text:
Liebich & Partner Management- und Personalberatung AG takes the protection of your privacy as a user of our website very seriously, especially regarding the processing of personal information. It is not necessary to provide personal information to use our website. However, in some cases we require your name and address and some further information so that we can process your request. When this is necessary we will specifically point this out to you. Furthermore, we will only store and use data which you have provided us with voluntarily or automatically.
The basis for data processing is Art. 6 (1) (b) DSGVO, which allows the processing of data to fulfil a contract or for measures preliminary to a contract. Further personal data will only be collected if this is provided voluntarily as part of a request or registration.
If you send us queries or requests via the contact form, we collect the data entered on the form, including the contact details you provide, to answer your query and any follow-up questions. We do not share this information without your consent.
Hence, we will only process any data you have entered into the contact form if you give us your consent per Art. 6 (1)(a) DSGVO. You may revoke your consent at any time. Please send us an informal email to do this. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
We will retain the data you provide on the contact form until you request that it is deleted, or you revoke your consent for its storage, or the purpose for its storage no longer pertains (e.g. after fulfilling your request). Any mandatory statutory provisions, especially those regarding mandatory data retention periods, remain unaffected by this provision.
You can register on our website if you want to access additional functions offered here. This data will only be used for the purpose of utilizing the respective offer or service you have registered for. The mandatory information requested during registration must be provided in full. Otherwise we will reject your registration.
We will use the email address specified during registration to inform you about important changes such as those regarding our services and offers or regarding necessary technical changes.
We will process the data provided during registration based on your consent per Art. 6 (1)(a) DSGVO. You may revoke your consent at any time. Please send us an informal email to do this. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
The download service of our website enables visitors to our website to get more information about our services and fields of competence, to download content and to provide their contact details. This data is stored on the servers of our software partner HubSpot. This data can be used by us to contact our website visitors and determine which of our services they are interested in.
When you complete the download form on our website, your data will be used by Hubspot Inc, Cambridge, MA 02141, USA, on our behalf to send you further information about the subject matter you downloaded and related services via our mailing lists and other automated emails. You can object to the sending of topic-related emails at any time.
Furthermore, Hubspot Inc. uses the data in the download form on our behalf to analyse how you continue to use our portal. Certain usage data is linked to your person and stored in our CRM system. This enables us to provide you with information and offers tailored to your specific interests.
provided us with your email address via registration for an event (e.g. L&P forum), via downloading further information (e.g. White Paper), or via another download.
Mailings are carried out in our name by HubSpot Inc. and are tracked by campaign.
You can informally object to the sending of mailings at any time, e.g. by email to info@liebich-partner.de. You are also free to unsubscribe from mailings on our topic pages. In each mailing you can remove yourself from the recipient list by clicking on the relevant link.
If you would like to receive the customer magazine offered on our website, we require a valid email address as well as information that allows us to verify that you are the owner of the specified email address and that you agree to receive this newsletter. If you want to receive the magazine by post, we will also collect your postal address. Additional data is either not collected or only collected on a voluntary basis. We use this data only to send the requested information and do not share it with third parties.
We process any data you enter into the contact form only with your consent as per Art. 6 (1) (a) DSGVO. You can revoke consent to the storage of your data and email address as well as their use for sending the customer magazine at any time, e.g. via the unsubscribe link in the magazine. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
The data provided for the purpose of subscribing to our customer magazine will be stored by us until you are removed from the mailing list, and deleted after you unsubscribe from the customer magazine. Data we have stored for other purposes (e.g. email addresses for the interest-relevant acquisition of information) remains unaffected.
Your privacy is very important to us. Any information you provide us with is treated confidentially and only shared with third parties if we need to do this in order to fulfil a contract, for example, to give order information to a supplier. Under no circumstances will we rent or sell your personal or personally identifiable information to third parties for their own use. We will only use your personal data to successfully deliver our services (e.g. you signed up for a seminar), to answer your queries and when we internally compile anonymous statistics. The only exceptions are with services requested by you, which involve your consent for the further use of your data as well as for sharing your data with state institutions and authorities if obliged by law.
If we advertise for other companies on our website, such advertisements will be clearly indicated. The Regional Court of Hamburg issued a ruling on 12 May 1998, the so-called "Liability for Links" (312 O 85/98) ruling, and clearly decided that by adding a link one may also be held responsible for the contents of the linked page, in other words, may be made liable for this content. This can only be avoided when the website owner explicitly distances itself from the content of the linked Internet pages, which Liebich & Partner Management- und Personalberatung AG hereby does. Liebich & Partner Management- und Personalberatung AG will not share any data with non-EU countries without your consent, unless this is necessary to fulfil a contract and expressly permitted by the DSGVO.
Of course, as the person concerned, you can also contact the regional data protection supervisory authorities.
You also have the right to receive information free of charge at any time about the origin, recipient and purpose of your stored personal data.
You have the right to have any data, which we process automatically based on your consent or in fulfilment of a contract, delivered to yourself or to a third party in a standard, machine-readable format. If you request the direct transfer of the data to another responsible party, this will only take place if it is technically feasible.
Stored personal data will be deleted if the user of the website and/or client withdraws his/her consent for storage, when knowledge of this data is no longer necessary in order to fulfil the purpose pursued by its storage, or when storing this data is prohibited for other legal reasons. Data for billing and accounting purposes is not affected by this.
This website uses the functions of Google Analytics, a web analytics service. It is operated by Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.
Google Analytics uses so-called "cookies". These are text files that are stored on your computer and that enable an analysis of how you use the website. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is normally transmitted to a Google server in the USA and stored there.
Google Analytics cookies are stored according to Art. 6 (1) (f) DSGVO. The website operator has a legitimate interest in analyzing user behaviour to optimize both its website and its advertising.
We have activated the IP anonymization feature on this website. This means that Google will shorten your IP address within the European Union countries or other countries belonging to the European Economic Area prior to transmission to the United States. Only in certain exceptions is the full IP address transmitted to a Google server in the US and shortened there. On behalf of this website operator, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports on website activities, and to provide other services regarding website activity and Internet usage for the website operator. The IP address transmitted by your browser, as part of Google Analytics, will not be merged with any other data held by Google.
We have entered into an agreement with Google for the processing of data on our behalf, and have fully implemented the strict requirements of the German data protection authorities when Google Analytics is used.
This website uses the demographic features of Google Analytics which enables reports containing statements about the age, gender, and interests of website visitors to be generated. This data comes from interest-based advertising by Google as well as third-party visitor data. This data cannot be linked to any specific individual person. You can disable this feature at any time by adjusting the ads settings in your Google account.
Our website uses plugins from the YouTube website. The operator of that website is YouTube LLC, 901 Cherry Ave., San Bruno, CA 94066, USA.
If you visit one of our pages which features a YouTube plugin, a connection to the YouTube servers is created. Thus, the YouTube server is informed about which of our pages you have visited.
If you are also logged in to your YouTube account, you will enable YouTube to link your browsing behaviour directly to your personal profile. You can prevent this by logging out of your YouTube account.
We use YouTube to help make our website more appealing. This constitutes a legitimate interest pursuant to Art. 6 (1) (f) DSGVO.
This site uses SSL encryption for security reasons and to protect the transmission of confidential content, such as requests you send to us. You can recognize an encrypted connection by the lock symbol in the browser line and by the address line of the browser which changes from "http://" to "https://". If SSL encryption is activated, the data you transmit to us cannot be read by third parties.
CVs or other data, which you want to send us or have sent us during an application process, are stored and processed on the server of Liebich & Partner Management- und Personalberatung AG. This data will be used exclusively for the purpose of filling personnel vacancies by comparing it with the requirement profiles for the positions to be filled for our clients.
Through appropriate technical and organizational measures, Liebich & Partner Management- und Personalberatung AG ensures the safety of your information against unintentional or intentional falsification, destruction, loss or access by unauthorized persons. Access to your personal information is restricted to those Liebich & Partner Management- and Personalberatung AG employees who are required to process this data and can handle this data in an appropriate and confidential manner.
With the exception of the projects for which you have applied, the responsible consultant will contact you personally before your data – also in anonymized form – is passed on to HR managers.
You have the right to access any personal information we hold about you and request that your information be amended or deleted. Upon request your data will be deleted. Moreover, you can withdraw at any time the consent you granted us to use your personal data.
We assure you that we store your personal information with the help of all technical and organizational capabilities in such a way that it is not accessible to third parties. When communicating by email we cannot guarantee that your data is completely secure, so we recommend that you send confidential information by post.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


text:
At The Bassett Firm, we provide peace of mind. We are trial attorneys. Not litigators, but attorneys who try cases. Our years of trial experience protect you and your company.
This week the Supreme Court of Texas issued no opinions and seventeen grants. Seven grants are of particular interest.
First, Mercedes -Benz USA LLC et al. v. Carduco Inc. deals with fraud underlying a contract. In this case the appellate court reduced the punitive damages awarded by the jury from $115,000,000 to $600,000. The issues granted oral argument include (1) whether reliance on the contract is precluded because the alleged misrepresentations conflict with the contract, (2) whether the contract's merger clause disclaiming reliance precludes fraud, (3) whether evidence supports that each defendant had a disclosure duty or gave affirmative misrepresentations,(4) whether separate jury instructions should have been presented on each fraud theory, (5) whether the appeals court improperly sustained a spoliation instruction, and (6) if the appellate court erred by reducing the punitive damages awarded.
Second, In Barrow-Shaver Resources Co. v. Carrizo Oil and Gas Inc. from the Tyler Court of Appeals, Barrow-Shaver sued Carrizo , Inc. for breach of a consent-to-assignment provision in a farm-out agreement. The court of appeals reversed a $27,000,000 verdict against Carrizo, Inc. and ruled that Barrow-Shaver take nothing. The issues in the Supreme Court are (1) whether the court made a mistake by interpreting the contract using a deleted provision from negotiations and (2) whether the court erred by rejecting a fraud claim on the grounds of reliance based on an oral promise to act although the written contract omitted that.
Third, in Baylor Scott and White, Hillcrest Medical Center v. Ruthen James Weems III, only one major issue is presented. The court listed to oral argument detailing whether a fraudulent-misdiagnosis claim falls under the health-care liability statute and requires a threshold expert-report requirement.
Fourth, in Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings LLC el al. from the Dallas Court of Appeals, a private jet bought with a faulty engine led to a fraud breach of contract and implied warranty case. The issues for oral argument include (1) if there is legal sufficient evidence to prove the fraud damage to all plaintiff owners of the private jet, (2) if there is legally sufficient evidence to support the actual damages awarded by the lower courts, (3) whether limits established in the purchase agreement bar any possible punitive damages, and (4) if punitive damages are allowed, are they unconstitutionally excessive in this case.
Fifth, In Rey Garza v. Roxana Harrison and Joseph Santellana, a case from Houston's 14thCourt of Appeals, the issue being heard is whether an off-duty police officer using deadly force outside his jurisdiction during an arrest is acting outside the scope of his employment. A dismissal motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act was denied previously in this case.
Sixth, also from the 14th Court of Appeals, University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Lance McKenzie and Deborah Diver revolves around the following issues: (1) whether M.D. Anderson's immunity defense is defeated because they used tangible personal property during surgery and (2) if the use of this tangible personal property during surgery proximately caused the patient's death.
The seventh and final grant of particular interest is Dallas Symphony Association Inc. v. Jose Reyes from the Dallas Court of Appeals. The primary issue in this case is whether an interlocutory appeal from a summary-judgment denial allows review of the entire summary-judgment order and not just that arising from First Amendment issues. In this defamation and contract interference suit, the interference claim is the claim in dispute.
The Bassett Law Firm located in Dallas, Texas serves clients from all over the state including, but not limited to the cities of Fort Worth, Plano, Arlington, Irving, Round Rock, Austin, San Antonio, Houston, Abilene, Sugar Land, Galveston, Denton and the counties of Dallas, Collin, Tarrant, Denton, Kaufman, Wise, Rockwall, Travis, Harris, and Bexar.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
This is an exclusive business profile of V. P. Prints located in , Faridabad. From this Page, you can directly contact V. P. Prints from the enquiry form provided on the right. On the left you can get the Verified Mobile Number of V. P. Prints â€“ feel free to call us to know more about our products & services. We will soon update our Catalog which you can download to get latest information about all our products & services and latest deals & offers by V. P. Prints. Do check out our Job Openings section to know about all the vacancies in V. P. Prints. You can also check out our Photo Gallery section to see latest photos of V. P. Prints. Before leaving, do not forget to give us your review and rating if you have been a customer of V. P. Prints in the past.
Do you want to receive special deals and offers from V. P. Prints?
Daily Download limit reached! Do you want to alert V. P. Prints to receive Catalogue?

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


Present: LENK, COWIN, & DOERFER, JJ.
COMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Plymouth Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 13, 2001.
The case was heard by Anna H. Doherty, J.
Joseph S. Tangusso for Paul M. Fleming.
Ellen Mattingly for Eileen Fleming.
DOERFER, J. Paul Fleming, the former husband (husband) of Eileen Fleming (wife), appeals from a judgment of divorce nisi, as corrected, of the Probate and Family Court which, among other things, divides the parties' property and allows the wife to retain a portion of the husband's share of the marital assets "in lieu of thirteen years of child support at $50.00 per week." We vacate so much of the corrected judgment as relates to child support and remand the matter to the Probate Court for further proceedings.
1. Background. The parties were married in May, 1991, and separated in March, 2001. Two children were born of the union. At the time of trial, the parties' primary assets were a general store and the former marital home. The parties opened the general store in April, 1994. Although the husband was instrumental in the "set-up" of the store, and worked there from time to time (as well as at a second store operated briefly by the parties), the wife managed the store throughout the marriage and was primarily responsible for its operation. [Note 1] At the time of trial, the store provided the wife and children with a gross weekly income of $690, their sole source of support. [Note 2] The store had a fair market value of about $145,000.
The parties purchased the former marital home prior to the marriage, the wife contributing $8,500 to $10,000 [Note 3] and the husband $35,000 toward the purchase of the property. At the time of trial, the house had a fair market value of $240,000 and a mortgage of $182,000 for an equity value of $58,000. Each party also owned a motor vehicle (the wife, a 1999 Ford Expedition with an equity value of $12,100, and the husband, a 1994 minivan worth $1,900) and other assets of nominal value.
"Wife needs the store to provide for the children. Husband testified he could not earn enough money to pay child support for the children of the ages of eight and five. The children will need support from both parents. The basic child support order is $50.00 per week, and the youngest child will need support until the age of eighteen. Therefore, I am having Mother retain a portion of Father's assets to pay that support. The children and Wife need medical insurance, and Husband has that available through his employment."
The judge ordered, in paragraph eight of the corrected judgment, that "[u]pon the payment [on or before December 18, 2002,] of $35,000.00 to the Husband by the Wife, [the Wife] shall be the sole owner of the home and business. The remaining $34,500.00, which represents Husband's one third share of the marital assets, [Note 4] shall be retained by the Wife in lieu of thirteen years of child support at $50.00 per week." [Note 5] The judge also ordered the husband to provide medical insurance for the children.
2. The valuation of the marital estate. At oral argument, the husband conceded that the judge's allocation of the marital assets was fair and equitable, but argued (as he also did in his brief) that the judge erred in calculating the total value of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband asserts that the "true value" of the marital assets was $253,164, [Note 6] "when you add the $4,400.00 appropriated by the Wife from the [parties'] joint [checking] account [Note 7] . . . and $31,864.00 she withdrew from the equity in the house for her personal benefit." [Note 8] The husband appears to assert that his one-third share of the marital assets (before adjustments) should have been fixed by the judge at $84,388. We fail to discern error.
Contrary to the husband's assertion in his brief, there is no indication in the record before us that the refinancing proceeds of approximately $31,864 were used "exclusively for [the] wife's benefit." Indeed, the husband, through counsel, conceded at oral argument that he could not answer whether the credit card balances were accumulated jointly or individually by the wife, and he appeared to acknowledge subsequently that the automobile loan and credit card balances were joint marital debts. Similarly, the record is devoid of evidence that the $4,400 taken by the wife from the joint checking account was used exclusively for her personal benefit. We note, in addition, that although the wife purchased a sport utility vehicle subsequent to the parties' separation and her refinancing of the marital home, the wife's equity in the vehicle at the time of trial, which the judge considered in calculating the value of the marital estate, appears to have been derived from the trade-in value of another vehicle. In the circumstances, and on the argument presented, we cannot say that the judge (who was cognizant that the wife had violated the automatic restraining order established by Rule 411 of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate Court  by refinancing the home) erred by failing to increase the value of the marital estate by $36,264.
3. The retention of assets in lieu of child support. The husband argues that the judge erred in (1) fixing his child support obligation at $50 per week when he was in "full compliance" with the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (guidelines), i.e., that he owed no child support to the wife under the guidelines, [Note 9] and (2) fashioning an order which, essentially, requires him to prepay thirteen years of child support. The husband also asserts that any order that deprives him of his fair share of the marital estate is inequitable. We agree that the provisions of the corrected judgment relating to child support must be set aside.
At the outset, the wife, through counsel, suggested at oral argument that the judge's order concerning the transfer of funds to her in lieu of child support might be viewed as an additional allocation of assets under G. L. c. 208, § 34 (taking into account the present and future needs of the children), rather than as child support to be computed strictly under the guidelines. In our view, however, such a position is inconsistent with the judge's repeated references to "child support" in her rationale, her stated intention to award the husband one-third of the marital assets, and the reference in her conclusions of law to her authority to secure a spouse's duty to provide support for minor children. [Note 10] That said, it is simply unclear how the judge arrived at the "basic child support order" of $50 per week. That amount, as the husband notes, does not appear to be consistent with the presumptive guidelines support order in this case, particularly when the husband's court-ordered payment of family group health insurance is taken into account. [Note 11] The judge made no finding that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in this case. See Child Support Guidelines, preamble. In the circumstances, the matter must be remanded to the Probate Court for further proceedings on the question of child support.
Although it is possible that a recalculation of child support on remand will obviate the need to consider the possible inclusion of a "security" provision in the judgment, we comment on the judge's order allowing the wife to retain approximately one-half of the husband's share of the marital assets in lieu of thirteen years of child support. It is settled that a Probate Court judge has "broad discretion to fashion judgments in divorce proceedings that will best protect the interests and welfare of the parties' minor children," see Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292 , 298-299 (1991); Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52 , 55 (1998); Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182 , 190 (1998), and may enter appropriate orders designed to secure a spouse's duty for future support. [Note 12] See G. L. c. 208, §§ 12-14 & 36 (regarding attachments and security for payment of support). See also Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. at 298-301. Compare Johnson v. Johnson, 425 Mass. 693 , 694-696 (1997) (judge may not assign marital property to third persons, even of the marriage). "Whether to enter such orders in a given case, as well as the specific form that any order or orders should take, are matters within the judge's broad discretion, to be exercised upon consideration of all relevant circumstances." Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. at 300. See Ross v. Ross, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 77 , 83 (2000).
In the circumstances presented here, we think the order fashioned by the Probate Court judge does not constitute a reasonable exercise of the judge's discretion and is inequitable. By providing the wife, in effect, with fifty dollars of weekly child support as well as the present benefit of thirteen years of that support (all without any constraint upon her as to the use of the monies, cf. Lang v. Koon, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 22 , 26 n.9 , or apparent contemplation of the possibility of future changes in the parties' or the children's circumstances), while effectively reducing the husband's one-third share of the marital assets [Note 13] and depriving him of any interest income which a full assignment of assets might otherwise produce, the judge's order is distinguishable from, and in our view, traverses the boundaries of, acceptable orders for security (or requests for orders for security) discussed in cases such as Pare, Passemato, and Rosenberg. See note 11, supra.
4. Summary. Paragraph eight of the corrected judgment of divorce nisi must be vacated and the matter remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings. The question of child support is to be revisited and appropriate orders entered thereon. The probate judge may conduct such further hearings as necessary. Any new order should be supported by findings of fact. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
[Note 1] In addition to working at the store sixty to seventy hours per week, the wife undertook substantial home and child care responsibilities.
[Note 2] After the parties' separation, the husband obtained employment as a delivery person for an auto parts company. The husband listed his income at $320 per week on his financial statement, and the judge found that because of the husband's age (sixty-one years) and "circumstances" (e.g., limited education and skills) he cannot earn more than $350 to $400 per week.
[Note 3] On page two of her findings, the Probate Court judge states that the wife contributed $8,500 to the purchase of the marital home, while on page three of the findings, the judge states that the wife contributed $10,000.
[Note 4] As the judge found that the husband's one-third interest in the marital estate was $72,300, it appears that the judge intended to say "which represents [the rest of] [h]usband's one third share of the marital assets."
[Note 5] As the parties' younger child was actually six years of age at the time the judgment was originally entered, the judgment provides the child with support beyond the age of eighteen.
[Note 6] At oral argument, the husband attempted to augment this sum to include a modest tax refund.
[Note 7] The judge found that at the time the parties separated, they held a joint checking account containing $4,400. The wife closed the checking account and opened a new account in her name only. There was evidence that the wife closed the account prior to the filing of the divorce complaint, i.e., when the automatic restraining order set forth in Rule 411 of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate Court (2000) would have prevented her from closing such accounts.
[Note 8] It is undisputed that the parties were deeply in debt during the marriage and that the wife, with the husband's assent, sought the assistance of a credit counseling service. Much of the parties' debt was consolidated and the wife made one payment per month to the counseling service. On June 27, 2001, some two and one-half months after the wife filed her complaint for divorce, she refinanced the marital home and paid off (among other things) the amounts owed to the counseling service, a loan (in the amount of $24,205.77) on a 2000 Grand Marquis automobile purchased during the marriage, and the balances on three credit cards in her name in the total amount of $7,659.11. The wife testified that as a result of the refinancing, her mortgage increased but her monthly expenditures decreased. As for the Grand Marquis automobile, the wife testified that she had been making payments of $560 per month on the vehicle but needed a larger vehicle to assist her in the operation of the store. The wife stated that after she paid off the loan on the Grand Marquis, she tried to sell it but "nobody would take it." Eventually, the wife received approximately $15,000 for the Grand Marquis as a "trade in" when she bought the 1999 Ford Expedition. The wife also financed the purchase of the vehicle by taking out a loan in the approximate amount of $8,000.
[Note 9] We note that the guidelines formerly provided for a minimum order of fifty dollars per month. See Child Support Guidelines II-C (1998). The minimum order was increased in 2002 to eighty dollars per month. See Child Support Guidelines II-C (2002). At oral argument, the husband, through counsel, stated that the "correct amount" of support that should have been ordered by the court was eighty dollars per month, but that the husband had satisfied his support obligation under the guidelines by paying medical insurance for the children.
[Note 10] In her brief, the wife herself voiced her understanding that the allocation of $34,500 of the husband's portion of the marital assets to her was "to secure the payment of child support."
[Note 11] In February, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulation, which became a temporary order of the court, wherein the husband agreed to provide health insurance coverage for the wife and the children. Based on the husband's representation that the cost of health insurance would increase from $28 per week to $81 per week in order to cover the family unit, the wife agreed that there should not be a child support payment by the husband. At trial, the husband offered evidence that his base salary, without overtime, was $320 per week (as we have stated, the judge found that the husband could not earn more than $350 to $400 per week), and that the cost to him of family health insurance was $77.84 per week. The husband used these figures, as well as a custodial parent gross income figure based on the wife's weekly income of $705 (somewhat above the amount found by the court), in the child support guidelines worksheet which he submitted to the court. Although the husband concluded that his weekly child support order was $0, we voice no opinion as to the precise amount, if anything, owed by the husband under the guidelines. We note only that at the time of trial the presumptive guidelines order would appear to have been less than $50 per week.
[Note 12] In Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. at 301, the Supreme Judicial Court directed the Probate Court judge to consider the wife's request that a portion of the husband's proceeds from the sale of the marital home be set aside as security for his future child support obligations. In Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. at 54-57, the court affirmed a judge's order requiring the wife to fund a college educational trust for the future benefit of the parties' three minor children (with unexpended sums to revert to the wife) in circumstances where the wife had engaged in reckless economic and social behavior and it was unlikely, in the absence of a trust structure, that sufficient funds would remain for the children to obtain college educations. In Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. at 190, the court upheld a judgment insofar as it attached $60,000 of funds held by the husband in a bank account. Said attachment meant to secure the husband's "child support obligation and for potential contribution to" the child's college education expenses. Id. at 189-190. The court noted that the husband was allowed to keep the income from the attached assets. Id. at 190 n.13.
[Note 13] The order leaves the husband, who was already in financial straits, with only modest resources to draw upon.


(J) partial hospitalization services provided by a community mental health center (as described in section 1395x(ff)(2)(B) of this title).
For definitions of "spell of illness", "medical and other health services", and other terms used in this part, see section 1395x of this title.
2011-Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii)(I). Pub. L. 112–40 substituted "quality improvement" for "quality control and peer review".
2008-Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 110–275 substituted ", outpatient" for "and outpatient" and inserted ", and outpatient speech-language pathology services (other than services to which the second sentence of section 1395x(p) of this title applies through the application of section 1395x(ll)(2) of this title)" before semicolon at end.
2000-Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 106–554 redesignated subsec. (c) as (b) and struck out former subsec. (b), which related to extension of coverage of immunosuppressive drugs for individuals who would exhaust benefits under section 1395x(s)(2)(J)(v) of this title in a year during the 5-year period beginning with 2000, and set forth provisions relating to extension periods for each year.
1999-Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 106–113 added subsec. (b) and redesignated former subsec. (b) as (c).
1997-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 105–33, §4603(c)(2)(B)(ii), substituted "subparagraphs (E) and (F) of section 1395u(b)(6) of this title;" for "section 1395u(b)(6)(E) of this title;".
Pub. L. 105–33, §4432(b)(5)(B), substituted "(2) and section 1395u(b)(6)(E) of this title;" for "(2);".
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iv). Pub. L. 105–33, §4511(c), substituted "but only if no facility or other provider charges or is paid any amounts with respect to the furnishing of such services" for "provided in a rural area (as defined in section 1395ww(d)(2)(D) of this title)".
Subsec. (a)(2)(H). Pub. L. 105–33, §4201(c)(1), substituted "critical access" for "rural primary care".
1990-Subsec. (a)(2)(A), (B). Pub. L. 101–508, §4153(a)(2)(A)(i), substituted "subparagraph (G) or subparagraph (I)" for "subparagraph (G)".
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 101–508, §4157(b), amended cl. (iii) generally. Prior to amendment, cl. (iii) related to services of a certified registered nurse anesthetist.
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iv). Pub. L. 101–508, §4155(b)(1), added cl. (iv).
Subsec. (a)(2)(D). Pub. L. 101–508, §4161(a)(3)(A), designated existing provisions as cl. (i) and added cl. (ii).
Subsec. (a)(2)(I). Pub. L. 101–508, §4153(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv), added subpar. (I).
Subsec. (a)(2)(J). Pub. L. 101–508, §4162(b)(1), added subpar. (J).
1989-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101–234, §201(a), repealed Pub. L. 100–360, §§203(a), 205(a), and provided that the provisions of law amended or repealed by such sections are restored or revived as if such sections had not been enacted, see 1988 Amendment notes below.
Subsec. (a)(2)(H). Pub. L. 101–239 added subpar. (H).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–234, §101(a), repealed Pub. L. 100–360, §104(d)(3), and provided that the provisions of law amended or repealed by such section are restored or revived as if such section had not been enacted, see 1988 Amendment note below.
1988-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–360, §205(a)(2), inserted sentence at end relating to in-home care provided to a chronically dependent individual on any day.
Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 100–360, §205(a)(1), designated existing provisions as cl. (i) and added cl. (ii) relating to in-home care for a chronically dependent individual.
Pub. L. 100–360, §203(a), inserted "and home intravenous drug therapy services" before semicolon at end.
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iv). Pub. L. 100–360, §411(h)(7)(B), struck out Pub. L. 100–203, §4077(b)(2), see 1987 Amendment note below.
Pub. L. 100–360, §411(h)(4)(A), struck out Pub. L. 100–203, §4073(b)(1), see 1987 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(i). Pub. L. 100–360, §411(g)(2)(E), added Pub. L. 100–203, §4063(e)(2), see 1987 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii). Pub. L. 100–360, §411(i)(4) (C)(vi), added Pub. L. 100–203, §4085(i)(22)(A), see 1987 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 100–360, §104(d)(3), substituted "definitions of 'medical and other health services' and" for "definitions of 'spell of illness', 'medical and other health services', and".
1987-Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 100–203, §4062(d)(2)(A), inserted "(other than items described in subparagraph (G))" after "services".
Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 100–203, §4062(d)(2)(B), inserted "(other than items described in subparagraph (G))" after "health services".
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iv). Pub. L. 100–203, §4077(b)(2), which directed the addition of cl. (iv) relating to qualified psychologist services, was repealed by Pub. L. 100–360, §411(h)(7)(B).
Pub. L. 100–203, §4073(b)(1), which directed the addition of cl. (iv) relating to certified nurse-midwife services, was repealed by Pub. L. 100–360, §411(h)(4)(A).
Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(i). Pub. L. 100–203, §4063(e)(2), as added by Pub. L. 100–360, §411(g)(2)(E), inserted "(including intraocular lens in cases described in section 1395l(i)(2)(A)(iii) of this title)" after "services" in two places.
Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii). Pub. L. 100–203, §4085(i)(22)(A), as added by Pub. L. 100–360, §411(i)(4)(C)(vi), substituted "payment on an assignment-related basis" for "an assignment described in section 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title" in concluding provisions.
Subsec. (a)(2)(G). Pub. L. 100–203, §4062(d)(2)(C), added subpar. (G).
1986-Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 99–509, §9320(d), added cl. (iii).
Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 99–509, §9337(a), amended subpar. (C) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (C) read as follows: "outpatient physical therapy services, other than services to which the next to last sentence of section 1395x(p) of this title applies;".
Subsec. (a)(2)(F). Pub. L. 99–509, §9343(e)(1), inserted "standard overhead" in cl. (i) and concluding provisions of cl. (ii).
1984-Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii). Pub. L. 98–369, §2341(b), substituted "paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 1395x(r) of this title" for "section 1395x(r)(1) of this title".
Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii)(II). Pub. L. 98–369, §2354(b)(6), substituted "organization" for "Organization".
1982-Subsec. (a)(2)(F)(ii)(I). Pub. L. 97–248 substituted "quality control and peer review organization (having a contract with the Secretary" for "Professional Standards Review Organization (designated, conditionally or otherwise,".
1980-Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 96–499, §930(g), struck out restriction on home health services of 100 visits during a calendar year.
Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II). Pub. L. 96–499, §948(a)(2), substituted "where the conditions specified in paragraph (7) of such section are met" for ", unless either clause (A) or (B) of paragraph (7) of such section is met".
Subsec. (a)(2)(E). Pub. L. 96–499, §933(a), added subpar. (E).
Subsec. (a)(2)(F). Pub. L. 96–499, §934(a), added subpar. (F).
1977-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 95–210, §1(a)(1), substituted "subparagraphs (B) and (D) of paragraph (2)" for "paragraph (2)(B)".
Subsec. (a)(2)(D). Pub. L. 95–210, §1(a)(2), added subpar. (D).
1972-Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 92–603, §227(e)(1), inserted provisions relating to medical and other health services performed by a physician to a patient in a hospital which has an approved teaching program.
Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 92–603, §251(a)(4), inserted ", other than services to which the next to last sentence of section 1395x(p) of this title applies".
1968-Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 90–248, §129(c)(6)(B), inserted "and the services for which payment may be made pursuant to section 1395n(b)(2) of this title" after "hospital".
Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 90–248, §133(d), added subpar. (C).
Pub. L. 110–275, title I, §143(c), July 15, 2008, 122 Stat. 2543 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, 1395y, 1395cc, and 1395nn of this title] shall apply to services furnished on or after July 1, 2009."
Amendment by section 4432(b)(5)(B) of Pub. L. 105–33 applicable to items and services furnished on or after July 1, 1998, see section 4432(d) of Pub. L. 105–33, set out as a note under section 1395i–3 of this title.
Pub. L. 105–33, title IV, §4511(e), Aug. 5, 1997, 111 Stat. 443 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395x, 1395y, 1395cc, and 1395yy of this title] shall apply with respect to services furnished and supplies provided on and after January 1, 1998."
Amendment by section 4603(c)(2)(B)(ii) of Pub. L. 105–33 applicable to cost reporting periods beginning on or after Oct. 1, 1999, except as otherwise provided, see section 4603(d) of Pub. L. 105–33, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1395fff of this title.
Pub. L. 101–508, title IV, §4153(a)(3), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–83 , provided that: "The amendments made by paragraphs (1) and (2) [amending this section and sections 1395l and 1395m of this title] shall apply to items furnished on or after January 1, 1991."
Pub. L. 101–508, title IV, §4155(e), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–88 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395u, and 1395x of this title] shall apply to services furnished on or after January 1, 1991."
Pub. L. 101–508, title IV, §4157(d), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–89 , provided that: "The amendments made by the preceding subsections [amending this section and sections 1395x, 1395y, and 1395cc of this title] apply to services furnished on or after January 1, 1991."
"(A) Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), the amendments made by this section [probably means this subsection, which amended this section and sections 1320a–7b, 1395l, 1395x, 1395y, and 1395oo of this title] shall apply to services furnished on or after October 1, 1991.
"(B) In the case of a Federally qualified health care center that has elected, as of January 1, 1990, under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act [this part], to have the amount of payments for services under such part determined on a reasonable-charge basis, the amendment made by paragraph (3)(A) [amending this section] shall only apply on and after such date (not earlier than October 1, 1991) as the center may elect.
"(C) The amendment made by paragraph (6) [amending section 1395oo of this title] shall apply to cost reports for periods beginning on or after October 1, 1991."
Pub. L. 101–508, title IV, §4162(c), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–96 , provided that: "The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) [amending this section and sections 1395x and 1395cc of this title] shall apply with respect to partial hospitalization services provided on or after October 1, 1991."
Amendment by section 104(d)(3) of Pub. L. 100–360 effective Jan. 1, 1989, except as otherwise provided, and applicable to inpatient hospital deductible for 1989 and succeeding years, to care and services furnished on or after Jan. 1, 1989, to premiums for January 1989 and succeeding months, and to blood or blood cells furnished on or after Jan. 1, 1989, see section 104(a) of Pub. L. 100–360, set out as a note under section 1395d of this title.
Amendment by section 203(a) of Pub. L. 100–360 applicable to items and services furnished on or after Jan. 1, 1990, see section 203(g) of Pub. L. 100–360, set out as a note under section 1320c–3 of this title.
Pub. L. 100–360, title II, §205(f), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 731 , which provided that the amendments made by section 205 of Pub. L. 100–360 [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, and 1395y of this title] were applicable to items and services furnished on or after January 1, 1990, was repealed by Pub. L. 101–234, title II, §201(a), Dec. 13, 1989, 103 Stat. 1981 .
Except as specifically provided in section 411 of Pub. L. 100–360, amendment by section 411(g)(2)(E), (h)(4)(A), (7)(B), (i)(4)(C)(vi) of Pub. L. 100–360, as it relates to a provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, effective as if included in the enactment of that provision in Pub. L. 100–203, see section 411(a) of Pub. L. 100–360, set out as a Reference to OBRA; Effective Date note under section 106 of Title 1, General Provisions.
Amendment by section 4062(d)(2) of Pub. L. 100–203 applicable to covered items (other than oxygen and oxygen equipment) furnished on or after Jan. 1, 1989, and to oxygen and oxygen equipment furnished on or after June 1, 1989, see section 4062(e) of Pub. L. 100–203, as amended, set out as a note under section 1395f of this title.
Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §4073(e), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–119 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395x, and 1396d of this title] shall be effective with respect to services performed on or after July 1, 1988."
Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §4077(b)(5), formerly §4077(b)(6), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–121 , as renumbered by Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, §411(h)(7)(F), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 787 , provided that: "The amendments made by this subsection [amending this section and sections 1395l and 1395x of this title] shall be effective with respect to services performed on or after July 1, 1988."
Pub. L. 99–509, title IX, §9320(i), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 2016 , as amended by Pub. L. 100–485, title VI, §608(c)(1), Oct. 13, 1988, 102 Stat. 2412 , provided that: "Except as provided in subsection (k) [set out below], the amendments made by this section (other than subsection (a)) [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395u, 1395x, 1395y, 1395aa, 1395bb, 1395cc, 1395ww, 1396a, and 1396n of this title] shall apply to services furnished on or after January 1, 1989."
Pub. L. 99–509, title IX, §9337(e), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 2034 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, and 1395cc of this title] shall apply to expenses incurred for outpatient occupational therapy services furnished on or after July 1, 1987."
Pub. L. 98–369, div. B, title III, §2341(d), July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 1094 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and section 1395x of this title] apply to services furnished on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 18, 1984]."
Amendment by section 2354(b)(6) of Pub. L. 98–369 effective July 18, 1984, but not to be construed as changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or interpretation which existed (under the provisions of law involved) before that date, see section 2354(e)(1) of Pub. L. 98–369, set out as a note under section 1320a–1 of this title.
Amendment by section 930(g) of Pub. L. 96–499 effective with respect to services furnished on or after July 1, 1981, see section 930(s)(1) of Pub. L. 96–499, set out as a note under section 1395x of this title.
Pub. L. 96–499, title IX, §933(h), Dec. 5, 1980, 94 Stat. 2637 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395n, 1395x, 1395z, and 1395aa of this title] shall become effective with respect to a comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility's first accounting period which begins on or after July 1, 1981."
Amendment by section 948(a)(2) of Pub. L. 96–499 applicable with respect to cost accounting periods beginning on or after Oct. 1, 1978, see section 948(c)(1) of Pub. L. 96–499, set out as a note under section 1395x of this title.
Pub. L. 95–210, §1(j), Dec. 13, 1977, 91 Stat. 1488 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395x, 1395y, and 1395aa of this title and enacting provisions set out as notes under sections 1395l and 1395x of this title] shall apply to services rendered on or after the first day of the third calendar month which begins after the date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 13, 1977]."
Amendment by section 227(e)(1) of Pub. L. 92–603 applicable with respect to accounting periods beginning after June 30, 1973, see section 227(g) of Pub. L. 92–603, set out as a note under section 1395x of this title.
Amendment by section 251(a)(4) of Pub. L. 92–603 applicable with respect to services furnished on or after July 1, 1973, see section 251(d)(1) of Pub. L. 92–603, set out as a note under section 1395x of this title.
Amendment by section 129(c)(6)(B) of Pub. L. 90–248 applicable with respect to services furnished after Mar. 31, 1968, see section 129(d) of Pub. L. 90–248, set out as a note under section 1395d of this title.
Pub. L. 90–248, title I, §133(g), Jan. 2, 1968, 81 Stat. 852 , provided that: "The amendments made by the preceding subsections of this section [amending this section and sections 1395n, 1395x, 1395aa, and 1395cc of this title] shall apply to services furnished after June 30, 1968."
Pub. L. 110–275, title I, §143(d), July 15, 2008, 122 Stat. 2543 , provided that: "Nothing in this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, 1395y, 1395cc, and 1395nn of this title] shall be construed to affect existing regulations and policies of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that require physician oversight of care as a condition of payment for speech-language pathology services under part B of the Medicare program [42 U.S.C. 1395j et seq.]."
Pub. L. 99–509, title IX, §9320(j), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 2016 , provided that: "Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395u, 1395x, 1395y, 1395aa, 1395bb, 1395cc, 1395ww, 1396a, and 1396n of this title, enacting provisions set out as notes under this section, and amending provisions set out as a note under section 1395ww of this title] shall contravene provisions of State law relating to the practice of medicine or nursing or State law requirements or institutional requirements regarding the administration of anesthesia and its medical direction or supervision."
Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, §1000(a)(6) [title II, §227(d)], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536 , 1501A-356, which required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit to Congress not later than Mar. 1, 2003, a report on the operation of section 1000(a)(6) [title II, §227] of Pub. L. 106–113, amending this section and section 1395x of this title, including an analysis of impact and recommendations regarding an appropriate cost-effective method for providing coverage of immunosuppressive drugs under the medicare program on a permanent basis, was repealed by Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(6) [title I, §113(b)(2)], Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763 , 2763A-473.
Pub. L. 100–360, title II, §205(e)(2), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 731 , directed Secretary of Health and Human Services to take appropriate efforts to assure quality and provide for appropriate utilization of in-home care for chronically dependent individuals under the amendments made by section 205 of Pub. L. 100–360 [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, and 1395y of this title], prior to repeal by Pub. L. 101–234, title II, §201(a), Dec. 13, 1989, 103 Stat. 1981 .
Pub. L. 100–360, title II, §205(g), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 731 , which required Secretary of Health and Human Services to study, and report to Congress, not later than 18 months after July 1, 1988, on advisability of providing, to chronically dependent individuals eligible for in-home care under amendments made by section 205 of Pub. L. 100–360 [amending this section and sections 1395l, 1395n, 1395x, and 1395y of this title], out-of-home services as alternative services to in-home care, was repealed by Pub. L. 101–234, title II, §201(a), Dec. 13, 1989, 103 Stat. 1981 .
"(C) each certified registered nurse anesthetist employed by, or under contract with, the hospital has agreed not to bill under part B of title XVIII of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1395j et seq.] for professional services furnished by the anesthetist at the hospital.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in a year (after 1989) to a hospital unless the hospital establishes, before the beginning of the year, that the hospital has had a volume of surgical procedures (including inpatient and outpatient procedures) requiring anesthesia services in the previous year that did not exceed 500 (or such higher number as the Secretary determines to be appropriate)."
Pub. L. 93–233, §15(a)(2), Dec. 31, 1973, 87 Stat. 966 , provided that for the cost accounting periods beginning after June 30, 1975, and prior to Oct. 1, 1978, subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i) of this section will be administered as if subclause II of subsec. (a)(2)(B)(i) read as follows: "(II) a physician to a patient in a hospital which has a teaching program approved as specified in paragraph (6) of section 1861(b) [42 U.S.C. 1395x(b)(6)] (including services in conjunction with the teaching programs of such hospital whether or not such patient is an inpatient of such hospital), where the conditions specified in paragraph (7) of such section [42 U.S.C. 1395x(b)(7)] are met and".


text:
On November 8th, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in United States v. Jones, the case on whether installation and/or use of a GPS device on a suspect’s car to record the public places the car travels is a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. I wanted to offer my thoughts on the case.
Does GPS Surveillance Justify A Departure from the Knotts/Karo Line?
In Jones, a GPS device was placed on the suspect’s car. The trial court concluded that the evidence of the GPS device in the suspect’s garage had to be suppressed under Karo, but that the evidence of the GPS device in public was permitted under Knotts. Only the latter evidence, the evidence of the location of the car on the public street, is at issue in the Jones case. The basic argument of the defendant-respondent in Jones is that GPS surveillance is different from radio beeper surveillance, and that those differences justify a departure from the Knotts/Karo information-based approach. The gist of the argument is that GPS monitoring is just too invasive to be allowed without judicial oversight — the monitoring is too constant, too easily done, too continuous, and too detailed.
The text of the Fourth Amendment states that the Amendment protects security in “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable “searches” does so by protecting invasions into those private spaces. Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a relatively simple line for distinguishing the invasions into persons, houses, papers, and effects that the Fourth Amendment regulates as “searches” from the investigative steps that the Fourth Amendment does not regulate.
Government entry into a home is a search, as is entry into a car, or a sealed package, or a letter, or a person’s pockets. These are all intrusions into persons, houses, papers, and effects. They are all searches. On the other hand, surveillance in public places that does not enter into private spaces, such as watching someone on the street, looking at their faces, examining the outside of their packages, overhearing their voice, or following someone in a store open to the public, is not a search. These are not intrusions into persons, houses papers, or effects, and they are not searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Interestingly, you get these same results regardless of version of the Supreme Court’s doctrine you apply. You get the same results whether you get these results under the “protected areas” test that preceded the 1967 Katz case, or the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test that the Court has adopted since then.
The results are the same: A search occurs when the government intrudes upon a private person, house, paper, or effect, but does not occur when the government merely observes something in a public space or in a space where the government is otherwise entitled to be.
For example, imagine the police approach a home, walk directly up to an open window, press their faces up to the window, and peer in to see what is in the room inside. Technically, that is surveillance from an open space, but functionally it is surveillance of the inside of the home. Is that protected inside surveillance, or unprotected outside surveillance? The Supreme Court has created the distinction between “curtilage” and “open fields” to answer that: The outside area immediately around the home that can be used to peer inside the home is treated as inside surveillance (curtilage) rather than outside surveillance (open fields). See United States v. Dunn. Similarly, imagine the police use a thermal imaging device to determine the exterior temperature of a wall on the home. Is that outside surveillance, as it is only of the outside of the wall exposed to the public, or is that inside surveillance, as it reveals information about the inside of home? It’s a tricky call, as the 5–4 decision in Kyllo v. United States reveals. But the basic point remains: The distinction between inside and outside surveillance is the basic building block of the Supreme Court’s “search” cases.
How does this distinction apply to the use of government surveillance devices installed to determine the location of property used or controlled by a criminal suspect? The Supreme Court first grappled with this in two cases in the 1980s, United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo. Both cases involved radio beepers provided by the government that the suspects did not realize were present and broadcasting their location. The technology was crude compared to today’s GPS technology, but it did the job: It enabled the government to know the location of the beepers, and thus, implicitly, the location of the suspects that the police wanted to follow.
Knotts and Karo reasoned that the way to translate the traditional Fourth Amendment protection to the era of high-tech radio beepers was to focus on the information that the surveillance devices revealed. Recall that the traditional Fourth Amendment rule was that the police could always watch a suspect in public (no search), but that they could not enter protected spaces without a warrant or some Fourth Amendment oversight (a search). Knotts and Karo together drew the same line for government-installed location devices: If the device is used to monitor a location in public, then no search occurred (Knotts), but if the device was used to monitor a location inside a protected space, like a home, then a search occurred (Karo).
Panel on United States v. Jones, the Fourth Amendment GPS Case: A student event panel (September 13, 2011) on the Supreme Court Case, United States v. Jones ("the GPS case"), focusing on whether the government may attach a GPS to a car without a warrant and whether receiving information from the device is a search.
Learn more about Alabama’s Immigration Law from all sides, taking a look at the status of legal challenges, the fear it’s breeding, the anti-immigration activism behind it and similar laws, and the electoral harm it’s likely to inflict on its conservative backers.