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James P. Hellen, for plaintiff in error.
W. J. Hendrick, for defendant in error.
The record does not show that it was also incorporated under any law of Indiana, but the company alleged that, being incorporated by the laws of Kentucky, it was granted certain powers and privileges under the laws of Indiana; though it was not denied that the company actually constructed and now owned and operated the bridge and approaches under its Kentucky charter. It was, moreover, averred that the company built its bridge under and in accordance with the act of congress of December 17, 1872 (17 Stat. 398, c. 4), entitled 'An act to authorize the construction of bridges across the Ohio river, and to prescribe the dimensions of the same,' which provided that any such bridge should be recognized as a post route; and the act supplementary to that act approved February 14, 1883 (22 Stat. 414, c. 44).
It appeared that the bridge company owned 9.46 miles of railroad and .65 of a mile of siding, making its railroad connections in Indiana, which property was assessed for taxation in that state at $627,660; that the length of the bridge in the two states, measured by feet, was one-third in Indiana and two-thirds in Kentucky; that the tangible property of the company was assessed in Henderson county, Ky., at $649,735.54; that the capital stock of the company was $1,000,000, and that it had issued bonds to the amount of $2,000,000.
From the evidence before them, the board of valuation and assessment placed the value of the company's entire property at $2,900,000, and deducted therefrom $627,660 for the tangible property assessed in Indiana, which left $2,272,340, of which two-thirds, or $1,514,893, was held to be the entire value of the property is Kentucky. From this, $649,735.54, the value of the tangible property in Henderson county, was deducted, and the remainder, $865,157.46, was fixed by the board as the value of the company's franchise.
The state circuit court rendered judgment in favor of the commonwealth for $595, which was reversed by the court of appeals, which held the commonwealth entitled to recover the full amount. 31 S. W. 486. The cause having been remanded, and judgment entered accordingly, by the circuit court, and affirmed by the court of appeals, this writ of error was sued out.
The company was chartered by the state of Kentucky to build and operate a bridge, and the state could properly include the franchises it had granted in the valuation of the company's property for taxation. Central Pac. R. Co. v. People of State of California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 766. The regulation of tolls for transportation over the bridge considered in Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, presented an entirely different question.
Clearly, the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such business. That business was carried on by the persons and corporations which paid the bridge company tolls for the privilege of using the bridge. The fact that the tax in question was to some extent affected by the amount of the tolls received, and therefore might be supposed to increase the rate of tolls, is too remote and incidental to make it a tax on the business transacted. This very question was decided in New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 439, 15 Sup. Ct. 896, 899, where it was said: 'It is argued that the imposition of a tax on tolls might lead to increasing them in an effort to throw their burden on the carrying company. Such a result is merely conjectural, and, at all events, too remote and indirect to be an interference with interstate commerce. The interference with the commercial power must be direct, and not the mere incidental effect of the requirement of the usual proportional contribution to public maintenance.' The only franchises treated here as the subject of taxation were those granted by the state of Ientucky. So far as the state of Indiana could be said to have conferred any franchise upon the company, it was a franchise that inhered in that portion of the structure that was within the state of Indiana, the value of which was not included in the tax complained of.
The acts of congress conferred no right or franchise on the company to erect the bridge or collect tolls for its use. They merely regulated the height of bridges over that river, and the width of their spans, in order that they might not interfere with its navigation. The declaration that such bridges should be regarded as post roads did not interfere with the right of the state to impose taxes, as was decided in Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 700, 14 Sup. Ct. 1094. The contrary view would withdraw from the taxing power of the states nearly all the railroads and stage routes throughout the country.
The tax in controversy was nothing more than a tax on the intangible property of the company in Kentucky, and was sustained as such by the court of appeals, as consistent with the provisions of the constitution of Kentucky in reference to taxation.
And for the reasons given, and on the authorities cited in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, we are unable to conclude that the method of taxation prescribed by the statute of Kentucky, and followed in making this assessment, is in violation of the constitution of the United States.
The plaintiff in error, the Henderson Bridge Company, owns and operates a bridge across the Ohio river from Henderson, Ky., to the Indiana shore. This bridge is largely occupied by railroad tracks, used, necessarily, solely for interstate commerce. On the Kentucky side there is an approach, and one also on the Indiana side, consisting of an embankment and a siding about nine miles in length. The corporation was chartered by the state of Kentucky. The general laws of the state of Indiana provide for the recognition of any corporation 'created by the laws of another state for constructing a bridge across any river or stream forming in whole or in part the boundary between such other state and this state.' It directs also the filing of a copy of the charter in Indiana, and subjects the charter of the corporation to the exercise by the state of Indiana of the power to repeal, alter, or amend. The bridge in question was also authorized by act of congress, and was established as a post route. 17 Stat. 398, as amended by 22 Stat. 414. Whether the operation of the Indiana legislation was to make the bridge company an Indiana corporation need not be considered. It is certain, however, from the facts just stated, that the bridge company possessed—First, a franchise to exist as a corporation from the state of Kentucky, and under this franchise to build and operate the bridge to the Indiana line,—that is, two-thirds of its length, second, that it also possessed a franchise or right from the state of Indiana, whether a corporation under the Indiana laws or not, to build and operate the bridge and its approaches in so far as these structures were to be located in that state; third, a franchise or right derived from the United States to operate the bridge for purposes of interstate commerce, and as a post route. None of these franchises were incompatible the one with be other, and all were of such a nature as to be of value to the corporation.
The laws of the state of Kentucky under which the tax in question was levied are set out in extenso in the opinion of the court in Weir v. Norman (this day decided) 17 Sup. Ct. 527, and I therefore content myself with a brief statement thereof. The sections referred to are as numbered and contained in Barbour & Carroll's compilation of the Kentucky Statutes in force in 1894.
Section 4019 fixes the rate of taxation and the various purposes for which taxes may be imposed. Section 4020 defines the general subjects of taxation; that is to say, the objects upon which the rate of taxation provided in the previous section are to be levied. This latter section provides that 'all real and personal estate within this state, and all personal estate of persons residing in this state, and of all corporations organize under the laws of this state, whether the property be in or out of this state, including intangible property, which shall be considered and estimated in fixing the value of corporate franchises as hereinafter provided, shall be subject to taxation unless the same be exempt,' etc.
It is manifest that this section clearly designates the objects of taxation to be as follows: (a) All real and personal estate within this state; (b) all personal estate of persons residing within the state; (c) all the property of corporations organized under the law of the state, whether such property be in or out of the state, including the intangible propery of such corporations, which property,—that is, the intangible property, whether situated in or out of the state, shall be considered and estimated in fixing the value of the corporate franchises.
The statutes of Kentucky provide, as a general rule, for the assessment by the local or county officials of all real and personal property of individuals or corporations in the county where the property is situated or the corporation established. The franchise tax embraced in the last of the foregoing enumeration is not assessed by the local authorities, but by a board of valuation and assessment, composed of the state auditor, treasurer, and secretary of state, for it is said in section 4077, 'The auditor, treasurer and secretary of state are hereby constituted a board of valuation and assessment for fixing the value of said franchises,' and a subsequent sentence makes the state auditor the chairman of the board. Section 4078 compels a return to this board, showing the amount of capital stock, preferred and common; the number of shares; the amount of stock paid up; the par and real value thereof; the highest price at which such stock was sold at a bona fide sale within the next 12 months before the day on which the statement is required to be made; the amount of surplus and undivided profit; the value of all assets; the total amount of principal indebtedness; the amount of gross or net earnings or income, including interest on investments and income from all sources for 12 months; the amount and kind of tangible property in the state, and where situated, 'assessed or liable to assessment in the state,' and the fair cash value thereof estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale; and such other facts as the auditor may require. Section 4079 provides, if the corporation have a line or lines extending beyond the limits of the state, the statement must also show the length of the entire line owned, leased, or controlled in the state, and the entire line of the same company elsewhere. If the corporation be organized under the laws of any other state, or under the laws of Kentucky. but conduct its business in Kentucky as well as in other states, the statement is required to show the gross or net income or earnings received in the state and out of the state on business done in the state, and the entire gross receipts of the company in the state and elsewhere during twelve months.
The first question which arises is, was the tax levied on the franchise of the corporation? In solving this question it will serve only to confuse and delude the reason if the method which has been pursued in argument is now followed; that is, of calling the levy a franchise tax in one breath, and then in the next dropping that designation, and not only denominating the tax, but treating it as solely a tax on intangible property. If the words 'intangible roperty' be synonymous with 'franchise,' there is no reason for shifting the name by which the object taxed is designated. If, on the contrary, intangible property and franchise are two different objects, then to call the tax first by one and then by the other name gives rise not only to inaccuracy, but to misapprehension.
But, clear as is the statute in its every line, the pleadings of the state, by which this suit was commenced, are, if possible, more so. The declaration, after reciting the levy of the assessment by the board, and stating the total amount, adds that it is the sum 'which said board of valuation and assessment fixed as the value of the franchise of said defendant company.' The language of the statute and the averment of the petition are, moreover, supported by the opinion of the highest court of the state of Kentucky, from which this case comes to this court, wherein it is announced that the tax is on the franchise. I shall quote from the opinion hereafter.
First, is it exclusively on the franchise to exist as a corporation granted by the laws of Kentucky? or, second, is it also a tax on the franchise enjoyed by the corporation from the United States, and likewise on the one accorded to the corporation by the state of Indiana, and, in addition, is the tax a burden laid directly by the state upon the interstate commerce business carried on by the corporation? If it is solely on the first of these objects of taxation, of course it was within the power of the state to assess and levy it. Central Pac. R. Co. v. People of State of California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 766. On the other hand, if the tax is levied on all or either of the subject-matters of taxation embraced in the second enumeration, it violates the constitution. California v. California Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 2, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, and authorities cited and referred to in the dissenting opinion in Sanford v. Poe, 17 Sup. Ct. 305.
The issue, then, is, was this franchise tax levied solely upon the franchise granted by the state of Kentucky to exist as a corporation, or was it upon all the franchises of the company, and upon all its interstate commerce business? It cannot be that the Kentucky law contemplated that the assessment which it ordained should be only on the franchise to exist as a corporation derived from that state, since the statute commands that the tax shall be laid upon all corporations doing business in the state, whether or not they hold a franchise to be a corporation from the state of Kentucky. This is shown to be the fact on the very face of the statutes, and this test was made decisive by this court, as shown in the foregoing citation from the opinion in Philadelphia & Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania.
Let me turn to the particular provisions of the statute, and ascertain upon what it commands the tax to be levied. Section 4020, in enumerating the objects of taxation which shall be assessed as part of the franchise, provides for all intangible property to be thus included in the franchise, whether the property be in or out of the state. Can it be said, when the law in mandatory terms directs the inclusion in the franchise to be assessed of property, whether in or out of the state, that it means that only the franchise granted by the state to a corporation to exist and such shall be assessed? Examine the other sections of the law,—4077, 4078, 4079, 4080,—and it is apparent that they also provide that the board shall consider the entire value of the corporate property, everything that it owns, in ascertaining the value of the franchise, which is the thing to be taxed. Now, when the law says that in taxing the franchise the board shall include therein all the intangible property of the corporation, whether within or without the state, and, moreover, in subsequent provisions imposes on the board the duty not simply of considering all the property in and out of the state, but imperatively says that the assessment of the franchise shall contain all this property, it seems to me that it is impossible with reason to say that the assessment which the law required was one only on the franchise to exist as a corporation granted by the state, and was not levied on the value of the franchise made up by assessing every right which the corporation possessed, whether in or out of the state, or whether conferred by the United States or the state of Indiana.
As by the statute the value of the taxable franchise was to be ascertained by taking the sum determined to be the worth of the capital stock, as that term was employed in the statute, less the amount of property otherwise taxed, which was to be deducted, it follows that the franchise was embraced in the amount of this total. As the franchise was included in the total, it also results, as the part is contained in the whole, that the elements which entered into and formed a part of the total were, therefore, elements of value entering into and forming part of the taxable franchise.
Thus the president of the board declares that the total sum out of which the taxable value of the franchise was to be ascertained was fixed at nearly two millions of dollars above the par value of the stock of the company, because the gross (not the net) earnings of the company derived from its entire interstate commerce business—its business done in Indiana as well as in Kentucky—were all treated as one. The further result of the testimony is that, because by so considering these gross earnings they established that the company realized a sum which would pay 6 per cent. upon its bonds and 7 per cent. upon the par of its capital stock, therefore the gross amount, in which the franchise was included, was fixed at $2,900,000.
In passing it is worthy of remark that the record contains no explanation of how it could have been found that the gross earnings could have produced the result stated, in view of the fact that none of the operating expenses of the corporation were taken into consideration, and that no allowance was even made for the payment of the sum of the tax which the board proceeded to assess. Can it be said, in face of the fact that the assessing officer declares that, although in making up the total amount every right possessed by the corporation and all the results of its interstate business were made the basis of the valuation, yet that the sum so made up embraced only the mere right of the corporation to exist as such, granted by Kentucky, and did not include the rights enjoyed by the corporation under the law of the United States and the law of Indiana, and also all its gross interstate commerce earnings?
That is to say, the president of the board testifies that, after having used the whole gross earnings of the company, from interstate commerce, from business done in Indiana under the franchise held by that state, and also under that held by the United States, in order thereby to swell the original amount, yet, when the deductions came to be made, nothing was subtracted in consequence of having included in the original amount the results of the United States franchise, those of the Indiana franchise, and those arising from the entire interstate commerce business of the corporation. As it is, in my opinion, a demonstration that these things were included in the gross amount, and as it is also a demonstration that none of them were deducted, it follows that the taxable value of the franchise was almost wholly made up of these items. It cannot, I submit, be said that where a thing is included to make up an amount, and is not subsequently deducted therefrom, it does not continue to be a part of the amount into which it originally entered. The statement of the president of the assessing board is the only testimony on the subject contained in the record. In view of the fact that he unquestionably establishes that the assessment was really on the gross receipts, I submit it leaves no room whatever for conjecture or presumption that the assessment must have been levied upon some other object of taxation.
This court has held repeatedly that a state cannot tax the gross earnings of a corporation, even though created by it, derived from interstate commerce, as the levy of such tax would be a burden on that commerce, and therefore an interference with the exclusive power of congress over that subject. It being beyond dispute, therefore, that the sum of taxation in this case was fixed almost exclusively by the gross earnings from interstate commerce, who, may I ask, can point out the distinction between taxing the gross earnings derived from interstate commerce and taxing a valuation based on such earnings? The elementary principle so often applied by the court, that a tax which may not be imposed directly cannot be levied indirectly, is decisive. Indeed, even the application of that familiar rule is unnecessary, since the method pursued in this case is an exact and literal equivalent of a tax levied directly upon the gross earnings from interstate commerce itself.
When the opinion of the court of last resort of the state, as announced in this very case, asserts that the tax is beyond doubt a levy upon all the property of the company in and out of the state, that it is a tax upon the valude of the exercise of the privilege of using the bridge, of charging for the running of locomotives across the bridge, and of doing the business of interstate commerce in any form, I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that the tax is only levied on the mere franchise to exist as a corporation conferred by the state of Kentucky.
It was doubtless the construction given by the Kentucky court to the statute which has caused the opinion of this court now announced to maintain the proposition that the traffic over the bridge which crosses the river between Kentucky and Indiana, and over which, in the nature of things, there can be, I think, nothing but interstate commerce, is not such commerce. Serious as I conceive to be the violation of the constitution which results from recognizing the right of a state to tax gross earnings derived from interstate commerce, the premise upon which the court thus rests its opinion, to my mind, is a yet more evident violation of the constitution, and is more pregnant with dangerous results to our institutions.
Both these questions were answered in the affirmative on the authority of Gloucester Ferry Co. v. State of Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. 826, and Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. People of Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. 4. These cases were held to be directly in point. The first denied the right of the state to impose a tax upon the franchise of a ferry company operating between the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, while the second denied to the state of Illinois the power of regulating the rates of railway charges between Illinois and New York. Where, may I ask, can the line of distinction be drawn between the Covington Bridge Case and this? The bridge in the former case was one between Kentucky and Ohio over the Ohio river, the bridge here is over the same river between Kentucky and Indiana. Certainly, it cannot be said that there is something peculiar to the state of Indiana which causes the bridge between that state and Kentucky not to be an instrument of interstate commerce, and the traffic over it not to be interstate commerce, when the contrary is the case as to a bridge between Kentucky and Ohio.
The contention that, although the traffic over the bridge may be interstate commerce and the receipts from said traffic be interstate commerce receipts, yet the tolls paid to the bridge company are not receipts from interstate commerce business transacted by the bridge company, is a mere distinction without a difference. What, may I again ask, is the toll paid to the company for the use of the bridge, but the result of a contract entered into for the purpose of carrying on interstate commerce? In the Covington Bridge Case the sole question was as to the right of the state of Kentucky to regulate the amount of tolls to be received by the bridge company. The right of the state was denied on the ground that the tolls were a matter of interstate commerce; that is, that the business of operating the bridge and charging for the use thereof was interstate commerce, and not subject to state control. In that case, then, the tolls were adjudged to be receipts from interstate commerce; in the case at bar, they are declared not so to be. The far-reaching consequence of this asserted distinction is well calculated to arouse solicitude for the future. A large portion of the interstate commerce business of the country is carried on by freight lines. These lines arrange with the railways for transportation, pay them a charge or toll, and upon this basis afford the public increased business facilities. Under the supposed distinction all this interstate commerce traffic ceases to be such, and the whole of the gross receipts become taxable in every state through which the business passes. The freight lines do not transport the merchandise; the railways do; therefore the receipts of the freight lines as to such lines are not interstate commerce receipts. This illustration is but one of the many which at once suggest themselves. All the express business, the sleeping-car business, the tank lines, and manifold other forms of interstate commerce, will be stricken down, if the rule now applied to the tolls of an interstate bridge be enforced as to other means of interstate commerce.
Where, also, I submit, does a distinction exist between this case and the case of the ferry between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, considered in the Gloucester Ferry Case, or the attempt of the state of Illinois to regulate freight charges between that state and New York, embraced in the Wabash Case, supra? Manifestly, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the decision in this case and the rulings of the court in the cases just cited. It follows that, in order to maintain the tax in the case at bar, the decisions referred to must be and are, as I conceive, substantially overruled by the opinion now announced.
Nor can I see the slightest relevancy to the issues in this cause of the decision in New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 15 Sup. Ct. 896. In that case, the court considered a statute of Pennsylvania which authorized the imposition of a tax upon the gross receipts of companies for tolls and transportation derived from railroads, etc., situated within the state. The Erie Company held and operated several branch lines lying wholly within the state of Pennsylvania, and permitted other railroad companies to use such branch lines or portions thereof; and the taxes there in question were laid upon the tolls so received by the Erie Company from its lessees. Such receipts, of course, were merely the income derived from property lying wholly within the state of Pennsylvania.
Obviously, the mere fact that corporations who practically rented property wholly in Pennsylvania, and paid rent charges thereon, did business outside of the state, could not exempt the landlord (the Erie Company) from paying taxes on the rentals so received from its tenants for property wholly in Pennsylvania. Is there any ground for contending here that the Henderson bridge is wholly in Kentucky, when the fact is that it is both in Kentucky and Indiana, and that no business can be done over it which is not necessarily business done in both states and between both states? That there was no intention in the Erie Case to question the settled doctrine as to the want of power in a state to tax interstate commerce, or the gross receipts derived therefrom, is conclusively shown by the express language of the opinion, where it was declared (page 437, 158 U. S., page 896, 15 Sup. Ct.) that it was needless to review the previous decisions of this court, holding that a tax laid upon gross receipts derived from interstate commerce put a burden upon commerce among the states, and was void, because the proposition the decisions were quoted to sustain was regarded as thoroughly established. So, likewise, at page 438, 158 U. S., page 896, 15 Sup. Ct., an extract was made from the decision in Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 695, 15 Sup. Ct. 268, 360, and the doctrine there declared was approved, to wit, that a tax, by whatever name imposed, was valid where the amount of the tax was made dependent in fact on the value of the property of the taxpayer situated within the jurisdiction of the state imposing the tax.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice FIELD, Mr. Justice HARLAN, and Mr. Justice BROWN, concur in this dissent.

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The results of scientific research concerning features of regional news of Luhansk and Donetsk regions are examined in this article as well as empirical analysis of possibilities of TV channels of beforementioned regions and monitoring of expectations of recipients who live on the edge between the territories occupied by Russia and the territories under control of Ukraine. Instruments and models of production of high-quality content for regional TV news in conditions of war are offered for the sake of national and civil dignity and Ukrainian identity. It was clarified that the subject and content characteristic of the news, their visual-textual tension and non-tension depend mainly on the socio-political situation in the region, Ukraine and the world.
It is investigated that in many channels which have been financed from the local or state budget still there is a lot of information about the first persons of region, but it must be in the past. There are a lot of sources of information, which can lead to publishing quality and interesting stories.
Characteristic features of neutralization of aggression in regional media are outlined, in particular in the TV news. The events that provoke aggression and their impact on the viewer are analyzed and alternative ways to reduce it are suggested.
It is worth combining the ethereal, non-ester and online promotions - everything that happens inside, outside and on the Internet. And in any case, it is not necessary to apply different strategies to them. It is about sites, which should add speed and dynamics, to strengthen its communication tasks between the viewer and the channel. The channel could acquire individual traits, to become attractive, and this can be done by updating its design, manner and style of content which broadcasts on the channel. News programs should be broadcasted in Ukrainian language.
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