D.C. Law Library - Chapter 5. Credit for Reinsurance.
Chapter 4. Business Transacted with Producer Controlled Insurer.
Chapter 5. Credit for Reinsurance.
§ 31–501. Credit allowed a domestic ceding insurer.
(a)(1) Credit for reinsurance shall be allowed a domestic ceding insurer as either an asset or a reduction from liability on account of reinsurance ceded only when the reinsurer meets the requirements of subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section.
(2) Credit shall be allowed under subsections (b), (c), or (d) of this section only in respect to cessions of those kinds or classes of business that the assuming insurer is licensed or otherwise permitted to write or assume in its state of domicile or, in the case of a United States branch of an alien assuming insurer, in the state through which it is entered and is licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance.
(3) Credit shall be allowed under subsections (d) or (e) of this section only if the applicable requirements of subsection (h) of this section have been satisfied.
(b) Credit shall be allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer that is licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance in the District.
(5) Demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that it has adequate financial capacity to meet its reinsurance obligations and is otherwise qualified to assume reinsurance from domestic insurers. An assuming insurer is deemed to meet this requirement as of the time of its application if it maintains a surplus as regards policyholders in an amount not less than $20 million and its accreditation has not been denied by the Commissioner within 90 days after submission of its application.
(B) Submits to the authority of the District to examine its books and records.
(2) The requirement of paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection does not apply to reinsurance ceded and assumed pursuant to pooling arrangements among insurers in the same holding company system.
(e)(1) Credit shall be allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer that maintains a trust fund in a qualified United States financial institution, as defined in § 31-503(b), for the payment of the valid claims of its United States ceding insurers, their assigns, and successors in interest. To enable the Commissioner to determine the sufficiency of the trust fund, the assuming insurer shall report annually to the Commissioner information substantially the same as that required to be reported on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Annual Statement form by licensed insurers. The assuming insurer shall submit to examination of its books and records by the Commissioner and bear the expense of the examination.
(2)(A) Credit for reinsurance shall not be granted under this subsection unless the form of the trust and any amendments to the trust have been approved by the commissioner of the state where the trust is domiciled or the commissioner of another state who, pursuant to the terms of the trust instrument, has accepted principal regulatory oversight of the trust.
(B) The form of the trust and any trust amendments shall also be filed with the commissioner of every state in which the ceding insurer beneficiaries of the trust are domiciled. The trust instrument shall provide that contested claims shall be valid and enforceable upon the final order of any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States. The trust shall vest legal title to its assets in its trustees for the benefit of the assuming insurer’s United States ceding insurers, their assigns, and successors in interest. The trust and the assuming insurer shall be subject to examination as determined by the Commissioner.
(C) The trust shall remain in effect for as long as the assuming insurer has outstanding obligations due under the reinsurance agreements subject to the trust. No later than February 28 of each year, the trustee of the trust shall report to the Commissioner in writing the balance of the trust and a listing of the trust’s investments as of December 31 of the preceding year and shall certify the date of termination of the trust, if so planned, or certify that the trust will not expire before December 31 of that year.
(A) The trust fund for a single assuming insurer shall consist of funds in trust in an amount not less than the assuming insurer’s liabilities attributable to reinsurance ceded by United States ceding insurers, and, in addition, the assuming insurer shall maintain a trusteed surplus of not less than $20 million, except as provided for in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.
(B)(i) At any time after the assuming insurer has permanently discontinued underwriting new business secured by the trust for at least 3 full years, the commissioner with principal regulatory oversight of the trust may authorize a reduction in the required trusteed surplus, but only after a finding, based on an assessment of the risk, that the new required surplus level is adequate for the protection of United States ceding insurers, policyholders, and claimants in light of reasonably foreseeable adverse loss development. The risk assessment may involve an actuarial review, including an independent analysis of reserves and cash flows and shall consider all material risk factors, including, when applicable, the lines of business involved, the stability of the incurred loss estimates, and the effect of the surplus requirements on the assuming insurer’s liquidity or solvency.
(ii) The minimum required trusteed surplus shall not be reduced to an amount of less than 30% of the assuming insurer’s liabilities attributable to reinsurance ceded by United States ceding insurers covered by the trust.
(iii) In addition to these trusts, the group shall maintain in trust a trusteed surplus of which $100 million shall be held jointly for the benefit of the United States domiciled ceding insurers of any member of the group for all years of account.
(B) The incorporated members of the group shall not be engaged in any business other than underwriting as a member of the group and shall be subject to the same level of regulation and solvency control by the group’s domiciliary regulator as are the unincorporated members.
(C) Within 90 days after its financial statements are due to be filed with the group’s domiciliary regulator, the group shall provide to the Commissioner an annual certification by the group’s domiciliary regulator of the solvency of each underwriter member or, if a certification is unavailable, financial statements prepared by independent public accountants of each underwriter member of the group.
(E) Within 90 days after its financial statements are due to be filed with the group’s domiciliary regulator, make available to the Commissioner an annual certification of each underwriter member’s solvency by the member’s domiciliary regulator and financial statements of each underwriter member of the group prepared by its independent public accountant.
(f)(1) Credit shall be allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer that has been certified by the Commissioner as a reinsurer in this state and secures its obligations in accordance with the requirements of this subsection.
(F) Satisfy any other requirements for certification considered relevant by the Commissioner.
(C) Within 90 days after its financial statements are due to be filed with the association’s domiciliary regulator, the association shall provide to the Commissioner an annual certification by the association’s domiciliary regulator of the solvency of each underwriter member or, if a certification is unavailable, financial statements prepared by independent public accountants of each underwriter member of the association.
(4)(A) The Commissioner shall create and publish a list of qualified jurisdictions under which an assuming insurer licensed and domiciled in such jurisdiction shall be eligible to be considered for certification by the Commissioner as a certified reinsurer.
(B)(i) To determine whether the domiciliary jurisdiction of a non-United States assuming insurer is eligible to be recognized as a qualified jurisdiction, the Commissioner shall evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of the reinsurance supervisory system of the jurisdiction, both initially and on an ongoing basis, and consider the rights, benefits, and the extent of reciprocal recognition afforded by the non-United States jurisdiction to reinsurers licensed and domiciled in the United States. A qualified jurisdiction must agree to share information and cooperate with the Commissioner with respect to all certified reinsurers domiciled within that jurisdiction.
(ii) A jurisdiction may not be recognized as a qualified jurisdiction if the Commissioner has determined that the jurisdiction does not adequately and promptly enforce final United States judgments and arbitration awards. Additional factors may be considered at the discretion of the Commissioner.
(C)(i) A list of qualified jurisdictions shall be published through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Committee Process. The Commissioner shall consider this list in determining qualified jurisdictions.
(ii) If the Commissioner approves a jurisdiction as qualified that does not appear on the list of qualified jurisdictions, the Commissioner shall provide thoroughly documented justification in accordance with criteria to be developed under regulations.
(D) United States jurisdictions that meet the requirement for accreditation under the National Association of Insurance Commissioners financial standards and accreditation program shall be recognized as qualified jurisdictions.
(E) If a certified reinsurer’s domiciliary jurisdiction ceases to be a qualified jurisdiction, the Commissioner has the discretion to suspend the reinsurer’s certification indefinitely, in lieu of revocation.
(5) The Commissioner shall assign a rating to each certified reinsurer, giving due consideration to the financial strength ratings that have been assigned by rating agencies deemed acceptable to the Commissioner pursuant to regulation. The Commissioner shall publish a list of all certified reinsurers and their ratings.
(6)(A) A certified reinsurer shall secure obligations assumed from United States ceding insurers under this subsection at a level consistent with its rating, as specified in regulations promulgated by the Commissioner.
(B) For a domestic ceding insurer to qualify for full financial statement credit for reinsurance ceded to a certified reinsurer, the certified reinsurer shall maintain security in a form acceptable to the Commissioner and consistent with the provisions of § 31-502, or in a multi-beneficiary trust in accordance with subsection (e) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this subsection.
(C) If a certified reinsurer maintains a trust to fully secure its obligations subject to subsection (e) of this section and chooses to secure its obligations incurred as a certified reinsurer in the form of a multi-beneficiary trust, the certified reinsurer shall maintain separate trust accounts for its obligations incurred under reinsurance agreements issued or renewed as a certified reinsurer with reduced security as permitted by this subsection or comparable laws of other United States jurisdictions and for its obligations, subject to subsection (e) of this section. It shall be a condition to the grant of certification under this subsection that the certified reinsurer shall have bound itself, by the language of the trust and agreement with the commissioner with principal regulatory oversight of each such trust account, to fund, upon termination of any such trust account, out of the remaining surplus of such trust, any deficiency of any other such trust account.
(D) The minimum trusteed surplus requirements provided in subsection (e) of this section are not applicable with respect to a multi-beneficiary trust maintained by a certified reinsurer for the purpose of securing obligations incurred under this subsection, except that such trust shall maintain a minimum trusteed surplus of $10 million.
(E) With respect to obligations incurred by a certified reinsurer under this subsection, if the security is insufficient, the Commissioner shall reduce the allowable credit by an amount proportionate to the deficiency. The Commissioner has the discretion to impose further reductions in allowable credit upon finding that there is a material risk that the certified reinsurer’s obligations will not be paid in full when due.
(F)(i) For the purposes of this subsection, a certified reinsurer whose certification has been terminated for any reason shall be treated as a certified reinsurer required to secure 100% of its obligations.
(ii) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “terminated” refers to revocation, suspension, voluntary surrender, and inactive status.
(iii) If the Commissioner continues to assign a higher rating as permitted by other provisions of this section, this requirement shall not apply to a certified reinsurer in inactive status or to a reinsurer whose certification has been suspended.
(7) If an applicant for certification has been certified as a reinsurer in a National Association of Insurance Commissioners accredited jurisdiction, the Commissioner has the discretion to defer to that jurisdiction’s certification and has the discretion to defer to the rating assigned by that jurisdiction, and such assuming insurer shall be considered to be a certified reinsurer in this state.
(8)(A) A certified reinsurer that ceases to assume new business in the District may request to maintain its certification in inactive status in order to continue to qualify for a reduction in security for its in-force business.
(B) An inactive certified reinsurer shall continue to comply with all applicable requirements of this subsection.
(C) The Commissioner shall assign a rating that takes into account, if relevant, the reasons why the reinsurer is not assuming new business.
(g) Credit shall be allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer not meeting the requirements of subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of this section, but only as to the insurance of risks located in jurisdictions where the reinsurance is required by applicable law or regulation of that jurisdiction.
(B) To designate the Commissioner or a designated attorney as its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served any lawful process in any action, suit, or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of the ceding company insurer.
(2) This subsection is not intended to conflict with or override the obligation of the parties to a reinsurance agreement to arbitrate their disputes if this obligation is created in the agreement.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provisions in the trust instrument, if the trust fund is inadequate because it contains an amount less than the amount required by subsection (e)(3) of this section, or if the grantor of the trust has been declared insolvent or placed into receivership, rehabilitation, liquidation, or similar proceeding under the laws of its state or country of domicile, the trustee shall comply with an order of the commissioner with regulatory oversight over the trust or with an order of a court of competent jurisdiction directing the trustee to transfer to the commissioner with regulatory oversight all of the assets of the trust fund.
(2) The assets shall be distributed by and claims shall be filed with and valued by the commissioner with regulatory oversight in accordance with the laws of the state in which the trust is domiciled that are applicable to the liquidation of domestic insurance companies.
(3) If the commissioner with regulatory oversight determines that the assets of the trust fund or any part thereof are not necessary to satisfy the claims of the United States ceding insurers of the grantor of the trust, the assets or part thereof shall be returned by the commissioner with regulatory oversight to the trustee for distribution in accordance with the trust agreement.
(4) The grantor shall waive any right otherwise available to it under United States law that is inconsistent with this provision.
(j)(1) If an accredited or certified reinsurer ceases to meet the requirements for accreditation or certification, the Commissioner may suspend or revoke the reinsurer’s accreditation or certification.
(C) The Commissioner finds that an emergency requires immediate action and a court of competent jurisdiction has not stayed the Commissioner’s action.
(3)(A) While a reinsurer’s accreditation or certification is suspended, no reinsurance contract issued or renewed after the effective date of the suspension qualifies for credit except to the extent that the reinsurer’s obligations under the contract are secured in accordance with § 31-502.
(B) If a reinsurer’s accreditation or certification is revoked, no credit for reinsurance may be granted after the effective date of the revocation except to the extent that the reinsurer’s obligations under the contract are secured in accordance with subsection (f)(6) of this section or § 31-502.
(k)(1) A ceding insurer shall take steps to manage its reinsurance recoverables proportionate to its own book of business. A domestic ceding insurer shall notify the Commissioner within 30 days after reinsurance recoverables from any single assuming insurer, or group of affiliated assuming insurers, that exceeds 50% of the domestic ceding insurer’s last reported surplus to policyholders, or after it is determined that reinsurance recoverables from any single assuming insurer, or group of affiliated assuming insurers, is likely to exceed this limit. The notification shall demonstrate that the exposure is safely managed by the domestic ceding insurer.
(2) A ceding insurer shall take steps to diversify its reinsurance program. A domestic ceding insurer shall notify the Commissioner within 30 days after ceding to any single assuming insurer, or group of affiliated assuming insurers, more than 20% of the ceding insurer’s gross written premium in the prior calendar year, or after it has determined that the reinsurance ceded to any single assuming insurer, or group of affiliated assuming insurers, is likely to exceed this limit. The notification shall demonstrate that the exposure is safely managed by the domestic ceding insurer.
This section is referenced in § 31-502.
D.C. Law 13-185 added subsec. (b-1).
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 20-235 rewrote this section.
Hospital and medical services corporations, applicability of this section, see § 31-3503.
For temporary amendment of section, see § 7 of the Insurance Omnibus Emergency Amendment Act of 1995 (D.C. Act 11-48, May 15, 1995, 42 DCR 2544) and § 6 of the Insurance Omnibus Congressional Recess Emergency Amendment Act of 1995 (D.C. Act 11-97, July 19, 1995, 42 DCR 3844).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 6 of Insurance Omnibus Temporary Amendment Act of 1995 (D.C. Law 11-36, September 8, 1995, law notification 42 DCR 5305).
Application of Law 10-36: Section 7 of D.C. Law 10-36 provided that §§ 35-3301 through 35-3303 and Section 5 of this act shall apply to all cession after the effective date of this act under reinsurance agreements which have had an inception, anniversary, or renewal date not less than 6 months after the effective date of this act.
Mayor authorized to issue rules: Section 5 of D.C. Law 10-36 provided that the Mayor shall, pursuant to subchapter I of Chapter 15 of Title 1 [subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2, 2001 Ed.], issue rules to implement the provisions of this chapter.
Delegation of authority pursuant to D.C. Law 10-36, the Law on Credit for Reinsurance Act of 1993, see Mayor’s Order 94-54, March 7, 1994 ( 41 DCR 1433).
(4) Any other investment which the Commissioner concludes is sufficiently secure and liquid to provide adequate security.
This section is referenced in § 31-3932.11.
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 20-235 rewrote (2).


The claimant appeared pro se at oral argument. Notice also sent to Matthew Shafner, Esq., O’Brien, Shafner, Stuart, Kelly & Morris, P.C., 475 Bridge St., Groton, CT 06340.
The respondents were represented by Robert D. McGann, Esq., McGann, Bartlett & Brown, 281 Hartford Tpke., Vernon, CT 06066.
This Petition for Review from the February 6, 1995 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Second District was heard April 19, 1996 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners George A. Waldron and Robin L. Wilson.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the February 6, 1995 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Second District. In that decision, the trial commissioner found that the claimant was employed by the respondent Norwich Public Schools as a school psychologist from October 20, 1986 through November 1988. The town’s Board of Education voted not to renew the claimant’s contract after evidence was presented at a hearing showing that the claimant failed to report for work on time, follow regulations, submit proper reports, or support co-workers, and that she had provided misleading or false information. The claimant filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities claiming unfair discharge, but it was dismissed on September 14, 1990 for lack of sufficient evidence. During the previous two years, the United States Department of Education had also dismissed complaints by the claimant alleging retaliatory dismissal, Civil Rights Act violations, and discrimination against a handicapped person on the part of the respondent.
Amidst these proceedings, the claimant filed a Form 30C with the Second District on April 13, 1989 alleging severe extrinsic asthma caused by exposure to smoke and asbestos during her tenure with the Norwich school system. The commissioner found that she had a long history of asthma and sensitivity to cigarette smoke, and that she was treated for allergies and symptoms of bronchitis in 1984 and 1985. During her employment with the respondent, she worked in six different schools, and testified that cigarette smoke permeated all of those facilities, even after smoking was banned in most areas of the Norwich public schools in October 1987. The claimant said that she began having breathing problems from the outset of said employment, and that these problems caused her to miss a lot of time from work. The commissioner observed that none of the contemporaneous doctors’ notes reflected that this fact was reported by the claimant.
The commissioner cited several doctors’ reports in his opinion. Dr. McGowan, an allergist, began treating the claimant in 1986, and diagnosed rhinitis, sinusitis, asthma, hypertension and hyperthyroidism. He believed that the claimant was able to work. He also testified that it would be purely speculative to say that the claimant had increased permanent lung disability because of her exposure to secondhand smoke while working for the Norwich school system, although he had advised the claimant to avoid cigarette smoke. The doctor also stated that the claimant did not get the full benefit of medical treatment because she was very selective and deceptive with information she gave to her treaters. The commissioner found that Dr. McGowan’s notes did not reflect complaints by the claimant of excessive exposure to secondhand smoke at the Norwich schools. The notes of Dr. Mlynarski, a throat specialist who treated the claimant in 1987, likewise contained no mention of complaints of smoke exposure. He thought that allergies such as recurrent rhinosinusitis were the main cause of the claimant’s symptoms.
Dr. Cullen, an occupational disease specialist, examined the claimant in 1989 at her attorney’s request. He testified that the claimant suffered from both environmental and psychological stressors, and that she had a 30 to 40 percent lung impairment caused by conditions related to her job in the Norwich schools. Although he agreed with Dr. McGowan that childhood exposure to smoke could cause permanent lung damage, he disagreed with Dr. McGowan’s insinuation that secondhand smoke exposure was not likely to be harmful to adults. Instead, he thought that exposure to smoke could awaken dormant symptoms. The commissioner noted, however, that Dr. Cullen’s October 2, 1989 report stated that it was a matter of speculation as to whether secondhand smoke and increased physical stress contributed to the claimant’s asthma.
The commissioner also cited the reports of Drs. DeGraff and Godar. Dr. DeGraff believed that the claimant’s exposure to smoke in Norwich worsened her condition, and that she had a 43 percent permanent partial disability of her lungs. However, Dr. DeGraff did not review any of the claimant’s prior medical records in making his diagnosis, instead relying on the history provided to him by the claimant. Dr. Godar obtained both a history from the claimant and her medical records, along with a pulmonary function test. He believed that her condition was identical before and after her employment in the Norwich school system, and that she would have been physically able to continue working there had her contract not been terminated. In his opinion, the smoke exposure was only a temporary aggravation of her asthma, which was generally well-controlled. He did not think that there was much medical evidence indicating that less than two years of exposure to secondhand smoke causes permanent aggravation of underlying asthma.
After reviewing the evidence, the trial commissioner concluded that the claimant suffered from asthma prior to working for the respondent, and that there was no documentation in the medical reports or at the claimant’s dismissal hearing of her complaining about secondhand smoke exposure at work. Both Dr. McGowan and a lay witness who had worked with the claimant cast doubt on her credibility, and the reports of Drs. Godar and McGowan were more persuasive to the commissioner than those of Drs. Cullen and DeGraff. Accordingly, the commissioner found that the claimant had failed to prove that she suffered a compensable injury due to secondhand smoke and cold air exposure while working for the Norwich school system. The claimant has appealed that decision to the CRB.
First, we address the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the claimant’s appeal. The February 22, 1995 motion is premised on the claimant’s failure to file reasons of appeal within ten days of the date she filed her petition for review, as required by Admin. Reg. § 31-301-2. The claimant’s Reasons of Appeal were filed on February 24, 1995, seventeen days after her February 7 petition for review. As we recently noted in Brown v. Interstate Pallet, 3064 CRB-3-95-2 (decided Oct. 25, 1996), the failure to file timely reasons of appeal makes an appeal voidable, not void. See Sager v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 11 Conn. App. 693, 697 (1987). In this case, the claimant is administering her own appeal without the assistance of an attorney, and her reasons of appeal were only a week late. The respondents were not prejudiced by this delay. We do not think it would be appropriate to dismiss the appeal of this pro se claimant under these circumstances.
Next, we reach the first of the claimant’s appellate issues: the untimeliness of the commissioner’s decision. The last formal hearing in this case was held on February 22, 1993. The respondents’ and claimant’s proposed findings of fact were filed on June 28 and July 6, 1993, respectively. According to § 31-300 C.G.S., the trial commissioner was required to issue a decision within one hundred twenty days of the last hearing. That was not done here. Instead, the commissioner issued his Finding and Dismissal on February 6, 1995, long after the statutory time limit had expired.
Recently, our Supreme Court held that the time period in § 31-300 is mandatory, and that prejudice need not be demonstrated to invalidate a late decision. Stewart v Tunxis Service Center, 237 Conn. 71, 76-80 (1996). However, the parties may waive a trial commissioner’s noncompliance with § 31-300, either explicitly or implicitly by conduct. Id., 80; Dichello v. Holgrath Corporation, 2249 CRB-5-94-12 (decided Sept. 5, 1996). In the Stewart case, this board was required on remand to decide whether the claimant had waived compliance with the 120-day time requirement. We stated that “when the 120-day time limit has long passed, and a party has made no indication that it has an objection to the lateness of a decision, this board is inclined to interpret that inaction as an intent to waive the 120-day time limit. A party shall not be allowed to choose to enforce its right to invalidate a ruling only after the party reviews the decision and decides that it is adverse to its interests, barring special circumstances.” Stewart v. Tunxis Service Center, 1684 CRB-6-93-4 (decided October 30, 1996). There, the claimant raised the issue of tardiness several times before the decision was actually issued, and we held that he had not waived the terms of § 31-300.
In this case, the claimant did not object to the lateness of the decision until after it was issued and her case was dismissed. She filed a Petition to Correct dated February 24, 1995 alleging financial prejudice from the delay; she also asserts in her brief that her attorney advised her to wait until the trial commissioner made a decision before attempting to file a lawsuit against Dr. McGowan “for malpractice, perjury and fraud,” and that she has now lost her right to sue the doctor because the statute of limitations for those lawsuits expired before the commissioner issued his decision. Implicit within this argument is the notion that the claimant chose to await the trial commissioner’s decision even though it was not forthcoming in a timely manner. Whether or not this was done at the advice of her attorney is immaterial to our analysis; it is apparent from the record and the arguments that the claimant did not seek to enforce her right to a timely decision under § 31-300 until after a ruling adverse to her interests had been released. We will not allow parties to acquire a type of veto power over a decision by failing to object to a late award until they have an opportunity to see whether they approve of the result. Thus, we hold that the claimant waived her right to enforce the 120-day time limit in § 31-300.
The claimant has filed a multitude of motions in conjunction with this appeal.1 The majority of those motions attempt to restate or expand upon the claimant’s appellate arguments. The proper method of stating one’s position on the merits of an appeal is to file a brief, which the claimant did. She also filed a reply brief to the appellees’ brief. Any arguments regarding errors made in the commissioner’s decision must be relegated to those documents, and we will not consider additional arguments (most of which are cumulative) mixed into the claimant’s many motions.
Several of the motions seek to introduce additional evidence. In order for this board to consider its introduction on appeal, the claimant must demonstrate that said evidence is material and that there were good reasons for her failure to present it below. Admin. Reg. § 31-301-9 C.G.S. None of the claimant’s motions meet that standard. Several other motions, such as the Motion to Reverse and the March 29, 1996 Motion to Correct, were procedurally improper, either because of tardiness or because they did not substantively correspond to the procedural rules of an appeal to the Compensation Review Board. See Admin. Reg. § 31-301-4 (Motion to Correct must be filed within two weeks of decision).
The only motions that would appear to have potential merit are those that allege that the commissioner relied on documents that were not properly introduced into evidence in making his decision. Again, however, that is an argument that is more properly raised in the Reasons for Appeal or in the appellate brief, rather than by motion. In fact, one of these motions was filed after oral argument, to which the respondents objected. We will not rule on this issue in the context of a motion; however, the sufficiency of the record to support the commissioner’s decision necessarily will be addressed below in reviewing the merits of this case.
The claimant objects to many of the commissioner’s findings and conclusions on the ground that they are not adequately supported by the evidence. We remind the claimant that this board acts as an appellate tribunal, meaning that once the commissioner finds specific facts, we may not change those findings unless there is no evidence to support them. Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 71, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995); Ettienne-Modeste v. Bloomfield, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 327, 328, 1789 CRB-1-93-9 (April 26, 1995). We cannot reevaluate the credibility of a person’s testimony, or overrule a commissioner’s decision to believe a particular witness, because the trial commissioner has sole authority in that area. Webb, supra, 70. When there is conflicting medical evidence, the commissioner is entitled to choose the evidence he finds more believable. Ettienne-Modeste, supra, 329.
In any workers’ compensation case, the claimant has the burden of proving that she has suffered a compensable injury. Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. App. 36, 41 (1996); see also Sylvia v. Victorian Salon, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 270, 1976 CRB-2-94-2 (Sept. 6, 1995). The respondents are not required to disprove that such an event has occurred. See Cummings, supra, 42. Here, the commissioner concluded that the claimant had not proven such an injury. He chose to credit the reports of Drs. Godar and McGowan over those of Drs. Cullen and DeGraff, and he found that the claimant had not conclusively demonstrated significant secondhand smoke exposure while working in the Norwich schools. The claimant has taken great objection at both of those findings, and has offered extensive arguments on appeal opposing them.
Although the trial commissioner cited in his findings two medical reports that were introduced as full exhibits, he primarily relied on the deposition testimony of each of the four medical experts in making his decision. The claimant has alerted this board to the fact that the deposition of Dr. McGowan was not marked as an exhibit by the trial commissioner. In fact, none of the depositions were marked as exhibits in this case. We have held in the past that a document not offered into evidence as a full exhibit cannot be relied upon in the findings, even if it is marked for identification. Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 341, 343, 1542 CRB-1-92-10 (July 11, 1994), affirmed, 40 Conn. App. 36 (1996).
The question now becomes whether the doctors’ testimony and reports supported the commissioner’s findings. The claimant vehemently attacks the credibility of Dr. McGowan both as a medical professional and as a person, and attempts to refute his testimony by citing details of his treatment and other doctors’ reports. However, it is not the place of this board to become involved with issues of personal credibility. Dr. McGowan’s deposition is accurately cited in the findings. He stated that the claimant had asthma prior to 1986, and that it was speculative at best as to whether smoke exposure in the Norwich school system made her condition worse. Despite the claimant’s strenuous objections in her briefs and motions, there is in fact no evidence that the claimant actually complained to a doctor about her work-related smoke exposure until the time when she filed her claim. We cannot say, therefore, that Dr. McGowan’s testimony was unreliable as a matter of law.
Additionally, the commissioner cited an October 2, 1989 report of Dr. Cullen that stated “whether the smoking and the increased physical stress of walking a longer distance contributed to the worsening of your asthma can only be a matter of speculation, but is certainly possible.” The commissioner was not required to ignore this opinion in favor of Dr. Cullen’s subsequent testimony that cigarette smoke exposure had likely worsened the claimant’s condition; instead, the commissioner considered both opinions in evaluating Dr. Cullen’s testimony. Similarly, the commissioner was not required to accept Dr. DeGraff’s testimony as being more credible than Dr. Godar’s testimony. It is clear that the commissioner considered all of the doctors’ opinions, and simply believed that the medical evidence did not establish the existence of a compensable injury in this case. This board does not have the power on review to tell the trial commissioner that he should have believed the claimant’s witnesses instead of the respondents’. If a trial commissioner does not accept a claimant’s version of the facts surrounding an alleged injury, or the opinions of her doctors about the cause of her injury, there is very little this panel can do about it on appeal.


F. Michael Ahern for appellants.
Harris Weinstein, Washington, D.C., for appellees.
By stipulation and affidavits in the District Court, the parties offered some examples of the imposition of these taxes on naval personnel stationed in Connecticut but domiciled elsewhere. Lieutenant Schuman, a Nebraska domiciliary, and Commander Carroll, a Michigan domiciliary, bought used motorboats from nonretailers in Connecticut and were assessed a use tax. Schuman paid the tax under protest, and Carroll has refused to pay, each claiming that he is exempt under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.17 Lieutenant Commander Shaffer and Commander Foster, who are domiciled in Pennsylvania and Texas respectively, each purchased a new car; the Connecticut retailer collected and paid the sales tax. Foster registered his car in Texas, which also exacted a sales or use tax.18 Finally, Commander Roloff, whose home State is Wisconsin, purchased a used car in Florida and paid that State a 2% sales tax. When he registered the car in Connecticut, he was assessed and paid the use tax, with credit for the Florida sales tax.
It is contended on behalf of the servicemen that, even if § 514 does not encompass sales taxes, at least it prohibits taxation of the use of personal property. Not only are use taxes said to fall literally within the meaning of the phrase 'taxation in respect of the personal property,' but § 514 specifically refers in two places to property 'or the use thereof.' Moreover, it is argued, the sole jurisdictional basis of the use tax is the location of the personal property in Connecticut; yet imposition of a tax with such incidence on a serviceman contravenes the command of § 514 that his personal property 'shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State.' While we agree that use taxes are not so clearly excluded by the language of § 514 as are sales taxes, neither do we believe that they are clearly included. And consideration of the purpose and legislative history of § 514 along with its language and other factors has led us to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to free servicemen stationed away from home from the sales or use taxes of the host State.
Section 514 does not relieve servicemen stationed away from home from all taxes of the host State. It was enacted with the much narrower design 'to prevent multiple State taxation of the property.'35 And the substantial risk of double taxation under multi-state ad valorem property taxes does not exist with respect to sales and use taxes. Like Connecticut, nearly every State which levies such taxes provides a credit for sales or use taxes paid on the transaction to another State.36 Of course it is true, as we held in Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 73 S.Ct. 721, 97 L.Ed. 1041, that § 514 prevents imposition of ad valorem property taxes even though the serviceman's home State does not tax the property. But the predominant legislative purpose nonetheless remains highly relevant in determining the scope of the exemption, and the absence of any significant risk of double taxation under state sales and use taxes generally is therefore strong evidence of congressional intent not to include them in § 514.
It is thus evident that in subsection (2)(b) Congress was dealing solely with a unique form of state 'tax'—the motor vehicle registration fee. Because such fees are not always clearly classifiable as property taxes,39 servicemen would not be exempted from many of them by subsection (1) of § 514. Since annually recurring license fees raise much the same risk of double taxai on to transitory military personnel as do property taxes, Congress evidently decided in 1944 to extend the exemption of § 514 to include motor vehicle registration fees as well as property taxes. From 1944 to 1962 the only reference in § 514 to 'use' of property was found in subsection (2)(b). And, in view of the narrow purpose of that subsection and the absence for 20 years of any other reference to 'use' in § 514, we cannot believe the repetition of that word in the 1962 amendment—described by Congress as a mere clarification of the existing law40—can be deemed to have added all use taxes to the coverage of the statute. The 1962 amendment merely reflected the prior reference to the 'use' of motor vehicles in subsection (2)(b).
Finally, we find unpersuasive the appellees' contention that, since the Connecticut use tax can be applied only with respect to personal property used within the State, its imposition on servicemen away from home cannot be squared with the declaration of § 514 that 'personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State.' That clause is modified by the opening words of the sentence—'(f)or the purposes of taxation in respect of the personal property.' Section 514, therefore, does not in terms relieve servicemen from every state tax which is somehow dependent on the presence of personal property within the State. Rather, it provides only that a State cannot justify imposing the taxes to which § 514 was initially intended to apply—annually recurring ad valorem property taxes—on the ground of the property's presence within the State.
The 1944 amendment, therefore, had only the limited purpose 'to clarify' Congress' original intent to cover 'personal-property taxes on property,' not to expand the exemption in a manne which would include sales or use taxes.
As added by § 17 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, 56 Stat. 777, and as amended, 58 Stat. 722, 76 Stat. 768, 50 U.S.C.App. § 574.
Although the issue was raised in the District Court, the appellants no longer dispute the right of the United States to bring this action on behalf of the servicemen in federal court. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358, 87 S.Ct. 464, 466, 17 L.Ed.2d 414; United States v. Arlington County, 4 Cir., 326 F.2d 929.
In this Court the United States had presented arguments prepared by officers of the Department of Justice in support of the judgment below. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice have informed the Court, however, that they have not been persuaded by those arguments, and that they do not believe that § 514 was intended to apply to the ordinary retail sales tax and concomitant use tax now imposed by most of the States. For other examples of such divergence of opinion among representatives of the United States before this Court, see De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61, 67—68, 52 S.Ct. 78, 76 L.Ed. 168; Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 147—151, 48 S.Ct. 219, 220, 72 L.Ed. 505.
270 F.Supp. 236. The District Court later amended its judgment to permit Connecticut to continue to collect sales and use taxes from nonresident servicemen, provided that the amounts collected would be refunded if the judgment was ultimately sustained.
393 U.S. 1012, 89 S.Ct. 617, 21 L.Ed.2d 558.
Conn.Gen.Stat.Rev. §§ 12—406 to 12—432a.
See J. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation Cases and Materials 15 (3d ed. 1969). 35 States have filed briefs in this case in support of the position of Connecticut.
See, e.g., Stetson v. Sullivan, 152 Conn. 649, 652—653, 211 A.2d 685, 686; Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 161, 170 171, 140 A.2d 479, 484; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 299—300, 57 A.2d 128, 130—131, 1 A.L.R.2d 453.
Lieutenant Schuman joined the United States as a party plaintiff in the District Court, seeking to represent the class of all servicemen or former servicemen from whom Connecticut had collected or threatened to collect any sales or use tax. The complaint was dismissed as to him for lack of jurisdiction, on the grounds that the requisite jurisdictional amount was not alleged to be in controversy and that the Eleventh Amendment forbids a suit by a private individual against a State in the federal courts. 270 F.Supp. 236, 246—247.
Foster's situation is not entirely clear. His affidavit states that officials of the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles informed him that he was required to pay a use tax but the tax actually paid was identified on the dealer's invoice as a sales tax. The latter seems to be correct, since the purchase was from a Connecticut retailer. Taxas officials told Foster he would have to pay a sales tax in order to register the car in that State. The Texas tax collector's receipt does not identify whether the payment was a sales or use tax, however, and under the Texas statutes it appears more likely that it was the latter. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat., Art. 6.01, provides that the motor vehicle sales tax apl ies only to sales in the State, while the use tax, in the same amount, applies to out-of-state sales of motor vehicles for use in Texas.
The word 'personal' was interpolated by the 1944 amendment. 58 Stat. 722.
'(1) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his personal property, income, or gross income, by any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia, such person shall not be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or in the District of Columbia, solely by reason of being absent therefrom in compliance with military or naval orders, or to have acquired a residence or domicile in, or to have become resident in or a resident of, any other State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, while, and solely by reason of being, so absent. For the purposes of taxation in respect of the personal property, income, or gross income of any such person by any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, of which such person is not a resident or in which he is not domiciled, compensation for military or naval service shall not be deemed income for services performed within, or from sources within, such State, Territory, possession, political subdivision, or District, and personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision, or district. Where the owner of personal property is absent from his residence or domicile solely by reason of compliance with military or naval orders, this section applies with respect to personal property, or the use thereof, within any tax jurisdiction other than such place of residence or domicile, regardless of where the owner may be serving in compliance with such orders: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall prevent taxation by any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia in respect of personal property used in or arising from a trade or business, if it otherwise has jurisdiction. This section shall be effective as of September 8, 1939, except that it shall not require the crediting or refunding of any tax paid prior to October 6, 1942.
See, e.g., N. Jacoby, Retail Sales Taxation 3—4 (1938). And see n. 28, infra.
The Connecticut statute defines a 'sale' generally as '(a)ny transfer of title * * * for a consideration.' § 12 407(2)(a). And see Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 161, 172, 140 A.2d 479, 484—485. The term also includes a transaction in which the right of possession is transferred but the seller retains title as security. § 12—407(2)(f).
S.Rep.No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1942); H.R.Rep.No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1942).
S.Rep.No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1944). See also the reference to 'personal property taxes in H.R.Rep.No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1944). The reports on the 1942 Act talked about 'taxation of the property' and the possibility that 'the personal property * * * may become liable for taxes in several States.' S.Rep.No. 1558, supra, n. 26, at 11; H.R.Rep.No. 2198, supra, n. 26, at 6. At the time of the 1962 Amendment, the reports continued to describe the taxes covered by § 514 as those 'imposed upon property of a serviceman.' S.Rep.No. 2182, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1962); H.R.Rep.No. 2126, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1962), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1962, p. 2841.
It has frequently been said that a use tax, like a sales tax, is an excise or privilege tax different in kind from a tax on property. E.g., Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93, 54 S.Ct. 575, 578, 78 L.Ed. 1141; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 649, 41 S.Ct. 606, 608, 65 L.Ed. 1139. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has described the very tax here in question, 'The use tax is not a tax on property but is described in the act as, and in fact is, in the nature of an excise tax upon the privilege of using, storing or consuming property.' Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 307, 57 A.2d 128, 134. This distinction may sometimes be more formal than actual, cf. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582, 586, 57 S.Ct. 524, 526, 528, 81 L.Ed. 814. But its long-time general acceptance supports the conclusion that when Congress talked about taxes on, or even 'in respect of,' personal property, it did not thereby include use taxes.
By 1938, more than half the States had adopted sales and use taxes. See 3 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, supra, n. 28, at 609.
54 Stat. 1059, now 4 U.S.C. §§ 105—110.
'(a) The provisions of sections 105 and 106 of this title shall not be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from the United States or any instrumentality thereof, or the levy or collection of any tax with respect to sale, purchase, storage, or use of tangible personal property sold by the United States or any instrumentality thereof to any authorized purchaser.
'11. Most of the day-to-day purchases of tangible personal property, which includes food, clothing, toilet articles and other personal items, made by servicemen in Connecticut are made from military exchanges, and commissaries operated by the armed services on military installations.
Conversely, the administrative burden which the States would have to shoulder if § 514 applied to sales and use taxes is potentially far greater than that attributable to the exemption from ad valorem property taxes. Whereas property taxation involves only the property owner and the tax officials, sales and use taxation usually requires participation and accounting by the seller as well. And the accounting difficulties which retailers and the States would encounter in determining for thousands of transactions which customers were properly exempt under § 514 are considerably greater than any that Congress can be thought to have envisioned for the exemption from property taxes alone.
S.Rep.No. 1558, supra, n. 26, at 11; H.R.Rep.No. 2198, supra, n. 26, at 6. This purpose was restated in the 1944 reports: 'When the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 was amended by the act of October 6, 1942, a provision was written into the act to relieve persons in the service from liability of double taxation by being moved from one State to another under orders.' H.R.Rep.No. 1514, supra, n. 27, at 2. And see S.Rep.No. 959, supra, n. 27, at 1.
See Prentice-Hall State and Local Tax Service, All States Unit, 92,963.
Indeed, the Court in Buzard emphasized that the tax had been adopted by California 'as a substitute for local ad valorem taxation of automobiles.' 382 U.S., at 395, n. 9, 86 S.Ct., at 484. California's sales and use taxes were not involved in that case.
See California v. Buzard, 382 U.S., at 394, n. 8, 86 S.Ct., at 483, 15 L.Ed.2d 436, for the various methods by which States impose registration or license fees on motor vehicles.
'This bill amends the tax immunity provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act * * * so as to clarify a situation which sometimes results in taxation contrary to the intent of the act. More specifically, the bill provides that where a serviceman is absent from his residence or domicile solely by reason of compliance with military or naval orders, the tax immunity provision of existing law shall apply with respect to his personal property, or the use thereof, within any tax jurisdiction other than his State of residence or domicile, regardless of where such serviceman may be located in compliance with such orders.' (Emphasis supplied.) S.Rep.No. 2182, supra, n. 27, at 1, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1962, p. 2841.
S.Rep.No. 959, supra, n. 27, at 1.


In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit recently held that the definition of “person” under the FDCPA includes business entities, including corporations and limited liability companies for purposes of 15 U.S.C. §1692k. Anarion Investments LLC v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, C.A. Nos. 14-5781, 14-5993, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12670, 2015 fed App. 0159P (6th Cir. 2015). The underlying litigation arose out of a foreclosure. Anarion Investments, the assignee of a lessee with an option to purchase the foreclosed residential real estate, brought sued alleging that the mortgage company made certain misrepresentations in the foreclosure notices and that the foreclosure notices did not provide sufficient notices to interested parties, including Anarion as the assignee of the lessee. Anarion alleged that these misrepresentations gave rise to the FDCPA claim.
The district court dismissed Anarion’s suit, holding that Anarion did not have standing under the FDCPA. In doing so, the district court focused on three provision of the FDCPA: (a) 15 USC §1692a; (b) 15 U.S.C. §1692d; and (c) 15 U.S.C. §1692k. The district court noted that a “consumer” is defined as being “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”; meanwhile, “debt” is defined as being “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer” incurred for personal, family, or household purposes.” Section 1692d prohibits a debt collection from engaging in “any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” (emphasis supplied). Section 1692k, which provides the private right of action, in turn states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person…” Anarion Invs., LLC v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., 33 F. Supp. 3d 927, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). The district court held that the meaning of “person” within Sections 1692d and 1692k did not extend to corporate plaintiffs and therefore, held that Anarion lacked statutory standing to sue under 15 U.S.C. §1692k.
On appeal, the sole issue was “whether Anarion is a “person” under 15 U.S.C. §1692k” and, therefore, had standing to assert an FDCPA claim. Anarion, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12670, *1. The appellate court in reversing the district court relied upon the federal Dictionary Act, which provides that the presumptive meaning of the word “person” includes artificial entities unless the context indicates otherwise. In reviewing the FDCPA (and apparently ignoring the statutory’ s purpose), the appellate court relied upon the fact that several places within the FDCPA included artificial entities within its definition of person – for example, “creditor” and “debt collector” routinely include artificial entities. Based upon these observations, the court held that the term “person” in 15 U.S.C. §1692k was broad enough to include corporate entities.
The opinion is troublesome and runs counter to the FDCPA’s purpose; however, it has limited application. While the court clearly missed the mark in not noting that the references to artificial entities were all outward facing and did not involve parties protected by the Act and ignored the FDCPA’s purpose and history, the opinion is likely to be an outlier because the FDCPA only applies to consumer debts. So how was the debt, in this case, considered a consumer debt when Anarion so clearly did not meet the definition of a consumer? Because the underlying debt was a mortgage of residential real property incurred by an individual who ultimately leased the property to Anarion’s assignor, the underlying debt was a “debt” as defined by the Act. Again, a fairly unusual situation that is not likely to occur. Moreover, while the court expanded the definition of “person” under 15 U.S.C. §1692k to include artificial entities, it was quick to point out that its opinion was limited solely to the narrow issue of who was a person for purposes of section 1692k. “Left unanswered, among other questions, is the question whether any of defendants’ representations were made “with respect to” Anarion, as required for relief under §1692k(a) of the Act.” Anarion, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12670, *6.
Despite all of the limitations on the opinion’s application, the court’s decision is, as described the dissent, “cavalier” in response to a very real concern and “potentially opens the door to a new class of plaintiffs under the FDCPA and effectively provides a new cause of action in foreclosure appeals.” Id. at *16.


text:
368 Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 66; Tuft v. Adams, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 547; White v. Whitney, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 81; Cowdrey v. Coit, 44 N. Y. 382.
369 west v. Stewart, 7 Pa. St. 122.
370 Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 66; Russ v. Steele, 40 Vt. 310. But see Hymes v. Esty, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 147; Brown v. Young, 69 Iowa, 625, 29 N. W. 941.
371 Peck v. Jones, 70 Pa, St. 83; Brimmer v. City of Boston, 102 Mass. 19.
372 Bostwick v. Williams, 36 111. 65, 69; Emerson v. Proprietors of Land, 1 Mass. 464. But see Fowler v. Poling, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 165.
373 Sedgwick v. Hollenback, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 376.
374 Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 1; Beebe v. Swartwout, 3 Gllman (111.) 180; Underwood v. Birchard, 47 Vt. 305.
375 Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 13; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 124; Western Min. & Manuf'g Co. v. Peytona Cannel Coal Co., 8 W. Va. 406; Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed. 365.
376 Freeman v. Foster, 55 Me. 508.
279. Covenant For Further Assurance-a covenant for further assurance is an agreement by the grantor to do any other acts which may be necessary for perfecting the grantee's title.
377 As to the measure of damages for breach of covenants, see Hale, Dam. 367. 378 Lewes v. Ridge, Cro. Eliz. 863.
379 Slater v. Rawson, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 450; Allen v. Kennedy, 91 Mo. 824, 2 S. W. 142.
380 Dickinson v. Hoomes' Adm'r, 8 Grat. (Va.) 353. And see Kane v. Sanger, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 89; Lane v. Woodruff (Kan. App.) 40 Pac. 1079.
381 Withy v. Mumford. 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 137.
382 Grant v. Hill (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. 952. The warrantor may be required to defend, though the claim set up is invalid. Meservey v. Snell (Iowa) 62 N. W. 767. An intermediate covenantee who has not been damnified cannot recover from prior covenantors. Booth v. Starr, 1 Conn. 244.
383 Merritt v. Morse, 108 Mass. 276; Somers v. Schmidt, 24 Wis. 417; Paul v. Witman, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 409; Mcconnell v. Downs, 48 111. 271. The warrantee cannot recover from the warrantor when the former instigated a third person to claim title to the land. Hester t. Hunnicutt, 104 Ala, 282, 16 South. 162.
(b) By deed (p. 453).
384 Lamb v. Burbank, 1 Sawy. 227, Fed. Cas. No. 8,012; Gwynn v. Thomas, 2 Gill & J. (md.) 420; Warn v. Bickford, 7 Price, 550.
385 Colby v. Osgood, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 339; Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503.
386 King v. Jones, 5 Taunt. 418. Cf. Kingdon v. Nottle, 1 Maule & S. 355.
387 Bush v. Person, 18 How. 82.
388 Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 480; Hanrahan v. O'reilly, 102 Mass. 204. Recitals do not estop a party from showing fraud. Hickman v. Stewart, 69 Tex. 255, 5 S. W. 833. An agreement to divide the proceeds of lands does not create an estoppel. Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218, 40 N. E. 980.

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the most cost-effective and efficient way of overcoming Africa’s vulnerability to drought and famine is to address Africa’s long-term development needs through a process that builds upon the needs and capabilities of the African people, promotes sustained and equitable economic growth, preserves the environment, and protects the rights of the individual.
The President is authorized to furnish project and program assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine in accordance with the policies contained in this section, for long-term development in sub-Saharan Africa.
The purpose of assistance under this section shall be to help the poor majority of men and women in sub-Saharan Africa to participate in a process of long-term development through economic growth that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant.
Assistance under this section should, in a manner consistent with paragraph (1), be used to promote sustained economic growth, encourage private sector development, promote individual initiatives, and help to reduce the role of central governments in areas more appropriate for the private sector.
assistance under this section shall be provided consistent with the policies contained in section 2151–1 of this title.
The Agency for International Development shall take into account the local-level perspectives of the rural and urban poor in sub-Saharan Africa, including women, during the planning process for project and program assistance under this section. In order to gain that perspective the Agency for International Development should consult closely with African, United States, and other private and voluntary organizations that have demonstrated effectiveness in or commitment to the promotion of local, grassroots activities on behalf of long-term development in sub-Saharan Africa as described in subsection (c).
For purposes of this section, the term “private and voluntary organization” includes (in addition to entities traditionally considered to be private and voluntary organizations) cooperatives, credit unions, trade unions, women’s groups, nonprofit development research institutions, and indigenous local organizations, which are private and nonprofit.
Local people, including women, shall be closely consulted and involved in the implementation of every project under this section which as  a local focus.
The Agency for International Development shall ensure that development activities assisted under this section incorporate a significant expansion of the participation (including decisionmaking) and integration of African women in each of the critical sectors described in subsection (i).
Assistance under this section shall emphasize primarily projects and programs to address critical sectoral priorities for long-term development described in subsection (i).
Assistance under this section may also include program assistance to promote reform of sectoral economic policies affecting long-term development in sub-Saharan Africa as described in subsection (c), with primary emphasis on reform of economic policies to support the critical sectoral priorities described in subsection (i).
Assisted policy reforms shall also include provisions to protect vulnerable groups (especially poor, isolated, and female farmers, the urban poor, and children including displaced children) and long-term environmental interests from possible negative consequences of the reforms.
to strengthen conflict resolution capabilities of governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental entities in sub-Saharan Africa.
Funds made available to carry out this section shall be used almost exclusively for assistance in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). Assistance consistent with the purpose of subsection (c) may also be furnished under this section to carry out the provisions of sections 2151a through 2151d of this title.
Increasing agricultural production in ways which protect and restore the natural resource base, especially food production, through agricultural policy changes, agricultural research (including participatory research directly involving small farmers) and extension, development and promotion of agriculture marketing activities, credit facilities, and appropriate production packages, and the construction and improvement of needed production-related infrastructure such as farm-to-market roads, small-scale irrigation, and rural electrification. Within this process, emphasis shall be given to promoting increased equity in rural income distribution, recognizing the role of small farmers.
Small-scale, affordable, resource-conserving, low-risk local projects, using appropriate technologies (including traditional agricultural methods) suited to local environmental, resource, and climatic conditions, and featuring close consultation with and involvement of local people at all stages of project design and implementation. Emphasis shall be given to grants for African local government organizations, international or African nongovernmental organizations, and United Statesprivate and voluntary organizations.
Support for efforts at national and regional levels to provide technical and other support for projects of the kinds described in clause (i) and to strengthen the capacities of African countries to provide effective extension and other services in support of environmentally sustainable increases in food production.
Support for special training and education efforts to improve the capacity of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to manage their own environments and natural resources.
Support for low-cost desalination activities in order to increase the availability of fresh water sources in sub-Saharan Africa.
Improving health conditions, with special emphasis on meeting the health needs of mothers and children (including displaced children) through the establishment of primary health care systems that give priority to preventive health and that will be ultimately self-sustaining. In addition, providing training and training facilities, in sub-Saharan Africa, for doctors and other health care providers, notwithstanding any provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries.
Providing increased access to voluntary family planning services, including encouragement of private, community, and local government initiatives.
Improving the relevance, equity, and efficiency of education, with special emphasis on improving primary education.
Developing income-generating opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed in urban and rural areas through, among other things, support for off-farm employment opportunities in micro- and small-scale labor-intensive enterprises.
The activities described in subsection (i)(1)(B), including identifiable components of agricultural production projects.
The activities described in subsection (i)(2).
The activities described in subsection (i)(3).
Assistance provided under this section shall be concentrated in countries which will make the most effective use of such assistance in order to fulfill the purpose specified in subsection (c), especially those countries (including those of the Sahel region) having the greatest need for outside assistance.
Assistance under this section shall, to the extent consistent with this section, include assistance to promote the regional and subregional integration of African production structures, markets, and infrastructure.
Funds made available to carry out this section may be used to assist the governments of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to increase their capacity to participate effectively in donor coordination mechanisms at the country, regional, and sector levels.
The authority granted by this section to provide assistance for long-term development in sub-Saharan Africa is not intended to preclude the use of other authorities for that purpose. Centrally funded programs which benefit sub-Saharan Africa shall continue to be funded under part I of this subchapter.
The transfer authority contained in section 2151g of this title shall not apply with respect to this section.
The transfer authority contained in section 2360(a) of this title may not be used to transfer funds made available to carry out this section in order to allow them to be used in carrying out any other provision of this chapter.
Section 2394–1 of this title does not apply with respect to funds made available to carry out this section.
In order to allow the assistance authorized by this section to be furnished as effectively and expeditiously as possible, section 2354(a) of this title, and similar provisions relating to the procurement of goods and services, shall not apply with respect to goods and services procured for use in carrying out this section. The exemption provided by this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to the Comprehensive Anti/Apartheid Act of 1986.
To the extent funds are provided for such purpose in the annual Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, funds made available to carry out this part may be used to assist sector projects, in the sectors specified in paragraph (2), that are supported by the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to enhance the economic development of the member states forming that regional institution.
The sectors with respect to which assistance may be provided under this subsection are the following: transportation; manpower development; agriculture and natural resources; energy (including the improved utilization of electrical power sources which already exist in the member states and offer the potential to swiftly reduce the dependence of those states on South Africa for electricity); and industrial development and trade (including private sector initiatives).
To the maximum extent feasible, the assistance authorized by this subsection shall be provided consistent with the policies and authorities contained in the preceding subsection of this section.
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (n)(2)(B), was in the original “this Act”, meaning Pub. L. 87–195, Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 424, as amended, known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2151 of this title and Tables.
The Comprehensive Anti/Apartheid Act of 1986, referred to in subsec. (n)(4), probably means the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which is Pub. L. 99–440, Oct. 2, 1986, 100 Stat. 1086, as amended, and was classified principally to chapter 60 (§ 5001 et seq.) of this title, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103–149, § 4(a)(1), (2), Nov. 23, 1993, 107 Stat. 1504, 1505. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
A prior section 2293, Pub. L. 87–195, pt. I, § 496, as added Pub. L. 93–559, § 53, Dec. 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 1818; amended Pub. L. 94–161, title III, § 314, Dec. 20, 1975, 89 Stat. 866, related to economic assistance, etc., to Portugal and Portuguese colonies in Africa gaining independence, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 99–83, title XII, § 1211(a)(4), Aug. 8, 1985, 99 Stat. 279, effective Oct. 1, 1985.
2000—Subsec. (h)(3). Pub. L. 106–200, § 127(c)(1)(B), added par. (3). Former par. (3) redesignated (4).
Subsec. (h)(4). Pub. L. 106–200, § 127(c)(1)(A), (2), redesignated par. (3) as (4) and substituted “paragraphs (1), (2), and (3)” for “paragraphs (1) and (2)” in first sentence.
“This Act may be cited as the ‘Electrify Africa Act of 2015’.
“The purpose of this Act is to encourage the efforts of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to improve access to affordable and reliable electricity in Africa in order to unlock the potential for inclusive economic growth, job creation, food security, improved health, education, and environmental outcomes, and poverty reduction.
promote and increase the use of private financing and seek ways to remove barriers to private financing and assistance for projects, including through charitable organizations.
“SEC. 4. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE, MULTIYEAR STRATEGY.
The President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to implement national power strategies and develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in order to reduce poverty and drive economic growth and job creation consistent with the policy stated in section 3.
The President shall ensure that the strategy required under paragraph (1) maintains sufficient flexibility for and remains responsive to concerns and interests of affected local communities and technological innovation in the power sector.
The objectives of the strategy and the criteria for determining the success of the strategy.
improve non-discriminatory access to power that is done in consultation with affected communities.
A description of plans to support efforts of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to increase access to power in urban and rural areas, including a description of plans designed to address commercial, industrial, and residential needs.
A description of plans to support efforts to reduce waste and corruption, ensure local community consultation, and improve existing power generation through the use of a broad power mix, including fossil fuel and renewable energy, distributed generation models, energy efficiency, and other technological innovations, as appropriate.
non-discriminatory access to power, including recommendations on the creation of new service provider models that mobilize community participation in the provision of power services.
policies that promote local community consultation with respect to the development of power generation and transmission projects.
A description of plans to ensure meaningful local consultation, as appropriate, in the planning, long-term maintenance, and management of investments designed to increase access to power in sub-Saharan Africa.
plans to protect the intellectual property of companies designing and manufacturing products that can be used to provide energy access in sub-Saharan Africa.
a description of how bolstering distributed renewable energy can enhance the overall effort to increase power access in sub-Saharan Africa.
A description of plans to ensure that small and medium enterprises based in sub-Saharan Africa can fairly compete for energy development and energy access opportunities associated with this Act.
A description of how United States investments to increase access to energy in sub-Saharan Africa may reduce the need for foreign aid and development assistance in the future.
A description of policies or regulations, both domestically and internationally, that create barriers to private financing of the projects undertaken in this Act.
A description of the specific national security benefits to the United States that will be derived from increased energy access in sub-Saharan Africa.
The President may, as appropriate, establish an Interagency Working Group to coordinate the activities of relevant United States Government departments and agencies involved in carrying out the strategy required under this section.
facilitate information sharing, and coordinate partnerships between the United States Government, the private sector, and other development partners to achieve the goals of the strategy.
“SEC. 5. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE FOR POWER PROJECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY KEY UNITED STATES INSTITUTIONS.
building the capacity of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to monitor and appropriately and transparently regulate the power sector and encourage private investment in power production and distribution.
In prioritizing and expediting institutional efforts and assistance pursuant to this section, as appropriate, such institutions shall use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of such guarantees and assistance in achieving the goals described in section 3.
In carrying out policies under this section, such institutions shall promote the use of private financing and assistance and seek ways to remove barriers to private financing for projects and programs under this Act, including through charitable organizations.
Nothing in this section may be construed to authorize modifying or limiting the portfolio of the institutions covered by subsection (a) in other developing regions.
utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of such projects.
A report on United States programs supporting implementation of policy and legislative changes leading to increased power generation and access in sub-Saharan Africa, including a description of the number, type, and status of policy, regulatory, and legislative changes initiated or implemented as a result of programs funded or supported by the United States in countries in sub-Saharan Africa to support increased power generation and access after the date of the enactment of this Act.
A description of power projects receiving United States Government support and how such projects, including off-grid efforts, are intended to achieve the strategy described in section 4.
The economic, security, and humanitarian interests of the United States and the nations of sub-Saharan Africa would be enhanced by sustainable, broad-based agricultural and rural development in each of the African nations.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the number of undernourished people in Africa has more than doubled, from approximately 100,000,000 in the late 1960s to 215,000,000 in 1998, and is projected to increase to 265,000,000 by the year 2010. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the term ‘under nutrition’ means inadequate consumption of nutrients, often adversely affecting children’s physical and mental development, undermining their future as productive and creative members of their communities.
Currently, agricultural production in Africa employs about two-thirds of the workforce but produces less than one-fourth of the gross domestic product in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Bank Group.
African women produce up to 80 percent of the total food supply in Africa according to the International Food Policy Research Institute.
An effective way to improve conditions of the poor is to increase the productivity of the agricultural sector. Productivity increases can be fostered by increasing research and education in agriculture and rural development.
In November 1996, the World Food Summit set a goal of reducing hunger worldwide by 50 percent by the year 2015 and encouraged national governments to develop domestic food plans and to support international aid efforts.
Although the World Bank Group recently has launched a major initiative to support agricultural and rural development, only 10 percent, or $1,200,000,000, of its total lending to sub-Saharan Africa for fiscal years 1993 to 1997 was devoted to agriculture.
United States food processing and agricultural sectors benefit greatly from the liberalization of global trade and increased exports.
Africa represents a growing market for United States food and agricultural products. Africa’s food imports are projected to rise from less than 8,000,000 metric tons in 1990 to more than 25,000,000 metric tons by the [sic] 2020.
Increased private sector investment in African countries and expanded trade between the United States and Africa can greatly help African countries achieve food self-sufficiency and graduate from dependency on international assistance.
Development assistance, technical assistance, and training can facilitate and encourage commercial development in Africa, such as improving rural roads, agricultural research and extension, and providing access to credit and other resources.
Several United Statesprivate voluntary organizations have demonstrated success in empowering Africans through direct business ownership and helping African agricultural producers more efficiently and directly market their products.
Rural business associations, owned and controlled by farmer shareholders, also greatly help agricultural producers to increase their household incomes.
“SEC. 101. AFRICA FOOD SECURITY INITIATIVE.
shall ensure that programs are designed and conducted in cooperation with African and United States organizations and institutions, such as private and voluntary organizations, cooperatives, land-grant and other appropriate universities, and local producer-owned cooperative marketing and buying associations, that have expertise in addressing the needs of the poor, small-scale farmers, entrepreneurs, and rural workers, including women.
It is the sense of the Congress that, if there is an increase in funding for sub-Saharan programs, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should proportionately increase resources to the Africa Food Security Initiative, or any comparable or successor program, for fiscal year 2000 and subsequent fiscal years in order to meet the needs of the countries participating in such Initiative.
In providing microenterprise assistance for sub-Saharan Africa, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall, to the extent practicable, use credit and microcredit assistance to improve the capacity and efficiency of agriculture production in sub-Saharan Africa of small-scale farmers and small rural entrepreneurs. In providing assistance, the Administrator should use the applied research and technical assistance capabilities of United States land-grant universities.
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall continue to work with other countries, international organizations (including multilateral development institutions), and entities assisting microenterprises and shall develop a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for providing microenterprise assistance for sub-Saharan Africa.
In carrying out paragraph (1), the Administrator should encourage the World Bank Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest to coordinate the strategy described in such paragraph.
“SEC. 103. SUPPORT FOR PRODUCER-OWNED COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS.
to support small businesses in sub-Saharan Africa as they grow beyond microenterprises.
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development is authorized to utilize relevant foreign assistance programs and initiatives for sub-Saharan Africa to support private producer-owned cooperative marketing associations in sub-Saharan Africa, including rural business associations that are owned and controlled by farmer shareholders.
shall take into account the local-level perspectives of the rural and urban poor through close consultation with these groups, consistent with section 496(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293(e)(1)).
to facilitate partnerships between United States and African cooperatives and private businesses to enhance the capacity and technical and marketing expertise of business associations in sub-Saharan Africa.
“SEC. 104. AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION.
The purpose of this section is to encourage the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [now the United States International Development Finance Corporation] to work with United States businesses and other United States entities to invest in rural sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in ways that will develop the capacities of small-scale farmers and small rural entrepreneurs, including women, in sub-Saharan Africa.
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should utilize existing equity funds, loan and insurance funds, to the extent feasible and in accordance with existing contractual obligations, to support agriculture and rural development in sub-Saharan Africa.
“SEC. 105. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION ACTIVITIES.
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and appropriate Department of Agriculture agencies, especially the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, shall develop a comprehensive plan to coordinate and build on the research and extension activities of United States land-grant universities, international agricultural research centers, and national agricultural research and extension centers in sub-Saharan Africa.
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with African governments, bilateral and multilateral partners, the private sector, and civil society to expand access to electricity and increase electricity generation in Sub-Saharan Africa, in both urban and rural areas. Through the Power Africa initiative (Power Africa), we aim to double access to power in Sub-Saharan Africa by adding 30,000 megawatts (MW) of capacity and 60 million new household and business connections by 2030, and in so doing, leapfrog to cleaner forms of energy and foster inclusive economic growth and opportunity across Sub-Saharan Africa.
On June 30, 2013, my Administration launched Power Africa, a new initiative to double access to power in Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than two-thirds of the population is without electricity, and more than 85 percent of those living in rural areas lack access to electricity. In its initial phase, Power Africa aimed to add more than 10,000 MW of cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity and to increase electricity access by at least 20 million new households and commercial entities with on-grid, mini-grid, and off-grid solutions. Power Africa builds on Africa’s enormous power potential, including extensive clean geothermal, hydro, wind and solar energy resources, as well as vast oil and gas reserves. Power Africa works with countries to develop resources responsibly, build out power generation, transmission, and distribution, and expand the reach of mini-grid and off-grid solutions. Power Africa brings to bear a wide range of tools from across the Federal Government and more than 130 public and private sector partners to support investment in Africa’s energy sector. Power Africa provides coordinated support to help African partners expand their power networks and access to electricity, including through policy and regulatory best practices, institutional capacity building, pre-feasibility support, grants, long-term financing, insurance, guarantees, credit enhancements, and technical assistance.
On August 5, 2014, during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, my Administration affirmed that Power Africa is intended to reach across Sub-Saharan Africa, and tripled Power Africa’s goals. Power Africa is now working toward adding 30,000 MW of new, cleaner electricity generation capacity and increasing electricity access by at least 60 million new connections. On January 28, 2016, my Administration, in coordination with Power Africa partners, launched the Power Africa Roadmap, which lays out a concrete plan for Power Africa to meet its ambitious goals by 2030.
The Electrify Africa Act of 2015, enacted on February 8, 2016 (Public Law 114–121) (the “Act”), calls for the development of a strategy to add at least 20,000 MW of electrical power and promote first-time access to power and power services for at least 50 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2020 in both urban and rural areas—an effort that directly supports and complements Power Africa’s goals. This order furthers the purposes of the Act and the work that Power Africa has been undertaking.
Sec. 2. Establishment of the Coordinator for Power Africa. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) shall serve as the lead agency to facilitate the implementation of Power Africa and associated activities across the United States Government. The Administrator of USAID shall establish the position of Coordinator for Power Africa within USAID.
Sec. 3. Power Africa Working Group. (a) There is hereby established the Power Africa Working Group (Working Group), co-chaired by the Coordinator for Power Africa within USAID and a member of the National Security Council (NSC) staff to be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Working Group shall serve as the multi-agency coordinating and advisory body for the Federal Government’s efforts to identify, evaluate, prioritize, and deliver assistance to energy projects across Sub-Saharan Africa in order to advance the energy access and electricity generation goals of Power Africa and promote policy cohesion across the Federal Government. Through the Working Group, participating departments and agencies shall provide advice and promote coherence of United States Government positions on and assistance for priority energy projects and policy reforms in support of Power Africa.
(xiii) such other agencies as the Co-Chairs may designate or invite to participate, including the United StatesAfrican Development Foundation.
(c) The Working Group may consult with non-United States Government entities that participate in Power Africa as bilateral, multilateral, private sector partners and nongovernmental organizations to provide input and advice to the United States Government, as appropriate, regarding the implementation of Power Africa.
(d) The Working Group may establish sub-groups consisting exclusively of Working Group members or their designees, as appropriate, such as one for each of the three pillars of the Power Africa Roadmap: (1) megawatts, (2) connections, and (3) unlocking energy sector potential.
(e) The Working Group shall be supported by the Office of the Coordinator for Power Africa within USAID.
(a) Ensure efficient and effective coordination of energy access activities in Sub-Saharan Africa among Participating Agencies.
(b) Identify, prioritize, and evaluate potential Power Africa projects, regulatory and policy reforms, and programmatic focus areas, including maximizing deployment of and access to renewable energy.
(c) Identify country and project specific obstacles to the development of the electricity sector, including financial and technical assistance needs and capacity building needs, and identify opportunities for Participating Agencies to deploy their respective tools and best practices to advance needed reforms and accelerate the completion of Power Africa projects.
(d) Enhance coordination among Participating Agencies to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of United States Government development assistance and other development finance tools as related to Power Africa priorities.
(e) Facilitate information sharing and coordination of partnerships between Participating Agencies and African governments, the private sector, development partners, and bilateral and multilateral partners to help advance Power Africa’s goals.
(f) Identify appropriate courses of action to liaise with host governments to advance regulatory and policy reforms, as well as energy transactions, related to Power Africa.
(g) Identify best practices for Participating Agencies to coordinate their engagement with development partners, including bilateral donors, development finance institutions, and multilateral development banks on energy access issues, to ensure that Power Africa’s tools are deployed in a way that is complementary to and leverages the impact of United States Government resources.
(h) Meet with private sector partners, as appropriate, to review Power Africa projects and activities, and to solicit input regarding technical, policy, financial or political, obstacles that partners are encountering in the energy sector across Sub-Saharan Africa.
(i) Meet with bilateral and multilateral development partners, as appropriate, to coordinate country-specific and regional energy access policy agendas, coordinate deployment of financial resources and technical expertise to identify and accelerate Power Africa projects and activities, and review project pipelines.
(j) Monitor and periodically evaluate Power Africa projects and activities to measure the effectiveness of United States Government assistance and other development finance tools in achieving Power Africa’s electricity generation and access goals, and to share lessons learned. These evaluations may recommend reforms to facilitate support for future projects and activities, and to increase the Working Group’s effectiveness.
Sec. 5. Partnering with African Private Sector Companies. I hereby direct Participating Agencies to facilitate as appropriate, to the maximum extent possible under the law, the participation of local and regional companies in power, renewable energy, and climate change projects in low-income countries in Africa, including through the use of financing and risk insurance, where appropriate.
Sec. 6. Reporting. The Administrator of USAID, in coordination with the Participating Agencies, shall lead in the development of a report, to be transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 7 of the Act and the Presidential Memorandum of August 3, 2016, “Delegation of Authority Pursuant to Section 4 and Section 7 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015,” on progress made toward achieving the comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy that was transmitted to the Congress on August 6, 2016, pursuant to section 4 of the Act, to encourage the efforts of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to implement national power strategies and develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient, reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in order to reduce poverty and drive economic growth and job creation.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby delegate to you the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 4 and section 7 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121) (the “Act”) [22 U.S.C. 2293 note].
Any reference in this memorandum to the Act shall be deemed to be a reference to any future act that is the same or substantially the same as such provisions.
  So in original. Probably should be “has”.


This month, three United States Senators introduced the “Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016.” The bill would dramatically narrow the venue statute that applies to patent cases and, it appears, prevent most cases from being litigated in the popular venues for patent cases, such as the Eastern District of Texas.
a party operates a regular physical facility and has engaged in the management of significant research and development of an invention claimed in a patent-in-suit prior to the effective date, or manufactured a product or implemented a process claimed in a patent-in-suit.
The question has been rattling around since 1957, when the Supreme Court held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp. (353 U.S. 222) that “the residence of a corporation for purposes of [Section] 1400(b) is its place of incorporation.” Then, in 1988 Congress amended § 1391(c) to begin “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter.” As referenced above, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding interpreted that change to mean that § 1391(c) should be read into § 1400(b), meaning a patent infringement action can be brought in any forum where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. In 2011, Congress passed the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, which replaced “for the purposes of venue under this chapter” with “[f]or all venue purposes.” According to Heartland, because the Federal Circuit had relied on the now amended language of § 1391(c) in deciding VE Holding, the decision should be treated as a nullity and § 1391(c) should no longer be interpreted to define the term “resides” in § 1400(b).
Ironically, during oral argument in early March on Heartland’s Federal Circuit mandamus petition, Judge Moore mused that the request to overturn VE Holding “feel[s] like something a legislature should do.” Congress may now indeed address the issue. Just yesterday, Judge Bryson, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Texas, denied a motion to dismiss in which Amazon was also attempting to argue its way out of the Eastern District by also attacking the holding of VE Holding. See Script Security Solutions LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al. (15-cv-01030 (E.D Tex.)).