text:
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
August 29.. 321 SCRA 375 (1999) 8. February 25. No. September 5. 1912 2. Bonifacio. Concept - Civil Code o Articles 2178. G. Lim v. G. 37 Phil. 2010 12. 138569. Pascasio. 2005 4. 2001 7. Manila Electric R. Incorporated. Corliss v. Robles.R. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila. 1957 18. NEGLIGENCE A. G. and 1733  Memorize: Articles 1172 to 1174 - Cases 1. 141538. Inc. Inc. August 22. Inc. Chan.R. nature of liability - Civil Code o Article 2194 (Memorize) - Cases 1.R. Soliman. August 23. L-21291. Worcester v. L-3422.. A. June 27. v. 2005 3. No. Ammen Transportation Co. 5932. 165279. Jr. Isaac v. v. No. L-40486. No. G. G. August 23.R. 160283. No. G. Ping.R. No. No. 2003 14. No. 1997 15. 2002 . No. G. No. No.R. 189998. People v.R. Court of Appeals. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Picart v. March 28. No. No. 401 SCRA 122 (2003) 10. No. No. Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals. G. No. Cabrido. 118141.R. Joseph v. Adarne v. 170 SCRA 540 (1989) 2.R.R. 2012 C. Pacis v. No. No. G.. G. De Los Santos. 2012 III. August 29.R. 2011 11. 1916 4. 114841-42. Chemical Bulk Carriers. v.. Inc. G.R. Iglesia Ni Cristo. G.R. Spouses Pereña v. No. October 14. 1173. Cusi v. Balandan. 7760. Philippine National Construction Corporation v. October 20. Smith. Hidalgo Enterprises. 1952 9. 1914 6.R. No.. G. 1172.R. A.R.2 - Cases 1. Inc. L-29889. G. Person/s liable. Manila Railroad Co. 10563. 2011 16. 169467. G. 1979 5.. Padua v.R. 1975 3. 1978 17.. No.R. September 7.R. No. United States v. June 7.R. & Light Co. L-9671. Bautista. G. March 23. October 1. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort. Court of Appeals. G. 159270. Aldaba. June 13. 148496. Wright v. 801. Ocampo. Court of Appeals. Tuazon. Cerezo v. 2004 5. August 29. 175256. v. 1995 4. Li v. March 19. Morales. Harper.L. Inc. G.R. 1969 3. 131588. March 27. 809 (1918) 2.C. March 2.. G. 157917. May 31.R. 193577. UCPB General Insurance Co. Garcia-Rueda v. Calvo v. September 11. Philippine National Railways. G.R. 2012 13. Francisco v. G. Spouses Zarate. G. February 27. No..
. 157 SCRA 1 (1988) 3. No.R. 252 (1921) 4. 306 SCRA 762 (1999) 5. G. 160889. 2 and 3(d) - Case Ong v. 23 Phil. 212 (1912) Chapman v. Court of Appeals.. 2005 4. March 9. v. No. Agana. 397 (1958) D. Metropolitan Water District. 3.3 19. Spouses Sarangaya. 133323.R. 1914 Caedo v. v. Court of Appeals. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works. Gabeto v. Juanillo. 1987 5. G. Africa v. 2012 7. G. Section 13.R. 65295. Perla Compania de Seguros. Negligence as proximate cause - Cases 1. Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp. January 30. Araneta.R. Reyes v. 124378. v. v. Urbano v. L-40570. No. G. No. Austria v. Huang v. Underwood.R. Court of Appeals. 513 SCRA 478 (2007) 10. March 10. DM Consunji v. Court of Appeals.. Intermediate Appellate Court. and implementing rules and regulations 1. Calalas v. Cases United States v. G. 16 SCRA 448 (1966) 2. v. 321 SCRA 584 (1999) and Ramos v. Court of Appeals. No. G.. G. April 20. 122039. 2000 1. 380 SCRA 467 (2002) 11. Bataclan v. 26 SCRA 410 (1968) . G. May 31. C. Medina. 1998 B. Traffic rules (Memorize Articles 2184 and 2185) b. Inc. March 28. Court of Appeals. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.R. No. 1976 7. Batiquin v.R. Go.. 104 Phil. Professional Services. Yu Khe Thai. 258 SCRA 334 (1996) 8. 126074. Presumption of Negligence (i) - Res ipsa loquitur Cases 1. Ramos v. Inc.. 181 (1957) 2.R. April 27. No. Phoenix Construction. 137873. Court of Appeals. Caltex. William Lines. 341 SCRA 760 (2000) (ii) Violation of rules and statutes a. G. Sisters of Mercy Hospital. Cantre v.R. Bacani. December 5.R. 2001 3. 2007 9. No. 42 Phil. Republic Act No. Proof of Negligence - Rules of Court o Rule 131. Sections 1. 2005 6. 2. No. 147746. March 8. 102 Phil. No. Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 9010. No. Court of Appeals. Inc. G.. 10586. Inc. October 25. National Power Corporation v.R. G. 2000 6. Inc. February 24. 180440.
No. 529 (1958) IV.. The Atlantic.. Fernando v. 52732. DEFENSES A. Court of Appeals. FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals. Gulf and Pacific Company. G. Mallari v. B. Court of Appeals. Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury - Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize) - Cases 1. 208 SCRA 714 (1992) 3. Inc. 8 (1910) 2. No. American Express International. Contributory negligence - Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize) - Cases Rakes v. Inc.R. Inc. Inc. 138550.R. Court of Appeals. American Express International. 1989 4.R. G. Philippine Aerial Taxi Co. 193861. 2008 7. 1988 3.R. Workmen’s Compensation Commission. March 23. Mumar. FF Cruz and Co. Court of Appeals. 359 (1907) .. September 12. 300 SCRA 20 (1998) (iii) Dangerous weapons and substances - Civil Code o Article 2188 (Memorize) - Case 1..R. v. G. G. 2010 1.. v. 2012 5. 57079. 174269. Taylor v. G. Inc. 16 Phil.4 4. PLDT v.R. Pantaleon v.. Court of Appeals. 263 SCRA 711 4. UCPB General Insurance Co. G. 557 SCRA 141 (2008) 8. August 29. Inc. v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. November 24. No. G. 99 Phil. March 14. October 14. 104 Phil. No.R. PCI Leasing and Finance. 7 Phil. 39309. No. No. Arreglado. 159132.. Statutes and ordinances/administrative rules - Cases 1. Court of Appeals. Inc. Cipriano v.. 441 SCRA 24 (2004) c.. Cordero. Kim v. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. Serra v.. v. 118889. Spouses Ramolete. 2005 6. Cayao-Lasam v. Araneta v. 1933 5. No. G. December 18. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents. 1998 7.. No. 324 SCRA 147 (2000) 6.R. Court of Appeals. 480 (1956) 2. August 25. Añonuevo v.
178 SCRA 518 (1989) Santos v. F. Casionan.R. No. Waiver . Bank of America NT & SA v. No. Servando v. G. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. Picart v. G. UCPB General Insurance Company. Court of Appeals. No.. 4. November 2. February 15. July 29.R. (1989) Transporto v. No. G. No. 2008 4.R. February 27. No. Philippine National Railways v.. Angala. June 21. No. 169891. 2007 6. 452 SCRA 285 (2005) 5. Prescription - Civil Code o Article 1146 - Cases Ferrer v. 179 SCRA 5. 2006 1. No. 67 (1949) Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Hisole. Vizcara. 146018. 3. 2. Philippine Steam Navigation Co.R. 2006 6. 327 (1930) 3.R. G. No. Bernal v. Ramos.R. 2009 5. Achevara v. 210 SCRA 18 (1992) 2. G. G. G. 37 Phil. Assumption of Risk - Cases Afialda v. 2009 4. G. November 27. 2005 De Guzman v. Tiu v. Philippine Racing Club. Gotesco v. Court of Appeals. 2003 G.R. Toyota Cubao. August 23. 150228. 117 SCRA 832 (1982) 3. Smith. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation v. G. Pizardo. G. Fortuitous Event - Civil Code o Article 1174 (Memorize) - Cases 1. 1978 Kramer v. C. Lambert v. 175172. No. 1 CAR 2s 860 (1961) D. June 25. Inc. Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines v. Ericta. Arriesgado. National Power Corporation v. Last Clear Chance - Cases 1.R. 809 (1918) 2. Chatto.. Philippine National Railways Corporation v.5 2.R. 2. Ltd. July 30. 151452. L-41767. 165969. Estacion v. Bernardo. 153076. November 29. 144723. 437 SCRA 426 (2004) 1. 2006 E. 141480. 2012 3. September 29. 3. 190022. Brunty. 54 Phil.R. G. 85 Phil. No.R. Heirs of Rey Castillon. Mijares.
Monfort.R. G. Gutierrez. McKee v. 1998 3. Owners and Managers of Enterprises/Employers . February 6. 2012 V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY - Civil Code o Articles 2180. 83589. Capuno. No. 174646. 221. G. v. G.. Amonoy v. 4.R.R. 1. 236 - Cases Exconde v. No. Court of Appeals. v. 1970 St. Intermediate Appellate Court.R.R. Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. G. Farolan v. 2003 5. Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply. 2182 (Memorize) A.R.. G. L-44264.R. October 1. Inc. No. Court of Appeals. Carpitanos. Gan v. v. 120639.R. Court of Appeals. Custodio v. February 15. 101 Phil. Parents and Guardians - Family Code (as amended by RA 6809) o Articles 219. No. September 25. Court of Appeals. Mary’s Academy v. 1988 2. 102316. Valenzuela v. 156034. No. February 9. G. Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. August 22. Solmac Marketing Corporation. Inc. Intermediate Appellate Court. No. 126780. Nos. Nos. G. 1996 4. 1996 3. No. G. 2005 H. No. DOLE Philippines. February 17. C&A Construction. 174089 & 174266. Gatchalian v. 116100. September 19. 1997 4.R. Court of Appeals. Delsan Transport Lines. 104685. G. 214 SCRA 16 (1992) Cuadra v. G. June 30. 115024 & 117944. September 30.R.R. February 7.R. 1991 2. Inc. No. Court of Appeals. 2001 5. January 25. March 14. 2012 I. 3. 843 (1957) Tamargo v. 209 SCRA 518 (1992) Libi v. Emergency - Cases 1.R. YHT Realty Corporation v. Rodriguez. 203 SCRA 126 (1991) 2. No. No. G. Damnum absque injuria - Cases 1. Mangalinao. G. Delim. 211 SCRA 517 (1992) 3. 143363. 2. March 13. 2181. Court of Appeals. Inc. L-24101. 1996 4. 140420. G.6 - Civil Code o Articles 6 and 1170 - Cases 1. Court of Appeals. No. 2002 B. G. BPI Express Card Corporation v. 5..R.
Jose v. Court of Appeals. Filamer Christian Institute v. September 28. May 28. 184905.R. No. No. G. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Nogales v. No. No. 75112. 2006 20. G. Casa Montessori Internationale. 1992 14. v. G. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. G. G. 2012 17. 38 Phil. No. 149454. L-22272.R. v. Carticiano v. 172122.R. Professional Services. 55963. No. 108 Phil. Huang. 1990 and Filamer Christian Institute v. No. 2006 22. No. June 20. 155990. G. No. 513 SCRA 478 (2007) and Professional Services. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals. 321 SCRA 393 (1999) 4. Government of the Philippine Islands. L-25142.R. March 25. Apostol.R. 1916 2.R. February 2. February 25. Inc.R. Merritt v. June 26. The State - Cases 1. and Fontanilla v. Q. v. April 25. Agana. Bahia v. Jayme v. 2010 21. Biong. 138054. 75112. Teachers and Heads of Establishments - Family Code o Articles 218 and 219 - Cases Mercado v. No. 173870. 2009 See also The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Dela Llana v. November 27. Bacoy. 174156. D. February 27.7 - Cases 1. Del Carmen v. Court of Appeals.R. No. December 19. Phil-American Forwarders. G. December 4. G. October 16. Court of Appeals. Filcar Transport Services v. Maliaman. 182356. Universal Aquarius. Nuval. Inc.R. 11154. Fontanilla v. Ramos v. Court of Appeals. G. 2000 5. No.R. 1991 9. September 11. In c.R. 1975 7. 414 (1960) . 30 Phil.R.R. 2003. G. Inc. September 12. 126297. So Un Chua. Court of Appeals. 127590. Litonjua.. Inc. v. 624 (1915) 6. Manila Doctors Hospital v. 2008 15. Court of Appeals.. 321 SCRA 584 (1999) and Ramos v. August 17. June 22. December 1. 300 SCRA 20 (1998) 11. 138569. 126467. Agana. 82465.R. August 28. Espinas. 55963 & 61045. COL Realty Corporation. Court of Appeals. Nos. G. 380 SCRA 467 (2002) 19. Francis High School v. Court of Appeals. 2007 10. No. 205 SCRA 591 (1992) 8. No. G. G.. Court of Appeals. 2000 12. G.R. July 31. No. No. Vasquez. Maliaman. G. 163609.R. C.R. 2013 2.. 2012 16. Cangco v. 142625. 2007 13. Perez. 2004 23.. 118441-42.C. 1991 1. G. G. 1989. Human Resources Management Corporation. January 18. Maranan v. G.R. No. G.R. G. 150355.. Martin v. 768 (1918) 3. No. St. G. March 21. 1967 18. Manila Railroad Co. Nos.R. No. G. Ramos v.R. No.R. Capitol Medical Center. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines.
141538. G. 18 SCRA 690 (1966) Yonaha v. Right to Reimbursement - Case 1. October 5. - Civil Code o Articles 2183 to 2193. 1993. G. Possessors/users of animals - Case Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court.R. Doroja. 180 SCRA 1 (1989) Bantoto v. 184202. City of Manila. Aquino. August 30. No. Owners of Motor Vehicles - See Section III(D)(ii)(a) above. July 29. Court of Appeals. October 18. Manufacturers and Processors - Case Coca-Cola Bottlers v. Inton. Aquinas School v. 2. 66102-04. Intermediate Appellate Court. G. No. 3. L-33722. and 1723 (Memorize) A. Court of Appeals. January 26. Court of Appeals. G. No. 4. 2. No. No. Bobis. 179 SCRA 47 (1989) B. 1. 7160. G. 255 SCRA 397 (1996) VI. Carpio v. 150 SCRA 510 (1987) . 70458. PRIMARY LIABILITY 1.R. No. C. Brillantes. Distinguished from subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code - Revised Penal Code o Articles 102 and 103 - Cases 1. Tuazon. 2011 E. Teotico. 5. March 23. Section 24 - Cases City of Manila v. 1. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. D.R. Palisoc v. 1988 Salvosa v. G. 1988 6.R. 160 SCRA 315 (1988) Ylarde v. 22 SCRA 267 (1968) Jimenez v. 110295. 3. Municipal Corporations - Republic Act No.8 2.R.R. 41 SCRA 557 (1971) Amadora v. 1990 See Cerezo v. 2004 F. Intermediate Appellate Court.
Court of Appeals. G. Velez. April 15.. 1990 11. 96126. 1993 8. 628 (1960) 12. G. No.R. G. Court of Appeals.9 3. G. Pellosis. 160273. 81262. 2001 3. No. Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores - Civil Code o Articles 19 to 21 (Memorize) - Cases 1. 165443.R. Cokieng. G. 117009. Security Bank & Trust Company v. Albenson Enterprises Corp. Inc. Far East Bank and Trust Company v.R. 88694. Court of Appeals. 97336. G. August 10. Court of Appeals. 1992 B. February 17.R. 2005 2. Reyes. Clemente. G. G. Court of Appeals. Guilatco v. No. 157314. v. G. No.R. No. Wassmer v. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Inc. Court of Appeals.R.R. No. 1988 VII.R. July 29. No. Cebu Country Club. G. v. L-47851. June 4. No. Court of Appeals. 132344. Nakpil & Sons v. and Nakpil & Sons v.R.R. No.R. 171 SCRA 382 (1989) E. Ford v. G. October 11.R. 1. 51171-72. No. Elizagaque. 154259. 1989 10.R. April 16. Strict liability torts - Liability is imposed even without fault or negligence. January 18. G. 138964. August 9. February 19. Unjust Enrichment - Civil Code o Articles 22 and 23 (Memorize) - Cases 1. No. Building Proprietors - Cases De Roy v. February 17. 150192. 2009 6. 1986. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. 2005 5. Engineers/Architects/Contractors - Cases 1. University of the East v. Hermosisima v. Baksh v. Martires v. Court of Appeals. Garciano v. v. 2008 4. 12 SCRA 648 (1964) 13. Pacilan. No. Court of Appeals. G.. No.R. v. January 11. G. G. No. Calatagan Golf Club. February 28. Rellosa v. Jader. 157 SCRA 757 (1988) F. August 25. 1993 14. Court of Appeals. No. 109 Phil. 2000 7. 1995 . City of Dagupan.R. 2005 9. L-47851. October 3. G. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS) A.
Public Estates Authority. G. No.R. October 6. No. 2009 2. 138088.R.R. Court of Appeals.. 1998 D. G. Inc. No. 2010 3.R. 2008 . 181393.10 2. July 7. No. No. G. No. 2007 5. Court of Appeals. National Labor Relations Commission. G. G. Judicial Vigilance - Civil Code o Article 24 (Memorize) - Case 1. Margallo. No. v. G.. 1992 3. November 25. Philippine Airlines. Grandteq Industrial Steel Products. 164349. G.R. 171365. January 31. Inc. 1978 1. August 21. 2006 4. Ltd. G. Dereliction of Duty - Civil Code o Article 27 (Memorize) - Cases 1.R. No. Unfair Competition - Civil Code o Article 28 (Memorize) - Case Calamba Medical Center. G. 170928. No. 176484.. L-30745. July 8. September 11.. Court of Appeals. Car Cool Philippines. City of Cebu. Inc. 129132.R. 1998 4. Court of Appeals. L-29993. Uy v. October 8.. 122494. 1978 2. 179799. G. Gregorio v. Philippine Match Co. Almario v. 2010 3.R. No. September 11. Manaloto v. 147925-26. Inc. G. v. July 28.. Inc. Radio Communications of the Philippines. Tuzon v. 2009 C. v. Everett Steamship Corporation v. Vital-Gozon v. 2006 F.R. October 23. Torio v. 90107. Verchez. G. Disrespect of Persons - Civil Code o Article 26 (Memorize) - Cases 1.R. No.R. January 23. No. January 18. Fontanilla. G.R. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation. v. G.. Thoughtless Extravagance - Civil Code o Article 25 (Memorize) E. Veloso.R. No.
1992 25. series of 2013  Memorize: Articles 2199.R. Manila Hotel Company. Inc. Daywalt v. Nabua. Inc. No. 157917. G. 1970 15. 1983 17. v. Spouses Pereña v. Philippine Air Lines. 27 Phil. No. G. July 30. Spouses Zarate. G. 122477.R. 1998 18. 107518. 284 (1914) 3. Philippine Hawk Corporation v. G. No. 39 Phil. Arellano. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company. G..R.R. No.R. and 2198  Memorize: Article 2197 - Case Ong v. 125817. No. Inc. 1920 7. 116617. 166869. G. No. January 25. 178771. 117103. 100401. Inc. Court of Appeals. Algarra v.R. Tan Chuco. 2202. 2010 16. Consolidated Dairy Products Co. 1914 5. Continental Cement Corporation v. G. G. G. 836 (1952) 27. 2011 13. 799..R. 2201. 2197. Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Incorporated v. G. December 29. 2200. 587 (1919) 24. v. Court of Appeals. People v. August 29. 1998 2. 2205. No. 88013. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. G. Tamayo v. Inc. Cruz v. Lim v. 1995 8.R. 2204 to 2213 o Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. Lee. Actual Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2199 to 2202. L-11037. June 29. Mendoza v. 148974. Court of Appeals. January 28. 2010 21. June 8. November 15. November 6. G. No. Sun Holidays. Araneta v. No. ASEA Brown Boveri. No.R. August 15. No. July 26. 159636. Court of Appeals. August 1. No. G.R. G. Court of Appeals. 176946. No. Gustilo. G. v. 1999 B.. G. Court of Appeals.. Bank of America. October 8.R.R. 2010 19. G. No. August 24. 9973. G.R. January 16. The Manila Electric Railroad & Light Company. 171660. Court of Appeals. Gammad. June 30. 2000 12. - Civil Code o Articles 2195. No. November 25. G. Sandejas. L-25499. L-25414. 179497. Mamaruncas. Anticamara. No. 2002 9. People v.R. L-63135. 1960 14. De Guia v. G. Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals. June 24.R. v.. 162608. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Señora. G.R. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos. 2012 22.R. 1918 4.R. G. Gonzales. Inc. v. Justiva v. No. November 16. People v. 186312. 91852. No.R. No. 2004 23.. 2012 11. October 17. 12907. January 21. G. Simex International (Manila). 2010 10. Cariaga v. Victory Liner. OMC Carriers.R. Cerrano v. February 16. 14335. No. De Caliston v. 7 SCRA 72 (1963) 6. TMX Philippines. February 18.12 1.R. Inc. No. Adrian Wilson International Associates. No.R. G..R. 1971 28. Hicks v.R. and 2208 - Cases 1.R. 90 Phil. 2204. 2010 20. No. July 2. No. 1990 . G. 2011 26. March 19. No.
Camaganacan. People v. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Bank of the Philippine Islands. 2009 16. February 19. Nos. 188979. September 5. No. Eastern Shipping v. G. 480 SCRA 39 (2006) 36. April 16.R.R. 188603. National Power Corporation v. No. No. G.R. 415 SCRA 596 (2003) 14. AGO Medical and Educational Center. 2012 32. v.R.R. 1991 2. G. Villanueva v. G. 2. G. January 28. April 25. No. L-24837. 161909. G. 150487. No. 269 SCRA 433 (1997) 7. Velasquez. Paras. March 17. 140743 & 140745.R. July 11. No. 187743. 2004 5. 1990. 2013 C. July 10.R. L-43814. Moral Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2216 to 2220 (Memorize) - Cases 1. No. Mayo v. David v. January 25. Padilla Machine Shop v. 91201. Sulpicio Lines.R. 141994. Ramos. 2003 3. Centeno.R. Rarugal. Bagumbayan v. 2010 12. L-12163. 2012 See Simex International (Manila). Inc. January 17. Inc. G. 516 SCRA 168 (2007) 34. Temperate Damages . December 5. People.R. 1961 Vda. No. Inc. Filipinas Broadcasting Network. L-8194. 139436. January 16. 194785. G. 1956 See Singson v. D. 1959 11. v. G. De Medina v. G.. No.R. 152753. Petron Corporation v. Pareja. 132 SCRA 441 (1984) 13. No. Nominal Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2221 to 2223 (Memorize) - Cases Ventanilla v. Salvador. People v. G. G. L-14333. v. Incorporated v. 1982 30. March 4.R. June 22. G. No. 16 SCRA 321 (1966) 35. Court of Appeals. 2013 10.R. G.R. August 13.. Curso.. Villanueva v.R.13 29. City Government of Tagaytay v. Fores v. Court of Appeals. Reyes. G. United Coconut Planters Bank v.R. 2008 31. 88013. Iroy. G. G. No. 172122. Kierulf v. 189871. No. 2007 6. People v. September 17. No. 2005 15. Bank of the Philippine Islands. Inc. No. Gallery Frames. 234 SCRA 78 (1994) 37. E.R. No. G. Miranda. 23 SCRA 1117 (1968). 157009.R. 33. Huang.R. July 11. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative. No.R. 1. Nacar v. 2012 9. No. Court of Appeals. Javilgas.R. Salvador. G. Mahinay v. 2010 8. Lacson v. 2006 4. National College of Business and Arts. No. 175960. Guerrero. Court of Appeals. G. Cresencia. Philtranco Service Enterprises. March 3. January 13. Samson v. Buan v. No. 182 SCRA 729 (1990). G. March 19.
125817. No. 188106. 116665. 2002 Sotelo v. 188602. 138980. 182460. 3. and . Family Foods Manufacturing Co. November 25. Court of Appeals. 1988 People v. 3. and 2214 to 2215 (Memorize) - Cases 1. Ltd. June 15. 2005.R. Court of Appeals. G.. 2005 See Consolidated Dairy Products Co. Filinvest Land. L-18390. 3. 4. G.R. 2. G.R. Bank of America. 2. Manila Electric Co. G. G. G. 1996 2. No.R. Murcia. Development Bank of the Philippines v. G. No. Dalisay. G. 4. v. 10422. 4. 1916 XI. Behn. G. 1932 Lemoine v. G. 35489. G. 1971.R. July 30. G. 1992. 150304. 165339.R. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals.. 2010 Ramos v. Inc. August 23.R.R.R. F. July 30. January 16. 2009 1.R. August 25. G.R. Coronado. March 9. 2010 People v. GRADING Recitation and Quizzes* 40% . L-46877. Liquidated Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2226 to 2228 (Memorize) - Case 1. April 12. - Civil Code o Articles 2224 to 2225 (Memorize) - Cases Equitable PCI Bank v. September 20. No. Court of Appeals. August 24. G. No. Azcuna v. No. No. No. L-25414. 180458. No. No.. Velasco v. January 22. No. Exemplary Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2229 to 2235 (Memorize) - Cases Makabali v. No. 2. Alkan. February 4.. 140182. Dacara. 321 SCRA 584 (1999) See Araneta v. No.R. Meyer & Co. August 6. v.R. January 11. 1989 Quezon City Government v. 5. 363 SCRA 62 (2001) People v. 100401. Court of Appeals. Catubig. December 29. No. 2009 Kapalaran Bus Line v. No.R. Mitigation of Damages - Civil Code o Articles 2203 to 2204. H.R. March 20.R. Gutierrez. G. No. G. No.R.14 1. 2010 People v. G. G. Tan. 1971 Lim v. 2005 3. 85331.
** The Final exam will cover all topics and cases identified above.15 Midterm exam Final exam** Total 20% 40% 100% * Recitation will be conducted every session. Expect quizzes covering assigned and/or previously-discussed lessons to be given every session. .

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Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action pursuant to Bivens.By Memorandum Order entered on December 11. 2017, the Court directed Prasad to file a particularized complaint. (ECF No. 9.) Thereafter, Prasad filed a Particularized Complaint (ECF No. 12), which is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) '"is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory, " or claims where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F.Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S. 319. 327 (1989)), aff'd 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Or. 1994). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5 A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, " id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face, " id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
The action proceeds on Prasad's Particularized Complaint (ECF No. 12). Prasad captions her suit, "United States: 'We- the People'; v. Sundari K. Prasad." (Id. at 2.) Despite labeling herself as the defendant, the Court construes Prasad to name the United States as the sole Defendant.
Plaintiff fails to identify a Defendant, but instead names an "Unknown Agent." Moreover, Plaintiffs current allegations fail to provide the Defendant with fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
a. At the very top of the particularized pleading, Plaintiff is directed to place the following caption in all capital letters "PARTICULARIZED COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3:17CV510."
b. The first paragraph of the particularized pleading must contain a list of defendants. Thereafter, in the body of the particularized complaint, Plaintiff must set forth legibly, in separately numbered paragraphs, a short statement of the facts giving rise to her claims for relief. Thereafter, in separately captioned sections, Plaintiff must clearly identify each civil right violated. Under each section, the Plaintiff must list each defendant purportedly liable under that legal theory and explain why she believes each defendant is liable to her. Such explanation should reference the specific numbered factual paragraphs in the body of the particularized complaint that support that assertion. Plaintiff shall also include a prayer for relief.


Who Do Dodd-Frank's Anti-Retaliation Provisions Protect? For Now, It Depends On Where You Are.
Julia M. Jordan is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Litigation Group. Ms. Jordan has a broad litigation practice that includes whistleblower litigation and workplace investigations, labor and employment, complex civil litigation and regulatory enforcement matters.
Tracy Richelle High is Deputy Managing Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Litigation Group, and a member of both the Firm’s Labor and Employment Law Group and Criminal Defense and Investigations practice.
The disagreement among courts as to whether a purported whistleblower must report wrongdoing to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) in order to be entitled to protection under Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision persists. To date, the Fifth Circuit and certain district courts have held that a whistleblower must report the alleged misconduct directly to the SEC to be entitled to protection under the provision, while the Second Circuit and a majority of district courts have held that Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision can be invoked not just by individuals who report concerns to the SEC but also by individuals who complain to their employers internally. Currently, appeals are pending in both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on this issue.
Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of Dodd-Frank prohibits retaliation against “whistleblowers” for, among other things, making “disclosures that are required or protected” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. §1513(e), and “any other law, rule or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].” 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1)(A). Dodd- Frank otherwise defines “whistleblower” in part as “any individual who provides … information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” Id. at §78u-6(a)(6).
In August 2011, the SEC issued a Final Whistleblower Rule to “clarify” that the anti-retaliation provision applies not only to individuals who report wrongdoing to the SEC but also to employees who, among other things, report potential securities law violations internally to their employers. 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2. In August 2015, the Commission issued interpretive guidance to “clarify” again that the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision applies to individuals who report information of possible securities law violations irrespective of whether they report such information internally or to the Commission. 80 Fed. Reg. 47829 (Aug. 4, 2015). The SEC has filed numerous amicus curiae briefs in federal district courts and appellate courts setting forth that position.
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC & WPP Group USA, Inc., 810 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that an employee who suffers retaliation because he reports wrongdoing internally, but not to the SEC, can obtain the retaliation remedies provided by Dodd-Frank. In doing so, the court relied on subsection 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii) and noted that it does not, by its own terms, limit its protection to those who report wrongdoing to the SEC, but rather “expands the protections of Dodd-Frank to include the whistleblower protection provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, and those provisions, which contemplate an employee reporting violations internally, do not require reporting violations to the Commission.” Id. at 147. The Second Circuit explained that this subsection was in tension with Dodd-Frank's definition of “whistleblower.” It therefore found Section 21F of Dodd-Frank as a whole sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the court's deference to the reasonable interpretation of the SEC.
To date, numerous other district courts outside the Second Circuit have similarly concluded. See, e. g., Lutzeier v. Citigroup, Inc., 2015 WL 7306443, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2015); Connolly v. Remkes, 2014 WL 5473144, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Peters v. LifeLock Inc., 2014 WL 12544495, at *4-*6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp, 2014 WL 940703, at *3-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44-46 (D. Mass. 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 2013), appeal dismissed in relevantpart, 566 Fed. App'x 719 (10th Cir. 2014); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993-95 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC , the Fifth Circuit found that Dodd-Frank's definition of “whistleblower” “expressly and unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a ‘whistleblower.'” 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013). Several district courts outside the Fifth Circuit have agreed with that analysis. See, e.g., Lamb v. Rockwell Automation Inc., No. 15-CV-1415-JPS, 2016 WL 4273210 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2016); Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 2015 WL 8328561, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2015) (appeal filed); Puffenbarger v. Engility Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d. 651 (E.D. Va. 2015); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2014); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 WL 3786643, at *4 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755-56 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Whether internal reports (or reports to agencies other than the SEC) qualify for protection under Dodd-Frank is important because Dodd-Frank gives additional rights and remedies to whistleblowers than those available under SOX. Among other things, the statute of limitations on a Dodd-Frank retaliation claim is three years, while a SOX retaliation claim must be filed within 180 days of the violation (or the date that the employee became aware of the violation). Moreover, SOX imposes additional administrative burdens on a claimant, requiring a purported whistleblower to first raise the complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, while a Dodd-Frank claimant can go straight to federal court. In addition, Dodd-Frank provides a claimant with the remedy of double back pay, which is not available under SOX. As a result, acceptance of the broad interpretation of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision would render the SOX cause of action a dead letter to a significant extent, as the Dodd-Frank cause of action is far more enticing for individuals given its procedural and substantive advantages.


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Unfortunately work place discrimination is a problem that is all too common. Discrimination in the work place occurs when certain employees are treated differently or worse by their bosses, managers, supervisors, and/or fellow employees simply because of characteristics of that employee – we are talking about an employee’s status in a protected class.
No employee should be forced to endure discrimination by an employer, especially if that discrimination is based on that employee’s status in a protected class. The essence of discrimination…is the formulation of opinions about others not on their individual merits, but on their membership in a class with assumed characteristics.” Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 378 (1988). The New Jersey Legislature has declared “that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants…are matters of concern to the government of the State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State.” N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. Thus, it is the clear public policy of the State of New Jersey to abolish discrimination in the work place. Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988). To effectuate this clear public policy articulated by our elected legislators, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (the “LAD”). As so eloquently stated, the overarching goal of the LAD, “is nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination.” Fuchilla, supra., 109 N.J. at 334. Indeed, “[f]reedom from discrimination is one of the fundamental principles of our society.” Lehman v. Toys R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993). As remedial legislation, the LAD is to be construed with a “high degree of liberality”. Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 495 (1982). “… our courts have found that, ‘the more broadly [the LAD] is applied the greater its anti-discriminatory impact.’” Ibid. (quoting L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Regional Schools Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 400 (2007)).
[f]or any person to take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act or to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of, any right granted or protected by this act.
An employee who proves they were the victim of discrimination is entitled to recover lost wage damages, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees from the offending employer. Economic damages may take the form of lost “back pay” and “front pay”. Lost back pay is calculated from the time loss of pay began to accrue (e.g., date of discharge) through to the date of trial. Front pay asks the jury to project forward in time and measures the ongoing economic harm, continuing after the final day of trial, which may be experienced by a plaintiff who has been wrongfully discharged in violation of the LAD. To recover a front pay award, an employee must prove: (1) what s/he would have earned had s/he not suffered the wrong allegedly committed by the employer, (2) how long s/he would have continued to receive those earnings, and (3) a reasonable likelihood that s/he will not be able to earn that amount in the future, such as through alternative employment. N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 2.34. As to emotional distress damages, an employee who receives a favorable verdict is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for any emotional distress proximately caused by the adverse employment action taken by the employer against the employee. N.J. Model Civil Jury Charge 2.36. “Emotional distress” includes embarrassment, humiliation, indignity, and other mental anguish. Id. For an employee to claim future emotional distress, s/he must offer expert testimony as to the permanency of the distress. Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 551-55 (2013).
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) provides that it is unlawful, "For any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so." To hold an employee liable as an aider and abettor, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004), (quoting Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3rd Cir.1999)). Applying these general principles, courts have found individual defendants liable under LAD when, for example: (a) they act to embolden other acts of discrimination (Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 612 F.Supp.2d 546, 554 (D.N.J. 2009); (b) they flout their duty as supervisors to act against harassment, including indifference thereto, thereby creating liability for his "himself and his employer" (Hurley, 174 F.3d at 126; see also United Stated v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463 (3 Cir. 1998); or (c) when they promote the interests of the defendant employer when they harass or commit other unlawful acts under LAD against the Plaintiff. Shepherd v. Hunterdon Development Center, 226 N.J. Super. 395, 426-427 (App. Div. 2001), aff'd in relevant part, 174 N.J. 1 (2002).
If you believe you have been, or are currently the victim of workplace discrimination, do not hesitate to call to speak to one of the experienced attorneys at Mashel Law.

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The City of Anderson and Anderson police officer Steven Stoops (collectively, the City), defendants below, appeal the courts judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of Timothy Davis, plaintiff below. In particular, the City contends that it was immune from liability for Daviss personal injuries pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA, or the Act). We reverse.
On May 24, 1995, Madison County Sheriff Scott Mellinger was driving when he observed a teenage male walking along the road. The individual matched the description of a teenager who had reportedly walked away from the Madison County Juvenile Center, where he was being detained upon charges of auto theft. When the juvenile realized he had been spotted, he retreated into a nearby wooded area. Sheriff Mellinger called his office for assistance. Officers from the Madison County Sheriffs department, including a county police dog and dog handler, as well as officers from the Pendleton police department, the Anderson police department, and the Indiana State Police, arrived and took positions on the perimeter of the area in which the teenager was thought to be hiding. Officer Stoops of the Anderson police department and his dog Chester eventually relieved the Madison County Sheriffs department dog and its handler.
Among the officers who responded to Sheriff Mellingers call was Davis, who at that time was the Chief Deputy in the Madison County Sheriffs department. Davis parked his police vehicle near the edge of the wooded area into which the suspect fled, and began to search the area on foot. While walking around the area, he heard over the police radio in his car that officer Stoops and Chester had arrived and were located somewhere in the area. At one point, Davis heard something in the woods. He proceeded to investigate, and encountered Madison County Sheriffs department Captain Thompson in the vicinity of Captain Thompsons vehicle. Captain Thompson advised that officer Stoops and Chester were in the area. At some point, Davis began to walk back to his car.
Around this time, Chester alerted to what officer Stoops thought was the scent of the suspect. Officer Stoops then made an announcement over his police radio that he would deploy Chester in an off-leash search. Officer Stoops also called out and announced that Chester would be released in the area. Davis heard this announcement. Officer Stoops released the dog, and Chester began to search the area. At some point he bolted, and officer Stoops followed. When officer Stoops caught up with his dog, he saw it attacking Davis. Davis sustained bites to his groin, forearm and leg, which required extensive medical treatment.
On May 22, 1997, Davis filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the City, officer Stoops, and then-Anderson Police Chief Ronald Rheam. Davis alleged that the Citys use of Chester under the circumstances amounted to excessive force and violated Daviss civil rights, and that Chesters attack was caused by the defendantss negligence. The defendants apparently moved for summary judgment on Daviss excessive force claims, and on the ground that Daviss remaining negligence claims raised no federal issues. On April 30, 1998, the court issued its Order on Summary Judgment, rejecting Daviss allegations of excessive force, and dismissing Daviss remaining negligence claims for lack of a federal issue. The court contemporaneously issued its Order of Judgment, stating Daviss excessive force claims were dismissed with prejudice, and that this determination constituted a final judgment. There is no indication in the record that Davis appealed this judgment.
On May 29, 1998, Davis filed another Complaint in the Madison County Superior Court against the same defendants, this time raising only negligence claims. The defendants denied Daviss allegations, and asserted the affirmative defense of governmental immunity under the ITCA. They also contended that any excessive force claims implicated in the complaint were barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on their immunity claim on July 21, 1998. On September 9, 1998, venue was transferred to the Hancock County Superior Court. The court denied the Citys summary judgment motion on June 11, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the defendants moved to dismiss Daviss complaint on the ground that Davis was injured by the actions of a co-employee, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the exclusivity provision in the Indiana Workers Compensation Act. The court had not ruled on this motion by the time the matter proceeded to bench trial on June 29 and 30, 1999.
The trial court issued its Judgment Order, as well as findings of fact and conclusions of law, on January 4, 2000. The court rejected the defendantss jurisdictional challenge, dismissed Chief Rheam for lack of evidence of his liability, and concluded that the use of Chester under the circumstances was negligent. The court also again concluded that the defendants were not immune under the ITCA, and entered judgment in favor of Davis in the amount of $200,000. The City now appeals.
While the issue of a governmental entitys immunity from liability under the ITCA may require extended factual development, the issue remains a question of law for the courts. Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We therefore review claims of governmental immunity de novo. Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 720 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), rehg denied. We owe the trial court no deference, and we will substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if necessary. Pedrazza ex rel. Pedrazza v. Grande, 712 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
The City claims that it was immune from liability for officer Stoopss alleged negligence pursuant to the law enforcement immunity provision of the ITCA. Davis contends that the City is not immune because the use of Chester under the circumstances did not constitute the enforcement of a law within the meaning of the Act. Our analysis of these competing claims requires a brief review of the confusing and perpetually fluctuating status of the immunity granted to law enforcement personnel under the ITCA.
the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.
The Indiana Supreme Court originally interpreted this provision to mean that government entities would be immune under the ITCA for all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment. Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind. 1981), clarified on rehearing, 428 N.E.2d 203. The supreme court subsequently disavowed Seymours broad view of law enforcement immunity under the ITCA on the ground that Seymours interpretation was inconsistent with the intent of the legislature. Tittle v. Mahan, 582 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ind. 1991). In Tittle, the court explained that by enacting the ITCAs law enforcement immunity provision, the legislature intended to include only those activities attendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law. Id. at 801. For other actions taken by law enforcement officers, government entities would be subject to liability to the extent allowable at common law. Id.
The supreme court revisited the issue and overruled Tittle two years later in Quackenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993). In Quackenbush, the supreme court expanded its definition of law enforcement beyond the bounds set by Tittle, explaining that its conclusion in Tittle regarding the legislatures intent to immunize only actual attempts to effect arrests had produced an unworkable rule of law, and was, after further reflection, analytically unsound. Id. at 1287. The court stated that the scope of the phrase adoption or enforcement of a law . . . is not limited to traditional law enforcement activities such as the arrest or pursuit of suspects by police. Rather, in its broader (and correct) meaning, Section 3(7) applies to the decision of any governmental entity and its employees about whether to adopt or enforce any statute, rule, or regulation. Id. at n.3. Although Quackenbush expanded the meaning of law enforcement under the ITCA,See footnote the court circumscribed the availability of immunity for such enforcement. The majority in Quackenbush decided that, by enacting the law enforcement immunity provision of the ITCA, the legislature actually intended to codify the common law as it existed at the time the Act was passed. Id. at 1290-1291. The court explained that when the ITCA was enacted, [t]he state of the common law was such that governments and their employees were subject to liability for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but were immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large. Id. at 1291. Thus, under Quackenbush, governmental entities would be immune from liability for losses stemming from law enforcement activities that breached public duties, but not for losses resulting from the violation of private duties. The court went on to determine that the negligent operation of a police car involved the breach of a private duty, and that the officer in question was not immune from liability. Id.
The supreme courts recent decision in Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1999) nullified much of Quackenbush. In Benton, the court jettisoned Quackenbushs complicated conception of common law governmental duty and immunity, and explained that under the common law as set forth in Campbell, governmental entities were simply under a general duty to exercise reasonable care, subject to the common law immunities identified in Campbell. Id. at 229-230. The court rejected Quackenbushs distinction between private and public duties owed by government entities, determining that the distinction was so highly abstract and almost metaphysical as to be unworkable in practice. Id. at 230. Although Benton did not directly involve immunity under the ITCA, the court reaffirmed the extensive protections from tort liability afforded Indiana governmental units under the ITCA, and explained that analysis of this immunity should focus on the ITCA itself rather than on judicially created tests by stating that, [i]n returning to the moorings of Campbell, we also return to the principle that it is the legislature, and not the courts, that is in the best position to determine the nature and extent to which governmental units in Indiana should be insulated from tort liability. Id. at 232.
In light of our supreme courts abrogation of the public duty / private duty test for ascertaining the existence of law enforcement immunity under the ITCA, and the courts reaffirmation of the primacy of the intent of the legislature, our task in this case is clear. We must determine whether, under the terms of the ITCA, the City was entitled to immunity for officer Stoopss alleged negligence. As noted above, the law enforcement immunity provision of the ITCA shields a government entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employees employment from liability for losses resulting from the enforcement of . . . a law . . . unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). There is no question here that officer Stoops was the Citys employee at the time of the incident, and Davis has not alleged false arrest or false imprisonment. Moreover, Davis does not contend that officer Stoops was acting outside the scope of his employment when he deployed Chester. See footnote We must therefore determine whether officer Stoops was engaged in the enforcement of a law at the time of Chesters attack.
As noted above, the supreme court in Mullin explained that the scope of the term enforcement is limited to those activities in which a government entity or its employees compel or attempt to compel the obedience of another to laws, rules or regulations, or sanction or attempt to sanction a violation thereof. 639 N.E.2d at 283. Davis contends that the Citys use of Chester did not constitute law enforcement because the City used the dog despite knowing that Chester had inappropriately attacked people in the past. Daviss argument here essentially describes his negligence claim. Davis cites no authority, and there appears to be none, suggesting that when a police officer performs his duties in a negligent manner, the officer is no longer enforcing a law. To exempt negligent acts from immunity under the Act, the explicit purpose of which is to shield government entities from liability for losses resulting from the performance of various governmental functions, would render the act largely meaningless. It is, after all, the Tort Claims Act. Indeed, police officers may be immune when their conduct is intentionally tortious, see City of Anderson v. Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied (holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress), and even when it is egregious and apparently contrary to law. Minks, 709 N.E.2d at 382-383 (holding that police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager, who was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his intoxicated relative, to drive the vehicle home rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork for the two intoxicated subjects, were immune from liability for damages resulting from deaths of two innocent motorists, and injuries to another, cause by the drunk driving relative).
Here, the City deployed Chester to assist in locating and apprehending an individual who had escaped from a juvenile detention facility, where he was being held on charges of auto theft, and who was evading recapture by the police. The Citys use of Chester under the circumstances plainly constituted an activit[y] in which a government entity or its employees compel or attempt to compel the obedience of another to laws, rules or regulations, or sanction or attempt to sanction a violation thereof, and therefore amounted to the enforcement of a law within the meaning of the ITCA.
Finally, we note that a portion of Daviss brief may be construed to suggest that, regardless of whether Officer Stoops was enforcing a law in the scope of his employment, the City is not entitled to immunity because Officer Stoopss use of Chester to apprehend the fleeing subject under the circumstances amounted to an unconstitutional use of excessive force. It is unclear if a police officer enforcing the law in the scope of his employment would be exempt from immunity under the ITCA if his actions amounted to excessive force, or were illegal in some other way. See footnote However, we need not determine this question here because, as the City notes, the legality of the Citys use of force was an issue resolved against Davis in the prior federal court action, and Davis was collaterally estopped from raising it again in his state case.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation in a subsequent action of a fact or issue adjudicated in a prior lawsuit. Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ind. 1998). The former adjudication will be conclusive in the subsequent action even if the two actions are on different claims. Sullivan v. American Cas. Co., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. 1992). When determining whether a party is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue, a court must consider whether the party against whom the judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit estoppel. Id. at 138.
Davis pursued his excessive force claims in the United States District Court. The federal court entered summary judgment against Davis on these claims, a final judgment from which Davis apparently took no appeal. Davis conceded in the trial court that his excessive force claims were rejected by the federal court, and he presents no argument upon appeal that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his excessive force claim in the prior action, or that application of collateral estoppel would be otherwise unfair. Thus, the federal courts judgment dismissing Daviss excessive force claims must be given preclusive effect here, and to the extent Davis argues that the City is not entitled to law enforcement immunity because its use of Chester amounted to an illegal use of excessive force, that argument would fail.
In sum, because Daviss damages resulted from officer Stoopss deployment of Chester, which constituted the enforcement of law in the scope of his employment, the City is immune from liability pursuant to the ITCA.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATTINGLY, J., concur.
Footnote: The City also challenges the qualification and testimony of one of Daviss experts, claims that Davis was contributorily negligent, and argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case by virtue of the exclusivity provision of the Workers Compensation Act. Because of our resolution of the governmental immunity issue, it is not necessary to address these claims.
Footnote: We would conclude that officer Stoops was acting within the scope of his employment, if called upon to determine the issue. The supreme court recently explained the meaning of scope of employment in the context of governmental immunity in the case of Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 2000). The court explained that conduct . . . of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized, is within the employees scope of employment. Id. at 453 (quoting Restatement (Second) Agency § 229 (1958)). An act is incidental to authorized conduct when it is subordinate to or pertinent to an act which the servant is employed to perform, id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Agency § 229 cmt. b (1958)), or when it is done to an appreciable extent to further his employers business. Id. (quoting Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind. 1993). In this case, there is no question that Officer Stoopss use of his police canine Chester to find and apprehend a fleeing suspect was intended to further the police activities of his employer, the City. This was precisely the conduct that Officer Stoops was employed to perform, and was accordingly in the scope of his employment.
Footnote: In Kemezy, the supreme court applied the test from Quackenbush, which had been issued the same day, and determined that the ITCA did not immunize a police officers use of excessive force, reasoning that law enforcement officers owe a private duty to refrain from using excessive force in the course of making arrests. Id. at 1297. However, as noted above, the supreme court in Benton explicitly disavowed the Quackenbush public duty / private duty test, upon which the holding of Kemezy is based. Thus, the excessive force exception to ITCA immunity announced in Kemezy cannot be regarded as good law to the extent that it is based on the Quackenbush test. The Act itself does not provide an explicit immunity exemption for excessive force or other illegal acts. The only exceptions specifically recognized are false arrest and false imprisonment. The interpretation of the ITCA to include a free standing illegality or excessive force exception, without any explicit support in the Act itself, would appear to run afoul of the supreme courts admonition in Benton that it is the legislature, and not the courts, that is in the best position to determine the nature and extent to which governmental units in Indiana should be insulated from tort liability. Id. at 232. But see OBannon v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1, 1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that actions of City of Anderson police officers in effecting the arrest of an armed felon who had attempted to kill a police officer did not amount to excessive force, and that the officers were entitled to law enforcement immunity under the ITCA). We also note that a police officers use of excessive force or performance of his duties in an otherwise illegal manner would not appear to take those activities outside the scope of his employment, see Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d at 186 (noting that willful and wanton behavior, and even intentional criminal conduct, may fall within the scope of employment), or beyond the realm of law enforcement. See Minks, 709 N.E.2d at 382-383 (immunizing apparently unlawful actions by police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager to drive a vehicle rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork).


Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 涉案的597专利涉及保护计算机网络设备免受外部攻击的技术。597专利的发明人在发明期间，曾作为员工就职于Cisco Systems, Inc.。发明人将这项发明的专利权转让给Cisco并保证将帮助获得并执行该专利。发明人随后从Cisco离职并与他人共同创立Arista Networks, Inc.
On November 9, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the doctrine of assignor estoppel should apply in the context of an inter partes review. The Court concluded that the doctrine of assignor estoppel does not apply because 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) unambiguously reflects Congress’s intent that any person who is not the owner of a patent may file an inter partes review petition.
The patent at issue (the ’597 patent) relates to protecting computer network devices from external attacks. The inventor of the ’597 patent was a Cisco Systems, Inc. employee at the time of the invention. He assigned his rights to the invention to Cisco and provided assurances that he would aid in obtaining and enforcing the patent. The inventor subsequently left Cisco and co-founded Arista Networks, Inc.
Thereafter, Arista petitioned for an inter partes review of certain claims of the ’597 patent. In its final written decision, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) concluded that only some challenged claims were invalid. Arista appealed the decision upholding certain claims as valid. Cisco cross-appealed the decision finding certain claims invalid, and asserted that the PTAB erred by not applying the doctrine of assignor estoppel to prevent Arista from initially challenging the patent’s validity.
The doctrine of assignor estoppel is a common law principle that bars the assignor of a patent, or those in privity with the assignor, such as a corporation founded by the assignor, from subsequently challenging the validity of the patent. The doctrine has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924). The doctrine also has been applied in the context of ITC proceedings. In a related ITC investigation, the Commission held that assignor estoppel barred Arista’s challenge to Cisco’s patent validity.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first evaluated whether the PTAB’s decision not to apply assignor estoppel was reviewable. The Court concluded that it could review this decision because the issue was not closely related to the PTAB Director’s preliminary patentability assessment or the Director’s discretion not to institute even if the threshold patentability assessment was met.
The Court then considered the applicability of the doctrine in the context of IPR proceedings. The PTAB had provided two reasons for its determination that assignor estoppel did not apply in inter partes review proceedings, concluding that: (1) 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) demonstrates Congress’s broad grant of the ability to challenge patent validity and (2) Congress has not expressly recognized assignor estoppel in the inter partes review context. The Court agreed, concluding that the language of § 311(a) - “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review . . .” - unambiguously demonstrates that Congress did not intend to exclude an assignor from petitioning for inter partes review.
The Court recognized that its decision could lead to forum shopping, but concluded that the decision was consistent with the goals of inter partes review. The decision also resolves a potential inconsistency in prior Court rulings on the issue of reviewability. Compare Husky Inj. Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d. 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2016) with Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
This case may be significant for companies with employees who assign inventions to their employer. Even though a patent owner could potentially block a validity challenge from an assignor in district court, the patent owner may still be vulnerable to an inter partes review petition by the assignor or those in privity with an assignor. An open question remains as to whether this scenario could be avoided through contractual provisions that specifically waive the right to challenge validity in subsequent proceedings.


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