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We take the protection of personal data very seriously. By providing this information on data protection, we aim to explain to you which personal data we process and for which purposes while you are using our website.
This information applies to all content on the website www.seyo.de (hereinafter referred to as the ‘website’).
The legal basis for data protection can be found in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘GDPR’) and the German Federal Data Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BDSG’).
‘Personal data’ means all information related to an identified or identifiable natural person; a natural person is considered identifiable if he or she can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by means of assignment to an identifier such as a name, to an identification number, to location data, to an online identifier (e.g. a cookie) or to one or more special features that are an expression of the physical, physiological, genetic, psychological, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
‘Processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.
Access data is data about each access to the server on which our website is located. Access data includes the name of the website accessed, file, date and time of access, transferred data volume, notification of successful access, browser type and version, the user’s operating system, referrer URL (the page visited previously), IP address and the requesting provider.
Cookies are small files that allow specific information related to the device to be stored on the device used to access the website.
If you register with us as a customer, fill in the contact form on our website or contact us in any other way (e.g. telephone, email), we process the personal data that you enter in the respective form or communicate to us in another way (e.g. last name, first name, email address, address).
Our hosting provider collects the access data on our behalf for security reasons for fraud and abuse monitoring as well as to statistically record website use. The legal basis for this processing is Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR. Please refer to Section 6 for information on how IP addresses are processed by third-party providers.
Cookies are used to improve the user-friendliness of websites and thus improve the user’s experience (e.g. storage of login data). On the other hand, they can be used to record statistical data on website usage and to analyse it in order to improve our website.
If you use our institute finder, your location data (geographic coordinate data) may be collected. For further information on this, please refer to Section 6.
If you register as a customer, we will use your personal data to administer your account (legal basis: Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(b) GDPR). If you use our contact form or otherwise communicate your personal data to us, we will use it to process your request (legal basis: Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(a), (f) GDPR). If you communicate with us by email, your emails and the personal data communicated therein will be transported on our behalf to the servers of our email provider Strato AG in order to be stored on our servers (legal basis: Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(a), (f) GDPR).
Our legitimate interest in this data collection within the meaning of Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR arises from the fact that we cannot process your request (registration, establishment of contact) without your data.
Our website is operated on the servers of the hosting provider Strato AG. The latter processes the personal data mentioned in Section 3 on our behalf for the operation of our website as well as for abuse monitoring. The legal basis for this is Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR.
We embed various services and content from third-party providers on our website. The embedding may result in the processing of your personal data. Furthermore, it is possible that data may be transferred to countries outside the EU as a result of embedding third-party content. For more information on this, please refer to Section 6.
The legal basis for embedding these services and content is Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR. Our legitimate interest in this data processing results from the fact that we use the third-party services to make our website user-friendly and to optimise our website.
Please note that on this website we use Google Analytics with the code ‘gat. anonymizeIp();’ in order to guarantee an anonymous collection of IP addresses (so-called IP masking).
The legal basis for the use of Google Analytics is Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR. Our legitimate interest in this data collection arises from the fact that we require the use of Google Analytics to optimise our website.
Our institute locator lets you find a SEYO institute near you. For this purpose, you are shown a map from Google Maps at www. seyo.de/en/providersearch. By zooming in on the map, you will find the location of the cosmetics institute offering SEYO products which is closest to you. When you visit our website, Google receives the information that you have retrieved the corresponding subpage of our website. In addition, as far as we are aware the following information is transmitted to Google: date and time of the visit to the respective website, internet address or URL of the website accessed, IP address of the device used to access the website and any start and destination addresses entered on the Google Maps page for navigation purposes. This occurs regardless of whether Google provides a user account that you are logged in with or whether no user account exists. If you are logged in to Google, your data will be directly associated with your account. If you do not wish for this data to be associated with your Google profile, you must log out before activating the button. Google stores your data as usage profiles and uses it for purposes of advertising, market research and/or the demand-oriented design of its website. Such analysis takes place in particular (even for users who are not logged in) to deploy demand-oriented advertising and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the creation of such user profiles, although you must contact Google to exercise this right.
Google also processes your personal data in the USA and has subjected itself to the EU-US Privacy Shield, www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework.
The legal basis for the use of the institute locator and Google Maps is Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR. Our legitimate interest in this data collection arises from the fact that we use Google Maps to make it easier to find our SEYO institutes and thus to optimise our website.
We offer you the opportunity to apply to us via our website. When you apply digitally in this way, we will electronically collect and process your applicant and application data as part of the application procedure.
The legal basis for this processing is Section 26(1) Sentence (1) BDSG in conjunction with Art. 88(1) GDPR.
If an employment contract is concluded after the application procedure, we will store the data you provided when applying in your personnel file for the purpose of the usual organisational and administrative processes – naturally in compliance with further legal obligations.
The legal basis for this processing is also Section 26(1) Sentence (1) BDSG in conjunction with Art. 88(1) GDPR.
If an application is rejected, we will automatically erase the data transmitted to us two months after notification of the rejection. However, this erasure will not take place if legal provisions require us to store the data for a longer period, for example for up to four months due to the obligation to provide proof under the General Act on Equal Treatment (AGG), or until the conclusion of legal proceedings.
In this case, the legal basis is Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR and Section 24(1) No. 2 BDSG. Our legitimate interest lies in legal defence or enforcement.
If you expressly consent to your data being stored for a longer period, e.g. for addition to a database of applicants or interested parties, we will process the data further on the basis of your consent. The legal basis is then Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR. However, under Art. 7(3) GDPR you can of course withdraw your consent with effect for the future at any time by notifying us.
The legal basis in this regard is Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR.
Under Art. 7(3) GDPR, you can withdraw your consent to receiving the newsletter with effect for the future at any time. All you need to do in this case is inform us of your withdrawal or click on the unsubscribe link contained in each newsletter.
We use MailChimp, a service provided by The Rocket Science Group, LLC, 512 Means Street, Suite 404, Atlanta, GA 30318, USA, hereinafter referred to as ‘The Rocket Science Group’, to send our newsletters.
The newsletter subsequently sent via The Rocket Science Group also contains what’s known as a tracking pixel or web beacon. Using this tracking pixel, we can evaluate whether and when you have read our newsletter and whether you have clicked on any links contained therein. In addition to other technical data, such as data from your computer system and your IP address, the data processed is stored so that we can optimise our newsletters and respond to the wishes of readers. We therefore process the data in order to enhance the quality and attractiveness of our newsletters.
The legal basis for sending the newsletter and for the analysis is Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR.
The provision of personal data when you visit our website is neither required by law or contract nor necessary to conclude a contract. You are also not obliged to provide personal data when you visit our website, although the access data is recorded automatically when you visit our website. If you wish to register as a customer, your registration data is required.
Our hosting provider temporarily stores the access data for security reasons (e.g. to clarify misuse or fraud) and then erases it. Data whose further storage is required for evidence is excluded from erasure until the respective incident has been finally clarified.
If IP addresses are processed by third-party providers, we have no influence on the duration of the processing. Under Section 6 you will find the links to the privacy policies of the third-party providers. There you can find out about the duration of the processing.
Personal data that you enter via our forms or otherwise provide to us will be processed for the duration of the processing of your request, provided the continued storage of the data is required due to tax and commercial retention periods or justified by a consent.
You have the right to object at any time to your personal data being processed on the basis of Art. 6(1) Sentence 1(f) GDPR, if there are reasons for the objection which result from your particular situation. However, we will continue to process your personal data if there are compelling legitimate reasons to continue processing the data which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or if the processing serves to establish, exercise or defend against legal claims. If we process your personal data for direct marketing purposes, you have the right to object at any time to the processing of your personal data for the purpose of such advertising, without giving any reasons (Art. 21 GDPR).
If you have given your consent, you have the right to withdraw it. Please note that a withdrawal does not alter the lawfulness of the consent granted up until the withdrawal (the withdrawal has no retroactive effect).
Under the GDPR, you have the right to receive information free of charge about the personal data we hold about you (Art. 15 GDPR).
Furthermore, in accordance with the GDPR you have the right to have your personal data rectified (Art. 16 GDPR), erased (Art. 17 GDPR), to have its processing restricted (Art. 18 GDPR) and a right to data portability (Art. 20 GDPR).
In justified cases, you also have the right to lodge a complaint with the data protection supervisory authority responsible for us (Art. 77 GDPR).
You can assert your rights under the GDPR by email or in writing. The provider’s contact details are specified below.

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Sadosky v. U.S. Properties, Inc.
The respondent Hartford Insurance Group was represented by Lucas Strunk, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton & Stabnick, 95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Glastonbury, CT 06033.
The respondent Royal & Sunalliance was represented by Marie Gallo-Hall, Esq., Montstream & May, L.L.P., Salmon Brook Corporate Park, 655 Winding Brook Drive, P.O. Box 1087, Glastonbury, CT 06033-6087.
This Petition for Review from the November 5, 2003 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Second District was heard May 28, 2004 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and Charles F. Senich.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The respondent, Hartford Insurance Group (hereinafter “Hartford Insurance”), has appealed from the November 5, 2003 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Second District. We affirm the decision of the trial commissioner.
The pertinent facts are as follows. The claimant, Theresa Sadosky, has been employed as an office manager and administrative assistant for the respondent employer, U.S. Properties, Inc., for 18 years. Most of her job involved typing or word processing. Six to eight years ago the claimant initially experienced pain in her right wrist, forearm and elbow which progressed to the point that she sought medical treatment from Dr. Patricia Stuart on April 24, 2000. Dr. Stuart diagnosed the claimant as having elements of medial and lateral epicondylitis, cubital tunnel syndrome and carpal tunnel syndrome. Additionally, the claimant underwent nerve conduction testing and electromyographic studies which were positive for ulnar neuropathy. At that point, the claimant established a claim with an April 18, 2000 date of injury which was paid by respondent-insurer Royal & Sunalliance.
Initially, Dr. Stuart treated the claimant conservatively with physical therapy and a prescription for Celebrex which alleviated some of the claimant’s pain, however, she still had some symptoms. On April 28, 2000 the claimant was 80 per cent better and had days when she felt completely normal, although she continued to experience pain after strenuous activities. The claimant completed her treatment with Dr. Stuart at that time. She self-treated for three months thereafter which entailed icing, heating, home exercise and the use of Tylenol Arthritis or Celebrex. After August 2000 the claimant continued to perform her regular work duties, however, she took more frequent breaks, used the computer mouse with her left hand and performed half of her non-typing work related tasks with her left hand. A few months later the claimant’s symptoms started to increase again.
Within two to five months of August of 2000 the claimant’s symptoms increased to the point where were the claimant believed she should have returned to Dr. Stuart. However, she did not do so because she believed that the next course of treatment would involve surgery and she was concerned that she was the only person doing her job at that time. During April 2001 the respondent-employer changed its workers’ compensation insurance carrier to Hartford Insurance. In September 2001 the claimant’s symptoms were worse than they had been in April 2000. On September 25, 2001 the claimant returned to Dr. Stuart who administered an injection into the lateral epicondylar area which provided the claimant approximately one week of pain relief. On October 18, 2001 Dr. Stuart opined the claimant required surgery for her condition.
On October 15, 2001 Dr. Stuart opined the claimant’s original symptoms never fully resolved and that her ongoing symptoms were a continuation of her prior workers’ compensation claim. On February 6, 2002 Dr. Stuart opined that the claimant’s employment activities prior to April 2000 were responsible for 75 percent of her then condition and work activities between August 2000 and September 2001 were responsible for 25 per cent of the condition.
Dr. Duffield Ashmead performed an independent medical examination on May 6, 2002. Dr. Ashmead opined that the claimant’s cubital tunnel and lateral epicondylar component were well established, well described and sufficiently severe such that subsequent work exposures did not contribute to causing a condition which already existed. He further opined that by continuing to perform any work or non-work related activities, her symptoms would have worsened.
The trial commissioner found that as a result of the claimant’s employment and exposure to repetitive trauma with the respondent-employer the claimant developed cubital tunnel and lateral epicondylitis which were well established in April 2000. He further found that after August 2000 the claimant’s performance of her regular job duties caused her to continue to be exposed to the repetitive trauma which aggravated her established cubital tunnel and lateral epicondylitis causing her symptoms to become increasingly worse. Ultimately the trial commissioner determined that in April 2001, the Hartford Insurance became the respondent-employer’s insurer and “because from a legal standpoint the claimant’s continued injurious exposure to repetitive trauma extended into the Hartford Insurance Group’s period of coverage, they are initially liable for all benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” Findings, ¶ E.D. Therefore, the trial commissioner ordered that as of October 18, 2001 the Hartford Insurance Group should assume liability for all benefits the claimant may be entitled to as a result of her cubital and lateral epicondylitis condition.
The issue at the formal hearing was apportionment of liability under § 31-299b C.G.S. May 1, 2003 and June 26, 2003 hearing notices. Under § 31-299b apportionment is appropriate in the case of a repetitive trauma or occupational disease where a single injury occurred over a period of time where several employers or insurance carriers were involved. Kelly v. Dunkin Donuts, 4278 CRB-4-00-8 (November. 1, 2001); Thomen v. Turri Electric, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 299, 1324 CRD-5-91-10 (December. 23, 1993). The trial commissioner is charged with the task of sifting through the evidence in order to determine whether an injury is new and distinct or merely a single injury which exhibits symptoms over a period of time. Boccuzzi v. Norwalk Courtyard Marriott, 4123 CRB-07-99-9 (October. 11, 2000).
Here the trial commissioner evidently relied on Dr. Stuart’s opinion. On March 5, 2002, Dr. Stuart specifically opined that she first treated the claimant in April of 2000 and that as of August 2000 the claimant was not back to normal, “she [the claimant] still had intermittent symptoms of both pain and numbness.” Respondent Royal Sunalliance’s Exhibit 1. Dr. Stuart further opined that as of August or September of 2001, “her symptoms returned gradually with daily use of the right extremity.” Id. Dr. Stuart believed “that all of the repetitive use of the right upper extremity combined to give her her [sic] current symptoms.” She further opined that “activity during both periods contributed to her current situation.” Id. It is clear Dr. Stuart’s opinion was that the claimant’s symptoms never vanished, but rather continued steadily throughout the entire period. This differs from Dr. Ashmead’s opinion that the claimant’s symptoms were well established at the time of diagnosis and that her employment after that initial diagnosis was not contributory. Respondent Hartford Group’s Exhibit 6, May 6, 2002 I.M.E. report. As the trier of fact the trial commissioner is entitled to weigh the evidence and determine which evidence to accept and which to reject. Krajewski v. Atlantic Machine Tool Works, Inc., 4500 CRB-6-02-3 (March. 7, 2003); Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July. 17, 1998). We will not disturb this finding unless it is unsupported by the record. Nasinka v. Ansonia Copper & and Brass, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 332, 1592 CRB-5-92-12 (April. 27, 1995).
Hartford Insurance contends that the trial commissioner should not have given any weight to Dr. Stuart’s March 5, 2002 opinion because it was not “based fairly in the relevant and material evidence before the commissioner.” Respondent Hartford Insurance’s April 21, 2004 Brief , p. 11. Dr. Stuart’s March 5, 2002 letter to Royal & Sunalliance’s counsel was in response to an inquiry from said counsel dated February 6, 2002. See respondent Royal & Sunalliance’s Exhibit 1. Hartford Insurance argues that the letter of inquiry to Dr. Stuart should have referenced certain portions of the claimant’s testimony regarding her symptoms and self treatment in the periods between Dr. Stuart’s treatments. We see no error in the trial commissioner’s consideration of Dr. Stuart’s March 5, 2002 opinion. If Hartford Insurance had questions regarding the basis for Dr. Stuart’s opinion they were free to depose her. Carroll v. Flattery’s Landscaping, Inc., 4499 CRB-8-02-2 (March. 25, 2003). Furthermore, the appellants never objected to the admission of Dr. Stuart’s reports at the formal hearings. If the trial commissioner believed that Dr. Stuart’s opinion was invalid based on an insufficient history provided by the claimant then he was free to discount her opinion. Dallaire v. Paper Delivery, Inc., 3951 CRB-65-98-12 (January. 19, 2000). Evidently, the trial commissioner considered the record and determined Dr. Stuart had the information necessary to provide a credible opinion. The trial commissioner denied Hartford Insurance’s Motion to Correct regarding that matter. That decision will not be disturbed on appeal.
Hartford Insurance also argues that the trial commissioner erred in concluding that a further injury occurred or that the claimant’s injury was aggravated by subsequent work activities. On March 5, 2002, Dr. Stuart opined that activities during both periods contributed to the claimant’s condition. Respondent Royal & Alliance’s Exhibit 1. Dr. Stuart also opined that claimant’s activities prior to April 2000 were responsible for 75 percent of the claimant’s condition and her activities between August 2000 and September 2001 were responsible for 25 percent of her condition. Findings, 23; Respondent Royal & Sunalliance’s Exhibit 1. Again this is a factual determination relating to the weight and credibility the trier assigned to the evidence.
Hartford Insurance argues that the activities subsequent to the claimant’s initial treatment were merely an aggravation of existing symptoms and as such there was only one injury. Thus, apportionment under § 31-299b cannot lie. Hartford Insurance contends this case is factually similar to Kisson v. Shawmut National Bank, 4188 CRB-5-00-2 (March. 16, 2001) and that the panel in Kisson wrongly held there was no distinction between an aggravation of symptoms and an aggravation of a condition. In essence the appellant asks us to use the instant matter as a vehicle to revisit our conclusion and the legal reasoning we employed in Kisson in reaching our conclusion. As we have stated in prior cases our determinations are governed by the principle of stare decisis. “The doctrine of stare decisis doctrine counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it.” George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 318 (1999), quoting Hall v. Gilbert & Bennet Mfg., Co., 241 Conn. 282, 296 (1997); Weymouth v. East Windsor-Police Department, 4550 CRB-1-02-7 (April. 3, 2003).
Furthermore, the Kisson tribunal ordered a remand to the trial commissioner for the purpose of assuring that the trial commissioner considered the Appellate Court’s holding in Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430 (1996). In Kisson, a bank teller suffered a compensable repetitive trauma to her master hand. As time went on the claimant complained of symptoms progressing in her upper arms. For part of the time of the claimant’s exposure to repetitive trauma in her employment, the employer was insured by Travelers and during another period the employer was self-insured. The trial commissioner concluded that Travelers was fully liable. However, the record reflected a medical report in which the claimant’s treating physician opined that the claimant’s work “aggravated her right elbow to the extent that she had decided to undergo elective surgery.” Kisson, supra. The CRB concluded that the Appellate Court’s ruling in Epps, supra, had some bearing, although considered in light of a different statutory apportionment scheme, i.e. § 31-275(1)(D). It then remanded the matter.
In Epps, supra, the Appellate Court held that where the medical evidence noted the “aggravation” of the claimant’s pulmonary condition due to his exposure to chemicals in the workplace the only legal conclusion that could be drawn was that the claimant suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing condition and the CRB erred in construing the term aggravation as synonymous with irritation. This was based on the concept that “an employer takes the employee in the state of health which it finds the employee.” Id., 435. The Epps court ordered a remand for a determination of the apportionment of liability pursuant to § 31-275 (1)) (D) in light of its conclusion that the claimant suffered a workplace aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
Kisson is factually analogous to the instant matter. Here the trial commissioner determined that the claimant suffered from a continuous exposure to repetitive trauma and liability is being assessed against the employer on the basis of § 31-299b. Under § 31-299b the last insurance carrier on the risk is deemed initially liable for the benefits with a right to seek apportionment against other employers or insurance carriers.
Here, the trial commissioner found “subsequent to August 2000 the claimant continued to perform her regular job functions and continued to be exposed to repetitive trauma which aggravated her established cubital tunnel and lateral epicondylitis condition and caused her symptoms to become progressively worse to the point where she again sought medical treatment. . .” Findings, ¶ D.E. This is a repetitive trauma case and therefore by its very nature it is an ongoing injury, occurring overtime. Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 613 (2000). The evidence not only supports a worsening of symptoms, but a worsening of the condition as well. This finding is supported by Dr. Stuart’s medical reports. Respondent Royal & Alliance’s Exhibit 1; Respondent Hartford Insurance’s Exhibit 5. Therefore, we find no error with the trial commissioner’s finding on that basis.
Hartford Insurance also contends that the only evidence in the case supports a conclusion that the claimant’s symptoms had fully recurred by January of 2001 and that only the claimant’s desire not to take time off from work delayed her treatment. The appellants contend therefore, that the trial commissioner should have ordered that Royal & Sunalliance be initially liable for the claimant’s surgery and associated benefits. Hartford Insurance points us to Dr. Ashmead’s opinion that the claimant was a surgical candidate in January 2001, however, the trial commissioner clearly relied on Dr. Stuart’s opinion that this was a continuing injury made worse as the claimant’s activities progressed over time. Findings, ¶ 22. Again the trial commissioner had the right to choose which medical evidence to rely on and we will not overturn that determination on appeal. Dallaire, supra.
For these reasons, we affirm the November 5, 2003 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Second District.


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From the Chair . . .
Steve Steinberg is a Principal of the firm. Steve is an intellectual property (IP) and business trial lawyer and litigator whose practice focuses on claims for patent, trademark, and copyright infringement, theft of trade secrets, and other complex business disputes in both federal and state courts. He has served as lead counsel in several cases, and has represented clients in numerous trials, where he has won cases for both plaintiffs and defendants. Steve has litigated patent cases concerning mobile phone accessories, web browsers, light emitting diodes (LEDs), networking technologies like Power-over-Ethernet and Wi-Fi, and power conversion technologies. He has handled trademark and copyright cases for video game, e-commerce, consumer product, and specialty food companies. Steve has also represented technology companies in prosecuting and defending against claims for theft of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duties, interference, and related claims, as well as cases for breach of contract against suppliers and disputes arising out of mergers and acquisitions.
Before joining Bartko Zankel Bunzel & Miller, Steve was Counsel at Vasquez, Benisek and Lindgren / Morgan Miller Blair and an associate at Morrison & Foerster LLP, where he handled a wide array of business disputes.
While in law school, Steve served as an extern for the Honorable Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, and as an extern for the Honorable Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma of the Hong Kong High Court in Hong Kong.
Stardock v. Reiche, Ford, Northern District of California – Currently lead counsel for defendants and cross-complainants in case involving allegations of copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition, and related claims.
Petranovic v. Casetagram Ltd. d/b/a Casetify, Central District of California – Lead counsel for defendant in case alleging copyright and trademark infringement, Lanham Act violations, and statutory and common law misappropriation of right of publicity; reached settlement after early discovery.
Comprehensive Industrial Disability Management, Inc. v. Chopra Consulting, LLC, Arvinder Chopra, et al., Northern District of California – Represented software developer and his company in defending against claims of breach of contract, copyright infringement, and interference; obtained favorable settlement following expert discovery.
Sahara Afghani Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. East & West Gourmet Afghan Foods, Trademark Trial and Appeals Board – Represented defendants in trademark cancellation proceedings.
Apollo Future Tech., Inc. v. Taqseem, Inc., Northern District of California – Lead counsel for declaratory judgment plaintiff manufacturer of e-cigarette liquids in case alleging non-infringement and seeking cancellation of trademark registration; obtained favorable settlement early in discovery.
Spiraledge, Inc. v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., Southern District of California – Lead counsel for plaintiff e-commerce company in infringement action regarding “Aquatica” trademark; obtained favorable settlement shortly before trial.
Case-Mate, Inc. v. Casetagram Ltd. d/b/a Casetify, Northern District of Georgia – Lead counsel for defendants in case regarding mobile phone cases; obtained settlement early in the case.
Uncommon, LLC v. Casetagram Ltd. d/b/a Casetify, Northern District of Illinois – Lead counsel for defendants in case regarding mobile phone cases; defeated motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and reached settlement early in the case.
Chrimar Holding Co., LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise USA Inc., Accton Tech. Corp., SMC Networks, Inc., Edgecore USA Corp., Costar Techs., Inc., Costar Video Sys., Belden, Inc., Garrettcom, Inc., Hirschmann, Inc., Eastern District of Texas – Represented numerous defendants in case regarding Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) technology; obtained favorable verdict after jury trial for one defendant and reached settlements on eve of trial for other defendants.
Trustees of Boston University v. Epistar Corp., Everlight Electronics Co. Ltd., Lite-On, Inc., District of Massachusetts – Represented leading LED manufacturers through jury trial and overturned adverse verdict through post-trial motions.
Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Electronics Co. Ltd., Eastern District of Texas – Represented leading LED package manufacturer through bench trial and appeal and obtained favorable verdict and judgment awarding no injunction or damages.
Synqor, Inc. v. Lineage Power Corp. & Cherokee International Corp. / Lineage Power Corp. v. Synqor, Inc., Eastern District of Texas – Represented leading power supply company (now subsidiary of GE) as defendant through trial and as plaintiff in dualing cases regarding DC-DC power converters.
Northpeak Wireless LLC v. SMC Networks, Inc., Northern District of California – Represented defendant in case regarding WiFi technology; obtained stipulated judgment of non-infringement after favorable claim construction order.
CSIRO v. 3Com Corp., D-Link Systems, Inc., Accton Tech. Corp., SMC Networks, Inc., Eastern District of Texas – Represented defendants in case regarding WiFi technology.
ASML US, Inc. v. XTAL, Inc., Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara – Represented the plaintiff, a leader in computational lithography, in a case involving theft of trade secrets, breaches of contract and fiduciary duty, and computer fraud by numerous former employees who joined a competing company; second-chaired a three-week jury trial that led to one of the largest trade secret verdicts in history.
Timefire, Inc. v. AQS Engineering, Inc., All Quality & Services, Inc., Superior Court of California, County of Alameda – Represented the plaintiff, a BitCoin circuit board design company, in breach of contract case against supplier; obtained favorable verdict and judgment after jury trial.
SMC Networks, Inc. v. Hitron Techs., Inc., Hitron Techs. Americas Inc., et al., Central District of California – Represented plaintiff in case alleging breach of contract, interference, breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition by former supplier and officers; obtained favorable settlement on eve of trial.
Accton Tech. Corp. v. Centillium Communications, Inc., Superior Court of California, County of Alameda – Represented plaintiff in case involving claims related to defective microchips.
SMC Networks, Inc. v. Netstar Tech. Corp., Central District of California – Represented plaintiff in case involving claims related to defective network switches.

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J. MARSHALL McCANN for appellant.
L.W. MORRIS and MARION RIDER for appellee.
The appeal is by Charles Toppass from a judgment for $5,000 rendered against him in favor of the administratrix of the estate of Velma Perkins, deceased, for damages for her death in an automobile accident. The suit was prosecuted against Toppass and Raymond Saunders, but the verdict was in favor of Saunders. The suit of George Hodges and Ethel Long against both defendants for injuries sustained in the same accident were tried with this case. Miss Long received a judgment for $200 against Toppass, which is not appealed, but the verdict went against Hodges. The place of the accident was about three miles from Frankfort at what is known locally as Black's Pond. There is no claim on appeal that the defendant was not negligent.
1. We have a novel situation. The defendant, who was driving his own car, insists that he was drunk, and his condition caused the accident. The plaintiff insists the driver was not drunk. The anomaly arises from the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the decedent in having become the guest of the defendant knowing him to be intoxicated.
The parties were friends living in the Thorn Hill section of Frankfort. On Saturday afternoon, June 2, 1934, Velma Perkins and Ethel Long went to the business part of the city and there saw Toppass and Hodges sitting in the former's automobile. Toppass offered to drive the young women home and they got in the rear seat with Hodges. He drove around a square and instead of going to Thorn Hill, went up the Georgetown and Lexington road over their protest. Toppass insisted that Miss Perkins get in front with him and she climbed over there while the car was in motion. About that time he began driving very fast. The young ladies began screaming and calling upon him to stop and let them out. Hodges called upon him to slow down. Continuing towards Georgetown at a terrific rate of speed, Hodges reached over from the rear seat to turn off the ignition key, but the speed of the car going around a curve threw him off his balance. About that time the machine struck the approaching car of Saunders. Such is the evidence for the plaintiff.
Toppass testified that Hodges had asked him to drive the party to Stevens' road house and there was never any purpose to take the young ladies home. They were out for a joy ride. He says there was no screaming or demand that he stop. Toppass related what took place until, as he said, he indistinctly remembered seeing the Saunders' car approaching. He knew nothing more.
"The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff's intestate, Velma Perkins, at the time, place and on the occasion mentioned in the evidence, to exercise ordinary care for her own safety; and if the jury believe from the evidence that at the time the plaintiff's intestate, Velma Perkins, entered or got into the automobile of the defendant, Charles Toppass, the plaintiff's intestate, Velma Perkins, knew or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, that the defendant, Charles Toppass, was so intoxicated as to be unable to properly manage, operate or control his car; or if the jury believe from the evidence that the decedent, Velma Perkins, after beginning the journey, which allegedly resulted in her death, knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, that the driver of said automobile was so intoxicated as to be unable to properly manage, operate or control his car, and failed to call upon the driver of said car to stop and to permit her to alight therefrom; or if the jury believe from the evidence that the decedent, Velma Perkins, after beginning the journey, which allegedly resulted in her death, failed to take any reasonable precaution which by the exercise of ordinary care she should have taken, to avoid injury to herself, then, or in either event, she was guilty of contributory negligence, and the law is for both of the defendants, and the jury so believing will find for both of the defendants."
The argument is made that the qualification (which we have italicized) places too great a burden upon the defendant in proving contributory negligence.
"One who voluntarily permits himself to be driven about the streets in a motor car operated by a drunken chauffeur does not exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and he assumes the danger incident to such drive when he voluntarily places himself in a car which is managed and controlled by an intoxicated driver. This is not because of the imputed negligence rule, but because of the personal negligence of the passenger."
"Even while prosecuting a journey if the driver becomes intoxicated so as to lose control of the vehicle, or is reckless, and this is known to the passenger, ordinary care requires the passenger to call upon the driver to stop and allow him to alight, or turn the management of the vehicle over to another capable of properly directing it, and if the passenger fails to exercise such care and is injured as a result of the negligence or recklessness of the driver and a third person, he may not have recourse of such third person, this being denied him because of his own negligence rather than upon the ground that the negligence of the driver is imputed to him."
"It is known of all men that the drinking of intoxicating liquor, though it be not done to the extent of actual intoxication, begets a spirit of recklessness, and is responsible for numerous accidents."
It was held that evidence of the intoxication of the driver of an automobile involved in an accident should go to the jury in connection with other circumstances on the question of negligence and contributory negligence. See also Brady v. B. B. Ice Co., 242 Ky. 138, 45 S.W.2d 1051.
While the standard of duty of a guest is the same as that of the driver, namely, to exercise ordinary care, the conduct required to fulfill that duty is ordinarily different because the circumstances are different. Precautions to be taken by the passenger are in any event less than those required of the driver. Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S.W.2d 363; Haller's Pet Shop v. Pearlman, 253 Ky. 130, 69 S.W.2d 9.
"Usually it is a question of fact whether a driver was so far intoxicated at the time of an accident as to affect his ability to operate the car, and whether his passenger had any cause, in the exercise of ordinary care, to be apprehensive on that account for his own safety."
Whether or not an instruction not requiring the jury's belief that the driver was intoxicated to the extent described in the instruction given here would be proper where the evidence disclosed that he had merely been drinking, and was not really and perceptibly under the influence of liquor, we will await a case of that kind before deciding. Here the defendant himself proved a high degree of intoxication. He cannot complain if the jury was required to believe he was in such a state that he could not prudently operate his machine in order to find the decedent assumed the risk of riding with him. We are of the opinion that the instruction was correct under the evidence.
The evidence as to the knowledge and participation of the young lady in the adventure distinguishes the case from Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky. 268, 300 S.W. 604. It was properly submitted to the jury on the conflicting evidence.
2. It was upon the motions of Hodges and Ethel Long that their cases were tried with the Perkins case. The defendants objected. The appellant submits that the Joint trial operated to his prejudice. It has been often stated that cases arising from the same accident where the defendants are the same and the issues are substantially so should be tried together if the court concludes that no undue advantage may be obtained by one or the other party by reason of the joint trials. That has been found to obtain in the joint trial of separate suits of a husband or wife because neither was a competent witness for the other. Sheetinger v. Dawson, 236 Ky. 571, 33 S.W.2d 609; Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62, 68 S.W.2d 767. In these cases there was no such incompetency, for each plaintiff was competent to testify not only in his own case, but in the other two cases as well. It was not error to try the cases together. Horton v. Herndon, 254 Ky. 86, 70 S.W.2d 975; Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 246 Ky. 208, 54 S.W.2d 666; City of Ashland v. Queen, 254 Ky. 329, 71 S.W.2d 650.
3. The defendant pleaded compromise and settlement and filed a release executed by the plaintiff. Avoidance upon the ground of misrepresentation and fraud was pleaded in reply. A tender of the money paid was offered in the pleading and actually made in open court and declined by the defendant. The appellant, insists that his demurrer to the reply should have been sustained upon the grounds, (a) a tender or refund of money paid in settlement and for release is a condition precedent to the bringing of the suit on the cause of action, and (b) the facts alleged do not constitute fraud.
(a) The accident was on June 2, 1934. The release was signed June 9th. Suit was filed August 6th and the tender made April 15, 1935, when the reply was filed in due course. Some of our opinions have expressly stated without qualification or distinction that repayment or a tender of money paid for a release must be made before bringing the action. Cf. Louisville N. R. Co. v. McElroy, 100 Ky. 153, 37 S.W. 844, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 730. In certain cases arising ex contractu, however, there are exceptions where no tender of restoration is necessary. See Fox v. Hudson's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 115, 150 S.W. 49, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 832. And in personal injury cases where payment was for loss of time or medical attention the rule does not apply. McGill v. Louisville N. R. Co., 114 Ky. 358, 70 S.W. 1048, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1244. In cases ex delicto, it is accepted everywhere that when a party has received money in discharge of a liability for unliquidated damages, he must restore the money before he can avoid the contract of settlement upon the ground of fraud. Kentucky Central Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Burrs, 256 Ky. 64, 75 S.W.2d 744. In the tort cases called to our attention in which the rule was applied with the statement that the tender should have been made before commencing the action, no tender had ever been made. The question we have before us now is, whether that tender or restoration meets the requirements of the law if made after the commencement of the suit for damages arising from the claims which formed the basis of the settlement.
"Where plaintiff seeks to recover unliquidated damages for an injury sustained and the defendant relies upon a release as a defense to said action, the plaintiff is not precluded from showing the invalidity of said release, if he has made a timely offer to rescind the same and restore the consideration, even if said offer is made after the commencement of the action."
The restoration or offer of restoration is made in order to accomplish the avoidance of the release and is a condition precedent to doing so. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Martin, 256 Ky. 436, 76 S.W.2d 269. We are of the opinion that the requirements and purposes of the tender are met if it is made when the party institutes his effort to vacate and set aside the contract of settlement or release, which is generally in a reply. We have recognized this as being in time. Shields v. Lewis, 49 S.W. 803, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1601; Wells v. Royer Wheel Co. (Ky.) 114 S.W. 737; Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Ortkies, 200 Ky. 8, 254 S.W. 434; Hooks v. Cornett Lewis Coal Co., 260 Ky. 778, 86 S.W.2d 697.
(b) We state the substance of the allegations impeaching the release. Shortly after the death of Velma Perkins, the defendant Toppass "acting by and through his duly authorized agents," represented to the plaintiff that he was anxious to do all he could for the family of the deceased. He had only $100 and no other means of paying or compensating her estate. He had been able to borrow some money from his father and could raise $500, which he was willing to give in settlement of the claim, and if she (the plaintiff) did not accept that sum and settle the claim she would not get anything. The plaintiff believed those representations to be true and in reliance on them accepted the $500 and executed the release. The representations were made for the purpose of inducing the execution of the release and were untrue and known to be untrue. The defendant and his agent knew that the defendant was insured against loss or expenses arising or resulting from claims for damages growing out of the death or injury suffered by any one through the operation of the automobile which the defendant was driving in the sum of $5,000 for one person and $10,000 for more than one person. Under the terms of the insurance contract, the insurer was obligated and bound to pay such claims for damages whether determined by compromise or by settlement. The money which the defendant paid plaintiff was paid by the insurance company and had not been borrowed by the defendant. It is further pleaded that had the plaintiff known such facts she would not have signed the release.
It is argued that the pleading is insufficient because, in effect, it only pleads that the plaintiff did not know that the defendant was insured; it is not alleged that she asked the defendant's agent or any one else representing him whether or not he carried insurance protection, and since there was no duty upon the defendant or his agent to make a voluntary disclosure of that fact, it was not fraudulent not to reveal the same. We think the appellant misses the mark. The fraud alleged consisted of the affirmative statements.
The pleading sets up a clear-cut deception of an existing, material, collective fact, namely, that the defendant was not able to pay but $100, but through a gracious desire to help the plaintiff he had borrowed $400; that he could raise no more, and unless the decedent's representative took that sum she could get nothing; whereas, in fact and in truth, an insurance company was not only furnishing the money, but was bound for as much as $5,000 if there was any liability on the part of the defendant for the death of the girl. As was said in Sun Indemnity Co. v. Dulaney, 264 Ky. 112, 89 S.W.2d 307, the contract of insurance was made for the benefit of those who might be injured or killed through the negligence of Toppass and such beneficiary stands in the place of the insured. The pleading stands up under the conclusions in Schlachter v. Henderson's Adm'r, 259 Ky. 759, 83 S.W.2d 491; Titus v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 97 Ky. 567, 31 S.W. 127, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 385, 28 L.R.A. 478, 53 Am. St. Rep. 426; Inter Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 246 Ky. 694, 56 S.W.2d 332, and Madison Trust Co. v. Helleckson, 216 Wis. 443, 257 N.W. 691, 96 A.L.R. 992.
In State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Daues, 316 Mo. 474, 290 S.W. 425, a representative of the railway company falsely represented to an injured passenger that the company was going into the hands of a receiver and he probably would not get over 10 cents on the dollar. In reliance upon that representation, the plaintiff settled his claim for $1,000. In a later suit the company pleaded the release as a bar. The court held the representation as not being merely prophetic of a future event, or an expression of opinion as to what might occur in the future, but as of an existing fact, clearly implying the existence of financial embarrassment or insolvency or some such existing condition as would jeopardize the collection of the claim for damages. Being untrue, the court held the representation was fraudulent and sustained the vacation of the release.
In the light of the evidence and the rule as to the consideration which must be given pleadings after judgment, we must view the allegations of the reply with indulgent eyes. We think the demurrer was properly overruled.
4. In connection with the allegations of the reply in avoidance and rescission of the release, the plaintiff set up the existence and terms of an insurance policy issued by the Wolverine Insurance Company to the defendant Toppass, showing its liability for the payment of the plaintiff's claim for damages; the knowledge of the defendant and his agent of that fact, and the fact that the money was paid by the insurance company. The defendant moved to strike all this from the pleading. The overruling of the motion is submitted as reversible error. The point is also pressed that it was prejudicial to permit references to the insurance in counsel's statement and to admit evidence in relation to it. The policy provided that the insurance company should investigate and undertake to settle claims that might be presented and should defend at its, own expense any suits filed against the insured by reason of the operation of his automobile. The basis of the argument of error is that there was no privity of contract between the person injured and the insurer; that the existence of the insurance indemnity was irrelevant to the issue and its entrance into the case was very harmful.
The negotiations and settlement were conducted and made by agents and representatives of the insurance company. It was their persuasion that induced the settlement. It was the very fact of its liability which made those representations untrue. The pleading, statement, and evidence were necessary. The case could not have been presented without disclosing all this. Hence there was no offense against the rule which prohibits and condemns the disclosure that a defendant in an action for damages is protected by insurance where it sheds no light upon any issue in the case. Coral Ridge Clay Products Co. v. Collins, 181 Ky. 818, 205 S.W. 958, 959; Hedger v. Davis, 236 Ky. 432, 33 S.W.2d 310; Gayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 596, 42 S.W.2d 877; Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715. The court more than once admonished the jury of the purpose of the evidence and the limitations which they should attach to it. It may be added that the jury learned the indemnity extended over the claims of Hodges and Miss Long, and yet their verdict was against the one and for only $200 for the other. This shows that, the entrance of the situation into the case was not harmful. We perceive no error in these particulars.
5. The appellant earnestly contends the evidence does not establish any grounds for vacating the settlement. The evidence is voluminous. Details adding color and light, though of importance in weighing the evidence as to the main facts and results, ma be omitted in the interest of brevity, although they have been given full consideration by the court.
Velma Perkins was nineteen years old and a factory employee. She had been reared by and was living with her grandmother, Mrs. Hattie Perkins, who is uneducated and now elderly. The girl was buried on Monday, June 4th, and the grandmother went to her son's home about fourteen miles in the country. According to plaintiff's evidence, the defendant's brother and representatives of the insurance company went to see her on Wednesday and told Mrs. Perkins that they had been sent by Charlie Toppass to say that he wanted to help her out; that be had $100, which was all he had, and if she did not take that she would not get anything. On Thursday the representatives returned to see if she would accept the $100, which it was repeated was all Toppass had. On Friday one of those who were there on Wednesday, but who declined to give his name, saying only that he was Toppass' friend and had been sent by him, told Mrs. Perkins they wanted her to come to town and that he would take her. She was not ready to go and he asked her to come on Saturday as Charlie Toppass wanted to make a settlement and "not let it get to court." On Saturday Mrs. Perkins, her son, and his wife came to a law office in Frankfort. An adjuster for the insurance company reported that Toppass had been able to borrow $150 and would pay her $250 and she could look to Saunders for the other $250. She replied that "Mr. Toppass killed my daughter," and she was not looking to Saunders for anything. When she hesitated, the adjuster stated: "When a fellow gives all he has got that is all he can do." Finally, he reported that Toppass had borrowed $450 from his father and "that is all we will do; if you don't take it and sign these papers you won't get anything." Mrs. Perkins then agreed. She testified to her reliance on these statements in ignorance of Toppass' insurance. It was admitted Toppass was insolvent.
One of the attorneys for the insurance company had learned during the intervening days that Miss Perkins' mother was living and had prepared a waiver of the right to qualify as her administratrix in favor of her grandmother. This was sent to the mother and had been signed by her. The grandmother was taken to the courthouse and there qualified. She stated she signed the release before qualifying, but was not certain because "I wasn't in any shape to talk to nobody; I was all tore up over her death." The insurance adjuster gave her his individual check. A neighbor and daughter-in-law corroborate Mrs. Perkins as to much of what was said in the country, and the son and daughter-in-law as to what occurred in the law office.
According to the evidence introduced in behalf of defendant, a local agent and an attorney for the insurance company, after consulting Toppass, went to see Mrs. Perkins on Tuesday, the day after the funeral. She was told that they wanted to settle any claim she might have. She said she had heard that Toppass was drunk at the time, and the attorney told her that if that was so it looked like the others in the car must have known it and so took the risk. He told her Toppass could get her $200, and she agreed to accept that sum and to come to Frankfort the next day and qualify as administratrix. It was then that the waiver of the mother was prepared. Nothing was said in this conversation about Toppass having to borrow any money or that $200 was all he could raise.
On Saturday the family came to Frankfort, Mrs. Perkins stated she ought to have $500, and the adjuster replied he was not prepared to pay her $500, but if she would give him a right to subrogate against Saunders he would give her that much. It is further testified in behalf of the defendant that Mrs. Perkins was told there would be a delay of ten days or two weeks as the money would have to be obtained from the insurance company to which the accident had not been reported. When at the instance of her son she insisted on immediate payment, the adjuster gave her his check and then in her presence dictated a telegram to the insurance company advising it of the settlement and requesting immediate remittance. But some of the evidence indicates she was in the adjoining room. At the county judge's office, in the presence of Mrs. Perkins and her son, in discussing the amount of the bond the judge was told what was being done. His testimony is that mention was made of the settlement by the insurance company. In response to this, the plaintiff insisted that reference was made only to some group life insurance carried by the girl and that it should be taken into consideration in fixing the bond at $1,000. The release was immediately recorded in the county clerk's office.
Concerning the law in connection with the proof, the authorities and statements in relation to the demurrer to the reply are enough to show the evidence for the plaintiff meets the demand. The plaintiff's evidence which is that to be regarded on the question of the insufficiency to sustain the verdict speaks for itself. Gross negligence was conceded. Criminal recklessness was proven. The amount paid in settlement was palpably inadequate. It required but slight additional evidence of fraud in the obtention of the release to overcome such a settlement. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Vaughn, 111 S.W. 707, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 906. The money was accepted after persistent pressure. The release was procured and induced by false representations, for half a truth may be as vicious as an express misrepresentation. The parties were not dealing at arm's length. "These day after the accident settlements * * * are not looked upon with favor by the courts." Brambell v. Cincinnati, F. S.E. R. Co., 132 Ky. 547, 116 S.W. 742, 745. We think the jury was authorized to return its verdict having the effect of setting aside the settlement.
6. The appellant invokes the rules of ratification. Repudiation for misrepresentation or fraud must be made seasonably, the party aggrieved being put upon his election to abide or rescind when knowledge of the fraud is brought home to him. The election to affirm a settlement may be either by express words or unequivocal acts. Cox v. Riggins, 223 Ky. 510, 4 S.W.2d 403; Farmers' Trust Company of Harrodsburg v. Threlkeld's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 211, 77 S.W.2d 616. The conduct of the plaintiff said by the appellant to have constituted ratification is that although she had expended nearly all the money received for funeral expenses and bills owing by the decedent before June 14th when she was told by a friend that Toppass was insured, she paid three or four small obligations after that with the balance of the money. This, it is claimed, showed an intention to "pursue the benefits" of the settlement, which is held to show an election to abide by such a contract. Cox v. Riggins, supra; Mock v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of Newport, 252 Ky. 243, 67 S.W.2d 9, 94 A.L.R. 716.
While reasonable diligence to discover the facts invalidating a release and promptness to disavow a voidable contract after acquiring full knowledge of the conditions are requisite, where there is an executed contract, it requires an extreme case before the application of the rule of ratification will be inferred from conduct. Kenyon Realty Company v. National Deposit Bank, 140 Ky. 133, 130 S.W. 965, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 169; Fletcher v. Wireman, 152 Ky. 565, 153 S.W. 982; Ades v. Wash, 199 Ky. 687, 690, 251 S.W. 970. One should not be held to have adopted a release of this kind procured by fraud in the absence of an unequivocal act giving rise to the inference of an intent to ratify or unless reasonable minds would say that he was guilty of conduct tending to show an intention to do so. We cannot read such an intention into the facts of this case. Louisville Nashville Railroad Company v. Helm, 121 Ky. 645, 89 S.W. 709, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 603. The trial court properly disregarded this defense.
There are six other points argued by the appellant as sufficient to authorize a reversal of the judgment. We think none of them is well taken.

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