text:
Below is a gallery of United States court cases which are, for various reasons, of great legal or historical significance to alternative educators and advocates of parental liberty.
Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Serv.
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2nd Cir. 1977).
Good v. Dauphin County Social Serv. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989).
Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Serv.
Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa (Juvenile Division), 406 F.S upp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), opinion adopted by 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
Anguis v. Superior Court, 429 P.2d 702 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
Appeal of Pierce, 451 A.2d 363 (N.H. 1982).
Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296 P.2d 298 (Ariz. 1956).
Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3rd Cir. 1994).
Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., 332 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2003); 480 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, U.S. LEXIS 11047 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2007); 06-10123 (5th Cir., Oct. 23, 2007).
Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. v. Tom F. on behalf of Gilbert F., 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd 520 U.S. ___ (2007)(No. 06-637).
Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 942 (1995).
Brunelle v. Lynn Public Schools, 702 N.E.2d 1182 (Mass. 1998).
Calhoun County Dep't of Educ. v. Page, No. 83DR966 (S.C. Fam. Ct., Calhoun County, June 28, 1983).
"Care and Protection of" -- see "In re"
City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church, 382 A.2d 377 (N.H. 1978).
Commonwealth v. Peterheim, ---- (Pa. Somerset County Court 1949).
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 34 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893).
Davis v. Newell Sch. Dist., Civ. 93-5012 (U.S Dist. S.D. January 20, 1993).
Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1985).
Dobbins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E.2d 154 (Va. 1987).
Dusan v. Cumberland Co. Sch. Bd. (Chancery No. 2102, Cumberland County, Va. September 15, 1993).
Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-III School Dist., 439 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006).
Forstrom v. Byrne, 775 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
Franz v. U.S., 526 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1981), rev’d 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983), order supplemented by 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on remand, 591 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1984).
Hinton v. Kentucky State Bd. of Educ., No. 88314 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Oct. 4, 1978), aff'd sub. nom. Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary Ed. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
Houghton Lake v. Board of Educ., 425 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. 1988).
In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juv. Action No. J-75482, 536 P.2d 197 (Ariz. 1975).
In re Ahlman, No. 83-JC-1366 (Harvey County Dist. Ct. of Kan. April 11, 1984).
In re Chapman, 490 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987).
In re Davis, 318 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1974).
In re D.B., 767 P.2d 801 (Colo. App. Ct. 1988).
In re Dixon, No. N-37-86 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. of Oswego County November 21, 1988).
In re Falk, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
In re Foster (Walker v. Foster), 330 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972).
In re Gosette, 326 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio 1975).
In re Hardon, No. 85-JC-9 (Rawlins County Dist. Ct. of Kan. January 17, 1986).
In re Hastings, 83-JC-1365 (Harvey County Dist. Ct. of Kan. 1984).
In re Jost, No. 84-C-88 (Marion County Dist. Ct. of Kan. 1985).
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
In re Kevin L., 726 P.2d 479 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee, 98 F. 429 (N.D.Iowa 1899).
In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
In re Nicholson, 2001 WL 1661707 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), opinion amended and superseded, 181 F.Supp.2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion supplemented, Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Nicholson, 181 F.Supp.2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), question certified, Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2nd Cir. 2003), modified and supplemented by Nicholson v. Williams, 294 F.Supp.2d 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Nicholson ex rel. Barnett v. Giuliani, 2001 WL 218936 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Nicholson v. Williams, 202 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), opinion superseded Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 16, 2001); In re Nicholson, 2001 WL 1338834 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Nicholson v. Williams, 2003 WL 21920266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
In re Patterson, No. 13477, 13478 (Id. Dist. Ct. October 2, 1990).
In re Peirce, 451 A.2d 363 (N.H. 1982).
In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977).
In re Petition to Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse Investigation (Appeal of R.G & S.G., Natural Parents), 2005 PA Super 188 (May 20, 2005)(Robert and Susan Gauthier).
In re Richards, 7 N.Y.S.2d 722 (App. Div. 1938).
In re Skipwith, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852, (N.Y. Dom. Ct. 1958).
In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1999) (Dissenting/Concurring Opinion), aff'd Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
In re Standish, No. N-125-86 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. of Oswego County December 23, 1988).
In re T.M., No. 99-351 (Vt. May 26, 2000).
In re Ward, 239 P.2d 560 (Wash. 1952).
In re White, 82-J-08 (Cloud County Dist. Ct. of Kan. July 2, 1982).
In re Willms, No. 87-JC-350 (Shawnee County Dist. Ct. of Kan. February 12, 1988).
Institute of Creation Research v. Honig, Civil No. 90-0483-B-(M) (S.D. Cal. January 29, 1992).
Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
Johnson v. Prince William County Sch. Bd., 404 S.E.2d 209 (Va. 1991).
Jones v. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 02-MISC-477, (Circuit Court of Kanawha County, W. Va., Sep. 23, 2003), cert. denied, (W. Va., May 26, 2004).
Kindstedt v. East Greenwich Sch. Comm. (R.I. Comm'r Educ. August 7, 1986).
Lawrence v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 412 S.E.2d 394 (S.C. 1991).
Linder v. Linder, No. 01-380 (Ark. 2002).
Livingston Parish School Bd. v. Lofton, 422 So.2d 1357 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
Maas v. Alabama, 601 So.2d 209 (Ala. Ct. App. 1992).
"Matter of" -- see "In re"
McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 81 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 1948).
Payne v. New Shoreham Sch. Dept. (R.I. Comm'r Educ. September 15, 1987).
People v. Black, No. 853105 (Santa Maria Mun. Ct. March 10, 1986).
People v. Darrah, No. 853104 (Santa Maria Mun. Ct. March 10, 1986).
People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993).
People v. Levison, 90 N.E.2d 213 (Ill. 1950).
People v. Turner, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886; (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1952).
"People in the Matter of" -- see "In re"
Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Hampshire County, Nov. 13, 1978).
Peters v. Malin, 111 F. 244 (C.C.N.D.Iowa 1901).
Peterson v. Minidoka, 118 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 132 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
Prince William Co. Sch. Bd. v. Charles Berlin, No. CH-34982 (Prince William Co. Circuit Ct. of Va. November 24, 1993).
Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (Ill. 1875).
School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909).
Sheppard v. State, 306 P.2d 346 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1957).
Snyder v. Asbery, No. 78,045 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Brush & Schnoor, Nos. T97-1105, 1085, 1136, 1137 (S.D. Mag. Ct. 7th Cir. June 17, 1998).
State v. Budke, No. 05009 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 7th Dist., Otter Trail County, Nov. 1, 1983).
State v. Cheney, 305 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. App. Ct. 1957).
State v. Davis, 598 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist., 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891).
State v. LaBarge, 357 A.2d 121 (Vt. 1976).
State v. Lefebvre, 20 A.2d 185 (N.H. 1941).
State v. Lundsten, Nos. 7220 & 7221 (Minn. County Ct., Beltrami County, May 20, 1980).
State v. Massa, 231 A.2d 252 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
State v. Noble, No. S791-0114-A (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegan County, Jan. 9, 1980).
State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. App. Ct. 1904).
State v. Pilkinton, 310 S.W.2d 304 (Mo.App. Ct. 1958).
State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983).
State v. Tollefsrud, No. K8222 (Minn. County Ct., Houston County, Feb. 9, 1983).
State v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987).
State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976).
State v. White, 325 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d, 332 N.W.2d 756 (Wis. 1983).
State v. Will, 160 P. 1025 (Kan. 1916).
State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1971), aff'd 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1 of Dixon County, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891).
Stobaugh v. Wallace, 757 F. Supp. 653 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
Svoboda v. Andrisek, 514 N.E.2d 1140 (Oh. Ct. App. 1986).
Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 843 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d in part and rev'd in part, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994).
Theiss v. Principi, No. 01-0906 (U.S. Ct. App. for Veterans Claims, July 27, 2004).
Trucke v. Erlemeier, 657 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D.Iowa 1987).
United States v. Imoda, 1 P. 721 (Mont.Terr. 1881).
Welker v. Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise City No. 1, No. 93225 (Id. Dist. Ct. May 25, 1990).
West Morris Bd. of Educ. v. Sills, 265 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970).
Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998).
Wright v. State, 209 P. 179 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1922).
Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
Application of Child Suspected of Having a Disability, No. 05-071 (State Education Dep't of NY 2005).
Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F.Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982).
Battles v. Anne Arundel County Bd. Educ., 904 F. Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 1996).
Bayes v. State, 785 P.2d 660 (Id. Ct. App. 1989).
Bendiberg v. Dempsey, 707 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D.Ga. 1989).
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), reconsideration denied, 1988 WL 85938 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 866 F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 1989); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F.Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 1989); In re Blackwelder (In re Sarah B.), 528 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
Blount v. Department of Educ. and Cultural Serv., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988).
Bradstreet v. Sobol, 650 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Public Schools, 616 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1984).
Bryant v. Brown, 118 So. 184 (Miss. 1928).
Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984).
Cavanagh v. Galamison, 297 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
City of Akron v. Lane, 416 N.E.2d 642 (Oh. Ct. App. 1979).
Clonlara v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Clonlara, Inc. v. State Bd. of Educ., 469 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 501 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. 1993).
Commonwealth v. Beiler, 79 A.2d 134 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1951).
Commonwealth v. Bey, 70 A.2d 693 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1950).
Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 126 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 1955).
Commonwealth v. Smoker, 110 A.2d 740 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1955).
Commonwealth ex rel. School Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Ross, 330 A.2d 290 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1975).
Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood Sch. v. Board of Educ., 379 F.Supp. 1233 (E.D.Tenn. 1974).
Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970).
Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Cude v. Arkansas, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964).
Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F.Supp. 379 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev’d, 802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986); Ellis v. O'Hara, 105 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
Ex parte Sharp, 96 P. 563 (Idaho 1908).
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F.Supp. 308, 317-18 (S.D.Iowa 1985), remanded, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.1987).
Gauvin v. Scituate Sch. Comm. (R.I. Comm'r Educ. July 5, 1990).
Grigg v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1982).
Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974).
Herndon v. Chapel-Hill Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
Hill v. State, 381 So.2d 91 (Ala. Cr. Ct. App. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 381 So.2d 94 (Ala. 1980), on remand, 410 So.2d 431 (Ala. Cr. Ct. App. 1981).
Hooks v. Clark County School District, 228 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1602 (2001).
Howell v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp.2d 1012 (W.D.Tex. 1998).
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F.Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd, 144 F.3d 798 (D.c. Cir. 1998), opinion vacated, 156 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rehearing, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(en banc).
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996).
In re Adam D., 505 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
In re Andrew "TT", 122 A.D.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
In re Baum, 401 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
In re Christa H., 513 N.Y.S.2d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
In re Conlin, 130 N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. Children's Ct. 1954).
In re Currence, 248 N.Y.S.2d 251 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1963).
In re Franz, 378 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1976), aff'd 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
In re H., 357 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974).
In re Ivan, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 87 (1999).
In re Kilroy, 467 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
In re McMillan, 226 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
In re Richards, 2 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Child Ct. 1938), aff’d, 7 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
In re Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1983).
In re Searles, No. 9037CH0017 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Sep. 5, 1990).
In re Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
In re Thomas H., 357 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974).
Jernigan v. State, 412 So.2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), cert denied, No. 81-481 (Ala. 1982).
Johnson v. Charles City Community Sch. Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1985), cert. denied sub nom, Pruessner v. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
Knox v. O’Brien, 72 A.2d 389 (N.J. Co. Ct. 1950).
Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1999).
Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981).
Mannis v. Arkansas ex rel. Dewitt Sch. Dist., 398 S.W.2d 206 (Ark. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp., 750 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal decided by 763 F.2d 845 (7th Cir.1985), on remand, 614 F.Supp. 1152 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff’d 798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986).
Michigan Dep't of Social Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 455 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1990).
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988).
New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989).
Novoa v. County of Ventura, 183 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
Null v. Board of Educ. of County of Jackson, 815 F.Supp. 937 (S.D. W.Va. 1993).
Parr v. State, 157 N.E. 555 (Ohio 1927).
People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993).
People v. Berger, 441 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982).
People v. Donner, 103 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951), aff'd without opinion, 100 N.E.2d 48 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1951).
People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953), app. dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954).
People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 179 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1961).
People ex rel. Shapiro v. Dorin, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), aff’d, 103 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951), aff’d 100 N.E.2d 48 (N.Y. 1951), motion granted, 100 N.E.2d 48 (N.Y. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 884 (1951).
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E.2d 342 (Va. 1948).
Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1985).
Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983).
Santa Fe Community Sch. v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ., 518 P.2d 272 (N.M. 1974).
Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F.Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985).
State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988).
State v. Bowman, 653 P.2d 254 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Brewer, 444 N.W.2d 923 (N.D. 1989).
State v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Counort, 124 P. 910 (Wash. 1912).
State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990).
State v. Drew, 192 A. 629 (N.H. 1937).
State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983).
State v. Garber, 419 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1966), cert denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
State v. Gieg, (General Sessions Ct. of Wilson County, Tenn. February 6, 1992).
State v. Hershberger, 144 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio App. Ct. 1955).
State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929).
State v. Jackson, 53 A. 1021 (N.H. 1902).
State v. Kasuboski, 275 N.W.2d 101 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
State v. La Barge, 357 A.2d 121 (Vt. 1976).
State v. Lowry, 383 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1963).
State v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977 (Me. 1983).
State v. Melin, 428 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
State v. M.M., 407 So.2d 987 (Fla. App. Ct. 1981).
State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981).
State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).
State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983).
State v. Superior Court, 346 P.2d 999 (Wash. 1959), cert. denied, Wold v. Shoreline School District, 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
State v. Vaughn, 207 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1965).
State v. Williams, 228 N.W. 470 (S.D. 1929).
State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981).
State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin, 415 N.E.2d 279 (Ohio 1980).
Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1937).
Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
T.A.F. and E.M.F., Juveniles v. Duval County, Florida, 273 So.2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 283 So.2d 564 (Fla.1973).
Thifault v. North Smithfield Sch. Comm. (R.I. Comm'r Educ. July 2, 1990).
Zebra v. School Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 296 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1972).
Bodne v. Bodne, 572 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003).
Foretich v. United States, No. 02-5224 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997), 524 U.S. 953 (1998).
Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971).
Pater v. Pater, 1990 WL 162021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992).
Stephen v. Stephen, 937 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1997).
Strosnider v. Strosnider, 686 P.2d 981 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Zummo v. Zummo, 1988 WL 168470 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
Bell v. Anderson Community Sch., No. 1:07-cv-00936-JDT-WTL (S.D. Ind., Aug. 6, 2007).
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 (1995).
Lofton v. Secretary of the Dep't of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.), aff’d 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004)(en banc).
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, No. 04-5350 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2007).
Burt v. County of Orange, 120 Cal.App.4th 273, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.
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William L. Campbell, Jr., Moving Against the Tide: An Analysis of Home School Regulation in Alabama, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 649 (2001).
Michael E. Chaplin, Comment, Peterson v. Minidoka County School: Home Education, Free Exercise, and Parental Rights, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 663 (1999).
Jessica C. Cox, Commentary, Parental Rights and Responsibilities of Control over Children’s Education, 26 J. L. & Educ. 179 (1997).
Michael Brian Dailey, Home Schooled Children Gaining Limited Access to Public Schools, 28 J.L. & Educ. 25 (1999).
Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 363 (2003).
Donald D. Dorman, Note, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement as Applied to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 733 (1990).
James C. Easterly, Comment, “Parent v. State”: The Challenge to Compulsory School Attendance Laws, 11 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 83 (1990).
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Donald H. Henderson, Eugene L. Golanda, Robert E. Lee, Commentary, Legal Conflicts Involving Home Instruction of School-Aged Children, 64 Ed. Law Rep. 999 (1991).
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J.S. Lerner, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 363 (1995).
Katherine Lindsay, The Law of Home Schooling in Australia, 2003 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 83 (2003).
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Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 971 (1987).
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Ralph D. Mawdsley, Changing Face of Parent's Rights, 2003 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 165.
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, Compulsory Attendance Laws Under Attack, 30 Ed. Law Rep. 627 (1986).
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, Home Instruction for Religious Reasons: Parental Right or State Option?, 4 Ed. Law Rep. 941 (1982).
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, Parental Rights and Home Schooling: Current Home School Litigation, 135 Ed. Law Rep. 313 (1999).
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Douglas G. McCray, Note, People v. Bennett: Are Teacher Certification Requirements for Secular Home Educators Constitutional?, 42 Wayne L. Rev. 259 (1995).
J. Bart McMahon, An Examination of the Non-Custodial Parent’s Right to Influence and Direct the Child’s Education: What Happens When the Custodial Parent Wants to Home Educate the Child, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 723 (1995).
Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 75 (2002).
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Daniel J. Rose, Note, Compulsory Education and Parental Rights: A Judicial Framework of Analysis, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 861 (1989).
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A.M. No. RTJ-11-2287 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3640-RTJ), January 22, 2014 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. HON. CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, PRESIDING JUDGE AND ABDULRAHMAN D. PIANG, PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 14, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY, Respondents.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. HON. CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, PRESIDING JUDGE AND ABDULRAHMAN D. PIANG, PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 14, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY, Respondents.
This concerns the anomalous compliance by respondent Process Server Abdulrahman D. Piang (Piang) with the requirements for the facilitation of his initial salary, particularly his Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the months of February and March of 2010.
Piang was appointed Process Server of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 of Cotabato City on January 25, 2010. He assumed office on February 15, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, Piang submitted the requirements to the OCA-OAS, including two DTRs with detailed time-in and time-out entries for the months of February and March 2010.2 The DTR for the month of February 2010 reported Piang’s time-in and time-out from February 15, 2010 to February 26, 2010, when it should only validly cover the period of February 15, 2010 up to February 21, 2010, the day prior to its submission to the OCA-OAS. In addition, the DTR for the month of March 2010 already contained complete time-in and time-out entries for the entire month even when the same had not yet transpired and become due.
Thus, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Marquez), in his 1st Indorsement3 dated April 5, 2010, required Piang to comment on his anomalous DTRs for February and March 2010.
In his explanation letter4 dated February 22, 2010 addressed to the OCA-OAS, Piang said that it was an honest mistake caused by his lack of knowledge of the policies being implemented by the office. He claimed that he understood the OCA-OAS directive to submit “complete DTR or Bundy Card verified as to prescribed office hours by the Presiding Judge/Clerk of court, one month from the date of assumption” to mean that he should already submit DTRs for the remaining days of February and of the whole month of March 2010 even though he had not yet worked on those days. He further explained that he had no fraudulent intention and that the error was due to sheer inadvertence on his part alone, being too excited to perform his duties and to have the documents signed by former Judge Cader P. Indar (Indar). He simply forgot to seek advice from Judge Indar. Piang adopted the same explanation in his subsequent Comment5 dated May 24, 2010.
Based on Piang’s explanation, Court Administrator Marquez wrote a letter6 dated April 20, 2010 addressed to Judge Indar requiring the judge to comment on why he signed the questioned DTRs even if these were not yet due.
In a Resolution9 dated June 29, 2011, the Court required (1) Piang to manifest if he was willing to submit the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings filed, and (2) Judge Indar to submit his comment on the present matter, otherwise, it shall be deemed waived and the case against him will be decided based on the records at hand.
Piang filed his Manifestation10 on September 15, 2011 expressing his willingness to submit the instant administrative case for resolution based on the submitted pleadings and requesting leniency of the Court in deciding his case.
In a Resolution11 dated February 8, 2012, the Court required Judge Indar to show cause why he failed to comply with the earlier Resolution dated June 29, 2011 of the Court and directed him anew to submit the required comment.
Acting Presiding Judge Bansawan Z. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), Al Haj, RTC-Branch 14 of Cotabato City, informed the OCA, through a letter12 dated April 23, 2012, that Judge Indar, who was by then already suspended because of another administrative case, had not been in touch with the court, thus, Judge Ibrahim believed that Judge Indar would no longer submit his comment on the present case. Judge Ibrahim also vouched for the absence of malice on the part of Piang when he prepared the subject DTRs; Piang was merely not advised properly.
The OCA’s findings and recommendation of a penalty of suspension for one (1) year without pay against Abdulrahman D. Piang, Process Server, Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, be APPROVED and ADOPTED.
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 clearly states that court personnel should indicate in their bundy cards the “truthful and accurate times” of their arrival at, and departure from, the office. As we have ruled in Garcia v. Bada16 and Servino v. Adolfo,17 court employees must follow the clear mandate of OCA Circular No. 7-2003. Piang’s entries in his February and March 2010 DTRs for dates that had not yet come to pass were a clear violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003.
There is no other way but for the Court to view Piang’s falsification of his February and March 2010 DTRs as tantamount to dishonesty. He cannot claim honest mistake as he was fully aware when he accomplished his DTRs for February and March 2010 that there were dates that had not yet even come to pass and for which he could not have reported for work yet. He even meticulously and, thus, intentionally, entered varying time-in and time-out for each date in said DTRs. Piang need not be advised of the policies at RTC-Branch 14 of Cotabato City. Truthfulness and accuracy in the DTRs should be complied with in any office, government offices most especially.
[I]n several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. There were several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty lower than dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances.
In In Re: Ting and Esmerio, the Court did not impose the severe penalty of dismissal because the respondents acknowledged their infractions, demonstrated remorse, and had dedicated long years of service to the judiciary. Instead, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six months on Ting, and the forfeiture of Esmerio’s salary equivalent to six months on account of the latter’s retirement.
The Court similarly imposed in Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero to Register his Time In and Out in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine on Several Dates the penalty of six months suspension on an employee found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying his time record. The Court took into account as mitigating circumstances Guererro’s good performance rating, 13 years of satisfactory service in the judiciary, and his acknowledgment of and remorse for his infractions.
In the case at bar, considering that Piang readily admitted his infraction and that this is Piang’s first administrative case, a similar penalty of six (6) months suspension, instead of dismissal, is already sufficient.
It took three directives and three years for Judge Indar to submit his Comment on the present administrative matter against him and Piang. In a letter dated April 20, 2010, Court Administrator Marquez required Judge Indar to comment on why he signed Piang’s DTRs for February and March 2010 even if these were not yet due. In a Resolution issued more than a year later, on June 29, 2011, the Court likewise ordered Judge Indar to submit his comment on the matter of Piang’s anomalous DTRs. Then, in another Resolution dated February 8, 2012, the Court already required Judge Indar to show cause why he failed to comply with the Resolution dated June 29, 2011 and directed him once more to file his comment. Despite being given notices of the aforementioned letter and Resolutions, Judge Indar filed his Comment only on October 7, 2013, and even then, he did not offer any apology and/or explanation for his long delay in complying with the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court. In fact, Judge Indar has still not complied with the show-cause order of the Court contained in its Resolution dated February 8, 2012. It is worthy to note further that Judge Indar, at that time, was already suspended pending investigation of another administrative case against him,21 and Judge Indar failed to file his comment and compliance with the directives/orders of the Court in said other case.
The conduct exhibited by Judge Indar constitutes no less than a clear act of defiance, revealing his deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court. It is completely unacceptable especially for a judge.
Additionally, the Court bears in mind Benedictos’s failure to submit her comment, which constitutes clear and willful disrespect, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the former. In fact, it can be said that Benedictos’s non-compliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself. Benedictos also directly demonstrated her disrespect to the Court by ignoring its Resolutions dated June 25, 2007 (ordering her to show cause for her failure to comply with the OCA directives and to file her comment) and March 26, 2008 (ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for her continuous failure to file a comment).
Respondent should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It is gross misconduct and even outright disrespect for this Court for respondent to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
Respondent’s continued refusal to comply with the lawful orders underscores his lack of respect for authority and a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of his position. This is anathema to those who seek a career in the judiciary because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every judge. How else would respondent judge endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law, let alone lead his peers, when he disdains to follow even simple directives?
Judging by the foregoing standards, the Court can only conclude that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for his long delay in complying, as well as for his total non-compliance, with the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court.
Lastly, Judge Indar’s excuse - that he inadvertently signed Piang’s DTRs for February and March 2010 as it was submitted for signature together with the DTRs of the other employees of RTC-Branch 14 of Cotobato City - is unacceptable. Judge Indar should be fully aware of the weight of his signature as a judge, and he should take care in affixing the same on the documents before him.
In the discharge of the functions of his office, a judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. Certainly, a judge is enjoined, his heavy caseload notwithstanding, to pore over all documents whereon he affixes his signature and gives his official imprimatur.25 The cavalier attitude displayed by Judge Indar in this case simply cannot be countenanced.
Therefore, Judge Indar is guilty of negligence in his failure to examine Piang’s DTRs for February and March 2010 before signing the same. Even a cursory reading of the said DTRs would readily reveal that they were not yet due, since they covered dates that had not yet transpired.
This is now Judge Indar’s fifth offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,26 the Court imposed upon him a fine of P10,000.00 for violating Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,27 the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for which he was fined P25,000.00. For his third offense, in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2332,28 he was already dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and dishonesty. In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2271,29 he was fined once more for P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. As per records, Judge Indar still has several more cases pending before the Court. All of these cases aggravate the imposable penalty against Judge Indar.
Since Judge Indar had already been dismissed from the service, a penalty of fine would suffice. Upon verification with the Leave Division, OAS, Judge Indar still has accumulated leave credits, the monetary value of which has not been claimed. For Judge Indar’s gross misconduct, insubordination, and negligence, a fine of P40,000.00, as recommended by the OCA, is proper, such amount to be deducted from the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits.
(3) Finding former Judge Cader P. Indar GUILTY of gross misconduct, insubordination, and negligence, and imposing upon him a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, to be deducted from the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
16 557 Phil. 526, 530 (2007).
17 538 Phil. 540, 550-551 (2006).
18 See also Duque v. Aspiras, 502 Phil. 15, 23 (2005).
19Servino v. Adolfo, supra note 17 at 552.
20 A.M. No. P-10-2784, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 403, 408.
21Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 24.
22 374 Phil. 35, 47 (1999), citing Josep v. Abarquez, 330 Phil. 352, 359 (1996).
23Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan, supra note 20 at 409.
24 461 Phil. 665, 669-670 (2003).
26Sampiano v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 597.
27Espina & Madarang, Co. v. Indar Al Haj, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 380.
28Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar, supra note 21.
29Magtibay v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2271, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 510.

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There is hereby imposed on the amount paid for taxable transportation of any person a tax equal to 7.5 percent of the amount so paid.
There is hereby imposed on the amount paid for each domestic segment of taxable transportation by air a tax in the amount of $3.00.
For purposes of this section, the term “domestic segment” means any segment consisting of 1 takeoff and 1 landing and which is taxable transportation described in section 4262(a)(1).
the tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall be determined without regard to such change in route.
There is hereby imposed a tax of $12.00 on any amount paid (whether within or without the United States) for any transportation of any person by air, if such transportation begins or ends in the United States.
This subsection shall not apply to any transportation all of which is taxable under subsection (a) (determined without regard to sections 4281 and 4282).
In any case in which the tax imposed by paragraph (1) applies to a domestic segment beginning or ending in Alaska or Hawaii, such tax shall apply only to departures and shall be at the rate of $6.
Except as provided in section 4263(a), the taxes imposed by this section shall be paid by the person making the payment subject to the tax.
The tax imposed by subsection (b)(1) shall not apply to any domestic segment beginning or ending at an airport which is a rural airport for the calendar year in which such segment begins or ends (as the case may be).
is not connected by paved roads to another airport.
In the case of amounts paid outside the United States for taxable transportation, the taxes imposed by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if such transportation begins and ends in the United States.
Any amount paid (and the value of any other benefit provided) to an air carrier (or any related person) for the right to provide mileage awards for (or other reductions in the cost of) any transportation of persons by air shall be treated for purposes of subsection (a) as an amount paid for taxable transportation, and such amount shall be taxable under subsection (a) without regard to any other provision of this subchapter.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), a corporation and all wholly owned subsidiaries of such corporation shall be treated as 1 corporation.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules which reallocate items of income, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance to the extent necessary to prevent the avoidance of tax imposed by reason of this paragraph. The Secretary may prescribe rules which exclude from the tax imposed by subsection (a) amounts attributable to mileage awards which are used other than for transportation of persons by air.
the cost-of-living adjustment determined under section 1(f)(3) for such calendar year by substituting the year before the last nonindexed year for “calendar year 2016” in subparagraph (A)(ii) thereof.
If any increase determined under the preceding sentence is not a multiple of 10 cents, such increase shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of 10 cents.
1998 in the case of the dollar amounts contained in subsection (c).
For purposes of subparagraph (A), in the case of the tax imposed by subsection (b), the beginning of the domestic segment shall be treated as the taxable event.
If an amount is paid during a calendar year for a domestic segment beginning in a later calendar year, then the rate of tax under subsection (b) on such amount shall be the rate in effect for the calendar year in which such amount is paid.
flights on the aircraft owner’s aircraft.
such other services as are necessary to support flights operated by an aircraft owner.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term “aircraft owner” includes a person who leases the aircraft other than under a disqualified lease.
For purposes of clause (i), the term “disqualified lease” means a lease from a person providing aircraft management services with respect to such aircraft (or a related person (within the meaning of section 465(b)(3)(C)) to the person providing such services), if such lease is for a term of 31 days or less.
In the case of amounts paid to any person which (but for this subsection) are subject to the tax imposed by subsection (a), a portion of which consists of amounts described in subparagraph (A), this paragraph shall apply on a pro rata basis only to the portion which consists of amounts described in such subparagraph.
but only if the helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft does not take off from, or land at, a facility eligible for assistance under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, or otherwise use services provided pursuant to section 44509 or 44913(b) or subchapter I of chapter 471 of title 49, United States Code, during such use. In the case of helicopter transportation described in paragraph (1), this subsection shall be applied by treating each flight segment as a distinct flight.
by a fixed-wing aircraft equipped for and exclusively dedicated on that flight to acute care emergency medical services.
No tax shall be imposed by this section or section 4271 on any air transportation exclusively for the purpose of skydiving.
No tax shall be imposed by this section or section 4271 on any air transportation by a seaplane with respect to any segment consisting of a takeoff from, and a landing on, water, but only if the places at which such takeoff and landing occur have not received and are not receiving financial assistance from the Airport and Airways Trust Fund.
No tax shall be imposed by this section or section 4271 on any air transportation if tax is imposed under section 4043 with respect to the fuel used in such transportation. This subsection shall not apply after September 30, 2023.
amounts paid during such period for transportation beginning after such period.
If, as of the date any transportation begins, the taxes imposed by this section would not have applied to such transportation if paid for on such date, any tax paid under paragraph (1)(B) with respect to such transportation shall be treated as an overpayment.
For inflation adjustment of certain items in this section, see Revenue Procedures listed in a table under section 1 of this title and Internal Revenue Service announcements listed in a table below.
The date of the enactment of this paragraph, referred to in subsec. (e)(1)(B)(ii)(II), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 105–34, which was approved Aug. 5, 1997.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, referred to in subsec. (f), is title I of Pub. L. 91–258, May 21, 1970, 84 Stat. 219, which was classified principally to chapter 25 (§ 1701 et seq.) of former Title 49, Transportation. Sections 1 to 30 of title I of Pub. L. 91–258, which enacted sections 1701 to 1703, 1711 to 1713, and 1714 to 1730 of former Title 49 and a provision set out as a note under section 1701 of former Title 49, were repealed by Pub. L. 97–248, title V, § 523(a), Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 695. Sections 31, 51, 52(a), (b)(4), (6), (c), (d), and 53 of title I of Pub. L. 91–258 were repealed by Pub. L. 103–272, § 7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379, the first section of which enacted subtitles II, III, and V to X of Title 49, Transportation. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables. For disposition of sections of former Title 49, see table at the beginning of Title 49.
The date of the enactment of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund Tax Reinstatement Act of 1997, referred to in subsec. (k)(1)(A)(i), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 105–2, which was approved Feb. 28, 1997.
2018—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 115–141, § 401(b)(42), substituted “a tax in the amount of $3.00.” for “a tax in the amount determined in accordance with the following table for the period in which the segment begins:” and table which set out tax amounts ranging from $1.00 to $3.00 for segments beginning after Sept. 30, 1997, to 2002 and thereafter.
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 115–254, § 802(c)(3), substituted “September 30, 2023” for “September 30, 2018”.
Pub. L. 115–141, § 202(c)(2), substituted “September 30, 2018” for “March 31, 2018”.
Subsec. (k)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 115–254, § 802(b)(1), substituted “September 30, 2023” for “September 30, 2018”.
Pub. L. 115–141, § 202(b)(1), substituted “September 30, 2018” for “March 31, 2018”.
2017—Subsec. (e)(4)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 115–97, § 11002(d)(1)(FF), substituted “for ‘calendar year 2016’ in subparagraph (A)(ii)” for “for ‘calendar year 1992’ in subparagraph (B)”.
Subsec. (e)(5). Pub. L. 115–97, § 13822(a), added par. (5).
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 115–63, § 202(c)(2), substituted “March 31, 2018” for “September 30, 2017”.
Subsec. (k)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 115–63, § 202(b)(1), substituted “March 31, 2018” for “September 30, 2017”.
2016—Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 114–190, § 1202(c)(2), substituted “September 30, 2017” for “July 15, 2016”.
Pub. L. 114–141, § 202(c)(2), substituted “July 15, 2016” for “March 31, 2016”.
Subsec. (k)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 114–190, § 1202(b)(1), substituted “September 30, 2017” for “July 15, 2016”.
Pub. L. 114–141, § 202(b)(1), substituted “July 15, 2016” for “March 31, 2016”.
2015—Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 114–55, § 202(c)(2), substituted “March 31, 2016” for “September 30, 2015”.
Subsec. (k)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 114–55, § 202(b)(1), substituted “March 31, 2016” for “September 30, 2015”.
2014—Subsec. (e)(1)(C). Pub. L. 113–295, § 221(a)(104)(A), struck out subpar. (C) which provided for no phasein of reduced ticket tax for certain transportation.
Subsec. (e)(5). Pub. L. 113–295, § 221(a)(104)(B), struck out par. (5) which related to rates of ticket tax for transportation beginning before Oct. 1, 1999.
2012—Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 112–95, § 1103(c), added subsec. (j). Former subsec. (j) redesignated (k).
Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 112–95, § 1101(b)(1), substituted “September 30, 2015” for “February 17, 2012”.
Pub. L. 112–91 substituted “February 17, 2012” for “January 31, 2012”.
Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 112–95, § 1103(c), redesignated subsec. (j) as (k).
2011—Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 112–30 substituted “January 31, 2012” for “September 16, 2011”.
Pub. L. 112–27 substituted “September 16, 2011” for “July 22, 2011”.
Pub. L. 112–21 substituted “July 22, 2011” for “June 30, 2011”.
Pub. L. 112–16 substituted “June 30, 2011” for “May 31, 2011”.
Pub. L. 112–7 substituted “May 31, 2011” for “March 31, 2011”.
2010—Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 111–329 substituted “March 31, 2011” for “December 31, 2010”.
Pub. L. 111–249 substituted “December 31, 2010” for “September 30, 2010”.
Pub. L. 111–216 substituted “September 30, 2010” for “August 1, 2010”.
Pub. L. 111–197 substituted “August 1, 2010” for “July 3, 2010”.
Pub. L. 111–161 substituted “July 3, 2010” for “April 30, 2010”.
Pub. L. 111–153 substituted “April 30, 2010” for “March 31, 2010”.
2009—Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 111–116 substituted “March 31, 2010” for “December 31, 2009”.
Pub. L. 111–69 substituted “December 31, 2009” for “September 30, 2009”.
Pub. L. 111–12 substituted “September 30, 2009” for “March 31, 2009”.
2008—Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 110–330 substituted “March 31, 2009” for “September 30, 2008”.
Pub. L. 110–253 substituted “September 30, 2008” for “June 30, 2008”.
Pub. L. 110–190 substituted “June 30, 2008” for “February 29, 2008”.
2007—Subsec. (j)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 110–161 substituted “February 29, 2008” for “September 30, 2007”.
2005—Subsec. (e)(1)(B)(i). Pub. L. 109–59, § 11122(a)(1), inserted “(in the case of any airport described in clause (ii)(III), on flight segments of at least 100 miles)” after “by air”.
Subsec. (e)(1)(B)(ii)(III). Pub. L. 109–59, § 11122(a)(2), added subcl. (III).
Subsec. (e)(4)(C). Pub. L. 109–135 substituted “imposed by subsection (b)” for “imposed subsection (b)”.
Subsecs. (i), (j). Pub. L. 109–59, § 11123(a), added subsec. (i) and redesignated former subsec. (i) as (j).
2003—Subsec. (e)(4)(D). Pub. L. 108–176 added subpar. (D).
Subsecs. (e), (f). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1031(c)(2), added subsec. (e) and redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated (g).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1031(c)(2), redesignated subsec. (f) as (g). Former subsec. (g) redesignated (h).
Subsec. (g)(1)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1031(b)(1), substituted “September 30, 2007” for “September 30, 1997”.
Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1601(f)(4)(D), inserted “on that flight” after “dedicated”.
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1435(a), added subsec. (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (i).
Pub. L. 105–34, § 1031(c)(2), redesignated subsec. (g) as (h).
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 105–34, § 1435(a), redesignated subsec. (h) as (i).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 104–188, § 1609(b), substituted “January 1, 1996, and to transportation beginning on or after the date which is 7 calendar days after the date of the enactment of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 and before January 1, 1997” for “January 1, 1996”.
1994—Subsecs. (e), (f)(2). Pub. L. 103–272, § 5(g)(2), substituted “section 44509 or 44913(b) or subchapter I of chapter 471 of title 49, United States Code,” for “the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982”.
1990—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 101–508, § 11213(a)(1), substituted “10 percent” for “8 percent”.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 101–508, § 11213(d)(1), substituted “January 1, 1996” for “January 1, 1991”.
1989—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101–239 substituted “$6” for “$3”.
1987—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 100–223, § 404(c), which directed the substitution of “Improvement Act” for “System Improvement Act” could not be executed because such words do not appear.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 100–223, § 404(a), added subsec. (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated (g).
Pub. L. 100–223, § 402(a)(1), substituted “January 1, 1991” for “January 1, 1988”.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 100–223, § 404(a), redesignated former subsec. (f) as (g).
“(B) the exploration for oil or gas, or”.
1984—Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 98–369 amended par. (1) generally, designating existing provisions as subpar. (A) and adding subpar. (B).
1982—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 97–248 substituted provisions relating to exemptions for certain helicopter uses for provisions that effective with respect to transportation beginning after Sept. 30, 1980, the rate of taxes imposed by subsecs. (a) and (b) would be 5 percent and taxes imposed by subsec. (c) would not apply.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 97–248 added subsec. (f).
1980—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 96–298 substituted “September 30, 1980” for “June 30, 1980”.
1976—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 94–455, § 1904(a)(7)(A), struck out “which begins after June 30, 1970” after “any person”.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 94–455, § 1904(a)(7)(A), struck out “which begins after June 30, 1970” after “with transportation”.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 94–455, § 1904(a)(7)(B), struck out “and begins after June 30, 1970” after “United States”.
1970—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 91–258 consolidated former provisions of subsecs. (a) and (b) for imposition of tax on amounts paid within and outside the United States, substituting an 8 percent rate commencing after June 30, 1970, for prior 5 percent rate commencing after Nov. 15, 1962.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 91–258 redesignated subsec. (c) as (b), substituting an 8 percent rate in connection with transportation which begins after June 30, 1970, and with respect to which a tax is imposed by subsec. (a) for prior 5 percent rate in connection with transportation which began after Nov. 15, 1962, and with respect to which a tax had been imposed by former provisions of subsecs. (a) and (b). Former subsec. (b) provisions for imposition of tax on amounts paid outside the United States were incorporated in subsec. (a).
Subsecs. (c), (d). Pub. L. 91–258 added subsec. (c), redesignated former subsec. (c) as (d), and substituted “section 4263(a)” for “section 4264”.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 91–258 added subsec. (e).
1965—Pub. L. 89–44 substituted “November 15, 1962” for “November 15, 1962, and before July 1, 1965” wherever appearing.
1964—Pub. L. 88–348 substituted “July 1, 1965” for “July 1, 1964” wherever appearing.
1963—Pub. L. 88–52 substituted “July 1, 1964” for “July 1, 1963” wherever appearing.
1962—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 87–508, § 5(b), struck out imposition of tax on transportation of persons by rail, motor vehicle, or water and substituted “tax equal to 5 percent of the amount so paid in connection with transportation which begins after November 15, 1962, and before July 1, 1963” for “tax equal to 10 percent of the amount so paid for transportation which begins before November 16, 1962”.
Pub. L. 87–508, § 5(a), substituted provisions imposing a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount paid for transportation which begins before Nov. 16, 1962, for provisions imposing a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount paid before July 1, 1962, or 5 percent of the amount paid on or after July 1, 1962.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 87–508, § 5(b), substituted “tax equivalent to 5 percent of the amount so paid in connection with transportation which begins after November 15, 1962, and before July 1, 1963” for “tax equivalent to 10 percent of the amount so paid in connection with transportation which begins before November 16, 1962”.
Pub. L. 87–508, § 5(a), substituted provision imposing a tax equivalent to 10 percent of the amount paid in connection with transportation which begins before Nov. 16, 1962 for provision imposing a tax equivalent to 10 percent of the amount paid before July 1, 1962, or 5 percent of the amount paid on or after July 1, 1962.
1961—Pub. L. 87–72 substituted “July 1, 1962” for “July 1, 1961”, wherever appearing.
1960—Pub. L. 86–564 substituted “July 1, 1961” for “July 1, 1960” wherever appearing.
1959—Pub. L. 86–75 reduced tax on transportation of persons from ten to five percent effective July 1, 1960.
1956—Subsec. (a). Act July 25, 1956, § 1, substituted “taxable transportation (as defined in section 4262) of any person by rail, motor vehicle, water, or air a tax” for “the transportation of persons by rail, motor vehicle, water, or air within or without the United States a tax”.
Subsec. (b). Act July 25, 1956, § 1, substituted “taxable transportation (as defined in section 4262) of any person by rail, motor vehicle, water, or air, but only if such transportation begins and ends in the United States” for “transportation of persons by rail, motor vehicle, water, or air which begins and ends in the United States”.
Subsec. (d). Act July 25, 1956, § 4(b), substituted “Except as provided in section 4264, the” for “The”.
Amendment by section 11002(d)(1)(FF) of Pub. L. 115–97 applicable to taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, see section 11002(e) of Pub. L. 115–97, set out as a note under section 1 of this title.
Amendment by section 1101(b)(1) of Pub. L. 112–95 effective Feb. 18, 2012, see section 1101(c) of Pub. L. 112–95, set out as an Effective and Termination Dates of 2012 Amendment note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–91 effective Feb. 1, 2012, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 112–91, set out as an Effective and Termination Dates of 2012 Amendment note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–30 effective Sept. 17, 2011, see section 202(c) of Pub. L. 112–30, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–27 effective July 23, 2011, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 112–27, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–21 effective July 1, 2011, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 112–21, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–16 effective June 1, 2011, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 112–16, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–7 effective Apr. 1, 2011, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 112–7, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–329 effective Jan. 1, 2011, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–329, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–249 effective Oct. 1, 2010, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–249, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–216 effective Aug. 2, 2010, see section 101(c) of Pub. L. 111–216, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–197 effective July 4, 2010, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–197, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–161 effective May 1, 2010, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–161, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–153 effective Apr. 1, 2010, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–153, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–116 effective Jan. 1, 2010, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–116, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–69 effective Oct. 1, 2009, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–69, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–12 effective Apr. 1, 2009, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 111–12, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 110–330 effective Oct. 1, 2008, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 110–330, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 110–253 effective July 1, 2008, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 110–253, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 110–190 effective Mar. 1, 2008, see section 2(c) of Pub. L. 110–190, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 110–161 effective Oct. 1, 2007, see section 116(d) of div. K of Pub. L. 110–161, set out as a note under section 4081 of this title.
Amendment by section 11123(a) of Pub. L. 109–59 applicable to transportation beginning after Sept. 30, 2005, see section 11123(c) of Pub. L. 109–59, set out as a note under section 4083 of this title.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the amendments made by subsections (b) and (c) [amending this section and sections 4263 and 4271 of this title] shall apply to transportation beginning on or after October 1, 1997.
the amendment made to section 4263(c) of such Code shall apply to the extent related to taxes imposed under the amendment made to such section 4261(c) on the amounts described in clause (i).
Paragraph (3) of section 4261(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by the amendment made by subsection (c)) shall apply to amounts paid (and other benefits provided) after September 30, 1997.
Amendment by section 1601(f)(4)(D) of Pub. L. 105–34 effective as if included in the provisions of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–188, to which it relates, see section 1601(j) of Pub. L. 105–34, set out as a note under section 23 of this title.
The amendments made by subsection (b) [amending this section and section 4271 of this title] shall apply to transportation beginning on or after such 7th day [means the 7th day after Feb. 28, 1997].
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the amendments made by subsection (b) shall not apply to any amount paid before such 7th day.
Amendment by Pub. L. 104–188 effective on 7th calendar day after Aug. 20, 1996, but not applicable to any amount paid before such date, see section 1609(i) of Pub. L. 104–188, set out as a note under section 4041 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 91–258 applicable to transportation beginning after June 30, 1970, see section 211(b) of Pub. L. 91–258, set out as a note under section 4041 of this title.
For provisions that nothing in amendment by section 401(b)(42) of Pub. L. 115–141 be construed to affect treatment of certain transactions occurring, property acquired, or items of income, loss, deduction, or credit taken into account prior to Mar. 23, 2018, for purposes of determining liability for tax for periods ending after Mar. 23, 2018, see section 401(e) of Pub. L. 115–141, set out as a note under section 23 of this title.
Due date for deposits of taxes imposed by this section which would be required to be made after Aug. 14, 1997, and before Oct. 1, 1997, to be Oct. 10, 1997, and due date for deposits of taxes imposed by this section which would be required to be made after Aug. 14, 1998, and before Oct. 1, 1998, to be Oct. 5, 1998, see section 1031(g) of Pub. L. 105–34, set out as a note under section 6302 of this title.
2011—Internal Revenue News Release IR 2010–129, Dec. 29, 2010.
2010—Internal Revenue News Release IR 2009–120, Dec. 23, 2009.