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Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1947. See .
The circumstances are these. On July 15, 1938, Gayes, then a lad of 16, was arraigned in the County Court of Monroe County, New York, upon an indictment charging burglary in the third degree and petty larceny. According to the record of conviction, he was asked, in accordance with the requirement of 308 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, whether 'he desired the aid of counsel,' and he answered 'No.'1 Imposition of sentence was postponed to July 28. When on that day [332 U.S. 145 , 147] Gayes appeared for judgment, he was asked, again according to the requirements of New York law, whether 'he had any legal cause to show, why judgment should not be pronounced against him.' New York Code of Criminal Procedure, 480. And 'No sufficient cause appearing,' the record continues, Gayes was committed to a New York State Vocational School to be dealt with there according to law. It appears from the facts before us that Gayes did not stay at this correctional institution as long as New York law would have authorized his detention. See New York Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, 2184-a and 2189, in connection with 407. For on October 14, 1941, he pleaded guilty, in the County Court of Schenectady, New York, to a new charge of burglary in the third degree. The record of this latter proceeding does not indicate whether this time he was or was not represented by counsel. But no claim is made that this plea of guilty, or the sentence under it, has any infirmity Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40 , 2184-a is that he was sentenced as a second offender by the inclusion of the improper sentence to the vocational school in 1938.
Upon this record, the county court denied the motion without opinion. As New York law then stood, no re- [332 U.S. 145 , 148] view could there be had of this determination. See People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427. This made the county court the highest court of the State of New York for purposes of our review. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 , 453. But see Chapter 706 of the New York Laws of 1947, amending Code Cr.Proc. 517. We brought the case here, 329 U.S. 710 , as one of a series, for further consideration of the circumstances under which the requirements of due process imply a duty to supply counsel to defendants in State prosecutions.
The guiding principles bearing on the general problem have been set forth in the opinion in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 , just decided. Insofar as the facts of this case present a particular variant, they are controlled by our decision in Canizio v. New York, supra. We there held that whatever doubts may arise from the circumstances of a plea of guilty, if, before sentence is imposed, the opportunities required by the Constitution for meeting the legal implications of the plea are satisfied, the sentence must stand. And so, the questions that may be raised regarding the circumstances attending the imposition of Gayes' commitment to the vocational institution in 1938 are not now open. Gayes is complaining of his sentence following his plea of guilty in 1941.2 What he wants is to be relieved of his imprisonment under that sentence. That sentence, to be sure, partly took into account his earlier sentence in 1938. But upon his subsequent sentence, as a second offender, in 1941, he had [332 U.S. 145 , 149] full opportunity, so far as appears, to contest whatever infirmity he may have claimed in the earlier sentence when the fact of that sentence was included in the sentence which he is now serving. 3 Since the process leading up to the second sentence is not challenged he cannot now, so far as the United States Constitution is concerned, by a flank attack, challenge the sentence of 1938.
I am unwilling to subscribe to such a doctrine of forfeitures concerning constitutional rights, which in the extreme circumstances of this case seems to me shocking. [332 U.S. 145 , 152] Under all of the New York decisions which have passed upon the question,10 the proper and apparently the necessary procedure, see People v. Keller, Gen.Sess.N.Y. County, 37 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62, for attacking a sentence as second offender, upon the ground that the former conviction was invalid, is first by motion in the court imposing the initial sentence to vacate it, after which if the motion is successful the sentence for the second offense may be attacked and vacated. 11 In other words, the second offender, situated as is petitioner, must first overturn his first conviction in the court where it was obtained, before he can attack the second sentence founded in part upon that conviction.
No state decisions are cited or, it would seem in view of the contrary authorities cited above,13 can be cited to support such a view. Nor is it required by anything said or done in Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 , if indeed such a matter could ever be within our function. The Canizio decision has no relevance to this case, either for prescribing the state procedure or for the constitutional issue. It held only that where a defendant had counsel at the time of his sentence and could then have moved to withdraw his prior plea of guilty, he was not prejudiced by the convicting court's previous failure to inform him of his right to counsel. [332 U.S. 145 , 154] That case had nothing to do with the state procedure open to one convicted as a second offender for challenging his sentence on the ground that the first conviction was invalid for federal constitutional reasons. And the facts, on the merits, were very different from those presented here. Whereas, among other things, in that case the petitioner did have counsel before his sentence was imposed, here not only was Gayes denied counsel altogether in the first trial, but so far as the record discloses he had none in the trial for the second offense. I do not think the Canizio decision can be held to cover such a wholly different situation as this. It did not rule that, if a convicted person has never had counsel, the fact that in a later proceeding he conceivably might have had such aid if he had applied for it cures the denial, more particularly when so far as appears he was treated no better during his trial for the second offense than during the first, and when moreover his present attack is made as a preliminary one required by state law to showing the second sentence invalid.
[ Footnote 1 ] Subsequent to the proceedings before the County Court of Monroe now under review, the minutes of the original proceedings against Gayes came to light. By stipulation of counsel these minutes are here. According to them, the precise question put to Gayes by the Assistant District Attorney in the presence of the Judge was, 'Do you need a lawyer before you enter a plea of guilty or not guilty to this indictment?' To which Gayes replied, 'No, sir.' It may be inconclusively debated whether if Gayes was asked 'if he desired the aid of counsel,' as stated in the entry in the record of conviction, he was better informed of his rights, than if he was asked, 'Do you need a lawyer?' In view of our disposition, the difference in significance becomes immaterial, and it is also immaterial whether, if there were a difference, we could consider, even in a case involving belated release from State detention, a matter not before the court whose judgment is here for review. But the differences that may exist between formal entry in the minutes of an acceptance of a plea and what was actually said contemporaneously lends foce to the caution frequently expressed that every intendment must be made in support of the due observance of law in the rendering of judgments which are collaterally attacked, often after a considerable passage of time.
[ Footnote 2 ] Gayes is detained under the 1941 sentence imposed by the County Court of Schenectady. A motion attacking that sentence would, under New York law, have to be made in that court. What he is asking is the invalidation of the prior sentence, underlying as it were the Schenectady sentence, presumably as a first step in getting relief from detention under the latter sentence. We are treating this proceeding, for our purposes, as one seeking, in effect, relief from the 1941 sentence without regard to formal distinctions which might otherwise be relevant.
[ Footnote 3 ] According to the State, Gayes could have raised the claim he now makes against the 1938 conviction at the time he was sentenced in 1941, and from a denial of relief could have appealed to the higher courts. This was not contradicted by the petitioner and is not brought into question in any opinion of the higher courts of New York. It has been ruled in courts of very limited authority that a second offender cannot apply for resentenceon a claim that there was a defect in the first sentence imposed by another court. See People v. Keller, 37 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Gen.Sess.N. Y.County), and People v. Paterno, 182 Misc. 491, 50 N.Y.S.2d 713 ( Chatauqua County Court). Neither case, however, presented the claim that a violation of the United States Constitution vitiated the first sentence, and neither case raised the power of the court at the time of sentencing to consider such a claim. It is certainly within the power of a duly advised defendant, before pleading guilty as a second offender, to raise the constitutional invalidity of the first sentence so as to secure opportunity appropriately to challenge such invalidity. Nothing that is herein decided precludes petitioner from raising a denial of his constitutional right upon a record that discloses circumstances other than those before us. An order on such a motion is now reviewable by the New York Supreme Court and in certain instances by the New York Court of Appeals.
[ Footnote 1 ] No answer was filed to the petition and the trial court determined the issues on the pleadings without hearing or appearance of petitioner in court, in person or by counsel. The allegation of petitioner that when asked whether he 'desired counsel,' he answered 'no' in the belief that he would have to pay the lawyer's fee, and was not informed to the contrary is, of course, to be taken as true in the absence of denial and of contrary evidence which might have been tendered on a hearing.
[ Footnote 2 ] The first count charged that petitioner 'broke and entered the building and garage of Francis Marolow * * * with intent to commit therein the crime of larceny'; the second count charged petit larceny of the property described in the text above.
[ Footnote 3 ] The sentence was to confinement in the New York State Vocational Institute, which when imposed for an unspecified term under New York Penal Law, 2184-a carried a maximum of 10 years, which is the maximum for burglary in the third degree as a first offense. N.Y.Penal Law, 407(3).
[ Footnote 4 ] Under the second count, for petit larceny or theft, being also presumably the property with respect to which it was charged in the first count that petitioner broke and entered with intent to commit larceny.
[ Footnote 5 ] Petitioner was held under the first sentence, see note 3, until December 14, 1943, when the New York Board of Parole directed that service of the sentence as second offender begin. The date of termination of the latter sentence, see note 6, was correspondingly postponed.
[ Footnote 6 ] The sentence of 10 to 20 years as second offender is mandatory. N.Y. Penal Law 1941. Had petitioner been sentenced in 1941 as a first rather than a second offender, the maximum sentence allowed would have been 5 to 10 years, N.Y.Penal Law, 2189, 407, and he might have been sent to a reformatory rather than prison. N.Y.Penal Law 2185.
[ Footnote 7 ] The 'Record of Conviction' in the trial for the second offense, contained in the record here, discloses that petitioner, having been charged and arraigned, first pleaded not guilty, then ithdrew th at plea and entered one of guilty. It is then recited that petitioner appeared for judgment and, 'having been asked by the clerk whether he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and no legal cause having been shown' or appearing to the court, judgment and sentence were thereupon pronounced. There is no recital that petitioner was represented by counsel, was informed of his rights in any manner, or admonished of the consequences of his plea.
[ Footnote 8 ] See notes 3, 5, 6 supra. See also note 12 infra and text.
[ Footnote 9 ] See note 11 infra.
[ Footnote 10 ] In the absence of determination by a state's highest tribunal the rule announced and applied by other state courts is to be taken by us as determining questions of state law. Cf. West v. A.T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223 , 132 A.L.R. 956.
[ Footnote 11 ] If the 1938 conviction is held void, under state law petitioner then may move to vacate the 1941 sentence in the court which imposed it, and for resentencing according to state law. See People ex rel. Sloane v. Lawes, 255 N.Y. 112, 174 N.E. 80; People ex rel. Carollo v. Brophy, 294 N. Y. 540, 63 N.E.2d 95; People v. Keller, Gen.Sess.N.Y.County, 37 N.Y.S.2d 61. And the proper forum for attacking the 1938 conviction, as a preliminary to attack on that of 1941, is the one where the former was obtained, by the motion to vacate which petitioner has employed. People v. Bernoff, Misc., 61 N.Y.S.2d 46; People v. Foster, 182 Misc. 73, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 831; People v. Paterno, 187 Misc. 56, 60 N.Y.S.2d 813, with which compare People v. Paterno, 182 Misc. 491, 50 N.Y.S.2d 713; cf. People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 167, 61 N.E.2d 427, 428, 429; People v. Keller, supra, Gen. Sess.N.Y.County, 37 N.Y.S.2d 61 at page 63.
[ Footnote 12 ] The opinion announced in conjunction with the Court's judgment seems to suggest that the decisions establishing the state procedure followed in this case are not controlling for our disposition, on what basis I am unable to understand, see note 10 supra, unless upon the untenable one that state rulings upon criminal procedures and the proper forum for utilizing them are not binding for federal determinations to the same extent as are such rulings in civil matters.
[ Footnote 13 ] See note 11.

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VIRGINIA M. VENZON, Petitioner, v. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA (AGUSAN DEL NORTE), INC., REPRESENTED BY LOURDESITA E. PARAJES, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 questioning the December 14, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01341-MIN which dismissed the Petition in said case, as well as its May 7, 2007 Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof.
On January 28, 2005, petitioner Virginia M. Venzon filed a Petition4 to nullify foreclosure proceedings and Tax Declaration Nos. 96-GR-06-003-7002-R and 96-GR-06-003-7003-R issued in the name of respondent Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan del Norte), Inc. The case5 was docketed as Civil Case No. 5535 and raffled to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City. Petitioner alleged that in 1983 she and her late spouse, George F. Venzon, Sr., obtained a P5,000.00 loan from respondent against a mortgage on their house and lot in Libertad, Butuan City, covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 28289 and 42710 issued in their names, which were later on replaced with Tax Declaration Nos. 96 GR-06-003-2884-R and 96 GR-06-003-2885-R; that she was able to pay P2,300.00, thus leaving an outstanding balance of only P2,370.00; that sometime in March 1987, she offered to pay the said balance in full, but the latter refused to accept payment, and instead shoved petitioner away from the bank premises; that in March 1987, respondent foreclosed on the mortgage, and the property was sold at auction for P6,472.76 to respondent, being the highest bidder; that the foreclosure proceedings are null and void for lack of notice and publication of the sale, lack of sheriff’s final deed of sale and notice of redemption period; and that she paid respondent P6,000.00 on October 9, 1995, as evidenced by respondent’s Official Receipt No. 4108486 issued on October 9, 1995.
In its Answer with Counterclaims,7 respondent claimed that petitioner did not make any payment on the loan; that petitioner never went to the bank in March 1987 to settle her obligations in full; that petitioner was not shoved and driven away from its premises; that the foreclosure proceedings were regularly done and all requirements were complied with; that a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff and duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds; that petitioner’s claim that she paid P6,000.00 on October 9, 1995 is utterly false; that petitioner’s cause of action has long prescribed as the case was filed only in 2005 or 18 years after the foreclosure sale; and that petitioner is guilty of laches. Respondent interposed its counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees as well.
In her Reply,8 petitioner insisted that the foreclosure proceedings were irregular and that prescription and laches do not apply as the foreclosure proceedings are null and void to begin with.
In other words, the trial court meant that under the Rural Banks Act, the foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks and executions of judgments thereon involving real properties levied upon by a sheriff shall be exempt from publication where the total amount of the loan, including interests due and unpaid, does not exceed P10,000.00.11 Since petitioner’s outstanding obligation amounted to just over P6,000.00 publication was not necessary.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,12 but in the September 6, 2006 Resolution,13 the trial court denied the same.
Petitioner went up to the CA via an original Petition for Certiorari.14 On December 14, 2006, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution15 dismissing the Petition. It held that petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since the July 13, 2006 Resolution is a final order of dismissal. Petitioner received the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration on September 18, 2006;16 but she filed the Petition for Certiorari on October 25, 2006 when she should have interposed an appeal on or before October 3, 2006. Having done so, her Petition may not even be treated as an appeal for the same was belatedly filed.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration18 by submitting a rewritten Petition. However, in a Resolution dated May 7, 2007, the CA denied the same, hence the present Petition.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSIBLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI THEREBY PREVENTING THE COURT FROM FINDING OUT THAT ACTUALLY NO EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF ON PETITIONER’S PROPERTY AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Petitioner claims that no extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings ever took place, citing a February 2, 2005 Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Butuan City stating that the record pertaining to the foreclosure proceedings covering her property “could not be found [in spite] of diligent efforts to find the same.”20 And because no foreclosure proceedings took place, there could not have been notice and publication of the sale, and no sheriff’s certificate of sale. For this reason, she claims that the CA erred in dismissing her case.
Petitioner adds that, technicalities aside, a Petition for Certiorari is available to her in order to prevent the denial of her substantial rights. She also argues that her payment to respondent of the amount of P6,000.00 in 1995 should be considered as a valid redemption of her property.
For its part, respondent merely validates the pronouncements of the CA by citing and echoing the same, and holding petitioner to a strict observance of the rules for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period, as it claims they are necessary for the orderly administration of justice,21 as well as that which requires that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Court finds no error in the CA’s treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The trial court’s July 13, 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order, disposing of the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very core of petitioner’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 5535 – and declaring the same to be unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act, as petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not exceed P10,000.00, and thus leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. This constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Rule 41, and not Rule 65.
The Court is not prepared to be lenient in petitioner’s case, either. Civil Case No. 5535 was instituted only in 2005, while the questioned foreclosure proceedings took place way back in 1987. Petitioner’s long inaction and commission of a procedural faux pas certainly cannot earn the sympathy of the Court.
Nor can the Court grant the Petition on the mere allegation that no foreclosure proceedings ever took place. The February 2, 2005 Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Butuan City to the effect that the record of the foreclosure proceedings could not be found is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings taken. Petitioner herself attached the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale22 as Annex “A” of her Petition in Civil Case No. 5535; this should belie the claim that no record exists covering the foreclosure proceedings. Besides, if petitioner insists that no foreclosure proceedings took place, then she should not have filed an action to annul the same since there was no foreclosure to begin with. She should have filed a different action.
Assumption cannot be had that there was an alleged foreclosure of the then property of the petitioner for the truth of the matter is that a foreclosure proceeding was duly conducted, which fact remains undisputable for so many years now.
The redemption period had long lapsed when the payment of P6,000.00 was allegedly made. Thus, there is no point talking about redemption price when the redemption period had long been gone at the time the alleged payment was made.
Interestingly, respondent did not deny being the issuer of Official Receipt No. 410848. Instead, it averred that petitioner’s payment to it of P6,000.00 was false and self-serving, but in the same breath argued that, without necessarily admitting that payment of P6,000.00 was made, the same cannot be considered as redemption price.
By making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent is deemed to have admitted receiving the amount of P6,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 410848, which amount under the circumstances it had no right to receive. “If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted.”24 “Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a ‘negative pregnant’ exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted.”25 “A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied.”26 “[P]rofession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, [is] no denial at all.”27 In fine, respondent failed to refute petitioner’s claim of having paid the amount of P6,000.00.
Since respondent was not entitled to receive the said amount, as it is deemed fully paid from the foreclosure of petitioner’s property since its bid price at the auction sale covered all that petitioner owed it by way of principal, interest, attorney’s fees and charges,28 it must return the same to petitioner. “If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.”29 Moreover, pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas which took effect July 1, 2013, the amount of P6,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed from the filing of the Petition in Civil Case No. 5535 up to its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2006 and May 7, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01341-MIN are AFFIRMED.
However, respondent Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan del Norte), Inc. is ORDERED to return to petitioner Virginia M. Venzon or her assigns the amount of P6,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed from the filing of the Petition in Civil Case No. 5535 up to its full satisfaction.
2 CA rollo, pp. 48-51; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
6 CA rollo, p. 16.
9 Id. at 40-41; penned by Augustus L. Calo.
The foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by Rural Banks and executions of judgments thereon involving real properties levied upon by a sheriff shall be exempt from the publications in newspapers now required by law where the total amount of loan, including interests due and unpaid, does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or such amount as the Monetary Board may prescribe as may be warranted by prevailing economic conditions. It shall be sufficient publication in such cases if the notices of foreclosure and execution of judgment are posted in the most conspicuous area of the Municipal Building, the Rural Bank and the Barangay Hall where the land mortgaged is situated during the period of sixty days immediately preceding the public auction or execution of judgment. Proof of publications as required herein shall be accomplished by affidavit of the sheriff or officer conducting the foreclosure sale or execution of judgment and shall be attached with the records of the case: Provided, That when a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, the homesteader or free patent holder, as well as his heirs shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure in the case of land not covered by a Torrens title or two years from the date of registration of the foreclosure in the case of land covered by a Torrens title: Provided, finally, That in the case of borrowers who are mere tenants, the produce corresponding to their share may be accepted as security.
12 CA rollo, pp. 43-44.
17 Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.
The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
18 CA rollo, pp. 55-61.
21 Citing Ditching v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 665, 678 (1996).
22 CA rollo, p. 15.
23 Id. at 22. Emphases supplied.
24Bañares v. Atty. Barican, 157 Phil. 134, 138 (1974).
25Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing, 130 Phil. 51, 54 (1968), citing Ison v. Ison, 115 SW 2d. 330, 272 Ky. 836 and 28 Words & Phrases 314.
26 Id., citing 41 Am. Jur. 429.
27Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto, 240 Phil. 719, 730 (1987), citing Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1970 ed., Vol. 1, p. 335; J.P. & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc., 139 Phil. 77, 83 (1969); Philippine Advertising Counsellors, Inc. v. Hon. Revilla, 152 Phil. 213, 222 (1973); Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 752, 757 (1976).
28 CA rollo, p. 15.
29 CIVIL CODE, Article 2154.

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In General Re Life Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance, the 2nd Circuit adopted an exception to the functus officio doctrine that allows an arbitral panel to clarify its own ambiguous award.
Both decisions reaffirm the strong state and federal policies in favor of arbitration and once again make clear that arbitral awards will be given substantial deference by New York courts.
In two recent decisions, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and the New York Appellate Division reaffirmed the strong state and federal policies in favor of arbitration and once again made clear that arbitral awards will be given substantial deference by the courts. In Deasang Corp. v. NutraSweet Co., the Appellate Division overturned a ruling by an overzealous lower court that had vacated an arbitral award on the purported ground that the arbitral panel had manifestly disregarded the law. In General Re Life Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance, the 2nd Circuit made clear that an arbitral panel has the authority to clarify its own ambiguous award. These decisions emphasize that the U.S. remains a strongly �arbitration friendly� jurisdiction.
Daesang Corp. v. Nutrasweet Co.
In a decision with important implications for the confirmation of arbitration awards in New York state courts, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, reinstated an arbitral award that had been vacated by the lower court, holding that the lower court incorrectly vacated the award on the ground of manifest disregard for the law. The decision, Deasang Corp. v. NutraSweet Co., reaffirms that New York state courts will vacate arbitral awards under only exceedingly rare circumstances and that the New York state court system remains a favorable forum in which to seek confirmation of an arbitral award.
The decision arose from an asset purchase agreement and processing agreement between NutraSweet and Daesang through which Daesang sold all of its aspartame assets to NutraSweet, including a manufacturing facility, and agreed to provide aspartame production services going forward at the same facility. Both agreements were governed by New York law and provided that disputes were to be resolved by a three-member tribunal in New York under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. The parties also entered into a joint defense and confidentiality agreement that allowed NutraSweet to rescind the transaction if legal proceedings challenging the deal as an antitrust violation were instituted by any customer that met certain size requirements.
Three years after the transaction closed, NutraSweet sought to rescind the deal based on an antitrust class action filed against NutraSweet and Daesang by several industrial aspartame customers. As a result, Daesang commenced arbitration proceedings against NutraSweet for breach of the agreements. NutraSweet defended the claims on several grounds, including that (1) NutraSweet was entitled to equitable rescission of the agreements based on the alleged falsity of certain representations and warranties made by Daesang, which NutraSweet argued allowed it to rescind the agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement; and (2) Daesang breached the agreements by failing to maintain the plant and failing to manufacture aspartame according to the agreed-upon specifications and at sufficient quantities.
The panel sided with Daesang on all claims and dismissed all of NutraSweet�s counterclaims and defenses. With respect to equitable rescission, the panel found that NutraSweet�s arguments were contractual in nature and could not be pursued on a theory of fraudulent inducement. With respect to NutraSweet�s breach-of-contract claim, the panel dismissed the claim because it found that NutraSweet had not asserted a breach of contract claim independent of its equitable rescission arguments, based on a finding that any such breach-of-contract claim had been waived.
Daesang moved to confirm the award in the Supreme Court, New York County. NutraSweet answered and cross-moved to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law and evidence, violated public policy, and failed to discharge their duties in accordance with the law. After a hearing, the Supreme Court sided with NutraSweet and vacated the award on manifest disregard grounds. Regarding equitable rescission, the Supreme Court held that the panel �chose to disregard the well-established principle [invoked by NutraSweet during the arbitration] that a fraud claim can be based on breach of contractual warranties where the misrepresentations are of present facts (in contrast to future performance).� Regarding the counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court held that the record failed to establish that NutraSweet had waived this claim.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, squarely rejected the Court�s rationale and granted Daesang�s petition to confirm the arbitration award. The First Department reiterated that �manifest disregard� is a �severely limited doctrine� that �gives extreme deference to arbitrators.� To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard for the law, a court must find �both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.� The First Department held that this standard had not been met.
In General Re Life Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance, the 2nd Circuit joined a number of other Courts of Appeals in adopting an exception to the functus officio doctrine, holding that, where an arbitral award is ambiguous, the arbitrator retains authority to clarify it.
The case involved a dispute between a life insurance company, Lincoln, and its reinsurer, General Re, arising under a reinsurance agreement that permitted General Re to increase premiums under certain circumstances, but gave Lincoln the option to �recapture� its policies (i.e., sever the reinsurance relationship) rather than pay the increased premiums. General Re sought to increase its premiums, and Lincoln challenged the increase in arbitration. The parties agreed to maintain the status quo while the arbitration was proceeding, with Lincoln paying the pre-increase premiums and General Re continuing to pay claims as they arose.
The panel held that General Re had the right to increase its premiums, and provided for the unwinding of premium and claim transactions if Lincoln opted to recapture the policies. After Lincoln elected to recapture its policies, the parties disagreed about the meaning of the portion of the award requiring premium and claims transactions to be unwound. In response, the panel issued a clarification to its award, explaining that its original award was ambiguous and that neither party had correctly interpreted it. General Re, unhappy with the clarification, petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to confirm the original (i.e., unclarified) award, and Lincoln filed a cross-petition to confirm the award with the clarification. The district court denied General Re�s petition and granted Lincoln�s petition to confirm the clarified award.
The court�s decision is in keeping with existing law in the 2nd Circuit, which requires that a court tasked with confirming an ambiguous award remand to the arbitrator for clarification. Furthermore, because it was the arbitrator that issued the ambiguous ruling in the first place, it makes sense for the arbitrator to clarify it. As such, the decision promotes the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration by allowing the arbitrator to retain authority to interpret its own awards and allowing the parties to avoid expensive litigation outside of the arbitration.

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23-1901. County surveyor; county engineer; qualifications; powers and duties.
(2) In all counties having a population of at least sixty thousand inhabitants but less than one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, the county surveyor shall be ex officio county engineer and shall be either a professional engineer as provided in the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act or a registered land surveyor as provided in the Land Surveyors Regulation Act or both. In such counties, the office of surveyor shall be full time.
In counties having a population of one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants or more, a county engineer shall be a professional engineer as provided in the act and shall be elected as provided in section 32-526.
(e) Have charge and general supervision of work or improvements authorized by the county board, inspect all materials, direct the work, and make a report of each piece of work to the county board.
The county engineer or surveyor shall also have such other and further powers as are necessarily incident to the general powers granted.
(4) The county surveyor shall prepare and file the required annual inventory statement of county personal property in his or her custody or possession as provided in sections 23-346 to 23-350.
(5) In counties having a population of one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants or more, the county engineer shall appoint a full-time county surveyor. The county surveyor shall perform all the duties prescribed in sections 23-1901 to 23-1913 and any other duties assigned to him or her by the county engineer. The county surveyor shall be a registered land surveyor as provided in the Land Surveyors Regulation Act.
Source:Laws 1879, § 127, p. 386; Laws 1905, c. 50, § 1, p. 295; R.S.1913, § 5685; Laws 1921, c. 141, § 1, p. 606; C.S.1922, § 5015; C.S.1929, § 26-1601; Laws 1939, c. 28, § 16, p. 154; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 26-1601; R.S.1943, § 23-1901; Laws 1969, c. 170, § 1, p. 747; Laws 1982, LB 127, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 512, § 1; Laws 1990, LB 821, § 14; Laws 1994, LB 76, § 543; Laws 1997, LB 622, § 58; Laws 2015, LB138, § 1; Laws 2017, LB200, § 1.
Engineers and Architects Regulation Act, see section 81-3401.
Land Surveyors Regulation Act, see section 81-8,108.01.


text:
The Commission brought one civil enforcement action this week. The case centers on a boiler room and the manipulation of a penny stock over a three year period. The action, and the parallel criminal case, are related to similar actions brought earlier this year. The agency also settled with another defendant in a long running insider trading case that traces to the announcement of a 2009 tender offer. One defendant remains. That person was found guilty after trial in the parallel criminal case.
Statistics: Last week the SEC filed 1 civil injunctive case and no administrative proceedings, excluding 12j and tag-along proceedings.
Manipulation: SEC v. Burnett, Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-6501 (E.D.N.Y. Filed Nov. 15, 2018) is an action which names as defendants: Mark Burnett, a former floor broker; Jeffrey Miller, a former registered representative; Christian Romandetti, the CEO of First Choice Health Care Solutions; Frank Sarro, who controlled a number of entities involved; Anthony Vassallo, the former CEO of Elite Stock Research, Inc., who has previously been enjoined by the Commission; and Elite Stock Research, a boiler room. The complaint alleges a fraudulent scheme, beginning in September 2013, which unfolded over the next three years to manipulated the share price of First Choice. The fraud began with the accumulations of large blocks of First Choice stock by Defendants Burnett, Miller, Sarro and Vassallo with the assistance of firm CEO Romandetti. Subsequently, various defendants engaged in manipulative trading while Elite Stock Research, a boiler room, rolled out a large scale promotional campaign, touting the stock. The share price increased from less than $1 to over $3. Collectively defendants reaped profits of over $3.3 million while over 100 investors suffered losses. The complaint alleges violations of Securities Act sections 17(a)(1) and (2) and Exchange Act sections 9(a)(1), 9(a)(2) and 10(b). The case is pending. See Lit. Rel. No. 24363 (Nov. 16, 2018); see also SEC v. PowerTradersPress.com, Inc., Civil Action No. CV-04133 (E.D.N.Y.)(related action filed earlier this years). A parallel criminal action was brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York.
Insider trading: SEC v. Mazzo, Case No. SACV – 121327 (C.D. Cal. Aug 17, 2012) is a previously filed action. It centered on the tender offer by Abbott Laboratories Inc. for Advanced Medical Optics Inc., announced in 2009. The action named as defendants James Mazzo, David Parker and Eddie Murray. Mr. Mazzo was the Chairman and CEO of Advanced Medical Optics, Inc. and was an executive officer of Abbott Laboratories, Inc. He was also a close friend and neighbor of major league baseball player Doug DeCinces (see below). Mr. Parker was in the private equity business. Eddie Murray was a retired major league baseball player. Mr. Mazzo was alleged to be the source of the inside information furnished to each of the other defendants who traded profitably in advance of the tender offer announcement. The complaint alleged violations of Exchange Act sections 10(b) and 14(e). Mr. Murray settled with the Commission at the time the complaint was filed. He consented to the entry of permanent injunctions based on the sections cited in the complaint. In addition, Mr. Murray paid disgorgement of $235, 324, prejudgment interest of $5,180 and a penalty of $117,657. Messrs. Mazzo and Parker did not settle. Now, almost a decade after the tender offer announcement, Mr. Mazzo has settled with the Commission. On November 13, 2018 he consented to the entry of permanent injunctions based on the two sections cited in the complaint. He also agreed to pay a penalty of $1.5 million and to the entry of an order that bars him from serving as an officer or director for five years. The action brought by the Commission against David Parker continues. See also SEC v. DeCinces, Civil Action No. 11-1168 (C.D. Cal.)(each defendant settled, agreeing to the entry of permanent injunctions and to pay disgorgement, prejudgment interest and penalites); U.S. v. DeCinces, Case No. 8:12-cr-00269 (C.D. CA. )(Messrs. DeCinces and Parker were convicted; the jury hung as to Mr. Mazzo).
IA – Misappropriation: U.S. v. Fulford, No. 4:16-cr-00551 (S.D. Tx.). Defendant Peggy Ann Fulford was an investment adviser to sports stars from the NBA and NFL. She became the adviser to NBA Players Travis Best and Dennis Rodman. Other clients included NFL players Ricky Williams and Lex Hilliard. Ms. Fulford garnered these clients by representing that she had graduated from Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School. Ms. Fulford also claimed to have made millions on Wall Street buying and selling hospitals and real estate. She did not charge clients a fee – she claimed not to need it. Rather, her concern was that client earnings were properly handled; their investments properly made. To achieve her goal Mr. Fulford requested and apparently received access to client bank accounts. She offered to manage client expenses and invest their funds for retirement. While that may have been the stated plan, it never happened. Rather, the funds were misappropriated. Ms. Fulford pleaded guilty to one count of interstate transportation of stolen property. The Court imposed the maximum sentence on Ms. Fulford: 120 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. In addition, she was ordered to pay $5,794,870 in restitution to the victims.
The agency issued a revised Geographic Targeting Order. It requires U.S. title insurance companies to identify natural persons behind shell companies used in all-cash purchases of residential real estate. The threshold amount is now set at $300,000 for each covered metropolitan area. It also applies to purchases using virtual currencies.
Remarks: John Price, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, delivered remarks at the FINSIA “the Regulators’ panel event.” Melbourne, Australia (Nov. 15, 2018). His remarks focused on the vision of the agency which is based on a strong and efficient financial system for Australia centered on implementing new supervisory approaches, close monitoring and strengthening supervision and enforcement (here).
Program: The Fifth Annual Dorsey Federal Enforcement Forum will be held on December 5, 2018. The program, centered on a tech theme and SEC enforcement, includes a keynote address on artificial intelligence and its impact on the legal profession, panels analyzing critical issues facing SEC enforcement, the question of broker protocols, trends in investment adviser inspections, how to conduct an ICO and concludes with an address on cyber-security and internal controls. A holiday party follows. The program, and registration for it and the party, are here or separate registration for the holiday party only here.


In a California State court, petitioners were tried jointly, convicted of 13 felonies, and sentenced to imprisonment. Exercising their only right to appeal as of right, they appealed to an intermediate Court of Appeals, and, being indigent, applied to it for appointment of counsel to assist them on appeal. In accordance with a state rule of criminal procedure, that court made an ex parte examination of the record, determined that appointment of counsel for petitioners would not be "of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court," and denied appointment of counsel. Their appeal was heard without assistance of counsel, and their convictions were affirmed. The State Supreme Court denied a discretionary review.
Held: Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right were decided without benefit of counsel in a state criminal case, there has been a discrimination between the rich and the poor which violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 372 U. S. 353-358.
187 Cal.App.2d 802, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
public defender was appointed to represent them. At the commencement of the trial, the defender moved for a continuance, stating that the case was very complicated, that he was not as prepared as he felt he should be because he was handling a different defense every day, and that there was a conflict of interest between the petitioners, requiring the appointment of separate counsel for each of them. This motion was denied. Thereafter, petitioners dismissed the defender, claiming he was unprepared, and again renewed motions for separate counsel and for a continuance. These motions also were denied, and petitioners were ultimately convicted by a jury of all 13 felonies, which included robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. Both were given prison terms. Both appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. 187 Cal.App.2d 802, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188. Both Meyes and Douglas then petitioned for further discretionary review in the California Supreme Court, but their petitions were denied without a hearing. [Footnote 1] 187 Cal.App.2d at 813, 10 Cal.Rptr. at 195. We granted certiorari. 368 U.S. 815.
"an independent investigation of the record and determine whether it would be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel appointed. . . . After such investigation, appellate courts should appoint counsel if in their opinion it would be helpful to the defendant or the court, and should deny the appointment of counsel only if in their judgment such appointment would be of no value to either the defendant or the court."
People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43.
"[d]enial of counsel on appeal [to an indigent] would seem to be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illinois. . . ."
People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 71, 9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076 (concurring opinion). In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, we held that a State may not grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. There, as in Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487, the right to a free transcript on appeal was in issue. Here, the issue is whether or not an indigent shall be denied the assistance of counsel on appeal. In either case, the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys "depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, supra at p. 351 U. S. 19.
upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel. If he can, the appellate court passes on the merits of his case only after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he cannot, the appellate court is forced to prejudge the merits before it can even determine whether counsel should be provided. At this stage in the proceedings, only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and, unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is forced to go without a champion on appeal. Any real chance he may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an ex parte examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not required.
U.S. 483, 348 U. S. 489; Griffin v. Illinois, supra, p. 351 U. S. 18. Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn, and we often sustain them. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464. But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.
that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.
We vacate the judgment of the District Court of Appeal and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
While the notation of a denial of hearing by the California Supreme Court indicates that only Meyes petitioned that Court for a hearing, and is silent as to Douglas' attempts at further review, the record shows that the petition for review was expressly filed on behalf of Douglas as well. Both Meyes and Douglas, therefore, have exhausted their state remedies and both cases are properly before us. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).
"When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged."
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U. S. 438, 369 U. S. 449.
and determine whether it would be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel appointed."
People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958). California's courts did that here, and, after examining the record, certified that such an appointment would be neither advantageous to the petitioners nor helpful to the court. It therefore refused to go through the useless gesture of appointing an attorney. In my view, neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause requires more. I cannot understand why the Court says that this procedure afforded petitioners "a meaningless ritual." To appoint an attorney would not only have been utter extravagance and a waste of the State's funds, but as surely "meaningless" to petitioners.
California's concern for the rights of indigents is clearly revealed in People v. Hyde, supra. There, although the Public Defender had not undertaken the prosecution of the appeal, the District Court of Appeal nevertheless referred the application for counsel and the record to the Los Angeles Bar Association. One of its members reviewed these papers, after which he certified that no meritorious ground for appeal was disclosed. Despite this, the California District Court of Appeal made its own independent examination of the record.
There is an old adage which my good Mother used to quote to me, i.e., "People who live in glass houses had best not throw stones." I dissent.
Statistics from the office of the Clerk of this Court reveal that, in the 1961 Term, only 38 of 1,093 in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari were granted (3.4%). Of 44 in forma pauperis appeals, all but one were summarily dismissed (2.3%).
"Further, the briefs filed by Meyes (which Douglas adopted) conform to the rules in all respects, are well written, present all possible points clearly and ably with abundant citation of pertinent authorities, and were no doubt prepared by one well versed in criminal law and procedure and in brief writing. There was no prejudicial error in not appointing counsel for defendants on the appeal."
187 Cal.App.2d 802, 812, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188, 195.
Clause and on the guarantees of fair procedure inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with obvious emphasis on "equal protection." In my view, the Equal Protection Clause is not apposite, and its application to cases like the present one can lead only to mischievous results. This case should be judged solely under the Due Process Clause, and I do not believe that the California procedure violates that provision.
To approach the present problem in terms of the Equal Protection Clause is, I submit, but to substitute resounding phrases for analysis. I dissented from this approach in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 351 U. S. 29, 351 U. S. 34-36, [Footnote 3/1] and I am constrained to dissent from the implicit extension of the equal protection approach here -- to a case in which the State denies no one an appeal, but seeks only to keep within reasonable bounds the instances in which appellate counsel will be assigned to indigents.
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminating between "rich" and "poor" as such in the formulation and application of their laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest that this provision prevents the State from adopting a law of general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich, or, on the other hand, from making some effort to redress economic imbalances while not eliminating them entirely.
uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories of offenses. Nor could it be contended that the State may not classify as crimes acts which the poor are more likely to commit than are the rich. And surely, there would be no basis for attacking a state law which provided benefits for the needy simply because those benefits fell short of the goods or services that others could purchase for themselves.
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." [Footnote 3/2] To so construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society. The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can afford.
in providing counsel for indigents, it could never be expected to satisfy an affirmative duty -- if one existed -- to place the poor on the same level as those who can afford the best legal talent available.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that, if the present problem may be viewed as one of equal protection, so may the question of the right to appointed counsel at trial, and the Court's analysis of that right in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, is wholly unnecessary. The short way to dispose of Gideon v. Wainwright, in other words, would be simply to say that the State deprives to indigent of equal protection whenever it fails to furnish him with legal services, and perhaps with other services as well, equivalent to those that the affluent defendant can obtain.
The real question in this case, I submit, and the only one that permits of satisfactory analysis, is whether or not the state rule, as applied in this case, is consistent with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Of course, in considering this question, it must not be lost sight of that the State's responsibility under the Due Process Clause is to provide justice for all. Refusal to furnish criminal indigents with some things that others can afford may fall short of constitutional standards of fairness. The problem before us is whether this is such a case.
in People v. Vigil, 189 Cal.App.2d 478, 480-482, 11 Cal.Rptr. 319, 321-322.
We have today held that in a case such as the one before us, there is an absolute right to the services of counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, ante, p. 372 U. S. 335. But the appellate procedures involved here stand on an entirely different constitutional footing. First, appellate review is in itself not required by the Fourteenth Amendment, McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684; see Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 351 U. S. 18, and thus the question presented is the narrow one whether the State's rules with respect to the appointment of counsel are so arbitrary or unreasonable, in the context of the particular appellate procedure that it has established, as to require their invalidation. Second, the kinds of questions that may arise on appeal are circumscribed by the record of the proceedings that led to the conviction; they do not encompass the large variety of tactical and strategic problems that must be resolved at the trial. Third, as California applies its rule, the indigent appellant receives the benefit of expert and conscientious legal appraisal of the merits of his case on the basis of the trial record, and whether or not he is assigned counsel, is guaranteed full consideration of his appeal. It would be painting with too broad a brush to conclude that, under these circumstances, an appeal is just like a trial.
to the indigent petitioner might be regarded as more substantial than in California. But as conscientiously committed as this Court is to the great principle of "Equal Justice Under Law," it has never deemed itself constitutionally required to appoint counsel to assist in the preparation of each of the more than 1,000 pro se petitions for certiorari currently being filed each Term. We should know from our own experience that appellate courts generally go out of their way to give fair consideration to those who are unrepresented.
The Court distinguishes our review from the present case on the grounds that the California rule relates to "the first appeal, granted as a matter of right." Ante, p. 372 U. S. 356. But I fail to see the significance of this difference. Surely, it cannot be contended that the requirements of fair procedure are exhausted once an indigent has been given one appellate review. Cf. Lane v. Brown, post, p. 372 U. S. 477. Nor can it well be suggested that having appointed counsel is more necessary to the fair administration of justice in an initial appeal taken as a matter of right, which the reviewing court on the full record has already determined to be frivolous, than in a petition asking a higher appellate court to exercise its discretion to consider what may be a substantial constitutional claim.
respects, California has outdone the federal system, since it provides a transcript and an appeal on the merits in all cases, no matter how frivolous.
The majority in Griffin appeared to rely, as here, on a blend of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in arriving at the result. So far as the result in that case rested on due process grounds, I fully accept the authority of Griffin.
Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 351 U. S. 34 (dissenting opinion of this writer).
California law provides that if counsel is appointed on appeal, the court shall fix a reasonable fee to be paid by the State. California Penal Code § 1241. It is, of course, clear that this Court may not require the State to compel its attorneys to donate their services.
Petitioners also contend that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This claim, in my view, is without merit. A reading of the record leaves little doubt that petitioners' dismissal of their appointed counsel and their efforts to obtain a continuance were designed to delay the proceedings and, in all likelihood, to manufacture an appealable issue. Moreover, the trial court acted well within constitutional bounds in denying the claim that there was a conflict of interest between Douglas and Meyes that required a separate appointed attorney for each.


§ 1.2 Liability of principal for act of agent.
§ 1.4 Electronic signatures, acknowledgments and verifications.
§ 1.7 Books and records requirements for security-based swap agreements.
§ 1.8 Requests for interpretation of swaps, security-based swaps, and mixed swaps.
§ 1.9 Regulation of mixed swaps.
§ 1.10 Financial reports of futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.
§ 1.11 Risk Management Program for futures commission merchants.
§ 1.12 Maintenance of minimum financial requirements by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.
§ 1.14 Risk assessment recordkeeping requirements for futures commission merchants.
§ 1.15 Risk assessment reporting requirements for futures commission merchants.
§ 1.16 Qualifications and reports of accountants.
§ 1.17 Minimum financial requirements for futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.
§ 1.18 Records for and relating to financial reporting and monthly computation by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.
§ 1.19 Prohibited trading in certain “puts” and “calls”.
§ 1.21 Care of money and equities accruing to futures customers.
§ 1.23 Interest of futures commission merchant in segregated futures customer funds; additions and withdrawals.
§ 1.24 Segregated funds; exclusions therefrom.
§ 1.25 Investment of customer funds.
§ 1.26 Deposit of instruments purchased with futures customer funds.
§ 1.27 Record of investments.
§ 1.28 Appraisal of instruments purchased with customer funds.
§ 1.29 Gains and losses resulting from investment of customer funds.
§ 1.30 Loans by futures commission merchants; treatment of proceeds.
§ 1.31 Books and records; keeping and inspection.
§ 1.32 Reporting of segregated account computation and details regarding the holding of futures customer funds.
§ 1.33 Monthly and confirmation statements.
§ 1.34 Monthly record, “point balance”.
§ 1.35 Records of commodity interest and related cash or forward transactions.
§ 1.36 Record of securities and property received from customers.
§ 1.37 Customer's name, address, and occupation recorded; record of guarantor or controller of account.
§ 1.38 Execution of transactions.
§ 1.39 Simultaneous buying and selling orders of different principals; execution of, for and between principals.
§ 1.40 Crop, market information letters, reports; copies required.
§ 1.46 Application and closing out of offsetting long and short positions.
§ 1.49 Denomination of customer funds and location of depositories.
§ 1.52 Self-regulatory organization adoption and surveillance of minimum financial requirements.
§ 1.54 Contract market rules submitted to and approved or not disapproved by the Secretary of Agriculture.
§ 1.55 Public disclosures by futures commission merchants.
§ 1.56 Prohibition of guarantees against loss.
§ 1.57 Operations and activities of introducing brokers.
§ 1.58 Gross collection of exchange-set margins.
§ 1.59 Activities of self-regulatory organization employees, governing board members, committee members, and consultants.
§ 1.60 Pending legal proceedings.
§ 1.63 Service on self-regulatory organization governing boards or committees by persons with disciplinary histories.
§ 1.64 Composition of various self-regulatory organization governing boards and major disciplinary committees.
§ 1.65 Notice of bulk transfers and disclosure obligations to customers.
§ 1.66 No-action positions with respect to floor traders.
§ 1.67 Notification of final disciplinary action involving financial harm to a customer.
§ 1.69 Voting by interested members of self-regulatory organization governing boards and various committees.
§ 1.70 Notification of State enforcement actions brought under the Commodity Exchange Act.
§ 1.71 Conflicts of interest policies and procedures by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.
§ 1.72 Restrictions on customer clearing arrangements.
§ 1.73 Clearing futures commission merchant risk management.
§ 1.74 Futures commission merchant acceptance for clearing.
§ 1.75 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk to establish an alternative compliance schedule to comply with futures commission merchant acceptance for clearing.
§ 2.2 Authority to affix seal.
§ 2.3 Prohibitions against misuse of seal.
§ 2.4 Employee Recreation Association's use of Commission seal.
§ 3.2 Registration processing by the National Futures Association; notification and duration of registration.
§ 3.3 Chief compliance officer.
§ 3.4 Registration in one capacity not included in registration in any other capacity.
§ 3.10 Registration of futures commission merchants, retail foreign exchange dealers, introducing brokers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, swap dealers, major swap participants and leverage transaction merchants.
§ 3.11 Registration of floor brokers and floor traders.
§ 3.12 Registration of associated persons of futures commission merchants, retail foreign exchange dealers, introducing brokers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators and leverage transaction merchants.
§ 3.21 Exemption from fingerprinting requirement in certain cases.
§ 3.30 Current address for purpose of delivery of communications from the Commission or the National Futures Association.
§ 3.31 Deficiencies, inaccuracies, and changes, to be reported.
§ 3.33 Withdrawal from registration.
§ 3.40 Temporary licensing of applicants for associated person, floor broker or floor trader registration.
§ 3.43 Relationship to registration.
§ 3.44 Temporary licensing of applicants for guaranteed introducing broker registration.
§ 3.45 Restrictions upon activities.
§ 3.47 Relationship to registration.
§ 3.51 Withdrawal of application for registration.
§ 3.55 Suspension and revocation of registration pursuant to section 8a(2) of the Act.
§ 3.56 Suspension or modification of registration pursuant to section 8a(11) of the Act.
§ 3.57 Proceedings under section 8a(2)(E) of the Act.
§ 3.60 Procedure to deny, condition, suspend, revoke or place restrictions upon registration pursuant to sections 8a(2), 8a(3) and 8a(4) of the Act.
§ 3.61 Extensions of time for proceedings brought under § 3.55, § 3.56, and § 3.60 of this part.
§ 3.63 Service of order issued by an Administrative Law Judge or the Commission.
§ 3.64 Procedure to lift or modify conditions or restrictions.
§ 3.70 Notification of certain information regarding associated persons.
§ 3.75 Delegation and reservation of authority.
§ 4.1 Requirements as to form.
§ 4.7 Exemption from certain part 4 requirements for commodity pool operators with respect to offerings to qualified eligible persons and for commodity trading advisors with respect to advising qualified eligible persons.
§ 4.8 Exemption from certain requirements of rule 4.26 with respect to pools offered or sold in certain offerings exempt from registration under the Securities Act.
§ 4.11 Exemption from section 4n(3)(B).
§ 4.12 Exemption from provisions of part 4.
§ 4.13 Exemption from registration as a commodity pool operator.
§ 4.14 Exemption from registration as a commodity trading advisor.
§ 4.15 Continued applicability of antifraud section.
§ 4.21 Required delivery of pool Disclosure Document.
§ 4.22 Reporting to pool participants.
§ 4.24 General disclosures required.
§ 4.26 Use, amendment and filing of Disclosure Document.
§ 4.27 Additional reporting by advisors of certain large commodity pools.
§ 4.31 Required delivery of Disclosure Document to prospective clients.
§ 4.34 General disclosures required.
§ 4.36 Use, amendment and filing of Disclosure Document.
§ 4.41 Advertising by commodity pool operators, commodity trading advisors, and the principals thereof.
§ 5.3 Registration of persons engaged in retail forex transactions.
§ 5.4 Applicability of part 4 of this chapter to commodity pool operators and commodity trading advisors.
§ 5.5 Distribution of “Risk Disclosure Statement” by retail foreign exchange dealers, futures commission merchants and introducing brokers regarding retail forex transactions.
§ 5.6 Maintenance of minimum financial requirements by retail foreign exchange dealers and futures commission merchants offering or engaging in retail forex transactions.
§ 5.7 Minimum financial requirements for retail foreign exchange dealers and futures commission merchants offering or engaging in retail forex transactions.
§ 5.8 Aggregate retail forex assets.
§ 5.9 Security deposits for retail forex transactions.
§ 5.10 Risk assessment recordkeeping requirements for retail foreign exchange dealers.
§ 5.11 Risk assessment reporting requirements for retail foreign exchange dealers.
§ 5.12 Financial reports of retail foreign exchange dealers.
§ 5.13 Reporting to customers of retail foreign exchange dealers and futures commission merchants; monthly and confirmation statements.
§ 5.14 Records to be kept by retail foreign exchange dealers and futures commission merchants.
§ 5.16 Prohibition of guarantees against loss.
§ 5.17 Authorization to trade.
§ 5.18 Trading and operational standards.
§ 5.19 Pending legal proceedings.
§ 5.20 Special calls for account and transaction information.
§ 5.22 Registered futures association membership.
§ 5.23 Notice of bulk transfers and bulk liquidations.
§ 5.25 Applicability of the Act.
§ 7.1 Scope of rules.
§ 9.1 Scope of rules.
§ 9.4 Filing and service; official docket.
§ 9.6 Sanctions for noncompliance.
§ 9.8 Practice before the Commission.
§ 9.9 Waiver of rules; delegation of authority.
§ 9.11 Form, contents and delivery of notice of disciplinary or access denial action.
§ 9.12 Effective date of disciplinary or access denial action.
§ 9.13 Publication of notice.
§ 9.20 Notice of appeal.
§ 9.21 Record of exchange proceeding.
§ 9.24 Petition for stay pending review.
§ 9.25 Limited participation of interested persons.
§ 9.26 Participation of Commission staff.
§ 9.30 Scope of review.
§ 9.31 Commission review of disciplinary or access denial action on its own motion.
§ 9.33 Final decision by the Commission.
§ 10.1 Scope and applicability of rules of practice.
§ 10.3 Suspension, amendment, revocation and waiver of rules.
§ 10.4 Business address; hours.
§ 10.5 Computation of time.
§ 10.6 Changes in time permitted for filing.
§ 10.7 Date of entry of orders.
§ 10.9 Separation of functions.
§ 10.10 Ex parte communications.
§ 10.11 Appearance in adjudicatory proceedings.
§ 10.12 Service and filing of documents; form and execution.
§ 10.21 Commencement of the proceeding.
§ 10.22 Complaint and notice of hearing.
§ 10.24 Amendments and supplemental pleadings.
§ 10.25 Form of pleadings.
§ 10.26 Motions and other papers.
§ 10.32 Substitution of parties.
§ 10.33 Intervention as a party.
§ 10.35 Permission to state views.
§ 10.36 Commission review of rulings.
§ 10.41 Prehearing conferences; procedural matters.
§ 10.44 Depositions and interrogatories.
§ 10.61 Time and place of hearing.
§ 10.63 Consolidation; separate hearings.
§ 10.65 Record of hearing.
§ 10.66 Conduct of the hearing.
§ 10.81 Filing the transcript of evidence.
§ 10.82 Proposed findings and conclusions; briefs.
§ 10.93 Obtaining default order.
§ 10.94 Setting aside of default.
§ 10.102 Review of initial decisions.
§ 10.103 Oral argument before the Commission.
§ 10.104 Scope of review; Commission decision.
§ 10.105 Review by Commission on its own initiative.
§ 10.106 Reconsideration; stay pending judicial review.
§ 10.107 Leave to adduce additional evidence.
§ 10.109 Delegation of authority to Chief of the Opinions Section.
§ 10.110 Basis for issuance of restitution orders.
§ 10.111 Recommendation of procedure for implementing restitution.
§ 10.112 Administration of restitution.
§ 10.113 Right to challenge distribution of funds to customers.
§ 10.114 Acceleration of establishment of restitution procedure.
§ 11.1 Scope and applicability of rules.
§ 11.2 Authority to conduct investigations.
§ 11.3 Confidentiality of investigations.
§ 11.6 Oath; false statements.
§ 11.7 Rights of witnesses.
§ 12.1 Scope and applicability of rules of practice relating to reparations.
§ 12.3 Business address; hours.
§ 12.4 Suspension, amendment, revocation and waiver of rules.
§ 12.5 Computation of time.
§ 12.6 Extensions of time; adjournments; postponements.
§ 12.7 Ex parte communications in reparation proceedings.
§ 12.8 Separation of functions.
§ 12.9 Practice before the Commission.
§ 12.11 Formalities of filing of documents with the Proceedings Clerk.
§ 12.13 Complaint; election of procedure.
§ 12.14 Withdrawal of complaint.
§ 12.15 Notification of complaint.
§ 12.16 Response to complaint.
§ 12.17 Satisfaction of complaint.
§ 12.18 Answer; election of procedure.
§ 12.20 Response to counterclaim; reply; election of procedure.
§ 12.23 Setting aside of default.
§ 12.26 Commencement of a reparation proceeding.
§ 12.27 Termination of consideration of pleadings.
§ 12.30 Methods of discovery.
§ 12.31 Production of documents and tangible items.
§ 12.32 Depositions on written interrogatories.
§ 12.34 Discovery by a decisionmaking official.
§ 12.35 Consequences of a party's failure to comply with a discovery order.
§ 12.36 Subpoenas to compel discovery.
§ 12.100 Scope and applicability of rules.
§ 12.101 Functions and responsibilities of the Judgment Officer.
§ 12.102 Disqualification of Judgment Officer.
§ 12.103 Filing of documents; subscription; service.
§ 12.104 Amendments to pleadings; motions.
§ 12.105 Submission of proof only in documentary or tangible form.
§ 12.106 Final decision and order.
§ 12.200 Scope and applicability of rules.
§ 12.201 Functions and responsibilities of the Judgment Officer.
§ 12.202 Disqualification of Judgment Officer.
§ 12.203 Filing of documents; subscription; service.
§ 12.204 Amended and supplemental pleadings.
§ 12.208 Submissions of proof.
§ 12.300 Scope and applicability of rules.
§ 12.304 Functions and responsibilities of the Administrative Law Judge.
§ 12.305 Disqualification of Administrative Law Judge.
§ 12.306 Filing of documents; subscription; service.
§ 12.307 Amended and supplemental pleadings.
§ 12.309 Interlocutory review by the Commission.
§ 12.311 Disposition of proceeding or issues without oral hearing.
§ 12.313 Subpoenas for attendance at an oral hearing.
§ 12.315 Consequences of overstating damages claims not in excess of $30,000.
§ 12.400 Scope and applicability of rules.
§ 12.401 Appeal to the Commission.
§ 12.402 Appeal of disposition of less than all claims or parties in a proceeding.
§ 12.403 Commission review on its own motion.
§ 12.404 The record of proceedings.
§ 12.405 Leave to adduce additional evidence.
§ 12.406 Final decision of the Commission.
§ 12.407 Satisfaction of reparation award; enforcement; sanctions.
§ 12.408 Delegation of authority to the General Counsel.
§ 13.2 Petition for issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
§ 13.3 Notice of proposed rulemaking.
§ 13.4 Public participation in rulemaking.
§ 13.5 Exceptions to notice requirement and public participation.
§ 13.6 Promulgation of rules; publication.
§ 14.2 Definitions of appearance and practice.
§ 14.4 Violation of Commodity Exchange Act.
§ 14.6 Disbarment or suspension by licensing authority.
§ 14.7 Finding of violation of Commodity Exchange Act or Federal securities laws in another proceeding.
§ 14.8 Lack of requisite qualifications, character and integrity.
§ 14.9 Duty to file information concerning adverse judicial or administrative action.
§ 15.00 Definitions of terms used in parts 15 to 19, and 21 of this chapter.
§ 15.01 Persons required to report.
§ 15.04 Reportable trading volume level.
§ 15.05 Designation of agent for foreign persons.
§ 16.00 Clearing member reports.
§ 16.01 Publication of market data on futures, swaps and options thereon: trading volume, open contracts, prices, and critical dates.
§ 16.02 Daily trade and supporting data reports.
§ 16.06 Errors or omissions.
§ 16.07 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight.
§ 17.00 Information to be furnished by futures commission merchants, clearing members and foreign brokers.
§ 17.01 Identification of special accounts, volume threshold accounts, and omnibus accounts.
§ 17.02 Form, manner and time of filing reports.
§ 17.03 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Office of Data and Technology or the Director of the Division of Market Oversight.
§ 17.04 Reporting omnibus accounts to reporting firms.
§ 18.00 Information to be furnished by traders.
§ 18.01 Interest in or control of several accounts.
§ 18.03 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Market and Oversight.
§ 18.04 Statement of reporting trader.
§ 18.05 Maintenance of books and records.
§ 19.01 Reports on stocks and fixed price purchases and sales pertaining to futures positions in wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal or cotton.
§ 19.02 Reports pertaining to cotton call purchases and sales.
§ 20.5 Series S filings.
§ 20.6 Maintenance of books and records.
§ 20.7 Form and manner of reporting and submitting information or filings.
§ 20.8 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight.
§ 20.11 Diversified commodity indices.
§ 21.00 Preparation and transmission of information upon special call.
§ 21.01 Special calls for information on controlled accounts from futures commission merchants, clearing members and introducing brokers.
§ 21.02 Special calls for information on open contracts in accounts carried or introduced by futures commission merchants, clearing members, members of reporting markets, introducing brokers, and foreign brokers.
§ 21.03 Selected special calls-duties of foreign brokers, domestic and foreign traders, futures commission merchants, clearing members, introducing brokers, and reporting markets.
§ 21.04 Special calls for information on customer accounts or related cleared positions.
§ 21.05 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight.
§ 21.06 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk.
§ 22.2 Futures Commission Merchants: Treatment of Cleared Swaps and Associated Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral.
§ 22.3 Derivatives clearing organizations: Treatment of cleared swaps customer collateral.
§ 22.4 Futures Commission Merchants and derivatives clearing organizations: Permitted Depositories.
§ 22.5 Futures commission merchants and derivatives clearing organizations: Written acknowledgement.
§ 22.6 Futures commission merchants and derivatives clearing organizations: Naming of Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts.
§ 22.7 Permitted depositories: Treatment of Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral.
§ 22.8 Situs of Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts.
§ 22.9 Denomination of Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral and location of depositories.
§ 22.10 Application of other regulatory provisions.
§ 22.11 Information to be provided regarding Cleared Swaps Customers and their Cleared Swaps.
§ 22.12 Information to be maintained regarding Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral.
§ 22.13 Additions to Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral.
§ 22.14 Futures Commission Merchant failure to meet a Cleared Swaps Customer Margin Call in full.
§ 22.15 Treatment of Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral on an individual basis.
§ 22.16 Disclosures to Cleared Swaps Customers.
§ 22.17 Policies and procedures governing disbursements of Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral from Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts.
§ 23.151 Definitions applicable to margin requirements.
§ 23.152 Collection and posting of initial margin.
§ 23.153 Collection and posting of variation margin.
§ 23.154 Calculation of initial margin.
§ 23.155 Calculation of variation margin.
§ 23.156 Forms of margin.
§ 23.159 Special rules for affiliates.
§ 23.202 Daily trading records.
§ 23.203 Records; retention and inspection.
§ 23.204 Reports to swap data repositories.
§ 23.205 Real-time public reporting.
§ 23.206 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight to establish an alternative compliance schedule to comply with daily trading records.
§ 23.410 Prohibition on fraud, manipulation, and other abusive practices.
§ 23.430 Verification of counterparty eligibility.
§ 23.431 Disclosures of material information.
§ 23.433 Communications - fair dealing.
§ 23.434 Recommendations to counterparties - institutional suitability.
§ 23.440 Requirements for swap dealers acting as advisors to Special Entities.
§ 23.450 Requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants acting as counterparties to Special Entities.
§ 23.451 Political contributions by certain swap dealers.
§ 23.504 Swap trading relationship documentation.
§ 23.505 End user exception documentation.
§ 23.506 Swap processing and clearing.
§ 23.600 Risk Management Program for swap dealers and major swap participants.
§ 23.601 Monitoring of position limits.
§ 23.603 Business continuity and disaster recovery.
§ 23.605 Conflicts of interest policies and procedures.
§ 23.606 General information: availability for disclosure and inspection.
§ 23.608 Restrictions on counterparty clearing relationships.
§ 23.609 Clearing member risk management.
§ 23.610 Clearing member acceptance for clearing.
§ 23.611 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk to establish an alternative compliance schedule to comply with clearing member acceptance for clearing.
§ 23.701 Notification of right to segregation.
§ 23.702 Requirements for segregated margin.
§ 23.703 Investment of segregated margin.
§ 23.704 Requirements for non-segregated margin.
§ 31.3 Fraud in connection with certain transactions in silver or gold bullion or bulk coins, or other commodities.
§ 31.6 Registration of leverage commodities.
§ 31.7 Maintenance of minimum financial, cover and segregation requirements by leverage transaction merchants.
§ 31.8 Cover of leverage contracts.
§ 31.9 Minimum financial requirements.
§ 31.10 Repurchase and resale of leverage contracts by leverage transaction merchants.
§ 31.13 Financial reports of leverage transaction merchants.
§ 31.15 Reporting to leverage customers.
§ 31.16 Monthly reporting requirements.
§ 31.17 Records of leverage transactions.
§ 31.20 Prohibition of guarantees against loss.
§ 31.21 Leverage contracts entered into prior to April 13, 1984; subsequent transactions.
§ 31.22 Prohibited trading in leverage contracts.
§ 31.23 Limited right to rescind first leverage contract.
§ 31.25 Bid and ask prices; carrying charges.
§ 31.26 Quarterly reporting requirement.
§ 31.27 Registered futures association membership.
§ 31.28 Self-regulatory organization adoption and surveillance of minimum financial, cover, segregation and sales practice requirements.
§ 31.29 Arbitration or other dispute settlement procedures.
§ 32.2 Commodity option transactions; general authorization.
§ 32.4 Fraud in connection with commodity option transactions.
§ 32.5 Option transactions entered into prior to the effective date of this part.
§ 33.2 Applicability of Act and rules; scope of part 33.
§ 33.3 Unlawful commodity option transactions.
§ 33.4 Designation as a contract market for the trading of commodity options.
§ 33.5 Application for designation as a contract market for the trading of commodity options.
§ 33.6 Suspension or revocation of designation as a contract market for the trading of commodity options.
§ 33.10 Fraud in connection with commodity option transactions.
§ 34.3 Hybrid instrument exemption.
§ 35.1 Agricultural swaps, generally.
§ 37.3 Requirements and procedures for registration.
§ 37.4 Procedures for listing products and implementing rules.
§ 37.5 Information relating to swap execution facility compliance.
§ 37.7 Prohibited use of data collected for regulatory purposes.
§ 37.8 Boards of trade operating both a designated contract market and a swap execution facility.
§ 37.9 Methods of execution for required and permitted transactions.
§ 37.10 Process for a swap execution facility to make a swap available to trade.
§ 37.12 Trade execution compliance schedule.
§ 37.100 Core Principle 1 - Compliance with core principles.
§ 37.200 Core Principle 2 - Compliance with rules.
§ 37.201 Operation of swap execution facility and compliance with rules.
§ 37.203 Rule enforcement program.
§ 37.204 Regulatory services provided by a third party.
§ 37.206 Disciplinary procedures and sanctions.
§ 37.300 Core Principle 3 - Swaps not readily susceptible to manipulation.
§ 37.400 Core Principle 4 - Monitoring of trading and trade processing.
§ 37.402 Additional requirements for physical-delivery swaps.
§ 37.403 Additional requirements for cash-settled swaps.
§ 37.404 Ability to obtain information.
§ 37.405 Risk controls for trading.
§ 37.407 Regulatory service provider.
§ 37.408 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 37.500 Core Principle 5 - Ability to obtain information.
§ 37.501 Establish and enforce rules.
§ 37.502 Collection of information.
§ 37.503 Provide information to the Commission.
§ 37.600 Core Principle 6 - Position limits or accountability.
§ 37.601 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 37.700 Core Principle 7 - Financial integrity of transactions.
§ 37.702 General financial integrity.
§ 37.703 Monitoring for financial soundness.
§ 37.800 Core Principle 8 - Emergency authority.
§ 37.801 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 37.900 Core Principle 9 - Timely publication of trading information.
§ 37.1000 Core Principle 10 - Recordkeeping and reporting.
§ 37.1100 Core Principle 11 - Antitrust considerations.
§ 37.1101 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 37.1200 Core Principle 12 - Conflicts of interest.
§ 37.1300 Core Principle 13 - Financial resources.
§ 37.1302 Types of financial resources.
§ 37.1303 Computation of projected operating costs to meet financial resource requirement.
§ 37.1304 Valuation of financial resources.
§ 37.1305 Liquidity of financial resources.
§ 37.1306 Reporting to the Commission.
§ 37.1307 Delegation of authority.
§ 37.1400 Core Principle 14 - System safeguards.
§ 37.1500 Core Principle 15 - Designation of chief compliance officer.
§ 37.1501 Chief compliance officer.
§ 38.3 Procedures for designation.
§ 38.4 Procedures for listing products and implementing contract market rules.
§ 38.5 Information relating to contract market compliance.
§ 38.7 Prohibited use of data collected for regulatory purposes.
§ 38.8 Listing of swaps on a designated contract market.
§ 38.9 Boards of trade operating both a designated contract market and a swap execution facility.
§ 38.10 Reporting of swaps traded on a designated contract market.
§ 38.11 Trade execution compliance schedule.
§ 38.12 Process for a designated contract market to make a swap available to trade.
§ 38.100 Core Principle 1.
§ 38.150 Core Principle 2.
§ 38.152 Abusive trading practices prohibited.
§ 38.153 Capacity to detect and investigate rule violations.
§ 38.154 Regulatory services provided by a third party.
§ 38.155 Compliance staff and resources.
§ 38.156 Automated trade surveillance system.
§ 38.157 Real-time market monitoring.
§ 38.158 Investigations and investigation reports.
§ 38.159 Ability to obtain information.
§ 38.160 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.200 Core Principle 3.
§ 38.201 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.250 Core Principle 4.
§ 38.252 Additional requirements for physical-delivery contracts.
§ 38.253 Additional requirements for cash-settled contracts.
§ 38.254 Ability to obtain information.
§ 38.255 Risk controls for trading.
§ 38.257 Regulatory service provider.
§ 38.258 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.300 Core Principle 5.
§ 38.301 Position limitations and accountability.
§ 38.350 Core Principle 6.
§ 38.351 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.400 Core Principle 7.
§ 38.450 Core Principle 8.
§ 38.451 Reporting of trade information.
§ 38.500 Core Principle 9.
§ 38.550 Core Principle 10.
§ 38.551 Audit trail required.
§ 38.552 Elements of an acceptable audit trail program.
§ 38.553 Enforcement of audit trail requirements.
§ 38.600 Core Principle 11.
§ 38.602 General financial integrity.
§ 38.603 Protection of customer funds.
§ 38.605 Requirements for financial surveillance program.
§ 38.606 Financial regulatory services provided by a third party.
§ 38.650 Core Principle 12.
§ 38.651 Protection of markets and market participants.
§ 38.700 Core Principle 13.
§ 38.703 Notice of charges.
§ 38.704 Right to representation.
§ 38.705 Answer to charges.
§ 38.706 Denial of charges and right to hearing.
§ 38.712 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.750 Core Principle 14.
§ 38.751 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.800 Core Principle 15.
§ 38.801 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.850 Core Principle 16.
§ 38.851 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.900 Core Principle 17.
§ 38.950 Core Principle 18.
§ 38.951 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.1000 Core Principle 19.
§ 38.1001 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 38.1050 Core Principle 20.
§ 38.1100 Core Principle 21.
§ 38.1150 Core Principle 22.
§ 38.1200 Core Principle 23.
§ 38.1201 Additional sources for compliance.
§ 39.3 Procedures for registration.
§ 39.4 Procedures for implementing derivatives clearing organization rules and clearing new products.
§ 39.5 Review of swaps for Commission determination on clearing requirement.
§ 39.8 Fraud in connection with the clearing of transactions on a derivatives clearing organization.
§ 39.10 Compliance with core principles.
§ 39.12 Participant and product eligibility.
§ 39.15 Treatment of funds.
§ 39.16 Default rules and procedures.
§ 39.27 Legal risk considerations.
§ 39.31 Election to become subject to the provisions of this subpart.
§ 39.32 Governance for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.33 Financial resources requirements for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.34 System safeguards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.35 Default rules and procedures for uncovered credit losses or liquidity shortfalls (recovery) for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.36 Risk management for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.37 Additional disclosure for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.38 Efficiency for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.39 Recovery and wind-down for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.40 Consistency with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures.
§ 39.41 Special enforcement authority for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 39.42 Advance notice of material risk-related rule changes by systemically important derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 40.2 Listing products for trading by certification.
§ 40.3 Voluntary submission of new products for Commission review and approval.
§ 40.4 Amendments to terms or conditions of enumerated agricultural products.
§ 40.5 Voluntary submission of rules for Commission review and approval.
§ 40.6 Self-certification of rules.
§ 40.8 Availability of public information.
§ 40.10 Special certification procedures for submission of rules by systemically important derivatives clearing organizations.
§ 40.11 Review of event contracts based upon certain excluded commodities.
§ 40.12 Staying of certification and tolling of review period pending jurisdictional determination.


text:
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matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Henry V. Shall I tell thee one thing, Poins?
Edward Poins. Yes, faith; and let it be an excellent good thing.
Edward Poins. Very hardly upon such a subject.
in reason taken from me all ostentation of sorrow.
Henry V. What wouldst thou think of me if I should weep?
Edward Poins. I would think thee a most princely hypocrite.
Bardolph. God save your Grace!
alewife's new petticoat, and so peep'd through.
Henry V. Has not the boy profited?
Bardolph. Away, you whoreson upright rabbit, away!
Page. Away, you rascally Althaea's dream, away!
Henry V. Instruct us, boy; what dream, boy?
firebrand; and therefore I call him her dream.
There's a letter for you.
Bardolph. In bodily health, sir.
and he holds his place, for look you how he writes.
Edward Poins. He sure means brevity in breath, short-winded.
Repent at idle times as thou mayst, and so farewell.
me thus, Ned? Must I marry your sister?
Henry V. Where sups he? Doth the old boar feed in the old frank?
Bardolph. At the old place, my lord, in Eastcheap.
Page. Ephesians, my lord, of the old church.
Henry V. Sup any women with him?
Shall we steal upon them, Ned, at supper?
Edward Poins. I am your shadow, my lord; I'll follow you.
I am yet come to town. There's for your silence.
Page. And for mine, sir, I will govern it.
This Doll Tearsheet should be some road.
true colours, and not ourselves be seen?