Petitioner, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent, prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search respondents' Montana ranch, which stated that the search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records. The application was supported by petitioner's detailed affidavit setting forth his basis for believing that such items were on the ranch and was accompanied by a warrant form that he completed. The Magistrate Judge (Magistrate) signed the warrant form even though it did not identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. The portion calling for a description of the "person or property" described respondents' house, not the alleged weapons; the warrant did not incorporate by reference the application's itemized list. Petitioner led federal and local law enforcement officers to the ranch the next day but found no illegal weapons or explosives. Petitioner left a copy of the warrant, but not the application, with respondents. Respondents sued petitioner and others under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, and 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment violation. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding no Fourth Amendment violation, and finding that even if such a violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed except as to the Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner, holding that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The court also concluded that United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, precluded qualified immunity for petitioner because he was the leader of a search who did not read the warrant and satisfy himself that he understood its scope and limitations and that it was not obviously defective.
1. The search was clearly "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 5-11.
(a) The warrant was plainly invalid. It did not meet the Fourth Amendment's unambiguous requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] ... the persons or things to be seized." The fact that the application adequately described those things does not save the warrant; Fourth Amendment interests are not necessarily vindicated when another document says something about the objects of the search, but that document's contents are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. It is not necessary to decide whether the Amendment permits a warrant to cross-reference other documents, because such incorporation did not occur here. Pp. 5-6.
(b) Petitioner's argument that the search was nonetheless reasonable is rejected. Because the warrant did not describe the items at all, it was so obviously deficient that the search must be regarded as warrantless, and thus presumptively unreasonable. This presumptive rule applies to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. Petitioner errs in arguing that such searches should be exempt from the presumption if they otherwise satisfy the particularity requirement's goals. Unless items in the affidavit are set forth in the warrant, there is no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause for a search as broad as the affiant requested. The restraint petitioner showed in conducting the instant search was imposed by the agent himself, not a judicial officer. Moreover, the particularity requirement's purpose is not limited to preventing general searches; it also assures the individual whose property is searched and seized of the executing officer's legal authority, his need to search, and the limits of his power to do so. This case presents no occasion to reach petitioner's argument that the particularity requirements' goals were served when he orally described the items to respondents, because respondents dispute his account. Pp. 6-11.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity despite the constitutional violation because "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted," Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202. Given that the particularity requirement is stated in the Constitution's text, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was valid. Moreover, because petitioner prepared the warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's assurance that it contained an adequate description and was valid. Nor could a reasonable officer claim to be unaware of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unconstitutional. "[A] warrant may be so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U. S., at 923. This is such a case. Pp. 11-14.
298 F. 3d 1022, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined as to Part III.
JEFF GROH, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH R.
Petitioner conducted a search of respondents' home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the "persons or things to be seized." U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. The questions presented are (1) whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and (2) if so, whether petitioner nevertheless is entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate Judge (Magistrate), relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search.
Respondents, Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, live on a large ranch in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana. Petitioner, Jeff Groh, has been a Special Agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) since 1989. In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed petitioner that on a number of visits to respondents' ranch the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher.1 Based on that information, petitioner prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch. The application stated that the search was for "any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers." App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Petitioner supported the application with a detailed affidavit, which he also prepared and executed, that set forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the ranch. Petitioner then presented these documents to a Magistrate, along with a warrant form that petitioner also had completed. The Magistrate signed the warrant form.
The day after the Magistrate issued the warrant, petitioner led a team of law enforcement officers, including both federal agents and members of the local sheriff's department, in the search of respondents' premises. Although respondent Joseph Ramirez was not home, his wife and children were. Petitioner states that he orally described the objects of the search to Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone. According to Mrs. Ramirez, however, petitioner explained only that he was searching for " 'an explosive device in a box.' " Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F. 3d 1022, 1026 (CA9 2002). At any rate, the officers' search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. When the officers left, petitioner gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant, but not a copy of the application, which had been sealed. The following day, in response to a request from respondents' attorney, petitioner faxed the attorney a copy of the page of the application that listed the items to be seized. No charges were filed against the Ramirezes.
22a. The court added that even if a constitutional violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the failure of the warrant to describe the objects of the search amounted to a mere "typographical error." Id., at 22a-24a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with respect to all defendants and all claims, with the exception of respondents' Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner. 298 F. 3d, at 1029-1030. On that claim, the court held that the warrant was invalid because it did not "describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized," and that oral statements by petitioner during or after the search could not cure the omission. Id., at 1025-1026. The court observed that the warrant's facial defect "increased the likelihood and degree of confrontation between the Ramirezes and the police" and deprived respondents of the means "to challenge officers who might have exceeded the limits imposed by the magistrate." Id., at 1027. The court also expressed concern that "permitting officers to expand the scope of the warrant by oral statements would broaden the area of dispute between the parties in subsequent litigation." Ibid. The court nevertheless concluded that all of the officers except petitioner were protected by qualified immunity. With respect to petitioner, the court read our opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), as precluding qualified immunity for the leader of a search who fails to "read the warrant and satisfy [himself] that [he] understand[s] its scope and limitations, and that it is not defective in some obvious way." 298 F. 3d, at 1027. The court added that "[t]he leaders of the search team must also make sure that a copy of the warrant is available to give to the person whose property is being searched at the commencement of the search, and that such copy has no missing pages or other obvious defects." Ibid. (footnote omitted). We granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1231 (2003).
The warrant was plainly invalid. The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The warrant in this case complied with the first three of these requirements: It was based on probable cause and supported by a sworn affidavit, and it described particularly the place of the search. On the fourth requirement, however, the warrant failed altogether. Indeed, petitioner concedes that "the warrant ... was deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type of evidence sought." Brief for Petitioner 10.
The fact that the application adequately described the "things to be seized" does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981, 988, n. 5 (1984) ("[A] warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional"); see also United States v. Stefonek, 179 F. 3d 1030, 1033 (CA7 1999) ("The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant particularly describe the things to be seized, not the papers presented to the judicial officer ... asked to issue the warrant"). And for good reason: "The presence of a search warrant serves a high function," McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455 (1948), and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document, somewhere, says something about the objects of the search, but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. We do not say that the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. See, e.g., United States v. McGrew, 122 F. 3d 847, 849-850 (CA9 1997); United States v. Williamson, 1 F. 3d 1134, 1136, n. 1 (CA10 1993); United States v. Blakeney, 942 F. 2d 1001, 1025-1026 (CA6 1991); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F. 2d 1028, 1031 (CADC 1990); United States v. Curry, 911 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA8 1990); United States v. Roche, 614 F. 2d 6, 8 (CA1 1980). But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further explore the matter of incorporation.
Petitioner argues that even though the warrant was invalid, the search nevertheless was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He notes that a Magistrate authorized the search on the basis of adequate evidence of probable cause, that petitioner orally described to respondents the items to be seized, and that the search did not exceed the limits intended by the Magistrate and described by petitioner. Thus, petitioner maintains, his search of respondents' ranch was functionally equivalent to a search authorized by a valid warrant.
We disagree. This warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items. Nor did it make what fairly could be characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error. Rather, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a "single dwelling residence ... blue in color." In other words, the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all. In this respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as "warrantless" within the meaning of our case law. See Leon, 480 U. S. 79, 85 (1987); Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498, 503-504 (1925). "We are not dealing with formalities." McDonald, 533 U. S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)), our cases have firmly established the " 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980) (footnote omitted). Thus, "absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within." Id., at 587-588 (footnote omitted). See Kyllo, 497 U. S. 177, 181 (1990); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 761-763 (1969); McDonald, 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
"The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965); United States v. Cardwell, 680 F. 2d 75, 77-78 (CA9 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674 F. 2d 1293, 1299 (CA9 1982); United States v. Klein, 565 F. 2d 183, 185 (CA1 1977); United States v. Gardner, 537 F. 2d 861, 862 (CA6 1976); United States v. Marti, 421 F. 2d 1263, 1268-1269 (CA2 1970). That rule is in keeping with the well-established principle that 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967). See Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958)." Ibid.
Petitioner argues that even if the goals of the particularity requirement are broader than he acknowledges, those goals nevertheless were served because he orally described to respondents the items for which he was searching. Thus, he submits, respondents had all of the notice that a proper warrant would have accorded. But this case presents no occasion even to reach this argument, since respondents, as noted above, dispute petitioner's account. According to Mrs. Ramirez, petitioner stated only that he was looking for an " 'explosive device in a box.' " 298 F. 3d, at 1026. Because this dispute is before us on petitioner's motion for summary judgment, App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986) (citation omitted). The posture of the case therefore obliges us to credit Mrs. Ramirez's account, and we find that petitioner's description of " 'an explosive device in a box' " was little better than no guidance at all. See Stefonek, 179 F. 3d, at 1032-1033 (holding that a search warrant for " 'evidence of crime' " was "[s]o open-ended" in its description that it could "only be described as a general warrant").
It is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted.6 Because petitioner did not have in his possession a warrant particularly describing the things he intended to seize, proceeding with the search was clearly "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the search was unconstitutional.
Having concluded that a constitutional violation occurred, we turn to the question whether petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity despite that violation. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 609 (1999). The answer depends on whether the right that was transgressed was " 'clearly established' "--that is, "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001).
Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818-819 (1982) ("If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct"). Moreover, because petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid. Cf. Sheppard, 468 U. S., at 989-990. In fact, the guidelines of petitioner's own department placed him on notice that he might be liable for executing a manifestly invalid warrant. An ATF directive in force at the time of this search warned: "Special agents are liable if they exceed their authority while executing a search warrant and must be sure that a search warrant is sufficient on its face even when issued by a magistrate." Searches and Examinations, ATF Order O 3220.1(7)(d) (Feb. 13, 1997). See also id., at 3220.1(23)(b) ("If any error or deficiency is discovered and there is a reasonable probability that it will invalidate the warrant, such warrant shall not be executed. The search shall be postponed until a satisfactory warrant has been obtained").7 And even a cursory reading of the warrant in this case--perhaps just a simple glance--would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have known was constitutionally fatal.
No reasonable officer could claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitutional. See Payton, 445 U. S., at 586-588. Indeed, as we noted nearly 20 years ago in Sheppard: "The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional." 468 U. S., at 988, n. 5.8 Because not a word in any of our cases would suggest to a reasonable officer that this case fits within any exception to that fundamental tenet, petitioner is asking us, in effect, to craft a new exception. Absent any support for such an exception in our cases, he cannot reasonably have relied on an expectation that we would do so.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Amendment was violated in this case. The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The warrant issued in this case did not particularly describe the things to be seized, and so did not comply with the Fourth Amendment. I disagree with the Court on whether the officer who obtained the warrant and led the search team is entitled to qualified immunity for his role in the search. In my view, the officer should receive qualified immunity.
An officer conducting a search is entitled to qualified immunity if "a reasonable officer could have believed" that the search was lawful "in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 641 (1987). As the Court notes, this is the same objective reasonableness standard applied under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See ante, at 13, n. 8 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 344 (1986)). The central question is whether someone in the officer's position could reasonably but mistakenly conclude that his conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment. Creighton, supra, at 641. See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 206 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
An officer might reach such a mistaken conclusion for several reasons. He may be unaware of existing law and how it should be applied. See, e.g., Saucier, supra. Alternatively, he may misunderstand important facts about the search and assess the legality of his conduct based on that misunderstanding. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995). Finally, an officer may misunderstand elements of both the facts and the law. See, e.g., Creighton, supra. Our qualified immunity doctrine applies regardless of whether the officer's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting that qualified immunity covers "mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law").
The present case involves a straightforward mistake of fact. Although the Court does not acknowledge it directly, it is obvious from the record below that the officer simply made a clerical error when he filled out the proposed warrant and offered it to the Magistrate Judge. The officer used the proper description of the property to be seized when he completed the affidavit. He also used the proper description in the accompanying application. When he typed up the description a third time for the proposed warrant, however, the officer accidentally entered a description of the place to be searched in the part of the warrant form that called for a description of the property to be seized. No one noticed the error before the search was executed. Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, the mistake apparently remained undiscovered until the day after the search when respondents' attorney reviewed the warrant for defects. The officer, being unaware of his mistake, did not rely on it in any way. It is uncontested that the officer trained the search team and executed the warrant based on his mistaken belief that the warrant contained the proper description of the items to be seized.
The question is whether the officer's mistaken belief that the warrant contained the proper language was a reasonable belief. In my view, it was. A law enforcement officer charged with leading a team to execute a search warrant for illegal weapons must fulfill a number of serious responsibilities. The officer must establish probable cause to believe the crime has been committed and that evidence is likely to be found at the place to be searched; must articulate specific items that can be seized, and a specific place to be searched; must obtain the warrant from a magistrate judge; and must instruct a search team to execute the warrant within the time allowed by the warrant. The officer must also oversee the execution of the warrant in a way that protects officer safety, directs a thorough and professional search for the evidence, and avoids unnecessary destruction of property. These difficult and important tasks demand the officer's full attention in the heat of an ongoing and often dangerous criminal investigation.
his clerical error on a warrant form can be a reasonable mistake.
The Court reaches a different result by construing the officer's error as a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact. According to the Court, the officer should not receive qualified immunity because "no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with [the particularity] requirement was valid." Ante, at 12. The majority is surely right that a reasonable officer must know that a defective warrant is invalid. This much is obvious, if not tautological. It is also irrelevant, for the essential question here is whether a reasonable officer in petitioner's position would necessarily know that the warrant had a clerical error in the first place. The issue in this case is whether an officer can reasonably fail to recognize a clerical error, not whether an officer who recognizes a clerical error can reasonably conclude that a defective warrant is legally valid.
The Court gives little attention to this important and difficult question. It receives only two sentences at the very end of the Court's opinion. In the first sentence, the Court quotes dictum from United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 923 (1984), to the effect that " 'a warrant may be so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.' " Ante, at 13-14. In the second sentence, the Court informs us without explanation that "[t]his is such a case." Ante, at 14. This reasoning is not convincing.
To understand the passage from Leon that the Court relies upon, it helps to recognize that most challenges to defective search warrants arise when officers rely on the defect and conduct a search that should not have occurred. The target of the improper search then brings a civil action challenging the improper search, or, if charges have been filed, moves to suppress the fruits of the search. The inquiry in both instances is whether the officers' reliance on the defect was reasonable. See, e.g., Garrison, supra, (apartment wrongly searched because the searching officers did not realize that there were two apartments on the third floor and obtained a warrant to search the entire floor); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995) (person wrongly arrested and searched because a court employee's clerical error led officer to believe a warrant existed for person's arrest); McLeary v. Navarro, 504 U. S. 966 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (house wrongly searched because informant told officers the suspect lived in the second house on the right, but the suspect lived in the third house on the right).
The language the Court quotes from Leon comes from a discussion of when "an officer [who] has obtained a [defective] warrant and abided by its terms" has acted reasonably. 468 U. S., at 922. The discussion notes that there are some cases in which "no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant." Id., at 923. The passage also includes several examples, among them the one that the Court relies on in this case: "depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Ibid.
The Court interprets this language to mean that a clerical mistake can be so obvious that an officer who fails to recognize the mistake should not receive qualified immunity. Read in context, however, the quoted language is addressed to a quite different issue. The most natural interpretation of the language is that a clerical mistake can be so obvious that the officer cannot reasonably rely on the mistake in the course of executing the warrant. In other words, a defect can be so clear that an officer cannot reasonably "abid[e] by its terms" and execute the warrant as written. Id., at 922.
We confront no such issue here, of course. No one suggests that the officer reasonably could have relied on the defective language in the warrant. This is a case about an officer being unaware of a clerical error, not a case about an officer relying on one. The respondents do not make the usual claim that they were injured by a defect that led to an improper search. Rather, they make an unusual claim that they were injured simply because the warrant form did not contain the correct description of the property to be seized, even though no property was seized. The language from Leon is not on point.
Our Court has stressed that "the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure" can be served best by rejecting overly technical standards when courts review warrants. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 237 (1983). We have also stressed that qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley, 475 U. S., at 341. The Court's opinion is inconsistent with these principles. Its analysis requires our Nation's police officers to concentrate more on the correctness of paper forms than substantive rights. The Court's new "duty to ensure that the warrant conforms to constitutional requirements" sounds laudable, ante, at 11, n. 6, but would be more at home in a regime of strict liability than within the "ample room for mistaken judgments" that our qualified immunity jurisprudence traditionally provides. Malley, supra, at 343.
and with whom The Chief Justice joins as to Part III, dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The precise relationship between the Amendment's Warrant Clause and Unreasonableness Clause is unclear. But neither Clause explicitly requires a warrant. While "it is of course textually possible to consider [a warrant requirement] implicit within the requirement of reasonableness," California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), the text of the Fourth Amendment certainly does not mandate this result. Nor does the Amendment's history, which is clear as to the Amendment's principal target (general warrants), but not as clear with respect to when warrants were required, if ever. Indeed, because of the very different nature and scope of federal authority and ability to conduct searches and arrests at the founding, it is possible that neither the history of the Fourth Amendment nor the common law provides much guidance.
As a result, the Court has vacillated between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard. Compare Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17, 20 (1984) (per curiam), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 65 (1950). The Court has most frequently held that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980), but has also found a plethora of exceptions to presumptive unreasonableness, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 762-763 (1969) (searches incident to arrest); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 800 (1982) (automobile searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 315-317 (1972) (searches of "pervasively regulated" businesses); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 534-539 (1967) (administrative searches); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298 (1967) (exigent circumstances); California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 390-394 (1985) (mobile home searches); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640, 648 (1983) (inventory searches); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 272 (1973) (border searches). That is, our cases stand for the illuminating proposition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are not.
Today the Court holds that the warrant in this case was "so obviously deficient" that the ensuing search must be regarded as a warrantless search and thus presumptively unreasonable. Ante, at 6-7. However, the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and the sheer number of exceptions to the Court's categorical warrant requirement seriously undermine the bases upon which the Court today rests its holding. Instead of adding to this confusing jurisprudence, as the Court has done, I would turn to first principles in order to determine the relationship between the Warrant Clause and the Unreasonableness Clause. But even within the Court's current framework, a search conducted pursuant to a defective warrant is constitutionally different from a "warrantless search." Consequently, despite the defective warrant, I would still ask whether this search was unreasonable and would conclude that it was not. Furthermore, even if the Court were correct that this search violated the Constitution (and in particular, respondents' Fourth Amendment rights), given the confused state of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the reasonableness of petitioner's actions, I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
"[A]ny Fourth Amendment case may present two separate questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was nevertheless 'reasonable' within the meaning of the first." United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 961 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). By categorizing the search here to be a "warrantless" one, the Court declines to perform a reasonableness inquiry and ignores the fact that this search is quite different from searches that the Court has considered to be "warrantless" in the past. Our cases involving "warrantless" searches do not generally involve situations in which an officer has obtained a warrant that is later determined to be facially defective, but rather involve situations in which the officers neither sought nor obtained a warrant. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987) (officer entitled to qualified immunity despite conducting a warrantless search of respondents' home in the mistaken belief that a robbery suspect was hiding there); Payton v. New York, supra, (striking down a New York statute authorizing the warrantless entry into a private residence to make a routine felony arrest). By simply treating this case as if no warrant had even been sought or issued, the Court glosses over what should be the key inquiry: whether it is always appropriate to treat a search made pursuant to a warrant that fails to describe particularly the things to be seized as presumptively unreasonable.
The Court bases its holding that a defect in the particularity of the warrant by itself renders a search "warrantless" on a citation of a single footnote in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984). In Sheppard, the Court, after noting that "the sole issue ... in th[e] case is whether the officers reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by a valid warrant," id., at 988, rejected the petitioner's argument that despite the invalid warrant, the otherwise reasonable search was constitutional, id., at 988, n. 5. The Court recognized that under its case law a reasonableness inquiry would be appropriate if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. But the Court declined to consider whether such an exception applied and whether the search actually violated the Fourth Amendment because that question presented merely a "fact-bound issue of little importance." Ibid. Because the Court in Sheppard did not conduct any sort of inquiry into whether a Fourth Amendment violation actually occurred, it is clear that the Court assumed a violation for the purposes of its analysis. Rather than rely on dicta buried in a footnote in Sheppard, the Court should actually analyze the arguably dispositive issue in this case.
"The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers... . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
But the actual contents of the warrant are simply manifestations of this protection. Hence, in contrast to the case of a truly warrantless search, a warrant (due to a mistake) does not specify on its face the particular items to be seized but the warrant application passed on by the magistrate judge contains such details, a searchee still has the benefit of a determination by a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to search a particular place and to seize particular items. In such a circumstance, the principal justification for applying a rule of presumptive unreasonableness falls away.
In the instant case, the items to be seized were clearly specified in the warrant application and set forth in the affidavit, both of which were given to the Judge (Magistrate). The Magistrate reviewed all of the documents and signed the warrant application and made no adjustment or correction to this application. It is clear that respondents here received the protection of the Warrant Clause, as described in Johnson and McDonald. Under these circumstances, I would not hold that any ensuing search constitutes a presumptively unreasonable warrantless search. Instead, I would determine whether, despite the invalid warrant, the resulting search was reasonable and hence constitutional.
Because the search was not unreasonable, I would conclude that it was constitutional. Prior to execution of the warrant, petitioner briefed the search team and provided a copy of the search warrant application, the supporting affidavit, and the warrant for the officers to review. Petitioner orally reviewed the terms of the warrant with the officers, including the specific items for which the officers were authorized to search. Petitioner and his search team then conducted the search entirely within the scope of the warrant application and warrant; that is, within the scope of what the Magistrate had authorized. Finding no illegal weapons or explosives, the search team seized nothing. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F. 3d 1022, 1025 (CA9 2002). When petitioner left, he gave respondents a copy of the search warrant. Upon request the next day, petitioner faxed respondent a copy of the more detailed warrant application. Indeed, putting aside the technical defect in the warrant, it is hard to imagine how the actual search could have been carried out any more reasonably.
The Court argues that this eminently reasonable search is nonetheless unreasonable because "there can be no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item mentioned in the affidavit" "unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also set forth in the warrant itself." Ante, at 8. The Court argues that it was at least possible that the Magistrate intended to authorize a much more limited search than the one petitioner requested. Ibid. As a theoretical matter, this may be true. But the more reasonable inference is that the Magistrate intended to authorize everything in the warrant application, as he signed the application and did not make any written adjustments to the application or the warrant itself.
The Court also attempts to bolster its focus on the faulty warrant by arguing that the purpose of the particularity requirement is not only to prevent general searches, but also to assure the searchee of the lawful authority for the search. Ante, at 10. But as the Court recognizes, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 requires an officer to serve the warrant on the searchee before the search. Ante, at 10, n. 5. Thus, a search should not be considered per se unreasonable for failing to apprise the searchee of the lawful authority prior to the search, especially where, as here, the officer promptly provides the requisite information when the defect in the papers is detected. Additionally, unless the Court adopts the Court of Appeals' view that the Constitution protects a searchee's ability to "be on the lookout and to challenge officers," while the officers are actually carrying out the search, 298 F. 3d, at 1027, petitioner's provision of the requisite information the following day is sufficient to satisfy this interest.
Even assuming a constitutional violation, I would find that petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity. The qualified immunity inquiry rests on "the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 819 (1982)], assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S., at 639. The outcome of this inquiry "depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is ... identified. For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause ... violates a clearly established right." Ibid. To apply the standard at such a high level of generality would allow plaintiffs "to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights." Ibid. The Court in Anderson criticized the Court of Appeals for considering the qualified immunity question only in terms of the petitioner's "right to be free from warrantless searches of one's home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances." Id., at 640. The Court of Appeals should have instead considered "the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed." Id., at 641.
The Court errs not only by defining the question at too high a level of generality but also by assessing the question without regard to the relevant circumstances. Even if it were true that no reasonable officer could believe that a search of a home pursuant to a warrant that fails the particularity requirement is lawful absent exigent circumstances--a proposition apparently established by dicta buried in a footnote in Sheppard--petitioner did not know when he carried out the search that the search warrant was invalid--let alone legally nonexistent. Petitioner's entitlement to qualified immunity, then, turns on whether his belief that the search warrant was valid was objectively reasonable. Petitioner's belief surely was reasonable.
The Court has stated that "depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 923. This language makes clear that this exception to Leon's good-faith exception does not apply in every circumstance. And the Court does not explain why it should apply here. As an initial matter, the Court does not even argue that the fact that petitioner made a mistake in preparing the warrant was objectively unreasonable, nor could it. Given the sheer number of warrants prepared and executed by officers each year, combined with the fact that these same officers also prepare detailed and sometimes somewhat comprehensive documents supporting the warrant applications, it is inevitable that officers acting reasonably and entirely in good faith will occasionally make such errors.
The only remaining question is whether petitioner's failure to notice the defect was objectively unreasonable. The Court today points to no cases directing an officer to proofread a warrant after it has been passed on by a neutral magistrate, where the officer is already fully aware of the scope of the intended search and the magistrate gives no reason to believe that he has authorized anything other than the requested search. Nor does the Court point to any case suggesting that where the same officer both prepares and executes the invalid warrant, he can never rely on the magistrate's assurance that the warrant is proper. Indeed, in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), the Court suggested that although an officer who is not involved in the warrant application process would normally read the issued warrant to determine the object of the search, an executing officer who is also the affiant might not need to do so. Id., at 989, n. 6.
Although the Court contends that it does not impose a proofreading requirement upon officers executing warrants, ante, at 11, n. 6, I see no other way to read its decision, particularly where, as here, petitioner could have done nothing more to ensure the reasonableness of his actions than to proofread the warrant. After receiving several allegations that respondents possessed illegal firearms and explosives, petitioner prepared an application for a warrant to search respondents' ranch, along with a supporting affidavit detailing the history of allegations against respondents, petitioner's investigation into these allegations, and petitioner's verification of the sources of the allegations. Petitioner properly filled out the warrant application, which described both the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and obtained the Magistrate's signature on both the warrant application and the warrant itself. Prior to execution of the warrant, petitioner briefed the search team to ensure that each officer understood the limits of the search. Petitioner and his search team then executed the warrant within those limits. And when the error in the search warrant was discovered, petitioner promptly faxed the missing information to respondents. In my view, petitioner's actions were objectively reasonable, and thus he should be entitled to qualified immunity.
Possession of these items, if unregistered, would violate 18 U. S. C. §922(o)(1) and 26 U. S. C. §5861.
The warrant stated: "[T]here is now concealed [on the specified premises] a certain person or property, namely [a] single dwelling residence two story in height which is blue in color and has two additions attached to the east. The front entrance to the residence faces in a southerly direction." App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a.
The affidavit was sealed. Its sufficiency is not disputed.
For this reason petitioner's argument that any constitutional error was committed by the Magistrate, not petitioner, is misplaced. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we suggested that "the judge, not the police officers," may have committed "[a]n error of constitutional dimension," id., at 990, because the judge had assured the officers requesting the warrant that he would take the steps necessary to conform the warrant to constitutional requirements, id., at 986. Thus, "it was not unreasonable for the police in [that] case to rely on the judge's assurances that the warrant authorized the search they had requested." Id., at 990, n. 6. In this case, by contrast, petitioner did not alert the Magistrate to the defect in the warrant that petitioner had drafted, and we therefore cannot know whether the Magistrate was aware of the scope of the search he was authorizing. Nor would it have been reasonable for petitioner to rely on a warrant that was so patently defective, even if the Magistrate was aware of the deficiency. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 915, 922, n. 23 (1984).
It is true, as petitioner points out, that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the executing officer to serve the warrant on the owner before commencing the search. Rule 41(f)(3) provides that "[t]he officer executing the warrant must: (A) give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken; or (B) leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property." Quite obviously, in some circumstances--a surreptitious search by means of a wiretap, for example, or the search of empty or abandoned premises--it will be impracticable or imprudent for the officers to show the warrant in advance. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355, n. 16 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 37-41 (1963). Whether it would be unreasonable to refuse a request to furnish the warrant at the outset of the search when, as in this case, an occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to the officers' safe and effective performance of their mission, is a question that this case does not present.
The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with this principle. Petitioner mischaracterizes the court's decision when he contends that it imposed a novel proofreading requirement on officers executing warrants. The court held that officers leading a search team must "mak[e] sure that they have a proper warrant that in fact authorizes the search and seizure they are about to conduct." 298 F. 3d 1022, 1027 (CA9 2002). That is not a duty to proofread; it is, rather, a duty to ensure that the warrant conforms to constitutional requirements.
We do not suggest that an official is deprived of qualified immunity whenever he violates an internal guideline. We refer to the ATF Order only to underscore that petitioner should have known that he should not execute a patently defective warrant.
Although both Sheppard and Leon involved the application of the "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment's general exclusionary rule, we have explained that "the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 344 (1986) (citation omitted).
Justice Kennedy argues in dissent that we have not allowed " 'ample room for mistaken judgments,' " post, at 6 (quoting Malley, 480 U. S. 79, 87 (1987).
Nor are we according "the correctness of paper forms" a higher status than "substantive rights." Post, at 6. As we have explained, the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement assures the subject of the search that a magistrate has duly authorized the officer to conduct a search of limited scope. This substantive right is not protected when the officer fails to take the time to glance at the authorizing document and detect a glaring defect that Justice Kennedy agrees is of constitutional magnitude, post, at 1.


text:
With a view to prepare the students for job market, the college has a ‘Placement Assistance Cell’. This cell makes arrangements for sending the students to job-fairs organized by different institutions. Information regarding various academic courses, competitive exams and vacancies is provided to students through notice boards.
At the departmental level, various departments recommend the meritorious students to local government and non government organizations wherever such recommendations are sought.
•	Students participated in placement drive held at Lovely Professional University, Jalandhar on 2 September, 2017.
•	One week Personality Development workshop was organized from 23 August to 1 September, 2017. CA Swinki was the resource person.
•	25 students participated in placement drive held at CT Institute of Management, Jalandhar on 20 April, 2017.
•	A meeting of TPOs has held with the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Development), Jalandhar regarding Job Fair (Spark -5) on 11 April, 2017.
•	Training and Placement coordinators meet was organized. Dr. Loviraj Gupta, Dr. Harpal and Mr. Varinder Singh were the resource persons. They talked about the placement scenario across the country and upcoming challenges in the Placement Industry on 7 April, 2017.
•	A five day workshop was organized on Personality Development. The resource person was Ms. Anshu from Creating Destiny on 28 March, 2017.
•	On 10 February, 2017, an educational seminar in Career Counselling was conducted. Me. Dev Raj of Bright Academy created the awareness among students regarding job opportunities after graduation in Government Sector.
•	On 13 October 2016, A seminar on Career Counselling was conducted. Mr. Amit Suri, Head, Creating Destiny guided the students and gave tips to choose career according to their capability and interest. Being the Project Director, he also gave information about the Skill India Project started by Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi.
•	On 13 September, 2016, an aptitude test was organized by NIIT. Students from different streams participated in the test.
•	On 12 September, 2016, a talk was organized. Mr. Sumit from Dreamweaver told the students that students can face interviews by enhancing their aptitude and employability skills.
•	On 8 – 12 August, 2016, a 5 day training workshop was organized with the collaboration of District Employment Office and Career Launcher. Ms. Sajinder Berry gave tips to the students how to be selected for Govt. Jobs.
•	On 5 August, 2016, a seminar was organized on the topic Job Opportunities. Ms. Sajinder Berry, Deputy Director, District Employment Office, Mr. Rajan Sharma, Employment Generation Officer and Mr. Sumit Chauhan from Career Launcher addressed the students.
Assistant Prof. in Mathematics at Lyallpur Khalsa College, Jalandhar.
Assistant Prof. in Mathematics at Lyallpur Khalsa College For Women, Jalandhar.
PGT, Employed at Apeejay School, Rama Mandi, Jalandhar.
Teacher at Cambridge International School, Jalandhar.
Assistant Prof. in Computer Science at Doaba College, Jalandhar.
Assistant Prof. in Commerce at Doaba College, Jalandhar.
Lecturer in Fashion Designing at Lyallpur Khalsa College, Jalandhar.
Lecturer in Cosmetology at Lyallpur Khalsa College, Jalandhar.
Teacher in Cosmetology at Govt. School, Nawashehar.
Teacher in Cosmetology at Govt. Sr. Sec. School, Nawashehar.
Branch Manager at New Image Beauty Academy.
IELTS teacher at Touch Stone.
Teacher in Fashion Designing at Akal Academy.
Marketing Executive in Sportking Pvt. Ltd., Ludhiana.
Production Executive in Sportking Pvt. Ltd., Ludhiana.
Assistance Prof. in Punjabi at Govt. College, Hoshiarpur.
Lecturer in Fine Arts at Khalsa College for Women, Jalandhar.
Lecturer in Fine Arts at Apeejay College of Fine Arts, Jalandhar.
Lecturer in Fine Arts at GNA, Phagwara.
Teacher in Fine Arts at Army Public School, JRC.
Teacher in Fine Arts at Innocent Hearts School.
Teacher in Fine Arts at Cambridge International School, Phagwara.
Lecturer in Fine Arts at St. Soldier College of Education, Jalandhar.
Lecturer in Fine Arts at Sant Baba Bhag Singh Institute, Kathar.
Scale -1 officer at UCO Bank, Amritsar.
Soft Skills Trainer at LPU, Phagwara.
Lecturer in Commerce at DAV College, Phillaur.
Lecturer in Physical Education at Govt. College, Tanda.
Assistant Prof. in Mathematics at Chandigarh University, Chandigarh.
Senior Software Engineer at Syscom Corp. Ltd.
Graphic Designer at Printing.Com at Papakura, New Zealand.
Trend Counselor and Air Export Executive at Continental Careers Pvt. Ltd.
Dietician at Tagore Hospital, Jalandhar.
Dietician at SGL Hospital, Jalandhar.
Dietician in Johal Hospital, Rama Mandi.
College directly appoints the students of college in teaching and non teaching faculty who fulfils the relevant eligibility criteria. In the current session 2014-15, the following students were placed in the college.

matches:
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine


The nature of the revelations in this letter requires this unique format. District courts of the United States have been mistaken for Article III since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nothing can be done to change the nature of these courts in the several states without the direct intervention of Congress. A judge without judicial power can do nothing to change the jurisdiction of the court where he presides. However, there are countless miscarriages of justice that must be corrected. Following my conclusion, I offer recommendations that should be considered by anyone that has had contact with a federal court in the past or may have such contact in the future. Under no circumstances should any litigant or defendant in any federal court proceeding attempt to have the court consider the issues raised in this letter. You must first assure yourself that opinion I provide in this letter is absolutely correct before you confront any federal judge. I suggest that you create a support group for yourself if want to challenge a federal judge.
First time recipients of this opinion letter are provided with the statutes mentioned in my letter. These materials should be reproduced and distributed to all persons interested in proper and efficient judicial administration. I have prefaced each paragraph with a descriptive sentence in bold so that a rather long letter can be shortened to suit the reader's needs.
In my opinion the United States District Court in your state is not an Article III court. I have been retained to provide you with my legal opinion of the lawful jurisdiction of the federal district court or courts that have been used in the past by the federal government to control those opposed to the loss of their freedom to the national government. The federal courts known as United States District Courts are federal and territorial in that these courts implement administrative law on territory exclusively under the jurisdiction of the United States. These courts are being used primarily to prevent the rendition of law and equity in national courts by masquerading as Article III courts. These courts are incapable of achieving justice because they are not Article III courts. This opinion letter will explain in summary fashion why we have two such courts.
The true nature of the government of the United States of America is libertarian. Very few of the Posterity of the People that ordained and established the Constitution are aware that the loose confederation of state governments that became the United States of America is a true libertarian government. It is true that the nation created by the Articles of Confederation lacked the autonomy to compete with the European empires but that was of small importance to the people. Nevertheless the Constitution of the United States was proposed and intended to perfect the Union and establish a government that would carry out the aims expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution. The purpose of the Constitution was to establish and limit government to the purposes for which it was established. Unfortunately, the Congress has used very effectively the mechanisms in the Constitution to limit the third branch of the national government to the people's detriment. This opinion letter will offer some recommendations to correct what the Congress has done but there can be no doubt that Congress has failed to provide Article III courts in the several states.
The present intent of the federal government is to subject you to its administration. If you would be content to survive or thrive on your own without interference of a national government, in a short time an organization with federal government ties would attempt to draw you into its administration of some social welfare program. Because you are in America you are free not to participate if you so choose. However, many people find themselves in a federal court that gives no assurance of being optional. Americans do not want to be in a court that denies them their freedom, however, for more than 200 years Americans have been subjected to administrative law in courts they believed were dispensing the judicial power of the United States.
Disguised administrative courts are being used to subvert your freedom. If you are being harassed by persons claiming to represent the government especially the national government, and you steadfastly refuse to consent to their demands you will likely later find yourself near or in an administrative, legislative, non-judicial court. You can bet that the court causing you immediate concern is not an Article III court. Since the court determines the judges' power and authority, the judge will not have judicial power, temperament or restraint. Individuals appointed to these United States District Courts are lead to believe that they are real judges and they are actually urged by the other two branches of government to act like judges.
Article III judicial power imposes self-restraint on judges. Only judges appointed to Article III courts may exercise the judicial power of the United States. Judicial power imposes restraints on the judges that have it that serves as some protection from judicial abuse. All justices appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States are real Article III judges. Forget about having a judge of this temperament involved in any federal case you might ever have. The judges of the other two types of courts, of course, have no constitutional judicial power so they tend to be extremely rigid in the way they administer their "judicial business." That rigidity is the result of the tight rein that the Congress maintains over the personnel and business of non-Article III courts to solely achieve congressional purposes.
United States District Court judges are lifetime administrators. Congress has provided for the appointment of administrators to lifetime tenures to courts created without Article III power and obtained a means by which it can continue to legislate long after a typical legislative enactment and executive approval would have run its normal course. The federal income tax is the best example. Just when genuine tax protesters in civil federal juries were about to decimate the tax, the Collector of Internal Revenue was abolished and the tax was made collectible by "voluntary compliance." Article I and Article IV courts now drain off all opposition to the federal income tax. A tax that is paid by "voluntary compliance" cannot be litigated because there is nothing to litigate?the tax is, of course, paid voluntarily. Alleged tax crimes do not take place in Article III courts because none exist in the several states. Those who do not volunteer to pay their taxes are prosecuted in Article IV courts where a conviction is practically assured because the court is organized primarily to collect taxes and administer the federal government.
2. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
Even Article III courts are limited to their territorial jurisdiction. Based on the statute law that created the various United States district courts throughout the several states, I have concluded that these courts are of limited federal territorial jurisdiction and that you are not to assume these courts have any power over you. A United States court with the name of a state of the Union is little different from a state court. In order for a court to have jurisdiction over you, there must be minimum contacts by you with the territory that makes up its geographical jurisdiction. Never voluntarily appear in these courts because your presence gives the court jurisdiction over you. These courts are not subject to regular judicial rules because they are not Article III courts. The Article III district court in the seat of government will not be of any value because its purpose is to support government and not to provide you with protection from its abuses.
Lawyers and judges must be aware of the true nature of the courts they practice and preside in. During the more than 30 years that I have been a practicing attorney in California, I have appeared in and represented clients in many different courts, but I only recently began researching how the courts are constituted. I have discovered that the United States district courts established in California and in 48 other states by United States Statute are not Article III courts. There is confusion as to the difference between Article III courts and those courts that are other than Article III courts. Article III district courts are not territorially different from the tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court that Congress may constitute pursuant to Article I. Federal courts do not extend their judicial districts beyond federal territory. Article III courts are "territorial courts" that may exercise the judicial power of the United States?Article I and W courts have no such power.
Congress has established Article III district courts in Hawaii and the District of Columbia. The 2 district courts of the United States that were ultimately pronounced ordained and established by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution are the only ones that can exercise the judicial power of the national government. The judicial power of the Hawaii district court securely bound up in that court without a chance of extraction. California and the other 48 states of the Union must have United States courts with judicial power if the people are to obtain justice in law and equity from United States courts. That is not something that Congress wants to happen anytime soon. Congress and the President will stop at nothing to keep a steady stream of voluntary tax payment into the United States Treasury. Administrative federal courts pretending to be courts of law and equity are interfering with California's sovereignty and can prevent prosecution of terrorists in the federal courts in all the states but one?maybe. Perhaps the increased demand for medical uses for marijuana will break the lock that the Article W territorial courts have had on state government.
Lifetime tenure during good behavior is criteria for a judge not criteria for an Article III court. A natural for the law school set, lifetime tenure fuels the universal presumption in the legal academic community that the federal districts courts are Article III courts and the judges that sit on those courts are Article III judges. I have found no basis for that presumption. Lifetime tenure as a predictor of judicial independence itself seems an invalid assumption. There is only one viable Article III district court in Washington, D. C., so there is little evidence to support that presumption. Because Congress can make law locally or nationally, it must be presumed that law enacted by Congress is territorial in scope rather than national, Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo 336 U.S. 281(1949), unless a contrary intent is shown in the legislation itself. The legislation creating the district court for Hawaii is the only example of a national legislative intent to create an Article III court in any of the 50 states of the Union. I have personally examined all the Statute Law used to create the district courts in the several states and Hawaii stands alone as the only state to have an Article III district court.
Combining the district court for Puerto Rico with the other United States District Courts identifies them all as territorial. The federal district courts are found in Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, in the sections numbered from 81 to 131. Title 28 U.S.C. was enacted into positive law in 1948. The district courts were found in Chapter 5 just as they are today. The districts themselves had not changed from 1911 when they were described as the territory that existed on July 1, 1910. The territory was, for example, the "State of California" which then and now consists of the federal territory within California and today is defined in Rev. & Tax. Code Sections 5304 and 6017.
Puerto Rico is not a state of the Union. Its inclusion in Chapter 5 and appearance in § 119 identifies the "states" in the sections of Chapter 5 as mere labels for the areas of federal territory. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico includes the federal territory under the jurisdiction of the United States. Included, for example, in the "State of California" is the territory of the United States located in the California Republic. Use of the "State of California" facilitates the use of federal law to create a California personal income tax. State of California denotes those special federal places where the United States has jurisdiction.
"The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii established by and existing under title 28 of the United States Code shall thence forth be a court of the United States with judicial power derived from article III, of the Constitution of the United States: Provided, however, that the terms of office of the district judges for the district of Hawaii then in office shall terminate upon the effective date of this section and the President, pursuant to sections 133 and 134 of title 28, United States Code, as amended by this Act, shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, two district judges for the said district who shall hold office during good behavior."
All of Title 28 U.S.C. provides for the territorial government of the United States and nothing of Article III can be put back into it without destroying the entire Title 28 U.S.C. as positive law. In other words, there may be a present belief by all of the state and federal judiciary, all the legal academic community and all the local, state and federal government officials that the United States district courts for the 50 states of the Union are Article III courts, but they are wrong.
Congress prevented the ordination of the Article III it established for Hawaii by denying the court full Article III judges. Congress took a territorial court established by and existing under title 28 and created an Article III district court for Hawaii. It must be noted that the territorial jurisdiction did not change?only the power of the court. Congress has not, however, provided that the judges to that court are to be appointed to an Article III court. The district judges for the district of Hawaii are specifically to be appointed by the President pursuant to sections 133 and 134 of title 28, United States Code, as officers of the United States but not as judges of an Article III court. These two sections are also to be used in appointing any of 7 judges of the Puerto Rico district should a vacancy occur there. It can be deduced that appointment pursuant to 133 and 134 of title 28, will always produce territorial judges.
The Hawaii judicial district established in § 91 of the Judicial Code of 1948 was a territorial court. Section 9 (a) clearly indicates that prior to the admission to statehood, the United States District Court of Hawaii was not a true United States court established under Article III of the Constitution, to administer the judicial power of the United States, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922). In Balzac, Chief Justice William Howard Taft stated that United States District Court for Arecibo, Porto Rico, as Puerto Rico was known then, "created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article W, § 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States." Puerto Rico is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and it has not been incorporated into the United States though its inhabitants are United States citizens. The inclusion of Puerto Rico in Chapter 5 as § 119 does not make the district court for Puerto Rico an Article III court because Puerto Rico has not been incorporated into the Union. Puerto Rico fits comfortably among the names of the 50 states because the geographical areas are mini federal territories or federal enclaves.
Government people are required to obey the law; it is their duty to obey the law. The government's law requires the total obedience of government's officers and employees but can impose upon citizens only certain legal duties. In the words of the Declaration of Independence, "Governments are instituted among men" to secure God given rights. Citizens are not part of government and they are not its subjects. There is only one duty that citizens have that indirectly protects the government. That duty demands that citizens must investigate and then determine the nature and extent of the authority of every person or group of persons, such as a grand jury, claiming any authority relationship with any government. As an abstract entity, a government maintains integrity through its agents and employees lawfully interacting with the public. A citizen's failure to carry out the investigation and determination of authority has grave consequences both for the citizen, his fellow citizens and the government. That duty has caused you to retain me to assist you in evaluating the claim that you should present yourself to give testimony. You have sought my counsel so you can determine the authority of a grand jury and of a person claiming to be the United States Attorney or one of his delegates or deputies.
A Citizen has a duty to question the authority of all who claim to represent government. You are cautioned against following any instructions that may be given you in any initial correspondence with any United States Attorney federal court. Agreeing to abide by any instructions set out in such a document is tantamount to accepting jurisdiction of what I have proven to be a territorial court. Because the law imposes a duty that you investigate the authority of all the persons from all departments of the government whose names appear on any document that even suggests that you act in a certain way, acting in a way suggested by them is evidence of your consent to their authority over you. Since these individuals are all connected with the United States district court for the territorial district of your own investigation should begin there.
No other state has an Article III court. The federal district courts of California fall squarely within the mold of the federal courts of the 49 states that have no Article III district courts. I have examined copies of all the Statute Laws described in the annotations to all the Chapter 5 sections of Title 28 that establish district courts in the states and Hawaii has the only Article III district court. I am convinced that none of the other states including California federal courts are Article III courts and that the district judges that sit in those courts are appointed pursuant to Title 28 and not Article III. When I examined all other related legal literature, I could find no evidence or reference to evidence that either the California federal courts or district judges were established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. I now make it my business to provide my opinion of the current state of the judicial system along with the statute law that supports that opinion. I am prepared to share what I have found with other interested researchers.
Citizens have a duty to discover the true authority of those claim government power. The consequences of not investigating and not determining the nature and extent of the authority claimed is that you may have to bear the costs of your failure to do so. The federal income tax is local legislation directed at taxation of federal income in the hands of its officers and employees that agree to the taxation before they receive any income. However, anyone can participate in the system of federal income taxation by making a return and as a consequence many do without conscious realization. The court system that assists in its administration is necessarily administrative itself because no judicial powers were ever conferred to it. The research that is included with this letter proves that the federal courts are administrative law courts and not courts that have been ordained and established under Article III to exercise the judicial power of the United States.
The use of the term, "district courts of the United States" refers to Article III courts. There are at least two "district courts of the United States," but probably no others. There is no doubt that the district court for Hawaii is an Article III court?that's one. The § 88 court for the District of Columbia is another. The Historical and Revision Notes to that section makes it clear that the District of Columbia district court is a constitutional court established and ordained under Article III. The existence of at least two "district courts of the United States" permits the general usage of language that refers to the "district courts of the United States" as Article III courts.
State courts that were already established when the Constitution was ratified were duty bound to obey the Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant to it. Reference to the Judiciary Act of 1789 clarified and substantiated that no Article III district courts had been created in the several states pursuant to that law. Districts were created for territories that by the date of enactment, September 24, 1789 had not yet ratified the Constitution because, of course, they were not states. North Carolina did not ratify the Constitution until after enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789. District courts created under that act could not have been created under Article III. The federal trial courts during the period of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were manned by two United States Supreme Court justices riding circuit and the district judge for the district. The Judiciary Act of 1879 and every other Judiciary Act since that one are also supportive of my position on these United States district courts.
The evidence is incontrovertible?Hawaii is the only state in which the Congress has established an Article III United States district court. In the very same law, Congress has neutralized the Article III district court by installing district court judges without Article III judicial power. This creates a crisis of immense concern in our war against terrorism. Any terrorist indicted by a grand jury of any United States district courts may effectively challenge the grand jury array because that court is a territorial court and the grand jury is drawn from a vicinage outside the federal territory that actually and legally constitutes the territorial district of all district courts.
Grand and petit jurors determine if they are citizens of the United States and whether they have resided in judicial district for a year. In 1968 Congress enacted the Jury Selection and Service Act that uses the nation's voter registration system as the basis for jury selection in the federal courts. I have examined many of the Plans the district courts have created and that have been approved by the federal courts of appeal. The jury questionnaire in common use merely asks an applicant a half dozen questions beginning with, if he or she is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the judicial district for at least a year. Very few Americans can prove that they are, indeed, citizens of the United States and practically no one understands that the Sixth Amendment requires that vicinage be established prior to trial. For all of the states, district court vicinage is the federal territory within the counties that comprise the district. This is the only vicinage that satisfies the 6th Amendment command that the "district shall have been previously ascertained by law." An individual jurors impression of what constitutes the judicial district does not satisfy the Constitution. Today most federal grand jurors live outside the judicial district and any apprehended terrorist can easily challenge them and any true bill of indictment.
All trial courts must have districts which shall have been previously ascertained by law. Venue and vicinage are being confused because an erroneous assumption is being universally made that the federal district courts are Article III courts. Of the 50 states only Hawaii can be shown to have an Article III district court. Vicinage describes where jurors come from. The areas from where Article III court jurors are to be drawn is the same as a territorial federal court. Grand and petit jurors for other than an Article III courts are territorial and they must only come from the federal territory within a district comprised of named counties but they are being drawn from outside the federal territory. Any grand and petit juror that resides outside a federal territory does not reside within the district and can successfully be challenged as unqualified.
A federal territorial court without Article III power cannot be conferred such power by the litigants. One United States district court cannot legitimately serve both local federal and national interests. The interests of the two courts are almost completely mutually exclusive. Territorial courts without judicial power tenaciously serve the need of Congress to administer government law and not necessarily the needs of the nation's people. There are in the several states only territorial courts and these courts cannot be used to further national interests and certainly they do not have the capacity to examine their own limitations. These courts only have the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress and they guard that jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other judicial concepts.
Based upon the research I have done and that is provided herewith, all the United States district courts in 49 of the several states are other than Article III of the United States Constitution courts. There, simply, is no evidence that the United States district courts for your state are ordained and established pursuant to Article III, Section 1; therefore, they are not vested with the judicial power of the United States. Article III has not been invoked by Congress in creating any of your state's federal district courts and the 1911 Judiciary Act specifically creates those federal courts from the territory of the United States. When it is apparent that court officials are unaware of the limitations on their authority, it is never wise to attempt to correct these officials in their own court.
Non-judicial, legislative, administrative and territorial courts are incapable of exercising the judicial power of the United States, which can only be found in an Article III court. Article III of the Constitution has expressly granted to Congress the power to vest courts inferior to the Supreme Court with the judicial power of the United States. The Constitution does not prohibit the creation of federal courts outside of Article III. It follows, therefore, that at the very least Congress must invoke the authority of Article III in creating Article III courts just so one court can be distinguished from another. Congress must start with the language of the Constitution if the fmal outcome is to be courts ordained and established by Congress under that article.
Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 5 which has been enacted into positive law provides for an Article III for Hawaii and no others. To support all the conclusions that I have made in this opinion letter, I have provided the portion of Title 28 U.S.C. that deals with the federal courts in your state, the statute law cited by Title 28 U.S.C. as involved in the creation of the federal courts in your state and the same for the district court in Hawaii. In 1959, Congress established the only state district court under Article III, so the statute and code law for the Hawaii district court will prove interesting when you examine the creation of your own state's federal courts. It is apparent that the district court in Hawaii is not functioning as an Article III court, so the issue of what additional acts of ordination and establishment must be undertaken to create Article III courts will be the subject of another opinion letter. I advise you to read all the written material after you have read my letter so you can understand how consenting to the general territorial jurisdiction of these territorial courts obviated any need for national Article III courts.
The evidence that exists to show that the federal district courts are ordained and established pursuant to Article III is anecdotal or circumstantial. The Constitution provides that Congress shall vest the judicial power of the United States in "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." That same language was used in the Preamble to the Constitution to "ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." There can be no question that the Congress has established but not ordained an Article III in Hawaii and in no other states. All that remains is to understand the consequences of what has happened and to learn from it.
Legal scholars assume without justification that the federal district courts are Article III courts. I have discovered and I hope proven that no responsible public federal officer has ever questioned their assumptions. In all the legal literature I examined, status of the United States district courts as Article III was assumed despite all the contrary authoritative evidence. The United States Supreme Court in two cases: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1921) and Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938) made it clear that a "district court of the United States" described a court created under Article III and a "United States district court" described a territorial court. The former identified a constitutional court of the United States exercising the judicial power of the United States and the latter merely identified a court for a district of the government of the United States.
Legal scholars are interpreting the power and authority of the federal courts without resort to the statute law that created and established them. There is no way to change the language of statutes decades old. The complete statute law and enacted Title 28 U.S.C. is presented here for your consideration. You are again, however, cautioned not to take the issue of jurisdiction to the federal courts as they are presently constituted. The federal courts are territorial legislative courts. This means that they are administrative courts without judicial power and you are without judicial protections if you submit yourself to them. The judges of these courts are there to serve the Congress and not any of the people.
The purpose of this letter is to advise and counsel those who fear that they are being oppressed by a distant government. You will find that when you first remove the oppression caused by your own ignorance foreign oppression will subside and disappear altogether. The United States district courts are territorial and without judicial power. This has been so since the Judiciary Act of 1789. If you do not believe this to be true, I have provided the means by which you can dispute my opinion. The complete absence of any Article III district courts in 49 of the 50 states is a "judicial" disaster waiting to happen. So far, it appears that no terrorist is aware that he or she may escape prosecution for a crime of terrorism because there is only one judicial court in the United States trial court system. Past Congresses may have been able to successfully construct a complex administrative criminal law process where an accused voluntarily accepts the jurisdiction of a non-article III federal court and judge, but dedicated and emboldened terrorists may be able to destroy it in one case. Congress must immediately establish Article III courts.
My task was to determine the legitimate jurisdiction of the federal district courts in your state. I fulfilled my objective in the only reasonable manner possible; I gathered all the statute law and enacted code law used to create the federal courts in all the states. I found only one instance in which Congress had declared that Article III was used to create the court. The one exception is the district court of Hawaii. Without exception, all the federal courts in your state are territorial. The territory that constitutes each of the judicial districts of each court is the federal enclaves within the counties of the state that comprise those judicial districts. Once the documentation for your local federal courts is reviewed and compared to the cross references provided in the government's own Title 28 U.S.C., the public deception becomes flagrant.
The occasion of Hawaii's admission to the Union in 1959 was certainly an appropriate event to establish an Article III court for the federal territory in those islands. Why has Congress not acted to create Article III courts in the remaining 49 states? The simple answer is that would have reduced its power. The more complex answer to that question lies in the need that early Americans felt to declare their independence from an unjust king. The following passage from the Declaration of Independence should teach that history repeats itself, especially, for those who refuse to learn it the first time around.
Your personal Declaration of Independence can be a simple recognition that Americans have managed to govern themselves without real federal judicial trial courts for more than 200 years.


text:
CBS Inc., CBS News Division, a division of CBS Inc., and the television show 48 Hours (collectively CBS) apply for an emergency stay of a preliminary injunction entered by the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial District of South Dakota prohibiting CBS from airing videotape footage taken at the factory of Federal Beef Processors, Inc. (Federal), a South Dakota meat-packing company. CBS seeks to televise the videotape this evening on a 48 Hours investigative news program, and contends that the injunction constitutes an intolerable prior restraint on the media. Due to the time pressure involved in resolving this emergency application, my discussion is necessarily brief.
As part of an ongoing investigation into unsanitary practices in the meat industry, CBS obtained footage of Federal's meat-packing operations through the cooperation of a Federal employee, who voluntarily agreed to wear undercover camera equipment during his shift one day in Federal's plant. The employee received no compensation for his cooperation. CBS represents that the investigation was not targeted at Federal, but at the meat-processing industry generally and that CBS did not intend to reveal the company that was the source of the material.
Federal sued to prevent the telecast of the videotape, alleging, inter alia, claims of trespass, breach of the duty of loyalty and its aiding and abetting, and violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. 37-29-1 et seq. (Supp. 1993). On January 25, 1994, the South Dakota Circuit Court entered a temporary restraining order, and on February 7, the court preliminarily enjoined CBS from "disseminating, disclosing, broadcasting, or otherwise revealing" any footage of the Federal plant interior. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Preliminary Injunction, Civ. No. 94-590, p. 8. The court found that disclosure of the videotape "could result in a significant portion of the national chains refusing to purchase beef processed at Federal, and thereafter the Federal plant's closure," and that "[p]ublic dissemination of Federal's confidential and proprietary practices and processes would likely cause irreparable injury to Federal." Id. at 3. The court concluded that, because the videotape "was obtained by CBS, at the very least, through calculated misdeeds," id. at 4, conventional First Amendment prior restraint doctrine was inapplicable, and that any injury to CBS resulting from delay was outweighed by the potential economic harm to Federal.
On February 8, 1994, the South Dakota Supreme Court denied CBS' application for a stay of the injunction and scheduled oral argument on CBS' original petition for a writ of mandamus for March 21, 1994. The State Supreme Court later amended its order to require that the Circuit Judge rescind the injunction or show cause on March 21 why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not be issued.
Although a single Justice may stay a lower court order only under extraordinary circumstances, such circumstances are presented here. For many years, it has been clearly established that a "prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a `heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971), quoting Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968).
Where . . . a direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media, each passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First Amendment.
A criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. . . .
A prior restraint, by contrast . . ., has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior restraint "freezes" it, at least for the time.
Although the prohibition against prior restraints is by no means absolute, the gagging of publication has been considered acceptable only in "exceptional cases." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Even where questions of allegedly urgent national security, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), or competing constitutional interests, Nebraska Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 559, are concerned, we have imposed this "most extraordinary remed[y]" only where the evil that would result from the reportage is both great and certain and cannot be militated by less intrusive measures. Id. at 562.
Federal has not met this burden here. The Circuit Court no doubt is correct that broadcast of the videotape "could" result in significant economic harm to Federal. Even if economic harm were sufficient in itself to justify a prior restraint, however, we previously have refused to rely on such speculative predictions as based on "factors unknown and unknowable." Id. at 563; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, supra.
Nor is the prior restraint doctrine inapplicable because the videotape was obtained through the "calculated misdeeds" of CBS. In New York Times Co., the Court refused to suppress publication of papers stolen from the Pentagon by a third party. Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First Amendment context. Even if criminal activity by the broadcaster could justify an exception to the prior restraint doctrine under some circumstances, the record as developed thus far contains no clear evidence of criminal activity on the part of CBS, and the court below found none.
I conclude that the decision below conflicts with the prior decisions of this Court, that there is a reasonable probability that the case would warrant certiorari, and that indefinite delay of the broadcast will cause irreparable harm to the news media that is intolerable under the First Amendment. Entry of a stay therefore is appropriate under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. See INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 501 U.S. ___ (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., in chambers). If CBS has breached its state law obligations, the First Amendment requires that Federal remedy its harms through a damages proceeding, rather than through suppression of protected speech.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.