text:
68. Studies done on corporal punishment and its impact on children and adolescents show that in most regions of the world the practice of corporal punishment is accepted and tolerated when used by adults responsible for the care and protection of children and adolescents as a means to discipline and control them. Thus, for example, the 2006 Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on Violence against Children shows that the discipline exercised through corporal punishment is often regarded as normal and inevitable, especially when no “visible” or “lasting” injury results.” The study finds that only a small percentage of cases of violence against children are reported and investigated and that, worldwide, only 2% of children and adolescents are protected against corporal punishment in the home; 4% of children in alternative care institutions are protected, 42% are protected against corporal punishment committed in the school, 42% are protected against corporal punishment imposed by the penal system as part of a judgment, whereas 81% of children are protected against corporal punishment imposed by the penal system as a disciplinary measure used on child offenders.
69. Domestic courts and the international bodies that oversee human rights have underscored the importance of the erga omnes nature of the duties that States have to respect and to ensure respect for the rights of children and adolescents to special protection vis-à-vis the actions of private third parties. Domestic and international jurisprudence clearly holds that states must oversee the provision of services that are in the public interest, such as health or education, when those services are supplied by private parties. This obligation of supervision is of fundamental importance when the services being supervised are those provided by public or private institutions charged with the protection, safekeeping, care and education of children, to guard them against corporal punishment.
Every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms.
71. Similarly, the jurisprudence of the European Court has addressed the State’s obligations vis-à-vis the actions of private citizens. Specifically, the topic of corporal punishment was dealt with in connection with the United Kingdom’s obligations regarding the forms of discipline used in private schools in the case of A v. the United Kingdom, 1998.
The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.
Article 32.2 recognizes the existence of certain inherent limitations to the rights of all persons which are a normal consequence of life in society.
75. In addition, as stated by the Court in Advisory Opinion 17, no room for discretion exists in the private sphere, particularly as regards the full respect for the human rights of children and adolescents. Accordingly, the IACHR holds that States are obliged to take steps of all kinds to ensure a correlation of rights between the adults responsible for the care, guidance, and education of children and the international standards applicable to minors and the way in which States can ensure that correlation in accordance with international human rights law.
77. In light of the Court’s rulings, the IACHR holds that in meeting their international obligations vis-à-vis the protection of children, States must ensure that the rights exercised by parents, guardians, and others responsible for the care and education of children under the age of 18 does not mean that the rights of those children and adolescents are ignored.
78. In this context, the IACHR points out that since corporal punishment is seen in the Americas as a “reasonable” and “moderate” practice and is broadly accepted and allowed as a necessary method of correcting children’s behavior, the result is a situation of disproportionate and unreasonable differentiation with regard to persons under the age of 18. The result of this is that only cases of extreme violence or those that leave physical marks on children and adolescents are sanctioned. The IACHR sees a contradiction in this situation, in that when the practice is used against adults, it is ruled illegitimate; this is exemplified by the fact that domestic laws contain criminal provisions that prohibit all forms of aggression and abuses against adults, defined as crimes of criminal injury and offenses against physical integrity. Thus, it could be held that with respect to children, the principles of nondiscrimination and of equal protection of the law are being violated.
79. In conclusion, it could be suggested that a State that permits or tolerates the use of corporal punishment as a form of discipline by private citizens – be they parents, teachers, or other adults with responsibilities in caring for children and adolescents – could be in violation of its international obligations to ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the right to humane treatment and a life without violence for all individuals aged under 18.
80. It should be noted, at the outset, that this section of the report is intended to assist States in adopting comprehensive public policies intended to educate families and institutions about the distinction that exists between corporal punishment, even the lighter forms thereof, and nonviolent discipline methods.
81. Corporal punishment administered by parents and other family members to correct and discipline children and adolescents is a widespread practice around the world. Various studies and statements made by the children and adolescents in the regional consultations conducted prior to preparation of the United Nations World Report on Violence against Children underscore the physical and psychological harm and damage they suffer as a result of corporal punishment. As observed in the Study on Violence against Children, the family can become a dangerous place for children and adolescents and this is one of the spheres that pose the most serious challenges in the struggle to combat violence against children and adolescents.
82. By way of example, the majority of the member states of the OAS have not yet adopted specific measures to protect children and adolescents from the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary method. That omission is evident in the fact that most states in the hemisphere still have laws on the books that, in either ambiguous or explicit terms, allow parents to moderately correct and punish their children. While this is true, there are a number of states in the region that do have laws establishing penalties for the improper exercise of patria potestad. These penalties consist of limitations or restrictions imposed when the parents endanger their children’s personal integrity. They apply only when the punishments inflicted by the parents are unreasonable or excessive. It is important to point out that the goal here is not that parents be penalized or sanctioned; instead, the goal is for States, in furtherance of their obligation to prevent and to act with due diligence, to promote stronger family units and family institutions by taking steps to eradicate the use of violence of any kind in the private sphere, which includes the family and the school. In most States of this hemisphere, the prevailing climate is one of permissibility and legal acceptance of punishments provided they are neither excessive nor unreasonable.
83. The Committee on the Rights of the Child is troubled by the social tolerance for corporal punishment. To those American states that have submitted their periodic reports, it has consistently recommended the adoption of a law “explicitly prohibiting the use of corporal punishment in the home, in schools and in other institutions.” An examination of the domestic laws in most member States of the OAS finds that while moderate corporal punishment is practiced that does not jeopardize the personal integrity of children and adolescents, corporal punishment is not prohibited.
84. The gaps and shortcomings of the domestic laws of the OAS member states with respect to the rights and authorities given to parents to discipline their children point up the fact that the Court needs to give the States its guidance as to how to regulate the institution of patria potestad. Thus, the interpretation of the scope and limits of the mutual rights and duties of parents and children is of particular importance in counseling the States as to how they can best ensure full respect for the human rights of children and adolescents within the family.
85. The IACHR recognizes that patria potestad is a basic institution in family law and has been recognized in international human rights instruments. The IACHR contends that parental authority must be interpreted as a function of the indivisibility of human rights to ensure that the rights of the child are protected. The member States’ domestic laws must regulate this matter in such a way that the human rights of children and adolescents are protected and observed.
86. It is self-evident that the special measures of protection required under Article 19 of the American Convention include the obligation to prevent and to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention. Improper exercise of patria potestad may lead to violation of various human rights of the child, beyond the right to humane treatment. Therefore, the requested interpretation of Article 19, taking Article 5 of the American Convention into account and rendered in light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is crucial to determining the State’s added obligation to regulate this institution in such a way that the principle of the best interests of the child is properly served, and to establishing the measures that must be taken to provide parents with assistance and comply with international human rights standards.
87. The indivisibility and interdependence of human rights must be reflected in all measures that States adopt, since violations of certain human rights may imply the abridgment of others. For example, if a child suffers corporal punishment, that undermines not only his right to humane treatment, but also his right to a decent life, free of violence. Consequently, it is imperative that the regulation and exercise of parental custody (patria potestad) reflect the recognition that human rights are indivisible and interdependent.
88. The IACHR notes that the aforesaid provision refers to the basic elements that make up parental custody, an institution that is protected by international human rights law and, in particular, by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and that established responsibilities, rights, and duties with respect to children and adolescents; at the same time, however, the guiding principle behind that institution must be the supremacy of the child’s best interests, ensuring that children and adolescents can exercise the rights granted to them by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
89. At the same time, in line with the position held by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 8, the IACHR believes it must be pointed out that although parenthood and child custody demand frequent physical actions and interventions to protect them (for example, holding a child so that a doctor can apply an inoculation, and “time outs” and other methods of “positive discipline”), that cannot justify the use of physical force to discipline a child. Of course, there are many other situations similar to those described in this section that neither the Commission nor the Court can catalogue. The topic of corporal punishment cannot be dealt with casuistically. That is not the aim of this study.
91. Accordingly, the IACHR holds that laws allowing parents to punish their children in a “moderate” or “reasonable” way by using corporal punishment are not in line with the international standards applicable to the institution of parental custody and, consequently, fail to afford the child due protection from corporal punishment.
92. As previously noted in this report, meeting the obligation of respecting and upholding human rights assumed by States in the protection of children and adolescents against corporal punishment requires measures of many different kinds, the goal of which must be the absolute eradication of the practice. In that regard, a consensus can be seen to exist within the international community regarding the urgency of legally prohibiting corporal punishment against children. This legal ban, however, must be accompanied by measures of other kinds – judicial, educational, financial, etc. – that, taken together, serve to eradicate the use of this form of punishment in the everyday lives of all children and adolescents.
93. Accordingly, in this section the Commission will propose a series of criteria that should form part of any strategy intended to eradicate the practice, and it then proposes a range of specific measures to guide States in their efforts to eradicate corporal punishment.
a. The child as a subject of rights: this criterion requires that States ensure that children are aware of their right to freedom from corporal punishment and have access to appropriate mechanisms for defending themselves. In addition, children must be allowed to participate and express their opinions in the actions taken toward eradicating corporal punishment.
b. A differentiated and specific approach for the effective protection of children in situations of greater vulnerability: children with disabilities, those held in detention centers, etc.
c. Efforts to bring about a change in social awareness regarding attitudes toward children, ensuring full respect for their rights through public policies in the social and educational spheres.
95. By legislative measures intended to protect children from corporal punishment, the Commission means both the repeal of provisions that explicitly authorize the use of corporal punishment on children under the age of 18, the elimination of the “corrective measures” guidelines that are still a part of the regulations governing parental custody in many countries, and the adoption of provisions that explicitly prohibit corporal punishment.
One of the obligations of the State to protect children against mistreatment involves taking positive measures. Furthermore, the Court considered that “if the States, pursuant to Article 2 of the American Convention, have a positive obligation to adopt the legislative measures necessary to guarantee the exercise of the rights recognized in the Convention, it follows, then, that they also must refrain both from promulgating laws that disregard or impede the free exercise of these rights, and from suppressing or modifying the existing laws protecting them.” In the same respect, the Tribunal has pointed out in various cases that the general duty under article 2 of the American Convention implies the adoption of measures of two kinds: on the one hand, elimination of any norms and practices that in any way violate the guarantees provided under the Convention; on the other hand, the promulgation of norms and the development of practices conducive to effective observance of those guarantees. Furthermore this adoption of measures becomes necessary when there is evidence of any practice which is contrary to the American Convention in any area.
97. The Commission notes with concern that although many countries of the region have laws that protect children and adolescents against physical violence and child abuse, the same provisions do not guarantee appropriate protection for ensuring that minors do not receive corporal punishment. Thus, from a general perspective, States must afford absolute protection for the dignity and integrity of children and adolescents. That demands eliminating, in their legal frameworks, the use of such nonjuridical concepts as “moderation” to define what kind of discipline can be used against a person of minor age. Neither is it permissible for States to remain neutral vis-à-vis the widespread social acceptance of corporal punishment or for them to attempt to justify it as a necessary disciplinary measure that corresponds to positive goals, arguing that its application is deemed beneficial for the child or adolescent.
98. In addition, it is vital that States explicitly prohibit corporal punishment, in particular, for two reasons: first, because it enhances the recognition of corporal punishment as a form of violence and a violation of human rights, which has an absolute effect on the actions of state agents; and, second, because although the goal of prohibition is not to penalize the actions of parents in the private arena, it is important to acknowledge that a legislative ban offers a reference point for the actions of legal officials responsible for enforcing domestic law in order to ensure protection for people aged under 18 who claim they have been victims of punishment. Furthermore, the experiences of other countries that have already taken a stance against the corporal punishment of children offers an argument in favor of an explicit ban covering such violations of children’s human rights.
99. In addition, to be effective, the adoption of legislative measures requires the State to provide guidelines for their enforcement, such as, for example, the dissemination of those provisions and the promotion of the human rights of children and adolescents.
100. With reference to our region, the IACHR notes that almost three years have passed since the Study on Violence against Children was presented, urging States to prohibit child corporal punishment by 2009, and that only three of the 35 member states of the Organization of American States have enacted legislation explicitly banning the use of corporal punishment on children and adolescents. Those countries are Uruguay, Venezuela, and Costa Rica.
101. Since the use of corporal punishment as a way to discipline children and adolescents is an accepted practice in many of the Hemisphere’s societies, it is vital that both the adults responsible for caring for children under the age of 18 themselves receive education about the rights of children, about the protection mechanisms available, and about discipline methods that are in no way based on violence.
102. Essential in this area are campaigns to raise society’s awareness about refraining from the use of corporal punishment and, instead, to promote the understanding and use of nonviolent methods of discipline. Public education campaigns might be vital in order to create an understanding about the negative consequences of the corporal punishment and the need to promote preventive programs, including programs aimed at families on mechanisms that promote positive forms of discipline.
103. For example, reference may be made to the experiences of other countries, such as Sweden, the first country in the world to embark on the eradication of corporal punishment, which implemented a series of mechanisms to educate its citizens about the need to eradicate corporal punishment. So, for example, the government of Sweden sent educational pamphlets to all homes and schools, to ensure that children and adolescents were aware of their rights.
104. In accordance with Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the IACHR urges the States to promote nonviolent forms of discipline that respect the rights of the child, to assist children in successfully attaining their goals by providing them with appropriate information and supporting their development as human beings. The IACHR holds that this new form of learning must be based on the recognition of children and adolescents as full subjects of rights and on respect for their dignity. This view consequently admits no method that in any way affects or undermines the right of people aged under 18. It unavoidably involves shared learning among parents, adults, and children under the age of 18, and this poses particular challenges in that it entails teaching this new approach to discipline to adults, almost all of whom were disciplined through the use of corporal punishment.
105. In addition, the IACHR believes that the Convention on the Rights of the Child helps identify some of the basic elements in the concept of discipline. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 28 of that Convention provides that school discipline must be compatible with the child’s human dignity. Although this provision deals with the right of children to education and the exercise of that right within educational establishments, the IACHR maintains that the discipline of children and adolescents can only be addressed in consideration of the human dignity of children; otherwise, it becomes an empty concept, one that is contrary to the rights of the child.
106. Finally, the IACHR notes the existence of various studies and manuals that provide reference points for guiding the adoption of measures to promote positive discipline or rights-based discipline within the family, at school, and in other institutions responsible for the protection and care of children and adolescents.
107. In addition to these legislative and educational measures, the eradication of corporal punishment against children and adolescents demands comprehensive action from the State. In connection with this point, the Commission does not intend to offer an exhaustive list of the range of measures that can be used to create a state policy for the eradication of corporal punishment. Nevertheless, it can identify a number of areas in which immediate action by the State would be necessary. These include health, justice, domestic security, etc.
108. A comprehensive and effective course of action to eradicate child corporal punishment demands the development of appropriate skills among the public officials and other individuals who are responsible for children and who act with the consent of the State. The development of skills necessarily demands the creation and facilitation of rights-based training programs covering all the agencies involved in the promotion and protection of children and adolescents.
109. In the sphere of justice, for example, the relevant measures include offering advisory services and specialized legal counsel for minors, so they are aware of and can act in situations in which they are victims of different forms of violence. In addition, consideration could be given to including the child-rights approach in the training courses given to justice system workers with responsibilities over children’s matters.
110. At the same time, different forms of violence, even the milder forms, create public health problems which, if not addressed, could have a negative impact on both the social life and personal development of individuals. Because of this, States should recognize that the use of corporal punishment to discipline children has a direct repercussion on physical and mental health, which requires the allocation of adequate specialized human and financial resources to ensure that the health system respects and protects the rights of children.
111. Since corporal punishment is a form of violence, it is, simultaneously, a mechanism that teaches violent ways to relate to others, and this, in conjunction with factors of exclusion such as poverty, can lead to law-and-order problems. As this report has already emphasized, the aim of banning corporal punishment is not to penalize the actions of adults, but it does require, inter alia, a greater awareness and preparation on the part of the individuals responsible for upholding law and order. Instead, the aim is to encourage the effective compliance by States of their international obligations in protecting children and adolescents from all forms of violence.
112. It is also important that regular research efforts are conducted to obtain updated information on children’s experiences with the topic of corporal punishment and on the perceptions and attitudes of parents and other responsible adults, to be used as ingredients in the design of new strategies.
113. Pursuant to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, interpreted in light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the IACHR affirms that the use of corporal punishment as a way to discipline children and adolescents, whether imposed by state agents or when a State permits or tolerates it, constitutes a form of violence against children that wounds their dignity and hence their human rights. The IACHR affirms that pursuant to the terms of Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article VII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the member states of the Organization of American States are obliged to guarantee children and adolescents special protection against the use of corporal punishment.
114. In accordance with the international standards governing the rights of children and adolescents, the IACHR emphasizes the urgent need to adopt a state policy for children that transcends individual governments and short-term needs and, at the same time, ensures the sustainability of the measures adopted to comply with international obligations relating to the protection of child rights in the Hemisphere.
115. Both the IACHR and the Court have identified the need to implement appropriate measures, based on the particular vulnerability of children and adolescents that guarantee full respect for their rights.
116. The Inter-American Commission has determined that under the domestic laws of the member states of the Organization of American States, the use of corporal punishment as a way to discipline children is accepted by societies and tolerated by the States. The IACHR consequently attests that the State’s duty of ensuring respect for the rights of the child requires the adoption of legislative measures that explicitly prohibit the corporal punishment of children and adolescents in the home, at school, and in institutions responsible for their care. Parallel to this, the IACHR recommends the adoption of other measures to assist in eradicating corporal punishment and to make the Americas a region free of corporal punishment for children and adolescents.
117. The IACHR underscores the need to ensure that a comprehensive approach to children’s rights is followed in all areas that have an impact on their full development as human beings. In this regard, the IACHR notes that the legal institutions applicable to the family jurisdiction are still conceived of and constituted juridically as institutions unaffected by the doctrine of comprehensive protection set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child: a relationship of absolute authority and subordination continues to exist between children and their parents and other adults with responsibilities for the care of children under 18.
118. The Commission believes that under the principles of nondiscrimination and equal protection of the law, States cannot tolerate social practices that allow children to be victims of corporal punishment.
1. That States prohibit all forms of violence against children, in all settings, within the family, schools, alternative care institutions and detention facilities, places where children work and communities, as required by the inter-American jurisprudence and international treaties, including the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; taking into account the General Comment No. 8 (2006) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment (articles 19, 28, paras. 2, and 37, inter alia) (CRC/C/GC/8) and the United Nations World Report On Violence Against Children.
2. That the member states incorporate an integral awareness of the rights of the child in designing public policies applicable to children, with particular emphasis on the eradication of corporal punishment in public institutions, such as detention centers, shelters, orphanages, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, schools and military schools, among others. The IACHR therefore recommends that the States take steps for the due implementation of such policies, by assigning adequate amounts of human and financial resources to areas that affect children.
3. That, in accordance to the corpus juris related to the rights of children, the member states take actions for the promotion of educational measures for adults and children that, based on an awareness of child rights, can assist the effective enforcement of laws banning corporal punishment, and promote alternative disciplinary measures that are participatory, positive and not violent in society in such a way, that children's human dignity is respected.
4. That the States implement initiatives of prevention and response to all forms of violence against children, creating mechanisms directed at facilitating children who have been victims of violence, including corporal punishment, to be heard and to present claims.
5. That the member States report back to the IACHR on the measures adopted to eradicate corporal punishment as a way of disciplining children and adolescents and to make the Americas a region free of child corporal punishment by 2011.
120. Finally, the IACHR reiterates its commitment toward cooperating with States in the promotional activities they undertake at the domestic and regional levels in order to eradicate corporal punishment as a way of disciplining children and adolescents.
 The following are examples of the studies done: Save the Children Sweden, Manual for Action: Ending Physical and Humiliating Punishment of Children, 2005. Poniendo fin al castigo físico contra la niñez, cómo hacerlo posible [Ending physical punishment of children: how to make it possible], 2003. Amor, poder y violencia. Una comparación transcultural de los patrones de castigo físico y psicológico [Love, Power and Violence: a Transcultural Comparison of Physical and Psychological Punishment Patterns], 2005. Save the Children Sweden and End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2005. Save the Children Sweden and the Andean Commission of Jurists, Poniendo fin a la violencia legalizada contra los niños. Marco jurídico sobre castigo corporal en América Latina, 2005 [Ending legalized violence against children. Legal framework on corporal punishment in Latin America], 2005, available at http://www.scslat.org/poniendofin/index.php.
 UN. Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations. Study on Violence against Children, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. A/61/299, August 29, 2006, paragraph 26.
 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic 1999, paragraph 431 http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Rep.Dominicana99sp/Cap.11.htm. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Sentence of April 25, 1978. Case A v Runited Kingdom, Sentence of September 23, 1998, Case Z v United Kingdom, Sentence of May 10, 2001 (aplication 29392/95) Committee of Human Rights, General Observation 20 of 10/04/92. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 (2006), The right of the child to protection against corporal punishment and other forms of cruel or degrading forms of punishment (arts 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, aong others), CRC/C/GC/8, August 21, 2006, paragraph 11. Human Rights Committee, General Observation 20, Replaces to the General Observation 7 prohibition of the torture and the deals and cruel griefs (article 7) 10/04/92, paragraph 5. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Final Observations: Belgium, E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, January 4, 2008 paragraph 33. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Final Observations: Costa Rica, E/C.12/CRI/CO/4, January 4, 2008, paragraphs 23 and 44.
 I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002. Series A No. 17, concurring opinion of Antônio Cançado Trindade, paragraphs 62 and 65.
 I/A Court H.R., Case of Ximenes Lopes. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, paragraphs 94, 96, 99. Case of Alban Cornejo et al. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2007. Series C No. 171, paragraph 119.
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The text is available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/spn.htm.
 European Court of Human Rights, Case of A v. United Kingdom, Judgment of September 23, 1998.
 I/A Court H.R., Cantoral Benavides Case. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, paragraph 178. Baena Ricardo et al. Case. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, paragraph 180.
 I/A Court H.R., Matter of the Sarayaku Indigenous People, Order of June 17, 2005, Explanation of Vote by Judge Antônio Cançado Trindade, paragraphs 14 to 20.
 IACHR, Report No. 38/96, Case of X and Y (Argentina), October 15, 1996, paragraph 55.
 I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002. Series A No. 17, paragraph 66.
 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Buchberger v. Austria, Judgment of November 20, 2001, paragraph 40; Case of Elsholz v. Germany, Judgment of July 13, 2000, paragraph 50; Case of Johansen v. Norway, Judgment of August 7, 1996, Reports 1996-III, paragraph 78; and Case of Olsson v. Sweden, Judgment of November 27, 1992, Series A No. 250, paragraph 90.
 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Buchberger v. Austria, Judgment of December 20, 2001, paragraph 40; Case of Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, Judgment of July 11, 2000, paragraph 169; Case of Elsholz v. Germany, Judgment of July 13, 2000, paragraph 50; and Case of Johansen v. Norway, Judgment of August 7, 1996, Reports 1996-IV, paragraph 78.
 I/A Court H.R., Resolution of January 27, 2009, in response to the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Available at: Other matters http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/opinion.pdf; Citing: Case of Ximenes Lopes. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, paragraphs 89 and 90, and Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002, Series A No. 17, paragraph 19; Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, paragraphs 146 and 147.
 International Save the Children Alliance, Ending Physical and Humiliating Punishment of Children – Making it Happen, Part I. Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Study on Violence against Children (Stockholm, Save the Children Sweden, 2005), available as of November 14, 2006 at www.violencestudy.org/europe-ca.
 UN. Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations. Study on Violence against Children. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. A/61/299.
 UN. Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations. Study on Violence against Children. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. A/61/299, page 47.
 The following are legal provisions in force in the member countries pertaining to the question of corporal punishment of children and adolescents: Cuba, Article 86 of the Family Code of Cuba. In moderation, parents have the authority to properly reprimand and correct the children under their patria potestad. [Los padres están facultados para reprender y corregir adecuada y moderadamente a los hijos bajo su patria potestad]. El Salvador, Article 215 of the Family Code. Mothers and fathers have a duty to properly correct their children, in moderation (...) [Es deber del padre y de la madre corregir adecuada y moderadamente a sus hijos (...)]. Antigua and Barbuda, Article 32 of the Education Act, “discipline of pupils” (The Education Act of April 4, 1973) provides that “Corporal punishment may be administered as a last resort by the Headteacher only or by his deputy, or by a teacher in his presence, under his direction and on his responsibility”; Article 11(4)(b) (Prison Act of July 1, 1956) provides that corporal punish as a disciplinary measure is permitted and that in the case of a person appearing to be under the age of 21, twelve strokes of a tamarind rod are allowed. Under Article 11 of the Corporal Punishment Act of December 23, 1946, a person under the age of eighteen may be sentenced to be whipped once. The Childcare and Protection Act of February 20, 2004, does not have a provision that protects children against the practice of corporal punishment. Argentina, Article 266 of the Civil Code (1998) provides that: Children must respect and obey their parents. Article 278 provides that: “Parents have the authority to correct or require correction of their minor children’s conduct. The power of correction must be practiced in moderation, and any form of mistreatment, punishment or measure that physically or psychologically harms or abuses the minors is prohibited. Judges must protect minors from excessive parental correction, order that the excesses be stopped and punish parents where appropriate.” [Los padres tienen la facultad de corregir o hacer corregir la conducta de sus hijos menores. El poder de corrección debe ejercerse moderadamente, debiendo quedar excluidos los malos tratos, castigos o actos que lesionen o menoscaben física o psíquicamente a los menores. Los jueces deberán resguardar a los menores de las correcciones excesivas de los padres, disponiendo su cesación y las sanciones pertinentes si correspondieren]. Barbados, The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (1996) punishes assault, neglect and “unnecessary suffering” of children under 16 years (section 5), but allows “moderate chastisement.” Belize, Part VI, Article 27 of the Education Act (amended December 31, 2000) provides that “for serious and repeated offences, punishment may be administered by the principal, or by a member of his staff under his authorization: provided that any such punishment shall not be excessive and harmful to the child); Brazil, Civil Code, Article 1638 provides that by order of a court, a father or mother who punishes his or her child excessively shall lose patria potestad. Canada, Section 43 of the Criminal Code provides that: “Every schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstance.” A January 30, 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the right of parents to administer physical punishment to children between the ages of 2 and 12. Guatemala, Article 13 of the Law for Comprehensive Protection for Children and Adolescents (2003) provides that “(…) The State shall respect the rights and duties of parents and, where appropriate, the legal representatives, to guide, educate and correct the child or adolescent, using prudent means of discipline that do not violate the child’s dignity and personal integrity as an individual or member of a family. They shall be held liable, under criminal and civil law, for any excesses that, as a result of their actions and omissions, are committed in the exercise of the patria potestad or guardianship (...)” [El Estado respetará los derechos y deberes de los padres y en su caso de los representantes legales, de guiar, educar y corregir al niño, niña o adolescente, empleando medios prudentes de disciplina que no vulneren su dignidad e integridad personal como individuos o miembros de una familia siendo responsables penal y civilmente de los excesos, que como resultado de sus acciones y omisiones, incurrieren en el ejercicio de la patria potestad o tutela.] Article 253 of the Civil Code (1963) provides that “The father and mother are required to care and provide for their children, whether born in or out of wedlock, to educate them and to correct them using prudent disciplinary methods and shall be answerable under criminal law if they abandon them, either morally or materially, and fail to perform the duties inherent in patria potestad.” [“El padre y la madre están obligados a cuidar y sustentar a sus hijos, sean o no de matrimonio, educarlos y corregirlos, empleando medios prudentes de disciplina, y serán responsables conforme a las leyes penales si los abandonan moral o materialmente y dejan de cumplir los deberes inherentes a la patria potestad”.] Grenada, the Education Act (2004) allows the use of corporal punishment in school, unless parents indicate their objection to it, in writing, addressed to the school principal. Honduras, Article 191 of the Family Code (1984) provides that “Under the institution of patria potestad, parents are authorized to reprimand and correct their children properly and in moderation.”[“Los padres están facultados para reprender y corregir adecuada y moderadamente a los hijos bajo su patria potestad”.] Jamaica, the Flogging Regulation Act of March 21, 1903, provides the following: 2. (...) and twelve strokes in the case of juvenile offenders...”) Under that law, an adult is anyone over the age of 16. Nicaragua, Child and Adolescent Code of 1998, Article 49, “Teachers, authorities, officials, employees or workers of the Educational System shall not use any abusive measure or punishment on pupils that causes them physical, moral and psychological harm as determined by an informed ruling by specialists and faculty or that restricts the rights contemplated in the present Code. The guilty parties shall face the appropriate administrative or criminal sanctions,” (emphasis added) [“Se prohíbe a los maestros, autoridades, funcionarios, empleados o trabajadores del Sistema Educativo aplicar cualquier medida o sanción abusiva a los educandos que les cause daños físicos, morales y psicológicos según dictamen calificado de especialistas o facultativos o que restrinja los derechos contemplados en el presente Código. Los responsables estarán sujetos a las sanciones administrativas o penales que correspondan”.] (emphasis added). Panama, Article 319 of the Family Code (1994), amended in 2001, provides the following: “Patria potestad over children includes the following duties and authorities: (…) 1.To reasonably and moderately correct them.”” [“La patria potestad con relación a los hijos o hijas comprende los siguientes deberes y facultades: (...) 2. Corregirlos razonable y moderadamente”]. Peru, Article 74 of the Child and Adolescent Code (1993, updated in 2000) provides the following: “The duties and rights of parents who exercise custody include: … (d) Providing [children] with good examples and correcting them moderately. When this action is not sufficient, they can turn to the competent authority.” [“Son deberes y derechos de los padres que ejercen la patria potestad: ... d) Darles buenos ejemplos de vida y corregirlos moderadamente”.] Saint Lucia, the Children and Young Persons Act (1972) speaks of “the right of any parent, teacher or other person having the lawful control or charge of a child to administer reasonable punishment to him” (Article 5). Under the Regulations to Education Act (1992) in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, corporal punishment is lawful in schools; in government and government assisted primary schools, children as young as 5 years of age can be given up to six strokes using “a leather strap”, as a last resort, by the head teacher or an assisted teacher in the presence of the head.
 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Antigua and Barbuda CRC/C/15/Add.247, November 3, 2004, paragraphs 35 and 36. Argentina, CRC/C/15/Add. 35, 1995, paragraph 39. Belize Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Belize, 10/05/99, CRC/C/15/Add. 99 paragraphs 19 and 30. Peru, CRC/C/15/Add. 120, 22/02/2000, paragraph 22. Brazil CRC/C/15/Add.241, November 3, 2004 paragraphs 42 and 43. Chile CRC/C/15/Add. 173, 2002 and 2007. Colombia Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Colombia, CRC/C/15/Add. 30, 15/02/95; Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Colombia, CRC/C/15/Add. 137, 16/10/2000 and Concluding observations, CRC/C/COL/CO/3, June 8, 2006, paragraphs 61 and 62. Ecuador, Concluding observations, CRC/C/15/Add.262, September 13, 2005, paragraphs 37 and 38. Honduras Concluding observations: CRC/C/HND/CO/3, May 2, 2007, paragraphs 54 and 55. Mexico, Concluding observations CRC/C/MEX/CO/3 June 8, 2006, paragraph 36. Nicaragua, Concluding observations CRC/C/15/Add.265, September 21, 2005, paragraphs 43 and 44. Peru Concluding observations, CRC/C/PER/CO/3, March 14, 2006, paragraph 43. Saint Lucia, Concluding observations, CRC/C/15/Add.258, September 21, 2005, paragraphs 34 and 35.
 Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” (emphasis added).
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 (2006), op. cit., paragraph 14.
 I/A Court H.R., Resolution of January 27, 2009, in response to the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Available at: Other matters http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/opinion.pdf.
 Council of Europe, Eliminating Corporal Punishment: A Human Rights Imperative for Europe’s Children, 2nd edition, Belgium, 2007, p. 57.
 Save the Children Sweden Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Positive Discipline, What it is and how to do it, Bangkok, 2007, p. 12.
 Examples include the following materials, developed in response to the recommendations set out in the Study on Violence against Children: Save The Children Sweden Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Positive Discipline, What it is and how to do it, Bangkok, 2007, 356 pp. Council of Europe, Parenting in Contemporary Europe: A Positive Approach, 2007, 175 pp. Council of Europe, Views on Positive Parenting and Non Violent Upbringing, 2007, 104 pp. UNESCO Eliminating corporal punishment: The way forward to constructive child discipline, UNESCO Publishing, Paris, 2005.
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 (2006) The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment (Article 19, paragraph 2 of Article 28, Article 37, et al.), CRC/C/GC/8, August 21, 2006, paragraph 48.

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Gordon Orloff is a Boston-based lawyer focusing on business, real estate and probate litigation in the trial and appellate courts of Massachusetts. Gordon represents clients in contract disputes as well as in trade secret and copyright cases, title, easement and zoning and boundary disputes.
Gordon is aware that some matters are best resolved outside of the courtroom and he regularly represents clients in alternative dispute resolution. He is a trained mediator and has served as a case conciliator at the Boston Municipal Court.
Gordon has presented on various real estate topics for Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education and other continuing legal education programs and is a member of Real Estate Bar Association’s Litigation Committee. He also is a regular contributor to the blog, Massachusetts Land Use Monitor, which reports on new developments in real estate and land-use law.
When the Conservation Commission refused to permit the construction of a house on her residential lot in a Falmouth subdivision, Janice Smyth decided to take action and sought damages for a regulatory taking of her land under the U.S. Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. She was successful initially, recovering damages of $640,000. But, in Smyth v. Conservation Commission of Falmouth, the Appeals Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
A Massachusetts regulation stating that no two digital billboards may be erected within 1,000 feet of one another set up a race between competing billboard companies that owned abutting land.
In a satisfying win for Rackemann, the Appeals Court today upheld a Land Court decision that inland lot owners hold no easement rights over our clients’ waterfront property.
Loiselle v. Hickey concerns a large subdivision in Dennis with a number of ways leading to Cape Cod Bay. An earlier case between many of the same parties established that the inland lot owners had easement rights in all of those ways. In Loiselle, many of the same the inland lot owners argued that they also had the right to use the private beach between those ways for recreational purposes.
The Appeals Court rejected that claim. While the decision does not break new legal ground, it does serve as a helpful review of the basic legal principles governing waterfront land.
Unable to leave well enough alone, the Supreme Judicial Court used a series of wooden puns in deciding not to change the longstanding rule that a landowner cannot hold a neighbor responsible for damage caused by that neighbor’s healthy tree. Shiel v. Rowell addressed Shiel’s nuisance and trespass claims that algae on her roof was caused by the Rowells’ overhanging tree.
Massachusetts is unusual in that an owner of waterfront property typically holds title to the low water mark. However, the area between the low and the high water marks normally remains subject to the rights of the public to fish, fowl (hunt birds) and navigate.
Can’t Get There From Here?
In the just-decided Maslow v. O’Connor, the Appeals Court addressed rights in a Gloucester subdivision road. Since Gloucester is a seaside community, naturally the case concerns water access.
When Is It Too Late to Force a Neighbor to Cure a Zoning Violation?
Section 7 of Chapter 40A contains a statute of limitations for actions by individuals and municipalities to compel the removal, alteration, or relocation of any structure due to a zoning violation. In Bruno v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Tisbury, the Appeals Court considered when the statute of limitations commences based on a zoning violation arising from an ANR (Approval Not Required) subdivision of land.
The Goethals owned a large lot with a single family home and guesthouse. In 2001, the local planning board endorsed the Goethals’ plan to subdivide that lot into two parcels and, for a time, the Goethals retained both Lots. Their guesthouse was on Lot 1 and a single family home was on Lot 2. Lot 1 is about 12,000 square feet, whereas zoning requires a minimum lot size of 25,000 square feet for a single family home.
On June 29, 2017, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Steinmetz v. Coyle Caron, Inc. That case, which has its roots in the mundane desire of a couple to build a new home on their land in Cohasset, gave rise to some interesting and complicated constitutional questions.

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Milton McGinty ("Applicant") filed an application to demolish the Takoma Theatre ("Theatre") constructed in 1923 and located at 6833 4th Street N.W. The Theatre is situated in the Takoma Park Historic District and is subject to the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978; D.C. Official Code § 6-1101 et seq. (2001) ("Act"). Under the Act, the Mayor's Agent may disallow permit issuance unless "it is necessary in the public interest," or if failure to issue a permit will result in "unreasonable economic hardship" to the owner. D.C. Official Code § 6-1104(e). The Applicant argued 1) that the demolition of the Theatre in order to construct a residential building is necessary in the public interest because it qualifies as a project of special merit, and 2) that failure to grant the permit would result in unreasonable economic hardship for the Applicant. After reviewing the evidence submitted by the Applicant and taking into consideration the issues and concerns of the affected Advisory Neighborhood Commission and the report by the Historic Preservation Review Board, The Mayor's Agent denied the permit to demolish the Theatre.
The Mayor's Agent reasoned that the proposed residential structure that would replace the Theatre does not qualify as a special merit project because the Applicant failed to prove, pursuant to Section 3 (11) of the Act, that the building would significantly benefit the District of Columbia "by virtue of  exemplary architecture,  specific features of land planning, or  social or other benefits having a high priority for community services." D.C. Official Code § 6-1102 (11). The Mayor's Agent relied on the opinion in Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 655 A.2d a865 (D.C. 1995), where the court declared that "projects featuring benefits to the occupants of new buildings (such as the purchasers of condominiums), coupled with general benefits to the District (such as increased tax revenue or increased housing stock), are not 'special' enough to come within the clause identifying 'special merit' as 'social or other benefits'." Id. , at 870. The Mayor's Agent held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the claim that the building embodies "exemplary architecture" or that the new residential development would provide for "social or other benefits having a high priority for the community services."
The Mayor's Agent concluded that the failure to grant the demolition permit would not lead to the Applicant's unreasonable economic hardship because the Applicant failed to demonstrate that all reasonable alternatives to demolition have been considered and that these alternatives are not viable. Because the Applicant could renovate and continue to use the property as a Theatre or for other purposes, he would be left with "alternative economic use for the property," 900 G. Street Associates v. Department of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C., 1981). The Mayor's Agent argued that according to Kalorama, that a property has diminished value after a denial of a demolition permit is immaterial so long as there is a reasonable alternative economic use for the Property.
The Mayor's Agent received request for party status to oppose the demolition application and since no objections were made, all requests were granted.
The Mayor's Agent concluded that Applicant has not satisfied his burden of proof that the issuance of a demolition permit to raze a contributing resource to the Takoma Park Historic District, known as the Takoma Theatre, is necessary in the public interest or that failure to issue a permit will cause unreasonable economic hardship to the Applicant, pursuant to § 5 of the Historic Preservation Act, D.C. Official Code § 6-1104.

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Appellant New Colonial Ice Co., Inc.
1. Whether and to what extent deductions of losses shall be allowed in computing income taxes depends upon legislative grace, and only as there is clear statutory provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed. P. 292 U. S. 440 .
defined, has there been provision for an allowance for losses suffered in an earlier year. P. 292 U. S. 440 .
3. The statutes also have disclosed a general purpose to confine allowable losses to the taxpayer sustaining them -- i.e., to treat them as personal to him, and not transferable to or usable by another. P. 292 U. S. 440 .
4. In order to overcome financial difficulties, all the assets, liabilities and business of a corporation were taken over by a new corporation specially organized for the purpose and having substantially the same capital structure, in exchange for a portion of its stock, which was distributed by the older corporation among its stockholders, share for share, thereby retiring the old shares. Creditors were given a supervising management of the new corporation through a stock voting trust until their claims should be paid. The corporate existence of the older corporation continued. Held that the two corporations were distinct entities, and that the new corporation, in the computation of the tax on its net income for succeeding year, was not entitled to deduct earlier losses of the old corporation, under § 204(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921, which provides that, where any "taxpayer" has sustained a net loss, the amount may be deducted from the net income of "the taxpayer" for succeeding tax years. P. 292 U. S. 440 .
5. As a general rule a corporation and its stockholders are deemed separate entities, and this is true in respect of tax problems. P. 292 U. S. 442 .
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 621, to review the affirmance of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 24 B.T.A. 886, upholding deficiency assessments of income taxes.
This is a controversy respecting deficiencies in the petitioner's income taxes for 1922 and 1923.
"If, for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1920, it appears upon the production of evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that any taxpayer has sustained a net loss, the amount thereof shall be deducted from the net income of the taxpayer for the succeeding taxable year, and if such net loss is in excess of the net income for such succeeding taxable year, the amount of such excess shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the next succeeding taxable year; the deduction in all cases to be made under regulations prescribed by the Commission with the approval of the Secretary."
and the plant was being operated at 40 percent of its intended capacity, the company became financially embarrassed and unable to meet its indebtedness or supply additional equipment needed to render the business profitable.
A creditors' committee was organized, and likewise a stockholders' committee. Investigation disclosed that much stock had been issued of which there was no record and for which no consideration was received. Negotiations resulted in the restoration and cancellation of the spurious stock and in an agreement to organize a new company to take over the assets and liabilities, proceed with the completion of the equipment, and continue the operation of the business. The agreement included provisions for the issue of stock by the new company to the old equal in class, par value, and number of shares, to the outstanding stock so that the old company could make an exchange share for share with its stockholders, and thereby retire its outstanding stock; for obtaining new funds with which to complete the equipment; for an extension of time by existing creditors, and for investing creditors with a supervising management through a stock voting trust until their claims were paid.
Accordingly, the new corporation, petitioner here, was organized and took over the assets, liabilities, and business of the old corporation on April 13, 1922. Other provisions of the agreement were carried out in the manner contemplated, save in minor particulars not material here. The corporate existence of the old corporation continue (so it is stipulated) during the remainder of 1922 and all of 1923, but, after the transfer, it transacted no business and had no assets or income.
and of $56,242.55 during the year 1923. In this proceeding, the new corporation asserts a right under § 204(b) to a deduction from its income so realized of the losses so sustained by the old corporation.
The petitioner insists that the continuity of the business was not broken by the transfer from the old company to the new, and this may be conceded. But it should be observed that this continuity was accomplished by deliberate elimination of the old company and substitution of the new one. Besides, the matter of importance here, as will be shown presently, is not continuity of business alone, but of ownership and tax liability as well. Had the transfer from one company to the other been effected by an unconditional sale for cash, there would have been continuity of business, but not of ownership or tax liability.
Petitioner also insists that the ultimate parties in interest -- stockholders and creditors -- were substantially the same after the transfer as before, and this may be conceded. But there is here no effort to tax either creditors or stockholders. Other statutes, as also constitutional provisions, have an important bearing on the taxation of gains by stockholders through corporate reorganizations, and the cited decisions relating to that subject [ Footnote 1 ] are not presently apposite. What is being taxed in this instance is the income realized by the new company in conducting the business after the transfer, and the sole matter for decision is whether, under § 204(b), there shall be deducted from that income the losses suffered by the old company in its conduct of the same business before the transfer.
The Board of Tax Appeals, 24 B.T.A. 886, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, 66 F.2d 480, both ruled that the deduction is not admissible under the statute.
The power to tax income like that of the new corporation is plain, and extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace, and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.
The statutes pertaining to the determination of taxable income have proceeded generally on the principle that there shall be a computation of gains and losses on the basis of a distinct accounting for each taxable year, and only in exceptional situations, clearly defined, has there been provision for an allowance for losses suffered in an earlier year. Not only so, but the statutes have disclosed a general purpose to confine allowable losses to the taxpayer sustaining them -- i.e., to treat them as personal to him, and not transferable to or usable by another.
Obviously, therefore, a taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms.
These views, often reflected in decisions of this Court, have been recently reaffirmed and applied in Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U. S. 319 , 286 U. S. 326 et seq.; Planters' Cotton Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 286 U. S. 332 , and Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., ante, p. 292 U. S. 371 .
be allowed. Had there been a purpose to depart from the general policy in that regard, and to make the right to the deduction transferable or available to others than the taxpayer who sustained the loss, it is but reasonable to believe that purpose would have been clearly expressed. And, as the section contains nothing which even approaches such an expression, it must be taken as not intended to make such a departure.
of the two corporations were substantially the same constitutes such a basis.
As a general rule, a corporation and its stockholders are deemed separate entities, [ Footnote 3 ] and this is true in respect of tax problems. [ Footnote 4 ] Of course, the rule is subject to the qualification that the separate identity may be disregarded in exceptional situations where it otherwise would present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or private rights. [ Footnote 5 ] But, in this case, we find no such exceptional situation -- nothing taking it out of the general rule. On the contrary, we think it a typical case for the application of that rule.
The petitioner relies on Pioneer Pole & Shaft Co. v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 861, Industrial Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 291, and H. H. Miller Industries Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 412. The decisions in these cases are not wholly in point, but contain language giving color to the petitioner's claim, and are to that extent in conflict with other federal decisions, notably Athol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 230; Turner-Farber-Love Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 416, and the decision now under review. Insofar as they are not in harmony with the views expressed in this opinion, they are disapproved.
United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 ; Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S. 176 ; Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 ; Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 ; Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536 .
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330 , 247 U. S. 337 ; Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 , 247 U. S. 349 ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 .
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 115 U. S. 587 , 115 U. S. 596 -597; Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267 , 208 U. S. 273 ; United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516 , 238 U. S. 527 -529; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 ; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 , 282 U. S. 24 .
Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 , 282 U. S. 24 ; Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U. S. 404 , 287 U. S. 410 ; Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410 , 287 U. S. 415 ; Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415 , 287 U. S. 418 -420.
United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 , 220 U. S. 272 -274; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assn., 247 U. S. 490 , 247 U. S. 500 -501; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330 , 247 U. S. 337 -338; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 .


§30-29-12. Law-enforcement officers to receive identification and certification to carry weapons off duty.
(a) Every person employed by a West Virginia state, county or municipal agency as a qualified law-enforcement officer within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §926B, shall receive an appropriate photo identification and certification of training required to carry a concealed firearm under the federal Law-Enforcement Officers Safety Act, 18 U. S. C. §926B. No currently employed officer may be charged a fee for the photo identification and certification. This subsection does not prohibit a law-enforcement agency from controlling the use of any department-owned weapon.
(b) When a qualified law-enforcement officer, within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §926B, retires from, or otherwise honorably ceases employment with, a West Virginia state, county or municipal agency, the agency shall provide, at no charge, an appropriate photo identification to show the former employee’s status as an honorably separated or retired qualified retired law-enforcement officer within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §926C. Every West Virginia state, county or municipal law enforcement agency which conducts firearms qualification for current employees shall offer its honorably retired or separated former employees an opportunity to participate in such firearms qualification on an annual basis. The former employees shall provide, at their own expense, an appropriate firearm and ammunition and may be charged a fee not to exceed $25 for such training. Upon completion of the training and payment of any fee, the law-enforcement agency shall issue a new photo identification and certification which identifies the former employee as a “qualified retired law-enforcement officer” who has satisfied the annual training requirements of 18 U. S. C. §926C.
(c) A law-enforcement agency may, in its sole discretion, allow a person who honorably retired or separated from another federal, state, county or municipal law-enforcement agency as a qualified law-enforcement officer within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §926B, the opportunity to participate in firearms qualification the agency provides its own former employees under subsection (b) of this section. Participants shall provide, at their own expense, an appropriate firearm and ammunition and may be charged a fee not to exceed $50 for such training. Upon completion of the training and payment of any fee, the law-enforcement agency shall issue a certificate which states that the retiree satisfied the training requirements of 18 U. S. C. §926C.


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Today, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued its highly anticipated decision in Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury; Future Value, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury.1 The court held that under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, Maryland had the authority to tax the income of two out-of-state subsidiaries that did not have economic substance as separate business entities apart from their Maryland parent. The court also clarified that the unitary business principle cannot be used as a basis to assert nexus over an out-of-state entity engaged in a unitary business with another entity with a presence in Maryland. A copy of the opinion can be accessed here.
W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. ("Gore") is a Delaware corporation that uses certain patented material in the manufacture of various products. Gore operates in Maryland and is the parent to two wholly owned, out-of-state subsidiaries – Gore Enterprises Holdings, Inc. (GEH) and Future Value, Inc. ("FVI"). GEH holds all of Gore’s patents and granted Gore an exclusive license to use the patents. In exchange for this license, Gore paid a royalty fee to GEH. FVI holds all of Gore’s financial assets and makes loans to Gore. In return, Gore pays interest to FVI. Gore deducts its royalty payments to GEH and its interest payments to FVI from its taxable income.
In 2006, the Comptroller audited Gore and issued its typical "pick your poison" alternative assessments. The Comptroller issued assessments to GEH and FVI, asserting that the entities had nexus with Maryland, and apportioning their income to the state using Gore’s apportionment factor. The Comptroller also issued an alternative assessment to Gore, disallowing Gore’s royalty and interest expense deductions for its payments to GEH and FVI. Upon the Comptroller’s Notice of Final Determination, which upheld the audit assessment, the entities appealed the matter to the Maryland Tax Court.
The Tax Court affirmed the assessments against GEH and FVI, explaining that because it was Gore’s business in Maryland that produced the income of GEH and FVI, the subsidiaries did not have real economic substance as business entities separate from Gore, and were engaged in a unitary business in Maryland with Gore. The taxpayers then appealed to the Circuit Court for Cecil County, which reversed the Tax Court decision. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court, stating that GEH and FVI had nexus with Maryland because they were engaged in a unitary business with Gore, and Gore had nexus with Maryland. Gore appealed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals to the Court of Appeals (Maryland’s highest court).
In reconciling the two principles in its analysis of Gore’s facts, the court determined that although the unitary business principle cannot be used to establish nexus over GEH and FVI, the subsidiaries nevertheless lacked economic substance as separate entities. The court pointed to the subsidiaries’ dependence on Gore for their income, the circular flow of money between the subsidiaries and Gore, the subsidiaries’ reliance on Gore for core functions and services, and the general absence of substantive activity from either subsidiary that was in any meaningful way separate from Gore as support for this finding.
Behind the Gore decision stands a line of cases involving similar issues currently pending at the Maryland Tax Court and at audit.4 Taxpayers will want to pay close attention to the application of Gore to these cases. Specifically, although the Gore decision represents a partial victory for taxpayers due to its rejection of the use of the unitary business principle to establish nexus, taxpayers will need to analyze how the “economic substance as separate entities” test applies to their facts.
Although the Court of Appeals decision rejects the unitary nexus theory, it notes that there’s no reason that factors that indicate a unitary business cannot also be relevant in determining whether subsidiaries have no real economic substance as separate business entities.5 This statement seems to suggest that there’s still a significant risk that the Maryland courts will continue to conflate the “unitary nexus” and “economic substance” theories as they apply the Gore decision in pending cases.
This Alert is a part of a series of periodic updates on recent judicial, legislative and policy developments in the State of Maryland. For more information on the Gore decision, or the Maryland tax treatment of payments to affiliated entities, please contact one of the authors, or the Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work. For more information on Reed Smith’s Maryland tax practice, visit www.reedsmith.com/mdtax.
1. Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury; Future Value, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 36, September Term, 2013 (Md. March 24, 2014).
2. 825 A.2d 399, 375 Md. 78 (Md. 2003).
3. Gore at 13 (internal citations omitted).
4. For instance, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. 09-IN-OO-0150, involving intercompany royalty payments, was heard by the Tax Court in October 2010. The Tax Court also heard arguments in August 2011 in Staples, Inc. v. Comptroller, No. 09-IN-OO-0148, and Staples the Office Superstore, Inc. v. Comptroller, No. 09-IN-OO-0149 ("Staples"), involving intercompany royalty and interest payments. In addition to these cases, there are a line of other cases involving intercompany royalty and interest payments pending before the Tax Court awaiting to be heard. Now that Gore has been decided, we may see a ruling from the Tax Court in these cases, regardless of whether the taxpayers in Gore seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
5. See Gore at 23-24.

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This revenue procedure explains both the standard procedure and an alternate procedure for preparing and filing Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement; Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return; Form W-4, Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate; and Form W-5, Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Certificate, in certain acquisitions.
This revenue procedure provides the requirements for completing and submitting Form 8655, Reporting Agent Authorization (Authorization).
This Revenue Procedure describes and updates the procedure for requesting the IRS authorize a person to act as agent under section 3504 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and §31.3504–1 of the Employment Tax Regulations for purposes of Chapters 21, 22, 24, and 25 of the Code. Special instructions are also set forth for agents authorized to perform acts for purposes of Chapter 23 of the Code.
This notice provides guidance for employers and employees to make claims for refund or adjustments of overpayments of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes and Federal income tax withholding resulting from the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___ , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) decision and Revenue Ruling 2013–17, 2013–38 I.R.B. 201.
Under this Notice, dividends and other distributions made by an Alaska Native Corporation to its shareholders are eligible for voluntary withholding under section 3402(p)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and § 31.3402(p)–1T of the Employment Tax Regulations.
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are developing guidance to implement the payroll tax credit election available to certain small businesses under § 41(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to claim the payroll tax credit under § 3111(f) of the Code. Sections 41(h) and 3111(f) allow a qualified small business to elect to apply a portion of the § 41(a) research credit for the taxable year against the employer portion of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance tax (social security tax) under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act.


RCW 58.08.040 does not require the payment of a deposit for anticipated property taxes upon the filing, pursuant to regulations adopted under RCW 58.17.060, of a "short plat" subsequent to May 31 in any year and prior to the date of collection of the taxes.
(1) Does RCW 58.08.040 require the payment of a deposit for anticipated property taxes upon the filing, pursuant to regulations adopted under RCW 58.17.060, of a "short plat" subsequent to May 31 in any year and prior to the date of collection of the taxes?
(2) If question (1) is answered in the affirmative, is the amount to be deposited as the anticipated tax payable only with respect to that portion of the property excised from the total original tract and comprising the "short subdivision" or, alternatively, is the deposit of anticipated taxes payable on the entire original tract?
We answer your first question in the negative, for the reasons set forth in our analysis below. Consideration of your second question is, therefore, unnecessary.
"Any person filing a plat subsequent to May 31st in any year and prior to the date of the collection of taxes, shall deposit with the county treasurer a sum equal to the product of the county assessor's latest valuation on the unimproved property in such subdivision multiplied by the current year's dollar rate increased by twenty-five percent on the property platted. The treasurer's receipt for said amount shall be taken by the auditor as evidence of the payment of the tax. The treasurer shall appropriate so much of said deposit as will pay the taxes on the said property when the tax rolls are placed in his hands for collection, and in case the sum deposited is in excess of the amount necessary for the payment of the said taxes, the treasurer shall return, to the party depositing, the amount of said excess, taking his receipt therefor, which receipt shall be accepted for its face value on the treasurer's quarterly settlement with the county auditor."
This statute originated as § 2, chapter 129, Laws of 1893. RCW 58.17.060, on the other hand, is a part of the modern, comprehensive platting law which was enacted by the legislature in 1969, as chapter 271, Laws of 1969, Ex. Sess. Accord, AGLO 1974 No. 7 [[to Charles R. Byrd, Prosecuting Attorney, Okanogan County on January 17, 1974]], copy enclosed.
Although RCW 58.08.040 has been amended several times since enactment,1/ the opening phrase "Any person filing a plat. . ." (emphasis supplied) has remained the same. This fact becomes significant when one examines the legislative history of platting and subdividing in this state during the past four decades.
"'. . . (a) to provide a method for officially filing maps so that future conveyancing instruments might refer to a parcel of realty by reference to the lot numbers as delineated on the map, and (b) to set forth sound engineering standards for maps so filed so as to avoid surveying errors, . . .'Lake Intervale Homes, Inc., supra, 147 A.2d at 33."
"The platting and subdividing of land into lots, or tracts comprising five or more of such lots or tracts, or containing a dedication of any part thereof as a public street or highway is hereby required to proceed under, and in compliance with, the provisions of this chapter."
However, as described in AGLO 1974 No. 7, this act was repealed and replaced by the even more comprehensive and detailed provisions of chapter 271, Laws of 1969, Ex. Sess.,supra, now chapter 58.17 RCW. On the other hand, the "old" platting law, chapter 58.08 RCW, was not so repealed, yet we nevertheless there concluded that a certain undeveloped [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] subdivision originally platted under the old law would have to be platted again under the new law if the lots contained in the tract involved were to be sold.
"Every subdivision shall comply with the provisions of this chapter. Every short subdivision as defined in this chapter shall comply with the provisions of any local regulation adopted pursuant to RCW 58.17.060."
". . . the division of land into five or more lots, tracts, parcels, sites or divisions for the purpose of sale or lease and shall include all resubdivision of land."
". . . the division of land into four or less lots, tracts, parcels, sites or subdivisions for the purpose of sale or lease."
". . . a map or representation of a subdivision, showing thereon the division of a tract or parcel of land into lots, blocks, streets and alleys or other divisions and dedications."
Similarly, RCW 58.17.020(7) defines a "short plat" as the map or representation of a short subdivision.
"The legislative body of a city, town, or county shall adopt regulations and procedures, and appoint administrative personnel for the summary approval of short plats and short subdivisions, or revision thereof. Such regulations shall be adopted by ordinance and may contain wholly different requirements than those governing the approval of preliminary and final plats of subdivisions and may require surveys and monumentations and shall require filing of a short plat for record in the office of the county auditor: Provided, That such regulations must contain a requirement that land in short subdivisions may not be further divided in any manner within a period of five years without the filing of a final plat: Provided further, That such regulations are not required to contain a penalty clause as provided in RCW 36.32.120 and may provide for wholly injunctive relief."
Section 34 of the 1969 platting act also amended the provisions of RCW 58.08.040. This amendment, however, did not explicitly add to the beginning phrase of that section, "Any person filing a plat subsequent to May 31st in any year . . ." the new subjects of the 1969 act, short plats and short subdivisions. Your first question, basically stated, is thus that of whether the word "plat" in RCW 58.08.040 includes not only such plats as are filed under chapter 58.17 RCW, but, in addition,short plats filed under regulations adopted pursuant to that chapter as well.
In responding to your inquiry we are also mindful of the rule that when legislative intent is plainly expressed so that an act read by itself or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject is clear, certain, and unambiguous, courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law according to its terms; the legislature must be understood to mean what is plainly expressed. Island County v. Calvin Philips & Co., 195 Wash. 265, 80 P.2d 840 (1938). Language of a statute which is explicit and unequivocal will not be given an ambiguous meaning in order that other language supposed to remove the ambiguity may be applied. In re Phillips'Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P.2d 1015 (1938). Moreover, the legislature, in passing a statute, is presumed to be familiar with its own prior enactments. Ropo, Inc. v. Seattle, 67 Wn.2d 574, 409 P.2d 148 (1965).
RCW 58.08.040 was further amended in 1973 to change the phrase "current year's millage rate" to read "current year's dollar rate."3/ However again, no amendment to RCW 58.08.040's opening phrase, "Any person filing aplat. . ." (emphasis supplied) was made ‑ nor has any amendment to that phrase been made in any of three subsequently completed sessions of the legislature. Under like circumstances our court in State ex rel. Taylor v. Superior Court, 2 Wn.2d 575, 98 P.2d 985 (1940), concluded that a failure of the legislature in three successive sessions to pass bills providing for the creation of a county purchasing department under the supervision of the board of county commissioners manifested legislative intent that counties should continue their established practice of having each officer purchase the supplies necessary for the proper conduct of his or her office.
In summary, on the basis of the legislative history of RCW 58.08.040, the rules of statutory interpretation we have discussed above, and the reasoning contained in AGO 65-66 No. 116, we therefore conclude that the word "plat" [[Orig. Op. Page 7]] in the opening phrase of RCW 58.08.040 does not refer to short plats or short subdivisions filed pursuant to RCW 58.17.060 and the regulations and procedures of a unit of general purpose local government enacted in accordance therewith. Therefore, RCW 58.08.040 does not require the payment of a deposit for anticipated taxes upon the filing, pursuant to regulations adopted under RCW 58.17.060, of a short plat subsequent to May 31 in any year and prior to the date of collection of taxes.
Having thus answered your first question in the negative, consideration of your second question is unnecessary.
We trust that the foregoing will be of assistance to you.
1/The amendments to § 2, chapter 129, Laws of 1893, now codified as RCW 58.08.040, are as follows: Section 1, chapter 44, Laws of 1907; § 1, chapter 200, Laws of 1909; § 1, chapter 66, Laws of 1963; § 34, chapter 271, Laws of 1969, Ex. Sess.; § 74, chapter 195, Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess.
2/Citing State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951).
3/See, § 74, chapter 195, Laws of 1973, Ex. Sess.


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We live-blogged as the Supreme Court released opinions in Sturgeon v. Frost and Sudan v. Harrison. SCOTUSblog is sponsored by Casetext: A more intelligent way to search the law.
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to our live blog, sponsored by Casetext.
We're expecting one or more opinions in argued cases today. As is almost always the case, we don't know which opinions we are getting or how many.
There is just one opinion outstanding from the October sitting (which is different from cases argued in October, because cases argued at the tail end of October would be part of the November sitting): Gundy v. United States. We would expect Justice Sotomayor to be writing in Gundy, because she is the only justice who has not yet written for the October sitting.
Good morning Amy. Please ask the justices not to release Murphy today as I have a pretty tight schedule today. Tomorrow would be much better for me. Thanks!
Amy, are you on site today?
I have an OT question: do we know what the Court is waiting for regarding the DACA case from 9th circuit DHS v. Regents of the University of California?
Any chance we'll see photos from yesterday of the justices with (or better yet drinking from) the Stanley Cup?
Any prediction on when they'll release the Gamble opinion?
I noticed in the VA House oral argument that the lawyers said the names of the Justices they were responding to far more frequently than usual (which was admittedly helpful because I still get Justices Breyer and Alito confused when listening, until the hypo starts of course!). Is there an informal protocol - maybe those with more arguments being less likely to repeat the names, or is it just a style thing?
The five-minute buzzer just sounded. One box today, folks.
Speaking of the Virginia House case, how soon would you expect an opinion?
Any feeling on when they might release the Blair v. Tennessee Liquor decision?
Also, once we are finished with opinions I am going to skedaddle upstairs for oral arguments. So if I wind up ghosting you, I don't mean to be rude. Just trying to get to arguments as soon as possible.
Going in to wait for opinions now.
We have the first decision, in Sturgeon v. Frost, from Justice Kagan.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit is reversed and remanded, and it is unanimous.
Justice Sotomayor has a concurring opinion, joined by Ginsburg.
The Court holds that the Nation River is not public land for purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.
Justice Kagan says "Sturgeon can take his hovercraft out of storage." This was a case about an Alaska man who used his hovercraft on the river there until park service rangers told him that he couldn't. Now he can.
The court also holds that non-public lands within Alaska's national parks are exempt from the National Park Service's ordinary regulatory authority, as are navigable waters within Alaska's national parks.
There will be at least one more opinion today, but in all likelihood not from Justices Gorsuch or Kavanaugh.
We have the second and final opinion today, from Justice Alito in Republic of Sudan v. Harrison.
The Second Circuit's decision is reversed and remanded. Thomas dissents.
The court holds that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act requires that to serve a foreign country, a mailing must be sent directly to the foreign minister's office in the minister's home country.
There are now three outstanding cases from the November sitting, Lamps Plus, Virginia Uranium and Bucklew. Alito is the only one who hasn’t written yet. Any way to predict which he might be writing? Obviously a couple of justices are going to have to do two for that sitting.
Will there be any Opinions released tomorrow?
I know 2 different groups asked SCOTUS yesterday for an emergency stay of the bump stock ban when would we see a response to those, given the ban is supposed to kick in today?
I believe Amy has gone upstairs to the argument. We'll shut this down from this morning. We will back here tomorrow!


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Original Sources - Justice Scalia, Concurring.
Contents: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606 Syllabus Justice Kennedy Delivered the Opinion of the Court. Justice O’connor, Concurring. Justice Scalia, Concurring. Justice Stevens, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part. Justice Ginsburg, With Whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer Join, Dissenting. Justice Breyer, Dissenting.
I write separately to make clear that my understanding of how the issues discussed in Part II–B of the Court’s opinion must be considered on remand is not Justice O’Connor’s. The principle that underlies her separate concurrence is that it may in some (unspecified) circumstances be "[un]-fai[r]," and produce unacceptable "windfalls," to allow a subsequent purchaser to nullify an unconstitutional partial taking (though, inexplicably, not an unconstitutional total taking) by the government. Ante, at 635. The polar horrible, presumably, is the situation in which a sharp real estate developer, realizing (or indeed, simply gambling on) the unconstitutional excessiveness of a development restriction that a naýve landowner assumes to be valid, purchases property at what it would be worth subject to the restriction, and then develops it to its full value (or resells it at its full value) after getting the unconstitutional restriction invalidated. This can, I suppose, be called a windfall—though it is not much different from the windfalls that occur every day at stock exchanges or antique auctions, where the knowledgeable (or the venturesome) profit at the expense of the ignorant (or the risk averse). There is something to be said (though in my view not much) for pursuing abstract "fairness" by requiring part or all of that windfall to be returned to the naýve original owner, who presumably is the "rightful" owner of it. But there is nothing to be said for givingit instead to the government—which not only did not lose something it owned, but is both the cause of the miscarriage of "fairness" and the only one of the three parties involved in the miscarriage (government, naýve original owner, and sharp real estate developer) which acted unlawfully—indeed unconstitutionally. Justice O’Connor would eliminate the windfall by giving the malefactor the benefit of its malefaction. It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a purchaser who bought property at a bargain rate from a thief clothed with the indicia of title, by making him turn over the "unjust" profit to the thief.* In my view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other than a restriction forming part of the "background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking. The "investment-backed expectations" that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a Penn Central taking, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of title.
Chicago: "Justice Scalia, Concurring.," Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606 in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 606–655. Original Sources, accessed April 24, 2019, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CY5G1TBFT7Z4DL2.
MLA: . "Justice Scalia, Concurring." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002, pp. 606–655. Original Sources. 24 Apr. 2019. www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CY5G1TBFT7Z4DL2.
Harvard: , 'Justice Scalia, Concurring.' in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606. cited in 2002, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Et Al., 533 U.S. 606, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp.606–655. Original Sources, retrieved 24 April 2019, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CY5G1TBFT7Z4DL2.

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