Claims seeking to set aside a will based on undue influence have become more prevalent over the last few years as the economy weakens and as more baby boomers reach the fragility of old age. Opportunities for children or others to take control of a senior’s finances often leads to temptations that are too often acted upon to the detriment of the intended heirs and beneficiaries.
Undue influence has been defined by the courts (in the context of will contests) as that sort of influence which results in the destruction of the free agency, that is the free will and judgment, of the person over whom it is exerted. In re Hale’s Will, 21 NJ 284 (1956). It has been found to exist where the testator yields to the will of another merely for the sake of peace or, in other words, where a testator is mentally or morally coerced into doing something contrary to his own volition. It amounts to mental, moral or physical coercion which constrains a person to do what is contrary to his own wishes. 5 N.J. Practice Clapp, Wills & Administration (3 ed. 1982), § 62.
260 N.J. Super. at 528.
In order to raise a presumption of undue influence, a contestant needs to establish that a confidential relationship between the testator and the beneficiary existed at the time the will was made, and that there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the change in disposition.
Courts have found that a confidential relationship includes all legal and fiduciary relationships as well as relationships where trust and confidence actually exist. A confidential relationship is found “where trust is reposed by reason of the testator’s weakness or dependence…” Haynes, supra. at 176. The essentials of a confidential relationship are a reposed confidence and dominant and controlling position by the beneficiary of the transaction. A confidential relationship exists when circumstances make it certain that the parties do not deal on equal terms, but on one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed, which does not exist where parties deal on terms of equality. See In re Stroming’s Will, 12 N.J.Super. 217 (N.J.Super. A.D. 1951); Croker v. Clegg, 123 N.J. Eq. 332, (N.J.Err. & App. 1938).
The second element required to raise the presumption of undue influence in relation to testamentary bequests is the presence of suspicious circumstances, which circumstances “need be no more then slight.” See Haynes, supra. at 177. See also In re Lehner’s Estate, 70 NJ 434 (1976); In re Catelli’s Will, 361 NJ Super 478 (App Div 2003).
10. whether the beneficiary disparaged other family members to the testator.
Will contests based on grounds of undue influence often involve strategic decisions that are best handled by attorneys specializing in probate litigation matters. There are often statutory time frames which must be met in asserting a claim of undue influence, and therefore, if suspicion arises, an attorney should be consulted immediately so that such a claim may be evaluated and if necessary, a timely complaint filed.
In the Matter of the Estate of Michael Fleischer, Deceased, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-0668-11T2) (App. Div. 2012). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Ocean County. Before Judges Espinosa and Kennedy.
Plaintiff, the daughter of Decedent, appeals dismissal of her Complaint and caveat challenging the Will of her father. Without reviewing the contents of Decedent’s Will dated in October of 1995, Plaintiff filed a caveat. The Will provided that Plaintiff and her sister, Decedent’s children from a prior marriage, would each receive $1,000, with Decedent’s second wife inheriting the remainder of the Estate.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Decedent had drafted an updated Will that he had discussed with her and that the Will offered for probate was not drafted by Decedent’s attorney. The Executor under the Will then filed a Complaint seeking to dismiss the caveat, which was accompanied by a Certification from the scrivener confirming that Decedent had signed the Will freely and that there was no undue influence. A hearing on the Orders to Show Cause were scheduled. On the return date, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s caveat.
Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a second Complaint with various allegations, which was also dismissed. Plaintiff, represented by new counsel, then filed a third Complaint seeking an accounting and for the first time, alleged that she received a handwritten birthday card from Decedent on January 27, 2009 which she contended should be admitted as a holographic will. The card allegedly instructed her to handle the Estate and split the assets with her sister. In the alternative, Plaintiff sought admission of a prior Will, dated in August of 1995, that was consistent with Decedent’s premarital agreement providing that Decedent’s assets would pass to his children. A hearing was held and the Court ordered plaintiff to submit a report from a hand-writing expert regarding the alleged holographic will. The Court also continued the restraints on distributions and ordered an accounting.
In early 2011, Plaintiff submitted an expert report which concluded that the alleged holographic will was in Decedent’s handwriting. The parties then entered into a consent order regarding discovery, providing in part that Plaintiff would deliver the original birthday card for inspection by Defendant’s expert. Plaintiff failed to produce the card, despite an order from the Court and motion practice, and the matter was ultimately dismissed, with the Court awarding counsel fees to Defendants.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding sufficient factual support for the trial Court’s dismissal of the action in light of Plaintiff’s failure to abide by the Court’s Order to produce the alleged holographic will. The fee award was also proper in light of Plaintiff’s failure to abide by her discovery obligations.
In the Matter of the Estate of Chaim Lichtsztra, deceased, et al. v. Pizem and Wiley, Malehorn, et al., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-3162-10T3, A-4615-10T3) (App. Div. 2012). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County. Before Judges Messano and Yannotti.
Plaintiff, the daughter of Decedent, appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of her Complaint for failure to bring a timely Will contest under Rule 4:85-1 within six months of the date of probate.
Decedent’s daughter, who resided in New York, had a falling out with the Decedent in 2003, just prior to his death. Decedent executed a new Will in 2003 when he moved from his home in Brooklyn to New Jersey to live with his good friends. After Decedent’s death in 2004, Decedent’s attorney, who drafted the 2003 Will, sought probate of the 2003 Will in New Jersey. Decedent’s attorney was unable to locate the Plaintiff daughter and therefore the trial court allowed for notice by publication.
After his death, Decedent’s daughter probated Decedent’s prior Will, executed in 1996, with the Kings County Surrogate in Brooklyn, New York. Despite receiving constructive notice of the probate of the 2003 Will in 2004 and 2005, Plaintiff did not bring a claim to set aside the 2003 Will which was probated in New Jersey until 2010. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action finding that she did not bring her claim within 6 months, as required by Rule 4:85-1. The Appellate Division upheld this decision, finding that Plaintiff had received constructive notice of the New Jersey probate, as her attorney was aware of the probate and the appointment of an Executor of the Estate in New Jersey in 2004, and that there was no reasonable justification for the delay in filing the New Jersey action.
In the Matter of the Estate of Catherine R. Hoch, Deceased, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-0758-10T2; A-4881-10T2; A-5019-10T2) (App. Div. 2012). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Mercer County. Before Judges Parrillo and Grall.
Brothers of the Decedent and a niece and nephew appeal from the trial Court’s admission of Decedent’s Will to probate, claiming that the Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that Decedent intended that her Will, which contained numerous cross-outs and alterations, should act as her Last Will and Testament. They also appeal the trial Court’s failure to award full counsel fees.
Decedent entered a nursing home in January of 2008 where she remained until her death on October 15, 2008. While a resident, Decedent asked Davis, her long time friend and Executrix under the Will to retrieve her Last Will and Testament dated April 1, 1999 from her residence. In its original form, the Will included some bequests to a charity and its principal beneficiaries were Decedent’s niece and nephew. Subsequent to the execution of the Will, Decedent made significant cross-outs and alterations in handwriting on the Will. She voided the residuary bequest to her niece and nephew, changed the bequest to charity and named the Hopewell Museum as her residuary beneficiary. She crossed out the words “Last Will” and the words “Living Trust,” “Corrected” and “Reviewed 9/23/07” have been added, along with a signature of the Decedent.
After Decedent’s death, Davis, the named Executrix, sought probate of the Will in its altered form. Answers in opposition were filed by Decedent’s brothers, intestate takers, and Decedent’s niece and nephew, the original residuary beneficiaries. Mediation proved unsuccessful. A trial was conducted and Davis was the only witness. She testified that she brought Decedent the April 1, 1999 Will and Decedent acknowledged it to be her Last Will and Testament. Davis expressed concern to Decedent over the handwritten cross-outs and alterations, and Decedent remarked that she intended the cross-outs and alterations to be revisions to her Will. She did not share Davis’ concern over their effectiveness. Nevertheless, Davis convinced Decedent to sign a new document which was typed by Davis and incorporated Decedent’s changes. However, before this document could be signed, Decedent passed away.
The trial Court found Davis’s testimony to be “credible, clear and convincing”, thereby finding that the Decedent made valid alterations to the Will, and that the Will in its altered form should be admitted to probate under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3. The trial Court also reduced respondents’ request for legal fees, finding a duplication in services. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that there was adequate support for the trial Court’s decision. A court’s duty in probate matters is to ascertain and give effect to the probable intention of the testator. Here, Davis’ testimony was unequivocal that Decedent intended the April 1, 1999 document to act as her Will, with the alterations and cross-outs. This is corroborated by the fact that Decedent preserved the document rather than destroying it. There was also no abuse of discretion in reducing the award of attorneys’ fees in light of the overlap in services.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Darryl Fields, Deceased, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-2349-10T2) (App. Div. 2012). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Cape May County. Before Judges Carchman and Nugent.
Appellant appeals from the trial Court’s order admitting the Will of her putative father to probate and issuing Letters Testamentary to Respondent, Lisa Perkins. The trial Court determined that appellant lacked standing to contest the validity of the Will because she could not prove that Decedent was her father. On appeal, this decision was reversed, with the Appellate Division finding that appellant presented sufficient evidence of paternity to establish standing.
On September 27, 2010, Decedent executed a pre-printed form Will in which he left his entire estate to his landlords, the Respondent and her husband, with whom he lived, and named Respondent as executor. Five and a half weeks later he died. On November 5, 201, appellant filed a caveat.
Respondent filed a Complaint seeking probate and an order to show cause was issued. Appellant answered the Complaint and asked for leave of Court to file a counterclaim, which was answered by Respondent. On the return date of the order to show cause, Respondent argued that the Will was valid, and that until paternity was established, appellant lacked standing. Appellant argued that three documents attached to her Answer established paternity, including her birth certificate, her mother’s Affidavit of paternity, and the certificate she signed authorizing the cremation of Decedent’s remains. She argued that since Decedent was an alcoholic, she needed to explore the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Will; the relationship between the witnesses and the beneficiaries, and whether Decedent had capacity.
The Court then questioned the parties, without objection from counsel. Respondent testified that she was friends with Decedent for 20 years, that he lived with them over that time, that she had not met appellant until after Decedent’s death and that Decedent referred to appellant once after receiving a call from her claiming she was his daughter. There was otherwise no contact with appellant. Shortly before signing his Will, Decedent had recovered an inheritance from his father and purchased the home next door, and died shortly thereafter. Decedent signed the Will in a storage unit where there was a notary, Respondent’s daughter-in-law and her nephew were the witnesses, and Respondent’s husband and Decedent obtained the form Will from the internet.
The Court then questioned appellant who said she found out that Decedent was her father when she was 11, and she had no relationship with him because of his alcoholism.
After hearing additional argument from counsel, the Court dismissed the caveat, dismissed the counterclaim, admitted the Will to probate and appointed Respondent as executrix. The Court stated that if appellant had standing as Decedent’s daughter then she probably would have standing to contest the Will, however, this should be the subject of an independent paternity action. Appellant appealed, and the order admitting the Will to probate was stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that appellant had standing to contest the admission of the Will to probate and is entitled to a hearing to establish paternity. Having asserted that Decedent was her father and having presented prima facie evidence of that fact, appellant had standing to file the caveat and contest the admission of the Will to probate. The lower Court conducted no paternity hearing and afforded the parties no opportunity to present evidence. The matter was therefore reversed and remanded.
In the Matter of the Estate of Albertha Blackwell, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-5441-10T3) (App. Div. 2012). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Essex County. Before Judges Lihotz and Waugh.
Appellant, Decedent’s daughter, appeals from the trial Court’s dismissal of her Complaint and admission of the Last Will and Testament of her mother to probate. On appeal, appellant maintains that the Court erred by allowing the Will to be probated because it was undated, not self-proving and otherwise failed to comply with the statutory attestation requirements of a valid will.
Decedent died on November 15, 2008, survived by six of her eleven children, and eight grandchildren. Only one grandchild, A.Q., was a minor, and Decedent had been appointed A.Q.’s guardian after A.Q.’s mother had died.
After Decedent’s death, one of her daughters found Decedent’s Will among her possessions, and she presented the Will for probate. The six page document was drafted by Decedent’s long-time attorney, who notarized the document and observed its execution in the presence of two witnesses who also signed the document. The Will named two of Decedent’s daughters as executors and devised her entire estate to A.Q.
Appellant filed a caveat challenging the Will. In response, the executors filed a complaint seeking to set aside the caveat and have the Will admitted to probate. Appellant filed an Answer and Counterclaim claiming that the Will was invalid or the result of undue influence. Without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court dismissed the caveats and admitted the Will to probate. Appellant appealed, and the trial Court’s order was reversed, with the matter being remanded for a plenary hearing to determine the authenticity and validity of the Will.
The trial Court then conducted a three day hearing, with testimony being presented by the witnesses who witnessed Decedent’s execution of the Will. The trial Court remained unconvinced of appellant’s arguments, and in a written opinion found no evidence to support appellant’s assertion that the Will was not signed by Decedent. The witnesses testified that Decedent acknowledged the document was her Will and voluntarily signed in their presence. The trial Court then ruled that proponents established by clear and convincing evidence that the document was Decedent’s Will, that she signed it voluntarily, that the witnesses signed the self-proving affidavit and witnessed her signature, and that the Will should be admitted to probate.
Appellant filed a motion and the proponents cross-moved for attorney’s fees, which the trial Court declined to consider. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial Court’s ruling was not supported by the evidence. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial Court’s ruling, finding its decision to be based on sufficient evidence contained in the record.
In order to comply with the necessary formalities, a Will must be in writing, signed by the testator and signed by at least two witnesses. N.J.S. 3B:3-2. Also, if a document lacks these formalities, the writing may nevertheless be treated as if it complied with N.J.S. 3B:3-2 if the proponent of the document establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the Decedent intended the document or writing to constitute her Will. N.J.S. 3B:3-3. The trial Court found that despite the omission of a date, two independent witnesses and Decedent’s long time attorney testified that each saw Decedent execute the document, the same document they witnessed, and that Decedent voluntarily signed the document following her express understanding that she intended the document to act as her Will. Appellant failed to refute this testimony. Therefore, the trial Court’s decision is affirmed. In addition, the Appellate Court failed to exercise jurisdiction over the fee issue until it was presented and ruled upon by the trial Court.
In the Matter of the Estate of Richard D. Ehrlich, Deceased, 2012 WL 2470122, (N.J.Super.A.D.). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Burlington County. Before Judges Parrillo, Alvarez and Skillman.
On June 29, 2012, the New Jersey Appellate Division continued to relax the formalities required for admission of a Will to probate, holding that the unexecuted copy of Decedent’s Will which had purportedly been executed by the Decedent and sent to his attorney-executor for safe-keeping sufficiently represented the Decedent’s final testamentary intent allowing for the document to be admitted to probate as a writing intended as a will under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.
Decedent was a trusts and estates attorney in Burlington County, New Jersey for over 50 years. At his death on September 21, 2009, his only next of kin were the surviving children of his predeceased brother, Todd, Jonathan and Pamela. The Decedent had no contact with Todd or Pamela for over 20 years, but maintained a close relationship with Jonathan over the years. Upon learning of Decedent’s death, Jonathan conducted an extensive search of Decedent’s home for a Will. He found an unexecuted copy of a purported Will in Decedent’s desk among numerous other papers. Jonathan filed a Complaint seeking to admit the Will to probate, and Todd and Pamela field an Answer asking the Court to deny probate.
The Court appointed a temporary administrator and ordered a thorough search of Decedent’s home and law office for any other Wills of Decedent. No other Will was ever located.
The unexecuted copy proffered by Jonathan is a detailed 14 page document entitled “Last Will and Testament”, on traditional legal paper, with Decedent’s name and law office address in the margin of each page. The document does not contain the signature of Decedent. It does, however, include a notation in Decedent’s handwriting on the cover page, “Original mailed to H.W. Van Scriver, 5/20/2000”, the named executor under the Will. Van Scriver predeceased the Decedent and an original has yet to be located.
The proffered Will leaves $50,000 to Pamela, $75,000 to Todd, 25% in trust for the benefit of Decedent’s friend, Kathryn Harris, and the remainder to Jonathan. It was undisputed that Decedent prepared the document just before he was to undergo surgery, and on the same day it was purportedly executed, May 20, 2000, Decedent executed a Power of Attorney and Living Will. Years after drafting these documents, Decedent acknowledged to others that he had a Will and wished to delete the bequest to his friend Kathryn as they had a falling out.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court admitted the unexecuted Will to probate, finding that Decedent’s hand written notation on the cover page of the Will provided clear and convincing evidence of Decedent’s final assent that he intended the original document to constitute his Last Will and Testament.
At issue on appeal was whether the unexecuted copy of a purportedly executed original document sufficiently represented Decedent’s final testamentary intent to be admitted to probate under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.
Relying on its recent interpretation of the harmless error doctrine under In re Probate of Will and Codicil or Macool, 416 N.J. Super. 298, 311 (App. Div. 2010), the Court held that a writing need not be signed by the testator in order to be admitted to probate. In order to be admitted as a writing intended as a Will under Macool, the proponent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter gave his or her final assent to it. Absent either one of these two elements, a trier of fact can only speculate as to whether the proposed writing accurately reflects the decedent’s final testamentary wishes.” Id. at 310.
The Appellate Division went on to find that the Decedent prepared and reviewed the challenged document, that Jonathan, who received the bulk of the Estate was the natural object of his bounty, and the mailing of the document to the executor, even if not signed, reflected Decedent’s final assent of his intention that the document act as his Last Will and Testament. This was bolstered by the testimony reflecting Decedent’s intentions years after its preparation. The Appellate Division found these facts established clear and convincing evidence that the unexecuted document was reviewed and assented to by Decedent and accurately reflected his final testamentary wishes and was properly admitted to probate under Macool.
In dissent, Judge Skillman found that N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3 does not authorize the admission of an unexecuted will to probate. Mere verbal assent to the terms of an unexecuted copy of a will which was not formalized by any signature on the document does not satisfy the statute. Instead, Judge Skillman found that only defectively executed wills may be admitted to probate under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.
Executrix and sole beneficiary of the Estate appeal the lower court’s award of the will contest attorney New Jerseys’s fees to decedent’s parents.
In the Matter of the Estate of Allan C. Schenecker, Deceased, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-4161-09T2) (App. Div. 2011). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Monmouth County. Before Judges Graves and Waugh.
Wife of Decedent appeals a decision by the trial court admitting a copy of Decedent’s 2006 Will to probate. In the Will, Decedent left his residence to his recently married wife, and the remainder to his daughter. The Court also found that Decedent’s wife was not an omitted spouse under the intestate statutes, and denied her counsel fees. On appeal, the lower court’s decision admitting the Will to probate was affirmed, but the matter was remanded for further findings of fact on the issue of counsel fees.
In 1988, Decedent met his wife, a real estate broker who assisted Decedent with his real estate purchases over the years. She managed the properties and they became close. On November 20, 2006, Decedent purchased a residence in Tinton Falls, New Jersey in which he and his future wife resided. Although the property was placed in Decedent’s name, it was eventually transferred to both of them with rights of survivorship. On November 29, 2006, Decedent executed a Will leaving the Tinton Falls property to his future wife and the remainder of his Estate to his daughter.
In 2008, Decedent was diagnosed with lung cancer. He decided to marry. Soon thereafter, he died.
Decedent’s wife received letters of administration, forcing the filing of a Complaint by Decedent’s daughter, seeking to probate a copy of the Will. The Complaint was supported by the testimony of Decedent’s long time attorney, who testified that Decedent intended that the November 26, 2006 Will be his Last Will and Testament and that he had no intentions of changing the disposition. In deciding the issue of admitting the lost Will to probate, the Court gave great weight to this testimony.
When a missing will is last seen in the possession of the testator there is a presumption that the testator destroyed the will with the intent to revoke it. The proponent of the will has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was not destroyed. The Court relied on the testimony of the various witnesses finding that the Decedent intended for the November 26, 2006 to control.
In upholding this decision, the Appellate Court held that the key issue in a case such as this is whether the testator had the intent to revoke the missing Will, even assuming he had the opportunity to do so. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that, whatever may have happened to the original, the Decedent did not intend to revoke it.
As to legal fees, the Appellate Division remanded the matter for further findings of fact, as the record was not clear as to whether the Court made a finding of reasonable cause to contest the Will.
In the Matter of the Estate of Regina Mapes, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: ESX-CP-0160-10) (Ch. Div. 2011). Decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Essex County.
Decedent, Regina Mapes, died a resident of Essex County in 1963. her Will dated January 29, 1960 was probated in 1963. The Will created a trust, granting life income to decedent’s daughter, Edith, who died on December 2, 1971. Upon Edith’s death, Edith’s son, Harry became successor life beneficiary. Harry died on July 29, 2009. Upon Harry’s death, the Trust terminated and the remaining assets were to be paid to Harry’s then living descendants.
Harry had 2 biological children, Cynthia and Kristina. These children were adopted by Harry’s ex-wife’s second husband in 1966. Harry specifically excluded his biological children as beneficiaries under his Will. In 1988, Harry adopted four children after they all attained majority: Brenda, Ricky, Kathy and Rhonda, all children of Harry’s second wife.
The issue is who is a “then living descendant” under the terms of Regina Mapes’ Will. Although Harry intended to cut off his biological children, the intent of Regina Mapes controls the situation. The Court went on to hold that the adoption of Harry’s biological children did not cut off their rights to inherit from Regina Mapes, and her probable intent was to include them as beneficiaries.
On the other hand, as to the children adopted by Harry, they are excluded from the definition of descendants under Regina Mapes’ Will under the “Stranger to the Adoption Doctrine”, which holds that an adult adoptee may not share in the estate of a third party who was not a party to the adoption proceeding. The doctrine creates a presumption that an adult adoptee is not included in a class gift to lineal descendants. This may be overcome by language in the governing instrument. But for such language, the Court must discern the testator’s probable intent. In this case, there was no language to support divergence from the doctrine, and the adult adoptees were therefore excluded from the class.
The Court also awarded attorneys’ fees to counsel for the trustee, but denied fees to counsel for the adult adoptees.
In re Estate of Albertha Blackwell, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: ESX-CP-0057-09) (Chan. Ct. 2011). On remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County.
At issue is whether the Last Will and Testament of Albertha Blackwell may be admitted to probate. The Will consisted of six (6) pages. Decedent signed the first five (5) pages and affixed her signature before the witnesses on the fifth page. The witnesses also signed the fifth and sixth page. Decedent failed to sign the side of page six (6), as she did with the other pages, and also failed to sign the attestation clause on the sixth page. The trial court on the return date of the Order to Show Cause, and without holding a plenary hearing, found that the Will was not self-proved, but was still a valid Will as it was signed by the Decedent, and also witnessed.
An appeal was taken, and the Appellate Court found that a will may be admitted to probate under circumstances where it does not literally comply with the statutory attestation requirements so long as there was “substantial compliance”. The matter was therefore remanded to the trial court for a plenary hearing on whether the proponent of the Will can establish by clear and convincing evidence that there was substantial compliance with the formalities required by N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2, that (i) the Will is in writing, (ii) signed by the testator, and (iii) signed by two (2) witnesses. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, a document not in strict compliance with N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 may be admitted to probate if the proponent of the document or writing established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute the decedent’s Will.
After holding a plenary hearing, the trial court found that the plaintiff established, through clear and convincing evidence, that the document at issue is the Last Will and Testament of Albertha Blackwell, that she signed it voluntarily, that the witnesses signed the self-proving affidavit and witnessed her signature, and that the will should be admitted to probate. The defendant challenged the signature but did not provide any evidence that is was a forgery. The scrivener of the Will, a long time attorney for Albertha Blackwell, testified on behalf of plaintiff that she recalls that the Will was signed in her office on March 1, 2007, that there was no coercion, that the witnesses also signed the document and that Ms. Blackwell intended that the document was her Will. The Court held that the document was both in substantial compliance with N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 and was intended to constitute Ms. Blackwell’s Will pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2, and was therefore admitted to probate.
In the Matter of the Estate of Inez Bull, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: ESX-CP-0084-10) (Ch. Div. 2011). Decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Essex County.
Decedent drafted a holographic Will on November 20, 1949 and a subsequent holographic Will on February 7, 1977 (the “1977 Will”). The 1977 Will expressly disinherits any part of decedent’s family, and leaves her “Ole Bull Museum” to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the Norwegian government to run the museum. The Will had internal conflicts. In any event, the Court determined that the 1977 Will should be admitted to probate as a writing intended as a Will as the material portions of the document are handwritten, the document is signed by decedent, in her own hand, and it is clear that decedent intended the document to act as her Will by using the phrase, “Last Will and testament of Inez Bull.” This, despite the conflicting terms and the fact that no executor was appointed. The Court admitted the Will to probate and appointed the temporary administrator as permanent administrator, leaving to future proceedings the mechanics of abiding by decedent’s intentions as reflected in the 1977 Will.
In the Matter of the Estate of Thomas J. Duffy, Deceased, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-3400-09T1) (App. Div. 2011). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Atlantic County. Before Judges Fisher, Sapp-Peterson and Fasciale.
This appeal involved the interpretation of Decedent’s Will, which failed to mention the disposition of his residuary estate in the residuary clause. The Will left his “jewelry, personal effects” to his friend, Diane, and if she predeceased, the “entire estate” to his veterinarian for the care of his pets. Decedent’s estranged wife and daughter sued, claiming that the decedent’s assets should be distributed under intestacy.
The lower court held that the Will had a gap, to which the probable intent doctrine applied. In applying the doctrine, the court held that the decedent would have intended that his residuary estate be distributed to his friend, Diane. The court, after holding a plenary hearing, found that the decedent’s intentions were clear inasmuch as he did not have any relationship with his estranged wife and daughter, and there argument that a partial intestacy should control was not convincing in this context.
In the Matter of the Estate of Leigh Cameron Randall, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: ESX-CP-0199-10) (Ch. Div. 2011). Decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Essex County.
Decedent died a resident of Arizona owning real property located at 861 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey. She did not execute a formal Will. However, plaintiff, one of decedent’s 6 first cousins, sought probate of a letter allegedly written by decedent in July of 1998 as a writing intended as a will. There is no signature on the pages offered for probate. The decedent made marks on some of the pages. She was never married and had no children.
Under New Jersey law, a document that was not executed in compliance with the Will statute may still be admitted as a writing intended as a Will if the proponent of the document establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended that the writing to constitute her Will.
Plaintiff received the 1998 letter from decedent, assuming she had a Will and considered the letter to be informational only, as it listed her assets, discussed a testamentary trust and listed him and his sisters as beneficiaries. After decedent’s death, plaintiff went to her Arizona home and found a photocopy of page 1 of the 1998 letter which included original notations in the margin. The Court was convinced that the handwritten notations on the margin of page 1 of the letter should be given testamentary effect, as the Court found that it was obvious that decedent believed that the 1998 letter and subsequent notations was an important document capable of disposing of her property at her death. It was therefore admitted as a writing intended as a Will.
In the Matter of the Estate of William W. Walb, Jr., Deceased, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-1368-09T2) (App. Div. 2011). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Burlington County. Before Judges Cuff, Simonelli and Fasciale.
In this matter, the lower court admitted a typed and signed addendum to Decedent’s Will disposing of his tangible personal property. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that a plenary hearing was required to determine whether the decedent intended the addendum to constitute an addition to or alteration of the Will.
Decedent executed the Will on January 24, 2003, devising certain amounts and percentages of his estate to some friends, with 81% being devised to Albright College. In the Will, Decedent referred to a list which he would prepare detailing the distribution of certain personal property. After executing the will, Decedent made two inter vivos gifts of stock to Albright College. Shortly thereafter, Decedent executed a document dated February 8, 2008 entitled “Addendum to Last Will and Testament of William W. Walb, Jr.” The addendum devised certain personal property to his friend and nephew, devised his residence to his friends, and changed the distribution of his net estate.
Decedent died on September 19, 2008 and the Will was probated soon thereafter. After probate, the executor discovered the addendum. An Order to Show Cause and Complaint was filed seeking to admit the addendum as an addition to or alteration of the Will, requiring a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
The lower court failed to hold a plenary hearing, instead ruling that the addendum only controlled the disposition of Decedent’s personal property as the executor failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Decedent intended the addendum to be an addition or alteration of his Will.
On appeal, the Appellate Division remanded the matter for a plenary hearing, finding that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Decedent intended to alter his Will, and that the lower court should not have ruled on the matter in a summary fashion without a hearing.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Will of Gabriela Sipko, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 480 (Docket No.: A-3622-08T1 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Civil Part, Bergen County. Before Judges Carchman and Parillo.
The Appellate Court upheld the lower court’s award of legal fees against the Estate to a successful contestant in a Will contest. The decision to award attorneys’ fees and the quantum of the reward, rests within the discretion of the trial judge. In this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Decedent created a pour-over Will and trust held for the benefit of her husband, with the remainder distributed in equal shares to her 2 children. Thereafter, Decedent executed a codicil to her Will which excluded her one son, Robert, from sharing in her estate and trust. This codicil was witnessed by only one witness, and then notarized. Robert contested the codicil claiming it did not meet the statutory requirements and was the product of undue influence.
The lower court found that the notary in fact did not act as a witness. Therefore, the codicil did not meet the statutory requirement for two witnesses, and granted Robert’s motion to set aside the codicil.
Thereafter, Robert moved for counsel fees pursuant to R. 4:49-2(a)(3). The court reduced Robert’s request by 20%, and awarded him $113,358.40 in legal fees. An appeal as to this award was taken.
The appellate court upheld the lower court’s award, highlighting that court’s finding that this is a case that should not have been brought in light of the failure to comply with the statute governing the signing of wills. Instead, it was brought in light of the family dysfunction. Robert does not have the financial means to fund the litigation and it is significant that he prevailed in the suit.
As to the quantum of fees, the trial court’s determination is given great deference. The lower court considered the work performed as set forth in the attorneys’ affidavit of services, and decided to reduce the fee by 20% in light of ancillary corporate work performed on the file. Based on the lower court’s findings of fact, the award of fees was upheld.
In the Matter of the Estate of Francis Marie Ackerson Yetter, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-0971-09T3) (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Sussex County. Before Judges R. B. Coleman and C. L. Miniman.
This appeal involves the court’s interpretation of a provision in Decedent’s will under the probable intent doctrine. The trial court took the literal meaning of the devise to Decedent’s great-grandchildren refusing to extend the gift to after born great-grandchildren, while the appellate court disagreed, extending the doctrine of probable intent based on the surrounding circumstances.
Decedent died on June 20, 2007 leaving a Last Will and Testament dated July 9, 2001. In the Will, Decedent specifically devised her Bank of New York stock worth $500,000 in equal shares to her great-grandchildren, naming them in the devise. After the Will was prepared and before Decedent died, 2 additional great grandchildren were born. Decedent did not change the terms of her will before her death.
A complaint was filed by a guardian ad litem which was supported by all interested parties, claiming that the probable intent doctrine should control, requesting the court to declare the devise as a class gift. The trial court, relying on the literal meaning of the devise, “to great grandchild A and B”, refused to declare it as a class gift. On appeal, the appellate court disagreed, finding that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the rule of probable intent, despite the lack of any ambiguity in the devise.
The appellate court cited the fact that the great-grandchildren named in the will were treated equally, there was no evidence that the Decedent did not otherwise wish to treat all great-grandchildren equally, the fact that Decedent unintentionally failed to revise the will and the fact that all interested parties were in agreement. The court was satisfied that there was sufficient indicia from the circumstances and the overall testamentary scheme of the will that Decedent did not intend to omit after-born great-grandchildren from the bequest.
In the Matter of the Estate of Thomas Antonelli, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-2502-09T2) (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Hudson County. Before Judges Reisner and Alvarez.
In this matter, the Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of a complaint filed by Decedent’s daughter seeking to set aside his probated Will as untimely under R. 4:85-1.
Plaintiff, a daughter of the Decedent, who lived in Pennsylvania, claimed that she met the requirements of R.4:85-2 which permits late filings where there is good cause for the delay and the absence of prejudice to the parties.
Decedent died on December 18, 2008. His will dated November 27, 2007 was admitted to probate on January 15, 2009 and plaintiff did not retain counsel until April 2009. It is undisputed that Decedent signed a prior will leaving a portion of Decedent’s estate to plaintiff, while the November 2007 will left everything to defendant.
R. 4:85-1 requires an out-of-state litigant to file a complaint contesting the will within 6 months of receiving notice. A filing was therefore required by July 15, 2009, but not filed until August 14, 2009. Counsel for plaintiff certified that the reason for delay was due to family circumstances and visits from his family. The lower court found that this was a mere oversight by counsel and not “good cause” to extend the period to file the complaint. The appellate court affirmed, finding no substantial reason that afforded a legal excuse for the default. Mere oversight is generally not a sufficient basis for an extension of time.
In the Matter of the Estate of Oliver T. Robinson, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-0353-09T1) (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Middlesex County. Before Judges Wefing, Baxter and Koblitz.
Plaintiff appealed the court’s denial of his application to set aside Decedent’s will based on the claim that plaintiff did not receive adequate notice as the biological son of the Decedent.
Plaintiff claimed to be the biological son of the Decedent and sought to set aside Decedent’s will, which left Decedent’s estate to his mother and siblings. Plaintiff’s complaint was filed 4 years after Decedent’s death. The court dismissed the complaint after a paternity suit was tried and the court found that plaintiff failed to provide proof of paternity. Neither the Decedent nor his siblings ever acknowledged plaintiff as Decedent’s biological son. In addition, prior to the conclusion of the paternity suit, plaintiff was given the ability to exhume Decedent’s body to perform a DNA test, which he failed to do. The court also failed to find “good cause” to extend the limitations period under Rule 4:85-1 as plaintiff’s complaint was filed 4 years after he found out that Decedent had passed. The trial court’s dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.
In the Matter of the Estate of Harriet Alexandra Sydlar, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. (Docket No.: A-1467-09T2 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Hudson County. Before Judges Cuff, Sapp-Peterson and Simonelli.
This case involved an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing the Complaint filed by Decedent’s daughters seeking to set aside Decedent’s Will and certain inter vivos transfers which they claimed were the product of undue influence exerted over the Decedent by her grand-daughter. The Will and transfers in question were executed just prior to the Decedent’s demise. Plaintiffs established a confidential relationship and suspicious circumstances and were therefore entitled to the presumption of undue influence, thereby shifting the burden of proof to Defendant to establish that the Will and transfers were the product of Decedent’s free will. The trial court did not find Defendants’ testimony credible and, relying on what seemed to be a preponderance of the evidence standard, issued a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
On appeal, the Defendants claim that the court should have been guided by a clear and convincing evidence standard and also that the court erred in misapplying the standard to the facts. The trial court seemed to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to both the questions pertaining to the Will as well as the inter vivos transfers. In inter vivos transfer cases involving undue influence, the court should apply a standard of clear and convincing evidence. The matter was therefore remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the evidence is clear and convincing as to the inter vivos transfers.
In the Matter of the Estate of Lucille Sand, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. (Docket No.: A-1856-08T1 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Union County. Before Judges Baxter and Koblitz.
This matter involved an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s caveat and admission of Decedent’s will to probate over claims of undue influence, fraud, lack of testamentary capacity and forgery.
Decedent died in 2008 leaving a Last Will and Testament dated December 4, 2002, and a codicil dated in 2005, wherein she specifically bequeathed $25,000 to her daughter, Sandra, with the remainder of her estate distributed in equal shares to her other three daughters. The will included an in terrorem clause as well. Sandra was estranged from Decedent for many years and the application for probate filed by the executors, two of Decedent’s children, sought probate of Decedent’s will. It was supported by separate affidavits of Decedent’s estate planning attorneys who certified that Decedent was of sound mind and was not subject to undue influence when they discussed with her the terms of her will and codicil and her intentions to leave only a small bequest to Sandra. In opposition to probate, Sandra merely opined that decedent would not have treated her and her siblings differently, there was no other evidence produced. There was also no evidence of lack of capacity. Not having met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, the court granted summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal.
In the Matter of the Estate of Maria Krasheninnkoff, deceased, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 195 (Docket No.: A-4220-08T32 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County. Before Judges Alvarez and Coburn.
The Appellate Court overturned the lower court’s award of legal fees to an unsuccessful contestant in a Will contest.
Plaintiff originally brought suit against Defendant requiring him to vacate the Decedent’s premises which were owned jointly with Plaintiff. Defendant refused to vacate. After several motion hearings, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant had obtained letters testamentary from the Ocean County Surrogate falsely claiming to be a relative of the Decedent. The matters were consolidated and a few days prior to trial, Defendant fired his counsel and appeared pro se.
The lower court found that Defendant had engaged in undue influence and set aside the will in which Defendant relied. The court probated the earlier will in which Plaintiff was the beneficiary. Defendant was eventually removed from the Decedent’s premises by the Ocean County Sheriff.
Defendant’s attorney filed an application for fees, which was opposed by Plaintiff’s counsel, but this opposition was never received by the court. A copy of the order awarding the fees was not served on Plaintiff’s counsel. Only after inquiring about the motion did Plaintiff’s attorney discover that it was granted. The application for reconsideration was denied.
Plaintiff appealed the award of fees claiming that the court erred as Defendant was found to have committed undue influence, and also failed to pay the ongoing carrying charges of Decedent’s premises while he lived there.
The appellate court reversed the award of fees, finding that where the wrongful conduct of one party triggers otherwise unnecessary litigation, no allowance of counsel fees will be made to the wrongdoer.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Will and Codicil of Macool, Deceased, 416 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County.
In this case, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order declining to admit a will which was not reviewed by Decedent prior to her death, even though the proposed Will contained a majority of the provisions requested by the Decedent.
Decedent had several step-children, which she raised with her husband, and was also quite fond of her niece. Her attorney had previously prepared Wills for her in 1996 and a codicil in 2007. After her husband died, Decedent visited her attorney requesting that a new Will be prepared on her behalf. She gave the attorney a hand-written note that identified the name and addresses of beneficiaries, along with a list of specific bequests. The Decedent did not sign her notes.
After discussing her notes and intentions with the Decedent, the attorney dictated the entire will while she was in his office. Either that afternoon or the next morning, the attorney’s secretary typed up a draft Will.
After discussing her Will with her attorney, the Decedent left his office with the intentions of having lunch nearby. According to her attorney, Decedent planned on setting up an appointment to review the Will after the attorney had reviewed it. Decedent passed away one hour after leaving the office, without having reviewed the terms of the draft Will.
Decedent’s niece, a beneficiary under the draft Will, filed an action seeking its probate as a writing intended as a Will under NJSA §3B:3-3.
Although the draft Will contained a majority of the provisions discussed with the Decedent, the Decedent never reviewed the terms of the draft Will. The trial court found insufficient evidence to conclude that the Decedent intended the draft to act as her Will.
The trial court went on to conclude that NJSA §3B:3-3 required that a writing bear the signature of the testator in order to be admitted to probate. The Appellate Court disagreed.
The Appellate Court held that in order for a writing intended as a Will to be admitted to probate under NJSA §3B:3-3, the proponent of the writing must prove, “by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the Decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter gave his or her final assent to it. Absent either one of these two elements, a trier of fact can only speculate as to whether the proposed writing accurately reflects the Decedent’s final testamentary wishes.” The Court also held that that a writing intended as a will need not be signed by the testator in order to be admitted to probate.
In re Estate of Albertha Blackwell, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. ____ (Docket No.: A-4816-08T3 (App. Div. 2010). On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County.
An appeal was filed seeking to set aside trial court’s order admitting Decedent’s Last Will and Testament to probate for failure to meet the statutory requirements.
The Will consisted of six (6) pages. Decedent signed the first five (5) pages and affixed her signature before the witnesses on the fifth page. The witnesses also signed the fifth and sixth page. Decedent failed to sign the side of page six (6), as she did with the other pages, and also failed to sign the attestation clause on the sixth page. The trial court on the return date of the Order to Show Cause, and without holding a plenary hearing, found that the Will was not self-proved, but was still a valid Will as it was signed by the Decedent, and also witnessed.
The Appellate Court found that a will may be admitted to probate under circumstances where it does not literally comply with the statutory attestation requirements if there was substantial compliance. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a plenary hearing on whether the proponent of the Will can establish by clear and convincing evidence that there was substantial compliance with the formalities required by N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2, that (i) the Will is in writing, (ii) signed by the testator, and (iii) signed by two (2) witnesses.
Poku v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation, the Estate of Richard Peprah, et al., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3152 (Docket No.: A-4014-08T2) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Lisa and Baxter.
Issue: Does Plaintiff, as attorney in fact for the Decedent during his life, have a right to a claim to all of Decedent’s assets after his death in lieu of an Executor?
Holding: No. This matter is an appeal of the trial Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Plaintiff brought an action challenging her son’s Will and the transfer of the son’s home to his wife.
Plaintiff framed the issue on appeal as follows: Plaintiff having Power of Attorney has the right to decide how to manage her son’s assets and therefore should not be denied the right to claim all assets belonging to her son. On appeal, in support of her allegations of undue influence and lack of mental capacity, Plaintiff sought to introduce a medical report pertaining to Decedent’s mental capacity at the time he drafted his Will and transferred his home to one of the Defendants. However, Plaintiff did not file the medical report in response to the motion for summary judgment, in fact, no opposition was filed. The trial Court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore affirmed.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Will of Mario Conti, deceased, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. (Docket No.: A-2638-07T3) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Wefing, Yannotti and LeWinn.
Issue: Are the handwritten notes of the Decedent entitled “Last Will and Testament”, which were notarized in Pennsylvania, a valid holographic Will?
Holding: No. The trial Court refused probate as the document in question was not properly executed in accordance with the laws of Pennsylvania, where it was executed. While the appeal was pending, the administrator of the Estate discovered a prior Will of the Decedent which was properly executed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
In re Estate of Bernard Olcott, deceased, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 996 (Docket No.: A-0927-08T1) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Skillman and Grall.
Issue: Is it proper to grant summary judgment in favor of an estate where a contestant claims he did not receive notice of the probate of the Decedent’s Will, then fails to provide requested discovery or to attend a plenary summary judgment hearing?
Holding: Yes. The contestant claims that the Decedent executed a subsequent Will after the Will that was probated. The contestant lived in the Bahamas and claimed that he did not receive notice of the probate of the Decedent’s prior Will, despite testimony to the contrary. The contestant failed to respond to the estate’s discovery requests, failed to file the new Will in the probate Court, and the Court found no support for contestant’s position other than a conclusory statement that he was not provided with notice. Therefore, the contestant’s claims are barred as being untimely.
In re Estate of Donald Towbin, deceased, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1746 (Docket No.: A-0161-08T3) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Alvarez.
Issue: Was the trial Court’s dismissal of the caveat and admission of the Decedent’s Will to probate proper in light of the parties ante-nuptial agreement wherein plaintiff waived her rights to the Decedent’s estate?
Holding: Yes. Plaintiff waived her rights in the Decedent’s estate by signing an ante-nuptial agreement after full disclosure. Plaintiff sought to set aside the ante-nuptial agreement but failed to offer clear and convincing evidence as to why it should be set aside. Generally, the grounds for challenging an ante-nuptial agreement include equitable considerations, such as unconscionability of the agreement, failure to disclose and similar concerns, none of which exist here. The Court did not find a genuine issue of material fact to allow the caveat to stand and the matter to proceed to discovery. Decedent provided for payment required by the ante-nuptial agreement in a trust established by him, and therefore plaintiff’s counterclaim was dismissed, and the lower Court’s decision affirmed on appeal.
Frederic K. Berman, Executor of the Estate of Denise Berman, deceased v. Charles I. Berman and Matthew Wilt, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48179 (Docket No.: Civil No. 07-2506 (JBS/AMD))(U.S.D.C. 2009). Before Judge Simandle.
Issue: Does the federal Court have jurisdiction to hear a dispute filed by an executor of a New Jersey estate seeking to recoup assets allegedly misappropriated by Decedent’s brother prior to Decedent’s death after the matter was removed to federal Court by Defendant/counterclaimaint who sought to aside Decedent’s Will as the product of undue influence and/or fraud?
Holding: No; the probate exception applies and the federal Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a Will contest. Jurisdiction is properly laid in the Superior Court of New Jersey.
Plaintiff, as executor of his sister’s estate, sought to recover assets allegedly misappropriated from her estate before her death. Decedent was a beneficiary of her father’s estate and due to health reasons, was unable to manage her affairs. Her brother, the defendant herein, managed Decedent’s assets pursuant to an informal trust. Plaintiff brought suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, seeking to recover these assets and an accounting. Defendant timely removed the matter to federal Court and counterclaimed that the Decedent’s Will naming Plaintiff as Executor was the product of undue influence and Decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to remand the matter to the probate Court, arguing that the district Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a probate exception to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. In the event that the probate exception applies, then the federal Court lacks jurisdiction. The probate exception is applicable only under three specific circumstances, when the federal Court is petitioned to (i) probate or annul a will, (ii) administer a decedent’s estate, or (iii) assume in rem jurisdiction over property that is in the custody of the probate Court.
Because the Defendant seeks a declaration that Decedent’s Will is void or unenforceable, the federal Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The Court is also unable to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the matter.
The matter was remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part for further proceedings.
Cohen v. Miller, et al., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2627 (Docket No.: A-3721-07T1) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Fisher, Sapp-Peterson and Espinosa.
Issue: Is an oral agreement by the Decedent to split her assets between her 2 children enforceable?
Holding: No, N.J.S.A. 3B:1-4 precludes enforcement.
Decedent left a Will leaving her entire estate to her son. Over 5 years after receiving notice of probate, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the Will should be set aside. The Court dismissed the complaint based on the time restraints contained in R. 4:85-1 governing Will contests.
Plaintiff also alleged that she entered into an oral agreement with her brother and the Decedent that the Decedent’s assets would be split equally between the siblings at her death. The Court also dismissed this part of the complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:1-4 as the alleged agreement was not in writing. The alleged agreement with her mother could not be enforced absent either a will provision expressing the contract’s material provisions; a reference in the will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or a writing signed by the Decedent evidencing the contract. None of these requirements were met and the Complaint was therefore dismissed on summary judgment.
In re Estate of Philomena Sica v. Ronald DeVito, Ralph DeVito and 10th Group, LLC, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2062 (Docket No.: A-4951-06T1) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Carchman and Sabatino.
Issue: Is the Decedent’s grandson entitled to share in Decedent’s residuary estate pursuant to the terms of her Will which provided for a distribution of a predeceased child’s share of the estate to his or her issue?
Geraldine never remarried and at her death, only 1 child of the Decedent survived. Despite the fact that there were several surviving grandchildren and great-grandchildren, Decedent’s only surviving child, Anna, when applying for Letters of Administration, named only herself and her children as heirs. Anna was appointed as Administratrix and conveyed Decedent’s residence to herself as sole heir. Anna died leaving a Will which was probated by the Essex County Surrogate. Anna left her entire estate to her children, Ronald DeVito, Ralph DeVito and Mary Ann Campanella. As Executor of Anna’s Estate, Ronald DeVito conveyed the residence to 10th Group, LLC, and a mortgage was taken out.
Decedent’s grandchild brought suit challenging Anna’s interpretation of Decedent’s Will. The trial Court interpreted the Will to provide for a division of equal shares for the issue of each predeceased child of the Decedent. It did so by determining Decedent’s probable intent. In interpreting a Will, the Court’s aim is to ascertain the intent of the testator. Under the probable intent doctrine, NJ Courts construe Wills to ascertain and give effect to the probable intention of the testator. The doctrine has been used to clarify ambiguities in a Will In discerning the Decedent’s probable intent, the Court could not accept that only “upon marriage” would all of the issue of a predeceased child of the Decedent share in the residuary estate. Decedent intended to provide for her daughter, Geraldine, and upon her death or marriage, then her estate (consisting of a house), would be divided and distributed to Decedent’s surviving children, per stirpes. There is no other evidence supporting Decedent’s intention to divest the issue of a predeceased child in the event that Geraldine does not marry.
In re Harry Sable, An Incapacitated Person, Michael Sable v. Barry Sable, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 334 (Docket No.: A-3743-06T2) (App. Div. 2009). Before Judges Stern, A. A. Rodriguez and Collester.
Issue #1: Is a non-treating expert psychiatrist’s opinion admissible in an undue influence case?
Holding: Yes. Under the rules of evidence, an expert’s opinion may be based upon facts or data of the type reasonably relied on by experts in that field. Bare conclusions unsupported by factual evidence are inadmissible as a net opinion. On appeal, it was argued that the expert relied on mini-mental exam scores to determine capacity that he ultimately agreed were inaccurate. In fact, the expert, in preparing his report, reviewed the Incapacitated Person’s medical files and reports, performed his own examination of the Incapacitated Person, interviews with the treating physicians and his own observations. Based on the foregoing, the expert’s opinion was not a net opinion and was properly considered by the lower Court.
Issue #2: Is it proper for a Court to consider the validity of a will while the testator is still living?
Holding: Yes. The case of In re Niles, 176 N.J. 282, 289-90, 823 A.2d 1 (2003), stands as authority for the proposition that when a live testator is adjudicated incompetent as of a particular date, any documents executed subsequent to that date may be invalidated.
This action was brought for an adjudication of incompetency and to invalidate all of the documents, including the Power of Attorney, Advanced Directive and Will, which were executed after a certain date. The same proofs to invalidate the Power of Attorney would apply to invalidating the Will and there is no need for separate trial. The Court upheld the lower Court’s findings of incapacity and the setting aside of all estate planning documents signed after the date of said incapacity.
Issue #3: What is the burden of proof to rebut a presumption of undue influence where the testator and the alleged influencer were represented by the same attorney?
Holding: The presumption of undue influence must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, because the attorney who prepared the Will represented both the testator and the proponent of the new Will and because there was no proof that the attorney disclosed the conflict of interest to the testator. The normal “preponderance of the evidence” standard therefore did not apply.
Issue #4: Was the assessment of damages for breach of fiduciary duty proper?
Holding: Yes. The Court found that the defendant misappropriated monies of the testator, failed to properly manage his finances, took undocumented loans, failed to properly account for expenses paid on behalf of the testator, and expended monies of the estate to litigate the matter. If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the fiduciary is liable to interested parties for damage or loss resulting from breach of his fiduciary duty. See N.J.S.A. 3B:14-35. Here, the lower Court’s findings were upheld.
Issue #5: Is the assessment of counsel fees against an agent under a Power of Attorney who committed undue influence proper?
Holding: Yes. Relying on In re Niles, the award of counsel fees against the defendant was proper. Even though defendant was not an executor or trustee as was the case in Niles, he controlled the testator’s estate under the Power of Attorney and he influenced the testator to change his estate plan to benefit himself. In Niles, the Court held that when an executor or trustee commits the pernicious tort of undue influence, it should result in an award of counsel fees and costs against said tortfeasor. In this matter, as in Niles, the award of attorneys fees was based on the rationale that the estate should be made whole when undue influence results in the development or modification of estate documents that create or expand the fiduciary’s beneficial interest in the estate. The award of attorneys fees against defendant was therefore upheld.


text:
DOUGLAS v. HAYES, Solicitor General.
Injunction. Coffee Superior Court. Before Judge Hodges.
1. The information of the solicitor general on the application of named relators was sufficient to state a cause of action for the abatement of a public nuisance. Lofton v. Collins, 117 Ga. 434 (3) (43 SE 708, 61 LRA 150); Kilgore v. Paschall, 202 Ga. 416 (43 SE2d 520); Lee v. Hayes, 215 Ga. 330 (110 SE2d 624).
2. The court did not err in refusing to permit counsel for the defendant to elicit testimony designed to demonstrate that the solicitor general had failed to institute proceedings to abate as a public nuisance other establishments operating in the same manner as the business of the defendant.
3. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the court to enjoin the defendant from operating the business. Norris v. State, 204 Ga. 441 (50 SE2d 22); Thornton v. Forehand, 211 Ga. 658 (87 SE2d 865).
Dewey Hayes, Solicitor General of the Waycross Judicial Circuit, brought this suit in Coffee County Superior Court on the application of named relators against J. W. Douglas, doing business as Amvets Post 34, being a petition in equity to enjoin as a public nuisance the operation of Amvets Post 34. An ex parte order was issued, enjoining the operation of the business, and ordering the defendant to show cause on a designated day why the operation of the business should not be enjoined as a public nuisance. The sheriff was directed to padlock the club and take charge of its contents until further order of the court.
The petition alleges in substance that: The defendant is operating what purports to be a private club, Amvets Post 34, operating with members only, but in fact it is open to members and the general public, including minors. The club is located two miles outside the city limits of Douglas on a public road. Large gatherings of people, including minors, are permitted to gather in the place, play the juke organ, carouse around, dance, drink alcoholic beverages, and gamble, the consequence of which is that it is a public nuisance to the entire community. Whiskey is illegally possessed and sold at the place. The defendant possesses illegal gambling devices, and operates and maintains a gambling house during the week and on Sunday. Arguments and fights occur therein, and one person has been killed therein recently.
In support of the allegations in the petition the plaintiff introduced evidence which in substance showed: The defendant owned the premises on which the club was operated, and maintained and operated it. It was located outside the city limits of Douglas on a public highway, and was frequented by the general public. There was a bar located therein where beer and whiskey were displayed and sold by the bottle and by the drink. Slot machines were located therein which were "played" by the customers. There was a dining room and a dance hall, and an electric phonograph which emitted music when operated. Carl Deen was ejected from the premises for fighting, and John Deen was seen beating his wife therein. It was stipulated that John Deen was shot by his wife while at the club, and subsequently died from the wounds received, and that no true bill was returned against her for such homicide. Several witnesses testified that they enjoyed going to the place of business and nothing therein disturbed them.
The defendant excepts to the denial of his oral motion to dismiss and to the grant of an injunction.
Dewey Hayes, Solicitor General, contra.
Leon A. Wilson, II, for plaintiff in error.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 14, 1965 -- DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 1965.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
This is a list of all my academic publications, grouped by year from newest to oldest. The DOI button on the right (when present) takes you to the publisher’s website for the official publication. The PDF button also at the right-hand side allows you to download the author-submitted version of the paper.
BibTeX entries for each paper are available by clicking on the corresponding link, or you can view the complete list of my publications in BibTeX format.
A. Rodrigues, L. Martinuzzo, F. M. Varejao, V. E. S. Souza, and T. Oliveira-Santos, “Reducing power companies billing costs via empirical bayes and seasonality remover,” Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 81, p. 387–396, 2019.
C. C. Peçanha, B. B. Duarte, R. A. Falbo, and V. E. S. Souza, “RASO: an Ontology on Requirements for the Development of Adaptive Systems,” Cadernos do IME – Série Informática, vol. 41, iss. 1, p. 57–76, 2018.
B. L. Zupeli and V. E. S. Souza, “Integração de um Gerador de Código ao FrameWeb Editor,” in Anais Estendidos do 24\textordmasculine Simpósio Brasileiro de Sistemas Multimedia e Web – Workshop de Ferramentas e Aplicações (WFA/WebMedia 2018), Salvador, BA, Brazil, 2018, p. 109–113.
C. C. Peçanha, B. B. Duarte, and V. E. S. Souza, “RASO: an Ontology on Requirements for the Development of Adaptive Systems,” in Proc. of the 21st Workshop on Requirements Engineering (WER 2018), Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil, 2018, p. 1–14.
L. A. Santos, G. M. Miranda, S. L. Campos, R. A. Falbo, M. P. Barcellos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. P. A. Almeida, “Using an Ontology Network for Data Integration: A Case in the Public Security Domain,” in Proc. of the 11th Seminar on Ontology Research in Brazil (ONTOBRAS 2018), São Paulo, SP, Brazil, 2018, p. 209–220.
C. Z. de Aguiar, R. A. Falbo, and V. E. S. Souza, “Ontological Representation of Relational Databases,” in Proc. of the 11th Seminar on Ontology Research in Brazil (ONTOBRAS 2018), São Paulo, SP, Brazil, 2018, p. 140–151.
R. C. do Prado and V. E. S. Souza, “Securing FrameWeb: Supporting Role-based Access Control in a Framework-based Design Method for Web Engineering,” in Proc. of the 24th Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia ’18), Salvador, BA, Brazil, 2018, p. 213–220.
B. B. Duarte, R. A. Falbo, G. Guizzardi, R. S. S. Guizzardi, and V. E. S. Souza, “Towards an Ontology of Software Defects, Errors and Failures,” in Proc. of the 37th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER 2018), Xi’an, China, 2018, p. 349–362.
G. E. Monjardim, A. Rodrigues, F. M. Varejão, V. E. S. Souza, and M. P. Ribeiro, “A Domain-Specific Language for Fault Diagnosis in Electrical Submersible Pumps,” in Proc. of the IEEE 16th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN 2018), Porto, Portugal, 2018, p. 843–848.
M. L. de Freitas, A. A. Silva, R. S. S. Guizzardi, and V. E. S. Souza, “Goal and Risk Analysis in the Development of Information Systems for the Web of Data,” in Proc. of the 21st Ibero-American Conference on Software Engineering (CIbSE 2018), Requirements Engineering track, Bogota, Colombia, 2018, p. 473–486.
B. B. Duarte, A. L. C. Leal, R. A. de Falbo, G. Guizzardi, R. S. S. Guizzardi, and V. E. S. Souza, “Ontological foundations for software requirements with a focus on requirements at runtime,” Applied Ontology, vol. 13, iss. 2, p. 73–105, 2018.
K. Angelopoulos, A. V. Papadopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Mylopoulos, “Engineering Self-Adaptive Software Systems: From Requirements to Model Predictive Control,” ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, vol. 13, iss. 1, p. 1:1–1:27, 2018.
S. L. Campos and V. E. S. Souza, “FrameWeb Editor: Uma Ferramenta CASE para suporte ao Método FrameWeb,” in Anais do 16º Workshop de Ferramentas e Aplicações, 23º Simpósio Brasileiro de Sistemas Multimedia e Web (WFA/WebMedia 2017), Gramado, RS, Brazil, 2017, p. 199–203.
N. V. de Almeida, S. L. Campos, and V. E. S. Souza, “A Model-Driven Approach for Code Generation forWeb-based Information Systems Built with Frameworks,” in Proc. of the 23rd Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia 2017), Gramado, RS, Brazil, 2017, p. 245–252.
C. H. Bernabé, P. P. Negri, B. B. Duarte, A. L. C. de Leal, R. S. S. Guizzardi, and V. E. S. Souza, “Unagi: Uma ferramenta para suporte à Modelagem de Requisitos de Sistemas Adaptativos,” in Anais da Sessão de Ferramentas do 8º Congresso Brasileiro de Software: Teoria e Prática (CBSoft 2017), Fortaleza, CE, Brazil, 2017, p. 1–8.
P. P. Negri, V. E. S. Souza, A. L. C. de Leal, R. A. Falbo, and G. Guizzardi, “Towards an Ontology of Goal-Oriented Requirements,” in Proc. of the 20th Ibero-American Conference on Software Engineering (CIbSE 2017), Requirements Engineering track, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2017.
D. R. Celino, L. V. Reis, B. F. Martins, and V. E. S. Souza, “A Framework-based Approach for the Integration of Web-based Information Systems on the Semantic Web,” in Proc. of the 22nd Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia 2016), Teresina, PI, Brazil, 2016, p. 231–238.
B. B. Duarte, V. E. S. Souza, A. L. C. de Leal, R. A. Falbo, G. Guizzardi, and R. S. S. Guizzardi, “Towards an Ontology of Requirements at Runtime,” in Proc. of the 9th International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS 2016), Annecy, France, 2016, p. 255–268.
K. Angelopoulos, A. V. Papadopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Mylopoulos, “Model predictive control for software systems with CobRA,” in Proc. of the 11th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2016), Austin, TX, USA, 2016, p. 35–46.
B. F. Martins and V. E. S. Souza, “A Model-Driven Approach for the Design of Web Information Systems based on Frameworks,” in Proc. of the 21st Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia 2015), Manaus, AM, Brazil, 2015, p. 41–48.
K. Angelopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Mylopoulos, “Capturing Variability in Adaptation Spaces: A Three-Peaks Approach,” in Proc. of the 34th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER 2015), Stockholm, Sweden, 2015, p. 384–398.
J. Pimentel, J. F. B. Castro, J. Mylopoulos, K. Angelopoulos, and V. E. S. Souza, “From requirements to statecharts via design refinement,” in Proc. of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (ACM SAC 2014), 2014, p. 995–1000.
K. Angelopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Mylopoulos, “Dealing with multiple failures in Zanshin: a control-theoretic approach,” in Proc. of the 9th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2014), 2014, p. 165–174.
F. Dalpiaz, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Mylopoulos, “The many faces of operationalization in goal-oriented requirements engineering,” in Proc. of the 10th Asia-Pacific Conference on Conceptual Modelling (APCCM 2014), 2014, p. 3–7.
V. E. S. Souza and J. Mylopoulos, “Designing an adaptive computer-aided ambulance dispatch system with Zanshin: an experience report,” Software: Practice and Experience, vol. 45, iss. 5, p. 689–725, 2013.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, K. Angelopoulos, and J. Mylopoulos, “Requirements-driven software evolution,” Computer Science – Research and Development, vol. 28, iss. 4, p. 311–329, 2013.
J. Pimentel, K. Angelopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, J. Mylopoulos, and J. F. B. Castro, “From Requirements to Architectures for Better Adaptive Software Systems,” in Proc. of the 6th International i* Workshop (iStar 2013), 2013, p. 91–96.
V. E. S. Souza and R. S. S. Guizzardi, “Usando Modelos de Requisito em Tempo de Execução: Potencial e Desafios,” in Proc. of Requirements Engineering@Brazil 2013 (ER@BR 2013), 2013, p. 1–6.
S. Ingolfo and V. E. S. Souza, “Law and Adaptivity in Requirements Engineering,” in Proc. of the 8th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2013), 2013, p. 163–168.
G. Tallabaci and V. E. S. Souza, “Engineering Adaptation with Zanshin: an Experience Report,” in Proc. of the 8th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2013), 2013, p. 93–102.
K. Angelopoulos, V. E. S. Souza, and J. Pimentel, “Requirements and Architectural Approaches to Adaptive Software Systems: A Comparative Study,” in Proc. of the 8th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2013), 2013, p. 23–32.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, W. N. Robinson, and J. Mylopoulos, “Awareness Requirements,” in Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems II, R. Lemos, H. Giese, H. A. Müller, and M. Shaw, Eds., Springer, 2013, vol. 7475, p. 133–161.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, and J. Mylopoulos, “Requirements-Driven Qualitative Adaptation,” in Proc. of the 20th International Conference on Cooperative Information Systems (CoopIS 2012), Rome, Italy, 2012, p. 342–361.
V. E. S. Souza, “Requirements-based Software System Adaptation,” PhD Thesis, University of Trento, Italy, 2012.
V. E. S. Souza, “A requirements-based approach for the design of adaptive systems,” in Proc. of the 34th International Conference on Software Engineering (ACM Student Research Competition), 2012, p. 1635–1637.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, and J. Mylopoulos, “(Requirement) Evolution Requirements for Adaptive Systems,” in Proc. of the 7th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2012), 2012, p. 155–164.
V. E. S. Souza, J. Mazón, I. Garrigós, J. Trujillo, and J. Mylopoulos, “Monitoring Strategic Goals in Data Warehouses with Awareness Requirements,” in Proc. of the 2012 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (ACM SAC 2012), 2012, p. 1075–1082.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, and J. Mylopoulos, “System Identification for Adaptive Software Systems: a Requirements Engineering Perspective,” in Proc. of the 30th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER 2011), Brussels, Belgium, 2011, p. 346–361.
V. E. S. Souza and J. Mylopoulos, “From Awareness Requirements to Adaptive Systems: a Control-Theoretic Approach,” in Proc. of the 2nd International Workshop on Requirements@Run.Time (RRT 2011), 2011, p. 9–15.
R. Ali, F. Dalpiaz, P. Giorgini, and V. E. S. Souza, “Requirements Evolution: From Assumptions to Reality,” in Proc. of the 12th International Conference on Enterprise, Business-Process and Information Systems Modeling, London, UK, 2011, p. 372–382.
V. E. S. Souza, A. Lapouchnian, W. N. Robinson, and J. Mylopoulos, “Awareness Requirements for Adaptive Systems,” in Proc. of the 6th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS 2011), 2011, p. 60–69.
R. Ali, A. K. Chopra, F. Dalpiaz, P. Giorgini, J. Mylopoulos, and V. E. S. Souza, “The Evolution of Tropos: Contexts, Commitments and Adaptivity,” in Proc. of the 4th International i* Workshop (iStar 2010), 2010, p. 15–19.
V. E. S. Souza, R. A. Falbo, and G. Guizzardi, “Designing Web Information Systems for a Framework-based Construction,” in Innovations in Information Systems Modeling: Methods and Best Practices, 1 ed., T. Halpin, E. Proper, and J. Krogstie, Eds., IGI Global, 2009, p. 203–237.
V. E. S. Souza and J. Mylopoulos, “Monitoring and Diagnosing Malicious Attacks with Autonomic Software,” in Proc. of the 28th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER 2009), Gramado, RS, Brazil, 2009, p. 84–98.
V. E. S. Souza, N. Zeni, N. Kiyavitskaya, P. Andritsos, L. Mich, and J. Mylopoulos, “Automating the Generation of Semantic Annotation Tools Using a Clustering Technique,” in Proc. of the 13th International Conference on Natural Language and Information Systems (NLDB 2008), 2008, p. 91–96.
V. E. S. Souza, “FrameWeb: um Método baseado em Frameworks para o Projeto de Sistemas de Informação Web,” Master Thesis, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2007.
V. E. S. Souza, T. W. Lourenço, R. A. Falbo, and G. Guizzardi, “S-FrameWeb: a Framework-Based Design Method for Web Engineering with Semantic Web Support,” in Proc. of the 2007 International Workshop on Web Information Systems Modeling (WISM 2007), 2007, p. 55–66.
V. E. S. Souza, R. A. Falbo, and G. Guizzardi, “A UML Profile for Modeling Framework-based Web Information Systems,” in Proc. of the 12th International Workshop on Exploring Modeling Methods in Systems Analysis and Design (EMMSAD 2007), 2007, p. 149–158.
V. E. S. Souza and R. A. Falbo, “FrameWeb – A Framework-based Design Method for Web Engineering,” in Proc. of the 2007 Euro American Conference on Telematics and Information Systems (EATIS 2007), 2007.
V. E. S. Souza and R. A. Falbo, “An Agile Approach for Web Systems Engineering,” in Proc. of the 11th Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the Web (WebMedia 2005), 2005, p. 1–3.
V. E. S. Souza and R. A. Falbo, “Supporting Ontology Axiomatization and Evaluation in ODEd,” in Proc. of the 8th Iberoamerican Workshop in Requirement Engineering and Software Environments (IDEAS 2005), 2005, p. 59–70.
V. E. S. Souza, “Estendendo ODEd: Axiomatização e Adequação ao Meta-Modelo da UML,” Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo 2004.
V. E. S. Souza and R. A. Falbo, “Construindo Axiomas e Avaliando Ontologias em ODEd,” in Anais da X Sessão de Ferramentas do Simpósio Brasileiro de Engenharia de Software, 2003, p. 7–12.
V. E. S. Souza, “Uso de Ontologias no Desenvolvimento de Software,” Caderno de Resumos – XIII Jornada de iniciação Científica, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo 2003.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.