text:
In accordance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016 (GDPR), we inform you that in order to contact us, the Controller (under Art. 13, par. 1 lett. a) GDPR is: Spikerot S.n.c. di Forte Antonello, Leocadia Alessio, Straccione Davide & C. Via Arapietra, 50, 65124 Pescara – VAT Number: 02210850687. You will be able to withdraw consent at any time without affecting the lawfulness of the processing based on consent before its withdrawal pursuant to art. 7 par. 3 of the EU General Data Protection 679/2016. You will be able to exercise your rights in relation to the processing operations described in this policy and as the data subject, under the conditions provided for in articles from 15 to 21 of the GDPR, in particular : right of access – art. 15 of the GDPR; right to rectification – art. 16 of the GDPR; right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) – art. 17 of the GDPR; right of restriction of processing – art. 18 of the GDPR; right to data portability– art. 20 of the GDPR; right to object – art. 21 of the GDPR; RIGHT TO LODGE A COMPLAINT. The data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint - under art. 77 - with the Italian Data Protection Authority, Piazza di Montecitorio n. 121, 00186, Rome (RM). In order to exercise the abovementioned rights, the data subject must send a registered letter to the Controller referred to under art. 1 of this Policy.
The application includes specific forms that, once filled in with the contact details, allow the user to be contacted by the Controller in order to receive information.
Personal data collected: contact data and IP address.
Nature of the provision of data and consequences of failure to provide such data under art. 13 par. 2 lett. e) GDPR: the provision of data for this purpose is mandatory. The failure to provide the required data shall not allow the service to be provided.
Consent: for the implementation of this purpose no explicit consent is required, which shall be considered to be given by entering the contact data.
Period for which the personal data will be stored under Art. 13, par. 2 lett. a) GDPR: the data are processed for the time necessary to provide the service requested by the user or required by the purposes described in this document and in any case no later than 12 months from collection.
Legal basis for the processing: the processing is necessary under Art.6 par.1 lett. b) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016 (GDPR).
Processing recipients: authorized staff of the company commercial area, company staff in charge of the application management and of the communication with the users via email.
By subscribing our mailing list or newsletter, the email address, the telephone number or the address of the User are automatically added to a list of contacts to which send emails, or printed materials - including commercial and promotional information - can be sent.
Nature of the provision of data and consequences of failure to provide such data under art. 13 par. 2 lett. e) GDPR: the provision of data for this purpose is optional and it does not affect the fulfillment of your requests and the performance of the contracts, but it will preclude the transmission of marketing communications by the Controller.
Consent: for the implementation of this purpose an explicit consent is required, which is given by filling in a specific form in the application.
Legal basis for the processing: EU General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016.
Processing recipients: Company staff in charge of the application management, of the marketing systems and the staff in charge of the customer service. The updated list of the abovementioned recipients is available at the Controller office and may be requested sending an email to the following address: info@spikerot.com or by registered letter to: Via Arapietra,50, 65124 Pescara (PE).
We at Spikerot are hungry for new music and we’re happy to give you a few tips on the best way to share your unreleased stuff with us.
Links are welcome. If you think your music fits our vision don’t hesitate to get in touch with us. The easiest way to submit your music is by sending us an email to demo@spikerot.com with a short description about your band/project including links to your Social Networks but, most importantly, your music (streaming, download or both). Any external platform will do (Soundcloud, Bandcamp, YouTube, Dropbox, you name it), no need of sending huge attachments via mail.
We also encourage bands to send us their stuff via standard mail as well, the way the product is presented is as important as the music itself. We like it old school so don’t feel outdated when considering physical copies for submission.
Our tastes have no boundaries but we do have some limits too. We’re big fans of metal in general but we’re not very fond of Power Metal, Symphonic Metal and Metalcore, we also like Grindcore, Death/Black Metal, Stoner Rock, Doom, Industrial, Post Metal, Cinematic soundscapes and experimental music pushed to extremes.
We’ll make sure all music will be heard and every mail will be replied to, though sending the same mail over and over again won’t increase your chances to get signed.

matches:
Art. 13
art. 7
art. 15
art. 16
art. 17
art. 18
art. 20
art. 21
art. 77
art. 1
art. 13
Art. 13
Art.6
art. 13


The claimant was represented by Albert J. McGrail, Esq., McEleney & McGrail, 363 Main St., Hartford, CT 06106.
The respondents were represented by James Moran, Esq., Maher & Williams, 1300 Post Road, P. O. Box 550, Fairfield, CT 06430-0550.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the February 14, 1994 Memorandum of the Commissioner for the First District. She argues on appeal that the commissioner improperly determined that the Workers’ Compensation Commission did not have jurisdiction over the claimant’s claim. The respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed. We deny the motion to dismiss, and reverse the trial commissioner’s decision.
The claimant and respondents stipulated as to certain facts, including that the decedent was killed in the course of his employment with the respondent on May 24, 1979, while on temporary assignment in Rochester, New York. They also stipulated that this Commission has “personal and subject matter jurisdiction of this claim for benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 31-306, i.e. the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act is applicable pursuant to Cleveland” [referring to Cleveland v. U. S. Printing Ink, 218 Conn. 181 (1991)]. The only issue not agreed to in the stipulation was the fulfillment of the notice requirements of § 31-294 C.G.S. The commissioner found, however, that the parties could not stipulate to the jurisdiction of this Commission, and that the stipulated facts did not support Connecticut jurisdiction. Without reaching the notice issue, he dismissed the claimant’s claim.
In Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, 36 Conn. App. 298, 301 (1994), our Appellate Court noted that “the most reasonable interpretation of the limitation provision applicable to appeals to the compensation review board is one that takes into consideration notice to the party aggrieved by the commissioner’s decision.” It went on to hold that the § 31-301 ten day period “begins to run on the day on which the party wanting to appeal is sent meaningful notice of the commissioner’s decision,” although it declined to hold that the appeal period commences when notice of the appealable decision is received. Id., 303.
Here, of course, there is no finding as to the date notice of the decision was sent. We would normally require such a determination to be made in order to determine whether the petition for review was timely. See O’Connor v. United Parcel Service, 1741 CRB-4-93-5 (March 30, 1995) (CRB applied Conaci and remanded case for determination of date notice sent to claimant). However, we will not do that in this case for two reasons. First, notice was not sent pursuant to the method required in § 31-321, thus potentially prejudicing the claimant. Compare Jimenez v. Montero, 1826 CRB-4-93-8 (decided May 4, 1995).
Second, and more importantly, the trial commissioner deprived the claimant of due process when he based his Memorandum dismissing the claim on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the commissioner’s reasoning was correct, the claimant and respondents both assumed that the jurisdiction issue was settled by virtue of their stipulation of facts. Neither party was ever notified that subject matter jurisdiction was considered an issue by the commissioner, and neither party had an opportunity to argue on its behalf or present evidence accordingly. Although the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, see, e.g., Peters v. State of Connecticut/Southern Connecticut State University, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 134, 1616 CRB-5-92-12 (February 1, 1995), the commissioner should not have made a decision on the matter without providing both parties with a chance to be heard. Nothing less than due process requires that it be so. Southard v. Southard Development, 1891 CRB-4-93-11 n. 2 (decided April 27, 1995).


text:
G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015 - LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG, YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN, CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON, REPRESENTED BY YSSEL L. NAGUIT, Petitioners, v. CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B. QUIAZON, REPRESENTED BY JAIME B. QUIAZON, Respondent.
LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG, YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN, CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON, REPRESENTED BY YSSEL L. NAGUIT, Petitioners, v. CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B. QUIAZON, REPRESENTED BY JAIME B. QUIAZON, Respondent.
On December 16, 2005, a complaint3 for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC-Branch 59 by the petitioners, namely, Leticia Naguit Aquino, Melvin Naguit, Rommel Naguit, Elma Naguit Tayag, Yssel L. Naguit, Rosalina Naguit Aumentado, Rizel Naguit Cunanan, Caridad Naguit Parajas, Millie Naguit Florendo, Marnel Naguit, Eduardo Naguit, Jose Naguit, Zoilo Naguit, and Amelia Naguit Dizon, represented by Yssel L. Naguit (petitioners). They alleged that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot situated in Magalang, Pampanga, consisting of 557 square meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894; that since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a hundred years, constructing houses and paying real estate taxes on the property; that sometime in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the respondents, namely, Cesar B. Quiazon, Amanda Quiazon, Jose B. Quiazon, and Reynaldo B. Quiazon, represented by Jaime B. Quiazon (respondents), claiming ownership over the subject property and demanding that they vacate the same; that upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213777-R; that the said title was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable; and that they were the true owners of the property.
Hence, they prayed that the title be cancelled and a new title be issued in their favor.
In their Answer,4 respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject land as per TCT No. 213777-R; that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1138 (11376), as per the Project of Partition and Deed of Agreement, dated January 2, 1974; and that petitioners had been occupying the property by mere tolerance. They denied the allegations in the complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims.
They argued that: First, the petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action"5 against them, because their deed of sale was spurious and could not prevail over Land Registration Decree No. 122511 issued on June 28, 1919 in Land Registration Case No. 5, LRC Records No. 128, by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. The predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were among the oppositors in the land registration proceeding but, nevertheless, after the trial, the subject lot was awarded, decreed and titled in favor of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, as per OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga. Second, the action was barred by prescription and that petitioners were guilty of laches in asserting their interest over the subject lot, considering that Land Registration Decree No. 122511 was issued on June 28, 1919 and OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) was issued on May 12, 1922. Hence, it was much too late for petitioners to institute the action after more than 80 years. They also raised the settled rule that a title registered under the Torrens system could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession, or by prescription. Third, the action was also barred by res judicata and violated the prohibition against forum shopping, considering that petitioners had earlier filed a similar case for quieting of title against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 5487, which the RTC-Br. 56 dismissed.
Petitioners filed their Comment to Defendant's Affirmative Defenses.6 Anent the alleged lack of cause of action due to the spurious deed of sale, petitioners argued that this contention was a matter of evidence which might only be resolved in a full-blown trial. They insisted that the deed of sale was genuine and authentic and was issued and certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court of the RTC. They added that the settled rule was that to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, and that the allegations in their complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.
As regards the allegation of prescription, the petitioners countered that an action to quiet title did not prescribe if the plaintiffs were in possession of the property in question. They argued that they were neither guilty of laches nor were they in possession of the property by mere tolerance, their possession being in the concept of owner for more than a hundred years.
Lastly, regarding the argument on res judicata, petitioners explained that they were not the same plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5487 and that the case was dismissed without prejudice.
The RTC set a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses.
Respondents presented Atty. Charlemagne Tiqui Calilung, RTC Clerk of Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, who presented the record of Cadastral Case No. 5, dated June 28, 1919, as well as Decree No. 122511. They also presented Luis Samuel Ragodon, the Registration Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, who presented the original copy of OCT No. 11376, reconstituted as RO-1138, and testified that the title was derived from Decree No. 122511. He further testified that the original title had been cancelled pursuant to a project of partition, which was registered on December 17, 1984, and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 213775, 213776, 213777, 213778, 213779, 213780, and 213781 were issued. He presented the original copy of TCT No. 213777-R issued in the names of respondents.
Henry Y. Bituin, the court interpreter who translated the June 28, 1919 decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Land Registration Case No. 5 from Spanish to English, also testified.
Petitioners manifested that they were opting to submit the incident for resolution without presenting evidence, relying on their position that only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered.
In their formal offer of evidence,7 respondents offered the following documents: (1) the June 28, 1919 Decision and its English translation; (2) Transmittal Letter, dated May 6, 1922; (3) Decree No. 122511; (4) OCT No. RO-1138; (5) TCT No. 213777-R; (6) the petition, dated July 29, 1988, and its annexes in Civil Case No. 5487; (7) the September 7, 1990 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 5487, without prejudice; and (8) the July 29, 1916 Decision in Expediente No. 132, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11958 and its English translation.
On July 14, 2008, the RTC-Br. 59 issued the Order dismissing petitioners' complaint. It found that based on the decision, dated June 28, 1919, in Cadastral Case No. 5, the Baluyut siblings, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, were declared the absolute owners of the subject property, over the claim of Jose Makam, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, who was one of the oppositors in the said case. From this decision, OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) was derived, which later became the subject of a project of partition and deed of agreement among the Baluyut siblings, dated January 2, 1972, which, in turn, was annotated on the OCT as Entry No. 8132. TCT No. 213777-R, covering the subject lot, was later derived from the partition. The RTC-Br. 59 also noted that it was stated in the said decision that in 1907, a warehouse was constructed on the subject lot by virtue of an agreement between the Chairman of Magalang and Enrique Baluyut, with no objection from the Makams. It was further noted that the deed of sale being asserted by petitioners was not mentioned in the 1919 decision despite the claim of their predecessors-in-interest.
The RTC-Br. 59, thus, ruled that the deed of sale had become invalid by virtue of the June 28, 1919 decision. It held that although the deed of sale dated, April 20, 1894, was never challenged, it was nevertheless unenforceable by virtue of the June 28, 1919 decision. It found that petitioners had lost whatever right they had on the property from the moment the said decision was rendered and an OCT was issued. Finding that petitioners were not holders of any legal title over the property and were bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the RTC-Branch 59 stated that the first requisite of an action to quiet title was miserably wanting. It also found the second requisite to be wanting because respondents had proved that the TCT registered in their names was valid.
Anent petitioners' argument that only the complaint may be considered in determining the sufficiency of the cause of action, the RTC-Br. 59 ruled that under Section 2 in relation to Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense in the answer might be had at the discretion of the court, during which the parties could present their arguments and their evidence.
But as shown in the foregoing rule, the holding of a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss which is pleaded as an affirmative defense is within the full discretion of the trial court. The rule speaks of affirmative defenses that are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Indubitably, lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action, being one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby.
The CA gave credence to the evidence presented by respondents and noted that, except for petitioners' bare allegation that respondents' title was invalid, there was nothing more to support the same. It further noted that the deed of sale was written in a local dialect without the translation and with no ascertainable reference to the area of the property being conveyed. The CA, therefore, found that petitioners did not have the title required to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, while respondents had sufficiently proven the validity of their Torrens title.
Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action.
Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in considering external factors beyond the allegations in the petition. They aver that it is a settled rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action, only facts alleged in the complaint shall be considered, and it is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold a preliminary hearing to determine their existence.
The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their Answer that petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action," raising factual matters,14 which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of action." Respondents' arguments made no assertion that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The ground of "lack of cause of action" has been frequently confused with the ground of "failure to state a cause of action," and this is the situation prevailing in the present case. The terms were, in fact, used interchangeably by both the respondents and the lower courts.
Also confused, respondents, on their part, asserted that "it is within the discretion of the Court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action,"17 the very basis of their argument being hinged on the application of Section 6. They also insisted on the applicability of the exceptions to the general rule that only averments in the complaint must be considered, which pertains to the ground of "failure to state a cause of action."
The trial court held a preliminary hearing resolving the ground of "lack of cause of action" pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 16, which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule that have been raised as an affirmative defense in the answer.18 The ground of "lack of cause of action," as already explained, however, is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6. On this point alone, the trial court clearly erred in receiving evidence on the ground of "lack of cause of action" during the preliminary hearing. The factual matters raised by respondents in their affirmative defense arguing the non-existence of a cause of action, should have been duly resolved during a trial on the merits of the case.
In any case, even if the Court were to treat respondents' argument as a "failure to state a cause of action," their defense would still fail.
"The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 ).
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
A review of the first ground under paragraph 6 of the answer reveals that respondents alleged that "[p]laintiffs have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action against the defendants." It is at this point that it must again be emphasized that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16, but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of action."33 The issue submitted to the court was, therefore, the determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact were true, as there was a hypothetical admission of facts alleged in the complaint.34 An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of action as against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after the conduct of the trial on the merits.35 A reading of respondents' arguments in support of this ground readily reveals that the arguments relate not to the failure to state a cause of action, but to the existence of the cause of action, which goes into the very crux of the controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a full-blown hearing.
The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held, however, that such a hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action,36 and that it is, in fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts outside the complaint.37 The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, has been held to be improper and impermissible.38 Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to present evidence except when the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no other.39 Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.
The lower courts also relied on the exception that external evidence may be considered when received "in the course of hearings related to the case," which is rooted in the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry (Tan).40 In said case, a hearing was conducted on the prayer for preliminary injunction where evidence was submitted by the parties. In the meantime, a motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant, citing as one of the grounds that the petition did not state a cause of action. The trial court resolved the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction simultaneously with the motion to dismiss. It dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action on the basis of the evidence presented during the hearing for preliminary injuction. On appeal, this Court ruled that the trial court was correct in considering the evidence already presented and in not confining itself to the allegations in the petition.
Second, Tan noted that the plaintiff had readily availed of his opportunity to introduce evidence during the hearing and, as a result, was estopped from arguing that the court is limited to the allegations in the complaint.44 This is in contrast to the present case, where petitioners steadfastly argued from the beginning that the trial court was limited to the allegations in the complaint. Petitioners maintained their stance during the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses, opting not to file rebuttal evidence and opposing respondents' formal offer of evidence on the same ground. Having been consistent in their position from the start, petitioners cannot be estopped from arguing that the trial court was precluded from considering external evidence in resolving the motion to dismiss.
Third, it was noted in Tan that the documentary evidence given credence by the trial court had effectively been admitted by stipulation during the hearing,45 and another had been an annex to the complaint,46 both of which are exceptions to the general rule that external facts cannot be considered. Neither of the said exceptions is availing in the present case. The Court notes that only the OCT of respondents was attached as an annex to their answer. The June 28, 1919 Decision in the Cadastral case, which was given considerable weight by the trial court, was not attached and was only presented during the preliminary hearing.
Fourth, Tan ruled that the rigid application of the rules could not be countenanced considering the overriding public interest involved, namely, the welfare of the inhabitants of the province whose lives and properties would be directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.47 There appears to be no overriding public interest in the present case to justify a similar relaxation of the rules.
It is of note that although the trial court might not have erred in holding a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it is readily apparent from the decisions of the lower courts that no disquisition whatsoever was made on these grounds. It cannot be denied that evidence in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action" was received and given great weight by the trial court. In fact, all the evidence given credence by the trial court were only in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action." This all the more highlights that the trial court erred in receiving evidence to determine whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Although neither the RTC or the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it appears that this case could not have been dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property,48 which is the situation prevailing in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.
Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits of the case.
1Rollo, pp. 21-32; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
2 Id. at 64-70 and 74-75.
15 379 Phil. 939, 944-945 (2000).
18 Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
19 G.R. No. 183308, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 112.
20 G.R. No. 79760, June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 720.
21Insular Investment and Trust Corporation v. Capital One Equities Corporation, supra note 19, at 142.
22Indiana Aerospace University v. Commissioner of Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 502 (2001).
23Evangelista v. Santiago, 497 Phil. 269, 290 (2005).
24Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 327, 341.
26Evangelista v. Santiago, supra note 23, at 286.
28Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939, 950-951 (2000).
29Philippine Army v. Pamittan, G.R. No. 187326, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 306, 312.
30Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28; Tan v. Director of Forestry, 210 Phil. 244 (1983).
33San Lorenzo Village Association v. CA, 351 Phil. 353, 365 (1998).
34Far East Bank v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 701, 709 (2000).
35Heirs of Paez v. Torres, 381 Phil. 393, 402 (2000).
36Municipality of Binan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94733, February 17, 1993, 219 SCRA 69, 76; Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, 505 Phil. 181, 188-189 (2005).
37D.C. Crystal, Inc. v. Laya, 252 Phil. 759, 768-769 (1989); Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87678, June 16, 1992 210 SCRA 33, 42-43; Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96825, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 144, 153.
38Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97816, July 24, 1992, 211 SCRA 824, 835.
39 Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Book Store, Inc., 2007), Volume I, p. 1042; citing 1 Moran, p. 620, 1995 ed., citing Asejo v. Lenoso, 78 Phil. 467 (1947).
40Tan v. Director of Forestry, supra note 30.
41Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd v. Catalan, 483 Phil. 525, 538 (2004).
43Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Catalan, supra note 41.
44Tan v. Director of Forestry, supra note 30, at 255.
48Almarza v. Arguelles, 240 Phil. 681, 685 (1987).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Please check the marked fields.
In accordance with § 11 Insurance Mediation Regulation (“Erstinformation”).
X-patrio operates as an independent insurance brokerage company within the meaning of § 34 d Par. 1 of the Commercial Code (“Ungebundener Versicherungsvermittler”). A statutory license in accordance with § 34 d Par. 1 of the Commercial Code has been awarded. X-patrio is also registered in the Insurance Intermediary Register with the registration number D-IOJC-EBSW8-35 in accordance with § 34 d Par. 7 of the Commercial Code.
X-patrio is registered at the trade registry, District Court Charlottenburg under the number HRB 189471 B. Headquarter and place of jurisdiction: Berlin, Germany.
X-patrio operates independently for different insurance companies and has access to a broad variety of available insurance products in the European Union. In case of certain product lines, such as the Public Health Insurance, X-patrio cooperates with Premium Partners and limited market comparison is offered. X-patrio is constantly updating the market comparison and strives to the highest level of transparency in the product selection process, which can always be requested by the User.
X-patrio is receiving commission from insurance companies for contracts concluded between the User and the insurance company. To do so, X-patrio provides the technical means, exploration, information and the offering for entering into the contract at the client’s free disposal. The contract is always executed between the insurance company and the insurance holder.
Neither X-patrio, nor an insurance company, or the parent company of an insurance company has shares, directly or indirectly, in the voting rights, or capital of an order of more than 10% of each other. Because X-patrio cooperates with a large number of product providers, X-patrio can offer their clients an extensive selection in all essential insurance areas. X-patrio performs the activities of a broker in this respect.
Copyright 2017 - 2019: Expatrio Global Services GmbH. All rights reserved.
Value-added-tax (VAT) identification number according to Umsatzsteuer-Identifikationsnummer § 27a value added tax act law: requested at the Tax Authority Berlin.
X-patrio operates as an insurance brokerage company within the meaning of § 34 d Par. 1 of the Commercial Code (Versicherungsvermittler). A statutory license in accordance with § 34 d Par. 1 of the Commercial Code has been awarded.
X-patrio is registered in the Insurance Intermediary Register with the registration number D-IOJC-EBSW8-35 in accordance with § 34 d Par. 7 of the Commercial Code.
X-patrio operates independently (ungebunden). Neither X-patrio, nor an insurance company, or the parent company of an insurance company has shares, directly or indirectly, in the voting rights, or capital of an order of more than 10% of each other. Because X-patrio cooperates with a large number of product providers, X-patrio can offer their clients an extensive selection in all essential insurance areas. X-patrio performs the activities of a broker in this respect.
This English General Terms and Conditions are binding in all respects.
provides its services free of charge if not mentioned differently.
These General Terms and Conditions (“GTC” or the “Policy”) shall govern the relationship between you, the contractual partner (“You” or the „User“) of X-patrio for using the X-patrio online presence (“Website” and other services as well as any form of communication (telephone, e-mail, WhatsApp, WeChat, Skype, Facebook messenger, Chat, Fax, etc.). Upon using the X-patrio services, these GTC shall apply.
These GTC shall also apply for all future servitude and business relations between you and X-patrio, unless other General Terms and Conditions have been explicitly agreed upon in the interim. When using X-patrio, you are deemed to have read, understood and given your consent to the terms of this Policy. Furthermore, when using X-patrio you may be using trusted third party service providers simultaneously (such as network, mobile communication providers, etc.). The use of these third party service providers is subject to their respective General Terms and Conditions as well as Data Privacy Policies. In addition, X-patrio governs Special Terms and Conditions („STC“) for dedicated services that are explicitly marked as such. If you use services with STC, those STC shall apply in addition to these GTC.
X-patrio is operated by Expatrio Global Services GmbH HRB 189471 B. The address and contact information are available above in 1 Preamble of these GTC, the LEGAL NOTICE and the BROKER INFORMATION. X-patrio is registered with the IHK as an insurance brokerage company with the registration number D-IOJC-EBSW8-35, publicly accessible at www.vermittlerregister.info. For the purposes of informing the User about the legal status of X-patrio concerning insurance brokerage, the User is deemed to have read, understood and given consent to the Broker Information as outlined in 3.4.2.
“X-patrio is operating an internet platform to perform global information - and consulting services for foreigners concerning the entry and relocation to Germany including mediation for bank- and blocked accounts, mobile phone- and internet contracts.
Furthermore X-patrio will perform insurance brokerage services according to §34d Abs. 1 GewO, especially health- and property insurances.
These GTC shall be valid in its current versions upon using X-patrio’s services. You shall agree to these GTC for the duration you are using X-patrio. You may access a current version of these GTC at any time on the X-patrio Website www.x-patrio.com/GTC. X-patrio is entitled to amend these GTC at any time. In the event the GTC are amended, you will be notified in writing, via e-mall or in another suitable manner. If you do not agree to the amendments, you may terminate the underlying user and business agreement with X-patrio anytime. If you continue to use X-patrio upon effectiveness of the GTC amendment, the GTC shall be considered agreed upon and binding. Deviation and/or supplementary provisions require the explicit written consent by an X-patrio managing director. If you violate the provisions outlined in these GTC, your right to use X-patrio shall expire automatically.
In accordance with § 11 section 1, Insurance Brokerage Act, X-patrio must provide Broker Information upon first contact (“Erstinformation”). This information provision has been legally mandated since 2007 and its demonstrates our insurance brokerage activity. In addition, all contact data of ombudspersons shall be disclosed. The aforementioned are also responsible for representing your interests in the event of disputes. This broker information is accessible and can be downloaded at www.x-patrio.com/broker-information.
Only natural persons may use X-patrio. The aforementioned may also represent private companies or legal entities. You are obligated to state the information requested accurately and in a truthful manner, as well as update this information in the event that changes occur (e.g. visa status, address, telephone number, e-mail address, etc.). If X-patrio should suspect incorrect or incomplete information, it may block the use or terminate your access at any time. An entitlement to a user account or the use of X-patrio does not exist.
You agree to use X-patrio, the services offered herein, as well as the software used by X-patrio only for the appropriate purpose. X-patrio enables you to use the services provided by X-patrio. You may not change, process, license, link with other software, integrate in your own services or otherwise utilize X-patrio without seeking prior written consent of X-patrio’s Managing Director(s), or use for illegal or immoral purposes, the services offered herein and the software used by X-patrio (or parts thereof).
You are responsible for the safekeeping of your data (login, password, etc.) and you must keep this data confidential. X-patrio considers each act executed requiring the disclosure of your access data as an act performed by you. If you suspect misappropriation you must notify X-patrio at [email protected] immediately.
X-patrio may perform updates without prior notification at any time. X-patrio is entitled to discontinue and/or change X-patrio as well as other corresponding services. All contents featured on X-patrio, such as texts graphics, logos, images etc. are protected by the intangible property copyrights of X-patrio or third parties whose use is licensed by X-patrio. The user agreement with X-patrio and/or the use of X-patrio does not represent an entitlement to its rights. X-patrio is entitled to revoke your right to use X-patrio at any time and without stating a reason.
X-patrio only enters into contracts with insurance companies for you, or on your behalf upon your consent. As a result, you are entering the contract directly with the insurance company selected. If you want to request new insurance coverage through X-patrio, X-patrio shall obtain offers from one or more insurance carriers based on the data and information provided, and forward these offers to you. X-patrio provides the technical means for entering the contract. The contract is always executed between the insurance company and the insurance holder.
X-patrio may offers you to sign contracts with product partners e.g. insurance companies, as well as other documents by digital e-signature on X-patrio’s Website. You sign on the touchscreen of your device with your finger or an appropriate pen (stylus), or on the Website with the appropriate mouse function (or a stylus). This signature will then be placed at the appropriate place on the document to be signed. You agree and acknowledge that this signature method is equal to the written form pursuant to BGB § 126 (German Civil Code) within the scope of using X-patrio. If any product partner requires a physical signature, we will send you a printed document via e-mail or to the address in your account. In this case you are obliged to print out the document and send it back to X-patrio as a scanned copy.
Generally, all communication through X-patrio takes place electronically (e.g. via messaging, e-mail, etc.). You agree and acknowledge that this communication method is equal to the written form pursuant to BGB § 126 (German Civil Code) within the scope of using X-patrio.
You hereby grant X-patrio permission to record and store your activities as well as telephone conversations in X-patrio. If you do not agree, please notify X-patrio. The address and contact information is available in the Legal Notice and Broker Information. However, in this event, X-patrio will not be able to provide the (full) services offered by the company.
The regulations regarding the privacy act and data security are available in the GDPP and applicable Special Data Privacy Policies (“SDPP”) for dedicated services that are explicitly marked as such. In an effort to transfer the data as securely as possible, X-patrio encrypts the data using TLS 1.2 or a later version (Transport Layer Security). This type of encrypted data transfer applies especially to all personal data.
Your use of X-patrio is free of charge, if not mentioned explicitly different. Depending on how you access X-patrio, you may incur third party connectivity costs (i.e. costs imposed by an internet provider or telecom provider for internet use, roaming, etc.). You are responsible for covering these costs. X-patrio is financed by the fees imposed on product partners for the administration, management and brokering of contracts, e.g. insurance policies (customary brokerage fees and commissions).
In the event of negligent violation of contractual obligations resulting from these GTC, the liability of X-patrio is limited to the amount mandated by the lawmakers within the framework of mandatory insurance for insurance brokers based on § 34d section 2, Commercial Code, in cohesion with § 9, Insurance Broker Act. X-patrio agrees to maintain mandatory liability insurance for insurance brokers for the duration of its activities. You may want to view further information in the Broker Information.
Please be advised that the coverage amount and annual total included in the mandatory insurance is subject to adjustment every 5 years pursuant to the European consumer price index (EVP), and acknowledge the amount respectively valid mandatory insurance sum as the liability limit. If, in exceptional cases, a higher risk of damages exists in your opinion, please notify X-patrio. X-patrio will then attempt to achieve the desired increase. You must take responsibility for covering the expenses resulting from obtaining the increased amount.
Entitlements to damage claims resulting from these GTC, due to negligent obligation violations, are subject to a statute of limitation of three years. The statute of limitation becomes effective at the time you have become aware of the damages and the claimant, or if you should have been aware of the circumstance in absence of gross negligence.
Damage claims resulting from intent or gross negligence, or from injury to life, body or health are not subject to limitations of liability or shorter statutes of limitation, in these cases the statutory regulations shall apply exclusively.
X-patrio strives to make X-patrio accessible to you in the best possible manner. However, X-patrio cannot guarantee that you are able to access X-patrio at all times. X-patrio is not liable for any failures or disruptions due to technical reasons (such as faulty hardware, software, maintenance, etc.), or for circumstances beyond the control of X-patrio (such as higher powers, third party intervention, etc.).
X-patrio attempts to provide updated and accurate information, but does not provide an explicit or implicated guarantee or promise with regard to accurate, correct, reliable or complete information.
X-patrio does not guarantee or accept liability for contents offered by third parties, which are accessible on X-patrio (e.g. links to other websites). With regard to the relationship between X-patrio and you, insurance carriers are considered third parties as well. Therefore X-patrio shall not be liable for, or guarantee the information provided by insurance carriers and made available/accessible through X-patrio.
other third parties assisting us in fulfilling our obligations.
Please be advised that all information made available by X-partrio does not constitute (legal or tax) advice but is only aiming to facilitate independent user decisions.
All rights and obligations outlined in this contract shall be assumed by potential legal successors or entities purchasing X-patrio. This applies especially to the broker authorization and the customer’s consent with regard to his data.
If support services for the brokered or supported customer contracts are sold or transferred to another company, the customer will be notified in advance and in writing. If the customer does not declare his intent to terminate this contract within 3 weeks upon receipt of the memorandum it is considered consent to the transfer. The customer is to be advised of his right to terminate in the message.
If certain provisions in these GTC should be (or become) invalid in part or entirely, for any reason, the validity of the remaining provisions in these GTC shall not be affected. This also applies for the absence of provisions in these GTC.
Existing contracts shall also remain unaffected. X-patrio will replace the invalid or ineffective provision with a valid provision that meets the intent of the previous invalid provision.
If X-patrio enters supplemental agreements deviating from these GTC’s, these agreements must be documented in writing for validity. Otherwise the new provisions shall not be valid. This also applies to the written form clause as well.
We will send you the amended paragraphs or GTC in text form before the validity status becomes effective. We will advise you of the new paragraphs, as well as the planned date of effectiveness. The Law of the federal Republic of Germany shall apply. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, as well any international conflict rule shall be excluded as well as the conflict rules of the German international private law (Introductory Act to the German Civil Code "Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch", EGBGB).
Berlin shall be agreed upon as the exclusive legal venue for all legal disputes resulting from this contract. If other provisions are legally mandated, X-patrio shall oblige.
You have the right to withdraw from contracts you conclude with X-patrio or one of our partners if not stated differently within fourteen days without giving a reason. The withdrawal period is fourteen days from the date of contract.
To exercise your right, you have to let us, Expatrio Global Services, Friedrichstraße 194, 10117 Berlin, e-mail: [email protected], by way of an unambiguous statement (e.g. a letter sent by mail or e-mail) know about your decision to withdraw from this contract. You can use the withdrawal template in Annex I, however it is not mandatory to use this exact template.
The withdrawal deadline shall be met, if you send your statement, exercising the withdrawal right, before the end of the withdrawal period.
In the case of an effective cancellation the mutually received benefits are to be returned immediately.
Please note that this Policy only describes the data collection, processing and usage of your personal data that takes place in the context of the usage of www.x-patrio.com and related functions, as laid out in the General Terms and Conditions (GTC).
The party responsible for the collection, processing and use of data within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is X-patrio as the operator of the Website . The collection, storage, as well as the use of such information shall therefore only take place within the framework of the applicable laws.
You can revoke any of the consents to the collection, processing and use of personal data provided in this Policy in writing or by e-mail with effect for the future until further notice. In this case, we will cancel further processing and use of personal data, as well as block or delete these, unless we are obligated by regulations to further processing, and in particular, to further storage. Please note that the revocation of the consents given may lead to restricted access of X-patrio’s services or termination of X-patrio’s services and Website use. Please address your cancellation in writing to Expatrio Global Services GmbH, Friedrichstraße 194, 10117 Berlin, or by e-mail to [email protected].
We collect, process and use your personal data only in accordance with this Policy and the relevant data protection laws. According to the GDPR, personal data are any details of personal or factual circumstances of an identified or identifiable natural person such as name, address, e-mail address or telephone number and, if applicable, also usage data. Usage data is the data that is required for using our Websites, and includes information on the beginning, end and extent of use of our Website and registration information. Additionally, content data, such as scanned passports and picture uploads may be affected. Based on the features offered by the service X-patrio, special categories of personal data within the meaning of the GDPR may also be affected. Further data, such as health data if required for insurance products and data to comply with legal obligations (e.g. the German Anti Money Laundering Act "GwG") may be requested.
Your personal data may be processed on servers outside the European Union (“EU”) and the European Economic Community (“EEC”), that is outside the scope of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, dated October 24, 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ. EC No. L 281 p. 31).
Some of this data will be aggregated exclusively for statistical and technical reasons, which means that we will not be able to identify you individually.
In addition to the aforementioned and in order to be able to take full advantage of X-patrio’s services, you may have to voluntarily register, create an account and/or submit certain personal data along the process.
to respond to requests and questions from third parties to proceed your requests and purchases.
If you do not agree to the aforementioned Website analysis, you can disable Google Analytics with the help of a browser add-on. The add-on can be installed here: https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en.
Referral buttons (so-called social plug-ins / like-buttons) are provided on www.x-patrio.com by and allow users to share content with the social network facebook.com and instagram.com and their users.
The operator of this network is Facebook Inc., 1601 S. California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94304, U.S.A. (hereafter referred to as “Facebook”). The data protection friendly “Shariff” technology is used on www.x-patrio.com (see: http://www.heise.de/ct/ausgabe/2014-26-Social-Media-Buttons-datenschutzkonform-nutzen-2463330.html), which causes usage information (the user-recommended content, including date and time as well as the IP address of the user) to be transmitted to Facebook only in each individual case when the user operates the referral button. Facebook, not X-patrio, is responsible for the further handling of this information on Facebook. The purpose and scope of any further uses of the information by Facebook, and the respective rights and settings options for protecting the privacy of the user can be found in the Facebook data protection guidelines (available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php). If transferring of data to Facebook is not desired, the user must refrain from operating the referral button.
Plugins of the social network Instagram are also integrated into our webpages (provider:. Instagram, LLC ("Instagram")). By means of the use of Instagram, the web pages you visited will be linked with your Instagram account and made known to other users. This data is also thereby transmitted to Instagram. We point out that we, as providers of the sites, have no knowledge of the content of the transmitted data and their use by Instagram. For more information, please see the privacy statement of Instagram at https://help.instagram.com/155833707900388.
If it serves the investigation of an unlawful use of X-patrio or it is necessary for litigation, personal information will be forwarded to law enforcement agencies and, where appropriate, to injured third parties. This, however, will only be done if there is concrete evidence of an unlawful or improper use.
A transfer can also take place if this serves the enforcement of the GTC or other agreements. X-patrio is also legally obliged to provide information to certain public bodies, upon request. These are law enforcement authorities pursuing fines for proven offences and the tax authorities.
Occasionally, we rely on contractually bound external companies and external service providers in order to provide our services, for example customer services or the hosting of www.x-patrio.com. In such cases, the information is passed on to these companies or individuals to enable further processing. These trusted external service providers are carefully selected by us and checked regularly to ensure that your privacy is maintained. They may use your data exclusively for the purposes specified by us. Moreover, they are contractually bound by us to treat your information in accordance with this Policy and German data protection laws.
www.x-patrio.com may contain links to the pages of other providers. Since X-patrio has no influence on these websites, the user is advised to inquire about the information on data protection possibly offered there. X-patrio takes no responsibility for the content of linked pages.
We are committed to maintaining the security of personal data at all time. In order for the data to be transferred as securely as possible, X-patrio uses an encryption with TLS 1.2 or a later version (transport layer security). This type of encrypted data transmission particularly applies to all personal data. However, the transmission of information via the Internet is not completely secure and therefore we cannot guarantee the security of data transmitted via the Internet to our Website. We secure our Website and other systems against loss, destruction, access, modification or distribution of your data by unauthorized persons, using latest technical and organizational standards.
If your data is no longer required for the aforementioned purposes, they will be deleted, as far as permitted by applicable law as X-patrio might be obliged to store certain data. When you delete your user account, your profile will be deleted completely and permanently. If data must be retained for legal reasons, it will be inaccessible. The data is then no longer available for further use.
You have the right to receive information about the data stored by us related to you, upon request. Furthermore, you have the right to correct, block and delete inaccurate data. To do so, please contact [email protected] or by post at the following address: Expatrio Global Services GmbH (X-patrio), Friedrichstraße 194, 10117 Berlin.
through your continued dealing and use of the Website.


text:
League: 27,968 v. QPR (Division 2), August 20, 1969.
FA Cup: 34,099 v. Manchester United (4th round), February 3, 1969.
League Cup: 27,656 v. Nottingham Forest (semi-final, 2nd leg), January 30, 1979.
UEFA Cup: 21,457 v. Kaiserslautern (1st round, 2nd leg), September 28, 1983.
League: £440,349.57 v. Chelsea (Premier League), September 18, 1999.
FA Cup: £189,799.13 v. Sheffield Wednesday (3rd round), January 3, 1998.
League Cup: £181,968.50 v. Tottenham (2nd round), September 21, 1994.
Paid: £3,250,000 to West Bromwich Albion for Nathan Ellington, August 29, 2007.
Most in League: 92, Division 4, 1959/60.
Southern League: 21 - Bertie Banks (Division 2) 1903/04.
Football League: 42 - Cliff Holton (Division 4) 1959/60.
FA Cup: 7 - Charlie Hare, 1899/1900, and George James, 1930/31.
League Cup: 7 - Luther Blissett, 1978/79.
UEFA Cup: 3 - Ian Richardson and Wilf Rostron, 1983/84.
Overall: 186 - Luther Blissett, 1976-1992.
Football League: 148 - Luther Blissett, 1976-1992.
FA Cup: 16 - Tommy Barnett, 1928-39.
League Cup: 17 - Luther Blissett, 1976-91.
Southern League: 6 - Harry Barton v. Wycombe Wanderers (Division 2), September 26, 1903.
Football League: 5 - Eddie Mummery v. Newport County (Division 3 South), January 5, 1924.
FA Cup: 5 - Thomas Ashbridge v. Bournemouth (not the present Football League club), 4th qualifying round, November 29, 1913.
League Cup: 3 - Ross Jenkins v. Nottingham Forest (4th round), October 28, 1980.
3 - John Barnes v. Cardiff City (2nd round, 1st leg), September 25, 84.
UEFA Cup: 2 - Ian Richardson v. Kaiserslautern (1st round, 2nd leg), September 28, 1983 (his first team debut).
Overall: 503 - Luther Blissett (451+52 as sub) 1976-92.
League: 415 - Luther Blissett (369+46 as sub) 1976-92.
FA Cup: 44 - Wilf Rostron (43+1 as sub) 1980-88.
League Cup: 44 - Luther Blissett (41+3 as sub) 1976-92.
UEFA Cup: 6 - John Barnes, Nigel Callaghan, Richard Jobson (5+1 as sub), Wilf Rostron and Steve Sherwood.
Southern League Division One: 1st (1914/15).
Southern League Division Two: 1st (1899/1900 and 1903/04).
Football League Division Three (South): 4th (1936/37, 1937/38, 1938/39 and 1953/54).
Football League Division Four: 1st (1977/78).
Football League Division Three: 1st (1968/69).
Football League Division Two: 1st (1997/98).
Football League Division One/Premiership: 2nd (1982/83).
UEFA Cup: 3rd round (1983/84).
Southern League: Home: 11-0 v. Maidenhead (Division 2), February 24, 1900.
Away: 6-1 v. Old St. Stephens (Division 2), April 13, 1898.
6-3 v. Merthyr Town (Division 1), March 13, 1920.
Football League: Home: 8-2 v. Newport County (Division 3 South), January 5, 1924.
8-0 v. Sunderland (Division 1), September 25, 1982.
Away: 7-4 v. Torquay United (Division 3 South), April 10, 1937.
7-4 v Burnley (Championship), April 5, 2003.
10-0 v. Bournemouth (not the present Football League club), (4th qualifying round), November 29, 1913.
10-1 v. Lowestoft (1st round), November 27, 1926.
Away: 6-0 v. Redhill (3rd qualifying round), October 31, 1903.
6-0 v. Worcester City (1st round), January 13, 1906.
6-0 v. Newport, Isle of Wight (1st round), November 17, 1956.
League Cup: Home: 8-0 v. Darlington (2nd round, 2nd leg), September 6, 1987.
Away: 4-0 v. Leeds United (3rd round), October 31, 1984.
UEFA Cup: Home: 3-0 v. Kaiserslautern (1st round, 2nd leg), September 28, 1983.
Away: 3-1 v. Levski Spartak (2nd round, 2nd leg), November 2, 1983.
Youngest player: Keith Mercer, 16 years, 125 days v. Tranmere Rovers, February 16, 1973.
Oldest player: Southern League: John Goodall, 44 years, 87 days v. Bradford Park Avenue, September 14, 1907.
Football League (including FA Premiership): Alec Chamberlain, 42 years, 327 days v. Newcastle United, May 13, 2007.
HORNETS PLAYER OFFER: £10 FOR 12 MONTHS!
All materials on this website © Watford Football Club & FLPTV Ltd.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
We guide clients through trade regulation and competition issues with practical advice and sound judgment, designed to help our clients achieve their business goals.
Businesses are confronted daily with existing and new competition. And just as competition grows, so do new and developing laws governing competition and competitive practices.
Our goal is to keep our clients out ahead of future business issues and potential disputes.
You need intuitive, clear counseling to compete effectively and lawfully. We deliver informed advice on competition issues based on decades of experience. As business partners, we focus on how best to achieve our clients’ goals with an eye toward streamlining the counseling process and, when necessary, limiting potential litigation risk.
We counsel domestic and foreign companies and individuals on virtually every kind of antitrust issue arising under state, federal and international antitrust laws, unfair competition statutes and common law tortious interference claims.
We represent clients in all phases of litigation in federal and state courts, in criminal antitrust investigations by federal and state agencies and in grand jury and other criminal proceedings. We also have extensive experience in mergers and acquisitions, including HSR filings and investigations by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice.
We have broad experience in conducting internal antitrust investigations and regularly provide antitrust audits and compliance programs.
Domestic and foreign companies and individuals involved in broadcasting, manufacturing, education, health care, publishing and retailing industries.
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, United States District Court, Northern District of California, MDL No. 3:07-MD-1827 SI, Eastman Kodak Company v. Epson Imaging Devices Corp., et al., Case No. 3:10-cv-5452 SI (2010). Represented Kodak as plaintiff in price-fixing claim against manufacturers of LCD Panels, alleging damages as an indirect purchaser of digital cameras containing LCD Panels. Settled on eve of trial.
Precision Associates et al. v. Panalpina World Transport et al., United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 08-cv-00042, 2010. Representing defendants MOL Logistics (Japan) and MOL Logistics (USA) in this purported class action. Plaintiffs alleged that our clients were part of alleged Japan-based and worldwide conspiracies to fix the price of freight forwarding services to, from, or into the U.S.
State of Arizona v. Gannett Co., Inc., et al., United States District Court, Arizona, 2009. Represented Gannett in a suit brought by the state of Arizona seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction against the company’s closure of the Tucson Citizen newspaper. The state alleged that the closure would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Arizona’s antitrust statute. The court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and the state dismissed its action.
Washington Alder LLC v. Weyerhaeuser Company, United States District Court, Oregon, Case No. CV 03-753-PA, 2007. Represented defendant in case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization. Competitor sawmill alleged that leading producer of alder lumber monopolized the market for alder saw logs by overpaying for logs to harm competitors and engaging in other exclusionary conduct. Favorable jury verdict followed by settlement.
SPI Supplies v. Eastman Kodak Company, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007. Represented Eastman Kodak Company in antitrust challenge to exclusive dealing arrangements and termination of distributor, as well as breach of contract claims. Case settled shortly before oral argument on second motion to dismiss for an extremely low payment and plaintiff agreed to stop certain trademark use that was not at issue in the case.
State of New York et al. v. Reebok International Ltd., 96 F3d 44, 2d Cir., 1996. Represented Reebok in investigation of its resale pricing practices by the Federal Trade Commission and National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), resulting in new law, helpful to Reebok, on the breadth of NAAG’s powers.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
(a) Dhanaram (PW-1) and his deceased younger brother Gunaram were running a Pawn Broking & Jewellery Shop in the name and style of 'Balaji Pawn Brokers' at No.1, 13th Street, Sakthi Nagar, the place of occurrence.
"INJURIES: (1) Oblique incised wound seen over lower part of front and side of the neck measuring 11 x 3 cm., the left side end of the incised wound is acute and lies 1.5 cm to the left of midline. The incised wound extends to the right side of the neck crossing the midline below the thyroid cartilage to a point 6 cm below the right side mastoid process. Tailing seen at this point to a length of 3.5 cm. The margins of the wound are clean cut. On front the lower end of the Incised wound lies 4 cm above the suprasternal notch. The upper border of the incised wound lies 6.5 cm below the chin.
(11) Incised wounds 2 x 0.4 x skin deep over front of right index finger in proximal phalynx (12) Incised wound 0.5 x 0.3 x skin deep over front of middle of right middle finger (13) Scratch abrasions 4 x 0.2 cm seen on front of upper part of neck.
(16) On dissection on the head; Dark Red contusion 5 x 4 cm x 0.5 cm on back of head in the occipital region."
As to the cause of death, which is relevant under Section 7 of the Evidence Act, Dr.Selvakumar (PW-21) has stated that 'the deceased would appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to cut injury to the neck.'.
(n) Sahadevan (PW-27), Inspector of Police, Pallikaranai Police Station (hereinafter referred to as 'Pallikkaranai Inspector') took up the investigation in Cr.No.925 of 2012 and during interrogation, the accused disclosed about his involvement in this case. His confession statement was recorded and based on the disclosure made by him, in the presence of Chittibabu (not examined) and Balaji (PW-22), Pallikkaranai Inspector (PW-27) recovered 32 pieces of Gold Covering Chains (MO-1 series) and a T-Shirt with blue and ash colour horizontal stripes (MO-4) from the residence of Jaishankar (PW-13), a Police Constable, whose sister-in-law (wife's sister) was in love with the accused and was slated to marry him shortly.
e) The recording continuously goes on till the arrival of the police and thereafter (13:30 Hrs)."
"Item 5 We have carefully examined the face of the male individual wearing the T-Shirt in the Video footage (Item-5) at the time between 11.20 and 11.41 with a male individual seen in items 1, 2 and 3 using morphological study.
OBSERVATION The asymmetric eye brows, the deep root of the nose and the broad bridge of the nose seen in the face of the male individual in items 1, 2 and 3 are well correlated with the corresponding features seen in the face of the male individual in item 5.
OPINION The male individual seen in items 1, 2 and 3 could possibly have belonged to the male individual seen in item 5."
3. On appearance of the accused before the trial Court, provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. were complied with and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions in S.C.No.142 of 2013 and was made over to the III Additional District and Sessions Court, Tiruvallur @ Poonamallee, where charges for the offences under Sections 449, 302, 392 and 404 IPC were framed. When questioned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty".
Conviction u/s Sentence imposed 449 IPC 10 years R.I.
392 IPC 10 years R.I.
404 IPC 3 years R.I.
302 IPC Death Sentence The sentences of imprisonment imposed for the offences under Sections 449, 392 and 404 IPC were ordered to run concurrently.
"A fact is said to be proved/disproved when, after considering the matters before it ............"
(emphasis supplied) Without viewing the CCTV footage, how can any Court, "consider the matter before it " to conclude that a fact has been 'proved' or 'disproved' ? That apart, Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states, "Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court."
11. Dhanaram (PW-1) deposed that his deceased brother Gunaram and he were into Pawn Broking and Jewellery business and were running 'Balaji Pawn Broking' at No.1, 13th Street, Sakthi Nagar; that on 14.4.2012 the deceased Gunaram opened the shop around 8.00 a.m. and around 9.00 a.m. he went to the shop and was there for some time, and later went to Sriram Finance, Virugambakkam; and that when he returned back to the shop, he found his brother on the floor in a pool of blood. When he raised an alarm, people from the neighbouring shop viz., Sahadev Prohith (PW-2), Varadarajan (PW-3), Selvi (PW-4), Kumar (PW-5) and Ashok (PW-7) gathered. It is not the case of the Prosecution that these witnesses had seen the assailant. PW-1 Dhanaram has further stated that the Police immediately played the Video Recorder and in the footage played he saw the accused. He also identified the 32 pieces of Gold Covering Chains (MO-1 Series) while in the witness box.
12. The fact that Gunaram's death was homicidal has been proved beyond any pale of doubt by the Prosecution, and that is also not seriously disputed by the defence. The only question that requires to be decided is, whether the accused was the perpetrator of the crime ?
(b) The next incriminating circumstance is the recovery of 32 pieces of Gold Covering Chains (MO-1 series) and horizontally striped T-Shirt (MO-4) by PW-27 from the residence of Jaishankar (PW-13) at the instance of the accused. At this juncture it may be relevant to discuss the evidence of Jaishankar (PW-13). PW-13 has deposed that he is a Police Constable in Nungambakkam Police Station and is living with his wife Kavitha and two children in the Police Quarters in the Thousandlights area; that his wife's sister Anjali was in love with the accused and wanted to marry him; that the accused would frequently come to his house and stay with them; that the accused told them that he needs money to go to Canada for higher studies, for which Jaishankar (PW-13) pledged his wife's jewellery and gave him Rs.9 lakhs on loan. Whileso, on 13.5.2012, Pallikaranai Police brought the accused to his house and seized 400 grams of jewellery and a T-Shirt; that he identified the covering jewellery as MO-1 Series and T-Shirt as MO-4; and that, on 18.5.2012 the Inspector of Police Maduravoyal Police Station brought the accused to his house and recovered a Jeans Pant (MO-3) and a knife (MO-5) in the presence of Mareeswaran (PW-14) and Manoharan (not examined).
23. Assuming for a moment that the photographs were taken in breach of certain procedural law, can it in any way vitiate the action ? In American jurisprudence, illegally collected evidence is best described as "fruit of the poisonous tree" and American Courts frown upon them (See: Nardone v. United States, 60 S.Ct. 266). The 94th Law Commission Report suggested to the Parliament to bring in similar provisions into our Legal System, which was not accepted by the Parliament. In State of M.P. through CBI, V. Paltan Mallah ((2005) 3 SCC 169 : 2005 (1) CTC 457 (SC)), the Supreme Court has discussed the 94th Law Commission Report and has categorically held that the evidence collected illegally or in violation of the procedural law will not become inadmissible. Very recently in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P. ((2013) 10 SCC 591), the aforesaid principle was reiterated in connection with photographs and tape-recordings. Of course, it would have been an ideal situation had the Police adhered to PSO 646 or the provisions of Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, but the ground reality is, Police in India do not work in ideal situations. In K.Ramaraj v. State by Inspector of Police, CBCID, Chennai ((2014) 2 MLJ (Crl) 41), a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (PNPJ) was a party, deprecated the practice of Police taking photographs of the accused in the Police Station. The Court however did not hold that the photographs so taken becomes incapable of being used by the Experts for their analysis and opinion.
26. As a prelude, we feel it will be appropriate to quote the following passage from the book "Law of Evidence" by the celebrated author Vepa P.Sarathi (6th Edition, page 208). We quote, "The law, it is said, walks a respectable distance behind science, but courts try to keep abreast. The criminal is quick to use science to commit ingenious crimes, and so the police and the courts should be no less innovative; and courts should always encourage the police to do so and admit the evidence collected by any innovative method. The law courts can play an important role by (1) taking expert evidence to see whether the best scientific methods have been used, (2) by the Judge scrutinising the evidence carefully, and (3) encouraging the scientists, when the evidence is reliable, by giving judicial recognition to his methods."
27. Criminal Justice Delivery System is built upon the episodic memory of witnesses and their capacity to translate the data stored in their memory into human language, for the purpose of communication and understanding by the Judge for rendering justice. Episodic memory is broadly described by Prof.Sen Cheng from RUHR University, Bosch, Germany as "fairly accurate representation of personally experienced episodes." To put it in short, the opthalmic and auditory senses in human beings capture events and store them as memory in the brain. Thereafter the events can be narrated orally via a language. That is why, perhaps Jeremy Benthem called Witnesses as "eyes and ears of Justice" (See: State of M.P. v. Dharkole, 2004 AIR SCW 6241).
Words were put into the mouths of men who had been silent spectators during the whole short episode; actions were attributed to the chief participants of which not the slightest trace existed; and essential parts of the tragi-comedy were completely eliminated from the memory of a number of witnesses. Hence, the Professor concluded: We never know whether we remember, perceive, or imagine ."
"As a measure of crime control, the Government felt that Closed Circuit Television Units (CCTV) should be installed in all public buildings, commercial establishments and places where large gatherings of public congregate, which will be made mandatory as a condition for issuing licence under relevant provisions of Municipal Corporation/ Municipal Rules."
By virtue of these Rules, now it has become mandatory for Public Buildings to install CCTV cameras. Apart from the law's compulsion, presence of lensmen with sophisticated cameras is ubiquitous. We also have in abundance camera buffs who love recording anything and everything for posting in Facebook and Whatsapp. The Police cannot afford to lose these evidences collected by individuals and instead, rely upon archaic method of collecting evidence. Very recently in Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused for the failure of the Police to produce the CCTV recordings, that being the best evidence. It may be necessary here to quote the relevant paragraph from the said judgment, which reads thus, "28. .............. Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the prosecution in possession of the best evidence, CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced."
District Police, 05 Office Expenses, 06 Investigation Charges, (DP Code 2055 00-109AA 0565)"
For Chennai City: "2055-00 - Police-108 State Head Quarters Police-1 Non Plan AA - Commissioner of Police, 05 Office Expenses 06 Investigation Charges, (DP Code 2055 00-108AA 0565)"
"the expressions "Certifying Authority", "electronic signature", "Electronic signature Certificate", "electronic form", "electronic records", "information", "secure electronic record", "secure electronic signature" and "subscriber" shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Information Technology Act, 2000."
"2(i) "computer" means any electronic, magnetic, optical or other highspeed data processing device or system which performs logical, arithmetic and memory functions by manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, computer software or communication facilities which are connected or related to the computer in a computer system or computer network."
2(o) "data" means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions which are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalised manner, and is intended to be processed, is being processed or has been processed in a computer system or computer network, and may be in any form (including computer printouts magnetic or optical storage media, punched cards, punched tapes) or stored internally in the memory of the computer".
"2(r) "electronic form", with reference to information, means any information generated, sent, received or stored in media, magnetic, optical, computer memory, micro film, computer generated micro fiche or similar device."
"2(t) "electronic record" means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche."
33. Strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/accused on the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.V.Anvar vs. P.K.Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, where interpretation of Section 65A and 65B of the Indian Evidence Act came up for consideration and the Supreme Court held that an electronic evidence recorded in the CD, bereft of a certification under Section 65B is inadmissible in evidence. In para 24 of the said ruling it is held as follows, "24. The situation would have been different had the appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available in evidence, the CDs used for announcement and songs. Had those CDs used for objectionable songs or announcements been duly got seized through the police or Election Commission and had the same been used as primary evidence, the High Court could have played the same in court to see whether the allegations were true. That is not the situation in this case. The speeches, songs and announcements were recorded using other instruments and by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom which were produced in court, without due certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in evidence since the mandatory requirements of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act are not satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act."
Defence will always complain of manipulation, but Courts can reject fanciful objections bearing in mind the principle underlined in Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. De omnibus dubitandum (doubt everything) philosophy may be a road to scientific discoveries, but not for judicial enquiries, where perfect proof is utopion. The celebrated Jurist late lamented Nani Palkhivala commented, "Our Legal System has made life too easy for criminals and too difficult for law abiding citizens. A touch here and push there and India may become ungovernable under the present Constitutional Set up."
"On playing back the recording continuously on the incident date 14.4.2012, the sequence of events that transpired (murder incident) are tabulated sequentially."
38. After playing the video and examining PW-6 the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with respect to the evidence of PW-6 before us and the incident seen in the video recording, to which he gave standard replies, 'Lie'.
"404. Dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death.- Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use property, knowing that such property was in the possession of a deceased person at the time of that person's decease, and has not since been in the possession of any person legally entitled to such possession, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and if the offender at the time of such person's decease was employed by him as a clerk or servant, the imprisonment may extend to seven years."
Section 404 IPC falls within the sub-Chapter 'Of Criminal misappropriation of property' under the main Chapter XVII - 'Of Offences against Property'. From a reading of Section 404 IPC, it is clear that the ingredients of it cannot fit within the definition of the word "theft" or "robbery". This section applies to a situation where a person in a sly manner appropriates to himself a property in the possession of the deceased person at the time of his death. We are fortified in our view by the Division Bench Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jamnadas Parashram v. The State of M.P., AIR 1963 M.P. 106, wherein in paragraph 34 it is held thus, "34. An argument arose during the course of the hearing whether the facts constituted an offence under Section 392 or under Section 404, Indian Penal Code. The basis for the argument was that in order to constitute 'robbery' all the elements of theft must exist and one of the ingredients of that offence, as defined in Sec.378 of the Penal Code is that the property stolen must have been in the possession of a "person". Now, in a case such as the one at hand it is difficult to hold precisely whether the articles were stolen before the murder or after it. In case the properties were taken by Jamnadas only after Mr.Raghuram breathed his last and was a dead body, could it be said that the offence committed was theft ? This argument at first appeared attractive (and we may also say that in another set of circumstances it may possibly be given effect to) but on a little reflection we find that where murder and robbery are committed in the course of the same transaction by the same person, the offence would fall under Sec.392 and not under Sec.404. In that context, the word "person" cannot be so narrowly construed as to exclude the dead body of a human being who was killed in the course of the same transaction in which theft was committed. The matter would be different if a thing is stolen from a dead body apart from the transaction in which death occurred. In our opinion, therefore, the offence committed by Jamnadas is punishable under Section 392, Indian Penal Code, and not under Section 404 of the Code."
41. Now we have to address the unenviable aspect of the case viz., the sentence. Mr.M.Jagadeesan, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/accused fervently and passionately submitted that the accused is an engineering graduate and there are possibilities of reformation. He also submitted that this is not "Rarest of Rare case" for sentencing the accused to gallows.

matches: v. V. v. v. v. v. v.