LASKIN, ROSENBERG and LAFORME JJ.A.
On appeal from the order of Justice Wailan Low of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 18, 2004.
 In October 2000, the Canadian Football League hired the appellant, Michael Lysko, to be the League’s Commissioner. His contract with the CFL was to be for three years. However, in March 2002, approximately halfway through the term, the appellant was dismissed. While the appellant continued to receive his salary, car allowance and medical benefits for the balance of the three-year term, he was dissatisfied with the manner in which his employment was terminated and the statements allegedly made by persons associated with the CFL about his management of the League. Accordingly, he launched an action claiming almost $19 million in damages. The various corporate and individual defendants brought motions either to strike out the entire claim or at least some of the causes of action. Low J., in reasons reported at 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 282, allowed some of the actions to proceed but in the end she struck out most of the claims and required the appellant to file an amended statement of claim for those that remained.
The corporate defendants: Negligent misrepresentation including misrepresentation by omission.
Lyle Bauer: Defamation paras. 152(e) and 153(j).
David Braley: Negligent misrepresentation including misrepresentation by omission.
Sherwood Schwarz: Defamation paras. 153(b) and (d).
John Tory: Negligent misrepresentation in paras. 44 and 46 (but not misrepresentation by omission).
David MacDonald: Negligent misrepresentation including misrepresentation by omission.
George Grant: Defamation para. 153(f).
Hugh Campbell: Negligent misrepresentation including misrepresentation by omission.
Bob Ellard: Negligent misrepresentation including misrepresentation by omission.
I would dismiss the appeal as against David Asper and Robert Wetenhall. While Sig Gutsche is referred to as a respondent, the motions judge did not strike the only paragraphs of the statement of claim that relate to him and there was no cross-appeal.
 On a motion to strike a claim as disclosing no cause of action, “the court must accept the facts alleged … as proven unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof, and must read the statement of claim generously with allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies” (Nash v. Ontario 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON C.A.), (1995), 27 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.) at 6). The facts set out below are accordingly taken from the statement of claim. The defendants did not file statements of defence and no discoveries have taken place.
 When he was hired by the CFL, Michael Lysko was an executive with The GEM Group, a marketing company. Lysko was based in Chicago and states that he was earning US $150,000 annually with periodic bonuses. He focused on sports teams and sporting events. He says he was lured away from this lucrative and satisfying career with The Gem Group by the CFL.
 The CFL is an unincorporated association. Lysko has, therefore, claimed against the incorporated football clubs that make up the CFL. The actions against the Hamilton and Toronto clubs have been stayed by receivership orders. He has also brought an action against individuals associated with the League and the member football clubs. A Board of Governors comprised of governors and alternate governors governs the CFL. Many of Lysko’s complaints concern the activities of the Search Committee, which was set up by the Board of Governors to find a new Commissioner, and which ultimately recommended that he be hired.
o Lyle Bauer, President and C.E.O.
 The names of many other persons come up in the pleadings. Thus, reference is made to employees of tmp Worldwide, an executive recruitment firm retained by the CFL to assist in the search for a commissioner to replace John Tory. The claim also refers to The GEM Group, Lysko’s former employer, and to Christopher Lang and Rick Jones, the Chairman and C.E.O. of The GEM Group, respectively. The claim also refers to many members of the media who were said to have been the recipients of defamatory and false statements by the individual defendants.
[A]ssuming that the facts as stated in the statement of claim can be proved, is it “plain and obvious” that the plaintiff’s statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action? As in England, if there is a chance that the plaintiff might succeed, then the plaintiff should not be “driven from the judgment seat”. Neither the length and complexity of the issues, the novelty of the cause of action, nor the potential for the defendant to present a strong defence should prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with his or her case. Only if the action is certain to fail because it contains a radical defect ranking with the others listed in Rule 19(24) of the British Columbia Rules of Court should the relevant portions of a plaintiff’s statement of claim be struck out under Rule 19(24)(a).
The facts are to be taken as pleaded. When so taken, the question that must then be determined is whether there [sic] it is “plain and obvious” that the action must fail. It is only if the statement of claim is certain to fail because it contains a “radical defect” that the plaintiff should be driven from the judgment.
 I will deal with each of the causes of action below in accordance with this test.
 The second set of issues concerns compliance with Rule 25. While I have reached a different conclusion from the motions judge with respect to some of the causes of action, I agree with her conclusion that the statement of claim offends the requirements of rule 25.06(1). Rule 25.06(1) requires that the pleading contain a “concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.” Rule 25.06(8) provides that where fraud, misrepresentation or malice are alleged, the pleading must contain full particulars. The motions judge found that many of the paragraphs of the statement of claim offended rule 25.06. Therefore, she struck them out under rule 25.11. Under rule 25.11, the court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading on three grounds: (1) the pleading may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action; (2) the pleading is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or (3) the pleading is an abuse of the process of the court. I agree with the motions judge’s statement at para. 63 that the statement of claim “includes a plethora both of evidence and of irrelevant material and fails to be concise to the point that the defendants are hindered in developing a responsive pleading.” Thus, I agree with the motions judge that although certain of the causes of action are to go forward, the appropriate remedy is to strike the pleading in its entirety and grant the appellant leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim.
 Lysko alleges that the “CFL” promised that all discussions and negotiations would be held in strict confidence so as not to jeopardize his relationship with The GEM Group. Lysko does not identify who in the CFL made this promise. He alleges that George Grant contacted his employer, Christopher Lang, asking for Lang’s opinion of Lysko and disclosing that the CFL was negotiating with him. Lysko learned of this conversation on October 26, 2000 while negotiating with the “CFL Board of Governors” in Toronto. Grant was not alleged to have been a member of the Search Committee and was an Alternate Governor. Lysko alleges that the “CFL” is responsible for Grant’s actions which severely damaged his position with The GEM Group.
 Lysko further alleges that it was a condition of the negotiations that if an agreement was made with the CFL, his hiring would not be made public until he could speak to his former employer. “[E]ither, Giles, Tory or a member of the Board of Governors, whose identity is unknown,” leaked “to the media” that an agreement in principle had been reached on October 26, 2000. This breach of confidence is alleged to have caused Lysko “considerable personal anguish, humiliation and embarrassment” and ended his relationship with Rick Jones, C.E.O. of The GEM Group.
 Lysko claims general, special, aggravated and punitive damages from Tory, Giles, Grant and the CFL corporate defendants in the amount of $200,000, for these breaches of confidence.
 The motions judge held that since Lysko obtained the job of Commissioner and did not plead any loss or damage, the cause of action of breach of confidence was not made out. The motions judge also struck out a large number of paragraphs of the claim, including paras. 23 to 33 for being scandalous, vexatious and an abuse of process, contrary to rule 25.06. The motions judge was of the view that Lysko’s claim was really for wrongful dismissal as against the corporate defendants and for defamation as against some of the individual defendants.
(3) that the confidential information was misused by the party to whom it was communicated to the detriment of the confider.
See Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., 1989 CanLII 34 (S.C.C.),  2 S.C.R. 574 at 635-639, Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., 1999 CanLII 705 (S.C.C.), , 1 S.C.R. 142 at paras. 52-54, and Ontex Resources Ltd. v. Metalore Resources Ltd. reflex, (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 229 at 259-260.
La Forest J. said in Lac Minerals that if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant made an unauthorized use of the information to the detriment of the party communicating it, the cause of action is complete (at pp. 635-36 and 657; see also ICAM Technologies Corp. v. EBCO Industries Ltd. reflex, (1991), 36 C.P.R. (3d) 504 (B.C.S.C.), affirmed 1993 CanLII 2289 (BC C.A.), (1993), 52 C.P.R. (3d) 61 (B.C.C.A.), per Toy J.A., at pp. 63-64; Ontex Resources Ltd. v. Metalore Resources Ltd. reflex, (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 229, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 158 (C.A.); 655 Developments Ltd. v. Chester Dawe Ltd. 1992 CanLII 2842 (NL S.C.T.D.), (1992), 42 C.P.R. (3d) 500 (Nfld. S.C.).
So I would think it a sufficient detriment to the confider that information given in confidence is to be disclosed to persons whom he would prefer not to know of it, even though the disclosure would not be harmful to him in any positive way.
 In this case, the appellant seeks a monetary remedy for the two breaches of confidence. However, he must be able to show some detriment or loss as a result of those breaches. As broad as the concept of detriment may be, in my view the appellant has not pleaded facts that show a compensable detriment. The bald allegation that Grant’s contacting Lang, the Chairman of The GEM Group, severely damaged the appellant’s position with The GEM Group, without any facts to show any loss or detriment, is not sufficient.
 The appellant alleges that the breach of confidence caused him “considerable personal anguish, humiliation and embarrassment” apparently because he lost the personal relationship with Jones, C.E.O. of The GEM Group. As the motions judge pointed out, however, the appellant obtained the employment he was seeking, despite the alleged breach of confidence. He does not plead any facts to show any other kind of detriment flowing from the breach of confidence, such as loss of bargaining advantage, that is compensable in law. The pleading also fails to disclose the kind of emotional or psychological distress that would result from the disclosure of intimate information referred to inCadbury. I agree with the motions judge that on this ground alone, the cause of action for breach of confidence must be struck out. That said, I should not be taken as holding that the appellant pleaded the other requirements for breach of confidence, such as the requirement that the party to whom it was communicated misused the confidential information.
 Lysko alleges that before he accepted the job as Commissioner, the “CFL” made representations to him concerning the profitability of the League. He alleges that “the Search Committee members” made representations about the League’s profits and revenues. He alleges that he met with John Tory. During that meeting, he alleges Tory represented that the League office was making annual distributions to the member clubs and that the League’s financial position had significantly improved since the mid-nineties. Lysko alleges that all of these representations were untrue. According to Lysko, had he known the truth, he would not have taken the job or would have insisted upon “very different terms of employment and a longer term of employment.” He says that “The CFL, as employer, is liable for the misrepresentations … and for the damages caused to the Plaintiff.” He alleges that the persons who made the misrepresentations knew or ought to have known of the falsity of the statements and that Lysko would rely upon them. He claims that the people who made the statements were negligent in failing to inform themselves of the truth or, alternatively, in failing to communicate the truth to Lysko.
 Lysko also alleges misrepresentation by omission on the basis that he had a reasonable expectation that certain information would be communicated to him. He names “the CFL as employer, the members of the Search Committee, Tory and Giles” as being liable for these misrepresentations by omission. Later in the claim he also names the Board of Governors, the CFL Corporate Defendants, Tory and Giles (“the misrepresentors”) for another series of omissions. In general, these omissions concern certain financial arrangements and difficulties experienced by the League.
 Lysko alleges that Tory and Giles provided inaccurate financial information to the Board of Governors in the form of various reports, financial statements and other communications. He claims that the Board of Governors knew or ought to have known that the financial information from Giles was incorrect and misleading. He says that Tory, Giles and “the CFL Board of Governors” should have foreseen that he would rely on financial information provided to him in deciding whether or not to accept the position of Commissioner. Lysko does not, however, indicate what reports, financial statements and other communications made to the Board of Governors, if any, were given to him while he was considering taking the job.
 Lysko claims $4.5 million in general, special, aggravated and punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation from the CFL Corporate Defendants; from Braley, Macdonald, Campbell and Ellard (members of the Search Committee); and from Tory and Giles.
 The motions judge struck out paras. 34 to 38 of the statement of claim, providing background information regarding the decision to hire a new commissioner, for failing to allege material facts. She struck out para. 40 concerning the representation about league profits because it was unclear who made the representation, and the CFL, as an unincorporated body, could not make actionable representations. She struck out paras. 41 and 43 concerning representations by the Search Committee because Lysko does not say which individual made the misrepresentations. She struck out paras. 44 to 48 concerning representations by Tory because there were no facts pleaded that showed Tory was in a special relationship with Lysko.
 The motions judge also struck out paras. 49 to 70 concerning the misrepresentations by omission. She struck out the misrepresentations as against Tory because there was no allegation of any special relationship. She also held this claim was insufficient as against the other defendants because there was no allegation as to from whom Lysko expected to receive the information, no facts and circumstances upon which Lysko formed that expectation, no facts and circumstances that made the expectation a reasonable one or that the information was within the defendants’ knowledge. She struck out the paragraphs relating to alleged misrepresentations to the Board of Governors by Tory and Giles because there was no allegation of these misrepresentations being made to Lysko.
 Further, the motions judge held that these allegations of pre-contractual misrepresentations were inconsistent with other parts of his claim and, therefore, should have been pleaded in the alternative in accordance with rule 25.06(4). In other words, in the negligent misrepresentation part of the claim, Lysko sought damages because he would have negotiated a different contract. However, in other parts of the claim he sought to enforce the contract, especially those parts of the claim relating to the performance bonuses, to which I will refer below.
 Finally, the motions judge struck out paras. 34 to 85 as being scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
(5) the reliance must have been detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages resulted.
the resulting loss or damage to the plaintiff.
 I will now turn to the defects found by the motions judge.
 It is important to identify the nature of the representations made in order to decide whether the motions judge properly applied this statement from Lana International. In short, the allegation is that the Search Committee misrepresented the financial state of the League and, in particular, the size of annual distributions to its member football clubs. The appellant has identified the date (October 17, 2000) and place (Sheraton Airport Hotel in Toronto) where the representations were made. He identifies the individuals with whom he met, not only Braley, Macdonald, Campbell and Ellard, but named senior executives from tmp Worldwide, described in the statement of claim as the CFL’s agent. The appellant states that the Search Committee, whose membership he has identified, made the impugned representations. This statement must be taken as true, that is that all members of the committee made the representations. If, as alleged by the appellant in this case, all of the members of the Search Committee at the meeting made the representations, it is not improper to place them together in the same paragraph.
 The motions judge erred in principle in applying a highly technical approach to this part of the pleading, especially to the use of the word “included”. First, if there were other members of the Search Committee, they are not alleged to have been at the meeting. The appellant has identified the members of the Search Committee at the October 17, 2000 meeting and they are the only individuals sued for negligent misrepresentation. Second, in my view, the pleading is reasonably open to the interpretation that by using the word “included” the appellant was in fact describing the entire membership of the Search Committee. Finally, if there is a defect, the remedy is not to strike out the plea but merely to require an amendment or the delivery of particulars, provided the pleading otherwise discloses a reasonable cause of action. That was the remedy adopted by Greer J. in Lana International, supra.
 In my view, this claim is different from the claim in Lana International where it was unclear which of the various defendants, some of whom were corporations, made the misrepresentations. In Lana International, some of the corporations stood in different relationships to the plaintiff and one of the individuals, Cybulski, occupied different positions in relation to two of the corporations. In any event, if there is a deficiency, the appropriate remedy is to allow for an amendment or require delivery of particulars.
At the request of tmp and Ellard, Lysko also agreed to meet with Tory, who was not officially involved with the search for a new commissioner but was at the time the acting commissioner and Chairman of the CFL Board of Governors.
 The claim had earlier identified tmp as the CFL’s agent and Ellard as the chair of the Search Committee. The paragraph goes on to identify the specific representation made by Tory concerning the distributions made to the clubs. It is apparent that Tory was not simply the person whose job the appellant was seeking. In my view, he fell within the category of persons in a special relationship with the appellant. He was the chairman of the CFL’s Board of Governors, the appellant’s proposed employer. It seems to me that given the Supreme Court’s decision in Cognos, supra, at p. 117, it cannot be doubted that in cases of alleged pre-employment negligent misrepresentations, a special relationship exists between the prospective employer through its representatives and the proposed employee so as to give rise to a duty of care. The occasion of the meeting between the appellant and Tory was not an idle meet and greet. It is reasonable to assume that the tmp personnel and Ellard arranged the meeting so that Tory could confirm the representations made by the members of the Search Committee.
 The appellant should provide particulars of the express misrepresentations, including whether they were oral or in writing or both.
(4) that the information was within the knowledge of the defendants (para. 52).
 In para. 49 of the statement of claim, the appellant says that the CFL as employer, the members of the Search Committee, Tory and Giles are liable to him for having made misrepresentations by omission. In para. 50, the appellant states that “these individuals” failed to discharge a duty to communicate important information to him. In para. 53 and following, he alleges that the “Board of Governors, the CFL Corporate Defendants, Tory and Giles (“the misrepresentors”) failed to advise him of various pieces of information. He previously identified the Search Committee as empowered by the Board of Governors to hire a new commissioner. This sufficiently identifies the Search Committee as agent of the CFL corporate defendants. Thus, contrary to the holding by the motions judge, he has identified the persons from whom he expected to receive the information, namely the Search Committee members and Tory and Giles.
 The motions judge also erred in holding that the appellant failed to set out the facts and circumstances upon which he formed the expectation. In para. 51, the appellant alleges that he “specifically invited the Search Committee to tell him what he needed to know about taking the position of commissioner.” While I think it can be inferred that this request took place on October 17, 2000, the appropriate remedy for the defect is to order particulars be delivered. Since there are no facts alleged against Tory in this regard, however, the claim against Tory for misrepresentation by omission must be struck.
 The motions judge erred in holding that the claim fails to state the facts and circumstances that made the expectation a reasonable one. Paragraph 43 of the statement of claim states that the “Search Committee members stressed to Lysko that the distribution to the member football clubs of league office profits was central to what the Board expected of the new commissioner.” In paras. 77 to 85, the appellant gives further particulars as to the importance he placed on the representations concerning the financial information. The majority of the alleged omissions relate to the ability of the League office to generate the profits that would be necessary to maintain the distributions. While it would have been preferable for the statement of claim to make the link between para. 43 and the alleged omissions, to highlight the reasonableness of the expectation, and to state the allegations in paras. 77 to 85, in a more concise manner, these defects can be cured by an amendment.
 Finally, the motions judge erred in holding that the claim fails to state that the information was within the knowledge of the defendants. The members of the Search Committee are all identified as members of the Board of Governors. In para. 50, the appellant alleges that information “was known to these individuals”.
In my view, there is a significant difference between making no representation, which is the complaint in this pleading, and making a representation or set of representations that reasonably leads or is calculated to mislead the recipient of the information to an inference which is not true. The latter is what occurred in Queen v. Cognos.
In reality, the trial judge did not impose a duty to make full disclosure on the respondent and its representative. He simply imposed a duty of care, the respect of which required, among other things and in the circumstances of this case, that the appellant be given highly relevant information about the nature and existence of the employment opportunity for which he had applied.
The claim of misrepresentation in paragraphs 128 and 134 is inconsistent with the thrust of the breach of contract and wrongful dismissal claims. Here, it is alleged that if the plaintiffs had been aware of the untruth of various statements, they would not have entered into the sales agreement. Yet they are seeking to enforce that agreement elsewhere in the pleadings. They also rely elsewhere on some or all of these representations to found a collateral contract with Seven-Up. Rule 25.06(4) requires that inconsistent pleadings be made in the alternative.
 However, there is an important difference between this case and Foodcor. The appellant does not simply say that he would not have entered into the contract but for the misrepresentations. Rather, at paras. 46 and 83 he alleges that had he known the true state of affairs, he would either not have entered into the contract or sought different terms. In BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 1993 CanLII 145 (S.C.C.),  1 S.C.R. 12 at 30, the court held that “actions in contract and tort may be concurrently pursued unless the parties by a valid contractual provision indicate that they intended otherwise.” See also Cognos, supra, at pp. 110-115. Based on the statement of claim, there is nothing to indicate that the tort for negligent misrepresentation was precluded by any terms of the contract. The allegations of negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract are inconsistent only to the extent that the appellant has alleged that he would not have taken the job. The appropriate remedy is to permit the appellant to amend the statement at claim in order to remedy that defect and bring the claim into line with rule 25.06(4).
 The motion judge did not deal specifically with the pleading of negligent misrepresentation as against the corporate defendants. It may be that because she struck out the claim against the individuals, it followed that the corporate defendants could not be liable. Also at para. 47 of her reasons, she notes that para. 40 of the claim alleges that “the CFL, an unincorporated entity, represented that the league was generating a profit”. Since an unincorporated entity can only speak through natural persons, and since those persons were not identified, she held that the paragraph must be struck out. I agree with the motions judge that this paragraph of the pleading is defective.
 However, other parts of the pleading allege, in effect, that the Search Committee was acting as agent for the corporate defendants. For example, para. 42 of the statement of claim states that, “[t]he Search Committee was empowered by the Board of Governors to hire a new CFL commissioner.” In para. 46, the appellant has also expressly pleaded that, “[t]he CFL, as employer, is liable for the misrepresentations described above and for the damages caused to the Plaintiff.” The misrepresentations referred to in para. 46 are positive misrepresentations, not the misrepresentations by omission. In paras. 7 and 13 of the statement of claim, the appellant describes the CFL Corporate Defendants as comprising the CFL. To be consistent with the obligation to read the statement of claim generously with allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies, the term CFL in the claim must be read in that manner. In this context, the term “CFL” can be taken to refer to the Corporate Defendants. The fresh amended statement of claim should, however, make this clear.
The misrepresentations, as described, were untrue, inaccurate and misleading, and the CFL, Tory and Giles acted negligently in making them.
 While I think it likely that the appellant intended that “CFL” in this context also referred to the Corporate Defendants, this allegation is defective in failing to expressly allege that the Corporate Defendants are liable for the misrepresentations by omission allegedly made by the members of the Search Committee. In my view, this omission is a mere drafting deficiency that can be cured by an amendment. The earlier parts of the claim make it clear that the appellant holds the corporate defendants liable for the misrepresentations by the members of the Search Committee.
 To conclude, the Corporate Defendants would be liable for the misrepresentations allegedly made by their agents, the individual members of the search committee and by Tory. See Cognos, supra at pp. 110 and 115.
 The motions judge struck out various parts of the statement of claim because they were irrelevant or otherwise breached rule 25.06. For example, she struck out paras. 34 to 38 because they do not allege material facts but only evidence. I do not agree. Those paragraphs identify Tory, Giles, and tmp Worldwide, their roles in the CFL and in recruiting Lysko. These are facts necessary for the claim of negligent misrepresentation. Paragraph 38 alleges the appellant’s knowledge of the history of the CFL and its marketplace strengths and weaknesses. The facts in para. 38 provide context demonstrating that the appellant relied upon the alleged misrepresentations.
 I agree with the motions judge that paras. 71 to 76 should be struck out. These paragraphs, concerning alleged prior misrepresentations by Tory and Giles to the Board of Governors, are irrelevant to any cause of action and are properly characterized as scandalous or vexatious pleading.
The claim against Braley, Macdonald, Campbell and Ellard for misrepresentation and misrepresentation by omission.
The claim against Tory for misrepresentation as set out in paras. 44 and 46.
The claim against the Corporate defendants for misrepresentations by Tory and misrepresentations and misrepresentations by omission by Braley, Macdonald, Campbell and Ellard.
 The claim for breach of contract is found in two parts of the claim. The first part is found in paras. 86 to 149. The notices of motion did not seek to strike out any of paras. 86 to 93. Paragraphs 94 to 98 set out the alleged results of a forensic audit that according to Lysko, shows poor management by Tory and Giles. Paragraphs 99 to 104 allege that the “CFL Board of Governors and the member teams” interfered withLysko’s performance of his contract, “by defying and undermining the authority of the league office.” He alleges that these actions compromised his ability to earn performance bonuses and his “career expectations, thereby causing him further damage” and “dramatically” impairing his subsequent employability.
 Paragraphs 110 to 149 fall under the heading “Performance Bonuses”. The corporate defendants sought to strike out paras 113 to 149. In paras. 110 and 111, Lysko claims entitlement to the performance bonuses and denotes the CFL’s refusal to pay them. In paras. 112 to 149, he describes at length the many things that he did as Commissioner, presumably in support of his claim of entitlement to the performance bonuses.
 Paragraphs 170 to 176 describe the dismissal, allege bad faith, and claim damages for loss of salary, cost of living allowance and other benefits and allowances.
 Lysko claims damages of $5.2 million against the corporate defendants for breach of contract. This amount includes their failure to pay the performance bonuses and other forms of remuneration, aggravated damages arising out of the manner of his dismissal and bad faith.
 The motions judge struck out paras. 94 to 104 and paras. 113 to 149 under rule 25.11, presumably as being scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. She reasoned at para. 65 of her decision that the case was “primarily a wrongful dismissal action wherein the main point of contention is the discretionary bonus.” While it was open to Lysko to plead that claim, the criteria for earning the bonus, and that he fulfilled the criteria, the statement of claim was really a “billboard for his accomplishments” or “an apologia for the shortcomings in his performance” (para. 65). The motions judge held that it was open to Lysko to claim for aggravated damages pursuant to Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., 1997 CanLII 332 (S.C.C.), , 3 S.C.R. 701, but he had to do so in a concise fashion, alleging the aggravating factors. As pleaded, the claim was “monstrously unwieldy and does not coherently set out the case the defendants have to meet” (para. 66).
 The motion judge struck out the claim in its entirety with leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim in accordance with her reasons. The formal order gives Lysko leave to bring a fresh amended statement of claim against the corporate defendants “for wrongful dismissal and any alleged failure to pay a discretionary bonus”.
 The statement of claim is so long and unwieldy, it is difficult to understand the nature of the appellant’s claim for breach of contract, who he claims against and what his real complaint is on the appeal. The appellant’s principal concern seems to be that by striking out paras. 99 to 104, the motions judge deprived him of his claim for an unpaid signing bonus. If that was the intention from the pleadings in paras. 99 to 104, it is completely obscure. I would grant the appellant leave to amend to concisely plead against the corporate defendants only, the claim for breach of contract including failure to pay the signing bonus. I agree entirely with the motions judge that paras. 94 to 98, which refer to the forensic audit, should be struck out as they are scandalous and vexatious.
 With respect to the balance of the claim for breach of contract, namely, wrongful dismissal and Wallace damages, that claim must be amended as ordered by the motions judge to comply with rule 25.06.
 There are several claims for defamation that fall into different categories. Lysko has divided the claims into two separate groups, namely, paras. 150 to 153 and 154 to 165. The latter group of defamatory comments are set out under a heading that includes allegations of “Injurious Falsehood, Contractual Interference, Further Defamation”. However, in para. 153(k) Lysko refers to statements made in paras. 154 to 165. Then, in paras. 166 to 169 are a number of allegations under the heading “Defamation Claims Generally”. I will review all of the defamation claims in this part.
 While the motions judge struck out the entire claim, she gave Lysko leave to file a fresh statement of claim including claims for defamation against three of the individual defendants: Asper, Gutsche and Schwarz. I will deal with the allegations and then the motions judge’s decision in relation to each individual defendant.
 The motions judge struck out paras. 150 and 154 to 169 as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. She also held that paras. 154 to 157 are not facts material to any of the causes of action, were at best evidence, and should be struck. These paragraphs describe some of the activities leading up to Lysko’s dismissal.
 Paragraphs 152(a) and (c) concern statements made by Asper to named members of the media. The paragraphs set out the exact words. The motions judge gave leave to amend to set out the extrinsic facts in support of the plea of a true innuendo.
 Paragraph 153(e) sets out that on or about March 13, 2002 “a representative of the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, identity unknown, but believed to be Asper or Bauer” falsely stated to members of the media, including a named member of the media, that disbursements to the teams would be down from what Lysko had promised. The motions judge struck out this paragraph because it did not identify the speaker nor did it set out the words complained of.
 Paragraphs 153(g) and (h) allege that Asper and Bauer made false statements to members of the Canadian media, including a named journalist, concerning distributions to the Blue Bombers by the League office. The motions judge struck these paragraphs out because they did not set out the words complained of.
 Paragraph 153(k) alleges that some time shortly before March 12, “one or more of the Governors, believed to be either Asper, Bauer,Braley, Schwartz, or the Defendant Robert Wetenhall, who was governor on behalf of the Montreal Alouettes, communicated false information to the media about Lysko’s performance, as further described below under the heading of injurious falsehood.” This allegation, therefore, leads the reader to look to paras. 154 to 165. In paras. 158 and 159, Lysko has coined the phrase “the Unidentified Source” to refer to Braley, Asper, Schwartz and Wetenhall and he alleges that they disseminated false information to the media, particularly, to two broadcast journalists. In para. 161, Lysko lists the falsehoods complained of, however, no specific words are set out. For example, para. 161(n) states “Lysko was responsible for fiscal malfeasance and incompetence”. The motions judge struck out paras. 153(k) and 154-164 on the basis that it was not sufficient to plead that the defendant is a member of a class and that an unidentified member of the class committed a tort. She also held that these paragraphs do not set out material facts.
 Paragraph 152(b) and (d) allege that Gutsche stated to members of the media, including named journalists, specific words said to be defamatory. While the motions judge struck out the statement of claim, she gave the appellant leave to bring a fresh amended statement of claim against Gutsche limited to these paragraphs. Therefore, there is no issue with respect to Mr. Gutsche on this appeal.
 Paragraph 152(e) alleges that on November 21, 2001, Bauer spoke to members of the media, including a named journalist, and “compared Lysko to the notoriously evil fictional character, Lord Voldemort”. The claim alleged this was defamatory since the plain and ordinary meaning of the words was that Lysko was evil. The motions judge struck out this plea because it does not set out the words alleged to have been published and “[i]t is not a tort to make comparisons” (para. 27).
 Paragraph 153(e) sets out that on or about March 13, 2002, “a representative of the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, identity unknown, but believed to be Asper or Bauer,” falsely stated to members of the media, including a named member of the media, that disbursements to the teams would be down from what Lysko had promised. The motions judge struck out this paragraph against Bauer for the same reason she struck it out against Asper: it did not identify the speaker nor did it set out the words complained of.
 Paragraphs 153(g) and (h) allege that Asper and Bauer made false statements to members of the Canadian media, including a named journalist, concerning distributions to the Blue Bombers. The motions judge struck these paragraphs out for the same reasons she struck them out against Asper because they do not set out the words complained of.
 Paragraph 153(i) states that on a specified day Bauer stated falsely to members of the Canadian media, including a named journalist, thatLysko did not engage in discussions about distribution levels. Paragraph 153(j) states that on the same day Bauer suggested that Lysko was not honest about League distributions. The motions judge struck out these paragraphs because they do not set out the words complained of. Although not mentioned by the motions judge, para. 153(j) also fails to name the recipient of the statement.
 Paragraph 153(k) states that “Asper, Bauer, Braley, Schwarz or the Defendant Robert Wetenhall” communicated false information to the media about Lysko’s performance “as further described below”. Bauer is not referred to again in the claim. The motions judge held that the paragraph does not set out material facts and should be struck. The appellant concedes that Bauer should not have been included in this paragraph.
 Paragraph 153(a) alleges that Schwarz stated on March 9, 2002 to members of the media, including a named journalist, that Lysko was a person of questionable integrity. The paragraph goes on to quote the actual words used. The motions judge held that the paragraph contained the “bare bones of a cause of action” and that any defects could be corrected through particulars. The formal order grants leave to bring a fresh amended statement of claim against Schwarz alleging the claim set out in this paragraph, other than the first sentence, which merely allegesLysko to be a person of questionable integrity and that the CFL had just cause to dismiss him.
 Paragraph 153(b) sets out three allegations of defamation. The first allegation names two journalists as recipients of the statement by Schwarz that Lysko “disqualified himself from being able to continue in the Office of commissioner”. The motions judge struck this plea because the words are not capable of a defamatory meaning. The second allegation merely says that Schwarz, “speaking to other media”, saidLysko was “off the wall”. The motions judge struck this plea because it does not name the recipient of the statement. The third allegation states that Schwarz, “speaking to other media”, stated that Lysko had caused more harm to the CFL than anyone else. The motions judge struck this plea because it does not set out the words complained of or the recipient.
 Paragraph 153(c) sets out specific words that were said by Schwarz to a named journalist. The formal order grants leave to bring a fresh amended statement of claim against Schwarz alleging the claim set out in this paragraph.
 Paragraph 153(d) alleges that Schwarz stated to a named journalist on a specified day that Lysko’s continuing as Commissioner would have a horrendous effect on the CFL. It goes on to state that two days later, Schwarz said that Lysko was not good for the League. The motions judge struck this paragraph because it fails to set out any words complained of. Although not mentioned by the motions judge, the second allegation does not name the recipient of the statement.
 Schwarz is also referred to in para. 153(k) and is one of the members of “the Unidentified Source” referred to in the paragraphs under the heading “Injurious Falsehood, Contractual Interference, Further Defamation”. These pleas against Schwarz were struck for the same reasons the similar pleas against Asper were struck.
 Paragraph 153(f) alleges that on a particular day, Grant publicly lent credence to defamatory statements to the media made by other members of the Board of Governors “further described below”. The plea alleges that Grant made his statements to a named journalist and other members of the media. The motions judge struck this plea because it does not set out the words complained of.
 Wetenhall is referred to in para. 153(k) and is one of the members of “the Unidentified Source” referred to in the paragraphs under the heading “Injurious Falsehood, Contractual Interference, Further Defamation”. These pleas against Wetenhall were struck for the same reasons the similar pleas against Asper and Schwarz were struck.
 Braley is referred to in para. 153(k) and is one of the members of “the Unidentified Source” referred to in the paragraphs under the heading “Injurious Falsehood, Contractual Interference, Further Defamation”. These pleas against Braley were struck for the same reasons the similar pleas against Asper, Schwarz and Wetenhall were struck.
 In para. 150, Lysko alleges that the “CFL, as employer, is liable” for the defamations by the individual defendants. The motions judge held, at para. 42 of her reasons that the allegations of defamation against the corporate defendants must be struck because Lysko failed to set out facts that would serve as a foundation for vicarious liability for the acts of the individuals. She also struck this paragraph as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
 This case raises an important issue for pleading defamation claims: whether or not the plaintiff can plead that the person who is alleged to have made the defamatory statements is a member of a class of persons who may have made the statements. This case also raises the application of rule 5.02(2)(c), which allows a plaintiff to join two or more persons as defendants where “there is a doubt as to the person or persons from whom the plaintiff … is entitled to relief”. The motions judge struck out many of the defamation claims because the appellant was unable to identify who allegedly made the defamatory statements.
 For example, the motions judge struck out paras. 158 to 164 of the statement of claim. The appellant alleged that the defamatory remarks were made by “one or more” of the four Governors who were in favour of terminating his employment. These four were Braley, Asper, Schwartz and Wetenhall and are referred to in this part of the claim as “the Unidentified Source”. The appellant alleges that the Unidentified Source disseminated false information to two broadcast journalists. The dates and occasions when these falsehoods were stated are not identified nor are the exact words set out.
 Publication by the defendant is an essential element of a defamation action and any person who participates in the publication of the defamatory expression in furtherance of a common design will be liable to the plaintiff. See Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd.,1995 CanLII 60 (S.C.C.),  3 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 75-76. The appellant, however, does not allege that the four members of the Unidentified Source were acting in concert, only that they shared the common goal of his removal as commissioner.
 In this case, if the appellant proves the facts pleaded, he will not have made out a prima facie case. Proving that one or more of a group of four people, not alleged to be acting in concert and not alleged to otherwise to be responsible for each other’s actions, defamed the plaintiff, does not make out a case against any of them. Absent proof of vicarious liability or actions in concert, we do not make individuals liable for the anonymous acts of others.
that the coherent body of fact of which he does have knowledge shows not only that there was an utterance or writing emanating from the defendant, but also that the emanation contained defamatory material of a defined character of and concerning the plaintiff (p. 583).
 As I have said, the appellant has not pleaded facts upon which to base a prima facie case nor a coherent body of fact showing a defamatory utterance emanating from the defendants. The cases that have considered the matter appear to uniformly require the plaintiff to identify the defendant alleged to have published the defamatory comments. See for example: Cassagnol v. Pickering Automobiles Inc., O.J. No. 4117 (Sup. Ct. J.) at paras. 7 and 12; Craig v. Langley Citizen’s Coalition,  B.C.J. No. 141 (S.C.) at paras. 16-19 andLana International, supra.
 Accordingly, I agree with the motions judge’s decision to strike out paras. 158 to 164. For similar reasons, para. 153(k), which alleges that “one of more of the Governors, believed to be either Asper, Bauer, Braley, Schwarz or the Defendant Robert Wetenhall, who was Governor on behalf of the Montreal Alouettes, communicated false information to the media about Lysko’s performance as further described below under the heading of injurious falsehood” must be struck out. Since these paragraphs contain the only defamation allegations against Wetenhall, the claim of defamation was properly struck against him. While the paragraph also includes Bauer, no allegedly defamatory statements are thereafter attributed to him and the appellant concedes that Bauer’s name should not have been included in this paragraph. It follows that this paragraph was properly struck out in its entirety.
 These reasons also apply to para. 153(e), which alleges that “a representative of the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, identity unknown, but believed to be Asper or Bauer” falsely stated to members of the media, including a named member of the media, that disbursements to the teams would be down from what Lysko had promised. That paragraph was properly struck out.
Paragraph 153(f): “Grant publicly lent credence to defamatory statements made to the media by other members of the Board of Governors, further described below”.
Paragraph 153(g): “Asper and Bauer stated … that their football club, the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, received only $650,000.00 as distribution from the league office, thus significantly understating the distribution level achieved by Lysko”.
Paragraph 153(h): “… Asper and Bauer stated … that the Winnipeg Blue Bombers had received $930,000 in distributions the year before, despite their knowledge, as revealed by Lysko’s preliminary report and the Forensic Audit, conducted in early 2001, that this figure had been shown to be false”.
Paragraph 153(i): “Bauer stated falsely … that Lysko did not engage in discussions with CFL member clubs about distribution levels”.
Paragraph 153(j): “Bauer suggested that Lysko was not honest about league distributions”.
 The difficulty faced by the appellant in this case is that he believes defamatory comments were made about him to the media because of what is contained in the media accounts. He does not, however, except in some limited cases, know exactly what the defendants said to the media.
– that the exact words are not in his knowledge, but are known to the defendant and will become available to be pleaded by discovery of the defendant, production of a document or by other defined means, pending which the plaintiff has pleaded words consistent with the information then at his disposal.
 The motions judge did not refer to these more recent authorities. In my view, she erred in principle in taking an overly strict view of the requirement of pleading the exact words with respect to paras. 153(b), (d), (g), (h), (i) and (j). The words in these paragraphs were pleaded with sufficient particularity to enable the defendants to understand whether the words alleged are defamatory and to enter any defences.
 Thus, by lending credence to defamatory comments by others, Grant could be liable to the appellant. The difficulty is that the appellant failed to identify any facts from which it could be inferred that Grant lent credence to the defamatory comments made by others. I would not give leave to amend para. 153(f). The appellant does not suggest that he can provide further particulars of the words complained of.
On or about November 21, 2001, Winnipeg Blue Bombers President and C.E.O. Lyle Bauer (“Bauer”), spoke to members of the Canadian media including Scott Taylor of the Winnipeg Free Press and compared Lysko to the notoriously evil fictional character Lord Voldemort. The plain and ordinary meaning of these words is the Lyskowas evil.
There is no plea of the words alleged to have been published. It is not a tort to make comparisons. In a claim for libel or slander, the cause of action is the words. In the absence of a plea of the words alleged to have been published, no cause of action is made out (para. 27).
[A publication] may be defamatory in its plain and ordinary meaning or by virtue of extrinsic facts or circumstances, known to the listener or reader, which give it a defamatory meaning by way of innuendo different from that in which it ordinarily would be understood. In determining its meaning, the court may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including any reasonable implications the words may bear, the context in which the words are used, the audience to whom they were published and the manner in which they were presented.
 In my view, the motions judge took too technical an approach to para. 152(e). Comparing the appellant unfavourably to a notoriously evil, albeit fictional, figure would tend to expose him to contempt or ridicule. It would seem to me that Lord Voldemort, the villain from the immensely popular Harry Potter stories, is sufficiently well known in the community that ordinary persons without special knowledge would take a defamatory meaning from the comparison. However, the appellant should be required to provide particulars of the way in which Bauer allegedly made the comparison to make the defamatory meaning clear. I would strike the paragraph with leave to amend to correct this deficiency.
On or about March 9, 2002, Toronto Argonaut owner, Sherwood Schwarz stated to members of the Canadian media including Bruce Arthur of the National Post that Lysko was a person of questionable integrity and that the CFL had just cause to dismiss him.
 In my view, this allegation is capable of meeting the modern test. Since, however, there is no allegation that the words actually spoken were that the appellant “was of questionable integrity”, the appellant must provide sufficient particulars to enable Schwarz “to understand whether the words have the meaning as alleged or some other meaning, and to enter whatever defences are appropriate in light of that meaning”: Brown, supra, at §19.3(2)(a)(i).
On the same day [March 9, 2002], speaking to other media, Schwarz stated that Lysko was “off the wall”. On the same day, speaking to other media, Schwarz stated that Lysko had caused more harm to the CFL than anyone else that Schwarz had encountered.
Counsel for the plaintiff stated in argument that all of the material facts within the plaintiff’s possession in support of the various named causes of action have been pleaded.
 As presently written, these quoted parts of para. 153(b) cannot stand. However, I would give the appellant leave to amend to allege the names of the person or persons to whom the words were uttered. It may be that the appellant intended to refer to Dan Ralph and Damien Cox who are referred to earlier in the same paragraph. If so, this should be made explicit.
 The motions judge struck out the first allegation in paragraph 153(b) because it was not capable of a defamatory meaning.
On or about the same day [March 9, 2002] Schwarz spoke to other media persons, including Dan Ralph of the Canadian Press and Damien Cox of the Toronto Star. He said that Lysko “disqualified himself from being able to continue in the Office of commissioner.” … The plain and ordinary meaning of these words is that Lysko was unqualified in his position and harmful to the league he was employed to serve and that he had acted indiscriminately.
It is a question of law whether any imputation contained in the words complained of is capable of being defamatory.
In deciding whether the words are capable of a defamatory meaning the trial judge will construe the words according to the meaning they would be given by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence, and will not consider what persons setting themselves to work to deduce some unusual meaning might succeed in extracting from them.
To determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words it is necessary to take into account the context in which the words were used and the mode of publication.
The natural and ordinary meaning of the words is to be determined according to the fair and natural meaning in which reasonable persons with the ordinary person’s general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs, would be likely to understand them in the context in which they were used.
The test to be applied by the court is whether the words complained of, in their natural and ordinary meaning, determined in accordance with the principles stated above, may tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of reasonable persons or to expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule.
 While the determination of whether the words pleaded are capable of bearing the defamatory meaning is a question of law, in order to strike the claim, it must be plain and obvious that the claim cannot succeed. In my view, it is not plain and obvious. The impugned words may be reasonably capable of the plain and ordinary meaning pleaded. Given the context, a flurry of media attention just prior to the appellant’s termination as commissioner halfway through his contract, the words might tend to lower the appellant in the estimation of a reasonable person. Such a finding does not depend on a pleading of a true innuendo. The motions judge erred in striking out this part of the pleading.
 I agree with Asper and Bauer. In their plain and ordinary meaning, the words are not reasonably capable of having a defamatory meaning. Since the appellant has not pleaded a legal innuendo nor the facts that would support a legal innuendo, this paragraph must be struck out. See Hodgson, supra, at 250.
 In my view, the same must be said about para. 153(i) where the appellant alleges that, “Bauer stated falsely … that Lysko did not engage in discussions with CFL member clubs about distribution levels.” Without special knowledge, an ordinary person could not take a defamatory meaning from this statement. The appellant would have to plead this allegation as a legal innuendo. He would also have to plead extrinsic facts known to people exposed to the statement, such as the nature of the relationship between the commissioner and the member clubs. He has not done so in para. 153(i) or, so far as I can tell, in any other part of this prolix statement of claim.
 Paragraphs 153(g), (h) and (i) were properly struck out.
From time to time, certain of the Defendants by letter, fax, spoken word or other communication injured Lysko’s reputation and further interfered with his ability to carry out the terms of his contract of employment. The CFL, as employer, is liable for the said defamation of Lysko.
I agree with the holding of the motions judge and, in my view, there is another fundamental problem with the paragraph.
The CFL Corporate Defendants comprise the CFL, and together they comprised the Plaintiff’s employer, as described below.
 Pleading that the CFL, as employer, is liable for the defamation is not sufficient. A principal can be liable for defamatory comments by its agent if the agent was acting within the scope of the agency at the time of the publication. Similarly, an employer can be vicariously liable for the defamatory expression of an employee acting within the scope of his employment.
In respect of those paragraphs pleading defamation that are not to be struck out, there is no allegation that the words complained of were published or authorized to be published by the corporate defendants. Any liability attaching to them must therefore arise vicariously in connection with the actions of individuals. The pleader has not, however, set out facts which would serve as a sufficient foundation upon which liability could attach to one or more of the corporate defendants for the acts of individuals.
 The defamation claims against the corporate defendants were properly struck out.
 The motions judge struck paras. 152(a) and (c) with leave to amend. I agree with that decision and I did not understand this part of the ruling to be in issue.
The words complained of injured Lysko’s reputation in his trade and calling. They were calculated to bring him into hatred and ridicule. They were actuated by malice.
The words complained of have lowered Lysko in the eyes of the community and caused him personal anguish and torment.
In particular, the makers of the words complained of took advantage of Lysko’s position as commissioner and inability to fight back without harming the very league which he was duty bound to protect.
The makers of the words complained of, and other representatives of the league and member clubs, have subsequently re-published the defamatory statements in various contexts, and they continue to do so.
 I agree that para. 168 was properly struck. I also agree that para. 169 must be struck, as it is too vague. Further, to the extent that the appellant is alleging publication by persons other than the initial publisher, para. 169 ignores the general rule that the initial publisher is not liable for damage caused by the republication of his defamatory statement unless the initial publication falls under an exception to the rule and that exception is specifically pleaded. See Jordon v. Talbot,  O.J. No. 1876 (Gen. Div.) at para. 3. I can see no reason for striking paras. 166 and 167.
 The claims for injurious falsehood and contractual interference are set out in the same part of the statement of claim. The claim of injurious falsehood is founded on allegedly false statements made by the Unidentified Source, comprised of one or more of Braley, Asper, Schwarz and Wetenhall. These falsehoods are set out in para. 161. The statement of claim does not set out the exact words used but alleges that the Unidentified Source made certain statements to the media. The statements included, for example, that Lysko failed to increase revenue for the CFL and that CFL sponsors had left or would be leaving the CFL because of Lysko. In para. 158, Lysko alleges that the Unidentified Source resolved to injure his reputation to create momentum for an “anti-Lysko sentiment” among the members of the Board of Governors and, thus, to injure Lysko. In para. 162, Lysko alleges that within a week of dissemination of the falsehoods, and as a direct result of the Governors’ reaction to them, the Board terminated his employment.
 Lysko claims against the corporate defendants and from Braley, Asper, Schwarz and Wetenhall, general, special, aggravated and punitive damages in the sum of $4.5 million for injurious falsehood, defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations. I have set out the defamation part of the claim above and will deal with the allegation of intentional interference with contractual relations below.
 The motions judge struck out the claim of injurious falsehood against the individual defendants for the same reason that she struck out this part of the claim alleging defamation: it is not sufficient to plead that a defendant is a member of a class and that an unidentified member of the class committed a tort against the plaintiff. She also held that the claim failed against the corporate defendants. Since their liability depended on being vicariously liable for the acts of the individuals, and the claim was bad as against the individuals, it had to be struck against the corporations. She also held that in any event, no facts are pleaded that would establish a foundation for vicarious liability. These paragraphs of the claim were also struck for being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
Actions for injurious falsehood involve the publication of false statements, either orally or in writing, reflecting adversely on the plaintiff’s business or property, or title to property, and so calculated as to induce persons not to deal with the plaintiff. There must be a showing that the published statements are untrue, that they were made maliciously, that is without just cause or excuse, and that the plaintiff suffered special damages.
 While the appellant claims for special damages for injurious falsehood, he has not particularized the actual damages. Since he does not allege that the defendants published the wordings in writing or some other permanent form, s. 17 of the Libel and Slander Act does not relieve him of this requirement. As was pointed out in Haines v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. (1995), 43 N.S.W.L.R. 404 (C. L. Div.) at 408: “The importance of actual damage as an element of the tort of injurious falsehood is that, because the tort is not concerned with injury to either reputation or feelings, damages for injurious falsehood would appear to be restricted to the recovery of that actual damage” [citations omitted]. The essence of Lysko’s allegation is that because of the actions of the defendants, potential future employers will be reluctant to hire him.
 In para. 179 the appellant alleges that the actions of the defendants have rendered him “unemployable” and that the defendants’ “public destruction of [his] reputation has destroyed his career and his ability to find any employment”. Brown writes at §28.1(9) that “where the comment by its very nature is intended and is likely to produce a general loss of business, evidence of a general loss of business as distinct from the loss of known customers, is admissible as evidence of damage to a person’s trade.” It follows that it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to plead more specifically in such circumstances. In this case, however, the appellant has not alleged that the comments were intended and likely to produce a general loss of business or employer interest.
 The appellant’s pleading of injurious falsehood is inadequate for an additional reason. It would appear that the requirement of identifying the words constituting the slander in pleading injurious falsehood is similar to the requirement for defamation. However, the appellant’s claims for injurious falsehood are all made against the Unidentified Source. Given the similarity between defamation and injurious falsehood, I can see no reason for distinguishing my holding relating to the necessity of pleading the identity of the defendant. Like the motions judge I would strike out the claims for injurious falsehood against Braley, Asper, Schwarz and Wetenhall and against the corporate defendants.
 For the same reasons that she struck the claim for injurious falsehood, the motions judge struck this claim. In addition, in para. 13 she held that the claim could not succeed against the individuals because there was no allegation that they were acting other than in the course and scope of their positions as Governors and in the best interests of the CFL, the members of which were alleged to be the appellant’s employer.
 As against the corporate defendants, the motions judge held in para. 14 that the plea must be struck because since the corporate defendants were the employer, and thus the contracting party, they could not be said to have interfered with their own contract.
 I agree with the motions judge’s decision to strike out the claim against the individual defendants on the basis that the appellant failed to identify the defendant. The rules of pleading for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations are not as strict as those for pleading defamation. See Carson v. William W. Creighton Centre reflex, (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 755 (Dist. Ct.) at 757-58. However, this is an intentional tort and the pleadings must contain several elements, including an intentional act on the part of the defendant to cause a breach of a contract and wrongful interference on the part of the defendant. See Unisys Canada Inc. v. York Three Associates Inc. et al.2001 CanLII 7276 (ON C.A.), (2001), 150 O.A.C. 49 (C.A.) at para. 13.
 As with the defamation and injurious falsehood allegations, the appellant relies upon rule 5.02(2)(b) that, it will be recalled, allows a plaintiff to join two or more persons as defendants where “there is a doubt as to the person or persons from whom the plaintiff … is entitled to relief”. The appellant offers the following analogy. Through the negligence of someone in the operating room, a surgical instrument has been left in his body. As the plaintiff has no way of knowing who of all the physicians and nurses present left the instrument in his body he will join all those present in the action.
 In my view, the analogy, although intriguing, is not apt. First, as I have said earlier, rule 5.02(2)(b) concerns joinder not pleadings. It would seem to me that the plaintiff would still have to plead that each of the persons joined in the action were negligent.
 It would be unfair to require the four individuals, one or more of whom are said to be the unidentified source of these falsehoods, to plead to this claim. The claim for intentional interference with contractual relations against the individuals was properly struck out on this basis. Accordingly, I need not consider the other grounds upon which the motions judge struck out the claim against the individuals.
 As against the corporate defendants, the motions judge held at para. 14 that as “they are collectively the contracting party and while they can breach the contract, they cannot be said to have interfered with it.” I agree that the claim was properly struck out against the corporate defendants for the following reasons.
 First, the appellant has not pleaded any facts that would make the corporate defendants liable for the acts of the Unidentified Source. Second, the appellant’s own pleading in para. 13, that the corporate defendants “together … comprised the Plaintiff’s employer” defeats his claim. As held by the motions judge, the contracting parties can be liable for breach of contract but not for intentional interference with the contract. See ADGA Systems International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. 1999 CanLII 1527 (ON C.A.), (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) at 106.
 The appellant seeks leave to appeal the costs award arguing that the costs order is inconsistent with this court’s decision in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON C.A.), (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291. Irrespective of the impact of Boucher on this case, it can no longer be said that all of the defendants, other than Wetenhall, were largely successful. Accordingly, the parties, other than Wetenhall, may submit brief submissions respecting costs of the motion. The parties may also submit brief submissions respecting costs of the appeal. As Wetenhall was wholly successful on the appeal he should submit his bills of costs and brief submissions within ten days of release of these reasons. The appellant will have ten days to respond. Wetenhall may file a brief reply within five days. Asper was also wholly successful on the appeal. He is represented by Mr. Freiman, who also represents Bauer. Mr. Freiman and the appellant may make submissions with respect to Asper and Bauer on the same timetable as submissions on behalf of Wetenhall. With respect to the cost submissions of the other respondents, the appellant will serve and file his submissions and bills of costs for the motions and appeal within ten days of release of these reasons. The respondents will serve and file their submissions and bills of costs for the motions and appeal within ten days. The appellant may serve and file a brief reply within five days. There will be no costs order for or against Gutsche.
Sherwood Schwarz: Defamation paras. 153(a), (b) and (d).
I would dismiss the appeal as against David Asper and Robert Wetenhall. While Sig Gutsche is referred to as a respondent, the motion judge did not strike the only paragraphs that relate to him and there was no cross-appeal. Thus, no order is required with respect to Mr. Gutsche. As I have indicated, I agree with the motions judge that the claim should be struck out with leave to amend in accordance with these reasons and those reasons of the motions judge permitting certain of the claims to proceed.
 The parties should make their costs submissions in accordance with para. 149 of these reasons.
“I agree H.S. LaForme J.A.
 The motions judge dismissed the claim against Giles and there is no appeal from that order.
 Unlike the case with defamation where at para. 150 the appellant alleged that, “The CFL, as employer, is liable for the said defamation of Lysko.” I have held that this paragraph was properly struck out for reasons set out above. But, there is, in any event, no comparable pleading relating to either injurious falsehood or intentional interference with contractual relations.
 Except The Hamilton Tiger Cats and The Toronto Argonauts since the action has been stayed against them.


The All Things Pros blog and IP Spotlight blog have noted that David Kappos issued a memo on January 26, 2010 in regard to the patent eligibility of computer readable medium claims (aka “Beauregard” claims): [Link][PDF].
When should a “whereby clause” be treated as a claim limitation?
The Federal Circuit quietly issued a Rule 36 opinion in Finisar v. DirecTV, 2009-1410 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2010) earlier this month. This was the second time that the Federal Circuit has addressed this dispute. In an earlier opinion, the court reversed the claim construction of a vital claim term, vacated a $78.9M jury verdict, and remanded the case back to the district court in the Eastern District of Texas. Upon remand, the district court subsequently found the remaining claims at issue invalid on summary judgment in view of the new claim construction.
whereby subscribers can be informed as to when a specified portion of the information database will be received.
Surprisingly, with both Judges Rader and Moore on the panel, the panel passed up a golden opportunity to wade in on the issue of what test should be used when assessing whether a “whereby clause” is a claim limitation. Instead, the panel simply issued a Rule 36 opinion without any detailed discussion. Presumably, the panel felt that regardless of whether the whereby clause was considered a limitation, the prior art clearly invalidated the claims.
Counsel for the appellant would later argue during rebuttal that the Hoffer case is in conflict with prior court precedent — which again begs the question of why this panel passed up an opportunity to wade in on the issue.
You can listen to the entire oral argument here: [Listen].
As you may recall, I4I v. Microsoft , 2009-1504 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2010) is the largest jury verdict of patent infringement to be affirmed on appeal. The Federal Circuit late last year affirmed the jury verdict of $200M in damages and $40M in enhanced damages as well as an injunction of the patented feature from Microsoft’s WORD software. [Link] Microsoft filed a Combined Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. Yesterday, I4I filed its response to that petition.
You can read I4I’s response here: [Read].
c) extending said first closing time using said second time interval in accordance with said determination.
Again, the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury verdict of infringement of this Beauregard claim.
There was one question during the oral argument which struck me as odd. Judge Moore asked the attorney for the defendant-appellant whether the claim at issue was an originally filed claim. [Listen]. Perhaps it was just curiosity on Judge Moore’s part — I can’t think of any legal precedent that would require claims that were added or amended after a patent application was filed to be treated any differently during litigation for purposes of literal infringement than one would treat an originally filed claim.
While not mentioned in the court’s opinion, the Federal Circuit panel that heard oral argument in Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 2009-1121, (January 22, 2010) inquired about a statement in the prosecution history that used the phrase “the present invention.” The court was trying to determine whether the term “fax protocol” of the patents should be construed to include packet switched network communications. A reference had been cited in the prosecution of one of the patents and that reference used packet switched network communications. The Applicant responded to the rejection by admitting that packet switched network communications would be encompassed by “the present invention” but that the cited reference could be distinguished on other grounds. Judge Bryson focuses on this issue in the following sound bite: [Listen].
You can read the court’s opinion here: [Read].
the recognition device one of transmitting proposed destination floor data, based upon the data transmitted from the information transmitter, to the control device, and, transmitting elevator user specific data, based upon individual features of the elevator user stored in the storage device, to the control device.
The Federal Circuit panel construed two claim limitations. Namely, it construed “information transmitter” to mean “a device that communicates with a recognition device via electromagnetic waves, after being actuated by that recognition device, without requiring any sort of personal action by the passenger.” And, the Federal Circuit construed the term “recognition device” to mean “a device that actuates and reads data transmitted by an information transmitter without requiring any sort of personal action by the passenger.” The strikeout shows the modification made to the District Court judge’s claim construction of the two terms.
First, “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. In claim 1, the term “information transmitter” itself suggests that the transmitter is a thing, separate and apart from an “elevator user” (a separate limitation), which transmits information. The claim also provides that “elevator calls [are] entered at an entry location by an information transmitter.” Thus, at least with regard to the transmission of information and the entry of calls, it is the information transmitter—not the elevator user—that performs these tasks. Similarly, the claim provides that a “recognition device . . . actuat[es] the information transmitter” and that “a unit . . . independently reads data transmitted from the information transmitter.” Accordingly, the tasks of actuating the transmitter and reading data are performed by the recognition device and the unit, respectively, not by the elevator user. The claim also explicitly provides that the transmitter is “carried by an elevator user.” Carrying a transmitter is thus a type of “personal action” that is expressly required in the claims. Nowhere does claim 1 limit the act of carrying to any specific manner of carrying.
Thus, the Federal Circuit noted that an elevator user is a separate claim limitation and that “carrying a transmitter” by a user is required by the claims. Moreover, the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant emphasized this step during oral argument: [Listen].
This would seem to suggest that at least claim 1 of Schindler’s patent is a hybrid claim that includes both structural elements and a method step that is performed by a user. How should this claim be treated under the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinion IPXL Holdings v. Amazon.com, 433 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)?
The district court found that claim 25 is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, as it attempts to claim both a system and a method for using that system. Section 112, paragraph 2, requires that the claims of a patent “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). A claim is considered indefinite if it does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of its scope. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Whether a single claim covering both an apparatus and a method of use of that apparatus is invalid is an issue of first impression in this court. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) of the PTO, however, has made it clear that reciting both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders a claim indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2. Ex parte Lyell, 17 USPQ2d 1548 (BPAI 1990). As the Board noted in Lyell, “the statutory class of invention is important in determining patentability and infringement.” Id. at 1550 (citing In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 665 (CCPA 1973); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 796 (1870)). The Board correctly surmised that, as a result of the combination of two separate statutory classes of invention, a manufacturer or seller of the claimed apparatus would not know from the claim whether it might also be liable for contributory infringement because a buyer or user of the apparatus later performs the claimed method of using the apparatus. Id. Thus, such a claim “is not sufficiently precise to provide competitors with an accurate determination of the ‘metes and bounds’ of protection involved” and is “ambiguous and properly rejected” under section 112, paragraph 2. Id. at 1550-51. This rule is well recognized and has been incorporated into the PTO’s Manual of Patent Examination Procedure. § 2173.05(p)(II) (1999) (“A single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.”); see also Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 60A (2001) (“Never mix claim types to different classes of invention in a single claim.”).
The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the predicted transaction information comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type and transaction parameters.
‘055 patent, col. 22, ll. 8-13 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one creates a system that allows the user to change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction, or whether infringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means to change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a displayed transaction. Because claim 25 recites both a system and the method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section 112, paragraph 2.
It will be interesting to see on remand to the District Court whether Otis Elevator pursues an indefiniteness argument under section 112.
You can read the Federal Circuit’s opinion here: [Read].
38 The Colorado Lawyer 76 (December 2009). All rights reserved.
By ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, Bradley C. Wright, ed.
William F. Vobach is a patent attorney and a partner with the intellectual property firm of Swanson and Bratschun in Littleton. He is co-editor of the Intellectual Property and Technology Law section of The Colorado Lawyer and a contributing author on “Patent Law” in the CBA’s The Practitioner’s Guide to Colorado Business Organizations—(303)268-0066, bvobach@sbiplaw.com.
Drafting Patents for Litigation and Licensing is an excellent book for anyone involved in the practice of writing patent applications, preparing patent non-infringement and invalidity opinions, or litigating patents. It will be less helpful to business attorneys who are not actively involved in counseling clients about patent law. However, for those attorneys who already have a general understanding of patent law and desire to learn more, this book will serve as a good reference.
Although patent attorneys are aware of the dichotomy between patent preparation and patent enforcement, not all attorneys might recognize a dichotomy exists. Although a patent application typically costs an inventor several thousands of dollars in attorney fees to prepare, millions of dollars typically will be spent when the patent is enforced. Thus, a significantly greater amount of money goes into enforcing an issued patent during litigation as compared to preparing the initial patent application. It therefore benefits all patent attorneys to be aware of the pitfalls that confront an attorney preparing a patent application. For example, it benefits not only those attorneys preparing patent applications so as to avoid these pitfalls, but also patent litigators looking for new arguments to attack an asserted patent.
This book focuses primarily on the preparation of patent applications and the pitfalls that can confront a patent attorney during the application process. In the first chapter, the current state of the law of claim construction is discussed. Then, a very useful chapter discusses the problems that can occur when drafting a patent application. The next chapter draws on the lessons learned from claim construction cases to propose a process that the attorney can employ when preparing a new patent application. I found these first three chapters of the book to be an excellent refresher on the recent developments and trends in patent law. Moreover, I have continued to refer back to them while I have prepared opinions or drafted patent applications.
The next third of the book deals with technical areas of patent law and the issues that are unique to each area. There are chapters focusing on mechanical patents; electrical patents; chemical and pharmaceutical patents; biotechnology patents; software, e-commerce, Internet, and business method patents; and design patents. The chapters are authored by specialists in their respective area of patent law and therefore are well tailored to address issues that confront practitioners in each technical specialty area. The chapter on design patents is one of the better treatments of this area of the law that I have seen.
The third section of the book discusses other topics of interest to patent attorneys, such as continuation practice, drafting patent applications with a view toward Europe, and combining patent prosecution with other forms of representation. The subject matter in these chapters, including the discussion about a firm serving as both opinion counsel and litigation counsel, is particularly well presented. Among the authors is David Hricik, who is one of the leading scholars on ethical issues confronting patent attorneys.
Due to the frequency with which changes occur in patent law, there have already been some significant changes in the law that will have to be updated when the book is supplemented. However, there is no avoiding this issue in books of this nature and I would not put off ordering the book until a supplement is released. Even without a supplement, the book will be valuable for many years to come.
I can highly recommend this book to all patent practitioners—both patent prosecutors and patent litigators alike. The authors selected to write each chapter clearly know their subjects and do an excellent job of presenting the material. The book is well crafted to assist those in the practice of drafting, litigating, or licensing patents to assist their clients in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a patent.
Readers who have questions about any reviewed material should contact the reviewer. Please contact the publisher to obtain a copy of the book.
CBA members can purchase any ABA publication at a 20 percent discount through the CBA’s Department of Law Practice Management (LPM). Some materials may be available for checkout through the LPM Lending Library. For more information about LPM purchases and the LPM Lending Library, contact Michelle Gersic at (303) 824-5342, (800) 332-6736, or mgersic@cobar.org.
Are registered patent attorneys more successful litigators than those attorneys who are not registered? I imagine the answer you get to that question will depend on whom you ask. In looking at the number of registered attorneys arguing patent cases at the Federal Circuit, however, I found the breakdown between registered attorneys and unregistered attorneys extremely interesting. There is a clear pattern of there being a greater percentage of unregistered attorneys arguing on behalf of appellees. And, a clear pattern of there being a greater percentage of registered attorneys arguing on behalf of appellants.
So, as fodder for discussion around the water cooler, what do these statistics mean, if anything? Does the higher percentage of unregistered attorneys representing appellees mean that unregistered attorneys are better trial lawyers, can think more like jurors or judges, are highly skilled appellate lawyers at general practice firms? Does the higher percentage of registered attorneys representing appellants mean that when the stakes are high, parties bring in a hired-gun appellate lawyer with a registration number? What about the high reversal rates at the Federal Circuit — what do they suggest about the ultimate outcome of a case? Do the trends have anything to do with movement of patent litigation and patent litigators away from boutique patent firms to large general practice firms? I don’t know the answer to these questions — but, I do find the opposing trends interesting.
Microsoft has now filed its request for a rehearing en banc in the I4I v. Microsoft appeal: [Read].
(e) piping network interconnecting said first and second containers, said filter unit and said first and second couplings.
One of the interesting aspects of the oral argument was when Peter Lancaster of Dorsey and Whitney’s Minneapolis office made the argument that the defendant’s own patent (stipulated to describe the accused device) described the elements of the allegedly infringing product as “connected.” [Listen]. In my review of the court’s opinion, I did not see that the panel ever addressed that argument.
The panel also noted that the doctrine of equivalents would not cover indirectly connected elements — elements are either connected or not connected.
Furthermore, the court was correct in limiting possible equivalents as a matter of law, finding that claim 8, paragraph (e), “warrant[s] few or no equivalents because there are no insubstantial or trivial changes that could be made to this limitation; the specified components are either connected or not connected to one another by a piping network.” Summary Judgment Opinion, 2007 WL 4081737 at *19. Based on the claim construction, the court was correct in finding that Oilmatic was entitled to summary judgment of noninfringement.
*Appropriately, the inventors for the chicken fryer patent at issue hail from Kentucky.
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text: 184 examinations and surveys and to locate and construct irrigation works, and was then to report annually to Congress on enum- erated matters.199 The Act also provides for withdrawal of public lands from entry for construction of irrigation works.200 Entries on lands so withdrawn are limited to a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 160 acres.201 Upon determination that a project was practi- cable, the Secretary could let contracts if funds were available in the Reclamation Fund.202 He must give public notice of lands available for entry, the permissible size of entry fixed in accord- ance with his determination of the acreage "reasonably required for the support of a family," and of the charges per acre to be made upon such entries and upon lands in private owner- ship.203 Charges were to be determined with a view to returning to the Reclamation Fund the estimated cost of construction, and had to be paid in not to exceed 10 annual installments.204 Additional homestead requirements for reclamation entries and patents are also established by the Act.205 Moreover, rights to use of water are limited to 160 acres as to private lands, and the landowner was required to be an of a proposed convention with Mexico, which was afterward signed on May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953, Congress extended the Reclamation Act to the portion of Texas bordering upon the Rio Grande which could be irri- gated from a dam to be constructed near Engle, New Mexico. Act of February 25, 1905, 33 Stat. 814. This is the Elephant Butte Dam. See Sperry v. Elephant Butte Irr. Dist., 33 N. Mex. 482, 270 Pac. 889 (1928). A month after the conclusion of the 1906 convention, the Reclamation Act was extended to the entire State of Texas. Act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat. 259, see 43 U. S. C. 391. Until this legislation, Texas embraced the only portion of arid land in the United States not within the Act. H. Rep. No. 1790, 59th Cong., 1st sess. (1906). 199 § 2, 32 Stat. 388, as amended, 43 U. S. C. 411. Through the remainder of this chapter, the word "Secretary," standing alone, will refer to the Secretary of the Interior. 200 § 3, 32 Stat. 388, see 43 U. S. C. 416. 201 Id. 202 § 4, 32 Stat. 389, 43 U. S. C. 419. 208 Id. 1204 § 4, 32 Stat. 389, see 43 U. S. C. 419. The Code omits the limit on installments. 205 § 5, 32 Stat. 389, see 43 U. S. O. 439.

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by Barry A. Bradley, Esq.
and Jaimee K. Wellerstein, Esq.
In a monumental victory for employers in one of the most significant employment rulings in recent history, the Supreme Court of the United States held on Monday, May 21, 2018 in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis that class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
The long-awaited decision resolved a prior federal court circuit split. According to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), class action waivers prevented employees from engaging in protected concerted activity in violation of the NLRA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the NLRB’s rulings, first in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, and, later in NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. The Fifth Circuit was then joined by the Second and Eighth Circuits in refusing to enforce the NLRB’s rule.
However, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the right to bring a class or collective action is protected concerted activity under the NLRA, and that class action waivers violate that right. In Ernst & Young v. Morris, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit and the NLRB.
To resolve the dispute, the United States Supreme Court granted certiori in the three consolidated cases – Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis; Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris; and NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in October 2017. In a 5-4 opinion, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, settled the issue once and for all, holding that the right to bring a joint, collective, representative, or class-based claim is not considered a “concerted action” as understood and protected by the NLRA.
While class action waivers do not mean the end of all representative actions (because employees may continue to bring PAGA actions in California), the Supreme Court’s ruling today should still be viewed as a monumental win for employers.
Employer Takeaway: Class action waivers contained in employment arbitration agreements are valid! There is no longer any legal reason for employers not to have employees waive their ability to bring class actions under federal, state, and local employment laws. Companies, along with their counsel, should review their employment arbitration agreements to determine whether they comply with the SCOTUS standards.
Please contact Bradley & Gmelich LLP if you have any questions about the Court’s ruling.
The attorneys at Bradley & Gmelich LLP bring a wide variety of experience to assist their clients. Bradley & Gmelich attorneys excel in litigation, and a number of them focus specifically on appeals and motion work. Bradley & Gmelich attorneys have worked for large civil litigation firms, managed large and small businesses, served as deputy district attorneys and state prosecutors, and been honored with judicial internships and clerkships. Bradley & Gmelich LLP believes in the importance of continuing legal education for their clients, and we have presented seminars, workshops, and classes on many legal topics.
The second edition of The Californian is now available. Mark your calendar!

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