text:
Larissa KHOPERSKAIA, D.Sc. (Political Sciences), professor, Rostov University (Russian Federation).
Political processes in the Northern Caucasus in the period 1999–2000 point to a deepening crisis of Russian statehood in the region. The main indications of this are new (political, legal and organizational) forms of conflict between the federal centre and North Caucasian subjects of the Federation, the growing number of participants in the Chechen confrontation, and the struggle between ethnic-based political groups for influence in the region.
The most acute political problems, resulting in contradictions between the federal centre and the national republics of the Northern Caucasus, are today closely related to the events in Chechnya. Representatives of ethnic elites are pressing for a political solution—not one based on the use of force—namely, through a referendum on Chechnya’s political status (see, for example, the Ingush newspaper Serdalo of 18 March 2000). Yet certain conditions are to be met to make sure that it is held in a normal environment: ensuring the return of displaced people to their homes as well as security, stability and basic living standards in Chechnya. Only after this has been done can a referendum go ahead, in the course of which residents will state their opinion on the political status of Chechnya: independence, special status as part of Russia or as a republic/Federation subject. According to Ingushetia’s President Ruslan Aushev, Chechens themselves should decide their fate and the fate of their President Aslan Maskhadov. The position taken by many international political and charity organizations—PACE, the OSCE, the Danish Council for Refugees, the German KER, the Arab Social Reforms Society, the non-governmental Peacemaking and Social Development Centre (Great Britain), and many others—does not coincide with the official Russian view of the Chechen problem. Yet they find understanding and support both among republic authorities (above all, in Ingushetia) and non-governmental national and public movements in the region. Thus, in March 2000, the Coordinating Council of Representatives of Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements of the Northern Caucasus appealed to the international community (the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UNHCR, and so forth) to open international humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring missions across the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Another category of political conflicts between regions and the federal centre stems from serious contradictions over the interpretation of federalization processes in the Northern Caucasus. The republics are seeking to assert an unequivocal understanding of the country’s ethnic nature as a federation of various peoples. This view is shared not only by leaders of national movements but also by state officials. Thus, M. Dzagiev, Deputy Minister for Justice of Ingushetia, wrote in the Serdalo newspaper (7 March 2000) that the Russian Federation is a federal state based on the principle of ethnicity.
The conflict between the federal centre and the North Caucasian subjects of the Russian Federation in the legislative sphere primarily arises from contradictions between federal and regional laws, which manifest themselves in, among other things, the declaration of the supremacy of national republican laws on the territory of a subject of the Federation, and suspension of Russian presidential decrees, laws and other Federal normative acts and enforceable enactments that are at odds with the sovereign rights and interests of these republics (e.g., Article 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan). The list of such contradictions could easily be continued.
Talking about the discrepancy between federal and regional laws, it has to be said that the ongoing processes objectively compel subjects of the Russian Federation to violate outdated or inoperative or ineffectual federal norms.
In the administrative sphere, conflicts manifest themselves in that the republics establish their own national state security agencies while these matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation (e.g., Security Councils in the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Territory, etc.). Along with republican security agencies, subjects of the Federation set up structures performing judicial functions that are not provided for under the Law on the Judicial System of the Russian Federation, and even republican bodies entrusted with constitutional oversight functions (e.g., the Constitutional Oversight Committee of the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania).
Furthermore, subjects of the Russian Federation adopt laws encroaching on the jurisdiction of federal power agencies on their territory. Thus, Paragraph 3 of Decree No. 45 by the President of Ingushetia (of 29 February 2000), On the Structure of the Executive Branch of Government in the Republic of Ingushetia, establishes that ‘executive power bodies of the Republic of Ingushetia exercising administration in spheres of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ingushetia may perform the functions of territorial agencies of corresponding federal executive agencies’. In addition, Ingushetia and North Ossetia–Alania officials have repeatedly called for permanent missions of the Russian president on their respective territories to be closed.
Political stability in the region is directly affected by conflicts between subjects of the Federation. The most serious contradictions exist between North Ossetia–Alania and Ingushetia, Stavropol Territory and the Chechen Republic, and Stavropol Territory and Karachaevo-Cherkessia.
Ingush conflict and ensure the return of refugees to their homes. Priority is given to rebuilding houses in the Prigorodny District. Attempts to settle the problem on the bilateral level (between the republics’ authorities), as a rule, yield no results—often thwarted by acts of terrorism or hostage-taking. Solutions proposed by the sides are often one-sided. The Ingush approach calls for the return of all refugees (displaced people) from North Ossetia–Alania to places of their permanent residence. From the Ossetian perspective, the sheer raising of the problem in such terms—returning all Ingush people who lived in North Ossetia before the conflict to their homes—is basically wrong and they should be helped to settle down in places where they live at present. These matters are seen in the context of social security, employment, and rebuilding or putting in place appropriate social infrastructure. The conflicting nature of a large number of proposals made on either side highlights the extreme instability of the current situation, adding to people’s concern and fears for their own security and the security and safety of their relatives.
Tension between Stavropol Territory and the Chechen Republic has been mounting ever since 1991. Numerous terrorist acts, kidnappings, and the stealing of vehicles and cattle by illegal Chechen armed formations were registered in eastern parts of Stavropol Territory, in close proximity to the Chechen border. Territory Cossacks have been repeatedly coming out with political demands: to end the growing genocide of ethnic Russians and Cossacks in and outside Chechnya; to stop prosecution of Cossacks for storing weapons acquired for self-defence; to allow historical Cossack areas to break away from Chechnya and join Stavropol Territory as the Terek region; to officially arm Terek Cossack battalions and to introduce them to the Naurskiy and Shelkovskoi districts; and should Cossacks continue to be evicted from their lands, to take adequate measures throughout Stavropol Territory. In the wake of the Russian president’s decree approving the statute of the Terek Cossack Army, the Territory’s Security Council considered the question of forming Cossack self-defence forces and arming all Cossacks living in border areas.
In 1999–2000, the conflict between the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol Territory came out into the open. Relations between them are seriously aggravated by environmental security problems. In particular, the sides disagree over environmental protection of areas in and around the city of Caucasus Mineralnye Vody. The environmental protection zone around mineral water springs in Karachaevo-Cherkessia is subject to federal environmental conservation regulations. Meanwhile, in recent years regional authorities allowed forests to be cut and cattle to be grazed in the region, which is bound to pollute mineral water springs at this unique resort. Deterioration in the quality of mineral water from some Stavropol springs has already been registered.
There are also disagreements over the use of hydrosystems—in particular the Big Stavropol Canal and a network of hydraulic power systems. Furthermore, Karachaevo-Cherkessian authorities are considering plans to increase water intake from the rivers of Zelenchuk, Marukha and Aksaut (up to 50 per cent of the flow) for a network of Zelenchuk hydroelectric power plants. Local experts believe that if this plan is carried out, the Zelenchuk, Khabez and Adighe-Khabl districts will experience severe water shortages, which could disturb the ecological balance of the entire region.
Stavropol Territory was highly negative toward some provisions of the executive directive, On Additional Measures to Stabilize the Situation in the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia, prepared by a Russian governmental commission headed by N. Aksenenko. The intention was to turn over to Karachaevo-Cherkessia four sanitariums located in Stavropol Territory on the pretext that residents of the republic, who had become ‘foreigners’ to their neighbours following the formation of an independent Federation subject, could not get a place at any of the sanitariums. Up until now such matters were decided ‘at the working level’: Stavropol would ask its neighbours how many places they needed and typically received a standard answer to the effect that they were unable to go anyway because of the low income levels of the citizens of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The territory administration believes that this outrageous decision by the governmental commission was motivated by the selfish interests of some government officials.
Personnel appointments in the Karachaevo-Cherkessia administration give rise to concern in the Stavropol Territory administrative and political elite; the inefficiency of some newly appointed officials creates serious difficulties between them in discussing and resolving outstanding problems.
One long-term destabilizing factor is the problem of migration and the change in the ethnic mix of the population living in the region, in particular, the mass influx of migrants to the Northern Caucasus, which has become a main centre of attraction, primarily for those fleeing from ethnic conflicts. Meskhetian Turks arrived there in the wake of ethnic clashes in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the wake of the Karabakh conflict and the events in Baku; refugees from South Ossetia as a result of Ossetia–Georgia confrontation; and Ingush after the Ossetian–Ingush conflict. The migration of population in the republic is caused by the notorious events in Chechnya. Furthermore, representatives of North Caucasian peoples who have suffered from acts of repression are returning to their homes; and people are migrating for socioeconomic reasons from northern and eastern parts of Russia, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.
In the period 1989–99, more than 2 million migrants moved to the Northern Caucasus, including 1.3 million from other regions of the Russian Federation and 0.7 million from newly independent countries. Approximately 790 000 people arrived in Krasnodar Territory, 480 000 in the Rostov Region, and 360 000 in Stavropol Territory. The flow of migration to North Caucasian republics was lower, and mainly comprised representatives of these national groups. The serious problem was posed by displaced people from Chechnya who moved to Ingushetia in 2000 (according to the Migration Service, 172 000 people were officially registered while their actual number was 234 000).
It has to be said that official statistics do not quite accurately reflect the actual situation: Many migrants live illegally and do not register with interior departments or migration services. This applies above all to migrants from the Transcaucasus.
Authorities and residents in a number of regions are concerned about the decline in the proportion of ethnic Russians. And although demographically the growing number of Caucasian peoples in traditional Russian populated areas does not threaten their absolute numerical superiority, nonetheless, this fact is widely used as an argument in substantiating the need to protect the Russian population. The outflow of ethnic Russians and representatives of other, even indigenous ethnic groups, from North Caucasian republics continues. A case in point is Chechnya. In the period 1989–99, its migration losses amounted to at least 500 000 people, virtually all of them being Russian speakers. Since 1997, there has been growing migration from Chechnya of representatives of indigenous ethnic groups, caused by aggravation of the situation and rising crime in the republic.
Migration to the North Caucasian region per se cannot be seen as a catalyst of conflict. Nonetheless, the mass influx of migrants created a number of serious socioeconomic problems. Growing real estate prices, rising competition on the labour market, falling living standards, aggravating education and public health problems, growing nationalist and separatist sentiments, rising crime and overstrained infrastructure that is not designed for such a large population are among them. All of that brought about a highly negative view of migration. Authorities are trying to regulate migration processes through enforceable enactments (local bylaws, edicts by republic presidents, government decrees, and executive orders by heads of administrations). Yet many of them come into conflict with Russian laws and regulations because, among other things, they limit to some extent constitutional rights and freedoms—in particular, the freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence. Local authorities, as a rule, try to justify their decisions by citing the need to prevent open ethnic conflicts. It has to be recognized that uncontrolled migration has already substantially changed the ethnic structure of the labour and housing markets, and affected the crime situation in the region, often leading to ethnic and communal clashes.
The inflow of non-Slavic refugees combined with the absence of adequate information is often associated among the most radically minded sections of society with rising crime, gun running and conflict-related psychology based on the use of force, which provokes a backlash as local chapters of Russian National Unity and some Cossack organizations are taking a higher profile.
Thus, V. Vodolatskiy, the newly elected ataman (chieftain) of the Grand Army of the Don, in his first public move in the sphere of ethnic relations, appealed, on behalf of the Council of Atamans, to the president and prime minister of the Russian Federation and to the population of the Rostov and Volgograd regions, also sending an open letter to V. Chub, head of the Rostov regional administration (September 1999), demanding immediate introduction of a state of emergency and adoption of appropriate laws to regulate migration. In particular, the open letter says that ‘diasporas of Chechens, Avars, Meskhetian Turks, Azerbaijanis, Abkhazians, Dagestanis, non-indigenous Armenians, and other ethnic groups from the Caucasian region that are strengthening their positions in the region, behaving disrespectfully and even outrageously on our territory—with connivance of local authorities and law enforcement agencies—arouse the legitimate concern of local residents, above all, the Cossacks. In the course of incidents and conflicts with local residents, representatives of these diasporas say cynically that they have bribed all authorities and that they feel real masters of the land, thus provoking ethnic strife. The Cossacks of the Grand Army of the Don are firmly convinced that migration to the territory of the Rostov Region is not a spontaneous but an organized and regulated process.’ In response to such tough statements by the Cossacks, Rostov regional authorities adopted new rules of registration on the region’s territory, designed to tighten migration control.
Decline in the number of Russian speakers considerably weakened their integrating importance in the republics’ political and socioeconomic spheres. Slavic peoples constitute the largest ethnic group in the region. Russian plays a consolidating role as a language of interethnic communication. A part of the Russian population can be seen as indigenous residents (others being descendants of migrants in the 19th and especially the 20th century). This applies, above all, to Cossack descendants in the south of Russia. Cossack revival began in 1990. There are different approaches to defining the Cossacks: as a former estate (social class), an independent people, an ethnic group, a subethnic group of the Russian people, and so on. Historically, Cossack troops are organized on the geographic principle: the Don, the Kuban and the Terek Cossack armies. Cossacks live in the Rostov Region, in Krasnodar Territory, Stavropol Territory and in all republics of the Northern Caucasus along the Terek River. At present attempts to replace geographical division by political division are increasing. Federal authorities and subjects of the Russian Federation are seeking to place the Cossack movement under their control. Today there are at least two organizations with the same name on the historical territory of each Cossack army. The split began in the wake of the edict by the Russian president, On State Registration of Cossack Communities in the Russian Federation (9 August 1995). Officially registered Cossacks are supported by official authorities but they are banned from engaging in political activity. Cossack subdivisions that are not included in the state register and consider themselves representatives of a separate people (Cossack ethnic group), align themselves with the opposition and are in conflict with authorities and officially registered Cossack groups.
The Cossacks’ ethnic self-identification is a complex, as yet uncompleted process. But it is generally recognized that Cossacks are already making political demands based on ethnic identity. The Cossacks are pressing for political rehabilitation, including territorial rehabilitation, in accordance with the Law on Rehabilitation of Peoples That Suffered from Political Reprisals, adopted in 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. In effect, the Cossacks demand certain privileges in property status, representation in all branches of government, and priority in employment in ‘prestigious’ spheres of activity. Furthermore, considering their geographical proximity to armed conflicts, they insist on legalization of the right to carry weapons. In particular, authorities in a Stavropol Territory district bordering Chechnya considered, under Cossack pressure, the question of arming the entire population—to be overseen by Cossack organizations. It is obvious that the arming of a large group of the population in close proximity to another armed group of the population (the Republic of Chechnya), given weak federal authority, is fraught with serious danger. A conflict between Cossacks in one region—say, Stavropol Territory—and another ethnic group (e.g., Chechens), could effectively consolidate the entire Cossack movement in the south of Russia.
Another regional problem is the spread of Wahhabism. Political instability and unemployment (mainly among young people) activated the Wahhabism factor as an instrument in addressing social and political problems, internal ethnic conflicts (Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan) and interethnic conflicts (Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia). Wahhabism is emerging as a serious ideological and organizational channel to influence the population (above all, youth). The number of its followers is steadily growing in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia, and even in Stavropol Territory. One distinguishing feature of the current stage is the Wahhabis’ aspiration to penetrate power structures on all levels. Thus, in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Wahhabis are represented in city assemblies; in Ingushetia, an adviser to the republic president is a Wahhabi while in Stavropol Territory, seven Nogai deputies in the town of Kangly (adjacent to the city of Mineralnye Vody), who fell under Wahhabi influence, declared the town’s secession from the rural district to which it officially belongs.
One special conflict factor comprises the Chechen diasporas in neighbouring subjects of the Federation. For example, in rural areas of the Rostov Region, the first three months of 2000 saw several politically based conflicts between the indigenous population (Cossacks) and representatives of Chechen and Dagestani diasporas. Thus, an unauthorized rally was held in the Martynovskiy District and an action group was formed which collected 2000 signatures of local residents demanding that a referendum be held on the eviction of Chechens from the district. A statement by the action group, elected at the rally, says in part: ‘We cannot live together’. Locals draw a sharp line between ‘their own’ Chechens and forced migrants, being rather wary of the latter, expressing concern that even when the situation returns to normal and the republic begins a rebuilding programme, they will not want to return to their motherland. Indigenous residents stress that even temporary residence on ‘traditionally Russian territories’ shows that migrants indulge in unacceptable practices, including alcohol abuse and disrespect for Russian women. The shrinking of the agricultural sector seriously aggravates the employment problem not only for Chechens but also for the indigenous population in the district. In this situation, employment of migrants at the expense of local residents is seen as discrimination, leading to ethnic conflicts. The absence of stable sources of income leads to theft of agricultural products, committed, according to police, by representatives of all ethnic groups, but public opinion is inclined to attribute it mostly to ‘outsiders’ (the non-indigenous population). It is also important to take into account background factors in the growth of tension: a general anti-Chechen mood provoked by the terrorist act in neighbouring Volgodonsk and current developments in Chechnya (casualties among police forces and so forth).
Tension is exacerbated also by the inefficient organization of humanitarian aid to displaced people. According to once established rules, it continues to be provided at a Red Cross mission in the city of Volgodonsk. After the outrageous terrorist act which killed a large number of civilians in a high-rise building, for understandable reasons, it is now virtually impossible for Chechens to appear in Volgodonsk. It would seem a good idea to move the Red Cross mission in charge of humanitarian assistance to another place—closer to areas populated by Chechens.
Political stability in the region is widely linked to a strengthening of authoritarian trends (the presidency and regional administrations) and state regulation of political, market, ethnic and communal relations. Ingushetia is a pioneer in promoting authoritarian institutions on the legislative level. In 1999, the republic’s president signed a law (approved by parliament), On the Congress of the People of Ingushetia, whereby the Congress of the People of Ingushetia is the supreme representative body in the republic—comprised of the president (chairman of the Congress); deputies of the People’s Assembly; representatives of public associations, religious confessions and artistic unions; and people’s deputies delegated on a residential basis.
The Congress’s powers include ‘appraisal of problems related to the administrative border of the Republic of Ingushetia; consideration—jointly with the People’s Assembly—of addresses and messages from the president to the people of Ingushetia; election of three republican presidential candidates from among persons who have nominated themselves for the presidency; other matters related to the ethnic and historical specifics of the Republic of Ingushetia—as proposed by the president of the Republic of Ingushetia’. Thus, observers note, the adoption of the Law on the Congress of the People of Ingushetia will result in effective abolition of the principle of separation of powers.
Further organization of the vertical power structure is provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government. The head of administration—head of an executive local self-government body—is the head of the municipality in the Republic of Ingushetia. He is appointed and dismissed by the president. A series of other laws defining the functions of state power agencies strengthens the authoritarian trend that is characteristic not only of Ingushetia but also, to varying degrees, of other subjects of the Federation in the Northern Caucasus.
Despite the serious ongoing conflicts, integration trends in the Northern Caucasus remain quite strong. By the year 2000, subjects of the Federation in the Northern Caucasus concluded about 100 treaties and agreements on cooperation and the setting up of missions on a reciprocal basis. In the socioeconomic sphere, these agreements are basically of a uniform character, designed to promote a regional market through the Association for Socioeconomic Cooperation of the Republics, Territories and the Rostov Region. At the same time the Association’s structure contains a pronounced ethnic component: its associated members include the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This approach is also visible in the formation of the Interparliamentary Union of the Republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adigey (July 1997). It is designed to strengthen and consolidate the union of the three republics to deal with common problems. Nonetheless, documents adopted by the union give priority to repatriation of Adighes to their historical motherland and promotion of horizontal links between these republics and Abkhazia, putting a special emphasis on the ‘Abkhaz issue’ in the course of its consideration at the Russian Federation Council. This bloc can increase the Cherkess–Vainakh confrontation in the struggle for political leadership in the Caucasus. At the same time, discontent among Turkic-speakers over this course of events invigorated Karachai and Balkar movements, especially during the election campaign in the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Karachai and Balkar representatives are seeking a new strategy and a new line up of forces. In particular, they are talking about the republic’s pulling out of the Interparliamentary Union, and demanding that the Russian Supreme Court judge on its constitutionality within the framework of the Russian Federation.
Another focus of the struggle for leadership is the Northern Caucasus Association, headed by Rostov Governor V. Chub, which is an informal de facto recognition of Rostov-on-Don as an administrative capital of the Northern Caucasus. Rivalry over this status between the Krasnodar and Stavropol governors, known for their Communist leanings, compels them to look for political allies to consolidate their influence, which creates an additional source of conflict—on the purely political level.
Intra- and interethnic consolidation is evolving not only on the official government level but also among public organizations.
A case in point—illustrating interethnic integration on the organizational level—is the 4th Congress of the International Cherkess Association (June 1998, in Krasnodar), which discussed problems of consolidation and mechanisms of preserving the identity of the Adighe-Abkhaz people. The Council of Leaders of the World Assembly of Turkic Peoples devoted its session in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in September 1998 to the promotion of economic, cultural and sociopolitical relations of the ethnic group with other ethnic groups as well as the possibility of opening in the city of Cherkessk a North Caucasian mission of the Assembly of Turkic Peoples to coordinate the integration of North Caucasian Turks. Each political bloc seeks to reach an agreement with the Cossacks, which does little to improve the Cossacks’ standing as a whole, only increasing the outflow of Russian speakers from respective areas. In these conditions, Russian National Unity has been taking a higher profile, in a bid to head up the Russian national movement and to win over Cossacks in the south of Russia as well as Slavic public movements.
Yet another regional threat is the danger of the spread of the Karachaevo-Cherkess conflict to Federation subjects that have Turkic and Adighe-Abkhaz ethnic groups (diasporas). Political elites in North Caucasian republics, political parties in Russia, and individual politicians and entrepreneurs are pursuing their own political, geopolitical, economic and corporate agendas. Interregional ethnic public movements have already declared their support for one side or the other in the conflict. If an armed conflict breaks out in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, it could have more far-reaching implications than the Chechen crisis as representatives of ethnic groups not only of the national republics but also of Stavropol and Krasnodar territories and the Rostov Region will get involved in it.
The 1999 election of the republic’s head seriously destabilized the situation in the republic, posing a threat of an open armed confrontation between the conflicting parties. The conflict stemmed from the struggle for the top administrative post in Karachaevo-Cherkessia which not only the administrative, political and economic elite but also the population at large associate with full control over the distribution of powers and property—that is to say, with the possibility of gaining (or preserving) some privileges in ethnic/social status.
The main indicator of the crisis was the political struggle between two ethnic groups—the Karachais and the Cherkess. The former was led by V. Semenov, a Karachai and former commander-in-chief of the Russian ground forces, and the latter, by S. Derev, mayor of the town of Cherkessk. Two public organizations—the Alan Interregional Karachai Association (President A. Katchiev) and the International Cherkess Association (President B. Akbashev)—were actively involved in the election struggles, contributing to the spread of the conflict.
The ethnically based split spread to the republic’s parliament, government, electoral commission and supreme court. In the course of the election campaign and after the voting (up until a special federal commission was created in October 1999), confrontation between the parties was mounting: importantly, passions were stirred up exclusively over the candidates’ ethnic backgrounds, not their political platforms or their personal and business qualities.
High electoral activism by the main ethnic groups led to a rapid rise in protests organized in the wake of the election and transformed into serious confrontation that could easily develop into an open ethnic conflict.
After the election, sociopolitical organizations of Russian speakers took a passive line, failing to reach a consensus, and formed political alliances with conflicting parties. Furthermore, the involvement of Don Cossacks (Ataman N. Kozitsyn) on the Cherkess side and Kuban Cossacks (Ataman Iu. Antonov) on the Karachai side (both structures being in opposition to official Cossack movements), not only deepened the split among the Russian speakers within the republic but also bred some highly negative stereotypes with respect to Cossacks as a whole.
heads of municipalities and deputies of local self-government agencies. An emergency session of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia Association of Municipalities heard calls for ‘a tough regulation policy’, adopting an appeal to the Russian and Karachaevo-Cherkessia justice ministries to judge on the constitutionality of the Adgylar and Adighe-Khase sociopolitical movements as well as of the International Cherkess Association, and to ban their activity in the republic. Speakers at the session expressed discontent with the radicalism of the ‘Akbashev group’ and concern about the unity of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia, accusing the interim administration and law enforcement agencies of inaction and demanding that the court make a ‘correct decision’ at once.
Representatives of the other party to the conflict convened a United Congress of deputies on all levels and representatives of ethnic public and political movements: Cossacks, Russians, Cherkess, Abazin and other peoples living in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The congress resolution stated that separate ethnic groups could not live together in the republic, declaring its firm intention (in conformity with the will of the people) to restore their autonomy, abolished back in 1957. The congress appealed to the Russian president and government to render assistance in putting in place a normative/legal base to restore their autonomy in line with the existing federal law and international norms on the right of nations to self-determination.
The Karachaevo-Cherkessia Supreme Court upheld V. Semenov’s victory in the election. S. Derev challenged its decision at the Russian Supreme Court. A series of negotiations followed with the participation of the Russian head of government and the Russian presidential chief of staff. Yet even on that level the parties failed to come to an agreement. Each party pressed its own demands: the Karachais wanted V. Semenov to assume office as soon as possible while the Cherkess wanted the formation of an independent administrative entity as part of the Russian Federation. Before the Russian Supreme Court passed judgement, V. Semenov was inaugurated as head of Karachaevo-Cherkessia (14 September 1999). Then, a regularly scheduled session of the United Congress (16 September 1999) adopted a resolution confirming S. Derev as head of the Cherkess Autonomous Region as part of Stavropol Territory, entrusting him with forming a government and transferring legislative powers, for the transition period, to the Congress and its executive committee.
It is important to note that on the federal level there was no legal base for dividing the republic. Furthermore, such a decision could have set a dangerous precedent and soon other Federation subjects could have followed suit. Territorial claims could have provoked open ethnic clashes.
So, the conflict came to a head while the decisions of either party to the conflict were impossible to carry out. The parties took uncompromising positions. In particular, the Karachai only recognized one solution—namely, that V. Semenov remain head of the republic while the Cherkess insisted that it was impossible for the two ethnic groups to live together. Russian speakers divided, with their leaders siding with conflicting blocs. Both parties had sufficient resources to organize mass disturbances with the use of firearms. Each of them was well structured and well organized, having a ‘political leadership’, headquarters, and mobile action groups provided with arms and means of communication. Leaders of ethnic movements should be given their due for preventing those forces from open confrontation. Yet in the event of a new aggravation of the situation (a conflict on the basis of everyday communication, an act of provocation, undesirable cadre appointments, some publications in the mass media, nationalist statements, and so forth), the likelihood of an open armed conflict was very high. The situation remained under the control of federal power structures but was on the verge of getting out of hand.
The complex socioeconomic and internal political situation provoked a rise in crime. The situation was aggravated by the use of criminal groups to intimidate ‘intractable’ representatives of ethnic elites, and turf wars among criminal groups, also organized on ethnic principles.
The results of elections in Karachaevo-Cherkessia not only stirred up strong interest among the political elite of the whole of the Northern Caucasus and other subjects of the Russian Federation but also affected the line-up of forces in the region, drawing the attention of ethnic elites in Abkhazia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Adigey, Chechnya and some of the Cossacks in the Rostov Region and Stavropol and Krasnodar territories.
On the whole, the division of the electorate on ethnic lines, institutionalization of the conflict, and the rapid growth of the protest movement within the conflicting parties pointed to the absence on the local level of effective consolidating mechanisms and resources capable of stabilizing the situation, which required adequate steps on the federal level (legislative, political, organizational, military, and so forth).
On 22 October 1999, the Russian Supreme Court again upheld the results of the election in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The Cherkess party came out with yet another statement about the need to restore the Cherkess autonomy. It was only thanks to mediation by the Russian head of government that a compromise in the long-standing confrontation was reached.
Yet, even the ‘truce’ did not put an end to the conflict. In the Russian State Duma elections, many observers pointed out that the electorate took a pragmatic view and backed a ‘surprise candidate’—B. Berezovskiy, a well known political figure and businessman. He garnered more than 45 per cent of the vote.
At the same time as the State Duma elections, an election was held for the Karachaevo-Cherkessia People’s Assembly. The ethnic breakdown of the deputies is as follows: Karachais, 31; Russians, 25; Cherkess, 7; Abazin, 3; Nogai, 3; and Greeks, 1. Fifteen members of the previous parliament were also elected. Then—with the participation of the Federal Commission on the Sociopolitical Settlement in Karachaevo-Cherkessia—agreement was reached on the ‘dividing up of posts’ in the republic. The parliament speaker was a Russian, while the head of government was a Cherkess (S Derev). True, for this to happen, the Russian, V. Neshchadimov, already appointed by V. Semenov, had to step down.
Yet, the first session of the new Karachaevo-Cherkessia People’s Assembly (on 6 January, 2000)—contrary to recommendations by the Federal commission—elected B. Suiunov, a Nogai, as speaker (with 44 votes). B. Berezovskiy issued a statement to the effect that either the Moscow-brokered agreement would have to be revisited or a new solution found. In response to that statement, a signature-raising campaign began in the republic to recall B. Berezovskiy from the State Duma.
The split between ethnic groups was compounded by an internal ethnic stand-off. Some of the Russian speakers, who were deprived of representation on the official level, sided with the Cherkess. In the wake of the election, the Alan Karachai movement also divided, and there are now two persons claiming chairmanship of Alan: A. Katchiev and S. Semenov (a relative of the head of the republic).
The present leader is trying to use tough measures to influence the situation. In particular, a statement, On the Sociopolitical Situation in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, made by public organizations under his control (on 25 March 2000), contains some points that are clearly not conducive to settling the conflict: ‘Derev and his inner circle are continuing their hostile activities in the republic’ while the ‘ideologues and masterminds behind the movement are carrying on their intrigues against the peoples living in the republic, acting with total impunity’ as ‘actions by these separatists are supported by some highly placed federal officials, including B. Berezovskiy’.
V. Semenov initiated a number of laws and regulations effectively blocking opposition activity. These include the law, On the Status of Karachaevo-Cherkessia Capital and an amendment to the law on the Karachaevo-Cherkessia government whereby it is virtually impossible to reject a candidate proposed by the head of the republic. On 14 March, Temporary Regulations on the Procedure for Notification of Executive Agencies and Local Self-Governing Bodies in Karachaevo-Cherkessia concerning Marches, Processions, Demonstrations, and Pickets in the Republic’s Streets, Squares, and Other Public Places were adopted. Under the new regulations, notification is to be served 10 to 15 days prior to an event, in writing, with an abstract of the protocol of an organization sponsoring the event. Permission may not be granted if ‘the event is in conflict with the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms or generally accepted norms of morality or if it coincides in form, time, venue, but not in direction and purposes with another public event, notification of which was served earlier or simultaneously. Refusal may be appealed in a court of law. An executive agency makes a decision, informing state power bodies concerned about it.’ This, in effect, introduces an authorization procedure for public events conducted by the opposition.
In addition, a Council for Economic and Public Security of Karachaevo-Cherkessia was formed, its functions including oversight and appraisal of performance by state power agencies (above all, power structures subject to the federal centre: the Prosecutor’s Office, the Interior Ministry, and other ministries and departments).
Obviously, such ‘suppression’ methods will do little to resolve the conflict or reduce the level of political instability.
To sum up, there are a number of destabilizing factors in the Northern Caucasus.
First, relations between subjects of the Federation and the federal centre (considerably weakened federal state organizations tend to supersede regional authorities which build up their own statehood by using mechanisms of authoritarianism and playing up their sovereignty rights). It is critical to ensure effective two-way progress toward legal reform of federal relations.
Second, it is important to ensure political coordination and harmonization between subjects of the Federation (Ossetian-Ingush confrontation, Chechen-Stavropol contradictions, and so forth) in the economic sphere and in environmental and migration policy.
Third, the situation in Karachaevo-Cherkessia has shown the futility of attempts to resolve ethnic conflicts with ‘local resources’. The regulation of ethnic relations in a multi-ethnic republic by peaceful means is only possible with an active presence of the federal centre, including the resolution of political and legal problems that brought about a particular conflict, and continuous negotiations between the lawful parties involved, within the legal framework of the Russian Federation.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
[240 U.S. 127, 129] Messrs. Hugh M. Dorsey and C. C. McDonald Ward for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Hugh M. Dorsey and C. C. McDonald for defendant in error.
The governor of Oregon honored a requisition made by the governor of Texas for the delivery of the plaintiff in error for removal to Texas as a fugitive from the justice of that state. The accused was taken to Texas, tried for murder and a conspiracy to commit murder, and acquitted. She was, however, not released from custody because she was ordered by the governor of Texas, under a requisition of the governor of Georgia, to be held for delivery to an agent of the state of Georgia for removal to that state as a fugitive from justice.
Alleging these facts, an application for release by habeas corpus was then presented to a state court upon the charge that the extradition proceedings and the warrant of removal thereunder were 'wholly null and void' because 'your petitioner was never a fugitive from justice from the state of Georgia to the state of Texas within the meaning and intent of the laws of the United States regulating extradition proceedings.' On the return to the writ, the court, finding the facts to be as above stated, refused to discharge the petitioner, and the case is [240 U.S. 127, 130] before us to review a judgment of the court of criminal appeals, which adopted the findings of the trial court and affirmed its action. -- Tex. Crim. Rep. --, L.R.A. --, --, 173 S. W. 291.
All the Federal questions involve the meaning of 2 of article 4 of the Constitution, which is as follows: 'A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.' They also depend on 5278 of the Revised Statutes, which is but a reproduction of 1 of the act of February 12, 1793 (chap. 7, 1 Stat. at L. 302, Comp. Stat. 1913, 10,126), giving effect to and establishing the methods of procedure to be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Constitution on the subject to the extent that their execution was by the statute provided for.
Broadly, there is but a single question for consideration: Was the order for rendition repugnant to the Constitution and the provisions of the statute? But two inquiries are involved in its solution: First, was the rendition order void because, under the facts, there was no power to award it except by disregarding express prohibitions or requirements of the Constitution or statute, or by necessary implication adversely affecting rights thereby created? and second, even although this was not the case, was the order nevertheless void because, under the circumstances, it dealt with a situation which, by the effect of the statute, was taken out of the reach of state authority, even although no express provision was made in the statute for dealing with such condition by any authority, state or Federal? We consider the two inquiries under separate headings.
First. For the purpose of the solution of the inquiry under this heading we treat the following propositions as beyond question: (a) That prior to the adoption of the [240 U.S. 127, 131] Constitution fugitives from justice were surrendered between the states conformably to what were deemed to be the controlling principles of comity. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 101, 102, 16 L. ed. 717, 727; 2 Moore, Extradition & Interstate Rendition, pp. 820 et seq. (b) That it was intended by the provision of the Constitution to fully embrace or rather to confer authority upon Congress to deal with such subject. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 10 L. ed. 1060; Kentucky v. Dennison, supra; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L. ed. 287; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 , 51 L. ed. 161, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073; (c) That the act of 1793 (now Revised Statutes, 5278, Comp. Stat. 1913, 10, 126) was enacted for the purpose of controlling the subject in so far as it was deemed wise to do so, and that its provisions were intended to be dominant, and, so far as they operated, controlling and exclusive of state power. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 10 L. ed. 1060; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 104, 105, 16 L. ed. 728; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 , 32 L. ed. 283, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1204; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 , 37 L. ed. 549, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687.
Coming in the light of these principles to apply the statute, it is not open to question that its provisions expressly or by necessary implication prohibited the surrender of a person in one state for removal as a fugitive to another where it clearly appears that the person was not and could not have been a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 , 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 218; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 , 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.S. 691 , 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 311; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 392 , 52 S. L. ed. 540, 543, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 13 Ann. Cas. 905.
From this it results that the first inquiry here is, did it appear that the accused was a fugitive from the justice of the state of Georgia? While the facts which we have stated do not disclose affirmatively that she was ever in Georgia, and the date, if at all, of her flight from that state, we think that she was such a fugitive is to be assumed for three obvious reasons: because there was no question of such fact made in the application for habeas corpus, since it is apparent on the face of the application that the ground of relief relied upon was not that there had [240 U.S. 127, 132] been no flight from Georgia, but that there was and could have been no flight into Texas, since the coming into that state was involuntary and resulted solely from the extradition proceedings; because that view of the subject was assumed, both in the elaborate opinion of the court below and that of the dissenting judge, to be unquestioned; and finally, because neither in the assignments of error in this court nor in the arguments pressed upon our attention is the contrary view insisted upon or even suggested. From that aspect, therefore, there is no ground for saying that the extradition order conflicted with the express provision of the statute.
Second. Although the order for rendition was not in conflict, either expressly or by necessary implication, with any of the provisions of the Constitution or statute, was it nevertheless void under the circumstances because it dealt with a subject with which it was beyond the power of the state to deal, and which was therefore brought, as the result of the adoption of the statute, within exclusive Federal control, although no provision dealing with such subject is found in the statute? To appreciate this question, the proposition relied upon needs to be accurately stated. It is this: The Constitution provides for the rendition to a state of a person who shall have fled from justice and be found in another state; that is, for the surrender by the state in which the fugitive is found. This, it is conceded, would cover the case and sustain the authority exercised, as the accused was a fugitive from the justice of Georgia and was found in Texas. But the proposition insists that the statute is not as broad as the Constitution, since it provides not for the surrender of the fugitive [240 U.S. 127, 134] by the state in which he is found, but only for his surrender by the state into which he has fled, thus leaving unprovided for the case of a fugitive from justice who is found in a state, but who has not fled into such state, because brought into such state involuntarily by a requisition from another. And the argument is supported by the contention that, as the statute exercises the power conferred by the Constitution and is exclusive, it occupies the whole field and prohibits all state action even upon a subject for which the statute has not provided, and which therefore in no manner comes within its express terms. But we are of the opinion that the contention rests upon a mistaken premise and unwarrantedly extends the scope of the decided cases upon which it relies. The first, because it erroneously assumes that although the statute leaves a subject with which there was power to deal under the Constitution unprovided for, it therefore took all matters within such unprovided area out of any possible state action. And the second, because, while it is undoubtedly true that in the decided cases relied upon (Kentucky v. Dennison, supra; Roberts v. Reilly, 166 U.S. 80 , 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.S. 691 , 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 311) the exclusive character of the legislation embodied in the statute was recognized, those cases, when rightly considered, go no further than to establish the exclusion by the statute of all state action from the matters for which the statute expressly or by necessary implication provided.
No reason is suggested nor have we been able to discover any, to sustain the assumption that the framers of the statute, in not making its provisions exactly coterminous with the power granted by the Constitution, did so for the purpose of leaving the subject, so far as unprovided for, beyond the operation of any legal authority whatever, state or national. On the contrary, when the situation with which the statute dealt is contemplated, the reasonable assumption is that by the omission to [240 U.S. 127, 135] extend the statute to the full limits of constitutional power it must have been intended to leave the subjects unprovided for not beyond the pale of all law, but subject to the power which then controlled them,-state authority until it was deemed essential by further legislation to govern them exclusively by national authority. In fact, such conclusion is essential to give effect to the act of Congress, since to hold to the contrary would render inefficacious the regulations provided concerning the subjects with which it dealt. This becomes manifest when it is considered that, if the proposition now insisted upon were accepted, it would follow that the delivery of a criminal who was a fugitive from justice by one state on a requisition by another would exhaust the power, and the criminal, therefore, whatever might be the extent and character of the crimes committed in other states, would remain in the state into which he had been removed without any authority to deliver him to other states from whose justice he had fled. And this, while paralyzing the authority of all the states, it must be moreover apparent, would cause them all to become involuntary asylums for criminals; for no method is suggested by which a criminal brought into a state by requisition, if acquitted, could be against his will deported, since to admit such power would be virtually to concede the right to surrender him to another state as a fugitive from justice for a crime committed within its borders.
It follows from what we have said that the court below was right in refusing to discharge the accused, and its judgment, therefore, must be and it is affirmed.
By stipulation of counsel a similar judgment will be entered in case of Victor E. Innes v. Tobin, Sheriff, No. 533.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


§ 212-2 Number of licenses limited; policy.
§ 212-3 Definitions and word usage.
§ 212-4 Application for license.
§ 212-6 Issuance of license.
§ 212-7 License information, term and revocation.
§ 212-10 Operation restricted to specific location.
§ 212-12 Licenses to be subject to rules.
§ 212-13 Junk in public view prohibited.
§ 212-18 Violations and penalties.
§ 212-20 License required; applicability.
§ 212-21 Granting of licenses.
§ 212-22 Application for license.
§ 212-24 License certificate; metal plate.
§ 212-26 Pledging or pawning prohibited.
§ 212-27 Purchase from minors and of stolen goods prohibited.
§ 212-29 Lost or stolen articles.
§ 212-31 Drifting and scattering of rubbish prohibited.
§ 212-32 Stacking of junk outside of fence prohibited.
§ 212-33 Fire protection required.
§ 212-34 Storage of flammable material.
§ 212-35 Junkyards subject to inspection.
§ 212-36 Suspension and revocation of license.
§ 212-38 Violations and penalties.
Business licensing — See Ch. 113.
Nuisances — See Ch. 246.
Unlicensed vehicles — See Ch. 345.
No person shall establish, operate or maintain a motor vehicle junkyard business unless he shall first obtain a license for such yard or business from the Mayor and Council of the Township of Marlboro.
The Mayor and Council shall grant 11 licenses to persons for the purpose of establishing, operating or maintaining a motor vehicle junkyard or business or retail and/or wholesale junkyard. No further licenses, over and above the amount listed and attached to this article and identified by block and lot and legally operating as of August 12, 1982, according to records in the Office of the Assessor, shall be granted.
Editor's Note: A list of properties operating as active junkyards is on file in the office of the Township Clerk.
It is the policy of the Mayor and the Township Council to license all legally existing businesses. However, all similar establishments must comply with all the requirements of this article.
Any business who operates in accordance with a motor vehicle junkyard license issued pursuant to this chapter but whose primary business involves the operation of a salvage pool or auto auction for the sale of total-loss vehicles and heavy equipment on behalf of insurance companies or charitable organizations; provided, however, that no dismantling, parting out, crushing or shredding of vehicles shall be permitted.
Any business or place of storage or deposit, whether in connection with another business or not, which displays in or upon which there is displayed to the public view two or more motor vehicles which are unfit for use for the highway transportation, or used parts of motor vehicles or old iron, metal, glass, paper, cordage or other waste or discarded material which has been a part of any motor vehicle, the sum of which parts or material shall equal in bulk two or more motor vehicles.
When used herein, "person" shall be held to mean and include partnerships and corporations and any other legal entity capable of suing or being sued; the masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter genders, and the singular number shall include the plural number.
The names and residences of the applicants if an individual, partnership or firm, or the names of the principal officers and their residences if the applicant is an association or corporation.
The length of time such applicant or applicants if an individual, partnership or firm, or the manager or person in charge if the applicant is an association or corporation, has or have resided at his or their present address, his or their places of previous employment, whether he or them or any of them have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and, if so, what offense, when and in what court.
Whether the applicant or applicants if an individual, partnership or firm, or the manager or person in charge if the applicant is an association or corporation, has or have been employed by a junk dealer or has or have been a junk dealer or dealers.
The premises where said business is to be located or carried on.
Such other information that may be required by the Mayor and Council of the Township of Marlboro.
No premises shall be used for establishing, operating or maintaining any junkyard or business as defined in § 212-3A, nor shall any junkyard be operated or situated, within a distance of 500 feet of premises used exclusively for residential purposes or a school, church or other place of public gathering, except that this section shall not apply to any premises entitled to a nonconforming use by reason of law or the judicial decision of this state; provided, however, that no such junkyard shall be located within an area which is less than 5,000 linear feet between the nearest lot line of such proposed junkyard and the nearest lot line of any other junkyard. The phrase "nearest lot line" as used herein shall be understood and construed in the case of irregular lot lines as being the mean or average distance between such lot lines, or in case of lot lines on opposite sides of a street or roadway as meaning the distance between said lines if the same were projected or extended so as to be on the same side of the street or roadway.
Upon the filing of the application as herein provided, the Mayor shall, after investigation of said application and the payment to the Township of the license fee herein provided, in his discretion, issue to the applicant a license.
All licenses shall be numbered in the order in which they are issued and shall state clearly the location of the junkyard, the date of issuance and expiration of the license and the name and address of the licensee. All licenses granted by the Mayor shall expire on the first day of January next after granting the same, and all such licenses issued shall be subject to the right of revocation reserved by the Council, except that the licensee shall be entitled to a hearing before revocation.
Each applicant for such licenses shall pay an annual license fee of $1,125. No license shall be transferable; and any holder of such license who permits it to be used by any other person shall be guilty of a violation of this article, and such license shall be subject to immediate revocation. For each renewal of such license, the fee shall be the same as for the original issuance, and a new bond shall be furnished with each renewal as in the case of the original issue. A mercantile license will be issued without additional fee.
Each licensee shall provide a quarterly report to the Chief of Police of the Township of Marlboro detailing the year, model and serial number of each motor vehicle acquired by said licensee during the previous three-month period. Such reports shall be based upon the quarters of January through March, April through June, July through September, and October through December. Said reports shall be received by the Chief of Police of the Township of Marlboro by the 15th calendar day of the first month of the succeeding quarter. Each licensee shall maintain the records required in § 212-28 of this chapter.
No junkyard shall operate in any manner, other than the business office directly connected to the junkyard, except between the hours of 7:00 a.m., prevailing time, and 5:30 p.m. prevailing time, except for emergency deliveries upon advanced notice to the Township Police Department; however, in no event after 8:00 p.m. Employees may be present in the office at other times.
Any motor vehicle auction and salvage business as defined by this chapter shall be permitted on Monday through Friday to take delivery of vehicles up to 7:00 p.m., provided that they establish a separate area approved by the Planning Board or Board of Adjustment for off-hour dropoff of vehicles between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
All licenses under this article shall at all times be subject to such reasonable rules as may be made, from time to time, by the Mayor and Council of the Township of Marlboro for the proper operation and regulation of the places of business named in such license.
No junk, old rope, iron, brass, copper, tin, lead or other metal, or damaged automobiles shall be kept or placed in front of the fence or in front of the place of business conducted by the licensee as a junkyard or in or upon any roof, fence or other object designed to place junk, old rope, iron, brass, copper, tin, lead or other metal, rags or damaged automobiles in public view.
Solid walls of cement block or poured concrete or fences at least eight feet above ground level and set back 30 feet shall be constructed and maintained in good repair at all times. Said fences shall be chain link fences interwoven with plastic lining so that the contents of the junkyard, whether the junkyard is a motor vehicle junkyard or a junkyard operated, established or maintained by a retail junk dealer, are not visible from the outside of the fence, and said solid walls or fences shall surround any area in which junk of any nature is stored. Any such wall or fence will have two gates and/or doors for the purpose of ingress and egress.
The requirement for interweaving shall apply only to the sides of fencing facing the front or side, adjacent to residential zones.
Any person who maintains or operates a motor vehicle junkyard and/or a wholesale or retail junkyard on the effective date of this chapter shall have a period of 80 days therefrom within which to construct or have constructed the wall or fence as prescribed in this article and shall not be liable to punishment under the provisions of this article unless the violations shall have occurred after the expiration of said eighty-day period.
Fences used for screening junkyards shall not be used for advertising purposes.
All signs shall conform to § 220-99 of Chapter 220, Land Use and Development.
Editor's Note: Former § 212-15, Removal of fuel required, as amended, was repealed 10-20-2016 by Ord. No. 2016-15.
All flammable material removed from said motor vehicles and not removed from the premises shall be stored in accordance with the Fire Code.
Editor's Note: See Ch. 183, Fire Prevention.
It shall be unlawful to stack, pile or place parts or motor vehicles upon said premises in such a manner as to create a fire hazard or to create a place for the harboring or breeding of rats, mice, vermin or mosquitoes, nor shall any junk be stacked, piled or placed or stored so that it shall be visible above the height of the fence surrounding said premises.
Editor's Note: Original § 82-18, When effective; grace period, which immediately followed this section, was deleted 12-10-2009 by Ord. No. 2009-35.
Any person who, by himself or by his Clerk, agent or employee, shall own, establish, operate, lease and/or maintain a motor vehicle junkyard or business, as herein defined, without a license as required by this article or who shall violate any of the provisions of this article or who, having had his license revoked, shall continue to establish, operate or maintain a motor vehicle junkyard or business, upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to the maximum allowable fine as provided in § 4-3 of the Code for each day during which such violation shall continue and/or be imprisoned in the county jail for the maximum allowable time, or both, in the discretion of the Magistrate before whom such person is convicted. In default of the payment of any fine imposed hereunder, such person may, in the discretion of the Magistrate, be imprisoned for up to the maximum allowable time. In addition to the penalties herein provided, the license of such person violating the same shall be subject to revocation.
Includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and associations.
A person who goes about the streets soliciting the purchase of junk or who maintains a store, shop or other place of business or a truck, cart or other vehicle for the purchase, sale and collection in small quantities of discarded articles and materials of every description, commonly called "junk."
A person who buys and sells junk in large quantities and who maintains a warehouse, yard or other place of business where discarded articles and materials of every description are purchased or collected in large quantities and are permitted to accumulate for the purpose of being sold at wholesale.
No person shall engage in the business of a retail or wholesale junk dealer except pursuant to and within the terms of a license granted by the Mayor and Council; provided, however, that nothing in this article shall apply to persons maintaining a licensed motor vehicle junk business or motor vehicle junkyard, as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:11-2, unless such persons are also engaged in the purchase, sale and collection of discarded articles and materials other than motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts. A separate license shall be required for each place of business and for each vehicle maintained by junk dealers, as hereinafter provided.
The Mayor and Council shall grant licenses to such and so many persons as it shall think proper, which persons shall be of good moral character.
Applications for licenses shall be in writing, signed by an applicant and filed with the Business Administrator, shall state the name, age and residence of the applicant and purpose for which the license is to be used, shall state the place where the licensed business is to be conducted or, in the case such license is sought for a vehicle, shall contain a detailed description of such vehicle, and shall be accompanied by the license fee hereinafter prescribed.
For each retail junk dealer or places of business, including one vehicle maintained by such retail junk dealer, $1,000; and for each additional vehicle maintained by such retailer, $100.
For each wholesale place of business, including one vehicle maintained by such wholesale junk dealer, $1,000; and for each additional vehicle maintained by such wholesaler, $100.
The Township Clerk shall issue to every person to whom a license has been granted by the Mayor and Council a license certificate, which shall state the purpose for which the license is granted, the name and business address of the licensee, the number of the license and the date of its expiration. Said certificate shall be displayed in a conspicuous place upon the licensed premises at all times or, in case of a licensed vehicle, in or upon such vehicle at all times when the vehicle is engaged in the business for which the license is granted. In addition to such certificate, every licensed vehicle shall have displayed on the exterior thereof in a conspicuous place a metal plate to be furnished by the Business Administrator, bearing the words: "Township of Marlboro Licensed Junk Dealer No. ________________, Expires, _______________, 20___," with the number of the license and the appropriate date inserted.
Before a retail junk dealer's license shall be issued to any person, such person shall enter into a bond to the Mayor and Council of the Township of Marlboro, with good and sufficient surety to be approved by the Mayor and Council in the penal sum of $1,000 conditioned for the due observance of all ordinances of the Township of Marlboro regarding the business of retail junk dealer. Said bond shall also be approved as to form by the Township Attorney.
No junk dealer shall receive in connection with his business any articles or materials by way of pledge or pawn, nor shall be lend or advance any money on the security of such articles and materials.
No junk dealers shall receive or purchase any articles or materials from a person under 18 years of age or which are known by him to have been stolen or converted.
Every retail junk dealer shall keep a book in which shall be clearly written at the time of each purchase a description of the article purchased, the name and address of the seller and the date and hour of the purchase. Said book shall be available for inspection by any member or agent of the Police Department for a period of one year after the date of the purchase.
Every junk dealer who shall receive or be in possession of any articles or materials alleged to have been lost or stolen shall, upon demand, present them for inspection to any officer or agent of the Police Department. If any articles or materials shall be advertised in any newspaper published in the Township of Marlboro as having been lost or stolen and said article or materials, or any portion of them, shall then be in, or thereafter come into, the possession of any junk dealer, said dealer shall forthwith give information thereof in writing to the Chief of Police, stating from whom the articles or materials were received or purchased and the time and date of the receipt or purchase.
No retail junk dealer shall receive or purchase in connection with his business any articles or materials except between the hour of 7:00 a.m., prevailing time, and sunset.
No junk, papers or rubbish shall be permitted to scatter, to drift or to be strewn, either inside or outside the junkyard, and all such materials shall be secured, fastened and neatly stacked.
No stacks of junk or piles of dirt or rubbish shall be permitted outside fenced enclosure.
Sufficient fire extinguisher equipment shall be maintained in good working order at every junkyard in accordance with directions of the Fire Marshal of the Township of Marlboro.
No flammable materials shall be stored unless the Fire Marshal of the Township of Marlboro is notified of the presence of said materials, and such materials shall be stored in such manner as the Fire Marshal may require for the purpose of eliminating fire hazards.
All junkyards shall be subject to the inspection of the Police Department, Fire Department, Health Department and Business Administrator and by any personnel charged with the duties of enforcing the health, safety and police ordinances, regulations and laws affecting or pertaining to this Township.
Any license issued pursuant to this article may be suspended or revoked by the Mayor and Council or Municipal Judge, after reasonable opportunity to the licensee to be heard, for violation of any of the provisions of this article or any other ordinance of the Township of Marlboro. Such suspension or revocation may be either in addition to or instead of the penalties prescribed herein.
No premises shall be used for establishing, operating or maintaining any junkyard or business, as defined in § 212-3 of the Motor Vehicle Junkyard Ordinance, nor shall any junkyard be operated or situated within a distance of 500 feet of premises used exclusively for residential purposes or a school, church or other place of public gathering, except that this section shall not apply to any premises entitled to a nonconforming use by reason of law or the judicial decisions of this state; provided, however, that no such junkyard shall be located within an area which is less than 5,000 linear feet between the nearest lot line of such proposed junkyard and the nearest lot line of any other junkyard. The phrase "nearest lot line" as used herein shall be understood and construed in the case of irregular lot lines as being the mean or average distance between such lot lines or, in case of lot lines on opposite sides of a street or roadway, as meaning the distance between said lines if the same were projected or extended so as to be on the same side of the street or roadway.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this article shall, upon conviction, be punished as provided in § 4-3 of the Code; and each day such violation shall be continued shall be deemed and taken to be a separate and distinct offense.


Notice 2011-8 provides adjustments to the limitation on housing expenses for purposes of Code § 911 for specific locations for 2011. These adjustments are made on the basis of geographic differences in housing costs relative to housing costs in the United States.
Code § 911(a) allows a qualified individual to elect to exclude from gross income the foreign earned income and housing cost amount of such individual. Code § 911(c)(1) defines the term “housing cost amount” as an amount equal to the excess of (A) the housing expenses of an individual for the taxable year to the extent such expenses do not exceed the amount determined under Code § 911(c)(2), over (B) 16 percent of the exclusion amount (computed on a daily basis) in effect under Code § 911(b)(2)(D) for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins ($254.52 per day for 2011, or $92,900 for the full year), multiplied by the number of days of that taxable year within the applicable period described in Code § 911(d)(1).
The applicable period is the period during which the individual meets the tax home requirement of Code § 911(d)(1) and either the bona fide residence requirement of Code § 911(d)(1)(A) or the physical presence requirement of Code § 911(d)(1)(B). Assuming that the entire taxable year of a qualified individual is within the applicable period, the Code § 911(c)(1)(B) amount for 2011 is $14,864 ($92,900 x .16).
Code § 911(c)(2)(A) limits the housing expenses taken into account in Code § 911(c)(1)(A) to an amount equal to (i) 30 percent (adjusted as may be provided under the Secretary’s authority under Code § 911(c)(2)(B)) of the amount in effect under Code § 911(b)(2)(D) for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the individual begins, multiplied by (ii) the number of days of that taxable year within the applicable period described in Code § 911(d)(1).
Thus, under this general limitation, a qualified individual whose entire taxable year is within the applicable period is limited to maximum housing expenses of $27,870 ($92,900 x .30) in 2011. Code § 911(c)(2)(B) authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations or other guidance to adjust the percentage under Code § 911(c)(2)(A)(i) based on geographic differences in housing costs relative to housing costs in the United States. Pursuant to this authority, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Department published Notice 2006-87, 2006-2 C.B. 766, and Notice 2007-25, 2007-1 C.B. 760, for 2006, Notice 2007-77, 2007-2 C.B. 735, for 2007, Notice 2008-107, 2008- 2 C.B. 1266, for 2008 and 2009, and Notice 2010-27, for 2009 and 2010 to provide adjustments to the limitation on housing expenses for qualified individuals incurring housing expenses in countries with high housing costs relative to housing costs in the United States.
Notice 2011-8 includes a lengthy table with adjusted limitations on housing expenses (in lieu of the otherwise applicable limitation of $27,870) for various locations in 2011.


Skrovig v. BNSF Ry. Co.
TAMI SKROVIG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Jeffrey Skrovig, deceased, Plaintiff, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
Defendant moves to amend the court's order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket 116) to include certification allowing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (Docket 120). Defendant also moves to stay all proceedings of the district court, including the jury trial presently set to commence on April 23, 2012, until the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decides defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal, and, if granted, until such time as the Court of Appeals issues its mandate following the appeal. Id. In the alternative, defendant moves for a separate trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) on the legal question of its federal preemption defenses. Id. Plaintiff opposes defendant's motions. (Docket 146).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (italics in original). "It has . . . long been the policy of the courts to discourage piece-meal appeals because most often such appeals result in additional burdens on both the court and the litigants. Permission to allow interlocutory appeals should thus be granted sparingly and with discrimination." White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1994). "In accordance with this policy, § 1292(b) 'should and will be used only in exceptional cases where a decision on appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation, as in antitrust and similar protracted cases.' " Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5260).
"Section 1292(b) establishes three criteria for certification: the district court must be of the opinion that (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) certification will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The court addresses each of these criteria separately.
The court concludes this case does not involve a controlling question of law. The court's order denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (Docket 116) properly recognized and considered the law of the case. Defendant's argument the court improperly interpreted the controlling law is simply misguided.
The court carefully analyzed all of the cases cited by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment. In arriving at its order denying partial summary judgment, the court concluded the train and train car collision cases cited by defendant were not helpful in the analysis of federal preemption regarding collisions involving on-track maintenance equipment. In its brief in support of the request for interlocutory appeal certification, defendant refers to Jacobsen v. BNSF Railway Co., No. 1:11-CV-01003, 2011 WL 6099389 (D.S.D. Dec. 7, 2011). (Docket 121 at p. 3). Jacobsen is not helpful in the analysis of the issues in the present litigation. Jacobsen involved a "low-profile flatbed railroad car" in the middle of a stopped train. Id. at 2011 WL 6099389 at *2. Plaintiff's negligence claims in Jacobsen were "(1) failed to sufficiently warn plaintiff of the train's presence at the crossing, (2) caused the railcar to block the crossing, and (3) failed to apply sufficient reflectorized material to the railcar." Id. at 2011 WL 6099389 at *3. Each of those claims were preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"). Id. at 2011 WL 6099389 at *4.
In the same fashion, defendant's citation to Cearley v. General American Transportation Corporation, 186 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1999) is not useful in a case involving on-track mainteance equipment. (Docket 121 at p. 4). Cearley involved a "tank car without underframe." Id. at 889. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out, there was a specific federal regulation controlling the construction of "tank cars without underframes." Id. at 891. Because of the specific regulation covering the tanker, the court held "that appellees' state law claims, based upon the allegedly inadequate safety features of the tank car platform, including the safety railing, are preempted by federal law." Id. at 893.
Defendant's argument ignores the court's analysis of the FRSA and its implementing regulations which allow railroad companies to adopt additional requirements for the operation of maintenance equipment other than trains. See Docket 116 at pp. 15-24. The court has not been presented with any case directly dealing with issues similar to the present litigation. White, 43 F.3d at 378. Defendant's arguments do not create a substantial ground for a difference of opinion justifying an interlocutory appeal.
An interlocutory appeal from the court's order denying partial summary judgment, even if successful, would not "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." White, 43 F.3d at 376. Plaintiff's claims related to the speed of the ballast regulator, Mr. Wise's failure to slow down and stop the ballast regulator prior to entering the crossing, his use of a warning horn, his failure to keep and maintain a proper lookout, and his failure to keep the ballast regulator under proper control to avoid the collision remain for trial. See Docket 116 at p. 9 n. 7. These claims are outside the scope of BNSF's preemption defense.
Defendant fails to satisfy its "heavy burden of demonstrating that the case is an exceptional one in which immediate appeal is warranted." White, 43 F.3d at 376.
In the alternative, BNSF requests the court grant a separate trial on federal preemption. (Docket 120 at p. 3). BNSF argues it "must necessarily offer all evidence relevant to its defense of federal preemption." (Docket 121 at p. 12).
In filing its motion for partial summary judgment, BNSF was required to provide the court with all evidence in support of the motion. The court considered all defendant's evidence and concluded partial summary judgment should be denied on the federal preemption issue. (Docket 116). Federal preemption is a legal question the court has resolved and is not a proper issue for consideration by a jury. Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 528 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The question presented is . . . one of federal preemption, which is predominantly legal."). The law-of-the-case doctrine "requires courts to adhere to decisions made in earlier proceedings in order to ensure uniformity of decisions, protect the expectations of the parties, and promote judicial economy." Murphy v. FedEx. National LTL, Inc., 618 F.3d 893, 905 (8th Cir. 2010).
Defendant's motion for a separate trial on federal preemption is denied.
ORDERED that defendant's motion (Docket 120) is denied in its entirety.


text:
162 valid minerals. 29 (TL) - type locality of valid minerals.
Reference: Pekov, I.V., Zubkova, N.V., Yapaskurt, V.O., Lykova, I.S., Chukanov, N.V., Belakovskiy, D.I., Britvin, S.N., Turchkova, A.G. and Pushcharovsky, D.Y. (2015) Alexkhomyakovite, IMA 2015-013. CNMNC Newsletter No. 25, June 2015, page 534; Mineralogical Magazine, 79, 529-535.
Reference: Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Pekov, I.V., Chukanov, N.V., Kononkova, N.N., Zubkova, N.V., Rabadanov, M.K., and Pushcharovsky, D.Y. (2008): Geology of Ore Deposits 50(8), 749-754.
Reference: Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: PEKOV, I.V. & NIKOLAEV, A.P. (2013) Minerals of the pegmatites and hydrothermal assemblages of the Koashva deposit (Khibiny, Kola Peninsula, Russia). Mineralogical Almanac 189(2), 7-65.
Reference: Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Kapustin, Y. L., Pudovkina, Z. V., Bykova, A. V., & Lyubomilova, G. V. (1975). Koashvite, a new mineral. International Geology Review, 17(6), 654-660.
Reference: Yakovenchuk, V.N., Ivanyuk, G.Y., Pakhomovsky, Y.A., Men’shikov, Y.P., Konopleva, N.G., and Korchak, Y.A. (2008): Geology of Ore Deposits 50(8), 732-745.
Reference: [World of Stones 95:5-6, p64]; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Khomyakov, A. P., Cámara, F., & Sokolova, E. (2010). Carbobystrite, Na8 [Al6Si6O24](CO3)· 4H2O, a new cancrinite-group mineral species from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 48(2), 291-300.
Description: Chlorbartonite occurs in a microcline – pectolite – sodalite – aegirine hydrothermal vein in the heterogeneous feldspathic urtite.
Reference: Arzamastsev, A., Yakovenchuk, V., Pakhomovsky, Y., & Ivanyuk, G. (2008). The Khibina and Lovozero alkaline massifs: Geology and unique mineralization. In Guidbook for 33rd International Geological Congress Excursion (No. 47, p. 58).
Reference: Pekov, I.V., Chukanov, N.V., Kononkova, N.N., Zubkova, N.V., Rabadanov, M.K., and Pushcharovsky, D.Y. (2008): Geology of Ore Deposits 50(8), 749-754.; Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Can Min (2002) 40, (3), 961-970 ; American Mineralogist, Volume 94, pages 1450–1458, 2009; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Victor N. Yakovenchuk, Alexander P. Nikolaev, Ekaterina A. Selivanova, Yakov A. Pakhomovsky, Julia A. Korchak, Dar’ya V. Spiridonova, Oleg A. Zalkind, and Sergey V. Krivovichev (2009) Ivanyukite-Na-T, ivanyukite-Na-C, ivanyukite-K, and ivanyukite-Cu: New microporous titanosilicates from the Khibiny massif (Kola Peninsula, Russia) and crystal structure of ivanyukite-Na-T. American Mineralogist, 94, 1450–1458.
Reference: [World of Stones 95:5-6, p64]; Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Kapustin, Y. L., Pudovkina, Z. V., Bykova, A. V., & Lyubomilova, G. V. (1975). Koashvite, a new mineral. International Geology Review, 17(6), 654-660.
Reference: [AmMin 85:1844]; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Pekov, I. (1998) Minerals First discovered on the territory of the former Soviet Union 369p. Ocean Pictures, Moscow; Kapustin, Y. L., Pudovkina, Z. V., Bykova, A. V., & Lyubomilova, G. V. (1975). Koashvite, a new mineral. International Geology Review, 17(6), 654-660.; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Can Min (2002) 40, (3), 961-970 ; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Kapustin, Y. L., Pudovkina, Z. V., Bykova, A. V., & Lyubomilova, G. V. (1975). Koashvite, a new mineral. International Geology Review, 17(6), 654-660.; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Takai, Y., Uehara, S., Inoo, T. (2011) Minerals from Khibiny, Kola, Russia. Chigaku Kenkyu, 60 (1), 41-46.
Reference: Pekov, I.V., and Agakhanov, A.A. (2008): Geology of Ore Deposits 50(7), 583-589.
Reference: Sergey Vasiliev of Systematic Mineralogy (dealer); Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Yakovenchuk, V.N., Selivanova, E.A., Ivanyuk, G.Yu., Pakhomovsky, Ya.A., Mikhailova, J.A., Nikolaev, A.P. (2010): Polezhaevaite-(Ce), NaSrCeF6, a new mineral from the Khibiny massif (Kola Peninsula, Russia). American Mineralogist, 95, (in press).
Reference: Lisitsin, D. & Bosio, P. (2001): An interesting find of thorosteenstrupine and steenstrupine-(Ce) at Mt. Koashva, Khibiny massif (Kola Peninsula, Russia). Rivista Mineralogica Italiana 2001 (4), 218-229 (in Italian). ; Pekov, I. V., & Nikolaev, A. P. (2007) Minerals of the Pegmatites and Hydrothermal Assemblages of the Koashva Deposit.
Reference: [AmMin 87:181]; Khomyakov, A. P., Nechelyustov, G. N., Sokolova, E., Bonaccorsi, E., Merlino, S., & Pasero, M. (2002). Megakalsilite, a new polymorph of KAlSiO4 from the Khibina alkaline massif, Kola peninsula, Russia: Mineral description and crystal structure. The Canadian Mineralogist, 40(3), 961-970.
Reference: Pekov, I.V., Chukanov, N.V., Boldyreva, M.M., Dubinchuk, V.T. (2006): Wilhelmramsayite, Cu3FeS3•2H2O, a new mineral from Khibiny Massif, Kola Peninsula. Proceedings of the Russian Mineralogical Society, 135(1), 38-48.
Yakovenchuk, V.N., Ivanyuk, G., Pakhomovsky, Y., and Men'shikov, Y. (2005) Khibiny. Apatity & London (Laplandia Minerals in association with the Mineralogical Society of Great Britain and Ireland), 468 pp.
Pekov, I.V. and Nikolaev, A.P. (2013) Minerals of the pegmatites and hydrothermal assemblages of the Koashva deposit (Khibiny, Kola Peninsula, Russia). Mineralogical Almanac, 189(2), 7-65.
Yakovenchuk, V.N., Ivanyuk, G.Y., Pakhomovsky, Y.A., Selivanova, E.A., Korchak, J.A., and Nikolaev, A.P. (2010) Strontiofluorite, SrF2, a new mineral from the Khibiny Massif, Kola Peninsula, Russia. Canadian Mineralogist, 48, 1487-1492.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Michael Neustel is a U.S. Patent Attorney who focuses his patent law practice on patent and trademark applications, infringement due diligence, Inter Partes Review (IPR), patent infringement litigation and trademark infringement litigation. Michael also counsels entrepreneurs and small-businesses on how best to protect their inventions and trademarks.
Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Quoting Neustel.com Website in 8/13/12 Article).
New Products Marketing Corp. d/b/a Stringliner Company v. Empire Level Mfg., Corp., 3:03-cv-00005-RRE-KKK (2003 District of North Dakota) – Represented the North Dakota plaintiff Stringliner in a patent infringement case involving United States Patent No. 5,927,635.
Universal Electronics Inc. v. Intrigue Technologies, Inc., 8:02-cv-01089-GLT-AN (2003 Central District of California) – Represented the Canadian defendant Intrigue Technologies (a.k.a. Harmony Remote) against the publicly traded Universal Electronics in a patent infringement lawsuit involving six patents (U.S. Patent No. 5,959,751, U.S. Patent No. 5,689,353, U.S. Patent No. 5,228,077, U.S. Patent No. 5,255,313, U.S. Patent No. 5,552,917, and U.S. Patent No. 5,414,761). Represented the defendant until they were purchased by Logitech for $29 million and then Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges continued the litigation.
C&A Pro, LLC v. Pride Solutions, LLC, 04-cv-03994-JRT-FLN (2004 District of Minnesota) – Represented the North Dakota plaintiff C&A Pro in a patent infringement lawsuit involving seven patents (U.S. Patent No. 6,086,101, U.S. Patent No. 6,331,008, U.S. Patent No. 6,619,676, U.S. Patent No. 6,764,635, U.S. Patent No. D466,832, U.S. Patent No. D480,332, and U.S. Patent No. D485,786).
Spiel Associates, Inc. v. Gateway Bookbinding Systems, LTD, 1:03-cv-04696-FB-RLM (2003 Eastern District of New York) – Represented the Canadian defendant Gateway Bookbinding in a patent infringement lawsuit involving two patents (U.S. Patent No. 6,547,502 and U.S. Patent No. 6,726,426) and unfair competition litigation resulting in summary judgment in favor of my client after over six years of contentious litigation.
University of North Dakota v. James Hardie et al., 2:04-cv-00152-RRE-KKK (2004 District of North Dakota) – Represented UND and the EERC in a contentious lawsuit against the international company James Hardie involving a dispute over patent inventorship, misappropriation of trade secrets, copyright infringement, unfair competition, breach of contract and replevin. The Felhaber Larson Fenlon & Vogt PA law firm got involved to assist UND/EERC with respect to the non-patent matters, but I maintained lead role relating to the patent matters. The Nilles Law Firm was local counsel for James Hardie.
New Products Marketing Corp. d/b/a Stringliner Company v. Lowes Companies, Inc., 4:06-cv-035-DLH-CSM (2006 District of North Dakota) – Represented the North Dakota plaintiff Stringliner in a patent infringement (U.S. Patent No. 5,927,635), trademark infringement and unfair competition lawsuit against the national retailer Lowe’s.
Schlagel, Inc. v. S-M Enterprises, Inc., 0:13-cv-00446-MJD-LIB (2013 District of Minnesota) – Represented defendant S-M Enterprises in a patent infringement lawsuit (U.S. Patent No. 5,593,019).
If you would like to speak with Michael, you can call him at 701-281-8822.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.