Oregon has a primarily student-based funding formula. It assigns a cost to the education of a student with no special needs or services, called a base amount. It then accounts for the additional cost of educating specific categories of students both through program-specific grants and by applying multipliers to the base amount to generate supplemental funding for certain students.
The categories of students generating supplemental funding in Oregon are English-language learners, low-income students, and students with disabilities. Services for students enrolled in career and technical education programs and in small and remote schools are provided through program-specific allocations.
Oregon has a fixed base funding amount per student. For FY2018, the per-student base funding amount was $4,500.
This means that an average student with no special needs or disadvantages would, in theory, be funded at that level. However, no student is actually funded at this level, because the base amount for each district is adjusted to reflect the district’s staff costs. This adjustment is based on the “Teacher Experience Difference,” which is the amount by which the average of the number of years of teacher experience in the district exceeds that average statewide. This amount, which may be positive or negative, is multiplied by $25 and added to the $4,500 base to create a new, district-specific per-student base amount.
After teacher experience adjustments are made, the new base amounts are adjusted by a ratio that ensures that all money appropriated for the formula will distributed to school districts. In FY2018, the statewide average base funding level was $7,680.
Michael Elliott, Program Analyst, School Finance and School Facilities, email message to EdBuild, August 24, 2017.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 327.013 (Lexis 2017).
Oregon expects school districts to contribute revenue to the funding of public schools. The amount each district is expected to raise for its education costs is based on its property values and its revenue from other local sources. Each district is expected to contribute the lesser of a rate that differs by county in a way that is related to the county’s historical tax rates, or $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value. Each district is also required to contribute revenue from other local sources, such as revenue from federal and state lands.
The state expects districts to contribute revenue received from a number of other sources, including federal forest reserve revenues, revenue from state managed forest lands, and revenues from state lands dedicated to public schools, called the Common School Fund. Once the state calculates the total amount of funding necessary to educate students within a district, it subtracts the expected local contribution and provides the difference in the form of state education aid.
O.R. Const. art. XI, § 11b (Lexis 2017).
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327.011 (Lexis 2017).
Oregon sets a ceiling for local property tax rates, and a level above which voter approval is required. School districts are limited to a tax rate that differs by county. However, school districts may exceed this limit with voter approval to impose a rate of up to $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value.
School districts in Oregon face two restrictions in property tax rates they may impose: a maximum rate that differs by county in a way that is related to the county’s historical tax rates, and a constitutional limitation of $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value for the purpose of funding its schools. If a school district’s limit based on assessed local property wealth is lower than $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value, school districts may exceed this limit with voter approval, to impose a rate up to $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value. If a school district’s limit based on assessed local property wealth exceeds $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value, it is limited at $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value.
School districts may exceed the constitutional limit of $5.00 for every $1,000 of real market value to issue general obligation bonds and impose an additional tax on newly constructed properties to fund capital improvements. The tax on new construction is limited to a certain percentage per square foot on both residential and non-residential property and a dollar maximum per non-residential property. In FY2018, this tax was limited to $1.00 per square foot for new residential properties, and $0.63 per square foot for non-residential properties, and $31,400 in total per non-residential property.
Or. Const. art. XI, § 11b (Lexis 2017).
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 320.170 (Lexis 2017).
School districts in Oregon receive local revenue only from property taxes.
Oregon does not differentiate funding based on students’ grade levels.
Oregon provides increased funding to English-language learners (ELLs). It does so by applying a multiplier of 1.5 to the base per-pupil amount for these students.
The total funding generated for any one student who is receiving services for a disability and is also an ELL is capped at three times the base amount. This cap does not currently have practical effect but could if the legislature increased the multiplier for either category of student need.
Additionally, Oregon has an English Language Learner Improvement Fund, an appropriation that supports technical assistance for and oversight of districts that are not providing adequate ELL services to their students. Funding for this program was $6.25 million in FY2018.
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327.013 (Lexis 2017).
Oregon provides increased funding for students from low-income households. It does so by applying a multiplier of 1.25 to the base per-pupil amount for these students.
The number of students eligible for supplemental funding is determined using the United States Census Bureau’s Small Area Income Poverty Estimate, which gives an estimate of the number of school-aged children in families below the federal poverty level for each district in the state. The same level of supplemental funding is also provided for students in foster homes and for students in state-recognized facilities for neglected and delinquent children, based on reporting from the Department of Human Services.
The state also mandates that all students eligible for reduced-price lunch under the National School Lunch Program be given free lunch, and it allocates funds to districts to cover this cost.
Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327.013 (Lexis 2017).
Oregon funds special education using a single student weight system, providing the same amount of state funding for each student with disabilities, regardless of the severity of those disabilities. It does so by applying a multiplier of 2.0 to the per-student base amount for students with disabilities.
However, the percentage of enrollment that can be funded using this multiplier may not exceed 11%. Above that prevalence threshold, students with disabilities are funded using a lower multiplier determined by the Department of Education. Additionally, the state provides partial reimbursements for the education of students whose approved special education costs exceed $30,000.
The remainder of state special education funding is distributed through specific program-based allocations, including the Oregon School for the Deaf; hospital programs, day treatment programs, and residential treatment programs for children with disabilities; regional services provided to children with low-incidence disabilities; evaluation services to determine eligibility for special-needs services; and matching grants for Medicaid dollars secured by the district to support services provided to children with disabilities. The speech pathology program and skilled nursing facilities are supported by separate state funding streams.
Elliott, Michael. Funding Oregon’s Future. Salem, OR: Oregon Department of Education, 2015.
Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327-013 (Lexis 2017).
Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327-023 (Lexis 2017).
Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327-035 (Lexis 2017).
Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327-348 (Lexis 2017).
Oregon does not provide increased funding for gifted and talented students.
However, the state does appropriate $150,000 annually for a Talented and Gifted staff member at the state level to provide districts with technical assistance.
Oregon provides increased funding for career and technical education (CTE) programs. It does so through competitive grants.
The Oregon Department of Education offers a competitive grant program each biennium to enhance collaboration between education providers and employers for new or existing CTE programs of study. School districts may request up to $350,000 and collaborations involving multiple districts may request up to $450,000. In considering applications, the state prioritizes CTE summer programs for students at the middle school level, because the state had previously funded a CTE program for middle-schoolers.
Oregon provides increased funding for small and remote elementary schools and for small high schools. In both cases, it does so through a supplemental per-student amount calculated through a formula that considers school enrollment and the number of grades served by the school, with the elementary school formula also considering the remoteness of the school. Small high schools also receive an additional supplemental grant.
In order to qualify for remote elementary school funding, an elementary school must have no more than an average of twenty-eight students in each grade served, and the school must be located more than eight miles from the nearest other elementary school. In order to qualify for small high school funding, a high school must be in a district with less than 8,500 students and must have an enrollment of fewer than 350 students if the school has four grades, or 267 if the school only serves three grades.
The state appropriates $2.5 million annually for the small high schools supplemental grant. The funding is divided among the qualifying schools in amounts proportional to their enrollment.
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327.077 (Lexis 2017).
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327.357 (Lexis 2017).


text:
The laboratory was established in 1996. The Head of the laboratory is V. Shkumatov, D.Sc, Professor, Correspondent member of the NAS of Belarus.
combined ultrasonic-enzymatic thrombolysis, use of enzymes in replacement therapy.
molecular mechanisms of pulsed low- frequency ultrasonic effect on the precursor molecules and active forms of several enzymes have been discovered in the development of a new ultrasonic-enzymatic treatment of thromboembolic conditions.
technology for proddction new medicinal form of the cardiac drug on the basis of phosphocreatine, kits of reagents for enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for determination of troponins and markers ofpathology of immune and allergic disorders developed in collaboration with JV Co.Ltd «Farmlend».
Revealing of novel affine interactions of NBD-labeled fluorescent steroids with bacterial steroid–converting oxidoreductases using molecular docking/ Ya.V. Faletrov, E.V. Rudaya, H.V. Hlushko, I.P. Edimecheva, V.M. Shkumatov // 50th FEBS EMBO 2014 Conference «From molecular mechanisms to Cellular Functions», 30 Aug - 4 Sep 2014, Paris, France / FEBS J. – 2014. – Vol. 281(Suppl. 1). – P. 638.
Faletrov YV, Bialevich KI, Edimecheva IP, Kostsin DG, Rudaya EV, Slobozhanina EI, Shkumatov VM. 22-NBD-cholesterol as a novel fluorescent substrate for cholesterol-converting oxidoreductases //J. Steroid Biochem Mol Biol. – 2013. - Vol.134. – P. 59-66.
Cherniavsky E.A., Strakha I.S., Adzerikho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. Ultrasound-assisted fibrinogen and fibrin proteolysis// Advances in Medicine and Biology, Vol.40 // Ed. L.V. Berhardt. – Nova Science Publishers, 2013. - P.281-296. (ISBN: 978-1-62100-421-9).
Mauersberger S., Novikova L.A., Shkumatov V.M. Cytochrome P450 expression in Yarrowia lipolytica and its use in steroid biotransformation // Yarrowia lipolytica, Microbiology Monographs 25 // Ed. G. Barth. – Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. – P. 171-226.
Ya.V. Faletrov, N.S. Frolova, E.V. Rudaya, D.G. Kostin, E.I. Slobozhanina, and V.M. Shkumatov 22-NBD-cholesterol, a new fluorescent substrate ofbacterial cholesterol-oxidases // Chem. Nat. Comp. – 2012. - Vol. 48, №. 1. – P. 172-173.
Cherniavsky E.A., Strakha I.S., Adzerikho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. Ultrasound-assisted fibrinogen and fibrin proteolysis// Advances in Medicine and Biology, Vol.40 // Ed. L.V. Berhardt. – Nova Science Publishers, 2012. (ISBN: 978-1-62100-421-9).
Cherniavsky E.A., Strakha I.S., Adzerikho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. Ultrasound-assisted fibrinogen and fibrin proteolysis// Advances in Medicine and Biology, Vol.40 // Ed. L.V. Berhardt. – Nova Science Publishers. - 2012. - P. 281-296.
Cherniavsky E.A., Strakha I.S., Adzerikho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. Effects of low frequency ultrasound on some properties of fibrinogen and its plasminolysis // BMC Biochemistry – 2011 – 12:60.
N.V. Loginova, T.V. Koval’chuk, Y.V. Faletrov, Y.S. Halauko, N.P. Osipovich, G.I. Polozov, R.A. Zheldakova, A.T. Gres, A.S. Halauko, I.I. Azarko, V.M. Shkumatov, O.I. Shadyro / Redox-active metal(II) complexes of sterically hindered phenolic ligands: Antibacterial activity and reduction of cytochrome c. Part II. Metal(II) complexes of o-diphenol derivatives of thioglycolic acid // Polyhedron. – 2011. – V. 30. – P. 2581–2591.
Cherniavsky, E.A. The extraction effect of ultrasound during plasma clot disruption / Cherniavsky E.A., Adzerikho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. // Biochemistry (Moscow). Suppl. B: Biomed. Chem. – 2009. – Vol.3, № 2. – P. 164-171.
Loginova N.V., Faletrov Y.V., Koval’chuk T.V., Osipovich N.P., Polozov G.I., Chernyavskaja A.A., Zheldakova R.A., Azarko I.I., Gres’ A.T., Shadyro O.I., Shkumatov V.M. / Redox-active metal (II) complexes of sterically hindered phenolic ligands: antibacterial activity and reduction of cytochrome c. // Polyhedron– 2010. – V.29. - P. 1646-1652.
Shkumatov V.M., Usova E.V., Frolova N.S., Barth G., Mauersberger S. / Effect of steroid biosynthesis modifiers on progesterone biotransformation by recombinant yeast expressing cytochrome P450c17// Biochem. (Moscow) Suppl. Series B: Biomed. Chem. – 2007. - V.1. P. 87-94.
Shkumatov V.M., Radyuk V.G., Faletrov Y.V., Vinogradova A.A., Luzikov V.N., Novikova L.A. / Expression of cytochrome P450scc in Escherichia coli cells: intracellular localization and interaction with bacterial redox proteins // Biochemistry (Mosc.) - 2006. – V.71. - P. 884-892.
V. M. Shkumatov, N. S. Frolova, E. V. Rudaya, Ya. V. Faletrov, S. Mauersberger, G. Barth / Range of substrates and steroid bioconversion reactions performed by recombinant microorganisms Saccharomyces cerevisiae and Yarrowia lipolytica expressing cytochrome P450c17// Applied Biochemistry and Microbiology – 2006. – Vol. 42 – P. 472-478 .
S.L.Ovsianko, E.A.Chernyavsky, V.T.Minchenya, I.E.Adzerikho, V.M. Shkumatov / Effect of ultrasound on activation of serine protease precursors// Ultrasonics Sonochem. – 2005. – V.12. - P. 219-223.
Shkumatov V.M., Adzerikho I.E., Lesnikovich J.A., Cherniavsky E.A. Effect of ultrasound on structure and functional properties of antithrombin III and proteins of PPSB complex // Biochemistry (Mosc), 2004. V.69. P.243–250.
Shkumatov V.M., Usova E.V, Radyuk V.G., Kashkan Zh.N., Kovganko N.V., Yuretzek T., Mauersberger S. Oxidation of 17alpha,20beta- and 17alpha,20alpha-dihydroxysipregn-4-en-ones--side products of biotransformation of progesterone by recombinant microorganisms expressing cytochrome P45017alpha// Bioorg Khim, 2003. V.29. P.640–647.
Nazarov P.A., Drutsa V.I., Miller W.L., Shkumatov V.M., Luzikov V.N., Novikova V.A. / Formation and functioning of fused cholesterol side-chain cleavage enzymes// DNA Cell Biol. – 2003. – V. 22. – P.243-252.
Lesnikovich Iu.A., Adzerokho I.E., Shkumatov V.M. Structure-functional change in streptokinase exposed to ultrasound // Biomed Khim., 2003. V.49. P.183–190.
Shkumatov V.M., Usova E.V., Poljakov Y.S., Frolova N.S., Radyuk V.G., Mauersberger S., Chernogolov A.A., Honeck H., Schunck W.-H. / Biotransformation of steroids by a recombinant yeast strain expressing bovine cytochrome P-45017a.// Biochemistry (Mosс.) – 2002. – V. 67, P.547-560.
Juvonen R.-O., Shkumatov V.M., Lang M.A. / Purification and characterization of a liver microsomal cytochrome p450 isoenzyme with a high affinity and metabolic capacity for coumarin rfom pyrasole treated D2 mice// Eur. J. Biochem. - 1988. – V.171. – P. 205-211.
Shkumatov V.M., Smettan G., Ristau O., Rein H., Ruckpaul K., Chashchin V.L., Akhrem A.A. / Quantitation of interaction between cytochrome P450scc and adrenodoxin – analysis in the median UV-region by second derivative spectroscopy// Chem-Biol. Interact. – 1988. – V.68. – P. 71-83.
Shkumatov V.M., Usanov S.A., Chashchin V.L., Akhrem A.A. / Cytochrome P450 dependent pathways in corticosteroid hormone biosynthesis// Pharmazie. – 1985. – V.10. – P. 757-766.
Chashchin V.L., Vasilevsky V.I., Shkumatov V.M., Akhrem A.A. / The domain structure of the cholesterol side chain cleavage cytochrome P450 from adrenocortical mitochondria// Biochem. Biophys. Acta. -1984. – V.787. – P. 27-38.
Akhrem A.A., Lapko V.N., Lapko A.G., Shkumatov V.M., Chashchin V.L. / Isolation, structural organization and mechanism of action of mitochondrial hydroxylating systems// Acta biol. Med. Germ. -1979. V.38. P.257-273.
ShkumatovV.M., AdzerikhoI.E., LesnikovichJ.A., CherniavskyE.A. Effect of ultrasound on structure and functional properties of antithrombin III and proteins of PPSB complex // Biochemistry (Mosc), 2004. V.69. P.243–250.
LesnikovichIu.A., AdzerokhoI.E., ShkumatovV.M. Structure-functional change in streptokinase exposed to ultrasound // Biomed Khim., 2003. V.49. P.183–190.

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Steven Loble has acted in a large number of cases involving obtaining evidence in England for use in proceedings in the United States of America, as well as enforcement of judgments. He has undertaken cases in this area throughout his career. This experience provides first hand knowledge of how the law and procedure works in practice and enables us to meet clients' needs in securing testimony and documents for use at trial in foreign countries, particularly in the United States.
It also enables us to assist clients who have been served with an Order to give evidence for foreign pleadings, if it appears that the Order should not have been made or if the Order is too wide. In such cases, we can apply for the Order to be set aside or modified to deal with the client’s concerns.
This paper explains the procedures for obtaining evidence from non-parties in England and Wales (referred to below as England for the sake of brevity)for use in legal proceedings in the United States of America. The United Kingdom is made up of a number of different jurisdictions – England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands (each of which is a separate jurisdiction). The paper suggests the most appropriate procedures in particular cases for England only; it is not an exhaustive review of the law or procedure.
Evidence may be obtained in England for use in foreign proceedings without any formal order. In certain other countries the obtaining of evidence without the permission of the Court is a criminal offence but the English Courts will not interfere with any procedure by which witnesses appear voluntarily to give evidence or produce documents. Only in restricted circumstances may production of documents be contrary toEnglish law (e.g. pursuant to the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1989).
The U.S. is a prolific source of requests for evidence and therefore the means of obtaining evidence outside the U.S. under U.S. Federal Law is also set out in this guide.
Depositions can be taken and documentary evidence collected from any persons willing to appear voluntarily. This must be done in a way acceptable to the U.S. Court and depositions are frequently taken before the U.S. Consul.
3.	Pursuant to Letters Rogatory (known in England as "Letters of Request" and so referred to below).
Further, a U.S. national or U.S. resident present in England and Wales may be subpoenaed pursuant to 28 USC Para. 1783.
However, there may be a conflict between the obligation of a U.S. national or U.S. resident to comply with such a subpoena and local law - for example, in the case of a London branch of a U.S. bank when such a subpoena would not be effective. A London branch of a U.S. bank should require the protection of an English Court Order before divulging any documents or information. There is also a limit to the subject matter jurisdiction of foreign courts (see MacKinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin and Jennrette Securities Corporation  2 WLR 453).
The Evidence (Proceedings in other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 was passed partly to give effect to the Hague Convention. The Act goes further than necessary for the purposesof the Convention and should be read in conjunction with Part 34 of the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) to ascertain the boundaries within which evidence can be obtained pursuant to the Convention, or for foreign proceedings generally, and the procedure for obtaining such evidence. Theprocedure under The Hague Convention is the same for any country which is a party toit and indeed for any country which requests judicial assistance from the English Court.
If English Solicitors are not instructed by the party seeking an Order for depositions or the production of documents, the Treasury Solicitor (the government legal service) will make an application to the Court for an Order but it is more prudent to instruct English Solicitors in case the witnesses resist the Order. It is also quicker to instruct Solicitors and to send the Letters of Request directly to them - an Order can then be obtained within a week, whereas transmission through diplomatic channels takes considerably longer.
Discovery in England andWales (which is documentary only) is much narrower than the discovery which is allowed in the U.S.: English Courts will not countenance "fishing expeditions". The English Court is prohibited from making an order requiring any particular steps to be taken unless they are steps which could be taken to obtain evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the English Court. The English rules distinguish between (i) evidence in the nature of proof to be used for the purposes of the trial and (ii) evidence in the nature of pre-trial discovery to be used for purposes of a train of enquiry which might produce evidence for trial. The English Court will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents and will not give effect to a request for those purposes.
Under s.2(3), the English Court is prohibited from making an order requiring any particular steps to be taken unless they are steps which can be required to be taken by way of obtaining evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the English Court, whether or not they are proceedings of the same description as those to which the application for the order relates. This provision, which applies both to oral and documentary evidence recognises and gives effect to the distinction between evidence in the nature of proof to be used for the purposes of the trial and evidence inthe nature of pre-trial disclosure to be used for the purposes of leading to a train of inquiry which might produce direct evidence for the trial. This distinction was in the mind of the draftsman of the Act of 1975 and was made the subject ofan express declaration by Her Majesty's Government when ratifying the Hague Convention that the United Kingdom would "not execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" (see Cmnd. 6727 (1976)).
The English Court will not give effect to any request from a U.S. Court unless proceedings have actually been instituted or proceedings are contemplated. Inthiscontext "contemplated" means that proceedings are imminent or pending.
Subject to the above, the general principle followed by the English Court is that the English Court will ordinarily give effect to requests from foreign courts so far as is proper and practicable and to the extent that is permissible under English Law.
General investigation (e.g. in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings) will not be allowed - re. International Power Industries Inc.  (not officially reported). Documents sought must be specifically listed and not referred to by general descriptions.
“The difficulty in the present case, as in previous cases, arises because of the difference in approach to discovery in this country and the United States. Their discovery procedures are not necessarily the same in all States. But in general in the United States there is a tradition of oral discovery which has never been developed in this country. Rightly or wrongly, we regard oral discovery as a form of discovery which generates unnecessary costs and complexity. There is another difference between the approach to discovery in this country and that in the United States. Generally, where it is possible to get much wider "non party" discovery. That isdiscovery against those who are not parties to the proceedings.” (per Lord Woolf MR).
i) Does the court have jurisdiction to make an order in response to the Letter of Request, and if not can this be overcome by making modifications to the order sought or imposing conditions when making it?
ii) Ought the order of Master Turner be set aside because it was sought for an impermissible purpose, specifically for an impermissible investigatory purpose? If so, can this objection to the order be met by making modifications to it or by imposing conditions?
iii) Ought the court set aside the order as a matter of discretion because it is unfairly oppressive to Mr Dunt? Can this objection be met by modifications or conditions?
"In face of a statement in letters rogatory that a certain person is a necessary witness for the Applicant . . . the court of request should not be astute to examine the issues in the action and the circumstances of the case with excessive particularity for the purpose of determining in advance whether the evidence of that person is relevant and admissible"
- see the Westinghouse case (cit sup) at p 654G per Lord Fraser. (As Moore-Bick J pointedout in United States of America v Philip Morris Inc (unrep) 10 December 2003 at para 76, this observation appears to be directed to whether the court should enquire for itself whether the witness can give relevant and admissible evidence.) However, in this case the Kansas court issuing the request did not itself state that the examination is likely to produce or is directed to producing such evidence. Ms Cockerill submits, and I readily accept, that this doesnot mean that the Request is in any way defective. Moreover, I am unable to accept Mr Hunter's submission that requests from foreign courts "normally" include such a statement: I simply do not know whether or not that normally is the case, but even if it were, I would not therefore attach particular significance to the absence of such a statement in the Letter of Request from the Kansas court. However, this does mean that this court may and must consider without the assistance of such a statement whether the request is within the statutory limits.
 I have referred to Mr Owens' evidence that the Kansas Plaintiff is seeking the deposition of Mr Dunt and others "for use at trial in the Kansas action", but this assertion in itself does not, in my judgment, provide convincing support for the request as it was made by the Kansas court, still less convincing support for the contention of the Kansas Plaintiff that Mr Dunt's evidence is not a matter of background significance, but "crucial" or "critical" to the litigation. Moreover, Mr Owens does not appear to acknowledge, or appear to recognise, the nature and ambit of the request made: for example, that all the documents to which Mr Diel referred were dated before the start of the pleaded conspiracy, and that the topics for examination are far wider than London meetings of the kind that Mr Owens describes that Mr Dunt is said to have had as Regional Director.
 However, the approach of the English court upon this initial question of jurisdiction is, as Lord Woolf MR emphasised in The State of Minnesota case (loc cit) at para 40, "if there is doubt on this matter, I should give the benefit of that doubt to the Plaintiffs". I can see that Mr Dunt might well have some knowledge of some matters which the Kansas Plaintiff asserts in the proceedings and which might, for all I know, be denied by one or more of the Defendants. Although the evidence is far from satisfactory and making properly generous allowance for the approach that Lord Woolf describes, I have concluded that I should not set aside the order of Master Turner on the grounds of jurisdiction. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider whether, had the original request been defective in this respect, it could be saved by restrictions such as the Kansas Plaintiff now proposes or by the sort of condition or undertaking put forward by MsCockerill and referred to in Golden Eagle Refinery Co Inc v Associated International Insurance Co (unrep) 19 February 1998 (for example, that Mr Dunt would be examined as if he were giving evidence in chief at the trial or that his examination should be for the purpose only of eliciting and recording testimony appropriate to be given at trial).
"the mere fact that letters rogatory have been issued at the pre-trial discovery stage does not mean that they are not seeking for evidence in the sense of s 1 of the Act of 1975 but it does, so to speak, put one on one's guard."
See too Buxton LJ in the Golden Eagle Refinery case (loc cit).
"As was held in Re Norway's Application No 1, [at  QB 433] where the matters on which examination is requested by the Letter of Request to proceed, are too widely drawn, it will lead to the inference that the Letter of Request was designed to elicit information which might lead to the obtaining of evidence rather than to establish allegations of fact, and that would amount to an impermissible fishing expedition."
Of course sometimes, as Sir Richard Scott V-C said in the First American Corporation case at p 1166, "the width of a request may be an inevitable consequence of the complexities of the issues and of the witnesses involvement in them", but I cannot accept that in this case the very wide ambit of the Letter of Request can be so explained.
 Moreover, the evidence of Mr Owens about the relevance of Mr Dunt's testimony confirms my view that the Letter of Request was directed to questioning mainly of an investigatory nature. The request ranges far wider than Mr Owens' explanation about the significance of Mr Dunt's testimony could possibly justify.
 I conclude that the Letter of Request seeks an impermissible investigation and for that reason this court should not accede to it.
We should be asked to advise on the form of the document request before the request is submitted to the U.S. Court. This will certainly save time in the long run: if this procedure is not followed there may be contested hearings in England and, as can be seen above, possibly part or all of the request may be struck out.
Section 2(4)(a) of the 1975 Act prohibits the English Court from making an order against a stranger to the proceedings requiring him to make general discovery of documents. Such an order would be in the nature of a "fishing expedition" which is never allowed in the English Court. The request for witnesses to be heard or documents to be produced must specify which evidence witnesses can give or the actual documents which are to be produced.
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the Order as being documents appearing to the Court making the Order to be, or likely to be, in his possession custody or power."
The Court must be satisfied that the documents in question are in the possession, custody or power of the person against whom the Order is made. The burden of proving this fact is on the applicant.
Once an Order has been made by the English Court depositions are taken in "the English manner" (Order 39 RSC) before an Examiner appointed by the Court. The Examiner will bean English barrister. In order to facilitate the taking of depositions at a time convenient to the party requesting the Order it is normally better to have an Examiner of the party's choice appointed rather than one of the Court Examiners who may not be available at the required time. This can only be done if the application for the Order is made by solicitors who will also make the appropriate arrangements for the examination - including providing a Court reporter if required.
Examinations may also be videotaped. An application to set aside an Order forvideotaping the taking of evidence was unsuccessful - (J. Barber & Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters  2 AllER 845.
"Two things are clear. (i) A video recording of evidence given in English Courts is not permitted. There is statutory recognition of tape recordings: photographs in Court are banned. In my judgment videotaping is not allowed. (ii) At the other extreme, evidence in the form of tape recordings and video recordings is capable of admission in English Courts, just as photographs are commonly admitted.
Here we have an intermediate situation. What is sought is videotaping outside the Court, and it is proposed that the videotaping should be available to the Court itself.That is parallel to the taking of tape recordings outside Court of a shorthand transcript outside Court. It is clearly something different from recording proceedings in the Court itself.... Proceedings involving examination of witnesses outside Court are not necessarily limited to the permitted methods of recording proceedings in Court. It seems to me that the request by the Californian Court is not inconsistent with the English mode".
It is noteworthy that many of the leading cases on extraterritoriality are concerned with whether or not evidence should be produced for foreign proceedings.
"I think that the branch of Barclays Bank in Douglas, Isle of Man, should be considered in the same way as a branch of the Bank of Ireland or an American Bank or any other Bank in the Isle of Man which is not subject to our jurisdiction.... It is subject to the laws and regulations of the Isle of Man. It is licensed by the Isle of Man Government. It has customers there who are subject to Manx law. It seems to me that the Court here ought not in its discretionto make an Order against the Head Office here in request of the books of the branch in the Isle of Man in regards to the customers of that branch. It would not be right to compel the branch - or its customers - to open their books or to reveal their confidences in support of legal proceedings in Wales".
The case of MacKinnon (above) concerned an Order made against an American bank, which was not a party to the main action, requiring it to produce books and papers held at its Head Office in New York. These related to an account of one of the Defendants, a Bahamian company which had, since the issue of the Writ, been struck off the Register of Companies, and a subsequent subpoena duces tecum which was served on an Officer of the Bank at its London Office. Hoffman J. held that the Order and subpoena, taking effect in New York, were an infringement of the sovereignty of the United States and therefore the English Courts should not require a foreign bank which owed a duty of confidence to its customers to produce documents outside the jurisdiction of the English Courts. The fact that the bank was regulated by the law of the country where the customer's account was kept (in this case the United States) and concerned business transactions outside the jurisdiction was material.
"the need to exercise the Court's jurisdiction with due regard to the sovereignty of others is particularly important in the case of banks.... If every country where a bank happened to carry on business asserted a right to require that bank to produce documents relating to accounts kept in any other such country, banks would be in an unhappy position of being forced to submit to whichever sovereign was able to apply the greatest pressure".
".... this decision shows a welcome revival in a United States Court of sensitivity to foreign sovereign interests".
Perhaps the best known case on the subject of such requests is Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation  AC 547. In this case the House of Lords reversed a decision of the Court of Appeal which had upheld the implementation of Letters of Request issued by a Court in Virginia.
".... for many years now, the United States has sought to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done outside the jurisdiction of that Country. This is not in accordance with international law and has led to legislation on the part of other States designed to protect their nationalsfromcriminal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction by those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion of sovereignty".
"Now Section 5 of the 1975 Act providesfor the obtaining of evidence for criminal proceedings but expressly the section only applies to proceedings which have been instituted (none have been instituted) and, impliedly, to a request by the Court in which the proceedings have been instituted. The case is therefore not within Section 5, and the procedure is an attempt to get the evidence in spite of that fact".
A party wishing to obtain evidence for use in foreign proceedings should institute proceedings, or at least produce some evidence that proceedings are about to be commenced, before any application is made to the Court for an order.
There is also the question of attorney-client privilege which in England is either legal advice privilege or litigation privilege.
In United States of America v. Philip Morris and Others the government was suing a number of tobacco companies for $280 billion, alleging that they misled the public about the risks of smoking.
Steven Loble acted for the United States of America in that case.
In December 2003, after a 3-day hearing, the Commercial Court in London made an order that Andrew Foyle, a partner in City solicitors firm Lovells, be examined about the document destruction policies of a company called BATCo, despite protestations that such evidence could not be obtained as a result of legal professional privilege.
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was unsuccessful.
In England there are two types of privilege – legal advice privilege and litigation privilege.
The judge went on to find that no privilege, neither litigation privilege nor legal advice privilege, attached to communications between the intended witness and BAT, and ordered Mr Foyle, a partner in a large London law firm to give evidence for use at trial in the US proceedings.
Both BAT and Mr Foyle appealed the decision. The appeals were unsuccessful.
“68. In the present case it is quite clear that the judge correctly considered that a "mere possibility" of litigation did not suffice. He was also correct to conclude that the fact that there was "a distinct possibility that sooner or later someone might make a claim" was insufficient. So was "a general apprehension of future litigation". He repeated three times that the appropriate test was that litigation must have been reasonably in prospect. The expression "real likelihood" seems to have been used as a counterpoise to "a mere possibility", and I do not consider that any more canproperly be read into this phrase. The judge was certainly not saying that there must have been a greater than 50% chance of litigation.
"Legal professional privilege is concerned with the interaction between two aspects of the public interest in the administration of justice. The public interest in the efficient working of the legal system requires that people should be able to obtain professional legal advice on their rightsand liabilities and obligations. This is desirable for theorderly conduct of everyday affairs. Similarly, people should be able to seek legal advice and assistance in connection with the proper conduct of court proceedings. To this end communications between clients and lawyers must be uninhibited. But, in practice, candour cannot be expected if disclosure of the contents of communications between client and lawyer may be compelled, to a client’s prejudice and contrary to his wishes. That is one aspect of the public interest. It takes the form of according to the client a right, or privilege as it is unhelpfully called, to withhold disclosure of the contents of client-lawyer communications. In the ordinary course the client has an interest in asserting this right, in so far as disclosure would or might prejudice him.
The other aspect of the public interest is that all relevant material should be available to courts when deciding cases. Courts should not have to reach decisions in ignorance of the contents of documents or other material which, if disclosed, might prejudice him.
An unusual feature of the case was the United States of America applied for a High Court Judge to sit as Examiner to resolve any questions of privilege as they arose. It is believed that this was the first time that such an Order had ever been made.
X A.G. v. A Bank  2 All ER 464 discussed the question of disclosure of documents in breach of the duty of confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers. Leggatt J. referred to the case of British Nylon Spinners Limited v. Imperial Chemical Industries Limited  2 All ER 780 and quoted the passage.
"The Courts of this Country will, in the natural course, pay great respect and attention to the Superior Court of the United States of America, but I conceive that it is nonetheless the proper province of English Courts, when their jurisdiction is invoked, not to refrain from exercising that jurisdiction if they think that it is their duty so to do for the protection of rights which are peculiarly subject to their protection. In so saying, I do not conceive that I am offending in any way against the principles of comity .....".
"The writ of the United States does not run in this country, and, if due regard is had to the comity of nations, it will not seek to run here."
Any sanction imposed now on the Bank would look like pressure on this Court, whereas as it seems to me, it is for the New York Court to relieve against the dilemma, in which it turns out to have placed its own national, by refraining from holding it in contempt proceedings are issued".
Accordingly, it was ordered that the injunctions should continue.
In In Re the State of Norway (No. 1 and No. 2) - Judgment 9th February 1989 (see paragraph 13 below for further details) Lord Goff upheld the decision of the Judge of the first instance that "witnesses should not be required to reveal the identity ofa settlor in breach of a banker's duty of confidentiality unless the witness should have evidence that the settlor was acting as the nominee or agent of the tax payer".
There was also much discussion of the practice relating to Letters of Request, possible infringement of UK sovereignty and extra-territoriality in the case of In Re. the State of Norway (No.1), In Re. the State of Norway (No. 2) House of Lords (Judgment 9th February 1989).
There had previously been two cases in the Court of Appeal which to some extent resulted in conflicting decisions. The main issue was whether an action in the Sandefjord City Court in Norway to set aside an assessment of tax was a "civil or commercial matter". The Court of Appeal in Norway (No. 1) had decided that this should be decided pursuant to the laws of the requesting Court and not the recipient Court of the Letters Rogatory. In Norway (No. 2) the Court decided that it should be resolved pursuant to the law of the Court receiving the request.
"The words (civil or commercial matter) should be given their ordinary meaning, so that proceedings in any civil matter should include all proceedings other than criminal proceedings, and proceedings in any commercial matter should be treated as falling within proceedings in civil matters. On this simple approach, I do not see why the expression should be read as excluding proceedings in a fiscal matter ....".
It will be seen from the above cases that the English Courts are keen, in accordance with the principle of comity of nations, to give effect to requests for evidence from foreign courts. The English Courts are, however, jealous in protecting the sovereignty of the U.K. and the border separating the willingness to assist foreign courts and the protection of sovereignty is not always clearly defined.
Another recent case, Janice Windh and Another v. Land Rover North America Inc., and Others  EWHC 432 (QB), involved an application to set aside an order for two witnesses to give evidence for proceedings in California. Steven Loble acted for the successfulapplicant in that case. The application to set aside the order was made by the defendant and not the witnesses. This is only the second reported case in which an application has not been made by the proposed witness.
It was contended by Mr Onions QC that in his judgment Master Turner addressed himself only to the first of these two questions.
1.	Both questions need to be asked because of the terms of s.2(3) and 2(4) of the 1975 Act which in effect provide that the Court’s discretionary power under s2 of the Act to make provision for the obtaining of evidence for use in proceedings in another jurisdiction is subject to jurisdictional limitations directed against “fishing” applications both in relation to oral testimony as well as documents.
iii) Appreciated that the intention behind the seekingof evidence has to be the obtaining of material to be used at the trial of the proceedings, as opposed to obtaining material for the impermissible purpose of a “fishing” or investigatory exercise.
Further, he had struck out parts of the requests which he viewed as “directed towards obtaining general discovery”.
I am satisfied that taken in the context of his judgment as a whole, and having regard to the strenuous representations before the Master both on the papers and orally through Mr Onions QC, there can be no question of Master Turner having failed to apply his mind to both questions as indicated by Sir Richard Scott V-C.
After almost two full days of argument, the judge reserved judgment and then refused permission to appeal.
“ In the light of the parties' respective arguments, I have reached the following conclusions. Firstly, I see no answer to Mr Mellor's point on the request for disclosure of documents by Mr Beckert. The three categories of document listed in the draft letter of request, which I have read out, plainly do not identify particular documents, even in a compendious way. In truth thethree categories amount to no more than a wish list of documents which the Fourth Defendant hopes may exist. Secondly, I accept Mr Mellor's submission that the request in respect of the oral testimony of Mr Beckert and Mr Juster falls within the description of "fishing" in the State of Norway and Minnesota cases.
Before embarking on any exercise to obtain evidence (take depositions) in England, please callus to discuss the matter.
Similarly, if you or your clients arethe recipient of an Order, we can advise on whether there are realistic prospects of challenging the Order or modifying it to deal with concerns raised by the Order. There is a 7 day time limit from date of service for applying to set aside such an Order, so it is important that you contact us immediately if you wish to consider applying to set aside or modify the Order.
We will work within whatever time constraints there are, but it is advisable, when seeking to take depositions or obtain documents from witnesses in England, to allow a reasonable amount of time to draft the request, ensure that it comports with the English requirements, obtain an Order from the English Court, serve the Order personally on the witnesses (and, if necessary, deal with any request to set aside the Order).
"It must be remembered that it is the duty and pleasure of the English Court to respond positively to a letter of request if it can. It is also in the public interest that a court (on either side of the Atlantic) should have all relevant material available to it when it decides a case." United States of America v. Philip Morris and Others.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Michael J. Barkett, Jr., for Petitioner.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Marjory Winston Parker, Robert D. Marshall and Kevin M. Corrington, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
Prior to submission of the matter to the grand jury, petitioner's testimony at a preliminary hearing led the magistrate to dismiss a complaint charging him with the same offenses. The district attorney did not bring this testimony to the attention of the grand jury.
[1a] Petitioner's testimony at the preliminary hearing did tend to "explain away" the charges against him, at least in the magistrate's opinion. Therefore, petitioner contends, the district attorney had an implied duty under section 939.7 to disclose this testimony to the grand jury. The People respond that the district attorney is not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury unless the jury calls for it.
The People's response is disingenuous. The grand jury cannot be expected to call for evidence of which it is kept ignorant. When a district attorney seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to inform the grand jury of its nature and existence. Such information having been withheld here, the writ of prohibition must issue.
On 31 July 1973, petitioner agreed to sell 200,000 amphetamine tablets to Mr. Logan, a federal undercover narcotics agent, and Mr. Young, Logan's informant. Petitioner told them the transaction would be consummated through Mr. Sherman because a pending court appearance caused petitioner concern. On three occasions in the preceding five weeks, agent Young had observed petitioner and Sherman in Mexico, negotiating to purchase amphetamine tablets.
On the evening of 7 August 1973, the transaction having been postponed once, Sherman telephoned Logan and Young in their hotel room in Stockton, arranging to meet them there. Twenty minutes later, petitioner drove up to Sherman's house in Lodi and Sherman came out to the car where they talked for five minutes. They then drove to Stockton in separate cars, petitioner leading the way. Sherman went to Logan and Young's room while petitioner circled the vicinity of the hotel for 15 to 20 minutes, finally parking within 200 yards of Sherman's car.
Sherman offered to sell Logan 50,000 amphetamine tablets for $3,000. Objecting that his agreement had been with petitioner, Logan told Sherman he wanted to know with whom he was dealing. Sherman replied that petitioner did not want to be directly involved because he had a prior conviction. When Logan pressed Sherman as to the ownership of the tablets, he replied, "They're borrowed but don't worry. [15 Cal. 3d 252] Me and Ray are partners." When the transaction was completed petitioner and Sherman were arrested.
In March 1973, petitioner was charged with one count of selling restricted dangerous drugs and two counts of possessing such drugs for sale. At a pretrial conference in superior court, petitioner was informed that the district attorney would recommend a county jail sentence in return for cooperation in securing information concerning other narcotics dealers. Petitioner agreed and was told to work with Deputy District Attorney Saiers. When petitioner subsequently balked at appearing as a witness in prosecutions resulting from information he was to supply, Mr. Saiers warned him that he would go to prison unless he cooperated. Pursuant to a bargain struck with Mr. Saiers just before his court appearance on 6 August 1973, petitioner was permitted to plead guilty to one of the possession counts, the other two counts were dismissed, and the probation and sentence hearing was continued until 17 September 1973, to give petitioner more time to "produce."
Petitioner had never been in Mexico with Sherman. He did agree to sell amphetamine tablets to Young and Logan when they met on 31 July 1973, but did so with the intention of informing on them. He did not tell them the transaction would be consummated through Sherman. Petitioner had nothing to do with the transaction on 7 August 1973; he was in the area because he hoped to inform on Sherman.
The People have chosen a poor vehicle for arguing that the district attorney is not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury unless the jury calls for it. Not only did the district attorney fail to inform the grand jury of petitioner's preliminary hearing testimony, but he also created the false impression that petitioner would refuse to testify if called. At the conclusion of the grand jury hearing, after three other witnesses had testified in the interim, the district attorney recalled the arresting officer and elicited his testimony that, following arrest and advisement of his Miranda rights, petitioner had refused to make a statement upon the advice of counsel. Reference to petitioner's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination was clear misconduct, as the Attorney General concedes. (People v. Miller (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 156 [53 Cal. Rptr. 720], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doherty (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 9, 14-15 [59 Cal. Rptr. 857, 429 P.2d 177]; see Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229]; People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 695, 710-711 [59 Cal. Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) But more importantly, the grand jury's power to order the production of evidence which may "explain away" the charges under consideration was thereby thwarted.
[1b] However, the adversary system does not extend to grand jury proceedings. As has been explained, if the district attorney does not bring exculpatory evidence to the attention of the grand jury, the jury is unlikely to learn of it. We hold, therefore, that when a district attorney seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to inform the grand jury of its nature and existence, so that the grand jury may exercise its power under the statute to order the evidence produced. Having disposed of this case on statutory grounds, we need not consider petitioner's alternative due process argument. We have considered the People's procedural objections and find them meritless.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Sullivan, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
I concur with the result reached by the majority and with the conclusion that the prosecution has a duty under Penal Code section 939.7 to inform the grand jury of the nature and existence of exculpatory evidence.
As I have intimated on another occasion (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 662, 670, fn. 1 [108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609], dissenting opn.), it is my belief that prosecution by indictment under the present statutory scheme denies an accused fundamental rights at a critical stage of the criminal process and results in violations of equal protection and due process of law.
It is thus clear that a functional revolution in the grand jury occurred in the six centuries between the Assize of Clarendon and the adoption of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. By the time of the latter, the institution had evolved to its purest form: a citizen's tribunal, set resolutely between the state and the individual. Unhappily, the contemporary grand jury no longer serves that historic role and has regressed to little more than a convenient prosecutorial tool. fn. 6 In order to appreciate the change that has taken place since 1791 it is necessary to review the development of the parallel method of accusation: the criminal information.
The reforms Holdsworth spoke of occurred in 1848, when Parliament decreed that defendants at preliminary examinations have the right to counsel, the right to have witnesses examined in their presence, and the right to make statements and present exculpatory witnesses. (11 & 12 Vict., ch. 42.) The enactment of these and further safeguards created the anomalous situation that accusation by information, once the bane of English civil libertarians, became imbued with far more procedural safeguards than were available when prosecution began by indictment.
The conclusion is inescapable that if a preindictment proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal justice process requiring due process safeguards, a fortiori the indictment proceeding itself is a critical stage. Indeed Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Coleman, pointed out the "anomaly" of requiring counsel at a preliminary hearing when "counsel cannot attend a subsequent grand jury inquiry, even though witnesses, including the person eventually charged, may be interrogated in secret session." (Id., at p. 25 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 405-406].) The chief justice openly wondered (ibid.) "how can this be reconciled" with the fact that "at the decidedly more 'critical' grand jury inquiry" there was no assistance of counsel.
The term "anomaly" tends to become overworked when the grand jury's indicting function is under discussion, but one is continually struck by the fact that this proceeding remains untouched by the safeguards which have become firmly attached to points in the criminal process of far less significance. For example, it is now the law that a casual suspect at a lineup has more rights than an accused before a grand jury. (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218 [18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926].) Similarly, a parolee charged simply with violation of conditions of his parole has the opportunity to personally appear, cross-examine hostile witnesses, and be conditionally represented by counsel at the revocation hearing (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593]; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 [36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S.Ct. 1756]), yet none of these protections is accorded to the potential indictee. Indeed, far more safeguards protect prison inmates at disciplinary hearings (Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963]) and parole rescission hearings (Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 571 [122 Cal. Rptr. 231, 536 P.2d 1017]) than are permitted free and presumptively innocent persons before the grand jury.
The traditional counterargument that the grand jury merely inquires into whether there is probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial, thus avoiding any need for due process safeguards, can no longer be considered valid after Coleman, Morrissey and their progeny. As noted, in Coleman the Alabama preliminary hearing determined only whether there was probable cause to present the case to the grand jury -- not even whether there was probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial. [15 Cal. 3d 264] Nevertheless the Supreme Court held that the potential jeopardy to the defendant was significant enough to trigger the demands of due process.
It is therefore manifest that if due process requires these various procedural protections in order to determine probable cause to terminate conditional liberties, equal or greater safeguards must be observed in order to protect the absolute liberty of the prospective indictee. Here again we see the incongruous circumstance of a proceeding which is deemed constitutionally sufficient to indict but is inadequate to serve as a substitute for the prerevocation hearing: either the preliminary hearing or the trial itself may serve as the prerevocation hearing if a parolee charged with a new offense is given notice of the dual purpose of the proceeding (In re Law (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 21 [109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 513 P.2d 621]); but the grand jury proceeding, because of its complete lack of the procedural rights mandated by Morrissey, may not be so substituted (In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 139 [115 Cal. Rptr. 340, 524 P.2d 812]). In short, the present grand jury system does not even rise to the constitutional standards of parole prerevocation hearings.
In Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 69 [77 L. Ed. 158, 170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527], the Supreme Court declared that a person accused of crime "required the guiding hand of counsel at every stage in the proceedings against him." If this were in fact the law this opinion [15 Cal. 3d 265] would be unnecessary, because it is irrefutable that the grand jury proceeding is a "stage," and indeed a critical stage, of the criminal justice process. Unfortunately, to date courts have been loathe to shine the revealing light of due process analysis into the secret recesses of the grand jury room. Because of this reticence, the state is permitted to subject an individual to the trauma of a felony trial without even cursory consideration of his side of the story. This, I submit, is a patent violation of the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions, rivaled only by its equally blatant violation of equal protection of the law.
Moreover, these classifications are not mere economic discriminations to which the rational relation test may be applied, but rather involve such fundamental rights as counsel, confrontation, the right to personally appear, the right to a hearing before a judicial officer, and the right to be free from unwarranted prosecution. These guarantees are expressly or impliedly grounded in both the state and federal Constitutions and must by any test be deemed "fundamental." Accordingly, as Serrano teaches, in order to justify such a selective denial of fundamental guarantees the state must show not only a compelling interest but also that the classifications are necessary to that end.
This court has on a number of occasions supplemented existing criminal or quasi-criminal procedures when the demands of equal protection warranted it. In In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 296 [96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201], we determined that due process and equal protection required that a youth whose normal discharge date from the Youth Authority was deferred because of the authority's conclusion that he was dangerous to the public (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1800-1803) was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of "dangerousness." We pointed out [15 Cal. 3d 267] that the Legislature had extended the right to trial by jury to other classes of persons subject to civil commitment and concluded there was no compelling state interest to support a distinction for this class of juveniles.
For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that equal protection requires that all criminal defendants have the same opportunity to prove to a magistrate that there is no probable cause to bind them over for trial. "The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless or unsupported charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the degradation and the expense of a criminal trial. Many an unjustifiable prosecution is stopped at that point, where the lack of probable cause is clearly disclosed." (Jaffe v. Stone (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150 [114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775].) A proceeding of such significance cannot, consistent with the constitutional mandate of equal protection, be selectively denied.
It may be argued that to afford an indicted defendant the right to demand a postindictment preliminary hearing would be a superfluous [15 Cal. 3d 268] formalism because the issue of probable cause had already been decided by the grand jury. However, the facts of the instant case provide an excellent demonstration of the potential value of such a postindictment hearing.
As the majority note, "Not only did the district attorney fail to inform the grand jury of petitioner's [prior] preliminary hearing testimony, but he also created the false impression that petitioner would refuse to testify if called." (Ante, p. 253.) It appears obvious that the district attorney was determined to initiate this prosecution in a forum that would preclude petitioner from testifying in his own behalf. If this tactic would be unavailing because of the defendant's right to a subsequent preliminary hearing, a prosecutor would have no incentive to engage in such devious gamesmanship. The safeguard of an available preliminary hearing is clearly preferable to the majority's proposal of depending upon this prosecutor -- the same one who misrepresented petitioner's desire to testify and engaged in the "clear misconduct" of referring to petitioner's invocation of Miranda -- to take the responsibility of protecting petitioner's rights by presenting the exculpatory evidence.
In addition to the likelihood that recognition of this right would preclude instances such as the case at bar from arising in the future, there is also a strong possibility that problems such as Uhlemann (see fn. 12, ante) henceforth will be avoided. While a rule requiring a postindictment preliminary hearing would not remove the incentive to forum shop among magistrates, it would remove any advantage to be gained from seeking an indictment. This would at least insure that the defendant is always given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, and, if he chooses, to present his own evidence through his own attorney, In factual contexts such as the case at bar such an opportunity might well provide the critical difference.
The alternative of leaving the grand jury structure in the posture here formulated by the majority is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, under the majority's rule the prosecutor need inform the grand jury only of the existence and nature of exculpatory evidence of which he is aware, thus by obvious implication excluding from the grand jury's consideration evidence solely in the defendant's possession which might adequately explain away the charge. In the present case, had there not been a prior preliminary hearing it is likely the district attorney would have been unaware of petitioner's exculpatory evidence. Under the [15 Cal. 3d 269] majority's formulation, however, there would be no way in which petitioner could have halted this unwarranted prosecution prior to trial.
Secondly, the district attorney need not call the defendant to testify or even inform the grand jury of its statutory right to order the defendant or his evidence produced. Rather, the majority are content to leave it to the grand jury, sua sponte, to "exercise its power under the statute to order the evidence produced." (Ante, p. 256.) Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, one may seriously question the enthusiasm and zeal that a prosecuting attorney seeking an indictment will bring to the task of presenting the accused's exculpatory evidence. I suggest that the proper person to present the accused's evidence is the accused through his attorney, and the proper forum is one which will permit the development not only of affirmative exculpatory evidence but also evidence gleaned from adequate cross-examination and confrontation of the state's witnesses.
The administrative burden of requiring preliminary hearings for all indicted defendants would be negligible. Some indicted defendants may choose to waive the subsequent preliminary hearing. But even if none do so, no court congestion will eventuate. The vast majority of felony prosecutions in California are begun by information with an attendant preliminary hearing. For example, in 1971 only 4.1 percent of the felony filings were prosecuted by indictment. (Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information -- An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue (1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 997, 1014.) To incorporate these few indicted defendants into the general administrative mainstream would obviously present no problem. Seldom are we given an opportunity to correct such a massive deprivation of rights by so minimal an effort.
As the concurring opinion of Justice Mosk suggests, the current application of the grand jury indictment function raises serious constitutional questions. In my view, however, a determination of such fundamental issues should properly await a case in which these questions have been directly raised and argued by the parties. Since that is not the case here, I express no opinion on the merits of these constitutional claims.
FN 1. This opinion is exclusively concerned with the grand jury's indicting process and not with its investigative function (see Olson, The California Grand Jury: An Analysis and Evaluation of Its Watchdog Function (1966)), nor with questions relating to selection of its membership (see Mar, California Grand Jury; Vestige of Aristocracy (1970) 1 Pacific L.J. 36). The grand jury serves a valuable and productive role in the area of investigation, particularly with respect to governmental corruption or ineptitude. Its public reports to the citizenry serve a salutary governmental and educational purpose. (See my dissent in People v. Superior Court (1973 Grand Jury) (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 430, 442 [119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 531 P.2d 761].) With regard to selection practices, there may lurk constitutional issues to be confronted in the future, but they are not presented in the case at bar.
FN 2. Article I, section 14, provides: "Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by law, either by indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by information."
FN 4. There is a technical difference between an indictment and a presentment. A presentment is an accusation made by the grand jury itself, flowing from the knowledge and personal observation of the members. An indictment comes to the grand jury as a charge from without, usually from a prosecutor or the king's officer, to which the grand jury either returns a true bill or a bill of "ignoramus."
FN 6. On those isolated occasions when grand jurors assert their independence, they are disparagingly referred to as "a runaway grand jury."
FN 7. Indeed even in the late 19th century this was still an open question in the United States. However, in Hurtado v. California (1884) 110 U.S. 516 [28 L. Ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292], the Supreme Court, over the vigorous dissent of Justice Harlan, held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require an indictment as a condition precedent to a state felony prosecution.
FN 10. The traditional response that the grand jury is per se constitutional because of its express mention in both the United States (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) and California Constitutions (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14) is unpersuasive. Although both charters speak of the grand jury as an institution, neither delineates how the system is to be administered, these matters being legislatively and judicially mandated. It is not the existence of the grand jury which is at issue -- that is constitutionally recognized; it is the procedure, not defined in either charter, which is conditionally inadequate.
FN 11. The court took pains to elaborate the reasons why counsel was necessary: "First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail." (Ibid.) These same factors, of course, also dictate that indicted defendants receive a postindictment preliminary hearing, because in California at present these advantages are not granted to indicted defendants.
FN 12. People v. Uhlemann (1973) supra, 9 Cal. 3d 662, is illustrative of the advantage. At the preliminary hearing the defendant, through counsel, was able to discredit the prosecution witnesses as he confronted them. The experienced magistrate refused to hold the defendant for trial. Undaunted, the prosecutor went forum shopping and took the case before the grand jury, where, such matters being uncontested, it was readily predictable that an indictment would be returned. It was.
FN 13. It may be argued, for example, that in certain cases there is an overwhelming need for the secrecy which can be obtained only through the grand jury, either for the protection of witnesses or, in rare instances, for the protection of the defendant himself. (See People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 710 [102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121].) However, once an indictment is returned these considerations can no longer be considered operative, because whatever secrecy was achieved through the grand jury will be forsaken when the defendant is brought to trial. Thus there would appear to be no reason, postindictment, why the defendant could not be accorded a preliminary hearing.
FN 15. The wording of the California Constitution does not preclude a postindictment probable cause hearing. Article I, section 14, provides that felonies shall be prosecuted "as provided by law." The term "law" of course embraces judicial rulings as well as legislative enactments. (Cf. Evid. Code, § 160.) Prior to the November 1974 streamlining of the state Constitution the wording of the section made plain that a post-indictment preliminary hearing was a considered possibility. At that time article I, section 8, provided: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law." From the ballot arguments and opinion of the legislative analyst it is clear that no substantive changes in this section were intended by the 1974 amendment.
FN 16. Edwards, page 35.


text:
[J.18] V. Sciancalepore, I. Filippini, V. Mancuso, A. Capone and A. Banchs, A Multi-Traffic Inter-Cell Interference Coordination Scheme in Dense Cellular Networks, Transactions on Networking, vol. 26(5), October 2018, Pages 2361-2375, IEEE/ACM.
[J.17] I. Filippini, V. Sciancalepore, F. Devoti, A. Capone, Fast Cell Discovery in mm-wave 5G Networks with Context Information, Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 17(7), Jul 2018, Pages 1538-1552, IEEE.
[J.16] A. Barkat, M.T. Kechadi, G. Verticale, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Green Approach for Joint Management of Geo-Distributed Data Centers and Interconnection Networks, Journal of Network and Systems Management, vol. 26(3), Jul 2018, Pages 723-754, Springer.
[J.15] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, The Throughput and Access Delay of Slotted-Aloha with Exponential Backoff, Transactions on Networking, vol. 26(1), February 2018, Pages 451-464, IEEE/ACM.
[J.14] I. Filippini, A. Redondi, A. Capone, Beyond Cellular Green Generation: Potential and Challenges of the Network Separation, Mobile Information Systems, vol. 2017, Article ID 7149643, 11 pages, 2017, Hindawi.
[J.13] A. Capone, S. D'Elia, I. Filippini, A. Redondi, M. Zangani, Modeling Energy Consumption of Mobile Radio Networks: An Operator Perspective, Wireless Communications, vol. 24(4), Feb 2017, Pages 120-126, IEEE.
[J.12] F. Devoti, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Facing the Millimeter-wave Cell Discovery Challenge in 5G Networks with Context-awareness , Access, vol. 4, December 2016, Pages 8019 - 8034, IEEE.
[J.11] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, Asymptotic Analysis of Backlog Estimates for Dynamic Frame Aloha, Journal of Communications Software and Systems, vol. 12(1), Mar 2016, Pages 83-90, IEEE.
[J.10] A. Redondi, M. Cesana, M. Tagliasacchi, I. Filippini, G. Dan, V. Fodor, Cooperative Image Analysis In Visual Sensor Networks, Ad Hoc Networks Journal, vol. 28, May 2015, Pages 38-51, Elsevier.
[J.19] S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, L. Chen, An Efficient Auction-based Mechanism for Mobile Data Offloading, Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 14(8), August 2015, Pages 1573-1586, IEEE.
[J.8] F. Martignon, S. Paris, I. Filippini, L. Chen, A. Capone, Efficient and Truthful Bandwidth Allocation in Wireless Mesh Community Networks, Transactions on Networking, vol. 23(1), February 2015, Pages 161-174, IEEE/ACM.
[J.7] I. Filippini, M. Cesana, E. Ekici, A New Outlook on Routing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Minimum Maintenance Cost Routing, Transactions on Networking, vol. 21(5), October 2013, Pages 1484-1498, IEEE/ACM.
[J.6] E. Amaldi, A. Capone, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, Design of Wireless Sensor Networks for Mobile Target Detection, Transactions on Networking, vol. 20(3), June 2012, Pages 784-797, IEEE/ACM.
[J.5] I. Filippini, M. Cesana, Topology Optimization for Hybrid Optical/Wireless Access Networks, Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 8(6), August 2010, Pages 614-625, Elsevier.
[J.4] A. Capone, M. Cesana, D. De Donno, I. Filippini, Deploying Multiple Interconnected Gateways in Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks: an Optimization Approach, Computer Communications, vol. 33(10), June 2010, Pages 1151-1161, Elsevier.
[J.3] A. Capone, G. Carello, I. Filippini, S. Gualandi, F. Malucelli, Routing, Scheduling and Channel Assignment in Wireless Mesh Networks: optimization models and algorithms, Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 8(6), August 2010, Pages 545-563, Elsevier.
[J.2] A. Capone, G. Carello, I. Filippini, S. Gualandi, F. Malucelli, Solving a Resource Allocation Problem in Wireless Mesh Networks: a Comparison Between a CP-based and a Classical Column Generation, Networks, vol. 55(3), May 2010, Pages 221-233, Wiley.
[J.1] E. Amaldi, A. Capone, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, F. Malucelli, Optimization Models and Methods for Planning Wireless Mesh Networks, Computer Networks, vol. 52(11), August 2008, pp. 2159-2171, Elsevier.
[B.1] A. Capone, I. Filippini, S. Gualandi, D. Yuan, Resource Optimization in Multiradio Multichannel Wireless Mesh Networks in "MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKING: Cutting Edge Directions", Second Edition, ed. by S. Basagni, M. Conti, S. Giordano, I. Stojmenovic, Wiley, 2013.
[C.33] F. Devoti, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Mm-wave Initial Access: A Context Information Overview, IEEE 19th International Symposium on "A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks" 2018, WoWMoM 2018, Chania, Greece.
[C.32] D. Sanvito, D. Moro, M.Gulli, I. Filippini, A. Capone, A. Campanella, ONOS Intent Monitor and Reroute service: enabling plug&play routing logic, IEEE International Conference on Network Softwarization 2018, NetSoft 2018, Montreal, Canada.
[C.31] D. Sanvito, I. Filippini, A. Capone, S. Paris, J. Leguay, Adaptive Robust Traffic Engineering in Software Defined Networks, IFIP Networking 2018, Zurich, Switzerland.
[C.30] M. Nourifar, F. Devoti, I. Filippini, Blockage-Robust 5G mm-Wave Access Network Planning, IFIP Networking 2018, Zurich, Switzerland.
[C.29] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, The Access Delay of Aloha with Exponential Back-off Strategies, IEEE IFIP Annual Mediterranean Ad Hoc Networking Workshop 2016, MedHocNet 2016, Vilanova i la Geltrú, Spain.
[C.28] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, The S-Aloha Capacity: Beyond the e-1 Myth, IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications 2016, INFOCOM 2016, San Francisco, California, USA.
[C.27] A. Capone, I. Filippini, V. Sciancalepore, D. Tremolada, Obstacle Avoidance Cell Discovery using mm-waves Directive Antennas in 5G Networks , The 9th International WDN Workshop on Cooperative and Heterogeneous Cellular Networks for 5G 2015, WDN-CN2015 Autumn, Hong Kong.
[C.26] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, Asymptotic Analysis of Schoute's Estimate for Dynamic Frame Aloha, International Conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks 2015, SoftCOM 2015, Split, Croatia.
[C.25] A. Capone, S. D'Elia, I. Filippini, M. Zangani, Measurement-based Energy Consumption Profiling of Mobile Radio Networks, International Forum on Research and Technologies for Society and Industry 2015, RTSI 2015, Torino, Italy.
[C.24] A. Capone, I. Filippini, V. Sciancalepore, Context Information for Fast Cell Discovery in mm-wave 5G Networks, The European Wireless Conference 2015, EW 2015, Budapest, Hungary.
[C.23] V. Sciancalepore, I. Filippini, V. Mancuso, A. Capone, A. Banchs, A semi-distributed mechanism for Inter-cell Interference Coordination exploiting the ABSF paradigm, IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking 2015, SECON 2015, Seattle, Washington, USA.
[C.22] R.J. Weiler, W. Keusgen, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Split Control Plane Functionality in Millimeter-Wave Overlay Access, International Conference on 5G for Ubiquitous Connectivity 2014, 5GU 2014, Levi, Finland.
[C.21] R.J. Weiler, M.Peter, W. Keusgen, E. Calvanese Strinati, A. De Domenico, I. Filippini, A. Capone, I. Siaud, A. Ulmer-Moll, A. Maltsev, T. Haustein, K. Sakaguchi, Enabling 5G Backhaul and Access with millimeter-waves, European Conference on Networks and Communications 2014, EuCNC 2014, Bologna, Italy.
[C.20] L. Barletta, F. Borgonovo, I. Filippini, Analysis of Dynamic Frame Aloha with Frame Restart, IEEE IFIP Annual Mediterranean Ad Hoc Networking Workshop 2014, MedHocNet 2014, Piran, Slovenia.
[C.19] A. Redondi, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Context Management in Energy-efficient Radio Access Networks, Tyrrhenian International Workshop on Digital Communications 2013, TIWDC 2013, Genova, Italy.
[C.18] I. Filippini, M. Cesana, I. Malanchini, Competitive Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Queuing Theory based Analysis, International Black Sea Conference on Communications and Networking 2013, BlackSeaCom 2013, Batumi, Georgia.
[C.17] S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, L. Chen, A Bandwidth Trading Marketplace for Mobile Data Offloading, IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications 2013, INFOCOM 2013 (Mini-conference), Turin, Italy.
[C.16] U. Barth, A. Capone, I. Filippini, B. Gloss, Rethinking Cellular System Architecture for Breaking Current Energy Efficiency Limits, IFIP Conference on Sustainable Internet and ICT for Sustainability 2012, SustainIT 2012, Pisa, Italy.
[C.15] S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, A. Capone, A Truthful Auction for Access Point Selection in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks, IEEE International Conference on Communications 2012, ICC 2012, Ottawa, Canada.
[C.12] S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, A. Capone, A Bandwidth Marketplace for Heterogeneous Mobile Networks , International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization 2011, NetGCooP 2011, Paris, France.
[C.11] F. Martignon, S. Paris, I. Filippini, A. Capone, Efficient Bandwidth Allocation in Wireless Community Networks, IFIP Wireless Days Conference 2011, Wireless Days 2011, Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada.
[C.10] C. Casetti, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, G. Dan, I. Marsh, Context-aware Information Dissemination in Vehicular Networks, Conference on Next Generation Internet Networks 2011, NGI 2011, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
[C.9] I. Filippini, M. Cesana, E. Ekici, Minimum Maintenance Cost Routing in Cognitive Radio Networks, IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2009, Macau SAR, P.R.C.
[C.8] D. Remondo, M. Nunes, S. Sargento, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, J. Triay, A. Agusti, M. De Andrade, Ll. Gutierrez, S. Sallent, C. Cervello-Pastor, Integration of Optical and Wireless Technologies in the Metro-Access: QoS Support and Mobility Aspects, Conference on Next Generation Internet Networks 2009, NGI 2009, Aveiro, Portugal.
[C.7] E. Amaldi, A. Capone, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, On the Design of Wireless Sensor Networks for Mobile Target Detection, International Network Optimization Conference 2009, INOC 2009, Pisa, Italy.
[C.6] A. Capone,M. Cesana,D. De Donno, I. Filippini, Optimal Placement of Multiple Interconnected Gateways in Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks, IFIP International Conference on Networking 2009, Networking 2009, Aachen, Germany.
[C.5] E. Amaldi, A. Capone, M. Cesana, I. Filippini, Coverage planning of Wireless Sensors for Mobile Target Detection, IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems 2008, MASS 2008, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
[C.4] A. Capone, I. Filippini, F. Martignon, Joint Routing and Scheduling Optimization in Wireless Mesh Networks with Directional Antennas, IEEE International Conference on Communications 2008, ICC 2008, Beijing, China.
[C.3] G. Carello, I. Filippini, S. Gualandi, F. Malucelli, Scheduling and routing in wireless multi-hop networks by column generation, International Network Optimization Conference 2007, INOC 2007, Spa, Belgium.
[C.2] A. Capone, I. Filippini, L. Fratta, L. Pizziniaco, Receiver Oriented Trajectory Based Forwarding, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS 3883, pp. 21-33, 2006. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
[C.1] A. Capone, I. Filippini, L. Pizziniaco, M.A. Garcia De La Fuente, SiFT: An efficient method for Trajectory Based Forwarding, 2nd International Symposium on Wireless Communications Systems 2005, ISWCS ’05, Siena, Italy.
[P.3] D. Sanvito, D. Moro, M.Gulli, I. Filippini, A. Capone, A. Campanella, Enabling external routing logic in ONOS with Intent Monitor and Reroute service (Demo), IEEE International Conference on Network Softwarization 2018, NetSoft 2018, Montreal, Canada.
[P.2] S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, A. Capone, A Bandwidth Marketplace for Heterogeneous Mobile Networks (Poster), International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization 2011, NetGCooP 2011, Paris, France.
[P.1] A. Capone, I. Filippini, L. Fratta, L. Pizziniaco, Receiver Oriented Trajectory Based Forwarding (Poster), European Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks 2006, EWSN ’06, Zurich, Switzerland.

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