This notice sets forth updates on the corporate bond monthly yield curve, the corresponding spot segment rates for October 2016 used under § 417(e)(3)(D), the 24-month average segment rates applicable for October 2016, and the 30-year Treasury rates. These rates reflect the application of § 430(h)(2)(C)(iv), which was added by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Public Law 112–141 (MAP-21) and amended by section 2003 of the Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014 (HATFA).
Sections 4375 and 4376, added to the Code by the Affordable Care Act, impose a fee on issuers of specified health insurance policies and plan sponsors of applicable self-insured health plans to help fund the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI). This notice provides that the adjusted applicable dollar amount that applies for determining the PCORI fee for policy years and plan years ending on or after October 1, 2016 and before October 1, 2017 is equal to $2.26. This adjusted applicable dollar amount has been determined using the percentage increase in the projected per capita amount of the National Health Expenditures published by HHS in July 2016.
The proposed regulation changes the user fee for the Enrolled Agent Special Enrollment Examination from $11 per part to $81 per part, and withdraws the proposed regulation published on January 26, 2016.
Generally, except for certain plans under sections 104 and 105 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and CSEC plans under § 414(y), § 430 of the Code specifies the minimum funding requirements that apply to single-employer plans pursuant to § 412. Section 430(h)(2) specifies the interest rates that must be used to determine a plan’s target normal cost and funding target. Under this provision, present value is generally determined using three 24-month average interest rates (“segment rates”), each of which applies to cash flows during specified periods. To the extent provided under § 430(h)(2)(C)(iv), these segment rates are adjusted by the applicable percentage of the 25-year average segment rates for the period ending September 30 of the year preceding the calendar year in which the plan year begins. However, an election may be made under §430(h)(2)(D)(ii) to use the monthly yield curve in place of the segment rates.
Notice 2007–81, 2007–44 I.R.B. 899, provides guidelines for determining the monthly corporate bond yield curve, and the 24-month average corporate bond segment rates used to compute the target normal cost and the funding target. Consistent with the methodology specified in Notice 2007–81, the monthly corporate bond yield curve derived from September 2016 data is in Table I at the end of this notice. The spot first, second, and third segment rates for the month of September 2016 are, respectively, 1.47, 3.34, and 4.30.
2017 Limitations Adjusted As Provided in Section 415(d), etc.
Effective January 1, 2017, the limitation on the annual benefit under a defined benefit plan under § 415(b)(1)(A) is increased from $210,000 to $215,000.
For a participant who separated from service before January 1, 2017, the participant’s limitation under a defined benefit plan under § 415(b)(1)(B) is computed by multiplying the participant’s compensation limitation, as adjusted through 2016, by 1.0112.
The limitation for defined contribution plans under § 415(c)(1)(A) is increased in 2017 from $53,000 to $54,000.
The limitation under § 402(g)(1) on the exclusion for elective deferrals described in § 402(g)(3) remains unchanged at $18,000.
The annual compensation limit under §§ 401(a)(17), 404(l), 408(k)(3)(C), and 408(k)(6)(D)(ii) is increased from $265,000 to $270,000.
The dollar limitation under § 416(i)(1)(A)(i) concerning the definition of “key employee” in a top-heavy plan is increased from $170,000 to $175,000.
The dollar amount under § 409(o)(1)(C)(ii) for determining the maximum account balance in an employee stock ownership plan subject to a 5-year distribution period is increased from $1,070,000 to $1,080,000, while the dollar amount used to determine the lengthening of the 5-year distribution period is increased from $210,000 to $215,000.
The annual compensation limitation under § 401(a)(17) for eligible participants in certain governmental plans that, under the plan as in effect on July 1, 1993, allowed cost-of-living adjustments to the compensation limitation under the plan under § 401(a)(17) to be taken into account, is increased from $395,000 to $400,000.
The limitation on deferrals under § 457(e)(15) concerning deferred compensation plans of state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations remains unchanged at $18,000.
The limitation under § 664(g)(7) concerning the qualified gratuitous transfer of qualified employer securities to an employee stock ownership plan remains unchanged at $45,000.
The compensation amounts under § 1.61–21(f)(5)(i) of the Income Tax Regulations concerning the definition of “control employee” for fringe benefit valuation purposes remains unchanged at $105,000. The compensation amount under § 1.61–21(f)(5)(iii) remains unchanged at $215,000.
The dollar limitation on premiums paid with respect to a qualifying longevity annuity contract under § 1.401(a)(9)–6, A–17(b)(2)(i) of the Income Tax Regulations remains unchanged at $125,000.
The Code provides that the $1,000,000,000 threshold used to determine whether a multiemployer plan is a systemically important plan under § 432(e)(9)(H)(v)(III)(aa) is adjusted using the cost-of-living adjustment provided under § 432(e)(9)(H)(v)(III)(bb). After taking the applicable rounding rule into account, the threshold used to determine whether a multiemployer plan is a systemically important plan under § 432(e)(9)(H)(v)(III)(aa) remains unchanged at $1,012,000,000.
The adjusted gross income limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contributions credit for married taxpayers filing a joint return remains unchanged at $37,000; the limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(B) remains unchanged at $40,000; and the limitation under §§ 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D) is increased from $61,500 to $62,000.
The adjusted gross income limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contributions credit for taxpayers filing as head of household remains unchanged at $27,750; the limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(B) remains unchanged at $30,000; and the limitation under §§ 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D) is increased from $46,125 to $46,500.
The adjusted gross income limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contributions credit for all other taxpayers remains unchanged at $18,500; the limitation under § 25B(b)(1)(B) remains unchanged at $20,000; and the limitation under §§ 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D) is increased from $30,750 to $31,000.
The applicable dollar amount under § 219(g)(3)(B)(i) for determining the deductible amount of an IRA contribution for taxpayers who are active participants in a qualified plan (or another retirement plan specified in § 219(g)(5)) filing a joint return or as a qualifying widow(er) is increased from $98,000 to $99,000. The applicable dollar amount under § 219(g)(3)(B)(ii) for all other taxpayers who are active participants (other than married taxpayers filing separate returns) is increased from $61,000 to $62,000. If an individual or the individual’s spouse is an active participant, the applicable dollar amount under § 219(g)(3)(B)(iii) for a married individual filing a separate return is not subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment and remains $0. The applicable dollar amount under § 219(g)(7)(A) for a taxpayer who is not an active participant but whose spouse is an active participant is increased from $184,000 to $186,000.
Accordingly, under § 219(g)(2)(A), the deduction for taxpayers making contributions to a traditional IRA is phased out for single individuals and heads of household who are active participants in a qualified plan (or another retirement plan specified in § 219(g)(5)) and have adjusted gross incomes (as defined in § 219(g)(3)(A)) between $62,000 and $72,000, increased from between $61,000 and $71,000. For married couples filing jointly, if the spouse who makes the IRA contribution is an active participant, the income phase-out range is between $99,000 and $119,000, increased from between $98,000 and $118,000. For an IRA contributor who is not an active participant and is married to someone who is an active participant, the deduction is phased out if the couple’s income is between $186,000 and $196,000, increased from between $184,000 and $194,000. For a married individual filing a separate return who is an active participant, the phase-out range is not subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment and remains $0 to $10,000.
The adjusted gross income limitation under § 408A(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I) for determining the maximum Roth IRA contribution for married taxpayers filing a joint return or for a taxpayer filing as a qualifying widow(er) is increased from $184,000 to $186,000. The adjusted gross income limitation under § 408A(c)(3)(B)(ii)(II) for all other taxpayers (other than married taxpayers filing separate returns) is increased from $117,000 to $118,000. The applicable dollar amount under § 408A(c)(3)(B)(ii)(III) for a married individual filing a separate return is not subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment and remains $0.
Accordingly, under § 408A(c)(3)(A), the adjusted gross income phase-out range for taxpayers making contributions to a Roth IRA is $186,000 to $196,000 for married couples filing jointly, increased from $184,000 to $194,000. For singles and heads of household, the income phase-out range is $118,000 to $133,000, increased from $117,000 to $132,000. For a married individual filing a separate return, the phase-out range is not subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment and remains $0 to $10,000.
The dollar amount under § 430(c)(7)(D)(i)(II) used to determine excess employee compensation with respect to a single-employer defined benefit pension plan for which the special election under § 430(c)(2)(D) has been made is increased from $1,106,000 to $1,115,000.
This notice provides the adjusted applicable dollar amount to be multiplied by the average number of covered lives for purposes of the fee imposed by §§ 4375 and 4376 of the Internal Revenue Code for policy years and plan years that end on or after October 1, 2016, and before October 1, 2017.
Section 4375 imposes a fee on the issuer of a specified health insurance policy for each policy year ending after September 30, 2012, and before October 1, 2019. Section 4376 imposes a fee on the plan sponsor of an applicable self-insured health plan for each plan year ending after September 30, 2012, and before October 1, 2019. The fee imposed by §§ 4375 and 4376 helps to fund the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) and is calculated using the average number of lives covered under the policy or plan and the applicable dollar amount for that policy year or plan year. Under §§ 4375(a) and 4376(a), the applicable dollar amount is $2 for policy and plan years ending on or after October 1, 2013, and before October 1, 2014. Treas.
Reg. §§ 46.4375–1(c)(4) and 46.4376–1(c)(3).
1(c)(3), the applicable dollar amount for policy years and plan years ending in any Federal fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 2014 is increased based on increases in the projected per capita amount of National Health Expenditures.
(B) The percentage increase in the projected per capita amount of the National Health Expenditures most recently released by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) before the beginning of the Federal fiscal year.
Notice 2015–60, 2015–43, I.R.B. 604, provides that the adjusted applicable dollar amount for policy years and plan years that end on or after October 1, 2015, and before October 1, 2016 is $2.17.
The applicable dollar amount that must be used to calculate the fee imposed by §§ 4375 and 4376 for policy years and plan years that end on or after October 1, 2016, and before October 1, 2017, is $2.26. The increase from the prior amount is calculated by multiplying the adjusted applicable dollar amount for policy years and plan years ending in the previous Federal fiscal year, $2.17, by the percentage increase of the projected per capita amount of National Health Expenditures published by HHS on July 12, 2016. See www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2015tables.zip, Table 3. The percentage increase is calculated after adjustment to reflect updates to the data used to calculate the prior amount, $2.17, which was based on the per capita amounts of National Health Expenditures for 2015 and 2016 published by HHS on July 22, 2015.
This notice is effective for policy years and plan years ending on or after October 1, 2016.
The principal author of this notice is Stephanie L. Caden of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt & Government Entities). For further information regarding this notice, contact Ms. Caden at (202) 317-5500 (not a toll free number).
 The applicable dollar amount is $1 for policy and plan years ending before October 1, 2013.
Withdrawal of notice of proposed rulemaking, notice of proposed rulemaking, and notice of public hearing.
This document withdraws a proposed regulation relating to the user fee for the special enrollment examination to become an enrolled agent. This document also proposes a new regulation to increase the user fee for the examination to recover the cost to the IRS of overseeing the administration of the examination. The withdrawal and proposal affect individuals taking the enrolled agent special enrollment examination. This document also contains a notice of public hearing on the new proposed regulation.
Written or electronic comments must be received by December 27, 2016. Requests to speak and outlines of topics to be discussed at the public hearing scheduled for December 29, 2016, must be received by December 27, 2016.
Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–134122–15), Room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–134122–15), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20224, or sent via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS REG–134122–15). The public hearing will be held in the IRS Auditorium, Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC.
Concerning this proposed regulation, Jonathan R. Black, (202) 317-6845 (not a toll-free number); concerning submissions of comments, the hearing, or to be placed on the building access list to attend the hearing, Regina Johnson, (202) 317-6901 (not a toll-free number); concerning cost methodology, Eva Williams, (202) 803-9728 (not a toll-free number).
Section 330 of title 31 of the United States Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the practice of representatives before the Treasury Department. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330, the Secretary has published regulations governing practice before the IRS in 31 CFR part 10 and reprinted the regulations as Treasury Department Circular No. 230 (Circular 230).
Section 10.4(a) of Circular 230 authorizes the IRS to grant status as enrolled agents to individuals who demonstrate special competence in tax matters by passing a written examination (Enrolled Agent Special Enrollment Examination (EA-SEE)) administered by, or under the oversight of, the IRS and who have not engaged in any conduct that would justify suspension or disbarment under Circular 230. There were a total of 51,755 active enrolled agents as of September 1, 2016.
Starting in 2006, the IRS engaged the services of a third-party contractor to develop and administer the EA-SEE. The EA-SEE is composed of three parts, which are offered in a testing period that begins each May 1 and ends the last day of the following February. The EA-SEE is not available in March and April, during which period it is updated to reflect recent changes in the relevant law. More information on the EA-SEE, including content, scoring, and how to register, can be found on the IRS Web site at www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/enrolled-agents. The IRS Return Preparer Office (RPO) oversees the administration of the EA-SEE.
The Independent Offices Appropriations Act (IOAA) (31 U.S.C. 9701) authorizes each agency to promulgate regulations establishing the charge for services provided by the agency (user fees). The IOAA provides that these user fee regulations are subject to policies prescribed by the President and shall be as uniform as practicable. Those policies are currently set forth in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-25 (OMB Circular), 58 FR 38142 (July 15, 1993).
The IOAA states that the services provided by an agency should be self-sustaining to the extent possible. 31 U.S.C. 9701(a). The OMB Circular states that agencies that provide services that confer special benefits on identifiable recipients beyond those accruing to the general public are to establish user fees that recover the full cost of providing those services. The OMB Circular requires that agencies identify all services that confer special benefits and determine whether user fees should be assessed for those services.
Agencies are to review user fees biennially and update them as necessary to reflect changes in the cost of providing the underlying services. During this biennial review, an agency must calculate the full cost of providing each service, taking into account all direct and indirect costs to any part of the U.S. government. The full cost of providing a service includes, but is not limited to, salaries, retirement benefits, rents, utilities, travel, and management costs, as well as an appropriate allocation of overhead and other support costs associated with providing the service.
An agency should set the user fee at an amount that recovers the full cost of providing the service unless the agency requests, and the OMB grants, an exception to the full-cost requirement. The OMB may grant exceptions only where the cost of collecting the fees would represent an unduly large part of the fee for the activity, or where any other condition exists that, in the opinion of the agency head, justifies an exception. When the OMB grants an exception, the agency does not collect the full cost of providing the service and therefore must fund the remaining cost of providing the service from other available funding sources. When the OMB grants an exception, the agency subsidizes the cost of the service to the recipients of reduced-fee services even though the service confers a special benefit on those recipients who should otherwise be required to pay the full costs of receiving that benefit as provided for by the IOAA and the OMB Circular.
As discussed above, Circular 230 § 10.4(a) provides that the IRS will grant enrolled agent status to an applicant if the applicant, among other things, demonstrates special competence in tax matters by written examination. The EA-SEE is the written examination that tests special competence in tax matters for purposes of that provision, and an applicant must pass all parts of the EA-SEE to be granted enrolled agent status through written examination. The IRS confers a benefit on individuals who take the EA-SEE beyond those that accrue to the general public by providing them with an opportunity to demonstrate special competence in tax matters by passing a written examination and therefore satisfying one of the requirements for becoming an enrolled agent under Circular 230 § 10.4(a). Because the opportunity to take the EA-SEE is a special benefit, the IRS charges a user fee to take the examination.
Pursuant to the guidelines in the OMB Circular, the IRS has calculated its cost of providing examination services under the enrolled agent program. The proposed user fee will be implemented under the authority of the IOAA and the OMB Circular and will recover the full cost of overseeing the program. The current user fee is $11 to take each part of the EA-SEE. The contractor who administers the EA-SEE also charges individuals taking the EA-SEE an additional fee for its services. For the May 2016 to February 2017 testing period, the contractor’s fee is $98 for each part of the EA-SEE. For the March 2017 to February 2019 testing periods, the contractor’s fee will be $100.94. For the March 2019 to February 2020 testing period, the contractor’s fee will be $103.97. The fee charged by the contractor is fixed by the current contract terms and therefore may not be reduced or renegotiated at this time. The contract will expire on February 29, 2020. The contract was subject to public procurement procedures, and there were no tenders that were more competitive.
The IRS has not increased the EA-SEE user fee since 2006, when it published the existing user fee regulation. Since that time, the costs incurred by the IRS to implement the EA-SEE program have increased. The IRS has recently gathered sufficient data to reliably estimate the IRS’s current costs in implementing the EA-SEE program as described in the costing analysis contained in this preamble.
The increased costs require an increase in the EA-SEE user fee. The increased costs are primarily attributable to the following: (1) The cost for background checks required under Publication 4812, “Contractor Security Controls,” for individuals working at the contractor’s testing centers increased by $289,000 per year; (2) the IRS estimates that the contractor will administer 12,000 fewer parts of the EA-SEE per year than the estimated 34,000 used to calculate the $11 fee, and the total costs are therefore being recovered from fewer individuals; and (3) the IRS’s costs of verifying the contractor’s compliance with the information technology security requirements necessary to protect the personally identifiable information of individuals taking the EA-SEE have increased, because Publication 4812 has strengthened those requirements.
In addition, the scope of the work performed to oversee the contract has expanded beyond what it was in 2006. The proposed fee more accurately accounts for the time and personnel necessary to oversee the development and administration of the EA-SEE and to ensure the contractor complies with the terms of its contract. The IRS’s costs for oversight now include costs associated with: (1) Review and approval of materials used by the contractor in developing the EA-SEE; (2) review of surveys of existing enrolled agents, which help to determine the topics to be covered in the EA-SEE; (3) composition of potential EA-SEE questions in coordination with the contractor’s external tax law experts; (4) Office of Chief Counsel review and revision of the potential questions for legal accuracy; and (5) analysis of the answers and raw scores of a testing population to determine what should be a passing score.
Further, the IRS’s personnel ensure the contractor’s compliance with its contract by reviewing the work of the contractor using an annual Work Breakdown Structure—a project management tool—and reviewing and verifying that the contractor is in compliance with its Quality Assurance Plan regarding customer satisfaction and accuracy. The IRS incurs additional costs associated with resolution of test-related issues such as cheating incidents, appeals regarding scores, refund requests, and customer service complaints that are not resolved at the contractor level.
Taking into account the full amount of these costs, the user fee for the EA-SEE is proposed to be increased to $81 per part as of the testing period that begins on May 1, 2017. The IRS does not intend to subsidize any of the cost of making the EA-SEE available to examinees, and is not applying for an exception to the full-cost requirement from the OMB.
On January 26, 2016, a notice of proposed rulemaking (REG–134122–15) proposing an increase to the EA-SEE user fee was published in the Federal Register (81 FR 4221). The January 26, 2016 notice of proposed rulemaking proposed to increase the EA-SEE user fee to $99 per part. The IRS has redetermined the user fee and now proposes to increase the user fee to $81 per part. The January 26, 2016 notice of proposed rulemaking is withdrawn.
User fee calculations begin by first determining the full cost for the service. The IRS follows the guidance provided by the OMB Circular to compute the full cost of the service, which includes all indirect and direct costs to any part of the U.S. government, including, but not limited to, direct and indirect personnel costs, physical overhead, rents, utilities, travel, and management costs. The IRS’s cost methodology is described below.
Once the total amount of direct and indirect costs associated with a service is determined, the IRS follows the guidance in the OMB Circular to determine the costs associated with providing the service to each recipient, which represents the average per unit cost of that service. This average per unit cost is the amount of the user fee that will recover the full cost of the service.
The IRS follows generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), as established by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) in calculating the full cost of providing services. The FASAB Handbook of Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements, as amended, which is available at http://files.fasab.gov/pdffiles/2015_fasab_handbook.pdf, includes the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 4: Managerial Cost Accounting Concepts and Standards for the Federal Government (SFFAS No. 4). SFFAS No. 4 establishes internal costing standards under GAAP to accurately measure and manage the full cost of federal programs. The methodology described below is in accordance with SFFAS No. 4.
The IRS determines the cost of its services and the activities involved in producing them through a cost accounting system that tracks costs to organizational units. The lowest organizational unit in the IRS’s cost accounting system is called a cost center. Cost centers are usually separate offices that are distinguished by subject-matter area of responsibility or geographic region. All costs of operating a cost center are recorded in the IRS’s cost accounting system and allocated to that cost center. The costs allocated to a cost center are the direct costs for the cost center’s activities as well as all indirect costs, including overhead, associated with that cost center. Each cost is recorded in only one cost center.
To establish the per-unit cost, the total cost of providing the service is divided by the volume of services provided. The volume of services provided includes both services for which a fee is charged as well as subsidized services. The subsidized services are those where the OMB has approved an exception to the full cost requirement, for example, to charge a reduced fee to low-income taxpayers. The volume of subsidized services is included in the total volume of services provided to ensure that the IRS, and not those who are paying full cost, subsidizes the cost of the reduced-full cost services.
Not all cost centers are fully devoted to only one service for which the IRS charges a user fee. Some cost centers work on a number of different services. In these cases, the IRS estimates the cost incurred in those cost centers attributable to the service for which a user fee is being calculated by measuring the time required to accomplish activities related to the service and estimating the average time required to accomplish these activities. The average time required to accomplish these activities is multiplied by the relevant organizational unit’s average labor and benefits costs per unit of time to determine the labor and benefits costs incurred to provide the service. To determine the full cost, the IRS then adds an appropriate overhead charge as discussed below.
Overhead is an indirect cost of operating an organization that cannot be immediately associated with an activity that the organization performs. Overhead includes costs of resources that are jointly or commonly consumed by one or more organizational unit’s activities but are not specifically identifiable to a single activity.
To calculate the overhead allocable to a service, the IRS first calculates the Corporate Overhead rate and then multiplies the Corporate Overhead rate by the direct labor and benefits costs determined as discussed above. The IRS calculates the Corporate Overhead rate annually based on cost elements underlying the Statement of Net Cost included in the IRS Annual Financial Statements, which are audited by the Government Accountability Office. The Corporate Overhead rate is the ratio of the sum of the IRS’s indirect labor and benefits costs from the supporting and sustaining organizational units—those that do not interact directly with taxpayers—and all non-labor costs to the IRS’s labor and benefits costs of its organizational units that interact directly with taxpayers.
The RPO is the only organization involved in overseeing the administration of the EA-SEE. The cost centers within the RPO support multiple programs and are not solely dedicated to the EA-SEE. The RPO, however, has a staff of only ten people who devote time to oversee the administration of the EA-SEE program. Because there are only a few individuals who directly handle oversight of the EA-SEE, the IRS projected the estimated costs of direct labor and benefits based on the actual labor and benefits of these specific individuals reduced to reflect the percentage of time each individual spends overseeing the EA-SEE program. The RPO’s managers are able to estimate the percentage of time these employees devote to overseeing the EA-SEE program based on their knowledge of actual program assignments. Of the ten people, eight devote seventy-five percent or more of their time to EA-SEE-related activities, and two devote approximately ten percent of their time to EA-SEE-related activities.
The total estimated direct labor and benefits costs for the three years is $2,763,997. After estimating the direct total labor and benefits, the IRS applied the Fiscal Year 2015 Corporate Overhead rate of 65.85 percent to the estimated direct labor and benefits to calculate indirect costs of $1,820,092, for a total labor and benefits costs for the three year period of $4,584,089.
The EA-SEE program incurs a cost for required background investigations performed on the employees of the contractor that administers the EA-SEE. The background investigations are not performed by the RPO, so the cost of the background investigations is not included in the direct labor and benefits costs calculated above for the ten RPO employees. The contractor administers the EA-SEE at approximately 260 domestic locations, and each employee at these locations must undergo a background investigation in order to administer the EA-SEE. The contractor’s employees are typically short-term or seasonal workers, so the IRS must perform background investigations on new employees on a continuing basis. Where permissible, the IRS will piggyback on previously completed background investigations. Typically, the IRS may rely on another government agency’s background investigation for up to two years from the date the prior investigation was completed. However, investigations performed by other organizations for the contractor’s employees generally cannot supplant the need for the IRS to perform its own investigations because the IRS’s background investigations include, among other elements, federal tax compliance checks, which are not necessarily part of investigations performed by other organizations. The EA-SEE is the only exam that the contractor administers on behalf of the IRS, so the contractor’s new hires typically have not undergone a background investigation performed by the IRS prior to being hired.
The IRS estimated the cost for background investigations using historical costs from the years 2012 through 2014. The IRS cannot forecast the future costs of background investigations with the same certainty as it can forecast labor and benefits, and it therefore used a historical three year average to estimate the background investigation costs. The IRS did not include the historical background investigation cost from 2015 in the historical average because 2014 was the most recent year for which information was available at the time the IRS initiated this project to update the user fee.
The cost for background investigations for the contractor was an average of $289,000 per year for the years 2012 through 2014, calculated as follows: The costs of all background investigations incurred on behalf of the RPO were $294,000, $259,000, and $409,000 in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively, for a $321,000 yearly average. Ninety percent of these background investigations were for the contractor who administers the EA-SEE. The other ten percent of these background investigations did not relate to the EA-SEE, so the IRS multiplied the $321,000 yearly average cost of background investigations by the ninety percent allocable to the contractor. The resulting average annual cost for EA-SEE background investigations for each year of the three year period was $289,000, with a total cost of $867,000. The IRS used the historical cost totals as the estimate of the 2016, 2017, and 2018 background investigations costs. Because background investigation costs may not increase as predictably as labor and benefits costs, the IRS did not apply an inflation factor.
The number of examinations provided during Fiscal Years 2012, 2013, and 2014 were 23,985, 23,110, and 20,180, respectively. As with the cost of background investigations, the number of examinations administered in 2015 was not available at the time this project was initiated, and the IRS therefore did not include it in the calculation. The total number of examinations for the three years was 67,275. The IRS used this historical three-year volume to estimate the number of examinations it expects to provide in 2016, 2017, and 2018.
The IRS divided the three year total EA-SEE program costs by the total volume of examinations expected over the same three year period to determine a unit cost per examination of $81.
Certain Treasury regulations, including this one, are exempt from the requirements of Executive Order 12866, as supplemented and reaffirmed by Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory impact assessment is not required. It is hereby certified that this proposed regulation, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This certification is based on the information that follows. The user fee primarily affects individuals who take the enrolled agent examination, many of whom may not be classified as small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Therefore, a substantial number of small entities is not likely to be affected. Further, the economic impact on any small entities affected would be limited to paying the $70 difference in cost per part between the proposed $81 user fee and the existing $11 user fee, which is unlikely to present a significant economic impact. Moreover, the total economic impact of this proposed regulation would be approximately $1.57 million, which is the product of the approximately 22,425 parts of the EA-SEE administered annually and the $70 increase in the fee. Accordingly, the proposed rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.
Before this proposed regulation is adopted as a final regulation, consideration will be given to any comments that are submitted timely to the IRS as prescribed in the preamble under the ADDRESSES section. The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on all aspects of the proposed regulation. All comments submitted will be made available at www.regulations.gov or upon request.
A public hearing has been scheduled for December 29, 2016, beginning at 10:00 a.m. in the IRS Auditorium, Internal Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. Due to building security procedures, visitors must enter at the Constitution Avenue entrance. All visitors must present photo identification to enter the building. Because of access restrictions, visitors will not be admitted beyond the immediate entrance area more than 30 minutes before the hearing starts. For information about having your name placed on the building access list to attend the hearing, see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this preamble.
The rules of 26 CFR 601.601(a)(3) apply to the hearing. Persons who wish to present oral comments at the hearing must submit written or electronic comments and an outline of the topics to be discussed and the time to be devoted to each topic by December 27, 2016. A period of 10 minutes will be allocated to each person for making comments.
The principal author of this regulation is Jonathan R. Black of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).
Accordingly, under the authority of 26 U.S.C. 7805, the notice of proposed rulemaking (REG–134122–15) that was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 2016, (81 FR 4221) is withdrawn.
§ 300.4 Enrolled agent special enrollment examination fee.
(b) Fee. The fee for taking the enrolled agent special enrollment examination is $81 per part, which is the cost to the government for overseeing the development and administration of the examination and does not include any fees charged by the administrator of the examination.
(d) Applicability date. This section applies on and after the date of publication of a Treasury decision adopting this rule as a final regulation in the Federal Register.


Zorrer v. Spartanburg Cnty. Det. Ctr.
Thomas R. Zorrer, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center; Sheriff Chuck Wright; Major Neil Urch; Ms. Ashley McCann; Captain Garcia; Deputy Jacob Brock; Deputy Greene; Deputy Preltlove; Deputy Nichols; Deputy Britt; Deputy Thomas; Deputy Ballew; Deputy Cooper; Deputy Rigsby; Deputy Wright; Deputy McCreary; Deputy Benstead; Ms. K. White; Nurse D. Simmons; Nurse Sonya; Deputy Rollins; and Victoria Carswell, Respondent.
Plaintiff's motion for discovery includes requests for production to Defendants. [ECF No. 45]. There is no indication that Plaintiff previously served the requests for production on Defendants. Plaintiff's motion for discovery is denied, as the deadline for completion of discovery expired March 6, 2017, three months prior to Plaintiff's motion. III. Motion for appointment of counsel.
There is no right to appointed counsel in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases. Cf. Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1975). While the court is granted the power to exercise its discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent in a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971), such appointment "should be allowed only in exceptional cases." Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff in his motion has not shown that any exceptional circumstances exist in this case.
After a review of the file, this court has determined that there are no exceptional or unusual circumstances presented that would justify the appointment of counsel, nor would Plaintiff be denied due process if an attorney were not appointed. Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984). In most civil rights cases, the issues are not complex, and whenever such a case brought by an uncounseled litigant goes to trial, the court outlines proper procedure so the uncounseled litigant will not be deprived of a fair opportunity to present his case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for a discretionary appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1) is denied.


text:
Ceramics at Murray State covers a broad range of clay working, including traditional approaches such as hand-building and wheel-throwing, along with mold making, casting, and the emerging fields of 3D ceramic printing and photographic image transfer. Students are exposed to utilitarian as well as purely sculptural approaches to clay, and are allowed to choose their focus as they move through the curriculum and develop their work.
The Ceramics studio includes a large clay and glaze mixing area stocked with over 100 raw materials, equipment for throwing, casting and extruding, two delta 3D clay printers, five electric kilns, a 12 cubic foot salt/soda kiln and a 31 cubic foot gas reduction kiln. Students in Ceramics II and above have individual studio spaces. The ceramics studio has 4,700 square feet of studio space, with 24-hour access.
John Utgaard is a Professor in Ceramics. He received his MFA from Alfred University and his BFA from Kansas City Art Institute.
ART 370 Introduction to Ceramics I (3). Beginning ceramics introduces students to a broad spectrum of clay working including the making of functional pottery, the vessel as metaphor, and clay as a medium for sculpture. Students learn hand building, wheel throwing, and glazing among other basic ceramic techniques. Design, craftsmanship and critical thinking are emphasized. Six hours per week. Pre- or Corequisite: ART 101 or 111 or 112 or permission of instructor.
ART 371 Ceramics II (3). Continued development of skills and concepts learned in ART 370 along with the introduction of advanced techniques including casting and kiln firing. Ideation, criticism and discussion are emphasized. six hours per week. Prerequisite: ART 370 or permission of instructor.
ART 372 Ceramics III (3). Continued development of the skills and concepts learned in ART 371 with an emphasis on individual investigation, technical finesse, concept, content, criticism and discussion. Six hours per week. Prerequisite: ART 371 or permission of instructor.
ART 471 Ceramics IV (3). Continued development of the skills and concepts learned in ART 372, largely through individually tailored and self-directed assignments. Students in this class will be responsible for all aspects of the production of their work, from mixing their clay and glaze to loading and firing kilns. Technical proficiency, criticism, discussion, and investigation of historical and contemporary ceramics will be emphasized. six hours per week. Prerequisite: ART 372 or permission of instructor.
ART 472 Ceramics V (3). Continuation of ART 471. Six hours per week Prerequisite: ART 471 or permission of instructor.
ART 571 Ceramics VI (3). Concentrated exploration of selected ceramic processes with emphasis on personal expression. Six hours per week. Prerequisite: Two courses in ceramics or permission of instructor.
ART 572 Ceramics VII (3). Continuation of ART 571. Six hours per week Prerequisite: ART 571 or permission of instructor.

matches:
ART 370
ART 101
ART 371
ART 370
ART 370
ART 372
ART 371
ART 371
ART 471
ART 372
ART 372
ART 472
ART 471
ART 471
ART 571
ART 572
ART 571
ART 571


Section 249.220f. Form 20-F, registration of securities of foreign private issuers pursuant to section 12(b) or (g), annual and transition reports pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d), and shell company reports required under Rule 13a-19 or 15d-19 (§ 240.13a-19 or § 240.15d-19 of this chapter).
17 CFR § 249.220f - Form 20-F, registration of securities of foreign private issuers pursuant to section 12(b) or (g), annual and transition reports pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d), and shell company reports required under Rule 13a-19 or 15d-19 (§ 240.13a-19 or § 240.15d-19 of this chapter).
§ 249.220f Form 20-F, registration of securities of foreign private issuers pursuant to section 12(b) or (g), annual and transition reports pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d), and shell company reports required under Rule 13a-19 or 15d-19 (§ 240.13a-19 or § 240.15d-19 of this chapter).
(a) Any foreign private issuer, other than an asset-backed issuer (as defined in § 229.1101 of this chapter), may use this form as a registration statement under section 12 (15 U.S.C. 78l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) (15 U.S.C. 78aet seq.), as an annual or transition report filed under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)), or as a shell company report required under Rule 13a-19 or Rule 15d-19 under the Exchange Act (§ 240.13a-19 or 240.15d-19 of this chapter).
(b) An annual report on this form shall be filed within six months after the end of the fiscal year covered by such report.
(c) A transition report on this form shall be filed in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 240.13a-10 or § 240.15d-10 applicable when the issuer changes its fiscal year end.
For Federal Register citations affecting Form 20-F, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at www.govinfo.gov.


Patent protection is available for a micro-organism that is artificially constructed rather than naturally occurring.
Chakrabarty, a scientist, sought patent protection related to his discovery of a method for developing a bacterium that could break down multiple components of crude oil. His claims ranged from the process of developing the bacterium to the bacterium itself and an inoculum in which the bacterium was stored with a carrier material. While the examiner found that a patent was appropriate for the process and the inoculum, Chakrabarty was denied a patent for the bacterium itself on the grounds that it did not meet the subject matter requirements for a patent. Under 35 U.S.C. Section 101 and the 1930 Plant Patent Act, according to the patent examiner, a living organism may not be patented. Various appellate review panels reached clashing decisions on the matter before the Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks sought certiorari review from the Supreme Court.
Acknowledging that patents cannot protect laws of nature or physical phenomena, Burger still felt that a broad interpretation of 35 U.S.C. Section 101 and particularly the term "manufacture" was appropriate. He found that "manufacture" should have the same expansive meaning as in an ordinary dictionary. Burger also held that the 1930 Plant Patent Act did not necessitate the examiner's interpretation, since that law was intended to separate products of nature from products of human ingenuity. The bacterium was a product of Chakrabarty's own ingenuity because it did not occur in nature.
Burger also rejected the theory that express authorization from Congress would be required to permit patent protection for micro-organisms, since Congress could not have foreseen this evolution in science when drafting the original patent laws. Patents are designed to reward ingenuity and invention, according to Burger, so it would undermine the policy supporting them to deny protection to unforeseen inventions.
Brennan advocated for a narrower interpretation of the issue, limiting it to whether a living organism like a bacterium may be patentable rather than whether unforeseen inventions may be patentable. He agreed with the patent examiner that the 1930 Plant Patent Act prohibited patent protection for living organisms, which he saw as central to the Congressional purpose in crafting that law. Brennan also referred to a 1970 law that specifically excluded bacteria from patent protection.
Naturally occurring organisms and plants cannot be patented because human ingenuity is not responsible for creating them, but an artificial organism is the product of an individual's creativity and skill, so it deserves protection.
Held: A live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under § 101. Respondent's micro-organism constitutes a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within that statute. Pp. 447 U. S. 308-318.
(a) In choosing such expansive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," modified by the comprehensive "any," Congress contemplated that the patent laws should be given wide scope, and the relevant legislative history also supports a broad construction. While laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable, respondent's claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter -- a product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character [and] use." Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 121 U. S. 615. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, distinguished. Pp. 447 U. S. 308-310.
(b) The passage of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, which authorized protection for certain sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its protection, does not evidence congressional understanding that the terms "manufacture" or "composition of matter" in § 101 do not include living things. Pp. 447 U. S. 310-314.
(c) Nor does the fact that genetic technology was unforeseen when Congress enacted § 101 require the conclusion that micro-organisms cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress expressly authorizes such protection. The unambiguous language of § 101 fairly embraces respondent's invention. Arguments against patentability under § 101, based on potential hazards that may be generated by genetic research, should be addressed to the Congress and the Executive, not to the Judiciary. Pp. 447 U. S. 314-318.
BURGER, C J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 447 U. S. 318.
"a bacterium from the genus Pseudomons containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway. [Footnote 1]"
second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and third, claims to the bacteria themselves. The patent examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but rejected claims for the bacteria. His decision rested on two grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are "products of nature," and (2) that, as living things, they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of these claims to the Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the Board affirmed the examiner on the second ground. [Footnote 3] Relying on the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, in which Congress extended patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, the Board concluded that § 101 was not intended to cover living things such as these laboratory created micro-organisms.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (1977), which held that "the fact that micro-organisms . . . are alive . . . [is] without legal significance" for purposes of the patent law. [Footnote 4] Subsequently, we granted the Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks' petition for certiorari in Bergy, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978)." 438 U.S. 902 (1978). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty and consolidated the case with Bergy for reconsideration. After reexamining both cases in the light of our holding in Flook, that court, with one dissent, reaffirmed its earlier judgments. 596 F.2d 952 (1979).
"[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens."
Kewanee, supra, at 416 U. S. 480.
In cases of statutory construction we begin, of course, with the language of the statute. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 442 U. S. 405 (1979). And "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 444 U. S. 42 (1979). We have also cautioned that courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed." United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 289 U. S. 199 (1933) .
"the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand labor or by machinery."
"all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids."
Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (DC 1957) (citing 1 A. Deller, Walker on Patents § 14, p. 55 (1st ed.1937)). In choosing such expansive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," modified by the comprehensive "any," Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits, or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 409 U. S. 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 333 U. S. 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 56 U. S. 112-121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 55 U. S. 175 (1853). Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk, supra at 333 U. S. 130.
"Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided, and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee."
333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 131. Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature, and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.
Variety Protection Act, which authorized protection for certain sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its protection. [Footnote 7] In the petitioner's view, the passage of these Acts evidences congressional understanding that the terms "manufacture" or "composition of matter" do not include living things; if they did, the petitioner argues, neither Act would have been necessary.
(1923). [Footnote 8] The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the "written description" requirement of the patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. Because new plants may differ from old only in color or perfume, differentiation by written description was often impossible. See Hearings on H.R. 11372 before the House Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1930) (memorandum of Patent Commissioner Robertson).
"There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man. . . ."
S.Rep. No. 315, supra at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support.
Nor does the passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act support the Government's position. As the Government acknowledges, sexually reproduced plants were not included under the 1930 Act because new varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type through seedlings. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 31. By 1970, however, it was generally recognized that true-to-type reproduction was possible, and that plant patent protection was therefore appropriate. The 1970 Act extended that protection. There is nothing in its language or history to suggest that it was enacted because § 101 did not include living things.
Patent Appeals suggested, it may simply reflect congressional agreement with the result reached by that court in deciding In re Arzberger, 27 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1315, 112 F.2d 834 (1940), which held that bacteria were not plants for the purposes of the 1930 Act. Or it may reflect the fact that, prior to 1970, the Patent Office had issued patents for bacteria under § 101. [Footnote 9] In any event, absent some clear indication that Congress "focused on [the] issues . . . directly related to the one presently before the Court," SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 436 U. S. 120-121 (1978), there is no basis for reading into its actions an intent to modify the plain meaning of the words found in § 101. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 437 U. S. 189-193 (1978); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 361 U. S. 313 (1960).
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." Id. at 437 U. S. 596.
It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that, once Congress has spoken, it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177 (1803). Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose. Here, we perceive no ambiguity. The subject matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.
Nothing in Flook is to the contrary. That case applied our prior precedents to determine that a "claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101." 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 595, n. 18. The Court carefully scrutinized the claim at issue to determine whether it was precluded from patent protection under "the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ideas' or phenomena of nature." Id. at 437 U. S. 593. We have done that here. Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se.
To buttress his argument, the petitioner, with the support of amicus, points to grave risks that may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent's. The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates -- that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better "to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of."
"[o]ur individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative] course . . . is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute."
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 194. Our task, rather, is the narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is done, our powers are exhausted. Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic engineering. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a), exempting from patent protection inventions "useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon." Or it may choose to craft a statute specifically designed for such living things. But, until Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces respondent's invention.
At present, biological control of oil spills requires the use of a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, each capable of degrading one component of the oil complex. In this way, oil is decomposed into simpler substances which can serve as food for aquatic life. However, for various reasons, only a portion of any such mixed culture survives to attack the oil spill. By breaking down multiple components of oil, Chakrabarty's microorganism promises more efficient and rapid oil-spill control.
Bergy involved a patent application for a pure culture of the microorganism Streptomuces vellosus found to be useful in the production of lincomycin, an antibiotic.
This case does not involve the other "conditions and requirements" of the patent laws, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
"[U]nder section 101, a person may have invented a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man. . . ."
"Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor. . . ."
"The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor. . . ."
84 Stat. 1547, 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). See generally 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents, ch. IX (2d ed.1964); R. Allyn, The First Plant Patents (1934).
"It is a little hard for plant men to understand why [Art. I, § 8] of the Constitution should not have been earlier construed to include the promotion of the art of plant breeding. The reason for this is probably to be found in the principle that natural products are not patentable."
Florists Exchange and Horticultural Trade World, July 15, 1933, p. 9.
We are not to be understood as suggesting that the political branches have been laggard in the consideration of the problems related to genetic research and technology. They have already taken action. In 1976, for example, the National Institutes of Health released guidelines for NIH-sponsored genetic research which established conditions under which such research could be performed. 41 Fed.Reg. 27902. In 1978, those guidelines were revised and relaxed. 43 Fed.Reg. 60080, 60108, 60134. And Committees of the Congress have held extensive hearings on these matters. See, e.g., Hearings on Genetic Engineering before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on H.R. 4759 et al. before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage progress. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 406 U. S. 530-531 (1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 383 U. S. 7-10 (1966). Given the complexity and legislative nature of this delicate task, we must be careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has provided. In particular, were there an absence of legislative direction, the courts should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available. [Footnote 2/1] Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., supra.
First, the Acts evidence Congress' understanding, at least since 1930, that § 101 does not include living organisms. If newly developed living organisms not naturally occurring had been patentable under § 101, the plants included in the scope of the 1930 and 1970 Acts could have been patented without new legislation. Those plants, like the bacteria involved in this case, were new varieties not naturally occurring. [Footnote 2/3] Although the Court, ante at 447 U. S. 311, rejects this line of argument, it does not explain why the Acts were necessary unless to correct a preexisting situation. [Footnote 2/4] I cannot share the Court's implicit assumption that Congress was engaged in either idle exercises or mere correction of the public record when it enacted the 1930 and 1970 Acts. And Congress certainly thought it was doing something significant. The Committee Reports contain expansive prose about the previously unavailable benefits to be derived from extending patent protection to plants. [Footnote 2/5] H.R.Rep.
No. 91-1605, pp. 1-3 (1970); S.Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1930). Because Congress thought it had to legislate in order to make agricultural "human-made inventions" patentable, and because the legislation Congress enacted is limited, it follows that Congress never meant to make items outside the scope of the legislation patentable.
I read the Court to admit that the popular conception, even among advocates of agricultural patents, was that living organisms were unpatentable. See ante at 447 U. S. 311-312, and n. 8.
But even if I agreed with the Court that the 1930 and 1970 Acts were not dispositive, I would dissent. This case presents even more cogent reasons than Deepsouth Packing Co. not to extend the patent monopoly in the face of uncertainty. At the very least, these Acts are signs of legislative attention to the problems of patenting living organisms, but they give no affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be patentable. The caveat of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 437 U. S. 596 (1978), an admonition to "proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress," therefore becomes pertinent. I should think the necessity for caution is that much greater when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and considered, but has not resolved.
The Court refers to the logic employed by Congress in choosing not to perpetuate the "dichotomy" suggested by Secretary Hyde. Ante at 447 U. S. 313. But by this logic, the bacteria at issue here are distinguishable from a "mineral . . . created wholly by nature" in exactly the same way as were the new varieties of plants. If a new Act was needed to provide patent protection for the plants, it was equally necessary for bacteria. Yet Congress provided for patents on plants, but not on these bacteria. In short, Congress decided to make only a subset of animate "human-made inventions," ibid., patentable.
If the 1930 Act's only purpose were to solve the technical problem of description referred to by the Court, ante at 447 U. S. 312, most of the Act, and in particular its limitation to asexually reproduced plants, would have been totally unnecessary.
"Under the patent law, patent protection is limited to those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by such methods as grafting or budding. No protection is available to those varieties of plants which reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds."
S.Rep. No. 91-1246, p. 3 (1970). Similarly, Representative Poage, speaking for the 1970 Act, after noting the protection accorded asexually developed plants, stated that, "for plants produced from seed, there has been no such protection." 116 Cong.Rec. 40295 (1970).


60-2308. Pension and retirement money exempt, exception; family postsecondary education savings account money exempt, exception; support money held by the Kansas department for children and families exempt. (a) Money received by any debtor as pensioner of the United States within three months next preceding the issuing of an execution, or attachment, or garnishment process, cannot be applied to the payment of the debts of such pensioner when it appears by the affidavit of the debtor or otherwise that such pension money is necessary for the maintenance of the debtor's support or a family support wholly or in part by the pension money. The filing of the affidavit by the debtor, or making proof as provided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity of such pension money for such support. It shall be the duty of the court in which such proceeding is pending to release all moneys held by such attachment or garnishment process, immediately upon the filing of such affidavit, or the making of such proof.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), any money or other assets payable to a participant or beneficiary from, or any interest of any participant or beneficiary in, a retirement plan which is qualified under sections 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A or 409 of the federal internal revenue code of 1986, and amendments thereto, shall be exempt from any and all claims of creditors of the beneficiary or participant. Any such plan shall be conclusively presumed to be a spendthrift trust under these statutes and the common law of the state.
(c) Any plan or arrangement described in subsection (b) shall not be exempt from the claims of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order. However, the interest of any and all alternate payees under a qualified domestic relations order shall be exempt from any and all claims of any creditor, other than the Kansas department for children and families, of the alternate payee. As used in this subsection, the terms "alternate payee" and "qualified domestic relations order" have the meaning ascribed to them in section 414(p) of the federal internal revenue code of 1986, and amendments thereto.
(d) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) shall apply to any proceeding which: (1) Is filed on or after July 1, 1986; or (2) was filed on or after January 1, 1986, and is pending or on appeal July 1, 1986.
(e) Money held by the central unit for collection and disbursement of support payments designated pursuant to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 39-7,135, and amendments thereto, the Kansas department for children and families, any clerk of a district court or any district court trustee in connection with a court order for the support of any person, whether the money is identified as child support, spousal support, alimony or maintenance, shall be exempt from execution, attachment or garnishment process.
(B) was filed prior to January 1, 2002, and is pending on or on appeal after January 1, 2002.
(2) Except as provided by paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection, if the designated beneficiary of a family postsecondary education savings account established pursuant to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-640 et seq., and amendments thereto, is a lineal descendant of the account owner, all moneys in the account shall be exempt from any claims of creditors of the account owner or designated beneficiary.
(B) claims of any creditor of an account owner, as to amounts contributed within a one-year period preceding an execution on judgment for such claims against the account owner.
(B) claims of any creditor of an account owner, as to amounts exceeding $5,000 contributed within a period of time which is more than one year but less than two years preceding an execution on judgment for such claims against the account owner.
History: L. 1963, ch. 303, 60-2308; L. 1980, ch. 176, § 5; L. 1986, ch. 220, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 312, § 40; L. 1999, ch. 80, § 1; L. 2001, ch. 195, § 8; L. 2002, ch. 104, § 1; L. 2012, ch. 162, § 79; L. 2014, ch. 115, § 233; July 1.


text:
Affirmative fraud, rule 10-b5 violation, failure to disclose, causation, concealment, misrepresentation, reliance.
Real estate brokers must disclose prospective purchasers and not engage in self-dealing as fiduciaries, act in good faith, and disclose all information that is or may be material to their clients' rights and interests.
Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission; Because investors rely on the reputation, integrity, independence, and expertise of an underwriter, the underwriter has a obligation to investigate and disclose material facts.
S.E.C. v. McNulty; Ordinarily, the conduct of an attorney is imputed to his client, since allowing a party to evade the consequences of the acts or omissions of his freely selected agent would be inconsistent with system of representative litigation.
Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp; When a lawyer inadvertently receives materials that obviously appear to be subject to attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential and privileged, the lawyer must immediately notify the sender.
McQueen, Rains & Tresch LLP v. CITGO Petroleum Corp; Non-refundable retainer fees and other non-refundable provisions in attorney fee agreements will be upheld if reasonable; sophisticated client; contract is in writing; incurred expenses.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC; Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure the preservation of relevant documents; spoliation.
Jovanovic v. City of New York; To prevail on a claim for denial of a fair trial due to prejudicial publicity, the plaintiff must establish (1) improper leaks; (2) in fact denied a fair trial; and (3) other remedies were not available or used to no avail.
Hoyt Properties, Inc. v. Production Resources Group, L.L.C; For an attorney statement in the course of representation to form the basis of a misrepresentation claim, the statement must be more than a legal opinion and must relate to actual facts.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena; for person seeking invoke attorney-client privilege prove client affirmatively sought become client; motion to quash; quash; subpoena duces tecum.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White; Government regulations suppress speech on basis of content must narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest; first amendment.
Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'l, Inc. In-house counsel may bring a common-law action for retaliatory discharge resulting compliance with Code of Professional Responsibility provision that represents a clear and definitive statement of public policy.
The Florida Bar v. Belleville An attorney has an ethical obligation to ensure that his client does not take unfair advantage of an unrepresented adversary.
Fire Ins. Exchange v. Bell. Parties have a right to rely on the representations of opposing counsel as a matter of law.
Viner v. Sweet; plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result; but-for causation.
Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.; clients are the principals, the attorney is an agent; under law of agency, principal is bound by agent's deeds, except attorney misconduct outside the scope of employment.
In re Primus; when freedom of association is involved, the state must demonstrate a compelling subordinating interest, and that the means employed is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.
United States v. Carona; the government may use deception in its investigations in order to induce suspects into making incriminating statements, even if reprensented by an attorney. California Rule 2-100.

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