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Paul is continuing on the theme we left last week, and that is our stewardship of the freedom that we now have in Christ. Last week we ended in chapter 8 seeing how Paul was urging us to think of our freedom as something we lay down in service of the gospel rather than as something we flaunt in service of our rights. Chapter 9 is Paul's way of saying "here's what that looks like for me." Paul isn't just telling the Corinthians (or us for that matter) to do something that he himself isn't also doing.
Specifically, Paul is using the example of how hard he and Barnabas work in both a ministry and apostolic capacity, but also as laborers who earn their income by another means. In other words, they work bivocationally, not because they must, but because they believe it best serves the kingdom. Paul even says that those who do gospel ministry full time should earn a living throgh gospel ministry (v. 14). Still, he did not demand or avail himself of the right.
For me, this hits very close to home. v. 9 quotes the OT Law saying “You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain.” Basically, while oxen plowed, they would eat parts of the grain, to nourish themselves as they spent themselves. Some people would muzzle their ox to keep them from eating while they were working and depleting the supply. And Moses' law forbid that practice because it was animal cruelty. Paul is saying that not paying pastors and ministers of the gospel and caring for their material and physical needs is the same kind of cruelty. Paul isn't making the case that pastors should made rich and affluent. Not at all. Just they should be well cared for.
Now, lest anyone think I'm making a play for anything, I'm not. This is such a humbling text to me because I know and have seen pastors who have labored with profound lack. I consider myself very well loved and cared for by the people I've been privileged to shepherd. This is just a passage that makes me so grateful for God's provision, the faithfulness and generosity of God's people, and the privilege to actually serve and lead Generations. I'm not getting wealthy of this, but I know how rich I am, and I'm incredibly grateful.
I guess a fair question to consider today is, are you giving faithfully and sacrificially to Jesus' church and Jesus' mission?
Generations is in a very healthy place right now financially, so it's nice to say that with no real need right now. :) If you struggle with giving, don't understand why God calls us to give or just want to talk more about any side of giving, please talk to me or an elder or Gospel Community leader.
v. 6-11 - These verses outline some of the characteristics and consequences of being with with fools. We should have a healthy fear of trusting a fool (v. 6), learning from a fool (v. 7, 9), honoring a fool (v. 8), hiring a fool (v. 10) or not learning from our own foolishness (v. 11). To ignore these things is bring harm to yourself and others.
v. 13-16 - Similarly, these verses outline the impact of associate with "the sluggard."
v. 17-21 - Warn against being with quarrelsome and argumentative people.
The bottom line really is that we should fear the impact of having trusted relationships with foolish, lazy and quarrelsome people. Instead, walk with wise, hard working and peacable people. The quality of your life will be far greater.
v. 5 tells us to value correction and criticism. My insecurities and pride make me resistant to rebuke, but Solomon seems to say I need to be resistant to that resistance. I want to be praised and affirmed, not corrected or challenged. But in v. 21 he goes so far as to say that I should be cautious and skeptical of praise. Correction, even if misguided, at least calls me to humility and healthy self-reflection, while praise tends to feed my ego and entrench me in an unhealthy self-assurance.
The real heart of this passage is v. 19, "For though I am free from all, I have made myself a servant to all, that I might win more of them." Paul's desire for the gospel to permeate everything and reach everyone dictated his strategy for ministry. And this is how we are to think about our own assignments from the Lord, and those he has placed us and called us to minister to. Christians are missionaries. Period. And the question for a good missionary is always how to build relational bridges strong enough to bear the weight of truth. So Paul laid down his preferences, comforts, natural likes, cultural norms, in order to accommodate and serve those he was called to minister to.
This is not relativism or liberalism. We must maintain biblical morality and gospel fidelity, while being flexible with cultural sensibilities. We must serve and honor not-yet-believers by removing unnecessary barriers to the gospel. We tend to be uncomfortable with so much in relating to not-yet-believers, and we want them to accommodate us. Paul says it's the privilege of the missionary to accommodate those to whom they are sent, as long as it doesn't mean sinning or diluting or distorting the gospel.
What does this look like for you and the people you're called to? In what ways can you lay down personal preferences or "Christian" sensibilities, to earn credibility, build trust, and create an in road for the gospel?
v. 14 - "Blessed is the one who fears the Lord, but whoever hardens his heart will fall into calamity."
Fear of the Lord is a softness to the Lord. It's receptive to him, open to him, not guarded or defensive toward him. Hardness of heart deflects the Lord, and brings destruction and difficulty.
v. 25 - "The fear of man lays a snare, but he who trusts in the Lord is safe."
Here is the other side of 28:14. Fear the Lord, or fear man. Trust in the Lord or trust in man. Those are our options. We will fall into one or the other. And it's far easier and more natural to fear man, to regard man's opinion, to want man's approval. It is quite natural for us to fear offending man who is right in front of us, than to fear God almighty who created us. It's natural... but it's backwards. It's a trap. But taking God at his word, and trusting his promises, his wisdom, his instruction, his design, his ways, is the only safe path.
This is another passage with a lot of different things. I want to simplify by leaning into v. 12, "Therefore let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall." This is Paul's warning corresponding to instruction against idolatry. His references to Israel's wilderness wanderings, and the various failures of God's people to keep God at the center. Whether it was foolishness, sexual immorality, grumbling against authority, or lifeless religious practices, much of Israel got distracted and turned away from the Lord.
The thing about our flesh is that it just never quits. We have to kill it and keep killing it. Every natural impulse we have is to disregard God. We are tragically and pathologically prone to diminishing him, seeking satisfaction in substitutes, trusting in counterfeits and to deceiving ourselves about the level to which those things are happening. Our self-congratulatory thoughts about how we're doing are a clear and present danger. For at the moment of feeling quite good about our spiritual progress, there lurks a self-deceiving temptation toward pride, apathy and pretense which would undermine any progress yo uhave made. There is no greater threat to our spiritual health than the threat of self-deception. We hate to see ourselves as we really are. We will do almost anything to avoid seeing ourselves as we really are. But real repentance and faith will only flow from an honest appraisal of who we really are. Let every one of us take heed lest we fall.
v. 5-6 - In the same way that we fear the Lord, we are have a fear of His Word. We trust his word, his revelation, because it his heart disclosed to us, and it leads us into life and it protects us. Solomon here affirms the reliability of God's word, and warns against adding to God's word. God's word will prove true so any distortion or addition to His word will also be proven false. Hold fast to the word.
Ladies, there is nothing more attractive than a woman who fears the Lord. Period.
Men, if you have a wife who fears the Lord, honor her and praise the Lord. Prioritize this quality above any other.
So in light of yesterday's passage and our need to be honest and real about our most humiliating and embarrassing selves, Paul says, "Flee from idolatry." One of the tendencies we display in our pretense and image obsessed self-deception, is the tendency to flirt with idolatry rather than flee from it. We give ourselves a lot of latitude to dabble in things, as Paul emphasized in chapter 9 due to our "Christian freedom." But our "freedom" is really a cover up for feeding our flesh. Brothers and sisters, anything in your life that would dampen your zeal for Jesus is a potential idol. Anything in which you hope or trust more than Jesus; anything to which your allegiance and loyalty is stronger than Jesus; anything you won't give up for the sake of Jesus is an idol.
And thought they threaten the Lordship and supremacy of Christ in our lives, we play footsies with them. We sneak around with certain indulgences; we entertain certain impulses; we are gentle in our opposition to sin; tentative in our dealings with our flesh; we want to get as close to idols as possible without entering into idolatry, which is an expression of idolatry in the first place. All that robs us of Christ and the peace and joy and life and freedom that he gives to us, is to be aggressively dealt with, ferociously opposed, violently put to death and decisively renounced. All of that, again, is pursued through humble self-searching, honest confession and deep personal repentance, trusting in the finished work of Christ every step, to redeem and refresh and renew us as we are continually remade in Jesus.
What must you flee from today? Not take steps away, or lean away from, but flee from? What idol do you need to make a clean break from and high tail it out of there?
v. 33 tells us that attentiveness to and application of God's word and wisdom leads to a settledness of heart. When we ignore the Lord's wisdom and instruction allows for fear, insecurity, anxiety and paranoia to debelitate and paralyze us. Disregard for God and disobedience to God leads to an inner anticipation of the other show dropping... we're just waiting for disaster, rather than living into the hope of God's blessing to those who honor him.
v. 7 is an incredible thought really... uprightness and integrity set us securely under the protection of the Lord. Integrity will not keep us from harm, but it will assure us of the Lord's covering us and carrying us through harm. If I'm going ot be in harm's way I'd much rather know that Jesus himself is shielding me from that which threatens me.
If v. 7 tells me that integrity rightly nurtures an expectation of safety in the Lord, v. 21 tells us integrity rightly nurtures an expectation of stability in the Lord. We will not be carried from here to there, displaced continually or uprooted suddenly. It doesn't mean God won't every move is physically, of course, but it means we can have confidence that whatever changing circumstances we may face, integrity of heart saves us from feeling we're being punished. If we're walking in integrity, than anything the Lord is orchestrating in our lives can be understand through the lens of blessing, protection, preservation and what's best for us. Our hearts will remain steadfast and stable whatever external shifts occur.
This text ties up a bunch of thoughts from the last 3 chapters in Paul's letter. We talked last week about the difference between asking "what am I free to do?" and "what does love require of me?" Paul speaks paritcularly about patterns of eating and drinking in the first century, something that Christians had differing convictions on. This brings us back to the social dimensions of exercising our freedom in Christ. And what Paul says is astonishing. We love to compartmentalize life into the spiritual and unspiritual, the sacred and secular, the serious and the frivolous. And Paul erases these distinctions. He brings the glory of God; the infinite worth and beauty and majesty of God; the surpassing worth of Jesus Christ; and he says these things are in play at every moment, in every activity, in every interaction.
This is not to replace watching football with a prayer meeting every Sunday afternoon. And this isn't to forbid family movie night for family worship every night. This isn't to switch out excercise or entertaining guests or yard work or vacation or video games with bible reading, Chris Tomlin playlists and missions trips. This is to infuse real meaning and significance into the everyday tasks we think of as "unspiritual". Every moment now matters. We can wash dishes and discipline children, and print of TPS reports, and play H.O.R.S.E and watch The Lego Batman Movie to the glory of God.
We are invited to enjoin every day, ordinary tasks and activities to eternal purpose and extraordinary significance. We eat, drink, play, work, laugh, clean, watch and rest all to the glory of God. But our hearts must be oriented that way... to honor him by enjoying him and the freedom that he gives in the midst of those every day activities. This is worship. Being shaped by the worth of Christ in everything we do.
What are you going to do this weekend to the glory of God?
v. 21-24 - Walking in strength of character does not just give us internal rest as we've already seen in the first 2 chapters... it actually gives us physical rest. With a clear conscience comes a settled heart, and with a settled heart comes peaceful mind. Our consciences, hearts and minds, when agitated and restless rob us of peace in every way, and that includes physical sleep.
If you don't sleep well, I wonder if you have an ailing conscience, burdened heart, or troubled mind. Most of us want to avoid those realities for fear of what we might find there, but integrity compels us to patiently press into that which is unsettled in our hearts... so the Lord might comfort us in sorrow, convict us of sin, and bring us back to dependence and repentance that leads to life.
Picking up on the idea above, v. 23 tells us to vigilantly guard our hearts - that is to guard our will, emotions, thoughts, desires and beliefs. We cannot guard that which we are not well acquainted with. A part of how we do this is in the following verses... We cultivate an awareness of our speech, because what comes out of our mouths is flowing from our hearts (v. 24). We pay attention to what we set our eyes and gaze upon, because our hearts can be enticed by the lusts of the eyes (v.25). We pay close attention to each decision we make and the direction of our lives, because they indicate where our hearts are ointing us (v. 26). And anything in any of these areas that move us off the path of integrity we diligently and vigilantly root out of our lives.

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ALFONSO JURADO, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, AND MARLENE JURADO, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFF, v. WESTERN GEAR WORKS, ORVILLE DUTRO AND SONS, BUCYRUS-ERIE CORPORATION, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, ABC CORPORATION, AND XYZ CORPORATION, SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, DEFENDANTS, AND WESTERN GEAR CORPORATION AND BUCYRUS-ERIE COMPANY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
*378 M. Christie Wise argued the cause for appellants (Bumgardner, Hardin & Ellis, attorneys; George R. Hardin, of counsel; Ms. Wise and Edward M. Suarez, Jr., on the briefs).
*379 Amy Lynn Fenno argued the cause for respondent (Fost and Muscio, attorneys).
Our focus is on the meaning of "misuse" as that term is used in a strict-liability design-defect products-liability case. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348, 354-55 (1985) (suggesting various definitions of "misuse"). In the present case, the problem arises from confusion inherent in Model Civil Charge 5.34I pertaining to product misuse. The trial court relied on that charge, which confuses the purpose for which a product is used with the manner of using it, in submitting special interrogatories to the jury. Those interrogatories apparently misled the jury about the meaning of "misuse."
Before submitting the case to the jury, the court reserved decision on a motion for a directed verdict by plaintiff Alfonso Jurado. After the jury returned a verdict for defendants Western Gear Corporation and Bucyrus-Erie Company, the court granted Jurado's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment on liability in Jurado's favor and remanded to the Law Division for a trial on damages only. 253 N.J. Super. 263, 601 A.2d 748 (1992).
We granted certification, 130 N.J. 7, 611 A.2d 647 (1992). We now reverse that part of the Appellate Division's judgment that affirmed the judgment on liability and remand the matter to the Law Division for a trial on both liability and damages.
Jurado, an employee of N & W Printing, injured his right hand when it became caught in an "in-running nip point" located between a rotating cylinder and a support bar underneath a collating machine. The machine, which was designed to *380 collate and assemble business forms, was manufactured and distributed by defendants.
During the collating process, excess paper salvage would enter a vacuum tube beneath the machine. Frequently, the paper would build up at the mouth of the tube, forcing the operator to clear it by hand. The tube was located near the rotating cylinder underneath the collator.
On the date of the accident, Jurado reduced the speed of the machine and tried to clear salvage that was blocking the vacuum tube. As he crouched and reached under the collator with his left hand, he lost his balance and tried with his right hand to prevent himself from falling. Jurado's right hand was injured when it was drawn into the in-running nip point. He claimed that he had not turned off the collator before attempting to unclog the vacuum tube because his employer had warned that the interruption would confuse the collating sequence. N & W Printing disputes this claim. Before trial, plaintiff Marlene Jurado abandoned her claim for loss of consortium. The trial proceeded on Jurado's personal-injury claim.
Jurado's expert witness, Gerald Weiner, a mechanical engineer, testified that the collator did not conform to proper design standards because of the absence of a guard on the in-running nip point. Weiner stated that at the time the collator was manufactured, defendants easily and inexpensively could have installed a sheet-metal fixed-barrier guard around the nip point. According to Weiner, the guard would not have affected the function of the machine and could have been installed for as little as $40 to $50 per unit.
He testified that since 1948 design engineers have recognized the potential danger posed by nip points. Defendants should have known, according to Weiner, that salvage would obstruct the mouth of the vacuum, and that an operator of the machine ultimately would have to clear the vacuum manually. In addition, he claimed that production engineers know that employees will typically take "shortcuts" to increase their productivity. *381 Thus, according to Weiner, a machine designer should have taken precautionary steps to prevent accidents that may result from such foreseeable shortcuts by employees.
He also noted that the area of the machine containing the in-running nip point was not "guarded by its location." He defined a guarded location as one either located more than eight feet off the floor or that could not be reached without removing a part of the machine. Weiner intimated that defendants had indirectly acknowledged that the location of the nip point did not constitute a guard because defendants had placed fixed-barrier guards over other nip points in the same area of the collator. He concluded that the in-running nip point was a foreseeable hazard and that defendants had avoided the use of well-known inexpensive methods of installing a guard.
Defendants' expert, Edward Schwalje, a mechanical engineer, asserted that the existence of the nip point did not require the installation of a sheet-metal guard. In his opinion, the nip point was already guarded by its location. Schwalje said that the location served as a guard because Jurado would not have placed his hands in the nip point during the normal course of operating the machine. He pointed out that Jurado had to squat and reach under the machine to touch the nip point, which was twenty-eight inches off the ground.
Schwalje acknowledged that the gears near the location of the injury were properly covered with fixed guards. He stated, however, that the collator had numerous moving parts that created nip points that were potentially dangerous if the operator "tamper[ed]" with the collator while it was in operation. According to Schwalje, the collator was not designed to be adjusted or repaired while in operation. Further, in the case of "salvage jams," the machine was designed to be stopped and cleaned while in "static condition." He concluded that the machine was "safe for use as intended" and met the design standards for safety when it was manufactured and distributed by defendants in the early-to-mid-1960s.
*382 Finally, Schwalje testified that he did not know whether defendants had reasonably anticipated when they had manufactured and distributed the machine that salvage would build up at the mouth of the vacuum tube. He stated, however, that similarly-designed collators occasionally jam because of excess salvage.
1. Was the product as designed, manufactured or sold defective, in that it was not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses? No. 2. Did the defect exist when the product left the hands and control of the defendant? No. 3. At the time of the accident was the product being used for an intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose, that is, that it was not being misused or had not been substantially altered in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable? Yes. 4. Was the defect in the product a proximate cause of the accident? No.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants on liability and awarded Jurado hypothetical damages of $65,000.
In his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Jurado argued that the jury's answers to the special interrogatories were inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. The court granted that motion, but denied Jurado's subsequent motion for additur or a new trial on damages. It then entered a verdict in favor of Jurado for $92,514.18 (the $65,000 award plus prejudgment interest).
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment on liability, but reversed the denial of a new trial on damages. It found that the affirmative answer to interrogatory three constituted a rejection of the defense expert's testimony and therefore left *383 the opinion of Jurado's expert uncontradicted. 253 N.J. Super. at 271-72, 601 A.2d 748. The court interpreted the jury's response to the third interrogatory as a finding that "plaintiff's use of the machine was reasonably foreseeable, and it was not being misused at the time of the accident." Id. at 271, 601 A.2d 748. This, according to the court, constituted a denial of the plausibility of the defense expert's theory that the nip point was guarded by its location. Ibid. Thus, the court found that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was warranted. We have a different view.
If you find that the plaintiff has shown by the preponderance of the credible evidence that (1) the product as designed, manufactured or sold was defective, in that it was not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses, (2) the defect existed when the product left the hands and control of the defendant, (3) that at the time of the accident the product was being used for an intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose, that is, that it was not being misused or had not been substantially altered in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable,... and (5) that the defect in the product was a proximate cause of the accident, then you must find for the plaintiff. If plaintiff has failed to establish any one of the just mentioned elements, then you must find for defendant.
Initially, subparagraph 3 of Model Civil Jury Charge 5.34I leads a jury to believe that the focus of the question is the purpose for which the product was used. The charge, however, proceeds to define "use for an intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose" in terms of whether the product was "misused" or "substantially altered." Thus, the charge could be understood to define misuse solely in terms of the purpose for which the collator was being used without mentioning the manner of use.
*384 As read by the Appellate Division, the answer to the third interrogatory, which was based on subparagraph three, confuses the purpose for which a product is used with the manner in which it is used. If the jury found in answering interrogatory three that Jurado was using the collator for its intended purpose, that finding would constitute only a partial resolution of the issue of misuse. The Appellate Division assumed that the jury's response necessarily found not only that the product was being used for a reasonably foreseeable purpose, but also that Jurado's manner of use was reasonably foreseeable.
Jurado instituted this action on October 4, 1985, before the effective date of the Products Liability Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -7. Consequently, the Act does not apply to Jurado's accident. See L. 1987, c. 197, § 8. The Legislature, moreover, did not intend that the Act codify all issues of product liability law. Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, L. 1987, c. 197. For instance, the Act does not specifically address product misuse. It states only that a manufacturer may be held liable "if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose...." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2.
Nor did the Legislature intend that the Act would effect a doctrinal change in the common law. Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 258 N.J. Super. 261, 273, 609 A.2d 487 (App.Div.) (citing Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 94-95, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990)), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 598, 617 A.2d 1220 (1992). The Act generally "leaves unchanged the ... theories under which a manufacturer ... may be held strictly liable for harm caused by a product...." Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 94, 577 A.2d 1239. The Legislature intended that the common law should fill the interstices left by the terms of the Act. Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, L.1987, c. 197; see also *385 William A. Dreier, Analysis: 1987 Products Liability Act, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 1279 (1989) (stating that the Legislature did not intend to supersede prior statutory or common law consistent with the Act). To fill those interstices, we turn to the common law.
Generally, to succeed under a strict-liability design-defect theory, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect caused the injury to a reasonably foreseeable user. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 179, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). Because this case involves a design defect, as distinguished from a manufacturing defect, plaintiff must show specifically that the product "`is not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes....'" Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d 179 (1982) (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)).
The decision whether a product is defective because it is "not reasonably fit, suitable and safe" for its intended purposes reflects a policy judgment under a risk-utility analysis. O'Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d 298. That analysis seeks to determine whether a particular product creates a risk of harm that outweighs its usefulness. Ibid. Risk-utility analysis is especially appropriate when a product may function satisfactorily under one set of circumstances and yet, because of a possible design defect, present an unreasonable risk of injury to the user in other situations. Id. at 181-82, 463 A.2d 298.
Under a risk-utility analysis, a defendant may still be liable when a plaintiff misused the product, if the misuse was objectively foreseeable. Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc., 128 N.J. 86, 95, 607 A.2d 637 (1992) (citing Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 177-78, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Suter, supra, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140). *386 The concept of foreseeable misuse extends to cases in which a product has been substantially altered from its original design. Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 168-69, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984); Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 151, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984). Hence, the plaintiff in a design-defect products-liability suit may succeed even if the product was misused, as long as the misuse or alteration was objectively foreseeable. Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d 1225; Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 159, 406 A.2d 140; Cepeda, supra, 76 N.J. at 177-78, 386 A.2d 816.
The absence of misuse is part of the plaintiff's case. Misuse is not an affirmative defense. Cepeda, supra, 76 N.J. at 177, 386 A.2d 816. Thus, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there was no misuse or that the misuse was objectively foreseeable. Johansen, supra, 128 N.J. at 95-96, 607 A.2d 637; Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 169, 484 A.2d 1234. So, for example, when a derrick operator injured his thumb while grabbing an overhead chain, he bore the burden of proving the foreseeability of his misuse. Beatty v. Schramm, Inc., 188 N.J. Super. 587, 591, 458 A.2d 127 (App.Div. 1983).
Essentially, product misuse contemplates two kinds of conduct. One is the use of a product for an improper purpose. "If, for instance, a plaintiff undertakes to use his power saw as a nail clipper and thereby snips his digits, he will not be heard to complain...." Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 194, 406 A.2d 140 (Clifford, J., concurring). For a plaintiff to recover, the purpose for which the product is used at the time of the accident must be objectively foreseeable. When a plaintiff is injured while using the product for a purpose that is not objectively foreseeable, the injury does not establish that the product is defective.
The other kind of misuse concerns the manner in which the plaintiff used the product. When, for example, the operator of a high-lift forklift is injured while using the forklift on steep, instead of level, terrain, the emphasis should be on the *387 manner, not the purpose, of the misuse. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978). As comment h of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A states: "A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling or consumption."
Commentators have accepted the definition of misuse in terms of purpose and manner. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 28.6 at 364-69 (2d ed. 1986); William A. Landes and Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J.Legal Studies 535, 561 (Dec. 1985); William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 102 at 668-69 (4th ed. 1971). So have courts in other states. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 348, 641 P.2d 258, 262 (1982); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (1987); Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 639 P.2d 555, 556 (1982). We, too, find the definition to be helpful.
Product misuse theoretically could relate to the existence of a defect, the issue of causation, or that of comparative fault. See James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability Problems and Process 669 (2d ed. 1992). In a work-place setting, when, because of a design defect, an employee is injured while using a machine in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the employee's comparative fault is irrelevant. Rivera v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 107 N.J. 256, 260, 526 A.2d 705 (1987); Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 95 N.J. 263, 264, 471 A.2d 15 (1984); Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d 140.
To the extent that misuse relates to the duty to design a safe product, "a manufacturer has a duty to make sure that its manufactured products placed into the stream of commerce are suitably safe when properly used for their intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes." Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 165, 484 A.2d 1234 (citing Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 144-45, 484 A.2d 1225; Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 169, 406 A.2d 140); *388 see also Victor E. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn.L.Rev. 171, 172 (1974) ("[when] a user makes an unforeseeable misuse of a product, the supplier has breached no duty to the user."). When someone is injured while using a product for an unforeseeable purpose or in an unforeseeable manner, the misuse sheds no light on whether the product is defective, because a manufacturer is not under a duty to protect against unforeseeable misuses. Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 159, 406 A.2d 140. A manufacturer, however, has a duty to prevent an injury caused by the foreseeable misuse of its product.
If the jury concludes that the product is defective, it must then determine whether the misuse proximately caused the injury. See, e.g., Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 171, 484 A.2d 1234. Even if a defect is a contributing or concurring cause, but not the sole cause, of an accident, the manufacturer will be liable. Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 171, 484 A.2d 1234. For example, if, in the present case, the accident had happened when a co-employee negligently or playfully bumped plaintiff while he crouched in front of the collator, the manufacturer could be found liable notwithstanding the untoward conduct of the co-employee. In that situation, the jury should consider whether the absence of the guard was the proximate, contributing, or concurring cause of the injury.
In sum, when misuse is an issue in a design-defect case, the jury should first determine whether the plaintiff used the product for an objectively foreseeable purpose. If the jury finds that the plaintiff's purpose was not foreseeable, the defendant did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff. If, however, the jury finds that the plaintiff's purpose was foreseeable, it must then decide whether the product was defective.
Under the risk-utility analysis, the jury must then determine whether the plaintiff used the product in an objectively foreseeable manner. The effect of a finding that the plaintiff did not so use the product, like a determination that the product was not used for a foreseeable purpose, is that the jury will have found that the defendant did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff. If, however, the jury finds that the plaintiff used the product in an objectively foreseeable manner, it should then evaluate the product's utility. See Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 170, 484 A.2d 1234. That evaluation entails the determination whether the defendant feasibly could have modified the product's design to prevent the injury or whether that modification would have either unreasonably impaired the utility of the product or excessively increased its cost. Ibid.
If the jury finds that the product is defective, it must then decide whether the misuse proximately caused the injury. In cases in which the product is defective solely because of a foreseeable misuse, the determination of defect predetermines the issue of proximate cause. In other cases, however, where a product is defective for reasons other than the particular misuse, the jury must separately determine proximate cause.
Here, the jury found that the product was not defective as designed, that it was reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses, that it was not defective when it left defendants' hands, and that it was not a proximate cause of the accident. It also found that at the time of the accident, the *390 product was being used for an intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose in that "it was not being misused or had not been substantially altered in any way that was not reasonably foreseeable." The Appellate Division concluded that the jury had found that Jurado had used the machine in a foreseeable manner and that the jury's finding was a rejection of the defense expert's theory that "the in-running nip point was guarded by reason of its location...." 253 N.J. Super. at 271, 601 A.2d 748. Special interrogatory number three, the jury's answer to which was the predicate for that conclusion, however, does not mention the word "manner." Instead, the interrogatory focuses on the purpose for which the product was being used at the time of the accident.
Consequently, the Appellate Division should not have assumed that the jury had decided the issue of misuse based on the manner in which Jurado had used the collator. In particular, the Appellate Division states: "The jury found that plaintiff had to put his hand into the nip point area during foreseeable operation." Ibid. In effect, the Appellate Division defined away the alternative that the jury found only that the machine had been used for its intended purpose. The inconsistency in the jury's findings requires a retrial on liability as well as damages.
The record suggests that if on retrial the jury determines that plaintiff's misuse was objectively foreseeable, that determination will predetermine that the defect was the proximate cause of the accident. If so, the trial court should instruct the jury that its determination of the existence of a defect will have that further effect.
The Appellate Division, after concluding that the jury must have determined that Jurado had not used the collator in an improper manner, implicitly concluded further that the jury must have determined that the defect was the proximate cause of the accident. As previously stated, however, we cannot ascertain whether the jury found that plaintiff had used the *391 collator in an improper manner or for an improper purpose. Contrary to the Appellate Division's implicit conclusion, moreover, the jury explicitly found that the defect was not the proximate cause of the accident. Given our concern about the possible inconsistency of the jury's finding on the existence of a defect and the implications of that finding for the issue of proximate cause, we believe that the interests of justice are better served by a retrial.
The judgment of the Appellate Division on liability is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Law Division for a trial on both liability and damages.
When in a querulous mood, our colleagues at the trial bench sometimes grumble that while trial judges devote their energies to the pursuit of justice, appellate judges spend their time hunched over the record, pawing through it in an unrelenting search for error. One might find support for that dyspeptic observation in today's decision to remand this case for a new trial, given the fact that the jurors rendered a verdict after a charge that, although not squeaky clean, nevertheless fairly put the single critical issue to them in simple, comprehensible terms: was defendants' product as designed, manufactured, or sold defective in that it was not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses? Answer: No.
That question and answer should have been the end of the case. In theory, there was no need for the jury to address questions two, three, and four. We have seen many other jury verdict forms in product-liability failure-to-warn cases that state that if the jury finds no defect, it should cease deliberations and return a verdict for defendant. Viewed in that way, the jury's answers to questions two through four become irrelevant, and the sole focus of appellate inquiry becomes whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that the product was not defective.
*392 Whatever shortcomings infect the current Model Civil Jury Charge, no one can be confused by the charge's definition of "defective" as "not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses." That is plain English, and I am willing to assume that the jury understood it, understood the evidence, understood what the plaintiff had done with the machine, and understood how plaintiff had been injured. To my way of thinking we go at the problem backwards if we surmise that the jury's answer to interrogatory number three informed, and rendered unacceptable, its answer to interrogatory number one.
With remarkable precision and impeccable clarity the Court lays out the principles of law that henceforth will govern this kind of case. The Court has come up with a better jury charge than the Model Charge, and I enthusiastically endorse the new, improved version. However, I do not perceive that the jury instructions in this case were so wide of the mark as to require yet another court event. The first trial was fair, albeit not pristine, and the result was hardly an unjust one.
I would reverse and remand to the Law Division for entry there of a judgment based on the jury's verdict.
For reversal and remandment Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 6.


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On Tuesday, October 14, 2014, Trooper Marc Omara exercised deadly force which resulted in the death of Hua Jian Ye on I-95 in the City of Norwalk.
Section 51-277a of the General Statutes provides that, whenever a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties, uses deadly physical force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof, the Division of Criminal Justice shall cause an investigation to be made and shall determine whether the use of deadly physical force was appropriate under Section 53a-22 of the General Statutes. In accordance with these statutes, the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk caused such an investigation to be conducted by the Connecticut State Police Central District Major Crime Squad (CDMCS), in conjunction with the Forensic Science Laboratory of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, and the Office of the State Medical Examiner.
The investigation is concluded and this report represents my findings and legal conclusions. It also should be noted that in the spring of 2015 the Division of Criminal Justice revised its policies to direct that any investigation into the use of force resulting in death be conducted by a State’s Attorney or other prosecutor from a Judicial District other the district where the incident occurred. This incident and the subsequent investigation on which this report is based occurred prior to the policy revision. I wish to extend my condolences to the family and friends of Mr. Hua Jian Ye on the loss of their loved one.
On Tuesday October 14, 2014, Hua Jian Ye boarded a Dahlia tour bus in the Chinatown section of New York City, bound for the Mohegan Sun Casino in Uncasville, Connecticut. Ye was traveling alone and was not known to the driver or any of the other 19 (nineteen) passengers. While on I-95 North in Connecticut, Ye began walking up and down the aisle and appeared to be using the light of his cell phone to look at other passengers. When the passengers expressed their displeasure with Ye’s behavior, he suddenly produced a box cutter type knife. For reasons not determined, Ye then began slashing passenger Meici Chan in the face with the box cutter. Meici Cahn began yelling which alerted the other passengers to the assault. Another passenger, Randy Chan, then attempted to stop the assault by grabbing Ye and pulling him toward the front of the bus. Several of the bus passengers began calling 911 from their cell phones to report the incident. Dispatchers at State Police Troop G and Norwalk Police were receiving calls from the passengers. Due to all of the callers only speaking Chinese, dispatchers were not able to obtain specific details of the assault or the exact location. The driver then pulled the bus into a construction zone on I-95 North at Exit 14, where Trooper Marc Omara (#747) was stationed with his state police cruiser to provide traffic control in the work zone. Another passenger, Nikorn Chinakul, exited the bus and approached the cruiser to advise Trooper Omara of the assault. Nikorn Chinakul was speaking English but was very excited and having trouble communicating to the Trooper exactly what was happening on the bus. When Trooper Omara realized that a man on the bus was assaulting a woman with a knife he advised Troop G via the cruiser’s radio. Troop G acknowledged and indicated that they had indeed been receiving calls but hadn’t identified the location. Other Troopers and Norwalk Police Officers were then dispatched to the area. As Trooper Omara approached the bus driver’s window, the driver told him to get out his weapon because the man on the bus had a knife. The driver then opened the door and the suspect Ye and passenger Randy Chan fell off the bus and onto the roadway. Ye was attempting to assault Randy Chan with the box cutter and ignored commands repeatedly given by Trooper Omara to “Stop and drop the knife”. Trooper Omara, standing approximately 10 feet away in front of the bus, drew his duty weapon and then discharged the weapon as Ye continued to ignore his commands and was lunging toward Randy Chan with the box cutter. One of the first shots inadvertently struck Randy Chan in the right leg and another possibly struck suspect Ye. Randy Chan fell to the ground and rolled toward the bus, seeking a safe location away from suspect Ye who had fallen to the ground in the center lane of the highway. Trooper Omara continued to yell commands for suspect Ye to drop the knife, however Ye stood up and lunged toward him with the box cutter extended. Trooper Omara discharged his weapon again several more times, striking Ye and causing him to again fall to the ground. Suspect Ye still had the box cutter in his hand and was attempting to get up again as Trooper Omara continued to yell commands for him to drop the knife. Trooper Omara had fired all 9 rounds of ammunition from his service weapon and reloaded with another magazine of 8. As Ye again got to his feet, still armed with the box cutter, Trooper Omara discharged his weapon two more times, again striking Ye and knocking him to the ground. Ye was then on the ground and began to scrape at his own eyes with the box cutter. Trooper John Acampora and Norwalk Police Officer Ramon Tejada then arrived to assist. Troopers Omara and Acampora had their weapons drawn and provided cover for Officer Tejada who was attempting to restrain Ye with handcuffs. Ye resisted Officer Tejada, refusing to release the knife. Officer Tejada was eventually able to pull the box cutter from Ye’s hand, roll him onto his chest and handcuff him.
Trooper Omara discharged his firearm a total of 11 (eleven) times to defend himself and Randy Chan from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Victim Randy Chan was struck once in the leg and suspect Ye was struck 6 (six) times in the right arm and torso areas. Toxicology reports indicated no presence of narcotics, but an elevated blood alcohol level of .014% for suspect Ye. No evidence of any pre-existing medical or psychological conditions or diagnosis were discovered for suspect Ye. Suspect Ye is believed to only have spoken Chinese and investigators were unable to establish whether or not he actually understood the verbal commands given to him by Trooper Omara.
Hua Jian Ye failed to comply with Trooper Omara’s lawful commands and was attempting to assault Randy Chan with a box cutter. In his written statement Trooper Omara stated when the two men first came out of the bus that “he felt in a matter of seconds, the aggression and level of violence displayed by the smaller man (suspect Ye) as he pursued the other man made it clear to him that he was going to kill him (the larger man).” Trooper Omara stated further that he first discharged his firearm in the direction of suspect Ye because “As the smaller man swung the knife with his left hand, Trooper Omara believed the smaller man was close enough to pose a serious risk of death or bodily harm to himself or the larger man”. After the first sequence of shots, Trooper Omara again felt he needed to discharge his weapon again several times because “Before he could even reassess the situation, the man quickly got to his feet and turned towards him with the knife still in his left hand. The man started towards him and began to close what he estimated to be 12-15 feet between them. He again yelled as loud as he could and ordered the man to drop the knife, however the man still ignored him.” Trooper Omara felt the need to continue to utilize his duty weapon on the successive instances because as he continuously was reassessing the situation which he estimated took approximately 15 fifteen seconds, he felt that “At no time did the man de-escalate his violently, aggressive behavior”.
He was driving on I-95 North in traffic when he heard several loud pops which sounded like gun shots. There were about four or five vehicles ahead of him and then a tour bus pulled over in the left lane which was closed for construction. He saw there was a struggle or confrontation going on near the front of the bus and so he pulled into the closed left lane behind the bus and got out of his vehicle. He was armed with a handgun, however only took his agency badge off his belt for identification. As he was getting out of his vehicle and approaching the bus he saw a man on the ground in the center of the roadway who was trying to get up and was looking toward something/someone in front of the bus, out of Pickett’s view. He heard several more pops but couldn’t tell who was firing the shots at that time. As he walked toward the bus, he saw that there was a uniformed Trooper standing in front of the bus, ahead of the open bus door. The Trooper had his weapon drawn and pointed at the man on the ground in the center lane next to the bus. Pickett was about twelve feet behind and four feet off to the right of the rear of the bus when the man got up from the ground and lunged toward the Trooper. Pickett saw the Trooper fire two shots at the lunging man. The man fell back to the ground, in the center lane. Pickett then saw that there was another man lying on the ground in the left lane next to the bus, bleeding profusely from his leg. The Trooper kept pointing his gun at the man in the center lane and another officer (later identified as a Norwalk Officer) arrived. Pickett never saw the Trooper point the weapon at the man bleeding by the bus, only the man who had lunged at him and had been shot. Picket stated he couldn’t see if the man on the ground had a weapon, but the two officers were yelling to the man repeatedly to drop the knife. The man appeared to still be struggling and trying to get up. At that time, the Norwalk Officer grabbed the man, kicked a knife out of his hand and was trying to keep him on the ground to put handcuffs on him. Pickett placed his foot on the man’s legs to help keep him down and the Norwalk Officer was then able to get the man handcuffed. Once the man was handcuffed several other officers arrived and Pickett stepped back.
When suspect Ye began assaulting the woman on the bus with the box cutter, Chan grabbed the man and pushed him to the front of the bus trying to restrain him. Chan stated that after the bus stopped and the Trooper approached, he heard the driver tell the Trooper that the man had a knife. The driver opened the door and he and the suspect fell out of the bus and onto the highway. He was still struggling briefly with the suspect and then he heard a gunshot and realized that he had been shot in the leg. He was then able to roll away from the suspect and then the suspect lunged at him, trying to stab him with the knife. It was then that he heard the Trooper tell the man two or three times to drop the knife. He saw that the suspect still had the knife and kept trying to get up and the Trooper, who was about ten feet away kept shooting the man as he tried to get up. Chan stated that when he first fell out of the bus and was struggling with the suspect, he didn’t remember hearing the Trooper give any commands before the first gunshot which he thought hit him in the leg.
When suspect Ye began assaulting the woman on the bus with the box cutter, another passenger, who Chinakul thought was a VIP, based on how he was treated, tried to stop the assault. The driver pulled over in a construction zone and stopped behind a Police car. The driver pointed toward the Police car and then opened the door and Chinakul got out and ran up to the Trooper. He knocked on the Trooper’s window and told him about the man on the bus with the knife. Chinakul doesn’t speak Chinese. He was speaking English to the Trooper, but stated that he was so excited that he could only get out a few words while informing the Trooper. As he and the Trooper were then outside the front of the bus, the driver opened the door and the VIP and the suspect with the knife fell out onto the highway. Chinakul was standing in front of the bus near the Trooper who was about eight to ten feet away from the suspect with the knife. He heard the Trooper yell to the suspect “Many times” to “Stop, drop the knife”. The suspect didn’t drop the knife and the Trooper shot him and the man fell down. The Trooper kept yelling for the man to sop and drop the knife, but the man kept trying to get up and then the Trooper shot him again.
Chief Medical Examiner Dr. James Gill conducted a post-mortem examination of Hua Jian Ye. Dr. Gill documented multiple gunshot wounds to the torso and extremities, as well as superficial cuts over both eyelids. Dr. Gill identified the locations and direction of the gunshot wounds. There were gunshot wounds to the left chest, left flank, right subclavian region, and right epigastric region. There were two gunshot wounds that traveled through the right arm and then re-entered the right chest area. There was a gunshot wound to the right forearm which exited the right wrist and possibly re-entered at one of the other abovementioned gunshot wounds. There appear to have been a total of six projectiles that struck Ye.
A blood sample drawn from Mr. Ye during the autopsy was analyzed and the toxicology report identified a Blood Alcohol Concentration level of .014%.
The cause of death was listed by Dr. Gill as gunshot wound of trunk and extremities. The manner of death was listed as homicide (shot by police).
The Central District Major Crime Squad examined the scene and recovered sixty evidence items. These items included Trooper Omara’s duty weapon, eleven expended shell casings from the roadway and six projectiles, two recovered from the scene and four were recovered from Mr. Ye, (three at Norwalk Hospital and one from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner). The duty weapon, shell casings and recovered projectiles were submitted to the forensic laboratory for examination.
Section 53a-22(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes permits a police officer to use deadly physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. The test to determine reasonableness is both subjective and objective. First, the officer must believe that the use of deadly force is necessary to defend himself or another from the imminent use of deadly physical force. Second, the belief must be objectively reasonable. State v. Smith , 73 Conn. App. 173, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 923 (2002). The burden is on the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of self-defense as set forth in section 53a-22. State v. Smith , supra, 73 Conn. App. at 185-86.
The test is not whether it was in fact necessary for the officer to use deadly physical force in order to defend against the imminent use of deadly physical force. The test is whether the officer believed it was necessary to use deadly physical force and whether such belief was objectively reasonable, based on the facts and circumstances known to the police officer at the time the decision to use deadly force was made. See State v. Silveira , 198 Conn. 454 (1986), State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643 (1999).
The United States Supreme Court has explained this test in a civil rights case: “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight …The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance of the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386 at 387 (1989). “The appropriate inquiry is whether the officers acted reasonably, not whether they had less intrusive alternatives available to them.” Scott v. Henrich , 39 F.3d. 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1992).
In examining the number of shots necessary to end the public safety risk, the United States Supreme Court has explained: “It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.” Plumhoff v. Rickard , 134 S.Ct. 2012 at 2022 (2014).
The accounts given by all of the officers involved regarding the events surrounding the shooting of Hua Jian Ye are corroborated by the seized evidence, the reports of the officers at the scene, the civilian witness statements, the radio transmissions, the forensic analysis, and the postmortem examination findings.
On Tuesday October 14, 2014, Hua Jian Ye boarded a Dahlia tour bus in the Chinatown section of New York City, bound for the Mohegan Sun Casino in Uncasville, Connecticut. Ye was traveling alone and was not known to the driver or any of the other 19 (nineteen) passengers. While on I-95 North in Connecticut, Ye began walking up and down the aisle and appeared to be using the light of his cell phone to look at other passengers. When the passengers expressed their displeasure with Ye’s behavior, he suddenly produced a box cutter type knife. For reasons not determined, Ye then began slashing passenger Meici Chan in the face with the box cutter. Meici Cahn began yelling which alerted the other passengers to the assault. Another passenger, Randy Chan, then attempted to stop the assault by grabbing Ye and pulling him toward the front of the bus. Several of the bus passengers began calling 911 from their cell phones to report the incident. Dispatchers at State Police Troop G and Norwalk Police were receiving calls from the passengers. Due to all of the callers only speaking Chinese, dispatchers were not able to obtain specific details of the assault or the exact location. The driver then pulled the bus into a construction zone on I-95 North at Exit 14, where Trooper Marc Omara (#747) was located. Another passenger, Nikorn Chinakul, exited the bus and approached the cruiser to advise Trooper Omara of the assault. Nikorn Chinakul was speaking English but was very excited and having trouble communicating to the Trooper exactly what was happening on the bus. When Trooper Omara realized that a man on the bus was assaulting a woman with a knife he advised Troop G via the cruiser’s radio. Troop G acknowledged and indicated that they had indeed been receiving calls but hadn’t identified the location. Other Troopers and Norwalk Police Officers were then dispatched to the area. As Trooper Omara approached the bus driver’s window, the driver told him to get out his weapon because the man on the bus had a knife. The driver then opened the door and the suspect Ye and passenger Randy Chan fell off the bus and onto the roadway. Ye was attempting to assault Randy Chan with the box cutter and ignored commands repeatedly given by Trooper Omara to “Stop and drop the knife”. Trooper Omara, standing approximately 10 feet away in front of the bus, drew his duty weapon and then discharged the weapon as Ye continued to ignore his commands and was lunging toward Randy Chan with the box cutter. One of the first shots inadvertently struck Randy Chan in the right leg and another possibly struck suspect Ye. Randy Chan fell to the ground and rolled toward the bus, seeking a safe location away from suspect Ye who had fallen to the ground in the center lane of the highway. Trooper Omara continued to yell commands for suspect Ye to drop the knife, however Ye stood up and lunged toward him with the box cutter extended. Trooper Omara discharged his weapon again several more times, striking Ye and causing him to again fall to the ground. Suspect Ye still had the box cutter in his hand and was attempting to get up again as Trooper Omara continued to yell commands for him to drop the knife. Trooper Omara had fired all 9 rounds of ammunition from his service weapon and reloaded with another magazine of 8. As Ye again got to his feet, still armed with the box cutter, Trooper Omara discharged his weapon two more times, again striking Ye and knocking him to the ground. Ye was then on the ground and began to scrape at his own eyes with the box cutter. Trooper John Acampora and Norwalk Police Officer Ramon Tejada then arrived to assist. Troopers Omara and Acampora had their weapons drawn and provided cover for Officer Tejada who was attempting to restrain Ye with handcuffs. Ye resisted Officer Tejada, refusing to release the knife. Officer Tejada was eventually able to pull the box cutter from Ye’s hand, roll him onto his chest and handcuff him.
It is the conclusion of this State’s Attorney that Trooper Marc Omara believed the use of deadly physical force was necessary to defend himself and the civilians present from the imminent use of deadly physical force. It is further concluded that his belief was objectively reasonable. Therefore, I have determined that Trooper Marc Omara was justified in his use of deadly physical force upon Hua Jian Ye, and that such force was appropriate under section 53a-22(c) of the General Statutes. Accordingly, no further action will be taken by the Division of Criminal Justice.

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CITY OF NEWTON vs. ERIC R. KRASNIGOR & others [Note 1]; NORFOLK & DEDHAM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, intervener (and a consolidated case [Note 2]).
Present: WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, & LYNCH, JJ.
CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 23, 1983, and March 20, 1985, respectively.
The cases were consolidated for trial and were tried before William H. Carey, J.
Joseph P. Musacchio (Robert P. Powers with him) for Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., of Pennsylvania (John A. Mavricos with him) for the city of Newton.
The actions were consolidated for trial. At trial, however, only the tort action for damages was tried to a jury. As to the declaratory judgment action, the judge stated that he would decide that action at the conclusion of the jury trial. The tort action was submitted to the jury on written questions for them to make written findings (special verdicts). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 49 (a), 365 Mass. 812 (1974).
The jury, in response to the written questions, found, among other things, that "Eric Krasnigor intended to start a fire or fires at the Meadowbrook Junior High School." It also found that Krasnigor's actions proximately caused damage to the school's science laboratory and to its library. The jury found further that Krasnigor did not "specifically intend to cause the substantial damage which was ultimately sustained" at the school and that he was not "substantially certain that his actions at the [school] . . . would result in the substantial damage which was ultimately sustained."
he entered judgment against the insurance company in both actions.
The Appeals court affirmed the judgments. Newton v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 202 (1988). The court agreed with the insurer's contention that "Abernathy does not require the insured to intend the precise injury which results for the exclusion to apply," and that "the exclusion is also in effect when the insured intends to cause some damage . . . but not necessarily the severity of damage that actually occurs." Id. at 203. However, the Appeals Court determined that the insurer did not adequately apprise the trial judge of its arguments and thus could not raise the issue on appeal.
The Appeals Court also stated the following: "We reject, however, the insurer's contention, made both to the trial judge in the declaratory judgment action and on appeal, that a deliberate intent to set a fire (as found by the jury's answer to the special question) as matter of law implies an intent to cause some property damage." Id. at 204 n.3.
We granted Norfolk & Dedham's petition for further appellate review. We hold that the jury's finding that Krasnigor deliberately intended to set a fire, in the circumstances of this case, implies, as matter of law, an intent to cause some property damage. We further hold that the exclusion for property damage "which is expected or intended by the insured" applies to Krasnigor's activities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against Norfolk & Dedham in the declaratory judgment matter and modify the tort judgment to delete the entry of judgment against Norfolk & Dedham.
barrel filled with paper, and, in the science laboratory, Alberts, Masterson, and Krasnigor burned files.
Krasnigor and Masterson proceeded to the school's library. Krasnigor brought some boxes of books together and pulled additional books from the shelves. He placed matches in the boxes, amongst the books, and set the books on fire. Masterson did the same. By the time Krasnigor and Masterson had completed their efforts, several separate fires were burning in the library. Krasnigor made no effort to extinguish the fires before he left the school. Shortly thereafter, when the police officers who had received a report of a fire at the school approached Krasnigor outside the school, they found a partially filled box of matches in his possession. The Meadowbrook Junior High School suffered 1.3 million dollars in damage as a result of the fires. Almost all of the damage was sustained in the library.
(1978); Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521, 523-525 (1986); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 252 (1973).
In Abernathy, we stated that "the resulting injury which ensues from the volitional act of an insured is still an `accident' within the meaning of an insurance policy if the insured does not specifically intend to cause the resulting harm or is not substantially certain that such harm will occur." Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, supra at 84. The "resulting harm" concerns the type of harm inflicted -- whether personal injury or property damage -- and not the extent of the harm actually sustained.
In this case, in order for the exclusion to apply there must be a showing that Krasnigor intended, or expected, to cause property damage, not that he intended, or expected, to cause the exact damage which actually occurred. [Note 8] The jury found, in response to a written question, that "Krasnigor intended to start a fire or fires at the Meadowbrook Junior High School," and that his actions were the proximate cause of damage to the library and to the science laboratory.
books, lit those boxes of books, and left the school while several small fires were blazing. Given such facts, it is impossible not to conclude that Krasnigor intended, or expected, to cause some property damage. See Terrio v. McDonough, supra at 169. See also, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445, 450-451 (1975); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978).
Accordingly, the provision excluding "property damage . . . which is expected or intended by the insured" applies to Krasnigor's actions. The judgments against the insurance company in both actions are reversed.
[Note 1] Leslie Alberts and Michael K. Masterson.
[Note 2] Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company vs. Nathan T. Krasnigor & others; City of Newton, intervener.
[Note 3] The difference of meaning of the words "expected" and "intended" is discussed in Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81 , 84-85 (1984), and need not be restated here.
[Note 4] Masterson had been denied coverage under his parents' homeowners' insurance policy based on this exclusion. See Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co. vs. Masterson & another (Superior Court, Norfolk County No. 85-0757).
[Note 5] In Terrio, supra at 169, the Appeals Court stated: "As to McDonough's argument that, even if he intended to push Terrio down the stairs, her plunge through a glass pane at the bottom was an unanticipated accident, it is self-evident that if a person is pushed down a flight of stairs it is to be expected that person will be hurt."
[Note 6] We think it significant that Abernathy involved a determination of the insured's state of mind on a motion for summary judgment, whereas in this case the question of the insured's intent to set the fire was decided by a jury.
[Note 7] We caution that the above discussion is not based on the tort principle that one is considered to have intended the natural and ordinary consequences of one's voluntary act. Rather, "[i]t is a much more narrow gauge that recognizes the correlation [between act and intent] only where reason mandates that from the very nature of the act, harm to the injured party must have been intended." United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., supra at 291 n.9, quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445, 450 (1975).
We must look at the nature of the act in this case in order to determine whether Krasnigor's activity is excluded from coverage. The particular risks associated with a fire set in an unattended building, and the foreseeability of a fire's spreading and doing damage to other objects, is relevant to our inquiry.
[Note 8] The two special questions to the jury dealing with damages did not present them with this standard. Rather, they presented the question whether Krasnigor "specifically intended to cause the substantial damage which was ultimately sustained" (emphasis supplied), and whether Krasnigor "was substantially certain that his actions at the [school] . . . would result in the substantial damage which was ultimately sustained." The Appeals Court held that, because Norfolk & Dedham did not sufficiently apprise the trial judge of its objections, it could not raise the question on appeal. Because we hold that the jury's finding that Krasnigor intended to start the fire at the school implies an intent to cause some property damage as matter of law, it is unnecessary to discuss whether Norfolk & Dedham properly objected. The judge, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 49(a), applied an improper legal standard as to the extent of damage intended, or expected, in entering a verdict on the jury's answers. See Henderson v. D'Annolfo, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 413 , 423-424 (1983); 9 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2503, at 488 (1971 & Supp. 1988). Also, he denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, the issue of the validity of the judgments is before us.
[Note 9] We thus agree with Newton that intentional acts of the insured may result in unintended and unexpected injury or damage. See Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, supra at 84. The fact that the act itself is intended will not lead to an exclusion if no damage is expected or intended, or if damage of another type is expected or intended.

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Hoosier Quick Hits: IU Basketball v. Ohio State from IUSTV on Vimeo.
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Communication data (e.g., device information, IP addresses).
Provision of the online performance, its features and contents.
Replying on requests and communicating with users.
“Personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’). An identifiable natural person is a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier (e.g. cookie) or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
“Processing” means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means associated with personal data. The term goes far and includes practically every handling of data.
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You have according to Art. 77 GDPR the right to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority.
You have the right to withdraw your consent in accordance with. Art. 7 (3) GDPR with effect for the future.
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We, respectively our hosting provider, process inventory data, contact data, content data, contract data, usage data, meta and communication data of customers, interested parties and visitors to our online service on the basis of our legitimate interests in an efficient and secure provision of our website according to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR in connection to Art. 28 GDPR (in conclusion of a job-processing contract).
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Log file information is stored for security purposes (for example, to investigate abusive or fraudulent activities) for a maximum of 7 days and then deleted. Data whose further retention is required for evidential purposes shall be excluded from the erasing until the final clarification of the incident.
Users can create a user account. As part of the registration, the required mandatory information is accessible on their online profile. The data entered during registration will be used for the purpose of using the website service. Users may be informed by e-mail about their registration-related information, such as changes in the scope of the offer or technical circumstances. When users terminate their user account, their data will be deleted with regard to the user profile data, subject to their necessary storage is for commercial or tax law reasons according to Art. 6 (1) lit. c GDPR. It is the responsibility of the users to store their data upon termination before the end of the registration. We are entitled to irretrievably delete all user data stored during the term of the registration.
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When contacting us (for example, by contact form, e-mail, telephone or via social media) the information of the user is processed on the contact request and its processing in accordance with Art. 6 (1) lit. b GDPR. User information can be stored in a Customer Relationship Management System ("CRM System") or comparable request system.
We delete the requests, if they are no longer required. We check the necessity every two years; furthermore, there apply the legal archiving obligations.
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Content of the newsletter: Newsletters, e-mails and other electronic notifications with work-related information (hereinafter just "newsletter") are distributed only with the consent of the recipient or a legal permission. By subscribing to AAEs’ newsletter you receive concretely description on its receipt; they are authoritative for the consent of the users. Incidentally, our newsletter contains information about our work and us.
Double opt-in and logging: The registration process to our newsletter is done by a so-called double-opt-in procedure. After registration, you receive an e-mail asking you to confirm your registration. This confirmation is necessary so that nobody can register with your personal e-mail addresses. The registration for the newsletter will be logged in order to prove the registration process according to its legal requirements. This includes the storage of the registration and the confirmation time, as well as the IP address. Likewise, all changes to your data stored at the shipping service provider are logged, too.
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The distribution of the newsletter and the associated performance statistics is based on the consent of the recipient according to Art. 6 (1) lit. a and Art. (7) GDPR.
The logging of the registration process is based on our legitimate interests in accordance with. Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. We are interested in a user-friendly and secure newsletter system, which serves both our business interests and the expectations of the users. Furthermore, it also allows us to prove our consent.
Withdrawal/unsubscribe - You may cancel the receipt of our newsletter at any time, respectively you can withdraw your consent at any time. The link to unsubscribe from the newsletter can be found at the end of each newsletter. We may save the submitted email addresses for up to three years based on our legitimate interests before deleting them for the purpose of sending out newsletters in order to provide evidence of prior consent. The processing of this data is limited to the purpose of a possible defense against claims. An individual request for cancellation is possible at any time, provided that at the same time the former existence of consent is confirmed.
If you would like to receive the newsletter we offer, we need your e-mail address and further information that allows us to verify your address to receive the newsletter.
The newsletter provider is MailChimp®. The system transmit your data to MailChimp. MailChimp is prohibited from selling and using your data for purposes other than sending newsletters. It is a certified provider, which was selected according to the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Federal Data Protection Act.
MailChimp participates in and has certified its compliance with the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework and the Swiss-U.S Privacy Shield Framework. They are committed to subjecting all Personal Information received from European Union (EU) member countries and Switzerland, respectively, in reliance on each Privacy Shield Framework, to the Framework’s applicable Principles. To learn more about the Privacy Shield Frameworks, and to view their certification, visit the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Privacy Shield website: https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome. A list of Privacy Shield participants is maintained by the Department of Commerce and is available at: https://www.privacyshield.gov/list.
MailChimp is responsible for the processing of data it receives under each Privacy Shield Framework and subsequently transfers to a third party acting as an agent on its behalf. They comply with the Privacy Shield Principles for all onward transfers of personal data from the EU and Switzerland, including the onward transfer liability provisions.
As part of the Google analytics range analysis the following data is processed, based on our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online performance as defined in Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR): the type of browser you use and the browser version, the operating system you are using, your country of origin, the date and time of the server request, the number of visits, how long you have spent on the site, and the external links you have activated. The IP address of the users is anonymized before being saved.
We maintain online performance within social media in order to communicate with members, partners and other active users active and to inform them about our work. When opening our profile at the social media platforms, the terms and conditions and data processing guidelines apply of the social media operators.

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