text:
Depleting adult dentate gyrus neurogenesis increases cocaine-seeking behavior..
Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Jean-Michel Revest, Jean-François Fiancette, Eric Balado, Muriel Koehl, Noëlle Grosjean, Djoher Nora Abrous, Pier-Vincenzo Piazza. Mol Psychiatry. 2018-03-05. 24(2) : 312-320.
Not all smokers appear to seek nicotine for the same reasons: implications for preclinical research in nicotine dependence..
Vernon Garcia-Rivas, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Addiction Biology. 2018-02-26.
Individual Variations in the Mechanisms of Nicotine Seeking: A Key for Research on Nicotine Dependence..
Vernon Garcia-Rivas, Nazzareno Cannella, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Neuropsychopharmacol. 2016-08-31. 42(3) : 584-586.
Differential Control of Cocaine Self-Administration by GABAergic and Glutamatergic CB1 Cannabinoid Receptors..
Elena Martín-García, Lucie Bourgoin, Adeline Cathala, Fernando Kasanetz, Miguel Mondesir, Ana Gutiérrez-Rodriguez, Leire Reguero, Jean- François Fiancette, Pedro Grandes, Umberto Spampinato, Rafael Maldonado, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Giovanni Marsicano, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Neuropsychopharmacol. 2015-11-27. 41(9) : 2192-2205.
A general theory of transition to addiction it was and a general theory of transition to addiction it is: reply to the commentaries of Ahmed, Badiani, George & Koob, Kalivas & Gipson, and Tiffany..
Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Psychopharmacology. 2014-06-08. 231(19) : 3929-3937.
Frequency of Cocaine Self-Administration Influences Drug Seeking in the Rat: Optogenetic Evidence for a Role of the Prelimbic Cortex.
Elena Martín-García, Julien Courtin, Prisca Renault, Jean- François Fiancette, Hélène Wurtz, Amélie Simonnet, Florian Levet, Cyril Herry, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Neuropsychopharmacol. 2014-03-17. 39(10) : 2317-2330.
Pregnenolone can protect the brain from cannabis intoxication..
Monique Vallée, Sergio Vitiello, Luigi Bellocchio, Etienne Hébert-Chatelain, Stéphanie Monlezun, Elena Martin-Garcia, Fernando Kasanetz, Gemma L. Baillie, Francesca Panin, Adeline Cathala, Valérie Roullot-Lacarrière, Sandy Fabre, Dow P. Hurst, Diane L. Lynch, Derek M. Shore, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Umberto Spampinato, Jean-Michel Revest, Rafael Maldonado, Patricia H. Reggio, Ruth A. Ross, Giovanni Marsicano, Pier Vincenzo Piazza. Science. 2014-01-02. 343(6166) : 94-98.
Psychobiology of cocaine addiction: Contribution of a multi-symptomatic animal model of loss of control..
Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Pier Vincenzo Piazza. Neuropharmacology. 2014-01-01. 76 : 437-449.
A multistep general theory of transition to addiction..
Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Psychopharmacology. 2013-08-21. 229(3) : 387-413.
The mGluR2/3 agonist LY379268 induced anti-reinstatement effects in rats exhibiting addiction-like behavior..
Nazzareno Cannella, Briac Halbout, Stefanie Uhrig, Lionel Evrard, Mauro Corsi, Corrado Corti, Veronique Deroche-Gamonet, Anita C Hansson, Rainer Spanagel. Neuropsychopharmacol. 2013-04-29. 38(10) : 2048-2056.
Responses to novelty and vulnerability to cocaine addiction: contribution of a multi-symptomatic animal model..
D. Belin, V. Deroche-Gamonet. Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine. 2012-11-01. 2(11) : a011940-a011940.
Prefrontal synaptic markers of cocaine addiction-like behavior in rats..
F Kasanetz, M Lafourcade, V Deroche-Gamonet, J-M Revest, N Berson, E Balado, J-F Fiancette, P Renault, P-V Piazza, O J Manzoni. Mol Psychiatry. 2012-05-15. 18(6) : 729-737.
A decrease in gamma-synuclein expression within the nucleus accumbens increases cocaine intravenous self-administration in the rat..
Frédéric Boyer, Eric Balado, Pier V. Piazza, Jean-Luc Dreyer, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Addiction Biology. 2010-11-29. 16(1) : 120-123.
High-novelty-preference rats are predisposed to compulsive cocaine self-administration..
David Belin, Nadège Berson, Eric Balado, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Neuropsychopharmacol. 2010-10-27. 36(3) : 569-579.
Transition to addiction is associated with a persistent impairment in synaptic plasticity..
F. Kasanetz, V. Deroche-Gamonet, N. Berson, E. Balado, M. Lafourcade, O. Manzoni, P. V. Piazza. Science. 2010-06-24. 328(5986) : 1709-1712.
Mifepristone and spironolactone differently alter cocaine intravenous self-administration and cocaine-induced locomotion in C57BL/6J mice..
Jean-François Fiancette, Eric Balado, Pier-Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Addiction Biology. 2010-01-01. 15(1) : 81-87.
Pattern of intake and drug craving predict the development of cocaine addiction-like behavior in rats..
David Belin, Eric Balado, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Biological Psychiatry. 2009-05-01. 65(10) : 863-868.
Stress and addiction: glucocorticoid receptor in dopaminoceptive neurons facilitates cocaine seeking..
Frédéric Ambroggi, Marc Turiault, Aude Milet, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Sébastien Parnaudeau, Eric Balado, Jacques Barik, Rixt van der Veen, Grégoire Maroteaux, Thomas Lemberger, Günther Schütz, Monique Lazar, Michela Marinelli, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, François Tronche. Nat Neurosci. 2009-02-22. 12(3) : 247-249.
Maternal Environment Influences Cocaine Intake in Adulthood in a Genotype-Dependent Manner.
Rixt van der Veen, Muriel Koehl, D. Nora Abrous, E. Ronald de Kloet, Pier-Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. PLoS ONE. 2008-05-21. 3(5) : e2245.
Cocaine-induced sensitization is associated with altered dynamics of transcriptional responses of the dopamine transporter, tyrosine hydroxylase, and dopamine D2 receptors in C57Bl/6J mice..
D. Belin, V. Deroche-Gamonet, M. Jaber. Psychopharmacology. 2007-05-17. 193(4) : 567-578.
Gene-environment interactions in vulnerability to cocaine intravenous self-administration: a brief social experience affects intake in DBA/2J but not in C57BL/6J mice..
Rixt van der Veen, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet. Psychopharmacology. 2007-03-31. 193(2) : 179-186.
Gene expression regulation following behavioral sensitization to cocaine in transgenic mice lacking the glucocorticoid receptor in the brain..
R. Izawa, M. Jaber, V. Deroche-Gamonet, I. Sillaber, C. Kellendonk, M. Le Moal, F. Tronche, P.V. Piazza. Neuroscience. 2006-01-01. 137(3) : 915-924.
Preexposure during or following adolescence differently affects nicotine-rewarding properties in adult rats..
Walter Adriani, Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Michel Le Moal, Giovanni Laviola, Pier Vincenzo Vincenzo Piazza. Psychopharmacology. 2005-09-15. 184(3-4) : 382-390.
Evidence for addiction-like behavior in the rat..
V. Deroche-Gamonet. Science. 2004-08-13. 305(5686) : 1014-1017.
Relationships between individual sensitivity to CS- and cocaine-induced reinstatement in the rat..
V. Deroche-Gamonet, A. Martinez, M. Le Moal, P. V. Piazza. Psychopharmacology. 2003-02-13. 168(1-2) : 201-207.
Study of the addictive potential of modafinil in naive and cocaine-experienced rats..
Deroche-Gamonet V., Darnaudéry M., Bruins-Slot L., Piat F., M. Le Moal, Piazza P.. Psychopharmacology. 2002-06-01. 161(4) : 387-395.
Influence of cue-conditioning on acquisition, maintenance and relapse of cocaine intravenous self-administration..
Véronique Deroche-Gamonet, Frédéric Piat, Michel Le Moal, Pier Vincenzo Piazza. European Journal of Neuroscience. 2002-04-01. 15(8) : 1363-1370.
SR141716, a CB1 receptor antagonist, decreases the sensitivity to the reinforcing effects of electrical brain stimulation in rats..
V. Deroche-Gamonet, M. Le Moal, P. Piazza, P. Soubrié. Psychopharmacology. 2001-07-20. 157(3) : 254-259.
Cocaine self-administration increases the incentive motivational properties of the drug in rats..
Véronique Deroche, Michel Le Moal, Pier Vincenzo Piazza. European Journal of Neuroscience. 1999-08-01. 11(8) : 2731-2736.
Individual differences in stress-induced dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens are influenced by corticosterone..
Françoise Rougé-Pont, Véronique Deroche, Michel Le Moal, Pier Vincenzo Piazza. European Journal of Neuroscience. 1998-12-01. 10(12) : 3903-3907.
Differences in the liability to self-administer intravenous cocaine between C57BL/6 x SJL and BALB/cByJ mice..
V Deroche, S.B Caine, C.J Heyser, I Polis, G.F Koob, L.H Gold. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior. 1997-07-01. 57(3) : 429-440.
Glucocorticoids have state-dependent stimulant effects on the mesencephalic dopaminergic transmission..
P. V. Piazza, F. Rouge-Pont, V. Deroche, S. Maccari, H. Simon, M. Le Moal. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 1996-08-06. 93(16) : 8716-8720.
Effects of dopamine agonists and antagonists on cocaine-induced operant responding for a cocaine-associated stimulus..
G. F. Koob, F. Weiss, V. Deroche, R. Weissenborn. Psychopharmacology. 1996-08-01. 126(4) : 311-322.
Inhibition of corticosterone synthesis by Metyrapone decreases cocaine-induced locomotion and relapse of cocaine self-administration..
Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Michela Marinelli, Christine Jodogne, Véronique Deroche, Françoise Rougé-Pont, Stefania Maccari, Michel Le Moal, Hervé Simon. Brain Research. 1994-09-01. 658(1-2) : 259-264.
Social isolation-induced enhancement of the psychomotor effects of morphine depends on corticosterone secretion..
Ve´ronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Michel Le Moal, Herve´ Simon. Brain Research. 1994-03-01. 640(1-2) : 136-139.
Corticosterone in the range of stress-induced levels possesses reinforcing properties: implications for sensation-seeking behaviors..
P. V. Piazza, V. Deroche, J. M. Deminiere, S. Maccari, M. Le Moal, H. Simon. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 1993-12-15. 90(24) : 11738-11742.
Individual differences in the psychomotor effects of morphine are predicted by reactivity to novelty and influenced by corticosterone secretion..
Véronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Michel Le Moal, Hervé Simon. Brain Research. 1993-10-01. 623(2) : 341-344.
Ve´ronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Jean-Marie Deminie`re, Michel Le Moal, Herve´ Simon. Brain Research. 1993-09-01. 622(1-2) : 315-320.
Sensitization to the psychomotor effects of amphetamine and morphine induced by food restriction depends on corticosterone secretion..
Véronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Paola Casolini, Michel Le Moal, Hervé Simon. Brain Research. 1993-05-01. 611(2) : 352-356.
Stress-induced sensitization to amphetamine and morphine psychomotor effects depend on stress-induced corticosterone secretion..
Véronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Paola Casolini, Stefania Maccari, Michel Le Moal, Hervé Simon. Brain Research. 1992-12-01. 598(1-2) : 343-348.
Repeated corticosterone administration sensitizes the locomotor response to amphetamine..
Ve´ronique Deroche, Pier Vincenzo Piazza, Stefania Maccari, Michel Le Moal, Herve´ Simon. Brain Research. 1992-07-01. 584(1-2) : 309-313.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Parliament is on recess for two weeks. Both the House of Commons and Lords return on 16 April.
Last week, the Law Society's chair of Employment Law Committee Max Winthrop gave evidence to the Women and Equalities Committee on its inquiry on sexual harassment in the workplace.
The Law Society was mentioned in several Westminster Hall debates last week. In a debate on legal aid and the Birmingham pub bombings our call to widen the scope of funding for representation was referenced.
In a debate on the Justice Committee's report (and Government's response) on the implications of Brexit for the justice system, our CETA report was mentioned and quoted from.
The Law Society was also mentioned by Justice Committee Chair Bob Neill MP and by Justice Minister Lucy Frazer QC MP in a debate on the promotion of legal services after Brexit.
Ms Frazer also appeared before the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee as part of its inquiry on post-Brexit enforcement and dispute resolution, alongside Exiting the European Union Minister Suella Fernandes MP.
The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill cleared Committee Stage in the House of Lords last week, and moves to its penultimate stage, Report Stage after Easter Recess.
Last week in Parliament also included several other select committee oral evidence sessions on the UK's economic relationship with the EU, on disclosure of evidence in criminal cases, and on the proposed UK-EU security treaty after Brexit.
Last week the Law Society launched a member action for members to write to their MPs and ask them to urge the government to negotiate and secure the continued rights of lawyers to practise, establish and have rights of audience in EU member states after Brexit. We also published an overview of the work we have been doing on Brexit since Article 50 was triggered in March 2017.
Parliament is on recess this week and returns on 16 April.
The House of Commons held a general debate on Russia and national security.
The Prime Minister began by updating the House on the situation following the Salisbury attack, including the evidence that Russia was responsible, and the actions that the Government had been taking since.
Without giving further detail, the Prime Minister also said the Government would table an amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill "to ensure that the UK cannot be a home for those who trade illicit finance or commit human rights abuses."
Pressing her on this point, the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn MP asked whether this amendment would be the Government's version of Labour's Magnitsky amendment to the Bill which was blocked in February.
Anti-Money Laundering (AML): The SNP's Westminster leader Ian Blackford MP said his party wanted action taken on both the Magnitsky amendments and tackling the use of Scottish limited partnerships (SLPs) "as a legal means to facilitate organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion." He added that they needed to correct the fact that they had made it too easy for criminals and those wishing to launder money to do so through the vehicle of SLPs, and work collectively to drive out those who want to use the UK to "shelter ill-gotten gains."
Labour MP and Justice Committee member Bambos Charalambous also said closing off access to dirty money was another area they wanted to hear more from the Government, specifically on the need for greater transparency and for beneficial ownership registers to be introduced for offshore companies operating in British overseas territories.
Russian interference: Speaking about the systematic nature of the attacks of Russia towards the West, Labour MP Madeleine Moon urged the Government "to establish an independent Russia commission to examine the role that Russia is playing in our social media and in our financial, business, political and legal spheres."
The EU (Withdrawal) Bill held its tenth Committee Stage debate. The full debates can be read here and here.
No Deal: Lord Jay of Ewelme (Crossbencher) tabled amendment 337 to Clause 14 of the Bill (relating to the interpretation of the Bill including provisions relating to the UK's 'exit day' from the EU), which would ensure that if there is a breakdown in the negotiations leading to a no-deal Brexit, the position should be fully and properly considered by Parliament before any final decision is taken. Speaking for the Government, Lord Callanan stated that the amendments would render key provisions in the Bill inoperable, as it would prevent the Government from making the necessary statutory changes in the event of a 'no deal' outcome. Lord Callanan further asserted that the Government was confident of achieving a negotiated outcome in the Brexit negotiations.
UK-wide frameworks: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbencher) tabled amendment 314 after Clause 11 of the Bill (relating to devolution), which would create a new clause defining UK-wide frameworks and requiring the consent of devolved administrations for these to be created. Peers argued that the amendment was necessary to ensure that the devolution settlement was respected post-Brexit. Responding for the Government, Lord Duncan of Springbank stated that this was still an area of developing policy and that the Government would consult further on the substance of the amendment.
Delegated Powers: Lord Tyler (Liberal Democrat) tabled Amendment 305 to Clause 11 of the Bill. The amendment would set out official procedures by which powers would be taken from the EU and transferred to the devolved administrations. Speaking to the amendment, Lord Tyler argued that it was not appropriate for the Government to use delegated powers, without due parameters being defined by Parliament. Responding for the Government, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth stated that the Government did not agree that it necessarily follows that secondary legislation can never be used to modify devolved competence or the devolution statutes more widely, and that this should only ever be achieved through primary legislation. However, Lord Bourne committed to consider the issue further.
Devolution sunset clauses: Lord Wallace of Tankerness (Liberal Democrat) tabled amendment 311 to Clause 11 of the Bill, which would ensure that the use of delegated powers by the UK Government, when related to devolution, would cease to apply within two years of the date of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Peers argued that the provisions were necessary to stop long-term erosion of the devolution settlement post-Brexit. Speaking for the Government, Baroness Goldie said that ministers intended to ensure accountability over the use of delegated powers, including regular parliamentary reporting.
There was a short debate in Westminster Hall on court closures and reform. The debate can be read here, and a short summary is included below.
The Law Society was mentioned once during the debate, regarding the impact on legal aid firms and on police resources and other organisations that use the courts.
Introducing the debate, Tan Dhesi MP (Slough, Labour) placed court reform and modernisation in the context of the 40 per cent budget cut in the Ministry of Justice since 2010.
He noted the proposal to close Banbury Magistrates' and County Court and Maidenhead Magistrates' Court, which would have a direct impact on his constituents.
He said that capacity should not be the only criterion used to determine court closures, and that geographical coverage and the representation of the justice system throughout the country are also important.
He raised concerns regarding the lack of detail in the Government's plan to use technology in the court system, to reduce the court estate and to change the role of case officers.
He highlighted his worry that virtual courts may significantly increase the number of unrepresented defendants, discriminate against vulnerable defendants or those who do not speak English well, and negatively affect the relationship between defence lawyers and their clients.
He spoke about the issue of increased travel times as the courts estate shrinks further, and noting theLaw Society's concerns, warned of additional costs for legal aid firms and the impact on police resources and on other organisations that use the courts.
He called for the Minister to publish the Courts Bill, and to halt court closures until the Government's 'fit for the future' consultation takes place.
Responding to the debate,Shadow Justice Minister Yasmin Qureshi MP said that it is important to fully consider the costs and benefits of the Government's proposals. She noted that the travel time standard used to determine court location was one hour in 2010, and now it has gone up to a whole day for a return trip. She said the most vulnerable will bear the costs of this.
She raised concerns about the slow rate at which the closed buildings are being sold.
She welcomed digitalisation in courts but argued that it must come after proper consultation and protect access to justice.
She raised concerns at the availability for legal advice in a digital system.
She called for the Government to publish the Courts Bill before proceeding with proposed court closures.
Responding to the debate, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Lucy Frazer QC MP said that the reform programme was not about cuts and that £1 billion is being invested into the programme, and that every time a court closes and is sold off, the money goes back into the justice system.
She spoke about modernising justice and ensuring that the justice system works for everyone. She said the online digital court process pilot has been extremely successful.
Other pilots are underway on uncontested divorce and probate online. She said it is possible to make pleas for lower level offences, to respond to jury summonses and to respond to civil money claims online. She argued that these changes are making access to the justice system more efficient, quicker and easier to use.
She noted concerns about vulnerable people and said that they are working closely with other departments to ensure that vulnerable people are protected and are able to access justice.
There was a short debate in Westminster Hall on legal aid and the Birmingham pub bombings. The debate can be read here, and a short summary is included below.
The Law Society was mentioned once during the debate, regarding the LASPO review and the Law Society's call to widen the scope of funding for representation.
Introducing the debate, Richard Burden MP (Birmingham Northfield, Labour) noted the history of the case, and said that the families of the victims have had to overcome hurdle after hurdle in the pursuit of justice and to get answers.
He said that the debate was not about taking sides on the case, but about whether both sides should have an equal opportunity to put their case to the courts. He argued that it is in the public interest that all the arguments for and against the identification of suspects at the inquest are heard at the Court of Appeal.
He criticised the Legal Aid Agency for proposing crowdfunding as a viable alternative and debated whether or not the Legal Aid Agency has discretion to award legal aid. He said that the decision to refuse legal aid for the Court of Appeal hearing does not fit with the fact that families finally won legal aid for their representation at the inquest.
He spoke about the LASPO review and mentioned the Law Society's call to widen the scope of funding for representation and called for situations like this to be considered as part of the review.
He called for public funds to be made available for the families, calling it an issue of fairness and parity.
Responding to the debate, Shadow Justice Minister Gloria de Piero MP congratulated the Birmingham MPs who have supported the families of the victims of the bombings.
She said that in certain cases the Legal Aid Agency may decide to waive the financial eligibility test for family members, if it can be argued that it would be unreasonable for the family to bear the full costs.
She raised concern regarding the Government's claim that families do not need legal aid for representation at an inquest because it is not an adversarial process, while the Government spend hundreds of thousands of pounds in public money to ensure that their side is represented at inquests. She called on the families to have the same access to the same degree of representation.
She called on the Minister to ask the Legal Aid Agency to review its decision.
Responding to the debate, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Lucy Frazer QC MP noted that early legal advice for inquests is available under legal aid for those who are eligible.
However, legal aid is available for legal representation at inquests under the exceptional case funding scheme. She said that decisions are made by the Legal Aid Agency independently of Government, and that she is not privy to the details of the decision.
She said the Government is currently reviewing legal aid and inquests as part of its LASPO review.
The Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee held an evidence session on its inquiry into Brexit: enforcement and dispute resolution. The witnesses were: Lucy Frazer QC MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice, and Suella Fernandes MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Exiting the European Union. The full session can be viewed here.
Mutual recognition of qualifications: Frazer welcomed the Government's previous references to mutual recognition of qualifications in order to protect the legal industry.
Influence on EU and international law: Both witnesses argued that the UK would maintain significant influence over international legal practice, highlighting the establishment of courts in Dubai and Qatar and reiterating the importance and reputation of the UK legal profession.
Family law: Frazer highlighted that a seamless transition to the Hague and Lugano conventions was needed and raised the importance of civil and judicial cooperation, particularly with regards to family, insolvency, and general civil law. She recognised that these were not as extensive as the Brussels I and II regulations, and that they would be improved upon domestically in due course.
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU): The witnesses reiterated that the binding nature of CJEU judgments, including direct effect and the supremacy of EU law, would come to an end following the UK's exit from the European Union. Although the CJEU's ultimate jurisdiction post-Brexit is included in Article 162 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, Fernandes highlighted that this had not yet been agreed, adding this would not fit with international best practice in arbitration by biasing towards EU principles and interpretations.
Mechanisms for dispute resolution: It was argued by both witnesses that different sectors would require distinct mechanisms at each different stage of the UK's withdrawal. A mixture of a joint committee, with representation from the EU and UK, and different arbitration mechanisms were raised as possible solutions for different sectors. It was also highlighted that citizens' rights would be separate from this and remain under the jurisdiction of the CJEU. It had not been agreed who would provide the further layer of arbitration over the joint committee that would eventually have to be set up.
Indirect impact of CJEU judgements: Frazer highlighted that with regards to domestic legislation there would be scope for individual judges to account for EU law where relevant. She highlighted that reciprocal arrangements were already in place and that mutual enforcement and recognition were very important moving forward.
Continued membership of European agencies: Fernandes accepted that the UK may seek to remain within European agencies in key sectors and would thus, accept CJEU jurisdiction. This was particularly likely in sectors such as medicines, chemicals and aviation.
UK representation on the CJEU: Fernandes stated that the British judge currently sitting in the CJEU would leave in March 2019 but that the UK would remain under its jurisdiction until the end of the implementation period in December 2020. Whilst Frazer admitted representation is valuable, she argued it would not affect individual cases or result in prejudice against the UK.
Fernandes admitted it was possible the CJEU would find the Withdrawal Agreement contrary to EU law but highlighted this was unlikely.
Fernandes reiterated that the Government was not seeking to align with the EFTA Court.
Both witnesses stated that the CJEU will no longer be able to rule parliamentary legislation unlawful but that the Supreme Court would maintain this capability.
The Chair of Employment Law Committee, Max Winthrop, gave evidence to the Women and Equalities Committee as part of their inquiry into sexual harassment in workplaces.
Winthrop spoke on the panel with Mark Mansell (Partner, Allen & Overy LLP), Tamara Ludlow (Partner, Simons Muirhead & Burton LLP), Suzanne McKie QC (Founder of Farore Law) and Gareth Brahams, Chair of the Employment Lawyers Association.
The session focused on the use and possible abuse of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).
Asked by Jess Phillips MP about NDAs, Winthrop said you can't require people to opt-out of rights that have yet to be crystallised. He added that provisions in the Equality Act 2010 would void the types of NDAs at the Presidents Club. Winthrop also said that he was not happy with the increasing scope of NDAs and how they were being used inappropriately in employee-employer relationships.
Asked by Ms Phillips whether he supported the Equality and Human Rights Commission's (EHRC) recommendation for a statutory code of practice that sets out the steps employers need to take prevent harassment in the workplace, Winthrop said that subject to further scrutiny there's a lot to support there. Gareth Brahams added that the EHRC proposal he was most against was the proposal for the public sector to ban confidentiality provisions.
Asked by Tonia Antoniazzi MP whether NDAs could help facilitate sexual harassment if used repeatedly, Mr Brahams said it was a common situation where the most senior person in an organisation was found to be abusing their submission.
In a discussion with Committee chair Maria Miller, Suzanne McKie said there was a question whether an obligation was needed to refer onto future employers allegations of harassment, as currently the only requirement was simply not to mislead others – so references could therefore be very vague. Mr Brahams pointed out that the Senior Manager Regime supplied additional requirements on those working in financial and insurance services.
Tonia Antoniazzi asked what potential there was for NDAs to be used to cover up instances of sexual harassment, to which Ms McKie recommended that employers be obligated to keep data given the HR function was not always effect and Mr Brahams said there could be more positive duties on employers to prevent workplace harassment.
Asked by Ms Antoniazzi whether he supported the EHRC's recommendation that the Government should legislate to nullify clauses in NDAs that prohibit disclosure of future events, Winthrop said that the Equality Act 2010 meant that you can't contract out your rights before you've got them. He added that the infamous Presidents Club NDA document was "shoved under people's noses" then taken away immediately after signature. Winthrop went on to say that before it was repealed, Section 40 of the Equality Act sent a "nice clear message to employers to engage their brains before sending their employees into harm's way."
Justice Committee chair Bob Neill MP led a Westminster Hall debate on the promotion of legal services after the UK leaves the EU.
The Law Society were mentioned three times in the debate, twice by Mr Neill and once by Justice Minister Lucy Frazer QC MP.
He also referenced many of our key asks on mutual market access and civil justice co-operation.
It is critical that UK court judgments can continue to be enforced in the courts of the EU27, and applies to areas like commercial law, but also maintenance payments for example.
The UK should consider re-signing The Hague Convention as an independent party, and should seek a waiver from the EU to re-sign prior to Brexit so that there is no delay in ratification. Mr Neill also agreed with his Justice Committee colleague Alex Chalk that the "great prize" and "gold standard" would be replicating the provisions of the recast Brussels I regulation, while The Hague Convention was very much a fall-back provision.
There is a need for a system that allows the legal services sector to attract talent. Any immigration regime should make it possible for firms to easily move staff between offices in the EU 27 and the UK, and vice versa.
As well as recognition of qualifications, all existing UK lawyers practising EU law in the European Union should be able to continue to do so, and vice versa.
A comprehensive agreement and partnership with mutual recognition and access is needed so UK law firms don't face restrictive regulations, preventing them from providing services and involving about 30 different regimes.
The legal services sector is the critical under-pinner of the financial services sector, the biggest and most valuable part of the UK's service economy. It can't be taken for granted that people come to the UK because our banks are sound and dependable, our regulatory system is perceived internationally as sound and dependable, and our legal system is seen as being second-to-none sound and dependable. It is a place where people want to litigate, and want to have their contracts written in English law.
Action points for the Government: Mr Neill concludedthat there needs to be a specific taskforce for dealing with legal services, as there were so many people in British law firms are ready and willing to supplement the Government's in-house lawyers on policy advice. He also asked Ms Frazer whether efforts would be made to join-up the work of the Ministry of Justice's legal services working group and the Brexit Law Committee. The Minister said she would take this point forward.
CETA: Mr Neill said later in the debate that a CETA-type deal "simply is no good" and that "for legal services, a CETA-type deal is no deal" and "would be just as bad as the cliff edge."
She hoped that in the withdrawal agreement the Government would soon reach an agreement on the protection of and mutual recognition of judgments, and on separation for cases that are pending and currently before the courts.
Both The Hague Convention and the Brussels Regulation are important, and we hope to secure the Hague Convention as a minimum. It is right to ensure that there will be no gap before we rejoin that convention, and we are pressing to secure that.
As part of the withdrawal agreement the Government have "agreed that any lawyers within the scope of the citizens' rights agreement who have become part of the host profession in the member state should remain recognised and able to practise. Last week… [the Government] agreed the terms of the implementation period, in which we will have the same rules as now. Therefore, rules on market access will continue, including on the provision of services and establishments for lawyers."
The UK has the opportunity to develop free trade agreements (FTAs) with third countries, which may cover legal services. But despite the fact protectionism already exists in other countries, and although few FTAs currently cover legal services, the Government hope and are ambitious to change that in the future.
LawTech, technology, and innovation in legal services are key to ensuring that the UK retains its world-leading status. The Government, building on success in the FinTech sector, are ensuring that new and innovative legal technologies are embraced and supported. The Government are also committed to ensuring that the UK becomes a world leader in smart contracts.
The Government are proactively spreading the message through its "GREAT" campaign about why English law, and the legal offering in the UK, is so strong.
They are also working with partners to target the countries that matter to the UK. Next month they will deliver an English law summit in Kazakhstan, "alongside the Law Society and the Bar Council in England and Wales." Legal services features prominently in the regular programme of bilateral ministerial meetings they organise, including last year with ministers from Singapore, India, Australia and China.
Concluding the debate, Ms Frazer said the Government's overall message was "the UK is, and will continue to be, one of the pre-eminent legal centres in the world. We will continue to be a leading player, and [are] determined to ensure that English law remains the law of choice, and that the UK continues to be the jurisdiction of choice."
The EU (Withdrawal) Bill held its eleventh and final Committee Stage debate. The full debates can be read here and here.
The Bill concluded its Committee stage debates in the House of Lords unamended and will begin the first of six days in Report Stage on 18th April.
It faces the prospect of increased parliamentary opposition at its Report Stage, should the Government decline to table amendments to the Bill. The Government does not have a majority in the House of Lords and peers used the opportunity of the Committee Stage debates to register issues with the legislation and give the Government the opportunity to return at Report Stage with suitable amendments. However, if the Government do not amend the Bill in areas where peers view improvement necessary, peers may push their own amendments to a vote.
Areas which peers have expressed discontent with the Bill as currently drafted include: the use of delegated powers to transpose retained EU law into UK legislation; the lack of input for peers in the role of Sifting Committees on Statutory Instruments (SIs); and preserving the devolution settlement post-Brexit.
CJEU: Lord Goldsmith (Labour) spoke to his amendment 358 to Clause 19 of the Bill, which would ensure that provisions for retained EU law and the role of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) only ends after transitional arrangements conclude. Speaking to his amendment, Lord Goldsmith stated that the amendment would provide legal clarity for the UK given the CJEU will continue to give references or preliminary rulings for UK courts before the end of the transition period. Speaking for the Government, Lord Keen of Elie responded that the purpose of the Bill is to ensure that there is a functioning UK statute book regardless of the outcome of negotiations, but conceded that the Government intended for a strictly time-limited role for the CJEU in a transition period.
Devolution: Lord Wigley (Plaid Cymru) spoke to his amendment 358A to Clause 19 of the Bill, which would require the Government to account for the replacing of current EU funding for Wales. Lord Wigley argued that the amendment was necessary to ensure that Wales did not detrimentally suffer as a result of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, due to the significant amount of EU funding that Wales currently receives. Responding for the Government, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth stated that the Government intended for the UK participate in 2014 to 2020 EU funding programmes until their closure and will consult further on post-Brexit funding arrangements.
EU Citizenship: Lord Wigley (Plaid Cymru) spoke to his amendment 358B to Clause 19 of the Bill, which would require the Government to adopt as a negotiating objective continued EU citizenship for UK citizens. Speaking to the amendment, Lord Wigley argued that associate EU citizenship is a model that the UK could adopt and pursue, to allow UK citizens the ability to continue to enjoy the rights and freedoms they currently do. Speaking for the Government, Lord Keen stated that pursuant to Article 20 of the EU, EU citizenship is an addition to the citizenship of a member state.
Justice Committee chair Bob Neill MP led another Westminster Hall debate on the Justice Committee's report on the implications of Brexit for the justice system, and the Government's response to the report.
The Law Society were mentioned once in the debate by Labour MP Bambos Charalambous, who referenced our conclusion that a CETA-style agreement "is essentially a 'no deal' outcome for the legal services sector...[and] would lead to a lack of legal certainty which would affect business confidence and have a negative wider impact on the UK economy". He also echoed our key arguments on the importance of continuing mutual market access and rights of audience.
Opening the debate and discussing the Government's response to his Committee's report, Neill said his objective was to press the Government on the need for more urgency, and to be more precise and specific about exactly how it would deal with Brexit issues affecting the justice system. He added that the Committee were concerned that the Government's response was "long on good intentions and on setting out an ambitious vision, but short on specifics and the details of how that ambitious vision will be achieved, and there is a concern that it may not be realistically achievable."
Neill also referenced many of our key arguments on Brexit, including the economic position of legal services and the jurisdiction being a global legal centre.
Impact on judiciary and operation of the courts: Neill said the Government needed urgently to find a means where the judiciary's practical views and experience were genuinely fed in to those negotiating, for example, on the future relationship with the European Court of Justice (CJEU) and on dealing with retained law. He added that the Committee needed clarity on the Government's position on the CJEU and retained law.
On the CJEU, Neill said the UK needed to be realistic that dispute resolution processes would required for continuing some partnership arrangements. He added that the desire to displace any role for the CJEU would create difficulties for the Government, but that there were some limited areas, such as interpreting specific matters of financial services and data regulation, where there might be sense in making a pragmatic compromise rather than setting up ad hoc arbitral mechanisms such as tribunals.
Conservative MP Victoria Prentis asked what work had been carried out to examine the success of joint committees established as part of free trade agreements, such as in the EEA and NAFTA agreements.
Yasmin Qureshi said Labour's view was that "a shared court-like body to oversee disputes and enforce rights and protection" was needed, and that it was important that there is an independent court to oversee the new UK-EU agreement. She declined to give a direct answer to Neill's question of whether Labour ruled out participating in the EFTA Court.
Neill also said there was real concern about the effectiveness and adequacy of the provisions in clause 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, refencing the comments of the President of the Supreme Court that the clause's drafting was "very unhelpful" to UK judges. Conservative MP Alex Chalk agreed that judges did not want to be dragged into the political arena and that they deserved the protection of knowing exactly what they are required to interpret.
Criminal justice and judicial co-operation: Supporting the Prime Minister's intention of securing an ongoing agreement for sharing in police, judicial and security co-operation, Neill reiterated that the UK needed to be realistic. He said the data arrangements would need to be aligned if the UK was to benefit from things like the European criminal records information exchange system, the work of Europol and the information exchange critical to the pursuit of terrorism and organised crime. This would mean following the EU27's data regulation and any subsequent jurisprudence that touches on this.
Continuing on criminal legislation and criminal law, Labour MP David Hanson asked the Government specifically "how, when and what progress" had been made on its aspiration to co-operate with the EU for criminal matters, and what discussions there had been, when they would publish their views and when agreement would be reached on the new arrangements for the legal framework on security, law enforcement and criminal justice between the UK and EU.
Civil and family justice co-operation: Neill said a firm arrangement for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments was needed, particularly for the commercial litigation sector and for those who have ability to have maintenance payments enforced against former partners now living in other EU jurisdiction countries.
Yasmin Qureshi asked the Government if they shared her party's concern that cross-border divorce and child custody disputes could become much more difficult unless the UK secured effective judicial co-operation arrangements with the EU after Brexit.
Mutual market access: Referencing the economic contribution of the sector, Labour's Justice spokesperson Yasmin Qureshi asked which measures the Government was taking to maintain cross-border legal practice rights and opportunities for the UK legal sector, given efforts by EU27 law firms to use Brexit to win clients from UK competitors.
Government response: Responding for the Government, Lucy Frazer QC MP answered the Committee's point that the Government should prioritise and separately negotiate EU-UK co-operation on criminal justice by quoting from the Prime Minister's Munich speech that the UK was "unconditionally committed to maintaining" Europe's security now and after our withdrawal from the EU because "our first duty" as a nation is "to protect our citizens."
replicating the recast Brussels I Regulation and remain a party to the Lugano Convention and The Hague Convention.
On competition from other jurisdictions and the Paris court, Ms Frazer said that the UK is expanding its judicial offering and seeing courts being established in Dubai, Qatar and Kazakhstan.
On Clause 6 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, Ms Frazer quoted from Lord Keen, who said clearly that the Government have heard the views expressed by peers in the Lords, and that the Government will return to that point.
On security partnerships, Ms Frazer said the Government wanted an ambitious deal and that there were many examples of international agreements between Europol and other third countries, such as the US.
International Trade Questions took place in the House of Commons.
Future FTAs: Asked by Liberal Democrat MP Christine Jardine what steps the Government would take to facilitate parliamentary scrutiny of future trade agreements (FTAs), Trade Minister Greg Hands MP said the Government were currently designing the UK's future FTA policy and no decisions had been taken given stakeholder consultation was continuing. Responding to points raised by other Opposition MPs, Greg Hands assured the House that Ministers engaged frequently with the devolved administrations on what future trade policy might look like, and that they and Parliament would work closely with the Government to ensure their voices were heard on future trade deals.
Preparations for future FTAs: Asked by two Conservative MPs what assessment they had made of the potential economic benefits of securing trade agreements with non-EU countries after Brexit, Hands said the Department for International Trade (DIT) has established 14 trade working groups and high-level dialogues with key trade partners beyond the EU to explore the best ways of progressing our trade and investment relationships.

matches: CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU


text:
February 23, 1942. Suggestion of Error Overruled April 27, 1942.
A life policy provision stating that if policy is not surrendered for cash or paid-up insurance within three months after default in payment of premium, its cash surrender value at date of default, less any indebtedness, should automatically purchase continued insurance and providing for deduction of a surrender charge in computing cash surrender value does not require policy to be surrendered but permits provision to come into operation automatically three months after default, as against contention that a surrender charge can be imposed only when policy is actually surrendered under a policy requirement.
Under life policy issued and delivered in Tennessee providing that if policy was not surrendered for cash or for paid-up insurance within three months after default in payment of premium, its cash surrender value at date of default, less any indebtedness, should automatically purchase continued insurance, authorizing deduction of surrender charge of not more than 1 1/2 percent of face of policy in computing cash surrender value, and setting forth table of guaranteed surrender values, insurer could deduct surrender charge in determining cash surrender value of policy within table (Code Tenn. 1932, secs. 6132, 6179).
Where life policy provided for deduction of surrender charge of not more than 1 1/2 percent of face of policy in computing cash surrender value and set forth table of "guaranteed surrender values," if quoted words were the equivalent of words "surrender values" and set forth values of policy after deduction of surrender charge, provision relating to surrender charge did not violate Tennessee statute requiring contract to be plainly expressed in policy (Code Tenn., 1932, secs. 6132, 6179).
Where life policy providing for deduction of surrender charge of not more than 1 1/2 percent of face of policy in computing cash surrender value and setting forth table of "guaranteed surrender values" was submitted to and approved by Tennessee insurance commissioner as required by Tennessee statute, commissioner must have necessarily decided that table of values set forth actual and not mere guaranteed minimum values, and his decision could not be said to be so manifestly wrong that the Mississippi Supreme Court should not observe it (Code Tenn., 1932, secs. 6132, 6179(9), 6182).
ROBERDS and ANDERSON, JJ., dissenting.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Hinds county, HON. J.F. BARBOUR, Judge.
Alexander Satterfield, of Jackson, for appellant.
The policy-contract totally fails to comply with the rules of the statutes of Tennessee and the decisions of Mississippi by failing to include an agreed contractual table, or to definitely fix any surrender charge, and hence no surrender charge may be deducted.
Secs. 6110, 6132, 6179 (9), Shannon's Code of Tennessee; Sec. 5171, Mississippi Code of 1930; Bank of Commerce v. Insurance Co. (Tenn.), 26 S.W.2d 135; Lane v. Grand Fraternity (Tenn.), 177 S.W. 941; McCarthy v. Catholic Knights, 102 Tenn. 353, 52 S.W. 142; Hahn v. Insurance Co. (Tenn.), 84 S.W.2d 361; Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 168 Tenn. 690, 80 S.W.2d 662; Aschenbrenner v. U.S. Fid. G. Co., 292 U.S. 80, 54 S.Ct. 590, 78 L.Ed. 1137; Laster v. Insurance Co. (Tenn.), 98 S.W.2d 1068; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, 189 Miss. 414, 196 So. 766.
Even though the court should hold that the policy-contract had sufficiently complied with the rules to fix and determine the amount of surrender charge, nevertheless, it is submitted that the policy-contract was not surrendered in this case and hence under the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in N Y Life Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 142 Miss. 541, 110 So. 432, and that of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Sugg v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 94 S.W. 936, such charge is not deductible in the case at bar.
See, also, Nessossis v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 189 Miss. 814, 196 So. 776; Sec. 6132, Shannon's Code of Tennessee; Umstaddt v. Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 342; Golightly v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 186 Miss. 598, 191 So. 111; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Boling, 177 Miss. 172, 169 So. 882, 111 A.L.R. 967; Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Minor, 170 Miss. 223, 152 So. 542; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 184 Miss. 632, 184 So. 636, 186 So. 837; Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 177 Tenn. 328, 149 S.W.2d 69; Mills v. National Life Ins. Co., 136 Tenn. 350; Bumpus v. Life Casualty Co., 167 Tenn. 412; Bryant v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 109 F. 748; Moss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 339; Zerrell v. Intersouthern Life Ins. Co., 58 F.2d 135; Commander v. Aetna Ins. Co., 169 Miss. 837, 153 So. 877; Virginia v. Sluss, 11 N.E.2d 500; Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (S.C.), 195 S.E. 552; Kurth v. National Life Accident Ins. Co. (Texas), 79 S.W.2d 338; Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 S.W.2d 488; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 31 F.2d 862; Erickson v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 258 N.W. 738; Carter v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (Ala.), 161 So. 446.
Watkins Eager, of Jackson, and F.H. Pease, of New York, N Y, for appellee.
The policy sued upon is in strict compliance with the statutes of the State of Tennessee.
Shannon's Code of Tennessee, Secs. 6178, 6179, 6182, 6188, 6210, 6211.
It contains every provision required in Section 6179 of the Tennessee Code. Upon default in the payment of premium, after the third year, the insured is given the option (a) to surrender the policy and receive the cash surrender value; (b) to surrender the policy and have endorsed thereupon paid-up insurance in the amount the cash surrender value would purchase; and (c) the policy contains an automatic provision which requires no election on the part of the insured. The automatic provision in this policy provides that upon default in the payment of a premium after three years, automatically and without action on the part of the insured, the cash surrender value, after paying any indebtedness to the company, would be utilized to purchase extended insurance, without participation in the surplus or profits of the company.
The policy contains a table so that the insured may look at the table and ascertain the sums available at the end of annual periods for the exercise of the available options.
The statute is further complied with in that the policy has been submitted to the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Tennessee and he has certified that the policy is free from discrimination and neither indefinite nor uncertain.
The surrender charge deducted from the reserve, in calculating the cash surrender value, instead of being two and one-half percent, as provided by the statute, is one and one-half percent at the end of the third year, with a graduated charge fading out at the end of the ninth year, the surrender charge for the ninth year being $2.50 per thousand.
Cash surrender value is the reserve less a surrender charge.
Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 85 L.Ed. 432.
Counsel claim that the policy is uncertain. In distinguishing the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 184 Miss. 632, 184 So. 636, and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, 189 Miss. 414, 196 So. 766, the court called attention to the fact that the Nelson policy used the word "cash" value instead of "cash surrender value." The Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee has made no such distinction. Upon the other hand, as specifically appears from the case of Mills v. National Life Ins. Co., 136 Tenn. 350; Bumpus v. Life Casualty, 167 Tenn. 412, and other cases, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has expressly used the terms "cash value" and "cash surrender value" as being equivalents.
Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties have used, and if they are clear and unambiguous, their terms are to be taken and construed in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. The rule of strict construction does not authorize the conversion of language nor the exercise of inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists.
Conley v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Tenn. App. 405; Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of the South, 177 Tenn. 328, 149 S.W.2d 69; Fidelity Bond Mortgage Co. v. Surety Co., 14 Tenn. App. 211; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 22 Tenn. App. 207; Moore v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 162 Tenn. 682; Paper Co. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 12 Tenn. App. 479; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ansley, 22 Tenn. App. 464-465; U.S. Stove Corp., etc., v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 264; Williams v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 170, 78 L.Ed. 711, 718.
The policy of insurance sued on was neither uncertain nor indefinite. Upon default in the payment of premium, no other option being exercised, the insured was entitled to extended insurance for such length of time as the cash surrender value under the policy would purchase. The policy contained, in compliance with Tennessee statutes, a table which informed the insured of each option available to him under the policy and the laws of Tennessee at annual periods, and such table was the full measure of the insured's rights to participate in the surplus of the company.
Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of the South, 177 Tenn. 328, 149 S.W.2d 69; Mills v. National Life Ins. Co., 136 Tenn. 350; Bumpus v. Life Casualty Co., 167 Tenn. 412; Sugg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (Tenn.), 94 S.W. 936, 938; Umstaddt v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Tenn.), 110 S.W. 342; Bryant v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 109 F. 748; Moss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 339.
See, also, Bene v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 191 Ark. 714; Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 195 S.E. 552; Bryant v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 109 F. 748; Carter v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 161 So. 446; Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 S.W.2d 488; Devitte v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 D.L.R., p. 1915, 183; Erickson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, etc., 258 N.W. 738; Golightly v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 186 Miss. 606, 191 So. 111; Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Zerrell, 58 F.2d 135; Kurth v. National Life Accident Ins. Co., 79 S.W.2d 339; Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. Sluss, 11 N.E.2d 500; Neal v. Mutual Life Ins. Society, 161 Miss. 814, 138 So. 353; N Y Life Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 144 Miss. 541, 110 So. 432; Petrie v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 92 Minn. 489, 100 N.W. 236; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 31 F.2d 862; Williams v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 170, 78 L.Ed. 711; Mississippi Code of 1930, Sec. 5171.
The Insurance Commissioner of the State of Tennessee is a quasi judicial officer, like the head of any other department, and his ruling is entitled to great weight.
North British, etc., Insurance Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 155; State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 120 Tenn. 86, 110 S.W. 565; State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 122 Tenn. 161, 121 S.W. 499; Kelly Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622.
If the policy in controversy had not contained an automatic option available to the insured, or if the policy had not contained a table informing the insured of his available annual options, or if the policy had provided that an insured might exercise either of the options, whether elective or automatic, and by selecting one instead of the other could have avoided the effect of the surrender charge, the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Tennessee would have disapproved the policy, declined to permit the same to have been written in the state, and would have revoked the license of the company if it continued so to do. The Insurance Commissioner of the State of Tennessee, to whom is entrusted this important function, is today saying to the public in Tennessee, as well as to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, that the policy in question is neither uncertain, indefinite nor discriminatory.
We submit that, the policy in question complying with the statutes of the State of Tennessee, the decisions of the courts of the State of Tennessee, the federal decisions in the State of Tennessee, and the statutory administrative rules and regulations of the State of Tennessee, if a deduction of a surrender charge should be denied, such action would violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States and deprive the appellee of the benefit thereof; and if your honors should enforce Section 2171 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, in this case, the same would violate the bill of rights of the State of Mississippi, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that the same would deprive the appellee of its property without due process of law and deny it equal protection under the law.
It cannot be said that there was any necessity that the policy be surrendered. The purpose of the Tennessee statute, like that of other states, was to secure to the insured, upon the lapse of the policy, one option which was automatic and required no action upon his part.
Argued orally by John C. Satterfield, for appellant, and by W.H. Watkins, for appellee.
Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant sued the appellee on a life insurance policy issued by it to her husband, payable to her. The case was tried in the court below without a jury, resulting in a judgment dismissing the action. The policy was issued and delivered to the insured Harry B. Anderson at Memphis, Tennessee, on December 9, 1925. Anderson then lived at Memphis and continued so to do until his death in April, 1935. The appellant also lived in Memphis when the policy was issued and has lived there since continuously. This action was brought in April, 1939, and in its substantive aspects is governed by the law of Tennessee.
"(3) If the policy be not surrendered for cash or for paid-up insurance within three months after default in payment of premium, its cash surrender value at date of default, less the amount of any indebtedness, shall automatically purchase Continued Insurance from the date of default for the face of the Policy plus any dividend additions and less any indebtedness to the Company. The Continued Insurance shall be without future participation and without the right to loans, cash surrender values, disability or double indemnity benefits.
"The Cash Surrender Value shall be the reserve on the face of the Policy at the end of the insurance year or, in event of default, at the date of default (omitting fractions of a dollar per thousand of insurance) and the reserve on any outstanding paid-up additions, plus any dividends standing to the credit of the Policy, and less a surrender charge for the third to the ninth years, inclusive, of not more than one and one-half per cent of the face of the Policy. Such reserve will be computed on the basis of the American Table of Mortality and interest at three per cent, and the amount of paid-up insurance under (2) and the term of the continued insurance under (3) will be computed on the same basis at the attained age of the Insured on the date of default.
As this policy is for $10,000 its cash surrender value at the end of its eighth year, according to this table, was $1,680. Had it remained in force one year longer it would have been $1,940, an increase in value of $260. As the premiums paid on the policy continued it in force to September 9, 1934, three-fourths of its ninth year, the appellee admits that its value on that date was $1,875. This, it will be observed, is the $1,680, its value at the end of the eighth year, plus three-fourths of the $260 it would have increased in value had it remained in force for the whole of the ninth year. After deducting from this $1,875 an indebtedness due the appellee by the insured the remainder was insufficient to carry the policy to the insured's death.
The appellant's only objection to the cash surrender value of the policy admitted by the appellee is that in arriving thereat the appellee wrongfully charged the policy with a surrender charge of $35 and failed to credit it with a dividend then standing to its credit. If both of these contentions are correct the policy was in force at the death of the insured, but if the appellant fails to sustain either of them the cash surrender value of the policy was insufficient to continue it in force to the date of the insured's death.
Since we have arrived at the conclusion that the appellee had the right to deduct this surrender charge in determining the policy's cash surrender value, it will not be necessary for us to set forth the facts on which the second of these contentions is based or to further consider it.
The appellee had adopted the custom of decreasing the surrender charge on its policies each year and imposed none after the ninth year. The charge was deducted in arriving at the table of values set forth in the policy and for the eighth year was $35.
The grounds of the appellant's contention that no surrender charge should have been deducted in determining the value of this policy are, (1) Clause 3 of Section 5 of the policy does not require the surrender of the policy and that a surrender charge can be imposed only when the policy is actually surrendered under a requirement of the policy so to do; and (2) the permission to the company to fix the surrender charge in its discretion at any sum not to exceed one and one-half percent of the face of the policy, enables the insurer to discriminate "between insurants of the same class" and prevents the contract from being "plainly expressed in the policy" in violation of Section 6132 of the 1932 Tennessee Code. That Section is substantially the same as Section 5171 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, and the appellant says that it requires either the exact amount of the surrender charge to be set forth in the policy or the table of values therein to set forth the value of the policy after the surrender charge has been deducted, as this court held that Section 5171, Code of 1930, requires in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Boling, 177 Miss. 172, 169 So. 882, 111 A.L.R. 967; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 184 Miss. 632, 184 So. 636, 186 So. 837, and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, 189 Miss. 414, 196 So. 766, 776.
Clause 3 of Section 5 of the policy does not require the policy to be surrendered but permits the clause to automatically come into operation three months after default in payment of premium, and also expressly permits the deduction of the surrender charge. Such was the case in the policy under consideration in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Nelson, supra, wherein this court held that the surrender charge could be deducted when determining the value of the policy at any given time. Such holding seems to be implicit in the Tennessee case of Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 177 Tenn. 328, 149 S.W.2d 69, but if not there is no Tennessee case to the contrary. We come then to the second of these objections to this surrender charge.
The Tennessee statute now appearing as Section 6179 of the Tennessee Code of 1932, with which the Mississippi Code has no counterpart, prohibits the issuance of a life insurance policy in that state unless it contains, among other things, "a provision which, in event of default in premium payments, after premiums shall have been paid for three years, shall secure to the owner of the policy a stipulated form of insurance, the net value of which shall be at least equal to the reserve at the date of default on the policy and on any dividend additions thereto, specifying the mortality table and rate of interest adopted for computing such reserves, less a sum not more than two and one-half per centum of the amount insured by the policy and of any existing dividend additions thereto, and less any existing indebtedness to the company on the policy." This policy's method for ascertaining its cash surrender value complies in all respects with this statute. Its designation of the surrender charge is in the statute's language, except that the amount thereof is less than the statute permits an insurer to charge. But if it be said that this section of the Tennessee Code when construed in connection with Section 6132 thereof requires the policy to state not the percent of its face value that the insured may in its discretion charge in arriving at its value, but the exact amount which the insurer intends to charge when determining this value, we must turn to the policy's table of surrender values for the answer thereto.
This table designates these values as "guaranteed surrender values" as did the policies in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Boling, supra (as appears from Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, supra), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, supra; but if under the Tennessee statutes and the action of its insurance commissioner these words must be held to be the equivalent of the words "surrender values," and to set forth the value of the policy after the surrender charge had been deducted therefrom, the surrender charge provision therein does not violate Section 6132 of those statutes. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, supra, with which the implications in Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co., supra, are in accord and there seems to be no Tennessee case to the contrary.
The Tennessee Code places insurance companies under the supervision of an insurance commissioner, and provides a much more elaborate scheme therefor than does the Mississippi Code. In addition to the sections of the Tennessee Code hereinbefore cited Paragraph (9) of Section 6179 requires life insurance policies to contain a table setting forth the policy's value each year upon default in premium payments beginning with the year in which such values have become available; and Section 6182 thereof provides that: "No policy of life insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state or be issued by a life insurance company organized under the laws of this state until the form of the same has been filed with the commissioner; and after the commissioner shall have notified any company of his disapproval of any form, it shall be unlawful for such company to issue any policy in the form so disapproved. The commissioner's action shall be subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction." The form of this policy was submitted to and approved by the Tennessee Insurance Commissioner and it could not have been lawfully issued without his approval. In approving it, the commissioner was called on to pass on the questions here presented and necessarily decided that the table of values therein set forth are actual and not mere guaranteed minimum values. This decision of the commissioner was within his delegated authority and assuming that it is subject to review by us, and although Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Minor, 170 Miss. 223, 154 So. 542; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Boling, and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, supra, would have required us to reach a different conclusion had the question been submitted to us in the first instance, we are not prepared to say that his decision is so manifestly wrong that we should not observe it and thereby cast doubt on the meaning of other similar provisions in insurance policies heretofore issued in Tennessee, the ultimate decision of which rests with the Supreme Court of that state. Consequently, we must hold that the table of surrender values in this policy is in the same category as the table thereof in the case of Eleogrammenos v. Standard Life Ins. Co., supra, and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, supra. From which it follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Roberds, J., delivered a dissenting opinion.
Under New York Life Insurance Company v. Blaylock, 144 Miss. 541, 110 So. 432, approved in New York Life Insurance Company v. Boling, 177 Miss. 172, 169 So. 882, 111 A.L.R. 967, the company had no right to deduct the surrender charge in this case, for the simple reason that there was no surrender, or offer of surrender, of the policy, and there is no provision therein automatically surrendering it under the facts of this case. This action is on the policy as extended insurance.
"The main question presented on the appeal, which will be decisive of the case, is whether or not the `surrender charge' of $15 may be deducted by the company from the reserve or cash amount due the insured on the policy at the time of the lapse, or should it be applied in extending the insurance under clause (b) of the provisions, `Options on Surrender or Lapse,' of the policy, where there has been no actual surrender of the policy, but the insurance is continued under said clause (b) to some future date as provided.
"In the case before us the policy became void several months before the death of the insured if the $15 as a `surrender charge' could be deducted from the amount due on the policy and not applied to extended insurance; but if the `surrender charge' of $15 in this case could not be retained by the company, then the insurance for the face amount of the policy was extended to a date after the death of the insured; so the question then is whether the $15 claimed by the company as a `surrender charge' should be applied to extended insurance under the terms of the policy, or whether the company should be allowed to retain that amount, in which event the policy would have become void before the death of the insured.
"We have been unable to find any decision of the question, counsel cite none, and we are therefore left to construe the provisions of the policy from the language used; and after a careful consideration of the proposition we are convinced that the $15 `surrender charge' cannot be collected by the insurance company, because, as we see it, there was no actual surrender of the policy, but the default in the payment of the premium amounted to a mere lapse of the policy, and under the said clause (b) the insurance was automatically extended, or `the insurance was continued as provided in option (b),' as expressed by the provisions of the policy mentioned, the insured having failed to elect to come under clause (a) or clause (c); therefore no `surrender charge' could be collected from the amount due the insured on the policy at the time of the lapse, because there was no surrender of the policy.
"We do not understand the provisions of the policy to mean that the $15 `surrender charge' could be retained by the company where the policy merely lapsed, and clause (b) extending the insurance automatically applied. It seems clear to us that this `surrender charge' can be collected by the company only where the policy is surrendered for cash, as provided in clause (a) or where the insured elects, clause (c), which latter question we do not decide, but the surrender charge cannot be retained where the insurance is continued under clause (b) as it was in the case before us.
"If the provisions in the policy under the designation `Options on Surrender or Lapse' can be reasonably construed to mean that when there is a lapse and the insurance is continued under clause (b) that this constitutes a surrender of the policy, or that the intention of the provision is that the lapse and continuance of the insurance shall warrant the charge of the $15 as a surrender or lapse charge, still the other construction that we have above placed upon the provision, namely, that the `surrender charge' is not to be deducted by the company unless the policy is actually surrendered and not continued under clause (b) as it is in the case before us, is also a reasonable construction of the provision; and when there are two reasonable constructions of the contract of insurance, one favorable to the insurance company and the other to the insured, it is the duty of the courts to adopt the one favorable to the insured, because the contract is to be construed most strongly against the writer of it. This is the universal rule, as we find it in all jurisdictions. Therefore we think, in the instant case, that the surrender charge cannot be claimed by the insurance company because there was no surrender of the policy; but if mistaken in that view, then it is our opinion that even if the construction contended for by the appellant is a reasonable one, still it is the duty of the court to adopt the other reasonable one favorable to the validity of the policy."
In the Nelson case [ 184 Miss. 632, 184 So. 638], cited in the majority opinion, the court drew a distinction between "The cash surrender value," the wording of the policy in the Blaylock case, and "the cash value," the wording in the Nelson case. In the case at bar, the wording is "Cash Surrender Value," as in the Blaylock case.
No Tennessee case has been called to our attention announcing a contrary rule, but, on the other hand, Sugg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 116 Tenn. 658, 94 S.W. 936, seems to approve it.
Anderson, J., concurs in this dissent.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
S. Binner doubled, RBI; A. Ebersole scored.
K. Campbell reached first on an error by ss.
B. Wagner hit by pitch; S. Binner advanced to second.
K. Campbell reached first on an error by ss, advanced to second; V. Jackson advanced to third.
J. Hughes singled, RBI; K. Campbell advanced to third; V. Jackson scored.
B. Zahn reached first on an error by 3b; J. Hughes advanced to second.
V. Jackson singled; T. McFadden advanced to third.
K. Campbell singled, RBI; V. Jackson advanced to second; T. McFadden scored.
J. Hughes reached first on an error by 2b; K. Campbell advanced to second; V. Jackson advanced to third.
B. Zahn reached on a fielder's choice; J. Hughes advanced to second; K. Campbell advanced to third; V. Jackson out at home 3b to c.
T. Cassidy pinch hit for C. Schroeder.
K. Valiga pinch hit for B. Garza.
C. Schroeder pinch ran for T. Cassidy.
B. Garza to cf for K. Valiga.
T. McIe singled, bunt; K. Feaser advanced to second.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Markel Corporation v. Caribbean Online International Ltd.
Complainant is Markel Corporation, of Virginia, America, of United States of America, represented by McGuireWoods LLP, United States of America.
Respondent is Caribbean Online International Ltd., of Nassau, Bahamas.
The disputed domain names <markeldirect.com> and <markelonline.com> are registered with DomainDoorman, LLC.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on October 17, 2007. On October 19, 2007, the Center transmitted by email to DomainDoorman, LLC a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain names at issue. On October 19, 2007, DomainDoorman, LLC transmitted by email to the Center its verification responses confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on October 22, 2007. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was November 11, 2007. Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified Respondent’s default on November 12, 2007.
The Center appointed Eduardo Machado as the sole panelist in this matter on November 14, 2007. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
Complainant is an insurance holding company, which has established rights over the mark MARKEL through the use of such mark. Complainant has registered such mark before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (registration n�. 1,720,714) and holds other international registrations (Office for the Harmonization of Internal Markets, registration n�. 1514025).
It has registered the MARKEL trademark before the USPTO and holds other international registrations.
The domain names <markelonline.com> and <markeldirect.com> are confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademarks.
A search of the PTO’s TESS database for all marks comprised of the word “Markel”, with or without design elements, did not reveal any parties who appeared to bear any relationship to Respondent.
A search of the OHIM’s CTM-ONLINE database for all marks comprised of the words “Markel”, with or without design elements, did not reveal any parties who appeared to bear any relationship to Respondent.
The name of Respondent bears no connection to the domain names that would suggest that the domain names are related to a mark or trade name in which Respondent has established rights.
A Google search for Respondent does not reveal any websites which suggest Respondent has established rights or legitimate interests in the domain names.
Complainant’s representative contacted Respondent on August 22, 2007 and again on September 21, 2007, via certified mail return receipt requested, notifying Respondent that the registration of the domain names <markelonline.com> and <markeldirect.com> were not authorized by Complainant. Respondent never responded to Complainant.
Respondent is merely using the disputed domain names to attract third parties, such as corporate entities, who may want to advertise on Respondent’s website. These entities could plausibly assume that Complainant endorsed or is a customer of Respondent because of Respondent’s use of the identical word “Markel” in the domain. As a result, Respondent may generate unjustified revenues. Respondent is therefore illegitimately capitalizing on the trademark MARKEL. Such finding indicates Respondent’s bad faith in the registration and use of the disputed domain names.
Since the MARKEL mark has being used for several years and given the existence of the United States of America and foreign trademark registrations for MARKEL, the Panel finds that Complainant has trademark rights in the MARKEL mark.
The Panel also finds that <markelonline.com> and <markeldirect.com> are confusingly similar to the MARKEL mark since the dominant portion of Complainant’s registered marks and of the disputed domain names is “markel.” The disputed domain names differ from Complainant’s registered MARKEL mark only in that they contain the generic words “online” and “direct”. Several prior UDRP Panels have held that the addition of a non-distinctive, descriptive or generic term like “online” and “direct” does not change the overall impression in terms of confusing similarity with a mark. “The addition of ‘my’ is not sufficient to avoid confusion.” Sony Kabushiki Kaisha also trading as Sony Corporation v. Sin, Eonmok, WIPO Case No. D2000-1007.
The Panel finds that the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights. Complainant has satisfied paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
With respect to paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy, there is no evidence before the Panel that Respondent, before any notice of the dispute, used or prepared to use the disputed domain names or a name corresponding to the domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
With respect to paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy, there is no evidence before the Panel that indicates that Respondent has ever been commonly known by the disputed domain names.
With respect to paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy, Respondent has not made and is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain names and has not used the disputed domain names, or a name corresponding to them, in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. At the time the UDRP complaint was filed, the domain names merely provided numerous advertisements and /or sponsored links. Such use does not of itself constitute grounds for establishing rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name particularly where such links appear to relate at least in part to the trademark value of the domain names. See mVisible Technologies, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Systems, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-1141.
Moreover, the disputed domain name <markeldirect.com> as of the date of this decision resolves to a page that displays links to Complainant’s competitors, that is, links for insurance companies. This is not a bona fide use. TM Acquisition Corp. v. Sign Guards, NAF Case No. 132439 (finding that Respondent’s use of complainant’s marks to divert Internet users to a website which displayed a series of links, some of which were links to sites of Complainant’s competitors, was not a bona fide offering of goods or services).
The Panel finds that the circumstances enumerated above establish that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names at issue.
The Panel finds that Respondent registered the disputed domain names in bad faith.
Complainant’s allegations of bad faith are not contested. Under the Policy, it is evidence of bad faith that, “by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your website or location or of a product or service on your website or location”, Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv). Respondent used Complainant’s known trademark in the insurance services to attract users to Respondents’ websites where they offered links to, amongst others, competing insurance service websites. This is evidence of the intention by Respondent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondents’ websites or of a product or service on Respondents’ websites.
At the time the Complaint was filed and at the time of this Decision, the domain names resolves to pages that offer visitors links to sites of other companies, including Complainant’s competitors. Staples, Inc., Staples The Office Superstore, Inc., Staples Contract and & Commercial, Inc. v. John Morgan, WIPO Case No. D2004-0537 (“the Panel is persuaded that Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for re-directing Internet users, particularly customers and potential customers of Complainants, from Complainants’ website to the website of OfficeMax, a company which directly competes with Complainants, constitutes bad faith and use. Prior WIPO UDRP decisions also support this conclusion.”). See also Edmunds.com, Inc. v. Ult. Search, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-1319 (“registration and use of a domain name to redirect Internet users to websites of competing organizations constitutes bad faith registration and use under the Policy.”).
The Panel finds that the circumstances enumerated above establish that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain names, <markeldirect.com> and <markelonline.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


1. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (priniata vsenarodnym golosovaniem 12.12.1993) (s uchetom popravok ot 30.12.2008 № 6-FKZ, ot 30.12.2008 № 7-FKZ, ot 05.02.2014 № 2-FKZ, ot 21.07.2014 № 11-FKZ) [The Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted by the popular vote of 12.12.1993) (amended of 30.12.2008 № 6-FCL, of 30.12.2008 № 7-FCL, of 05.02.2014 № 2-FCL, of 21.07.2014 № 11-FCL )]. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2014, no. 31, art. 4398.
2. Degtev G. V. Sovremennyi rossiiskii federalism: osobennosti pravovogo statusa i osnovnye napravleniya ego sovershenstvovaniya [Modern Russian federalism: peculiarities of legal status and main directions of its improvement. Cand. jur. sci. diss.]. Moscow, 2001. 182 p.
3. Mirsoev G. B., Makarova I. Yu. Institut polnomochnogo predstavitelia Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Institute of the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President]. Moscow, 2002. 92 p.
4. Muraviev A. A. Razvitie gosudarstvennogo ustroistva Rossiiskoi Federatsii kak factor sovershenstvovaniya sistemy regional’nogo upravleniya [The development of the state system of the Russian Federation as a factor in improving regional governance. Dr. jur. sci. diss.]. Moscow. 2003. 400 с.
5. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2000, no. 20, art. 2112; 2015, no. 43, art. 5946.
6. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2010, no. 4, art. 369.
7. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2014, no. 12, art. 1265.
8. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2016, no. 31, art. 4984.
9. Vedomosti SND i VSRF [Sheets SND and the Armed Forces], 1992, no. 30, art. 1792; Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2015, no. 48 (pt. I), art. 6720.
10. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2004, no. 24, art. 2395; 2014, no. 30 (pt. II), art. 4286.
11. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2000, no. 34, art. 3473.
12. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2012, no. 22, art. 2758; 2016, no. 15, art. 2073.
13. Gadjiev A. K. Apparat polnomochnogo predstaviteliya Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v federal’nom okruge: naznachenie, struktura, polnomochiya [Offi ce of the Plenipotentiary Representative of RF President in the Federal District]. Rossiiskaia iustitsia [Russian justice], 2014, no. 1, pp. 59‒62.
14. Polnomochnyi predstavitel’ Prezidenta RF v Privolzhskom federal’nom okruge (Plenipotentiary Representative of RF President in the Volga Federal District. Site). Avai lable at: http://www.pfo.ru/ (accessed 15 May 2016).
15. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2005, no. 13, art.1139; 2014, no. 52 (pt. I), art. 7755.
16. Cherkasov K. V. Institut polnomochnykh predstavitelii Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v federalnykh okrugakh: sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiya [Institute of plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts: state and prospects ]. Saratov, 2007. 364 p.
17. Volkov A. M., Hahina A. A. K voprosu o dvoistvennosti administrativno-pravovoi prirody instituta polnomochnykh predstavitelei Prezidenta RF v federalnykh okrugakh [On the duality of the administrative and legal nature of institute of plenipotentiaries of the President in the federal districts]. Administrativnoe pravo i proсess [Administrative Law and Procedure], 2012, no. 4, pp. 44‒48.
18. Cherkasov K. V. Kontrol’ kak osnovnoe napravlenie deiatel’nosti polnomochnykh predstavitelei Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v federalnykh okrugakh [Control as the main activity of plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the fe deral districts]. Gosudarstvennaya vlast’ i mestnoe samo upravlenie [State power and local self-government], 2009, no. 4, pp. 22‒25.
19. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2004, no. 26, art. 2651; 2015, no. 7, art. 1025.
20. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 1997, no. 1, art. 118; 2014, no. 30 (pt. II), art. 4286.
22. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda RF ot 06.04.1998 № 11-P [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 06.04.1998 № 11-P]. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 1998, no. 16, art. 1879.
23. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda RF ot 01.12.1999 № 17-P [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 01.12.1999 № 17-P]. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 1999, no. 51, art. 6364.
24. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda RF ot 30.04.1997 № 7-P [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 30.04.1997 № 7-P]. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 1997, no. 20, art. 2383.
25. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda RF ot 25.06.2001 № 9-P [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 25.06.2001 № 9-P]. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2001, no. 27, art. 2804.
26. Bobrova V. K. Institut polnomochnogo predstavitelia Prezidenta v Konstitutsionnom Sude: praktika deiatel’nosti [Institute of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Constitutional Court: the practice of activities]. Jurnal konstitutsionnogo pravosudiya [Constitutional Justice Magazine], 2008, no. 5, pp. 16‒18.
27. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2002, no. 11, ст. 1022; 2015, no. 41 (pt. II), art. 5638.
28. Glavnyi federal’nyi inspector po Saratovskoi oblasti apparata Polnomochnogo predstavitelia Prezidenta RF v Privoljskom federalnom okruge (Chief Federal Inspector of the Plenipotentiary Representative of RF President in the Volga Federal District. Site). Available at: http://www. gfi 64.pfo.ru/ (accessed 15 May 2016).
29. Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], 2004, no. 13, ст. 1188; 2015, no. 11, art. 1585.