Rehearing Denied December 19, 1955.
Louis E. Lipp, Omaha, Neb. (Bernard J. Boyle, Boyle & Hetzner, Fred S. White, White, Lipp & Simon, Omaha, Neb., and Charles W. Bowers, Des Moines, Iowa, were with him on the brief), for appellant.
Roy L. Stephenson, U. S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa (H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Mitchell, Joseph M. Howard and Dumond P. Hill, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and John C. Stevens and Robert J. Spayde, Asst. U. S. Attys., Des Moines, Iowa, were with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before STONE, WOODROUGH and VOGEL, Circuit Judges.
Appellant herein was found guilty in two counts of an indictment charging him with wilful attempts to defeat and evade a large part of his income taxes for the years 1947 and 1948 in violation of Section 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. Specifically, the government charged that for the year 1947 the appellant filed a false and fraudulent return showing his net income at $13,314.09 and the amount of tax due and owing thereon to be $3,358.31, whereas, the government alleged that for the said year 1947 the appellant's net income was $51,786.40, upon which he owed a tax of $26,039.31. With reference to the year 1948, it was alleged that the appellant filed a false and fraudulent return showing a net income of $22,485.80 with a tax due in the amount of $5,036.36, whereas his net income for said year totalled $53,178.12, upon which he owed a tax of $18,047.00.
Upon being found guilty by a jury, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for two consecutive terms of three years and fined $7,000.00 on each count.
The appellant was the operator of a billiard parlor and a bowling alley but derived additional income from a drive-in theater, a horse racing stable and from gambling. In connection with the billiard parlor, he operated two separate types of lottery, one called "Baseball" and the other "Tip Tickets".
The government attempted to establish its case by the net worth method, and in conjunction therewith offered and there was received in evidence what is designated as Exhibit No. 14. Exhibit No. 14 is a summary of the government agents' findings based upon the testimony and other evidence in the case. The exhibit sets forth in detail the appellant's liabilities and assets beginning with December 31, 1939. It shows the net worth as of that date to be $53,577.19. Yearly thereafter, through December 31, 1948, there appears the appellant's net worth arrived at through computing the assets and liabilities of each year. The net worth as of December 31, 1946, immediately preceding the indictment period, was $197,443.29; on December 31, 1947, it was $223,576.54; and on December 31, 1948, it was $273,146.61, an increase during the two indictment years of $75,703.32.
The exhibit also shows appellant's estimated net income for each one of such years and it includes the net income as reported by the appellant in his income tax returns and the additional income upon which the government claims the appellant paid no tax during all of those years, with the exception of the year ending December 31, 1946, in which the government agents found that the appellant overstated his income by the sum of $275.43.
The appellant did not testify in his own behalf but his position with reference to the government's charge becomes apparent through affidavits given to the government agents during the investigation and his oral statements in reply to the agents' questions. As in all cases, where the taxpayer's books are inadequate and incomplete and an attempt to establish failure to pay the proper tax is based upon use of the increase in net worth method, discrepancies and differences appear. That the appellant's books were inadequate and incomplete appears clear from the appellant's statements to the effect that with reference to his gambling income he did not keep records for fear local authorities might procure them and he admits that his reported income might have been understated by "about forty thousand dollars during the period 1940 to 1950 inclusive; that most, if not all of this understatement would have occurred during the war years, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945;". It is also apparent that with respect to the income from lotteries, such as Baseball and Tip Tickets, only the net was reported in the books, and consequently there was no possibility of the government agents checking gross income therefrom or doing an accurate job of accounting.
The main point in controversy, however, revolves around the claim of the appellant that on or about December 31, 1939, he had in his possession in various safes and on his person $90,000.00 in currency which he claims to have accumulated between the years 1907 and 1939. In ascertaining the basis for Exhibit 14, the agents disregarded this claim. They based this refusal on their examination of appellant's income tax returns for years prior to the years under inspection, by the introduction into evidence of financial statements given by the appellant on June 4, 1940, in connection with an application for a loan, and on August 1, 1946, given for the same purpose, together with a transcript of his testimony in a divorce proceedings between appellant and his first wife in 1932, in which he claimed that he was operating his business at a loss and was extremely hard up for money.
It must be conceded that if the appellant's claim that he had $90,000.00 in currency on December 31, 1939, was correct, then the government's case must fall, as such an accumulation of currency could at least to a large extent explain what otherwise might appear as income during subsequent years. It is apparent that the jury disbelieved his claim with reference to the accumulation of such a large amount of currency and such disbelief or finding is amply supported in the record.
"The trial Court erred in admitting and not withdrawing the Revenue Agents' net worth summary, Exhibit 14."
Appellant quotes from Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, and companion cases, with reference to the guideposts the Supreme Court has set up for use of the trial courts and the appellate courts where the government has used the increase in net worth method of attempting to prove its case. He criticizes what he terms the government's failure "on the very threshold of its responsibility by avoiding the essential inquiry as to the taxpayer's currency position at the start of the prosecution years (as finally selected by the Agents) or for that matter, at the start of any year closer thereto than seven years earlier". We think appellant's criticism is unjustified.
According to the testimony, the agents' first step was to verify, if possible, the existence of the claimed $90,000.00 in currency as of January 1, 1940. The agents testified that they examined bank records and balances, business transaction records in the taxpayer's books, loan accounts at banks and public records as well as court records. The indication is that the agents did everything they could to verify the existence of the claimed $90,000.00. They found no justification for such claim and accordingly did not consider it in computing the appellant's net worth at the beginning of the period examined.
The appellant's signed financial or credit statements, his testimony in the divorce proceedings in 1932, his obtaining money in subsequent years from his wife's postal and savings accounts, the liquidation of stock and a life insurance policy are strange actions for one who had in his possession this large amount of cash. It was claimed by appellant that he had approximately $50,000.00 in cash which he gave to his father for safekeeping in about 1932, yet at the same time he testified in his divorce proceedings to the effect that he was operating at a loss and he subsequently asked the court having jurisdiction of the divorce proceedings to set aside an alimony decree for the support of his wife and minor child in the amount of $40.00 per month because of economic conditions necessitating his borrowing money. This was competent evidence to justify the agents' refusal to include the alleged $90,000.00 in their summary.
"But where relevant leads are not forthcoming, the Government is not required to negate every possible source of nontaxable income, a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. See Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92, 53 S.Ct. 532, 533, 77 L.Ed. 1051.
If the government agents did not ask the appellant the specific question as to how much currency he had in his safe or cash in the bank box on December 31, 1946, then it must be asserted on behalf of the government that neither did the appellant make any reference thereto in his detailed affidavit which was gone over and corrected by him and his counsel. He remained quiet at his peril. The lack, if there be one, went to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. We think the government agents exhausted all material and relevant leads furnished them and find no justification for criticism. The most that can be said for appellant's objection is that he did not agree with the summary or its conclusions.
"It is stipulated and agreed by and between the plaintiff and defendant that Exhibit `14' except items 2 & 26 contains a list of defendant's assets, liabilities and living expenses for the years 1939 to 1948, inclusive, and to the extent only that said items are contained in said Exhibit, the same are correct.
"It is understood by the parties that defendant claims that there are other assets and liabilities that are not listed in said Exhibit and reserves the right to offer evidence of such other assets and liabilities.
"It is also understood by the parties that defendant does not agree that the summary of gross income, net income and additional income is a correct summary of said items.
"The defendant waives identification of the Exhibits relating to the items contained in Exhibit `14', and consents to the use of secondary evidence of the contents of the books and records referred to in said Exhibit.
"This Stipulation shall not operate as a limitation upon the right of either party to introduce other evidence upon the matters contained in said Exhibit `14', and defendant reserves the right to object to the admissibility of said Exhibit `14' except as to the identification & secondary character of the items therein. This Stipulation shall be binding on the parties hereto only in this proceeding.
"Signed at Des Moines, Iowa, this 17 day of June, 1054."
Of the two exceptions referred to above, Item 2 covers "cash in banks" which, of course, was disputed by appellant, and Item 26 referring to the value of certain real estate estimated by the government agents at $10,000.00 for each of the years 1947 and 1948. As was stated in the Gariepy case, supra, the government's computation was at best but an estimate. It was, however, entitled to the consideration of the jury. We believe there was ample basis for the introduction of the summary and that the weight to be given it was for the jury.
"The Trial Court erred in admitting and not withdrawing appellant's income tax returns for 1940 to 1946 and record of year-end bank balances for 1939 to 1946."
"Over Defendant's objection the government was permitted to introduce in evidence income tax returns made by Defendant covering years prior to the years here involved and also to introduce proof that Defendant made no income tax returns during certain prior years. We think the evidence was admissible. Leeby v. United States, supra; Hanson v. United States, 8 Cir., 186 F.2d 61; Schuermann v. United States, 8 Cir., 174 F.2d 397. A like contention was urged in Leeby v. United States, supra, and in the course of that opinion it is said, inter alia, `In estimating defendant's income on the receipts and disbursements basis, or on the net worth basis, the witness considered the question of his income or want of income prior to 1944 and we think the testimony was admissible for that purpose and the court carefully limited it to that purpose.'"
We hold that the tax returns for the years subsequent to the starting point of the computation with reference to net worth were entirely competent and no error was committed in their receipt.
"Mr. Bowers: The defendant objects to all of that portion of Exhibit 46 relating to the years 1939 and 1946, inclusive, as being transactions other than those alleged in the indictment and for years prior to 1947 and 1948, and therefore irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent."
"* * * for all purposes for such assistance that it will be to the jury as a breakdown of the summary that is already in evidence for that particular item, and for the reason that it was gone into on cross-examination."
We think there was no error in the admission. In the preparation of a net worth summary, it seems to us proper that the yearly bank balances be shown. In Exhibit 14A, supra, the appellant questioned Item 2 and "reserves the right to offer evidence of such other assets and liabilities". He failed to do so. Under the circumstances, we believe it was entirely proper for the figures regarding year-end bank balances to go before the jury for such weight as the finders of the facts believed them to be entitled.
"* * * evidence concerning his bank deposits, withdrawals and year-end balances for certain periods during the prosecution years and prior thereto."
"We find nothing improper in the admission of such evidence where it clearly relates to and forms a part of the factual ingredients of the Government's case and has probative value; indeed, the proper revelation of appellant's financial history and the computation of his worth required that all financial transactions be checked, including banking transactions. However, some of the Government's evidence had no relation to this permissible inquiry."
That is not the situation in the instant case. The bank balances referred to covered only the particular years under investigation beginning with 1939. They were part and parcel of the government's net worth computations as contained in Exhibit 14, "the factual ingredients of the Government's case". The admission of the yearly bank balances as a breakdown of part of Exhibit 14, which included a statement of appellant's other assets and his liabilities, was entirely proper.
"The Trial Court erred in admitting and not withdrawing records of tax assessments, tax returns, documents and other exhibits dealing with transactions prior to 1940."
Appellant had claimed to have accumulated $90,000.00 in currency between 1907 and 1940 and that he had gradually invested a large part of such cash accumulation during "1942 and in succeeding years". Appellant's statements to the agents were inconsistent. Originally he claimed to have had no more than $20,000.00 or $30,000.00 at any time or possibly $50,000.00 in cash in 1940. Subsequently he claimed the amount was $90,000.00. It was necessary, under Holland v. United States, supra, that the government agents check the "leads" given to them, which investigation might prove the truth or falsity of the taxpayer's assertion regarding the accumulation of undisclosed funds. Certainly, an examination of the record during the period in which the appellant claimed he accumulated the cash was indicated and entirely proper. No error was committed in admitting the records.
"The Trial Court erred in denying appellant's motion for acquittal."
What we have already said justifies little further comment on this score. The agents' summary, Exhibit 14, disregarded appellant's statement with reference to the accumulation of a large amount of cash on December 31, 1939. The evidence was sufficient to justify such discounting or disbelief. There was, however, a question of fact for the triers thereof as to the accuracy of the government's computations and certainly the question of intent was also one for the jury. Appellant's motion for acquittal was properly denied.
"The Trial Court erred in giving certain instructions and in failing to give other instructions."
Appellant's main complaint is that, "The Court's instruction No. 13, not only does not meet the standard of lucidity and completeness in acquainting the jury with the nature of the net worth method and does not set out `the assumptions on which it rests and the inferences available both for and against the accused,' it is, in truth, a misstatement of its scope and significance."
The record indicates that the court prepared written instructions, giving copies to counsel. Thereafter, and before the charge was read to the jury, counsel on each side were given an opportunity to take their exceptions.
"Mr. Bowers: Defendant further excepts to Instruction Number 13 in that on the second page of said instruction in the paragraph commencing `there are in evidence here certain affidavits of the defendant, in one of which he claims to have had $90,000 in currency on or about January 1st, 1940, following the completed purchase of a farm in Hinton, Iowa.' The defendant believes that in regards to said $90,000 that the date was indefinite, and that it was after January 1st, 1940, and that there was testimony that in 1940 also he had some $50,000, so there is testimony relating to an item of $50,000, and there was also testimony later in the year as to an item of $90,000.
"The Court: I interpreted it to include both."
We find no error in connection with the court's action on appellant's second exception to Instruction No. 13.
"Mr. Bowers: Yes. Now, we further object to that instruction for the reason that it confines the findings of the jury to this sum of $90,000 and it confines the right of the jury to challenge the accuracy of Exhibit 14 solely by the exclusion of this sum of $90,000, and we think that there should be inserted in there in that paragraph — that in the succeeding paragraph I find this phrase: `If you find from all of the evidence in this case that defendant had $90,000 in currency on hand as above on January 1, 1940, then Exhibit 14 is inaccurate in that it would not have taken into account all of defendant's assets.' We think there should be added after the word `$90,000' or any other sum of money in safety deposit boxes or safes."
The trial court's refusal to amend the charge in accordance with the suggestion of appellant's counsel by including "or any other sum of money in safety deposit boxes or safes" was entirely justified. The particular instruction attacked had reference to the situation as of January 1, 1940. True enough, the record contains vague references to the period subsequent to January 1, 1940, as to large bills in safes, changing large bills to small, gambling winnings of approximately $40,000.00, and purchases of two notes in January, 1947, from unknown funds. These, however, all had to do with the situation subsequent to January 1, 1940. No specific reference thereto was called to the trial court's attention and no proper exception was taken thereon. The inclusion of the words suggested, "or any other sum of money in safety deposit boxes or safes", would have been meaningless insofar as January 1, 1940, was concerned. There was no such evidence. Appellant's after-thoughts of criticism, not called to the attention of the trial judge, and raised here for the first time, may not be considered by this court unless we find that the instructions were so completely erroneous as to result in a miscarriage of justice. Mitchell v. United States, supra. We do not so find.
"Mr. Bowers: Defendant further excepts to Instruction Number 14, particularly the latter part of said instruction referring to the — refers to the bearing of prior returns on the question of intent. We think that there should be added to that instruction before the jury can use the prior returns — the returns for the years prior to 1947 and '48 as bearing on the question of intent they must first find that the returns filed for those years were false and fraudulent and filed wilfully with intent to defraud the government."
As we have demonstrated, the prior returns were admissible insofar as they might have a bearing on the establishment of net worth. They did, then, have some connection with the charges in the instant case. Furthermore, the appellant, in his affidavit, admits that the prior returns were incorrect in that they understated his income by "about forty thousand dollars during the period 1940 to 1950 inclusive; that most, if not all of this understatement would have occurred during the war years, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945". The appellant's own statement makes the returns admissible on the question of intent and we believe the trial court properly instructed the jury with reference thereto. We find no error therein.
"If you find that there was unreported income of the Defendant, but that this income was earned prior to 1948, you will find for the Defendant on Count 2.
"If you find that there was unreported income of the Defendant, but that this income was earned prior to 1947, you will find for the Defendant on Count 1."
The court did not give requested Instruction No. 7, stating that it was adequately covered by other instructions. We believe the court was correct. Continuously through the instruction he cautioned the jurors that the charges against the appellant of knowingly and wilfully attempting to defeat and evade his income tax were confined to the years 1947 and 1948, "It is those years that are involved in the indictment."
We have examined the court's entire charge in detail. In our opinion, the jury was not misled nor was there any resultant misunderstanding or confusion. The instructions covered the increase in net worth theory and properly limited the use of evidence covering years prior to the indictment periods. Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 covered the period from December 31, 1939 to December 31, 1948. Plaintiff's Exhibit 14A, supra, stipulated that with the exception of Items 2 and 26 Exhibit 14 was correct as far as it went. In other words, all figures contained therein, with the exception of the conclusions, of course, were accurate, but the appellant claimed that there were other assets and liabilities and reserved the right to offer evidence on such other assets and liabilities. This he failed to do. The appellant "remained quiet at his peril". The main and overriding objection to Exhibit 14 was that it did not include appellant's claimed accumulation of $90,000.00 in currency as of December 31, 1939. We think the jurors so understood from the evidence, from Exhibit 14 and from the court's instructions. They were specifically told that the appellant was charged with a violation of the income tax laws for the years of 1947 and 1948 only. We do not think this was in any way confusing to the jury or misleading. We find no error in the court's instructions.
"The Trial Court erred in permitting the U. S. Attorney to make improper comment in his summation to the jury."
At the opening of the trial, the United States Attorney requested that the court order all witnesses excluded from the courtroom during the trial with the exception of an Internal Revenue Special Agent. After discussion, it was agreed that the appellant might retain two accountants at his counsel table. One of such accountants was called as a witness for the government, but neither testified for the defense. In his argument to the jury, the United States Attorney directed attention to the fact that the appellant had accountants present in the court room and that not one of them took the witness stand to verify any of the facts and circumstances in appellant's records. Exception was taken and the trial court overruled. It was claimed by the government that the appellant's records were inaccurate and incomplete. The appellant had received permission to keep his two accountants in the court room and at counsel table during the trial of the case. We think it was not unreasonable for the trial court to allow the United States Attorney to direct the jurors' attention to that fact, which was, of course, perfectly obvious. See United States v. Beekman, 2 Cir., 155 F.2d 580, 584; Wigmore, Evidence, § 288. Considering all the circumstances in the trial, it was a discretionary matter and no error was committed.
Viewing the case in its entirety, we are of the opinion that the appellant had a fair trial and accordingly the case is affirmed.


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Arapahoe County Public Authority v. Centennial Express Airlines, Colo. 1998  Centennial Airport, a general aviation airport built in 1967, had never permitted scheduled passenger flights. Nevertheless, Centennial Express Airlines peremptorily began passenger service on December 20, 1994. The next day the airport filed suit for an injunction prohibiting Centennial Express from conducting passenger flights out of the airport. The trial court granted the injunction, and the Supreme Court upheld the injunction.
Aviation Cadet Museum v. Hammer, Ark. 2008  Owners of property near a private, public-access airport filed a claim against the airport as a nuisance. The trial court determined the airport was a nuisance and ordered that the airfield not be used for take off and landing. It said the injunction was to remain in effect until such time, if any, that the airport owners could demonstrate to the court that it could operate the airfield in a manner that would not constitute a nuisance, would not trespass on the plaintiffs' property, and would otherwise be operated in conformity with the law. The state supreme court upheld the decision.
Note: In Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu (2002) the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that federal law does not preempt a Honolulu ordinance banning aerial advertising and distinguishes Banner (see FN 6).
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County, Iowa 1999  A state statute creating immunity from nuisance actions results in a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, thus violating the U.S. and Iowa constitutions. The statute authorizes County Boards of Supervisors to designate property as an "agricultural area" in order to protect agricultural land from nonagricultural development. The statute includes an immunity provision that gives property owners in a designated "agricultural area" the right to create or maintain a nuisance over neighboring property, in effect creating an easement. The court's opinion includes a nice overview of takings jurisprudence. (584 N.W.2d 309).
Note:The U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Circuit relied on this decision in Vacation Village v. Clark County, Nevada (2007) to determine that a county ordinance created a taking of property under the Nevada Constitution even though no taking occurred under the U.S. Constitution.
Note: This decision is a good example of the "battle between experts". Different real estate appraisers testified for plaintiffs and defendant; the trial judge believed the testimony of the defendant's witness and expressly discredited that of the plaintiffs' witness.
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review this decision (409 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 218, 34 L.Ed.2d 181); see the dissent of Justice Douglas, in which he argues that the Ohio court's decision is contrary to the weight of precedent following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Causby (1946).
Benton et al. v. Savannah Airport Commission, Ga. App., 1999  Property owners sued for damages to their property, allegedly caused by increased air traffic and noise. Plaintiffs based their claims on a number of statutory and common law grounds, including inverse condemnation and nuisance. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance on the grounds the claims were barred by the statute of limitation. The court characterized the airport noise as a permanent (rather than continuing) nuisance, and therefore the injury to the plaintiffs' property was "complete and capable of being fully compensated" at the time the airport's runway became operational at its present length. (525 S.E.2d 383).
City of Atlanta v. Starke, Ga. Ct. App., 1989  Owners of residential property next to city-owned airport sued the city for trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. Held: property owners could prevail on inverse condemnation even though the value of their properties had increased due to overall increases in property value in plaintiffs' neighborhood. (384 S.E.2d 419, 192 Ga.App. 267).
Parachutes, Inc. v. Township of Lakewood, N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972  The township adopted an ordinance prohibiting sound over 50 decibels at night and 60 decibels during the day. Plaintiffs operated a sport parachuting center at an airport within the township. This operation required pilots to stop the airplane's engine in mid air over the airport just before a parachutist jumps, and to restart the engine after the jump. The noise from the repeated starting of engines, which continued from morning until dark, violated the township's ordinance. Parachutes, Inc. challenged the ordinance, claiming it was vague and overly broad and also was preempted by federal law. The trial court ruled the ordinance was lawful and the appellate court affirmed. (121 N.J. Super. 48, 296 A.2d 71).
Thul v. State of Minnesota, Minn. Ct. App., 2003  Helicopter pilot was cited for flying to and from his own property in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting helicopter operations in residential districts. The court upheld the ordinance, concluding that it saw no conflict between the city's regulatory power over land use and federal regulation of airspace.
Barnes v. City of Hillsboro, Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, 2010  City of Hillsboro rezoned a large area near an airport, imposing various limitations on uses and new development, including the requirement of an avigation easement for new subdivisions. Some property owners who objected to the ordinance appealed to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), a nonjudicial forum and the first of its kind in the United States. LUBA found the avigation easement to be an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation and reversed the rezoning ordinance. LUBA's decision was upheld by the state court of appeals.
Centennial Express Airlines v. Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth., Federal Aviation Administration, 1998-1999  After Arapahoe Airport, a general aviation airport near Denver, Colorado, banned commercial passenger operations, Centennial Express filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation Administration. In this series of hearings the FAA ordered the airport to accomodate scheduled passenger service by Centennial; if the airport did not comply, it would be ineligible for new FAA grants. One interesting issue was whether the FAA had to respect the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court upholding a permanent injunction against commercial passenger service at the airport (Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express Airlines). The FAA's decision was upheld by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001 (Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. FAA).
Naples (Florida) Municipal Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, 2001 - 2003 (FAA Docket No. 16-01-15)  The Naples Airport Authority instituted a ban on stage-2 aircraft after complying with the FAA's Part 161 requirements (which implement the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990). The ban was challenged in U.S. District Court and upheld (see National Business Aviation Assn. v. City of Naples Airport Authority, 162 F.Supp.2d 1343, Aug. 8, 2001). The FAA then issued a notice of investigation into whether the stage-2 aircraft ban was consistent with "assurances" given by the airport when it received Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funds. The FAA issued its final decision on Aug. 25, 2003, the first formal interpretation by the FAA of its Part 161 requirements. The Naples Airport Authority challenged the decision in federal court. In 2005 the court vacated the FAA's decision, ruling that the Authority had produced ample evidence to justify the ban.
New York North Shore Helicopter Route, Federal Aviation Administration, 2010 - 2013 (FAA Docket FAA-2010-0302)  In 2008 the FAA published a flight path for helicopter pilots flying near residential centers in Long Island, New York. The path was intended to avoid noise over populated areas of Long Island and was voluntary. On July 6, 2012 the FAA adopted a final rule changing the status of the path from voluntary to mandatory. The path will be mandatory until 2014, when the FAA will review whether to continue the path as mandatory or revert to voluntary compliance by pilots. The Helicopter Association International challenged the rule but the court denied the petition for review. The court ruled that the FAA's power to "prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for ... protecting individuals and property on the ground� (49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(2)) was broad enough to include the power to require specific flight patterns for the sole purpose of reducing the impact of aircraft noise on residential communities.
Sutherland v. Vancouver Int. Airport Authority, Court of Appeal for British Columbia, 2002  More than 300 residents near the airport filed an action for nuisance arising from operation of a new runway, i.e., noise from air traffic. Their application for certification as a class was denied by the trial court (see Sutherland: denial of class proceeding). Three of the plaintiffs went forward with their case as a test, hoping to resolve issues common to all plaintiffs. The trial court found the airport liable for a noise nuisance (see Sutherland: trial court judgment for plaintiffs). The appellate court, however, reversed on the grounds that construction of the runway was authorized by statute. Under Canadian law, an activity does not give rise to liability for nuisance if it is authorized by statute and the defendant proves that the nuisance is an "inevitable result" or consequence of exercising that authority. That is, if a statute authorizes an act that causes injury to a private person, and is silent respecting compensation for the injury, no compensation for the injury is payable.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), 2001  Residents near Heathrow Airport in London alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights after the government relaxed restrictions on nighttime flights in 1993. The court held that the government "failed to strike a fair balance between the United Kingdom�s economic well-being and the applicants� effective enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and their private and family lives," thus violating Article 8 of the Convention. Other, related issues were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs by the court's judgment. Notably, the court concluded that the scope of review of the nighttime restrictions by the U.K. courts did not provide an effective remedy and therefore was a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. The scope of review by the domestic courts focused exclusively on traditional English law and did not allow consideration of whether the increase in night flights under the 1993 scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right under the Convention to respect for the private and family lives or the homes of those who lived in the vicinity of Heathrow airport.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 2003  On appeal (see above), the court held that the British government's relaxation of restrictions on nighttime flights at Heathrow Airport did not violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights but did violate Article 13. The court further held that the mere finding of a violation of Article 13 constituted sufficient satisfaction to the plaintiffs.
Powell and Raymer v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 1990  People bothered by noise from air traffic at Heathrow Airport asked the court "to find that they have been the victims of a violation of Articles 6 and 8 (art. 6, art. 8) of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and that the lack of any effective remedy before a national authority itself violates Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention". Article 8 of the Convention concerns a right to respect for private life and home; Article 6 a right of access to the courts in civil matters; and Article 13 a right to an effective remedy under domestic law for alleged breaches of the Convention. The court ruled it has no jurisdiction on grievances under Articles 6 and 8 independently of their relevance within the context of Article 13. It then ruled there had been no violation of Article 13 in respect of either applicant.

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intent that it should remain there; 4. that there was no stipulation that the county seat should remain there in perpetuity; 5. that the practical interpretation of the phrase "permanently established," which has been in long and frequent use in the statutes of Ohio with respect to county seats established otherwise than temporarily, is, though by no means conclusive, entitled to consideration.
2. In the interpretation of statutes like that of 1848, supra, the rule is that, as against the state, nothing is to be taken as conceded but what is given in express and explicit terms, or by an implication equally clear.
The controversy relates to the removal of a county seat in Ohio from one town to another.
The case, briefly stated, is this: on Feb. 16, 1846, the General Assembly of that State passed "An Act to create the County of Mahoning." The first section creates the county and defines its boundaries, including among other towns Canfield and Youngstown, and declares that it "shall be known by the name of Mahoning, with the county seat at Canfield."
"SEC. 5. That the court of common pleas and supreme court of said county shall be holden at some convenient house in the Town of Canfield until suitable county buildings shall be erected."
"SEC. 8. That before the seat of justice shall be considered permanently established at Canfield, the proprietors or citizens thereof shall given bond with good and sufficient security, payable to the commissioners of said county, hereafter to be elected, for the sum of $5,000, to be applied in erecting public buildings for said county, and that the citizens of Canfield shall also donate a suitable lot of ground on which to erect public buildings."
To secure the permanent establishment of the county seat at Canfield, numerous citizens of that town -- some of whom are plaintiffs in this suit -- in compliance with the provisions of said sec. 8, duly executed their bond for $5,000, which was accepted by the county commissioners. A suitable lot of ground on which to erect the county buildings was also, by their procurement, conveyed to the county.
county, in full satisfaction of the bond, and as a full compliance with said sec. 8, and thenceforward the courthouse was used as a seat of justice, and Canfield continued to be the county seat of the county.
"An Act to provide for the removal of the seat of justice of Mahoning County from the Town of Canfield to the City of Youngstown in said county."
"SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, that from and after taking effect of this section of this act as hereafter provided, the seat of justice in the County of Mahoning shall be removed from the Town of Canfield, and shall be fixed, until otherwise provided by law, at the City of Youngstown, in said county."
"SEC. 2. That the foregoing section of this act shall take effect and be in force when and so soon as the same shall be adopted by a majority of all the electors of said Mahoning County, voting at the next general election after the passage thereof, and when suitable buildings shall have been erected, as hereinafter provided."
"SEC. 3. That the electors of said Mahoning County, at the next general election after the passage of this act, shall endorse or otherwise place on their tickets either the words 'for removal' or 'against removal,' and if a majority of all the electors of said Mahoning County, voting at said election, shall vote for removal, the first section of this act shall thereafter be considered and holden to be adopted by such majority, provided that all tickets upon which the words 'for removal' shall not be endorsed or otherwise placed shall be taken and considered as votes 'against removal' as fully as though the words 'against removal' were endorsed or otherwise placed thereon."
of the returns thereof; and the officers opening the same shall, at the same time they make, certify, and sign the abstracts required by law, also make, certify, and sign a separate abstract of all votes so returned for or against removal, showing the number so given in each township, and the footings or aggregate number given in all the townships, which abstract shall be forthwith deposited in the clerk's office of said county, and be by him forthwith recorded in the journal of the court of common pleas of said county, which record, or a duly certified copy thereof, shall be taken and received as evidence for all purposes as the result of said election."
"SEC. 5. That in case a majority of the electors of said County of Mahoning shall vote 'for removal,' as heretofore provided, the seat of justice and county seat shall be deemed and taken to be removed from Canfield in said county to the City of Youngstown in said county, and to be located at said City of Youngstown, provided however, that nothing in the act shall be so construed as to authorize the removal of said seat of justice to the City of Youngstown until the citizens of the City and Township of Youngstown, and of sufficient size and suitably located to accommodate the courthouse, jail, and necessary offices for said county, and shall have erected thereon, or shall have caused to have erected thereon, and completed thereon, suitable buildings for courthouse, jail, and all offices and rooms necessary for the transaction of all the public business of said county, at a cost for said buildings of not less than $100,000, and to the satisfaction and acceptance of the commissioners of said county, and all such buildings shall be fully completed within two years from the date of the election at which this act shall be ratified, and said commissioner shall not, nor shall any other authority of said county, levy any tax on the taxable property of said county for said land or building, provided that the citizens of Youngstown may, within said two years, build said public buildings, and tender the same to said county commissioners."
"SEC. 6. It shall be the duty of the sheriff or coroner, as the case may be, to cause proclamation to be made to the qualified electors of said county of the time of holding said election, in the same manner as by law he is required to do in other elections, notifying said electors to vote as aforesaid on the question by which this act is submitted to them."
"SEC. 7. The sections of this act subsequent to the first section shall take effect and be in force from and after their passage. "
At the next general election a majority of votes cast in the county was in favor of the removal.
Thereupon Newton, and a number of other citizens of the Town of Canfield, filed their petition in the Court of Common Pleas for Mahoning County praying for an injunction restraining the board of county commissioners from removing the county seat to Youngstown. The court denied the injunction and dismissed the petition. That decision having been affirmed by the supreme court of the state, the petitioners brought the case here.
It is claimed in behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the act of the 16th of February, 1846, and what was done under it, constituted an executed contract which is binding on the state; and that the act of April 9, 1874, and the steps taken pursuant to its provisions, impair the obligation of that contract, and bring the case within the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. Art. I, sec. 10.
These allegations are the ground of our jurisdiction. They present the only question argued before us, and our remarks will be confined to that subject.
Was it competent for the state to enter into such a contract as is claimed to have been made?
And if such a contract were made, what is its meaning and effect?
and be bound accordingly. Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.
The cases in which such contracts have been sustained and enforced are very numerous. Many of them are cases in which the question was presented whether a private act of incorporation, or one or more of its clauses, is a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. There is no such restraint upon the British Parliament. Hence, the adjudications of that country throw but little light upon the subject.
The Dartmouth College Case was the pioneer in this field of our jurisprudence.
"That anterior to the formation of the Constitution, a course of legislation had prevailed in many, if not in all, of the states, which weakened the confidence of man in man, and embarrassed all transactions between individuals, by dispensing with a faithful performance of engagements. To correct this mischief by restraining the power which produced it, the state legislatures were forbidden 'to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts' -- that is, of contracts respecting property, under which some individual could claim a right to something beneficial to himself, and that since the clause in the Constitution must, in construction, receive some limitation, it may be confined, and ought to be confined, to cases of this description -- to cases within the mischief it was intended to remedy."
instrument they have given us is not to be so construed, may be admitted. The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. It never has been understood to restrict the general right of the legislature to legislate on the subject of divorces. . . . If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution to be employed in the administration of the government, or if the funds of the college be public property, or if the state of New Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in its transactions, the subject is one in which the legislature of the state may act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the Constitution of the United States."
"a private eleemosynary institution, endowed with a capacity to take property for purposes unconnected with the government, whose funds are bestowed by individuals on the faith of the charter."
and duties modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. . . ."
"It is hardly possible to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vindicated, without destroying all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislative improvements and amendments, as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies."
The legislative power of a state, except so far as restrained by its own constitution, is at all times absolute with respect to all offices within its reach. It may at pleasure create or abolish them, or modify their duties. It may also shorten or lengthen the term of service. And it may increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of compensation. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402.
The police power of the states, and that with respect to municipal corporations, and to many other things that might be named, are of the same absolute character. Cooley, Const.Lim., pp. 232, 342; The Regents v. Williams, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 321.
In all these cases, there can be no contract and no irrepealable law, because they are "governmental subjects," and hence within the category before stated.
They involve public interests, and legislative acts concerning them are necessarily public laws. Every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy, in this respect, a footing of perfect equality. This must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to the public welfare that each one should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies touching the subject involved may require. A different result would be fraught with evil.
All these considerations apply with full force to the times and places of holding courts. They are both purely public things, and the laws concerning them must necessarily be of the same character.
If one may be bargained about, so may the other. In this respect, there is no difference in principle between them.
The same reasoning, pushed a step farther in the same direction, would involve the same result with respect to the seat of government of a state.
If a state capital were sought to be removed under the circumstances of this case with respect to the county seat, whatever the public exigencies, or the force of the public sentiment which demanded it, those interested, as are the plaintiffs in error, might, according to their argument, effectually forbid and prevent it, and this result could be brought about by means of a bill in equity and a perpetual injunction.
It is true a state cannot be sued without its consent, but this would be a small obstacle in the way of the assertion of so potent a right. Though the state cannot be sued, its officers, whose acts were illegal and void, may be. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.
"so soon as the public buildings are completed in the manner aforesaid, at the place designated, the same shall be forever thereafter the permanent seat of justice of said county of Dearborn."
"the establishment of the time and place of holding courts is a matter of general legislation, respecting which the act of one session of the General Assembly cannot be binding on another."
See also Adams v. The County of Logan, 11 Ill. 336, and Bass v. Fanthroy, 11 Tex. 698. They are to the same effect.
Secondly, but conceding, for the purposes of this opinion, that there is here a contract, as claimed by the plaintiffs in error, then the question arises what is the contract, or in other words to what does it bind the state?
"But the contract must be shown to exist. There is no presumption in its favor. Every reasonable doubt should be resolved against it. Where it exists, it is to be rigidly scrutinized, and never permitted to extend either in scope or duration beyond what the terms of the concession clearly require."
There must have been a deliberate intention clearly manifested on the part of the state to grant what is claimed. Such a purpose cannot be inferred from equivocal language. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510.
It must not be a mere gratuity. There must be a sufficient consideration, or, no matter how long the alleged right has been enjoyed, it may be resumed by the state at its pleasure. Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300. No grant can be raised by mere inference or presumption, and the right granted must be clearly defined. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.
"The rule of construction in this class of cases is that it shall be most strongly against the corporation. Every reasonable doubt is to be resolved adversely. Nothing is to be taken as conceded but what is given in unmistakable terms or by an implication equally clear. The affirmative must be shown. Silence is negation, and doubt is fatal to the claim. This doctrine is vital to the public welfare. It is axiomatic in the jurisprudence of this court."
Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.
specified time, or "permanently." At most, the stipulation is that it shall be considered as permanently established there when the conditions specified are fulfilled. If the legislature had intended to assume an obligation that it should be kept there in perpetuity, it is to be presumed it would have said so. We cannot -- certainly not in this case -- interpolate into the statute a thing so important which it does not contain. The most that can be claimed to have been intended by the state is that when the conditions prescribed were complied with, the county seat should be then and thereupon "permanently established" at the designated place. We are therefore to consider what is the meaning of the phrase "permanently established." Domicile is acquired by residence and the animus manendi, the intent to remain. A permanent residence is acquired in the same way. In neither case is the idea involved that a change of domicile or of residence may not thereafter be made. But this in no wise affects the preexisting legal status of the individual in either case while it continues. So the county seat was permanently established at Canfield when it was placed there with the intention that it should remain there. This fact, thus complete, was in no wise affected by the further fact that thirty years later the state changed its mind and determined to remove, and did remove, the same county seat to another locality. It fulfilled at the outset the entire obligation it had assumed. It did not stipulate to keep the county seat at Canfield perpetually, and the plaintiffs in error have no right to complain that it was not done. Keeping it there is another and a distinct thing, in regard to which the eighth section of the act is wholly silent. In Mead v. Ballard, 7 Wall. 290, land was conveyed on the 9th of August, 1848, "upon the express understanding and condition "that a certain institution of learning then incorporated "shall be permanently located on said land," between the date of the deed and the same day in the succeeding year. The trustees passed a resolution, within the year, locating the institution on the premises, and at once contracted for the erection of the necessary buildings. The buildings were completed, and the institution was in full operation by November, 1849.
"It is clear to us . . . that when the trustees passed their resolution locating the buildings on the land, with the intention that it should be the permanent place of conducting the business of the corporation, they had permanently located the institution, within the true construction of the contract. Counsel for the plaintiff attach to the word 'permanent' a meaning inconsistent with the obvious intent of the parties -- that the condition was one which might be fully performed within a year. Such a construction is something more than a condition to locate. It is a covenant to build and rebuild; a covenant against removal at any time; a covenant to keep up an institution of learning on that land for ever, or for a very indefinite time. This could not have been the intention of the parties."
In Harris v. Shaw, 13 Ill. 463, land was conveyed on condition that the county seat should be "permanently located" upon it. The location was made accordingly with that intent, but some years later the county seat was removed. The grantor sued to recover the land. The court said it was no part of the contract that the county seat should remain for ever on the premises; that the grantor must be presumed to have known that the legislature had the power to remove it at pleasure, and that he must be held to have had in view at least the probability of such a change when he made the deed.
There is no point arising under either the former or the present Constitution of Ohio which in our judgment requires any remark.
The results of the elaborate research of one of the counsel for the defendants in error show that the phrase "permanently established" is a formula in long and frequent use in Ohio, with respect to county seats established otherwise than temporarily. Yet it is believed this is the first instance in the juridical history of the state in which such a claim as is here made has been set up.
This practical interpretation of the meaning of the phrase, though by no means conclusive, is entitled to grave and respectful consideration.

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text:
iów, iówian, iówih. v. eów, eówian, eówic.
ir; adj. Angry :-- Yr on móde, Cd. 4; Th. 4, 33; Gen. 63. v. irre, ir-scipe.
Íra-land, es ; n. Land of the Irish, Ireland :-- Gewitan him ðá Norþmenn Dyflen sécean eft Íraland [Yraland, hira land], Chr. 937 ; Th. 206, col. 2, 1. 15; Æðelst. 56. In Ors. 1, 1 ; Swt. 19, 15, 16 Íraland is doubtful. In the Anglo-Saxon, version of Bede's History Hibernia generally is rendered by Hibernia Scotta eáland. v. Ír-land.
íren, es; n. Iron, an iron weapon [cf. use of steel in modern English], a sword, blade :-- Ðæt swurd, drihtlic íren, Beo. Th. 1788; B. 892. Gif ðæt gegangeþ ðæt ádl oððe íren nimeþ ealdor ðínne if it come to pass, that disease or sword take off thy prince, 3700; B.1848. Mé sceal wæ-acute;pen niman, ord and íren, Byrht. Th. 139, 12. Áres and írenes æris et ferri, Bd. 1, I ; S. 473, 23, note. Heardes írenes grindlas gratings of hard iron, Cd. 19 ; Th. 24, 25; Gen. 383. Ðeáh hé wæ-acute;re mid írne ymbfangen, 224; Th. 297, 15; Sat. 513. Héht his sweord niman, leóflíc íren, Beo. Th. 3622; B. 1809. His sweord, írena cyst, 1350; B. 673 : 1609; B. 802. Bite írena, 4511; B. 2259. Íren ecgheard, Andr. Kmbl. 2363; An. 1183. [Icel. járn : Dan. jern : Swed. järn.] v. hring-íren; ísen, ísern.
íran; adj. Of iron, iron :-- Ecg wæs íren the edge was of iron, Beo. Th. 2922; B. 1459 : 5549; B. 2778. Hé hine hét áþenian on írenum bedde and hine cwicne hirstan he bade stretch him on an iron bed, and roast him alive, Shrn. 116, 2. Mid írenum gyrdum with iron rods, 115, 24 : Salm. Kmbl. 55; Sal. 28 : 942 ; Sal. 470. Scyttelas ýrenne hé forbræc vectes ferreos confregit, Ps. Spl. 106, 16. v. eal-íren, the following compounds, and ísen, isern.
íren-byrne, an; f. An iron byrnie :-- Námon írenbyrnan, heard swyrd hilted, and his helm, Beo. Th. 5965; B. 2986.
íren-gelóma, an; m. An iron implement :-- Ða írengelóman ferramenta, Nar. 9, 19. v. gelóman.
íren-heard; adj. Iron-hard, Beo. Th. 2227; B. 1112.
íren-þreát, es ; m. A band having iron armour, Beo. Th. 666; B. 330.
íre-þweorh; adj. Having the mind perverted by rage, Exon. 67 a ; Th. 248. 3 ; Jul. 90.
irfe, ierfe, yrfe, es; n. Inheritance, property :-- Gewriten yrfe legatum, Ælfc. Gl. 13; Som. 57, 96; Wrt. Voc. 20, 37. Ungewriten yrfe intestata hereditas, Som. 57, 101; Wrt. Voc. 20, 41. Yrfe drihtnes hereditas Domini, Ps. Spl. 126, 4. Yrfe sceal gedæ-acute;led deádes monnes a dead man's property must be divided, Exon. 90 a ; Th. 338, 18; Gen. Ex. 80. Ne wilna ðú ðínes néhstan ierfes mid unrihte covet thou not thy neighbour's goods, L. Alf. 9 ; Th. i. 44, 21. Þolige his wæ-acute;pna and his ierfes let him forfeit his weapons and his property, L. Alf. pol. 1; Th. i. 60, 14. Gif hwá gefeohte on cyninges húse síe hé scyldig ealles his ierfes, L. In. 6 ; Th. i. 106, 3. Ðonne is riht ðæt heó sý healfes yrfes wyrðe and ealles gif hý cild gemæ-acute;ne hæbban then is it right that she be entitled to half the property, and to all if they have children together, L. Edm. B. 4 ; Th. i. 254, 15. Ðú ðínes yrfes æðele gyrde álýsdest liberasti virgam hæreditatis tuæ, Ps. Th. 73, 3. Malalehel wæs æfter iarede yrfes hyrde fæder on láste Mahalaleel was after Irad the guardian of the heritage, in succession to his father, Cd. 52; Th. 65, 17; Gen. 1067. Nelle ic from mínum hláforde ne from mínum wífe ne from mínum bearne ne from mínum ierfe I will not go from my lord, nor from my wife, nor from my child, nor from my goods, L. Alf. 11; Th. i. 46, 9. Ne sylle gé ðæt land on éce yrfe terra non vendetur in perpetuum, Lev. 25, 23. His yrfe forhogode hæreditatem suam sprevit, Ps. Th. 77, 62. Gif hé wite hwá ðæs deádan ierfe hæbbe tiéme ðonne tó ðam ierfe and bidde ða hond ðe ðæt ierfe hafaþ ðæt hé him gedó ðone ceáp unbeceásne oððe gecýde ðæt se deáda næ-acute;fre ðæt ierfe áhte if he know who has the property of the dead, let him then vouch the property to warranty, and demand of the hand which has that property, that he make the chattel uncontestable to him; or prove that the dead man never owned that property, L. In. 53; Th. i. 136, 4-8. Him on láste heóld land and yrfe malalehel, Cd. 58; Th. 71, 8 ; Gen. 1167. [Under the single form yrfe two words seem to be comprised ; the one just given, also written ærfe, erfe, and another, which would correspond with a Gothic aurbi, connected with orf, with the meaning cattle. With the former may be compared Goth. arbi; n. heritage, inheritance : O. Sax. er&b-bar;i ; n : 0. L. Ger. ervi ; n. hæreditas : O. Frs. erve ; n : O. H. Ger. arbi, erbi, arpi ; n. possessio : Ger. erbe ; n : Icel. arfr ; m. inheritance; erfð; f. inheritance. See yrfe, orf]. v. sundor-irfe; and Grmm. R. A. pp. 466-7; 565.
irfe-béc; pl. f. A will, testament :-- Uncwedene yrfebéc ruptum testamentum : forswíged yrfebéc suppressum testamentum : underne yrfebéc nuncupatio : samhíwna yrfebéc jus liberorum, Ælfc. Gl. 13; Som. 57, 102-8 ; Wrt. Voc. 20, 42-6: ii. 49, 14. Áwæ-acute;gune yrfebéc inritum testamentum : unárlíce yrfebéc inofficiosum testamentum, 49, 15-18.
irfe-first, es; m. A delay before entering upon an inheritance; cretio, Ælfc. Gl. 13; Som. 57, 106; Wrt. Voc. 20, 44.
irfe-gedál, es; n. A division of an inheritance or property :-- Yrfe-gedál familiæ erciscundæ, Ælfc. Gl. 13; Som. 57, 109; Wrt. Voc. 20, 47. Yrfegedál familia erciscundæ, quia ærciscunda enim apud veteres divisio nuncupabatur, ii. 39, 26.
irfe-geflit, es; n. A dispute about inheritance :-- Ðá gehýrde wé manegu yrfegeflitu then did we hear of many disputes about the inheritance, Chart. Th. 486, 12.
irfe-gewrit, es; n. Writing concerning an inheritance, a will, testament :-- Ac hit gelamp ðæt Æðelréd cingc gefór ðá ne cýðde mé nán mann nán yrfegewrit ne náne gewitnesse ðæt hit æ-acute;nig óðer wæ-acute;re bútan swá wit on gewitnesse æ-acute;r gecwæ-acute;don but it happened that king Ethelred died; then no man made known to me any testament or any witness that it was any other than as we two before with witness agreed, Chart Th. 486, 7. On ðam yrfegewrite in the testament, 32.
irfe-hand, a ; f. One who manages the estate of a deceased person, an administrator [?] :-- Se mann se tó londe fóe ágefe hire erfehonda xiii pund pendingæ and heó forgifeþ xv pund for dý ðe mon ðás feorme ðý soel gelæ-acute;ste let the man who succeeds to the land give to her administrator thirteen pounds of pennies; and he will give fifteen pounds, in order that this refection may be the better provided, Chart. Th. 474, 9. v. hand.
irfe-láf, e; f. An hereditary relic, heirloom, what is left of an inheritance, inheritance, heir :-- Hé fédeþ folc Iacobes and Israhéla yrfeláfe pascere Jacob servum suum, et Israel hæreditatem suam, Ps. Th. 77, 70. Æ-acute;ghwylcum máððum gesealde yrfeláfe to each he gave a gift, an heirloom, Beo.Th. 2110; B. 1053. Hé bátwearde swurd gesealde, ðæt hé syððan wæs mádme ðý weorðra, yrfeláfe, 3810; B. 1903. Wolde líge gesyllan his swæ-acute;sne sunu ángan ofer eorþan yrfeláfe he [Abraham] was ready to give to the flame, his dear son, the only heir that was left him on earth, Cd. 162; Th. 203, 14 ; Exod. 403.
irfe-land, es; n. Land that passes as an inheritance, heritable land :-- Ic cýðo hú mín willa is ðet mín ærfelond fére ðe ic gebohte on æ-acute;ce ærfe I declare how my will is that my heritable land shall go, that I bought in perpetual inheritance, Chart. Th. 476, 12. Hie dydon mín land him selfum tó ierfelonde dederunt terram meam sibi in hereditatem, Past. 50, 2 ; Swt. 387, 30. Gebletsa ðín yrfeland benedic hæreditati tuæ, Ps. Th. 27, 10. Sealde heora eorþan on yrfeland dedit terram eorum hæreditatem, 135. 22.

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