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Evidence suggests Justice Freeman’s fears were well founded.145 While the Edgar majority’s minimalist reading of Article X was fairly accurate,146 the delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention nonetheless believed that Article X’s strong wording would compel the Illinois state legislature to pass significant funding reforms in order to remedy educational inequality.147 More than forty years later, the legislature has yet to act.148 In other states as well, legislative inaction has often prevented meaningful reform.149 Thus, it may be time to once again challenge Illinois’s school funding system in court.
education reformers are left with few options.
As this Part will demonstrate, however, the Edgar and Lewis E. opinions leave open a few points of attack for future litigants. The Illinois Supreme Court’s reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s political question jurisprudence, which precludes courts from hearing certain inherently political issues, defers unnecessarily to federal law, and also contradicts the Illinois Supreme Court’s own political question precedent. Moreover, the Edgar court’s interpretation of Article X failed to define a key provision—whether the promise of a “high quality” education establishes some minimal level of educational adequacy.151 Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court’s deference to local control is unnecessary and ignores the fact that the current funding system does not provide meaningful control for property-poor school districts.
Before examining the Edgar and Lewis E. courts’ political question analysis, some background on the doctrine is necessary. The political question doctrine is a federal law principle that preserves the separation of powers by helping courts to determine when ruling on an issue taxing rates, the plaintiffs’ injuries were not properly traceable to the named defendants and thus could not provide standing. See Carr v. Koch, 981 N.E.2d 326, 331-36 (Ill. 2012).
145 See Secter, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
146 See infra Part IV-B (analyzing the intentions of the 1970 Constitutional Convention delegates).
147 See BURESH, supra note 2, at 126 (quoting Malcolm Kamin, a member of the Convention’s education committee, as stating after the Convention that “[ i]f the legislature and the new State Board of Education will take the school financing language for what it is— the statement of a pressing problem and the urgent prayer for a fair solution—then they will act to equalize educational opportunity and the tax burdens of educational financing without further judicial intervention”).
148 See Secter, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Thomas D. Wilson & John K. Wilson, Equalizing School Funding and the 1970 Constitutional Convention, ILL. ISSUES, Mar. 1992, at 21, 21, available at http://www.lib.niu.edu/1992/ii920321.html (stating that “[t]he hope for equalizing funding through the legislature has never been fulfilled” since the 1970 Convention, but funding disparities between rich and poor districts have greatly increased).
149 In Rodriguez, the Texas district court initially delayed hearing of the case for two years while the Texas legislature unsuccessfully investigated possible reforms. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4 (1973). After invalidating the funding scheme, the court stayed its decision for another two years but retained its right to fashion remedial actions in case the legislature failed to act. Id. at 6 n. 5. In New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill first invalidated the state’s funding system in 1973, but the legislature did not pursue true reform until after Abbott v. Burke was decided in 1997. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 287-298 (N.J. 1973); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Lynch, supra note 14, at 974 (summarizing education reform in New Jersey).
150 See supra Part I (summarizing the economic shortfalls and inequalities Illinois public schools currently face). During the 2011- 2012 school year, just 32.5% of public school funding came from the state. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Total Revenues and Percentage Distribution, supra note 4.
151 See infra Part IV-B (providing an analysis of the 1970 Constitutional Convention record and what it suggests about the meaning of Article X).

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(1) The Administrator shall test, or require to be tested in such manner as he deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations prescribed under section 7521 of this title. If such vehicle or engine conforms to such regulations, the Administrator shall issue a certificate of conformity upon such terms, and for such period (not in excess of one year), as he may prescribe. In the case of any original equipment manufacturer (as defined by the Administrator in regulations promulgated before November 15, 1990) of vehicles or vehicle engines whose projected sales in the United States for any model year (as determined by the Administrator) will not exceed 300, the Administrator shall not require, for purposes of determining compliance with regulations under section 7521 of this title for the useful life of the vehicle or engine, operation of any vehicle or engine manufactured during such model year for more than 5,000 miles or 160 hours, respectively, unless the Administrator, by regulation, prescribes otherwise. The Administrator shall apply any adjustment factors that the Administrator deems appropriate to assure that each vehicle or engine will comply during its useful life (as determined under section 7521(d) of this title) with the regulations prescribed under section 7521 of this title.
(2) The Administrator shall test any emission control system incorporated in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine submitted to him by any person, in order to determine whether such system enables such vehicle or engine to conform to the standards required to be prescribed under section 7521(b) of this title. If the Administrator finds on the basis of such tests that such vehicle or engine conforms to such standards, the Administrator shall issue a verification of compliance with emission standards for such system when incorporated in vehicles of a class of which the tested vehicle is representative. He shall inform manufacturers and the National Academy of Sciences, and make available to the public, the results of such tests. Tests under this paragraph shall be conducted under such terms and conditions (including requirements for preliminary testing by qualified independent laboratories) as the Administrator may prescribe by regulations.
(3)(A) A certificate of conformity may be issued under this section only if the Administrator determines that the manufacturer (or in the case of a vehicle or engine for import, any person) has established to the satisfaction of the Administrator that any emission control device, system, or element of design installed on, or incorporated in, such vehicle or engine conforms to applicable requirements of section 7521(a)(4) of this title.
(B) The Administrator may conduct such tests and may require the manufacturer (or any such person) to conduct such tests and provide such information as is necessary to carry out subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. Such requirements shall include a requirement for prompt reporting of the emission of any unregulated pollutant from a system, device, or element of design if such pollutant was not emitted, or was emitted in significantly lesser amounts, from the vehicle or engine without use of the system, device, or element of design.
(4)(A) Not later than 12 months after November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall revise the regulations promulgated under this subsection to add test procedures capable of determining whether model year 1994 and later model year light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks, when properly maintained and used, will pass the inspection methods and procedures established under section 7541(b) of this title for that model year, under conditions reasonably likely to be encountered in the conduct of inspection and maintenance programs, but which those programs cannot reasonably influence or control. The conditions shall include fuel characteristics, ambient temperature, and short (30 minutes or less) waiting periods before tests are conducted. The Administrator shall not grant a certificate of conformity under this subsection for any 1994 or later model year vehicle or engine that the Administrator concludes cannot pass the test procedures established under this paragraph.
(B) From time to time, the Administrator may revise the regulations promulgated under subparagraph (A), as the Administrator deems appropriate.
(1) In order to determine whether new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines being manufactured by a manufacturer do in fact conform with the regulations with respect to which the certificate of conformity was issued, the Administrator is authorized to test such vehicles or engines. Such tests may be conducted by the Administrator directly or, in accordance with conditions specified by the Administrator, by the manufacturer.
(2)(A)(i) If, based on tests conducted under paragraph (1) on a sample of new vehicles or engines covered by a certificate of conformity, the Administrator determines that all or part of the vehicles or engines so covered do not conform with the regulations with respect to which the certificate of conformity was issued and with the requirements of section 7521(a)(4) of this title, he may suspend or revoke such certificate in whole or in part, and shall so notify the manufacturer. Such suspension or revocation shall apply in the case of any new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines manufactured after the date of such notification (or manufactured before such date if still in the hands of the manufacturer), and shall apply until such time as the Administrator finds that vehicles and engines manufactured by the manufacturer do conform to such regulations and requirements. If, during any period of suspension or revocation, the Administrator finds that a vehicle or engine actually conforms to such regulations and requirements, he shall issue a certificate of conformity applicable to such vehicle or engine.
(ii) If, based on tests conducted under paragraph (1) on any new vehicle or engine, the Administrator determines that such vehicle or engine does not conform with such regulations and requirements, he may suspend or revoke such certificate insofar as it applies to such vehicle or engine until such time as he finds such vehicle or engine actually so conforms with such regulations and requirements, and he shall so notify the manufacturer.
(B)(i) At the request of any manufacturer the Administrator shall grant such manufacturer a hearing as to whether the tests have been properly conducted or any sampling methods have been properly applied, and make a determination on the record with respect to any suspension or revocation under subparagraph (A); but suspension or revocation under subparagraph (A) shall not be stayed by reason of such hearing.
(ii) In any case of actual controversy as to the validity of any determination under clause (i), the manufacturer may at any time prior to the 60th day after such determination is made file a petition with the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such manufacturer resides or has his principal place of business for a judicial review of such determination. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Administrator or other officer designated by him for that purpose. The Administrator thereupon shall file in the court the record of the proceedings on which the Administrator based his determination, as provided in section 2112 of title 28.
(iii) If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Administrator, the court may order such additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Administrator, in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. The Administrator may modify his findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken and he shall file such modified or new findings, and his recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of his original determination, with the return of such additional evidence.
(iv) Upon the filing of the petition referred to in clause (ii), the court shall have jurisdiction to review the order in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5 and to grant appropriate relief as provided in such chapter.
For purposes of enforcement of this section, officers or employees duly designated by the Administrator, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the manufacturer or person in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any plant or other establishment of such manufacturer, for the purpose of conducting tests of vehicles or engines in the hands of the manufacturer, or (2) to inspect, at reasonable times, records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities used by such manufacturer in conducting tests under regulations of the Administrator. Each such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
The Administrator shall by regulation establish methods and procedures for making tests under this section.
The Administrator shall make available to the public the results of his tests of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine submitted by a manufacturer under subsection (a) of this section as promptly as possible after December 31, 1970, and at the beginning of each model year which begins thereafter. Such results shall be described in such nontechnical manner as will reasonably disclose to prospective ultimate purchasers of new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines the comparative performance of the vehicles and engines tested in meeting the standards prescribed under section 7521 of this title.
All light duty 1 vehicles and engines manufactured during or after model year 1984 and all light-duty trucks manufactured during or after model year 1995 shall comply with the requirements of section 7521 of this title regardless of the altitude at which they are sold.
(1) In the case of any class or category of heavy-duty vehicles or engines to which a standard promulgated under section 7521(a) of this title applies, except as provided in paragraph (2), a certificate of conformity shall be issued under subsection (a) of this section and shall not be suspended or revoked under subsection (b) of this section for such vehicles or engines manufactured by a manufacturer notwithstanding the failure of such vehicles or engines to meet such standard if such manufacturer pays a nonconformance penalty as provided under regulations promulgated by the Administrator after notice and opportunity for public hearing. In the case of motorcycles to which such a standard applies, such a certificate may be issued notwithstanding such failure if the manufacturer pays such a penalty.
(2) No certificate of conformity may be issued under paragraph (1) with respect to any class or category of vehicle or engine if the degree by which the manufacturer fails to meet any standard promulgated under section 7521(a) of this title with respect to such class or category exceeds the percentage determined under regulations promulgated by the Administrator to be practicable. Such regulations shall require such testing of vehicles or engines being produced as may be necessary to determine the percentage of the classes or categories of vehicles or engines which are not in compliance with the regulations with respect to which a certificate of conformity was issued and shall be promulgated not later than one year after August 7, 1977.
(E) shall remove any competitive disadvantage to manufacturers whose engines or vehicles achieve the required degree of emission reduction (including any such disadvantage arising from the application of paragraph (4)).
(4) In any case in which a certificate of conformity has been issued under this subsection, any warranty required under section 7541(b)(2) of this title and any action under section 7541(c) of this title shall be required to be effective only for the emission levels which the Administrator determines that such certificate was issued and not for the emission levels required under the applicable standard.
(5) The authorities of section 7542(a) of this title shall apply, subject to the conditions of section 7542(b) 2 of this title, for purposes of this subsection.
Within 18 months after November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall review and revise as necessary the regulations under subsection 3 (a) and (b) of this section regarding the testing of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines to insure that vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel, temperature, acceleration, and altitude.
Section 7542 of this title, referred to in subsec. (g)(5), was amended generally by Pub. L. 101–549, title II, §211, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2487, and provisions formerly contained in section 7542(b) of this title are contained in section 7542(c).
Section was formerly classified to section 1857f–5 of this title.
A prior section 206 of act July 14, 1955, related to testing of motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines and was classified to section 1857f–5 of this title, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 91–604.
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 101–549, §208(a), added par. (4).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101–549, §230(7), struck out “announce in the Federal Register and” after “The Administrator shall”.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101–549, §230(8), struck out par. (1) designation before “All light duty vehicles”, inserted reference to all light-duty trucks manufactured during or after model year 1995, and struck out par. (2) which required the Administrator to report to Congress by Oct. 1, 1978, on the economic impact and technological feasibility of the requirements of former par. (1).
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101–549, §208(c), added subsec. (h).
1977—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 95–95, §220, inserted provisions covering testing by small manufacturers.
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 95–95, §214(b), added par. (3).
Subsec. (b)(2)(A)(i). Pub. L. 95–95, §214(c)(1), (2), substituted “certificate of conformity was issued and with the requirements of section 7521(a)(4) of this title, he may suspend” for “certificate of conformity was issued, he may suspend” and “such regulations and requirements” for “such regulations”.
Subsec. (b)(2)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 95–95, §214(c)(2), substituted “such regulations and requirements” for “such regulations”.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 95–95, §213(a), added subsec. (f).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 95–95, §224(e), added subsec. (g).
Subsec. (g)(3)(D). Pub. L. 95–190 inserted “shall” before “be”.
1 So in original. Probably should be “light-duty”.
3 So in original. Probably should be “subsections”.


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Never played soccer? Here, a former soccer pro, seasoned coach, and current soccer camp owner offers expert insights to help parents new to the game.
For parents who never played the game, the different types of soccer camps, clinics, classes, teams, and leagues may seem shrouded in mystery. And the more we Google information on the sport, the more confusing things can become since the number of teammates and the rules of game play are different for different age levels.
To help clear the confusion, ActivityHero recently talked to Ken Mburu, who has been coaching soccer for young kids since 2003 and founded Coach Ken Soccer Academy in 2009. (Coach Ken played club and college soccer in Kenya, and he holds a diploma from the National Soccer Coaches Association of America Coaching Academy.) Today, Coach Ken Soccer Academy offers soccer classes, camps, and private instruction for ages preschool through adult at locations in Mountain View, Los Altos, Palo Alto, and Menlo Park.
Here, Coach Ken shares an overview of the different levels of soccer and what to look for in a soccer program.
Coach Ken’s curriculum starts with kids as young as 3.5 years old. In his experience, kids who are younger than this will do better in a program that involves the mother or father. At the preschool level, Coach Ken lets each child have their own ball and ensures they will score goals very often. There’s no goalie, and if a child loses control of their ball or kicks it too far, the coach will quickly toss them an extra so they can keep playing.
A curriculum that ties drills to game play. It’s not enough for coaches to create drills that are fun. It’s also important for coaches to educate kids on how those games relate to a real soccer game. “People love what they’re good at, and if you’re good at something, you almost always love it. It’s a cycle,” he says. “The best way to make sure kids are having fun is to get them better.” Ultimately, kids won’t become better at soccer unless they learn specific skills that they will use when they later engage in a soccer game.
A focus on footwork. “Kids have got to be comfortable maneuvering the ball,” says Coach Ken. “That’s the main skill of soccer. We only get better by touching the ball.” Little touches, not big kicks, are the key to soccer success. One of the biggest problems little kids face is that they tend to boot the ball as far as possible, as they would in kickball. In soccer, though, it’s important to keep control of the ball, so kids need to learn to keep the ball close using little taps. Kids should also learn a variety of different ways to control the ball, using different parts of the foot to tap it. At this age, they should not be kicking with their toe because it’s very difficult to control the ball that way.
Use of correct soccer terminology. “The person who is harder to teach is not someone who knows nothing,” says Coach Ken, “but someone who has learned something wrong.” Your child will do better as they move up within the soccer system if they have a good foundation that includes using the correct terms. They should learn the names for different parts of the foot (inside foot, outside foot, shoelaces, etc.) and different soccer skills (pull back or drag back, throw-in, etc.).
At this level, kids will move from playing 1 v. 1 (one player versus another) to playing some real soccer matches. “They don’t have to follow all the rules,” says Coach Ken. “At that age, I carry extra balls and throw in another ball when one is kicked out of bounds.” Kids in this group have a very short attention span, he explains, so coaches have to keep the ball and the game moving quickly. “If you don’t, soon they will be chasing butterflies,” he says.
Kids being grouped by ability. Some kids naturally pick up the game more quickly and easily than others. Coaches should begin grouping kids based on their abilities —beginners together, medium-level players together, and so on. This is important because it’s very frustrating for beginner kids to face an advanced player who is always stealing the ball. And this scenario won’t help the better players develop their skills either. “The kids need to be in groups where they are challenged accordingly,” says Coach Ken.
Some mini games. Coach Ken tries to do 3 v. 3, 4 v. 4, and 5 v. 5 at this age. If there are more players than that, the field becomes too crowded and chaotic.
No goalies. Coach Ken says goalies should not be used until around age 8 or 9. “Younger kids don’t have the body control yet,” he explains. That means that goalkeepers could easily get kicked and injured. To practice shooting, Coach Ken does drills where the players stand as many feet away from the goal as their age, then kick into the goal. (So if they are 5 years old, they would stand 5 feet away.) Sometimes a child will play goalkeeper in that setting, but the shooters never come into the cordoned-off goalie’s zone.
Starting at this age, kids who have been playing soccer since age 4 are already trying out for competitive teams, according to Coach Ken. Though he and many other coaches wish such tryouts didn’t begin until age 8, he realizes that clubs are forming teams at younger and younger ages – mainly because parents request it. Moms and dads want to ensure that their kids become part of a team early on so they will “grow up” with their teammates and not be left out socially or during game play.
In this age group, teams may play each other 4 v. 4 without a goalkeeper. Coaches will likely be watching from the sidelines. They also may serve as referees, with an actual ref being introduced for kids playing U-8 soccer.
Games will be broken into short time periods, such as four 8-minute quarters at U-6 and U-7 and four 10-minute quarters for U-8. Players won’t necessarily play positions at this point, but they should be getting a chance to touch the ball and dribble it. Games may be scored and reported, depending on the league.
At this level, rule enforcement will be more lenient, though. For instance, when a ball goes out of bounds, kids will kick it in or throw it in. In later years, throw-ins will be more regulated, with both feet needing to remain planted when the ball is thrown.
Coaches who are willing to let your kids try other activities. Coach Ken advises that no matter what option you choose (competitive team or rec league), encourage your child to try other activities too. “When you commit to one sport this early, I think you are denying the child the chance to experience other things in life, and I think it’s a big disadvantage,” says Coach Ken. He adds that kids who start playing competitively at age 5 might burn out by age 15 since they have been going full-tilt for a decade already.
One season, one sport. “There are four seasons of soccer,” says Coach Ken. “I commend parents who allow their children to do a different sport each season, and at most two seasons for the one sport their child really likes.” This approach helps kids avoid burnout and leaves them time for other things like scouting, homework, and free-play with friends.
Time for unsupervised soccer play. Coach Ken recommends looking for a program that is not overly scheduled. “You want kids to be in a program where they are not being too controlled,” he says. “The best thing you can do is let the kids play in the park by themselves with their friends.” When kids aren’t being guided by parents and coaches, he explains, they have the freedom to become more creative in their game play. This is important because during a soccer game the coach is on the sidelines and can’t tell players every little thing they need to do. Kids need to learn to think for themselves and make quick decisions. If your soccer program doesn’t make time for free play, arrange for teammates to get together during off-hours so they can have a fun game without adult intervention.
This is the age group where soccer practice and games really begin to change, says Coach Ken. For one thing, there will be more players in the games. It might be 6 v. 6, including goalkeepers, and referees will be used. Some leagues play 7 v. 7 at U-10. Games will likely consist of two 25-minute “halfs” and the kids will use a larger soccer ball (size 4, not size 3).
Additional rules will be introduced. For instance, referees will penalize kids who are “offsides,” which occurs when they are on the offense and place themselves between all of the defenders and the goalkeeper. (The upshot: An offensive player can’t hang out by the goal waiting for a pass.) At this level, the refs might only penalize kids who are blatantly offsides, rather than those who are just slightly ahead of the defenders.
If you’re interested in what the rules are for your child’s team and age group, ask the coach to explain them to you or to direct you to league materials that can do so.
Note: Recreational (rec) leagues may not exist for every age group, depending on the level of interest in your geographical area. For instance, teams might be U-8, U-10, and U-12, if there aren’t enough kids to also fill the U-9 and U-11 slots.
According to Coach Ken, the main change at this level, U-13 especially, is that kids start playing by FIFA standards. FIFA is the abbreviation for Fédération Internationale de Football Association, which is the international governing body for the sport of soccer, aka “football” in other countries.
Kids will play 9 v. 9 (at U-11 and U-12) and 11 v. 11 at U-13. Each game half will be slightly longer than before, lasting a full 30 minutes. Rules will be more stringently enforced. For instance, offside play (even if it’s just by a few inches) will be called out by refs, and when kids throw in the ball from the sideline, they’d better keep both feet planted until the ball leaves their hands! At U-13, kids will switch from a size 4 soccer ball to a size 5.
Again, the coach can help clear up any confusion you may have, but your child should be old enough to explain the rules to you.
Also important at this age: Soccer clubs will be more keen in their separation of players based on ability, grouping them into A, B, and C teams (and so on, depending on the number of kids in each age group). The best players will start honing their skills so they might one day play on the U.S. National Team. Elite players start being recruited by national soccer talent development groups such as the Olympic Development Program, the U.S. Soccer Development Academy (for boys) and the Elite Clubs National League (for girls). In 2017, the U.S. Soccer Development Academy also plans to launch a program for girls. Parents who have a child on the A team might want to inquire about these organizations.
If your child loves the game, they have the talent, and you really want them to make the A team, you may want to consider enrolling them in private lessons at this point. However, Coach Ken says parents should be sure not to show disappointment if the child doesn’t make the A team … or if they were on the A team one year and are on the B team the next. There are great variations in how each player develops. Some develop early … others may hit a seasonal snag in development due to a factor outside of soccer, such as teenage issues, an injury, a change in coach or players, etc., and they may need more time to bloom or rediscover their form.
As with U-13, kids will play 11 v. 11 (including the goalkeeper) and will play with a size 5 ball. Halves will be 30 minutes each, and there may be 2 or 3 referees on the field after kids progress beyond the U-14 level.

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Schilling v. New Departure-Hyatt Div.
The claimant was represented by Robert B. Cohen, Esq., Levy & Droney, P.C., Pondview Corporate Center, 74 Batterson Park Road, P. O. Box 887, Farmington, CT 06034-0887.
The respondents were represented by Maureen H. Drummond-Closson, Esq., McGann, Bartlett, & Brown, 281 Hartford Tpke., Vernon, CT 06066.
This Petition for Review from the March 1, 1996 Findings of Compensability and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Sixth District was heard November 22, 1996 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners Robin L. Wilson and Amado J. Vargas.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the March 1, 1996 Findings of Compensability and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Sixth District.1 He argues on appeal that the trier erred by finding that the claimant did not have a binaural hearing loss. The respondents have also filed a Motion to Dismiss this appeal. Although we deny the Motion to Dismiss, we affirm the trier’s decision.
The Motion to Dismiss is predicated on the claimant’s failure to file a timely brief. The CRB requested that his brief be filed by September 9, 1996. It was not filed until September 24, 1996. The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on September 20, 1996. Where an appellant fails to file a timely brief, this board retains the discretion to dismiss its appeal. Norton v. James Fleming Trucking, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 472, 474, 2119 CRB-1-94-8 (Sept. 16, 1996). The brief in question was only two weeks late in this case, and the appellees have not demonstrated any prejudice from the late filing. We do not think that this delay was significant enough to warrant dismissal of this appeal, so we deny the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.
To begin, we note two relatively recent decisions by this board. In Ricigliano v. Rex Forge, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 142, 2190 CRB-6-94-10 (Jan. 18, 1996), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 15655 (May 2, 1996), the claimant experienced significant high-frequency binaural hearing loss after years of being exposed to excessive occupational noise. Based upon AMA guidelines, however, the trier determined that the claimant had only sustained a .62% permanent partial hearing loss. The trier observed that the AMA guidelines provide for the measurement of hearing at or above 25 decibels, and up to a frequency of 3000 cycles per second. Id., 144. However, two doctors had found a high frequency hearing loss, and the trier found that the claimant would benefit from the use of a hearing aid. This board held that the trier’s reliance on the AMA guidelines resulted in a permanent partial disability assessment “which did not fairly or accurately reflect the claimant’s undisputed high frequency hearing loss.” Id., 145. In a dissent, Chairman Frankl stated that it was within the discretion of the trier to determine the weight to be given the AMA guidelines.
Nine months later, a different panel considered Blassingame v. Acme Steel Company, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 20, 3007 CRB-6-95-3 (Oct. 8, 1996), in which the facts were substantially the same as in Ricigliano. Again, the trier relied on a doctor’s opinion that the claimant had only a 1% binaural hearing loss based on the AMA formula, despite an undisputed high-frequency hearing loss. Recognizing the similarity of this case to Ricigliano, this board nonetheless stated that reversing the trier’s decision would not “comport with the principles of appellate review that have been enunciated in seminal cases such as Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988), and Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979).” Overturning his ruling would have interfered with the trier’s duty to find facts amidst conflicting evidence, and to weigh the credibility of the evidence. See Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70-71, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995). “Whether or not the AMA guidelines are a fair and appropriate determinant of a claimant’s actual hearing loss in all cases, we cannot say; what we can and must say, however, is that the trial commissioner has the ultimate responsibility and authority to make that decision.” Blassingame was affirmed without a written discussion by the Appellate Court. 45 Conn. App. 914 (1997) (per curiam).
The persuasiveness of the claimant’s reliance on Ricigliano in his brief is thus tempered by our decision in Blassingame. Although the claimant contended at oral argument that the facts of his case materially differ from Blassingame and Ricigliano in that the respondents offered no evidence to support the use of the AMA formula, the record does not mandate the result he seeks. The reports of Dr. Koops (Claimant’s Exhibit F) and Dr. Cavo (Claimant’s Exhibit B) both catalogue symptoms of high-frequency hearing loss. However, none of those reports prescribe a percentage of permanent impairment that the trier could have relied on in making an award. Instead, Dr. Cavo’s report states that the AMA formula can be applied here, leading to the conclusion “that there is no hearing impairment which can be determined on a percentage basis.” Susan Meissner, the audiologist for Drs. Koops and Cavo, also reported a 0% hearing loss based on her calculations from the claimant’s hearing test.
Dr. Cavo indeed indicated that he thought the higher frequency sounds were important, and suggested that “a much better judgment of a person’s disability [than the AMA formula] might be quite simply reached by having an experienced compensation referee look at the pattern of a person’s pure tone thresholds and make a rational call.” Nothing else was done, however, to persuade the trial commissioner to abandon the traditionally persuasive AMA guidelines. It is true that the AMA formula was not described in any detail during the proceedings below, but it does not appear that its specifications and characteristics were questioned by the claimant. Moreover, no contrary evidence was offered to demonstrate the percentage of permanent partial disability that the claimant would have based on his high-frequency hearing loss under some alternative test. The only figures available to the trier were the zero percent figures in the reports of Dr. Cavo and Susan Meissner. As it is the claimant who has the burden of proving permanent partial disability, not the respondent, the trier was certainly entitled to conclude here that the claimant had not proven entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits based on a binaural hearing loss.
AMADO J. VARGAS, COMMISSIONER, DISSENTING. I dissent. I believe that the time has come where, perhaps, we should not recognize the AMA guidelines with respect to certain hearing loss claims. This case is a perfect example. Here, common sense and fairness dictate that claimant has a hearing loss of greater than .62 percent.
Section 31-308 C.G.S. provides specific amounts of compensation for the loss of or loss of use of various body parts, including the sense of hearing. Where a claimant proves that he has lost the use of a certain percentage of his back, or knee, or hand, he is compensated accordingly. Where a claimant proves that he has lost a percentage of his hearing, the same result should follow. The claimant here proved that he had lost a portion of his hearing. In fact, he wore a hearing aid, which his employer purchased for him. Dr. Cavo testified that the AMA formula inaccurately reflected the nature of this situation, and that a better judgment of the claimant’s disability would result from the application of a different test. (Claimant’s Exhibit B). He stated that it was unfortunate that he had been “saddled” with the AMA formula.
I agree with this board’s prior decision in Ricigliano: under the circumstances of both that case and this one, the reliance of a trial commissioner on AMA guidelines resulted in a permanent partial disability assessment that unfairly and inaccurately reflects the claimant’s undisputed high-frequency hearing losses. I believe that the appropriate solution here would be to remand this matter to the trier for a determination of the claimant’s permanent partial hearing loss using a more balanced and appropriate test. The Workers’ Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy to claimants for their work-related injuries. See § 31-284(a). By failing to award compensation to a claimant for an undisputed injury, we are depriving him of any remedy for his loss. Such a result is unjust, and inconsistent with the remedial and humanitarian spirit of the Act. See Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676, 682-83 (1997).
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.


text:
69-109.01. Security interest; personal property; sale by auctioneer; no liability under conditions specified.
The auctioneer, who in good faith and without notice of a security interest therein, sells personal property at auction, which is in fact subject to a security interest, for a principal whose identity has been disclosed, in which property the auctioneer has no interest but acts only as an intermediary of the owner is not liable to the holder of the security interest for any damage sustained as a result of such sale.
Source:Laws 1963, c. 391, § 1, p. 1242; Laws 1969, c. 543, § 2, p. 2194; Laws 1971, LB 961, § 2.
Section held constitutional, but auctioneer to be relieved of liability must meet all conditions, including actual disclosure of principal's identity. State Securities Co. v. Norfolk Livestock Sales Co., Inc., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).
Where auctioneer, in good faith, without notice of security interests of Farmers Home Administration, and for principals whose identities had not been disclosed, sold cattle, he was not liable to government in conversion. United States v. Chappel Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975).
Where security agreement between bank and debtor granted security interest in livestock for farming operations rather than for personal, family, or household purposes or for business purposes, a security interest in livestock used in farming operations, as opposed to inventory, was created. First State Bank v. Maxfield, 485 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1973).
Title to the one hundred forty-five head of cattle passed to H & O Farms at the time the plaintiff delivered them and, therefor, any interest the plaintiff retained was no more than a security interest provided there was no agreement between the parties, either expressly or in course of conduct, that altered the result. Myers v. Columbus Sales Pavilion, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 805 (D. Neb. 1983).

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MUSCLEPHARM CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LIBERTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Plaintiff-Appellant MusclePharm Corporation (“MusclePharm”) appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. (“Liberty”). This insurance coverage lawsuit arises from a United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) investigation of MusclePharm (“the investigation”). We exercise jurisdiction in this diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1332 and affirm.
MusclePharm and Liberty entered into an insurance agreement for the period beginning on January 6, 2013 and ending on January 6, 2014. The agreement, a “claims made policy,” covered “claims first made against” MusclePharm “during the policy ․ or discovery period[s], ․ and reported to” Liberty “as soon as practicable but ․ no ․ later than 60 days after the end of the policy ․ or discovery period[s].” Aplt. App., at 297 (emphasis omitted).
Insured Organization Reimbursement: The Insurer shall pay on behalf of the Insured Organization all Loss which is permitted or required by law to indemnify the Insured Persons as a result of a Claim first made during the Policy Period or Discovery Period, if applicable, against the Insured Persons for a Wrongful Act which takes place before or during the Policy Period.
Id. at 299 (emphasis in original).
The policy provides that an “Insured Organization” is “any entity named in Item 1 of the Declarations.” Id. at 306. And, “MusclePharm Corporation” is named in Item 1. See id. at 297. “Insured Persons” are defined in relevant part as “one or more natural persons who were, now are, or shall hereafter be duly elected or appointed directors or officers of the Insured Organization.” Id. at 306. “Loss” is defined as “sums which the Insured Persons ․ are legally obligated to pay solely as a result of any Claim insured by the Policy, including Defense Costs.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Defense costs” are “reasonable and necessary fees (including attorneys' fees and experts' fees) and expenses incurred in the defense of a Claim.” Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).
(d) a formal criminal, administrative, or regulatory investigation against an Insured Person when such Insured Persons' [sic] receives a Wells Notice or target letter in connection with such investigations.
Id. at 340 (emphasis in original).
(b) any matter claimed against the Insured Persons solely by reason of their status as Insured Persons.
Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
Notice of Circumstance or Wrongful Act: If during the Policy Period the Insureds become aware of any circumstance or Wrongful Act that reasonably may be expected to give rise to a Claim, and if such circumstance or Wrongful Act is reported to the Insurer during the Policy Period in writing with details as to the nature and date of such circumstance or Wrongful Act, the identity of any potential claimant, the identity of any Insured Person involved in such circumstance or Wrongful Act, and the manner in which the Insureds first became aware of such circumstance or Wrongful Act, then any Claim subsequently arising from such circumstance or Wrongful Act shall be deemed under this Policy to be a Claim made during the Policy Period in which the circumstance or Wrongful Act was duly reported to the Insurer.
Id. at 302 (emphasis in original).
On May 16, 2013, the SEC mailed a letter to MusclePharm stating that it was “conducting an inquiry into MusclePharm” and “requesting that MusclePharm voluntarily produce documents” (the “May 16 letter”). Id. at 353. The letter noted, “[t]his inquiry is non-public and should not be construed as an indication that the Commission or its staff believes any violation of law has occurred, nor should you consider it an adverse reflection upon any person, entity, or security.” Id. MusclePharm complied.
Later, on July 8, 2013, the SEC issued an “Order Directing Private Investigation and Designating Officers to Take Testimony” (the “July 8 Order”) to MusclePharm. Id. at 291. The July 8 Order stated that the SEC “has information that tends to show that from at least January 1, 2011,” MusclePharm “possibl[y]” violated provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 292–94. It ordered “that a private investigation be made to determine whether any persons or entities have engaged in, or are about to engage in, any of the reported acts or practices or any acts or practices of similar purport or object.” Id. at 294. It also noted that specific SEC officers may “administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records deemed relevant or material to the inquiry.” Id. at 295. The footer of each page of the July 8 Order contained the following disclaimer: “it should be understood that the Commission has not determined whether any of the persons or companies mentioned in the order have committed any of the acts described or have in any way violated the law.” See id. at 291–95.
Thereafter, the SEC issued 21 subpoenas to MusclePharm and to individual officers and directors. The subpoenas instructed MusclePharm to produce documents. The subpoenas also required individuals to produce documents and to appear for testimony. Cover letters accompanied the subpoenas and noted that “[t]he investigation is confidential and nonpublic and should not be construed as an indication by the Commission or its staff that any violation of the law has occurred, or as a reflection upon any person, entity, or security.” See, e.g., id. at 424.
On February 13, 2015, the SEC issued Wells Notices 1 to Donald Prosser, MusclePharm's Chief Financial Officer at the time, and to Gary Davis, MusclePharm's former Chief Financial Officer. The Wells Notices stated that the SEC “has made a preliminary determination to recommend that the Commission file an enforcement action against” Prosser and Davis. Aplt. App., at 375, 377. On September 8, 2015, the parties settled and the SEC issued Cease-and-Desist Orders against MusclePharm, Prosser, Davis, and two other executives. MusclePharm alleges that it spent more than $3 million responding to the investigation, including more than $1,319,539.73 for “legal and related expenses” and more than $1,708,868.29 in indemnification costs.
On June 20, 2013, MusclePharm sought coverage from Liberty under the policy for its expenditures, attaching the SEC's May 16 letter, and stating that if the SEC's May 16 letter “d[id] not arise to the level of a claim, then” MusclePharm would like it “considered a notice of circumstance.” See id. at 351. On August 21, 2013, MusclePharm forwarded to Liberty the SEC's July 8 Order. On September 18, 2013, based on the May 16 letter and the July 8 Order, Liberty denied coverage. However, Liberty treated the matter as a notice of circumstance under the policy. On May 19, 2015, Liberty wrote that, with the SEC's issuance of Wells Notices to Prosser and to Davis on February 13, 2015, “this matter appears to qualify as an investigation against Insured Persons.” Id. at 382. Liberty has stated that it intends to cover post-Wells notice costs “incurred in connection with a covered claim against Insured Persons,” but it insists that MusclePharm has not yet explained how it calculated its costs. Aplee. Br., at 16 n.9, 16–17.
On February 12, 2015, one day prior to the SEC's issuance of Wells Notices, MusclePharm filed in Colorado state court a three-count complaint against Liberty for breach of contract and statutory and common law bad faith breach of insurance contract. Specifically, MusclePharm asserted that the SEC investigation was a “claim” within the meaning of the policy and Liberty must cover all “loss,” as defined in the policy, which MusclePharm incurred in connection with the covered claim. Id. at 15. On March 18, 2015, Liberty removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1441, and 1332.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Liberty's motion for summary judgment, denied MusclePharm's motion, and dismissed its claims. The district court determined “that the July 8 Order did not allege a ‘Wrongful Act’ within the meaning of the Policy.” Aplt. App., at 74. The court concluded that Liberty did not have a duty to indemnify MusclePharm for costs that it incurred prior to the Wells Notices, and it “had a good faith basis, rooted in the language of the Policy and relevant caselaw, to deny coverage.” Id. at 75. The court entered judgment in Liberty's favor on that same day. MusclePharm timely filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), tolling the time to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The district court denied the motion to reconsider. MusclePharm timely appealed.
MusclePharm raises six issues on appeal. With respect to the denial of its motion for summary judgment, MusclePharm argues that the district court misconstrued the policy terms “claim” and “allege” and therefore erred in concluding that its expenses incurred in responding to the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas are not covered under the policy. MusclePharm also contends that the district court should have addressed “Liberty's refusal to pay all post-Wells Notice defense costs” and discussed the impact of the policy's notice of circumstance provision. As regards the denial of its motion to reconsider, MusclePharm claims that the district court abused its discretion by not considering the absence of exclusionary language in the policy at issue, and by not taking judicial notice of a Liberty policy found online that contained exclusionary language. Finally, MusclePharm asserts that the district court should have considered the affidavit of its expert witness, Peter Kochenburger, which explained the purpose and effect of notice of circumstance provisions.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011). We affirm if “ ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and the moving party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A fact is ‘material’ if under the substantive law it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. An issue is ‘genuine’ if a rational jur[or] could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Adams v. Am. Guarantee and Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “On cross-motions for summary judgment, ․ we must view the inferences to be drawn from affidavits, attached exhibits and depositions in the light most favorable to the party that did not prevail.” Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
This court also “review[s] de novo the district court's interpretation of [an] insurance policy.” Farmington Cas. Co. v. Duggan, 417 F.3d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005). In this diversity action, “[w]e apply Colorado law, interpreting the policy as we think a Colorado court would.” Id. “Colorado courts ‘construe the plain language of the contract to effectuate the intent of the parties, and ․ resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured.’ ” Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Woody Creek Ventures, LLC, 830 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Radil v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 233 P.3d 688, 692 (Colo. 2010)). “The Colorado Supreme Court generally relies on case law from other jurisdictions and recognized dictionary definitions to establish the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined terms in a contract.” Id. A contract should be interpreted “in its entirety with the end in view of seeking to harmonize and to give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless.” Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys., Inc., 208 P.3d 692, 697 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).
MusclePharm first argues that the district court misconstrued the policy's definition of the term “claim.” We disagree, and conclude that MusclePharm is not entitled to recover its expenditures resulting from the July 8 Order and related subpoenas as these expenditures are not covered under the policy.
Aplt. App., at 340 (emphasis in original).
Thus, for coverage under the policy, the following elements must be present: (i) there must be a claim; (ii) the claim must be made during the policy period; (iii) the claim must be lodged against an insured person or an insured organization; and (iv) the claim must be for a wrongful act. These four requirements for coverage were not met until the SEC issued Wells Notices on February 13, 2015. Prior to that time, the SEC had not alleged a “wrongful act,” nor had it targeted a specific insured person. The SEC's issuance of Wells Notices triggered part (d) of the policy's “claim” definition, as the district court held and the parties do not dispute. Therefore, the issue presented is narrowed to whether the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas fall within parts (a) or (c). We conclude they do not.
MusclePharm argues that the SEC subpoenas are covered under part (a) because they are written demands for non-monetary relief. In support of its position, MusclePharm cites to a trial court decision from New York, Syracuse University v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, which rejected the idea that a subpoena is “a mere discovery device,” and instead agreed with cases holding that “government issued subpoenas and other document requests are demands for non-monetary relief” because “relief” is “broad enough to include a demand for ‘something due.’ ” 975 N.Y.S.2d 370 (table), 2013 WL 3357812, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, MusclePharm analogizes the facts of this case to an unpublished Northern District of Illinois decision, Minuteman International, Incorporated v. Great American Insurance Company, which held that an SEC subpoena constituted “a demand for relief” because a subpoena is “a substantial demand for compliance by a federal agency with the ability to enforce its demands.” No. 03 C 6067, 2004 WL 603482, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2004). However, neither ruling is based on the plain meaning of “relief.” See Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Woody Creek Ventures, LLC, 830 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Colorado courts ‘construe the plain language of the contract to effectuate the intent of the parties, and’․ The Colorado Supreme Court generally relies on case law from other jurisdictions and recognized dictionary definitions to establish the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined terms in an insurance contract.”) (citation omitted).
The policy at issue here does not define “relief,” so we must turn to dictionary definitions to establish its plain and ordinary meaning. See id. “Relief” is defined as “legal remedy or redress,” or as “[t]he redress or benefit,” especially “equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a court.” Definition of RELIEF, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relief (last visited Oct. 12, 2017); Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The July 8 Order states that the investigation is “be[ing] made to determine whether any persons or entities have engaged in, or are about to engage in, any of the reported acts or practices or any acts or practices of similar purport or object.” Aplt. App., at 294. Thus, the SEC sought to determine, through documents and testimony, whether there would ultimately be any basis for seeking monetary and/or non-monetary relief from MusclePharm. By this action, the SEC was not seeking relief, but was only gathering information.
Cases arising in similar contexts support the conclusion that the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas were not written demands for non-monetary relief as defined by part (a) of the policy. In an unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit held that subpoenas and civil investigative demands sent by the Federal Trade Commission “sought information related to” its “investigation, not a remedy provided by a court,” excluding them from the plain definition of “relief,” and therefore from constituting a “claim” under the policy at issue. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 524 Fed.Appx. 241, 252 (6th Cir. 2013). In contrast, the Southern District of New York held in Patriarch Partners, LLC v. AXIS Insurance Company that “non-monetary relief” includes an SEC subpoena. 2017 WL 4233078, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017). But in so holding it noted, “[h]ad the parties in this case intended to exclude a subpoena where there was no assertion of civil or criminal liability from the definition of a ‘Claim,’ they could have done so by limiting coverage to demands for non-monetary relief that allege a ‘Wrongful Act.’ ” Id. at *5. That is exactly what MusclePharm and Liberty did here: the policy at issue, like that in ProMedica, “require[d] that ‘relief’ be ‘for a Wrongful Act.’ ” 524 Fed.Appx. at 253.
Under the policy, the insured does not have a covered “claim” without an allegation of wrongdoing against an insured person, and the SEC stated in both the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas that these documents were not alleging wrongdoing. Specifically, these documents noted, “the Commission has not determined whether any of the persons or companies mentioned in the order have committed any of the acts described or have in any way violated the law,” Aplt. App., at 291–95, and “[t]he investigation ․ should not be construed as an indication by the Commission or its staff that any violation of the law has occurred, or as a reflection upon any person, entity, or security.” Id. at 424. Thus, we conclude that the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas are not covered under part (a).
MusclePharm also contends that the July 8 Order “constitutes a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding” under part (c) of the “claim” definition because it “is authorized by Section 20(a) of the Securities Act and Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act,” and because its caption “states that it is a proceeding of the United States of America Before the Securities and Exchange Commission.” Aplt. Opening Br., at 27–28. However, the mere fact that the July 8 Order is captioned as a “proceeding” does not result in its coverage under the policy.
Because the policy did not define “investigation” or “proceeding,” we turn to the plain meaning of these terms and conclude that the events leading up to the SEC's issuance of Wells Notices were part of a “regulatory investigation,” and were not a “proceeding.” The dictionary definition of “proceeding” is “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment,” or “[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The dictionary definition of “investigation” is “[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about something.” Id. The July 8 Order explicitly stated that it was an investigation “to determine whether any persons or entities has engaged in, or are about to engage in, any of the reported acts or practices or any acts or practices of similar purport or object.” Aplt. App., at 294 (emphasis added). This language makes clear that this was an SEC investigation, not a proceeding, and coverage under the policy for a “regulatory investigation” was conditioned on the issuance of a Wells Notice or a target letter.2 Thus, part (c) was not implicated, and a “claim” did not arise under the policy until the SEC issued Wells Notices, which triggered part (d) of the “claim” definition.
The policy defines “Wrongful Act” in part (a) as “any actual or alleged error, misstatement, misleading statement, act, omission, neglect, or breach of duty, actually or alleged[ly] committed or attempted by the Insured Persons in their capacities as such or in an Outside Position, or, with respect to Insuring Agreement 1.3, by the Insured Organization.” Id. at 307 (emphasis in original). Again, the policy does not define “alleged,” and therefore, this court “may utilize the plain and generally accepted meaning of the term.” Bohrer v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., 965 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Colo. 1998). Turning to dictionary definitions, “alleged” means “[a]sserted to be true as described,” or “[a]ccused but not yet tried,” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), and “accused but not proven or convicted,” or “asserted to be true or to exist.” Definition of ALLEGED, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alleged (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
Relying on the provisional language of the July 8 Order and its disclaimers, we conclude that it did not contain an allegation of wrongdoing. The July 8 Order noted that it “should not be construed as an indication by the Commission or its staff that any violation of the law has occurred, nor as a reflection upon any person, entity, or security.” Aplt. App., at 353. The SEC was not asserting that MusclePharm had broken any laws; rather, the SEC was investigating to determine whether it had.
MusclePharm cites to Morden v. XL Specialty Insurance, a case arising from the United States District Court for the District of Utah to argue that such a “narrow” reading of “alleged” “contradicts the District of Utah's interpretation.” 177 F.Supp.3d 1320, 1328 (D. Utah 2016); Aplt. Opening Br., at 32. We see no conflict. In analyzing the policy at issue in Morden, the court noted, “nothing ․ requires that [a] wrongful act ․ be definitively proven,” instead, “wrongful acts include mere allegations of wrongdoing.” 177 F.Supp.3d at 1328. But the Morden court also stated “that notice to hold the insured responsible for a wrongful act must be more than an accusation [of] wrongdoing,” “a naked threat of a future lawsuit,” “or a request for information or an explanation.” Id. (quoting Windham Solid Waste Mgmt. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 146 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)). Our conclusion, which mirrors that of the district court's—that the July 8 Order did not “allege” a “wrongful act”—aligns with Morden's holding that “a request for information” is not a “wrongful act.” See id.
MusclePharm also argues the district court “creates two definitions of ‘allege’ ” by holding that there was no coverage under the policy for the July 8 Order because it did not “allege” a “wrongful act” and simultaneously determining that MusclePharm was entitled to coverage for the Wells Notices because they “allege” a “wrongful act.” Aplt. Opening Br., at 34. These conclusions are not in conflict. MusclePharm attempts to analogize the Wells Notices to the July 8 Order. However, there is no need for us to compare the contents of the documents to respond to MusclePharm's argument.3 The determinative fact is that the policy explicitly states Wells Notices are covered, whereas costs for the July 8 Order which do not “allege” a “wrongful act” are not.
MusclePharm further argues that the district court should have addressed Liberty's obligation and “refusal” “to pay all post-Wells Notice defense costs.” Aplt. Opening Br., at 34 (emphasis omitted). Liberty, in response, asserts that whether it “was obligated to indemnify MusclePharm for post-Wells defense costs was not part of MusclePharm's claim for relief.” Aplee. Br., at 50 (emphasis omitted).
We agree that this issue was not before the district court. MusclePharm filed the complaint on February 12, 2015, which was one day prior to the SEC's issuance of Wells Notices. MusclePharm never amended its complaint to seek coverage for post-Wells Notice defense costs. We read the scope of MusclePharm's claims as the district court read them when addressing this specific argument in its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider. “[T]he complaint itself asserts a claim for breach of contract based on an allegation that ‘the Policy requires Liberty to reimburse MusclePharm for the expenses MusclePharm has incurred in connection with the SEC Proceeding,’ ” which “[t]he complaint makes clear ․ was the SEC's investigation pre-dating issuance of the Wells Notices.” Aplt. App., at 289 (citing complaint and jury demand) (emphasis in original).
We review a grant or denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) under an abuse of discretion standard. Hayes Family Trust v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 845 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2017). “The district court ‘abuses its discretion if it made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 1004–05 (quoting ClearOne Commc'ns v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011)).
“Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). A motion to reconsider “is not appropriate to ․ advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id. It appears that is precisely what MusclePharm attempted to accomplish through its motion to reconsider.
MusclePharm contends that the district court erred in not addressing the policy's notice of circumstance provision, which, it claims, “requires Liberty to reimburse” its “defense costs relating back to” its “notice of circumstance.” As the district court noted, MusclePharm did not raise this argument in its motion for summary judgment, but instead raised it for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. The court generally need not address arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration as they are not properly before the court. See Burnette v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 1988). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not address this belated argument.
MusclePharm also argues that the court abused its discretion by not ruling on its request for judicial notice, which asked the court to take judicial notice of a Liberty policy found online that contained limiting language not included in the policy at issue. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. “Judicial notice is an adjudicative device that alleviates the parties' evidentiary duties at trial, serving as ‘a substitute for the conventional method of taking evidence to establish facts.’ ” York v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d at 948, 958 (10th Cir. 1996). It “is appropriate where a matter is ‘verifiable with certainty,’ ” such as “to establish ‘adjudicative fact[s]’ that are generally known or ‘capable of accurate and ready determination’ by resort to reliable sources.” Id. (citation omitted).
MusclePharm initially sought judicial notice of the online policy in its reply brief in support of its motion for reconsideration. Courts are “reluctant to consider evidence raised only in a reply brief,” W. Coast Life Ins. v. Hoar, 558 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2009), and a party should not “introduce evidence after judgment” has been entered. See Am. Stores Co. v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). For this reason alone, the district court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to consider the online policy.
Also, MusclePharm did not attempt to establish that this document was appropriate for judicial notice. Further, as the policy was undated and unauthenticated, it did not satisfy the basic requirements for judicial notice. Moreover, other circuits have cautioned courts from “finding judicially noticeable facts amongst ․ private corporate websites,” which is where this online policy was found. See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007). Finally, the online policy was not relevant to the court's analysis of the contracted-for policy governing MusclePharm and Liberty's relationship. See Leprino v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 487, 489 (Colo. App. 2013) (“We may not rewrite policy provisions that are clear and unambiguous, and we may neither add provisions to extend coverage beyond that contracted for nor delete them to limit coverage.”).
Next, MusclePharm asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not considering Kochenburger's Affidavit. Again, we disagree. Peter Kochenburger is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law, the Executive Director of the Insurance LLM Program, and the Deputy Director of the Insurance Law Center at the University of Connecticut School of Law. MusclePharm presented his Affidavit for the first time in its motion for reconsideration, and it did not even attempt to show that it “made a diligent yet unsuccessful effort to discover the evidence” earlier. See Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). MusclePharm did not state when it retained Kochenburger, explain why it did not disclose Kochenburger as an expert witness in discovery, or explain why it did not offer his affidavit during summary judgment briefing. The district court was correct in declining to consider MusclePharm's new arguments and new evidence presented in its motion to reconsider.
Also before the court are two motions to seal. We order all of the documents at issue unsealed and third-party names redacted from subpoenas.
We may, in our discretion, “seal documents if the public's right of access is outweighed by competing interests.” Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “In exercising this discretion, we weigh the interests of the public, which are presumptively paramount, against those advanced by the parties.” Id. (citation omitted). “The party seeking to overcome the presumption of public access to the documents bears the burden of showing some significant interest that outweighs the presumption.” Id. (citation omitted). MusclePharm failed to meet its burden, and Liberty has now conceded that its sealed volume should be unsealed. Therefore, we deny both motions.
MusclePharm failed to meet its burden of demonstrating an interest that outweighs the presumption of public access to volumes 2–4 of its appendix. MusclePharm contends that it seeks to file the documents under seal because they were sealed at the district court. But, a “part[y] cannot overcome the presumption against sealing judicial records simply by pointing out that the records are subject to a protective order at the district court.” Id. MusclePharm further asserts that SEC investigations are private, and the sealed volumes contain information generally unavailable to the public. And, MusclePharm claims that the volumes include SEC subpoenas issued to third-parties who are not involved in this litigation. However, MusclePharm does not argue that the confidentiality of these documents outweighs the presumption of public access. See Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2012). This failure alone is sufficient for us to deny its motion.
Moreover, after an examination of the provisionally sealed documents, we determine they should not be sealed. First, Liberty's Executive Advantage Policy should not be sealed because its provisions can be found online, as can its boilerplate language. See Executive Advantage PLUS, Liberty International Underwriters, https://www.liu-usa.com/Pages/ExecutiveAdvantagePLUS.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). And, the policy is extensively quoted and analyzed in the parties' publicly-filed briefs. Second, the July 8 Order should not be sealed because SEC investigations become public when the SEC issues Wells Notices. See, e.g., SEC Charges Sports Nutrition Company with Failing to Properly Disclose Perks for Executives, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-179.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (linking to SEC Orders against MusclePharm, Pyatt, Meer, Davis, and Prosser). Third, for this same reason, the SEC subpoenas should be unsealed. But the names of subpoenaed individuals and entities should be redacted because they are not relevant to the parties' arguments or to the disposition of this case. Fourth, communications between the parties need not be sealed because they simply articulate the parties' positions on coverage under the policy, which are publicly available through the briefs filed in this court. Finally, the communications contain attachments, including the May 16 letter and a letter indicating that the SEC recommends enforcement actions be filed against certain individuals. For the same reason that the July 8 Order and the subsequent subpoenas should be unsealed—because the investigation became public with the Wells Notices—so should these attachments.
Lastly, we note, “where documents are used to determine litigants' substantive legal rights, a strong presumption of access attaches.” Colony, 698 F.3d at 1242 (citation omitted). In this case, the parties dispute whether the July 8 Order and the related subpoenas constitute a claim under the policy and thereby entitle MusclePharm to coverage. These documents are clearly being “used to determine the litigants' substantive legal rights.” See id. Thus, they should all be unsealed, but the names of third party individuals and entities should be redacted from the subpoenas.
Liberty also submitted volume 2 of its supplemental appendix to the court under seal; however, Liberty acknowledged that, beyond complying with the district court's order, it did not have a substantial interest in sealing its volume. We agree. This court is not “bound by the district court's decision to seal certain documents below.” Williams v. FedEx Corporate Servs., 849 F.3d 889, 905 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The documents simply contain communications between Liberty and MusclePharm articulating their coverage positions. Thus, volume 2 of Liberty's appendix is also ordered unsealed.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court and DENY both motions to seal, but order redaction from the subpoenas of the names of third party individuals and entities to be completed by MusclePharm by October 27, 2017.
1. A Wells Notice is an alert “that the SEC's Enforcement Division is close to recommending to the full Commission an action against the recipient and provides the recipient the opportunity to set forth his version of the law or facts.” Aplt. App., at 70 n.6 (quoting SEC v. Orr, 2012 WL 1327786, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 17, 2012)).
2. Patriarch Partners is further distinguishable on this point. In PatriarchPartners, the relevant policy's “claim” definition expressly included the “Investigation of an Insured alleging a Wrongful Act,” where “Investigation” was defined to encompass “an order of investigation or other investigation by the” SEC. 2017 WL 4233078, at *1. In contrast, here an investigation was not covered under the policy until such time as the SEC issued a Wells Notice or a target letter—“at the point when the insured has been charged with wrongdoing.” See id. at *6 (interpreting the policy in ProMedica).
3. But the documents are dissimilar: the Wells Notices indicate that the SEC “has made a preliminary determination to recommend that the Commission file an enforcement action,” which is in stark contrast of the July 8 Orders' disclaimers.

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* For conforming opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, see 66 F.( 2d) 93. [288 U.S. 170, 171] Messrs. Lee M. Friedman and Louis B. King, both of Boston, Mass., for petitioner.
Mr. Martin Witte, of Boston, Mass., for respondent.
In these actions at law, tried together before District Judge James A. Lowell and a jury, respondent obtained judgments, and petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The records on the appeals contained what purported to be bills of exceptions signed by the attorneys for the respective parties and initialed by the District Judge as follows: 'Allowed August 20, 1930, J.A.L., D.J.' The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments upon the sole ground that the bills of exceptions were not sufficiently authenticated, and that it was too late to send the cases back for amendment, as the term for which the judgments were entered had expired and the District Court had lost jurisdiction. 57 F.(2d) 44. This Court granted certiorari. 287 U.S. 586 , 53 S.Ct. 80, 77 L.Ed. --. [288 U.S. 170, 172] There is no question that District Judge Lowell affixed his initials to the bills of exceptions and intended in this manner to authenticate them as allowed. Apparently, in connection with petitioner's application for a rehearing in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Lowell addressed a communication to the judges of that court stating that the bills had been seasonably presented to him, and that he had signed them with his initials intending that they should have full legal effect; he requested that the bills should be returned to him for correction. 1 There was also submitted to the Circuit Court of Appeals a certificate by the clerk of the District Court in which it was stated: 'It has been the practice in this district for a long time for judges, the clerk and deputy clerks and the bar to treat as sufficiently allowed for appellate purposes bills of exceptions signed by the trial judge with either his full name or his initials.' The petition for rehearing was denied.
Under the statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. I, ch. 31, it was essential that exceptions should be authenticated by the seal of the trial justice. Enfield v. Hills, 2 Lev. 236; 2 Inst. 427, 428; 2 Bac. Abr., 326, 327; 2 Tidd's Pr., 789; Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 176 , 33 S.Ct. 1043; Krauss Bros. Co. v. [288 U.S. 170, 173] Mellon, 276 U.S. 386, 389 , 390 S., 48 S.Ct. 358. In the practice of the federal courts, however, it was held that a seal was unnecessary; the signature of the trial judge being sufficient Generes v. Campbell, 11 Wall. 193, 198; Herbert v. Butler, 97 U.S. 319 , 320. Compare Mussina v. Cavazos, 6 Wall. 355, 363; Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354, 357. The Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, 4 (17 Stat. 197, R.S. 953) expressly dispensed with the necessity of a seal, but retained the requirement of the signature of the judge of the court in which the cause was tried. Herbert v. Butler, supra; Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281, 286 , 287 S., 20 S.Ct. 115; Krauss Bros. Co. v. Mellon, supra. As amended by the Act of June 5, 1900, c. 717 (31 Stat. 270, 28 U.S.C. 776 (28 USCA 776)), the statute provides for the signature of another judge of the court in certain contingencies. 2 [288 U.S. 170, 174] The statute does not prescribe the form of signature. The manifest purpose is authentication by the proper judge. In the absence of such authentication there is no bill of exceptions which the appellate court may consider. Malony v. Adsit, supra; Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U.S. 322, 330 , 25 S.Ct. 28; McCuing v. Bovay (C.C.A.) 60 F.(2d) 375, 376. Compare Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, 201, 202. Appropriate disapproval of the practice of signing by initials such important documents as bills of exceptions, and insistence upon a method of signature more in keeping with the formal character of the proceeding, do not reach the question now presented. That question is not whether the signature is informal, but whether there is a signature. If the attempted authentication by Judge Lowell be deemed to be merely informal or irregular, but not a nullity, the defect could be disregarded or cured by amendment. R.S. 954, 28 U.S. C. 777 (28 USCA 777). See, also, 28 U.S.C. 391 (28 USCA 391). Thus, in Idaho & Oregon Land Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 509 , 10 S.Ct. 177, the clerk of the court below in attempting to authenticate the record had appended the seal of the court but had failed to comply with the rule of this court in affixing his signature. The court said (page 513 of 132 U.S. 10 S.Ct. 177, 178): 'The question presented is not one of no authentication, but of irregular or imperfect authentication; not of jurisdiction, but of practice. It is therefore within the discretion of this court to allow the defect to be supplied.' And as it appeared to be then 'too late to take a new appeal or writ of error,' the court permitted the record to be withdrawn 'for the purpose of having the certificate of authentication perfected by adding the signature of the clerk.' A defect or inaccuracy in mere matters of form can be corrected, notwithstanding the end of the term. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 , 35 S.Ct. 16.
The Circuit Court of Appeals felt constrained to reach its conclusion, that the attempted authentication was a nullity, by reason of the decisions of this Court in Origet [288 U.S. 170, 175] v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 243 , 244 S., 8 S.Ct. 846, 848, and Kinney v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 222 U.S. 283, 284 , 32 S.Ct. 101, 102. Neither of these decisions is strictly in point. In the Origet Case, at the foot of a paper entitled 'Bill of Exceptions,' appeared the following: 'Allowed and ordered on file November 22, '83. A.B.' Referring to the Act of 1872 (R.S. 953) the court said: 'This provision merely dispensed with the seal. The necessity for the signature still remains. We cannot regard the initials 'A.B.' as the signature of the judge, or as a sufficient authentication of the bill of exceptions, or as sufficient evidence of its allowance by the judge or the court. Therefore the questions purporting to be raised by the paper cannot be considered.' In the Kinney Case, the record did not contain any bill of exceptions. There was a paper styled 'Exceptions to the Charge to Jury,' which was initialed 'J. B. McP., Trial Judge,' and signed by the plaintiff. The court said that this paper was 'not a bill of exceptions,' citing the Origet Case, but the court added that 'if it were to be treated as a bill of exceptions' it could not avail, as all the matters in question depended upon 'examination of the evidence, which is not in the record,' and hence the court had 'no means of determining whether reversible error arose from an action of the court on any of the subjects to which the paper refers.' Thus, in the Kinney Case, the present question was not necessarily involved, and in the Origet Case the court was unable to regard the initials as to signature of the judge. In the instant case, it appears that the trial judge did affix his initials in order to authenticate the bills of exceptions, and he added the initials 'D.J.' for the obvious purpose of referring to his office and characterizing his action as official. So far as the statements in the opinions of the Origet and Kinney Cases may be taken to imply that such an authentication by the trial judge is void and that bills of exceptions so allowed cannot be consid- [288 U.S. 170, 176] ered, or the informality be corrected, the statements are not approved.
The statute contains no indication that the word 'sign' is used in other than the ordinary sense. The statute gives neither definition nor qualification. Signature by initials has been held to be sufficient under the Statute of Frauds3 and the Statute of Wills, and in other transactions. 4 It has been held in some states5 that a different rule obtains in the case of the official signature of certain judicial officers, but the Congress has not established such a rule for the judges of the federal courts. Nor, in the absence of special statutory requirement, is there a uniform custom in relation to official signatures. It may be assumed that a requirement of the officer's signature, without more, means that he shall write his name or his distinctive appellation; but the question remains as to what writing of that character is to be deemed sufficient for the purpose of authenticating his official act. There is no rule that he shall adhere to the precise form of his name as it appears in his commission. The full name of [288 U.S. 170, 177] the officer may or may not be used. Not infrequently christian names are omitted, in part or altogether, or are abbreviated or indicated by initials. In some of the most important communications on behalf of the federal government, only the surname of the officer is used. When an officer authenticates his official act by affixing his initials he does not entirely omit to use his name; he simply abbreviates it; he uses a combination of letters which are part of it. Undoubtedly that method is informal, but we think that it is clearly a method of 'signing.' It cannot be said in such a case that he has utterly failed to 'sign,' so that his authentication of his official act, in the absence of further statutory requirement, is to be regarded as absolutely void.
We do not approve the signing of bills of exceptions merely by the initials of the judge, but we regard the question as one of practice; of regularity, not of validity. In the instant cases, the District Judge authenticated his allowance of the bills of exceptions by a form of signature easily and actually identified as his. No one was misled or injured. We perceive no reason why petitioner should lose its right to have the rulings upon the trial appropriately reviewed by the appellate court, merely because the District Judge failed to sign his full name. This is precisely the sort of defect which the Congress has provided shall not impair the substantial rights of the parties. 28 U.S.C. 391 (28 USCA 391). At most, in the interest of a better practice, the bills of exceptions could have been returned for a more formal signature; but even that course was not necessary.
The judgments are reversed, and the causes are remanded to the Circuit court of Appeals for hearing upon the merits.
[ Footnote 3 ] Salmon Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446, 454; Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp, 513; Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L.T.(N.S .) 433, 443; Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen (Mass.) 474, 478; Smith v. Howell, 11 N.J.Eq. 349, 357, 358; Burns v. Burrows, 196 Iowa, 1048, 1056, 196 N.W. 62; Browne on the Statute of Frauds (5th Ed.) 362.
[ Footnote 4 ] Re Savory, 15 Jur. 1042; Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 229-232, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.Rep. 798; In re Estate of Kimmel, 278 Pa. 435, 440, 441, 123 A. 405, 31 A.L.R. 688; Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 84 S. E. 667, L.R.A. 1915D, 902; Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 443, 447; Brown v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 443, 444, 41 Am.Dec. 755; Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio (N.Y.) 471, 479; Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 432; Jarman on Wills (6th Ed.) pp. 107, 108.
[ Footnote 5 ] See Fairbanks v. Beard, 247 Mass. 8, 141 N.E. 590, 30 A.L.R. 698; Smith v. Geiger, 202 N.Y. 306, 95 N.E. 706; Conery v. His Creditors, 115 La. 807, 40 So. 173. Compare Blades v. Lawrence, L.R. 9 Q.B. 374. See, also, 29 A.L.R.ann. 919, et seq., 72 A.L.R.ann. 1290, et seq.

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