Marroquin v. F. Monarca Masonry et al.
The claimant did not appear.
The respondents F. Monarca Masonry and Travelers Indemnity Company were represented by Timothy G. Zych, Esq., Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty, Crossroads Corporate Park, 6 Devine Street, North Haven, CT 06473. The respondents MRI Construction and Eastern Casualty Insurance Company were represented by David A. Kelly, Esq., Montstream & May, LLP, 655 Winding Brook Drive, P.O. Box 1087, Glastonbury, CT 06033.
This Petition for Review from the November 26, 2007 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District was heard on August 29, 2008 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Ernie R. Walker and Amado J. Vargas.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the November 26, 2007 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District. We find no error, and affirm the decision of the trial commissioner.
The following factual determinations are pertinent to our review. The claimant was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia as the result of a workplace injury which occurred on June 21, 2001 while the claimant was in the employ of MRI Construction. The claimant was treated surgically for this injury, which procedure involved the insertion of surgical mesh to reinforce the injured area. On September 20, 2004, while working for another employer, the claimant alleged that he sustained a second injury in a lifting incident during which he felt an internal pull and experienced a sudden sharp pain. The claimant reported the incident to his supervisor and thereafter sought medical attention at a local immediate health care center, from which he was referred to the emergency room at St. Vincent’s Hospital.
The claimant was admitted to the hospital and treated non-surgically. On September 23, 2004, he was discharged with a diagnosis of acute diverticulitis and a leftside inguinal mass with a suspected hernia. The claimant was referred to and subsequently presented at the hospital’s surgical clinic for treatment of the left inguinal mass. In a report dated September 30, 2004, the evaluating physician cited the claimant’s history of a hernia repair with mesh and relatively recent episodes of diverticulosis/diverticulitis, and recommended exploratory surgery with possible repair of a left inguinal hernia.
On October 15, 2004, the claimant underwent surgery at the hands of Vincent Donnelly, M.D., a surgeon at St. Vincent’s Medical Center. In his surgical report, Dr. Donnelly indicated that contrary to expectations, “[n]o indirect or direct hernias were appreciated during this exploration.” Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 2, Oct. 15, 2004 Report of Dr. Donnelly. Rather, the doctor discovered the claimant had developed a “marked inflammatory response” from his previous hernia surgery and that a “significant amount” of the mesh used to repair the hernia had “migrated” out of the original surgical site. Id. At trial, Dr. Donnelly would testify that “[w]e just assumed he had a recurrent inguinal hernia based on the physical findings. In fact, [the claimant] was wrong and we were wrong because he didn’t have a hernia at that time at all.” Respondent Eastern Casualty’s Exhibit 6, January 9, 2007 Deposition of Dr. Donnelly, p. 18.
The claimant returned to St. Vincent’s on October 18, 2004 because of an infection, and continued to treat through November and December of 2004 for pain and drainage of the wound site. Dr. Donnelly recommended that the claimant have additional surgery to remove the remaining mesh, but the claimant did not want more surgery at that time. The claimant was seen again in February and May as his symptoms worsened, and finally agreed to the additional surgery, which Dr. Donnelly performed on June 10, 2005. In his operative report, Dr. Donnelly stated that the claimant was suffering from “an infected left inguinal mesh secondary to a perforation of the colon.” Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 4, June 10, 2005 Report of Dr. Donnelly. The doctor opined that the perforation had been caused by the mesh plug which had been inserted during the claimant’s hernia repair surgery in 2001. According to Dr. Donnelly, the perforation had then “caused leakage from the bowel that inflamed the colon and was the reason for the ongoing infection, pain and drainage issues.” Id. Following the June 10, 2005 surgery, the claimant’s wound healed and he recovered with no further complications.
Based on the foregoing factual findings, the trial commissioner concluded “that the Claimant did not sustain a new inguinal hernia as a result of the September 20, 2004 lifting incident.” Findings, ¶ C. The trial commissioner found Dr. Donnelly’s opinion credible as to the cause of the claimant’s delayed healing, which the doctor attributed to “the presence of residual infected mesh which [the doctor] was not able to completely remove at the October, 2004 surgical procedure.” Findings, ¶ I, Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 7. Concluding that “the Claimant’s September 20, 2004 alleged date of injury was not the cause of the Claimant’s subsequent need for the October 15, 2004 and June 10, 2005 surgeries,” Findings, ¶ L, the trial commissioner attributed the claimant’s “fistula, colon infection, and inguinal mass, and subsequent need for hospitalization and surgeries” to the claimant’s hernia surgery of 2001 and, specifically, the insertion of the mesh plug. Findings, ¶ M.
As a result of these findings, the trial commissioner ordered respondent MRI Construction, through its carrier, Eastern Casualty, to reimburse respondent F. Monarca Masonry, through its carrier, Travelers, all sums expended in medical and indemnity benefits stemming from the claimant’s surgeries of October 15, 2004 and June 10, 2005. Respondents MRI Construction and Eastern Casualty (“appellants”) filed a Motion to Correct, which was denied in its entirety, and this appeal followed.
The appellants contend that the trial commissioner erred in concluding that MRI and Eastern Casualty bore responsibility for the claimant’s medical treatment subsequent to the incident of September 20, 2004 “because the undisputed medical evidence in the record demonstrates that the Claimant sustained an aggravation,” Appellants’ Brief, p. 3, which pursuant to Connecticut case law “constitutes a separate and distinct compensable injury.” Id., p. 4. The appellants also argue that the Finding and Award issued on November 26, 2007 “reflects a misinterpretation of Dr. Donnelly’s testimony” regarding the relation between the mesh plug inserted during the claimant’s original surgery of June 2001 and the development of the fistula in the claimant’s colon. Id., p. 10. Having reviewed the evidentiary record in this matter, we do not find either of the appellants’ arguments persuasive.
We begin with the appellants’ assertion that the trial commissioner committed reversible error in failing to find that the claimant sustained an aggravation of his original injury, and therefore a legally cognizable “separate and identifiable” injury. Kelly v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004). In essence, the gravamen of the instant appeal is the tension between § 31-307b C.G.S.,1 which governs recurrent injuries, and § 31-349(a) C.G.S.,2 which determines compensation awards and liability for subsequent injuries which result in a separate and distinct second disability. With regard to the former, liability is generally assessed against the employer at the time of the initial injury; with regard to the latter, liability generally lies with the employer at the time of the second injury. In the instant matter, the trial commissioner has concluded that liability for the claimant’s surgeries of October 2004 and June 2005 and related medical treatment falls on the appellants, who had been responsible for the claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits arising from the initial hernia injury in June 2001.
On appeal, the appellants have placed great emphasis on the portion of Dr. Donnelly’s testimony in which he indicated the claimant’s lifting and stretching prior to the incident of September 2004 “aggravated” the claimant’s condition.3 We do concede that the word “aggravation” has become a term of art within the workers’ compensation lexicon. In Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996), the Appellate Court found in favor of the claimant, who had appealed the trial commissioner’s determination (and this board’s affirmance) that the claimant failed to prove his continued employment as a chemical compounder was an aggravating factor that had caused his preexisting respiratory condition to worsen. In reaching its decision, the court relied on a medical report from Garland Jackson, M.D., which diagnosed the claimant with “industrial bronchitis that ‘is more probably than not a direct result of [his] employment at Beiersdorf, Inc.’ ” and another from Thomas Godar, M.D., stating that “the plaintiff’s ‘workplace exposure was not the cause of his condition but was an aggravating factor on his already existing hyper-reactive airways, upon which was superimposed [the plaintiff’s] 1987 viral infection, inducing clinical asthma.’ ” Id., at 432.
However, this board has “long held that the question of whether an injury is a recurrence or a new injury is a factual determination for the trial commissioner.” Hanzlik v. James Freccia Auto Body, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 2, 5, 1984 CRB-7-94-3 (November 1, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 908 (1996)(per curiam). “The factual issue to be resolved is one of proximate cause. If the claimant’s later symptoms occurred as an inevitable progression of the events set in motion by the earlier injury without any new intervening proximate cause, then the claimant’s condition is a recurrence of the prior compensable injury. If, on the other hand, an intervening event, such as an accidental injury definitely located as to the time and the place, has played a causal role in the claimant’s subsequent incapacity, then a new injury, whether by aggravation of the prior injury or otherwise, has occurred.” Mellor v. Pleasure Valley Mobile Homes, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 270, 271, 1393 CRB-2-92-3 (November 18, 1993) (internal citations omitted). Further, “[w]e are obliged on review to give significant deference to the decisions of trial commissioners on whether or not a particular incident legally amounts to a substantial cause of a physical injury.” Belanger v. J & G Belanger Concrete Construction, 4684 CRB-6-03-6 (July 28, 2004), citing Pothier v. StanleyBostitch/The Bostitch Company, 3411 CRB-3-96-8 (January 21, 1998).
As such, the pertinent inquiry in the instant matter is to discover whether the evidentiary record supports the inference that the claimant’s condition which led to the surgeries of October 2004 and June 2005 represented a “progression” from the initial hernia injury of June 2001 or, rather, whether the workplace incident of September 2004 constituted a “new identifiable work related occurrence,” Colas v. Marriott Food Services, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 88, 939 CRD-7-89-11 (February 26, 1991), which then resulted in the need for the surgeries. In other words, “it is not a mere increase in pain or symptoms that triggers a finding of a new injury or aggravation within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Some finding that subsequent work exposures have contributed to a claimant’s condition must also be present.” Orlando v. Reliable Construction Services et. al., 4791 CRB-8-04-3 (April 6, 2005).
.” Respondent Eastern Casualty’s Exhibit 6, January 9, 2007 Deposition of Dr. Donnelly p. 6. In describing the surgery he performed on October 15, 2004, Dr. Donnelly stated that he “grabbed a piece of mesh and pulled that and some of it came out. We removed quite a bit of mesh at the first operation we did which obviously had been put in at his first operation.” Id., p. 7. When queried under direct examination as to whether the surgery of October 2004 was in the same place as the prior surgical site, Dr. Donnelly replied in the affirmative and stated that he had removed as much mesh as he could, but it had been difficult because “[i]t was all like concrete. It was all scar tissue with mesh impregnated into it.” Id., p. 12. Dr. Donnelly also stated that the mass “looked like it had been there a long time because there was scar tissue surrounding mesh up underneath the old previous groin incision or from the previous hernia.” Id., p. 28.
used what’s called a plug and a patch. It’s a fairly modern way to repair hernia. There’s a mesh tied into a thing that looks like a badminton shuttlecock and you push that into the hernia to keep everything back beyond the fascia, which is the tissue with the hole in it, and then you put a piece of mesh on top of that and sew it in. And I think what we were seeing was the superficial mesh but not the plug that was in. But he had an awful lot of mesh.
Dr. Donnelly testified that the claimant’s colon was stuck to the mesh that had been used in the hernia repair, id., p.10, and commented that he thought the “infection or inflammation of that probably was the inciting factor that caused the acute pain and maybe increased the swelling because infection is one of the cardinal symptoms of infection is swelling.” [sic] Id., pp. 33-34.
Dr. Donnelly also testified that following the procedure of October 15, 2004, he tried to persuade the claimant to have additional exploratory surgery “to try to get the rest of the mesh out because once the mesh is infected, you have to remove it or it will just continue to drain.” Id., p. 7. Unfortunately, the claimant did not choose to follow the doctor’s recommendation, and by the time he presented to Dr. Donnelly on May 18, 2005, his condition had deteriorated to the point where the doctor felt that surgical debridement and mesh removal were warranted. Id., p. 8. The surgery was initially scheduled for early June 2005. However, when the claimant updated Dr. Donnelly regarding his symptoms prior to the surgery, the doctor cancelled the procedure because he realized the claimant had developed a fistula and he did not want to proceed without first ascertaining the precise location of the fistula. Id., p. 9. When Dr. Donnelly did ultimately perform the surgery on June 10, 2005, he removed the remaining mesh, and the claimant healed quickly without further difficulties. Id., p. 11.
. It was noted that some mesh was also found anterior to the internal oblique.
Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 2, October 15, 2004 Report of Dr. Donnelly.
. At this time, attention was placed on the mass which had been adherent to the inguinal region, which was taken down using blunt and sharp dissection. The mesh plug was noted to be visible at this time.” Id. Finally, the report indicates that the “obvious” wound in the claimant’s left groin was the site of a prior hernia repair which had been done at another hospital. Id.
In addition to the foregoing medical reports, the evidentiary record also contains correspondence dated July 15, 2005, from Karla Lee, the adjuster at St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, to Dr. Donnelly in which Ms. Lee queried whether his diagnosis was related to the claimant’s hernia repair of 2001. Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 6. In his answering correspondence of August 18, 2005, Dr. Donnelly replied, “[o]bviously the mesh was placed at the time of the 2001 hernia repair so that is the relationship to the infected mesh.” Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 7. Ms. Lee also asked whether the surgery of October 2004 was directly related to the 2001 surgery and, “[i]f so, how did this come about after four years?” Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 6. Dr. Donnelly answered, “[y]es, because the mesh was placed at the 2001 hernia,” Respondent Travelers’ Exhibit 7, and went on to elaborate that “[t]he mesh is an inflammatory focus in the abdomen or in fact in other areas where it is placed and can become secondarily infected. This is one of the reasons that some people do not want to use mesh in hernia repairs.” Id. Dr. Donnelly also confirmed that the reason the claimant did not heal after the surgery of October 2004 was the continued presence of the surgical mesh. Id.
In summation, we find that the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented supports the trier’s conclusion that the claimant’s need for the surgeries of October 2004 and June 2005 was not causally connected to the workplace incident which occurred in September 2004 but, rather, arose out of complications stemming from the original hernia repair in June 2001. While the appellants are correct in pointing out that Dr. Donnelly did use the word “aggravated” in his testimony, that point is not dispositive of our inquiry. “Whether an expert’s testimony is expressed in terms of a reasonable probability that an event has occurred does not depend upon the semantics of the expert or his use of any particular term or phrase, but rather, is determined by looking at the entire substance of the expert’s testimony.” Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 555 (1987). Given that we find this matter easily distinguishable from Epps in light of the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial commissioner was well within her discretion in formulating her findings relative to the issue of whether the claimant sustained an aggravation of his previous hernia injury. “If there is evidence in the record to support the factual findings of the trial commissioner, the findings will be upheld on appeal. This board may disturb only those findings that are found without evidence, and may also intervene where material facts that are admitted and undisputed have been omitted from the findings.” McMahon v. Emsar, Inc., 5049 CRB-4-06-1 (January 16, 2007) (internal citations omitted).
.” Respondent Eastern Casualty’s Exhibit 6, January 9, 2007 Deposition of Dr. Donnelly, p. 23.
So what we found was a fistula between the colon and the mesh plug. Once we took the colon off of the mesh plug, of course, there was a hole in the colon. Now, our pathologist said that’s a ruptured diverticulum. I don’t know whether it was or not. It could have been just a colon stuck to the mesh plug because we do know that mesh can cause fistulas in the bowel. He did have diverticula above and below that.
While we must admit that Dr. Donnelly’s testimony did become a bit disjointed at this juncture, we conclude that the trial commissioner reasonably inferred, given the balance of the doctor’s testimony, that the doctor started to say that he disagreed with the pathologist’s findings and then continued on in the same sentence to restate the same opinion he had already articulated several times before; namely, the mesh plug from the original hernia repair was responsible for the development of the fistula. Having reviewed the entirety of Dr. Donnelly’s testimony in this portion of the deposition, we find the trial commissioner’s inferences with regard to the relationship between the mesh plug and the claimant’s fistula permissible and are not persuaded by the appellants’ attempts to take Dr. Donnelly’s remarks out of context.
We appreciate that several issues in this matter were not completely resolved by the evidence presented. For instance, Dr. Donnelly could not explain what may have accounted for the “popping” sensation experienced by the claimant at the time of the September 2004 injury.7 Nor could the doctor explain the claimant’s insistence that he did not notice he had a bulge in his groin until after the lifting incident of September 2004;8 rather, the doctor theorized that the claimant had probably had the bulge for some time and simply didn’t realize it.9 In fact, Dr. Donnelly persisted in that explanation, even when pressed by counsel.10 Finally, the doctor’s testimony regarding the genesis of the claimant’s infection was vague and inconclusive, and we affirm the trial commissioner’s decision to disregard the doctor’s testimony on this point.11 However, the fact that these issues were not resolved to the appellants’ satisfaction does not significantly detract from the overall tenor of Dr. Donnelly’s testimony or the thrust of the operative reports in terms of supporting the trial commissioner’s determinations regarding the relationship between the lifting incident of September 20, 2004 and the claimant’s surgeries in October 2004 and June 2005.
As mentioned previously herein, the appellants filed a Motion to Correct, which was denied in its entirety.12 Given that our review of this motion suggests that the appellants were primarily seeking to have the trial commissioner reformulate her findings to comport with the appellants’ contentions that the claimant’s lifting incident of September 2004 resulted in a new injury, separate and distinct from the injury of June 2001, we find no error on the part of the trial commissioner in denying the appellants’ motion. As this board has previously observed, when “a Motion to Correct involves requested factual findings which were disputed by the parties, which involved the credibility of the evidence, or which would not affect the outcome of the case, we would not find any error in the denial of such a Motion to Correct.” Robare v. Robert Baker Companies, 4328 CRB-1-00-12 (January 2, 2002).
Having found no error, the November 26, 2007 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District is hereby affirmed.
Commissioners Ernie R. Walker and Amado J. Vargas concur in this opinion.
3 Q: So is it fair to state that the � this reaching and straining and lifting the cinderblock, that would have hastened the onset of him discovering this condition? Or how would you characterize it?
A: I would think that, yeah.
Q: Did it aggravate his condition, this lifting and stretching?
5 Q:	Okay. Now, with this second hernia in Fairfield, if I understand your testimony, you clearly could perceive and feel the bulge?
A: Oh, I saw that definitely.
Q: You don’t remember the first time, but you definitely remember the second time?
7 Q:	Doctor, what was that pop he heard or felt?
A: I don’t know. As I say, if he had a groin pull or a tearing of the muscle, he could have had it from that. But you have to remember that we actually were in the groin looking for a hernia and he didn’t have one.
8 Q: And I take it that you were reaching to grab these blocks and move them and you felt � you heard something and you felt something?
Q: Okay. And then you went to the restroom and found a bulge?
Q: Was that bulge there before you went to work that morning?
10 Q:	I guess what I’m really getting at is that, though you are certain about the hernia, he did start the day without a bulge and finished the day with this bulge and he did appreciate this popping sensation.
With all the information you have and looking at a chart and whatnot, can you give me a diagnosis of what occurred to him that day?
A: I don’t know. My feeling would be that probably he had the bulge for a period of time and, as he strained, lifted, pulled, whatever he did, he got pain in the groin and, because of that, felt the bulge and the tenderness there �.
Q: I think Mr. Marroquin was pretty clear he didn’t have it in the morning and he had it in the afternoon.
A: How many times do you feel your groin in the morning before you go to work?
11 Q: So you believe that an infection arose as a result of the September 20th incident?
A:	Yes. I can’t really explain how but, yes, I think it must have.


Enclosed please find a copy of the lawsuit our local counsel in your state intends to file against you related to the delinquent account referenced above. If you pay the balance due on this account or make acceptable payment arrangements with our office by April 29, 2009, we will instruct our local counsel not to file the lawsuit against you at this time. Please contact our office by April 29, 2009, to either pay the balance due on this account or make acceptable payment arrangements to stop the lawsuit from being filed against you.
Attached to the letter was 1) a completed summons setting forth the name of the court, the parties to the purported lawsuit, and stating that the defendant had 20 or 30 days to answer, depending on the method of service; 2) a complaint bearing the same caption, setting forth a cause of action for account stated, and 3) an Affidavit of Military Investigation, all documents "identical to those generated for and transmitted for use in actual litigations in New York State courts." The "pre-suit package" also contained a "Notice to Debtor Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," which set forth the disclosures required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
1. In order to prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is a "consumer" under the Act, and that the allegedly violative conduct was used in an attempt to collect a 'debt' within the meaning of the FDCPA.
2. "Debt" is defined as "any obligation ... of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction [that was] ... primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
Portfolio Recovery conceded that the plaintiff was a consumer, and was unable to demonstrate there was a material issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff's debt was a consumer debt. Thus, stated the court, the only remaining issue was whether the defendant's "Pre-Suit Package" violated 1692e(9) and (13), which prohibit false representations regarding legal documents, court actions or legal process.
Under the objective, 'least sophisticated consumer' standard, the Court concludes that [the plaintiff] has met his burden of demonstrating that Defendant has violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9) and (13). The 'least sophisticated consumer' might well conclude that Defendant has initiated a lawsuit to collect the debt, given the form of the Summons and Complaint, the reference to the court and parties, the requirement to respond within 20 or 30 days, and the fact that an attorney from Portfolio's "Litigation Department" had signed the cover letter.
Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff consumer's motion for summary judgment.
 Herzlinger v. Nichter, No. 7:09-CV-00192, 2011 WL 1434609 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011)(quoting Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)("this ['least sophisticated consumer'] standard has been widely adopted by district courts in the Second Circuit").
 Wiener v. Bloomfield, 901 F. Supp. 771, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).


§ 1008.201 Scope of this subpart.
§ 1008.203 The Bureau's establishment of loan originator licensing system.
§ 1008.205 The Bureau's establishment of nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry.
§ 1008.301 Scope of this subpart.
§ 1008.309 Absence of liability for good-faith administration.
§ 1008.401 The Bureau's authority to examine loan originator records.
Source: The provisions of this Part 1008 appear at 76 Fed. Reg. 78487, Dec. 19, 2011, effective December 30, 2011.
(a) Authority. This part, known as Regulation H, is issued by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to implement the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, title V of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (S.A.F.E. Act) (Pub. L. 110--289, 122 Stat. 2654, 12 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.).
(b) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to enhance consumer protection and reduce fraud by directing states to adopt minimum uniform standards for the licensing and registration of residential mortgage loan originators and to participate in a nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry database of residential mortgage loan originators. Under the S.A.F.E. Act, if the Bureau determines that a state's loan origination licensing system does not meet the minimum requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act, the Bureau is charged with establishing and implementing a system for all loan originators in that state. Additionally, if at any time the Bureau determines that the nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry is failing to meet the S.A.F.E. Act's requirements, the Bureau is charged with establishing and maintaining a licensing and registry database for loan originators.
(1) Subpart A establishes the definitions applicable to this part.
(2) Subpart B provides the minimum standards that a state must meet in licensing loan originators, including standards for whom a state must require to be licensed, and sets forth the Bureau's procedure for determining a state's compliance with the minimum standards.
(3) Subpart C provides the requirements that the Bureau will apply in any state that the Bureau determines has not established a licensing and registration system in compliance with the minimum standards of the S.A.F.E. Act.
(4) Subpart D provides minimum requirements for the administration of the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry.
(5) Subpart E clarifies the Bureau's enforcement authority in states in which it operates a state licensing system.
(6) Appendices A through D set forth examples to aid in the understanding and application of the regulations.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, any requirement under Federal or state law regarding the privacy or confidentiality of any information or material provided to the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry or a system established by the Director under this part, and any privilege arising under Federal or state law (including the rules of any Federal or state court) with respect to such information or material, shall continue to apply to such information or material after the information or material has been disclosed to the system. Such information and material may be shared with all state and Federal regulatory officials with mortgage industry oversight authority without the loss of privilege or the loss of confidentiality protections provided by Federal and state laws.
(2) Subpoena or discovery, or admission into evidence, in any private civil action or administrative process, unless with respect to any privilege held by the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry or by the Director with respect to such information or material, the person to whom such information or material pertains, waives, in whole or in part, in the discretion of such person, that privilege.
(c) Any state law, including any state open record law, relating to the disclosure of confidential supervisory information or any information or material described in paragraph (a) of this section that is inconsistent with paragraph (a), shall be superseded by the requirements of such provision to the extent that state law provides less confidentiality or a weaker privilege.
(d) This section shall not apply with respect to the information or material relating to the employment history of, and any publicly adjudicated disciplinary and enforcement action against, any loan originator that is included in the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry for access by the public.
This subpart provides the definitions applicable to this part, and other general requirements applicable to this part.
Terms that are defined in the S.A.F.E. Act and used in this part have the same meaning as in the S.A.F.E. Act, unless otherwise provided in this section.
Administrative or clerical tasks means the receipt, collection, and distribution of information common for the processing or underwriting of a loan in the mortgage industry and communication with a consumer to obtain information necessary for the processing or underwriting of a residential mortgage loan.
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) is the national association of executives and employees of the various states who are charged with the responsibility for administration and regulation of residential mortgage lending, servicing, and brokering, and dedicated to the goals described at www.aarmr.org.
Application means a request, in any form, for an offer (or a response to a solicitation of an offer) of residential mortgage loan terms, and the information about the borrower or prospective borrower that is customary or necessary in a decision on whether to make such an offer.
Bureau means the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
(ii) Offering or negotiating terms of a residential mortgage loan.
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) is the national organization composed of state bank supervisors dedicated to maintaining the state banking system and state regulation of financial services in accordance with the CSBS statement of principles described at www.csbs.org.
Director means the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
(2) Whose compensation for Federal income tax purposes is reported, or required to be reported, on a W-2 form issued by the controlling person.
Farm Credit Administration means the independent Federal agency, authorized by the Farm Credit Act of 1971, that examines and regulates the Farm Credit System. For compensation or gain. See § 1008.103(c)(2)(ii).
Independent contractor means an individual who performs his or her duties other than at the direction of and subject to the supervision and instruction of an individual who is licensed and registered in accordance with § 1008.103(a), or is not required to be licensed, in accordance with § 1008.103(e)(5), (6), or (7).
Loan originator. See § 1008.103.
(2) A registered loan originator.
Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry or NMLSR means the mortgage licensing system developed and maintained by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators for the licensing and registration of loan originators and the registration of registered loan originators or any system established by the Director, as provided in subpart D of this part.
Nontraditional mortgage product means any mortgage product other than a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.
Origination of a residential mortgage loan, for purposes of the definition of loan processor or underwriter, means all residential mortgage loan-related activities from the taking of a residential mortgage loan application through the completion of all required loan closing documents and funding of the residential mortgage loan.
(5) Offering to engage in any activity, or act in any capacity, described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this definition.
Residential mortgage loan means any loan primarily for personal, family, or household use that is secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other equivalent consensual security interest on a dwelling (as defined in section 103(w) of the Truth in Lending Act) or residential real estate upon which is constructed or intended to be constructed a dwelling (as so defined).
State means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
(3) Shall not be used for purposes other than those set forth under the S.A.F.E. Act.
This subpart describes the minimum standards of the S.A.F.E. Act that apply to a state's licensing and registering of loan originators. This subpart also provides the procedures that the Bureau follows to determine that a state does not have in place a system for licensing and registering mortgage loan originators that complies with the minimum standards. Upon making such a determination, the Bureau will impose the requirements and exercise the enforcement authorities described in subparts C and E of this part.
(2) Obtains and maintains a valid loan originator license from the state.
(2) Represents to the public, through advertising or other means of communicating or providing information (including the use of business cards, stationery, brochures, signs, rate lists, or other promotional items), that such individual can or will perform the activities described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(c)(1) An individual "takes a residential mortgage loan application" if the individual receives a residential mortgage loan application for the purpose of facilitating a decision whether to extend an offer of residential mortgage loan terms to a borrower or prospective borrower (or to accept the terms offered by a borrower or prospective borrower in response to a solicitation), whether the application is received directly or indirectly from the borrower or prospective borrower.
(ii) Receives or expects to receive payment of money or anything of value in connection with the activities described in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section or as a result of any residential mortgage loan terms entered into as a result of such activities.
(ii) Obtains and maintains a valid loan originator license from the state.
(2) An individual "engage[s] in residential mortgage loan origination activities as a loan processor or underwriter" if, with respect to a residential mortgage loan application, the individual performs clerical or support duties.
(5) An individual who is lawfully registered with, and maintains a unique identifier through, the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry, and who is an employee of a covered financial institution, as that term is defined in 12 CFR Part 1007.
(6)(i) An individual who is an employee of a Federal, state, or local government agency or housing finance agency and who acts as a loan originator only pursuant to his or her official duties as an employee of the Federal, state, or local government agency or housing finance agency.
(ii) For purposes of this paragraph (e)(6), the term employee has the meaning provided in paragraph (1) of the definition of employee in § 1008.23 and excludes the meaning provided in paragraph (2) of the definition.
(D) Whose activities make it eligible to be a member of the National Council of State Housing Agencies.
(7)(i) An employee of a bona fide nonprofit organization who acts as a loan originator only with respect to his or her work duties to the bona fide nonprofit organization, and who acts as a loan originator only with respect to residential mortgage loans with terms that are favorable to the borrower.
(G) Meets other standards that the state determines are appropriate.
(iv) For residential mortgage loans to have terms that are favorable to the borrower, a state must determine that the terms are consistent with loan origination in a public or charitable context, rather than a commercial context.
(f) A state must require an individual licensed in accordance with paragraphs (a) or (d) of this section to renew the loan originator license no less often than annually.
(ii) At any time preceding such date of application, if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, or money laundering.
(ii) Whether a particular crime is classified as a felony is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which an individual is convicted.
(c) Has demonstrated financial responsibility, character, and general fitness, such as to command the confidence of the community and to warrant a determination that the loan originator will operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently, under reasonable standards established by the individual state.
(3) 2 hours of training on lending standards for the nontraditional mortgage product marketplace.
(e)(1) Achieved a test score of not less than 75 percent correct answers on a written test developed by the NMLSR in accordance with 12 U.S.C. 5105(d).
(2) To satisfy the requirement under paragraph (e)(1) of this section, an individual may take a test three consecutive times, with each retest occurring at least 30 days after the preceding test. If an individual fails three consecutive tests, the individual must wait at least 6 months before taking the test again.
(3) If a formerly state-licensed loan originator fails to maintain a valid license for 5 years or longer, not taking into account any time during which such individual is a registered loan originator, the individual must retake the test and achieve a test score of not less than 75 percent correct answers.
(f) Be covered by either a net worth or surety bond requirement, or pays into a state fund, as required by the state loan originator supervisory authority.
(2) An independent credit report.
(iii) 2 hours of training related to lending standards for the nontraditional mortgage product marketplace.
(b) A state must provide that a state-licensed loan originator may only receive credit for a continuing education course in the year in which the course is taken, and that a state-licensed loan originator may not apply credits for education courses taken in one year to meet the continuing education requirements of subsequent years. A state must provide that an individual may not meet the annual requirements for continuing education by taking an approved course more than one time in the same year or in successive years.
(c) An individual who is an instructor of an approved continuing education course may receive credit for the individual's own annual continuing education requirement at the rate of 2 hours credit for every one hour taught.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, a state must provide that the effective date for requirements it imposes in accordance with §§ 1008.103, 1008.105, and 1008.107 is no later than August 29, 2011.
(b) For an individual who was permitted to perform residential mortgage loan originations under state legislation or regulations enacted or promulgated prior to the state's enactment or promulgation of a licensing system that complies with this subpart, a state may delay the effective date for requirements it imposes in accordance with §§ 1008.103, 1008.105, and 1008.107 to no later than August 29, 2011. For purposes of this paragraph (b), an individual was permitted to perform residential mortgage loan originations only if prior state law required the individual to be licensed, authorized, registered, or otherwise granted a form of affirmative and revocable government permission for individuals as a condition of performing residential mortgage loan originations.
(c) The Bureau may approve a later effective date only upon a state's demonstration that substantial numbers of loan originators (or of a class of loan originators) who require a state license face unusual hardship, through no fault of their own or of the state government, in complying with the standards required by the S.A.F.E. Act and in obtaining state licenses within one year.
(a) General. A state must maintain a loan originator licensing, supervisory, and oversight authority (supervisory authority) that provides effective supervision and enforcement, in accordance with the minimum standards provided in this section and in § 1008.113.
(6) To impose civil money penalties for individuals acting as loan originators, or representing themselves to the public as loan originators, in the state without a valid license or registration.
(c) A supervisory authority must have established processes in place to verify that individuals subject to the requirement described in § 1008.103(a)(1) and (d)(1) are registered with the NMLSR.
(d) The supervisory authority must be required under state law to regularly report violations of such law, as well as enforcement actions and other relevant information, to the NMLSR.
(e) The supervisory authority must have a process in place for challenging information contained in the NMLSR.
(f) The supervisory authority must require a loan originator to ensure that all residential mortgage loans that close as a result of the loan originator engaging in activities described in § 1008.103(b)(1) are included in reports of condition submitted to the NMLSR. Such reports of condition shall be in such form, shall contain such information, and shall be submitted with such frequency and by such dates as the NMLSR may reasonably require.
(4) The supervisory authority must examine or investigate loan originator licensees in a systematic manner based on identified risk factors or on a periodic schedule.
(b) A supervisory authority that is accredited under the Conference of State Bank Supervisors-American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators Mortgage Accreditation Program will be presumed by the Bureau to be compliant with the requirements of this section.
(a) Evidence of compliance. Any time a state enacts legislation that affects its compliance with the S.A.F.E. Act, it must notify the Bureau. Upon request from the Bureau, a state must provide evidence that it is in compliance with the requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act and this part, including citations to applicable state law and regulations; descriptions of processes followed by the state's supervisory authority; and data concerning examination, investigation, and enforcement actions.
(b) Initial determination of noncompliance. If the Bureau makes an initial determination that a state is not in compliance with the S.A.F.E. Act, the Bureau will notify the state and will publish, in the Federal Register, a notice providing the Bureau's initial determination and presenting the opportunity for public comment for a period of no less than 30 days. This public comment period will allow the residents of the state and other interested members of the public to comment on the Bureau's initial determination.
(c) Final determination of noncompliance. In making a final determination of noncompliance, the Bureau will review additional information that may be offered by a state and the comments submitted during the public comment period described in paragraph (b) of this section. If the Bureau makes a final determination that a state does not have in place by law or regulation a system that complies with the minimum requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act, as described in this part, the Bureau will publish that final determination in the Federal Register.
(d) Good-faith effort to comply. If the Bureau makes the final determination described in paragraph (c) of this section, but the Bureau finds that the state is making a good-faith effort to meet the requirements of 12 U.S.C. 5104, 5105, 5107(d), and this subpart, the Bureau may grant the state a period of not more than 24 months to comply with these requirements. If an extension is granted to the state in accordance with this paragraph (d), then the Bureau will provide an additional initial and final determination process before it determines that the state is not in compliance and is subject to subparts C and E of this part.
(2) If an extension had been granted to the state in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, the effective date of the Bureau's subsequent final determination with respect to the state following the expiration of the period of time granted pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.
The S.A.F.E. Act provides the Bureau with "backup authority" to establish a loan originator licensing system for any state that is determined by the Bureau not to be in compliance with the minimum standards of the S.A.F.E. Act. The provisions of this subpart become applicable to individuals in a state as provided in § 1008.115(e). The S.A.F.E. Act also authorizes the Bureau to establish and maintain a nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry if the Bureau determines that the NMLSR is failing to meet the purposes and requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act for a comprehensive licensing, supervisory, and tracking system for loan originators.
If the Bureau determines, in accordance with § 1008.115(e), that a state has not established a licensing and registration system in compliance with the minimum standards of the S.A.F.E. Act, the Bureau shall apply to individuals in that state the minimum standards of the S.A.F.E. Act, as specified in subpart B, which provides the minimum requirements that a state must meet to be in compliance with the S.A.F.E. Act, and as may be further specified in this part.
If the Bureau determines that the NMLSR established by CSBS and AARMR does not meet the minimum requirements of subpart D of this part, the Bureau will establish and maintain a nationwide mortgage licensing system and registry.
(a) Provide uniform license applications and reporting requirements for state-licensed loan originators.
(b) Provide a comprehensive licensing and supervisory database.
(c) Aggregate and improve the flow of information to and between regulators.
(d) Provide increased accountability and tracking of loan originators.
(e) Streamline the licensing process and reduce the regulatory burden.
(f) Enhance consumer protections and support anti-fraud measures.
(g) Provide consumers with easily accessible information, offered at no charge, utilizing electronic media, including the Internet, regarding the employment history of, and publicly adjudicated disciplinary and enforcement actions against, loan originators.
(h) Establish a means by which residential mortgage loan originators would, to the greatest extent possible, be required to act in the best interests of the consumer.
(i) Facilitate responsible behavior in the mortgage marketplace and provide comprehensive training and examination requirements related to mortgage lending.
(j) Facilitate the collection and disbursement of consumer complaints on behalf of state and Federal mortgage regulators.
To the extent that CSBS maintains the NMLSR, CSBS must annually provide to the Bureau, and the Bureau will annually collect and make available to the public, NMLSR financial statements, audited in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) promulgated by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, and other data. These financial statements and other data shall include, but not be limited to, the level and categories of funds received in relation to the NMLSR and how such funds are spent, including the aggregate total of funds paid for system development and improvements, the aggregate total of salaries and bonuses paid, the aggregate total of other administrative costs, and detail on other money spent, including money and interest paid to reimburse system investors or lenders, and a report of each state's activity with respect to the NMLSR, including the number of licensees, the state's financial commitment to the system, and the fees collected by the state through the NMLSR.
(a) To the extent that CSBS, AARMR, or their successors maintain the NMLSR, CSBS, AARMR, and their successors, as applicable, must complete a background check on their employees, contractors, or other persons who have access to loan originators' Social Security Numbers, fingerprints, or any credit reports collected by the system.
CSBS, AARMR, or the Bureau, as applicable, may charge reasonable fees to cover the costs of maintaining and providing access to information from the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry. Fees shall not be charged to consumers for access to such system and registry. If the Bureau determines to charge fees, the fees to be charged shall be issued by notice with the opportunity for comment prior to any fees being charged.
The Bureau or any organization serving as the administrator of the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry or a system established by the Bureau under 12 U.S.C. 5108 and in accordance with subpart C, or any officer or employee of the Bureau or the Bureau's designee, shall not be subject to any civil action or proceeding for monetary damages by reason of the good-faith action or omission of any officer or employee of any such entity, while acting within the scope of office or employment, relating to the collection, furnishing, or dissemination of information concerning persons who are loan originators or are applying for licensing or registration as loan originators.
(2) Summon any loan originator referred to in paragraph (a)(1) of this section or any person having possession, custody, or care of the reports and records relating to such loan originator, to appear before the Bureau at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to an investigation of such loan originator for compliance with the requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act.
(b) Examination authority--(1) In general. If the Bureau establishes a licensing system under 12 U.S.C. 5107 and in accordance with subpart C of this part for any state, the Bureau shall appoint examiners for the purposes of ensuring the appropriate administration of the Bureau's licensing system.
(2) Power to examine. Any examiner appointed under paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall have power, on behalf of the Bureau, to make any examination of any loan originator operating in any state which is subject to a licensing system established by the Bureau under 12 U.S.C. 5107 and in accordance with subpart C of this part, whenever the Bureau determines that an examination of any loan originator is necessary to determine the compliance by the originator with minimum requirements of the S.A.F.E. Act.
(3) Report of examination. Each Bureau examiner appointed under paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall make a full and detailed report to the Bureau of examination of any loan originator examined under this section.
(4) Administration of oaths and affirmations; evidence. In connection with examinations of loan originators operating in any state which is subject to a licensing system established by the Bureau under 12 U.S.C. 5107, and in accordance with subpart C of this part, or with other types of investigations to determine compliance with applicable law and regulations, the Bureau and the examiners appointed by the Bureau may administer oaths and affirmations and examine and take and preserve testimony under oath as to any matter in respect to the affairs of any such loan originator.
(5) Assessments. The cost of conducting any examination of any loan originator operating in any state which is subject to a licensing system established by the Bureau under 12 U.S.C 5107 and in accordance with subpart C of this part shall be assessed by the Bureau against the loan originator to meet the Director's expenses in carrying out such examination.


These General Terms and Conditions shall apply exclusively. They shall be applicable vis-à-vis entrepreneurs (Art. 14 of the German Civil Code, BGB), legal persons under public law or special funds under public law. We shall not acknowledge any different general terms and conditions of our customers unless we consented to their applicability in writing. Our General Terms and Conditions shall also apply if we carry out the delivery with knowledge of deviating general terms and conditions of our customer.
Our offers shall be subject to confirmation.
We shall reserve the right to title and copyright with respect to illustrations and drawings, calculations and other data and documents; they shall not be made available to third parties. This shall especially apply to such data and documents marked as confidential; prior to passing them on to third parties the customer shall obtain our explicit consent.
Documents, such as for example models, brochures, catalogues, pictures, drawings, indications of weights and measurements shall only be approximate unless explicitly declared in writing as binding.
Unless otherwise agreed the prices shall apply ex headquarters Holzmaden, excluding freight, insurance, customs duties, agreed installation, foreign taxes etc., including the respective applicable value added tax.
If a payment is agreed upon or permissible via the SEPA Company Direct Debiting Procedure, it shall be agreed that we have the right to inform our customers as debtors until one day prior to the due date of the collection date and the collection amount (shortening of the period for prenotification).
Unless otherwise agreed the price list valid on the day of the order shall be applicable.
In the case of agreed debit or direct debit authorization debiting shall be effected within 2 days subsequent to invoicing. Payment orders, cheques or bills of exchange shall only be accepted after special agreement and always only on account of performance. The costs for discounting and collection shall be borne by the customer.
Should the customer be in default with at least two instalments regarding partial payments we shall have the right to accelerate the entire claim also if cheques or bills of exchange were accepted. In such case, the papers shall be returned for prompt payment.
Should the customer’s payment not be received at the latest upon expiry of the period set after the delay occurred we shall have the right to withdraw from the contract and to require from the customer a lumpsum in the amount of 10% of the due net invoice amount. The customer shall explicitly be granted proof that no damage or decrease in value or a substantially lower one occurred than the lump sum. Should the proof be successful the claim shall be restricted to the established damage or withdrawn if evidently no damage occurred. The amount of the lumpsum compensation shall especially consider the circumstance that the products purchased are products subject to quick development and price decline. Thus, even short delays result in high damages. Furthermore, in the case of a failed contract, a very high administrative effort is incurred as a result that the contractual goods must regularly be sold as separates and the effort connected hereto for documentation and allocation is very high.
Should after the conclusion of the contract a substantial deterioration or change occur with respect to the financial circumstances of the customer due to which our claim for consideration is jeopardized, or if such situation at the customer was already the case at the time of concluding the contract but only became known afterwards, we can refuse our fulfilment of our performance until the consideration is accomplished. This shall especially apply to cases of unsuccessful compulsory enforcement measures, bill or cheque protests, private insolvency petitions, moratorium attempts, liquidation or similar. In such cases, we can set the customer a term for effecting the consideration or providing security. If the consideration or bail is not effected, we shall have the right to withdraw from the contract.
Our claims can only be offset against recognized or legally valid claims. Counterclaims shall be excluded. The customer shall only be entitled to assert a right of retention if and to the extent that the customer’s claim is based on the same contractual relationship.
Should we have own claims vis-à-vis the customer – irrespective of the legal basis – we shall have a right of retention vis-à-vis this customer until full payment of our claims by the customer.
Supplies and raw materials being available in a correct, timely manner remains reserved, unless we have given a guarantee of successful performance.
The start of the delivery period determined by us requires the timely receipt of all documents and information to be delivered by the customer, as well as the clarification of all details of the contract, especially of all technical issues. Partial deliveries shall be permissible if reasonable for the customer.
We shall not be responsible for delivery delays due to force majeure or other circumstances through no fault of our own, especially traffic and operational disruptions we are not responsible for, strikes, lockouts, shortage of raw materials, or war, if we did not assume any warranty with respect to the successful performance. Should we not be able to deliver within the agreed delivery time, the delivery period shall be prolonged accordingly. Should there be a delivery obstacle exceeding the extended delivery period, we shall have the right to withdraw from the contract.
Should we not be able to comply with the agreed delivery period the customer shall be obliged to declare at our request within an adequate period whether the customer still insists on the delivery. Should the customer not declare itself we shall have the right to withdraw from the contract or to cancel the contract after the expiry of an adequate period.
Unless otherwise specified in the order confirmation, supply “ex headquarters Holzmaden” shall be agreed upon. The dispatch shall always be carried out at the customer’s risk also in the case of delivery from another than the place of performance and also in the case of carriage-free delivery and/or delivery through own personnel or vehicles.
Should delivery through us be agreed in order to guarantee a smooth unloading from the customer, competent personnel and possibly necessary technical equipment (e.g. forklift) shall be provided in time. It is assumed that the vehicle can directly approach the unloading area and be immediately unloaded. Should this not be the case additional costs incurred shall be charged separately.
The customer shall, as far as feasible in compliance with duly business routines, inspect the delivered goods immediately, however at the latest within one week from the day of delivery. Should there be a defect we shall be informed immediately, however at the latest within one week of the day of delivery. Should the customer neglect to notify us, the goods shall be considered as approved unless a defect is concerned that was not recognizable upon inspection. Should such a defect occur later, notification shall be made immediately after discovering the defect; otherwise the goods shall also be considered as approved regardless of the defect. Articles 377 and 381 of the German Commercial Code (HGB) shall remain unaffected. The customer shall also not be discharged from its liability of inspection in the case of recourse of the company in compliance with Art. 478 of the German Civil Code (BGB). Should in such cases the customer not notify the claimed defect immediately the goods shall also be considered as approved regardless of the defect.
In the case of supplementary performance with respect to defects we shall only be liable to bear the necessary costs, especially transport, journey, labour and material costs, as these are not increased by the fact that the items were transferred to another location than the customer’s headquarters or the commercial place of business. This subparagraph shall not apply in the case of recourse in compliance with Art. 478 of the German Civil Code.
The claim for defects by the customer including claims for damages shall be subject to a limitation period of one year from the delivery of the item. This shall not apply in the case of recourse pursuant to Art. 478 of the German Civil Code, and shall also not apply in the cases of Art. 438 Para. 1 Subpara. 2 of the German Civil Code, as well as Art. 634a Para. 1 Subpara. 2 of the German Civil Code. This shall also not apply to claims for damages due to damages to life, body or health or due to a grossly negligent or intentional violation of duty by us or our vicarious agents.
Claims for damages and reimbursement of expenses of the customer (hereinafter referred to as “claims for damages”) irrespective of the legal cause, especially due to the violation of duties arising from the obligatory relation and from tortious acts, shall be excluded.
if we fraudulently concealed a legal or material defect.
if we assumed a warranty for the quality of our goods or a performance success and the warranty case occurred.
with respect to existing claims in compliance with the Product Liability Act.
in cases of intent, gross negligence, damage to life, body or health and in all cases of violation of substantial contractual obligations. The claim for damages for the violation of substantial contractual obligations shall, however, be restricted to the predictable damage typical for the contract unless it is deliberate intention or gross negligence or liability due to damages to life, body or health.
If our liability is excluded or restricted this shall also apply to the personal liability of our workers, employees, colleagues, representatives and vicarious agents.
A change of the burden of proof to the detriment of the customer shall not be connected to the above specified regulations.
We shall not assume liability for the admissibility of the use of the delivered item implied by the contract pursuant to the regulations of the recipient country. We shall also not be liable for taxes and charges payable in that country.
We shall not be liable for delivery obstacles triggered by regulatory actions, especially import or export restrictions.
We shall only be liable vis-à-vis the customer for compensation pursuant to the legal provisions if a violation of the contract is due to an intentional or grossly negligent violation of the contract by us, our representatives or vicarious agents. We shall also be liable pursuant to the legal provisions if we violate a substantial contractual obligation. The aforementioned limitation of liability shall not apply to existing claims in compliance with Art. 1, 4 of the German Product Liability Act or regarding claims due to damages caused by the goods to life or body of persons.
If delivered items are in violation of a contract, the customer shall only have the right to cancel the contract or to replacement if claims for damages vis-à-vis us are excluded or it is unacceptable for the customer to use the goods which are in violation of the contract and claim the remaining damage. In such cases, we shall first be entitled to remove the defect. Should the removal of the defect fail and/or should it result in an unacceptable delay the customer shall at its discretion have the right to declare annulation of the contract or require replacement. The customer shall also have the right to do so if remedying the defect should cause an unacceptable inconvenience or uncertainty about the reimbursement of possible expenses of the customer.
The claims for defects shall become statutebarred within one year from the delivery of the item.
We shall retain title regarding the delivered goods until receipt of all payments arising from the contract. In the case of collection of the claim by us through an agreed direct debiting procedure we shall reserve title regarding the goods until the customer can no longer object to the collection of the claim.
In the case of attachment or other interventions by third parties the customer shall immediately inform us in writing in order to protect our rights (e.g. suit pursuant to Art. 771 of the German Code of Civil Procedure). If the third party is not in the position to reimburse us the judicial and extrajudicial costs of a lawsuit in compliance with Art. 771 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, the customer shall be liable for the loss incurred.
In the case of us collecting the claim via an agreed direct debiting procedure, the customer shall not have the right to resell and use the goods as long as the customer can still object the collection of the claim. Otherwise, especially in the case of the costumer waiving its right of objection regarding the collection of the claim via direct debiting, the customer shall have the right to resell and use the goods within regular business routine; the customer shall, however, transfer all claims arising from the resale vis-à-vis the customer’s buyers or third parties in the amount of the goods subject to retention of title, irrespective of whether the delivered goods are resold without or after further processing. The total invoice amount (including VAT) shall be considered as the value of the goods subject to retention of title. If the resold goods subject to retention of title are in our joint property, the transfer of the claims shall refer to the amount corresponding to our portion of the title. We shall assume the transfer. The customer shall not have the right to other sales of the goods, especially pledging or transfer by way of security.
The customer shall also remain authorized to collect the claim from the resale after the transfer until revocation. Our authorization to collect the claim ourselves shall remain unaffected. We undertake however not to collect the claim and not to revoke the direct debit authorisation of the customer as long as the customer fulfils its payment obligations from the collected receipts, is not in arrears, no insolvency proceedings have been initiated or there is no suspension of payment. Should this, however, be the case we can require that the customer informs us about the transferred claims and their debtor, provides all details necessary for collection, hands over the respective documents and informs its debtor of the assignment.
We shall undertake to release the securities due to us at the customer’s request insofar as the realisable value of our securities exceeds the claims to be secured by more than 10% or the nominal amount by more than 50%; selection of the securities to be released shall be our responsibility.
This Contract shall be subject to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
73271 Holzmaden shall serve as place of performance for all performances from this contract.
Regarding contracts with entrepreneurs, legal persons under public law or special funds under public law and with foreigners without domestic jurisdiction, 73271 Holzmaden shall serve as jurisdiction. However, we shall remain entitled to file a suit at the headquarters of the customer.


§ 18.2-60 Threats of death or bodily injury to a person or . . .
1. Any person who knowingly communicates, in a writing, including an electronically transmitted communication producing a visual or electronic message, a threat to kill or do bodily injury to a person, regarding that person or any member of his family, and the threat places such person in reasonable apprehension of death or bodily injury to himself or his family member, is guilty of a Class 6 felony. However, any person who violates this subsection with the intent to commit an act of terrorism as defined in § 18.2-46.4 is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
2. Any person who communicates a threat, in a writing, including an electronically transmitted communication producing a visual or electronic message, to kill or do bodily harm, (i) on the grounds or premises of any elementary, middle or secondary school property, (ii) at any elementary, middle or secondary school-sponsored event or (iii) on a school bus to any person or persons, regardless of whether the person who is the object of the threat actually receives the threat, and the threat would place the person who is the object of the threat in reasonable apprehension of death or bodily harm, is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
B. Any person who orally makes a threat to any employee of any elementary, middle or secondary school, while on a school bus, on school property or at a school-sponsored activity, to kill or to do bodily injury to such person, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.A prosecution pursuant to this section may be either in the county, city or town in which the communication was made or received.
Code 1950, § 18.1-257; 1960, c. 358; 1973, c. 118; 1975, cc. 14, 15; 1994, c. 265; 1998, cc. 687, 788; 2001, cc. 644, 653; 2002, cc. 588, 623.
If you’re reading this for anything important, you should double-check its accuracy—read § 18.2-60 on the official Code of Virginia website.
. . . jury trial of stalking in violation of Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992). On appeal, he argues that the . . .
. . . do bodily injury" in violation of Code § 18.2-60, John Henry Dowdy, Jr., was convicted by a . . .
. . . Code § 18.2-60.3. . . .
. . . second offense of stalking. He argues that Code § 18.2-60.3 requires proof that he had actual . . .
. . . injury to that person, in violation of Code § 18.2-60(A). Relying analogously on our use of the . . .
. . . communicating a written threat in violation of Code § 18.2-60(A)(1). Specifically, appellant argues . . .
. . . injury" to such person, a violation of Code § 18.2-60(A). On appeal, he complains that the trial . . .
. . . sending a threatening letter, in violation of Code § 18.2-60(A). On appeal, he contends the trial . . .
. . . criminal offense of stalking is described in Code § . . .
. . . intimidated M.S. by "stalking" her. Cf. Code § 18.2-60.3 (stalking statute). It notes that he . . .


The team chosen by the City of Issy-les-Moulineaux to manage and run Le Cube was built around the ART3000 association, set up in 1988 by brothers Florent and Nils Aziosmanoff, joined by Stéphanie Fraysse in 2000 and Hélène Gestin in 2004.
ART3000, a pioneer in the fields of art and emerging technologies in France, has brought together from the outset all kinds of artists, musicians, graphic designers, stage and film directors, visual artists, architects and designers who all share an interest in the influence of emerging technologies on creative practices.
Renowned for its enthusiasm, the ART3000 association soon set up a team of several hundreds of volunteers, and in a few years developed an international network of several thousands of professionals. It organised over 1000 artistic events in France, but also in Tokyo, Boston and Montreal, published the NOV’ART magazine, sold in newsstands for several years, and set up, in partnership with Sun Microsystems, a Creation Workshop dedicated to “3D real-time” technology. This purposeful activity brought recognition from the international artistic community, represented at the time by the international electronic arts association ISAE. In 1998, following ISEA’s international call for projects, ART3000 was chosen to organise ISEA2000 - the International Symposium on Electronic Arts – in Paris, a major symposium for digital creation professionals, with over 30 participating countries.
Over the years, ART3000 fine-tuned its project to create a space entirely dedicated to digital creation, following the example of what was already taking place in Canada, Japan and Germany. The association was then looking for a local authority to support such a project. Few in France were yet to be interested but, in the year 2000, the town of Issy-les-Moulineaux – whose mayor, André Santini, is a key player in the field of emerging technologies – welcomed the opportunity straight away. Le Cube opened its doors in 2001.
Le Cube is an initiative created in 2001 by the city of Issy-les Moulineaux, as the Grand Paris Seine Ouest's centre for digital creation. It is organised and managed by the ART3000 association.
Grand Paris Seine Ouest (GPSO) brings together the 8 towns of Boulogne-Billancourt, Chaville, Issy-les-Moulineaux, Marnes-la-Coquette , Meudon, Sevres Vanves and Ville d'Avray , more than 314 000 inhabitants.
Its role as a pioneering community that has successfully developed by focusing on digital technology is recognised far beyond the borders of France (it is the only French town to have featured three times in the "Top Seven Intelligent Communities" of an American think-tank, and it takes part in numerous European projects). Issy-les-Moulineaux has been labelled a "Living Lab": an innovation laboratory on a human scale.
Le Cube, created in 2001 at the initiative of the city of Issy-les-Moulineaux, is part of Grand Paris Seine Ouest. It is managed and run by the ART3000 association. Le Cube is a member of clusters Cap Digital and Systematic Paris-Region.
Nils Aziosmanoff (Président), Stéphanie Fraysse (Vice-Présidente), Jean-Pierre Alix (Trésorier), Flavien Bazenet, Xavier Boissarie, Carol-Ann Braun, Roland Cahen, Thierry Chevillard, Pierre de la Coste, Magda Danysz, Félicie d’Estienne d’Orves, Diana Filippova, Etienne Krieger, Joël Paubel, Philippe Perennez, Bruno de Sa Moreira, Laurent Sorbier, Sylvie Tissot, Gilles Vercken.


U.S. Supreme Court Opinions > 1951 > HOFFMANv.UNITED STATES.
‘Q. What do you do now, Mr. Hoffman? A. I refuse to answer.
‘Q. Have you been in the same undertaking since the first of the year? A. I don’t understand the question.
‘Q. Have you been doing the same thing you are doing now since the first of the year? A. I refuse to answer.
‘Q. Do you know Mr. William Weisberg? A. I do.
‘Q. How long have you known him? A. Practically twenty years, I guess.
‘Q. When did you last see him? A. I refuse to answer.
‘Q. Have you seen him this week? A. I refuse to answer.
‘Q. Do you know that a subpoena has been issued for Mr. Weisberg? A. I heard about it in Court.
‘Q. Have you talked with him on the telephone this week? A. I refuse to answer.
‘Q. Do you know where Mr. William Weisberg is now? A. I refuse to answer.’ It was stipulated that petitioner declined to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense.
Petitioner’s claim of privilege was challenged by the Government in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which found no real and substantial danger of incrimination to petitioner and ordered him to return to the grand jury and answer. Petitioner stated in open court that he would not obey the order, and on October 5 was adjudged in criminal contempt and sentenced to five months imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 401; Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), 18 U.S.C.A.
‘He assumed when he refused to answer the questions involved before the Grand Jury, that both it and the Court were cognizant of, and took into consideration, the facts on which he based his refusals to answer.
‘He has since been advised, after his commitment, that the Court did not consider any of said facts upon which he relied and, on the contrary, the Court considered only the bare record (of the questions and answers as set out above).
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to strike and affirmed the conviction. 1950, 185 F.2d 617, 620. With respect to the questions regarding Weisberg, the court held unanimously that ‘the relationship between possible admissions in answer to the questions * * * and the proscription of (pertinent federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1501)) would need to be much closer for us to conclude that there was real danger in answering.’ As to the questions concerning petitioner’s business, the court observed that ‘It is now quite apparent that the appellant could have shown beyond question that the danger was not fanciful.’ In the court’s view the data submitted in the supplemental record ‘would rather clearly be adequate to establish circumstantially the likelihood that appellant’s assertion of fear of incrimination was not mere contumacy.’ But the Court of Appeals concluded, again unanimously, that the information offered in support of the petition for reconsideration of bail ‘was not before the court when it found appellant in contempt, and therefore cannot be considered now.’ Thus limited to the record originally filed, the majority of the court was of the opinion, with respect to the business questions, that ‘the witness here failed to give the judge any information which would allow the latter to rule intelligently on the claim of privilege for the witness simply refused to say anything and gave no facts to show why he refused to say anything.’ One judge dissented, concluding that the District Court knew that ‘the setting of the controversy’ was ‘a grand jury investigation of racketeering and federal crime in the vicinity’ and ‘should have adverted to the fact of common knowledge that there exists a class of persons who live by activity prohibited by federal criminal laws and that some of these persons would be summoned as witnesses in this grand jury investigation.’ Petitioner unsuccessfully sought rehearing in the Court of Appeals, urging remand to the District Court to permit reconsideration of the conviction on the basis of data in the supplemental record. We granted certiorari, 1951, 340 U.S. 946, 71 S.Ct. 532.
This is another of five proceedings before this Court during the present Term in each of which the privilege against self-incrimination has been asserted in the course of federal grand-jury investigations.* A number of similar cases have been considered recently by the lower courts. The signal increase in such litigation emphasizes the continuing necessity that prosecutors and courts alike be ‘alert to repress’ any abuses of the investigatory power invoked, bearing in mind that while grand juries ‘may proceed, either upon their own knowledge or upon the examination of witnesses, to imquire * * * whether a crime cognizable by the court has been committed’, Hale v. Henkel, 1906, 201 U.S. 43, 65, 26 S.Ct. 370, 375, 50 L.Ed. 652, yet ‘the most valuable function of the grand jury (has been) not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused,’ id., 201 U.S. at page 59, 26 S.Ct. at page 373, 50 L.Ed. 652. Enforcement officials taking the initiative in grnad-jury proceedings and courts charged with their superintendence should be sensitive to the considerations making for wise exercise of such investigatory power, not only where constitutional issues may be involved but also where the noncoercive assistance of other federal agencies may render it unnecessary to invoke the compulsive process of the grand jury.
The Fifth Amendment declares in part that ‘No person * * * shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself’. This guarantee against testimonial compulsion, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, ‘was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed.’ Feldman v. United States, 1944, 322 U.S. 487, 489, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 1083, 88 L.Ed. 1408. This provision of the Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 1892, 142 U.S. 547, 562, 12 S.Ct. 195, 197, 35 L.Ed. 1110; Arndstein v. McCarthy, 1920, 254 U.S. 71, 72 73, 41 S.Ct. 26, 65 L.Ed. 138.
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime. (Patricia) Blau v. United States, 1950, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223. But this protection must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. Mason v. United States, 1917, 244 U.S. 362, 365, 37 S.Ct. 621, 622, 61 L.Ed. 1198, and cases cited. The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, Rogers v. United States, 1951, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ Temple v. Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 899. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.’ See Taft, J., in Ex parte Irvine, C.C.S.D.Ohio, 1896, 74 F. 954, 960.
Also, the court should have recognized, in considering the Weisberg questions, that one person with a police record summoned to testify before a grand jury investigating the rackets might be hiding or helping to hide another person of questionable repute sought as a witness. To be sure, the Government may inquire of witnesses before the grand jury as to the whereabouts of unlocated witnesses; ordinarily the answers to such questions are harmless if not fruitless. But of the seven questions relating to Weisberg (of which three were answered), three were designed to draw information as to petitioner’s contacts and connection with the fugitive witness; and the final question, perhaps an afterthought of the prosecutor, inquired of Weisberg’s whereabouts at the time. All of them could easily have required answers that would forge links in a chain of facts imperiling petitioner with conviction of a federal crime. The three questions, if answered affirmatively, would establish contacts between petitioner and Weisberg during the crucial period when the latter was eluding the grand jury; and in the context of these inquiries the last question might well have called for disclosure that Weisberg was hiding away on petitioner’s premises or with his assistance. Petitioner could reasonably have sensed the peril of prosecution for federal offenses ranging from obstruction to conspiracy.
In this setting it was not ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer(s) cannot possibly have such tendency’ to incriminate. Temple v. Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 898, cited with approval in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 1892, 142 U.S. 547, 579— 580, 12 S.Ct. 195, 204, 35 L.Ed. 1110. See also, Arndstein v. McCarthy, 1920, 254 U.S. 71, 41 S.Ct. 26, 65 L.Ed. 138.
This conclusion is buttressed by the supplemental record. It showed that petitioner had a twenty-year police record and had been publicly labeled an ‘underworld character and racketeer’; that the Senate Crime Investigating Committee had placed his name on a list of ‘known gangsters’ from the Philadelphia area who had made Miami Beach their headquarter; that Philadelphia police officials had described him as ‘the king of the shore rackets who lives by the gun’; that he had served a sentence on a narcotics charge; and that his previous conviction was dramatized by a picture appearing in the local press while he was waiting to testify, in which petitioner was photographed with the head of the Philadelphia office of the United States Bureau of Narcotics in an accusing pose.
It appears that the petition which comprised the supplemental record, though captioned a ‘Petition for Reconsideration of Allowance of Bail Pending Appeal,’ was by its terms an application to the District Court to vacate the contempt order on constitutional grounds, and alternatively a second motion for bail. Clearly this petition, filed but two weeks after the contempt order, was directed to the power of the committing court to discharge the contemnor for good cause—a power which courts should be solicitous to invoke when important constitutional objections are renewed. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 1921, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647. The ends of justice require discharge of one having such a right whenever facts appear sufficient to sustain the claim of privilege. Accordingly the supplemental record should have been considered by the Court of Appeals.


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agent or otherwise), or in conjunction with, any such organization. For purposes of this question, please include any information relating to any Class V Church or Mission without regard to whether such Church or Mission is required to be listed in your response to question 1. Please include any pending criminal charges (and/or any pending court action including relevant docket number(s) against such entity or individual. Include in the description the investigating agency and any knowledge and/or documents known by you, or in your possession, or known by a Scientology-related organization or in the possession of such an organization regarding the investigation (e.g., what the allegations are and the date the acts were allegedly committed). In addition, please list all positions held by the individual listed in response to this question in any Scientology-related organizations at the present time and at the time the activity in question allegedly occurred.
additional facts you believe would be relevant to allow us to understand the bases of the suit, and the status of the action. The list need not contain litigation in which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a named party.
former member wishing a refund of his or her donations, and who included tort causes of action as a litigation tactic. Such cases were typically dismissed without a trial or settled for a refund of the donations made.
people they perceived as enemies of the Church — means that were completely against Scientology tenets and policy.
investigated and disbanded the GO in the early 1980s, dismissing a large number of GO members from Church staff along with a few GO sympathizers in Church management.
The GO documents and the activities that they revealed, along with a small group of rabid apostates, came to the attention of Boston personal injury attorney Michael Flynn, who concluded that this combination made the Church an easy litigation target in cases which he hoped to position for large monetary settlements.
Church; (2) convince the person to file “cookie-cutter” fraud and emotional distress claims; and (3) commence an action through an inflammatory complaint, relying on documents from the Guardian’s Office to give an air of false credibility to the claims.
FAMCO was merely a front designed to generate money to finance Flynn’s litigation against the Church. A “get rich quick” scheme outlined in one FAMCO document actually promised FAMCO “investors” between $2 and $4 for every $1 invested in FAMCO shares. FAMCO was essentially a franchising scheme through which Flynn solicited co-counsel in various other jurisdictions to join in the Church litigation through a fee-splitting system. Flynn’s plan was “. .
Church. She was a loser in the purge. Flynn provided her to the IRS who used her as a government witness represented by DOJ attorneys in Flynn litigation. Dede Reisdorf was also a GO sympathizer who was removed from her post in 1981 when she tried to block the investigation in the GO.
Scientologists. Unable to comply with the order as Mr. Hubbard was not running the Church or even accessible to anyone in the Church, the Church’s suit was dismissed in April of 1985 as a discovery sanction.
“accorded reverence and respect by Scientologists,” he was not the managing agent of the Church corporations.
Between 1980 and 1986, Flynn was either counsel of record, of counsel or coordinating counsel on 40 virtually identical lawsuits against the Church. Flynn’s plan to incite 1,000 lawsuits never came to fruition, and his plan to break the Church financially, failed. By 1986, only one of Flynn’s cases had gone to trial.
That case, Stifler v. Church of Scientology of Boston and Church of Scientology of California, involved an altercation between Stifler and a Church disseminator in which Stifler claimed injuries.2/ He found his way to Michael Flynn and filed suit, alleging various tortious conduct on the part of the Church and sought $4,250,000 in damages. Flynn took the case to trial and Stifler was awarded the amount of his medical bills ($979) in a judgment against the individual Church member. There was no judgment or damages against either of the Churches.
of the Flynn-related cases, as listed below, were settled if they had not been previously dismissed already. A new era of expansion did begin for Scientology.
those efforts causing the negotiations to break down, as is covered in more detail later.
(MJL), United States District Court Southern District of New York; Peggy Bear v. Church of Scientology of New York et al.; No. 81 Civ. 4688 (MJL) United States District Court Southern District of New York; Phillip Bride v. Church of Scientology of Portland, Church of Scientology Mission of Davis, et al.. No. A 8003-01189, Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, Multnomah County; Eileen Brown for Kevin Brown v. Delphian Fdn., et al. No. 81-435 (FBL); United States District Court of New Jersey transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on July 28, 1982; Tonja C. Burden v. Church of Scientology of California, et al., No.
80-501-Civ-T-K, U.S. District Court for Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. Gabriel and Margaret Cazares v. Church of Scientology. No. 82-886-Civ-T-15 United States District Court Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division; Gabriel and Margaret Cazares v. Church of Scientology of California, et al. 81- 3472-CA-OI, Circuit Court Seventh Judicial Circuit Volusia County; John G. Clark, Jr. v. L. Ron Hubbard No. 85-356-MCN, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; Bent Corydon and Mary Corydon, Mark Lutovsky, Phil Black, Mark Chacon, Church of Sciologos v. Church of Scientology Mission of Riverside, et al., No. 154129, Superior Court of the State of California County of Riverside; Paulette Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc., et al., No. 81 681 MC United States District Court, District of Massachusetts; Michael J. Flynn, Lucy Garritano, Steven Garritano, James Gervais and Peter Graves v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc., (counter-claim), No. 40906 Superior Court Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Michael J.
Artists International, No. C 312 329, Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles; Janet Troy v. Church of Scientology of Boston and Church of Scientology of California, No. 41073, Superior Court Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Kim L. Vashel v. Church of Scientology of Boston and Church of Scientology of California, No. 47237, Superior Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Margery Wakefield v. Church of Scientology of California, No.
82-1313 Civ-T-10 United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida Tampa Division. Bent Corydon v. Church of Scientology International, et al., No. C 694401, Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles.
information, witnesses, tactics and sometimes acted as coordinating counsel for other attorneys involved in similar litigation against the Church. In other instances, while there was no apparent direct link between Flynn and a particular plaintiff or attorney in a suit, the similarity of claims and tactics suggests that these individuals or attorneys were copying Flynn’s strategy. The following cases fall into this category: Alberto Montoya v. L. Ron Hubbard, Church of Scientology, et al., No. 450094, Superior Court of California, County of San Diego; Joan Edin v. Church of Scientology Mission of Davis, et al., No. 287191, Rita Engelhardt B. v. Church of Scientology, et al., No. C 312 692, Superior Court of California, for the County of Los Angeles. Each of those cases was dismissed.
California, No. C-332-027, in State Court in Los Angeles in 1980, represented by attorney Charles O’Reilly, a participant in the original FAMCO planning meetings.
District of Missouri (defendants plead guilty).
the economic advantage of Mayo’s organization and other related splinter groups. This litigation consists of the consolidated cases, including counter-claims, of Religious Technology Center, et al. v. Scott, et al., U.S. District Court (C.D. Dal. 1988), No. CV 85-711 JMI (Bx) and Religious Technology Center, et al. v.
Wollersheim, et al., U.S. District Court (C.D. Cal. 1985) No. CV 85-7197 JMI (Bx).
psychiatrist Sarge Gerbode. In 1986, Gerbode formed a trust known as the “Friends of the First Amendment.” The IRS granted exempt status to this anti-Scientology fundraising entity, and Gerbode has funnelled in excess of $1.4 million dollars to fund Mayo’s litigation through that trust as charitable tax deductions for himself.
testimony, she first got in trouble when she sought to place an ex-GO criminal in RTC’s personnel department. Vicki and her husband then left the Church after Vicki’s removal.
Upon his termination, a billing dispute erupted between Yanny and the Church, and Yanny enlisted the aid of the Aznarans in supporting him in his billing dispute and, in exchange, acted as de facto counsel for the Aznarans in helping them prepare and file a lawsuit against his former clients. The Aznaran suit, Aznaran v. Church of Scientology of California, et al., U.S. District Court (C.D. Cal. 1988), No. CV 88-1786 JMI, was filed on April 1, 1988.
$70,000,000 in damages and is still pending.
Aznarans urging that the tapes of the interview be furnished to Lipkin and LA IRS CID.
and was the subject of a Congressional investigation).
subversion and acting as a referral service for deprogrammers on a fee sharing arrangement. Although complaints have been made to the IRS about CAN’s continued exempt status in light of its true activities, no action has been taken.
manipulates them to attack the Church either through the media or by referring them to an anti-Scientology attorney.
Superior Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia (pending); Mark Lewandowski v. Church of Scientology of Michigan, et al., No.
California for the County of Los Angeles (settled); Irene Zaferes v. Church of Scientology, Superior Court of the State of California County of Los Angeles (dismissed); Jo Ann Scrivano v. Church of Scientology of New York, et al., No. 87-1277, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk (in discovery stage); Marissa Alimata and Richard Wolfson v. Church of Scientology of California, etc., et al., No. C 650 988, Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles (judgment entered for the Church).
(dismissed in favor of the Church); Mario Metellus v. Church of Scientology of New York, Linda Barragan, No. 01133-89, Superior Court of the State of New York, County of New York (settled).
the GO’s crimes and harrassment, put an end to GO misconduct, and rid Scientology of the criminals who were responsible for the GO’s terrible legacy. In that regard, the unsettling truth is that what can correctly be characterised as the GO’s last operation, was the litigation campaign the GO criminals, Flynn and his confederates and their IRS allies launched against the people and organizations which put an end to the GO.

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