The British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI) is soliciting public comments on its recently-issued consultation paper recommending that the province enact franchise legislation similar to existing franchise laws in Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island.
The BCLI intends its “Consultation Paper on a Franchise Act for British Columbia” to be “a catalyst for an informed discussion about franchise regulation in BC.” After consideration of responses received, BCLI will produce a report with final recommendations and draft legislation.
 British Columbia should enact franchise legislation.
 Franchise legislation should be modeled generally on the Uniform Franchises Act and the Uniform Disclosure Documents Regulation.
 Franchise legislation should not provide for mandatory mediation on the demand of one party of the franchise agreement.
 Legislation should require presale disclosure of information to prospective franchisees.
 A franchisor may request and receive a fully refundable deposit before delivering a disclosure document.
 A disclosure document must state whether or not an exclusive territory is granted under the franchise.
 A disclosure document must state whether the franchisor reserves the right to directly market goods or services.
 An action for misrepresentation should extend to misleading or inaccurate financial or earnings projections.
 A franchisor should be able to use “wrap around” disclosure documents prepared in compliance with laws of another jurisdiction with additional information required by British Columbia.
 There should be a presumption of reliance by a franchisee on a disclosure document.
The institute is requesting comment from franchisors, franchises, business and consumer organizations, and the general public.
Comments, which will be accepted through September 30, 2013, may be submitted by email at gblue@bcli.org; by fax at 604-822-0144, and by mail at British Columbia Law Institute, 1822 East Mall, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1.
This posting was written by Jody Coultas, Contributor to Wolters Kluwer Antitrust Law Daily.
A gun dealer failed to state Sherman Act, Section 1 or Lanham Act commercial disparagement claims against the Village of Norridge, Illinois, stemming from a change in an ordinance that may force the gun dealer to close up shop, according to the federal district court in Chicago (Kole v. Village of Norridge, April 19, 2013, Durkin, T.).
The gun dealer entered into an agreement with the Village in which he agreed to sell guns only over the Internet in return for a license to operate the business in the Village. A revised ordinance terminated gun store licenses altogether and bans gun stores from the Village. Once the agreement and its three-year exemption from the revised ordinance expires, the gun dealer may be forced to close up shop, or at least relocate their business outside the Village.
The gun dealer failed to allege a conspiracy, agreement, or other concerted action to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, according to the court. The Village and its trustees were one entity. Although a single firm’s restraints may directly affect prices and have the same economic effect as concerted action might have, there can be no liability under Section 1 in the absence of agreement.
Statements made by a Village trustee did not run afoul of the Lanham Act commercial disparagement section, according to the court. One trustee stated to a local newspaper that "the one current Village weapons dealer licensee has agreed that it will cease doing business in the village no later than April, 30, 2013." The gun dealer argued that the statement was commercial disparagement because it false and harmed business because the statement suggested to potential customers that it would soon go out of business.
The Lanham Act section prohibiting commercial disparagement applies only to statements used in commerce and made in commercial advertising or promotion. The statement also did not support the gun dealer’s Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (ABI) has resolved Department of Justice Antitrust Division concerns over its proposed acquisition of the remaining stake in Grupo Modelo S.A.B. de C.V.
A proposed final judgment was filed in the federal district court in Washington, D.C. that, if approved by the court, would resolve a civil antitrust complaint challenging the combination, which was filed on January 31, 2013.
The Justice Department had contended that the $20.1 billion transaction would substantially lessen competition in the market for beer in the United States as a whole and in 26 metropolitan areas across the United States. ABI’s global brands include Budweiser, Bud Light, Stella Artois, and Beck’s. Modelo’s Corona Extra brand is the top-selling import in the United States.
Under the proposed final judgment, the companies would be required to divest Modelo's entire U.S. business to Constellation Brands Inc. or to an alternative purchaser if for some reason the transaction with Constellation cannot be completed. It is intended to create an independent, fully integrated and economically viable competitor to ABI, according to the Justice Department.
The divestiture assets include Modelo's newest, most technologically advanced brewery (the "Piedras Negras Brewery"), which is located in Mexico near the Texas border; perpetual and exclusive U.S. licenses of the Modelo brand beers; Modelo's current interest in Crown—the joint venture established by Modelo and Constellation to import, market and sell certain Modelo beers into the United States; and other assets, rights and interests necessary to ensure that Constellation is able to compete in the U.S. beer market using the Modelo brand beers, independent of a relationship to ABI and Modelo.
Further, Constellation was added as a defendant for purposes of settlement and would be required to expand the capacity of Piedras Negras in order to meet current and future demand for the Modelo brands in the United States.
The settlement comes after initial attempts of the parties to remedy the potentially anticompetitive aspects of the transaction were rejected by the Justice Department as inadequate. An original proposal to sell Modelo's stake in Crown to Constellation and enter into a 10-year supply agreement to provide Modelo beer to Constellation to import into the United States was rejected on the ground that it would have eliminated the Modelo brands as an independent competitive force in the U.S. beer market. The federal district court stayed proceedings in the case multiple times while the parties attempted to reach a resolution.
"This is a win for the $80 billion U.S. beer market and consumers," said Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. "If this settlement makes just a one percent difference in prices, U.S. consumers will save almost $1 billion a year."
According to an ABI statement, with this proposed resolution of the Justice Department suit, all necessary regulatory hurdles have been cleared. The Mexican Competition Commission approved the revised transaction with Constellation earlier this month. As a result, the transaction is expected to close in June 2013.
This posting was written by William Zale, contributor to Wolters Kluwer Antitrust Law Daily.
Section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act did not preempt retail natural gas buyers’ claims under state antitrust laws in multidistrict litigation against natural gas traders for price manipulation associated with transactions falling outside of the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco has ruled (In re: Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, April 10, 2013, Bea, C.). The court reversed and remanded the district court’s preemption decision, reversed orders dismissing American Electric Power (AEP) defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and affirmed in other respects.
The buyers alleged that the traders manipulated the price of natural gas by reporting false information to price indices published by trade publications and by engaging in wash sales—prearranged sales in which traders agreed to execute a buy or a sell on an electronic trading platform and then to immediately reverse or offset the first trade by bilaterally executing over the telephone an equal and opposite buy or sell.
The buyers brought claims in state and federal court beginning in 2005, and all cases were eventually consolidated into the underlying multidistrict litigation proceeding. In July 2011, the district court entered summary judgment against the buyers in most of the cases, finding that their state law antitrust claims were preempted by the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq.
The NGA applies to: (1) transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (2) natural gas sales in interstate commerce for resale (i.e., wholesale sales), and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale. The NGA does not apply to retail sales (direct sales for consumptive use). FERC is the agency charged with the administration of the NGA.
Preemption. The court framed the question presented on appeal as follows: Does Section 5(a) of the NGA, which provides FERC with jurisdiction over any "practice" affecting jurisdictional rates, preempt state antitrust claims arising out of price manipulation associated with transactions falling outside of FERC’s jurisdiction? The court concluded that such an expansive reading of Section 5(a) conflicts with Congress’s express intent to delineate carefully the scope of federal jurisdiction through the express jurisdictional provisions of Section 1(b) of the Act.
When Congress enacted the NGA in 1938, it expressly limited federal jurisdiction over natural gas to "the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale," under Section 1(b). Since passage in 1938, Congress had further demonstrated its intent to limit the scope of federal regulation by enacting statutes removing from FERC’s jurisdiction "first sales"— sales of natural gas that are not preceded by a sale to an interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, local distribution company, or retail customer.
The holding that the NGA does not preempt all state antitrust claims is supported, according to the court, by its decision in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Encana Corp., 503 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) that the filed-rate doctrine did not bar antitrust claims that were essentially the same as those in the present case. The court found that the Gallo reasoning applies in this case with equal force: federal preemption doctrines do not preclude state law claims arising out of transactions outside of FERC’s jurisdiction.
The district court read the word "practices" in Section 5(a) of the NGA to preempt impliedly the application of state laws to the same transactions (first sales and retail sales) that Congress expressly exempted from the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction in Section 1(b) of the Act. This reading ran afoul of the canon of statutory construction that statutory provisions should not be read in isolation, and the meaning of a statutory provision must be consistent with the structure of the statute of which it is a part, the court observed. While the Ninth Circuit had not had the opportunity to define the scope of Section 5(a), the Supreme Court and other circuits had read Section 5(a) narrowly to define the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction within the limitations imposed by Section 1(b).
The court also determined that the 2003 enactment of the FERC’s Code of Conduct did not affect the conclusion that the NGA does not grant FERC jurisdiction over claims arising out of false price reporting and other anticompetitive behavior associated with nonjurisdictional sales.
Personal jurisdiction. In suits brought in Wisconsin and Missouri, the district court dismissed American Electric Power and its subsidiary AEP Energy Services (AEPES), Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the court decided that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over the state antitrust claims arising out of the nonresident AEP defendants’ alleged collusive manipulation of gas price indices in the Wisconsin case, while the Missouri case would proceed only against AEPES because the plaintiffs had waived any argument for personal jurisdiction over the parent company.
Other issues. The court affirmed the dismissal of untimely motions in four cases to add federal antitrust claims and in one case to seek treble damages under the Colorado antitrust law. The court also affirmed summary judgment holding that Wisconsin plaintiffs lacked standing to have contracts determined void under Wisconsin Statutes §133.14 because the statute applies only to plaintiffs who are direct purchasers.
This posting was written by Jody Coultas, Editor of State Unfair Trade Practices Law and contributor to Antitrust Law Daily.
The federal district court in Albuquerque has denied in part fashion retailer Urban Outfitters, Inc.’s motion to dismiss trademark infringement and dilution claims brought by the Navajo Nation (The Navajo Nation v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., March 26, 2013, Hansen, C.). The court declined to dismiss the Navaho Nation’s claim under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and stayed ruling on whether the Navajo Nation has standing to sue under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act.
The Navajo Nation alleged that Urban Outfitters and its subsidiaries started a product line of items containing the NAVAJO trademark, which they sold on their website and retail stores, that evoked the Navajo Nation’s tribal patterns and resembled Navajo Indian-made patterned clothing, jewelry, and accessories.
Specifically, the Navajo Nation alleged that the product lines were likely to cause confusion and had created actual confusion in the market place, and constituted trademark infringement, trademark dilution by blurring, and willful trademark dilution by tarnishment in violation of the Lanham Act. Urban Outfitters also allegedly engaged in unfair competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act.
Trademark infringement. To state a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must allege that its mark is protectable, and the defendant’s use of an identical or similar mark in commerce is likely to cause confusion among consumers.
The fair use doctrine did not apply to the claims and did not warrant a dismissal because The Navajo Nation sufficiently stated trademark infringement claims, according to the court. A word that has acquired a secondary meaning still belongs to the public in its primary descriptive sense and any person may use it in such a way that does not convey the secondary meaning or deceive the public.
Urban Outfitters used the term "Navajo" in a trademark sense and did not accompany the term with marks such that a buyer exercising ordinary care would not be deceived into believing the product was produced by the Navajo Nation. There were no clarifying words that would clarify that a "Navajo" product was made by a member of the Navajo Nation. The inclusion of the manufacturer’s brand name did not eliminate confusion as to the source of the product.
Urban Outfitters’ argument that the term "Navajo" was a generic, descriptive term for a particular style of prints, clothing, and clothing accessories was better suited for a motion for summary judgment or trial, according to the court.
Trademark dilution. The court limited the Navajo Nation’s trademark dilution claims to those based on the relative qualities of the products at issue. An owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction against another person who uses a mark in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark. Dilution by blurring arises from the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Dilution by tarnishment is association arising from the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.
The Navajo Nation argued that Urban Outfitters’ use of "Navaho" was scandalous because the Navajo Nation Code provides that the term be spelled "Navajo," and argued that products like Urban Outfitters’ "Navajo Flask" was derogatory, scandalous, and contrary to the Navajo Nation’s principles because it banned the sale and consumption of alcohol within its borders and does not use its mark in conjunction with alcohol. There was sufficient evidence that the mark was famous. However, there was evidence that the Navajo Nation had used the mark on shot glasses, and the alleged misspelling was not sufficiently scandalous to state a dilution claim.
Indian Arts and Crafts Act. Urban Outfitter’s request to dismiss the Navajo Nation’s Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) claim was denied by the court. The IACA is a truth-in-advertising law that creates a cause of action "against a person who, directly or indirectly, offers or displays for sale or sells a good, with or without a Government trademark, in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization." Urban Outfitters argued that the allegations did not show that it falsely suggested that their products were made by Indians, Indian products, or the products of a particular Indian or Indian tribe, and that neither clothing nor clothing accessories constitute "arts" or "crafts" within the meaning of the IACA. The Navajo Nation sufficiently alleged that the products were in a traditional Indian style, and composed of Indian motifs and Indian designs. Also, modern apparel may fall within the definition of an "art" or "craft." The court declined to rule on Urban Outfitters’ judicial estoppel argument and declined to rely on any extra-pleading evidence to make a judicial estoppel finding at this stage of the case.
New Mexico Unfair Practices Act. The court stayed ruling on whether the Navajo Nation had standing to pursue a claim under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (UPA). New Mexico courts would hold that a business competitor has standing to assert UPA claims where the business competitor can show that the challenged practice significantly affects the public as actual or potential consumers of the defendant’s goods or services. The briefing on whether business competitors have standing to assert UPA claims did not directly addressed whether there is a public interest component to business competitor standing and/or whether the Navajo Nation sufficiently alleged a public interest component.
"For at least four years, Bosley’s and Hair Club’s chief executive officers repeatedly exchanged competitively sensitive, nonpublic information regarding aspects of their firms’ surgical hair transplantation business," the FTC alleged in a complaint announced today against Bosley, Inc. Bosley has agreed to settle the FTC charges that it engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of Sec. 5 of the FTC Act (In the Matter of Bosley, Inc., FTC File No. 121 0184).
The complaint names Bosley, as well as Aderans America Holdings, Inc. and parent company Aderans Co., Ltd. HC (USA), Inc.—Hair Club—was not named as a respondent in the complaint because Aderans plans to acquire all of Hair Club’s stock from Regis Corporation.
Bosley provides medical and surgical hair restoration services. Hair Club provides nonsurgical hair restoration and hair therapy products. Hair Club manages medical/surgical hair restoration practices, including providing input on pricing, according to the FTC.
The FTC alleges that Bosley’s and Hair Club’s CEOs directly exchanged detailed information about future product offerings, surgical hair transplantation price floors, discounting, forward-looking expansion and contraction plans, and operations and performance. The conduct facilitated coordination and endangered competition and served no legitimate business purpose, the agency contends. Bosley purportedly provided competitively sensitive information to other competitors, as well.
A proposed FTC consent order would prohibit the respondents from communicating competitively sensitive, non-public information to a competitor or requesting, encouraging, or facilitating the communication of competitively sensitive, non-public information from a competitor. There are exemptions for legitimate information exchanges.
The consent order also would require the establishment of an antitrust compliance program. In addition, Bosley would be required to submit periodic compliance reports to the FTC.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Boston affirmed verdicts of over $140 million, reached by both a jury and trial court, in favor of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. for injuries suffered as a result of Pfizer, Inc.’s fraudulent scheme to market its epilepsy drug Neurontin for off-label uses (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., April 3, 2013, Lynch, S.).
Neurontin was approved by the FDA as an adjunctive therapy in the treatment of partial seizures in adults with epilepsy, with a maximum dose at 1800 mg/day. Pfizer’s marketing of Neurontin for off-label uses resulted in over $2 billion in sales, with only about ten percent of Neurontin prescriptions filled for on-label uses.
Kaiser alleged that Pfizer and its subdivision Warner-Lambert Company, LLC violated the federal RICO law and the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by fraudulent marketing Neurontin for off-label uses. Pfizer was found to have misrepresented Neurontin's effectiveness for off-label uses directly to doctors, sponsored misleading informational supplements and continuing medical education programs, suppressed negative information about Neurontin, and published articles in medical journals that reported positive information about Neurontin's off-label effectiveness.
The court found that Kaiser presented sufficient evidence of causation to support a RICO claim. Pfizer argued that Kaiser failed to show proximate causation because there were too many steps in the causal chain connecting its misrepresentations to the injury to Kaiser because the injury was based on the actions of independent actors -- the prescribing doctors.
Courts look at three factors to determine whether proximate cause exists under RICO: the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of damages attributable to the violation; claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury to avoid the risk of multiple recoveries; and the societal interest in deterring illegal conduct and whether that interest would be served in a particular case.
In cases where the plaintiffs did not receive the misrepresentations at issue, courts may still find proximate causation. Pfizer’s argument that Kaiser could not show causation because its misrepresentations went to prescribing doctors was, therefore, dismissed. Kaiser was a foreseeable victim of Pfizer's scheme to defraud, and Kaiser’s injury was a natural consequence of the scheme. Pfizer was obviously aware that doctors would not be the ones paying for the drugs they prescribed, and that its revenues stemmed from payments by insurance and health care plans such as Kaiser.
Kaiser submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate but-for causation between Pfizer’s conduct and its injury, according to the court. Pfizer argued that its evidence at trial rendered Kaiser's theories of causation false. Kaiser presented evidence that its employees directly relied on Pfizer's misrepresentations in preparing monographs and formularies, which, in turn, influenced doctors' prescribing decisions, and Pfizer's fraudulent off-label marketing directed to physicians caused PMG doctors to issue more Neurontin prescriptions than they would have absent such marketing. Pfizer's evidence did not, as a matter of law or of evidence, "falsify" Kaiser's theory of reliance upon Pfizer's misrepresentations. The testimony of some doctors who did not view Pfizer’s statements that prescribed Neurontin for off-label uses did not defeat the inference that this misinformation had a significant influence on prescribing decisions which injured Kaiser.
The statistical evidence submitted by Kaiser’s expert was sufficient and admissible, according to the court. Pfizer argued that some of the evidence Kaiser presented to prove but-for causation was inadmissible based on the methodology used. However, regression analysis, used by Kaiser’s expert, is a recognized and scientifically valid approach to understanding statistical data. Pfizer also argued that the expert failed to account for other factors that may have led doctors to prescribe Neurontin for off-label use. The court found that the district court was well within its discretion to admit Kaiser’s evidence.
Kaiser presented sufficient evidence for the jury and district court to find that Neurontin was not effective for the four off-label conditions, according to the court. Pfizer argued that the court applied an erroneous burden of proof and an erroneous medical standard in making its findings as to Neurontin's effectiveness. However, the court did not but the burden on Pfizer of proving Neurontin’s effectiveness. Kaiser presented sufficient evidence on the topic, and Pfizer was unable to overcome it.
The court also dismissed Pfizer’s challenges to the amount of damages awarded by the jury and court. The district court did not err in accepting Kaiser’s methodology for calculating damages.
Labels: California Unfair Competition Law, Civil RICO, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Pfizer Inc.


George Michael Curley, pro se.
Richard J. Banta and Lisa A. Vanderhoof, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, State of New Mexico and Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General, State of New Mexico, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees.
David W. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General; Norman C. Bay, United States Attorney; Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, Department of Justice; and Jonathan H. Levy, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.
George Michael Curley filed this pro se civil-rights action seeking to restrict inmate-to-inmate correspondence in the New Mexico prison system. Acting sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We granted Curley's motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees, appointed counsel, and directed supplemental briefing on the constitutionality of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (Order of October 10, 2000.) We also granted the United States's motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a congressional act. (Order of January 24, 2001.) We now affirm.
Curley is a state prisoner in New Mexico. Due to unspecified threats, he has been placed in administrative segregation for his own safety. He alleges that he is being targeted by members of the "Security Threat Group," allegedly a group of inmates in the New Mexico prison system who take retaliatory action against other inmates. He asserts that members of the Security Threat Group plan their violent activities through inmate-to-inmate correspondence. While in segregation, Curley received a threatening letter from an inmate at another facility, which he turned over to a prison official. Although we do not have a copy of that letter, Curley alleges it revealed that he was being targeted by the Security Threat Group because of his perceived assistance to the authorities in some way.
Curley seeks, by this lawsuit, to prohibit all inmate-to-inmate mail except for correspondence between immediate family members or involving legal issues. His complaint asks for a declaratory judgment and an injunction that (among other things) would require Defendants to "investigate" and ultimately implement more restrictive correspondence regulations. He does not seek monetary damages.
The district court granted Curley's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court, acting sua sponte, then dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
On appeal, Curley challenges both the district court's dismissal decision on the merits and the constitutionality of the court's procedure in sua sponte dismissal. We address the merits first because we need to address the constitutional procedural challenge only if we affirm on the merits the dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6).
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court's decision to dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). We must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. We further construe a pro se complaint liberally. See id. "Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend." Id. Similarly, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) without affording the plaintiff notice or an opportunity to amend is proper only "when it is 'patently obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Like the district court in this case, we construe Curley's complaint as asserting a violation of the Eighth Amendment. He argues that the prison officials created unconstitutional conditions of confinement by failing to prevent or monitor inmate-to-inmate correspondence, which is an alleged mechanism that inmates use to plan violence against other inmates.
A prison official's failure to prevent harm "violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, the prison official's act or omission must be "objectively, sufficiently serious" and "result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. . . . [T]he inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, the "prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind," in this case "deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of the risk to inmate safety. See id. at 837.
The complaint in this case does not meet either requirement. While "prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners," id. at 833 (citations, quotations marks, and alteration omitted), Curley has not alleged facts to show that the vague threat he received, without more, poses a substantial risk of serious harm to him. More significantly, Curley has not alleged that any of the Defendants are acting with deliberate indifference to his safety. To the contrary, he alleges that he has been placed in administrative segregation for his own protection. Therefore, the complaint as it stands did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We can conceive of amendments to the complaint that would satisfy the first prong of Farmer, if Curley could show that the letter he received was so threatening and credible that the prison officials' failure to act is objectively, sufficiently serious. We do not believe, however, that any amendment could establish that the officials are acting with deliberate indifference to Curley's safety. By placing Curley in administrative segregation, the officials have demonstrated concern for his safety. Even if it is negligent of them not to take further protective actions, it cannot be said that they have shown deliberate indifference. Cf. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]o the extent the defendants knew of threats they took immediate action to remove McGill from the general population. It makes no sense to infer that they wanted him humiliated, or didn't give a fig for his welfare, when they acted promptly to protect his safety."), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Because no amendment could cure this defect, it was appropriate for the district court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
We therefore affirm the district court's decision dismissing Curley's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Curley argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the laws by dismissing his complaint without providing notice or an opportunity to amend it. We review this constitutional question de novo. See White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (constitutionality of a federal statute).
Curley argues that the dismissal in his case violated his due process rights by infringing on his right of access to the courts. A number of courts have held, however, that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a statutory provision does not violate due process or unduly burden a plaintiff's right of access to the courts. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the screening provisions of § 1915A do not restrict prisoners' right of access to the courts); Constant v. United States, 929 F.2d 654, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that due process is not violated by sua sponte dismissal when the underlying claim is without merit and amendment would be futile); Hanley v. Stewart, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (D. Ariz. 1998) ("A prisoner whose case has been dismissed pursuant to section 1915A(b)(1) has had his case heard and decided by a court and therefore has not been denied access to the courts."); cf. Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1998) (apparently rejecting a due process challenge to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without comment); Bilal v. Kaplan, 956 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (affirming the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion arguing that sua sponte dismissal violated due process); Baker v. Director, United States Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("[A] trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief. . . . [This rule] is practical and fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights . . . ." (quotation marks omitted)). But see Jefferson Fourteenth Assoc. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 527 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Even if its claim ultimately has no merit, a party who brings a claim in good faith has a due process right to litigate that claim. . . . The order . . . sua sponte dismissing the case failed to give Wometco its due process rights to file a written response, present its arguments at a hearing, and amend its complaint.").
We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts. Curley has not been prevented from bringing a meritorious claim. In addition, we find adequate procedural safeguards to avoid erroneous dismissals. A litigant whose complaint has been dismissed with prejudice could file a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) or for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).(4) The litigant can also bring an appeal, in which we conduct plenary review of the sufficiency of the complaint. Other courts have found these procedures adequate to protect plaintiffs' rights in the context of sua sponte dismissals for failure to prosecute, see Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962), or for defective service, see Blaney v. West, 209 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (7th Cir. 2000). As the Seventh Circuit explained, "The lack of notice before the entry of the judgment certainly did not rise to the level of a violation of due process in this case because [the plaintiff] received notice from the judgment itself and had ample opportunity after the entry of the judgment to make his case to the district court." Blaney, 209 F.3d at 1032; cf. Link, 370 U.S. at 632 ("[T]he availability of a corrective remedy such as is provided by Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b)  which authorizes the reopening of cases in which final orders have been inadvisedly entered  renders the lack of prior notice of less consequence."). We hold similarly that the lack of prior notice of a sua sponte dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a claim is harmless when, as here, the plaintiff has a reasonable post-judgment opportunity to present his arguments to the district court and the appellate court, including the opportunity to suggest amendments that would cure the complaint's deficiencies.
We reiterate that the district court should allow a plaintiff an opportunity to cure technical errors or otherwise amend the complaint when doing so would yield a meritorious claim. Cf. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (holding that under a prior version of § 1915, "if it appears that frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a court of appeals reviewing a § 1915(d) disposition should consider whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend."). In this case, however, the district court appears to have considered whether amendment would be futile. (Doc. 9, at 1.) Given Curley's allegation that the prison has responded to his safety concerns by placing him in protective segregation, we agree that amendment would be futile. Curley therefore has been afforded the process to which he is constitutionally entitled.
Curley argues that § 1915(e)(2) violates equal protection principles by treating indigent litigants less favorably than paying litigants. As we noted above, however, in this circuit the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted without providing an opportunity to amend is very similar under § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, indigent litigants are not treated less favorably then paying litigants.
In addition, "[u]nless a legislative classification either burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, it need only bear a rational relation to some legitimate end to comport with" equal protection. White, 157 F.3d at 1234 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indigent plaintiffs(5) do not constitute a suspect class, see id., and we concluded above that the sua sponte dismissal in this case did not violate Curley's fundamental due process rights. We agree with the Eighth Circuit that § 1915(e)(2) rationally advances the legitimate goal of removing meritless cases from the federal dockets by allowing the courts to review sua sponte claims that are particularly likely to lack merit, since indigent litigants have less financial incentive than do paying litigants to screen their potential claims. See Christiansen, 147 F.3d at 658. The Christiansen case appears to be the only published federal appellate decision squarely to rule on the constitutionality of this section. We likewise hold that § 1915(e)(2) does not violate Curley's equal protection rights.
Curley's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The statute under which his complaint was dismissed is constitutional. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's decision.
1.Section 1915(e)(2) provides that once a district court allows a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted."
2.Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move that a complaint be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
3.A similar provision mandates sua sponte review of complaints by prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The district court did not rely on § 1915A, and we express no opinion on its constitutionality or proper construction.
4.Curley did not file a motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60.
5.Curley's Supplemental Brief also seems to argue that the statute discriminates between prisoners and non-prisoners. However, prisoners, like indigents, are not a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection analysis. See White, 157 F.3d at 1234. The analysis is therefore similar regardless of whether Curley is treated as a prisoner or an indigent.


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D.C. Law Library - § 6–1106. Subdivisions.
(a) Before the Mayor may admit to record any subdivision of an historic landmark or of a property in an historic district, the Mayor shall review the application for admission to record in accordance with this section and § 6-1108.03, and, for applications that will be submitted to the Historic Preservation Review Board or the Commission of Fine Arts for a public hearing, place notice of the application in the District of Columbia Register and on the website for the Historic Preservation Office.
(b) Prior to making the finding on the application for admission to record required by subsection (e) of this section, the Mayor shall refer the application to the Historic Preservation Review Board for its recommendation.
(c) Within 120 days after the Review Board receives the referral, the Mayor shall, after a public hearing, make the finding required by subsection (e) of this section; provided, that the Mayor may make such finding without a public hearing in the case of a subdivision of a lot in an historic district or a subdivision that assembles land with the lot of a historic landmark if the Review Board advises him that such subdivision is consistent with the purposes of this subchapter.
(d) If the Review Board recommends against granting the application, it shall promptly notify the applicant in writing of its recommendation and the reasons therefor.
(e) No subdivision subject to this subchapter shall be admitted to record unless the Mayor finds that admission to record is necessary in the public interest or that a failure to do so will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the owner.
(f) The owner shall submit at the hearing such information as is relevant and necessary to support his application. In any case in which there is a claim of unreasonable economic hardship, the owner shall comply with the requirements of subsections (f) and (g) of § 6-1104.
(g) In those cases in which the Mayor finds that the subdivision is necessary to allow the construction of a project of special merit, no subdivision shall be permitted to record unless a permit for new construction is issued simultaneously under § 6-1107 and the owner demonstrates the ability to complete the project.
This section is referenced in § 6-1108, § 6-1108.01, and § 6-1113.
D.C. Law 16-185, in subsec. (c), substituted “historic district or a subdivision that assembles land with the lot of a historic landmark” for “historic district”; and, in subsec. (g), “no subdivision shall be permitted to record” for “no subdivision permit shall be issued”.
Applicability of D.C. Law 20-249: § 3 of D.C. Law 20-249 provided that the change made to this section by § 2(c) of D.C. Law 20-249 is subject to the inclusion of the law’s fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. Therefore that amendment has not been implemented.
Because of the codification of D.C. Law 5-69 as subchapter II of this chapter, and the designation of the preexisting text of Chapter 11 as subchapter I, “subchapter” has been substituted for “chapter”, where applicable, in this section.

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NJ APPEALS COURT VOIDS MORTGAGE: US BANK, N.A. VS. NIKIA HOUGH, ET AL.
While US Bank cannot foreclose on the home, it can sue her to collect the debt she still owes.
MR. HOUGH, HUSBAND OF NIKIA HOUGH; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS; COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING; TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY; NEW JERSEY HOUSING AND MORTGAGE FINANCE AGENCY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; and THE COMMONS AT PISCATAWAY, INC., Defendants.
Henry A. Loeb argued the cause for appellant (Blumberg & Rosenberg, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Loeb, on the brief).
Vladimir Palma argued the cause for respondent (Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, PC, attorneys; Mr. Palma, on the brief).
Geraldine Callahan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Attorney General (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Callahan, on the statement in lieu of brief).
Before Judges Fuentes, Gilroy and Simonelli.
The primary question presented is whether a commercial lender, which makes a loan secured by a mortgage on an affordable housing unit in excess of the amount permitted by N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b), is prohibited from seeking to foreclose the mortgage. We answer the question in the affirmative, holding that the mortgage is void pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e). Accordingly, we reverse.
The owner’s right title and interest in this unit and the use, sale and resale of this property are subject to the terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations and provisions as set forth in Ordinance number 88-34, as amended, which Ordinance is entitled “An Ordinance Establishing and Creating Regulations Governing the Conduct of the Purchase and/or Rental of Affordable Housing in the Township of Piscataway[,”]. . . as well as those terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations, and provisions as set forth in the “Affordable Housing Plan of the Commons at Piscataway” dated April 3, 1991 which plan was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Middlesex County . . . on June 20, 1991. Both are on file with the Piscataway Township Department of Planning and Community Development.
The deed was recorded in the Middlesex County Clerk’s Office on March 15, 2004.
On March 25, 2005, Hough refinanced the condominium unit by borrowing $108,000 from Mortgage Lenders Network, USA, Inc. At the time of the mortgage transaction, the maximum allowable resale price of the condominium unit, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6, was approximately $68,735.41.[ 1 ] Hough executed a promissory note in favor of Mortgage Lenders, secured by a mortgage on the condominium unit. The mortgage was recorded in the Middlesex County Clerk’s Office on April 14, 2005. Hough used the mortgage proceeds to satisfy the Wells Fargo purchase money mortgage then in the amount of $62,795.10, and for other personal unsecured debts, and real property tax liens. Hough netted $20,080.45 from the mortgage refinance. The new mortgage included the same affordable housing restriction contained in the January 14, 2004 deed. On February 1, 2007, Hough defaulted on the mortgage.
On June 12, 2007, Mortgage Lenders filed a complaint in foreclosure against Hough.[ 2 ] On July 20, 2007, Mortgage Lenders assigned the mortgage to plaintiff. On July 8, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding as defendants: the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), the Township, HMFA, and Hough’s condominium, The Commons at Piscataway, Inc. Plaintiff served Hough with the amended complaint and summons on August 13, 2008. Plaintiff entered default against defendants on September 18, 2008.
The Township filed an answer alleging priority over plaintiff’s mortgage based on the deed restriction. On December 15, 2008, plaintiff and the Township filed a consent order under which the Township withdrew its answer; and plaintiff agreed to prosecute the action subject to the affordable housing restriction referenced in the January 14, 2004 deed, to provide the Township with notice of any sheriff’s sale, and to request the court return the matter to the Office of Foreclosure as an uncontested action.
On January 26, 2009, plaintiff filed and served a notice for entry of final judgment. On March 9, 2009, plaintiff filed proofs in support of its request for entry of judgment. In the interim, Hough filed a motion seeking to void the judgment of foreclosure and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, contending that the mortgage violated the UHAC regulations, as it secured a loan in excess of the amount permitted pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b).
On April 3, 2009, mistakenly believing that final judgment had already been entered, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that vacating the judgment would improperly bestow a benefit upon Hough because she had been aware of the affordable housing restrictions when she borrowed the money, paid off the Wells Fargo mortgage, and otherwise used or retained the balance of the mortgage proceeds. It is from this order that Hough appeals.
The order appealed from is not a final judgment. A “final judgment in an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage fixes the amount due under the mortgage and directs the sale of the real estate to raise funds to satisfy the amount due.” Eisen v. Kostakos, 116 N.J. Super. 358, 365 (App. Div. 1971). Accordingly, the order appealed from is interlocutory, as it is not final as to all parties and all issues. Janicky v. Pt. Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545, 549-50 (App. Div. 2007). Nonetheless, because of the importance of the issue presented, we grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Gill v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 404 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2008).
Questioning whether N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) requires voiding only the mortgage or whether it also requires voiding the indebtedness, we invited the Attorney General to address the issue on behalf of the HMFA. Consistent with Hough’s initial assertion, the Attorney General argued it is only “the mortgage secured by the affordable property that offends the regulation and is void as against public policy.” Nonetheless, contrary to her initial position, Hough contended at re-argument that we should not only void the mortgage, but also declare the underlying indebtedness void as against public policy.
(a) Prior to incurring any indebtedness to be secured by an ownership unit, the owner shall submit to the administrative agent a notice of intent to incur such indebtedness, in such form and with such documentary support as determined by the administrative agent, and the owner shall not incur any such indebtedness unless and until the administrative agent has determined in writing that the proposed indebtedness complies with the provisions of this section.
(b) With the exception of original purchase money mortgages, during a control period, neither an owner nor a lender shall at any time cause or permit the total indebtedness secured by an ownership unit to exceed 95 percent of the maximum allowable resale price of that unit, as such price is determined by the administrative agent in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.6(c).
“Administrative agent” is defined in the regulations as meaning “the entity responsible for administering the affordability controls of this subchapter with respect to specific restricted units, as designated pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.14.” N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.2.
(c) The initial purchase price of a restricted ownership unit financed under [Urban Home Ownership Recovery Program] or [Market Oriented Neighborhood Investment Program] unit shall be calculated so that the monthly carrying costs of the unit, including principal and interest (based on a mortgage loan equal to 95 percent of the purchase price and the Federal Reserve HR15 rate of interest), taxes, homeowner and private mortgage insurance and condominium or homeowner association fees do not exceed 28 percent of the eligible monthly income of a household whose income does not exceed 45 percent of median income, in the case of a low-income unit, or 72 percent of median income, in the case of a moderate-income unit, and that is of an appropriate household size as determined under N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.4.
(d) The maximum resale price for a restricted ownership unit, if the resale occurs prior to the one-year anniversary of the date on which title to the unit was first transferred to a certified household, is the initial purchase price. If the resale occurs on or after such anniversary date, the maximum resale price shall be consistent with the regional income limits most recently published by COAH and calculated pursuant to [N.J.A.C.] 5:94-7.2(b). The administrative agent shall prove all resale prices, in writing and in advance of the resale, to assure compliance with the foregoing standards.
Banks and other lending institutions are prohibited from issuing any loan secured by owner-occupied real property subject to the affordability controls set forth in this subchapter, if such loan would be in excess of the amounts permitted by the restriction documents recorded in the deed or mortgage book in the county in which the property is located. Any loan issued in violation of this subsection shall be void as against public policy.
Hough contends that because N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(e) provides that “[a]ny loan issued in violation of [the regulation] shall be void as against public policy,” that the regulation prohibits plaintiff from seeking not only to foreclose upon the mortgage, but also from seeking to collect upon the underlying debt instrument. Plaintiff counters that because it has agreed with the Township that it will foreclose upon the condominium unit subject to the affordable housing restrictions, stipulating that any sheriff’s sale will not produce a sale price higher than the maximum resale price as determined by the UHAC regulations, and the property would be sold only to a qualified buyer as determined under those regulations, that we should affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff also contends that if we prohibit it from proceeding with its foreclosure action, Hough “would clearly have been unjustly enriched,” when, in fact, her own acts or omissions materially contributed to the mortgage refinance in violation of N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b). In support of that contention, plaintiff cites N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(a), which requires an owner to give notice of intent to the administrative agent that the owner intends to incur an indebtedness secured by a mortgage on the affordable housing unit, other than a first purchase money mortgage loan. Plaintiff asserts the record is devoid of any evidence that Hough gave the required notice before she refinanced the property with Mortgage Lenders.
The HMFA, through the Attorney General, contends that N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) only requires the voiding of the mortgage as against public policy, contending that “[t]he regulation does not affect the underlying debt as that does not undermine the regulation’s purpose.” We agree with the HMFA’s interpretation of the regulation.
“[W]e `give great deference to an agency’s interpretation and implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it is responsible.'” ZRB, LLC v. NJ Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 403 N.J. Super. 531, 549 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488 (2004)); see also DiMaria v. Bd. of Trustees of Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 225 N.J. Super. 341, 351 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988). “That deference stems from the recognition that agencies have specialized expertise and superior knowledge in the areas of law delegated by the Legislature.” Lourdes Med. Ctr. v. Bd. of Rev., 394 N.J. Super. 446, 458 (App. Div. 2007), rev’d. on other grounds, 197 N.J. 339 (2009).
The agency’s interpretation need not be the only permissible one or even the one that the court would have chosen had the question been first presented to it. Matturri v. Bd. of Trs. of Judicial Ret. Sys., 173 N.J. 368, 382 (2002). So long as the agency’s interpretation is not “plainly unreasonable,” it will prevail. Ibid. Nonetheless, “we are not `bound by the agency’s interpretation of the statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.'” ZRB, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 550 (quoting In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 658 (1999)).
Applying these principles, we conclude that HMFA’s interpretation of N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) is not “plainly unreasonable” because it supports the primary purpose of the UFAC regulations. Thus, plaintiff is only barred from seeking to foreclose upon the mortgage; it is not barred from seeking to collect upon the underlying obligation.
The Legislature enacted the New Jersey Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to 329, to further the goals of the Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel decisions. The Court in Mt. Laurel I declared that the New Jersey Constitution “requires every developing municipality, through its land use ordinance, to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the region’s low and moderate income housing needs.” In re Adoption of Unif. Hous. Affordability Controls by the N.J. Hous. and Mortgage Fin. Agency, 390 N.J. Super. 89, 92 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 65 (2007); see also N.J.S.A. 52:27D-302a. In Mt. Laurel II, the Court mandated that “municipalities were required to address not only the housing needs of their own citizens, but also the housing needs `of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing demand within the municipality.'” In re Adoption of Unif. Hous. Affordability Controls, supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 93 (quoting Mt. Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 208-09).
To implement the legislative process of the FHA, the Legislature established COAH, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-305a, and appointed the HMFA as the agency to “establish affordable housing programs to assist municipalities in meeting the obligation of developing communities to provide low and moderate income housing.” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-321. COAH and the HMFA are authorized to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out their statutory charges. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307.5 and N.J.S.A. 52:27D-321e, f, and g, respectively.
Pursuant to the FHA, the HMFA developed and now administers housing affordability controls. 36 N.J.R. 3655(a). The purpose of those controls is to “ensure the continuing affordability of housing receiving credit from [COAH] or receiving funding under the Neighborhood Preservation Balanced Housing . . . program.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
We reject defendant’s contention that N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(e) requires voidance of both the mortgage and the underlying indebtedness. Such an interpretation would unduly enrich Hough, with Hough having contributed to the mortgage refinance. Regulations, like statutes, must be construed “to avoid . . . interpretations that lead to absurd or unreasonable results.” State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005); see also Cosmair, Inc. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax., 109 N.J. 562, 570 (1988) (“[i]f a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words.”) (quoting State v. Clark, 29 N.J.L. 96, 99 (1860)).
We reverse the June 12, 2009 order that denied defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff may file a separate action seeking to collect upon the unsecured underlying indebtedness.
1. The record contains a November 13, 2007 letter from the Township, advising that the maximum allowable resale price of the condominium unit on that date was $68,735.41. Although the record does not contain any evidence of the maximum allowable resale price as of the date of the mortgage transaction, Hough certified that it was lower than on November 13, 2007.
2. At time Hough executed the mortgage in favor of Mortgage Lenders, she executed the mortgage as a single person. The complaint also named “Mr. Hough” as a defendant as Mortgage Lenders did not know at the time of filing the complaint whether Hough had married subsequent to execution of the mortgage.
3. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) (Mt. Laurel II); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808, 96 S. Ct. 18, 46 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I).
4. We note that the January 14, 2004 deed restriction does not conform to the mandatory deed form contained in the Appendixes to N.J.A.C. 5:80-26 that were later adopted on November 23, 2004, effective December 20, 2004. 36 N.J.R. 5713(a). The mandatory deed restrictions contained in the Appendixes prohibit a property owner from incurring an indebtedness secured by a mortgage upon the affordable housing unit as contained in N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.18(d)4iii and in N.J.A.C. 5:80-26.8(b). N.J.A.C. 5:80-26, Appendix A, Mandatory Deed Form for Ownership Units, Art. 4C. Plaintiff does not contest that it was on constructive notice that the property was an affordable housing unit, subject to the UHAC regulations.
This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

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'Section 1. The welfare of the state of Washington depends on the welfare of its workers and demands that they be protected from conditions that result in their being liable to imposition and extortion.
'The state of Washington therefore exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of imposition and extortion and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state.
'Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing him or her with employment or with information leading thereto.
In Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523, the supreme court held schoolteachers were not 'workers' within the quoted measure, and that it did not apply to one conducting an agency patronized only by such teachers and their employers. And in State v. Rossman, 93 Wash. 530, L.R.A.1917B, 1276, 161 Pac. 349, the same court declared it did not in fact prohibit employment agencies, since they might charge fees against persons wishing to hire laborers; that it was a valid exercise of state power; that a stenographer and bookkeeper is a 'worker;' and that one who charged him a fee for furnishing information leading to employment violated the law.
As members of copartnerships and under municipal licenses, during the year 1914 and before, appellants were carrying on in the city of Spokane well established agencies for securing employment for patrons who paid fees therefor. November 25, 1914, in the United States district court, they filed their original bill against W. V. Tanner, attorney general of the state, and George H. Crandall, prosecuting attorney for Spokane county, asking that Initiative Measure Number 8 be declared void because in conflict with the 14th Amendment, Federal Constitution, and that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from undertaking to enforce it. On the same day they presented a motion for preliminary injunction, supported by affidavits which were subsequently met by countervailing ones. Appellees thereafter entered motions to dismiss the original bill because (1) 'said bill of complaint does not state facts sufficient to warrant this court in granting any relief to the plaintiffs; (2) that plaintiffs have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (3) this court has no jurisdiction over the persons of these defendants or either of them, or the subject-matter of this action.' A temporary injunction was denied. The motions to dismiss were sustained and a final decree to that effect followed.
Considering the doctrine affirmed in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, and cases there cited, the record presents no serious question in respect of jurisdiction.
We have held employment agencies are subject to police regulation and control. 'The general nature of the business is such that, unless regulated, many persons may be exposed to misfortunes against which the legislature can properly protect them.' Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 343, 60 L. ed. 1034, 1036, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. But we think it plain that there is nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare in acting as paid representative of another to find a position in which he can earn an honest living. On the contrary, such service is useful, commendable, and in great demand. In Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 324, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100, 98 Pac. 755, the supreme court of Washington said: 'It cannot be denied that the business of the employment agent is a legitimate business; as much so as is that of the banker, broker, or merchant; and under the methods prevailing in the modern business world it may be said to be a necessary adjunct in the prosecution of business enterprises.' Concerning the same subject, Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 236, 66 L.R.A. 928, 103 Am. St. Rep. 82, 77 Pac. 924, 1 Ann. Cas. 428, the supreme court of California said: 'The business in which this defendant is engaged is not only innocent and innocuous, but is highly beneficial, as tending the more quickly to secure labor for the unemployed. There is nothing in the nature of the business, therefore, that in any way threatens or endangers the public health, safety, or morals.' And this conclusion is fortified by the action of many states in establishing free employment agencies charged with the duty to find occupation for workers.
It is alleged: 'That plaintiffs have furnished positions for approximately ninety thousand persons during the last year, and have received applications for employment from at least two hundred thousand laborers, for whom they have been unable to furnish employment. . . . That such agencies have been established and conducted for so long a time that they are now one of the necessary means whereby persons seeking employment are able to secure the same.' A suggestion in behalf of the state, that while a pursuit of this kind 'may be beneficial to some particular individuals or in specific cases, economically it is certainly nonuseful, if not vicious, because it compels the needy and unfortunate to pay for that which they are entitled to without fee or price, that is, the right to work,' while possibly indicative of the purpose held by those who originated the legislation, in reason, gives it no support.
Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction of one's right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession, possibly no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practices; and as to every one of them, no doubt, some can be found quite ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skilfully directed agitation might also bring about apparent condemnation of any one of them by the public. Happily for all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be freely submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification is advanced and the police power invoked.
The general principles by which the validity of the challenged measure must be determined have been expressed many times in our former opinions. It will suffice to quote from a few.
'If, looking at all the circumstances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling, the state thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless, looking through mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they can say that the statute enacted professedly to protect the public morals has no real or substantial relation to that object, but it a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law.' Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 429, 46 L. ed. 623, 626, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425.
'It is also true that the police power of the state is not unlimited, and is subject to judicial review, and when exerted in an arbitrary or oppressive manner such laws may be annulled as violative of rights protected by the Constitution. While the courts can set aside legislative enactments upon this ground, the principles upon which such interference is warranted are as well settled as is the right of judicial interference itself. The legislature, being familiar with local conditions, is, primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The mere fact that a court may differ with the legislature in its views of public policy, or that judges may hold views inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground for judicial interference, unless the act in question is unmistakably and palpably in excess of legislative power. . . . If there existed a condition of affairs concerning which the legislature of the state, exercising its conceded right to enact laws for the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of the people, might pass the law, it must be sustained; if such action was arbitrary interference with the right to contract or carry on business, and having no just relation to the protection of the public within the scope of legislative power, the act must fail.' McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 548, 53 L. ed. 315, 319, 320, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206.
'The 14th Amendment protects the citizens in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does not prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public. Neither does it prevent a municipality from prohibiting any business which is inherently vicious and harmful. But, between the useful business which may be regulated and the vicious business which can be prohibited lie many nonuseful occupations which may, or may not be harmful to the public, according to local conditions, or the manner in which they are conducted.' Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 628, 56 L. ed. 1229, 1232, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 153, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697.
We are of opinion that Initiative Measure Number 8, as constructed by the supreme court of Washington, is arbitrary and oppressive, and that it unduly restricts the liberty of appellants, guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, to engage in a useful business. It may not therefore be enforced against them.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Mr. Justice McKenna dissents upon the ground that, under the decisions of this court,some of them so late as to require no citation or review,the law in question is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, directed against a demonstrated evil.
To declare the statute of a state, enacted in the exercise of the police power, invalid under the 14th Amendment, is a matter of such seriousness that I state the reasons for my dissent from the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs, who are proprietors of private employment agencies in the city of Spokane, assert that this statute, if enforced, would compel them to discontinue business and would thus, in violation of the 14th Amendment, deprive them of their liberty and property without due process of law. The act leaves the plaintiffs free to collect fees from employers; and it appears that private employment offices thus restricted are still carrying on business. 2 But even if it should prove, as plaintiffs allege, that their business could not live without collecting fees from employees, that fact would not necessarily render the act invalid. Private employment agencies are a business properly subject to police regulation and control. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 60 L. ed. 1034, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. And this court has made it clear that a statute enacted to promote health, safety, morals, or the public welfare may be valid, although it will compel discontinuance of existing businesses in whole or in part. Statutes prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor present the most familiar example of such a prohibition. But where, as here, no question of interstate commerce is involved, this court has sustained also statutes or municipal ordinances which compelled discontinuance of such business as (a) of manufacturing and selling oleomargarin (Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257); (b) of selling cigarettes (Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132); (c) of selling futures in grain or other commodities (Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 46 L. ed. 623, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425); (d) of selling stocks on margin (Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 47 L. ed. 323, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168); (e) of keeping billiard halls (Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 56 L. ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 153, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697); (f) of selling trading stamps (Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 368, 60 L. ed. 679, 691, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370).
These cases show that the scope of the police power is not limited to regulation as distinguished from prohibition. They show also that the power of the state exists equally, whether the end sought to be attained is the promotion of health, safety, or morals, or is the prevention of fraud or the prevention of general demoralization. 'If the state thinks that an admitted evil cannot be prevented except by prohibiting a calling or transaction not in itself necessarily objectionable, the courts cannot interfere, unless in looking at the substance of the matter, they can see that it 'is a cear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law." Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 609, 47 L. ed. 323, 327, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 429, 46 L. ed. 623, 626, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425. Or, as it is so frequently expressed, the action of the legislature is final, unless the measure adopted appears clearly to be arbitrary or unreasonable, or to have no real or substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by assumptions or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possibleEx facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law.
It is necessary to inquire, therefore: What was the evil which the people of Washington sought to correct? Why was the particular remedy embodied in the statute adopted? And, incidentally, what has been the experience, if any, of other states or countries in this connection? But these inquiries are entered upon, not for the purpose of determining whether the remedy adopted was wise, or even for the purpose of determining what the facts actually were. The decision of such questions lies with the legislative branch of the government. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685, 32 L. ed. 253, 256, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257. The sole purpose of the inquiries is to enable this court to decide whether, in view of the facts, actual or possible, the action of the state of Washington was so clearly arbitrary or so unreasonable that it could not be taken 'by a free government without a violation of fundamental rights.' See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 64, 49 L. ed. 78, 99, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561.
The evils with which the people of Washington were confronted arose partly from the abuses incident to the system of private employment agencies and partly from its inadequacy.
'1. Charging a fee and failing to make any effort to find work for the applicant.
'2. Sending applicants where no work exists.
'3. Sending applicants to distant points where no work or where unsatisfactory work exists, but whence the applicant will not return on account of the expense involved.
'4. Collusion between the agent and employer, whereby the applicant is given a few days' work and then discharged to make way for new workmen, the agent and employer dividing the fee.
'5. Charging exorbitant fees, or giving jobs to such applicants as contribute extra fees, presents, etc.
'Fees are often charged out of all proportion to the service rendered. We know of cases where $5, $9, $10, and even $16 apiece has been paid for jobs at common labor. In one city the fees paid by scrubwomen is at the rate of $24 a year for their poorly paid work. Then there is discrimination in the charges made for the same jobs. Often, too, men are sent a long distance, made to pay fees and transportation, only to find that no one at that place ordered men from the employment agent. A most pernicious practice is the collusion with foremen or superintendents by which the employment agent 'splits fees' with them. That is, the foreman agrees to hire men of a certain employment agent on condition that one fourth or one half of every fee collected from men whom he hires be given to him. This leads the foreman to discharge men constantly in order to have more men hired through the agent and more fees collected. It develops the 'three-gang' method so universally complained of by railroad and construction laborers, namely, one gang working, another coming to work from the employment agent, and a third going back to the city.
But the evils were not limited to what are commonly called abuseslike the fraud and extortion described above. Even the exemplary private offices charging fees to workers might prove harmful, for the reason thus stated in the report to Congress of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, cited supra.
'18. . . . Investigations show, however, that instead of relieving unemployment and reducing irregularity, these employment agencies actually serve to congest the labor market and to increase idleness and irregularity of employment. They are interested primarily in the fees they can earn, and if they can earn more by bringing workers to an already overcrowded city, they do so. Again, it is an almost universal custom among private employment agents to fill vacancies by putting in them people who are working at other places. In this way new vacancies are created and more fees can be earned.
'19. They also fail to meet the problem because they are so numerous and are necessarily competitive. With few exceptions, there is no co-operation among them. This difficulty is further emphasized by the necessity of paying the registration fees required by many agencies; obviously the laborer cannot apply to very many if he has to pay a dollar at each one.
'20. The fees which private employment offices must charge are barriers which prevent the proper flow of labor into the channels where it is needed and are a direct influence in keeping men idle. In the summer, when employment is plentiful, the fees are as low as 25 cents, and men are even referred to work free of charge. But this must necessarily be made up in the winter, when work is scarce. At such times, when men need work most badly, the private employment offices put up their fees and keep the unemployed from going to work until they can pay $2, $3, $5, and even $10 and more for their jobs. This necessity of paying for the privilege of going to work, and paying more the more urgently the job is needed, not only keeps people unnecessarily unemployed, but seems foreign to the spirit of American freedom and opportunity.
During the fifteen years preceding 1914 there had been extensive experimentation in the regulation of private employment agencies. Twenty-four states had attempted direct regulation under statutes, often supplemented by municipal ordinances. 6 Nineteen states had attempted indirect regulation through the competition of state offices, and seven others through competition of municipal offices. 7 Other experiments in indirect regulation through competition petition were made by voluntary organizations, philanthropic, social, and industrial. 8 The results of those experiments were unsatisfactory. The abuses continued in large measure; and the private offices survived to a great extent the competition of the free agencies, public and private. There gradually developed a conviction that the evils of private agencies were inherent and ineradicable, so long as they were permitted to charge fees to the workers seeking employment. And many believed that such charges were the root of the evil.
3. Conditions in the state of Washington.
The peculiar needs of Washington emphasized the derects of the system of private employment offices.
'In no part of the United States perhaps is there so large a field for employment offices as in the Pacific states. As has been noted, industrial conditions there favor inconstancy of employment. Much of the business activity is based upon the casual, short-time job. This in itself means the frequent shifting of workers from place to place. And the shifting is the more difficult, as much of the work offered is in more or less remote districts of the country. . . .
The necessity laid upon so many workers of constantly seeking new jobs opens a peculiarly fertile field for their exploitation by unscrupulous private employment agencies. There is much testimony to the fact and frequency of such exploitation. The most striking evidence of this is that in the state of Washington private agencies made themselves so generally distrusted that in 1915 their complete abolition was ordered by popular vote. . . .
The abuses and the inadequacy of the then existing system are also described by state officials in affidavits included in the record.
It is facts and considerations like these which may have led the people of Washington to prohibit the collection by employment agencies of fees from applicants for work. And weight should be given to the fact that the statute has been held constitutional by the supreme court of Washington and by the Federal district court (three judges sitting),courts presumably familiar with the local conditions and needs.
In so far as the statute may be regarded as a step in the effort to overcome industrial maladjustment and unemployment by shifting to the employer the payment of fees, if any, the action taken may be likened to that embodied in the Washington Workmen's Compensation Law (sustained in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260), whereby the financial burden of industrial accidents is required to be borne by the employers.
As was said in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 387, 42 L. ed. 780, 789, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383.
In my opinion, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
'An Act to Prohibit the Collection of Fees for the Securing of Employment, or Furnishing Information Leading Thereto, and Fixing a Penalty for Violation Thereof.
'The state of Washington therefore exercising herein police and sovereign power declares that the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of imposition and extortion and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state.
'Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or from any person in his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing him or her with employment or with information leading thereto.
The supreme court of Washington has twice passed upon the scope of the act; holding in Huntsworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523, that it is not applicable to teachers, and in State v. Rossman, 93 Wash. 530, L.R.A. 1917B, 1276, 161 Pac. 349, that it is applicable to stenographers and bookkeepers.
See Report of the State of Washington Bureau of Labor (1915, 1916), pp. 120, 121.
The evils incident to private employment agencies first arrested public attention in America about 1890. During the fifteen years preceding the enactment of the Washington law there were repeated investigations, official and unofficial, and there was much discussion and experimentation. See Free Public Employment Offices in the United States; U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bulletin No. 68, p. 1; Statistics of Unemployment and the Work of Employment Offices, U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin 109, p. 5; Subject Index of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 174, pp. 85-87; Munro, Bibliography of Municipal Government, pp. 379-381.
United States Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 109, p. 36.
Final Report and Testimony submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by the Act of August 23, 1912, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. 415, vol. 1, pp. 109-111. See also vol. 2. pp. 1165-1440.
Public Employment OfficesW. M. Leiserson, 29 Political Science Quarterly (March, 1914), p. 36.
Proceedings of the Association of Public Employment Offices (September 25, 1914), U. S. Dep. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 192, p. 61.
Unemployment and Work of Employment Offices, Bulletin of U. S. Bureau of Labor No. 109, pp. 5, 37 (October, 1912).
Made in August, 1915, and cited supra, Note 4. Between 1914 and this date six states had legislated on the subject. See Unemployment Survey, 1914, 1915. 5 American Labor Legislation Review, p. 560.
The fire was so extensive that the Congress appropriated $200,000 for relief of all sufferers (Act of August 1, 1914, chap. 223, 38 Stat. at L. 681).
Labor Laws and their Administration in the Pacific States. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 211 (1917), pp. 17, 18.
Washington State Bureau of Labor, Report 1913, 1914, pp. 27, 28.
Washington State Bureau of Labor, Report 1915, 1916, p. 120.
The first free public employment office in the United States was the municipal agency established in Cleveland in 1890. Then followed (in 1893) the Los Angeles office. Bulletin of United States Bureau of Labor No. 68, p. 1. (Jan. 1907).
Washington State Bureau of Labor Report 1913, 1914, p. 291.
W. D. Wheaton, Labor Agent.'The complaint against the private office is almost universal. The experience of this office is that private agencies charge all that the traffic will bear and that in hard times, when work is scarce and the worker poverty-stricken, the fee is placed so high as to be almost prohibitive, and the agencies take longer chances, sometimes sending men on only a rumor, depending on their financial straits to make it impossible to return.
'The fees charged run from $1 for the poorest job of uncertain duration to as high as 10 per cent of the first year's salary in educational lines, and 30 per cent of the first month's salary in office or mercantile lines. Most of the agencies catering to the better class of positions charge a registration fee which is worked to the limitor rather without limit. Advertisements for attractive positions are placed with the newspapers and registration is made of all that apply, irrespective of whether the position has been filled or not, and generally at a fee of $2 or more. This registration fee is always followed by a percentage of the earnings when a position is secured, but only a small proportion of those registering are placed in positions.
United States Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 109, p. 136.
See Report of Secretary of Labor, 1914, p. 51.
'Aberdeen, Bellingham, Custer, Everett, Friday Harbor, Lynden, Noosack, North Yakima, Port Angeles, Port Townsend, Spokane, Takoma, Walla Walla. Monthly Review of U. S. Labor Statistics, July, 1915, p. 9. See Report of Secretary of Labor, 1915, p. 36; 1916, p. 54. Hearings Committee on Labor, on H. R. 5783, to establish a National Employment Bureau. 64th Cong. 1st Session, February, 1916, p. 49.
The Unemployment Crisis of 1914, 1915, 5 American Labor Legislation Review, p. 475.
Washington State Bureau of Labor Report, 1913, 1914, pp. 13, 16, 17. Unemployment Survey, 5 American Labor Legislation Review, 482, 483 (1915).
Recent Advances in the Struggle against Unemployment, by Prof. Charles R. Henderson, 2 American Labor Legislation Review, 105, 106 (1911). 'The point of starting ameliorative effort is the employment agency or 'labor exchange."
The unemployed in Philadelphia, Department of Public Works (1915) p. 113.
What is done for the Unemployed in European Countries, U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin, No. 76, pp. 741-934; The British System of Labor Exchanges, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 206.
'Anyone who knows the employment agency business and everyone who has tried earnestly to regulate private agencies will testify to the futility of regulation.
General Discussion on Unemployment, 5 American Labor Legislation Review, p. 451; T. S. McMahon, Univ. of Washington.
'The people of the state of Washington are not indifferent to the problem of unemployment, nor do they show any tendency to offer charitable panaceas as a permanent remedy. They trying to work out some constructive policy, and as a preliminary step have made it illegal for employment offices to charge fees for jobs.
'A bill will be presented to the next legislature for the establishment of a network of public employment offices all over the state. This will make possible the complete organization of the labor market, which we hope is the first step toward the organization of industry itself.
'The aggressive attitude of the leaders among the workers has impressed upon the mind of the people the fact that the problem will have to be met in another way than by providing food and clothing for a period of distress such as we are passing through at the present time.

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Bushnell, O.A. The Illustrated Atlas of Hawaii. Norfolk Island. Island Heritage. 1970. 72 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy.
Bushnell, O.A. The Illustrated Atlas of Hawaii. Norfolk Island. Island Heritage. 1970. 72 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Butcher, Russell. The Desert. New York. Viking Press. 1972. 128 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Butler, Daniel. "Unsinkable" Full Story of H.M.S. Titanic. Mechanicsville. Stackpole. 1998. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Butler, Daniel. "Unsinkable" Full Story of H.M.S. Titanic. Mechanicsville. Stackpole. 1998. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Cahill, Marie. A History of Ford Motor Company. Photo available. New York. Smithmark. 1992. 192 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Cahill, Susan (ed). Desiring Italy. Women Writers Celebrate The Passions of a Country and Culture. New York. Fawcett. 1997. Octavo. Soft cover. Fine copy.
Cahill, Tim. Road Fever. A High-Speed Travelogue. New York. Random House. 1991. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Cahilly, Rebecca (ed). The Megayachts USA. Volume 7. 2006. Photo available. Kingston-Upon-Thames. Edisea. 2005. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Cairnes, D.D. Upper White River District, Yukon. Memoir 50. Photo available. Ottawa. Government Printing Office. Canadian Division of Mines. 1915. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Folding maps in rear pocket. Fine copy.
Calderone, John A. The History of Fire Engines. Photo available. New York. Barnes & Noble. 1997. 128 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Calhoun, Bruce. Cruising the San Juan Islands. New York. W.W. Norton. 1973. 216 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Calhoun, Bruce. Cruising the San Juan Islands. Bellevue. Weatherly. 1991. 4to. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy (owner name on end paper).

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