[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136 (1879). Less than 15 years ago, it was again noted that "[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). Those statement remain true today. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, like the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not susceptible of precise definition. Yet we know that the values and ideals it embodies are basic to our scheme of government. And we know also that the Clause imposes upon this Court the duty, when the issue is properly presented, to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that punishment may be. In these cases, "[t]hat issue confronts us, and the task of resolving it is inescapably ours." Id. at 103.
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the consideration that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, [p259] what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.
. . . Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence — petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our [Virginia] bill of rights. — "that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to . . . define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more — you depart from the genius of your country. . . .
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your [Virginia] declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? — [p260] That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.
These two statements shed some light on what the Framers meant by "cruel and unusual punishments." Holmes referred to "the most cruel and unheard-of punishments," Henry to "tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment." It does not follow, however, that the Framers were exclusively concerned with prohibiting torturous punishments. Holmes and Henry were objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, and they cited to support their objections the unrestrained legislative power to prescribe punishments for crimes. Certainly we may suppose that they invoked the specter of the most drastic punishments a legislature might devise.
Mr. LIVERMORE. — The [Eighth Amendment] seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
The question was put on the [Eighth Amendment], and it was agreed to by a considerable majority.
Livermore thus agreed with Holmes and Henry that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposed a limitation upon the legislative power to prescribe punishments. [p263] However, in contrast to Holmes and Henry, who were supporting the Clause, Livermore, opposing it, did not refer to punishments that were considered barbarous and torturous. Instead, he objected that the Clause might someday prevent the legislature from inflicting what were then quite common and, in his view, "necessary" punishments — death, whipping, and earcropping.  The only inference to be drawn from Livermore's statement is that the "considerable majority" was prepared to run that risk. No member of the House rose to reply that the Clause was intended merely to prohibit torture.
is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language [p264] should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 373.
if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition.
[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
that the provision "would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct."
apparently in a struggle between the effect to be given to ancient examples and the inconsequence of a dread of them in these enlightened times, . . . hesitate[d] to advance definite views.
that government by the people instituted by the Constitution would not imitate the conduct of arbitrary monarchs. The abuse of power might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that it would be manifested in provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men.
[Patrick] Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances. Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their [jealousy] of power had a saner justification than that. They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they [p267] might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the [Stuarts',] or to prevent only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment was overlooked.
We concede the power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the right to assert a judgment [p268] against that of the legislature of the expediency of the laws or the right to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their punishment, unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In such case, not our discretion, but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its direction, is invoked.
[l]ike no other constitutional provision, [the Clause's] only function would be to legitimize advances already made by the other departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom.
We know that the Framers did not envision "so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights." Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1773, 1782 (1970). The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections."
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied [p269] by the courts.
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Judicial enforcement of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights. The difficulty arises, rather, in formulating the "legal principles to be applied by the courts" when a legislatively prescribed punishment is challenged as "cruel and unusual." In formulating those constitutional principles, we must avoid the insertion of "judicial conception[s] of . . . wisdom or propriety," Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 379, yet we must not, in the guise of "judicial restraint," abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights. Were we to do so, the "constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality." Id. at 373. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would become, in short, "little more than good advice." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 104.
Ours would indeed be a simple task were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against those that history has long condemned. That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however, was left behind with the 19th century. Our task today is more complex. We know "that the words of the [Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static." We know, therefore, that the Clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress [p270] of a maturing society." Id. at 100-101.  That knowledge, of course, is but the beginning of the inquiry.
The basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.
Id. at 100. At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.
More than the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings. The barbaric punishments condemned by history, "punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like," are, of course, "attended with acute pain and suffering." O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). When we consider why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is not the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that they treat [p273] members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to [treatises on military law] are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that [p276] category, within the meaning of the [Clause]. Soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military offenses are, in the great majority of cases, sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for such occasions is given in great fulness by the writers upon the subject of courts-martial.
As Wilkerson v. Utah suggests, when a severe punishment is inflicted "in the great majority of cases" in which it is legally available, there is little likelihood that the State is inflicting it arbitrarily. If, however, the infliction of a severe punishment is "something different from that which is generally done" in such cases, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101 n. 32,  there is a substantial [p277] likelihood that the State, contrary to the requirements of regularity and fairness embodied in the Clause, is inflicting the punishment arbitrarily. This principle is especially important today. There is scant danger, given the political processes "in an enlightened democracy such as ours," id. at 100, that extremely severe punishments will be widely applied. The more significant function of the Clause, therefore, is to protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction.
the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.
in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
The question under this principle, then, is whether there are objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contemporary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Accordingly, the judicial [p279] task is to review the history of a challenged punishment and to examine society's present practices with respect to its use. Legislative authorization, of course, does not establish acceptance. The acceptability of a severe punishment is measured not by its availability, for it might become so offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use.
The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: the infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, cf. Robinson v. California, supra, at 666; id. at 677 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 114 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the punishment inflicted is unnecessary, and therefore excessive.
[The Clause] is directed not only against punishments of the character mentioned [torturous punishments], but against all punishments which, by [p280] their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.
the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss of many thousand[s] of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public account.
Since the Bill of Rights was adopted, this Court has adjudged only three punishments to be within the prohibition of the Clause. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (12 years in chains at hard and painful labor); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for narcotics addiction). Each punishment, of course, was degrading to human dignity, but of none could it be said conclusively that it was fatally offensive under one or the other of the principles. Rather, these "cruel and unusual punishments" seriously implicated several of the principles, and it was the application of the principles in combination that supported the judgment. That, indeed, is not surprising. The function of these principles, after all, is simply to provide means by which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and, in most cases, it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a punishment is "cruel and unusual." The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: if a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
The punishment challenged in these cases is death. Death, of course, is a "traditional" punishment, Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100, one that "has been employed throughout our history," id. at 99, and its constitutional [p283] background is accordingly an appropriate subject of inquiry.
There is also the consideration that this Court has decided three cases involving constitutional challenges to particular methods of inflicting this punishment. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), the Court, expressing in both cases the since-rejected "historical" view of the Clause, see supra at 264-265, approved death by shooting and death by electrocution. In Wilkerson, the Court concluded that shooting was a common method of execution, see supra at 275-276;  in Kemmler, the Court held that the Clause did not apply to the States, 136 U.S. at 447-449.  [p285] In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, the Court approved a second attempt at electrocution after the first had failed. It was said that "[t]he Fourteenth [Amendment] would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner," 329 U.S. at 463, but that the abortive attempt did not make the "subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other execution," id. at 464.  These three decisions thus reveal that the Court, while ruling upon various methods of inflicting death, has assumed in the past that death was a constitutionally permissible punishment.  Past assumptions, however, are not sufficient to limit the scope of our examination of this punishment today. The constitutionality of death itself under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is before this Court for the first time; we cannot avoid the question by recalling past cases that never directly considered it.
The question, then, is whether the deliberate infliction of death is today consistent with the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict punishments that do not comport with human dignity. I will analyze the punishment of death in terms of the principles [p286] set out above and the cumulative test to which they lead: it is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment. Under these principles and this test, death is today a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly, the common view is that death is the ultimate sanction. This natural human feeling appears all about us. There has been no national debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment comparable to the debate about the punishment of death. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted, see infra at 296-298, nor has any State yet abolished prisons, as some have abolished this punishment. And those States that still inflict death reserve it for the most heinous crimes. Juries, of course, have always treated death cases differently, as have governors exercising their commutation powers. Criminal defendants are of the same view.
As all practicing lawyers know who have defended persons charged with capital offenses, often the only goal possible is to avoid the death penalty.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting). Some legislatures have required particular procedures, such as two-stage trials and automatic appeals, applicable only in death cases.
It is the universal experience in the administration of criminal justice that those charged with capital offenses are granted special considerations.
Ibid. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (all States require juries of 12 in death cases). This Court, too, almost [p287] always treats death cases as a class apart.  And the unfortunate effect of this punishment upon the functioning of the judicial process is well known; no other punishment has a similar effect.
The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself. Expatriation, for example, is a punishment that "destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development," that "strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community," and that puts "[h]is very existence" in jeopardy. Expatriation thus inherently entails "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." Id. at 101. "In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." Id. at 102. Yet, demonstrably, expatriation is not "a fate worse than death." Id. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Although death, like expatriation, destroys the [p290] individual's "political existence" and his "status in organized society," it does more, for, unlike expatriation, death also destroys "[h]is very existence." There is, too, at least the possibility that the expatriate will, in the future, regain "the right to have rights." Death forecloses even that possibility.
In comparison to all other punishments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity. I would not hesitate to hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a "cruel and unusual" punishment, were it not that death is a punishment of longstanding usage and acceptance in this country. I therefore turn to the second principle — that the State may not arbitrarily inflict an unusually severe punishment.
The outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it. The evidence is conclusive that death is not the ordinary punishment for any crime.
When a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied. To dispel it would indeed require a clear showing of nonarbitrary infliction.
Although there are no exact figures available, we know that thousands of murders and rapes are committed annually in States where death is an authorized punishment for those crimes. However the rate of infliction is characterized — as "freakishly" or "spectacularly" rare, or simply as rare — it would take the purest sophistry to deny that death is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases. How much rarer, after all, could the infliction of death be?
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system. The States claim, however, that this rarity is evidence not of arbitrariness, but of informed selectivity: death is inflicted, they say, only in "extreme" cases.
Informed selectivity, of course, is a value not to be denigrated. Yet presumably the States could make precisely the same claim if there were 10 executions per [p294] year, or five, or even if there were but one. That there may be as many as 50 per year does not strengthen the claim. When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and criminals simply do not admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely as to explain, on that ground, the execution of such a tiny sample of those eligible. Certainly the laws that provide for this punishment do not attempt to draw that distinction; all cases to which the laws apply are necessarily "extreme." Nor is the distinction credible in fact. If, for example, petitioner Furman or his crime illustrates the "extreme," then nearly all murderers and their murders are also "extreme."  Furthermore, our procedures in death cases, [p295] rather than resulting in the selection of "extreme" cases for this punishment, actually sanction an arbitrary selection. For this Court has held that juries may, as they do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence wholly unguided by standards governing that decision. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-208 (1971). In other words, our procedures are not constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.
Although it is difficult to imagine what further facts would be necessary in order to prove that death is, as my Brother STEWART puts it, "wantonly and . . . freakishly" inflicted, I need not conclude that arbitrary infliction is patently obvious. I am not considering this punishment by the isolated light of one principle. The probability of arbitrariness is sufficiently substantial that it can be relied upon, in combination with the other principles, in reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of this punishment.
When there is a strong probability that an unusually severe and degrading punishment is being inflicted arbitrarily, we may well expect that society will disapprove of its infliction. I turn, therefore, to the third principle. An examination of the history and present operation of the American practice of punishing criminals by death reveals that this punishment has been almost totally rejected by contemporary society.
It is this essentially moral conflict that forms the backdrop for the past changes in, and the present operation of, our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime.
Our practice of punishing criminals by death has changed greatly over the years. One significant change has been in our methods of inflicting death. Although this country never embraced the more violent and repulsive methods employed in England, we did for a long time rely almost exclusively upon the gallows and the firing squad. Since the development of the supposedly [p297] more humane methods of electrocution late in the 19th century and lethal gas in the 20th, however, hanging and shooting have virtually ceased.  Our concern for decency and human dignity, moreover, has compelled changes in the circumstances surrounding the execution itself. No longer does our society countenance the spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable as a deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.
[t]his new legislative criterion for isolating crimes appropriately punishable by death soon proved as unsuccessful as the concept of "malice aforethought,"
legislatures did not try, as before, to refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead, they adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact.
Thus, although "the death penalty has been employed throughout our history," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99, in fact the history of this punishment is one of successive restriction. What was once a common punishment has become, in the context of a continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of this punishment evidences not that it is an inevitable part of the American scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the national conscience. The result of this movement is our current system of administering the punishment, under which death sentences are rarely imposed and death is even more rarely inflicted. It is, of course, "We, the People" who are responsible for the rarity both of the imposition and the carrying out of this punishment. Juries, "express[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death," Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 519, have been able to bring themselves to vote for death in a mere 100 or so cases among the thousands tried each year where the punishment is available. Governors, elected by and acting for us, have regularly commuted a substantial number of those sentences. And it is our society that insists upon due process of law to the end that no person will be unjustly put to death, thus ensuring that many more of those sentences will not be carried out. In sum, we have made death a rare punishment today.
The progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today. The States point out that many legislatures authorize death as the punishment for certain crimes, and that substantial segments of the public, as reflected in opinion polls and referendum votes, continue to support it. Yet the availability of this punishment through statutory authorization, as well as the polls and referenda, [p300] which amount simply to approval of that authorization, simply underscores the extent to which our society has, in fact, rejected this punishment. When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted save in a few instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the punishment is tolerated only because of its disuse. The objective indicator of society's view of an unusually severe punishment is what society does with it, and today society will inflict death upon only a small sample of the eligible criminals. Rejection could hardly be more complete without becoming absolute. At the very least, I must conclude that contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt.
The final principle to be considered is that an unusually severe and degrading punishment may not be excessive in view of the purposes for which it is inflicted. This principle, too, is related to the others. When there is a strong probability that the State is arbitrarily inflicting an unusually severe punishment that is subject to grave societal doubts, it is likely also that the punishment cannot be shown to be serving any penal purpose that could not be served equally well by some less severe punishment.
The States' primary claim is that death is a necessary punishment because it prevents the commission of capital crimes more effectively than any less severe punishment. The first part of this claim is that the infliction of death is necessary to stop the individuals executed from committing further crimes. The sufficient answer to this is that, if a criminal convicted of a capital crime poses a danger to society, effective administration of the State's pardon and parole laws can delay or deny his release from prison, and techniques of isolation can eliminate [p301] or minimize the danger while he remains confined. The more significant argument is that the threat of death prevents the commission of capital crimes because it deters potential criminals who would not be deterred by the threat of imprisonment. The argument is not based upon evidence that the threat of death is a superior deterrent. Indeed, as my Brother MARSHALL establishes, the available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively prove, that the threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat of imprisonment. The States argue, however, that they are entitled to rely upon common human experience, and that experience, they say, supports the conclusion that death must be a more effective deterrent than any less severe punishment. Because people fear death the most, the argument runs, the threat of death must be the greatest deterrent.
It is important to focus upon the precise import of this argument. It is not denied that many, and probably most, capital crimes cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment. Thus, the argument can apply only to those who think rationally about the commission of capital crimes. Particularly is that true when the potential criminal, under this argument, must not only consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish between two possible punishments. The concern, then, is with a particular type of potential criminal, the rational person who will commit a capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death. On the face of it, the assumption that such persons exist is implausible.
There is, however, another aspect to the argument that the punishment of death is necessary for the protection of society. The infliction of death, the States urge, serves to manifest the community's outrage at the commission of the crime. It is, they say, a concrete public expression of moral indignation that inculcates respect for the law and helps assure a more peaceful community. Moreover, we are told, not only does the punishment of death exert this widespread moralizing influence upon community values, it also satisfies the popular demand for grievous condemnation of abhorrent crimes, and thus prevents disorder, lynching, and attempts by private citizens to take the law into their own hands.
The question, however, is not whether death serves these supposed purposes of punishment, but whether death serves them more effectively than imprisonment. There is no evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment, rather than death, encourages private blood feuds and other disorders. Surely if there were such a danger, the execution of a handful of criminals each year would not prevent it. The assertion that death alone is a sufficiently emphatic denunciation for capital crimes suffers from the same defect. If capital crimes require the punishment of death in order to provide moral reinforcement for the basic values of the community, those values can only be undermined when death is so rarely inflicted upon the criminals who commit the crimes. Furthermore, it is certainly doubtful that the infliction of death by the State does, in fact, strengthen the community's moral code; if the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values. That, after all, is why we no longer carry out public executions. In any event, this claim simply means that one purpose of punishment is to indicate social disapproval of crime. To serve that purpose, our [p304] laws distribute punishments according to the gravity of crimes, and punish more severely the crimes society regards as more serious. That purpose cannot justify any particular punishment as the upper limit of severity.
There is, then, no substantial reason to believe that the punishment of death, as currently administered, is necessary for the protection of society. The only other purpose suggested, one that is independent of protection for society, is retribution. Shortly stated, retribution in this context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve it.
Although it is difficult to believe that any State today wishes to proclaim adherence to "naked vengeance," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 112 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the States claim, in reliance upon its statutory authorization, that death is the only fit punishment for capital crimes and that this retributive purpose justifies its infliction. In the past, judged by its statutory authorization, death was considered the only fit punishment for the crime of forgery, for the first federal criminal statute provided a mandatory death penalty for that crime. Act of April 30, 1790, § 14, 1 Stat. 115. Obviously, concepts of justice change; no immutable moral order requires death for murderers and rapists. The claim that death is a just punishment necessarily refers to the existence of certain public beliefs. The claim must be that, for capital crimes, death alone comports with society's notion of proper punishment. As administered today, however, the punishment of death cannot be justified as a necessary means of exacting retribution from criminals. When the overwhelming number af criminals who commit capital crimes go to prison, it cannot be concluded that death serves the purpose of retribution more effectively than imprisonment. The asserted public belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random [p305] few. As the history of the punishment of death in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them.
When this country was founded, memories of the Stuart horrors were fresh and severe corporal punishments were common. Death was not then a unique punishment. The practice of punishing criminals by death, moreover, was widespread and by and large acceptable to society. Indeed, without developed prison systems, there was frequently no workable alternative. Since that time, successive restrictions, imposed against the background of a continuing moral controversy, have drastically curtailed the use of this punishment. Today death is a uniquely and unusually severe punishment. When examined by the principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity. The punishment of death is therefore "cruel and unusual," and the States may no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes. Rather than kill an arbitrary handful of criminals each year, the States will confine them in prison.
The State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime [p306] is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 381.
(Emphasis added.) The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is fully applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 n. 6 (1964); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany — of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.
3 J. Elliot's Debates 447-448 (2d ed. 1876). Although these remarks have been cited as evidence that the Framers considered only torturous punishments to be "cruel and unusual," it is obvious that Henry was referring to the use of torture for the purpose of eliciting confessions from suspected criminals. Indeed, in the ensuing colloquy, see n. 3, infra. George Mason responded that the use of torture was prohibited by the right against self-incrimination contained in the Virginia Bill of Rights.
But the gentleman says that, by this Constitution, they have power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe punishments, and that, consequently, we are not free from torture. . . . If we had no security against torture but our [Virginia] declaration of rights, we might be tortured tomorrow, for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded.
Mr. GEORGE MASON replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the [Virginia] bill of rights did not prohibit torture, for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence against himself, and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.
Mr. NICHOLAS acknowledged the [Virginia] bill of rights to contain that prohibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to the practice of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries where torture is used; but still he saw no security arising from the bill of rights as separate from the Constitution, for that it had been frequently violated with impunity.
Ibid. There was thus no denial that the legislative power should be restrained; the dispute was whether a Bill of Rights would provide a realistic restraint. The Framers, obviously, believed it would.
^ . We have not been referred to any mention of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the debates of the state legislatures on ratification of the Bill of Rights.
What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine.
Since Livermore did not ask similar rhetorical questions about the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, it is unclear whether he included the Clause in his objection that the Eighth Amendment "seems to have no meaning in it."
^ . Indeed, the first federal criminal statute, enacted by the First Congress, prescribed 39 lashes for larceny and for receiving stolen goods, and one hour in the pillory for perjury. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, §§ 16-18, 1 Stat. 116.
expressed the opinion that the provision did not apply to punishment by "fine or imprisonment or both, but such as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel," etc.
said that, ordinarily, the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like. . . . Other cases . . . selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the meaning of the clause and the extent of its prohibition.
This [English] Declaration of Rights had reference to the acts of the executive and judicial departments of the government of England; but the language in question as used in the constitution of the State of New York was intended particularly to operate upon the legislature of the State, to whose control the punishment of crime was almost wholly confided. So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, . . . it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition. And we think this equally true of the [Clause], in its application to Congress.
Id. at 446-447 (emphasis added).
^ . Indeed, the Court in Weems refused even to comment upon some decisions from state courts because they were "based upon sentences of courts, not upon the constitutional validity of laws." 217 U.S. at 377.
may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 378.
It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What painful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard labor. It may be hard labor pressed to the point of pain.
His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving notice to the "authority immediately in charge of his surveillance," and without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty.
[I]t can be supposed that the consequences of greatest weight, in terms of ultimate impact on the petitioner, are unknown and unknowable. Indeed, in truth, he may live out his life with but minor inconvenience. . . . Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the impact of expatriation — especially where statelessness is the upshot — may be severe. Expatriation, in this respect, constitutes an especially demoralizing sanction. The uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt, which must accompany one who becomes an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a substantial factor in the ultimate judgment.
It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 377.
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is, instead, the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably, as long as he remained in this country, he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so, because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101-102.
^ . "The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights of . . . ." Id. at 100.
^ . The specific incident giving rise to the provision was the perjury trial of Titus Oates in 1685.
None of the punishments inflicted upon Oates amounted to torture. . . . In the context of the Oates' case, "cruel and unusual" seems to have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif.L.Rev. 839, 859 (1969). Thus, "[t]he irregularity and anomaly of Oates' treatment was extreme." Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1773, 1789 n. 74 (1970). Although the English provision was intended to restrain the judicial and executive power, see n. 8, supra, the principle is, of course, fully applicable under our Clause, which is primarily a restraint upon the legislative power.
^ . In a case from the Philippine Territory, the Court struck down a punishment that "ha[d] no fellow in American legislation." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 377. After examining the punishments imposed, under both United States and Philippine law, for similar as well as more serious crimes, id. at 380-381, the Court declared that the "contrast"
id. at 381. And in Trop v. Dulles, supra, in which a law of Congress punishing wartime desertion by expatriation was held unconstitutional, it was emphasized that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime." Id. at 102. When a severe punishment is not inflicted elsewhere, or when more serious crimes are punished less severely, there is a strong inference that the State is exercising arbitrary, "unrestrained power."
The court pointed out that death was an usual punishment for murder, that it prevailed in the Territory for many years, and was inflicted by shooting, also that that mode of execution was usual under military law. It was hence concluded that it was not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States as cruel or unusual.
[o]n the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the [Clause], precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. . . . If the word "unusual" is to have any meaning apart from the word "cruel," however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that which is generally done.
There are other statements in prior cases indicating that the word "unusual" has a distinct meaning: "We perceive nothing . . . unusual in this [punishment]." Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 480 (1867). "[T]he judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unusual, but a cruel one. . . ." O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). "It is unusual in its character." Weems v. United States, supra, at 377. "And the punishment inflicted . . . is certainly unusual." United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "The punishment inflicted is not only unusual in character; it is, so far as known, unprecedented in American legal history." Id. at 435. "There is no precedent for it. What then is it, if it be not cruel, unusual and unlawful?" Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 479 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting). "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 667.
It is fair to conclude from these statements that "[w]hether the word ‘unusual' has any qualitative meaning different from ‘cruel' is not clear." Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100 n. 32. The question, in any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause simply by parsing its words.
enforcing . . . private view[s], rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Constitution.
I cannot bring myself to believe that [the State's procedure] . . . offends a principle of justice "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people."
Id. at 470. ". . . I cannot say that it would be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. at 471. Yet nowhere in the opinion is there any explanation of how he arrived at those conclusions.
^ . Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, at 463: "The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence."
We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this [punishment]. The object of the law was to protect the community against the manifold evils of intemperance. The mode adopted, of prohibiting under penalties the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors without license, is the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States. It is wholly within the discretion of State legislatures.
This discussion suggests that the Court viewed the punishment as reasonably related to the purposes for which it was inflicted.
Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime.
The State thereby suffers nothing, and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal.
^ . The principle that a severe punishment must not be excessive does not, of course, mean that a severe punishment is constitutional merely because it is necessary. A State could not now, for example, inflict a punishment condemned by history, for any such punishment, no matter how necessary, would be intolerably offensive to human dignity. The point is simply that the unnecessary infliction of suffering is also offensive to human dignity.
The Constitution expressly proscribes cruel or unusual punishments. It would be mere speculation and conjecture to ascribe to the framers an intent to exempt capital punishment from the compass of that provision solely because, at a time when the death penalty was commonly accepted, they provided elsewhere in the Constitution for special safeguards in its application.
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 639, 493 P.2d 880, 887 (1972).
The [Clause] forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the [Clause] was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the [Clause].
Under this view, of course, any punishment that was in common use in 1791 is forever exempt from the Clause.
^ . The Court expressly noted that the constitutionality of the punishment itself was not challenged. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. at 136-137. Indeed, it may be that the only contention made was that, in the absence of statutory sanction, the sentencing "court possessed no authority to prescribe the mode of execution." Id. at 137.
We held in the case of Kemmler . . . that, as the legislature of the State of New York had determined that [electrocution] did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment, and its courts had sustained that determination, we were unable to perceive that the State had thereby abridged the privileges or immunities of petitioner or deprived him of due process of law.
^ . It was also asserted that the Constitution prohibits "cruelty inherent in the method of punishment," but does not prohibit "the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." 329 U.S. at 464. No authority was cited for this assertion, and, in any event, the distinction drawn appears to be meaningless.
^ . In a non-death case, Trop v. Dulles, it was said that, "in a day when it is still widely accepted, [death] cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." 356 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). This statement, of course, left open the future constitutionality of the punishment.
That life is at stake is, of course, another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and non-capital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant.
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.).
When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance.
I do not concede that whatever process is "due'"an offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no means novel, . . . nor is it negligible, being literally that between life and death.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (concurring in result). And, of course, for many years, this Court distinguished death cases from all others for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
^ . See Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, 700-789, pp. 246-273 (1953); Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-21 (1968) (testimony of Clinton Duffy); H. Barnes & N. Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 306-309 (3d ed. 1959); C. Chessman, Trial by Ordeal 195-202 (1955); M. DiSalle, The Power of Life and Death 84-85 (1965); C. Duffy & A. Hirschberg, 88 Men and 2 Women 13-14 (1962); B. Eshelman, Death Row Chaplain 26-29, 101-104, 159-164 (1962); R. Hammer, Between Life and Death 208-212 (1969); K. Lamott, Chronicles of San Quentin 228-231 (1961); L. Lawes, Life and Death in Sing Sing 170-171 (1928); Rubin, The Supreme Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 15 Crime & Delin. 121, 128-129 (1969); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 1268, 1338-1341 (1968); Brief amici curiae filed by James V. Bennett, Clinton T. Duffy, Robert G. Sarver, Harry C. Tinsley, and Lawrence E. Wilson 12-14.
^ . See Barnes & Teeters, supra, at 309-311 (3d ed. 1959); Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in A. Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 131, 151-156 (1960); C. Duffy & A. Hirschberg, supra, at 68-70, 254 (1962); Hammer, supra, at 222-235, 244-250, 269-272 (1969); S. Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 340 (1963); Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 Amer.J.Psychiatry 393 (1962); Gottlieb, Capital Punishment, 15 Crime & Delin. 1, 8-10 (1969); West, Medicine and Capital Punishment, in Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 (1968); Ziferstein, Crime and Punishment, The Center Magazine 84 (Jan. 1968); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 1268, 1342 (1968); Note, Mental Suffering under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 Iowa L.Rev. 814 (1972).
^ . The State, of course, does not purposely impose the lengthy waiting period in order to inflict further suffering. The impact upon the individual is not the less severe on that account. It is no answer to assert that long delays exist only because condemned criminals avail themselves of their full panoply of legal rights. The right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment cannot, of course, be played off against the right to pursue due process of law, but, apart from that, the plain truth is that it is society that demands, even against the wishes of the criminal, that all legal avenues be explored before the execution is finally carried out.
^ . It was recognized in Trop itself that expatriation is a "punishment short of death." 356 U.S. at 99. Death, however, was distinguished on the ground that it was "still widely accepted." Ibid.
^ . Stephen, Capital Punishments, 69 Fraser's Magazine 753, 763 (1864).
^ . From 1930 to 1939: 155, 153, 140, 160, 168, 199, 195, 147, 190, 160. From 1940 to 1949: 124, 123, 147, 131, 120, 117, 131, 153, 119, 119. From 1950 to 1959: 82, 105, 83, 62, 81, 76, 65, 65, 49, 49. From 1960 to 1967: 56, 42, 47, 21, 15, 7, 1, 2. Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930-1970, p. 8 (Aug. 1971). The last execution in the United States took place on June 2, 1967. Id. at 4.
^ . 1961 — 140; 1962 — 103; 1963 — 93; 1964 — 106; 1965 — 86; 1966 — 118; 1967 — 85; 1968 — 102; 1969 — 97; 1970 — 127. Id. at 9.
^ . Commutations averaged about 18 per year. 1961 — 17; 1962 — 27; 1963 — 16; 1964 — 9; 1965 — 19; 1966 — 17; 1967 — 13; 1968 — 16; 1969 — 20; 1970 — 29. Ibid.
^ . Transfers to mental institutions averaged about three per year. 1961 — 3; 1962 — 4; 1963 — 1; 1964 — 3; 1965 — 4; 1966 — 3; 1967 — 3; 1968 — 2; 1969 — 1; 1970 — 5. Ibid.
^ . These four methods of disposition averaged about 44 per year. 1961 — 31, 1962 — 30; 1963 — 32; 1964 — 58; 1965 — 39; 1966 — 33; 1967 — 53; 1968 — 59; 1969 — 64; 1970 — 42. Ibid. Specific figures are available starting with 1967. Resentences: 1967 — 7; 1968 — 18; 1969 — 12; 1970 — 14. Grants of new trials and orders for resentencing: 1967 — 31; 1968 — 21; 1969 — 13; 1970 — 9. Dismissals of indictments and reversals of convictions: 1967 — 12; 1968 — 19; 1969 — 33; 1970 — 17. Deaths by suicide and natural causes: 1967 — 2; 1968 — 1; 1969 — 5; 1970 — 2. National Prisoner Statistics No. 42, Executions 1930-1967, p. 13 (June 1968); National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1968, p. 12 (Aug. 1969); National Prisoner statistics, supra, n. 40, at 14-15.
^ . Id. at 9.
^ . During that 10-year period, 1,177 prisoners entered death row, including 120 who were returned following new trials or treatment at mental institutions. There were 653 dispositions other than by execution, leaving 524 prisoners who might have been executed, of whom 135 actually were. Ibid.
^ . Id. at 8.
They got me charged with murder and I admit, I admit going to these folks' home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out, backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn't intend to kill nobody. I didn't know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn't know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when the gun went off, I was down on the floor, and I got up and ran. That's all to it.
The admission in open court by the accused . . . that, during the period in which he was involved in the commission of a criminal act at the home of the deceased, he accidentally tripped over a wire in leaving the premises causing the gun to go off, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased by violent means, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder. . . .
Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 254, 167 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1969). About Furman himself, the jury knew only that he was black and that, according to his statement at trial, he was 26 years old and worked at "Superior Upholstery." App. 54. It took the jury one hour and 35 minutes to return a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death. Id. at 64-65.
^ . T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 15 (1959).
^ . Eight States still employ hanging as the method of execution, and one, Utah, also employs shooting. These nine States have accounted for less than 3% of the executions in the United States since 1930. National Prisoner Statistics, supra, n. 40, at 10-11.
^ . Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have abolished death as a punishment for crimes. Id. at 50. In addition, the California Supreme Court held the punishment unconstitutional under the state counterpart of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880 (1972).
^ . New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have almost totally abolished death as a punishment for crimes. National Prisoner Statistics, supra, n. 40, at 50. Indeed, these five States might well be considered de facto abolition States. North Dakota and Rhode Island, which restricted the punishment in 1915 and 1852, respectively, have not carried out an execution since at least 1930, id. at 10; nor have there been any executions in New York, Vermont, or New Mexico since they restricted the punishment in 1965, 1965, and 1969, respectively, id. at 10-11. As of January 1, 1971, none of the five States had even a single prisoner under sentence of death. Id. at 18-19.
In addition, six States, while retaining the punishment on the books in generally applicable form, have made virtually no use of it. Since 1930, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming have carried out a total of 22 executions. Id. at 10-11. As of January 1, 1971, these six States had a total of three prisoners under sentences of death. Id. at 18-19. Hence, assuming 25 executions in 42 years, each State averaged about one execution every 10 years.
^ . There is also the more limited argument that death is a necessary punishment when criminals are already serving or subject to a sentence of life imprisonment. If the only punishment available is further imprisonment, it is said, those criminals will have nothing to lose by committing further crimes, and accordingly, the threat of death is the sole deterrent. But "life" imprisonment is a misnomer today. Rarely, if ever, do crimes carry a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole. That possibility ensures that criminals do not reach the point where further crimes are free of consequences. Moreover, if this argument is simply an assertion that the threat of death is a more effective deterrent than the threat of increased imprisonment by denial of release on parole, then, as noted above, there is simply no evidence to support. it.


In Michael Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC and Underground Printing-Wisconsin, LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (available here), Defendant Sconnie Nation made some t-shirts and tank tops displaying the image of Paul Soglin’s face, the Mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, and the phrase “Sorry for Partying.” Mayor Soglin’s photographer, Michael Kienitz, brought suit against Sconnie Nation for copyright infringement because Kienitz dod not give Sconnie permission to use Mayor Soglin’s photo.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, holding that Sconnie Nation made fair use of the Mayor’s photo. Sconnie Nation altered the photo by posterizing it, removing the background, turning the Mayor’s face lime green and surrounding it with multi-colored writing. Sconnie Nation put the altered photo on t-shirts for a 2012 Block Party in the college town of Madison, Wisconsin and sold 54 t-shirts.
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit Court recited the law pertaining to the defense of fair use. Fair use is a defense to infringement and the Copyright Act sets out four non-exclusive factors for the court to consider. 17 U.S.C. §107. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered include – (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that in the case of Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit found that a “transformative use” is enough to bring a modified copy within the scope of §107. However, the Seventh Circuit was skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively whether something is “transformative” not only replaces the list in §107, but also overrides another provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §106(2), which protects derivative works of the original artwork. The Seventh Circuit failed to see how every “transformative use” can be “fair use” without extinguishing the author’s rights under §106(2).
In analyzing the case under the fair use factors, the Seventh Circuit turned to the fourth factor and asked whether the contested use is a complement to the protected work (an allowed use of the copyrighted original work) rather than a substitute for it (a prohibited use of the original). The Seventh Circuit found that a t-shirt or tank top is not substitute for the original photographic work. In connection with the third factor, the Seventh Circuit found that Defendant Sconnie Nation removed so much material from the original that only the non-copyrightable outline of Mayor Soglin’s face remained. Accordingly, Defendants use qualified as a fair use of the original photo under the Copyright Act.


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Garland, E., "The Indian River Lagoon: An estuary of national significance," Palatka, Florida: St. Johns River Water Management District, http://www.sjrwmd.com/indianriverlagoon/. Last updated on December 23, 2015, accessed January 11, 2016.
Thurman, H.V. & Trujillo, A.P. (2004). Introductory Oceanography (10th Edition), Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Illustration depicting the overturning circulation of the global ocean. Throughout the Atlantic Ocean, the circulation carries warm waters (red arrows) northward near the surface and cold deep waters (blue arrows) southward.
Oceans cover about 70% of the globe and have a major influence on all of Earth's systems. Oceanography offers a fascinating context to connect science with human dimensions through the study of current events and issues such as hazards, pollution, energy resources, and more. Dive into the resources available on Cutting Edge for exciting ways to incorporate oceanography and its multi-disciplinary facets into your classroom and laboratory.
Several resources about Oceanography are available from the SERC websites. This Stie Guide provides a list of project websites that provide visualizations, teaching activities, and tools that may be of use in the classroom or in lab.

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Failure to let the Secretary of State know within 60 days that its registered agent has changed or resigned.
Idaho Code § 30-21-601. When the Secretary of State determines that one of the reasons for dissolution exists, it must give notice to the corporation. The notice may be hand delivered or mailed to the corporation’s office or registered agent. Idaho Code § 30-21-602(a). The corporation has 60 days to cure the problem. Id. If it does not, it is administratively dissolved.
After being administratively dissolved, the corporation continues to exist but it may not do any business other than “wind up its activities and affairs and liquidate its assets in the manner provided in its organic law or to apply for reinstatement under section 30-21-603, Idaho Code.” Idaho Code § 30-21-602(c).
A corporation that is administratively dissolved may apply for reinstatement within 10 years of being administratively dissolved. Idaho Code § 30-21-603(a). To be reinstated, the corporation must file an application that states the name, address, date of the administrative dissolution, and that the the issue has issue has been resolved. Idaho Code § 30-21-603(b).
If any fees, taxes, interest, or penalties are due, they must be paid before the corporation will be reinstated. Idaho Code § 30-21-603(c).
When a corporation is reinstated, the date of reinstatement “relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the administrative dissolution.” Idaho Code § 30-21-603(d). The corporation is treated as if it was never administratively dissolved. Id.


Summary: On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the Workers' Compensation Court's findings that claimant was not permanently partially disabled and held that he had suffered more than a $2 an hour wage loss. It remanded for a determination of the permanent partial disability benefits due him. On remand, the dispute over permanent partial disability benefits was limited to the impairment award.
Held: The only impairment rating in evidence is that of the claimant's treating physician. The Supreme Court held that the opinions of the claimant's treating physician are entitled to deference and relied upon them in its decision. In that light, claimant is entitled to a fifty percent impairment award. The other factors entitle him to an additional forty-two percent , thus his total impairment award is ninety-two percent.
Folding: Sometimes ya got to fold 'em. In the words of Kenny Rogers' song, "The Gambler": You got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em, Know when to walk away and know when to run.
Impairment: Impairment Ratings. Where the only impairment rating is that of the treating physician and the Supreme Court has held on appeal that the treating physician's opinions are entitled to deference and relied upon those opinions in reaching its decision, the treating physician's impairment rating is adopted.
Attorney Fees: Reasonableness of Insurer. Where arguments of insurer in opposition to claimant's request for impairment award of fifty percent were not unreasonable, claimant is not entitled to attorney fees. § 39-71-612, MCA (1993). However, if the 42% has not been paid, claimant is entitled to a penalty on that portion.
Penalties: Insurer. Where arguments of insurer in opposition to claimant's request for impairment award of fifty percent were not unreasonable, claimant is not entitled to a penalty. § 39-71-2907, MCA (1993). However, if the 42% has not been paid, claimant is entitled to a penalty on that portion.
Constitutions, Statutes, Rules, and Regulations: Montana Code Annotated: 39-71-612 (1993). Where arguments of insurer in opposition to claimant's request for impairment award of fifty percent were not unreasonable, claimant is not entitled to attorney fees. § 39-71-612, MCA (1993). However, if the 42% has not been paid, claimant is entitled to a penalty on that portion.
Constitutions, Statutes, Rules, and Regulations: Montana Code Annotated: 39-71-2907 (1993). Where arguments of insurer in opposition to claimant's request for impairment award of fifty percent were not unreasonable, claimant is not entitled to a penalty. § 39-71-2907, MCA (1993). However, if the 42% has not been paid, claimant is entitled to a penalty on that portion.
¶1 This case is on remand from the Supreme Court following its decision in Nielson v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 2003 MT 95, 315 Mont. 194, 69 P.3d 1136. The Supreme Court reversed my decision, found at 2000 MTWCC 64, wherein I denied claimant's request for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. The Court remanded with instructions that I determine the amount of PPD benefits due claimant.
¶ 48 The undisputed evidence submitted to the Workers' Compensation Court was that at the time of his injury, Louis Nielson was capable of earning $9 per hour servicing oil wells for his employer. Assuming, for the limited purposes of this appeal, that he is capable of returning to any employment, the only evidence of employment to which he could return were the clerk and sales positions identified by Dennis McLuskie. The auto sales position is based on commission and Nielson's previous experience in that occupation was unsuccessful. The two clerk positions paid a maximum of $5.50 per hour but it was Dr. Ben-Youssef's opinion that Nielson could not engage in those occupations on a regular basis.
¶ 49 We conclude, therefore, that based on the only substantial credible evidence offered at the time of trial, Louis Nielson has sustained a work-related permanent partial disability as defined at § 39-71-116(18), MCA (1993), and is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits as provided for at § 39-71-703, MCA (1993), based on the difference between what he was capable of earning in his time of injury employment and what he is capable of earning on a part-time basis as a sales clerk or video store clerk, earning $5.50 per hour.
¶3 Further facts are found in my first Nielson decision denying permanent total disability benefits, 1999 MTWCC 49, and my second decision denying PPD benefits, 2000 MTWCC 64. I will refer to the first decision as Nielson I and the Supreme Court opinion as Nielson SC.
39-71-703. Compensation for permanent partial disability. (1) If an injured worker suffers a permanent partial disability and is no longer entitled to temporary total or permanent total disability benefits, the worker is entitled to a permanent partial disability award.
(2) The permanent partial disability award must be arrived at by multiplying the percentage arrived at through the calculation provided in subsection (3) by 350 weeks.
(d) if a worker, at the time of the injury, was performing heavy labor activity and after the injury the worker can perform only light or sedentary labor activity, 20%; if a worker, at the time of injury, was performing heavy labor activity and after the injury the worker can perform only medium labor activity, 15%; if a worker was performing medium labor activity at the time of the injury and after the injury the worker can perform only light or sedentary labor activity, 10%.
(4) The weekly benefit rate for permanent partial disability is 66 2/3% of the wages received at the time of injury, but the rate may not exceed one-half the state's average weekly wage. The weekly benefit amount established for an injured worker may not be changed by a subsequent adjustment in the state's average weekly wage for future fiscal years.
(5) If a worker suffers a subsequent compensable injury or injuries to the same part of the body, the award payable for the subsequent injury may not duplicate any amounts paid for the previous injury or injuries.
My task on remand is simply to go through the specific factors to determine claimant's PPD award.
¶5 After reading the briefs of the parties it appears that the only controversy is over the impairment award under subsection (3). They do not argue over the other elements, so I assume they are in agreement as to those other elements.(2) If they are not, they should be.
¶5b Subsection (3)(b) provides for a 2% award for a worker who has completed high school but not gone beyond but 0% for a worker who has had any post-high school education. Claimant attended a junior college for at least a short time (id.), therefore he is not entitled to benefits under this subsection.
¶5c Subsection (3)(c) provides for a 20% award if the worker has a wage loss of more than $2 an hour. Paragraphs 48 and 49 of the Supreme Court's decision specifically find that he suffered more than a $2 an hour loss, thus he is entitled to the 20% award.
¶5d Subsection (3)(d) provides for 20% where the worker was performing heavy labor and post-injury can only perform light or sedentary labor. My finding of fact at paragraph 8 of Nielson I indicates that claimant was working in a laboring position servicing oil wells and involved "working with heavy hose at well sites." Dr. Ben-Youssef's opinion, which the Supreme Court held is entitled to deference, was that following claimant's injury he "could engage in no employment using the upper extremities." (Nielson SC ¶ 22.) It is therefore clear that claimant went from heavy labor to light or sedentary work and is entitled to the 20% under this subsection.
Adding the above entitlements together, the claimant at a minimum is entitled to a forty-two percent PPD award.
¶6 In its brief on remand, the State Fund disputes only the fifty percent impairment rating of Dr. Ben-Youssef. Under section 39-71-703(3), MCA (1993), that impairment rating directly translates into a percentage award of fifty percent. Combined with the forty-two percent discussed above, it would entitle claimant to a ninety-two percent award.
As it presently sits, Dr. Ben-Youssef's impairment rating is the only one in evidence in this case and the Supreme Court has expressly indicated that his opinions are entitled to deference.
¶8 The final question is whether the claimant is entitled to a penalty and attorney fees with respect to the fifty percent impairment award. To award either, I must find that the State Fund has acted unreasonably in opposing the award. §§ 39-71-612 and -2907, MCA (1993). While I have adopted Dr. Ben-Youssef's impairment rating, the State Fund's arguments for rejecting it were not unreasonable and were supported by many of my own findings of fact. The Supreme Court did not address the impairment rating, only the lost wages. I therefore find that the State Fund's opposition to the fifty percent rating was not unreasonable and that the claimant is not entitled to a penalty.
However, the Supreme Court specifically held that claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, especially wage loss benefits, see ¶ 2. Thus, the 42 percent attributable to the other factors should have been paid within a reasonable period of time after the Supreme Court's decision. That decision was on April 23, 2003. If the 42 percent has not been paid, then it has been unduly and unreasonably delayed, entitling the claimant to a 20 percent penalty on the 42 percent. § 39-71-2907, MCA (1993). The claimant is also entitled to attorney fees under section 39-71-611, MCA (1993), since the failure to pay amounted to a denial of all PPD benefits and that denial was unreasonable to the extent of the 42 percent.
¶9 Under section 39-71-703, MCA (1993), the claimant is entitled to a ninety-two percent permanent partial disability award, which the State Fund shall pay.
¶10 The claimant is not entitled to attorney fees or a penalty with respect to the 50 percent impairment award. However, if the 42 percent for other factors has not been paid, claimant is entitled to a 20 percent penalty on that percentage and attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the Court in accordance with its rules.
¶11 The claimant is entitled to his costs. He shall file his memorandum of costs in accordance with Court rules, and any opposition to the costs shall be filed in accordance with Court rules.
¶12 This JUDGMENT is certified as final for purposes of appeal.
¶13 Any party to this dispute may have twenty days in which to request a rehearing from this Decision and Judgment After Remand.
DATED in Helena, Montana, this 20th day of February, 2004.
1. Claimant was injured on April 18, 1995, therefore his entitlement to benefits is governed by the 1993 version of the law as that was the version in effect at the time. Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 224 Mont. 318, 321, 730 P.2d 380, 382 (1986).
2. After writing this paragraph I contacted counsel and determined that in fact they are in agreement with the percentages I had determined. The only dispute was as to impairment.
3. In its brief on remand it suggests that an "equitable solution would be to order an Independent Medical Exam to determine an appropriate rating." (Respondent's Brief on Remand at 9.) Unfortunately, the record is closed, and was closed long ago.