In 2001 the two female justices on the U.S. Supreme Court spoke out about the quality of legal representation afforded to criminal defendants facing the death penalty in this nation.
that 12% of those condemned to death from 1976 to 1999 were represented by “an attorney who had been, or was later, disbarred or suspended—disciplinary sanctions reserved for conduct so incompetent, unethical or even criminal that the state believes an attorney’s license should be taken away.” The newspaper said that an additional 9.5% had “received a new trial or sentencing because their attorney’s competence rendered the verdict or sentence unfair, court records show.” (Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict”).
Less than a year later (September 9, 2000) the Charlotte Observer reported that at least 16 condemned inmates in North Carolina, including 3 who had been executed, were represented by attorneys who have been disbarred or disciplined for unethical or criminal conduct.
The following day the Dallas Morning News reported that it had examined 461 capital cases in Texas and found that one in four of the condemned inmates had been represented at trial or on appeal by court-appointed attorneys who had been disciplined for professional misconduct at some point in their careers. (“Quality of Justice,” 09/10/2000).
Reports like these, and its own experience with death penalty cases in Texas, prompted the Texas Defender Service to undertake a study of the quality of legal representation provided in capital cases. “Death row inmates today face a one-in-three chance of being executed without having the case properly investigated by a competent attorney and without having any claims of innocence or unfairness presented or heard.” (“Lethal Indifference: The Fatal Combination of Incompetent Attorneys and Unaccountable Courts,” 2002).
lled Ms. Guidry’s parents. Seeing this, Ms. Robinson bolted from the truck, ran into the Guidry residence, and hid until Koon had departed. See: Koon v. Cain, 277 Fed.Appx. 381, 382; 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 9478 (5th Cir. 2008).
Upon leaving the Guidry residence, Koon drove to Livingston Parish where he surrendered to law enforcement authorities. He was subsequently indicted for three counts of capital murder. The trial court assigned the local public defender’s office to represent Koon. The defendant expressed dissatisfaction at the appointment, prompting the court to appoint a private attorney named Kevin Monahan to represent him along with the public defender’s office. A second private attorney named Denise Vinet was soon substituted to replace the public defender’s office in the case. Id.
The trial began in March 1995. Before any testimony could be taken, Monahan informed the court that Ms. Vinet wanted to withdraw from the case. The lead attorney told the court that Ms. Vinet’s assistance was not needed. Ms. Vinet concurred, telling the court that Monahan had not asked her to do a thing on the case. The trial court granted Ms. Vinet’s motion to withdraw, but only after Koon waived any objection. No additional counsel was appointed to the case. Id.
Koon’s wife had left him.
The defendant has become ill.
He had a tax lien levied against him.
Ms. Robinson had told him in the truck on the way to the Guidry residence that his estranged wife was having an affair.
While Koon had stated he was not using drugs or alcohol when he killed the three people, he had been using drugs (Xanax) and alcohol earlier that morning as well as in the preceding weeks, and this led Monahan to believe that his client was suffering from “withdrawal” at the time of the murders. Id., 277 Fed.Appx. at 383.
Monahan theorized that these factors, particularly the “detoxification effects” of the drug withdrawal, and the “bad week” rendered Koon “unable to tell right from wrong when he shot his estranged wife and her parents.” Id. In support of this theory, Monahan enlisted the assistance of several medical experts. He finally identified Dr. Marc Zimmerman as his chief expert and hired the doctor the day before the trial commence. Id.
This tactical decision proved to be a disaster. Dr. Zimmerman, who had only one hour to interview Koon before the start of trial, testified that “detoxification contributed to [Koon’s] inability to tell right from wrong at the time of the killings.” Id., at 384. State prosecutors knew a “turkey in the woods” when they saw one. They called Dr. Donald Hoppe in rebuttal to Dr. Zimmerman. Hoppe did not spare the rod of criticism. He pointed out that Zimmerman had conducted only a “cursory interview” with Koon and had not interviewed any of his friends or family members. While Dr. Hoppe, a clinical psychologist, had not interviewed Koon, he had reviewed the results of “the MMPI test conducted by Zimmerman” and determined that Koon was: 1) a lair, 2) not remorseful, 3) manipulative, and 4) violent. Id.
“Koon’s insanity/manslaughter defense was dealt another blow when Robinson, the lone eyewitness to the killings, whom Monahan had failed to interview prior to trial, contradicted Koon’s own testimony by denying that she had told him shortly before the killings that his wife was having an affair with one Joey Leblanc, a person Koon particularly disliked because he had been betrayed by Leblanc in the past. Robinson also contradicted Koon’s testimony that he had consumed alcohol and drugs (including Xanax) the morning of the killings.” Id.
Koon was convicted on three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. He then filed an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The trial court heard, and rejected, Koon’s request to have 33 witnesses subpoenaed to support his ineffective assistance claim. The trial court, however, did permit two witnesses to testify: Monahan and Ms. Vinet. But their testimony did not persuade the trial judge who denied the post-conviction application, concluding that Monahan “did a good job with what he had to work with.” Id.
Koon thereafter petitioned to the federal district court for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After an exhaustive review of the state court record, the federal district court found that Koon had been denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt/innocence and penalty phases of the trial. The district court reversed Koon’s conviction and death sentence, remanding the case back to state authorities for a new trial. The State elected to appeal to the Fifth Circuit which upheld the district court’s order. Id., at 382-83.
“The Supreme Court has held that a state court’s decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case is sufficient for a federal habeas court to grant the writ. For a federal court to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent ‘unreasonable,’ however, the state court’s decision must have been more than simply incorrect or erroneous; its application of federal law must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’ Moreover, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and the federal court only reviews the facts for clear and convincing error.” Id., at 385.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court had paid proper deference to the state court record and had reached a correct determination in granting the writ of habeas corpus. Id. The appeals court further found that Koon had satisfied the dual mandate of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) in making his ineffective assistance claim: Monahan’s performance was deficient and (2) that deficient performance caused actual prejudice to the defendant’s defense. Id., 466 U.S. at 687.
To prove deficient performance under Strickland, a state prisoner must “demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under the then “prevailing professional norms.” Id., 466 U.S. at 688. The Supreme Court has recognized that the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice is the barometer for measuring “what is reasonable.” See: Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005). While the Fifth Circuit applies a strong presumption that counsel performed adequately and insulates his informed tactical decisions from ineffectiveness attack unless they are so egregious as to render the entire trial unfair, the appeals court has recognized the distinction between strategic judgment decisions and omissions that amount to no strategic decision at all. See: Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 608 (5th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 604 (5th Cir. 1999).
Deficient performance alone is not enough to secure ineffective assistance relief. The state prisoner must establish prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under confidence in the outcome.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this prejudice requisite to mean that there is a harmful constitutional trial error only if there is “more than a reasonable probability that it contributed to the verdict.” See: Mayabb v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1999).
”Monahan’s defensive strategy centered on Koon’s mental state at the time of the killings, and Robinson was the only eyewitness to them and to Koon’s behavior in the hours preceding the shootings. As such, she was the only person who could speak to Koon’s mental state leading up to and during the event. Monahan should have interviewed her to ascertain what she intended to say at trial, especially whether she would corroborate Koon’s intended testimony about his mental state, around which Monahan’s entire defense was structured. Monahan failed even to attempt to interview her, though, and Robinson ultimately took the stand and directly contradicted Koon’s testimony that she had told him that his wife was having an affair. The prejudicial effect of this contradiction cannot be overstated because Monahan had theorized that Robinson’s testimony would bolster Koon’s ‘heat of passion’ defense, not undermine it. Furthermore, Robinson subsequently recanted her trial testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing and admitted that she had told Koon about the affair before the killings, stating further that she would have told the truth at trial if Monahan had merely approached her ahead of time and assured her that she would not be held criminally responsible for the killings.
”The State advances a number of excuses for Monahan’s failure to interview Robinson, e.g., it was his policy not to interview government witnesses; there was no guarantee that she would have come clean and told the truth at trial even if she had been approached by Monahan; she was not a credible witness; and so on and so forth–none of which justify his conduct. Irrespective of Robinson’s credibility (or lack thereof) and whether she would have actually told the truth as she now insists, Monahan had an absolute obligation to interview her as the only eyewitness to the crime: Her testimony was crucial to Monahan’s defensive theory. If he had interviewed her and then decided not to call her to testify, his decision might be excusable as strategic. His failure to interview her altogether, though, is deficient per se, at least under the specific circumstances present here.
“Monahan’s decision not to hire Zimmerman, his primary mental health expert, until one day before trial exacerbates his overall deficient performance. Monahan came up with the detoxification facet of the mental health defense because Koon had told him that he was not using drugs or alcohol when he shot his wife and her parents (Koon later revealed, during the federal evidentiary hearing, that he was in fact using at the time). Zimmerman was able to conduct a few tests on Koon, but only met with him for one hour and could not consult with any of his family members or friends before testifying. The State’s opposing expert, Hoppe, severely undermined Zimmerman’s testimony, highlighting the limited time and information available to Zimmerman. This rebuttal testimony went uncontested by Monahan. In fact, Zimmerman was not even present for Hoppe’s testimony, as Monahan had failed to ensure that Zimmerman was on hand to assist Monahan in cross-examination. At the federal evidentiary hearing, Koon’s experts testified that Zimmerman had insufficient time to develop a complete psychological history and insufficient information on which to base an opinion of Koon’s mental state at the time of the killings, which left Zimmerman’s testimony vulnerable to attack and resulted in severe damage to the detoxification aspect of Koon’s mental health defense.
”The State attempts to make much of the fact that Koon’s experts at the federal evidentiary hearing had the benefit of basing their testimony on Koon’s revelation that he actually had been using drugs and alcohol at the time of the killings, insisting that Koon’s self-serving change in testimony cannot serve as the basis for arguing that Monahan’s assistance was ineffective. Even if we acknowledge that Koon’s defense would have been better served if he had admitted his drug and alcohol use, and even if we concede that Koon is solely to blame for the detoxification theory employed by Monahan, we still must evaluate the actual execution and quality of the defense as presented. And, it is apparent that this aspect of Koon’s defense, predicated as it was on the effects of withdrawal, was hamstrung by Monahan’s failure to hire Zimmerman until the eve of trial. The state court had granted Monahan the authority and funds to hire a mental health expert nearly a year before trial, yet he procrastinated until the last minute. Not only did Monahan make a questionable decision to pursue a detoxification defense on his own (without first consulting a medical professional and substantiating his theory), but he then severely limited the effectiveness of even that questionable defense by enlisting an expert who was not given even minimally sufficient time to gather information in support of his opinions.
”Considering Monahan’s failure to interview Robinson and his botched handling of Zimmerman, together with his other deficiencies identified by the district court, we see as inescapable the conclusion that Monahan’s performance was deficient during the guilt/innocence phase of Koon’s trial. Equally inescapable is the conclusion that Koon was prejudiced by Monahan’s deficient performance: There is a reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted Koon of a lesser offense than first degree murder if Monahan’s performance had not been deficient.
”If Monahan had interviewed Robinson before trial, she may have told the truth instead of controverting Koon’s testimony regarding his mental state at the time of the killings. It follows that the jury could have and likely would have given greater consideration to the ‘heat of passion’ aspect of Koon’s defense. If, on the other hand, Robinson had continued to insist on denying that she had told Koon about his wife’s affair after Monahan interviewed her, he would have been aware of Robinson’s intended testimony and could have adjusted his defensive strategy accordingly and mitigated the damaging effects of Robinson’s testimony. Furthermore, if Zimmerman had been retained a reasonable time in advance of trial, he would have had plenty of time to evaluate Koon and interview his friends and family. That way, Zimmerman could have formulated a more informed opinion on Koon’s mental state and been prepared to support and defend that opinion on cross-examination. In short, if Monahan’s performance had not been deficient and prejudicial, it is probable that Koon’s level of culpability would have been reduced in the eyes of the jury. These failings by Monahan, which subverted both the insanity and manslaughter aspects of Koon’s defense, undermine any confidence we might otherwise have in the propriety of his first degree murder conviction. Based on the foregoing considerations, the state court’s ruling that Koon was not denied effective assistance of counsel during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial is objectively unreasonable.” Id., at 386-89 [Emphasis original].
It is our firm belief that the only way to truly reform the death penalty system is to abolish the punishment. The courts will never appoint rich and powerful attorneys on a regular basis in death penalty cases. The quality of representation in these cases will most always be lacking because most appointed attorneys do not have the time (due to heavy caseloads), the means (such as support staff) to amass a viable defense, or the resources (finances for experts and investigators) to support that defense. A person’s life should not hang in the balance based on the quality of legal representation he or she receives. Further more, our judicial system, as good as it is, obviously allows for erroneous conclusions by juries. Just look at the number of convicts exonerated by DNA evidence. Those people had their day in court before a fair jury, right? It is simply the nature of the beast that some jury verdicts will be wrong. We should not allow the ultimate penalty, from which there is no return, to rest in such an imperfect dispute resolution system. Do away with the punishment – and this ugly controversy ceases to exist.


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The CJEU Preliminary Ruling in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV – where are we now?
Home Perspectives The CJEU Preliminary Ruling in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV – where are we now?
On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) published its preliminary ruling in Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV (Ruling), which held that the application of the investor-state dispute settlement provision at Article 8 of the Netherlands-Slovakia bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was incompatible with EU law.
See our analysis of the Ruling here. In that article, we considered some of the questions raised by the Ruling, as well as the possible effects on arbitration under intra-EU investment treaties. While the position remains unclear, there have since been a number of developments that could go some way to providing clarity in the future.
The tribunal in Addiko v. Croatia was fully constituted on March 19, 2018 with ICSID ’s appointment of Jean Kalicki as presiding arbitrator.1 As we understand it, this is one of a number of claims under the Austria-Croatia BIT brought by Austrian banks against Croatia following the enactment of legislation that converted Swiss franc-denominated mortgages and other loans into euros.2 This is also the first ICSID tribunal to be constituted to hear claims arising under an intra-EU BIT following the Ruling. In the likely event that Croatia disputes the tribunal’s jurisdiction in reliance on the Ruling, the tribunal’s decision may give guidance as to the likely significance and effect to be attributed to the Ruling (if any) by ICSID tribunals hearing claims arising under intra-EU BITs.
Hungary’s application for annulment of the award in Dan Cake v. Hungary was registered on March 28, 2018. While the grounds relied on in the annulment application are not public, the application followed hot on the heels of the Ruling and it seems likely that the Ruling could, at least in part, form the basis for Hungary’s application. If this is the case, then any decision on the annulment application may provide further clarity as to the approach that may be adopted by ICSID tribunals (and ad hoc committees) in the future.
In its Procedural Order No. 9 dated April 9, 2018 dismissing a request by Spain to the tribunal to inter alia “supplement or interpret” the award in relation to six issues regarding the applicability and relevance of EU law and its relationship with the ECT, the tribunal noted that it did not consider there to be any valid grounds for “supplementing” the award on this point and further that “it was not empowered to make a renewed assessment of the Respondent’s case on the merits.”4 The Ruling is not explicitly referenced in the decision, but it is likely that it would have been relied upon by Spain in its request dated March 13, 2018 and no doubt the tribunal would have considered its relevance and applicability to Spain’s request.
However, the award will not do much to alleviate concern among claimant investors relying on intra-EU BITs since, in contrast to intra-EU BITs (including the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, which is the subject-matter of the Ruling), the EU itself is a signatory to the ECT and, thus, has arguably consented to investment-treaty claims brought under the ECT’s dispute resolution clause. Interestingly, in what could be said to be obiter comments, the tribunal stated that the Ruling was of only “limited application” to BITs concluded between EU member states.7 How that application is limited is not clear pending sight of the award itself, but it may be based on a commonly held view that the Ruling only applies to arbitrations seated within the EU. ICSID arbitrations, which comprise the vast majority of investment treaty disputes, are seated in Washington, D.C., and as such fall outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
Investors seeking to enforce awards rendered under intra-EU investment treaties involving member states are likely to face ongoing difficulties. In an interview with the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, Secretary-General of ICSID Meg Kinnear noted that, in relation to non-compliance with arbitral awards rendered under the ICSID Convention based on the allegation that compliance with such arbitral awards are inconsistent with EU law, “[t]he ICSID secretariat needs to be impartial and that means not commenting on legal decisions. We are carefully watching the impact of the decision, and it is being raised by parties in a number of ICSID cases.”8 Enforcement proceedings arising out of the award in Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20) are currently on foot in a number of jurisdictions, including Washington, D.C., England and Wales, Romania and Sweden. Eiser and Novenergia are also seeking to enforce awards against Spain in the United States. It remains to be seen how these courts will deal with the Ruling.
Meanwhile, in a letter dated April 26, 2018, Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Sigrid A.M. Kaag told the lower house that in the light of the Ruling the Dutch government sees no other option than to terminate the now arguably defunct Netherlands-Slovakia BIT and 12 further BITs with other EU member states that contain similar dispute resolution clauses. It is reported that the letter also proposed that all investment agreements between EU member states be terminated by way of a multilateral termination treaty.9 It is unclear how such a treaty would address the sunset provisions contained in the majority of BITs.
The Netherlands has also published a new draft-model BIT with radical proposals to do away with party appointed arbitrators and so-called “double-hatting,” which prevents the appointment of any arbitrator who has acted as legal counsel in an investment-treaty dispute in the preceding five years. In the current climate, it seems likely that other EU member states will follow suit.
The Ruling has had wide-ranging effects on ongoing arbitration proceedings in various fora and, more generally, on the approach to dispute resolution between EU member states. While recent decisions in proceedings under the ECT may suggest a reluctance to attribute significance to the Ruling outside of arbitrations under intra-EU BITs, it remains to be seen how tribunals in ICSID and other, ad hoc arbitrations will deal with the Ruling, and, critically, whether any awards rendered in investor-state disputes involving EU member states will be enforceable.
Novenergia v. Spain (SCC Case No. 063/2015), Procedural Order No. 9 dated April 9, 2018.
The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2018-1).
Interview with Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, by Crina Baltag (acting editor) on April 15, 2018, us6.campaign-archive.com.

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Πτυχίο Χημείας από τη Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών του Αριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης (2005). Μεταπτυχιακές Σπουδές στην Προχωρημένη Χημική Ανάλυση (2007) και PhD στην Προχωρημένη Χημική Ανάλυση – Αρχαιομετρία (2010) στο Τμήμα Χημείας του Αριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης. Έχει εργαστεί ως Ερευνητής στο Εργαστήριο Αρχαιομετρίας του Ινστιτούτου Πολιτιστικής και Εκπαιδευτικής Τεχνολογίας (ΙΠΕΤ) στη Ξάνθη (2006-2009). Από το 2011 εργάζεται ως Μεταδιδακτορικός Ερευνητής σε διάφορα Ερευνητικά Προγράμματα (π.χ. NARNIA, STARLAB) στην Ερευνητική Μονάδα Αρχαιολογίας του Τμήματος Ιστορίας και Αρχαιολογίας του Πανεπιστημίου Κύπρου.
Τα ερευνητικά του ενδιαφέροντα περιλαμβάνουν: χημική ανάλυση αρχαίων κραμάτων χαλκού και χρυσού, χημική ανάλυση αρχαίων χρυσών και αργυρών νομισμάτων, χημική και ορυκτολογική ανάλυση και μελέτη Κυπριακής Μεσαιωνικής εφυαλωμένης κεραμικής, χημική ανάλυση αρχαίας κεραμικής με καταστρεπτικές και μη-καταστρεπτικές αναλυτικές τεχνικές.
MARKOU, E., CHARALAMBOUS, A., and KASSIANIDOU, V., 2014. pXRF analysis of Cypriot gold coins of the Classical Period, American Journal of Numismatics Second Series 26: 33-60.
CHARALAMBOUS, A., KASSIANIDOU, V., and G. PAPASAVVAS, 2014. A compositional study of Cypriot bronzes dating to the Early Iron Age using portable X-ray fluorescence spectrometry (pXRF), Journal of Archaeological Science 46: 205-216.
CHARALAMBOUS, A.C., SAKALIS, A.J., KANTIRANIS, N.A., PAPADOPOULOU, L.C., TSIRLIGANIS, N.C. and STRATIS, J.A, 2010. Cypriot Byzantine Glazed Pottery: A study of the Paphos Workshops, Archaeometry, 52 (4), 628-643.
STRATIS, J.A., LALIA-KANTOURI, M., CHARALAMBOUS, E., CHARALAMBOUS, A., KANTIRANIS, N., 2010. Thermal, Chemical and Mineralogical Characterization of Ceramic Tobacco Pipes from Cyprus, Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry, Special Volume for Cultural Heritage, 1, 7.
CHARALAMBOUS, A. and Economou, E., 2005. A study on the utility of bismuth-film electrodes for the determination of In(III) in the presence of Pb(II) and Cd(II) by square wave anodic stripping voltammetry, Analytica Chimica Acta, 547, 53-58.
CHARALAMBOUS, A., 2015. pXRF analysis of Cypriot copper alloy artefacts dating to the Late Bronze and the Iron Age. Στο: THE NARNIA PROJECT, INTEGRATING APPROACHES TO ANCIENT MATERIAL STUDIES, Vasiliki Kassianidou & Maria Dikomitou-Eliadou (Eds.), 134-145.
CHARALAMBOUS A. 2014. Cypriot Medieval Glazed Pottery: A Study on Provenance and Manufacture. Στο: Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzi and Nicholas Coureas (Eds), Cypriot Medieval Ceramics: Reconsiderations and New Perspectives, A.G.Leventis Foundation and Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 279-298.
CHARALAMBOUS A. and V. KASSIANIDOU 2014 Appendix I. pXRF chemical analysis of copper alloy artefacts from Palaepaphos – Plakes. Στο: V. Karageorghis and E. Raptou, Necropoleis at Palaepaphos from the End of the Late Bronze Age to the Cypro-Archaic Period. Nicosia: The Cyprus Institute. 119-125.
CHARALAMBOUS A. and V. KASSIANIDOU 2012 Appendix I. Chemical analyses of metal artefacts from Late Cypriot tombs excavated in the Limassol area with the employment of pXRF. Στο: V. Karageorghis and I. Violaris, Tombs of the Late Bronze Age in the Limassol Area Cyprus (17th -13th Centuries BC). Municipality of Limassol. 37-45.
Chemistry degree from the Faculty of Sciences of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (2005). Graduate studies in Advanced Chemical Analysis (2007) and PhD in Advanced Chemical Analysis – Archaeometry (2010) from the Chemistry Department of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He has worked as a research fellow at the Archaeometry Laboratory of the Cultural and Educational Technology Institute (CETI) at Xanthi (2006-2009). Since 2011 he has been working as a Postdoctoral Researcher in various Research Programs (e.g. NARNIA, STARLAB) at the Archaeological Research Unit of the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Cyprus.
His research interests include: chemical analysis of ancient copper alloy and gold artefacts, chemical analysis of ancient gold and silver coins, chemical and mineralogical analysis and study of Cypriot Medieval glazed pottery, chemical analysis of ancient ceramics with destructive and non-destructive techniques.
CHARALAMBOUS, A., 2015. pXRF analysis of Cypriot copper alloy artefacts dating to the Late Bronze and the Iron Age. In: THE NARNIA PROJECT, INTEGRATING APPROACHES TO ANCIENT MATERIAL STUDIES, Vasiliki Kassianidou & Maria Dikomitou-Eliadou (Eds.), 134-145.
CHARALAMBOUS A. 2014. Cypriot Medieval Glazed Pottery: A Study on Provenance and Manufacture. In: Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzi and Nicholas Coureas, Cypriot Medieval Ceramics: Reconsiderations and New Perspectives, A.G.Leventis Foundation and Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 279-298.
CHARALAMBOUS A. and V. KASSIANIDOU 2014 Appendix V. Chemical analyses of copper alloy artefacts from Pyla-Kokkinokremos using portable X-Ray Fluorescence. In: V. Karageorghis and A. Kanta, Pyla-Kokkinokremos : a late 13th century BC fortified settlement in Cyprus, excavations 2010-2011. Uppsala: Åströms Förlag. 197-204.
CHARALAMBOUS A. and V. KASSIANIDOU 2014 Appendix I. pXRF chemical analysis of copper alloy artefacts from Palaepaphos – Plakes. In: V. Karageorghis and E. Raptou, Necropoleis at Palaepaphos from the End of the Late Bronze Age to the Cypro-Archaic Period. Nicosia: The Cyprus Institute. 119-125.
CHARALAMBOUS A., DIKOMITOU-ELIADOU M. and V. KASSIANIDOU2013A preliminary chemical study of Grey and Black Polished II (IV) pottery with the employment of pXRF. In: G. Georgiou and V. Karageorghis, A Cypro-Archaic tomb at Xylotymbou and three Cypro-Classical tombs at Phlasou: from exuberance to recession. Uppsala: Åströms Förlag. 59-63.
CHARALAMBOUS A. and V. KASSIANIDOU 2012 Appendix I. Chemical analyses of metal artefacts from Late Cypriot tombs excavated in the Limassol area with the employment of pXRF. In: V. Karageorghis and I. Violaris, Tombs of the Late Bronze Age in the Limassol Area Cyprus (17th -13th Centuries BC). Municipality of Limassol. 37-45.

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Today, June 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court deadlocked in a 4 to 4 split in the long-awaited case, United States v. Texas, effectively upholding the lower court’s injunction halting the expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and the creation of a new program known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). The original DACA program remains in place.
The case, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, concerned a 2014 executive action by the president to allow as many as five million unauthorized immigrants who were the parents of citizens or of lawful permanent residents to apply for a program that would spare them from deportation and provide them with work permits. The program was called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents, or DAPA.
The court did not disclose how the justices had voted, but they were almost certainly split along ideological lines. Administration officials had hoped that Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. would join the court’s four-member liberal wing to save the program.
The case hinged in part on whether Texas had suffered the sort of direct and concrete injury that gave it standing to sue. Texas said it had standing because it would be costly for the state to give driver’s licenses to immigrants affected by the federal policy.
Chief Justice Roberts is often skeptical of expansive standing arguments. But it seemed plain when the case was argued in April that he was satisfied that Texas had standing, paving the way for a deadlock.
White House officials had repeatedly argued that presidents in both parties had used similar executive authority in applying the nation’s immigration laws. And they said Congress had granted federal law enforcement wide discretion over how those laws should be carried out.
But the court’s ruling may mean that the next president will again need to seek a congressional compromise to overhaul the nation’s immigration laws. And it left immigration activists deeply disappointed.
In their Supreme Court briefs, the states acknowledged that the president had wide authority over immigration matters, telling the justices that “the executive does have enforcement discretion to forbear from removing aliens on an individual basis.” Their quarrel, they said, was with what they called a blanket grant of “lawful presence” to millions of immigrants, entitling them to various benefits.
In response, Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. told the justices that this “lawful presence” was merely what had always followed from the executive branch’s decision not to deport someone for a given period of time.
Speaking at the White House, President Obama described the ruling as a deep disappointment for immigrants who would not be able to emerge from the threat of deportation for at least the balance of his term.
On June 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court deadlocked in a 4 to 4 split in the long-awaited case, United States v. Texas, effectively upholding the lower court’s injunction halting the expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and the creation of a new program known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). The original DACA program remains in place.
Today, 11/20/2014, President Barack Obama announced broad executive action to offer temporary relief from deportation to millions of undocumented immigrants.
The most controversial aspect of the president’s executive order allows as many as five million undocumented immigrants to stay in the U.S., including the undocumented parents of children born here. Those parents will be able to request deportation relief and work permits for three years at a time, provided that they register, pass background checks, pay fees, and prove that their legal resident or citizen child was born before the date of the executive order.
The plan also protects more so-called “DREAMers” — young immigrants brought to the United States illegally as children. Previously, individuals were eligible for deferred action if they were born after 1981 and entered the country before 2007. That date is expected to change to January 1, 2010, with no age limit.
While relatives of U.S. citizens often find a path to legal status, relatives of green card holders can also apply for a green card. If you are related to a permanent resident or green card holder, you might be eligible to petition for a green card.
A green card holder may apply for his/her spouse and children (unmarried, any age) to come to the U.S. legally. As a relative of a permanent resident, you will be placed in a category known as “family second preference”. Because the number of visas given out to family preference applicants annually is limited, you will be placed on a wait list. When a visa number is available, it will be assigned to you.
If you are in the U.S., the process of applying for a visa will be the same as that of relatives to U.S. citizens. If you are already in the U.S., your relative must file Form I-130. When it is approved, you must wait until the priority date in the family preference category becomes current. The priority date is the date when the I-130 is properly sent. When it becomes current, you can file the I-485 which will allow you to adjust your status. Eventually, the adjustment process will result in your status as a permanent resident.
For the most part, the application process must be completed by the green card holder. First, he/she must file Form I-130 and provide USCIS with proof of his/her status as a legal permanent resident. Documents and evidence of the relationship between the green card holder and immigrant must also be included. Examples of evidence include birth and marriage certificates. If you and your family member do not share the last name, you must show proof of the legal name change. More specific details can be found on the forms that need to be filed.
If you are outside the U.S., you must undergo the process of consular processing. This type of processing occurs when USCIS works with the Department of State to issue a visa on an I-130 that has been approved. When the Department of State issues you the visa, you can travel abroad and will become a permanent resident when you enter the U.S.
Many families are under the impression that an approved I-130 means that an applicant has been granted a benefit or change in status. This is not true. If USCIS accepts and approves the visa petition, it means that you are now in line for a visa number. If you belong to a first preference category, you will be issued a visa right away. If not, there will be a longer wait.
If you have any questions about preference categories, the process of becoming a U.S. citizen, or how to obtain a visa, please contact Immigration Attorney Phillip Kim.
Obama Administration Files Brief in DACA/DAPA Case at Supreme Court.
The Obama Administration filed its brief with the Supreme Court in United States v. Texas, the case where Texas and 25 other states are challenging the President’s executive action on expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). The brief sets forth the arguments for why the Fifth Circuit was wrong to block expanded DACA and DAPA from being implemented.
The Obama Administration begins by saying simply that this case does not even belong in court. The states bringing suit are trying to force the Supreme Court into “complex debates over immigration policy that the Constitution reserves to the political Branches of the National Government.” And for this simple reason alone, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling should be reversed.
Now that the government has filed its brief, those who wish to file an amicus brief (a friend of the court brief) in support of the Obama Administration’s position have until March 8 to file. Texas and the other states have until March 28 to file their brief in the case.
Oral arguments in the case will likely be scheduled for April 2016, and the Court will likely issue a decision before its current term ends at the end of June 2016. For the sake of the immigrant families whose lives are riding on this decision, let’s hope that the Court makes clear that President Obama, like every President before him dating back to Eisenhower, has the authority to take executive action on immigration. from immigrationimpact.
Immigration Law has been changing- sometimes with a huge media coverage but more often, without much coverage because of the new changes’ limited application.
For example, when DACA and DAPA were announced, almost every single media channel has reported on those new laws. There have been, however, many more changes in immigration law mostly made by courts’ rulings. Those new laws apply to the cases that meet the specific situations required by those courts.
The 9th Circuit Court recently made a ruling in Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, No. 12-73210 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015).
One of Attorney Phillip Kim’s clients was waiting for her first court hearing in September 2015. The DHS was trying to deport her under the previous laws, which made her deportable.
One month before her Court Hearing, the 9th Circuit released a new case law. Attorney Phillip Kim filed a Motion To Terminate citing the new 9th Circuit case law among others such as Fregozo v. Holder, Descamps (by US Supreme Court), Lopez-Valencia (by US Supreme Court).
A few days before her first Court Hearing, the Judge from Immigration Court terminated her Deportation Proceedings.
Moreover, Attorney Phillip Kim contacted DHS ICE Chief Counsel’s office. The ICE Prosecuting Attorney agreed to return the Client’s Green Card because the Judge terminated proceedings.
Very fortunately and dramatically right before the first Court Hearing, the Client was able to receive her Green Card. She did not even have to appear in court.
Many of you have been waiting for an opportunity to get your case approved. Be hopeful and patient because Immigration Laws are changing in favor of immigrants.
scams, making them particularly vulnerable to deceitful solicitations.
For example, scams may take the form of all-inclusive student visa service packages or great deals on travel. Often students realize too late that the fees they paid to a company to organize their trip to the United States are lost forever or they have not been properly registered as promised by the scammer.
research companies before submitting any payments or personal information.
School officials should work with their international students to ensure they are aware of how to avoid scams.
International students are required to adhere to many rules and regulations to maintain their student status, so it is especially alarming when they receive an email or telephone call advising them that their immigration status is in jeopardy unless they provide immediate payment for services, fees or fines.
transfer, and may even claim to be from a U.S. government agency or known student organization.
–Not give out any personal information.
Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), and their DSO.
The focus on the part of the White House to pass a 2013 immigration reform bill has not changed, said Press Secretary Jay Carney in a press briefing on Monday.
“Our absolute focus on getting immigration reform passed by both houses and signed into law has not changed at all,” Carney said in response to a question about President Barack Obama’s message to those concerned the issue has been low priority for the White House.
Earlier this year, there was increased momentum for a comprehensive immigration reform bill passing Congress before the end of the year. With the failure of gun control in April, delivering a huge blow to Obama’s second-term agenda, overhauling the status quo on immigration looked at one point as if it was the only one of Obama’s agenda items that would see legislative success.
The Senate passed its comprehensive immigration reform bill in June, providing a 13-year path to citizenship for immigrants in the U.S. illegally and boosting spending for border security and more fencing along the Mexico border.
Click here to continue reading the article.
A refugee is someone persecuted in his or her home country due to race, religion, war, nationality, or political affiliation. Obtaining refugee status in the United States is a form of protection for refugees who are not allowed or unwilling to return to their home country because of fear or social harm. In order to qualify for the refugee status, the applicant must be from outside the U.S.
To qualify for an asylum status, the applicant must meet the definition of a refugee, be present in the U.S., and seek admission at a port of entry, according to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
One can apply for asylum regardless of the background of your country and immigration status.
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., indicated in a recent memo to Republicans that a vote on 2013 immigration reform bills may come this fall, as the topic was added to the legislative agenda for this month and the next.
Cantor noted that the House “may begin considering” this fall the five bills passed in various committees. No one in the majority leader’s office was available for a comment Wednesday evening on when exactly the bills will be brought to the floor. “Before we consider any other reforms, it is important that we pass legislation securing our borders and providing enforcement mechanisms to our law enforcement officials,” the memo read.
This should be a good sign for immigration reform advocates: Unlike in previous memos from Cantor, this one did not mention immigration reform as an afterthought — even though thorny issues like appropriations, debt limit, Syria, nutrition (food stamps) and Obamacare all came before it on the agenda, in that particular order.
For the year of 2013, USCIS has approved the maximum of 10,000 U visa petitions. U visas are for victims of crime who has suffered abuse emotionally and mentally. Victims agree to help law enforcements prosecute such crimes. The program for U visas started in 2008 and has helped more than 76,000 victims and their families. USCIS will be accepting U visa applications again on October 1, 2013.
There are multiple ways to get a green card as a relative of a U.S. citizen. As the spouse, unmarried child, or parent of an adult citizen (over 21 years old) you qualify as an immediate relative. Green cards for immediate relatives are unlimited, so there is no waiting for a visa as an immediate family member. Receiving a green card will allow you to live and work in the U.S. as a permanent resident.
If you are already in the United States, to receive a green card, you will file need to file for permanent residence. Second, you will petition for your status as an immediate relative of a citizen. For immediate relatives of U.S., these two steps can be done at the same time or you can submit your petition and then file for residence.
If you are not yet living in the U.S., you must submit your petition for residence as a family member of a citizen first. After your petition is submitted, there is a waiting period for a visa to allow you to travel to the U.S. This process is the same for immediate and non-immediate family members of citizens.
Remember to keep in mind that your status as a child will most likely be counted from the date of your petition, and that to keep the status of child you must be 21 years old or younger. Also, children under 21 must be unmarried through the green card process in order to count as immediate relatives. If you are the married child of a U.S. citizen you do not count as an immediate relative, but can still petition for residence as a family member of a U.S. citizen.
"We are glad that we hired Attorney Phillip Kim for our Green Card processing. It was such a smooth process and took only three months! I highly recommend Kim & Wong Law Group. If you have any questions about Mr. Kim's work, feel free to call my cell. # (559) 708-0228"Lily and Adam Chan from Central Valley, CA.
"I am a DENTIST busy managing two offices and hired Attorney Kim recently. Alex Denes, DDS, PhD. Mr. Phillip Kim is a very knowledgeable and efficient immigration attorney. I was extremely pleased on how he handled the immigration of my father-in-law. His office staff is courteous and always returned my calls and email inquiries in a timely fashion. His Fresno office is very clean and he has extremely good knowledge of the US immigration law. I felt very safe having him handle our case. I am confident that you will not benefit of the same level of professionalism elsewhere. I am a busy professional, dentist with 2 offices and time and efficiency matters more. All that said, I found his fees to be extremely reasonable relative to the kind of service that he provides. I congratulate him on his knowledge and dedication as well as I congratulate his office staff for their professionalism. Dr. Alex Denes, DDS, PhD."
“I am a REGISTERED NURSE and My father just went through very lengthy difficult deportation proceedings. We hired our first lawyer, who lost our case. That’s when we hired Attorney Kim, who appealed and took our case to San Francisco Immigration Court. He attended our hearings in Court and finally won our case. My father now has a Green Card. If you have a Deportation Case or are about to be deported, please call me. I will tell you how Attorney Kim helped my father with his Deportation case. My Cell # is (559) 802-7124.” – by Nalleli Medina, RN; Tulare, CA.
"Attorney Kim helped me and my wife realize our American dream of staying together in the US by getting my wife a Green Card. It took less than three months. Please call my cell. (559) 978-9497 or home at (559) 297-4040. I will tell you more about Attorney Kim's practice." - by Leo HISUGAN & Marites HISUGAN; Fresno, CA.
“My green card application was denied. Attorney Kim appealed for me and attended the interview with me. It was approved at the interview. Please call me if you want to ask me about Attorney Kim’s work. (209) 534-7112.” – by Molly Harrington; Los Angeles, CA"
“We got our Green Card approved in less than three months. Everything went very well smoothly. Thank You. We highly recommend Attorney Kim. Please call us at (559) 475-0155. We will tell you more about our experience with Attorney Kim’s firm.” – by Raul TABADA and Family; Fresno, CA.
“I hired two other lawyers before Mr. Kim. They could not do it. It was denied. Finally, my third attorney, Mr. Kim helped me to get my green card even after my husband died. Please call me at (559) 283-5636. (ask for Reagan). We will tell you more about how Mr. Kim helped us.” – by Sochinda Nguon & Reagan; Fresno, CA"

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The operational data protection officer of the individual is under the o.g. Address, to Hd.
Claudia Weaver, respectively under photo@claudiaziegler.com reachable.
When you visit our website http://claudiaziegler.com, the browser used on your device automatically sends information to the server of our website. This information is temporarily stored in a so-called log file. The following information is collected without your intervention and stored until automated deletion: IP address of the requesting computer, date and time of access, name and URL of the retrieved file, website from which the access is made (referrer URL), used Browser and possibly the operating system of your computer as well as the name of your access provider. The above data are processed by us for the following purposes: ensuring a smooth connection setup of the website, ensuring a comfortable use of our website, evaluation of system security and stability and for other administrative purposes. The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DSGVO. Our legitimate interest follows from the data collection purposes listed above. In no case we use the collected data for the purpose of drawing conclusions about you.
A transfer of your personal data to third parties for purposes other than those listed below does not take place. We only disclose your personal data to third parties if: You have provided your personal details pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 sent. 1 lit. a DSGVO have expressly consented to this, disclosure pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 lit. f DSGVO is required to assert, exercise or defend legal claims and there is no reason to assume that you have a predominantly legitimate interest in not disclosing your data in the event that disclosure pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 applies lit. c DSGVO, as permitted by law, and in accordance with Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 lit. b DSGVO is required for the settlement of contractual relationships with you.
personal data, as far as the accuracy of the data is disputed by you, the processing is unlawful, but you reject their deletion and we no longer need the data, but you this to assert, exercise or defense of legal claims or you have objected to the processing according to Art. 21 GDPR; pursuant to Art. 20 GDPR to obtain your personal data provided to us in a structured, common and machine-readable format or to request the transfer to another person responsible; pursuant to Art. 7 para. 3 DSGVO your once granted consent to revoke against us at any time. As a result, we are no longer allowed to continue the data processing based on this consent for the future, and according to Art. 77 GDPR to complain to a supervisory authority. As a rule, you can contact the supervisory authority of your usual place of residence or work or our company headquarters.

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Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 21
Art. 20
Art. 7
Art. 77


The local Immigration District Office makes the initial custody and bond determinations. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d). Upon issuance of an arrest warrant (Form I-205) by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a foreign national may be arrested and detained by ICE. It should also be noted that “in the event of emergency or other extraordinary circumstances,” ICE can also arrest and detain foreign national for up to 48 hours even without issuing arrest warrants. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). During or immediately before the expiration of the 48 hours, ICE must make a determination of whether to release the detainee on bond or release the detainee on his or her own recognizance, or continue to detain the alien and issue a Notice to Appear (NTA).
Financial ability to post bond.
If the foreign national is not released by ICE, and remains detained, ICE will likely issue an NTA to the foreign national, at which time the foreign national comes under the jurisdiction of the Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a); 8 C.F.R. § 240.1. Once under the jurisdiction of the Immigration Court, the alien may request a bond redetermination hearing before the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(d). Even in situations where the foreign national is released, that foreign national may request review of the bond or custody redetermination before the Immigration Court. This usually occurs when the alien is seeking to lower the bond or have the conditions of his release alleviated.
The Immigration Judge also has the authority to review the initial custody/bond determination made by ICE at any time up until the removal order becomes final. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(a). However, arriving aliens, aliens charged with being deportable on security, terrorist and related grounds, or aliens subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c)(1) are not entitled to bond redetermination by an Immigration Judge. Id.
Foreign nationals who are arrested by ICE and issued an Arrest Warrant (Form I-205) along with a Notice of Custody Conditions (Form I-286) are eligible for a delivery bond. The minimum amount for the delivery bond is $1,500. However, this amount may be higher depending on the severity of the immigration charge, or if ICE determines that the amount is sufficient to ensure that the alien will appear for all future immigration proceedings.
After ICE determines that a foreign national is eligible for a delivery bond, the bond may be posted by paying a cash bond or posting a surety bond. For a surety bond, the foreign national’s family member or agent/representative should contact a private bond company that can post the surety bond against some form of collateral or premium payment. The value of the collateral or premium payment should represent a percentage of the full amount of the bond.


A section of the criminal code makes it a Class A misdemeanor for a person acting "under color of law, ordinance or regulation of this state or a municipality or other political subdivision of this state" to "intentionally deprive another of a right, privilege or immunity in fact granted by the constitution or laws of this state." AS 11.76.110.
The FOIA contains no provisions for civil penalties or forfeitures. A person who negligently violates the FOIA, however, is guilty of a misdemeanor and can be fined up to $500. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-104.
The CPRA does not provide for the imposition of fines; however, other statutes may. See, e.g., Cal. Ed. Code § 67380(b) ($1,000 penalty may be assessed against post-secondary educational institutions receiving state funds for failing to disclose records pertaining to certain specified crimes occurring on campus property).
Any person who commits an arbitrary or capricious violation of the provisions of the D.C. Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $100. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(d). All employees of the D.C. government are responsible for compliance with the provisions of the D.C. Act. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(e).
The Act provides that any person or entity deliberately violating the Act (1) by knowingly and willingly failing or refusing to provide access to records not subject to exemption, (2) by knowingly and willingly failing or refusing to provide access to such records within the Act’s time limits or (3) by knowingly and willingly frustrating or attempting to frustrate the access to records by intentionally making records difficult to obtain or review shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 for the first violation. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-74(a).
Alternatively, negligent violations of the Act may result in a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000.00 for the first violation. Id.
A civil penalty or criminal fine not to exceed $2,500.00 per violation may be imposed for each additional violation that the violator commits within a 12 month period from the date the first penalty or fine was imposed. Id.
The OIP may investigate violations by agencies, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 92F-42(4), and recommend appropriate disciplinary action to "appropriate officers of an agency," id. § 92F-42(6). Specific statutes governing particular records may also mandate fines.
The Court may impose a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 upon a public official who deliberately and in bad faith improperly refuses a legitimate request for inspection and copying. Idaho Code § 74-117.
The court shall impose civil penalties against a public body, if the court determines that the public body willfully or intentionally failed to comply with the FOIA or otherwise acted in bad faith. The civil penalty must range between $2,500.00 and $5,000.00 per occurrence. See 5 ILCS 140/11(i).
The Access to Public Records Act contemplates penalties under certain circumstances. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9.5. The Act also provides defenses to civil penalties. Id. § 5-14-3-9.5(f). Notably, individuals are personally liable under the Act, unless directed by a public agency officer. Id. § 5-14-3-9.5(j), (k). Additionally, a prevailing requestor for law enforcement recordings, the court may assess a civil penalty under Section 5-14-3-9.5. Id. § 5-14-3-9(k)(2).
The trial court is the appropriate venue to determine whether a party is entitled to civil penalties. Holleman v. Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 27 N.E.3d 293, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
Damages assessed in amounts that vary depending upon whether the violation was knowing. Iowa Code § 22.10(b).
Fines are not allowable. K.S.A. 45-223.
In addition to costs and attorney fees for willful violations, the Circuit Court may also "award the person an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record." Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.882(5). Such penalties are also discretionary with the Circuit Court, and Circuit Courts have discretion to impose penalties on a per-record basis. See Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Courier-Journal, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).
A person convicted of violating the Public Records Act shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 or imprisoned not less than one month nor more than six months upon first conviction and shall be fined not less than $250 nor more than $2,000 or imprisoned not less than two months nor more than six months, or both, upon subsequent convictions. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44.37.
A fine may be recovered, but only by the Attorney General or District Attorney. 1 M.R.S.A. § 410; Scola v. Town of Sanford, 1997 ME 119, ¶ 7, 695 A.2d 1194, 1195.
A willful and knowing violation of the PIA, failure to petition a court after temporarily denying inspection of a public record, or accessing/gaining by false pretenses, bribery or theft a copy of a personal record where disclosure of such record is prohibited constitute a misdemeanor and a fine up to $1,000 may be imposed. § 4-402(b).
If the circuit court finds that the public body has "arbitrarily and capriciously" violated the FOIA by refusing to disclose or delaying in disclosing or providing copies of a public record, the court will award, in addition to any actual or compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount of $1,000.00 to the person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.240(7). Previously, the amount of punative damages was $500.00, but the 2015 amendment doubled the amount. These damages are not to be assessed against an individual but against "the next succeeding public body that is not an individual and that kept or maintained the public record as part of its public function." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.240(7).
A plaintiff is not, of course, entitled to punitive damages or attorney’s fees and costs where he or she was not found to be entitled to the requested information. Bredemeier v. Kentwood Board of Education, 95 Mich. App. 767, 291 N.W.2d 199 (1980) (defendant's failure to provide plaintiff with written notice of denial constituted a violation of FOIA, but plaintiff could not collect fees, costs, or damages where requested information was not in recorded form). Moreover, a party must raise an argument for compensatory damages or the claim is abandoned. See Prins v. Michigan State Police, 299 Mich. App. 634 (2013).
One example of a case where punitive damages were granted is Walloon Lake, supra, 415 N.W.2d at 296, where the actions of township officials in refusing FOIA requests without explanation and in rendering judicial order of disclosure impossible by disposing of the only copy of a document was considered an arbitrary and capricious violation of the FOIA as a matter of law. See also Kincaid v. Dep't of Corrections, 180 Mich. App. 176, 446 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1989) (affirming award of $500 in punitive damages against defendant which arbitrarily and capriciously denied request on basis that requests were not sufficiently specific despite fact that defendant's own records established the opposite to be true).
There are no fines associated with a refusal to provide access to documents.
Only if the custodian is prosecuted and convicted of a crime under §84-712.09. Conviction under that statute is a Class III misdemeanor, which carries a possible maximum fine of $500.
The NPRA does not provide for fines against public agencies or officers who fail to disclose public records.
Under RSA 91-A:8,IV the court has the authority to impose a civil fine of $250 to $2000 for a “bad faith” violation of the Statute does not impose fines.
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 provides that a public official, officer, employee or custodian who knowingly and willfully violates the act and is found to have unreasonably denied access under the totality of the circumstances is subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 for an initial violation, $2,500 for a second violation occurring within 10 years of the initial violation and $5,000 for a third violation within 10 years of an initial violation.
A custodian who does not deliver or mail a written explanation of denial in fifteen days after receipt of written request for inspection is subject to an action to enforce the act and the requester may be awarded damages not to exceed $100 per day. NMSA 1978 § 14-2-11(C)(2). But see Derringer v. State of N.M., 2003-NMCA-73, 68 P.3d 961 (filing suit after compliance may eliminate possibility of an attorney fee, damages, or cost award). The failure to respond to an oral request shall not subject the custodian to any penalty. NMSA 1978 § 14-2-8(A).
The Public records law does not provide for any fines, criminal sanctions, or other penalties for the unauthorized withholding of public records. There are criminal sanctions for the unlawful destruction of public records.
For an intentional or knowing violation, the court may award damages in an amount equal to one thousand dollars or actual damages caused by the violation, whichever is greater. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(1).
The public records statute does not authorize a fine. It authorizes statutory damages of $100 per business day up to a maximum of $1,000. Statutory damages are compensation for presumed injury of loss of use of requested public records, not a fine or penalty. The first day when a public office can be liable for statutory damages is the day that the requester sues. Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(C)(2).
A public official found guilty of violating the Open Records Act may be fined up to $500. 51 O.S. § 24A.17.A.
None, except contempt of court if the court’s order is not obeyed. See ORS 190.431.
The court shall impose a civil fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000) against a public body or official found to have committed a knowing and willful violation of this chapter, and a civil fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) against a public body found to have recklessly violated the APRA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-9(d).
In Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651 (R.I. 2003), the Court held that statutory amendments allowing trial court to waive costs of retrieval and to award reasonable attorneys' fees in an APRA violation applies only to the imposition of a fine.
If the public body is found to have arbitrarily and capriciously violated the Act by refusal or delay in disclosing or providing copies of the public record, the court may impose a civil fine of $500 in addition to any actual or compensatory damages. S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-110(F). .
There is no provision for the imposition of fines. Before the 1985 amendments, refusal or failure to release public records for inspection was a misdemeanor; however, this criminal sanction was eliminated.
The Act does not contemplate the award of damages for an officer’s non-compliance with the Act. Moore , 897 S.W.2d at 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). However, Sections 552.351-.353 set forth fines and other penalties that can be assessed under the Act. An officer for public information who, with criminal negligence, “fails or refuses to give access to, or to permit or provide copying of, public information” may be found guilty of a misdemeanor and face up to six months in jail and a $1,000 fine, or both. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.353(a), (e). Anyone who distributes information deemed confidential under the Act faces a similar criminal sentence and fine. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.352. Section 552.351 provides that any person who “willfully destroys, mutilates, removes without permission as provided [in the Act], or alters public information” may be found guilty of a misdemeanor and face up to three months in jail and a $4,000 fine, or both.
A public employee who intentionally refuses to release a public record is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code § 63G-2-801(3). A class B misdemeanor is punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 and/or imprisonment of up to six months. See id. §§ 76-3-204(2), 76-3-301(1)(d).
“A person who willfully destroys, gives away, sells, discards, or damages a public record without having authority to do so shall be fined at least $ 50.00 but not more than $ 1,000.00 for each offense.” 1 V.S.A. § 320.
No criminal fines are authorized by the Act. If the Court finds that a violation was willfully and knowingly made, it shall impose upon the member of the public body, in his individual capacity, a civil penalty not less than $500.00 and not more than $2,000.00. The penalty for a second violation shall not be less than $2,000.00 nor more than $5,000.00. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3714.
A requesting party who prevails against the agency is entitled to recover, in addition to its costs and attorneys’ fees, a statutory penalty up to $100 per day for each day that records were improperly withheld. RCW 42.56.550(4). Because the statutory award is a penalty, and aimed at deterrence, the requester need not establish damages to recover or, for that matter, that the agency acted in bad faith. Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wn.2d 25, 37-38, 929 P.2d 389 (1997); American Civil Liberties Union of Washington v. Blaine Sch. Dist. No. 503, 95 Wn. App. 106, 111, 975 P.2d 536 (1999); Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wn. App. 295, 301, 825 P.2d 324 (1992). However, an agency’s bad or good faith is relevant in determining how high the penalty should be, as are such factors as the promptness of the agency’s response, the clarity of the request, the agency’s training practices and the significance of the records. Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, 168 Wn.2d 444, 229 P.3d 735 (2010). A requester need not prevail as to every record to recover fees, so long as the requester “substantially” prevails. Overlake Fund v. City of Bellevue, 70 Wn. App. 789, 796, 855 P.2d 706 (1993), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1009, 869 P.2d 1084 (1994). However, a requesting party who prevails against a private person opposing agency disclosure of a record is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Yakima Newspapers, 77 Wn. App. at 329.
A "willful" violation of the Freedom of Information Act by a custodian of public records is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of "not less than two hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars.” W. Va. Code § 29B-1-6.
Violation of any provision of the Public Record Act is a misdemeanor, punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed $750.00. Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-205 (1977, Rev. 1995).


§18-10-1. Assent to federal land grants for West Virginia University; investment of funds from sale of land warrants.
§18-10-2. Federal aid for West Virginia agricultural experiment station.
§18-10-3. Federal aid for West Virginia University and West Virginia State College.
§18-10-4. Federal aid for cooperative agricultural extension work.
§18-10-5. Federal aid for vocational education; duties of state Board of Education.
§18-10-8. Acceptance and distribution of future federal funds available to state.
§18-10-9. State Board of Education, board of Governors and commissioner of public institutions empowered to carry out provisions of federal aid acts.
§18-10-10. Custody and disbursement of federal funds.
§18-10-11. West Virginia Library Commission authorized to accept federal appropriations for rural library service; Governor may supplement state appropriation.
§18-10-12. Custody and disbursement of library funds.
§18-10-13. State educational institutions authorized to participate in federal student loan program.
The state of West Virginia hereby renews its assent to the provisions and purposes of the act of Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, entitled "An act donating public lands to the several states and territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts," and of all subsequent acts of Congress amending or supplementing said act, and accepts the grants authorized thereby. The funds derived from the sale of United States land warrants which were donated to this state for the purpose of endowing an agricultural college shall be invested by the board of the school fund in a loan or public stocks of the United States, or otherwise, as required by Congress, for the use and benefit of West Virginia University.
The state of West Virginia hereby renews its assent to the provisions and purposes of the act of Congress of March second, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, entitled "An act to establish agricultural experiment stations in connection with the colleges established in the several states under the provisions of an act approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and of the acts supplementary thereto," and of all subsequent acts of Congress amending or supplementing said act, and accepts the appropriations of money authorized thereby.
The state of West Virginia hereby renews its assent to the provisions and purposes of the act of Congress of August thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled "An act to apply a portion of the proceeds of the public land to the more complete endowment and support of the colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts established under the provisions of the act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two," and of all subsequent acts of Congress amending or supplementing said act, and accepts the appropriations of money authorized thereby.
The state of West Virginia hereby designates West Virginia University as the beneficiary of appropriations under the eighteen hundred and sixty-two act of Congress referred to in section one of this article and West Virginia State College as the beneficiary of appropriations under the eighteen hundred and ninety act of Congress referred to in this section.
The state of West Virginia hereby renews its assent to the provisions and purposes of the act of Congress of May eighth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, entitled "An act to provide for cooperative agricultural extension work between the agricultural colleges in the several states receiving the benefits of an act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and of acts supplementary thereto, and the United States Department of Agriculture," and of all subsequent acts of Congress amending or supplementing said act, and accepts the appropriations of money authorized thereby.
The provisions and purposes of the act of Congress of February twenty-third, nineteen hundred and seventeen, entitled "An act to provide for the promotion of vocational education; to provide for cooperation with the states in the promotion of such education in agriculture and the trades and industries; to provide for cooperation with the states in the preparation of teachers of vocational subjects; and to appropriate money and regulate its expenditures," are hereby accepted by the State of West Virginia as to (a) appropriations for the salaries of teachers, supervisors and directors of agricultural subjects; (b) appropriations for salaries of teachers of vocational and industrial subjects; (c) appropriations for the training of teachers, supervisors and directors of vocational subjects.
The state Board of Education is hereby designated as the state board to carry out the provisions of said act so far as the same relates to the cooperation of the states and the federal government, and shall have full power to do all things necessary in the formulation and execution of plans for the promotion of education in agriculture, in trades and industries, and to formulate and execute plans for the preparation of teachers of vocational subjects.
Acts, 1945 Reg. Sess., Ch. 58.
The state Board of Education is hereby authorized and empowered to accept for the State of West Virginia, and expend for the purpose designated, any funds that may hereafter be made available to the board out of the federal treasury by an act or acts of Congress and allocated to this state for vocational education, or for the use or benefit of the state colleges and other state institutions under the direct control and supervision of the board, or for any other educational purpose.
The state superintendent of free schools is hereby authorized and empowered to accept for the State of West Virginia any funds that may hereafter be made available to the state Department of Education or to the state superintendent of free schools out of the federal treasury by an act or acts of Congress for current expense, capital outlay, free textbooks, or any other educational purpose in local public school units, or for any other educational purpose.
(a) Ten dollars per month for all teachers holding emergency certificates based on less than two years of college training.
(b) Twenty-five dollars per month for all teachers holding regular certificates based on less than four years of college training and all teachers holding emergency certificates based on two or more years of college training.
(c) Sixty-five dollars per month for all teachers holding regular certificates based on college degrees.
All such increments may be reduced or increased on a proportionate basis in accordance with the amount of funds available under the seventy-one percent allocation.
2. The balance of said federal funds, the equivalent of twenty-nine percent of said funds, shall be distributed among the several counties. Such distribution shall be based on the net enrollment for the fourth school month of the current year and determined on a ratio that said net enrollment of each county bears to the total net enrollment of the state.
The state Board of Education as to educational matters other than those relating to the West Virginia University, the board of Governors of West Virginia University as to educational matters relating to said university, and the state commissioner of public institutions, as to financial and business matters, as provided by law, are authorized and empowered to carry out the provisions of the original and supplemental acts of Congress mentioned or referred to in this article, and of any subsequent act or acts of Congress making appropriations to this state for educational purposes.
The treasurer of this state shall be the custodian of all moneys received by the state from appropriations made by any of the original or supplemental acts of Congress mentioned or referred to in sections two to six, inclusive of this article, and of all moneys received by the state from appropriations for educational purposes that may hereafter be made by any act or acts of Congress, and is authorized to receive and provide for the proper custody of the same. He shall keep an accurate account of the moneys so received, shall place the same to the credit of the proper institutions or funds, and, unless a different method is provided by law, shall make disbursements therefrom upon warrants of the State Auditor issued on requisitions of the state commissioner of public institutions: Provided, however, That disbursements from the funds received for vocational education and vocational rehabilitation shall be made upon warrants of the State Auditor issued on requisitions of the state Board of Education approved by the state commissioner of public institutions. The treasurer shall include in his biennial report to the Governor a statement of his receipts and disbursements under the provisions of this article.
The West Virginia Library Commission, established by section twelve, article one, chapter ten of this code, is hereby authorized and empowered to accept for the State of West Virginia any appropriations of money for rural library service, and for similar library purposes, that may hereafter be made out of the federal treasury by an act or acts of Congress.
Should the appropriation provided by the Legislature for the purpose prove insufficient in amount to meet the requirements of the federal government relative to library purposes, the Governor may supplement, from his contingent fund or from any other funds available for the purpose, said legislative appropriation by an amount sufficient to meet the said requirements of the federal government.
The treasurer of this state shall be the custodian of all moneys received by the state from appropriations made by any of the original or supplemental acts of Congress mentioned or referred to in section eleven of this article, and specifically of all moneys received by the state from appropriations for such library purposes that may hereafter be made by any act or acts of Congress; and he is authorized to receive and to provide for the proper custody of the same. He shall also be the custodian of such library moneys received by the state from any other agencies, private and/or otherwise; and he is similarly authorized to receive and provide for the proper custody of these funds. The treasurer shall keep an accurate account of the moneys so received from whatever source, shall place the same to the credit of the West Virginia Library Commission; and, unless a different method is provided by law, he shall make disbursements therefrom upon warrants of the State Auditor issued on requisitions of the West Virginia Library Commission approved by the state commissioner of public institutions. The said Library Commission shall make bylaws, rules and regulations for the allocation and administration of all library funds, and for the establishment of an adequate system of auditing and reporting such disbursements. The treasurer shall include in his biennial report to the Governor a statement of his receipts and disbursements under the provisions of this section.
The governing board of each state educational institution is hereby authorized and empowered to comply with all provisions of federal law necessary to permit participation by such institution in the federal student loan program established by the "National Defense Education Act of 1958" or by any other act of Congress heretofore or hereafter enacted. The state matching funds needed to qualify the institution for receipt of federal contributions under any such program may be provided by the board from gifts or grants available to the institutions for loans to students unless the terms of the gift or grant would preclude its use for matching purposes.


Before: SCHROEDER and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges, and WHYTE,** District Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas A. Snooks appeals and defendants SRS Technologies ("SRS") and Mohindar S. Sandhu cross-appeal the district court's judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Snooks in Snooks's action alleging that SRS engaged in securities fraud in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and intentional misrepresentation and breach of contract in violation of California state law in connection with Snooks's sale of the stock of Snooks's company, SETAC, Inc., to SRS. The jury awarded Snooks $320,000 in damages against SRS and Sandhu on the securities fraud claim and $862,845 in damages against SRS on the breach of contract claim but found against Snooks on the state law intentional misrepresentation claim. The district court denied Snooks's request for prejudgment interest.
Defendants contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial because the jury verdicts finding SRS liable on the federal securities fraud claim but not liable on Snooks's state law intentional misrepresentation claim were inconsistent. We agree that the verdicts on the two fraud claims are irreconcilable, as the record shows that the same six alleged misrepresentations form the basis of both counts and Snooks has not identified any meaningful difference between the elements of the two claims as they apply here.
Plaintiff cites Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), in support of his argument that a verdict of liability for securities fraud is not inconsistent with a verdict of no liability for common law fraud. Although the court of appeals in Bradford-White affirmed a judgment for plaintiff on its securities fraud claim where the jury found against plaintiff on its common law fraud claim, the court did not review the judgment based upon an alleged inconsistency between the two theories. The issue reviewed was merely whether the jury's answers to special interrogatories on the securities fraud claim were consistent with each other. Id. at 1155, 1158. Therefore, we find Bradford-White inapposite. The verdicts on the securities fraud and common law fraud claims are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Defendants assert that the district court also abused its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial because the jury verdicts on the breach of contract and securities fraud claim are against the weight of the evidence. They also claim that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law based upon insufficiency of the evidence. After reviewing the evidence, we do not find that the verdicts in plaintiff's favor are against the "great weight of the evidence" or that the jury reached a "seriously erroneous" result. See E.E.O.C. v. Pane Lift. Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1997); Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff appeals the district court's denial of his request for prejudgment interest. California Civil Code section 3287 provides in subsection (a) that a court must award prejudgment interest where the damages are certain. Under subsection (b), a court's award of prejudgment interest is discretionary where the damages are unliquidated at the time the right to such damages vested. See Cal. Civ.Code § 3287(b); Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 1247 (1985). We agree with defendant that the evidence does not meet the requirements of subsection (a) and, therefore, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion under subsection (b).
Although plaintiff indicated at oral argument and in his briefs that plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest was denied because plaintiff had rejected an earlier $750,000 settlement offer, the district court's reasoning is not in the record before us. We determine, however, that the record reflects sufficient factors to support the discretionary denial of the request and, therefore, affirm the trial court's denial. Such factors include the reasons for pre-trial delay and the fact that defendant prevailed on many of plaintiff's original claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. The parties are to bear their own costs.