text:
M. Delaney singled up the middle.
M. Basile singled up the middle; M. Delaney advanced to second.
A. Carney singled up the middle.
R. Russo advanced to second on a passed ball.
M. Meyer singled to shortstop; R. Russo advanced to third.
B. Goodrich singled to right field, RBI; M. Meyer advanced to second; R. Russo scored, unearned.
D. Evans reached on a fielder's choice; B. Goodrich advanced to second; M. Meyer out at third p to 3b.
D. Evans advanced to second; B. Goodrich advanced to third on a wild pitch.
A. Haberer tripled to right field, 2 RBI; D. Evans scored, unearned; B. Goodrich scored, unearned.
G. Bongiorno singled to shortstop.
A. Johnson to rf for R. Allen.
M. Basile walked; M. Delaney advanced to second.
V. Grayson reached on a fielder's choice; M. Basile advanced to second; M. Delaney out at third 3b unassisted.
E. McNamara to 2b for H. Prenoveau.
M. Grosch singled up the middle.
N. Papasergi reached first on an error by p; M. Grosch advanced to second.
K. Meyer to ss for A. Barnas.
J. Hartman pinch hit for R. Colan.
S. Belkota pinch ran for V. Purucker.
M. Millevill singled up the middle, RBI; S. Belkota scored.
A. Carney tripled to center field, RBI; M. Millevill scored.
V. Purucker pinch ran for S. Belkota.
V. Grayson singled up the middle; M. Delaney advanced to second.
M. McNeill doubled to left field, RBI; V. Grayson advanced to third; M. Delaney scored.
S. Shallcros to 1b for G. Bongiorno.
K. Barone to rf for N. Papasergi.
D. Evans tripled to right center.
V. Purucker singled to left center.
A. Carney advanced to second; V. Purucker scored on a wild pitch.
M. Basile singled through the left side; M. Delaney advanced to second.
V. Grayson singled to center field; M. Basile advanced to second; M. Delaney advanced to third.
A. Johnson pinch ran for V. Grayson.

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text:
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, Respondents.
In the letter-complaint, 3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainant’s father allegedly gave the subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote 5 to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder6 , respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred 7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission’s full faith and credence.
Respondent’s evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject property to the Respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife’s signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced.
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant’s father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon. as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, 11 purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme." As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.’s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon’s acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, 15 which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated "this ___ day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter’s TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
1.	September 24, 1992, filed by Jose Ducat, Jr.
2.	Resolution dated March 1, 2000.
3.	Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
4.	Records, Vol. I, pp. 10-19.
5.	Records, Vol. I, pp. 47-48.
6.	Records, Vol. I, pp. 64-72.
7.	Resolution dated February 1, 1993, Records, p. 46.
8.	Records, Vol. I, Report and Recommendation, pp. 7-10.
9.	Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Cruz v. Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto, Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000 citing Maligsa v. Cabantig, 272 SCRA 408 .
10.	Leonito Gonato and Primrose Gonato v. Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza, Adm. Case No. 4083, March 27, 2000 citing Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 .
11.	Exhibit "A-2" Rollo Vol. I, p. 20.
12.	Nakpil v. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, 774  citing Igual v. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 .
13.	Adm. Case No. 2936, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 108.
14.	Ibid., pp. 114, 117-118.
15.	Exhibit "A-3", ` Vol. II, p. 21.

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The 2019 Jury is chaired by Pascal Nemirovski, “International Chair in Piano” at the Royal Birmingham Conservatoire, Hon ARAM from the Royal Academy of Music in London.
Concert Pianist, Professor and International Chair in Piano, Royal Birmingham Conservatoire. Honorary Professor, Royal Academy of Music in London.
The French Pianist Pascal Nemirovski, Hon ARAM joined the Royal Birmingham Conservatoire in September 2016, where he holds the position of International Chair in Piano.
He is recognised as one of the most sought-after piano pedagogues in the world with many of his students winning top international prizes and now successful recording artists represented by major Concert Artist Maement companies, among them Lise de la Salle, 1st Prize winner of the Ettlingen International Piano Competition and Young Concert Artist (YCA) in New York and Louis Schwizgebel, 2nd Prize at the Leeds International Piano Competition and BBC New Generation Artist between 2013-2015.
From 1981 to 1984, Pascal studied with Nadia Reisenberg and Adele Marcus at the Juilliard School where he was awarded a full scholarship (Steinway & Freundlich Fund). In 1984, he settled in Paris and continued his studies with France Clidat and Alexis Weissenberg, while giving concerts and masterclasses in Europe, the United States and Asia.
In 1990, his vocation for teaching was recognised by violinist Vladimir Spivakov who invited him to to create and lead the Masterclasses of the International Festival of Colmar. This festival brought together the greatest international institutions such as the Paris Conservatoire, Philadelphia’s Curtis Institute of Music, London’s Royal Academy of Music, the Moscow Conservatory, and New York’s Juilliard School. Pascal was the youngest contributing professor, among internationally renowned figures including Dmitri Bashkirov, Pascal Devoyon, Gary Graffman, Vladimir Krainev, Reina Sherechevskaia, Tatiana Zelikman.
In 2004, he released his first CD “Entre Ciel et Terre” devoted to Chopin, Prokofiev and Scriabin which was unanimously acclaimed by the press.
From 2006 to 2016, he taught at the Royal Academy of Music in London and was awarded Honorary Associate of the Royal Academy of Music (Hon ARAM). Having much experience in teaching, he was also responsible for the Subject Specialism “Piano Pedagogy” for LRAM (Licentiate of the Royal Academy of Music) and edited two books. During this period, he also taught at the Purcell School.
He is also very much in demand as a jury member at International Piano Competition throughout the world and has been appointed Artistic Director and Chairman of the Jury of the “Concours International de Piano Antoine de Saint-Exupéry” (Saint-Priest-Lyon, France) in May 2017.
Pascal Nemirovski is a Steinway Artist.
She has performed as soloist under the batons of most of the world’s finest conductors, including Leopold Stokowski, Georg Solti, Zubin Mehta, Kemperer, Kirill Kondrashin, Michael Tilson Thomas, Edo de Waart, Leonard Slatkin, Sergiu Comissiona, Colin Davis, Kurt Sanderling, Cassadesus, Bertini, Raymond Leppard, Wolfgang Sawallisch, Atzmon, Raymond Leppard, Rodan, James Judd, Lawrence Foster, Matthias Bamert, Mariss Jansons and Vanska.
A regular participant in summer festivals, Vered has made appearances at the Mostly Mozart Festival in New York, Chicago’s Ravinia Festival, Tanglewood, Cleveland’s Blossom Festival, the Meadow-brooks Festival in Detroit, and at Los Angeles’ Hollywood Bowl. She has repeatedly demonstrated sovereign musical and technical command over some forty-five concertos – from J.S. Bach, through Mozart, Chopin, Johannes Brahms, Tchaikovsky and Sergei Rachmaninov, to Alban Berg….
Ilana Vered is a chamber musician of distinction and is noted particularly for her frequent performances with the Tokyo String Quartet. A highlight of this collaboration was Vered’s world premiere performance with the ensemble of Ezra Laderman’s Piano Quintet at the Metropolitan Museum in New York City. During the Hampton Summerfest and the Rutgers Summerfest Ilana Vered performed the five L.v. Beethoven concertos in one event.
During the 1993-1994 season, she performed a L.v. Beethoven cycle of the complete sonatas and variations for piano and cello, with cellist Sharon Robinson, in Washington, D.C., Santa Fe, New York City.
Ilana Vered recorded for Decca/London works by Brahms, Mozart and Rachmaninov. For connoisseur society she recorded the complete Chopin Etudes, Op. 10 and 25, complete recording of Moszkowski’s 15 Études de Virtuosité, Op. 72 (1970). Decca also released a disc entitled “25 Virtuoso Etudes” new readings of concert etudes by Chopin, Schumann, Paganini-Liszt, and Debussy (1992). Vered committed to disc the complete set of Beethoven’s five piano concertos with the Warsaw Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Kazimierz Kord (1993 ProArte). Ilana Vered has made a series of unusual feature length films entitled “Looking at Music” being distributed in the US by BMG.
She has taught master-classes world wide and has founded three festivals : the Summerfest Series of Rutgers University, the Hamptons Summerfest, and Music Fest Perugia in Perugia, Italy, which is today the largest festival for young classical musicians in Italy. She is also a frequent juror of many international competitions: Young Concert Artists (NY), Vendome Prize (Verbier), Jerusalem Young Talent Prize, Saint Priest (Lyon), Silk Road Competition (Xian) and others.
Presently she is spending the winter in Vancouver, giving master classes at the University and appearing at the “satelites” Music fest Perugia has founded in Seoul, Moscow and Taipei.
Artist manager at the agency Caecilia.
Director of the “Meisterinterpreten” concert series at the Tonhalle Zurich.
Born 1972 into a family of musicians. Started playing the piano at age 5 and won 1st prize at the Swiss Youth Music Competition.
Studied musicology at the University of Zurich and holds a master in Arts Management.
Started his professional career within Universal Music as promotion manager for the labels Decca and Philips where he worked for artists such as Alfred Brendel, Cecilia Bartoli and Sir Georg Solti.
Currently artist manager at the agency Caecilia (Geneva/Zurich) where he manages some world-class soloists. Director of the concert series “Meisterinterpreten” at the Tonhalle Zurich where he presents stars such as Daniel Barenboim, Martha Argerich, Murray Perahia, Radu Lupu but also with great enthusiasm the next generation such as Benjamin Grosvenor, Francesco Piemontesi and Louis Schwizgebel.
In leisure time he likes reading books, travelling, playing Tennis and hiking the mountains.
Editor Live Music and New Generation Artists BBC Radio 3.
Emma Bloxham read music at Oxford University and joined the BBC in 1997.
She has held a variety of posts at BBC Radio 3 and is currently Editor live music; her responsibilities include the radio coverage of the BBC Proms, Opera and the New Generation Artists scheme.
She has extensive experience of working in the recording studio and is passionate about helping young musicians develop their careers.
Philippe Cassard has established an international reputation as concerto soloist, recitalist and chamber musician since giving a joint recital with Christa Ludwig in Paris in 1985. The same year he was finalist at the Clara Haskil Competition and in 1988 he won the First Prize at the Dublin International Piano Competition.
His performance of the complete piano works of Debussy (four recitals in a single day) received extremely enthusiastic press and media coverage. He has presented the cycle in London Wigmore Hall, Dublin, Paris, Lisbon, Sydney, Singapore and Tokyo. His Debussy’s recordings published by Decca have been awarded Grand Prix du Disque Français in 1994.
He also visits China, Australia, South America and Canada regulary.
Philippe plays also a huge repertoire of chamber music, and he appearead with such artists as Natalie Dessay, Angelika Kirchschlager, Wolfgang Holzmair, Cédric Pescia, Paul Meyer, David Grimal, Anne Gastinel, Matt Haimovitz, Isabelle Faust, the Ebene, Modigliani, Takacs, Auryn, Vanbrugh, Danish and Chilingirian string quartets.
His recording of Schumann’s Humoresque and Fantasiestücke op.12 was awarded Gramophone Editor’s Choice and FM Magazine « Best Buy » (2005). Philippe Cassard’s releases (Schubert 8 Impromptus, Brahms op.116 to 119) have been received very warmly.
Philippe joins soprano Natalie Dessay in 2012 for a Debussy Songs programme (Erato) and a Poulenc, Fauré, Duparc and Chausson recital in 2015. His recent release of a Schubert programme (Sonata D959 and four hands piano music with Swiss pianist Cédric Pescia) for La Dolce Volta, has been awarded “Choc 2014” by Classica magazine.
Philippe Cassard has been artistic director of the festival « Nuits Romantiques du Lac du Bourget » (1999-2008), and since 2005, he has presented 430 live weekly programmes on France Musique Radio dedicated to piano interpretation (awarded Prix SCAM in 2007 as “Best radio programme”). He has written an essay on Schubert and a book on cinema and music links.
Unconventional and original in her choice of repertoire, Marie Catherine Girod has made herself a special place in the musical world by her virtuosic interpretation of unknown repertoire .Her performances delivery counterpoised by masterly technique and her personal engagement, have allowed a large audience to get acquainted with composers such as Abel Decaux, Tournemire, Le Flem, D’Indy, Emmanuel or Aubert, but also Arnold Bax or York Bowen for the English music, without of course neglecting the classic and romantic repertoire in which she excels as testify her recordings of Chopin, Franck, Rachmaninov or Weber. Regularly invited to perform in festivals such as le festival Chopin de Bagatelle et de Nohant, the festival de la Roque d’Anthéron, where she played the complete Etudes by Chopin in 2016, La Folle Journée de Nantes and La Folle Journée in Tokyo, and also festivals abroad, including the Husum Festival in Germany devoted to “Rareties of Piano Music”. She also takes part periodically in radio shows in France Musique or in Radio Classique.
Marie Catherine Girod teaches at the Ecole Normale de Musique de Paris.
Passionate, enthusiastic, sensitive in all her public appearances, Marie Catherine Girod takes the testimony of her art at the highest level. Marie Catherine Girod was made a Knight of Arts and Letters and Chevalier in the Order of Merite.
Vladimir Ovchinnikov is the only pianist ever to receive top prizes at the Tchaikovsky International Piano Competition (1982) International and the Leeds International Piano Competition (1987).
Vladimir Ovchinnikov is also a laureate of the Concours International de Montreal (Canada, 1980, 2nd Prize) and the International Music Competition G.B.Viotti in Vercelli (Italy, 1984, 1st Prize).
His success at Leeds launched his international career. He made a triumphant début in London in the presence of Her Majesty the Queen.
Vladimir Ovchinnikov is a graduate of the Central Special Music School (the class of) and the Moscow Conservatory. He studied with A. Artobolevskaya and then Prof. A. Nasedkin.
He appears regularly with orchestras all over the world, including the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, the Philharmonia Orchestra, BBC Symphony Orchestra, the Royal Scottish National Orchestra, the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra and the English Classical Players in the UK. He has also appeared with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra, Montreal Symphony Orchestra and numerous others from around the world. In Russia he works with the St. Petersburg Philharmonic Orchestra, Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra, the Great Symphony Orchestra and the State Academic Symphony Orchestra.
He has performed with many leading conductors including E. Svetlanov, Sir Georg Solti, V. Ashkenazy, R. Barshay, M. Bamert, J. Brett, W. Weller, A. Wit, A. Dmitriev, J. Kraizberg, L. Pesek, G. Rozhdestvensky, S. Skrowaczewski, V. Fedoseev, M. Jansons, N. Jarvi, A. Lazarev, R. Martynov, Y. Simonov, V. Poliansky, A. Vedernikov, T. Sanderling, J. Conlon, V. Gergiev, M. Gorenstein, M. Shostakovich.
V. Ovchinnikov possesses a wide repertory and appears in most prestigious Concert Halls such as the Great Hall of the Moscow Conservatory, the Great Hall of St. Petersburg Philharmony, Carnegie Hall and Lincoln Centre in New York, the Albert Hall and Royal Festival Hall in London, the Gewandhaus in Germany, the Vienna Musikverein, Conservatorio Milano Verdi, Champs-Elysees Theatre in Paris, Suntory Hall in Tokyo and has received the highest praises of the audience, music critics and press. His festival appearances include: Carnegie Hall and Hollywood Bowl (USA), Edinburgh and Cheltenham (UK), Schleswig Holstein (Germany), Sintra (Portugal), Stresa (Italy), Singapore Festival, BBC Proms in London, V. Cliburn in Concert Festival (USA).
EMI released his CDs with “Transcendental Etudes” by Liszt, “Etudes — Tableaux” by Rachmaninoff, all 9 Sonatas and pieces from the ballet “Cinderella” by Prokofiev. For the label Collins Classics he recorded the First Piano Concerto by Shostakovich with the Philharmonia Orchestra conducted by Maxim Shostakovich and “Pictures at an Exhibition”.
For several years he was the Guest Professor of Piano at the Royal Northern College of Music in England and Rector of the Central Music School of the Moscow Tchaikovsky Conservatory from 2011 to 2016. He is now the Head of the piano department and Professor at the Gnessin Institute of Music.
Currently he is the Resident Professor of piano at the Moscow Conservatory and Guest Professor of Piano at the Moscow State University in Russia. He has also been a jury member of many International Competitions.
In 2005 Vladimir Ovchinnikov received Russia’s highest award and honour for Musicians — the title National Artist of Russia awarded by the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

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Lennon v. Cohen, 264 Mass. 414, 420, and cases cited. See First Report of Judicial Council of Massachusetts, .... There seems to us to be nothing in Stewart v.
5/21/2015, Court, 202-Richards v Prieto_Amicus Curiae Charles Nichols' Motion for ... by Gura for Appellants Calguns Foundation, Richards, SAF and Stewart.
A summary and case brief of Stewart v. Stewart, including the facts, issue, rule of law, holding and reasoning, key terms, ... Holding and Reasoning (Richards, J.).
In a decision filed December 6, 2012, Plaintiffs Adam Richards, Brett Stewart, the ... Circuit now states “In light of our disposition of the same issue in Peruta v.
Mar 8, 2018 ... Cases addressed in this video include: DFC v. Muirfield · Dell v. Magnetar · Verition v. Aruba · Corwin v. KKR · In re: Saba · Sciabacucchi v.

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On September 30, 2018, Governor Brown signed SB 212, an act amending the California Integrated Waste Management Act to create a statewide takeback program for pharmaceuticals and sharps (the “Act”) from households. California joins Washington and New York in implementing statewide pharmaceutical takeback programs. By enacting SB 212, California also adds to existing producer-funded stewardship programs operating in the State for products ranging from paint to mattresses.
The Act requires manufacturers of “covered products” to create and operate a stewardship program that provides for the takeback of covered drugs and home-generated sharps waste from households. The Act also imposes various requirements on a covered entity or stewardship organization that operates a stewardship program, including submitting a proposed stewardship plan, an initial stewardship program budget, an annual budget, annual report, and other specified information to the California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (“CalRecycle”). CalRecycle is required to adopt implementing regulations no later than January 1, 2021. Cal. Pub. Resc. Code § 42031.2(a). “Program operators” must submit their proposed programs within six months of CalRecycle adopting relevant implementing regulations.
Under the Act, “covered product” means a covered drug or home-generated sharps waste. § 42030(g). A “covered drug” is defined as a drug, including a brand name or generic drug, sold, offered for sale, or dispensed in the State. § 42030(e)(1). Covered drugs also include a drug in a medical device, or a combination product containing a drug and a medical device. Id. Covered drugs exclude vitamins, supplements, herbal-based remedies, cosmetics, household cleaning products, drugs that are used for animal medicines, and medical devices, or component parts or accessories of medical devices, if they do not contain a covered drug. § 42030(e)(2).
Home-generated sharps waste means hypodermic needles, pen needles, intravenous needles, lancets and other devices that are used to penetrate the skin for the delivery of medications. § 42030(l) (incorporating Health and Safety Code § 117671).
A “covered entity” is the manufacturer of covered drugs or sharps that are sold in or into the state. § 42030(f)(1)(A). If no entity meets this “manufacturer” definition, the Act then identifies four other potential elements of the supply chain as “covered entities”, ranging from the distributor of covered products that is licensed as a wholesaler, to a repackager, to the owner or licensee of a trademark or brand under which the covered products are sold in or into the state, to ensure that an entity is responsible for managing all covered products. § 42030(f)(1)(B)-(E).
A “stewardship organization” is a non-profit organization, which must be a 501(c)(3) entity under the federal Internal Revenue Code, that is established by a group of covered entities to develop, implement, and administer a stewardship program for covered drugs and/or home-generated sharps waste. § 42030(w). A “program operator” means a covered entity, or stewardship organization acting on behalf of a group of covered entities, that is responsible for operating a stewardship program. § 42030(q).
An “authorized collector” means a person or entity that has entered into an agreement with a program operator to collect covered drugs, which can include a law enforcement agency, a retail pharmacy, or other collector registered with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that is authorized to collect controlled substances for the purpose of destruction. § 42030(b). An “authorized collection site” means a location where an authorized collector operates a secure collection receptacle for collecting covered products. § 42030(a).
A “retail pharmacy” is a pharmacy possessing a license from the California Board of Pharmacy to operate a pharmacy. § 42030(s). A “retail pharmacy chain” means a retail pharmacy with five or more stores in the state. § 42030(t). As discussed below, the Act places certain collection obligations on retail pharmacy chains.
Within 90 days of the Act’s effective date, a covered entity must identify all covered products, and identify any drugs or sharps that are not covered products, that it sells or offers for sale in the state. § 42031(a)(1). A covered entity, or the stewardship organization on behalf of covered entities, must update this list by January 15th of each year. § 42031(a)(2).
Within 90 days of the Act’s effective date, a retail pharmacy that sells a covered product under its own label must identify the covered entity from which the retail pharmacy obtains a covered product that the retail pharmacy sells under its store label. § 42031(b). The California Board of Pharmacy shall verify the information collected pursuant to this and the prior paragraph, and make it available to CalRecycle. § 42031(c).
If an entity receives a letter of inquiry as to what drugs and sharps it distributes in California from the California Board of Pharmacy, it must respond within 60 days. § 42031(d). If the entity does not believe it is a covered entity, it must state the basis for that belief, a list of any drugs and sharps it sells, distributes, repackages, or otherwise offers for sale in California, and identify the name and contact information of the manufacturer for each drug identified. Id. Information provided pursuant to this requirement may be shared with CalRecycle, but is otherwise deemed proprietary and exempt from disclosure. Id.
Within six months of the adoption date of regulations, a program operator must submit a complete stewardship plan for the establishment and implementation of a stewardship program to CalRecycle for approval. § 42032(a)(1). Prior to submitting a stewardship plan to CalRecycle, a program operator must submit its proposed stewardship plan for review to the California Board of Pharmacy and also to any other state agency with areas of authority relative to the stewardship plan. § 42032(b)(1).
An agency that receives a plan shall review the plan for compliance with state and federal laws and regulations related to the agency’s respective authority. § 42032(b)(2). The agency shall determine compliance or noncompliance with those laws and regulations within 90 days of receipt of the plan, and provide to the program operator that determination and an explanation for any finding of noncompliance. Id.
CalRecycle must review the submitted plan and determine if it is complete within 30 days of receipt, and notify the program operator. § 42032(c)(1). If CalRecycle determines that a plan is incomplete, it shall identify for the program operator the required additional information, and the program operator shall resubmit the plan within 30 days. § 42032(c)(3).
CalRecycle must review the plan and approve, disapprove, or conditionally approve the plan within 90 days of receipt of a complete plan. § 42032(d)(1). This timeline shall be extended if CalRecycle consults with or submits a plan to another state agency. § 42032(d)(2). If CalRecycle disapproves a submitted stewardship plan, it must explain in writing how the plan does not comply with the Act within 30 days of disapproving the plan. § 42032(f)(1).
A program operator is required to fully implement the operation of an approved stewardship program no later than 270 days after CalRecycle approves the stewardship plan. § 42032(g).
The law identifies the information required for plan proposals, including information about each participating covered entity, each covered drug, the method for handling, transporting, and disposing of collected products, and a demonstration of adequate funding. § 42032.2. All handling, transport, and disposal undertaken as a part of a stewardship program must comply with all applicable state and federal laws, including, but not limited to, regulations adopted by the DEA. § 42035.8.
A stewardship plan for covered drugs must provide for a collection system meeting the “convenience standard,” which is defined as providing in each county in which the plan shall be implemented: (i) a minimum of five authorized collection sites or one authorized collection site per 50,000 residents, whichever is greater; (ii) a “reasonable geographic spread” of authorized collection sites and an explanation for the geographic spread; and (iii) a mail-back program covering any counties where there is not an authorized retail pharmacy operating as an authorized collection site. § 42032.2(a)(1)(F).
In addition, a plan must permit homeless, homebound, or disabled individuals to request prepaid, preaddressed, mailing envelopes or alternative forms of a collection and disposal system that would render a covered drug inert. § 42032.2(a)(1)(G)(i). Moreover, a plan must provide alternative methods of collection for any covered drugs, other than controlled substances, that cannot be accepted or commingled with other covered drugs in secure collection receptacles or through a mailback program, to the extent technically feasible and permissible under state and federal law. § 42032.2(a)(1)(G)(ii).
At least 120 days before submitting a stewardship plan for covered drugs, the program operator shall notify potential authorized collectors in the county or counties in which it operates of the opportunity to serve as an authorized collector for the proposed stewardship program. § 42032.2(b)(1). If a potential authorized collector expresses interest in participating in a stewardship program, the program operator shall commence good faith negotiations with the potential authorized collector within 30 days. Id.
After a stewardship plan for covered drugs has been approved, the program operator may supplement service, if approved by CalRecycle, for a county in which it operates that does not have the minimum number of authorized collection sites due to circumstances beyond the program operator’s control, by establishing (1) a mail back program, which may include providing information on where and how to receive mail-back materials or providing the location at which it distributes prepaid, preaddressed mailing envelopes (locations shall be proposed as part of the stewardship plan) (note that prepaid mailing envelopes may be mailed to an “ultimate user” upon request), and/or (2) an alternative form of collection and disposal of covered drugs that complies with applicable state and federal laws, including DEA regulations. § 42032.2(c).
A stewardship plan for home-generated sharps waste must provide for a mail back handling, transport, and disposal system, at no cost to the end-user, that complies with applicable state and federal laws. § 42032.2(d)(1). The program must provide or initiate distribution of a sharps waste container and mail-back materials at the point of sale, to the extent allowable by law. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F). The program operator shall select and distribute a container and mail-back materials sufficient to accommodate the volume of sharps purchased by an ultimate user over a selected time period, and all sharps waste containers shall include prepaid postage affixed to the container or to the mail-back packaging. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F). All sharps waste containers shall include the program operator’s website address and toll-free telephone number affixed to a label on the container or packaging, or on a separate insert included in the container or packaging. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F)(i)(II). The program must also demonstrate adequate funding for all administrative and operational costs of the sharps waste stewardship program. § 42032.2(d)(1)(C).
Upon request, a stewardship plan must provide for reimbursement to local agencies for actual costs of transport and disposal related to home-generated sharps waste, unless the program operator provides for the removal of the home-generated sharps waste from the local household hazardous waste facility. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F)(ii). When a local jurisdiction requests removal of home-generated sharps waste, cost recovery, or reimbursement for removal of home-generated sharps, the local jurisdiction must provide information on home-generated sharps waste to the covered entity or program operator, within a reasonable time upon request by the covered entity or program operator. § 42033.5. A local agency shall not knowingly request reimbursement for expenses for disposal costs resulting from a municipal needle exchange program or a medical waste generator. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F)(ii)(I). Any request for reimbursement shall be submitted with a declaration under penalty of perjury that the local agency has not knowingly requested reimbursement for prohibited expenses. § 42032.2(d)(1)(F)(ii)(III).
A retail pharmacy must make a reasonable effort to serve as an authorized collector as part of a stewardship program in the county in which it is located. § 42032.2(b)(2). If the “convenience standard” requiring a minimum of five authorized collection sites or one authorized collection site per 50,000 people is not met in a county in which a retail pharmacy chain has store locations, the retail pharmacy chain must have at least one location or 15 percent of its store locations, whichever is greater, in that county serve as authorized collectors in the stewardship program. § 42032.2(b)(2).
On or before March 31, 2022, and annually thereafter, a program operator must submit a written report describing the stewardship program activities during the previous reporting period. § 42033.2(a)(1). This annual report must include a list of covered entities participating in the stewardship organization; the updated and verified list of covered products that each covered entity subject to the stewardship plan sells or offers for sale; the amount, by weight, of covered products collected from ultimate users at each authorized collection site; the name and location of authorized collection sites at which covered drugs were collected; information about the home-generated sharps waste mail-back program; a description of any noncomliance with policies and procedures for collecting, transporting, and disposing of covered products, as established in the stewardship plan; whether any safety or security problems occurred during collection, transportation, or disposal of collected covered products during the reporting period and what changes have been made to alleviate the problem and to improve safety and security; and any other information CalRecycle reasonably requires. § 42033.2(b).
In addition, on or before March 31, 2022, and annually thereafter, a program operator must submit to CalRecycle a written program budget for stewardship program implementation for the upcoming calendar year. § 42033.2(a)(2). This annual program budget must include an independent financial audit of the stewardship program, funded by the stewardship organization from the charge paid from its member covered entities. § 42033.2(c)(1). The annual program budget must also include anticipated costs and the recommended funding level necessary to implement the stewardship program, including costs to cover the stewardship plan’s budgeted costs and to operate the stewardship program over a multiyear period in a “prudent and responsible manner.” § 42033.2(c)(2).
CalRecycle has 30 days to determine whether an annual report and program budget are complete and to notify the program operator of its determination. § 42033.2(d)(1). If complete, CalRecycle has 90 days for review. § 42033.2(d)(2). If they are not complete, CalRecycle must identify the required additional information in 30 days, and the program operator has 30 days from that date to resubmit. § 42033.2(d)(3). At that point, CalRecycle can conditionally approve the annual report and budget, and call for additional resubmissions. § 42033.2(e)(2).
A program operator must maintain minutes, books, and records that clearly reflect the activities and transactions of the program operator’s stewardship plan. § 42033.4(a). The minutes, books, and records of a program operator must be audited by an independent certified public accountant at least once annually at the program operator’s expense. § 42033.4(b)(1).
Proprietary information submitted to CalRecycle shall be protected by all parties as confidential and shall be exempt from public disclosure under the California Public Records Act. § 42036.4.
Covered entities are required to pay all administrative and operational costs associated with establishing and implementing the stewardship program in which it participates, including the cost of collecting, transporting, and disposing of covered products. § 42034. On or before the end of the 2022-2023 fiscal year, and once every three months thereafter, a program operator shall pay CalRecycle an administrative fee, set by CalRecycle, which is adequate to cover CalRecycle’s and other state agencies’ costs of administrating and enforcing this chapter. § 42034.2(a)(1). These costs may include the actual and reasonable costs associated with regulatory activities before submission of stewardship plans. § 42034.2(a)(1). The administrative fees shall be deposited into a Pharmaceutical and Sharps Stewardship Fund. § 42034.2(b).
Each program operator must conduct a comprehensive education and outreach program intended to promote participation in the stewardship program. § 42031.6(a). The law requires each program to, at a minimum: promote its stewardship program to ultimate users by providing signage for hospitals, pharmacies, and other locations; provide educational and outreach materials for persons authorized to prescribe drugs, pharmacies, pharmacists, ultimate user, and others, as necessary; establish a website that publicizes the location of authorized collectors and provides other information intended to promote the use of the stewardship program; prepare and provide additional materials to promote the collection and proper management of covered products; and encourage ultimate users to separate materials that are not covered products before disposing of the covered products. § 42031.6(a).
Drugs and sharps take-back ordinances already exist in a number of California counties, including Alameda (drugs and sharps), Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara (drugs and sharps), and Santa Cruz (drugs and sharps). This Act does not apply to a drug or sharp within a jurisdiction that is subject to a local stewardship program pursuant to an ordinance that took effect before April 18, 2018. § 42036.2(a). If that ordinance is repealed in the jurisdiction, the drug or sharp shall be subject to this statewide law within 270 days after the date on which the ordinance is repealed. Id. This Act preempts a local stewardship program for drugs or sharps enacted by an ordinance with an effective date of April 18, 2018 or later. § 42036.2(b).
A local stewardship program for covered products enacted by a local ordinance that has an effective date before April 18, 2018 may continue in operation, but such program and its participants cannot receive or benefit from moneys from the Pharmaceutical and Sharps Stewardship Fund or the Pharmaceutical and Sharps Stewardship Penalty Account established pursuant to the Act, including funds collected as administrative fees or enforcement costs. § 42036.2(c).
CalRecycle may impose penalties on any covered entity, program operator, stewardship organization, or authorized collector that sells, offers for sale, or provides a covered product in violation of the law. § 42035.2(a)(1). The amount of the administrative penalty cannot exceed $10,000 per day unless the violation is intentional, knowing, or reckless, in which case the penalty shall not exceed $50,000 per day. § 42035.2(a)(2). Any penalties collected pursuant to these authorities shall be deposited in the Pharmaceutical and Sharps Stewardship Penalty Account. § 42035.2(c).
Upon a written finding that a covered entity, program operator, stewardship organization or authorized collector has not met a material requirement of the Act, CalRecycle may, after affording the covered entity, program operator, stewardship organization or authorized collector a reasonable opportunity to respond to, or rebut, the finding, revoke a program operator’s approval or require the program operator to resubmit a plan, or to require additional reporting relating to compliance with the material requirement of the Act that was not met. § 42035.4.


Public schools have the right to discipline a student for giving a speech at a school assembly that is indecent, although not obscene.
At Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington, senior student Matthew Fraser used a series of sexual double entendres in a speech that nominated one of his classmates for the position of Associated Student Body Vice President. The school administration found him in violation of policies regarding vulgar speech and disruptive behavior. He appealed these findings through the internal grievance procedures of the school but was unsuccessful. The school barred Fraser from speaking at graduation, even though a write-in vote would have selected him as one of the three speakers. He also was subject to other penalties, including a suspension.
When Fraser brought a First Amendment claim against the school, he succeeded in federal district court and at the Ninth Circuit, which supported a broad view of free speech protections.
Finding that the school's policy did not infringe on First Amendment rights, the majority tried to distinguish its reasoning from the precedent in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969). This decision had seemed to rule resoundingly in favor of free speech protections in schools. The majority used this case to narrow the holding in Tinker, allowing schools to regulate certain types of speech, such as those that are vulgar, on the grounds that they could disrupt school discipline. Since the speech in question was not political, as it was in Tinker, it was entitled to a lower level of protection.
Schools have the responsibility of instructing students in what constitutes socially appropriate behavior and speech, so they have the right to punish inappropriate speech. It also interfered with the operation of the school by requiring it to explain the situation to younger students.
As an historical aside, it is worth noting that this was the last Supreme Court decision during Burger's tenure as Chief Justice.
School District from preventing him from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. The First Amendment did not prevent the School District from disciplining respondent for giving the offensively lewd and indecent speech at the assembly. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, distinguished. Under the First Amendment, the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the school, and the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, as well as limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629. Petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon respondent in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech, which had no claim to First Amendment protection. Pp. 478 U. S. 680-686.
2. There is no merit to respondent's contention that the circumstances of his suspension violated due process because he had no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech would subject him to disciplinary sanctions. Given the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions. The school disciplinary rule proscribing "obscene" language and the prespeech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to respondent that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. P. 478 U. S. 686.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 478 U. S. 687. BLACKMUN, J. concurred in the result. MARSHALL, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 690, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 691, filed dissenting opinions.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly.
to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.
Two of Fraser's teachers, with whom he discussed the contents of his speech in advance, informed him that the speech was "inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it," App. 30, and that his delivery of the speech might have "severe consequences." Id. at 61.
During Fraser's delivery of the speech, a school counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that, on the day following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class. Id. at 41-44.
"Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."
The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called Fraser into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. Fraser was presented with copies of five letters submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was given a chance to explain his conduct and he admitted to having given the speech described and that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises.
many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assembly." The examiner determined that the speech fell within the ordinary meaning of "obscene," as used in the disruptive conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. Fraser served two days of his suspension, and was allowed to return to school on the third day.
Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Respondent alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court held that the school's sanctions violated respondent's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the school's disruptive conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such removal as a possible sanction. The District Court awarded respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation costs and attorney's fees, and enjoined the School District from preventing respondent from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation speaker by a write-in vote of his classmates, delivered a speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983.
Appeals also rejected the School District's argument that it had an interest in protecting an essentially captive audience of minors from lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by the school, reasoning that the School District's "unbridled discretion" to determine what discourse is "decent" would "increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools." 755 F.2d at 1363. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the School District's argument that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it had the power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activity.
We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 814 (1985). We reverse.
This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra, that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 474 U. S. 506. The Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any discipline of Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly. That court appears to have proceeded on the theory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make what the speaker considered to be a point in a nominating speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the expression of a political position.
The marked distinction between the political "message" of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals. In upholding the students' right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students." Id. at 393 U. S. 508.
It is against this background that we turn to consider the level of First Amendment protection accorded to Fraser's utterances and actions before an official high school assembly attended by 600 students.
"[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation."
C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 441 U. S. 76-77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility" essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these "fundamental values" must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.
Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use of "impertinent" speech during debate, and likewise provides that "[n]o person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House." Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice §§ 359, 360, reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 97-271, pp. 158-159 (1982); see id. at 111, n. a (Jefferson's Manual governs the House in all cases to which it applies). The Rules of Debate applicable in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or for referring offensively to any state. See Senate Procedure, S. Doc. No. 97-2, Rule XIX, pp. 568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for abusive language directed at other Senators. See Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972, S.Doc. No. 92-7, pp. 95-98 (1972) (Sens. McLaurin and Tillman); id. at 152-153 (Sen. McCarthy). Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?
Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (opinion concurring in result).
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of the schools." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 508; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers -- and indeed the older students -- demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.
bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.
This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), this Court upheld a New York statute banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material in question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults. And in addressing the question whether the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of public schools to remove books from a public school library, all Members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, acknowledged that the school board has the authority to remove books that are vulgar. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 457 U. S. 871-872 (1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 457 U. S. 879-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and in judgment); id. at 457 U. S. 918-920 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). These cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children especially in a captive audience -- from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.
"These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said:"
Id. at 438 U. S. 746.
"I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students."
"maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship."
* Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the removal of Fraser's name from the ballot for graduation speaker violated his due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a potential punishment in the school's disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this issue has become moot, since the graduation ceremony has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to speak in accordance with the District Court's injunction. No part of the damages award was based upon the removal of Fraser's name from the list, since damages were based upon the loss of two days' schooling.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
"I know a man who is firm -- he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm -- but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm."
"Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts -- he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally -- he succeeds."
"Jeff is a man who will go to the very end -- even the climax, for each and every one of you."
"So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president -- he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be."
not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent's remarks exceeded permissible limits. Thus, while I concur in the Court's judgment, I write separately to express my understanding of the breadth of the Court's holding.
mission. [Footnote 2] Respondent's speech may well have been protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.
In the present case, school officials sought only to ensure that a high school assembly proceed in an orderly manner. There is no suggestion that school officials attempted to regulate respondent's speech because they disagreed with the views he sought to express. Cf. Tinker, supra. Nor does this case involve an attempt by school officials to ban written materials they consider "inappropriate" for high school students, cf. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853 (1982), or to limit what students should hear, read, or learn about. Thus, the Court's holding concerns only the authority that school officials have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high school assembly.
Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar"). Under the circumstances of this case, however, I believe that school officials did not violate the First Amendment in determining that respondent should be disciplined for the disruptive language he used while addressing a high school assembly. [Footnote 3] Thus, I concur in the judgment reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the course of its opinion, the Court makes certain remarks concerning the authority of school officials to regulate student language in public schools. For example, the Court notes that "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions." Ante at 478 U. S. 683. These statements obviously do not, and indeed, given our prior precedents, could not, refer to the government's authority generally to regulate the language used in public debate outside of the school environment.
The Court speculates that the speech was "insulting" to female students, and "seriously damaging" to 14-year-olds, so that school officials could legitimately suppress such expression in order to protect these groups. Ante at 478 U. S. 683. There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found the speech "insulting." And while it was not unreasonable for school officials to conclude that respondent's remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assembly, the language respondent used does not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), or the indecent speech banned in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). Indeed, to my mind, respondent's speech was no more "obscene," "lewd," or "sexually explicit" than the bulk of programs currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema. Thus, I disagree with the Court's suggestion that school officials could punish respondent's speech out of a need to protect younger students.
Respondent served two days' suspension and had his name removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises, although he was eventually permitted to speak at the graduation. While I find this punishment somewhat severe in light of the nature of respondent's transgression, I cannot conclude that school officials exceeded the bounds of their disciplinary authority.
I agree with the principles that JUSTICE BRENNAN sets out in his opinion concurring in the judgment. I dissent from the Court's decision, however, because, in my view, the School District failed to demonstrate that respondent's remarks were indeed disruptive. The District Court and Court of Appeals conscientiously applied Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969), and concluded that the School District had not demonstrated any disruption of the educational process. I recognize that the school administration must be given wide latitude to determine what forms of conduct are inconsistent with the school's educational mission; nevertheless, where speech is involved, we may not unquestioningly accept a teacher's or administrator's assertion that certain pure speech interfered with education. Here the School District, despite a clear opportunity to do so, failed to bring in evidence sufficient to convince either of the two lower courts that education at Bethel School was disrupted by respondent's speech. I therefore see no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals' judgment.
When I was a high school student, the use of those words in a public forum shocked the Nation. Today Clark Gable's four-letter expletive is less offensive than it was then. Nevertheless, I assume that high school administrators may prohibit the use of that word in classroom discussion and even in extracurricular activities that are sponsored by the school and held on school premises. For I believe a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the style of student speech in carrying out its educational mission. [Footnote 2/1] It does seem to me, however, that, if a student is to be punished for using offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the consequences of its violation.
The interest in free speech protected by the First Amendment and the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment combine to require this conclusion.
does mean that he should not be disciplined for speaking frankly in a school assembly if he had no reason to anticipate punitive consequences.
One might conclude that respondent should have known that he would be punished for giving this speech on three quite different theories: (1) it violated the "Disruptive Conduct" rule published in the student handbook; (2) he was specifically warned by his teachers; or (3) the impropriety is so obvious that no specific notice was required. I discuss each theory in turn.
"In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in certain noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts which disrupt and interfere with the educational process."
"Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."
755 F.2d 1356, 1357, n. 1 (CA9 1985).
of the educational process. In the words of Mr. McCutcheon, the school counselor whose testimony the District relies upon, the reaction of the student body 'was not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly.' In our view, a noisy response to the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of a material interference with the educational process that justifies impinging upon Fraser's First Amendment right to express himself freely."
"We find it significant that, although four teachers delivered written statements to an assistant principal commenting on Fraser's speech, none of them suggested that the speech disrupted the assembly or otherwise interfered with school activities. See Finding of Fact No. 8. Nor can a finding of material disruption be based upon the evidence that the speech proved to be a lively topic of conversation among students the following day."
Respondent read his speech to three different teachers before he gave it. Mrs. Irene Hicks told him that she thought the speech "was inappropriate, and that he probably should not deliver it." App. 30. Steven DeHart told respondent "that this would indeed cause problems in that it would raise eyebrows." Id. at 61. The third teacher, Shawn Madden, did not testify. None of the three suggested that the speech might violate a school rule. Id. at 49-50.
The fact that respondent reviewed the text of his speech with three different teachers before he gave it does indicate that he must have been aware of the possibility that it would provoke an adverse reaction, but the teachers' responses certainly did not give him any better notice of the likelihood of discipline than did the student handbook itself. In my opinion, therefore, the most difficult question is whether the speech was so obviously offensive that an intelligent high school student must be presumed to have realized that he would be punished for giving it.
Justice Sutherland taught us that a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, -- like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 272 U. S. 388 (1926). Vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and intolerable in others. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 438 U. S. 750 (1978). Indeed, even ordinary, inoffensive speech may be wholly unacceptable in some settings. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 249 U. S. 52 (1919); Pacifica, supra, at 438 U. S. 744-745.
It seems fairly obvious that respondent's speech would be inappropriate in certain classroom and formal social settings. On the other hand, in a locker room or perhaps in a school corridor, the metaphor in the speech might be regarded as rather routine comment. If this be true, and if respondent's audience consisted almost entirely of young people with whom he conversed on a daily basis, can we -- at this distance -- confidently assert that he must have known that the school administration would punish him for delivering it?
For three reasons, I think not. First, it seems highly unlikely that he would have decided to deliver the speech if he had known that it would result in his suspension and disqualification from delivering the school commencement address. Second, I believe a strong presumption in favor of free expression should apply whenever an issue of this kind is arguable. Third, because the Court has adopted the policy of applying contemporary community standards in evaluating expression with sexual connotations, this Court should defer to the views of the district and circuit judges who are in a much better position to evaluate this speech than we are.
"Because every university's resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that, if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a particular time -- one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet -- the First Amendment would not require that the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a 'compelling state interest' to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges, and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like 'compelling state interest.'"
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 454 U. S. 278-279 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (footnotes omitted).
"Any student of history who has been reprimanded for talking about the World Series during a class discussion of the First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state that a 'time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.'"
As the Court of Appeals noted, there "is no evidence in the record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive." 755 F.2d 1356, 1361, n. 4 (CA9 1985).
In its opinion today, the Court describes respondent as a "confused boy," ante at 478 U. S. 683, and repeatedly characterizes his audience of high school students as "children," ante at 478 U. S. 682, 684. When a more orthodox message is being conveyed to a similar audience, four Members of today's majority would treat high school students like college students, rather than like children. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534 (1986) (dissenting opinions).
See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
The Court's reliance on the school's authority to prohibit "unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process," ante at 478 U. S. 686, is misplaced. The findings of the District Court, which were upheld by the Court of Appeals, established that the speech was not "disruptive." Departing from our normal practice concerning factual findings, the Court's decision rests on "utterly unproven, subjective impressions of some hypothetical students." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 553 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
"[i]n our Nation's legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the debate."
See ante at 478 U. S. 681. If a written rule is needed to forewarn a United States Senator that the use of offensive speech may give rise to discipline, a high school student should be entitled to an equally unambiguous warning. Unlike the Manual of Parliamentary Practice drafted by Thomas Jefferson, this School District's rules of conduct contain no unequivocal prohibition against the use of "impertinent" speech or "indecent language."


text: locative of বল: বল1 [ bala1 ] n a ball; a playing ball; a football. বল করা, বল দেওয়া v. (in cricket) to bowl. বল খেলা v. to play football. বলখেলা n. the game of football. বলবেয়ারিং n. ball-bearings. locative of বল: বল2 [ bala2 ] n power, might; force; strength; ability; energy; an armed force; a man or piece in chess; support or help; a supporter or helper. ~কর, ~কারক a. strengthening, invigorating, (med.) tonic. ~ক্ষয় n. loss or decay of strength; loss or decrease of soldiers or men (of an army etc.). (in chess) loss of pieces. ~ক্ষয়কর a. weakening; causing loss of strength; causing loss of soldiers or men; (in chess) loss of pieces or men. ~গর্ব same as বলদর্প । ~গর্বিত same as বলদৃপ্ত । ~তুল্যাঙ্ক n. (phys.) a mechanical equivalent (of heat.) ~ত্রিভুজ n. a triangle of forces. ~দর্প n. pride of strength or power. ~দায়ক a. strengthening; invigorating; energizing. ~দৃপ্ত a. proud of strength or power, conceited with strength or power. ~পূর্বক adv. by force; by violence. ~প্রদ same as বলকর । বল প্রদান করা v. to strengthen or invigorate. ~প্রয়োগ n. exercise or application or use of force or violence. বলপ্রয়োগ করা v. to apply force; to force. ~প্রয়োগে adv. by force; by violence. ~বৎ a. operative, in force, intact. বলবৎ করা v. to put (a law etc.) into force. ~বতী fem. of ~বান । ~বত্তর a. stronger; more forceful. ~বত্তা n. powerfulness; (rare) force fulness; possession of strength. ~বন্ত same as বলবান । ~বর্ধক a. invigorating. ~বর্ধন n. increase of strength or power; invigoration; acceleration of force. ☐ a. causing increase of strength or power; invigorating, (med.) tonic; accelerating the force of. বলবর্ধন করা v. to increase strength or power; to invigorate, (med.) to tone up; to accelerate the force of. ~বান a. strong; powerful robust, sturdy. ~বিদ্যা n. mechanics. ~বিন্যাস n. arraying of troops; arraying of pieces in chess. ~ভরসা n. strength and support; support and prop. ~শালিতা same as বলবত্তা । ~শালী same as বলবান । fem. ~শালিনী । ~শূন্য same as ~হীন । ~শ্রেণি n. (phys.) system of forces. ~সামান্তরিক n. (mech.) a parrallelogram of forces. ~সাম্য, বলস্থিতি n. (phys.) equilibrium of forces. ~হীন a. devoid of strength, weak; powerless, infirm; impotent. fem. ~হীনা । imperfective participle and 2nd person ordinary past habitual tense of বলা: বলা [ balā ] v to say; to deliver a lecture, to speak; to mention (ও কথা আর বোলো না); to inform; to tell (এ খবর কাউকে বোলো না); to permit (ডাক্তার ভাত খেতে বলেছে); to order or request, to ask (আসতে বলো); to counsel or advise (কী করি বল); to invite, to call (বিয়েতে কাউকে বলিনি); to speak out, to express (মনের কথা বলা); to narrate, to relate (গল্প বলা); to rubuke or censure; to consider (ধন বল, মান বল, সবই দুদিনের).

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