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With the rise and rapid development of the Internet technology, the network shopping which is the most extensive and popular model of the electronic business grew significantly. Behind the hot network shopping, we also have found a large amount of counterfeit goods sold on these internet websites. Accordingly, trademark owners required these internet service providers hereinafter referred to as ISPs to protect their trademarks and prevent sales of counterfeit goods. At the same time, many countries including the United States took legislative action of safe harbor to protect ISPs from various liabilities. But even if ISPs help to take down the link of counterfeit goods on these websites after receiving notice from trademark owners, the infringement of counterfeit goods remains rampant.
Compared to cost, difficulty and uncertainty for trademark owners to police counterfeit goods on internet, a lot of famous trademark holders seek to hold ISPs liable for contributory trademark infringement around the world. In the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, and Britain, the international and famous luxury manufacturers LVMH, Hermes, Rolex, L 'Oreal, and Tiffany filed trademark infringement litigation against the largest auction site eBay in succession.
From watching the judgment, courts in many countries take different views about contributory liability of ISPs. In the United States and Belgium, if ISPs do not specifically know infringements and they take enough measure to prevent infringement, basically they are not liable. And trademark owners bear the burden of policing their trademark on websites. And in Germany, courts held that if ISPs knowingly allow continued sales of counterfeit goods, they can be found liable for damages. However, some courts in France imposed full liability for willful trademark infringement by showing sales of counterfeit goods.
Specifically, this article would begin by an introduction of ISPs contributory liability. The second part reviews the different approaches in different countries. The third part discusses and analyzes issues to determine what kind of contributory liability ISPs should take better. The fourth part figures out our proposal to the problems under the present rules. Then finally we will draw our conclusion in fifth part.
LVMH is one of the largest luxury manufacturers in the world. It owns many famous brands like Lovis Vuitton, Christian Dior, Fendi and Guerlain, etc. In 2006, LVMH noticed there were counterfeit goods sold on eBay. They filed a lawsuit and claimed that 90% goods of Louis Vuitton bags and Dior perfume sold on eBay are counterfeit goods. On June 30, 2008, Commercial Court of Paris held eBay is not a negative network service provider but an active broker, in other words, as an intermediary between sellers and buyers. Moreover, eBay acknowledges counterfeit goods but still provides service for the seller and profits from transactions. Finally, because eBay had subjective fault of not taking effective and enough measures against infringement, eBay should compensate the LVMH value of $61 million loss.
Lancome that is affiliated with L 'Oreal group is a makeup and perfume manufacturer, the company found that counterfeit goods were sold on eBay as well. So they filed a lawsuit to a Belgian court. In 2008, the Brussels Commercial Court held that eBay is only a network platform that provides information release services of goods sales. As ISPs, eBay does not have obligation to monitor information released by its user and does not have obligation to actively search for illegal counterfeit information. Therefore, eBay does not have to undertake contributory liability for counterfeit goods unless it knew of facts or it had known but failing to take down.
First, consumers purchased counterfeit goods from eBay’s subscribers not eBay. So eBay is not seller of the transactions. Second, when Tiffany sent notice to eBay that some listings were selling counterfeit goods on its website, eBay immediately removed the challenged listing from its website. Third, eBay just possessed general knowledge about counterfeit goods on its website, not specific knowledge. Finally, supervision of trademark infringement is not eBay’s responsibility. No law required ISPs to adopt measures to prevent infringement. So, as eBay did not specifically know about the fact of infringement, eBay is not contributorially liable for trademark infringement. Tiffany filed appeal. And the United States Court of Appeals for Second Circuit affirmed.
All issues in these cases are cited as follows: Is legal identity of ISPs a broker or simple service providers? Should ISPs have obligation to monitor infringement trade? Should ISPs specifically know or generally know? Should ISPs have a duty of care?
A. Is legal identity of ISPs a broker or simple service providers?
About the legal status of internet service provider, basically there are the following four views: the first point is that ISPs are sellers or joint party. For example, in the Gentry v. eBay, Inc, plaintiff argued that eBay is a dealer of counterfeit goods. 6 The second view is that ISPs are lessors of counter. It is similar to a market on website. The relationship between ISPs and sellers is a cyberspace renting relationship. 7 The third point is that ISPs are trade intermediary. For example, French court in the foregoing LVMH v. eBay and German court in Rolex v. judgment case held that eBay is not only an internet service provider, but also a broker of the sale, taking responsibility of supervision counterfeit. The fourth point is that eBay is an internet services provider. For example, the Belgian court in the foregoing Lancome v. eBay case and the American court in the foregoing Tiffany v. eBay held that eBay is only internet service providers, not the broker.
The author thinks that the first three opinions are inappropriate. First of all, ISPs are not the seller of the goods on the website. Second, ISPs are also not a lessor of counter. They did not sign a space rental agreement with merchants. Its charge is service fees not commission from sales. Finally, ISPs also are not the internet trade intermediary. The reason is as follows: ISPs did not report trade information to both parties. Transaction information is released by the seller or buyer. And whether trade could be completed depends on will of both parties not ISPs. And in traditional intermediary services, intermediaries actively match trade between sellers and buyers and charge fee from the action by using their experience and knowledge. Unlike traditional intermediary, ISPs are very passive did not collect fees from the buyer during the whole transaction.
Therefore, the author agrees with the fourth view that ISPs are only network service provider. This is because ISPs only provide necessary services for concluding contracts between sellers and buyers, such as information release. So ISPs keep a passive role and they are only internet service providers but not content providers.
B. Should ISPs have obligation to monitor infringement trade?
First, the nature of the trademark right is private right. As it is assets of trademark owners, so trademark owners should be responsible for management and protection of trademarks. It is reasonable and sensible that trademark owners should establish management system and risk evaluation system of trademark asset, pay attention to the use of the trademark, prevent happening of trademark infringement. Moreover, trademark owners gain maximum benefit in using trademark and suffer the biggest loss. So it is more reasonable for trademark owners to monitor and concern their own trademarks.
The author thinks the above opinion ignored characteristics of internet transactions. Unlike the traditional market, ISPs do not have ability of possessing goods, but only providing a platform in internet transaction. To ensure efficiency, ISPs do not check and know any details of transaction. In addition, huge internet transaction volume makes it impossible for ISPs to monitor every trademark infringement. Especially in recent years, network auction is very hot. For example, with nearly 100 million active users, eBay's core marketplace site hosts millions of retail and wholesale transactions in some 30 countries every day.9 Facing hundreds of millions of commodity list in internet, it is slow, arduous, costly, and impossible to require ISPs check one by one. If ISPs have monitoring obligation, it will greatly increase costs of internet transaction, reduce the efficiency of internet transaction, and eventually led to bankruptcy of some auction websites. Even if ISPs could arrange a lot of staffs to monitor for each goods, they can not accurately review whether each of them is original or fake as a trademark owners. So, there is no possibility to impose monitoring obligation only to ISPs.
Third, as internet auction has brought a lot of convenience, and save the transaction costs, it is widely welcome and popular for public. If only because of counterfeit goods sold in internet transaction, we shut down websites or terminate trade pattern, it will lead to destruction of a new industry. Furthermore, if we impose ISPs for monitoring obligation, it may strengthen the rights of trademark owners, interfere in free flow of goods, and then damage the interests of consumers. In practice, many trademark owners just sell products through their own stores or their own websites and tried to ban an auction website commodity sales action. If monitoring obligation is imposed to ISPs, buyer of luxury goods can not resell, buyer who hope to buy secondhand luxury also will lose opportunity to buy cheap goods from website. So this potential practice will strengthen monopoly position of trademark owners, violate first sale doctrine, and also harm the interests of consumers. Therefore, the law should not require ISPs bear monitoring obligation.
C. Should ISPs specifically know or generally know?
In Tiffany v. eBay, defendant contended that specific knowledge is required to take liability. And because defendant did not specifically know counterfeit goods sold on the website, so they do not bear responsibility. However, plaintiff argued that as long as defendant generalized knows infringement fact of counterfeit goods, defendant then has subjective fault and should be liable for compensation.
The author believed that generalized knowledge is not suitable for the factors to determine contributory liability. This is because generalized knowledge is a kind of abstract and fuzzy standard. First, if applying this standard, as long as someone sells counterfeit goods on the website, the law will presume ISPs should know all the fake sales. In fact, generalized knowledge is not equal to web site specific know all the fact of infringement. It will be too strict to impose contributory liability to ISPs when they do not specifically know. As a possible result, it will greatly restrict development of internet and ISPs. Second, applying this standard will lead to unpredictability and uncertainty of law. If only with generalized knowledge ISPs could be held legal responsibility, ISPs will not foresee risk and liability of internet auction website. Authority and credit of law will be lost, the website will be closed down.
D. Should ISPs have a duty of care?
The author thinks ISPs should undertake certain duty of care. In particular, the duty of care is mainly embodied in the following two aspects.
One is ISPs should have taken measures to prevent infringement. Some criminals often will use this platform for sales of counterfeit goods, ISPs usually can foresee these situations. Therefore, ISPs should take some preventive measures. For example eBay spent $20 million a year and take various measures to guard against fake sales. They bought an anti-counterfeiting engine system and a VeRO (Verified Bights Owner) system. If a trademark Owners or customers find someone in an auction website sold fake goods, they can notice eBay. After receiving the notice, eBay will delete reported commodity list in 24 hours, cancel transaction between buyers and sellers, and return cost to consumers.
Another is whether ISPs remove fake goods list in time after finding infringement. If ISPs find infringement through report or search of infringing goods, ISPs should be timely remove fake goods list. In Tiffany v. eBay, eBay deleted the list of counterfeit goods in 24 hours after they received notice from trademark holder, canceled the deal between buyer and seller. It shows that defendant took feasible measures to prevent infringement. So the court held that defendant carried out all obligations under the duty of care. Otherwise, if ISPs did not take enough measures after specifically knowing infringement, ISPs will constitute contributory liability.
Through the whole analysis we can see ISPs could get safe harbor if they take enough measure to prevent infringement, remove all the lists after receiving notice and do not specifically know infringement. To some extent the present rules adopted in the United States reduce counterfeit goods but not eliminate counterfeit goods. And we still find two problems. One is that trademark owners have to spend time and a lot of money on monitoring infringement. Another is that a lack of consumer protection for online consumers has become an increasingly pervasive problem. To solve these two problems we have followed proposal.
First, under the present rules, as internet transaction will absolutely increase in recent years, trademark owners will undertake large burden to police their own trademark. A new legislation of government interference in important fraud that can balance interests of trademark owners and ISPs seems to be more reasonable and sensible.
Second, trademark owners could pool their resource together to policy infringement. They may form a collective organization through which they could create and improve their own filtering software. ISPs also should share their experience and knowledge in filtering software. ISPs and trademark owners should enhance cooperation with each other. It will efficiently reduce their cost in combating online sales of counterfeit goods.
Third, congress should enact new legislation to require ISP keep and retain the IP address and personal information such as name, address, and telephone number of each user in order to register for eBay. Thus when some users sell counterfeit goods, it is easy for trademark owner to track these infringers.
Finally, government should supervise the model contract between ISPs and subscribers and contract between seller and buyer to ensure whether interests of consumers would be well protected.
In principle, ISPs only simply provide internet service. And through contracts with its subscribers so many ISPs also show that they are only service providers and are not related to specific transactions. Generally, ISPs are not liable for trademark infringement by its subscribers, unless they do not take any measure to prevent infringement and do not take down infringing goods lists after receiving notice. This is the trend of the legislation of all the countries in the world. We should not compound duty of ISPs or impose obligations that are difficult to realize.
Furthermore, we also hope that ISPs could help trademark owners as more as possible. To keep balance between ISPs and trademark owners, government may interfere in some important fraud cases on internet. To protect interests of consumers, government may supervise model contract provided by ISPs. Through these method, we may balance the interests between ISPs and trademark owners, ensure the interests of consumers, and protect the new technology.
1.Patricia L. Bella, Paul Schiff Berman, Brett M. Frischmann & David G. Post, Cyberlaw Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in The Information Age (Fourth Edition, West, 2011), 507.
2. http://www.loeb.com/news/CaseList.aspx?Type=ip&case=810 (accessed 28 November 2011).
3. http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=744ef3a68146e10ddd6ce5291d98aeea&client=%5B%2713%27%2C+%2713%27%5D&client=%5B%2713%27%2C+%2713%27%5D&nr=44077&pos=0&anz=1 (accessed 28 November 2011).
4. http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/business/2009/feb/eBay-Victorious-Over-Rolex-in-Latest-Counterfeiting-Lawsuit.html (accessed 28 November 2011).
5. Patricia L. Bella, Paul Schiff Berman, Brett M. Frischmann & David G. Post, Cyberlaw Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in The Information Age (Fourth Edition, West, 2011), 496.
7. See Kelley E. Moohr, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold! Are Sales of Copyrighted Items Exposing Internet Auction Sites to liability? LOY.L.A.Ent.L.J.1997, at 21.
11. P P Swire, ‘Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy’ (2003) 54 Hastings Law Journal, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=424167> (accessed 29 November 2011).

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Full Case Name: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kenneth Lawrence HERSHEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Summary: In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed.
**1 *826 In this criminal case, defendant appeals the judgment convicting him of first-degree animal neglect, ORS 167.330.1 Defendant moved to suppress evidence gathered as a result of law enforcement officers' warrantless entry onto his property, arguing that the entry violated his rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.2 The trial court denied that motion, concluding that the search was justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement as we had recently interpreted that exception. See State v. Fessenden, 258 Or.App. 639, 649, 310 P.3d 1163 (2013), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom. State v. Fessenden/Dicke, 355 Or. 759, 333 P.3d 278 (2014). Defendant assigns error to that ruling. Addressing the narrow question properly before us, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, there were specific and articulable facts from which the officers could, and did, reasonably conclude that the entry was necessary in order to provide emergency aid to defendant's cattle. We therefore affirm.
We review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress for errors of law. State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 74-75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993). We are bound by the trial court's explicit and implicit findings of fact if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them. Id. at 75, 854 P.2d 421. We state the facts consistently with that standard.
At the time of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Sheriff Glerup was the Sheriff of Harney County. At the time of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Glerup had more than 31 years' experience in law enforcement and had investigated “several” animal abuse and neglect cases in the county. Sergeant Needham was a *827 deputy sheriff in Harney County, who, at the time of the motion hearing, had conducted approximately 10 major animal abuse and neglect investigations.
On July 8, 2013, Needham went to defendant's property in Burns, Oregon, in response to a call from Noelle Hauck, who lived on a nearby ranch and had reported “that [defendant's] cows were starving, and/or had no water or food.” Needham drove to the property, but was unable to see the cattle. There is a hill with a lip, which can conceal the cattle from view from the highway.
Needham called defendant, who was at the coast, and explained that the sheriff's office had received a report about the condition of defendant's cattle. Defendant told Needham that the cattle “were okay,” and that he had fired the workers who had been taking care of them approximately a week earlier but had arranged for a man named Brandon Baron to take care of the cattle.
**2 Needham took no further action that day. Glerup called Noelle Hauck and relayed the information Needham had received from defendant.
According to Glerup, after Scott Hauck's call, “[t]hat's when * * * Sergeant Needham contacted Brandon Baron by phone, and we learned that what we had been told by [defendant] was not true, that [Baron] was not hired to take care of” the cattle. Baron told Needham that defendant had contacted him a few days earlier because he had gotten a call that the cattle were out on the highway. Baron said that defendant asked him to check, and to put them back onto his property if they were out. Baron told Needham that he agreed to check for the cattle on the highway—he did not find them there—but that he had never been hired to take care of the cattle.
Also at the motion hearing, Glerup described the information he had when he decided that they had to enter defendant's property immediately: “We had two local people that were very familiar with cows and cattle, and they were telling us that they were in very poor health, and they—they feared for their safety and their lives.” When asked if he felt that it was necessary to enter the property to render immediate aid or assistance to the cows, he said, “Yes,” and that in his view it was their “duty” to ensure the safety of the cattle.
**3 Glerup and Needham entered defendant's property, where they made observations and gathered evidence of *829 animal neglect. Defendant was ultimately charged with five counts of first-degree animal neglect, ORS 167.330, and one count of second-degree animal neglect, ORS 167.325.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the officers' entry onto his property.4 In response, the only justification that the state advanced for the warrantless entry was the emergency aid doctrine. The parties both filed memoranda recognizing that a Court of Appeals' decision, Fessenden, had recently held that that doctrine could apply to nonhuman animals. 258 Or.App. at 649, 310 P.3d 1163. The parties also agreed on the legal analysis for determining whether the requirements of the emergency aid doctrine had been satisfied. The dispute before the trial court at the suppression hearing was whether the state had met its burden of proving that those requirements had been satisfied. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made findings, concluded that the emergency aid doctrine applied, and denied the motion to suppress.
Pursuant to negotiations, defendant agreed to a stipulated facts trial on one count of first-degree animal neglect, with the understanding that he would be able to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. See State v. Pierce, 263 Or.App. 515, 518-19, 333 P.3d 1069 (2014) (holding that similar agreement allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry onto his property was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. He argues that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing the requirements for emergency aid, and he argues that, in any event, contrary to *830 our decision in Fessenden, that doctrine does not extend to animals.
**4 Defendant also renews on appeal his argument that the state had failed to satisfy the requirements of the *831 emergency aid exception. That more narrow argument is properly before us, and we now turn to it.
Article I, section 9, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Under Article I, section 9, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, unless they fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Baker, 350 Or. 641, 647, 260 P.3d 476 (2011).
350 Or. at 649, 260 P.3d 476 (footnotes omitted). To establish that the requirements of the emergency aid exception are satisfied, the state must prove that, at the time of the warrantless entry, the officers had the subjective belief “that there was an immediate need to aid or assist a person who has suffered (or is imminently threatened with suffering) serious physical injury or harm” and that that “belief [was] objectively reasonable.” State v. McCullough, 264 Or.App. 496, 502-03, 336 P.3d 6 (2014). The emergency aid exception does not require probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. Fessenden/Dicke, 355 Or. at 765, 333 P.3d 278. “It permits warrantless entry, search, or seizure, regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed, as long as the officer reasonably believes it necessary to “ ‘render immediate aid to persons * * * who have suffered, or who are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.’ ” Id. (quoting Baker, 350 Or. at 649, 260 P.3d 476 (omission in Fessenden/Dicke)).
Id. at 650, 310 P.3d 1163.
Based on those facts, Glerup and Needham subjectively believed that it was necessary to enter defendant's property to render immediate aid or assistance. As Needham testified, he believed that the cattle “needed immediate aid or assistance, and without that immediate aid or assistance they would suffer serious physical injury or death.” That belief was objectively reasonable; the circumstances known to the officers at the time of their entry onto the property were sufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief *833 that the cattle were presently dying from starvation and dehydration and were near death. As in Fessenden, we conclude that, “[g]iven the possibility of imminent death, as well as the unnecessary suffering associated with starvation,” the officers could reasonably conclude that they “should take immediate steps to save” the cattle, or to alleviate their suffering. 258 Or.App. at 650, 310 P.3d 1163.
Defendant argues that the articulated facts do not show that there was a true emergency. He argues that the fact that the officers waited a day before entering the property shows that they did not believe that a true emergency existed. But the officers explained how the information that they had changed over time, and how their concerns escalated. When Needham first called defendant, after the sheriff's office had received Noelle Hauck's report, defendant reassured Needham that the cattle were “okay,” and that, although he had fired his previous workers approximately a week before, he had hired Baron to take care of the cattle. The next day, after Scott Hauck called and reported that the cattle were “near death,” Needham contacted Baron, and determined that what defendant had told them about Baron taking care of the cattle “wasn't true.” At that point, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that no one had been taking care of the cattle for approximately a week, and given the information that the known callers were reporting, it was reasonable for them to believe that the cattle lacked food and water and appeared to be “dying” and “near death.” Under the totality of the circumstances, it was also reasonable to conclude that it was necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to the cattle, and that, without that immediate aid or assistance they would suffer serious physical injury or death.
Defendant also argues that the officers could have taken the time to call defendant back, or should have sought a search warrant. But, as we have concluded, it was reasonable to believe that the cattle needed immediate aid at the time the officers entered defendant's property, and the officers did act immediately after learning that the cattle had not had anyone taking care of them for a week.
**6 *834 In sum, the officers' belief that immediate action was necessary to provide aid to the cattle, which appeared to be “dying” and “near death,” was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress.
* Garrett, J., vice Flynn, J. pro tempore.
4 The record does not reveal whether any part of the land that the officers entered was curtilage, but there was no dispute at the suppression hearing that defendant had a protected privacy interest in the property. The record does indicate that the officers entered through a locked gate. See State v. McKee, 272 Or.App. 372, 377, 356 P.3d 651 (2015) (Under Article I, section 9, “a person has a protected privacy interest in property outside the curtilage of a residence if the person manifests an intention to exclude the public from the property[,]” by fencing it, posting it, or otherwise closing it off.).
5 In Fessenden, we held that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to animals. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed on an alternative basis that the trial court had also ruled on. It held that the warrantless actions at issue in the case were justified under the exigent circumstances exception, and expressly declined to address “whether the emergency aid exception applies to animals,” because it was unnecessary to resolve that question under the circumstances. Here, the state did not advance below any other justification for the warrantless action, nor would one of the alternate grounds discussed by the parties on appeal—exigent circumstances or consent—satisfy the requirements for affirming on an alternate ground. See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or. 634, 658-60, 20 P.3d 180 (2001) (A reviewing court may affirm on an alternative basis if (1) the evidentiary record is sufficient to support it, (2) the trial court's ruling is consistent with the view of the evidence under the alternative basis, and (3) the record is materially the same one that would have been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis below.). Fessenden/Dicke, 355 Or. at 775, 333 P.3d 278.

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Parking is always tight in urban condominiums, especially in Boston, Brookline and Cambridge. It is also expensive. Parking spaces can sell for six figures. As such, condominium parking is often the subject of controversy and sometimes litigation as the following case illustrates.
In the case of Sewall-Marshal Condominium Assoc. v. 131 Sewall Ave. Condominium Assoc., one condominium challenged the validity of a 1978 agreement dividing parking spaces with a neighboring condominium association on the grounds that the Agreement violated the Massachusetts Condominium Act, M.G.L. c. 183A. One Condominium contended that 100% unit owner consent was required for the parking agreement and/or that it was unconscionable. The Land court disagreed keeping the 1978 agreement in place. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the Land Court’s Decision on March 1, 2016. A copy of the Decision can be obtained by clicking the link.
The parties were neighboring condominium associations in the Coolidge Corner area of Brookline, where parking is at a premium. In 1978, when both condominiums were controlled by the same developers, they entered into a written agreement concerning the shared use and allocation of parking spots on their respective properties. Summarized in broad strokes, they agreed that twenty percent of the spots would be reserved for residents of the plaintiff, the smaller of the two condominium associations (Sewall-Marshal), and eighty percent would be reserved for residents of the defendant, the larger one (131 Sewall), at no cost to either side. This arrangement continued for some twenty-eight years until 131 Sewall notified Sewall-Marshal that it would no longer abide by the agreement. Litigation followed, with the larger condominium seeking a declaration concerning the rights of the parties under the agreement. In essence, 131 Sewall contended that the agreement is unenforceable because it fails to comply with various provisions of G.L.c. 183A, the statute that enables the creation of condominiums, and because it is otherwise an unconscionable contract.
Specifically, 131 Sewall contended that the parking agreement was an unrecorded easement and, therefore, void ab initio, and, further, pointing to §5(b) of the Act, that the parking agreement altered the undivided interests of the unit owners without their consent. Section 5(b), as in effect when the condominiums were formed, see St. 1963, c. 493, §1, provides, in part, that ‘[t]he percentage of the undivided interest of each unit owner in the common areas … as expressed in the master deed shall not be altered without the consent of all unit owners, expressed in an amended master deed duly recorded. [The Act was amended in 1994 to allow for the grant of easements without 100% unit owner consent, and that act has some limited retroactivity, however, since the agreement was executed in 1978, the Court applied law in effect at that time, also the limited retroactivity provisions of the legislative amendment did not apply].
The Appeals Court held that both arguments failed because they rested on incorrect premises: namely, that the parking agreement created an easement and that it affected the interests of the unit owners in the common areas. The Appeals court held that the parking agreement did not create an easement because it did not create a property interest appurtenant to land. Although the agreement sets the percentage of parking spaces each condominium has the right to use, it does not assign any particular space to one or the other condominium, or to any specific unit owner. There is no specific property benefited or burdened by the agreement; accordingly, the parking agreement did not create an easement and hence the Condominium Acts provisions relative to granting of easements was not implicated.
The Appeals Court also went on to note that the parking agreement did not alter 131 Sewall’s unit owners’ percentage interest in the condominium’s common areas such that unanimous consent was required under G.L.c. 183A, §5(b). The Appeals court stated that “[T]he parking agreement does not grant exclusive use of the condominium’s common areas to any unit owner. Indeed, the agreement created a procedure whereby parking space assignments could be changed each year. No unit owner’s interest in the common area diminished”.
The Appeals Court stated that “Rather than creating an easement or altering interests in the condominiums’ common areas, the parking agreement was instead simply an exercise of the boards’ powers under G.L.c. 183A, § 10(b)(1), inserted by St. 1963, c. 93, §1, ‘[t]o lease, manage, and otherwise deal with … [the] common areas.’ … Because the Massachusetts condominium statute does not circumscribe the means by which a board can exercise this power, the boards here were allowed to exercise it in whatever lawful way they saw fit. In this case, the developers did so by including in the by-laws the power to enter into a parking agreement with the abutting condominium, and then signing a contract that pooled and allocated parking spaces located on the common areas.” The Appeals court held that the parking agreement is a valid contract, that is, a bargained-for exchange supported by consideration. “Each side gave and received the opportunity to park in the other’s parking spots. This opportunity was not a chimera; at least one unit in 131 Sewall has been assigned a parking spot at Sewall-Marshal for at least twenty years. … It does not matter that the benefit may have been greater to the residents of Sewall-Marshal than to those of 131 Sewall.
The above case illustrates that Courts are going to be reluctant to undo a contract and a course of dealing that has been in existence for a number of years. That being said, parking agreements and easements contain numerous traps for the unwary, as the above case illustrates, there are numerous statutory arguments that can be made when it comes to control and legality of condominium parking spaces.
Ed Allcock has litigated numerous condominium parking cases in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. While, Ed was not involved in this case, he believes that the result in this case was legally correct and the right outcome given the parties course of dealing. That being said, he cautions, parking and easement issues in condominiums are extremely complex and should be carefully reviewed for statutory and legal compliance. They can be a hidden asset or a burden when it comes to maintenance and litigation, which should not be ignored.
Ed Allcock can be reached to discuss your condominium’s parking issues at eallcock@meeb.com.


John P. Seyfried, Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper Becker, P.C., Port Huron, Mich., for plaintiff.
Richard M. Selik, Bradley T. Raymond, Boaz Siegel and Finkel, Whitefield Selik, P.C., Southfield, Mich., for defendant Detroit Millmen's Health and Welfare Fund.
1. Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company . . . offers automobile insurance policies in accordance with the requirements of the Michigan No Fault Automobile Insurance Act [MCLA 500.3101 (et seq)].
2. Defendant, Detroit Millmen's Health Welfare Fund ("Millmen"), is an Employee Welfare Benefit Plan as defined by Section 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
3. Defendant Millmen is currently, and was at the time of the accident set forth in the Complaint, fully self-insured and provided medical, hospital and other health care related benefits to its participants. Defendant Millmen has never purchased stop loss insurance coverage.
4. Plaintiff provided a no fault automobile insurance policy under which Janet Bryan was a covered person.
5. Plaintiff's policy contained a coordination of benefits endorsement as required by MCLA 500.3109a.
6. Janet Bryan is a beneficiary of the health care insurance provided by Defendant Millmen.
6. Any loss resulting from automobile or other vehicular accidents.
8. Janet Bryan sustained bodily injury as a result of an automobile accident on December 19, 1987. Plaintiff has paid certain medical expenses on behalf of Defendant as a result of this accident.
In its complaint for declaratory relief, plaintiff Allstate alleges that on December 19, 1987, defendant Janet Bryan was injured in an automobile accident; that at the time Bryan was insured under a no-fault policy issued by Allstate; that the no-fault policy contained "a coordinated benefits clause wherein plaintiff, as the no-fault carrier, is liable for no-fault personal injury protection benefits only to the extent that same are in excess of coverage for expenses provided under any individual or group health care coverage plan"; and that at the time of her accident Bryan was also covered by a health insurance policy provided by defendant Detroit Millmen's Health and Welfare Fund, which contained a provision extending personal injury, benefits only "in excess of insurance for expenses provided under any no-fault policy of insurance." Allstate asserts that under M.C.L. § 500.3109a, it is entitled to recoup from the Millmen's Fund "amounts paid on behalf of its insured as a result of injuries sustained in the . . . accident, which would not be in excess of the coverage available under defendant's health care coverage plan . . ." Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that it is not liable for "any future no-fault personal injury protection benefits . . . which are not in excess of the coverage available under the defendant's health care coverage plan."
An insurer providing personal protection insurance benefits shall offer, at appropriately reduced premium rates, deductibles and exclusions reasonably related to other health and accident coverage on the insured. The deductibles and exclusions required to be offered by this section shall be subject to prior approval by the commissioner and shall apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the policy, the spouse of the insured and any relative of either domiciled in the same household.
The purpose of this statute is to "eliminate duplicative recovery and to contain insurance costs." LeBlanc v. State Farm, 410 Mich. 173, 197, 301 N.W.2d 775 (1981). See, also, Lewis v. Transamerica Insurance Corp. of America, 160 Mich. App. 413, 418, 408 N.W.2d 458 (1987); Wiltzius v. Prudential Property and Casualty Co., 139 Mich. App. 306, 312, 361 N.W.2d 797 (1984). Under this statute, if a claimant for personal injury benefits has health/accident insurance and no-fault insurance policies, both of which seek to place primary responsibility for automobile injury benefits on the other, it is the health insurance carrier that is primarily liable. See, e.g., Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Health Administration, Inc., 424 Mich. 537, 551, 383 N.W.2d 590 (1986).
The disposition of this matter is squarely controlled by Liberty Mutual Insurance Group v. Iron Workers Health Fund of Eastern Michigan, 879 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1989). That case involved facts nearly identical to those presented here. The no-fault carrier sued its insured's health and medical plan, an ERISA plan issued by the insured's union, in order to recoup the medical expenses paid after the insured was injured in an automobile accident. As in the present case, the insured in Iron Workers had elected to coordinate his no-fault coverage with the health and accident coverage pursuant to M.C.L. § 500.3109a. And, as in the present case, the health and accident policy specifically excluded coverage for any loss resulting from automobile accidents.
[T]he state regulation in question, as we have assumed the Michigan courts would interpret it, is plainly a mandated-benefit statute of the type discussed in Metropolitan Life [Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)]. It would require the ERISA plan to provide a benefit which would not otherwise be provided to employees: coverage for injuries incurred as the result of an automobile accident. The law would therefore fall within the narrow reading given the "deemer" clause by the court in Northern Group Services [v. Auto Owners Insurance Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987)].
In sum, even though § 3109a is the Michigan statute at issue in both Northern Group Services and in this case, the added gloss given the statute by our assumption that the Michigan courts would extend Federal Kemper to outright automobile accident exclusions requires us to reach a different answer to the question of whether ERISA preempts it.
We hold that even if Michigan law requires this court to disregard the automobile accident exclusion set forth in the Fund's health and accident policy, that state law is preempted.
879 F.2d at 1388 (emphasis added).
Given the Sixth Circuit's clear holding that, under circumstances such as those presented in this case, § 3109a is preempted by ERISA, the court has no alternative but to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff also makes a half-hearted argument, at pages 4-5 of its brief, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and that the case therefore was improperly removed from state court and should be remanded. Specifically, plaintiff argues that its "claim for reimbursement arises strictly by virtue of operation of state law . . . The first time that the issue of ERISA preemption surfaced in this claim was by virtue of defendant's answer, raising same as a defense to Allstate's claim." Plaintiff argues that because the possibility of ERISA preemption does not appear on the face of the complaint, under the "well-pleaded complaint rule" enunciated in Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908), no federal question was presented and removal was improper.
The only Sixth Circuit opinion cited by plaintiff in support of this position is Transamerica Insurance Company of North America v. Detroit Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, 883 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1989). In Transamerica, which involved facts similar to those presented by the instant action, the court determined that the "complaint in the case at bar does not present a federal question. It merely alleges a state law action for subrogation. The federal question arises only as defense . . ." The court concluded that no federal question was raised by the complaint itself, and that the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Accordingly, this suit, although it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, "arise[s] under the . . . laws . . . of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [ 28 U.S.C.S. § 1331], and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) [ 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(b)]. . . .
481 U.S. at 67, 107 S.Ct. at 1548.
The decision in Transamerica also appears to be inconsistent with at least two prior published panel decisions of the Sixth Circuit, Kentucky Laborers District Council Health and Welfare Fund v. Hope, 861 F.2d 1003 (6th Cir. 1988), and Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1986). Both of these decisions noted that a claim for ERISA benefits necessarily gives rise to federal question jurisdiction.
The present action, just as the one involved in Metropolitan Life, "purports to raise only state law claims," but in reality seeks to collect benefits from an ERISA plan. The fact that plaintiff in the case at bar seeks to collect these benefits by way of a subrogation action is immaterial. Defendant correctly notes that a subrogee simply "stands in the shoes of the subrogor and acquires no greater rights than those possessed by the subrogor." Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Isaacson, 145 Mich. App. 179, 182, 377 N.W.2d 379 (1985). The same rule applies where a subrogee seeks ERISA benefits to which the subrogee is entitled. See, e.g., Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical Benefits, 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988); Misic v. Building Service Employees Health Welfare, 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Life mandates a conclusion that this case presents a federal question and that it was properly removed to federal court. Consequently, plaintiff's jurisdictional challenge must be rejected.
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.


There’s an old saying that “bad facts make bad law,” acknowledging that a court’s decisions regarding extreme cases can result in law poorly adapted to less extreme cases. The Supreme Court’s recent trio of 35 U.S.C. § 101 decisions regarding method claims (Bilski v. Kappos, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., and this term’s Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l) followed a common pattern for patent cases reviewed by the Court: the claims at issue were poorly drafted, claiming more than the patentee was likely to have been entitled.
But unlike the Court’s treatment of other such claims (like the claims in KSR v. Teleflex Int’l, for example), in these recent cases the Court has not addressed the substantive patent law under §§ 102, 103, or 112. Rather, the core of the disputes and the questions before the Court involved the patent eligibility of the claims under § 101. In part due to how the questions were framed, and in equal part how the Court seems to think about patent law, the lines between §§ 101, 102, and 103 have become blurred, removing some of the doctrinal certainty that the Federal Circuit has labored for a generation to impart to patent law.
More disturbingly, the Supreme Court has not clarified what makes a claim fall into the patent-ineligible category of abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena. As a consequence, the state of the law regarding patent eligibility is in flux and thus it is difficult to predict with any confidence how courts or the Patent Office will assess patent eligibility in instances where the claims are more circumscribed within the confines of what the patentee has disclosed.
The CLS Bank case is the most recent of the Court’s patent eligibility decisions, and the Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s per curiam opinion (itself an effort to apply the Court’s patent eligibility jurisprudence regarding computer-based methods) that all of Alice’s claims were too abstract to meet the requirements of § 101. The claims at issue included method claims (directed, according to the Court, to methods for implementing an intermediated settlement that are well-known in the art), system claims involving implementation of the method using a general purpose computer, and computer readable-media claims for directing a general purpose computer to implement the method. None of the distinctions thought heretofore to matter between claims to methods, systems, and computer-readable media made any difference to the Court.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to [an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon]. If so, we then ask, [w]hat else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, we . . . search for an inventive concept — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.
The Court did not rely solely on Mayo, however, and asserted that its jurisprudence from Gottschalk v. Benson, through Parker v. Flook, Bilski, and finally the Mayo opinion is consistent in both the underlying principles and how the patent-eligibility analysis should be performed. The opinion distinguished the Court’s seemingly contrary decision in Diamond v. Diehr in a way that may be useful in determining what is patent-eligible subject matter and how it should be claimed: “In other words, the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on a computer.” And, in a footnote, the Court declared that its Mayo analysis is consistent with the patent law principle that the claims should be considered as a whole because the Mayo decision instructs a court to consider the elements of the claim at issue both individually and in their entirety.
Taken in this light, the Court’s views are consistent with other instances where the Court denied patentability for claims that attempted to encompass subject matter in the prior art. But those cases were based on the equivalent of § 102, a standard (novelty) more readily assessed objectively (the claimed subject matter is either in the prior art or it is not) rather than categorically and subjectively under § 101 (wherein the Court seems to think it can “know [a patent eligible claim] when [it] see[s] it”).
The Court’s reliance on § 101 is apparently at odds with its earlier decision in Diehr, which stands for the principle that patent-eligibility under § 101 is independent from novelty under § 102 and non-obviousness under § 103. The Court’s characterization of Alice’s and Bilski’s claims as “preexisting human activity” conflate these analyses and raise the question as to whether the Court intended to partially overrule Diehr. Regardless of its intentions, the Court’s decision to abjure the questions of novelty and non-obviousness in favor of subject matter eligibility decreases the extent to which prior precedent, including the Court’s, can be relied upon in deciding questions of claim scope.
After a brief discussion of the Court’s understanding of how a conventional general purpose computer works, the Court opined that the manner by which a computer implements the claimed (and ineligible) method is not “enough” to render the system claims patent-eligible because said implementation is entirely conventional. In words arising from the Mayo decision, Alice’s claims did not include “significantly more” than an abstract idea and thus were considered to be no more than the abstract idea itself.
The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. There is no specific or limiting recitation of . . . improved computer technology . . . . Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amount to “nothing significantly more” than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not “enough” to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
This decision answers two questions about how to apply the Mayo analysis that were not apparent from that opinion. First, the two-prong Mayo test should be applied for claims encompassing any judicial exclusion to § 101, not just those that incorporate a law of nature as in Mayo. Second, the Mayo analysis is not limited to method claims – it can be applied to claims of other statutory classes as well. It is also evident that this decision is an incremental one, insofar as it does not strike down all software patents and is crafted as an application of the Court’s earlier precedents, particularly Bilski and Mayo. From the opinion, it is clear that the Court is still striving for balance between tying up fundamental building blocks that would inhibit innovation, while not swallowing patent law whole (because everything ultimately is based on an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon). The Court’s decision is also entirely consistent with its disinclination to enunciate broad proscriptions against patenting particular areas of technology, as evidenced by its decisions in Bilski (which did not rule all business method claims to be patent-ineligible), Association for Molecular Pathologists v. Myriad Genetics (which was limited to rendering genomic DNA patent-ineligible but did not disturb patent-eligibility for cDNA), and even Bowman v. Monsanto (which cautioned against interpreting the Court’s decision in that case to apply to all “self-replicating technologies”).
Initially, an applicant should attempt to avoid claiming an invention in a way that makes it look like an abstract idea. Accordingly, an applicant should avoid disembodied method steps, for example by tying each step to a specific hardware component that is not simply a processor or memory of a general purpose computer.
If possible, an applicant should attempt to tie at least some steps of the claim to special purpose hardware. For instance, if the invention improves the operation of a digital camera, an applicant can include in the claims steps directed to image capture and display. If the invention permits one device to control another by a wireless link, an applicant can include the steps of transmitting and/or receiving information wirelessly in her claims. If the invention improves the usability and user experience of a smartphone application, the applicant should claim with specificity what information is displayed in what manner.
In some cases, it may not be possible or practicable to draft claims that can easily avoid being classified as an abstract idea. In these situations, an applicant should be prepared to argue that her claims pass the second prong of the Mayo test by reciting “significantly more” than just an abstract idea. Exemplary arguments include that the inventions improve an industrial process or the operation of a computer itself, thus tying the claims more closely to the Court’s Diehr decision than any of its later decisions including CLS Bank. However, these distinctions should be clearly set forth in the language and the structure of the claims.
To be sure, some inventions may be much harder to claim post CLS Bank. Others may require a more focused claim drafting approach, and a few may be prohibitively difficult to see though to issuance. On the other hand, CLS Bank may have no appreciable impact on many inventions that include software as a component.
There may be another beneficial strategy to use during the next year or two as the Patent Office and the courts hash out the contours of the CLS Bank decision. This strategy is to start by drafting software and business method claims as narrowly as possible (e.g., include specific hardware in the claims) but that still cover at least one commercially-valuable embodiment of the invention. Should these claims be allowed, a continuing application can be filed having claims that do not recite some of this hardware. This approach (starting narrow, then going broad) has the added advantage that it often leads to faster allowances, and also lets the applicant carefully probe the boundaries of § 101.
Alice’s claims could have, and probably should have, been attacked as being anticipated or obvious. After all, this decision relies on the existence of prior art that could have been used for such a purpose. Instead, the Court has fully opened the Pandora’s Box that it peeked into with Mayo, apparently sanctioning the use of prior art to render a claimed invention well-known, conventional and thus abstract under § 101.
Ultimately, CLS Bank continues the trend of two other patent cases decided this term, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. and Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., in which the Court has placed further limits on the scope of patent protection. In doing so, the Court has introduced new avenues for challenging the validity of patents.
 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
 CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed May 28, 1993).
 CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297) (internal citations omitted).
 CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (emphasis added).
 See Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co. (The Wood Paper Pulp Cases), 90 U.S. 566 (1874); Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
 Diamond v. Diehr noted that “[t]he question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). After CLS Bank, and consistent with the Court’s decision in Mayo, it appears as if novelty (or lack thereof) can play a major role in determining whether claims are statutory under § 101. In finding Alice’s claims drawn to the abstract idea of “intermediated settlement,” the Court cited several references (some of which may or may not qualify as prior art under §§ 102 or 103) to establish that such undertakings were “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.” CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. Similarly, when considering the impact of the recited (or stipulated) computer implementation, the Court stated that “all of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Id. at 2359.
 In Bilski, the Court held that “while the machine-or-transformation test has always been a ‘useful and important clue,’ it has never been the ‘sole test’ for determining patentability.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593. In this case, Alice’s computer-readable media and system claims were struck down under § 101, despite some being tied to general-purpose computer hardware. Thus, it appears that to pass the machine-or-transformation test, claims must be tied to a particular machine and not just a generic computer.
 CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (citations omitted).
 Id. at 2360 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
 Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion is brief and to the effect that she believes business method patents to be patent ineligible per se because they do not fall within the ambit of a “process” under the Patent Act. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justices Breyer and Ginsberg join her here, as they did in Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Bilski. Id.; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (Stevens, J., concurring). The other Justices apparently are not yet ready to make all business method claims ineligible for patenting, provided that they satisfy the rule reiterated here that there must be something that improves existing technology or otherwise does not merely adapt methods for controlling human activity for implementation by a computer.
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).


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Toronto: Anansi, 1972. First edition. Near fine in black, illustrated wraps. The simultaneous paperback edition of the author's early work, a guide to Canadian literature.	More about Survival.
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The Way the Crow Flies: A Novel.
London: Bloomsbury, 1997. Hardcover. First British edition. The first British and the first hardcover edition of the Canadian author's first novel. The Canadian first was a paperback original. The winner of several prices, including the Governor General's and the Orange Prize. The correct first issue with burgundy endpapers and a ribbon marker. Fine a fine dust jacket. A.	More about Fugitive Pieces.
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Bryan Schwartz Law: The First Amendment Protects Public Employees’ Right to Run for Office – Or At Least, It Should!
The First Amendment Protects Public Employees’ Right to Run for Office – Or At Least, It Should!
Public employees’ constitutional rights are important. Recent figures suggest that sixteen million Americans — more than 10 percent of the nation’s workforce — are employed by a state or local government, with another two million, approximately, employed by the federal government. With the economic downturn, even more workers are moving from the private sector to typically more secure public sector jobs. See, e.g., “Despite Downturn, Federal Workforce Grows; Stimulus Plan Expected to Increase the Ranks at State, Local Levels,” MSNBC News Report, January 31, 2009 (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28952802/). Simply put, public employees are a major and growing part of our workforce. However, public employees’ rights are now vulnerable, after the recent decision in Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2008).
In Greenwell, a deputy sheriff was fired because he ran for sheriff against the incumbent. The Sixth Circuit in Kentucky held that such a firing does not implicate the First Amendment, relying on an earlier precedent from that court which said that “[t]he First Amendment does not require that an official in [an employer's] situation nourish a viper in the nest.” Id. at 404 (citing Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 850-53 (6th Cir. 1997)).  Other circuits disagree, and rightly conclude that a public employee’s candidacy for office should be protected to at least the same degree as a public employee’s political speech. See, e.g., James v. Texas Collin County, 535 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2008); Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1985); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1977); and Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977).
The Greenwell plaintiff recently petitioned for the Supreme Court to overturn the 6th Circuit, in light of the 6th Circuit’s clear split with other Circuits on this issue. See Petition for Certiorari, 77 USLW 3619 (Apr 27, 2009) (No. 08-1328). The Supreme Court should grant review (certiorari) because “citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Running for office is a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (1968), set forth a balancing test for public employees’ First Amendment rights in the workplace. More recently, in 2006, the Supreme Court acknowledged, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), “Many citizens do much of their talking inside their respective workplaces, and it would not serve the goal of treating public employees ‘like any member of the general public,’ [citing Pickering], to hold that all speech within the office is automatically exposed to restriction.” Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1959. Greenwell seemingly eliminates the Pickering balance, reiterated recently in Garcetti.
There are four issues that warrant Supreme Court review of the Greenwell decision’s divergent holding: 1) whether a public employee may be prevented from speaking on a matter of public concern without balancing the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern; 2) whether a public employee who communicates an intent to run for office has engaged in protected First Amendment speech; 3) whether a public employee can be fired based on the employee’s political affiliation even when that affiliation is irrelevant to the performance of the employee’s job; and 4) the depth of public employees’ First Amendment protections generally.
1. Public employees’ interests – as citizens - must be given weight.
Greenwell’s reactionary result – that the employer’s interest is all-encompassing and that the employees’ rights need not enter into the balance at all – erodes Pickering and its progeny to the point of meaninglessness. Certainly, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly find, an employee whose hostility to his employer (a public officeholder) reaches the level of insubordination, can be properly removed. See, e.g., Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir.2000)) (speech done in a vulgar, insulting, and defiant manner is entitled to less weight in the Pickering balance). But there still must be some balancing in this analysis.
2. The Court should not construe narrowly what kinds of public employees’ communications engender constitutional protection.
Contrary to Greenwell’s result, “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 145. After Greenwell and the 2006 Garcetti decision, a public employee cannot expect protection if he/she responsibly disagrees with the employer regarding a matter of public concern within the scope of his/her duties, nor if he/she tries to shift policy by dislodging the public officeholder. Essentially, this would leave a public employee devoid of the protection envisioned by Connick – unable to change a bad regime and stuck in it, without recourse, unless he/she is willing to sacrifice secure employment and the ability to provide for his/her family.
3. The right to run for office is encompassed in the right to political association.
The Supreme Court has previously held that “[t]he First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression,” and that “[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom” of association. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam). Those who devote their life to public service should not be deprived, contrary to Connick, the basic rights provided other citizens.
4. The Supreme Court should reaffirm the breadth of public employees’ constitutional protections.
Greenwell is particularly important because, despite the favorable language in Garcetti about treating public employees like members of the general public with respect to First Amendment expression, that 2006 Supreme Court decision may have raised doubts about the depth of public employees’ constitutional rights. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. Public employees need the Court, in reviewing Greenwell, to reestablish the strong First Amendment protections they still have on the job. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979).
If you are a public employee whose constitutional rights have been compromised, contact Bryan Schwartz Law, www.BryanSchwartzLaw.com.
 The concurrence in Greenwell by Circuit Judge Boyce Martin invites Supreme Court review of both Greenwell and Carver. Judge Boyce’s strong language in his concurrence is compelling (rivaling Carver’s viper imagery): he described Carver, upon which Greenwell relied, as “a stray cat that hangs around the door and infests the house with fleas,” stating that Carver “continues to plague this Court's jurisprudence. As such, we are bound by its conclusion.” Greenwell, 541 F.3d at 405-406.
Greenwell v. Parsley, 130 S.Ct. 64, 77 USLW 3619, 78 USLW 3011, 78 USLW 3161, 78 USLW 3170, 29 IER Cases 1408 (U.S. Oct 05, 2009) (NO. 08-1328).

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We transfer your data to providers who process it on our behalf under Art. 28 GDPR in order to help us run our websites and the related processes. Our service providers are subject to our strict instructions and are contractually obligated to follow them. The name of our provider is: Host Europe GmbH, Google LLC.
Google Analytics (USA) has an adequate level of data protection due to its participation in the Privacy Shield (Art. 45 (1) GDPR).
Our websites use session cookies. Processing is based on Art. 6 (1) (1) f) GDPR and in the interest of optimizing/enabling user navigation and presenting our websites.
We use Google remarketing technologies.
We use Google's cross-device remarketing technologies so that targeted advertising can be displayed on other websites based on your visits to our websites. Data is processed on the basis of your consent under Art. 6 (1) (1) a) GDPR.
When you visit our websites, it is possible for Google to access recognition features for your browser or your device (e.g., it creates a “browser fingerprint”), analyze your IP address, or store a fingerprint in the form of a small text file on your device (e.g. a “third-party cookie”). It is also possible for Google to link and store your visit to our websites with one or more of these fingerprints in order to show you our ads on other pages on the internet.
The above fingerprints are designed as a pseudonym and can be used by Google in order to recognize your device on other websites. For instance, if you visit a page that takes part in Google's Display Ads network (i.e. that shows ads on behalf of Google), Google can recognize your device and browser using the above features.
We can also use "remarketing tags” on our websites. This means that we can add keywords to our websites that contain information about the content of the page shown (such as product or service categories). The keywords that we use do not include personal or sensitive information. Google receives and stores these keywords for the aforementioned fingerprints. This means that when you visit a page where we have placed keywords for a certain product category, Google will store this keyword and match it with your fingerprints.
This allows us to have Google place ads on other websites that are based on our pages you have visited. In other words, if you visit another website that takes part in the Google Display Ad network, Google can use the fingerprint and the keywords stored on this fingerprint to determine whether our ads should be shown to you, and if so, which ones.
For more information on how the Google remarketing technologies works, see https://www.google.com/policies/technologies/ads/.
If you log onto Google services with your own user ID, or use one or more of your own Google accounts, Google can link the fingerprints from various browsers and devices. If Google has created a separate fingerprint for the laptop, desktop PC, smartphone and/or tablet that you use, these fingerprints can be linked with one another once you use or have used a Google service with your user ID. This allows Google to show our ad campaigns in a targeted manner regardless of device. However, Google will not do this unless you have provided Google with your consent for this data processing in the past.
You can change your ad settings.
You can opt out of this form of processing at any time. To do so, go to https://support.google.com/ads/answer/2662922 and deactivate personalized ads. Please note that these settings may not affect all devices and browsers. You can also find more information at https://support.google.com/ads/answer/2662922.
We take technical and organizational measures to protect your data as much as possible from unauthorized access. We use an encryption method on our sites. Your information is sent from your computer to our server and back via the internet using TLS encryption. You can verify this by making sure that the lock symbol is closed in the status bar of your browser and that the address begins with https://.
You have the right to obtain confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning you is being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and the specific information listed in Art. 15 GDPR.
You have the right to request the immediate rectification of incorrect personal data about you and, if needed, the completion of incomplete personal data.
You also have the right to request that personal data about you is deleted immediately if one of the specific reasons listed under Art. 17 GDPR applies, e.g. if the data is no longer needed for the intended purpose.
You have the right to request the restriction of processing if one of the conditions listed in Art. 18 GDPR is met, e.g. if you have filed an objection to the processing, for the duration of any review.
In certain cases, as specified in Art. 20 GDPR, you have the right to receive personal data about you in a structured, standard and machine-readable format or to request that this data be transferred to a third party.
If data is collected on the basis of Art. 6 (1) (1) f) (data processing to protect legitimate interests), you have the right to object at any time to the processing for reasons relating to your particular circumstances. We will no longer process the personal data if there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.
Under Art. 77 GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority if you feel that the processing of data about you infringes provisions of data protection laws. The right to lodge a complaint can be exercised in particular with a supervisory authority in the member state of your residence, your workplace or the place of alleged infringement.
The following information is to notify you as our client, business partner, supplier, prospective client (or contact person of a business partner, supplier, or prospective client) about how we handle the collection, use and transmission of personal data. The controller for the data processing set forth below is GEG German Estate Group AG.
Under our business relationship with you as our client, business partner, supplier or prospective client, we process personal data such as your name, address, e-mail address, telephone/fax number, tax ID, client number, bank details and possibly your place of birth, date of birth, nationality – if you have voluntarily provided this information to us – and your credit rating. Processing is for the purposes of clear identification and the initiation, performance, management and fulfillment of contracts, the evaluation of credit ratings and collateral, and in particular to prepare invoices and credit notes or refunds, the administration and enforcement of claims, the compliance with legal requirements, data security, and in the interests of comprehensive client support.
The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 (1) b), c) and f) GDPR.
Your data will be transmitted to third parties outside GEG German Estate Group AG only if you have given express prior consent to transmission, or if we are obligated to do so by law. The legal basis for this data processing is Art. 6 (1) a) in the case of consent or Art.6 (1) c) in the case of a legal obligation. Within GEG German Estate Group AG, your data will be transmitted to fulfill or initiate a business relationship, among other things. In exceptional cases, data will be processed by a third party on our behalf. These providers are always selected with care, are audited by us, and have contractual obligations under Art. 28 GDPR.
We store the data required for the term of the business relationship with you and until the end of the applicable period of limitation, as well as any resulting claims and legal retention obligations.
Our company processes the contact information of contact persons of clients, prospective clients, suppliers and other business partners for communications by e-mail, phone, fax and post. The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 (1) b) and f) GDPR. The legitimate interest refers to the interest in fulfilling or initiating the business relationship with clients, prospective clients, suppliers and other business partners and maintaining personal contact with contact persons in this regard.
Your data will be transmitted to third parties outside GEG German Estate Group AG only if you have given express prior consent to transmission, or we are obligated to do so by law. The legal basis for this data processing is Art. 6 (1) a) in the case of consent or Art.6 (1) c) in the case of a legal obligation. Within the GEG Group, your data will be transmitted to fulfill or initiate a business relationship, among other things. In exceptional cases, data will be processed by a third party on our behalf. These providers are always selected with care, are audited by us, and have contractual obligations under Art. 28 GDPR.
Personal data will be stored for the purposes of fulfilling business relationships only as long as there is a legitimate interest.
The GEG Group companies use personal data for marketing purposes, especially for marketing via e-mail, phone, and post. The purpose of data processing with regard to marketing activities is to inform data subjects about products and services from the GEG Group. The legal basis for sending advertisements by post is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR. The legitimate interest refers to the interest in notifying clients and prospective clients about products and services. The legal basis for marketing activities by e-mail or phone is generally a declaration of consent provided by you. There may also be special requirements for marketing activities with existing clients.
You can opt out of advertising at any time with future effect by sending an e-mail to datenschutz@geg.de.
We generally do not transmit data to third parties outside GEG German Estate Group AG. If external providers are used to send advertisements, these are contractually obligated under Art. 28 GDPR and monitored accordingly for compliance with organizational and technical security measures. Your data can be transmitted to other companies within the GEG Group for marketing purposes.
If you object to the receipt of advertising, your data will be blocked immediately and then deleted if it is not stored for other purposes as well.
Unless otherwise stipulated in the above sections, the provision of personal data is not legally or contractually prescribed, nor is it required in order to conclude a contract. You are not required to provide the personal data unless otherwise stipulated in advance. The failure to provide your personal data may mean that we cannot respond to your inquiry, that you cannot take part in an application process, or that you may not be able to participate in an event.
You can contact us using a web form. To use our contact form, you must provide us with your name and e-mail address. You can also provide additional information if you so choose.
By submitting this online form, you agree that the data you provide can be electronically recorded and stored. The legal basis for this processing is Art. 6 (1) (1) a) GDPR. We use your data only to process your request. You can opt out at any time, such as by sending an e-mail to datenschutz@geg.de.

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text:
6. Then Apuzzariah answered, saying unto him, “Asses are plentiful, and new ones born each day; and we shall ask those who hate the Usurper to lend their asses unto us, or to carry parchments on their own backs to the judges, to be laid before them.
1. In the beginning was the Prophet, and his name was Emerich de Vattel.
2. And Vattel laid down the Law unto all nations, and the name of the Book was, The Law of Nations.
3. It was written in the language of the French.
5. Thus it was and thus it shall always be.
6. For did not John Jay seek permission of George Washington to inquire if any but a natural born citizen should ever become President?
7. And did not George Washington borrow The Law of Nations and returned it not, for the love of it?
8. Yea verily, the French are a great peoples, who invented mimes and many wonderful cheeses.
1. Then there arose in the land those who denied the words of Vattel, and mocked the true believers and tempted them from the paths of patriotism with clever arguments.
2. These were known as the Anti-Vattelites.
3. They falsely testified that the common law of the English was the source of natural born citizenship, and yea, had been so for centuries before the coming of Vattel.
4. They told tales of Calvin’s Case, and how mere birth within the kingdom made one a natural born citizen.
5. Many were the American legal cases whereof they spake, and none which required two citizen parents to begat a natural born citizen, when the birth occurred within the Kingdom.
6. But the fast tongues of the Anti-Vattelites did not stop there.
8. Their slick words caused many to doubt, for of a truth those words do seemeth to indicate to the unlearned that the Prophet Vattel taught England was a nation unto itself, wherein mere birth inside the kingdom was sufficient for citizenship.
9. Yet, the wise Birther, who hath studied the matter thoroughly, doth understand that there were two Englands, and the Prophet was speaking of the other one, not the one from which sprangeth the United States.
1. Then in the year of 1875, did one Virginia Minor sueth the Elders of the Tribe of Missouri so that she might be possessed of the right to vote, in the same manner as the men thereof.
5. Thus did the Supreme Court recognize the words of the Prophet Vattel, and this became precedent throughout the land.
1. Alas, after hearing the words of the Judges, the hearts of Anti-Vattelites were hardened.
2. For in shame they should have been driven from the land, no longer being able to ridicule the Constitutionalists with their mockery of French law, and their blasphemies against the Prophet Vattel.
3. Lo, was there now an American source which gaveth the law that two citizen-parents must begat natural born citizens, and no others.
6. They bore false witness that the Judges indeed made no decision whatsoever in the manner of precedent, and didst but punt the question regarding the children born inside the Kingdom of aliens and foreigners to some later court.
7. In truth, those words do follow the first words of the decision, yet they do not mean there was incompleteness.
8. For if those words didst mean such a thing, then the words of the Prophet Vattel would not be fulfilled.
9. This teaching is complicated, and must not be mistaken for reasoning that cometh and goeth in circles.
1. Trusting in the Prophet Vattel, verily did his Disciples begin to spread his word among all the peoples of the land, yea even unto the very Courts of the Law.
2. Yet the Judges thereof were cold men of hard demeanor, who kneweth not of visions and strange divinations.
3. First, the Judges of the Tribe of Indiana didst send the Birthers packing, saying they kneweth not whereof they spake, and that the Birthers understoodeth not the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
4. Then, in like manner a Judge of the Tribe of Georgia, didst send the Birthers packing, saying they kneweth not whereof they spake, and that the Birthers understoodeth not the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
5. With great impudence, the Judge of The Tribe of Georgia, favored the words of an empty chair, though it spoke not, over the words of the Birthers.
6. Verily, in a third such smite, a Judge of the Tribe of Virginia didst send a Birther of that land packing, saying he kneweth not whereof he spake, and that the Birther understoodeth not the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
7. And, with much disdain, the Judge of the Tribe of Virginia didst also speak harsh words unto the Birther, mocking him for a Fool, saying his words were without worth, and forbade him from coming again unto that Court.
8. Lo, but the travails mounted up unto the very Heavens, for then a Judge of the Tribe of Illinois didst send a Birther of that land packing, saying he kneweth not whereof he spake, and that the Birther understoodeth not the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
1. It taketh not a wise man to discerneth a pattern in these things, and portents of things yet to come.
2. For liketh unto a small ball of snow rolling down a mountain, it mayst but grow larger and larger until it buries all before it.
3. So likewise might the words of the Judges, over a time, be heard and reinforce one the other, until the voices of the Birthers are met everywhere with laughter and great jeering.
4. For then will the people sayeth unto us, that we knoweth not whereof we speak, and we understandeth not the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
5. Perhaps it wouldst be a wise thing for us Birthers to haveth ready made excuses near at hand, to explaineth away these defeats, and the ones yet to cometh.
6. Therefore, let it be said, when we meet with defeat in the Courts of the Law, that the Judges thereof are but exchanging false decisions for gold and favors.
7. Or, let it be said, that the Judges are but minions of the Usurper, and thus provide false decisions out of loyalty unto him.
8. Shouldst the Judge be of a group opposed to the Usurper, let it be said that he has been threatened for his life, or that unknown persons have graven images of him in compromising positions of adultery, which they doth dangle over his head.
9. Also might we blame our defeats on our Advocates, saying that they doth secretly labor on behalf of the Usurper, or are not truly wise in the ways of the Law, having learned their craft at long distances from the places of teaching.
10. Nor shouldst we stoppeth with these alone.
11. Let our explanations be called Legion, for from these signs and omens, great will be our needs.
1. Many are the scribes of the Anti-Vattelites and their name is Legion.
2. Day and night doth they toil at their evil work, incessantly setting down facts which have the outward appearance of negating the words of the Prophet Vattel, yea even contradicting the interpretations of the words of the Judges of Minor v. Happersett.
4. For truly is it said, that ants may kill a camel, and gnats drive the bull from the pasture.
5. Thus, is it better for thee not to contend with words against the Anti-Vattelites for they are quick of wit, and will confound thee with uncomfortable facts.
6. Far better it is for thee, to hitteth and runneth away. Say, in thy haste, that it takes two citizen-parents to begat a natural born citizen, as if knowing whereof you speak, and then flee the forum hurriedly lest you be confronted.
7. For truly is it said that words repeated often enough take on an existence all of their own.
1. But if thou canst not hold thy tongue, then it is better to contend with words than to stew in silence, for such will busteth thy gut and cause fits.
2. And yea, here is the manner in which thou shouldst confront the Anti-Vattelites, if thou art feeling lucky.
3. Avoideth all talk of the Wong Kim Ark legal case, for here there be many dragons. Sayeth simply that Wong Kim Ark was not running for the Presidency, and prayeth earnestly that the Anti-Vattelite knoweth not the case well.
4. If however, the Anti-Vattelite knoweth well the case, then shouldst thou falsely remember thou hast an appointment with a physician, or some other pressing errand, and promise to return on the morrow. But, returneth not.
5. Doeth likewise with the case of Ankeny v. Governor, although thou mayst also calleth these judges by foul names, they being but judges of that one tribe.
6. Some Birthers doth meet with success by copying and pasting large numbers of words from previous arguments without care that these words pertaineth not to the argument at hand.
7. Likewise mayst thou distracteth from the argument by the calling of names, limning the Anti-Vattelites as Minions of the Usurper.
8. All such artfulness mayst be avoided if thou simply stays among the chambers of like-minded Birthers, where thou canst be comforted with the sound of echos.
1. These be the acts which it is better for thee not to commit.
2. Thou shalt not maketh a Citizen’s Arrest. These turneth out badly.
3. If thou attempts to maketh a Citizen’s Arrest anyway, and are afterwards arrested and convicted, do not talketh back and disrespect the Judge.
4. Thou shalt not engageth in civil rebellions or sedition.
5. If thou engageth in civil rebellions or sedition anyway, then thou shouldst not broadcast thy plans to bankers, the FBI, and strangers on the Internet. These also turneth out badly.
6. Neither shalt thou carryeth within thy vehicle, personal pleasure devices or deviant materials, as these will cause much shame unto thee.
7. Thou shalt not refuseth to deploy if so ordered by thy Centurion.
8. Thou shalt not walketh away from thy military retirement.
9. Thou shalt not maketh the youtube videos in which thou promises to arresteth the President. For lo, his protectors shall descend upon thee with guns, subpoenas, and search warrants.
10. Thou shalt not calleth judges by names or falsely accuse them within their own Courtroom, for their sanctions may be laid heavily upon thee.
3. Yea, though we goeth forth roaring like lions, we doth return always like small cats which meweth for milk in tiny voices.
8. And the faithful were comforted, for yea on some distant morrow, a Revelation would cometh, and many new parchments, though none kneweth the day or hour.
This is so incredibly brilliant that i am going to shut down my internets for the day and reflect upon its awesomeness.
Amen and Hallelujah! thou hast spoken truth to the wicked and granted merryment tho the oppressed. As it has been written, let it be so.
A superb piece of sardonic wit. Great conception and execution. And it teaches the truth.