Fans of SyFy’s The Expanse were dealt a blow this week when the network announced it would be cancelling the highly rated sci-fi show. Fans were also quick to respond, however, petitioning for Amazon to pick up the show and even going so far as flying a banner over the studio’s headquarters. The space opera, which has been called a spiritual successor to the revered Battlestar Galactica, is one of the best new space-based sci-fi shows in recent memory. Check out this killer fan-made trailer to get a taste of the show.
The plot goes as follows: After the exploration and settlement of Mars, Earth unites as one government under the United Nations (“UN”). After a few generations of unrest and resentment, the territorial government of Mars exchanges its newly-invented “Epstein Drive” with Earth to guarantee their independence. The Drive allows much faster, more efficient space travel to the outer solar system, where both Earth and Mars tenuously share the right and responsibility of “mining” natural resources in an asteroid belt (“the Belt”) between Mars and Jupiter. Still, the militaristic government of Mars is not happy with its portion of the resources (namely, water), and a type of cold war exists between the two planets.
Millions of miles from these planets, it only takes a few generations before those born in the Belt start to grumble. Belters have their own language (lang Belta, or “Belter Creole”), are taller and thinner due to the low gravity, and generally poorer in health due to atmospheric and environmental issues. Most Belters have never been to a civilized planet, and they have no residual love for the place their great-great-great grandparents were born. Resenting the second-class citizenship afforded them by the “Earthers and Dusters,” some Belters form the “Outer Planet Alliance” to fight for autonomy and more rights. Like most freedom-seeking organizations that employ violence, Earth and Mars are quick to label the OPA a terrorist organization and the planets quickly suppress any independence talk by the Belt.
Rich in natural resources and far from the inner planets, it’s easy to see why the Belters feel like they deserve more. Because Earth’s resources are gone and Mars has very little natural resources to speak of, it’s even easier to understand why they would not give up control of the Belt without a fight. So how can the Belt establish its independence? Fortunately, Earth has seen its share of independence movements and the path to independent nationhood (Is this planethood? non-planetary-grouphood?) is well established—if not also exceedingly difficult.
While no universal agreement on how to establish an independent nation or non-planetary asteroid belt exists, history provides us with a solid outline. First, the group must meet certain practical requirements involving territory, population, and government. Second, the group must declare its independence. Third, but not necessarily fatal, other governments must recognize the group’s independence and sovereignty. Based on what we have seen of the Belt in The Expanse, I think the Belters stand a decent chance in the long run. Earth and Mars can’t destroy the Belt, they need it.
In the Montevideo Convention of 1933, 19 nations in North and South America codified the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law. The Convention, which set out the definition, rights, and duties of statehood, acknowledged that “[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (1987). To meet the third and fourth requirement, it’s likely the entity also “must be capable of acting independently of foreign governments.” IV Encyclopedia of Public International Law 603 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1st ed. 2000).
The Belters probably can meet all of these requirements, but their reliance on Earth and Mars could mean that it doesn’t matter. The Belt has somewhere between 50 and 100 million inhabitants, spread across five major colonies: Ceres, Vesta, Eros, Anderson Station, and Tycho Station. These colonies are located amid the general orbits of Mars and Jupiter, and could be “geographically” limited to the space between the current outer posts.
Furthermore, although Earth and Mars considered the OPA to be a terrorist organization, Belters view the group as a de-centralized sociopolitical movement capable of Belt governance. Assuming OPA leaders like Fred Johnson could unite the various factions, the Belt should be able to establish an actual working government. Whether the Belt is “capable of acting independently of foreign governments,” however, depends solely on its reliance on Earth and Mars for air and other goods that are naturally found in the Belt. My guess is they could.
So if I’m getting this right, I just yell that I’m an independent state and everyone leaves me alone, right?
Throughout history, groups have successfully declared themselves independent of their colonial masters. For example, the Cabinet of Rhodesia adopted the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, declaring itself independent of Great Britain in November of 1965. The most famous example is arguably the United States’ Declaration of Independence (“DOI”) in 1776, which declared that “these united Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States,” and promptly started a war. Although the DOI “may not have the force of organic law,” Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901); see also Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independence, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 693, 696 (2012), it served its purpose in declaring the United States an independent nation.
We declare the Main Asteroid Belt to be a democratic, secular, and multi-ethnic, non-planetary republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in the Belt and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes. Because the history of Earth and Mars is one of subjugation, exploitation, and neglect, we hereby break all allegiances with those planets. Furthermore, we commit to protecting the rights, resources, and lives of all Belters, as is our right.
Ok, so can we all agree that belts are a necessary item for Belters to wear in the Belt? No? Well great, there goes my idea for a pop up on Ceres.
“Recognition is a ‘formal acknowledgement’ that a particular ‘entity possesses the qualifications for statehood’ or ‘that a particular regime is the effective government of a state.’” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (quoting § 203, cmt. a). This last stage of establishing definitive statehood presents the most difficult for those in the Belt. Unlike Earth, which previously had many different nations that could recognize a new country, the Belt can only seek recognition from Earth and Mars. No other governments even exist within the solar system.
Fortunately, as the Restatement explains: “An entity that satisfies the requirements of § 201 is a state whether or not its statehood is formally recognized by other states.” § 202, cmt. b. And under United States’ law, recognition mostly seems to be “a precondition of regular diplomatic relations,” see Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084, not a precondition for independence. Because the Belt is unlikely to be recognized by Earth or Mars—absent a treaty establishing trade with one but not the other—it may be difficult to gain an accepted independence outside of the Belt’s confines.
As a former Marine myself, I approve of the Martian Marine Corps’ jumpsuit-only uniform. So comfortable.
Although the Belt may meet international law’s qualifications for becoming an independent and sovereign entity, which it could legally declare itself to be, it’s hard to imagine Earth or Mars giving up their space-age breadbasket and recognizing the Belt as such. Without negotiating or fighting for that recognition, the Belt could still act independently in its own territories; however, it would not have the benefit of trade or diplomacy with its planetary-based neighbors. Fortuitously, the Belt may have been dealt a strong hand to play (Warning: Spoiler), but we likely won’t get to find out unless Amazon picks up the series. No, seriously, Amazon, you should pick up the series. Please?
Because air and water are more precious than gold in the Belt, I’m sure scores of air and water lawyers argue about all the attendant regulations and statutes. What are water rights in space like?
The Expanse does a great job anticipating changes in culture due to the effects of space. Like the inclusion of hand symbols in lang Belta, which developed when Belters were doing space walks and needed to communicate quickly.
Would death by being sucked out into space be considered cruel and unusual? My guess is that the practice, like walking the plank, is pretty commonplace in the more remote Belt outposts. Probably not.
Apparently legal battles are already being planned over the colonization of Mars, so maybe we can get all of these hashed out in the next hundred or so years. I vote for Belter rights!
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Provisonal Remedies | GOALGOOLE | Because you need Information for your goals !
(1) Where at any stage of suit, other than a suit regarding immovable property, the court is satisfied by affidavit or other evidence on oath that the defendant or a plaintiff against whom a counter-claim has been lodged.
the court may issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the court to show cause why be should-not furnish security for his appearance.
(3) The defendant shall not be arrested if he pays to the officer entrusted with the execution of the warrant sc sum specified in the warrant as is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim. Which sum shall be held in deposit by the court until the suit is disposed of or until the further order of the court.
(2) Every surety for the appearance of a defendant shall bind himself, in default of such appearance, to pay such sum of money as the defendant may be ordered to pay in the suit.
(1) A surety for the appearance of a defendant may at any time apply to the court in which he becomes such surety to be discharged from his obligation.
(2) On such application being made, the court shall summon the defendant to appear or , if it thinks fit, may issue a warrant for his arrest.
(3) On the appearance of the defendant in pursuance of the summons or warrant, or on his voluntary surrender, the court shall direct the surety to be discharged from his obligation, and shall call upon the defendant to find fresh security.
(4) Where the defendant is unable to find fresh security, one court shall order him to deposit in court, if he is able to do so, money or other property sufficient to satisfy any decree that may be passed against him.
Provided that the defendant may not be so detained for more than six months.
the court may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the court, when required the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be should not furnish security.
(2) The plaintiff shall, unless the court otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof.
(3) The court may also in the order direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified.
Art. 152- Attachment of property.
(1) Where the defendant fails to show cause why he should not furnish security, or fails to furnish the security required, within the time fixed by the court, the court may order that the property specified , or such portion thereof as appears sufficient to satisfy any decree which maybe passed in the suit, be attached.
(2) Where the defendant shows such cause or furnishes the required security after the property specified or any portion of it has been attached, the court shall order the attachment to be with drawn, or make such other order as it thinks fit.
(1) Unless otherwise expressly provided, the attachment shall be made in the manner provided for the attachment of property in execution.
(2) Attachment before judgment shall not affect the rights, existing prior to the attachment, or persons not parties to the suit, nor bar any person holding a decree against, the defendant from applying for the sale off the property under the attachment in execution of such decree.
(3) Where any claim is preferred to property attached before judgment, such claim shall be investigated in the same manner as a claim to property attached n execution of a decree for the payment of money.
(4) Where an order is made for attachment before judgment, the court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the security required, together with security for the costs of the attachment, or when the suit is dismissed.
(5) Where property has been attached under this Article and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, It shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for a reattachment of the property.
(b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors. The court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or further orders.
(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other act prejudicial to the plaintiff, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the institution of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or act complained of, any breach of contract or act of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.
(2) The court may be order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as it thinks fit.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall affect the provisos of At. 2121 of the Civil Code.
(1) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also sentence such person for contempt of court in accordance with Art. 443 of the Penal Code.
(2) No attachment under sub-art. (1) shall remaining force for more than one year, at the end of which tie if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the court may award such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitle thereto.
The court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injection would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injection, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party.
Any order for an injunction may be discharge, or varied, or set aside by the court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order.
An injunction directed to a body corporate shall be binding on the corporation itself as well as on all the members and officers thereof whose personal action it seeks to restrain.
The court may, on the application of any party to a suit, order the sale, by any person named in such order, and in such manner and on such terms as it thinks fit, of any movable property, being the subjects matter of such suit, or attached before judgment in such suit, which is subject to speedy and natural decay, or which for any other just and sufficient cause it may be desirable to have sold at once.
(b) for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, authorize any person to enter upon or into any land or building in the possessions of any other party to such suit, or any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made or experiment to be tried, which may seem necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence.
(1) An application by the plaintiff for an order under Art. 160 or 161 may be made after notice to the defendant at any time after institution of the suit.
(2) An application by the defendant for a like order may be made after notice to the plaintiff at any time after appearance.
(1) Where a party in possession of land or tenure the subject-matter of a suit, neglects to pay the government revenue, or the rent due to the proprietor of the tenure, as the case may be, and such land or tenure is consequently ordered to be sold, any other party to the suit claiming to have an interest in such land or tenure may, upon payment of he revenue or rent due previously to the sale apply to the court for the suspension off the sale and the court may grant the application on such terms as it thinks fit.
(2) The court in its decree may award against the defaulter the amount paid under sub-art. (1), with interest thereon at such rate as the court thinks fit, or may charge the amount so paid, with interest thereon at such rate as the court orders, in any adjustment of accounts which may be directed in the decree passed in the suit.
Where the subject-matter of a suit is money or some other things capable of delivery and any party thereto admits that he holds such money or other things as. A trustee for another party, or that it belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same to be deposited in court or delivered to such last-named party with or without security, subject to the further direction of the court.
Pending the decision of the suit, the court may at any time, on the application of any party of which notice shall be given to be other party, make on such terms as it thinks fit such orders as it considers necessary or expedient in the circumstances, including orders for the custody of a minor or the payment of alimonies.
(d) confer up on the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where an application is made for an order under sub-art (1), the court shall have regard to the amount of the debt claimed by the applicant, to the amount which may possibly be obtained by the receiver and to the probable costs of his appointment and may before making the appointment, direct such inquires on these or other matters to be made as it thinks fit.
The court may by general or special orders fix the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver.
(d) be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his willful or gross negligence.
(b) occasions loss to the property by his willful default or gross negligence, the court may direct his property to be attached and sold and may apply the proceeds to make god any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him, and shall pay the balance, if any, to the receiver.
(1) Where for the purpose of preserving property which may be or is the subject of proceedings in court, the court considers that seals should be affixed the provisions of is Paragraph shall apply.
(2) No seal when affixed shall be removed without an order of the court for which any interested party may apply.
(1) An application for the affixing of seals may be made to any court by any person who satisfies the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that property which may be the subject of proceedings in court should be preserved.
(2) An order for the affixing of seals may be made at any stage of proceedings in court by the court of its own motion or on application.
(3) On making an order for the affixing of seals, the court shall appoint such person (hereinafter referred to as the official sealer) as it thinks fit to carry out such order.
(1) The official sealer after having affixed seals in accordance with the order of the court, shall prepare a dated and signed record showing.
(d) the name of the caretaker, it any, in charge of the premises where the sealing has taken place.
(2) The official sealer shall hand over to the registrar of the court any keys belonging to any locks he has sealed.
(c) any property required for the use of a party to the suit specifically exempted from sealing by the court.
(2) Where any property is committed to the use of any person under sub-art (1), (c), the official sealer shall make and deposit in court an inventory of all such property.
(1) Where the official sealer finds wills, sealed papers or other documents he shall make a list of such papers and shall place them in a sealed bundle and forward such list to the court for instructions.
(2) The court shall make such order for the disposal of such documents as it thinks fit.
(1) Where as application for the removal of seals is made or where the court of its own motion proposes to order such removal, all interested parties shall be informed of the day when the other will be made if they appear they may be heard, Any objection shall be considered by the court which shall, having heard the parties, give its decision forthwith.
(2) When an order for the removal of seals has been made the official sealer shall remove the seals and shall make a written dated and signed report to the court giving particulars of all property which he has unsealed.
(1) The court may, on the conditions laid down in Art. 171, order that an inventory of property, which is or may be the subject of proceedings in court, be made by such person (hereinafter referred to as the official record) as it thinks fit to appoint.
(b) an accurate description of each articles entered in the inventory and the estimated value thereof.
(3) Where the court so orders, the estimation of value shall be made by an expert appointed under Art. 136, whose report, dated and signed, shall be attached as an annex to the official recorder’s report.
(4) The report of the official recorder, dated and signed, shall be forwarded to the court and, after being registered by the registrar of the court in a special inventory register, shall form part of the record of the case.
(1) An application for habeas corpus may be made to the High Court by any person restrained otherwise than in pursuance of an order duly made under this Code or the Criminal Procedure Code.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant stating the name of the person under whose custody he is, the nature and place of the restraint and the names of the persons, if any, who can testify to the facts alleged in the application.
(3) Where the person restrained if for whatever reason unable to make the application and/or affidavit himself, the same maybe made by any person on his behalf and the affidavit shall then state the name of the person restrained and that he is unable to make the application and/or affidavit himself.
(1) On receiving an application under Art 177, the High Court that forth with issue a summons directing the person under whose custody the restrained person is to appear before the High Court together with the latter person on such day as shall be fixed in the summons and to show cause why the person restrained should not be released.
(2) Summonses shall also be issued for the appearance of such persons as may be able to testify to the facts alleged inn the application.
(1) On the day fixed in the summons issued under Art. 178, the court shall investigate the truth or otherwise of the facts alleged in application and may make with regard to evidence such orders as it thinks fit.
(2) Where the court is satisfied that the restraint is unlawful, it shall order the immediate release of the person restrained and the person under whose custody the person restrained is shall not withstanding any other orders or instructions to the contrary by any person or authority forthwith release that person.
(3) Where the court is in doubt as to the truth or otherwise of the facts alleged in the application, it may order the release of the person restrained on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, that he will appear in any court on any future day on which his appearance may be required and comply with such other order as the court ordering release may think fit to make in the circumstances.


A number of retailers and technology giants – including Amazon.com, Facebook, and Microsoft – have filed amicus briefs with the Federal Circuit in support of Netflix, Inc.’s petition for rehearing en banc in Media Queue, LLC v. Netflix, Inc. et al. Netflix successfully parried Media Queue’s patent infringement charges in California district court, but was denied attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 256, because the court concluded that the case failed to qualify as "exceptional" under the statute. Netflix has requested en banc consideration of the Federal Circuit’s standard, which Amici claim is to blame for "an unchecked epidemic of overreaching patent assertions." Absent a requirement that patentees demonstrate "an objectively reasonable basis" for bringing infringement suits, the Amici assert, many arguably frivolous suits will continue to be brought.
Previously, prevailing plaintiffs and defendants played on a level field when seeking fees. As the Federal Circuit Court held in Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., "there is and should be no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers who engage in bad faith litigation" when determining attorneys' fee motions. 903 F.2d 805,811 (Fed. Cir. 1990). This party-neutral application of section 285 looked to the objective unreasonableness of a party's position - whether a defendant's denial of liability or a patentee's assertion of infringement. Evidence that a party proceeded in reckless disregard of the objective unreasonableness of its position sufficed to establish bad faith and an exceptional case under Section 285. Under the current standard applied in the Federal Circuit, however, a case is "exceptional" for defendants when the conduct related to the litigation is materially inappropriate, such as "willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, unjustified litigation, or a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11." Thus, if there is no misconduct, a case is exceptional only if the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith and the litigation is objectively baseless. See, e.g., Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further, even if the case is found to be exceptional, the court has discretion to deny fees. Netflix and the Amici argue that this gives plaintiffs a "free pass," permitting them to make bad faith allegations of infringement and unreasonable demands for injunctions or damages based on patents directed to trivial features.
Netflix has taken the position that the previous standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants is proper and consistent with the standards for awarding fees in other intellectual property cases. Netflix cites the Supreme Court case of Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), where the Court applied a party-neutral reading to copyright claims, stating "the federal fee-shifting statutes in the patent and trademark fields support a party-neutral approach." Netflix has argued that the Federal Circuit’s higher standard for prevailing defendants in patent cases runs counter to the Fogerty decision and is inconsistent with the interpretation of similar statutes such as the trademark fee-shifting statute, 15 U.S.C. § 117, which is interpreted much more broadly than the current standard used for patents.
The Amici are interested in a clarification of the standard as to what constitutes an "exceptional case," and focus their briefing on the "epidemic" of unreasonable patentee litigation, and the financial and administrative burdens placed on companies by "non-practicing entities." The Federal Circuit's decision will have far-reaching effects on patent cases and the ability of defendants to recover when they successfully argue that plaintiff’s cases were without merit.


text:
Understanding that a citizen of the United States (“citizen”) is one thing, but that a natural born citizen of the United States (“natural born citizen”) is another is the key to understanding what a natural born citizen is. To avoid constitutional error, it is critical that these two classes of citizens not be conflated, confounded, and confused. There are different way by which one can become a citizen. But none of that does or should change what a natural born citizen is.
Why is it important that we understand the constitutional distinction between a citizen and a natural born citizen and give the correct meaning to a natural born citizen? It is important because the Framers looked to the natural born citizen clause, apart from the Electoral College, through its requirement of absolute allegiance and love of country, as a means to provide for the safety and national security of the republic. They looked to the natural born citizen clause as a way to keep monarchical and foreign influence out of the singular and powerful civil Office of President and military Office of Commander in Chief of the Military. The Framers saw such monarchical and foreign influence as an insidious way to destroy what they had so greatly sacrificed to build.
The historical record is replete with examples showing how the Framers sought to keep monarchical and foreign influence out of the Office of President and Commander in Chief of the Military. For sake of brevity, I shall focus on this one example. Alexander Hamilton gave a speech to the Convention on June 18, 1787. He read to Convention his Propositions for A Constitution of Government. See Works of Alexander Hamilton (page 393); 3 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 617 (1911) (Farrand). This speech contained a sketch of a plan which has become known as the English Plan. This plan can be read here, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_618.asp . James Madison informed us in his Convention notes that “[i]t meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendment which he should probably propose to the plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. Although this plan was not formally before the Convention in any way, several of the delegates made copies . . . Farrand. at 617. Hamilton proposed in his Propositions that the "supreme executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governor. . ." and that he also be the "commander-in-chief. . ." In this initial sketch, Hamilton did not include any eligibility requirements for the supreme executive authority who he would call the President rather than Governor in his later draft of the Constitution. In his speech to the Convention, Hamilton advocated an executive for life. The reason that he gave for such a life position was the following: “The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad-and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermedling Neibours.” Id. Here we can see that Hamilton was very concerned with the harm that could be done to the nation by an executive who was corrupted by foreign influence and intrigue.
"Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen" (“born” underlined in the original).
John Jay reminded General George Washington of the importance of remanding back to the original concerns of the people and offered his presentation, to which George Washington offered, verbatim, to the convention. Alexander Heard and Michael Nelson, Presidential Selection 123 (Duke University Press 1987) via Google Books.
Jay demanded that there be a "strong check" on foreign influence infiltrating the national government in general and the Office of Commander in Chief of the Military specifically. A “natural born subject,” as defined by the English common law, which permitted dual and conflicting allegiance at birth, would not have provided that strong check on foreign influence for which Jay was looking.
Madison's notes of the Convention http://www.nhccs.org/dfc-0904.txt .
The proposal passed unanimously without debate which does not mean that the proposal was not discussed, for the convention meetings were conducted in secrecy. Another reason that there was no debate is probably that the definition that was used of a natural born citizen was of such universal acceptance that it satisfied all laws then know to the Framers.
Hamilton gave his paper to Madison before the convention came to an end which we know occurred on September 17, 1787, the date the delegates signed the Constitution. Hamilton served on committees that drafted convention rules and provided for writing style. We can reasonably assume that since the document was in the hands of these two influential Founders and Framers, they would have discussed Hamilton’s presidential citizenship proposal with others making decisions at that time. While we do not know exactly what happened during the convention regarding Hamilton’s “now a citizen of one of the States” and “born a citizen of the United States” concept, we do know that they were both rejected and “natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution” was accepted. We can see that the Framers did not accept merely being a citizen of the United States at birth. Rather, they demanded that future presidents be natural born citizens.
What is critical to understand about the Hamilton “born a citizen” language is that it shows that he did not request that the President be a “natural born citizen.” So he knew that the definition of the clause was a child born in the country to citizen parents. By advocating born a citizen, anyone who was made a citizen from the moment of birth by positive law [Endnote 1] such as an Act of Congress would have been eligible to be President. This would have included children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents and even children born in the United States to alien parents who should by positive law be made citizens from the moment of birth. But the Convention adopted “natural born citizen” and not “born a citizen,” which means that the delegates wanted a more stringent standard than just born a citizen. So then how did the Framers define a natural born citizen?
Before its adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an [p166] association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.
For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words "subject," "inhabitant," and "citizen" have been used, and the choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. Citizen is now more commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one living under a republican government, it was adopted by nearly all of the States upon their separation from Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the Constitution of the United States. When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.
To determine, then, who were citizens of the United States before the adoption of the amendment it is necessary to ascertain what persons originally associated themselves together to form the nation, and what were afterwards admitted to membership.
Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen -- a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were.
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [p168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea.
So, Minor looked to the law of nations and not to the English common law for the Framers’ definition of a natural born citizen. Chief Justice John Marshall in The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 289 (1814) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) and Justice Daniel in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 476 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring), had done the same, citing and quoting the law of nations and Vattel at Section 212 and not the English common law and Blackstone. Hence, when Minor said that a natural born citizen was defined “at common-law,” it was not referring to the English common law. Rather, it was referring to American national common law which incorporated the citizenship principles of the law of nations.
Minor explained that if one was a natural born citizen, there was no doubt that one was a citizen. Hence, accepting that Virginia Minor was a natural born citizen, it held that she was a citizen. After the Court defined the natural born citizens and told us that anyone who was a natural born citizen was without any doubt a citizen, the Court raised the question sua sponte whether there could be other “citizens” by birth “within the jurisdiction.” This question regarding other “citizens” did not involve the “natural born citizens,” who the Court had just defined through an all-inclusive and all-exclusive definition (the Court said that under that common law all the people who did not meet that definition were “aliens or foreigners”). So the Court did not raise any question of whether there could be other birth circumstances that could serve as the basis for making one a natural born citizen. These other children were different from those that were natural born citizens because unlike them, they were born to alien parents. In fact, the Court even referred to these children as belonging to another “class.” The Court said that “some authorities” included these other children as “citizens” also. The Court, however, said that “there have been doubts” whether they were citizens. So, not only did the Court explain that those children could not be natural born citizens, it also said that it was doubtful whether they were even just citizens. The Court was referring to The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) which stated that children born in the United States to alien parents were not citizens of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the end, the Court explained that it was not necessary for it to solve the doubts involving whether the children of that other class were citizens. For sure, it was not necessary because Virginia Minor was born in the country to parents who were its citizens which made her a natural born citizen. Knowing that Virginia Minor was born in the country to parents who were citizens, which made her a natural born citizen, provided the Court with sufficient information for it to decide the question of whether Virginia Minor was a citizen.
The Court finally held that “all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens,” meaning that all children who were natural born citizens were citizens. Accepting both that rule to be true and that Virginia Minor satisfied that rule was sufficient for the Court to hold that she was a citizen. It simply was not necessary for the Court to explore any other avenues by which Virginia Minor could be a citizen. Indeed, she was a natural born citizen which without any doubt ipso facto made her a citizen and that is all she had to be in order for her to have standing to make her Fourteenth Amendment argument that as a citizen of the United States, she had a privilege or immunity that created a constitutional right to vote which the State of Missouri could not abridge by making or enforcing any law against her. The Court in the end held that citizenship did not constitutionally give one the right to vote and so Missouri could through its laws decide that it would not allow women to vote. But the Court's ultimate holding regarding a woman’s right to vote has absolutely no bearing on the court’s ratio decidendi that it applied to defining the citizens and the natural born citizens, an analysis which makes its definition of a natural born citizen binding precedent.
So Minor confirmed the Framers’ definition of a natural born citizen. It also left open the question of whether a child born in the United States to alien parents could be a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the Court demonstrated that there was only one way to become a natural born citizen which was to be born in the country to parents who were its citizens. But it also explained that there were different avenues by which one could become a citizen. It explained that one way was for a person to satisfy the naturalization Acts of Congress. Another way was to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment which it chose not to analyze and left to be done another day.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) answered in 1898 the Fourteenth Amendment question regarding birth in the United States to alien parents which Minor left open in 1875. It is the seminal case for interpreting and applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause, which establishes thereunder who may be a “citizen” of the United States from the moment of birth, to persons who are born in the United States, but who do not satisfy Minor’s common law definition of a natural born citizen. Wong Kim Ark thoroughly analyzed the question of who was included as a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment and it showed that people like Wong, born in the United States to alien parents who were legally domiciled and permanently residing in the United States and neither foreign diplomats nor military invaders, were citizens of the United States from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, but they could not be natural born citizens by virtue of the common law which Minor explained defined a natural born citizen.
Wong Kim Ark explained that “[t]he Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the words "citizen of the United States," and "natural-born citizen of the United States" and that “[t]he Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except insofar as this is done by the affirmative declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." Id. at 654. Hence, Wong Kim Ark also confirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not define a natural born citizen. The Court then explained that “[i]n this as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465. The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common law. Kent Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274.” Id. at 654. Hence, Wong Kim Ark, like Minor, explained that the Court could use the common law to interpret the Constitution, Article II in Minor and the Fourteenth Amendment in Wong Kim Ark.
While it acknowledged Minor’s definition of a natural born citizen and the common law it relied upon to arrive at that definition, in rendering its decision it did not rely upon American national common law, but rather on colonial English common law. It did not rely on the former because it was not defining an Article II natural born citizen, but rather a different clause of the Constitution, as amended, the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, Wong Kim Ark said that it was not constrained by any rule of “international law” or the municipal laws of any foreign nation in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it resorted to looking to and using colonial English common law as an aid to construing the Fourteenth Amendment’s “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” clause. It found that under the English common law, a child born in the King’s dominion to alien parents who were neither foreign diplomats nor military invaders were born subject to his jurisdiction and entitled to his protection, and therefore English natural-born subjects. It found that this rule had been continued in the new free and independent states after the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, by the states selectively adopting the English common law through their constitutions and reception statutes. By the force of that state practice, it ruled by analogy that a child born in the United States to alien parents who were permanently domiciled and resident in the United States and neither foreign diplomats nor military invaders was born in the United States and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Hence, that child was a “citizen” of the United States from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on the English common law’s exceptions to being born in the King’s dominion and within the jurisdiction of the King, it also explained that any child born in the United States to foreign diplomats or military invaders would not be born subject to its jurisdiction and therefore not a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment.
So Wong Kim Ark resolved the question of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” clause, as applied to children born in the United States to alien parents, by resort to the colonial English common law, which under its notion of broad allegiance, treated non-diplomatic and friendly aliens present in the King’s dominions as his subjects. It used the colonial English common law to interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” clause, not the meaning of an Article II natural born citizen. In conducting its jurisdiction analysis, it did not reinterpret the natural born citizen clause under the English common law, for Minor had already demonstrated that its definition was to be found in American common law. In fact, no U.S. Supreme Court that ever provided the definition of a natural born citizen relied upon any jurisdiction analysis when defining a natural born citizen. Actually, Wong Kim Ark recognized that a natural born citizen was a different type of citizen than a citizen of the United States at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.” Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 (1758) (1797). “At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Minor 88 U.S. at 167. “The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 665 (citing and quoting Horace Binney, “Alienigenae of the United States,” 22, note (2nd ed. Philadelphia, December 1, 1853). As we can see, both Vattel and Minor said a natural born citizen was a child born in the country to parents who were its citizens. Justice Gray in Wong Kim Ark agreed.
Another crucial point needs to be addressed. What did Vattel and Minor mean when they said “children” and “parents” as in all “children” born in the country to citizen “parents” were natural born citizens? Under the law of nations and at common law, children meant legitimate children. Hence, using the term children suggested that the father and mother were married or at least that the child was legitimated at some point. Under the law of nations and at common law, “parents” could only mean father and mother. In fact, Vattel throughout The Law of Nations, when referring to parents, spoke about a child’s father and mother. Under the common law doctrine of coverture, a wife upon marriage (femes covert) become one with her husband. She acquired the citizenship and allegiance of her husband, whether her husband was a citizen or an alien. At the Founding and until the passage of the Cable Act in 1922 (ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021), there was no such thing as a husband having one citizenship and the wife having another. This father and mother interpretation of Vattel has been confirmed by our U.S. Supreme Court which has always interpreted Vattel’s “parents” to mean both father and mother. In their concurring opinions, Chief Justice John Marshall in The Venus (1814) and Justice Daniel in Dred Scott did just that. Minor provided a scenario where the child’s parents were both either citizens or both aliens. The same occurred in Wong Kim Ark, where the Court explained that a child born in the country to an alien parent is as much a “citizen” as the natural born child born in the country to a citizen parent. This statement can have sense only if both parents are either aliens or citizens. So, both Minor and Wong Kim Ark provided scenarios wherein the child’s parents are both either citizens or both aliens. See also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 3 NY Leg. Obs. 236 (1844) (confirms the same scenario when it said: “it is insisted that the national rule is that of the public law, by which a child follows the status of its parents (emphasis in the original);” “Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents . . .;” and “every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents”); Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct.App. 2009) (stating in footnote 12 “that the Court in Minor contemplates only scenarios where both parents are either citizens or aliens, rather in the case of President Obama, whose mother was a U.S. citizen and father was a citizen of the United Kingdom”). This reasoning followed from our nation adopting the common law doctrine of coverture that the wife acquired the citizenship of her husband. Hence, the word “parents” in both Vattel’s and Minor’s definition of a natural born citizen could not mean that one parent had one citizenship and another had a different one; it could only mean father and mother who had the same citizenship at the time of the child’s birth. This law of nations and common law rule regarding parents having the same nationality is reflected in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Article 2 provides: “A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State,” in effect providing that a foundling is to be treated and considered as though she satisfies the definition of a natural born citizen under the law of nations. Hence, the common public understanding of “parents” at the time the Constitution was adopted and ratified was that parents meant father and mother, with the spouses acquiring the citizenship of the husband, and children meant legitimate children of those parents. So, at the time of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, legitimate children were born either to two citizen parents or to two alien parents. Under the ancient maxim partus sequitur patrem (children follow the condition of their parents), those children inherited the citizenship and allegiance of their parents.
Finally, other convincing evidence demonstrating that the Framers defined a natural born citizen as a child born in the country to citizens parents are the Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1804. The only children Congress did not seek to reach with its naturalization powers in these Acts were children born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents. There was no constitutional basis for Congress to do that, for these children were the natural born citizens. What is also most telling is that in these naturalization Acts, Congress treated children born in the United States to alien parents as aliens and in need of naturalization. This Congressional naturalization rule was not changed until after the U.S. Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark held that children born in the United States to qualifying alien parents were citizens of the United States from the moment of birth.
What this historical and legal evidence (not meant to be exhaustive) shows is that there is only one definition of a natural born citizen. That definition is a child born in a county to parents (father and mother) who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth. But there can be different definitions of a citizen. Those other definitions exist under the Fourteenth Amendment, naturalization Acts of Congress, and treaties, all positive laws. We can argue, for whatever reasons, about what those other definitions of being a citizen should be under those particular positive laws. But whatever we agree or disagree on with respect to a citizen under those laws, none of that changes or can change the Framers’ original common law definition of a natural born citizen which under the Constitution is a child born or reputed born in the United States to parents, meaning a married father and mother, who were U.S. citizens at the time of the child’s birth. The Framers adopted this definition of a natural born citizen into the Constitution. As such, it is the supreme law of the land and cannot be changed unless done so by a duly ratified constitutional amendment.
Even if today we were to relax the requirement of parents having to be married due to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection requirements, we would still be left with the requirement that the father and mother be both U.S. citizens at the time of the birth of their child in the United States. Finally, the Cable Act of 1922, which for the first time gave to women the right to have a separate citizenship and allegiance from that of their husbands, did no more than that; it did not nor could it amend the definition of a natural born citizen which required that both parents be U.S. citizens at the time of their child’s birth in the United States.
For sure, the United States would never deny its protection to a natural born citizen, for no other foreign nation can make any legitimate claim based on its sovereign authority to that person’s citizenship and allegiance based on either jus sanguinis or jus soli, for under the American national common law’s definition of a natural born citizen, i.e., a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth, both right of blood and right of soil merge into the child at the moment of birth to create a unity of citizenship and allegiance in the child at the time of birth. Hence, that child is born with allegiance only to the United States and to no other nation. Simply stated, all the nations of the world recognize that person to be only a citizen of the United States and of no other nation. The Framers commanded that future Presidents and Commanders be born with sole allegiance to the United States. In contrast, citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment and naturalization Acts of Congress, who do not meet the definition of a natural born citizen, while born with allegiance to the United States, are also born with citizenship and allegiance to some foreign nation, under the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship in and allegiance to the foreign nation of one or both alien parents, and under a naturalization Act of Congress, citizenship in and allegiance to the foreign nation in which born and/or of an alien parent. These citizens “at birth” are made citizens at birth only by operation of law, the Fourteenth Amendment or Act of Congress, and not by universal principles of natural law and the law of nations, recognized and adopted by American national common law.
It is treason upon the Constitution and the Framers’ command that for the sake of the national security of the republic, for persons born after the adoption of the Constitution, no person except a natural born citizen is to be eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military, to interpret the natural born citizen clause out of the Constitution and replace it with how we may today define under the positive laws of the Fourteenth Amendment or naturalization Acts of Congress a citizen of the United States at birth, a person who, if not also a natural born citizen, is not born with sole allegiance to the United States.
With these principles to guide us, we can only conclude that de facto President Barack Obama, Senator Ted Cruz, Senator Marco Rubio, and Governor Bobby Jindal are all not natural born citizens. None of them were born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of their children’s birth.
Obama, assuming he was born in the United States, is a citizen of the United States at birth, but only by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. He is not and cannot be a natural born citizen under the common law because while he was presumably born in the United States to a U.S. citizen mother, he was born to a non-U.S. citizen father.
Cruz was born in Canada, presumably to a U.S. citizen mother and a non-U.S. citizen father. He can be a citizen of the United States at birth, but only by virtue of a naturalization Act of Congress (section 301(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952). He is not and cannot be a natural born citizen under the common law because, while he was born to a U.S. citizen mother, he was not born in the United States and he was born to a non-U.S. citizen father.
Rubio and Jindal were born in the United States to two non-U.S. citizen parents. They are both citizens of the United States at birth, but only by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. They are not and cannot be natural born citizens under the common law because, while they were born in the United States, they were born to two non-U.S. citizen parents.
Endnote 1: The concept of "positive law" has existed since the beginning of ordered legal systems. Positive law includes constitutions, statutes, case law, and any other law adopted by whatever sovereign has power to make law at any given moment in time. It has been said by many political and legal philosophers throughout the ages that positive law has its origin in what man perceives to be natural law and God's law, or what Thomas Jefferson in The Declaration of Independence called “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” meaning the laws of nature and the laws of nature's God.

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