Kristy Downs, individually and as personal representative of Ivan Downs and guardian of Suzanne and Matthew Downs, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company ("Panhandle") and Vesta Energy Company ("Vesta") (collectively "Appellees") determining that no duty was owed by either of them to the Downs. Downs asserts that the designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. The case arises from a natural gas explosion at the Downs' home.
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993). Any doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact, or an inference to be drawn from the facts, must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. 1991). "A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue." Scott v. Bodor, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
The facts most favorable to Downs, the nonmovant, follow. Montezuma Municipal Gas Utility ("Montezuma") sold and delivered natural gas to customers, including the Downs, through a distribution system installed, maintained and owned by the Town of Montezuma. The gas, which Montezuma purchased from Vesta, was produced from gas fields in western states including Kansas. The gas was transferred by Vesta to Montezuma at Haven, Kansas, and reached Montezuma's distribution facility through a pipeline system operated by Panhandle. Montezuma contracted with Panhandle for the transportation of its gas through Panhandle's pipeline. The natural gas produced by Vesta and transported through Panhandle's pipeline was odorless. Montezuma, after receiving the gas from Panhandle's pipeline into its own system, added odorant to the gas, utilizing apparatus and odorant it purchased from Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. ("NGO").
Montezuma's gas distribution system was installed in 1934 and consisted of bare steel pipe buried in the ground. The service line to the Downs' home was installed in 1942.
Because bare steel pipe is susceptible to corrosion, federal regulations now prohibit installation of this type of pipe. However, bare steel pipe installed prior to 1971 do not have to be replaced. In 1992, Montezuma began a project to replace the bare steel pipe in its system with polyethylene pipe which is less susceptible to corrosion.
In the early morning of January 21, 1993, natural gas from a ruptured service line seeped into the foundation of the Downs' house in Montezuma, Indiana. During this time, Kristy and her two children, Suzanne and Matthew, were asleep. Around one o'clock in the morning, Downs' husband, Ivan, returned home from work. When Ivan added logs to a wood burning stove, the gas ignited. The subsequent explosion destroyed the house and fatally injured Ivan. Kristy, Suzanne, and Matthew survived, but received serious injuries from the explosion.
The National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") investigated the explosion and determined that the gas leak came from a corroded bare steel service line to the Downs' home. The steel line apparently had been ruptured by a growing tree root. Shortly after the explosion, a check for the presence of odorant at a nearby residence confirmed that the gas odorization system was functioning.
Downs subsequently filed an amended complaint, adding Black Pipeline Construction, Inc. ("Black" - hired by Montezuma to perform work on the pipeline system), NGO, and Vesta as defendants. In the amended complaint, Downs alleged that Black damaged the service line to her house, that NGO failed to odorize the gas, and that Vesta negligently supplied the gas. Both Panhandle and Vesta denied the allegations against them.
Panhandle and Vesta each moved for summary judgment. Panhandle claimed that as an interstate transporter of natural gas, it merely carried the gas through its pipeline to Montezuma's service lines. As such, Panhandle contended that its liability ended once it delivered the gas to Montezuma and that it had no duty to investigate the conditions of the service lines or to odorize the gas. Vesta admitted that it provided the gas which was transported through Panhandle's pipelines. However, Vesta likewise claimed that its liability ended once the gas was delivered to Montezuma and that it had no duty to investigate the conditions of the service lines or to odorize the gas.
Downs responded to both motions for summary judgment. Downs reasserted that both Panhandle and Vesta negligently supplied natural gas to Montezuma and failed to odorize the gas. In addition, Downs raised a new claim that Panhandle and Vesta were liable under a product liability theory. Specifically, she argued that the natural gas was unreasonably dangerous.
Following a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Panhandle and Vesta.
Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we make some preliminary observations about the nature of natural gas as a background for our analysis. Natural gas is, as a matter of law, a dangerous substance. South Eastern Indiana Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Ingram, 617 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). However, the utility of natural gas is derived from the very qualities that make it dangerous. It is gaseous and flammable. Because it is gaseous, it can be moved through pipes and apparatus as needed. Because it is flammable, it can burn and produce heat for various purposes. Natural gas is odorless, which makes it unreasonably dangerous because its unintended presence cannot be detected and it is explosive when mixed with air. Because natural gas is odorless, governmental regulations and common sense due care require that an odorant be added to it where it is to be used by ordinary consumers so that they will realize that gas is present when and where it should not be. Properly odorized natural gas is not unreasonably dangerous for use by ordinary consumers. See generally Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976).
Because of the hazards associated with handling natural gas, a gas utility must function under the comprehensive system of state and federal regulations that govern gas distributors. See Ind. Code § 8-1-22.5-1 to 12 (Gas Pipeline Safety). As part of that regulation, a gas utility is required to comply with all safety standards, inspection and maintenance protocols, and record keeping and reporting requirements. I.C. § 8-1-22.5-6.
Downs contends that the designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. She asserts that the liability of the Appellees is established under several theories. Her application of these theories generally depends on her contentions that the Appellees knew or should have know that: 1) the gas was not or would not be properly odorized by Montezuma; 2) the type of pipe used by Montezuma for distribution was unsafe; or 3) there was a problem with the particular pipe that leaked and caused the explosion. She continues her argument by asserting that such actual or constructive knowledge imposed upon the Appellees a duty to inspect Montezuma's distribution system to determine its safety, to cease selling gas to Montezuma if its system was found to be unsafe, and to warn Montezuma and the Downs about the dangers previously noted. We will address these contentions in light of the several theories upon which she relies.
failed to demonstrate that they did not owe her a duty of care. At the outset, we recognize that summary judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence cases. Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt, & Nichols, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. 1996). Issues of negligence, contributory negligence, causation, and reasonable care are more appropriately left for determination by a trier of fact. Houin v. Burger, 590 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Whether a duty of care exists, however, is a question of law to be decided by the court. Tibbs, 668 N.E.2d at 250.
When the defendant in a negligence case moves for summary judgment, it has the burden to show the uncontroverted nonexistence of a least one of the elements of the plaintiff's case. Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), reh'g denied, trans. denied; see Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ind. 1994). The elements of negligence are (1) a duty on the part of the defendant to conform his conduct to a standard of care arising from his relationship with the plaintiff, (2) a failure of the defendant to conform his conduct to that standard, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of that duty. Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. 1994). Absent a duty owed to a plaintiff by the defendant, there can be no actionable negligence. Lewis v. City of Indianapolis, 554 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.
support her contention that a gas supplier and transporter are liable for unsafe conditions of gas distribution pipes owned and maintained by a local gas utility. City of Indianapolis v. Bates, 137 Ind.App. 227, 205 N.E.2d 839 (1965). Appellees assert that Downs has misconstrued the holding in that case. We agree.
In Bates, the plaintiffs brought suit against a local gas company after a gas explosion damaged the plaintiffs' house. The explosion occurred after a third party had installed flexible brass tubing to supply gas to the plaintiffs' gas range although such tubing is known to be unsafe when used for natural gas. Employees of the gas company had inspected the plaintiffs' house and pipes after the installation but did not notify the plaintiffs of the problem with the brass tubing. This court affirmed the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs holding that the gas company could be held liable after acquiring knowledge that unsafe tubing had been installed. Id. at 243, 205 N.E.2d at 847.
Downs asserts that our holding in Bates is that "a gas provider is liable for damages cause[d] by the failure of equipment installed and under the control of another party when the provider knows or has reason to know that injury may result from its continued provision of gas." Appellant's brief p. 15 (original emphasis). Thus, she concludes that the Appellees should be liable because, despite the fact that the Appellees had no control over Montezuma's distribution lines, they knew or should have known that Montezuma's distribution lines were unsafe.
premises, examine and test all appliances and gas pipes and tubing in such home and thereby upon assuming such duties became responsible for its negligence." Bates, 137 Ind.App. at 243, 205 N.E.2d at 847 (emphasis added). We reasoned that the gas company had a duty to the plaintiffs because its affirmative act of inspection placed upon it the duty to act once it became aware of unsafe conditions. Id. In the case before us, the Appellees did not inspect the distribution pipes under the Downs' home or elsewhere in Montezuma's system, nor did they acquire any actual knowledge of dangerous conditions that required remedial action.
To accept Downs' reading of Bates would stretch the reach of liability to the point where the Appellees and others with an indirect relationship to gas consumers would be required to directly inspect gas pipes not within their means to inspect. In Bates, we further noted that "[t]he negligence in such cases consists not in failing to inspect the pipes of the owner of the building, but rather in furnishing the gas through the pipes after obtaining knowledge or information that would suggest to a person of ordinary care and prudence the danger of allowing the gas to pass through such pipes." Id. (quoting Southern Indiana Gas Co. v. Tyner, 49 Ind.App. 475, 488, 97 N.E. 580, 585 (1912)). Thus, we conclude that Bates does not impose liability upon the Appellees.
between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) the public policy concerns. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991), reh'g denied. We first consider the nature of the relationship that exists between the Appellees and the Downs. In determining whether a relationship exists that would impose a duty, we must consider the nature of the relationship, a party's knowledge, and the circumstances surrounding the relationship. Murphy v. Target Products, 580 N.E.2d 687, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
"It has been repeatedly held that where the furnisher of electricity supplies the same to the customer, first through its own wires, and then through the wires owned and maintained by such customer, and over which the furnisher had no supervision or control, and an injury results by reason of the negligent manner in which the customer's wires are equipped and maintained, the party who merely sells the current is not liable."
electricity has no duty for injury caused by the owner's failure to safely maintain the wiring. Id. We find the NIPSCO case analogous to the present case and instructive on the issue of duty. We see no reason why this rule should not be applied where the utility involved is natural gas rather than electricity.
Our review of the designated materials does not reveal any facts to support the notion that either Vesta or Panhandle had ownership or control over the leaking pipe that released the gas that exploded and injured the Downs. After the gas was transferred to the possession of Montezuma at its distribution facility, the Appellees had no control of either the gas or the pipelines used by Montezuma to distribute the gas to its customers. Therefore, because the Appellees had neither ownership nor control of the defective pipe from which the gas escaped or any other part of the Montezuma system, we hold that there is no relationship between the Appellees and the Downs that would impose a duty upon them to insure that Montezuma's distribution system was safe. See id.
likelihood of injury, the greater the justification for recognizing a legal duty." Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind. 1992).
"Vesta and Panhandle knew that they were supplying to an unusual customer, a very small utility. They knew or should have known that the level of sophistication of gas utilities, their equipment and employees vary widely. They knew or should have known that small utilities are more susceptible than large utilities to pipeline safety problems resulting from use of bare steel as opposed to more modern safer pipelines. They knew or should have known that the technical sophistication of employees at small utilities such as the Montezuma Utilities tends to be low. Thus, Montezuma's size alone put Vesta and Panhandle on notice that the utility to which it [sic] was supplying was unusually susceptible to safety problems resulting from outdated equipment and/or inadequately trained personnel."
Appellant's brief, pp.17-18 (citations omitted). Further, Downs points to Montezuma's annual regulatory reports which were apparently available for the Appellees upon request, and perhaps even received by Panhandle. These reports indicate the number of leaks requiring repair and that a large portion of Montezuma's pipes are bare steel, a material that the gas industry universally accepts as a potentially unsafe material.
foreseeability of harm to the Downs and other customers of Montezuma remote and speculative.
Viewed from a perspective most favorable to the Downs, the most that can be said of any knowledge Appellees might have had (assuming that they had examined the annual reports of Montezuma) about the Montezuma system was that it sometimes experienced leakage and that much of its pipe was bare steel. Short of an actual detailed inspection of the Montezuma system at a level of intensity comparable to that required of Montezuma, they could be expected to know no more. Such knowledge is neither enough to charge them with greater knowledge nor with a duty to acquire more.
However, even if we were to determine that the Appellees had constructive knowledge of the deficiencies of the Montezuma system, we conclude that, because of the tenuous relationship between the Appellees and the Downs, such constructive knowledge alone would not be enough to impose a duty.
This is supported by the NIPSCO case, in which we noted that where ownership or control of the utility lines is absent, actual knowledge of the circumstances that created an imminent danger to the injured party is required before liability attaches.See footnote 3 NIPSCO, 590 N.E.2d at 1073. This would require the Appellees to have actual knowledge of an unsafe condition before they would have a duty to take action. Once again, we find no facts alleged in the designated evidence that would support an inference of such actual knowledge.
Downs also argues that the Appellees had a duty to inquire about or investigate the safety of Montezuma's distribution system. She cites City of Alexandria v. Allen to support this contention. City of Alexandria v. Allen, 552 N.E.2d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), reh'g denied. In this case, we imposed liability on the city when a fireman sustained injuries from a defective fire engine. We held that although the city had no actual knowledge of the defective condition, it was nevertheless liable because it had a duty to inspect the fire engine, which it owned and about which it had received numerous complaints. Id. at 496. Downs construes this case to establish that the Appellees had a duty to inspect and thus should be liable regardless of their knowledge.
However, the Allen case is distinguishable on the facts before us. In Allen, the city owned and controlled the fire engine, thus it had a duty to perform maintenance inspections. Id. at 496. Once again, the Appellees did not own or control the distribution system and, as such, they had no duty to inspect the system.See footnote 4 See NIPSCO, 590 N.E.2d at 1073.
suppliers and transporters of gas to ensure that utilities to which they supply gas follow the legal requirements for the operation of such a utility and otherwise exercise reasonable care to protect their customers and others. Such utilities are subject to state and federal regulation with respect to the handling and distribution of natural gas. They are also subject to the obligation to exercise reasonable care. While there is a strong argument that liability should be imposed on anyone that has within their means to inspect, supervise, and oversee the distribution of gas to the public, there is little to be gained by imposing such a duty on one who has no control of or access to the distribution system. The cost of imposing such a duty would exceed the benefit to be gained by requiring the supplier and transporter to obtain access and exercise control in addition to that already in the hands of the utility.
Furthermore, the costs of such a requirement are even less justifiable when considering the state and federal regulations already in place to monitor the safe transport and distribution of gas to the public. Placing liability on gas suppliers and transporters for the negligent maintenance of local gas utilities would be duplicative in effort. Therefore, we agree with the trial court in its conclusion that "[t]he social utility derived from the supply and transport of natural gas to consumers should not be hampered by the imposition of liability based on the negligent acts of distributors."See footnote 5 Record, p. 1061.
or control of the distribution system. Nor is there any evidence of actual knowledge on the part of the Appellees that the Downs were in imminent danger of the explosion that caused their injury. Also, we do not find a strong public policy supporting the imposition of such a duty. In balancing these factors, we conclude that the Appellees owed no common law duty to the Downs. See Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995.
"[A] duty may be imposed upon one who by affirmative conduct . . . assumes to act, even gratuitously, for another to exercise care and skill in what he has undertaken. It is apparent that the actor must specifically undertake to perform the task he is charged with having performed negligently, for without the actual assumption of the undertaking there can be no correlative legal duty to perform the undertaking carefully."
Lather v. Berg, 519 N.E.2d 755, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) , reh'g denied . "The mere performance of coordinate or duplicative functions will not suffice." NIPSCO, 590 N.E.2d at 1074.
actually requested and reviewed by Panhandle, the review of such reports would not result in the active assumption of a duty to insure that Montezuma's distribution lines are safe. Even so, due to the annual inspections performed by state agencies in regulating the safety of gas companies, even the routine review of a gas company's annual reports would be duplicative in nature and thus would still not constitute an affirmative intention to assume the duty to inspect Montezuma's lines. See id. Thus, we find no facts in dispute with respect to either Vesta or Panhandle actively assuming the duty to insure the safety of Montezuma's distribution system.
In sum, we conclude that the Appellees had no duty to the Downs either through the common law or by having assumed any duty towards the Downs. Liability does not attach where there is no duty and without such duty there is no action in negligence. Estate of Cummings by Heck v. PPG Industries, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 305, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Therefore, we hold that summary judgment with respect to Downs' common law negligence theory is appropriate.
Unlike the Restatement, which allows such a claim to be based on constructive knowledge, a claim of negligent entrustment in Indiana requires actual knowledge that the person entrusted is incompetent. See id. Our review of the designated evidence reveals no evidence to support that either of the Appellees had actual knowledge that Montezuma was not capable of safely handling and distributing the gas.
support that the Appellees had actual knowledge that Montezuma was incompetent to safely distribute gas, we conclude that the Appellees are not liable to the Downs under a negligent entrustment theory.
Downs next asserts that the Appellees would be liable for negligence under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, which imposes liability on a supplier of goods known to be dangerous for an intended use when it does not use reasonable care to inform the consumer of the facts that make the chattel dangerous.See footnote 7 We initially note that this theory would not apply to Panhandle because Panhandle is not the "supplier" of the gas, but the transporter.See footnote 8 Thus, we address only Vesta's potential liability under this theory.
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388.
However, we conclude that this section of the Restatement does not impose liability on Vesta for several reasons. First, turning to § 388(a), the designated evidence does not present an issue of fact as to whether Vesta knew or had reason to know that the gas it supplied to Montezuma was or was likely to be "dangerous for the use for which it [was] supplied." Id. There is no question that natural gas is dangerous. To make it reasonably safe for use, it must be handled properly. Safe handling includes properly odorizing the gas and containing it in a closed system that prevents leaks.
gas in a safe manner. Thus, under § 388(a), the Appellees did not "[ know] or [have reason to know] that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied ." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388.
"[T]he manufacturer of LP gas who sells it to a distributor in bulk fulfills his duty to the ultimate consumer when he ascertains that the distributor to whom he sells is adequately trained, is familiar with the properties of the gas and safe methods of handling it, and is capable of passing on that knowledge to his customers. A manufacturer so selling owes no duty to warn the ultimate consumer, and his failure to do so is not negligence and does not render the product defective."
Jones, 219 Kan. at 639, 549 P.2d at 1394. In other words, if a distributor of gas has adequate knowledge of the dangers associated with the gas it purchases from a bulk supplier of gas, the bulk supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the gas. See id. at 635-636, 549 P.2d at 1392 (distinguishing bulk supplier situations from situations where a supplier is able to warn the ultimate consumer through the use of a warning label on the packaging).
In addition, a supplier's duty to warn a retailer or distributor of gas is satisfied where there is evidence that the distributor knew of the dangerous characteristics of the gas and the safe methods of handling it and had operated a business distributing it for many years. Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265, 268 (10th Cir. 1958). "Warning is required to impart knowledge, and if that knowledge has already been acquired, it is not necessary." Id.
at 269; see also Shanks v. A.F.E. Industries, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Ind. 1981) (holding that no additional warning must be furnished where such warnings would not improve upon the user's understanding of the characteristics of the product).
Therefore, under § 388, we must determine if Montezuma was adequately warned of the dangers, such that Vesta had no duty to warn the Downs or any other customers of Montezuma. The designated evidence clearly indicates that Montezuma was well aware of the dangers associated with transporting natural gas and, in particular, of the potential problems with its own distribution system. This knowledge is indicated by the programs and policies developed by Montezuma to survey, inspect, repair its pipelines and to detect leaks and corrosion. The evidence indicates that Montezuma knew the purposes of odorization and had an odorization system in place to add odorant into its gas to aid customers in detecting leaks. Ricky Nichols, an employee of Montezuma, indicated in his deposition that Montezuma was fully aware of the potential safety problems that could arise with bare steel pipe and that USDI, hired by Montezuma to perform inspections and leak surveys, had recommended to Montezuma that the pipes be replaced. In fact, Montezuma had begun a program to replace the bare steel pipes with pipes less susceptible to corrosion. Further, Montezuma even undertook to warn its own customers of the dangers of gas.
As noted earlier, natural gas is, as a matter of law, a dangerous substance and is regulated by state and federal authorities. South Eastern , 617 N.E.2d at 952. The designated evidence reveals that Montezuma did prepare and file regulatory reports and was inspected at least annually by the state agencies.
Therefore, we agree with Vesta that while the evidence designated by the Downs shows that Montezuma may have been negligent in maintaining its distribution system, it does not indicate that Montezuma was not fully aware of the dangers associated with distributing gas generally or through its own pipelines, specifically. Therefore, under § 388, Vesta had no duty to warn Montezuma of these well known dangers. See Parkinson, 255 F.2d at 269. Because the evidence indicates that Montezuma was adequately warned of these dangers, Vesta, as a bulk supplier, also had no duty to warn the Downs. See Jones, 219 Kan. at 639, 549 P.2d at 1394.
a duty to warn the Downs of the gas-related dangers to which they were exposed even though it was the negligent maintenance of the pipe by Montezuma that caused the injury. However, we conclude that Downs has misapplied that case.
The Reynolds case involved the sale and installment of a veal confinement operation which included a septic system for removal of animal waste. The supplier apparently knew that the accumulation of methane in the septic tank could be dangerous to anyone entering the tank, but failed to inform the purchaser of this danger. As a result, two men were overcome by methane and died while in the process of cleaning the tank. The defendant argued that liability for their negligent failure to warn the plaintiffs about the danger was relieved because of the intervening negligence of the party installing the tank who had failed to obtain the necessary state permits.
We held that the intervening negligence of the party installing the tank did not relieve the defendant's duty to warn the purchaser of the dangers associated with the methane that would be foreseeably encountered when the purchaser cleaned or performed maintenance on the tank. Id. at 229. However, the Appellees are not arguing that Montezuma's negligence in maintaining the pipes relieves them of their duty to warn as in Reynolds. They argue that, under § 388, they have no duty to warn. Because we have concluded that under the facts of the present case, Vesta owed no duty to warn the Downs, the Reynolds case is not instructive.
Next, Downs argues that the Appellees did not establish that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her product liability claim. She asserts that the Appellees "are strictly liable to the Downs for their failure to provide any kind of warning to Montezuma concerning the inherent dangers associated with their product or instructions concerning its use." Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.
At the outset, we must address the Appellees' contention that Downs has waived this issue by failing to raise it in her pleadings. To preclude summary judgment, the nonmovant may not contend that there were factual issues concerning a theory of recovery which he could have raised in his pleadings, but did not. Keane v. Pachter, 598 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), reh'g denied, trans. denied; Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. However, because the Appellees were given adequate time to respond to this theory of liability in their replies to Downs' brief asserting this theory and because this issue was presented to the trial court during the summary judgment hearing, we will address the merits of Downs' challenge.
(2) The product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in which it is sold by the person sought to be held liable under this chapter.
(2) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
However, in any action based on an alleged design defect in the product or based on an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding the use of the product, the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the warnings or instructions."
(2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption.
(2) give reasonably complete instructions on proper use of the product; when the seller, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have made such warnings or instructions available to the user or consumer.
(c) A product is not defective under this chapter if it is safe for reasonably expectable handling and consumption. If an injury results from handling, preparation for use, or consumption that is not reasonably expectable, the seller is not liable under this chapter.
(d) A product is not defective under this chapter if the product is incapable of being made safe for its reasonably expectable use, when manufactured, sold, handled, and packaged properly ."
Pursuant to this statute, a defendant is liable when it "puts into the stream of commerce any product without reasonable (adequate) warnings thereby leaving it in a condition unreasonably dangerous to any user, if such warnings could have been given in the exercise of reasonable diligence." Jarrell, 528 N.E.2d at 1166. The failure to adequately warn cannot alter the basic nature of the product, but may render the product unreasonably dangerous. Id. While warnings cannot make a dangerous product safe, such warnings may avert liability. Id.
Under the Product Liability Act, a product may be deemed "defective" if not accompanied by the appropriate warnings as to its dangerous characteristics and properties. I.C. § 33-1-1.5-2.5(b)(1). A party making a claim of liability must show that the defendant "failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the warnings or instructions." I.C. § 33-1-1.5-3 (emphasis added). Actual knowledge and appreciation of specific dangers associated with a product will bar recovery for injury caused in the use of that product. Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind. 1990).See footnote 11 Further, no additional warning must be furnished where such warnings would not add to the user's understanding of the characteristics of the product. Shanks, 416 N.E.2d at 837.
Specifically, Downs contends that the Appellees had a duty to "warn Montezuma about such things as using bare steel lines to distribute the product or using the proper amount of odorant to ensure that their unodorized product would be made safer." Appellant's brief, p. 34. We disagree.
no question that the unodorized gas supplied by Vesta and transported by Panhandle was expected to be substantially altered by the addition of odorant by Montezuma.
Second, section (a) notwithstanding, the designated evidence indicates that Montezuma had actual knowledge of the dangers associated with the distribution and handling of natural gas. Section (b) of the statute states that where the action is based on a failure to warn, as it is here, it must be found that "the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances . . . in providing the warnings or instructions." I.C. § 33-1-1.5-3(b) (emphasis added). As we noted under our § 388 analysis, there was no information about natural gas or the handling of gas that could have been provided by the Appellees that would have improved upon the knowledge Montezuma already possessed. See Shanks, 416 N.E.2d at 837. As we held under § 388, we now also hold under I.C. § 33-1-1.5-3 that the supplier has no duty to warn a gas distributor if the distributor already has adequate knowledge of the dangers associated with the gas it purchases. See Jones, 219 Kan. at 635-636, 549 P.2d at 1392. Thus, we do not find that the Appellees "failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." I.C. § 33-1-1.5-3(b). Therefore, we conclude that the Appellees are not liable under the Product Liability Act.
Because we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of the theories of negligence raised by Downs, we hold that summary judgment in favor of the Appellees is appropriate. See Rosi, 615 N.E.2d at 434.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.
Footnote: 1 Cathodic protection prevents corrosion of steel pipes in soil.
Footnote: 2 Because natural gas is odorless and therefore not detectable in circumstances where it could be ignited unintentionally and cause harm, it is required to be odorized by use of a suitable odorant so that its presence can be detected by smell.
Footnote: 3 In addition, there is case law to support the idea that lack of privity between parties requires actual knowledge on the part of those accused of negligence before a duty can exist. Webb, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind. 1991); see also Essex v. Ryan 446 N.E.2d 368, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
Footnote: 4 In addition, we note that a duty to inspect arises out of the nature of the party's interaction with the machine or instrumentality. In Johnson v. Kempler Industries, Inc., we held that a trade-in dealer had no duty to thoroughly inspect a piece of machinery it sold to a party because, as an intermediary party, the dealer did not employ people to inspect the safety mechanisms, did not rebuild any of the machines it acquired, and did not routinely do thorough inspections of the machinery to determine if the equipment is reasonably safe for use. Johnson v. Kempler Industries, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. Here, there is no evidence to support that the Appellees inspected or maintained Montezuma's distribution system or that Montezuma requested that they do so. Therefore, under Johnson, the Appellees would have no duty to inspect due to their complete lack of interaction with the system.
Footnote: 5 Downs raises public policy as a separate basis for imposing liability on the Appellees. However, because we have addressed the public policy considerations she raises under our analysis of duty, we do not give treatment to her separate public policy argument.
Footnote: 6 Downs concedes that the Restatement of Torts is not the law in Indiana with respect to negligent entrustment. However, she urges this court to change the law such that only constructive knowledge is required in a claim of negligent entrustment. To expand the liability of a gas supplier or transporter by requiring it to be liable for that which it should have known, as noted earlier in this opinion, would have a significant impact on the gas industry. In light of this consideration, Downs has not persuaded us to change the longstanding law of negligent entrustment in Indiana.
Footnote: 7 In Indiana, the duty of a manufacturer to give warnings about their products is summarized by § 388. American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
Footnote: 8 Downs argues that Panhandle is a supplier under § 388 and notes Comment C of this section which states that a supplier is "any person who for any purpose or in any manner gives possession of a chattel for another's use." However, to hold that any transporter of goods being supplied through another party is liable to the eventual consumer would require those in the transportation industry to inquire not only about the nature of the product for the purposes of transporting it safely, but also about the intended use of the product and about the knowledge of the consumer to whom they deliver. Imposition of such a liability would impose too great a burden on the substantial industry built around delivering goods to consumers and retailers.
Footnote: 9 Downs also asserts that the Appellees are liable under § 389 of the Restatement because they "[knew] or [had] reason to know that Montezuma was unlikely to make their product safe" by odorizing the gas. Appellant's brief, p. 25. However, this court has previously noted that § 389 has not been adopted as the law of this state. Rogers v. Grunden, 589 N.E.2d 248, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In addition, we have already concluded that there is no genuine issue of fact from which it could be found that Appellees either knew or had reason to know that the natural gas supplied or transported by them would not be made reasonably safe for use by Montezuma under § 388. Therefore, we do not address liability under this theory.
Footnote: 10 Downs' claim under § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dealt with the Appellees' duty to warn the Downs. Under this product liability theory, Downs only asks us to consider whether there was a duty to warn Montezuma.
Footnote: 11 In Koske, our supreme court held that while it was not appropriate to determine what dangers the user "should have known" under an objective standard, it is still appropriate to consider what the user of the product actually knew in regards to the dangers associated with a product. Koske, 551 N.E.2d at 441.
Footnote: 12 Two other cases have been brought before this court involving different defendants as a result of the accident. These cases are cited as Town of Montezuma v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied and Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), reh'g denied, trans. pending.


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TWO JUVENILES vs. COMMONWEALTH (and a companion case [Note 1]).
Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., BRAUCHER, WILKINS, & LIACOS, JJ.
CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on February 22, 1980, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
The cases were heard by Abrams, J.
Daniel F. Featherston, Jr., for one juvenile.
Franklin H. Levy for a second juvenile.
Constance L. Rudnick (Richard A. Gargiulo with her) for a third juvenile.
and attacked him. Majidi was hit with a metal bar, kicked, and beaten to the ground with fists. While lying on the ground Majidi was repeatedly stabbed with Juvenile A's knife, resulting in three puncture wounds to the front and three to the back. As a result of screams from witnesses the three fled, leaving Majidi on the sidewalk bleeding. A little more than one hour later, Majidi was pronounced dead after being taken to a hospital. The three were subsequently arrested.
Probable cause was found and, on October 31 and November 1, 1979, the second part of the transfer process, the transfer determination, was held before the same judge who had heard the evidence of probable cause. As at the probable cause state, the juveniles were represented by counsel, and a court reporter was present. Juveniles B and C both testified. Based on this evidence, as well as other evidence pertaining to the background of each juvenile, the judge entered findings of fact and orders to dismiss the juvenile complaints and cause criminal complaints to be issued pursuant to G. L. c. 119, Section 61. On November 26, 1979, the grand jury returned indictments as to each defendant on each charge (murder and two related counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon). The defendants then moved to dismiss in the Superior Court alleging that, since the facts found by the Municipal Court judge failed to meet the standards established by the Legislature and this court, the Superior Court therefore lacked jurisdiction. After reviewing the evidence, a judge of the Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss and entered written findings supporting his order.
to transfer such cases. Following this we examine the evidence presented relative to each defendant, and the findings of the Municipal Court judge, all of which lead us to conclude that there has been no error.
1. Requirements of G. L. c. 119, Section 61, and Court Guidelines.
findings in these or in the similar factors presented in our guidelines. See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 281-283 (1976). Neither the statute nor our cases, however, require the judge to make a written finding concerning any particular one of these individual factors.
Our cases supplement the statutory requirements. A judge who makes the two written findings required by G. L. c. 119, Section 61, must also make subsidiary findings indicating the basis for his conclusions concerning the two statutorily required findings. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 282 (1976). These subsidiary findings may show consideration of the five enumerated statutory factors and the factors identified in our guidelines, id. at 282 n.14, although any single factor will rarely, if ever, be controlling. Cf. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 282 (1976).
broad range of evidence from a wide variety of sources, the enumerated factors identifying only the minimum evidence which must be considered, if available. This concern is further indicated by the statutory preface "the court shall then consider, but shall not be limited to, evidence of the following factors." G. L. c. 119, Section 61, second par.
Our previous cases also reflect this concern. "There is no specific requirement that a judge weigh these factors in a certain manner or achieve some predesigned balance. Any factor which bears on the protection of the public and the amenability of the child to treatment as a juvenile may be considered." A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 282 (1976). "[I]n the relatively few cases in the Juvenile Courts in which the transfer question arises, the proof should be full, and in the still fewer cases where transfer is ordered, the findings should express the judge's reasons in fair detail and with logical cohesion." A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552 , 563 (1980). It may be better practice for a judge to make detailed written findings concerning each enumerated factor, but so long as the transfer order complies in other aspects with our guidelines and the findings meet the statute's "clear and convincing" test, a transfer order is not fatally deficient if it omits factors the judge finds ambiguous, unpersuasive or nonexistent.
2. The Evidence Presented at Petitioners' Transfer Hearing.
Having reviewed the proper standards for transfer hearings, we next examine the subsidiary findings identified by the judge. Included in the evidence submitted for each juvenile was a written psychiatric report prepared by an independent doctor who was selected by the Commonwealth, a copy of each juvenile's school records, and a psychiatric report prepared by the Brookline Court Clinic. These documents were considered by the judge as bearing on the minor's potential for successful treatment before the age of majority within existing juvenile facilities. Additionally, for Juveniles B and C, there was submitted for each a full written report as to his family and home life.
There were some findings made by the judge which were common to all three juveniles. The judge gave great weight to the nature of the offense charged, as he was permitted to do under our cases and G. L. c. 119, Section 61. See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 282 (1976). In his written findings the judge found that the rehabilitation resources of the Department of Youth Services would inadequately serve to protect the public both because secure facilities were used only as a last resort and because of the delay involved prior to placing a child in such a facility. The final written findings common to all three juveniles were the two critical findings required by G. L. c. 119, Section 61: that, based upon clear and convincing evidence, the juveniles presented a significant danger to the public and were not amenable to rehabilitation as juveniles.
The judge also entered, as to each of the three juveniles, written findings of subsidiary factors upon which these two statutory conclusions were based. The more important findings particular to each of the three are summarized below. As before, we note that the judge was not required to make written findings concerning subsidiary factors he has found to be ambiguous, unpersuasive or nonexistent.
in criminal prosecution. The court made further findings in addition to those here listed.
B. Findings as to Juvenile B. The judge found that there was appreciable domestic violence in Juvenile B's home. His father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, and his mother had previous psychiatric problems. There had been incidents of aggressive behavior in which Juvenile B was involved, and he was also a drug and alcohol abuser. Prior to the time of the homicide, he had been arrested for assault and battery, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, larceny, and malicious injury to personal property. While on probation for a charge of malicious destruction, he was again before the court for a charge of breaking glass. he was found not to have responded to any rehabilitation he had been offered. Juvenile B was found to be the assailant who had used the metal bar in the homicide.
C. Findings as to Juvenile C. Juvenile C was found not to have exhibited any appreciable remorse by word, act or expression. Subsequent to the homicide, and within a few days of the transfer determination, he was caught writing on the walls of his former high school. From the time he was in seventh grade, he had been suspended three times, once for fighting. His school performance was found to have significantly deteriorated.
Juvenile C was found to have been the instigator of altercations with other young people prior to the homicide. He had previously rejected all counseling and therapy, despite recommendations that he accept assistance. Not only was he found to have a proclivity to violence but also to have a strong antipathy to minorities. He was heavily involved in self-defense training and interested in military weaponry. His character structure was found to exhibit "anxiety, rigidity and an interest in aggression."
each of these reports as "inconclusive." The petitioners emphasize this finding as illustrative of the judge's unwillingness to entertain favorable evidence. We read the use of the word "inconclusive" as signifying the judge's proper hesitancy to accept these reports (or indeed any particular evidence) as conclusive when considered with all of the other evidence. Cf. American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 379 Mass. 408 , 412-413 (1980). It is just this sort of literal hypertechnicality that we wish to avoid in construing the requirements of G. L. c. 119, Section 61, since the transfer process is already carefully circumscribed by the guidelines established in the statute and our cases.
We disagree with the petitioners' contention that the transfer was "arbitrary and capricious" because unsupported by sufficient evidence. While we perhaps might have reached different conclusions from those of the judge, we are unable to say that no reasonable judge making this difficult determination could have found the evidence sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard mandated by G. L. c. 119, Section 61. Further, the findings express the judge's reasons "in fair detail and with logical cohesion" as we have required. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552 , 563 (1980). As we have indicated above, it would have been better if the judge had made findings as to each of the five statutory factors, even if some of those findings indicated the inconclusiveness or nonexistence of some of the factors. Those findings would show beyond question the judge's compliance with statutory requirements. Nevertheless, there is nothing in this record, including the judge's findings, to support the petitioners'premise that the judge did not comply with the mandates of the statutes or of this court. On the contrary, the record as a whole gives strong support to our conclusion that the judge gave full and fair consideration to the issues and fully complied with all requirements. There was no error.
guidelines established by this court have been satisfied, we now determine whether those requirements afford the petitioners sufficient protection. A related question was addressed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1978). In Stokes, the plaintiff challenged his transfer for trial as an adult under G. L. c. 119, Section 61, stating that since he had not been provided with a statement of reasons for this transfer, his due process rights had been violated. We note that at the time of his hearing (1969), G. L. c. 119, Section 61, did not require consideration of the factors enumerated (a) through (e) in the present version, nor was such consideration required under Rule 85 of the Rules of District Courts. See Stokes v. Comwealth, 368 Mass. 754 , 775 (1975).
Analyzing the requirements of such a transfer hearing, in terms of due process, the First Circuit stated that "the procedural protections which must be afforded a juvenile before he may be transferred to adult offender status vary in terms of the particular statutory scheme which entitles him to juvenile status in the first place.... While we readily agree that in most cases in which review is possible the preferred procedure would be for the court to state the reasons for its decision and in some cases such a statement of reasons may be essential to due process, we cannot say that the appellee's constitutional rights were violated here." Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287, 289-290 (1978). The Court of Appeals suggested that two areas of concern were to be examined in resolving such a due process challenge: (1) ensuring that the juvenile is adequately informed of the basis upon which the court was ordering transfer, and (2) providing a record which would enable a reviewing court to evaluate the transfer proceedings. Id. at 291. We have no disagreement with these statements of principle. The additional procedures now required by G. L. c. 119, Section 61, and our guidelines fully satisfy both of these criteria. We think that the protection afforded by G. L. c. 119, Section 61, and our guidelines fully provide all the "formal mechanisms" to which the petitioners were entitled in order to protect their due process rights. See id. at 289.
Finally, we note the petitioners' contention that these petitions are properly considered under G. L. c. 211, Section 3, both in order to protect rights of minors which would be irremediably damaged by a public trial and in order to resolve a question of proper transfer practice involving the working relation between two departments of the Trial Court. [Note 5] Since there is no error in the transfer process, there is thus no need to determine whether this case presents a proper occasion for relief under G. L. c. 211, Section 3, in order to protect substantive rights of minors. The urgency of resolving the question concerning the relation between two departments of the Trial Court has since subsided with our recent decision of A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552 , 556-558 (1980). Therefore, finding no occasion for relief for these particular petitioners and no need to address the more generalized inquiry concerning the trial courts, we affirmed, by an order issued by the full court on September 18, 1980, the decision of the single justice dismissing the petitions.
[Note 1] A joint petition filed by two juveniles and a separate petition filed by a third juvenile were consolidated in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County.
[Note 2] After the issuance of the full court's order of September 18, 1980, the court was informed that Juvenile A had pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter and that the district attorney had entered a nolle prosequi as to the remainder of the indictment charging murder. The other defendants, we were informed, proceeded to trial. Although the Commonwealth now avers that Juvenile A, by his guilty plea has waived all his rights in this appeal, we nevertheless issue this opinion as related to all three petitioners because we have previously entered an order for judgment dismissing the petition in its entirety.
[Note 3] The "transfer hearing" required by G. L. c. 119, Section 61, is actually a two-step determination. The first part is an inquiry into probable cause. Only if probable cause is found to exist is the second determination -- whether to retain juvenile jurisdiction or to "bind over" the defendant to the Superior Court -- then made. In order to retain the statutory terminology, we refer to the entire process as the "transfer hearing" and to its two component parts as the "probable cause state (or determination)" and the "transfer stage (or determination)." See G. L. c. 119, Section 61, and Rule 208 of the Special Rules of the District Courts.
[Note 4] The statute requires that, if the judge finds probable cause, he "shall then consider, but shall not be limited to, evidence of the following factors: (a) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (b) the child's family, school and social history, including his court and juvenile delinquency record, if any; (c) adequate protection of the public, (d) the nature of any past treatment efforts for the child, and (e) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child." G. L. c. 119, Section 61, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 840, Section 1.
Section 61 authorizes the adoption of court rules for the conduct of transfer hearings. In our earlier cases we spoke of procedures mandated by Rule 85A of the Rules of the District Courts, effective May 7, 1973. See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272 , 275 n.3 (1976). These requirements have since been changed and are presently found in Rule 208 of the Special Rules of the District Courts of Massachusetts. Rule 208 adds no substantive requirements to the enumerated factors in G. L. c. 119, Section 61, and the guidelines in our cases. The sequence of District Court rules on this subject is as follows: rule 85 (effective March 4, 1969); rule 85A (effective May 7, 1973); rule 208 of the Special District Court Rules (effective July 1, 1975); and rule 208 of such rules (amended, effective June 1, 1976), which is the current rule. See also Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 363 Mass. 640 , 641-642 (1973), for the relevant part of former rule 85 and a discussion of former rule 85A, and see Commonwealth v. Clark, 379 Mass. 623 , 631-634 (1980), for a comparison of former and current procedures of transfer.
[Note 5] Although a finding of probable cause is a necessary predicate to a transfer determination, neither of the two proffered grounds for decision under G. L. c. 211, Section 3, is involved in our reviewing a determination of probable cause. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider Juvenile C's challenge to the finding of probable cause to believe that he committed murder.

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We have studied the two- and three-photon absorption (2PA and 3PA) properties of Mn-doped CsPbCl3 two-dimensional nanoplatelets (2D NPs) and cubic nanocrystals. Compared with their cubic counterparts, the Mn-doped 2D NPs exhibit stronger quantum confinement effects that can more efficiently enhance their dopant-carrier exchange interactions and multiphoton absorption. More specifically, the maximum volume-normalized 2PA and 3PA cross sections of the 2D NPs were 6.8 and 7.2 times greater than those of their cubic counterparts, respectively, reaching up to 1237 GM/nm3 in the visible light band and 2.24×10?78 cm6·s2·photon?2/nm3 in the second biological window, respectively.
基金项目：Shenzhen Basic Research Project of Science and Technology (JCYJ20150324141711581, JCYJ20170302142433007); Postgraduate Innovation Development Fund Project of Shenzhen University (PIDFP-ZR2018007).
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30 APR 2009 - Scriptorium v. 2.2f: BUGFIX + RADIANCE UPDATE.
- Fixed a bug that left (harmless) M&G files after uninstallation.
- Newest Radiance 2.4 (by dDefender) is now included in the installer.
- Outdated and superseded Radiance v. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 have been removed from the installer.
TIRED OF READING ALL THESE INFO? JUST LOOK AT THE MARKS!
Creators of custom modular stairs, fireplaces, walls (not wallpapers, but custom walls), and lamps/mods using custom lights are tired of spending half of their time explaining the users how to edit the game files, and where to find them.
And users are (rightly) afraid to manually edit the game files, and to rummage their hard disks to find the folders where they hide.
In brief: it helps users to install custom fireplaces, modular stairs, walls and lights.
In detail: Basically, it's a revolutionary new approach to the custom scripts (modular stairs etc...). And, of course, the Scriptorium is also an installer (for Windows) that sets up your game to easily accept new custom scripts.
HOW DOES THE "SCRIPTORIUM" WORK?
In brief: It creates the special folders where to put the text files for the custom modular stairs etc., and instructs the game to automatically load all the file found in those folders.
In detail: the Installer creates three special folders named "Scriptorium_ModularStairs", "Scriptorium_Fireplaces" and "Scriptorium_Walls" in the folder (gamedir)\The Sims 2\TSData\Res\Catalog\Scripts.
These two simple steps ensure the needed support for the custom content.
As an added bonus, the installer creates some shortcuts in the Downloads folder, to easily access the various "Scriptorium..." folders. (These shortcuts are ignored by the game when loading).
The support for the custom lights is identical: only difference, the "lighting.txt" and the "Scriptorium_CustomLights" folder are located in (gamedir)\The Sims 2\TSData\Res\Lights.
To know *exactly* what happens to your system, using the installer, read the "Manual-Installation" instructions, attached below.
Windows users have the option to use the provided installer, or to perform the required steps manually. Mac users, unfortunately, can only install it by hand.
Here you can choose whether you want or not the support for the various custom scripts. In particular, if you enable the support for custom light, you can choose to keep the normal Maxis lighting system (selected by default), or to install the Radiance lighting system.
I strongly suggest NOT to change the default installation options, unless you *know* what you are doing.
Please note that - beside the (optional) Radiance - the SCRIPTORIUM doesn't add any custom content to your game: it just enables it!
Please note that the Scriptorium installer doesn't overwrite any customized file: if you have already installed (by hand, the "old way") some custom fireplaces, stairs, walls or lights, they will still be available in your game.
NOTE: If you want to install the Radiance and you have customized your userStartup.config, rest assured that it will NOT be overwritten: this version of the Radiance uses the Maxis shaders, so it doesn't require to overwrite the userStartup.
AUTOMATIC UNINSTALLATION: *DON'T* USE THE ADD/REMOVE PROGRAM WINDOW! In order to completely uninstall the Scriptorium, you must run the installer and choose the option "Restore Maxis lights & Uninstall Scriptorium". After the uninstallation, the custom scripts located in the various "Scriptorium_..." folders will NOT be removed, so don't be afraid to lose anything during the automatic uninstallation.
MANUAL INSTALLATION (Win and Mac users): download the attached file "MANUAL-INSTALLATION_(MAC_and_WIN).txt" and follow the instructions. The manual installation only enables the support for custom scripts (the Radiance can be manually installed following the instructions provided in the Radiance threads).
END-USERS - When you download a custom modular stair, a fireplace, etc., the creator will provide, along with the object itself, a simple text file. Open your Download folder, and you will find 4 new shortcuts, all marked with this icon: .
And removing a custom fireplace etc. is extremely easy, too: delete the .package from the Downloads, and delete the related text files from the Scriptorium folder, and you're done!
CREATORS: from now on, you don't need any more to give long instructions to the users: just create yourself a simple text file, and put in it all the code required for the fireplace etc. to work.
The filename to assign to the text file is important: use the pattern "Number_CustomName.txt, where "Number" is the unique number you have chosen for your custom object (for example: "fireplace 88", or "wall 90"). By putting the unique number in front of the filename, the users will be immediately aware if they have two conflicting scripts.
When you post your object, include the text file in the attachments, and then tell the users to open their Downloads and put the text file in the right Scriptorium folder (of course, the users must have installed the Scriptorium ).
The SCRIPTORIUM installer is freeware, and can be used by anyone for personal use. DO NOT REPOST OR REDISTRIBUITE ANYWHERE!
When you post your custom stairs etc (at MTS2 or any other site), post a link to this very thread at MTS2, to let your downloaders get the Scriptorium and easily install your creations.
Also, note that I've included the Radiance Lighting System in this installer just to ensure the best compatibility with the support for custom lights, but I'm not the creator of the Radiance, nor I'm involved in any way in that project.
- V. 2.3 / 2.4.
If you have questions/problems related to the Radiance mods, post in the mentioned threads.
FAQ 1: AFTER INSTALLING THE SCRIPTORIUM, WHAT SHOULD I DO WITH ALL THE STAIRS ETC... PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED "BY HAND"?
You can just leave them alone: the "old" custom content will stay in the main script files (modularstairs.txt, fireplaces.txt or walls.txt); if you are tired of a custom object, you must uninstall it "by hand", deleting the related section from the main script.
First, uninstall the Scriptorium, to restore the original situation.
One by one, CUT the custom sections from the main script and PASTE it into a text file of its own; SAVE the new text file as "NN_CustomName.txt" ("NN" is the unique number written at the beginning of the custom text: e.g. "fireplace 99" or "modularStair 77").
Repeat for every custom section, until the main script contains only Maxis definitions.
When done, install the Scriptorium, and put each new text file into the proper Scriptorium folder.
First off, redownload the latest version of the Scriptorium (even if you already have it: it might be corrupted) and try installing again.
If this doesn't help, go to the folder where you have unpacked the installer (the .exe), right-click on it and choose "Create Shortcut".
Right-click on the shortcut and choose "Properties".
In the very first field, delete everything and write exactly: Scriptorium_Setup.exe /LOG=log.txt then click OK.
Double-click on the shortcut to run the installer; if an error window pops up, click "Ignore" or "Continue" whenever possible.
When finished, you will find a text file named log.txt in the same folder as the Scriptorium_Setup.exe: post the log.txt file as an attachment in this thread, and I will examine it.
FAQ 3: THE CREATOR DIDN'T PROVIDE A SEPARATE TEXT FILE TO GO WITH THE MODULAR STAIRS, WALL, FIREPLACE ETC.! - What to do to "convert" the downloaded stuff to the new Scriptorium format.
sometimes the creators forget / don't want to update their modular stairs, fireplaces etc to the Scriptorium format. In these cases, they provide a text code in the download page, suggesting to manually append it to the "modularstairs.txt" or other game file.
Save the text file as "XYZ_AnyNameYouLike.txt"
Put this txt file in the proper Scriptorium folder.
23 JAN 2009 - Scriptorium v. 2.2e: RADIANCE UPDATE.
The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 2.0 (released today).
Also, fixed a bug that prevented the Scriptorium to correctly install the Radiance files for Mansion & Garden.
28 NOV 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.2d: RADIANCE UPDATE.
The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 1.9 (released today), that is compatible with Mansion and Garden. Also, included Chesspieceface in the Radiance credits.
25 NOV 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.2c: BUGFIX. Improved the internal code so to solve the problem of the diagonal pool becoming not usable after installing custom fence-arches. Thanks again to ClicknPsycho for reporting.
23 NOV 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.2b: BUGFIX. Fixed the path for the "Scriptorium_Decks-Foundations-Pools" shortcut (in the Downloads). Thanks to ClicknPsycho for reporting. Also, extended the credits for the Radiance mods to include Chocolate Pi and dDefender.
22 NOV 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.2 released.
NEW FEATURE: Added support for custom Decks, Foundations and Pools.
UPDATE: The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 1.8.
22 SEPT 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.1c released.
UPDATE: The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 1.7.
BUGFIX: When installing the Radiance 2.2 or 2.3, the installer now correctly finds the right installation paths in Deluxe and DoubleDeluxe games.
22 SEPT 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.1b released.
BUGFIX: The "Maxis Original Lighting" contained one broken file, that caused the UNI windows and objects not cast light.
18 SEPT 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.1a released.
UPDATE: The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 1.6a.
IMPROVEMENT: When the Radiance 2.3 is selected, the installer now automatically adds the needed lines to the userStartup.cheat. Please note that the userStartup.cheat is NOT overwritten, but only updated: all the custom cheats and command previously added by the user are perfectly retained.
09 SEPT 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.1 released.
BUGFIX: The "Maxis Original Lighting" actually contained some parts of the Radiance code, causing unwanted changes in dawns, sunsets and window-less rooms. Now, selecting the "Maxis Original Lighting" option really restores the Maxis lights (also useful to repair a messed up manual installation).
BUGFIX: No error is issued any more when the "userstartup.cheat" file is not found in the player's game.
IMPROVEMENT: The Scriptorium should now be fully compatible with Deluxe and DoubleDeluxe games.
UPDATE: The Radiance 2.3 (by dDefender) contained in this installer has been updated to v. 2.3 beta 1.6.
03 JULY 2008 - Scriptorium v. 2.0 released.
Added optional installation for the new Radiance 2.3 beta 1.3 (by dDefender).
Easier installation of custom TXT files when using Vista: now it should be possible to manually copy TXT files into the Scriptorium folders (Vista sometimes denied permission to do that); in any case, it is possible to install TXT files by dragging and dropping them over the proper Scriptorium shortcut (placed in the Downloads folder).
Improved internal code: the installer should now be capable of restoring the original Maxis lighting system in any case, even if you messed up the lights while manually installing/removing the Radiance.
New uninstallation routine: in order to completely uninstall the Scriptorium and restore the original Maxis lights, you must run the installer again and choose the option "Restore Maxis lights & Uninstall Scriptorium". This is the only way of correctly uninstall it.
13 OCT 2006 - UPD to v. 1.0e - Completed the Spanish translation, that now includes also the License Agreement and the Additional info after installation.
11 OCT 2006 - UPD to v. 1.0d (bugfix) - The last version 1.0c, released only a couple of days ago, had a bug (now fixed) that forced the installer to always install the Radiance mod.
09 OCT 2006 - UPD to v. 1.0c (Minor update) -Multiple languages are now available for the installer (only the installer messages: the Licence Agreement and the final notes are only Eng/Ita).
Also, the graphics shown during installation have been renewed.
26 SEPT 2006 - UPD to v. 1.0b (Bug fix) - After only few hours since the first release, I've discovered a bug: the Scriptorium didn't enable correctly the support for the fireplaces. The new version 1.0b fixes this bug.
27 SEPT 2006 - MAC USERS! - There was a typo in the previous installation instruction: the wildInclude... lines must end with a quotation mark![/B] Now the instructions have been corrected.
26 SEPT 2006 - Version 1.0 released - The SCRIPTORIUM replaces the older Custom Walls installer (now removed), and also includes the custom light support & Radiance formerly provided by the CEP installer (that now is again a CEP-only installer).
7904 people have said thanks to Numenor for this download.
3. Follow the instruction provided in the "Overview" post for the AUTOMATIC or MANUAL installation.
NOTE - The Scriptorium is an installer: DO NOT put it in the Downloads folder! Read the Overview for info about using the Scriptorium.

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