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Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA - 63rd Annual UOL Convention!
For the 63rd time, since 1947, when His Beatitude Metropolitan John (Theodorovich) blessed the convocation of the first Ukrainian Orthodox League Convention, delegates from local chapters throughout the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA have gathered in Morristown, NJ for the annual convention of the Ukrainian Orthodox League of the USA. This year’s gathering is hosted by Holy Ascension Senior and Junior UOL Chapter of the Holy Ascension Ukrainian Orthodox parish in Maplewood, NJ and working sessions began on Thursday, July 29, 2010 until will continue through Sunday, August 1, 2010.
His Beatitude Metropolitan Constantine opened the annual Convention with the celebration of the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom in the convention chapel of Hyatt Regency hotel. All three hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA – Metropolitan Constantine, Archbishop Antony and Bishop Daniel – are present at the convention to provide spiritual guidance under the convention theme: “Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it.” (Proverbs 22:6). Concelebrating with the Metropolitan at the Liturgy were Spiritual Advisors to the League: V. Rev. Fr. Myron Oryhon of the Senior UOL and Rev. Fr. Anthony Perkins of the Junior UO, as well as V. Rev. Fr. Oleh Hucul, Pastor of Holy Ascension Parish and Spiritual Advisor to the convention committee and Protodeacon Ihor Mahlay of St. Vladimir Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral in Parma, OH. In his remarks Metropolitan Constantine welcomed the delegates to the Convention, calling upon them to follow in the footsteps of the founding members of the UOL, providing support to each other as we journey through the 21st century, living our Holy Orthodox Faith. His Beatitude was visibly moved when the faithful joyfully sang “Mnohaya Lita” in honor of his birthday that very day!
Following opening ceremonies and prayers with the Jr. and Sr. convention bodies gathered together, the Presidents of the two organizations, Oleh Bilynsky – Senior and Taylor Gladys – Junior, greeted the participants and set the tone for a serious examination of the League’s work during the past year and comprehensive planning for the years to come.
The convention discussions this year have taken a different form. The committees and commissions already existent to accomplish the ongoing work of the UOL will continue to do so in years to come. The goal for this convention is to discuss where the UOL will be – or rather, where the UOL wants to be ten years from today in 2020. The discussions took up most of the time of the first day’s sessions and will conclude at sessions on Friday afternoon.
In the afternoon hours of the day, the delegates listened to a brief presentation by Michael Nakonachny about the needs of All Saints Camp in repairing and maintaining all the cabins and other buildings, which are part of the camp. Michael challenged all present to become actively involved in the effort to preserve our camp for future generations.
A special moment of the day occurred when Oleh Bilynsky presented a check for over $2,000 to the president of the UOC of USA St. Andrew Society, Protodeacon Dr. Ihor Mahlay, to assist the Society in its soup kitchen programs in Ukraine. The funds were collected by UOL chapters during it’s annual “Souper Bowl” campaign.
The day concluded with the entire convention body traveling to a NJ port on the Hudson River for Dinner/Cruise on the Majestic Princess Ship, which took the group all the way around Manhattan Island – New York City.
“What is the future of the organization that brought me up and keeps touching the lives of my children with the love of Christ?” – this was the question that sounded from one end of the convention hall to the other among the delegates on the second day of its work.
At the beginning of the working session on Friday, July 30th, His Eminence Archbishop Antony addressed the delegates of the 63rd Annual UOL Convention, concentrating on the convention theme: ““Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it.” (Pr. 22:6) The Archbishop stressed to the UOL membership that they could not possibly “train up their children in the way they should go” if they, themselves, do not know the way they should go, or if they have not gone that way as an example for their children. “You cannot be Christ to your children if you do not know Christ at an intimate level. You cannot teach your children about the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in your life if you have not allowed the Holy Spirit to permeate your existence and to be the guiding force in your life” the Archbishop said. Trust in God cannot be “faked”…it becomes natural only when it is a real trust – when it is not – the “little ones”, as Christ calls our children, will be the first to recognize it – and they will lose trust in their parents or grandparents or uncles or aunts who exhibit no real trust in God – and the most sad consequence is that they will never learn to trust God themselves.
The UOL Convention body reflected over several hours the “20/20 vision for UOL”. Michael Komichak, Co-Chairman of this year’s convention challenged the delegates to approach the ministry and mission of the organization from a new angle – what should the UOL be and what should it accomplish over the next decade. The delegates, divided into small groups spent their time working, reflecting, and challenging each other on issues of moral and social context. The issues of technological and scientific progress brought up a lively discussion on ways and means of reaching out to a younger generation of active Ukrainian Orthodox League members that are to become the future leaders of their Church. Leadership training and the retention of our youth were presented by almost every small group.
All three hierarchs visited the Junior Convention, which is conducted separately from the Senior Convention. They challenged the upcoming generation to face with zeal the challenges of our society, while remaining dedicated and devoted to Christ and His Holy Orthodox Faith. The hierarchs answered numerous questions that the youth of the Church posed to them, addressing moral concerns of their daily life and the influence of technological progress on the development of the future active Ukrainian Orthodox Christians.
The Junior UOL delegates responded to the request made of the UOL by the hierarchs, to assist in establishing a monastic community for our Church, by committing to raise $5000 during the coming year for this worthy goal.
1. On behalf of the Resolutions Committee of the Jr. UOL convention delegates, we would like to start by thanking the 2010 Convention Committee for all of their hard work and dedication throughout the year to prepare for this event. We would especially like to acknowledge Mr. Michael Komichak, Ms. Aleksandra Hucul, and Elly Hucul for their tireless efforts that made this successful convention possible. In addition, we'd like to thank both the Senior and Jr. UOL Chapters of Maplewood, New Jersey, and all of their parishioners for devoting their time, commitment, and love to the UOL.
2. We would like to express our deep gratitude to our Hierarchs, His Beatitude Metropolitan Constantine, His Eminence Archbishop Antony, and His Grace Bishop Daniel for the endless love, support, and guidance that they continually show to the members of the Junior League.
4. We wish the best for the succeeding National Executive Board, and we will pray for them as they take on their new responsibilities. May God guide them through all of their successes and endeavors. Good luck!
5. We would like to offer our sincere gratitude to the Junior National Board Advisors, Fr. Anthony Perkins and Melanie Nakonachny for their ceaseless love, support, generosity, and direction throughout the entirety of this year. We appreciate your service in everything you do. May God bless you!
6. Thank you to all of the 49th Annual Jr. UOL Convention delegates. It is through you that the organization thrives, serves, and spreads the word of Christ. We appreciate your dedication to our Church and the League.
7. We pray for the 2011 Convention Committee from Philadelphia. May God guide, strengthen, and aid you as you make preparations for next year's 64th Annual UOL Convention! Good luck!
8. We would like to call to mind all members of the UOL who have fallen asleep in the Lord this year. May God provide them with a place of eternal rest and peace. Vichnaya Pamyat, Memory Eternal.
9. We would like to recognize the graduated class of 2010. Congratulations on all of your accomplishments. Good luck in your future, we pray for your success. We would also like to encourage your membership in the Senior UOL. Thank you for all of your service.
10. We express our sincere gratitude to the following individuals who perpetually devote their time and love to the development of the youth in our Holy Ukrainian Orthodox Church: our Hierarchs for their continuous spiritual guidance, our Spiritual and Senior advisors for their direction, and any other members who care about the spiritual growth of children in our Churches. We would like to extend a special thank you to the Spiritual Advisors of the All Saints Encampments: Fr. Zinovy Zharsky, Fr. Vasyl Sendeha, Fr. John Harvey, Fr. Bohdan Hladio, Fr. Taras Naumenko, and Fr. Anthony Perkins. In addition, we would especially like to recognize Ms. Natalie Kapeluck-Nixon, the director of Youth and Young Adult Ministry, Diocesan Church School Camp, and Teenage Conference, as well Ms. Kira Senedak and Ms. Denise Spoganetz, the directors of the Mommy and Me/ Daddy and Me encampment. Recognition must also be given to Fr. Paisius McGrath for serving as the spiritual director of All Saints Camp. Finally, we would like to thank Oleh and Natalie Bilynsky, Melanie Nakonachny, and Diane Senedak for the work they put into planning the UOL Lenten Retreats. We whole-heartedly appreciate all that you do for our youth. You help us to learn and grow in love for our faith and you touch the lives of those who are vital to our Church's prosperity.
11. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the mission team members who traveled both around the United States and Ukraine in the past year, selflessly giving up their time and love to care for those who need it most. Bringing the light of Christ to those who are suffering, the Junior League supports you fully, and we thank you for your dedication to your brothers and sisters in Christ. We strongly encourage participation in such mission trips in the future and the past, present, and future mission teams will continually be in our prayers. May God grant you many blessed years for the love you show to the less-fortunate. Mnohaya Lita!
1. We assure His All Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew, Archbishop of New Rome – Constantinople the Mother Church, from which Rus-Ukraine accepted the totality of the Orthodox Christian Faith and order 1022 years ago during the reign of the Venerable Great Prince St. Volodymyr, of our filial love, profound esteem and prayers.
2. We offer prayerful support to our Hierarchs in all efforts, through the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and strongly encourage His All Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew to intensify efforts to establish a local autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine.
3. We continue to be deeply aware of the chronic shortage of clergy in our Holy Ukrainian Orthodox Church of U.S.A. and truly appreciate the efforts of the St. Sophia Seminary staff in attempting to meet these needs. We acknowledge with profound gratitude the vital ministry of the Staff of Saint Sophia Theological Seminary in the sacred task of priestly formation and education.
4. We prayerfully greet the delegates of the 19th Regular Sobor of our Holy Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA and encourage the active participation of the Ukrainian Orthodox League in the Sobor sessions, addressing the values and needs of the organization as well as the Church as we spread the Word of God among the faithful of our parish communities in the face of the spiritual, social and moral needs of our society.
5. We honor the Blessed Memory of the ten million men, women and children who perished during the insidious genocide created by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Government, which ravished Ukraine from 1932 to 1933. We strongly urge the United Nations to finally declare this horror to be the genocidal act that it was, not bowing to the revisionist history and propaganda currently being distributed by the Russian government denying the facts of the famine and declaring that it was only part of a general famine throughout the Soviet Union at the time.
6. We applaud the ongoing construction of the Ukrainian Museum of New Jersey – History and Education Complex in Memory of His Holiness Patriarch Mstyslav I (HEC) – on the grounds of our Metropolia Center in South Bound Brook/Somerset, New Jersey. We call upon the faithful of our Holy Ukrainian Orthodox Church to continue to cooperate in and financially support the completion of this construction.
7. We enthusiastically reaffirm in the 63rd year of the Ukrainian Orthodox League of USA our motto - “Dedicated to our Church and Devoted to its Youth,” - and recognize that the fulfillment of this motto is only possible through the intimate relationship with Christ through a life commensurate with His Holy Gospel, which we accept and live without reservation.
8. We extend special gratitude and appreciation to the members of Holy Ascension Senior and Junior Chapters of the Ukrainian Orthodox League for their dedicated efforts in hosting this 63rd Annual UOL Convention—2010. May God bless them for their dedication and devoted efforts for the benefit of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the U.S.A.
9. We express our most sincere appreciation to those officers who served faithfully on the Senior and Junior National Executive Boards of the Ukrainian Orthodox League of USA during the past year. May God bless them when we League members may fail in our efforts to express appreciation.
10. We remember Protopresbyter Frank Estocin who fell asleep in the Lord during the past year. May his memory be eternal in God’s Heavenly Kingdom.
11. We strongly encourage all parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of USA to expend great efforts to establish and provide continued support to Senior and Junior UOL Chapters and all UOL programs, activities, and ensure that the traditional convention committees remain active (i.e., Vocations and Clergy Support, Website, Ways and Means, Christian Caregiving and Missions, Youth, Membership and Chapter Development, and Education).
12. We share the joy of our clergy who were ordained to the Holy Deaconate and Priesthood during the past year: Deacon Ivan Synevskyy 9 August 2009; Deacon Boris Kroner – 13 September 2009; Rev. Fr. Siloan Rolando – 18 October 2009; Deacon Charles Sanderson – 31 October 2009; Deacon Oleh Sasiuk – 13 December 2009; Deacon James Cairns – 10 April 2010 and Rev. Fr. Ivan Synevskyy – 5 June 2010. We also greet those clergy celebrating significant anniversaries of ordination: Protopresbyter Michael Zemlachenko – 55 years; Protopresbyter Alexis Limonczenko – 55 years; Protopresbyter Nestor Kowal – 45 years; Protopresbyter Hryhorij Podhurec – 35 years; Protopresbyter Taras Chubenko – 30 years; V. Rev. Volodymyr Paszko – 30 years; Rev. Fr. Andrew Rogers – 25 years; Protodeacon Sviatoslav Novytsky – 25 years; V. Rev. Volodymyr Wronskyj – 20 years; V. Rev. Evhen Kumka – 20 years; Archimandrite Raphael (Moore) – 15 years; V. Rev. Oleh Hucul – 15 years; Rev. Fr. Walter Kvostyk – 15 years; V. Rev. Michael Kochis – 15 years; V. Rev. Taras Naumenko – 15 years; V. Rev. Volodymyr Steliac – 15 years; Deacon Dennis Lapushansky – 15 years; Rev. Fr. Vasyl Kryshtompol – 15 years; Rev. Fr. Paul Bigelow – 15 years; Rev. Fr. Paisius McGrath – 5 years; Rev. Fr. Gabriel Rochelle – 5 years and Rev. Fr. Victor Wronskyj – 5 years.
13. We celebrate and greatly appreciate the staff and volunteers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Camping Programs – the Teenage Conference, Church School Camp, and Mommy/Daddy and Me Camp – for their dedicated efforts with the youth and families of our Church. We encourage all parishes, UOL Chapters and faithful to learn more about these ministry programs so that they can enthusiastically support and promote them through prayer, material support and active participation.
14. We encourage the continued support of sister organizations: the United Ukrainian Orthodox Sisterhoods, St. Andrew Society and pray for their continued success.
15. We, as Orthodox Christians, repeat our firm belief in the sanctity of life – from the moment of conception to the moment of natural death. Our Lord offered the ultimate sacrifice of love – His very own life on the Cross – for the sake of human life – the crown of His creation. No attempt to destroy life – at any point or for any reason – can possibly be interpreted as the Will of God. Hereby we encourage the support of Zoe for Life, the Orthodox ministry for women in crisis pregnancy.
16. We encourage all U.O.L. Chapters to reach out to all peoples of their local communities, including new immigrants from Ukraine and Eastern Europe, to become faithful and active members of our Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox League.
17. We continue to encourage each UOL Chapter to adopt a nursing home near its parish and spend time each month visiting its residents – especially those bound to their rooms.
18. We strongly encourage all parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA to expend great efforts to establish and provide continued support to Senior and Junior UOL Chapters and all UOL programs, activities and Convention Committees.
19. We ask that all UOL members and chapters pray for and support the men and women serving in our Armed Forces through letter-writing campaigns, adopting a platoon, special mention during services or reminders in icon corners and candle stands with yellow ribbons or small USA Flags as well as other appropriate programs. We also pray for the eternal rest of those who have given the ultimate sacrifice of their very lives I faithful service to our great nation.
The convention body confirmed bids for hosting UOL conventions through 2015: 2011 – St. Vladimir Cathedral, Philadelphia; 2012 – Protection of the Mother of God, (St. Mary) Cathedral, Allentown, PA; 2013 St. Vladimir Cathedral, Parma, OH; 2014 – The California Parishes and Chapters, in Los Angeles, CA and 2015 – as part of the Centennial Celebrations of the UOC of USA, St. Andrew Metropolia Center, South Bound Brook/Somerset, NJ.
The plenary sessions of the convention concluded late this day with the benediction and the singing of Ukraine’s National Anthem. Following the evening prayers, the delegates, alternates and guests departed to Ukrainian Cultural Center in Whippany, NJ for Ukrainian Vechornytsi evening, sharing in the experience of Ukrainian cuisine and village traditions.
Saturday, July 31 was a free day during the UOL Convention for reunions and socializing between UOL friends and visitors who traveled from various parts of. The evening was a time of joy and festivity during the convention Grand Banquet and Ball. The major UOL awards and scholarships are always made during the banquet and this year was no exception. The Father Volodymyr Bukata “Orthodox of the Year” Award went to Andrea Karbiwnyk of St. Vladimir Chapter, Philadelphia. The UOL Chapter of the Year Award was presented to St. John Chapter, Johnson City, NY. The Jr. UOL Chapter of the Year Award was presented to St. Michael Chapter, Woonsocket, RI. Metropolitan John Scholarships were presented to Rev. Fr. John Synevskyy, recent graduate from Holy Cross Seminary, Boston, MA and to Subdeacons Vasyl Pasakas, Andriy Matlak, Vasyl Dovhan, and Deacon Borislav Kroner from St. Sophia Seminary. Lynn Sawchuk-Sharon Kuzbyt Scholarships went to: Lesya Mahlay, Anastasia Markiw, Daria Gapon.
Divine Liturgy took place on Sunday morning in Holy Ascension Parish, Maplewood, NJ.
The children of the parish escorted our hierarchs to the church entrance where they were welcomed by Lynn Gulak, Parish President, Oleh Bilynsky, outgoing UOL President and Martha Misko, newly elected UOL President who asked the hierarchs to lead the faithful in the Eucharistic celebration.
Very Rev. Fr. Oleh Hucul offered the words of prayerful greeting to the hierarchs, calling upon them to remember in prayers the founders and benefactors of the Ukrainian Orthodox League since its conception in 1947.
These were the words of profound significance and humility, as each of the Board members realized the responsibilities and trust that people put in them.
Concluding the induction office, the Archbishop presented the Metropolitan of the Church with the newly elected and appointed Senior and Junior Ukrainian Orthodox League national Executive Boards.
Metropolitan Constantine concluded the Divine Liturgy with wishing the delegates of the Convention a safe and blessed journey home.
Following the Hierarchical Divine Liturgy, the Holy Ascension Senior and Junior UOL chapters sponsored a Farewell Luncheon at Holy Ascension parish hall, following which the “farewells” were exchanged, accompanied by sincere smiles, tears of joy and hope that the Holy Spirit will guide the UOL into the vision for 2020, which was proclaimed during the convention sessions. Everyone promised to return for the 64th Annual UOL Convention in 2011, which will be hosted by St. Vladimir Cathedral Sr. and Jr. UOL Chapters, Philadelphia, PA.
2010 Winter Mission Trip to Ukrainian Orphanage!

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§ 84-2 Establishment and duties of Fire Prevention Bureau.
§ 84-4 Limits for storage of explosives.
§ 84-5 Limits for storage and production of flammable liquids.
§ 84-6 Limits for bulk storage of liquefied petroleum gas.
§ 84-7 Routes for transporting explosives.
§ 84-8 Routes for transporting hazardous chemicals and other articles.
§ 84-11 Permits for new materials, processes or occupancies.
§ 84-12 Issuance and duration of permits.
§ 84-13 Violations and penalties.
Smoke detectors — See Ch. 134.
There is hereby adopted by the Borough of Ligonier for the purpose of prescribing regulations governing conditions hazardous to life and property from fire or explosion that certain code known as the "BOCA National Fire Prevention Code," being particularly the 1987 Edition thereof, as amended, and the whole thereof, save and except such portions as are hereinafter deleted, modified or amended by § 84-9 of this chapter, of which code not less than three copies have been and now are filed in the office of the Secretary of the Borough of Ligonier, and the same is hereby adopted and incorporated as fully as if set out at length herein, and, from the date on which this chapter shall take effect, the provisions thereof shall be controlling within the limits of the Borough of Ligonier.
The Fire Prevention Code shall be enforced by the Bureau of Fire Prevention in the Fire Department of the Borough of Ligonier, which is hereby established and which shall be operated under the supervision of the Chief of the Fire Department.
The Chief in charge of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall be appointed by the Ligonier Borough Council on the basis of examination to determine his qualifications. His appointment shall continue during good behavior and satisfactory service, and he shall not be removed from office except for cause after public hearing.
The Chief of the Fire Department may detail such members of the Fire Department as inspectors as shall from time to time be necessary. If necessary, the Chief of the Fire Department shall recommend to the Borough of Ligonier the employment of technical inspectors, who, when such authorization is made, shall be selected through an examination to determine their fitness for the position. The examination shall be open to members and nonmembers of the Fire Department, and appointments made after examination shall be for an indefinite term with removal only for cause.
A report of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall be made annually and transmitted to the chief executive officer of the municipality; it shall contain all proceedings under this code, with such statistics as the Chief of the Fire Department may wish to include therein; the Chief of the Fire Department shall also recommend any amendments to the code which, in his judgment, shall be desirable.
The attorney for the Borough of Ligonier.
The limits referred to in Section F-2601.2 of the Fire Prevention Code, in which storage of explosives and blasting agents is prohibited, are hereby established as follows: anywhere within the limits of the Borough of Ligonier.
The limits in which storage of flammable liquids in outside aboveground tanks is prohibited are hereby established as follows: anywhere within the limits of the Borough of Ligonier.
The limits in which new bulk plants for flammable or combustible liquids are prohibited are hereby established as follows: anywhere within the limits of the Borough of Ligonier.
The limits in which bulk storage of liquefied petroleum gas is restricted are hereby established as follows: anywhere within the limits of the Borough of Ligonier.
Pursuant to Section F-2603.9.1 of the Fire Prevention Code, the routes established for vehicles transporting explosives and blasting agents are hereby established as follows: Route 30 bypass or Market Street only.
In addition to the requirements of Article 29 of the Fire Prevention Code, the routes for vehicles transporting hazardous chemicals and other dangerous articles are hereby established as follows: Route 30 bypass or Market Street only.
The Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall have power to modify any of the provisions of the Fire Prevention Code upon application in writing by the owner or lessee, or his duly authorized agent, when there are practical difficulties in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the code, provided that the spirit of the code shall be observed, public safety secured and substantial justice done. The particulars of such modification, when granted or allowed, and the decision of the Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention thereon shall be entered upon the records of the Department, and a signed copy shall be furnished the applicant.
Whenever the Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall disapprove an application or refuse to grant a permit applied for or when it is claimed that the provisions of the code do not apply or that the true intent and meaning of the code have been misconstrued or wrongly interpreted, the applicant may appeal from the decision of the Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention to the Ligonier Borough Council within 30 days from the date of the decision appealed.
The Mayor of Ligonier, the Chief of the Fire Department and the Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall act as a committee to determine and specify, after giving affected persons an opportunity to be heard, any new materials, processes or occupancies which shall require permits, in addition to those now enumerated in said code. The Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention shall post such list in a conspicuous place in his office and distribute copies thereof to interested persons.
Permits shall be issued by the Land Use Administrator upon authorization of the Chief of the Bureau of Fire Prevention. Permits shall be issued for not exceeding one year. Permits shall be issued as directed by the Bureau of Fire Prevention.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the code hereby adopted or fail to comply therewith, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any order made thereunder, or who shall build in violation of any detailed statement of specifications or plans submitted and approved thereunder, or any certificate or permit issued thereunder, and from which no appeal has been taken, or who shall fail to comply with such an order as affirmed or modified by Ligonier Borough Council or by a court of competent jurisdiction, within the time fixed herein, shall, upon conviction before the Magisterial District Judge, severally for each and every such violation and noncompliance respectively, be guilty of a summary offense, punishable by a fine of not more than $600 or, in default of payment thereof, by imprisonment for not more than 30 days. The imposition of one penalty for any violation shall not excuse the violation or permit it to continue; and all such persons shall be required to correct or remedy such violations or defects within a reasonable time; and, when not otherwise specified, each 10 days that prohibited conditions are maintained shall constitute a separate offense.


A life insurance company which has several hundred thousand policyholders is in its nature a public institution, and where there is no apprehension as to its solvency, a court of equity will consider all the facts as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of a receivership or accounting before granting relief of that nature in the suit of an individual policyholder even if jurisdiction to grant such relief exists.
The fact that stockholders claim the surplus of an insurance company and the officers of the company do not actively deny the claim gives no ground for a receivership at the suit of a policyholder claiming that the surplus belongs to the policyholders.
A demurrer only admit facts well pleaded in the pleading demurred to; it does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law or the correctness of his opinions as to future results.
The construction of a general act and a charter granted thereunder pertain to the state court just as if the charter were granted by a special act, and in a suit by the holder of a policy, executed at the home office, the meaning and construction of the charter as held by the state court will be binding on the federal courts, and, in the absence of any federal question, the construction of the contract by the state court will be of most persuasive influence even if not of binding force.
The wrongdoing of former officers of an insurance company, and their continuance in power, in the absence of any trust relation, gives no jurisdiction for an accounting in equity in a suit in which the company is the only defendant as between a simple debtor and creditor.
The Equitable Life Assurance Society is not a trustee of its policyholders under its charter and policies as the same have been construed by the highest courts of the New York.
As the charter and contract have been construed by the highest court of New York, a policyholder in the Equitable Life Assurance Society can only participate in the surplus of the society according to the terms of the policy, and a discretion rests with the officers of the society as to what amount of surplus shall be retained and distributed, and when the distribution shall be made.
While wrongdoing, waste, and misapplication of funds reducing the surplus of an insurance company before distribution might give ground of action to a policyholder, it would not necessarily, where there is no allegation of insolvency, give ground for equitable action.
Where the bill avers solvency of defendant at present, a prediction of insolvency in the future on account of inability to meet claims of policyholders by reason of mismanagement is a mere conclusion of law, and not a fact which is admitted by demurrer or on which a court can grant equitable relief.
Where a suit for accounting by a policyholder against an insurance company as sole defendant avers that the stockholders claim to own the surplus, no decree can be made as to such ownership without the presence of the stockholders as parties.
law, and where, so far as necessary, discovery may be obtained as well as in equity. Rev.Stat., § 724; United States v. Bitter Root Co., 200 U. S. 451. A complainant who can obtain all the relief to which he is entitled in a single suit cannot invoke the interference of a court of equity on the ground that defendant may be saved a multiplicity of suits against it by others situated similarly to himself.
This case comes here on writ of certiorari, which brings up the record from the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, reversing the decree of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, which sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the plaintiff's bill and dismissed the same. The opinion of the circuit court is reported in 142 F. 835, and that of the circuit court of appeals, 151 F. 1.
The complainant is a citizen of the State of Maryland and brings this suit in behalf of himself, as well as all the policyholders and annuitants of the company defendant who may choose to come in and join therein; the defendant is a citizen of the State of New York and an inhabitant of the southern district thereof.
"to receive a semiannual dividend on the stock so held by them, not to exceed three and one-half percent of the same, such dividends to be paid at the times and in the manner designated by said directors of the company. The earnings and receipts of said company, over and above the dividends, losses, and expenses, shall be accumulated."
The officers were to strike a balance every five years from December 31, 1859, which was to exhibit its assets and liabilities and also the net surplus, after deducting a sufficient amount to cover all outstanding risks and other obligations. Each policyholder was to be credited with an equitable share of the surplus, which was to be applied to the purchase of an additional amount of insurance for each policyholder, or, if any policyholder should so direct, such equitable share of the surplus should be applied in his case to the purchase of an annuity.
of the person holding the absolute legal title to this policy, substitute a cash payment, to be fixed by said society, in lieu of the said increase to the amount insured, and such payment may be made by reduction of subsequent premiums, if said policyholder shall so elect."
The complainant elected to receive his share of the surplus, as ascertained from time to time, in the reduction of the premium, and the company was notified of that election, and ratified and accepted the same; and, since the date of the issuing of the policy, the complainant has regularly paid the premiums thereon as they severally accrued, after deducting the sums which at each period, the officers of the defendant stated to be the entire amount applicable in reduction of the premiums as complainant's equitable share in the surplus. Although the complainant has been entitled to have his full share of the lawfully ascertained and true surplus profits of the defendant applied in reduction of his premium, yet the amounts allowed by the officers of the defendant in reduction of his premium have not been the real amounts of complainant's equitable share in the true surplus, but, by means of the abuse of discretion, wrongs, and the inequitable and fraudulent conduct of the defendant, its officers and agents, the company, its officers and stockholders, have wrongfully retained, and, to the extent of a large sum, fraudulently wasted and misappropriated to themselves, a large portion of complainant's share in said surplus; that he has accepted such reductions of premium as have been from time to time assigned to him solely because of his belief that the officers of the defendant were acting in a just and lawful manner, and in reliance upon the representations of the officers of the defendant thereto, stating that he was receiving his lawful share of the true surplus, which representations were untrue and fraudulent, and without knowledge by complainant that they were untrue, or of the facts thereafter stated in the bill.
defendant during the preceding year, which surplus has been reported annually for many years to the insurance department of the State of New York as the fund which belonged to the policyholders exclusively, and one in which the stockholders were without any interest whatever, while, on the other hand, the defendant now claims that such surplus belongs to its stockholders.
The defendant, through its officers, has been crediting and paying to its policyholders, from time to time, only a portion of the surplus admitted to exist by the defendant, and to the whole amount of which complainant and the other policyholders are entitled in equitable proportion, and the officers, contrary to the rights of the policyholders, and in fraud of their rights, have not credited the policyholders with their equitable share of the surplus, although such surplus has been duly ascertained from their books, nor have they paid policyholders whose policies matured from time to time their just and equitable share of such surplus to which they were entitled, and the stockholders now claim and threaten to appropriate all the surplus as a dividend, or earning, upon the shares of stock of the company, in direct disregard of the representations made by the defendant to the superintendent of insurance of the state and in disregard of the rights of the policyholders.
that in fact they have distributed to themselves improper and extravagant salaries, commissions, and expenses from the fund or surplus which belonged to the policyholders. Great waste and extravagance are alleged to have been committed by the defendant through its officers in many ways. The officers of defendant have failed to properly invest and reinvest the funds of the company, but have willfully and negligently misappropriated and fraudulently mismanaged them.
The defendant is still in the control of the stockholders, whose representatives have been guilty of misappropriation, and its business is at a standstill. The interests of the policyholders are to place the assets in the hands of a receiver, in order to wind up the affairs of the defendant, which is the only way to safeguard the policyholders' interests. An action at law is inadequate to afford proper relief, and there would result, if such actions were necessary, a multiplicity of suits.
connection with the funds of the defendant, except to transfer the same to a receiver, and that a receiver be appointed to take possession of all the funds held by the defendant, of every character and description, and administer and distribute the same as he may be directed by the court.
The defendant demurred to this bill (1) for want of equity; (2) complainant has an adequate remedy at law; (3) complainant, under the laws of New York, had not legal capacity to sue; (4) complainant had no interest in the subject matter of the bill. Other grounds were stated not specially material now to notice.
ruinous to the interests of hundreds of thousands of people, and really beneficial to none. The enormous and very likely necessary expenses connected with a receivership, its certain failure to give full satisfaction to all, and the very great delays that would accompany the granting of the relief asked are strong reasons against granting it in the case of a defendant which is paying all its obligations as they are presented. In addition to all these objections, it has happened that, since 1905, a new board of directors has been chosen, new officers placed in command, and probably an entirely new policy adopted and followed, although these last-mentioned facts have happened since the filing of the bill in 1905, nevertheless it is not improper to refer to them, as they only constitute a history of the defendant since that time. They are found in public documents in New York, filed and existing of record in its insurance department, and they are the sworn returns of the officers of the defendant, made since the change in 1906. They may be referred to not to contradict the averments of the bill, but to show the officers now in control of the management of the defendant, its present condition, and the fact that it is now in full operation and in the daily discharge of all its obligations as they are presented. The right to an accounting in equity and the winding up of the defendant under these circumstances would have to be most clearly made out before such relief would be granted. A court of equity is bound to consider these facts before it would grant relief of the nature demanded. Such a court takes all the facts into consideration, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of granting a relief which lies largely, in cases of this nature, in the discretion of the court, even if it be assumed that jurisdiction to grant the relief existed at all.
and a still further appeal is pending in the New York Court of Appeals. We do not regard the matter as material, as it only refers to the claims of the stockholders to own the entire surplus in the defendant, and to the alleged attitude of the defendant as to these matters, in not denying their claims. This gives no ground for equitable interference at the suit of a policyholder against the defendant of the nature herein demanded.
As the questions in this case arise upon the defendant's demurrer to the bill of the complainant, it is necessary to direct attention to the effect of a demurrer as an admission. We are not called upon to cite authorities for the statement that a demurrer only admits facts well pleaded in the pleading demurred to. It does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law, nor does it admit the correctness of any opinion set forth in the bill; as, for instance, in regard to the probable effect in the future of the continued control of the defendant by the interests existing therein up to 1906. Hence, any construction placed by complainant upon the charter of the defendant and the insurance policy issued by the defendant to the complainant is not admitted, nor is the allegation of the ownership of the surplus by the policyholders, as alleged by the complainant, nor any opinion which is expressed in the bill as to the ability of the defendant to continue business; nor is any other opinion as to future happenings admitted by the demurrer.
and had its general home office and its legal residence and domicil in that state. The insurance policy owned by complainant appears on its face to have been executed in New York, and there is no averment to the contrary. The decisions of the highest court of New York are therefore binding upon this Court as to the meaning and effect of the charter of the defendant, and as it is a New York company, and the contract is a New York contract, executed and to be carried out therein, its meaning and construction, as held by the highest court of the state, will be of most persuasive influence, even if not of binding force, in the absence of any federal question arising in the case. There is no such question here. Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181, 94 U. S. 183; National Park Bank v. Remsen, 158 U. S. 337-342; Sioux City &c. Co. v. Trust Co., 173 U. S. 99. This principle has been so frequently decided that further reference to adjudged cases need not be made.
The suit is brought by complainant for himself, as well as all other policyholders and annuitants of the defendant who may choose to come in and join in the suit, and the company is the sole defendant. No officer of the company or stockholder therein, or any alleged debtor to the company, is made a party, and consequently any averment of the continuance in power of the same persons in the board of directors or otherwise is immaterial as a reason for the bringing of the action by the complainant in his own behalf, etc., to recover debts due the defendant, which the defendant will not itself sue for. This is not an action of that nature, and there are not present the necessary parties to maintain it if it were. The purpose of the averment is probably to sustain the application for a receiver, made necessary, as alleged, by the wrongdoing of some of the former officers of the defendant. That, however, gives no jurisdiction for an accounting in equity as between a simple debtor and creditor, and in the absence of any trust relation between them. A mere creditor, as such, has no right to that remedy.
of the moneys of the defendant before they ever reached the surplus fund, and before any distribution of it was made. In other words, they aver facts of mismanagement of the funds and wrongdoing by others, upon which a cause of action might arise against the officers and stockholders, or other persons guilty of such acts of wrongdoing and waste, in favor of the company itself. They lay no foundation for the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such a case unless it appears that the relation between the policyholder and the defendant is that the latter is the trustee of the former by reason of the trust relation between them resulting from the insurance policy. The complainant's contention, as above stated, that there is such a trust in the fund mentioned has never been regarded as the law in the State of New York (Cohen v. New York Life Insurance Company, 50 N.Y. 610; People v. Security Life &c. Co., 78 N.Y. 114; Bewley v. Equitable Life &c., 61 How.Pr. 344; Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N.Y. 421; and, to the same effect, Greeff v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 160 N.Y. 19), nor anywhere else so far as any case has been cited on the subject.
"that it cannot be said that the defendant is, in any sense, a trustee of any particular fund for the plaintiff, or that it acts as to him and in relation to any such fund in a fiduciary capacity. It has been held that the holder of a policy of insurance, even in a mutual company was in no sense a partner of the corporation which issued the policy, and that the relation between the policyholder and the company was one of contract, measured by the terms of the policy."
complainant. Indeed, the policyholder in the Uhlman case occupied a much stronger position for making the claim than does this complainant, who is the holder of an ordinary life policy, with rights to participate in the distribution of the surplus according to methods, etc., adopted by the defendant, as already mentioned. The claim was, however, denied by the state court, following the decisions of the New York courts for many years. To hold that a trust is proved in this case by virtue of the charter and policy of insurance is to hold contrary to the decisions of the highest court of the State of New York for a long number of years past, without a single decision the other way in all that time.
having in view the present and future contingencies of the business, and the court remarked that "there was no evidence or allegation that the plaintiff had been inequitably treated by the defendant as between himself and the other policyholders." The frauds and mismanagement mentioned did not, in themselves, give a policyholder any greater right to a distribution than is mentioned in the contract, and the right depended upon the judgment and discretion of the company as to time and amount.
such allegations, and if true, the court could declare the proper principles upon which the apportionment was to be made, so as to become an equitable apportionment. The Greeff case simply adopted that statement in the course of the opinion, which is chiefly devoted to the discussion of other matters.
There is nothing in either case to show that any other wrongdoing or fraud was in contemplation of the court than that above mentioned, viz., that the proposed or actual distribution of the money as between the policyholders themselves was not equitable, or was based on erroneous principles.
Wrongdoing, waste, misapplication of funds, and actions of that character, affecting the amount of the fund before distribution, were not held to furnish a ground of equitable jurisdiction for an accounting, and it was not held that even frauds in the distribution itself as between policyholders, or the adoption of wrong principles for such distribution, would be ground of jurisdiction in equity. That question was not before the court, and was not decided. It was simply stated that it would afford ground of action, not necessarily ground for equitable jurisdiction. However, this is no such case as the language used shows was contemplated in the observations of the court in the Uhlman case.
So far as the averments in the bill go as to the purchase of the majority of the stock of the defendant by Mr. Ryan and the execution by him of a deed of trust, we think those averments have no tendency to prove the existence of facts material to the cause of action attempted to be set forth in the bill.
way of salaries and fees, and also for sums of money lost consequent upon the fraud and waste of the directors or officers of the defendant, all of which are too large for the defendant to pay when demanded, is not admitted by the demurrer, and is not accurate as a conclusion of law. Whether such liability could be legally maintained or whether the defendant would be unable to pay the amount claimed from it when it was properly proved, and judgment duly recovered against it in an action for that purpose, is a mixture of a legal conclusion with a matter of opinion as to the future ability of the defendant to pay such liabilities. And the idea that the defendant itself is liable to policyholders for the frauds or wrongdoing set out in the bill and committed by its officers or members of its board of directors against the defendant, and in their personal interests, we regard as without foundation. Such a kind of future possible insolvency furnishes not the slightest ground for present legal action adverse to the defendant. Very likely the defendant could itself maintain an action against those who have been guilty of fraudulent conduct towards it, resulting in financial loss to it, and, of course, those who are alleged to be guilty would have to be made parties. No case is therefore made for an accounting or for a receiver, based upon these allegations of the bill. Certainly the court could not give any judgment that the policyholders are the owners of the so-called surplus. It may be that they are. The bill itself avers that the stockholders contend they are the owners of the surplus, or at least, of some considerable part of it, and certainly no decree could be made on the subject of such ownership and against the claims of the stockholders, without their presence as parties.
where, so far as necessary, discovery may be obtained as well as in equity. Rev.Stat. § 724; United States v. Bitter Root Co., 200 U. S. 451, and cases cited.


La Cour rappelle que seuls peuvent être remboursés au titre de l'article 41 de la Convention les frais et dépens dont il est établi qu'ils ont été réellement exposés, qu'ils correspondaient à une nécessité et qu'ils sont raisonnables quant à leur montant (voir, par exemple, Amihalachioaie c. Moldova, no 60115/00, § 47, CEDH 2004-...).
The Court recalls that in order for costs and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41 of the Convention, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 60115/00, § 47, ECHR 2004-...).
The Court recalls that in order for costs and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 60115/00, § 47, ECHR 2004-...).
It may have regard in that connection to such matters as the number of hours worked and the hourly rate sought (see, Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 60115/00, § 47, ECHR 2004-...).
At the outset the Court reiterates the most important role played by the lawyers in the administration of justice (see, on this point, Schöpfer v. Switzerland, 20 May 1998, §§ 29-30, Reports 1998-III; Nikula v. Finland, no. 31611/96, § 45, ECHR 2002-II; Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 60115/00, § 27, ECHR 2004-III; Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, § 173, ECHR 2005-XIII; and André and Another v. France, no. 18603/03, § 42, 24 July 2008; all cited in Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § 132, ECHR 2015).
The Court recalls that in order for costs and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41 of the Convention, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, no. 60115/00, § 47, ECHR 2004-III).


text:
2. The instant appeal reveals a very sorry state of affair where the wife files a criminal complaint before the competent court to initiate criminal proceedings against her husband alleging that they had obtained decree of divorce by playing fraud upon the court without realising that in such a fact-situation she herself would be an accomplice in the crime and equally responsible for the offence. More so, the appeal raises a substantial question of law as to whether the judgment and decree of a competent Civil Court can be declared null and void in collateral proceedings, that too, criminal proceedings.
3. This criminal appeal arises from the judgment and final order dated 9.8.2010 in Criminal Misc. No. M-29339 of 2009 (O&M) passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, by which the High Court has dismissed the application filed by the appellant under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as `Cr.P.C.’) for quashing the complaint No. 87/02/09 dated 12.6.2009 filed by respondent no. 2 under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter called the `Act 2005′).
Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the `Act 1955′) for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. In the said case, statements of appellant and respondent no. 2 were recorded on 19.9.2007 and proceedings were adjourned for a period of more than six months to enable them to ponder over the issue. B. The parties again appeared before the court on 20.3.2008 on second motion and their statements were recorded and both of them affirmed that it was not possible for them to live together and, therefore, the learned District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and order dated 20.3.2008 allowed the said petition and dissolved their marriage.
separately after divorce and, no case was made out against the present appellant. However, he suggested to seek legal opinion in the matter. D. Accordingly, legal opinion dated 2.6.2009 was sought, wherein it was opined that the parties had obtained the divorce decree by mutual consent and the allegations made by respondent no. 2 against the appellant were false and baseless and the purpose of filing the complaint was only to harass the appellant.
E. Respondent no. 2 subsequently filed a complaint under the Act 2005 on 12.6.2009. The learned Magistrate issued the summons to the appellant on the same date. The Magistrate vide order dated 3.10.2009 summoned the minor child for counseling. The appellant, being aggrieved of the order of Ld. Magistrate dated 12.6.2009, filed application dated 13.10.2009 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint dated 12.6.2009.
F. In the meanwhile, respondent no. 2 filed Civil Suit on 17.7.2009 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana, seeking declaration that the judgment and decree dated 20.3.2008, i.e. decree of divorce, was null and void as it had been obtained by fraud. The said suit is still pending.
G. Respondent no. 2 also filed application dated 17.12.2009 under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for grant of custody and guardianship of the minor child Gurarjit Singh and the same is pending for consideration before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana.
H. Respondent no. 2 on 11.2.2010 also lodged an FIR under Sections 406, 498-A, 376, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called `IPC’) against the appellant and his mother and sister.
I. The High Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 9.8.2010 dismissed the application filed by the appellant. Hence, this appeal.
by the respondent no.2 in the complaint for obtaining the decree of divorce before the Civil Court as per her own version, succinctly reveals that she herself had been a party to this fraud. The High Court failed to appreciate as to what extent her version could be accepted as she herself being the accomplice in the said offence of fraud committed upon the court. Even if the allegations made therein are true, she is equally liable for punishment under Section 107 IPC. More so, the reliefs claimed by the respondent no. 2 in the civil suit for declaring the decree of divorce as null and void and in another suit for getting the custody of the child referred to hereinabove, would meet her requirements. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
READ Whether print out of order taken from official website of High court is admissible in evidence?
7. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
I. Appellant and respondent no.2 are highly qualified persons. Both of them are employed and economically independent. Appellant is an Assistant Professor and respondent no. 2 is a Lecturer. The appellant is Ph.D and respondent no.2 has registered herself for Ph.D. They are competent to understand the complications of law and other facts prevailing in the case.
together as husband and wife."
allowed. The marriage between the petitioners is henceforth declared dissolved…."
VI. The complaint dated 4.5.2009 filed by respondent no. 2 before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana was investigated by the Superintendent of Police, City-I, Ludhiana. He recorded statements of several neighbours and maid servant working in appellant’s house and submitted the report to the effect that as the husband and wife could not live together, they obtained the decree of divorce by mutual consent. However, the complainant Amandeep Kaur had alleged that she was induced by her husband to get divorce for settling in the United States and it was his intention to kick her out from the house. However, the husband stated that she had been paid Rs.3,00,000/- in the court by draft and Rs.27,00,000/- in cash for which the husband Inderjit Singh Grewal had entered into an agreement to sell his ancestral property. The complainant had not been living with the appellant after the decree of divorce and they were not having physical relationship with each other. It was further suggested in the report that legal opinion may also be taken.
VII. Legal opinion dated 2.6.2009 had been to the effect that the parties had taken divorce by mutual consent due to their differences. The allegation to the extent that they had been living together even after divorce were false and baseless and had been labelled only to harass the appellant.
9. The instant case is required to be considered in the aforesaid factual backdrop.
and continued co-habitation with him. They had visited several places together during this period. The child had been forcibly snatched from her by the appellant. Therefore, she was entitled to the custody of the minor child along with other reliefs.
"It is therefore prayed that the respondent no.1 be directed to hand over the custody of the minor child Gurarjit Singh Grewal forthwith. It is also prayed that the respondent no.1 be directed to pay to her a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month by way of rent of the premises to be hired by her at Ludhiana for her residence. It is also prayed that all the respondents be directed to restore to her all the dowry articles as detailed in Annexure A to C or in the alternative they be directed to pay to her a sum of Rs.22,95,000/- as the price of the dowry articles. Affidavit attached."
(a) Custody of the minor son; (b) right of residence; and (c) restoration of dowry articles.
12. However, the question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order as null and void without getting it set aside from the competent court.
Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1240).
13. In Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1377, this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an order is void or voidable, the same requires to be set aside by the competent court.
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 194.
From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. More so, such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.
16. The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor has instigated another or engaged with another in a conspiracy to commit offence. (Vide: Faguna Kanta Nath v. The State of Assam, AIR 1959 SC 673; and Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1967 SC 553). If more than one person combining both in intent and act, commit an offence jointly, each is guilty, as if he has done the whole act alone. Offence has been defined under Section 40 IPC and Section 43 IPC defines illegality. Making false statement on oath before the court is an offence under Section 191 IPC and punishable under Section 193 IPC.
17. While granting the decree of divorce, the statement of respondent no.2 had been recorded in the first as well as in the second motion as mentioned hereinabove. Period of more than 6 months was given to her to think over the issue. However, she made a similar statement in the second motion as well.
on the part of the court under Section 23(2) of the Act 1955 to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. In Jagraj Singh v. Birpal Kaur, AIR 2007 SC 2083, this Court held that conjugal rights are not merely creature of statute but inherent in the very institution of marriage. Hence, the approach of a court of law in matrimonial matters should be "much more constructive, affirmative and productive rather than abstract, theoretical or doctrinaire". The court should not give up the effort of reconciliation merely on the ground that there is no chance for reconciliation or one party or the other says that there is no possibility of living together. Therefore, it is merely a misgiving that the courts are not concerned and obligated to save the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
tangible materials which demonstrably disclose such consent. (Vide: Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR 2011 SC 1637).
21. Respondent no.2, who did not change her stand in the second motion and obtained a sham decree of divorce as alleged by her asked the criminal court to sit in appeal against the judgment and decree of the competent Civil Court. The complaint was filed before the Magistrate, Jalandhar while the decree of divorce had been granted by the District Judge, Ludhiana i.e. of another district. Therefore, it is beyond our imagination as under what circumstances a subordinate criminal court can sit in appeal against the judgment and order of the superior Civil Court, having a different territorial jurisdiction.
diary of the child cannot be taken into consideration so long as the judgment and decree of the Civil Court subsists. On the similar footing, the contention advanced by her counsel that even after the decree of divorce, they continued to live together as husband and wife and therefore the complaint under the Act 2005 is maintainable, is not worth acceptance at this stage.
23. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, this Court considered the expression "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the Act 2005 placing reliance on earlier judgment in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 636 and held that relationship "in the nature of marriage" is akin to a common law marriage. However, the couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses in addition to fulfilling all other requisite conditions for a valid marriage.
24. Submissions made by Shri Ranjit Kumar on the issue of limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., that the complaint could be filed only within a period of one year from the date of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the Act 2005 read with Rule 15(6) of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which make the provisions of Cr.P.C. applicable and stand fortified by the judgments of this court inJapani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762; and Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508.
be travesty of justice. Thus, interest of justice warrants quashing of the same.
26. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 9.8.2010 is hereby set aside. Petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. Complaint No. 87/02/09 pending before the Magistrate, Jalandhar and all orders passed therein are quashed.
Before parting with the case, we clarify that respondent no.2 shall be entitled to continue with her other cases and the court concerned may proceed in accordance with law without being influenced by the observations made herein. The said observations have been made only to decide the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant.
In my case a false DV case has been filed almost 22 months after seperation.There were never any police compliant or medical records which could go against me. Its an absolutely false case. The case is still going on. The interim hearings are yet to start. Can I quote this judgment and para 24 and go for a dismiss/discharge petition?

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Before PARKER, LYNCH, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges. Gregory Warren, pro se, Bronx, NY. Paula Ryan Conan, Assistant United States Attorney (William F. Larkin, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
Plaintiff-appellant Gregory Warren appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Senior Judge ) dismissing his claim for damages and litigation fees under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Because the Privacy Act guarantees access only to an individual's own records and does not require federal agencies to provide information that pertains to a requesting individual, but is contained in another individual's records, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Warren's claim for damages under the Privacy Act. Because FOIA, as amended, allows for fee shifting where, as here, a federal agency voluntarily complies with a requested disclosure following the filing of a FOIA lawsuit, we VACATE that portion of the district court's judgment denying Warren's request for litigation costs, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to award Warren $350 in litigation costs.
In August 2012, the SSA voluntarily provided the requested records to Warren, who consequently abandoned his request for injunctive relief. Warren continued to seek damages and litigation fees, however, and the defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss his remaining claims. The district court granted the motion, and this timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Warren has abandoned his claims for damages under FOIA and litigation costs under the Privacy Act. We therefore address only his remaining claims for damages under the Privacy Act and litigation costs under FOIA.
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, taking the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir.2009). Further, because Warren appears pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116,122 (2d Cir.2011).
Warren argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for damages under the Privacy Act's right-of-access provision. We disagree.
The Privacy Act generally prohibits federal agencies from disclosing individuals' personal records “except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). However, the Act's right-of-access provision requires agencies, “upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the [agency's system of records], [to] permit him ․ to review the record.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).3 Citing that provision, Warren claims that the SSA wrongfully withheld his father's records. Warren does not argue that his father's records constitute his own records within the meaning of the statute. Instead, he contends that the records pertained to him and that—because his father was deceased at the time of Warren's request—the SSA had no legitimate interest in withholding them.
The relevant statutory language and interpretive guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) refute Warren's contention. The right-of-access provision's plain terms require agencies to provide only those records that are contained in an agency's system of records. “System of records” is defined as a “group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). The statutory language thus strongly suggests that agencies must provide an individual with access only to records retrievable by reference to the requesting individual's name or other identifying information.
Warren correctly asserts that deceased individuals generally do not enjoy rights under the Privacy Act. See, e.g., Monk v. Teeter, 951 F.2d 361, at *2 (9th Cir.1992) (mem.) (“The right to privacy does not survive one's death.”). But that does not resolve the issue. The question here is not whether the Act's privacy provision prohibited the SSA from releasing the requested records, but whether the Act's right-of-access provision gave Warren a right to receive them. We join the other circuits that have addressed the issue in holding that the Act does not provide an individual with a right to demand materials pertaining to him but contained only in another individual's records.
Because Warren was not entitled to his father's records, the agency's refusal to provide such records did not violate the Privacy Act. Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Warren's damages claim.
As the government now concedes, the district court erroneously rejected Warren's claim for reimbursement of his costs. FOIA now provides for fee shifting where an agency voluntarily complies with a request for records after a FOIA lawsuit has been filed. Thus, Warren is entitled to recover the filing fee that was debited from his inmate account.
To be eligible to recover litigation costs under FOIA, a plaintiff must establish that he “substantially prevailed” in his civil action. Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army, 568 F.3d 341, 343 (2d Cir.2009). Relying on Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the district court reasoned that a litigant does not “substantially prevail” where a federal agency voluntarily complies with a plaintiff's requested relief.
However, Congress amended FOIA in 2007 to abrogate the Buckhannon holding, as applied to FOIA actions, and to define “substantially prevailed” to include, inter alia, “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant's claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii); see also Open Government Act of 2007, Pub.L. 110–175,121 Stat. 2524 (2007). Congress intended this amendment to prevent federal agencies from denying meritorious FOIA requests, only to voluntarily comply with a request on the eve of trial to avoid liability for litigation costs. Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C.Cir.2011). The district court correctly quoted the current FOIA language, but did not give it its intended effect.
Because FOIA now provides for the recovery of litigation costs where an agency voluntarily complies with a records request, the district court erred in denying Warren's claim for costs. Warren only seeks reimbursement of the $350 fee he paid to file this action,5 an amount that the government concedes he may recover. We therefore remand the case to the district court with instructions to award him the costs he sought below.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of appellant's claim for damages under the Privacy Act, VACATE the denial of his claim to recover costs, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to award costs to plaintiff in the amount of $350.
1. On the day that he filed this suit, Warren also sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Although the motion was granted, Warren, who was then incarcerated at the Mohawk Correctional Facility, paid the $350 filing fee by operation of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The record reflects that the fee was withheld from his prisoner account and tendered to the district court before he was paroled in May 2012.
2. Warren claimed damages in the amount of the estimated interest that accrued on his father's life insurance policy while the SSA refused to provide the requested records.
3. The Act defines a “record” as any “item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency ․ and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4).
4. See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106,1121 (D.C . Cir.2007) (holding that the Act grants access to only those records that are “about” the requestor, “not to all information pertaining to them that happens to be contained in a system of records”); Cuccaro v. Sec'y of Labor, 770 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir.1985) (citing favorably OMB guidance that “individuals only have a right of access to information keyed to the requestor's own name or identifying number or symbol”); Boyd v. Sec'y of Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that “a record must be maintained by the agency in a group of records cued to the requestor” to be subject to mandatory disclosure).
5. As a pro se litigant, Warren has not incurred any attorney's fees and is not eligible to recover any imputed fees. See Kuzma v. U.S. Postal Serv., 725 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.1984).


Tower of Babel or Court of Confusion? The stakeholders in the federal courts can fairly be characterized as a mosaic of diverse nationalities, ethnicities, and languages. Linguistic chaos, confusion, and/or incomprehension cannot be allowed to contaminate the courtroom environment or interfere with fact-finding, deliberations, or due process under the law. Accordingly, federal district courts gainfully utilize the services of language interpreters (or sign language interpreters) under applicable provisions of federal law in the context of proceedings wherein the parties or witnesses have communication difficulties relative to English.
United States courts and government agencies,2 not to mention state agencies (e.g., motor vehicle departments), routinely require certified translations of transcripts and other legal documents in order to validate the precision of translations.3 Moreover, as a general rule, any foreign-language source documents proffered to an American federal court as evidence must have a concomitant English-language translation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are no standards or uniform federal rule, or approved validation or certification process, relating to translation of foreign language source documents or to the qualifications or competence of translators.
For a variety of reasons, and on a number of levels, all of the participants in civil and criminal cases — parties, witnesses, experts, lawyers, judges and, if applicable, juries — of necessity, must have, and are entitled to, the benefit of accurately translated documents. Veteran litigators are cognizant, and rightly concerned, that all of the foreign-language source documents pertinent to the case must be: (a) identified, isolated, and secured; (b) properly translated; (c) fully comprehended; and (d) admitted into evidence by the court.
Despite these realities of the litigation trenches, the rules of engagement for achieving these admirable goals are as murky as the Potomac. Somewhere along the river of rules, the acts of oral interpretation and documentary translation drifted apart into two divergent branches; while the former stayed the course and made it to a sheltered procedural port, the latter seems to be hopelessly encircling a whirlpool in the same dark muddy waters.
Surprisingly, and lamentably, however, the CTIA fails to extend to documentary translations for foreign language documents or to translators thereof. Moreover, albeit some states5 have promulgated well-considered rules regarding foreign document translations, the Federal Rules of Evidence remain inexplicably mute on this paramount language issue.
The history of documentary translation is a long and honored one. The ancient Greeks in Alexandria translated earlier Hebrew scriptures (the Bible and some related texts) into a monumental translation work known as the “Septuagint” between 300-200 B.C.E.10 Subsequently, around 384 A.D. Saint Jerome — often referred to as the Patron Saint of Translators — translated what later became known during the 16th century as the standard Latin “Vulgate” Bible.
The Arabs and Muslims, having conquered the Greeks, deciphered many works from the original Koine Greek texts. Additionally, Greek works enthusiastically were rendered into Latin during the reigns of the various Roman conquerors.
During the Middle Ages, of course, Latin was the lingua franca of the scholarly class in the Western World. In 13th century Spain, for example, King Alphonse the Wise founded a translation school in Toledo (to wit, The “Schola Traductorum”),11 where Hebrew, Arabic, and Latin texts were decoded into still other world languages. In 14th century England, Geoffrey Chaucer12 adapted the Italian author Giovanni Boccaccio’s works into the former’s celebrated works, “The Knight’s Tale” and “Troilus and Criseyde”.
Indeed, it would appear that, depending upon the century, the practice and vogue in translating vastly differed. To illustrate, in 17th century Europe, there seems to have been more concern for artistic and stylistic issues as opposed to verbal accuracy. Later, in the 18th century, the translators’ mantra changed to ease of popular reading, while the 19th century saw more emphasis placed upon technical precision. It was not until well into the 20th century that faithful accuracy was elevated to its well-deserved lofty pedestal.
Modern English translations of old or original language texts certainly will serve to help a reader better digest and comprehend legal masterpieces such as Cicero’s De Legibus,15 Justinian’s Codex Justinianus,16 or the Code Napoléon.17 However, for courtroom purposes nowadays, translations most assuredly are judged by a decidedly higher standard, if not as to artistic effect and style, then as to unswerving fidelity and technical exactitude vis-a-vis the foreign source document.
As a rule of thumb, for legal and official purposes, evidentiary documents and other official documentation normally are mandated to be in the official language(s) of a particular jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the procedure for translating for so-called legal equivalence differs from nation to nation.
In some countries, for example, it is a requirement that a translator swear an oath to attest that it is the legal equivalent of the source text. Often, only translators of a special class are authorized to swear such oaths. In some cases, the translation is only accepted as a legal equivalent if it is accompanied by the original or a sworn or certified copy of it. Even if a translator specializes in legal translation, or is a lawyer in his (her) country, this does not necessarily make him (her) a sworn translator. In a number of countries, mere “declared competence” by a translator will pass muster. Yet, other nations require a translator to be officially appointed by the government.
Sworn translation, then, also sometimes referred to as a "certified translation," shoots for legal equivalence between two (2) documents, the original of which is penned in a different source language. Such a translation should be performed by someone authorized so to do by applicable statutes, court rules, or agency regulations.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "[t]here is currently no universal form of certification required of interpreters and translators in the United States, but there are a variety of different tests that workers can take to demonstrate proficiency."18 To be sure, court interpreters are highly-skilled professionals in both simultaneous and consecutive reporting tasks; the lawyers, judges, and other players in the American justice system heavily depend upon the interpreters to keep the gears of the machinery of justice in perpetual, if glacial, motion. Translators of documents also are pressed into service in order to provide a vital function.
Well over a hundred diverse tongues require language interpretation in federal court proceedings in any given year. Needless to say, the lion’s share of the cases involve Spanish speakers. Other languages involved with some measure of frequency include, but are not limited to, Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Vietnamese, Arabic, Korean, Russian, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole.
Examining the lineage of our federal court precedents, it becomes crystal clear that all federal court proceedings must be conducted in the English language. The cases so holding are legion. Moreover, any witness who does not speak English well enough to understand the proceedings must be afforded the benefit of an interpreter.
The results of failing to have such translations properly admitted into evidence can be disastrous for both litigator and client alike. See, e.g., Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft24 wherein a copy of a passport was held to have been properly excluded from evidence where no English translation or certification was offered. See also Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes25 wherein the court declined to consider a deposition excerpt as part of the record on summary judgment because the party proffering same had failed to submit an English translation; United States v. Cruz,26 in which case the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, confronted with a situation where the defendant had engaged in a “deliberate tactical decision” not to submit an English translation of a Spanish-language tape, held that he could not complain on appeal that the jury’s function was usurped when he had failed to present evidence that would have aided the jury in fulfilling that function); and Heary Bros. Lightning Protection Co., Inc. v. Lightning Protection Institute et al,27 where the court, sua sponte, struck plaintiff’s exhibits as inadmissible, on the ground that the exhibits were not in English and that no translations had been provided with respect thereto.
Another stark illustration of the potentially devastating effect of an epic translation failure is provided by the Villalobos case.28 A few years back, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to reverse an immigration ALJ who had ordered a deportation largely for lack of evidence because, as the BIA noted, the petitioner had only provided an unsigned statement, unaccompanied by a certificate of translation, and had failed to address the claim raised in her motion.
A review of the relevant authorities further reflects that a producing party, in a vacuum, has no duty to translate documents regularly kept in a foreign language. See, e.g., In re P.R. Elec. Power Authority.29 However, in order to utilize such documents and have them admitted into evidence, they will have to be translated and exchanged during the discovery process.
The question next arises as to which party should be obliged to shoulder the burden of the costs of translating documents in discovery. It is well-settled that each party seeking discovery is expected to bear any special attendant costs, which costs encompass the cost of translating foreign language documents received in response to document requests. Thus, an objective study of the case law under Rule 34 (document production) reveals that the requesting party ordinarily must bear the burden.30 However, when a party responds to an interrogatory by producing documents written in a foreign language, Rule 33(d) requires that the responding party provide a translation of those documents.
The cost of translating foreign language documents is by no means de minimis. In the Miami, Florida area, for example, the market rate for a Spanish-English translation appears to be 25 cents per word. Extrapolate that cost, for example, to a 12 page document (approximately 4,000 words); the cost would be $1,000.00 (U.S.D.).
Under Title 28, U.S. Code Section 1920, it is commonplace that the compensation to “interpreters” is among the costs that may be awarded to prevailing parties. What about taxing the expense of document translation as costs for purposes of awards to prevailing parties in federal actions?
The issue thus presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether costs incurred in translating documents were “compensation of interpreters” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1920(6)? The high court’s answer was in the negative.
As a matter of black letter law, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Taniguchi case, by a vote of 6-3, reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and slammed shut the Section 1920 statutory door on recouping the costs of document translation. Justice Alito, writing for the court, expressly held that the “compensation of interpreters” in Section 1920(6) does not include the costs of document translation.
While there is no federal law or local rule pertaining to the qualifications for a translator of written documents, it ought to be noted that some courts or their Clerk’s Offices do have filing requirements to the effect that “[d]ocuments not written in English must be accompanied by a translation unless a waiver has been granted by the court.”34 Translators of foreign documents need to possess excellent linguistic skills in both the original source language and the target language. In addition, the translator must be aware of, and adjust for, colloquialisms, dialects, idioms, regional differences, slang and, last but not least, legal terminology. Nevertheless, there are no accepted or uniform certifications, examinations, interviews, licenses, tests, or validations for document translators that we can point to.
What, then, does a “certification” mean in relation to a document translator? One thing is certain; it does not mean “federal court certified translator,” inasmuch as there is no such appellation extant. One approach that a seasoned litigator may adopt is to only utilize the services of an ATA-certified translator, although there is no strict requirement therefor imposed by the federal rules or courts so to do. The ATA is the American Translators Association. Many folks in the legal translation industry have considered this as a smart, or best, practice for the last half century or so. In the author’s view, teaming up with a translator that is ATA-certified can serve to ensure that the translations not only will be accurate but, equally important, will be admissible in evidence and accepted by the court.
As and for other, pertinent best practices during litigation, it is strongly recommended that the litigator introduce both the source foreign language documents and the translated versions as exhibits at both deposition and at trial. In addition, under ordinary circumstances, it would seem eminently prudent to secure an affidavit or declaration attesting to the translator’s qualifications and certifying that the English translation is both true and accurate.
There is a saying in the Southwest region of our great nation… “[e]verything’s bigger in Texas.” Certainly, the Code of Evidence down there is King-Sized; they even have one more rule in Article X than does the Federal Rules of Evidence. That extra heaping helping of jurisprudence serves to satisfy even the most discerning legal tastes and evidentiary palettes.
It readily must be observed that the Texas rule comprehensively covers the subject-matter, treating translations, objections thereto, effect of failure to object or offer conflicting translation, effect of objections and of conflicting translations, expert testimony of translators, and court appointments. In so doing, it must be viewed as markedly superior when compared to the Federal Rules of Evidence which, as noted above, are rather conspicuous in their silence on this significant subject.
1Longfellow, the celebrated American poet, was a professor of Italian at Harvard University. In 1867, he completed his renowned translation of Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy. culturesconnection.com/20-quotes-about-translation/, retrieved February 24, 2017.
3Another example is provided by the Rules for the Federal Trade Commission. Under Title 16 C.F.R. Section 803.8, documentary materials in a foreign language are “required to be submitted …with verbatim English language translations or all existing English language versions, or both…” See also C.F.R. Title 21, Part 10, Section 10.20 (c) (2), which regulation requires submission of verified English translations of foreign documents.
4Title 28, U.S. Code Section 1827.
5See, e.g., Texas Rule of Evidence 1009.
6Cassell’s New Latin Dictionary 857 (1968 ed.).
9The NAS Old Testament Hebrew Lexicon, www.biblestudytools.com, retrieved on February 24, 2017.
10The Septuagint (sometimes referred to as “LXX”) was named in Latin for the 70 scholars commissioned by Ptolemy Philadelphus to perform the translation tasks. www.septuagint. net, retrieved on February 24, 2017.
11Alfonso X (Alphonso El Sabio)(1221-1284). During his reign, Alphonso retained Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scholars at court for his royal scriptorium, where books were translated from the Arabic and Hebrew into Latin and Castilian (Spanish).
12Geoffrey Chaucer (1343-1400), known as the Father of English Literature, also translated Roman de la Rose and Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.
13Don Quixote (the full title was “The History of the Valorous and Wittie Knight-Errant Don-Quixote of the Mancha”) was first published in 1605.
14Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote, Second Part, Chapter LXII. Ironically, Don Quixote would go on to become the most translated book in the world, second only to the Bible, having been translated into over 50 languages.
15“On the Laws.” Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) was an ancient Roman statesman, philosopher and, by all accounts, a brilliant lawyer.
16Justinian I, a/k/a Justinian the Great, Eastern Roman Emperor (527 – 565 A.D.) The Corpus Juris Civilius (Body of Civil Law) was issued from 529-534.
17The Napoleonic Code, a/k/a Code Civil des Français, entered into force on March 21, 1804, and was drawn up by four eminent jurists; interestingly, it was not derived from earlier French laws, but rather from Justinian’s Code (see discussion and note xvi, above).
18Archived October 11, 2007, in the Wayback Machine.
20300 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002).
21Id., 300 F. 3d, at 7, n. 4. But see Torres Santa et al v. Rey Hernandez et al, 279 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. P.R. 2003)(wherein Judge Perez-Gimenez opines as to the problems with the First Circuit’s Rivera-Rosario decision and admits Spanish language documents).
22519 F. 3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008). (Error deemed not plain error and not fatal to Defendant’s conviction because evidence was submitted for limited purpose and defendant failed to object at trial).
24382 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 2004).
25230 F.3d 409, 413-14 (1st Cir. 2000).
26765 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir. 1985).
27287 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2003).
28Maria Villalobos v. U.S. Attorney General, Case No. 11-12758, June 17, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012).
29687 F.2d 501 (1st Cir. 1982).
30See Sungjin Fo-Ma, Inc. v. Chainworks, Inc., Civil Action No. 08-CV-12393, 2009 WL 2022308, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 2009). See also In re Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 506 (1st Cir. 1982).
31566 U.S. 560, 132 S. Ct. 1997, 182 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2012).
32“Most federal courts of appeals confronted with the question have held that costs may be awarded under §1920(6) for the translation of documents necessary to, or in preparation for, litigation. Compare 633 F. 3d 1218, 1220–1222 (9th Cir. 2011); BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2005); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 63 F.3d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); and Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 782 (CAFC, 1983) (all holding that costs for document translation are covered by §1920(6)), with Extra Equipamentos E Exportação Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 727–728 (7th Cir. 2008) (costs for document translation are not covered by §1920(6)). See also In re Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 506, 510 (1st Cir. 1982) (recognizing that costs of document translation may be reimbursed, without specifying the relevant subsection of §1920); Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 713 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing document translation costs under §1920(4)); Quy v. Air Am., Inc., 667 F.2d 1059, 1065 (CADC 1981) (allowing “translation costs” under §1920(6)).” Slip Opinion, Taniguchi, supra, Dissenting Op., at pp. 2-3.
33“Currently, some federal district courts make the practice of allowing fees for translation of documents explicit in their local rules. See Rule 54–4.8 (CD Cal. 2012) (allowing “[f]ees for translation of documents... reasonably necessary to the preparation of the case”); Rule 54.1 (Guam 2011) (same); Rule 54.1(c) (7) (Idaho 2011) (allowing reasonable fee if the “document translated is necessarily filed or admitted in evidence”); Rule 54.7 (MD Pa. 2011) (same); Rule 54.1 (Ariz. 2012) (same); Rule 54.1(b)(4)(e) (SD Cal. 2012) (same); Rule 54.1 (NJ 2011) (same); Rule 54–5(d) (Nev. 2011) (same); Rule 54.2 (NM 2012) (allowing translator’s fee if the translated document is admitted into evidence); Rule 54.1(c)(4) (SDNY 2012) (allowing reasonable fee if translated document “is used or received in evidence”); Rule 54.1(c)(4) (EDNY 2012) (same). See also Rule 54.03(F)(1) (c) (SC 2012) (allowing costs of certain document translations under §1920(4)); Rule 54.1(b)(5) (Del. 2011) (same); Rule 54(c) (3)(i) (Conn. 2011) (same); Misc. Order ¶7, Allowable Items for Taxation of Costs (ND Fla. 2007) (allowing “fee of a competent translator of a non-English document that is filed or admitted into evidence”); Taxation of Costs Guidelines (PR 2009) (allowing fees for translation of documents filed or admitted into evidence), available at www.prd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/taxation_of_costs_guidelines_2007_with_time_computation_ amendments.pdf (All Internet materials as visited May 17, 2012, and included in Clerk of Court’s case file); Taxation of Costs (Mass. 2000) (allowing fees “for translation of documents... reasonably necessary for trial preparation”), available at www. mad.uscourts.gov/resources/pdf/taxation.pdf.” Slip Opinion, Taniguchi, supra, Dissenting Op., at p. 4, n. 2.
34U.S. D.C., S.D. Fla., Section 2N, Civil Filing Requirements.