1. A contract for the transportation of cargo shipped on board a barge, with privilege to the carrier of reshipping, in whole or in part, on steamboats or barges and of towing with one steamer two or more barges at the same time, is a contract of affreightment, in which it is necessarily implied that the barge as a means of transportation will be used in conjunction with a steamer or tug, to be furnished by the carrier, the two constituting together the effective instrumentality. P. 273 U. S. 328.
2. In such case, the barge and the tug together constitute the "vessel transporting merchandise or property" within § 3 of the Harter Act. P. 273 U. S. 330.
3. The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of a statute to have their full meaning or the more extended of two meanings. P. 273 U. S. 329.
Certiorari (268 U.S. 683) to a decree of the circuit court of appeals which affirmed a decree of the district court in favor of Salz, the present respondent, in a suit in personam brought by him to recover for the loss of a cargo of barley while it was being towed by the petitioner under a contract of affreightment.
"That if the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel. . . ."
"on board of the Sacramento Transportation [Navigation] Co.'s barge Tennessee, . . . with the privilege of reshipping in whole or in part, on steamboats or barges; also with the privilege of towing with one steamer at the same time, . . . two or more barges, either loaded or empty."
While being towed by the steamer in the course of transportation, the barge came into collision with a British ship at anchor, and was swamped. The barley was a total loss. The sole cause of the collision was the negligence of the steamer. That both barge and steamer were "in all respects seaworthy, and properly manned, equipped, and supplied " is not in dispute. Upon these facts, respondent filed its libel in personam against petitioner.
of tug and barge, was the "vessel transporting" the barley within the meaning of the Harter Act. This question is a nice one, and the answer to it is by no means obvious. The court below thought the contract was between the respondent and the barge, and did not include the tug; that, since the barge had no power of her own, there was an implied contract that a tug would be furnished to carry her to her destination, and that the Harter Act should receive a strict construction, and, so construed, it applied only to the relation of a vessel to the cargo with which she was herself laden -- that is to say, in this case, the barge alone. The decree of the district court for respondent accordingly was affirmed. 3 F.2d 759.
The libel recites that it is "in a cause of towage," and, in argument, this is strenuously insisted upon. Towage service is the employment of one vessel to expedite the voyage of another. Here, while there was towage service, the contract actually made with respondent was not to tow a vessel, but to transport goods, and plainly that contract was a contract of affreightment. See Bramble v. Culmer, 78 F. 497, 501; The Nettie Quill, 124 F. 667, 670. Respondent's contention, however, seems to be that the shipping contract, as evidenced by the bill of lading, was with or for the barge alone, but that, when petitioner took the barge in tow, an implied contract of towage with respondent at once arose. This view of the matter, we think, is fallacious.
The fact that we are dealing with vessels which, by a fiction of the law, are invested with personality does not require us to disregard the actualities of the situation -- namely that the owner of the tug towed his own barge as a necessary incident of the contract of affreightment, and that the transportation of the cargo was in fact effected by their joint operation. The bill of lading declares that the cargo was shipped on board the barge.
But it was to be transported, and this the barge alone was incapable of doing, since she had no power of self-movement. It results necessarily that it was within the contemplation of the contract that the transportation would be accomplished by combining the barge with a vessel having such power. Respondent says there was an implied contract to this effect -- that is, as we understand, a distinct contract implied in fact. But a contract includes not only the promises set forth in express words, but, in addition, all such implied provisions as are indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties and as arise from the language of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made. 3 Williston on Contracts, § 1293; Brodie v. Cardiff Corporation  A.C. 337, 358. And there is no justification here for going beyond the contract actually made to invoke the conception of an independent implied contract.
Considering the language of the bill of lading in the light of all the circumstances, it is manifest that we are dealing with a single contract, and the use of the tug must be read into that contract as an indispensable factor in the performance of its obligations. To transport means to convey or carry from one place to another, and a transportation contract for the barge without the tug would have been as futile as a contract for the use of a freight car without a locomotive. In this view, by the terms of the contract of affreightment, in part expressed and in part necessarily resulting from that which was expressed, the transportation of the goods was called for not by the barge, an inert thing, but by the barge and tug, constituting together the effective instrumentality to that end.
extended of two meanings. The words are not to be bent one way or the other, but to be taken in the sense which will best manifest the legislative intent. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 73 U. S. 396; United States v. Corbett, 215 U. S. 233, 215 U. S. 242. In the light of the decisions presently to be noted, the words a "vessel transporting merchandise," etc., are entirely appropriate to describe the combination now in question, and we see no reason to think that Congress intended that they should not be so applied. This Court and other federal courts repeatedly have held that such a combination constitutes, in law, one vessel. See The Northern Belle, 9 Wall. 526, 76 U. S. 528-529; The "Civilta" and the "Restless," 103 U. S. 699, 103 U. S. 701; The Nettie Quill, supra; The Columbia, 73 F. 226; The Seven Bells, 241 F. 43, 45; The Fred W. Chase, 31 F. 91, 95; The Bordentown, 40 F. 682, 687; State v. Turner, 34 Or. 173, 175, 176.
In The Northern Belle, supra, this Court, speaking of a combination of barge and steamboat, said that "the barge is considered as belonging to the boat to which she is attached for the purposes of that voyage." In The "Civilta" and the "Restless," supra, a tug and a ship which she was towing by means of a hawser were held to be, in contemplation of law, "one vessel, and that a vessel under steam."
vessel for the purpose of that voyage -- as much so as if she had been taken bodily on board the tug, instead of being made fast thereto by means of lines."
It was accordingly held that, without surrendering both vessels, the owner was not entitled to the advantages of Revised Statutes, § 4283 et seq., providing for a limitation of liability of "the owner of any vessel," etc.
The court below rejected this decision as not applicable to a case arising under the Harter Act, but it is hard to see why the case is not pertinent, and, if sound, controlling. What we are called upon to ascertain is the meaning of the term "any vessel," and the point decided in that case is that it includes a combination identical in all respects with that here dealt with. True, the court there, in construing the phrase "the owner of any vessel," was considering one statute, while here we are considering another and different statute; but there is no such difference between the statutes in respect of the connection in which the phrase is used, or in respect of the subject matter to which it relates, as to suggest that Congress intended that it should bear different meanings.
Respondent contends that his view to the contrary is sustained by The Murrel, 195 F. 483, aff'g 200 F. 826, and The Coastwise, 233 F. 1, aff'g 230 F. 505. Some things are said in those cases which, if we should not consider the differences between them and the present case, might justify this contention. The most important of these differences is that, in both cases, it was held that contracts of towage, and not of affreightment, were involved. We do not stop to inquire whether this conclusion as to the nature of the contracts was justified by the facts. It is enough that it was so held, and this holding was the basis of the decisions. Here, upon all the facts, as we have just said, the contract upon which respondent must rest is one of affreightment, the obligation of which is to carry a cargo, not to tow a vessel.
"that, for the purposes of liability, the passive instrument of the harm does not become one with the actively responsible vessel by being attached to it."
But this is far from saying that the entire flotilla might not be regarded as one vessel for the purposes of the undertaking in which the common owner was engaged at the time of the collision. The distinction seems plain. There, the libel was for an injury to a ship in no way related to the flotilla. It was a pure tort; no contractual obligations were involved, and the simple inquiry was what constituted the "offending vessel"? Here we must ask what constituted the vessel by which the contract of transportation was to be effected? -- a very different question. If the British ship, which here was struck by the barge, were suing to recover damages, and a limitation of liability were sought by the owner of the tug and barge, the Liverpool case would be in point. But the present libel is for a loss of cargo, and falls within the principle of The Columbia, supra, where, upon facts substantially identical with those here, a surrender was required of the combined means by which the company undertook the transportation of the cargo.


Summary/Purpose: The purpose of this policy is to establish the procedures for seeking access to public records, to protect the privacy of certain records, to ensure compliance with the Mississippi Public Records Act, and to ensure compliance with applicable privacy and other laws. This policy applies to all University of Mississippi employees and departments receiving a request for public records. This policy also applies to any individual requesting to inspect, copy or review public records possessed by the University of Mississippi.
Any University of Mississippi employee or department receiving a public records request (sometimes described as a “freedom of information” or “FOIA” request) shall immediately (within one (1) business day) forward a copy of the request to the Office of General Counsel along with all contacts and communications from the requester. Any University of Mississippi employee or department receiving a public records request or possessing requested records or information shall cooperate with and assist the Office of General Counsel in responding to a request. Questions regarding this policy or its implementation should be directed to the Office of General Counsel.
The Mississippi Ethics Commission has developed model rules to provide best practices for complying with the Mississippi Public Records Act and to promote a spirit of cooperation between public bodies and requestors by standardizing best practices throughout the state. This policy is based on the model rules. When submitting a request for public records, all individuals are required to comply with this policy. Any questions regarding this policy should be directed to the Office of General Counsel.
“It is the policy of the Legislature that public records must be available for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided by this act. Furthermore, providing access to public records is a duty of each public body and automation of public records must not erode the right of access to those records.” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-1.
III.b.2: The public records officer will oversee compliance with this policy but may designate another University of Mississippi staff member to process a request. Therefore, these rules will refer to the public records officer “or designee.” The public records officer or designee will provide assistance to requestors; ensure that public records are protected from damage or disorganization; and prevent fulfilling public records requests from causing excessive interference with essential functions of the University of Mississippi.
III.c.1:Hours for inspection of records. Public records are available for inspection and copying during normal business hours of the University of Mississippi, Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., excluding holidays. The public records officer or designee may work with the requester to determine the time, place and manner of inspection and copying of records so as not to interfere with other essential duties and functions of the University of Mississippi.
III.c.2: Organization of records. The University of Mississippi will maintain its records in a reasonably organized manner and will take reasonable actions to protect records from damage and disorganization. A requestor shall not physically remove or take with them any records possessed or maintained by the University of Mississippi. Numerous records are available on the University of Mississippi’s web site at www.olemiss.edu. Requestors are encouraged to view the documents available on the web site prior to submitting a records request.
III.c.3: Making a request for public records.
III.c.3.ii: If the requestor wishes to receive copies of the records instead of simply inspecting them, he or she should so indicate and make arrangements to pay for copies of the records or a deposit. Pursuant to Section III(H) of this policy, standard photocopies will be provided at 15 cents per page.
III.c.3.iii: The public records officer or designee may accept requests for public records that contain the above information by telephone or in person. If the public records officer or designee accepts such a request, he or she will confirm receipt of the information and the substance of the request in writing.
The University of Mississippi acknowledges that providing access to public records is a duty and that any person shall have the right to inspect, copy or mechanically reproduce or obtain a reproduction of any public record in accordance with these rules. The public records officer or designee will process requests in the order allowing the most requests to be processed in the most efficient manner.
If the University of Mississippi does not respond in writing within five (5) business days of receipt of the request, the requestor should contact the public records officer to determine the reason for the failure to respond.
In the event the requested records contain information that may affect rights of others and may be exempt from disclosure, the public records officer or designee may, prior to providing the records, give notice to such others whose rights may be affected by the disclosure. Such notice should be given so as to make it possible for those other persons to contact the requestor and ask him or her to revise the request, or, if necessary, seek an order from a court to prevent or limit the disclosure. The notice to the affected persons will include a copy of the request.
Some records are exempt from or protected from disclosure, in whole or in part. If the University of Mississippi determines that a record is exempt from disclosure and should be withheld, the public records officer or designee will state the specific exemption and provide a brief explanation of why the record or a portion of the record is being withheld. The University of Mississippi may determine that it can redact protected or exempt information and provide the portion of a record that is not protected or exempt from disclosure. In such a case, the public records officer or designee will redact the exempt portions, provide the nonexempt portions, and indicate to the requestor why portions of the record is redacted.
IV.f.1: Consistent with other demands, the University of Mississippi shall promptly provide space to inspect public records. No member of the public may remove a document from the viewing area or disassemble or alter any document. The requestor shall indicate which documents he or she wishes the University of Mississippi to copy.
IV.f.2: The requestor must claim or review the assembled records within thirty (30) days of the University of Mississippi’s notification to him or her that the records are available for inspection or copying. The University of Mississippi will notify the requestor in writing of this requirement and inform the requestor that he or she contact the public records officer or designee to make arrangements to claim or review the records. If the requestor or a representative of the requestor fails to claim or review the records within the thirty (30) day period or make other arrangements, the University of Mississippi may close the request and refile the assembled records. Other public records requests can be processed ahead of a subsequent request by the same person for the same or almost identical records, which can be processed as a new request.
After inspection is complete, the public records officer or designee shall make the requested copies or arrange for copying.
When the request is for a large number of records, the public records officer or designee will provide access for inspection and copying in installments, if he or she reasonably determines that it would be practical to provide the records in that way. If, within thirty (30) days, the requestor fails to inspect the entire set of records or one or more of the installments, the public records officer or designee may stop searching for the remaining records and close the request.
When the inspection of the requested records is complete and all requested copies are provided, the public records officer or designee will indicate that the University of Mississippi has completed a diligent search for the requested records and made any nonexempt records available for inspection.
When the requestor either withdraws the request or fails to fulfill his or her obligations to inspect the records or pay the deposit or final payment for the requested copies, the public records officer or designee will close the request and indicate to the requestor that the University of Mississippi has closed the request.
If, after the University of Mississippi has informed the requestor that it has provided all available records, the University of Mississippi becomes aware of additional responsive documents existing at the time of the request, it will promptly inform the requestor of the additional documents and provide them on an expedited basis.
The process for requesting electronic public records is the same as for requesting paper public records.
When a requestor requests records in an electronic format, the public records officer or designee will provide the nonexempt records or portions of such records that are reasonably locatable in an electronic format that is used by the public body and is generally commercially available, or in a format that is reasonably translatable from the format in which the public body keeps the record. Costs for providing electronic records are governed by Section III(H) of this policy.
With the consent of the requestor, the University of Mississippi may provide customized access if the record is not reasonably locatable or not reasonably translatable into the format requested. The University of Mississippi may charge the actual cost for such customized access.
The Mississippi Public Records Act, as well as other statues and court decisions, provide that some documents are exempt from public inspection and copying. In addition, other statutes or rules of law, such as various privacy restrictions, may prohibit disclosure. Furthermore, the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act shall not be construed to conflict with, amend, repeal or supersede any constitutional or statutory law or decision of a court which declares a public record to be confidential or privileged. Requestors should be aware of the below listed exemptions that restrict the availability of some documents held by the University of Mississippi. Please note, the below list does not constitute a complete list of all exemptions but rather represents a list of exemptions commonly applicable to public record requests received by the University of Mississippi.
Academic records exempt from public access, see Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-51.
Academic research exempt from public access, see Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-51.
Appraisal records exempt from access, see Miss. Code Ann. § 31-1-27.
Archaeological records exempt from public access, see Miss. Code Ann. § 39-7-41.
Attorney work product and records protected by the attorney-client privilege are exempt from disclosure, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-102 and Mississippi Rule of Evidence 502.
Audit reports compiled pursuant to the Mississippi Internal Audit Act, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-65-17.
Educational Records as defined by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).
Environmental self-evaluation reports, public records act, exemption, see Miss. Code Ann. § 49-2-71.
Health records as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
Hospital records, Mississippi Public Records Act exemption, see Miss. Code Ann. § 41-9-68.
Individual tax records in possession of public body, exemption from public access requirements, see Miss. Code Ann. § 27-3-77.
Investigative Reports of a law enforcement agency, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-12.
Letters of recommendation respecting admission to an educational institution, see Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-51.
Licensure application and examination records, see Miss. Code Ann. § 73-52-1.
Nonpublic personal information as defined by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
Personnel files exempt from examination, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-100.
Personal contact information of individuals possessing a weapon permit, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-11.1.
Personal contact information of law enforcement officers and their family, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-12.
Privileged communications to physicians, see Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-21.
Public disclosure of private facts, see Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 382 (Miss.1990).
Test questions in the possession of a public body, see Miss. Code Ann. § 73-52-1 and Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-51.
Trade secrets, proprietary commercial and financial information, see Code Ann. § 79-23-1.
Trade secrets and confidential commercial and financial information of a proprietary nature developed by a college or university under contract with a firm, business, partnership, association, corporation, individual or other like entity, see Miss. Code Ann. § 79-23-1.
Unpublished manuscripts, preliminary analyses, drafts of scientific or academic papers, plans or proposals for future research and prepublication peer reviews, see Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-51.
Victim identity records, see Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-12.
Workers’ compensation records, see Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-66.
When any person files or submits documents with the University of Mississippi which the filer contends are exempt from disclosure under the Mississippi Public Records Act, the filer shall provide a written statement at the time of filing which shall describe the documents filed and which shall fully explain why the documents are designated as exempt from disclosure and must specifically cite any statute or other legal authority in support of such designation. Such written statement shall itself be a public record subject to disclosure.
Any document filed with the University of Mississippi which contains trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information subject to the protection of any applicable law or court decision shall be clearly designated as such by the filer on its face and accompanying cover letter at the time of filing. Each page of each document shall be marked confidential. Upon request to inspect or copy any document so designated, the University of Mississippi shall notify the person who filed the document. Thirty (30) days after such notice, the document will be made available for public inspection or copying unless the filer shall have obtained a court order protecting such records as confidential pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-9.
If a party fails to clearly designate or mark a document as confidential, the University of Mississippi may still provide notice to a third party that the records requested may contain trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. Thirty (30) days after such notice, the document will be made available for public inspection or copying unless the party obtains a court order protecting such records as confidential pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-9.
Any person filing documents with the University of Mississippi shall, prior to filing, redact from the documents any social security numbers, account numbers or dates of birth not required to be listed. The University of Mississippi shall determine on a case-by-case basis whether similar information may be redacted by the filer to prevent identity theft. In no event will the University of Mississippi bear any responsibility for a filer’s failure to redact such information which leads to or may lead to identity theft or other crime or loss.
A requestor may obtain standard black and white photocopies for 15 cents per page. Copy charges for some specific types of records are set by statute and may exceed the amount stated above.
The cost of electronic copies of records shall be $5.00 for information on a CD-ROM. The cost of scanning existing University of Mississippi paper or other non-electronic records is 5 cents per page. There will be no charge for e-mailing electronic records to a requestor, unless another cost applies.
The University of Mississippi may also charge actual costs associated with mailing public records, including the cost of the shipping container.
Payment may be made by cash, check, or money order to the University of Mississippi. Payment should be sent to the attention of the public records officer. Before beginning to make the copies, the requestor must pre-pay all reasonably estimated costs of copying all the records selected by the requestor. The public records officer or designee may also require the payment of the remainder of the copying costs before providing all the records in an installment before providing that installment. The University of Mississippi will not charge sales tax when it makes copies of public records.
The actual cost of searching, reviewing and, if necessary, redacting exempt information from public records shall be based upon the hourly rate of compensation for the lowest paid agency employee qualified to perform the task, which shall be multiplied by the actual time to complete the task. Such fees shall be collected by the public body in advance of complying with the request.
Any person who objects to the initial denial or partial denial of a records request may petition in writing (including e-mail) to the public records officer for a review of that decision. The petition must include a copy of or reasonably identify the written statement by the public records officer or designee denying the request.
The public records officer must promptly provide the petition and any other relevant information to the Provost for the University of Mississippi. The Provost for the University of Mississippi will immediately consider the petition and either affirm or reverse the denial within three (3) business days following the University of Mississippi’s receipt of the petition, or within such other time as the University of Mississippi and the requestor mutually agree to.
If the University of Mississippi denies a requestor access to public records, the requestor may ask the Mississippi Ethics Commission to review the matter. The Mississippi Ethics Commission has adopted rules on such requests. They may be found at www.ethics.state.ms.us.
Any person whose request for public records was denied may institute a suit in the chancery court of Lafayette County seeking to reverse the denial, as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-13.


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We attach great importance to the protection of your personal data. We therefore strictly adhere to the legal provisions governing the admissibility of the handling of personal data and have taken appropriate technical and organisational precautions. The following declaration gives you an overview of how we guarantee this protection and what kind of data we collect for what purpose.
We only collect and use our users’ personal data of insofar as this is necessary to provide a functional website as well as our contents and services. The collection and use of our users’ personal data takes place regularly and only with the user's consent. An exception applies in those cases where prior consent cannot be obtained for real reasons and the processing of the data is permitted by law.
FAZIT Communication GmbH is entitled, with your voluntary consent, to collect, process and store, combine with other data, archive and use your personal data for the purpose of providing information about FAZIT Communication GmbH products. You give your consent either in writing or by clicking on the corresponding declaration. In particular, personal data will only be passed on to third parties if you have given your express prior consent or if we are obliged to surrender the data, for example due to an official order.
Insofar as we obtain the consent of the data subject for the processing of personal data, art. 6 para. 1 lit. a EU Data Protection Ordinance (GDPR) serves as the legal basis for the processing of personal data. In the processing of personal data required for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR serves as the legal basis. This also applies to processing operations that are necessary to carry out pre-contractual measures. Insofar as the processing of personal data is required to fulfil a legal obligation to which our company is subject, art. 6 para. 1 lit. c GDPR serves as the legal basis. In the event of the vital interests of the data subject or another natural person requiring the processing of personal data, article 6(1)(d) GDPR serves as the legal basis. If processing is necessary to safeguard a legitimate interest of our company or a third party and if the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject do not outweigh the first-mentioned interest, art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR serves as the legal basis for processing.
The data are also stored in the log files of our system. The IP addresses of the user or other data that enable the assignment of the data to a user are not affected by this. These data are not stored together with other personal data of the user.
FAZIT Communication GmbH cannot assign these data to specific persons. They serve exclusively for the statistical evaluation and improvement of our offers and services by providing information about the use of the information provided by FAZIT Communication GmbH.
The temporary storage of the IP address by the system is necessary to enable the website to be delivered to the user's computer. For this the user’s IP address must remain stored for the duration of the session.
Our legitimate interest in data processing pursuant to art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR also lies in these purposes.
The legal basis for the processing of personal data using cookies is art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
Cookies are stored on the user's computer and transmitted to our site. They are automatically deleted at the end of each session.
Various analysis tools are integrated into the websites we operate.
The etracker tracking tool is used on some of FAZIT Communication GmbH's websites. The provider is etracker GmbH, Erste Brunnenstraße 1, 20459 Hamburg, Germany. The data can be used to create user profiles under a pseudonym. Cookies may be used for this purpose.
On some of the FAZIT Communication GmbH websites, the open source software Matomo is used to analyse and statistically evaluate the use of the website. Cookies are used for this purpose (see section 4). The information generated by the cookie about website usage is transmitted to our servers and combined in pseudonymous user profiles. The information is used to evaluate the use of the website and to enable a demand-oriented design of our website. The information is not passed on to third parties. Under no circumstances will the IP address be linked to other data relating to the user. The IP addresses are anonymized so that an assignment is not possible (IP masking). Your visit to this website is currently recorded by Matomo Webanalyse. Click here (https://matamo.org/ docs/privacy/), in order for your visit to be no longer recorded.
Some websites use Google Analytics, a web analytics service provided by Google Inc. ("Google"), 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. Google Analytics uses "cookies", which are text files placed on your computer, to help the website analyze how users use the site. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is usually transferred to a Google server in the USA and stored there. However, due to the activation of IP anonymisation on these websites, your IP address will previously be shortened by Google within Member States of the European Union or in other signatory states to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the USA and shortened there. On behalf of the operator of this website, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports on website activities, and to provide the website operator with further services associated with website use and Internet use. The IP address transmitted by your browser in the context of Google Analytics is not merged with other Google data. Google Analytics data may not be passed on without the customer's consent, unless special circumstances such as legal requirements exist.
For further information on the collection and use of data by Google and your rights to protect your privacy, please refer to the data protection information at https://www.google.de/intl/de/policies/privacy/.
The purpose of using the data and of analysis with website services is to optimize our services.
Cookies are stored on the user's computer for up to two years and transmitted to our site by the user.
On some of our websites we use the remarketing function "Custom Audiences" of Facebook Inc. (1601 p. California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA; "Facebook").
This function serves the purpose of targeting the visitors of the website with interest-related advertising on Facebook.
For this purpose, the Facebook remarketing tag was implemented on the website. This tag establishes a direct connection to the Facebook servers while visiting the website transferring to the Facebook server which of our pages you have visited. Facebook maps this information to your personal Facebook account. When you visit the Facebook social network, you will see personalized, interest-based Facebook ads.
In this context, the data are not disclosed to third parties. The data areused exclusively for processing the conversation.
The legal basis for the processing of data transmitted in the course of establishing contact is art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR. If the e-mail contact aims at the conclusion of a contract, then additional legal basis for the processing is art. 6 exp. 1 lit. b GDPR.
The processing of the personal data from the input mask serves us only with regard to the processing of the establishment of contact.
The other personal data processed during the sending process via the contact form serve to prevent misuse of the contact form and to ensure the security of our IT systems.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer necessary to achieve the purpose for which they were collected. For the personal data from the input mask of the contact form and those that were sent by e-mail, this is the case when the respective conversation with the user is finished. The conversation is terminated when it can be inferred from the circumstances that the matter has been clarified once and for all.
If statutory provisions provide for retention obligations (e.g. six years for commercial letters received, section 257 (4) of the German Commercial Code(HGB)), deletion shall take place after expiry of the corresponding period.
In some areas of the site, you may be asked to provide personal information in order to use the offers or free features described or to participate in special promotions (subscription orders, product orders, editorial or advertising newsletters, participation in competitions or other promotions). You will be informed about which information you must provide for these offers and which data you can voluntarily provide.
In particular, the following data may be collected: Name, address, bank details, password, date of birth, e-mail address, declarations of consent, information on the concluded legal transaction.
To fulfill your order or registration we pass your data on to partners, who in turn act in conformity with the data protection regulations.
You can apply at any time to have your customer account deleted at datenschutz(*)fazit-communication(.)de.
When subscribing to a newsletter, the user receives a confirmation message after registration, which contains a link to the final registration (double opt-in). This ensures that the newsletter is explicitly desired.
You can unsubscribe from the newsletter via a personalized link that will be sent with each mailing.
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This is an appeal by the Government from the dismissal of two counts of an indictment charging appellee with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by making false statements in wagering tax forms required by 26 U.S.C. § 4412. The District Court dismissed the indictment, reasoning that appellee could not be prosecuted for "failure to answer the wagering form correctly," since his privilege against self-incrimination would have prevented prosecution for "failure to answer the form in any respect."
1. One who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself. Bryson v. United States, ante, p. 396 U. S. 64. Pp. 396 U. S. 79-80.
2. By filing false statements, appellee took a course other than the one that § 4412 was designed to compel, a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take. Pp. 396 U. S. 81-82.
3. Whether, as appellee argues, he gave the false information under the duress of §§ 4412 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, or his false statements were not made "willfully" as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1001, must be determined initially at his trial. Pp. 396 U. S. 82-84.
Appellee Knox has been charged with six counts of violation of federal law in connection with his wagering activities. The first four counts of the indictment charge that, between July, 1964, and October, 1965, he engaged in the business of accepting wagers without first filing Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C, the special return and registration application required by § 4412 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and without first paying the occupational tax imposed by § 4411 of the Code. Counts Five and Six charge that, when Knox did file such a form on October 14, 1965, and when he filed a supplemental form the next day, he knowingly and willfully understated the number of employees accepting wagers on his behalf -- in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a general criminal provision punishing fraudulent statements made to any federal agency.
falls within the terms of § 1001. However, Knox claims that the Fifth Amendment bars punishing him for the filings because they were not voluntary, but were compelled by §§ 4412 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code. He points out that, if he had filed truthful and complete forms as required by § 4412, he would have incriminated himself under Texas wagering laws. On the other hand, if he had filed no forms at all, he would have subjected himself to criminal prosecution under § 7203. [Footnote 5] In choosing the third alternative, submission of a fraudulent form, he merely opted for the least of three evils, under a form of duress that allegedly makes his choice involuntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
For this proposition, Knox relies on United States v. Lookretis, 398 F.2d 64 (C.A. 7th Cir.1968), where, after this Court had remanded for reconsideration in light of Marchetti, see 390 U. S. 338 (1968), the Court of Appeals ruled that truthful disclosures made under the compulsion of § 4412 could not be introduced against their maker in a criminal proceeding. However, the Fifth Amendment was offended in Lookretis precisely because the defendant had succumbed to the statutory compulsion by furnishing the requested incriminatory information. Knox does not claim that his prosecution is based upon any incriminatory information contained in the forms he filed, nor that he is being prosecuted for a failure to supply incriminatory information. He has taken a course other than the one that the statute was designed to compel, a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take.
this prosecution under the traditional doctrine that a person is not criminally responsible for an act committed under duress. See generally Model Penal Code §§ 2.09, 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); id. § 2.09, Comment (Tent.Draft No. 10, 1960). It is only in this sense that there is any relevance to Knox's attempted distinction of this case from Dennis, Bryson, and their predecessors, United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937), and Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), on the ground that, in those cases, the false statements were voluntarily filed for the purpose of obtaining benefits from the Government.
is not before us on this appeal from dismissal of the indictment, and we intimate no view on the matter.
But see nn. 3 6 infra.
"An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: "
The District Court sustained the claim of privilege not on the basis of facts peculiar to this case, but on the basis of its conclusion that the Fifth Amendment provides a defense to any prosecution under § 1001 based on misstatements on a Form 11-C. This amounts to a holding that § 1001, as applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid. The generality of the impact of the District Court's holding appears to us to render our jurisdictional holding a fortiori compared to analogous jurisdictional holdings in such cases as Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100, 331 U. S. 102-104 (1947); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950); Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 385 U. S. 356-357 (1966). We prefer to rest our jurisdiction on this aspect of § 3731, rather than, as advocated by the Government, the statute's "motion in bar" provision, in light of the fact that the scope of the latter provision will be the subject of full-dress consideration, as will certain problems under the "dismissing any indictment" provision not present in this case, in United States v. Sisson, consideration of jurisdiction postponed, post, p. 812.
Knox argues that his false Forms 11-C were not filed "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," a necessary element of a violation of § 1001, because Marchetti and Grosso held that the Internal Revenue Service was not authorized to require the filing of the forms. Even if his reading of those decisions were correct, his argument would fail for the reasons explained in Bryson. The Internal Revenue Service has express statutory authority to require the filing, and when Knox submitted his forms this Court had held that such a requirement raised no self-incrimination problem. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1963); Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 (1955). Further, in Marchetti, we did not hold that the Government is constitutionally forbidden to direct the filing of the form, but only that a proper assertion of the constitutional privilege bars prosecution for failure to comply with the direction. See n 6, infra; see also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 69-70, n. 7.
"were not true, correct, and complete, in that the number of employees and/or agents engaged in receiving wagers in his behalf were misrepresented and understated, in that the number, name, special stamp number, street address, and city and state of employees and/or agents engaged in receiving wagers in the said JAMES D. KNOX's behalf had been omitted. . . ."
Count Six contains language identical except for an apparently inadvertent difference in punctuation. Although the wording is not entirely clear, we need not decide whether on a fair reading the indictment encompasses affirmative misstatements. The District Court read the indictment as alleging that Knox violated § 1001 "by willfully and knowingly making a false statement" on the forms, and it was on the basis of this construction that the court dismissed Counts Five and Six. We have no jurisdiction on this direct appeal to review the construction of the indictment. E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 308 U. S. 193 (1939). But see United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948). See also n 2, supra.
"Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required under authority of section 6015 or section 6016), keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
"that we do not hold that these wagering tax provisions are, as such, constitutionally impermissible; we hold only that those who properly assert the constitutional privilege as to these provisions may not be criminally punished for failure to comply with their requirements. If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is not confronted by substantial hazards of self-incrimination, or if he is otherwise outside the privilege's protection, nothing we decide today would shield him from the various penalties prescribed by the wagering tax statutes."
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 61. Nothing before us indicates that the hazard of incrimination faced by Knox was less substantial than that faced by Marchetti, or that Knox would have been disqualified for any other reason from asserting the privilege in defense of a prosecution for failure to comply with § 4412.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which cautions the trial judge that he may consider on a motion to dismiss the indictment only those objections that are "capable of determination without the trial of the general issue," indicates that evidentiary questions of this type should not be determined on such a motion.
In this case, as in Bryson v. United States, ante, p. 396 U. S. 64, the relevant inquiry is whether, "constitutionally speaking, it was within the jurisdiction'" of a government agency to require the filing of certain information. Id. at 396 U. S. 74 (dissenting opinion). In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 390 U. S. 61, we held that the statutory requirement of filing Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C is not unconstitutional per se. It is clear, however, that, under Marchetti, supra, and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, the "jurisdiction" of the Internal Revenue Service to require this form to be filed is subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
merely been requested to file the form and, with full knowledge of his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment, had done so voluntarily, we would have quite a different case. That is not this case. Under the scheme then in effect, the Government demanded unconditionally that Knox file the form, regardless of the fact that it would incriminate him. Heavy penalties were placed on a failure to file the form.
"Given the decisions of this Court in Kahriger and Lewis, supra, which were on the books at the time of petitioner's trial, and left untouched by Albertson v. SACB [382 U.S. 70], we are unable to view his failure to present this issue as an effective waiver of the constitutional privilege."
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 71.
That reasoning is equally applicable here, for Kahriger and Lewis were still on the books at the time Knox filed his form. And see Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 395 U. S. 27-29.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Bryson, ante, p. 396 U. S. 73, and in MR. JUSTICE BLACK's separate opinion in Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 384 U. S. 875, if the Internal Revenue Service had no constitutional authority to require Knox to file any wagering form at all, his filing of a form which included false information in no way prejudiced the Government, and is not, in my view, a matter "within the jurisdiction" of the Internal Revenue Service.
"Nothing before us indicates that the hazard of incrimination faced by Knox was less substantial than that faced by Marchetti, or that Knox would have been disqualified for any other reason from asserting the privilege. . . ."
Ante at 396 U. S. 83 n. 6.


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A.P. ROSS ENTERPRISES, INC., ILLINI CONSTRUCTION, INC., JOSEPH T. MORETTI, RENATE CAITHAMER, KEITH MARING, HERBERT CHAMPAGNE AND IRVING ADAMS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS LIMITED PARTNERS OF HOTSPURS ASSOCIATES, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ROBERT MARSICO, ANDREW ANKA, DOUGLAS BUFFONE, STEPHEN LOMBARDI, JR., AND MARTIN GUTILLA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GENERAL PARTNERS OF HOTSPURS ASSOCIATES, HOTSPURS ASSOCIATES, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CHARLES J. LACRECO, DBA SUNSET CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, AND HOTSPURS OF LAS VEGAS, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLANTS, v. HYNDS PLUMBING HEATING COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
No. 12196Supreme Court of Nevada.
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Carl J. Christensen, Judge.
Morse-Foley, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Jones Holt, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
Hynds Plumbing Heating Company, a plumbing subcontractor, recovered judgment against two general contractors and a number of property owners for certain labor and materials furnished to the property. Hynds was awarded a total of $33,980.35 for breach of contract and for the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished. The breach of contract award included compensation for lost profits and for prejudgment interest. In addition, the judgment established the existence of a mechanic’s lien in favor of Hynds and included an award of attorneys’ fees thereunder. The entire amount of damages was secured by the mechanic’s lien.
Appellants first challenge the validity of the mechanic’s lien since they claim that respondent did not follow appropriate procedure in perfecting the lien. We do not find it necessary to discuss the propriety of respondent’s procedure in perfecting the lien since consideration of the issue was waived by appellants.
During discovery respondents requested documents and other information concerning the personal assets of the property owners. Appellants twice refused to produce the information on the ground that the mechanic’s lien was responsible for any liability and that the lien was “not in dispute before this court.” Appellants also submitted a pre-trial statement very similar to that submitted by respondent. Both parties indicated that the legal and factual issues in dispute concerned breach of contract and monies due respondent. It was not until trial that appellants attempted to challenge the validity of the lien. Although the court apparently admitted some evidence in this regard, it indicated that the issue was foreclosed by the pre-trial statements.
the lien would not be challenged. Moreover, respondent was led to believe, on receiving appellants’ pre-trial statement, that it would not be required to establish the procedures followed in effecting the lien. It would have been unfair at trial to force respondent to provide evidence on an entirely unexpected issue.
(Kan. 1970). In the case before us, appellants were in no way prejudiced by an unfair pre-trial order. Appellants had clearly specified their view of the contested matters and were in essential agreement with respondent. It would, however, have been unjust to depart from the pre-trial statements and force a major new issue upon the respondent. The court therefore properly ruled that the issue of the validity of the lien had been foreclosed.
mechanic’s lien, the award for both attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest must stand.
Appellants’ claim that respondent failed to support its claim for breach of contract is without merit. There is ample evidence in the record for the court to have found in favor of the respondent. We therefore will not disturb the finding of the lower court. See In re Gordon, 40 Nev. 300, 161 P. 717 (1916).
Appellants finally assert that the award for lost profits secured by a mechanic’s lien is improper. We agree. The mechanic’s lien statute merely contemplates reimbursement for materials and labor. That interpretation is consistent with the view that the statute was designed to “secure payment to those who perform labor or furnish material to improve the property of the owner.” Vaughn Materials v. Meadowvale Homes, 84 Nev. 227, 232, 438 P.2d 822, 825 (1968) (BATJER, J., dissenting). Authority from other jurisdictions is in accord. See Lenslite Co. v. Zocher, 388 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1964); Texas Bank and Trust Co. v. Campbell Bros., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Ct.App. 1978). Respondent cites no authority to the contrary.
Despite the court’s order to secure the award for lost profits under the mechanic’s lien, we find the error to be harmless. Respondent states, and appellants do not deny, that the verdict is presently secured by a supersedeas bond. Since the mechanic’s lien is no longer implicated in the award, we see no harm to the appellants.
The judgment of the court is affirmed.
GUNDERSON, C.J., and MANOUKIAN and SPRINGER, JJ., and GRIFFIN, D.J., and McKIBBEN, D.J., concur.
 Authority from other jurisdictions supports this conclusion. See United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Castle, 444 P.2d 454, 457 (Alas. 1968) (a bonding company’s response to an interrogatory that it had furnished a bond precluded it from challenging the validity of the bond at trial); American Nat. Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. McNally, 445 P.2d 91, 95-96 (Ariz.App. 1968) (in the absence of a formal pre-trial order, parties may be bound by the record of the pre-trial conference); Batson v. Strehlow, 441 P.2d 101 (Cal. 1968) (pre-trial statement may be binding on the parties when the statements are adopted by the trial court and made part of the order).
Plastino v. Mills, 236 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1956) (pre-trial order prepared by attorneys was so vague that trial court was not obliged to follow it); Fruehauf Trailer Div. v. Thronton, 366 N.E.2d 21 (Ind.App. 1977) (parties were released from pre-trial order since there was no record of a pre-trial conference and the order was not entered until the day of the trial); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Broward County, 465 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1972) (notice of claim issue was properly considered even though it was omitted from the pre-trial statement since the parties had raised the issue in an earlier pleading and in a motion to dismiss).
 Even if the lien had not been properly established by the court, respondent would have been entitled to prejudgment interest under its contract action. See NRS 99.040; State Farm Mut. Auto. v. Christensen, 88 Nev. 160, 494 P.2d 552 (1972).
 The Governor designated Honorable Michael R. Griffin, District Judge of the First Judicial District, to sit in this case in place of THE HONORABLE JOHN MOWBRAY, who voluntarily recused himself. Nev. Const., art. 6, § 4.
 The Governor designated Honorable Howard D. McKibben, District Judge of the Ninth Judicial District, to sit in this case in place of THE HONORABLE CAMERON BATJER. Nev. Const., art. 6, § 4.

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In this week's Episode of Make Money Mondays Dealer Synergy's Nation Sales Director, Joseph Argento, explains how you need to lead and motivate your team if you want to be successful. You need to get your people behind you and supporting you which means, everyone has to be on the same page. Everyone needs to understand the goals of the dealership, how to approach those goals, and the consequences if those goals are not met in order to work well as one unit. It's about planning, being on the same page, motivating, and the execution.
In this week's Episode of Make Money Mondays Sean V. Bradley, CSP, President of Dealer Synergy, discusses the different levels of professionalism. An Olympic athlete is the highest honor of professionalism you can hold. If you think you are truly a professional, you should grade yourself on a realistic level. As an automotive professional, you can be junior varsity, varsity, AAA, or in the major leagues. Which level of professional are you?
In this week's Episode of Make Money Mondays Dealer Synergy's President, Sean V. Bradley helps you identify what your personal deficiencies are and how to improve them. You should not became overwhelmed with the size of your goal. There are a list of steps you can follow to help improve your overall skill. Take some time to write down the things you are not good at. You will see what you should prioritize and improve upon.
Make Money Monday with Sean V. Bradley - How to Handle "I'm Just Looking"
In this week's Episode of Make Money Mondays Dealer Synergy's President, Sean V. Bradley gives advise handling a prospect that comes into your store and says "I'm Just Looking." A vehicle is the second largest item a person will buy in their lifetime after a home. Do not take offense if someone says to you, "I'm just looking." Sean gives us advise on what to say when a customer says those three words. If you are structured and professional with your response, you could have the prospect abandon the "I'm just looking" reflex.
Make Money Mondays with Sean V. Bradley - How To Handle "I'm Just Looking"
Dealer Synergy Presents Lee Lee Williams, Internet Director of Grindstaff Automotive Group, giving advice on branding and networking on a personal level. You need to go out into your community and interact and network with the people of your community. You need to create a personal website branded for you even if you are part of a bigger automotive group.
It is an indelible image of the financial crisis: a bird’s-eye view of the backyards of foreclosed houses, their in-ground pools festering with algae and mosquitoes. In Northern Virginia, Marcus Sheridan was in the financial storm.
By early 2009, his company, River Pools and Spas, a 20-employee installer of in-ground fiberglass pools in Virginia and Maryland, had a decline in orders from an average of six a month to barely two. That winter, four customers who had planned to install pools costing more than $50,000 each demanded their deposits back. For three consecutive weeks, the company overdrew its bank account.
Around this time, Mr. Sheridan began to overhaul his marketing. The company had been spending about $250,000 a year on radio, television and pay-per-click advertising. It would now cut the budget to about a tenth of that and focus on generating sales through informational blog posts and videos, what has become known as content marketing. But Mr. Sheridan took an unconventional approach to his content.
As a result, River Pools has recovered to exceed its peak pre-2007 revenue, and Mr. Sheridan, a 35-year-old father of four, has become something of a Web marketing guru. While he still owns a 33 percent interest in the pool company, his partners manage it day to day while he concentrates on his new venture, TheSalesLion.com. He recently spoke about his marketing approach in a conversation that has been edited and condensed.
Q. Take us back. How did you save your company?
A. I just started thinking more about the way I use the Internet. Most of the time when I type in a search, I’m looking for an answer to a specific question. The problem in my industry, and a lot of industries, is you don’t get a lot of great search results because most businesses don’t want to give answers; they want to talk about their company. So I realized that if I was willing to answer all these questions that people have about fiberglass pools, we might have a chance to pull this out.
Q. What was the first question you answered?
A. The question I was always asked within the first two minutes of talking to customers was, How much does a fiberglass pool cost? Pool installers are like mattress or car dealers — we hate talking about how much a pool costs until we have you in person because there are so many options and accessories we want to sell you. As a result, pool companies never mention price on their Web sites. But I said, I don’t care what the question is, we’re going to answer it.
Q. Did you actually tell people the price of a pool?
A. No — because I couldn’t. But see, that’s the magic behind this. Google’s search engine doesn’t really care if we answer the question. It’s just looking for companies that are willing to address the question. So I said in that article, there are a ton of options, so it depends, the price can range anywhere from $20,000 to $200,000 and a lot of our customers end up between $40,000 and $80,000. And that was enough. Within about 24 hours of writing that article, it was No. 1 for every fiberglass-pool, cost-related phrase you could possibly type in. And because I have analytics, so far to this day, I’ve been able to track a minimum of $1.7 million in sales to that one article.
Q. What was the next question?
A. In most industries, there comes a time in the sale process where the customer turns to you and says, “O.K., I like you, but who are some of the other good companies that do this?” Half the time it’s a test, because people know who our competitors are because they can find them in .5 seconds online. Most contractors avoid the question. They say, “Oh, we don’t really have competition.” But because I was asked that question so often, I decided to answer it. I wrote a blog post about the best swimming pool builders in Richmond, Va., one of our main service areas.
Q. Where were you on the list?
A. I wasn’t on it.
A. No, because the moment I put my name up there I would lose all my credibility. But here’s the thing. Take the first company on the list, Pla-Mor Pools, a top competitor of ours. If you type in, “Pla-Mor Pools reviews Richmond, Va.,” which of course people do all the time when they’re vetting a company, what comes up? Me! You vet all my competitors, now I’m showing up for all their key words. If you really want to understand the power of inbound marketing, it comes down to this idea: I want to have the conversation at my house.
Q. Once you wrote a blog post, how much time did you spend promoting it on Twitter and Facebook?
A. I didn’t. Dude, that one article on price has never been tweeted. It’s never been Facebooked. I’m not saying social media doesn’t help, but it’s nowhere near what people think. The only metric that really matters is total pages viewed. Here’s a statistic for you: If somebody reads 30 pages of my River Pools Web site, and we go on a sales appointment, they buy 80 percent of the time. The industry average for sales appointments is 10 percent. So, our whole marketing campaign revolves around getting people to stick around and read our stuff, because the longer they stay on our site, the greater the chance they’re going to fall in love with our company.
Q. What do you say to business owners who say they don’t know what to blog about?
A. That’s the dumbest thing I ever heard, and I hear it a lot. What they should be doing is just listening to every single question they get and answering it. In my consulting business the first thing we do is brainstorm what questions the company gets on a regular basis. I’ve never had a company come up with less than 100 questions in 30 minutes.
Q. How do you suggest companies find time to do all of this blogging?
A. Most of the time, they can take the employees they already have talking to customers and turn them into content producers. If you have 25 salespeople, and each one of them writes one post a month, your search is going to be through the roof because that’s a new piece of content every day.
Q. How have your competitors responded to all of this?
A version of this article appears in print on February 28, 2013, on page B6 of the New York edition with the headline: A Revolutionary Marketing Strategy: Answer Customers’ Questions.
If there is one thing you can count on for marketing, it’s this: there is no one way to do it. It’s always changing. What worked yesterday may not work in a year from now.
Digital technology has sped up the process. Now dealerships have more possibilities to connect with customers.
If you feel as though your auto dealership marketing is beginning to flat line, it may be time to mix it up and try something new.
Branding is the starting point for all your marketing efforts. Without a strong brand name, logo, and message, it’s difficult to catch the eyes and ears of customers. Even an excellent marketing campaign suffers if the brand doesn’t have that extra “oomph!”.
If you’ve had your dealership name for some time, it’s okay to keep it (in fact, that may be a better idea). You canmake your brand more engaging and interesting without a complete overhaul.
Create a byline for your brand. A short message that communicates your “promise” to customers. That message creates a common theme for the rest of your marketing efforts.
Hire a professional designer to create a new logo.
Search engine optimization (SEO) is not a new trend. Most dealership GM’s and managers are familiar with PPC advertising, targeting keywords, and the goal of ranking higher in Google. But, there is another way to marketing your business using SEO techniques, and, believe it or not, it’s all about your blog.
You can target specific keywords within your blog content. Each piece of content you publish effectively turns into a landing page for your dealership, drawing more targeted traffic to your website.
Hire a professional content writer to write SEO’d content for your blog each week.
Make your blog content informative and helpful to your readers.
Keep each post short, visually appealing (use pictures), and easy to read.
If you are using a generic CRM tool, think about switching to one that offers features specifically tailored to dealerships. AutoRaptor is made by car sales professionals, for car sales professionals. Every feature is intuitively designed to help your salespeople work more efficiently.
Lead assignments within the software tool.
Send text messages and phone calls with no additional carrier charge.
Complete mobile capability with unique features, such as license and VIN number scanning.
Many of your customers view your website, emails, and inventory with mobile phones. If you haven’t already, it’s time to ensure that all of your digital content is responsive to mobile devices, including tablets. Content that is not easily readable on mobile screens is losing you conversion opportunities.
Design all of your auto dealership marketing with mobile browsers in mind.
Think about how your content is read: make your email messages short and to the point. Mobile readers will skim and scan before they decide to read.
Get your website up to snuff, in other words. In terms of digital marketing (or perhaps all of your auto dealership marketing), your website is the most important piece of the puzzle. It’s the virtual doorway to your dealership. Your leads will pass through to view your inventory, read your content, and get a feel for how you do business. What will they see?
Create video content to post on your website. Dealership walk-throughs, salespeople spotlights, virtual car presentations, etc.
Hire a web designer to give you a new, sleek look. Make your website look attractive, fun, and engaging.
Make sure to build links to all your pages so Google can index them correctly.
Include pictures of the salespeople with short bios and contact information.
Converting your web visitors into qualified leads is a step-by-step process. Gaining an email address is easier if you offer something free in return, such as an e-book, white paper, redeemable coupon, etc. This is one of the main methods of inbound (or permission-based) marketing.
A person visits your website, views inventory, and researches your dealership.
He watches your videos of vehicle presentations and reads your blog.
At the bottom of your web page is an offer to download your entire library of video content.
To download the content, he needs to provide an email address and/or phone number.
He provides his information and is added to your opt-in marketing list.
You sent out automated messages (email drip campaign) offering more useful content.
After a few messages, you sent out a targeted promotion based on his vehicle search and behavior.
He responds, comes into the dealership, and now your salespeople have a qualified lead.
Finally, if you want your marketing to provide effective ROI, you need to target specific groups and personalize your efforts. The “spray and pray” techniques do not work like they used to. People want to have a personal connection to your dealership. They will not respond to vague, objective, or generic marketing material.
For better results, segment your marketing lists into specific groups and demographics. Use your research and tracking tools to see what they’ve viewed, what vehicles they’re interested in, and what promotion would best attract their attention.
Break your email lists into specific groups. Create promotional material specifically for them.
Make sure your emails and text messages are personal. One-to-one conversations are the messages people respond well to.
Think small: brainstorm ways to target specific groups with engaging, useful, and relative promotions.
Every dealership needs to mix up their marketing efforts on a regular basis. Of course, if something is working well, there is no reason to try and change it. But, if you see that your “go-to” tactics are starting to flat line, use these tips to diversify your marketing mix. Remember: your internet marketing is a critical aspect of your overall strategy. Give your website the attention it deserves and build up your inbound marketing sales funnel.
What’s your opinion? Do you have any marketing tips to add? Share your thoughts!
I recently added this into a forum post comment and realized that some more people might be wondering about this. Where is the best place to ask for a referral? It used to be simple, after they purchase - ask for a referral or maybe give them a call a few weeks later and ask. Definitely YES, those two options are prime time referral asking opportunities but now that we live in a digital era, there are A LOT more opportunities to connect and engage with your customer. Meaning there are a lot more opportunities to ask for a referral.
I like to refer to all the best places to "ask for a referral" as touch points and I will preface this with my STRONG, STRONG opinion that a referral program is great, it's awesome, but without an offer of some kind.... some of these ideas can just fall flat... why? People are busy. The offer is the stickiness that you need to go above the competition and stay at the top of your customer's mind. PS: People prefer MOOLAH, according to a recent survey," 77% of Americans identify money as their reward of choice."
I know some dealers are hesitant/wary about the effective on ROI when combined with the reward amount but it's such an inaccurate/outdated way of thinking about it. I love showing stats and blowing dealer's minds about ROI on referrals. Just look at PayPal: "By directly paying people to sign up and then paying them more to refer friends, we achieved extraordinary growth. This strategy cost us $20 per customer, but it also led to 7% daily growth, which meant that our base nearly doubled every 10 days." - Peter Thiel - Co-founder. And not only is it cost effective, it improves your overall branding and marketing efforts, according to MarketShare, "Word-of-mouth has been shown to improve marketing effectiveness by up to 54%."
My biggest tip to gain the most traction in the following scenarios is that you ensure your referral offer/request gets to your customers QUICKLY and it is EASY for them to refer. Below are a few top touch points for a dealership/salesperson, GM or really any employee to ask for a referral.
In-Store Marketing - while they wait for F&I create some flyers that highlight the referral program + $OFFER, your customer is at their most elated point right now, they just bought a car but now they're stuck waiting. They also know they've just spent a pretty penny and the option to help a friend and earn is extremely appealing at this point. We've had some customers submit 4+ referral leads while they've waited for F&I!
F&I - your F&I manager is an ideal candidate to quickly explain the benefits of your referral program AKA earning money, while they are also discussing added benefits of new features AKA customer's spending money. a nice ying and yang for the customer to think about.
Automated Emails - if you have a follow up email to thank your customer for their purchase - add a referral button or banner that leads to a form to submit referrals. It's easy and efficient. Your salesperson should also be following up with an email or call (mentioned below) but if they forget or won't, these automated emails and inclusive offers will ensure it gets to your customer!
Salesperson Follow up - 1-2 weeks after purchase. A simple check in to see how the car is doing can lead to a LOT of useful information, like if anything is wrong and the salesperson can help remedy this -- Major brownie points and once resolved, it's the perfect time to ask.
REVIEWS! If you get a good review, comment back and give them a link to a landing page/form where they can submit referrals! The lack of action on positive reviews sometimes saddens me, they are a GOLD MINE for referrals... and even the bad one's offer up so much learning experience --- a goodwill offer can help a ton here too.
Your Website - PLEASE!!! do not stuff it into one of your million and billions of tabs and sub tabs. Nobody really looks in those. Make it a nice attractive button that highlights the offer amount "$100 Referral Credit" $100 Reward Credit". Something to catch their eye.
Make Money Mondays with Sean V. Bradley - You MUST listen to your customer!
Looking to start an exciting career in automotive sales? Several Dealer Synergy clients are looking for talented individuals to join their team. Check our current listings and submit your resume.
Sean V. Bradley, CSP, CEO of Dealer Synergy speaks on the topic of how BDC is not an expense. People are not an expense, they are an asset. The difference between your organization and others are your people. The competition does not have anything different than you do, people are not an expense it comes down to your value proposition package. You cannot make money without putting money out. 92-99% of Americans go online before they even step foot in the dealership. If you can direct that traffic to an Internet or BDC department and you've got the right factors, you will be able to build a customer factory.

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More than mere presence at the scene is required. United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 1001 (1st Cir. 1995). The fact that criminal activity occurs in front of someone does not always allow the inference that that someone was a participant. Id. There are circumstances, though, where presence itself implies participation such as when a thug stands near an extortion act or a lookout stands near a robbery. Id.
More is needed than simply knowledge that the crime was to be committed. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d at 998-99. Awareness of the crime is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting. United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 638 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928, 1145 S.Ct. 337, 126 L.Ed.2d 281 (1993).
Mere association between the principal, and the aider and abettor is insufficient. Id. Mere participation is not enough proof that a defendant intentionally assisted in the ventures illegal purpose. United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 1993).
So, mere presence at the crime scene and guilty knowledge of the crime are generally not enough for aiding and abetting. United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 144, 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991). However, one court ruled it would be unreasonable to believe that participants would permit a noncontributing interloper to remain nearby conspicuous criminal activity, unabated for an extended period of time. See United States v. Batista-Polance, 927 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1991). However, presence, association and knowledge may be relevant and material toward proving aiding and abetting. United States v. Martiarena, 955 F.2d 363, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1992).
The key elements are the defendant's association with the venture, participating in it as in something he wished to bring about, and seeking to make it succeed. United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 539 (1st Cir. 1991). "Association" within the meaning of aiding and abetting means the defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal. United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134, 115 S.Ct. 2014, 131 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1995). "Participation" means the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the venture. Martiarena, 955 F.2d at 366.
Furthermore, it is a defense to aiding and abetting if the crime has already been committed. United States v. Camarge-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 1001 (11th Cir. 1995). Of course, there can be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265, 83 S.Ct. 1130, 1132, 10 L.Ed.2d 335 (1963).

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