Full Title Name: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 14. Aeronautics and Space. Chapter II. Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation (Aviation Proceedings). Subchapter D. Special Regulations. Part 382. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel. Subpart H. Services on Aircraft. § 382.117 Must carriers permit passengers with a disability to travel with service animals?
Summary: This federal regulation states that carriers must permit service animals to accompany passengers with disabilities. A carrier must permit the service animal to accompany the passenger with a disability at any seat in which the passenger sits, unless the animal obstructs an aisle or other area. The Department of Transportation allows identification of a service animal by the presence of harnesses, tags, or "the credible verbal assurances of a qualified individual with a disability using the animal." A carrier is never required to accommodate certain unusual service animals (e.g., snakes, other reptiles, ferrets, rodents, and spiders). With respect to all other animals, including unusual or exotic animals (e.g., miniature horses, pigs, monkeys), a carrier must determine whether any factors preclude their traveling in the cabin as service animals (e.g., is the animal too large or heavy to be accommodated in the cabin, would it pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others, would it cause a significant disruption of cabin service, would it be prohibited from entering a foreign country that is the flight's destination, etc.). Foreign carriers, however, are not required to carry service animals other than dogs. If a passenger seeks to travel with an emotional support animal, he or she must provide current documentation on the letterhead of a licensed mental health professional. This documentation must indicate the presence of a DSM IV mental or emotional disability and the need for the animal, among other things.
§382.27 May a carrier require a passenger with a disability to provide advance notice in order to obtain certain specific services in connection with a flight?
§ 382.51 What requirements must carriers meet concerning the accessibility of airport facilities?
§ 382.117 Must carriers permit passengers with a disability to travel with service animals?
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and §382.133(e)(4) and (5) and (f)(5) and (6), as a carrier you must not require a passenger with a disability to provide advance notice in order to obtain services or accommodations required by this part.
(b) You may require a passenger with a disability to provide up to 72 hours' advance notice and check in one hour before the check-in time for the general public to receive carrier-supplied in-flight medical oxygen on international flights, 48 hours' advance notice and check-in one hour before the check-in time for the general public to receive carrier-supplied in-flight medical oxygen on domestic flights, and 48 hours' advance notice and check-in one hour before the check-in time for the general public to use his/her ventilator, respirator, CPAP machine or POC.
(c) You may require a passenger with a disability to provide up to 48 hours' advance notice and check in one hour before the check-in time for the general public to receive the following services and accommodations. The services listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(3) of this section are optional; you are not required to provide them, but you may choose to do so.
(7) Provision of an on-board wheelchair on an aircraft with more than 60 seats that does not have an accessible lavatory.
(10) Accommodation of a passenger who has both severe vision and hearing impairments (see §382.29(b)(4)).
(d) If the passenger with a disability provides the advance notice you require, consistent with this section, for a service that you must provide (see paragraphs (c)(4) through (c)(10) of this section) or choose to provide (see paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(3) of this section), you must provide the requested service or accommodation.
(e) Your reservation and other administrative systems must ensure that when passengers provide the advance notice that you require, consistent with this section, for services and accommodations, the notice is communicated, clearly and on time, to the people responsible for providing the requested service or accommodation.
(f) If a passenger with a disability provides the advance notice you require, consistent with this section, and the passenger is forced to change to another flight (e.g., because of a flight cancellation), you must, to the maximum extent feasible, provide the accommodation on the new flight. If the new flight is another carrier's flight, you must provide the maximum feasible assistance to the other carrier in providing the accommodation the passenger requested from you.
(g) If a passenger does not meet advance notice or check-in requirements you establish consistent with this section, you must still provide the service or accommodation if you can do so by making reasonable efforts, without delaying the flight.
(1) You must ensure that terminal facilities providing access to air transportation are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs. You are deemed to comply with this obligation if the facilities meet requirements applying to places of public accommodation under Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations implementing Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
(2) With respect to any situation in which boarding and deplaning by level-entry loading bridges or accessible passenger lounges to and from an aircraft is not available, you must ensure that there is an accessible route between the gate and the area from which aircraft are boarded (e.g., the tarmac in a situation in which level-entry boarding is not available). An accessible route is one meeting the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), sections 4.3.3 through 4.3.10.
(3) You must ensure that systems of intra- and inter-terminal transportation, including, but not limited to, moving sidewalks, shuttle vehicles and people movers, comply with applicable requirements of the Department of Transportation's ADA rules (49 CFR parts 37 and 38).
(4) Your contracts or leases with airport operators concerning the use of airport facilities must set forth your airport accessibility responsibility under this part and that of the airport operator under applicable section 504 and ADA rules of the Department of Transportation and Department of Justice.
(5) In cooperation with the airport operator and in consultation with local service animal training organization(s), you must provide animal relief areas for service animals that accompany passengers departing, connecting, or arriving at an airport on your flights.
(6) You must enable captioning at all times on all televisions and other audio-visual displays that are capable of displaying captions and that are located in any portion of the terminal to which any passengers have access on May 13, 2009. The captioning must be high-contrast insofar as is feasible.
(7) You must replace any televisions and other audio-visual displays providing passengers with safety briefings, information, or entertainment that do not have high-contrast captioning capability with equipment that does have such capability whenever such equipment is replaced in the normal course of operations and/or whenever areas of the terminal in which such equipment is located are undergoing substantial renovation or expansion.
(8) If you newly acquire televisions and other audio-visual displays for passenger safety briefings, information, or entertainment on or after May 13, 2009, such equipment must have high-contrast captioning capability.
(b) As a carrier, you must ensure that passengers with a disability can readily use all terminal facilities you own, lease, or control at a foreign airport. In the case of foreign carriers, this requirement applies only to terminal facilities that serve flights covered by §382.7 of this part.
(1) This means that passengers with a disability must be able to move readily through such terminal facilities to get to or from the gate and any other area from which passengers board the aircraft you use for such flights (e.g., the tarmac in the case of flights that do not use level-entry boarding). This obligation is in addition to your obligation to provide enplaning, deplaning, and connecting assistance to passengers.
(2) You may meet this obligation through any combination of facility accessibility, auxiliary aids, equipment, the assistance of personnel, or other appropriate means consistent with the safety and dignity of passengers with a disability.
(c) As a foreign carrier, you must meet the requirements of this section by May 13, 2010, except as otherwise indicated in paragraph (a). As a U.S. carrier, you must meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section by May 13, 2010.
(4) The date and type of the mental health professional's license and the state or other jurisdiction in which it was issued.
(f) You are never required to accommodate certain unusual service animals (e.g., snakes, other reptiles, ferrets, rodents, and spiders) as service animals in the cabin. With respect to all other animals, including unusual or exotic animals that are presented as service animals (e.g., miniature horses, pigs, monkeys), as a carrier you must determine whether any factors preclude their traveling in the cabin as service animals (e.g., whether the animal is too large or heavy to be accommodated in the cabin, whether the animal would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others, whether it would cause a significant disruption of cabin service, whether it would be prohibited from entering a foreign country that is the flight's destination). If no such factors preclude the animal from traveling in the cabin, you must permit it to do so. However, as a foreign carrier, you are not required to carry service animals other than dogs.
(h) You must promptly take all steps necessary to comply with foreign regulations (e.g., animal health regulations) needed to permit the legal transportation of a passenger's service animal from the U.S. into a foreign airport.
(i) Guidance concerning the carriage of service animals generally is found in the preamble of this rule. Guidance on the steps necessary to legally transport service animals on flights from the U.S. into the United Kingdom is found in 72 FR 8268-8277, (February 26, 2007).


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Chas. L. Mayer, Shreveport, La., Sidney E. Cook, Jackson, Mayer & Kennedy, Shreveport, of counsel, for appellants.
Whitfield Jack, Shreveport, La., Harry H. Lipsig, New York City, Booth, Lockard, Jack & Pleasant, Shreveport, La., for appellee.
Before HOLMES and RIVES, Circuit Judges, and WRIGHT, District Judge.
American Fidelity and Casualty Company, Texas and Pacific Motor Transport. Company, and Harvey Steen Bell, appellants herein, seek reversal of a judgment against them based on the verdict of a jury in the amount of $42,353.44. The case arises out of a collision between a transport truck, owned by Texas and Pacific, driven by Bell and insured by American Fidelity, and an automobile driven by Louis A. Drexler, who was killed in the collision. Appellee here is Drexler's widow. In seeking reversal, appellants assert that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion for a directed verdict, in refusing to grant their motion for a new trial, in giving certain instructions to the jury and in refusing others, and in certain rulings on evidence. In addition, appellants assign as error the refusal of the trial court to allow them to cross-examine the appellant, Bell, after he had been placed on the stand by plaintiff at beginning of the trial under Rule 43(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.A. For reasons hereinafter assigned, we find that the assignments of error are without merit sufficient to justify reversal.
The record shows that a transport truck, tractor-trailer type, forty-one feet in length, loaded with 15,000 pounds of freight, driven by appellant Bell, was proceeding east on Louisiana State Highway 20 followed at some distance by a Chrysler automobile driven in the same direction by the deceased, Drexler. There were no other occupants of either vehicle. When the truck arrived at an unmarked dirt road one and one-half miles north of Powhatan, Louisiana, it attempted to execute a left turn into that road. At that time, the Drexler car was in the act of passing the truck. The collision followed, with the car striking the rear end of the trailer, most of which was still on the right-hand side of the highway.
Before outlining the evidence on which the jury could have predicated its verdict, it may be well to restate the principles which govern the consideration of a motion for a directed verdict filed by the defendant. In determining whether or not the evidence in a given case is sufficient to take the case to the jury over a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every inference favorable to him which may be fairly drawn. It is not for the court to weigh the conflicting evidence or to judge the credibility of witnesses. Whenever the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences therefrom, and reasonably disagree as to what the verdict should be, the matter is one for the jury. 'And the appellate court's function is exhausted when the evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.' Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916.
Applying this test, we find from the record that the jury here could reasonably have drawn the following inferences from the evidence before it: that the driver of the transport truck first noticed the Drexler car when the truck was 450 feet from the dirt road; that at that time the Drexler car was 1,300 feet behind him; that Bell did not look back again to check on the plaintiff's car until the truck was 10 to 15 feet from the dirt road; that at the time he saw the plaintiff's car 150 to 180 feet behind him; that at that time the Drexler car, driving fast, was moving over to the left side of the road to pass the truck; that in spite of seeing the Drexler car in the position in which it was, Bell nevertheless attempted to execute the left turn; that, as a result, the 41 feet of the tractor-trailer was spread across both sides of the highway, making it impossible for the Drexler car to pass on either side; and that once the truck began to execute the left turn, Drexler could not have avoided the accident. Considering these inferences which the jury could fairly have drawn from the evidence, there can be no question but that this case is not one for a directed verdict for the defendant.
Under the Louisiana State Highway Regulatory Law, LSA-R.S. 32:235, 236, a driver attempting to make a left turn on a public highway must make certain that the turn can be made without danger to normal overtaking or on-coming traffic, and he must yield the right-of-way to such vehicles. Messina v. Audubon Ins. Co., La.App., 67 So.2d 143; Martin v. Globe Indemnity Co., La.App., 64 So.2d 257; Bergeron v. Department of Highways, La.App., 50 So.2d 337; Michelli v. Rheem Mfg. Co., La.App., 34 So.2d 264; Lane v. Bourgeois Al.App., 28 So.2d 91; Lively v. State La.App., 15 So.2d 617; Rogers v. F Strauss & Son, La.App., 194 So. 136 This is particularly true where, as here, the left turn is being made into an unmarked dirt road. Dudley v. Surles, La.App., 11 So.2d 70; Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Langley, La.App., 197 So. 178. 'When such a left-hand turn is being made and an accident occurs, the burden rests heavily on the driver who is marking the left-hand turn to explain how the accident occurred and to show that he was free from negligence.' Codifer v. Occhipinti, La.App., 57 So.2d 697, 699.
Here there was only one living witness to the accident, the driver of the truck. Under the law of Louisiana, it was incumbent on him, since he was making a left turn, not only to explain how the accident occurred, but to show that he was free from negligence. The evidence here shows, and the jury found, that Bell not only did not acquit himself of negligence, but his testimony, together with the physical facts in the case, clearly shows that he attempted to execute a left turn in utter disregard of the Drexler car which was then in the act of overtaking him. Instead of waiting for the Drexler car to pass, as he was bound to do under the law, Bell actually testified that he expected the Drexler car to stop in the highway while he made his left turn into the dirt road.1 Not only does the evidence support the jury's conclusion as to the negligence of Bell, a reading of the Louisiana cases on left turn situations convinces this court that had the case been tried to the court rather than to the jury, the result would have been the same.
Appellants' alternative motion for a new trial involves a consideration of various rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury by the trial court. Appellants complain of the admission in evidence of retained copies of the joint income tax returns filed by the decedent and his wife. These tax returns were introduced in evidence in connection with Mrs. Drexler's testimony and she identified them, and her signature thereon, as genuine. The authenticity of the copies was supported by the credibility of the witness. The jury was at liberty to disbelieve Mrs. Drexler and disregard the evidence. Apparently it did not. Moreover, during the trial and pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, the court ordered the plaintiff to make available to the defendants all records of Mr. Drexler and his employers which would support the returns, none of which was used by appellants.
Appellant Bell was placed on the stand by the plaintiff at the beginning of the case under Rule 43(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and was cross-examined fully on the circumstances surrounding the accident. At the conclusion of the cross-examination by plaintiff, the court indicated to the jury that Bell would be recalled to the stand by the other parties and examined by them during their part of the case. Whereupon counsel representing all defendants said, 'I would like the record to show that I asked he be tendered to me for cross-examination.' Appellants now urge error on the part of the court in refusing to allow the defendants to cross-examine Bell at the conclusion of the cross-examination by the plaintiff, insisting that Rule 43(b) gives them that right.
Appellants are correct. Rule 43(b) does give them that right.2 But counsel for appellants should have called the court's attention to Rule 43(b) instead of merely preserving the point for appeal. Omniscient as a district judge is presumed to be, it is still the duty of counsel to state the ground of his objection and, in proper instances, the authority which supports his position. Rule 46, Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. Otherwise the point may not be preserved for appeal. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 201 F.2d 153. In any event, the court's error in this regard has not prejudiced appellants. Subsequently, Bell was placed on the stand by appellants and examined fully.
Appellants' primary assignment of error as to the court's instruction centers around the court's charge on the doctrine of last clear chance. As appellants contend, the court's charge on this doctrine is incomplete in that it does not refer, in so many words, to the element of discovered peril.3 Counsel, however, in excepting to the court's charge in this connection, merely stated, 'We further except to the Court's Charge as given on last clear chance. We feel the Court's Charge does not correctly state the law.' Counsel failed to advise the court in what way the charge failed correctly to state the law and, consequently, his exception presents nothing for review. Rule 51, Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc.; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645; Allen v. Nelson Dodd Produce Co., 10 Cir., 207 F.2d 296; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 529. Nevertheless, we have studied the court's charge on this doctrine. A reading thereof, considered in the background of this case, leaves us in no doubt that the jury was not misled thereby.
Appellants also argue that it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse certain of their requested charges. All of these requested charges were either covered in the general charge or are inapplicable. It is true that the court's charge on Louisiana Statutes Annotated-Revised Statute 32:227 is not exactly in the language of the statute, and is, in fact, inaccurate in some degree, but not to the extent that it is prejudicial.4 Rule 61, Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc.
Appellants' three remaining points may be quickly disposed of. The contention that there is no evidence to show that Drexler's death was caused by the accident is totally without merit. All of the medical evidence, including an autopsy report, is to this effect. Appellants' complaints about the argument of plaintiff's counsel are likewise unavailing. Counsel's argument was spirited and aggressive, but within the bounds of propriety. Finally, appellants insist that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow the dismissal of the intervention filed by the compensation carrier of Drexler's employer and to instruct counsel during a trial not to refer to the fact that the plaintiff was receiving compensation. It is understandable why appellants would have the jury know of the compensation aspects of this case. Perhaps the jury might determine that since the widow was being otherwise taken care of, there should be no recovery against appellants in tort. But the plaintiff's claim for compensation is totally independent of her claim in damages for the death of her husband, and the fact that she had exercised her right to compensation should not be allowed to prejudice her claim in damages. Particularly is this true where, as here, her recovery in tort is subject to the claim of the compensation carrier.
'Q. You figured he was going to stop and let you turn across? A. Yes, sir.
'Q. Mr. Bell, you thought it was Mr. Drexler's duty to stop and let you make this left turn? A. Yes, sir.
'Here is a principle of law which you may apply in this case if you find the facts support it. It is what is known as the doctrine of last clear chance and it is simply this: if you find despite all other circumstances involved that Mr. Bell still had the opportunity by maintaining a proper look-out to do or not to do something which would have avoided the accident he would have had the last clear chance. On the other hand, if you find that notwithstanding all the other facts involved by maintaining a proper lookout Mr. Drexler still had the time to avoid the accident or the opportunity to avoid the accident or to do or not to do something that would have avoided it, then he would have had the last clear chance.

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Community paramedicine / hospital partnerships: March 20, 2019, free seminar, FDs, elected officials and hospital representatives sharing best practices; will be videotaped and posted on our web page.
HAZMAT: Fall, 2019 two-day class, UAVs For Emergency Responders, FST 3055 will include presentations for Incident Commanders [Nov. 8, 2019 at UC Flight Lab] and multi-agency HAZMAT drill [Nov. 9, 2019 at a FD training center]. UC Fire Science Adjunct Professor / Fire Chief (retired) BJ Jetter, PhD will be coordinating the drill.
U.S. Supreme Court: Execution, injunction by 11th Cir. quickly set aside.
IL: State immunity statute only applies when patient is on board ambulance.
KS: Workers Comp - Court orders State BWC to cover FF’s back surgery.
OH: Fire Chief’s age / ADA lawsuit dismissed, did not file with EEOC.
MI – Detroit FD layoffs – Union used FD seniority, per CBA; no evidence race discrimination.
IL – Chicago paramedic entitled to disability retirement; numerous traumatic runs.
MA – Nepotism – Fire Chief’s niece, brother on FD; ethics investigation; lawsuit dismissed.
“On November 6, 2018, the State scheduled … Ray’s execution date for February 7, 2019. Because Ray waited until January 28, 2019 to seek relief, we grant the State’s application to vacate the stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (‘A court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.’).
“JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting from grant of application to vacate stay.
Holman Correctional Facility, the Alabama prison where Domineque Ray will be executed tonight, regularly allows a Christian chaplain to be present in the execution chamber. But Ray is Muslim. And the prison refused his request to have an imam attend him in the last moments of his life…. Given the gravity of the issue presented here, I think that decision profoundly wrong.
Legal Lessons Learned: The Supreme Court’s five “conservative” Justices have made it clear that last minute stays of execution are not favored.
On Feb. 1, 2019, in Roberto Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC and Joshua M. Nicholas, the Appellate Court of Illinois (First District; Fifth Division) held (2 to 1): “As the ambulance driven by Nicholas was not transporting a patient to a health care facility at the time of the collision with the vehicle driven by the plaintiff, section 3.150(a) of the EMS Act does not provide Nicholas or Lifeline with immunity from liability for any negligent acts or omissions which proximately resulted in damages to the plaintiff.
“In his first amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, on March 11, 2016, he was operating his motor vehicle in a westerly direction on Grand Avenue in Chicago when his vehicle was struck by an ambulance traveling southbound on Lake Shore Drive. The complaint alleged that the ambulance was owned by Lifeline and being operated by its employee, Nicholas.
The plaintiff responded, arguing both that the immunity provision of the EMS Act does not apply to the operation of an ambulance until it is engaged in providing medical services to a patient and that there exists an issue of fact on the question of whether the ambulance driven by Nicholas at the time of the collision was being operated in the performance of non-emergency medical services.
“For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing counts I and III of the plaintiff’s first amended complaint and remand the matter for further proceedings.
‘Any person, agency or governmental body certified, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act or rules thereunder, who in good faith provides emergency or non-emergency medical services *** in the normal course of conducting their duties *** shall not be civilly liable as a result of their acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions *** constitute willful and wanton misconduct.’ 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a) (West 2016).
‘medical care *** rendered to patients whose conditions do not meet this Act’s definition of emergency, *** during transportation of such patients to or from health care facilities visited for the purpose of obtaining medical or health care services which are not emergency in nature, using a vehicle regulated by this Act.’ 210 ILCS 50/3.10(g) (West 2016).
Relying upon the supreme court’s decision in Wilkins v. Williams,2013 IL 114310, the defendants correctly assert that section 3.150(a) immunizes the operator of an ambulance from civil liability for negligence committed in the non-emergency transport of a patient. Id. ¶¶ 21, 59.They argue that immunity from liability for negligence applies to acts or omissions committed from the time that the ambulance is dispatched to provide non-emergency medical transportation of a patient. We believe that the defendants’ reliance upon the holding in Wilkinsis misplaced.¶ 16 In Wilkins,the defendant ambulance driver was transporting a patient on a non-emergency basis from a hospital to a nursing home when the driver was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff. Wilkins,2013 IL 114310, ¶ 3. The supreme court found that the accident occurred while the ambulance was transporting a patient, and as a consequence, there was no dispute that the ambulance operator was providing non-emergency medical service. Wilkins,2013 IL 114310, ¶ 21. In the instant case, there was no patient being transported at the time of the accident; the ambulance was in route to pick up a patient for non-emergency transport.
Had the legislature intended to provide immunity for the negligence of an ambulance driver while in route to pick up a patient for transport as suggested by the defendants, it could have included the activity within the definition of ‘non-emergency medical services.’ The legislature did not include the activity within the definition of non-emergency medical services, and we are not at liberty to do so under the guise of statutory construction.
Legal Lessons Learned: The Illinois immunity statute broadly includes non-emergency transports, but not so broad as to cover driving ambulance to pick up a patient. Hopefully the ambulance company’s private insurance will cover both the company and its employee.
On January 28, 2016, Schneider filed two applications for hearings, in which he asserted that he had a right to benefits under the Act. In the first application, Schneider stated that his work accident occurred while working for the City on September 21, 2008. In his second application, Schneider stated that his work accident occurred while working for the City on September 27, 2010. Schneider alleged that both of his injuries were to his low back and body as a whole.
The City responded that it intended to deny Schneider's applications for benefits as untimely. Schneider asserted that his applications were timely because the City had provided him authorized medical care for back injuries on December 14, 2015. Schneider argued that the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 44-534(b) was revived upon the City's December 14, 2015 payment.
At the regular hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Schneider testified about his back pain becoming progressively worse after his 2010 injury. He explained that by 2015, it was difficult for him to work. He testified that he went to his personal doctor, Dr. David Fritz, and they discussed him having back surgery. This was the first doctor he had visited since his last physical therapy appointment paid for by the City on February 28, 2012. Schneider testified that his personal health insurance paid for his appointment with Dr. Fritz. Yet, he further testified that his personal health insurance denied his request for back surgery once it learned that his back pain stemmed from work-related injuries. He admitted that after his personal insurance denied his request for back surgery, he contacted the City, and the City sent him to its doctor, Dr. Chris Fevurly.
Dr. Fevurly explained that at the end of the examination, he concluded that Schneider's 2008 and 2010 work injuries were the cause for his current ongoing back pain. Dr. Fevurly also explained that Schneider returned to him for treatment on January 18 and 22, 2016, because of increased back pain. He testified that on those dates, he gave Schneider medicine and modified his duties. Dr. Fevurly testified that he told Schneider to schedule another appointment for February 2016, but Schneider never did so.
Dr. Fevurly testified that he had treated Schneider for the 20 years that Schneider had been employed with the fire department. He testified that he had also examined him annually for the firefighter fitness exam. He explained that for Schneider's 2008 and 2010 work injuries, he had treated Schneider for "spondylolysis of L5 and then spondylolisthesis grade two of L5 and S1." Dr. Fevurly testified that on December 14, 2015, Schneider returned for another examination, complaining of back pain. He testified that at that examination, Schneider told him he was there because his personal insurance denied his back surgery.
27, 2010 injury happened on June 24, 2012. On cross-examination, Cooper agreed that the City paid for Schneider to see Dr. Fevurly when he reported his back problems in December 2015.
The parties filed briefs with the ALJ. The City argued that the ALJ should deny Schneider's claims because he failed to file his application for benefits within three years of his accidents or within two years from the City's last payment as required under K.S.A. 44-534(b). The City cited Graham v. Pomeroy, 143 Kan. 974, 57 P.2d 19 (1936), for the proposition that its payments for Schneider's medical treatment in December 2015 and in January 2016 did not revive the two-year timeline to file an application for hearing….
“As a preliminary note, the City also briefly asserts that ‘[t]he uncontroverted evidence in the administrative record does not support that the examination and treatment of Dr. Fevurly in 2015 and 2016 were payment of compensation for the 2008 and 2010 injuries.’ The City contends that each of Schneider's appointments were for ‘acute exacerbation symptoms which the claimant indicated occurred on January 14, 2016.’ This argument, however, is patently meritless because Dr. Fevurly testified that the injuries Schneider presented related to his 2008 and 2010 injuries. Dr. Fevurly merely explained that Schneider's January 29, 2016 appointment also related to an acute aggravation of his injury, which occurred on January 14, 2016.
Indeed, had the Legislature wanted to prevent workers from reviving the statute of limitations as the City argues, the Legislature could have easily included the following language after the above "whichever is later" language in K.S.A. 44-534(b): however, if there is a gap of two years or more from the last payment of compensation, no proceeding will be maintained under the workers compensation act. If the previously italicized language would have more clearly expressed what the Legislature was attempting to say under K.S.A. 44-534(b), the Legislature could have easily included this language in K.S.A. 44-534(b). Nevertheless, the Legislature included no such language in K.S.A. 44-534(b).
This court's first obligation is to determine if a statute has a clear meaning. If it does, then this court merely applies the language of the statute. Here, the language of K.S.A. 44-534(b) is clear and unambiguous. As a result, this court is required to apply K.S.A. 44-534(b) as written.
Legal Lesson Learned: Workers comp statutes of limitation are designed to require prompt disclosure of workplace injuries. The City may decide to appeal this decision to the Kansas Supreme Court.
“As part of the biennial budget process the Ohio General Assembly passed House Bill 27 to create the workers compensation budget for 2018-2019. In addition to establishing the budget the bill also amended sections of the Ohio Revised Code that relate to workers compensation law. Mainly among the changes, the bill shortens the statute of limitations for an employee to file a workers compensation claim against Ohio Employers.
“Plaintiff, Chief Jay W. Keller is a contracted employee with the City of Bucyrus. On July 20, 2017, he was notified and disciplined –while on disability leave for major surgery to his back -in accordance with the due process afforded him under his contract. Unnamed employees accused Chief Keller of essentially using racially insensitive slurs in the workplace and ‘bullying’ employees/ member of the Bucyrus City Fire Department. Thereafter, the City of Bucyrus –under the leadership and direction of Defendant Mayor Jeffrey Reser and Defendant Safety-Service Director Jeffrey Wagner –engaged in a pattern of conduct, using the disciplinary notice of July 20, 2017 as its basis, that created a hostile work environment for Chief Jay W. Keller, violated the terms and conditions of the Defendant City of Bucyrus and Plaintiff’s contract, and engaged in age discrimination and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its state analogue.
Over the course of nearly a year, in order to mitigate his damages and maintain his employment with the Defendant City of Bucyrus, Chief Keller was required by Defendant Mayor Jeffrey Reser and Defendant Safety-Service Director Jeffrey Wagner to undergo unnecessary, age and disability inappropriate trainings and certification for which Plaintiff is now economically liable and for which he has been damaged; Chief Keller was not paid during periods of his contract when he was, in fact, due his normal and regular salary; he was not allowed to work on or otherwise be around the Bucyrus Fire Department for which he was ultimately accountable as chief; he was disciplined for using a device necessary to meet his disability needs in a Defendant City of Bucyrus administrative meeting to which he was invited despite being on leave and under disciplinary sanctions.
During the period of time that Plaintiff has acted as Chief of the Bucyrus City Fire Department, he has had 5 total surgeries for various job and personal related injuries….
“Around 2017, Plaintiff took disability leave for major back surgery. Keller’s back surgery is not result from work-related injuries. In July 2017, while Plaintiff was still on medical leave, Defendants gave Keller a disciplinary notice, citing alleged racial slurs and bullying.
Subsequently, Defendants placed Plaintiff Keller on unpaid leave. Further, they required Keller to pay for professional development and complete a physical examination. Plaintiff satisfied these physical examination and professional development requirements and returned to work.
“Because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court dismisses his federal discrimination claims without prejudice.
Footnote 16: The Court notes that Plaintiff Keller may have missed his chance to file claims with the EEOC… Plaintiff was required to file any EEOC complaint within 180 days of the challenged conduct…. Here, the allegedly wrongful conduct appears to have occurred on July 20, 2017 and March 18, 2018.
Legal Lessons Learned: (1) FDs should have written policy regarding when personnel on leave will be required to pass medical or physical fitness for duty testing, and any retraining of job skills; and (2) must timely file EEOC charge to pursue federal ADA case.
“Filing a Complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See also Judge Cox’s Jan. 26, 2017 decision where he described the RIF. Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d at 627-28.
“On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection. Prior to the filing, on July 2, 2012 the City notified agencies that the City would initiate RIF activities across different agencies, with a goal to lose 2,227 employees through various means, including layoffs. The Detroit Fire Department ("DFD") received notification on June 18, 2012, that the deadline for implementation of layoffs for the July 1, 2012 fiscal year was passing that day, and as of July 2, 2012, the DFD would not be in compliance with its 2012-2013 fiscal budget. Two days later, the City notified the DFFA by letter that layoff notices would be issued in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties and attached a matrix with the number of reductions to be made, detailed by position. According to this initial matrix, twenty-two firefighters would be laid off.
a class action grievance alleging that the City's proposed RIF violated the parties' CBA. On August 10, 2012, the City proceeded with the RIF by departmental seniority, as urged by the DFFA, and laid off twenty-seven firefighters, including ten of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Anthony McCloud was demoted from firefighter to fireboat deckhand.
“The DFFA also moved for summary judgment on June 6, 2016, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claim failed because the DFFA did not breach its duty of fair representation to the Plaintiffs, which it urged is ‘an essential component of a Title VII race discrimination claim against a union.’ The DFFA also argued that Plaintiffs could not prove damages given that they had been reinstated and made whole, and neither compensatory nor punitive damages were available as a matter of law. Finally, the DFFA argued that it should be awarded attorney fees and costs because Plaintiffs’ claims were unmeritorious.
Plaintiffs fail to establish direct evidence proving a fact that requires no inferences or circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination.
On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that they have direct evidence— [Plaintiff Eric] Peeples’ [deposition] testimony that Williams stated that the union wanted to “save” the white firefighters and submitted the layoff list including Plaintiffs to that end…. Peeples stated that Williams, a City employee, had concluded that the DFFA wanted to ‘protect the white boys.’ McCloud testified that he heard from Exander Poe that Williams said that the DFFAdid not want to “lay those white boys off.” Plaintiffs’ argument therefore requires an inference that the City knew of and approved of that discrimination. Accordingly, we find that the statements do not constitute direct evidence of any motive the City harbored.
Plaintiffs and the EEOC, amicus in this case, urge that the standards governing a duty of fair representation claim do not govern Title VII discrimination claims against a union, and that the district court relied on reasoning that has been withdrawn.
Legal Lessons Learned: Plaintiffs failed to establish Title VII liability for City or the Local.
On Feb. 1, 2019, in Leah Siwinski v. The Retirement Board of the Fireman’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, the Appellate Court of Illinois (First District) held (3 to 0), “In summary, because the manifest weight of the evidence showed that the plaintiff sustained PTSD arising from an act or acts of duty while working for CFD, and as a result, was disabled from performing any of her assigned duties, we reverse the decision of the Board that denied her a duty disability pension, and reverse the decision of the circuit court, which confirmed the Board’s decision."
“The plaintiff, in her testimony and affidavit, stated that she began working as a paramedic for CFD in December 2008. Her duties included responding to 911 calls and transporting individuals to hospitals. On December 22, 2010, she and Kelly responded to a “[m]ayday” call involving injured firefighters. When she arrived at the scene, firefighters placed the body of a firefighter whom she recognized on her stretcher. She had transported nonresponsive individuals “quite a few” times without being affected, but “wasn’t prepared to have somebody that [she] had worked with dead on [her] stretcher” and felt like it “could have been [her].” At that moment, she “mentally and emotionally *** turned off” and “couldn’t hear any noise, *** [or] notice any lights.” The rest of the incident was a “blur,” but she finished her shift as required. Later, the plaintiff saw videos and photographs of her carrying the stretcher, and attended the funerals of the firefighters who died.
According to the plaintiff, during the following months, she became hypervigilant, felt startled when the alarm at the firehouse sounded, experienced anxiety while on calls, withdrew from her family and friends, and developed problems in her romantic relationship. In June 2011,she was hospitalized after becoming “near syncopal” while taking a patient’s blood pressure. In August 2011, she went on leave for “non-duty illness,” and multiple doctors told her that the syncope related to anxiety. As she was already seeing a therapist and did not want to “admit” that her syncope was caused by anxiety, she did not seek further treatment and returned to work in March 2012.
The plaintiff stated that, on October 12, 2012, she heard gunshots near her firehouse and was dispatched to the scene of the shooting where a large crowd stood by the body of a victim who had been shot in the head. When the paramedics confirmed that he was dead, people in the crowd closed around them and threw objects, used racial slurs, accused them of not doing their job, and threatened to kill them. Police officers restrained the victim’s sister, who attempted to reach the plaintiff, but she felt ‘frozen in fear’ and thought she would be killed. Although she had been threatened on other calls, that incident caused her to ‘br[eak] down,’ and for several weeks, she feared that she would be “shot in retaliation for not saving [the victim’s] life.” Due to the ‘stigma’ of talking about her feelings as a first responder, she did not tell anyone how she felt and enrolled in college courses to avoid thinking about work. However, she began failing her classes, her romantic relationship ended, and she felt herself ‘spiraling out of control.’ She topped cleaning and cooking, showered less frequently, struggled to leave bed, and developed a shopping addiction.
The plaintiff further testified that, in November 2013, she was dispatched to a hospital to meet with an ambulance crew that had transported a firefighter who shot himself in the head. She knew the firefighter, and saw him on life support when she arrived. The following month, she began cutting herself as a ‘coping mechanism’ when therapy and medication failed to help. She felt ‘hopeless and alone,’ experienced nightmares, anxiety, and depression, and was ‘afraid of [her] job.’ In January 2014, her symptoms became ‘unbearable’ and she ‘decided that [she] needed to get help.’ On January 25, 2014, she ‘explained the situation’ to Chief Bob Ertl, who placed her on medical leave.
October 2014, she began treating with Gilligan, who specialized in PTSD. As of the date of the hearing, she still experienced hypervigilance, isolation, intrusive thoughts, and nightmares. Ambulance lights and sirens produced ‘flashback[s]’ and ‘strong anxiety,’ and wearing a uniform ‘trigger[ed]’ her to cut herself. She could not ‘sleep’ or ‘function’ due to ‘images of calls’ that she had been on and her fear of being ‘violently killed’ like some of the victims she had seen, and added that the December 2010 incident “haunts [her] thoughts every day and night.
“The plaintiff, Leah Siwinski, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of The Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Board), denying her a duty disability pension under section 6-151 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/6- 151 (West 2016)). For the reasons which follow, we: (1) reverse the decision of the Board; (2) reverse the decision of the circuit court; and (3) remand the matter to the circuit court, with directions.
Legal Lesson Learned: PTSD is a recognized disability issue in the emergency services.
See this April 13, 2018 article: Study: More firefighters died by suicide than in the line of duty in 2017 - A study found that 103 firefighters and 140 police officers died by suicide in 2017, compared to 93 firefighter and 129 officer line-of-duty deaths.
“The case arises out of a dispute related to the resignation of Kevin Robinson (‘Robinson’ or ‘The Chief’) as the Chief of the Fire Department in Marshfield, Massachusetts. Robinson alleges that he was constructively discharged as Fire Chief in retaliation for lodging internal complaints for age and gender discrimination against other officials in the Town of Marshfield.
In October, 2013, the Chief’s niece, Shauna Robinson Patten (‘Ms. Patten’), was selected for a full-time firefighter trainee position with the Marshfield Fire Department. Before Ms. Patten began her employment, the Board of Selectmen (‘the Board’) met with the Chief and he submitted a conflict of interest disclosure form which stated that he would 1) recuse himself from any involvement in the interview or promotion process for which his brother, son or niece (all then employees of his department)became candidates, 2) not make any discretionary assignments resulting in extra pay for his family members and 3) notify the Town of any potential disciplinary situation involving a family member.
During the first year of Ms. Patten’s training, two of her supervisors expressed concerns about her ability to make decisions. Upon hearing about those concerns, the Chief asked that Ms. Patten be transferred to his group and, at one point, despite concerns from supervisors, he placed Ms. Patten on ‘shift strength’ (meaning that she was able to take regular shifts). While defendants contend that Ms. Patten received special treatment during her training, Robinson submits that his niece was subject to gender discrimination by the defendants.
With respect to the Chief’s brother, Shaun Robinson, a captain in the Marshfield Fire Department, defendants argue that the Chief conducted a disciplinary hearing without the presence of the Town Administrator or Town Counsel and later improperly reduced the disciplinary punishment meted out to his brother. The Chief responds that the Town Administrator, Rocco Longo (‘Longo’) gave him permission to reduce the punishment.
Contemporaneously, the Town declined to renegotiate the Chief’s contract, which had expired in 2013, and allegedly encouraged him to retire at least three times. The Town also reported the Chief’s supervision of family employees to the State Ethics Commission (‘the Commission’).
In January, 2015, Chief Robinson filed a complaint with the Board [of Selectmen] alleging that he was a victim of age discrimination and harassment. The Board retained Attorney Regina Ryan who concluded in February that those complaints were meritless.
That same month, Attorney Mark Smith, whose firm had been retained by the Town in November, 2014, to investigate allegations of conflict of interest, issued a report (“the Smith Report”) which concluded that the Chief and his brother violated one or more sections of the Massachusetts conflict of interest laws. He recommended that the matter be referred to the Commission for further proceedings.
“The Chief alleges that he was faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice: he could retire or be discharged. In support of that claim, he points to a series of incidents in which the Town refused to renegotiate his contract, pressured him to retire, threatened to damage his reputation if he refused to retire, initiated an internal investigation against him and voted to place him on paid administrative leave.
This Court finds that such allegations do not rise to the level of constructive discharge. Despite the Town’s encouragement to retire and refusal to renegotiate his employment contract, the Chief continued his employment until he resigned in 2015. Thus, unlike the employee in Herbert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., the Chief did not suffer a ‘forced choice’ with respect to retirement. Cf. Herbert v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,872 F.2d 1104, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that an early retirement offer is distinguished from a discharge when the employee has the choice to remain employed).
As noted previously, the defendants have offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing the Chief on administrative leave based on the fact that an independent investigation conducted by retained counsel concluded that he had violated several conflict of interest laws.
Legal Lessons Learned: Fire Chiefs, in states that do not prohibit close family members on their FD, must be extremely careful to avoid even an “appearance” of conflicts of interest.
“Petitioner City of Watertown (City) commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 seeking a permanent stay of arbitration of a grievance filed by respondent, the collective bargaining representative for the employees of the City's Fire Department.
In its grievance and demand for arbitration, respondent alleged that the City violated, among other things, certain provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) relating to minimum staffing levels for shifts and regular operations within the Fire Department (staffing provisions).
“Further, the record establishes that the parties contemplated during their negotiation of the CBA that the staffing provisions were necessary to protect the health, safety and well-being of respondent's members, and, contrary to the City's contention, the staffing provisions are not tantamount to ‘no-layoff’ clauses (see id.). We therefore conclude that the court erred in determining that the staffing provisions are job security provisions that are not subject to arbitration.
Legal Lessons Learned: Courts favor arbitration regarding CBA disputes, unless it involved items that are clearly management right (such as lay-offs).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


COMMONWEALTH vs. KEVIN J. FAHERTY.
Present: Sacks, Ditkoff, & Singh, JJ.
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Evidence, Prior conviction, Intoxication, Blood alcohol test. Practice, Criminal, Prior conviction, Assistance of counsel, Sentence, Required finding. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel, Blood alcohol test. Intoxication.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Woburn Division of the District Court Department on December 14, 2015.
The case was tried before David E. Frank, J.
Tasha Kates for the defendant.
Gabriel Pell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
DITKOFF, J. A District Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin J. Faherty, of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). At a subsequent jury-waived trial, a District Court judge convicted the defendant as a fourth offender. We are faced with the question whether a subsequent offense may be based on a prior conviction for which the defendant was not entitled to (and presumably did not receive) appointed counsel because the prior offense carried no risk of incarceration. Concluding that it may be, and rejecting the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm.
1. Background. At approximately 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 2015, the defendant was injured while riding his motorcycle on Pond Street in Stoneham. A Massachusetts State trooper at the scene of the accident noticed a strong odor of alcohol and later discovered four unopened nip bottles of Jim Beam bourbon in the defendant's saddle bag.
The defendant was transported to a hospital. Hospital records recorded that the defendant's serum alcohol level was 359 milligrams per deciliter. An expert from the Office of Alcohol Testing at the Massachusetts State Police Crime Laboratory testified that this was the equivalent of a blood alcohol level of between .30 percent and .32 percent.
The defendant testified that the accident was caused by his hitting something in the road while momentarily distracted. He testified that he did not drink any alcohol prior to the accident but decided to drink six nip bottles of bourbon to dull the pain while waiting for medical assistance. The jury convicted the defendant on both a theory of impairment and a theory of having a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher.
At the jury-waived trial on the subsequent offense portion of the complaint, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant had received a continuance without a finding for OUI in District Court in 1989. The Commonwealth then introduced, over objection, evidence of two convictions for OUI in New Hampshire, from 1992 and 2005. The New Hampshire cases were prosecuted as first offenses, and the defendant received no incarceration but instead was fined and had his license revoked. The judge found the defendant guilty as a fourth offender.
2. Prior offenses. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel as established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963), may not "be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense." Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). Accordingly, convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel may not be used to impeach a defendant's credibility, see Commonwealth v. Saunders, 435 Mass. 691, 694 (2002), or to determine the length of a defendant's sentence. See Commonwealth v. Proctor, 403 Mass. 146, 147 (1988).
Since 2002, Massachusetts courts have employed a presumption of regularity (at least regarding post-Gideon convictions) that the right to counsel in felony cases was honored "unless the defendant first makes a showing that the conviction in issue was obtained without representation by, or waiver of, counsel." Saunders, 435 Mass. at 696. We have applied this presumption to misdemeanors that carry the possibility of incarceration, such as first and second offense OUI, see Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905 (2010), and to out-of-State convictions. See Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 205, 207-208 (2015).
presumption of regularity gives us no confidence that the defendant was offered appointed counsel in New Hampshire. Indeed, the presumed regularity would be that the defendant was not offered appointed counsel.
return to enhance a defendant's sentence in the future. The convictions here, however, were obtained in full accordance with the defendant's constitutional rights. In our view, it would be strange if art. 12 created classes of convictions, some of which are permitted but then may not be acknowledged in the next case.
There can be little doubt that a conviction provides more confidence when the defendant was represented by counsel at trial. Nonetheless, a conviction obtained without counsel because the defendant was found not indigent but declined to retain counsel is fully admissible. Commonwealth v. Delorey, 369 Mass. 323, 325-326, 329-331 (1975). Similarly, a conviction where the defendant chose to represent himself is fully admissible. See McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 905. Respect for the defendant's constitutional rights, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 720-721 (1997), not increments in reliability, must be the touchstone here.
Moreover, the contrary rule would pose some serious problems for the administration of justice. Crimes such as disorderly conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 53(b), and shoplifting, G. L. c. 266, § 30A, where a first offense is punishable only by a fine, could never be prosecuted for a subsequent offense punishable by incarceration, unless by some happenstance the defendant retained counsel or the prosecution was joined with other, more serious charges. The presumption of regularity would lose much of its force if courts were required to go beyond the presumption and determine whether the regularity in each case resulted in a conviction that counted in the future. Seeing no constitutional basis to require such a regime, we conclude that the New Hampshire convictions here were properly considered as predicates for the defendant's conviction as a fourth offender.
way or place to which the public has a right of access; and (3) had a blood alcohol content percentage of .08 or greater or was impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor.'" Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016), quoting from Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 778, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 (2011). Only the third element is contested by the defendant.
A breathalyzer test performed within a "reasonable time" of operation is admissible to show a defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of operation. Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 816 (2007). Three hours is presumptively a "reasonable time," subject to the "facts and circumstances in particular cases." Id. at 816-817. Moreover, "a breathalyzer test result showing a blood alcohol level of .08 or above, administered within a 'reasonable time' of the operation of a motor vehicle, as that phrase was defined in Colturi, is sufficient to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . under the 'per se' theory." Commonwealth v. Dacosta, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 389 (2014). These teachings apply as well when the blood alcohol level was measured by a blood test, rather than by a breathalyzer. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 652 (2009).
Here, the hospital blood test revealed a serum alcohol level that was the equivalent of a blood alcohol level of between .30 percent and .32 percent. Although the portion of the medical records admitted at trial does not record the time that the defendant's blood was drawn, the results appear in the medical records prior to the description of the doctor's examination at 4:38 p.m. (approximately two hours after the accident). In light of this evidence, and the commonsense idea that the routine drawing of blood for a motor vehicle accident victim would not ordinarily wait for the conclusion of a doctor's examination, the trier of fact was well justified in finding that the blood alcohol level was measured within a "reasonable time" of the defendant's operation. See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 739 (2018) (jury may draw reasonable inferences). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's guilt under a theory that he had a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater. See Dacosta, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 389.
381 (2017). Accordingly, the evidence remained sufficient to support the defendant's conviction at the close of all evidence.
Because the jury specified that they convicted the defendant under both the theory that he had a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater and on a theory of impairment, we need find sufficient evidence on only one of the two theories to affirm the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 155 (2013). Accordingly, we need not discuss whether the evidence was also sufficient on a theory of impairment.
[Note 1] For the relevant statutes in effect at the time of the earlier offenses, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265:82(I) (2004); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265:82-b(I)(a) (2004).
[Note 2] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court went further and allowed the use of an uncounseled conviction that resulted in no incarceration, even if incarceration had been a possibility. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740 n.1. We need not reach this issue. Cf. State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 281 (2015) (Iowa constitution prohibits use of prior conviction in this circumstance). We observe that Commonwealth v. Barrett, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 9 (1975), found error in such a circumstance. That opinion, however, was based solely on Federal law and cannot survive the teachings of Nichols. The question thus remains open.
[Note 3] See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th 1007, 1022-1023 (2009); State v. Brooks, 89 Conn. App. 427, 435, 437 (2005); People ex rel. Glasgow v. Kinney, 970 N.E.2d 506, 508-509 (Ill.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 944 (2012); Morphew v. State, 672 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Tims, 302 Kan. 536, 541-543 (2015); State v. Cook, 706 A.2d 603, 607 (Me. 1998); People v. Reichenbach, 459 Mich. 109, 123-127 (1998); Ghoston v. State, 645 So. 2d 936, 938-940 (Miss. 1994); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 471-472 (Mo. 2005); State v. Spotted Eagle, 316 Mont. 370, 375, 379 (2003); State v. Wilson, 17 Neb. App. 846, 856 (2009); State v. Woodruff, 124 N.M. 388, 399 (1997); Glaze v. State, 366 S.C. 271, 274-275 (2005); State v. Porter, 164 Vt. 515, 521 (1996); State ex rel. Webb v. McCarty, 208 W. Va. 549, 552-553 (2000). But see State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1052-1053 (Fla. 2008); State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St. 3d 155, 161 (2015).


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Intro: The life of Elijah has been a whirlwind of activity! From the time he stepped out of nowhere to confront the king of Israel, to his adventures of faith at the dry brook and the widow’s house, to his great victory on Mount Carmel and to his fall into and restoration from defeat and disuse. Elijah’s life has been tempestuous to say the least! Now, that life is about to end! Verse one of our text makes it clear that God is about to remove the prophet from this earth. He will leave here like he lived here; in a whirlwind!
As Elijah lives out the last days and hours of his life, it is interesting to see how he conducted himself. He did not live like a man who knows his time is short. He actually lives like a man who thinks he has plenty of time. It is this time just before Elijah is taken into heaven that I want to focus in on this morning.
I believe that Elijah sets a great example for those of us who are waiting on that time when we too will leave this world. If we were to be honest this morning, every saved person here would readily admit that they are anxiously awaiting that time when they will be home with the Lord in glory. But, what are we to be doing here, in the meantime, while we wait? Elijah shows us in this passage! As we read this account, we find there are three ways that Elijah spent his time as he waited on the whirlwind. One of these days all of our journeys will be over. Those who are saved will leave this world either by way of the cemetery or be way of the rapture. Either way, we will leave here in a whirlwind. Swept away into the presence of God. Until that day comes, we must live our lives in a way that is pleasing to the Lord and in a way that honors His will. Elijah shows us how to do just that. Let’s look in on Elijah and see the ways he spent his time as we think on the subject, Waiting On The Whirlwind.
For A Precious Event – According to this verse, Elijah knew the precious truth that he was going to get to go to Heaven without having to pass through death. This was a privilege that had only been enjoyed by one other person in history. Genesis 5:21-24 tells that story of a man named Enoch. He was a man who lived for and walked with the Lord. When his time here was over, God simply took Enoch to Heaven, without him having to pass through death! This is the precious event that Elijah was anticipating.
For A Promised Event – As one reads these verses, it quickly becomes apparent that everyone knew what was coming. The sons of the prophets knew, verses 3, 5, & 7. Elisha knew, verses 2-6. As I have already said, Elijah knew about it. So, this wasn’t a secret event! It was something people had heard about and could prepare themselves for.
(Ill. So it is with the return of the Lord Jesus Crist. This is not a thing that has been hidden from men. Jesus predicted it during His life, John 14:3.
For A Private Event – Even though all these people knew it was coming, no one knew when it would happen! Elijah knew that God was coming for him, but he did not know just when. Therefore, he lived his last days and hours in anticipation of that coming event.
Verse 1-6 Walking with Purpose – As Elijah anticipated his departure from this world, he continued to live as he always had. He continued to walk in humble obedience before the Lord God! Notice his statement, “The LORD hath sent me…”, v. 2, 4, 6. If Elijah had been like many in our day, he would have spent his last days on the earth in retirement from service. He would have spent his time doing all the things he hadn’t had time to do while he was active serving the Lord. However, Elijah knew a truth that many people never learn: There is no higher call than that of following the Lord and doing what He bids you to do!
(Ill. The lesson for us is this: there will never come a day when we can quit serving the Lord. Even though we know we are leaving, and that our leaving could be today, we should still seek to live lives that are filled with surrender to the call of the Lord. If we want to take a biblical example, let us look to the book of Nehemiah. As he and his workers were being threatened by their enemies, they worked with one hand and held a weapon in the other, Neh. 4:17. In other words, they watched and they worked all at the same time! I will say it again, there will never come a day when we can quit serving the Lord! If you have been guilty of quitting on the Lord, let me encourage you to pick up your tools again! There is work to be done!
Verse 1-7 Walking with Progress – As the Lord led Elijah from place to place, God was bringing the prophet to that place from which he intended to remove him from this world. For Elijah, these places also gave Elijah the opportunity to reminisce about his life and how the Lord had worked in it so powerfully and so wonderfully. Let’s take a moment to look at each of these places Elijah visited and note the significance each held for the prophet.
Gilgal – v. 1 – Gilgal was the first place Israel camped when they crossed the Jordan and entered the Promised Land. Gilgal was the place of new beginnings. Here, they were near the battles, but not fighting them yet. They were in a place of safety, of preparation, and of communion with the Lord. Here, they renewed their covenants and grew strong in their relationship with the Lord. For Elijah it was time for him to remember how it all began for him. How the Lord called him and filled him to use him for the glory of God.
Bethel – v. 2-3 – Bethel was a holy place for the people of Israel. It was at Bethel that the patriarch Jacob had met the Lord God, Gen. 28:11-22. Bethel signified the place of the altar and of total dependence upon the Lord. Bethel was the place of revelation. Bethel was the place where God became known and where He became big in the eyes of those who worship Him. For Elijah, Bethel was a place to reflect upon all the altars he had experienced in his life. He remembered how his life had been one lived in total dependence upon the Lord God!
Jericho – v. 4-5 – For the people of Israel, Jericho represented the power of God to give victory in the day of battle. This was the place of their first major conquest in the promised land. Jericho was the place of victory and power. For Elijah, Jericho was a place for him to remember all the great victories he had enjoyed in his life. He could reflect back on all the great things God had done form him and through him. Times like the ravens, the barrel of meal, the resuscitated child, the victory at Carmel, all flooded the prophet’s mind. He remembered a life of powerful victories!
Jordan – v. 6-8 – For Israel, the river Jordan marked the end of their wilderness wanderings. It was a picture of death. That is, it was the place where the pilgrims died. When they crossed Jordan, they were no longer pilgrims, but they were a people who had arrived home. Jordan was the place of death. For Elijah, it was the perfect place to reflect on all the ways he had died to self during his years as a man of God. There, he could reflect on the fact that he had lived a selfless life, and that he had lived a life to the glory of God!
(Ill. What does all this mean for us? Well, Elijah’s travels show us something of the progression of the normal Christian life.
First, we all must have that Gilgal experience. That is, there must be that time of beginnings, when we meet the Lord Jesus in a personal manner. Jesus Himself said it this way, “Ye must be born again”, John 3:7. There, we are safe, we are brought into communion with the Lord. It is a time of spiritual preparation for the battles that surely lie ahead.
Then, as we grow in the Lord and learn to pray, we come to that Bethel time of our walk with Jesus. At Bethel, we learn to walk in dependence upon the Lord. It is the place of maturity.
Eventually, if we grow as we should, we will come to our Jericho experience. This is where we see the Lord give us victories in the battles of life. Here, we will see the flesh, the world and the devil defeated as we live victoriously for the Lord our God.
(Ill. Do you see what I am trying to say? The Christian life is not meant to be a life of stagnation. It is meant to be a life of progression.
V. 2-11 Walking With People – As Elijah traveled his last miles here on the earth, he did not attempt to travel them along. Verses 2, 4, and 6 might lead one to believe that Elijah wanted Elisha to stay behind. However, these statements were merely tests for Elisha. Verses 6, 8-9, and 11 tell the real story. These verses speak of friendship and fellowship. As Elijah completed his tasks upon the earth, he did not withdraw himself from those who could encourage him. He continued to walk in fellowship with other believers! This is seen in the fact that he visited the schools of the prophets and in the fact that he walked with his friend and associate Elisha. Apparently, Elijah knew that he needed others in his life!
(Ill. There are too many Lone Ranger Christians in our day! Far too many believers act as though they no one else in their life. However, the truth of the matter is, we need one another! We need good, godly fellowship and friendship. We need the presence and the ministry of the other saints of God! Even the Lord Jesus longed for that kind of ministry in His own life. Notice Him as He goes to the garden to pray. He takes three special men with Him and asks them to watch and pray with Him. When He returns from prayer, He finds them asleep and is disappointed that they could not stand with Him during that lonely hour, Matt. 26:36-40. This is the very reason we are commanded to make attendance upon the services of the Lord a priority in our lives, Heb. 10:24-25. Whether we will admit it or not, we need one another!
(Ill. I have already touched on this thought, but this man did not spend his last days sitting on the bench of do nothing. He was busy in the work of the Lord until the instant God called him away.
Verse 8 Trusting His Redeemer – Even at the end of his life, Elijah is still walking by faith. When he and Elisha come to the river Jordan, they need to get across, so Elisha does what he always did, he expected the impossible from God and received it by faith! It appears that Elijah never reached a place in his life where he said, “Well, I’ve seen God do all that He is able to do!” No, he just kept on walking in faith and dependence until the very end of the road.
(Ill. Friend, no matter how long you may walk with the Lord, no matter what you have seen Him do, no matter what He has done through your life, there will never come a day when you should stop trusting Him. Just because the years have brought you closer to your crossing, you should not stop walking by faith.
Verse 9-10 Training His Replacement – As they walk together, Elijah spends his last moments with Elisha teaching him about obedience and faithfulness. Ill. Elisha’s request and the stipulations attached to its fulfillment. Elijah doesn’t clap Elisha on the shoulder and walk off into the sunset. He knows this man is to take his place someday. He knows that Elisha needs and deserves the best training he can be given. The future depends on Elijah doing his duty today. Before he leaves, he must hand down his ministry to the same keeping of the next generation.
(Ill. Friends as we near the end of our own road, there is another generation coming along behind us. What are we teaching them about faith, obedience to God, faithfulness to the Lord’s house and work, love for the Bible, etc? What kind of legacy are we leaving behind as we travel toward our crossing? We are here this morning because some people were faithful to hand down their faith to us, 2 Tim. 2:2. Our duty to those who follow is to give them what they need to get the job done for Jesus.
Verse 11 Traveling His Road – In this verses, there is the phrase, “as they still went on.” Even though he was nearing the end of the life, Elijah found no stopping place. He found no place to unhook and drop out of the journey. Even though the end was near, he still went on. In fact, it was as he was going on that the Lord sent that chariot of fire to get him and bring him to glory! What an exit this man had! Can you imagine what it would have been like to see that? Can you imagine what it would have been like to experience that? But, as impressive as all that is, what impresses me more is that while Elijah waited on the whirlwind, he just remained faithful and kept on serving the Lord like he was going to live another hundred years!

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We, Joyson Safety Systems Aschaffenburg GmbH, Bahnweg 1, 63743 Aschaffenburg, Germany, (datenschutz@eu.joysonsafety.com), shall be providing you with information as to how we process personal data on this page.
We have compiled the key information on typical data processing operations for you below, broken down by data subject group. The obligations to provide information shall be fulfilled separately for certain data processing operations which only concern specific groups.
Where the term ‘data’ is used in the text, this refers to personal data within the meaning of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Our Web server processes an array of data with each request that your browser automatically transmits to the server. This entails the IP address currently assigned to your device, the date and time of the request, the time zone, the specific page or file that was opened, the http status code, the amount of data transferred, the website from which your request came, your device’s operating system and the pre-set language. The Web server uses this data to optimise how the contents of this website are displayed on your device.
To prevent unauthorised administrative access to our website, we use public blacklists for IP addresses and store IP addresses to protect against attacks launched against our website, e.g., brute force attacks to gain access to login data.
As the processor in accordance with Art. 28 GDPR, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website to compile reports on website activities as well as to provide further services to the site owner in connection with the use of the website and the Internet. The IP address transmitted by your browser in connection with Google Analytics will not be merged with other Google data.
1.4 The purpose of the data processing is the online presentation of our company as well as its products and services and interaction with communication partners. If you order our newsletter, we will process your data for the purpose of sending the newsletter. User behaviour is analysed on the website for the purpose of designing the website to conform to user preferences.
1.5 The legal basis for the processing is Art. 6 Para. 1f GDPR (legitimate interest, operation of a website and interaction with communication partners). The legal basis for processing data for newsletters is Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR (consent). The legal basis for the analysis of user behaviour is Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest, i.e., design of the website to conform to user preferences).
1.6 Log and communication data shall not be transferred to third parties except where special circumstances exist. Data may be transferred to the police or public prosecutor’s office if a suspected offence has been committed or during pre-trial proceedings. We furthermore engage service providers to perform commissioned data processing when rendering services, in particular to provide, maintain and support IT systems.
1.7 IP addresses will be anonymised in log files after no later than seven days and deleted from security logs after no later than 14 days. Newsletter data will be deleted when the user unsubscribes to the newsletter. Pseudonymous usage data will be deleted after three months.
1.8 Use of the website is not possible without the disclosure of personal data such as your IP address. Communication via the website without providing data is not possible. Data must be provided in order to receive newsletters. Newsletters cannot be sent without the provision of data. Use of the website is also possible if the user objects to pseudonymous analysis of usage.
2.1 When you place an order on the webshop, your data will be processed for the purposes of reviewing the order, entering into a contract, fulfilling the contract, including consultation and support, and complying with statutory requirements.
2.2 The legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR (preparation and fulfilment of the contract) in case of contracts with natural persons, Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest, i.e., communication with contact persons relevant to the contract) in case of contracts with legal entities and Art. 6(1)(c) GDPR (legal obligations, in particular tax and commercial regulations) in all cases.
2.3 Recipients of data may include banks for the purpose of processing payments and postal service providers for the purpose of shipping goods. Public authorities and offices may receive data within the scope of their duties, insofar as we are obliged or authorised to transmit data. We furthermore engage service providers to perform commissioned data processing when rendering services, in particular to provide, maintain and support IT systems.
2.4 All contractual data and data relevant for accounting is stored for ten calendar years after the contract is terminated in accordance with the retention periods set out in tax and commercial law.
2.5 The provision of data is obligatory for customers and their employees both legally and contractually. The contract cannot be entered into or implemented without the provision of data.
3.1 We process the data of prospective customers and communication partners for the purpose of communication with the data subjects.
3.2 The legal basis for processing the data of prospective customers and communication partners is Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest, i.e., communication with prospective customers and communication partners).
3.3 We forward the requests internally to the responsible employees. We furthermore engage service providers to perform commissioned data processing when rendering services, in particular to provide, maintain and support IT systems.
3.4 Requests and communication shall be deleted automatically after ten calendar years.
3.5 The provision of data is required for prospective customers and communication partners. Communication is not possible without the provision of data.
4.1 The purpose of processing is the preparation and fulfilment of contracts as well as communication with employees of business partners.
4.2 The legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR (preparation and fulfilment of the contract) in case of contracts with natural persons, Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest, i.e., communication with contact persons relevant to the contract) in case of contracts with legal entities and Art. 6(1)(c) GDPR (legal obligations, in particular tax and commercial regulations) in all cases.
4.3 Recipients of data may include banks for the purpose of processing payments. Public authorities and offices may receive data within the scope of their duties, insofar as we are obliged or authorised to transmit data. We furthermore engage service providers to perform commissioned data processing when rendering services, in particular to provide, maintain and support IT systems.
4.4 All contractual data and data relevant for accounting is stored for ten calendar years after the contract is terminated in accordance with the retention periods set out in tax and commercial law.
4.5 The provision of data is obligatory for business partners and their employees both legally and contractually. The business relationship cannot be established or carried out without the provision of data.
5.1 We do not use automated procedures to make individual decisions on a case-by-case basis.
5.2 You have the right to request information at any time about all your personal data that we process.
5.3 If your personal data is incomplete or inaccurate, you have the right to rectification and amendment.
5.4 You may request the erasure of your personal data at any time, unless we are legally obliged or authorised to further process your data.
5.5 If the legal requirements are satisfied, you may request a restriction on the processing of your personal data.
5.6 You have the right to object to processing if data processing is performed for the purpose of direct marketing or profiling. If processing is performed as a result of the balancing of interests, you may object to the processing, stating reasons arising from your particular situation.
5.7 Where data is processed on the basis of your consent or within the scope of a contract, you have the right to transfer the data provided by you, unless the rights and freedoms of other persons are impaired.
5.8 Where we process your data on the basis of a declaration of consent, you have the right to withdraw this consent at any time with future effect. Processing performed prior to withdrawing your consent shall remain unaffected.
5.9 In addition, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a data protection supervisory authority at any time if you are of the opinion that data processing has occurred in breach of applicable law.

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Art. 28
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
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Art. 6


text:
Don Schmidt practices in the areas of health care, major business litigation, and antitrust law. He has handled a variety of litigation and antitrust counseling matters for national and regional companies in, among others, the insurance, pharmacy, paper, health care, oil, advertising, financial services, manufacturing, franchising, distribution, and retail industries.
Don also has significant experience with both civil and criminal investigations by state and national enforcement agencies.
Health care - general hospital representation, particularly with regard to physician peer review proceedings and litigation and related medical staff matters.
Major business litigation - prosecution and defense of breach of contract, insurance coverage, RICO, commercial fraud, unfair trade practices, and similar business disputes, including class actions.
Antitrust and trade regulation - extensive antitrust counseling and training; prosecution and defense of private treble damage litigation, including defense of clients in class actions; defense of civil and criminal governmental enforcement investigations.
Hospital Peer Review Hearings - represented respective Medical Executive Committees in peer review hearings at several hospitals, obtaining decisions to uphold adverse recommendations against physicians.
Hospital Peer Review Board of Trustees Representation - represented respective hospital Boards of Trustees in peer review appeal proceedings and in making final decisions in peer review matters.
Ramiro Abaunza, M.D. v. Kendall Healthcare Group, Ltd., et al. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County.
Arthur M. “Mac” Cowden, II, D.O. v. South Dade Healthcare Group, Ltd. f/d/b/a Deering Hospital, et al. U.S. District Court, Southern District.
Charles E. Graper, M.D., D.D.S. v. North Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. Circuit Court, 8th Judicial Circuit, Alachua County.
Anthony J. Hall, M.D. v. Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd. & Columbia Hospital Corp. of Miami Beach. U.S. District Court, Southern District.
Integon General Insurance Corp. v. Daniel Morrison & Okeechobee Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Columbia Raulerson Hospital. County Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County.
Emmanuel Johnson, M.D. v. Memorial Healthcare Group, Inc. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Jacksonville. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit, Duval County.
Lawrence J. Kanter, M.D. v. HCA of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Memorial Hospital of Jacksonville. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit, Duval County.
Marcene F. Kreifels, M.D. v. Healthtrust, Inc.--The Hospital Company, d/b/a the North Okaloosa Medical Center, et al. U.S. District Court, Northern District.
J. Lancelot Lester, III, M.D. v. Columbia/JFK Medical Center Limited Partnership, et al. Circuit Court, 15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County.
Anthony Lewis, M.D. & Nagender Reddy, M.D. v. Marion Community Hospital, Inc. Circuit Court, 5th Judicial Circuit, Marion County.
Dilip Mehta, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Oak Hill Hospital. U.S. District Court, Middle District.
Dilip Mehta, M.D. d/b/a Spring Hill Radiology v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. d/b/a HCA Oak Hill Hospital. U.S. District Court, Middle District.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., individually and for the use and benefit of Catherine Harris V. Columbia Park Medical Center, Inc., a/k/a Lucerne Medical Center. County Court, 9th Judicial Circuit, Orange County.
Metropolitan Life Automobile & Home Ins. Co. v HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Blake Medical Center. Circuit Court, 12th Judicial Circuit, Manatee County.
Metropolitan Life Automobile & Home Ins. Co. v. Ocala Regional Medical Center, et al. Circuit Court, 5th Judicial Circuit, Marion County.
Metropolitan Life Automobile & Home Ins. Co. v. St. Petersburg General Hospital. Circuit Court, 6th Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County.
Metropolitan Life Casualty Ins. Co., individually and for the use and benefit of Clara McLendon v. Orange Park Medical Center, Inc. County Court, 4th Judicial Circuit, Clay County.
Metropolitan Life Casualty Ins. Co., individually and for the use and benefit of Eric Collette v Osceola Regional Hospital, Inc. County Court, 9th Judicial Circuit, Osceola County.
Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida, Inc. v. HCA-The Healthcare Company, f/k/a Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, et al. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County.
North Florida Regional Medical Center v. Gary L. Lowery, M.D. Circuit Court, 8th Judicial Circuit, Alachua County.
Paul J. Schilling v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. & North Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. Circuit Court, 8th Judicial Circuit, Alachua County.
Thyssen Elevator Company, d/b/a Thyssen Miami Elevator v. Sun City Hospital, Inc. d/b/a South Bay Hospital. American Arbitration Association.
Randy T. Warner, M.D. v. Columbia /JFK Medical Center, LLP d/b/a JFK Medical Center. U.S. District Court, Southern District.
Layne Yonehiro, M.D., Fernando E. Kafie, M.D. & Southeast Vascular Institute v. West Florida Regional Medical Center. Circuit Court, 1st Judicial Circuit, Escambia County.
W. Brent Young, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Florida d/b/a Columbia Regional Medical Center Oak Hill Hospital, et al. Circuit Court, 5th Judicial Circuit, Hernando County.

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D.C. Law Library - § 1–325.156. Alley Rehabilitation Project.
↪ § 1–325.156. Alley Rehabilitation Project.
Part Q. Senior Housing Modernization Grant Fund.
§ 1–325.156. Alley Rehabilitation Project.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, the Chief Financial Officer shall transfer to and retain in the Alley Rehabilitation Project the first $6 million of surplus capital funds identified pursuant to § 1-325.153a or § 1-325.153b, to be made available for purposes of the Alley Rehabilitation Project through a reprograming pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title 47 [§ 47-301 et seq.].
(b) This section shall expire on September 30, 2016.
For temporary (90 days) addition of this section, see § 8042(g) of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-127, July 27, 2015, 62 DCR 10201).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(c) of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Law 21-76, Feb. 27, 2016, 63 DCR 264).