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The new Directory came into effect on 24th Ocotber, 2011. Some formators are not aware of the changes and additions in the new directory on formation. The numbers releted formation with changes are presented here. The changes are shown in red colour.
156.The formation plan for those called to the Claretian missionary life (Can. 650 § 1) is made up of the elements expressed in the following, which are gathered together and presented in our General Plan of Formation, called “Formation of Missionaries.”.
The fundamental objective of formation is to promote growth in union and conformity with Christ according to the Claretian charism, in a responsible and creative manner.
Formation does not consist only in the study of a series of subjects, but of an experiential process in which the encounter with God and the Congregation help the individual to identify and to express his own identity beginning with the call he has received from God. In addition to vocational discernment, the initial formation must offer to the one in formation the necessary elements to build a foundation on which he can maintain a commitment for ongoing personal and spiritual growth throughout his life.
– transforming that leads to increasing levels of human and spiritual maturity as the one in formation advances in his formative process.
– gradual and progressive, respecting the different stages of formation, as well as the different pace and level of maturity of each individual.
160. All members of the Congregation on all its different levels are responsible for the important task of missionary formation, as much through their testimony of life as by their collaboration (Can. 652 § 4; CC 76).
162. So that the function of formation may be more complete, where possible there should be a formation team with complementary abilities. The formators should be offered the means and resources necessary to undertake their work, and they must commit themselves to it without reservation.
–to verify the results he has obtained and judge whether he has the capabilities demanded of him at present by the Church and the Congregation.
166. It is recommended that Provinces and Independent Delegations have a formation council, established in the form determined by the respective government (No. 457 h).
Where it exists, it also belongs to the formation council to carry out an animating and evaluating work regarding formation in its various aspects.
In order to assure continuity in the formative process there must be good communication among those in charge of the different stages of the formative process, and updated reports about the candidates should be given to new formators.
168. Each province should have a formation plan prepared in conformity with the General Plan for Formation and approved by the Provincial Superior with his Council (No. 457 h). This plan should include vocation promotion and a consideration of the different stages of formation, as well as matters relating to permanent formation.
Each formation centre should apply the provincial formation plan to its own situation and draw up its own corresponding plan.
Similarly, each province or delegation will select, prepare, and accompany those who will need to assume the work of formation.
169. Our academic centres should draw up their own statutes (Can. 659 § 3), detailing their objectives, orientation, selection and appointment of professors, the formation of an academic council, student participation, economic administration, etc.
These statutes should be drafted by those responsible for the centre, with the participation of the community, and are to be approved by the major superior. At these centers, the responsibility of the Rector or Director is limited to the academic area. Nonetheless, there must be good coordination with the formator, the formation team and the superior of the community.
The Claretian Professors in these centres need to be conscious not just of their contribution to academic formation, but also their participation in the holistic formation of Claretian Students.
170. Vocation ministry is the specific activity by which each community commits itself to foster, welcome, and accompany those who feel a vocational calling. Vocation promotion has to be a priority in each Province, Independent Delegation and community, and for every Claretian (CC 58). Every Claretian is responsible for fostering vocations, above all, by being a model for those whom God might be calling to the Claretian life. Each community should be welcoming toward vocations and should include vocation promotion within their community project and pastoral planning, assigning some member of the community to be more directly responsible for this ministry.
171. The aim of vocation ministry is to help the candidate discover his vocation in the Church and if he feels drawn to the Congregation makes an option to follow Jesus according to the Claretian charism. Youth ministry that does not lead young people to make their own option for the Lord should be considered incomplete.
172. So that this option may be a viable one, a “vocational culture” must be encouraged in the Province or Delegation, informing the youth of the vocations that exist in Church, challenging and accompanying them in the maturation of their vocational choice young people should be presented with a broad spectrum of vocational possibilities in the Church. This presupposes on the part of those committed to youth ministry an ability to orient young or adolescent persons in the progressive discernment of their vocation, respect for the call of God and firmness in insisting on the fidelity due to the Lord.
With a true ecclesial sense and in collaboration with the local church, we should take care to integrate families, diocesan priests, religious, and teachers into our vocation ministry.
173. In all provinces and, whenever possible, in the independent delegations there should be at least one Claretian specifically prepared and dedicated full time to vocation ministry. In all the Provinces and Independent Delegations of the Congregation, a Claretian Vocation Team should be established, which will also seek to incorporate some lay persons.
174.This team is responsible for vocational animation throughout the province or delegation, encouraging the participation of all and should draft plans for vocation promotion. In doing this it should make explicit the three modes of life in our Institute: priestly, diaconal and lay. It should not forget the task of promoting vocations to the various other groups of the Claretian Family. In order to fulfil its mission, it should have the necessary resources with which to work.
The provincial government should encourage and evaluate the work of the team and that of the local communities.
175.Within the vocation ministry team of the province or delegation there should be those assigned to do a serious and responsible study of candidates according to their age and stage of development, so as to reach the best discernment possible concerning their sincerity, freedom of choice, their physical, psychological, intellectual, moral, religious, apostolic and community aptitudes, and the universal availability required by our charism. In making this discernment they should, if they deem it necessary, avail themselves of methods of psychological testing and a review of life, without prejudice to the privacy of each person (Cann. 220, 642). They will take into account the criteria expressed in the Vocational Directory and the directives of the Congregation.
176. Mutual collaboration between vocation teams on an inter-provincial level is desirable for an interchange of experiences, and for clarifying the objectives and the means used in vocation ministry. To this end, they should hold periodic meetings and inform all of our communities of their activities. Our vocation ministry will be open to collaboration with all the groups of the Claretian Family, with other religious institutes, and with dioceses.
177.The General Prefecture of Formation should promote various vocational activities on the provincial and inter-provincial levels and keep the Congregation informed of experiences, achievements and difficulties in this area.
Each province or delegation will determine the location of the vocation ministry within the organizational chart of the institute and its relationship with the Prefectures and Secretariats. The same will apply to the General Government.
The general director of vocation ministry will seek to promote vocation activities in the different areas of the Congregation, and will be informed of experiences, successes and difficulties in this endeavor.
Article 3. Reception of Prospective Vocations and Pre-novitiate Candidates.
178.The Claretian community carries out the initial reception and development of vocations through institutionalised forms such as minor seminaries or similar centres, and through other forms of welcoming vocations such as parish groups, youth groups, apostolic movements, etc. of those adolescents and young adults who have expressed a desire to be Claretians.
179. Admission to the Minor Seminary or to a centre of vocation discernment belongs to the local Superior, keeping in mind the opinion of the animator or the provincial team for vocation ministry; or of whoever is designated by legitimately approved statutes. Dismissal is always the responsibility of the local Superior, after hearing from the formators or those responsible.
180.The pre-novitiate in the Congregation is an educational institution erected to help candidates, who show signs or the seeds of a Claretian vocation, to discern and to respond to it. It also welcomes those who have concluded their studies at the Minor Seminary or other experiences of vocational reception.
‑having the candidates exercising some apostolic activity.
‑In all areas of its activities, the pre-novitiate should establish a lifestyle suited to the age, situation and educational level of its students and see to their development in keeping with sound psychological and pedagogical norms.
‑Formation should be imparted in a climate of friendship, discipline and a community of faith. Students should be expected to show signs of religious sensibility and sincere piety so that, in professing and celebrating their faith with their peers, they may come to experience a close union with God and their fellow human beings. Thus they may discover an experiential awareness of the mystery of Christ and of the Church.
‑Families should be incorporated into this educative process by means of an adequate relationship with the students and by their presence in the seminary.
‑Formation should be open to the social and ecclesial realities, and to the persons, works and communities of the Congregation, and its multicultural nature.
‑An effort must be made to involve the students in this education process. This involvement should be personal, progressive, integral and objectively verifiable.
– show signs or seeds of a Claretian vocation discernible from his basic personal aptitudes, and of his having an elementary life of faith and religious sensibility (No. 180).
– show an initial desire to follow Christ in the Congregation, either because he is openly inclined to our missionary life or because he thinks of it as a possibility for himself.
‑to initiate him into acquiring habits of discipline, community‑mindedness and study.
to determine the modality and duration of this stage, consistent to what is indicated in n. 193.
that he does not have contractual obligations for unlawful misconduct in sexual matters or financial offenses.
191. The postulancy of those coming from a minor seminary or from other forms of welcoming vocations may coincide with the last period of the pre-novitiate.
Should someone be allowed to enter the postulancy directly, the government of the Province or Independent Delegation must arrange for the most opportune and effective way to complete this stage, bearing in mind the circumstances of the candidate and organising an experience ‑ a group experience if possible – in our communities.
192. It is recommended that the period of postulancy be spent outside the novitiate house. If it does take place in the novitiate, it should constitute a different section. In some cases with permission of the Major Superior, it may even be made outside our houses, but always under the guidance of an experienced religious.
194. Formation personnel in charge of postulants should have adequate preparation and, in order to assure continuity in formation, should keep in close contact with the novice master and with those responsible for the prior formative stages and for the vocation ministry.
198. In order for the novitiate to be valid, it should be held in a house properly designated for this purpose (Can. 647 § 2). The erection, transfer or suppression of the novitiate must be done by means of a written decree of the Superior General with the consent of his council (Can. 647 § 1; Dir. 496 f). This is to be requested by the Major Superior with the consent of his council (No. 457 m).
199. Only those candidates who do not have any canonical impediment (Can. 643) and wish to be Claretian missionaries, and possess the requisite qualities of age, physical and psychological health, aptitude, and human, spiritual and vocational maturity (Can. 642), may be admitted to the novitiate. Those who have shown progress in fulfilling the demands of religious life and apostolic activities in our Institute should be regarded as suitable candidates.
200. Before being admitted to the novitiate, all candidates should present certificates of their Baptism and Confirmation and of their free status (Can. 645 § 1). Clergy candidates and those who come from other seminaries or Religious Institutes need to present a written report from their respective superior (cf. Can. 645 & 2 & 3).
202. Admission to the novitiate belongs to the Major Superior with the consultative vote of his council (Can. 641; CC 69; Dir. 458 e). But with respect to a priest, seminarian, or ex-religious, whose reports may present some doubt, the Major Superior must call for a deliberative vote of his Council.
For any just reason the novice can be dismissed by the Major Superior (Can. 653; Dir. 271).
219. During the novitiate it should be made known to the novices that the Congregation will not take the responsibility for the moral and legal consequences arising from acts against consecrated chastity. Before the first profession the novices should declare in writing that they know and accept the will of the Congregation, according to what is stated in n. 190.
220. An official record of the profession should be drawn up, and signed by the religious himself, the superior who receives the profession, the secretary of the community, and two witnesses. In houses where professions take place habitually there should be a special book to contain these records.
233. The local superior of the house where the profession takes place will inform the provincial secretary of the person professed concerning all professions. The provincial secretary should inform the secretary general of all first and perpetual professions and report perpetual professions to the pastors of the places where the professed were baptised (Can. 535 § 2).
193.In the post‑novitiate period, the work begun in the novitiate should be continued and integrally deepened in all aspects of Claretian missionary life, with a view to definitive incorporation into the Congregation and into the missionary service in the Church.
239.For formative or other reasons, it may be advisable to follow a system of inter-provincial formation centres. It is fitting that these have the close support of the Provincial Government in whose territory the Centre is located and that the relationship between those in formation and their own province or delegation is properly cared for.
Because of the universal and multicultural character of the Congregation, intercultural formation centres on all continents will continue to be created and consolidated, with clear criteria for operating and suitable teams of formation.
a) Are not obliged to promote their students to Orders.
b) Should in every case ascertain their fitness for promotion to Orders. To this end, the members of the community are obliged to report to the Major Superior regarding the fitness of candidates to diaconate and priesthood.
c) Need the deliberative vote of their consultors for approval (No. 457 f).
d) Can grant dimissorial letters to members of their respective organism who are to be ordained (Can. 1019 § 1).
e) Can confer Ministries on their professed subjects and delegate this conferral to another.
f) Shall report the ordination to the pastor of the place where the one ordained was baptized (Cann. 535 § 2; 1054,).
244.The title of ordination of our members is that of “Common table“.
145.During the last years of study it is necessary to direct each of the students toward a particular pastoral area and, in dialogue with the major superior, the formator, and the student himself, decide upon the most suitable specialisation, in harmony with the options of the Congregation and bearing in mind the needs of the province or delegation and of the Congregation in general.
 Formation of Missionaries. General Plan of Formation. Madrid, 1994. cf. PI 66; VC 68; XXI Gen Ch, Acta 14, Ann. 60 (1991) p.253.
 Cf. OT 5; 1F 75; MFL 63.5; GPF 416; Cf. Ann. 67 (2005)24 ss.; MFL 63,4.
 Cf. 1F 84, 162; 2F 13.
 Cf. 1F 97; IPM 36-37.
 Cf. VC 64; IPM 37.7.
 CVD 232; “Chapter Directives regarding some subjects related to the vows of chastity” n. 3 (November 11. 2003).

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Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (issuing body.).
3 of 7 copies available at Island Libraries.
Subject: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.
Native peoples > Canada > History.
Native peoples > Canada > Government relations.
General Note: Volume 5 and volume 6 bound together on inverted pages.
Volume 1 copy 3 - volume 6 downloaded and printed on Robertson Library Espresso Book Machine (EBM).
"Principles" volume also issued in French under title: Ce que nous avons retenu : les principes de la vérité et de la réconciliation.
Formatted Contents Note: v. 1. Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future : summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada -- v. 2. What we have learned : principles of truth and reconciliation -- v. 3. The survivors speak : a report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada -- v. 4. Les survivants s'expriment : un rapport de la Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada -- v. 5. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada : calls to action -- v. 6. Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada : appels à l'action.
Language Note: English or French.
They came for the children : Canada, Aboriginal peoples, and residential schools.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


License revocation; appeal; notice of judgment.
Any person who feels himself or herself aggrieved because of the revocation of his or her operator's license under sections 60-498.01 to 60-498.04 may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county where the alleged events occurred for which he or she was arrested, and the appeal shall be in accordance with section 84-917. The district court shall allow any party to an appeal to appear by telephone at any proceeding before the court for purposes of the appeal. Such appeal shall not suspend the order of revocation. The court shall provide notice of the final judgment to the department.
Laws 2011, LB667, § 27.
Neither this section nor subsection (2)(a) of section 84-917 provides that its jurisdictional provisions are exclusive. Reiter v. Wimes, 263 Neb. 277, 640 N.W.2d 19 (2002).
Administrative license revocation statutes are reviewed using the rational relationship standard of review. The administrative license revocation statutes do not violate equal protection, nor do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 782, 593 N.W.2d 295 (1999).
The venue requirements of this section governing the right to appeal are mandatory and must be complied with in order for the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction. An appeal from an order of the Director of Motor Vehicles revoking an operator's license for refusing to take a blood, breath, or urine test must be filed in the district court of the county in which the alleged events occurred for which the operator was arrested. Jackson v. Jensen, 225 Neb. 671, 407 N.W.2d 758 (1987).
On appeal to district court from order of Director of Motor Vehicles under section 39-669.16 (transferred to section 60-498.02) revoking operator's license, the burden is on licensee to establish ground for reversal. Mackey v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975).
On appeal from order of revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license under the implied consent law, review is de novo as in equity. Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).
Pursuant to Nebraska's administrative revocation statutes, decisions of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles are appealed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. Wilson v. Neth, 18 Neb. App. 41, 773 N.W.2d 183 (2009).


§ 246-2 Imposition of tax.
§ 246-3 Declaration, return and payment of tax.
§ 246-4 Collection at source.
§ 246-7 Incorporation of statute.
§ 246-8 Penalty for late payment of taxes.
An enterprise, activity, profession or any other undertaking of an unincorporated nature conducted for profit or ordinarily conducted for profit, whether by a person, partnership, association or any other entity.
The place where one lives and has his permanent home and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent. Actual residence is not necessarily "domicile," for "domicile" is the fixed place of abode which, in the intention of the taxpayer, is permanent rather than transitory. Domicile is the place in which a man has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family, not for a mere special or limited purpose, but with the present intention of making a permanent home, until some event occurs to induce him to adopt some other permanent home. In the case of businesses or associations, the domicile is that place considered as the center of business affairs and the place where its functions are discharged.
Salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, incentive payments, fees, tips and other compensation received by a person or his personal representative for services rendered, whether directly or through an agent, and whether in cash or in property; not including, however, wages or compensation paid to persons on active military service; periodic payments for sickness and disability other than regular wages received during a period of sickness, disability or retirement; or payments arising under worker's compensation acts, occupational disease acts and similar legislation; or payments commonly recognized as old-age benefits, retirement pay or pensions paid to persons retired from service after reaching a specific age or after a stated period of employment; or payments commonly known as public assistance; or unemployment compensation or payments made by employers or labor unions for wage and salary supplemental programs, including, but not limited to, programs covering hospitalization, sickness, disability or death, supplemental unemployment benefits, strike benefits, social security and retirement.
A person, partnership, association, corporation, institution, governmental body or unit or agency, or any other entity employing one or more persons for a salary, wage, commission or other compensation.
Person, public employee or private agency designated by Borough Council to collect and administer the tax on earned income and net profits.
The net income from the operation of a business, profession or other activity, except corporations, after provision for all costs and expenses incurred in the conduct thereof, determined either on a cash or accrual basis in accordance with the accounting system used in such business, profession or other activity, but without deduction of taxes based on income.
A person, partnership, association or other entity domiciled outside the taxing district.
A person, partnership, association or any other entity required hereunder to file a return of earned income or net profits or to pay a tax thereon.
A tax of 1/2 of 1% on all salaries, wages, commissions and all other compensation earned by residents of the Borough and on similar earned income earned by nonresidents of the Borough of Zelienople for work done or services rendered or performed in said Borough, said tax being initially imposed from April 1, 1972, through December 31, 1972, and annually thereafter.
A tax of 1/2 of 1% on the net profits of businesses, professions and other activities conducted in the Borough of Zelienople by residents of the Borough and on the net profits of businesses, professions or other activities conducted in the Borough by nonresidents of the Borough, said tax being initially imposed from April 1, 1972, through December 31, 1972, and annually thereafter.
The first installment on or before June 15, 1972; the second installment on or before September 15, 1972; and the last and final installment on or before January 15, 1973; and on or before April 15, 1973, shall file a final return showing the amount of net profits earned during the period beginning April 19, 1972, and ending December 31, 1972; the total amount of tax due thereon; and the total amount of tax paid thereon. At the time of filing the final returns, the taxpayer shall pay to the Officer the balance of the tax due or shall make demand for refund or credit in the case of overpayment.
After 1972, every taxpayer making net profits in any year succeeding 1972 shall file a declaration of his estimated net profits for the then current year and shall pay the tax due thereon in quarterly installments and shall file a final return as provided in Section 13, III-A(3), and pay the balance of the tax due, all as provided in Section 13, III-A(1) of the Local Tax Enabling Act.
Editor's Note: See now 53 P.S. § 6901 et seq., and 53 P.S. §§ 6924.101 et seq.
For 1972, every taxpayer shall, on or before April 15, 1973, make and file with the Officer a final return showing the amount of earned income (other than net profits) received during the period beginning April 1, 1972, and ending December 31, 1972; the total tax due thereon; the amount of tax paid thereon that has been withheld pursuant to the provisions relating to collection at the source; and the balance of tax due. At the time of filing said final return, the taxpayer shall pay the balance of the tax due or shall make demand for refund or credit in the case of overpayment.
After 1972, for years succeeding the year 1972, every taxpayer shall make and file final returns and pay the taxes dues, all as provided in Section 13, III-B, first paragraph, of the Local Tax Enabling Act.
Quarterly returns. Every taxpayer who is employed for a salary, wage, commission or other compensation and who receives any earned income not subject to the provisions relating to collection at source shall make and file with the Officer quarterly returns and shall pay quarter annually the amount of tax shown as due on such returns, all as provided in Section 13 III-B(2), of the Local Tax Enabling Act.
Every employer having an office, factory, workshop, branch, warehouse or other place of business within the geographical limits of the Borough of Zelienople shall deduct the tax imposed by this article on the earned income due to his employee or employees and shall file quarterly returns and pay quarterly to the Officer the amount of taxes deducted, all as set forth in Section 13, IV, of said the Local Tax Enabling Act.
The Income Tax Officer shall be selected from time to time by resolution of and shall receive such compensation for his services and expenses as determined from time to time by the Borough of Zelienople. Such Officer shall have the powers and duties and be subject to the penalties provided in the Local Tax Enabling Act.
The tax imposed by § 246-2 of this article shall not be levied on the net profits of any person, institution or organization as to whom it is beyond the power of the Borough of Zelienople to impose said tax under the Constitution of the United States of America or the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The provisions of Sections 13, 19 and 20 of the Local Tax Enabling Act (Act No. 511 of 1965), as amended, are incorporated herein by reference; except where options are provided in said Section 13, this article reenacts the designation of the option selected, and except as and where hereinbefore specifically provided otherwise.
Ten percent is hereby established as the penalty to be levied upon the face of taxes levied as payment due, in addition to the value of said taxes upon late payment, said late payment period to commence on the first day of July 9, 1977, and on the same date of each subsequent year thereafter.


DAVID C. GUADERRAMA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Petitioner Stephen Tyler Dawe seeks Court intervention through a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). He asks the Court to order Respondent S. Nicklin to consider him for twelve months' placement in a residential reentry center ("RRC") program, in accordance with his understanding of the Second Chance Act. Pet'r's Pet. at 2, 18, ECF No. 1. The Court finds it appears from the face of Dawe's petition that his claims are unexhausted and, in the alternative, that he is not entitled to § 2241 relief. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Dawe's petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).
In the early morning hours of September 29, 2014, a detective from the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Police Department contacted a special agent with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The detective advised the special agent that Stephen Tyler Dawe was in custody undergoing questioning for a possible kidnapping and conspiracy to commit a violent felony. The detective explained Dawe, a convicted felon, was found in possession of an altered Stevens, model 94, single-shot, 12-gauge shotgun.
Dawe pleaded guilty to a federal indictment charging him with felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The Court sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release. J., ECF No. 40, United States v. Dawe, l:14-CR-3422-lWPJ (D. N.M. July 14, 2015).
Dawe, now a prisoner at the La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution, in Anthony, Texas,  claims he "has a projected release date of Feb. 5th, 2019." Pet'r's Pet. at 1. He asks the Court to order Nicklin to consider him for RRC placement for twelve months, or "the maximum amount of time, " before his ultimate release from Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") custody. Id. at 18.
A writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides a basis for relief for prisoners who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012). It provides the proper procedural vehicle in which to raise an attack on "the manner in which a sentence is executed." Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000). A court must order a respondent to show cause why a petition pursuant to § 2241 should not be granted "unless it appears from the [petition] that the [petitioner] or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).
An initial issue a court must address when screening a § 2241 petition is whether the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1994) (per curiam). A petitioner seeking habeas relief must first exhaust all administrative remedies that might provide appropriate relief. Id.; Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993). "Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are appropriate where the available administrative remedies either are unavailable or wholly inappropriate to the relief sought, or where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile course of action." Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62 (internal citations omitted). Exceptions may be made only in "extraordinary circumstances, " which the petitioner bears the burden to establish. Id.
Dawe concedes he has not exhausted his claims through the BOP administrative review process. Pet'r's Pet. at 7-18. He asks the Court to excuse him from exhausting "due to futility." Id. at 14.
The BOP uses a three-tiered Administrative Remedy Program to review inmate complaints relating to all aspects of their imprisonment. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 et seq. A federal prisoner must generally pursue the procedures set forth in the program prior to seeking relief in a district court. Rourke, 11 F.3d at 49. Thus, Administrative remedies are available and not wholly inappropriate to obtaining relief from aspects of imprisonment that Dawe seeks.


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Bacterial populations communicate through the cell density-dependent mechanism of quorum sensing (QS). Vibrio harveyi, one of the best studied model organisms for QS, was used to explore effects of the synthetic cannabinoid HU-210 on QS and different QS-regulated physiological processes in bacteria.
Analysis of QS-regulated bioluminescence in wild-type and mutant strains of V. harveyi revealed that HU-210 affects the autoinducer-2 (AI-2) pathway, one of three known QS cascades of V. harveyi. Furthermore, QS-mediated biofilm formation and swimming motility in the mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) were significantly reduced in the presence of HU-210. HU-210 inhibited QS-mediated virulence factor production without any inhibitory effect on bacterial growth. It also alters the expression of several genes, which are regulated by QS, specifically downregulating the genes of the AI-2 QS cascade.
First evidence is being provided for interference of bacterial signal-transduction systems by a synthetic cannabinoid. The effect of HU-210 was specific to the AI-2 cascade in V. harveyi. AI-2 is known as a "universal autoinducer" and interference with its activity opens a broad spectrum of applications for synthetic cannabinoids in future research as a potential anti-QS agent.
Bacteria communicate and coordinate population behavior through the mechanism of quorum sensing (QS), which controls the expression of genes that affect a variety of bacterial processes [1, 2]. QS is based on small signaling molecules, termed autoinducers (AIs), which control factors such as bioluminescence, pigment production, motility and biofilm formation, among many others [3–5]. The QS, free-living marine bacterium Vibrio harveyi produces and responds to at least three distinct AIs : HAI-1, an acyl homoserine lactone ; AI-2, a furanosyl-borate-diester ; and CAI-1, a long-chain amino ketone (Z)-3-aminoundec-2-en-4-one (Ea-C8-CAI-1) . AI-2 is referred to "universal autoinducer" as it is found in numerous Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria [10, 11]. A better understanding of QS actions and novel ways to affect them is providing an opportunity to manipulate bacterial properties that are of major importance in industry, agriculture and medicine.
Plant and endogenous cannabinoids have been investigated extensively, particularly as agonists of the endocannabinoid signaling system and as therapeutically active substances [12, 13]. Both delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the major psychoactive constituent of cannabis  and cannabidiol (CBD), a non-psychoactive constituent, alter immune functions, mostly via suppression. The mechanism governing these activities has not been fully elucidated (for a recent review see Cabral et al. ). In most investigations, these phytocannabinoids have been found to enhance the susceptibility of mice to microorganisms (both bacteria and viruses). However, several reports have indicated that administration of THC leads to lower viral loads and moderation of disease progression .
The effect of cannabinoids on bacterial QS has never been investigated. We chose to study the activity of the synthetic cannabinoid HU-210 (Fig. 1), because its physical and chemical properties have been well defined. HU-210 was first synthesized from (1R,5S)-myrtenol . It displays a multiplicity of biochemical, pharmacological, and behavioral effects, most of which depend on its potent agonistic activity at the cannabinoid receptors CB1 and CB2 .
To investigate the effect of HU-210 on the QS cascade of V. harveyi wild-type strain BB120 and QS-mutant strains (Table 1), bioluminescence was measured with and without HU-210 in the growth media. First, we determined whether addition of HU-210 to the growth media alters the bioluminescence of the wild-type V. harveyi strain. Results showed no significant difference in bioluminescence between samples with and without HU-210 (Fig. 2a). The experiments were repeated with other V. harveyi strains mutated in the QS cascade. Addition of HU-210 to the growth media resulted in an up to 98 % decrease in the bioluminescence of V. harveyi mutant BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+), in a dose-dependent manner, whereas bioluminescence of the mutant strain MM30 (AI-1+, AI-2−) was not significantly affected (Fig. 2a). However growth of V. harveyi mutant BB152 (Fig. 2b) and other mutant strains (data not shown) was not affected by HU-210. Results indicated that a notable effect of HU-210 was specific to AI-2 in the QS cascade of V. harveyi, as this AI regulates QS of V. harveyi mutant strain BB152.
To further analyze the mode of action of HU-210, another mutant strain, BB170 (Sensor-1−, Sensor-2+) was tested. Bioluminescence in V. harveyi BB170 is mainly controlled by AI-2, as this strain is not responsive to AI-1 stimulation due to the absence of sensor-1 . In the presence of HU-210, bioluminescence production by mutant strain BB170 was decreased by up to 85 %, further confirming the specific action of HU-210 on AI-2 (Fig. 2c). To validate the molecular QS target of HU-210, another experiment was designed in which mutant strain MM77 (AI-1−, AI-2−), in the absence or presence of different doses of HU-210, was simultaneously incubated with 10 % (v/v) spent medium containing exogenous AI-1 and AI-2 isolated from V. harveyi MM30 (AI-1+, AI-2−) and BB152 (AI-1−,AI-2+) respectively. The inhibitory effect of HU-210 on bioluminescence production was more pronounced in samples to which exogenous AI-2 had been added (~95 % decrease), suggesting that the effect of HU-210 is not only on the production of AI-2 signal, but also on the reception of those signal molecules by hybrid sensor kinases present in mutant strain MM77 (Additional file 1: Figure S1).
Interestingly when mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) was supplemented with exogenous AI-1 from MM30 (AI-1+, AI-2−) and simultaneously treated with different concentrations of HU-210, the latter's dose-dependent inhibitory effect could be reversed and bioluminescence level of this mutant strain restored to the similar level of the wild-type BB120, except in sample with highest HU-210 concentration (200 μg/ml) (Fig. 2d).
The effect of HU-210 on other QS-controlled processes in V. harveyi, such as biofilm formation, was also tested. Biofilms were grown with and without different concentrations of HU-210 using different V. harveyi strains (Table 1). The biofilm biomass formed by the different strains was quantified using crystal violet (CV) staining. The effect of HU-210 on biofilm biomass formed by wild-type BB120 and mutant strain MM30 was minimal, as no significant decrease was observed with increasing concentrations of HU-210 (Additional file 1: Figure S2). Consistent with these results, an up to 80 % decrease was observed in biofilm biomass of mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+). Inhibition of biofilm biomass formation by HU-210 in mutant BB152 was found to be dose-dependent (Additional file 1: Figure S2).
This anti-biofilm effect was further confirmed using a DNA-quantification method which specifically quantified the DNA present in different V. harveyi biofilms. DNA quantification results showed the same trend of inhibitory action for HU-210: biofilm in the mutant strain BB152 was dose-dependently inhibited by up to 80 % (Fig. 3), whereas there was no significant decrease in the amount of DNA present in wild-type BB120 and mutant MM30 biofilms.
To further evaluate the effect of HU-210 on biofilm formation by V. harveyi, we analyzed the morphology of the biofilms generated by the V. harveyi wild type BB120, and mutants MM30 (AI-1+, AI-2−) and BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) using confocal laser scanning microscopy (CLSM). The depth of the biofilms formed by the wild type and mutant strain MM30 was least affected by the addition of HU-210. However biofilms formed by mutant BB152 in control samples (without HU-210) were more confluent (95 μm) than those formed in the presence of HU-210 (55 μm), and showed a gradual decrease in average depth with increasing concentrations of HU-210 (Fig. 4a & b).
The amount of EPS was normalized to live cells in the biofilm, and we observed less EPS in biofilms formed by all tested V. harveyi strains in the presence of HU-210 vs. controls. However, the decrease was only significant for mutant strain BB152, where up to 75 % less EPS was measured in the presence of 200 μg/ml HU-210 vs. controls. Bacterial cell viability in the biofilms was not significantly affected by HU-210 in any of the tested V. harveyi strains (Table 2).
Swimming motility assays were performed with wild-type strain BB120 and mutant strains MM30 and BB152. A significant decrease (P < 0.05) in swimming motility was observed in all three strains in the presence of the highest tested concentration of HU-210 (200 μg/ml). This effect of HU-210 was most evident in mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) as it interfered with swimming motility at lower concentrations as well (above 2 μg/ml) (Fig. 5). In both the wild-type strain BB120 and the mutant strain BB152, the observed reduction in swimming motility was dose-dependent (up to 80 % and 85 %, respectively), whereas in mutant strain MM30, up to 95 % inhibition was observed at the highest HU-210 concentration tested (200 μg/ml).
The molecular basis of the inhibitory action of HU-210 on QS and biofilm formation in V. harveyi mutant strain BB152 was investigated. We quantified mRNA levels of six genes which had been previously found to be regulated by the AI-1- and AI-2-dependent QS in Vibrio. Genes specific to the AI-2 QS cascade—luxS, luxP and luxQ—were downregulated in the presence of 2 μg/ml HU-210 in wild-type BB120 and mutant BB152, whereas genes specific to the AI-1 cascade—luxM and luxN—were upregulated in wild-type BB120 and mutant strain MM30. Significant downregulation of AI-2 synthase luxS and master regulator luxR was only observed in mutant strain BB152 treated with HU-210 (Table 3). Results suggested that HU-210 can inhibit QS through the AI-2 cascade by inhibiting the production of AI-2 signal molecules through luxS. Furthermore, decreased expression of luxP and luxQ in mutant strain BB152 also suggested that the mechanism of action proceeds through these hybrid sensor kinases. As an outcome, there was less expression of luxR—the master regulator of QS target genes—resulting in suppressed activity of the AI-2-mediated QS cascade present in mutant strain BB152. This could also explain the specific inhibitory effect of HU-210 on bioluminescence, biofilm-forming ability and swimming motility of mutant strain BB152 observed throughout the study.
Bacteria communicate via QS using extracellular chemical signaling molecules. AI-2 used for QS signaling is found in both Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria. Recent studies have focused on finding small molecules analogous to AIs which can alter QS-regulated pathogenic behaviors and biofilm formation in bacteria . The action of cannabinoids on microbes and viruses has been documented . However their effect on bacterial QS pathways is unknown.
V. harveyi is one of the best-characterized model organisms for the study of QS [20, 21]. Therefore, we investigated the effect of the potent synthetic cannabinoid HU-210 on QS-regulated bioluminescence, biofilm formation and swimming motility of V. harveyi strains. Further research on cannabinoid–bacteria interactions will involve exploring more derivatives and their effects on other types of bacteria.
Our study focused mainly on the effect of HU-210 on QS-mediated pathways at concentrations below the minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC). Growth of V. harveyi strains was unaffected at all tested concentrations (0.2–200 μg/ml) of HU-210. In experiments with V. harveyi wild-type strain BB120 and mutant strains BB152 and MM30, HU-210 only significantly reduced bioluminescence of the mutant strain BB152. Strain BB152 is a HAI-1 synthase mutant and inhibition of its bioluminescence by HU-210 led us to postulate that this synthetic cannabinoid acts on the AI-2 mediated QS cascade. Using the bioluminescence reporter strain BB170 (Sensor-1−, Sensor-2+), we were able to address the specific inhibitory action of HU-210 on AI-2. The mutant BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) was incubated simultaneously with different doses of HU-210 and exogenous AI-1 and assessed for further effects of HU-210. Interestingly, exogenous AI-1 reversed HU-210 inhibition, indicating complementation by exogenous AI-1 for the dose-dependent effect of HU-210, except in samples with the highest tested HU-210 concentration (200 μg/ml). This could be because at the highest concentration (200 μg/ml), HU-210 strongly inhibited AI-2 activity (~95 % decrease) in BB152 and the observed bioluminescence production was due only to the excess exogenous AI-1 available at the time.
The plant kingdom is a well-known source of medicines, including numerous antimicrobial agents. Several other quorum-quenching molecules have been isolated from plants . For example, the plant constituent curcumin was recently shown to interfere with QS-mediated bioluminescence production in V. harveyi . Similarly, extracts of garlic have been shown to block QS of Pseudomonas aeruginosa , and vanilla extracts are capable of interfering with QS in Chromobacterium violaceum .
Previous studies have confirmed that biofilm formation is one of the primary attributes toward bacterial pathogenicity and that it is partially controlled by QS . Results of the present study suggest that HU-210 at the tested concentrations significantly inhibited the biofilm-forming capability of V. harveyi mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+). The amount of total biomass in the biofilm, determined by CV staining and DNA quantification, decreased with increasing concentration of HU-210. Since the inhibitory action of HU-210 was more prominent in the mutant strain BB152 (AI-1−, AI-2+) than in the other tested V. harveyi strains, HU-210 seems to interfere with the AI-2-dependent QS pathway, resulting in less QS and ultimately less biofilm formation. Results of the current study are consistent with previous observations made in Vibrio spp. wherein a pytochemical, resveratrol significantly reduced total biofilm bimoass .
The anti-biofilm effect of HU-210 was further confirmed by CLSM observation of biofilm architecture, showing a significant decrease in the depth of the biofilm formed by mutant BB152; however, there was no such effect on biofilm formed by wild-type strain BB120 or mutant strain MM30. The average thickness of the biofilm formed by these strains remained almost the same in HU-210-treated and untreated samples. The substantial reduction in biofilm thickness for strain BB152 was comparable to the result of a study in which S6-15, an extract from the marine bacterium Bacillus pumilus, was shown to be effective against biofilm formation in a wide range of Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria .
Bacterial motility is an important virulence factor in many pathogens. Some Vibrio spp. (including V. harveyi) possess dual flagellar systems that are suited to movement under different conditions . A recent study reported that QS enhances flagellar motility in pathogenic V. harveyi . To further investigate the effect of HU-210 on QS, we checked its possible impact on swimming motility of V. harveyi. The results indicated an inhibitory effect of HU-210 on QS via its restrictive effect on the motility of the wild type as well as mutant strains BB152 and MM30. Observations from this study fall in line with another study in which curcumin was shown to affect swimming motility of V. harveyi .
Biofilm formation is a developmental process due to changes in the structural and regulatory genes required at various steps of its formation [31–33]. To unveil the molecular basis of V. harveyi BB152 bioluminescence and biofilm inhibition by HU-210, we measured differential expression of genes regulating QS-phenotypes in the presence and absence of HU-210. In V. harveyi, the AI-2-mediated QS system is composed of LuxS, LuxP and LuxQ. LuxS is responsible for the synthesis of AI-2 . LuxP is a periplasmic protein that binds AI-2, and LuxQ is a hybrid sensor kinase. Lux R is the master regulator of all three parallel QS systems in V. harveyi . We observed less expression of luxS, luxP, luxQ and luxR in mutant strain BB152 treated with HU-210, suggesting that this cannabinoid interferes with AI-2 production, as well as with reception of these QS signals by sensor kinases, resulting in lower activity of LuxR and less activation of QS target genes. This notion is in agreement with several other reports showing disruption of QS-regulated gene expression in V. harveyi by halogenated furanone [35, 36].
It has been reported that three QS systems work in parallel, based on a coincidence detection scheme, to regulate different genes' expression in V. harveyi . We noticed that luxM (AI-1 producer) and luxN (hybrid sensor kinase which perceives AI-1) in wild-type BB120 as well as in mutant strain MM30 were upregulated in the presence of 2 μg/ml HU-210. It has been recently shown that in a growing wild-type V. harveyi culture, AI-2 synthesis is quickly followed by that of HAI-1 . Based on this knowledge, it becomes evident that the observed limited effect of HU-210 on wild-type BB120 bioluminescence and biofilm formation is a result of the coincidence detection scheme in which AI-1 of BB120 (AI-1+, AI-2+) complements the QS system when AI-2 activity is interfered with by HU-210.
The present study is the first report on the effect of a cannabinoid on QS-mediated processes, namely bioluminescence, biofilm formation and swimming motility of a bacterial species. The inhibitory action of HU-210 was found to proceed through AI-2 and it was the result of altered expression of genes involved in the AI-2 QS cascade. AI-2 is known as the "universal autoinducer" and interference in its activity opens a broad spectrum of applications for synthetic cannabinoids in future research with prokaryotes. Further investigations need to be carried out to establish the molecular aspects and mode of action of cannabinoids' effects on QS.
The synthetic cannabinoid HU-210 has an inhibitory effect on QS and QS-dependent properties, such as bioluminescence, biofilm formation and swimming motility of V. harveyi, without affecting its growth. Furthermore, HU-210's effect was found to proceed through the AI-2-mediated QS cascade. Results of the present study suggest a novel mode of action for synthetic cannabinoids on bacteria via the bacterial communication system, and potential use of cannabinoids as anti-QS agents.
V. harveyi wild-type and mutant strains (Table 1) were grown aerobically overnight at 30 °C in AB-medium. Bacterial strains were kindly provided by B. Bassler (Princeton University).
HU-210 was synthesized as described previously : m.p. 140–1 °C (from pentane), [α]D -227 (CHCl3), δ (CDCl3) 6.40, 6.25 (2 arom H's), 5.6 (C = CH), 4.09 (CH2–O). Stock solutions were prepared by dissolving 5 mg HU-210 in 250 μl of 100 % ethanol and stored at 4 °C until use. Working concentrations were prepared from the stock solutions by diluting with sterile AB-medium to final concentrations of 0.2–200 μg/ml.
V. harveyi wild-type strain BB120 was grown at 30 °C in the presence of HU-210 at concentrations ranging from 2–4 mg/ml in 96-well transparent plates (Nunc, Roskilde, Denmark). After 24 h of incubation, bacterial growth was determined by absorbance at 595 nm (OD595) (TECAN GENios reader, Schweiz, Austria). The MIC was recorded as the minimum concentration that exhibited visible growth inhibition and all further experiments were performed at sub-MIC .
QS regulates bioluminescence in V. harveyi . For the bioluminescence assay, V. harveyi overnight culture (O.D595 ~ 0.7) was diluted 1:200 in fresh AB-medium along with different concentrations of HU-210. After dilution, 180 μl bacterial culture was transferred to 96-well white plates with an optic bottom (Nunc) and the readings were taken using the GENios reader at 30 °C. Luminescence was measured every 30 min in parallel with absorbance measurement (OD595) for 18 h. Relative luminescence unit (the amount of luminescence per unit of growth) was calculated as the quotient of luminescence value and growth for each well. The area under the curve was calculated for each sample, compared with a control sample (without HU-210) and reported as a percentage [38, 40].
Biofilm biomass was quantified by CV staining as described previously  with slight modifications. Briefly, a 96-well polystyrene plate (Nunc) was seeded with 20 μl of V. harveyi overnight culture (O.D595 ~ 0.7) followed by addition of 160 μl AB-medium and 20 μl of HU-210 at different concentrations for biofilm growth. The plate was incubated for 24 h at 30 °C. Generated biofilms were washed carefully twice using 200 μl saline solution. The biofilms were stained with 200 μl of 0.1 % (w/v) CV (Merck, Darmstadt, Germany) solution for 20 min, then washed twice with saline and the stained biofilms were dried overnight at room temperature. Next, 33 % acetic acid was added to elute the CV for 60 min along with shaking at room temperature. The extract was transferred to a new 96-well plate and OD595 was measured using the GENios reader.
For biofilm growth, a polystyrene 48-well plate (Nunc) was seeded with 50 μl of V. harveyi overnight culture (O.D595 ~ 0.7) followed by addition of 400 μl AB-medium and 50 μl HU-210 at different concentrations. The plate was incubated for 24 h at 30 °C. Generated biofilms were washed carefully twice using 500 μl of saline solution.
DNA extraction and quantification were performed as described previously [42, 43]. Briefly, 160 μl NaOH (0.05 M) (Bio Lab Ltd., Jerusalem, Israel) and 40 μl DEPC-treated water (Bio Basic Canada Inc., Markham, Ontario, Canada) were added to each well. The plate was then immersed in a hot water bath for 1 h at 60 °C. Then, 18.5 μl Tris buffer (pH 7) (Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, NY, USA) was added to each well and extracted DNA samples were stored at −20 °C until further use.
DNA samples from different V. harveyi biofilms were quantified by qPCR with specific primers for 16S rRNA using an ABI prism instrument (Applied Biosystems Prism 7300, Foster City, CA, USA). The amount of DNA was quantified according to the specific standard curve. Total genomic DNA was extracted from an overnight culture of V. harveyi BB120 using GenElute Bacterial Genomic DNA kit (Sigma Aldrich, St. Louis, MO, USA) as per the manufacturer’s instructions. Extracted genomic DNA for the standard curve analysis was stored at −20 °C.
Bacterial cell viability, presence of EPS and depth of the biofilms grown as described above were examined by CLSM (Olympus Fluoview 300, Tokyo, Japan) with a UPLSA 10X/0.4 lens. The biofilm was formed by seeding 20 μl V. harveyi overnight culture (O.D595 ~ 0.7), 160 μl AB- medium and 20 μl of HU-210 at different concentrations in a 96-well plate (Nunc). The plate was incubated for 24 h at 30 °C under aerobic conditions. Biofilms were then washed carefully with saline solution and stained for 20 min at room temperature with different stains. Biofilms were washed again with saline solution before visualization under the microscope.
To examine cell viability, biofilms were stained with LIVE/DEAD BacLight fluorescent dye (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA, USA). SYTO9 fluorescence was measured using 488 nm excitation and 515 nm emission filters, and propidium iodide (PI) fluorescence was measured using 543 nm excitation and 570 nm emission filters (Olympus). EPS were stained with concanavalin A–Alexa Fluor 647 conjugates (Invitrogen Molecular Probes, Carlsbad, CA, USA). The biofilm depth was determined by acquiring optical sections at 5-μm spacing using a previously described method . Biofilm depth was examined at the center of each well and quantified as the distance between the highest and lowest section. Fluorescence intensity per unit area was calculated using Image J software (National Institutes of Health) for each color separately.
The swimming motility assay was performed on soft agar plates using a previously described method  with some modifications. Briefly, AB-medium with 0.2 % (w/v) agar was prepared and autoclaved. After cooling to 60 °C, different concentrations of HU-210 were added and the medium was poured into small petri dishes. After solidification, 3 μl V. harveyi overnight culture (O.D595 ~ 0.5) was inoculated at the center of the agar. Agar plates without HU-210 served as controls. The plates were incubated at 30 °C for 15 h, then the area of the motility halo was measured using Image J software and compared with controls.
V. harveyi wild-type BB120 and mutant strains MM30 and BB152 were grown overnight planktonically with and without (control) 2 μg/ml HU-210. V. harveyi overnight culture (200 μl; O.D595 ~ 0.7) was added in triplicate to a 12-well polystyrene plate (Nunc) along with 1.6 ml AB-medium and 200 μl HU-210 (2 μg/ml). The plate was incubated for 24 h at 30 °C under aerobic conditions. Following incubation, the bacterial culture in each well was mixed vigorously and transferred to 10-ml tubes. Further RNA extraction was performed using a previously described method . Briefly, 2 ml of RNA Protect (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) was added to each tube, mixed well and incubated at room temperature for 5 min. Cells were harvested and DNA-free RNA was isolated using the RNeasy MINI kit (Qiagen) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. RNA purity and quantity were determined using Nanodrop (Nanovue, GE Healthcare Life Sciences, Buckinghamshire, UK). RNA integrity was determined using a bioanalyzer (Agilent, Santa Clara, CA, USA) and the samples were stored at −80 °C for later use.
Reverse transcription was performed with the SuperScript™ First-Strand Synthesis Kit (Invitrogen, Life Technologies) in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
The synthesized cDNA was used for real-time PCR analysis with specific primers for the genes examined in this study. The RT-PCR was performed as described previously . The PCR thermal profile included an initial denaturation at 95 °C for 10 min, followed by a 40-cycle amplification consisting of denaturation at 95 °C for 15 s and annealing and extension at 60 °C for 1 min.
As an additional control for each primer pair and each RNA sample, the cDNA synthesis reaction was performed in the absence of reverse transcriptase in order to check for contamination with residual genomic DNA. The expression levels of all genes tested by real-time PCR were normalized to the 16S rRNA gene of V. harveyi as an internal standard. There was no significant difference in the expression of the 16S rRNA gene for the two conditions and samples. Fold change of transcription level was calculated using ABI Prism 7300 SDS Software v1.1 with RQ Study 1.0 (Applied Biosystems) [43, 45].
Experiments were performed independently three times in triplicate and the data were analyzed statistically using Student's t test, with a P value of less than 0.05 considered significant.
We would like to thank members of the Steinberg laboratory, especially Danielle Assaf-Duanis, for helpful discussions.
DS performed all of the experimental work and wrote the manuscript. RS, AB and RM contributed reagents. *DS initiated and followed the study. All authors reviewed the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Docket No. 83890, (Calendar No. 9).
Argued October 5, 1989.Decided March 20, 1990.
York & Dolan, P.C. (by John A. Dolan), for the plaintiff.
Anthony & Hearsch (by Francis J. Hearsch, Jr., and Eileen K. Smith) for the defendants.
May, Gowing, Simpson & Strote (by Thomas C. Simpson and Allison D. Daniels) for the Real Property Law Section, State Bar of Michigan.
The issue before us is whether a person who holds title to real property with another as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship"  may convey a life estate interest without the consent of the cotenant. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was correct in enjoining such a transfer. We disagree.
On October 14, 1977, certain commercial property in Macomb County was conveyed to Carol Allen and Helen Albro "as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship." On April 23, 1987, Carol Allen entered into a purchase agreement with Steven Kinzer, in which she agreed to convey her interest in the property to Kinzer by quitclaim deed.
On May 12, 1987, Helen Albro instituted an action to enjoin sale of Allen's interest. Both Allen and Kinzer were named as defendants. Upon institution of the action, a temporary restraining order was entered enjoining the sale.
Both Albro and Kinzer filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Albro and permanently enjoined Allen and Kinzer from completing the pending sale, and further enjoined Allen "from any transfer, conveyance, sale or alienation of such property without the consent and approval of Helen R. Albro...." The trial court in its opinion noted the general rule that "one joint tenant can transfer his or her undivided interest in the estate to a third person, who becomes a tenant in common with the other joint tenant," thus destroying the survivorship feature. However, the court stated that "where property stands in the name of joint tenants with the right of survivorship, neither party may transfer title to the premises and deprive the other of such right of survivorship." The court found that  the sale of Allen's interest would create a tenancy in common and necessarily deprive Albro of her right of survivorship.
The Court of Appeals described the interest held by Albro and Allen as "a joint life estate followed by a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor." 170 Mich App 238, 240; 428 NW2d 34 (1988). The Court of Appeals found that the contingent remainder was alienable, and that Allen could "lawfully alienate her future contingent interest in fee" without destroying Albro's right of survivorship. Id., p 242. However, the Court of Appeals held that Allen could not alienate her interest in the joint life estate, since "by operation of law, any alienation would convert the joint life estate to a tenancy in common, thereby defeating the survivorship element of the joint life estate." Id., p 241.
Kinzer sought leave to appeal in this Court, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Allen could not transfer her interest in the joint life estate. We granted leave on that issue, 432 Mich 892 (1989). The alienability of the contingent remainder is not before us.
Michigan law recognizes two forms of joint tenancies. The first is of the type typically recognized in various jurisdictions. This joint tenancy is characterized by the four unities, that is, unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed), § 418, p 196. Each joint tenant shares in possession of the entire estate, and each is entitled to an undivided share of the whole. 4A Powell, Real Property, ¶ 617, p 51-9. The principal characteristic  of the joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. Upon the death of one joint tenant, the surviving tenant or tenants take the whole estate. Tiffany, supra, § 419, p 198. In the standard joint tenancy, the right of survivorship may be destroyed by severance of the joint tenancy. Id., p 199. The joint tenancy may be severed by an act of the parties, by conveyance by either party, or by levy and sale on an execution against one of the parties. Smith v Smith, 290 Mich 143; 287 NW 411 (1939). If one joint tenant conveys his interest to a third party, then the remaining joint tenant and the grantee become tenants in common, thus destroying the element of survivorship. Powell, supra, ¶ 618, p 51-14; Tiffany, supra, § 425, p 209.
The "joint tenancy" involved in this case, while unfortunately sharing the same appellation as the typical joint tenancy, is an interest of a different nature. It is created by express words of survivorship in the granting instrument in addition to those creating a joint tenancy, such as "and to the survivor of them," Schulz v Brohl, 116 Mich 603, 605; 74 NW 1012 (1898); "to them and the survivor of them," Finch v Haynes, 144 Mich 352, 355; 107 NW 910 (1906); "or survivor of them," Jones v Snyder, 218 Mich 446, 447; 188 NW 505 (1922); "with right of survivorship," Ballard v Wilson, 364 Mich 479, 481; 110 NW2d 751 (1961); Mannausa v Mannausa, 374 Mich 6, 8; 130 NW2d 900 (1964); "with full rights of survivorship," Jones v Green, 126 Mich App 412, 413; 337 NW2d 85 (1983).
At the crux of this case is the distinction between the "joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship" and the ordinary joint tenancy. The "joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship" is comprised of a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. See 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law, § 9.11, p 274. While the survivorship  feature of the ordinary joint tenancy may be defeated by the act of a cotenant, the dual contingent remainders of the "joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship" are indestructible. A cotenant's contingent remainder cannot be destroyed by an act of the other cotenant.
The joint life estate with dual contingent remainders was first recognized in Schulz v Brohl, supra. In Schulz, the interest created by a deed to Peter Brohl and Christine Schulz "and to the survivor of them" was described as "a moiety to each [party] for life, with remainder to the survivor in fee." 116 Mich 605. Peter conveyed his interest to a third party, Joseph Brohl, reserving a life estate. Subsequent to Peter's death, Christine Schulz brought an action to quiet title. The Court held in her favor, stating that "[n]either grantee could convey the estate so as to cut off the remainder." Id. The question of a transfer of the life estate was not at issue, since Peter did not attempt to transfer his life estate, instead reserving it to himself.
In Finch v Haynes, supra, land was deeded to Cora Finch and Nellie Haynes "and the survivor of them." The Court again characterized the interest created as "a moiety to each [party] for life, with remainder to the survivor in fee." Id., p 354. Nellie quitclaimed her interest in the land to her husband, John Haynes. Subsequent to Nellie's death, Cora Finch brought an action to quiet title. The Court noted that if the deed had merely made the parties "joint tenants of the fee," either of them could by conveyance deprive the other of the right of survivorship. Id., p 355. However, where the parties were "joint tenants for life with a contingent remainder in fee to the one who survives," id., quoting 1 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed), § 866, the Court held that "no joint tenant  [could], by his conveyance or otherwise, affect the right of survivorship." Id., p 355. The question of the transfer of Nellie's life estate was not at issue, and could not have been, for upon the death of the original holder of the "joint life estate," Cora Finch's contingent remainder was realized, and she acquired title in fee.
In Jones v Snyder, supra, this Court construed a deed to Melvin Root and to Jared, Susan, and Flora Snyder "and to the survivors or survivor of them," as creating in the grantees a "joint tenancy for life ... with a contingent remainder in fee simple to the survivor," id., pp 447, 449. Root conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the property to Julia Jones. By the time Jones brought suit for partition, only Flora Snyder survived of the original grantees. The Court held in favor of Flora Snyder. Again, however, the Court was not required to decide whether Jones had acquired a life estate in the land by virtue of the conveyance from Root, for, upon the death of all of the other original cotenants, Flora Snyder acquired the land in fee.
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized that the express words of survivorship create a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders, Butler v Butler, 122 Mich App 361, 364; 332 NW2d 488 (1983); ("joint life estate in all of the grantees followed by a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor"); In re Ledwidge Estate, 136 Mich App 603, 607; 358 NW2d 18 (1984) ("moiety to the joint tenants for life with remainder to the survivor in fee"); Albro v Allen, 170 Mich App 240 ("joint life estate followed by a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor").
The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the interest held by Allen and Albro was a "joint life estate followed by a contingent remainder in  fee to the survivor," id., but it erred when it applied the rules governing ordinary joint tenancies to this case. We do not agree with the conclusion that "by operation of law, any alienation would convert the joint life estate to a tenancy in common, thereby defeating the survivorship element of the joint life estate." Id., p 241. Were this an ordinary joint tenancy, conveyance of one party's interest would indeed convert the tenancy into a tenancy in common, thus destroying the survivorship element of the joint tenancy. Powell, supra. However, where the interest held is a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders, the principles governing ordinary joint tenancies are not controlling.
"[T]his is a completely different interest from the joint tenancy of the common law. A true joint tenant could sever the joint tenancy by conveying his interest to a third party and thus defeat the survivorship." Agnor, Joint Tenancy in Georgia, 3 Ga S B J 29, 30 (1966). Since a contingent remainder is indestructible, however, the right of survivorship in a joint account cannot be destroyed by "severance."
Thus, the court held that a conveyance of one party's interest operated to convey only his life estate and contingent remainder.
What is abundantly clear upon review of the case law concerning the joint life estate with dual contingent remainders, in Michigan and in other jurisdictions, is that a contingent remainder cannot be destroyed by any act by the holder of the preceding life estate. However, this Court has not before today considered whether a cotenant's alienation of his interest in the joint life estate will necessarily destroy the contingent remainder.
The plaintiff urges that we should conclude that, since alienation of the life estate would destroy the contingent remainder, the life estate may not be alienated. The plaintiff's position rests on the  assumption that the joint life estate with dual contingent remainders is governed by the same rules governing ordinary joint tenancies, i.e., that conveyance by one cotenant will destroy the right of survivorship. But the estate at hand is not an ordinary joint tenancy; we would only confound the rules governing each interest were we to treat the joint life estate with dual contingent remainders as an ordinary joint tenancy. Instead, we should apply the principles which normally govern the component parts of the joint life estate with dual contingent remainders.
The principle that life estates are transferable, together with the rule that an expectant estate may not be defeated by alienation of the precedent estate, leads us to conclude that a person sharing a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders may convey his interest in the joint life estate, without destroying the cotenant's contingent remainder.
We find that a rule prohibiting the alienation of the joint life estate would be contrary to the settled principle that life estates are transferable, Ferris v Poucher, supra; In re McBride's Estate, supra. Moreover, Michigan recognizes a strong public policy against restraints on alienation. Mandlebaum v McDonell, 29 Mich 787 (1874); Braun v Klug, 335 Mich 691; 57 NW2d 299 (1953). Of course, a cotenant in a joint life estate cannot convey an estate which will extend beyond his own estate, Tiffany, supra, § 59, p 85. The interest which Allen held in the joint life estate was limited by the dual contingent remainders; the joint life estate would terminate upon the death of Allen or Albro, whichever occurred sooner. Thus, Allen could convey to Kinzer an undivided interest in the joint life estate, to terminate at the death of either of the original cotenants.
The plaintiff protests that "sound policy considerations" support a prohibition on alienation of the joint life estate held by Allen. The plaintiff contends that since the remedy of partition is not available to those holding a "joint tenancy with rights of survivorship," then alienation may "cast upon the remaining co-tenant an unwanted or impractical co-tenant," without the remedy of partition which would be available in an ordinary joint tenancy. It is true that this Court has denied partition to parties holding joint life estates with dual contingent remainders, Ames v Cheyne, 290 Mich 215; 287 NW 439 (1939).
We agree with the plaintiff that it would be anomalous to allow the conveyance of one cotenant's interest in a joint life estate when Michigan law bars partition between the remaining cotenant and the grantee. While the principles of concurrent ownership have never guaranteed amiability between cotenants — in both an ordinary joint tenancy and a tenancy in common, an original cotenant may find himself sharing possession as tenant in common with a stranger after a conveyance by the former cotenant — the remedy of partition is available if cotenants cannot get along. Today we reconsider the rule against partition of a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders, and we conclude that the "joint life estate" element may be partitioned without doing violence to the contingent remainders.
 In Ames v Cheyne, supra, this Court, enforcing an oral contract, held that "[w]here property stands in the name of joint tenants with the right of survivorship, neither party may transfer the title to the premises and deprive the other of such right of survivorship." Id., p 218. The Court concluded without further discussion that the plaintiff could not have partition. Id.
 This Court in Mannausa v Mannausa, supra, approvingly cited both Ames and Ballard, but was not called upon to consider the question of partition.
An action for partition has as its object the distribution of possession between those entitled to possession. Metcalfe v Miller, 96 Mich 459; 56 NW 16 (1893); Fox v Greene, 289 Mich 179, 185; 286 NW 203 (1939). Partition may be accomplished voluntarily by cotenants or by judicial action. Powell, supra, ¶ 607, , pp 50-42 to 50-50. Physical division of the jointly held property is the preferred method of partition. Id., ¶ 607, p 50-50. "Normally a physical division of the property confers upon each cotenant his respective fractional portion of the land." Id., p 50-52. Where such a division results in inequalities in owners' shares, the court may award money payments to offset the difference. Id., p 50-53. Although partition in kind is favored, the court may also order sale and division of the proceeds when it concludes that an equitable physical division cannot be achieved. Id., ¶ 607, p 50-54.
We now turn to the question of partition of a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. The dual contingent remainders are not subject to partition because they are not possessory estates,  MCL 600.3308; MSA 27A.3308. Thus, the question becomes whether the parties' joint life estate is subject to partition. In Metcalfe v Miller, supra, p 462, this Court held that partition could be had as between owners of life estates. Of course, the partition is of a duration no longer than the duration of the estate which is partitioned. Id., p 460. In Rendle v Wiemeyer, 374 Mich 30; 131 NW2d 45 (1964), the Court considered a situation in which one of several life tenants instituted partition proceedings, and partition of the entire estate was ordered, without reference to the fact that the party seeking partition held a life estate only. The Court held that "the proceedings could not partition what the parties did not have," and were "void as to the remaindermen...." Id., p 40. In other words, the remainders which followed the life estate were unaffected by partition of that estate.
Courts in other jurisdictions generally hold that joint life estates are subject to partition. The purpose of such partition is to allow each life tenant "to have, use, and enjoy his or her part during the term of such life interest...." Wright v Conner, 200 Ga 413, 416; 37 SE2d 353 (1946). Partition between cotenants of a life estate will not affect the remainder. Willhite v Rathburn, 332 Mo 1208, 1216-1217; 61 SW2d 708 (1933). See also Whittaker v Porter, 321 Ill 368; 151 NE 905 (1926) (a life estate held as a tenancy in common may be partitioned); Snapp v Gallehue, 333 Ill 138, 142-143; 164 NE 222 (1928) (partition may be had of a common life estate); Rupp v Molitor, 320 Mo 938; 9 SW2d 609 (1928) (a life estate held by two persons, each  with an undivided one-half, may be partitioned); Cottingham v Love, 211 Ala 152; 99 So 907 (1924) (a life tenant to an undivided interest in land was entitled to partition).
The common law conferred this remedy upon joint tenants, tenants in common, owners of estates for life or years, and owners of estates in which some of the cotenants held for term of life or years and others held estates of inheritance. A prerequisite was an estate in possession, and none but parties having such estates were bound by the judgment, but the partition did not affect estates in remainder or contingency. Tenants of estates in remainder were not permitted to interfere with tenants in possession, but tenants in possession had power to compel partition confined to their particular estates but could do nothing towards effecting a severance of estates in remainder or reversion. It was the rule at common law and under the English statutes that estates of remainder or reversion could not be divided by proceedings for compulsory partition.
We find this summary of the common law persuasive; it is consistent with Michigan authority that life estates may be partitioned, Metcalfe, supra, and that partition of a life estate will not affect the estate in remainder, Rendle, supra. Thus, we hold that the joint life estate element of such a cotenancy may be partitioned without affecting the contingent remainders. The retention of the rule against partition would be anomalous in view of our holding today that a party may  alienate his undivided interest in a joint life estate. We expressly overrule those cases holding that a "joint tenancy with right of survivorship" may not be partitioned.
The interest which was conveyed by the deed to Carol Allen and Helen Albro "as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship" was a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. The contingent remainder of either cotenant may not be destroyed by any act of the other. Thus, we hold that either cotenant may transfer her interest in the joint life estate and such a transfer has no effect on the contingent remainders. Upon the death of either of the original cotenants, the other cotenant, or any person to whom she has transferred her contingent remainder, takes the whole estate. We further hold that the joint life estate may be partitioned without affecting the contingent remainders.
We reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals decision which would preclude transfer of a cotenant's interest in a joint life estate, and remand the case to the trial court to modify its order of permanent injunctive relief pursuant to this decision.
RILEY, C.J., and LEVIN, BRICKLEY, CAVANAGH, ARCHER, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J.
 In Michigan, MCL 565.49; MSA 26.565 abolishes the requirements of unities of time and title.
 If Allen predeceases Albro, then, upon Allen's death, Albro's contingent remainder will be realized and she will acquire title to the land in fee. If Albro predeceases Allen, then Allen's contingent remainder, which was transferred to Kinzer, will be realized and Kinzer will acquire the land in fee.
 The interest of a tenant in common is fully alienable, Powell, supra, ¶ 602, p 50-13. A cotenant in an ordinary joint tenancy may also transfer his interest to a stranger, resulting in a tenancy in common between the original cotenant and the grantee. Id., ¶ 618, p 51-14. A tenant in common has the right to compel partition, id., ¶ 607, p 50-40, as does a cotenant in an ordinary joint tenancy. Id., ¶ 619, p 51-18.
 Final Report of Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision, Parts I & II, § 27.2, p 227 (1960); committee comment to 1961 PA 236, § 3304, effective January 1, 1963 (MCL 600.3304; MSA 27A.3304).
 Pursuant to the statutory language, a person holding only a contingent remainder may not maintain an action for partition. A person holding both a life estate and a future interest may have partition of the life estate only, absent a statute authorizing partition of future interests. Powell, supra, ¶ 607, p 50-44.
 In Michigan, the common law prevails unless abrogated by statute. Myers v Genesee Co Auditor, 375 Mich 1; 133 NW2d 190 (1965); Bugbee v Fowle, 277 Mich 485, 492; 269 NW 570 (1936).
 We do not disturb Ames and Ballard, supra, to the extent that they bar partition of the right of survivorship. See n 5 and accompanying text.


text:
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Paul is recognized as a leading tax controversy adviser in the International Tax Review 2017 Tax Controversy Leaders guide. He has authored several important works on US and international tax issues and is widely sought as a speaker and presenter at professional tax seminars and symposia. With the Tax Executives Institute, Paul organizes the annual Tax Controversy Seminar in Silicon Valley. In addition to sharing his knowledge at professional programs, he has taught international tax classes as an adjunct professor at the LLM level. Prior to joining Mayer Brown in 2003, Paul practiced in Washington DC and San Francisco with two other prominent international law firms.
Bare Escentuals, Inc. v. Commissioner, Tax Court Docket No. 030729-15 (deduction for domestic production activities; settled in 2017).
Save Mart Supermarkets v. City of Oakland, No. RG10514461 (2011) (retroactive taxation of real property transfers under Measure H).
Flextronics America, LLC, as Alternative Agent Pursuant to Treas. Reg. §1.1502-77A(e)(4)(ii) for C-MAC Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries Consolidated Group v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo 2010-24, (basis in acquired inventory).
United Parcel Service of America v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g and remanding, T.C. Memo. 1999-268, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999) (vacating Tax Court’s finding on sham, assignment of income and penalties).
Amp, Inc. v. United States,492 F Supp 27 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998), rev’d by 185 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (taxpayer entitled to additional foreign tax credits).
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,109 T.C. 100 (1997), aff’d by 177 F.3d 136 (3d. Cir. 1990) (NOL computations for life and non-life insurance groups).

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This matter is a petition for habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, a prisoner in federal custody at USP-Leavenworth, proceeds pro se. The Court has screened his Petition (Doc. 1) under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and dismisses this action for the following reasons.
Petitioner was sentenced by Judge Roger L. Hunt in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada on October 2, 2008, after pleading guilty on May 28, 2008. USA v. Ali, Case No. 2:06-cr-00160-APG-RJJ (D. Nev.) (Docs. 63, 68). Petitioner appealed the judgment on October 8, 2008, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal “in light of the valid appeal waiver” on June 2, 2009. Id. at Docs. 72, 84. On June 2, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion under § 2255. Id. at Doc. 95. Judge Hunt denied the § 2255 motion on November 17, 2010. Id. at Doc. 106. Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his § 2255 motion, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his request for a certificate of appealability on December 20, 2011. Id. at 114. Petitioner filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied by Judge Hunt, and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at Doc. 135.
A federal prisoner seeking release from allegedly illegal confinement may file a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A motion under § 2255 must be filed in the district where the petitioner was convicted and sentence imposed. Sines v. Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010). This remedy is normally the only means to challenge a federal conviction after the direct appeal is resolved. Brace v. United States, 634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2011). However, under the “savings clause” in § 2255(e), a federal prisoner may file an application for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of confinement if the petitioner demonstrates that the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
Petitioner has not shown a compelling reason that might justify the use of § 2241 to test the legality of his confinement. “Only in rare instances will § 2255 fail as an adequate or effective remedy to challenge a conviction or the sentence imposed.” Sines, 609 F.3d at 1073. A petitioner does not present one of these rare instances “simply by asserting his ability to file a § 2255 motion is barred by timing or filing restrictions.” Crawford v. United States, 650 F. App'x 573, 575 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Sines, 609 F.3d at 1073; Haynes v. Maye, 529 F. App'x 907, 910 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (noting fact that § 2255 motion is time-barred doesn't render § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is the inefficacy of the [§ 2255] remedy, not a personal inability to utilize it, that is determinative, and appellant's difficulty here is simply that his circumstances preclude him from invoking it.”).
Petitioner suggests that his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate because the sentencing judge, Judge Roger L. Hunt, was biased and did not recuse until 2016. Courts have held that a petitioner's suggestion of judicial bias is not sufficient to find that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a petitioner's detention.
In Prost, we held that “[t]he relevant metric or measure” in applying the savings clause of § 2255(e) “is whether a petitioner's argument challenging the legality of his detention could have been tested in an initial § 2255 motion.” 636 F.3d at 584. “If a petitioner's argument challenging the legality of his detention could've been tested in a § 2255 motion, the clause is satisfied.” Id. (emphasis in original). “In this way, the clause is concerned with process-ensuring the petitioner an opportunity to bring his argument-not with substance-guaranteeing nothing about what the opportunity promised will ultimately yield in terms of relief.” Id. (emphasis in original). In other words, “[t]he ultimate result may be right or wrong as a matter of substantive law, but the savings clause is satisfied so long as the petitioner had an opportunity to test his claim.” Id. at 585.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Kapordelis's attempt to rely on the savings clause, finding that he was not deprived of the adequate and effective opportunity to test the legality of his detention in his initial § 2255 motion, where he had raised the bias claims in a prior § 2241 action and in his § 2255 proceeding, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Id.; see also Meltcalf v. Masters, 2015 WL 5031614, at *3 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 6, 2015) (“The fact that these claims were unsuccessfully raised in the petitioner's prior federal proceedings, notwithstanding his contentions that the Michigan district court and the Sixth Circuit are ‘biased, ' is not a sufficient basis upon which to find that section 2255 is ‘inadequate' or ‘ineffective' to test the legality of the petitioner's detention.”), adopted 2015 WL 5031557 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 25, 2015), aff'd 633 F. App'x 586 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016); Barnett v. Ebbert, 535 F. App'x 70, 72 (3rd Cir. 2013) (alleged judicial bias does not render section 2255 inadequate or ineffective and is not a basis for a section 2241 petition)).