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The Complainant is M.M. Warburg & Co KGaA, of Hamburg, Germany, represented by Latham & Watkins LLP, Germany.
The Respondent is Claudia Miller, The Nathan M. Warburg Foundation of New York, New York, United States of America.
The disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> is registered with Register.com.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on November 27, 2008. On December 1, 2008, the Center transmitted by email to Register.com a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On December 1, 2008, Register.com transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant. Register.com provided contact details for the registrant and its administration and technical contacts by way of street addresses in New York and Switzerland and by way of email addresses. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center employed reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent of the Complaint. Notice to the Respondent of the Complaint (without attachments) was achieved by email. The courier delivery of the Complaint (with attachments) to the New York street address of the Respondent provided by the Registrar could not be made because, as the courier reported “A correct name or receiver name is needed for delivery”. The copies of the Complaint (with attachments) posted to addresses in Zurich and Bern, Switzerland were returned to the Center, addressee unknown.
The proceedings commenced on December 10, 2008. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was December 30, 2008. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent's default on December 31, 2008.
The Center appointed Alan L. Limbury as the sole panelist in this matter on January 15, 2009. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Complainant is a famous bank which has been inseparably connected with the Warburg family for over 200 years, when the brothers Moses Marcus and Gerson Warburg founded the bank under the name M.M. Warburg & Co. in the North of Germany in 1798.
It now has numerous branches, subsidiaries and affiliates all over the world, including in Zurich, Jakarta, New York and Luxembourg. The Complainant and its trademarks are well-known not only in Germany but in many other countries of the world.
The Complainant is the registered proprietor of numerous WARBURG and WARBURG formative trademarks including German trademark No. 1165240 M.M. WARBURG filed on June 2, 1989 and registered on October 8, 1990 for services in Classes 35 and 36.
The disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> was registered on September 13, 2007. It resolves to a website which presents the Nathan M. Warburg Foundation as an organization with its head office in Bern, Herzogstrasse 349, Switzerland and as one of the largest private philanthropic foundations, with assets of over $ 2.4 billion and grants and program-related investments totaling approximately $ 100 million annually. The website describes Nathan M. Warburg as the founder of the Nathan M. Warburg Foundation; as one of the last representatives of a dynasty of bankers founded in the 18th century; and as a famous financier, philanthropist, philosopher and author of a number of books and articles. He is also described as the co-founder and chairman of NM Warburg Holdings, Inc., one of the oldest and most prestigious financial services firms in the world with headquarters in Zurich, offices in 40 nations, primarily in Europe and North America, approximately 20,000 employees and over 10 million customer accounts in more than 100 countries with total assets of nearly $ 70 billion.
The Complainant seeks an order that the disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> be transferred to the Complainant on the ground that it is virtually identical and confusingly similar to the Complainant's well-known trademark M.M.WARBURG and that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, which was registered and is being used in bad faith.
As to legitimacy, the Complainant says the information provided on the website under the disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> is false.
The Complainant asserts that there exists no Nathan M. Warburg Foundation. The address mentioned on the website (Herzogstrasse 349, Bern) is wrong as the street numbers on Herzogstrasse, Bern, go up only to the thirties. The telephone number provided to contact the foundation appears to be the fax number of the Historical Museum in Bern. The alleged news and press releases mentioned on the website are not accessible (clicking on such news, Internet users receive the information that the document could not be found).
Further, the Complainant asserts that NM Warburg Holdings, Inc., allegedly headquartered in Zurich, does not exist. According to the Cantonal Commercial Register Database of Zurich, the only existing “Warburg” companies headquartered in Zurich are “M.M. Warburg CO Vermögensverwaltungs-AG”, “M.M. Warburg Bank (Schweiz) AG”, “S.G. Warburg Securities S.A.” and “Warburg Alternative Investments AG”. A Google search for “NM Warburg Holdings, Inc.” provides only 8 search results, none of which leads to information which proves the existence of this company. In view of this, it is more than unlikely that NM Warburg Holdings, Inc. is as alleged on the website under the disputed domain <nmwarburg.org> one of the oldest and most prestigious financial services firms in the world with offices in 40 nations, primarily in Europe and North America, approximately 20,000 employees and over 10 million customer accounts in more than 100 countries with total assets of nearly $ 70 billion. It does exist at all.
The Complainant asserts that Nathan M. Warburg is not a member of any famous family of bankers. There is a famous family named “Warburg” which started the Complainant's banking business in the middle of the 18th century in Germany and is now active all over the world. Yet there is no famous family member “Nathan M. Warburg” alive. A Google search for the name “Nathan M. Warburg” provides only 10 search results, none of which provide any information which could prove the existence of such person because all of them lead to the website under the disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org>. The information provided on that website according to which “Nathan M. Warburg” is an author of a number of books is not true either: Amazon.com does not offer any book by such author. In light of is, the assertions made on the website that Nathan M. Warburg gave a speech at the United Nations headquarters in New York about his vision of the world in 2008 and that the New York Times published an interview with Nathan M. Warburg in 2007 cannot be accepted.
The Complainant asserts that as a result, there are strong indications that neither the individual Nathan M. Warburg nor the organization Nathan M. Warburg Foundation exist. The list of noteworthy members and institutions related to the Warburg family which is published by the free Encyclopedia Wikipedia does not include such individual or organization either. Even if there were an organization “Nathan M. Warburg Foundation”, it could not derive any rights in the name “Warburg” from the alleged famous financier founding the organization, i.e. Nathan M. Warburg, because this financier does not exist.
Given the information above, the Complainant asserts that there has been no use of the disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; the Respondent has not been commonly known by the disputed domain name; and the Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name because the information provided under the disputed domain name is false and misleading to the public.
As to bad faith, the Complainant says the Respondent must have been aware of the Complainant's well-known trademarks and company name when registering the disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> and that the Respondent's bad faith is shown by its falsely pretending to be an organization founded by a fictitious Nathan M. Warburg, said to be a Suisse financier and philanthropist and one of the last representatives of a dynasty of bankers.
The Complainant asserts that the choice of the name “Warburg” and of the initials “NM” show that the Respondent intended to refer to the Warburg family of the Complainant and, in particular, to the Complainant's company name and trademarks “M.M.WARBURG”, causing confusion amongst consumers searching for the Complainant's site; disrupting the Complainant's business and tarnishing the reputation and prestige of the Complainant. Given the strong indications that the Nathan M. Warburg Foundation does not exist, it is likely that the contact information provided by the registrant (i.e. the name of the registrant) is false, thus masking the person behind it. Deliberately furnishing false contact information to a domain name registrar also constitutes bad faith registration and use.
The Complainant suggests that, given the false contact information, it is not unlikely that the organization behind the Nathan M Warburg Foundation spies out personal data, confidential information and bank account details by purporting to offer grants in order to misuse them for its own purpose.
A respondent is not obliged to participate in a proceeding under the Policy but if it fails to do so, asserted facts may be taken as true and reasonable inferences may be drawn from the information provided by the complainant: Reuters Limited v. Global Net 2000, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0441. See also Microsoft Corporation v. Freak Films Oy, WIPO Case No. D2003-0109; SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC V. MARK FREEMAN, WIPO Case No. D2000-1080 and ALTA VISTA COMPANY V. GRANDTOTAL FINANCES LIMITED et al., WIPO Case No. D2000-0848. In this case support for the Complainant's contention that the Respondent does not exist is provided by the failure of the courier delivery to the Respondent's New York street address and the return of the postal delivery addressed to the Respondent at Herzogstrasse 349 in Bern, the very address which Complainant says does not exist.
It is well established that “essential” or “virtual” identity is sufficient for the purposes of the Policy: The Stanley Works and Stanley Logistics Inc. v. Camp Creek Co., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0113; that the test of confusing similarity is confined to a comparison of the disputed domain name and the trademark alone: BWT Brands, Inc. and British American Tobacco (Brands), Inc v. NABR, WIPO Case No. D2001-1480; and that the specific top level of the domain name, in this case “.org”, does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar: Magnum Piering, Inc. v. The Mudjackers and Garwood S. Wilson, Sr., WIPO Case No. D2000-1525.
The disputed domain name <nmwarburg.org> is clearly virtually identical and is confusingly similar to the Complainant's well-known M.M.WARBURG trademark.
The Panel is satisfied that the M.M.WARBURG mark is distinctive and well known. The Complainant's assertions are sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of absence of rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name on the part of the Respondent. The evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete evidence that it does have rights or legitimate interests in that disputed domain name: Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0624 and the cases there cited. The Respondent has made no attempt to do so. Therefore, the Complainant's factual assertions in support of its submission that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests stand uncontradicted.
The four illustrations of bad faith set forth in the Policy, paragraph 4 (b) are non-exclusive.
In the absence of any Response, the Panel accepts the Complainant's contention that the disputed domain name was registered in the name of a fictitious organization, with knowledge of the reputation in banking circles of the Complainant and its M.M.WARBURG and other marks; that false contact information was deliberately provided to the Registrar; and that the information presented on the website to which the disputed domain name leads is false and designed to mislead consumers into believing that the Respondent is or is intimately associated with the Complainant.
Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name, <nmwarburg.org> be transferred to the Complainant.

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The production of proteins by total synthesis is a growing field of research. This approach is very complementary to recombinant techniques for applications to the deciphering of biological mechanisms at the molecular level (chemical biology) or the development of new drugs. This alternative route is particularly useful for accessing modified proteins (post-translational modifications, selective labeling, introduction of probes, non-natural amino acids, modification of the peptide backbone, etc.) or difficult to produce (cytotoxic proteins, disulfide-rich miniproteins etc.).
Current technologies focus on the modular assembly of unprotected peptide fragments, through very selective reactions called "chemical ligation". This approach revolutionized the field some thirty years ago and is gradually being democratized for the synthesis of small proteins (50-100 amino acids). However, access to more ambitious targets in terms of size or molecular complexity remains a real challenge still reserved for rare specialists, often at the cost of considerable effort and investment. Three major technological bottlenecks remain to be overcome: (1) the assembly of numerous fragments by successive ligations, that requires repeated purifications steps, ultimately leading to very low overall yields, (2) the handling of poorly soluble or aggregation-prone fragments, a very frequently encountered problem, and (3) the development of more efficient ligation methods, from both the points of view of the nature of the chemical reactions used and of the synthesis of appropriately functionalized peptide fragments.
One of the main focuses of our group relies on the conception and development of original solutions to each of the three above-mentioned bottlenecks. We have thus gradually established a coherent molecular toolkit, aiming to be robust and versatile.
Particular emphasis has been placed on the development of techniques allowing a solid support assembly in order to avoid intermediate purifications. To this end, we have introduced a range of new linkers allowing the specific immobilization of a first pure and unprotected peptide fragment on a suitable solid support. Similar linkers have also been applied to the temporary modification of hydrophobic or aggregation-prone fragments, in order to render them soluble by the addition of charged residues (e.g., hexalysine label). The main challenge is to control the conditions necessary for the cleavage of these arms under very mild conditions, in order to release the protein assembled by successive ligations from the solid support or to eliminate the solubilizing groups.
The most commonly used reaction for protein synthesis was discovered some 20 years ago and is called native chemical ligation (NCL). It consists in the reaction of peptide fragments equipped respectively with a thioester function and an N-terminal cysteine. If the synthesis of the cysteinyl moiety can be carried out routinely, that of the thioester moiety is still very problematic. Indeed, the reaction conditions most commonly used in solid phase peptide synthesis (Fmoc / tBu strategy) are intrinsically incompatible with the thioester function.
Inspired by the spontaneous formation of a thioester during protein splicing, a non-enzymatic maturation process mediated by protein domains called inteins, we designed a molecular device programmed to in situ form a thioester under NCL conditions: so-called peptide crypto-thioesters. This bio-inspired process has the advantage of not requiring an additional chemical step after solid phase peptide synthesis. It can be totally automated at low cost, which makes its implementation by non-specialists very affordable. The peptide crypto-thioesters thus obtained are stable and can be handled, analyzed and purified by conventional techniques, and can be directly used in an NCL reaction, with very fast kinetics of transformation into a reactive thioester.
While seeking alternative reactions to NCL, we pioneered the use of the copper(I)-catalyzed alkyne/azide cycloaddition (CuAAC) in the context of chemical protein synthesis. This highly chemoselective reaction leads to the formation of a 1,4-disubstituted 1,2,3-triazole which is recognized as an excellent mimic of a trans amide bond: CuAAC can thus be considered as a peptidomimetic ligation technique.
Additionally, triazoles cannot be hydrolyzed by proteases, and this feature has been exploited for the development of peptidomimetics whith enhanced in vivo stability for drug discovery purposes.
Disulfide rich peptides (DRP) are ubiquitous natural products composed of 10 to 90 amino acids, characterized by evolutionary-conserved cysteines reticulated by a dense disulfide bond network. These remarkably compact and stable compounds are active in adverse environments, exhibiting incredibly diverse host-defense or predation-related functions. DRPs are potent and selective binders of various targets, making them attractive compounds as pharmacological tools or new drug leads.
Our group has a long-lasting expertise in the synthesis of these compounds, including their oxidative folding to achieve the natural disulfide connectivity. The ligation-based synthetic methodologies we developed now allow us to synthesize very long DRPs, particularly difficult to access through standard synthetic means.
◊ New strategies for cancer immunotherapy.
Glycan antigens carried by mucins present on cancer cells are tumor markers which are in part responsible for the immune system anergy regarding tumors. Structure and density of mucin glycans have an important impact on immune cells inaction. The mucins most often used in order to study those mechanisms are a mixture of heterogeneous glycoproteins with multiple glycan structures. But, for a better understanding of the relationship between glycan structure and immune response, it is mandatory to have access to mucins of variable size with well-defined glycan structures. Therefore, in order to produce those synthetic glycoproteins, we developed solid support synthesis methodologies combining chemical and enzymatic glycosylation steps. This allowed the preparation of homogenous and structurally well-defined mucins (up to 160 aminoacids and 24 short O-glycans) useful to study with precision the role of glycans carried by those glycoproteins in endocytosis and antigen presentation by dendritic cells and macrophages.
Many tumor antigens could in theory be used as targets for cancer immunotherapy. However, they usually don’t provoke a strong response because they have already been present on normal cells during embryonic development. In order to circumvent that problem, we use monosaccharide analogs of N-acetylgalactosamine or N-acetylmannosamine which can be readily incorporated into tumor cell glycans, due to the abnormal and very active carbohydrate metabolism of cancer cells, and exposed on cell surface. This approach targets specifically tumor cells and the reactive groups on the glycans can be used as handles to covalently link through bioorthogonal ligation reactions, strong immunostimulants specifically to the tumor cell surface where they will activate the anergic immune cells inside the tumor.
Jacobsen M. T., Petersen M. E., Ye X., Galibert M., Lorimer G. H., Aucagne V. and Kay M. S.
Terrier V. P., Adihou H., Arnould M., Delmas A. F. and Aucagne V.
Galibert M., Piller V., Piller F., Aucagne V. and Delmas A. F.
Chuh K. N., Zaro B. W., Piller F., Piller, V. and Pratt M. R.
Aucagne V., Valverde I. E., Marceau P., Galibert M., Dendane N. and Delmas A. F.
Valverde I., Lecaille F., Lalmanach G., Aucagne V. and Delmas A. F.

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I. C.F.R. Versus e-CFR and its Progeny?
Federal regulations pose the same fundamental citation question as do provisions in the United States Code. On January 18, 2017, important new and amended regulations governing the determination of disability benefit claims under the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs were published in the Federal Register.
In due course the volume containing all Social Security Administration regulations, as of April 1, 2017, was published by the Office of the Federal Register of the National Archives and Records Administration. In that physical form the new regulations, fully compiled and in context, made their way to Federal Depository Libraries, arriving in mid-September.
Following distribution of the printed volume, a digital replica in PDF was placed online as part of the Government Publishing Office’s Federal Digital System (FDsys).
The citation issue posed by that schedule is this: During the eight months that separated initial publication of these regulations from their appearance in a volume of the “official” Code of Federal Regulations (print and electronic) would it have been appropriate to cite them in accordance with the code location designations they carried from the moment of release? Take the revised 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521, for example. The pre-2017 version of that section dated from 1985. How should a legal memorandum written and filed in July 2017 have cited the text of the section by then in effect?
Citation norms, formed during the era in which the printed volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations and its companion, the Federal Register, were the only trustworthy means of accessing federal regulatory texts, would require citing such a recently revised provision to the Federal Register issue dated January 18, 2017, until the C.F.R. volume holding it could be inspected.
Today the same public offices that publish the official Code of Federal Regulations also prepare and disseminate online a continuously updated version of the Code they call the “Electronic Code of Federal Regulations” or e-CFR. It lags the most recently published final regulations by a few days, at most.
Unless the citation to a compilation like the Code of Federal Regulations or the United States Code indicates otherwise, it will be understood as pointing to the cited portion as it stood at the time of writing. Recent regulatory (or statutory) changes to a provision are likely to require a parenthetical note to remove uncertainty about the reference. With a citation to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521, for example, the reader will want to know whether the writer is invoking the section’s language before or after the 2017 revision. The writer may well also want to signal to the reader that she is aware of the change. On this score an initial citation reading “20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (as amended in 2017)” or even “20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (as amended, 82 Fed. Reg 5844, 5868 (Jan. 18, 2017))” is more useful than one that simply furnishes the year of the most recent official publication or the “as of” date of an unofficial version. On the other hand, a citation to 20 C.F.R. § 404.130, which was last amended in 1990, need carry no such baggage.
The existence of the chronological slices represented by the annual official versions does provide a ready means for citing to provisions as they once read. So long as the context makes it clear that the writer means to refer to the language of the section as it stood before the recent change, a citation reading “20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (2016)” should suffice. But standing alone, one reading “20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (prior to the Jan. 18, 2017 amendment)” provides a reader with more information. The GPO’s online archive of past C.F.R. editions, which reaches back to 1996, allows retrieval of no-longer-current regulatory texts on the basis of such references.
Rule 14.2(a) of The Bluebook calls for a C.F.R. citation to include the year of the cited section’s “most recent edition.” No exceptions. The mandate applies to a provision like 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 which has not been amended for over a quarter century. For a citation in a memorandum completed in July 2017, this rule would require “20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (2016)”. A few months later, that, again per The Bluebook, would become “20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (2017)”. The Indigo Book, being limited in purpose to prying the citation system codified in The Bluebook out of its proprietary wrapper, takes precisely the same position. The ALWD Guide to Legal Citation (6th ed.) goes a step further and addresses the likelihood that the writer has relied on an online compilation more up-to-date than the once-a-year official edition. Acknowledging the e-CFR, it provides in Rule 18.1(c), that if one is relying on its version of the C.F.R. the citation should “indicate the exact date (Month Day, Year) through which the provision is current, and append its URL after the publication parenthetical.” If the writer has, instead, referred to a commercial service’s compilation, ALWD calls for the citation to take the form: “27 C.F.R. § 72.21 (Westlaw through Sept. 29, 2016)”. (The section in its example was last amended in 1995.) In the ordinary case, both are unnecessary.
C. How Federal Judges (and Lawyers Appearing before them) Cite the C.F.R.
With the exception of opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court do which include the year of the current volume in initial citations to the Code of Federal Regulations, the decisions of most federal judges cite its provisions generically. That is, so long as they are referring is to the language of a C.F.R. section currently in effect, they cite it without any indication of date or online source. See, for example, the citations in: Gorman v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-05113 (W.D. Mo., Nov. 30, 2017); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 862 F. 3d 987 (9th Cir. 2017); and Cazun v. Attorney Gen., 856 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017). Briefs filed by the U.S. Justice Department take the same approach.
Generally, months pass between an author’s completion of a journal article and its eventual publication. Moreover, since publication delays are common, the date carried by the journal issue in which the article appears may or may not correspond to the actual date of its distribution. Finally, against the odds, the author may imagine the piece being read with care for years into the future. Arguably, these factors argue for attachment of an explicit statement of the “current as of date” to all cited statutory and regulatory code sections. At minimum their inclusion reminds an unknown, and perhaps distant, reader to check on whether subsequent amendments may have altered the force of the writer’s analysis.
In contrast, legal briefs and judicial opinions carry explicit dates of filing. So long as there is no indication to the contrary, those reasonably anchor an assumption that all citations to codified statutes and regulations they contain refer to the provisions in effect on that date.
In a year’s time the California Supreme Court receives nearly eight thousand petitions for review, agreeing to hear less than ten percent. Prior to a rule change that takes effect on July 1, 2016, the high court’s decision to take a case automatically placed the opinion being appealed in the “unpublished” category. Of course, in the modern era, this did not prevented the circulation of the previously “published” decision in print or online. Indeed, all “unpublished” opinions of the Courts of Appeal are released to the public at a judicial branch website. But automatic depublication blocked citation of it and any subsequent judicial reliance.
This unique rule dates from a time when the California Supreme Court reviewed trial court decisions de novo, so that its agreeing to hear a case effectively nullified the prior opinion of the intermediate appellate court in the matter. A 1984 constitutional amendment altered that framework. Bar groups and judges urged that the depublication rule be revisited, but without success. Three decades later the California Supreme Court released a set of proposed amendments for public comment. With some modification those changes were adopted in June 2016, effective July 1.
Chalk this up as a very modest reform. As Professor David Cleveland reports in the most recent issue of The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process, the last decade has seen a significant and steady shift in state rules governing “unpublished” or “non-precedential” decisions. His article counts seven states as having moved to permit citation of unpublished decisions, one as going the further step of granting them precedential weight, and five as having eliminated the “unpublished” category altogether. California’s change comes nowhere near such measures or even the situation in the federal courts under Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Perhaps, in another thirty years?


Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 327 › United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc.
1. Each of two motor carriers made application to the Interstate Commerce Commission under Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act for a permit to operate between points A and C. One was then operating between A and B; the other between B and C, and they operated joint service between A and C by freight interchange. Each applicant opposed the other's application, and competing carriers opposed both. The applications were heard separately by different joint boards, but were dealt with by the Commission in a single report.
Held: that an order of the Commission granting both applications was valid. Pp. 327 U. S. 517, 327 U. S. 523.
2. Neither the fact that the Commission dealt with both applications in one report nor the fact that the Commission granted both applications invalidated its order. P. 327 U. S. 523.
3. The Commission's disposition of the applications did not inject into the proceedings as a "new issue" the question whether both applications should be granted. P. 327 U. S. 526.
4. That the Commission did not determine each case exclusively on the record therein, but considered the evidence in both proceedings, does not warrant invalidating its order in the absence of ay showing of specific prejudice. P. 327 U. S. 528.
5. Where the Commission's report contains all the required findings, it is not obliged to annotate to each finding the evidence supporting it. P. 327 U. S. 529.
6. The fact that an administrative agency has considered matters dehors the record does not invalidate its action unless substantial prejudice is shown. P. 327 U. S. 530.
7. The order of the Commission granting both applications was supported by the findings and the evidence. P. 327 U. S. 530.
8. The Commission's ultimate finding as to the fitness and ability of one of the applicants in this case was supported by a sufficient basic finding and by evidence. P. 327 U. S. 533.
9. Rehearings before administrative bodies are within their own discretion, and only the clearest abuse, not shown upon the record in this case, will sustain an exception to the rule. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, distinguished. P. 327 U. S. 534.
10. The Interstate Commerce Commission, and not the reviewing court, is the arbiter of the paramount public interest. The judicial function is limited to ascertaining whether the order has support in the law and in the record. P. 327 U. S. 535.
Appeal from a decree of a district court of three judges which suspended an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission and remanded the cause to the Commission for a rehearing. 57 F.Supp. 192. Reversed, p. 327 U. S. 536.
The validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is in question. The order granted to appellants, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., and Oregon-Nevada-California Fast Freight, Inc., certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing extensions of their operations as motor carriers. Appellees, competing carriers, some of whom are railway-affiliated, were protestants in the proceedings before the Commission. They successfully attacked the order in a specially constituted District Court on grounds questioning the sufficiency of the findings and the evidence, as well as the propriety and fairness of the Commission's procedure. The District Court's decree, 57 F.Supp. 192, "suspended" the order and remanded the cause to the Commission for rehearing although a stay pending appeal was denied.
originally sought exclusive authority to conduct the proposed through operation in substitution for the former joint service, and thus opposed the other's application, both now seek to sustain the Commission's order, as, of course, does the Commission itself.
At the time of Consolidated's application in December, 1939, it operated various routes in the Northwest, some extending eastward from the Portland and Seattle areas, in addition to the joint service by interchange with O.N.C. southward from Portland to San Francisco. [Footnote 1] Two of these routes, comprising part of the latter service, extended from Portland southerly to Medford and Klamath Falls, both of which lie just north of the Oregon-California boundary and were points of interchange with O.N.C. [Footnote 2] Insofar as it is now pertinent, Consolidated's application sought permission to extend its operations from Medford and Klamath Falls southward to San Francisco [Footnote 3] -- in other words, over the portion of the route previously used in the joint service for O.N.C.'s operations.
they were so closely related in their common features, the hearings were held at the same places, and one application was heard immediately after the other. Each applicant intervened in the proceeding on the other's application, and various parties, including the appellees, [Footnote 9] appeared in opposition in both proceedings. The parties stipulated that much of the evidence presented in the O.N.C. hearing should be introduced by reference into the Consolidated record. This included all of the appellees' affirmative evidence in opposition to the two applications. The hearings thus were substantially coordinated, though not technically consolidated, for the common features of the applications.
"the Commission considered the separate records as though the case was a consolidated one. Evidence which appeared only in one record was used by the Commission to support general findings in the Report concerning both Consolidated and O.N.C. In each proceeding embraced within the Report and the Commission's order, evidence not offered or received in such proceeding and not a part of the record therein was drawn upon and considered by the Commission."
"the whole basis of the original proceeding before the Joint Boards was the question of whether any through-line operation between San Francisco and Portland should be allowed, and, if so, which one of the two separate applications;"
"no opportunity was given to plaintiffs to maintain their rights or to present appropriate protests and defenses to the institution of two competing through-line operations between San Francisco and Portland."
"This action will be taken in order that all parties may be placed on notice as to what type hearing will be held, whether joint or several, and in order that appropriate findings be made as to the public convenience and necessity which requires the authorization of two new through-lines in competition with each other and in competition with the other facilities, and also as to the ability of Consolidated to initiate and maintain one of such lines in view of present conditions."
(Emphasis added.) 57 F.Supp. at 198.
Obviously, the court's objection was not to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted prior to the time when the hearings ended and the Commission took the cases under consideration. Up to this point, no fault is found with what was done. The difficulty lay altogether, in the court's view, with the way in which it thought the Commission had considered the cases and reached its conclusions. And this arose entirely from the fact that the Commission disposed of them in a single report, rather than in separate ones for each case, and from the further fact that it concluded that both applications should be granted, rather than that both should be denied, or one denied and one granted.
We are not informed, of course, whether the court would have reached the same result if the Commission had written separate reports in each case, arriving at the same conclusions, although it seems suggested that any of the other possible results would have been impeccable, whether stated in separate reports or a single one. Obviously it was no sufficient ground for suspending the Commission's order that it chose to write one report, rather than two, especially in matters as closely related as these, if the single report, together with the findings and the evidence, was sufficient to sustain the action taken in each case. It is not uncommon judicial practice to follow this course.
possibility that both might be granted, although, for obvious reasons, each applicant opposed the granting of the other's extension, and, from the beginning, it was as much a possible outcome that both applications would be granted as that both would be denied, or one be granted and one denied. If, therefore, the Commission had written separate reports in each case reaching the same result, it would have been squarely within the issues and within the outcomes comprehended from the beginning, and the only questions for judicial consideration, absent some procedural deviation not now presented, would have been the sufficiency of the findings and the evidence to sustain its action in each case. We think those are the only questions of any substance arising upon this appeal.
basic idea, other errors were pyramided, among them that the protesting appellees had been given no notice of the kind of proceeding which would be held, and had been deprived of any opportunity to present proper protests and evidence relating to the allegedly newly injected issue.
The case has taken longer to state than the merits should require for its disposition. Appellees plant themselves here squarely on the District Court's objections to the Commission's "approach" and procedure. Two principal questions thus are presented: (1) was evidence improperly considered by the Commission, so as to require reversal of its order, and (2) were new issues injected by its action in disposing of the cases with a single report? Other issues more or less related may be shortly disposed of.
"Division 5 has erroneously and improperly assumed that in granting one of the applications it is by force of necessity required to grant the other. . . ."
in raising it, has said that it was acting in protection of the public interest, and we pass therefore to consideration of the issue on its merits.
The Commission did not, by the manner in which it disposed of the cause, inject as a "new issue" the question whether both applications might be granted. If the appellees actually assumed in the beginning that both applications could not be granted, their assumption was in the teeth of the applications and the permissible outcomes presented for the Commission's decision.
And this possibility must have been apparent from the beginning, not only from the history of the prior operations and the primary cause for their impending disruption, but also from the obvious relations of the applications to each other, the equally obvious consequences to the applicants of granting one and denying the other, and the Commission's recognition of these facts by the manner in which it scheduled the hearings for substantially concurrent treatment. The parties, too, apparently gave similar recognition to the questioned possible outcome by their stipulation for the use of evidence in both proceedings.
The issue concerning whether both applications should be granted was injected not by the Commission's report or any other action taken by it, but by the filing of the applications in the first place. If appellees misconceived the nature of the proceedings in this respect, as we do not think was the case, they were not misled into doing so by any action of the Commission or the other appellants.
principal cause of complaint in these respects is that the Commission did not consider each case exclusively on its own record, but looked to the evidence in both proceedings in forming its judgment. If this is true, and if it has resulted in substantial prejudice to the appellees, as might occur, for example, if the Commission were shown prejudicially to have considered evidence bearing on one case which did not affect it and was presented in the other, and which appellees were given no opportunity to meet, the orders, or one of them, would be improperly grounded.
But no showing of this sort has been made. It is to be recalled that all of the appellees, as well as both of the applicants, were parties to both proceedings, were represented at all of the hearings, which were conducted at substantially the same times and places, and were given full opportunity to present all evidence they considered pertinent, to cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise to protect their interests. Moreover, large portions of the evidence applied as much to one application as to another. This was true, for example, of the proofs relating to traffic conditions, shipper demands, the need for faster service and mechanical refrigeration, and other items. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how appellees could have sustained substantial prejudice from the Commission's consideration of the evidence upon matters as closely related as those in issue in these two proceedings.
sort. The assertion, we think, is colored by the court's erroneous idea that the report first injected the question whether both applications should be granted, and to the same cause, it would seem, may be attributed the court's undue discounting of the fact that, upon this issue, as on the alternative possible outcomes, much of the evidence was identical, made so by the parties' own stipulation. In any event, the appellees have not pointed to any specific statement in the report which is obviously applicable to both cases, or which is required as a basic finding to support the order in one, which is without support in both records or in the one which is appropriate.
In the absence of any showing of specific prejudice, the claim comes down to the highly technical objection that the Commission, in the final stage of forming its judgment, could not in either case take account of what had been done in the other, notwithstanding the closely related character and objects of the applications and the prior proceedings. The contention, in its farthest reach, amounts to a legal version of the scriptural injunction against letting one's right hand know what one's left hand may be doing.
Obviously it would be consistent neither with good sense nor, we think, with the type of hearing assured by the statute to force the Commission to put on such complete blinders. Whatever may be the limits outside which it cannot go in looking beyond the record in the particular proceeding at the stage of formulating its judgment, none certainly would go so far. And, given that the report contains all the essential findings required, cf. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, the Commission is not compelled to annotate to each finding the evidence supporting it.
record presented and such matters as properly may receive its attention through "official notice." [Footnote 16] It is also true that this Court, in appropriate instances, has limited the use of the latter implement in order to assure that the parties will not be deprived of a fair hearing. See United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 265 U. S. 286-290; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 227 U. S. 93-94. But, in doing so, it has not undertaken to make a fetish of sticking squarely within the four corners of the specific record in administrative proceedings, or of pinning down such agencies, with reference to fact determinations, even more rigidly than the courts in strictly judicial proceedings. On the contrary, in the one case as in the other, the mere fact that the determining body has looked beyond the record proper does not invalidate its action unless substantial prejudice is shown to result. Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U. S. 548, 324 U. S. 561-562; cf. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 312 U. S. 154-155. In these cases, no more is necessary than to apply that rule.
Co., 326 U. S. 236, and the further fact that there can be no presumption that the Commission disregarded the public or any other interest, there are two obvious answers. One is that the Commission, in making the separately stated findings, could not have been oblivious to the competitive consequences of its order or the relation of those consequences to the public interest. [Footnote 20] The other is that those findings, read in the light of the report, adequately and expressly cover the element of public convenience and necessity, including the competitive factors which the Commission inescapably had in mind. Only the most hypercritical reading of the findings, and one which ignores the report's explicit statements in many respects, could construe them as meaning only that each operation was required by public convenience and necessity without any regard to the competitive consequences of granting both. The Commission should not be required to rewrite its report simply to say, redundantly, we think, that both operations, as well as each, are required by public convenience and necessity.
"the Commission failed to find, and there is no evidence in the record to support such a finding, that Consolidated is adequately equipped under any conditions. "
The court undoubtedly did not mean that there was no finding whatever as to fitness, willingness, and ability, for the Commission did make such a finding in the statutory language. What was obviously meant was that such an ultimate finding was not enough, as, of course, it was not, see Florida v. United States, supra, in the absence of a basic finding to support it, and that there was no such basic finding.
Finally, the District Court remanded the cases for rehearing in order for the Commission, among other things, to determine Consolidated's fitness "to initiate and maintain one of such lines in view of present conditions." This action was unwarranted. The records in the two proceedings were closed in October, 1940. The Commission issued its report and order on March 1, 1943. A petition for rehearing was filed by the appellees and other protestants on April 30, 1943, and was denied by the Commission on August 2, 1943. [Footnote 23] The certificates were issued on September 7 and 15, 1943. Suit was brought in the District Court on January 13, 1944. The court rendered its decision on September 20, 1944, suggesting that the Commission had improperly denied the petition for rehearing. Its view was that the record was so stale, particularly in view of the influence of the war upon transportation facilities, that application of the doctrine of Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, was proper.
stands virtually alone." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 322 U. S. 515; see also Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 298 U. S. 389. Except in the single instance, it has been held consistently that rehearings before administrative bodies are addressed to their own discretion. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Jersey City, supra. Only a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion could sustain an exception to that rule. The Commission was well acquainted with the impact of the war upon facilities for transport, and upon the transportation business in general. In addition to its own expert knowledge concerning such matters, it had before it not only the facts set forth in the petition for rehearing, [Footnote 24] but also those alleged in the extended replies filed by the applicants.
business of the Commission, made such by the very terms of the statute. The function of the reviewing court is much more restricted. It is limited to ascertaining whether there is warrant in the law and the facts for what the Commission has done. Unless, in some specific respect, there has been prejudicial departure from requirements of the law or abuse of the Commission's discretion, the reviewing court is without authority to intervene. It cannot substitute its own view concerning what should be done, whether with reference to competitive considerations or others, for the Commission's judgment upon matters committed to its determination, if that has support in the record and the applicable law.
There are two main north-south highways between the San Francisco and Portland areas, U.S. 101, the so-called Coast Route, and U.S. 99, roughly parallel but some miles inland, called the Valley Route. The joint service was conducted over the latter, and the applications of Consolidated and O.N.C. each sought to extend operations over this route.
The joint service followed Highway 99 from San Francisco nearly to the northern boundary of California, from where part continued on No. 99 to Medford, and the remainder followed a separate highway to Klamath Falls, this leg of the journey being made with O.N.C.'s equipment in both directions. Consolidated's "leg" between Portland at the north and Medford and Klamath Falls at the south followed different, but substantially parallel, highways, the westerly route being No. 99.
Consolidated also sought authority to extend its service from Marshfield, Oregon, to San Francisco over the Coast Route, see note 1 and from Lakeview, Oregon, to Redding, California, through Alturas, California.
O.N.C. also operated a route from San Francisco to Elko, Nevada.
O.N.C. also sought authority to serve Marshfield, Oregon, and other points in the Coos Bay area.
". . . O.N.C. and Consolidated have interchanged freight at Medford for over 11 years, and at Klamath Falls for over 6 years, to give joint through service between points served by each. Since July, 1939, about one-third of the tonnage has been handled through interchange of trailers. At first, the amount of interchanged traffic was small, and Consolidated's principal business was of a local nature to and from Medford. Apparently, O.N.C.'s principal business also was local. The interchange business has since increased until it far exceeds that of the local business."
Although the president of Consolidated admitted at the hearing that O.N.C.'s refusal to join the association had a substantial influence in causing the filing of Consolidated's application, he could not say whether or not that application would have been filed if O.N.C. had joined.
Section 205(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 305(a). Apparently the reason that the two proceedings were not consolidated and heard before one joint board arose from the fact that, although the major issue, whether or not a through route between San Francisco and Portland should be allowed, was common to both cases, certain other issues were not and, since some of the latter relating to O.N.C. affected operations in Washington as well as in Oregon and California, a differently constituted board was required for making recommendations concerning them. Cf. American Trucking Assn. v. United States, 326 U. S. 77, 326 U. S. 81-83.
There are five appellees. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, and Angelo Colletti (doing business as Colletti Fast Freight), are common carriers by motor vehicle which operate between Portland and San Francisco. Pacific Motor Trucking Company is a subsidiary of Southern Pacific Company, and performs certain motor vehicle operations which are auxiliary to the rail services of the Southern Pacific Railway. Pacific Southwest Railroad Association is an unincorporated association of railroads serving the Pacific southwest territory, organized to protect rail interests as they may be affected by motor carrier operations in that territory.
Section 205(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 305(b).
The certificate of public convenience and necessity granted to Consolidated authorizes extensions of its routes from Medford and Klamath Falls to San Francisco, and also from Lakeview, Oregon, to Redding, California. The certificate granted to O.N.C. authorizes extensions from Medford to Portland and from Klamath Falls to Goshen, Oregon. In both cases, operation was thus authorized over alternate highways. Cf. notes 3 and | 3 and S. 515fn5|>5.
The District Court permitted Consolidated to intervene and file an answer "with admissions and denials to the petition," but refused to consider and ordered stricken the affirmative defenses which Consolidated set up. One of these was that the appellees were guilty of laches in bringing the suit, since the certificates of public convenience and necessity were issued in September, 1943, and the complaint was not filed until January, 1944. Consolidated contends that the District Court erred in striking the affirmative defenses. In the view that we take of the case, it is not necessary to consider this question.
"the Commission failed to find, and there was no evidence in either record to support such a finding, that each applicant was separately capable of equipping, maintaining, and conducting the proposed operation in the face of competition from the other;"
"the Commission's Report fails to disclose that it gave any consideration to the possibility of adverse effect upon any plaintiff of the institution of two through-line competitive operations between San Francisco and Portland;"
"the Commission failed to find, and there is no evidence to support such a finding, that Consolidated is adequately equipped to establish and maintain the proposed through-line operations under any condition."
These findings are considered below.
"From your experience in watching the development of this joint service, what do you expect the effect to be of the granting of this application upon the existing carriers between San Francisco and Medford and San Francisco and Klamath Falls?"
"Treating them separately, south of Medford, we have in our operation the Oregon-Nevada-California Fast Freight and the Pacific Truck Express and the Pierco Auto Lines."
"The California Fast Freight are concurrently applying for the right to extend their services north of Medford to Portland. The net result of the granting of their application and our application would be the splitting of the traffic between the two companies. We would each take part of the present business we are now jointly handling, and operate our equipment straight through."
"In my opinion, this will result in both of us operating about the same number of vehicles, about the same number of miles, and, if our divisions of revenues of the past have been properly arranged, we continue to gross about the same amount of revenue. It should result in our both having a more profitable operation, as it will eliminate the present waste of checking, weighing, and transferring freight at an intermediate point."
"The service would be improved, and no doubt it would attract more volume. That is a conjecture. At the present time, both companies are maintaining terminal facilities in San Francisco, so on our part it would mean very little increase in our terminal costs."
"It will mean an increase in terminal costs for the Oregon-Nevada-California Fast Freight, but the cost of it would be offset, in my opinion, by eliminating the cost of transferring the through freight at Medford."
"For reasons which are obvious [see note 14] authority should be either granted or denied to both applicants to operate over the Valley Route."
Cf. Judicial Notice by Administrative Tribunals (1934) 44 Yale L.J. 355; Faris, Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies (1928) 4 Ind.L.J. 167.
"Of the motor carrier protestants, there is only one -- Pierce -- which is authorized to transport general commodities to and from all intermediate points along the Valley Route. Pierce did not reinstitute daily operations to and from San Francisco, however, until after the filing of these applications and but a few weeks prior to the hearings herein. Shipper witnesses generally were unfamiliar with the fact that Pierce's operation was daily. There are, of course, certain other motor carriers operating over this route, but their authority is either (1) restricted in such a way as to preclude a finding that their service is adequate especially as to intermediate points, or (2) the record definitely establishes that their service to and from San Francisco is, at best, negligible. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that public convenience and necessity require the operations set forth in our findings herein."
"There is no doubt but that a number of shippers desire such proposed services. Each applicant also operates units equipped with mechanical refrigeration, which service certain of the shippers desire for the proper transportation of their shipments. The proposed service will enable shippers to obtain goods more rapidly, resulting in an increase in their businesses. Some of the shippers estimate an increase in their business amounting to several thousand dollars. Practically all of the witnesses prefer a single-line through service. Some of them have used the services of existing carriers, and have not found them satisfactory principally because of improper refrigeration or lack of service to intermediate points."
See also note 17 The Commission noted in its report that the traffic between San Francisco and Portland was increasing.
"Fitness. -- There is no doubt as to O.N.C.'s fitness, financial or otherwise, to conduct the operations herein authorized, although protestants question Consolidated's financial ability to conduct the proposed operation. Protestants content that, if these applications are granted, each applicant will operate at a loss. Each applicant, of course, claims that it will be better off if allowed to operate straight through without the necessity of interchanging at Medford. Elimination of the cost of transfer at Medford would save approximately fifteen or sixteen hundred dollars a month. Considering the facts heretofore discussed in some detail, we are of the opinion that we should give applicants the benefit of any doubts that may exist as to whether they could operate successfully over the routes authorized herein."
It is true that, in 1939, Consolidated had approximately $215,000 of current liabilities in excess of current assets, and had hypothecated a great deal of equipment as a means of obtaining capital. Nevertheless, from its inception, the company had been financed largely out of earnings, and, in every year but 1932, had been able to earn profits. Moreover, there was ample testimony that its service was satisfactory and reliable. There was evidence also from which the Commission could find that the additional financial burden which would be imposed by granting Consolidated's application could be met by that company. The amount of additional capital investment needed for terminals and equipment was doubtful. But there was testimony that the intermediate cash outlay necessary for new terminals at Oakland and Sacramento would not be more than $12,000, and that, if additional equipment were needed, Consolidated was in a position to furnish it and have it financed. In addition, because of the considerable distance covered by the new through route, Consolidated would be able to make "a profitable load factor."
On this and other evidence, we cannot say that the Commission's finding as to the financial ability of Consolidated to undertake the new service lacked support in the record. For us or the District Court to do so would be to invade the Commission's proper function.
"In its exceptions, O.N.C. also requests a further hearing, but, in view of our conclusions herein, it is doubtful whether it would still desire such further hearing. Its request for further hearing is hereby denied."
"new motor vehicle common carrier operations such as are authorized by the order and which duplicate existing operations are forbidden by orders of the Office of Defense Transportation;"
"since orders of the Office of Defense Transportation prohibit speeds in excess of 35 miles per hour and the promised service would require consistent highway speeds averaging 52 1/2 miles per hour outside of cities and other restricted areas, it is certain the service proposed and authorized cannot and will not be given, nor can any service faster than that of existing operators be rendered;"
"all controlling statements of fact relied upon by the division to sustain its conclusions were as of the date of the report and are now entirely and completely untrue. . . ."
"While it is true that problems such as these can only be brought to the courts when private interests conceive there has been injury of rights of property, and although the field of judicial review of administrative determination has been narrowly confined, the courts must, in a litigated case, be the arbiters of the paramount public interest."


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Ordinary transactions with real estate or with real rights over real estates - municipal property are carried out at market prices, but not lower than their tax assessments. The market prices of the properties and of the property rights shall be determined by the municipal council on the basis of market assessments prepared by the appraisers determined by the order of art. 22, para. 3, unless otherwise provided by law. The initial prices for conducting tenders or tenders for dispose of real estate or property rights over municipal property may not be lower than the prices determined by the municipal council. The municipality dispenses with property and belongings - private municipal property, by sale, exchange, donation, partition, free or gratuitous establishment of limited real rights, by contribution to the capital of commercial companies or otherwise, determined by law. The establishment of limited real rights over objects - public municipal property, shall be carried out under conditions and by order, determined by law. Preparatory actions shall be carried out only on properties the acts of which have been entered in the relevant order at the Registry Office. The order for conducting auctions and contests for dispose of real estates and property - municipal property is determined by the municipal council in the ordinance under art. 8, para. 2 of the PPL. No payment of the price is possible in whole or in part with compensatory instruments. Contracts for the acquisition of property and limited real rights over real estates, as well as for disposal of property - municipal property, shall be concluded in writing by the mayor of the municipality and shall be entered by order of the judge on the registrations on the location of the property. Contracts for exchange of real estates - municipal property, with properties owned by individuals or legal entities, are registered at the location of the municipal property and in the case of exchanges with state property - on the location of the state property. In the municipality, a public register is created and maintained for disposing of transactions with real estate - municipal property. In the register are entered data about the properties according to the act of ownership, by type of disposal transactions, as well as: the market and tax assessment of the property or the property rights, the assessment determined by the municipal council and the final price of the transaction; the manner of disposal - by public auction, publicly announced competition or decision of the municipal council; the counterparty of the deal; other data, determined by the municipal council in the Ordinance under Art. 8, para. 2 of the IPA - the procedure for acquiring the right of ownership and of limited real rights, for the provision of management, rental and disposal of real estates and property - municipal property, and the powers of the mayor of the municipality, of the mayors of the regions, of the mayors of the mayoralties and the mayoral deputies shall be determined by an ordinance of the Municipal Council in compliance with the provisions of this law and of the special laws in this field, except when the Law on Public-Private Partnership is applicable.
Sale and donation. The sale and donation of private municipal property are within the competence of the General Assembly. Sale of real estate and property - private municipal property, is made after a decision of the municipal council by the mayor of the municipality through a tender or a competition. Sale of land - private municipal property, to the owner of a lawfully built on it building is carried out by the mayor of the municipality without a tender or competition under an order determined in the ordinance under art. 8, para. 2 of the PPL. When the persons, which may be sold, are determined by law, the sale shall be carried out without auction or competition under the procedure specified in the ordinance under Art. 8, para. 2 of the PPL. Territorial Planning Act, Investment Promotion Act, Agricultural Land Ownership and Use Act, Postal Services Act, Energy Act. Donation of a property - a private municipal property, is made after a decision of the municipal council, adopted by a majority of three quarters of the total number of councilors. On the basis of the results of the tender or the competition, respectively - the decision of the municipal council, the mayor of the municipality issues an order and concludes a contract.
Termination of co-ownership. The termination of co-ownership of real estate between the municipality, the state, natural persons or legal entities shall be made after a decision of the municipal council under an order determined by the ordinance under art. 8, para. 2 through: partition, sale of the part of the municipality, redemption of the part of the natural persons or legal persons or exchange.
Right to build. Right to build on a property - private municipal property is established after a decision of the municipal council by the mayor of the municipality through a tender or competition and according to the provisions of an enacted detailed development plan. Where the right to build is set up for a fixed period, after the expiry of the period for which it was established, the municipality acquires the ownership of the built site free of charge. The right to construction shall be established without a tender or competition after a decision of the municipal council, adopted by a majority of more than half of the total number of the councilors, in an order determined in the ordinance under Art. 8, para. 2 of the PPL, of.

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Public discussion of this specification is welcome on the (archived) WebGL mailing list public_webgl@khronos.org (see instructions).
Before using the WebGL API, the author must obtain a WebGLRenderingContext object for a given HTMLCanvasElement [CANVAS] as described below. This object is used to manage OpenGL state and render to the drawing buffer, which must be created at the time of context creation.
Each WebGLRenderingContext has an associated canvas, set upon creation, which is a canvas [CANVAS].
Let context's canvas be the canvas the getContext() method is associated with.
Set the attributes of contextAttributes based on the properties of the newly created drawing buffer.
The table below shows all the buffers which make up the drawing buffer, along with their minimum sizes and whether they are defined or not by default. The size of this drawing buffer shall be determined by the width and height attributes of the HTMLCanvasElement. The table below also shows the value to which these buffers shall be cleared when first created, when the size is changed, or after presentation when the preserveDrawingBuffer context creation attribute is false.
If the requested width or height cannot be satisfied, either when the drawing buffer is first created or when the width and height attributes of the HTMLCanvasElement are changed, a drawing buffer with smaller dimensions shall be created. The dimensions actually used are implementation dependent and there is no guarantee that a buffer with the same aspect ratio will be created. The actual drawing buffer size can be obtained from the drawingBufferWidth and drawingBufferHeight attributes.
The depth, stencil and antialias attributes are requests, not requirements. The WebGL implementation does not guarantee that they will be obeyed, but should make a best effort to honor them. Combinations of attributes not supported by the WebGL implementation or graphics hardware shall not cause a failure to create a WebGLRenderingContext. The attributes actually used to create the context may be queried by the getContextAttributes() method on the WebGLRenderingContext. The alpha, premultipliedAlpha and preserveDrawingBuffer attributes must be obeyed by the WebGL implementation.
WebGL presents its drawing buffer to the HTML page compositor immediately before a compositing operation, but only if the drawing buffer has been modified since the last compositing operation. Before the drawing buffer is presented for compositing the implementation shall ensure that all rendering operations have been flushed to the drawing buffer. By default, after compositing the contents of the drawing buffer shall be cleared to their default values, as shown in the table above.
This default behavior can be changed by setting the preserveDrawingBuffer attribute of the WebGLContextAttributes object. If this flag is true, the contents of the drawing buffer shall be preserved until the author either clears or overwrites them. If this flag is false, attempting to perform operations using this context as a source image after the rendering function has returned can lead to undefined behavior. This includes readPixels or toDataURL calls, or using this context as the source image of another context's texImage2D or drawImage call.
OpenGL manages a rectangular viewport as part of its state which defines the placement of the rendering results in the drawing buffer. Upon creation of the WebGL context, the viewport is initialized to a rectangle with origin at (0, 0) and width and height equal to (canvas.width, canvas.height).
OpenGL manages several types of resources as part of its state. These are identified by integer object names and are obtained from OpenGL by various creation calls. In contrast WebGL represents these resources as DOM objects. Each object is derived from the WebGLObject interface. Currently supported resources are: textures, buffers (i.e., VBOs), framebuffers, renderbuffers, shaders and programs. The WebGLRenderingContext interface has a method to create a WebGLObject subclass for each type. Data from the underlying graphics library are stored in these objects and are fully managed by them. The resources represented by these objects are guaranteed to exist as long as the object exists. Furthermore, the DOM object is guaranteed to exist as long as the author has an explicit valid reference to it or as long as it is bound by the underlying graphics library. When none of these conditions exist the user agent can, at any point, delete the object using the equivalent of a delete call (e.g., deleteTexture). If authors wish to control when the underlying resource is released then the delete call can be made explicitly.
WebGL resources such as textures and vertex buffer objects (VBOs) must always contain initialized data, even if they were created without initial user data values. Creating a resource without initial values is commonly used to reserve space for a texture or VBO, which is then modified using texSubImage or bufferSubData calls. If initial data is not provided to these calls, the WebGL implementation must initialize their contents to 0; depth renderbuffers must be cleared to the default 1.0 clear depth. This may require creating a zeroed temporary buffer the size of a requested VBO, so that it can be initialized correctly. All other forms of loading data into a texture or VBO involve either ArrayBuffers or DOM objects such as images, and are therefore already required to be initialized.
If the texImage2D or texSubImage2D method is called with otherwise correct arguments and an HTMLImageElement, HTMLVideoElement, or HTMLCanvasElement violating these restrictions, a SECURITY_ERR exception must be raised.
WebGL applications may utilize images and videos that come from other domains, with the cooperation of the server hosting the media, using Cross-Origin Resource Sharing [CORS]. In order to use such media, the application must explicitly request permission to do so, and the server must explicitly grant permission. Successful CORS-enabled fetches of image and video elements from other domains cause the origin of these elements to be set to that of the containing Document [HTML].
Shaders must not be allowed to read or write array elements that lie outside the bounds of the array. This includes any variable of array type, as well as vector or matrix types such as vec3 or mat4 when accessed using array subscripting syntax. If detected during compilation, such accesses must generate an error and prevent the shader from compiling. Otherwise, at runtime they may return a constant value (such as 0), or the value at any valid index of the same array.
The WebGLContextAttributes interface contains drawing surface attributes and is passed as the second parameter to getContext. A user object may be supplied as this parameter; the specified attributes will be queried from this object.
The following list describes each attribute in the WebGLContextAttributes object and its use. For each attribute the default value is shown. The default value is used either if no second parameter is passed to getContext, or if a user object is passed which has no attribute of the given name.
Default: true. If the value is true, the drawing buffer has an alpha channel for the purposes of performing OpenGL destination alpha operations and compositing with the page. If the value is false, no alpha buffer is available.
Default: true. If the value is true, the drawing buffer has a depth buffer of at least 16 bits. If the value is false, no depth buffer is available.
Default: false. If the value is true, the drawing buffer has a stencil buffer of at least 8 bits. If the value is false, no stencil buffer is available.
Default: true. If the value is true and the implementation supports antialiasing the drawing buffer will perform antialiasing using its choice of technique (multisample/supersample) and quality. If the value is false or the implementation does not support antialiasing, no antialiasing is performed.
Default: true. If the value is true the page compositor will assume the drawing buffer contains colors with premultiplied alpha. If the value is false the page compositor will assume that colors in the drawing buffer are not premultiplied. This flag is ignored if the alpha flag is false. See Premultiplied Alpha for more information on the effects of the premultipliedAlpha flag.
Default: false. If false, once the drawing buffer is presented as described in theDrawing Buffer section, the contents of the drawing buffer are cleared to their default values. All elements of the drawing buffer (color, depth and stencil) are cleared. If the value is true the buffers will not be cleared and will preserve their values until cleared or overwritten by the author.
The WebGLBuffer interface represents an OpenGL Buffer Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glGenBuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.9, man page) , bound as if by calling glBindBuffer (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.9, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteBuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.9, man page) .
The WebGLFramebuffer interface represents an OpenGL Framebuffer Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glGenFramebuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.1, man page) , bound as if by calling glBindFramebuffer (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.1, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteFramebuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.1, man page) .
The WebGLProgram interface represents an OpenGL Program Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glCreateProgram (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.3, man page) , used as if by calling glUseProgram (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.3, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteProgram (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.3, man page) .
The WebGLRenderbuffer interface represents an OpenGL Renderbuffer Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glGenRenderbuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.3, man page) , bound as if by calling glBindRenderbuffer (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.3, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteRenderbuffers (OpenGL ES 2.0 §4.4.3, man page) .
The WebGLShader interface represents an OpenGL Shader Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glCreateShader (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.1, man page) , attached to a Program as if by calling glAttachShader (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.3, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteShader (OpenGL ES 2.0 §2.10.1, man page) .
The WebGLTexture interface represents an OpenGL Texture Object. The underlying object is created as if by calling glGenTextures (OpenGL ES 2.0 §3.7.13, man page) , bound as if by calling glBindTexture (OpenGL ES 2.0 §3.7.13, man page) and destroyed as if by calling glDeleteTextures (OpenGL ES 2.0 §3.7.13, man page) .
Vertex, index, texture, and other data is transferred to the WebGL implementation using the ArrayBuffer and views defined in the Typed Array specification [TYPEDARRAYS].
If the called method is in the list of methods with explicit context lost handling, perform the implementation of the called method, return its result and terminate these steps.
If any argument to the method is a WebGLObject with its invalidated flag set, generate an INVALID_OPERATION error and let use default return value be true.
A reference to the canvas element which created this context.
Returns a new WebGLContextAttributes object describing the context creation parameters.
VERSION Returns a version or release number of the form WebGL<space>1.0<space><vendor-specific information>.
SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION Returns a version or release number of the form WebGL<space>GLSL<space>ES<space>1.0<space><vendor-specific information>.
The viewport specifies the affine transformation of x and y from normalized device coordinates to window coordinates. The size of the drawing buffer is determined by the HTMLCanvasElement. The scissor box defines a rectangle which constrains drawing. When the scissor test is enabled only pixels that lie within the scissor box can be modified by drawing commands. When enabled drawing can only occur inside the intersection of the viewport, canvas area and the scissor box. When the scissor test is not enabled drawing can only occur inside the intersection of the viewport and canvas area.
Binds the given WebGLBuffer object to the given binding point (target), either ARRAY_BUFFER or ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER. If the buffer is null then any buffer currently bound to this target is unbound. A given WebGLBuffer object may only be bound to one of the ARRAY_BUFFER or ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER target in its lifetime. An attempt to bind a buffer object to the other target will generate an INVALID_OPERATION error, and the current binding will remain untouched.
For the WebGLBuffer object bound to the passed target write the passed data starting at the passed offset. If the data would be written past the end of the buffer object an INVALID_VALUE error is generated.
Delete the buffer object contained in the passed WebGLBuffer as if by calling glDeleteBuffers. If the buffer has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the buffer object will be deleted when the WebGLBuffer object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the buffer object is destroyed.
Bind the given WebGLFramebuffer object to the given binding point (target), which must be FRAMEBUFFER. If framebuffer is null, the default framebuffer provided by the context is bound and attempts to modify or query state on target FRAMEBUFFER will generate an INVALID_OPERATION error.
Delete the framebuffer object contained in the passed WebGLFramebuffer as if by calling glDeleteFramebuffers. If the framebuffer has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the framebuffer object will be deleted when the WebGLFramebuffer object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the framebuffer object is destroyed.
Bind the given WebGLRenderbuffer object to the given binding point (target), which must be RENDERBUFFER. If renderbuffer is null the renderbuffer object currently bound to this target is unbound.
Delete the renderbuffer object contained in the passed WebGLRenderbuffer as if by calling glDeleteRenderbuffers. If the renderbuffer has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the renderbuffer object will be deleted when the WebGLRenderbuffer object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the renderbuffer object is destroyed.
Delete the texture object contained in the passed WebGLTexture as if by calling glDeleteTextures. If the texture has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the texture object will be deleted when the WebGLTexture object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the texture object is destroyed.
The source image data is conceptually first converted to the data type and format specified by the format and type arguments, and then transferred to the OpenGL implementation. If a packed pixel format is specified which would imply loss of bits of precision from the image data, this loss of precision must occur.
If the source image is an RGB or RGBA lossless image with 8 bits per channel, the browser guarantees that the full precision of all channels is preserved.
If the original image contains an alpha channel and the UNPACK_PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA_WEBGL pixel storage parameter is false, then the RGB values are guaranteed to never have been premultiplied by the alpha channel, whether those values are derived directly from the original file format or converted from some other color format.
If this function is called with an HTMLImageElement or HTMLVideoElement whose origin differs from the origin of the containing Document, or with an HTMLCanvasElement whose origin-clean flag is set to false, a SECURITY_ERR exception must be raised. See Origin Restrictions.
See texImage2D for the interpretation of the format and type arguments.
Delete the program object contained in the passed WebGLProgram as if by calling glDeleteProgram. If the program has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the program object will be deleted when the WebGLProgram object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the program object is destroyed.
Delete the shader object contained in the passed WebGLShader as if by calling glDeleteShader. If the shader has already been deleted the call has no effect. Note that the shader object will be deleted when the WebGLShader object is destroyed. This method merely gives the author greater control over when the shader object is destroyed.
Return the list of shaders attached to the passed program.
See Supported GLSL Constructs, Maximum GLSL Token Size, Characters Outside the GLSL Source Character Set, and Maximum Nesting of Structures in GLSL Shaders for additional constraints enforced in, additional constructs supported by, and validation performed by WebGL implementations.
Assign the WebGLBuffer object currently bound to the ARRAY_BUFFER target to the vertex attribute at the passed index. Size is number of components per attribute. Stride and offset are in units of bytes. Passed stride and offset must be appropriate for the passed type and size or an INVALID_OPERATION error will be generated; see Buffer Offset and Stride Requirements. If no WebGLBuffer is bound to the ARRAY_BUFFER target, an INVALID_OPERATION error will be generated. In WebGL, the maximum supported stride is 255; see Vertex Attribute Data Stride.
If first is negative, an INVALID_VALUE error will be generated.
Draw using the currently bound element array buffer. The given offset is in bytes, and must be a valid multiple of the size of the given type or an INVALID_OPERATION error will be generated; see Buffer Offset and Stride Requirements. If count is greater than zero, then a non-null WebGLBuffer must be bound to the ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER binding point or an INVALID_OPERATION error will be generated.
WebGL performs additional error checking beyond that specified in OpenGL ES 2.0 during calls to drawArrays and drawElements. See Enabled Vertex Attributes and Range Checking.
The type of pixels must match the type of the data to be read. For example, if it is UNSIGNED_BYTE, a Uint8Array must be supplied; if it is UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_6_5, UNSIGNED_SHORT_4_4_4_4, or UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_5_5_1, a Uint16Array must be supplied. If the types do not match, an INVALID_OPERATION error is generated.
If pixels is null, an INVALID_VALUE error is generated. If pixels is non-null, but is not large enough to retrieve all of the pixels in the specified rectangle taking into account pixel store modes, an INVALID_OPERATION value is generated.
For any pixel lying outside the frame buffer, the value read contains 0 in all channels; see Reading Pixels Outside the Framebuffer.
An implementation of WebGL must not support any additional parameters, constants or functions without first enabling that functionality through the extension mechanism. The getSupportedExtensions function returns an array of the extension strings supported by this implementation. Extension strings are case-insensitive. An extension is enabled by passing one of those strings to the getExtension function. This call returns an object which contains any constants or functions defined by that extension. The definition of that object is specific to the extension and must be defined by the extension specification.
Once an extension is enabled, no mechanism is provided to disable it. Multiple calls to getExtension with the same extension string shall return the same object. An attempt to use any features of an extension without first calling getExtension to enable it must generate an appropriate GL error and must not make use of the feature.
Returns an array of all the supported extension strings. Any string in this list, when passed to getExtension must return a valid object. Any other string passed to getExtension must return null.
Returns an object if the passed extension is supported, or null if not. The object returned from getExtension contains any constants or functions used by the extension, if any. A returned object may have no constants or functions if the extension does not define any, but a unique object must still be returned. That object is used to indicate that the extension has been enabled.
WebGL generates a WebGLContextEvent event in response to a status change to the WebGL rendering context associated with the HTMLCanvasElement which has a listener for this event. Events are sent using the DOM Event System [DOM3EVENTS]. Event types can include the loss or restoration of state, or the inability to create a context. EventInit is defined in the DOM4 specification [DOM4].
To fire a WebGL context event named e means that an event using the WebGLContextEvent interface, with its type attribute [DOM4] initialized to e, and its isTrusted attribute [DOM4] initialized to true, is to be dispatched at the given object.
Once the context is restored, WebGL resources such as textures and buffers that were created before the context was lost are no longer valid. The application must reinitialize the context's state and recreate all such resources.
The WebGL API does not support client-side arrays. If vertexAttribPointer is called without a WebGLBuffer bound to the ARRAY_BUFFER binding point, an INVALID_OPERATION error is generated. If drawElements is called with a count greater than zero, and no WebGLBuffer is bound to the ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER binding point, an INVALID_OPERATION error is generated.
If a vertex attribute is enabled as an array via enableVertexAttribArray but no buffer is bound to that attribute via bindBuffer and vertexAttribPointer, then calls to drawArrays or drawElements will generate an INVALID_OPERATION error.
If a vertex attribute is enabled as an array, a buffer is bound to that attribute, and the attribute is consumed by the current program, then calls to drawArrays and drawElements will verify that each referenced vertex lies within the storage of the bound buffer. If the range specified in drawArrays or any referenced index in drawElements lies outside the storage of the bound buffer, an INVALID_OPERATION error is generated and no geometry is drawn.
In the WebGL API, functions which read the framebuffer (copyTexImage2D, copyTexSubImage2D, and readPixels) are defined to generate the RGBA value (0, 0, 0, 0) for any pixel which is outside of the bound framebuffer.
In the OpenGL ES 2.0 API, the IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_FORMAT and IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_TYPE parameters are used to inform applications of an additional format and type combination that may be passed to ReadPixels, in addition to the required RGBA/UNSIGNED_BYTE pair. In WebGL 1.0, the supported format and type combinations to ReadPixels are documented in the Reading back pixels section. The IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_FORMAT and IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_TYPE enumerants have been removed.
In the WebGL API, the enumerants INFO_LOG_LENGTH, SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH, ACTIVE_UNIFORM_MAX_LENGTH, and ACTIVE_ATTRIB_MAX_LENGTH have been removed. In the OpenGL ES 2.0 API, these enumerants are needed to determine the size of buffers passed to calls like glGetActiveAttrib. In the WebGL API, the analogous calls (getActiveAttrib, getActiveUniform, getProgramInfoLog, getShaderInfoLog, and getShaderSource) all return DOMString.
Typed Array Specification: Editor's Draft , V. Vukicevic, K. Russell, May 2010.
Web IDL: W3C Editor’s Draft , C. McCormack, September 2009.
Additional thanks to: Alan Hudson (Yumetech), Bill Licea Kane (AMD), Cedric Vivier (Zegami), Dan Gessel (Apple), David Ligon (Qualcomm), David Sheets (Ashima Arts), Glenn Maynard, Greg Roth (Nvidia), Jacob Strom (Ericsson), Kari Pulli (Nokia), Leddie Stenvie (ST-Ericsson), Neil Trevett (Nvidia), Per Wennersten (Ericsson), Per-Erik Brodin (Ericsson), Shiki Okasaka (Google), Tom Olson (ARM), Zhengrong Yao (Ericsson), and the members of the Khronos WebGL Working Group.

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