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The laws of all 50 states recognize the right to use armed force for self-defense. The U.S. Constitution and 44 state constitutions protect the right to use arms for self-defense.
Of NRA’s 120,000 Certified Firearm Instructors, 79,000 are certified to teach our basic handgun course.
Ironically, though the Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right to keep and bear arms from infringement by the federal government, the states were the first to impose gun control, particularly handgun control.
In the early and mid-1800s, a number of states prohibited the carrying, or the concealed carrying of pistols and various edged weapons. Contrary to gun control supporters’ claim that courts never considered the Second Amendment to protect an individual right until the Supreme Court did so in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), courts clearly did so in cases challenging some of these early laws, in advance of the Supreme Court doing so in the late 1800s in other cases.
In 1911, New York passed the Sullivan Law, which to this day requires a person to obtain a license, issued at the discretion of police officials, to possess a handgun. The law was aimed at preventing handgun ownership by Italians and Irish immigrants of the period, then considered untrustworthy by New York legislators with different bloodlines.
The National Firearms Act (1934), as originally proposed, would have required registration of handguns. As passed, the law imposed that requirement on only fully-automatic firearms, short-barreled shotguns and rifles, and “silencers.” While consideration had been given to banning fully-automatic firearms altogether, President Roosevelt’s Justice Department believed a ban would have violated the Second Amendment.
The Gun Control Act was not the first attempt to prevent Blacks from having guns in this part of the world. The French Black Code (1751) required Louisiana colonists to stop and, “if necessary,” beat “any black carrying any potential weapon.” After Nat Turner’s rebellion in 1831, the Virginia legislature made it illegal for free blacks “to keep or carry any firelock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead.” In 1834, Tennessee revised Article XI, Section 26 of its constitution to read, “That the free white men of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense,” inserting the words “free white men” to replace “freemen,” whose rights were protected when the constitution was ratified in 1796.
After ratification of the 14th Amendment (1868) and enactment of the Civil Rights Act (1875), several states responded by passing laws which on their face were race-neutral, but which in effect were not. Among these laws, the forerunners of so-called “Saturday Night Special” legislation, was Tennessee’s “Army and Navy” law (1879), which prohibited the sale of any “belt or pocket pistols, or revolvers, or any other kind of pistols, except army or navy pistol” models, among the most expensive, and largest, handguns of the day. The law thus prohibited small two-shot derringers and low-caliber rimfire revolvers, the handguns that most Blacks could afford.
Conspicuously, the race-oriented history of many federal and state gun control laws has escaped the attention of many in the civil rights community. Legal scholars Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, both African-American, have written, “The history of blacks, firearms regulations, and the right to bear arms should cause us to ask new questions regarding the Second Amendment. . . . Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern realization of what the framers of the Second Amendment understood: that it is unwise to place the means of protection totally in the hands of the state, and that self-defense is also a civil right.
As expected, following imposition of the federal “assault weapons ban” in 1994, gun control supporters refocused their efforts on handguns. In the 104th Congress, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) introduced her “Junk Gun Violence Protection Act,” modified and reintroduced in the 105th Congress as the “American Handgun Standards Act,” and again introduced in the 106th Congress. The bills proposed to prohibit the manufacture, in the U.S., of any handgun that the ATF considered ineligible for importation under 18 U.S.C. 925(d)(3). By regulations adopted by the ATF, a handgun is ineligible for importation if it fails requirements related to length, weight, caliber and other features, called the Handgun Factoring Criteria.
Sen. Boxer claimed her bill would prohibit “Junk Guns—also called Saturday Night Specials,” but it would have prohibited many expensive handguns on the basis of their size. Other bills or laws have defined “Saturday Night Specials” on the basis of the melting point of the metals used in a handgun’s construction, or on the basis of a variety of a handgun’s attributes. During the late 1990s, several California municipalities defied the state’s local ordinance preemption law by imposing their own “Saturday Night Special” laws. Concurrently, anti-gun groups and politicians launched campaigns for mandatory inclusion of trigger locks with all handguns sold, or for a ban on the sale of any handgun not possessing an integral “personalized” safety mechanism, and for lawsuits against manufacturers of handguns, alleging them liable for injuries inflicted by criminals using handguns.
By the early 1990s, the Brady Campaign claimed to no longer be interested in a handgun ban, but its efforts have remained consistent with the three-part handgun ban strategy the group laid out in the 1970s. In the 1980s, when the group was known Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI), it filed a brief in support of Morton Grove, Illinois,’ handgun ban. Following passage of the Brady bill in 1993, which initially imposed a background check on handgun purchasers in states not having a comparable requirement of their own (allowing law enforcement agencies a maximum of five days to complete a check), HCI referred to the measure as “the cornerstone of our national gun policy” and announced a campaign for gun registration and a host of other onerous measures later incorporated into a so-called “Brady II” bill, introduced by the sponsor of the 1993 “Brady bill,” then-Rep. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).
After Instant Check replaced the Brady Act’s waiting period restriction on Nov. 30, 1998, HCI, which had previously called for a waiting period on retail sales of handguns, began calling for a waiting period on all firearm transfers, retail and private, handguns and long guns—a measure that could be enforced only if a universal gun registration law were also imposed. HCI’s talking point was, and remains, “[w]e need to close the gun show loophole.” There is no gun show “loophole,” of course, since laws regulating sales of firearms apply at gun shows just as they apply anywhere else, and federal law expressly permits people to sell guns from their personal collections without having to obtain a federal firearm dealer’s license, which today costs $200. The Brady Campaign also filed a brief in Heller, in support of D.C.’s handgun ban.
Other activists make no attempt to conceal their wish that handguns be banned. On Jan. 20, 1999, VPC advocated subjecting firearms to consumer product regulations to be enforced by ATF and said, “we believe that ultimately handguns would be phased out through such an agency.” The late Marvin Wolfgang, a prominent anti-gun criminologist, wrote in 1995 that, if possible, he would “eliminate all guns from the civilian population and maybe even from the police.” U.S. Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy, while expressing support for legislation to impose a mandatory waiting period on all retail and private firearm transfers, said he favored an outright ban on handguns, but doubts that Americans would support such a measure. In 1993, the founder of the now-defunct HELP (Handgun Epidemic Lowering Plan) Network, a group composed largely of anti-gun activists in the public health field, stated that the group’s purpose was to “work toward changing society’s attitude toward guns so that it becomes socially unacceptable for private citizens to have handguns.” Apparently, the group failed. Gallup reports that support for banning handguns has dropped from 60 percent in 1959 to 27 percent in 2011.
Washington, D.C.—During the 1960s, D.C. began requiring police approval to buy a handgun and imposed handgun registration. A law prohibiting the possession of handguns not previously registered with the police took effect in Feb. 1977. Even handguns that remained legal to possess could not realistically be legally used for protection, even at home, since it was illegal to possess a loaded firearm at home. This, in a city where “official police personnel and the government employing them are not generally liable to victims of criminal acts for failure to provide adequate police protection . . . (there is) no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citizen.” Attorney Stephen Halbrook, who has successfully argued firearm law issues before the Supreme Court, described D.C. gun laws as a “badge of slavery” that treats District residents as “second class citizens” in violation of the 14th Amendment and civil rights legislation adopted by Congress since the Civil War.
From 1974-1976, before the ban took effect, D.C.’s murder rate dropped 30%. Anti-gun activists claimed that murders declined after the ban, but while the annual number of murders decreased, the city’s per capita murder rate increased due to a decrease in D.C.’s population. The rate increased gradually after the ban, dropped sharply after enactment in 1982 of an NRA-backed mandatory penalty for using a gun during a violent crime, rose as the penalty fell into disuse, then rose sharply with the advent of “crack” cocaine gangs. Overall, between 1976 and 1991, D.C.’s homicide rate tripled. In 1993, 1994 and 1995, all but four of the city’s 1,027 firearm-related murders were committed with handguns. D.C.’s murder rate began decreasing in the 1990s, when crime began decreasing nationally. The city’s handgun ban and its ban on having any firearm loaded at home were struck down by the Supreme Court in Heller.
Chicago—Chicago imposed a handgun registration requirement in 1968, with no effect on the city’s rising handgun homicide numbers. After peaking in 1974, Chicago homicides declined until the 1980s. In April 1982, a law prohibiting possession of handguns not previously registered with the police was imposed. Annual handgun homicide numbers and percentages of total homicides fluctuated, then rose sharply.
On October 19, 1984, in a 4-to-3 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld Morton Grove’s ban as within its “police powers.” Prior to the ban, there were an estimated 3,000 privately owned handguns in Morton Grove. Compliance with the law was slight, with fewer than 20 handguns turned in or seized by police after the law took effect. Survey research by Professor Paul Lavrakas of Northwestern University indicated that 80% or more of Morton Grove households (2,400+) still had handguns two years after the law’s enactment. Most people who turned in handguns were much older than the 15- to 30-year-old age group disproportionately responsible for firearm-related crime. The average person turning in a handgun was 63 years old; the mean age, 67. One handgun came from someone under age 40, two from people under age 50; three from people 70 years old or older. Crime rates remained low after the ban, except for a short-term increase in burglary. Morton Grove rescinded its ban following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller.
Oak Park, Illinois—Despite stable or declining violent crime and burglary trends in other Chicago suburbs, rates of those crimes increased sharply in Oak Park between 1977 (when the village banned handgun sales) and 1984. In 1984, Oak Park banned private possession of handguns altogether, prompting a citizens’ movement to repeal the ordinance. When challenged by a reporter about Oak Park’s increase in burglaries after banning possession of handguns, the village’s president could respond with only a personal attack, accusing the journalist of trying to “insist on the gun nut (the mayor of Kennesaw, Ga., which responded to Oak Park’s ban by singing an ordinance requiring handgun ownership his town) being right.” Oak Park’s ban was struck down by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago (2010).
Evanston, Illinois—Evanston banned handguns in 1982. In 1983, Evanston’s robbery rate rose 8%, while nationwide suburban areas experienced a 20% decline, and the U.S. rate declined 16%. Evanston rescinded its ban following the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller.
Wisconsin—Despite media predictions of a landslide victory by anti-gun activists, voters in Madison rejected a non-binding handgun ban referendum in April 1993, by 51%-49%. On November 8, 1994, Milwaukee voters rejected a binding handgun ban proposal by 67%-33%, and Kenosha voters defeated one 73%-27%. A non-binding handgun ban referendum in Shorewood passed by 576 votes. In 1998, Wisconsin voters approved, by a margin of 3-to-1, an amendment to their state constitution protecting the right to arms “for security, defense,” and other purposes.
 In U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876), the Court recognized that the right to arms is a fundamental, individual right, saying, “The right there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose.’ This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers the national government.” In Presser v. Illinois (1886), the Court upheld a law prohibiting private groups of people marching armed in a parade without license of the governor. However, the Court observed, “It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.” In Miller v. Texas (1896) the Court ruled, as it had in Cruikshank and Presser, that the Second Amendment restricts infringement of the right to arms by Congress, but not by the states. In each of these cases, if the Court had believed that the Second Amendment did not protect an individual right, but instead protected a “right” of a state to maintain a militia or that of a person to bear arms while on duty in a state militia, it would have rejected the pleadings of the plaintiffs in Cruikshank, and the defendants in Presser and Miller, as lacking standing before the Court on the grounds that they were neither states nor members of a militia. See Dave Kopel, The Second Amendment Before the Supreme Court, Independence Institute, 2014.
 Robert Sherrill, The Saturday Night Special, New York: Charterhouse, 1973, pp. 280-283.
 B. Bruce-Briggs “The Great American Gun War,” The Public Interest, Fall 1976, p. 50.
 Clayton E. Cramer, “The Racist Roots of Gun Control,” Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Winter 1995.
 Don B. Kates, Jr., “Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States,” Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Skeptics Speak Out, Don B. Kates, Jr., Ed., North River Press, Inc, 1979.
 “The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration,” Gun Control and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Second Amendment, ed., Robert J. Cottrol, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Law, 1994, N.Y.: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 427.
 Pete Shields, “In His Own Words,” People Weekly, October 20, 1975.
 Shields, quoted in Richard Harris, “A Reporter at Large,” The New Yorker, July 26, 1976.
 Nelson “Pete” Shields, Guns Don’t Die, People Do, p. 126.
 New Right Watch and the Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence, “Assault Weapons in America,” Conclusions, pp. 26-27.
 “Tom Morgenthau, “Why Not Real Gun Control?,” Newsweek, October 11, 1993, p. 34.
 HCI Chair, Sarah Brady, quoted by the Associated Press, January 4, 1999.
 Tom Diaz, on “Fresh Air,” National Public Radio.
 Wolfgang, “A Tribute to a View That I Have Opposed,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Fall 1995, pp. 188-192.
 Ariel Sabar, “Kennedy joins effort to pass gun-control measures,” The Providence Journal, January 4, 1999.
 HELP founder Dr. Katherine K. Christoffel, August 28, 1993, letter to Dr. Edgar Suter, of Doctors for Integrity in Research and Public Policy.
 A 1998 national survey of voters by Lawrence Research found that by an 8:1 margin, Americans believe you have the right to use a handgun to defend yourself in your own home. By a 3:1 margin, they believe that to fight crime, getting tough with criminals is more effective than banning guns. A U.S. News & World Report poll published 5/22/95, found that 75% of Americans believe “the Constitution guarantees you the right to own a gun;” 18% disagreed. On 1/24/94, NBC TV News asked viewers “Should handguns be banned?” By 80%-20%, respondents said “no.” A June 1993 Luntz-Weber Strategic Services poll found that only 21% believe “all guns should be outlawed,” only 9% believe restricting firearms is “the single most important thing that can be done to reduce violent crime,” and only 8% believe guns are “the most important cause of violent crime.” The public favored mandatory prison for criminals, over “gun control,” 70%-25%. Polls claiming that the public supports additional restrictions on firearms generally have been commissioned by anti-gun groups or conducted by firms with histories of support for their activities, and often occur after a major media blitz castigating firearms.
 Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d1 1, D.C. App. 1981.
 Halbrook, “Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia,” George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal, Summer 1995.
 Colin Loftin, et al., “Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 325:1615-1620, 1991.
 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, N.D. Ill.
 Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 113 Ill. App.3d 488.
 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261.
 Dishonestly, anti-gun groups continued to falsely claim that NRA was afraid to press for the Supreme Court to rule in a Second Amendment case. However, that claim came to an abrupt halt after the Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) that the Second Amendment protects a fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms. Thereafter, gun control supporters conceived a brand new, false claim, that in declaring the amendment to protect an individual right, Heller reversed previous Supreme Court rulings, discussed in note 5, above. Heller was novel only in that it was the first case in U.S. history in which the Court was asked to rule on specifically whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms.
A ban on handguns for Canada?
The federal government plans to study a full ban on handguns and assault weapons in Canada.
Canada: Montreal city council votes to demand Ottawa ban handguns, "assault weapons"

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Under Par. 20, of § 24, of the Judicial Code, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of a suit against the United States for refund of money paid for documentary stamps affixed to charter parties under § 25 of the War Revenue Act of 1898 and the district court of the proper district has concurrent jurisdiction of claims of that nature not exceeding ten thousand dollars.
Under the various refunding statutes, culminating in the Act of July 27, 1912, c. 256, 37 Stat. 240, such claims are founded upon a law of Congress within the meaning of the Tucker Act as now incorporated in the Judicial Code.
Although the pendency of one class of claims may have induced the passage of an act of Congress providing for their adjustment, the act may embrace other claims if its terms are sufficiently wide so to do.
While, under § 297 of the Judicial Code, § 5 of the Tucker Act was saved from repeal and the district court having jurisdiction of a claim against the United States is the one of the district in which the plaintiff resides, that requirement may be waived, and if no specific objection is taken before pleading to the merits, it will be deemed to have been waived, and if the district court otherwise has jurisdiction, the case may proceed.
documentary stamps was not essential to recovery. Right to repayment exists if the record shows that the sums sought to be recovered were not legally payable and the claim was duly presented within the time prescribed.
The constitutional freedom from taxation on imports assured by § 9, Art. I, of the federal Constitution means more than mere exemption from taxes specifically laid upon the goods themselves. It means that the process of exportation shall not be obstructed by any burden of taxation.
Where a charter party is practically a bill of lading for the entire cargo of the vessel, and is essential to the business of exportation in shipload lots, a tax on the charter party is, in substance, a tax on exportation and, as such, a tax on the exports, and, if on charter parties of vessels exclusively for foreign ports, is invalid under § 9, Art. I, of the federal Constitution.
There is a distinction between tonnage taxes, as laid by the federal government, and export taxes, and the fact that Congress has power to lay a tonnage tax on entry does not authorize it to lay taxes on exportation which practically amount to taxes on the exports themselves.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the district court awarding a recovery against the United States for the amount paid as stamp taxes upon certain charter parties under § 25 of the War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 448, 460, Comp.Stat. 1913, § 6144. These charter parties were exclusively for the carriage of cargo from ports in the states of the United States to foreign ports, and the imposition of the taxes was held to be in violation of § 9, Article I. of the Constitution of the United States, which provides: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
"That all claims for the refunding of any internal tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected under the provisions of § twenty-nine of the Act of Congress approved June thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, known as the War-Revenue Tax, or of any sums alleged to have been excessive, or in any manner wrongfully collected under the provisions of said Act may be presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on or before the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, and not thereafter."
claims, and shall establish such erroneous or illegal assessment and collection, any sums paid by them or on their account or in their interest to the United States under the provisions of the Act aforesaid."
The government demurred to the petition upon the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant, or of the subject of the action, and that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled (217 F. 680), and, after answer, the case was heard on the merits. The court found in substance that the firm, of which the defendants in error were the surviving members, had paid without protest certain stamp taxes on charter parties of the character described; that, on filing their claim under the Act of 1912, it had been certified by the collector to be correct in its statement of facts, but that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had rejected it for the reason that the act was not applicable. Holding the taxes to be unconstitutional, and the claim to have been duly presented, the court rendered judgment for the claimants.
1902, various provisions of the War Revenue act, and amendments thereof, including §§ 6, 12, 25, schedules A and B, with regard to stamp taxes, and § 29 as to taxes on legacies and distributive shares, were repealed. Act of April 12, 1902, c. 500, 32 Stat. 96, 97. The repealing act was to take effect on July 1, 1902, and, shortly before that date, Congress made specific provision that certain taxes collected under the repealed statute should be refunded. Act of June 27, 1902, c. 1160, 32 Stat. 406. These taxes were (1) those that had been paid upon bequests for uses of a religious, literary, charitable, or educational character, etc.; (2) the "sums paid for documentary stamps used on export bills of lading, such stamps representing taxes which were illegally assessed and collected;" and (3) taxes theretofore or thereafter paid upon legacies or distributive shares to the extent that they were collected "on contingent beneficial interests" which had not become vested prior to July 1, 1902. It was also provided that no tax should thereafter be assessed under the act in respect of any such interest which had not become "absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment" prior to the date mentioned.
"against the value of products or merchandise actually exported to foreign countries, such stamps representing taxes which were illegally assessed and collected, said refund to be made whether said stamp taxes were paid under protest or duress or not."
Act of February 1, 1909, c. 53, 35 Stat. 590; see also Acts of August 5, 1909, c. 7, 36 Stat. 120; June 25, 1910, c. 385, 36 Stat. 779; August 26, 1912, c. 408, 37 Stat. 626.
as to all claims described in the Act of 1912, and in this view we are not concerned in the present case with questions arising under the general provisions of the internal revenue laws.
It is urged by the government that Congress intended to limit the Act of 1912 to the refunding of death duties erroneously or illegally assessed under § 29 of the War Revenue act. Reference is made to the legislative history of the statute, but the contention lacks adequate support. See House Reports, 62d Cong.2d Sess., Report No. 848, June 6, 1912. While the pendency of claims for the refunding of such taxes may have induced the passage of the act, its terms were not confined to these. On the contrary, after providing for the claims arising under § 29, Congress added the further clause making express provision for the presentation of claims for the refunding "of any sums alleged to have been excessive, or in any manner wrongfully collected under the provisions of said act;" and the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to pay to those who duly present their claims and establish the erroneous or illegal collection "any sums paid by them . . . to the United States under the provisions of the act aforesaid." We are not at liberty to read these explicit clauses out of the statute.
made in the court below. The general language of the demurrer with respect to jurisdiction had appropriate reference to the general authority of the court to entertain such a suit against the United States and to the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. But assuming that the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the court, the requirement as to the particular district within which the suit should be brought was but a modal and formal one, which could be waived, and must be deemed to be waived in the absence of specific objection upon this ground before pleading to the merits. St. Louis &c. Ry. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 141 U. S. 131; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 151 U. S. 133; Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 151 U. S. 673, 151 U. S. 688; Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 160 U. S. 220; Western Loan Co. v. Butte & Boston Mining Co., 210 U. S. 368; Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark, 235 U. S. 669, 235 U. S. 674.
repayment was established by the express terms of the statute.
The question, then, is whether the tax, so far as it was laid upon charter parties which were exclusively for the carriage of cargo from state ports to foreign ports, was a valid one. The constitutional provision that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state" has been the subject of elaborate and authoritative exposition, and we need but to apply the principles of construction which have been settled by previous decisions.
"the process of exporting the products of a state, the goods, chattels, and property of the people of the several states should not be obstructed or hindered by any burden of taxation."
from any state. There is some diversity in language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited. The United States have the same right to tax occupations which is possessed by the states. Now suppose the United States should require every exporter to take out a license, for which he should pay such tax as Congress might think proper to impose; would government be permitted to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the Constitution would expose it by saying that this was a tax on the person, not on the article, and that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?"
Id., pp. 25 U. S. 444-445. And in Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, applying the same principle, the Court said, by Chief Justice Taney, that "a tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in form from a duty on the article shipped," was "in substance the same thing," for "a bill of lading, or some written instrument of the same import" was "necessarily always associated with every shipment of articles of commerce from the ports of one country to those of another." There, as was pointed out in Woodruff v. Parham, supra, shipments to foreign ports were not in fact involved, but this did not detract from the force of the statement so far as it concerns the effect of the tax described.
"that it was one of the compromises which entered into and made possible the adoption of the Constitution. It is a restriction on the power of Congress, and as, in accordance with the rules heretofore noticed, the grants of powers should be so construed as to give full efficacy to those powers, and enable Congress to use such means as it deems necessary to carry them into effect, so in like manner a restriction should be enforced in accordance with its letter and spirit, and no legislation can be tolerated which, although it may not conflict with the letter, destroys the spirit and purpose of the restriction imposed."
"If mere discrimination between the states was all that was contemplated, it would seem to follow that an ad valorem tax upon all exports would not be obnoxious to this constitutional prohibition. But surely, under this limitation, Congress can impose an export tax neither on one article of export, nor on all articles of export. In other words, the purpose of the restriction is that exportation, all exportation, shall be free from national burden."
to be unavailing in view of the clear meaning and scope of the constitutional provision.
Following this decision, it was held by the district court that the stamp tax on manifests of cargoes for foreign ports was invalid. These manifests were essential to the exportation. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 125 F. 320. And while the case was determined in this Court upon another ground, the correctness of this ruling as to the invalidity of the tax was conceded by the United States. 200 U. S. 200 U.S. 488, 200 U. S. 491.
described voyages on which "cargoes of goods were to be, and were in fact carried" to the places mentioned.
Instead of a contract for the carriage of a particular lot of goods occupying less than the entire cargo space, as in the case of an ordinary bill of lading, the charter party was a contract for the carriage of a full cargo lot. In legal principle, there is no distinction which can condemn the tax in the one case and save it in the other. Whether the contract of carriage covers a small lot, or a partial cargo, or an entire cargo, whether the goods occupy a part of the cargo space or the whole cargo space, can make no constitutional difference. The charters were for the exportation; they related to it exclusively; they served no other purpose. A tax on these charter parties was in substance a tax on the exportation, and a tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.
applied to the charter parties here in question was nothing else than a tax on exportation, and to this extent was, in any event, invalid. The same principle governs that has constantly been held to obtain in cases where it has been sought to give effect to taxes upon interstate commerce under general legislation of the states. In Robbins v. Shelby County, supra, it was strongly urged, "as if it were a material point in the case," that no discrimination was made "between domestic and foreign drummers," -- that is, between those of the state whose legislation was in question and those of other states; that all were taxed alike. But the court held that this did not meet the difficulty, inasmuch as interstate commerce could not "be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce." This had been decided, as the Court pointed out, in the case of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, and it has become one of the commonplaces of constitutional law. See Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 153 U. S. 304; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 187 U. S. 629; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 203 U. S. 510; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389. We know of no ground upon which a different effect can be given to the explicit constitutional provision which denies to Congress the right to tax exportation from the states.


§ 476.70 - Statutory bases and applicability.
§ 476.71 - QIO review requirements.
§ 476.73 - Notification of QIO designation and implementation of review.
§ 476.74 - General requirements for the assumption of review.
§ 476.76 - Cooperation with health care facilities.
§ 476.78 - Responsibilities of providers and practitioners.
§ 476.82 - Continuation of functions not assumed by QIOs.
§ 476.83 - Initial denial determinations.
§ 476.84 - Changes as a result of DRG validation.
§ 476.85 - Conclusive effect of QIO initial denial determinations and changes as a result of DRG validations.
§ 476.86 - Correlation of Title XI functions with Title XVIII functions.
§ 476.88 - Examination of the operations and records of health care facilities and practitioners.
§ 476.90 - Lack of cooperation by a provider or practitioner.
§ 476.93 - Opportunity to discuss proposed initial denial determination and changes as a result of a DRG validation.
§ 476.94 - Notice of QIO initial denial determination and changes as a result of a DRG validation.
§ 476.96 - Review period and reopening of initial denial determinations and changes as a result of DRG validations.
§ 476.98 - Reviewer qualifications and participation.
§ 476.100 - Use of norms and criteria.
§ 476.102 - Involvement of health care practitioners other than physicians.
§ 476.104 - Coordination of activities.
§ 476.110 - Use of immediate advocacy to resolve oral beneficiary complaints.
§ 476.120 - Submission of written beneficiary complaints.
§ 476.130 - Beneficiary complaint review procedures.
§ 476.140 - Beneficiary complaint reconsideration procedures.
§ 476.150 - Abandoned complaints and reopening rights.
§ 476.160 - General quality of care review procedures.
§ 476.170 - General quality of care reconsideration procedures.


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Please click on the case name to open the decision.
Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1993).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Acosta, 612 So2d. 1361 (Fla. 1992).
Miller v. Nolte, 453 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1984).
Anthony v. Indian River County, 482 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Aristek Communities, Inc. v. Fuller, 453 So.2d 547 (Fla 4th DCA 1984).
Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Yadevia, 579 So.2d 213 (Fla 2d DCA 1991).
Autry v. Autry, 622 So.2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Brower v. Indian River County Code Enforcement Board, 1993 WL 228785 (Fla. Cir . Ct. 1993).
Brown v. Brown, 429 So.2d 846 (Fla 4th DCA 1983).
Burch v. State, 376 So.2d 289 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
C & M Braddick, Inc. v. Garnett, 621 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Capital Assurance Co. v. Margolis, 726 So.2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Carter v. State, 374 So.2d 1063 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
Copeland v. State, 543 So.2d 450 (Fla 4th DCA 1989).
Drayton v. State, 372 So.2d 983 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
Fields v. State, 379 So.2d 408 (Fla 3d DCA 1980).
Florida Atlantic Associates v. Belmont, 464 So.2d 659 (Fla 4th DCA 1985).
Florida Atlantic Associates v. Kivolowitz, 485 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Florida Atlantic Associates v. LaBar, 471 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Florida Atlantic Associates v. Malinoskie, 471 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Florida Atlantic Associates v. Simering, 471 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Fryc v. State, 377 So.2d 1013 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
G. J. E. v. State, 372 So.2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
J.J.’s Mae, Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 763 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Jefferson v. State, 367 So.2d 263 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
Koppenhoefer v. Roberts, 654 So.2d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
McGowan v. State, 366 So.2d 1240 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
Miller v. Nolte, 427 So.2d 248 (Fla 4th DCA 1983).
Olbek v. Kraut, 650 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
Perruzzi v. Ferretti, 564 So.2d 621 (Fla 4th DCA 1990).
Purdy v. Purdy, 450 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
R.G. Industries, Inc. v. Balsiger, 502 So.2d 1378 (Fla 4th DCA 1987).
Stitely v. State, 368 So.2d 937 (Fla 3d DCA 1979).
Thomas v. McKenzie, 718 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Vero Beach Shores, Inc. v. Nolte, 467 So.2d 1041 (Fla 4th DCA 1985).
Wells v. Sinna, 702 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Wharton v. Dubose, 458 So.2d 411 (Fla 4th DCA 1984).
Daniell v. Baker-Roos, Inc., 1990 WL 302693 (S.D.Fla., Jul 19, 1990).
Lancaster v. State of Florida, 832 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir 1987).
Perkins v. Windsor Hosp. Corp., 142 Vt. 305, 455 A.2d 810 (1982).
State v. Allen, 139 Vt. 303, 427 A.2d 373 (1981).

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JaPo Publishing s.r.o., třída Edvarda Beneše 1541/50, Nový Hradec Králové, 500 12 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic, Business ID No. 07640439, Tax ID No. CZ07640439, entered in the Register of the Regional Court at Hradec Králové, Section C, Insert 42775, is an operator of Internet sites as well as a seller and supplier of the articles specified on these websites. The company exercises copyrights to these Internet sites and products, as well as the appurtenances presented on these web sites under Act No. 121/2000 Coll., Copyright Act, as amended. All the provisions and legal regulations quoted in the „Business Terms“, are subject to the law of the Czech Republic. All and any disputes shall be resolved at competent and relevant courts of the Czech Republic.
To order articles using an Internet site, a Buyer shall provide his/her personal data. The Seller shall treat the provided data in compliance with Act No. 101/2000 Coll., On protection of personal data, as amended, in the scope required for entering into and performing a purchase agreement (order). The Buyer can lodge a claim at the relevant Office for Personal Data Protection in Prague (Czech Republic) should its rights be violated, and request a remedy.
Relationships between the Buyer and the Seller shall be governed by Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code, as amended (hereinafter the “Civil Code”).
These Business Terms stipulate the mutual rights and obligations of the Parties arising from or following from the Purchase Agreement (hereinafter the "Purchase Agreement”) entered into between the Seller and another physical or legal entity (hereinafter the “Buyer”) via the shopping web site of the Seller.
The shopping web site is operated by the Seller at the Internet address www.japo.eu.
The Business Terms shall not apply to situations when the Buyer, who is willing to purchase articles from the Seller, does so by ordering the articles as part of his/her entrepreneurial activities.
A consumer is any individual who, outside the framework of his/her entrepreneurial activities or beyond the framework of the independent performance of his/her profession, concludes an agreement with the Seller or acts with the Seller in another way.
Provisions that differ from the Business Terms can be agreed in the Purchase Agreement. Variant provisions in the Purchase Agreement shall take precedence over the provisions of the Business Terms.
The Buyer shall select articles exclusively using the websites of the Seller. The Buyer shall make itself acquainted in detail with the description of the articles to avoid any confusion in terms of the labelling, image congruence, which can only depict one type, but in more configurations. Should the Buyer not be sure about the configuration and type of articles, it should contact the Seller exclusively via a contact form on the website.
The shopping web site contains a list of articles offered for sale by the Seller, including the stated prices of individual articles offered for sale. Prices of the offered articles include value added tax and all related fees. The offer for the sale of articles and the prices for such articles remain in force for the period they are visible on the web interface of the online shopping site. This provision shall not limit the possibility of the Seller to enter into a Purchase Agreement under individually agreed conditions. No offers for the sale of articles placed on the web interface of the online shopping site are binding and the Seller is not obliged to enter into a Purchase Agreement regarding such articles. The web interface of the online shopping site also contains information on the costs associated with packing and delivering the articles.
To order articles, the Buyer shall fill in the order form on the shopping web site.
The Buyer shall order articles (enters into a Purchase Agreement with the Seller) by filling in the details and requisites specified in the order form. Once the order has been checked for completeness, it is confirmed. While processing the order, the Buyer uses the menu, in which he/she can change some items even retrospectively. If the Buyer agrees with all the details he/she has stated in the order form, he/she shall confirm the order, which is then sent for further processing. Details specified in the order are regarded as correct by the Seller. After receiving the order, the Seller shall promptly confirm its acceptance to the Buyer by electronic mail, to the address of the Buyer´s electronic mail specified in the user interface or the order (hereinafter the “Buyer´s electronic address”). By placing an order, the Buyer undertakes to withdraw the articles ordered in the order form.
The Seller reserves the right to verify or request additional details about the Buyer in specific cases.
A contractual relationship between the Seller and Buyer arises from acceptance of an order sent to the Buyer by the Seller by electronic mail to the Buyer´s electronic mail address.
Costs of the use of electronic means shall be governed by the agreement between the Buyer and the provider of his/her Internet connection. The Buyer consents to using remote use of communication means when entering into the Purchase Agreement. Costs incurred by the Buyer when using remote communication means in connection with entering into the purchase agreement (costs of the Internet connection, costs of telephone calls) shall be covered by the Buyer.
Subject to the character of the order, the quantity of articles, the price, transport costs , distance, etc., the Seller is at all times entitled to request that the Buyer authorise the order in an appropriate way, such as in writing or by telephone. An order shall be deemed invalid and the Purchase Agreement will lose its validity if the Buyer refuses to authorise the order in the required way.
The Seller also restricts the right to cancel an order in the event of a quite evident printing error concerning prices or descriptions of articles (the Buyer shall be informed by the Seller).
The Buyer acknowledges that the Seller is not obliged to enter into the Purchase Agreement, particularly with individuals who have violated the Purchase Agreement (including the Business Terms) in a gross manner.
Prices specified on the website are effective for the Buyer at the moment of placing an order.
The Prices shown on the website are for the Buyer.
An invoice issued upon an order (purchase agreement) between the Seller and the Buyer also serves as a tax document and a bill of delivery. The invoice is either part of the delivered articles or it can be sent by email upon agreement. In principle, the Buyer can accept the articles once it has paid for them. Details on price terms of the transport and postage charges are stated in „Order summary“ according to weight of articles and delivery address.
The Buyer shall pay the purchase price to the Seller as well as the costs associated with packing and delivering the articles. Unless otherwise stated, the purchase price shall be further understood as also containing the costs associated with delivery of articles.
For cashless payments, the Buyer shall cover the purchase price for articles while stating the variable symbol of the payment. The obligation of the Buyer to pay the purchase price by cashless payment is met at the moment the relevant amount is credited to the Seller's Account.
If the Buyer pays the price in advance and the Seller is not able to deliver the articles, the Seller shall promptly return the amount paid to the Buyer in the agreed way. The period will depend on the method of returning the payment.
Retention of title: The title to the delivered articles shall pass to the Buyer on the day the total price of the delivered articles, including appurtenances, such as the bank fee for any currency exchange, transport fee, packaging, etc., has been paid. The bank fees for any currency exchange shall be covered by the Buyer. The Buyer shall pay the price in the currency specified in the issued invoice.
The delivery period starts from the moment the specific amount has been credited to the Seller´s account. Should it be impossible to deliver the ordered articles by the specific deadline, the Seller shall inform the Buyer of this and it shall state the replacement date of delivery.
The delivery shall be carried out within 30 calendar days of the date the payment was received.
The Seller reserves the right to modify the prices with regards to the development of postal or transport charges.
The delivery method of the articles shall be specified by the Seller, unless otherwise stated in the Purchase Agreement. Should the delivery method be agreed upon a requirement of the Buyer, the risk and any additional costs connected with such method shall be borne by the Buyer.
If the articles have to be delivered repeatedly due to reasons on the Buyer's side, or using a method different to that specified in the order, the Buyer shall be obliged to pay the costs associated with repeated delivery of the articles, or the costs connected with the different method of delivery.
The Buyer shall duly accept the articles from the carrier, check the packaging integrity and inform the carrier itself without any delay should it establish any defects. Should the Buyer establish any damage of the original packaging of the articles or other damage to the packaging evidencing an illegal infringement of the consignment, it is recommended that the Buyer not accept the consignment in its own interest. If the Buyer accepts such a consignment, it shall fill in a damage form with the specific forwarding agent, signed by both parties. The Buyer shall claim the compensation from the forwarding agent. By signing the bill of delivery, the Buyer confirms that the consignment has met all the terms and appurtenances stated above. Later complaints about damaged consignment packaging will not be taken into account. The Seller bears no responsibility for any damage incurred by the forwarding agent or a third party.
A guarantee for the sold articles shall be provided by the Seller under the generally binding legal regulations of the Czech Republic. The guarantee period commences as of the day the Buyer accepts the articles from the Seller. The guarantee applies to manufacturing defects or other defects not incurred as a result of incompetent or inconsiderate handling, use of the product in conflict with its purpose or instructions for assembly, mechanical damage, natural disasters or as stipulated by law. Please note that the image on the packaging of the articles is informative only and does not need to fully comply with the contents of the delivered articles.
Complains can also be lodged via the email address: sales@japo.eu.
Faulty articles can be sent by mail, unless the Seller and the Buyer have agreed in advance by e-mail that the Seller shall see to sending the defective, missing or otherwise complained part of the article of the complained article to the Buyer without requesting to inspect the faulty article. Should the Buyer send the faulty item to the Seller, it shall append a legible original of the purchase document – the invoice with a detailed description of the defect of the faulty items. If the articles accepted by the Buyer do not comply with the purchase agreement, the Buyer shall have the right to have the item put into the condition corresponding to the purchase agreement by the Seller free of charge and without any delay, namely, either by replacing the items(s) or by completing it (them) subject to the Buyer´s requirement. If such procedure is impossible, the Buyer can request adequate suitable reduction in the price of the articles or it can withdraw from the agreement. This shall not apply to situations where the Buyer knew about the conflict before accepting the articles or if the conflict with the purchase agreement was caused by the Buyer itself.
Once the complaint has been accepted, the Buyer shall be informed of the most suitable form and details of the complaint procedure within 7 days. A record in writing on accepting the complaint and its settlement shall be made and sent to the email address of the Buyer. If the complaint is justified, the Buyer has the right to compensation for all cost purposefully incurred in connection with the enforced complaint.
The rights and obligations of the Parties regarding the rights following from defective performance shall be governed by the relevant general binding regulations (particularly the provisions of § 1914 to § 1915 of the Civil Code).
The Seller shall be held responsible for defect-free articles upon acceptance. In particular, the Seller is responsible towards the Buyer that the purchased article has the quality and properties required by the agreement, described by the Seller, manufacturer or its representative, or expected by these upon the advertising carried out, or that the purchased article has the quality and properties common for an article of such type; that the purchased article corresponds to the requirements stipulated in the legal regulations, it was provided in the corresponding quantity, rate or weight and it corresponds to the purpose specified by the Seller for use of the article or the purpose such article is usually used for.
Upon acceptance by the Buyer, should the article have a defect, the Buyer has the right to have the article put in the condition corresponding to the Purchase Agreement by the Seller free of charge and without any delay, upon the requirement of the Buyer either by replacing the article or by its repair; if such a procedure is impossible, the Buyer can request an adequate price reduction of the article or can withdraw from the Agreement. This shall not apply if the Buyer knew that it showed a defect or if the Buyer itself inflicted the defect before acceptance of the article.
The Buyer shall be entitled to enforce the right from a defect occurring in a consumable article within twenty four months (24) of acceptance, unless this contradicts the character of the article or unless the contrary is proved.
If the sold article, its packaging, the instructions appended to the article or the advertising pursuant to other legal regulations, specifies a period for which the article can be used, the provisions of the quality guarantee shall be applied.
The rights following from defective performance, including the guarantee responsibility of the Seller, shall be applied by the Buyer on the Seller, at the address E. Beneše 1541, 500 12 Hradec Králové.
upon delivery of an item with a digital content, unless it was delivered on a material carrier with the prior explicit consent of the consumer before expiry of the period for withdrawal from the Agreement, and the Seller informed the consumer before concluding the agreement that in such case it has no right to withdraw from the Agreement.
Save for an event specified in Art. 11.1, pursuant to the provisions of § 1829, subs. 1 of the Civil Code, the Buyer has the right to withdraw from the Purchase Agreement within fourteen (14) days of the date of article acceptance. Withdrawal from the Purchase Agreement must be demonstrably delivered to the Seller within fourteen (14) days of the date the articles were accepted, i.e. to the address of the Seller´s mail sales@japo.eu or to the address E. Beneše 1541, 500 12 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic.
In the event of withdrawal from the agreement subject to Art. 11.2 of the Business Terms, the Purchase Agreement shall be cancelled from the beginning. The articles must be returned to the Seller undamaged and unused and in the original packaging.
Should the Buyer withdraw from the Purchase Agreement subject to Art 11.2. of the Business Terms, the Seller is not obliged to return the received money to the Buyer before the Buyer returns the articles.
If the Buyer withdraws from the Agreement, the Seller shall return to him/her all the money received from him/her subject to the Agreement, in the same way without any delay, at the latest within fourteen (14) days of the date of returning articles to the Seller. The Seller shall return to the Buyer money received in a different way only if the consumer agrees to it and provided no additional costs shall be incurred.
If the Buyer selects a different method of delivery than the cheapest one offered by the Seller, the Seller shall return to the Buyer the costs for delivery of the articles in the amount corresponding to the cheapest offered method of delivery of the articles.
The Buyer acknowledges that should the articles returned by the Buyer be damaged, worn or partially consumed, the Seller shall have the right to compensation for the loss incurred by it as a result. If so, the Seller is obliged to provide evidence for the loss incurred. The Seller is entitled to set off the claim to payment of the incurred loss unilaterally against the claim of the Buyer for refund of the purchase price.
The Buyer shall return articles within 2 work days of dispatching of the notification of withdrawal at the latest, to the address of the Seller. A document of acceptance (invoice) shall be appended to the returned articles, so that the consignment can be explicitly identified. If the returned articles are damaged or worn in any way, the Seller reserves the right to compensate for the loss in a refund against the purchase price. The articles cannot be returned using the “cash on delivery” method.
Unused (unconsumed) articles should be treated as waste. The Buyer is entitled to dispose of the waste only in the manner specified by Act No. 185/2001 Coll., On waste, as amended, by implementing regulations as well as effective regulations locally at the domicile of the Buyer. The Seller does not provide any collection of used articles or their packaging.
The Buyer can receive the electronic contents to his/her e-mail address.
These Business Terms are effective in the scope and wording shown on the Internet sites of the Seller as of the day an electronic order is placed. By placing an electronic order, the Buyer confirms to the Seller that the Buyer accepts the price of the ordered articles together with any dispatch and transportation costs and all business terms and provisions in the wording effective at the moment the order was placed. As soon as the Buyer receives a confirming e-mail from the Seller, the Seller´s offer for the ordered articles and the price specified in the order are effective until the articles are delivered to the Buyer, unless any provisions of these Business Terms stipulate otherwise in a special case. By placing an order, the Buyer undertakes to meet the Business Terms for the period stipulated for the delivery of the articles. The Seller shall keep the order (purchase agreement) in its bookkeeping in electronic format for five years. Such archived purchase agreement is not accessible by the public.


text:
A statute of the State just named imposes upon 'each fire, marine, and fire and marine insurance company, incorporated or associated under the laws of any government or State other than one of the United States, a tax of 4 per cent. upon all premiums charged or received on contracts made in this commonwealth for insurance of property.' The same statute imposes a tax of but 2 per cent. upon such premiums when the company is incorporated under the laws of any one of the United States other than Massachusetts; upon which premiums, where the company is incorporated by itself, it imposes but 1 per cent.; while no tax is imposed by the laws of the State upon the business of insurances transacted by any natural persons citizens of the same.
With the enactment just mentioned on its statute-book, the State of Massachusetts, in 1868, filed a bill in its Supreme Judicial Court against the Liverpool and London Life and Fire Insurance Company (a company doing a large business in that State), to collect a tax of 4 per cent. on its premiums upon contracts made in Massachusetts for insurance of property, and to restrain the company from doing further business till the tax was paid. The company set up that it was not 'incorporated' at all, but was an association, under the laws of Great Britain, of natural persons, some of whom were citizens and residents of the country just named; and some citizens and residents of the State of New York; formed for the purpose of conducting the business of insurance under certain deeds of settlement, and having the legal character of a partnership; that accordingly it could not be taxed as a 'company incorporated under the laws of any government or State other than one of the United States;' while, in so far as the discriminating tax of 4 per cent. was sought to be laid against it as a company associated simply and not incorporated, it violated, in regard to the members of the company who were subjects of Great Britain, a provision in the treaty of 1815, between that country and the United States, by which it is agreed that the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce; and-in regard to the citizens of New York, that provision in section 2, article 4, of the Federal Constitution which secures to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Of course, if the company was a corporation, the defence failed: and it not being denied that the persons composing the company were British subjects, with certain citizens of New York with rights like theirs, the first question-and the only one if it was resolved affirmatively-was whether the company was a corporation or not.
This instrument, as far as it could be done without the aid of Parliament, established a company under the name of 'The Liverpool Life and Fire Insurance Company,' with a capital of 2,000,000 sterling, which was divided into 100,000 shares of 20 each, and declared its purpose to be making insurance on life and against fire. These shares could be sold and transferred, and executors and administrators represented them in the company on the death of the owner. If, by the laws of the association, a share became forfeited, the owner was released from all further liability to the company. The business of the company was to be conducted by a board of directors exclusively, and they could make by-laws and change and modify them. There was a covenant that suits might be brought by or against the company in the names of one or more directors, which should bind the stockholders, and that no stockholder would plead in abatement the nonjoinder of the others; and it was further covenanted that a judgment so obtained against a director might be made out of the property of any of the stockholders. Numerous other provisions were found in the original articles, which consisted of over a hundred sections, but only those are referred to here which bear on the question which the court had before it. There were also three subsequent deeds of settlement, and three acts of Parliament were passed to give efficiency to the purposes of the association.
The first of these acts provided that the association might sue and be sued in the name of the chairman or deputy chairman of the board of directors; that the stockholders might sue the company as plaintiffs, or be sued by it as defendants. It regulated the manner in which the shareholders might be made individually liable for the debts of the association; and it declared that the act should not be construed to incorporate the company or relieve its members from their individual liability, except as provided in the act.
The second act of Parliament changed the name of the company to that which it now bears, and authorized it to make contracts by the new name, and it also contained a provision that the act should not make the company a corporation; and there was a third act which authorized amalgamation with another company, and which again provides against its being construed into an act of incorporation or a limited liability partnership.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave a decree against the company, and enjoined it from the further prosecution of its business till the taxes found to be due were paid.
The case was now brought to this court on the ground that in its application to the company the statute of Massachusetts was in conflict with the provision of the Constitution, which confers on Congress the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, and with that which secures to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Whatever may be the character of the defendants, their association together and their relations to others, they must depend upon the laws of Great Britain. If the defendants are not a corporation by the English law, then they are not by our law, because here they have done no act in any way to alter or change their legal status or their relations to others. Indeed, our law does not in any way apply to them, act upon or affect their character, or profess to do it; it leaves that to be defined by the laws of the country under which they formed their association.
Now, under the laws of Great Britain, it cannot be maintained that the defendants are a corporation, or in fact anything more than a partnership of a large number of natural persons, having procured certain privileges from the government, under which they associated together for the convenience of those who deal with them.
In Great Britain, the King and Parliament alone can create corporations. In this case, neither has exercised the power, but when Parliament granted to the company certain privileges, especial care was taken to declare that the grant made should not create a corporation. This seems conclusive.
With us the defendants would not possess and enjoy the privilege, or be subject to the liability of being sued, and suing in the name of an officer of their association, but would be obliged to sue or be sued in the name of all partners, for the acts of Parliament giving that right and imposing that liability, apply to the manner of enforcing a remedy, and cannot avail beyond its own limits and courts.
So that when the defendants transact their business in this country, the acts of Parliament, giving some of the privileges of corporations, are of no avail to them; in fact they are like any partnership of natural persons, and must be treated in the same way, entitled to the same rights and privileges, and subject to the same liabilities.
Nor does this case fall within a principle often acted upon by courts, that when a collective body of natural persons are granted powers, rights, and privileges by a collective name, and there is no mode in which they can be enjoyed and exercised, without acting in a corporate capacity, such a body is held to be a corporation by necessary implication. Here, such implication is precluded by the legislative declaration that a corporation shall not exist, and by the fact that the deeds and legislative acts very minutely and carefully provide in what manner the rights and powers granted shall be enjoyed and exercised. Indeed, it is always holden, that where a corporation is so established by implication, the legislative intention to confer a corporate existence must be certain and plain.
Assuming that the plaintiff in error was not a corporation, but was, as they above argued, a partnership or association of individuals, some of which were subjects of Great Britain and others citizens of the State of New York, the learned counsel argued further that the rights of the former were protected by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, and the rights of the latter by section 2, article 4, of the Federal Constitution referred to in the statement of the case.
It is true, that the various acts of Parliament conferring corporate privileges upon the plaintiffs in error declare that it is not the intention thereby to constitute them a corporation; and if merely saying that they are not to be a corporation, at the same time when all the essential qualities and privileges of a corporation are bestowed upon them, would make it that they are not in fact a corporation, then it would have to be admitted that they are not a corporation. But in ascertaining the legal character of the company, we are not to look at what they are called, but at what they are.
By what rule is the question to be tested? The essential characteristics of a corporation are not the same at different times and in different countries. The definitions of a corporation vary. Certain things were formerly deemed essential qualities of a corporation, which are so no longer. Thus, a common seal formerly had essential significance, in those days when it was considered that corporations could only act by deed; but now, in this country, the common seal is of no significance. It is a mere ornament, and without use.
The deeds of settlement of the company show that they strained all laws applicable to partnerships to the very utmost, in the endeavor to provide for the transaction of their business before applying to Parliament for corporate privileges. This company by their deeds of settlement, in fact, made provisions and took upon themselves powers which are inconsistent with the common law applicable to partnerships.
For instance, carrying on business by means of directors exclusively, and depriving the members of all voice in determining matters. This is one. But it was in vain, with the aid of all the provisions that were contained in the deed of settlement, or that could be included in a private agreement among individuals, to attempt to stretch the law of partnerships far enough to cover the business of this company.
Accordingly acts of Parliament were obtained, which gave them in direct terms the various powers; and among these, that they might sue and be sued in the name of one individual; that the company might sue and be used by members of the company; that an amalgamation with another company should be binding on all of their members, whether consenting or not.
After these acts this company lacked no quality or characteristic of a corporation.
The exemption from individual liability is not now (however it may have been heretofore) a characteristic test of a corporation.
^* Harrison v. Timmins, 4 Meeson & Welsby, 510; Bartlett v. Pentland, Barnewall & Adolphus, 704; Van Sandau v. Moore, 1 Russell, 441; Cape's Executors, 2 De Gex, Mylne & G. 562; Mahew's Case, 5 Id. 562; Blakeley's Exec., 13 Beavan, 133; Burnes v. Pennell, 2 House of Lord's Cases, 522.
^** Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 636; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 562.

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v. put food out to eat. Pagbáhaw na, Serve the dinner now. Ibáhaw (baháwa) ang kan-un sa panay, Put the rice on the clay plate. -an(→) n. 1. plate for an individual serving; 2. home plate in tubigtúbig game, the area behind the last guarded line or pair of squares; v. use something as a plate.
n rice which got wet before having been threshed. Bahay nga gilung-ag búsà dílì mutúbù, You cooked slightly spoiled rice, so it won’t rise; v. become spoiled through getting wet.
n. kind of forest tree, the tuberous roots of which are eaten in times of famine.
n. 1. rope sewn to the edge of a net to make it stiff and as a place to attach floats; 2. longline in longline fishing (palangri) to which several leaders with hooks are attached; v. put rope on edge of net.
n. 1. the hard portion of a palm trunk; 2. cane or club made of a palm trunk.
v. sort, separate according to different classes or sizes. Bahigun nátù ang lubi sa tulu ka grúpu, We will sort the coconut into three groups.
a. flirtatious, trying to attract a man’s attention. Bahignit kaáyu. Mangúnag kablit, She’s flirtatious. She nudges men to get their attention; n. term of endearment of infants.
n. 1. neighing of a horse, bleating of a sheep or goat; 2. sound like neighing; v. neigh, bleat.
v. high-pitched, somewhat restrained laughter. Mibahikhik sila nga namátì sa malaw-ay nga isturya, They snickered as they listened to the dirty stories.
n. complete set of dishes.


Samuel W. McNabb, U.S. Atty., and Elden McFarland, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal., for libelant.
Forfeiture. Libel. Proceeding by the United States against one airplane, Ansaldo type, Fiat engine, single propeller, biplane; E.M. Hahn, claimant, intervening. Libel dismissed.
In my opinion under the evidence in this matter, which is a libel brought by the government for the purpose of forfeiting an airplane under the provisions of the Acts of May 22, 1918 ( 22 USCA §§ 223-226), and March 2, 1921 (22 USCA § 227), the proceeding must be dismissed.
It would appear that all penal provisions, which include those concerning forfeiture of vehicles in the War-Time Passport Act of May 22, 1918, have not been continued in force by the Act of March 2, 1921. Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335 (8th C.C.A.). See, also, U.S. v. Phelps (D.C.) 14 F.2d 679, and U.S. ex rel. Porter v. Yale (D.C.) 14 F.2d 682, and that subsequent legislation has supplanted the penal and forfeiture provisions of said War-Time Passport Act of 1918 so as to render such provisions inoperative and ineffectual. Johnson v. Keating, 17 F.2d 50 (1st C.C.A.).
I have been unable to find any construction or interpretation of said War-time Passport Act by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, except Koyama v. Burnett, 8 F.2d 940, and there is nothing in that decision that manifests a ruling in conflict with the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the First and Eighth Circuits above cited. There is not apparent to me any real distinction between the penal provisions of the act imposing sentence upon the person of an offender and those that forfeit vehicles used to violate its provisions. Moreover, when reasonable doubt exists as to whether provisions of a statute that are penal in effect have been repealed, such doubt should be resolved against the government. See McFarland v. U.S. (6th C.C.A.) 19 F.2d 805 and 807.
With respect to the other ground of libel, I am of the opinion that under the evidence in this proceeding no forfeiture of the airplane can be decreed under the Tariff Act of 1922 ( 42 Stat. 858). This contention was not seriously urged by the government, but in any event in my opinion it has no merit.
The libel herein will be dismissed upon payment by claimant of all storage charges and costs, whereupon the airplane in controversy will be returned to E.M. Hahn, claimant and intervener herein.


text:
In medical imaging, I am developing new acquisition techniques for ultrasound with the goal of improving diagnostics. Two current research directions in this area are 3D ultrasound and spatial compounding to improve the visualization of anatomy and pathology.
In medical information systems, I am working with industry to improve the timely dissemination of digital medical images and associated data to health care providers. In particular I am currently working on new methods for radiologists to navigate large image sets. This is in response to the growing size of studies produced by modern scanners.
Finally, I have an interest in the calibration of robotic systems and their application in surgery.
All of these topics are multidisciplinary and I hold a joint appointment with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Department of Mechanical Engineering to support this research.
H. Vaseli, Z. Liao, A.H. Abdi, H. Girgis, D. Behnami, C. Luong, F.T. Dezaki, N. Dhungel, R. Rohling, K. Gin, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Designing lightweight deep learning models for echocardiography view classification,” In Medical Imaging 2019: Image-Guided Procedures, Robotic Interventions, and Modeling (Vol. 10951, p. 109510F). International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2019.
L.R. Porto, R. Tang, A. Sawka, V. Lessoway, E.M.A. Anas, D. Behnami, P. Abolmaesumi, and R. Rohling, “Comparison of Patient Position and Midline Lumbar Neuraxial Access Via Statistical Model Registration to Ultrasound,” Ultrasound in medicine & biology, 45(1), pp.255-263, 2019.
S. Honigmann, Y.C. Zhu, R. Singla, P. Abolmaesumi, A. Chau, and R. Rohling, “EpiGuide 2D: visibility assessment of a novel multi-channel out-of-plane needle guide for 2D point of care ultrasound,” In Medical Imaging 2019: Image-Guided Procedures, Robotic Interventions, and Modeling (Vol. 10951, p. 109510K). International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2019.
M.H. Jafari, H. Girgis, N. Van Woudenberg, Z. Liao, R. Rohling, K. Gin, P. Abolmaesumi, and T. Tsang, “Automatic biplane left ventricular ejection fraction estimation with mobile point-of-care ultrasound using multi-task learning and adversarial training,” International journal of computer assisted radiology and surgery, pp.1-11, 2019.
F. Deeba, M. Ma, M. Pesteie, J. Terry, D. Pugash, J.A. Hutcheon, C. Mayer, S. Salcudean, and R. Rohling, “Attenuation Coefficient Estimation of Normal Placentas,” Ultrasound in medicine & biology, 2019.
M. Pesteie, V. Lessoway, P. Abolmaesumi, and R.N. Rohling, “Automatic localization of the needle target for ultrasound-guided epidural injections,” IEEE transactions on medical imaging, 37(1), pp.81-92, 2018.
I. Peterlík, H. Courtecuisse, R. Rohling, P. Abolmaesumi, C. Nguan, S. Cotin, and S. Salcudean, “Fast elastic registration of soft tissues under large deformations,” Medical image analysis, 45, pp.24-40, 2018.
M. Ai, T. Salcudean, R. Rohling, P. Abolmaesumi, and S. Tang, “Transurethral illumination probe design for deep photoacoustic imaging of prostate,” In Photons Plus Ultrasound: Imaging and Sensing 2018 (Vol. 10494, p. 104940C). International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2018.
C.D. Gerardo, E. Cretu, and R. Rohling, “Fabrication and testing of polymer-based capacitive micromachined ultrasound transducers for medical imaging,” Microsystems & Nanoengineering, 4(1), p.19, 2018.
B. Zhuang, R. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Accumulated angle factor-based beamforming to improve the visualization of spinal structures in ultrasound images,” IEEE transactions on ultrasonics, ferroelectrics, and frequency control, 65(2), pp.210-222, 2018.
M. Pesteie, P. Abolmaesumi, and R. Rohling, “Deep neural maps,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.07291, 2018.
G. Samei, O. Goksel, J. Lobo, O. Mohareri, P. Black, R. Rohling, and S. Salcudean, “Real-time FEM-based registration of 3-D to 2.5-D transrectal ultrasound images,” IEEE transactions on medical imaging, 37(8), pp.1877-1886, 2018.
P. Edgcumbe, R. Singla, P. Pratt, C. Schneider, C. Nguan, and R. Rohling, “Follow the light: projector-based augmented reality intracorporeal system for laparoscopic surgery,” Journal of Medical Imaging, 5(2), p.021216, 2018.
M.H. Jafari, H. Girgis, Z. Liao, D. Behnami, A. Abdi, H. Vaseli, C. Luong, R. Rohling, K. Gin, T. Tsang, and P. Abolmaesumi, “A Unified Framework Integrating Recurrent Fully-Convolutional Networks and Optical Flow for Segmentation of the Left Ventricle in Echocardiography Data,” In Deep Learning in Medical Image Analysis and Multimodal Learning for Clinical Decision Support (pp. 29-37). Springer, Cham, 2018.
A.H. Abdi, C. Luong, T. Tsang, G. Allan, S. Nouranian, J. Jue, D. Hawley, S. Fleming, K. Gin, J. Swift, and R. Rohling, “Automatic quality assessment of echocardiograms using convolutional neural networks: feasibility on the apical four-chamber view,” IEEE transactions on medical imaging, 36(6), pp.1221-1230, 2017.
A. Mehrtash, M. Pesteie, J. Hetherington, P.A. Behringer, T. Kapur, W.M. Wells, R. Rohling, A. Fedorov, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Deepinfer: open-source deep learning deployment toolkit for image-guided therapy,” In Medical Imaging 2017: Image-Guided Procedures, Robotic Interventions, and Modeling (Vol. 10135, p. 101351K). International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2017.
A.H. Abdi, C. Luong, T. Tsang, J. Jue, K. Gin, D. Yeung, D. Hawley, R. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Quality assessment of echocardiographic cine using recurrent neural networks: Feasibility on five standard view planes,” In International Conference on Medical Image Computing and Computer-Assisted Intervention (pp. 302-310). Springer, Cham, 2017.
P. Beigi, P. Malenfant, A. Rasoulian, R. Rohling, A. Dube, and V. Gunka, “Three-dimensional ultrasound-guided real-time midline epidural needle placement with epiguide: a prospective feasibility study,” Ultrasound in medicine & biology, 43(1), pp.375-379, 2017.
M. Honarvar, R.S. Sahebjavaher, R. Rohling, and S.E. Salcudean, “A comparison of finite element-based inversion algorithms, local frequency estimation, and direct inversion approach used in MRE,” IEEE transactions on medical imaging, 36(8), pp.1686-1698, 2017.
P. Beigi, R. Rohling, T. Salcudean, V.A. Lessoway, and G.C. Ng, “Detection of an invisible needle in ultrasound using a probabilistic SVM and time-domain features,” Ultrasonics, 78, pp.18-22, 2017.
R. Singla, P. Edgcumbe, P. Pratt, C. Nguan, and R. Rohling, “Intra-operative ultrasound-based augmented reality guidance for laparoscopic surgery,” Healthcare technology letters, 4(5), pp.204-209, 2017.
F.T. Dezaki, N. Dhungel, A.H. Abdi, C. Luong, T. Tsang, J. Jue, K. Gin, D. Hawley, R. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Deep residual recurrent neural networks for characterisation of cardiac cycle phase from echocardiograms,” In Deep Learning in Medical Image Analysis and Multimodal Learning for Clinical Decision Support (pp. 100-108). Springer, Cham, 2017.
J.M. Abeysekera, M. Ma, M. Pesteie, J. Terry, D. Pugash, J.A. Hutcheon, C. Mayer, L. Lampe, S. Salcudean, and R. Rohling, “SWAVE imaging of placental elasticity and viscosity: proof of concept,” Ultrasound in medicine & biology, 43(6), pp.1112-1124, 2017.
P. Beigi, R. Rohling, S.E. Salcudean, and G.C. Ng, “Spectral analysis of the tremor motion for needle detection in curvilinear ultrasound via spatiotemporal linear sampling,” International journal of computer assisted radiology and surgery, 11(6), pp.1183-1192, 2016.
C. Schneider, C. Nguan, R. Rohling, and S. Salcudean, “Tracked “pick-up” ultrasound for robot-assisted minimally invasive surgery,” IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering, 63(2), pp.260-268, 2016.
W. Shu, M. Ai, T. Salcudean, R. Rohling, P. Abolmaesumi, and S. Tang, “Broadening the detection view of 2D photoacoustic tomography using two linear array transducers,” Optics express, 24(12), pp.12755-12768, 2016.
N. Uniyal, H. Eskandari, P. Abolmaesumi, S. Sojoudi, P. Gordon, L. Warren, R. Rohling, S.E. Salcudean, and M. Moradi, “Ultrasound RF time series for classification of breast lesions,” IEEE transactions on medical imaging, 34(2), pp.652-661, 2015.
R.S. Sahebjavaher, G. Nir, M. Honarvar, L.O. Gagnon, J. Ischia, E.C. Jones, S.D. Chang, L. Fazli, S.L. Goldenberg, R. Rohling, and P. Kozlowski, “MR elastography of prostate cancer: quantitative comparison with histopathology and repeatability of methods,” NMR in Biomedicine, 28(1), pp.124-139, 2015.
S. Nagpal, I. Hacihaliloglu, T. Ungi, A. Rasoulian, J. Osborn, V. A. Lessoway, R. N. Rohling, D. P. Borschneck, P. Abolmaesumi, and P. Mousavi, “A global CT to US registration of the lumbar spine,” in SPIE Medical Imaging, p. 90362O–90362O, 2014.
A. Rasoulian, J. Osborn, S. Sojoudi, S. Nouranian, V. A. Lessoway, R. N. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “A System for Ultrasound-Guided Spinal Injections: A Feasibility Study,” in Information Processing in Computer-Assisted Interventions, Springer, pp. 90–99, 2014.
A. Rasoulian, R. N. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Automatic labeling and segmentation of vertebrae in CT images,” in SPIE Medical Imaging, 2014, pp. 903623–903623.
H. Eskandari, A. Baghani, S. E. Salcudean, and R. N. Rohling, Bandpass sampling for elastography. Google Patents, 2014.
S. Nagpal, P. Abolmaesumi, A. Rasoulian, T. Ungi, I. Hacihaliloglu, J. Osborn, D. P. Borschneck, V. A. Lessoway, R. N. Rohling, and P. Mousavi, “CT to US Registration of the Lumbar Spine: A Clinical Feasibility Study,” in Information Processing in Computer-Assisted Interventions, Springer, 2014, pp. 108–117, 2014.
A. Suzani, A. Rasoulian, S. Fels, R. N. Rohling, and P. Abolmaesumi, “Semi-automatic segmentation of vertebral bodies in volumetric MR images using a statistical shape+ pose model,” in SPIE Medical Imaging, p. 90360P–90360P, 2014.
N. Uniyal, H. Eskandari, P. Abolmaesumi, S. Sojoudi, P. Gordon, L. Warren, R. N. Rohling, S. E. Salcudean, and M. Moradi, “Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada,” in Ultrasonics Symposium (IUS), 2013 IEEE International, 2013, pp. 96–99.
H. Eskandari, S. E. Salcudean, and R. N. Rohling, Method and apparatus for determining viscoelastic parameters in tissue. Google Patents, 2013.
M. C. Yip, D. G. Lowe, S. E. Salcudean, R. N. Rohling, and C. Y. Nguan, “Tissue tracking and registration for image-guided surgery,” Medical Imaging, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 2169–2182, 2012.
I. Hacihaliloglu, R. Abugharbieh, A. J. Hodgson, R. N. Rohling, and P. Guy, “Automatic bone localization and fracture detection from volumetric ultrasound images using 3-d local phase features,” Ultrasound in medicine & biology, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 128–144, 2012.

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AgroAtlas - Weeds - Area of distribution and weediness of Alisma plantago-aquatica L.
Area of distribution and weediness of Alisma plantago-aquatica L.
Map was created using maps of natural scale 1:15,000,000-1:100,000,000 and information taken from published literature.
.Alber's Equal Area Conic for the USSR., 9, 1001, 7, 100, 0, 44, 68, 0, 0.
Vector map. Area of distribution is marked by polygons (main distribution) and points (sporadic distribution). Zone of weediness is marked by polygons.
Area of the species is divided into main distribution, weediness, and sporadic distribution areas. Zone of weediness is established according to occurrence (% of fields where this species is found) and abundance (Tanskii et al., 1998), i.e., where the occurrence of the species exceeded 50% with a field abundance (projective cover) of 4-5 points.
The map was created following the analysis of published cartographical materials and literature. The map of E. Hulten & M. Fries (1986) was used as a prototype, supplemented by maps of distribution from A.A. Grossgeim (1939), A.I. Poyarkova (1953), A.I. Tolmachev (1974), S.S. Kharkevich (1987), and L.I. Malyshev (1979). The northern, southern, western and eastern boundaries of the area were outlined according to E. Hulten & M. Fries (1986) and corrected according to V.L. Komarov (1934) (northern, southern, western and eastern boundaries), A.I. Poyarkova (1953) (northern boundary), S.S. Kharkevich (1987) (southern and eastern boundaries), A.A. Grossgeim (1939), R.R. Shreder (1941), B.K. Shishkin (1952), N.V. Pavlov (1956), P.N. Ovchinnikov (1957), V.V. Nikitin & A.М. Gel.dikhanov (1988) (southern boundary), E.I. Bordzilovs.kii (1940), B.K. Shishkin (1949), and Т.S. Geideman (1975) (western boundary). The sporadic distribution was determined according to E. Hulten & M. Fries (1986), A.A. Grossgeim (1939), A.I. Poyarkova (1953), A.I. Tolmachev (1974), L.I. Malyshev (1979), and S.S. Kharkevich (1987). The zone of weediness was determined according to I.T. Vasilchenko & O.A. Pidotti, V.V. Nikitin (1983), T.N. Ul.yanova (1998), G.I. Bazdyrev et al. (2004), and T.A. Shatalov (1987) and specified according to data on abundance, frequency of occurrence or weediness of the weed taken from the below-mentioned references (except .Manuals. and .Flores.).
Bazdyrev, G.I., Zotov L.I. & Polin, V.D. 2004. Weed plants and their control in modern agriculture. Moscow: MSKHA. 288 p. (in Russian).
Bordzilovs.kii, E.I., ed. 1940. Flora of the URSR. V. 2. Kiev: AN URSR. 590 p. (in Ukrainian).
Geideman, T.S., ed. 1975. Keys to higher plants of Moldavia. Kishinev, Shtiintsa, 576 p. (in Russian).
Grossgeim, A.A. 1939. Flora of the Caucasus. V.1. Baku: AzFAN. 402 p. (in Russian).
Hulten, E., Fries, M. 1986. Atlas of North European vascular plants, North of the Tropik of cancer: In 3 v. Konigstein: In 3 vol., 1172 p. (in English).
Kharkevich, S.S. 1987. Vascular plants of Soviet Far East. Leningrad: Nauka. 446 p. (in Russian).
Komarov, V.L. & Il.in, M.M., eds. 1934. Flora of the USSR. V. 1. Leningrad: AN SSSR. 302 p. (in Russian).
Malyshev, L.I. & Peshkova T.A., eds. 1979. Flora of Central Siberia. V. 1. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 536 p. (in Russian).
Nikitin, V.V. & Gel.dikhanov, A.M. 1988. Manual of plants of Turkmenistan. Leningrad: Nauka. 680 p. (in Russian).
Nikitin, V.V. 1983. Weed plants of USSR flora. Leningrad: Nauka. 454 p. (in Russian).
Ovchinnikov, P.N., ed. 1957. Flora of Tajik SSR. Moscow & Leningrad: AN SSR, V. 1. 547 p. (in Russian).
Pavlov, N.V., ed. 1956. Flora of Kazakhstan. V. 1. Alma-Ata: AN Kaz. SSR, 354 p. (in Russian).
Popov, M.G. 1957. Flora of Middle Siberia. V. 1. Moscow & Leningrad: AS SSSR, 556 p. (in Russian).
Poyarkova, A.I., ed. 1953. Flora of the Murmansk Region. Vol. 1. Moscow & Leningrad: AN SSSR, 250 p. (in Russian).
Shatalov, T.A., ed. 1987. Weed plants and their control in Rostov Region. Rostov-na-Donu: Persianovka. 102 p. (in Russian).
Shishkin, B.K., ed. 1949. Flora of BSSR. V. 1. Moscow: Sel.khozgiz. 432 p. (in Russian).
Shishkin, B.K., ed. 1952. Flora of Kirgiz SSR. V. 1. Frunze: Kirgizfan. 103 p. (in Russian).
Shreder, R.R., ed. 1941. Flora of Uzbekistan. V. 1. Tashkent: AN Uzbekistan. 568 p. (in Russian).
Tanskii, V.I., Levitin, M.M., Ishkova, T.I. & Kondratenko, V.I. 1998. Phytosanitary diagnostics in integrated management of cereals. In: Novozhilov, K.V., ed. Compendium of methodical recommendations in plant protection. St. Petersburg: VIZR, p. 5-55. (in Russian).
Tolmachev, A.I., ed. 1976. Flora of North-East of the European part of the USSR. V. 1. Leningrad: Nauka. P. 250 (in Russian).
Ulyanova, T.N. 1998. Weeds in the flora of Russia and other CIS states. St. Petersburg: VIR. 344 p. (in Russian).
Ulyanova, T. N. 1993. Useful weed plants in flora of the USSR. In: Catalogue of world collection of VIR. Rel. 643. Saint-Petersburg: VIR. 160 p. (in Russian).
Vasilchenko, I.Т. & Pidotti, O.A. 1975. Manual of the weed plants of irrigated agriculture. Leningrad: Kolos. 376 p. (in Russian).
All rights reserved. Copyright 2005 © A.Yu. Doronina & I.A. Budrevskaya (vector map, description).

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FindACase | Presidential Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Republic Services, Inc.
Presidential Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Republic Services, Inc.
REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC., et al, Defendants.
In this tort action, Plaintiff Presidential Towers Condominium, Inc. alleges that Defendants Republic Services, Inc. ("Republic") and BFI Waste Services, LLC ("BFI") were contracted to pick up the trash from Plaintiffs property, and negligently damaged and subsequently trespassed on Plaintiffs property by refusing to remove Defendants' dumpsters. ECF No. 12 at 2-3. Plaintiff seeks a total of $133, 187.25 in damages. Id. BFI filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff, alleging a breach of contract and seeking damages of $35, 561.57. ECF No. 14. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 26. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted-in-part and denied-in-part.
On September 7, 2012, Plaintiff entered into a Customer Service Agreement (the "Agreement") with BFI Waste Services, LLC for BFI to remove Plaintiffs trash and recyclables. ECF No. 26-3 at 2. The Agreement specifically provided that the contracting party was "BFI Waste Services, LLC, DBA Allied Waste Services of Washington, Republic Services of Washington Metro, Calvert Trash." Id. The Agreement specified that it would "automatically renew for successive 36 month terms unless either party gives written notice of termination to the other at least 60 days before the end of the then current term." Id. The Agreement also provided that the Company could, after notice to Plaintiff, "increase the rates provided in this Agreement to adjust for any increase in" a number of different costs. Id. at 6.
Under the terms of the Agreement, BFI provided dumpsters for Plaintiff to store its trash and recycling. The parties do not dispute that it was Plaintiffs responsibility to empty the dumpsters and remove the trash. There is conflicting evidence, however, regarding whose responsibility it was to move the dumpsters from inside the building to the pick-up location. According to BFI's Business Unit Controller, BFI was responsible for picking up the trash and recycling from outside of Plaintiff s building; it was the responsibility of Plaintiff s employees or cleaning contractors to transport the dumpsters from the interior of Plaintiff s building to the outside area. ECF No. 26-4 at 2. At his deposition and in his affidavit, however, Plaintiffs corporate designee was unclear as to whose responsibility it was. Compare ECF No. 26-6 at 5 ("primarily the task [of moving the dumpsters] is done by the cleaning company"), with ECF No. 27-8 at 11-12 (explaining that the "responsibility ... to get the cans from the trash room to the outside ... varied between the trash company and the cleaning company"), and ECF No. 27-5 at 3 ("Both the defendant and the cleaning contractor were responsible for taking dumpsters from the trash collection rooms to outside and returning them.").
The parties carried out this relationship for several years until late 2014. On an invoice dated December 20, 2014, BFI included under a heading labeled "Important Information" the notice that "[y]our next invoice may reflect a rate adjustment, if you have any questions after receiving your next invoice please contact us." ECF No. 26-5 at 18. The total charges for the December 20, 2014 invoice were $6, 812.03, and consisted of $6, 190.31 for "Basic Service" and $619.03 for a "Total Fuel Recovery Fee." Id. On the next invoice, dated January 20, 2015, the total charges were $7, 016.87, which consisted of $6, 376.02 for "Basic Service" and $637.70 for "Total Fuel Recovery Fee." Id. at 26-5. This amounts to a roughly 3% increase. At this point, as reflected by the invoices, Plaintiff stopped paying its monthly balance. BFI continued to provide service and send Plaintiff monthly invoices, noting the past due balance, and assessing monthly late fees. See Id. at 22 (invoice from February 20, 2015); id. at 24 (invoice from March 20, 2015); id. at 26 (invoice from April 20, 2015); id. at 28 (invoice from May 20, 2015); id. at 30 (invoice from June 20, 2015); id. at 32 (invoice from July 20, 2015). The invoices indicate that throughout this time, Plaintiff made payments towards its balance only once, on June 25, 2015, when it made three payments of $2, 500 each. Id. at 32. The invoice from July 20, 2015, indicates that the final past due balance was $35, 551.67. Id.
Once Plaintiff stopped paying its monthly balance, Plaintiff and BFI entered into negotiations regarding the balance and Plaintiffs contract with BFI. ECF No. 26-4 at 3. BFI discussed waiving part of the outstanding balance, entering into a new contract with Plaintiff, and matching any price that Plaintiff was being offered by BFI's competitors. Id. Ultimately, on July 2, 2015, Plaintiff informed BFI that it wished to terminate its relationship with BFI, and requested that BFI remove its containers by July 13, 2015. ECF No. 26-12 at 2. Plaintiff informed BFI that it would begin assessing a storage fee of $75 per day per container after July 13, 2015, if the containers were not removed. Id. On July 8, 2015, BFI acknowledged receipt of the notice of termination, but demanded "final payment for services rendered of $35, 551.67" for Plaintiff to be able to terminate the relationship. ECF No. 26-9 at 2. Furthermore, BFI informed Plaintiff that "[u]ntil payment is received we will not service or remove these containers and we will not pay a storage fee." Id. On August 4, 2015, BFI delivered several "Final Notices" to Plaintiff, threatening to turn the matter over to a collection agency. ECF No. 27-4 at 3-5. The dumpsters were not removed until November 11, 2015. ECF No. 26-10 at 5.
At some point prior to May 9, 2016, the walls of the corridor between Plaintiffs trash room and the pick-up location were "substantially gouged or damaged." ECF No. 26-11. Plaintiffs corporate representative testified that this damage occurred while Republic was servicing Plaintiff, and that Republic's representatives acknowledged that their containers had caused the damage to the walls. ECF No. 27-8 at 4.
On July 6, 2016, Plaintiff commenced an action against Republic in the District Court for Prince George's County. Presidential Towers Condominium. Inc. v. Republic Services. Inc., Civil Case No. CAL1627862 (District Court for Prince George's Cty.). On November 9, 2016, Republic removed the action to this Court pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction (Defendants are Delaware corporations, with their principal places of business in Arizona, and Plaintiff is a Maryland corporation). ECF No. 1; ECF No. 13 at 1. On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint, naming BFI as an additional defendant, ECF No. 12. BFI answered the Complaint and filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff on December 20, 2016. ECF No. 14. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs claims and BFI's counterclaim on July 28, 2017, which is now pending before the Court. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff has opposed Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 27, to which Defendants replied, ECF No. 30.
"Under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c), summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute exists as to material facts. Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). If the moving party demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Importantly, at the summary judgment stage, it is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence but simply to decide if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the conflicting evidence creates "fair doubt, " Cox v. Cnty. Of Prince William, 249 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2001), such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. Nevertheless, a "mere scintilla of proof' is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). To defeat the motion, the party opposing summary judgment must submit evidentiary materials showing facts on the basis of which the finder of fact could reasonably decide the case in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Id.

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