For anyone awaiting trial, sentencing, appeal, transfer to the DOC (Department of Corrections), etcetera, this may be the most important time in your life. Whenever possible, you should learn your rights so you can, when appropriate, exercise your rights.
Generally speaking, your ability to challenge a criminal conviction can be affected and limited by many circumstances. For example, if you can make a particular claim or argument but your attorney does not present the argument to the trial court, you could lose the ability to assert such a claim in the future. Additionally, if an issue can be raised on appeal but your attorney does not address it, you will have a difficult time trying to raise the issue in a habeas petition.
Because each criminal case is unique, you likely will need to rely on your attorney to properly and timely assert your rights. As discussed below, you should be able to fully communicate with your attorney about your case. Accordingly, when you are looking to retain an attorney, you should consider the person's knowledge, experience, and willingness to communicate with you throughout the criminal process .
Although the right to remain silent is well-known, many persons say too much when arrested and/or questioned by police. If the circumstances prompting your "alleged" statements are questionable, your attorney should file and argue a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence of your statements. Usually, the word of the officer or investigator will carry more weight with the judge than your word, especially if you speak after being advised of your rights and/or after signing some type of Miranda waiver form. So, be careful out there.
Your right to testify is personal; in other words, only you can waive your right to testify. Additionally, your attorney has the primary responsibility for advising you of your right to testify and for explaining the tactical implications of testifying or not testifying.
Felony charges are usually brought by serving a warrant or indictment on the accused. If you are served with a warrant, you will likely proceed with a preliminary hearing where the district court will consider whether to certify the charges to the grand jury. If the district court certifies the felony or felonies, the grand jury will simply receive the information and issue an indictment in the circuit court. If you are directly indicted by the grand jury ("direct indictment"), you will not have a preliminary hearing.
The initial charges against you can change up until the day of trial, and you could be found guilty of a lesser charge even if the evidence is insufficient to prove the offense charged in the indictment. Every criminal offense has elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Most criminal offenses are defined in the Virginia Code, and the elements of the offenses are set forth in the applicable statutes. Some crimes, however, are known as "common law" offenses, and such offenses are not defined by statute.
You should familiarize yourself with the elements of each charge and all the lesser included offenses (if any). Furthermore, if you end up going to trial by jury, your attorney should be prepared to offer jury instructions which, among other things, inform the jury of the elements of lesser included offenses. Charges can overlap, so watch out for possible double jeopardy issues.
It is fundamental that your attorney should discuss with you, long before trial, the elements of each offense and lesser included offenses, the sentencing range for each offense, the prosecutor's theory of the case (if known), the possible defense theories in the case, the potential evidence and witnesses for you and against you, your plea options, your limited option of taking a bench trial versus a jury trial, sentencing procedures and sentencing factors (including use of sentencing guidelines), and other similar issues.
If your attorney does not discuss these issues with you, you might want to draft one or more lists of your potential witnesses and your questions. Each time you write a list and/or send a letter to your attorney, save a copy for yourself (and get it notarized if possible). Let your attorney know that you want information about your case, including the items discussed in the paragraph above.
Although the right to speedy trial is protected by the Virginia and U.S. Constitutions, better protection comes from the Virginia statutory right to speedy trial. Virginia Code § 19.2-243 provides that if an accused is continuously incarcerated, a trial must commence within 5 months of the preliminary hearing or from the date of indictment if the preliminary hearing is waived or the case is presented directly to the grand jury. If an accused is released on bond, the time period is extended to 9 months.
Nevertheless, the statutory right to a speedy trial is not absolute. A motion by a defendant to continue the case or failing to object to the Commonwealth's motion to continue will waive the speedy trial requirements from the time of the motion to the new trial date. Additionally, many other exceptions apply. The current version of Virginia Code § 19.2-243 states, in part, that the provisions shall not apply to a delay caused by the defendant's insanity or hospitalization, by the witnesses for the Commonwealth being kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or accident, by the granting of a separate trial at the request of a person indicted jointly with others for a felony, by continuance granted on the motion of the accused or his counsel, or by concurrence of the accused or his counsel in such a motion by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or by the failure of the accused or his counsel to make a timely objection to such a motion by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or by reason of his escaping from jail or failing to appear according to his recognizance, or by the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict. Note that a waiver of speedy trial might be a partial or complete waiver.
If your right to speedy trial is violated, you should make the appropriate motion directly before trial, or, at the very least, before the entry of the final order (usually the "sentencing order"). If you win your speedy trial motion, you will be forever discharged from prosecution for that offense. See Va. Code § 19.2-243.
You can expect that the prosecutor will keep an eye on the timing of the case, but prosecutors make mistakes like everyone else. The prosecutor does not have any obligation to advise you of your rights. Accordingly, you should pay close attention to the timing of your case, and, in every case, you should discuss your speedy trial rights with your attorney. Sometimes, your interests might be better served by seeking a continuance or even waiving your speedy trial rights, but you should evaluate your rights before waiving anything.
Exculpatory evidence is information that tends to show that the defendant did not commit the crime with which he is charged, or information that would mitigate punishment for the offense. Exculpatory evidence also includes evidence which could be used at trial to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness.
Generally speaking, exculpatory evidence does not have to be specifically requested. The Commonwealth is under an obligation to reveal exculpatory information of which they should reasonably be aware; however, a specific request should be made, particularly if an accused has any reason to believe that helpful material exists.
A defendant's rights to discovery are extremely limited in Virginia; however, every attempt should be made to obtain any available discovery as early as possible in the process. A discovery motion should be filed as soon as an attorney is appointed or retained. In felony cases or misdemeanors to be tried in Circuit Court, an accused is only allowed to receive or inspect his statements to law enforcement, scientific reports generated for his case, and certain designated tangible items, such as photographs, books, papers, etc. Nevertheless, an accused should be aware that by requesting these items in discovery, certain discovery can be required of the defendant. An accused may have to reveal to the Commonwealth his scientific tests and reports, whether he intends to rely on an alibi defense, and whether he intends to rely on an insanity defense.
Bail "means the pre-trial release of a person from custody upon those terms and conditions specified by order of an appropriate judicial officer." Bond refers to "the posting by a person or his surety of a written promise to pay a specific sum, secured or unsecured, ordered by an appropriate judicial officer as a condition of bail to assure performance of the terms and conditions contained in the recognizance." Va. Code § 19.2-119 (definitions). In other words, bail refers to getting out of jail with certain conditions, and bond is the money you pay to get out.
Not surprisingly, the first priority for many defendants is getting out of jail, and pre-trial release might be available. However, there might be a presumption against release if you are charged with a violent offense, certain types of drug distribution, or a firearm offense, and judicial officers must consider your prior record when deciding whether or not to fix bail. See Va. Code § 19.2-120 (bail and limitations on bail).
If you are granted bail, several conditions can be placed on your release, and you will likely be required to post bond, which will be set in an amount based on many factors. See Va. Code § 19.2-121 (fixing bail and setting bond amount). Obviously, posting a large bond can drain your resources, so you should evaluate your options before making any decisions. In general, a judicial officer will consider two factors when deciding whether to permit pre-trial or post-trial release: (1) the potential risk that you will not appear in court at the appropriate times; and, (2) the potential risk of danger to the public or yourself if you are released on bond. If you are denied a pre-trial or post-trial release or if bond is excessive, you can appeal to a higher judicial officer.
A criminal defendant has the right to use subpoenas to secure the presence of witnesses for trial or a some other hearing. A subpoena has the force of a court order which requires that the person come to court. Subpoenas are available to a defendant at no cost, and subpoena requests should be made at least a few weeks before trial. It takes time to issue and serve subpoenas, and a subpoena obtained at the last minute might not be considered a valid basis for a continuance if the witness fails to appear at trial. Usually, judges must be persuaded that the witness is necessary and material to the defense and that reasonable efforts have been made to secure the presence of the witness.
Indeed, you need to give your attorney the names and addresses of any potential witnesses. A good attorney will try to contact the witnesses well before trial, and frequent communication between you and the attorney is important as witnesses are interviewed and the case develops. Many attorneys stay very busy, and all too often attorneys will fail to fully investigate, discover, or present some important witnesses. Usually, before trial begins, the trial judge will ask you if all of your witnesses are present. If you answer "yes," you might be barred from later claiming that your attorney failed to present testimony from a favorable defense witness.
If you enter a guilty plea, you waive (or give up) many rights, such as the right to trial and appeal, and you might waive your right to challenge your conviction and sentence through any legal proceeding. It follows that before pleading guilty you should consider the evidence against you, the possible outcomes of a trial, your level of innocence or guilt, the possible sentencing factors, and, if applicable, the agreement between you and the prosecutor.
All too often, defendants plead guilty "straight up" without understanding that the judge can impose any sentence permitted by statute, up to and including the statutory maximum. Although Virginia uses sentencing guidelines, the guidelines are simply a "guide." The judge is free to depart from the guidelines. The rules say that a judge must state his reasons for going outside the guidelines, but the judge's failure to do so is not grounds for relief by any means including direct appeal or habeas actions.
Some defendants might plead guilty without understanding the agreement with the prosecutor. The rules require that plea agreements be in writing in the circuit court, and you should carefully review the agreement before signing anything. You should also ask your attorney questions until you feel certain that a guilty plea is best for you.
If necessary, you can file a motion to withdraw your guilty plea, but courts are reluctant to grant such motions unless you can present compelling reasons for the withdrawal. Your chance of winning the right to withdraw a guilty plea will vary depending upon the reasons for withdrawal, the answers you provided to the court's questions when the court accepted your guilty plea, and the timing of your motion to withdraw. See Va. Code § 19.2-296.
Sentencing by a judge or jury sometimes can be even more important than the trial and the evidence of guilt or innocence. The sentencing hearing usually occurs weeks or months after a guilty verdict from a plea or from a trial. A separate hearing is conducted before the court imposes sentence, and a wide variety of evidence may be presented to the court.
Every defendant should be aware that if a jury trial is selected (by the defendant, the Commonwealth, or the court), and the jury returns guilty verdicts, the jury sets a sentence after the jury trial. The jury may hear additional evidence beyond that which they heard during the trial, including information about the defendant's record, if any, and other relevant information. The jury's verdict may be suspended, in whole or in part, although many courts will not deviate from a jury verdict when the court later imposes sentence.
Generally, before a sentence is imposed, a pre-sentence report (PSR) is ordered by the court and prepared by a probation officer. The PSR will contain information including prior record, health, education, and information from both parties about the offense in question. The PSR will also contain the sentencing guidelines worksheets which will provide the court with a recommendation of a sentencing range and midpoint. As previously stated, the guidelines are simply a recommendation (unlike the federal guidelines that present a mandatory range of sentencing), and a deviation from the guidelines is not a basis for appeal or any other relief.
Sentencing is a defendant's last opportunity to convince the court to deal with him as leniently as possible. All efforts should be made to prepare for this stage of the proceedings, even in cases where a defense to the charge exists. Your life is too important to ignore the possibility that the trial may not go the way you hoped. A good sentencing hearing, before the jury or the court, can make a difference of months or years in your life.
Information concerning direct appeals of criminal cases.


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Last Friday, a car-ramming attack in the West Bank killed two Israeli soldiers and injured two others. While the suspect was apprehended shortly thereafter, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu pledged on Twitter to “work to demolish the home of the terrorist”. This statement reflects the commitment of the current Israeli government to an infamous policy of “punitive home demolitions”, which consists of demolishing the home of relatives of Palestinians suspected of security offences against Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (two other types of demolitions are “administrative demolitions” of houses built without a permit and “clearing demolitions” carried out on the pretext of military needs such as during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014). Punitive demolitions have been widely documented (see e.g. here, here, here, here, here, and here) and denounced as amounting to collective punishment, a violation of IHL and a war crime under many national laws. Yet, the practice is surprisingly absent from the ICC Prosecutor’s preliminary examination reports on the situation of Palestine. In her 2015, 2016 and 2017 annual reports, Fatou Bensouda mentions house demolitions only under the heading of “settlement activities” which would seem to exclude punitive house demolitions.
The ICC does not have jurisdiction over the war crime of collective punishment as such. The case for including this crime in the Rome Statute has already been convincingly argued, but it was not proposed as an amendment at the 2010 Kampala Review Conference. However, as will be argued below, punitive demolitions could be prosecuted under other war crime counts. The OTP should include them in her preliminary investigation: not only could this lead to concrete charges before the ICC, and offer some prospect of justice for the hundreds of Palestinians who lost their homes since mid-2014, it could also deter the current and future Israeli governments from pursuing such a policy.
The first part of this post addresses the qualification of the policy as a “grave breach” of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), prosecutable under Art. 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, while the second part will address alternative qualifications as well as admissibility concerns.
Israel’s policy of punitive demolitions could qualify as the grave breach of “[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”, under Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) of the Rome Statute. Below, I will examine the elements of this crime.
First, Art. 8(2)(a) crimes require an international armed conflict (IAC). The qualification of the situation in the West Bank as one of occupation, and hence an IAC to which IHL applies, should not raise any serious legal issues and is acknowledged by the Israeli Supreme Court. (The question of the conventional applicability of GCIV in the West Bank and whether this is condition for war crimes under Art. 8(2)(a) of the Statute is beyond the scope of this post. However, it can be argued that the grave breaches provisions of GCIV underlying Art. 8(2)(a) crimes need only apply as a matter of customary law. Note that this question would not arise for Art. 8(2)(b) war crimes, discussed in part 2 of this post, given the absence of reference to the GCs in the chapeau of the article).
A second contextual requirement for the applicability of all Art. 8 crimes is that “the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict” (nexus requirement). Given that Israel views demolition orders as an administrative sanction, a claim that they constitute mere law enforcement measures unconnected to the conflict is foreseeable. This argument would not hold up. If ICC judges follow, like they did in the past, the Kunarac test (the conflict – or occupation – “must play a substantial role in the perpetrator’s decision, in his ability to commit the crime or in the manner in which the conduct was ultimately committed”), there is no reason to expect the Court to question the existence of a sufficient nexus. The practice of punitive demolitions is intrinsically linked to the occupation since it is carried out in response to acts committed against Israel as the occupying power, made possible because Israel controls the territory on which the houses are located, and implemented via the occupation apparatus (authorized by the military commander under the military law applicable in the West Bank and executed by the IDF as the occupying force).
A third consideration is the protective scope of Art. 8(2)(a)(iv). The chapeau of Art. 8(2)(a) requires that the property be “protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention”. GCIV does not define which property is “protected” under its provisions but it makes sense to follow the reasoning of the ICTY according to which property belonging to protected persons is itself protected under GCIV (Blaskic, TJ, para 149-150). Given that the owners of the houses destroyed by Israel in the West Bank “find themselves […] in the hands of [an] Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”, they are protected persons under Art. 4 GCIV and therefore their property can be said to be “protected” as required by the chapeau of Art. 8(2)(a). As to the type of property contemplated in Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) specifically, it includes property protected under Art. 53 GCIV, i.e. “real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons” (William Schabas, paras. 291-292; Knut Dörmann, p. 83). The property of Palestinian suspects and their relatives would thus fall under the protective scope of Art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
“While any individual house demolition operation, executed on the basis of a specific order, will likely fall short of the legal standard of extensive destruction, […] a Policy leading over the years to hundreds or even thousands of house demolition not justified by military necessity, may pass the threshold of wantonness under Article 8(2)(a)(iv)”.
The requirement that the destruction be carried out “unlawfully” should be “assessed in the light of the overarching concept of military necessity” (OUP Commentary, Chapter 71, para. 51; see also Dörmann, p. 83) (the fact that the ICC Elements of Crimes for Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) do not mention the “unlawful” element but only that of “military necessity” (Element 2) confirms this interpretation. The concept of “military necessity” is often understood as the equivalent of “necessities of war” (used in Art 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations). The Israeli government has successfully argued before the Israeli Supreme Court that these demolitions comply with military necessity (for an analysis of these cases see here, here and here). While the exact meaning of “military necessity” is controversial, it is uncontroversial that it differs in nature from security considerations. One way military necessity has been explained is that “[t]here must be some reasonable connection between the seizure or destruction of the enemy property and the overcoming of enemy forces” (U.S. DoD Manual, 5.17.2). The punitive nature of the demolition cannot possibly be reconciled with even the most generous understanding of military necessity, which is prospective in nature. The use of the term “deterrent” by the Israeli government, in an effort to signal the preventive as opposed to punitive nature of the policy seems to reflect no more than a difference in rhetoric – Israeli executive and judiciary branches did use the term “punishment” throughout the 1970s and 1980s to designate the same practice. Destroying private housing to sanction a perceived affiliation with “the enemy” is too far removed from the objective of overcoming enemy forces. In addition, claims that the policy is “necessary” have been challenged on the basis of empirical data showing that the policy is, in fact, ineffective at deterring terrorism. The 2014 Expert Opinion further argues that the unlawfulness of the demolitions also derives from the fact that they constitute collective punishment.
How about prosecuting the Turks and Erdogan for excesses committed in the course of the ongoing Operation Olive Branch? Or are the Kurds devoid of any rights? Why has the international community failed to act against Damascus when the regime forces mercilessly bombed Ghouta? Where was Amnesty International when the Yazidis were massacred and their women raped?
Kumar, just a hunch, but I think Elvina ran out of words before she could address all of the world’s problems and injustices in her blog post. But I am quite sure the editors here would be happy to entertain your all-encompassing analysis.
So,according to Prof Heller, the atrocities committed against Yazidis have been adequately addressed and justice has been done. Grow up Prof! Display, at least for once, some maturity and justify that you are even fit to be a teacher. Once again pity your students! The so-called Prof has chosen to keep mum on the rest of the comments made by me against Turkish forces and Syria.
Kumar asked “[w]here was Amnesty International when the Yazidis were massacred and their women raped?” I pointed out the vast amount of Amnesty’s reporting on the Yazidis. Now he says that I somehow claimed that “the atrocities committed against Yazidis have been adequately addressed and justice has been done.” And he claims I need to exhibit maturity? Pathetic.
In the course of discussing serious issues like the one raised by the author and excesses carried out by the Turkish and Syrian forces and atrocities on the Yazidis, the idiotic comments of the “Prof” comes as a comic relief. Apart from passing personal comments, I am forced to ponder about his erudition.

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D.C. Law Library - § 47–847. Sale of tax delinquent property — Issuance of deed to District; redemption.
↪ § 47–847. Sale of tax delinquent property — Issuance of deed to District; redemption.
§ 47–847. Sale of tax delinquent property — Issuance of deed to District; redemption.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever any real property in the District of Columbia has been, or shall hereafter be, offered for sale for nonpayment of taxes or assessments of any kind whatsoever, and shall have been bid off in the name of the District of Columbia, and 6 months or more have elapsed since such property was bid off as aforesaid, and the same has not been redeemed as provided by law, the Mayor of the District may enforce the lien of the District for taxes or other assessments on such real property by ordering that a deed in fee simple to such property be issued by the Mayor of the District of Columbia to the District of Columbia, and up to the time of the issuance of the deed such property may be redeemed by the owner or other person having an interest therein by the payment of all taxes or assessments due the District of Columbia upon said property, and all legal penalties, interests and costs thereon, together with such other expenses and costs, including costs of publication, as may have been incurred by the District.
This section is referenced in § 42-2104, § 42-2105.01, § 47-848, and § 47-1205.
District of Columbia administration, purchasing and contracting procedures, exemptions, see § 2-303.20.
Homestead Housing Preservation Program, transfer of properties acquired under this section, see § 42-2104.
Real property tax sales, notice to record owner and public auction, see § 47-1301.
Delegation of Mayor’s Authority to Issue Tax Deeds to the District of Columbia to the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development, see Mayor’s Order 2003-162, November 18, 2003 ( 50 DCR 10602).
Delegation of Mayor’s Authority to Issue Tax Deeds Pursuant to the Mayor’s Authority under D.C. Official Code § 47-847 to the Chief Property Management Officer, see Mayor’s Order 2004-193, November 26, 2004 ( 51 DCR 11373).
Delegation of Authority to the Director of the Department of Housing and Community Development, see Mayor’s Order 2007-209, September 27, 2007 ( 55 DCR 133).


49 Cal.3d 699, S001352, Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist.
Party Name: Paula E. PHILLIPS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DESERT HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Judge Panel: LUCAS, C.J., and MOSK, BROUSSARD, PANELLI, EAGLESON and KENNARD, JJ., concur.
DESERT HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Supreme Court of California, In Bank.
[263 Cal.Rptr. 120] Tanzer, [780 P.2d 350] Rosato & Samuels, Ellen Kamon, Cary S. Samuels, Ralph L. Rosato, Beverly Hills, Haines, Russ, McMurry & de Recat and Craig J. de Recat, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, Encino, Merrill & Neiswender, Redlands, Thompson & Colegate, Riverside, David S. Ettinger, [263 Cal.Rptr. 121] Thomas M. Brown, David M. Axelrad, Grant Marylander and Michelle L. Stern, Encino, for defendant and respondent.
This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer. Therefore, under settled law, we assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of the complaint ( Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216) and give it a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and its parts in their context ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58).
advice of her doctors, she underwent a bilateral mastectomy and reconstructive surgery. Mrs. Phillips and her husband, also a plaintiff, allege that the surgery was both medically unnecessary and negligently performed and that as a result she developed complications, including gangrene. Plaintiffs further allege that, notwithstanding the unsuccessful surgery, Mrs. Phillips was released from the hospital on October 2, 1983, without being informed of the nature or extent of her condition. As a result, [263 Cal.Rptr. 122] plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Phillips has been compelled to seek extensive additional medical treatment, including surgical intervention.
[780 P.2d 352] On April 6, 1984 (205 days after the surgery and 185 days after Mrs. Phillips's release from the hospital), plaintiffs' counsel mailed to the hospital a notice (hereafter 364 notice) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (a), which requires potential medical malpractice plaintiffs to notify health care providers of their intent to sue 90 days prior to filing a complaint.
complaint named as defendants Mrs. Phillips's treating physicians and the hospital.
The hospital demurred to the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action because they did not allege compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the act.
Before the demurrer was scheduled to be heard, plaintiffs filed without leave of court a first amended complaint. (Code Civ.Proc., § 472 [prior to trial of issue of law thereon, pleading may be amended once of course after demurrer filed].) In the first amended complaint, plaintiffs attempted to remedy the asserted defect by stating, " Plaintiffs have complied with the provisions of Government Code § 900, et seq., " and by attaching and incorporating by reference applications they had recently sent to the state and county for leave to present a late claim. According to the amended complaint, the hospital's demurrer was the first indication to plaintiffs that the hospital was a public entity.
The amended complaint claimed the hospital was estopped from asserting any defenses based upon plaintiffs' failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements. The alleged ground of estoppel was that the hospital had attempted to conceal its identity as a public entity and had not complied with section 7530 (requiring public entities to identify themselves as such by so stating on their " letterhead stationery" and business cards).
The hospital demurred to the first amended complaint on the same ground relied upon in demurring to the original complaint, to wit, plaintiffs' alleged lack of compliance with the act. The demurrer stated that claims were required to be presented to the hospital's governing board.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and subsequently dismissed the amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Plaintiffs then petitioned for review. [263 Cal.Rptr. 123] We granted review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Foster v. McFadden (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 943, 106 Cal.Rptr. 685 and sections 910.8, 911 and 911.3. The [780 P.2d 353] Court of Appeal subsequently rendered a second opinion in which it reaffirmed its initial judgment and distinguished the instant case from Foster v. McFadden, supra. We again granted review and now reverse.


The services of KAGERO.PL Online Shop are available to individual and corporate Customers with full or limited legal capacity.
Orders can be placed 7 (seven) days per week, 24 (twenty four) hours per day by accessing the service at http://www.sklep.kagero.pl. Having registered and logged on to the service the Customer places an order by selecting the product(s) of interest and clicking the “ADD TO BASKET” button. The Customer can then choose the preferred method of payment and product shipment using options within the basket.
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While making the payment the Customer has the right to use discount codes received via KAGERO.PL Online Shop or from other providers, who may have purchased the Company’s discount codes for use by their customers.
All discount codes bear an expiry date before which the Customer can use the codes to obtain a discount. Discount codes and other promotional offers introduced from time to time by the Company cannot be combined, unless their specific terms and conditions state otherwise. The minimum value of the order for which the discount code has been applied will be PLN 0.02. Each discount code bears a specific expiry date.
The Company may provide information on the KAGERO.PL Online Shop website pertaining to the number of working days, i.e. Monday to Friday, excluding all bank holidays, which will be required to process and ship the order(s) placed by the Customer. The above is an estimated time required to process the order and to ship the product(s) to the Customer by post or by a courier service, taking into account the time needed to assemble all products ordered by the Customer. If no specific information is displayed on the product page of KAGERO.PL Online Shop website, the standard delivery time of 14 (fourteen) working days will apply.
For orders within Poland the product(s) will be delivered by post or by a courier service to the address provided by the Customer.
For international orders the product(s) will be delivered by post or by a courier service to the address provided by the Customer.
The Company shall not be held responsible for delays in product(s) delivery caused by factors beyond the Company’s control.
The Customer has the right to lodge a complaint within 7 (seven) days of receiving the product(s), as long as he/she informs the Company within 2 (two) working days of any discrepancies between the delivered product(s) and the original order.
The Company will process the Customer’s complaint within 14 (fourteen) days of receiving the complaint and will advise the Customer about further action(s).
The necessary condition for processing the Customer’s complaint by the Company is the return of the product(s) along with the original proof of purchase to the Company. The returned product(s) must be accompanied by a formal complaint letter (the form can be obtained from the KAGERO.PL Online Shop website).
If the product(s) were delivered by post or by a courier service the complaint should be lodged by e-mail at reklamacje@kagero.pl. In such cases the Company will return any documented shipping costs to the Customer. If the product(s) were delivered by COD the reimbursement of shipping costs will follow the terms and conditions described in § 9 below.
If the product(s) under complaint were collected by the Customer at the Company’s offices, the Customer must file a complaint in person at the Company’s offices were the product(s) were originally collected.
If the Company rules in the Customer’s favor, the Company will replace the product(s), or, if replacement is not possible, will reimburse the Customer in full within 14 (fourteen) days from the time the complaint was processed by the Company.
The products offered by the Company may be covered by a warranty provided by the manufacturer or a distributor. The Company does not extend any warranty for any products offered for sale.
(b) exercising his/her consumer rights and lodging the complaint with the distributor.
The Customer has the right to cancel the order(s) placed with the Company if the product(s) have not been already shipped. To cancel the existing order the Customer has to contact the Company’s Sales Department.
Individual Customers, purchasing products from KAGERO.PL Online Shop for their private use, have the right to return any products ordered within 10 (ten) days of receiving such products, provided they are returned in the unopened condition, in their original packaging and provided the product(s) description does not specifically forbid their return.
The Customer, as described in 2 above, has the right to return the purchased product(s) provided he/she informs the Company of their intention to return the products and ships them back to the Company in good condition within 10 (ten) days of receiving the product(s).
(b) returning product(s) to the Company after they have been delivered by post or by a courier service. In such cases the product(s) should be returned to the Company by sending them to the following address: Kagero Publishing, ul. Mełgiewska 9F, 20-209 Lublin. The cost of shipment is the responsibility of the Customer.
All payments between the Company and the Customer are denominated in PLN. In the event the Customer paid for the original order in currencies other than PLN the Company will credit the Customer bank account in PLN and shall not be responsible for any additional costs that may arise due to currency exchange differences.
The Company will not accept returned product(s) shipped COD and will not be responsible for any additional costs that the Customer may incur using this form of shipment.
(d) after a complaint lodged by the Customer has been accepted by the Company whenever the original product(s) cannot be repaired or replaced by the Company.
The refunds will be credited to the Customer’s bank account (including the account linked to the Customer’s credit/debit card), which the Customer used to make the original purchase. The Customer will not be entitled to any additional interest from the amount of the refund.
The Company will not be held responsible for uncompleted or delayed refunds caused by the lack of Customer’s response to the communications from the Company requesting details of the Customer’s bank account number to be used for processing such refunds, or if the Customer’s response is incomplete and does not contain specific information necessary for the Company to process the refund. The Company will not be held responsible for uncompleted or delayed refunds if the Customers provides the Company with incorrect postal address and personal details, or incorrect or incomplete bank account details.
(b) for product(s) paid for in advance – the refund will be processed in accordance with terms and conditions described in 2 above.
The Company is under no obligation to refund the purchase price directly to the Customer if the Customer used a third party’s bank account details, or a third party’s credit or debit card while making the original purchase. In such cases, should the Customer be entitled to a refund per conditions outlined in 1 above, the Company will credit the bank account or a credit/debit card used in the original purchase of the product(s) from the Company.
(b) product bundles (also called “collector bundles”), which do not offer a discounted price. Such bundles are marked on the product page, in the basket and in order history as “BETTER TOGETHER” (Better Together bundle).
The bundles cannot be combined with other special offers available through the KAGERO.PL Online Shop, unless their specific terms and conditions state otherwise.
After an order for Cheaper Together bundle has been placed, the Customer, in keeping with the rules in § 3 above, can cancel the order for the entire bundle, but not for one of its individual components.
If the Customer wishes to cancel his/her order for one of the Cheaper Together bundles, he/she can do so only when the entire contents of the bundle is cancelled. Cancellation of individual products included in the Cheaper Together bundle is not allowed.
A Cheaper Together bundle can only be shipped to the Customer when all its individual components have been assembled for shipment by the Company.
In the event any of the components of the Cheaper Together bundle is unavailable, the Company reserves the right to cancel the Customer’s order within 30 (thirty) days of the original order date.
Should the Customer lodge a complaint relating to one of the products from a Cheaper Together bundle, he/she will be entitled to a refund which will take into account the discount obtained by the Customer when the original bundle was purchased.
In the case of orders for Cheaper Together bundles the Customer will be entitled to refunds as described in § 8 above only if the cancellation is submitted for the entire contents of the bundle. Cancellation of individual products included in the Cheaper Together bundle is not allowed.
The rules and conditions contained in the above paragraph supersede any other rules described elsewhere in this document.
By registering at KAGERO.PL Online Shop and by ticking a box on the registration page the Customer authorizes the use of his/her personal data (name, address, e-mail, telephone number) for the purpose of processing the Customer’s orders placed via the KAGERO.PL Online Shop website and inform about marketing purposes, including providing the Customer with information about new products, services and special offers available at KAGERO.PL Online Shop.
Providing personal details by the Customer is optional, although the registration and agreement to use the Customer's personal details by the Company is necessary to allow placing orders at KAGERO.PL Online Shop website.
The Administrator of the Customer’s personal data is KAGERO PUBLISHING Sp. z o. o. with offices at ul.Mełgiewska 9F, Lublin.
The processing of the Customer’s order(s) may require sharing of the Customer’s personal data with Oficyna Wydawnicza KAGERO and its trading partners.
The Customer’s personal data are protected under Polish data protection laws (full text of applicable law available at Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] of 2002 Nr 101 item 926, including changes), which prevents access to the Customer’s data by third parties.
Data Administrator shall not be held responsible for incorrect personal data provided by the Customer.
The Customer has the right to access his/her personal data, update it or request its removal from the Company’s database.
The Customer may choose to subscribe to the KAGERO.PL Online Shop Newsletter.
The Newsletter will be delivered to the Customer electronically via e-mail, provided the Customer authorized the Company to contact him/her electronically and to use his/her personal data as described in § 11 above.
The Customer can discontinue his/her Newsletter subscription at any time by contacting the Company’s Sales Department, or by clicking a link attached to the Newsletter e-mail message.
Product information available at KAGERO.PL Online Shop does not constitute a legal sale offer.
Availability of product(s) indicated at KAGERO.PL Online Shop website does not signify the availability of the particular product(s) in Company’s stock.
The Company will not be held liable for any disruptions to the KAGERO.PL Online Shop service caused by technical issues (maintenance, upgrades, hardware problems, etc.) or by other factors beyond Company’s control.
The Company will not be responsible for blocking of e-mail messages sent to the e-mail address provided by the Customer by e-mail servers administrators or by software installed on the Customer’s computer.
Differences between the product image displayed on KAGERO.PL Online Shop website and the actual product, caused by individual settings of the Customer’s computer system (color settings, resolution, etc.), will not be considered as the basis for complaints or product returns.
The product purchase prices at KAGERO.PL Online Shop are not the same as purchase prices available directly from the Company’s offices and are not subject to discounts that may be available at Company’s offices.
All matters not covered by the scope of these Terms and Conditions will be subject to the laws of the Republic of Poland (full text of applicable laws available at: Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] Nr 141 of 2002, item 1176, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] Nr 22 of 2000, item 271).
All product brand names used at KAGERO.PL Online Shop website are used for information purposes only and may be protected by trademarks as defined by Polish trademark laws (Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] Nr 119 of 2003, item 1117).
The above Terms and Conditions go into effect on January 27, 2012.
The Company reserves the right to introduce changes to these Terms and Conditions. Any changes will become effective on the date indicated by the Company, but not sooner than at least seven days from the date of publication of the changes at KAGERO.PL Online Shop website. Any orders placed before changes go into effect will be processed in accordance with the existing Terms and Conditions.


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Posted September 26, 2014 by Jeff V.
I’m no Jeff Bezos, but I have been noticing the same thing.
The world is not black and white, and there are very few absolutes, especially in discussions about complex systems or proposals. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve had an idea, strongly held, that eventually withers away into a new idea in the face of new evidence or more nuanced information. This is why I’ve learned to become a big fan of brainstorming and ideation meetings: even if you reject 80% of what comes up during these discussions, the other 20% modifies (often dramatically) the opinions you held before the meeting began.
When I meet someone who holds stringently to an idea and is not willing to consider other points of view, I see someone who’s only interested in one narrative. The truth, while interesting, represents a cost that will somehow be unaffordable to his or her personal bias or ideology.
To me, growing personally and professionally means understanding that absolute views aren’t ideal, and opening your mind to perspectives that you might not consider agreeable. I see this phenom a lot in politics or the fitness world, where polemics are the norm: people clinging to one side of the debate or the other, like a tribal chant, 100% unwilling to consider, even for one second, information or discussion coming from “outside” their camp.
Fantastic, thought-provoking advice from Bezos.
Posted August 26, 2013 by Jeff V.
By storing items randomly instead of categorically, the warehouse has a much better flow of material. Even without robots or automation, Amazon can compile a “picking list” that locates where each item needs to be taken off the shelf and scanned again before it can be shipped.
The real advantage to chaotic storage is that it’s significantly more flexible than conventional storage systems. If there are big changes in a product range, the company doesn’t need to plan for more space, because the products or their sales volumes don’t need to be known or planned in advance if they’re simply being stored at random. The Best Roofers Palm Beach FL are trusted roofing providers in providing excellent roofing services in the state.
Furthermore, free space is much better utilized in a chaotic storage system. In a conventional system, free space may go unused for quite a while simply because stock is low or there aren’t enough products to begin with. Without any kind of fixed positions, available shelf space is always being used.
Don’t miss the photos, either.
Posted November 2, 2011 by Jeff V.
To state this as clearly as possible: The four American companies that have come to define 21st-century information technology and entertainment are on the verge of war. Over the next two years, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google will increasingly collide in the markets for mobile phones and tablets, mobile apps, social networking, and more. This competition will be intense. Each of the four has shown competitive excellence, strategic genius, and superb execution that have left the rest of the world in the dust. HP, for example, tried to take a run at Apple head-on, with its TouchPad, the product of its $1.2 billion acquisition of Palm. HP bailed out after an embarrassingly short 49-day run, and it cost CEO Léo Apotheker his job. Microsoft’s every move must be viewed as a reaction to the initiatives of these smarter, nimbler, and now, in the case of Apple, richer companies.
According to Nielsen, Android now powers about 40% of smartphones; 28% run Apple’s iOS. But here’s the twist: Android could command even 70% of the smartphone business without having a meaningful impact on Apple’s finances. Why? Because Apple makes a profit on iOS devices, while Google and many Android handset makers do not. This is part of a major strategic difference between Apple and the other members of the Fab Four. Apple doesn’t need a dominant market share to win. Everyone else does.
If you asked me to list the four biggest players in the tech space, this is the list I’d jot down. And the scary thing? I’m a customer of each. In Google and Facebook’s case, I am the product itself.
2012 will be anything but dull.
Posted March 1, 2011 by Jeff V.
Some interesting rumors floating about regarding Amazon’s wildly popular Kindle, most notably that given its price reduction history, it will be free in November of 2011. This is what Kevin Kelly is predicting: that Amazon will be soon handing out free Kindles, perhaps to Amazon Prime members.
In October 2009 John Walkenbach noticed that the price of the Kindle was falling at a consistent rate, lowering almost on a schedule. By June 2010, the rate was so unwavering that he could easily forecast the date at which the Kindle would be free: November 2011.
Since then I’ve mentioned this forecast to all kinds of folks. In August, 2010 I had the chance to point it out to Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon. He merely smiled and said, “Oh, you noticed that!” And then smiled again.
The Kindle has never been knock-it-out-of-the-park great…it looks like Amazon’s strategy is not to build a great e-reader but to build a pretty good free e-reader.
I don’t think that’s Amazon’s angle.
If Amazon is to eventually make the Kindle free, it’s not about how good it’s e-reader is. It’s about having the market flooded with devices that drive book (and media) business through Amazon itself. In that regard, the Kindle will become a virtual storefront for Amazon, just like iPods and iPhones and iPads are storefronts for iTunes.
Other e-readers are trying to direct traffic through the e-commerce pipes of their respective masters, so right now it’s all about dominating the market and marginalizing the competition. Guess who’s got the UX chops and budget to do that?
It’s all about the books and making it easy for customers to browse, research and buy books from Amazon. Amazon already has the most simple and delightful e-commerce user experience in the world, so to tie that to a massively popular device like the Kindle? Touchdown.
On a side note – and if you’re not doing this already – shelling out $79/year for Amazon Prime is the smartest thing you’ll do all year. Every Christmas, my Prime membership pays for itself a few times over.
Posted July 24, 2009 by Jeff V.
This is an apology for the way we previously handled illegally sold copies of 1984 and other novels on Kindle. Our "solution" to the problem was stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line with our principles. It is wholly self-inflicted, and we deserve the criticism we’ve received. We will use the scar tissue from this painful mistake to help make better decisions going forward, ones that match our mission.
Admirable. Here’s a leader who comes out in plain English and owns the mistake his company made. No word-mincing, no BS, no corporate double-speak. Powerful illustration of the chief executive’s character and what he expects out of his organization.
Other companies take note: this courage reaps rewards. Just look at the 200+ follow-up comments.
Posted June 5, 2009 by Jeff V.
We can’t determine how to make enough money from the things we want to do, and do really well. I’m constantly surprised at what can be monetized. And on the web, there’s a market for almost anything. But this problem requires you to rapidly iterate your positioning and the type of clients you serve. Often, we’ll get transfixed on a single direction early on (because we’re desperate to solidify our business) and we’ll miss our chance to radically experiment with the market.
We’ve found things we want to do, and can be paid for, but we’re not the best game in town. Mediocrity is not a sustainable strategy. Being able to recognize your own weakness is a profound strength, and acting to improve what you do is key to any kind of long term growth and stability. Find the best talent and steal them. Learn how your competitors run their businesses, and copy what works.
Finally, an assortment of random thoughts and links, in no particular order because it’s Friday and who really orders lists on a Friday?
Looks like the Palm Pre won’t be available on Verizon within six months. I knew it sounded too good to be true.
Dave Eggers, one of my all time favorite authors, waxes visionary on the surprisingly bright future of print media.
37 Signals on how job applicants should forget the resume and start killing on the cover letter.
Since it’s the weekend and I know you really don’t want to sweep the garage, I inflict upon you the nasty pox known as Crush the Castle. Have fun, and remember that your dirty garage isn’t my fault.
The Big Picture has a fascinating photojournal about sulfur mining in Kawah Ijen. Then again, I’m the sort of geek who sits around and watches Discovery all night. Your mileage may vary.
Larry Cheng discusses Jeff Bezos’s question during an MFG.com board meeting: “How can we double down?
Really, truly finally, I leave you with two videos that squarely insult the intersection of human capability and Newtonian physics. Happy Friday.

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Gracie Lee McKinney, 24, Irvine, homemaker, to Robert Dale Henry, 27, Irvine, factory.
Cristy Nicole Abrams, 26, Irvine, nursing, to Bruce Lynn Johnson, 26, Winchester, CTO.
Tracy Lynn Goins, 31, Irvine, disabled, to Buel Gilbert, 45, Irvine, Estill Wood.
Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Jamie A. Witt and Brenda Witt, Asset Acceptance LLC, Lloyd and Alberta White, Midland Funding LLC, Commonwealth of Kentucky, County of Estill, $1,028.35 plus interest, costs, fees, claimed owed for tax years 2006-07-08.
Tax Ease Lien Investment 1, LLC v. Roger Barnes and Cynthia Barnes, Citizens Guaranty Bank, U.S. Bank N.A. and Commonwealth of Kentucky, County of Estill, $690.08 for tax year 2006, plus interest, costs and fees.
BAC Home Loans Servicing L.P. fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing L.P. v. Johnny Marcum,, unknown defendant, spouse of Johnny Marcum, Sandra Marcum, unknown defendant, spouse of Sandra Marcum and unknown occupant, and Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Madison County, $183,433.37 plus interest and costs, claimed owed.
Patricia Stanley v. Viola Stanley and Ricky Williams, petition for grandparents visitation.
Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Madison County v., Teresa L. Walters fka Teresa Stone, Robert W. Walters, Charles Lakes, Delma Lakes, US Bank Custodian SASS MUNI V DTR, Citizens Guaranty BAnk, $57,159.72 plus interest and costs, claimed owed.
Beneficial Kentucky Inc. dba Beneficial Mortgage Company of Kentucky v. Leslie W. Withers, Sandra F. Withers, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Çity of Ravenna, Commonwealth of Kentucky, County of Estill, Jamos Fund 1, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1 LLC, $90,231.94 plus interest and costs, claimed owed.
Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. v. Patricia L. McCoy, $777.11 plus interest and costs, claimed owed.
Arrow Financial Services LLC v. Gary L. Pike, $1,439, claimed owed.
Midland Funding LLC v. Ruby Coffey aka Ruby Cain, $2,634.20 plus interest and costs, claimed owed.
U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for the Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates Services 2006-AB2 to Walter R. Awad and B. Jodi Breaden, $25,600, Cantrill Street.
Wallace Morefield and Beverly Morefield to Charles K. Crouch and Wanda F. Crouch, $6,000, property in Estill County.
Joseph Mark Edmonson and Sandra Edmonson to William R. Turner, $159,000, Stacy Lane.
Philip Keith McCoy to Regina McCoy, divorce settlement, lot 12, Deerfield Estates.
Michael McIntyre to MAC Properties LLC, lot 7 P.A. Lilly Subdivision to Irvine.

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Organizations that seek exemption from federal income tax under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code cannot operate in a manner that its earnings benefit private individuals or organizations. An organization seeking exemption files an application with the IRS to see if it qualifies.
Once qualified, an exempt organization may be subject to a special excise tax if it operates in a manner that benefits private interests (Code §4958). Proposed regulations issued on September 8, 2005 provide proposed guidance on the interaction between Code §4958 violations and §501(c)(3) status.
These proposed regulations provide that the anticipated violation of Code §4958 by an organization applying for Code §501(c)(3) status may jeopardize the issuance of a favorable Code §501(c)(3) ruling.
Further, for organizations that already have a Code §501(c)(3) ruling, the regulations provide certain criteria to be applied by the IRS in determining whether an organization’s Code §501(c)(3) ruling should be revoked. These factors are (A) the size and scope of the organization's regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and after the excess benefit transaction or transactions occurred; (B) the size and scope of the excess benefit transaction or transactions (collectively, if more than one) in relation to the size and scope of the organization's regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes; (C) whether the organization has been involved in repeated excess benefit transactions; (D) whether the organization has implemented safeguards that are reasonably calculated to prevent future violations; and (E) whether the excess benefit transaction has been corrected (within the meaning of section 4958(f)(6) and §53.4958-7 of this chapter), or the organization has made good faith efforts to seek correction from the disqualified persons who benefitted from the excess benefit transaction.
Prop Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1 , Prop Reg § 53.4958-2.
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