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Lymph-node (LN) stromal cell populations expand during the inflammation that accompanies T cell activation. Interleukin-17 (IL-17)-producing helper T cells (TH17 cells) promote inflammation through the induction of cytokines and chemokines in peripheral tissues. We demonstrate a critical requirement for IL-17 in the proliferation of LN and splenic stromal cells, particularly fibroblastic reticular cells (FRCs), during experimental autoimmune encephalomyelitis and colitis. Without signaling via the IL-17 receptor, activated FRCs underwent cell cycle arrest and apoptosis, accompanied by signs of nutrient stress in vivo. IL-17 signaling in FRCs was not required for the development of TH17 cells, but failed FRC proliferation impaired germinal center formation and antigen-specific antibody production. Induction of the transcriptional co-activator IκBζ via IL-17 signaling mediated increased glucose uptake and expression of the gene Cpt1a, encoding CPT1A, a rate-limiting enzyme of mitochondrial fatty acid oxidation. Hence, IL-17 produced by locally differentiating TH17 cells is an important driver of the activation of inflamed LN stromal cells, through metabolic reprogramming required to support proliferation and survival.
The RNA-Seq datasets generated for Figs. 6 and 7 are available at GEO accession code GSE124649. All other data used to generate figures for the study are available upon request by the corresponding author.
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Funding for this study was provided by the following grants: NIH Nos. AI110822 and AI128991 (to M.J.M.), No. T32-AI089443 (to I.R.), No. DK104680 (to P.S.B.), Nos. DE022550, DE023815 and AI107825 (to S.L.G.), and No. DP2AI136598 (to G.M.D); and R.K. Mellon Institute for Pediatric Research No. AACR SU2C-AACR-IRG-04-16 (to T.W.H). This research was supported in part by the University of Pittsburgh Center for Research Computing through the resources provided. We thank V. Kuchroo (Harvard University) for Il23r–/– mice, P. Kolattukudy (University of Central Florida) for Zc3h12a+/– mice, J. Kolls (Tulane University) for Il17rafl/fl mice (now available at JAX labs) and L. D’Cruz for critical reading of the manuscript.
S.M. and M.J.M. conceptualized and designed the study, performed analysis and wrote the manuscript. S.M., N.A., S.R., C.V.J., P.S.B., D.W. and A.M. performed experiments. N.R., I.R., N.A., A.C.P. and S.K. performed or assisted with analysis. F.D., A.B., U.S., T.W.H., G.M.D., S.L.G., P.S.B. and M.J.M. assisted with methodology, resources and analysis of experiments. T.W.H., A.P., P.S.B. and M.J.M. reviewed and edited the manuscript.
Correspondence to Mandy J. McGeachy.

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Present: Williams, P.J., McCallum [Note 2] and Hand, JJ.
Liam C. Floyd, pro se.
Wendy E. Owens, pro se.
PER CURIAM. This is a Dist./Mun. Cts. R A. D. A. 8C appeal by defendant Wendy E. Owens ("Owens") of the denial of her third motion for relief from a default judgment. There was no error.
On June 28, 2007, plaintiff Liam C. Floyd ("Floyd"), an attorney in the law firm of Stanzler Levine ("Stanzler Levine"), commenced this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment to recover unpaid attorney's fees for legal work he performed on behalf of Owens, defendant Ablemedia, LLC, and others in a superior court action. The return of service filed in the trial court indicates that Owens was served in hand on July 10, 2007, and Owens has admitted receipt of service. Owens failed to file an answer within the twenty day period prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 12(a) (1), and a default judgment was entered against her on August 6, 2007.
On August 15, 2007, Owens filed a motion "to remove and vacate default judgment and dismiss complaint" on the sole ground that Floyd had no standing to bring this action. In an unsworn memorandum in support of her motion, Owens argued only that the retainer agreement she and Floyd had executed was with the law firm of Stanzler Levine, of which Attorney Floyd was a member, and that Floyd was not entitled to commence this suit in his individual capacity. Floyd filed a written opposition to the motion and a supporting affidavit by Attorney Philip H. Levine ("Levine") , who averred that he had assigned Owens' unpaid account to Floyd, who was the proper plaintiff in this collection action. [Note 3] After hearing, Owens' motion was properly denied on October 2, 2007, and execution was issued on October 5, 2007.
this Appellate Division. Instead, on October 18, 2007, Owens simply filed a second motion to vacate judgment that was virtually identical to her first motion. Requests for relief from judgment must be made promptly, see Kalenderian v. Marden, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 930 (1999), and there is nothing in Rule 60(b) that contemplates or permits serial refilings of the same unavailing motion in the hope that a different judge will at some point grant relief. The only change in Owens' second motion was her unsubstantiated allegation that Levine's assignment of her unpaid account to Floyd was not made until after the commencement of this action and, thus, that Floyd had lacked standing at the time he filed this suit. Floyd submitted a second written opposition, with another copy of Levine's affidavit attached, and argued that Owens had again failed to advance any mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect justifying Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b) (1) relief. After a second full hearing before a second judge, Owens' second motion to vacate was denied on November 30, 2007.
Clearly undaunted, and continuing to eschew appellate review, Owens simply filed a third motion to vacate the default judgment on December 7, 2007. Unsupported by an affidavit, Owens' third motion purported to be based on "excusable neglect." Owens claimed that she had retained the law firm of Proskauer Rose ("PR") to defend her in this action; that PR attempted, unsuccessfully, to confer with Floyd during the twenty day period in which her answer should have been filed; that Floyd remained unavailable until the day before her answer was due, and then "denied [PR's] request for an extension without reason"; that a PR attorney informed her the next day that the firm could not represent her because it did not handle malpractice actions against other attorneys; and that she was unable to retain new counsel before the default judgment was entered against her. Floyd responded with a third written opposition, almost identical to that which he had filed against Owens' first and second motions.
On January 16, 2008, Owens' third motion to vacate was denied, without hearing, by a third motion judge, who ruled: "This issue has already been addressed by this Court. Defendant's appropriate avenue if it believes that the court has erred in its decision is to appeal it to the Appellate Division of the District Court. No costs assessed against the defendant at this time" (emphasis in original). Ignoring the implicit threat of sanctions in the court's order, Owens simply filed a fourth motion to vacate on February 4, 2008. She also filed this appeal.
1. As Owens did not, as noted, appeal the denials of her first and second motions to vacate, those rulings are not before us on this appeal. Before proceeding to Owens' third motion, however, it is necessary to clarify that Owens' allegation of Floyd's lack of standing presented in a motion to vacate judgment did not require the first two motion judges to consider any question of the court's jurisdiction, or to determine that the default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.
Owens did not file a Rule 12(b) dismissal motion to raise any issue, properly and timely, of Floyd's standing. The default entered against her effectively established the truth of the well pleaded factual allegations of Floyd's complaint for purposes of liability. Nancy P v. D'Amato, 401 Mass. 516 , 519 (1988); Reichenbach v. Financial Freedom Ctrs., Inc., 2006 Mass. App. Div. 10 , 11. The complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment recited that Owens had failed to pay attorney's fees for the legal services provided to her by Floyd. No question of standing appeared on the face of the complaint. The default judgment entered against Owens was not subject to attack on the issue of standing by a motion to vacate. See Sarin, supra at 424.
2. While a motion to vacate judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion judge, Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 322 , 324-325 (1999), the motion must be predicated on a ground for relief cognizable under Rule 60(b) . MacLeod v. Dizazzo, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 128 , 129; Massey v. Stop & Shop Cos., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 117 , 119 n.2. Thus, a default judgment may be vacated pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (1) only if the moving party demonstrates that the default resulted from some mistake, inadvertence, or neglect that "was excusable and `was not due to his own carelessness."' Murphy v. Administrator of the Div of Personnel Admin., 377 Mass. 217 , 228 (1979), quoting Reporters' Notes, J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice 462 (1977). Owens failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that her failure to file an answer and the default that resulted were attributable to some mistake or neglect on her part that was excusable.
relief. Owens essentially contended that she failed to file an answer due to Floyd's unavailability for most of the twenty day answer period, and his refusal to grant Owens an extension of time to file an answer. Floyd, the opposing party in this case who was in China for most of the time in question, was under no obligation to remain available to, or assist, Owens or her attorney in filing a response to his own complaint. Moreover, Floyd was not authorized to extend the time for filing Owens' answer even if he had been inclined to do so. Parties cannot, with impunity, ignore, flout, or circumvent the Rule 12(a) (1) twenty day deadline for filing an answer. Evangelidis v. Cuevas, 2008 Mass. App. Div. 88 , 90. If an enlargement of time to answer is required, it must be sought by means of a Rule 6(b) motion to the trial court setting forth sufficient good cause, or excusable neglect if the filing time has already expired, to warrant the extension. Old Colony Bank & Trust Co. of Middlesex County v. Tacey Transp. Corp., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 825 (1980). See Rudnicki v. Gottlieb, 337 Mass. 769 (1958). The motion rests entirely within the discretion of the trial court. Croteau v. Swansea Lounge, Inc., 402 Mass. 419 , 422-423 (1988). [Note 5] Owens could have filed a motion at any time before the entry of a default to obtain additional time to file her answer. She failed to do so.
Owens also complains that her PR attorney refused to proceed without reviewing the matter with Floyd first, and then withdrew from the case because her firm did not handle legal malpractice cases. This is, of course, a collection case, not a legal malpractice action. But even if, as Owens claims, her attorney withdrew from the case and Owens was unable to secure new representation before the Rule 12(a) (1) filing time expired, such claim was insufficient to warrant Rule 60(b) (1) relief. Atek, Inc. v. Henry, 1999 Mass. App. Div. 26 . "Even if the defendant offered an excuse for [her] failure to hire an attorney, the defendant always has the option of proceeding pro se." Id. Owens could, at the very least, have proceeded pro se to file a simple Rule 6(b) motion for additional time. As noted, she did not do so.
Finally, Owens failed to advance any facts demonstrating that she had a meritorious defense to Floyd's claims. Proof, preferably by affidavit, of the existence of such a defense is an essential requirement for a successful Rule 60(b) (1) motion. Finkel v. Natale Rota, Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 55 , 57 (1984). In the absence of Owens' assertion of a meritorious defense, the denial of her third motion to vacate the default judgment did not constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. See Clamp All Corp. v. Foresta, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 795 , 807 (2002); Tai v. City of Boston, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 220 , 222 (1998).
held on her earlier motions, then her third motion for relief from the default judgment was nothing more than a motion for reconsideration. When there has been no change of circumstances and no new evidence, a court is not required even to entertain, much less hold a hearing, on a reconsideration motion. Harmon Plumbing, Inc. v. Jacobs, 1994 Mass. App. Div. 88 , 89, citing Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597 , 599 (1940). But even if Owens asserted excusable neglect for the first time in her third Rule 60(b) (1) motion, we find no prejudicial error in the court's denial of that motion without a hearing. Owens' third motion was patently inadequate as a vehicle for relief from judgment, and Owens has not identified any other arguments or claims beyond that motion that she would or could have presented at a third motion hearing.
The denial of the defendant's third motion to vacate the default judgment is affirmed.
[Note 2] The Honorable Paul J. McCallum participated in the hearing of this case, but resigned from the Appellate Division prior to the issuance of this opinion.
[Note 3] Levine averred that he operated Stanzler Levine as a sole proprietorship until June, 2007, at which time he organized the law firm as a limited liability company; that Floyd was a member and an agent of the firm at all times; that Floyd had "formed" the contract with Owens and her codefendants to provide their legal representation, and had served as their lead counsel in the superior court action; that the defendants had failed to pay their legal fees; and that he had assigned the account receivable for the unpaid fees to Floyd, who was the holder of the receivable.
[Note 4] The Appeals Court stated in Southwick: "The [trial] judge may have been under the impression that the plaintiffs standing remained a live issue at the rule 60(b) stage. ... However, standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction only in the sense that it is a criterion that must be met in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction, when the court otherwise is competent to decide the case. Once a court has rendered judgment and opportunities for appeal have been exhausted, a subsequent showing that the plaintiff did not, in fact, have standing does not mean that the judgment is void and must be vacated; the judgment is immune from postjudgment attack unless the court's exercise of jurisdiction constituted a 'clear usurpation of power'" (citations omitted). Southwick, supra at 268, quoting Lubben v. Selective Sew. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972).
[Note 5] A party may, as a courtesy, assent to his opponent's motion for an extension, and such assent may even constitute a factor in a judge's allowance of the motion. See Guindon Ins. Agency v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 931 (1983). What might be phrased as a plaintiff's grant of an extension of time to the defendant to file an answer, see, e.g., Xarras v. McLaughlin, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 799 , 802 (2006), can, at best, constitute only the plaintiff's agreement, as a courtesy, to refrain from requesting a default against the defendant during the extended period in question.

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Today, the United States Supreme Court held that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act, Section 2(a), is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, affirming the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Lee v. Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Matal v. Tam, Case No. 15-1293, __ U.S. __ (June 19, 2017). Section 2(a) prohibits the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). The USPTO had relied upon Section 2(a) in refusing registration of the trademark THE SLANTS, for entertainment services in the nature of live performances by a musical band, on the grounds that the term SLANTS is a derogatory term for Asians.
The Supreme Court next rejected the argument that trademarks are government speech, not private speech. The Court distinguished the Section 2(a) disparagement provision from its prior decision in Walker holding that the messages on Texas specialty license plates are government speech. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The Court observed that: (1) license plates have long been used by the government to convey state messages; (2) license plates are often closely identified in the public mind with the government, are manufactured and owned by the state, are generally designed by the state, and serve as a form of government identification; and (3) the State of Texas maintained direct control over the messages conveyed on the specialty plates. The Court observed none of these factors are present in this case involving the Section 2(a) disparagement provision in the Lanham Act.
The Supreme Court then rejected the arguments that trademarks are a form of a government subsidy, and that the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new “government-program” doctrine.
The Supreme Court then ruled that it need not address whether trademarks constitute commercial speech subject to “intermediate scrutiny” under First Amendment Analysis, or non-commercial speech, subject to “strict scrutiny” because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even “intermediate scrutiny” under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Under Central Hudson, “a restriction of speech must serve ‘a substantial interest,’ and it must be ‘narrowly drawn.’” Id., at 564-565. “This means, among other things, that ‘[t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.’” Id., at 565.
The disparagement clause failed this requirement of extending only as far as the interest it serves. The Supreme Court found that the disparagement clause served two interests: First, “[t]he Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend.” Slip op. at 25.
And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Slip op. at 25 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929)).
Second, the government has an interest in protecting the orderly flow of commerce. However, the Supreme Court ruled that “the disparagement clause is not “narrowly drawn” to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination.” Slip op. at 25. The Court emphasized that the clause “reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution. It applies to trademarks like the following: “Down with racists,” “Down with sexists,” “Down with homophobes.” It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.” Id.
The Supreme Court also found the disparagement clause far too broad in other ways in that it protects every person living or dead as well as every institution. The Court questioned how speech disparaging deceased presidents or calling “Slavery an evil institution” could conceivably disrupt commerce.
The commercial market is well stocked with merchandise that disparages prominent figures and groups, and the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case illustrates. If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, reasoned that the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) constitutes viewpoint discrimination, which is “a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.” Slip op. at 1 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy emphasized that apart from a few categories of speech and narrow exceptions, “it is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.” Id., at 2 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-829 (1995)). “A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an ‘egregious form of content discrimination,’ which is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’” (Id., quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830). Because the disparagement clause permits an applicant to register a positive or benign mark, but not a derogatory one, that law reflects the government’s disapproval of a subset of messages that the government finds offensive. “This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.” Id., at 2-3.
Justice Kennedy further emphasized that regardless of whether or not trademarks are commercial speech, the viewpoint based discrimination at issue with respect to the disparagement clause necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny. “’Commercial speech is no exception, . . . to the principle that the First Amendment ‘requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Id., at 5 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). In Justice Kennedy’s view, to permit viewpoint discrimination in the modern commercial marketplace “is to permit Government censorship.” Id., at 5.
For these reasons, Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment holding Section 2(a) facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tam likely will impact an appeal by the Washington Redskins professional football team to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit of the decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) granting a petition for cancellation of various REDSKINS marks pursuant to Section 2(a). The Tam decision almost certainly will lead to a reversal of the TTAB decision cancelling those registrations on the grounds that they disparage Native American Indians.


text:
A social network may be provided. First, a content group comprising a list of a plurality of content programs may be received. Next, a user selectable element corresponding to the content group may be made available to a plurality of users. A first request may then be received associated with the user selectable element from a one of the plurality of users. The first request may indicate that the one of the plurality of users wants to receive the content group. Next the content group may be provided to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request. A second request may then be received from the one of the plurality of users for content corresponding to a one of the plurality of content programs. Then the content may be provided to the one of the plurality of users in response to the second request.
Under provisions of 35 U.S.C. §119(e), applicants claim the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/946,790, filed Jun. 28, 2007, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/931,698, filed May 25, 2007, both of which are hereby incorporated by reference.
This application is a continuation-in-part (CIP) of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/787,732, filed Apr. 17, 2007, which is incorporated herein by reference. U.S. application Ser. No. 11/787,732, filed Apr. 17, 2007, claimed the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/881,888, filed Jan. 23, 2007, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/897,341, filed Jan. 25, 2007, under provisions of 35 U.S.C. §119(e).
Related U.S. application Ser. No. 11/651,140, filed on Jan. 9, 2007, and U.S. application Ser. No. 11/787,733, filed on Apr. 17, 2007 are hereby incorporated by reference.
Related U.S. application Ser. No. 12/126,025, entitled “PROVIDING A VIDEO USER INTERFACE” (60136.0036U511), U.S. application Ser. No. 12/126,096, entitled “PROVIDING A CONTENT MARK” (60136.0036USI3), U.S. application Ser. No. 12/126,126, entitled “PROVIDING A USER INTERFACE” (60136.0036USI4), and U.S. application Ser. No. 12/126,165, entitled “PROVIDING A CUSTOMIZED USER INTERFACE” (60136.0036USI5), filed on even date herewith in the name of Lisa A. Pickelsimer et al., assigned to the assignee of the present application, are also hereby incorporated by reference.
Service providers may deliver content to a user over a content delivery system. For example, conventional content delivery systems distribute the content to a first user and a second user independently. In other words, the first user may watch a sports program while the second user may simultaneously watch a video-on-demand program. Independent content use, however, does not create a socialized entertainment sense with the users. Consequently, the first user may be socially detached and isolated from the second user. Stated another way, the conventional content delivery system may present an impersonal and unsocial user experience.
Consistent with embodiments of the present invention, a social network may be provided. First, a content group comprising a list of a plurality of content programs may be received. Next, a user selectable element corresponding to the content group may be made available to a plurality of users. A first request may then be received associated with the user selectable element from a one of the plurality of users. The first request may indicate that the one of the plurality of users wants to receive the content group. Next the content group may be provided to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request. A second request may then be received from the one of the plurality of users for content corresponding to a one of the plurality of content programs. Then the content may be provided to the one of the plurality of users in response to the second request.
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a method for providing a social network.
Service providers may deliver content to users over a content delivery system independently. For example, a first user may receive a sports program from the content delivery system while a second user may simultaneously receive a video-on-demand program from the content delivery system. Independent content use by the users, however, does not create a socialized entertainment experience. Consistent with embodiments of the invention, a social network may be provided. First, a request may be received, by a service provider from a subject comprising a subscriber to the social network, to send invitations to a plurality of individuals. The invitations may be directed toward inviting each one of the plurality of individuals to be included in the plurality of users (e.g. social network.) Then the invitations may be sent by the service provider and responses to the invitations may be received. The plurality of individuals may then be included in the plurality of users based upon the received responses. The plurality of users may be considered members of the social network when they answer the invitations affirmatively.
Once the social network's members (e.g. plurality of users) are established, a content group comprising a list of a plurality of content programs (e.g. television shows, movies, broadcast programming, VOD programming, music, and any content available over the internet) may be received by the service provider. Next, a user selectable element corresponding to the content group may be made available to the plurality of users. A first request may then be received, by the service provider, associated with the user selectable element from a one of the plurality of users. The first request may indicate that the one of the plurality of users wants to receive the content group. Next the content group may be provided by the service provider to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request. A second request may then be received by the service provider from the one of the plurality of users for content corresponding to a one of the plurality of content programs. Then the content may be provided by the service provider to the one of the plurality of users in response to the second request.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a content delivery system 100. All or a portion of system 100 may be operated by a system operator. The system operator may comprise, but is not limited to, service provider such as a cable television service provider, for example. Consistent with embodiments of the present invention, system 100 may comprise an edge network 110, an edge quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) device 115, a video-on-demand (VOD) server 120, a communications processor 125, a broadcast server 130, a modular cable modem termination system (M-CMTS) core 135, and a core network 140. In addition, system 100 may comprise, a hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) network 145, a set-top-box (STB) 150, a television (TV) 155, a cable modem (CM) 160, a portable device 165, a personal computer (PC) 170, and a STB control device 175. Communications processor 125 will be discussed in greater detail below with respect to FIG. 2.
Broadcast server 130 may perform processes for providing broadcast services. Broadcast server 130 may use a broadcast signal and a narrowcast signal to deliver broadcast services to a broadcast system. Broadcast server 130 may receive video, audio, and data from fiber optic input, wireless input, recorded tape, recorded digital video disc, or satellite input. Broadcast server 130 may utilize digital signal formats and analog signal formats. Furthermore, broadcast server 130 may comprise a specialized receiver and data switching equipment for broadband distribution including, for example, using switched digital technology for broadcast video delivery to digital set-tops. In addition, broadcast server 130 may provide broadband multimedia services including, for example, i) the broadcast multi-media service; ii) the high-definition multimedia service; iii) the digital television multimedia service; iv) the analog multimedia service; v) the VOD service; vi) the streaming video service; vii) the multimedia messaging service; viii) the voice-over-internet protocol service (VoIP); ix) the interactive multimedia service; and x) the e-mail service. The aforementioned are examples and broadcast server 130 may comprise other components and systems for providing broadcast services in system 100.
Core network 140 may comprise any data or broadband network that may provide data and services to edge network 110, communications processor 125, broadcast server 130, or M-CMTS core 135. For example, core network 140 may comprise the Internet. In addition, core network 140 may comprise various components including, for example, i) servers; ii) switches; iii) routers; iv) gateways; v) hubs; vi) fiber optic cable; vii) copper cable; and viii) terminations. The aforementioned are examples and core network 140 may comprise other components and may supply other services using various other formats.
TV 155 may comprise an end use device for displaying delivered broadband services. TV 155 may comprise, for example, a television, a high definition television, a liquid crystal display unit (LCD), a video projection unit, or PC 170. The aforementioned are examples and TV 155 may comprise other display devices for delivered broadband services.
Portable device 165 or PC 170 may comprise any personal computer, network switch, wireless switch, network hub, server, personal digital assistant, and home computing device. Portable device 165 or PC 170 may serve as user devices for data access from system 100. Portable device 165 and PC 170 may transmit and receive data and services from system 100.
STB control device 175 may comprise any input and output device for interfacing with STB 150. For example, STB control device 175 may be a remote control for using STB 150. STB control device 175, after proper programming, may interface with STB 150.
Furthermore, system 100 maybe configured to utilize Open Cable Applications Platform (OCAP.) OCAP was developed by Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. of Louisville, Colo. 80027-9750, as a common interactive TV platform. OCAP is a specification for a middleware software layer that enables application developers, interactive television services, and various other products to run interactive applications on content delivery system such as television systems.
Embodiments consistent with the invention may comprise a system for providing user communication. The system may comprise a memory storage and a processing unit coupled to the memory storage. The processing unit may be operative to receive a content group comprising a list of a plurality of content programs and to make a user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to a plurality of users. In addition, the processing unit may be operative to receive a first request associated with the user selectable element from a one of the plurality of users. The first request may indicate that the one of the plurality of users wants to receive the content group. Moreover, the processing unit may be operative to provide the content group to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request. Furthermore, the processing unit may be operative to receive a second request from the one of the plurality of users for content corresponding to a one of the plurality of content programs listed in the content group and to provide the content to the one of the plurality of users in response to the second request.
Consistent with embodiments of the present invention, the aforementioned memory, processing unit, and other components may be implemented in a content delivery system, such as system 100 of FIG. 1. Any suitable combination of hardware, software, and/or firmware may be used to implement the memory, processing unit, or other components. By way of example, the memory, processing unit, or other components may be implemented with communications processor 125, in combination with system 100. The aforementioned system and processors are examples and other systems and processors may comprise the aforementioned memory, processing unit, or other components, consistent with embodiments of the present invention.
FIG. 2 shows communications processor 125 of FIG. 1 in more detail. As shown in FIG. 2, communications processor 125 may include a processing unit 210 and a memory unit 215. Memory 215 may include a communication software module 220 and a communication database 225. While executing on processing unit 210, communication software module 220 may perform processes for providing a social network, including, for example, one or more stages included in method 300 described below with respect to FIG. 3. Furthermore, any communication software module 220 and communication database 225 may be executed on or reside in any element shown in FIG. 1.
Communications processor 125 (“the processor”) may be implemented using a personal computer, a network computer, a mainframe, or other similar microcomputer-based workstation. The processor may comprise any computer operating environment, such as hand-held devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable sender electronic devices, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. The processor may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices. Furthermore, the processor may comprise a mobile terminal, such as a smart phone, a cellular telephone, a cellular telephone utilizing wireless application protocol (WAP), personal digital assistant (PDA), intelligent pager, portable computer, a hand held computer, a conventional telephone, a wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) access point, or a facsimile machine. The aforementioned systems and devices are examples and the processor may comprise other systems or devices.
FIG. 3 is a flowchart setting forth the general stages involved in a method 300 consistent with an embodiment of the invention for providing a social network. Method 300 may be implemented using communications processor 125, as described above with respect to FIG. 2. Ways to implement the stages of method 300 will be described in greater detail below. Method 300 may begin at starting block 305 and proceed to stage 310 where communications processor 125 may receive a content group comprising a list of a plurality of content programs. For example, a subscriber to the social network may also be, but not limited to, a subscriber to HFC network 145. For example, the subscriber may have a subscription with a service provider (e.g. such as a cable television service provider) to use all or a portion of system 100. The subscriber, using STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 for example, may create the content group and transmit the content group to communications processor 125. The service provider may control or otherwise operate communications processor 125 and HFC network 145.
The content group may comprise a list of a plurality of content programs. For example, the content programs may comprise, but not limited to, television shows, movies, broadcast programming, VOD programming, music, and any content available over the internet. The aforementioned are examples, and the content programs may comprise any content type. One or more of the plurality of content programs may be provided through HFC network 145 to the subscriber to, for example, STB 150, portable device 165, or PC 170.
The plurality of content programs may comprise favorite programs of the subscriber. For example, the subscriber may enjoy watching a particular movie or television program. Consequently, the subscriber may desire to let others know of these favorite content programs. Accordingly, the subscriber may place these favorite content programs in the list of plurality of content programs comprising the content group.
In addition, a service provider may determine the list of plurality of content programs comprising the content group. For example, the service provider may have certain programming content that the service provider is promoting. In other words, the service provider may be providing a certain content that the service provider wants subscribers to receive or wants the subscriber to know is available. Consequently, the service provider may place in the list of plurality of content programs comprising the content group the certain programming content that the service provider is promoting.
In addition, a service provider may determine popularity of certain content provided, for example, by the service provider. For example, the service provider may determine popularity of certain programs popular in a certain predetermined geographic area or programs popular on the social network. Consequently, the service provider may place in the list of plurality of content programs comprising the content group the certain programs popular in a certain predetermined geographic area or programs popular on the social network.
From stage 310, where communications processor 125 receives the content group, method 300 may advance to stage 320 where communications processor 125 may make a user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to a plurality of users. For example, communications processor 125 may make a user selectable element available to a device being used by one or more of the plurality of users using STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165. The plurality of users may comprise members of the social network to whom the subscriber or the service provider wants to communicate the content group. The plurality of users may comprise other subscribers to the service provider's services or may not comprise other subscribers to the service provider's service. Notwithstanding, the plurality of users may be designated by a subject (e.g. a person) comprising the subscriber to the social network.
The user selectable element may graphically or pictorially identify the subscriber. For example, the user selectable element may include the subscriber's picture or an avatar corresponding to the subscriber. Notwithstanding, the user selectable element corresponding to the content group may be made available to the plurality of users where the user selectable element may identify the subscriber. Furthermore, the user selectable element may provide information graphically or pictorially indicating a genre corresponding to the content group. For example, the user selectable element may indicate to a viewer of the user selectable element that the user selectable element corresponds to certain programs popular in a certain predetermined geographic area or programs popular on the social network. Moreover, the user selectable element may indicate to the viewer of the user selectable element that the user selectable element corresponds to certain programming content that the service provider is promoting.
In making the user selectable element available to the plurality of users, each one of the plurality of users may respectively be identified by the communications processor 125 by any of an e-mail address, a telephone number, or combination of a media access control (MAC) address and a username corresponding to ones of the plurality of users. Furthermore, in making the user selectable element available to the plurality of users, the user selectable element may be made available to the social network utilizing, for example, a full-duplex, two-way broadband network, a hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) network, a data network, the internet, a cable television network, and a telecommunications network. The aforementioned are examples and other may be used.
Once communications processor 125 makes the user selectable element available in stage 320, method 300 may continue to stage 330 where communications processor 125 may receive a first request associated with the user selectable element from one of the plurality of users. The first request may indicate that the one of the plurality of users wants to receive the content group. For example, one of the plurality of users using STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 may select the user selectable element made available to STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 by communications processor 125. Once the user selectable element is selected, the first request may be transmitted to communications processor 125 from one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example system 100. The first request may be transmitted to communications processor 125 over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider as described in more detail below.
After communications processor 125 receives the first request in stage 330, method 300 may proceed to stage 340 where communications processor 125 may provide the content group to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request. For example, communications processor 125 may transmit the content group to one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example system 100. The content group may be transmitted to the one of the plurality of users by the service provider over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider. For example, the service provider may comprise a cable television service provider operating HFC network 145. In this case, the service provider may transmit the content group to the one of the plurality of users over HFC network 145 that may be controlled by the service provider. In addition, the service provider may transmit the content group to the one of the plurality of users over core network 140 (e.g. the internet.) Some or all of core network 140 may or may not be controlled or operated by the service provider. The HFC network 145 may be more secure to malicious activity than core network 140 (e.g. the internet) because HFC network 145 may comprise a closed data network controlled by the system operator as opposed to a more open data network such as the internet, for example.
Once communications processor 125 provides the content group in stage 340, method 300 may continue to stage 350 where communications processor 125 may receive a second request from the one of the plurality of users for content corresponding to a one of the plurality of content programs listed in the content group. For example, the one of the plurality of users may view the content group on one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165. Upon viewing the content group, the one of the plurality of users may decide to view or otherwise receive one of the plurality of content programs within the content group. Consequently, the one of the plurality of users may send the second request from one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example, system 100 to communications processor 125. The second request may be transmitted to communications processor 125 over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider.
From stage 350, where communications processor 125 receives the second request, method 300 may advance to stage 360 where communications processor 125 may provide the content to the one of the plurality of users in response to the second request. For example, upon receiving the second request, communications processor 125 may transmit to one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example, system 100 content corresponding to the second request. The content may be transmitted to one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider. For example, if the content comprises a broadcast program such as a television show, the service provider may provide the broadcast program in progress if it is currently being broadcast. The service provider may provide times and dates of the next showing if the broadcast program is not in progress. If the content comprises a pay-per-view or a video-on-demand content, the service provider may provide the content.
In some situations, the one of the plurality of users may not have rights to the content corresponding to the second request. For example, the content may comprise content associated with a premium service from the service provider to which the one of the plurality of users does not have a subscription. Furthermore, the content may be video-on-demand content for which the user does not have a subscription or for which the user has not paid a requisite fee. In this situation, rather than transmitting the content, communications processor 125 may transmit to one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example, system 100 information on how to subscribe to the premium service or on how to pay the requisite fee for the content. Upon satisfaction of the subscription or fee, communications processor 125 may transmit to one of STB 150, PC 170, or portable device 165 over, for example, system 100 content corresponding to the second request.
Once communications processor 125 provides the content in stage 360, (or prior to stage 310) method 300 may continue to stage 370 where communications processor 125 may receive, from the subject comprising the subscriber to the social network, a request to send invitations to a plurality of individuals inviting each one of the plurality of individuals to be included in the plurality of users. For example, as stated above, the plurality of content programs may comprise favorite programs of the subject. In other words, the subscribe may enjoy watching a particular movie or television program. Consequently, the subscriber may desire to let others know of these favorite content programs. Consequently, the subscriber my send the request to communications processor 125 to send invitations to a plurality of individuals inviting each one of the plurality of individuals to be included in the plurality of users (e.g. the social network.) The plurality of users may comprise friends or acquaintances the subscriber wishes to join the social network. The request may be transmitted to communications processor 125 over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider.
After communications processor 125 receives the request in stage 370, method 300 may proceed to stage 380 where communications processor 125 may send the invitations. For example, communications processor 125 may parse the received request and may create a plurality of invitations corresponding to the received request. Once the invitations are created, the invitations may be transmitted to each of the plurality of individuals over a portion of system 100 controlled by the service provider or over a portion not controlled by the service provider.
From stage 380, where communications processor 125 sends the invitations, method 300 may advance to stage 390 where communications processor 125 may receive responses to the invitations. For example, some or all of the plurality of individuals may decide to join the social network. Consequently, those of the individuals who decided to join the social network may send response to the invitations received.
Once communications processor 125 receives responses to the invitations in stage 390, method 300 may continue to stage 395 where communications processor 125 may include the plurality of individuals in the plurality of users based upon the received responses. For example, for those individuals who provided positive response to the invitations that those individuals wish to join the social network, communications processor 125 may include the plurality of individuals corresponding to the positive response in the plurality of users. After communications processor 125 includes the plurality of individuals in the plurality of users in stage 395, method 300 may then end at stage 398.
providing the content group to the one of the plurality of users in response to the first request.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the content group comprises receiving the content group comprising the list of the plurality of content programs comprising favorite programs of each of the plurality of individuals.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users comprises making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users wherein the plurality of users are designated by a subject comprising the subscriber to the social network.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users comprises making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users, each one of the plurality of users being respectively identified by at least one of the following: an e-mail address, a telephone number, and combination of a media access control (MAC) address and a username.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users comprises making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users over the social network utilizing one of the following: a full-duplex, two-way broadband network, a hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) network, a data network, the internet, a cable television network, and a telecommunications network.
including the plurality of individuals in the plurality of users based upon the received responses.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users further comprises making the user selectable element corresponding to the content group available to the plurality of users wherein the user selectable element provides information indicating a genre corresponding to the content group.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein making the user selectable element provide the information indicating the genre corresponding to the content group comprises making the user selectable element provide the information indicating the genre wherein the information is provided as one of: graphically and pictorially.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein inserting the content program into the content group comprises inserting the content program into the content group by a service provider of the content program.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein inserting the content program into the content group by a service provider of the content program comprises inserting the content program into the content group based on a popularity of the content program on another social network.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein making the user selectable element available to the plurality of users further comprises providing a pictorial indication along with the graphical indication.
inserting one of the content groups to a respective geographical area.
providing the content group to the one of the first plurality of users in response to the first request.
providing the content to the one of the first plurality of users that are subscribers to the social network in response to the second request.
15. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein providing the message comprises providing the message inviting the second plurality of users that are not subscribers to the social network to join the social network.
16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein receiving the content group comprising the list of the plurality of content programs comprises receiving the list of the plurality of content programs wherein the plurality of content programs are favorite programs of each of the plurality of individuals.
provide subscription information to the other user, the subscription information indicating how the other subscriber may subscriber to the portion of the content.
18. The system of claim 17, wherein the user selectable element provides information indicating a genre corresponding to the content group.
19. The system of claim 18, wherein the information indicating the genre is provided as one of the following: graphically and pictorially.
20. The system of claim 17, wherein the processor being operative to provide the graphical information further comprises the processor being operative to provide pictorial information along with the graphical information.
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§119
Application No. 60
Application No. 60
Application No. 60
Application No. 60
§119


text:
News and Announcements from the Supreme Court of Ohio and Other Governmental Entities Within the Buckeye State.
2005-0150. Lewis v. J. E. Wiggins & Co.
Franklin App. No. 04AP-469, 04AP-544, and 04AP-668, 2004-Ohio-6724.
IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion for leave is denied.
2005-1992. State ex rel. Cafaro Mgt. Co. v. Mabe.
2005-2153. State ex rel. Monroe v. Indus. Comm.
Franklin App. No. 04AP-1198, 2005-Ohio-5157.
2005-2196. Raintree Golf, LLC v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision.
Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2003-B-2040.
2005-2199. Raintree Golf, LLC v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision.
Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2003-B-2039.
2005-2208. 12610 Kirby Ave. LLC v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision.
Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2004-V-257.
Commission on Legal Education Opportunity.
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
on the Rules of Practice and Procedure in Ohio Courts.
6. J. Craig Wright was appointed to the Ohio Public Defender Commission.
Mentoring Program will be published for public comment.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated a January ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit that had reversed the conviction and death sentence of a U.S.-British citizen for starting a fire that killed a northwest Ohio girl. The Justices, in an unsigned opinion, stated that the 6th Circuit had erred when it reversed Kenneth Richey's sentence because of "constitutional errors" that undermined its confidence in the reliability of the conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio decision appealed from dates back to 1992.
2005-2131. State ex rel. Holland v. Gen. Motors Corp.
Franklin App. No. 05AP-49, 2005-Ohio-5649.
2005-1631. State ex rel. Advanced Metal Precision Prod. v. Indus. Comm.
Franklin App. No. 04AP-95, 2005-Ohio-3789.
2005-1717. State ex rel. Conley v. Canton Police Patrolmen's Assn.
2005-1223. State ex rel. Estate of Hards v. Klammer.
before the court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lake County.
On July 26, 2005, the court referred this case to mediation.
returned to the regular docket.
IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion is granted.
an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio.
effective as of the date of this entry.
administrative agency or other public authority.
or in any manner perform legal services for others.
to a member in good standing of the legal profession of Ohio.
as to form, number, and timeliness of filings.
to the attorney registration office.
respondent bear the costs of publication.
The following case has been referred to mediation pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.
2005-2143. Sycamore Community School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty.
Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2003-T-2131.
On November 18, 2005, the Ohio Department of Taxation announced OHTAX-Alert, an e-mail information service that allows you to choose which tax topics you'd like to receive tax notices on, and avoid cluttering your electronic in-box with items of limited value. On the sign-up page, simply enter your name and a valid e-mail address along with choosing your topics of interest.
20-year veteran in library field.

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