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Frank Patterson successfully defeated a bad faith set-up case in the trial of Lloyd Sidley vs Roshan Dulal and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co. Trial was before Judge Frederick Martinez in Arapahoe County. Plaintiff was severely injured in a motorcycle accident, with medical expenses in excess of $1 Million. The defendant had only $25,000 in liability coverage. Plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to State Farm saying plaintiff would accept the limits in settlement of the claim if State Farm satisfied 3 conditions – 1) supply proof of the liability limits; 2) perform due diligence in determining whether there was any other liability insurance; and 3) provide an affidavit, which he provided, signed by the insured which indicated the defendant’s assets. State Farm did all three and offered its limits. Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm’s insured, arguing that State Farm failed to satisfactorily complete the three conditions, thus exposing the insured to a large excess verdict and making State Farm liable for the excess. The trial court allowed State Farm to intervene and bifurcated the trial to determine first whether a settlement had been reached. The jury quickly returned a verdict that State Farm had properly completed the conditions and that there was indeed a settlement for $25,000.
This case is a good example of a situation with large damages and little insurance, where the plaintiff’s attorney was trying to set-up the insurance company to be on the hook for all the damages. It was clear that counsel never had any real intent to settle. He was going to argue that the insurer failed to satisfy the conditions no matter what it had done. We were fortunate in this case that our insurance client was allowed to intervene in the underlying injury suit rather than having to wait until a sizable judgment was entered against its insured and then fight it in separate litigation.
Kevin G. Ripplinger tried the case of Craig Cypher v. Mountain Man Welding and Fabrication, Inc., and James Fedje in an 8-day trial in Adams County. This case arises from an auto accident involving employee and claims under Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act. Kevin Ripplinger represented the employer under claim for respondeat superior. Defense verdict obtained for both defendants.
Karl Chambers tried the case of Grace Stean and Adam Stevens v. Margaret Molloy in a four day trial in Arapahoe District Court.
This action arose out of a motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff’s wife, Grace Stean, and our client, Margaret Molloy. Ms. Stean claimed that she was injured in the accident, including an alleged mild traumatic brain injury and a cervical facet injury. Plaintiff, Adam Stevens, was not involved in the accident, but claimed that he suffered a loss of consortium due to his wife’s injuries. We admitted that defendant negligently caused the accident, but challenged the injuries and damages claimed by Ms. Stean and her husband. Ms. Stean settled her claim prior to trial and Mr. Stevens elected to litigate his loss of consortium claim. Our defense was that he did not suffer a loss of consortium. The jury agreed and returned a defense verdict finding that Mr. Stevens did not suffer a loss of consortium.
Frank & Hillary Patterson obtained a Defense Verdict in an October trial over UIM benefits. The case is Velvet Entz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Pueblo County District Court, 2016CV030960. Plaintiff claimed the accident caused serious cervical injuries including a herniated disc, with past medical expenses of $160,000 and an anticipated future cervical surgery at a cost of $140,644.00 – $244,430. The liability carrier had previously paid its $100,000 in limits. Plaintiff demanded the full UIM policy limits of $500,000. The last and lowest offer to settle by Plaintiff was $350,000.
Frank and Hillary disputed causation. In the trial they admitted plaintiff may have had a slight exacerbation of some pre-accident complaints but denied that the disc herniation or subsequent surgeries were the result of the accident. They argued that plaintiff had a pre-existing degenerative condition in her cervical spine for which she sought periodic chiropractic treatment in the years preceding the accident and that her post-accident treatment was not consistent with a herniation caused by the accident. Instead, they argued that the significant herniation at C5-6 occurred 8 months after the accident and it was not related to the accident.
The jury agreed, finding that Plaintiff’s total damages from the accident were $4,300. Since she had already recovered the liability limits far in excess of that, State Farm owed no UIM payment.
Plaintiff’s treating doctors who testified were Dr. Lloyd Mobley, Dr. Roger Sung, Dr. John Warner, DC and Dr. William Anderson, DC. The defense expert who testified was Dr. Henry Roth.
Karl Chambers gave oral arguments in the case Bailey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of our client, State Farm. The plaintiff sued the party that caused the accident along with State Farm seeking underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm claiming that his damages exceeded the liability policy limits of the at-fault party. Shortly before trial the liability insurer for the at-fault party agreed to pay the judgment regardless of the amount. The jury returned a verdict for an amount greater than the at-fault party’s policy limits and his insurer paid the full amount of the judgment. Notwithstanding the fact that the full amount of the judgment was paid by the liability insurer the plaintiff argued that he was still entitled to $100,000 in UIM coverage. We argued that there was no UIM coverage because the entire judgment had been paid by the liability insurer. The trial court agreed with us and entered a judgment only against the at-fault party. Plaintiff filed an appeal of the trial court’s judgment and the Court of Appeals also agreed with us that no UIM benefits were owed because the entire judgment was paid by the liability insurer.
On August 1, 2018, attorneys Frank Patterson and Hillary Patterson obtained a directed verdict for the defendant in the case of Patrice Fujisaki Sauter. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (Denver County District Court, 2017CV33275).
Plaintiff Patrice Fujisaki Sauter is the daughter of the deceased homeowner and State Farm insured, Rose Fujisaki. Plaintiff alleged a hail and wind storm caused damage to Rose Fujisaki’s home and lightweight concrete tile roof. State Farm determined the concrete tile roof was not damaged in the hail/wind event, but had sustained unrelated damage from improper installation and footfall. State Farm issued payment to Rose Fujisaki for other damage to the property caused by hail/wind. Plaintiff lived in the home, but did not own the home, was not the named insured on the State Farm policy, and was not the personal representative of the Estate of Rose Fujisaki. Plaintiff brought a first-party claim in her own right alleging breach of contract, common law bad faith, and unreasonable delay and denial pursuant to C.R.S. §§ 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116.
Plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and common law bad faith were dismissed on summary judgment because Plaintiff was not the homeowner or policyholder, and therefore had no standing to pursue those claims. The Court denied summary judgment on the claim of unreasonable delay/denial, ruling a fact question remained as to whether Plaintiff had authority to assert the claim on behalf of the Estate of Rose Fujisaki. Plaintiff never moved to amend the pleadings and presented no other timely evidence of her standing to assert claims on behalf of the Estate of Rose Fujisaki.
At trial, The Honorable Judge Martin F. Egelhoff ruled on State Farm’s oral motion for directed verdict after Plaintiff rested her case-in-chief. Judge Egelhoff held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Plaintiff had not presented any evidence that she had legal authority to pursue a claim of unreasonable delay/denial under C.R.S. §§ 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116 on behalf of the Estate of Rose Fujisaki. Therefore, Plaintiff lacked standing and her remaining claim was dismissed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 50.
On July 23, 2018, Kevin G. Ripplinger and Brian D. Kennedy tried the case of Julie Weber v. Keyan Pesaran, Nahid Pesaran, and Ahmad Pesaran in Boulder County District Court in front of the Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill.
Law Office of Alan C. Shafner, P.C.
TYPE OF CLAIMS: Wrongful Death (Negligence) claim against Defendant Keyan Pesaran, Family Car Doctrine claim against Defendants Nahid Pesaran and Ahmad Pesaran.
DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ACCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE: December 6, 2015, near mile marker 123 on Colorado Highway 40 in Routt County, Colorado.
DESCRIPTION OF CASE: Plaintiff’s daughter, Nicole Weber, Keyan Pesaran and a mutual friend, Shannon Cook, were returning to Boulder from Steamboat, Colorado. Nicole Weber was a passenger in a Jeep Grand Cherokee being driven by Keyan Pesaran. The previous night (and early morning), Nicole Weber, Shannon Cook and Keyan Pesaran had attended a party. Keyan Pesaran used drugs and alcohol during or after the party. The morning after the party, Keyan Pesaran also took Adderall or Vyvanse. During the drive back to Boulder, Keyan Pesaran fell asleep or lost consciousness, and the Jeep left the road, rolling several times. Keyan Pesaran and Shannon Cook were injured in the accident, and Nicole Weber was killed.
Nahid and Ahmad Pesaran are Keyan Pesaran’s parents. They purchased the Jeep for Keyan Pesaran several years before the accident. Nahid Pesaran was the registered owner of the Jeep, and Nahid and Ahmad Pesaran covered most of Keyan Pesaran’s expenses. Keyan Pesaran was a college student at the time of the collision and had an apartment separate from his parents’ home.
Plaintiff asserted a wrongful death claim against Keyan Pesaran and a family car claim against Nahid and Ahmad Pesaran.
INJURIES AND/OR DAMAGES ALLEGED: Plaintiffs adult daughter, Nicole Weber, was killed in a car accident. Plaintiff claimed emotional distress, suffering, inconvenience and loss of quality of life as the result of the death of her daughter.
FINAL OFFER BEFORE TRIAL: $300,000 from all defendants jointly.
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESSES: Daniel Anderson, Colorado Bureau of Investigation Forensic Services Division, as to blood test results concerning Keyan Pesaran. Ken Kulig, M.D., toxicologist, as to effects of substances consumed by Keyan Pesaran.
VERDICT: For the plaintiff and against Defendant Pesaran on the Wrongful Death (negligence) claim. The jury determined that Plaintiff’s damages were $1,500,000. For Defendants Nahid Pesaran and Ahmad Pesaran and against the plaintiff on the Family Car claim.
OTHER COMMENTS: Plaintiff petitioned the court for a determination that the death of Nicole Weber constitutes a felonious killing and the court granted that motion.
On April 30, 2018, Brian D. Kennedy tried and won case number 2017CV30697 in front of the Honorable Martin F. Egelhoff, in a three day (although scheduled for four) jury trial in Denver District Court.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant attacked him without warning or provocation while he was walking down Larimer Street near a nightclub called the Retro Room, punching Plaintiff in the back of the head and tackling him. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s allegations and claimed that Plaintiff came up behind Defendant’s wife and groped her buttocks. When Defendant approached Plaintiff and began speaking to him about the incident, Defendant alleged that Plaintiff charged him and that, in the ensuing scuffle, Plaintiff fell to the ground, injuring himself.
TYPE OF CLAIMS: Assault, Battery, and Outrageous Conduct.
DIRECTED VERDICTS: The Court directed verdicts in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim of assault and on all of Plaintiff’s claims for economic damages.
INJURIES AND/OR DAMAGES ALLEGED: Facial bruising, abrasions and laceration, corneal abrasion, concussion, post-concussive syndrome, depression, anxiety, PTSD, headaches, tinnitus, panic attacks, and ED. Plaintiff also claimed to have wage loss from missed work as well as diminished earning capacity because of his inability to continue a career in the Air force.
SPECIALS: $24,000 in medical expenses, $1,700 in past wage loss and an estimated $750,000 in future income loss.
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESSES: Laur M. Birlea, M.D.
VERDICT: For the defendant on the Plaintiff’s claims of battery and outrageous conduct.
OTHER COMMENTS: The Court excluded evidence of diagnoseable mental health conditions and treatment, as well as evidence of diminished earning capacity as a sanction for discovery violations. The Court also limited the testimony of Plaintiff’s physicians based upon inadequate disclosures. Defendant is seeking costs, as well as an award of attorney’s fees for discovery violations.
Frank Patterson argued the Fisher vs State Farm case in the Supreme Court in October. He receives periodic calls from insurers asking about the status. The Supreme Court has not yet issued a ruling, and there is no deadline to issue its ruling, but it is likely to do so by May or June.
Frank Patterson was honored with selection to the “TOP 100” in Colorado Super Lawyers 2018 following a blue ribbon review process. Frank has been listed annually in Super Lawyers for many years and has long been recognized in the legal community as one of the best trial lawyers around. Trial success followed from his earliest years in practice. It is believed he was the youngest attorney ever selected to the American Board of Trial Advocates when he was selected in the early 90’s. Congratulations Frank!
Frank Patterson was honored again by 5280 Magazine as a Top Lawyer in personal injury defense. Congratulations again, Frank!
Frank and Hillary Patterson teamed up with Frank’s wife, Robin, and Joe Buchholz to win the 2017 CDLA golf tournament. Pictured here are the happy Pattersons with the traveling trophy. Not bad for a team with a novice (Hillary) and a new hip (Robin). They hope to defend the title this year at the CDLA conference in Telluride.
Frank Patterson and Karl Chambers won a summary judgment motion in a declaratory relief action entitled Viking Insurance Co v. Mark Achter; Monica Achter; Little Willie J. Ortiz, II; Darrell J. Ortiz in Pueblo County, case number 2017 CV 030215. The case involved an excluded driver who was involved in the accident. Because the Complaint in the underlying bodily injury suit identified the excluded driver as the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident, the declaratory relief action could be pursued without awaiting the conclusion of the underlying suit. The trial court agreed the exclusion was consistent with Colorado law and Viking was not obligated to defend or indemnify for the accident.

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"You did a great very professional job here."
Lester L. Levy is Of Counsel to Wolf Popper LLP and was the Chairman and Managing Partner of the Firm from 1992 to 2016. A graduate of Columbia Law School, Mr. Levy has prosecuted hundreds of class actions and has recovered over one billion dollars for the class members he has represented. He is a recognized leader in complex class action litigation and has lectured in complex litigation at the University of Illinois and the University of Miami Law Schools.
Mr. Levy's ability to prosecute sophisticated class actions successfully has often been the subject of judicial recognition.
Most recently, in certifying a class action supervised by Mr. Levy against Procter & Gamble for mislabeling certain toilet wipes as "flushable" and "safe for sewers and septic systems," Judge Jack B. Weinstein stated that Wolf Popper has "handled the case with great skill and full attention." See Belfiore v. Procter & Gamble, 14-cv-4090 (E.D.N.Y. March 27, 2017).
In the Motorola Securities Litigation, No. 03 C 287 (United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois), Mr. Levy represented the lead plaintiff, the State of New Jersey, Department of Treasury, Division of Investment. While approving a $190 million recovery, the Court stated: "You did a great very professional job here. This was hard fought, but extremely professionally fought battle and I appreciate it. Thank you."
In In re Providian Financial Securities Litigation, MDL No. 1301 (E.D. Pa), Mr. Levy was co-lead counsel for the plaintiff class and obtained a $38,000,000 judgment from the defendants. The Court, in approving the settlement in June, 2002, remarked on the "extremely high quality" and "skill and efficiency" of plaintiffs' counsel's work.
I want to not only compliment you lawyers for the professionalism that you showed in the course of reaching this compromise resolution, but I want to compliment you on the professionalism that you showed during the course of the litigation. This was a hard fought litigation. It was well briefed. The issues were presented crisply. . . . [A]s a judge presiding over this case, it was a pleasure to preside over it because of the skill and the quality of the lawyering on everyone's part in connection with this case.
Mr. Levy was co-lead counsel in one of the largest class actions brought in New Jersey State Court, Princeton Economics Group, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995). That case resulted in a settlement valued at $85-90 million. At the conclusion of the case, the Court noted the high level of skill possessed by class counsel and stated that... "If not for the skill and the experience of class counsel, a settlement may not have been reached or, if it had been reached, may have resulted in a significantly diminished recovery for the class."
Mr. Levy also headed the class action litigation against American Bankers Ins. Group Inc. He obtained a nationwide class determination [Taylor v. American Bankers Ins. Group Inc., 700 N.Y. S. 2d 458 (1st Dept. 1999)] and achieved a complete recovery for class members as the defendant agreed to pay the class members' disputed coverage claims in full. The defendant also agreed to revise its solicitations to prevent a recurrence.
Mr. Levy was plaintiffs' co-lead counsel in Seidman v. Stauffer Chemical Co., (United States District Court, District of Connecticut) where at the successful conclusion of the case, Chief Judge Daly remarked that plaintiffs' co-lead counsel had acted throughout the litigation "...in accord with the highest standards of the bar, and it was a pleasure to deal with you and to listen to you, and to review your work...".
Mr. Levy played a leading role in the landmark Joseph v. Shell Oil Litigation, wherein the plaintiff stockholders successfully petitioned the Delaware Chancery Court to enjoin the proposed merger of Shell Oil Company and Royal Dutch Petroleum Company. At the conclusion of the litigation, which resulted in a $205,000,000 recovery for the class, the Court said that "the results achieved in this case for the class are outstanding".
In In re Fidelity Medical, Inc. Securities Litigation, 92-1908 (United States District Court, District of New Jersey), where Mr. Levy was a member of plaintiffs' Executive Committee that prosecuted the case, the Court at the conclusion of the case complimented counsel for their skill and professionalism and thanked them for the way the litigation was conducted.
Mr. Levy was in charge of the team of lawyers that prosecuted In re Coordinated Title Insurance Cases. That action against several large title insurance companies, resulted in the largest recovery in a consumer class action in Nassau County, New York. The presiding Justice commented, in approving the settlement on July 29, 2005, that the prosecution by the Firm "was lawyering of the highest quality."
Mr. Levy was co-lead counsel in the TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, (United States District of Mass.). At the end of the case, the Court commented that co-lead counsel was "quite creative" in crafting an "excellent settlement" for the class.
Lester Levy of Wolf Popper Ross Wolf & Jones made short work of this case by winning a quick handsome return for shareholders. In one of the highest payout ratios in recent memory, eligible investors recovered 93% of the money they were deprived of. Levy obtained the settlement in just 15 months and investors received their checks within 6 months after the claim deadline date!
Securities Class Action Alert, p.60 (April 1991).
Zinberg v. Washington Bancorp, Inc., (United States District Court, District New Jersey) (recovery for the class members of 200% of their damages).
Mr. Levy argued before the New York Court of Appeals in Tanzer v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, 91 N.Y.2d 850 and won a unanimous decision upholding a class action complaint on behalf of insureds who had been denied medical insurance coverage. Thereafter, the class received 100% of their damages.
Mr. Levy is also active in charitable work. He has received the Lifetime Trustee Award from the National Multiple Sclerosis Society for "outstanding service to the MS community."


John B. Flemming, Belmont, Mass., with whom Camille F. Sarrouf, Anthony Tarricone, and Sarrouf, Murray & Daly, Boston, Mass., were on brief for defendants, appellants.
Paul F. Markham, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff, appellee.
1. The Board of Selectmen lack confidence in Robert C. Hagopian as Town Manager.
Failed to demonstrate a clear pattern of leadership for the town as required by Chapter 17.
Failed to communicate effectively with the Board of Selectmen and with the Town Meeting on matters important to the future of the Town.
Consistently proven to be uninformed or misinformed on the status of programs such as the two (2) million dollar sewer program currently underway.
The Board granted appellee's request for a public hearing, and adopted a final resolution of removal some time later.
Appellee then brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking damages for the asserted deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically he objected to the Board's failure to identify further the grounds for his removal, its failure to allow him to cross-examine Board members under oath at the public hearing, and its decision to dismiss him "without any justifiable cause or basis in fact." The case was tried before a jury, which awarded a $30,000 verdict in his favor.
Initially we determine whether appellee was deprived of a "property" or "liberty" interest in order to establish whether his hearing was constitutionally required. Appellee's claim of "property" in his employment "must be determined by reference to state law". Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976). Here the relevant state statute is the Saugus town charter, 1947 Mass. Acts ch. 17, §§ 8 & 11.* The significant aspect of the charter, from the standpoint of a property right, is that town managers can be dismissed without cause. Under Massachusetts law a mere requirement that reasons be stated does not mean they must be sufficient to constitute legal cause, or even that they be true. Fabrizio v. City of Quincy, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. 991, 993, --- Mass.App. ---, 404 N.E.2d 675, 676-77 (1980). Manifestly this confers no property interest. Requiring a hearing, without the necessity of establishing a cause, stands no higher. "With or without a hearing, there is a record of the cause of removal, and the appeal in either case is to public opinion." Id., quoting O'Dowd v. Boston, 149 Mass. 443, 447, 21 N.E. 949 (1889). See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 345-47, 96 S. Ct. at 2077-78. In other words, we view the statutory notice and hearing requirements as serving two purposes: first, that an articulated and facially invalid reason such as racial discrimination be quickly identified; and second, that employees have an opportunity, should they feel that the reasons proffered were unsupported or not the real reasons, to put their case to the public via a hearing. See Fabrizio, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. at 993 & n.3, --- Mass.App. at ---, 404 N.E.2d at 677 & n.3 (1980). In view of the hearing's limited purpose, there is no constitutional right in how it is conducted.
Since the town's contractual notice of employment incorporated the statutory terms, appellee similarly can claim no property entitlement arising from contract, as a matter apart from Massachusetts statutes. Neither does appellee demonstrate an infringement upon a cognizable "liberty" interest, since the Board's charges were not of the "serious and specific" nature that the cases have required. Ventetuolo v. Burke, 596 F.2d 476, 484 n.13 (1st Cir. 1979). There being neither a property nor a liberty interest at stake here, we need not consider further his contentions that the process he received was inadequate. See Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 1980).
"Section 11. Removal of Manager. The Selectmen, by majority vote of the full membership of the board, may remove the Town Manager. At least thirty days before such proposed removal shall become effective, the Selectmen shall file a preliminary written resolution with the Town Clerk setting forth in detail the specific reasons for his proposed removal, a copy of which resolution shall be delivered to the Town Manager. The Manager may reply in writing to the resolution and may request a public hearing. If the Manager so requests, the Board of Selectmen shall hold a public hearing, not earlier than twenty days nor later than thirty days after the filing of such request. After such public hearing, if any, otherwise at the expiration of thirty days following the filing of the preliminary resolution, and after full consideration, the Selectmen by a majority vote of the full membership of the Board may adopt a final resolution of removal. In the preliminary resolution, the Selectmen may suspend the Manager from duty, but shall in any case cause to be paid to him forthwith any unpaid balance of his salary and his salary for the next three calendar months following the filing of the preliminary resolution."


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Doctrine of Sin: Where Did it Come From & Why Does it Exist?
Sin, in its very essence, is contradictory to the nature of God, creating separation in the intimacy between God and man; however, it is allowed and even used by God in the provision of man’s free will, but is ultimately conquered by God’s grace, in the ultimate redemptive plan, through Jesus Christ. However, several questions still remain: “Why did God allow sin to enter the world,” and “why does He continue to allow it, especially considering, ‘The wages of sin is death’” (Romans 6:23). The problem or doctrine of sin continues to be a highly debated topic amongst scholars, because to fully understand the grace of God; one must first comprehend the depth of despair rooted in sin and its origin. Furthermore, one must also comprehend the nature of God, in order to offer a proper apologetic response to theological questions like: “If God made everything in creation good, how did evil and sin enter the world? If God is good, why does He allow evil and sin to exist? Why, if humans are created in the image of God, is there an inherent propensity to sin? And what purpose could evil and sin serve in accomplishing the will of God?” Ultimately, the sovereignty of God is on trial when people question the mystery of how and why evil and sin entered the world, so one must know sin’s origin and purpose to defend the faith. The thesis of this paper will show God allows sin in order to establish the freedom of mankind to freely choose Him.
By examining the introduction of sin into the world, it will be established sin was first found in Satan because of his desire to seek something contrary to what God intended. While God is sovereign in and over all things, He did not create sin, so it will then be revealed how evil originated in the created and not the Creator. The rejection of God’s will leads to spiritual death and this was played out in the lives of Adam and Eve, leading to the fall of mankind and all future generations. Working from the Old Testament to the New Testament, it will be displayed, God was not surprised or caught off guard by anything that has happened or will happen. In Old Testament times, animal sacrifices were continually offered at the Temple. These sacrifices showed the Israelites the seriousness of sin because: “Blood had to be shed before sins could be pardoned” (Leviticus 17:11). But the blood of animals could not fully remove sins (Hebrews 10:4). The sacrifices could only point to Jesus’ future sacrifice, which paid the final penalty for all sins. Paul, in his letter to the Romans, asserts the law failed only because “It was weakened by the flesh.” Douglas Moo illustrates, “In light of this criticism of the law in Romans, and the focus on liberation from sin and death in, ‘what the law could not do’ is not to condemn sin, but to break sin’s power—or, to put it positively, to secure eschatological life. It is God Himself who has done what the Law could not do, and He has done it through the sending of His own Son.” When sin corrupted the world, God first provided the law as a means for sinners to know just how sinful they were and how far they had deviated from God’s standards. Before the law was given, sin existed (Romans 5:13). However, after the law was given, sin could be quantified and each act and could then be identified as an offense of a specific commandment found within law.
In the New Testament, God then provides a way for mankind to restore communion with the Father, which came through Jesus Christ. Ultimately, sin stands in the way of God’s best, and modern-day culture has become numb to its very presence, leading many to just do what feels good. However, the ripple effect of “original sin” still carries immense consequences. Lastly, it will be shown how Satan uses sin to isolate and condemn people, while God uses it to redeem and make His children whole. Sin has corrupted the world; so only by understanding how to counter Satan’s strategy will followers of Christ be able to use what the enemy meant for harm, for ultimate good (Genesis 50:15-21).
Seen in the fact that it would prefer the world to be a desert in its own hands than a garden in the hands of someone else. In fact, the capacity to destroy and oppress becomes a source of pride. This is perversion at its plainest. But again the poet has turned the boast back upon the boaster. He who had exiled hundreds of thousands from their homes and would not let them return now is himself homeless, and in a much more profound sense. This man is a spiritual exile. His pride has driven him from the home, which the Father has given in trust to all his children. Because pride denies God it must deny us what God has given, ultimately life itself.
The assault on the prince involves three actions, which, while directed at a human monarch, reflect the treatment that images of a deity in the temple would receive from an attacking army. If the king of Tyre would claim the status of a god, then let him put up with the treatment of a god at the hands of invaders. First, the nations will attack the source of the prince’s pride, the symbols of his wealth and glory. Second, the invaders will desecrate and profane the prince’s radiant splendor. Third, the strangers will send the prince down to the Pit and the prince will exchange his falsely secure position “in the heart of the seas” for the world of the dead. The one who dares to claim the status of deity and demands to live among the gods must join the dead in Sheol. For this man the way up led down.
Sin is caused by ignorance, error, inattention, and pride. It is then characterized by missing the mark, irreligion, transgression, rebellion, treachery, perversion, abomination, and lack of integrity. These causes and characteristics of sin have detrimental results and consequences, which lead to guilt, wickedness, and evil. In Psalm 51, David becomes convicted of his sin with Bathsheba after his confrontation with the prophet Nathan making both this confession of sin and pleading for forgiveness a prime example of what all sinners should do. In v. 2, David laments, “Cleanse me from my sin.” David uses several different forms for the word sin and here חַטָּאת or ḥaṭṭāʾt is used, which literally means missing the mark deliberately and purposefully disobeying God’s Word. In v. 3, David calls upon the Lord to blot out his transgressions, wickedness and rebellion. Here, David uses פֶּשַׁע or pešaʿ, which essentially means forgiveness for knowing what God’s Words says, but choosing to revolt or rebel against His commands. In v. 9, David asks God to, “Blot out all my iniquities.” In this verse, David chooses the word עָוֹן or ʿāwon to signify the crooked thinking and living that results when one acts against God’s Word. In each of these examples, David assumes responsibility for his sins and he knew that only repentance and forgiveness would cleanse his perverted inner state.
A similar model can be found in Paul’s letter to the Romans in chapter five. In v. 12, Paul is dealing with the topic of sin coming into the world through one man: Adam, but through the obedience and sacrifice of Christ, all believers might know the righteousness of God. Paul uses the word hamartia or ἁμαρτία, which is synonymous with the Old Testament חַטָּאת or ḥaṭṭāʾt, meaning a purposeful missing of the mark and of God’s standards, His holiness, and His Word. In v. 14, parabaseōs or παράβασις is used to describe sinning as going beyond or over and disregarding or overstepping God’s Word. As humans, it is part of one’s fallen nature to test limits and boundaries of what is acceptable and allowed, but here the sin is to put one’s foot over the line to test what the consequences are and this is exactly what Adam and Eve did. In v. 19, parakoēs or παρακοή is used to define disobedience or the willful choice not to hear. Selective listening never fares well, especially when people hear what he or she wants to hear. In vv. 15, 17, and 18 paraptōma or παράπτωμα is used to describe the offense or trespass. Another deviation of this word means falling sideways or false stepping, which means instead of doing what is necessary or right, one chooses to go around. In this particular passage, Paul is addressing not only the problem of sin, but also the issue of continuing to sin. Before Paul could teach about the new life believers had in Christ, his listeners had to know the definition of sin.
Temptation exists when something or someone attempts to influence another person to sin. Jesus Himself was tempted, so the act of being tempted is not sin, but acting on those thoughts is. God does not tempt His children, (James 1:13-15) but Satan does. In an attempt to corrupt the world, Satan wants everyone to live in total depravity, but as Frame demonstrates, “The corruption of sin remains until death, but it grows weaker and weaker, through the continual strength from the sanctifying Spirit of Christ. Scripture promises victory in Jesus, so the final word about the believer is not corruption, but overcoming. Paul said, ‘For sin will have no dominion over you, since you are not under law but under grace’” (Romans 6:14).
The doctrine of sin reveals man’s fallen nature and often can be difficult to identify. Frame shows, “Many people are unable to grasp the concept of sin as a inner force, an inherent condition, a controlling power. People today think more in terms of sins as wrongful acts. Sins are something external and concrete, logically separable from the person. On this basis, one who has not done anything wrong [generally conceived of as an external act] is considered good.” In today’s society, sins are often ranked by a variety of manmade circumstances. In the judicial system, there are felonies and misdemeanors and each crime will carry with it a sentence or judgment. In a like manner, Christians often do the same thing with sin, but in God’s eyes all sin is still sin. While there can be some argument that blasphemy of the Holy Spirit was considered an unpardonable sin, a proper understanding of the historical context and environment Jesus was speaking in reveals His authority came from the Spirit of the Father.
Joseph Haven provides two logically possible suppositions on the existence of sin in the world: “(1) That God cannot entirely prevent sin and (2) That for some reason, He does not choose to prevent it. Each of these propositions supposes what the other denies; and, as such, by the laws of contradiction, and of excluded middle, while they cannot both be true, one or the other must be true.” It is the view of this writer that God chooses not to prevent sin based on four principles highlighted by Haven: (1) Because its existence is in itself desirable; (2) because, though not in itself desirable, it is still the necessary means of the greatest good; (3) because, thought not in itself tending to good, it may be overruled to that result; or (4) because, in general terms, its permission will involve less evil that its absolute prevention. The most valid response is the permission of sin serves the greater good and that God allow its presence, under specific restrictions. Haven then asserts, “It is not sin, but the purpose on the part of God not to do more than He is doing to prevent sin, that is for the best. [This view] puts the existence of sin, not in the light of a greater good, but only of a lesser evil.” Harrison further demonstrates how, “The consequences of sin are so terrible that in permitting it the righteous and just God must see it as essential to the achievement of a purpose who benefits are of supreme importance to Himself.” Upon this premise, Harrison claims sin entered the creation for three primary reasons: (1) God desired His creature to know Him and receive His blessings; (2) The freedom to choose exercised without any influence by God was the direct cause of sin; and (3) Sin and all of its consequences were necessary to show His love and holiness, and the inability of man and angel apart from God, not only to be redeemed, but so every creature would understand.
Everyone is born into the world as sinners because of Adam’s sin. David Wilcox explains, “Adam’s sin is and was therefore indeed our sin – for Adam’s sin is embedded in those who make us human, and they can only make us after their image. Adam’s rebellion has come down to us generation after generation – culturally transmitted, and neurologically inevitable.” Ian Boyd, when dealing with the issue of self-destroying sin, demonstrates how the problem of sin and evil is often contested when it affects the unwilling suffering of innocents. Boyd explains, “The problem of self-destroying sin can lead a Christian to doubt God’s power or God’s goodness toward the one who sins self-destructively. God appears to betray and be unable to save and redeem, which calls Christianity itself into question because of the central promise of redemption from sin.” Despite this view, the justice and love of God work in conformity.
The law was ultimately incapable of providing life to those who adhered to it, as Dirk Venter explains, “All sin was collectively condemned by God in the flesh of Jesus Christ, and He bore that condemnation out in the destruction of His flesh. Those who partake of this reality through their participation or inclusion ‘in Christ’ by faith can boldly proclaim with Paul that ‘there is now no condemnation for me’” (Romans 8:1). Thomas further explains the mission of Christ and how, “Christian faith teaches that sin cannot be overcome through human ingenuity or effort. The solution to the problem lies in what God has done for us in Jesus Christ. The penalty for sin is death, judgment, and hell, but the gospel is that God has chosen to pay this penalty Himself in the sacrificial life and death of His Son, Jesus Christ.” The vicarious atonement Christ provided at Calvary made a way not only to restore fellowship with the Father, but also to provide payment in full for all past, present, and future sin. Only an infinite God could cover the multitude of sin found within mankind’s fallen nature.
Betenson, Toby. “Evaluative Claims within the Problem of Evil.” Religious Studies 51, no. 3 (09, 2015): 361-77, http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/1703895888?accountid=12085 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Boyd, Ian T. E. “The problem of self-destroying sin in John Milton’s Samson Agonistes.” Faith and Philosophy 13, no. 4 (October, 1996): 487-507. (accessed May 10, 2017).
Block, Daniel I. The New International Commentary on the Old Testament – The Book of Ezekiel Chapters 25-48. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976.
Crisp, Oliver D. “On Original Sin.” International Journal of Systematic Theology, 17, (June 2015): 252–266. doi: 10.1111/ijst.12107 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Davids, Peter H. The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The First Epistle of Peter (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990.
Durden, John. “The Doctrine of Sin.” Filmed , Liberty University Website, THEO 525, Course Content, Week Seven Video Presentation. 12:48. https://learn.liberty.edu/webapps/blackboard/content/listContent.jsp?course_id=_351169_1&content_id=_16910176_1 (accessed May 11, 2017).
Egan, Robert. “Epistemological Foundations for A Theology of Sin.” The Heythrop Journal, 57, (May 2016): 553–567. doi: 10.1111/heyj.12318 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Esqueda, Octavio Javier. “Sin and Christian Teaching.” Christian Education Journal 8, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 164-176. General OneFile http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA254754469&sid=summon&asid=7cd444ab8fa87f29079655e13d84de39 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Fee, Gordon D. The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The First Epistle to the Corinthians. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1987.
Geisler, Norman L. The Problem of Evil, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing, 1999.
Geisler, Norman L. and Ronald M. Brooks. When Skeptics Ask. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing Group, 1995.
Gockel, Matthias. “‘Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good’: an orientational approach to suffering and evil.” Modern Theology 25, no. 1 (January 2009): 97-105. ATLASerials, Religion Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 10, 2017).
Harrison, William K. (William Kelly). “Origin of Sin.” Bibliotheca Sacra 130, no. 517 (January 1973): 58-61. ATLASerials, Religion Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 10, 2017).
Haven, Joseph. “Sin, As Related To Human Nature And To The Divine Purpose.” Bibliotheca Sacra 020, no. 79 (July 1863): 445-488. (accessed May 10, 2017).
Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Eternally Incorrigible: The Continuing-Sin Response to the Proportionality Problem of Hell.” Religious Studies 39, no. 1 (2003): 61-78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008447 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Lewis, C. S. The Complete C. S. Lewis Signature Classics: The Problem of Pain. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Der christliche Glaube, nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. Zweite Auflage 1830/31 (Kritische Gesamtausgabe 1/13), ed. Rolf Schäfer (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2003), vol. 1 (§ 80).
The Church of England Website, “Article IX Of Original or Birth-sin.” https://www.churchofengland.org/prayer-worship/worship/book-of-common-prayer/articles-of-religion.aspx#IX (accessed May 11, 2017).
Venter, Dirk J. “Romans 8:3-4 and God’s resolution of the threefold problems of sin, the incapability of the law and the weakness of the flesh.” In die Skriflig 48, no. 1 (2014). Academic OneFile http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA406163579&asid=6a1e0a7a5321bc7b9c4c11a1a02b29d6 (accessed May 10, 2017).
Wilcox, David L. “A proposed model for the evolutionary creation of human beings: From the image of God to the origin of sin.” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 68, no. 1 (2016): 22-43. Academic OneFile http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA486164679&sid=summon&asid=e80c6aa2b9a2eae051ab74327ee96e56 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Douglas J. Moo, The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), 477-478.
 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 3rd Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing Group, 2013), 557.
 John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2013), 852.
 John N. Oswalt, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament – The Book of Isaiah Chapters 1-39 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), 323.
 Daniel I. Block, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament – The Book of Ezekiel Chapters 25-48 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), 98.
 Block, TNICOT, The Book of Ezekiel, 117.
 William K. Harrison, “Origin of Sin,” Bibliotheca Sacra 130, no. 517 (January 1973): 60. ATLASerials, Religion Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Oliver D. Crisp, “On Original Sin,” International Journal of Systematic Theology, 17, (June 2015): 256. doi: 10.1111/ijst.12107 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 John Durden, “The Doctrine of Sin,” Filmed , Liberty University Website, THEO 525, Course Content, Week Seven Video Presentation, 12:48. https://learn.liberty.edu/webapps/blackboard/content/listContent.jsp?course_id=_351169_1&content_id=_16910176_1 (accessed May 11, 2017).
 R. L. Thomas, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. 2nd Edition. ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing Group, 2001), 1103-1104.
 Robert Egan, “Epistemological Foundations for A Theology of Sin,” The Heythrop Journal, 57, (May 2016): 553–567. doi: 10.1111/heyj.12318 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Crisp, “On Original Sin,” 258.
 The Church of England Website, “Article IX Of Original or Birth-sin,” https://www.churchofengland.org/prayer-worship/worship/book-of-common-prayer/articles-of-religion.aspx#IX (accessed May 11, 2017).
 Joseph Haven, “Sin, As Related To Human Nature And To The Divine Purpose,” Bibliotheca Sacra 020, no. 79 (July 1863): 472. (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Haven, “Sin, As Related To Human Nature And To The Divine Purpose,” 481 & 483.
 Harrison, “Origin of Sin,” 60.
 Kenneth Einar Himma, “Eternally Incorrigible: The Continuing-Sin Response to the Proportionality Problem of Hell,” Religious Studies 39, no. 1 (2003): 69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008447 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 See also William Wainwright, “Original Sin,” in Thomas V. Morris (ed.) Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 34-35.
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube, nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. Zweite Auflage 1830/31 (Kritische Gesamtausgabe 1/13), ed. Rolf Schäfer (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2003), vol. 1, p. 488 (§ 80).
 Octavio Javier Esqueda, “Sin and Christian Teaching,” Christian Education Journal 8, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 164. General OneFile. http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA254754469&sid=summon&asid=7cd444ab8fa87f29079655e13d84de39 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Esqueda, “Sin and Christian Teaching,” 166.
 David L. Wilcox, “A proposed model for the evolutionary creation of human beings: From the image of God to the origin of sin.” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 68, no. 1 (2016): 22-43. Academic OneFile http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA486164679&sid=summon&asid=e80c6aa2b9a2eae051ab74327ee96e56 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Ian T. E. Boyd, “The problem of self-destroying sin in John Milton’s Samson Agonistes,” Faith and Philosophy 13, no. 4 (October, 1996): 489. (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Dirk J. Venter, “Romans 8:3-4 and God’s resolution of the threefold problems of sin, the incapability of the law and the weakness of the flesh,” In die Skriflig 48, no. 1 (2014). Academic OneFile http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=vic_liberty&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA406163579&asid=6a1e0a7a5321bc7b9c4c11a1a02b29d6 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 Thomas, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 1106.
 Gordon D. Fee, The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1987), 806.
 Peter H. Davids, The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The First Epistle of Peter (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 112.
 I. Howard Marshall, The New International Commentary on the New Testament – The Epistles of John (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1978), 118.
 Toby Betenson, “Evaluative Claims within the Problem of Evil.” Religious Studies 51, no. 3 (09, 2015): 361. http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/1703895888?accountid=12085 (accessed May 10, 2017).
 C. S. Lewis, The Complete C. S. Lewis Signature Classics: The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 561.
 Norman L. Geisler and Ronald M. Brooks, When Skeptics Ask (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing Group, 1995), 73.
 Lewis, The Problem of Pain, 562.
 Geisler and Brooks, When Skeptics Ask, 73.
 Lewis, The Problem of Pain, 120.
 Ravi Zacharias and Norman Geisler, Who Made God? And Answers to Over 100 Other Questions of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003), 31.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. V.


§ 76-1 Responsibility of owner or custodian.
§ 76-2 Running at large prohibited.
§ 76-5 Return to owner.
§ 76-6 Reclamation of seized dogs.
§ 76-7 Failure to pay penalty; abandonment of dogs.
§ 76-8 Disposal of dogs.
§ 76-9 Violations and penalties.
It shall be unlawful for the owner or custodian of any dog, whether licensed or not, to fail to keep such dog either confined within an enclosure from which it cannot escape, firmly secured by means of a collar and chain or other device so that it cannot stray beyond the premises of the owner or custodian, under the personal control of and in close proximity to said owner or custodian or, when engaged in lawful hunting, accompanied by an owner or custodian.
It shall be unlawful for the owner or custodian of any dog, at any time whatsoever, to permit such dog to run at large or to cause any damage to any buildings, lawns, shrubbery or any other real or personal property or to cause any annoyance to persons in the Township of Concord. Failure of any such owner or custodian to properly curb and restrain his dog shall subject him to penalties provided under this article.
It shall be unlawful for any person to interfere with any officer in the enforcement of this article, and it shall be unlawful for any person forcibly to cut the leash of or to take such dog away from any officer having it in his possession after having found it running at large unaccompanied by the owner or custodian.
It shall be the duty of a Constable of Concord Township or an Animal Control Officer, to be appointed by the Board of Supervisors, to enforce this article and to seize any dog allowed to run at large contrary to the provisions of this article.
The owner or custodian recognizes the violation of this article and agrees to pay a penalty, in accordance with the fine schedule, to the township at the Secretary's office within five days of said violation.
The owner or custodian recognizes the violation of this article and agrees to pay to the township, at the Secretary's office, the penalty as prescribed in the fine schedule within five days following said release.
If the owner or custodian fails to pay the applicable penalty within the five-day period, he shall be subject to prosecution before a District Justice or other court having jurisdiction, and be charged with violation of this article. If the owner or custodian fails to claim the dog within three days following seizure, it shall be considered abandoned, and subject to disposition in accordance with the rules of the SPCA. Such abandonment shall not, however, relieve the owner or custodian from the consequences of violating this article.
If the ownership of a seized dog cannot be ascertained because such dog is not carrying any identifying license, such dog may be disposed of in accordance with the rules of the SPCA.
A fine of $50 for the second offense in any one calendar year.
A fine of $100 for the third and subsequent offenses in any calendar year.
Each violation for each separate day and each violation of any provision of this article shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
Any person who violates or permits the violation of any provision of this article shall, upon being found liable therefor in a civil enforcement proceeding commenced by Concord Township, pay the fine prescribed by this article, plus all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by Concord Township.
In the event that the violator falls to pay to Concord Township the civil penalty fine on or before the due date, Concord Township shall commence a civil enforcement proceeding in a court having jurisdiction.
Editor's Note: This ordinance also repealed former § 76-9, Fines; fees, and renumbered former § 76-10 as § 76-9.


Zolla v. John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc.
The claimant was represented by Barry S. Moller, Esq., Cramer & Anderson, 46 West Street, P.O. Box 278, Litchfield, CT 06759.
The respondent was represented by Richard W. Lynch, Esq., Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, 52 Trumbull Street, P.O. Box 1612, New Haven, CT 06506.
This Petition for Review from the August 7, 2007 Finding and Ruling on Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner acting for the Fifth District was heard March 28, 2008 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners Ernie R. Walker, Charles F. Senich and Stephen B. Delaney.
ERNIE R. WALKER, COMMISSIONER. The present appeal from a Finding and Ruling on the Motion to Preclude granted to the claimant in this case is based on the respondent’s position that the claimant, an interstate truck driver, should not have been able to file an injury claim before this Commission. They advance a number of separate arguments around this central theme. They argue that the claimant was barred by contract from bringing a claim in Connecticut and his sole contractual remedy was before the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“Ohio BWC”). They further argue that the facts of this case, where a Connecticut resident working for an Ohio employer was injured while in New Jersey, do not present a situation where Connecticut has jurisdiction. Finally, they argue that the Ohio BWC has rendered a judgment in the respondent’s favor on this claim, and this denial should be binding on the Connecticut forum.
We have considered these arguments at length, but in light of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323 (2008), we find these arguments unpersuasive. There is no dispute in this case that the respondent failed to file a disclaimer of liability within the statutory period to contest this claim, and pursuant to Harpaz, supra, the claimant’s injury is conclusively presumed to be compensable under Connecticut law. Our application of the legal standard regarding claims under Chapter 568 delineated in Jaiguay, supra, directs us to the conclusion this Commission had concurrent jurisdiction over the claimant’s injury. As a result, we affirm the Finding of the trial commissioner and dismiss this appeal.
The trial commissioner found the following facts which are relevant to this appeal. On December 27, 2001 the claimant suffered a heart attack in Atlantic City, New Jersey aboard a truck he was operating for the respondent. The respondent’s administrative office and one of its terminals are in Ft. Recovery, Ohio, but the respondent also operates a truck terminal in East Windsor, Connecticut. The claimant lives in Torrington, Connecticut and routinely drove to the East Windsor terminal to receive instructions and to pick up loads for delivery.
When the claimant was hired by the respondent he had to travel to their Ohio office to fill out his job application, undergo a physical examination and pick up his truck. While in Ohio he was directed to sign a preprinted form issued by the Ohio BWC which sought to make Ohio the state of exclusive remedy for all workers’ compensation claims brought by the claimant. There was no consideration identified in the agreement in exchange for the claimant’s waiver of other remedies and the claimant testified he believed he would not be offered the job if he failed to sign.
On January 23, 2002 the claimant filed a Form 30C with the Commission and with the respondent at their East Windsor terminal, seeking benefits as a result of the December 27, 2001 heart attack. The respondent received this Form 30C on January 31, 2002. The respondent claims they discussed this claim with the claimant and was led to believe he would not pursue his Connecticut remedies and would file a claim in Ohio.1 No disclaimer of liability was filed by the respondent prior to the expiration of the statutory twenty eight day period to contest whether the claimant’s injury was compensable.
On February 17, 2002 the claimant received an Ohio BWC First Report of injury form which had been mailed to him by the respondent. He filled out the form and mailed it back to the respondent. The respondent then initiated a claim in Ohio on the claimant’s behalf and without his consent on February 28, 2002.2 The Ohio BWC denied the claim on March 18, 2002. An appeal of the initial denial occurred on August 1, 2002. The claimant did not receive notice of this hearing until after it was mailed on July 16, 2002. The respondent was the only party in attendance at this Ohio hearing and the claim was denied again.
The trial commissioner concluded in her Finding of August 7, 2007 that the primary focus of the respondent’s argument was that the Ohio BWC decision was res judicata on the issue of whether the claimant suffered a compensable injury. She determined however, that the respondent was an employer in Connecticut as defined under § 31-275(10) C.G.S. by virtue of maintaining a place of business at its East Windsor terminal. She concluded the respondent has sufficient contacts with the State of Connecticut to confer jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims filed with this Commission. She also found the provisions of § 31-290 C.G.S. banned the use of agreements in which an employer and employee attempted to alter the statutory obligations present under Connecticut law.
Looking to the res judicata argument the trial commissioner found the claimant appropriately commenced an action under Chapter 568 by filing the Form 30C on January 23, 2002 and the respondent may have had an affirmative defense to this claim. They failed to advance such a defense within 28 days of receipt of the Form 30C and by operation of law consented to the compensability of the injury on February 28, 2002. She also found the Ohio claim filed by the respondent was filed with knowledge of a previous Connecticut claim. She concluded that as the Connecticut claim was first in time, it was not subject to res judicata as the exclusivity agreement did not deprive the Connecticut workers’ compensation commission of subject matter jurisdiction.
Based on those findings the trial commissioner granted the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. She ordered the parties to proceed to a hearing in damages on the claim. The respondent filed a Motion to Correct in response. The granted corrections did not materially change the result herein and the respondent has pursued this appeal.
a) Did the State of Connecticut have subject matter jurisdiction over the December 27, 2001 injury the claimant sustained in New Jersey?
b) If subject matter jurisdiction existed over the December 27, 2001 injury did the failure of the respondent to file a timely response bar their defenses of contractual exclusivity and res judicata?
We proceed to analyze this appeal in this manner since if the State of Connecticut lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the injury, then the claimant was precluded from receiving any relief in this forum even in the absence of a defense from the respondent. We must answer the question of whether we have jurisdiction prior to considering any other issues. If jurisdiction does not exist, we must sustain the appeal and vacate the Finding. If jurisdiction does exist in this forum, we must then determine whether the trial commissioner’s finding of preclusion properly overcame the respondent’s legal arguments.
In recent weeks, the Connecticut Supreme Court has had occasion to delineate the standard for when Connecticut can assert jurisdiction when an employee is injured during the course of employment and another state also can assert jurisdiction over the injury. In Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323 (2008) the Supreme Court considered a wrongful death action brought in Connecticut courts by the estate of a deceased New Yorker, seeking to sue a co-worker who lived in New York who was responsible for a fatal traffic accident in Greenwich. Such a suit was barred by exclusivity provisions in the New York Workers’ Compensation Act, but permitted under Connecticut law. The Supreme Court applied New York law as it related to tort liability, but made clear that on the issue of jurisdiction for workers’ compensation claims that it took an expansive view as to the extent of Connecticut jurisdiction.
Consequently, the choice of law question posed by a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in this state is not whether Connecticut has the most significant relationship to or interest in the matter but, rather, whether Connecticut’s relationship or interest is sufficiently significant to warrant an award of benefits under its workers’ compensation statutes. Thus, in Cleveland, we concluded that this state’s interest in awarding workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee is satisfied either when Connecticut is (1) the place of the injury, or (2) the place of the employment contract, or (3) the place of the employment relationship. Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., supra, 195. Supra, 346.
The Jaiguay decision pointed out that “more than one state may have a legitimate interest in having a worker compensated under the applicable workers’ compensation statutes”. Id. “The issue is whether this state has a sufficient interest in having an injured employee receive an award of benefits under the laws of this state” Id., 345.
There is no dispute that the first two prongs of the Cleveland test were not met by the claimant in this case. His injury occurred in New Jersey and based on the trial commissioner’s findings of fact, we can infer that his employment contract was formalized at the respondent’s Ohio headquarters. The trial commissioner however, found jurisdiction as a result of the claimant conducting his work for the respondent out of their East Windsor terminal.
We look to Findings, ¶ 6 in the Finding which determined that facts herein were consistent with the claimant’s employment relationship being in Connecticut. The claimant lived in Torrington, Connecticut and routinely drove to respondent’s East Windsor, Connecticut terminal to receive his trucking instructions and/or pick up his loads to be driven to a location assigned by the respondent.
The respondent places great weight on precedent from Burse, supra, claiming that this case indicates Connecticut lacks jurisdiction when a Connecticut citizen is injured while employed out of state. See Respondent’s Brief, pp. 26-29. We reject this argument as the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Jaiguay, supra, already distinguished Burse on the facts from the present case.
In Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31, 808 A.2d 672 (2002), this court again was required to decide a choice of law issue involving a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in this state. The plaintiff, William J. Burse, resided in Connecticut and was employed as an airline pilot for the named defendant, American International Airways, Inc., a freight carrier based in Michigan that had only minimal contacts with Connecticut. Id., 33, 39–40. After Burse was injured during a flight somewhere over the Midwest, Burse sought workers’ compensation benefits in Connecticut. Id., 34. The workers’ compensation commissioner concluded that Burse was entitled to benefits because Connecticut was Burse’s place of employment and the place of the employment contract. Id., 35. The compensation review board affirmed the commissioner’s decision. Id. On appeal to this court, we reviewed the test set forth in Cleveland and refined it, explaining that a claimant seeking workers’ compensation benefits in this state as the place of the employment contract or the employment relationship must, ‘‘at a minimum, [make] a showing of a significant relationship between Connecticut and either the employment contract or the employment relationship.” 11 (Emphasis in original.) Id., 38–39. Upon review of the facts, we concluded that the compensation review board improperly had determined that Burse had established the requisite nexus between Connecticut and the employment contract or relationship to warrant the award of workers’ compensation benefits in this state. Id., 40, 45. Jaiguay, supra, 339-340.
The nature of the contacts in Burse were quite limited; the respondent had no physical presence and only one mechanic in the state and the claimant (a pilot) had worked out of Bradley Airport only twelve times in a four year period. As a result, Justice Katz wrote in her opinion “these contacts indicate that Connecticut had, at most, a peripheral relationship to the employment between the plaintiff and American.” Burse, supra, 40. (Emphasis in original). This board exercised similar reasoning in finding a lack of jurisdiction for an injury suffered by a interstate truck driver in Kelley v. Venezia Transport Services, 4184 CRB-2-00-2 (March 8, 2001), as the respondent had no office in Connecticut and transacted all business with the claimant in Pennsylvania.
The aforementioned U.S. Supreme Court cases go to the issue of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state firm conducting business in Connecticut, which means we must still ascertain if this Commission has subject matter jurisdiction. The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is essential to determine herein to ascertain if the respondent’s other legal arguments concerning contractual exclusivity and the subsequent Ohio proceedings were time barred by operation of § 31- 294c(b) C.G.S.
Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 11 . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1979). Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. Craig v. Bronson, 202 Conn. 93, 101, 520 A.2d 155 (1987).
We believe based on the facts herein that the trial commissioner properly found the claimant was an “employee” as defined in § 31-275(9) C.G.S. and that the respondent was an “employer” as defined in § 31-275(10) C.G.S. As the circumstances of this claim meet the third prong of the test promulgated in Cleveland, supra, making Connecticut “the place of the employment relationship,” this matter falls within “the class of cases” we may adjudicate. Thus we find the Commission possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the claimant’s December 17, 2001 injury.
This determination is largely dispositive of the other defenses raised by the respondent pertaining to contractual waiver and the subsequent Ohio proceedings. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Harpaz, supra, outlined the serious consequences when a respondent fails to file a disclaimer of liability within the statutory time period allowed under § 31-294c(b) C.G.S. The Court construed the “plain meaning” of this statute pursuant to § 1-2z C.G.S.
(b) Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the commissioner, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the employer, the date of the alleged injury or death and the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested. The employer shall send a copy of the notice to the employee in accordance with section 31-321. If the employer or his legal representative fails to file the notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received the written notice of claim, the employer shall commence payment of compensation for such injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received the written notice of claim, but the employer may contest the employee’s right to receive compensation on any grounds or the extent of his disability within one year from the receipt of the written notice of claim, provided the employer shall not be required to commence payment of compensation when the written notice of claim has not been properly served in accordance with section 31-321 or when the written notice of claim fails to include a warning that (1) the employer, if he has commenced payment for the alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim, shall be precluded from contesting liability unless a notice contesting liability is filed within one year from the receipt of the written notice of claim, and (2) the employer shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death unless the employer either files a notice contesting liability on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim or commences payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day. An employer shall be entitled, if he prevails, to reimbursement from the claimant of any compensation paid by the employer on and after the date the commissioner receives written notice from the employer or his legal representative, in accordance with the form prescribed by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, stating that the right to compensation is contested. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. (Emphasis added).
In Harpaz, as in the present case, a claim for benefits was properly commenced by an employee against his employer and the respondent failed to either accept the compensability of the claim, pay the claimant without prejudice, or disclaim liability for the injury in a timely fashion. The respondent in Harpaz later offered evidence contesting medical treatment for the claimant, which the Connecticut Supreme Court found was legally impermissible based on the terms of the statute.
We therefore conclude that, under § 31-294c(b), if an employer neither timely pays nor timely contests liability, the conclusive presumption of compensability attaches and the employer is barred from contesting the employee’s right to receive compensation on any ground or the extent of the employee’s disability. Such a penalty is harsh, but it reflects a just and rational result. Id., 130.
In a footnote to Harpaz, Justice Katz noted initially that while the Appellate Court in LaVogue v. Cincinnati, 9 Conn. App. 91 (1986) had determined the statutory effect of the conclusive presumption of compensability would bar any defense, courts have later construed this provision to permit challenges only as to subject matter jurisdiction. Harpaz, supra, n.11. The scope of such a permissible challenge after a finding of statutory preclusion has been established in Del Toro v. Stamford, 270 Conn. 532 (2004). The respondent does not advance an argument that any of the grounds stated in Del Toro to challenge subject matter jurisdiction (failure to properly commence a claim, absence of an employer-employee relationship, or statutory exclusion of the injury from the definition of “personal injury.” Id., 543-545.) are present in this case.
We do believe the issue of whether the Ohio proceedings were res judicata on the issue of causation should be addressed. We agree there are circumstances when a prior decision in another forum can be binding on this Commission, see Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp., 255 Conn. 762 (2001). The flaw in respondent’s argument herein is that all the Ohio proceedings were subsequent to the statutory determination of preclusion in the Connecticut forum, and clearly not a prior decision. By operation of law Mr. Zolla’s claim was conclusively determined to be compensable under Connecticut statutes on February 28, 2002, prior to any action being taken by the Ohio BWC.7 We do not find that Lafayette stands for the proposition that a subsequent determination in a forum having concurrent jurisdiction can expunge or overrule a legal determination already reached in a Connecticut proceeding.8 We also note that the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the defense of res judicata must be advanced as a special defense; Beccia v. City of Waterbury 185 Conn. 445, 451 (1981), unlike a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, which may be considered sua sponte. Rayhall v. Akin Co. 263 Conn. 328, 336-337 (2003).
This rationale also governs the Full Faith and Credit argument presented by the respondent. The respondent argues that the final decision of the Ohio BWC denying the claim must be given Full Faith and Credit in Connecticut, based on Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. However, at the time when statutorily the respondent became liable to honor Mr. Zolla’s claim here in Connecticut, there was no judgment in effect in a foreign forum for which Connecticut was constitutionally obligated to defer to. More importantly, the case cited by the respondent as standing for this proposition, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) was cited by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Jaiguay, supra, for an entirely different proposition, that the Commonwealth of Virginia could not use the Full Faith and Credit clause to prevent the District of Columbia from awarding supplemental benefits to one of its injured residents, notwithstanding the law in effect in Virginia. Jaiguay, supra, 333-334.
Our research indicates that a U.S. Supreme Court case predating Thomas, supra, Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965) is more congruent legally and factually with the issues herein. The claimant in Crider was an Alabama resident working for a Georgia company who was injured in Alabama. He obtained a default judgment in an Alabama court seeking an award under Georgia law. The Georgia defendants argued Crider’s exclusive remedies were before the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Commission and refused to honor the Alabama default judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court held Alabama had a sufficient interest in protecting its injured citizens and this interest overcame Georgia’s interest in its workers’ compensation procedures. Georgia could not require the claimant to utilize its procedures regarding workers’ compensation, and bar the claimant from seeking redress in his home state.
The trial commissioner’s conclusions herein were supported by facts on the record and consistent with the most recent appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction of this Commission and the impact of failing to disclaim liability to a duly filed claim. We herein affirm her Finding and Ruling on the Motion to Preclude, and dismiss this appeal. This matter shall be referred to the Fifth District for further proceedings consistent with the standards delineated in Harpaz, supra.