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[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 73-1069, Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; No. 73-1070, Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; No. 73-1071, Lorch-Westway Corp. et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; and No. 73-1072, United States et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al., also on appeal to the same court.
1. The District Court erred in refusing to enforce the ICC's order. Pp. 284-294.
(a) Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the scope of review is a narrow one whereby a reviewing court must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 . Pp. 285-286.
(b) The ICC's observation that appellees' exhibits as to the acceptability of their existing service covered periods subsequent to the ICC's notice of hearing supported its refusal to credit this evidence. The ICC was entitled to regard such exhibits as non-representative of the usual service, to reason that the shortcomings [419 U.S. 281, 282] were greater than the exhibits showed, and to conclude that service would be improved by granting the applications. Pp. 286-289.
(c) There was a rational basis for the ICC's attributing little significance to appellees' exhibits showing appellants' transit times over other routes. The question was whether service on the routes at issue would be enhanced by new entry and, as to this, performance by prospective entrants on other routes was of limited relevance. The ICC erred in not attributing the same qualification to appellants' transit time exhibits, but its finding that service would be improved by new entry was supported by other evidence. Pp. 289-292.
(d) The ICC's conclusion that consumer benefits of new entry outweighed any adverse impact upon the existing carriers reflects the kind of judgment that is entrusted to it, namely, the power to weigh the competing interests and arrive at a balance that is deemed "the public convenience and necessity." Pp. 292-294.
2. The lapse of time between the conclusion of evidentiary hearings and the ultimate agency decision in this case does not justify a reviewing court's requiring that the record be reopened. Pp. 294-296.
3. The ICC was entitled to take an approach, divergent from that of its examiners, favoring added competition among carriers. Pp. 297-299.
4. Whether or not the certificate granted appellant Bowman Transportation Co. conformed to the authority set forth in its application, an issue not briefed or argued in this Court, should be considered by the District Court on remand. Pp. 299-300.
364 F. Supp. 1239, reversed and remanded.
Charles S. Rhyne argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 73-1055, 73-1069, 73-1070, and 73-1071. With him on the briefs were Bryce Rea, Jr., Donald E. Cross, Courts Oulahan, Robert L. Jones, Jr., Maurice F. Bishop, Sander W. Shapiro, and Jerry C. Prestridge. William L. Patton argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 73-1072. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Carl D. Lawson, [419 U.S. 281, 283] Fritz R. Kahn, Betty Jo Christian, and Richard H. Streeter.
Phineas Stevens argued the cause for appellees in all cases. With him on the brief were Drew L. Carraway, Phillip Robinson, M. Ward Bailey, Don A. Smith, Thomas Harper, Wentworth E. Griffin, Frank W. Taylor, Jr., William O. Turney, and J. William Cain, Jr.
"(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law [or] . . .
"(E) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . ."
These two provisions of 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) are part of six which are "separate standards." See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971). The District Court properly concluded that, though an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence, based on the definition in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), 2 it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious action. There seems, however, to be agreement that the findings and conclusions of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. The question remains whether, as the District Court held, the Commission's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" as provided in 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A). We disagree with the District Court and accordingly reverse its judgment and remand the cases for consideration of one issue not reached by the District Court or by this Court.
The Motor Carrier provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 551, 49 U.S.C. 307, empower the [419 U.S. 281, 285] Commission to grant an application for a certificate if it finds (1) that the applicant is "fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service proposed"; and (2) that the service proposed "is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." The Commission made both findings, relying upon the applicants' general service record in support of a finding of fitness, and upon expressions of customer dissatisfaction with the existing service in support of its conclusion that the service proposed was consistent with the public convenience and necessity. The competing appellee carriers made presentations designed to show that their existing service was satisfactory and that the applicants would not offer measurably superior performance. The District Court concluded that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in its treatment of the presentations made by the protesting carriers. While the Commission had acknowledged the appellees' evidence, its reasons for refusing to credit it would not, in the District Court's view, withstand scrutiny, making its action tantamount to an arbitrary refusal to consider matters in the record.
Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the scope of review is a narrow one. A reviewing court must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 416. The agency must articulate a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the [419 U.S. 281, 286] agency itself has not given, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947), we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595 (1945). Having summarized the appropriate scope of review, we proceed to consider the District Court's objections seriatim.
The applicant carriers presented exhibits showing the time in transit of selected shipments that had been consigned to appellee carriers by particular shippers during a designated study period. As the Commission acknowledged, the selection of particular shipments from those occurring during the study period had been made with an eye toward demonstrating service inadequacies. 3 These "worst case" studies figured in the Commission's finding that service would be improved by the entry of new carriers to the routes at issue.
The appellee carriers offered studies of their own. These covered the same period and the same shippers as the applicants' presentations, but whereas the applicants had selected particular shipments to emphasize inadequacies, the appellee carriers included in their presentations all of the shipments consigned during the study period. These exhibits, argued the protesting carriers, placed the incidents cited by the applicants in perspective and demonstrated that the existing service was generally acceptable. The Commission acknowledged the appellees' presentations but concluded that they offered an inadequate rebuttal to the applicants' exhibits because [419 U.S. 281, 287] (1) they "relate to short periods of time or cover traffic handled for specified shippers"; and (2) the studies represented service provided by appellees after the Commission had designated the applications for hearing. Herrin Transportation Co., 114 M. C. C. 571, 599 (1971). The District Court ruled that the Commission had applied inconsistent standards in reviewing the evidence of the parties, since the appellees' exhibits were based upon the same study periods and the same shippers as the applicants' exhibits. 364 F. Supp., at 1259-1260.
We agree with the District Court that the first reason assigned by the Commission - that the appellees' exhibits were based only upon short periods and particular shippers - failed to distinguish the presentations of applicants and opponents. To counter the applicants' presentations, the protesting carriers chose the identical study periods and shippers but expanded the presentation to show all the shipments consigned. Since the protesters confined themselves to the periods and shippers the applicants had selected, there was no basis for an inference that the former had chosen so as to make the exhibits unrepresentative in their favor.
The Commission's second reason, however - that the appellees' studies covered periods subsequent to a notice of hearing - provides support for the Commission's assessment of the evidence. The Commission recognized that protesting carriers might have been spurred to improve their service by the threat of competition raised by the designation of applicants for hearing. Therefore, reasoned the Commission, the protesting carriers' performance subsequent to the notice of hearing might be superior to the service they normally offered, and their exhibits, covering those periods, had to be read in light of that possibility. But the Commission was not precluded from relying upon the demonstrated shortcomings of the protesters' service during that period, for the incentive [419 U.S. 281, 288] effect the Commission identified would have, if anything, distorted the performance studies in the protesters' favor.
The issue before the Commission was not whether the appellees' service met some absolute standard of performance but whether the "public convenience and necessity" would be served by the entry of new carriers into the markets served by appellees. United States v. Dixie Express, 389 U.S. 409, 411 -412 (1967). Even if the Commission had accepted appellees' exhibits at face value, it could still have concluded that the deficiencies were sufficient to justify the admission of additional carriers. Certainly the Commission was entitled to regard the appellees' studies as possibly nonrepresentative of the usual service afforded, 4 to reason that the shortcomings [419 U.S. 281, 289] were probably greater than these studies showed, and to conclude that service would be improved by granting the applications.
The applicants supported their service proposals with exhibits showing transit times over comparable distances on other routes. The appellees once again pointed out that the applicants had been selective and offered transit times on different routes served by the applicants that were substantially longer than those applicants proposed to provide on the routes at issue. Appellees thus argued that the applicants could not reasonably be expected to live up to their service proposals. In addition, the appellees cited service restrictions that the applicants practiced on other routes - refusal to make scheduled pickup of merchandise, refusal to handle shipments less than a certain weight, refusal to transport goods to certain destinations, and the like.
The Commission attributed little significance to the appellees' rebuttal. With respect to transit times, the Commission noted that different highway conditions might make transit times over identical distances totally incomparable. 114 M. C. C., at 611. The District Court held that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in so treating the evidence, for it had apparently relied on the applicants' transit-time evidence (id., at 586, 600) to support its finding of fitness. 364 F. Supp., at 1260-1261. Similarly, the District Court viewed as [419 U.S. 281, 290] arbitrary the Commission's failure to mention in its opinion the service restrictions by applicants that appellees' had cited, since the Commission had relied upon identical restrictions practiced by appellees to support its finding that existing service was not satisfactory. 114 M. C. C., at 600.
The particular features of the applicants' performance elsewhere that the appellees cited were not shown by the Commission to be explainable by special market conditions on the routes where they occurred. It is said that the Commission could conclude that the evidence of performance elsewhere would be unlikely to prove dispositive, and that accordingly, absent some compelling demonstration by a proponent of a "performance elsewhere" study that it offered important predictive value, the Commission should disregard such evidence. 6 Of course, evidence of especially egregious performance elsewhere might have been viewed as an exception; a general assumption that competition would force new entrants to exceed the pre-existing quality of service in an effort to attract business might have to yield in the face of an applicant whose shortcomings elsewhere were many and flagrant. But no such evidence was offered here, and none of the applicants was so characterized. Indeed the examiners found [419 U.S. 281, 292] that "in the main the carriers participating in these proceedings are substantial and responsible carriers" (2 App. 878), and no party has disputed this finding. We do not find the Commission's treatment of the evidence arbitrary.
Having found that the admission of the applicant carriers to the routes they sought would produce benefits to the consumers served, the Commission proceeded to consider the effect of new entry upon the appellees. While the Commission acknowledged that competition from new entrants might cause at least short-run business losses for existing carriers, it found that, with the exception of one carrier, none would be "seriously adversely affected." Further, the Commission concluded that in any event, "the gains to be derived by the shipping public in general far outweigh any adverse effect this carrier or any other protestant may experience." 114 M. C. C., at 611.
The District Court thought the Commission's treatment unsupportable, in view of the findings by the hearing examiners as to adverse impacts if the applications were granted. 364 F. Supp., at 1262-1263. Insofar as the District Court's comments express the view that the Commission failed to consider the examiners' findings or the appellees' interests, the record shows otherwise. The Commission stated in its opinion that "grants of authority will subject some of protestants' traffic to the possibility of diversion," but went on to make findings that there would be no "serious adverse impact." 114 M. C. C., at 610-611.
The Commission's conclusion that consumer benefits outweighed any adverse impact upon the existing carriers reflects the kind of judgment that is entrusted to it, a power to weigh the competing interests and arrive at a balance that is deemed "the public convenience and necessity." United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535 -536 (1946). If the Commission has "drawn out and [419 U.S. 281, 294] crystallized these competing interests [and] attempted to judge them with as much delicacy as the prospective nature of the inquiry permits," ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81, 89 (1961), we can require no more. Here the Commission identified the competing interests. We cannot say that the balance it struck was arbitrary or contrary to law.
The District Court expressed concern about the considerable lapse of time between the conclusion of evidentiary hearings and the Commission's decision. 364 F. Supp., at 1261-1262. While it is unclear whether this was an independent ground for setting aside the Commission's order, we deem it advisable to deal directly with the suggestion that the record has grown too stale to support the order.
Hearings on the applications in these cases began in 1966 and concluded in 1967. Thereafter, the parties prepared extensive briefs for the examiners, who rendered their decision in November 1969. The decision of the Commission was handed down on December 30, 1971. Thus, the evidentiary material pertained to service conditions which were dated by five years at the time the Commission rendered its decision.
"Administrative consideration of evidence - particularly where the evidence is taken by an examiner, [419 U.S. 281, 295] his report submitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their exceptions to it - always creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. This is especially true if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and careful. If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearings as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of rights, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it has been considered that the discretion to be invoked was that of the body making the order, and not that of a reviewing body."
"indicates a predilection to grant these particular applications, followed by a strained attempt to marshal findings to support such conclusion." 364 F. Supp., at 1264.
We disagree with the District Court insofar as its remarks charge the Commission with prejudging the issue and deciding without giving consideration to the evidence. But we think the approach adopted by the Commission does differ from that taken by the examiners in significant respects that are important to identify.
"[n]ormally existing carriers should have an opportunity . . . to transport all of the traffic they can handle adequately and efficiently in the territory they are authorized to serve without the competition of new operations."
And to the extent that service inadequacies were demonstrated, the examiners viewed complaints to force compliance with certificates held by existing carriers as a preferred mode of relief.
The Commission's approach, on the other hand, was more congenial to new entry and the resulting competition. This is the Commission's prerogative in carrying out its mandate to insure "safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service," National Transportation Policy, [419 U.S. 281, 298] preceding 49 U.S.C. 1. The Commission was not compelled to adopt the same approach as the examiners. It could conclude that the benefits of competitive service to consumers might outweigh the discomforts existing certificated carriers could feel as a result of new entry. 10 Our decisions have dispelled any notion that the Commission's primary obligation is the protection of firms holding existing certificates. ICC v. J-T Transport Co., supra, disapproved the proposition that shippers must take their grievances through complaint procedures before improvement through new entry is permitted. 368 U.S., at 91 . And in United States v. Dixie Express, 389 U.S. 409 (1967), we rejected the suggestion by a reviewing court that existing carriers have "a property right" to an opportunity to make amends before new certificates issue. Id., at 411.
A policy in favor of competition embodied in the laws has application in a variety of economic affairs. Even where Congress has chosen Government regulation as the primary device for protecting the public interest, a policy of facilitating competitive market structure and performance is entitled to consideration. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967). The Commission, of course, is entitled to conclude that preservation of a competitive structure in a given case is overridden by other interests, United States v. Drum, [419 U.S. 281, 299] 368 U.S. 370, 374 -375 (1962), but where, as here, the Commission concludes that competition "aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy," McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, at 85-86, we have no basis for disturbing the Commission's accommodation.
Our opinion disposes of appellees' objections to the Commission's order insofar as it granted the applications of Johnson and Red Ball. 11 As to appellant Bowman, however, an issue remains. In granting Bowman a certificate the Commission noted that the authority sought by Bowman exceeded that set forth in Bowman's application. The "excess" was granted, subject to a condition precedent of publication in the Federal Register of Bowman's request for the excess authority. Various appellees filed objections to the augmented authority sought by Bowman, which the Commission overruled. Appellees challenged the Commission's procedure in the District Court on a variety of grounds, and though the District Court indicated disapproval of the Commission's action, the court did not have to rule on the merits of appellees' objections since it set aside the Commission's approval of all the applications.
While we have on occasion decided residual issues in the interest of an expeditious conclusion of protracted litigation, see Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966), we believe that the issue of conformity of the Bowman certificate to its application is one for the District Court. The issue was not briefed or argued here, owing to the limitations set forth in our order noting probable jurisdiction. And while the District Court spoke of the Commission's [419 U.S. 281, 300] action in this regard, we do not construe its expressions as a final ruling, since they were unnecessary to the District Court's disposition of the case. Accordingly, the issue remains open on remand.
We hasten to add, however, that our remand provides no basis for depriving Bowman of authority conferred by the Commission that was within its original application.
[ Footnote 1 ] The hearings lasted over 18 months; this transcript covers 23,423 pages; there are 1,989 exhibits; a total of 950 witnesses testified on behalf of 10 applicants; 66 rail and motor carriers entered appearances in opposition to the applications; 48 of the protestants offered evidence through 62 witnesses and numerous exhibits.
[ Footnote 2 ] "The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." 340 U.S., at 488 . And see 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 29.03, p. 129 (1958); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 601 (1965).
[ Footnote 3 ] The Commission stated: "Many of the service exhibits do not cover all of the shipper's pertinent traffic during the study period and some include shipments which were listed because complaints were received on this traffic." Herrin Transportation Co., 114 M. C. C. 571, 596 (1971).
[ Footnote 4 ] The District Court also ruled that since there had been no suggestion during the evidentiary hearings that performance studies subsequent to notice of hearing might not be viewed as representative, the appellees had been denied fair notice of the standards by which their evidence would be judged. 364 F. Supp. 1239, 1260. We disagree. A party is entitled, of course, to know the issues on which decision will turn and to be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for decision so that he may rebut it. Indeed, the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an opportunity to offer a contrary presentation. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274 (1924). But these salutary principles do not preclude a factfinder from observing strengths and weaknesses in the evidence that no party identified. If the examiners had raised the qualifications to appellees' evidence the Commission later interposed, there would have been no basis for suggesting unfairness. See American Trucking Assns. v. Frisco Transportation Co., 358 U.S. 133, 144 (1958). The situation is not altered by the fact that the Commission parted company with the examiners. Even as to matters such as the credibility of witnesses, where the examiner is thought to have an advantage, the reviewing agency is not rigidly barred from taking a contrary position. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). We perceive no reason for binding an agency to the experience and viewpoint of [419 U.S. 281, 289] the examiner in the interpretation of studies in the record. Appellees are not in a position to claim unfair surprise. The Commission offered the identical rationale in interpreting transit-time studies in a case decided just as hearings in this case began. See Braswell Freight Lines, 100 M. C. C. 482, 493-494 (1966). Appellees offered their studies knowing that the Commission might interpose qualifications.
[ Footnote 5 ] We thus distinguish the case where a firm already in possession of a franchise that offers a high degree of protection from competition [419 U.S. 281, 291] seeks its renewal. Cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 341, 359 F.2d 994, 1007 (1966) ("history of programming misconduct . . . would preclude . . . the required finding that renewal of the license would serve the public interest").
[ Footnote 6 ] Fairness as well as rationality, however, command evenhanded application of such a rule. The Commission should not have cited applicants' "performance elsewhere" presentations without noting appropriate qualifications. Compare 114 M. C. C., at 586, with id., at 611. Yet in view of the examiners' undisputed conclusion that all the carriers were "substantial and responsible," there was adequate remaining basis for the Commission's finding of the applicants' fitness. And the service benefits the Commission anticipated from new entry included, not merely a possibility of improved transit times, but many other improvements in service quality. The Commission identified as service deficiencies that would be removed by new entry the following: "restrictions or embargoes [or] outright refusals by existing carriers to handle . . . traffic"; "pickup and delivery problems; interline difficulties relating to loss, damage, tracing, shortages, and misrouting. . . ." Id., at 600.
[ Footnote 7 ] Each carrier presented the possible diversion of traffic that would result if the applications it was opposing were granted. In many cases, the protesting carrier was opposing applications not ultimately granted by the Commission. See, e. g., Examiners' Decision, App. D, at 6, 13, 14, 19, 24, 25, 34, 35, and 48 (reproduced in 2 App. 864, 1191).
[ Footnote 8 ] The same must be said of the examiners' concern that service to small communities might be adversely affected by granting all the applications, since these fears derived from those about impact upon protesting carriers.
[ Footnote 9 ] Much is made, for example, of the Commission's failure to notice a number of terminal closings by appellant Red Ball that had occurred since evidentiary proceedings had concluded. 364 F. Supp., at 1261. The Commission, however, cited the number of Red Ball terminals - reduced by intervening events - only in support of its conclusion that Red Ball, rather than three other carriers, should be certificated to offer new service. 114 M. C. C., at 603. Since these three carriers are not among appellees, we have doubt that appellees can show substantial prejudice from the Commission's failure to update the information.
[ Footnote 10 ] In commenting upon the perceived lack of diligence by the shippers in seeking out service, the examiners rejected the notion that "the burden is upon carriers to inform shippers of their services through personal solicitation." The Commission, however, would have been free to conclude that greater promotional effort by carriers, brought about through competition, might most economically facilitate the matching of services to needs.

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Debra W. Wooley and April Zachary appeal an adverse summary judgment in their action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found, inter alia, that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons assigned we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
The officers discussed the court order before taking any action. Brooks testified that the officers attempted to contact personnel in the juvenile department but that everyone in that office was busy. He further testified that the officers did not attempt to call anyone in the legal department because no one from that division was active at that time of night. He conceded that a legal advisor can be reached after hours under "extreme circumstances, but we have to wait around." Lapeyrouse'stestimony supports Brooks, but Coulter testified that neither she nor her fellow officers attempted to contact anyone in either the legal or juvenile departments.
Brooks decided that immediate action had to be taken. Coulter knocked on the door, identified herself as a police officer, and told Wooley to open the door. Wooley complied and the officers stepped inside the residence. In response to a request by Coulter, Wooley produced her custody papers. Noting the date on her order, the officers informed Wooley that they would have to take Jordan because they had been instructed that when there were conflicting orders, the order bearing the later date prevails. The officers denied Wooley's request to call either her lawyer or April. She pleaded with them not to take the child, claiming that Cecil Zachary had abused April Zachary as a child and that she feared the same thing would happen to Jordan. The officers insisted and Wooley gave Jordan to Coulter. Coulter exited the house and gave Jordan to his grandparents.
Wooley, individually and on behalf of Jordan,3 sued the Baton Rouge City Police Department, the Parish of East Baton Rouge, the City of Baton Rouge, Police Chief Greg Phares, and Officers Coulter, Brooks and Lapeyrouse. In her complaint Wooley claimed that the officers violated her fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and her fourteenth amendment right to family integrity. The complaint also alleged that the police had deprived Jordan of his fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures and his fourteenth amendment liberty interest in remaining in the custody of his legal guardian. Wooley joined Chief Phares and the City of Baton Rouge, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference and failed to train the officers adequately. The claims against the Baton Rouge City Police and the Parish of East Baton Rouge were dismissed voluntarily, and the court declined to exercise its jurisdiction over several pendent state law claims. The district court granted the remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and this appeal followed. Appellants do not discuss in their briefs any issue related to the claims against Police Chief Phares and the City of Baton Rouge. Those claims are deemed abandoned.4 We consider only the fourth and fourteenth amendment claims by Debra Wooley and Jordan Zachary.
Wooley contends that she was deprived of her right to custody of Jordan without due process of law. In addition, Wooley and Jordan each contend that the police officers violated their fourteenth amendment right to family integrity by removing Jordan from Wooley's home. In order to recover under 1983 for violations of their due process rights, Wooley and Jordan must demonstrate that they were denied a cognizable liberty or property interest clearly established either by state law or the United States Constitution.We conclude that they did not have such a clearly established interest.
That expectation is often justified by a biological link between those asserting the protection. " [T]he usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed this element."33 In Stanley the Court, in finding that such a liberty interest existed, emphasized that Stanley "sired and raised" his children and noted that " [i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."34 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a grandmother challenged an ordinance that forbade certain related family members, including Moore and her grandson, from living in the same home. The Court found a liberty interest based on the recognized tradition of relatives, including uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents to "draw together and participate in the duties and satisfactions of a common home."35 Further, the Court distinguished Moore from Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,36 in which an ordinance forbidding more than two unrelated persons from living in a single-family house was found to be constitutional, because the ordinance challenged inBoraas specifically permitted individuals related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to live together. In short, the biological relationship between Moore and her grandson brought the case within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
The present case is distinguishable from the prior cases in which the right to family integrity has been asserted by persons not biologically related on two obvious and important bases. Unlike the cases involving foster families, the contours of the relationship between Wooley and Jordan are not defined by state law, and state law does not supply the justifiable expectations that attend their relationship.44 In addition, unlike in Frank, the expectation that the relationship would be a durable one has not been defeated by the child's biological parents. In fact, April Zachary's approval of their relationship has created and fostered those expectations. Wooley and Jordan contend that under the rubrics of the foregoing cases the emotional ties between a minor and an unrelated adult care giver can create a liberty interest vis-a-vis the child's biological grandparents when the relationship is countenanced by the child's natural mother. They thus contend that under the circumstances here presented Wooley and Jordan shared a fourteenth amendment protected expectation that the state would not interfere in their relationship. However persuasive this contention ultimately may be, we need not definitively resolve it here, for it is indisputable that, at the time of the events in question, no such fourteenth amendment right could be described as clearly established. As to this claim, therefore, Wooley has failed Siegert's "first inquiry" in that she has "failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." The district court did not err in granting the defendants qualified immunity on this claim."
We are not hesitant, however, in finding constitutional protection for the relationship between Jordan and his natural mother. April Zachary does not assert any claims on her own behalf but, rather, asserts a claim on behalf of Jordan. Because a child's right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent,45 we define the scope of Jordan's rights in this context with reference to his mother's rights.
Although a biological relationship does not conclusively establish a liberty interest, the cases in which that interest has been found lacking have concluded that those familial expectations were defeated by either the biological parent's disassociation from the child48 or the state's and society's traditional preference for and protectionof other inconsistent family models.49 Here we have neither circumstance. April Zachary has maintained a significant role in Jordan's life. At the time of the alleged occurrences, she and Jordan lived in the same home and maintained daily contact. If she moved out, she and Wooley had agreed that she was to visit Jordan every weekend and for several hours during the week. When a biological parent "'com [es] forward to participate in the rearing of [her] child,' [her] interest in personal contact with [her] child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause."50 April never removed herself from Jordan's life to a degree sufficient to support the conclusion that she no longer has a liberty interest in personal contact with him. It cannot be seriously suggested that the traditions of our nation establish a preference for child rearing antithetical to the manner in which April proposed to raise Jordan such that her expectation of maintaining a relationship with her son might be justified.
Jordan undeniably is entitled to stay with his mother without governmental interference. That requires us to consider the nature of the process due Jordan before depriving him of that right. The right to family integrity must be balanced against the state's interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of children.51 In close cases, the tension between these two interests is pronounced and we occasionally have been unable to conclude that the due process violation involved was "clearly established."52 Defendants claim that this is such a case and that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted to protect Jordan and to defuse a potentially explosive situation. We are not persuaded. Our cases in which the state's interest has blurred the existence of a family's rights uniformly have involved removal of children by social workers specifically charged with protecting children where there were allegations of abuse.53 There is no indication in this record of any threat to Jordan's safety, nor were the officers investigating allegations that he previously had suffered abuse at the hands of Wooley or April. The requirements of due process may also be satisfied where police officers are authorized to effect a transfer of custody in furtherance of the state's prerogative to protect the welfare of children.54 As mentionedpreviously, however, the court order obtained by the Zacharys did not direct the police to take any action. Under the circumstances, April and Jordan Zachary enjoyed a clearly established right to maintain their relationship free from interference by state actors.
The defendants concede that they had neither a warrant nor probable cause to seize Jordan. In order to prevail, therefore, they must demonstrate a governmental interest sufficient to justify dispensing with constitutional protections. The record before us is devoid of such. As previously noted, there was no evidence of danger to Jordan sufficient to implicate the state's interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of minors. The officers further contend that they acted to defuse a potentially explosive situation. Even if this assertion were true, the interest created by this circumstance is no greater than the interest of law enforcement generally to enforce the laws and keep the peace. The seizure of Jordan inorder to quell a potentially volatile situation was no more permissible than the seizure of Debra Wooley or Cecil Zachary would have been under the same circumstances.
Finally, the officers contend that it was objectively reasonable for them to seize Jordan because: (1) they defused a potentially explosive situation, (2) Cecil Zachary indicated that Jordan was in danger,61 and (3) the Livingston Parish court order was valid on its face. As discussed previously, however, the desire to avoid a domestic dispute cannot form a reasonable basis for depriving Jordan of his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Reasonableness in this context must be gauged in light of clearly established law. An exception for the preservation of domestic tranquility cannot reasonably be thought to exist as to the right to family integrity or the right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The officers' actions, even if they perfectly served this goal, were not reasonably within the bounds of the law. Nor was it objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that Jordan was in danger of imminent harm. The Livingston Parish order in no way indicated that Jordan's safety might be jeopardized. The police were not informed of any abuse prior to arriving at Wooley's home, and they found no evidence of abuse while there. Although Cecil Zachary made allegations casting doubt on April Zachary's fitness as a mother, he made no statement that tended to indicate Jordan was unsafe in Wooley's home. In fact, April Zachary was not present while the police were deciding what to do, and by all appearances Jordan appeared to be safely in Wooley's care.
The police department is not to be involved in enforcing child custody orders in the absence of a specific order signed by a judge and directed to law enforcement to pick up a certain child and deliver him/her to a certain place. General orders stating that one parent is to have custody of the child from Friday - Sunday, for example, are not to be enforced by this Department. The orders that police officers are to enforce mustbe an order to law enforcement officers directing officers to pick up and deliver a child. "Civil warrants" are an example of these direct orders to law enforcement, and are enforceable throughout the state just as other warrants are. However, if you are relying simply on a court order that is not a warrant, it must be signed by a judge of this parish. These will be relatively rare, as most judges will choose to style their own orders to law enforcement in the form of a warrant. Whether you are relying on a civil warrant or simply a court order, you must have it in your possession before you take any action. In addition, both civil warrants and court orders, to be enforceable, must be stamped by the Clerk of the Court with the words "Certified True Copy." The stamp must be an original. If those three magic words do not appear on the order, DO NOT ENFORCE THE ORDER (emphasis in original).
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); La. Const. Art. 1 3; Jordan v. Cosey, 434 So. 2d 386 (1983).
We note two additional bases for this conclusion. First, La. R.S. 952 limits the duration of provisional custody by mandate to a period not to exceed one year, but Wooley purported to accept custody of Jordan until he reached the age of eighteen. The effect of an attempt to transfer custody for a period greater than the prescribed period is unclear. Second, La. R.S. 953 and Civil Code art. 2998 require that the powers granted to the mandatary be express and specific. Whether the general grant of custody contained in the petition and affidavits relied upon by plaintiffs is sufficient to meet those requirements is similarly unclear. Plaintiffs have cited no precedent that resolves these issues, and our research has failed to produce any that clearly establishes Wooley's rights under Louisiana law.
Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1991); Bennett v. Town of Riverhead, 940 F. Supp. 481 (1996). Bennett bears a striking resemblance to this case. Christy and William Bennett were divorced by a judgment that entitled Christy to sole custody of their daughter Charlotte and granted William visitation including three weeks each year away from his custodial residence. When Christy sought the court's permission to change her residence to Arizona, William made known his intention to exercise his three weeks of visitation beginning August 1, but failed to challenge the modification of the visitation decree. The decree was modified. Nevertheless, on August 1 he enlisted the assistance of a police officer in obtaining custody of Charlotte. The officer went to Christy's home in order to control what the police viewed as a "potentially hostile domestic relations dispute" and, after reading both the original order granting visitation to William and the modified order allowing her and Charlotte to move to Arizona, expressed his opinion that William's order controlled and allegedly ordered Christy to relinquish Charlotte. The district court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs had alleged a clearly established denial of due process.


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An “oracle” is a message of doom, usually pronounced against foreign nations, but here it includes the judgement that awaits God’s people. 1:1-2:5 is a dialogue between the prophet and God. From the text, it seems that Habakkuk wrote when Babylonian armies were ravaging Judah, before the fall of Jerusalem in 587 BC, but the problem is universal.
In vv. 1-4, Habakkuk asks God: why do you neither listen nor act? “Violence” is being done to us; our basic human rights are being violated. The state is in confusion and near anarchy (“law becomes slack ... justice never prevails ...”, v. 4). The “wicked”, fellow Jews or foreigners, have taken over! God answers in vv. 5-11: rather than promising stability, he says he is working through the “Chaldeans” (v. 6, Babylonians), a people known for their ferocity and savagery! “Their justice” (v. 7) is their own (not God’s); “their own might is their god!” (v. 11). The prophet now asks: aren’t you Israel’s God? Surely you have marked this enemy for judgement, so why allow this misery to happen to your people? Doesn’t using such wicked people as your agents go against your very essence? (v. 13) The enemy is merciless and self-serving, like someone who catches helpless fish (v. 15); he worships his own achievement, in immense pride (v. 16). Are you and the enemy intent on “destroying nations”? (v. 17) Like a sentinel on a city wall, Habakkuk awaits God’s reply ( 2:1). God responds: make my message “plain” ( 2:2) so all hear it: my justice will come at “the appointed time” ( 2:3), in the “end” times. But God’s time may not be human time, so “wait for it”. “The proud” ( 2:4, the enemy), those who are self-sufficient, don’t endure (“their spirit is not right”), but those who trust in God, “the righteous”, continue to “live”, to keep the faith, even in these difficult times. God has a plan for the future: the faithful will be rewarded, the wicked punished.
This is the 18th stanza of the longest psalm in the Psalter; in Hebrew, each verse begins with tsadhe, the 18th letter in the alphabet. As in each of the other stanzas, the emphasis is on the Law; a synonym for it occurs in each verse. The psalmist’s “foes” (v. 139) are probably fellow Israelites who do not keep the Law, for foreign enemies would not even know it. The psalmist is “despised” (v. 141), in “trouble and anguish” (v. 143). Only the wicked would despise one who keeps the Law. To the psalmist, understanding the God-given Law is the key to living.
V. 1 indicates that “Paul” is the principal author of this letter; “Silvanus, and Timothy” share in writing it. (“Silvanus”, called Silas in Acts, worked with Paul in Thessalonica and Corinth. “Timothy” joined him at Lystra, in central Asia Minor.) Paul’s wishes for the “church”, the community of people of God called to intimate fellowship with Christ, are both Greek (“grace”, v. 2) and Jewish (“peace”); they are from the Father and the Son.
their example to other churches of remaining faithful in spite of sufferings (probably ostracism) (v. 4).
“the name of our Lord Jesus”, v. 12) whatever intentions (“resolve”, v. 11) and acts of trust in God they initiate. Thus Christ’s godliness (goodness) will be seen in them, and theirs in Christ. This will be achieved through the Father’s and the Son’s “grace” (v. 12), his gift of love.
Jesus has been asked by a rich “ruler” ( 18:18) what he must do to inherit eternal life. When Jesus has told him to keep the Ten Commandments, he has said that he has done so since his youth. Jesus then adds: “There is still one thing lacking. Sell all that you own and distribute the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me” ( 18:22). He finds it hard to give up his wealth.
Now we meet Zacchaeus, a tax farmer working for the Romans and therefore also rich – a despised person and an outcast from Jewish society. He is curious about Jesus (v. 3). Jesus senses his presence up in a “sycamore tree” (v. 4). He even invites himself to Zacchaeus’ home! (God extends hospitality to all people.) The crowd grumbles (v. 7), for Jesus has crossed social and religious barriers: good people don’t associate with sinners. Zacchaeus, unlike the rich ruler, is prepared to give generously, and to recompense anyone he has defrauded, as the Law requires. (The Law required that a stolen sheep be replaced by “four”, v. 8, sheep.) “Salvation has come” (v. 9) to Zacchaeus’ house, indeed to his whole household: Jesus chose to stay with him, Zacchaeus accepted him and has changed his life. Being saved is the same spiritual experience as inheriting eternal life and entering the kingdom of God. In spite of the crowd’s grumbling, thinking him “lost” (v. 10), the tax (or toll) collector is a “son of Abraham” (v. 9), a true member of God’s people.

matches: v. V. v. v. v. v.


D.C. Law Library - § 47–2842. Council of the District of Columbia may regulate, modify, or eliminate license requirements.
↪ § 47–2842. Council of the District of Columbia may regulate, modify, or eliminate license requirements.
§ 47–2841. Exposing persons or animals as targets prohibited.
(a) The Council of the District of Columbia is authorized and empowered, when in its discretion such is deemed advisable, to require a license of other businesses or callings not listed in this chapter or Chapter 30 [repealed] of this title and which, in its judgment, require inspection, supervision, regulation, or any other activity or expenditure by any municipal agencies; and the Council of the District of Columbia is further authorized and empowered to fix the license fee therefor in such amount as, in its judgment, will be not less than the cost to the District of Columbia of such inspection, supervision, regulation, or other activity or expenditure. The Council is further authorized and empowered in its discretion to modify any of the provisions of this chapter or Chapter 30 [repealed] of this title so far as eliminating therefrom any business or calling in this chapter or Chapter 30 [repealed] of this title required to be licensed, and the Council is further authorized and empowered in its discretion to raise or lower the amount of the license fee provided in this chapter or Chapter 30 [repealed] of this title, when in its judgment such increase or decrease is warranted.
(b) The fee for an original or renewal license for motor vehicle driving instructors shall be $78.
(d) The Council shall make such regulations, modifications, or eliminations of licensing requirements consistent with the basic business license system as set forth in subchapter I-A of this chapter.
D.C. Law 14-307, in subsec. (b), substituted “$78” for “$50”.
D.C. Law 15-354, in subsec. (d), substituted “basic business license system” for “master business licensing scheme”.
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 1702 of Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Support Amendment Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-544, December 4, 2002, 49 DCR 11700).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 1702 of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Support Amendment Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-27, February 24, 2003, 50 DCR 2151).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 1702 of Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Support Amendment Second Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-103, June 20, 2003, 50 DCR 5499).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5003 of Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-168, July 26, 2005, 52 DCR 7667).
Chapter 30 of this title, referred to throughout subsection (a) of this section, was repealed by D.C. Law 5-136.
District of Columbia Drug Manufacture and Distribution Licensure Act of 1990: See D.C. Law 8-137, codified as §§ 8-131, 8-137 and 33-1001 et seq.


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The article analyzes the data of expedition studies conducted by the team of the leading scientific school of Professor Fedorov Yu.A. in the Archangelsk region for more then 10-years period of researches. The materials of mercury content obtained for samples of bottom sediments sampled in the mouth area of the Northern Dvina River, the lakes of Arkhangelsk and the surrounding areas, at Dvina Bay and different areas of the White Sea. Based on the available data and having considered the results of the authors working on the subject of mercury pollution in the subarctic region, conclusions about the level of anthropogenic impact on water bodies and streams of the Arkhangelsk region are justified. Factors that contribute to the formation of relatively high and low concentrations of mercury in sediments identified. The effects of mechanical, hydrochemical, hydrological barriers analyzed. The natural background of mercury in the bottom sediments of the region revealed. Comparative analysis of the accumulation of mercury in the bottom sediments of the study area and other parts of the subarctic region realized. Opportunities and conditions for existence of the effect of "secondary pollution" discussed.
The peculiarity of bottom sediments is their ability to sequestrate mercury and its compounds and in the case of changing physicochemical and hydrodynamic environmental conditions to bring them partly back to the water column. This results in repeated water pollution, which can last for many years. Generally, the most toxic mercury forms are released from bottom sediments. Such events nonplus the ecologists, as against the background of the all-in-all trouble-free state of the aquatic environment and absence of visible pollution sources one observes the bursts of very high concentrations of mercury and its compounds. As the Northern Dvina estuarine area refers to the bodies, for which mercury is an element of characteristic pollutants [1-3], the urgency is obvious to study the changes in content of this metal and its compounds in the bottom sediments in the region as a factor that can have an adverse effect on the surface water quality. It should be also added that such long-term and large-scale mercury measurements from the bottom sediment area and depth are done for the first time.
Mercury remains one of the priority pollutants of the environment, and this fact concerned the international community. So, at January 19, 2013, after four years of negotiations, parties to the UN was agreed a new international instrument on the issue of mercury contamination of the environment, which aims to reduce the use of mercury in industry, as well as the elimination of accumulated mercury-containing waste .
Lake ecosystems are systems with standing or slightly flowing waters. Bottom sediments, formed in these conditions, are able to demonstrate the timing of the formation of anthropogenic pollution and its intensity. That is, to act as an indicator of anthropogenic load. At the same time, because of its features, lake ecosystems are more vulnerable to various types of exposure. Research has shown that the presence of only one activity on the lake – a recreational, can cause increased toxicity of water and bottom sediments from the complete lack of prior chronic toxicity in short time – 10 years .
Bottom sediments of rivers and other watercourses have greater mobility. In estuarine and tidal areas of rivers bottom sediments are affected also by such factors as changing salinity, pH, Eh and other physico-chemical characteristics along with the hydrodynamic factor.
The mouth region of the Northern Dvina River inflowing into the White Sea is a marginal filter in which anthropogenic factors play important roles equally with the natural factors and processes. The marginal filters are the first step in the removal of pollutants off the waters entering with riverine discharge .
Major work on the study of sediment on the content of mercury, on the basis of which this article is written, has been held in the mouth area of the Northern Dvina River.
River sections as subject waste water discharges and relatively little susceptible to human impacts (the top of pre-estuarial area) were investigated. Also was conducted testing of lake bottom sediments adjacent to the territory of the Arkhangelsk agglomeration, bottom sediments of Ilas marshes and different parts of the White Sea.
Several expeditions were organized and realized on the rivers and water reservoirs of northern part of European territory of Russia in 2004–2011 to study the peculiarities of changes in mercury content in water and bottom sediments by the staff of Southern Federal University. The study regions encompassed the mouth region of the Northern Dvina River, Dvina Bay, and the White Sea areas [7-9]. The procedures of sampling, sample processing and determination of mercury content in the bottom sediments followed the methods tested earlier in the Russian waterbodies [3, 7, 8].
The bottom sediments were sampled along the river in the mouth region with a bottom scoop and/or a tube of a State Oceanographic Institute design aboard the R/V “Aisberg2” in the surface (0–5-cm depth) and subsurface (5–10 cm) sediment layers. More than 150 samples of river bottom sediments were taken at 18 monitoring stations (the scheme of sampling stations see in ).
And in the open part of the White Sea bottom sediments were sampled aboard the R/V Professor Shtokman (64th cruise; August, 2004) by the staff of the Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, Russian Academy of Sciences . The number of analyses totaled more than 350 including 170 analyses of the surface layer of sediments (depth of 0–5 cm).
During the field research a series of lakes, namely Lake Korziha, Lake Butygino, Ilas Marshes, Lake Kudmozero, Lake Kholmovskoye, Lake Lakhta, backwater of Solombalka were investigated (Fig. 1). From each water object differing on physical and chemical composition of waters, bottom sediments and samples of water were collected at randomly selected littoral (<2 m) stations. The samples of bottom sediments were taken with a bottom scoop. Maximum depth of the column, which was selected, was 22 centimeters. Analysis of the mercury content produced for every 2 centimeters from the surface deep into the sediment. About 150 determinations of total form of mercury content were produced.
Most mercury measurements were performed with the help of an atomic absorption method in the cold vapor of the certified Laboratory of the Southern Federal University. The frequency control of the results obtained was performed in the Federal State Unitary Geological Enterprise (FSUGE) Yuzhgeologiya and Hydrochemical Institute of Roshydromet. The measurement error was 10–15%. Eh and pH were also measured in bottom sediments. Accuracy of the analysis also confirmed that analysis was performed of the analyst Anikanov A.M. He was took part in an international intercalibration experiment for determination of mercury in standard water samples, the laboratory held AMOS-Proficiency Test, Water Analysis. On the accuracy of determinations performed 30 laboratories from around the world, his findings did not come from the interval of permissible error values.
Fig. 1. Schematic map of investigated lakes. 1 - Lake Korziha, 2 - Ilas Marshes, 3 - Lake Butygino, 4 - Lake Kudmozero, 5 - Lake Lakhta, 6 - Lake Kholmovskoye, 7 - backwater of Solombalka.
Mercury concentration in bottom sediments of the estuarine area of the Northern Dvina River and the Dvina Gulf of the White Sea varied within 0.02–0.80 μg/g dry weight (DW) amounting on average to 0.135 μg/g DW [3, 7]. Very high mercury concentrations were detected in bottom sediments of internal channels crossing the town of Arkhangelsk. It should be said that these values were excluded from average concentration calculations. Changes in mercury concentration by levels were as follows. In the 0–5-cm layer the mercury content varied from 0.02 to 0.48 μg/g DW, on average it amounted to 0.11 μg/g DW; in the 5–10-cm layer the minimum content was 0.02 μg/g DW, the maximum content was 0.8, the average content was 0.16 μg/g DW.
In the top of the pre-estuarial area of the Northern Dvina River, mercury concentration changed in a narrow interval of values and approached the minimum (0.04–0.05 μg/g DW). At the Port Bakaritsa station, 51 km away from the sea edge of the delta, mercury content in the bottom sediments reached comparatively high values (up to 0.37 μg/g DW). At the next station, downstream of the delta, the mercury concentration decreases approximately by 10 times accounting for 0.03 μg/g DW. The mercury content in the bottom sediment of the Solombala Island station increased up to 0.2 μg/g DW. When moving along Maimaksa channel, over the bottom sediment area from the station Port Ekonomiya to the Mud'yugskii Island station, mercury concentration increases from 0.05 to 0.18–0.22 μg/g DW.
The study of the spatial distribution of mercury in bottom sediments of the estuarine water area showed the following features. The bottom sediments in the water area are the most polluted being influenced by the town of Novodvinsk with the largest pulp-and-paper plant in the region, the Kuznechikha channel downstream of the mouth of the Yuras River and the dock of Solombala Island. The area of the enhanced mercury concentration in bottom sediments is detected in the zone where river waters mix with the sea waters; it stretches from the station of Ust’yanskie turning gange lines to the station of Mud’yugskii Island. When passing a complex barrier formed in the zone where river and sea waters mix, which is mostly pronounced near the station of village of Lapominka, mercury is intensively removed from the water solution being absorbed by suspended substance and then deposited [11-13]. Mud’yugskii Island is a mechanic barrier on the way of river waters moving forward. Here, the water flow velocities decrease and fine disperse suspended material mostly enriched in mercury deposits [3, 13-15]. Such mechanism can also promote accumulation of mercury and its compounds in bottom sediments in the region under the influence of the town of Novodvinsk. Numerous small islands and shoals located over this section of the stream channel play the role of a mechanic barrier. Thus, natural conditions together with the anthropogenic factor promote here the formation of bottom sediments with the maximum metal concentration.
Investigations of accumulation of mercury in the upper layers of lake bottom sediments in the Arctic shows  that concentration of mercury in these layers for a hundred years increased from 0.03 to 0.11 μg/g. In Russia the strongest pollution is observed near iron and steel works on the Kola Peninsula and in Norilsk where the corresponding concentration exceed background levels of tens, and in some places in hundreds of times. Lake sediments are excellent reservoirs of heavy metals that are why it is possible that the contamination levels remain high for many decades.
The amount of mercury in time not only increases in lakes, but also in marine sediments. Even at the North Pole in the sediments at depths from 22 to 3 m mercury concentrations increased from 0.03 to 0.13 μg/kg. These data indicate the increasing global flow of mercury, which is deposited in the Arctic because of the "polar distillation" .
In general at the bottom sediments of the Archangelsk region lakes, the total mercury contents varied from 0.002 to 0.052 μg/g DW (mean 0.012 μg/g DW). The highest concentration of mercury detected in the bottom sediments in the backwater of Solombalka, amount of 0.04 μg/g DW. Relatively high concentrations were found in bottom sediments of the Ilas marshes (varied from 0.009 to 0.06, in average 0.026 μg/g DW).
At the same time, high concentrations of mercury in the backwater of Solombalka allow us to conclude that the main role in the accumulation of mercury here are the effluents of industrial and agricultural enterprises and ports, located on the Northern Dvina River. Backwater of Solombalka has a direct relationship with the Northern Dvina river, as Solombalka is it’s channel.
In the case of bottom sediments of the Ilas marshes, where the mercury contamination was in average 2 times higher than in bottom sediments of lakes in the region – we can talk about the role of organic matter as a supplier of mercury and pH, namely the acidity that increase the mobility of mercury in all components of the landscape.
Overall features of the distribution and accumulation of mercury in bottom sediments of rivers and lakes in the region indicates a small role of the transport of mercury into water bodies through atmospheric channel compared to the direct impact on aquatic ecosystems. Perhaps some role in the uptake of atmospheric mercury can play the vegetation of the region. So, researchers have detected elevated mercury concentrations in the spruce needles and lichens on woody vegetation in the vicinity of sources of mercury emissions to the atmosphere .
Distribution of mercury in bottom sediments of lakes by depth revealed insignificant fluctuations of concentration with a maximum content of mercury in horizon from 2.0 to 4.0 cm with a further decrease with depth.
By analyzing the distribution of mercury in depth of the sediment, it is important to take into the sedimentation rate of sediments. The rate of sedimentation in lakes depends on many factors, such as efficiency of aquatic ecosystems, structure of soils and breeds of a reservoir, susceptibility of economic activity, and the amount of flowing streams. Thus, for each concrete lake will apply its rate of sedimentation. According to various authors, the rate of sedimentation of the lake in the test region fluctuate within 1.6 - 2.1 mm per year (on the Solovetsky Islands) to 3-5 mm per year in the lakes of the Western Sweden (also located in the boreal zone) [18-20]. On the basis of the average accumulation rate of about 3 mm per year, calculated scale formation of sediment in the lakes of the Arkhangelsk region (Fig. 2).
Study of mercury content in deep-water areas of the White Sea allowed to reveal that concentrations of mercury in the bottom sediments of the White Sea varied in the range 0.006–0.095, averaging 0.023 μg/g DW. Note that about 80% of the samples contain less than 0.03 µg/g DW of mercury .
The authors studied the column of bottom sediments from the White Sea, came to the following conclusions: changes of concentrations of mercury is unequal with general tendency to decrease with depth; the maximum concentrations are confined to the horizon of 1.5–3.0 cm sediment; for the upper horizon 0.0–1.5 cm is characterized by the presence of low concentrations of mercury, there is a zone of erosion of sediments, oxidation and a sharp lower border; the presence of the second peak concentrations at depths of 7.5–10.0 cm (2.5 times less compared to the upper horizon), due to the high content of iron sulfides here.
Variations of natural background concentrations of mercury were defined in the range of 0.01–0.03 μg/g DW. At the same time over a background value for the ecosystem of the White Sea was suggested to adopt the upper limit of this range, that is 0.03 μg/g DW .
To evaluate the contamination of bottom sediments by the aquatic ecosystems of Arkhangelsk region, it was decided to use the methodology of determining the index of ecological danger of Hakanson , adapted for conditions in the European subarctic.
Fig. 2 Average mercury content in bottom sediments of the Arkhangelsk region lakes and the years of their formation (quoted from the article ).
The contamination factor was calculated as the quotient of the concentration of the substance in the surface layer of bottom sediments to pre-industrial background value (1). To determine background values was analyzed available data. For bottom sediments of lakes of the Arkhangelsk region revealed average mercury content at the level of 0.012 µg/g DW. For the lakes of the Kola Peninsula these values are on a comparable level . Thus, the proposed value of the background concentration of mercury in bottom sediments of lakes was equal to 0.012 µg/g DW.
So, ranking at a rate of the ecological index danger revealed that bottom sediments of the river ecosystem is most subjected to anthropogenic change and pollution of mercury, while bottom sediments of the Arkhangelsk Region lakes and the White Sea bottom sediments have a little transformed regarding mercury pollution, an intermediate position is occupied by bottom sediments of the Ilas Marshes.
The study of bottom sediments and it’s mercury contamination we can make the following conclusions.
The mercury content in bottom sediments of lakes of Arkhangelsk region varies from 0.002 to 0.052 μg/g DW, with an average 0.012 μg/g DW. Relatively high concentrations were found in bottom sediments of the Ilas marshes (varied from 0.009 to 0.06, in average 0.026 μg/g DW). Concentrations of mercury in the bottom sediments of the White Sea varied in the range 0.006–0.095, averaging 0.023 μg/g DW. Mercury concentration in bottom sediments of the estuarine area of the Northern Dvina River and the Dvina Gulf of the White Sea varied within 0.02–0.80 μg/g dry weight (DW)amounting on average to 0.135 μg/g DW.
The levels of Hg concentrations in the studied lakes are comparable with values for lakes of the Kola Peninsula, not subject to the direct influence of wastewater of industrial enterprises, 4-25 times lower concentrations of mercury in the bottom sediments of lakes of the North American continent. In average the highest concentrations of mercury from different lakes were found in bottom sediments in the backwater of Solombalka, it was 0.04 μg/g DW. At the same time, high concentrations of mercury in the backwater of Solombalka allow us to conclude that the main role in the accumulation of mercury here are the effluents of industrial and agricultural enterprises and ports, located on the Northern Dvina River.
In comparison with bottom sediments of Northern Dvina, where mean of total mercury contamination in bottom sediments is 0.14 μg/g DW, lake bottom sediments contain up to 12 times smaller amount of mercury. These features can be explained by the fact that the lakes are not affected of mercury with wastewater, the main brings of metal and its compounds occurs due to atmospheric transfer and also washout of mercury-containing connections from a reservoir surface. And as we can see their role in the transportation of mercury is small.
Due to the very significant accumulation of mercury in bottom sediments of the estuarine zone of the river, we can assume that under certain conditions, it is possible emission of mercury from the sediments into the water column, and its inclusion in biogeochemical cycles. This danger is relevant to the area of the river, which located downstream from city Novodvinsk. Also in the study of mercury contamination in bottom sediments, we can observe the work of the marginal filter, through which the main part of the migrating in the water mercury is deposited in the mixing zone of the Northern Dvina river - Dvina Bay of the White sea.
The work was supported by the President Grant MK-6241.2016.5, and G/k № 1334.
1. Olenicheva A. V. “About the Experience of the Northern Administration of Hydrometeorological Service (NAHS) in the Field of Studying Extremely Polluted Regions of the Natural Environment,” in The NAHS Information Letter No. 1 (164) (Severnoye UGMS, Arkhangel'sk, 1997) [in Russian].
2. Ovanesyanc, A.M., Krasil'nikova, T.A., Ivanov, A. About the pollution of the environment and radiation situation in the Russian Federation in March 2008 [O zagrjaznenii prirodnoj sredy i radiacionnoj obstanovke na territorii Rossijskoj Federacii v marte 2008 g.]. Meteorologija i gidrologija, 2008, no 6, pp. 98-104.
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Krasnoyarskiy B., Ovsepyan A., Fedorov Y., Savitskiy V. BOTTOM SEDIMENTS OF LAKES AND STREAMS OF DVINA BAY OF THE WHITE SEA COASTAL AREAS AS AN INDICATOR OF ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACT (BY THE EXAMPLE OF MERCURY POLLUTION) _ // Materials of XXVI International Coastal Conference "Managinag risks to coastal regions and communities in a changinag world" . Academus Publishing . 2019. pp. 1-1. DOI: 10.31519/conferencearticle_5b1b93bc761330.98887077 URL: https://academuspub.com/en/nauka/conference_article/2017/view (Date of access 25.04.2019).
Krasnoyarskiy B., Ovsepyan A., Fedorov Y., Savitskiy V. " BOTTOM SEDIMENTS OF LAKES AND STREAMS OF DVINA BAY OF THE WHITE SEA COASTAL AREAS AS AN INDICATOR OF ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACT (BY THE EXAMPLE OF MERCURY POLLUTION) _ " Materials of XXVI International Coastal Conference "Managinag risks to coastal regions and communities in a changinag world" (2019): 1-1. DOI: 10.31519/conferencearticle_5b1b93bc761330.98887077 url: https://academuspub.com/en/nauka/conference_article/2017/view (Date of access 25.04.2019).
Krasnoyarskiy B., Ovsepyan A., Fedorov Y., Savitskiy V. " BOTTOM SEDIMENTS OF LAKES AND STREAMS OF DVINA BAY OF THE WHITE SEA COASTAL AREAS AS AN INDICATOR OF ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACT (BY THE EXAMPLE OF MERCURY POLLUTION) _ " Materials of XXVI International Coastal Conference "Managinag risks to coastal regions and communities in a changinag world" (2019): 1-1. DOI: 10.31519/conferencearticle_5b1b93bc761330.98887077 Print.
Krasnoyarskiy B., Ovsepyan A., Fedorov Y., Savitskiy V.. " BOTTOM SEDIMENTS OF LAKES AND STREAMS OF DVINA BAY OF THE WHITE SEA COASTAL AREAS AS AN INDICATOR OF ANTHROPOGENIC IMPACT (BY THE EXAMPLE OF MERCURY POLLUTION) _ ". Materials of XXVI International Coastal Conference "Managinag risks to coastal regions and communities in a changinag world" (2019): 1-1. DOI: 10.31519/conferencearticle_5b1b93bc761330.98887077 https://academuspub.com/en/nauka/conference_article/2017/view (Date of access 25.04.2019).

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Infinite Art Tournament: The Infinite Art Tournament Left Bracket Third-Round Elimination: Vieira da Silva v. Miró!
The Infinite Art Tournament Left Bracket Third-Round Elimination: Vieira da Silva v. Miró!
There have been four tiebreak matches going on in the Left Bracket Third Round, and both of today's artists got here by winning through one of them. Losing to Vieira da Silva was Henry Raeburn (3-2-2; 42 vf, 34 va, .553) -- he of the ice-skating parsons -- while Miró joins us fresh from a victory over the sculptor Claus Sluter (3-2-1; 43- 30, .589).
Tied with James Tissot in her first try at the Left Bracket Third Round.
Defeated Sir Henry Raeburn in a Left Bracket Third Round tiebreaker.
Brought down Claus Sluter in the Left Bracket Third Round.
This is a strong matchup! I'll vote Vieira da Silva.
Miro for the color. And more variety of line.
OK, here's a match where one artist is really famous, and the other is someone I had never heard of before the tournament. And, in my mind, Vieira da Silva is so much better I can hardly stand it. Where are HER calendars?
I'm going to vote for Miro' and good cheer, but don't tell my wife.
And that was Miro's seventh votes, against Vieira da Silva's two, which means it's Miro' who continues the long journey left to take on Ernst Haeckel!
Left Bracket Fifth Round: Picasso v. O'Keeffe!
Left Bracket Round Four: Ghirlandaio v. Turner!
Left Bracket Round Four: Kupka v. Kandinsky!
Left Bracket Round Four: Manet v. Metsu!
Left Bracket Round Four: Rubens v. Schwitters!

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.