If a juvenile fails to object at trial to imposition of a life-without-parole sentence, has he waived his argument on appeal that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama?
While the Court did not expressly address the question in Maxwell of whether a Miller claim is subject to forfeiture by inaction, the reasons it gave for retroactivity nonetheless amply justify placing a violation of Miller at least within the class of claims that probably cannot even be affirmatively waived. Read the concurrence.
The conclusion that failure to object does not waive the Eighth Amendment argument is similar to the way courts have treated significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions announcing new constitutional rules, such as Furman v. Georgia and Griffith v. Kentucky. Read the concurrence.
when the constitutional rule at issue had not been established at the time of the defendant’s trial. Read the concurrence.
The petition should be dismissed as improvidently granted because the record did not establish (by judicial finding or any other means) that the defendant was a juvenile. Additionally, the Court’s holding that a rule of law can be established by the Court’s complete failure to address an issue in a prior case is not correct. Even if a rule of law could be established in such a manner, the Court would be constrained to follow it in a subsequent case. Read the dissent.
The bottom line for this case is that a juvenile defendant does not need to object at trial to complain on appeal that he should not have been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. That holding can hardly be surprising, but the court certainly did take a messy route in getting there. The holding should also be unnecessary in most cases because the Legislature has now amended the controlling statute to prevent life without parole for juvenile offenders (which—in Supreme Court parlance—is anyone under the age of 18 when he committed the offense).
1) Did an anonymous tip that alleged the defendant was selling crack out of van but also named and described the defendant, the vehicle the defendant was in, and the location of the vehicle create reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant long enough to conduct a K-9 search of the vehicle for drugs?
2) Did the defendant have standing to challenge the search of the van, which was borrowed and which he abandoned when he fled on foot during the detention?
1) The court did not answer this question specifically, because it said the tip itself was not the sole basis of the reasonable suspicion. The location was also a high-crime area and the defendant behaved suspiciously when encountered. The fact that the tip was accurate as to the name of the defendant, description of the defendant, description of the vehicle, and location of the vehicle established reasonable suspicion when combined with the other two factors.
2) No. The driver had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the borrowed vehicle, but he abandoned that expectation when he abandoned the vehicle itself by fleeing.
The tip in this case was not really “anonymous” because the officers knew the telephone number and general identity of the tipster. The tipster even showed up at the scene when the defendant was finally apprehended. Nevertheless, there was more than enough here for the officers to conduct a narcotics investigation and detain the defendant, and—when the defendant ran—the officers had probable cause to arrest him for committing the offense of evading detention. This is not a surprising decision, but it should be helpful in cases in which a citizen has called for the police. The standing issue will be helpful only if a defendant has run away from a vehicle that was not really his in the first place.
When an alcohol-related crash resulted in a victim being hospitalized, did the time necessary to investigate the crash, coupled with the dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream, provide sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a blood draw under §724.012(b)(1)(C), Transportation Code, without a warrant?
No. The focus of the exigent circumstances analysis in both Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013)and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) is whether the delay that would be caused by obtaining a warrant, not investigating a crash, would threaten the destruction of the evidence. In this case, there are no facts on the record indicating that the delay in investigating the crash led to a delay in obtaining a warrant; in fact, the record is silent as to why the officer did not obtain a warrant. Read the opinion.
The record in this case indicates that the officer had wrapped up the investigation of the crash in less than an hour, but then delayed more than an hour afterward before having the defendant’s blood drawn. That evidence alone demonstrates there were no exigent circumstances in the case. Read the concurrence.
The record supports the trial court’s determination that the officer considered whether the delay caused by the investigation made any further delay in obtaining a warrant impracticable. Accordingly, the facts of this case are essentially identical to the facts in Schmerber, where the U.S. Supreme Court found exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw. Read the dissent.
This case is interesting because it was decided by all nine justices on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (en banc) and because the vote was split 5–4. But the issue of most importance in this case—or at least to prosecutors—is probably going to be decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals in another case. The majority opinion is exhaustive in its reasoning and very well-researched. It will be difficult to overturn on petition for discretionary review. But it is not unassailable. Near the end of the majority’s opinion, Justice Busby states, “The State’s evidence does not support an objectively reasonable conclusion that obtaining a warrant was impractical.” But much of the support for that conclusion is based upon the officer’s subjective testimony (or lack thereof). The split of the justices in this en banc decision would seem to make this case ripe for a decision from the Court of Criminal Appeals. But do not be surprised if this case is instead remanded to the court of appeals to be decided in light of the court’s ultimate application of McNeely and Schmerber to mandatory blood draw or implied consent situations.
After the Court of Criminal Appeals found the statute upon which the defendant’s conviction was based to be facially unconstitutional (see Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)), was the defendant barred from raising the constitutionality of the statute on appeal because he did not preserve it at trial?
No. The requirement that a defendant preserve an argument against the constitutionality of a statute is based on a presumption that a statute is valid until determined otherwise. That presumption cannot apply after the Court of Criminal Appeals has deemed a statute facially unconstitutional. Read the opinion.
This decision is arguably a logical extension of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Lo, as well as the more recent per curiam decision of the court in Ex parte Chance decided on May 7, 2014 (although there was no real holding in that latter case, notwithstanding the forcefulness of Judge Cochran’s concurring opinion).
Was the State entitled to a writ of mandamus against a trial judge who disqualified the entire district attorney’s office from prosecuting an “unspecified criminal offense committed against a child” because an assistant district attorney had witnessed the Children’s Advocacy Center’s interview of the victim?
Yes. There are only two grounds for the disqualification of a prosecutor set out in Art. 2.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: 1) when the prosecutor is of counsel adverse to the State, and 2) when the prosecutor is the subject of a criminal investigation. Neither of those applied here, and a trial court may not force a prosecutor to recuse herself, much less disqualify an entire office. Read the opinion.
So a trial cannot disqualify an ENTIRE district attorney’s office because ONE of the assistant district attorneys MAY have become a fact witness. Good to know. Good grief.
When police saw the defendant smoking a cigar and smelled marijuana, and when that probable cause led to a search that turned up cocaine, should the cocaine have been suppressed when the defendant presented evidence that he was actually smoking a “Kush” cigar that did not actually smell like marijuana?
No. Even if the defense could prove conclusively that material in the cigar did not smell like marijuana, that does not eliminate the possibility that the officers smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Read the opinion.
This case highlights the fact that, when reviewing an officer’s search or seizure, the courts view the officer’s objectively reasonable belief (rising to the level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause). Courts are not reviewing whether the officer may have in fact been mistaken. There was no evidence in this case that the officers did not reasonably smell marijuana.
1) Was the State required to plead laches at a habeas hearing to preserve that issue for appeal?
2) Was the defendant entitled to habeas relief on an ineffective assistance theory because his attorney had not presented payroll records at trial that showed the arresting officer’s 476 DWI arrests in the past year earned him $82,032 in overtime pay for testifying at the subsequent trials stemming from those arrests?
1) Yes. The State did not present any authority to support the idea that it can raise an issue on appeal that was not raised in the trial court, and even though the Court of Criminal Appeals may be currently considering that same issue, it has not yet been decided.
2) Yes. An investigation that did not include obtaining the payroll records, which were available and readily detailed the vast extent of Lindsey’s overtime pay, does not reflect reasonable professional judgment.
I have always thought that the general rule is that the non-appealing party (the appellee)—in this case, the State—does not need to preserve error to be able to raise it on appeal. The general rule is also that a trial court’s ruling can be upheld for any reason applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason at trial. Furthermore, it does not seem right that the defense should be permitted to impeach an officer with specific instances of alleged misconduct (as set forth in T.R. Evid. 608(b)). Therefore, a defense lawyer cannot be ineffective for failing to do something the rules of evidence prevent. It seems like the court of appeals got this decision wrong on all fronts. We shall see if the Court of Criminal Appeals reviews the case on petition for discretionary review.


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Kudermetova V. / Voskoboeva G. - Cirstea S. / Mitu A. 1:2 14.04.
Kudermetova V. / Voskoboeva G. - Bencic B. / Kuzmova V. 2:0 13.04.
Cirstea S. / Mitu A. - Bacsinszky T. / In-Albon Y. 2:0 12.04.
Bacsinszky T. / In-Albon Y. - Lister C. E. / Voracova R. 2:1 11.04.
Bencic B. / Kuzmova V. - Marchetti G. / Rus A. 2:1 11.04.
Kudermetova V. / Voskoboeva G. - Barthel M. / Knoll X. 2:1 11.04.
Lapko V. / Minella M. - Cirstea S. / Mitu A. 1:2 11.04.
Bencic B. / Kuzmova V. - Kalashnikova O. / Peterson R. 2:0 10.04.
Kudermetova V. / Voskoboeva G. - Fomina A. / Wacanno E. 2:0 10.04.
Kung L. / Tauson C. - Cirstea S. / Mitu A. 1:2 10.04.
Barthel M. / Knoll X. - Ferro F. / Parmentier P. 2:0 09.04.
Chen P. H. / Wu F. - Bacsinszky T. / In-Albon Y. 0:2 09.04.
Golubic V. / Teichmann J. B. - Marchetti G. / Rus A. CAN. 09.04.
Gorgodze E. / Korpatsch T. - Marchetti G. / Rus A. 0:2 09.04.
Skamlova C. / Zarycka A. - Lister C. E. / Voracova R. 0:2 08.04.
Thombare P. / Yashina E. - Lapko V. / Minella M. 0:2 08.04.
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matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


Entitlement to an extension of the delimiting date for Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits beyond August 28, 2009.
The Veteran served on active duty from March 1995 to August 1999.
This matter comes to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2010 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO), Education Center in Muskogee, Oklahoma.
This matter was previously before the Board in December 2012, November 2014, February 2017, and June 2017.
1. The Veteran had active service until August 27, 1999, he had until August 28, 2009 to use his Montgomery GI Bill benefits.
2. During this 10 year period, the Veteran worked full time and did not have a disability or disabilities that rendered it infeasible for him to go to school.
The criteria for extension of the delimiting date of the Montgomery GI Bill benefits have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3031(a), 3033; 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.7142, 21.7050(f), (g), 21.7051(a), 21.7135(s) (2017).
Under applicable criteria, VA has certain notice and assistance obligations to claimants. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). In this case, required notice was provided, and neither the Veteran, nor his representative, has either alleged, or demonstrated, any prejudice with regard to the content or timing of VA’s notices or other development. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 U.S. 1696 (2009). Thus, adjudication of his claim at this time is warranted.
As to VA’s duty to assist, the Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). Service treatment records, VA treatment records, vocational rehabilitation records, and private treatment records have been obtained. Additionally, the Veteran testified at a Board hearing.
The Veteran was separated from active duty on August 27, 1999. The law provides a ten-year period of eligibility during which an individual may use his or her entitlement to educational assistance benefits; that period begins on the date of the Veteran’s last discharge from active duty. 38 U.S.C. § 3031(a); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 3033; 38 C.F.R. § 21.7142.
Exceptions to this rule provide that the 10-year period can be extended if (1) the individual was initially prevented from establishing eligibility for educational assistance due to the character of his discharge, but was later able to establish eligibility as a result of a change, correction, modification, or other corrective action by competent military authority, (2) the individual was captured and held as a prisoner of war by a foreign government or power after his last discharge or release from active duty, (3) the individual was prevented from pursuing his chosen program of education before the expiration of the 10-year period because of a physical or mental disability not the result of his own willful misconduct, (4) the individual was enrolled in an educational institution regularly operated on the quarter or semester system and the period of entitlement under 38 U.S.C.A. § 3013 expired during a quarter or semester, or (5) the individual was enrolled in an educational institution not regularly operated on the quarter or semester system and the period of entitlement under 38 U.S.C.A. § 3013 expired after a major portion of a course was completed. 38 U.S.C. § 3031(b), (c), (d), and (f); 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.7050(f), (g), 21.7051(a), 21.7135(s). The Board notes that it must be clearly established by medical evidence that such a program of education was medically infeasible.
The Veteran’s period of active duty was from March 1995 to August 1999. Ten years from the date of his discharge from active duty was August 27, 2009. Therefore, his delimiting date is August 27, 2009.
The Veteran argues that his delimiting date should be extended as he was mentally ill during the period from discharge until March 31, 2008, as indicated in a June 2009 statement from the Veteran. The RO denied the Veteran’s claim for an extension of his delimiting date because a statement from the Veteran, submitted in June 2009, indicated that the Veteran worked full-time for the Social Security Administration from October 12, 1999 to present and had been promoted from Contact Representative to Supervisor.
3. The nature of the disability actually precluded the claimant from pursuing the desired program of training.
Chapter 30 Status and Award History shows that the Veteran has not been awarded benefits under that program. His May 2009 statement, indicated that he had been forced to deal with his mental health for many years and that there had been times when he felt able to go back to school, but would then become paranoid and afraid and subsequently would not follow through. He stated that he had been on his current medication for approximately one year and felt confident in his ability to pursue his education as long as he could stay on medicines and keep his doctor appointments.
He also argued that he experienced difficulty walking and sitting for extended periods due to your back and knee injuries.
The Veteran’s Extension of Ending Date Attachment indicated that he could not work or go to school due to mental disability beginning August 27, 1999, and ending March 31, 2008. He stated that he was not in control of his thinking, and that his decision making skills were poor. Without assistance, he felt out of control.
However, he acknowledged being employed as a contact representative/supervisor for the Social Security Administration from October 12, 1999, for more than a decade to at least beyond the delimiting date. Moreover, he acknowledged working 40 hours per week.
The Veteran has advanced several medical opinions in an effort to show that it was medically infeasible to pursue an educational program in the 10 years following his separation from military service.
In a June 2009 statement from a VA Outpatient Clinic in McAllen, Texas it was noted that the Veteran had bipolar disorder and alcohol abuse for which he had been treated with medication and counseling. This disability had existed since 2000. The medical professional suggested that the Veteran had been unable to work or go to school due to disability beginning January 1, 2000, and ending January 1, 2009.
In a March 2010 statement a nurse at VA Outpatient Clinic wrote that due to medical concerns, until stabilized, the Veteran was not able to attend school until the previous year. She noted that the Veteran had successfully attended school from May 2009 to the present, and supported his efforts to extend his GI Bill benefits.
VA treatment records were reviewed from multiple VA facilities in Texas and Washington from 2001-2010. These treatment records show that the Veteran was seen for bilateral knee pain and lumbosacral spine pain. At that time he reported working as a claim representative (office work at a desk) for the Social Security Administration and he denied having missed any time from work due to his orthopedic conditions. In another treatment record, the Veteran reported working as a technical instructor for the Social Security Administration, and he stated that he had been doing well overall. In January 2006, the Veteran reported that he had been on medication for mental health problems since 2001, which had rendered him essentially “symptom-free”. At that time, he reported being entirely without mental health complaints or concerns.
In May 2006, the Veteran reported that he had been diagnosed with testicular cancer and had undergone surgery in April 2006. Treatment records showed a history of testicular cancer with surgery and radiation in April 2006, history of depression on medication, and history of chronic back pain. He again reported working as a supervisor at the Social Security Administration. In October 2007, the Veteran reported that he was doing well at work and at home. He was waiting on a promotion at work.
Having reviewed the evidence, the Board rules that the petition for extension of the Delimiting Date Under Ch. 30, 38 U.S.C. 3031(d) is denied. While the Veteran has advanced several medical opinions in support of his claim, the fact remains that these letters do not appear to have any grounding in the evidence. To this point, the medical professionals appear to argue that the Veteran was incapable of working at a time when he worked full-time for a decade and had been promoted. A bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. See Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998).
Here, the evidence clearly showed that the Veteran was employed on a full-time basis from October 1999 until after his delimiting date had elapsed, and he had even been promoted from a claims representative to instructor to supervisor.
The evidence of record does not show that the Veteran missed any extended period of work due to disability and he did not provide medical evidence that confronted this stark reality. The medical opinions that were presented wholly omitted any discussion of this fully gainful employment. There is little doubt that the Veteran’s service connected disabilities caused him some impairment in his work, but the evidence of record shows that he could work, and the ability to not just keep a job but also excel in it (as evidenced by promotions), suggests that his medical conditions did not render him medically infeasible of pursuing an educational program. Accordingly, the Veteran’s claim is denied.
An extension of the delimiting date for Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits beyond August 28, 2009 is denied.


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Messrs. Frank A. Bull and Russell T. Mount, both of New York City, for petitioner.
In view of petitioner's failure to appeal from the dismissal as to the tugs, we must assume that as to them petitioner failed to make out its case and that the stranding of the tanker was not in whole or in part due to any fault of theirs. It was not shown that respondent was to have or at any time did have control of the tanker or that it agreed or undertook to do more than to furnish tugs to assist her while using her own propelling power. Her master, officers, and crew were at their stations, and her propelling power and steering apparatus were used to bring her to destination. And if the pilotage clause is valid, the tug captains while on board the tanker and respectively acting as her pilot were for that turn the servants of petitioner and the respondent may not be held responsible for any act or omission of theirs during the period of that service.
The validity of its applicable provision cannot reasonably be doubted. So far as concerns the service to be rendered under the agreement, respondent was not a common carrier or bailee or bound to serve or liable as such. Towage does not involve bailment, and the services covered by the contract were less than towage. Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 200, 52 S.Ct. 347, 76 L.Ed. 699. There is no foundation in this case for the application of the doctrine that common carriers and others under like duty to serve the public according to their capacity and the terms of their undertaking cannot by any form of agreement secure exemption from liability for loss or damage caused by their own negligence. N.Y.C. Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L.Ed. 627; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 440, 9 S.Ct. 469, 32 L.Ed. 788. Respondent had no exclusive privilege or monopoly in respect of the services that petitioner desired to have performed for its tanker. And petitioner was under no compulsion to accept the terms of respondent's pilotage clause. There is nothing to suggest that the parties were not on equal footing or that they did not deal at arm's length. 'There is no rule of public policy which denies effect to their expressed intention, but, on the contrary, as the matter lies within the range of permissible agreement, the highest public policy is found in the enforcement of the contract which was actually made.' Santa Fe, P. & P. Railway Co. v. Grant Brothers, 228 U.S. 177, 188, 33 S.Ct. 474, 478, 57 L.Ed. 787.
Respondent's responsibility is not to be extended beyond the service that it undertook to perform. It did not furnish pilotage. The provision that its tug captains while upon the assisted ship would be the servants of her owner is an application of the well-established rule that when one puts his employee at the disposal and under the direction of another for the performance of service for the latter. such employee while so engaged acts directly for and is to be deemed the employee of the latter and not of the former. Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 284 U.S. 305, 308, 52 S.Ct. 141, 76 L.Ed. 310. It would be unconscionable for petitioner upon occurrence of a mishap to repudiate the agreement upon which it obtained the service.
The decree under consideration is not in conflict with the decisions of this court cited by petitioner, The Steamer Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167, 20 L.Ed. 382, and Compania de Navegacion v. Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 66, 48 S.Ct. 459, 72 L.Ed. 787. Neither involved an agreement similar to the provisions of the pilotage clause on which this case turns.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


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1. Telegraphs — Mental Anguish — Surgeon — Notice of Importance — Substantial Damages.
For mental anguish proximately resulting from the negligence of a telegraph company in sending an affirmative reply from a surgeon to a message reading, "Young lady appendicitis; can't pay anything till fall. Will you operate? Answer," and signed by the physician of the patient, substantial damages are recoverable by the patient for whose benefit it was sent, the message giving notice of the character of damages that would likely result.
2. Telegraphs — Reasonable Stipulations — Message — Blank.
Telegraph companies may make reasonable stipulations restrictive of liability to the extent that they are not relieved thereby from the obligations of diligence superimposed by law in the performance of their duties.
3. Same — Messenger — Agent of Sender — Principal and Agent — Telephone — Evidence.
A telegraph company cannot avail itself of a stipulation in its message blank to the effect that a messenger boy is to be deemed the agent of the sender in taking a telegram to the telegraph office for transmission, without liability on the part of the company, when it appears that the sender of the message got into communication with a person answering the telephone number call of the company and the messenger came in accordance with a request that one be sent, and was evidently sent by the company for the express purpose of getting the message for transmission.
4. Same — Prima Facie Evidence.
Testimony that the sender of a message called the well-known telephone number of a telegraph company's office and requested the one responding thereto that a messenger be sent to take a telegram to the office, and that the messenger appeared in consequence and received the message, affords evidence that the messenger was the duly authorized agent of the company for the purpose of receiving the message for transmission.
5. Telegraphs — Mental Anguish — Surgeon — Measure of Damages — Evidence.
In this case damages were demanded for mental anguish caused the plaintiff on account of the failure of the defendant telegraph company to transmit a telegram replying affirmatively to one sent to a surgeon by the plaintiff's physician, reading, "Young lady appendicitis; can't pay anything till fall. Will you operate? Answer." Evidence upon the measure of damages Held competent which tended to show that the attending physician, not hearing from his telegram, did not call upon his patient until several hours after his usual time for a visit, desiring to make arrangements elsewhere; that in this interval of waiting the plaintiff, not understanding his absence, suffered mental anguish in apprehension that she could not get operated on, from which she supposed that she would die, etc.
6. Appeal and Error — Incompetent Evidence — Instructions — Harmless Error.
Instructions by the court in this case to the jury, that they must not consider certain incompetent evidence in an answer of a witness, on the question of the measure of damages for plaintiff's mental suffering alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant telegraph company in failing to transmit a message, Held, sufficient, and no error is found therein.
(475) APPEAL from Cline, J., at December Term, 1911, of BEAUFORT.
George H. Fearons, Small, MacLean McMullan, and A. S. Barnard for defendant.
Action to recover damages for negligent failure to deliver a telegraphic message. There was a verdict for plaintiff establishing negligent failure to transmit message pursuant to contract, and awarding recovery of substantial damages by reason of mental anguish. Judgment on verdict, and defendant excepted and appealed.
1. That there was no evidence that the message had ever been received for transmission by defendant company.
2. That there was no sufficient evidence of mental anguish to justify an award of substantial damages on that account.
But we are of opinion that neither position can be sustained.
DR. SOUTHGATE LEIGH, ROPER, N.C. 19 July, 1909.
Young lady appendicitis; can't pay anything till fall. Will you operate? Answer. J. H. SPEIGHT.
Dr. J. W. SPEIGHT. July 19, 1909.
Yes; send patient at once. What train?
That this message was never received, and the doctor, not having heard, did not go to see the patient the following morning by 8:30, as he would have done, nor until 2 or 3 P. M., and then told the parties that no message had been received. That it was then arranged that the patient should go to Dr. Tayloe at Washington, N.C. and she did go there on Wednesday and was there treated successfully. That Dr. Tayloe was a skilled surgeon and the patient's case was properly treated at Washington. As tending to show a degree of mental suffering amounting to mental anguish, the plaintiff, testifying in her own behalf, among other things was allowed to say: "He said I had to go to the hospital right away. He could not operate on me. He said that he would wire Dr. Leigh that afternoon and let us know the next morning, and when my mother asked him why he did not come, he said it was because he had not heard from Dr. Leigh."
"Tell us whether you were alarmed or not about your condition, and to what extent, as best you can?"
(Defendant objects to this form of answer and moves that the same be stricken out. Objection overruled, and defendant excepts. Here the court charged the jury that they should not consider the crying of the mother nor anything except the plaintiff's mental and physical condition directly due to her failure to hear from Dr. Leigh as to whether he would operate).
"I did not know of anywhere I could get relief except from Dr. Leigh during that whole day, until Dr. Speight came late in the evening and said he had not heard from Dr. Leigh, and fixed for me to go to the Washington Hospital."
Q. What impressions was made on your mind by Dr. Speight — that you would die if you did not get operated on? A. He said that an operation had to be performed, and so I thought it was an operation or death.
Q. Why was it that you had to look to Dr. Leigh? A. Because that was all Dr. Speight had told me.
Q. Did you have any money to pay cash for your operation? A. I did not.
Q. From the time Dr. Speight said he could not hear from Dr. Leigh, on through the balance of the afternoon and night and next morning until you heard from Dr. Speight that Dr. Tayloe would operate on you, what was your mental condition with reference to the question as to whether you could get anybody to operate on you at all? A. I thought the reason that Dr. Leigh had not answered the telegram was that I did not have the money to pay him with, and I did not know whether I could get anybody else to operate on me or not. I did not know whether Dr. Tayloe would operate on me without the money or not, and my mind was all torn up because I did not know whether I could get anybody to operate on me or not. If I had heard from Dr. Leigh I would have known whether he would operate on me or not, and (478) would not have been uneasy.
"I was conscious of everything that was happening. I was studying whether I could be operated on or not. I did not want to be operated on, but after Dr. Speight said I had to be operated on, I thought I would have to be operated on right away or die one. My mother and sister were crying because they were afraid of the operation and death, too, I suppose. What was troubling me was that Dr. Speight said I had to be operated on and we didn't hear from Dr. Leigh, and I didn't know of anywhere else I could get operated on.". . . "I did not know why he did not hear from Dr. Speight. I did not know whether he thought I would die before I could get to the hospital or not. I was lying there thinking that he thought I was too low to go to the hospital, and that I would die before I could get there. I thought he was waiting to let me die before he let us know what was the matter. That annoyed my mind."
Q. To what extent? A. I was in agony. I did not know what to do or what to think. I just thought he was waiting for me to die.
On the same subject Walker Alexander, a brother of plaintiff, testified as to his sister's suffering as follows: "She would ask me when I would go to the room, `Bud, have you heard from the doctor yet?' and I said no. She said, `Do you think I am going to die?' and I said, `No, I hope not.' All she talked about was believing she was going to die."
The right of an addressee or a beneficiary whose interest has been made known to the company to recover for a negligent failure to deliver a message of this character is fully established with us, and a persual of this testimony will clearly bring plaintiff's cause within the principle of our decisions where substantial damages by reason of mental anguish have been allowed. Christmon v. Telegraph Co., 159 N.C. 195; Kivett v. Telegraph Co., 156 N.C. 296; Suttle v. Telegraph Co., 148 N.C. 480; Dayvis v. Telegraph Co., 139 N.C. 80; Green v. Telegraph Co., 136 N.C. 489; Bright v. Telegraph Co., 132 N.C. 317; Kennon v. Telegraph Co., 126 N.C. 232; Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 370.
As to the receipt of the message by the company, the relevant facts appearing in the record as we understand them, are that (479) the original message was received by Dr. Leigh in due course, at his office in Norfolk on the afternoon of 19 July, and the doctor then dictated a return message, which was written by his secretary on a company blank, kept regularly in his office for the purpose. The secretary then called over the telephone for 165, the telegraph company's number, and asked them to send a boy for the telegram. The witness stating that "165 was the defendant company's phone number, as she had called it several hundred times before. That in fifteen or twenty minutes, not over a half hour, a boy came for the return message, and it was delivered to him in the office of Dr. Leigh.
There was evidence for defendant from the different employees of the office that no such message was received in the office of the company, and the office record, the call sheet on which all entries of the kind were made, was referred to by the witnesses, who stated that it showed no call for a messenger on that date for any purpose, and on consideration of the testimony and the authorities applicable, we are of opinion and so hold, that there was a receipt of the return message for transmission on the part of the company, or rather testimony from which such receipt could be properly inferred, and this notwithstanding a stipulation appearing on the blank that no responsibility regarding messages should attach to the company unless accepted at one of its transmission offices, and if a message is sent to the office by one of the company's messengers, he acts for the purpose as "agent of the sender."
It is well understood here and in other jurisdictions that a telegraph company may make reasonable stipulations restrictive of its liability and to the extent that they are not relieved thereby from the obligations of diligence superimposed by law in the performance of their duties. Sherrill v. Telegraph Co., 109 N.C. 527; Thompson v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 449. And there is authority to the effect that the stipulations in question here appearing on a blank on which the sender writes the message shall bind the sender as a part of the contract. Stamey v. Western Union, 92 Ga. 613. If this, however, may be allowed to prevail under ordinary conditions, it is qualified, as a general proposition, (480) by decisions which hold that if a messenger is instructed by the company to procure an answer, for this last purpose the messenger will be considered the company's agent and the stipulation referred to is not controlling. And this limitation should apply, we think, when in response to a specific request the company sends a messenger for the express purpose of taking a message. Will v. Telegraph Co., 3 A.D. N. Y., 22; Ayers v. Telegraph Co., 3 A.D. N. Y., 149; Jones on Telegraph and Telephone Companies, sec. 408; 37 Cyc., 1692, note 68.
The case of Ayers v. Telegraph Co., 65 N.Y., supra, cited by defendant, recognizes the limitations on the general principle established in the former case. Will v. Telegraph Co., supra. In this connection it was further insisted for defendant that there was no evidence that the messenger boy was sent by the company for the purpose of receiving the message, and that the message given over the telephone wire to the telephone number of defendant company was not sufficient as testimony in the absence of evidence ultra that this message was received by an agent of defendant company authorized for that purpose, citing Planters Oil Co. v. Telegraph Co., 126 Ga. 621. While there is some difference in the facts of that case, we do not think it can be upheld as authority on the facts presented here, where the number is called, known to be that of the telegraph company, "tried as such, several hundred times," as stated by the witness, and responded to by a company messenger. In such case, on the better reason and by the weight of authority, we are of opinion that a messenger sent in response to such a request should be considered prima facie an agent of the company, and certainly under such circumstance there is evidence from which authority of the company could be inferred. Reed v. R. R., 72 Iowa 166; R. R. v. Potter, 36 Ill. App. 590; Gore v. Tel. Co., Tex. Civ. App.; Jones on Evidence (2 Ed.), 262.
There were also several objections to the admission of evidence, chiefly as to the physical and nervous condition of the plaintiff at the time in question, but none of the exceptions can be sustained or held for reversible error. Most of the testimony was directly relevant as (481) tending to show mental suffering that would naturally arise under the conditions indicated, and where it was otherwise, the trial court in its clear and comprehensive charge was so careful to restrict the recovery and the effect of the evidence to the suffering directly attributable to the failure to deliver the message and to that alone that the jury could not have been misled. There is no error, and the judgment below must be affirmed.

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§ 210.020 Vaccination and Tag.
§ 210.030 Facsimile, Etc., Tags Prohibited.
§ 210.040 Non-Transferability of Tag.
§ 210.050 Badge or Tag Required.
§ 210.100 Collar With Badge or Tag Required.
§ 210.110 Running At Large Prohibited.
§ 210.120 Dogs or Cats of Temporary Residents.
§ 210.130 Barking Dogs — Howling Cats.
§ 210.170 Number of Dogs or Cats Kept, Maintained or Harbored in Residentially Zoned Districts.
§ 210.180 Impoundment — Required of Animals At Large.
§ 210.190 Impoundment — Period — Disposition of Dogs and Cats Unclaimed Within Impoundment Period.
§ 210.200 Impoundment — Completion of Registration — Vaccination Procedure Following Release.
§ 210.210 Additional Fees Collectible.
§ 210.220 Interfering With Impounded Animals.
§ 210.225 Tampering With Humane Traps, Cages, Animal Carriers or Otherwise Interfering With The Duties of The Animal Control Officer.
§ 210.230 Authority of Animal Control Officer To Quarantine Animals.
§ 210.240 Suspected Rabid Animals.
§ 210.250 Animals Exposed To Rabies.
§ 210.260 Report of Rabies.
§ 210.280 Delivery of Dogs or Cats To Animal Control Officer Required.
§ 210.290 Right of Entry of Animal Control Officer.
§ 210.300 Owning, Possessing or Harboring A Dangerous Dog.
§ 210.320 Euthanization of Certain Dogs Under Certain Conditions.
§ 210.330 Keeping Livestock Within City.
§ 210.333 Keeping Service Animals Within City.
§ 210.350 Turning Animals Loose For Purpose of Impoundment Prohibited.
§ 210.360 Dangerous Animals — Prohibiting The Keeping or Harboring Thereof.
§ 210.370 Animal Neglect or Abandonment.
§ 210.390 Fighting, Baiting, Keeping, Using, Etc., Bulls, Bears, Dogs, Etc., Prohibited.
§ 210.410 License and Permit Issuance and Revocation.
Cross References — As to nuisances generally, see ch. 220; as to number of dogs or cats allowed in residential zoned districts, see §210.170.
Section 210.020 Vaccination and Tag.
Section 210.030 Facsimile, Etc., Tags Prohibited.
Section 210.040 Non-Transferability of Tag.
Section 210.050 Badge or Tag Required.
Section 210.100 Collar With Badge or Tag Required.
Section 210.110 Running At Large Prohibited.
Section 210.120 Dogs or Cats of Temporary Residents.
Section 210.130 Barking Dogs — Howling Cats.
Section 210.170 Number of Dogs or Cats Kept, Maintained or Harbored in Residentially Zoned Districts.
Section 210.180 Impoundment — Required of Animals At Large.
Section 210.190 Impoundment — Period — Disposition of Dogs and Cats Unclaimed Within Impoundment Period.
Section 210.200 Impoundment — Completion of Registration — Vaccination Procedure Following Release.
Section 210.210 Additional Fees Collectible.
Section 210.220 Interfering With Impounded Animals.
Section 210.225 Tampering With Humane Traps, Cages, Animal Carriers or Otherwise Interfering With The Duties of The Animal Control Officer.
Section 210.230 Authority of Animal Control Officer To Quarantine Animals.
Section 210.240 Suspected Rabid Animals.
Section 210.250 Animals Exposed To Rabies.
Section 210.260 Report of Rabies.
Section 210.280 Delivery of Dogs or Cats To Animal Control Officer Required.
Section 210.290 Right of Entry of Animal Control Officer.
Section 210.300 Owning, Possessing or Harboring A Dangerous Dog.
Section 210.320 Euthanization of Certain Dogs Under Certain Conditions.
Section 210.330 Keeping Livestock Within City.
Section 210.333 Keeping Service Animals Within City.
Section 210.350 Turning Animals Loose For Purpose of Impoundment Prohibited.
Section 210.360 Dangerous Animals — Prohibiting The Keeping or Harboring Thereof.
Section 210.370 Animal Neglect or Abandonment.
Section 210.390 Fighting, Baiting, Keeping, Using, Etc., Bulls, Bears, Dogs, Etc., Prohibited.
Section 210.410 License and Permit Issuance and Revocation.


65-2844. Reinstatement of license, registration, permit or certificate; application; burden of proof; reapplication for reinstatement, when; proceedings. A person whose license, registration, permit or certificate has been revoked may apply for reinstatement after the expiration of three years from the effective date of the revocation. Application for reinstatement shall be on a form provided by the board and shall be accompanied by a reinstatement of a revoked license, registration, permit or certificate fee established by the board under the applicable practice act. The burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence shall be on the applicant to show sufficient rehabilitation to justify reinstatement. If the board determines a license, registration, permit or certificate should not be reinstated, the person shall not be eligible to reapply for reinstatement for three years from the effective date of the denial. All proceedings conducted on an application for reinstatement shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act and shall be reviewable in accordance with the Kansas judicial review act. The board, on its own motion, may stay the effectiveness of an order of revocation of license, registration, permit or certificate.
History: L. 1957, ch. 343, § 44; L. 1976, ch. 273, § 20; L. 1984, ch. 313, § 120; L. 1987, ch. 240, § 8; L. 1991, ch. 193, § 1; L. 2010, ch. 17, § 139; L. 2014, ch. 131, § 17; July 1, 2015.


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So the moment many of you have no doubt been waiting for. The new Yamaha Tyros3 keyboard, the latest in the line of popular flagship models that have shaped the future of all other keyboards and digital pianos in Yamaha’s range.
Fortunately, I have been one of only a handful of people to experience the new flagship keyboard from Yamaha before its official release and yet more importantly, I have also had this new musical delight positioned comfortably in my own home, allowing for some very close scrutiny indeed!
The FSX keyboard continues the lovely feel the Tyros2 gave us with now enhanced after touch response. There are no new speakers available for Tyros3, however Tyros2 speakers are fully compatible as all the connections and speaker slots remain intact.
The button layout is only slightly different, however spread out more liberally around the keyboard. The buttons also have a slightly lower profile resulting in a cleaner perspective.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Tyros series of keyboards have been a huge success and have certainly warranted our musical affections. There are those of you who may also remember that it was due to my love of the original Tyros, I decided to start ‘Yamaha Personal Keyboard Owner‘ and none of us have really looked back since have we? Tyros(1) will be fondly remembered for its introduction of MegaVoices, which gave accompaniment styles real sounding guitars, including fantastic strums and many other characteristics that we may today take for granted. There was just one issue though. Naturally owners expected to play MegaVoices themselves, especially as they are listed in the voice selections. Unfortunately though, MegaVoices are instead intended for talented accompaniment style programmers, who could carefully add these nuances when they saw fit.
Tyros2 appeared and answered this request by many Yamaha enthusiasts and featured playable MegaVoices, known as Super Articulation. We all welcomed Super Articulation with open arms as a fleet of new instruments including guitars, brass, strings and many others were added with the same characteristics we loved in MegaVoices, however now playable live.
The latest buzzword on the Yamaha Tyros3 is Super Articulation 2, but what does this bring to the table?
Just like Super Articulation on Tyros2, each voice featuring the technology has an impressive number of recorded samples, therefore creating a very satisfying realism from a multitude of options the keyboard brain can select from. Essentially the more samples the better, but the clever part is the keyboard working out where they fit together in a performance. Super Articulation 2 however goes much further with a larger array of instrument characteristics available the keyboard can trigger automatically based upon your timing, pressure, while also taking into consideration which keys are pressed in relation to the previously triggered key, but probably the most exciting part is you can (if you wish) have total control over this.
There may not be a huge selection of Super Articulation 2 voices, however the 5 core selections available take a whopping 1/6 of the internal wave memory capacity! So we are talking about a really large range of new instrument samples available. As you may have noticed already, they are all wind instruments and using the new Super Articulation 2 technology, the keyboard can now fully express legato and staccato-like nuances that are found in the sound the real life counterparts feature.
Tyros3 has two new buttons located to the right of the Pitch Bend and Modulation wheels named Art. 1 and Art. 2. If we take the new Super Articulation 2 Clarinet as an example, you can control the samples played at both the beginning and the tail end of the note.
Using these additional buttons, Tyros3’s automatic computer brain can be momentarily overridden while you apply effects when you so desire. Be it a glide, glissando and other characteristics depending on the voice selected. The Art. 1 and Art. 2 buttons can be selected either before you press a note or just before you release, giving the player a full array of selections to mimic their favourite tunes and the result is both rewarding and quite astounding.
However for those of you who don’t wish to be pressing these two new buttons during a performance, the keyboard will also tirelessly fill in the gaps based on your style of playing. So really you have the best of both worlds.
It is also worth noting that Super Articulation (1) voices new and old also can use the Art. 1 and Art. 2 functionality when available. The biggest alert to this is when both the buttons are illuminated green, indicating that they can be used with the voice selected.
The feature of Tyros3 that is responsible for the overall audio improvement has to be the new D.S.P. effects. Now boasting extremely high quality reverbs, both voices and accompaniment styles have a far richer sound. Styles more than any other section of the Tyros3 seem to make the most of this and the compression, but it is certainly not the only benefiting section of the keyboard. Of course this also adds to the realism, especially when the era of styles change. You will notice that drum kits and bass in particular will have different effects applied depending on the genre the style is based around adding to the authenticity.
It is not just limited to new effects though… There are two exclusive D.S.P. effect blocks for accompaniment styles, providing rich aural sensations no matter what rhythm you select. This means where Tyros2 had 3 D.S.P. effects on offer, Tyros3 has 5 available. You certainly notice the difference when you jump back to Tyros2 as it sounds less dynamic and dare I say weak after playing the new flagship Tyros3. This of course is technology moving on and no matter how much I love the Tyros2, the successor takes us beyond yet again.
Organ players will no doubt rejoice at this one new feature alone as it allows them to tweak theatre organ footages on the fly. No more fiddling with up and down buttons and then saving to a registration, now you can control it all in real time with just a little bit of skill and effort. There is also a button added to the panel layout so you can immediately jump to the screen with all the footages displayed.
The sliders can also be used to control other on screen elements. For example, when the balance display is shown on the LCD screen, you can control all of the volumes with the 8 provided sliders. It works just as well on other areas of the operating system as well.
There is also a ninth assignable slider, that can be used to control a multitude of functions including style volume, microphone volume and many others that you can select from a list.
Tyros2 featured an impressive 400 styles, however there is always the desire for more from the community. Tyros3 boasts a whopping 450 styles, all utilizing the new features of the keyboard. Many old favourites remain, but every style has been enhanced overall and some intros and endings have also been changed. There is of course a great selection of completely new additions to wet our appetitive for something completely different.
The backing styles on Tyros3 also use a new programming technology designed primarily for the guitars and as a result, are far more realistic when trying to match the most awkward of chords you may invoke.
If we take the Movie&Show category as an example, there are a few new styles here that feature prominently in the Tyros3 repertoire. One style is perfect for anyone who has loved the ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’ films and another captures the awe inspiring work of Hanz Zimmer, another movie this time from the blockbuster hit ‘Gladiator’.
As exciting as these styles are, the most invigorating has to be Ethereal Movie’. Usually with any style, you are locked into the tempo, which can make it difficult to add a real sense of emotion, particularly with voices you play slowly. Ethereal Movie however changes this premise and allows you to play freestyle as you are not locked into a set speed for the majority of the variations. The metronome is certainly not a requisite here!
A resonating sound erupts as you trigger the style and you can change chords whenever you wish and not when the tempo dictates. It certainly gives you a whole new experience on the Tyros3, however it is a shame that this seems to be the only accompaniment style that features this new freestyle’ ambition. Hopefully more will be available in the future!
Of course there is a lot more to Tyros3 than just the new Super Articulation 2 technology. The classic Sweet! designation remains and fans of the orchestral sound will no doubt celebrate with the fact that the Tyros3 includes a brand new Orchestral Flute, Oboe, Clarinet and even Bassoon. All sound fantastic and there is even a new Orchestral Harp that really does sound delicious. There are also new Super Articulation (1) and MegaVoices added.
For those who were hoping for new piano voices will also not be disappointed, as there are an additional 5 voices named; Concert Piano (equivalent to a piano voice from the CVP-400 range), Pop Grand, Rock Piano, Ambient Piano and Cocktail Piano. Each piano voice has its own distinctive sound and therefore should match many of your intended sheet music selections.
For those who adore their organ voices (and that would be a lot of you!), Yamaha have added to the repertoire, while also taking full advantage of Super Articulation. In Tyros2, the aim was for a pure representation, taking out any of the audio segments that were deemed rough. Now in a bizarre yet understandable twist, the nuances such as the generator leakage sound that Yamaha before painstakingly removed, have all been recaptured and added for authenticity.
There are also new drum kits added, featuring a more powerful rock kit, while also not forgetting the Dance category and extending this section too.
Older voices that are now deemed to be less important are now placed in a new folder called ‘Legacy’. This can be found by selecting one of the voice panel buttons on the right hand side of the keyboard and selecting ‘Up’, which also of course reveals the famous GM&XG folder. The reasoning behind this is quite simple really as Yamaha want you to use the newer updated voices available in your performances. It is also worth noting that the newer voices will be featured on page 1 on each voice section.
This is probably an area you won’t hear mentioned very often or at all by the traditional publications; however I do feel as one of the younger Yamaha enthusiasts, that it is of importance. Tyros3 has a bucket load of new Synth and Pad voices that have been taken directly from the Motif and when I say a lot, I really mean a lot!
While this area of the keyboard may not get the attention of your typical Yamaha owner, it is actually very exciting for those of us who like to experiment with the Dance’ selection. Of course the pad sounds can also be used within other style genres. This on top of the fact that there are now sliders to adjust volumes on the fly, makes it more than just a little appealing for fans of this genre to really expand their enjoyment.
It is not just better, but absolutely stunning. Utilising TFT technology, the screen is incredibly vibrant, clear and viewable from many angles. So confident are Yamaha with this new viewing device that the contrast wheel is now nowhere to be found, it really is that good!
Yamaha are also confident that the screen will perform much better for those who perform outside.
For those who have experienced the Yamaha range already in the last few years, will no doubt notice a comforting familiarity with the Tyros3. For those who are migrating from either Tyros(1) or Tyros2, there is very little difference in functionality and layout, however the overall presentation has been improved. Now sporting a soft blue colour scheme, all the areas are easy to read, pleasing to the eye and edges far more rounded than ever before.
New information screens are available for One Touch Settings (O.T.S.) and the Registration Memory section. If we take the O.T.S. information screen as an example, you can now see on the LCD display what voices are used within each ‘One Touch Setting’. No more shock horror when you jump to an unsuspecting voice selection as you now see in advance what will be triggered before selecting the button.
For those who like me use the Internet Direct Connection (I.D.C.) feature, will be happy to know that an adapter is no longer required for those who use a wired connection. There is now a built in LAN port around the back of the keyboard. I.D.C. allows the keyboard to connect to Yamaha directly on-line, which gives you the opportunity to purchase new premium quality styles, download free additional Music Finder records and much more.
I personally love to create my own multipads, however timing is crucial when activating them during a performance otherwise your multipad that is intended to begin on the first beat instead triggers too late causing a right mess. Sometimes you wish you had an extra hand and to get around this, I would cheat by adding an extra break or intro in-between so I had time to trigger one of my custom selections. On Tyros3 however, the process is made far easier with the synchronisation button. Simply hold this new button, select a multipad that Yamaha have provided or you have created yourself and happily it all matches up perfectly. Very handy indeed!
If the hunt for an officially recognised compatible hard drive was causing a few headaches with Tyros2, well you no longer need to reach for the paracetamol. The Tyros3 comes pre-installed with a massive 80GB hard drive. This is certainly plenty to store your registrations, additional styles and of course the real hard drive space grabbers, which include wave files (*.wav) and expandable voices.
Hard Disk Recording has also seen an enhancement in the way of a new two track feature. This allows you to record one track, followed by another separate track and then allows you to adjust each one independently before combining them.
Tyros3 includes USB 2.0 support. This means that loading new wave samples (additional voices you can purchase on-line from third party manufacturers) is far quicker than that of Tyros2.
Multipads are crying out to be updated! Very little has changed in this area and the selection remains virtually identical to the ones that arrived with the original Tyros. With all the new Synth sounds in particular now knocking on our door and much of dance music relying on loops (which Multipads cater for perfectly!), I hope that Yamaha have a look at this area in particular in the near future.
The sliders sometimes need a larger nudge so they realise you are triggering them and this seems to be the case when the position shown on the screen doesn’t match the physical slider itself below the LCD display. The sliders are not motorised (which actually means there is less to go wrong with them!), but it does mean you need to adjust the sliders initially.
The power button has now moved to the rear of the keyboard, which is completely different from the Tyros(1) and 2. This actually is incredibly minor; however it is not the perfect solution so only just barely worthy of mention in this section.
The sliders are bound to impress the organ enthusiasts and for those who wish to adjust other parameters such as volumes on the fly, will feel a sense of control the up and down buttons could never quite match.
It certainly seems that Yamaha has listened to a lot of what the community were looking for in a new flagship keyboard as well, including USB 2.0 support, new Grand Pianos, crystal clear LCD screen, faster expandable voice loading and much more.
Hopefully third party voice creators will for the first time find extra vigour within themselves to create extremely high quality voices of their own, now that loading times have vastly improved thanks to the USB 2.0 feature.
Tyros3 is a whole lot grittier than its predecessor. Tyros2 aimed for a very pure recreation of whatever it was trying to mimic, however Tyros3 goes for the more accurate and dare I say more dirtier representation, which completely enhances the styles and voices tremendously in such a positive way.
Let’s be clear, this is not a Tyros2 with just a few bits bolted on to keep people happy, in fact the better description would be Tyros2 further refined and given a swift kick up the backside pushing it ever closer to perfection. Perfection may be unattainable, but Yamaha are certainly edging ever closer to this goal. Tyros(1) owners will no doubt experience a gigantic transformation moving to Tyros3 and even those with Tyros2 daring to upgrade will feel an inner warmth in their musical soul after a couple of hours with the new flagship.
As always, get yourself down to your local dealer when Tyros3 is available and give it a whirl for yourself. I am certainly convinced after just a few weeks! Even with this extended review, there is so much more to explore on Tyros3, but hopefully I will have pointed out many of the highlights for you.

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California Youth Authority The California Youth Authority is the largest youthful offender agency in the nation. It is now called the Division of Juvenile Justice.
General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority (PDF file) A report by Barry Krisberg on CYA.
Let His Children Go Review of Jerome Miller’s Last One over the Wall: The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools, his story of how he closed the large training schools in Massachusetts.
National Center on Institutions and Alternatives Founded by Jerome Miller, the former director of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, NCIA is an organization devoted to reforming American correctional systems.
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency A non-profit organization that conducts research and promotes reform of the juvenile justice system.
Housing Juveniles In Adult Facilities is Dangerous A short report to the House Judiciary Committee.
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention The 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act created the OJJDP.
Associated Marine Institutes This non-profit specializes in marine- and wilderness-based juvenile rehabilitation programs.
Key Program This non-profit provides juvenile services throughout New England.
ACLU Fact Sheet on the Juvenile Justice System An ACLU fact sheet arguing that the movement to erase any distinction between young offenders and adult criminals is misguided.
Delinquents or Criminals: Policy Options for Young Offenders An Urban Institute report on options for treating juvenile offenders.
Kent v. U.S. (1966) U.S. Supreme Court ruling that juvenile courts waiving jurisdiction must hold a fitness hearing.
Criminal Children: The Lunacy of Leniency This 1997 CST News article by Dr. Don Boys favors treating juveniles accused of serious crimes as adults.
Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails: A National Assessment (PDF) (Text) A Bureau of Justice Assistance study completed in 2000.
Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) U.S. Supreme Court case deciding that it is unconstitutional to execute anyone for crimes they committed when they were under the age of 16.
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri (1989) U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty for those who committed crimes when they were over 16. The Supreme Court overruled these decisions in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.
Juveniles, Capital Punishment, and Sentencing This site by the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention addresses the issue of severe juvenile sentences, such as capital punishment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Roper v. Simmons (2005) U.S. Supreme Court decision banning the execution of those who committed their crimes while under 18.
Death Penalty: The International Context Links to reports and treaties banning capital punishment for crimes committed when an offender was under 18 years old.
Juvenile Offenders and Troubled Teens This web site on juveniles involved with criminal justice agencies contains a glossary of terms in Juvenile Law and articles on juvenile ruthlessness, causal factors for juvenile crime, and how juveniles in trouble should be handled.


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Which Apdex Features Can Be Generalized?
I’m writing a series of posts about Generalizing Apdex. This is #6.
The current Apdex specification is entirely focused on application response time, specifically on the response time of Tasks and Task Chains. However, people have already adopted the Apdex method as a convenient way to report on other metrics, including network “turns”, bandwidth, and VOIP quality scores. These adaptations demonstrate the strength and adaptability of the core Apdex concepts. But because such ad hoc extensions fall outside the standard, they are likely to be implemented in inconsistent ways. By generalizing the Apdex spec, we aim to rectify that situation, bringing a wide class of metrics in a wide range of measurement domains within the scope of the standard.
Which Apdex features are candidates to be generalized? To answer that question, I will review the current Apdex specification. For clarity, I will use the section symbol (§) when referring to specific sections or subsections of the spec. During this pass, my goal is only to identify the major aspects of the current standard to be reviewed and reworked, not to address the actual structure or language of the generalized spec. It will be much easier to produce precise language once the concepts are clear.
To simplify the discussion here, I will also introduce letter suffixes to denote specific elements of an Apdex spec. This idea is modeled on the naming scheme used by the Transaction Processing Performance Council for their TPC benchmarks.
This naming scheme, and my particular choices of letter suffixes, are arbitrary editorial conveniences at this point; they have never been discussed by the Alliance. However, there may be marketing benefit from defining different versions of Apdex in this way. The existence of separately identified versions of the Apdex standard may help to emphasize its broad applicability. If you have opinions or alternative suggestions as to the best way to name and distinguish the components of a generalized Apdex spec, please contribute them in a comment to this post.
While it can be reasonably applied to many metrics in many measurement domains, there are probably some in which the Apdex method would be more applicable than the name itself. Does that mean we should not seek to apply Apdex in those domains? I don’t think so; it’s sufficient that the name reflect the history of the method. In practice this may not be a real issue, but the origin of Apdex should be noted somewhere in the introduction to Apdex-G.
[§2.1] Earlier posts in this series on Core Apdex Qualities and Apdex as a (Key) Performance Indicator have discussed the subject of Index Objectives.
[§2 (preamble), §2.3, §2.4] These sections are specific to measurements of application responsiveness; they belong in Apdex-R.
The present spec (§2.5) contains the rule that the value of F is four times the value T. This rule of thumb, while convenient, is not generally applicable outside the application responsiveness domain; it must be moved to Apdex-R. Since F cannot, in general, be derived from T, Apdex-G must permit both T and F to be specified separately, and make no assumptions about which is the larger value. In some measurement domains, larger values are more desirable.
Separately Configurable Thresholds will be the subject of a future post.
These changes are unlikely to encounter any objections. They have been proposed for several years within the Apdex community, and are already employed in some Apdex-based reporting. For example, Keynote Systems implemented them in their VOIP quality reports. See Clarity in Voice Performance Measurements with Apdex, presented by Ken Harker at the Apdex Symposium in December 2007 [PPT file].
To accommodate these cases, we would need Apdex-G to provide more flexibility when configuring targets and zones. See also “Configurable Scoring” under §4 below.
Configurable Zone Alignment will be the subject of a future post, in which I will aim to address all requirements for separately configurable threshold values.
[§2.6] How the Index Works: This needs minor wording changes to remove any references to ‘seconds’.
[§3.1] Response Time Measurements: most of this section must be moved to Apdex-R. It can be replaced by more general guidelines about measurement tools.
[§3.3] The entire discussion of Thresholds must be generalized, removing references to ‘seconds’ and incorporating any decisions made about “Configurable Zone Alignment” (§2.5).
[§3.4] Number of Measurement Samples: The core ideas in this section can remain, with minor wording changes. However, the minimum number of samples is probably domain-specific, so that rule should be moved to the addenda. Apdex-R should specify a minimum of 100 samples.
The present spec defines an attractively simple scoring rule in which measurements falling within the zones Satisfied, Tolerating, and Frustrated receive scores of 1, ½, and 0 respectively. Alan Ackers and Neil Gunther have discussed possible enhancements that would involve retaining the core approach to scoring while allowing for more than two targets (or thresholds), thereby creating more than three zones, and using finer scoring gradations (but still between 0 and 1) for rating measurements that fall within those zones.
The changes necessary to permit these kinds of generalization are closely related to those discussed under “Configurable Zone Alignment” (§2.5) and the two topics must be considered together.
Configurable Scoring will the subject of a future post.
[§4.1] The description of the Apdex Formula must be rewritten to incorporate any decisions made about “Configurable Zone Alignment” and “Configurable Scoring”.
[§4.2] This discussion of Exceptions must be moved to Apdex-R. I’m not sure if we need to replace it with any more general equivalent.
[§5.1, §5.2, §5.3] The rules for Displaying the Apdex Value and Indicating Sample Size must be generalized to handle “Separately Configurable Thresholds” (§2.5). Also, these requirements of the present Apdex standard may need to be modified to allow Apdex to be applied in many other domains.
The issues to be considered in the generalization process are (1) the degree of generalization to be accommodated, (2) the notation to be used to describe the more general targets, zones, and scoring, and (3) because the more general notation will necessarily be more complex, whether to retain any simpler notation for use in simpler cases like those defined in the present spec. This is an area for further research; I will try to identify some specific examples of the requirements of other domains.
Configurable Reporting will the subject of a future post.
The thresholds defining the Apdex Rating Bands (Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor, Unacceptable) are already defined as optional in section 5.4 of the present spec. But if implemented, the details must follow the specification.
According to Jonathan Becher, such grades are an essential feature of a KPI. However, I suspect that the Apdex thresholds, and the names of the five rating bands they define, may need to be configurable so that an Apdex implementation can conform to existing practice within a measurement domain, or within a user organization.
Configurable Rating Bands will the subject of a future post.
We should review, and decide what is appropriate as the Apdex-G spec evolves. One possibility is to convert this section into a “History” section, unless we have references that support the concepts behind the generalized version of Apdex. There is some flexibility in the choice and allocation of explanatory background material to sections §1, §2, and §6, so I intend to defer decisions on the exact composition of those sections until later in the process.
See my previous post, An Extensible Apdex Glossary. My current view is that all Apdex spec documents should share a common glossary; any other approach seems likely to be a maintenance headache.
These posts will discuss Apdex-G at the next level of detail, and I will link each post as it is published. Otherwise I do not plan to extend or refine this post unless I discover an error or omission. However, my conclusions in this post are certainly open for public comment. If you post a question or suggestion below, I will respond.

matches: §2 §2 §4 §5 §5 §1 §2 §6


text:
Comment: Car accident victim brought a lawsuit for her injury. After completion of discovery this case was placed on the court's trial calendar. The injured plaintiff had previously been examined by a defense orthopedist. However, after the case was placed on the trial calendar (and thus represented by the plaintiff's side as ready for trial) plaintiff had knee surgery and served notice of this additional claim of injury on the defense. The defense, entitled to have her re-examined due to this added injury claim, selected a different orthopedist from that whom examined plaintiff/accident victim previously. The plaintiff's lawyers did not like this second orthopedist, they wanted their client (the plaintiff) to be re-examined by the first orthopedist. The defense wanted the plaintiff to see a different doctor -- for reasons we can only speculate about, but we can assume that the defense thought that this second orthopedist would be less favorable to the injured plaintiff than the first orthopedist.
The court held that the plaintiff could not pick which doctor the defense could designate to examine her, that this was the defense's choice.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Anthony F. John and Takis Corp. appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sweeney, J.), dated January 13, 2011, as denied their motion to strike the plaintiffs' second and third supplemental bills of particulars or, in the alternative, to preclude the plaintiffs from offering any evidence or testimony with respect to knee surgery performed on the plaintiff Veronica Lewis, unless that plaintiff appeared for a physical examination by Dr. Steven Robbins, to the extent of directing the plaintiff Veronica Lewis to appear, within 45 days of the order, for a further physical examination to be conducted by Dr. Lisa Nason, rather than Dr. Steven Robbins.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the motion of the defendants Anthony F. John and Takis Corp. to strike the plaintiffs' second and third supplemental bills of particulars or, in the alternative, to preclude the plaintiffs from offering any evidence or testimony with respect to the knee surgery performed on the plaintiff Veronica Lewis is granted unless the plaintiff Veronica Lewis appears for an examination to be conducted by Dr. Steven Robbins within 45 days of service upon the plaintiffs of a copy of this decision and order.
The plaintiff Veronica Lewis (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) and her husband, suing derivatively, commenced this action against, among others, the defendants Anthony F. John and Takis Corp. (hereinafter together the defendants) to recover damages allegedly sustained as a consequence of a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on September 23, 2008. The plaintiffs alleged, in their initial verified bill of particulars, dated October 6, 2009, and their first supplemental bill of particulars, dated October 28, 2009, that the injured plaintiff sustained injuries to her neck, back, left shoulder, and left hand as a result of the defendants' negligence.
On April 1, 2010, the injured plaintiff was examined, at the defendants' request, by Dr. Lisa Nason, an orthopedist. Thereafter, on April 28, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a note of issue and certificate of readiness.
In October 2010 the plaintiffs served a second supplemental verified bill of particulars and a third supplemental verified bill of particulars, in which they alleged that, as a result of the defendants' negligence, the injured plaintiff sustained medial and lateral meniscal tears to her right knee, requiring a surgical repair. The defendants served upon the plaintiffs a request for an additional orthopedic examination of the injured plaintiff, to be conducted by Dr. Steven Robbins. The plaintiffs objected to the examination solely on the basis that it should be conducted by Dr. Nason, who performed the first orthopedic examination on behalf of the defendants, and not by Dr. Robbins.
The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' second and third supplemental bills of particulars or, in the alternative, to preclude the plaintiffs from offering any testimony or evidence with respect to the injured plaintiff's knee surgery unless the injured plaintiff appeared for an examination by Dr. Robbins. The plaintiffs opposed the motion only to the extent that they argued that Dr. Nason, rather than Dr. Robbins, should conduct the further orthopedic examination of the injured plaintiff.
The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion on the condition that the injured plaintiff appear for an examination by Dr. Nason within 45 days of its order. The defendants appeal, and we reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the defendants were aggrieved by the order of the Supreme Court (see CPLR 5511; AMS Prods., LLC v. Signorile, 66 A.D.3d 929, 929, 886 N.Y.S.2d 830; Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v. Duclaire, 49 A.D.3d 863, 853 N.Y.S.2d 906).
"While discovery determinations rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Appellate Division is vested with a corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court, even in the absence of abuse" (Andon v. 302_304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 N.Y.2d 740, 745, 709 N.Y.S.2d 873, 731 N.E.2d 589; see Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Occidental Gems, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 843, 845, 873 N.Y.S.2d 239, 901 N.E.2d 732). CPLR 3121(a) provides that, where the physical condition of the plaintiff is in controversy, "any party may serve notice on another party to submit to a physical ... examination by a designated physician" (emphasis added). Although a plaintiff may challenge a defendant's choice of an examining physician, the challenge must be based upon a claim of bias against the plaintiff or his or her attorney by the designated examining physician (see Noteboom v. Shugrue, 306 A.D.2d 453, 761 N.Y.S.2d 527) or prejudice against the plaintiff if that examining physician is allowed to testify at trial (see Whipple v. Edward P. Myers D.D.S., P.C., 234 A.D.2d 833, 651 N.Y.S.2d 234).
Here, there was no evidence that Dr. Robbins was biased against the plaintiffs or their counsel, or that the plaintiffs would be prejudiced if Dr. Robbins, rather than Dr. Nason, performed the second orthopedic examination. As such, it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the Supreme Court to require the defendants to utilize Dr. Nason for the second orthopedic examination of the injured plaintiff instead of their designated physician, Dr. Robbins (see CPLR 3121[a] ).


Definition: all, the whole, every kind of.
3956 pás – each, every; each "part(s) of a totality" (L & N, 1, 59.24).
3956 /pás ("each, every") means "all" in the sense of "each (every) part that applies." The emphasis of the total picture then is on "one piece at a time." 365 (ananeóō) then focuses on the part(s) making up the whole – viewing the whole in terms of the individual parts.
a. any, every one (namely, of the class denoted by the norm annexed to πᾶς); with the singular: as πᾶν δένδρον, Matthew 3:10; πᾶσα θυσία, Mark 9:49 (T WH Tr marginal reading omits; Tr text brackets the clause); add, Matthew 5:11; Matthew 15:13; Luke 4:37; John 2:10; John 15:2; Acts 2:43; Acts 5:42; Romans 14:11; 1 Corinthians 4:17; Revelation 18:17, and very often; πᾶσα ψυχή ἀνθρώπου, Romans 2:9 (πᾶσα ἄνθρωπος ψυχή, Plato, Phaedr., p. 249 e.); πᾶσα συνείδησις ἀνθρώπων, 2 Corinthians 4:2; πᾶς λεγόμενος Θεός, 2 Thessalonians 2:4; πᾶς ἅγιος ἐν Χριστῷ, Philippians 4:21ff with the plural, all or any that are of the class indicated by the noun: as πάντες ἄνθρωποι, Acts 22:15; Romans 5:12, 18; Romans 12:17; 1 Corinthians 7:7; 1 Corinthians 15:19; πάντες ἅγιοι, Romans 16:15; πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ, Hebrews 1:6; πάντα (L T Tr WH τά) ἔθνη, Revelation 14:8; on the phrase πᾶσα σάρξ, see σάρξ, 3.
b. any and every, of every kind (A. V. often all manner of): πᾶσα νόσος καί μαλακία, Matthew 4:23; Matthew 9:35; Matthew 10:1; εὐλογία, blessings of every kind, Ephesians 1:3; so especially with nouns designating virtues or vices, emotions, character, condition, to indicate every mode in which such virtue, vice or emotion manifests itself, or any object whatever to which the idea expressed by the noun belongs: — thus, πᾶσα ἐλπίς, Acts 27:20; σοφία, Acts 7:22; Colossians 1:28; γνῶσις, Romans 15:14; ἀδικία, ἀσέβεια, etc., Romans 1:18, 29; 2 Corinthians 10:6; Ephesians 4:19, 31; Ephesians 5:3; σπουδή, 2 Corinthians 8:7; 2 Peter 1:5; ἐπιθυμία, Romans 7:8; χαρά, Romans 15:13; αὐτάρκεια, 2 Corinthians 9:8; ἐν παντί λόγῳ καί γνώσει, 1 Corinthians 1:5; σοφία καί φρονήσει etc. Ephesians 1:8; ἐν πάσῃ ἀγαθωσύνη καί δικαιοσύνη, καί ἀλήθεια, Ephesians 5:9; αἰσθήσει, Philippians 1:9; ὑπομονή, θλῖψις, etc., 2 Corinthians 1:4; 2 Corinthians 12:12; add, Colossians 1:9-11; Colossians 3:16; 2 Thessalonians 1:11; 2 Thessalonians 2:9; 1 Timothy 1:15; 1 Timothy 5:2; 1 Timothy 6:1; 2 Timothy 4:2; Titus 2:15 (on which see σπιταγη); ; James 1:21; 1 Peter 2:1; 1 Peter 5:10; πᾶσα δικαιοσύνη, i. e. ὁ ἄν ἤ δίκαιον, Matthew 3:15; πᾶν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, everything God wills, Colossians 4:12; πᾶσα ὑποταγῇ, obedience in all things, 1 Timothy 2:11; πάσῃ συνειδήσει ἀγαθή, consciousness of rectitude in all things, Acts 23:1; — or it signifies the highest degree, the maximum, of the thing which the noun denotes (cf. Winer's Grammar, 110 (105f); Ellicott on Ephesians 1:8; Meyer on Philippians 1:20; Krüger, § 50, 11, 9 and 10): as μετά πάσης παρρησίας, Acts 4:29; Acts 28:31; μετά πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης, Acts 20:19; προθυμίας, Acts 17:11; χαρᾶς, Philippians 2:29, cf. James 1:2; ἐν πάσῃ ἀσφάλεια, Acts 5:23; ἐν παντί φόβῳ, 1 Peter 2:18; πᾶσα ἐξουσία, Matthew 28:18 (πᾶν κράτος, Sophocles Phil. 142).
c. the whole (all, Latintotus): so before proper names of countries, cities, nations; as, πᾶσα Ἱεροσόλυμα, Matthew 2:3; πᾶς, Ἰσραήλ, Romans 11:26; before collective terms, as πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραήλ, Acts 2:36; πᾶσα κτίσις (see κτίσις, 2 b.); πᾶσα γραφή (nearly equivalent to the ὅσα προεγράφη in Romans 15:4), 2 Timothy 3:16 (cf. Rothe, Zur Dogmatik, p. 181); πᾶσα γερουσία υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ, Exodus 12:21; πᾶς ἵππος Φαραώ, Exodus 14:23; πᾶν δίκαιον ἔθνος, Additions to Esther 1:9 [Esther 11:71:1f]; by a somewhat rare usage before other substantives also, as (πᾶν πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς, Acts 17:26 L T Tr WH); οἰκοδομή, Ephesians 2:21 G L T Tr WH, cf. Harless at the passage, p. 262 (others find no necessity here for resorting to this exceptional use, but render (with R. V.) each several building (cf. Meyer)); πᾶν τέμενος, 3Macc. 1:13 (where see Grimm); Παύλου ... ὅς ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολή μνημονεύει ὑμῶν, Ignatius ad Eph. 12 [ET] ((yet cf. Lightfoot)); cf. Passow, under the word πᾶς, 2; (Liddell and Scott, under the word, A. II.); Winers Grammar, § 18, 4; (Buttmann, § 127, 29); Krüger, § 50, 11, 8 to 11; Kühner, see 545f.
2. with nouns which have the article, all the, the whole (see c. just above): — with the singular; as, πᾶσα ἡ ἀγέλη, the whole herd, Matthew 8:32; πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος, Matthew 13:2; πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, Romans 3:19; Colossians 1:6; πᾶσα ἡ πόλις (i. e. all its inhabitants), Matthew 8:34; Matthew 21:10, etc.; πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία, Matthew 3:5; add, Matthew 27:25; Mark 5:33; Luke 1:10; Acts 7:14; Acts 10:2; Acts 20:28; Acts 22:5; Romans 4:16; Romans 9:17; 1 Corinthians 13:2 (πίστιν καί γνῶσιν in their whole compass and extent); Ephesians 4:16; Colossians 1:19; Colossians 2:9, 19; Philippians 1:3; Hebrews 2:15; Revelation 5:6, etc.; the difference between πᾶσα ἡ θλῖψις (all) and πᾶσα θλῖψις (any) appears in 2 Corinthians 1:4. πᾶς ὁ λαός οὗτος, Luke 9:13; πᾶσαν τήν ὀφειλήν ἐκείνην, Matthew 18:32; πᾶς placed after the noun has the force of a predicate: τήν κρίσιν πᾶσαν δέδωκέ, the judgment he hath given wholly (cf. Winer's Grammar, 548 (510)), John 5:22; τήν ἐξουσίαν ... πᾶσαν ποιεῖ, Revelation 13:12; it is placed between the article and noun (Buttmann, § 127, 29; Winer's Grammar, 549 (510)), as τόν πάντα χρόνον, i. e. always, Acts 20:18; add, Galatians 5:14; 1 Timothy 1:16 (here L T Tr WH ἅπας); — with a plural, all (the totality of the persons or things designated by the noun): πάντας τούς ἀρχιερεῖς, Matthew 2:4; add, Matthew 4:8; Matthew 11:13; Mark 4:13; Mark 6:33; Luke 1:6, 48; Acts 10:12, 43; Romans 1:5; Romans 15:11; 1 Corinthians 12:26; 1 Corinthians 15:25; 2 Corinthians 8:18, and very often; with a demonstrative pronoun added, Matthew 25:7; Luke 2:19, 51 (here T WH omit L Tr marginal reading brackets the pronoun); πάντες is placed after the noun: τάς πόλεις πάσας, the cities all (of them) (cf. Winer's Grammar, as above), Matthew 9:35: Acts 8:40; add, Matthew 10:30; Luke 7:35 (here L Tr WH text πάντων τῶν etc.); Luke 12:7; Acts 8:40; Acts 16:26; Romans 12:4; 1 Corinthians 7:17; 1 Corinthians 10:1; 1 Corinthians 13:2; 1 Corinthians 15:7; 1 Corinthians 16:20; 2 Corinthians 13:2, 12(13); Philippians 1:13; 1 Thessalonians 5:26; 2 Timothy 4:21 (WH brackets πάντες); Revelation 8:3; οἱ πάντες followed by a noun, Acts 19:7; Acts 27:37; τούς κατά τά ἔθνη πάντας Ἰουδαίους, Acts 21:21 (here L omits; Tr brackets πάντας).
1. masculine and feminine every one, any one: in the singular, without any addition, Mark 9:49; Luke 16:16; Hebrews 2:9; followed by a relative pronoun, πᾶς ὅστις, Matthew 7:24; Matthew 10:32; πᾶς ὅς, Matthew 19:29 (L T Tr WH ὅστις); Galatians 3:10; πᾶς ὅς ἄν (ἐάν Tr WH), whosoever, Acts 2:21; πᾶς ἐξ ὑμῶν ὅς, Luke 14:33; with a participle which has not the article (Winer's Grammar, 111 (106)): παντός ἀκούοντος (if anyone heareth, whoever he is), Matthew 13:19; παντί ὀφείλοντι ἡμῖν, everyone owing (if he owe) us anything, unless ὀφείλοντι is to be taken substantively, every debtor of ours, Luke 11:4; with a participle which has the article and takes the place of a relative clause (Winer's Grammar, as above): πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, everyone that is angry, Matthew 5:22; add, Matthew 7:8; Luke 6:47; John 3:8, 20; John 6:45; Acts 10:43; Acts 13:39; Romans 1:16; Romans 2:10; Romans 12:3; 1 Corinthians 9:25; 1 Corinthians 16:16; Galatians 3:13; 1 John 2:23; 1 John 3:3f, 6, etc. Plural, πάντες, without any addition, all men: Matthew 10:22; Mark 13:13; Luke 20:38; Luke 21:17; John 1:7; John 3:31a (in 31b G T WH marginal reading omit the clause); ; Acts 17:25; Romans 10:12; 1 Corinthians 9:19; 2 Corinthians 5:14(); Ephesians 3:9 (here T WH text omit; L brackets πάντας); of a certain definite whole: all (the people), Matthew 21:26; all (we who hold more liberal views), 1 Corinthians 8:1; all (the members of the church), 1 Corinthians 8:7; by hyperbole equivalent to the great majority, the multitude, John 3:26; all (just before mentioned), Matthew 14:20; Matthew 22:27; Matthew 27:22; Mark 1:27 (here T Tr WH ἅπαντες); Mark 1:37; Mark 6:39, 42; ( Lachmann); Luke 1:63; Luke 4:15; John 2:15, 24, and very often; (all (about to be mentioned), διά πάντων namely, τῶν ἁγίων (as is shown by the following καί κτλ.), Acts 9:32). οἱ πάντες, all taken together, all collectively (cf. Winer's Grammar, 116 (110)): of all men, Romans 11:32; of a certain definite whole, Philippians 2:21; with the 1 person plural of the verb, 1 Corinthians 10:17; Ephesians 4:13; with a definite number, in all (cf. Buttmann, § 127, 29): ἦσαν δέ οἱ πάντες ἄνδρες ὡσεί δεκαδύο (or δώδεκα), Acts 19:7; ἤμεθα αἱ ψυχαί διακόσιαι ἑβδομήκοντα ἕξ, Acts 27:37 (ἐπ' ἄνδρας τούς πάντας δύο, Judith 4:7; ἐγένοντο οἱ πάντες ὡς τετρακόσιοι, Josephus, Antiquities 6, 12, 3; τούς πάντας εἰς δυσχιλιους, id. 4, 7, 1; ὡς εἶναι τάς πάσας δέκα, Aelian v. h. 12, 35; see other examples from Greek authors in Passow, under the word πᾶς, 5 b.; (Liddell and Scott, under the word, C.); relinquitur ergo, ut omnia tria genera sint causarum, Cicero, de invent. 1, 9); οἱ πάντες, all those I have spoken of, 1 Corinthians 9:22; 2 Corinthians 5:14(15). πάντες ὅσοι, all as many as, Matthew 22:10; Luke 4:40 (here Tr marginal reading WH text ἅπαντες); John 10:8; Acts 5:36f; πάντες οἱ with a participle, all (they) that: Matthew 4:24; Mark 1:32; Luke 2:18, 38; Acts 2:44; Acts 4:16; Romans 1:7; Romans 10:12; 1 Corinthians 1:2; 2 Corinthians 1:1; Ephesians 6:24; 1 Thessalonians 1:7; 2 Thessalonians 1:10; Hebrews 3:16; 2 John 1:1; Revelation 13:8; Revelation 18:19, 24, and often. πάντες οἱ namely, ὄντες: Matthew 5:15; Luke 5:9; John 5:28; Acts 2:39; Acts 5:17; Acts 16:32; Romans 9:6; 2 Timothy 1:15; 1 Peter 5:14, etc. πάντες with personal and demonst. pronouns (compare Winer's Grammar, 548 (510)): ἡμεῖς πάντες, John 1:16; Romans 8:32; 2 Corinthians 3:18; Ephesians 2:3; πάντες ἡμεῖς, Acts 2:32; Acts 10:33; Acts 26:14; Acts 28:2; Romans 4:16; οἱ πάντες ἡμεῖς, 2 Corinthians 5:10; ὑμεῖς πάντες, Acts 20:25; πάντες ὑμεῖς, Matthew 23:8; Matthew 26:31; Luke 9:48; Acts 22:3; Romans 15:33; 2 Corinthians 7:15; (Galatians 3:28 R G L WH); Philippians 1:4, 7; 1 Thessalonians 1:2; 2 Thessalonians 3:16, 18; Titus 3:15; Hebrews 13:25, etc.; αὐτοί πάντες, 1 Corinthians 15:10; πάντες αὐτοί, Acts 4:33; Acts 19:17; Acts 20:36; οὗτοι πάντες, Acts 1:14; Acts 17:7; Hebrews 11:13, 39; πάντες (L T ἅπαντες) οὗτοι, Acts 2:7; οἱ δέ πάντες, and they all, Mark 14:64.
a. in the singular: πᾶν τό followed by a participle (on the neuter in a concrete and collective sense cf. Buttmann, § 128, 1), 1 Corinthians 10:25, 27; Ephesians 5:13; 1 John 5:4; πᾶν τό namely, ὄν, 1 John 2:16; πᾶν ὁ, Romans 14:23; John 6:37, 39 (R. V. all that); John 17:2; πᾶν ὁ, τί ἄν or ἐάν, whatsoever, Colossians 3:17, and Rec. in Colossians 3:23. Joined to prepositions it forms adverbial phrases: παντός or διαπαντός, always, perpetually, see διά, A. II. 1 a.; ἐν παντί, either in every condition, or in every matter, Philippians 4:6; 1 Thessalonians 5:18; in everything, in every way, on every side, in every particular or relation, 2 Corinthians 4:8; 2 Corinthians 7:5, 11, 16; 2 Corinthians 11:6, 9; Ephesians 5:24; πλουτίζεσθαι, 1 Corinthians 1:5; (περισσεύειν), 2 Corinthians 8:7; ἐν παντί καί ἐν πᾶσιν (see μυέω, b.), Philippians 4:12.
b. Plural, πάντα (without the article (cf. Winers Grammar, 116 (110); Matthiae, § 438)) all things; α. of a certain definite totality or sum of things, the context shewing what things are meant: Mark 4:34; Mark 6:30; Luke 1:3; (v. 28 L T Tr WH); John 4:25 (here T Tr WH ἅπαντα); Romans 8:28; 2 Corinthians 6:10; Galatians 4:1; Philippians 2:14; 1 Thessalonians 5:21; 2 Timothy 2:10; Titus 1:15; 1 John 2:27; πάντα ὑμῶν, all ye do with one another, 1 Corinthians 16:14; πάντα γίνεσθαι πᾶσιν (A. V. to become all things to all men), i. e. to adapt oneself in all ways to the needs of all, 1 Corinthians 9:22 L T Tr WH (Rec. τά πάντα i. e. in all the ways possible or necessary); cf. Kypke, Obs. ii, p. 215f. β. accusative πάντα (adverbially), wholly, altogether, in all ways, in all things, in all respects: Acts 20:35; 1 Corinthians 9:25; 1 Corinthians 10:33; 1 Corinthians 11:2; cf. Matthiae, § 425, 5; Passow, ii, p. 764a; (Liddell and Scott, under the word D. II. 4). γ. πάντα, in an absolute sense, all things that exist, all created things: John 1:3; 1 Corinthians 2:10; 1 Corinthians 15:27; Hebrews 2:8 (and L T Tr WH in ); Ephesians 1:22; Colossians 1:17; 1 Peter 4:7; Revelation 21:5; (in Romans 9:5 πάντων is more fitly taken as genitive masculine (but see the commentaries at the passage)). ποίᾳ ἐστιν ἐντολή πρώτη πάντων (genitive neuter; Rec. πασῶν), what commandment is first of all (things), Mark 12:28 (ἐφασκε λέγων κορυδον πάντων πρώτην ὀρνιθα γενέσθαι, προτέραν τῆς γῆς, Aristophanes av. 472; τάς πόλεις ... ἐλευθερουν καί πάντων μάλιστα Ἀντανδρον, Thucydides 4, 52; cf. Winers Grammar, § 27,6; (Buttmann, § 150, 6; Green, p. 109); Fritzsche on Mark, p. 538]. δ. with the article (cf. references in b. above), τά πάντα; αα. in an absolute sense, all things collectively, the totality of created things, the universe of things: Romans 11:36; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Ephesians 3:9; Ephesians 4:10; Philippians 3:21; Colossians 1:16; Hebrews 1:3; Hebrews 2:10; Revelation 4:11; τά πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληροῦσθαι, to fill the universe of things in all places, Ephesians 1:23 (Rec. omits τά; but others take ἐν πᾶσιν here modally (see θ'. below), others instrumentally (see Meyer at the passage)). ββ. in a relative sense: Mark 4:11 (Tdf. omits τά) (the whole substance of saving teaching); Acts 17:25 (not Rec.st) (all the necessities of life); Romans 8:32 (all the things that he can give for our benefit); all intelligent beings (others include things material also), Ephesians 1:10; Colossians 1:20; it serves by its universality to designate every class of men, all mankind (cf. Winers Grammar, § 27, 5; Buttmann, § 128, 1), Galatians 3:22 (cf. Romans 11:32); 1 Timothy 6:13; εἶναι τά (T WH omit τά) πάντα, to avail for, be a substitute for, to possess supreme authority, καί ἐν πᾶσιν (i. e. either with all men or in the minds of all (others take πᾶσιν as neuter, cf. Lightfoot at the passage)), Colossians 3:11; ἵνα ἤ ὁ Θεός τά (L Tr WH omit τά) πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν (neuter according to Grimm (as below)), i. e. that God may rule supreme by his spiritual power working within all, 'may be the immanent and controlling principle of life,' 1 Corinthians 15:28 (so in secular authors πάντα or ἅπαντα without the article: πάντα ἦν ἐν τοισι Βαβυλωνιοισι Ζωπυρος, Herodotus 3, 157; cf. Herm. ad Vig., p. 727; other examples from secular authors are given in Kypke, Observations, ii., p. 230f; Palairet, Observations, p. 407; cf. Grimm in the Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol. for 1873, p. 394ff); accusative (adverbially, cf. β. above) τά πάντα, in all the parts (in which we grow (Meyer)), in all respects, Ephesians 4:15. The article in τά πάντα refers — in 1 Corinthians 11:12 to the things before mentioned (husband and wife, and their mutual dependence); in 2 Corinthians 4:15 to 'all the things that befall me'; in 1 Corinthians 15:27; Philippians 3:8, to the preceding πάντα; in Colossians 3:8 τά πάντα serves to sum up what follows (Winer's Grammar, 107 (102)). πάντα τά followed by a participle (see πᾶς, πάντες, II. 1 above): Matthew 18:31; Luke 12:44; Luke 17:10; Luke 18:31; Luke 21:22; Luke 24:44; John 18:4; Acts 10:33; Acts 24:14; Galatians 3:10; τά πάντα with participle, Luke 9:7; Ephesians 5:13; πάντα τά namely, ὄντα (see πᾶς (πᾶν), πάντες, II. 1 and 2 above), Matthew 23:20; Acts 4:24; Acts 14:15; Acts 17:24; πάντα τά ὧδε, namely, ὄντα, Colossians 4:9; τά κατ' ἐμέ, Colossians 4:7 (see κατά, II. 3 b.). ζ. and τά πάντα with pronouns: τά ἐμά πάντα, John 17:10; πάντα τά ἐμά, Luke 15:31; ταῦτα πάντα, these things all taken together (Winer's Grammar, 548 (510); Fritzsche on Matthew 24:33, 34; cf. Bornemann on Luke 21:36; Lobeck, Paralip., p. 65): Matthew 4:9; Matthew 6:33; Matthew 13:34, 51; Luke 12:30; Luke 16:14; Luke 21:36 (πάντα τά L marginal reading); Luke 24:9 (Tdf. πάντα ταῦτα); Acts 7:50; Romans 8:37; 2 Peter 3:11; πάντα ταῦτα, all these things (references as above): Matthew 6:32; Matthew 24:8, 33 (T Tr text ταῦτα πάντα),34 (Tr marginal reading ταῦτα πάντα); Luke 7:18; Acts 24:8; 1 Corinthians 12:11; Colossians 3:14; 1 Thessalonians 4:6; the reading varies also between πάντα ταῦτα and ταῦτα πάντα in Matthew 19:20; Matthew 23:36; Matthew 24:2; πάντα τά συμβεβηκότα ταῦτα, Luke 24:14; πάντα ἅ, John 4:(29 T WH Tr marginal reading (see the next entry)); John 4:45 (here L Tr WH ὅσα (see the next entry)); ; Acts 10:39; Acts 13:39. εε. πάντα ὅσα: Matthew 7:12; Matthew 13:46; Matthew 18:25; Matthew 28:20; Mark 12:44; John 4:29 (see ζ' above), L Tr WH; ; Acts 3:22; πάντα ὅσα, ἄν (or ἐάν), Matthew 21:22; Matthew 23:3; Mark 11:24 (G L T Tr WH omit ἄν); Acts 3:22. τη. πάντα with prepositions forms adverbial phrases: πρό πάντων, before or above all things (see πρό, c.), James 5:12; 1 Peter 4:8. (But περί πάντων, 3 John 1:2, must not be referred to this head, as though it signified above all things; it is rather as respects all things, and depends on εὔχομαι (apparently a mistake for εὐοδοῦσθαι; yet see περί, the passage cited ἆ.), cf. Lücke at the passage, 2nd edition, p. 370 (3rd edition, p. 462f; Westcott at the passage); Winer's Grammar, 373 (350)). (on διά πάντων, Acts 9:32, see 1 above.) ἐν πᾶσιν, in all things, in all ways, altogether: 1 Timothy 3:11; 1 Timothy 4:15 (Rec.); 2 Timothy 2:7; 2 Timothy 4:5; Titus 2:9; Hebrews 13:4, 18; 1 Peter 4:11 (see also 2 a. at the end, above); ἐπί πᾶσιν, see ἐπί, B. 2 d., p. 233b. κατά πάντα, in all respects: Acts 17:22; Colossians 3:20, 22; Hebrews 2:17; Hebrews 4:15.
1. οὐ πᾶς, not everyone.
2. πᾶς οὐ (where οὐ belongs to the verb), no one, none, see οὐ, 2, p. 460b; πᾶς μή (so that μή must be joined to the verb), no one, none, in final sentences, John 3:15; John 6:39; John 12:46; 1 Corinthians 1:29; with an imperative Ephesians 4:29 (1 Macc. 5:42); πᾶς ... οὐ μή with the aorist subjunctive (see μή, IV. 2), Revelation 18:22.
Including all the forms of declension; apparently a primary word; all, any, every, the whole -- all (manner of, means), alway(-s), any (one), X daily, + ever, every (one, way), as many as, + no(-thing), X thoroughly, whatsoever, whole, whosoever.