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Judgment - Collateral Estoppel - Prior Determination - Necessity. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not prevent the relitigation of an issue unless the issue was actually litigated and conclusively decided by a previous valid judgment and the decision was essential to the judgment. Collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue which could have and should have been raised previously, but was not.
 Appeal and Error - Review - Law of the Case - Elements. The law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually decided by an appellate court in a previous appeal of the same case.
 Guaranty and Suretyship - Written Agreement - Necessity. A writing is necessary to prove a suretyship agreement only when a creditor seeks to enforce a suretyship obligation against a surety.
 Guaranty and Suretyship - Deeds of Trust - Transfer of Property - Personal Suretyship. A transferee of land which is subject to a deed of trust does not become a personal surety of the debt of the grantor of the deed of trust.
 Liens - Subrogation - Payment of Debt Owed to Senior Lienor. A junior lienholder does not become subrogated to the rights of a senior lienholder unless it expends its own assets to satisfy the debt secured by the senior lien.
 Costs - Attorney Fees - Frivolous Claim or Defense - Review. A trial court decision under RCW 4.84.185, which authorizes an attorney fee award in actions involving a frivolous claim or defense, will be upheld absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
 Appeal and Error - Frivolous Appeal - What Constitutes. An appeal is not frivolous and does not justify the imposition of sanctions under RAP 18.9(a) if it raises issues on which reasonable minds might differ.
NATURE OF ACTION: Indemnification action by a guarantor which had paid the guaranteed obligation and lost its security as the holder of a second deed of trust during foreclosure proceedings by the holder of the first deed of trust.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 84-2 06217-7, Robert M. Elston, J., on December 20, 1984, granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Supreme Court: Holding that the guarantor had no right to indemnification under applicable suretyship and subrogation principles and that the defendant was not entitled to recover his attorney fees, the court AFFIRMS the judgment.
COUNSEL: JONES, GREY & BAYLEY, P.S., by DONALD B. MYERS, JOHN E. GLOWNEY, and S. LEIGH FULWOOD, for appellant.
MUSSEHL, ROSENBERG, GRIEFF, MUSSEHL & COTTER, by LAWRENCE R. BESK and JEFFREY MICHAEL GRIEFF, for respondents.
MAJORITY OPINION: Fluke Capital and Management Services Company lost its ownership interest in a piece of property during foreclosure by a holder of a first deed of trust. Fluke now seeks indemnification from Volney Richmond III and his marital community. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the case.
In the late 1970's Richmond, the respondent, became involved in an attempt to develop a ski resort in the Snoqualmie Pass area when he invested in a piece of property with Glen Young. They purchased the property by purchasing the stock of a corporation, Mountain Grandeur, Inc. (MGI), holder of title to the property. Richmond and Young delivered a promissory note for $607,366.42 to the sellers of MGI, Michael Curtis and the Wedgewood Corporation. To secure the note Richmond and Young, as the new officers of MGI, had MGI execute a deed of trust on the property.
Fluke Capital and Management Services Company, the appellant, became involved in the development efforts as a creditor. Sometime after Richmond and Young purchased MGI, Young approached Fluke Property Management Company (a general partnership that preceded appellant Fluke Capital and Management Services Company) to discuss investing in another corporation that he ran, Alpine World, Inc. Young planned that Alpine World would develop the Mountain Grandeur project. Fluke agreed to guarantee a loan of about $200,000 made by Peoples National Bank of Washington to Alpine World. As security for the guaranty Young had MGI execute for Fluke a second deed of trust on the Mountain Grandeur property. As further security MGI at the same time gave Fluke an option to purchase the property at any time for $1,090,000.
The development efforts failed and foreclosures began. Alpine World defaulted on its loan. Fluke honored its agreement to guarantee the loan and paid Peoples National Bank of Washington. Fluke then initiated a nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure on its second deed of trust. At the trustee's sale in June 1981, Fluke purchased title to the Mountain Grandeur property, subject to the first deed of trust, for an amount equal to the amount of the debt it paid Peoples plus costs (approximately $280,000).
«1» Because First Interstate Bank and Curtis have identical interests they will be referred to collectively as "First Interstate Bank."
«2» The Bankruptcy Court of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle discharged Glen Young and his marital community of any personal obligation in connection with the transactions at issue in the second foreclosure action. Accordingly, Fluke did not join Young as a defendant in this action.
MGI, and Fluke (who by then held title to the encumbered property) as codefendants.
In this second foreclosure proceeding Fluke asserted a cross claim against Richmond in its initial pleading. Fluke claimed that it was a surety for Richmond, and that foreclosure was a proper remedy only after the Richmonds' assets had been exhausted for payment of the debt. The trial court denied Richmond's motion for a summary judgment dismissal of Fluke's claim. Later the court denied Fluke's motion for summary judgment on the claim.
Thereafter First Interstate Bank amended its pleadings to convert the lawsuit from a foreclosure to an action on the note. Deed of trust issues disappeared and venue changed to King County. Then First Interstate Bank again amended its pleadings to reconvert the lawsuit to a foreclosure action with a claim for a deficiency judgment. Venue changed back to Kittitas County. When Fluke filed its final set of pleadings it elected not to reassert its cross claim against Richmond. In a pretrial memorandum Fluke asserted a reservation of rights to pursue the claims of indemnification and subrogation in later proceedings.
In November 1983, the Kittitas court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in favor of First Interstate Bank. The court ordered that the Mountain Grandeur property be sold and the proceeds applied to the judgment against Richmond. In its order the court dismissed with prejudice all affirmative claims raised by the defendants, "provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect any post-Judgment, statutory or equitable right of the Defendants." Clerk's Papers, at 375. The trial court entered judgment against Richmond for $484,691.85 principal and $161,053.12 interest. Fluke lost its interest in the property when it failed to bid above the amount for which the property was sold at a sheriff's sale, $343,836.31.
«3» The court's record contains no record of Judge Elston's reasoning. However, the parties appear to agree on the reasoning that he used.
Judge Elston reasoned that (1) collateral estoppel bars Fluke from reasserting its claim in this action, (2) a writing is necessary to establish a suretyship agreement, (3) Washington law does not support Fluke's assumption that a suretyship exists in the property itself, and (4) the equities favor Richmond, not Fluke, so Fluke's claim of subrogation must fail.
Fluke appealed the decision to Division One of the Court of Appeals. That court transferred the case to this court in March 1986. Although we reverse the trial court's rulings on collateral estoppel and the statute of frauds we affirm the dismissal of Fluke's action.
 The parties dispute whether Fluke's lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel bars an action only if a prior adjudication is "sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect." Restatement (Second) of Judgments 13, at 132 (1982); Trautman, CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION IN CIVIL LITIGATION IN WASHINGTON, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805, 822 (1985). Here, contrary to Richmond's assertions, no conclusive decision was rendered on Fluke's initial suretyship cross claim. The trial court heard two pretrial motions on the claim; the court denied Fluke's motion for summary judgment and denied Richmond's motion for dismissal on summary judgment. Neither ruling can be characterized as a decision on the merits of Fluke's claim.
In addition, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only when an issue actually has been litigated and decided in a prior action.
whether on the same or a different claim.
«4» When a party files an amended pleading that abandons a former cause of action the original pleading is considered abandoned and ceases to perform any function. HASAN v. FREDERICKSON, 37 Wn. App. 800, 683 P.2d 203 (1984); ENNIS v. RING, 49 Wn.2d 284, 300 P.2d 773 (1956).
The claim was not even pending during trial or when the court made its final ruling. The issue of suretyship cannot be said to have been "actually litigated and determined." Nor was the issue of suretyship essential to the court's final decision in the foreclosure action. The court decided the enforceability of Richmond's obligation to First Interstate Bank, the validity of the deed of trust, and the priority of the liens on the property. The issue of Fluke's ability as a surety to seek indemnification from Richmond is not essential to any of those findings.
proceedings shall not affect the proceedings of the plaintiff.
(Italics ours.) Here, no "written complaint to the court" requesting determination of the suretyship issue existed after First Interstate Bank filed its final pleadings. The court therefore had no mandate to rule on the suretyship issue.
Richmond also argues that Fluke's suretyship claim is barred because the issue "could have and should have" been raised in the prior action. This argument is appropriate only under res judicata theory. Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a claim decided in a prior action cannot be raised in a subsequent action. Restatement 17. A claim includes "all rights of the [claimant] to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose", without regard to whether the issues actually were raised or litigated. Restatement 24(1), at 196. SEE SANWICK v. PUGET SOUND TITLE INS. CO., 70 Wn.2d 438, 423 P.2d 624, 38 A.L.R.3d 315 (1967). SEE ALSO Trautman, 60 Wash. L. Rev. at 813-19. In contrast, under collateral estoppel or issue preclusion - only those issues actually litigated are barred. Restatement 27. In this case Fluke abandoned its suretyship claim when it filed its final set of pleadings. Because Fluke abandoned its claim the doctrine of res judicata is inappropriate in this action (and in fact Richmond purports to rely only on the theory of collateral estoppel). Richmond's "could have and should have" argument, which is grounded in res judicata, thus must fail.
 Richmond also suggests that the doctrine of "the law of the case" bars Fluke's claim. This argument has no merit. The law of the case doctrine applies only when an appellate court holding has issued in a prior appeal of the same case. SEE GREENE v. ROTHSCHILD, 68 Wn.2d 1, 402 P.2d 356, 414 P.2d 1013 (1965); Trautman, 60 Wash. L. Rev. at 810. Also, the doctrine applies only to issues actually decided. RILEY v. STURDEVANT, 12 Wn. App. 808, 532 P.2d 640 (1975); Trautman, 60 Wash. L. Rev. at 811. Neither circumstance exists here.
 The parties dispute whether a writing is required to prove a suretyship. This court has recognized that an implied promise to indemnify the surety by the principal can be enforceable without an express written agreement. LEUNING v. HILL, 79 Wn.2d 396, 486 P.2d 87 (1971). Generally courts interpret the statute of frauds to require a writing only when it is the creditor who attempts to enforce a suretyship obligation against the surety. A. Stearns, SURETYSHIP 3.6 (5th ed. 1951). In this case Fluke is attempting to enforce a suretyship obligation against the principal, not a surety.
Finally, the parties dispute whether Fluke can prove a right to indemnification. Fluke appears to argue that two lines of reasoning support its claims against Richmond. None of Fluke's arguments, however, are persuasive.
 Fluke first claims that it can assert surety rights of MGI against Richmond. Fluke reasons that a suretyship arose when MGI executed a deed of trust to secure Richmond's debt. Fluke is partly correct. Generally, courts distinguish two types of suretyships: personal and real. CITY NAT'L BANK & TRUST CO. v. PYLE, 25 Wn. App. 583, 609 P.2d 966 (1980). A "personal" suretyship obligates the surety personally to satisfy the obligation. In contrast, a "real" suretyship imposes an obligation only upon the land used as security. A real suretyship arises when property is pledged or mortgaged for a debt. A. Stearns, 1.3, at 3. The obligation of the property owner is limited to the land itself. Restatement of Security 83(c), comment E (1941). Here, Fluke is correct in arguing that MGI's transfer of the Mountain Grandeur property gave rise to a real suretyship.
However, Fluke next reasons that because the Mountain Grandeur property was a real surety Fluke acquired surety status by acquiring title to the property. This jump in logic is unsupportable. Fluke is claiming to be a personal surety. A personal suretyship arises only when a party assumes an obligation to pay another's debt. A. Stearns, SUPRA. A personal suretyship is a consensual and contractual relationship that requires mutual assent. NATIONAL BANK v. EQUITY INVESTORS, 86 Wn.2d 545, 546 P.2d 440 (1976). Fluke has presented no evidence that it intended at any time to assume personal liability for Richmond's debt. This court will hold the transferee of land that is subject to a mortgage personally liable for the debt underlying that mortgage only upon clear and convincing proof of the assumption of the debt. HEGGEN CONSTR. CO. v. TURALBA, 88 Wn.2d 711, 565 P.2d 420 (1977). In the absence of further proof Fluke cannot argue that its purchase of the property subject to a deed of trust was equivalent to an agreement to assume personal liability for Richmond's debt.
Fluke cites MGIC FIN. CORP. v. H.A. BRIGGS CO., 24 Wn. App. 1, 600 P.2d 573 (1979) to support its argument that it succeeded to MGI's suretyship status by purchasing the Mountain Grandeur property. The MGIC case does not support this argument. The MGIC case involved a junior lienor's succession to the rights of a senior lienor. Here, MGI was not a senior lienor. The MGIC case thus does not in any way support Fluke's argument that Fluke can succeed to a surety position held by MGI.
 However, Fluke next argues that it is entitled to subrogation to the claims and judgment of First Interstate Bank, the senior lienor. "Subrogation is the substitution of one person to the position of another, an obligee, whose claim he [or she] has satisfied." G. Osborne, MORTGAGES 277, at 561 (2d ed. 1970).
MGIC FIN. CORP. v. H.A. BRIGGS CO., SUPRA, is relevant to this argument. At issue in that case was the protection of the security interest of a holder of a second deed of trust. The court stated that the junior lienor had the right to (1) pay off the debt secured by the senior mortgage, and (2) then stand in the shoes of the senior lienor and assert that party's rights, which could include personally suing the mortgagor. 24 Wn. App. at 6.
order to protect some interest of his [or her] own. .
and be subrogated to all rights under it against the mortgagor.
LEUNING v. HILL, 79 Wn.2d 396, 400, 486 P.2d 87 (1971). SEE ALSO LIVINGSTON v. SHELTON, 85 Wn.2d 615, 620, 537 P.2d 774 (1975), CERT. DENIED, 424 U.S. 958 (1976); IN RE NEW ENGLAND FISH CO., 749 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
Here, Fluke apparently reasons that it has "paid" First Interstate because Fluke lost its interest in the Mountain Grandeur parcel when the parcel was sold and the proceeds applied against Richmond's obligation. Fluke cannot make this claim. When Fluke acquired title to the Mountain Grandeur property the parcel already secured Richmond's obligation of more than $600,000. None of Fluke's own assets ever were applied against this debt.
When First Interstate Bank foreclosed upon the Mountain Grandeur property Fluke could have protected its own interest by paying off Richmond's obligation to First Interstate Bank. Fluke also could have protected its interest by bidding an amount higher than the sale price at the sheriff's sale or by exercising its right to redemption after the sale. Instead, Fluke relinquished all of its rights in the property. Fluke allowed the "real" surety the property - to pay the debt. Fluke cannot now claim that it possesses the rights of a "personal" surety.
We agree with the trial court that the equities of the case favor Richmond. CF. TRANSAMERICA TITLE INS. CO. v. JOHNSON, 103 Wn.2d 409, 417, 693 P.2d 697 (1985). Fluke assumed the risk of loss that it now suffers. Fluke took a second deed of trust on the Mountain Grandeur parcel even though the first deed of trust secured a $600,000 obligation. Fluke paid $280,000 for a piece of encumbered property once valued at over one million dollars. Any business person in Fluke's position would know that if the prior lienor foreclosed Fluke would either have to pay more or lose the property.
shall thereafter be obtained on such obligation. . .
RCW 61.24.100. Here, Fluke chose to rely solely on the value of the Mountain Grandeur parcel to remedy the default by Alpine World. The value of the land dropped, however, and cannot cover the obligations of both Alpine World and Richmond. Fluke cannot now turn around and try to recover its losses from Richmond's personal assets.
Fluke's only contention is that it should not lose the property when Richmond is capable of paying his obligation to First Interstate Bank. This argument is not persuasive. Richmond protected himself from personal liability by having MGI use the Mountain Grandeur property as security. Richmond's personal financial worth cannot now affect his contractual relationships.
Richmond cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees against Fluke. Richmond claims three grounds for an award: (1) an attorney fees provision in the guaranty agreement executed between Fluke and Alpine World, (2) an attorney fees provision in the promissory note that obligates Richmond to First Interstate Bank, and (3) RCW 4.84.185, which authorizes awards of attorney fees for frivolous lawsuits. We will not consider the first two arguments because Richmond has raised them for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
We affirm the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 for two reasons. First, RCW 4.84.185 does not apply in this case. RCW 4.84.185 authorizes a court to award attorney fees against a nonprevailing party "upon final judgment and written findings . . . that the action . . . was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause". However, the statute also provides that "[t]his determination shall be made upon POST TRIAL motion". (Italics ours.) This language indicates that RCW 4.84.185 does not authorize an award of attorney fees on a PRETRIAL motion. Richmond requested attorney fees pursuant to a pretrial motion for summary judgment dismissal. The trial court properly refused to award attorney fees.
 Second, this court has held that an award of attorney fees that is authorized by statute is left to the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed "in the absence of a CLEAR showing of abuse of discretion". MARKETING UNLIMITED, INC. v. JEFFERSON CHEM. CO., 90 Wn.2d 410, 412, 583 P.2d 630 (1978). SEE ALSO MEYER v. UW, 105 Wn.2d 847, 719 P.2d 98 (1986). This standard of review is appropriate for decisions under RCW 4.84.185. However, Richmond has not proven that the trial court's refusal to award fees constituted an abuse of discretion.
 Finally, Richmond requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.9(a), which authorizes sanctions for frivolous appeals. Because the appeal raises issues on which reasonable minds might differ we decline to award attorney fees. SEE BOYLES v. DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYS., 105 Wn.2d 499, 508-11, 716 P.2d 869 (1986).
Fluke cannot seek indemnification from Richmond when Fluke has never used its own assets to pay a debt owed by Richmond. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Dolliver, C.J., Brachtenbach, Dore, Pearson, Andersen, Goodloe, and Durham, JJ., and Verharen, J. Pro Tem., concur.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: Reconsideration denied December 8, 1986.

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While drug laws at the federal and state levels classify a vast array of “controlled substances,” two in particular have stood out in recent political and legal debates. The legalization of marijuana for medical use is now a reality in at least 26 states, including Texas. Several states have gone a step further and legalized the distribution and possession of small amounts of marijuana for recreational use. At the same time, opioid use is on the rise across the country, and the number of deaths resulting from overdoses have led many to call it an “epidemic.” Both drugs are scheduled as controlled substances, but the similarities mostly end there. Some research suggests that allowing medical marijuana use may reduce the number of opioid overdose deaths. Federal officials, however, continue to view opioid use as a matter of criminal enforcement rather than public health. The federal government’s approach to these issues is likely to influence the Texas criminal justice system’s response.
The term “opioid” can refer to almost any drug derived from opium, including heroin. In its current usage, it usually refers to prescription painkillers like hydrocodone and oxycodone, as well as synthetic products like fentanyl. Heroin is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning it has “a high potential for abuse” and “no currently accepted medical use.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), (c)(I)(b)(10), (c)(I)(c)(10). Fentanyl and many other pharmaceutical opioid products are Schedule II controlled substances, meaning that, while addictive, they have medical uses. Id. at §§ 812(b)(2), (c)(II)(b)(6). The Drug Enforcement Administration moved hydrocodone from Schedule III to Schedule II in 2014, largely because of the increase in overdose deaths. 79 Fed. Reg. 49661 (Aug. 22, 2014).
Scientific studies have not shown marijuana to have addictive properties at all similar to those of opioids. It is nevertheless classified in Schedule I alongside heroin. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c)(I)(c)(10). Numerous state medical marijuana laws dispute the assessment that the drug has no accepted medical use. The Texas medical marijuana law is among the most restrictive in the country, and it allows the use of “low-THC cannabis” only in the treatment of intractable epilepsy. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 487.001 et seq., Tex. Occ. Code § 169.001 et seq.
Marijuana’s legal status has recently undergone major changes. The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) still places marijuana in its most highly restricted category, but more than half of the states in the U.S., including Texas, now allow medical marijuana to some extent. Colorado, California, and several other states have legalized the production, sale, and possession of small amounts of marijuana for recreational purposes. This has led to legal disputes over whether states like Colorado have exceeded their constitutional authority. For criminal justice advocates in Texas, where marijuana remains a highly controlled substance, law enforcement attention to suspected interstate drug trafficking raises a variety of constitutional civil rights questions.
The CSA classifies “marihuana” as a Schedule I controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(I)(c)(10). The statute prohibits “manufactur[ing], distribut[ing], or dispens[ing]” a controlled substance, or “possess[ing] with intent to” do any of the aforementioned acts with a controlled substance. Id. at § 841(a)(1). Penalties depend on the identity and amount of the controlled substance involved. Texas marijuana law classifies THC, the active component of marijuana, in Penalty Group 2. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.103(a)(1). It identifies numerous offenses related to the manufacture, delivery, and possession of both Penalty Group 2 controlled substances in general and marijuana in particular. See, e.g. id. at §§ 481.116, 481.121.
The U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate Commerce…among the several States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The CSA has faced constitutional challenges alleging that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to enforce federal drug laws within states that have legalized marijuana to various extents. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), but it remains a controversial question. The federal government’s authority to deal with controlled substances that cross state lines, on the other hand, rather unambiguously falls within the federal government’s constitutional authority. This is where many recent legal challenges have arisen.
Federal and state laws regarding both medical and recreational use are coming more and more into conflict. More than half of the states in the U.S., as well as the District of Columbia, allow the possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes. Federal law, on the other hand, classifies it alongside the most highly restricted controlled substances. The current U.S. Attorney General (AG) has repeatedly stated an intention to crack down on legal state medical marijuana programs. A group of medical marijuana patients, including a father and daughter who relocated from Texas to Colorado so that the daughter could obtain relief from intractable epilepsy, have filed suit against the AG and other federal officials and agencies. Washington, et al. v. Sessions, et al., No. 1:17-cv-05625, complaint (S.D.N.Y., Jul. 24, 2017). The plaintiffs allege that the federal government’s scheduling of marijuana as a controlled substance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, unlawfully restricts some plaintiffs’ freedom of travel between states, and exceeds the authority conferred by the Commerce Clause.
Of the five schedules established by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Schedule I is the most restrictive. It is defined to include substances with a “high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use,” and a “lack of accepted safety for use…under medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Schedule I has included “marihuana” since its original enactment. Id. at § 812(c)(I)(c)(10). The Washington lawsuit alleges that “the Federal Government does not believe, and…never has believed” that marijuana meets these three criteria. Washington, complaint at 4.
Texas is among the states that have authorized medical marijuana to some extent, although in Texas’ case, the extent is not far at all. The Texas Compassionate-Use Act only applies to “low-THC cannabis.” This means cannabis products that contain, at most, “0.5 percent by weight of tetrahydrocannabinols” and at least “10 percent by weight of cannabidiol.” Tex. Occ. Code § 169.001(3). This essentially minimizes the active component of marijuana, THC. It may only be prescribed for the treatment of intractable epilepsy after a patient has tried two “maximally titrated antiepileptic drugs” without success. Id. at § 169.001(2).
A jury in a federal court convicted a former hedge fund manager of three out of eight counts related to securities fraud in early August 2017. The government had charged the defendant with multiple counts related to alleged defrauding of investors and misuse of corporate funds, as well as conspiracy to commit various fraudulent acts. United States v. Shkreli, No. 1:15-cr-00637, superseding indictment (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 3, 2016). The case is notable in part because of the high degree of infamy gained by the defendant for reasons unrelated to this case. The securities and wire fraud charges in this case added to the defendant’s unpopularity, presenting challenges for the defense team.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the trading of various securities, particularly corporate stocks. It prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” connected to “the purchase or sale of any security.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). This broad phrasing has been applied to a wide range of actions deemed fraudulent by securities regulators and prosecutors. The statute allows criminal prosecution for “willful” violations, allowing penalties for individuals of up to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $5 million. Id. at § 78ff(a).
Proving the required elements of securities fraud in a federal or Texas criminal case can be very difficult, but federal law also allows the government to charge a person with conspiracy to commit an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 371. A conspiracy charge requires evidence that two or more persons, which could include individuals or certain organizations, conspired to commit an offense and that the defendant took an “overt act” in furtherance of the conspiracy. If the underlying offense is a felony, the conspiracy statute provides for imprisonment of up to five years.
The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) defines five schedules of controlled substances and prescribes penalties for their production, distribution, and possession. Texas drug crime laws contain similar schedules. The CSA includes a list of substances in each schedule, but it also gives some authority to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to modify or adjust the schedules. The DOJ has delegated this authority to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). One factor considered in the scheduling of controlled substances involves the potential for medical use. A different federal agency, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), deals with drugs used for medical purposes. Recently, the FDA announced that it will allow further research into the medical potential of a Schedule I controlled substance known as MDMA. While this research could lead to FDA approval of MDMA for medical purposes, the DEA or Congress would still have to remove it from Schedule I.
The CSA places the most highly restricted controlled substances in Schedule I. MDMA, scientifically known as 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine and colloquially known as ecstasy, among other names, was not among the drugs originally added to Schedule I by Congress. The DEA designated MDMA as a Schedule I “hallucinogenic substance” in the 1980s. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(11). Texas places MDMA in Penalty Group 2. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.103(a)(1).
The CSA’s criteria for inclusion in Schedule I are “high potential for abuse,” a lack of “currently accepted medical use,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use…under medical supervision.” 8 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Other well-known Schedule I controlled substances include heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and marijuana. Id. at §§ 812(c)(I)(b)(10), (c)(9), (c)(10). Many controlled substances commonly associated with the illegal drug trade are actually listed in Schedule II, including cocaine and methamphetamine. Id. at § 812(c)(II)(a)(4), 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d)(2).
The legal status of marijuana at the state level is changing across the country, with more than half of all U.S. states now allowing the possession and use of marijuana to some extent. Federal law, however, still considers marijuana to have no medical use and therefore no acceptable reason for possession, cultivation, or sale. The disparity between federal law and many state laws has produced numerous unusual and unfortunate results. A ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from last year, while not binding on Texas, ought to be concerning to many Texas drug crime defendants, since the court held that federal law may bar lawful medical marijuana users from purchasing firearms. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F. 3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016).
Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(I)(c)(10). Texas enacted a medical marijuana law in 2015 that allows the use of “low-THC cannabis,” with a prescription, to treat “intractable epilepsy.” See Tex. Occ. Code § 169.001 et seq., Tex. Health & Safety Code § 487.001 et seq. This is one of the most restrictive medical marijuana laws in the country, but it is still far less restrictive than federal law. The Wilson case involves Nevada law, which exempts individuals from prosecution for marijuana possession if they have a valid state registration card. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.010 et seq.
Federal law makes it a crime for certain individuals to possess firearms in a manner that affects interstate commerce, which has often been interpreted as prohibiting the sale of a firearm to someone covered by the statute. This includes “unlawful user[s] of…any controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). The law further states that it is a crime for someone to sell a firearm to someone they know or have “reasonable cause to believe” meets this criterion. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3).
The policies of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding federal drug sentencing have gone through several major changes recently. Former Attorney General (AG) Eric Holder undertook a major overhaul several years ago, seeking to focus attention away from low-level drug offenses and onto major ones. In May 2017, however, AG Jeff Sessions rescinded Holder’s policy and issued a new memorandum directing federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.” The memorandum does not specifically mention drugs and drug-related offenses, but that is where it is likely to have the most far-reaching effects.
Federal sentencing guidelines derive, in part, from a list of factors established by Congress in 1984 that courts must consider when imposing a sentence. These include “the nature…of the offense and the…characteristics of the defendant,” the effect of the sentence on society at large, the need to maintain consistent sentencing practices for similar offenses, and “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
A “mandatory minimum” sentence gives courts no discretion to adjust the sentence downward. Such sentences became particularly widespread with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570 (Oct. 27, 1986). That law established lengthy minimum sentences for various drug offenses, such as 10 years for manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute one kilogram of heroin or five kilograms of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii). According to the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), 47.9 percent of all federal drug convictions in fiscal year 2015 involved an offense with a mandatory minimum penalty.
More than half of the states in the U.S. now allow the use of medical marijuana to some extent. At the same time, federal law still treats marijuana as having “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1)(B), (c)(I)(c)(10). This has, obviously, created conflicts between federal and state law enforcement. Congress relieved this tension somewhat in 2014, when it passed legislation known as the Rohrbacher-Farr amendment as part of a spending bill. This amendment prohibits the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) from spending funds on law enforcement activities that interfere with lawful state medical marijuana systems, which range from the extensive in California to the restrictive in Texas. Texas marijuana lawyers are aware, however, that officials in the new White House administration have sought to use federal resources against state medical marijuana. So far, the Rohrbacher-Farr amendment remains in force.
California was the first state to allow the use of medical marijuana with a doctor’s prescription. Voters approved Proposition 215 in November 1996, also known as the “Compassionate Use Act.” Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11362.5. Twenty years later, in November 2016, voters in that state approved Proposition 64, which authorized the sale, purchase, and possession of limited amounts of marijuana for recreational use. Id. at § 11362.1. Most states have not gone this far, but states that allow medical marijuana in some form outnumber those that do not. Texas is among the states that allow medical marijuana use, although it is strictly limited to “low-THC cannabis” to treat “intractable epilepsy.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ch. 487, Tex. Occ. Code Ch. 169.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected at least two challenges to the applicability of federal marijuana laws over state medical marijuana laws. The court rejected a common-law medical necessity defense in U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). Justice Thomas, writing for the court, noted that federal criminal law generally does not recognize common-law defenses unless Congress specifically includes them in a statute. He concluded that “a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act.” Id. at 491. The court held that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution allows a federal prohibition of marijuana production, distribution, and possession, regardless of state medical marijuana laws, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
The gradual decriminalization of marijuana in several states around the country has created unusual legal pitfalls. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken an interest in efforts to attract investors to the legal marijuana trade. This is practically unexplored legal territory, since such investments would have been unambiguously illegal just a few years ago. The SEC recently filed a civil complaint for securities fraud against a California company involved in legal marijuana sales, as well as its founder and two corporate officers. The founder and the corporation settled with the SEC, which is the civil equivalent of pleading no contest. SEC v. Notis Global, Inc., et al., No. 2:17-cv-01905, final judgment (C.D. Cal., Mar. 21, 2017).
“Securities fraud” encompasses a wide range of activities. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., regulates the issuance of new securities, including corporate stocks. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., deals with the trading of securities after they have been issued, such as in the various stock exchanges. Both statutes prohibit fraudulent statements and other deceptive acts in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. Violations may result in civil liability and, in some situations, criminal penalties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 3301.
Lawmakers and law enforcement must often figure out how to reconcile new marijuana laws with old systems. One state might have removed criminal penalties for the production, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, but financial institutions subject to federal regulations might still shy away from doing business with them. In 2014, the SEC issued a memorandum about potential microcap investment scams, also known as penny stock fraud, in the marijuana business. The memo sought to warn investors about “pump-and-dump” scams, which involve making false or misleading statements about a company in order to artificially inflate its stock price.
Unauthorized access to computer systems, commonly known as “hacking,” undoubtedly causes significant damage to individuals and businesses around the country. As often happens, however, the law has had difficulty keeping up with new technology. Federal law prohibits a wide range of computer fraud-related activities, but most offenses require proof that a defendant acted with intent, which is the most difficult mental state for prosecutors to prove. Perhaps as a result, some prosecutors have developed creative strategies to pursue alleged hackers. In one recently filed case, federal prosecutors have charged an individual under the federal hacking statute with no allegations that he personally engaged in any hacking activities. Instead, they essentially allege that he developed software with the intent that it would be used by hackers. United States v. Huddleston, No. 1:17-cr-00034, indictment (E.D. Va., Feb. 16, 2017).
Congress first enacted a criminal statute related to computer fraud, found at 18 U.S.C. § 1030, in 1984. It has amended this section numerous times over the years, perhaps most notably in 1986 with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). That bill significantly expanded the legal definition of “computer fraud.” The original 1984 law made it a federal crime to access computer systems of the federal government or a financial institution without authorization. The CFAA added provisions about unauthorized access, or access that exceeds granted authority, to any “protected computer,” which it defined to include nearly any computer whose use affects interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(4) – (6), (e)(2)(B).
Federal prosecutors are not accusing the defendant in Huddleston of hacking anybody. Instead, the alleged conduct leading to the indictment consisted solely of developing a software tool reportedly used by hackers. According to the indictment, the defendant created a “remote administration tool,” or “remote access trojan” (RAT), a type of software that allows a user to take control of someone else’s computer without their knowledge or consent. This RAT has allegedly been used in multiple cyberattacks around the world. Prosecutors allege that the defendant created this software for the specific purpose of making it available to hackers.


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Fig. 1—Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have protected Facebook's theft of Leader Technologies' social networking invention to promote their New World Order Agenda.
(Feb. 26, 2016)—Whistleblowers inside Facebook’s law firms have just leaked evidence proving that Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama colluded with Facebook’s lawyers to obstruct justice.
EXPOSED: Mitt Romney's Top 20 Wall Street campaign donor/supporters mirror Facebook, IBM, The Eclipse Foundation, Clintons and Obama.
EXPOSED: Mitt Romney holds up to $45.1 million in Goldman Sachs funds, underwriter to Facebook, IBM, The Eclipse Foundation, Clintons and Obama.
Yesterday, an internal document surfaced from Gibson Dunn LLP, one of Facebook’s law firms. It proves that Facebook and CEO Mark Zuckerberg lied in multiple lawsuits about the existence and contents of Zuckerberg's 2003-2004 Harvard computers and emails. This evidence, which is now supported by Ceglia court filings (Doc. No. 42 link below) supports the Leader case that Facebook stole Leader's invention and obstructed justice to hide it from discovery.
Now, the lies are proven. In Leader v. Facebook, after nearly a year of stonewalling, Facebook's trial attorney, Cooley Godward LLP, claimed that all of Zuckerberg’s 2003-2004 Harvard emails and computer hard drives were lost. They produced nothing to Leader Technologies in preparation for the trial. They never said that the information was lost until almost a year of stonewalling, and just days before they were going to be ordered to produce it by the judge.
When will lawyers condemn this judicial corruption and Constitutional betrayal?
Fig .2— Mark E. Zuckerberg, property thief, privacy invader, pathological liar, child predator, identify thief, fraudster, conspirator.
AFI researchers have uncovered more than 233 Zuckerberg Harvard emails between Jun. 02, 2003 and May 08, 2004. Click here for Doc. No. 42, Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, Facebook filed Nov. 17, 2011. It is unclear when the court published this. AFI researchers are just learning about it, and no one in the mainstream media has covered it.
The existence of even one of these Zuckerberg messages would automatically trigger Leader Technologies' right to forensically examine all of Zuckerberg's 28 computer devices and Harvard emails from 2003-2004.
Fig. 5— Leonard P. Stark, Cooley Godward LLP recommendation to Obama; former partner at Skadden Arps LLP, Hillary Clinton's chief of staff, Christina M Tchen, former law firm; Hillary donor.
Obama justice adviser; Obama McBee Strategic energy stimulus adviser.
Fig. 3— Heidi L. Keefe, Cooley Godward LLP, Facebook attorney, former White & Case Facebook attorney.
Magistrate Stark on Facebook's year of stonewalling review of Zuckerberg's 2003-2004 Harvard information: "I am inclined to the view that prior deposition testimony related to what materials were relied on in the development of the Facebook website sounds to me like it may very well prove to be relevant and the production of it could also streamline and thereby make more efficient the deposition process in this case."
On Oct. 26, 2009, three days later, Facebook replaced White & Case LLP with Cooley Godward LLP, however, the attorneys remained, including Heidi Keefe. Tellingly, Cooley Godward's partner, Donald K. Stern, was now Obama's Justice adviser at the White House.
Fig. 6— Thomas G. Hungar, Gibson Dunn LLP, Facebook attorney.
On Jun. 04, 2010, Heidi L. Keefe, Cooley Godward LLP, instructed Zuckerberg during his Leader v. Facebook deposition not to answer any questions about his 2003-2004 activities.
Gibson Dunn LLP partner, Thomas G. Hungar, a protégé of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., became Facebook's appeals attorney in Leader v. Facebook. He had represented the judges in the appeals court and both he and the Federal Circuit judges should have recused themselves due to their obvious conflict of interest. But alas, the entire legal community sat silent while Facebook and the Courts performed their charades. Evidently all in the Facebook (Crime) Family.
Fig. 7—Mark E. Zuckerberg and Facebook denied the existence of 28 Zuckerberg computer devices and Harvard emails in Leader v. Facebook. However, Facebook's lawyers, Gibson & Dunn LLP, leaked an internal spreadsheet verifying that Zuckerberg's Inbox contained hundreds of emails and files that should have been produced in Leader v. Facebook. Such lies during litigation are Fraud on the Court and are criminal offenses since they obstruct justice. Click here: PDF of the leaked Facebook spreadsheet proving that 2003-2004 information existed.
Fig. 8— Orin S. Synder, Gibson Dunn LLP, Facebook's and Zuckerberg's lawyer in the Ceglia v. Zuckerberg. Some call him the "Punk with a Pen."
Facebook's experts lied. In Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, Facebook's trial attorney, Gibson Dunn LLP, accused Ceglia of forging over 233 emails exchanged with Zuckerberg during 2003-2004. However, the courts have never allowed Ceglia to examine Zuckerberg’s information from the same period.
In Nov. 2011, according to sources close to the case, the Winklevoss Twins' attorney warned Ceglia that 28 Zuckerberg hard drives and Harvard emails were never lost as Cooley Godward LLP and Zuckerberg had told Leader Technologies. They were in the custody of Gibson Dunn LLP, and were about to be destroyed. Ceglia's attorneys successfully stopped the destruction.
However, for the next six months, the court continued to shield Zuckerberg's information until finally allowing Ceglia to depose Facebook's experts about Facebook's information. The impropriety aside of only allowing self-serving expert testimony, Ceglia's attorney was blistering nonetheless.
Fig. 10— Michael F. McGowan, Stroz Friedberg, Facebook forensic expert who lied about the presences of Ceglia emails on Zuckerberg's 28 hard drives and Harvard emails.
Fig. 9— Brian J. Rose, Stroz Friedberg, Facebook forensic expert who lied about the presences of Ceglia emails on Zuckerberg's 28 hard drives and Harvard emails.
In two days of testimony, Facebook's Stroz Friedberg experts, Bryan J. Rose and Michael F. McGowan, confirmed the existence of the 28 computer devices and Harvard emails.
Three months later, criminal charges were filed against Ceglia for forgery of his contract with Zuckerberg (charges which have since been proven unfounded by the U.S. Secret Service forensic lab).
Facebook’s Stroz Friedberg experts lied like drunken sailors.
Took their search terms from Gibson Dunn LLP.
To this day, Ceglia's experts have been stonewalled and been unable to study Zuckerberg's 28 computers and Harvard emails. This injustice is just gross; as bad as in a Banana Republic; worse since it is happening in the United States where we are supposed to be better than this.
Rose and McGowan waffled with repeated vagaries like “don’t recall,” “not sure,” “hard for me to answer.” Experts are supposed to help juries learn the facts. It is illegal for experts to simply shill and obstruct fact finding for their client, thus betraying their expert objectivity, as Rose and McGowan clearly did. In this case, Tweedledum and Tweedledee would've remembered more than these purported experts.
This admission is a bombshell.
The whistleblower evidence proves that "I don't believe so" is a boldface lie. It also proves Facebook committed fraud on the court in both Ceglia v. Zuckerberg and Leader v. Facebook.
Fig. 11— Orin S. Synder, Gibson Dunn LLP, labelled all of Ceglia's emails bogus. His own leaked internal documents prove he is the liar and defrauded the court.
The leaked forensic spreadsheet was created on April 30, 2012 by "METROSTAR." It compares 111 Ceglia emails and 233 Zuckerberg emails. Here are the Ceglia emails that mostly match messages also in Zuckerberg's emails and prove McGowan lied.
Facebook's Gibson Dunn LLP's attorney, Orin S. Snyder, called the "Punk with a Pen," said that Ceglia's emails were: "supposed emails," "fabricated emails," "fraudulent emails," "those emails were concoted," "bogus emails," "his so-called emails," "purported emails, " and "made up emails." Clearly, Snyder is a bully who spews falsities in bombastic tirades.
Reading Snyder's outburst reminds one of Hamlet, Act III, Scene II (1599): "The lady doth protest too much, methinks." Hamlet's mother, Queen Gertrude, observes of the actor who is secretly playing her in Shakespeare's play-within-a-play that the actor's too frequent and vehement attempts to convince others of some matter of which the opposite is true, makes her appear defensive and insincere.
Note: The leaked Stroz Freidberg spreadsheet was created by "METROSTAR." A Washington, D.C. company named METROSTAR SYSTEMS has a long client list of federal government agencies, including the Department of Justice, Patent Office and FBI. Could this company be running cover and obstructing justice for Facebook on the goverment's dime?
Between Jul. 16, 2003 and Oct. 20, 2003, Ceglia had 62 out of 88 held by Zuckerberg. In other words, 70.5% were held by both men.
Between Jun. 2, 2003 and Jul. 14, 2003, Ceglia had 42 for which Zuckerberg had 0.
Between Oct. 21, 2003 and May 8, 2004, Ceglia had 103 for which Zuckerberg had 0.
This proves Ceglia did not forge them since he would have had to hack through Harvard FASmail system security and make substantial changes, undetected. He did not have that kind of technical proficiency.
“StreetFax” is mentioned 78 times in the spreadsheet. (This is the smoking gun for McGowan's "I don't believe so" lie.) StreetFax is the parallel project that Zuckerberg and Ceglia were working on along with Facebook.
Zuckerberg's emails either have a typically techie tone, spelling (poor) and grammar (loose), or they are flowery, well-written, properly punctuated and formatted, and obvious written by lawyers.
During the Ceglia case, Facebook accused Ceglia of forging hundreds of emails.
However, the leaked spreadsheet debunks the Facebook accusation that Ceglia forged hundreds of emails. It proves unequivocally that Zuckerberg has lied all along and Ceglia is telling the truth. But, Ceglia has been idicted and had to flea the government's persecution. Click here for more in defense of Paul Ceglia.
Table 1—Partial timeline of Barack Obama's and Hillary Clinton's racketeering to promote and protect Facebook. Click here for full timeline.
What can I do about this? Plenty.
What does the average American do about this legal profligacy? Complain loudly and persistently to public officials and the media, and keep complaining until these injustices are righted. Otherwise, if these people are allowed to get away with mistreating Leader Technologies and Paul Ceglia today, you, your family and friends will be next.
Fig. 10—Obama's Fundamental Transformation of America. His wheel of corruption.
Fig. 11—The evidence is unmistakable. A Cartel of private companies, in collusion with the NSA, collect ALL relationship data between American citizens and the federal government. Much of that data is stored overseas, e.g., Lulea, Sweden, outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution ("Inside the Arctic Circle, Where Your Data Lives," Business Week).
Fig. 12—Primary Participants in the American NSA - C.I.A. Spy State "Public-Private" Cartel. See AFI. (Oct. 19, 2015). The social networking patent property case every American needs to fight. Americans For Innovation.
Tries to codify IBM's theft of social networking from Ohio innovator Leader Technologies by calling it "The Internet of Things"
Breaking News! Feb. 23, 2016—C.I.A. whistleblower Jeffrey Sterling, currently serving jail time for leaking documents to The New York Times, said today from his prison cell that Hillary Clinton has been given a pass by the Obama Administration regarding her flagrant email abuses of classified information. Hillary's untouchability is evidently tied to Bill Clinton's defining role in the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) and collusion with IBM and the IBM Eclipse Foundation exposed by Obama's latest executive order discussed in this post.
Abuse of power thru three presidents: These Executive Orders are Ground Zero of the American "public-private" Spy State—without an ounce of Congressional oversight.
A succession of executive orders preceded Obama latest order on Feb. 09, 2016.
EO 13511 (Sep. 29, 2009, Obama).
Now comes: EO [unnumbered] (Feb. 09, 2016, Obama).
These orders have created the American spy state "public-private" Cartel, with spy master James P. Chandler, IBM and Thomas E. Noonan directing traffic. All this activity has occurred outside of Congressional oversight.
This is the shadowy "Washington Cartel" that uses mass surveillance to blackmail, coerce and bribe bureaucrats, politicians, judges, academia and the media into submission, in our opinion. An endless stream of "dirt" on your targets is a powerful weapon to preserve power.
Photos: Getty Images, Mandel Ngan; IBM.
(Feb. 11, 2016)—Just a few days ago, on Feb. 09, 2016, Barack Obama signed an Executive Order creating the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity (CENC).
President Obama wrote in protections for IBM's "The Internet of Things" market push. We believe this action is criminal on numerous counts. (1) He violates ethical pledges of impartiality by federal employees, (2) he fraudulently conceals his IBM loyalties, and (3) he colludes with a host of individual and companies across state lines in a pattern of RICO racketeering (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations).
Fig. 2—Barack Obama Executive Order, Feb. 09, 2016, Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity (CENC). Obama identifies IBM "The Internet of Things" market initiative and is attempting to codify its stability and adaptability. Obama fails to disclose that IBM's claim to the enabling social networking technologies is fraudulent, having been stolen from Columbus, Ohio innovator Leader Technologies, Inc.
Fig. 3—IBM started using the term "The Internet of Things" and cloud computing in about 2009. Today, this theme dominates IBM's market push. Barack Obama is essentially using the power of the presidency to promote IBM in evident violation of the ethics rules, namely the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Subpart D - Conflicting Financial Interests, and Subpart E - Impartiality in Performing Official Duties).
Obama's order is the latest in a string of cybersecurity orders reaching back to Bill Clinton in 1999. On the surface the goal to protect the national from cyber threats seems noble enough. However, these orders are the devil's playground. They have created the illegal American spy state outside of Congressional oversight.
"In confusion, there is profit." See this overview of the Bush EO 13286 for a veritable playground for legal mischief, unaccountable power-mongering and greed.
The public record shows that IBM and its career IBMer Thomas E. Noonan have been fixtures at NIAC since inception.
On Jan. 18, 2001, Clinton appointed career IBM outside counsel (and his national security adviser), James P. Chandler to NIAC.
On Nov. 29, 2001, IBM provided a $40 million "donation" to start The Eclipse Foundation with their chief outside intellectual property counsel, James P. Chandler, who was also Leader Technologies' patent counsel, but who did not disclose his conflicts of interest, which is unethical and illegal for an attorney.
On Aug. 29, 2002, Leader Technologies invention, magically appeared in IBM Eclipse Version 2.0.1, just 11 weeks after Leader had provided a custody copy of the source code to Chandler.
On Sep. 18, 2002, Bush appointed career IBMer Thomas E. Noonan to begin what would become a 14-year reign at NIAC (2002-2016), along with others, notably Cisco's John T. Chambers. Under George Bush, the name changed to the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, but the NAIC acronym was unchanged.
On Feb. 2-5, 2004, IBM Eclipse Foundation sponsored the first EclipseCON 2004.
On Feb. 4, 2004, Facebook launched during IBM EclipseCON 2004.
On Apr. 14, 2004, Bush invited Wall Street to the spy state party, under the guise of "best practices;" banks like Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley (later Facebook underwriters).
On Dec. 08, 2004, IBM wrote they were "unable to locate" the original creator of the Eclipse social networking source code (Leader Technologies).
On Dec. 08, 2004, IBM sold the PC Group to the Chinese (Lenovo), underwritten by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Credit Suisse (later Facebook underwriters).
On Feb. 10, 2007, Barack Obama announced his candidacy for president on Facebook, evidently an IBM spying creation.
On Aug. 07, 2009, Obama appointed another career IBMer, David J. Kappos, to run the Patent Office. Kappos is a Chandler protégé. The Patent Office is managed by the U.S. Department of Commerce which was and is also funding the NAIC executive orders. By Oct. 27, 2009, Kappos dumped his IBM stock and purchase The Vanguard Group—a big winner in the Facebook pintail public offering in 2012.
On Oct. 07, 2009, Obama awarded IBM the 2008 National Medal of Technology and Innovation social networking "The Internet of Things" invention which was STOLEN from Leader Technologies.
On Nov. 03, 2011, IBM, Eurotech SpA and The IBM Eclipse Foundation gave Facebook IBM's MQTT messaging technology.
On Mar. 22, 2012, IBM sold Facebook 750 patents.
On Apr. 17, 2012, career IBMer and Patent Office director, David J. Kappos, ordered Leader Technologies' patent killed by internal secret "reexamination" court. He assigned former IBM employee, Stephen C. Siu, as chief judge.
On Mar. 02, 2015, Obama and Valerie Jarrett met with his Pay-to-Play "Technology CEO Council" at the White House, including IBM's Virginia M. Rometty.
On Feb. 09, 2016, Obama promotes IBM's the "Internet of Things" by name in a new Executive Order likely in violation of ethics, racketeering and fraud laws, for starters.
It is time to pull the plug on this abject criminality masquerading as national security.
Tellingly, on Jan. 18, 2001, just a day before Clinton left office, he appointed James P. Chandler as a member of NIAC. Chandler was legal counsel to both IBM and Leader Technologies.
Evidently, Chandler's role was to ensure that: (1) IBM controlled the emerging spy state and (2) Leader Technologies' new social networking invention became NIAC's core Internet architecture and applications.
On Nov. 29, 2001, IBM and Chandler founded The Eclipse Foundation to become the repository of Leader Technologies' social networking invention.
On Aug. 29, 2002, IBM published Leader's invention in IBM Eclipse Version 2.0.1 illegally marked with IBM copyrights. Chandler had received a custody copy of Leader's invention—his other paying client—eleven weeks earlier.
On Aug. 30, 2002, a whistleblower revealed Chandler's duplicity and collusion with IBM and the U.S. Patent Office in Chandler's personal notes.
Fig. 5—On Sep. 18, 2002, Thomas E. Noonan was appointed by George Bush, promoted by IBM outside counsel, James P. Chandler. Tellingly, Noonan gave a resume (shown above from NIAC's meeting minutes) that did not disclose that his Internet Security Systems is an IBM company and that he is a career IBM employee. This is very evidently willful deception. Chandler also does not disclose his close association with IBM and IBM's chief insided intellectual property counsel, David J. Kappos. Also tellingly, Kappos was appointed by Barack Obama as director of the U. S. Patent Office on Aug. 07, 2009 in a surprise recess appointment.
Fig. 5—Thomas A. Noonan, career IBMer, IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) (1994-2008); Cisco (2009?-2016). His time after ISS appears to have been spent in Cisco surrogates.
On Sep. 18, 2002, two weeks later, George Bush appointed Thomas A. Noonan as a member of NIAC, but cleverly disguised his long association with IBM.
How can one IBM employee be so confused about who he works for, unless he's not, but wants readers of his resume to be confused?
Noonan's jumble of company names and titles are clearly meant to hide his continuous and ongoing IBM affinities. IBM corporate website states: "Once an IBMer, always an IBMer." Judging from Noonan's post 2009 resume and current position at Cisco (another NIAC fixture), Noonan is receiving his "handsome reward" of significant financial gains, like another one of his dutiful counterparts at Baidu (China), Robin Y. Li.
AFI researchers see a now familiar Cartel pattern of obfuscation in Noonan's jumbled affiliations meant to confuse and discourage the casual reader from further investigation.
Noonan failed to disclose a shady Cobian Corp, formed in Andover, Massachusetts on Nov. 04, 2002, just two weeks after George Bush / James P. Chandler appointed him to NIAC on Sep. 18, 2002. Germans Olaf Jacobi and Friedrich von Diest are identified on the incorporation papers. The incorporation attorney was a thuggish-looking Steffan Vounessea.
No evidence of a real Cobian Corp business exists.
However, on Oct. 11, 2006, IBM merged Cobian into Noonan's Internet Security Systems and moved the operation, such as it was, to IBM's Atlanta office at 6303 Barfield Rd NE, Atlanta, GA 30328.
Fig. 6—Thomas E. Noonan disguised his IBM association to the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC) during its formative days. Noonan was recommended to this post by IBM chief outside intellectual property counsel, James P. Chandler. Chandler never disclosed his Noonan association to Leader Technologies, according to a Leader spokesperson. Noonan's public resumes are a jumble of on again, off again, overlapping disclosures of his career at IBM. Here are just a few of Noonan's vague and incomplete resumes: Cisco, Cisco-JouleX, eWorks, LinkedIn, TechCrunch, TechOperators, and Bloomberg.
The evident purpose of Thomas E Noonan's jumbled biographies is to distance himself from his career IMB association which would lessen IBM's overarching control of NIAC activities to direct public policy on national security. Obama's latest executive order shows that IBM intends to embed the future of IBM in America's embedded infrastructure, just ensuring that the gravy train will be in perpetuity. One small problem for IBM is the fact that they rely on the seminal cloud computing invention of social networking that they stole from Columbus innovator, Leader Technologies. Click here: NIAC Meeting Minutes from Jan. 13, 2004. Click here: Terrorex 04 timeline.
Noonan knows about perjury. His failure to disclose Cobian Corp appears willful. What are IBM & Noonan hiding?
On Oct. 11, 2006, IBM and Thomas E. Noonan merged Cobian Corp into IBM and Noonan became its chief executive and chairman. In Cobian Corp's Massachusetts filings, Noonan acknowledges that he knows what perjury is.
Fig. 7—Thomas E. Noonan demonstrates in this Cobian Corp disclosure that he is aware of the legal penalties for failing to disclose material information. However, nowhere does he ever disclose his association with Cobian Corp. To the best of our knowledge and research, Noonan has never disclosed Cobian Corp to the American public during his tenure at the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NAIC). Click here: Cobian Corp, MA Sec. of State Filing Apr. 06, 2006.
Cobian Corp appears to have been a "shell" company (no operations) that IBM and Noonan felt compelled to merge into IBM on Oct. 11, 2006 to make it go away. Given Noonan's and IBM substantial role in the secret workings of the NAIC, the American public have a right to know what Noonan and IBM are hiding.
The AFI Timeline shows for a fact that James P. Chandler and IBM were in the thick of the theft of Leader Technologies' invention at that time. On Aug. 29, 2002, IBM Eclipse release version 2.0.1 On Nov. 04, 2002, Cobian Corp formed, and without any known operation. Then on Oct. 11, 2002, Cobian Corp was merged out of existence into IBM Internet Security Systems (Thomas E. Noonan's company) whereupon Noonan became its Chairman and CEO.
Fig. 8—Cobian Corp timeline. IBM has very evidently exploited Leader Technologies' invention of social networking and co opted it for its "The Internet of Things" strategy. It appears that IBM's entire corporate strategy is now based on theft of Leader Technologies' invention. Even Barack H. Obama, the man we elected to protect the property and invention of all Americans, steals it for himself and his narrow-minded cronies. Click here: PDF of this timeline.
Fig. 9—Thomas E. Noonan's undisclosed NAIC relationships reveal the spy state public-private Cartel. Click here: PDF of this timeline.
Internet Security Systems Form S-1. (Jan. 20, 1998). SEC Edgar (verifies material Thomas E. Noonan relationships with Goldman Sachs, UBS, Bank of America, Kleiner Perkins (Google), Facebook, LinkedIn, Reid Hoffman, Accel Partners, James W. Breyer, AT&T and Greylock Partners, Merrill Lynch, PNC Bank, Intel, IBM, HP, Xerox, Microsoft, Lucent, Siemens, Lockheed Martin, AOL, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, GTE, Nippon, Netcom, NASA, USAF, US Army, US DoD, US State Dept, EDS, KPMG, Price Waterhouse, SAIC, SITA).
Karkaria, U. (May 29, 2013). Cisco to acquire Atlanta energy firm JouleX [Thomas E. Noonan] for $107 million. Atlanta Business Chronicle.
Karkaria, U. (May 31, 2013). JouleX [Thomas E. Noonan] sells for 100 times revenue. Atlanta Business Chronicle.
Endolyn, O. (Jun. 03, 2015). [Thomas E. Noonan] On an Epic Winning Streak. Georgia Tech Alumni Magazine.
NJH Security Consulting. (Mar. 07, 1996). Corporate filings, No. K607704. GA Sec. of State.
NJH Security Consulting. (Dec. 27, 2001). Merger with Internet Security Systems, No. K607704 [Thomas E. Noonan]. GA Sec. of State (includes Internet Security Systems Articles of Organization, Apr. 19, 1994).
Having now established that IBM and Thomas E. Noonan have been fixtures at NIAC since inception. And, having also established that IBM, James P. Chandler and Noonan are playing a crooked game with America's security and Leader Technologies' social networking invention, we now return to Barack Obama's latest Executive Order promoting IBM's the "Internet of Things."
It would be like Obama ". . . protecting the policy and legal foundation for product security in the context of:"
The Internet of Things (IBM) . . . wait, Obama just protected this brand.
“An employee shall not use or permit the use of his Government position or title or any authority associated with his public office to endorse any product, service or enterprise."
"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."
The wheels are coming off of this spy state Administration and its cronies.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


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MISHNAH. R. ELIEZER SAID: IF ONE DID NOT BRING AN INSTRUMENT ON THE EVE OF THE SABBATH,1 HE MUST BRING IT ON THE SABBATH UNCOVERED;2 BUT IN [TIMES OF] DANGER3 HE HIDES IT ON THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES. R. ELIEZER SAID FURTHER: ONE MAY CUT TIMBER TO MAKE CHARCOAL FOR MANUFACTURING IRON.4 R. AKIBA STATED A GENERAL PRINCIPLE: ANY [MANNER OF] WORK WHICH COULD BE PERFORMED ON SABBATH EVE DOES NOT SUPERSEDE THE SABBATH; BUT THAT WHICH COULD NOT BE PERFORMED ON SABBATH EVE DOES SUPERSEDE THE SABBATH.
GEMARA. The scholars asked: Is R. Eliezer's reason5 out of love for the precept6 or perhaps it is because of suspicions?7 What is the practical difference? Whether it may be brought covered on the testimony of witnesses. If you say it is out of love for the precept, it must be uncovered and not hidden. But if you say it is because of suspicions it is well even if hidden: what then? It was stated, R. Levi said: R. Eliezer ruled thus only out of love for the precept. It was taught likewise: He must bring it uncovered, and he must not bring it covered: this is R. Eliezer's opinion.8 R. Ashi said: Our Mishnah too proves this, because it states, BUT IN TIMES OF DANGER HE HIDES IT ON THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; thus in times of danger only, but not when there is no danger. This proves that it is out of love for the precept: this proves it.
R. ELIEZER SAID FURTHER [etc.]. Our Rabbis taught: In R. Eliezer's locality they used to cut timber to make charcoal for making iron on the Sabbath. In the locality of R. Jose the Galilean they used to eat flesh of fowl with milk. Levi visited the home of Joseph the fowler [and] was offered the head of a peacock in milk, [which] he did not eat. When he came before Rabbi he asked him, Why did you not place them under the ban?12 It was the locality of R. Judah b. Bathyra, replied he, and I thought, Perhaps he has lectured to them in accordance with R. Jose the Galilean. For we learnt: R. Jose the Galilean said: It is said, Ye shall not eat any nebelah,13 and it is said, Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk:14 [this teaches,] that which is forbidden on the score of nebelah may not be seethed in milk. Now since a fowl is prohibited when nebelah, you might think that one must not seethe it in milk; therefore it is stated, 'in its mother's milk', hence a fowl is excluded, since it has no mother's milk.
R. Isaac said: There was one town in Palestine where they followed R. Eliezer,15 and they died there at the [proper] time,16 Moreover, the wicked State17 once promulgated a decree against Israel concerning circumcision,18 yet did not decree [it] against that town.
That all may see it.
When circumcision is forbidden by the State, as during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes before the Maccabean revolt; v. 1 Macc. I, 48, 60, 11, 46. It was again forbidden during the Hadrianic persecution; cf. Mek. Yithro, Ba-Hodesh, VI; Graetz, Geschichte IV, 154.
For a circumcision knife. Thus R. Eliezer permits not only circumcision but even its preparatory adjuncts, though these could have been prepared before the Sabbath.
For requiring the knife to be brought uncovered.
One must show how precious is circumcision that he even desecrates the Sabbath on its account.
That would otherwise attach to the bringer, that he was unlawfully desecrating the Sabbath.
The emphatic repetition shows that it must not be hidden on any account.
'It was the practice' implies that this is not a mere theoretical ruling but an actual account of what happened in the past. As R. Eliezer died before the Hadrianic wars, this must refer to the days of the persecution by Antiochus. — Weiss, Dor, II, p. 131. n. I.
There is only one, as obviously he cannot be counted.
In truth it may be he and another, nevertheless there are two who know the purpose of his carrying. and they are referred to as witnesses, since two in general can testify. Yet two independent witnesses may not be required, since there is no actual lawsuit.
For infringing the dietary laws.
Ibid. 22 — these laws are stated successively.
Forbidding it; v. p. 649, n. 3.
Ps. CXIX, 162. This is understood to refer to circumcision, which is a single 'word', i.e., command, which preceded the bulk of Mosaic legislation (this dating back to Abraham, Gen. XVII, 10), and which the Jew, in virtue of being circumcised, ceaselessly performs.
viz., because they were now interdicted in marriage.
Lit., 'in which they (the parties concerned) throw no discord'.
Cf. p. 649, n. 3. Antiochus demanded idol worship too; later, Caligula made a similar demand; v. Graetz, History (Eng. trans.) Vol. II, pp. 188 seqq.; cf. also Weiss, Dor, II, p. 5.
V. Weiss, op. cit., p. 134.
Cf. also supra 49a and notes a.l.
For which no 'erub (q.v. Glos) had been provided. It is normally forbidden to carry through such by Rabbinical law.
R. Zera asked R. Assi: In the case of an alley in which they [its residents] have not become partners,6 what about carrying in the whole of it?7 do we say it is like a courtyard: just as a courtyard, even if an 'erub has not been made, it is permitted to carry in the whole of it,8 so this too, though they have not become partners in it,9 it is permitted to carry in the whole of it; or perhaps it is unlike a courtyard; for a courtyard has four walls [partitions], whereas this has not four walls; alternatively, a courtyard has tenants,10 whereas this has no tenants? He was silent and said nothing to him. On a subsequent occasion he [R. Zera] found him [R. Assi] sitting and stating: 'R. Simeon b. Lakish said in the name of R. Judah the prince: They once forgot to bring a knife on Sabbath eve, so they brought it on the Sabbath. Now this matter was difficult for the Sages [to understand]: how could they abandon the opinion of the Sages and act as R. Eliezer: firstly, since R. Eliezer was [a follower] of Beth Shammai;11 and further, [where an individual and many [are in dispute], the halachah is as the many? Whereupon R. Oshaia said: I asked R. Judah the circumciser, and he told me, It was an alley wherein they [its residents] had not become partners, and they brought it [the knife] from one end to the other. Said he to him: Do you then hold that in the case of an alley in which they had not become partners, it is permitted to carry in the whole of it? Yes, he replied.' Said he [R. Zera] to him [R. Assi], But I once asked [it of] you and you did not answer me: perhaps in the rapid course [of your review] your tradition sped [back] to you?12 Yes, he replied; in the course of my review my tradition sped [back] to me.
It is a general principle (infra 133a) that where a positive command and a negative command are in question, both should be fulfilled wherever possible; hence it might be argued that R. Eliezer too agrees that it should not be carried through the street, since there is an alternative (Tosaf.). Yet it may be that since R. Eliezer's ruling is largely in order to emphasize the great esteem in which the precept is held (supra a), the Talmud felt that he would require it to be carried through the streets.
Carrying from one to another is permitted.
I.e., which were there from the beginning of the Sabbath, v. 'Er. 91a.
I.e., which were in the house at the beginning of the Sabbath. — Here the knife belonged to the former category (Tosaf.).
By means of an 'erub; v. supra 23a.
Sc. utensils which were there at the commencement of the Sabbath.
Not from a house into the courtyard or from one courtyard into another, but in that courtyard itself.
This is the technical term in respect of an alley, whereby it all ranks as a single and private domain for its residents.
I.e., the residents of the houses which open into it put it to private use.
So Rashi and Tosaf. on the strength of a statement in J. Sheb. IX, end; this does not mean that he actually belonged to the School of Shammai, but generally adopted their views (v. Weiss, Dor, II, p. 83, n. 2), which were always disregarded in favour of Beth Hillel's. Rashi suggests another meaning: he was under a ban (v. B.M. 59b).
I.e., you recalled it. [Aliter: 'In the rapid course (of your study) your tradition escaped you', i.e., R. Oshaia's statement. V. Strashun].
That open into the alley.
Which give on the courtyards. I.e., all the houses served by the same courtyard are combined by means of an 'erub, so that they may carry to and fro between the houses and the courtyard belonging to same; but the courtyards themselves have not been made common partners in the alley.
Sc. utensils which were in the alley at the beginning of the Sabbath.
Of Be Hozae. V. p. 234, n. 3.
Lit., 'torn away' from their original designation.
I.e., they are now part of the houses and not courtyards at all.

matches: v. v. v. V. v. v. V. V.


Prompt reporting of a change in aircraft ownership, destruction, or mailing address changes to the Aircraft Registration Branch (Registry) has long been required by registration regulations. Without these reports from the owners, the aircraft registration records are not updated and quickly become unreliable. The Registry has revoked registrations due to unreported changes; however, this process is slow and expensive. In many cases registration would be revoked, but the notices were undeliverable. So, owners would be unaware they needed to take action regarding their now unregistered aircraft, and the Registry's data would remain unreliable.
The re-registration of all aircraft registered before October 1, 2010, took place under the rule between October 1, 2010, and December 31, 2013, updating the U.S. Civil Aircraft Register with current data derived from recent contact with aircraft owners. Renewal of registration every third year, along with other new tools, enables the Registry to keep aircraft registration information current. This data is essential for safety, regulatory enforcement, and all levels of law enforcement.
"These improvements will give us better knowledge about the state of the aviation industry, especially general aviation," said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. "We also are responding to calls from law enforcement and other government agencies for more accurate, up-to-date registration data."
Approximately six months before an aircraft's registration expires, the Registry will mail a notice with instructions to the owner using the mailing address of record. The notice will identify the expiration date, and a file-by date by which application must be made to enable arrival of the new certificate before the old certificate expires.
Application should be made as soon as possible, especially applications reporting changes that must be filed by mail. Filing promptly will leave time to address any errors in the application that require correction, or to re-send lost mail.
A security code provided in the notice enables on-line renewal and payment of the $5 renewal fee when there are no changes in ownership, address, or citizenship to report. If there are changes to report, the form can be completed on-line, printed, signed, and mailed with the $5 fee.
Filing promptly will not affect the new renewal expiration date. The expiration date on a renewal certificate will be three years from the expiration date on the old certificate when the application is filed on time.
When a post office or drop box is used as a mailing address, the street or physical address of the applicant must be entered on the aircraft registration application.
Two months before expiration, after the file-by date has passed, a second notice will be sent to owners of aircraft that have not yet been issued a renewal certificate.
Owners who filed their applications shortly before the file-by date may want to check the status of their Registration Renewal Application using the check status tool provided on the Aircraft Registry Menu page to confirm the filing of their application, or the issue of the renewal certificate.
The security code for on-line renewal application is also included in this notice. These late applicants are advised to make application without delay. Online applicants are advised to allow at least two weeks for mail delivery time when making application.
Applications that arrive at the Registry after the file by date have arrived late in the processing time line and the new certificate may be issued after the old certificate expires. During this interim, the aircraft would be without authority to operate.
Expired certificates cannot be extended. This is why the process starts six months before expiration, when prompt action will enable the timely delivery of new certificates, and leave a few extra weeks to recover from most inadvertent errors.
If your application was received by the Registry before the expiration date, even if there is an error, the Registry will work with you to complete the registration renewal process.
If a renewal application was first received by the Registry after the expiration date, the renewal process no longer applies. An aircraft owner may apply for registration of an unregistered aircraft under 14 C.F.R. §4731(a), by filing an Aircraft Registration Application, AC Form 8050-1, the $5.00 registration fee, and evidence of ownership (if it is not already on file at the Registry).
After the registration expiration date the Registry will send a notice to the owner to tell them when the N-number assignment is scheduled for cancellation. If the owner wishes to keep the N-number they must, before the cancelation takes place, send a request to the Registry asking that the aircraft's registration be cancelled and the N-number be reserved in the owner's name, accompanied by the $10.00 N-number reservation fee. If the N-number is canceled without being reserved, it will not be available for re-assignment or reservation for the next five years.
Aircraft registration issued due to renewal expires three years from the expiration date of the previous certificate.
Aircraft registration issued to a new, import, or reinstated aircraft entering or re-entering the U.S. Civil Aircraft Register expires three years after the last day of the month in which it is issued.
When an aircraft registration is not renewed, the cancellation of the N-number assigned to that aircraft will take place approximately 90 days after the expiration of an aircraft's registration. Upon cancellation, an N-number will be unavailable for re-assignment or reservation for a period of five years.
If aircraft registration has expired and no renewal application was filed, then application may be made to register the aircraft under 14 CFR § 47.31, using the standard application for registration and payment of the $5 registration fee. The process to reinstate a previously registered aircraft remains unchanged.
With these changes the Registry and other system users will be better able to distinguish between validly registered aircraft and unregistered aircraft as the time aircraft are in transitional statuses will be limited.
When aircraft registration has ended as prescribed by §47.41 (e.g., expiration, destruction, etc.) the assignment of an N-number is no longer authorized for use. (The exception remains for the 90 day temporary operating authority of the second, or "pink," copy of the Aircraft Registration Application, following ownership transfers under §47.31(c)).
Six months after notice from the owner of an ownership transfer, if application for registration has not been made, the Registry will schedule the assigned N-number for cancellation.
Twelve months after a purchaser has filed evidence of ownership and applied for registration, if the applicant or successive applicants have not met the requirements for registration, then the Registry will schedule the assigned N-Number for cancellation.
Temporary operating authority, evidenced after the sale of a registered aircraft by retention and display of the second, or "pink," copy or the application for registration, will not be extended beyond one year from the date of the first application for registration filed.
Six months after a dealer's certificate holder has submitted evidence of ownership under § 47.67 and the dealer has not met registration requirements, the Registry will schedule the N-number for cancellation.
When a dealer's certificate expires, any aircraft registered under that certificate would be without registration and must be registered under normal registration procedures of §47.31 or §47.63; or the N-number will be scheduled for cancellation.
The effective date of an aircraft's registration is now the date on which the Registry determines that the submissions meet the requirements of Part 47.
An expired, aircraft registration certificate may be destroyed by its holder instead of returning it to the Registry.
Each person signing an aircraft registration application or a document submitted as supporting evidence under Part 47 must also type or legibly print their name in the signature block.
Minor changes to establish consistency and ensure the regulations conform to statute or current Registry practices.
Look up your aircraft on the Search Aircraft Registration Information web page and verify that the mailing addresses and the names of owners shown are correct.
If the mailing address is wrong, the owner should update the address promptly.
If an ownership change has occurred, the seller should report the sale to the Registry by sending in their registration certificate with the reverse side completed. The purchaser should submit their application for registration, evidence of ownership and $5 registration fee to the Registry as soon as possible.
For additional information, contact the Aircraft Registration Branch.


23-262. Towns; actions by or against; how brought.
When any controversy or cause of action shall exist between any towns of this state, or between any town and individual or corporation, proceedings may be had or suits brought, either at law or in equity, for the purpose of trying and finally settling such controversies. In all such suits and proceedings the town shall sue and be sued by its corporate name, except when town officers shall be authorized by law to sue in their names of office for the benefit of the town.
Source:Laws 1895, c. 28, § 62, p. 148; R.S.1913, § 1046; C.S.1922, § 948; C.S.1929, § 26-262; R.S.1943, § 23-262.
Township can maintain an action for a breach of official duty by a road overseer. Town of Denver v. Myers, 63 Neb. 107, 88 N.W. 191 (1901).


Petitioner requests that the Commissioner exercise his supervisory authority, pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.181(a)(3), to direct the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) to designate its decision entered February 18, 1992, as a new ground of rejection under 37 CFR § 1.196(b) so that petitioner may further prosecute the application before the examiner pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.196(b)(1).
Petitioner's request is granted only to the extent that prosecution of the application is reopened before the examiner under 37 CFR § 1.198.
On February 18, 1992, the Board entered a decision (Paper No. 26) affirming an examiner's rejection of claims 3 and 5 in petitioner's application as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. According to the Board's summary of the examiner's rejection: "the examiner relies on either Imamura or Kitahata in combination with any one of Codella, Terada, Kayama, Sato and Ueno" (Board decision at 3). The Board affirmed the obviousness conclusion stating: "there are sufficient reasons or motives in the appellant's description of the prior art in the specification, particularly with reference to Figure 4, for the artisan to have structured an asymmetric Schottky barrier gate field effect transistor like the appellant did" (Board decision at 6). The examiner did not expressly rely on the description of the prior art in the specification.
On March 18, 1992, petitioner filed a REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION OF DECISION (Paper no. 27) requesting the Board to reconsider and modify its decision by stating that the decision is based on a new ground of rejection under 37 CFR § 1.196(b) so that petitioner might exercise his options for further prosecution under § 1.196(b)(1) or (b)(2).
On March 31, 1992, the Board entered a decision on request for reconsideration (Paper No. 28) denying the request to modify its decision. The Board stated that it had affirmed the ground of rejection before it, 35 U.S.C. § 103, and that the reliance on different evidence did not constitute a new ground of rejection.
On April 4, 1992, petitioner filed a PETITION TO EXERCISE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES (Paper No. 29), requesting the Commissioner to exercise his supervisory authority, pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.181(a)(3), to direct the Board to designate its decision as a new rejection under 37 CFR § 1.196(b) so that petitioner could further prosecute the application before the examiner pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.196(b)(1).
*2 On April 28, 1992, the Chairman of the Board entered a decision dismissing the petition (Paper No. 30), stating that "[s]ince the matter is reviewable by a court, it is not properly subject to review via a petition under 37 CFR 1.181."
On May 5, 1992, petitioner filed a REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION ON PETITION PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 (Paper No. 31) requesting reconsideration of the Chairman's decision on the grounds that "the Petition was decided by the wrong and a potentially interested person and because the Chairman's Decision is legally erroneous." Petitioner argues that a new ground of rejection is a petitionable matter under In re Weiss, 160 USPQ 423 (Comm'r Pat.1967). Petitioner states that "In re Weiss applies here because Petitioner does not intend to appeal the merits of the Board's rejection to the court."
On April 12, 1992, the Commissioner sua sponte entered an order extending the time to file a notice of appeal until twenty (20) days after action by the Commissioner on the request (Paper No. 32).
This discretionary power of the Commissioner should be exercised, however, only in exceptional cases, and then only to correct some palpable error which is clear and evident on its face.
However, proper petitions to exercise the Commissioner's supervisory authority have the salutary effect of establishing uniform operating procedures within the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and of conserving judicial resources until cases have been handled in accordance with the rules. Cf. Oriskasa v. Oonishi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996, 1997 (Comm'r Pat.1989).
Review of adverse decisions of examiners is committed to the Board by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) and § 134. An applicant dissatisfied with a decision of the Board may seek judicial review. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-145. The Commissioner does not review the merits of final decisions of the Board. Cf. In re Dickerson, 299 F.2d 954, 958, 133 USPQ 39, 43 (CCPA1962) ("[I]n performing his duties, the Commissioner cannot usurp the functions or impinge upon the jurisdiction of the Board ... established by 35 U.S.C. 135."); Bayley's Restaurant v. Bailey's of Boston, Inc., 170 USPQ 43, 44 (Comm'r Pat.1971) ("The Commissioner will not intervene with respect to a question which by law is committed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.").
A decision to reopen prosecution notwithstanding an adverse decision by the Board is a question solely within the discretion of the Commissioner and is in no way a review of a merits decision by the Board.
The Board's reliance for the first time on appeal in this case on petitioner's description of the prior art constitutes a new basis for refusing a patent and petitioner has not had an adequate opportunity to respond to the precise basis upon which the rejection is based.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is an appropriate exercise of his supervisory authority to order reopening of prosecution under 37 CFR § 1.198.
FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions are otherwise denied.