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These provisions of organic and Federal statutory law being in force, an act of the legislature of New Jersey, 'for the collection of demands against ships, steamboats, and other vessels,'1 approved March 20th, 1857, enacted that whenever a debt shall be contracted by the master, owner, agent, or consignee of any ship or vessel within the State, on account of any work done or materials furnished in this State for or towards the building, repairing, furnishing, or equipping such ship or vessel, such debt shall be and continue a lien on the vessel for nine months; and that any person having such claim over $20 may apply to the proper officer for a warrant to enforce his lien; that the officer receiving the warrant may seize the vessel and give the prescribed notice; that any other person having such lien may make proper demand and proof and be admitted as an attaching creditor; that the owner or any party may at any time before sale apply for her discharge upon giving bond to pay such claims as shall be established to have been subsisting liens under the act; that upon such bond being given the vessel shall be discharged, and the creditors may sue [88 U.S. 532, 534] upon the bond alleging their claims and averring them to be subsisting liens; and that if no such bond is given, proceedings may be taken as provided in the act for the sale of the vessel, or such part of her tackle , &c., as shall be sufficient to pay the claims.
This statute of New Jersey being on its statute-book, an article of agreement was made November 3d, 1866, between Henry Jeroleman of the first part, and a certain Hasbrook, and several others of the second, for building a schooner of specified dimensions, for the consideration of $54 per ton; the builder to furnish all labor and materials and deliver the vessel. The whole price, at the said rate per ton, was to be about $21,000, and the payments were to be made by Hasbrook and the others, at stated times during the progress of the work, as: $2500 when the keel was laid; $ 3000 when the frame was up; $3500 when ceiled, and decks laid; $3500 when outside planks were on and squared off; $3500 when the poop deck was on; $ 2000 when ready for launching, and the balance when delivered according to contract. And it was agreed that as the said several instalments were paid, the schooner, so far as then constructed, and the materials therein inserted, should be and become the property of Hasbrook and the others.
On the 24th of June, 1867-and, therefore, after Elliott and Ripley had furnished the timber to Jeroleman-Jeroleman assigned the contract giving him the right to build the vessel, to one Edwards, by whom the vessel was finished.
On the 2d of July, 1867, Edwards, the new owner, gave [88 U.S. 532, 535] bond to Elliott and Ripley, in the manner prescribed by the New Jersey statute when a liberation of a vessel from seizure is desired, and the vessel was discharged from the seizure.
Jeroleman had been paid more than the original contract price, but the time when any payments had been made to him did not appear; nor any fact upon which an appropriation of payment could be founded.
As was stated by counsel in this court, and as is also stated in reports of the case in the Supreme Court of New Jersey,2 the defendants demurred to the declaration and insisted that the statute of the State, by attempting to create a lien on ships, under State law, assumed a control of a subject in its nature maritime, and one, therefore, over which under the already quoted clauses of the Federal Constitution and of the statutes of the United States, the Federal courts alone had cognizance; and, therefore, that the State statute was void. The New Jersey Reports further state that the demurrer was overruled; the court in its judgment overruling it, admitting that if the lien sought to be enforced, had been for materials used in repairing a vessel which had been finished, launched, and enrolled, it could not have been enforced, and that so far as the statute was designed to aid in the enforcement of a maritime contract for which the admiralty might proceed in rem-it was void under the objection stated; but holding that the lien set up having been for materials used in building a vessel-a matter done on land, entirely under State control, and payment for which might be enforced by a common-law remedy, or by [88 U.S. 532, 536] any new remedy which the legislature might provide-the statute was pro tanto valid.
The counsel in this court stated that after this opinion the demurrer was withdrawn.
'2. Nil debet, as to Elliott.
'3. Nil debet, as to Ripley.
'4. Claim of Elliott not a subsisting lien.
'5. Claim of Ripley not a subsisting lien.
'6. That Jeroleman, who built the vessel, was not owner or agent.
One question in the case obviously was the question, much agitated in England and here, namely, whether in the case of an executory contract to build a vessel to be paid for by instalments as the work progresses, the title remains in the builder until the work is completed and delivered, or whether the title passes to the person for whom the vessel is to be built; in other words, whether in such a case the contract is one for work and materials or one for sale.
A second question also obviously was (admitting that, as a general principle, the contract is in such a case one leaving the title in the builder until the work is completed and delivered), what was the effect of the final clause of the particular contract under consideration, the part on page 534, italicized, in changing this general rule? If it did change what was assumed to be the general rule, then, if the payments were made before the materials were furnished, the title was divested out of Jeroleman, since he, then, though builder, could not be 'owner' of the vessel when the materials [88 U.S. 532, 537] were furnished, and, therefore, was not competent to charge it with liens; and consequently the defendants were not liable on their bond, which took the vessel's place.
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the builder was, on general principles, to be regarded as owner; that the final clause divested his title, on the payments of the money; that the burden lay upon the claimants of the vessel-who were the obligors in the bond-to show the time of these payments, or some fact upon which an appropriation of payment could be founded, and as they had not shown either, that, therefore, in law, the builder (Jeroleman) was to be regarded as the owner when the materials were delivered, and accordingly that debts contracted by him did become liens.
'1. That the Supreme Court held the act of March 20th, 1857, valid and constitutional.
'2. That the said court decided that Jeroleman, the builder of said vessel, was the owner thereof and competent to charge it with liens.
A writ of error was immediately taken to this court, and within ten days an appeal-bond with good, sufficient security given, that the plaintiff in error should prosecute his writ to effect and answer all damages and costs if he failed to make his plea good. Due service was also made, within ten days, of the writ in the mode prescribed by the Judiciary Act, in order to make the writ a supersedeas. The transcript was filed here, December 6th, 1872.
The record being in this court with the entry of judgment or 'rule to affirm,' as just given, a suggestion was made here by counsel, May 25th, 1874, that the above-quoted 'rule to affirm' had been vacated and set aside by the [88 U.S. 532, 539] Court of Errors and Appeals, and an amended 'rule' substituted therefor since the filing of said transcript, and a certiorari was issued, without prejudice, on the 25th of May, 1874, to bring up any rule entered by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the suit subsequent to the entering of the 'rule to affirm,' by which the said rule to affirm had been corrected or vacated; and to bring up also any rule which has been substituted for the said rule to affirm.
A return to the certiorari filed in this court August 6th, 1874, showed that it appearing to that court that the 'rule to affirm' had been erroneously entered by the attorney of the plaintiffs in error, and did not correctly express the judgment of this court as set forth in the opinion of the court delivered in the cause, it was ordered, on the 1st day of April, 1874, that the said rule to affirm be annulled and stricken from the minutes; and that a rule to affirm the said judgment of the Supreme Court be entered in conformity with the decision of the court on the questions before it.
We assume then that the altered or rather the substituted rule, brought up on the return to the certiorari, is to be dismissed from view.
Cleared from that, there is plain matter for review before this court.
1. That court held that the State statute was not in any sense or in any respect repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. [88 U.S. 532, 541] This position was certainly reviewable, under section 709 of the Revised Statutes.
2. It also held that the contract for building the vessel in question was not a maritime contract, and, therefore, that the statutory remedy given by New Jersey did not conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Here is a distinct reference to the provision of the Constitution, and to the ninth section of the Judiciary Act,7 confining admiralty jurisdiction to the Federal courts.
Now, we asserted and still assert that the contract for the building of the vessel was a maritime contract. If it was, then the act is clearly, under the case of The Josephine,8 unconstitutional.
At the time the state of facts arose under which The Jefferson was decided, there was no lien law in existence in New Jersey, and the case could have been decided on that point, but the court, or Catron, J., in delivering its opinion, went further, and decided that the contract was not of a maritime character.
1. That the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not limited by the statutes or judicial prohibitions of England.
2. That as to contracts, the true criterion, whether they are within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is their nature and subject- matter, as whether they are maritime contracts having reference to maritime service, maritime transactions, or maritime casualties, without regard to the place where they were made.
And this new and enlarged doctrine must now be taken to be the settled law of this court.
Bradley, J., who delivered the opinion, refers to the views of Grier, J., and observes that the mind of that great judge underwent some change, in the progress of his judicial life, about the extent of admiralty jurisdiction, and that though he dissented, A.D. 1848, in the case of The Lexington, when it was decided, he afterwards appeared to receive the decision as setting forth a right view; and that when in a late case, The Jefferson (in which he had concurred), was pressed upon him as obliging him to narrow views of admiralty jurisdiction, he intimated that that case was to be confined to the precise question then before the court.
Examining the case now before us-the case of a three-masted schooner, to cost $54 a ton, and (as the contract price amounted to about $21,000) of a tonnage over four hundred [88 U.S. 532, 543] tons, built at East Newark, New Jersey, which the court can judicially notice is on the Newark Bay, an estuary or arm of the sea, in which she was to be launched-examining the case we say by the test presented by Insurance Company v. Dunham, the contract for building this vessel had direct 'reference to maritime service and maritime transactions;' and the furnishing of materials toward the construction of such a vessel was as much maritime as the furnishing materials to any vessel undergoing process of rebuilding or thorough repairing. If the materials furnished to this vessel had been furnished to a vessel that had been once launched, it will be admitted that the lien would be a maritime one; though the vessel were one which had been wrecked and required to be nearly rebuilt; nay, even though she were so far gone, that piece by piece, everything in her required to be new. Wherein does our case differ from either of such cases? Nay, wherein does it differ from any case where a vessel is hauled out of water and put upon the dry-dock and there repaired under a contract made on shore? In one case just as much as the other, the contract is a contract made on land, and to be performed on land.
If under the rule laid down in Insurance Company v. Dunham, the sources of admiralty jurisdiction are to be found in the continental countries of Europe, and in the decisions or practices of our admiralty courts under the Colonial rule and after the formation of our government, and are not to be taken exclusively from England, it will be found that contracts relating to the building of a new ship or furnishing materials for that purpose were well-recognized subjects of admiralty jurisdiction; and that our District Courts for many years entertained jurisdiction over such cases. Mr. Benedict, in the last edition of his Admiralty Practice,13 issued A.D. 1870, has fully shown this.
He examines and controverts the cases of The Jefferson and of Roach v. Chapman, and proves by many references that the maritime law as laid down by all the great civilians [88 U.S. 532, 544] and jurists, embraced contracts for building, repairing, supplying, and navigating ships. His argument and his learning exhaust the subject, and we refer to them only; they being much too extensive for us to quote.
3. The Court of Errors also held that the act does not violate the right of trial by jury, nor conflict with the constitution of the State.
I. The court, having by certiorari brought the amended record here, will treat it as if it had been correct in the first instance, and will examine it to ascertain its own jurisdiction.
The Court of Errors was bound to make the amendment which it did. It is their duty to see that their records are faithfully kept and speak the truth in all matters to which they relate, and on which the court acted. For the records import absolute verity and cannot be controverted elsewhere. Where any accident or negligence of clerk or attorney has caused an error, it is the prerogative and duty of the court to amend it and make it speak the truth.
And such amendments may be made after the case has been taken to the appellate court. And that court will, when justice requires it, delay their judgment in order to enable the party to apply for such amendment in the court below and bring up the amended record by certiorari at any time. 15 [88 U.S. 532, 545] II. Upon the amended record this court has no jurisdiction.
The question of the constitutionality of the act was not before the Court of Errors, and was not decided. The point was raised and disposed of by the Supreme Court on the demurrer. The constitutionality of the act was the sole subject of the judgment then rendered. That judgment was not removed to the highest court, but was acquiesced in, for the defendants asked leave to withdraw their demurrer and plead on the merits.
III. Conceding-for the sake of argument only-that jurisdiction exists, the only point really urged for reversal is that the court below sustained the act on the ground that a contract for building a ship is not a maritime contract.
That decision, if made, was correct. It follows three solemn decisions of this court, which the opposing counsel would set aside because Insurance Company v. Dunham, made subsequently to them, manifests so wide a departure from the old restrictions upon admiralty jurisdiction that, as the counsel consider, the logical result must be the abandonment of the position that a contract for building a vessel is not a maritime contract.
It is true that there has been a constant tendency of late days-days beginning, however, in the Genesee Chief, decided A.D. 1851, and long anterior to the decision in Insurance Company v. Dunham, decided in 1870, and anterior to The Jefferson, decided in 1857-to throw off the fetters imposed upon the admiralty courts by English traditions, and to place the extent of their jurisdiction upon grounds widely differing from the long- established rules of the English courts, and more in accordance with views derived from its essential nature and objects, and with the laws of the most enlightened and oldest commercial nations of the world; and that by a series of decisions, culminating in Insurance Company v. Dunham, it is now settled that as to contracts, the fundamental inquiry is whether a contract is or is not a maritime contract, and that that question depends not upon where the contract was made, but upon its subject-matter.
It is useless to speculate whether if the wider views held [88 U.S. 532, 546] A.D. 1870, in the case last named, had been entertained by the judges who decided The Jefferson, A.D. 1857, the result would have been different. It is enough to say that during all the changes of opinion manifested by the court, the positions then taken upon this particular point have never been modified, and that in the case of Insurance Company v. Dunham, Bradley, J., alluding to the fact that in other cases it had been sought to press the decision in The Jefferson to its logical result in restricting admiralty jurisdiction, does not deny its soundness or authority, but quotes the answer of Grier, J., to the argument, viz., that the decision of the court that a contract to build a ship was not a maritime contract, must be confined in its effect to that precise question and not extended by implication to other cases.
We admit that all contracts, claims, or services, purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation are cognizable in the admiralty courts. But we assert also that to be 'maritime' in a jurisdictional sense, such contracts, claims, or services must appertain to commerce and navigation, and to ships as their instruments, after they have become ships, and have reached the only element upon which navigation can exist; to vessels, as such ; floating structures ready for navigation; ready at least for a crew, and prepared to be the subject or occasion for contracts of bottomry, affreightment, wages, insurance, demurrage, salvage, towage, &c., or the instrument of collision or other marine torts and injuries; not to incomplete masses of material in the hands of a manufacturer in a carpenter-shop, which may at some future time become a ship and float upon the seas.
If this is the true position of the court it is of no avail to argue that the jurists and lawgivers of other maritime countries have held that a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract. This may be admitted, and the reasons for such a doctrine may be very sound as applied to the circumstances of those countries.
It is natural that in view of the late tendency to enlarge admiralty jurisdiction Mr. Benedict, whose views were not [88 U.S. 532, 547] sustained in the case of The Jefferson, should reargue his case in a new edition of his excellent book, and set forth more fully the Continental authorities in favor of his position. But this court may adopt those views so far as the circumstances of this country seem to require. It has adopted them from time to time, in modification of former views, as the exigencies of the case have demanded. It can stop where it pleases. It has deliberately chosen to stop at the point where the ship reaches its native element, and not to trace it back to its first germ on the land. And, as already intimated, it was after the wide departure from old views indicated by the decision of the case of The Genesee Chief and other cases, that this court distinctly held such a contract not to be maritime. And as that departure grew still wider the court adhered to that view, manifesting no disposition to modify, but only to let it stand as a starting-point.
Even if this court would not be restrained from overthrowing its repeated decisions merely for the sake of being logically consistent, it would find reason enough to stand by them in the nature of the question, and in the consequences to which a different view would lead. For if every contract relating to the building of a ship, steamboat, ferry-boat, canal- boat, or other structure intended to float upon the water is a maritime contract, then the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts will indeed be widely extended. It will embrace the preparation of materials in the saw- mill and the foundry intended for maritime uses; the manufacture of marine engines and machinery, the making of cordage and sailcloth, the furniture for cabins and state-rooms, the manufacture [88 U.S. 532, 548] of chronometers and nautical instruments, and all the various branches of business which are concerned with the production of materials which may, by simple adaptations, become suited to marine uses. And the character of these contracts would be fixed, and their consequences would attach as soon as the contracts were completed, whether the structure ever really assumed the form of a ship or not.
Endless confusion, indeed, would arise from any attempt on the part of the courts of admiralty thus to follow up a ship to its remotest origin in the forest and the mine. And for this reason it is, that this court, in its widest extension of admiralty jurisdiction, has limited it to ships afloat, after they have in fact acquired the character and been prepared for the uses of marine structures.
The claims here do not arise out of any contract to build a ship, but are simple demands for the price of lumber sold out of lumber-yards to shipbuilders who used them in a structure which probably did become a ship in the course of time, though it does not appear that she is launched yet.
IV. To the point that this State law is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States because it abridges the right of trial by jury, and provides for taking the vessel without due process of law, and because it is contrary, in some way not clearly pointed out, to the fourteenth amendment-it is enough to say that no such question was ever broached in any stage of this suit in the State court.
No similar question even was touched until the case reached the Court of Errors, and there the point was made that the act was in conflict with the constitution of New Jersey, by abridging the right of trial by jury.
This point was fully considered by the court and nothing need be added to its opinion, holding the act not to be repugnant to the constitution of the State.
Nothing appears in the record to warrant the conclusion that any question re-examinable here was presented in the court of original jurisdiction, whether the proposition is tested by the declaration, the pleas filed by the defendant, the special verdict, or by the judgment, as all alike tend to show that the questions presented, examined, and decided were questions of local law. Every suggestion of that kind, therefore, may be dismissed without further remark, as they are utterly destitute of support.
Opposed to that statement is the suggestion in argument, that the presiding justice overruled the demurrer to the declaration, but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion to say that this court cannot go out of the record to re-examine any question under a writ of error to a State court.
If the case stopped there it would be clear that the writ of error must be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, but it does not stop there, as plainly appears by the judgment of affirmance rendered in the Court of Errors, which shows that the State court of last resort determined, among other things, the following propositions: (1.) That the lien law of the State is not in any respect repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as contended by the original defendants. (2.) That the contract for building the vessel in question is not a maritime contract, and that the remedy given by the lien law of the State does not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States. (3.) That the said lien law does not violate the right of trial by jury nor conflict with the constitution of the State.
Like every other pleading, an assignment of error is subject to a reasonable construction. Reasonably constructed it cannot be held that the first proposition of the judgment of affirmance involves a comparison of the State lien law with every separate provision of the Federal Constitution, and if not with every one, it is impossible to determine with which one, as there is nothing in the judgment or any other part of the record pointing to any particular part of the Constitution, except what is contained in the second proposition of the judgment, which, in view of the whole record, must be regarded as a more complete specification of what is meant by the first proposition.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions it must be understood from the two propositions that the State Court of Errors decided that the contract in this case for the building [88 U.S. 532, 551] of the schooner was not a maritime contract, and that the law of the State giving the remedy which was pursued by the plaintiffs does not conflict with the Federal Constitution or with Federal laws. Such an allegation in the judgment of the State court is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction under the writ of error to re-examine that question. Wellfounded doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, unless it be assumed, as contended by the plaintiffs, that the copy of the judgment embodied in the transcript is not correct.
Concede all that and still the defendants contend that the plaintiffs, as the furnishers of the materials, had a maritime lien for their respective claims which may be enforced in the admiralty, and that the State law giving the remedy which the plaintiffs pursued is in conflict with that clause of the Federal Constitution which provides that the judicial [88 U.S. 532, 553] power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. They admit, in effect, that to maintain that proposition it is necessary to show that a contract to furnish materials for the construction of a ship is a maritime contract, and they accordingly submit the affirmative of that proposition and insist that all such contracts are maritime, if it appears that the vessel to be constructed is designed for use upon navigable waters.
Building materials for such a purpose come very largely from the forest and mines, but if it be admitted that a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract it is difficult to affirm that a contract to furnish the materials for the same is not of the same character, although its breach and even its performance may involve judicial inquiries into the business transactions of men, as well in the forests and mines as in the manufactories and workshops of the whole civilized world. Wherever the question, therefore, involved in the present assignment of error, has been considered, the decision has uniformly turned upon the solution of the inquiry whether a contract for building a ship is or is not a maritime contract. Unless the contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, no one, it is presumed, would contend that the furnishers of the materials for such a purpose can successfully support such a claim; and if it be admitted that the builders of a ship may enforce the payment of the contract price in the admiralty, it would be difficult to maintain that the furnishers of the materials for the purpose are not entitled to pursue their remedy to enforce payment in the same jurisdiction. [88 U.S. 532, 554] Shipbuilding is an occupation requiring experience and skill, and, as ordinarily conducted, is an employment on land, as much as any other mechanical employment, and men engage in the business for a livelihood just as they do in other mechanical pursuits and for the same purpose. Shipwrights, unlike the seamen, have their homes on the land, and not on the seas, and they are seldom shipowners, and not more frequently interested in commerce and navigation than other mechanics. Ships are bought and sold in the market just as ship timber, engines, anchors, or chronometers are bought and sold, even before they are fully constructed and before they are equipped for navigation, and no reason is perceived why a contract to build a ship, any more than a contract for the materials of which a ship is composed, or for the instruments or appurtenances to manage or propel the ship, should be regarded as maritime.
Authorities to support that proposition are unnecessary, as the proposition is conceded by both parties in this controversy, but that rule was never adopted in England, and the reverse of it is the settled rule in our jurisprudence in respect to the question under consideration. Conclusive support to that proposition is found in the case of The Jefferson,21 in which the opinion of the court is given by Mr. Justice [88 U.S. 532, 555] Catron. By the statement of the case it appears that it was a libel filed by the assignees of the builders against a new steam ferryboat for a balance due to the builders on account of work done and materials furnished in constructing the hull of the ferry-boat. They claimed a lien for the unpaid balance of the price, and the decree was in their favor in the Circuit Court, but the claimants appealed to this court. When the cause came up for argument the first point made for the claimants was that a contract to build a ship is not one within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts, even though it be intended to employ the vessel in ocean navigation. Sufficient appears in the report of the case to show that the libellants took direct issue upon that proposition, and the court say, in disposing of it, that the only matter in controversy is whether the District Courts have jurisdiction in admiralty to enforce liens for labor and materials furnished in constructing vessels to be employed in the navigation of waters to which the admiralty jurisdiction extends.
Convinced or not, every candid inquirer must admit that this court did decide in that case that neither a contract to build a ship or to furnish materials for the purpose is a maritime contract. Nor does that decision stand alone, as the same question since that time has more than once come before the court and been decided in the same way. Such was the view of the court in the case of Roach v. Chapman,22 in [88 U.S. 532, 556] which the opinion of the court was given by Mr. Justice Grier.
Two answers may be made to that objection, either of which is decisive: (1.) That it does not apply to trials in the State courts. 30 (2.) That no such error was assigned in [88 U.S. 532, 558] the Court of Errors, and that the question was not presented to, nor was it decided by, the Court of Errors.
[ Footnote 1 ] Nixon's Digest, 576.
[ Footnote 2 ] 5 Vroom, 96; 7 Id. 449; 6 Id. 265. The counsel also exhibited a certified copy of the opinion of the court in the cases from the proper repository.
[ Footnote 3 ] See Appendix.
[ Footnote 4 ] Avendano v. Gay, 8 Wallace, 376; Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Id. 425; Generes v. Bonnemer, 7 Id. 564; Kearney v. Case, 12 Id. 275.
[ Footnote 5 ] Smith v. Cave, 3 Levinz, 312; Clanrickard v. Lisle, Hobart, 329; Belt v. Collins, 8 Modern, 148; Anonymous, 11 Id. 78; Tazewell v. Stone, Burrow, 2454.
[ Footnote 6 ] See supra, p. 537.
[ Footnote 7 ] Both quoted, supra, p. 534.
[ Footnote 8 ] 39 New York, 19.
[ Footnote 9 ] 20 Howard, 393, 401; reported as The People's Ferry Company v. Beers.
[ Footnote 10 ] 22 Id. 129.
[ Footnote 11 ] 23 Id. 494.
[ Footnote 12 ] 11 Wallace, 1.
[ Footnote 13 ] Section 213, p. 116.
[ Footnote 14 ] Section 1; and see the fifth and seventh amendments.
[ Footnote 15 ] Powell on Appellate Proceedings, 173 and 174, and cases there cited.
[ Footnote 16 ] The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace, 77.
[ Footnote 17 ] Messenger v. Mason, 10 Id. 509; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Id. 16; Furman v. Nicholl, 8 Id. 44; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 Howard, 516.
[ Footnote 18 ] Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 351; Hoyt v. Shelden, Ib. 521; Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wallace, 180.
[ Footnote 19 ] Generes v. Bonnemer, 7 Wallace, 564; Avendano v. Gay, 8 Id. 376; Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Id. 431; Hozey v. Buchanan, 16 Peters, 215; Albers v. Whitney, 1 Story, 310; Brush v. Robbins, 3 McLean, 486; Medford v. Dorsey, 2 Washington's Circuit Court, 433; Kanouse v. Martin, 15 Howard, 210; Cheang-Kee v. United States, 3 Wallace, 326; Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Id. 129.
[ Footnote 20 ] Elliott et al. v. Edwards et al., 6 Vroom, 266; Edwards v. Elliott, 5 Id. 96.
[ Footnote 21 ] 20 Howard, 393.
[ Footnote 22 ] 22 Howard, 129.
[ Footnote 23 ] The Jefferson, 20 Howard, 400.
[ Footnote 24 ] Morewood v. Enequist, 23 Id. 494.
[ Footnote 25 ] 1 Clifford, 45.
[ Footnote 26 ] 2 Id. 35.
[ Footnote 27 ] The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 644; The Moses Taylor, 4 Id. 411; Hine v. Trevor, Ib. 555.
[ Footnote 28 ] Brookman v. Hamill, 43 New York, 554; The Josephine, 39 Id. 19.
[ Footnote 29 ] The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 645; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 New York, 55; Ferran v. Hosford, 54 Barbour, 208.
[ Footnote 30 ] Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 247; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wallace, 326; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters, 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 Howard, 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 76; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 2d ed. 19.
[ Footnote 31 ] Crowell v. Randell, 10 Peters, 392; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How ard, 440.

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Of course you can revoke your declarations of consent at any time for the future. Please contact our data protection officer, whose contact details are below.
If you apply to us, we will process the personal data you submit to us in the application process. If you send the data by e-mail of our online presence, the processing is done electronically. If, after the application process, you conclude a contract of employment, we store your data for the purpose of carrying out the employment relationship in compliance with the statutory provisions.
Purpose: The purpose is to process the application process.
The legal basis for the processing of your data for the purpose described above is Article 6 (1) lit. b DSGVO.
Deletion: If it does not come to the conclusion of an employment contract, your data will be deleted after completion of the application process or at the latest 2 months after its completion. This does not apply if legal provisions preclude the deletion or the further storage of your data is necessary for the purpose of providing evidence. The application process is considered completed when the cancellation is sent to you.
Prevention: You also have the right at any time to withdraw your application or to request the deletion of your personal data.
You can leave comments on our website. You must enter your name and your e-mail address. If you have left a comment, the time of creation of the comment will be saved in addition to this information. This is for our security, as we may be prosecuted for any illegal content on our website, even if created by users.
According to Art. 15 GDPR, you can request a confirmation as to whether and which personal data we process from you. In addition, you may provide us, free of charge, with information on the processing purposes, the category of personal data, the categories of recipients to whom your data has been disclosed or the planned storage period, the right to rectification, deletion, limitation of processing or opposition , the existence of a right of appeal and the origin of their data, if they were not collected from us. You also have the right to know whether your personal data has been transmitted to a third country or to an international organization. If so, you have the right to obtain information about the appropriate guarantees in connection with the transfer.
According to Art. 16 GDPR, you may request the correction of incorrect or complete incomplete personal data stored with us and you.
If you have asserted the right of rectification, cancellation or limitation of the processing to us, we are obliged to notify all recipients who have been disclosed of your personal data concerning the correction or deletion of the data or their request Notify of limitation of the processing, unless this proves to be impossible or involves a disproportionate effort. You have the right to be informed by us about these recipients.
In accordance with Art. 20 GDPR, you may request that we obtain the personal data relating to you which you have provided to us in a structured, standard and machine-readable format or to request the transfer to another person responsible.
According to Art. 77 GDPR you have the right to complain to a supervisory authority. For this you can contact the supervisory authority of your usual place of residence, your workplace or our company headquarters.
You have the right, at any time, to object to the processing of the personal data concerning you, which is based on a balance of interests (Article 6 (1) (f) GDPR), for reasons that arise from your particular situation. This is especially true if the data processing is not required to fulfill a contract. If you exercise your right of objection, we will ask you to explain the reasons. We will then no longer process your personal data, unless we can prove to you that compelling legitimate reasons for data processing outweigh your interests and rights.
Scope: The use of Youtube allows us to embed various videos and clips that are made available on the Internet platform www.youtube.de. After a page or subpage of our website is called up on which such embedding has taken place, the Internet browser you use will cause video components of the respective embedded video or clip to be downloaded. During your visit to our website and its subpages, both Youtube and Google will be notified of the page or subpage you have accessed by sending your IP address to Google’s external servers in the United States. This information is provided regardless of whether the video or clip you are watching is actually viewed or clicked, or you are logged in to your Youtube or Google Account. Google is a participant in the Privacy Shield Agreement and is certified to European standards for data processing. This information will be collected and assigned to your Google Account if you are logged in when you visit it.
The use of the Youtube components on our website is intended to provide you videos and clips of the website www.youtube.de on our website for the purpose of viewing and interacting. Youtube’s data processing is for the purposes of advertising, market research, website design and providing on-demand advertising.
The legal basis for the above-mentioned use of the data is Article 6 (1) lit. f DSGVO.
Prevention: You can prevent the data transfer at any time by logging out of your Youtube account, or by opting out of the log out button https://adssettings.google.com/authenticated after logging into your Google Account an opt-out cookie put.
Our website uses social media plugins from the providers listed below. Which plugin belongs to which provider can be recognized by the respective logo with which the plugin is marked. When you visit one of our sites where a plugin is implemented, a connection is automatically established between your browser and the provider’s servers with the provider of the plug-in. Data is immediately transmitted to the provider. In addition, data will be transmitted to the provider as a result of further interactions with the respective social plug-in (for example, clicking the “like me button on Facebook, re-tweet button on Twitter). If you have an account with the provider, this data can be linked to it. In order to prevent such a linking of your data, you can log out before visiting our page at the service of the provider.
To find out what is the purpose for collecting, and to what extent data is collected from the provider, you can refer to the respective, in the following communicated, privacy statements of the provider.
Xing always receives information from the Xing component that the data subject has visited our website if the data subject is simultaneously logged in to Xing at the time of accessing our website; this happens regardless of whether or not the affected person clicks on the Xing component. If such a transfer of this information to Xing by the person concerned is not intended, it can be prevented by logging out of your Xing account before calling our website.
We also use plugins from Facebook on our website. Facebook is a service of Facebook Inc., 1601 S. California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94304 – USA.
The plugins are recognizable by one of the Facebook logos (white “f” on a blue tile or a “thumbs up” sign) or are marked with the addition “Facebook Social Plugin”. The list and appearance of Facebook Social Plugins can be viewed here: https: //developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/? Locale = en_US.
If you are a member of Facebook and do not want Facebook to collect data about you via this offer and link it to its member data stored on Facebook, you must log out of Facebook before visiting our website. In addition, you have the option to block Facebook social plug-ins with add-ons for your browser, for example with the “Facebook Blocker”. Other settings and inconsistencies regarding the use of data for promotional purposes are possible within the Facebook profile settings: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads.
We use “Google Analytics”, a service of Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA, on our website.
Among other things, Google Analytics collects data on which website you came to our website (so-called referrers), on which subpages of the website you accessed or how often and for which length of stay a subpage was viewed and what interactions you have made. In order to collect and store this data, Google Analytics sets a cookie on the device you are using (see the term above under the heading Cookies). We use the function AnonymizeIP to make your IP address anonymous, so that it is shortened, and no longer be assigned to your visit to our website. Other information transmitted will not be associated with, or linked to the anonymous IP address by Google. The information generated in this way is transmitted to Google servers in the USA and stored there. Google may transfer such personal data collected through the technical process to third parties. Google has submitted to the Privacy Shield Agreement between the European Union and the United States and been certified. As a result, Google agrees to comply with the standards and regulations of European data protection law.
We have a contract processing agreement with Google. Google is entitled and obliged to evaluate the information obtained for us and to provide us with statistical reports on the nature and extent of website use. These statistics enable us to constantly improve our offer, to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of our Internet marketing and to make our website more interesting and user-friendly for you as a user.
Our above-mentioned interest in the evaluation of user data represents the purpose of the use of Google Analytics.
The legal basis for the above-described use of the data is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f DSGVO.
The data collected and transmitted by us in this way will be automatically deleted after 26 months.
For more information about Google’s terms of service and privacy, please visit https://www.google.com/analytics/terms/en.html.
Prevention: You can prevent the storage of cookies by downloading and installing the browser provided by Google Add-on. This is available at https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en . You may, however, not be able to use all features of our website in full. You also have the option to prevent the storage of cookies by setting this in your browser. Cookies already set can be deleted by you at any time.
We use Jetpack for WordPress, an analysis tool from Automattic Inc. Automattic Inc., 60 29th Street, # 343, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA. Automattic Inc.
Automattic uses the tracking technology of Quantcast Inc., 201 Third Street, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA, and passes the data collected through our website to it. Quantcast uses the data for the same purposes as Automattic.
Our above-mentioned interest in the evaluation of user data represents the purpose of the use of Automattic.
You can prevent the storage of cookies by setting a so-called opt-out cookie, which prevents future data from being collected on our website. Please click on the following link https://www.quantcast.com/opt-out/ and click on the corresponding setting.
You may not, however, be able to use all the features of our website to the fullest extent possible. To ensure that no data transfer occurs, the opt-out cookie must be installed on each of the systems you use. You can also prevent the storage of cookies in the settings of your browser.
We use the Akismet service on our website, which is provided by Automattic Inc., 60 29th Street # 343, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA.
Scope: Akismet is used to filter user-submitted comments and to identify comments that are classified as “spam” and to treat them appropriately. For this purpose, the comments you submit to the external servers of Automattic Inc. in the US are transmitted and analyzed.
time of submission of the commentary and information about which website you have previously visited (referrer).
Automattic is a participant in the Privacy Shield Agreement and is certified to European standards for data processing. There is no data processing by us.
Use of the Service is to treat comments classified as spam and prevent them from being posted.
Comments and related data will be automatically deleted from their server after four days by Automattic Inc. If a comment is classified as spam, it will be stored beyond that period.
You can prevent the transmission of individual data by not indicating it when submitting a comment. In addition, you are free to use the comment function to prevent complete data transmission.
We also apply state-of-the-art technical and organizational security measures to comply with data protection laws, and to protect your data against accidental or intentional manipulation, partial or total loss, destruction or against unauthorized access by third parties.

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Art. 6
V.
Art. 28
Art. 15
Art. 16
Art. 20
Art. 77
Art. 6


text:
waif n. A homeless, neglected wanderer.
waive v. To relinquish, especially temporarily, as a right or claim.
wampum n. Beads strung on threads, formerly used among the American Indians as currency.
wxane v. To diminish in size and brilliancy.
weak-kneed adj. Without resolute purpose or energy.
wean v. To transfer (the young) from dependence on mother's milk to another form of nourishment.
well-bred adj. Of good ancestry.
well-doer n. A performer of moral and social duties.
well-to-do adj. In prosperous circumstances.
whereabouts n. The place in or near which a person or thing is.
wherever adv. In or at whatever place.
whet v. To make more keen or eager.
whine v. To utter with complaining tone.
wield v. To use, control, or manage, as a weapon, or instrument, especially with full command.
wile n. An act or a means of cunning deception.
wintry adj. Lacking warmth of manner.
wiry adj. Thin, but tough and sinewy.
witless adj. Foolish, indiscreet, or silly.
witling n. A person who has little understanding.
witticism n. A witty, brilliant, or original saying or sentiment.
wittingly adv. With knowledge and by design.
wizen v. To become or cause to become withered or dry.
wizen-faced adj. Having a shriveled face.
working-man n. One who earns his bread by manual labor.
workmanlike adj. Like or befitting a skilled workman.
workmanship n. The art or skill of a workman.
wrangle v. To maintain by noisy argument or dispute.
wreak v. To inflict, as a revenge or punishment.
wrest v. To pull or force away by or as by violent twisting or wringing.
wretchedness n. Extreme misery or unhappiness.
writhe v. To twist the body, face, or limbs or as in pain or distress.
writing n. The act or art of tracing or inscribing on a surface letters or ideographs.
wry adj. Deviating from that which is proper or right.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Art.1.1x This Convention shall apply to the Baltic Sea Area. For the purposes of this Convention the "Baltic Sea Area" shall be the Baltic Sea and the entrance to the Baltic Sea bounded by the parallel of the Skaw in the Skagerrak at 57° 44.43'N. It includes the internal waters, i.e., for the purpose of this Convention waters on the landward side of the base lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured up to the landward limit according to the designation by the Contracting Parties.
Art.1.2x A Contracting Party shall, at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, approval or accession inform the Depositary of the designation of its internal waters for the purposes of this Convention.
Art.2.11 11. The "Commission" means the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission referred to in Article 19.
Art.3.1 1. The Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate legislative, administrative or other relevant measures to prevent and eliminate pollution in order to promote the ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea Area and the preservation of its ecological balance.
Art.3.2 2. The Contracting Parties shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventive measures when there is reason to assume that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects.
Art.3.4 4. The Contracting Parties shall apply the polluter-pays principle.
Art.3.6 6. The Contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to ensure that the implementation of this Convention does not cause transboundary pollution in areas outside the Baltic Sea Area. Furthermore, the relevant measures shall not lead either to unacceptable environmental strains on air quality and the atmosphere or on waters, soil and ground water, to unacceptably harmful or increasing waste disposal, or to increased risks to human health.
Art.4.1 1. This Convention shall apply to the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area which comprises the water-body and the seabed including their living resources and other forms of marine life.
Art.4.3 3. This Convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, military aircraft or other ship and aircraft owned or operated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.
Art.4.4x However, each Contracting Party shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such ships and aircraft owned or operated by it, that such ships and aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention.
Art.7.2 2. The Contracting Party of origin shall enter into consultations with any Contracting Party which is likely to be affected by such transboundary impact, whenever consultations are required by international law or supra-national regulations applicable to the Contracting Party of origin.
Art.8.2 2. The Contracting Parties shall develop and apply uniform requirements for the provision of reception facilities for ship-generated wastes, taking into account, inter alia, the special needs of passenger ships operating in the Baltic Sea Area.
Art.9.1x The Contracting Parties shall, in addition to implementing those provisions of this Convention which can appropriately be applied to pleasure craft, take special measures in order to abate harmful effects on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area caused by pleasure craft activities. The measures shall, inter alia, deal with air pollution, noise and hydrodynamic effects as well as with adequate reception facilities for wastes from pleasure craft.
Art.10.1 1. The Contracting Parties shall prohibit incineration in the Baltic Sea Area.
Art.10.2.c c) believed to be engaged in incineration within its internal waters and territorial sea.
Art.11.1 1. The Contracting Parties shall, subject to exemptions set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article, prohibit dumping in the Baltic Sea Area.
Art.11.3.c c) believed to be engaged in dumping within its internal waters and territorial sea.
Art.11.4 4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply when the safety of human life or of a ship or aircraft at sea is threatened by the complete destruction or total loss of the ship or aircraft, or in any case which constitutes a danger to human life, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat and if there is every probability that the damage consequent upon such dumping will be less than would otherwise occur. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimize the likelihood of damage to human or marine life.
Art.12.1 1. Each Contracting Party shall take all measures in order to prevent pollution of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area resulting from exploration or exploitation of its part of the seabed and the subsoil thereof or from any associated activities thereon as well as to ensure that adequate preparedness is maintained for immediate response actions against pollution incidents caused by such activities.
Art.13.2 2. Whenever deemed necessary by the Contracting Parties referred to in paragraph 1, consultations should take place with a view to preventing, reducing and controlling such pollution.
Art.13.3 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall also apply in cases where a Contracting Party has sustained such pollution from the territory of a third state.
Art.15.1x The Contracting Parties shall individually and jointly take all appropriate measures with respect to the Baltic Sea Area and its coastal ecosystems influenced by the Baltic Sea to conserve natural habitats and biological diversity and to protect ecological processes. Such measures shall also be taken in order to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources within the Baltic Sea Area. To this end, the Contracting Parties shall aim at adopting subsequent instruments containing appropriate guidelines and criteria.
Art.16.1.c c) problems encountered in the implementation of the provisions referred to in sub-paragraph a) of this paragraph.
Art.18.2 2. If a Contracting Party nevertheless decides to supply such protected information to another Contracting Party, the Party receiving such protected information shall respect the confidentiality of the information received and the conditions under which it is supplied, and shall use that information only for the purposes for which it was supplied.
Art.19.1 1. The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, referred to as "the Commission", is established for the purposes of this Convention.
Art.19.3 3. The chairmanship of the Commission shall be given to each Contracting Party in turn in alphabetical order of the names of the Contracting Parties in the English language. The Chairman shall serve for a period of two years, and cannot during the period of chairmanship serve as a representative of the Contracting Party holding the chairmanship. Should the chairman fail to complete his term, the Contracting Party holding the chairmanship shall nominate a successor to remain in office until the term of that Contracting Party expires.
Art.19.4 4. Meetings of the Commission shall be held at least once a year upon convocation by the Chairman. Extraordinary meetings shall, upon the request of any Contracting Party endorsed by another Contracting Party, be convened by the Chairman to be held as soon as possible, however, not later than ninety days after the date of submission of the request.
Art.19.5 5. Unless otherwise provided under this Convention, the Commission shall take its decisions unanimously.
Art.20.2 2. The Commission may assume such other functions as it deems appropriate to further the purposes of this Convention.
Art.21.1 1. The working language of the Commission shall be English.
Art.21.2 2. The Commission shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
Art.21.3 3. The office of the Commission, known as "the Secretariat", shall be in Helsinki.
Art.21.4 4. The Commission shall appoint an Executive Secretary and make provisions for the appointment of such other personnel as may be necessary, and determine the duties, terms and conditions of service of the Executive Secretary.
Art.21.5 5. The Executive Secretary shall be the chief administrative official of the Commission and shall perform the functions that are necessary for the administration of this Convention, the work of the Commission and other tasks entrusted to the Executive Secretary by the Commission and its Rules of Procedure.
Art.22.1 1. The Commission shall adopt its Financial Rules.
Art.22.2 2. The Commission shall adopt an annual or biennial budget of proposed expenditures and consider budget estimates for the fiscal period following thereafter.
Art.22.5 5. Each Contracting Party shall pay the expenses related to the participation in the Commission of its representatives, experts and advisers.
Art.23.1 1. Except as provided for in Paragraph 2 of this Article, each Contracting Party shall have one vote in the Commission.
Art.25.1x The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to develop and accept rules concerning responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in contravention of this Convention, including, inter alia, limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures for the determination of liability and available remedies.
Art.26.1 1. In case of a dispute between Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of this Convention, they should seek a solution by negotiation. If the Parties concerned cannot reach agreement they should seek the good offices of or jointly request mediation by a third Contracting Party, a qualified international organization or a qualified person.
Art.30.1x A conference for the purpose of a general revision of or an amendment to this Convention may be convened with the consent of the Contracting Parties or at the request of the Commission.
Art.31.1 1. Each Contracting Party may propose amendments to the Articles of this Convention. Any such proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary and communicated by it to all Contracting Parties, which shall inform the Depositary of either their acceptance or rejection of the amendment as soon as possible after receipt of the communication.
Art.31.1.ax A proposed amendment shall, at the request of a Contracting Party, be considered in the Commission. In such a case Article 19 paragraph 4 shall apply. If an amendment is adopted by the Commission, the procedure in paragraph 2 of this Article shall apply.
Art.31.2 2. The Commission may recommend amendments to the Articles of this Convention. Any such recommended amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary and communicated by it to all Contracting Parties, which shall notify the Depositary of either their acceptance or rejection of the amendment as soon as possible after receipt of the communication.
Art.31.3 3. The amendment shall enter into force ninety days after the Depositary has received notifications of acceptance of that amendment from all Contracting Parties.
Art.32.3 3. Such amendment shall be deemed to have been accepted at the end of a period determined by the Commission unless within that period any one of the Contracting Parties has, by written notification to the Depositary, objected to the amendment. The accepted amendment shall enter into force on a date determined by the Commission.
Art.32.3.ax The period determined by the Commission shall be prolonged for an additional period of six months and the date of entry into force of the amendment postponed accordingly, if, in exceptional cases, any Contracting Party informs the Depositary before the expiration of the period determined by the Commission that, although it intends to accept the amendment, the constitutional requirements for such an acceptance are not yet fulfilled.
Art.33.1 1. The provisions of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
Art.35.1 1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or approval.
Art.35.2 2. This Convention shall, after its entry into force, be open for accession by any other State or regional economic integration organization interested in fulfilling the aims and purposes of this Convention, provided that this State or organization is invited by all the Contracting Parties. In the case of limited competence of a regional economic integration organization, the terms and conditions of its participation may be agreed upon between the Commission and the interested organization.
Art.35.3 3. The instruments of ratification, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
Art.36.2 2. For each State which ratifies or approves this Convention before or after the deposit of the last instrument of ratification or approval referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, this Convention shall enter into force two months after the date of deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or approval or on the date of the entry into force of this Convention, whichever is the latest date.
Art.36.3 3. For each acceding State or regional economic integration organization this Convention shall enter into force two months after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of accession.
Art.36.6 6. Notwithstanding paragraph 4 of this Article, recommendations and decisions adopted under the said Convention shall continue to be applicable to the extent that they are compatible with, or not explicitly terminated by this Convention or any decision adopted thereunder.
Art.37.1 1. At any time after the expiry of five years from the date of entry into force of this Convention any Contracting Party may, by giving written notification to the Depositary, withdraw from this Convention. The withdrawal shall take effect for such Contracting Party on the thirtieth day of June of the year which follows the year in which the Depositary was notified of the withdrawal.
Art.37.2 2. In case of notification of withdrawal by a Contracting Party the Depositary shall convene a meeting of the Contracting Parties for the purpose of considering the effect of the withdrawal.
Art.38.1x.b b) transmit certified copies of this Convention to acceding States and regional economic integration organizations.
Conc.2 DONE at Helsinki, this ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and ninety two in a single authentic copy in the English language which shall be deposited with the Government of Finland. The Government of Finland shall transmit certified copies to all Signatories.


The Federal statutes proscribing money laundering were enacted in 1986 with the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. In order to promote consistency and uniformity in the use of these statutes, certain approval, consultation and notification requirements have been promulgated. These requirements are set forth below. It should be noted that, pursuant to the notification requirement in 9-105.310, copies of all filed indictments and criminal complaints containing money laundering charges must be sent to the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section regardless of whether the charges required prior approval or consultation with the Section.
The Criminal Resource Manual contains an extensive treatment of the money laundering statutes, with indictment forms and jury instructions, at 2101. A table of contents for these materials is at 2100.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. Criminal Division (Asset Forfeiture & Money Laundering Section) (AFMLS) approval is required before the commencement of any investigation where jurisdiction to prosecute is based solely on the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions of §§ 1956 and 1957. Due to the potential international sensitivities, as well as proof problems, involved in using these extraterritorial provisions, no grand jury investigation may be commenced, no indictment may be returned, and no complaint may be filed without the prior approval of AFMLS, Criminal Division when jurisdiction to prosecute these offenses exists only because of these extraterritorial provisions.
Tax Division Authorization. Tax Division authorization is required prior to any prosecution under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) where the sole or principal purpose of the financial transaction was to evade the payment of taxes. Such approval shall be given in accordance with the prosecution policies set forth in JM 9-105.750.
Prosecutions of Attorneys. Criminal Division approval is required for prosecutions of attorneys (under either § 1956 or § 1957) where the financial transaction is one involving attorneys' fees. This approval is required regardless of whether the fee was received in a criminal or civil case. Such approval shall be given in accordance with the prosecution policies set forth in JM 9-105.600 et se.
Prosecution of a Financial Institution. No prosecution of a financial institution (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 20 and 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100) for violations of §§ 1956 or 1957 of Title 18, or § 5322 of Title 31, shall be instituted without the prior express authorization of AFMLS, Criminal Division. Further,in any criminal case under §§ 1956 or 1957 of Title 18, or § 5322 of Title 31, in which a financial institution, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 20 and 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100, would be named as a defendant, or in which a financial institution would be named as an unindicted co-conspirator or allowed to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement or Non-Prosecution Agreement, AFMLS, Criminal Division approval is required before any indictment, complaint, information, or Deferred Prosecution Agreement is filed. In cases where the financial institution involved is a "non-bank financial institution," such as a check-cashing service or a casa de cambio, which is a stand-alone business and not a branch of a larger institution, these requirements do not apply. However, when such institutions are part of a larger business or a branch of an international institution, Criminal Division approval is required.
The review and approval function for prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, and 31 U.S.C. § 5322 prosecutions, requiring Criminal Division approval has been centralized within the AFMLS. In the case of any prosecution requiring Criminal Division approval under these provisions, a copy of the proposed indictment, complaint, information, or Deferred Prosecution Agreement or Non-Prosecution Agreement, and a prosecution memorandum should be sent as soon as possible before the anticipated date of indictment or settlement to the Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section. The preferred method of transmittal is by email. Attorneys are required to notify the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section at the time an investigation is undertaken and are encouraged to seek guidance well before a final indictment, complaint, information, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, or Non Prosecution Agreement and prosecution memorandum are submitted for review.
(g) NOTICE OF CONVICTION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—If any financial institution or any officer, director, or employee of any financial institution has been found guilty of an offense under this section, section 1957 or 1960 of this title, or section 5322 of title 31, the Attorney General shall provide written notice of such fact to the appropriate regulatory agency for the financial institution.
In order to implement this requirement, all United States Attorneys Offices or Department components must notify the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of such convictions. Attached to the notification letter must be a certified copy of the order of conviction from the court rendering the decision. See §§ 1502(a)-(c) and 1503(a)-(b) of the Annunzio-Wylie Act. In addition, the notification should include a file-stamped copy of the indictment, the name of the Assistant United States Attorney who handled the case, and the name of the primary investigative agency involved.
First, since this provision was added to § 1956, the relevant definition of the term "financial institution" is that set forth in § 1956(c)(6), which is very broad and includes numerous kinds of businesses other than depository institutions. Based on the prior history of this provision and the context in which it was enacted, it is the position of the Criminal Division that the notification requirement in § 1956(g) be limited to national banks, Federal savings associations, Federal credit unions, federally insured State depository institutions and federally insured State credit unions.
Second, this requirement will apply to persons who were officers, directors or employees of a financial institution either at the time of the offense or at the time of the conviction (i.e., if the offense was committed prior to the defendant's employment at the financial institution).
Third, it should be noted that § 5322 of Title 31 is the penalty provision for violations of other sections of subchapter II of chapter 53 of Title 18 (i.e., §§ 5311-5328); § 5322 does not set out an offense which can be committed. However, we will interpret this provision to include violations of other sections of Title 31 which are punishable under § 5322.
Notifications pursuant to this provision should be sent to: Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division. The form which should be used for this notification can be found in the Criminal Resource Manual at 2185.
Consultation with the Criminal Division's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) will provide a means to ensure the orderly development of the case law and to assist prosecutors in applying these statutes in a consistent manner. In the following instances, United States Attorneys' Offices must consult with AFMLS prior to the filing of an indictment or a civil or criminal complaint. As noted below, some of these investigations or prosecutions are also subject to a separate reporting requirement.
Forfeiture of Businesses. In any case where forfeiture of a business is sought under the theory that the business facilitated the money laundering offenses, no forfeiture action, either criminal or civil, may be filed without prior consultation with AFMLS, Criminal Division.
Cases Filed Under § 1956(b). Section 1956(b) provides for the imposition of a civil penalty (of not greater than $10,000 or the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved in the transaction) against anyone who violates the criminal provisions of § 1956(a)(1) and (a)(2). In any case where a civil action under § 1956(b) is going to be brought against a business entity, no complaint may be filed without prior consultation with AFMLS, Criminal Division.
Cases Involving Financial Crimes. In any case in which the conduct to be charged as "specified unlawful activity" under §§ 1956 and 1957 consists primarily of one or more financial or fraud offenses, and in which the financial and money laundering offenses are so closely connected with each other that there is no clear delineation between the underlying financial crime and the money laundering offense, no indictment or complaint may be filed without prior consultation with AFMLS, Criminal Division. (This issue is often referred to as the "merger" issue.) Such prosecutions must be authorized by the district's United States Attorney and must be reported to AFMLS in accordance with Criminal Resource Manual 2187.
Explanation: Sections 1956 and 1957 both require that the property involved in the money laundering transaction be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity at the time that the transaction occurs. The statute does not define when property becomes "proceeds," but the context implies that the property will have been derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense, before it is laundered. Therefore, as a general rule, neither § 1956 nor § 1957 should be used where the same financial transaction represents both the money laundering offense and a part of the specified unlawful activity generating the proceeds being laundered.
Certain Promotion Cases. In any case where the conduct to be charged as money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) consists of a financial transaction alleged to have promoted the "specified unlawful activity" that generated the proceeds, and where both money laundering and the "specified unlawful activity" itself are being charged as offenses, no indictment or complaint may be filed without prior consultation with AFMLS, Criminal Division. Such prosecutions must be authorized by the district's United States Attorney and must be reported to AFMLS in accordance with Criminal Resource Manual 2187.
Prosecutions in Receipt and Deposit Cases: In any case when the conduct to be charged as money laundering under § 1956 or § 1957, or where the basis for a forfeiture action under § 981 consists of the deposit of proceeds of specified unlawful activity into a domestic financial institution account that is clearly identifiable as belonging to the person(s) who committed the specified unlawful activity, no indictment or complaint may be filed without prior consultation with the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.
Explanation: One of the major concerns expressed about the use of the money laundering statutes involves a class of money laundering cases often referred to as "receipt and deposit" cases. "Receipt and deposit" cases are those kinds of cases where a person obtains proceeds from specified unlawful activity, which that person committed, and then deposits the proceeds into a bank account that is clearly identifiable as belonging to that person. In that type of transaction, there is generally no concealment involved and the transaction is conducted so that the person can use or enjoy the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.
The concern has been expressed that "receipt and deposit" cases should not be sentenced as severely as money laundering cases involving more active forms of concealment or promotion because, arguably, the money laundering activity in "receipt and deposit" cases creates little or no additional harm to society above that which was caused by the commission of the underlying offense and, in some cases, merely constitutes the completion of the underlying offense. Such concerns have been responsible, in part, for attempts by the Sentencing Commission to amend the sentencing guidelines in a manner that would reduce the offense levels for money laundering offenses.
While §§ 1956 and 1957 apply to "receipt and deposit" transactions, for reasons of policy, "receipt and deposit" transactions should not be charged unless there are extenuating circumstances. However, a "receipt and deposit" transaction may be charged when the transaction involves other indicia of money laundering such as an effort to conceal or disguise the illegal proceeds, when a financial transaction is conducted to promote further unlawful activity, or when the transaction is designed to avoid a transaction reporting requirement.
Title 31 investigations of financial institutions. In any criminal investigation of potential violations of § 5322 of Title 31, in which a financial institution, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 20 and 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100, is the subject of the investigation, notice must be provided to AFMLS at the time the investigation is initiated.
Section 1957, as originally enacted, granted no exemptions based upon the kind of trade or business engaged in by a potential defendant or the purpose for which a particular "monetary transaction" was undertaken. Thus, the statute, on its face, would have allowed the prosecution of a defense attorney who knowingly received and deposited more than $10,000 in criminally derived funds as legal fees for representation of a client in a criminal case. At that time, several Congressmen expressed concern that such an application of the statute might infringe upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal case and contemplated adding language to the proposed statute exempting such "attorney fee" transactions. Although no prosecution of a defense attorney had been brought or submitted for consideration, Congress reversed course in 1988 and enacted an express, but extremely limited, exemption under § 1957 for "attorney fee" transactions. It did this by enacting § 6182 of the 1988 Act which added the following language at the end of the definition of "monetary transaction" in subsection 1957(f)(1): but such term does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354 (emphasis added).
There is no legislative history to clarify this provision and its scope is open to differing interpretations. The statutory exemption would allow criminal prosecution of defense attorneys who knowingly "receive and deposit" tainted funds either as part of a sham or fraudulent transaction, or as legal fees for representation of a client in any non-criminal matter. See, e.g., Hullom v. Burrows, 266 F.2d 547, 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 919 (1959) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply in civil litigation). It would also permit prosecution of a defense attorney who "receives and deposits" tainted funds from a third-party payor as legal fees for representation of a client in a criminal case. Such third-party payments can hardly be said to be necessary to preserve the client's right to counsel in a criminal case because, in the absence of such payments, the client would still be free to retain private counsel with his own funds or to be represented by a public defender or court-appointed counsel if he could not afford to retain private counsel.
Further, in cases involving the civil forfeiture of attorney fees, the Supreme Court has ruled that there is no Sixth Amendment right to use criminally derived property to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
In any event, any prosecution of an attorney under § 1957 for the receipt and deposit of funds allegedly derived from a specified unlawful activity (when the fee appears to be bona fide) is a highly sensitive area and must be approached with great care. Attorneys in such situations, unlike all others who may deal with criminal defendants, may be required to investigate and pursue matters which will provide them with knowledge of the illicit source of the property they receive. Indeed, the failure to investigate such matters may be a breach of ethical standards or may result in a lack of effective assistance to the client.
Because the Department firmly believes that attorneys representing clients in criminal matters must not be hampered in their ability to effectively and ethically represent their clients within the bounds of the law, the Department, as a matter of policy, will not prosecute attorneys under § 1957 based upon the receipt of property constituting bona fide fees for the legitimate representation in a criminal matter, except if (1) there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney had actual knowledge of the illegal origin of the specific property received (prosecution is not permitted if the only proof of knowledge is evidence of willful blindness); and (2) such evidence does not consist of (a) confidential communications made by the client preliminary to and with regard to undertaking representation in the criminal matter; or (b) confidential communications made during the course of representation in the criminal matter; or (c) other information obtained by the attorney during the course of the representation and in furtherance of the obligation to effectively represent the client.
What constitutes "representation in a criminal matter" depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In deciding if representation in different but related proceedings constitutes "representation in a single matter," consideration will be given to whether the proceedings relate to investigations or cases arising out of the same facts or transactions, for example, a civil RICO case which arises out of a criminal RICO prosecution.
This prosecution standard applies only to fees received for legal "representation in a criminal matter." Attorneys who receive criminally derived property in exchange for carrying out or engaging in other commercial transactions unrelated to the representation of a client in a criminal matter or for representing a client in a civil matter should be treated the same as any other person.
what evidence may be relied upon to meet the knowledge requirement of the policy.
See the Criminal Resource Manual at 2102 through 2104, for a discussion of each of these issues.
No Department attorney shall, either orally or in writing, inform an attorney who is legitimately representing a client in a criminal matter that the property the attorney is receiving is or may be criminally derived solely for the purpose of meeting the requirements of knowledge imposed by this prosecution policy or by the statute.
[The provision] is vital to the effective use of the money laundering statute and would allow the Internal Revenue Service with its expertise in investigating financial transactions to participate in developing cases under § 1956. Under this provision any person who conducts a financial transaction that in whole or in part involves property derived from unlawful activity, intending to engage in conduct that constitutes a violation of the tax laws, would be guilty of a money laundering offense.
This amendment was intended to facilitate and enhance the prosecution of money launderers. It was not intended to provide a substitute for traditional Title 18 and Title 26 charges related to tax evasion, filing of false returns, including the aiding and abetting thereof, or tax fraud conspiracy. Consequently, appropriate tax-related Title 18 and Title 26 charges are to be utilized when the evidence warrants their use.
The use of the specific intent language set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) in a proposed indictment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 requires Tax Division authorization: (1) when the indictment also contains charges for which Tax Division authorization is required, including allegations of tax frauds (e.g., Klein-type) conspiracy; or (2) when the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 or 26 U.S.C. § 7206 is the sole or principal purpose of the financial transaction which is the subject of the money laundering count. Such authorization would be preceded by IRS Regional Counsel review in accordance with normal review procedures, except in Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force cases. (See JM 6-4.210).
Tax Division authorization is not required for use of such language in a money laundering indictment that does not fall in either of the above two categories. It is assumed in situations where Tax Division authorization is not requested that: (1) the principal purpose of the financial transaction was to accomplish some other covered purpose, such as carrying on some specified unlawful activity like drug trafficking; (2) the circumstances do not warrant the filing of substantive tax or tax fraud conspiracy charges; and (3) the existence of a secondary tax evasion or false return motivation for the transaction is one that is readily apparent from the nature of the money laundering transaction itself.
Section 1956 also directs that the authority to investigate money laundering violations is controlled by a Memorandum of Understanding which has been entered into by the Departments of Justice and Treasury and the Postal Service. See § 1956(e). Prosecutors should be aware of the provisions of this memorandum and do nothing to cause its abrogation. A copy is contained in the Criminal Resource Manual at 2186.


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I study social perception and judgment. I focus in particular on the dynamics of stereotyping -- how stereotypes are represented in the mind, how and when they get activated, and what consequences their activation has for basic mental operations such as attention, inference, and memory. I am interested in both implicit and explicit aspects of stereotyping and prejudice. I also study the relationship between affect and social cognition and the ways in which the social context influences basic mental processes.
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