text:
207. Hetherington Clark W. (1922). School Program in Physical Education. – Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Co.
208. Hoda? B. (1995/96). Lidsk? t?lo a pohyb. P?edpoklad a projev lidsk?ho byti ve sv?t? (pozn?mky k problem) // T?lesn? kultura. Sbornik praci kateder t?lesn? v?chovy a t?lov?chovn?ho l?ka?stvi, svazek 26. – Olomouc. – Р. 48–68.
209. Hoda? B. (1997). To the Problem of the ?Sense of Physical Exercise // Philosophy of Physical Culture: Proceedings of the Int. Conference held in Olomouc, Czech Republic, September 1–3, 1996. – Olomouc. – Р. 4–8.
210. Huizinga, Johan (1950). Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture. Boston: Beacon Press.
211. Hye-Kerkdal K. (1956). Wettkampfspiel und Dualorganisation bei den Timbira Brasiliens // Haekel J. Die Wiener Schule der Volkerkunde. – S. 504–533.
212. Hyland D. (1990). Philosophy of Sport. – New York: Paragon House.
213. Jeu B. (1972). Le sport, la mort, la violence. – Paris. – 208 р.
214. Jeu Bernard (1985). De la vraie nature du sport. Essai de d?duction g?n?rale des cat?gories sportives. – Paris: ?ditions VIGOT. – 81 p.
215. Kosiewicz J. (1986). Kultura fizyczna, osobowosc, wycowanie. Zagadnienia metodologiczne. – Warszawa.
216. Kosiewicz Jerzy (2000b). Kultura fizyczna i sport w perspektywie filozofii: Warszawa. – 234 p.
217. Kosiewicz Jerzy (2005). Philosophical and axiological aspects of physical culture and sport // Sport, Culture and Society. In Honour of Prof. Zbigniew Krawczyk / Ed. by J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 222–245.
218. Kosiewicz J., Krawczyk Z. (1997). Philosophy of Sport or Philosophical Reflection over Sport // Philosophy of Physical Culture: Proceedings of the International Conference held in Olomouc, Czech Republic, September 1–3, 1996 / Svatopluk Horak (Ed.). – Olomouc. – Р. 9–15.
219. Krawczyk Zbigniev (1970). Natura, kultura, sport. – PNN, Warszawa. – 387 р.
220. Krawczyk Zbigniev (1974). Philosophie und allgemeine Theorie der K?rperkultur in Polen // Sportwissenschaft. – N. 4. – S. 372–383.
221. Krawczyk Z. (1978c). Studia z filozofii i sociologii kultury fizycnej. – Warszawa. – 180 р.
222. Krawczyk Z. (1983a). O kulturze fizycznej. Studia i szkice. – Warszawa. – 153 р.
223. Krawczyk Z. (1984a). The Human Body as a Value // Contribution of sociology to the study of sport. – Jyv?skyl?, University of Jyv?skyl?. – P. 101–117.
224. Krawczyk Z. (1984c). The ontology of the body: a study in philosophical and cultural antropology // Dialectics and Humanism. – v. XI, N. 1. – P. 59–75.
225. Krawczyk Z. (1984d). Sport, Kultur, Gesellschaft. Sozialphilosophische Beitrage. – Verlag Karl Hofmann: Schorndorf. – 125 р.
226. Krawczyk Z. (1988a). Physical Culture from the Perspective of Values – a General and Selective approach to Physical Culture // International Review for the Sociology of Sport. – vol. 23, № 2. – P. 97–107.
(1988b). Two Faces of the Olympism: Ideology and Utopia // Sport and Humanism: Proceedings of the International Workshop of Sport Sociology in Japan. – Gotenba. – Р. 238–255.
228. Krawczyk Z. (1990a). Aksjologia ciala // Filozofia kultury fizycznej. Koncepcje i problemy, b.I, Warszawa. – P. 99–122.
229. Krawczyk Z. (1990b). Sport i kultura – orientacje teoretyczne // Filozofia kultury fizycznej. Koncepcje i problemy, b.II, Warszawa. – Р. 161–175.
230. Krawczyk Zbiegniew (1996). Sport as Symbol // International Review for the Sociology of Sport. – vol. 31, N. 4. – Р. 429–438.
231. Krawczyk Zbiegniew (2000). Sport w zmieniaj?cym si?spo?ecze?stwie. – Warszawa. – 169 p.
232. Krawczyk Zbigniew (2005a). Sport and Culture // Sport, Culture and Society. In Honour of Prof. Zbigniew Krawczyk / Ed. by J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 82–91.
233. Krawczyk Zbigniew (2005b). Sport and Sacrum // Sport, Culture and Society. In Honour of Prof. Zbigniew Krawczyk / Ed. by J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 99–108.
234. Kretchmar S. (1982). Distancing: an essay on abstract thinking in sport performances // Journal of Philosophy of Sport. – v. IX. – Р. 6–18.
235. Kretchmar R. Scott (1988). From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two Kinds of Counterpoint in Sport // Philosophic Inquiry in Sport. Edited by William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. – Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. – Р. 223–229.
236. Kretchmar S. (1989). On beautiful games // Journal of Philosophy of Sport. – v. XVI. – Р. 34–43.
237. Kretchmar R. Scott (1994). Practical philosophy of sport. – Human Kinetics. – 281 р.
238. Krickeberg W. (1948). Das mittelamerikanische Ballspiel und seine religiose Symbolik // Pai-deuma. – N. 3. – S. 118–190.
239. Krockow von C. Graf (1974). Sport – Eine Soziologie und Philosophie des Leistungsprinzips. – Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.
240. Lenk Hans (1964а). Values, aims and reality of the Modern Olympic Games // Report of the 4th Summer Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 205–211.
241. Lenk H. (1964b). Werte, Ziele, Wirklichkeit der modernen Olympischen Spiele. – Verlag Karl Hofman, Schrndorf. Stuttgart. – 376 S.
242. Lenk H. (1970). Leistungsmotivation und Mannshaftscdynamik. – Schorndorf.
243. Lenk Hans (1971а). Sport, Achievement, and the New Left Criticism (Including Remarks Concerning the Co-operation of Philosophy and Sociology of Sport): Paper presented at the Third Int. Symposium on the Sociology of Sport ?Socialization Via Sport – Culture and Society, University of Wa-terloo, Canada, August 22–24, 1971. – 21 p.
244. Lenk H. (1971b). Sport – Gesellschaft – Philosophie. Zur Sozialkritik an der sportlichen Leistung und zur Programmatik einer Philosophie des Sports // Sportwissenschaft. – Nr. 1. – Р. 19–32.
245. Lenk H. (1972а). Perspectives of the Philosophy of Sport // The Scientific View of Sport, ed. O.Grupe et al. – Heidelberg – New York. – Р. 30–58.
246. Lenk H. (1972b). Sport in philosophischer Sicht // Sport im Blickpunkt der Wissenschaften. Perspektiven, Aspekte, Ergebnisse. – Berlin. Heidelberg. New York: Springer-Verlag. – S. 15–42.
247. Lenk H. (1973a). Alienation, Manipulation and the Self of the Athlete // Sport in the Modern World – Chances and Problems: Papers, results, materials of scientific congress, Munich, August 21 to 25, 1972. – Berlin, Heidelberg, N.Y.: Springer Verlag. – Р. 8–18.
248. Lenk H. (1973b). «Manipulation» oder «Emanzipation» im Leistungssport. Die Entfremdung und das Selbst des Athleten // Lenk H., Moser S., Beyer E. (Hrsg.). Philosophie des Sports. – Schorndorf. – S. 67-108.
249. Lenk H. (1974). Leistungssport: Ideologie oder Mythos? – Stuttgart: Verlag W.Kohlhammer.
250. Lenk H. (1976b). Sozialphilosophie des Leistungshandels. – Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
251. Lenk H. (1976c). Towards a social philosophy of the Olympics: Values, aims and reality of the modern Olympic movement // P.Graham and H.Ueberhorst (eds.). The Modern Olympics. – Cornwall, N.Y.: Leisure Press.
252. Lenk Hans (1978). Some Problems of Sociopedagogical Elitism and Competition as Reflected in the Olympic Movement // The International Congress of Physical Activity Sciences. Physical Activity and Human Well-being, book 2. – Quebec, Symposia Specialists. – Р. 419–435.
253. Lenk H. (1979). Social philosophy of Athletics. A Pluralistic and Practice-Oriented Philosophical Analysis of Top Level and Amateur Sport. Stipes Publishing Company, Champaign, Illinois. – 227 p.
254. Lenk H. (1980а). Auf dem Wege zu einer analytischen Sportphilosophie // Sportwissenschaft. – Nr. 10. – S. 417–436.
255. Lenk H. (1980b). Sport International in Search for Renovated Olympic Idea: Essay on the Insufficiency of Philosophy Concepts and Scientific Approaches Concerning the Olympic Games // International Journal of Physical Education. – v. XVII. – Р. 26–31.
256. Lenk Hans (1981а). Eigenleistung: eine sozialphilosophische Analyse und ein «adamitisches» Pladoyer f?r eine positive Leistungskultur // Olympische Leistung. Ideal, Bedingungen, Grenzen. Begegnungen zwischen Sport und Wissenschaft: Eine Dokumentation. – K?ln: Bundesinstitut fur Sportwissen-schaften. – S. 279–306.
257. Lenk H. (1981b). Humanite! = Humanity! = Гуманность! // Bulletin «Les Limites des Sports» (11-e Congres olympique. Baden-Baden 1981). – N. 4. – Р. 30–33, 53–54.
258. Lenk H. (1981с). Sport, achievement and social criticism // Luschen G. and Sage G. (eds.). Handbook of Social Science of Sport. – Stipes, Champaign, Illinois. – Р. 369–382.
259. Lenk Hans (1982а). Presidential Address – 1981. Tasks of the Philosophy of Sport: Between Publicity and Anthropology // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – vol. IX. – Р. 94–106.
260. Lenk Hans (1982b). Prolegomena Toward an Analytic Philosophy of Sport // International Journal of Physical Education. – N 19. – Р. 15–18; 27.
261. Lenk H. /Hrsg/ (1983а). Aktualle Probleme der Sportphilosophie. – Verlag Karl Hofman Schorndorf. – 437 S.
262. Lenk H. (1983b). Eigenleistung. – Z?rich-Osnabr?ck: Interfrom.
263. Lenk H. (1983c). In search of a renovated Olympic Idea // Olympic Review. – N. 187, May. – Р. 289–293.
264. Lenk Hans (Ed.). (1983d). Topical Problems of Sport Philosophy. Proceedings of the Workshop in the Philosophy of Sport. In connection with the ХIIIth Annual Meeting of the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, Karlsruhe. – K?ln: Bundesenstitut f?r Sportwissenschaft, 1983.
265. Lenk Hans (1983e). The Achieving Being and Athletics. Toward an Anthropology and Analytic Philosophy of Achievement // Topical Problems of Sport Philosophy. Edited by Hans Lenk. – K?ln: Bundesenstitut f?r Sportwissenschaft.
266. Lenk H. (1984a). Status and development as well as research tendencies and central aspects of sport philosophy // Int. Journal of Physical Education. – vol. XXI, N. 2. – Р. 33–36.
267. Lenk H. (1984b). The Essence of Olympic man: Toward an Olympic philosophy and antropology // Int. Journal of Physical Education. – vol. XXI, N. 2. – Р. 9–15.
268. Lenk H. (1985а). Aspekte einer Pragmatisierung der Ethik – auch f?r die Sportethik // K. Cachey etc. /eds./. Sport und Ethik. dvs – Protokolle 6, Clausthal – Zellerfeld, DVS, 1985. – Р. 1–20.
269. Lenk H. (1985b). Die achte Kunst. Leistungssport – Breitensport. – Osnabr?ck. Z?rich.
270. Lenk Hans (1985с). Genuinely Personal Achievement, Sport, Educational Program and Beyond // International Journal of Physical Education. – Nr. 22. – Р. 9–17.
271. Lenk H. (1985d). Pers?nliche Leistung, Sport und Erziehungsprogram // Internationale Zeit-schrift f?r Sportp?dagogik. Nr. 2. – S. 9-17.
272. Lenk H. (1985e). Towards a Philosophical Anthropology of the Olympic Athletes and/as the Achieving Being. Can and/or How Can a Philosopher Understand Athletes and Olympic Athletes? // IOA. Report of the 22nd Session. – Lausanne. – Р. 163–177.
273. Lenk Hans (1986). Notes Regarding the Relationship Between the Philosophy and the Sociology of Sport // Int. Review for the Sociology of Sport. – v. 21. – Р. 83–91.
274. Lenk H. (1987). Leistung im Brennpunkt. – Frankfurt a. M.: DSB.
275. Lenk Hans (1988). Toward a Social Philosophy of Achievement and Athletics // Philosophic Inquiry in Sport. Edited by William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. – Р. 393–402.
276. Lenk H. (1990). Zadania filozofii sportu // Filozofia kultury fizycznej. Koncepcje i problemy. Том I. Wybor tekstow i opracowanie naukowe Z.Krawczyk, J.Kosiewicz. – Warszawa: Opracowanie naucjwe. – s. 20–30.
277. Lenk Hans (2007). An Anthropology of the Olympic Athlete Towards a Modernised Philosophy of the Olympic Games and Athletes // Journal of Olympic History. – vol. 15, N. 1. – Р.39–47.
278. Lipiec J?zef (1984). How is Sport Possible? // Dialectics and Humanism. – v. XI, N. 1. – Р. 115–124.
279. Lipiec Jozef (1994). The Olympic Movement in Search of the Ideal of Versality // Almanack 1994, Polish Olympic Committee, Polisn Olympic Academy. – Р. 79–98.
280. Lipiec J. (1997). The Fair Play philosophy // Fair play – Sport – Eduсation. European Congress of Fair Play. 2nd General Assembly of the European Fair Play Movement. Warsaw, September 12–14, 1996. – Warszawa. – Р. 99–110.
281. Lipiec J?zef (1999а). Filozofia olimpizmu. – Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Sportowe SPRINT. – 234 р.
282. Lipiec J?zef (1999b). Philosophical Sources of Modern Olympism // Proceedings of the 3-rd International Scientific Congress on Modern Olympic Sport. – Warsaw. – Р. 50–52.
283. Lipiec J?zef (2005). On the Human Physical Activity // Sport, Culture and Society. In Honour of Prof. Zbigniew Krawczyk / Ed. by J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 207–221.
284. Loy John W., Kenyon Gerald, McPherson Barry D. (1980). The Emergence and Development of the Sociology of Sport as an Academic Specialty // Research quarterly for exercise and sport. – vol. 51, N. 1. – Р. 91–109.
285. Matthias Eugen (1929). The Deeper Meaning of Physical Education. – New York: A.S. Barnes and Co.
286. McBride Peter (1932). The Philosophy of Sport. – London: Health Cranton Ltd.
287. McCloy Charles H. (1940). Philosophical Bases for Physical Education. – New York.
288. McIntosh P. (1963). Sport and Society. – London, C.A.Watts.
289. McIntosh P. (1979). Fair play. Ethics in sport and education. – London. – 213 р.
290. McIntosh P.C. (1984а). International Communication, Sport and International Understanding // Sport and International Understanding: Proceedings of the Congress held in Helsinki, Finland, July 7-10, 1982. – Berlin, Heidelberg, N.Y., Tokyo: Springer-Verlag. – Р. 276–284.
291. McIntosh P. (1984 b). Systems of Value and International Sport // Contribution of sociology to the study of sport. – Jyv?skyl?, University of Jyv?skyl?. – Р. 69–83.
292. Mendner D. (1956). Das Ballspiel im Leben der Volker. – Munster.
293. Metheny Eleanor (1968). Movement and Meaning. – New York: McGraw-Hill.
294. Mihalich J.C. (1982). Sports and Athletics Philosophy in Action. – Toptowa, NJ: Littlefield.
295. Morgan William J. (1976). On the Path Toward an Ontology of Sport // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – v. III. – Р. 25–34.
296. Morgan William J. (1977). Some Aristotelian Notes on the Attempt to Define Sport // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – v. IV. – Р. 15–35.
297. Morgan William J. (1978). Preliminary Discourse Concerning Sport and Time // Journal of Sport Behavior. – N 3. – Р. 139–146.
298. Morgan William J. (1983a). Social Philosophy of Sport: A Critical Interpretation // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – v. X. – Р. 33–51.
299. Morgan William J. (1983b). Toward a Critical Theory of Sport // Journal of Sport and Social Issues. – N 7. – Р. 24–34.
300. Morgan William J. (1985). 'Radical' Social Theory of Sport: A Critique and a Conceptual Emendation // Sociology of Sport Journal. – v. 2. – Р. 56–71.
301. Morgan William J. (1988). Play, Utopia, and Dystopia: Prologue to a Ludic Theory of the State // Philosophic Inquiry in Sport. Edited by William J. Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. – Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. – Р. 419–430.
302. Mylik Miroslaw (1997). Filozoficzne podstawy sportu. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Kolegium Pijarow. – 239 р.
303. Nissiotis Nikolaos (1979). Philosophy of Olympism // Report of the 18th Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 178–187.
304. Nissiotis Nikolaos (1982). Philosophy of Olympism // Olympic Message, Lausanne, IOC. – N. 2. – Р. 38–50.
305. Nissiotis Nikolaos (1985). Olympism and Today‘s Reality // IOA. Report of the 24th Session. – Lausanne. – Р. 57–74.
306. Osterhoudt R. (1973). The Philosophy of Sport. – Springfield (III.): Charles Thomas.
307. Osterhoudt Robert G. (1974). Modes of Philosophic Inquiry Concerning Sport: Some Reflections on Method // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – v. I. – Р. 137–141.
308. Osterhoudt R. (1978). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physical Education and Sport. – Champaign (III.): Stipes publishing Co. – 260 р.
309. Osterhoudt R. (1998). Philosophy of sport // ICSSPE. Vade Mecum. Directory of sport science. First Edition. – Р. 39–44.
310. Osterhoudt Robert G., Simon Bob, Volkwein Karin (2000). Philosophy of sport // ICSSPE. Vade Mecum. Directory of sport science. 2nd Edition. – Р. 107–121.
311. Paleologos Cleanthis (1970). Ancient Olympia and its Moral Teaching // Report of the 9th Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 51–62.
312. Paleologos Cleanthis (1974). The Lofty Teaching of Symmetry in the Work of Ancient Greek Philosophers // Report of the 13th Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 59–67.
313. Paleologos Cleanthis (1977). The Olympic Idea in the Antiquity and Today // Report of 16th Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 41–48.
314. Paleologos Cleanthis (1978). The Ideological Foundation of the Ancient Games // Report of the 17th Session of the IOA. – Athens. – Р. 44–53.
315. Paleologos Cleanthis (1982). Heracles (Hercules), the Ideal Olympic Personality // IOA. Report of the 22nd Session. – Lausanne. – Р. 54–71.
316. Philosophic Inquiry in Sport/ William J.Morgan, Klaus V.Meier (Eds.). – Champaign, IL.: Human Kinetics, 1988.
317. Philosophic inquiry in sport (Second Edition) /William J.Morgan, Klaus V.Meier (Eds.). – Human Kinetics, 1995. – 456 p.
318. Philosophie des Sports/Lenk H., Moser S., Beyer E. (Hrsg.). – Schorndorf, 1973.
319. Philosophies Fashion Physical Education/Davis Elwood Craig (Ed.). – Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co., Publishers, 1963.
320. Philosophy of Physical Culture: Proceedings of the Int. Conference held in Olomouc, Czech Republic, September 1–3, 1996. – Olomouc, 1997. – 151 р.
321. Philosophy, Theology and History of Sport and Physical Activity. International Congress of Physical Activity Sciences. Quebec, July 11–16, 1976. – Miami: Symposia Specialists, 1978. – 364 р.
322. Pociello Christian (2004). Le sport, un fait social total // L'esprit sportif aujourd'hui, Paris, Universalis, 2004. ©Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A.
323. Sadler William A. Jr. (1977). Alienated Youth and Creative Sports Experience // Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. – vol. IV. – Р. 83–95.
324. Schulte R.W. (1928). К?rреr-Kultur. Vorsuch einer Philosophie der Leibes?bungen. – M?nchen.
325. Slusher Howard S. (1967). Man, Sport and Existence: A Critical Analysis. – Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger.
326. Spiker Stuart F. (Ed.) (1970). The Philosophy of the Body. – Chicago: Quadrangel Books.
327. Sportphilosophie/ V. Caysa (Hrsg.). – Leipzig, 1997.
328. Stolyarov V. (2002b). Humanization of competition as a new scientific theory // Education. Physical training. Sport. – N. 1. – Р. 58–64.
329. Stoljarov V.I. (2004b). Competi??o humanistica – uma nova teoria cientifica у seu papel no desenvolvimento do eswporte para todos (sport for all) [Гуманистика соревнования как новая научная теория и ее роль в развитии «спорта для всех»] // F?rum Internacional de Qualidade de Vida у Saude, 21–24 de Abril de 2004, Brasil. Revista Cientifica JOPEF. – vol. 1, n. 1. – Р. 7–8.
330. Stolyarov, Vladislav (2005). Humane content of competition as a new scientific theory // Sport, Culture and Society. In Honour of Prof. Zbigniew Krawczyk / Ed. by J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 357–362.
331. Stolyarov. Vladislav (2006). Humane content of competition as a new scientific theory // Sport, culture, spo?ecze?stwo / Red. J. Kosiewicz. – Warsaw. – Р. 515–522.
332. Sutton-Smith B. (1970). The Cross-cultural and Psychological Study of Games // Luschen G. (Ed.). Cross-cultural analysis of sport and games. – Champaign, III.: Stipes Publishing Co. – Р. 100–108.
333. Sutton-Smith Brian (1978). The Dialectics of Play // The International Congress of Physical Activity Sciences. Physical Activity and Human Well-Being, book 2. – Quebec, Symposia Specialists. – Р. 759–767.
334. Sutton-Smith B. (1981). The social psychology and anthropology of play and games // L?schen G. and Sage G. (eds.). Handbook of Social Science of Sport. – Stipes, Champaign, Illinois. – Р. 452–478.
335. Takacz F. (1973). Die Aesthetik der Korperkultur. Die Erscheinung des Aesthetischen in der K?rperkultur und in der menschlichen Bewegung. – Budapest.
336. Takacz F. (1981). ?sthetische Kathegorien und ihre spezifischen Manifestationen in der K?rperkultur // Beitr?ge zur ?sthetik des Sports. – Leipzig. – S. 59–88.
337. Takacz F. (1986). The Theoretical Foundations of Sport Aesthetics // Review of the Hungarian University of Physical Education. – Budapest. – Р. 233–250.
338. The Philosophy of Sport: A Collection of Original Essays/Robert G. Osterhoudt (ed.). – Springfield, III.: Charles C.Thomas, Publisher, 1973.
339. Thomas Carolyn E. (1983). Sport in a Philosophic Context. – Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger.
340. Topical Problems in Sport Philosophy/ed. Hans Lenk. – Hoffman Verlag, Schorndorf, 1983.
341. Vanderzwaag Harold J. (1972). Towards a Philosophy of Sport. – Massachusetts.
342. Volkwein Karin A.E. (1995). Ethics and Top-Level Sport – a Paradox // Ethics and Sport. Special Issue. Int. Review for the Sociology of Sport. – vol. 30, N 3/4. – P. 311–321.
343. Volkwein-Caplan Karin (2004a). Body Image and Physical Activity // Volkwein-Caplan Karin A.E. Culture, Sport and Physical Activity. – Oxford: Meyer & Meyer Sport (UK) Ltd. – Р. 182–204.
344. Volkwein-Caplan Karin A.E. (2004b). Culture, Sport and Physical Activity. – Oxford: Meyer & Meyer Sport (UK) Ltd. – 240 p.

matches: v. v. V. v. v. v. V. v. v. v. v. v. V. v. V. V.


§ 323-1 Impoundment of motor vehicles.
§ 323-4 Disposition of unredeemed motor vehicles.
§ 323-5 Towing and storage under certain emergent circumstances.
§ 323-6 Exclusive use of storage yard.
§ 323-7 Exemption from liability.
§ 323-8 Applicability of provisions to motor vehicles impounded in connection with criminal charges.
Traffic — See Ch. 7.
Wherever a motor vehicle appears to have been abandoned on any street or public property within the Township or whenever a motor vehicle is parked or left on any street or public property within the Township in violation of any state statute or local ordinance under circumstances which may adversely affect the public safety or welfare, a police officer or employee of the Department of Public Works may arrange for the removal of such motor vehicle for storage at a location designated by resolution of the Township Committee as a storage yard for motor vehicles impounded pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. Any removal shall be performed by the Township or by a private tower pursuant to procedures established therefor by the Township Committee.
Upon the redemption of a motor vehicle which has been towed to a Township storage yard pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the owner shall pay to the Township or the private tower such amount as may be currently established or approved by the Township Committee.
Upon the redemption of a motor vehicle that has been towed to a Township storage yard pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the owner shall pay to the Township a storage charge in accordance with the schedule in Chapter 160, Fees.
Any motor vehicle which remains unredeemed for a period of 30 days after being placed in a storage yard pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to sale or other disposal by the Township pursuant to state law.
In the event that a motor vehicle is towed solely for the convenience of police business or solely by reason of the occurrence of an emergency, such as a fire or street cave-in, the motor vehicle may be redeemed by the owner without charge, and all expenses of towing and storage will be met by the Township.
No motor vehicle may be towed to or stored on any property of the Township except a storage yard designated by the Township Committee as provided in § 323-1, and no motor vehicle may be towed to or stored in any such storage yard except at the direction of a Township Police Officer or employee of the Department of Public Works.
The Township shall not be responsible or liable for any damage to or any loss of any motor vehicle which is towed to or kept in any storage yard pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, nor shall the Township be responsible or liable for the contents of any such motor vehicle.
The provisions of §§ 323-2, 323-3, 323-4 and 323-7 shall apply to the towing and storage of motor vehicles taken into possession within the Township by law enforcement officers in connection with criminal proceedings.


text:
Floridians who were of age during the 2000 U.S. Presidential election know firsthand how controversial close elections, disputed results, and recounts can be. Disputed homeowners’ association and condominium association elections can be just as disruptive to the community. Since community associations are statutorily required to retain election materials for a period of time, one natural response to a disputed ballot count is to recount the election materials to determine proper results. However, arbitration decisions from the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulations’ Division of Condominiums, Timeshare and Mobile Homes (“Division”) cast substantial doubt on whether a community association, itself, may conduct a recount or correct election errors after conclusion of the annual meeting except when ordered to do so by the Division.
In Parker v. East Linden Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. (2007), Miller v. Harbor Isles Condominium Association, Inc. (2010), and Silva v. Southchase Phase 1A Parcels 12, 14 and 15 Homeowners Association, Inc. (2015), the Division held that condominiums and homeowners associations may not conduct election recounts after the annual meeting concludes unless a procedure is set forth in the association’s governing documents. However, in the most recent decision addressing the recount issue, Rosenblatt v. Southshore Falls Homeowners Association, Inc. (2015), the Division held that since there was no dispute that the originally announced election results were inaccurate based on two recounts conducted by the association, the election results as demonstrated by the recounts would control. The Division in Rosenblatt noted that the association failed to recognize the recount results because it believed that it was not authorized to do so, and opined further that “whether true or not,” such belief was reasonable. Notwithstanding, the Division ordered the association to pay the petitioner’s attorney’s fees. In other election disputes brought by unit owners, including Chikovsky, et al. v. Le Lac Property Owners’ Association, Inc. (2014), the Division reviews the election materials and, if the correct result materially differs from that announced by the association, the Division will take the appropriate action to select the correct board members or redo the election. In fact, in at least one arbitration decision, Frazier v. Venture Out at Panama City Beach, Inc. (2004), the Division ordered the association, itself, to conduct a recount and declare the winners based on the recount results.
Until further guidance is provided by the Division by way of regulations or arbitration decisions, it appears that a community association, even if it determines conclusively that its initial election results are inaccurate, must nonetheless accept the results of the election as announced unless an affected unit owner timely challenges the election results and the Division orders an alternate result. Notably, the Association, itself, is not permitted to file an arbitration petition challenging the election results. Gulf Island Beach & Tennis Club I Condominium, Inc. v. Lapenna (2003), Cypress Palms Condominium Association, Inc. (2008).
Since the association may be unable to correct even obvious errors in the vote count after announcing election results at an annual meeting, unless authorized by its governing documents, the association should be extremely careful in conducting the initial vote count and consider multiple counts or other precautionary measures to ensure an accurate count before announcing results and adjourning the annual meeting. Having competent counsel attend and conduct annual meetings and elections can help the association avoid ballot counting and other mistakes which are far more difficult to correct after the fact. Associations desiring to allow recounts should review their governing documents to determine whether authority exists and, if needed, consult with an attorney regarding requirements to amend the governing documents to establish recount procedures.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Patrick Kemp is a shareholder in the firm's Austin, Texas office and serves as Chair of the firm's Insurance Coverage/Bad Faith Practice Group. Mr. Kemp represents insurance companies in insurance coverage and bad faith litigation arising out of a broad range of commercial and personal lines claims. He has extensive experience serving as lead counsel in first-party insurance lawsuits defending breach of contract, bad faith and statutory extra-contractual claims throughout the State of Texas.
Mr. Kemp is an active member of several professional organizations including the State Bar of Texas Insurance Law Section, the Claims and Litigation Management Alliance, the Property & Liability Resource Bureau and the Austin Bar Association.
Summary judgment for homeowners carrier in bad faith lawsuit related to the carrier's investigation of a sewage backup claim. Durrett v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, _ F.Supp.3d_, 2015 WL 1564783 (W.D. Texas, Austin Div. 2015).
Summary judgment for commercial property carrier in a bad faith lawsuit related to the applicability of an anti-concurrent causation clause in a foundation damage claim. Bilotto v. Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company, _ F.Supp.3d _, 2015 WL 241218 (W.D. Texas, San Antonio Div. 2015).
Judgment for homeowners carrier following trial in which it was proven that an insured committed arson. Weidner v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, _ F.Supp.3d_, 2014 WL 6427541 (E.D. Texas, Sherman Div. 2014).
Summary judgment for homeowners insurance carrier on the insureds' statutory bad faith and extra-contractual claims. Walker v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 992 F.Supp.2d 703 (W.D. Texas, Austin Div. 2014).
Arbitration compelled under Federal Arbitration Act on marine insurance carrier's motion related to insurance broker's indemnity claims. Chartis Seguros Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. HLI Rail & Rigging, LLC., 967 F.Supp.2d 756 (S.D. New York 2013).
Directed verdict for automobile insurance carrier granted during jury trial in bad faith lawsuit brought by judgment creditor. (Travis County, Texas 2012).
Judgment on jury verdict for national commercial mat distributor in catastrophic personal injury lawsuit affirmed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Farmer v. Home Depot U.S.A. Incorporated, 487 Fed.Appx. 916 (5th Cir. 2012).
Summary judgment for commercial property carrier in a bad faith lawsuit related to Hurricane Ike damage to insured's apartment complex. Sterling Equities, Inc. v. Chubb Custom Insurance Company, 806 F.Supp.2d 1004 (S.D. Texas, Houston Div. 2011).
Summary judgment for commercial general liability carrier in lawsuit brought by insured construction subcontractor seeking to recover defense costs and indemnity in construction defect lawsuit. Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 712 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D. Texas, Houston Div. 2010).
Judgment rendered on appeal for excess commercial motor carrier's insurer regarding excess liability under Motor Carrier Safety Act MCS-90 endorsement. Wells v. Gulf Insurance Company, 484 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Petitioner, claiming that he was wrongfully discharged from his employment by respondent railroad, filed a state-court action based on state law for breach of contract. The suit was removed to Federal District Court which dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust the remedies provided by the Railway Labor Act, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Since the source of petitioner's right not to be discharged and of his employer's obligation to restore him to his regular employment following an injury is the collective-bargaining agreement, petitioner must follow the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the Railway Labor Act. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 , overruled. Pp. 321-326.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 326. POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Andrew W. Estes argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was James E. Slaton.
William H. Major argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Lamar W. Sizemore and Robert G. Young.
Petitioner brought suit in the state trial court of Georgia seeking damages for alleged "wrongful discharge" [406 U.S. 320, 321] by the respondent. * He alleged that prior to an auto accident in 1967, he had been an employee in good standing of the respondent, employed "under specified conditions and with a stipulated schedule of benefits." He alleged that following the accident, he had fully recovered and was physically able to resume his work for respondent, but that respondent had refused to allow him to return to work, and that respondent's actions amounted to a wrongful discharge. He prayed for damages consisting of loss of past and future earnings and for attorneys' fees. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court and there moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust the remedies provided by the 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 579, as amended, 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i). See also 1966 amendments to 3 Second, 80 Stat. 208. The District Court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 955 and are once more confronted with the question of whether Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), should be overruled.
Moore held that a railroad employee who elected to treat his employer's breach of the employment contract as a discharge was not required to resort to the remedies afforded under the Railway Labor Act for adjustment and arbitration of grievances, but was free to commence in state court an action based on state law for breach of contract. The result was supported by the Court's conclusion that the procedures for adjustment of "minor [406 U.S. 320, 322] disputes" under the Railway Labor Act had been intended by Congress to be optional, not compulsory, and that therefore a State was free to accord an alternative remedy to a discharged railroad employee under its law of contracts. The basic holding of Moore was reaffirmed and its state law aspects amplified in Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953). There it was held that if state law required the employee to exhaust administrative remedies provided for in his contract of employment before resorting to court, a federal diversity court should enforce that requirement.
"Provision for arbitration of a discharge grievance, a minor dispute, is not a matter of voluntary agreement under the Railway Labor Act; the Act compels the parties to arbitrate minor disputes before the National Railroad Adjustment Board established under the Act." 385 U.S., at 198 .
The related doctrine expressed in Moore and Koppal, that a railroad employee's action for breach of an employment contract is created and governed by state law, has been likewise undercut by later decisions. In Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963), an agreement required under 204 of the Railway Labor Act was said to be "like the Labor Management Relations Act 301 contract . . . a federal contract and . . . therefore governed and enforceable by federal law, in the federal courts." 372 U.S., at 692 . A similar result was reached under 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), the Court deduced from the Labor Management Relations Act a preference for the settlement of disputes in accordance with contractually agreed-upon arbitration procedures. It accordingly held that before a state court action could be maintained for breach of such a contract, the employee must first "attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress." 379 U.S., at 652 . In Maddox, the Court not only refused to extend Moore to save state court actions for breach of contract under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, but intimated that its rule might well not survive even in Railway Labor Act cases. Indeed, since the compulsory character of the administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for disputes such as that between petitioner and respondent stems not from any contractual undertaking between the parties but from the Act itself, the case for insisting on resort to those remedies is if anything stronger in cases arising under that Act than it is in cases arising under 301 of the LMRA.
The fact that petitioner characterizes his claim as one for "wrongful discharge" does not save it from the Act's [406 U.S. 320, 324] mandatory provisions for the processing of grievances. Petitioner argues that his election to sever his connection with the employer and treat the latter's alleged breach of the employment contract as a "discharge" renders his claim sufficiently different from the normal disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to warrant carving out an exception to the otherwise mandatory rule for the submission of disputes to the Board. But the very concept of "wrongful discharge" implies some sort of statutory or contractual standard that modifies the traditional common-law rule that a contract of employment is terminable by either party at will. Here it is conceded by all that the only source of petitioner's right not to be discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a "wrongful" one that entitles him to damages, is the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. Respondent in this case vigorously disputes any intent on its part to discharge petitioner, and the pleadings indicate that the disagreement turns on the extent of respondent's obligation to restore petitioner to his regular duties following injury in an automobile accident. The existence and extent of such an obligation in a case such as this will depend on the interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Thus petitioner's claim, and respondent's disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations of the collective-bargaining agreement. The fact that petitioner intends to hereafter seek employment elsewhere does not make his present claim against his employer any the less a dispute as to the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. His claim is therefore subject to the Act's requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment.
The constitutional issue discussed in the dissent was not set forth as a "question presented for review" in the [406 U.S. 320, 325] petition for certiorari, and therefore our Rule 23 (1) (c) precludes our consideration of it. "We do not reach for constitutional questions not raised by the parties." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n. 5 (1954).
The term "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in its broader sense may be an entirely appropriate description of the obligation of both the employee and carrier under the Railway Labor Act to resort to dispute settlement procedures provided by that Act. It is clear, however, that in at least some situations the Act makes the federal administrative remedy exclusive, rather than merely requiring exhaustion of remedies in one forum before resorting to another. A party who has litigated an issue before the Adjustment Board on the merits may not relitigate that issue in an independent judicial proceeding. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959). He is limited to the judicial review of the Board's proceedings that the Act itself provides. Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965). In such a case the proceedings afforded by 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i), will be the only remedy available to the aggrieved party.
In Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1966), the Court noted that there had been complaints not only about the long delay in processing of grievances on the part of the Adjustment Boards, but also about the fact that a more extensive right of judicial review of Board action was accorded to carriers than to employees. The Court noted that Congress, by Public Law 89-456, 80 Stat. 208, effective June 20, 1966, had legislated to correct these difficulties, but observed that the employee in Walker had not had the benefit of these new procedures. It therefore declined. "in his case," 385 U.S., at 199 , to overrule Moore. Petitioner Andrews, however, would in the prosecution of his claim before the Adjustment Board have the benefit of these [406 U.S. 320, 326] improved procedures. We now hold that he must avail himself of them, and in so doing we necessarily overrule Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra.
[ Footnote * ] References throughout the opinion to respondent are to the Georgia Railroad Co., which consisted of properties leased by Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. and Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the Georgia Railroad Co. had refused to allow him to return to work.
The complaint in this case alleges that following an automobile accident, in which the petitioner-employee was involved, the company refused to allow him to go to work on the ground he had not recovered sufficiently to perform his former duties. No issue involving the collective-bargaining agreement was tendered. Petitioner - rightly or wrongly - claimed this was a discharge and that under Georgia law, governing the place where he worked, he had been deprived of wages from the time he recovered from the accident, and that he was deprived "of the expectancy of future earnings . . . until the date of his scheduled retirement."
The Adjustment Board has considerable expertise in construing and applying collective-bargaining agreements, as respects severance pay, seniority, disciplinary actions by management, and the various aspects of reinstatement. But the body of law governing the discharge of employees who do not want or seek reinstatement is not found in customs of the shop or in the collective agreement but in the law of the place where the employee works. The Adjustment Board is not competent to apply that law. In the first place the members of the four divisions of the Adjustment Board authorized by 45 U.S.C. 153 First (b) presumably do not know the local law governing the employee-employer relationships in all of the States where railroads run. In the second place, the personnel of these divisions of the Adjustment Board may occasionally have lawyers on them but law-trained members are the exception, not the rule. In the third place, an employee seeking damages for reinstatement is normally entitled to a jury trial; and no division of the Adjustment Board ever pretends to serve in that role.
The Board, we now know, is made up of laymen; those laymen have no insight into the nuances of Georgia [406 U.S. 320, 330] law on the question of damages, and they obviously cannot even purport to give the remedy in damages which a "court suit" entails.
The regime of mediation and arbitration under collective-bargaining agreements, such as the one we upheld in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 , and those we have cited under the Railway Labor Act, are important in stabilizing relations between unions and employers. See U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 355 -356. But where the collective-bargaining agreement is not directly involved, and certainly where the individual employee, who tenders his grievance, wants to quit the railroad scene and go elsewhere and sever his communal relation with union and railroad, the case falls out of the ambit of authority given to the mediation or arbitration agencies.
The courthouse is the forum for that litigant and I would never close its door to him, unless the mandate of Congress were clear. Even then I do not see how the Seventh Amendment could be circumvented: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
Though the case is in the federal courts, this employee sues to enforce a common-law right recognized by the State of Georgia. The only place he can get a trial by jury is in a court. If he sues under a collective-bargaining agreement, he does not sue at common law but under a statutory federal regime. Yet that is not this case.
Everyone who joins a union does not give up his civil rights. If he wants to leave the commune and assert his common-law rights, I had supposed that no one could stop him. I think it important under our constitutional regime to leave as much initiative as possible to the individual. What the Court does today is ruthlessly [406 U.S. 320, 331] to regiment a worker and force him to sacrifice his constitutional rights in favor of a union. I would give him a choice to pursue such rights as he has under the collective agreement and stay with the union, 3 or to quit it and the railroad and free himself from a regime which he finds oppressive. I would construe the federal law as giving the employee that choice. The choice imposed by the Court today raises serious constitutional questions 4 on which we have not had the benefit of any argument.
This is a plain, ordinary, common-law suit not dependent on any term or provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. I cannot, therefore, join those who would close the courthouse door to him. Under the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth, he is petitioning the Government "for a redress of grievances" in the traditional manner of suitors at common law; and by the Seventh Amendment is entitled to a jury trial.
As noted, my basic disagreements with the majority concern the validity of the two assumptions implicit in its holding: (a) that the collective agreement will be sufficiently implicated in this dispute to warrant the application of federal substantive law, and (b) that Congress has vested the Board with jurisdiction to entertain [406 U.S. 320, 332] nonreinstatement grievances such as Andrews' complaint. But, even taking these assumptions as correct for purposes of argument, I believe the Court has erred.
The majority does not hold that Congress has mandated that the statutory procedure be the exclusive route for adjusting Andrews' grievance. Indeed, that path was foreclosed by our decision in Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U.S. 196 , holding that prior to the 1966 amendments Congress had evinced no such purpose, and by the fact that nothing in the 1966 amendments themselves evidences an intention to render the statutory channel exclusive for nonreinstatement claims. 5 Rather, today's result is grounded in the authority of the federal courts to fashion the substantive law to be applied to collective agreements. Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 695 ; see also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 . Even under that assumption, I would not impose the exhaustion requirement upon this narrow and readily identifiable group of discharges.
There is no equation of the substantive law to govern agreements under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, into which exclusive arbitration clauses may voluntarily be inserted by the parties and the substantive law to govern railroad contracts, onto which the statutory grievance procedure is superimposed by law. One would not suppose that every doctrine developed under the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, should be carried over into the apparatus created by the Railway Labor Act. A salutary doctrine under one measure may serve no worthwhile purpose under the other. Yet today the majority transplants [406 U.S. 320, 333] the Maddox rule in the foreign soil of the railroad world without any discussion of the ends to be served. Even Maddox cautioned against that result, stating that any overruling of Moore should come only after "the various distinctive features of the administrative remedies provided by [the Railway Labor] Act can be appraised in context, e. g., the make-up of the Adjustment Board, the scope of review from monetary awards, and the ability of the Board to give the same remedies as could be obtained by court suit." 379 U.S., at 657 n. 14.
It is said that the fact that Congress (rather than private parties as in Maddox) fashioned the instant adjustment procedure somehow reinforces a presumption of exclusivity. Yet it is difficult to perceive how that can be when it is also conceded, as mentioned earlier, that Congress itself has never designed its prescription to be the sole avenue of redress for this limited class of claimants. Rather, the significance of the statutory source of this procedure lies in its inflexibility and immunity from modification through collective bargaining. Unlike the Maddox rule, what is done today cannot be undone tomorrow through contract negotiation. 6 That difference would seem to warrant caution to ensure that more is to be gained than lost by closing the court-house door.
One clear disadvantage counsels against today's holding. Given the nature of permanent dischargees' weak positions vis-a-vis their former unions, the personnel manning the adjustment mechanism, its haphazard decisional process, and the absence of judicial review of Board decisions, the risk is substantial that valid complaints [406 U.S. 320, 334] of permanent discharges such as Andrews will be unfairly treated.
"As the Board has operated in practice, the procedures followed in holding hearings have been quite informal and have differed from the trial-type hearings conducted by other agencies established and maintained by the Federal Government. Disputes are referred to the Adjustment Board by the filing of written submissions. Each submission contains a statement of claim, accompanied by a statement of facts. If the parties can agree, a joint statement of facts is filed; if they cannot agree, separate submissions are filed, stating the facts separately. All submissions are in writing. Parties may be heard in person, by counsel, or by other representatives as they elect. . . . It would be most extraordinary for live testimony to be given by witnesses. There is no requirement that a factual submission or other [406 U.S. 320, 336] written statement be sworn. There is no cross-examination of witnesses and no record or transcript of the proceedings. There is no provision for issuance of subpenas or compulsory attendance of witnesses." Hearing on H. R. 706 [1966 Railway Labor Act amendments] before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 49 (1966).
All of this might be made tolerable if at some point in his journey Andrews could look forward to a judge's inquiry into the affair. But the fact is that whatever order by whatever process the Board may enter will be virtually immune from any judicial review because an award, either of the Adjustment Board or of a special board, is reviewable only for fraud or for lack of jurisdiction. 45 U.S.C. 153 (p) (proviso).
On the other side of the balance, it could not be claimed that permitting a judicial remedy (in addition to an administrative one) would risk economic warfare, especially in light of the estranged relationship of permanent dischargees to their former unions. Nor could it be claimed that a judicial remedy would risk nonuniformity in interpretation of collective agreements inasmuch as courts as well as the Board would be obliged to apply a single body of federal common law. See Maddox, supra, at 658 n. 15.
[ Footnote 1 ] The opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Walker case makes clear that the seniority dispute was based on the collective agreement. 354 F.2d 950.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Georgia law of "wrongful discharge" seems to amount to a set of common-law axioms of construction to fill in the ambiguities in employment contracts and employment relationships. If there is a contract, however, which expressly addresses the issue, the contract, and not the construction axioms, controls. For example, unless a contract provides otherwise, disobedience is a ground for discharge, Georgia Coast & Piedmont R. Co. v. McFarland, 132 Ga. 639, 64 S. E. 897, as is disrespectful language, Wade v. Hefner, 16 Ga. App. 106, 84 S. E. 598. If the employment contract, whether oral or written, provides that the worker may be fired only if his performance is unsatisfactory, he may not be discharged only for economic necessity, Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Baugh, 29 Ga. App. 498, 116 S. E. 51, although "mitigating factors" may generally be a defense. Walker v. Jenkins, 32 Ga. App. 238, 123 S. E. 161. But where the language of the agreement is clear, that language controls and not the rules of construction. Thus, if the parties provide that the employer may fire at will, no discharge can be wrongful. Webb v. The Warren Co., 113 Ga. App. 850, 149 S. E. 2d 867. The general presumption is that hiring is terminable at will, [406 U.S. 320, 328] unless some definite period of employment is provided or inferable from the relationship. Ga. Code Ann. 66-101 (master and servant). The intent of the parties is the guide to determine if the courts may look to custom or the pay interval, if the contract is otherwise ambiguous. Odom v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S. E. 1013, Thus, if the worker is paid monthly, he must be given 30 days' notice. As to damages, once it is shown that the discharge was wrongful, the measure of damages is the difference between the rate of pay and what the dischargee might have been able to earn in other employment. Ga. Code Ann. 4-216. The fact that the employer prevented the employee from performing the remainder of the service is not a bar to recovery on that portion of the term. Irwin v. Young, 91 Ga. App. 773, 87 S. E. 2d 322. For Andrews to recover on a damages theory, it appears that it would be necessary for him to show first that he was not dischargeable at will. We do not know from the pleadings what proof Andrews will tender. So far as we can now tell the collective agreement is not in issue. His complaint does not state the source of the employer's duty; and respondents allege that the collective agreement creates no such duty. As to damages it is also impossible to say that any terms of the collective agreement will be relevant to this dispute.
[ Footnote 3 ] The Board is currently disposing of petitions at the rate of about 1,500 annually. At that rate the Board will eliminate its present backlog of slightly more than 3,000 cases in two years. Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 95 (Table 9) (1971).
[ Footnote 4 ] Constitutional issues not raised by the parties are at times passed upon by the Court. For a notorious example, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , and Butler, J.'s comments, id., at 88-89. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673 -677 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771 -772 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[ Footnote 5 ] Nothing in the 1966 amendments nor their related legislative history even suggests or hints at a design to overrule Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 . See H. R. Rep. No. 1114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. Rep. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
[ Footnote 6 ] It was expressly observed by the majority in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 -658, that bargaining parties could avoid the force of that opinion simply by agreeing that arbitration was not the exclusive remedy.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Williams v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc.
COSHANDA WILLIAMS v. BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 21) filed by defendant Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Plaintiff Coshanda Williams opposes the motion. The motion, noticed for submission on October 22, 2014, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
Plaintiff filed this pharmaceutical products liability action against Bayer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA") alleging that the Mirena intrauterine birth control device injured her. Bayer now moves for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff cannot establish causation for her injuries by a characteristic of an unreasonably dangerous product. Trial in this matter is scheduled for January 12, 2015.
It appears that Plaintiff's complaints were temporary and that she did not sustain any permanent or long term injuries from the device. Of course, even a temporary injury can be considered "damage" under the LPLA.
A prima facie case under the LPLA has four elements that the plaintiff must establish: 1) the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; 2) the plaintiff's damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; 3) this characteristic made the product "unreasonably dangerous"; and 4) the plaintiff's damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product. Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(A) (West 1997)).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's cause," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her claims as a matter of law. First, the depositions of Plaintiff and her physician Dr. Newman, demonstrate that any claim based on a failure to warn is precluded by the learned intermediary doctrine. Further, the evidence of record fails to create an issue of fact as to any other claim or theory under the LPLA.
Under Louisiana's learned intermediary doctrine, a drug manufacturer discharges its duty to warn consumers by reasonably informing the prescribing physician of the risks associated with the drug. See Grenier v. Med. Eng'r Corp., 243 F.3d 200, 205 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001).
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 21) filed by defendant Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

matches:
v.
v.
v.
§ 9
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.