text:
Ancell, C., At the heart of the art, F. ’05, V.10-#3, pp. 12-13.
Barnett, L., Maybe Even I Can Play the Harp, Su.>97, V.2-#2, p.4.
Barrable, S., Creation and Healing with Harmonic Sound, F. >96, V.1-#3, pp. 3,11-12.
Bemiss, A., Remembering Lynn Marks, F. 07, V.12-#3, p. 7.
Benson, S., Healing the Healer, Su. >00, V.5-#2, pp. 5, 7.
Benson, S., IHTP, IHMP, & CMHSC announce coalition, Sp. ’10, V.15-#1, p. 13.
Benson, S., National certification board created, Su. 04, V.9-#2, pp. 1, 14.
Benson, S., NSBTM news, W. '10-11, V. 5-#4, p. 15.
Benson, S., The International Therapeutic Musicians Program – online, Sp. 04, V.9-#1, pp. 12-14.
Benson, S., Why become a Certified Therapeutic Musician?, Sp. ’09, V.14-#1, p. 7.
Berry, E., A harp to help with healing, W. 01, V.6-#4, pp. 6-7.
V.11-#2, pp. 5, 9, 11.
Bock, K., Harp music eases pain from lupus, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, p. 4.
Bowling, C., A testimonial to the healing power of the harp, Su. >00, V.5-#2, pp. 1, 11-12.
Brown, J., Encouragement form Canada, W. >98, V.3-#4, pp. 1, 9.
Brown, M., Vessel of Light in Ohio: an update, Su. 08, V.13-#2, p. 13, 15, 20.
Buchanan, L., Harp Debuts in O.R., S. >96, V.1-#2, pp. 1,8,10.
Buchanan, L., San Antonio Hosts Music -Medicine Symposium, W. >96, V.1-#4, pp.1, 5, 12.
Butler, B., Business Basics: Building a referral base, F. >99, V.4-#3, p. 10.
Camie, A., My personal journey with the harp, Su. 02, V.7-#2, pp.6-7.
Camie, A., New developments, W. 02, V.7-#4, p.5.
Cerio, M. A harmony of harps, Su. >97, V.2-#2, p.11.
Charnetski, C., Brennan, F., Harrison, J., Muzak boosts immune system, F.>97, V.2.#3, pp. 1, 8.
Chesky, K. & Michel, D., Music and Music Vibration for Pain Relief, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, pp. 1, 11-13, 15.
Cook, P., Crosscultural music in healing, F.=98, V.3-#3, pp. 4-5.
Cox, B., Using music for healing and transition., F. 01, V.6-#3, pp. 9, 11-12.
Dallas-Feeney, S., The healing harp, F. >99, V.4-#3, p. 4.
developments, Su. 05, V.10-#2, pp. 6-7, 9, 15.
Day, E., Musings on the IHTP Conference, Su. ’09, V.14#2, p. 17.
Dexter, B., In the spirit of love, Sp. 02, V.7-#1, p.8.
Diaz, G.C., A Small Harp Accompanies ADance of the little rattlers@, Su. =97, V.2-#2, pp. 6-7.
DiSaverio, M., Vibroacoustic harp therapy opens doors to inner self, F. >99' V.4-#3, p. 11.
Diwa, Portia, Update about the Healing Harp Program, Sp. ’09, V.14#1, p 4.
Eady, R., Maker of chi spheres and energy spirals – Sarajane Williams, F. ’09, V.14#3, pp. 7-9.
Eady, R., Wellness: Seen and heard? Not just for the superconscious hero…, Sp. ’10, V.15-#1, pp. 8-9, 16, 18.
Edelson, L., Compassionate Harps – soothing the critically ill, W. 04, V.9-#4, pp. 14-15.
Ediger, L. & Owens, M., Seizure Disorders: Healing Harps Impact Richmond Public School Harp Student, S. >96, V.1-#2, pp. 5, 10-11.
Ediger, L., Healing Harps in a scholastic setting, Sp.=98, V.3-#1, pp.1, 4-5, 9, 11-12.
Ediger, L., Illumination and Light, Healing Harps in the Richmond Public Schools, Spr. >96, V.1 -#1, pp. 5, 7,9.
Ediger, L., Live Harp Music Increases Agitation, Increases Attention Span, W.=96, V.1-#4, p.9.
Ediger-Kordzaia, L., First International Harp Therapy Conference exceeds all expectations, Su. >99' V.4-#2, pp. 1, 6.
Ediger-Kordzaia, L., Interview with Countess Media Kordzaia, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, pp. 6-7.
Ediger-Kordzaia, L., Richmond Public Schools Harp Therapy Outreach Program: A case study, Su. >00, V.5-#2, pp. 4, 8-10.
Eisele, M., Bringing heart to the hospital, Su. >99, V.4-#2, pp. 10-11.
Elkan, E., Bedside HarpJ launches a groundbreaking research project, Su. 05, V.10-#2, pp. 1, 15.
Elkan, E. & Nolan, D., Taking up the harp as an adult sweetens life, study shows, Su. 04, V.9-#2, pp. 1, 6-7, 9.
Elkan, E., The Alexander technique, W. >98, V.3-#4, pp. 4-5, 8.
Estes, D., The harp as a divine communication tool. F. >98, V.3-#3, pp.6-8, 11.
Farrington, H., The mysterious Irish harp – only a miracle would save our town library, W. 04; V.9-#4, pp. 7, 9.
Froehlich, M., Opportunities for the harp with pediatric patients, F. >98, V.3-#4, pp. 10-11.
Galante, G., Teaching a harp student challenged with lupus, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, p.5.
Galante, G., The Harp and Meditation, F.>97, V.2-#3, p. 5.
Gardiner, M., The Sound and Music Alliance takes form. F. ’09, V.14#3, p. 17.
Gilliland, C., Harpist as patient, Su. >98, V.3-#2, pp. 4, 8.
Gilliland, C., Harps replace violence in Oregon, F. >98, V.3-#3, p.1.
Gilliland, C., Oregon to Host Harp Therapy Symposium, Spr. >96, V.1-#1, p.3.
Gomez, M., Jose Roman De La Cruz - Tenek harpist, instrument builder, composer and shaman, Su. >97, V.2-#2, pp. 1, 5, 8.
Greenland, D., Notes from a harp journal: First experiences with harps for healing, F.=97, V.2-#3, p. 9.
Harriss, Sile, Music thanatologists unite. Su. 03, V.8-#4, p.5.
Henning, K., Practicing religiously, Su. ’05, V.10-#2, pp. 4-5.
Hero, B., Sacred Geometry of the harp=s harmonic curve, W. >98, V.3- #4, p. 12.
Hero, B., Tetra-harp therapy, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, pp. 9, 11.
Hussar, J., My journey as a therapeutic harpist, Sp. ’10, V.15-#1, pp. 1, 6, 19-20.
Jaegly, P., Musicians from around the world convene in Seattle, F. 02, V.7-#3, pp.1, 5.
Jones, M., Love in Music: A Potent Healer, F. >96, V.1-#3, pp. 8-9.
Kanner, A., An incredible weekend, full of possibility C Highlights of the Second International Harp Therapy Conference, Sp. 01, V.6-#1, pp. 1, 4, 9, 11.
Kanner, A., Where do we go from here? Exciting possibilities for teamwork to enhance the impact of all practitioners of harp therapy programs, Sp. 01, V.6-#1, p.11.
Kapelsohn , K., My magic harp, Sp. 04, V.9-#1, pp. 11, 16.
Katz, S., The Legend of Aurora... for the child in us all, Su.'10. V. 15-#2, pp. 14-15.
Kleiman, N., Becoming an instrument, Sp. 07, V.12-#1, pp.1,12, 15-16.
Latzgo, R., Asclepius: Holistic son of Apollo, W. >98, V.3-#4, p. 7.
Latzgo, R., Melody A La Mode, F. >96, V.1-#3, pp. 5, 11.
Leschied, A., Long-term benefits of long-term harp therapy, Su. 03, V.8-#2, pp. 7, 13, 16.
Llewellyn, D., Harp music assists with adult learning, W. 06-07, V.11-#4, p. 6.
Love, M., Order of the Dead String comes to life at Providence Hospital, Sp. 01, V.6-#1, pp. 8-9.
Lozier, J., Harping for Harmony, Su. >97; V.2-#2, p.9.
Lyon, K., Experiences to live by, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, pp. 1, 8.
Marriner, B., The labyrinth C bridging healing, movement and sound, Su. 01, V.6-#2, pp. 1, 8-9.
Melander, L., Harp and soul C soul-tending both ancient and modern with the harp, W. '00, V 5-#4, pp. 6-9, 11-12.
Mell, J., Approaching Hospitals As A Harp Therapist, Spr. >96, V.1-#1, pp. 10-11.
Mell, J., From A Teacher=s Perspective, W.=96, V.1-#4, p.4.
Mintz, M., 2006 MHTP Conference held in Ohio, F. 06, V.11-#3, pp. 5, 15.
Mintz, M., An interview with Richard B. Fratianne, M.D., Sp. 07, V.12-#1, pp.8-9, 11.
Mintz, M., Heart to Harp – healing with music in Northern Michigan, F. 03, V.8-#3, p.4.
Mintz, M., MHTP holds 4th biennial conference, F. 08, V.13-#3, p. 13.
Mollenhauer, J., Columbus chapter of the AHS hosts midcentral region conference on Healing and the Harp, F. >99, V.4-#3, pp. 1, 5.
Mollenhauer, J., Drama portrays healing power of harp music, F.=97, V.2-#3, p.10.
Niles, B., Harp Therapy a new way of life, Sp. 99, V.4-#1, pp. 7, 10, 12.
NSBTM, Accreditation Process for Therapeutic Music Programs, W. 07-08, V.12-#4, p. 14.
NSBTM, NSBTM news, Sp. ’10, V.15-#1, p. 13.
Page, J., Paso por aqui (translation: passed by here), F. '00, V.5-#3, pp. 1, 9, 11.
Politi, C., A visit with Laurie Riley, W. 08-09, V.13-#4, p. 5, 15.
Price, R., Healing Harps training program update, F.=97, V.2-#3, p.3.
Price, R., Music=s powerful contribution to the therapeutic process, W.=97-98, V.2-#4, pp.10-11.
Price, R., Seizure Disorders: Attitude, Acceptance, Awareness Required to Teach These Students, S. >96, V.1-#2, pp. 4, 9.
Price, R., Starting Point: Attitude, Knowledge and Skill, S. >96, V.1-#2, p.4.
Price, R., Stop, Look Listen!, Spr. >96, V.1-#1, p.3.
Raimond, S., Music to soothe the savage beast, W.=97-98, V.2-#4, pp. 1, 4-5.
Riley, L., A pilot program – Therapeutic music at Flagstaff Medical Center, Sp. 02, V. 7-#1, pp.1, 9.
Riley, L., Consortium for clinical music formed in Arizona, Su. >00, V.5-#2, pp. 1, 7.
Riley, L., First National Convergence for Therapeutic Music, Sp. 05, V.10-#1, p. 5.
Riley, L., MHTP Certifies Musicians to Help and Heal, Spr. >96, V.1-#1, p.4.
Riley, L., The Clinical Musician’s Home Study Course, Sp. 04, V.9-#1, pp.5, 9, 11, 15.
Rocha, A., In the rainforest of intuition, Sp. >98, V.3-#1, pp. 10-11.
Rosenfield, J., The future of harp therapy, F. >98, V.3-#3, pp. 1, 9.
Roth, B., Hymns and the Harp - a soothing combination in hospitals, F.=97, V.2-#3, p.4.
Schamp, J., Remembering Marjorie Valerie, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, pp. 7, 10-12.
Schwartz, S., A tribute to Art, F. 07, V.12-#3, pp. 16-18.
Schwartz, S., “Vessel of light” shines in Ohio, W. 06-07, V.11-#4, pp. 1, 4, 12-13.
Scovel, M., Abstract: Voice analysis and the effects of music, sound and brain gym exercises on children >at risk,= Sp. >97, V.2-#1, p. 5.
Scovel, M., Melodic Intonation Therapy, Su. >99, V.4-#2, p. 7.
Scovel, M., Voice Analysis and the Vibrasound Massage Table, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, pp. 4-5.
Sell, M., Rx: Vibroacoustic Therapy, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, pp. 4-5.
Smith, J., Fire in the music room, Su., '10, V. '15-#2, p.6.
Sweeney, D., From classical harpist to training program owner, Su. 08, V.13-#2, p.1,4,9.
Sweeney, D., NSBTM seats the new board, W. 08-09, V.13-#4, p. 1, 4.
Sweeney, D. Update from the NSBTM., Su. ’09, V.14#2, p. 16.
Terman, S., Healing from bedside harp playing - a psychiatrist=s perspective, Su. >99, V. 4-#2, pp. 4, 5, 8, 9.
Thea, J., Bringing repose to the souls of the dead., W. 01, V.6-#4, pp. 4, 11.
Tourin, T., 1999 professional development gathering of the IHTP, Su. 99, V.4-#2, pp. 8-9.
Tourin, T., Harp-healing put to the test, F.=98, V.3-#3, p. 10.
Tourin, C., Harp therapy happenings, F. 06, V.11-#3, pp. 6-7.
Tourin, T., Harp therapy spreads far and near, W. 07-08, V.12-#4, p. 20.
Tourin, T., IHTP and MTAI build musical and professional bridges, W. '10-11, V.15-#4, p. 14.
Tourin, T., IHTP announces collaborations, W. >99, V.4-#4, p.1.
Tourin, T., IHTP to be featured at ISSSEEM conference, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, p. 5.
Tourin, T., IHTP: Understanding the Client in the Helping Process, F. >96, V.1-#4, p.11.
Tourin, T., News from IHTP, S. >96, V.1 -#2, p. 11.
Tourin, T., News notes from IHTP, Su. >97, V.2-#2, p.11.
Tourin, T., Science and Spirit are Keystones of IHTP, Spr.=96, V.1-#1, p.6.
Tourin, T., The body as teacher, Su. >98, V.3-#2, p. 4.
Tourin, T., The Harp Creates Peace at Time of Death, F. >96, V.1 -#3, p.10.
Tourin, T., You can help to research the benefits of harp music, W. >99, V.4-#4, pp. 1, 5-8.
Tremblay, M., Behind the veil: Healing harp electrifies Cambridge, F, ’05, V.10-#3, pp. 6-7, 9.
Tysseland, E., Healing Strings, W. >96, V.1-#4, pp. 5, 10.
Volk, J., Sound Health: The Healing Nature of Sound, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, pp. 7, 16.
W. 02, V. 7-#4, p.1.
Warczak, M., For whom should the music be played?, F. 01, V.6-#3, p. 8.
Weaver, J., A Harp For Every Classroom, Su. >97, V.2-#2, p.4-5.
Wienand, M., The instrument of angels: Easing souls from this life to the next, W.=97-98, V.2- #4, pp. 8-9, 12.
Williams, S., AHS Wickersham Award names recipients for 1998, F.=98, V.3-#3, p.1.
Williams, S., An interview with Deborah Geer, M.D., F. 06, V.11-#3, pp. 8-9, 11.
Williams, S., An interview with Dr. Ron Price, Sp.=98, V.3-#1, pp. 6-7, 8.
Williams, S., An interview with Fabien Maman, Su. >98, V.3-#2, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., An interview with Georgia Kelly, W.=97-98, V.2-#4, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., An interview with John M, Ortiz, Ph.D., F. 02, V7-#3, pp.6-9.
Williams, S., An interview with Laurie Riley, W. >98, V.3-#4, pp. 6, 9, 11-12.
Williams, S., An interview with Melinda Gardiner, Sp. 05, V.10-#1, p.6-7, 9.
Williams, S., An interview with Monika Stadler, Su.=00, V.5-#2, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., An interview with Stella Benson, F. 03, V.8-#3, p.11-13, 15.
Williams, S., An interview with Tina Tourin, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., Applications available for Wickersham Award, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, p.1.
Williams, S., Apollo, F.=97, V.2-#3, p.12.
Williams, S., Blind Harp Students Have Special Needs, W.=96, V.1-#4, p. 4.
Williams, S., CD benefits breast cancer research, SP. >00, V.5-#1, p. 3.
Williams, S., Chalice of Repose video, Su. >97, V.2-#2, p.12.
Williams, S., Charter SAMA Symposium creates a sound vision, Su.'10, V.15-#2, pp.1, 17-18.
Williams, S., Counselors Explore Music=s Effects, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, p. 10.
Williams, S., Fibromyalgia revisited, Su. '10, V.15-#2, pp.5, 7, 18.
Williams, S., First international harp therapy conference slated, Su. >98, V.3-#2, p. 11.
Williams, S., Harp Therapy logo contest featured in this issue, W. >99, V.4-#4, pp. 1, 9.
Williams, S., Harp therapy logo contest winner named, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, p. 1.
Williams, S., Harp therapy logo contest, F. >99. V.4-#3, p.8.
Williams, S., Harp therapy training programs’ offerings, W. 03, V.8-#4, pp. 6-7, 9, 11, 12-14.
Williams, S., Harpists Give Good Vibrations - A Harp Therapy Update on Vibroacoustic Harp Therapy, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, p. 6.
Williams, S., Healing Harp Symposium Assembles New Generation of Harp Therapists, Spring '96, V.1-#1, pp.1, 10-11.
Williams, S., Healing Harps Improves Quality of Life for Women with MS, F.>96, V.1-#3, pp 4,9.
Williams, S., Healing Harps offers teacher training this summer, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, p.8.
Williams, S., Healing Harps offers teacher training, Sp. >98, V.3-#1, p.9.
Williams, S., How to develop a harp therapy program at your hospital, Su.=98, V.3-#2, pp.8-9.
Williams, S., In memory of Jane Weidensaul, W. 03, V.8-#4, p. 4.
Williams, S., In memory of Karl Wienand, W. >99, V.4-#4, p.1.
Williams, S., In search of harp-healers of the Andes, Su. >98, V.3-#2, pp.1, 10, 12.
Williams, S., Interview with Dr. Alfredo Rolando Ortiz, W. >96, V.1-#4, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., Interview with Gail Barber, W. >99, V.4-#4, pp. 4, 10, 11.
Williams, S., Interview with Mary Scovel, F. >99, V.4-#3, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., Interview with Olav Skille - Vibroacoustic Therapy, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, pp. 8-10, 14.
Williams, S., It’s all in their heads, Sp. 02, V.7-#1, p.11.
Williams, S., King David, Su. >98, V.3-#2, p.12.
Williams, S., Liturgical Conference Explores Harp=s Sacred Role, F. >96, V.1-#3, p. 1, 9.
Williams, S., Liturgical harp conference to explore worship experience, Su. >98, V.3-#2, p.5.
Williams, S., MHTP and Healing Harps to Partner in the Northwest, S. >96, V.1-#2, p. 12.
Williams, S., Multiple Sclerosis: An Unpredictable Disease, F. >96, V.1-#3, p. 4.
Williams, S., Music Electro-acupuncture - Stimulating music sparks recovery from paralysis, F. >97, V.2-#3, p. 11.
Williams, S., Music for the Pharaohs, W. >96, V.1-#4, p.12.
Williams, S., Musical Muscles, Su. >98, V.2-#2, p.10.
Williams, S., Nanoharp used to study microscopic systems, F. >99, V.4-#3, p. 5.
Williams, S., National continuing education organization to host harp therapy workshop, Su. 04, V.9-#2, p. 14.
Williams, S., Neural network determines music perception, W.=97-98. V.2-#4, p.4.
Williams, S., New internet directory of harp therapy services, Su. >98, V.3-#2, p. 11.
musicians, W. 07-08, V.12-#4, pp. 1, 4.
Williams, S., Pythagoras of Samos, S. >96, V.1-#2, p. 12.
Williams, S., Raising Awareness of a New Role for Harpists, F. >96, V.1-#3, p.1.
Williams, S., Rules of Courtesy to Blind and Visually Impaired Persons, W.=96, V.1-#4, p. 5.
Williams, S., Sappho, F. >96, V.1-#3, p.12.
Williams, S., Singing Bones, Sp. >00, V.5-#1, p. 12.
Williams, S., Soothing the Survivors, W. 01, V.6-#4, pp. 1, 5.
Williams, S., String Players Show Changes in Cortical Development, S. >96, V.1-#2, pp. 10-11.
Williams, S., Taliesin, Su. >99, V.4-#2, p. 12.
Williams, S., The ch=in of Confucius, F. >99, V.4-#3, p.12.
Williams, S., The Cosmic Harp, W.=97-98, V.2-#4, p.12.
Williams, S., The Druid bards, F. >98, V.3-#3, p.12.
Williams, S., "The future of harp therapy" questionnaire results, W. '00, V.5-#4, pp. 1, 4, 12.
Williams, S., The gift of a teacher - a tribute to Dorothy Knauss, Sp. '10, V.15-#1, p.17.
Williams, S., The Guiding Light of Lyra, Sp. >97, V.2-#1, p. 16.
Williams, S., The Harp Links Worlds of Spirit and Matter, F. >96, V.1-#3, pp. 6-7.
Williams, S., The Harp of Dagda, Su. >97, V.2-#2, p. 12.
Williams, S., The harpist of Keros, Sp. >98, V.3-#1, p.12.
Williams, S., The harps and lyres of Ur, Sp. >99, V.4-#1, p.12.
Williams, S., The VAHT Training Course announces new graduates, W. ’09-10, V.14-#4, p. 20.
Williams, S., The VAHT Training Course announces new graduates, W. ’10-11, V.15-#4, p. 20.
Williams, S., To Hades and Back, Spr. >96, V.1-#1, p.12.
Williams, S., Water Spirits, W. >99, V.4-#4, p.12.
Williams, S., What’s in a name?, Su. 05, V.11-#1, pp. 4-5, 7.
Williams, S., Wickersham award recipient named, W. '00, V.5-#4, p.9.
Williams, S., Aeolian harp music fills the void. F. 03, V.7-#3, p.12.

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Persistent cookies are automatically deleted after a specified period, which differs depending on the cookie. You can delete cookies at any time in the security settings of your browser. The legal basis for the processing of personal data by means of cookies is Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. Our legitimate interest lies in the provision of our website and the improvement of the quality of our website and its contents.
When you contact us by e-mail or using the contact form provided on our website we will save your name and e-mail address so that we can answer your enquiry. As an option, you can also enter your telephone and fax number in addition to your e-mail address and your name, and whether you would like us to call you back, so that we can also address you personally and answer your enquiry in a more targeted manner. The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer required to achieve the purpose for which they were collected; this is regularly the case after the final answer to your enquiry. Otherwise, we limit the processing in the case of legal storage obligations.
The legal basis for the processing of the data which you submit to us upon establishment of contact is Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR. The legal basis for the processing of the data in case of consent is Art. 6 (1) (a) GDPR. You have the possibility to withdraw your consent to the processing of personal data at any time. If you contact us by e-mail or via the contact form, you can object to the storage of your personal data at any time. In this case, any and all personal data stored in the course of the establishment of contact by means of the contact form or the e-mail will be deleted. You can withdraw your consent and object to the storage of your personal data by sending an e-mail to or to the contact details stated in the "about us" section.
By giving your consent, you can subscribe to our newsletter in which we inform you about our latest offers. The advertised goods and services are named in the declaration of consent. For the registration to our newsletter we use the so-called double opt-in process. This means that, after your registration for the newsletter, we will send you an e-mail to the specified e-mail address in which we will ask you to confirm your desire to receive the newsletter. Should you fail to confirm your registration within 24 hours, your information will be blocked and automatically deleted after one month. In addition, we store the IP addresses you used and the time of registration and confirmation. The purpose of the procedure is to prove your registration and, if necessary, to clarify any possible misuse of your personal data.
The only mandatory information for the submission of the newsletter is your e-mail address. After having received your confirmation, we will save your e–mail address for the purpose of sending you the newsletter. The legal basis is Art. 6 (1) 1st sentence (a) GDPR. The collection of the user's e-mail address serves to send the newsletter. The e-mail address will be stored for as long as you subscribe to the newsletter.
You can withdraw your consent to receiving the newsletter at any time and unsubscribe from the newsletter. You can cancel your subscription simply by clicking on the link provided in each newsletter e-mail, by sending an e-mail to , or by sending a message to the contact details stated in the section "about us".
A registration of the user is necessary for the fulfilment of a contract concluded with the user or for the purpose of the performance of pre-contractual measures. The legal basis for the processing of the data is Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR. The data will be stored for the duration of the registration. As a user, you have the possibility to cancel the registration at any time. You can request us to change the stored personal data at any time. Even after the conclusion of the contract, it may still be necessary to store personal data of the contracting party in order to comply with contractual or legal obligations. As a user, you have the possibility to cancel the registration at any time. You can request us to change the stored personal data at any time.
For this purpose, please contact us at the address provided in the "about us" section or send an e-mail to . If the data are required to fulfil a contract or to carry out pre-contractual measures, early deletion of the data is only possible insofar as contractual or statutory obligations do not conflict with a deletion obligation.
To ensure data security during the transmission of data, we use the service reCAPTCHA provided by the company Google LLC/Alphabet Inc. (1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA). This allows us to check whether data has been entered by a natural person or by automated processing. The legal basis for the use of reCAPTCHA is Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. Data security constitutes our legitimate interest. Google reCAPTCHA requires the transmission of the user's IP address and the time spent on the website to Google, and, as the case may be, other data required by Google for the provision of the reCAPTCHA service. For this service, other data protection regulations of Google LLC/Alphabet Inc. apply, which you can find here.
We use Google Analytics with the extension anonymizeIp. In this way, IP addresses are further processed in abbreviated form, so that personal identification can be excluded. We use Google Analytics to analyse the use of our website and to improve it on a regular basis. By means of the statistics obtained, we are able to improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. For the exceptional cases in which personal data are transferred to the US, Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield.
Our legitimate interest lies in the increase of the customer-friendly design of our website.
We use the offer provided by Google Adwords to draw attention to our attractive offers by means of advertising materials (so-called Google Adwords) placed on external websites. In relation to the data of the advertising campaigns, we can determine how successful the individual advertising measures are. We are interested in showing you advertisements which are of interest to you, to make our website more interesting for you, and to achieve a fair calculation of advertising costs. These advertising media are delivered by Google via so-called "Ad Servers". For this purpose, we use ad server cookies, by means of which certain parameters for the measurement of success, such as the insertion of ads or clicks by users, can be measured. If you access our website via a Google ad, Google Adwords stores a cookie on your PC. These cookies usually expire after 30 days and are not intended to identify you in person. In general, the unique cookie ID, the number of ad impressions per placement (frequency), the last impression (relevant for post-view conversions), and opt-out information (indication that the user no longer wishes to be addressed) are usually stored as analysis values for this cookie.
These cookies enable Google to recognize your Internet browser. In case a user visits certain pages of an Adwords customer's website and the cookie stored on his/her computer has not expired, Google and the customer are able to recognize that the user has clicked on the ad and has been redirected to this page. A different cookie is assigned to each Adwords customer. Therefore, cookies cannot be traced via the websites of Adwords customers. We do not collect and process any personal data in the aforementioned advertising measures. We only receive statistical evaluations from Google. On the basis of these evaluations, we are able to recognize which of the used advertising measures are particularly effective. We do not receive any further data from the use of advertising material; in particular, we cannot identify users on the basis of this information.
Due to the marketing tools used, your browser automatically establishes a direct connection to the Google server. We have no influence on the extent and the further use of the data which are collected in the course of the use of this tool by Google; therefore, we would like to inform you according to our knowledge: By means of the integration of AdWords conversion, Google receives the information that you called the respective part of our Internet appearance or clicked on one of our advertisements. If you are registered with a Google service, Google may associate your visit with your account. Even if you are not registered with Google or have not logged in, it is possible that the provider may obtain and store your IP address.
You can prevent your participation in this tracking process in various ways: a) by setting your browser software accordingly, in particular, if you suppress third-party cookies, you will not receive any ads from third-party providers; b) by deactivating cookies for conversion tracking; in order to do so, you need to set your browser so that cookies are blocked by the domain "www.googleadservices.com", https://www.google.de/settings/ads; whereas this setting will be deleted when you delete your cookies; c) by deactivating the interest-based ads of the providers, which are part of the "about ads" self-regulation campaign, via the link http://www.aboutads.info/choices; whereas this setting will be deleted when you delete your cookies; d) by permanently deactivating them in your browsers Firefox, Internet Explorer or Google Chrome by means of the link http://www.google.com/settings/ads/plugin. Please note that in this case you may not be able to use all functions of this offer to their full extent.
Legal basis for the processing of your data is Art. 6 (1) 1st sentence (b) GDPR. Our legitimate interest lies in the marketing of our offers and services. For more information on data protection by Google, click here and here. As an alternative, you can visit the website of the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI). Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield.
On our website under the "Contact" category, we use the offer provided by Google Maps. This allows us to show you an interactive map directly on our website and facilitate your trip to us. By visiting the website, Google receives the information that you have called up the corresponding sub-page on our website. In addition, the data specified under item IV. of this data protection declaration will be transmitted. This takes place regardless of whether or not Google provides a user account that you are logged in to. If you are logged in to Google, your information will be directly associated with your account. If you do not wish to be associated with your profile on Google, you must log out before activating the button. Google stores your data as user profile and uses them for the purposes of advertising, market research, and/or demand-oriented design of its website. This constitutes the legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR which serves as the legal basis for the evaluation. In particular, such evaluation is carried out (even for users not logged in to Google) to provide demand-oriented advertising and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the creation of these user profiles, whereas you must contact Google to exercise this right.
Google also processes your personal data in the USA and has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield.
– You have the right to request information as to whether and which personal data we process with regard to your person.
– You have the right to request rectification and erasure of such data.
– You have the right to a restriction of the processing of your personal data.
– You are also entitled to object to the processing or use of your personal data for purposes of advertising or market and opinion research as well as business-like data processing.
– You also have the right to object to the processing of your personal data at any time for reasons arising from your particular situation. This does not apply if we are obliged or entitled by law to collect, process or use this data.
Furthermore, as a matter of principle, you have the right to withdraw your prior consent to the processing of your personal data at any time with future effect. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the legality of the processing carried out on the basis of the consent until the withdrawal. Besides, you also have a right to data portability.
In order to exercise your rights, you can contact us by e-mail at or by letter to be sent to Conclude GmbH, with the addition "FAO Data Protection Officer", Ohligsmuehle 3, 42103 Wuppertal (Germany). Furthermore, without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority about the processing of your personal data by us.

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Since 2011, a party cannot bring a private cause of action for acts and practices which fall under the catch-all provision of T.C.A. §47-18-104(27). The TCPA contains a laundry list of fairly specific acts or practices which are per se unfair and deceptive. It also contains a catch-all subdivision which declares that “any other act or practice which is deceptive” is actionable. In many cases, in my experience, it is difficult to shoe horn the conduct at issue into one of the defined unfair acts and practices. In such cases, the catch-all provision may be the only avenue for a client to achieve the relief provided by the TCPA. In 2011, however, the TCPA was revised to prohibit a private cause of action under the catch-all provision. There are still other provisions for which a private cause of action is available, which are somewhat broad and which may fit a client’s case, particularly, T.C.A. §47-18-104(5)(7) and (19).
The statute of limitations for lawsuits under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is one year. The one year period begins running from “a person’s discovery of the unlawful act or practice.” Beware that a defendant can argue that the statute began running when a person had constructive knowledge of the act or practice. A plaintiff has constructive knowledge when the plaintiff is aware of facts which would put a reasonable person on notice that the plaintiff has suffered an injury because of the wrongful conduct and knows the identity of the entity or person who engaged in that conduct. When a plaintiff had constructive knowledge is a question of fact to be decided by the jury, if a jury has been demanded. There is an absolute outer limit, or statute of repose, for the filing of TCPA claims of 5 years after the date of the transaction which is the basis of the lawsuit.
To recover under the Tennessee Consumer Act, a plaintiff has to show more than just an unfair or deceptive act or practice: A plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an ascertainable loss as the result of the act or practice. In other words, consistent with the common law tort claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff in a consumer protection lawsuit must show that the conduct at issue caused him or her damages. The question of whether or not there has been an ascertainable loss, and the amount thereof, is a question of fact for the jury where a jury has been demanded.
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act can no longer be used as a cause of action against an insurance company. In 2011, T.C.A. §56-8-113 became effective and it prohibits the use of the TCPA against insurance companies.
A plaintiff cannot recover both treble damages under the TCPA and punitive damages for a common law claim which relates to the same conduct. Plaintiffs typically combine a TCPA cause of action with a common law cause of action like fraud. Punitive damages are not available under the TCPA, but a court may treble the amount of any damages awarded by the jury under the TCPA. If a plaintiff recovers punitive damages under a common law claim and treble damages under the TCPA, the plaintiff must then elect which award to take (which is a no brainer decision).
The TCPA applies to acts or practices in connection with the marketing or sale of securities.
Under the TCPA, a court may award a successful plaintiff attorney’s fees.
In a recent breach of contract case involving a former employee who was promised 2.5% of the stock of the company which had employed him for twenty-six years, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee made some significant new law on the six year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract actions.
The breach of contract statute of limitations which was applicable to Mr. Power’s claim was the six year statute. Under Tennessee law, the six year period begins to run when a party’s cause of action accrues. A & W’s position was that Mr. Powers cause of action accrued on December 31, 2001, the date when his shares vested and on which he was supposed to receive the shares. If A & W’s position was correct, then the six year statute did bar Mr. Power’s breach of contract claim.
The trial court held that Mr. Power’s breach of contract claim was not barred and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reasoned that a principle of equity was applicable: “Equity regards that as done which in good conscience ought to be done.” A corollary of this equitable maxim is: “No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” The Court of Appeals, to reach the result which it reached, also recognized that Tennessee law does not require someone to have actual shares in order to have ownership in a corporation, and that a transfer of stock does not have to be memorialized in writing.
For a former employee or contractor who has signed a non-competition agreement, the threshold question is quite often this: Is the non-compete agreement enforceable or not?
How Tennessee courts treat non-compete agreements varies by court and by the unique facts of each case. In my experience, there is quite a bit of subjectivity involved when a court undertakes to determine if a non-competition agreement is enforceable and, if so, to what extent.
Despite the reality that each non-compete case turns on its own facts and on the particular court making the ruling, there are some guidelines that any court must apply when ruling on a non-compete agreement. For employers and employees who want to understand those guidelines, a very good case to read is Vantage Technology, LLC v. Cross, a 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
It happens with some frequency in Tennessee that a check is written and notated “paid in full” or “payment in full.” Sometimes, if a check is not written “paid in full,” the business which owes the debt may send an accompanying letter stating that the payment is for the full amount of the account or debt. Sometimes, when the debtor is very prudent, it so notates the check and also sends such a letter with the check.
Under Tennessee common law, as well as under a Tennessee statute, T.C.A. §47-3-311, if a person or business owed money (a creditor), cashes a check marked “paid in full” or with similar language, or cashes a check sent with a letter stating that the payment is in full satisfaction of the debt, that creditor may well be barred from collecting any additional money.
In Tennessee breach of contract cases, a party who proves an accord and satisfaction is relieved of further liability to the creditor. To prove successfully an accord and satisfaction, the debtor must prove that the amount it owed the creditor was disputed; it sent a check conspicuously marked “paid in full,” or with other language establishing that the payment was in full satisfaction of the debt, or sent the check with a letter indicating that the payment was in full satisfaction of the alleged debt; and, that the creditor cashed the check.
For salesmen and manufacturers representatives who are owed commissions, a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a breach of contract case for commissions owed is not encouraging. The analysis and application of Tennessee breach of contract law to the facts of the case by the majority of the three judge panel was D to D- work (to the losing plaintiff, I am sure it was F work) . The dissenting judge’s opinion, which was justifiably quite sharp, is the only bright spot for those seeking unpaid commissions (and for lawyers who like to see the law applied correctly).
In the case, Maverick Group Marketing, Inc. v. Worx Environmental Products, Ltd., the plaintiff sales company worked for years on behalf of the defendant to have Wal-Mart buy the defendant’s product. Then, the defendant terminated its contract with plaintiff. The defendant then received its first order from Wal-Mart three weeks after terminating its contract with the plaintiff.
Before terminating the plaintiff’s contract, the defendant had supplied Wal-Mart a supplier agreement, Wal-Mart had tested the product, and Wal-Mart and the defendant had agreed on the price for the product. The only thing that had not happened was that Wal-Mart had not placed an order.
The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant provided that, if the agreement between them was terminated, then the plaintiff would still receive commissions on “orders solicited prior to the effective date of termination.” The two judge majority reasoned that, because Wal-Mart had not placed an order, no orders had been solicited and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to any sales commissions.
Many Tennessee businesses have commercial general liability policies, and many other types of policies and endorsements, which contain exclusions for any loss resulting from dishonest or criminal acts. These exclusions will most likely apply to employees, partners and directors of the business.
Sometimes, in insurance policy litigation, there is no way to defeat a policy exclusion for dishonest or criminal acts. For example, if the insurance company can prove that the loss resulted solely and exclusively as a result of the theft or other illegal conduct by an employee of the insured business, the insurance company will not have to pay the claim. Where, however, the loss could have resulted from both the dishonest or criminal act of an employee and some other concurrent cause, the insurance company may not be able to rely successfully on the exclusion.
While no published Tennessee opinion addresses a fact situation where there was a dishonest or criminal acts exclusion in an insurance policy along with concurrent causation (causation of a loss resulting from an employee’s dishonest or criminal conduct and some other cause), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Allstate Insurance Company v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883 (1991) would apply directly to such a case.


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Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J. – These three writ petitions have been preferred challenging the notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for reassessment under Section 147 of the Act on common grounds with the only difference with regard to the quantum involved in different assessment years namely AY 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07. The Writ Petition No. 1366 of 2009 pertains to AY 2003-04; Writ Petition No. 1367 of 2009 pertains to AY 2006-07; and Writ Petition No. 1368 of 2009 pertains to AY 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2005-06. Since the facts and controversy involved in all these three writ petitions is common the Writ Petition No. 1366 of 2009 is taken up as the leading case.
“(i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Years 2003-04 contained in Annexure No.5 to this writ petition.
(ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities not to make any reassessment against the petitioner under Section 147 in pursuance of the notice contained in Annexure No.5 of the writ petition.
3. Briefly stated the common facts in the present cases are that the petitioner is a Trust created under the Trust Deed dated 26.5.1998 as corrected by the Deed dated 19.9.2000. The assessments of the Trust for AY 2003-04 and 2006-07 were completed under Section 143(3) of the Act. The Trust is registered under Section 12 AA and Section 80G of the Act. It is alleged in the writ petition that the trust is engaged in imparting and spreading education by establishing various educational institutions and running hospitals to give treatment and relief to the weaker sections of the society. It has started paramedical courses and training for nurses. The colleges established by the Trust and its courses are approved and recognized by Medical Council of India, Dental Council of India and by the Director, Medical and Health, U.P., and the C.M.O. Bareilly. In paragraph-11 it is alleged that there are 100 seats in each colleges. Two batches of BDS courses have passed out and MDS course is running in second year. The MBBS course is running in third year and the college is in process of taking admission of the students for the fourth year. A notice dated 25.3.2009 under Section 148 of the Act was issued to the petitioner for AY 2003 – 04. A notice dated 26.3.2009 for AY 2006-07 was issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Act. Likewise notice dated 19.3.2009 for AY 2002-2003, notice dated 19.3.2009 for AY 2004-05 and notice dated 26.3.2009 for AY 2005-06 were issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Act. All these notices have been challenged in these writ petitions on the ground that in the absence of the existence of ingredients of Section 147 of the Act, these notices are wholly without jurisdiction. For AY 2003-04, an additional ground has been taken that since the notice has been issued after four years from the end relevant assessment year for which assessment under Section 143 (3) of the Act has been completed in the absence of any material that income chargeable to tax as escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 or in response to a notice issued under Sub Section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the impugned notice is wholly without jurisdiction.
Assessee is a charitable Trust and derives income from fees, donation and other sources. The original assessment in this case was completed u/s 143(3) of the IT Act, 1961 on 7.3.2006 at net income of Rs. Nil as against the assessee filed its return declaring income Nil on 14/01/2004 after claiming exemption u/s 11 of the IT Act, 1961 of Rs. 94,90,419/-. A perusal of balance sheet it is observed that the assessee has made addition in corpus of Rs. 11,20,010/- however no comments have made by the Assessing Officer in his order passed on 07/03/2006. Therefore, this amount has been left to be considered. Meanwhile, a complaint dated 14/02/2009 was received from Mr. Jitendra Kumar alleging that the donations disclosed by the assessee are not genuine donation. He has already worked in Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust in the capacity of Joint Treasurer /Member. His statement u/s 131 was recorded on 27/02/2009. In this statement he alleged that the Trust is debiting various expenditure especially salary of Teachers, Doctors which are either not genuine or inflated and Capitation Fees received from students are being shown as a donation. His statement is placed on record from Page No. 96 to 104 (complaint/confidential folder).
5. We have heard Sri Shubham Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel appears for the respondents.
(i) The proceedings for the AY 2003-04 is barred by limitation in view of the first Proviso to Section 147 of the Act inasmuch as the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act has been issued after expiry of four years from the end of the AY 2003-04.
(ii) The assessment for AY 2003-04 was completed under Section 143 (3) of the Act vide assessment order dated 7.3.2006. The proceeding under Section 148 of the Act, therefore, cannot be initiated in the absence of any of the ingredients of the first Proviso to Section 147 of the Act namely, the escapement of assessment of income chargeable to tax by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 or in response to a notice issued under Sub section (1) of Section 142 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for that assessment year.
(iii) No satisfaction has been reached and recorded by the A.O., with regard to the sufficiency and adequacy of material available with him at the time of issuance of the notices for reassessment.
(v) No fresh material was brought to the knowledge of the A.O. so as to give rise to reason to believe that the income of the petitioner has escaped assessment.
(vi) The statement of Sri Jitendra Kumar, a non credible person cannot be made basis to invoke the provisions of Section 148 of the Act. The impugned notice is based on change of opinion and has been issued merely to conduct a roving inquiry to collect evidence to reassess the petitioner, which is impermissible in law.
(vii) The impugned notices are wholly without jurisdiction.
(i) Indra Prastha Chemicals (P.) Ltd. v. CIT  271 ITR 113/ 142 Taxman 205 (All).
(ii) Sunil Kumar Jain v. ITO  284 ITR 626/ 147 Taxman 463 (All.).
(iii) Kothari Filaments v. Commissioner of Customs (Port)  2 SCC 192.
(iv) CIT v. SFIL Stock Broking Ltd.  325 ITR 285 (Delhi).
(v) Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT  U.P.T.C. 1405 (All) Para – 12, 14 and 15.
(vi) Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 8.8.2013 passed in the Income Tax Appeal No. 442 of 2009, CIT v. Uttaranchal Welfare Society.
(i) The impugned notices under Section 148 of the Act are valid inasmuch as the reason for the formation of the belief has rational connection and bearing on the formation of belief.
(ii) The petitioner has not fully and truly disclosed the donation for the corpus and expenses.
(iii) The statement of Sri Jitendra Kumar, Joint Treasurer of the Trust was recorded under Section 131 of the Act on 27.2.2009 in which he disclosed that the trust is debiting various expenditure especially salary of teachers, doctors which are not genuine and are inflated, and that the capitation fees received from students is being shown as donation to the Trust. The donation and expenditure as disclosed are not genuine.
(iv) The objections filed by the petitioner against the impugned notices were decided by the A.O. by a detail orders dated 3.6.2009 (Annexure No. CA-2) also establishes that the proceedings under Section 148 by the impugned notices have been validly initiated.
(v) For each of the assessment years in question the reassessment proceedings under Section 148 of the Act have been completed and the assessment orders have been passed but the same have not been served on the petitioner in view of the interim order passed by this Court in these writ petitions.
(vi) The impugned notices are wholly valid and they do not suffer from any infirmity.
(i) Raymond Wollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO  236 ITR 34 SC.
(ii) United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon  8 SCC 110.
10. The first objection of the petitioner to the impugned notice for AY 2003-04 that it is barred by limitation under section 147 of the Act, is not sustainable inasmuch as the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued by the A.O. after obtaining approval of the competent authority.
(i) The list of voluntary contributors/donors towards corpus was not enclosed along with the return nor submitted during the assessment proceedings u/s 143(3) of the IT Act, 1961. Further no declaration has been filed issued by the voluntary contributors/donors, who contributed /donated the amount directly to the corpus. Even the names and addresses as well as PAN number of such donors were provided to the department, either along with return or during the course of assessment proceeding under Section 143(3) of the IT Act, 1961. The assessee has thus failed to comply with the provisions of Sub section (d) of Section 11(1) of the IT Act, 1961. In these circumstances the amount added in corpus during the period under consideration has been left to be examined and same as income chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment, on the part of the assessee.
(ii) The assessee described its charitable activities in its objections filed under consideration stating therein that the trust has established Dental College, Medical College and Nursing College in the name and style of M/s Rohilkhand Medical College & Hospital after obtaining the approval of MCI and DCI. In this regard it has come to the notice to the Department that the assessee had made claims of payment of salary to the teachers which have not worked for full year of Rs. 1,17,98,237/- and other expenses of Rs. 12,73,370/-. These expenses are required to be examined for determination of genuineness of payment of salary and expenses by the Trust during the period under consideration. This fact has also come to notice with the report of Midical Council of India vide its No. MCI-34(41)/2007-Med. / 2399 date 16/4/2008 addressed to the secretary to the Govt. of India, Minsitry of Health and F.M., Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi.
(iii) In view of report of MCI, it is clear that the assessee has claimed salary and expenses which are bogus. The assessee has thus violated the provision u/s 12AA and 80G of the IT Act, 1961. In these circumstances the Assessing Officer rightly initiated action u/s 147.
(iv) The Chairman of the trust Dr. Keshav Kumar Agarwal had filed an affidavit in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in writ petition (Civil) No. 294 of 2008 in the case of M/s Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust v. Union of India, in which as Chairman of the Trust he had mentioned that investment of more than 100 crores has been made in the corpus of the trust. On the other hand on examination of the balance sheet for A.Y.2007-08 it is observed that the assessee has shown total corpus of Rs. 17,83,18,968/- and in the Balance Sheet tallied at Rs. 33,38,69,499/-. Thus there is a gross difference of the amount disclosed in the Court of law and the amount disclosed in the balance sheet of Rs. 66,61,30,501/-.
(v) On examination of records available with the Department for A.Y.2004-05, it is observed that the assessee has prepared two balance sheets for this period under consideration. The first balance sheet was finalized as provisional on 26/04/2004 which tallied at Rs. 6,40,89,311.16/- and the other finalized on 30/10/2004 which is tallied at Rs. 5,68,33,136.38/-. Thus there is a difference of Rs. 72,52,154.71/-.
13. From the facts noted above it is clear that the A.O. has relevant material in his possession to form the belief that certain income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the assessment years 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07. The sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be considered at this stage. The ‘reason to believe’ recorded by the A.O. as well as the order dated 3.6.2009 rejecting the objection of the assessee leaves no manner of doubt that prima facie the A.O. was having material to form the belief in good faith that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for his assessment for the assessment years in question. The necessary conditions for invoking the provisions of Sections 147 and 148, stand satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case.
16. In view of the conclusions drawn as above the impugned notices are held to be validly issued by the A.O. He had relevant and credible material with him to form the requisite reason to believe to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act, that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment to tax. The material has rational connection and relevant bearing on such formation of belief for issuing valid notices for reassessment, the sufficiency of which is not justifiable issue at this stage and may be examined in the proceedings of reassessment. For the AY 2003-04, the additional ground of limitation also does not merit consideration, as we have held that A.O. had material available with him that on the failure of the assessee to have disclosed fully and truly all material facts the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.
17. The judgments relied by Sri Shubham Agarwal are of no help to the petitioner in view of our above conclusions on the facts of the present case.
18. In the result all the writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. The interim orders are vacated. The A.O. shall be at liberty to serve reassessment orders on the assessee if such orders have been made. If reassessment orders for any of the assessment years in question have not been made the A.O. is allowed to complete reassessment proceedings within a period of six months from today. There shall be no order as to costs.
This entry was posted in Section 13, Section 148 and tagged 365 ITR, Allahabad High Court, In favour of Revenue.

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§ 255-44 Purpose; conformance required.
§ 255-45 Revision of plans during construction.
§ 255-46 Maintenance of streets.
§ 255-53 Storm sewerage system.
§ 255-54 Central water supply; fire hydrants.
§ 255-55 Private water supply.
§ 255-56 Public sewer systems.
§ 255-57 Lot area requirements when public sewer and/or water is unavailable.
§ 255-58 Private sewer systems.
§ 255-59 Electric, telephone and communication facilities.
§ 255-63 Inspection of streets and improvements.
§ 255-64 Acceptance of streets and improvements.
The purpose of this article is to establish and define the public improvements which will be required by the Township to be constructed or cause to be constructed by the applicant.
All improvements shall be constructed in accordance with the specifications of the Township.
The improvements included in this article are minimum requirements. However, the Board of Commissioners reserves the right, in any case, to increase the same if conditions so warrant.
When changes from the accepted drawings and specifications become necessary during construction, written acceptance by the Township, upon the advice of the Township Engineer, shall be secured before the execution of such change.
Adequate provisions for the satisfactory maintenance of all streets shall be made by dedication to and acceptance for maintenance by the Township or by other acceptable means.
The construction of streets and driveways as shown upon final plans and as contained in contract agreements shall in every respect conform to such requirements as the Township may, by resolution, require for the construction of streets.
The grades shown on the street profiles and cross-section plan submitted and approved with the final plan.
The full width of the right-of-way; in wooded areas this may be modified to preserve existing trees.
Along the existing street on which a subdivision or land development abuts (hereinafter called a "boundary street"), improvements shall be made to the street. The improvements to the boundary street shall be determined by the width of the required cartway and built to the specifications established by the Township.
Editor's Note: See also Ch. 250, Streets and Sidewalks.
The Township shall erect, at the developer's expense, at every street intersection a street sign or street signs meeting Township approval, having thereon the names of the intersecting streets. At intersections where streets cross, there shall be at least two such street signs; and at the intersections where one street ends or joins with another street, there shall be at least one such street sign.
Street signs are to be erected when the first dwelling on the street is occupied. Temporary street signs may be erected on the approval of the Township, but shall be made permanent before final offer for the dedication of roads is made.
Warning and regulatory signs shall be erected along streets as required by the Board of Commissioners.
Where appropriate, the developer shall install or cause to be installed, at the developer's expense, metal or fiberglass pole streetlights serviced by underground conduit in accordance with a plan to be prepared by the developer's engineer and approved by the Board of Commissioners and by the Philadelphia Electric Company. The equipment of metal or fiberglass poles may be waived in such instances as approved by the Board of Commissioners due to the existence of wooden poles already in place. Provisions shall be made for energizing said lighting after 50% or more of the dwellings in a given subdivision or land development or section of a subdivision or land development have been occupied. The developer shall be responsible for all costs involved in lighting the streets until such time that the streets are accepted or condemned as public streets by the Township.
Monuments shall be placed in each change in direction of street-line boundary; two to be placed at each street intersection and one on each side of any street at angle points and at the beginning and end of curves. Areas to be conveyed for public use shall be fully monumented at their external boundaries.
Monuments shall be placed in the ground after final grading is completed, at a time specified by the Township Engineer.
All monuments may be checked for accuracy by the Township Engineer or their accuracy certified by the owner's engineer or surveyor. Accuracy of monuments shall be within 3/100 of a foot.
Sidewalks shall be constructed as required by § 255-27C. These standards shall apply on all new streets and on existing streets, unless in the opinion of the Board of Commissioners they are unnecessary for public safety and convenience.
All sidewalks shall be constructed in accordance with § 255-37 of this chapter.
The alignment and gradient of walks shall be coordinated with the grading plan to prevent the passage of concentrated surface water on or across the sidewalk and to prevent the pocketing of surface water by sidewalks.
Curbs shall be provided as required in § 255-27C, unless in the opinion of the Board of Commissioners they are unnecessary.
Curbs, where required, shall be the vertical type and constructed in accordance with Township specifications.
The developer shall construct stormwater drainage facilities, including curbs, catch basins, inlets, storm sewers, culverts, road swales, open channels and other structures in order to prevent erosion, flooding and other hazards to life and property. All such facilities are to be of adequate size and grade to hydraulically accommodate maximum potential volumes of flow; and size, type and installation of all storm drains and sewers shall be constructed in accordance with approved plans. The Township shall have the option of requiring that those areas set aside as retention or catch basins shall be dedicated to the Township.
The developer shall construct water mains in such a manner as to make adequate water service available to each lot or dwelling unit within the subdivision or land development. A minimum pressure of 20 pounds per square inch shall be provided at each house or other building to be connected to the water supply main. The water supply must comply with the regulations and the standards of the Department of Environmental Resources. Said supply shall be located and constructed so as to eliminate the possibility of flood damage.
The system shall also be designed with adequate capacity and appropriately spaced fire hydrants for fire-fighting purposes pursuant to the specifications of the National Fire Protection Association. Review and approval by the Township Engineer and the Township Fire Marshal shall be required in order to ensure that adequate fire protection is provided. Therefore, any and all subdivision and land development plans submitted to this Township shall indicate, according to scale, the closest existing fire hydrant to the proposed subdivision and land development.
Where water is to be provided by means other than by private wells owned and maintained by the individual owners of lots within the subdivision or development, the applicant shall present evidence to the Board of Commissioners that the subdivision or development is to be supplied by a certified public utility, a bona fide cooperative association of lot owners or by a municipal corporation, authority or utility. A copy of a certificate of public convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission or an application for such certificate, a cooperative agreement or a commitment or agreement to serve the area in question, whichever is appropriate, shall be acceptable evidence.
Where no public water is accessible, water shall be furnished by the developer on an individual lot basis. If wells are installed on each lot and the lot also contains its own sewage disposal facilities, the well shall be of the drilled type, cased and grout-sealed into the bedrock. The well will be required to have a production of not less than six gallons per minute as established by bailor tests and certified by the well driller. Before being placed in consumer use, it shall be disinfected by the use of sodium hypochlorite or other acceptable solutions and a sample bacteriological examination collected by a licensed water analyst.
Wherever practical, sanitary sewers shall be installed and connected to an appropriate public sewer system. Where a sanitary sewer is not yet accessible but is planned for extension to the subdivision within 10 years, the developer shall install sewer lines, including lateral connections, as may be necessary to provide adequate service to each lot when connection with the public sewer system is made. The sewer lines shall be suitably capped at the limits of the subdivision, and the laterals shall be capped at the right-of-way line. The sewer installation shall include construction within rights-of-way or easements to bring the sewer to the future connection with the public sewer system.
A sewer shall be considered to be planned for extension to a given area any time after preliminary engineering and related studies have been completed by the Township and the construction of facilities adequate to serve the area containing the subdivision or land development have been programmed for completion within a reasonable time.
When capped sewers are provided, approved on-site disposal facilities shall also be provided.
All public sanitary sewers shall be designed and constructed in accordance with Township specifications. Such sewers shall be located or constructed so as to eliminate the possibility of flood damage.
No public sewer system or treatment plant shall be constructed until plans and specifications have been submitted to the Department of Environmental Resources and the Township and approved in accordance with existing laws.
When both public sewer and water are unavailable, the minimum lot size shall be 60,000 square feet and the minimum width of the building line shall be 150 feet.
If public facilities are not available, as determined by the Township, the developer shall provide for sewage disposal on an individual lot basis.
Upon completion of the excavation.
Upon installation of the major equipment, such as septic tanks, distribution boxes and drain tiles, before any backfilling.
All electric-, telephone- and communication-service facilities, both main and service lines, shall be provided by underground cables installed in accordance with the prevailing standards and practices of the utility and other companies providing such services. Such facilities shall be located or constructed so as to eliminate the possibility of flood damage.
Where practicable, all utilities shall be located within the street right-of-way; otherwise, easements or rights-of-way of sufficient width for installation and maintenance shall be provided.
Final plans shall show locations of all utilities and shall be coordinated with required street tree planting.
Grading shall conform in all respects to the final plan.
Street trees and other required planting shall be in accordance with §§ 255-29B, 255-38 and 255-42.
Street trees and other required plant material shall not be planted until the finished grading of the subdivision or land development has been completed.
The developer shall replace, in accordance with landscaping plans, any plantings that die or, in the opinion of the landscape architect, are in an unhealthy or unsightly condition and/or have lost their natural shape due to dead branches, excessive pruning, inadequate or improper maintenance or any other causes due to the developer's negligence, prior to an offer of dedication. The developer shall not be held responsible for acts of vandalism occurring after the commencement of the guaranty period.
Additional community facilities, as set forth in § 255-26, may be required to serve the proposed lots or dwellings in a subdivision or land development. Where a proposed park, playground or other public facility shown in the Comprehensive Plan is located in whole or in part in a subdivision or land development or when additional facilities are made necessary by the development, the dedication or reservation of such areas or financial contribution for the construction of such facilities may be required by the Township in those cases in which it deems such requirements to be reasonable.
Prior to commencing construction, the applicant shall notify the Township Engineer of the proposed construction schedule. Pursuant to notification by the applicant, the Township Engineer shall inspect required improvements during the initial construction phase and on a periodic basis thereafter, as may be required to ensure proper adherence to this chapter. The Township Engineer shall notify the applicant, in writing, of those items of construction, material and workmanship which do not comply with Township specifications or the approved final plan.
The applicant, upon notification from the Township Engineer, shall proceed, at his own cost, to make such corrections as shall be required to comply with the Township specifications and approved final plans and shall notify the Township Engineer upon completion requesting final inspection.
Final inspection. The Township Engineer shall make a final inspection, with the applicant, of all required improvements.
As-built plan. An as-built plan prepared and certified by a land surveyor registered in the State of Pennsylvania shall be submitted to the Township Engineer for review and approval. This plan shall accurately indicate the location of all improvements, both public and private, on the site and whatever other information the Township Engineer or Director of Public Works feels necessary.
Editor's Note: Former Subsection D, Maintenance inspection of private stormwater management systems, added 2-26-1996 by Ord. No. 96-08, which immediately followed this subsection, was repealed 5-9-2005 by Ord. No. 2005-11.
The Board of Commissioners shall notify the applicant of acceptance of the required improvements, if satisfied that the applicant has complied with all specifications and ordinances of the Township.
The applicant shall furnish the Township with two paper prints of the completed required improvements, including drainage, profiles and utilities, and pay all costs for the Clerk of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on the petition and resolution of the Board of Commissioners to said Court for its approval of the acceptance of the required improvements.
No streets or other improvements will be accepted by the Township if such improvements were constructed during the period from October 15 to April 15 of each year, unless otherwise recommended by the Township Engineer.


text:
By this petition purported to have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short `the Constitution’) prayer is to declare Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the IPC‘) to be unconstitutional and ultra vires in the alternative to formulate guidelines so that innocent persons are victimized by unscrupulous persons making false accusations.
Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under Section 498 IPC are unfounded, stringent action should be taken against person making the allegations. This according to the petitioner, would discourage persons from coming to courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of offence punishable underSection 498A IPC has been made with oblige motive and with a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.
According to the petitioner there is no prosecution in these cases but persecution. Reliance was also placed on a decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court wherein concern was shown about the increase in number of false and frivolous allegations made. It was pointed out that accusers are more at fault than the accused. Persons try to take undue advantage of the sympathies exhibited by the courts in matters relating to alleged dowry torture.
Section 498A appears in Chapter XXA of IPC.
Substantive Sections 498A IPC and presumptive Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 1872 (in short `Evidence Act‘) have been inserted in the respective statutes by Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983.
Section 498A IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act include in their amplitude past events of cruelty. Period of operation of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is seven years, presumption arises when a woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage.
“498A: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
“113-B: Presumption as to dowry death-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman is required to be established in order to bring home the application of Section 498A IPC. Cruelty has been defined in the explanation for the purpose of Section 498A. It is to be noted that Sections 304-B and498A, IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The explanation to Section 498A gives the meaning of `cruelty’. In Section 304- B there is no such explanation about the meaning of `cruelty’. But having regard to common background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of `cruelty’ or `harassment’ is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section 498A under which `cruelty’ by itself amounts to an offence.
The object for which Section 498A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act No. 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examines the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, which constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Cr.P.C.’) and theEvidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in laws and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menance of dowry death and cruelty.
One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The basic difference between the two Section i.e. Section 306 and Section 498A is that of intention. Under the latter. cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the women concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended.
It is well settled that mere possibility of abuse of a provisions of law does not per se invalidate a legislation. It must be presumed, unless contrary is proved, that administrative and application of a particular law would be done “not with an evil eye and unequal hand” (see A Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorised Official and Income-Tax officer and Anr., AIR (1956) SC 246.
In Budhan Choudhry and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1955) SC 191 a contention was raised that a provision of law may not be discriminatory but it may land itself to abuse bringing about discrimination between the persons similarly situated. This court repelled the contention holding that on the possibility of abuse of a provision by the authority, the legislation may not be held arbitrary or discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
From the decided cases in India as well as in United States of America, the principle appears to be well settled that if a statutory provision is otherwise intra-vires, constitutional and valid, mere possibility of abuse of power in a given case would not make it objectionable, ultra-vires or unconstitutional. In such cases, “action” and not the “section” may be vulnerable. If it is so, the court by upholding the provision of law, may still set aside the action; order or decision and grant appropriate relief of the person aggrieved.
“The possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any element of invalidity.” It was said in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India,  3 SCC 592 “it must be remembered that merely because power may sometimes be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of power. The wisdom of man has not yet been able to conceive of a Government with power sufficient to answer all its legitimate needs and at the same time incapable of mischief.” (Also see: Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Meth,  1005.
As observed in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat,  6 SCC 672,Unique Butle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors.,  2 SCC 455 and Padma Sundara Rago (dead) and Ors. v. State,  3 SCC 533. while interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of Law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
“Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
We do not see any merit in the challenge made to the order of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2002 on the facts of the case. the special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
Above being the position we find no substance in the plea that Section 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation.
The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry meance. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have filed with obligue motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignomy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not assassins’ weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any strait jacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre- conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumption that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumption are drawn which again are reputable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that in innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.
Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short the `CBI’) in certain matters where the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. We do not find any substance in this plea. If the petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if held.

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It is not uncommon for police to take a “the ends justify the means” approach in their investigation of a criminal matter. For example, police are permitted to lie to a suspect in questioning him or her to elicit a confession or confirmation of information. Police are allowed to operate in “good faith,” even if the “good faith” is based on a mistake of law, to protect an arrest or evidence. Police will often also search a car for identification when the driver is holding the identification for the officer, but the officer insists upon “looking for more documents,” as the driver asks “such as what?” and the officer finds drugs.
However, there are limits to such stretching of our Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure.
Joshua Corbett was arrested for breaking into the home of celebrity Sandra Bullock in June, 2014. Police responded to her house at 6:35 a.m. in response to her call to police that a man wearing a dark sweatshirt and dark pants was in her house. Officers caught Corbett inside the house, walking down a staircase.
He was taken to the police station, where he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent under Miranda. Police questioned him anyways and Corbett relented, eventually advising police of his address and his gun collection.
Police then went to his house and searched his house without a warrant and without his consent. They found guns and ammunition.
The District Attorney then filed a 24-count criminal complaint against Corbett for various firearm related offenses, such as possession of a machine gun (Penal Code § 32625(a)), three counts of possession of an assault weapon (Penal Code § 30605(a), ten counts of possession of a destructive device (illegal ammunition) (Penal Code § 18710(a)), two counts of machine gun conversion (Penal Code § 32625(b) and one count of illegal activity with a 0.50 BMG rifle (Penal Code § 30600(a). He was also charged with one count of first degree burglary (Penal Code § 459) and stalking (Penal Code § 646.9(a)).
The following day, police obtained a warrant and went back to the house to search his gun safe, based upon his interrogation at the police station and the guns found during the first warrantless search. The warrant application did not include any assertion or any facts demonstrating a fair probability that evidence pertaining to the offenses of stalking or burglary would be found at Corbett’s house. In other words, it was a fishing expedition.
The case went to trial, at which time Corbett’s attorney moved to suppress the statements made during his police station interrogation (Fifth Amendment violations) and the evidence found during the first warrantless search of his house (Fourth Amendment violation). The trial court granted the motion to suppress.
The District Attorney filed a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to suppress and to issue a new order denying the motion.
The Second Appellate District denied the writ (People v. Superior Court and Joshua James Corbett (2017 DJDAR 1397)).
The appellate court found that Corbett had unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent, meaning the Los Angeles Police Department had violated Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Once Corbett indicated he wanted to remain silent, “the interrogation must cease.” People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 339. A statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be admitted to establish guilt in a criminal case. Id. The court found “no dispute” that Corbett’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated.
The appellate court also found that the LAPD also violated the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. U.S. Const. 4th Amend; see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9. While there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, very few apply to the unambiguous dimensions of a person’s home. Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573 589. A search inside a home is presumptively unreasonable and thus, illegal.
The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an illegal search. Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. Consequently, all evidence found in not only the first search, but the second search as well, was affirmed as ordered suppressed.
The People claimed that Corbett had consented to the search, but the appellate court found that this “consent” was elicited in violation of Corbett’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
The appellate court’s ruling does not mean the case against Corbett would be dismissed. He remains a defendant on counts of first degree burglary and stalking.


Jack is a partner in San Francisco. He represents construction-industry labor unions, joint labor-management committees, apprenticeship programs and employee benefit trust funds. In addition to advising and representing his clients in all areas of traditional labor law, Jack has developed new methods for prosecuting non-union employers' violations of prevailing-wage, apprenticeship and public contracting laws. He also represents Taft-Hartley employee benefit trust funds in complex litigation. Jack serves on the boards of directors of California Lawyers for the Arts and ArtSpan.
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