Your application must include a clear “drawing” or depiction of the trademark you want to register. We also call a “drawing” a “mark drawing” or a “representation of the mark.” Federal trademark law requires that you provide a drawing with your application for us to assign the application a filing date and move it toward registration. Click on the headings below to learn more.
Once your application has a filing date, we upload the drawing of your trademark into our automated records. The public can view these records online using the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) and the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) databases. This publicly available information about your trademark may help you avoid subsequent legal conflicts.
The trademark that appears in your drawing will also appear on your registration certificate.
Which type of drawing should I use and which provides broader protection?
This decision depends on many factors, including the mark you use most often with your goods or services, which words or designs are important for you to protect, and how much money you plan to spend on protecting the mark.
For example, companies often separately register various components of a mark that they use together and separately. A company might register its business name, a slogan, and a logo to ensure the broadest possible protection. This gives companies flexibility in their promotional matter, social media, and webpages to mix and match marks (sometimes using a slogan or design alone, or a design with the slogan) and still protect all their marks.
Some companies, however, can afford to register only one mark, so they might focus instead on registering the one or two components they use most often and that are most important to their brand. Because this decision is important, an applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters.
Click on the headings below to learn more about the two types of drawings, the protection each provides, and when a special form drawing is required.
1. A standard character drawing shows a mark in text only (without a design) in no particular font style, size, or color.
Examples of standard character marks:1 NIKE, TARGET, VW.
2. A special form drawing shows a mark with stylization, designs, graphics, logos, or color. These are also called “stylized marks” or “design marks."
You can apply for only one mark per application, which means you can have only one drawing. Generally, we will not assign your application a filing date or move it toward registration if your application has two or more drawings of different marks (or one drawing of multiple marks). For more information about the requirement for only one mark, see the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §807.01.
1 These marks are registered as follows (from left to right): U.S. Registration Nos. 3081688, 5167255, and 2992649.
2 These marks are registered as follows (from left to right): U.S. Registration Nos. 2209815, 5200640, and 3032408.
DISCLAIMER: References to particular trademarks, service marks, products, services, companies, or organizations appearing on this page are for illustrative and educational purposes only and do not constitute or imply endorsement by the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, or any other federal agency.
You must decide whether to apply for a standard character drawing or a special form drawing (you cannot choose both). If you register your mark in standard characters, you will receive the broadest form of protection for your mark because your registration will encompass the wording itself, without limiting the registered mark to a specific font, style, size, or color. If you register your mark in special form, your mark will be protected only for the particular depiction you provided.
When is a special form drawing required?
You must submit a special form drawing when your mark includes words, letters, or numerals presented in a way that creates an uncommon or "special" impression that would be altered or lost if the text were registered alone.
A special form drawing is also required if you want your registered mark to include specific colors or underlining, superscripts, subscripts, exponents, emoticons, or characters and symbols that are not in our standard character set (see also “Requirements for color marks”).
The mark appeared on the drawing as LABID (for use with prescription drugs) but on the specimen as LáBID. "BID" is a common abbreviation of the Latin “bis in die,” used with prescription drugs to mean twice a day. Standard characters did not convey that BID stood apart from the other letters because of the specific font style used on the specimen.
The mark appeared on the drawing as FOR LIFE INSURANCE SEE US (for insurance services), but on the specimen the "US" portion was underlined and appeared in much larger lettering. The actual use on the specimen suggested a double meaning, with “US” standing for both the applicant’s name "United Services" and the pronoun "us." Standard characters did not convey this double meaning.
For more information about when a special form drawing is required, see TMEP §807.04(b).
For more information about the protection provided by standard character and special form drawings, see In re Calphalon Corp., 122 USPQ2d 1153, 1160 n.8 (TTAB 2017) and 37 C.F.R. 2.52(a).
What are the requirements for drawings?
You must submit a depiction of the mark as well as a standard character claim.
Include only common punctuation (colon, dashes) and diacritical marks (accents, tildes).
For a complete list of all the characters and symbols you can use in a standard character mark, view our standard character set. For example, standard character marks may include symbols such as the dollar ($) or Euro (€) sign; “at” sign (@); degree sign (°); ampersand (&); number, pound, or hashtag sign (#); or asterisk (*).
You cannot use a standard character drawing if your mark includes any elements not found in our standard character set, or includes standard characters that form shapes or designs, such as emoticons.
Our databases will display a standard character mark in a simple standardized typeface. For more information about standard character drawings, see the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §807.03-807.03(i).
You must submit a depiction of the mark as well as a description of the mark.
Display a high-quality image of the mark drawing that reproduces well with all lines appearing clean, sharp and solid, and not fine or crowded.
In addition to submitting a special form drawing that meets the requirements above, you must also submit a statement consisting of an accurate and concise description of everything appearing in the mark: all text and design elements, and the location of any color, if relevant.
For example, the Target design mark of a bullseye3 in the section above called "How are drawings used?" includes the following description: “The mark consists of concentric circles representing a target or bullseye design.” A description of your mark cannot, however, include a registered mark or elements not appearing in the mark.
We will assign all design elements in your mark a numerical “design code” from our Design Search Code Manual that enables us to properly search those design elements for conflicting design marks. The design code will appear in our databases.
For more information about special form drawings, see TMEP §807.04-807.04(b).
3 This mark is registered as U.S. Registration No. 5200640.
Depending on your filing basis, the mark in your drawing has to match the mark on either your specimen or your foreign registration.
If your application was filed based on use in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, or you are now filing an allegation of use (AAU/SOU), the mark in your drawing must show a “substantially exact” representation of the mark on your specimen. With few exceptions, the marks have to match.
If the marks do not match, and the differences are material or significant (see below on changes to mark after filing your application), you must submit a different specimen showing the mark on the drawing or amend the application filing basis to intent-to-use under Section 1(b), (or withdraw the AAU) and submit a specimen (that matches) at a later date.
If your application was filed based on a foreign registration under Section 44(e), the mark in your drawing must show a “substantially exact” representation of the mark in your foreign registration. If the marks do not match, you must change your application basis to a Section 1(a) or 1(b) basis, if you can satisfy all the requirements. If you cannot, your mark will not be permitted to register.
For more information about the requirement for the mark in drawings to match the mark on specimens or foreign registrations, see TMEP §807.12(a)-(b).
For more information on specimens and how to use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to submit a new specimen and amend the filing basis, see our specimen webpage.
People often rely on our database of trademarks to see what trademarks have been applied for before selecting a trademark for their business, so federal law does not allow you to make any material or significant changes to the trademark in your drawing after you file your application.
Adding the wording MR. SEYMOUR to the design above was a material change because it added a naming element that changed the overall commercial impression of the character design.
Adding a crown and banner design to the wording THE WINE SOCIETY OF AMERICA was a material change because it changed the visual impression of the text phrase alone, and thus changed the overall commercial impression.
You can change the mark in your drawing only if the change does not materially or significantly alter the mark as compared to the mark shown in the previously submitted drawing. If we determine that the old and new forms of the mark create the same overall impression, the change is not considered material or significant.
Changing a special form drawing from black and white to specific colors.
We generally do not permit changes to marks in drawings in requests for an extension of protection to the United States filed under Section 66(a). International and U.S. federal law do not permit these types of marks to be amended.
For more information about changes to the mark in drawings, see TMEP §§807.13-807.14, 1904.02(j).
A statement that color is a feature of the mark, listing all the colors shown in your mark, including black, white, and gray. For example, “The colors black and red are claimed as a feature of the mark.” When listing colors, you must use common everyday color names to identify the colors in your mark, such as pink, yellow, and blue.
A mark description that identifies where the various colors appear in the mark. For example, “The mark consists of a black hat and a red heart with the words BLACK HAT CHOCOLATES in black stylized letters.” If black, white, or gray represent background, outlining, shading, or transparent areas and are not part of your mark, you must include this information in your mark description.
For more information about color marks, see TMEP §807.07-807.07(g).
3D marks and trademark trade dress (3D product design or product packaging), or service mark trade dress – you generally need to provide a special form drawing showing a single rendition of your mark in three dimensions.
Motion marks – you must provide a special form drawing showing a single point in the movement, or a square showing up to five freeze frames of various points in the movement of your mark.
Scent marks – you must provide a standard character drawing with “scent mark” typed as the mark.
Sound marks – you must select “sound mark” as your mark type. You must then submit the actual sound of the sound mark in a .wav, .wmv, .wma, .mp3, or .avi format that does not exceed 5 megabytes in size.
We also require a detailed written description for these unusual marks because the mark drawing cannot always adequately represent them. For 3D and trade dress marks, you must mention in your description that the mark is three-dimensional.
For more information about drawings for these types of marks, see TMEP §807.09 (for sound, scent, and non-visual marks), TMEP §807.10 and TMEP §1202.02(c)(i) (for 3D and trade dress marks), and TMEP §807.11 (for motion marks).
Need to respond to an office action about a mark drawing issue?
Respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). Follow the specific instructions below for mark drawing issues, or get general information about responding to office actions.
The instructions presume that you will use a TEAS form to respond online to more than one issue. To respond using TEAS, fill out the form to address all issues in the office action and, at the end of the form, the correct party must properly sign it. It is important that the proper party sign your response, otherwise we may not accept it and you could miss the deadline for responding to an office action. For more information about who may sign a response, please review your office action.
1. If you are responding to a nonfinal office action, use the Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form. If you are responding to a final office action, use the Request for Reconsideration after Final Action form.
2. Answer "Yes" to question 4 on the form.
3. In the "Mark Information" section of the form, check the box stating that you have read and understood that a material alteration will not be permitted.
a. For a standard character mark (non-stylized text mark), click the box by “Standard Characters” and type the new mark in the text field for adding/modifying the standard character mark.
iii. Click the "Open" file button.
iv. After the file name appears in the window, click the "Attach" button to upload the file into the application.
v. Enter the literal elements in the text field below.
vi. Enter further below a complete description of all text and/or design elements in the text field for a mark description.
5. If your mark is in color, after you click the box for “Special Form (Stylized and/or Design)” enter each color appearing in the mark in the field for claiming color and revise the mark description to indicate where color is located in the mark.
If a color mark, use RGB color scheme; if you can open your image with your browser, then it is saved in the RGB color scheme. Do not use the CMYK color scheme when using design programs such as Adobe Photoshop or Illustrator.
For grayscale images, ensure 8 bits per sample pixel. We consider grayscale images to be black and white.
If you are responding to a nonfinal office action, use the Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form. If you are responding to a final office action, use the Request for Reconsideration after Final Action form.
Answer "Yes" to question 4 on the form.
In the "Mark Information" section, check the box stating that you have read and understood that a material alteration will not be permitted.
Type your mark in the text field for adding/modifying the standard character mark.
Answer "Yes" to question 3 on the form.
In the “Additional Statement(s)” section, type the revised mark description in the text field following “The Mark Consists of”.
If you initially submitted your mark as a standard character mark and need to change it to a special form drawing and submit a mark description, follow the directions under “To submit a new mark drawing in TEAS” above for a special form mark.


All U.S. employers are responsible for completion and retention of Form I-9 for each individual they hire for employment in the United States. This includes citizens and noncitizens. On the form, the employer must verify the employment eligibility and identity documents presented by the employee and record the document information on the Form I-9. The list of acceptable documents can be found on the last page of the form.
Do not file Form I-9 with U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or USCIS. Form I-9 must be kept by the employer either for three years after the date of hire or for one year after employment is terminated, whichever is later. The form must be available for inspection by authorized U.S. Government officials (e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Department of Labor, Office of Special Counsel).
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that it has delayed by 60 days, until April 3, 2009, the implementation of an interim final rule entitled “Documents Acceptable for Employment Eligibility Verification” published in the Federal Register on December 17, 2008. The rule streamlines the Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9) process. The delay is intended to provide the government with an opportunity for further consideration of the rule and also allows the public additional time to submit comments. A notice announcing this delay has been transmitted to the Federal Register and is scheduled for publication on February 3, 2009. In addition, USCIS has reopened the public comment period (which was to end on February 2, 2009) for 30 days until March 4, 2009.
Employers must complete a Form I-9 for all newly hired employees to verify their identity and authorization to work in the U.S. The interim final rule will amend regulations governing the types of acceptable identity and employment authorization documents that employees may present to their employers for completion of the Form I-9. Under the interim rule, employers will no longer be able to accept expired documents to verify employment authorization on the Form I-9.
The interim final rule streamlining the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9) process that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), announced it submitted to the Federal Register on December 12, 2008, has now been published in the Federal Register along with a copy of the proposed new I-9 form at 73 Fed. Reg. 76505 (Dec. 17, 2008).
The interim final rule amends 8 CFR § 274a.2 to change the term “eligibility” to “authorization” and, in subsection (b)(1)(v), narrows the list of acceptable identity documents and specifies that expired documents are not considered acceptable forms of identification.
Employers must complete a Form I-9 for all newly hired employees to verify their identity and authorization to work in the U.S. The list of approved documents that employees can present to verify their identity and employment authorization is divided into three sections: List A (8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)) documents verify identity and employment authorization, List B (8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(B)) documents verify identity only, and List C (8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(C)) documents verify employment authorization only. The interim final rule removes the terms “unexpired” and “expired” from those documents currently listed in the regulations. Rather than modify each acceptable document with the term “unexpired,” the rule imposes a general requirement that all documents must be unexpired. USCIS invites comments on whether this prohibition on the use of expired documents for the Form I-9 should be modified to permit employers to accept List B identity documents that have expired within the last 90 days (or other limited time period) of the date when they are presented to the employer for the Form I-9.
In 8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(3), the rule modifies the reference to temporary I-551 stamps on unexpired foreign passports to include pre-printed temporary I-551 notation on machine-readable immigrant visas (MRIVs); however, since the pre-printed notation is not included on Form I-94s, the rule does not make any changes to regulatory references to temporary I-551 stamps on Form I-94s.
The interim final rule eliminates Forms I-688, I-688A, and I-688B (temporary resident card and older versions of the employment authorization card/document) from List A, new 8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A). USCIS no longer issues these cards, and all that were in circulation have expired. The rule also adds to List A of the Form I-9 in 8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A) foreign passports containing specially-marked machine-readable visas and documentation for certain citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI).
In addition, the rule updates the list of acceptable documents and receipts by including “Form I-94A” next to each reference to the Form I-94, Arrival-Departure Record, new 8 CFR § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(5) and (b)(1)(vi)(B) and (C). The Form I-94A is nearly identical to the Form I-94 except that all fields are computer-generated rather than being annotated by hand.
The revised Form I-9 includes additional changes, such as revisions to the employee attestation section and the addition of the new U.S. passport card to List A.
Employers will have to use the revised Form I-9 for all new hires and to reverify any employee with expiring employment authorization beginning 45 days after publication in the Federal Register. The current version of the Form I-9 (dated June 5, 2007) will no longer be valid after that date.
Currently, the first box in that section states: ‘'A citizen or national of the United States.’‘ USCIS states that separating those two groups will eliminate one difficulty that currently exists when prosecuting those who make false claims to U.S. citizenship. USCIS explains that noncitizen nationals of the U.S. are persons born in American Samoa as provided in INA § 308 [8 USCA § 1408]; certain former citizens of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands who relinquished their U.S. citizenship acquired under INA § 301 of Pub. L. No. 94-241 (establishing the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) by executing a declaration before an appropriate court that they intended to be noncitizen nationals rather than U.S. citizens; and certain children of noncitizen nationals born abroad, as provided by INA § 308. A definition of noncitizen national is added to the instructions to the Form I-9.
Form I-9. The revised edition of Form I-9 is dated February 2, 2009, and must be used beginning on that date; the June 5, 2007 version of the form should be used until that time. Both versions of the form are available on USCIS' website.
• also on page 1 of the instructions, USCIS has added a paragraph concerning noncitizen nationals of the U.S.


Opinion Judge: Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J.
Party Name: STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent v. William MAINAAUPO, Jr., Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. State of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent v. Mark K. Lopez, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
As Amended April 4, 2008.
James S. Tabe, Deputy Public Defender (DPD), for the defendant-appellant-petitioner William Mainaaupo, Jr.
Donn Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA), for the plaintiff-appellee-respondent State of Hawai'i in No. 27764.
Karen T. Nakasone, DPD (Katie L. Lambert, DPD, on the briefs), for the defendant-appellant-petitioner Mark K. Lopez in No. 27969.
Brian R. Vincent, DPA (Daniel H. Shimizu, DPA, on the briefs), for the plaintiff-appellee-respondent State of Hawai'i in No. 27969.
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and DUFFY, JJ.
[117 Hawai'i 239] On December 7, 2007, the defendant-appellant-petitioner Mark K. Lopez filed an application for a writ of certiorari, urging us to review the memorandum opinion (mem. op.) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Lopez, No. 27969, 2007 WL 2430155 [hereinafter, "ICA's Lopez mem. op."], and, on December 11, 2007, the defendant-appellant-petitioner William Mainaaupo, Jr., filed an application for a writ of certiorari, asking us to review the ICA's memorandum opinion in State v. Mainaaupo, No. 27764, 2007 WL 2576952 [hereinafter, "ICA's Mainaaupo mem. op."]. Although these cases are factually unrelated, they share a common legal question: Whether the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court of the first circuit 1 correctly declined to instruct the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense, as provided by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-218 (1993), 2 in relation to charges of the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836 (Supp.2001), 3 where the defendant claims a mistaken belief that the person who authorized his use of the vehicle was the registered owner of the vehicle. Beyond this shared issue, Mainaaupo argues that the ICA gravely erred in concluding that the circuit court correctly instructed the jury that, under HRS § 708-836, the defendant has a legal duty to obtain consent to operate the vehicle directly from the registered owner of the vehicle. And Lopez contends that the ICA gravely erred in concluding that the remarks during closing argument by the plaintiff-appellee-respondent State of Hawai'i [hereinafter, "the prosecution"] regarding Lopez's post-arrest silence and his failure to produce a critical defense witness to corroborate his testimony were legitimate comment on the evidence and not misconduct. We accepted Lopez's and Mainaaupo's applications on January 18, 2008 and consolidated the cases for disposition the same day.
For the reasons discussed herein, we hold (1) that the circuit court erred in declining to give Lopez's and Mainaaupo's mistake-of-fact jury instructions, (2) that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that Mainaaupo had a legal duty to obtain consent to operate the vehicle directly from the registered owner of the vehicle, (3) that the prosecution's comments regarding Lopez's post-arrest silence were improper, and (4) that the prosecution's comments regarding Lopez's failure to produce a critical defense witness were not improper. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments against Lopez and Mainaaupo and remand their cases for new trials.
was ever lost. Aside from some damage to the front of the car, the car was in "pretty good" condition; its door locks and steering column were not damaged, and an after-market sound system, the initial cost of which was between $300.00 and $400.00, was installed in it.
At around 5:00 p.m. on May 31, 2005, Harris drove the car to his workplace at Bandito's Cantina in the Pearlridge Center, located in the City and County of Honolulu, parked the car in the mall's parking lot, locked the doors, and went to work. He left some clothes, his wallet, and over one hundred compact discs in the car. Harris finished work at about 9:00 p.m. only to discover that the car was gone. He contacted security guards and the police, reporting that the car had been stolen.
Shortly after midnight, at approximately 12:45 a.m. on June 8, 2005, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Edward Hawkins was in a police cruiser at Wai'anae Mall, employing a laser device to identify and stop drivers speeding on Farrington Highway. Using the laser device, he observed a car traveling sixty miles an hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone. Officer Hawkins pursued the car and activated his cruiser's blue lights and siren, and the car pulled over immediately. Officer Hawkins exited the cruiser and approached the car to find Lopez behind the wheel. Lopez provided his Washington State driver's license but was unable to produce either the vehicle's registration certificate or any proof of insurance. Lopez stated that the car belonged to a friend and that he did not know where the paperwork was located.
Officer Hawkins instructed Lopez to turn off the vehicle's ignition and, in response, Lopez retrieved what appeared to be a house key from his pocket, put his hands underneath a towel on the steering column for fifteen to twenty seconds, and turned off the ignition. Deeming the towel suspicious, Officer Hawkins called dispatch, ran a check on the vehicle's license plate number, and was informed by dispatch that the car was stolen. The officer ordered Lopez out of the car, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest for driving a stolen vehicle. The record does not reflect whether Officer Hawkins, or any other police officer, administered warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), during or after the arrest. Officer Hawkins processed the car, removing the towel and observing that all of the plastic around the steering column was gone, such that he could see its internal mechanisms. HPD Officer Kepi Visoria, who assisted in processing the car, noticed that the ignition was broken and dangling and that the door locks had been "punched," which means that the locks had been shoved in with a blunt object, such as a screwdriver, in order to open the doors.
The police returned the car to Harris, whereupon he noticed that, in addition to the other damage, the compact discs, the sound system, and Harris's wallet were missing, and a door window was "flexed," which is a method by which a person breaks into a car by flexing a window so that he can place his hand through the window and open the door. Harris never gave Lopez, or anyone else, permission to drive the car at any time, and Gregory and Mona, the vehicle's owners, likewise never authorized Lopez, or anyone other than Harris, to drive the car.
On June 17, 2005, Lopez was charged by complaint with intentionally or knowingly exerting unauthorized control over a propelled vehicle, by operating the vehicle without the consent of Gregory and/or Mona, the owners of the vehicle, thereby committing the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836, see supra note 3.
to a friend and he doesn't know where the paperwork is." On redirect examination by the prosecution, the officer testified that Lopez did not volunteer his friend's name or address or the means by which he acquired control of the car from his friend. The deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) asked, "Did he say anything at all about this friend except [']well, I got it from a friend, I don't know where the paperwork is[']?," to which Officer Hawkins responded, "That's all he said." On recross-examination, the officer admitted that he could not recall whether he had asked Lopez for his friend's name and other pertinent information.


text:
PATRICIA WARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIGIDA OCHOA, NOE GONZALEZ, LAND SAFE APPRAISALS, INC. and BANK OF AMERICA, Defendants, and CENTURY 21 WORDEN & GREEN and KEN SONG, Defendants-Respondents.
Justin Lee Klein argued the cause for appellant (Hobbie, Corrigan & Bertucio, PC, attorneys; Justin Lee Klein, of counsel and on the briefs). Deirdre M. Dennis argued the cause for respondents (Law Offices of Linda S. Baumann, attorney; Deirdre M. Dennis, on the brief).
Plaintiff Patricia Ward ("Ward") appeals the Law Division order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Century 21 Worden & Green ("Century 21") and Ken Song ("Song") and dismissing the complaint against them with prejudice. We affirm.
Ward's claim arises out of severe and permanent injuries she sustained after being attacked by a pitbull while performing an appraisal on October 3, 2014, at the home owned by defendants Brigida Ochoa ("Ochoa") and Noe Gonzalez ("Gonzalez"). Ochoa and Gonzalez previously settled their claim with Ward.
We discern the following facts from the motion record, considering them in the light most favorable to Ward. See Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 203 (2014) (citation omitted). On June 5, 2014, Song entered into a listing agreement with the homeowners with a view toward conducting a short sale of their foreclosed residential property. Song, a realtor employed by Century 21, was the listing agent and the buyer's agent. In order to close title, the short sale had to be approved by the foreclosing mortgage holder, Bank of America ("BOA"). During the period of the listing agreement, Ward contends Song was obligated to ascertain the number and breed of dogs the homeowners owned. Ward, a licensed real estate appraiser since 1989, was assigned to inspect and appraise the subject property through the auspices of BOA's appraisal coordinator, Land Safe Appraisal Services, Inc. ("Land Safe").
Ward was contacted directly by Land Safe to perform the appraisal. In her career, she had performed 200 to 250 residential appraisals annually. Ward attempted to communicate with Ochoa to set up the appointment because the homeowner was listed as the contact person for the appraisal. After Ward's efforts were unsuccessful, she asked Land Safe for permission to contact Song in order to facilitate making the appointment with Ochoa. Ward called Song to follow up. At her deposition, she stated that no inquiry was made as to whether the home was owner occupied or if dogs were on the premises.
Ultimately, Ward contacted Ochoa to set up the appointment. At her deposition, Ward understood Ochoa was her client. Ward did not ask Ochoa if there was a lockbox on the house or if there were dogs present. Song was never contacted by Ward to ascertain whether or not the home was owner occupied. However, he did inform her that there was a dog at the premises prior to the date of the appraisal. The homeowners contended that their pitbulls did not have any vicious propensities prior to this incident.
When Ward arrived at the home on October 3, 2014, Ochoa told her that two dogs were crated in the kitchen. Ward confirmed this and felt that the crated dogs posed no danger to her. After stepping into the foyer, a bedroom was situated to the left. An older, lethargic, uncrated pitbull was in that bedroom described by Ward as "very calm and docile." Ward did not object to the presence of any of the dogs or request their removal. The crated dogs were fifteen to sixteen feet away from the foyer. The interior inspection proceeded for about forty minutes without incident. She proceeded with the appraisal and did not reschedule even though she had the ability to do so. At her deposition, Ward admitted that she had no reason to believe the pitbulls were dangerous because two were in crates and not making noise, and the other dog was sick.
After Ward and Ochoa exited the home through the front door, they walked along the perimeter of the house near the side door and Ochoa went inside. She noticed that the dogs were out of their crates and on the deck and making noise. Ward observed this as well and nonetheless, proceeded to photograph the rear of the house. At this point, she testified that she still had no reason to believe that any of the dogs would bite her. As Ward walked toward her car, one of the pitbulls charged her and she ran away in fear. At the foot of the driveway, Ward was repeatedly attacked by one of the pitbulls, which resulted in her sustaining a fractured radius and nerve damage, requiring surgery. Admittedly, Ward did nothing to ensure her own safety. Song was not at the premises when the incident occurred, and no one requested him to be there.
Century 21 crafted an internal "policy" to ensure that "pets" were appropriately secured by homeowners when third parties were to visit. Song and Century 21 contend that they abided by their internal policy, referred to as the "Open House Don't" list, as evidenced by the fact that the dogs were restrained and crated at the time Ward arrived.
1. USE OWNERS' PHONES TO MAKE ANY LONG DISTANCE CALLS. IF YOU DO LEAVE $$.
2. LET OWNER BE THERE WHEN [YOU ARE] HOME.
3. FORGET PAPERWORK TO WORK ON IF IT IS SLOW.
4. ONLY PUT UP 1 OR 2 SIGNS.
5. FORGET TO CLEAN UP DONUTS/COFFEE.
6. LEAVE HOUSE TO SHOW ANOTHER HOME IN AREA.
7. BE LATE OR CLOSE EARLY.
9. DO OPEN ON POORLY TRAVELED ROAD, SECLUDED AREA.
10. HOLD OPEN ON POPULAR SPORTING DATE/HOLIDAY WEEKENDS.
11. HOLD OPEN ON O.P.T.
12. ALLOW OWNER TO LEAVE PETS AROUND.
13. LET SMALL CHILDREN OF VISITORS GET OUT OF CONTROL.
It is undisputed that Ward never had a written agreement with Century 21 (or Song). On the date in question, Ward was a partner with P & R Appraisals, LLC ("P & R"). Her company did not have any policies or protocols applicable to appraising a residence when dogs were present.
Century 21 and Song moved for summary judgment arguing that their alleged acts or omissions were not a proximate cause of damage to Ward, and that they did not owe any duty to her.
[t]he most that could be said is to tell the parties to keep your dogs caged or take them out of the house. They have dog[s] in ca[g]es. The dog gets loose. It's not foreseeable in any way. They complied with everything reasonable that the realtor could have told them. There's nothing in any way that would be foreseeable by [Century 21 and Song], which is an element of negligence on premises liability.
A memorializing order was entered on the same date, and this appeal followed.
Ward argues on appeal that the judge should have denied the motion for summary judgment because she established that Century 21 and Song owed her a duty to remove the pitbulls, breached that duty, and caused her injuries. In making this argument, Ward essentially presents two theories of negligence. First, she argues that movants' duty is derived from "multiple sources," including common law, because being attacked by the pitbull was an apparent and foreseeable risk. Second, Ward contends Century 21 and Song had an affirmative obligation to ensure the safety of the premises by having the pitbulls removed when she was present because movants had an internal "policy" to this effect which they failed to abide with. Additionally, she contends that the judge disregarded legal authorities, evidence, and her expert report. We disagree.
This court reviews a ruling on summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017); and Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Thus, this court considers, as the trial judge did, "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)).
Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente, 224 N.J. at 199 (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
a determination whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.
"To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opponent must 'come forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32 (App. Div. 2012)). "[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome the motion." Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005) (citations omitted).
If there is no genuine issue of material fact, this court must then "'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citations omitted). "When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court." Templo Fuente, 224 N.J. at 199 (citing Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). However, a "'trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Ibid. (quoting Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 378).
Ward's initial argument on appeal raises a purely legal issue because "[t]he determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court." Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479 (1995) (citation omitted). Our courts "have long held that it is ordinarily a plaintiff's burden to prove negligence, and that it is never presumed." Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009) (citation omitted). "To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements: '(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)).
There is a presumption against negligence, and the burden of establishing such negligence is on plaintiff. Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981). "A prerequisite to recovery on a negligence theory is a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff." Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 529 (1988) (citation omitted). "The duty owed by a premises owner . . . depends in general upon the application of well-established categories through which the status of the injured party is used to define both duty and foreseeability." Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 316 (2013).
In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 (1993), plaintiff was injured after losing her footing on a step during an open-house tour at the invitation of the broker. The Court held "the nature of the relationship between a [real estate] broker and its customer in the conduct of an open-house inspection of property is substantial." Id. at 441. "[W]e conclude that implicit in the broker's invitation to customers is some commensurate degree of responsibility for their safety while visiting the premises." Ibid. "[T]he key to the broker-customer relationship, which gives rise to a duty of care, is the services that are offered by the broker and expected by the customer in the context of an open-house inspection of property." Id. at 444. (Emphasis added).
We find that Hopkins is factually distinguishable. The Court's holding in Hopkins is grounded in the recognition that it is reasonable for a broker to inspect a home for purposes of marketing it to potential buyers . . . and to give adequate warnings with respect to hazards readily discoverable through such an inspection . . . . " Id. at 446. We decline to extend the holding in Hopkins to interpret that a dog constitutes a "hazardous condition," as urged by Ward. Century 21 and Song did not have an economic interest in Ward conducting an appraisal here. Governed by these principles, we find that Ward did not engage in any activity akin to any sort of a relationship with Century 21 or Song, thus making Hopkins inapplicable here.
Unlike the plaintiff in Hopkins who was injured after missing a step, Ward was injured as a result of her employment with P & R. The record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that Ward was a "customer" of Century 21 or Song. Consequently, there was no legal relationship between the parties, and no privity of contract.
Whether analyzed under the traditional common law categories, or under Hopkin's more general analysis, Ward failed to establish a duty. Thus, the judge properly granted summary judgment after analyzing "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care . . . ." Id. at 449.
Plaintiff's remaining evidentiary arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

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J.B. Sala, S.M. Courtney (2009). Flexible working memory representation of the relationship between an object and its location as revealed by interactions with attention. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 71(7), 1525-33. doi: 10.3758/APP.71.7.1525.
J.K. Roth, S.M. Courtney (2007) “Neural system for updating object working memory from different sources: sensory stimuli or long term memory” NeuroImage, 38(3):617-30.
Susan M. Courtney, Jennifer K. Roth, Joseph B. Sala (2007) “A Hierarchical Biased-Competition Model of Domain-Dependent Working Memory Maintenance and Executive Control.” Book chapter to be published in “Working Memory- Behavioural & Neural Correlates.” Editors Naoyuki Osaka, Robert Logie & Marl D’Esposito, Oxford University Press.
K. Morgen, G. Sammer, S.M. Courtney, T. Wolters, H. Melchior, C. Blecker, P. Oschmann, M. Kaps, D. Vaitl (2007) “Evidence for a direct association between cortical atrophy and cognitive impairment in relapsing-remitting MS”NeuroImage, 37(3): 937-46.
Joseph B. Sala and Susan M. Courtney (2007) “Binding of What and Where during Working Memory Maintenance” Cortex, 43, 5-21.
J. Roth, J. Serences, S.M. Courtney (2006) “Neural system for controlling the contents of object working memory in humans” Cerebral Cortex, 16, 1595-1603.
Laurie E. Cutting, Amy M Clements, Susan Courtney, Sheryl Rimrodt, Joanna Schafer, Jeanne Bisesi, James Pekar, Ken Pugh. (2006). Differential components of sentence comprehension: Beyond single word reading and memory. NeuroImage, 29(2), 429-38.
Memory” Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 4(4): 501-516.
John T. Serences, Jens Schwarzbach, Susan M. Courtney & Steven Yantis (2004) “Control of object-based visual attention in human cortex” Cerebral Cortex, 14: 1346-1357.
J.B. Sala, P. Rama, and S.M. Courtney. (2003) “Functional Topography of a Distributed Neural System for Spatial and Nonspatial Information Maintenance in Working Memory.” Neuropsychologia, 41(3): 341-56.
S. Yantis, J. Schwarzbach , J. Serences, R.L. Carlson, M.A. Steinmetz, J.J. Pekar, & S.M. Courtney (2002) “Transient neural activity in human parietal cortex during spatial attention shifts” Nature Neuroscience, 5:955-1002.
Pia Rama, Joseph B. Sala, Joseph S. Gillen, James J. Pekar, and Susan M. Courtney. (2001) “Dissociation of the Neural Systems for Working Memory Maintenance of Verbal and Nonspatial Visual Information,” Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1 (2), 161-171.
James V. Haxby, Laurent Petit, Leslie G. Ungerleider, Susan M. Courtney (2000) “Distinguishing the functional roles of multiple regions in distributed neural systems for visual working memory” NeuroImage,11(2): 145-156.
Susan M. Courtney (1999) “Cognition – Perception, 3: Perception/memory”American Journal Of Psychiatry, 156(8): 1137.
Leslie G. Ungerleider, Susan M. Courtney, and James V. Haxby. (1998) “A Neural System for Human Visual Working Memory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95, 883-890.
Susan M. Courtney, Laurent Petit, Leslie G. Ungerleider, José Ma. Maisog, James V. Haxby. (1998) “An Area Specialized for Spatial Working Memory in Human Frontal Cortex,” Science, 279: 1347-1351.
Laurent Petit, Susan M. Courtney, Leslie G. Ungerleider, James V. Haxby. (1998) “Sustained activity in the medial wall during working memory delays” Journal of Neuroscience, 18(22): 9429-9437.
Susan M. Courtney, Laurent Petit, James V. Haxby, Leslie G. Ungerleider. (1998) “The Role of Prefrontal Cortex in Working Memory: Examining the Contents of Consciousness,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 353, 1819-1828.
Susan M. Courtney, Leslie G. Ungerleider, Katrina Keil, James V. Haxby. (1997) “Transient and Sustained Activity in a Distributed Neural System for Human Working Memory,” Nature, 386, 608-611.
Susan M. Courtney and Leslie Ungerleider. (1997) “What fMRI has Taught us about Human Vision,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 7: 554-561.
Susan M. Courtney, Leslie G. Ungerleider, Katrina Keil, James V. Haxby. (1996) “Object and Spatial Visual Working Memory Activate Separate Neural Systems in Human Cortex,” Cerebral Cortex, 6: 39-49.
Susan M. Courtney, Leif H. Finkel, Gershon Buchsbaum. (1995) “A Multi-Stage Neural Network for Color Constancy and Color Induction,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 6(3):972-985.
Susan M. Courtney, Leif H. Finkel, Gershon Buchsbaum. (1995) “Network Simulations of Retinal and Cortical Contributions to Color Constancy,” Vision Research, 3 (3): 413-434.
Susan M. Courtney and Gershon Buchsbaum (1991) “Temporal Differences Between Color Channels within the Retina as a Possible Origin of Subjective Colors,” Vision Research, 31(9): 1541-1548.
Susan M. Courtney (1999) “Cognition – Perception, 3: Perception/memory”American Journal of Psychiatry, 156: (8) 1137.

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CHALCEDONYX - Sorry, definition not available.
DETOXICANTS - Sorry, definition not available.
DETOXICATED - detoxicated v. simple past tense and past participle of detoxicate.
DETOXICATES - detoxicates v. Third-person singular simple present indicative form of detoxicate.
DICTATRIXES - Sorry, definition not available.
DISCLIMAXES - disclimaxes n. plural of disclimax.
EXACERBATED - exacerbated v. simple past tense and past participle of exacerbate.
EXACTITUDES - exactitudes n. plural of exactitude.
EXCOGITATED - excogitated v. simple past tense and past participle of excogitate.
EXCRUCIATED - excruciated v. simple past tense and past participle of excruciate.
EXULCERATED - exulcerated v. simple past tense and past participle of exulcerate.
HEXADECANES - hexadecanes n. plural of hexadecane.
HEXADECIMAL - hexadecimal n. (arithmetic, computing, uncountable) A number system with base 16, using the digits 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
hexadecimal n. (countable, computing) A number expressed in the hexadecimal system.
hexadecimal adj. Of a number, expressed in hexadecimal.
INTOXICATED - intoxicated adj. Stupefied by alcohol, drunk.
intoxicated adj. Stupefied by any chemical substance.
intoxicated v. simple past tense and past participle of intoxicate.
LEXICALISED - lexicalised v. simple past tense and past participle of lexicalise.

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A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653 - Formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1498-MTJ - Eugenio Juan R. Gonzalez v. Judge Lizabeth G. Torres etc.
EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ, Complainant, v. Judge LIZABETH G. TORRES, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.
This is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by Eugenio Juan R. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) against Judge Lizabeth G. Torres (Judge Torres), Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for the Violations of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution and Rules 3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 71984 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Revelina R. Limson" pending before said court.
It stemmed from an earlier complaint for perjury filed by Gonzalez against Revelina R. Limson (Limson) with the Mandaluyong Prosecutor's Office. After the submission of the necessary pleadings by the respective parties, the Mandaluyong Prosecutor's Office recommended the filing of an information for perjury against Limson. Accordingly, the appropriate information was filed with the MeTC of Mandaluyong City and was raffled to Branch 60, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 71984. Thereafter, trial ensued.
After Gonzalez rested his case, the defendant Limson, instead of presenting evidence, filed a Manifestation/Motion to Admit Attached Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the court in an Order dated 18 May 2002. The order also gave Gonzalez ten days within which to file his comment, which the latter submitted on 14 June 2002. Gonzalez averred that the "Demurrer to Evidence" was first considered submitted for resolution on 20 June 2002. However, on 26 August 2002, a hearing was set but the said issue was not resolved. Judge Torres again considered the said matter submitted for resolution.
In his complaint dated 23 October 2003, Gonzalez charged Judge Torres with delay in resolving Limson's Demurrer to Evidence. Gonzalez called the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to the fact that, per the certification dated 21 October 2003 of the Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC, Branch 60, the issue relating to the "Demurrer to Prosecution Evidence" in Criminal Case No. 71984 remains unresolved. He prayed that Judge Torres be ordered to inhibit herself from further taking cognizance of the pending issue and of other matters in connection with Criminal Case No. 71984.
Through an Indorsement dated 7 November 2003, OCA required Judge Torres to submit her comment on Gonzalez's complaint within ten days from receipt of said indorsement. On 3 December 2003, Judge Torres requested for an extension of 20 days within which to file the required comment which the OCA granted on 15 January 2004.
On 11 March 2004, the OCA sent a 1st Tracer to Judge Torres reminding her of its directive for her to comment on the allegations in Gonzalez's administrative complaint. Judge Torres was also warned that, should she fail to comply within five days from receipt of the 1st Tracer, the matter shall be submitted to the Court without her comment.
Subsequently, the OCA received a letter dated 5 April 2004 from Judge Torres wherein she requested a further extension of 20 days from 5 April 2004 to submit her comment, which the OCA again granted on 21 April 2004. Judge Torres was thus given until 26 April 2004 within which to submit her comment.
However, on 21 January 2005, the OCA once more received a letter from Judge Torres, requesting for another extension of 20 days within which to submit her comment on Gonzalez's administrative complaint against her. Her request for extension was granted for the third time by the OCA on 26 January 2005.
Judge Torres finally submitted her Comment dated 20 February 2006. In her Comment, she averred that the record of Criminal Case No. 71984 was rigged and that Gonzalez cited orders that she did not issue. The hearing dates Gonzalez referred to were without minutes; and those with minutes, were not signed by legal stenographers, or if they were signed, the signatures were unidentifiable or were not of the legal stenographers' signatures on record. Proof of service of the alleged orders she issued to the adversarial parties was either missing or dubious.
Judge Torres added that the pleadings in Criminal Case No. 71984 were being filed inconsistently. Some were filed directly at Branch 60, while others were filed at the Office of the Clerk of Court without record of when the same were purportedly forwarded to her branch. She could not review the records of Criminal Case No. 71984 as fast as she wanted to because said records were merely fastened, and the pleadings were not filed chronologically.
She further countered that since 18 May 2002, she had no official intervention in Criminal Case No. 71984. She was constrained to inhibit herself from acting on Limson's Demurrer to Evidence to protect the MeTC of Mandaluyong City from being drawn into the real controversy between the Gonzalezes and their adversaries over the Wack-Wack Apartments.
She expressed offense that the acts alleged by Gonzalez in his administrative complaint made her appear remiss in her duties. Respondent reasoned that she was acting on inherited cases as inventoried by the court staff and the records were disorganized. In fact, she claimed that she had already personally gone to the OCA Legal Staff to explain her predicament.
While admitting that she was not able to quickly comment on the present administrative case, she invoked her case load and added duties as Executive Judge of MeTC Mandaluyong City, as well as the four vacancies in her branch (i.e., branch clerk of court, sheriff, legal researcher and stenographer) as her reasons for the delay.
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and respondent Judge Torres be FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and WARNED that further infraction of the Rules of Court shall be dealt with more severely.
On 23 August 2006, we required3 the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. On 26 October 2006, Gonzalez submitted his Manifestation4 stating that he was submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Judge Torres, on the other hand, asked for an extension5 of 20 days from 30 October 2006 within which to submit her manifestation, which we granted on 22 November 2006.6 Judge Torres, however, still failed to file her manifestation within the extended period despite the notice sent to and received by her. Thus, we deemed that Judge Torres had already waived7 her right to submit supplemental comment/pleadings herein.
Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed, after a review of which, we find ourselves agreeing in the recommendation of the OCA.
Also relevant herein is Administrative Circular No. 1, dated 28 January 1988, which requires all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
In the case at bar, Limson's Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 was submitted for resolution on 20 June 2002. The same was still pending even after Gonzales had filed this administrative case on 23 October 2003.
Respondent Judge Torres presented several excuses for her delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and in filing her comment to the present administrative case, among which were her heavy case load, additional duties as Executive Judge of the MeTC of Mandaluyong City, the vacancies in her branch, and the disorganized record-keeping. These will not exonerate her.
If it was indeed true that Judge Torres was prevented from the timely disposition of her pending cases, including Criminal Case No. 71984, by her case load, additional assignments or designations, lack of personnel, and any other reason, all she had to do was to simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of her cases. The records of this administrative matter do not show that Judge Torres made any attempt to report and request extension of time to resolve the cases pending before her court. Instead, she preferred to remain silent, kept the cases pending, and thus clothed the same with suspicion. Obviously, she forgot the character of her office as a public trust, imposing upon her the highest degree of responsibility, efficiency, as well as transparency.
Judge Torres even stated that she was constrained to inhibit herself from acting on Limson's Demurrer to Evidence to protect the MeTC of Mandaluyong City from being drawn into the controversy between the Gonzalezes and their adversaries over the Wack-Wack Apartments. Such an excuse is feeble and unacceptable, hardly expected from a judge. First and foremost, it is precisely Judge Torres' duty to settle controversies between adversarial parties. Judge Torres cannot shirk from the responsibility of resolving a case pending before her court because she is afraid that her court will be dragged into a "controversy." Second, her fear that her court will be dragged into an even bigger controversy between Gonzalez and other parties involving the Wack-Wack Apartments is unfounded considering that the MeTC can only take cognizance of the issues pending before it and over which it has jurisdiction. Third, Judge Torres' course of action is totally baseless and irrational. She cannot keep Criminal Case No. 71984 pending before her court, neither proceeding with it nor dismissing it, for an undetermined period of time or hopefully, perhaps, until the Wack-Wack Apartments controversy has blown over. And fourth, Judge Torres' actions, instead of protecting her court, has actually done more damage to it, raising doubts and suspicions as to its credibility, impartiality, and independence.
Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed her comment on the present complaint more than one year from the time the OCA issued a directive25 for her to do so. As a judge, Judge Torres ought to know that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, said directives should be respected. Directives issued by the OCA should not be construed as mere requests, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for a lawful order and directive. Judge Torres' reasoning that she needed more time to be able to make a detailed comment is not sufficient for her to just ignore the deadline set by OCA. It took resolutions issued by this Court for Judge Torres to finally file her comment. Even then, Judge Torres had asked for several more extensions (on 3 December 2003, 5 April 2004 and on 21 January 2005) before actually filing her comment on 20 February 2005.
Please be advised that under Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998, inhibitions are ":judicial actions which do not require prior administrative approval." Under Circular No. 7 dated 10 November 1980, "orders arising from motions for inhibitions should not be treated as administrative in character but should be considered as judicial. The party who alleges to be aggrieved may apply for the appropriate legal remedy."
In the situation at hand, a motion for inhibition should be filed with the judge involved. And, pursuant to the aforecited provisions, should the party who seeks the inhibition of the judge feel aggrieved by the action taken by the judge involved, then he should take the appropriate legal remedies.
It must be noted also that Judge Torres was already penalized and was fined P20,000.00 for her inefficiency and Violation of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611 entitled, "Antonio del Mundo v. Judge Lilibeth G. Torres." She should have known better than to simply let the reglementary period pass by again in another case.
There are also pending cases against Judge Torres in which she is charged with the following: (1) Inefficiency, Gross Negligence, Grave Abuse of Discretion and Violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1464-MTJ, in which she was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for failure to file her comment therein; (2) Violation of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, and Rules 3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Grave Prejudice, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1496-MTJ; (3) Culpable violation of the Constitution, Gross Ignorance of the law and Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, docketed as OCA-IPI-1806-MTJ; and (4) Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Criminal Case and Gross Inefficiency, docketed as OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ.
Given the foregoing premises, we find that the imposition of the maximum amount of fine, P20,000.00, reasonable.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, is found guilty of undue delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to her personal records. The Court Administrator is directed to furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.
8 Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 540, 548-549, citing Valdez v. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929, 933 (1960) and Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 (1946).
9 Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. 00-4-09-SC, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 132.
11 Office of the Court Administrator v. Alumbres, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1965, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 375, 386.
12 Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 54, Bacolod City, A.M. No. 06-4-219-RTC, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 505, 520.
13 Bajet v. Baclig, 434 Phil. 564, 574 (2002).
14 Re: Cases Left Undecided by Retired Judge Antonio E. Arbis, Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City, 443 Phil. 496, 502 (2003).
15 Office of the Court Administrator v. Alumbres, supra note 11 at 388.
16 Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila, A.M. No. 00-1-10-RTC, 10 September 2004, 438 SCRA 111, 125.
18 A.M. No. RTJ-95-1325, 4 October 1995, 248 SCRA 684, 687, citing Cruz v. Basa, A.M. No. MTJ-91 - 598, 9 February 1993, 218 SCRA 551, 557.
19 Judge Gonzales-Decano v. Judge Siapno, 405 Phil. 752, 763 (2001).
20 Report on Judicial Audit conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City, 354 Phil. 8, 21 (1998).
21 Guerrero v. Judge Deray, 442 Phil. 85, 91-92 (2002).
22 Re: Judicial Audit of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Zamboanga City, Presided over by Hon. Ernesto R. Gutierrez, 482 Phil. 310, 320 (2006).
23 Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada, Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. 00-4-09-SC, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 133.
24 Celino v. Judge Abrogar, 315 Phil. 305, 312 (1995).
25 Issued on 7 November 2003; rollo, p. 13.

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UNITED STATES v. OTHER MEDICINE February 26, 2010 No. 09-30020.
TRAXLER v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY February 26, 2010 No. 08-35641.
RICE v. HOLDER February 26, 2010 No. 05-74297.
IN RE: David Douglas TAYLOR; Linda Sue Taylor February 26, 2010 No. 08-60033.
OFFICE DEPOT INC DS LLC v. ZUCCARINI February 26, 2010 No. 07-16788.
UNITED STATES v. BRIGHT February 26, 2010 Nos. 07-17027, 08-16912, 08-16913.
UNITED STATES v. GARRIDO February 25, 2010 No. 08-10398.
KODE v. CARLSON February 25, 2010 No. 08-36056.
DOODY v. SCHRIRO February 25, 2010 No. 06-17161.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS INC v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES February 24, 2010 No. 09-55749.
UNITED STATES v. JENNEN February 24, 2010 No. 09-30146.
AVALOS v. BACA February 24, 2010 No. 07-56511.
CUMBIE v. WOODY WOO INC DBA II DBA February 23, 2010 No. 08-35718.
COOPER v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION VRW February 22, 2010 No. 08-17074.
HARRISON v. RJJ GILLESPIE February 22, 2010 No. 08-16602.
UNITED STATES v. HAENG HWA LEE February 22, 2010 No. 09-10126.
ROBINSON v. SCHRIRO February 22, 2010 No. 05-99007.
COOPER v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION February 22, 2010 No. 08-17074.
CUELLAR v. JOYCE February 19, 2010 No. 09-35068.
CHRISTIAN v. FRANK February 19, 2010 No. 08-17236.
ALVAREZ REYNAGA v. HOLDER February 19, 2010 No. 08-70253.
ZETINO v. HOLDER February 18, 2010 No. 08-70390.
KIN v. HOLDER February 18, 2010 No. 05-73079.
UNITED STATES v. GUERRERO February 18, 2010 No. 09-30066.
MAREZ v. BASSETT February 18, 2010 No. 08-56035.
GEBHART v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION February 17, 2010 No. 08-74943.
UNITED STATES v. BOROWY February 17, 2010 No. 09-10064.
UNITED STATES v. NORWOOD February 17, 2010 No. 08-30050.
UNITED STATES v. EDWARDS February 16, 2010 Nos. 08-30055, 08-30056, 08-30059.
NUNEZ v. HOLDER February 10, 2010 No. 06-70219.
NORTH COUNTY COMMUNICATIONS CORP v. CALIFORNIA CATALOG TECHNOLOGY CTT OCN 573B TGEC LLC CA OCN 5969 OCN 6261 GTE February 10, 2010 No. 08-55048.
UNITED STATES v. ANCHRUM February 10, 2010 No. 09-30013.
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION v. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE February 9, 2010 No. 09-17235.
BULL v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO February 9, 2010 Nos. 06-15566, 05-17080.
UNITED STATES v. VONGXAY February 9, 2010 No. 09-10072.
SCHULTZ v. UNITED STATES II February 9, 2010 No. 08-17304.
YOKOYAMA v. MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY February 8, 2010 No. 07-16825.
MANSOURIAN v. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA February 8, 2010 No. 08-16330.
OMSTEAD v. DELL INC February 5, 2010 No. 08-16479.
WAGGY v. SPOKANE COUNTY WASHINGTON February 5, 2010 No. 09-35133.
MORTIMER 15 v. BACA February 5, 2010 No. 07-55393.
AGUILAR RAMOS v. HOLDER February 4, 2010 No. 07-70240.
UNITED STATES HAIGHT v. CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST February 4, 2010 No. 07-16857.
UNITED STATES HAIGHT v. CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST February 4, 2010 No. 07-16857.
PROSHIPLINE INC EP v. ASPEN INFRASTRUCTURES LTD LTD February 3, 2010 No. 08-35337.
PROSHIPLINE INC EP v. ASPEN INFRASTRUCTURES LTD February 3, 2010 No. 08-35337.
UNITED STATES v. LOEW February 2, 2010 No. 09-30032.
UNITED STATES v. TERRELL February 2, 2010 No. 08-10560.
UNITED STATES v. RESSAM February 2, 2010 No. 09-30000.
RIVER RUNNERS FOR WILDERNESS v. MARTIN February 1, 2010 No. 08-15112.
IN RE: John William FINDLEY February 1, 2010 No. 08-60024.
UNITED STATES v. NAPULOU February 1, 2010 No. 08-10190.
MAHACH WATKINS v. DEPEE February 1, 2010 No. 08-15694.

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"§ 22-1705. Gambling premises; definition; prohibition against maintaining; forfeiture; liens; deposit of moneys in Treasury; penalty; subsequent offenses.
(a) Any real estate listings, building, vessel, shed, booth, shelter, vehicle, enclosure, room, lot, or other premises in the District of Columbia, used or to be used in violating the provisions of § 22-1701 or § 22-1704, shall be deemed “gambling premises” for the purpose of this section.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person in the District of Columbia knowingly, as owner, lessee, agent, employee, operator, occupant, or otherwise, to maintain, or aid, or permit the maintaining of any gambling premises.
(c) All moneys, vehicles, furnishings, fixtures, equipment, stock (including, without limitation, furnishings and fixtures adaptable to nongambling uses, and equipment and stock for printing, recording, computing, transporting, safekeeping, or communication), or other things of value used or to be used: (1) in carrying on or conducting any lottery, or the game or device commonly known as a policy lottery or policy, contrary to the provisions of § 22-1701; (2) in setting up or keeping any gaming table, bank, or device contrary to the provisions of § 22-1704; or (3) in maintaining any gambling premises; shall be subject to seizure by any designated civilian employee of the Metropolitan Police Department or any member of the Metropolitan Police force, or the United States Park Police, or the United States Marshal, or any Deputy Marshal, for the District of Columbia, and any property seized regardless of its value shall be proceeded against in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia by libel action brought in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel or any Assistant Corporation Counsel, and shall, unless good cause be shown to the contrary, be forfeited to the District of Columbia and shall be made available for the use of any agency of the government of the District of Columbia, or otherwise disposed of as the Mayor of the District of Columbia may, by order or by regulation, provide; provided, that if there be bona fide liens against the property so forfeited, then such property shall be disposed of by public auction. The proceeds of the sale of such property shall be available, first, for the payment of all expenses incident to such sale; and, second, for the payment of such liens; and the remainder shall be deposited in the General fund of the District of Columbia. To the extent necessary, liens against said property so forfeited shall, on good cause shown by the lienor, be transferred from the property to the proceeds of the sale of the property.
(d) Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned not more than 180 days or fined not more than $1,000, or both, unless the violation occurs after the person has been convicted of a violation of this section, in which case the person may be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than $2,000, or both.
§ 22-1701. Lotteries; promotion; sale or possession of tickets.
If any person shall within the District keep, set up, or promote, or be concerned as owner, agent, or clerk, or in any other manner, in managing, carrying on, promoting, or advertising, directly or indirectly, any policy lottery, policy shop, or any lottery, or shall sell or transfer any chance, right, or interest, tangible or intangible, in any policy lottery, or any lottery or shall sell or transfer any ticket, certificate, bill, token, or other device, purporting or intended to guarantee or assure to any person or entitle him or her to a chance of drawing or obtaining a prize to be drawn in any lottery, or in a game or device commonly known as policy lottery or policy or shall sell or transfer, or have in his or her possession for the purpose of sale or transfer, a chance or ticket in or share of a ticket in any lottery or any such bill, certificate, token, or other device, he or she shall be fined upon conviction of each said offense not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both. The possession of any copy or record of any such chance, right, or interest, or of any such ticket, certificate, bill, token, or other device shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor of such copy or record did, at the time and place of such possession, keep, set up, or promote, or was at such time and place concerned as owner, agent, or clerk, or otherwise in managing, carrying on, promoting, or advertising a policy lottery, policy shop, or lottery.
§ 22-1702. Possession of lottery or policy tickets.
If any person shall, within the District of Columbia, knowingly have in his or her possession or under his control, any record, notation, receipt, ticket, certificate, bill, slip, token, paper, or writing, current or not current, used or to be used in violating the provisions of § 22-1701, 22-1704, or 22-1708, he or she shall, upon conviction of each such offense, be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned for not more than 180 days, or both. For the purpose of this section, possession of any record, notation, receipt, ticket, certificate, bill, slip, token, paper, or writing shall be presumed to be knowing possession thereof.
§ 22-1703. Permitting sale of lottery tickets on premises.
If any person shall knowingly permit, on any premises under his or her control in the District, the sale of any chance or ticket in or share of a ticket in any lottery or policy lottery, or shall knowingly permit any lottery or policy lottery, or policy shop on such premises, he or she shall be fined not less than $50 nor more than $500, or be imprisoned not more than 180 days, or both.
§ 22-1704. Gaming; setting up gaming table; inducing play.
Whoever shall in the District set up or keep any gaming table, or any house, vessel, or place, on land or water, for the purpose of gaming, or gambling device commonly called A B C, faro bank, E O, roulette, equality, keno, thimbles, or little joker, or any kind of gaming table or gambling device adapted, devised, and designed for the purpose of playing any game of chance for money or property, or shall induce, entice, and permit any person to bet or play at or upon any such gaming table or gambling device, or on the side of or against the keeper thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years. For the purposes of this section, the term “gambling device” shall not include slot machines manufactured before 1952, intended for exhibition or private use by the owner, and not used for gambling purposes. The term “slot machine” means a mechanical device, an essential part of which is a drum or reel which bears an insignia and which when operated may deliver, as a result of the application of an element of chance, a token, money, or property, or by operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as a result of this application of an element of chance, a token, money, or property.
§ 22-1706. Three-card monte and confidence games.
Whoever shall in the District deal, play, or practice, or be in any manner accessory to the dealing or practicing, of the confidence game or swindle known as 3-card monte, or of any such game, play, or practice, or any other confidence game, play, or practice, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 180 days.
§ 22-1707. “Gaming table” defined.
All games, devices, or contrivances at which money or any other thing shall be bet or wagered shall be deemed a gaming table within the meaning of §§ 22-1704 to 22-1706; and the courts shall construe said sections liberally, so as to prevent the mischief intended to be guarded against.
§ 22-1708. Gambling pools and bookmaking; athletic contest defined.
It shall be unlawful for any person, or association of persons, within the District of Columbia to purchase, possess, own, or acquire any chance, right, or interest, tangible or intangible, in any policy lottery or any lottery, or to make or place a bet or wager, accept a bet or wager, gamble or make books or pools on the result of any athletic contest. For the purpose of this section, the term “athletic contest” means any of the following, wherever held or to be held: a football, baseball, softball, basketball, hockey, or polo game, or a tennis, golf, or wrestling match, or a tennis or golf tournament, or a prize fight or boxing match, or a trotting or running race of horses, or a running race of dogs, or any other athletic or sporting event or contest. Any person or association of persons violating this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 180 days, or both.
§ 22-1713. Corrupt influence in connection with athletic contests.
(B) The margin of victory or score of any such contestant, participant, or team to be limited.
(c) Whoever violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years and by a fine of not more than $10,000.
(d) Whoever violates any provision of subsection (b) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than 1 year and by a fine of not more than $5,000.
(e) As used in this section, the term “athletic contest” means any of the following, wherever held or to be held: a football, baseball, softball, basketball, hockey, or polo game, or a tennis or wrestling match, or a prize fight or boxing match, or a horse race or any other athletic or sporting event or contest.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the giving or offering of any bonus or extra compensation to any manager, coach, or professional player, or to any league, association, or conference for the purpose of encouraging such manager, coach, or player to a higher degree of skill, ability, or diligence in the performance of his or her duties.
§ 22-1714. Immunity of witnesses; record.
(a) Whenever, in the judgment of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, the testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other records or documents, by any witness, in any case or proceeding involving a violation of this subchapter before any grand jury or a court in the District of Columbia, is necessary in the public interest, such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, and other records and documents on the grounds that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of such witness may tend to incriminate such witness, or subject such witness to penalty or forfeiture; but such witness shall not be prosecuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which such witness is compelled, after having claimed his or her privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise; except that such witness so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury or contempt committed in so testifying.
(b) The judgment of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that any testimony, or the production of any books, papers, or other records or documents, is necessary in the public interest shall be confirmed in a written communication over the signature of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, addressed to the grand jury or the court in the District of Columbia concerned, and shall be made a part of the record of the case or proceeding in which such testimony or evidence is given.
§ 22-1716. Statement of purpose.
It is the purpose of this subchapter to legalize lotteries, daily numbers games, bingo, raffles, and Monte Carlo night parties, which activities are to be conducted only by the District of Columbia and only those licensed by the District of Columbia and subject to the jurisdiction, authority, and control of the District of Columbia. These activities will provide revenue to the District of Columbia and will provide the citizens of the District of Columbia financial benefits.
§ 22-1717. Permissible gambling activities.
Nothing in subchapter I of this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the operation of or participation in lotteries and/or daily numbers games operated by and for the benefit of the District of Columbia by the Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board; bingo, raffles, and Monte Carlo night parties organized for educational and charitable purposes, regulated by the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board.
§ 22-1718. Advertising and promotion; sale and possession of lottery and numbers tickets and slips.
(a) Nothing in subchapter I of this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the advertising and promotion of excepted permissible gambling activities pursuant to § 22-1717, hereof, including, but not limited to, the sale, by agents authorized by the District of Columbia, and the possession of tickets, certificates, or slips for lottery and daily numbers games excepted and permissible pursuant to § 22-1717, hereof, and the sale, lease, purchase, or possession of tickets, slips, certificates, or cards for bingo, raffles, and Monte Carlo night parties, excepted and permissible pursuant to § 22-1717, hereof.
(b) Nothing in § 22-1701 shall prohibit advertising a lottery by the Maryland State Lottery so long as Maryland does not prohibit advertising or otherwise publishing an account of a lottery by the District of Columbia."


text:
Structure investigation of nickel-based superalloy Inconel 718 produced by selective laser melting was carried out by transmission microscopy. Multiple cycles of heating and rapid cooling during manufacturing lead to the formation of a complex microheterogeneous structure of the alloy. Nevertheless, a chemical analysis of such a structure showed high homogeneity. Structure consists of the γ grains with size of about 1-0.5 μm banded, probably, with δ phase particles or small carbides. Intermetallic phases Ni3Nb were homogeneous precipitated. Volume fraction of this precipitates is about 13%. Carbides typical for this wrought alloy with dimensions of 2-10 μm were not detected. Such an unusual structure is due to manufacturing technology and chemical homogeneity of the powder. The data of the calculation of the maximum volume fraction of the hardening intermetallic phases γ′′, δ Ni3Nb) in the alloy are shown. The calculated volume fraction of the Nb containing phases is not more than 13.61%. However, previously carried out studies give data of a higher (up to 25%) content of this phases. It has been suggested that other metals, for example Ti, Cr, Fe, Mo, Co, can be included in the intermetallic phases that lead to an increase in its volume fraction in the alloy.
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