text: বাড়ি1 [ bāṛi1 ] n a stroke, a hit (লাঠির বাড়ি); a staff, a stick, a cudgel (পাচন বাড়ি) বাড়ি দেওয়া, বাড়ি মারা v. to deal (one) a blow, to strike, to hit. বাড়ি2 [ bāṛi2 ] n a house; a building; a dwelling-house, an abode; a residence; a home. ~ওয়ালা n. the owner of a house (esp. of tenanted one), (cp.) a landlord (fem. a landlady). fem. বাড়িওয়ালি , (coll.) বাড়িউলি । ~ঘর n. homestead; houses and buildings; habitations. ~ভাড়া n. house-rent; rent of a dwelling house. ~মুখো a. & adv. homeward; home bound. যমের বাড়ি (fig.) death's door. 1st person present simple tense and present imperative of বাড়া: বাড়া1 [ bāṛā1 ] v to proceed, to go. আগে বাড়া v. to go forward or ahead, to advance. 1st person present simple tense and present imperative of বাড়া: বাড়া2 [ bāṛā2 ] v to grow up, to develop (গাছ বাড়া); to increase (লোক বাড়া); to augment (বিপদ বাড়া); to be expanded (রাজ্য বাড়া); to aggravate (রোগ বাড়া); to flourish, to thrive (ধনসম্পদ বাড়া); to mend or sharpen (পেনসিল বাড়া); to grow audacious (বদমাশটা বড় বেড়েছে); to serve on a dinner-plate (ভাত বাড়া). ☐ a. mended; served on a dinner-plate; more or greater than ('সে মাটি মায়ের বাড়া'). বাড়ানো v. to develop; to increase; to multiply (বংশ বাড়ানো); to augment; to expand; to aggravate; to cause to mend or sharpen; to stretch; to extend, to crane (হাত বাড়ানো, গলা বাড়ানো); to cause to serve on a dinner-plate; to exalt or extol unduly or give undue importance to (অযোগ্য লোককে বাড়ানো); to exaggerate (বাড়িয়ে লেখা); to over-indulge (ছেলেটাকে সে বাড়িয়েছে); to enhance falsely (বয়স বাড়ানো). ~বাড়ি n. excess; immoderation; intemperance; overmuchness; aggravation (রোগের বাড়াবাড়ি). বাড়াবাড়ি করা v. to go beyond the limit. বাড়াবাড়ি হওয়া v. to be aggravated; to be in excess. বাড়া ভাতে ছাই দেওয়া v. (fig.) to frustrate or foil somebody's hopes or plans almost at the point of success.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
A: From v. 22-24, we talked about the gospel urgency that Paul displays as he has shown a great desire to preach to those who’ve never heard the gospel. What are ways that you could display gospel urgency in your life? What habits help produce a greater gospel urgency?
B: In v. 25-27, we see just how important the ministry of mercy is in Paul’s life…he is willing to go to Jerusalem to deliver a contribution to the saints. What are examples of mercy ministry today?
C: We also see in v. 25-27 that the giving was done in joy…talk about how genuine, joy-filled generosity is a mark of the Christian. How can we be more generous, in a variety of ways, in 2019?
D: In v. 28-29, Paul shows a clear confidence that being with the Roman Christians will have a fullness of blessing…it was said on Sunday that this confidence is because of knowing they’ll be serving alongside one another in gospel ministry. How does serving in gospel ministry generate sweetness & blessing for the soul? Have you experienced this kind of fullness of blessing in serving?
E: In v. 30-31, Paul shares 2 prayer requests with the Roman Christians: deliverance from unbelievers in Jerusalem & acceptance of the gift by the Christians in Jerusalem. Why is it so important to see that Paul is a man who has prayer concerns & asks for prayer? What do you take away from knowing that Paul’s prayer requests were answered…but by means that would not have been expected?
F: In v. 32-33, Paul ends by praying for the believers in Rome about their biggest issue-unity. How has the gospel brought greater unity to your community group? Take time to pray specifically for the various concerns and needs of your group.


Appellant Mark T. Storms appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter—unreasonable belief that killing was justifiable  and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).  Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for voluntary manslaughter because the Commonwealth failed to disprove his self-defense claim. He also challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
[Appellant] shot and killed 27-year-old Robert E. Braxton, III [(“Decedent”)], on April 24, 2016, during a Sunday morning service at Keystone Fellowship Church in Montgomery Township, Montgomery County. The events leading to the shooting, which occurred in the midst of numerous parishioners, began when [Decedent] entered the church in an agitated state shortly after the service had begun and moved into a row of chairs in the overflow seating area. A fellow parishioner in the row behind tapped [Decedent] on the back to alert him that he may be in a section of seats already occupied by others who had momentarily left. [Decedent] told the person not to touch him, using obscene language, and created a verbal disturbance that prompted ushers to try to calm him down.2 During this time, [Decedent] told anyone who attempted to intervene to leave him alone. An associate pastor, seeing that the ushers’ efforts only exacerbated [Decedent]’s agitation, had them back away and directed someone to call the police.
[Appellant] told investigators he saw [Decedent] pushing the parishioner, but the parishioner testified at trial that [Decedent] never touched him nor got close to him.
[Appellant], who was sitting nearby with his wife and young son, did not believe enough was being done and decided to intervene.3 He was armed at the time with a loaded 9-millimeter semi-automatic pistol concealed in a holster on his right hip.4 [Appellant] had observed [Decedent] become agitated each time someone addressed him and believed [Decedent] would not leave the church without violence.5 He admittedly approached [Decedent] not with the intent to calm him down but to get him out of the church.
[Appellant] had no position of authority with the church at the time and was not a law enforcement officer.
[Appellant] had a permit to carry a concealed weapon. As soon will become relevant, he also obtained a gold concealed weapon permit “badge.” The unofficial badge is not issued in connection with the permit but can be obtained on the Internet.
While [Appellant] attempted in his trial testimony to distance himself from his statement to investigators that he did not think [Decedent] would leave without violence, the jury as fact-finder was free to disbelieve his self-serving testimony.
With the two separated by a row of chairs, [Appellant] asked [Decedent] to go outside with him. When [Decedent] refused, [Appellant] flashed his unofficial concealed weapon permit badge. [Decedent] recognized it as a fake, telling [Appellant] as much in colorful language. [Appellant] then revealed his 9-millimeter pistol. The victim reacted by punching [Appellant] in the face and proceeding toward him. [Appellant] absorbed the blow and, rather than retreat down the open aisle behind him or call for help from the hundreds of people in church, squared himself into a ready fire stance and shot the unarmed [Decedent] twice.6 One of the bullets pierced [Decedent]’s heart and he died soon thereafter despite life-saving efforts by fellow parishioners and emergency medical responders.
[Appellant] testified that [Decedent] did not have a visible weapon and no trial witness stated they ever saw [Decedent] in possession of a weapon.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/7/17, at 1-3 (citations and footnote omitted).
Appellant was arrested and charged with voluntary manslaughter and REAP in reference to the other parishioners. At the three-day jury trial, the following testimony was elicited. After the ushers backed away and left Decedent alone, one of the pastors, Rusty S. Williams, III, testified that he was not yelling. N.T., 11/1/16, at 288-89. However, after Appellant approached and asked Decedent to go outside, Williams testified he could see Decedent starting to yell and that “things were escalating again.” N.T., 11/1/16, at 289-90; see also N.T., 11/2/16, at 16-17, 19 (Joseph McDevitt, another witness, testified that Decedent had calmed down prior to Appellant speaking with him). Williams’ police statement, which the Commonwealth used to refresh his recollection and was admitted into evidence without objection, also reflected Williams’ belief that Appellant’s “actions escalated the situation more than what it had to be.” N.T., 11/1/16, at 315; Commonwealth’s Ex. 30.
When the incident escalated and Decedent punched Appellant, Appellant shot Decedent from a distance of about eight feet. N.T., 11/1/16, at 133. Lauren Hendrie, another witness, testified that no one and nothing impeded Appellant’s ability to retreat from the situation. Id. at 46. Jeffrey Lemon similarly testified that no person and no thing was impeding Appellant from leaving the area. Id. at 166.
Appellant claimed self-defense. Appellant testified he had no opportunity to retreat after being punched. N.T., 11/2/16, at 59. Appellant also believed that Decedent was “younger, bigger, faster, and stronger” than him, could kill him, and would take his gun and use it. Id. at 57.
The jury found Appellant guilty and the court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and held a hearing, which we discuss in further detail below. The court imposed its sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter, followed by two years’ probation for REAP. The court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant’s affirmative defense of self-defense?
2. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in deviating above the applicable standard and aggravated guideline range to impose a sentence of ten to twenty years for voluntary manslaughter without providing any statement of reasons for its extreme departure from the guideline range?
3. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a manifestly unreasonable sentence above the applicable guideline range for the charge of voluntary manslaughter based solely upon factors already taken into account by the guidelines, without giving adequate consideration to mitigating factors such as Appellant’s clear remorse, his cooperation with law enforcement, and witness descriptions of Appellant as an otherwise peaceable man of good character?
In support of his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that in the seconds after he was punched, he could reasonably retreat. Appellant’s Brief at 31. In Appellant’s view, the Commonwealth did not establish the unreasonableness of his fear that Decedent could gain control of and use Appellant’s gun. Id. at 32. He cites testimony that Decedent’s erratic behavior and punching of Appellant support the reasonableness of his belief that Decedent would seriously harm him and others. In addition, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he initiated the use of deadly force. Id. Appellant argues that the record established that he was “calmly speaking” to Decedent, before Decedent decided to “suddenly and unexpectedly” punch Appellant. Id.
The trial court initially argues that Appellant waived his challenge to the sufficiency of evidence disproving his claim of self-defense because he failed to identify the precise element or elements at issue.  Trial Ct. Op., 8/7/17, at 8. Regardless, in the court’s view, the record established that Appellant did not have a reasonable belief that he had to use deadly force to protect the hundreds of people in the room and that by displaying his gun, Appellant provoked the use of force. The court notes that Decedent punched Appellant only after he brandished his weapon. Id. at 9. Finally, the trial court states Appellant could have safely retreated without having to shoot Decedent.
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 2017 PA Super 382, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
The use of force against a person is justified when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person. When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the claim, before the defense is properly at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever source, to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence that will support the claim, then the issue is properly before the fact finder.
Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). After such evidence is adduced, the Commonwealth has the burden of disproving Appellant’s defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating . . . .
if it proves any of the following: that the slayer was not free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying; that the slayer did not reasonably believe that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to kill in order to save himself therefrom; or that the slayer violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
Instantly, we agree with the trial court that the record establishes Appellant escalated the situation by interjecting himself and brandishing his weapon, which led to Decedent punching Appellant and subsequently his death. As set forth above, Williams and McDevitt testified that prior to Appellant’s actions, Decedent was calm; afterwards, Decedent was aggravated. N.T., 11/1/16, at 289-90; N.T., 11/2/16, at 16-17, 19.
Moreover, Hendrie and Lemon testified that Appellant could have safely retreated. See N.T., 11/1/16, at 46, 166. Appellant, therefore, could have avoided any use of deadly force. See Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 740-41. While Appellant testified he believed he had no opportunity to retreat, N.T., 11/2/16, at 59, it was well within the fact-finder’s province to favor the other witnesses’ testimony to the contrary. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 617 Pa. 107, 52 A.3d 1139, 1163 (Pa. 2012). Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to disprove self-defense merits no relief.
Certainly, this time, it didn’t work out.
No luck here. Or did these never happen and this was an opportunity to carry out that fantasy of yours. I don’t know. That is a mystery. I guess we’ll never know. All I know is that I believe you are a danger to society.
In the present case, I have considered your age, the information about you that you have presented to me and that I found in the pre-sentence investigation, and that evidence that I found as the trial judge in considering your sentence.
I can’t imagine — I cannot imagine the pain of losing a child. This is probably the most difficult day I have had as a judge. This is such a heartbreaking circumstance, to lose a child in such a violent and unusual circumstance. I can’t seem to get it out of my mind, [Appellant], that — we can’t forget that we are talking about the loss of a young man’s life.
And the jury has spoken. I have to balance your rehabilitative needs, the safety of society, as well as the nature of the crime when I determine your sentence.
I listened to all the testimony today. And I have come to this conclusion. I have read your letters of support as well. I know the heartache your family must feel. How strange it is that such religious families on both sides of the aisle are placed in this horrible, horrible heartbreaking situation.
With that said, please stand.
There has been no dispute as to your personal background and circumstances found to be set forth in the pre-sentence investigation except the ones [Appellant’s counsel] mentioned [when they had corrected the PSI report earlier].
As I said, the jury has spoken. And after considering these factors, I find that there would be an undue risk that during the period of probation or partial confinement you will commit another crime. You, sir, are in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by your commitment to an institution.
And once again, a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of your crime. I, therefore, find that a sentence of total confinement is proper.
Turning to Appellant’s arguments, he maintains that the court’s sentence must be supported by a clear record and reflect a “dispassionate decision to depart” from the guidelines. Appellant’s Brief at 22 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rodda, 1999 PA Super 2, 723 A.2d 212, 216 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Appellant opines the court’s reasoning, as set forth above, does not justify an upward deviation from the recommended sentence in the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 25. Appellant assails the absence of any factual basis to support the court’s conclusion that he is a “danger to society.” Id. He concludes that the court failed to acknowledge that the sentence departed from the guideline range. Id. Appellant argues that the court double-counted factors, such as Decedent’s death, that are already taken into account by the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 27. The court, Appellant contends, overlooked mitigating factors such as his age and cooperation with the police. Id.
A discretionary challenge to a judgment of sentence is not appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Luketic, 2017 PA Super 146, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2017). We will exercise our discretion to consider the issue only if (1) the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) he has preserved the sentencing issue at the time of sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify his sentence; (3) he presents the issue in a properly framed statement in his brief under Rule 2119(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1987); and (4) in the words of Section 9781(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), “it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haynes, 2015 PA Super 214, 125 A.3d 800, 807 (Pa. Super. 2015). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1160 (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant has timely appealed and timely filed a post-sentence motion preserving the sentencing issue he seeks to raise on appeal. See Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1159. Appellant has also preserved his issue in his Rule 2119(f) statement. See id. We therefore address whether Appellant has raised a substantial question.
A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process. One of the fundamental norms in the sentencing process is that a defendant’s sentence be individualized. . . .
. . . [S]entencing must result both from a consideration of the nature and circumstances of the crime as well as the character of the defendant.
The first responsibility is a fact-finding responsibility: the judge must be sure he had enough information. The second responsibility is an application-and-explanation responsibility: the judge must apply to the information he has gathered the guidelines specified in the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701 et seq., and explain how the sentence he has selected is responsive to, and reflects the standards embodied in, those guidelines. If the judge fails to fulfill these responsibilities, we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1160. A substantial question exists when the claim is that the court imposed a sentence outside the guidelines and by double-counting factors already considered by the guidelines. Commonwealth v. Goggins, 2000 PA Super 69, 748 A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).
Here, Appellant argued the court “failed to articulate sufficient reasons” for imposing a ten-year minimum sentence and the court double-counted the impact of Decedent’s death and Appellant’s unreasonable belief in the use of force. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. This argument raises a substantial question, which we review on the merits. See Goggins, 748 A.2d at 728.
the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing . . . . In every case where the court imposes a sentence or resentence outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing . . . , the court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to the commission . . . . Failure to comply shall be grounds for vacating the sentence or resentence and resentencing the defendant.
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). Where a pre-sentence investigation report exists, we shall “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957, 967 n.7 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “Even if a sentencing court relies on a factor that should have not been considered, there is no abuse of discretion when the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Sheller, 2008 PA Super 265, 961 A.2d 187, 192 (Pa. Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 2006 PA Super 20, 894 A.2d 120, 133 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In this case, the court complied with Section 9721(b). The court noted that the standard range sentence was fifty-four to seventy-two months in prison for voluntary manslaughter. The court, as set forth above, stated reasons for imposing a minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. The court acknowledged Appellant’s PSI and stated it considered his age, rehabilitative needs, protection of the public, and the nature of the crimes at issue, as well as their impact on the community. N.T., 4/18/17, at 80-82. Because a PSI exists, which the court acknowledged reviewing, we also presume that the court weighed the information contained within the PSI. See Walls, 926 A.2d at 967 n.7.
We acknowledge that the court did not explicitly state it was departing from the recommended sentence set forth in the guidelines, but the court explicitly expressed its reasons for imposing the sentence it did. N.T., 4/18/17, at 80-82. Even if the court improperly double-counted factors, such as Decedent’s death, the court indicated it considered the impact his death had on family and friends and that it was troubled by Appellant’s tendency to insert himself into circumstances that could cause his death and portray him as a hero. Thus, any departure from the sentencing guidelines was supported by independently valid reasons. See, e.g., Sheller, 961 A.2d at 192. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. See generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
*. Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b).
2. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
3. We decline to find waiver, as the trial court discerned and responded to Appellant’s argument in its opinion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Laboy, 594 Pa. 411, 936 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007).
4. With respect to the defendant’s reasonable belief, there are two factors: “(1) the defendant’s subjective belief that he had an honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger, to which expert testimony is admissible; and (2) the objective measurement of that belief, i.e., the reasonableness of that particular belief in light of the facts as they appear, to which expert testimony is inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 631 Pa. 67, 108 A.3d 779, 792 (Pa. 2014).


Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 393 › Oestereich v. Selective Svc. Bd.
Petitioner, a theological student preparing for the ministry, was classified IV-D by his Selective Service Board in accordance with § 6(g) of the Selective Service Act, which provides that "students preparing for the ministry" in qualified schools "shall be exempt from training and service" under the Act. He returned his registration certificate "for the sole purpose of expressing dissent from the participation by the United States in the war in Vietnam." His Board then declared him delinquent for failure (1) to have his registration certificate in his possession and (2) to provide the Board with notice of his local status, and changed his classification to I-A. Petitioner took an administrative appeal and lost, and was ordered to report for induction. He sued to restrain his induction, but the District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed, in part on the basis of § 10(b)(3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, which states that there shall be no pre-induction judicial review "of the classification or processing of any registrant," judicial review being limited to a defense in a criminal prosecution or to habeas corpus after induction.
Held: Pre-induction judicial review is not precluded in this case. Pp. 393 U. S. 235-239.
(a) There is no legislative authority to deny an unequivocal statutory exemption to a registrant who has qualified for one because of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of granting or continuing the exemption, and delinquency proceedings cannot be used for that purpose. Pp. 393 U. S. 236-237.
(b) Section 10(b)(3) cannot be construed to impair the clear mandate of § 6(g) governing the exemption for theological students. P. 393 U. S. 238.
390 F.2d 100, reversed and remanded.
failure to provide the Board with notice of his local status. The Board thereupon changed his IV-D classification to I-A. He took an administrative appeal and lost, and was ordered to report for induction.
At that point, he brought suit to restrain his induction. The District Court dismissed the complaint, 280 F.Supp. 78, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 390 F.2d 100. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. 391 U.S. 912.
U.S. 114, 12125; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304; Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 348 U. S. 377. If we assume, as we must for present purposes, that petitioner is entitled to a statutory exemption as a divinity student, by what authority can the Board withhold it or withdraw it and make him a delinquent?
not define delinquency, nor did it provide any standards for its definition by the Selective Service System. Yet Selective Service, as we have noted, [Footnote 6] has promulgated regulations governing delinquency, and uses them to deprive registrants of their statutory exemption, because of various activities and conduct and without any regard to the exemptions provided by law.
We can find no authorization for that use of delinquency. Even if Congress had authorized the Boards to revoke statutory exemptions by means of delinquency classifications, serious questions would arise if Congress were silent and did not prescribe standards to govern the Boards' actions. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that, when Congress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets its terms and conditions, a Board can nonetheless withhold it from him for activities or conduct not material to the grant or withdrawal of the exemption. So to hold would make the Boards freewheeling agencies meting out their brand of justice in a vindictive manner.
We deal with conduct of a local Board that is basically lawless. It is no different in constitutional implications from a case where induction of an ordained minister or other clearly exempt person is ordered (a) to retaliate against the person because of his political views or (b) to bear down on him for his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get him out of town so that the amorous interests of a Board member might be better served.
See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376. In such instances, as in the present one, there is no exercise of discretion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a claimed exemption is deserved. The case we decide today involves a clear departure by the Board from its statutory mandate. To hold that a person deprived of his statutory exemption in such a blatantly lawless manner must either be inducted and raise his protest through habeas corpus or defy induction and defend his refusal in a criminal prosecution is to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness. As the Solicitor General suggests, such literalness does violence to the clear mandate of § 6(g) governing the exemption. Our construction leaves § 10(b)(3) unimpaired in the normal operations of the Act.
granted as a statutory right, or sufficiently buttressed by legislative standards, we conclude that pre-induction judicial review is not precluded in cases of this type.
We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand the case to the District Court, where petitioner must have the opportunity to prove the facts alleged and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
"Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, as defined in this title, and students preparing for the ministry under the direction of recognized churches or religious organizations, who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in recognized theological or divinity schools, or who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction leading to their entrance into recognized theological or divinity schools in which they have been preenrolled, shall be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this title."
Section 1617.1 of the Selective Service System Regulations requires a registrant to have the certificate in his personal possession at all times (32 CFR § 1617.1), and § 1642.4, 32 CFR § 1642.4(a), provides that, whenever a registrant fails to perform "any duty" required of him (apart from the duty to obey an order to report for induction) the Board may declare him to be "a delinquent."
"No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed to participation in war in any form: Provided, That such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis, in fact, for the classification assigned to such registrant."
"A registrant who presents himself for induction may challenge his classification by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his induction. If the registrant does not submit to induction, he may raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution the issue of the legality of the classification."
In Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, a Jehovah's Witness had been given conscientious objector status and ordered to report to a domestic camp for civilian work in lieu of military service. In defense to a criminal prosecution for disobeying that order, he argued that his local board had wrongly classified him by denying him an exemption as a minister. Without deciding whether Congress envisaged judicial review of such classifications, we held that a registrant could not challenge his classification without first exhausting his administrative remedies by reporting, and being accepted, for induction. Because he might still have been rejected at the civilian camp for mental or physical disabilities, Falbo had omitted a "necessary intermediate step in a united and continuous process designed to raise an army speedily and efficiently." Id. at 320 U. S. 553. In Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, petitioners were Jehovah's Witnesses like Falbo, who had been denied ministerial exemptions and who challenged that classification in defense to a criminal prosecution for refusing induction. In their case, however, they had exhausted their administrative remedies by reporting, and being accepted, for service, before then refusing to submit to induction. We found nothing in the 1940 Act to preclude judicial review of selective service classifications in defense to a criminal prosecution for refusing induction.
We would have a somewhat different problem were the contest over, say, the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a Board's classification. Then we would not be able to say that it was plain on the record and on the face of the Act that an exemption had been granted, and there would therefore be no clash between § 10(b)(3) and another explicit provision of the Act.
The pivotal language of § 10(b)(3), for present purposes, is the statute's proscription of pre-induction judicial review "of the classification or processing of any registrant. . . ." I take the phrase "classification or processing" to encompass the numerous discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations which a Selective Service Board must make prior to issuing an order to report for induction. I do not understand that phrase to prohibit review of a claim, such as that made here by petitioner, that the very statutes or regulations which the Board administers are facially invalid.
"Classification is the key to selection," 32 CFR § 1622.1(b), and among a local Board's most important functions is "to decide, subject to appeal, the class in which each registrant shall be placed." 32 CFR § 1622.1(c). Classification is a highly individualized process, in which a Board must consider all pertinent information presented to it. Ibid. Thus, a Board may be required to determine, on a conflicting record, whether a registrant is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form, 32 CFR § 1622.14, or whether the registrant's deferment "is in the national interest and of paramount importance to our national security. . . ." 32 CFR § 1622.20. A Board also exercises considerable discretion in the processing of registrants -- for example, in securing information relevant to classification, 32 CFR §§ 1621.9-1621.15, scheduling of physical examinations, 32 CFR, pt. 1628, and scheduling and postponement of induction itself, 32 CFR, pt. 1632.
evidence, hear testimony, and resolve controversies on a sizable record. Even though the scope of judicial review is narrow, see Estep v.United States, supra, at 122-123, this cannot be done quickly. To stay induction pending such review would work havoc with the orderly processing of registrants into the Nation's armed forces. See 113 Cong.Rec. 15426 (Senator Russell); cf. Estep v. United States, supra, at 327 U. S. 137 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result).
Second, the registrant has been afforded, prior to his induction, the opportunity for a hearing and administrative appeals within the Selective Service System. 32 CFR, pt.s. 1624 1627. It is properly presumed that a registrant's Board has fully considered all relevant information presented to it, and that it has classified and processed him regularly, and in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations. Greer v. United States, 378 F.2d 931 (1967); Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255 (1966); cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 272 U. S. 14-15 (1926); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 208 U. S. 12 (1908); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827).
First, such a claim does not invite the court to review the factual and discretionary decisions inherent in the "classification or processing" of registrants, and does not, therefore, present opportunity for protracted delay. To be sure, collateral factual determinations -- for example, whether the registrant was subjected to the statute or regulation drawn in question (in this case, the delinquency reclassification procedure) -- may sometimes be necessary. But, in general, a court may dispose of a challenge to the validity of the procedure on the pleadings.
registrants' communities; [Footnote 2/5] the fact that a registrant may not be represented by counsel in Selective Service proceedings, 32 CFR § 1624.1(b), seems incompatible with the Boards' serious consideration of such purely legal claim. Indeed, the denial of counsel has been justified on the ground that the proceedings are nonjudicial. United States v. Sturys, 342 F.2d 328, 332 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879; cf. United States v. Capehart, 141 F.Supp. 708, 719 (1956), aff'd, 237 F.2d 388 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971.
history, [Footnote 2/7] language, or purpose. On the foregoing basis, I agree that § 10(b)(3) does not forbid pre-induction review in this instance.
"When a statute of the State denies his right, or interposes a bar to his enforcing it, in the judicial tribunals, the presumption is fair that they will be controlled by it in their decisions. . . ."
Id. at 100 U. S. 321. See also Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966).
See 32 CFR §§ 1603.3, 1604.22; Memorandum from General Hershey, S.Doc. No. 82, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 13, 1967, p. 395; Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 74-79 (1967).
Although each local Board has assigned to it a part-time, uncompensated appeal agent -- "whenever possible, a person with legal training and experience," 32 CFR § 1604.71(c) -- his pertinent responsibilities to the Board are limited to assisting its members by "interpreting for them laws, regulations, and other directives," 32 CFR § 1604.71(d)(4), and he must be "equally diligent in protecting the interests of the Government and the rights of the registrant in all matters." 32 CFR § 1604.71(d)(5).
It is doubtful whether a person may be deprived of his personal liberty without the prior opportunity to be heard by some tribunal competent fully to adjudicate his claims. Cf. Kuong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 344 U. S. 596-598 (1953); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152-153 (1941); United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 291 U. S. 463 (1934); Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 210 U. S. 385 (1908); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (1961). But cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 321 U. S. 520 (1944); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908). The validity of summary administrative deprivation of liberty without a full hearing may turn on the availability of a prompt subsequent hearing, cf. U.S.Const., Amdt. VI; United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 383 U. S. 120 (1966); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965) -- something not made meaningfully available to petitioner here, either by the option of defending a criminal prosecution for refusing to report for induction, see Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920); cf. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964), or by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after induction. See ante at 393 U. S. 235-236; Estep v. United States, supra, at 327 U. S. 129-130 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy).
The problem is exacerbated by petitioner's nonfrivolous argument that induction pursuant to the delinquency reclassification procedure constitutes "punishment" for violation of collateral regulations, without jury trial, right to counsel, and other constitutional requisites. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 372 U. S. 168-169 (1963). It is not necessary to decide this issue. If petitioner's claim is valid, however, then postponement of a hearing until after induction is tantamount to permitting the imposition of summary punishment, followed by loss of liberty, without possibility of bail, until such time as the petitioner is able to secure his release by a writ of habeas corpus. This would, at the very least, cut against the grain of much that is fundamental to our constitutional tradition. Cf. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362, 380-1383 (1953).
"disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts to review the classification action of local or appeal Boards before the registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies."
Section 10(b)(3) was likely precipitated by the Second Circuit's well publicized decision in Wolff v. Selective Service Bd., 372 F.2d 817 (1967). See dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, post at 393 U. S. 247; Brief for Respondent 18, n. 4, 69, n. 32. Wolff, as well as the other "recent cases" to which the committee reports probably referred, and this Court's decisions construing the antecedent to § 10(b)(3), all involved claims that the Selective Service Boards had maladministered or misapplied the applicable statutes or regulations, and not challenges to the validity of the laws themselves. Wolff v. Selective Service Bd., supra, (loss of deferment for participating in demonstration); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (1956) (failure to follow proper appeal procedure); Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (1953) (concurring opinion) (misclassification); Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F.Supp. 139 (1952) (refusal to recognize foreign medical school for deferment); Tomlinson v. Hershey, 95 F.Supp. 72 (1949) (refusal to hear request for deferment); Estep v. United States, supra, (entitlement to ministerial exemption); Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944) (entitlement to conscientious objector status).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.
specify the exclusive methods by which the determinations of Selective Service Boards may be judicially reviewed. Since, under the terms of that provision, the present suit is plainly premature, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
"No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction. . . ."
It is unquestioned that the overriding purpose of this provision was "to prevent litigious interruptions of procedures to provide necessary military manpower." [Footnote 3/2] To be sure, the provision is somewhat inartistically drawn, but its background and legislative history clearly resolve whatever difficulties might otherwise be presented by the imprecision of the draftsman's language.
In interpreting the less explicit terms of predecessor statutes, [Footnote 3/3] this Court had established the general rule that draft classifications could not be judicially reviewed prior to the time a registrant was to be inducted. Review was held to be proper only when challenges to such determinations were raised either (1) in defense to a criminal prosecution following a refusal to be inducted, or (2) in habeas corpus proceedings initiated after induction.
See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 348 U. S. 377; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114; Billings v. Tribesdell, 321 U. S. 542; Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549.
"Until recently, there was no problem in the observance of the finality provision. In several recent cases, however, district courts have been brought into selective service processing prematurely. The committee attaches much importance to the finality provisions, and reemphasizes the original intent that judicial review of classifications should not occur until after the registrant's administrative remedies have been exhausted and the registrant presents himself for induction. [Footnote 3/6]"
action of local or appeal boards before the registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies. Existing law quite clearly precludes such a judicial review until after a registrant has been ordered to report for induction and has responded either affirmatively or negatively to such an order. In view of this inclination of the courts to prematurely inquire into the classification action of local boards, the committee has rewritten this provision of the law so as to more clearly enunciate this principle. The committee was prompted to take this action since continued disregard of this principle of the law by various courts could seriously affect the administration of the Selective Service System. [Footnote 3/7]"
"A registrant who presents himself for induction may challenge his classification by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his induction. If the registrant does not submit to induction, he may raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution the issue of the legality of the classification. [Footnote 3/8] "
"the Department of Justice would not prosecute [such a registrant] if he refuses to be inducted, and would promptly confess error if he submits to induction and brings a habeas corpus action. [Footnote 3/13]"
induction with the uncertain hope of prevailing in a habeas corpus proceeding. Yet the Court has made plain today in Clark v. Gabriel, supra, that a registrant whose exemption from service is not clear will, under § 10(b)(3), be put to just such a fateful choice. In light of Gabriel, the allowance of pre-induction review in the present case thus stands as all the more irrational and unjustified. I respectfully dissent.
50 U.S.C.App. § 460(b)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. III). The Act amends and supersedes the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
"[D]ecisions of . . . local boards shall be final except where an [administrative] appeal is authorized. . . ."
See also Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 327 U. S. 119, 327 U. S. 123-125.
See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376; Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (concurring opinion); Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F.Supp. 139, Tomlinson v. Hershey, 95 F.Supp. 72.
In Wolff, the court allowed pre-induction review of the reclassification of two students who had demonstrated against the hostilities in Vietnam.
S.Rep. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1967).
H.R.Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 30-31 (1967).
S.Rep. No. 209, supra, at 10.
The Court seems to limit its holding to statutory "exemptions"; yet "deferments" may just as "plainly" preclude a registrant's induction. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. III); 32 CFR § 1622.25 (1968) (full-time college students).
"deprive[d] petitioner of his liberty without the prior opportunity to present to any competent forum -- agency or court -- his substantial claim that he was ordered inducted pursuant to an unlawful procedure."
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN seeks to avoid such difficulties by viewing § 10(b)(3) as intended to prohibit, not all delays in the processing of registrants, but merely those protracted delays that result from judicial consideration of factual claims.
As the absence of any exception in its terms indicates, however, § 10(b)(3) plainly was intended to prevent any interruption whatever of the orderly processing of registrants. There is not a glimmer of evidence in the section's legislative history that Congress intended to prevent some sorts of delay but not others. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the distinction MR. JUSTICE HARLAN seeks to draw -- between claims "that the procedure employed by the Board is invalid on its face" and challenges to a Board's factual determinations -- with his recognition that the enactment of § 10(b)(3) was in substantial part a congressional reaction to the Second Circuit's decision in Wolff v. Selective Service Bd., 372 F.2d 817. Wolff involved no factual dispute whatsoever; rather, that decision held that, on the basis of admitted facts, the "delinquency" reclassification of the registrants there involved had been entirely unauthorized under both the statute and the applicable regulations.
Nor can I view the constitutional theory suggested by my Brother HARLAN as presenting a justifiable ground for decision. It is noteworthy, first of all, that no such theory has ever been advanced by the petitioner. Furthermore, persons arrested for criminal offenses are routinely deprived of their liberty -- to a greater extent than are military inductees -- without any prior opportunity for the adjudication of legal or constitutional claims, and often without any hope of securing release on bail. Preliminary hearings before magistrates, by and large, determine only the existence of a prima facie case for the prosecution, and do not begin to reach defenses that might be raised, whether factual, legal, or constitutional. Nor does § 10(b)(3) necessarily compel deprivation of liberty. A registrant in the petitioner's position is free to refuse induction, keeping open the option of raising his claims should a criminal prosecution be brought against him. And it is entirely possible, of course -- and more than likely in the petitioner's case -- that no such prosecution will ever be instituted.
The petitioner suggests that, where the action of a draft board is challenged as a violation of freedom of speech, the postponement of judicial review until after the scheduled time of induction might have a "chilling effect" upon First Amendment activity. But petitioner's complaint presents no bona fide First Amendment issue. His alleged return of his registration certificate to the Government would not be protected expression. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367.
"Even if there were, as the petitioner argues, a constitutional requirement that judicial review must he available to test the validity of the decision of the local board, it is certain that Congress was not required to provide for judicial intervention before final acceptance of an individual for national service."
Id. at 320 U. S. 554. See also Wltmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 348 U. S. 377; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114; Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542.
Brief for Respondents 70, n 33.


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Categories of affected persons Visitors and users of the online offer (hereinafter we refer to the affected persons as “users”).
In accordance with Art. 13 GDPR, we inform you about the legal basis of our data processing. Unless the legal basis in the data protection declaration is mentioned, the following applies: The legal basis for obtaining consent is Article 6 (1) lit. a and Art. 7 GDPR, the legal basis for the processing for the performance of our services and the execution of contractual measures as well as the response to inquiries is Art. 6 (1) lit. b GDPR, the legal basis for processing in order to fulfill our legal obligations is Art. 6 (1) lit. c GDPR, and the legal basis for processing in order to safeguard our legitimate interests is Article 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. In the event that vital interests of the data subject or another natural person require the processing of personal data, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. GDPR as legal basis.
Measures include, in particular, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data by controlling physical access to the data, as well as their access, input, disclosure, availability and separation. We have also set up procedures to ensure the enjoyment of data subject rights, data deletion and data vulnerability. Furthermore, we consider the protection of personal data already in the development, or selection of hardware, software and procedures, according to the principle of data protection through technology design (Art. 25 GDPR).
You have gem. Art. 77 GDPR the right to file a complaint with the competent supervisory authority. Withdrawal You have the right to grant consent in accordance with. Art. 7 para. 3 GDPR with effect for the future right to You can object to the future processing of your data in accordance with Art. 21 GDPR at any time.
“Cookies” are small files that are stored on users’ computers. Different information can be stored within the cookies. A cookie is primarily used to store the information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his visit to an online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies” or “transient cookies”, are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves an online service and closes his browser. In such a cookie, e.g. the contents of a shopping cart in an online shop or a login status are saved. The term “permanent” or “persistent” refers to cookies that remain stored even after the browser has been closed. Thus, e.g. the login status will be saved if users visit it after several days. Likewise, in such a cookie the interests of the users can be stored, which are used for range measurement or marketing purposes. A “third-party cookie” refers to cookies that are offered by providers other than the person who manages the online offer (otherwise, if it is only their cookies, this is called “first-party-Cookies”).
When contacting us (for example, by contact form, e-mail, telephone or via social media) the information of the user to process the contact request and its processing in accordance with. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b) GDPR processed. User information can be stored in a Customer Relationship Management System (“CRM System”) or comparable request organization. We delete the requests, if they are no longer required. We check the necessity every two years; Furthermore, the legal archiving obligations apply.
The hosting services we use are designed to provide the following services: infrastructure and platform services, computing capacity, storage and database services, e-mailing, security and technical maintenance services we use to operate this online service. Here we, or our hosting provider, process inventory data, contact data, content data, contract data, usage data, meta and communication data of customers, interested parties and visitors to this online offer on the basis of our legitimate interests in an efficient and secure provision of this online offer acc. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR i.V.m. Art. 28 GDPR (conclusion of contract processing contract).

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Facebook, Inc. (NASDAQ:FB) of Menlo Park, CA, is best known for its hugely popular online social media website. Incredibly, the website recently welcomed one billion visitors to its digital platform on August 24th, meaning that nearly one out of every seven people living in the world logged onto Facebook that day. Facebook is the platform of choice for many social media participants and a recent study by food and drink market research firm Sopexa shows that 81 percent of online users posting food content, also known as “foodies,” use Facebook compared to the 18 percent who frequent Pinterest. As we discussed in our coverage of a recent report on e-businesses released by the American Consumer Satisfaction Index, Facebook had the greatest one-year gains of any e-business in terms of consumer satisfaction.
Operations for Facebook continue to grow, even in rural areas, as is evidenced by the recent announcement of the opening of a third data center in Prineville, OR, to service users in rural Oregon. The social media giant is also developing a virtual assistant known as ‘M’ which hopes to compete with rival virtual assistants like Cortana from Google Inc. (NASDAQ:GOOG) or Siri from Apple Inc. (NASDAQ:AAPL). In the political realm, it may be interesting to note whether ties between Facebook and Washington, D.C., are affected at all by the White House’s recent hiring of a Facebook employee to serve as the federal government’s first Director of Product, overseeing digital properties such as WhiteHouse.gov and the We the People petition website.
Facebook has been experiencing an uptick in terms of its intellectual property holdings in recent years. In 2014, the company was tied with Emerson Electric for 132nd overall with 279 patents issued that year by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, an increase of almost 120 percent over the company’s patenting pace the previous year. Facebook’s already earned 250 U.S. patents in 2015 according to Innography, making it very likely that the company will post higher patent totals this year. The text cluster provided here shows us that much of the company’s recent innovation focuses on social networking, although user interfaces and computing devices were also large areas of focus.
discussed within U.S. Patent No. 9092826, which is titled Profile Page with Biographical Summary for Social Networking System User. This patent discloses a method of maintaining profile stores including biographical information items of multiple users of a social networking system, determining biographical information items from a first user which are temporarily relevant in response to a request from a second user, selecting multiple biographical information items as most relevant to the second user, concatenating the items into a short biography for displaying to a second user and generating a profile page of the first user for viewing by the second user including a first section corresponding to the short biography and a second section corresponding to the first user’s biographical information. This innovation intends to enable more effective social networking by providing users with the biographical information about other users which is most relevant to the user seeking out information.
Anyone who already feels like social networks collect too much personal data may not be happy to find out about the invention protected by U.S. Patent No. 9118725, issued under the title User Activity Tracking System. The method claimed here involves receiving sensor signals from a client device which correspond to motions of the client device, determining an activity of the user by associating sensor signals with activity periods comprising a geographic location and selecting activity types corresponding to each activity period. This invention is designed to better determine the exact sports activity in which a user is engaged. Geographical location of social network users is at the center of U.S. Patent No. 9097531, titled Human-Like Global Positioning System (GPS) Directions. The method protected here involves receiving a request for a route to a first geolocation to a second geolocation, calculating the route between the two geolocations, identifying inferred paths that coincide with a portion of the route, replacing one or more route navigation instructions with abbreviated navigation instructions associated with the inferred paths and providing a set of navigation instructions including the abbreviated navigation instructions. This system is designed to track frequently traveled routes of a user and present them for inclusion when determining GPS directions to a destination.
Personal assistant technologies related to the new Facebook M virtual assistant are detailed within U.S. Patent No. 9075867, entitled Intelligent Results Using an Assistant. The method claimed here involves receiving a character stream of non-completion characters input by a user, analyzing the character stream with an assistant, initiating a search related to analysis of the character stream and displaying search results prior to input of a completion character by a user. This system for providing results which predict user interests is designed to reduce the challenges in navigating large stores of information available online.
A greater flexibility for Facebook’s Messenger instant messaging service seems to be the focal point of U.S. Patent No. 9043419, titled Associating Online Identities Between Different Messaging Services. This patent protects a method of subscribing a user of a first communication service to a second communication service, requesting a first user identifier for the user, storing the first identifier, storing a second identifier after the user is subscribed to the second communication service, associating both identifiers with each other, receiving contact list information associated with a user’s first communication service, identifying user identities associated with the second communication service corresponding to identities in the first contact list and populating a second contact list with the identified user identities associated with the second service. This innovation is intended to improve the ease at which messaging service users can switch between those services.
Various improvements to Facebook’s social networking service are again clearly on display in the company’s recent patent application filings, as can be seen within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150100458, titled Systems and Methods for Using a Social Networking System to Purchase Products. The method that would be protected here involves providing communication including information to purchase a product to a social networking system user, providing a selectable option to purchase the product from the social networking system and initiating a purchase of the product in response to a selection of the selectable option by a user. This invention seeks to facilitate e-commerce directly through Facebook’s social networking platform. Automated techniques for organizing media content uploaded to a social network by a user are described within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150104059, entitled Automatic Photo Album Creation Based on Social Information. This would protect a method of storing profiles for a plurality of social networking system users, storing information for a plurality of social networking system objects, storing a plurality of connections between the users and the objects, accessing a plurality of images posted by a user, receiving a request to access an album comprising a set of images selected from the plurality of images, identifying tagged objects in the images of the album, computing a score for each of the images based in part on an association between user profile information and tagged objects, selecting a subset of the plurality of images based on the computed scores and sending an album comprising the selected subset of images for display to a viewing user. This technology is intended to automate the process of curating photos uploaded to a social network, which can be time consuming. Online message boards made available by social networking systems will receive improved controls thanks to the invention outlined within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150163184, which is titled Moderating Content in an Online Forum. This patent application discloses a method of receiving a comment from a posting user that is posted on a page within a social networking system, determining that the comment contains proscribed content and displaying the page including the comment to the posting user while displaying a page not including the comment to social networking system users not connected to the posting user. This technology is intended to help online forum moderators strike a better balance between encouraging open discussion and weeding out inappropriate comments from users.
Parents who want to clean up the newsfeed being presented to a child that may be using a social network should get a helping hand from the technology detailed within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150234916, issued under the title Community-Based Parental Controls. The method claimed here involves maintaining rating groups that provide ratings relating to a piece of content and containing multiple users who evaluate multiple pieces of content, receiving a selection of a first rating group from a first user to be applied to a set of users associated with the first user, determining that a user sending the request belongs to the set of users associated with the first user, accessing information associated with the first rating group, determining that the first rating group includes a rating for the requested content and determining whether or not to provide information to the requesting user based on the indication or absence of a rating for the requested piece of content within the first rating group. This technique of using content rating groups is intended to improve the ability of rating online content as appropriate for viewing by others.
More messaging service innovation can be seen on display within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150215787, which is titled Phone Number Verification Method and System. The method claimed here involves obtaining an unconfirmed phone number for a phone device, transmitting a verification message from the phone device over a data channel of a voice network to the unconfirmed phone number, receiving the verification message at the phone device and indicating that the phone device is verified as being associated with the unconfirmed phone number responsive to the verification message. This system allows phone device users to communicate via text message without incurring SMS text messaging rates charged by some network providers.
Methods for determining how engaging pieces of online social content are to a social network user are featured within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150142954, titled Systems and Methods for Estimating User Attention. The computer-implemented method disclosed here involves identifying first activity data indicating activities of a first user on a website or application, detecting a first predetermined period of inactivity in the first activity data, initiating a response triggering event after the predetermined period of inactivity, monitoring for an indication of a user response and determining whether the user is passively present on the website or application based on the monitoring. This social networking optimization technology is designed to determine pages and content which garner little attention in order to better provision popular social content.
Finally, we were intrigued to get a look at an invention in the field of spoken word language translation, found within U.S. Patent Application No. 20150127321, entitled Lexicon Development via Shared Translation Database. The method that would be protected here involves receiving an utterance in a first language from a user which includes a first term associated with the field term, translating the utterance from the first language into a second language, receiving an indication to add the first field-associated term to a recognition lexicon of a first automatic speech recognition module of the speech translation system, adding the first term and at least a portion of the utterance translation to a machine translation module associated with the first language of the speech recognition system and adding the first term and the portion of the utterance in a second language to a shared community database. This system for updating the vocabulary of a speech recognition system for the correction of recognition errors over time.

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This data protection declaration explains to you the type, scope and purpose of the processing of personal data (hereinafter referred to as "data") within our online offer and the associated websites, functions and contents as well as external online presences, e.g. our social media profile (hereinafter jointly referred to as "online offer"). With regard to the terms used, such as "processing" or "person responsible", we refer to the definitions in Art. 4 of the Basic Data Protection Ordinance (DSGVO).
- Contact details (e.g., e-mail, telephone numbers).
- Answer contact requests and communicate with users.
"processing" means any operation carried out with or without the aid of automated procedures or any such series of operations in connection with personal data. The term goes a long way and covers practically every handling of data.
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MARINUCCI BROS. & CO., INC. vs. COMMONWEALTH.
Failure of the Department of Public Works to furnish for disposal of material dredged from a river the areas specifically designated in a contract of the Commonwealth with a dredging contractor, by reason of the revocation by the Metropolitan District Commission of its permission to the department to use such areas, was an "act of omission" by the Commonwealth within an article of the contract, and, where it appeared in a proceeding against the Commonwealth by the contractor for compensation for added expenses incurred in disposing of the dredged material elsewhere that the contractor had not complied with the provisions of such article requiring a contractor claiming compensation for work or damage "on account of any act of omission" by the Commonwealth to make a timely written claim therefor and to file an itemized statement thereof with the Commonwealth's engineer and that the article recited that "Unless such statement shall be made . . . the Contractor's claim for compensation shall be forfeited . . . and he shall not be entitled to payment on account of any such work or damage," the contractor was not entitled to recover.
PETITION filed in the Superior Court on March 16, 1967.
The case was heard by Hale, J., on an auditor's report and other evidence.
John E. Sheehy, Assistant Attorney General (Peter R. Leone, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, with him), for the Commonwealth.
Arthur Brogna for the petitioner.
SPALDING, J. In this petition pursuant to G. L. c. 258, Marinucci Bros. & Co., Inc. (contractor) seeks damages resulting from an alleged breach of a contract entered into between it and the Commonwealth acting through the Department of Public Works (D.P.W.). The case was tried on an auditor's report (findings not final) and other evidence. The auditor found for the contractor in the amount of $143,651.77. Adopting the findings of the auditor, the judge made additional findings, dealt with numerous requests for rulings, and found for the contractor in the same amount found by the auditor.
Facts found by the auditor and by the judge may be summarized as follows: On September 30, 1960, the D.P.W. entered into an agreement with the contractor for State highway and bridge construction. The contractor, among other things, agreed to dredge and relocate the Mystic River for the construction of Route 93. The contract "was unique in the sense that contrary to the usual provisions in contracts by the D.P.W. peat disposal areas were designated by it in the plans." [Note 1] Certain disposal areas were specifically designated along the river. These areas were provided "at the site of the project in order to reduce the cost to the . . . [Commonwealth, because] if the material had to be trucked away wet and disposed of the prospective bids would be higher and also . . . spillage on the streets would occur." The contractor relied on the availability of these areas in making its bid.
District Commission (M.D.C.) to the D.P.W. After the contractor was awarded the contract and had begun the work of peat excavation and disposal, the M.D.C. revoked the permission granted to the D.P.W.
With no disposal areas available at the site, the D.P.W. faced the added expense of trucking the dredged material elsewhere. To avoid this the D.P.W. and the M.D.C. agreed to make other areas available. Since the new areas were not as suitable as those formerly designated, the contractor lost some of the benefit of the shrinkage properties of the peat and was obliged to build and maintain dikes around the areas twelve to fifteen feet above the height originally planned. "In order" the judge found, "to build and maintain the dikes . . . [at the new height, the contractor] incurred costs of $49,291.77 due to the loss of efficiency by reason of having to pump dredged material over a height of 15 feet. It took 1,348 hours of additional pumping time. This cost the . . . [contractor] at the rate of $70 per hour or . . . $94,360.00." The judge concluded that "the failure of the . . . [D.P.W.] to furnish the 4 areas specified in the plans resulted in a breach of contract and that the . . . [contractor] incurred damages as the result of this breach in the amount of $143,651.77."
To the findings and rulings the respondent claimed seventeen exceptions. Of these, we shall discuss only two (Nos. 4 and 15), for they are dispositive of the case. Exception No. 4 attacks the finding for the contractor in view of the allowance of the respondent's requests for rulings numbered 5, 6, 7, and 8.
compliance with either art. 23 or art. 58 of the Standard Specifications; and (c) the Commonwealth did not waive or excuse the contractor from complying with the provisions of art. 58 of the Standard Specifications.
The judge, although allowing these requests, ruled that the contractor's claim was not one for extra work as defined in art. 23 nor was it a claim under art. 58, as it was not based on any act or omission of the respondent or its agents within the meaning of art. 58. The latter ruling was challenged by exception No. 15.
We need not discuss art. 23 for that appears to apply exclusively to extras, and the parties agreed before the auditor "that the issues . . . do not involve `Extras' as defined in the [Standard Specifications]."
duty is sufficient to bring the case within art. 58 as an "omission." The contractual duties of the D.P.W. could not be avoided because the M.D.C., also an agency of the Commonwealth, saw fit to withdraw its permission to use the disposal areas originally contemplated. The contract was with the Commonwealth and its obligations could not be diminished by conduct of the M.D.C. The effect of what happened was an omission by the Commonwealth. And the present action is against the Commonwealth.
By the terms of art. 58 the failure of the contractor to make a timely claim in writing based on that omission and an itemized statement setting forth the details of the work done or damage incurred results in a forfeiture of its claim.
The reasons for the forfeiture clause are set out at some length in the Commonwealth's brief. It is there argued that the failure of the contractor to comply with the provisions of art. 58 has placed the Commonwealth at an extreme disadvantage in checking the correctness of the $143,651.77 claim. But, however that may be, the provisions of art. 58 are not invalid and the respondent has a right to insist on compliance with them as a condition precedent to recovery. See Crane Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 290 Mass. 249 , 253-254, which denied recovery to a contractor who had failed to comply with the notice requirements of the predecessor of art. 23. See also M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 568 , 590.
It follows that the judge erred in ruling that the contractor's claim was not based on any act of omission of the respondent within the meaning of art. 58, and the respondent's exceptions must be sustained.
Finding for the petitioner vacated.
[Note 1] Peat as used in the contract refers to material that is unsuitable for constructing roads and structures.
[Note 2] "All claims of the Contractor for compensation other than as provided for in the contract on account of any act of omission or commission by the Party of the First Part or its agents must be made in writing to the Engineer within one week after the beginning of any work or the sustaining of any damage on account of such act, such written statement to contain a description of the nature of the work performed or damage sustained; and the Contractor shall, on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of the month succeeding that in which such work is performed or damage sustained, file with the Engineer an itemized statement of the details and amount of such work or damage. Unless such statement shall be made as so required, the Contractor's claim for compensation shall be forfeited and invalid, and he shall not be entitled to payment on account of any such work or damage."
[Note 3] "Party of the First Part" is defined in the Standard Specifications as the "Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Department of Public Works."

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