Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian brings this action to the Honorable Court due to the failure of the Rhode Island State Sheriff’s Department and one of its deputies (hereinafter referred to as “the Department,” “defendant,” or “Defendant Doe”) failed to adhere to the laws pertaining to searches, seizures, privacy, and stalking: specifically R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-1-2.1, 9-1-28.1, 11-45-1, the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island; as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; and other causes of action to be conveyed to the Court. The search and seizure of the Plaintiff’s phone by a Sheriff’s deputy failed to “adhere to the highest standards of ethical conduct, [and] respect the public trust and the rights of all persons” pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-1 et seq. Further, the search and seizure failed to protect the lawful entitlements to privacy of Nicholas Alahverdian. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court declare that the Department’s actions violate state and federal laws, assess civil fines, punitive damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and enjoin the Department from further violations.
1. Plaintiff, Nicholas Alahverdian is a resident of Rhode Island.
2. Defendant, Rhode Island State Sheriff’s Department is a Rhode Island law enforcement agency. Defendant Doe is a deputy who refuses to give his name and was not provided by the Department.
3. Jurisdiction over this matter is vested in the Superior Court pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-14.
4. Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian appeared at the Garrahy Judicial Complex. Plaintiff attempted to speak to a Court Clerk, but before even entering the courtroom, was confronted by a demonstrative deputy in the anteroom of the Courtroom. Plaintiff was screamed at by the deputy (John Doe) in the hallway, who was also swearing and acting in a volatile manner, who instructed Plaintiff to leave the area because of a “confidential hearing.” Plaintiff objected and stated that he wanted to speak to the clerk and that the court was obviously not in session.
5. While in the hallway, Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian took out his phone and began to record the malicious, verbally assaultive remarks. Defendant threatened to take Plaintiff’s phone away. Plaintiff called for help as the vicinity fell into silence because of how loud the deputy was screaming. Defendant Doe threatened to physically assault Plaintiff while they were in an elevator. Plaintiff was escorted out of the building. Plaintiff was thus prohibited from access to the courts.
6. A few weeks later, Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian returned to the courthouse. Plaintiff was speaking in the lobby of the Court offices on his cellular telephone to Chief Joseph Little of the Capitol Police. Defendant Doe heard Plaintiff tell Chief Little of the recording of the deputy who was verbally assaultive. Plaintiff did not see the deputy. Plaintiff ended the phone call. Plaintiff saw Defendant Doe come around the corner. Plaintiff felt stalked. Plaintiff was instructed to hand over the phone.
7. Plaintiff was screamed at in a volatile manner. Capitol Police officers and the Chief of Staff of the Family Court, as well as other witnesses, were present. Plaintiff refused to hand over the phone.
8. Plaintiff inquired as to why the Defendant Doe required the phone. Plaintiff was threatened with arrest for “obstruction of justice.” Plaintiff was struck twice. Plaintiff had his arms twisted. Plaintiff was violently shoved against the wall. Defendant Doe repetitively took out his hand cuffs. Defendant was verbally threatening. Defendant repetitively threatened to arrest Plaintiff.
9. Plaintiff, intimidated and in fear for his life, and under threat of arrest, handed the phone over to the deputy. Defendant left the area with the phone and returned several times, all the while screaming and hollering maniacally, violently asking the Plaintiff to locate the videos and photographs on the phone in an effort to provoke the spoliation of the evidence of the video of his verbal assaultiveness recorded earlier.
10. The two Capitol Police officers encouraged their colleague to calm down because he was so out of control.
11. Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian finally managed to depart the area.
12. Plaintiff has been stalked by Defendant Doe each time he enters the Courthouse, even after complaining about the deputy to Chief Deputy Silva and High Sheriff Dias. Defendant also has appeared in courtrooms without recusing himself due to an ongoing investigation of his conduct, and harasses Plaintiff each time he enters the courthouse.
13. Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian had an important role to document the criminal conduct of the sheriff when he began to be screamed at. Plaintiff could not perform that role if he feared criminal reprisals.
14. The four factors of illegal seizure established by Rhode Island courts are satisfied. Plaintiff owned the phone. Plaintiff previously used the phone. Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian had the power to exclude the deputy’s unlawful use and/or seizure of the phone, and Plaintiff had a legitimate basis for being present in the Courthouse.
15. Defendant’s search and seizure of the phone was unconstitutional. There was no reason to search the phone. No crime was committed. The deputy’s sole intent was to destroy evidence against him, thus using state power, the color of law, for a personal interest; that is, to destroy evidence of his previous misbehavior of verbal assault and violation of the Code of Ethics.
16. Defendant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
17. Defendant had no warrant, no proof of a crime, and no probable cause.
18. The unlawful and intrusive seizure was profound. Justice Louis Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, “The Fourth Amendment must protect the privacies of life.” It was 1928 when he warned that “ways may someday be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.” Searching and seizing Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian’s phone is a major violation of privacy.
19. Defendant did not have a warrant, nor did Defendant have the authority to issue such a warrant as the Defendant is not a judge, thus the “warrant” was not judicially sanctioned. There was no probable cause that a crime had been committed.
20. The Fourth Amendment allows no search or seizure of a person’s property without a warrant. An illegal seizure of property occurred when the defendant unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s possessory interests.
21. The Plaintiff’s freedom of movement was restrained and his liberty was unconstitutionally intruded upon by the defendant.
22. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 21 herein.
23. Defendant illegally searched the Plaintiff and seized the Plaintiff’s phone.
24. At the time of the incident, the agent of the Department were acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment.
25. Plaintiff claims and is entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries set forth above.
26. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court declare that the Department violated the Fourth Amendment.
27. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court enjoin the Department from future violations of the Fourth Amendment.
28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 27 herein.
29. The Department violated the Fourth Amendment when it unlawfully seized the phone of the Plaintiff.
30. The Department had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the law.
31. The Department is presumed to have a knowledge of the law.
32. The Department willfully and/or knowingly violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
33. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court assess a fine against the Department and the responsible agents for a knowing and intentional violation of the Fourth Amendment.
34. Plaintiff claims and is entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries set forth above.
35. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 34 herein.
36. Defendant violated the privacy of the Plaintiff when it unlawfully seized Plaintiff’s phone.
37. At the time of the incident, the agent of the Department was acting under color of state law and within the scope of his employment.
38. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above for the Department’s violation of Plaintiff’s rights under color of law.
39. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court declare that the Department violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1.
40. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court enjoin the Department from future violations of R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1.
41. Plaintiff asks that this Honorable Court assess a fine against the Department and the responsible agents for a knowing and intentional violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1.
42. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 41 herein.
43. Defendant violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-2.1 when Defendant Doe surreptitiously stalked Plaintiff in an effort to confront Plaintiff, unlawfully seize the phone, and destroy evidence of his misconduct.
44. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above for stalking.
45. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 44 herein.
46. The Department and Defendant Doe violated 11-45-1 when Defendant was swearing, screaming, and yelling, admonishing Plaintiff Nicholas Alahverdian to be in fear for his life.
47. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above for disorderly conduct.
48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 47 herein.
49. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under color of law.
50. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 49 herein.
51. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Defendant for violation conspiring to interfere with Plaintiff’s civil rights.
52. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 51 herein.
53. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against Defendant for having knowledge of the wrongs conspired to be committed.
54. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 53 herein.
55. Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth above under the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Article 1, Sections 2, 5, and 6.
6) and grant such other relief as may be just and appropriate.
I certify that the foregoing Complaint has been hand delivered to the Rhode Island Department of Attorney General, on this 25th day of April, 2011.


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S. C. Kwon, S. C. Baek, Y. G. Choi, J. Yang, Y. Lee, J.-S. Woo*, V. N. Kim* (2019) "Molecular basis for the single-nucleotide precision of primary microRNA processing" Molecular Cell, 73(3):505–518.
H. Kim1, J. Kim1, K. Kim, H. Chang, K. You, V. N. Kim (2018) "Bias-minimized quantification of microRNA reveals widespread alternative processing and 3′ end modification" Nucleic Acids Research, in press.
J. Yeo, V. N. Kim (2018) "U-tail as a guardian against invading RNAs" Nature structural & molecular biology, 25, 903–905.
Y. Kim1, J. Park1, S. Kim1, M. Kim, M. G. Kang, C. Kwak, M. Kang, B. Kim, H. W. Rhee, V. N. Kim (2018) "PKR senses nuclear and mitochondrial signals by interacting with endogenous double-stranded RNAs" Molecular Cell, 71(6):1051-1063.e6.
J. Lim1, D. Kim1, Y. Lee1, M. Ha, M. Lee, J. Yeo, H. Chang, J. Song, K. Ahn, V. N. Kim (2018) "Mixed tailing by TENT4A and TENT4B shields mRNA from rapid deadenylation" Science, eaam5794.
H. Yi1, J. Park1, M. Ha, J. Lim, H. Chang, V. N. Kim (2018) "PABP Cooperates with the CCR4-NOT Complex to Promote mRNA Deadenylation and Block Precocious Decay" Molecular Cell, 70(6):1081-1088.e5..
B. Kim, V. N. Kim (2018) "fCLIP-seq for transcriptomic footprinting of dsRNA-binding proteins: Lessons from DROSHA" Methods, S1046-2023(18)30064-1.
T. A. Nguyen1, J. Park1, T. L. Dang, Y. G. Choi, V. N. Kim (2018) "Microprocessor depends on hemin to recognize the apical loop of primary microRNA" Nucleic Acids Res., 46(11):5726-5736.
A. Son1, J.-E. Park1, V. N. Kim (2018) "PARN and TOE1 Constitute a 3′ End Maturation Module for Nuclear Non-coding RNAs" Cell Reports, 23(3):888-898.
H. Chang1, J. Yeo1, J.-g. Kim, H. Kim, J. Lim, M. Lee, H. H. Kim, J. Ohk, H.-Y. Jeon, H. Lee, H. Jung, K.-W. Kim and V. N. Kim (2018) "Terminal Uridylyltransferases Execute Programmed Clearance of Maternal Transcriptome in Vertebrate Embryos" Molecular Cell, 70(1):72-82.e7.
K. Kim1, T. D. Nguyen1, S. Li, T. A. Nguyen (2018) "SRSF3 recruits DROSHA to the basal junction of primary microRNAs" RNA, 24(7):892-898.
V. N. Kim (2018) "RNA-targeting CRISPR comes of age" Nature Biotechnology, 36:44–45.
B. Kim1, K. Jeong1, V. N. Kim (2017) "Genome-wide Mapping of DROSHA Cleavage Sites on Primary MicroRNAs and Noncanonical Substrates" Molecular Cell, 66(2):258-269.
J. Choi, Y.-K. Kim, K. Park, J. Nah, S. S. Yoon, D. W. Kim, V. N. Kim, R. H. Seong (2016) "MicroRNA-139-5p regulates proliferation of hematopoietic progenitors and is repressed during BCR-ABL-mediated leukemogenesis" Blood, 128(17):2117-2129.
J. Lim1, M. Lee1, A. Son, H. Chang, V. N. Kim (2016) "mTAIL-seq reveals dynamic poly(A) tail regulation in oocyte-to-embryo development" Genes & Development, 30:1671-1682.
B. Choi1, J. Yu1, T.-S. Han, Y.-K. Kim, K. Hur, B.-C. Kang, W. H. Kim, D.-Y. Kim, H.-J. Lee, V. N. Kim, H.-K. Yang (2016) "Gastric Carcinogenesis in the miR-222/221 Transgenic Mouse Model" Cancer Research and Treatment, 49(1):150-160.
J.-E. Park1, H. Yi1, Y. Kim1, H. Chang, V. N. Kim (2016) "Regulation of Poly(A) Tail and Translation during the Somatic Cell Cycle" Molecular Cell, 62(3):462-471.
Y.-K. Kim*, B. Kim, V. N. Kim* (2016) "Re-evaluation of the roles of DROSHA, Exportin 5, and DICER in microRNA biogenesis" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U. S. A., 113(13):E1881-E1889.
S. C. Kwon1, T. A. Nguyen1, Y.-G. Choi1, M. H. Jo, S. Hohng, V. N. Kim*, J.-S. Woo* (2016) "Structure of Human DROSHA" Cell, 164(1-2):81-90.
K. T. You, J. Park, and V. N. Kim (2015) "Role of the small subunit processome in the maintenance of pluripotent stem cells" Genes & Development, 29:2004-2009.
J. Cho1, N.-K. Yu1, J.-H. Choi, S.-E. Sim, S. J. Kang, C. Kwak, S.-W. Lee, J. Kim, D. I. Choi, V. N. Kim*, and B.-K. Kaang* (2015) "Multiple repressive mechanisms in the hippocampus during memory formation" Science, 350(6256):82–87.
M. Kampmann, M. A. Horlbeck, Y. Chena, J. C. Tsai, M. C. Bassik, L. A. Gilbert, J. E. Villalta, S. C. Kwon, H. Chang, V. N. Kim, J. S. Weissman (2015) "Next-generation libraries for robust RNA interference-based genome-wide screens" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U. S. A., 112(26):E3384-E3391.
S. Kim1, D. Seo1, D. Kim, Y. Hong, H. Chang, D. Baek, V. N. Kim, S. Lee, K. Ahn (2015) "Temporal Landscape of MicroRNA-Mediated Host-Virus Crosstalk during Productive Human Cytomegalovirus Infection" Cell Host & Microbe, 17(6):838-851.
T. A. Nguyen, M. H. Jo, Y.-G. Choi, J. Park, S. C. Kwon, S. Hohng, V. N. Kim*, J.-S. Woo* (2015) "Functional Anatomy of the Human Microprocessor" Cell, 161(6):1374-1387.
K. Boo1, J. Bhin1, Y. Jeon, J. Kim, H. J. Shin, J. E. Park, K. Kim, C. R. Kim, H. Jang, I. H. Kim, V. N. Kim, D. Hwang, H. Lee, S. H. Baek (2015) "Pontin functions as an essential coactivator for Oct4-dependent lincRNA expression in mouse embryonic stem cells" Nature Communications, 6:6810.
T.-S. Han, K. Hur, G. Xu, B. Choi, Y. Okugawa, Y. Toiyama, H. Oshima, M. Oshima, H.-J. Lee, V. N. Kim, A. N. Chang, A. Goel, and H.-K. Yang (2015) "MicroRNA-29c mediates initiation of gastric carcinogenesis by directly targeting ITGB1" Gut, 64:203–214.
I. Jang1, H. Chang1, Y. Jun, S. Park, J. O. Yang, B. Lee, W. Kim, V. N. Kim, and S. Lee (2015) "miRseqViewer: Multi-panel visualization of sequence, structure and expression for analysis of microRNA sequencing data" Bioinformatics, 31(4): 596-598.
J. Lim1, M. Ha1, H. Chang1, S. C. Kwon, D. K. Simanshu, D. J. Patel, and V. N. Kim (2014) "Uridylation by TUT4 and TUT7 marks mRNA for degradation" Cell, 159(6):1365-1376.
M. Lee, Y. Choi, K. Kim, H. Jin, J. Lim, T. A. Nguyen, J. Yang, M. Jeong, A. J. Giraldez, H. Yang, D. J. Patel, and V. N. Kim (2014) "Adenylation of maternally inherited microRNAs by Wispy" Molecular Cell, 56(5):696-707.
Y. Kim1, J. Yeo1, J. H. Lee1, J. Cho, D. Seo, J. Kim, and V. N. Kim (2014) "Deletion of human tarbp2 reveals cellular microRNA targets and cell cycle function of TRBP" Cell Reports, 9:1061–1074.
M. Lee, B. Kim and V. N. Kim (2014) "Emerging roles of RNA modifications: m6A and U-tail" Cell, 158:980-987.
M. Ha and V. N. Kim (2014) "Regulation of microRNA biogenesis" Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology, 15, 509–524.
Y. Kim, J. H. Lee, J.-E. Park, J. Cho, H. Yi and V. N. Kim (2014) "PKR is activated by cellular dsRNAs during mitosis and acts as a mitotic regulator" Genes & Development, 28: 1310-1322.
H. Chang1, J. Lim1, M. Ha, and V. N. Kim (2014) "TAIL-seq: Genome-wide Determination of Poly(A) Tail Length and 3′ End Modifications" Molecular Cell, 53(6):1044-1052.
J.-S. Woo, and V. N. Kim (2014) "MeCP2 Caught Moonlighting as a Suppressor of MicroRNA Processing" Developmental Cell, 28(5):477-478.
Y. Tian1, D. K. Simanshu1, J.-B. Ma, J.-E. Park, I. Heo, V. N. Kim, and D. J. Patel (2014) "A Phosphate-Binding Pocket within the Platform-PAZ-Connector Helix Cassette of Human Dicer" Molecular Cell, 53:606-616.
Y.-K. Kim1, G. Wee1, J. Park, J. Kim, D. Baek, J.-S. Kim*, and V. N. Kim* (2013) "TALEN-based knockout library for human microRNAs" Nature Structural and Molecular Biology, 20(12):1458-1464.
S. C. Kwon, H. Yi, K. Eichelbaum, S. Föhr, B. Fischer, K. T. You, A. Castello, J. Krijgsveld, M. W. Hentze, and V. N. Kim (2013) "The RNA-binding protein repertoire of embryonic stem cells" Nature Structural and Molecular Biology, 20(9):1122-1130.
S.-R. Ryoo, J. Lee, J. Yeo, H.-K. Na, Y.-K. Kim, H. Jang, J. H. Lee, S. W. Han, Y. Lee, V. N. Kim, and D.-H. Min (2013) "Quantitative and Multiplexed MicroRNA Sensing in Living Cells Based on Peptide Nucleic Acid and Nano Graphene Oxide (PANGO)" ACS Nano, 7(7):5882–5891.
C. Joo, M. Fareh, V. N. Kim (2013) "Bringing single-molecule spectroscopy to macromolecular protein complexes" Trends in Biochemical Sciences, 38(1):30-37.
S. Cho, I. Jang, Y. Jun, S. Yoon, M. Ko, Y. Kwon, I. Choi, H. Chang, D. Ryu, B. Lee, V. N. Kim, W. Kim and S. Lee (2012) "miRGator v3.0: a microRNA portal for deep sequencing, expression profiling and mRNA targeting" Nucleic Acids Research, 41 (D1): D252-D257.
I. Heo1, M. Ha1, J. Lim, M.-J. Yoon, J.-E. Park, S. C. Kwon, H. Chang and V. N. Kim (2012) "Mono-uridylation of pre-microRNA as a key step in the biogenesis of group II let-7 microRNAs" Cell, 151: 521-532.
J. Kim, M. Choi, J. R. Kim, H. Jin, V. N. Kim and K. H. Cho (2012) "The co-regulation mechanism of transcription factors in the human gene regulatory network" Nucleic Acids Research, 40(18):8849-8861.
H. Jin, V. N. Kim* and S. Hyun* (2012) "Conserved microRNA miR-8 controls body size in response to steroid signaling in Drosophila" Genes & Development, 26:1427-1432.
Y.-K. Kim, J. Yeo, B. Kim, M. Ha and V. N. Kim (2012) "Short Structured RNAs with Low GC Content Are Selectively Lost during Extraction from a Small Number of Cells" Molecular Cell, 46:893-895.
Y. Kim and V. N. Kim (2012) "MicroRNA Factory: RISC Assembly from Precursor MicroRNAs" Molecular Cell, 46:384-386.
S. Kim, S. Lee, J. Shin, Y. Kim, I. Evnouchidou, D. Kim, Y.-K. Kim, Y.-E. Kim, J.-H. Ahn, S. R. Riddell, E. Stratikos, V. N. Kim and K. Ahn (2011) "Human cytomegalovirus microRNA miR-US4-1 inhibits CD8+ T cell responses by targeting the aminopeptidase ERAP1" Nature Immunology, 12:984-991.
K.-H. Yeom, I. Heo, J. Lee, S. Hohng, V. N. Kim* and C. Joo* (2011) "Single-molecule approach to immunoprecipitated protein complexes: insights into miRNA uridylation" EMBO Reports, 12:690-969.
Y.-K. Kim, I. Heo and V. N. Kim (2010) "Modifications of Small RNAs and Their Associated Proteins" Cell, 143:703-709.
S. Hyun1, J. H. Lee1, H. Jin1, J. Nam, B. Namkoong, Gina Lee, J. Chung and V. N. Kim (2009) "Conserved microRNA miR-8/miR-200 and its target USH/FOG2 control growth by regulating PI3K" Cell, 139:1096-1108.
I. Heo and V. N. Kim (2009) "Regulating the Regulators: Posttranslational Modifications of RNA Silencing Factors" Cell, 139:28-31.
H. Jin1, M. R. Suh1, J. Han, K.-H. Yeom, Y. Lee, I. Heo, M. Ha, S. Hyun and V. N. Kim (2009) "Human UPF1 Participates in Small RNA-Induced mRNA Downregulation" Molecular and Cellular Biology, 20(21):5789-99.
I. Heo1, C. Joo1, Y.-K. Kim1, M. Ha, M.-J. Yoon, J. Cho, K.-H. Yeom, J. Han and V. N. Kim (2009) "TUT4 in Concert with Lin28 Suppresses MicroRNA Biogenesis through Pre-MicroRNA Uridylation" Cell, 138:696-708.
Y.-K. Kim, J. Yu, T. S. Han, S. Y. Park, B. Namkoong, D. H. Kim, K. Hur, M. W. Yoo, H. J. Lee, H. K. Yang*, and V. N. Kim * (2009) "Functional links between clustered microRNAs: suppression of cell-cycle inhibitors by microRNA clusters in gastric cancer" Nucleic Acids Research, 37:1672-1681.
V. N. Kim*, J. Han and M. C. Siomi* (2009) "Biogenesis of small RNAs in animals" Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology, 10:126-139.
J. Han, J. S. Pederson, S. C. Kwon, C. D. Belair, Y.-K. Kim, K. H. Yeom, W. Y. Yang, D. Haussler, R. Blelloch, and V. N. Kim (2009) "Posttranscriptional crossregulation between Drosha and DGCR8" Cell, 136:75-84.
S. Y. Park1, J. H. Lee1, M. Ha, J. W. Nam and V. N. Kim (2009) "miR-29 miRNAs activate p53 by targeting p85a and CDC42" Nature Structural and Molecular Biology, 16(1):23-9.
I. Heo1, C. Joo1, J. Cho, M. Ha, J. Han and V. N. Kim (2008) "Lin28 mediates the terminal uridylation of let-7 precursor microRNA" Molecular Cell, 32:276-284.
V. N. Kim (2008) "Cell cycle micromanagement in embryonic stem cells" Nature Genetics, 40(12):1391-2.
V. N. Kim (2008) "Sorting out small RNAs" Cell, 133:25-26.
H. H. Lee, Y. S. Kim, K. H. Kim, I. Heo, S. K. Kim, O. Kim, H. K. Kim, J. Y. Yoon, H. S. Kim, D. J. Kim, H. J. Yoon, S. J. Kim, B. G. Lee, H. K. Song, V. N. Kim, C. M. Park and S. W. Suh (2007) "Structural and functional insights into Dom34, a key component of No-Go mRNA decay" Molecular Cell, 27(6):938-50.
S. Y. Sohn1, W. J. Bae1, J. J. Kim, K. H. Yeom, V. N. Kim and Y. Cho (2007) "Crystal structure of human DGCR8 core" Nature Structural and Molecular Biology, 14(9):847-53.
Y.-K. Kim and V. N. Kim (2007) "Processing of intronic microRNAs" EMBO Journal, 26(3):775-83.
J. T. Lee, S. S. Yu, V. N. Kim and S. Kim (2007) "Control of Splicing Efficiency by the Mouse Histone H2a Element in a Murine Leukemia Virus-based Retroviral Vector" Molecular Therapy, 15(1):167-72.
V. N. Kim (2006) "Small RNAs just got bigger: Piwi-interacting RNAs (piRNAs) in mammalian testes" Genes & Development, 20(15):1993-7.
K. H. Yeom, Y. Lee, J. Han, M. R. Suh and V. N. Kim (2006) "Characterization of DGCR8/Pasha, the essential cofactor for Drosha in primary miRNA processing" Nucleic Acids Research, 34(16):4622-9.
V. N. Kim and J. W. Nam (2006) "Genomics of microRNA" Trends in Genetics, 22(3):165-73.
S. J. Yim1, Y. S. Lee1, D. J. Chang, J. H. Han, H. Kim, H. Park, H. Jun, V. N. Kim and B. K. Kaang (2006) "Regulation of ApC/EBP mRNA by the Aplysia AU-rich element-binding protein, ApELAV, and its effects on 5-hydroxytryptamine-induced long-term facilitation" Journal of Neurochemistry, 98(2):420-9.
J. Han1, Y. Lee1,K. H. Yeom1, J. W. Nam, I. Heo, J. K. Rhee, S. Y. Sohn, Y. Cho, B. T. Zhang, and V. N. Kim (2006) "Molecular basis for the recognition of primary microRNAs by the Drosha-DGCR8 complex" Cell, 125(5):887-901.
Y. Lee1, I. Hur1, S. Y. Park1, Y.-K. Kim, M. R. Suh and V. N. Kim (2006) "The role of PACT in the RNA silencing pathway" EMBO Journal, 25(3):522-32.
J. W. Nam, K. R. Shin, J. Han, Y. Lee, and V. N. Kim, B. T. Zhang (2005) "Human microRNA prediction through a probabilistic co-learning model of sequence and structure" Nucleic Acids Research, 33(11):3570-81.
K. Lee, K. Jeon, J. M. Kim, V. N. Kim, D. H. Choi, S. U. Kim and S. Kim (2005) "Downregulation of GFAP, TSP-1, and p53 in human glioblastoma cell line, U373MG, by IE1 protein from human cytomegalovirus" Glia, 51(1):1-12.
V. N. Kim (2005) "MicroRNA biogenesis: coordinated cropping and dicing" Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology, 6(5):376-85.
V. N. Kim (2005) "Small RNAs: classification, biogenesis, and function" Molecules and Cells, 19(1):1-15.
J. Han1, Y. Lee1, K. H. Yeom, Y.-K. Kim, H. Jin and V. N. Kim (2004) "The Drosha-DGCR8 complex in primary microRNA processing" Genes & Development, 18(24):3016-27.
Y. Lee, M. Kim, J. Han, K. H. Yeom, S. Lee, S. H. Baek, and V. N. Kim (2004) "MicroRNA genes are transcribed by RNA polymerase II" EMBO Journal, 23(20):4051-60.
M. R. Suh, Y. Lee, J. Y. Kim, S. K. Kim, S. H. Moon, J. Y. Lee, K. Y. Cha, H. M. Chung, H. S. Yoon, S. Y. Moon, V. N. Kim* and K. S. Kim* (2004) "Human embryonic stem cells express a unique set of microRNAs" Developmental Biology, 270(2):488-98.
V. N. Kim (2004) "MicroRNA precursors in motion: exportin-5 mediates their nuclear export" Trends in Cell Biology, 14(4):156-9.
Y. Lee, C. Ahn, J. Han, H. Choi, J. Kim, J. Yim, J. Lee, P. Provost, O. Radmark, S. Kim, V. N. Kim (2003) "The nuclear RNase III Drosha initiates microRNA processing" Nature, 425(6956):415-9.
Y. Lee, K. Jeon, J. T. Lee, S. Kim and V. N. Kim (2002) "MicroRNA maturation: stepwise processing and subcellular localization" EMBO Journal, 21(17):4663-70.

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§ 205-39 Purpose and intent.
§ 205-41 One-family and multifamily dwelling units.
§ 205-42 Downtown Business Zone.
§ 205-43 Commercial and industrial zones.
§ 205-44 Signs permitted in all zones.
§ 205-46 Permanent identification signs.
§ 205-51 Sandwich signs, Community Associations.
§ 205-57 Maintenance and inspections.
§ 205-58 Exceptions to permit requirement.
§ 205-61 Violations and penalties.
The purpose of these regulations is to regulate the size, location, height and construction of all signs placed for public observance. The regulations are intended to protect the public safety, to protect property values and to preserve and strengthen the ambience and character of the City.
An important feature of these regulations is the restriction of advertising to the business or use of the premises on which the sign is located and the restriction of the total sign area permissible per site. Any sign placed on land or on a building for the purposes of identification or for advertising a use conducted therein or thereon shall be deemed to be accessory and incidental to such land, building or use. It is intended that the display of signs will be appropriate to the land, building or use to which they are appurtenant and will be compatible with the character of existing architecture and the fabric of development. The display of signs should be adequate, but not excessive, for the intended purpose of identification or advertisement. With respect to signs advertising business uses, it is specifically intended, among other things, to avoid excessive competition and clutter among sign displays in their demand for public attention. It is further intended in commercial areas now in existence, and more so in proposed commercial and industrial areas, that all signs within one complex shall be coordinated with the architecture in such a manner that the overall appearance is harmonious in color, form and proportion.
It is also intended by this article that all temporary signs erected for directional purposes for public information or to call attention to special events shall be confined to those that are of general public interest and that such signs shall be limited to the giving of information.
Large signs, including outdoor advertising structures, billboards or poster panels advertising projects or businesses not related to the site or building on which they are located, are not permitted.
A sign intended to be hung with or without a frame, possessing characters, letters, illustrations or ornamentations applied to paper, plastic or fabric of any kind.
A nonaccessory sign which is commercially maintained principally for calling attention to a place, profession, activity, commodity, service or entertainment not conducted, sold or offered upon the premises where such sign is located or within the building to which such sign is affixed.
A sign with changeable lettering, totally enclosed, illuminated or nonilluminated, wall mounted or freestanding.
A sign which directs attention to a business, profession, activity, commodity, service or entertainment conducted, sold or offered upon the premises where such sign is located or within the building to which such sign is affixed.
A structure made of cloth, metal or other material with frames affixed to a building and carried by a frame which may be supported by the ground.
An association organized for purposes other than generating profit, which primary purpose is for the benefit of the Taneytown community and its citizens.
A sign identifying individuals or companies involved in design, construction, wrecking, financing or development when placed upon the premises where work is under construction, but only for the duration of construction or wrecking.
A sign directing a person to a location where materials and goods, etc., are received or shipped.
A sign, providing no advertising of any kind, which provides direction or instruction to guide persons to facilities intended to serve the public, including but not specifically limited to those signs identifying rest rooms, public telephones, public walkways, parking areas and other similar facilities.
A sign which indicates the name and/or address of the occupants, the address of the premises and/or identification of any legal business or occupation which may exist at the premises.
A sign capable of displaying words, symbols, figures or images that can be electronically controlled by remote or automatic means.
A fixed, nonportable sign displayed in the City on the effective date of this article.
Illumination of a sign which is effected by an artificial source of light which is not contained within the sign itself.
An illuminated sign on which the artificial source of light is not maintained stationary or constant in intensity and color at all times when such sign is illuminated. For the purpose of this article, any moving illuminated sign effected by intermittent lighting shall be deemed to be a flashing sign.
The average level of the finished surface of the ground adjacent to a sign or the exterior wall of the building to which a sign is affixed.
The entire area within a single continuous perimeter enclosing the extreme limits of characters, lettering, illustrations, ornamentation or other figures, together with any material or color forming an integral part of the display or used to differentiate the sign from the background on which it is placed. Structural supports bearing no sign copy shall not be included in gross surface area.
A sign in which an artificial source of light is used in connection with the display of such sign.
Illumination of a sign which is effected by an artificial source of light which is contained within the sign itself.
A permanent, roof-like structure extending from part of the wall of a building but not supported by the ground and constructed of durable material, such as metal, wood or glass.
A sign which revolves, rotates, swings, undulates or otherwise attracts attention through movement of parts or through the impression of movement, including automatic electronically controlled copy change, but not including flags, banners, pennants or barber poles.
Illumination effected by a light source consisting of a neon or other gas tube which is bent to form letters, symbols or other shapes.
A sign which does not conform to one or more of the provisions contained in this article.
A sign which directs attention to a business, professional activity, commodity, service or entertainment other than one conducted, sold or offered upon the premises where such sign is located or within the building to which such sign is affixed.
A low protective wall or railing along the edge of a raised structure, such as a roof or balcony.
A long, narrow, relatively small flag, often triangular, used for identification or as an emblem.
The Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Taneytown.
A temporary sign identifying a political candidate, issue or party.
A sign not permanently affixed to the ground, a building or other structure which may be moved from place to place.
The main or principal building located upon a single zoned lot.
The building in which the principal use of the premises is conducted.
A sign which is affixed to a building or wall and extends beyond the line of such building or wall or beyond the surface of that portion of the building or wall to which it is affixed.
A sign which is used to offer for sale, lease or rent the premises upon which such sign is placed.
A sign erected or maintained in whole or in part on, against or directly above the roof or parapet line of a building.
A sign erected on an "A" frame which is not permanently attached to a foundation in the ground and which is not attached to a wheeled framework.
A commercial development under unified control consisting of three or more separate commercial establishments sharing a common building, entranceway or parking area.
Any identification, description, illustration or device, illuminated or nonilluminated, which is visible to the general public and directs attention to a product, service or place or a placard designed to advertise, identify or convey information.
A nonpermanent sign erected, affixed or maintained on a premises for a short, usually fixed, period of time.
A sign attached directly to an exterior wall of a building or dependent upon a building for support, with the exposed face of the sign located in a place substantially parallel to such exterior building wall to which the sign is attached or by which the sign is supported.
A sign, containing no advertising material, warning the public of the existence of danger.
A sign attached to, placed upon or painted on the interior or exterior of a window or door of a building which is intended for viewing from the exterior of such building.
A maximum of one sign per dwelling unit with a maximum of two square feet per sign is permitted.
A minimum setback of 10 feet from the nearest property line is required.
The maximum height shall be five feet above the ground.
The sign shall be nonilluminated.
Awning/canopy signs. One awning/canopy is permitted per storefront. Maximum height of lettering is five inches. Awnings/canopies are allowed on the ground floor only. Fixed canopies only may be illuminated above the sidewalk. See § 205-55, Illumination.
Flat wall signs. One flat wall sign is permitted per storefront, except where a building fronts two streets, then two signs may be permitted. Where a building has multiple tenants, all tenants will utilize the same sign. Flat wall signs are permitted on the ground floor only. Maximum square footage per sign is 24 square feet or 10% of the storefront, whichever is less. If illuminated, § 205-55, Illumination, applies. No part of the sign or mounting hardware may block a second-story window.
Freestanding signs. Where a flat wall sign or a hanging sign is inappropriate, a freestanding sign may be permitted. One sign per storefront is permitted. The maximum square footage of the sign is 27 square feet per side, and the sign may not exceed 12 feet in height. No part of the sign may intrude on any public right-of-way. More than one business may utilize the sign. If illuminated, § 205-55, Illumination, applies.
Hanging/projecting signs. Only one hanging sign per business storefront may be used in lieu of a flat wall sign. Where there are multiple tenants, all tenants will utilize the same sign, if advertising is required. If illuminated, § 205-55, Illumination, applies. Maximum size is 12 square feet per side or 24 square feet total. The bottom of the sign must be eight feet above the sidewalk and two feet behind the curbline. The sign or mounting hardware may not block any second-story window.
Directories. A directory is permitted where a building has multiple tenants. Directories are not calculated as part of overall allowed signage. Directories will be mounted at the entrance, if possible, and shall be no larger than two square feet.
Delivery sign. One delivery sign is permitted per tenant. Signs will be located at the side or rear of the building. Maximum size is two square feet, and the sign shall not be mounted above the first floor. If illuminated, § 205-55, Illumination, applies.
Portable signs. One portable sign is permitted per tenant.
Size. A total sign area of two square feet for each lineal foot of building frontage shall be allowed. If the building has multiple frontage, an additional sign area of one square foot for each additional lineal foot of building frontage shall be allowed. The total area of all signs erected on the lot and building shall be within the allowable square footage. Where there is multiple frontage, only the amount of added sign area allowed by each additional frontage shall be allowed to face that frontage.
Flat wall signs. Flat wall signs may be located anywhere on any wall on the first floor. No window or part of a window shall be situated within the area of the sign or its supporting structure. No flat wall sign shall extend above the roofline. In the case of a multistory building which has a screen enclosing elevator shafts, stairs or heating and air-conditioning units, a flat wall sign may be permitted within the area of the screen.
Projecting signs. Projecting signs may project over public rights-of-way (sidewalks) only where there is no building setback. The sign may project no more than 42 inches beyond the right-of-way line and no closer than six feet to the curbline without a variance from the Board of Appeals. The sign must have a clearance of 10 feet above the finished grade of a sidewalk. A projecting sign or supporting structure shall not extend above the roofline and shall extend no higher than 25 feet from finish grade to the top of the sign.
Marquee signs. Signs may be placed on the vertical faces of a marquee and may project below the lower edge of a marquee not more than 24 inches, but the bottom of a sign placed on a marquee shall be no less than 10 feet above the sidewalk or grade at any point. No part of the sign shall project above the top of the vertical faces of a marquee. Signs shall not be permitted anywhere on a marquee which projects over any public right-of-way, except that a variance may be granted for theater marquees by the Board of Appeals.
Freestanding signs. Where a building does not cover the full area of the property, signs may be freestanding in addition to a flat wall sign. Maximum height is 35 feet, and maximum square footage of the sign is 40 square feet per side. Where a site plan is submitted, the Planning Commission shall determine the type and location during the site plan review process and may vary the maximum square footage requirement contained in this subsection. No part of the sign may extend beyond the property line or restrict the line of sight. Where a property has two entrances, a freestanding sign may be erected at both entrances. Where a freestanding sign is used at a shopping center, more than one tenant may be included on the sign. Signs shall be a minimum of 15 feet from the street right-of-way.
Electronic message display board (EMDB). A portion of one freestanding sign per site may be configured as an EMDB following approval by the Planning Commission. The EMDB may not exceed 66% of the total square footage of the sign. EMDBs may advertise on-premises sales or services, Community Association events, notify of Amber Alert or other public service messages.
One sign each shall be permitted for all building contractors, professional firms and lending institutions on sites under construction. Each sign shall not exceed 16 square feet overall, with not more than a total of three such signs permitted on one site. The sign shall be confined to the site of the construction and shall be removed no later than 14 days upon completion of the project.
One temporary real estate sign not exceeding six square feet in area and located on the property shall be allowed for each lot. If the lot, parcel or tract has multiple frontage, one additional sign not exceeding six square feet in area shall be allowed on the property to be placed facing the additional frontage.
One temporary subdivision identification sign, not exceeding 24 square feet in area and located on the property, shall be allowed for each development of 10 lots or more. An increase in size may be allowed by the Board of Appeals.
Street banners. Street banners advertising a public entertainment or event, if specifically approved by the City and in locations designated by the City, may be displayed 14 days prior to and seven days after the public entertainment or event.
When attached to a building, the flag cannot impede pedestrian traffic.
The flag cannot in any way interfere with vehicular traffic.
If illuminated, the flag must comply with § 205-55, Illumination, and the National Flag Code.
Bulletin boards. An on-site bulletin board may be used in any zone by religious, civil or government organizations for messages that relate to that organization. A bulletin board shall not exceed 36 square feet of total sign area per side without Planning Commission approval. The Planning Commission may consider larger dimensions based on site- and district-specific factors. If illuminated, the requirements of § 205-55, Illumination, must be met.
All bulletin boards incorporating an EMDB must be approved by the Planning Commission.
Bulletin boards incorporating an EMDB for governmental entities shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for review and comment.
Only governmental entities shall be permitted to have a bulletin board incorporating an EMDB in the Downtown Zoning District.
Bulletin boards incorporating an EMDB may not exceed 10 feet in height or 36 square feet per side in total sign area.
The EMDB display portion of the bulletin board may not exceed 66% of the total square footage of each side of the sign. The remaining 34% must be static and identify the entity.
The Planning Commission may further limit dimensions of such signs based on site- and district-specific factors, and may permit larger dimensions for bulletin boards containing an EMDB on publicly owned property.
Hours of illumination/operation shall be reviewed and set by the Planning Commission.
Bulletin boards incorporating EMDB shall only display on-site events and activities, community events, and public service messages.
Yard sale sign. One yard sale sign shall be permitted on private property where the sale is being conducted and may not exceed six square feet in area. Signs shall not be attached to utility poles, street signs, trees or other public structures. Signs may be erected 24 hours prior to the sale and must be removed immediately following the sale.
Signs shall be permitted in a window or in a display of merchandise when incorporated with such a display. The total area of all window signs shall not exceed 35% of the window glass area. An additional 10% of window area may be used on a temporary basis to advertise nonprofit activities.
Signs of a permanent nature, setting forth the name of a community development center or other like projects, shall be permitted by the Planning Commission and approved at the time of plan review. Illumination shall be in accordance with the restrictions set forth in § 205-55, Illumination. Such signs shall not exceed 24 square feet in area.
Portable sandwich-type signs are the only portable signs permitted, with one sign per lot in the Downtown Business District and General Business District. Maximum square footage is eight square feet per side. Portable signs shall not remain on the street after the hours of darkness. A forty-inch clear walking space must be provided. Sandwich signs for a shopping center may be one sign per storefront. These signs may only advertise products and services rendered by the occupant of the lot or store.
Editor's Note: The Local Business District was changed to the Downtown Business District 3-10-2003 by Ord. No. 1-2003. See § 205-19.
Banners. A new business may display a banner advertising the opening for a period of three months. A banner of a promotional nature may be used for a period of 30 days. Banners are not to exceed 15 square feet.
Pennants. Pennants for grand openings and special events may be used for a period not to exceed 14 days.
One banner per street frontage may be placed on properties within the Downtown Business District, the General Business District, or the Restricted General Business District.
The banner may not be larger than 15 square feet.
The banner may only be used for Community Associations to direct people to an event or place.
Written permission must be obtained from the property owner and a copy of such permission placed on file with the Zoning Administrator of the City of Taneytown.
The banner shall be removed immediately following the last date or time for the specified event.
A change of use is, for the premises, required.
The sign, in the opinion of the Zoning Administrator, has become unrepairable.
Five days from the passage of this article.
A directional sign is the only type of sign permitted.
One off-premises sign is allowed for multiple businesses.
The sign must conform to the zone where the sign is to be located.
One sign may be placed on each street frontage at the intersection of Route 140 and Route 194. A sign may be placed in the open space zone only at the entrance to the City's parks.
One sign per street frontage may be placed on properties within the Downtown Business District, the General Business District, or the Restricted General Business District.
The sign may not be larger than eight square feet per side.
The sign may not remain on a sidewalk after the hours of darkness.
The sign may only be used for Community Associations to direct people to an event or place.
Written permission must be obtained from the property owner and a copy placed on file with the Zoning Administrator of the City of Taneytown.
The sign shall be removed immediately following the last date or time for the specified event.
Exposed neon signs shall be permitted inside windows. None shall be placed outside. Neon window signs shall not cover more than 10% of the window area and must comply with § 205-55, Illumination.
Streamers, balloons three feet and larger and other inflatable figures or devices.
Signs that can be confused with traffic control.
Off-premises signs, except as permitted as a special exception by the Board of Appeals or in compliance with § 205-50.
Signs on utility poles and trees.
Signs with obscene, indecent or immoral content.
Signs on parked vehicles. Signs placed on, decaled, painted or otherwise affixed to vehicles and/or trailers which are parked on a public right-of-way, public property or private property so as to be visible from a public right-of-way where the apparent purpose is to advertise a product or direct people to a business or activity located on the same or nearby property. However, this is not in any way intended to prohibit signs placed on or affixed to vehicles and trailers, such as lettering on motor vehicles, where the sign is incidental to the primary use of the vehicle or trailer.
Public sign. Signs of a noncommercial nature and in the public interest erected by, or on the order of, a public officer in the performance of his duty, such as directional signs, regulatory signs, warning signs and informational signs.
Integral part of structure. Names of buildings, dates of erection, monumental citations, commemorative tablets and the like, when carved into stone, concrete or similar material or made of bronze, aluminum or other permanent-type construction and made an integral part of the structure.
Private traffic direction signs. On-site signs directing traffic movement onto a premises or within a premises, not exceeding six square feet in area for each sign.
Real estate signs. Temporary real estate signs not exceeding six square feet in area, located on the subject property and limited to one such sign for each frontage of a home, lot or parcel. Signs must be removed within seven days after closing occurs.
Billboards. Billboards erected prior to the adoption of these regulations.
The light from any illuminated sign or from any light source, including the interior of a building, shall be so shaded, shielded or directed that the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect surrounding or facing premises nor adversely affect safe vision of operators of vehicles moving on public or private roads, highways or parking areas. Light shall not shine or reflect on or into residential structures.
Beacon lights or search lights shall not be permitted as a sign or for advertising purposes.
Electronic message display boards shall be the only type of sign to have any illuminating device which may have a changing light intensity, brightness or color, or which are so constructed and operated as to create an appearance or illusion of writing or printing.
No exposed reflective-type bulbs and no strobe lights or incandescent lamps shall be used on the exterior surface of any sign.
Any sign involving electrical components shall be wired by a licensed electrician in accordance with the National Electrical Code, and the electrical components used shall bear an Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., seal of inspection located on the outside of the sign.
Nothing in this subsection shall be constructed as preventing the use of lights or decorations relating to religious or patriotic festivities.
Application. No sign shall be erected, replaced, altered or relocated without a permit issued by the Zoning Administrator. The permit application shall be signed by the applicant, and when the applicant is any person other than the owner of the property, the permit application shall also be signed by the owner of the property and shall contain the location of the sign structure, the name and address of the sign owner and of the sign erector, drawings showing the design, dimensions and locations of the sign and such other pertinent information the Zoning Administrator may require to ensure compliance with the law of the City.
Expiration. A sign permit shall become null and void if the work for which the permit was issued has not been completed within a period of six months after the date of the permit.
All signs and components thereof shall be kept in good repair and in a safe, neat, clean and attractive condition.
Signs for which a permit is required shall be inspected periodically by the Zoning Administrator for compliance with this article and the other laws of the City.
Replacing copy. The changing of the advertising copy or message on an approved painted or printed sign or on a theater marquee and similarly approved signs which are specifically designed for the use of replaceable copy.
Maintenance. Painting, repainting, cleaning and other normal maintenance and repair of a sign or a sign structure, unless a structural change is made.
Exempt signs and window signs.
A sign on the premises shall be removed from the premises within 30 days when the business it advertises is no longer conducted. The owner of the building is responsible for the removal of any abandoned signs.
Upon denial of a sign permit by the Zoning Administrator and where a variance or a special exception may be permitted hereunder, the sign owner, or owner of property on which a sign is located, may file an appeal within 30 days of the date of action of the Zoning Administrator to the Board of Appeals. The appeal shall be in writing in form as required by the Board.
Any person who violates this article shall be subject to the provision of § 205-90.


text:
The controversy presented by the parties is whether an insurance policy covers the damage to a school caused by the rupture of a water pipe beneath the school. We agree with McAlester Public Schools that the policy covers the event.
¶2 The Oklahoma Schools Risk Management Trust is an interlocal cooperative composed of public schools and alternative education cooperatives for the purpose of pooling their property casualty risks by a member-funded self-insurance program. The Oklahoma Schools Risk Management Trust (OSRMT) issued a Plan of Coverage to McAlester Public Schools (McAlester Schools) for the period August 15, 2012 to August 15, 2013. On August 13, 2013 a water pipe underneath one of the McAlester Schools, Parker Middle School, broke causing damage to the school.
¶4 The OSRMT filed a motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment cause of action. OSRMT stated the loss suffered from earth movement, or water under the ground, or "wear and tear" was excluded by the parties' agreement. OSRMT argued these policy exclusions were unambiguous.
¶5 McAlester Schools filed a response to the OSRMT's motion combined with a cross-motion for summary judgment. The text of the motion states McAlester Schools is entitled to a summary judgment.
¶6 McAlester Schools' response stated a water supply line ruptured under the school and caused "the slab to heave under a jet of high pressure water." The response stated the rupture was a "sudden event," when the water flow was turned off to the school the slab subsided, and "there is no evidence or earth movement." McAlester Schools argued "there is no evidence of any earth movement (naturally occurring, or otherwise) was any cause of the damage." It also argued the earth movement exclusion did not apply because the damage was caused by "jetting water" and not natural earth movement.
¶7 McAlester Schools' also argued the policy's water exclusion language did not apply. The response argued the language in the policy did not address "the majority rule" where an exclusion clause for damage or loss resulting from water is understood as applied to naturally occurring water movement and not to water movement caused or resulting from the acts of people.
¶8 The OSRMT responded to McAlester Schools' cross-motion for summary judgment. It argued the temporal nature of the loss-creating event as either sudden or gradual has nothing to do with the coverage exclusions at issue. The OSRMT stated "there is indeed, evidence of "earth movement" as the term is used in the Plan of Coverage, and argued the earth movement exclusion "specifically includes within its ambit: '...the action of water under the ground surface.'" The OSRMT argued the earth movement exclusion clause contained an anti-concurrent causation clause, and must be read with other language indicating "the movement of earth caused by 'the action of water under the ground surface' is still movement of the earth."
¶9 McAlester Schools replied and argued the only issue is "whether the earth movement exclusion (and, to some extent, the water exclusion) apply when the cause of the 'movement' (or 'water') is man-made as opposed to naturally occurring."
¶10 The trial court granted OSRMT's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found "pursuant to the majority teachings of Broom, this Court finds the relevant portions of the plan of coverage are not ambiguous [and] therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted."2 McAlester Schools' motion for summary judgment was denied. McAlester Schools appealed and then sought certiorari review in this Court after the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
¶11 We must first address what appears to have been decided by the trial court, what appears to have not been decided, and the effect on this Court's review of the summary judgment. OSRMT's motion for summary judgment argued for application of more than one exclusionary clause in the policy. The exclusionary clauses invoked were (1) "earth movement," (2) "water," including "water under the ground" and (3) "wear and tear" which included as a subcategory "rust or corrosion." Broom relied on Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,3 where a water pipe had broken, and we discussed the relationship of this event to an earth movement exclusion in an insurance policy.4 Broom did not address movement of water, or wear and tear, or rust or corrosion as separate exclusions. We did not address what factors make, or do not make, ambiguous policy exclusions other than the particular earth movement exclusion that was before the court. The trial court's journal entry granting summary judgment and expressly relying on Broom appears to grant judgment solely on the earth movement exclusion.
¶12 The Court of Civil Appeals stated McAlester Schools' property loss was caused by two factors, water movement and earth movement, and that both were excluded risks in the policy. The appellate court determined "a discussion of the earth movement exclusion is unnecessary" because "attention must be given to the water exclusion provision of the policy." McAlester Schools sought certiorari and argued the earth movement exclusion rationale in Broom applied to a water movement exclusion. OSRMT responded on certiorari and argued the trial court correctly determined that the earth movement exclusion applied. OSRMT also argued the appellate court correctly concluded a water exclusion barred any recovery by McAlester Schools. OSRMT did not raise on certiorari the application of a wear and tear exclusion, or application of the rust or corrosion language which OSRMT did raise in the trial court.
¶13 Generally, an appellate court will not make first instance determinations of disputed law or fact issues, and will not affirm a summary judgment based upon facts and legal issues unadjudicated by the trial court when it granted summary judgment.5 Although a decree in equity is affirmed if it is sustainable on any rational theory when the ultimate conclusion by the trial court is correct, a party's legal argument on appeal which is not supported with authority supplied by counsel will be deemed waived when a decree is reviewed on appeal.6 Fundamental fairness cannot be afforded except within a framework of orderly procedure, and that fairness includes giving notice of certain judicial events altering legally cognizable rights.7 If parties invoke a rule or principle of appellate procedure for an appellate court to determine an entire cause of action with its affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims on all of the theories raised before the trial court, then the parties must actually present those claims and theories to the appellate court in a judicially cognizable form with supporting authority where all opposing parties possess an opportunity to address them before the court. We decline to hold policy exclusions raised by OSRMT in the trial court are waived due to OSRMT failing to raise them on certiorari with supporting authority supplied by counsel.
¶15 Due to the nature of the trial court's decision and the arguments raised on certiorari with supporting authority supplied by the parties, we address on certiorari the earth movement exclusion and the flow of water exclusion in the policy.
¶18 The parties also discuss the nature of the agreement. McAlester Schools states the agreement is an "all-risks policy."19 OSRMT states that it is "undisputed that this coverage structure is colloquially referred to by many as an 'All-Risks' form, although the Plan of Coverage never uses this term."20 OSRMT states although the Plan of Coverage has the nature of all-risks nature, such characterization has no impact on the controversy.21 Once McAlester Schools' under an all-risk policy shows loss is a covered loss, then OSRMT has a burden to show the loss is excluded by the policy.22 OSRMT has the burden to show the loss to covered property is excluded by the policy.
¶19 OSRMT argues the exclusions in the agreement apply to both naturally occurring and man-made phenomena. McAlester Schools argue the exclusions apply to only naturally occurring events and not the man-made ruptured water pipe. In Broom v. Wilson Paving & Excavating, Inc., we stated the following.
Earth movement exclusions in insurance policies "generally refer to and have historically related to catastrophic and extraordinary calamities such as earthquakes and landslides." Peters Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir.1987). Such exclusionary provisions were included in insurance policies to protect insurance companies from having to pay out on policies when catastrophic events, such as earthquakes or floods, caused damage to numerous policyholders. Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 252 P.3d 668, 672--673 (2011). "[T]he reason for the insertion of the exclusionary clause ... in all risk insurance policies is to relieve the insurer from occasional major disasters which are almost impossible to predict and thus to insure against." Wyatt v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F.Supp. 781, 783 (D.Minn.1969). Broom, 2015 OK 19, ¶ 33, 356 P.3d at 629.
¶21 OSRMT asks the Court to read the agreement [or policy] as a whole and view the exclusions as referring to both naturally occurring and man-made events, which according to the OSRMT distinguish the present controversy from our opinion in Broom v. Wilson Paving & Excavating, Inc., supra. The language relied on by OSRMT to show the loss was excluded states the following.
1. We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
a. Ordinance Or Law . . .
(4) Earth sinking (other than sinkhole collapse), rising or shift including soil conditions which cause settling, cracking or other disarrangement of foundations or other parts of realty. Soil conditions include contraction, expansion, freezing, thawing, erosion, improperly compacted soil and the action of water under the ground surface.
But if earth movement, as described in b.(1) through (4) above, results in fire or explosion, we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that fire or explosion.
(5) Volcanic eruption, explosion or effusion. . . . .
Seizure or destruction of property by order of governmental authority. . . .
Nuclear reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination, however caused, . . .
The failure of power, communication, water or other utility service supplied to the described premises, however caused, . . .
War, including undeclared or civil war . . .
(c) Doors, windows or other openings.
But if water, as described in g.(1) through g.(4) above, results in fire, explosion or sprinkler leakage, we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that fire, explosion or sprinkler leakage.
h. Fungus, Wet Rot Dry Rot And Bacteria . . .
a. Artificially generated electrical, magnetic or electromagnetic energy that damages , disturbs, disrupts, or otherwise interferes with any [electrical systems, devices, appliances, etc.] . . .
b. Delay, loss of use or loss of market.
(5) Nesting or infestation, or discharge or release of waste products or secretions by insects, birds, rodents or other animals.
(6) Mechanical Breakdown, including rupture or bursting caused by centrifugal force. . . .
(c) Marring or scratching. . . .
e. Explosion of steam boilers, steam pipes, steam engines or steam turbines owned or leased by you, or operated under your control. . . .
f. Continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water, or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor, that occurs over a period of 14 days or more.
OSRMT argues the language in the agreement stating "underground pipes, flues or drains" are not covered property should be read together with the exclusionary clause language, and when so read shows that the exclusions are not ambiguous when referring to "water under the ground surface pressing on, or flowing or seeping through," and "settling, cracking, shrinking or expansion," and "earth sinking (other than sinkhole collapse), rising or shift including soil conditions which cause settling, cracking or other disarrangement of foundations or other parts of realty [and] . . . and the action of water under the ground surface." OSRMT states the exclusions in the agreement include both naturally occurring and man-made events. Further, it states "What is at issue here is the applicability of unambiguous coverage exclusionary language."
¶23 In the policy before us, "earth movement" is referenced to "earthquake," landslide," "mine subsidence," and "earth sinking," all similar to the language noted in Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra, which was held to be ambiguous as to the event of a ruptured pipe. In Broom we noted the ambiguous nature of an earth movement exclusion in a policy as applied to a man-made event when earth movement exclusions are referenced in a policy to naturally occurring events. It is not a complete failure to reference man-made events in the policy which created the ambiguity in Broom, but the failure to expressly state man-made events are included in the earth movement exclusion.
¶24 We uphold "clear and unambiguous" exclusionary clauses when shown by an insurer, but a lack of specificity in the language may make an exclusion ambiguous when applied to a particular event.30 This lack of specificity as to an event that is man-made or caused as such relates to earth movement is an issue in this controversy. The earth movement refers to mine subsidence but not expressly to ruptured water pipes. We note that other exclusions in the agreement use language attempting to include events regardless of the identified cause, e.g., "nuclear reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination, however caused," and "failure of power, communication, water or other utility service supplied to the described premises, however caused." A layperson reading these exclusionary clauses would understand a universal causation is specified in some but not all of the exclusions, with language of universal causation being intentionally omitted from the earth movement exclusion. Generally, when an insurer creates specificity in one clause of a policy and then omits it in a similar context, the omission is considered purposeful and should be given meaning.31 OSRMT's omission of language referencing universal causation occurs in an exclusionary clause which has historically been understood as referring to naturally caused events.
¶27 We hold exclusionary clauses in an insurance policy on the issue of man-made or caused events were ambiguous based upon (1) the lack of specificity in the particular clause when a similar specificity was used in other exclusionary clauses in the policy, and (2) the issue of man-made causation as applied to the particular exclusion had historically been treated by courts as ambiguous when man-made causation or a form of universal causation were not specified in the policy. We agree with McAlester Schools that OSRMT failed to show a policy-based exclusion to coverage for the event based upon earth movement and flow of water exclusions.
Outcome: The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo and an appellate court makes an independent and nondeferential review testing the legal sufficiency of the evidential materials used in support and against the motion for summary judgment.34 The summary judgment for Oklahoma Schools Risk Management Trust is reversed and the controversy is remanded to the District Court for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


D.C. Law Library - § 47–3505. Nonprofit housing organizations — Qualifications; exemptions.
↪ § 47–3505. Nonprofit housing organizations — Qualifications; exemptions.
(a) In order to qualify for an exemption under this section, a nonprofit housing organization shall have been approved by the Internal Revenue Service as exempt from federal income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) or (4).
(2) The purchaser receives a credit against the purchase price of the property in an amount equal to the total tax that would have been due without regard to this subsection.
(c)(1) Deeds of property transferred to a qualifying nonprofit housing organization shall be exempt from the deed recordation tax pursuant to § 42-1102, if a return under oath, certifying the organization’s intent to transfer the property within 36 months to a household (or to households in at least 35% of the units in a multifamily property) subject to the income limitations and conditions of transfer described in § 47-3502 or to a cooperative housing association exempt from the deed recordation tax pursuant to § 47-3503(a)(2), accompanies the deed at the time of its offer for recordation.
(2) Recordation of a construction loan deed of trust or mortgage, as that term is defined in § 42-1101(9), or a permanent loan deed of trust or mortgage, as that term is defined in § 42-1101(10), shall be exempt from the deed recordation tax pursuant to § 42-1102, if the property securing the deed of trust or mortgage is owned by or is being simultaneously transferred to a qualifying nonprofit housing organization.
(d) Property transferred to a qualifying nonprofit housing organization shall be exempt from the real property tax pursuant to § 47-1002, through the end of the third tax year following the year in which the property was transferred to the organization if a return under oath, certifying the organization’s intent to transfer the property within 1 year to a household (or to households in at least 35% of the units in a multifamily property) subject to the income limitations and conditions of transfer in § 47-3502 or to a cooperative housing association exempt from the deed recordation tax pursuant to § 47-3503(a)(2), accompanies the deed at the time of its offer for recordation.
(e) A qualifying nonprofit housing organization shall be exempt from the provisions of Chapter 17 of Title 42.
(f)(1) Subject to the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, any nonprofit organization that has been denied exemption from District of Columbia real property taxes pursuant to § 47-1002 and has acquired property to develop more than 10 units of housing for affordable or lower income homeownership households in the District of Columbia and subdivides the acquired property into more than 10 units shall have 2 years from the date of the subdivision of the property to hold the property as exempt from the recordation, transfer, and real property taxes associated with the acquisition and development of the property for low-income or affordable housing.
(2) Recordation, transfer, and real property tax assessments associated with the acquisition of a property under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be assessed against a nonprofit organization that acquires property and subdivides it for resale into more than 10 units to low-income home owners when the first low-income home owner purchases a home within 2 years of the subdivision of the real property into lots on the records and cadastral maps of the Office of Tax and Revenue.
(3) Real property owned or acquired by a nonprofit organization shall be exempt from recordation, transfer and real property taxes if the nonprofit organization subdivides the property into more than 10 units of low-income housing and completes the sale of all units of low-income housing on the property within 4 years from the date of acquisition.
This section is referenced in § 42-1102, § 47-813, § 47-902, § 47-1002, § 47-2853.181, and § 47-3506.
D.C. Law 16-33, § 1182, added subsec. (f).
D.C. Law 16-33, § 1281(c), in subsecs. (b)(1) and (c)(1), substituted “within 36 months” for “within 1 year”; and, in subsec. (d), substituted “third tax year” for “first tax year”.
Special rules for real estate brokers, salespersons and property managers, licensure requirement exemptions, see § 47-2853.181.
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Nonprofit Housing Organizations Tax Exemption Emergency Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-732, January 19, 2005, 52 DCR 1962).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see §§ 1182, 1183, 1281(c), 1282, 1283 of Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-168, July 26, 2005, 52 DCR 7667).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 4 of Finance and Revenue Technical Amendments Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-260, January 26, 2006, 53 DCR 780).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 4 of Finance and Revenue Technical Amendments Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-361, April 26, 2006, 53 DCR 3619).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3(b) of Finance and Revenue Technical Amendments Second Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-585, December 28, 2006, 54 DCR 340).
“(f)(1) Beginning October 1, 2002, any nonprofit organization that has (i) acquired property to develop more than 10 units of housing for affordable or lower income home ownership in the District of Columbia, (ii) subdivided the acquired property into more than 10 units, and (iii) been denied exemption from District of Columbia real property taxes pursuant to § 47-1002 shall have 2 years from the date of the subdivision of the property to hold the property without liability for the recordation, transfer, or real property taxes associated with the acquisition and development of the property.
Section 5(b) of D.C. Law 15-345 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
“(f)(1) Subject to the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, any nonprofit organization that has been denied exemption from District of Columbia real property taxes pursuant to § 47-1002 and has acquired property to develop more than 10 units of housing for affordable or lower income homeownership households in the District of Columbia and subdivides the acquired property into more than 10 units shall have 2 years from the date of the subdivision of the property to hold the property as exempt from the recordation, transfer, and real property taxes associated with the acquisition and development of the property for low-income or affordable housing.
“(2) Recordation, transfer, and real property tax assessments associated with the acquisition of a property under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be assessed against a nonprofit organization that acquires property and subdivides it for resale into more than 10 units to low-income home owners when the first low-income home owner purchases a home within 2 years of the subdivision of the real property into lots on the records and cadastral maps of the Office of Tax and Revenue.
Short title of subtitle W of title I of Law 16-33: Section 1181 of D.C. Law 16-33 provided that subtitle W of title I of the act may be cited as the Dupont Commons Low-Income Housing Tax Relief Act of 2005.
Section 1183 of D.C. Law 16-33 provided that § 1182 shall apply to real property exemption applications filed on or after January 1, 2001.


discrimination. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 495—507.
5 Cir., 441 F.2d 370, reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, joined by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr.
in the list of questions presented by the writ of certiorari. Pp.
petit jury service. Pp. 496—505.
Mr. Justice WHITE, joined by Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr.
jury that indicted him. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct.
1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559. P. 507.
Edward T. M. Garland, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Dorothy T. Beasley, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
not apply in a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
protection and of due process.
on the circumstances of the person making the claim.
establish a basis for relief.
under that single analytical umbrella.
excluded jurors and the stigmatized class.
Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct.
and impartial tribunal in administrative hearings, Goldberg v.
due process, be subjected to trial by an insane juror, Jordan v.
violence, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed.
532 (1971); and in pre-Duncan state jury trials, e.g., Turner v.
unfairness.' 349 U.S., at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625.
cases, and they increase the risk of actual bias as well.
challenge the tribunal on that ground could be similarly confined.
the entire fabric of our society.
exclusion of Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race.
many defendants, rather than giving it to too few.
For Congress has made such exclusion a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 243.
djQ Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr.
Justice POWELL join, concurring in the judgment.
from jury service on grounds of race in a class by themselves.
discrimination.' Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282—283, 67 S.Ct.
1613, 1624, 91 L.Ed. 2043 (1947).
the standard governing criminal proceedings instituted hereafter.
Hence, I join the judgment of the Court.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
direct appeal, and the case was remanded for a new trial.
juries. His conviction was affirmed.
equal opportunity to participate in the administration of justice.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880).
officials are subject to criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C. § 243.
U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).
(1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed.
Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, at 309. See also Gibson v.
L.Ed. 354 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386, 26 L.Ed.
92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972).
contempt charge. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct.
U.S., at 517—518, 88 S.Ct. at 1774, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.
See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 280—281, 67 S.Ct.
white defendants in nonracial criminal poceedings.
petitioner was convicted by a prejudiced tribunal.
dictum in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
statutory command. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed.
discriminatory jury selection has taken place in the past.
The history of this litigation is long and complicated.
properly does not press it here.
See Brief for Appellee in Court of Appeals 28—43.
is subject to challenge only by a member of the excluded class.
never since then approved or rejected it.
S.Ct. 153, 11 L.Ed.2d 110 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S.
306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757 (1939); Rogers v.
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 20 S.Ct. 687, 44 L.Ed. 839 (1900); Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S.Ct. 625, 27 L.Ed. 354 (1883).7 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed.
L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129, 84 S.Ct.
58 S.Ct. 753, 82 L.Ed. 1050 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries.
jury service of his own or any other class. E.g., Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83—87, 62 S.Ct. 457, 470—473, 86 L.Ed.
simply standing to challenge it.
S.E.2d 711, 715 (1964) (alternative holding).
of fundamental, constitutional rights, see, e.g., Johnson v.
apply with respect to statutory rights.


Chapter 131E - Health Care Facilities and Services.
§ 131E-2. Contested case hearing petition time limit.
§ 131E-3. Coordination of rules on pathological materials.
§ 131E-4. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 2 - Public Hospitals.
§ 131E-5. Title and purpose.
§ 131E-7.1. Public hospitals' managed care development authorized.
§ 131E-8. Sale of hospital facilities to nonprofit corporations.
§ 131E-8.1. Maintenance of Health Education Facilities.
§ 131E-9. Governing authority of hospital facilities.
§ 131E-11. Federal and State aid.
§ 131E-13. Lease or sale of hospital facilities to or from for-profit or nonprofit corporations or other business entities by municipalities and hospital authorities.
§ 131E-14. Lease or sale of hospital facilities to certain nonprofit corporations.
§ 131E-14.2. Conflict of interest.
§ 131E-15. Title and purpose.
§ 131E-17. Creation of a hospital authority.
§ 131E-19. Incorporation of a hospital authority.
§ 131E-20. Boundaries of the authority.
§ 131E-21. Conflict of interest.
§ 131E-22. Removal of commissioners.
§ 131E-23. Powers of the authority.
§ 131E-25. Zoning and building laws.
§ 131E-26. Revenue bonds and notes.
§ 131E-27. Contracts with federal government.
§ 131E-28: Repealed by Session Laws 2016-5, s. 5.3(a), effective May 11, 2016.
§ 131E-29. Audits and recommendations.
§ 131E-31. Transfers of property by a city or county to a hospital authority.
§ 131E-32. Purchase money security interests.
§ 131E-34: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-326, s. 17, effective June 27, 2011.
§§ 131E-35 through 131E-39. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-40. Title and purpose.
§ 131E-41. Methods of creation of a hospital district.
§ 131E-42. Hearing and determination.
§ 131E-43. Limitation of actions.
§ 131E-46. Referendum on repeal of tax levy.
Article 2A - Garnishment for Debts Owed Public Hospitals.
§§ 131E-48 through 131E-51: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 13.2, effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to hospital and ambulatory surgical facility billings and collections practices occurring on or after that date.
§ 131E-52: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-53: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-54: Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 3 - North Carolina Specialty Hospitals.
§§ 131E-55 through 131E-58: Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 856, s. 13.
§ 131E-59: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-60: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-61: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-62: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-63: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-64: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-65. Alcohol Detoxification Program.
§ 131E-66: Repealed by Session Laws 1985, c. 589, s. 40.
§ 131E-68. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-69. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 4 - Construction and Enlargement of Hospitals.
§ 131E-70. Construction and enlargement of local hospitals.
§§ 131E-71 through 131E-74. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 5 - Hospital Licensure Act.
§ 131E-78. Adverse action on a license.
§ 131E-78.1: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-78.2: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-78.3: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-78.4: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-78.5. Designation as primary stroke center.
§ 131E-79. Rules and enforcement.
§ 131E-79.1. Counseling patients regarding prescriptions.
§ 131E-79.2. Educating parents of newborns regarding pertussis disease.
§ 131E-83. Temporary change of hospital bed capacity.
§ 131E-84. Waiver of rules for hospitals that provide temporary shelter or temporary services during a disaster or emergency.
§ 131E-84.1. Human trafficking public awareness sign.
§ 131E-87. Reports of disciplinary action; immunity from liability.
§ 131E-88. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-89. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-90. Authority of administrator; refusal to leave after discharge.
§ 131E-91. Fair billing and collections practices for hospitals and ambulatory surgical facilities.
§ 131E-92. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-93. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-94. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-95. Medical review committee.
§ 131E-96. Risk management programs.
§ 131E-97. Confidentiality of patient information.
§ 131E-97.1. Confidentiality of personnel information.
§ 131E-97.2. Confidentiality of credentialing information.
§ 131E-97.3. Confidentiality of competitive health care information.
§ 131E-98. Inmate medical records.
§ 131E-99. Confidentiality of health care contracts.
Article 6 - Health Care Facility Licensure Act.
§ 131E-103. Adverse action on a license.
§ 131E-104. Rules and enforcement.
§ 131E-106. Evaluation of residents in adult care homes.
§ 131E-107. Quality assurance, medical, or peer review committees.
§ 131E-111: Recodified as § 131E-255 by Session Laws 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 713, s. 3(a), as amended by Session Laws 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 713, s. 3(b).
§ 131E-112. Waiver of rules for health care facilities that provide temporary shelter or temporary services during a disaster or emergency.
§ 131E-113. Immunization of employees and residents.
§ 131E-114. Special care units; disclosure of information required.
§ 131E-114.1. Posting of information indicating number of staff on duty.
§ 131E-114.2. Use of medication aides to perform technical aspects of medication administration.
§ 131E-114.3. Smoking prohibited inside long-term care facilities; penalty.
§ 131E-114.4. Examination and screening for the presence of controlled substances required for applicants for employment in nursing homes.
§ 131E-117. Declaration of patient's rights.
§ 131E-118. Transfer of management responsibilities.
§ 131E-119. No waiver of rights.
§ 131E-120. Notice to patient.
§ 131E-121. Responsibility of administrator.
§ 131E-124. Enforcement and investigation; confidentiality.
§ 131E-125. Revocation of a license.
§ 131E-126: Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 600, s. 1.
§ 131E-127. No interference with practice of medicine or physician-patient relationship.
§ 131E-128. Nursing home advisory committees.
§ 131E-128.1. Nursing home medication management advisory committee.
§ 131E-128.2. Nursing home quality assurance committee; duties related to medication error prevention.
§ 131E-128.3. Staff orientation on medication error prevention.
§ 131E-128.4. Nursing home pharmacy reports; duties of consultant pharmacist.
§ 131E-128.5: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-360, s. 12G.2(c), effective July 1, 2013.
§ 131E-130. First available bed priority for certain nursing home patients.
§ 131E-131. Rule-making authority; enforcement.
§ 131E-132. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-133. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-134. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-137. Services to be provided in all counties.
§ 131E-138.1. Licensure fees for nursing beds and adult care home beds in continuing care retirement communities.
§ 131E-139. Adverse action on a license.
§ 131E-140. Rules and enforcement.
§ 131E-141.1. Penalties for violation.
§ 131E-143. Smoking prohibited; penalty.
§ 131E-144. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-144.3. Declaration of home care clients' rights.
§ 131E-144.4. Notice to client.
§ 131E-144.6. Enforcement and investigation.
§ 131E-147.1. Fair billing and collections practices for ambulatory surgical facilities.
§ 131E-148. Adverse action on a license.
§ 131E-149. Rules and enforcement.
§ 131E-153. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-154. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-154.4. Rules and enforcement.
§ 131E-154.6. Adverse action on a license; appeal procedures.
§ 131E-154.9. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-154.10. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-154.11. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-154.14. NC NOVA program established.
Article 7 - Regulation of Emergency Medical Services.
§ 131E-155.1. EMS Provider License required.
§ 131E-156. Permit required to operate ambulance.
§ 131E-157. Standards for equipment; inspection of equipment and supplies required for ambulances.
§ 131E-158. Credentialed personnel required.
§ 131E-161. Violation declared misdemeanor.
Article 7A - Statewide Trauma System Act of 1993.
§ 131E-162. Statewide trauma system.
§ 131E-163. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-164. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 8 - Cardiac Rehabilitation Certification Program.
§ 131E-168. Adverse action on a certificate.
§ 131E-169. Rules and enforcement.
§§ 131E-171 through 131E-174. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 9 - Certificate of Need.
§ 131E-175. Findings of fact.
§ 131E-177. Department of Health and Human Services is designated State Health Planning and Development Agency; powers and duties.
§ 131E-178. Activities requiring certificate of need.
§ 131E-180: Repealed by Session Laws 2005-325, s. 2, effective August 26, 2005.
§ 131E-181. Nature of certificate of need.
§ 131E-184. Exemptions from review.
§ 131E-187. Issuance of a certificate of need.
§ 131E-188. Administrative and judicial review.
§ 131E-189. Withdrawal of a certificate of need.
§ 131E-190. Enforcement and sanctions.
§ 131E-191. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 511, s. 1.
§ 131E-191.1. Lobbyists prohibited from serving on the North Carolina State Health Coordinating Council.
§ 131E-192. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 9A - Certificate of Public Advantage.
§§ 131E-192.1 through 131E-192.13: Repealed by Session Laws 2015-288, s. 4, as amended by Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12G.4(a), effective September 30, 2016.
§§ 131E-193 through 131E-199. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 10 - Hospice Licensure Act.
§ 131E-205. Adverse action on a license; appeal procedures.
§ 131E-208. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-209. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 11 - North Carolina Medical Database Commission.
§§ 131E-210 through 131E-213: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 517, s. 39.
Article 11A - Medical Care Data.
§ 131E-214. Title and purpose.
§ 131E-214.2. Data submission required.
§ 131E-214.3. Patient data not public records.
§ 131E-214.4. Statewide data processor.
§§ 131E-214.5 through 131E-214.10. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 11B - Transparency in Health Care Costs.
§ 131E-214.12. Purpose; Department to publish price information.
§ 131E-214.13. Disclosure of prices for most frequently reported DRGs, CPTs, and HCPCSs.
§ 131E-214.14. Disclosure of charity care policy and costs.
Article 12 - Disclosure and Contract Requirements for Continuing Care Facilities.
§§ 131E-215 through 131E-224: Repealed by Session Laws 1989, c. 758, s. 2.
§§ 131E-225 through 131E-229. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 13 - Temporary Management of Long-Term Care Facilities.
§ 131E-232. Who may petition; contents of petition.
§ 131E-233. Procedures for appointment; evidence in defense.
§ 131E-234. Grounds for appointment of temporary manager.
§ 131E-235. Alternative to appointment of temporary manager.
§ 131E-236. Compensation of temporary manager.
§ 131E-237. Candidates for temporary managers.
§ 131E-238. Temporary manager; powers and duties.
§ 131E-239. Plan for correction of deficiencies in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
§ 131E-240. Payment to temporary manager.
§ 131E-241. Avoidance of preexisting leases, mortgages, and contracts.
§ 131E-243. Review and termination of temporary management.
§ 131E-244. Accounting lien for expenses.
§ 131E-245. Obligations of licensee.
§ 131E-246. Conflict of laws.
§ 131E-247. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-248. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-249. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 14 - Disposal of Surplus Property to Aid Other Countries.
§ 131E-250. Disposition of surplus property by public and State hospitals.
§§ 131E-251 through 131E-254. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 15 - Health Care Personnel Registry.
§ 131E-255. Nurse Aide Registry.
§ 131E-256. Health Care Personnel Registry.
§ 131E-256.1. Adverse action on a license; appeal procedures.
Article 15A - Public Hospital Personnel Act.
§ 131E-257. Title; purpose; applicability of other laws; "public hospital" defined.
§ 131E-257.1. Compensation; personnel policies; employee benefits plans.
§ 131E-257.2. Privacy of employee personnel records.
§§ 131E-258 through 131E-264. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 16 - Miscellaneous Provisions.
§ 131E-265. Criminal history record checks required for certain applicants for employment.
§ 131E-266. Compliance history provider file.
§ 131E-267. Fees for departmental review of licensed health care facility or Medical Care Commission bond-financed construction projects.
§ 131E-268. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-269. Authorization to charge fee for certification of facilities suitable to perform abortions.
§ 131E-270. Medication Aide Registry.
§ 131E-271: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 131E-272. Initial licensure fees for new facilities.
§ 131E-273. Certain charges/payments prohibited.
§ 131E-274: Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 17 - Provider Sponsored Organization Licensing.
§ 131E-277. Direct or indirect sharing of substantial financial risk.
§ 131E-278. Applicability of other laws.
§ 131E-280. Applicants for license.
§ 131E-282. Issuance of license.
§ 131E-286. Ongoing financial standards – Net worth.
§ 131E-289. Minimum of net worth that must be in cash or cash equivalents.
§ 131E-291. Collaboration with local health departments.
§ 131E-294. Additional consumer protection and quality standards.
§ 131E-295. Powers of insurers and medical service corporations.
§ 131E-297. Hazardous financial condition.
§ 131E-298. Protection against insolvency.
§ 131E-299. Hold harmless agreements or special deposit.
§ 131E-300. Continuation of benefits.
§ 131E-303. Incurred but not reported claims.
§ 131E-304. Suspension or revocation of license.
§ 131E-307. Penalties and enforcement.
§ 131E-308. Statutory construction and relationship to other laws.
§ 131E-309. Filings and reports as public documents.
§ 131E-310. Confidentiality of medical information.
§ 131E-313. Utilization review and grievances.