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ineligible. That is what occurred in, Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com.3 Amazon successfully showed that the patents in suit were invalid under 35 U.S.C. Section 101 and were granted judgment on the pleadings.4 Amazon will then question the validity of the complaint, meaning, did the plaintiff meet its burden of proof of stating a cause of action? If Amazon can successfully show that the complaint is invalid, they will often receive judgment in their favor.
Adaptix, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-01379-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111933 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Adaptix, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111933 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
This was a patent infringement case brought by Adaptix Inc. against Amazon.com and other named defendants. The court concluded that the 4 cases, in which Amazon was a defendant, must be dismissed because they were barred by the doctrine against claim splitting.
Adaptix, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33521 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016).
Adaptix asked the court to revisit this last set of decisions in their previous set of cases alleging patent infringement. The court had previously granted summary judgment on the claims in favor of defendants. The court concluded that because Adaptix made similar arguments that were already dismissed, the court denied the plaintiff’s request.
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77411 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2015).
In this case, the court was deciding whether to grant Amazon’s motion to dismiss based solely on the pleadings (early in the legal process). Here, plaintiff’s claim that Amazon was infringing their patent for “wirelessly communicating selective information to an electronic device.” The court granted the motion because the patent infringement claim would inhibit the “abstract idea” that made the technology possible from growing and developing.
Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61039, 2011 WL 2260276 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2011).
The court here defined the disputed terms in the five patents that were in controversy.
Amazon. Com Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2004 Wash. LEXIS 864, 152 Wn.2d 1030, 103 P.3d 200 (Wash. 2004).
Amazon.com International alleged that defendant American Dynasty Surplus Lines infringed upon its patents by misappropriating the software used on Amazon’s website. The court concluded that “because the allegations conceivably amounted to an advertising injury covered by Amazon’s policy with Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, Atlantic Mutual had a duty to defend” and revered the summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Mutual. The court remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Amazon’s excess carrier, American Dynasty Surplus Line. The court states that the duty is upon the primary insurer regarding any infringement of patents.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18660, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1115 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
Defendants may continue to offer an “Express Lane” feature if the feature is modified to avoid infringement of the ‘411 patent in a manner that is consistent with the applicable conclusion of law.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163, 57 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The Court vacated the lower court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings based on BarnesandNoble.com’s ability to raise substantial questions as to the validity of the ‘411 patent, which was not considered in the lower court.
This was a patent infringement case involving four software patents held by plaintiffs Amazon.com and A9.com, the assignee of one of the four patents at issue here. The plaintiffs alleged patent infringement via the company websites of defendants Cendant Corporation and its subsidiaries Trilegiant, Orbitz, Budget Rent-a-Car (“Budget”), and Avis Rent-a-Car Systems (“Avis”). The court granted the motion to transfer venues. The motion to transfer was granted here because the motion was backed by the convenience of the parties.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Straight Path IP Grp., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69281 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2015).
This was a patent infringement case involving the sale of Internet-enabled devices with pre-installed video streaming applications – Amazon Instant Video streaming service. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and granted the motion to transfer venue.
Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90004, 2015 WL 4210890 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2015).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case. Amazon motioned for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that because the patents-in-suit were invalid under, 35 U.S.C. Section 101, the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted.
Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24421 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 2015).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case. Amazon.com motioned to transfer pursuant to a clause within an agreement signed by both parties. The court granted the motion finding that the “clear language of the forum selection clause includes this action because it related to the Service Offerings.” The court denied Amazon’s motion for partial summary judgment as it found that there was a genuine issue of material fact when looking at the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Amazon Digital Services was a defendant in this patent infringement case. Amazon filed a motion to transfer. The court, after looking at the convenience of the witnesses, convenience of the parties, and the interest of justice, found that these factors did not weigh in favor of a transfer and denied the motion.
Big Baboon Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80289 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
This was a patent infringement case involving a Motion to Compel, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The court ordered Big Baboon to provide Amazon with specific infringement claims charts with citations, so that Amazon could understand exactly what it was being accused of infringing.
Bovino v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32016 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2014).
Bovino filed a motion to amend his complaint to include an additional 100 products that Amazon allegedly infringed. The court granted this motion as it found no bad faith argument against this amendment and found Amazon’s arguments to be without merit and therefore, invalid.
Bovino v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71772, 2015 WL 3523218 (D. Colo. June 1, 2015).
Amazon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that they did not infringe the patent as a result of the patent’s meaning and that the patent is invalid. The court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment as Mr. Bovino did not adequately show a claim that the products infringed on the patent.
Bovino v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32368, 2016 WL 943780 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2016).
Amazon filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Mr. Bovino filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. The court held that the Motion for Attorney’s Fees was denied, as the case did not rise to the “exceptional” level required. Additionally, the court could not enforce a settlement agreement, after a judgment by a court had been entered.
Celebrate Int’l, LLC v. LeapFrog Enters., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114407, 2015 WL 5092611 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2015).
This was a patent infringement case filed by Celebrate International LLC against Leapfrog Enterprises, an Amazon-owned e-reader for kids, regarding the ‘398 Patent and the ‘776 Patent. The court stated that the parties were to submit a proposed order that was consistent with the terms agreed upon in the opinion.
Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174715 (D. Del. 2014).
This was a patent infringement case where Cloud Satchel could not successfully argue patent infringement against Amazon.com Inc. and Barnes & Noble, Inc. The court granted Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble’s request for summary judgment for invalidity.
Clouding IP, LLC v. amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73655, 2013 WL 2293452 (D. Del. May 24, 2013).
Clouding IP filed suit against Amazon.com for patent infringement. The court addressed the issue of Direct Infringement, Induced Infringement, Willful Infringement, and a motion for a more definite statement. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part.
Content Guard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39807 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2015).
Amazon filed a defense claiming that Content Guard Holdings had failed to plead a case upon which relief could be granted. After observing all of the relevant documents, pleadings, and briefs, the court found that Content Guard Holdings had pled a case upon which relief can be granted. Amazon’s motion to dismiss was denied.
Content Guard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33881 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2015).
Amazon, along with other named defendants, found that the joinder was improper in this case and motioned to sever pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied all motions to sever finding that the parties were properly joined.
Content Guard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34667 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2015).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant in this patent infringement suit, this document deals specifically with the court construing disputed terms.
ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53687 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2015).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant in this case, this particular document involved a motion to transfer filed by defendant, Apple. The court denied the motion to transfer and found that venue was proper.
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 333, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74368 (D. Del. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff sued Amazon for patent infringement by use of its website’s “1-click” purchase feature. Plaintiff claimed Amazon’s information storage and way of collecting buyer and seller reviews violated plaintiff’s patents. Amazon successfully argued against an order that would require them to permanently halt its infringing activities or pay an ongoing royalty to patent owners because plaintiff did not show irreparable harm that could not be rectified by monetary payment.
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 244, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51268 (D. Del. 2012).
CyberFone Sys., LLC v. Cellco P’ship, 885 F. Supp. 2d 710, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115740, 2012 WL 3528115 (D. Del. 2012).
Amazon was one of the named defendants in this patent infringement case. Cyberfone Systems, LLC, sued 175 defendants for violating the 060 patent. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The court found that because the content patent was ineligible for patent protection, that the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
CyberFone Sys., LLC v. Cellco P’ship, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60045, 2012 WL 1509504 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2012).
Amazon.com is a named defendant in a patent infringement case. Cyberfone Systems, LLC, sued 175 defendants for violating the 060 patent and the 382 patent. A number of defendants motioned to sever and dismiss. The court granted in part on the issue of contributory infringement motions and denied in part on the remaining grounds.
CyberFone Sys., LLC v. ZTE (USA), Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13478, 2014 WL 490586 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 2014).
Amazon.com was a named defendant in this patent infringement case. Cyberfone Systems, LLC, sued multiple defendants for violating the 060 patent. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court in finding that the patent was invalid because the categorical data storage mentioned in the patent is an abstract idea that is not patent-eligible.
Discovery Patent Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D. Del. 2011).
The court here is determining what construction of the parties disputed terms in the patent claim should be adopted by the court.
Droplets, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-392, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122978 (E.D. Tex. June 27, 2012).
The court here was determining whether to grant defendants motion to transfer venue where the majority of relevant documents and defendants’ headquarters were located in the District of Northern California. The court found that the location of sources of proof, availability of compulsory process, the convenience for witnesses, and the local interest factors all favored transfer, and granted the motion.
EBAY Inc. and Microsoft Corporation v. Kelora Systems, LLC.
This patent infringement case concerned Kelora’s US Patent No. 6,275,821, or the ‘821 Patent. The Court found that, without the assistance of expert testimony, Defendants had not met the standards required for summary judgment.
Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., 810 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Adobe Sys., 891 F. Supp. 2d 803 (E.D. Tex. 2012).
In this case, the court as assessing the fairness of allowing the defendants to recover the costs of: (1) video depositions; (2) electronic discovery costs including document collection, processing, hosting, scanning and conversion; (3) photocopies; (4) CD and DVD copies; (5) graphics professional support at trial; and (6) demonstratives and exhibits for trial. The court provided guidance to the parties in how the costs can most fairly be assessed and ordered the defendants to resubmit their Bill of Costs to the court.
EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. T-Mobile United States, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76467 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012).
In this case the court esd deciding whether or not to grant a subpoena for discovery of third party Kineto. The court found that the subpoena could be granted with two slight exceptions because plaintiff Eon modified the scope of the subpoena to limit its discovery to matters relating strictly to T-Mobile devices.
Execware, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174885 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2012).
In this case a Magistrate judge recommended that claims against defendant Staples, Inc. for both direct and willful infringement be dismissed because the complaint did not allege that Staples’ customers actually used the accused software, or that Staples caused its customers to directly infringe the patent, and plaintiff’s amended complaint relies solely on allegations that Staples was made aware of the patent by the filing of the original complaint in the present action.
com, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99196 (D. Del. Dec. 9, 2008).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case. Girafa, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The court concluded that there were substantial questions concerning the infringement claims and their validity and thus denied Girafa’s motion for preliminary injunction.
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012).
The court held that the motion to sever was granted, as the defendants’ infringements were not related and did not stem from the same occurrence. Additionally, the court denied the motion to transfer for Amazon, as it found that it had enough connections with the forum and there were also procedural issues with granting both motions.
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Del. 2013).
The court set forth an interpretation of the claim language in the patents provided for the cases and denied collateral estoppel from the previous Texas court decision.
Guardian Media Techs., Ltd. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171254 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
The court was determining whether defendants were improperly joined where it was alleged that defendants conduct was part of the same transaction or occurrence. The court held that joinder was improper as to all defendants except Amazon.com, Inc. because there is no indication that the defendants acted in concert or was connected in any way.
Hand Held Prods. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85345 (D. Del. June 24, 2014).
In order to infringe upon a patent, the actions taken must follow the same sequence or order of actions outlined in the patent. Amazon did not present any expert testimony but rather merely relied on attorney arguments, and therefore did not show that claims of a patent were indefinite or invalid.
In re Amazon.com, Inc., 476 Fed. Appx. 738 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Amazon had submitted a writ of mandamus to vacate an order denying a motion to transfer a case and directing to transfer to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The court ordered Global Sessions LP et al. to respond no later than February 8, 2012.
In re Amazon.com Inc., 478 Fed. Appx. 669 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Amazon had submitted a writ of mandamus to vacate an order denying a motion to transfer a case and directing to transfer to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The court denied Amazon’s writ of mandamus; the transfer of venue would not have been more convenient.
Infinite Data Llc v. Amazon.com Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8849 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2014).
In this case the court was deciding whether to grant a motion to stay (temporarily postpone judicial proceedings). The court ultimately held that those defendants who agreed to be bound by the litigation decided during the stay would be granted that stay, and that those who wanted to litigate on their own would not be granted a stay. This decision favored fairness to all parties because plaintiff was not forced to re-litigate against any defendant, thus avoiding any tactical advantages.
Innovative Office Prods. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59090 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2012).
This was a patent infringement case brought by Innovative Office Productions against Amazon.com. among other defendants. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed most of the defendants, Amazon.com included. This case dealt specifically with the remaining defendants.
IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Va. 2004).
IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
This was a case involving the appellant appealing summary judgment for a patent infringement claim awarded by the previous court. The court affirmed summary judgment and reversed the award of attorney fees. The district court erred in granting Amazon attorney fees, Amazon did not file a timely request. The district court properly granted Amazon summary judgment for the infringement claim.
JVW Enters. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 175 Fed. Appx. 344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
JVW previously sued a wholesaler for patent infringement and no infringement was found so JVW appealed. The district court’s decision was reversed in part and remanded in part. The case here was on appeal. The district court’s decision was affirmed.
KKG, LLC v. Rank Group, PLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54279 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013).
The court was defining the meaning of 6 terms in dispute by the parties.
Lexington Luminance LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Mass. 2014).
Lexington sued Amazon.com and Amazon Digital Services alleging that the Kindle e-readers created by amazon were in violation of patent infringement of the 851 patent. This case dealt specifically with defendant, Amazon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the claim failed to narrow the composition of the substrate to any degree of substantial certainty. Ultimately, the court found the claim 1 of the 851 patent to be indefinite. The District Court allowed Amazon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment was entered on Amazon’s counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity in its favor and Lexington’s complaint was dismissed.
Lexington Luminance LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 601 Fed. Appx. 963 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Lexington sued Amazon.com and Amazon Digital Services alleging that the Kindle e-readers created by amazon violated the 851 patent. This is an appeal from the United States District Court judgment in favor of Amazon.com. The Court of Appeals now reviewed the judgment and found that the district court erred in construing the claim and in holding the claim indefinite. The court remands.
Lexington Luminance LLC v. Amazon Digital Servs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46023 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2016).
The court determined claim construction for the patents in suit by defining them in a way that most naturally aligns with the patent’s description.
M-Edge Accessories LLC v. Amazon.Com Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 311 (D. Md. Jan. 2, 2013).
The court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, as it determined the plaintiff’s complaint contained enough factual allegations to support the claims.
Amazon was able to get one of two patent infringement claims dismissed where the Court had no question that Amazon’s book cover did not infringe upon Plaintiff’s patent. Amazon’s motion for Summary Judgment was denied where there was a question of fact as to whether one of its e-reader book covers infringed upon the Plaintiff’s patent.
Milo & Gabby sued Amazon.com for multiple infringement claims. Amazon.com motioned to dismiss claiming that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The District Court agreed with Amazon and granted to motion to dismiss the III, V, VII claims.
Milo & Gabby sued Amazon.com for multiple infringement claims. The defendant, Amazon.com motioned in Limine. The court granted in part and denied in part.
Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149939 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2015).
Milo & Gabby sued Amazon.com for multiple infringement claims. Amazon.com motioned to dismiss claiming that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. After a jury hearing, the court adopted the jury’s finding that Amazon.com was not liable for “offering to sell” the alleged infringing products at issue in this matter. A judgment was placed in favor of Amazon.com and all claims against Amazon.com were dismissed.
Mobile Telcoms. Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138786 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014).
Amazon.com was a defendant in a patent infringement case brought by Mobile Telecommunications. Amazon.com motioned to dismiss the claims. The United States District Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss because they found the claims brought by plaintiff, Mobile Telecommunications were sufficient.
Mobile Telcoms. Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156454 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant, this patent infringement suit deals specifically with the claim construction order of the disputed claims within the patents.
Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85344 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2013).
The court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, as Nazomi failed to show specific facts that support their allegations.
Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. Microsoft Mobile Oy, 597 Fed. Appx. 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The court affirmed the lower court’s order for summary judgment for the defendants, as it did not find Nazomi’s arguments persuasive enough to overturn the decision.
Nomura v. YouTube, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174332 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2012). The court found that the new evidence and modifications dud not unfairly prejudice Nomura and therefore denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike the modifications and not admit the new evidence.
Nomura v. YouTube, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18292 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) The court determined the meaning of the patent terms that were disputed in the claim of patent infringement.
Nomura v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122895 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013).
The court determined that the documents Amazon requested to be sealed did not contain privileged information or trade secrets and therefore as not entitled to protection under the law and thus denied the motion to seal.
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Olympic Devs. AG, LLC v. Barnesandnoble.com LLC (N.D. Cal., 2011).
The court here was ruling on the parties’ stipulation to stay (temporarily postpone) the proceedings pending re-examination of the patent at issue in this claim. The court held that this action was stayed in its entirety pending completion of the reexamination of the patent at issue.
On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Amazon.com was a named defendant in a suit filed by On Demand Machine Corp. for Patent infringement. The United States District Court for the Eastern district of Missouri found Amazon to be liable. Amazon, along with other named defendants appealed the verdict and the court of appeals ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision.
Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 704 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
The court here, on appeal, was determining whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiff made challenges to the lower courts rulings on claim construction, its non-infringement rulings, and its denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion with respect to the severed defendants. The court affirmed the lower court because it agreed that plaintiff was attempting to amend its infringement contentions in order to make arguments that could have and should have been made before the entry of summary judgment.
PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. NEC Corp. of Am., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110046 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013).
The court determined the claim language of the patent and determined what each term shall mean for the duration of the case. Additionally, the court denied Facebook’s Motion for Summary Judgment and HP’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Indefiniteness.
Personalized Media Communs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104369 (D. Del. Aug. 10, 2015).
The court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as none of the claims stated were eligible patent claims.
Piao Shang Indus. Co. v. Acco Brands Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67417 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2011).
Pragmatus Mobile, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82256 (D. Del. June 17, 2015).
The court determined that the Motion to Stay Litigation was done as a tactical attempt by the defendants and therefore denied the motion.
Premium Prods. v. Pro Performance Sports, LLC, 997 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. Va. 2014).
The court affirmed the disqualification of Spiegel as the attorney for Premium as it would violate Virginia’s witness-advocate rule. The court determined that Spiegel would be a necessary witness and the magistrate did not rule contrary to law or erroneously.
Red Pine Point LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc. Case No. 14C 00274; 14C 00290. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, July 2014.
The court determined the motion to transfer was reasonable and granted to have all consolidated and related cases transferred to the Northern District of California.
RMail Ltd. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34912 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2013).
The court issued claim construction for the patents-in-suit.
Robbins v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 31 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016).
Robbins sought unemployment compensation from Amazon after termination of his employment. Robbins did not provide a doctor’s note when he returned to work from a previous injury and subsequently left because he felt unable to perform. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board determined that Robins was not entitle to unemployment compensation benefits because he voluntarily quit without good cause. The court determined that the decision of the Board should be affirmed as Robbins did not meet his burden to show that he left Amazon with good cause.
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wn. App. 454 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
The court here was determining whether the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claim against Amazon where Amazon was the provider or user of interactive computer services, plaintiff treated Amazon as a publisher, and Amazon was not the information content provider. The court agreed that because these elements were satisfied that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claim.
SFA Sys., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189807 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2013).
Amazon.com was a defendant in a case dealing with patent infringement. Amazon.com motioned for partial summary judgment. The court found that defendants failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that these claims were insoluble due to an impermissible mix of apparatus limitations and method steps. Ultimately, the court denied the motion for partial summary judgment.
Sipco, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150940 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2012).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant in this patent infringement case, the document at hand dealt specifically with the construction of the disputed terms in the patent.
Sipco, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137518 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2013).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant in a patent infringement case, the document at hand dealt specifically with another named defendant, Hawking’s motion for leave to reconvene. The United States District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
Soverain Software LLC v. Gap, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 760 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
Amazon.com was a named defendant in a patent infringement case. The document at hand dealt specifically with Amazon.com’s motion to compel production of non-privileged documents. The court disagreed with Amazon’s arguments and denied the motion.
Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
Amazon.com was a named defendant in an action brought by Soverain Software alleging patent infringement. This case dealt specifically with defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied the vendor’s motion as to the patentee’s personal compliance with marking statute but granted the motion in all other respects.
Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
Amazon.com was a named defendant in an action brought by Soverain Software alleging patent infringement. Defendant, Amazon motioned to stay. After looking to the three determining factors, the court found that they did not weight in favor of a stay and denied the motion.
Switzer v. Litex Indus. Case No. 11-cv-01174-REB. D. Colo., May 3, 2011.
This was a case involving patent infringement and a briefing schedule to resolve matters. The court ordered that the parties shall file a joint claim construction statement of the patents at issue, limited to fifteen pages, shall be filed thirty days after the statement is filed, deadlines for filing a response brief and reply shall be followed, a response brief shall be limited to twenty pages, and the parties shall convene a telephone motions hearing within ten days after the reply brief is filed to set a time for a hearing.
TainoApp, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177361 (D.P.R. Dec. 24, 2014).
Amazon.com is a defendant in a patent infringement case. Amazon.com motioned for transfer and the court granted the motion finding that the interest of justice was in favor of transfer.
Innovations, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115352 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2013).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case. After reviewing the multiple motions made by the parties, the United States District Court ordered that plaintiff must show cause on or before September 12, 2013 for why the assertion of the 407 patent was proper under the requirements of Rule 11.
Innovations, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51415 (D. Del. Apr. 20, 2015).
Amazon.com was defendant in this patent infringement case. Amazon.com requested attorney fees for the claims against them filed by plaintiff. This document deals specifically with the courts order for plaintiff to pay a total of $51,046 in attorney fees to Amazon.
Telebuyer, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96391 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2015).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case brought by Telebuyer. Amazon.com motioned for summary judgment claiming that the patents were invalid. The court, after applying the Alice framework, found that each of the representative claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Therefore, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Telebuyer, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18200 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2015).
This patent infringement case was dismissed in favor of Amazon because the claims in plaintiff’s patents were abstract, generic and indefinite, and therefore invalid.
Tompkins v. Able Planet Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153068 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011).
The court here issued an order severing plaintiff’s claims. The court found that because the claims are clearly distinguishable, it should exercise its discretion and sever the claims based on product manufacturer in order to promote judicial economy as well as fairness to the litigants.
Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122457 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014).
The court was determining whether to grant defendant Amazon.Com, Inc.’s, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The court found that the concept of “upselling” in the field of marketing is “as old as the field itself,” and thus that the claim involved patent ineligible subject matter. The court noted that the limitations set out in the claim do narrow its scope, but not enough to save the claim from invalidity.
Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37128 (D. Del. Mar. 25, 2015).
The court here was determining whether to grant defendant Amazon.Com, Inc.’s, (Amazon) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where Amazon claimed the patent, which deals with the concept of “upselling,” is for ineligible subject matter. The court held that the patent claims clearly are drawn to patent ineligible subject matter. The concept of “upselling” is a longstanding commercial practice. Even though limitations narrow the scope of the claims, these limitations do not amount to an “inventive concept.” Thus all of the claims of the patent are invalid.
United Video Props. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86914 (D. Del. June 22, 2012).
The court determined the claim construction of the patents that were allegedly infringed.
United Video Props., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 561 Fed. Appx. 914 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The court affirmed the lower court’s claim construction and their judgment of non-infringement under these claims and their definitions.
Press v. Amazon.com, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26987 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2001).
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause in the agreement. The court determined that the forum selection clause was valid, as the plaintiff failed to show that it would be unreasonable.
Vantage Point Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 675 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2015).
This as a patent infringement case involving a number of manufacturers and suppliers of chipsets. The Court decided that the chipset manufacturers’ cases will proceed to trial first. Amazon’s motion to stay was denied.
Vantage Point Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8335 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015).
The court decided what the terms in the patent meant for purposes of the claims, through claim construction.
Vivo Per Lei, Inc. v. Bruchim Case No. 11cv05169 GW (JCGx). C.D. Cal., March 20, 2012.
This case involved a proposed stipulated protective order to keep documents confidential in a case where defendants were accused of both copyright and trademark violations. The court found that Amazon would likely have had to provide information during discovery that would have been potentially harmful if it were made available to competitors. The court ultimately granted the protective order in order to keep the requested information confidential and required the parties to sign a non disclosure agreement.
Voltstar Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6008 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Amazon.com was a defendant in this patent infringement case filed by Voltstar Tech. Amazon filed a motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion finding that there were sufficient differences between the patented device created by Voltstar and the device used by Amazon.
Walker Digital, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 559 (D. Del. 2012).
This case involved a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court granted the defendants motion to dismiss.
Wax v. Amazon, Inc., 500 Fed. Appx. 944 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
The Court determined that because Amazon Technologies Inc. is the dominant component for the trademarks utilizing this term, there is a high degree of similarity between Amazon.com and the Plaintiff’s desired mark, Amazon Ventures. This indicated a likelihood of confusion. The Court ruled in favor of Amazon Technologies, Inc. on the grounds that Mr. Wax’s arguments lacked merit.
Wireless Recognition Tech. v. A9.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130159 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012).
While Amazon.com was a named defendant, the main issues of this case were whether or not the court should stay the action for the 474 Patent. The court considered all factors within the case and granted the defendant’s motion for a stay of this case.

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Petitioner Wachovia Bank, National Association (Wachovia), is a national banking association with its designated main office in North Carolina and branch offices in many States, including South Carolina. Plaintiff-respondent Schmidt and other South Carolina citizens sued Wachovia in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing them to participate in an illegitimate tax shelter. Shortly thereafter, Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. As the sole basis for federal-court jurisdiction, Wachovia alleged the parties' diverse citizenship. See 28 U. S. C. §1332. The District Court denied Wachovia's petition on the merits. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, vacated the judgment, and instructed the District Court to dismiss the case. The appeals court observed that Wachovia's citizenship for diversity purposes is controlled by §1348, which provides that "national banking associations" are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." As the court read §1348, Wachovia is "located" in, and is therefore a "citizen" of, every State in which it maintains a branch office. Thus, Wachovia's South Carolina branch operations rendered it a citizen of that State. Given the South Carolina citizenship of the opposing parties, the court concluded that the matter could not be adjudicated in federal court.
Held: A national bank, for §1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located. Pp. 5-15.
(a) When Congress first authorized national banks, it allowed them to sue and be sued in federal court in any and all civil proceedings. State banks, however, could initiate actions in federal court only on the basis of diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal question. Congress ended national banks' automatic qualification for federal jurisdiction in 1882, placing them "on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located," Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778, 780. In an 1887 enactment, Congress first used the "located" language today contained in §1348. Like its 1882 predecessor, the 1887 Act "sought to limit ... the access of national banks to, and their suability in, the federal courts to the same extent [as] non-national banks." Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 565-566. In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress combined two formerly discrete provisions on proceedings involving national banks, but retained without alteration the "located" clause. Finally, as part of the 1948 Judicial Code revision, Congress enacted §1348 in its current form. Pp. 5-7.
(b) The Fourth Circuit advanced three principal reasons for deciding that Wachovia is "located" in, and therefore a "citizen" of, every State in which it maintains a branch office. First, consulting dictionaries, the court observed that the term "located" refers to "physical presence in a place." Next, the court noted that §1348 uses two distinct terms to refer to the presence of a banking association: "established" and "located." The court concluded that, to give independent meaning to each word, "established" should be read to refer to the bank's charter location and "located," to the place where the bank has a physical presence. Finally, the court relied on Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S. 35, in which this Court interpreted the term "located" in the former venue statute for national banks, see 12 U. S. C. §94 (1976 ed.), as encompassing any county in which a bank maintains a branch office. Viewing the jurisdiction and venue statutes as pertaining to the same subject matter, the court concluded that, under the in pari materia canon, the two statutes should be interpreted consistently. Pp. 7-8.
(c) None of the Fourth Circuit's rationales persuade this Court to read §1348 to attribute to a national bank, for diversity-jurisdiction purposes, the citizenship of each State in which the bank has established branch operations. First, the term "located," as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no fixed, plain meaning. In some provisions, the word unquestionably refers to the site of the banking association's designated main office, but in others, "located" apparently refers to or includes branch offices. Recognizing the controlling significance of context, this Court stated in Bougas: "There is no enduring rigidity about the word 'located.' " 331 U. S. 461, 467. Finally, Bougas does not control §1348's meaning. Although it is true that, under the in pari materia canon, statutes addressing the same subject matter generally should be read " 'as if they were one law,' " Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243, venue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the same order. Venue, largely a matter of litigational convenience, is waived if not timely raised. Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court's competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases; a matter far weightier than venue, subject-matter jurisdiction must be considered by the court on its own motion, even if no party raises an objection. Cognizant that venue "is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum," Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 180, the Court in Bougas stressed that its "interpretation of [the former] §94 [would] not inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation," 434 U. S., at 44, n. 10. Subject-matter jurisdiction, however, does not entail an assessment of convenience. It poses the question "whether" the Legislature empowered the court to hear cases of a certain genre. Thus, the considerations that account for the Bougas decision are inapplicable to §1348, a prescription governing subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting §1348 in pari materia with the former §94. Significantly, Bougas' reading of former §94 effectively aligned the treatment of national banks for venue purposes with the treatment of state banks and corporations. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit's decision in this case severely constricts national banks' access to diversity jurisdiction as compared to the access generally available to corporations, for corporations ordinarily rank as citizens only of States in which they are incorporated or maintain their principal place of business, and are not deemed citizens of every State in which they maintain a business establishment. Pp. 8-14.
388 F. 3d 414, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Thomas, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
TIONER v. DANIEL G. SCHMIDT, III, et al.
federal-court diversity jurisdiction, of national banks, i.e., corporate entities chartered not by any State, but by the Comptroller of the Currency of the U. S. Treasury. Congress empowered federal district courts to adjudicate civil actions between "citizens of different States" where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U. S. C. §1332(a)(1). A business organized as a corporation, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, is "deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated" and, since 1958, also "of the State where it has its principal place of business." §1332(c)(1). State banks, usually chartered as corporate bodies by a particular State, ordinarily fit comfortably within this prescription. Federally chartered national banks do not, for they are not incorporated by "any State." For diversity jurisdiction purposes, therefore, Congress has discretely provided that national banks "shall ... be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." §1348.
The question presented turns on the meaning, in §1348's context, of the word "located." Does it signal, as the petitioning national bank and the United States, as amicus curiae, urge, that the bank's citizenship is determined by the place designated in the bank's articles of association as the location of its main office? Or does it mean, in addition, as respondents urge and the Court of Appeals held, that a national bank is a citizen of every State in which it maintains a branch?
Recognizing that "located" is not a word of "enduring rigidity," Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S. 35, 44 (1977), but one that gains its precise meaning from context, we hold that a national bank, for §1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located. Were we to hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that a national bank is additionally a citizen of every State in which it has established a branch, the access of a federally chartered bank to a federal forum would be drastically curtailed in comparison to the access afforded state banks and other state-incorporated entities. Congress, we are satisfied, created no such anomaly.
The litigation before us commenced when plaintiff-respondent Daniel G. Schmidt III and others, citizens of South Carolina, sued Wachovia in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing them to participate in an illegitimate tax shelter. Shortly thereafter, Wachovia filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. As the sole basis for federal-court jurisdiction, Wachovia alleged the parties' diverse citizenship. See 28 U. S. C. §1332. The District Court denied Wachovia's petition on the merits; neither the parties nor the court questioned the existence of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit panel determined that the District Court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the action; it therefore vacated the judgment and instructed the District Court to dismiss the case.
The Court of Appeals' majority observed that Wachovia's citizenship for diversity purposes is controlled by §1348, which provides that "national banking associations" are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." As the panel majority read §1348, Wachovia is "located" in, and is therefore a "citizen" of, every State in which it maintains a branch office. Thus Wachovia's branch operations in South Carolina, in the majority's view, rendered the bank a citizen of South Carolina. Given the South Carolina citizenship of the opposing parties, the majority concluded that the matter could not be adjudicated in federal court. 388 F. 3d 414, 432 (CA4 2004).
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among Courts of Appeals on the meaning of §1348. 545 U. S. ___ (2005). Compare Horton v. Bank One, N. A., 387 F. 3d 426, 429, 431 (CA5 2004) (for §1348 purposes, "a national bank is not 'located' in, and thus [is] not a citizen of, every state in which it has a branch"; rather, the provision retains "jurisdictional parity for national banks vis-À-vis state banks and corporations"), and Firstar Bank, N. A. v. Faul, 253 F. 3d 982, 993-994 (CA7 2001) (same), with 388 F. 3d, at 432 (§1348 renders national bank a citizen, not only of the State in which its main office is located, but also of every State in which it has branch operations), and World Trade Center Properties, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F. 3d 154, 161 (CA2 2003) (dictum) (same).
When Congress first authorized national banks in 1863, it specified that any "suits, actions, and proceedings by and against [them could] be had" in federal court. See Act of Feb. 25, 1863, §59, 12 Stat. 681. National banks thus could "sue and be sued in the federal district and circuit courts solely because they were national banks, without regard to diversity, amount in controversy or the existence of a federal question in the usual sense." Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 565-566 (1963). State banks, however, like other state-incorporated entities, could initiate actions in federal court only on the basis of diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal question. See Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 142 U. S. 644, 648-649 (1892).
"[T]he jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association established under any law providing for national-banking associations ... shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking business where such national-banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun[.]" Act of July 12, 1882, §4, 22 Stat. 163.
Under this measure, national banks could no longer invoke federal-court jurisdiction solely "on the ground of their Federal origin," Petri, 120 U. S. 778, 780 (1887).
Like its 1882 predecessor, the 1887 Act "sought to limit ... the access of national banks to, and their suability in, the federal courts to the same extent to which non-national banks [were] so limited." Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 565-566.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
"All national banking associations shall, for the purpose of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." 28 U. S. C. §1348.
The Fourth Circuit panel majority advanced three principal reasons for deciding that Wachovia is "located" in, and therefore a "citizen" of, every State in which it maintains a branch office. First, consulting dictionaries, the Court of Appeals observed that "[i]n ordinary parlance" the term "located" refers to "physical presence in a place." 388 F. 3d, at 416-417 (internal quotation marks omitted). Banks have a physical presence, the Fourth Circuit stated, wherever they operate branches. Id., at 417. Next, the court noted, "Section 1348 uses two distinct terms to refer to the presence of a banking association: 'established' and 'located.' " Id., at 419. "To give independent meaning" to each word, the court said, "it is most reasonable to understand the place where a national bank is 'established' to refer to a bank's charter location, and to understand the place where it is 'located' to refer to the place or places where it has a physical presence." Ibid. Finally, the Court of Appeals stressed that in Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S. 35 (1977), this Court interpreted the term "located" in the former venue statute for national banks, see 12 U. S. C. §94 (1976 ed.), as encompassing any county in which a bank maintains a branch office. 388 F. 3d, at 419-420. Reasoning that "the jurisdiction and venue statutes pertain to the same subject matter, namely the amenability of national banking associations to suit in federal court," the panel majority concluded that, "under the in pari materia canon[,] the two statutes should be interpreted" consistently. Id., at 422.
None of the Court of Appeals' rationales persuade us to read §1348 to attribute to a national bank, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the citizenship of each State in which the bank has established branch operations. First, the term "located," as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no fixed, plain meaning. In some provisions, the word unquestionably refers to a single place: the site of the banking association's designated main office. See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §52 (national bank's capital stock certificates must state "the name and location of the association"); §55 (requiring notice of sale of capital stock "in a newspaper of the city or town in which the bank is located"); §75 (bank's regular annual shareholders' meeting shall be rescheduled when it "falls on a legal holiday in the State in which the bank is located"); §182 (requiring publication of a notice of dissolution "in the city or town in which the association is located"). In other provisions, "located" apparently refers to or includes branch offices. See, e.g., §36(j) (defining "branch" to include "any branch place of business located in any State"); §85 (limiting interest rate charged by national bank to "rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located") (construed in OCC Interpretive Letter No. 822 (Feb. 17, 1998), [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. ¶81-265, pp. 90,256-90,257); §92 (permitting national bank to act as insurance agent in certain circumstances when bank is "located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants") (construed in 12 CFR §7.1001 (2005)).7 Recognizing the controlling significance of context, we stated in Bougas, regarding a venue provision for national banks: "There is no enduring rigidity about the word 'located.' " 434 U. S., at 44.
Finally, Bougas does not control the meaning of §1348. In that case, we construed a now-repealed venue provision, which stated that actions against national banking associations could be filed "in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association [was] located." 409 U. S. 239, 243 (1972) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564 (1845)). But venue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the same order. Venue is largely a matter of litigational convenience; accordingly, it is waived if not timely raised. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 638, n. 25 (1984); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(1). Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court's competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases; a matter far weightier than venue, subject-matter jurisdiction must be considered by the court on its own motion, even if no party raises an objection. See, e.g., Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3).
Cognizant that venue "is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum," Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 180 (1979), the Court in Bougas stressed that its "interpretation of [the former] §94 [would] not inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation," 308 U. S. 165, 168 (1939) ("This basic difference between the court's power and the litigant's convenience is historic in the federal courts."). Thus, the considerations that account for our decision in Bougas are inapplicable to §1348, a prescription governing subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting §1348 in pari materia with the former §94.
Significantly, this Court's reading of the venue provision in Bougas effectively aligned the treatment of national banks for venue purposes with the treatment of state banks and corporations. For venue in suits against state banks and other state-created corporations typically lies wherever those entities have business establishments. See 19 C. J. S., Corporations §717(d), p. 374, n. 30 (1990) (under typical state venue statutes, "[v]enue in action against domestic corporation can be laid in any county where corporation maintains branch office"). By contrast, the Court of Appeals' decision in the instant case severely constricts national banks' access to diversity jurisdiction as compared to the access available to corporations generally. For purposes of diversity, a corporation surely is not deemed a citizen of every State in which it maintains a business establishment. See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 295-296 (1886). Rather, under 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1), a corporation is "deemed to be a citizen" only of "any State by which it has been incorporated" and "of the State where it has its principal place of business." Accordingly, while corporations ordinarily rank as citizens of at most 2 States, Wachovia, under the Court of Appeals' novel citizenship rule, would be a citizen of 16 States. See FDIC Institution Directory, available at http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/ main.asp.9 Bougas does not call for this anomalous result.
To summarize, "located," as its appearances in the banking laws reveal, see supra, at 8-9, is a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in and purpose for which it is used.
In the context of venue, "located" may refer to multiple places, for a venue prescription, e.g., the current and former 12 U. S. C. §94, presupposes subject-matter jurisdiction and simply delineates where within a given judicial system a case may be maintained. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1391(c) (for venue purposes, "a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced").
In contrast, in §1348, "located" appears in a prescription governing not venue but federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. Concerning access to the federal court system, §1348 deems national banks "citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." There is no reason to suppose Congress used those words to effect a radical departure from the norm. An individual who resides in more than one State is regarded, for purposes of federal subject-matter (diversity) jurisdiction, as a citizen of but one State. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 828 (1989) (an individual is deemed a citizen of the State of her domicil); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 625 (1914) (domicil is the "technically preeminent headquarters" of a person; "[i]n its nature it is one"). Similarly, a corporation's citizenship derives, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, from its State of incorporation and principal place of business. §1332(c)(1). It is not deemed a citizen of every State in which it conducts business or is otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction. Reading §1348 in this context, one would sensibly "locate" a national bank for the very same purpose, i.e., qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State designated in its articles of association as its main office.
Treating venue and subject-matter jurisdiction prescriptions as in pari materia, 388 F. 3d, at 422-423, the Court of Appeals majority overlooked the discrete offices of those concepts. See supra, at 11-12; cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against."). The resulting Fourth Circuit decision rendered national banks singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access to federal courts. The language of §1348 does not mandate that incongruous outcome, nor does this Court's precedent.
www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/forms/articles-conv.doc (All Internet materials as visited Jan. 13, 2006, and included in Clerk of Court's case file.) The place so designated serves as the bank's "main office." Changes in the location of that office are effected by amendment to the bank's articles of association. See 12 U. S. C. §§21a, 30(b); 12 CFR §5.40(d)(2)(ii) (2005). The State in which the main office is located qualifies as the bank's "home State" under the banking laws. 12 U. S. C. §36(g)(3)(B).
National banks originally lacked authority to operate branch offices. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, §11, 12 Stat. 668. In 1865, Congress enacted an exception permitting a state bank that converted to a national bank to retain its pre-existing branches. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, §7, 13 Stat. 484. Congress authorized limited branch operations in the bank's home State in 1927 and 1933. McFadden Act (Branch Banks), 1927, §7(c), 44 Stat. 1228; Glass-Steagall Act, 1933, §23, 48 Stat. 189-190. These Acts, like the 1865 enactment, allowed interstate branching only under narrow "grandfather" provisions. McFadden Act, §7(a)-(b), 44 Stat. 1228; see Girard Bank v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 748 F. 2d 838, 840 (CA3 1984) (observing that only two national banks had "grandfathered" interstate branches). Not until 1994 did Congress grant national banks broad authority to establish branch offices across state lines. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, §101, 108 Stat. 2339. See generally J. Macey, G. Miller, & R. Carnell, Banking Law and Regulation 18-19, 23, 32-33 (3d ed. 2001).
Wachovia unsuccessfully moved for rehearing en banc. Six judges voted to grant the rehearing petition, three voted to deny it, and four recused themselves. Thus the petition failed to garner the required majority of the Circuit's 13 active judges. No. 03-2061 (CA4, Jan. 28, 2005), App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a-58a.
The term "established under" did appear in the 1882 and 1887 formulations, in both texts as synonymous with the term "organized under." In neither measure is the word used in a locational sense.
Earlier, in 1888, Congress had revised the 1887 prescription by adding as a separate paragraph this caveat: "The provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases commenced by the United States or by direction of any officer thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank." Act of Aug. 13, 1888, §4, 25 Stat. 436.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... [o]f all cases commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, and cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank; and of all suits brought by any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under the provisions of title 'National Banks,' Revised Statutes, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by said title. And all national banking associations established under the laws of the United States shall, for purposes of all other actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." 36 Stat. 1091-1093. The first sentence of this formulation merged the 1888 caveat with text, including the word "established," originally contained in the Act of Dec. 1, 1873, §629 (Tenth to Eleventh), 18 Stat. 111. The second sentence, including the word "located," derives from the 1887 formulation.
The Court of Appeals did not overlook these nonuniform uses of the word "located" in various provisions of the National Bank Act. See 388 F. 3d 414, 425 (CA4 2004). Nevertheless, it declared that, in §1348, "located" unambiguously means "physically present." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court did not say what facilities other than branch offices, for example, storage sites or even automated teller machines, would suffice to establish a bank's physical presence. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37 (counsel for respondents stated that an ATM, although an arguable question, probably would suffice to locate a bank in a State for §1348 purposes).
Context also matters in assigning meaning to the word "established." See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-19, Art. 5, pp. 8-9 (2002) ("For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'permanent establishment' means a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on ... ."). Given the character of the proceedings covered by the first paragraph of §1348, see supra, at 7, one might read "established" as referring to the bank's main office as set forth in its articles of association. Other readings mentioned in Court of Appeals opinions are the bank's principal place of business and the place listed in the bank's organization certificate. See Horton v. Bank One, N. A., 387 F. 3d 426, 434 (CA5 2004); Firstar Bank, N. A. v. Faul, 253 F. 3d 982, 992 (CA7 2001). Because this issue is not presented by the parties or necessary to today's decision, we express no opinion on it. Cf. ibid.
To achieve complete parity with state banks and other state-incorporated entities, a national banking association would have to be deemed a citizen of both the State of its main office and the State of its principal place of business. See Horton, 387 F. 3d, at 431, and n. 26; Firstar Bank, N. A., 253 F. 3d, at 993-994. Congress has prescribed that a corporation "shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). The counterpart provision for national banking associations, §1348, however, does not refer to "principal place of business"; it simply deems such associations "citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The absence of a "principal place of business" reference in §1348 may be of scant practical significance for, in almost every case, as in this one, the location of a national bank's main office and of its principal place of business coincide.


48.05.210 Service of process — Procedure.
Repealed by 2011 c 47 § 19.
Repealed by 1979 ex.s. c 130 § 5.
48.05.240 Exceptions to countersignature requirement.
48.05.300 Credit disallowed for reinsurance ceded to an insurer — Exceptions.
Repealed by 1997 c 379 § 10.
48.05.310 General agents, managers — Appointment — Powers — Licensing.
[1995 c 338 § 1; 1982 c 181 § 17; 1947 c 79 § .05.31; Rem. Supp. 1947 § 45.05.31.] Repealed by 2007 c 117 § 39, effective July 1, 2009.
48.05.360 Special surplus requirements for certain combinations.
Repealed by 2005 c 223 § 35.
48.05.490 RBC reports for 1995 — Requirements.
Repealed by 2006 c 25 § 11.


text:
These GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS govern the relationship between Bulgariality Ltd., hereinafter referred to as Découvrir la Bulgarie, on the one hand, and Users of websites and services located on the domain www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr (hereinafter referred to as Members), on the other.
Please read in full the published Terms and Conditions before using the information and commercial services offered by the site www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr (hereinafter referred to as Services). By visualizing www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr every User automatically agrees to comply with the terms and conditions described below.
This document contains information about the Découvrir la Bulgarie’s activity and the general terms and conditions to use the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie, governing the relationship between us and any of our registered users.
Confirming the Terms and Conditions is a necessary and indispensable condition for the registration of each User and the conclusion of a contract between them and Découvrir la Bulgarie. By pressing the virtual Register button, it is considered you have familiarized yourself with the Terms and Conditions and have agreed to follow them.
Art. 1 The services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie to the User constitute the information society services under the Law on Electronic Commerce.
Art. 2 Découvrir la Bulgarie provides and maintains a website with informative and commercial purpose where the Users can obtain information and apply for the use of the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie.
Art. 3 (1) Découvrir la Bulgarie provides its services free of charge or for remuneration payable by the Users according to the services chosen by them.
(2) Information on the various Services and their prices is available at www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr.
Art. 4 (1) Découvrir la Bulgarie identifies the Users of the site by storing log files on the server at www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr and the IP address of the User.
(2) Découvrir la Bulgarie is entitled to collect and use any information about the Users after the registration done by them. The information used to identify a person may include name, surname, date of birth, gender, address, telephone, data of identity card and any other information that the person provides voluntarily when registering. This information includes any other information that User enters, uses or provides when using the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie.
Art. 5 (1) Découvrir la Bulgarie provides due diligence and is responsible for protecting the User information it comes into possession of in connection with the registration – subject to these Terms and Conditions, except in the cases of force majeure, an accident or malicious acts of third parties.
(2). In the registration form filled in by the User during registration Découvrir la Bulgarie identifies the compulsory or voluntary nature of data provision and the consequences of refusing to provide them. By agreeing with these General Terms and Conditions, the User agrees the information related to them to be processed as provided therein.
(3) The restrictions under parr. 1 shall not apply in case that Découvrir la Bulgarie undertakes an obligation to provide personal information about the User to the competent national authorities in accordance with the applicable legislation.
Art. 6 (1) Découvrir la Bulgarie collects and uses information under Art. 5 for the purposes specified in these General Terms and Conditions, as well as to offer new products and/or services to the User (free of charge or paid). The purposes described the information is used for are not exhaustive and do not create any obligations for Découvrir la Bulgarie.
(2) By accepting these General Terms and Conditions the User agrees to the processing of personal data for the purposes of this contract and direct marketing.
Art. 7 (1) To enter into contract with Découvrir la Bulgarie, the User shall pre-register by filling out the relevant electronic registration form available in real time (on-line) on the Internet, at Découvrir la Bulgarie site, and shall agree with these Terms and Conditions, declaring their competence.
(2) By pressing the virtual Register button, having the power of a written confirmation of the General Terms and Conditions, the User performs an electronic statement within the meaning of the Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Act, declaring they are familiar with these Terms and Conditions, they accept them and undertake to follow them. By recording it to a relevant Découvrir la Bulgarie’s server, through a common standard for technical conversion making its reproduction possible, the electronic statement becomes an electronic document within the meaning of said Act. Découvrir la Bulgarie is entitled to store in log files on its server the IP address of the User and any other information necessary to identify them and reproduce their electronic statement of acceptance of these Terms and Conditions in the event of a legal dispute. The text of these Terms and Conditions is available on the Internet, at the Découvrir la Bulgarie’s site in a way that allows its storage and reproduction.
(3) Upon completion of the registration application, the User shall provide complete and accurate information concerning data on their identity (for individuals), legal status (for legal persons) and other provisions required by the electronic form of Découvrir la Bulgarie, and update them within 7 (seven) days from their modification. The User declares that for the purposes of this contract agrees to provide such requested personal data, therefore ensuring that the data provided in the registration process are true, complete and accurate and in case of their modification, will update them promptly. In the case of providing false information, Découvrir la Bulgarie has the right to terminate or suspend immediately and without any notice the provision of services and the registration of the User.
Art. 8 (1) Upon registration the User receives a unique username and password to access the services available through the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie.
(2) The user name the User registered with does not give them any other rights but the right to use this username within the information system of Découvrir la Bulgarie for the duration of the contract.
(3) Upon registration as a representative of a legal person, the User shall fill in their full name and address, respectively, name of the entity they represent. By accepting the Terms and Conditions they guarantee and acknowledge that they have a contractual relationship with the company user registered. Filling in incorrect or misleading information results in deprivation of the party of the right to access the services of the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie.
(4) The User shall take all care and any necessary measures reasonably required to protect their password and not to disclose it to any third parties and shall immediately notify Découvrir la Bulgarie in case of an unauthorized access, as well in case of any probability and doubt therefor. It is their responsibility and risk to protect their password and for all acts performed by them or by any third party using their password.
Art. 9 (1) The contract between the parties shall take effect upon confirmation of the consent of the Registered User to the General Terms and Conditions, by accepting them by clicking the Register button. The contract is concluded in English. By accepting these Terms and Conditions the Registered User agrees communication with them to be made by the e-mail and other voluntarily submitted means of contact provided by them.
(2) Upon unilateral termination of the contract by the Registered User, all amounts paid for the use of the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie shall not be returned, even if the deadline for their use has not expired.
Art. 10 The user can pay the price of the services chosen by them via PayPal or bank transfer in favour of Bulgarialiti EOOD, as the bank account number of the company is available at www.decouvrirlabulgarie.fr or is provided personally to the User via e-mail on demand.
Art. 11 Découvrir la Bulgarie reserves the right to unilaterally modify the prices of the services provided.
Art. 12 Découvrir la Bulgarie is entitled in its sole discretion, without giving any prior notice, to terminate the contract if it finds that the services are used in violation of these Terms and Conditions, the Bulgarian legislation and the generally accepted moral norms or that the User has provided incomplete, inaccurate or false information when registering or during the subsequent use of the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie.
Art. 13 (1) The User is entitled to cancel the contract without giving any reason thereof, without any compensation or penalty, within 14 days from the date of signing the contract to provide services.
(2) To exercise its right under this clause, the User shall notify Découvrir la Bulgarie in writing for their decision to cancel the contract by sending an email to dlb@decouvrirlabulgarie.fr.
(3) The User shall reimburse Découvrir la Bulgarie for any administrative costs for the contract incurred by the latter.
Art. 15 Découvrir la Bulgarie shall reimburses the User the price paid by them for any returned goods to a bank account specified by the User or by any other means appropriately required by the User within 14 days of receipt of the notification of contract cancellation.
Art. 16 (1) The User is entitled to an on-line access to the services provided through the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie, subject to the conditions and requirements for access set by Découvrir la Bulgarie. In order to use the services, the User shall enter a username and a password.
(2) The User is entitled to an on-line access and correction of the personal data provided during the registration.
Art. 17 (1) Intellectual property rights on all materials and resources on the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie (including the databases available) are subject to protection under the Law on Copyright and Related Rights, and belong to Découvrir la Bulgarie or the relevant indicated person who ceded the right of use to Découvrir la Bulgarie, and shall not be used in violation of the applicable law.
(2) The User’s right to access does not include the right to use, copy or reproduce the information constituting the subject of intellectual property, unless it is an insignificant amount of information intended for personal use, provided this does not unreasonably legitimate any author interests or other holders of intellectual property rights in the event that copying or reproduction is performed for non-commercial use.
(3) When copying or reproducing information outside of the permissible under the preceding paragraph, and any other violation of intellectual property rights on the resources of Découvrir la Bulgarie, Découvrir la Bulgarie has the right to claim compensation for any direct and indirect damages in full.
(4) When using the access provided to the services of Découvrir la Bulgarie, the User: shall respect the Bulgarian legislation, these Terms and Conditions, the Internet ethics, morality and decency; shall not undermine the reputation of others and not call for a forcible change of the constitutional order, to commit a crime, to violence or incitement of racial, national, ethnic or religious hatred, shall not preach fascist or other antidemocratic ideology, shall not violate others’ material or moral rights, including intellectual property; shall immediately notify Découvrir la Bulgarie in case of violation done or found; shall not interfere with the proper operation of the system including, but not limited to, interfering with the procedure of identification of other Users, shall not access use unauthorized, shall not impair or impede the availability, reliability or quality of the access and shall not use it in a way causing cancellation of its use; shall not extract by technical means any information resources or parts of information resources belonging to databases located on the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie and thus shall not create their own database in electronic or other form; shall not impersonate others or otherwise mislead others about their identity or affiliation to a particular group of people; shall not perform any malicious actions under these Terms and Conditions.
(5) Except where expressly agreed, the User shall not reproduce, modify, delete, publish, distribute and otherwise disclose any information resources published on the website of Découvrir la Bulgarie.
Art. 20 (1) Découvrir la Bulgarie shall provide due diligence to ensure the User’s normal access to the services provided.
(2) Découvrir la Bulgarie is entitled to deactivate or delete the username and password to access a profile of a User if the latter violates the intellectual property rights of Découvrir la Bulgarie on elements contained on its website – subject to intellectual property rights.
(3) Découvrir la Bulgarie reserves the right to suspend the access to the services provided after sending a notice to the user’s profile. Découvrir la Bulgarie is entitled but not obliged to, in its sole discretion to delete any information resources and materials posted on its site.
Art. 21 (1) Except as provided in these Terms and Conditions, the contract between the parties shall be terminated upon cessation of the activities of Découvrir la Bulgarie or termination of the maintenance of its website.
(2) The User may, at any time, in their sole discretion, suspend the use of the services provided by Découvrir la Bulgarie.
(3). Upon termination of the contract Découvrir la Bulgarie deactivates the User profile and password for access thereto.

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