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SAMINCORP SOUTH AMERICAN MINERALS & MERCHANDISE CORPORATION vs. REUBIN LEWIS & others.
Present: WILKINS, C.J., SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN, & CUTTER, JJ.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated June 8, 1956.
The action was heard by Quirico, J., on a motion for judgment.
Sheldon Newman, for the defendants.
Harold Rosenwald, for the plaintiff.
WILKINS, C.J. In this action of contract upon a foreign judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on undisputed facts, supported by an affidavit. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 59, as appearing in St. 1955, c. 674, Section 1. The defendants also filed an affidavit. From an order allowing the motion and ordering the entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 96.
The judgment was in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in and for the County of New York, and was based upon an arbitration award for breach of two written contracts whereby the defendant partners of Chelsea were to deliver automobile radiator scrap to the plaintiff, a New York corporation doing business in New York city. The controversy was whether the contracts had expired because of the plaintiff's failure to give shipping directions by February 28, 1955, there having been a change in export license requirements for metal scrap, and whether the defendants' refusal to deliver thereafter was a breach. Each contract contained the following: "Arbitration: Any difference under this contract is to be settled by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association of New York. For the purposes of this arbitration, the laws of the State of New York shall apply."
On April 6, 1955, the plaintiff mailed to the defendants a written demand for arbitration, dated April 5, setting forth the nature of the dispute, the amount involved, and the remedy sought, and specifying New York city as the place for arbitration. This demand the defendants received. Also on April 5, the plaintiff filed with the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter called the Association) copies of the demand and the contracts, and paid a fee, all as required by the Association's rules. The defendants stated in their affidavit that no notice of filing was received from the Association. Nevertheless, on May 14 and 20 the defendants filed answering statements denying the Association's jurisdiction. On May 12 the Association notified the parties that since the defendants had not indicated their choice for the place of arbitration within the time allowed, the arbitration would be held in New York city, as designated by the Association's arbitration committee. On May 14 the defendants' counsel by letter addressed to the Association requested that the arbitration be held in Boston. On July 20 the plaintiff mailed to, and on July 26 served on, the defendants a notice of intention to conduct arbitration pursuant to art. 84, Section 1458, of the New York civil practice act. The defendants at no time served notice of a motion to stay the arbitration.
thereafter participated to some extent in the hearing on the merits.
On November 23, 1955, the arbitrator made an award, which, in accordance with the Association's rules, was delivered by mail under date of November 29 by the Association to counsel for the parties. The award was in the sum of $1,764.19.
On March 9, 1956, counsel for the plaintiff caused to be served by mail on counsel for the defendants a notice of a motion, returnable on March 23 before the Supreme Court of the State of New York in and for the Country of New York, for an order confirming the award and directing the entry of judgment. This procedure was in conformity with New York civil practice act, art. 84, Section 1461. On the return day the motion was taken under advisement, the defendants not appearing, and on April 6 the motion was granted. On April 9 judgment was entered against the defendants. No appeal was taken. See N. Y. civil practice act, art. 84, Section 1467.
The arbitration clause in the contracts in the clearest terms is both an agreement to arbitrate under the rules of the Association and a consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the State of New York. There is no inconsistency between agreeing to arbitrate under the rules of the Association and agreeing to consent to the enforcement of an award by "the laws of the State of New York." The phrase last quoted is not to be given the narrow construction urged by the defendants. The phrase, "laws of the State of New York," is unqualified, and is obviously broad enough to embrace art. 84 of the civil practice act. The contrary construction would place the parties in the position of entering into an agreement to make an unenforceable award, and would exclude from the operation of their agreement the law which is specifically applicable to arbitrations.
Sections 77 (1) (d), 81. See Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19. But they raise a number of points in an effort to show that they have not in fact consented to the jurisdiction of the State of New York. Some of these points doubtless should have been raised in the arbitration proceedings or in the New York courts. We do not pause to cull them out, as all may be as briefly disposed of on the merits.
(a) The contention is made that the contracts do not provide for arbitration in New York and hence the defendants have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York courts in accordance with art. 84, Section 1450, of the civil practice act. By its rules, which are by reference made part of the contracts, the Association had power to fix the place of arbitration. The Association exercised the power. As was said in a similar case, "The contract between the parties, while providing for arbitration, does not fix the place thereof. The rules of the American Arbitration Association are by reference made a part of the contract. Under these rules the association has the power to fix the place of arbitration. In this case the power was exercised. It can be thus said that the parties contracted to fix the place of arbitration in New York." Matter of Bradford Woolen Corp. (Freedman) 189 Misc. (N.Y.) 242, 244. See Application of L. N. Jackson & Co. Inc. 106 N. Y. Sup. (2d) 725, 726.
(b) The defendants object that the second contract was not signed by them and that no copy was returned by them to the plaintiff. Their conduct, however, shows that they accepted it. They retained the copy of the contract. They informed the plaintiff that the material purchased under both contracts was ready in their warehouse and asked shipping instructions. They later purported to cancel both contracts, and still later declared that the contracts had expired according to their terms.
merely be in writing, and a signature is not required. Matter of Helen Whiting, Inc. (Trojan Textile Corp.) 307 N. Y. 360, 367-368. Matter of Nimphius (Greyhound Corp.) 8 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 378, 381.
(d) The defendants argue that both contracts were no longer in existence on the date when arbitration was demanded, because the plaintiff had not submitted shipping instructions in February as called for by the written contracts. The question of breach, however, was one of the principal issues to be arbitrated. The defendants could not by unilateral action cut off operation of the arbitration clause. Matter of Lipman (Haeuser Shellac Co.) 289 N. Y. 76, 80. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield Ltd. 204 Fed. (2d) 366, 368 (C. A. 2). Mulcahy v. Whitehill, 48 Fed. Sup. 917, 919-920 (D. C. Mass.).
The basic issues are relatively simple: actual consent to jurisdiction, power to enforce an award, and full faith and credit to a foreign judgment. The defendants, however, have chosen to present a number of arguments collateral to the main issues. Many of these arguments, even if open, would not merit discussion. For example, Association rule 39 provides that notice of any motion for the entry of judgment on an award may be served by mail "provided that reasonable opportunity to be heard . . . has been granted." Because of certain rulings of the arbitrator the defendants appear to contend that there was a violation of that rule. A requirement of reasonable opportunity to be heard is not a guaranty of a correctness of all the rulings in the tribunal hearing the matter. It connotes that there be reasonable notice of the proceeding and the affording of an opportunity to be heard. See Restatement: Conflict of Laws, Sections 72, 75, 100, 429; Restatement: Judgments, Section 4. "A valid foreign judgment will not be denied recognition because of error of law or of fact in the proceedings before judgment" (Restatement: Conflict of Laws, Section 431) or "because the procedural law of the state where the judgment was rendered was violated in the proceedings before judgment." Restatement: Conflict of Laws, Section 432.
The arbitrator correctly stated the New York law in advising the defendants' counsel that participation in the hearing on the merits, such as by cross-examining witnesses, would be a waiver of any objections to jurisdiction. Harris v. East India Trading Co. Inc. 144 N. Y. Sup. (2d) 894, 897-898. The defendants' subsequent participation would be a sufficient ground upon which to rest our decision. Furthermore, thereafter the defendants had an opportunity to raise any questions relating to the conduct of the arbitration in the Supreme Court of New York. This they failed to do, and they cannot raise them now.
We have considered all the points argued by the defendants and have discussed at least all we think worthy of discussion.

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Water treatment system in a Brazilian private hospital. From right to left are seem one sand filter, two softeners (iron-exchange filters), two charcoal (carbon) filters, and a set reverse-osmosis membranes.
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22. Jackson, B. M.,, C. M. Beck-Sague,, L. A. Bland,, M. A. Arduino,, L. Meyer,, and W. R. Jarvis. 1994. Outbreak of pyrogenic reactions and gram-negative bacteremia in a hemodialysis center. Am. J. Nephrol. 14: 85– 89.
23. Jochimsen, E. M.,, W. W. Carmichael,, D. M. Cardo,, S. T. Coookson,, C. E. M. Holmes,, M. B. C. Antunes,, D. A. Melo Filho,, T. M. Lyra,, V. S. T. Barreto,, S. M. F. O. Azevedo,, and W. R. Jarvis. 1998. Liver failure and death after exposure to microcystins at a hemodialysis center in Brazil. N. Engl. J. Med. 338: 873– 878.
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29. Laurence, R. A.,, and S. T. Lapierre. 1995. Quality of hemodialysis water: a 7-year multicenter study. Am. J. Kidney Dis. 25: 738– 750.
30. Lonnemann, G.,, T. C. Behme,, B. Lenzner,, J. Floege,, M. Schulze,, C. K. Colton,, K. M. Koch,, and S. Shaldon. 1992. Permeability of dialyzer membranes to TNF-α inducing substances derived from water bacteria. Kidney Int. 42: 61– 68.
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32. Pegues, D. A.,, C. U. Oettinger,, L. A. Bland,, J. C. Oliver,, M. J. Arduino,, S. M. Aguero,, S. K. McAllister,, S. M. Gordon,, M. S. Favero,, and W. R. Jarvis. 1992. A prospective study of pyrogenic reactions in hemodialysis patients using bicarbonate dialysis fluids filtered to remove bacteria and endotoxin. J. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 3: 1002– 1007.
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34. Petersen, N. J.,, K. M. Boyer,, L. A. Carson,, and M. S. Favero. 1978. Pyrogenic reactions from inadequate disinfection of a dialysis fluid distribution system. Dial. Transplant. 7: 52– 57.
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36. Roth, V. R.,, and W. R. Jarvis. 2000. Outbreaks of infection and/ or pyrogenic reactions in dialysis patients. Semin. Dial. 13: 92– 96.
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38. Schena, F. P. 2000. Epidemiology of end-stage renal disease: international comparisons of renal replacement therapy. Kidney Int. 57( SuppL 74): S39– S45.
39. Sundaram, S.,, T. W. Barrett,, K. B. Meyer,, C. Perrella,, M. Cendoroglo Neto,, A. J. King,, and B. J. Pereira. 1996. Transmembrane passage of cytokine-inducing bacterial products across new and reprocessed polysulfone dialyzers. 1. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 7: 2183– 2191.
40. Tokars, J. I.,, E. R. Miller,, M. J. Alter,, and M. J. Arduino. 2000. National surveillance of dialysis-associated diseases in the United States, 1997. Semin. Dial. 13: 75– 85.
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42. Varma, P. P.,, R. Kumar,, P. K. Prasher,, and N. D. Roy. 1999. Hypochromic anaemia in chronic renal failure: role of aluminum. J. Assoc. Physicians India 47: 690– 693.
43. Vorbeck-Meister, I.,, R. Sommer,, F. Vorbeck,, and W. Horl. 1999. Quality of water used for haemodialysis: bacterial and chemical parameters. Nephrol. Dial. Transplant. 14: 666– 675.
44. Yeun, J. Y.,, R. A. Levine,, V. Mantadilok,, and G. A. Kaysen. 2000. C-reactive protein predicts all-cause and cardiovascular mortality in hemodialysis patients. Am. J Kidney Dis. 35: 469– 476 .

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From KDD – additional case law and Nov. 8, 2013 at 11 am is an important day!
KDD has found some wonderful case law, courtesy of the ACLU. And in the meantime, as some of you are aware Atty Lanre Amu, and African immigrant to this country, has been prosecuted by the ARDC for speaking out against the troubles and travails over at the Daley center!
Since many of your are probate victims, I am sure you will want to come out to his oral argument and cheer him on this Nov. 8, 2013 at 11 am. I will be there. Meet and greet and support him. His brief will be published shortly (with my comments, of course), but take a look at the case law Ken has found–good going Ken!
What I would like to know is HOW IN THE HECK CAN A BLOG CAUSE AN “IMMEDIATE AND SEVERE THREAT TO THE JUDCIARY OR ANY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING”?
These are all good questions and Mr. Amu, just let me know when we can meet tomorrow.
The issue in this case is whether an attorney may be disciplined for true statements critical of a court simply because the court dislikes the tone of the statements.* Robert Snyder was suspended from practice solely because the Court of Appeals found his letter to the District Court to be “disrespectful.” In re Snyder, 734 F.2d at 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals agreed with Snyder that there are major problems with the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act. 734 F.2d at 337-341. Nonetheless, the court suspended him because it did not like the tone and words he used in addressing the court.
*8 Speech by attorneys is an essential way of exposing problems in the system and pressuring for reform. By virtue of their knowledge and dealings with the judiciary, lawyers have a unique ability to help improve the administration of justice. At times, attorneys must vigorously advocate their clients’ positions and criticize the way in which the courts are treating their clients’ cases. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1959). At times, attorneys must speak out about injustices they perceive in the administration of the courts. Such speech serves an invaluable public purpose and is protected by the very core of the First Amendment. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Robert Snyder’s letter to the secretary of the district court was exactly the type of speech which should be encouraged. He was writing to a branch of the United States *9 government for redress of his grievance: his failure to receive prompt payment for services provided to an indigent criminal defendant. Furthermore, his letter complained about the administration of an important government program and the failure of the government to provide adequate representation of indigents. Attorneys perform an essential public function when they complain in this manner. Snyder’s letter prompted the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to propose a reconsideration of the manner in which the CJA is implemented in North Dakota. In re Snyder, 734 F.2d at 337-341. Snyder thus was performing the highest mission of the bar in seeking to improve the system.
Speech about courts does not lose its protection just because it is harsh or even disrespectful. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1959); *10 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947). Courts, like all parts of government, may be criticized, even in intemperate tones. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 436 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
It is firmly established that speech about courts may be punished only if it poses a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845-46 (1978); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941). Speech never poses a clear and present danger just because it is critical of the courts. In order to discipline an attorney for his or her speech, there must be proof that the attorney’s statements actually interfered with a pending judicial proceeding. No such interference is even hinted at in this case.
These e-mails suggest that you have oral argument on early November 2013.
6 This was strong language, intemperate language, and, we assume, an unfair criticism. But a judge may not hold in contempt one ‘who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him * * *.’ See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 281, 44 S.Ct. 103, 108, 68 L.Ed. 293, Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting. The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.
As many of you know, I have a lot of probate victims where property, cash, coin and other items have simply fallen off inventories and have not been accounted for.
If any of you know of a professional investigator that can help or you are one and can do this on a pro bono or reduced cost basis, please contact me ASAP.
The Sykes coins are gone, but they are so unique, I am sure they have left a trail.

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1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law and this court's review is unlimited.
2. K.S.A. 12-105b(d) is construed and applied.
3. K.S.A. 12-105b(d) allows a claimant against a city to extend the statute of limitations if the denial of the claim by the city is made after the statute of limitations bars the action.
4. The extension period allowed by K.S.A. 12-105b(d) is computed by counting from the date the notice of claim is filed with the city to the date the notice of rejection of the claim is received by the claimant or until after 120 days have passed following the filing of the notice of claim, whichever occurs first.
Appeal from Kearny District Court; MICHAEL L. QUINT, judge. Opinion filed April 25, 2003. Affirmed.
Mark E. McFarland, of Doering, Grisell & McFarland, P.A., of Garden City, for appellant.
Allen G. Glendenning, of Watkins, Calcara, Rondeau, Friedeman, Bleeker, Glendenning & McVay, Chtd., of Great Bend, for appellee.
Before MARQUARDT, P.J., ELLIOTT, J., and WAHL, S.J.
WAHL, J.: Connie Cummings' personal injury action against the City of Lakin (City) was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. She appeals. This is a date-driven case.
Cummings was injured on May 11, 2000, when she stepped on a manhole cover and fell. The cover was installed by the City allegedly in a negligent manner. On May 10, 2002, a notice of claim pursuant to K.S.A. 12-105b(d) was received by the City. Pursuant to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) the statute of limitations was due to expire on May 13, 2002, on Cummings' claim. Since May 11, 2002, was a Saturday, the limitation period was extended to Monday, May 13, 2002.
On July 2, 2002, the City denied Cummings' claim. Cummings' attorney received the letter denying the claim on July 8, 2002. On July 24, 2002, Cummings filed her petition in the Kearny County District Court.
The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings citing this court's ruling in Martin v. Johnson County Comm'rs., 18 Kan. App. 2d 149, 848 P.2d 1000 (1993), which considered the manner in which K.S.A. 12-105b(d) tolls the statute of limitations. Martin holds that "the statute of limitations is extended by the amount of time that elapses between the filing of the notice of claim with the municipality and its rejection." 18 Kan. App. 2d at 157.
The district court held that Cummings' petition should have been filed by July 11, 2002, 3 days after Cummings' attorney received the City's rejection letter. and that the statute of limitations had run and dismissed her petition.
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. [Citation omitted.]" Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 263 Kan. 875, 879, 953 P.2d 1027 (1998). "The interpretation and application of a statute of limitations is a question of law for which the court's review is unlimited. [Citation omitted.] Likewise, the court's review of conclusions of law is unlimited. [Citation omitted.]" Brown v. State, 261 Kan. 6, 8, 927 P.2d 938 (1996).
"Once notice of the claim is filed, no action shall be commenced until after the claimant has received notice from the municipality that it has denied the claim or until after 120 days has passed following the filing of the notice of claim, whichever occurs first. A claim is deemed denied if the municipality fails to approve the claim in its entirety within 120 days unless the interested parties have reached a settlement before the expiration of that period. No person may initiate an action against a municipality unless the claim has been denied in whole or in part."
"If the rejection period of a notice of claim filed pursuant to 12-105b(d) extends beyond the end of the statute of limitations period, the statute of limitations is extended by the amount of time that elapses between the filing of the notice of claim with the municipality and its rejection. The length of the extension of the statute of limitations will vary from case to case, but the longest possible extension of the statute of limitations would be 120 days." 18 Kan. App. 2d at 157.
This statute was again considered in King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, 890 P.2d 1217 (1995), and that panel of this court held that the statute of limitations will be extended "by the amount of time that elapses between the filing of the notice of claim with the municipality and its rejection." 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, Syl. ¶ 6.
Both Martin and King leave a doubt about the computation of the extension period. Both decisions use the same language holding the statute of limitations will be extended "by the amount of time that elapses between the filing of the notice of claim with the municipality and its rejection." The question arises whether "rejection" means the date the governing body, in proper session, votes to deny the claim, the date the notice of rejection is deposited in the mail, or the date the notice of rejection is received by the claimant.
The district court properly applied the statute by counting from the day the notice of claim was filed with the city clerk until the day the rejection letter was received by Cummings' attorney. This extension period will vary from case to case depending upon the length of time it takes the City to reject the claim. In this case, the statute of limitations was extended by 59 days. This was the number of days between May 10, 2002, when the notice of claim was filed with the City, and July 8, 2002, the date when Cummings' attorney received the City's rejection letter.
The district court did not err in its ruling.
ELLIOTT, J.: I concur with our holding that the present case is time barred under our holdings of King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, 890 P.2d 1217 (1995), and Martin v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 18 Kan. App. 2d 149, 848 P.2d 1000 (1993).
I write separately to emphasize the traps contained in K.S.A. 12-105b(d) and to echo the suggestion made by then Chief Judge Briscoe in Martin. The traps were discussed in Palmer & Snyder, What Happened and What's Left After Judicial Scrutiny, 57 J.K.B.A. 21, 28 (Nov./Dec. 1988). The first trap occurs where a claim is filed and the 120 days run shortly before the statute of limitations expires. The second trap occurs when the 120 days run or the denial itself is made after the statute of limitations expires. Pimentel and Martin define the second trap, but the first trap remains. See Martin, 18 Kan. App. 2d at 155-58.
I agree with the conclusion of Chief Judge Briscoe in Martin that a statute which makes a clear provision for a period of time during which a claimant may file an action after notice of claim is denied would eliminate both traps and is preferable to a statute such as K.S.A. 12-105b(d), which creates the traps. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2000); Martin, 18 Kan. App. 2d at 158.
It is for the legislature to address this problem, should they feel a need to do so.


034 Pa. Code § 131.59a. Voluntary mediation.
(a) If all parties and the adjudicating judge agree, the adjudicating judge may conduct the voluntary mediation and may subsequently participate in a decision on the merits of the petition or petitions if they are not resolved amicably.
(b) Voluntary mediation activities conducted by judges are confidential.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) supersede 1 Pa. Code § § 31.2131.23, 35.11135.116 and 35.188.
The provisions of this § 131.59a issued under sections 401.1 and 435(a) and (c) of the Workers Compensation Act (77 P. S. § § 710 and 991(a) and (c)); section 2205 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (71 P. S. § 565); and section 414 of The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act (77 P. S. § 1514).
The provisions of this § 131.59a adopted October 16, 2009, effective October 17, 2009, 39 Pa.B. 6038.


name and surname or name of the institution, location in the town (in the case of a town divided into streets: street, building number, apartment or flat number, in the case of a town not divided into: streets and city numbers), zip code and town.
PROOF OF PURCHASE - invoice, bill or receipt issued in accordance with the Goods and Services Tax Act of March 11, 2004, as amended and other applicable laws.
PRODUCT CARD - a single store subpage containing information about a single product.
CUSTOMER - an adult natural person with full legal capacity, a legal person or an organizational unit without legal personality and having the capacity to perform acts in law, making a purchase directly related to its business or professional activity at the Seller's.
CIVIL CODE - Civil Code Act of April 23, 1964, as amended.
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES - a set of rules of conduct, in particular ethical and professional standards, referred to in Article 2 point 5 of the Act on Counteracting Unfair Market Practices of August 23, 2007, as amended.
CONSUMER - an adult natural person with full legal capacity, making a purchase from the Seller not related directly to its business or professional activity.
CART - a list of products made from the products offered in the store based on the Buyer's choices.
BUYER - both Consumer and Customer.
PLACE OF DELIVERY OF THINGS - postal address or collection point indicated in the order by the Buyer.
MOMENT OF ISSUING THE THINGS - the moment when the Buyer or a third party indicated by him to take over will take possession of the item.
PAYMENT - Blue Media SA is an entity providing online payment services.
If there is a need to return funds for the transaction made by the customer with a payment card, the seller will be refunded to the bank account assigned to the payment card of the Ordering Party.
[E. If there is a need to return funds for a transaction made by the customer with a payment card, the seller will be refunded to the bank account assigned to the payment card of the Ordering Party.
With card payments, the order processing time in Poland is up to 3 business days.
CONSUMER LAW - the Consumer Rights Act of 30 May 2014.
SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT - products and delivery being the subject of the contract.
SUBJECT OF THE BENEFITS - subject of the contract.
RECEPTION POINT - the place of delivery of the item not being a postal address, listed in the list provided by the Seller in the store.
THING - a movable object that may or may be the subject of a contract.
SKLEP - internet service available at https://theodderside.pl/, through which the Buyer can place an order.
SYSTEM - a team of cooperating IT devices and software, ensuring processing and storage, as well as sending and receiving data through telecommunications networks using the end device appropriate for a given type of network, commonly referred to as the Internet.
IMPLEMENTATION DATE - the number of hours or working days listed on the product card.
AGREEMENT - an agreement concluded outside the business premises or at a distance within the meaning of the Act on Consumer Rights of 30 May 2014 in the case of Consumers and a sales agreement within the meaning of art. 535 of the Civil Code of 23 April 1964 in the case of Buyers.
WADA - both physical defect and legal defect.
6. it does not have the characteristics provided for by the manufacturer or his representative or person who places the product on the market as regards his business and a person who, by placing his or her name, trade mark or other distinguishing sign on the item, presents itself as a producer, unless the Seller did not know the assurances or, judiciously, he could not know or they could not affect the Consumer's decision to conclude the contract, or if their content was corrected before the conclusion of the contract.
LEGAL DEFECTIVE - a situation when a sold item is owned by a third party or is encumbered with the right of a third party, and if the restriction in the use or disposal of an item results from a decision or decision of a competent authority.
ORDER - a declaration by the Buyer's will made through the store clearly specifying: the type and quantity of products; type of delivery; payment method; place of issue of things, details of the Buyer and aiming directly at the conclusion of the contract between the Buyer and the Seller.
AGREEMENT is concluded in Polish, in accordance with Polish law and these regulations.
THE PLACE OF THE EDITION OF THE THINGS must be located on the territory of the Republic of Poland.
All prices quoted by the Seller are expressed in Polish currency and are gross prices (including VAT). Product prices do not include the cost of delivery, which is specified in the delivery price list.
All dates are calculated in accordance with art. 111 of the Civil Code, i.e. the period marked in days ends on the last day, and if the beginning of the period marked in days is an event, it is not taken into account when calculating the date of the day in which the event occurred.
attach to the completed order, sent to the indicated place of issue of printed items: proof of purchase, information about the right to withdraw from the contract, these regulations, the model withdrawal form.
SELLER informs about the guarantees given to him by third parties for products in the store.
SELLER provides the Buyer using the system the correctness of the store's operation in the following browsers: IE version 7 or newer, FireFox version 3 or newer, Opera version 9 or newer, Chrome version 10 or newer, Safari with the latest versions of JAVA and FLASH installed, on screens with resolution horizontal above 1024 px.
Using third party software affecting the functioning and functionality of browsers: Internet Explorer, FireFox, Opera, Chrome, Safari can affect the correct display of the store, so in order to get full functionality of the store https://theodderside.pl/, you should turn them all off .
The BUYER may use the option of remembering his data by the store in order to facilitate the process of placing another order.
For this purpose, the Buyer should provide a login and password necessary to access his account.
Login and password are a sequence of characters determined by the Buyer, who is obliged to keep them secret and protect against unauthorized access by third parties. The buyer has the ability to view, correct, update data and delete the account at any time.
The SELLER applies to the code of good practice.
placing an order in the store by using the "ORDER" button.
Conclusion of the contract with the Consumer takes place at the moment of placing the order.
Delivery of the Consumer's order for cash on delivery takes place immediately, and orders payable by bank transfer or via the electronic payment system after posting the Consumer's payment on the Seller's account, which should take place within 30 days of placing the order, unless the Consumer was unable to fulfill the payment fault and informed the Seller.
The conclusion of the contract with the Customer takes place at the moment of the order acceptance by the Seller, which he informs the Customer within 48 hours of placing the order.
The Customer's order is payable on delivery, immediately after the conclusion of the contract, and the order paid by bank transfer or via the electronic payment system after the conclusion of the contract and the payment of the Customer's account credited to the Seller's account.
The Customer's order fulfillment may depend on the payment of all or part of the value of the order or obtaining the merchant credit limit at least the value of the order or the Seller's consent for sending the order on delivery (payable upon delivery).
Sending the subject of the contract takes place on the date specified in the product card, and for orders placed from many products in the longest term from the products specified on the cards. The period starts from the moment the order is processed.
The purchased subject of the contract is, together with the purchase document selected by the Buyer, sent to the selected by the Buyer type of delivery to the place of delivery of the item indicated by the Buyer in the order, together with the attached attachments referred to in § 2 point 6b.
CONSUMER is entitled under Article 27 of the Consumer Law, the right to withdraw from a distance contract, without giving a reason and without incurring costs, except for the costs specified in art. 33, art. 34 of Consumer Law.
The deadline for withdrawing from a distance contract is 3 days from the date of receipt by the buyer, and it is sufficient to send a statement before its expiry.
In the event of withdrawal from the contract, the contract is considered null and void.
CONSUMER is obliged to return the item to the Seller immediately, but no later than 14 days from the day on which he received the parcel.
The CONSUMER sends back the items being the subject of the contract, from which he resigned at his own expense and risk.
CONSUMER is liable for the decrease in the value of the object being the subject of the contract and resulting from using it in a way that goes beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of things.
SELLER immediately, no later than within 14 days from the date of receipt of the declaration of withdrawal from the contract submitted by the Consumer returns to the consumer all payments made by him, including the cost of delivering the item, and if the consumer has chosen a delivery method other than the cheapest usual delivery offered by the seller The Seller will not reimburse the Consumer for additional costs in accordance with Article 33 of the Consumer Law.
The SELLER shall refund the payment using the same method of payment as the Consumer used, unless the Consumer has explicitly agreed to a different payment method which does not involve any costs for him.
The SELLER may withhold the reimbursement received from the Consumer until receipt of the item back or delivery by the Consumer of proof of its return, depending on which event occurs first.
for delivering newspapers, periodicals or magazines, with the exception of a subscription agreement.
SELLER based on art. 558§1 of the Civil Code completely excludes liability towards customers due to physical and legal defects (warranty).
The SELLER is liable towards the Consumer on the terms specified in art. 556 of the Civil Code and subsequent ones for defects (warranty).
In the case of a contract with a Consumer, if a physical defect was found within one year of the delivery of the item, it is assumed that it existed at the time the danger passed on to the Consumer.
unless the Seller immediately and without excessive inconvenience for the Consumer exchanges the defective item for a defect-free one or removes the defect. However, if the item has already been replaced or repaired by the Seller or the Seller did not satisfy the obligation to replace the item for free from defects or to remove the defect, he is not entitled to replace the item or remove the defect.
CONSUMER, instead of removing the defect as proposed by the Seller, request replacement of the item for free from defects, or instead of replacing things, demand removal of the defect, unless bringing things to compliance with the contract in the manner chosen by the Consumer is impossible or would require excessive costs compared to the method proposed by the Seller , while the cost of things free of defects is taken into account when assessing the cost overruns, the nature and significance of the defect found, and the inconvenience to which the Consumer would otherwise expose them.
The CONSUMER may not withdraw from the contract if the defect is irrelevant, or is related to the nature of the material from which the product is made, and arises in connection with the use of the goods.
request removal of the defect.
The SELLER is obliged to replace the defective item with one free of defects or to remove the defect within a reasonable time without excessive inconvenience to the Consumer.
The SELLER may refuse to accept the Consumer's complaint if the defect is irrelevant, or is related to the nature of the material from which the product is made, and arises in connection with the use of the product.
The SELLER is obliged to accept a faulty item from the Consumer in the event of replacing the item with a non-defective one or withdrawing from the contract.
request for removing the defect.
Otherwise, it is considered that he considered the Consumer's statement or demand justified.
The administrator of the personal databases provided by the Consumers of the store is the Seller.
The SELLER undertakes to protect personal data in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act of August 29, 1997 and the Electronic Services Provision Act of July 18, 2002. The Buyer giving his personal data to the Seller when placing the order agrees to their processing by the Seller in order to complete the order. The buyer has the ability to view, correct, update and delete their personal data at any time.
None of the provisions of these regulations is intended to infringe the Buyer's rights. It can not be interpreted in this way either, because in the event of non-compliance of any part of the regulations with the applicable law, the Seller declares absolute compliance and application of this right in place of the challenged provision of the regulations.
The registered buyers will be notified via e-mail about changes to the regulations and their scope (on the e-mail address provided during registration or order). The notification will be sent at least 30 days before the entry into force of the new regulations. Changes will be introduced in order to adjust the regulations to the applicable legal status.
The current version of the regulations is always available to the Buyer in the rules tab (http://theodderside.com/Regulamin-sklepu-internetowego-theodderside-pl-cterms-pol-18.html). During the execution of the order and throughout the period of after-sales care of the Buyer, the regulations accepted by him when placing the order apply. Except for the situation when the Consumer considers it to be less favorable than the current one and informs the Seller of the current choice as binding.
In matters not covered by these regulations, the applicable applicable legal provisions shall apply. Contentious issues, if the consumer expresses such a wish, are solved through mediation proceedings before the Provincial Inspectorates of the Trade Inspection or the arbitration process at the Provincial Inspectorate of Trade Inspection. The consumer may also make use of equivalent and lawful methods before the court or out-of-court dispute resolution, for example via the EU ODR online platform at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/. As a last resort, the matter is settled by the local court and property court.


§ 126-2 Contractor registration and fees for inspection and registration.
§ 126-3 Right of access to buildings.
§ 126-4 Inspection of wiring; issuance of certificate.
§ 126-6 Conformance to regulations; establishment of standards by reference.
§ 126-7 Keeping of records; petition for review of condemned installations.
§ 126-8 Electrical Appeals Board.
§ 126-9 Location of underground electrical service; detached dwelling units.
§ 126-10 Exemption for utilities.
§ 126-11 Violations and penalties; minor violations and fines.
§ 126-24 Deviation from requirements.
§ 126-25 Submission of plans and specifications.
§ 126-26 Installation and accessibility of electrical equipment.
§ 126-27 Request for electrical inspection.
§ 126-28 Approval of wiring before concealment.
§ 126-29 Availability of plans.
§ 126-30 Licensed representative required on site.
§ 126-31 Notices of inspection.
§ 126-32 Requests for code interpretations.
§ 126-33 Carnivals, convention displays and product and street shows.
§ 126-34 Certificate of final inspection.
§ 126-37 Permits for temporary work.
§ 126-38 Additions to permits.
§ 126-39 Additional permits or fees.
§ 126-40 Issuance of permits to authorized persons.
§ 126-42 Permit requirements for master electricians.
§ 126-43 Fraudulent permit applications.
§ 126-44 Revocation of permits for violations.
§ 126-45 Expiration of permits; reinstatement.
§ 126-48 Transfer of permits.
§ 126-49 Failure to pass inspection; correction of violation.
§ 126-50 Requests for inspection.
§ 126-51 Conformance to requirements of reciprocal municipalities.
§ 126-52 Joint (combined) Boards.
§ 126-53 Proof of residency.
§ 126-54 Issuance of occupational licenses.
§ 126-55 Issuance of contractor licenses.
§ 126-56 Application form requirements.
§ 126-57 Minimum examination grade.
§ 126-58 Certification of exam results and application.
§ 126-59 Payment of license fee.
§ 126-60 Filing of approved application.
§ 126-61 Confidentiality of records.
§ 126-63 Journeyman status required prior to application for master's license.
§ 126-64 Examination of Electrical Inspectors and Board members.
§ 126-67 Issuance of licenses.
§ 126-68 Renewal of license.
§ 126-69 Minimum number of hours per course.
§ 126-70 Approval of courses by Board.
§ 126-71 Licensing of instructors.
§ 126-72 Certificate of completion.
§ 126-73 Process and approval for courses and instructors.
§ 126-74 Authority to investigate violations.
§ 126-75 Grounds for Board action.
§ 126-76 Imposition of sanctions.
§ 126-77 Minimum standards for existing dwelling units.
§ 126-78 Adoption of standards; copies on file.
§ 126-79 References to state and municipality.
§ 126-80 Enforcement and administrative agency.
§ 126-81 Fees and charges.
§ 126-82 Technical amendments to standards.
Department of Buildings and Inspection — See Ch. 7, Sec. 7.13. Public utility services -See Ch. 14.
Plumbing — See Ch. 221.
Signs — See Ch. 264.


Under a statute of frauds which requires the consideration of a promise to answer for the debt of another to be expressed in writing, a guaranty by a third person of the payment of a negotiable promissory note need not itself express any consideration if written upon the note before it is delivered and first takes effect as a contract, but must if written afterwards.
A negotiable promissory note, even if not purporting to be "for value received," imports a consideration, and the endorsement of such a note is itself prima facie evidence of having been made for value.
A promissory note payable to the maker's own order first takes effect as a contract upon endorsement and delivery by him.
The statute of frauds of a state, even as applied to commercial instruments, is a rule of decision in the courts of the United States.
This was an action brought April 16, 1888, by a national bank, organized under the acts of Congress and doing business in and a citizen of Pennsylvania, against six persons, citizens of Alabama, and residing in the Middle District of Alabama, to recover the amount due on a guaranty of a promissory note.
all others to whom the note and guaranty were offered for negotiation and sale, to take the note and guaranty, and to give value therefor; that the note, with the guaranty thereon, was before its maturity duly endorsed for value by the Sheffield Furnace Company to the order of Witherow; that afterwards, and before the maturity of the note and guaranty, Witherow endorsed the note, guarantied as aforesaid, to the plaintiff for value; that afterwards, and before the maturity of the note and guaranty, the defendants endorsed in writing on the note their waiver of protest and notice; that the note was not paid at maturity, and that the note and guaranty remained unpaid, and the property of the plaintiff.
Fourth. That the guaranty sued on was a special promise to answer for the debt of another, and did not express any consideration for the promise.
Fifth. That the note was given by the Sheffield Furnace Company for a debt owing to Witherow before it was made, and was not founded upon a consideration paid or liability accrued at the time of the making thereof, and the guaranty was without any consideration.
Eighth. That the Sheffield Furnace Company paid the debt sued on to Witherow before this action was commenced.
Twelfth. That the guaranty sued on was a special promise to answer for the debt of another, and did not express any consideration therefor, and was not executed contemporaneously with nor before the negotiation of the note of which it guarantied the payment.
The plaintiff demurred to the fourth and fifth pleas because they did not deny that the defendants endorsed the guaranty upon the note contemporaneously with its execution and before any negotiation thereof, and also demurred to these pleas, as well as to the twelfth because they did not deny that the defendants endorsed the guaranty upon the note before its negotiation to the plaintiff and in order to give it credit and currency, nor allege that the plaintiff had notice of any want of consideration for the guaranty.
To the eighth plea a replication was filed alleging that the plaintiff became the owner of the note for a valuable consideration before maturity, and that no part thereof had ever been paid to the plaintiff or to any one authorized by the plaintiff to receive it. To this replication the defendants demurred.
The court sustained the demurrers to the pleas and overruled the demurrer to the replication.
Issue was then joined on the eighth plea and the replication thereto, and a trial by jury was had upon that issue at which the plaintiff gave in evidence that note, purporting to be "for value received," and the following endorsements thereon, in the order in which they appeared upon the note: First, "Pay to the order of J. P. Witherow," signed by the Sheffield Furnace Company. Second. An endorsement in blank by Witherow. Third. "We hereby guarantee the payment of this note at maturity," signed by the defendants. Fourth. Another blank endorsement by Witherow under the guaranty. No other evidence was introduced. Thereupon the court instructed the jury to render a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount sued for, with interest. A verdict was returned accordingly, and the defendants, having duly excepted to the evidence and to the instruction, tendered a bill of exceptions, and sued out this writ of error.
By the statute of frauds of Alabama, a special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another is void, "unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration" is in writing and subscribed by or in behalf of the party to be charged. Alabama Code of 1887, § 1732. The words "value received," or acknowledging the receipt of one dollar, sufficiently express a consideration. Neal v. Smith, 5 Ala. 568; Bolling v. Munchus, 65 Ala. 558.
Every negotiable promissory note, even if not purporting to be "for value received," imports a consideration. Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Page v. Bank, 7 Wheat. 35; Townsend v. Derby, 3 Metc. 363. And the endorsement of such a note is itself prima facie evidence of having been made for value. Riddle v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch 322, 9 U. S. 332.
The promissory not in the case at bar, having been made payable to the maker's own order, first took effect as a contract upon its endorsement and delivery by the maker, the Sheffield Furnace Company, to Witherow, the first taker. Lea v. Bank, 8 Port. 119; Little v. Rogers, 1 Metc. 108; Hooper v. Williams, 2 Exch. 13; Brown v. De Winton, 6 C.B. 336.
note, written by a third person upon the note before its delivery, requires no other consideration to support it, and need express none other, even where the law requires the consideration of the guaranty to be expressed in writing, than the consideration which the note upon its face implies to have passed between the original parties. Leonard v. Vredenburg, 8 Johns. 29; D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476, 26 U. S. 501-502; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396, 400-401; Bickford v. Gibbs, 8 Cush. 154; Nabb v. Koontz, 17 Md. 283; Parkhurst v. Vail, 73 Ill. 343.
The demurrers to the fourth and fifth pleas therefore were rightly sustained.
But a guaranty written upon a promissory note, after the note has been delivered and taken effect as a contract, requires a distinct consideration to support it, and if such a guaranty does not express any consideration, it is void where the statute of frauds, as in Alabama, requires the consideration to be expressed in writing. Leonard v. Vredenburg and other cases above cited; Rigby v. Morwood, 34 Ala. 129.
The demurrer to the twelfth plea therefore should have been overruled, and judgment rendered thereon for the defendant unless the court saw fit to permit the plaintiff to file a replication to that plea.
It was argued in behalf of the original plaintiff that the validity and effect of the guaranty must be governed by the general commercial law, without regard to any statute of Alabama. But there can be no doubt that the statute of frauds, even as applied to commercial instruments, is such a law of the state as has been declared by Congress to be a rule of decision in the courts of the United States. Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92; Rev.Stat. § 721; Mandeville v. Riddle, 1 Cranch 290, and 9 U. S. 5 Cranch 322; D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476; Kirkman v. Hamilton, 6 Pet. 20; Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608; Paine v. Central Vermont Railroad, 118 U. S. 152, 118 U. S. 161.
frauds under the general issue. That might have been true if he had pleaded the general issue. Kannady v. Lambert, 37 Ala. 57; Pollak v. Brush Electric Association, 128 U. S. 446. But he did not plead it, and had the right to rely on his special pleas only. Alabama Code of § 2675.
The suggestion of counsel that by the practice in Alabama, the entry of an appearance of counsel for the defendant was equivalent to filing a plea of the general issue, is too novel to be accepted without proof, and seems inconsistent with Grigg v. Gilmer, 54 Ala. 425. If the record did not show what the pleadings were, it might be presumed that the general issue was pleaded. May v. Sharpe, 49 Ala. 140; Hatchett v. Molton, 76 Ala. 410. But in this case, twelve pleas are set forth in the record, and it cannot be assumed that there was any other.
The eighth plea was payment. The defendant introduced no evidence to support this plea, and has therefore no ground of exception to the rulings and instruction at the trial of the issue joined thereon.
Judgment to be reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.


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In an unusual display of speedy discretion, federal District Judge Sheri Polster Chappell wasted no time in dismissing the complaint on a public works payment bond filed by Advance Industrial Coating, LLC in Advance Indus. Coating, LLC v. Westfield Ins. Co., No. 2:15-cv-141-FtM-38DNF (D. for M.D. Fla., Mar. 6, 2015). Advance filed its complaint in the Middle District of Florida – Ft. Myers Division – on March 4, 2015. Just two (2) days later, on March 6, 2015, Judge Chappell dismissed the action without prejudice for Advance’s failure to properly plead the citizenship of the parties! The Court’s order was sua sponte!
It should be noted that the undersigned just learned that Advance filed an amended complaint that included corrected jurisdictional allegations.
For more information on this matter, or any other litigation-related questions, please contact Edward Sylvester directly.
S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., that an expanded exclusion in a current CGL form bars claims not only for misappropriation of trade secrets (intellectual property) but also for any other injury alleged in the same suit.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc., and Street Surfing, LLC v. Great Am. E&S Ins. Co. on different aspects of the extent of the insurer’s duty to defend.
Pryor v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. as to what a plaintiff seeking to establish a claim for copyright infringement must prove.
Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Food, Inc., on the “substantial similarity” doctrine in copyright infringement jurisprudence.
Welenco, Inc. v. Corbell, on vaicarious liability in copyright infringement.
Inter123 Corp. v. Ghaith is cited as an example as to the eight factors courts have considered when analyzing the likelihood of “confusion” in trademark infringement jurisprudence.
Burrill v. Nair on the elements of a claim for defamation.
Opperman v. Path, Inc. on the necessary elements of a claim for public disclosure of private facts.
For more information on Media Liability Insurance, please contact James Castle (email).
Four insurance companies sued the California Department of Insurance, claiming the agency has become “increasingly aggressive” in its efforts to enforce the state’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act.
The companies say the department is trying to enforce the UPA beyond the scope of the original statute, by wanting to impose “millions of dollars in monetary penalties” against insurance companies.
In statute form, the UPA outlines 16 unfair claims settlement practices that companies must avoid in order to be compliant with the law. Prohibited practices include misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy revisions to clients, compelling insured clients to pursue litigation to recover amounts due, and attempting to settle a claim for less than a “reasonable” amount.
But the four plaintiffs known as the Torchmark group of companies said the department has been adding to the original 16 practices, creating 25 “categories of acts” that outline specific conduct to be followed or prohibited in the settlement of claims.
The Torchmark group includes Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company, American Income Life Insurance Company, United American Insurance Company and United Investors Life Insurance Company and is represented in the suit by Robert Hogeboom of the Los Angeles firm Hinshaw & Culbertson.
In Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a pension plan participant could not be “made whole” by using the equitable remedy of surcharge to recover pension benefits he was erroneously told he would receive….
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court on May 29 reversed a class action verdict for a class which was based on a flawed statistical model to determine liability and damages. Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association.
Attorney’s fees were the subjects of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions today in high profile patent cases. In Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Highmark v. Allcare Health, the Court decided in “exceptional cases” reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded to a prevailing party.
Interestingly, the Court leaves it to the trial court to define which cases are exceptional. This is to be done in the court’s exercise of its discretion on a case-by-case basis. This is a dramatic change. The prior standard used in these types of matters required a finding of “subjective bad faith” and/or “objectively baseless” conduct.
Those standards were very high; making the circumstances where a fee award was granted to be rare. The policy surrounding this decision appears to deter parties who have abused the patent system for their own financial gain.
Originally posted to Barger & Wolen’s Litigation Management & Attorney Fee Analysis blog.
Did the judge make the right call in XL Specialty v. St. Paul Mercury?
Category: Uncategorized Tags: Appellate Decisions, Case Updates, Excess and Umbrella Insurance, Insurance Coverage, XL Specialty Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.

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Giovannetti. Beware of the Dog. Photo available. New York. Macmillan. 1958. 4to. Hardcover. Stated first edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Girouard, Mark. Cities & People. A Social and Architectural History. Photo available. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1985. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Gissing, George. By the Ionian Sea. Evanston. Marlboro. 1996. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition thus. Fine copy (owner blind stamp).
Giulianni, Mauro. Mauro Giulainni. Twenty-Four Studies for the Guitar. Op. 100. Sheet Music. Miami. CPP. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Near fine copy (stain on front panel).
Giuliano, Geoffrey. The Illustrated Paul McCartney. Secaucus. Chartwell. 1993. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy (owner name on end paper) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Given, Meta. Meta Given's Modern Encyclopedia of Cooking. Two volumes In dust jackets. Photo available. Chicago. J.G. Ferguson. 1955. Octavo. Hardcovers. New revised edition. Two volumes. Near fine copies (light wear) in good (edge chipped) dust jackets (in mylar).
Given, Meta. Meta Given's Modern Family Cook Book. Photo available. Chicago. J.G. Ferguson Pub. Co. 1953. 632 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Revised edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Given, Meta. The Modern Family Cook Book. Photo available. Chicago. J.G. Ferguson Pub. Co. 1961. 932 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Gray cloth. Stated first edition thus. Illustrated in color and black & white. Important reference work. Cookies end papers. Fine copy.
Givens, Bill. Son of Film Flubs. More Memorable Movie Mistakes. New York. Citadel. 1991. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Givens, Robert H., Jr. Outlawry of Chainstores. Tampa. Martello. 1936. Octavo. Hardcover. Second edition. Fine copy.
Glaser, Leah S., PhD. The History, Values, and Visions of Carollo Engineers. Photo available. np. Self published. 2003. 108 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Glass, Bill. Crime: Our Second Vietnam. Inscribed by the author. Dallas. Self published. 1999. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Glasscock, Jean (ed). Wellesley College. 1875-1975: A Century of Women. Photo available. Wellesley. Wellesley College. 1975. 496 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Glassmire, Carol Gast. Price Guide to the Twentieth Century Dolls Series. Des Moines. Wallace Homestead. 1981. 224 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Fine copy.
Glazer, Nathan (ed). Clamor at the Gates. The New American Immigration. Photo available. San Francisco. ICS Press. 1985. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Gleason, Abbott (1939- ). Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s. New York. Viking Press. 1980. 437 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Gleick, James. What Just Happened. A Chronicle from the Information Frontier. New York. Pantheon. 2002. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Glendenning, Sharon. Flow Blue Handbook II. Madison. Self published. nd. Octavo. Spiral bound. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Very scarce. Fine copy.
Glenn, Nancy Texas A&M University. Inscribed by the author. A Legacy of Tradition. Photo available. College Station. Spectrum Fine Arts Pub. 1999. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Glenn, Russell W. Marching Under Darkening Skies. The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat. Santa Monica. Rand. 1998. 32 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Fine copy.
Glickman, Barbara. Maryland's Public Gardens & Parks. In shrink wrap. Photo available. Arglen. Schiffer. 2015. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy (in shrink wrap).
Glock, Charles Y., Gertrude J. Selznick and Joel L. Spaeth. The Apathetic Majority: A Study Based on Public Responses to the Eichmann Trial New York. Harper. 1970. Octavo. Soft cover. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Glueck, Nelson. Deities and Dolphins. The Story of the Nabataeans, Illustrated with Over Four Hundred Photographs. Photo available. New York. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 1965. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Glueck, Sheldon. War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment. Cambridge. Harvard. 1955. 255 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in chipped dust jacket.

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