text:
It is very important to us to protect your personal data when you visit our website. We protect your privacy and your private data. We collect, process and use your personal data in accordance with the content of these data protection provisions and the applicable rules on data protection, in particular the General Data Protection Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive, the German Data Protection Act and the German Telemedia Act.
These data protection provisions regulate which personal data we collect, process and use. For this reason, please read through the following information carefully.
1. The following section contains information on the collection of personal data when you use our website. Personal data is defined as any information which refers to you personally, e.g. your name, address, e-mail addresses, user behaviour.
3. When you contact us via e-mail or a contact form, we store the data you supply (your e-mail address, where applicable your name and your telephone number) in order to answer your questions. We delete data provided in this connection once storage is no longer required or restrict processing where a legal obligation to retain such data applies.
4. Should we avail ourselves of the services of contracted providers for individual functions of our offering or wish to use your data for advertising purposes, you can find detailed information on the respective processes below. We also specify the fixed criteria for the data storage duration.
2. In addition, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a data protection supervisory authority against the processing of your personal data by us.
2. In addition to the data specified above, cookies are also stored on your computer when you use our website. Cookies are small text files assigned to the browser you use and stored on your hard disk. They provide specific information to the party setting the cookie (in this case, us). Cookies cannot run programs or transfer viruses to your computer. They are used to help us make our overall internet offering more user-friendly and effective.
b) Transient cookies are automatically deleted when you close your browser. They are frequently session cookies. These save a so-called session ID with which various requests from your browser can be identified as part of the same session. This allows us to recognise your computer when you visit our website again. Session cookies are deleted when you log out or close your browser.
c) Persistent cookies are automatically deleted after a set time, which may vary from cookie to cookie. You can delete cookies at any time via the security settings of your browser.
d) You can configure your browser settings as you wish, for example, by refusing to accept third-party cookies or refusing to accept any cookies at all. We do point out, however, that this means you may not be able to use all functions of our website.
f) Furthermore, we use HTML5 storage objects, which are stored on your end device. These objects save the necessary data independent of the browser you use and have no automatic expiry date. You can prevent the use of HTML5 storage objects by using private browsing mode. In addition, we recommend that you delete cookies and your browser history regularly.
1. In addition to the use of our website for purely informational purposes, we also offer various services you may choose to take advantage of. In order to do so, you will as a rule be required to enter further personal data which we use to provide the service in question and in accordance with the data processing principles named above.
2. In some cases, we use external service providers in order to process your data. These providers have been carefully selected and commissioned by us, are bound by our instructions and monitored regularly.
3. In addition, we may disclose your personal data to third parties when conducting campaigns, holding competitions, concluding contracts or offering similar services together with partners. Further information is provided when you enter your personal data or can be found below in the description of the offer.
4. Where our contracting providers or partners are based in a country outside the European Economic Area (EEA), we will inform you of the consequences of this in our description of the offer.
1. If you have agreed to the processing of your data, you can withdraw your consent at any time. Once you have revoked your consent, this influences the permissibility of processing of your personal data.
2. In as far as we base the processing of your personal data on a weighing up of interests, you are entitled to object to processing. In particular, this is the case where the processing of your data is not necessary for the performance of a contract with you, which is stated by us in the following description of the functions. If you make use of your right to objection, we ask you to state the reasons why your personal data should not be processed in the manner intended by us. When you file such an objection with us, stating your reasons, we will examine the circumstances and either cease or adapt the processing of your data or state our compelling and legitimate grounds for continuing the processing of your data.
3. You are, of course, entitled to object to the processing of your personal data for the purpose of advertising and data analysis at any time. You can notify us of your objection to the processing of your data for advertising purposes using the following contact data: SOMMER Antriebs- und Funktechnik GmbH, Hans-Böckler-Str. 21-27, D-73230 Kirchheim/Teck, E-mail: datenschutz@sommer.eu, Tel.: 07021 8001-0, Fax: 07021 8001-100.
1. If you wish to order from our online store, it is necessary for conclusion of the contract for you to enter the personal data required in order to process your order. All information required for processing of the contracts is marked as mandatory; any further information is provided voluntarily. The data you provide are used by us to process your order. In the course of this, we are entitled to pass on your payment data to our bank. The legal basis here is Art. 6 Par. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. b GDPR.
2. Optionally: You can choose to create a customer account, allowing us to store your data for further orders placed at a later date. When you create an account under "My account,” the data you enter are saved, to which you can revoke your consent at any time. You can have all further data, including your user account, deleted at any time in the customer area of our website.
3. We are also entitled to process the data you provide in order to inform you about further products of interest from our portfolio or in order to send you e-mails containing technical information.
4. Under commercial and tax law, we are under obligation to store your address, payment and order data for a period of ten years. However, after two years, we place restrictions on the processing of your data, i.e. your data are then only used in order to fulfil our legal obligations.
5. To prevent unauthorised access to your personal data, in particular financial details, by third parties, the order process is encrypted using TLS technology.
1. If you wish to use our specialist retailer area, you must register by entering your e-mail address and a password of your choice. For registration, we use the so-called double-opt-in procedure, i. e. registration is only completed when you have confirmed your registration by clicking the link sent to you for this purpose in a confirmation e-mail. If confirmation is not received within 24 hours, your registration is automatically deleted from our database. Entry of the data specified above is mandatory; all further information can be provided voluntarily by using our specialist retailer area.
2. If you use our specialist retailer area, we store data which is required for the performance of contracts, including details of the method of payment, until you permanently delete your access. We also save all data provided voluntarily by you for the duration of your use of the specialist retailer area, unless you delete such data beforehand. You can manage and edit all entries in the secure customer area of our website. The legal basis is Art. 6 Par. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. f GDPR.
3. If you use the specialist retailer area, your data may become accessible to other subscribers to the specialist retailer area in accordance with the contractual service. Members who are not registered will receive no information about you. Your specialist retailer designation and reference number are visible to all registered members, irrespective of whether you have approved this. In contrast, only members you have confirmed as personal contacts can view your complete profile with the data approved by you.
4. To prevent unauthorised access to your personal data, in particular financial details, by third parties, the connection is encrypted using TLS technology.
1. You have the option of subscribing to our newsletter, in which we inform you of current offers which may be of interest to you. The products and services advertised in the newsletter are specified in the declaration of consent.
2. For registration for our newsletter, we use the so-called double-opt-in procedure. This means that on registration, we send an e-mail to the e-mail address provided by you, asking you to confirm that you wish to receive our newsletter. If you do not confirm your registration within 24 hours, your information is blocked and deleted automatically after one month. We also store the IP addresses you use, the time of registration and confirmation. The purpose of this is to supply verification of your registration and to allow clarification of possible misuse of your personal data.
3. The only information you have to enter in order to receive the newsletter is your e-mail address. Any further data entered in the fields marked as voluntary are used in order to allow us to address you personally. On receipt of your confirmation, we save your e-mail address in order to send you the newsletter. The legal basis is Art. 6 Par. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. a GDPR.
4. You can withdraw your consent to receiving the newsletter and cancel your subscription at any time. You can do this by clicking on the link provided for this purpose in every newsletter, via the form on the website https://www.sommer.eu/en/newsletter.html, by sending an e-mail to datenschutz@sommer.eu or using the contact data given on the legal information page of our website.
5. We would like to point out that we do evaluate user behaviour when dispatching our newsletter. To allow this, the e-mails we send contain so-called web beacons or tracking pixels in the form of one-pixel image files which are stored on our website. For evaluation, we link the data specified in § 3 and the web beacons with your e-mail address and an individual ID. Links contained in the newsletter also contain this ID. We use the data collected to create a user profile which allows us to tailor the newsletter to your specific interests. We track when you read our newsletter and which links you click in it, which and on the basis of this, we draw conclusions about specific topics which interest you. We combine these data with your activities on our website.
6. You can file an objection to this tracking at any time by clicking the special link provided for this purpose in every newsletter or by notifying us by other means. This information is stored for the duration of your subscription to the newsletter. If you cancel your subscription to the newsletter, the information is stored purely for statistical purposes and in anonymous form.
1. This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service provided by Google Inc.("Google"). Google Analytics also uses so-called "cookies," text files that are stored on your computer and enable your use of the website to be analysed. As a rule, the information created by the cookie about your use of this website is transferred to a Google server in the USA and stored there. However, if IP anonymisation is activated on this website, in member countries of the European Union or other countries that are signatories to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, Google truncates your IP address beforehand. Only in exceptional cases is the full IP address transferred to a Google server in the USA and truncated there. On behalf of the operator of this website, Google will use this information to analyse your use of the website, compile reports about activities on the website and provide the website operator with further services in connection with website and Internet use.
2. The IP address transferred by your browser for the purpose of Google Analytics is not merged with any other Google data.
3. You can prevent the cookies from being stored by means of a corresponding setting in your browser software, but we would like to point out that you may not be able to use all the website's functions to the full extent in this case. In addition, you can prevent Google from obtaining and processing the data created by the cookie concerning your use of the website (including your IP address) by downloading and installing the browser plug-in accessed by clicking the following link: http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de.
4. This website uses Google Analytics with the extension "_anonymizeIp()". This means that IP addresses are truncated prior to further processing, rendering it impossible to trace them back to a specific person. Where data collected on you identify you personally, they are therefore immediately excluded and the personal data are thereby deleted at once.
5. We use Google Analytics in order to analyse your use of our website, enabling us to improve our website regularly. The statistics we obtain in this way allow us to improve our online offering and make our website more interesting for you as a user. For those exceptional cases where personal data are transferred to the USA, Google has certified that it complies with the EU-US Privacy Shield Frameworks, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework. The legal basis for the use of Google Analytics is Art. 6 Par. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. f GDPR.
1. On this website, we use Google Maps. This enables us to display interactive maps directly on the website and gives you the convenience of the map function.
2. When you visit our website, Google receives the information that you have accessed the corresponding subpage of our website. In addition, the data specified in § 3 of this declaration are transferred. This takes place irrespective of whether Google provides a user account via which you are logged in or whether no user account exists. If you are logged in to Google, your data are assigned directly to your account. If you do not wish the data to be linked to your Google profile, you must log out before activating the button. Google stores your data as user profiles and uses them for advertising purposes, market research and/or requirements-oriented design of its website. Such evaluation is carried out in particular (even in the case of users who are not logged in) in order to provide advertising which caters to the needs of users and in order to inform other users of social media networks of your activities on our website. You are entitled to object to the creation of such user profiles; however, you must contact Google in order to exercise this right.
3. Further information on the purpose and scope of the collection and processing of data by the plug-in provider can be found in the provider’s data privacy policies. There, you will also find further information on your rights in this context and configuration options for the protection of your privacy: http://www.google.de/intl/de/policies/privacy. Google also processes your personal data in the USA and has certified that it adheres to the EU-US Privacy Shield Principles, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework.
1. We use the services of Google Adwords to draw attention to our attractive products on external websites through the use of advertising material (so-called Google Adwords). In relation to the data from advertising campaigns, we can evaluate how successful individual advertising measures are. Our aim here is to present advertising which is of interest for you, to make the design of our website more interesting and to allow a fair calculation of advertising costs.
2. This advertising material is provided by Google via so-called "ad servers." We use ad server cookies, which allow us to measure specific success parameters such as how often the ads are displayed or clicked by users. If you access our website via a Google ad, Google Adwords will store a cookie on your computer. As a rule, these cookies are only valid for 30 days, and they are not intended to be used to identify you as a person. Usually, the analysis values unique cookie ID, the number of ad impressions per placement (frequency), the last impression (relevant for post-view conversions) and opt-out information (notification that the user does not wish to be addressed again) are stored for this cookie.
3. These cookies allow Google to recognise your Internet browser. If a user visits specific pages of an Adwords customer’s website and the cookie stored on his or her computer has not yet expired, Google and the customer can see that the user has clicked the advertisement and been redirected to this page. A different cookie is assigned to each Adwords customer. Cookies can therefore not be tracked via the websites of Adwords customers. We ourselves do not collect or process any personal data in the course of the named advertising measures. We merely receive statistical evaluations from Google. Using these evaluations, we can see which of the advertising measures implemented have been particularly effective. We receive no more detailed data from the use of the advertising measures, and in particular, the information does not enable us to identify the user.
4. The marketing tools installed mean that your browser automatically establishes a direct connection to the Google server. We have no influence on the scope and further use of the data captured by Google through the use of this tool and therefore inform you on the basis of the information available to us: As a result of the integration of Google AdWords Conversion, Google receives the information that you have accessed the corresponding section of our website or clicked one of our ads. If you are registered with a service provided by Google, Google can assign your visit to the website with your account. Even if you are not registered with Google or have not logged in, it is possible for the provider to learn your IP address and store it.
d. by means of permanent deactivation in your Firefox, Internet Explorer or Google Chrome browsers under the link http://www.google.com/settings/ads/plugin. We do point out, however, that in this case, you may not be able to use all functions of our website.
6. The legal basis for the processing of your data is Art. 6 Par. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. f GDPR. You can find further information on data protection at Google here: http://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy and https://services.google.com/sitestats/de.html. Alternatively, you can visit the website of the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) at http://www.networkadvertising.org. Google has certified that it complies with the EU-US Privacy Shield Frameworks, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
§ 3
Art. 6
§ 3
Art. 6


text:
As of 10 December 2015, companies generating industrial wastewater, industrial emissions, or solid waste with an amount of 500 m3/day or greater, of 200,000 m3/day or greater, of 5 tones/day or greater are; and facilities producing, trading, or providing services used radioactive materials or generating radioactive waste required to obtain an approval for its environmental impact assessment (EIA) report as specified under the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT adopted on 27 October 2015. Furthermore, Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT states that companies generating industrial emissions listed in the list of emission sources with great flow (provided in Appendix I of this Circular) are required to register as an industrial emission generator, and install an automatic air emission monitoring equipment. It should be noted that producers and traders listed in Appendix 2 of the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT are subject to the requirement to carry out an environmental management system, unless they have complied with the environmental management system under the national standard TCVN ISO 14001.
Pursuant to the Law on Environmental Protection No. 55/2014/QH13 of 23 June 2014 (LEP 2014), all companies operating in Vietnam are obligated to protect the environment in line with economic development, social security development under the Law on Environmental Protection in order to develop biodiversity conservation, and adapt to climate change, and to ensure the right of all people to live in healthy environment (Art. 4).
In particular, the LEP 2014 indicates certain environmental-related requirements such as the requirement to obtain an approval for its environmental impact assessment (EIA) report (Art. 18, 19, 20, 22); to obtain a confirmation letter for its environmental protection plan (Art. 29, 30); to comply with environmental protection requirements regarding climate change adaptation (Art. 39), environmental protection regulations applicable to industrial parks, export processing zones, high-tech zones (Art. 66), environmental protection regulations applicable to producers, traders, service establishments (Art. 68), environmental protection regulations on import of discarded materials (Art. 76); to comply with regulations on solid waste management, including classification, collection, transport, recycling, and disposal of ordinary or hazardous waste (Art. 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92); to comply with regulations on wastewater management (Section 4); and to comply with regulations on dust, emission, noise, vibration, light, and radiation (Section 5).
On 27 October 2015, in order to provide specific regulations on environmental protection for industry and trade sector, the Ministry of Industry and Trade adopted the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT. It replaces the Decision 52/2008/QD-BCT dated 30 December 2008 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade providing temporary regulation on environmental protection for industry and trade sector.
Facilities producing, trading, or providing services used radioactive materials or generating radioactive waste.
The EIA must be performed in the preparation stage of the project (Clause 1, Art. 6, Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT).
Furthermore, Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT states that, during the preparation stage of the project, owners of companies subject to an environmental protection plan requirement are required to register their environmental protection plan in line with Art. 18 of the Decree No. 18/2015/ND-CP and Art. 33 of the Circular No. 27/2015/TT-BTNMT.
Under the Decree No. 18/2015/ND-CP, companies must ensure that the environmental management plan is developed based on the management and monitoring program suggested in the approved EIA report (Clause 2, Art. 16). In the case that the management and monitoring program is changed, companies are required to update the environmental management plan, and submit the updated environmental management plan to the People Committees at commune level (Clause 2, Art. 10 of Circular No. 27/2015/TT-BTNMT). Form for an environmental management plan is provided in Appendix 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 of the Circular No. 27/2015/TT-BTNMT.
To build an environmental management system. This requirement applies to producers, traders listed in Appendix 2 of the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT.
Producers and traders listed in Appendix 2 of the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT are not required to carry out an environmental management system when they have complied with the environmental management system under the national standard TCVN ISO 14001 (Clause 7b, Art. 11, Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT). Nonetheless, these producers and traders are obligated to comply with the environmental management system’s contents specified in Art. 27 of the Decree No. 19/2015/ND-CP. It includes, for example, the requirement to apply process and equipment for efficient production, saving energy, raw materials, and reducing environmental pollution.
Regarding import of discarded materials used as production materials, under the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT (Art. 12), companies importing discarded materials must make a monetary deposit as a guarantee for payments at the Vietnam Environment Protection Fund – VEPF or commercial banks where the companies have their main trading accounts as specified under the Decree No. 38/2015/ND-CP. The purpose of the deposit is to ensure that companies importing discarded materials will be responsible for handling of risks related to environmental pollution that may occur from the imported discarded material shipments (Art. 57, Decree No. 38/2015/ND-CP).
Furthermore, Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT (Clause 2, Art. 12) states that companies using imported discarded materials as production materials are required to obtain a certificate of eligibility of environmental protection for import of discarded materials as specified under the Decree No. 38/2015/ND-CP.
In terms of reporting requirements, producers and traders are required to submit an annual report on environment protection activities to the provincial Departments of Industry and Trade – DoIT by 31 March of the following year. The form for the report is provided in Appendix 3 of the Circular No. 35/2015/TT-BCT.
Interested in learning more about this regulatory development? Let us know!

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 18
Art. 33
Art. 16
Art. 10
Art. 11
Art. 27
Art. 12


text:
Thank you for visiting our website and for your interest in our company. Dealing with our customers and interested parties is a matter of trust. The protection of your privacy and your personal data while using our website is of great importance to us. Therefore, it is of crucial importance and an obligation to handle your data carefully and to protect it against misuse.
With these data protection guidelines we would like to inform you about the storage of your data, and how we process and use it.
In principle, we process personal data of our users only insofar as this is necessary to provide a functioning website and our content and services. The processing of personal data of our users takes place regularly only according to the consent of the user. An exception applies to cases in which a prior consent cannot be obtained and the processing of the data is permitted by law.
Insofar as we obtain the consent with processing of the personal data, the Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR: DSGVO) offers a legal basis.
In the processing of the personal data that are necessary for the performance of a contract with the respective person (Party), Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b DSGVO as legal basis. This also applies for processing operations required to carry out pre-contractual actions.
Insofar as processing of personal data is required to fulfill a legal obligation that is subject to our company, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c DSGVO serves as the legal basis.
In the case that vital interests of the data subject or another natural person require the processing of personal data, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. d DSGVO serves as the legal basis.
If data processing is necessary to safeguard a legitimate interest of our company or a third party, and if the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject do not outweigh the first-mentioned interest, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f DSGVO serves as the legal basis for processing.
The personal data of the concerned person will be deleted or blocked, as soon as the purpose of storage does no longer exist. Furthermore, data may be stored if this has been provided for by the European or national legislator in EU regulations, laws or other provisions, to which the responsible person is subject. The data will also be blocked or deleted if a storage period prescribed by the aforementioned standards expires, unless there is a need for further storage of the data for the conclusion or fulfilment of a contract.
Each time our website is accessed, our system collects data and information from the computer system of the calling computer automatically.
The data will also be stored in the log files of our system. Storage of these data together with other personal data of the user does not take place.
The temporary storage of the IP address by the system is necessary to allow delivery of the website to the computer of the user. To this end, the user's IP address must be saved for the duration of the session.
Our legitimate interest in the processing of data for the above-mentioned purposes occurs according to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f DSGVO.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer necessary to achieve the purpose for which they were collected. In case of the collection of data for the provision of the website, this is the case when the respective session has ended.
The collection of data for the provision of the website and the storage of data in log files is absolutely necessary for the operation of the website. Consequently, there is no possibility of objection from the user.
The legal basis for the processing of personal data using cookies for analysis purposes is the consent of the user Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR.
The use of the analysis cookies takes place to improve the quality of our website and its contents. Through the analysis cookies, we learn how the website is used and so we can constantly optimize our offer.
For example, frequently used entry pages in the navigation structure are implemented more prominently and processed in terms of content. Furthermore, errors in page views can be better recognized and are needed for a quick correction. At longer intervals, web pages will be analyzed to detect and fix failure and information architecture problems.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analytics service provided by Google Inc. ("Google"). Google Analytics uses the so-called "cookies", text files that are stored on your computer and that allow an analysis of the use of the website by you. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website (including your IP address) is usually transmitted to a Google server in the USA and stored there.
However, if the IP anonymisation is activated on this website, your IP address will be shortened by Google beforehand within the member countries of the European Union or other parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases the full IP address will be sent to a Google server in the US and shortened there. On behalf of the operator of this website, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports on website activity and to provide other services related to website activity and internet usage to the website operator. The IP address provided by Google Analytics as part of Google Analytics will not be merged with other Google data.
We would like to point out that we use Google Analytics with the extension "_anonymizeip ()". Your IP addresses are therefore shortened by the last octet, thereby making personal data unrecognizable.
By using this website, you consent to the processing of your collected data by Google in the manner and for the purposes mentioned above.
As an alternative to the browser add-on (or for use on mobile devices), please click on this link to disagree with the collection of data by Google Analytics on this website in the future. Doing so, an opt-out cookie will be stored on your device. Once you delete your cookies, you will need to click the link again.
The European Commission provides a platform for online dispute resolution (OS) available at ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/. We are not obligated and unwilling to participate in a dispute settlement procedure in front of a consumer arbitration board.
Our website uses plugins from the social network Facebook, Facebook Inc., USA.
The Facebook plugins can be recognized by the Facebook logo on our website. For an overview of Facebook plug-ins, see: developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
When you visit our website, the plugin will establish a direct connection between your browser and the Facebook server. Facebook receives information that you have visited our website with your IP address. If you click on the Facebook "Like-Button", you will be logged in to your Facebook account, you can link the contents of our page on your Facebook profile. May we assign Facebook the visit to our website to assign your user account.
We point out that as the provider of the website we do not receive any information about the content of the revised data. When you were not able to facebook, Users can not find!
You have the right to request information about whether your personal information will be delivered to a third country or an international organization. In this context, you can request the appropriate guarantees to be informed in accordance with Art. 46 GDPR.
You have a right to rectification and / or completion to the controller, if the personal data concerning you is incorrect or incomplete. The responsible person must make the correction without delay.
the controller no longer requires the personal data for the purposes of processing, but you need them for asserting, exercising or defending legal claims, or if you objected to the processing pursuant to Art. 21 (1) GDPR and it is not yet certain whether the legitimate reasons of the responsible person prevail over your reasons.
If the processing of your personal data has been restricted, such data may only be processed - apart from being stored - with your consent or for the purpose of asserting, exercising or defending rights or protecting the rights of another natural or legal person or on grounds of an important public interest of the Union or a Member country.
If the processing according to the above mentioned conditions is restricted, you will be informed by the person in charge before the restriction is lifted.
If the person in charge has published personal data, and is obliged pursuant to Art. 17 para. 1 DSGVO to delete it, he shall take the appropriate measures, including technical measures, taking into account the available technology and the implementation costs, to inform data processors, that you as the data subject have requested the deletion of all links to this personal data or of copies or replications of this personal data.
for archival purposes of public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes acc. Article 89 (1) GDPR, to the extent that the law referred to in subparagraph (a) is likely to render impossible or seriously affect the achievement of the objectives of that processing, or to assert, practice or defend legal claims.
You have a right against the responsible person to be informed about these recipients.
In using this right, you also have the right to obtain that your personal data are transmitted directly from one person to another, insofar as this is technically feasible. Freedoms and rights of other persons should not be affected.
The right to data portability does not apply to the processing of personal data necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the practice of official authority delegated to the controller.
You have the right at any time, for reasons that arise from your particular situation, to profile an objection against the processing of your personal data, pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. e or f DSGVO; this also applies to profiling based on these provisions.
The controller will no longer process your personal data unless he can demonstrate compelling legitimate reasons for processing that outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or the processing is for the purpose of enforcing, practicing or defending legal claims.
If your personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, you have the right to object at any time to the processing of your personal data for the purpose of such advertising; this also applies to profiling in so far as it is connected with such direct advertising.
Regardless of Directive 2002/58 / EC, you have the option, in the context of the use of information society services, of practicing your right to object through automated procedures that use technical specifications.
You have the right not to be subjected to a decision based solely on automated processing - including profiling - that will have legal effect or affect you in a similar manner. This does not apply if the decision to conclude or to execute a contract between you and the controller is required by Union or Member State legislation to which the controller is subject, and that legislation is adequate to safeguard your rights and freedoms as well as your legitimate interests or with your express consent.
However, these decisions must not be based on special categories of personal data under Art. 9 (1) GDPR, unless Art. 9 (2) lit. a or g DSGVO applies and reasonable measures have been taken to protect your rights and freedoms as well as your legitimate interests.
With regard to the cases referred to in (1) and (3), the responsible person shall take appropriate measures to uphold the rights and freedoms and their legitimate interests, including at least the right to obtain the intervention of a person by the controller, to express his / her own position and to challenge the decision.
Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, you have the right to complain to a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of its residence, place of work or place of alleged infringement, if you believe that the processing of your personal data acts against the DSGVO violates.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 46
Art. 21
Art. 17
Art. 6
Art. 9
Art. 9


text:
New York’s Second Department Appellate Division recently held that the purchasers of a property were bona fide purchasers for value despite the filing of a notice of pendency on the property because of the death of the prior owner. See Caldara v. Monti, 165 A.D.3d 1219 (2d Dept. 2018). Plaintiff brought an action against the decedent in 2015 in which he sought specific performance of a real estate contract.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently reversed a lower court and held that a Florida statute cured an improperly-witnessed deed and prevented the IRS from foreclosing on the property. See Saccullo v. United States of Am., 2019 WL 168217 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2019). In 1998, the owner of a property executed a deed conveying the property to a trust for the benefit of his son.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a borrower’s claim against a lender under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) was properly dismissed because the lender could not be held vicariously liable for the servicer’s alleged violation. See Christiana Tr. v. Riddle, 2018 WL 6715882 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018). In the case, the borrower defaulted on her mortgage and the lender brought a foreclosure action. The borrower counterclaimed and alleged a violation of RESPA, among other things.
New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently reversed a lower court and held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether the statute of limitations should be tolled in a case in which plaintiffs allege that defendant defrauded them out of title to a property over 20 years earlier. See Benipal v. Tri-State Petro, Inc., et al., A-0894-17T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 4, 2019).
New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently held that the 2011 amendment to the Construction Lien Law (the “CLL”) regarding the proper signatory to a construction lien claim does not apply retroactively and that the amendment could not be used by a claimant to validate claims it filed in 2008. See Diamond Beach, LLC v. Mar. Assocs., Inc., 2018 WL 6729724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 24, 2018).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a six-year statute of limitations period applied to an action seeking to rescind a loan under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). See Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 WL 6367268 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2018). The case involved a home loan that plaintiffs, residents of Washington, refinanced with defendant on April 30, 2010. Defendant failed to provide plaintiffs with a notice of right to rescind the loan, which is required under TILA. 15 U.S.C. 1635(a).
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently granted the plaintiff debtor’s motion for summary judgment and held that a debt collection letter stating, “[i]f you carry any insurance that may cover this obligation, please contact [the defendant debt collector’s] office at the number above” violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). See Kassin, v. AR Resources, Inc., 2018 WL 6567703 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2018). In the putative class action, defendant debt collector sent a collection letter to plaintiff that contained the requisite validation notice that plaintiff could dispute the debt in writing within 30 days of receipt of the letter.
The Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County, recently granted Fidelity National Title Company’s (“Fidelity”) motion to dismiss and held that Fidelity could not be liable to the former owner of a property for fraud. See DeMaio v. Fidelity Nat. Title Co., Docket No. 31159/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). In the case, plaintiff was the owner of the property at issue. Plaintiff purportedly sold the property to a couple, the Capozellos, and the Capozellos sold it again to defendant Stephen Zangre.
In a decision approved for publication, New Jersey’s Appellate Division provides an important reminder as to the crucial distinction between direct and derivative claims in shareholder actions. Specifically, in Tully v. Mirz, the Appellate Division held that one of two shareholders of a closely-held corporation could not bring a direct action against the other shareholder for the other shareholder’s alleged mismanagement of the corporation and conversion of corporate funds, but that he had the right to bring direct claims for the other shareholder’s alleged breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Ronald A. Jacks, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Peter L. Strauss, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Petitioners brought this suit against the United States in the Court of Claims1 seeking just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for damages done by rioters to buildings occupied by United States troops during the riots in Panama in January 1964. The Court of Claims held that the actions of the Army did not constitute a 'taking' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and entered summary judgment for the United States. 396 F.2d 467, 184 Ct.Cl. 427 (1968). We granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 959, 89 S.Ct. 399, 21 L.Ed.2d 372 (1968). We affirm.
Petitioners' buildings, the YMCA Building and the Masonic Temple, are situated next to each other on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone at its boundary with the Republic of Panama. Rioting began in this part of the Zone at 8 p.m. on January 9, 1964. Between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., an unruly mob of 1,500 persons marched to the Panama Canal Administration Building at the center of the Atlantic segment of the Zone and there raised a Panamanian flag. Many members of the mob then proceeded to petitioners' buildings—and to the adjacent Panama Canal Company Office and Storage Building. They entered these buildings, began looting and wrecking the interiors, and started a fire in the YMCA Building.
At 9:50 p.m. Colonel Sachse, the commander of the 4th Battalion, 10th Infantry, of the United States Army, was ordered to move his troops to the Atlantic segment of the Zone with the mission of clearing the rioters from the Zone and sealing the border from further encroachment. The troops entered the three buildings, ejected the rioters, and then were deployed outside of the buildings. The mob began to assault the soldiers with rocks, bricks, plate glass, Molotov cocktails, and intermittent sniper fire. The troops did not return the gunfire but sought to contain the mob with tear gas grenades. By midnight, one soldier had been killed and several had been wounded by bullets; many others had been injured by flying debris. Shortly after midnight, Colonel Sachse moved his troops inside the three buildings so that the men might be better protected from the sniper fire.
The buildings remained under siege throughout the night. On the morning of January 10, the YMCA Building was the subject of a concentrated barrage of Molotov cocktails. The building was set afire, and in the early afternoon the troops were forced to evacuate it and take up positions in the building's parking lot which had been sandbagged during the night. Following the evacuation, the YMCA Building continued to be a target for Molotov cocktails. The troops also withdrew from the Masonic Temple on the afternoon of January 10, except that a small observation post on the top floor of the building was maintained. The Temple, like the YMCA Building continued to be under heavy attack following withdrawal of the troops, the greatest damage being suffered on January 12 as a result of extensive fire-bomb activity. The third building under heavy attack in the area—the Panama Canal Company Office and Storage Building—was totally destroyed on January 11 by a fire started by Molotov cocktails.
On January 13, the mob dispersed, and all hostile action in the area ceased. The auditorium-gymnasium in the YMCA Building had been destroyed, and the rest of the building was badly damaged. The Masonic Temple suffered considerably less damage because of its predominantly concrete and brick construction. Other buildings in the Atlantic segment of the Canal Zone were also damaged or destroyed. These buildings were all located along the boundary between the Zone and the Republic of Panama, and none, except the Office and Storgae Building, had been occupied by troops during the riot.
Petitioners' suit in the Court of Claims sought compensation for the damage done to their buildings by the rioters after the troops had entered the buildings. The basic facts were stipulated, and all parties moved for summary judgment. The Court found it 'abundantly clear from the record * * * that the military units dispatched to the Atlantic side of the Zone by General O'Meara were not sent there for the purpose or with the intention of requisitioning or taking (petitioners') buildings to house soldiers. Both buildings had previously been looted and damaged by the rioters. Colonel Sachse's men wee ordered to remove the Panamanians from the buildings in order to prevent further loss or destruction and then to seal off the border from further incursions by the rioters into the Atlantic portion of the Canal Zone.' 396 F.2d, at 473—474, 184 Ct.Cl., at 438. Accordingly, the court held that 'the temporary occupancy of (petitioners') buildings and the damage inflicted on them by the rioters during such occupancy did not constitute a taking of the buildings for use by the Army within the contemplation of the fifth amendment * * *.' Id., 396 F.2d, at 473, 184 Ct.Cl., at 438. The Government's motion for summary judgment was granted, petitioners' motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case was dismissed.
At the outset, we note that although petitioners claim compensation for all the damage which occurred after the troops retreated into the buildings in the early hours of January 10, there was no showing that any damage occurred because of the presence of the troops. To the contrary, the record is clear that buildings which were not occupied by troops were destroyed by rioters, and that petitioners' very buildings were under severe attack before the troops even arrived. Indeed, if the destroyed buildings have any common characteristic, it is not that they were occupied by American soldiers, but that they were on the border and thus readily susceptible to the attacks of the mobs coming from the Republic of Panama. We do not rest our decision on this basis, however, for petitioners would not have a claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment even if they could show that damage inflicted by rioters occurred because of the presence of the troops.
The Just Compensation Clause was 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960); see also United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266, 60 S.Ct. 225, 229, 84 L.Ed. 230 (1939).2 Petitioners argue that the troops entered their buildings not for the purpose of protecting those buildings but as part of a general defense of the Zone as a whole. Therefore, petitioners contend, they alone should not be made to bear the cost of the damage to their buildings inflicted by the rioters while the troops were inside. The stipulated record, however, does not support petitioners' factual premise; rather, it demonstrates that the troops were acting primarily in defense of petitioners' buildings.
The military had made no advance plans to use petitioners' buildings as fortresses in case of a riot. Nor was the deployment of the troops in the area of petitioners' buildings strategic to a defense of the Zone as a whole. The simple fact is that the troops were sent to that area because that is where the rioters were.3 And once the troops arrived in the area, their every action was designed to protect the buildings under attack. First, they expelled the rioters from petitioners' buildings and the Office and Storage Building, putting out the fire started by the rioters in the YMCA Building. Then they stood guard outside to defend the buildings from renewed attack by the 2,000 to 3,000 Panamanian rioters who remained in the area. In this defense of petitioners' property the troops suffered considerable losses and were forced to retreat into the buildings.
Thus, there can be doubt that the United States Army troops were attempting to defend petitioners' buildings. Of course, any protection of private property also serves a broader public purpose. But where, as here, the private party is the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity, 'fairness and justice' do not require that losses which may result from that activity 'be borne by the public as a whole,' even though the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the public. See Armstrong v. United States, supra, 364 U.S. at 49, 80 S.Ct. at 1569; United States v. Sponenbarger, supra, 308 U.S. at 266, 60 S.Ct. at 229. Were it otherwise, governmental bodies would be liable under the Just Compensation Clause to property owners every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil burglars thought to be inside.
Petitioners' claim must fail for yet another reason. On oral argument, petitioners conceded that they would have had no claim had the troops remained outside the buildings, even if such presence would have incited the rioters to do greater damage to the buildings. We agree. But we do not see that petitioners' legal position is improved by the fact that the troops actually did occupy the buildings. Ordinarily, of course, governmental occupation of private property deprives the private owner of his use of the property, and it is this deprivation for which the Constitution requires compensation. See, e.g. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945). There are, however, unusual circumstances in which governmental occupation does not deprive the private owner of any use of his property. For example, the entry by firemen upon burning premises cannot be said to deprive the private owners of any use of the premises. In the instant case, the physical occupation by the troops did not deprive petitioners of any use of their buildings. At the time the troops entered, the riot was already well under way, and petitioners' buildings were already under heavy attack. Throughout the period of occupation, the buildings could not have been used by petitioners in any way. Thus, petitioners could only claim compensation for the increased damage by rioters resulting from the presence of the troops. But such a claim would not seem to depend on whether the troops were positioned in the buildings. Troops standing just outside a building could as well cause increased damage by rioters to that building as troops positioned inside. In either case—and in any case where government action is causally related to private misconduct which leads to property damage—a determination must be made whether the government involvement in the deprivation of private property is sufficiently direct and substantial to require compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Constitution does not require compensation every time violence aimed against government officers damages private property. Certainly, the Just Compensation Clause could not successfully be invoked in a situation where a rock hurled at a policemen walking his beat happens to damage private property. Similarly, in the instant case, we conclude that the temporary, unplanned occupation of petitioners' buildings in the course of battle does not constitute direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment. We have no occasion to decide whether compensation might be required where the Government in some fashion not present here makes private property a particular target for destruction by private parties.
If United States military forces should use a building for their own purposes—as a defense bastion or command post, for example—it seems to me this would be a Fifth Amendment taking, even though the owner himself were not actually deprived of any personal use of the building. Since I do not understand the Court to hold otherwise, I join its judgment and opinion.
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in the result.
At the time the military retreated into the YMCA and the Masonic Temple three alternative courses of action were open to the army commander. First, the troops could have continued their prior strategy and stood their ground in front of the buildings without returning the rioters' hostile sniper fire; second, the troops could have stood their ground and attempted to repel the mob by the use of deadly force; third, the troops could have retreated from the entire area, leaving the mob temporarily in control. The petitioners argue that if the troops had adopted either of the first two of these alternative strategies, their buildings would not have suffered the damage which resulted from the military's occupation.
But what if the military had adopted the third strategy open to it? If the army had completely abandoned the area to the rioters, and regrouped for a later counter-attack, there can be little doubt on this record that the rioters would have subjected the buildings to greater damage than that which was in fact suffered. I believe this fact to be decisive. For it appears to me that, in riot control situations, the Just Compensation Clause may only be properly invoked when the military had reason to believe that its action placed the property in question in greater peril than if no form of protection had been provided at all.
I start from the premise that, generally speaking, the Government's complete failure to provide police protection to a particular property owner on a single occasion does not amount to a 'taking' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Every man who is robbed n the street cannot demand compensation from the Government on the ground that the Fifth Amendment requires fully effective police protection at all times. The petitioners do not, of course, argue otherwise. Yet surely the Government may not be required to guarantee fully effective protection during serious civil disturbances when it is apparent that the police and the military are unable to defend all the property which is threatened by the mob. If the owners of unprotected property remain uncompensated, however, there seems little justice in compensating petitioners, who merely contend that the military occupation of their buildings provided them with inadequate protection.
Petitioners' claim that they may recover on a bare showing that they were afforded 'inadequate' protection has an additional defect which should be noted. If courts were required to consider whether the military or police protection afforded a particular property owner was 'adequate,' they would be required to make judgments which are best left to officials directly responsible to the electorate. In the present case, for example, petitioners could argue that it was possible for the troops to maintain their position in front of the buildings if they had been willing to kill a large number of rioters. In rebuttal, the Government could persuasively argue that the indiscriminate use of deadly force would have enraged the mob still further and would have increased the likelihood of future disturbances. Which strategy is a court to accept? Clearly, it is far sounder to defer to the other duly constituted branches of government in this regard.
I must emphasize, however, that the test I have advanced should be applied only to gevernment actions taken in an effort to control a riot. The Army could not, for example, appropriate the YMCA today and claim that no payment was due because the building would have been completely demolished if the military had not intervened during the riot. Once tranquility has been restored, property owners may legitimately expect that the Government will not deprive them of the property saved from the mob. But while the rioters are surging through the streets out of control, everyone must recognize that the Government cannot protect all property all of the time. I think it appropriate to say, however, that our decision today does not in any way suggest that the victims of civil disturbances are undeserving of relief. But it is for the Congress, not this Court, to decide the extent to which those injured in the riot should be compensated, regardless of the extent to which the police or military attempted to protect the particular property which each individual owns.
While I agree with the Court that no compensation is constitutionally available under the facts of this case, I have thought it appropriate to state my own views on this matter since the precise meaning of the rules the majority announces remains obscure at certain critical points. Moreover, in deciding this particular case we should spare no effort to search for principles that seem best calculated to fit others that may arise before American democracy once again regains its equilibrium.
The Court sets out two tests to govern the application of the Just Compensation Clause in riot situations. It first denies petitioners' recovery on the ground that each was the 'particular intended beneficiary' of the Governe nt's military operations. Ante, at 92. I do not disagree with this formula if it means that the Fifth Amendment does not apply whenever the policing power reasonably believes that its actions will not increase the risk of riot damage beyond that borne by the owners of unprotected buildings. But the language the Court has chosen leaves a good deal of ambiguity as to its scope. If, for example, the military deliberately destroyed a building so as to prevent rioters from looting its contents and burning it to the ground, it would be difficult indeed to call the building's owner the 'particular intended beneficiary' of the Government's action. Nevertheless, if the military reasonably believed that the rioters would have burned the building anyway, recovery should be denied for the same reasons it is properly denied in the case before us. Cf. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).
Moreover, the Court's formula might be taken to indicate that if the military's subjective intention was to protect the building, the courts need not consider whether this subjective belief was a reasonable one. While the widest leeway must, of course, be given to good-faith military judgment, I am not prepared to subscribe to judicial abnegation to this extent. If a court concludes, upon convincing evidence, that the military had good reason to know that its actions would significantly increase the risk of riot damage to a particular property, compensation should be awarded regardless of governmental good faith.
While I accept the Court's 'intended beneficiary' test with these caveats, I cannot subscribe to the second ground the majority advances to deny recovery in the present case. The majority analogizes this case to one in which the military simply posted a guard in front of petitioners' properties. It is said that if the rioters had damaged the buildings as a part of their attack on the troops standing in front of them, the property damage caused would be too 'indirect' a consequence of the military's action to warrant awarding Fifth Amendment compensation. It follows, says the Court, that even if the military's occupation of the buildings increased the risk of harm far beyond any alternative military strategy, the Army's action is nevertheless too 'indirect' a cause of the resulting damage.
This argument, however, ignores a salient difference between the case the Court hypothesizes and the one which we confront. If the troops had remained on the street, they would not have obtained any special benefit from the use of petitioners' buildings. In contrast, the military did in this instance receive a benefit not enjoyed by members of the general public when the troops were ordered to occupy the YMCA and the Masonic Temple. As the Court's statement of the facts makes clear, the troops retreated into the buildings to protect themselves from sniper fire. Ordinarily, the Government pays for private property used to shelter its officials, and I would see no reason to make an exception here if the military had reason to know that the buildings would have been exposed to a lesser risk of harm if they had been left entirely unprotected.
On the premises set forth in this opinion, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.
The Court says that: 'Shortly after midnight, Colonel Sachse moved his troops inside the three buildings (which included the two buildings for which compensation is here sought) so that the men might be better protected from the sniper fire.' Ante, at 87. The Army selected those two buildings to protect itself while carrying out its mission of safeguarding the entire zone from the rioters. Thus, the Army made the two buildings the particular targets of the rioters and the buildings suffered heavy damage. The Army's action was taken not to save the buildings but to use them as a shelter and fortress from which, as the Court of Claims found, 'tos eal off the border from further incursions by the rioters into the Atlantic portion of the Canal Zone.' 396 F.2d 467, 474, 184 Ct.Cl. 427, 438 (1968). At that time, I think it can hardly be said that these private buildings were taken for the good of the owners. Instead, the taking by the Army was for the benefit of the public generally. I still feel that 'the guiding principle should be this: Whenever the Government determines that one person's property—whatever it may be—is essential to the war effort and appropriates it for the common good, the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss.' United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156, 73 S.Ct. 200, 204, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
Jurisdiction in the Court of Claims was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
For a general discussion of the purposes of the Just Compensation Clause, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
It is significant that at the outset of the rioting Colonel Sachse sent one of his companies—'B' Company—to an area several blocks away from petitioners' buildings. It was only because '(t)he number of rioters in the 'B' Company area was practically none' that 'B' Company was sb sequently sent to the area near petitioners' buildings.


Property division in a divorce case can be a difficult concept for most family court litigants who face the dissolution of their marriage. How is property divided at divorce? Who gets the house? What factors are considered by the court when dividing or assigning property? How does the court deal with property that was fraudulently transferred? Does alimony effect property division? Does the fact that my spouse had an affair effect property division? How are pensions divided? How are other retirement accounts divided? Will the court ever assign separate property to the other spouse? Our attorneys are standing by to answer any questions you have, and we are conveniently located in Boston, Hingham, and New Bedford, MA.
The trial court is empowered by M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34 to assign estates of the parties at the time of divorce, or anytime after the judgment of divorce has been entered by the court assuming the court retained jurisdiction. The courts are charged with dividing property in a fair and equitable manner and these statutes are closely linked with the spousal support and alimony statutes. Our Massachusetts property division attorneys can help give you the edge.
MGL Chapter 208, Section 34 sets forth a number of factors that the court must consider when provided the task of dividing property, as well as other factors that the court may consider. The court must set out specific findings of fact to support its conclusions. These are the same factors that the court considers when ordering alimony. Because the law now prefers to award property as opposed to permanent spousal support, the court considers all the factors for equitable property division along with alimony.
The division of estates of the parties upon divorce is supposed to entail a final assignment of their property, not subject to modification.
During a divorce proceeding, it is essential that a party concentrate on portraying information to the judge that addresses each of the factors listed above. It is important to paint a picture applicable to the goals of that party in the divorce, such as showing evidence that a party enhanced the estate of the other party, for example, or that a spouse has sufficient assets to be received in the divorce sufficient to negate the need for alimony.
What does Equitable Division of Property mean in Massachusetts?
Massachusetts is an “equitable property division” state, which means that the family court judge in each case is required to fairly divide property. This concept is different than other states that are called “community property” states, which has defined rules for what constitutes “marital” property and what constitutes “separate” property. If you live in Hingham, Cohasset, Wellesley, Boston, New Bedford, or anywhere else in Massachusetts and property division is an issue in your case, call us today.
One of the mandatory factors that the court considers in a divorce case when dividing and assigning property is the conduct of the parties during marriage. The conduct of the parties is relevant not only to property division but also to spousal support.
A spouse causing additional liability.
These are just some more common examples of conduct by a spouse during marriage that may have an effect on the division and assignment of property. Of course, the code does not specifically state that the conduct has to relate to finances to be considered; however, it is common that the bad conduct by one party would have had to necessarily negatively affect the parties’ assets to be held against that party upon divorce.
Importantly, the “conduct” considered by the court need not be “bad” at all. The court often considers the good conduct of a spouse when awarding assets in divorce cases. Think of the example where one spouse prudently invests and takes extraordinary efforts to increase the marital property and the other spouse makes no similar contribution.
While M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34 provides the same factors for alimony (spousal support) and property division at divorce or in a separate support action, the attorney’s planning must go far beyond a simple analysis.
The trial court is allowed to order one party to provide part of his or her estate to the other party; the court is allowed to order alimony; and the court is allowed to assign certain property to each spouse; and the court is allowed to order both spousal support and assignments of property. As a result, the court must receive a comprehensive and equitable proposal for the division of property and for the support of the spouse in need.
While spousal support orders are subject to review and modification, property division orders are final and cannot be modified.
Spousal support orders terminate at a date defined in the future based on the length of marriage (so long as the marriage is under 20 years; if the marriage is more than 20 years then spousal support may continue forever).
If a supported spouse remarries, any spousal support order would terminate. As a result, a party may want to consider that if they provide spousal support rather than property, there is a chance the spousal support obligation could terminate prematurely.
Spousal support rights terminate at the death of either party. Property is final and is included in the estate of the deceased.
A parties’ filing of bankruptcy could be an important consideration.
There may be different tax consequences involved. For example, receipt of alimony is taxable income to the recipient and tax-deductible for the person that pays. Property may be divided upon divorce as a “non-taxable” event.
The present value of future earning potential is not a “current asset” that the court will divide in divorce.
The court’s analysis differs with respect to alimony (which focuses on needs and income) and property division (which focuses on financial and non-financial contributions during marriage).
HOW DOES ALIMONY AND PROPERTY ASSIGNMENT RELATE IN DIVORCE CASES?
Many family law divorce litigants wonder how the court will order spousal support in their case and how the court will divide and assign property. They also wonder if these issues are related. The answer is yes. When a court considers the issues of spousal support and assignment of property the analysis overlaps. The court looks at the parties’ income, assets, income derived from those assets, whether the assets were acquired during marriage, among other similar issues.
In fact, the applicable code section for spousal support and for the assignment of property in divorce cases is the same statute, M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34. The trend in Massachusetts for judges in the Probate and Family Court is to focus more on an equitable division of property and less on alimony. Providing property and assets to a spouse might be better for the supported spouse in the long run in many circumstances. In long term marriages of twenty years or more, spousal support is still vibrantly relevant.
The factors for equitable property division and alimony are the same, and include the length of marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each party and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. Also, the present and future needs of minor children are a factor the court must consider.
The important difference between alimony and property division is that alimony is subject to modification when changed circumstances occur, whereas property assignment is final and cannot be changed after judgment is entered.
WHAT HAPPENS IF A SPOUSE IN A DIVORCE CASE DISSIPATES OR INTENTIONALLY DEVALUES PROPERTY?
In divorce cases, it is not an uncommon occurrence for a spouse to fraudulently transfer property in the anticipation of divorce. Many spouses also intentionally fail to ensure assets are kept in the same valuable condition as when the parties were married.
Here is an example. Jack is about to divorce Jill. Before he files a complaint for divorce, he transfers title to his ranch in Rochester, MA to Doug, who agrees to hold the title to the property until Jack’s divorce is final. Jack also transfers certain Apple stocks to Doug’s name to hold until the divorce is final. Jill thereafter finds out about Jack’s transfer to Doug of the ranch and Apple stock. Jill can introduce evidence during the divorce case to show the value of the ranch and Apple stock and ask the court to grant Jill her interest in the monetary value of those assets.
Likewise, in another example, John and Betty are married and Betty lives in the parties’ family residence. During the pending divorce case, Betty fails to fix leaky water pipes, fails to pay the mortgage and property taxes, fails to clean out the pool and hot tub, and fails to insulate the pipes in winter, and so on, causing thousands of dollars in damage. John can introduce evidence at trial showing what the value of the house would have been except for Betty’s failure to take care of the parties’ asset.
In other cases, parties hide assets like fur, jewelry, electronics and so forth. The court may accept evidence as to the existence and value of these assets for purposes of division.
Pursuant to M.G.L.A. c. 208 § 34 and 34A, the probate court is allowed to order the division of property instead or in lieu of all or part of spousal support. This statute is in line with the 2012 reforms concerning permanent spousal support in Massachusetts and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
The probate court judge is allowed to review the financial circumstances of both parties to the divorce case and order that a spouse is to be provided for by his or her property rather than monthly financial support.
If the judge orders real estate to be conveyed or released to the other party, such a judgment operates to vest title in the party entitled to the property when the divorce judgment becomes absolute (i.e. after the “nisi” period has run). This is an important concept to remember. While property division judgments are final, if the court grants alimony those judgments are generally modifiable based on a changed circumstance and may end upon the paying spouse reaching his or her retirement age.
During divorce cases it has been common knowledge among family and divorce lawyers that pensions and other employment benefits, such as stock and stock options or profit sharing plans, are property that is divisible or assignable.
The courts have recognized that the non-employee spouse deserves a share of a pension where there has been a long term marriage and where the non-employee spouse has dedicated time to raising children, especially. Divorce litigants should recognize the general “rule of thumb” that retirement assets that are acquired over the course of marriage are divided equally.
The courts must consider the tax consequences of dividing or assigning a pension interest.
The next step, after the court has determined that a pension should be divided, is to determine and effectuate the method of division. Most often pensions are paid out at a future date. As such, one method is to assign presently a percentage of the present value of the future pension. This is the preferred method but often a difficult task since the pension must be presently valued. The second method is to postpone division until the employee spouse actually receives the pension benefit.
Pensions and most other retirement assets are divided pursuant to a QDRO, which stands for Qualified Domestic Relations Order. This is a document which the judge signs that orders the division of a retirement asset. Most often, the QDRO allows for direct payment of a portion of the account to the non-employee spouse.
DOES THE LENGTH OF MARRIAGE MATTER WHEN THE DIVORCE COURT ASSIGNS PROPERTY?
Many divorce litigants wonder whether the Probate and Family Court (Divorce Court) judge considers the length of marriage when dividing and assigning property in a divorce case. The answer is YES – the judge is bound to consider the length of marriage as one of the mandatory factors the trial court must consider in assigning property under M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34.
The purpose behind the requirement that the divorce judge consider the length of marriage is that marriages are considered a partnership between spouses. Since the length of marriage requirement is one of the first enumerated mandatory factors the divorce court must consider in assigning property, it is widely believed it is therefore one of the most important factors (i.e. that the judge should give more weight to that factor as compared to other factors).
There are many cases that describe the divorce judge’s reasoning for dividing and assigning assets based on the divorcing parties’ length of marriage. Of course, every case is different and thus the court official must look at not only the length of marriage in terms of whether the marriage was short, intermediate in length, or a long term marriage, but also what occurred between the parties during the marriage.
The court in divorce cases has the power to divide and assign the separate property of one spouse. Separate property is property acquired before marriage or by inheritance, gift, bequest or devise.
The court should endeavor to assign separate property to the owner spouse. However, the statute that authorizes the court to assign separate property belonging to one spouse to the other spouse is M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34 and is appropriate in cases where the property assigned is in lieu of or in addition to spousal support.
Inheritance and gift property that is not received is only a mere expectancy and is not property subject to division (more on this issue directly below).
Does a Beneficiary Interest Constitute Marital Property?
In a recently decided case by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Court had to decide if a present value of a discretionary trust could be included in the division of marital property. A “beneficial interest” is the right to receive benefits on assets held or owned by another person. Beneficial interest is often referred to in matters concerning trusts. For example, most beneficial interest arrangements are in the form of trusts, whereby one has a vested interest in the trust’s assets. The beneficiary receives (or may receive in the future) income from the trust’s holdings, but the beneficiary may or may not own the holdings.
In this recent case (Marriage of Pfannenstiehl, No. SJC-12031, Westlaw cite 2016 WL 4131248, Aug. 4, 2016), Curt married Diane in 2000 and during the marriage they had a daughter and son. In 2010, Curt filed for divorce. During the marriage Curt was the primary earner working for his father’s company, several part-time jobs, support from his father, and distributions from a trust account allowing his family to live an upper-middle class life style. Diane worked for 18 years in the army reserves but retired two years before she was able to earn a pension, which resulted from pressure from Curt and his family to stay home to take care of the children. During the marriage Diane worked one day a week as a ultrasound technician.
The trust account in issue was established by Curt’s father in 2004 to benefit Curt’s father’s heirs which were described as “lawful blood decedents” in any degree, allowing it to be an open group. The distribution of the money was made by trustees, Curt’s brother and an attorney who was not a beneficiary. The total value of the trust was $24 million dollars and 11 individuals were beneficiaries, meaning that at the time of the divorce Curt’s “interest” in the trust was $2.25 million.
From 2008 to August 2010, Curt received payouts from the trust in the amount of $800,000. The payouts were not always consistent and often Curt did not receive anything in some months, and in others the trust lost money. The trustees stop paying out money to Curt in September as they believed it too risky to the trust to continue the payouts during the divorce. During the trial the judge awarded 60% of Curt’s “present interest” in the trust to in 24 payments with 3% interest to Diane in the amount of $1.16 Million.
Curt appealed saying the judge abused her discretion by including the trust account in the marital property and the appellate court confirmed. The Supreme Court was required to determine if the interest in the trust was fixed and enforceable. It has been determined in past cases that interests that are “speculative” are not assignable to the marital estate. However the argument that the payouts from the trust created a standard of living that should be taken into consideration. This is not the case here because the trust is open to beneficiaries that qualify. If however, the trust was closed or Curt was the sole beneficiary the court would be able to have more control to consider it marital property for the control that Curt would have on it. Furthermore, Diane cannot force Curt to compel distributions in her favor, when he does not otherwise have a right to compel distributions. Lastly, the only way the trust could be dissolved is by the selling of the stocks that fund the trust, which the trustees had no intention of doing.
For the above stated reasons the trust was considered an expectancy in future acquisitions of capital assets and income in determining what disposition to make of the property that is subject to division and was not considered to part of the marital estate.
AT WHAT POINT IN TIME IS PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE CASE VALUED?
Many litigants going through divorce ask the question, “When are assets in a Massachusetts divorce case valued?” Of course, the court is obligated to assign property to each party during a divorce case. State law throughout the country varies on this issue. Some states assign property to one spouse based on the value as of the date the parties’ separated from each other. Some states value property as of the date the divorce case is filed. In other states, property is valued at the time of trial.
There is no set date of valuation rule in Massachusetts. The court is allowed wide discretion to determine what date assets should be valued based on the specific facts of a case and the assets involved. In many cases, assets may fluctuate significantly between the date of separation and the date of trial. In fact, the Court of Appeals has indicated specifically that M.G.L.A. c. 208, § 34 does not set any hard rule for the date of valuation and the Court prefers to ensure that trial court judges are given discretion to determine a valuation date for property differently for different cases.
The court may even value different assets in one divorce case as of different dates.
When there is a long separation period before a divorce trial, courts have held that it is not error to value an asset at the date of separation because only one spouse contributed to the asset’s increase in value after the date of separation.
How is the Marital Home Divided in Divorce?
Our Boston property division attorneys offer a free, private consultation to discuss divorce, alimony and the division of property as it may relate to your potential case. Call or email us today for a free, initial consultation. We also have an office in New Bedford and Hingham on the South Coast of Massachusetts. Contact us today!
Our firm serves Boston as well as all courts in Bristol County, including the New Bedford, Fall River and Taunton courthouses. We also serve all courts in Plymouth County including the Family and Probate Courthouses in Plymouth, Hingham and Brockton, as well as the Family Courts in Middlesex County and Norfolk County.


This is a collection of links to Texas appellate opinions touching on various aspects of wage garnishment. All links are to Google Scholar. Cases arranged by date. The Texas court system has fourteen Courts of Appeals that review both civil and criminal appeals, except for death penalty cases, a Court of Criminal Appeals that has the final appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, and a Supreme Court which has the final appellate jurisdiction in civil and juvenile cases.
Issue: Constitutional Due Process of pre- judgment garnishment. Not specifically wage garnishment.
Held that funds of the State’s retirement system are “a part of a member’s compensation or wages which are not subject to garnishment,” citing Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1928); Tex. Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 28. Sydnor v. City of Galveston, 15 S.W. 202 (Tex.App.1890), holds that amounts due a physician for professional services for a specific sum per day are not subject to garnishment. Bonus or commissions payable to a salesman at year’s end in addition to his regular salary is exempt as current wages for personal service. J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ). Commissions on the sale of gasoline and oil, payable monthly to a service station operator, were exempt. Alemite Co. of North Texas v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 50 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Civ.App.1932, no writ).
Money owed by Houston Oilers to former player for breach of an employment contract constituted current wages and therefore exempt from garnishment.
Issue: Can the ex-wife in a Texas divorce, who has been awarded a portion of the military retirement pay of her ex-husband as her share of the community property, garnish the United States under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659. Answer: Yes. REVERSED by Texas Supreme Court in United States v. Stelter, 567 SW 2d 797 on grounds of sovereign immunity.
Military retirement pay is not “current wages,” but is property and it is not exempt from garnishment. Case reversed on other grounds. The procedure followed was in violation of due process rights in that it was a prejudgment garnishment; also, it was carried out under an unconstitutional statute.
At the time of this case 42 USC 659 gave consent to suits for “legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments,” but 42 USC 662(c) specifically excluded “community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses” from the meaning of alimony. 42 USC 662(c) has since been repealed.
A New York court ordered Texaco to withhold wages. A Texas court ordered Texaco to not withhold wages. Texaco sought to resolve the conflicting court orders by way of interpleader in federal court. The Federal District Court ruled the New York wage garnishment should prevail. The Texas Court of Appeals decided the federal court judgment should be honored.
We hold that Texaco was entitled to submit the cause to the federal district court, that that court was empowered under the above mentioned statutes to determine the questions involved and that our state court was bound to follow the decision of the federal district court even if the effect would be to allow the garnishment of wages, which our state court could not do because of the prohibition of art. 3836 and art. 4099, V.A.C.S., and art. 16, § 28 Constitution of the State of Texas.
A school district decided it had overpaid its teachers by mistake one year and that it would simply deduct the over-payments from salary the next year. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled this to be improper.
The district contends that since it has a duty to recover public funds paid out under a mistake of fact, it may resort to self-help by deducting the overpayments from current salaries due. We do not agree. By such action the district is treating current salaries as already paid to the extent of the previous overpayments, contrary to the common-law rule that mutual debts do not extinguish each other in the absence of agreement or judicial action.
The teachers could either agree to the repayment or the school district could sue the teachers and prove the claim. But, the school district could not just withhold the money.
A creditor sought to garnish money owed by Santa Fe Energy to debtor, who was not an employee. Debtor provided personal service as a leasing agent and real estate title examiner for Santa Fe Energy’s oil and gas business without being on Santa Fe Energy’s payroll. He was paid $200 per day for his services, plus expenses. He did no work for any business other than Santa Fe Energy. He worked for Santa Fe Energy full time. Santa Fe did not withhold taxes or pay any share of debtor’s Social Security. Although the debtor’s daily activity was self-supervised, he was very specifically directed by Santa Fe Energy to the oil and gas lands they were interested in. The creditor argued that as an independent contractor, and not an employee, the debtor’s payments from Santa Fe Energy were not “wages” exempt from garnishment.
In Prewitt v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ) this Court held that funds of the State’s retirement system are “a part of a member’s compensation or wages which are not subject to garnishment,” citing Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1928); Tex. Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 28. Sydnor v. City of Galveston, 15 S.W. 202 (Tex.App.1890), holds that amounts due a physician for professional services for a specific sum per day are not subject to garnishment. Bonus or commissions payable to a salesman at year’s end in addition to his regular salary is exempt as current wages for personal service. J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1931, no writ). Commissions on the sale of gasoline and oil, payable monthly to a service station operator, were exempt. Alemite Co. of North Texas v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 50 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Civ.App.1932, no writ).
Under the specific facts of this case, the court held that the money owed was for personal services and therefore exempt from a garnishment.
The Texas Turnover and do an attorney’s receivables have the characteristics of ‘wages’ exempt from execution? This is the case to look to for some answers. If garnishment is not an effective method for collecting a judgment from canny uncooperative debtors, like lawyers, Texas has Civil Practice &. Remedies Code § 31.002 (former TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 3827a), the Texas Turnover Statute, which allows courts to assist creditors collect judgments by digging a little deeper.
This is another case where an employer (City of Houston) withheld pay from an employee (a police officer) who owed the city money, along the lines of Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Ind. Sch. Dist.. Like the Benton case, the employer lost.


text:
Can. 1108 §1. Only those marriages are valid which are contracted before the local ordinary, pastor, or a priest or deacon delegated by either of them, who assist, and before two witnesses according to the rules expressed in the following canons and without prejudice to the exceptions mentioned in cann. ⇒ 144, ⇒ 1112, §1, ⇒ 1116, and ⇒ 1127, §§1-2.
Can. 1109 Unless the local ordinary and pastor have been excommunicated, interdicted, or suspended from office or declared such through a sentence or decree, by virtue of their office and within the confines of their territory they assist validly at the marriages not only of their subjects but also of those who are not their subjects provided that one of them is of the Latin rite.
Can. 1110 By virtue of office, a personal ordinary and a personal pastor assist validly only at marriages where at least one of the parties is a subject within the confines of their jurisdiction.
Can. 1111 §1. As long as they hold office validly, the local ordinary and the pastor can delegate to priests and deacons the faculty, even a general one, of assisting at marriages within the limits of their territory.
Can. 1113 Before special delegation is granted, all those things which the law has established to prove free status are to be fulfilled.
Can. 1114 The person assisting at marriage acts illicitly unless the person has made certain of the free status of the contracting parties according to the norm of law and, if possible, of the permission of the pastor whenever the person assists in virtue of general delegation.
Can. 1115 Marriages are to be celebrated in a parish where either of the contracting parties has a domicile, quasidomicile, or month long residence or, if it concerns transients, in the parish where they actually reside. With the permission of the proper ordinary or proper pastor, marriages can be celebrated elsewhere.
2/ outside the danger of death provided that it is prudently foreseen that the situation will continue for a month.
Can. 1117 The form established above must be observed if at least one of the parties contracting marriage was baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it and has not defected from it by a formal act, without prejudice to the prescripts of ⇒ can. 1127, §2.
Can. 1119 Outside the case of necessity, the rites prescribed in the liturgical books approved by the Church or received by legitimate customs are to be observed in the celebration of a marriage.
Can. 1120 The conference of bishops can produce its own rite of marriage, to be reviewed by the Holy See, in keeping with the usages of places and peoples which are adapted to the Christian spirit; nevertheless, the law remains in effect that the person who assists at the marriage is present, asks for the manifestation of consent of the contracting parties, and receives it.
Can. 1121 §1. After a marriage has been celebrated, the pastor of the place of the celebration or the person who takes his place, even if neither assisted at the marriage, is to note as soon as possible in the marriage register the names of the spouses, the person who assisted, and the witnesses, and the place and date of the celebration of the marriage according to the method prescribed by the conference of bishops or the diocesan bishop.
§2. Whenever a marriage is contracted according to the norm of ⇒ can. 1116, a priest or deacon, if he was present at the celebration, or otherwise the witnesses in solidum with the contracting parties are bound to inform as soon as possible the pastor or local ordinary about the marriage entered into.
Can. 1122 §1. The contracted marriage is to be noted also in the baptismal registers in which the baptism of the spouses has been recorded.
Can. 1123 Whenever a marriage is either convalidated in the external forum, declared null, or legitimately dissolved other than by death, the pastor of the place of the celebration of the marriage must be informed so that a notation is properly made in the marriage and baptismal registers.

matches: §1 §1 §1 §2 §1 §2 §1