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Before I get too far into this discussion, there are some important things I want to emphasize. First, the First Amendment was put into place as a protection to the people…not as a means to subvert other laws. In other words, although someone is protected under one law, doesn’t mean they are exempt from negligence or harm they cause (or could potentially cause). Way too many people use the first amendment as a shield – if you act within the scope of your protected “rights”, but cause harm to someone else, or infringe upon their rights or personal freedoms, you are accountable and can face civil and criminal charges for your intentions, perceived intentions, and/or your negligence – and, your ignorance in that respect does not guarantee your innocence.
It is also important to understand that the laws in the United States are not black and white in many cases. Much of our laws (and accountability to those laws) is based upon interpretations made by the courts – or, case law. In short this means that judges often refer to previously decided cases to ensure both judicial economy and continuity.
During my discussion on the First Amendment, I will cover some of the important case law as well – this will hopefully help explain things a bit more thoroughly.
The other part, concerning “the free exercise” of religion is not so absolute. The Supreme Court ruled in Reynolds v. United States (1879) that “...laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” This case revolved around the issue of polygamy…a religious practice which goes against federal law…the court upheld the criminal charges being contested by the defendant in the case – a similar opinion was offered in the case of Davis v. Beason (1890). The court reasoned that allowing religious practices that broke federal laws would set a precedent that would open the door to other practices such as human sacrifice and other extremes.
*It is important to note that in the case of animal sacrifices for religious purposes, the Supreme Court has upheld those rights using the First Amendment as a means of protection – see cases: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) and Jose Merced, President Templo Yoruba Omo Orisha Texas, Inc., v. City of Euless (2009) – with Justice Anthony Kennedy stating in the decision, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection”.
There are many other issues related to religion – such as religion in schools, religion at work, prayer in school, the pledge of allegiance, and so forth…I am only going to discuss the basic protections of the First Amendment in this post.
The next part of the First Amendment reads “…or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press…” This is probably one of the most misunderstood protections of the First Amendment.
Quite often, people with the most derogatory and defamatory things to say, use the First Amendment as a shield against liability on their part. Even though, we, as Americans, are free to voice our opinions, we do not have blanket approval to cause harm to others, nor do we have blanket approval to use our voice to spread false statements or rumors without consequence. We may be free to speak our mind, but if in so doing we infringe upon others freedoms and protections – even without intention, which is known as negligence – we remain accountable both civilly and criminally depending on the harm caused. In other words, I am free to publish a story about someone, or a business, and, I am free to say whatever I want to say in that regard; however, if, as a result of my words, that person (or, those people), or that business suffers harm, directly, or indirectly, I may be liable for damages, or even criminal charges.
To simply things more, the Courts have laid out some exclusions to free speech: Defamation, invasion of privacy, obscenity, copyright (or trademark) violations, inciting riots, inciting others to break the law, threats, inciting violence, endangering national security, false advertising, and, in certain cases, speech that causes obstruction or disrupts others lawful activities.
Here are some cases which better exemplify the scope of this protection under the law: Debs v. United States (1919) – Eugene V. Debs was an American labor and political leader and Socialist Party of America candidate for the American Presidency. On June 16, 1918 he made an anti-war speech in Canton, Ohio, protesting US involvement in World War I. He was arrested under the Espionage Act of 1917 and convicted – he sentenced to serve ten years in prison and to be disenfranchised for life. The case against him was based on a document entitled Anti-War Proclamation and Program, which showed that his original intent was to openly protest the war. The argument of the Federal Government was that he was attempting to arouse mutiny and treason by preventing the drafting of soldiers into the United States Army. This type of speech was outlawed in the United States with the Espionage Act of 1917.
The New York Times v. Sullivan (1964): In order to protect “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues, the Supreme Court held that no public official may recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice‘ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” The Court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that critics of official conduct have the “fair equivalent” to the immunity protection given to a public official when he is sued for defamatory speech uttered in the course of his duties.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974): The Court applied the rule in the New York Times case to public figures, finding that persons who have special prominence in society by virtue of their fame or notoriety, even if they are not public officials, must prove “actual malice” when alleging libel. Gertz was a prominent lawyer who alleged that a leaflet defamed him.
FCC V. Pacifica Foundation (1978): In a case that considered the First Amendment protections extended to a radio station’s daytime broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s “Seven Filthy Words” monologue, the Supreme Court held that Section 326 of the Communications Act, which prohibits the FCC from censoring broadcasts over radio or television, does not limit the FCC’s authority to sanction radio or television stations broadcasting material that is obscene, indecent, or profane. Though the censorship ban under Section 326 precludes editing proposed broadcasts in advance, the ban does not deny the FCC the power to review the content of completed broadcasts. In its decision, the Court concluded that broadcast materials have limited First Amendment protection because of the uniquely pervasive presence that radio and television occupy in the lives of people, and the unique ability of children to access radio and television broadcasts.
American Library Association v. U.S. Department of Justice and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997): In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26, 1997, declared unconstitutional a federal law making it a crime to send or display indecent material on line in a way available to minors. The decision in the consolidated cases completed a successful challenge to the so-called Communications Decency Act by the Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition, in which the American Library Association and the Freedom to Read Foundation played leading roles. The Court held that speech on the Internet is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection, similar to the protection the Court gives to books and newspapers.
I will move on to the Freedom of the Press. As most of you are aware, the media has evolved into more of an entertainment venue, rather than an actual journalistic press corp. Much of the mainstream media provides stories that are misleading, inciting, and in some cases completely fabricated. For the most part, the media remains protected by the First Amendment, since courts generally look for “intent” or actual “malice” – which is very difficult to prove.
As an example, you can look at the popular case of Hustler v. Falwell (1988). In this case, Hustler (an adult magazine) published a story about a prominent minister…I won’t detail the published article, but Falwell sued for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress – the court ruled in favor of Falwell, but the appeal resulted in a reversal of that decision, stating that Falwell failed to prove that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice.” The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state’s interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.
Another important case to consider is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990). I won’t get into all the details, but I will summarize the court’s decisions for you. First, the court declined to even hear the case twice before finally accepting it in an effort to “clarify once and for all the extent to which opinions could be expressed without fear of being held libelous“. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that a separate opinion privilege existed against libel. After recounting the case history and the court’s recent rulings in libel cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that the statement from [a previous case, Gertz v. Robert Welch] was not “intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion'” since “expressions of ‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.” The published material in question strongly suggested that Milkovich perjured himself and was not couched hyperbolically, figuratively or in any other way that would mean the writer didn’t seriously mean it. And since that statement could easily be found true or false by comparing Milkovich’s statements at the initial hearing with his court testimony (which the column did not do), it was moot whether it was intended as opinion or not since it asserted a matter of objective fact. “The connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false,” the Court concluded.
I found this article on loc.gov.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the United States Congress from enacting legislation that would abridge the right of the people to assemble peaceably, and the Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applicable to state governments.
After reviewing all the case law, and opinions provided by the various courts, I find it hard to believe that organizations such as ANTIFA are still seeking protection under the First Amendment…well, I actually don’t find it hard to believe, since I consider that particular group a terrorist organization. I won’t glorify them further by detailing their cowardly rituals and violent uprisings.
The last part of the First Amendment states “…petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” I don’t think this requires much explanation, but it basically protects our right to make complaints to, or seek assistance from the government without being punished.
Thank you for stopping by. You can listen to my podcast on both Podbean and BlogTalkRadio.

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not-wrítere, es; m. One who writes notes :-- Notwrítera notariorum, Wrt. Voc. ii. 59, 66. v. notere.
Numantie, Numentie, Numentíne, Numentínas; pl. The Numantians :-- Se consul fór on Numentíne, Ispania folc, Ors. 5, 2; Swt. 218, 29. Numentie áhnescaden, 5, 3; Swt. 222, 15. On Numantie, 220, 22. Numantia duguþ, 222, 8. Numentia fæsten, 5, 2; Swt. 218, 32. On Numantium, 5, 3; Swt. 220, 19. On Numentínas, Ispania þeóde, 5, 2; Swt. 218, 13.
Numentisc; adj. Of Numantia :-- Se wæs Numentisc, Ors. 5, 3; Swt. 222, 14.
nume-stán, es; m. A pebble :-- Cealc, numestán calculus, Wrt. Voc. ii. 13, 6.
Numeðe; pl. The Numidians :-- Numeðe, Ors. 4, 10; Swt. 200, 9. Numeðia cyning Numidarum rex, 5, 7; Swt. 228, 6.
numol; adj. Able to take or contain much :-- Numol capax, Ælfc. Gr. 9, 60; Som. 13, 41. Numul, gripul capax, qui multum capit, Wrt. Voc. ii. 128, 29. v. scearp-, teart-numol.
nunn-híréd, es ; m. A nunnery :-- Ðe æ-acute;r ðes nunhírédes wes, Chart. Th. 232, 6.
nunn-, nunnan-mynster, es ; n. A nunnery :-- Ðæt nunmynster (monasterium virginum) ðæt mon nemneþ Coludesburhg, Bd. 4, 25; S. 599, 19 : 5. 3; S. 615, 41. In tó nunnanmynstre, Chart. Th. 231, 35. [Cf. Icel. nunnu-klaustr a nunnery.] v. neáh-nunnan-mynster.
nunn-scrúd, es; n. The habit of a nun :-- Finde Æþelflæd án hyre nunscrúde, lóce hwæt hió betsð mæ-acute;ge, Chart. Th. 538, 12.
nýd, nýhst. v. níd, níhst.
nyhtness, e; f. Abundance :-- Of nyhtnisse ex abundantia, Mt. Kmbl. Rush. 12, 34. v. ge-nyhtsum.
nyllan = ne willan :-- Nylle ic út wítan, Met. 24, 52. Ic nelle nolo, ðú nelt non vis, hé nele non vult, wé nellaþ nolumus ... nelle ðu noli, nelle gé nolite, . . . nellan nolle, Ælfc. Gr. 32; Som. 36, 16-19. Ðú nelt, Exon. Th. 250, 12; Jul. 126. Nyle hé, Ps. Th. 74, 8. Nán eówer nele nemo vestrum vult, Coll. Monast. Th. 28, 1. Nellaþ nolunt, 29, 3. Nyllaþ, Past. 5; Swt. 45, 18. Nolde, Jn. Skt. 7, 1. Nalde, Ps. Surt. 35, 4. Noldon, Mt. Kmbl. 22, 3. Gif ðæt wíf nele si noluerit mulier, Gen. 24, 5. Sam wé willan, sam wé nyllan, Bt. 35, 12; Fox 154, 7. Nyllan gé nolite, Ps. Th. 61, 11. Nellaþ, 61, 10. Bútan nellendes andsware, R. Ben. 20, 19.
nymne, nymþe, nýr, nyrwan, nyrwian, nyrwet, nyt. v. nefne, nimþe, neáh (adv.), nirwan, nirwet, nett, nytt.
nytan = ne witan :-- Ic nát nescio, Jn. Skt. 9, 25. Nát ic hwile wundorlíc þing, Shrn. 36, 18. Gif ðú nást if you do not know, Ælfc. Gr. 50, 17; Som. 51, 34. Gyt nyton hwæt gyt biddaþ, Mk. Skt. 10, 38. Wé witon ðæt God spæc wið Moyses; nyte wé hwanon ðes is, Jn. Skt. 9, 29. Wé nyton (nutu wé, Lind. : niton wé, Rush.), Mt. Kmbl. 21, 27. Gé neton, Exon. Th. 282, 9; Jul. 660. Ic wiste ðæt ðú út áfaren wæ-acute;re, ac ic nyste hú feor, Bt. 5, 1; Fox 8, 33. Ðæt ðæt ic æ-acute;r sæ-acute;de ðæt ic nyste (Cott. MS. nesse) ... Ðú sæ-acute;dest ðæt ðú nystest (Cott. MS. nesse), 34, 12; Fox 154, 12-13. Ðú nysstest (Cott. MS. nesse) . . . ic nyste (Cott. MS. nysse), 35, 2; Fox 156, 33-34. Ðú nestest, 5, 3; Fox 12, 34. Hé nyste, Past. 15; Swt. 91, 13. Hí nysðon (nyston, MS. A.), Mt. Kmbl. 24, 39, Wé neston, Blickl. Homl. 17, 12. Wénst ðú ðæt ic nyte, Bt. 5, 3; Fox 12, 17. Ðæt hé nán ryht andwyrde nyte, 35, 1; Fox 156, 8. Nyte ðín wynstre hwæt dó ðín swýðre, Mt. Kmbl. 6, 3. Nytende, Lchdm. i. 164, 5, Him nytendum, 228, 1. Nytendum weardmannum clam custodibus, Ælfc. Gr. 47; Som. 47, 58. v. nát-.
nyten; adj. Ignorant :-- Ðæt ðás nytenan menn ðíne mihta oncnáwon, Homl. Th. i. 62, 14. v. nytenness.
nytenness, e; f. I. ignorance :-- Hwæt getácnaþ seó midniht bútan seó deópe nytennys, Homl. Th. ii. 568, 5. Ðæt men for nytennysse misfaran ne sceolon, 314. 5. Ðú cniht ne cúðest manna Hæ-acute;lend ... Nú ic for ðínre nytennysse geornlíce bæd, i. 66, 30. Se ðe tódræ-acute;fde ealle nytennysse ðære ealdan nihte, 36, 29. Crist mæg ðíne nytennysse (MSS. C. V. nyte-) onlíhtan, Homl. Skt. 5, 200. Gif folces man syngaþ þurh nytenysse per ignorantiam, Lev. 4, 27. Ðæt hyra nán þurh nytennesse hine beládian ne mæ-acute;ge, R. Ben. 127, 10. II. laziness, disgrace, ignominy :-- Netenes ðam se ðe forlét ignominia ei qui deserit, Kent. Gl. 454. On his netenesse in ignominia sua, 615. For módes mínes nytenysse propter mentis meae ignaviam, Coll. Monast. Th. 25, 7.
nyt-líc; adj. Useful, profitable, beneficial :-- Æ-acute;ghwæðer (the male and female pennyroyal) ys nytlíc (MS. H. netlíc) . . . and hí on him habbaþ wundorlíce mihte, Lchdm. i. 204, 11. Móna se feórþæ wercu onginnan nytlíc ys the fourth day of the moon is advantageous for beginning works, iii. 184, 28. Mæ-acute;den (a girl born on the eighth day of the moon) is nytlíce, 188, 6. Is eallum mannum nytlíc, ðæt hié heora fulwihthádas wel gehealdan, Blickl. Homl. 109, 26. Ic ne gýmde ðara nytlícra geþeahta mínra freónda utilia consilia spreveram amicorum, Nar. 6, 26. Monig nytlíco þing multa utilia, Bd. 5, 20; S. 642, 19. [O. H. Ger. nuz-líh utilis.] v. un-nytlíc.
nytlícness, e; f. Usefulness, utility, useful property :-- Ic bidde ðé vica pervica manegum nytlícnyssum tó hæbenne te precor vica pervica multis utilitatibus habenda, Lchdm. i. 314, 8.

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[ Footnote * ] Page I Together with Finazzo et al. v. Norris, also on certiorari to the same court.
Respondent Norris was terminated from his job as an aircraft mechanic by petitioner Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (HAL), after refusing to sign a maintenance record, as required by his collective bargaining agreement (CBA), for a plane he considered unsafe, and reporting his concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration. In separate state court suits against HAL and its officers, also petitioners, he alleged, inter alia, that he had been wrongfully discharged in violation of the public policy expressed in the Federal Aviation Act and implementing regulations and in violation of Hawaii's Whistleblower Protection Act. The court dismissed these tort claims as preempted by the Railway Labor Act's (RLA's) mandatory arbitral mechanism for so-called "minor" disputes, which grow "out of grievances or out of the interpretation and application of agreements concerning [pay rates], rules, or working conditions," 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i). The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 153 First (i)'s plain language does not support preemption of disputes independent of a labor agreement, and interpreting the opinion in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 299 , to limit RLA preemption to disputes involving contractually defined rights. The court rejected petitioners' argument that the claims were preempted because resort to the CBA was necessary to determine whether Norris was discharged for insubordination, pointing to Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 , in which this Page II Court held that the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), preempts state law only if a state law claim is dependent on the interpretation of a CBA, and that purely factual questions about an employee's conduct and the employer's conduct and motives do not require interpreting such an agreement's terms.
The RLA does not preempt Norris' state law causes of action. Pp. 5-21.
(a) The minor disputes contemplated by the RLA are those that are grounded in a CBA. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp., 491 U.S., at 305 . The RLA preemption standard for resolving such disputes that has emerged from the relevant cases, see e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 , is that a state law cause of action is not preempted if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the CBA. This standard is virtually identical to the preemption standard employed in cases involving 301 of the LMRA. Given the convergence of the two standards, Lingle provides an appropriate framework for addressing RLA preemption, and its standard - that the existence of a potential CBA-based remedy does not deprive an employee of independent remedies available under state law - is adopted to resolve such claims. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 ; Consolidated Rail Corp., 491 U.S., at 302 , distinguished. Pp. 5-20.
(b) Under Lingle, Norris' state law claims are independent of the CBA. Petitioners' argument that resort to the CBA is necessary to determine whether Norris was discharged for cause is foreclosed by Lingle's teaching that the issue whether an employer's actions make out the element of discharge under state law is a purely factual question. Similarly, Norris' failure to sign the maintenance record is not relevant to the determination of his state law tort claims. Pp. 20-21.
74 Haw. 648, 847 P.2d 263 (first case), and 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634 (second case), affirmed.
Respondent Grant Norris is an aircraft mechanic licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). His aircraft mechanic's license authorizes him to approve an airplane and return it to service after he has made, supervised, or inspected certain repairs performed on that plane. See Certification: Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 14 CFR 65.85 and 65.87 (1987). If he were to approve any aircraft on which the repairs did not conform to FAA safety regulations, the FAA could suspend or revoke his license. See Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding and Alteration, 14 CFR 43.12 (1992).
Respondent then invoked the grievance procedure outlined in the CBA, and a "Step 1" grievance hearing was held on July 31, 1987. Petitioner HAL accused respondent of insubordination, claiming that his refusal to sign the record violated the CBA's provision that an aircraft mechanic "may be required to sign work records in connection with the work he performs." Respondent relied on the CBA's guarantees that an employee may not be discharged without just cause and may not be disciplined for refusing to perform work that is in violation of health or safety laws. The hearing officer terminated respondent for insubordination.
Still conforming to the CBA procedures, respondent appealed his termination, seeking a "Step 3" grievance hearing. Before this hearing took place, HAL offered to reduce respondent's punishment to suspension without pay, but warned him that "any further instance of failure to perform [his] duties in a responsible manner" could result in discharge. Respondent did not respond to this offer, nor, apparently, did he take further steps to pursue his grievance through the CBA procedures.
On December 18, 1987, respondent filed suit against HAL in Hawaii circuit court. His complaint included two wrongful discharge torts - discharge in violation of the public policy expressed in the Federal Aviation Act and implementing regulations, and discharge in violation of Hawaii's Whistleblower Protection Act, Haw.Rev.Stat. 378-61 to 378-69 (1988). 2 He also alleged that [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 4] HAL had breached the collective bargaining agreement. HAL removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, which dismissed the breach of contract claim as preempted by the RLA, and remanded the other claims to the state trial court. The trial court then dismissed respondent's claim of discharge in violation of public policy, holding that it, too, was preempted by the RLA's provision of exclusive arbitral procedures. The state court certified its order as final to permit respondent to take an immediate appeal.
In the meantime, respondent had filed a second lawsuit in state court, naming as defendants three of HAL's officers who allegedly directed, confirmed, or ratified the claimed retaliatory discharge. 3 He again sought relief for, among other things, discharge in violation of public policy and of the Hawaii Whistleblower's Protection Act. The Hawaii trial court dismissed these two counts as preempted by the RLA and certified the case for immediate appeal.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed in both cases, concluding that the RLA did not preempt respondent's state tort actions. Norris v. Finazzo, 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634 (1992); Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 74 Haw. 648, 847 P.2d 634 (1993). That court concluded that the plain language of 153 First (i) does not support preemption of disputes independent of a labor agreement, 74 Haw., at 251, 842 P.2d, at 642, and [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 5] interpreted the opinion in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 299 (1989), to limit RLA preemption to "disputes involving contractually defined rights." 74 Haw., at 250, 842 P.2d, at 642. The court rejected petitioners' argument that the retaliatory discharge claims were preempted because determining whether HAL discharged respondent for insubordination, and thus for just cause, required construing the CBA. The court pointed to Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), a case involving 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, in which the Court held that a claim of wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a state worker's compensation claim did not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, but depended upon purely factual questions concerning the employee's conduct and the employer's motive. Because the same was true in this case, said the Supreme Court of Hawaii, respondent's state tort claims were not preempted.
We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases, ___ U.S. ___ (1994).
Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987); see also 45 U.S.C. 151a. To realize this goal, the Act establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes. 45 U.S.C. 151a. The first class, those concerning "rates of pay, rules or working conditions," ibid. are deemed "major" disputes. Major disputes relate to "`the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them.'" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989) ("Conrail"), quoting Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). The second class of disputes, known as "minor" disputes, "gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S.C. 151a. Minor disputes "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957). Thus, "major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." Conrail, 491 U.S., at 302 , citing Burley, 325 U.S., at 723 .
The Court's inquiry into the scope of minor disputes begins, of course, with the text of the statute. Petitioners point out that the statute defines minor disputes to include "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of [CBAs]." Petitioners argue that this disjunctive language must indicate that "grievances" means something other than labor contract disputes, else the term "grievances" would be superfluous. Accordingly, petitioners suggest that "grievances" should be read to mean all employment-related disputes, including those based on statutory or common law. Even if we were persuaded that the word "or" carried this weight, but cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. ___ (1993) (slip op. 6-7) (reading "error or defect" to create one category of "error"), citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , n. 12 (1985); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 -359 (1987) (second phrase in disjunctive added simply to make the meaning of the first phrase "unmistakable"), petitioners' interpretation produces an overlap not unlike the one it purports to avoid. Their expansive definition of "grievances" necessarily encompasses disputes growing out of "the interpretation or application" of CBAs. Thus, in attempting to save the term "grievances" from superfluity, petitioners would make the phrase after the "or" mere surplusage.
We think it more likely that "grievances," like disputes over "the interpretation or application" of CBAs, refers to disagreements over how to give effect to the bargained-for agreement. The use of "grievance" to refer to a claim arising out of a CBA is common in the labor law context in general, see, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987), and it has been understood in this way in the RLA context. See H.R.Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1934) (referring to RLA settlement of "minor disputes known [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 8] as `grievances,' which develop from the interpretation and/or application of the contracts between the labor unions and the carriers"). Significantly, the adjustment boards charged with administration of the minor dispute provisions have understood these provisions as pertaining only to disputes invoking contract-based rights. See, e.g., NRAB Fourth Div. Award No. 4548 (1987) (function of the National Rail Adjustment Board is to decide disputes in accordance with the controlling CBA); NRAB Third Div. Award No. 24348 (1983) (issues not related to the interpretation or application of contracts are outside the Board's authority); NRAB Third Div. Award No. 19790 (1973) ("this Board lacks jurisdiction to enforce rights created by State or Federal Statutes and is limited to questions arising out of interpretations and application of Railway Labor Agreement"); Northwest Airlines/Airline Pilots Assn., Int'l System Bd. of Adjustment, Decision of June 28, 1972, p. 13 ("both the traditional role of the arbitrator and admonitions of the courts require the Board to refrain from attempting to construe any of the provisions of the [RLA]"); United Airlines, Inc., 48 LA 727, 733 (BNA) (1967) ("The jurisdiction of this System Board does not extend to interpreting and applying the Civil Rights Act").
Accordingly, we believe that the most natural reading of the term "grievances" in this context is as a synonym for disputes involving the application or interpretation of a CBA. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1585 (1986) (the word "or" may be used to indicate "the synonymous, equivalent, or substitutive character of two words or phrases"). Nothing in the legislative history of the RLA 4 or other sections of the [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 9] statute 5 undermines this conclusion. But even accepting that 151(a) is susceptible of more than one interpretation, no proposed interpretation demonstrates a clear and manifest congressional purpose to create a regime that broadly preempts substantive protections extended by the States, independent of any negotiated labor agreement.
Our case law confirms that the category of minor disputes contemplated by 151(a) are those that are grounded in the collective bargaining agreement. We have defined minor disputes as those involving the interpretation or application of existing labor agreements. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989) ("The distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] is that the [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 10] dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [CBA]"); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 490, 496 , n. 12 (1989) ("Minor disputes are those involving the interpretation or application of existing contracts"); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 353 U.S., at 33 (minor disputes are "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement"); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 243 (1950) (RLA arbitral mechanism is meant to provide remedies for "adjustment of railroad employee disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing agreements").
"State laws have long regulated a great variety of conditions in transportation and industry, such as sanitary facilities and conditions, safety devices and [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 11] protections, purity of water supply, fire protection, and innumerable others. Any of these matters might, we suppose, be the subject of a demand by work[ers] for better protection and upon refusal might, we suppose, be the subject of a labor dispute which would have such effect on interstate commerce that federal agencies might be invoked to deal with some phase of it. . . . But it cannot be said that the minimum requirements laid down by state authority are all set aside. We hold that the enactment by Congress of the [RLA] was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves. . . . " Id., at 6-7.
Thus, under Norwood, substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever labor agreement might govern, are not preempted under the RLA.
"Here, it is conceded by all that the only source of [Andrews'] right not to be discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a "wrongful" one that entitled him to damages, is the [CBA]. . . . [T]he disagreement turns on the extent of [the railroad's] obligation to restore [Andrews] to his regular duties following injury in an automobile accident. The existence and extent of such an obligation in a case such as this will depend on the [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 12] interpretation of the [CBA]. Thus, [Andrews'] claim, and the [railroad's] disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations of the [CBA]. . . . His claim is therefore subject to the Act's requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment." Id., at 324 (emphasis added).
Here, in contrast, the CBA is not the "only source" of respondent's right not to be discharged wrongfully. In fact, the "only source" of the right respondent asserts in this action is state tort law. Wholly apart from any provision of the CBA, petitioners had a state law obligation not to fire respondent in violation of public policy or in retaliation for whistleblowing. The parties' obligation under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the CBA did not relieve petitioners of this duty.
The fact that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the RLA does not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA action for damages. . . . The FELA not [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 13] only provides railroad workers with substantive protection against negligent conduct that is independent of the employer's obligations under its collective bargaining agreement, but also affords injured workers a remedy suited to their needs, unlike the limited relief that seems to be available through the Adjustment Board. It is inconceivable that Congress intended that a worker who suffered a disabling injury would be denied recovery under the FELA simply because he might also be able to process a narrow labor grievance under the RLA to a successful conclusion." 480 U.S., at 564 -565.
The pre-emption standard that emerges from the line of cases leading to Buell - that a state law cause of action is not preempted by the RLA if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement - is virtually identical to the preemption standard the Court employs in cases involving 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 185. 7 In Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), the Court applied 301 preemption to a state law claim for bad faith handling of a worker's compensation claim because the duties the employer owed the employee, including the duty of good faith, were rooted firmly in the collective bargaining agreement. Its preemption finding was based on the fact that "the right asserted not only derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, [so that] any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract interpretation." Id., at 218.
It recognized that, where the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. Id., at 405-406, citing Lueck, supra; Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). It observed, however, that "purely factual questions" about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not "requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement." Id., at 407. The state law retaliatory discharge claim turned on just this sort of purely factual question: whether the employee was discharged or threatened with discharge, and, if so, whether the employer's motive in discharging him was to deter or interfere with his exercise of rights under Illinois worker's compensation law.
"such parallelism render[ed] the state law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis. For while there may be instances in which the National Labor Relations Act preempts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question, 301 preemption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 17] itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for 301 preemption purposes." Id., at 408-409.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioners' suggestion that this contract-dependent standard for minor disputes is inconsistent with two of our prior cases, Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), and Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989). Burley was not a preemption case. Rather, it concerned the authority of union officials to settle railroad workers' individual claims for damages for alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement. The railroad urged that the union representative, who had the authority to negotiate collective agreements in major disputes, enjoyed similar authority to settle individual claims in minor disputes. In the course of rejecting this claim, the Court described minor disputes as including the "omitted case," that is, one "founded upon some incident of the employment relationship, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective bargaining agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injury." 325 U.S., at 723 .
This language is sweeping, but its effect is limited. The conflict in Burley, which the parties agreed was a minor dispute, concerned the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and not some other "incident of [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 19] the employment relationship," or any "omitted case." These references, therefore, are dicta. Moreover, even the "omitted case" dictum logically can refer to a norm that the parties have created but have omitted from the collective bargaining agreement's explicit language, rather than to a norm established by a legislature or a court. 10 Finally, Burley's one specific example of an "omitted case" - claims for personal injury that do not depend on the contract - was found in Buell to be outside the RLA's exclusive jurisdiction. Nonetheless, to avoid any confusion, we expressly disavow any language in Burley suggesting that minor disputes encompass state law claims that exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement.
Conrail, like Burley, involved no preemption analysis. The parties agreed that the dispute - a workers' challenge to the railroad's drug testing policies - was governed by the RLA, because Conrail's policy of conducting physical examinations was an implied term of the collective bargaining agreement. 491 U.S., at 301 . The only question before the Court was whether the employer's drug testing policy constituted an attempt to add a new term to the existing agreement, making it a major dispute subject to a "protracted process" of bargaining and mediation, id., at 303, or whether the testing reflected the employer's interpretation and application of an implied term of the existing contract, [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 20] producing a minor dispute subject to a less onerous process of arbitration. We concluded that the dispute was minor, stating that "[t]he distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [CBA]." Id., at 305, citing Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567, 568, 576 (1937). Obviously, to say that a minor dispute can be "conclusively resolved" by interpreting the CBA is another way of saying that the dispute does not involve rights that exist independent of the CBA.
Petitioners, however, pin their hopes on the observation that "[w]here an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement." Id., at 307 (emphasis added). They argue that this case involves a minor dispute because the termination of respondent was "arguably justified" by the CBA's provision permitting termination for "just cause." This "arguably justified" standard, however, was employed only for policing the line between major and minor disputes. Recognizing that accepting a party's characterization of a dispute as "minor" ran the risk of undercutting the RLA's prohibition "against unilateral imposition of new contractual terms," id., at 306, the Court held that a dispute would be deemed minor only if there was a sincere, nonfrivolous argument that it turned on the application of the existing agreement, that is, if it was "arguably justified" by that agreement. Obviously, this test said nothing about the threshold question whether the dispute was subject to the RLA in the first place.
Returning to the case before us, the question under Lingle is whether respondent's state law wrongful [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 21] discharge claims are independent of the collective bargaining agreement. Petitioners argue that resort to the agreement is necessary to determine whether respondent, in fact, was discharged. This argument is foreclosed by Lingle itself. Lingle teaches that the issue to be decided in this case - whether the employer's actions make out the element of discharge under Hawaii law - is a "purely factual question." 486 U.S., at 407 .
Nor are we persuaded by petitioners' contention that the state tort claims require a determination whether the discharge, if any, was justified by respondent's failure to sign the maintenance record, as the agreement required him to do. Although such a determination would be required with regard to respondent's separate allegation of discharge in violation of the agreement, the District Court dismissed that count as preempted by the RLA, and respondent does not challenge that dismissal. The state tort claims, by contrast, require only the purely factual inquiry into any retaliatory motive of the employer.
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court of Hawaii that respondent's claims for discharge in violation of public policy and in violation of the Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act are not preempted by the RLA, and we affirm that court's judgment.
[ Footnote 1 ] In response, the FAA initiated a comprehensive investigation, proposed a civil penalty of $964,000 against HAL, proposed the revocation of the license of the supervisor who terminated respondent, and ultimately settled all charges for a substantial fine.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act forbids an employer to "discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee . . . [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 4] because . . . [t]he employee . . . reports or is about to report to a public body . . . a violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this State, a political subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless the employee knows that the report is false." 378-62(1). The Act authorizes an employee to file a civil action seeking injunctive relief and actual damages. 378-63(a).
[ Footnote 3 ] These managerial officers, petitioners here, are Paul J. Finazzo, Howard E. Ogden, and Hatsuo Honma.
[ Footnote 4 ] During the debates surrounding the RLA's enactment in 1926, floor statements that, in isolation, could support a broader interpretation of "grievances" were counterbalanced by other statements - some even by the same legislators - that equated grievances with contract interpretation. [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 9] Compare 67 Cong. Rec. 4517, 8807 (1926), with id., at 4510, 8808. This inconclusive debate hardly calls for fashioning a broad rule of preemption. Moreover, in 1934, when Congress amended the RLA to make arbitration mandatory for minor disputes, the accompanying House Report stated that the bill was intended "to provide sufficient and effective means for the settlement of minor disputes known as "grievances," which develop from the interpretation and/or application of the contracts between the labor unions and the carriers, fixing wages and working conditions." H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1934).
[ Footnote 5 ] Petitioners cite the statute's reference to the parties' general duties as including "settl[ing] all disputes, whether arising out of the application of [collective bargaining] agreements or otherwise." 45 U.S.C. 152 First. This provision, which is phrased more broadly than the operative language of 153 First (i), does not clearly refer only to minor disputes. But even if this provision is read to require parties to try to settle certain issues arising out of the employment relationship but not specifically addressed by the CBA, this does not compel the conclusion that all issues touching on the employment relationship must be resolved through arbitration or that all claims involving rights and duties that exist independent of the CBA are thereby preempted. Our precedents squarely reject this pervasive preemption.
[ Footnote 6 ] Buell, of course, involved possible RLA preclusion of a cause of action arising out of a federal statute, while this case involves RLA preemption of a cause of action arising out of state law and existing entirely independent of the collective bargaining agreement. That distinction does not rob Buell of its force in this context. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 412 (1988) (Buell principles applicable to determine whether federal labor law preempts a state statute). Principles of federalism demand no less caution in finding that a federal statute preempts state law. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S., at 21 (preemption of state statute "should not be lightly inferred in this [labor] area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police powers of the State").
[ Footnote 7 ] Section 301(a) provides federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements and "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
[ Footnote 8 ] The Court applies these principles in Livadas v. Aubry, ante, at ___, in which we reject the claim that an employee's state law right to receive a penalty payment from her employer was preempted under 301 because the penalty was pegged to her wages, which were determined by the governing CBA. The Court states that, "when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished." Ante, at ___, citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 413 , n. 12 (1988). In addition, it reaffirms that " 301 cannot be read broadly to preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as as matter of state law." Ante, at ___.
[ Footnote 9 ] It is true, as petitioners observe, that the RLA and the LMRA are not identical in language, history, and purpose. The LMRA, unlike the RLA, does not mandate arbitration, nor does it prescribe the types of disputes to be submitted to arbitration under bargaining agreements. Nonetheless, the common purposes of the two statutes, the parallel development of RLA and LMRA preemption law, see, e.g., International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 691 -692 (1963); Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985), and the desirability of having a uniform common law of labor law preemption, cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 -384 [ HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. v. NORRIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) , 18] (1969), support the application of the Lingle standard in RLA cases as well. Lower courts, too, have recognized the appropriateness of the Lingle standard to RLA preemption analysis. See, e.g., Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (CA5 1993) (applying Lingle to analyze RLA preemption); Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 466-467 (CA10 1992) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1993); O'Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1, 4 (CA1 1992) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1993); Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 125 N.J. 455, 472-473, 593 A.2d 750, 758 (1991) (same). But see, e.g., Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1097 (CA9 1991) (Lingle does not govern in RLA cases); Lorenz v. CSX Transp., Inc., 980 F.2d 263, 268 (CA4 1992) (same).

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the assessment was made was not required by the state law or that a notice actually given by mailing it fifteen days before the meeting, addressed to the stockholder at his address last known to the bank, was insufficient. P. 281 U. S. 646.
2. In assailing the constitutionality of a state statute, the burden rests upon the complainant to establish that it infringes the constitutional guarantee which he invokes. If the state court has not otherwise construed it, and it is susceptible of an interpretation which conforms to constitutional requirements, doubts must be resolved in favor of the state. P. 281 U. S. 647.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a recovery by the Bank in an action to collect an assessment from a stockholder.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia, upholding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Georgia statutes regulating the assessment, by corporate action, of shareholders of state banking institutions whose capital has become impaired. 149 S.E. 645. Section 1 of Art. VI Georgia Banking Law, Act of August 26th, Ga.Laws, 1925, p. 126, amending Art. VI, Ga.Laws, 1919, pp. 135, 152; Ga.Civil Code 1926, § 2366, (48), (49).
"it shall be the duty of the officers and directors of the bank receiving such notice to immediately call a special meeting of the stockholders for the purpose of making an assessment upon its stockholders sufficient to cover the impairment."
Section 2 authorizes the bank, in addition to other remedies, to bring suit against stockholders for the amount of the assessment. The supreme court of the state, construing the statute, has held that an assessment under the provisions of § 1 (formerly in § 2 of Article VI of the Georgia Banking Law, Ga.Laws 1919, p. 135) is a voluntary act on the part of the stockholders, who may, at their election, by action taken at the stockholders meeting, levy the assessment or decline to levy it and permit the liquidation of the bank of the superintendent of banks, who may levy an assessment under another provision of the statute not now involved. Smith v. Mobley, 166 Ga.195. Art.. VI and VII of the Georgia Banking Law, Ga.Laws, 1919, p. 135.
net indebtedness of the bank exceeded its capital. Certain depositors of the bank having undertaken to release their claims so that its indebtedness would equal its capital, the superintendent of banks agreed to surrender his control of the bank if its stockholders would authorize a levy of an assessment of 100 percent of the par value of the stock. A stockholders meeting, held October 22, 1926, at which a majority of the shares was represented, adopted resolutions assessing the stock accordingly.
The present suit to recover the assessment upon appellant's shares was brought in the Superior Court of Wilkes County, and its judgment in favor of the respondent was affirmed by the state supreme court. Appellant, by his pleadings, challenged the constitutionality of the statute upon the ground, relied on here, that § 1, by its failure to provide for notice to stockholders of the special meeting for the purpose of levying the assessment, denies due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioner thus seeks to raise the question whether one who acquires stock in a corporation, notice of whose meetings is dispensed with by state law, can, for that reason alone, invoke the due process clause to set aside corporate action adversely affecting his interest as a stockholder.
corporate meetings to be called by reasonable notice to stockholders. See Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214; Wiggin v. First Freewill Baptist Church, 8 Metc. 301, 312; Stevens v. Eden Meeting-House Society, 12 Vt. 688, 689. That, we think, in the absence of a controlling decision of the highest court of Georgia, must be taken to be the implied requirement of § 1.
Notice was in fact given in the present case, as appears by the agreed statement of facts, by mailing it fifteen days before the meeting, addressed to petitioner at his address last known to the bank. It does not appear whether he received the notice. In the face of this record, we cannot assume either that notice was not required by the law of the state or that that actually given was insufficient.
In assailing the constitutionality of a state statute, the burden rests upon appellant to establish that it infringes the constitutional guarantee which he invokes. If the state court has not otherwise construed it, and it is susceptible of an interpretation which conforms to constitutional requirements, doubts must be resolved in favor of, and not against, the state. See No. 454, Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, etc. v. Lowe, etc., ante, p. 281 U. S. 431; South Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325, 262 U. S. 331.
"Section 1. Assessment of stockholders."
Whenever the Superintendent of Banks shall find that the capital stock of any bank has become impaired or reduced as much as ten percent of its par value from losses or any other causes, the Superintendent of Banks shall notify and require such bank to make good its capital stock so impaired or reduced within sixty (60) days, by an assessment upon the stockholders thereof, and it shall be the duty of the officers and directors of the bank receiving such notice to immediately call a special meeting of the stockholders for the purpose of making an assessment upon its stockholders sufficient to cover the impairment of the capital, payable in cash at which meeting such assessment shall be made, provided that such bank may reduce its capital to the extent of the impairment of such reduction will not place its capital below the amount required by this Act. At any such special meeting of the stockholders a majority of the stock outstanding at the time shall be deemed a quorum, and such assessment may be made upon a majority vote of the quorum present.


text:
Vyacheslav A. Duke, Scientific director of Deep Patterns made a presentation «Logical methods of machine learning» during «Transportation problem and transport facilities» session held in House of scientists on January 16, 2019.
Overall picture of modern machine learning methods which are normally taken as important part of artificial intelligence systems was given in the first part of the presentation. It was noted that there is no clear interpretation for significant amount of such methods. Among them are discriminant analysis (with heterogenous data sets), neural network approach, nearest neighbors method, support vector machines etc. Machine learning practice of the last decade shown that such a requirement as interpretability of the results became a secondary issue.
The accent moved to stability of obtained models. This trend brought up ensemble approaches where hundreds or even thousands of models built by different methods and algorithms are combined to form a solution. It appeared that such committees (often built with boosting, bagging, method of random subspaces and stacking) of even «weak» algorithms can show same or even better accuracy as isolated so-called «strong» algorithms aimed at finding deep consistent patterns in data arrays.
This tendency was, in particular, reflected by publication in New York Times, posted on November 13, 2017, where the list of modern technologies that will change the world is headed by artificial intelligence methods in healthcare context. At the same time the accent in this article is made to perspectives of deep learning neural networks, mainly basing on effectiveness of this approach in visual pattern recognition tasks. This view of artificial intelligence misses the fact that many of medical diagnostics problems require not only formal result like diagnostic model accuracy but also result explanation, result interpretability.
The neural network approach is not the only one that misses interpretability requirement. Many of other modern artificial intelligence methods are based on building big ensembles of «weak» algorithms implementing so-called «swarm intelligence» and producing «black box» models that don’t contribute much to understanding the essence of diagnostic and prognostic decisions.
Thus, significant changes are happened in machine learning world during the last decade. Discovering «strong» methods and algorithms is no more attractive for most of the machine learning professionals — their interest now moved to using big ensembles of «weak» methods and algorithms on big data. This trend in machine learning must be analyzed separately. Here we deal with obvious deviation from basic machine learning ideals associated with extracting knowledge from data but not building «black box» models.
At the same time the problem of building «strong» models is still actual. It’s obvious, that strong models are more suitable for interpretation and can be combined into less bulky collections to achieve effective results on classification and prognosis tasks. Special value in this field belongs to logical analysis methods that reflect interconnections in data in terms of «if-then» rules allowing extraction and understanding the essence of the built models.
Regular polls among data scientists conducted by KDnuggets portal (www.kdnuggets.com) show stable popularity of logical methods of data mining. Results of these polls show that modern data mining software tools use wide spectrum of different procedures and special instruments for building and tuning big ensembles of decision rules. But at the same time the logical data analysis methods are still in top 3 approaches which are far ahead of others in terms of usage frequency.
In the next part of the presentation prof. V. Duke described characteristics of most commonly used methods of finding logical rules in data — decision (classification) trees — and shown that these methods can give reliable solutions only for simple data structures. Another popular approach to building logical rule, reviewed in the presentation is selection of binary features (elementary predicates) which is implemented in practice as procedures of limited search in the set of these elementary predicates. Special attention was paid to evolutionary approach (genetic algorithms mainly).
The emphasis in the presentation was placed on achievements of Deep Patterns, LLC, promoting innovative SRMD technology (Structural Resonance in Multidimensional Data) having no analogs worldwide. The SRMD technology is based on author’s concept of context-dependent local metrics and effect of structural resonance in multidimensional data. SRMD brings special value to areas described by complexity of systematic relations where traditional machine learning methods fail to give reliable results.
1. Accuracy — Deep Data Diver shows much better accuracy in areas with highly complex interrelations (bioinformatics, healthcare, chemometrics). This is reflected by significant growth of AUC[CROC] metric (area under the curve).
2. Computational complexity for algorithms used in Deep Data Diver — O(PN), where P — number of objects properties, N — number of objects in data matrix.
3. Result interpretability — Deep Data Diver finds in multidimensional data so-called «strong» (most complete for given accuracy) logical rules which allow significantly better interpretation.
At the end of the presentation were given some examples of solutions for practical tasks from different areas including transportation problems, finding long associative chains in data, et cetera.
At the end of July, the Deep Patterns LLC has celebrated its second anniversary. It’s a good practice to sum up achievements to these dates, build plans and we will follow this tradition. In period from July 2015 to July 2016 the Deep Patterns LLC took part in many activities expressed in details in our news column.
In October 2015 by initiative of head of Saint Petersburg branch of Motorola Solutions we took part in negotiations with participation of Motorola Solutions CTO. Both sides agreed on great potential of cooperative development of innovative approaches to Data Science in BigData and IoT (Internet Of Things) fields.
In December 2015, as it has already mentioned in our news feed, our project „DP4SAR — innovative tool for discovering patterns in chemical structures and structure — activity relationships for directed drug design“ has successfully passed the Skolkovo Biomedical cluster (BMT) expertise. Thus since December 2015 Deep Patterns LLC is participant of two Skolkovo clusters — Information Technologies (IT) and Biomedical Technologies (BMT). This reflects the strategic technological trend of XXI century — BioInfoCognito (BIC), which incorporates biotechnologies, information and cognitive technologies.
At the beginning of the 2016 our company has received the grant by START program of Bortnik foundation. This funding is aimed at development of Deep Data Diver software implementing the technology of discovering deep interrelations in multidimensional data based on the information structural resonance effect. During the last year the Deep Patterns LLC also took part in 2 contests. The first one was arranged by BMT and IT clusters of Skolkovo foundation and aimed at problems of Big Data in biomedicine. Our project „DP4SAR — the innovative virtual screening software for directed drug design“ passed the expertise and became one of finalists of the competition. Another contest was held by „Sberbank Insurance“, branch of Sberbank of Russia. Here we again became a finalist with our project „SRMD — an innovative Big Data analysis technology (Structural Resonance in Multidimensional Data)“ in „Machine Learning“ competition area. Challenges and possibilities of applying SRMD to business analysis in insurance area were discussed during the meeting attended by top management of „Sberbank Insurance“ and Deep Patterns CEO Andrei Konchakov on June 3, 2016.
In July 2016 by initiative of Chinese company the Deep Patterns team have held a meeting with representative of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd — one of the largest Chinese companies in IT and Communications. Wide area of fundamental theoretical and practical questions of modern Big Data analysis was discussed during the talks. Parties expressed satisfaction with contact and agreed on further cooperation roadmap.
Our vision and plans remain unchanged — we are going to introduce Deep Data Diver software and commercialize its results in areas benefiting from discovering and analyzing of deep and hidden regularities in Big Data. We are on the way of finding potential investors and partners able to cooperate for introducing our technology into research and business fields in order to achieve our goals.
On February 10 The granted funds will be used for development of Deep Data Diver software implementing the associative rules discovering technology based on the structural resonance effect in multidimensional data. At the moment company works for achieving private co-funding necessary for the project. Business negotiations concerning promotion and integration of the product into different industry fields are held with potential partners and investors.
Further roadmap of product commercialization includes integration of Deep Data Diver software into industries benefitting from discovering hidden consistent patterns in big data. The most representative among such industries are bioinformatics and chemometrics (genome annotation, discovering structure-property relations) that suffer from high complexity of systemic interrelations. The product is also valuable in such fields as marketing, banking, CRM, medical diagnostics, telecommunications etc.
Another project by Deep Patterns LLC has successfully passed the Skolkovo foundation expertise. This time the project named “DP4SAR — innovative tool for discovering patterns in chemical structures and structure — activity relationships for directed drug design” was introduced to Bio-Medical Technologies (BMT) cluster.
The project is aimed at actual fundamental scientific and practical problem — discovering patterns in chemical structures and structure-activity relationships (SAR). Using mathematical methods for SAR analysis in pharmaceutical industry allows highlighting leading compounds with given properties in huge array of candidates by means of computing. This allows reducing risks for patients and significantly reduces costs and duration of development of a new medication.
At the same time the application of known SAR mathematical methods often gives results that are not accurate enough because these methods are not always adequate to the structural complexity of analyzed objects (high dimensions, diverse nature of descriptive data, polymorphism of target properties). It is also common that SAR models have no good interpretation that restricts their applicability to directed drug design.
In order to improve effectiveness of SAR problem solving our project implements the innovative technology DP4SAR (Deep Patterns for SAR) which is based on proprietary SRMD (Structural Resonance in Multidimensional Data) method. Outstanding ability of SRMD for discovering strong and complex logical associations in multidimensional data allows using known systems of chemical compound descriptors in a new way building accurate and interpretable SAR models.
The main audience for the project results are companies involved into drug design and chemical compounds research activities. It includes consortiums with universities, small innovative companies in pharmaceutical and perfume and cosmetic industry. Our project can also be interesting for investors from BioTech companies, life science and big pharma.
The Skolkovo foundation experts have given positive evaluation of the subject, innovativeness and potential of the DP4SAR project. Since December 2015 Deep Patterns LLC becomes participant of 2 clusters of Skolkovo foundation — Information Technologies (IT) and Bio-Medical Technologies (BMT). This combination reflects the strategic technological tendency of the XXI century — BioInfoCognito (BIC), that unites biotechnologies with information and cognitive technologies.
On October 8 the “Bio- and chemoinformatics in pharmaceutics” workshop was held during the St. Petersburg International Innovation Forum. Main topics of the discussion concerned requirements to modern drugs, theoretical approaches to drug design and ideas forming the background for new design methods utilizing modern information technologies.
Advanced reports were presened by Elena Fedorova (CEO, “VVS Lab” LLC), dr. Vyacheslav Duke (chief scientist, “Deep Patterns” LLC) and Adnrei Khudoshin (head of chemo-biological department, Elsevier S&T).
In his speech, Vyacheslav Duke made accent on problems and perspectives of methods aimed at creating predictive models for bioactivity of compounds and selection of leaders. It was highlighted that conventional data mining methods applied to SAR models rarely give accurate enough results because these methods are not always adequate to structural complexity of analyzed data (class polymorphism, structural asymmetry, high dimensions and diverse nature of data etc.) In addition, SAR models often have no direct interpretation that makes it impossible to use such models for directed drug design.
The most adequate to the systemic complexity of biochemical objects are the methods finding the logical regularities in data. The problem is that all such methods are restricted in analysis depth because finding so-called “strong” logical rules in data is extreme combinatorial (NP-hard) problem.
In his report V. Duke presented advantages of the DP4SAR software by DeepPatterns LLC on several examples. DP4SAR is based on the method of structural resonance in multidimensional data SRMD. This method shows significantly better accuracy and analysis depth than conventional machine learning methods that find logical relations in data.
It’s also important that SRMD is highly scalable and ready for parallel computations that defines its success in Big Data field.
Workshop attendees expressed a sincere interest to presented reports and took part in discussion of theoretical and practical aspects of applying methods of bio- and chemoinformatics for drug design. Participants has outlined ways for further cooperation.
The “Best innovative project” award ceremony was held on October 7, 2015 during the joint meeting of the Presidiums of Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg and Regional Union of employers of Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg in “Expoforum” exhibition hall.
Deep Patterns LLC was granted the “Best innovative project” award with its “DeepDataDiver software development implementing the technology of finding hidden patterns in multidimensional data using structural resonance effect” project.
On April, 29 the “Current status and development perspectives of Russian hydrobionics” seminar was held on initiative of Perspective Research Foundation at the Saint Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation of the Russian Academy of Sciences (SPIIRAS).
The main goal of the seminar was to form a cooperation of researchers and developers able to establish a basis for hydrobionical principles to be used for building the security and ecological monitoring system for sea areas in context of the “Hydrobioinformatics of the Future” project lead by Perspective Research Foundation.
The seminar brought together representatives from such scientific and industrial organizations of Saint Petersburg and Moscow as SPIIRAS, State research institute for applied problems (GosNIIP), research institute for evolutionary physiology and biochemistry RAS, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University (LETI), Military Educational-and-Research Centre Naval Academy, N. N. Andreyev Acoustic Institute, P. P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology RAS, Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering “Rubin”, Pavlov Institute of Physiology RAS, D. I. Mendeleev Institute of Metrology, Research and design Institute for biotechnical systems and others.
— Modern trends in hydrobionics.
— Current state of researches in hydrobionics in Russia.
— Research and development perspectives for maritime robotics utilizing bionic models for security and ecological monitoring.
— Studies of acoustic abilities of marine animals and fish as a basis for development of underwater communication devices.
— Marine mammals as a part of biotechnical security systems for harbours, offshore facilities and sea areas.
V. A. Duke made a presentation “Methods for discovering deep consistent patterns in multidimensional nonstationary signals” describing previous researches and current state in this area in context of hydrobioinformatics. Prof. Duke has made an accent on necessity of building a data storage based analytical system and presented the innovative data analysis technology for Big Data being developed by Deep Patterns company.
Seminar attendees expressed an unanimous opinion about high actuality of “Hydrobioinformatics of the Future” project lead by Perspective Research Foundation, made an outline for building a project participants cooperation and adopted a resolution on necessity of intensive scientific researches and innovative technology development in the field of hydrobionics and hydrobioinformatics.
On November 17-18, the annual international partnering forum “Life Sciences Invest. Partnering Russia” was held at “Taleon Imperial Hotel” in Saint-Petersburg. This event brought together main directions of the Life Science world — pharmacy, biotechnology, radiology and health care industry. The main goal of the forum was to contribute to federal initiative for pharmaceutical market development as one of the main economic growth drivers.
The Forum, opened by Governor of Saint-Petersburg Georgy Poltavchenko, was attended by leading representatives of governmental, research and scientific institutions and large pharmaceutical companies.
Deep Patterns founder and scientific director, prof. Vyacheslav Duke took part in the “Innovations in Pharmacy” workshop with his presentation “New Algorithms for Computer Aided Drug Design”. The main theme of the speech was fundamental scientific and practical problem of discovering relations between chemical structure of compounds and their activities ( SAR ) for targeted drug design.
Prof. Duke gave an overview of main development directions and problems of data analysis methods applied to areas with high systemic complexity such as chemoinformatics and presented the new DP4SAR (Deep Patterns for SAR) project being developed by Deep Patterns LLC in cooperation with leading researchers from Saint-Petersburg State Chemical-Pharmaceutical Academy for biomedical cluster of “Skolkovo” foundation.
The international partnering forum “Life Sciences Invest. Partnering Russia” was held by “Medical and pharmaceutical projects. XXI Century” non-commercial partnership.
On November 17-18, the IV international “Life Sciences Invest. Partnering Russia” partnering forum will be held at Talion Imperial Hotel, Saint Petersburg.
Prof. Vyacheslav Duke, founder and scientific director of Deep Patterns, LLC, became a member of the “Innovations in Pharmacy” section workshop presidium.
This annual event conducted as live dialog became a regular platform for business communications and establishing new relations between representatives of pharmaceutical industry, authorities and business.
The Forum organizers managed to gather highly representative array of decision makers to the event.
— Arkady Nekrasov, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Petrovax Pharm.
Schedule of plenary session includes opening ceremony for the reconstructed and technically upgraded educational building of the Chemical-Pharmaceutical Academy. It is also planned to discuss development perspectives of innovative drug design centers.
The main session of the forum is devoted to problems of switching industry to GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) standard — the system of standards, rules and instructions concerning manufacturing of drugs and medical equipment. Attendees will discuss vital problems of regulatory mechanisms, quality control and supervision related to GMP approach implementation.
Among other topics the forum agenda includes wide area of questions related to current state and future trends of pharmaceutical, biomedical and healthcare markets.
One of the latest approaches to SAR, QSAR and SPR discovering problems will be presented by prof. Vyacheslav Duke at “Innovations in Pharmacy” workshop in his “New Algorithms for Computer Aided Drug Design” paper, explaining perspectives of applying the innovative SRMD technology to this problem domain.
The “Life Sciences Invest. Partnering Russia” partnering forum is organized by “Medical and Pharmaceuticals projects. XXI Century” partnership.
On October 30, the “Information technologies in medicine and healthcare” section of XIV international conference “Regional informatics 2014” was held by dr. Vyacheslav Duke, founder and scientific director of Deep Patterns, LLC.
The section workshop was attended by Doctors, Magisters as well as graduate and post-graduate students in mathematics and medical sciences.
— St. Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation of Russian Academy of Sciences.
— Russian scientific centre of Radiology and Surgery of Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation.
— Pavlov First Saint Petersburg State Medical University.
— Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M. V. Lomonosov.
— Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical Univercity “LETI” named after V. I. Ulianov (Lenin).
— St. Petersburg Information and Analytical Centre.
— Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation.
— The Bonch-Bruevich Saint Petersburg State University of Telecommunications.
— Pavlov Institute of Physiology of Russian Academy of Sciences.
Opening the “Information technologies in Medicine and Healthcare” section workshop prof. Vyacheslav Duke emphasized the necessity of fundamental theoretical research in this field. Attendees discussed actual questions and future trends of modern science of living systems. It was stated that data analysis and modeling for living systems require special approach and in-depth understanding of specifics of information processes describing such systems.
Attendees came to conclusion that the most promising direction for IT in medicine is development and implementation of innovative approaches to multiaspect medical and biological data with respect to systemic complexity of targets for medical and biological studies.
The XIV international conference “Regional informatics (RI-2014)” was held in Saint Petersburg with support of UNESCO, Government of St. Petersburg, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Academy of Education, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and other organizations.
On October 6, 2014 the scientific management representatives of Saint-Petersburg State Chemical-Pharmaceutical Academy and Deep Patterns held a meeting discussing actual problems and development perspectives of computer-aided drug design industry.
Тhe parties have agreed on partnership and decided to begin a cooperative work in this area. There’s a great and still growing demand in modern society for solving one of the most important and actual problems — the problem of discovering dependencies between the internal structure and different properties of substances.
This set of tasks includes exploration of SAR (Structure — Activity Relationship), QSAR (Quantitative Structure — Activity Relationship), QSRP (Quantitative Structure — Property Relationship). Solving these problems allows prognosis for properties of new chemical compounds and makes able the directional molecular design of new compounds with desired properties (including the computer-aided drug design).
During the meeting dr. Vyacheslav Duke (Deep Patterns) presented the SRMD technology explaining its abilities and advantages when applied to tasks of discovering “structure — property” relationships.
Elena Fedorova (ph. d., head of research department, Saint-Petersburg State Chemical-Pharmaceutical Academy) noted the necessity of tight cooperation between chemists, biologists, mathematicians and software engineers for correct and effective solving SAR, QSAR and QSRP problems.
The outcome of the meeting was the agreement on development of cooperative project within Skolkovo Foundation Biomedical Cluster.
23.09.2014 The XIV international conference “Regional Informatics-2014” will be held on 29-31 of October in Saint-Petersburg.
V. Duke, Deep Patterns founder and scientific director will attend the conference as head of “Information technologies in Health Care industry” section.
The “RI-2014” program covers wide range of information technology applicability areas corresponding to different problem domains including economics, management, business, industry, health care, transportation, education and others. It’s planned to conduct section workshops allowing discussions of actual problems such as regional informatics policy, e-government, information security and information laws as well as sections lead by youth scientific schools.
The event is supported by UNESCO, Saint-Petersburg City Government, Russian Academy of Science, Russian Academy of Education, Russian Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of Russian Federation et al.
Deep Patterns was presented at this event by Andrei Konchakov, CEO.
The Forum topics concerned actual state and upcoming technology and business trends of Big Data industry. At the event SAP has presented it’s Startup Focus Program and modern enterprise software platform SAP HANA.
According to Deep Patterns CEO Andrei Konchakov SAP HANA can make significant value on certain stages of Deep Patterns products life cycle. Some technical details concerning integration of SRMD technology into SAP HANA infrastructure were discussed by Andrei Konchakov and SAP Israel team members during the meeting.
We are pleased to mention excellent Forum organization and want to thank SAP team for extensive information on SAP startup support program.
Photos are presented by SAP Labs, CIS.
11.09.2014 Deep Patterns company has received the Skolkovo Foundation community participant certificate.
Our project, aimed at implementation of Big Data to Knowledge innovative technology (BD2K) in series of commercial products has been approved by IT cluster of Skolkovo Foundation.
Our unique Big Data analysis technology known as Structural Resonance in Multidimensional Data (SRMD) is developed by prof. V. Duke. It is based on proprietary concept of local context-sensitive metrics in multidimensional data and structural resonance effect.
As a Skolkovo Community member our company is going to introduce a new implementation level of innovative SRMD technology relying on tremendous business acceleration resources, international communications and other benefits granted to Skolkovo project participants. We would like to congratulate all Deep Patterns employees on this remarkable event and thank the Skolkovo Foundation for their trust and support.

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