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Abstract: The year of 2016 has witnessed the conclusion of 14 cases of abuse of dominant market position and 5 cases of monopoly agreement in all levels of courts in China. This article comprehensively reviews the key points embodied in the judgments of those cases, and provides comments on certain important issues such as the legality of RPM, the probative value of administrative enforcement decisions before courts and the arbitrability of monopoly disputes.
2016 has seemed to be a relatively insipid year for anti-monopoly litigations in China. It is first reflected in the small number of cases. Chinese courts have adjudicated on 18 monopoly disputes nationwide, rendering 20 judgements or rulings. It is also reflected in the lack of landmark cases like Huawei v. IDC and 360 v. Tencent in previous years. Nevertheless, the adjudicated cases in 2016 have certain features, and some of them are either of important referential value or have provoked heated discussion or even criticism.
In the procedural aspect, the Supreme People’s Court concluded 2 retrial cases, which signals its determination to reinforce judicial supervision and its efforts towards more judicial consistency. With respect to regional difference, Guangdong Province and Beijing Municipality have adjudicated the largest numbers of cases with 5 and 4 cases respectively, while around 20 provinces/municipalities have heard no case at all. The cause of action is diversified. 14 cases concern abuse of dominant market position, where specific monopoly behaviours involved include unfairly high prices, exclusive dealing, tie-in sales and refusal to trade. 5 cases concern monopoly agreements, of which 3 are vertical and 2 are horizontal. In one case the plaintiff even accused the defendant to have violated provisions of Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law regarding concentration of undertakings. As to the results, there is only 1 case where the plaintiff prevailed ultimately, i.e. Wu Xiaoqin v. Shaanxi Broadcasting Media. It is also worthy to note that objections to jurisdiction have been frequently raised (6 cases), and the ratio of withdrawal of claims is surprisingly high (6 cases, accounting one third of the total).
Below we will review the monopoly cases in 2016 and provide comments from the aspect of abuse of dominant market position, monopoly agreement, objections to jurisdiction and the relationship between monopoly disputes and other type of disputes in turn.
In Changsha Zhenshanmei Ltd. v. Ningbo Bull Electric, the Supreme People’s Court held that the relevant market cannot be defined as, as Plaintiff alleged, the Bull brand switch market in the Changsha city. To start with, experience from daily life suggests that there exist other competing and closely substitutable switch products against the Bull brand switch. Given that the Plaintiff cannot substantiate its claim of relevant product market, there would be no need to determine the relevant geographic market. Even assuming that the relevant market is the switch market in Changsha, the Plaintiff has failed to provide with sufficient evidence about the defendant’s market share to prove its dominant position in the relevant market.
In Yang Zhiyong v. China Mobile, Shanghai Intellectual Property Court ruled that Plaintiff did not prove China Mobile has dominant position in the relevant market. In the area of mobile communication service, there are other domestic operators such as China Unicom, China Telecom. In addition, China Mobile, the Defendant, also provides various packages of service for consumers to choose from. Therefore, the Defendant does not possess the capability to manipulate price and gain monopoly profits in the relevant market.
In Wu Xiaoqin v. Shaanxi Broadcasting Media, the Supreme People’s Court determined without hesitation that the Defendant held dominant position in the cable TV transmission market, given that the Defendant is the only legally permitted operator of cable TV transmission service in the Shaanxi Province.
In Wu Xiaoqin v. Shaanxi Broadcasting Media, having confirmed the Defendant’s tie-in sale practice of selling basic TV programs and other programs requiring extra payment as a package, the Supreme People’s Court ruled that the Defendant has conducted tie-in sales without justifiable reasons because the two type of programs are independent from each other and the Defendant has not proven that it is trade practice to do so or to charge the two types of programs separately would result in detriment to the performance or use value of the two.
In Yang Zhiyong v. China Mobile, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant China Mobile’s 4 types of practices, namely charge of monthly fee, charge of roaming service, billing method that approximates second to minute and pricing at 0.39 yuan per minute, constitute “selling commodities at unfairly high prices” prohibited by Anti-Monopoly Law. Shanghai Intellectual Property Court decided that the Plaintiff did not provide evidence to prove its claim.
Regarding the 0.39 yuan per minute call charges, the Court considered that, the Defendant provides various packages of service for consumers to choose from, where the price varies from 0.1 yuan to 0.39 yuan. The Plaintiff is free to opt for other packages.
In terms of whether the monthly fee and domestic roaming charge is overly high and whether it is reasonable in relation to its operating costs, the Court considered that the Plaintiff should have submitted evidence to establish the Defendant’s operating costs and profitability and what would be the reasonable level of profit.
As to the billing method that approximates second to minute, the Court held that this method is recognized by the competent authority and that the Plaintiff provided no proof regarding whether charging by minute or by second is more economic and efficient and whether the current charging method imposes a negative effect on competition.
An impression the above cases have left us is that, burden of proof is one of the key factors in winning a case of abuse of dominant market position. Article 7 of Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (hereinafter, as Provisions for Monopoly Case) allocates the burden of proof as follows: Plaintiff bears the burden to prove Defendant’s dominant market position in the relevant market, and its abuse and Defendant shall bear the burden to prove its behaviors are justifiable in defense.
The above cases seem to suggest that plaintiffs bear a relatively heavier burden of proof. Particularly in the case of Yang Zhiyong, in order to prove that the monthly fee and the roaming service charge are unfairly high, the Plaintiff was expected to provide evidence proving the Defendant’s operational costs, profitability and its reasonable level of profit, which might be an impossible task for an individual consumer.
It is also worthy to note that, except for the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court may take into consideration “common sense” and attach importance to documents issued by competent authorities.
In Dongguan Guochang Electrical Appliance Shop v. Dongguan Shengshi Ltd. and Dongguang Heshi Ltd., Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court held, although it contains provisions that restrict the minimum resale price (RPM), the agreement concerned does not constitute a monopoly agreement as prohibited under the Anti-Monopoly Law.
First of all, the common sense suggests that there are various comparable domestic brands and foreign brands that compete with Gree in the air conditioner market in the Dongguan city. Evidence submitted by the Defendant regarding Gree’s participation in promotions also establishes the sufficiency of competition in the air conditioner market in Dongguan and that Gree does not possess dominant market position. Even though Gree restricts resale prices, consumers are fully free to opt for other similar brands. In addition, no evidence suggests that competition in the other industries related to air conditioners has been affected by Gree’s RPM practice. Therefore, the agreement concerned does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.
Furthermore, although the Defendant’s RPM practice may have affected the intra-brand price competition among distributors, the Plaintiff and other distributors can still compete among one another in terms of pre-sale marketing, sale promotions and after-sale services.
In Tian Junwei v. Carrefour Shuangjing Branch and Abbott Ltd., the Plaintiff mainly relied on the Decision on Penalty made by NDRC against Abbott in September 2013. According to that Decision, Abbott has fixed resale prices through contract arrangements since 2011, and thus constituting vertical monopoly agreements.
The Beijing High Court rejected the Plaintiff’s appeal. Acknowledging that the Decision may, prima facie, establish Abbott’s vertical monopoly agreements with downstream undertakings, the Court considered that given the Decision fails to identify the counterparty of the monopoly agreements, it cannot serve to prove the existence of a vertical monopoly agreement between Carrefour Shuangjing Branch and Abbott.
The Judgement of Dongguan Guochang Electrical Appliance Shop again highlights the once-existing (probably still exists) inconsistency between courts and administrative agencies as to the legality of RPM. Following the case Beijing Ruibangyonghe v. Johnson and Johnson China, this judgment adopts the rule of reason doctrine, which means that RPM only constitutes vertical monopoly agreement when it eliminates or restricts competition in the relevant market. In this case, the Court, on the basis that the air conditioner market in Dongguan is a market with full competition and Gree does not possess dominant market position therein, held that the RPM agreement does not constitute a monopoly agreement because it neither restrains inter-brand competition, nor eliminates intra-brand competition other than price competition.
Administrative law enforcement prior to 2016 seems to have adopted the rule of illegal per se with respect to RPM. For example, in Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau’s penalty decisions on 3 distributors of Haier Electronics and SAIC-GM, the law enforcement agency concluded that the parties under investigations violated the anti-monopoly law immediately following its findings that they entered into and implemented RPM agreements. However, certain law enforcement decisions in 2016 have appeared to switch to the rule of reason to some extent. One example is Shanghai Price Bureau’s penalty decision on Smith & Nephew, where analysis was made as to the price-restricting agreement’s effect of eliminating and restricting intra-brand competition. A more noteworthy case is NDRC’s penalty decision on Medtronic. This Decision analyzed more in detail how the RPM concerned had eliminated or restricted both the intra-brand and inter-brand competition. That said, it remains to be seen whether convergency is emerging between the administrative agencies and the courts in determining the legality of RPM.
The focus of Tian Junwei is whether a plaintiff may discharge his burden of proof by relying on NDRC’s decisions on penalty. Notwithstanding administrative decision is not a prerequisite to file a case before the court, facts recorded in instruments prepared by State organs within their competence shall be presumed to be true in court proceedings, which means administrative decisions might help a plaintiff to establish certain facts and result in an enhanced chance to prevail.
The problem is that, as revealed by this case, administrative decisions normally do not disclose the identification of the counterparties of the monopoly agreements. A plaintiff thus cannot rely on such a decision to establish that a particular distributor who sold products to the plaintiff had participated in fixing resale prices, but has to do so by himself. Questions that follow would be: Is a plaintiff entitled to, or does a court have the power to, request the relevant anti-monopoly law enforcement agency to disclose relevant information?
Objections to jurisdiction can be divided into 2 categories: (1) objections in relation to hierarchy jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction of courts; and (2) the arbitrability of civil monopoly disputes.
The Provisions for Monopoly Case in its Article 3 provides: First-instance Monopoly Civil Disputes shall be under the jurisdiction of intermediate people’s courts in municipalities where the people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government are located or municipalities separately designated in the State plan, or intermediate people’s courts otherwise designated by the Supreme People’s Court. Furthermore, according to Article 3 of Notice on Intellectual Property Courts Jurisdictional Matters issued by Supreme People’s Court, Beijing Intellectual Property Court, Shanghai Intellectual Property Court and Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court shall exercise jurisdiction on first instance cases of anti-monopoly civil disputes within the Beijing municipality, Shanghai municipality and the province of Guangdong(except for Shenzhen).
In Dongguan Guochang Electrical Appliance Shop v. Dongguan Shengshi Ltd. and Dongguang Heshi Ltd., High Court of the Guangdong province confirmed that because the dispute at hand is a monopoly civil dispute and 2 defendants’ domiciles are in the city of Dongguan, Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. In Huazhou Chen Yawang Farming Cooperative v. Huazhou Food Ltd., Huazhou Bayberry Food Ltd., Maoming Intermediate Court held that the dispute concerns abuse of dominant market position over which the Court did not have jurisdiction, and thus declined to hear the case. In the subsequent appeal, High Court of the Guangdong province upheld that decision. In Yulong Telecom Ltd. v. Ericsson Ltd., in response to jurisdictional objections raised by Ericsson, Intermediate Court of the Shenzhen municipality held, as “an intermediate people’s court of a municipality separately designated in the State plan”, it has jurisdiction over the dispute. In Corporation X v. Corporation Y, the Plaintiff filed the case before People’s Court of Qufu County, and the case was then transferred to Beijing Intellectual Property Court.
The Provisions for Monopoly Case in its Article 4 provides: The territorial jurisdiction over Monopoly Civil Disputes shall be determined pursuant to the provisions on jurisdiction over tort disputes and contract disputes as prescribed in the Civil Procedure Law and relevant judicial interpretations, and in light of the specific circumstances of the cases. Regarding provisions on jurisdiction relating to tort, Article 28 of Civil Procedural Law stipulates: Dispute of torts shall be under the jurisdiction of the people’s court of the place where the tort is committed or where the defendant has his domicile.
In Shenzhen Daotong Ltd., et al. v. General Motors China Ltd., et al. (4 parties), 2 of the defendants including General Motors China protested that Intermediate Court of Shenzhen does not has jurisdiction over the case. Their reasons were, despite that Shenzhen Tangren Car Area and Baoyilai are domiciled in Shenzhen, these two defendants are irrelevant to the tort actions alleged by the Plaintiffs and the Court should not exercise jurisdiction by establishing a connecting point that does not exist.
High Court of Guangdong held that part of the plaintiffs’ claims and the facts therein are based on joint torts of the 4 defendants. Given that the 2 defendants including Tangren Park Area are domiciled in Shenzen, Intermediate Court of Shenzhen has jurisdiction over the dispute. Whether these 2 defendants conducted the torts is a substantive matter that should be decided in the subsequent trial procedure and need not be decided at the stage of jurisdiction.
There have been 2 cases in 2016 that involve arbitrability of monopoly civil disputes. They both receive negative answers from the courts.
The judgement of Nanjing Songxu Ltd. v. Samsung China Ltd., is a more representative one. In this case, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Intermediate Court of Nanjing against Samsung over its unfairly high price, compulsive tie-in sale and other monopolistic acts. Samsung raised objection to jurisdiction on the ground that both parties have concluded an arbitration clause that covers “any disputes” between them. The Intermediate Court of Nanjing held that monopoly disputes are arbitrable under the Arbitration Law, but the arbitration agreement was void because it did not designate one and only arbitration institution.
Anti-monopoly law enforcement in China is currently accomplished mainly through administrative agencies. Supreme People’s Court’s Provisions for Monopoly Case only provides civil litigations as a mean of private enforcement of anti-monopoly law and even makes special restrictions on jurisdiction.
Anti-monopoly law is of a strong “public policy” character. In China, it was not long ago when anti-monopoly law came into force, and not many experiences have been accumulated in administrative and judicial enforcement of anti-monopoly law. Under these circumstances, the “public policy” character is of considerable importance. Currently, there is no explicit provision in law that allows private remedies of monopoly disputes through arbitration and so far there has been no relevant practice of arbitrating monopoly disputes.
The case involves public interests, such as the sale relationships between Samsung and all its distributors, and also directly affects the benefits of the consumers of Samsung products. The arbitration clause concluded by the parties applies only to their contractual disputes. It cannot be the basis to arbitrate a monopoly dispute.
The Supreme People’s Court’s interpretation regarding hierarchy jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction in monopoly civil dispute cases is clear. The ratio of objections is expected to decline in the future. The so called “circumvention of jurisdiction” that appeared in Shenzhen Daotong Ltd., et al. v. General Motors China Ltd., et al., is a general issue in civil procedures and not of much relevance to anti-monopoly law. What merits a further discussion is whether monopoly civil disputes are arbitrable. Below are some of our thoughts.
First, the Arbitration Law of China allows parties to submit monopoly civil disputes to arbitration. Article 2 of Arbitration Law stipulates: Contractual disputes and other disputes over rights and interests in property between citizens, legal persons and other organizations that are equal parties are arbitrable. Also, Article 3 provides, the following disputes may not be arbitrated: (1). marital, adoption, guardianship, support and succession disputes; (2). administrative disputes within the competence of administrative agencies as prescribed by law. Monopoly dispute cases are monetary claims between equal parties. Neither are they family law disputes nor do they pertain to administrative disputes within the competence of administrative agencies. They are, consequently, arbitrable under Arbitration Law.
Further, Anti-Monopoly Law and relevant judicial opinions do not contain provisions forbidding monopoly civil disputes to be submitted to arbitration. Article 55 of Anti-Monopoly Law provides: Where the monopolistic conduct of an undertaking has caused losses to another person, it shall bear civil liabilities according to law. It does not exclude arbitration from the means of private enforcement. Neither does Provisions for Monopoly Case deny the arbitrability of monopoly disputes. Its Article 2 provides, a people’s court shall accept a civil lawsuit directly filed by a plaintiff, or filed by a plaintiff after the decision affirming the relevant act as constituting a monopolistic act by the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency concerned has become legally effective, as long as such lawsuit satisfies other case acceptance conditions prescribed by law. This provision prescribes the procedure to initiate a legal action in courts, with the emphasis that administrative decision is not a prerequisite to file a monopoly suit; it does not imply that a court shall hear the dispute as long as the plaintiff initiates an action, regardless of the existence of an arbitration clause.
Third, given that Arbitration Law, Anti-Monopoly Law and relevant judicial opinions do not exclude monopoly civil disputes from being arbitrable, it might not be appropriate for a particular court to deny the arbitrability of monopoly civil disputes in a particular case on the basis that anti-monopoly law involves public policy or third party interests. First, it is within the competence of legislative body to decide the arbitrability of a certain type of disputes on grounds of public policy. Next, monopolistic conduct may harm the interests of various distributors or consumers, but arbitral awards are only binding on the parties and do not affect third parties such as other distributors or consumers, and may in no way prevent the administrative enforcement agencies from investigating and punishing the monopolistic behaviours. Therefore, resolving monopoly disputes through arbitration would not prejudice public interests. In any event, a competent court has the power to set aside an arbitral award under Article 58 Paragraph 2 of Arbitration Law when it finds that the award violates the public policy. It is not necessary to reject the arbitrability of monopoly disputes at the very beginning.
In various cases of 2016, the courts required the plaintiffs to split monopoly claims from others such as contractual claims or tort claims, and declined to hear other claims in deciding a monopoly case. For example, in Changsha Zhenshanmei Ltd. v. Ningbo Bull Electric, the Supreme People’s Court held in its judgement that the case is an monopoly dispute that concerns abuse of dominant market position, which is distinct from other issues proclaimed by the plaintiff, e.g. breach of contract and torts relating to right to reputation. It upheld the decisions of the courts of the first and second instance to tell the plaintiff to initiate separate lawsuits.
In Wu Xiaoqin v. Shaanxi Broadcasting Media, the Supreme People’s Court explained how to distinguish monopoly disputes from other disputes. It stressed that courts should consider the specific claims that plaintiff puts forward, the defendant’s defending opinions and the evidence they have submitted in ascertaining the nature of the dispute. It decided that in the case at hand, Wu Xiaoqin specified clearly in its complaint that Shaanxi Broadcasting Media violated anti-monopoly law by conducting tie-in sales. Wu did not seek damages under consumer protection. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to apply anti-monopoly law to this case.
The relationship between exercise of intellectual property rights and abuse of dominant market position has been a hot topic. In 2016, 2 monopoly disputes are related to exercise or abuse of patent or trademark rights respectively. In ZTE v. Vringo, et al., ZTE filed a lawsuit at Intermediate Court of Shenzhen in 2014 against Vringo alleging the latter abused its patent rights. The factual background was that, Vringo concluded a patent purchase agreement with Nokia in August 2012, through which the former obtained more than 500 patents in areas of 2G, 3G and 4G, and since then it initiated patent litigations against ZTE in UK and other jurisdictions all over the world. In December 2015, Vringo and ZTE reached global settlement and ZTE withdrew its claim from Intermediate Court of Shenzhen. Another case Hubei Deyu Ltd. v. Haining Ltd., Jinlian Ltd. concerns monopoly dispute arising out of trade mark rights.
In addition to ZTE v. Vringo, et al., in 2016 there have been another 5 cases that ended up with withdrawals of the claims. Signs show that withdrawals of claims do not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs gain nothing. Rather, they are usually accompanied by concessions made by the defendants. For a defendant, monopoly lawsuit tends to impose a spillover effect or domino effect, which makes the defendant inclined to settle outside the court even the likelihood to lose the case is not high. To this extent, to force a defendant to settle may have been one of the driving factors for a plaintiff’s decision to sue.
With the increasing awareness about the anti-monopoly law, and especially with the increasing number of administrative enforcement cases, victims of monopoly practices, including down-stream distributors, other types of undertakings or consumers, will gain more willingness and confidence to take legal actions. In January 2017 Apple Inc. filed a suit over Qualcomm’s abuse of dominant market position in Beijing Intellectual Property Court, which probably heralds 2017 will be a “bumper year” of anti-monopoly civil litigations.
To make anti-monopoly private enforcement as strong as administrative enforcement, joint efforts from the anti-monopoly community are needed. In addition to plaintiffs who have the courage to stand up and safeguard their rights, more qualified anti-monopoly lawyers are needed, and courts and administrative enforcement agencies are encouraged to adopt appropriate measures to ease the heavy burden of proof of plaintiffs.
 Partner, Global Law Office, Beijing, China. Email: renqing@glo.com.cn. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of his firm or his clients. The author is grateful to Haochen Li who assisted the author to translate this article into English.
 Statistics by the author according to information published by the Website of China Judgements and Rulings (http://wenshu.court.gov.cn).
 Supreme People’s Court (2015) Civ. Retrial Civil Ruling No. 3569, made on March 4th 2016.
 Shanghai Intellectual Property Court (2015) SH IP Civ. F.I. Civil Judgement No. 508, made on April 25th 2016.
 Supreme People’s Court (2016) Civ. Retrial Civil Judgement No. 98, made on May 31st 2016.
 In this case the Plaintiff also claimed that the Defendant’s prohibition on number portability amounts to an exclusivity agreement, which was rejected by the Court.
 Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court (2015) GD IP Comm. Civ. Civil Judgement No. 33, made on 30th August 2016; High People’s Court of the Guangdong Province (2016) GD Civ. Jurisd. Final Civil Ruling No. 273.
 High People’s Court of the Beijing Municipality (2016) BJ Civ. Final Civil Judgement No. 214, made on 22nd August 2016.
 High People’s Court of the Shanghai Municipality (2012) SH HC Civ. 3 (IP) Final Civil Judgement No. 63, made on 1st August 2013.
 Administrative Decision on Penalty No.2520160009, Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau, made on 8th August 2016.
 Administrative Decision on Penalty No.2520160027, Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau, made on 19th December 2016.
 Administrative Decision on Penalty No.2520160028, Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau, made on 29th December 2016.
 National Development and Reform Commission  Administrative Penalty Decision No. 8, December 2016.
 See Article 14 of Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China.
 Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court (2015) GD IP Comm. Civ. F.I. Civil Judgement No. 33, made on 30th August 2016; High People’s Court of the Guangdong Province (2016) GD Civ. Jurisd. Final Civil Ruling No. 273.
 High People’s Court of the Guangdong Province (2016) GD Civ. Final Civil Ruling No. 1978, made on 23rd December 2016.
 It is open to discussion whether the trial court should transfer the case to Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court, instead of refusing to hear the case.
 People’s Court of the Qufu County, Shandong (2016) SD0881 Civ. F.I. Civil Ruling No. 1800, made on 14th July 2016.
 The other case is Yulong Telecom v. Sony Ericsson, Intermediate People’s Court of Shenzhen, Guangdong (2015), SZ INTMD IP Civ. F.I. Civil Ruling No. 1089, made on 1st April 2016.
 See, press release of the Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court. http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/yjdt/20120508152415.htm, last visited on 5th January 2017.
 Supreme People’s Court (2015) Civ. Retrial Civil Ruling No. 3569, made on 4th March 2016.
 Supreme People’s Court (2016) Civ. Retrial Civil Judgment No. 98, made on 31st May 2016.
 Intermediate People’s Court of Shenzhen, Guangdong (2014) SZ INTMD IP Civ. F.I. Civil Ruling No. 167-2, made on 19th January 2016.
 Intermediate People’s Court of Wuhan (2015) HB WH INTMD IP F.I. Civil Ruling No. 02615, made on 26th April 2016; Court of Haining (2015) JX HN IP F.I. Civil Judgment No. 44, made on 7th March 2016.

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** In addition to the “Insurance Agents Errors and Omissions” cases listed below, please see our Insurance Professional Liability cases. View “Professional Liability” cases.
Engaged by plaintiff counsel to evaluate Agents Errors & Omissions and Bad Faith issues from a Commercial Property policy cancellation. Litigation resulted from a premium finance company failing to notify the mortgagee of policy cancelation for nonpayment, followed by a total windstorm loss to an apartment complex. Case required analysis of insurance industry standards for completing ACORD form applications and Certificates of Insurance. Attorney Grady Terrill, Craig, Terrill, Hale, & Grantham, L.L.P. (806) 744-3232. First Bank & Trust v. Guide One & AREA Insurance; Cause No. 2013-508,134 In The 237th District Court of Lubbock County, Texas.
Engaged as consulting expert by counsel defending against allegations of Agent Errors & Omissions. Case involved client expectations of coverage for “business risk tax liability”. Claim was denied under Commercial General Liability, Property and Inland Marine policies. Boat Town v. Belter Insurance Agency; Cause No. D-1-GN-10-003327 In The District Court of Travis County, Texas, 53rd Judicial District. Attorney Darrell Cockcroft, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP (512) 703-5094.
Designated by policyholder counsel as their Agent Errors & Omissions and Flood Insurance expert. Case involved NFIP policies issued using non-FEMA flood zone maps and adverse consequences to policyholder. Hometex v.. James Hooten and McMullan Insurance Agency; Cause No. BA-CV-05-0012; In the 216th Judicial District Court of Bandera County, Texas. Attorney Charles Japhet, (210) 775-1881.
Engaged by counsel for insured as their Flood Insurance and Agent Errors & Omissions expert. Case revolved around agent’s faulty flood zone determination and resultant claim penalties after a car wash suffered severe flood damage. Attorney Charles Japhet (210) 554-5278. Hometex Corporation v. McMullan Insurance Agency, Inc., et al; Cause No. BA-CV-05-00012 in The 216th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas.
Engaged as consulting expert by policy holder counsel. Case involved review of Agent Errors & Omissions, valuation and limits for an Inland Marine claim under a manuscript Warehouse Legal Liability policy. Attorney Tom Carlyon, (570) 455-6308.
Engaged by policyholder’s counsel to provide analysis and testimony regarding Personal Auto and Agent Standard of Care. Case included failure to procure insurance issues. Garza v. U.S. Auto Insurance Services, Inc., et al; Cause No. 2007-CI-00169; Bexar County, TX. Counsel for plaintiff, Richard Silvas, The Silvas Law firm, San Antonio, TX (210)680-2800.
Designated as policyholder’s expert for Property Insurance, Business Income, and Agent’s Errors & Omissions. Case issues included building & contents valuations and Ordinance or Law coverage following a total fire loss in Metairie, LA. Cardinale v. Goza, et al; Civil Action No. 09-4181 in United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, Judge Section “N”, Magistrate 4. Attorney Greg Dupuy, Dupuy & Dupuy Attorneys (504) 831-4833.
Designated by plaintiff counsel as Property Insurance, Flood Insurance and Agent’s Errors & Omissions expert. Case involved DIC, inaccurate NFIP Flood Zones, and flood coverage omitted from property insurance policy schedules. Cummins Northwest v. PLW, INC., et al, No. CV-09-334-HA; US District Court for the District of Oregon. Attorney David M. Brenner, (206) 389-1773, Riddell Williams, P.S.
Retained by defense counsel as a consulting expert for Flood Insurance and Agent Errors & Omissions. Case involved flood and wind damage to two high value homes damaged during Hurricane Katrina. Attorney Ed Beder, Brantley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP (202) 719-8290. Conwill v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, et al, Civil Action Number 1:08-CV-1511 HSO-JMR, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi Southern Division.
Designated by plaintiff counsel as their Property Insurance Expert regarding a total loss due to Hurricane Wilma. Provided analysis pertaining to Agent Error & Omission. Case issues involved Florida Windstorm insurance, Business Income and Surplus Lines Insurance placement. Scott Katz & Beth Berry, Butler Pappas Attorneys , (813) 281-1900. TCB Farms v. Oswald Trippe, et al; Case No. 07-1389-CA, Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Collier County, FL.
Plaintiff engagement as their expert for Property Insurance, Agent Errors & Omissions & Business Income. Litigation involved a total fire loss to underinsured building and Business Personal Property. Attorney Jeff Stewart – Seikaly & Stewart, Attorneys, (248) 723-5120. Trojan Cleaners, et al v. The Regency Insurance Group, et al; Case No. 2006 611590 CK 6 611590 CK, State of Michigan Wayne County Circuit Court.
Defense counsel engagement regarding insurance placement “Standard of Care”, market conditions and allegations of fraud. Case issues included Insurance Agent Errors & Omissions during placement of a PEO Workers Compensation program. Attorney Troy Glander – Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc. (210) 822-6666. Texas Citrus Exchange, et al v. Brown & Brown, Inc., et al; Cause No.C-1420-02-E; in the 275th Judicial District, Hidalgo County, Texas.

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Sommeliers are an incredible asset not only for the wine industry, but for you as a consumer. A sommelier, by definition, is a trained and knowledgeable wine professional, normally working in fine restaurants, who specializes in all aspects of wine service, as well as wine and food pairing. Don’t be intimated, though. You should take advantage of this wine expert! But first, let’s expand on what goes into being a sommelier.
The wine industry is constantly evolving and so are sommeliers. Traditionally, sommeliers were viewed as highly educated wine connoisseurs in black suits with their tastevin hanging around their neck primarily recommending wines for dining guests. But today, somms have become the celebrity ambassadors of hospitality for the wine industry, with a hand in everything from the wine menu, staff trainings to collaborating with the chefs on food pairings. You can also find certified sommeliers in many urban wine bars and winery tasting rooms – including two at V. Sattui! Whether you’re a wine connoisseur or a novice wine drinker, a somm will always aim to provide you an unforgettable experience.
The immediate answer to becoming a certified somm is hard work and dedication to the program and wine itself. You have to live, eat and breath all things wine. For some background, there are 249 wine professionals in the world who have the highest title of Master Sommelier, 155 of those are in the U.S., and only 25 of them are women. They have the privilege of putting “M.S” after their name.
You can start this process by taking the four courses through The Court of Master Sommeliers, along with passing each exam. Another well-known organization is the Wine and Spirits Trust, or WSET, which is an academic program out of the United Kingdom.
Whether you’re at dinner, in a wine shop or visiting V. Sattui Winery, here are 5 great questions you may ask a sommelier.
What is your favorite bottle of wine under $75?
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I typically enjoy Burgundy wines. Do you have any wines from that region or a wine comparable in style?
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V. Sattui is lucky to have two brilliant sommeliers on staff. They are here to answer your questions and help you discover your palette at V. Sattui Winery!
Marija has been a part of the V. Sattui family for three years. Her passion lies in the library of wines we offer and in travel tourism. Marija holds a WSET (Wine & Spirit Education Trust) Level 3 Advanced Certificate and is a Certified Sommelier from the Court of Master Sommeliers. Marija is a pro at relaying her passion for wine, food, and people to our guests every day. Experience her expertise at one of our upcoming Wine & Food Pairings.
Martin (otherwise known as Marty) has been with us for more than three years and is a Certified Sommelier by the Court of Master Sommeliers. He holds a Certified Wine Professional certification from The Culinary Institute of America. Martin discovered his love for wine and food in New York City where he worked at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel followed by the Claremont Hotel in Berkeley Hills, CA. Marty left the food business to pursue his passion for wine, and we’re lucky enough to have access to his skill set in all things wine.
We bought a goat cheese and an aged cheddar from the Artisan Deli for our picnic. Which V. Sattui wine do you recommend to pair with them?
I love your 2016 Dry Riesling. What other white wine would you recommend for my palette?
I have been exploring red blends recently. Do you have any we could taste?
We plan to come for a V. Sattui BBQ on Sunday. Which wines do you recommend to go with the food?
Which Cabernet Sauvignon do you recommend that is under $60?
By asking these questions, you are getting to know your palette, the sommelier, and wines you may or may not like — even wines you never thought you would enjoy! So next time you V. Sattui, be sure to ask our somms any questions you may have and expand your wine knowledge along the way. Cheers!

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the3rdchoice.org • View topic - Genesis 11 - Is the story of Babel true?
Do you believe the story of babel is true and people actual tried to construct a ladder to reach god. When he saw this happening he spread them out and changed their languages.
Re: Genesis 11 - Is the story of Babel true?
Yeah, it's true. The context of Genesis 1-11 as a whole is to show the need for the covenant. Humanity is incapable of staying on the path of recognizing truth and worshipping the true God. The only path to reclaim humanity is for God to reveal himself over and over. This story show how necessary a program of revelation has become.
v. 1: "The world had a common speech." The reference is to the world of the Mesopotamian region. The Hebrew word translated "world" is *eretz*, and can also mean "land." (Genesis 10.5, 20, 31 already admit to different languages in the world.) In other words, they had the collective power to band together and seek significance apart from God, much the same as in the Garden of Eden passage. They were in rebellion as a united front. A Sumerian epic ("Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta") tells the same tale, speaking of a time when there was only harmony among the people: "The whole universe in unison spoke to Enlil in one tongue."
v. 2: "As man moved eastward." "East" for the ancients always meant "the land of the gods." They settled in Shinar. History records for us a migration into the region of southern Mesopotamia in the 4th millennium. This particular story is set in about 2100 BC, a period known as the Uruk phase that history tells us was just as the Bible describes it. It was a period of architectural and cultural advances, as well as the significant development of urban culture in the region, just as the Bible says. Again, we are speaking of a regional people group moving eastward, not global population movements.
v. 3 tells of their construction techniques, and history confirms the accuracy. Mudbricks are first found in about 8-9th millennium BC. The practice was to use stone for foundations and kiln-baked mud bricks for the superstructure. This practice started towards the end of the 4th millennium. Bitumen tar was used for mortar, just as the Bible says. These building techniques were not used in Palestine, but only Mesopotamia, and they weren't used for common buildings (too expensive), but only for public and cultic buildings, just as the Bible says.
v. 4. They were constructing a ziggurat. Many have been found in the area dating to that era. The information is historically correct.
The sin was not building a cohesive civilizations, technological competence, or human progress. The sin was "so that we may make a name for ourselves." It is more to the point to think of them as desiring to make a name for themselves instead of making a name for God. This tower was connected to a temple, as such towers always were, and temples were designed to honor a deity. Their motivation was not to honor God but to bring prosperity and honor to themselves.
v. 4 "and not be scattered over the face of the whole earth." God had told people to fill the earth, to enjoy all of what the planet had to offer, and to make the whole world sacred space. Their clumping together (to NOT be scattered over the face of the whole earth) to make a name for themselves was an act of rebellion against God. God scattered them later not because he did not want them to be together, but because their united efforts were causing mischief (like separating children who misbehave).
v. 5. The whole point of building a ziggurat was so that God would come down and dwell with them. The irony here is that the REAL God came down and was not pleased with what he saw, because they were in rebellion against him, not because they were building cities, using technology, cooperating, or experiencing human progress, but because they were trying to manipulate God to be what they wanted him to be rather than subscribing to the revelation of what God truly was.
v. 6. The problem with their unity, urbanization, and project is that they were using it for blasphemy and apostasy. The problem is deity falsely construed, not technological progress, understanding each other, cohesive societies, and human progress. You've misunderstood the entire story and come to an illegitimate conclusion based on false facts and distorted interpretations.
v. 7. Confusing their language would bring an end to the cooperative effort that led to this building project. His remedial action didn't eliminate the problem (which continued in the Mesopotamian religious system), but it certainly registered God's displeasure with their distortion of who He was and how He works, and it paved the way for His decision to work through one nation and one language group (ch. 12 and following).
v. 8. Their offense is a religious system in which the gods are made to be like humans (like accusing God of jerking people around). People were trying to bring God down to the level of fallen humanity. We must all be careful not to reduce God to being like humans with problems.
The scattering accords perfectly with what we know from history. At this time in history the united cultures of the Sumerians are invaded by the Babylonians (who spoke Semitic, not Sumerian) who dispersed the populations, effecting a disintegration of their society, a loss of their identity as a people, and mixing of languages.
> This story show how necessary a program of revelation has become.
Enlighten me. What is the program of revelation that you have?
The prime offense of the people of this story was in trying to reestablish God’s presence with flawed motives (His presence that had been lost at the Garden of Eden, Gn. 3). In the rhetorical strategy of Gn. 1-11, Adam and Eve lost access to the presence of God by presuming to make themselves the center of order and wisdom. In Gen. 4 the sacrifices and even calling on the name of the Lord didn’t reestablish divine presence. Here the builders of the tower take initiative to reinitiate sacred space through the abiding presence of God as represented in the tower (the ziggurat), but they do it through (1) encroachment on divine prerogatives (putting themselves in the place of God), (2) violation of boundaries between divine and human identities, and (3) the encroachment of disorder on the ordered realm the worldview of the ancient world was all about order, disorder, and nonorder). The Babel project, motivated by the Great Symbiosis (the gods give to us as we give to the gods), represented disorder in the divine and human interrelationships and resulted in God’s interruption of order by the confusion of languages.
The tower builders conceived of sacred space as focused on themselves—a repetition of the Garden of Eden scenario—thus forming an inclusio to Gn. 1-11. The motivation of the building project was for order determined by them and built around them.
The tower building account has introduced another theological problem that has to be resolved. The first was sin and the loss of access to sacred space (Gn. 3). Before those problems can be resolved, God must reveal His nature and institute relationship so sacred space can be reestablished on a proper basis.
God's initiative—His program of revelation—is going to reestablish his presence not on the strength of their unity (the Tower of Babel) but in the midst of their diversity (Acts 2); not through the Great Symbiosis but through the covenant (Gn. 12 and following). Genesis 11 is a failed human initiative to reestablish God’s presence; Genesis 12 is God’s initiative that will lead to relationship in his presence and sacred space.
Genesis 3-11 are the story of what the world looks like under the law of sin and death, and the judgment of God on it. God put in development a plan—a program of revelation—to restore what was marred.
God continued his program of revelation by showing that he was as faithful to the covenant curses and penalties as he was to the covenant benefits and blessings. The purpose of Genesis 1-11 was to show the need for the covenant. The only path to reclaim humanity is for God to reveal himself anew. The first step on the path to reclamation and redemption is revelation. The Tower of Babel shows how necessary a program of revelation has become.
So when you said "has become" you meant to say "had become"?
Last bumped by Anonymous on Fri Sep 28, 2018 11:07 pm.

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