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ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY (and a consolidated case [Note 1]).
Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, & O'CONNOR, JJ.
CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on October 16 and 17, 1984, respectively.
The case was heard by Liacos, J., and was reported by him.
Michael Arthur Walsh (Edward H. Seksay with him) for Boston City Council.
Stephen S. Ostrach, Assistant Attorney General (Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, with him) for the Attorney General.
Chester A. Janiak (Christopher A. Duggan with him) for Sheriff of Suffolk County.
Max D. Stern for the interveners.
John O. Mirick, for Hawthorne Residents Association & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
NOLAN, J. A single justice of this court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974), has reported the propriety of certain orders entered by him for our hearing and determination. We affirm these orders.
The Attorney General filed a complaint in the county court in which he sought an order to compel the sheriff of Suffolk County (Sheriff) to accept into his custody all pretrial detainees committed to him by the courts of the Commonwealth. The Sheriff then brought an action by verified complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the mayor of Boston (Mayor), the city council of Boston (City Council), and the Commissioner of Correction. The Sheriff sought to enjoin the Mayor and City Council from failing to provide funding for facilities to house Suffolk County pretrial detainees, to enjoin the Commissioner of Correction from refusing to accept Suffolk County pretrial detainees, and to declare the obligation of the Mayor and City Council to provide suitable facilities for pretrial detainees who cannot be accommodated at the Charles Street jail (jail). These two actions were consolidated and the detainees at the jail and the inmates at the Deer Island house of correction were permitted to intervene. [Note 2] The City Council filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it and the motion was denied.
The problem is overcrowding at the jail, which has suffered malignant neglect for many years.
rights to due process because of the housing conditions at the jail. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973). A judge of that court entered a detailed judgment covering many subjects such as single cell occupancy, clothing, medical examinations of inmates, and recreation time. The judgment permanently enjoined the defendants from housing in the jail any inmate awaiting trial after June 30, 1976. Id. at 691. That judgment was not appealed. The United States District Court postponed the operative date from June 30, 1976, to July 1, 1977, then to November 1, 1977. At the request of the City Council, a further stay was granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to March 3, 1978. A final stay of the order barring the housing of inmates at the jail was allowed until October 2, 1978. The order was then to become effective unless the parties reached a definite agreement on a site, construction schedule, and design plans for a replacement of the present jail. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 100-101 (1st Cir. 1978).
In April, 1979, all parties in the Federal litigation signed a consent decree which required the continued housing of inmates on a one inmate to one cell basis. The consent decree called for construction on the present site and contained detailed specifications for construction, which was to begin in 86 weeks (by the end of 1980) and be completed by 1983. The consent decree plan recommended a population of 272 men and 18 women to be housed in "modules."
The original projections of the anticipated jail population was 238 inmates in 1983, which figure would decline in later years. A safety margin of 34 spaces was provided. However, by 1982, the architectural plans were modified to provide a maximum capacity of 309 inmates.
in State institutions to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction under G. L. c. 276, Section 52A. By October, 1984, even these stop-gap measures proved inadequate because the entire correctional system was sagging under the weight of overcrowding.
The proceeding before the single justice. When the breaking point was reached in October, 1984, the Attorney General filed his complaint against the Sheriff, which was followed by the Sheriff's complaint against the Mayor, the City Council, and the Commissioner of Correction. The single justice conducted a number of hearings at which he consistently pressed the parties for agreement on as many issues as possible. Finally, all parties and interveners agreed in a stipulation on the following: (1) a new jail was necessary; (2) its site should be the site of the present jail; (3) a jail of 435 cells was required; (4) the new jail should contain at least a thirteen story highrise component.
The parties stipulated that the city of Boston has already appropriated $15.4 million and the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Correction will support State funding of $28 million to construct a seventeen story jail. The City Council opposes the seventeen story structure and has espoused a plan calling for a thirteen story structure and rehabilitation of at least part of the existing jail in order to accommodate 435 cells. All the parties (the Attorney General, Commissioner, Mayor, inmates) except the City Council favor the seventeen story plan though the Sheriff would be content with either plan as long as there were 435 cells. All parties agree that any plan which differs from that approved in the consent decree must be submitted to the Federal court for approval.
planning and outlay (DCPO), whereas plans for the rehabilitation of the existing jail, which is part of the thirteen story plan, would require submission to DCPO for review and approval. This submission and approval, it is estimated, would cause a delay of approximately two years.
The present site would not have been the choice of the single justice (nor would it be our choice) but he adopted it because all the parties agreed to it.
f. Bid process 2 months Dec. 3, 1985"
On appeal, the City Council challenges the validity of the single justice's orders on the grounds (1) that an action in the nature of mandamus does not lie against the City Council, (2) that the orders violate art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, and (3) that they violate art. 6 of the United States Constitution. We shall treat them in this order.
1. Limitations on mandamus. [Note 5] The City Council argues that the single justice has no power to order it to construct a seventeen story jail because such an order invades the City Council's discretionary powers and mandamus does not lie in such cases. The argument is without merit. The obligation of the City Council to provide a suitable jail is not discretionary.
of Hampden, 2 Pick. 414 (1824). In 1943 the court ordered the town of Hudson to chlorinate its water supply. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335 (1943). The court imposed a receivership on the Boston Housing Authority in Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703 (1980), because the defendant had failed to operate the authority "as the Legislature declared it should be." Id. at 742. A year later, the court sustained a single justice's order restraining the Suffolk County Court House Commission, among others, from reducing the existing level of services at the Suffolk County Court House. Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 383 Mass. 286 (1981). Therefore, the power of the single justice to compel city officials to comply with law is beyond dispute.
In this case, of course, the single justice has done more than simply order the city officials to comply with their statutory duties. He has directed that they carry out those duties in a specific way. Normally, as we have said, courts may properly direct a public official to carry out a statutory duty, but, where the means of carrying out that statutory duty is within the discretion of the public official, courts normally will not direct how the public official should exercise that statutory duty. Here, however, it is implied in the judge's findings and in the circumstances presented that there was only one means by which the public officials could carry out their statutory duty, that is, by the construction of a seventeen story jail.
The only suitable plan was the seventeen story proposal. The thirteen story proposal required a rehabilitation of the existing jail, which required the expenditure of $20 million for which no provision had been made. In contrast, the seventeen story plan could be accomplished with the $15.4 million already set aside by the city and $28 million of expected State funds. In addition, the thirteen story plan would require submission of plans to DCPO, which would entail an additional two-year delay. In light of the scandalous delay already suffered in providing a suitable jail for Suffolk County, the additional two-year delay alone would be sufficient to render the thirteen story plan wholly unrealistic. In a word, there was only one plan which could be adopted within the financial and time frame available and this was the seventeen story plan.
2. Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The City Council argues that the single justice's orders violate the principle of separation of powers contained in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to the extent that the judicial orders are an improper exercise of political and nonjusticiable power. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-455 (1939). The orders represent, it is claimed, a poaching by the judicial branch on executive and legislative territories.
The orders are designed to carry out a purely judicial function, i.e., ordering the fulfilment of the statutory obligation of the city of Boston to provide a suitable jail under the mandate of G. L. c. 34, Section 3. It falls to the judicial branch to insure compliance with this statute. The court must have power to carry out its obligation. See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335 , 346 (1943).
An argument similar to the City Council's was made by the defendant in Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., supra, wherein this court affirmed the action of a Superior Court judge in placing the Boston Housing Authority in temporary receivership. The language of Perez is most apposite to the instant case: "But if it is a function of the judicial branch to provide remedies for violations of law, including violations committed by the executive branch, then an injunction with that intent does not derogate from the separation principle, nor, by extension, does a receivership otherwise properly instituted. To the contrary, when the executive persists in indifference to, or neglect or disobedience of court orders, necessitating a receivership, it is the executive that could more properly be charged with contemning the separation principle." Id. at 739-740. The same principle can be applied to the City Council. Courts have traditionally issued orders and injunctions directing public officials to carry out their obligations. See Blaney v. Commissioner of Correction, 374 Mass. 337 , 342 (1978).
What is more, even if art. 30 did bear upon the orders, it must be remembered that the City Council's failure to construct a suitable jail in which to house detainees committed by the courts may interfere with the functioning of the judicial branch, which is charged with committing persons to the jail.
3. Article 6 of the United States Constitution. The City Council argues that art. 6 of the United States Constitution, popularly known as the supremacy clause, prohibits this court from treating the subject matter of the construction of the jail because the Federal court has spoken in the consent decree and, in terms of art. 6, such consent decree is the supreme law of the land.
At the outset, the question whether a judgment or decree of a United States District Court is within the supremacy clause is by no means settled. It is doubtful that decisions of any Federal court except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are conclusive on State courts. See United States v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-1076 (7th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603 , 604 (1983); State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tenn. 1984); Kraus v. Board of Education of Jennings, 492 S.W. 783, 784 (Mo. 1973). Further, even if the supremacy clause were in point, it may be argued that the City Council should not be heard to claim the shield of art. 6 because it has consistently failed to discharge its obligation under the Federal consent decree.
In truth, the difference between the orders of the single justice and the provisions of the consent decree is miniscule, i.e., seventeen stories as contrasted with thirteen stories. The construction of seventeen stories would not conflict with the order for thirteen stories. The single justice's orders achieve the goal that the consent decree sought, but is no longer able, to achieve. This is hardly the species of confrontation covered by the supremacy clause, even if art. 6 is properly invocable. There is no real conflict between the Federal consent decree and the orders of the single justice.
The orders of the single justice are affirmed.
[Note 1] Sheriff of Suffolk County vs. Mayor of Boston & others. Also named as defendants were the city council of Boston and the Commissioner of Correction.
[Note 2] Subsequently, the inmates at the Deer Island house of correction brought a third-party complaint against the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Correction, the Sheriff, the Mayor, the City Council, and the penal commissioner of Boston. This action has been severed.
On this appeal, we acknowledge the amici curiae brief filed by the Hawthorne Residents Association and Charles River Park, Inc.
[Note 3] The term "inmate" has been used generally to describe any person held at the jail, whereas a detainee is one who is held only while awaiting trial. The terms are used interchangeably in this opinion.
[Note 4] This opinion deliberately omits discussion of the merits of an interim jail, use of the "Plant" at the Deer Island house of correction as a temporary jail, and the single justice's order regarding bail reviews because these issues have not been raised on appeal.
[Note 5] For convenience, we use the term mandamus, instead of action in the nature of mandamus, though mindful of the abolition of the writ of mandamus by Mass. R. Civ. P. 81 (b), 365 Mass. 841 (1974).
[Note 6] General Laws c. 34, Section 3, as amended through St. 1978, c. 478, Section 17, provides in pertinent part: "Each county shall provide suitable jails, houses of correction, fireproof offices and other public buildings necessary for its use except that the county of Dukes need not provide a house of correction, and that Boston shall provide necessary public buildings for Suffolk county."

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text: 1st person future tense and future imperative of খাওয়া: খাওয়া [ khāōẏā ] v to eat; to drink (জল খাওয়া); to take or enjoy (চা খাওয়া, ওষুধ খাওয়া, হাওয়া খাওয়া); to smoke (সিগারেট খাওয়া); to chew (পান খাওয়া); to accept or take (ঘুষ খাওয়া); to take or receive, to suffer (মার খাওয়া, কিল খাওয়া); to cause to lose, to cause to be dismissed from (চাকরি খাওয়া); to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়া); to consume or absorb (লণ্ঠনটা খুব তেল খায়); to eat away, to wear away, to corrode. ☐ a. eaten or drunk or taken or smoked or chewed completely or incompletely (পাখিতে খাওয়া ফল); used by one whilst eating or drinking and yet unwashed (খাওয়া থালা); partly eaten away or worn away or corroded. কিল খাওয়া v. to receive a blow; to be buffeted. কুরে খাওয়া v. to scrape or gnaw away, to eat away. গালি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or rated. চরিত্র খাওয়া n. character-assassination. বকুনি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or abused or reprimanded, to be taken to task. খাওয়া খাওয়ি n. mutual entertainment at tables; mutual feasting; (idiom.) mutual quarrelling (খাওয়া-খাওয়ি করা). খাওয়া-দাওয়া n. eating and drinking. খাওয়া-দাওয়া করা v. to eat and drink. খাওয়ানো v. to feed; to cause to eat or drink or take or smoke or chew; to cause to accept (ঘুষ খাওয়ানো); to cause to receive or suffer (মার খাওয়ানো); to cause to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়ানো); to cause to consume or absorb (তেল খাওয়ানো); to cause to be eaten or worn away; to cause to be corroded.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. GLENN SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, AND DORY ANN PARCON Y DEL ROSARIO, ACCUSED, GLENN SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, Accused–Appellant.
For review is the Decision2 dated September 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CR H.C. No. 03230 that affirmed in toto the January 15, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q–03–120799–800. The said RTC Decision found Glenn Salvador y Balverde (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), and accused Dory Ann Parcon y Del Rosario (Parcon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11 (illegal possession), both of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (RA9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
While PO2 Soriano was on duty in Police Station 2, Baler Street, Quezon City on September 2, 2003, a confidential informant (CI) arrived at around 9:00 a.m. and reported that a certain alias Bumski was engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous drugs in Barangay Pag–asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano immediately relayed this information to Police Chief Inspector Joseph De Vera (P/C Insp. De Vera). A surveillance operation conducted the same day on alias Bumski, who turned out to be the appellant, confirmed the report. Thus, a police team was formed to conduct a buy–bust operation. PO2 Soriano was designated as poseur–buyer while PO2 Richard Vecida, PO1 Alexander Pancho, PO1 Alvin Pineda (PO1 Pineda) and P/C Insp. De Vera would serve as his backup.
At around 2:45 p.m. of September 3, 2003, the team arrived at Road 10, Barangay Pag–asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano and the CI proceeded to appellant’s house while the rest of the buy–bust team positioned themselves within viewing distance. The CI introduced PO2 Soriano to appellant as a drug dependent who wanted to purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. During their conversation, Parcon arrived and asked appellant for shabu. Appellant gave her a small heat–sealed plastic sachet that she placed in her coin purse. Thereafter, PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the buy–bust money consisting of two 100–peso bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a heat–sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Soriano then immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy bust money. At this juncture, PO2 Soriano’s teammates rushed to the scene. PO1 Pineda arrested Parcon and recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing white crystalline substance.
Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The items recovered during the buy–bust operation were marked by PO2 Soriano as “SJ–03” and “AP–03” and turned over to the designated investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay (PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then prepared a letter–request for laboratory examination, which, together with the confiscated specimen, was brought by PO2 Soriano to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
In his testimony,15 appellant claimed that at about 11:00 p.m. of September 2, 2003, he was parking his tricycle outside his residence at 135 Road 10, Brgy. Pag–asa, Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly stopped in front of his house. Three policemen alighted, aimed their guns at him, and forced him to board their vehicle. Already inside were two men in handcuffs sitting on the floor. The police car then proceeded to Police Station 2 in Baler, Quezon City, where he and the two other men were taken to a room and frisked by policemen who demanded P20,000.00 from each of them. They were told to call their relatives to inform them of their arrest for engaging in a pot session. When appellant refused to oblige, PO2 Soriano said to him: “matigas ka, hindi ka marunong makisama dapat sayo ikulong.” He was thereafter detained and no longer saw the two men he mentioned. Two days later, he was presented to the Prosecutor’s Office for inquest.
Appellant accused the police officers of falsehood but could not file a case against them since his parents were in the Unites States of America and he did not know anyone else who could help him. He denied knowing Parcon and the arresting officers and claimed that he saw Parcon for the first time during the inquest and the arresting officers when they arrested him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 charged in Criminal Case No. Q–03–120799. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand ( P500,000.00) PESOS.
On the other hand, judgment is likewise rendered in Criminal Case No. Q–03–120800 finding accused DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON–COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. No. 9165.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE APPREHENDING TEAM TO PROVE ITS INTEGRITY.
Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove the elements constituting the crime of illegal sale of shabu, appellant asserted that the apprehending officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same as mandated by Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165; that the chain of custody was broken since PO2 Soriano could not determine with certainty whether the plastic sachet allegedly seized from him was the same specimen subjected to laboratory examination; that the prosecution was unable to substantiate its claim that the two 100–peso bills were the same money used in purchasing shabu since the said bills were neither dusted with fluorescent powder nor was he subjected to fingerprint examination; that the failure to coordinate the buy–bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was prejudicial to his substantive right; and, that PO2 Soriano and the buy–bust team did not accord him due process by failing to apprise him of his rights after he was arrested.
The People of the Philippines, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserted in its Brief20 that the Decision of the RTC must be affirmed since the guilt of appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution proved all the elements of the illegal sale of drugs; that the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy–bust operation and their positive identification of appellant as the seller of the shabu prevail over the latter’s denial; that the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized from appellant was sufficiently established; that the failure to use fluorescent powder in the marked money does not result in a failure of the buy–bust operation since the same is not a prerequisite to such operation; that the failure of the law enforcers to conduct a physical inventory or to photograph the seized items in accordance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not fatal; that the failure of the buy–bust team to coordinate with the PDEA does not invalidate appellant’s arrest; that PO2 Soriano’s failure to recall the markings on the specimen shows that he was not coached as a witness; that appellant’s defenses of denial and frame–up are unconvincing; and that the failure to apprise appellant of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is not fatal since such rights apply only against extrajudicial confessions.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated January 15, 2008 insofar as the accused–appellant Glenn Salvador Y Balverde is affirmed in toto.
On February 8, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs.23 The OSG opted to adopt the brief it submitted before the CA as its appeal brief while appellant filed a Supplemental Brief24 which, however, contains practically the same arguments he advanced before the CA. Again, aside from questioning the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against him, appellant questions the arresting officers’ alleged failure to comply with the chain of custody rule.
All the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established in this case.
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of illegal sale of shabu. The testimony of PO2 Soriano reveals that an entrapment operation was organized and conducted after they confirmed through a surveillance operation the information that appellant is engaged in drug peddling activities. Designated as a poseur–buyer, PO2 Soriano, together with the CI, approached appellant outside his residence. After having been introduced by the CI to appellant as a drug user, PO2 Soriano asked appellant if he could purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the marked money consisting of two P100 bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO2 Soriano then arrested appellant and recovered the buy–bust money from the latter. Immediately thereafter his back–up who were monitoring the transaction from viewing distance arrived. Forensic examination subsequently confirmed that the contents of the sachets bought from appellant and recovered from Parcon were indeed shabu.
Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy–bust operation. Their narration of the incident, “buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight.”27 Here, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that the testimonies and facts stipulated upon were consistent with each other as well as with the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb the findings of the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frame–up are unavailing.
The Court cannot convince itself to reverse the finding of facts of the lower courts on the basis of appellant’s self–serving allegations of denial and extortion/frame–up.
Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame–up which “is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law.”29 To substantiate this defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the buy–bust team was inspired by improper motive or was not properly performing its duty.30 Here, there is no evidence that there was ill motive on the part of the buy–bust team. In fact, appellant himself admitted that he did not know the police officers prior to his arrest. There could therefore be no bad blood between him and the said police officers. Moreover, there was no proof that the arresting officers improperly performed their duty in arresting appellant and Parcon.
Non–compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal.
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non–compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied).
The links in the chain of custody must be established.
On the same day, PO2 Soriano personally brought the letter request and specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Arban who conducted the examination on the specimens submitted. During the pre–trial conference, appellant admitted the purpose for which P/Insp. Arban’s testimony was being offered.38 The marked sachet of shabu and the marked money used in purchasing the same were both presented in evidence.
Appellant’s claim that the testimony of PO2 Soriano does not deserve credence due to his failure to identify and/or recall the markings he made on the subject specimen also fails to convince. His failure to immediately recall the markings on the specimens only show that he is an uncoached witness.40 “Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to the essential details of the incident.”41 It must also be considered that aside from the fact that police officers handle numerous cases daily, he testified three years after appellant’s arrest. It is therefore understandable that PO2 Soriano could no longer easily remember all the details of the incident.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the enactment of RA 9346,44 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.45 Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper.
1People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 180,199.
2 CA rollo, pp. 125–137; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Antonio L. Villamor.
3 Records, pp. 235–241; penned by Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.
8 See Motion for Consolidation, id. at 1.
12 TSN, September 6, 2004, pp. 4–8; TSN, January 12, 2005, pp. 2–5.
15 TSN, November 6, 2007, pp. 3–7.
18 CA rollo, pp. 51–68.
25People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 409 (2007).
26People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 61, 70.
27People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 288, 300–301.
28People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA 706, 714.
30People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 71, citing People v. Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.
31People v. Llanita, supra note 27 at 305.
32People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 879, 898.
33People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 106, 119.
34People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 76.
35 Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002; re Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
36People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307–308.
37 See Records, p. 155.
39 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, Sec. 21(a).
40People v. Dilao, supra note 25 at 406.
42People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 683, 696.
43 Id., quoting People v. Roa, G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 359, 368–370.
44 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
45People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 322, 339.

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