I. SOUTH CAROLINA HAS NEVER RULED OUT REVOCATION OF CONSENT TO TOUCHING AS GROUNDS FOR BATTERY.
The first part of the lower Court's holding was that a cause of action for medical battery based on revocation of consent is a novel issue in South Carolina. In her Initial Brief, Appellant cited cases from several jurisdictions for the obvious point that medical battery based on revocation of consent is a valid cause of action. Appellant further quoted a case stating "There is little doubt" of that. Appellant's Initial Brief, at 13 (quoting Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. Of Wisconsin, 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (WI 1999)). Appellant further noted that every State that she is aware has considered the issue has so held. She implicitly invited Respondents to present any cases stating the reverse.
Respondents present three cases they claim hold the reverse: All are from South Carolina. They rely especially on Hook v. Rothstein, 281 S.C. 541, 316 S.E.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1984), quoting the case twice: "''Thus, the battery theory is applicable either where the physician performs a procedure to which the patient has not consented or where the patient gives permission to perform one type of procedure and the physician performs another.'" Respondents' Brief, at 8 (quoting Hook, supra, 316 S.E.2d at 700); id., at 12 (identical). They argue this language rules out revocation of consent as grounds for medical battery. They ignore the difference between "applicable only where" and "applicable where," between "applicable either where" and "only applicable either where." For example, a principal writes, "A student may receive a failing grade either when he quotes from a publication without attribution, or when he has someone else write the assignment for him." Such a rule would not preclude a student failing because he fails to turn in the assignment, or turns in work that does not rise to passing quality. "One may reach first base either by hitting a ball that lands in the outfield, or by beating out a grounder in the infield." This does not rule out reaching first base by a base on balls, or a dropped third strike, or an error. It simply states the most common ways of reaching first base.
The question of revocation of consent was neither before the Court in Hook nor addressed by it. Nor in the other cases Respondents cite.
Respondent's inaccurate and tortured reading of Hook would make South Carolina the only State on record to say one cannot revoke consent.
It is unfortunate that Respondents did not take the lesson stated elsewhere in Hook, 281 S.C. at 548, 316 S.E.2d at 695, noting that no case in South Carolina had at that time expressly adopted the doctrine of informed consent, but that the doctor there "proper[ly]" refrained from contending the doctrine would not be recognized here. In declining to make such contentions, the doctor there enabled the Court to focus on the real issues.
II. RESPONDENTS MISLEAD IN CLAIMING THAT ONLY FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS ACCEPT LAY TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE OF CONSENT.
The Order at issue here is based on two grounds: (A) That revocation of consent is a novel issue (discussed above); and (B) That Appellant failed to provide expert testimony (specifically, that the Georgia case (Mims v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902, (Ga. 1964)) requires an expert, and Appellant presented no expert).
if [Dr.] Ratliff's testimony was correct there had been no breach of duty, while if [patient] Stallings was correct there had been a breach of duty. No expert testimony was necessary to aid the jury in drawing these inferences. The critical issue was not a question involving medical knowledge and judgment, but simply a question of who was telling the truth about whether Ratliff disclosed the risk. In other words, a classic jury issue was presented.
Stallings, 292 S.C. at 354, 356 S.E.2d at 41. In short, when the question is what was said, whether words were spoken that deal with consent, South Carolina law is the same as the law of "foreign jurisdictions": lay jurors are as qualified to make that determination as are Nobel laureates in medicine.
III. NO EXPERT IS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PROCEDURE COULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED.
Respondents harp that Appellant cited a Georgia case, Mims (Mims v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902, (Ga. App. 1964)), and Mims requires an expert. But Appellant also cited Coulter v. Thomas, 33 S.W.3d 522 (KY, 2000). She cited Coulter both throughout her Initial Brief, and had previously cited Coulter at the Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider [R. pp. 54-55]. She cited both Mims and Coulter to show that courts have held what she thought was obvious, and that a court has said is obvious, Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. Of Wisconsin, 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (WI 1999): one may revoke consent to a medical procedure.
Mims required an expert for one point and one point only: to show the procedure could have been stopped without serious harm to the patient. And on that point, Coulter says no expert is required.
Besides, on this specific point, Coulter is more on-point. In Coulter, the planned procedure was halted by the medical staff before its contemplated completion, without injury from the cessation, and the court held there was no need to have an expert come testify that the procedure could have been stopped without injury when the injury was in fact stopped without injury. So too here. If either authority is to control, it is the more on-point authority.
Respondents write that the purpose of osseous surgery is to "remove infection, infected tissue, infected bone, calcium debris, plaque debris, irregular bony contours, and irregular root structures." Respondents' Brief at 2. That is true. It is equally true that the practice of criminal law involves death penalty appeals, strong-arm robbery charges, burglary charges, and speeding tickets. But one could not claim the same procedural protections on a speeding ticket charge that one receives for a death penalty case. Ms. Linog was having her gums scraped to remove tartar. A jury can certainly use its common sense to conclude that having one's gums scraped is not a "medical emergency" or that the dentist could have stopped.
Respondents concede that it was not medically necessary to initiate the procedure. ("Q: [It] was an elective procedure, was it not? A: She could have chosen not to do it, yes. Q: Okay. It wasn't life saving? A: No. . . . . A: Emergent in the sense of acute emergency, no." [R. p. 123, lines 4-12. See also R. p. 215, lines 17-18 (what they were doing was "scraping tartar from her gums.")]. But Respondents, through their attorneys, now argue that once initiated, the scraping of gums could not be stopped. However, as noted in Appellant's Initial Brief, the testimony is that Ms. Linog began to protest as soon as the dentist began to work. Certainly he could have stopped at the beginning.
Even were this Court to conclude scraping gums something that as a matter of law cannot safely be stopped once started, or that as a matter of law a lay jury cannot be trusted without expert guidance to understand whether gum scraping can be stopped once it has been started, there can be no rational debate that he could have ceased at the beginning.
At any rate, the South Carolina legislature has spoken. They have stated what must be done by a health care practitioner who claims that there is an emergency requiring treatment. Respondents nowhere even attempt to claim that they complied with the Statute. Respondents may not like the Statute. But whether Respondents, or, with respect, even this Court, feels the Statute is wise is not the issue. The Legislature of South Carolina, not the Court of Appeals of Georgia, makes the rules that apply in South Carolina.
IV. NO EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT MS. LINOG WAS CAPABLE OF REVOKING CONSENT.
Respondents next argue that Ms. Linog must show she had the capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her health care, and communicated that decision in an unambiguous manner. They cite Mims' language on the matter: that the statements must be "from a clear and rational mind;" that the statements must be unambiguous ("such as to leave no room for doubt.") Respondents' Brief, at 16 (citing Mims). However, Mims did not require an expert on this issue. Thus, since the Order stated that it was based on Mims' expert requirement, Respondents could only justify this claim under Rule 220(c), SCACR (the "right for the wrong" reasons Rule), and Respondents nowhere invoke that Rule, which the Court is not bound to apply. Generally, it is within the Court's discretion whether to invoke that Rule.
A. In arguing that Ms. Linog lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision as to her own care, or that she failed to articulate her preferences in an unambiguous manner, Respondents have brought this case squarely within the South Carolina Informed Consent Act.
(6) 'Unable to consent' means unable to appreciate the nature and implications of the patient's condition and proposed health care, to make a reasoned decision concerning the proposed health care, or to communicate that decision in an unambiguous manner.
Respondents' factual argument that Ms. Linog lacked the capability to make such a decision, if accepted, brings this squarely within the statute. (Their related argument that it is to be presumed she lacked such capacity, unless she presents an expert to state the reverse, also brings this case within that Rule. Respondents may not avoid a Statute declaring what the procedure is when someone is unable to consent by declaring, "We simply want a conclusion she was unable to make a reasoned decision, but we do not accept the statutory results of such a conclusion.") In determining what to do when the patient is unable to make a reasoned decision, or to communicate it unambiguously, the South Carolina statute trumps the out-of-state case.
A patient's inability to consent must be certified by two licensed physicians, each of whom has examined the patient.
Respondents' argument is that Appellant was unable to make a reasoned decision as to her own care. Were the Court inclined to reach that argument under Rule 220(c), which Respondents did not invoke, the Court should defer to the Legislature. The Legislature has afforded what it considers ample protection to health care professionals, while defending the integrity of patients: Those who wish to disregard a patient's statements on grounds the patient cannot make her own decisions must put that in writing, and then let her spouse decide.
However, in an emergency the patient's inability to consent may be certified by a health care professional responsible for the care of the patient if the health care professional states in writing in the patient's record that the delay occasioned by obtaining certification from two licensed physicians would be detrimental to the patient's health.
Thus, even were the Court to conclude that having one's gums scraped is, as a matter of law, an emergency, the Court should defer to the Legislature, which has stated the proper procedure for such "emergencies." Thus, the requirement from the Georgia case, Mims, that an expert testify whether continuing the procedure was an "emergency" that could not be halted without serious detriment to the patient is irrelevant. It would be applicable, if ever, only after the doctors had at least complied with the clear directive of the Statute. It is the Legislature of South Carolina that sets the rules for this State.
Again, Appellant cited Mims only for the obvious proposition that one may revoke consent, and did not intend to import, and could not have imported, any Mims requirement contrary to South Carolina statute.
B. Respondents' Argument on the Facts Is Misleading.
Respondents claim that evidence is that the drugs they gave Appellant made Appellant "legally drunk." They write, regarding the drugs Respondent Bradham gave Appellant, "One of the effects of these medications is that the patient is considered 'legally drunk.'" [Respondents' Brief, at 2-3 (quoting R. p. 245 (no line number provided))]. Again, they write, Respondents' Brief at 9 (quoting R. p. 245, lines 1-4), "On the contrary, the evidence shows that based on the combination of anesthetic agents used, Linog would have been considered 'legally drunk' for 24 hours following the procedure."
Because all of these drugs are quickly metabolized and allow for quick return to alertness and allow the patient to be discharged within a reasonable time, typically an hour.
So the idea behind using this combination of drugs is for their quick metabolism, quick return to what we call street fitness. Now, I do send the patient home instructing them that they are considered legally drunk 24 hours post-op.
R. p. 244, line 19 - p. 245, line 3. But the difference is well-established in law between a witness stating "X is true," and stating "I tell people X;" between stating under oath, "I tell my waiters my name is Bill Gates," and stating under oath "My name is Bill Gates." It is commonplace for transcripts to go along the lines, "Q: What did you do then? A: I told them Billy was on fire. Q: And was Billy in fact on fire?" Because to be admitted for the fact of the matter stated, the statement must not be "This is what I heard" or "This is what I said" but "This is what actually happened."
Common sense tells one that Dr. Bradham urges patients to be extra cautious, more cautious than they need to be, because Dr. Bradham gets no benefit from their acting normally, and no detriment from their holing up. She misleads them, for what she believes is their good.
As a matter of law, there is no competent evidence that Appellant was legally drunk.
C. Taking Respondents' Claim as True, the Decision Must Be in Appellant's Favor.
Suppose Ms. Linog was in fact "legally drunk." Suppose rather than provide the drugs in fact provided, Dr. Bradham gave Appellant shots of Tequila. Here, all would agree, Appellant was legally drunk. And Dr. Yampolsky walks into the room, and Appellant says, "Stop. I do not want to do this." She would have been entitled to have her wishes respected.
As even Respondent's expert testified, one may revoke consent after being given anesthesia. [Supp. R. p. 2, lines 14-18]. Perhaps one may not legally consent after having anesthesia--had Dr. Bradham gotten Appellant drunk, and then she consented, perhaps the consent might not be legally valid. But a woman is entitled to revoke her consent to have her body touched even when legally drunk.
Respondents once again hang on their own petard: legal drunkenness does not prevent one from revoking consent to have her body touched.
Respondents raise other factual issues, not encompassed in the lower Court's order, and thus similarly reachable only were this Court to do so under Rule 220(c).
A. The so-called "Threshold Issue."
At best for Respondents, at worst for Appellant, this creates a jury issue: which Respondent to believe? At worst for Respondents, at best for Appellant, a decision as a matter of law should be made: when one witness testifies that she knows when X occurred, and the other states he cannot say when, the only evidence is that it happened when the one with memory says it happened.
B. Appellant's "combativeness" is a question for the jury.
Respondents further quote Respondent Bradham as testifying that Appellant was not combative. Respondents' Brief, at 14 (quoting R. p. 269, lines 2-3) ("'Q: Would you describe her as being combative? A: No.'"). However, Appellant had earlier quoted Respondent Yampolsky that Appellant was combative. [Appellant's Brief, at 10 (quoting R. p. 173, lines 11-18 ("'the combativeness'"); id. at 19 ("combative during the entire procedure") (quoting R. p. 155, line 2)].
While this might be a fine debate Respondents are having with each other, it is the province of the jury to determine who is telling the truth. The jury may believe one Respondent in his entirety, may reject his testimony in whole, may accept part and reject other parts.
This suffices for a jury question.
As noted above, Respondents repeatedly quote in a highly selective manner.
Moreover, in the precise areas in Respondents' Brief that allege Appellant's quotations are misleading, Respondents are misleading. For example, Appellant noted that Respondent Bradham had testified that Appellant was saying "Stop," and words to that effect. Appellant's Brief, at 9. In the next sentence, Appellant noted that Respondent Bradham had testified that what Appellant said was "'sometimes gibberish,'" thus noting that not all that Appellant said was clear. Id. Respondents accuse Appellant of "piecemeal presentation," Respondents' Brief at 13, and, in the very next sentence, claim that Dr. Bradham said Appellant's statements were "'gibberish,'" leaving out the qualifier of the immediately preceding word, "sometimes." What Dr. Bradham said was that Appellant's statements were "sometimes gibberish," leaving the implication as a matter of law, or at least as jury issue, that they were sometimes not gibberish. But Respondents selectively quote, leaving out the qualifier "sometimes," and do so in the same breath they accuse Appellant of selectively quoting--where Appellant had noted that Dr. Bradham's statement was qualified by stating it was "sometimes gibberish."
Moreover, a reasonable inference from Dr. Bradham's testimony is that the "sometimes gibberish" statements were not the "Stop." "Let me out of here" statements that Dr. Bradham had previously referred to, but to other statements Appellant made. At best for Respondents, it is a jury question as to whether the "sometimes gibberish" limitation applies to the "Stop. Let me out of here." And even were the jury to find that it does, and that sometimes, the "Stop" was gibberish, it is at best for Respondents a jury question as to whether the times that the "Stop" was not gibberish meant "Stop."
Further, it is difficult to conceive of how "Stop" could be gibberish.
At worst, if both parties are selectively quoting, that is what juries are for. To determine who is telling the truth, and what inferences to make from each statement that is deemed truthful. Appellant maintains her quotations are proper. Seen in a light most favorable to the non-moving party on the summary judgment motion, Dr. Bradham's "sometimes gibberish" comment did not even apply to Appellant's "Stop. Let me out." But even assuming, contrary to law, that the inference must be favorable to the movant, that Dr. Bradham's statement about "sometimes gibberish" did apply to Appellant's "Stop. Let me out," it was misleading to characterize them as "gibberish" and not admit it was only "sometimes" gibberish.
Were the Court to intrude on the jury's province, and find that the "sometimes gibberish" qualifier applies to Appellant's "Stop. Let me out of here," the Court must still conclude that sometimes these statements were not gibberish, and find in favor of Appellant. Appellant would be satisfied even were the Court to take out of the jury's hand the question of whether the "sometimes gibberish" qualifier applies to the "Stop. Let me out," and allow the jury to determine whether the non-gibberish "Stop. Let me out" meant "Stop. Let me out."
D. Ms. Linog is not an expert.
Ms. Linog is a high school graduate, a semester at Trident Tech, working as a waitress at the time of the event in question. The gist of Ms. Linog's claim is that experts refused to listen to her. The response of these experts is to hire a second set of experts - legal experts -- to argue that Ms. Linog cannot even bring her claim unless she hires a third set of experts. This second set of experts, Respondents' lawyers, are now asking a fourth set of experts -- this Court -- to hold that she cannot bring her claim of experts wrongfully overriding her wishes unless she hires the third set of experts. And all she wants is to bring her claim to a jury representing a cross-section of the community: it might be some people with post-doctoral education, some with college degrees, a high school graduate or two. This second set of experts is now arguing that Ms. Linog cannot have her claim heard because she has not hired a third set of experts--medical experts. They ask a fourth set of experts--legal experts, and specifically this Court -- to hold that an average citizen cannot bring a claim to a jury of average citizens that her wishes were overridden, unless she pays some other expert to say she was capable of stating her wishes -- thus overriding the Statute written by the Legislature, which speaks for the average citizen, that evidence the patient may bring of her intent is not intended to be limited, and that a health practitioner, seeking to override a patient's stated wishes, must put in writing that the patient cannot be trusted with her own wishes, and then consult the next of kin.
The lower Court's Order is based on two grounds: first, that whether one may revoke consent to a health care operation is a novel question in South Carolina, a question that every court that has considered has decided in the affirmative. Second, that the Georgia case, Mims, requires an expert, and Appellant provided no expert. Mims required an expert only on the question of whether the procedure could have been stopped. Later jurisdictions considering revocation of consent have properly refused to require an expert to so testify where the procedure was in fact stopped. Here, it was stopped, so Mims' requirement of an expert to testify it could have been stopped is not applicable. Moreover, whether having one's gums scraped is a "medical emergency" is eminently within the sound common sense of a jury. No expert need tell them that in theory one could stop having her gums scraped without serious physical harm.
Further, Appellant claims the "procedure" that was agreed upon was a cleaning of all her gums, and that the "procedure" was in fact stopped. Respondents claim that each quarter of Appellant's mouth suffices for a "procedure" and thus in finishing one-quarter of her mouth, the dentist completed, rather than stopped, the "procedure." The Court need not determine what the legal meaning of "a procedure" is, because, assuming for the sake of argument that Respondents' definition is correct, Appellant has produced testimony that she withdrew her consent at the initiation of the "procedure"-- as Respondents define the term. Respondents had done nothing to her at that point that required Respondents to continue their invasion.
Nor can it be maintained a medical emergency necessitated initiation of the "procedure," under either definition, for Respondent dentist is on record that Ms. Linog's tartar was not an emergency.
Further, Ms. Linog is not asking for summary judgment. She simply seeks the chance to present her evidence in her day in court. Any limitation on her right do so should come from the Legislature.
Finally, the legislature of South Carolina has the right and the power to determine what the procedure is for medical emergencies that arguably justify overriding a person's wishes. They have not stated that a medical emergency is to be conclusively presumed unless the patient hires an expert to state the contrary. Rather, they have stated that no such claim of emergency is to be even considered unless and until the medical worker complies with serious procedural guidelines.
Respondents' other claims could only be considered were the Court, in its discretion, to apply Rule 220(c), which Respondents do not even ask the Court to apply. Were the Court to consider Respondents' claim that Appellant was unable to appreciate the nature and implications of her condition and proposed care, unable to make a reasoned decision concerning that care, the Court would be obliged to follow the Statute that speaks to that situation, and hold that Respondents committed medical battery. (The Court may wish to reserve that issue until if and when a lower court Order explicitly based thereon comes before this Court, or until if and when a party making such a claim explicitly requests consideration under 220(c)). On these facts and these pleadings, the only answer is to look to the Statute.
The lower Court had it right the first time and found there was a jury issue. On reconsideration, the lower court felt bound not to consider the evidence because a Georgia case required an expert. South Carolina case law does not require an expert to testify that one can stop at the beginning without doing harm. Nor does South Carolina case law require an expert to testify that scraping gums is a medical emergency. Nor does South Carolina statutory law allow one, except with imminent danger of death or death-like injury, to even raise the defense of emergency without complying with serious procedural safeguards, and there is no evidence those safeguards were met here, or even attempted to be met. The Legislature has put the initial evidentiary burden on Respondents. The Court might later entertain questions of whether it should create, out of whole cloth, an evidentiary burden on Plaintiffs, were the issue raised by Defendants whom had complied with the Statute. Respondents whom have not complied with the Statute's requirements to establish what they claim, cannot ask this Court to prevent the aggrieved from going forward unless the aggrieved meets demands the Legislature never required.
The case should be REVERSED and REMANDED, with instructions to the Trial Judge that his instincts were right: there is a jury question.
 It is also interesting that, while insisting Appellant is bound by every part of Mims, even those parts that do not apply to her facts, Respondents wish to pick and choose from the South Carolina Informed Consent Act. They quote, and underline, language from S.C. Code § 44-66-60, paragraph (B). Significantly, and in addition to the fact that Respondents preface and follow the quoted language with an interpretation that tortures the meaning of that paragraph, they want to claim benefit from the language they quote, while disclaiming the next paragraph (C): "(C) This section does not limit the evidence on which a court may base a determination of a patient's intent in a judicial proceeding." They also want the benefits of their partial quotation from 44-66-60 (B) while ignoring the thrust of the statute of a whole: That if a patient is incompetent, one must put that in writing, have another professional put that in writing, and then contact the patient's spouse for instructions. If the parties are bound by every aspect of any authority they cite, Appellant must prevail: the South Carolina statute trumps the out of state case, and since Respondents did not take the steps the Statute mandates to avoid a medical battery claim, they are liable.
Regardless of whether she factually withdrew her consent, the circuit court concluded that once a procedure has been initiated the time for a decision and discussions relating to that decision has passed. We reject the notion that the onset of a procedure categorically forecloses a patient's withdrawal of consent. To be sure, at some point in virtually every medical procedure a patient reaches a point from which there is no return. However, that point need not be arbitrarily created at the commencement of treatment. Rather it varies with the nature and circumstances of the individual procedure and continues so long as there exist alternative viable modes of medical treatment.
588 N.W.2d at 31. Thus, even were this Court to reject Schrieber's teaching and hold that one must protest at the initiation of the treatment, Appellant meets that stringent test.
 Further, what is "legally drunk," just as with other questions of law, or engineering, or physics, is an expert question. And there is no evidence that anesthesiologist Bradham had been qualified as a legal expert. Moreover, unlike other questions requiring expertise, questions of law cannot be testified to: they are in the exclusive domain of the Court; the trial judge is the only authority in his/her courtroom on matters of law.
 Were additional evidence required, Appellant would point to the testimony of the dental assistant, Michelle Olaes, that Appellant was moving her arms in front of the dentist and Ms. Olaes to prevent them from operating on her [R. p. 296, line 21 - p. 297, line 9], as well as the evidence in Appellant's Initial Brief, that she was combative throughout the procedure, trying to get out the chair, the most combative of any of the thousands of patients dentist Yampolsky has seen, so combative that anesthesiologist Bradham swore off further dental sedations, etc.
 Similarly for Respondents' argument, Respondents' Brief at 13-15, that Linog relies "only on selected 'sound bytes' from Dr. Bradham's testimony." Respondents spend two pages slaying this dragon, and justify it, id. at 13, by stating that at the original hearing on Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (not the Hearing on Respondent's Motion to Reconsider), that was all Appellant orally brought to the lower court's attention. But of course, at a Hearing, one is limited in time, and cannot and should not mention every deposition quotation contained in one's pleadings. [Nor is anyone challenging the result of that initial Hearing]. If Appellant directed attention only to certain deposition excerpts at the initial Hearing, Appellant had cited others in her pleadings. Respondents argue, even now, on appeal, from their Motion to Reconsider, as if the only evidence Appellant has cited is what was offered orally on the initial Motion--Respondents' Brief, at 13-15--as if what was in Appellant's pleadings leading to the initial Motion does not exist, apparently ignoring the evidence Appellant presented at the Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider and in Appellant's Initial Brief before this Court.


§ 102-4 Compliance required prior to plat approval.
§ 102-5 Compliance required prior to issuance of certificate of occupancy.
§ 102-6 Permits and fees.
§ 102-7 Bond and surety.
§ 102-8 Extension of time.
§ 102-9 Failure to complete work.
§ 102-10 Conditions for nonissuance of permits.
§ 102-11 Modification of approved plans.
§ 102-12 Responsibilities of permittees during grading operations.
§ 102-14 Maintenance of protective devices.
§ 102-15 Minimum design standards.
§ 102-16 Variances and exceptions; appeals.
§ 102-17 Enforcement by City Engineer.
§ 102-18 Equitable remedies; right of entry.
Council hereby finds that excessive quantities of soil are eroding from certain areas that are undergoing development for nonagricultural uses, such as housing developments, industrial areas, recreational facilities and roads. This erosion makes necessary costly repairs to gullies, washed out fills, roads and embankments. The resulting sediment clogs storm sewers and road ditches, muddies streams, leaves deposits of silt in lakes and reservoirs and is considered a major water pollutant.
The purpose of this chapter is to prevent soil erosion and sedimentation from occurring as a result of nonagricultural development within the City by requiring proper provisions for water disposal and the protection of soil surfaces during and after construction, in order to promote safety, public health, convenience and the general welfare of the community.
The increased lay occurring as a result of man's activities.
The Chief of the Building Department of the City or his or her duly authorized representative.
A signed written statement by the City Engineer or the Building Official that specific construction has been inspected and found to comply with all grading plans and specifications.
The City Engineer or his or her duly authorized representative.
Loose refuse or earth material not suitable for use as presently situated or constituted, as determined by the City Engineer.
A man-made change in the natural cover or topography of land, including cut and fill activities, which change may result in or contribute to soil erosion or sedimentation of the waters of the state. "Earth change" shall not apply to the practice of plowing and tilling soil for the purpose of crop production.
The process by which the ground surface is worn away by action of wind, water, gravity or a combination thereof.
Any act by which soil or rock is cut into, dug, quarried, uncovered, removed, displaced or relocated, and includes the conditions resulting therefrom.
A deposit of soil, rock or other material, placed or replaced by man or machine, which raises an existing elevation.
That area which would be inundated by storm runoff or flood water equivalent to that which would occur with a rainfall or flood with a one-hundred-year recurrence frequency after total development of the watershed.
Any stripping, excavating, filling, stockpiling or combination thereof, including land in its excavated or filled condition.
An on-site roadway constructed to prevent the spread of debris onto the public right-of-way.
Any danger to public health, welfare and safety, including exposure to risk of damage to property or liability for personal injury, or risk of harm to land, air or water resulting in environmental degradation. "Hazard" includes flooding and ponding, compaction and settling, landslides, earthquakes, toxic chemicals, radiation, fire and disease.
A use of land which may result in an earth change, including, but not limited to, subdivision, residential, commercial, industrial, recreational or other development, private and public highway, road and street construction, drainage construction, logging operations, agricultural practices and mining.
Includes, but is not limited to, existing streams, soil, vegetation and trees two inches or greater in diameter or 15 inches or greater in height, whichever is less.
Any ground surface in its original state before any grading, excavation or filling, and established by the City Engineer when there is any question of its location.
A speed of water movement which is not conducive to the development of accelerated soil erosion.
Those control measures which are installed or constructed to control soil erosion and which are maintained after completion of the project.
A natural person, firm, corporation, partnership or association.
Any solid particulate material, both mineral and organic, that is in suspension in, is being transported by, or has been moved from its origin by air, water or gravity as a product of soil erosion.
Any lot or parcel of land or combination of contiguous lots or parcels of land where grading is performed or permitted.
Any inclined, exposed surface or a fill, excavation or natural terrain.
All earth material, of whatever origin, that overlies bedrock, including the decomposed zone of bedrock which can be readily excavated by mechanical equipment.
The proper placement of earth materials or rock for temporary periods of time in accordance with the requirements of this chapter for the purpose of facilitating construction operations.
The depositing of earth materials or rock for temporary periods of time in accordance with the requirements of this chapter for the purpose of facilitating construction operations.
A river, stream, creek or other surface waterway which may or may not be serving as a drain, as defined by Act No. 40 of the Public Acts of 1956, as amended, being MCLA 280.1 to 280.630, as amended, and which has definite banks, a bed and visible evidence of a continued flow or continued occurrence of water, including the connecting waters of the Great Lakes.
Any activity which removes or significantly disturbs the vegetative surface cover, and includes clearing and grubbing operations.
Interim control measures which are installed or constructed for the control of soil erosion until permanent soil erosion control is effected.
No site plan, plot plan or plat shall be approved under the Zoning Code unless such site plan, plot plan or plat includes soil erosion and sediment control measures consistent with the requirements of this chapter and related land development regulations.
Editor's Note: See Ch. 270, Zoning.
No certificate of occupancy for any building shall be issued under the Zoning Code unless the applicant for such certificate has obtained a certification of compliance indicating compliance with all grading plans and specifications and completion of all permanent soil erosion control measures, issued by the County of Wayne.
Permit required. Except as exempted by § 102-16, no person shall do any grading, stripping, excavating or filling, or undertake any earth change, which disturbs one or more acres of land, or if the earth change is within 500 feet of a lake or stream of the state, unless he or she has a valid grading permit issued by the County of Wayne. Anything less than one acre must be referred to the Building Department.
Application. A separate application shall be required for each grading permit. Plans, specifications and timing schedules shall be submitted with each application for a grading permit. The plans shall be prepared or approved by a professional engineer or architect. Wayne County may waive this requirement if the work entails little hazard to the adjacent property and does not include the construction of a fill upon which a structure may be erected.
Other information or data as may be required by the County of Wayne, such as a soil investigation report which shall include, but not be limited to, data regarding the nature, distribution and supporting ability of existing soils and rock on the site.
Fees. Fees shall be established, as part of the building permit fee, from time to time by resolution of Council.
A grading permit shall not be issued unless the permittee first posts per Wayne County requirements a bond executed by the landowner and a corporate surety with authority to do business in the state as a surety.
If a permittee is unable to complete the work authorized by this chapter within the specified time, he or she must adhere to Wayne County requirements pertaining to extension of time.
The City will not issue a certificate of occupancy if the permittee fails to complete the work and to meet all requirements.
The proposed work would cause hazards to the public safety and welfare.
The work as proposed by the applicant will damage any public or private property or interfere with any existing drainagecourse in such a manner as to cause damage to any adjacent property, result in the deposit of debris or sediment on any public way or into any waterway or create an unreasonable hazard to persons or property.
The land area for which grading is proposed is subject to geological hazard to the extent that no reasonable amount of corrective work can eliminate or sufficiently reduce settlement, slope instability or any other hazard to persons or property.
The land area for which the grading is proposed may lie within the floodplain of any stream or watercourse (not specifically designated and delineated by the City as an area subject to flood hazard) unless a hydrologic report, prepared by a professional engineer, is submitted to certify that the proposed grading will have, in his or her opinion, no detrimental influence on the public welfare or upon the total development of the watershed.
All modifications of approved grading plans must be submitted to and approved by the City Engineer. All necessary sustaining reports shall be submitted with any proposal to modify the approved grading plan. No grading work in connection with any proposed modification shall be permitted without the approval of the City Engineer.
The prompt removal of all soil, miscellaneous debris or other materials applied, dumped or otherwise deposited on public streets, highways, sidewalks or other public thoroughfares during transit to and from the construction site, where such a spillage constitutes a public nuisance or hazard.
Earth changes shall be conducted in such a manner so as to effectively reduce accelerated soil erosion and resulting sedimentation.
All earth changes shall be designed, constructed and completed in such a manner that the exposed area of any disturbed land shall be limited to the shortest possible period of time.
Sediment caused by accelerated soil erosion shall be removed from runoff water before it leaves the site of the earth change.
Any temporary or permanent facility designed and constructed for the conveyance of water around, through or from the earth change area shall be designed to limit the water flow to a nonerosive velocity.
Permanent soil erosion control measures for all slopes, channels, ditches or disturbed land areas shall be completed within 15 calendar days after final grading or after the final earth change has been completed. When it is not possible to permanently stabilize a disturbed area after an earth change has been completed, or where significant earth change activity ceases, temporary soil erosion control measures shall be implemented within 30 calendar days. All temporary soil erosion control measures shall be maintained until permanent soil erosion control measures are implemented.
Persons carrying out soil erosion and sediment control measures under this chapter, and all subsequent owners of property concerning which such measures have been taken, shall maintain all permanent erosion control measures, retaining walls, structures, plantings and other protective devices.
All grading plans and specifications, including extensions of previously approved plans, shall include provisions for erosion and sediment control in accordance with, but not limited to, the standards contained in the County Soil District Standards for Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control. Copies of such standards shall be available for inspection in the offices of the City Clerk and the City Engineer.
A sidewalk or driveway authorized by a valid permit under Chapter 217, Articles I and II.
Where the City Engineer certifies, in writing, that the planned work and the final structures or topographical changes will not result in or contribute to soil erosion or sedimentation of the waters of the state; will not interfere with any existing drainagecourse in such a manner as to cause damage to any adjacent property or result in the deposit of debris or sediment on any public way; will not create any hazard to any person or property; and will have no detrimental influence upon the public welfare or upon the total development of the watershed.
Even though no permits are required under Subsection A(1) to (5) hereof, operations and construction which are exempt from the permit requirement must still be in compliance with the provisions of this chapter concerning grading and erosion.
Where it is alleged that there is an error or misinterpretation in any order, requirement, decision, grant or refusal made by the City Engineer, the Zoning Board of Appeals may hear specific applications and may amend or change such order, requirement, decision, grant or refusal so that it is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this chapter. The procedural requirements for appeals under the Zoning Code shall be applicable to appeals under this chapter.
This chapter shall be enforced by the City Engineer. The City Engineer shall inspect the work and shall require adequate inspection or compaction by a soil engineer or by a soil testing agency, approved by the City Engineer, unless he or she determines that such inspection requirements may be waived due to the nonhazardous nature of the grading.
Upon satisfactory execution of all approved grading plans and other requirements, the City Engineer shall issue a certification of completion. If the City Engineer finds any existing conditions not as stated in any application, grading permit or approved plan, he or she may refuse to approve further work until approval of a revised grading plan, which will conform to the existing conditions, has been granted.
Notwithstanding the existence or pursuit of any other remedy, the City may maintain an action in its own name in any court of competent jurisdiction for an injunction or other process against any person to restrain or prevent violations of this chapter.
The City Engineer or his or her duly authorized agents may enter, at all reasonable times, in or upon any private or public property for the purpose of inspecting and investigating conditions and practices that may be a violation of this chapter.


On 19 March 1998, with the notification of 17 September 1996, the Austrian company Red Bull GmbH has received the right of protection for its word trade mark based on the international registration IR-641378 A, in almost all classes (3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39,41 and 42). On March 2004, the Polish company Przedsiebiorstwo Produkcji Lodów “KORAL” applied for the registration of the word trade mark RED BLUE Z-277694 in Class 30 for goods such as ice creams and other products. However, the Polish Patent Office recognized earlier priority of Red Bull’s trade mark and rejected the application.
Koral requested a motion to declare the expiration of Red Bull’s trade mark rights in Class 30, claiming that the Austrian company failed to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years. The PPO agreed with “Koral” and declared the expiration of Red Bull’s trade mark in its decision of 30 October 2005 case file Sp. 199/04. Red Bull’s evidences of use that were based on the fact that Austrian company has put its trade mark on boxes with sweets which were later sent during different occasions to customers and business partners were found insufficient. The date on which five years period ended was set by the PPO on 9 July 2004 (the date on which the request for invalidation was filed). Both parties filed a complaint against this decision. The Polish company did not agree with PPO’s findings as regards trade mark rights’ expiration date, and the Austrian company claimed that PPO should consider reputation of its trade mark.
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 7 September 2006 case file VI SA/Wa 557/06 held that reputation is not taken into account during proceedings for lapse of a right of protection. Arguments that Koral company has no standing were rejected by the Court because both parties were also involved in unfair competition proceeding before civil court. Once again, both companies filed a cassation complaint.
The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 September 2008 case file II GSK 138/07 ruled that the reputation of a trade mark is irrelevant when there are the invalidation proceedings. This is not the proper stage. The reputation could be taken into account during the application proceeding for Koral company’s trade marks. A single fact of non-used Red Bull’s trade mark being an obstacle for registration was a sufficient condition for declaring its expiry. Koral has also called into question the date of expiry of the right of protection. It was the reason for the Court to discuss this issue in the extended chamber. The Supreme Administrative Court in its opinion of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 gave a very detailed explanation of that problem. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“.
Categories: Art. 134 §1 PBAC | Art. 141 §4 PBAC | Art. 145 PBAC | Art. 169(1)(i) IPL | Art. 169(6) IPL | Art. 172 IPL | Art. 28(1) TMA | non-use | Polish Act on Industrial Property Law | Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts | Polish Act on Trade marks | Polish Supreme Administrative Court | trade mark lapse | trademark law | Voivodeship Administrative Court.


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2005: PhD in Computer Science at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) under Dr. Kale. Thesis title: "Impostors for Interactive Parallel Computer Graphics."
January 2005-Present: Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Alaska Fairbanks.
September 2001-December 2004: Full-time staff at the Center for Simulation of Advanced Rockets, of the Computer Science and Engineering department at UIUC, supervised by Dr. Kale. Duties include extensive software development; technical interactions; and technical writing.
September 1999-August 2001: Research assistant in Dr. Kale's research group in the Computer Science department at UIUC. Duties included maintaining, extending, and porting Charm++, a 100,000-line C/C++ parallel runtime system; interacting with external users; and technical writing.
July 1999-August 1999: Intern at IBM TJ Watson Research Laboratory, Hawthorne, New York. Developed a visual language with a Java GUI, C++ interpreter, and database backend.
February 1997-June 1999: Student assistant at the STEP Lab, of the Alaska SAR Facility, of the UAF Geophysical Institute. Duties included maintaining and extending large satellite image processing and interferometry toolset for Unix workstations and the ARSC Cray T3E parallel machine.
Innumerable large and small programming languages, including Pascal, assembly, Bourne shell, Perl, and Scheme.
Parallel programming, including MPI, OpenMP, and SMP threads.
Networking, including Berkeley TCP and UDP, UNIX pipes, and Winsock.
GUI development, including Windows, X11, MacOS, Java, and OpenGL/GLUT.
Development tools, including lex, yacc, make, RCS and CVS.
Embedded systems and hardware development, including designs using the 6800 and Microchip's PIC line of microcontrollers, and serial, parallel, and ISA interfaces.
Kernel development under Linux, MacOS, and embedded systems.
Convex optimization, linear systems including Krylov methods such as conjugate gradient, and nonlinear optimization methods.
Frequency domain processing, including the FFT, DCT, and DWT. Uses for the frequency domain include radar and sonar processing, sound and music processing, and fast correlation and filtering for computer vision.
Finite element simulation, including linear elastic, viscoelastic, and large-displacement methods.
Finite difference simulation, including first- and higher-order stencils for advection and dissipation.
Extensive technical writing and technical communication experience.
System administration for Windows, Linux, and Macintosh.
Taught CS 301 (Assembly Language) and CS 381 (Computer Graphics) fall 2006.
Taught CS 321 (Operating Systems) and CS 497 (Intrusion Detection) spring 2006.
Prepared and presented tutorial on parallel language Charm++ at CINECA, Bologna, Italy in summer 2005.
Taught CS 301 (Assembly Language) fall 2005.
Taught CS 321 (Operating Systems) and CS 481/681 (Topics in Computer Graphics) spring 2005.
Prepared and presented tutorial on parallel language Charm++ at LACSI 2003 conference.
Prepared and presented 3-hour tutorial on parallel FEM Framework research at 2001 FEM Workshop, 2002 Charm++ Workshop, 2003 Charm++ Workshop.
Created lab materials, ran lab sections, and graded lab reports for GEOS 662 graduate class at UAF in 1998.
1999: "Outstanding" rating in the UMAP International Mathematical Contest in Modeling.
1998: Placed 5th of 44 teams in Northwest Regional contest of ACM International Intercollegiate Programming Contest.
1998: Grand Prize Winner, ACM/IBM International Quest for Java. Won an IBM Thinkpad laptop.
1997: "Outstanding" rating in the UMAP International Mathematical Contest in Modeling.
1996, 1997: Placed 7th of 44 teams in Northwest Regional contest of ACM International Intercollegiate Programming Contest.
1994: Selected to represent Alaska at the U.S. Department of Energy's Supercomputer Research Camp at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
In Proceedings of Computer Graphics and Virtual Reality '06, 2006.
Gengbin Zheng, Orion Sky Lawlor, and Laxmikant V. Kale.
Multiple flows of control in migratable parallel programs.
In Proceedings of 8th Workshop on High Performance Scientific and Engineering Computing (HPSEC-06). IEEE Press, August 2006.
Orion S. Lawlor, Sayantan Chakravorty, Terry L. Wilmarth, Nilesh Choudhury, Isaac Dooley, Gengbin Zheng, and Laxmikant V. Kale.
Parfum: A parallel framework for unstructured meshes for scalable dynamic physics applications.
Engineering With Computers (in press), 2006.
Xiangmin Jiao, Gengbin Zheng, Phillip A. Alexander, Michael T. Campbell, Orion S. Lawlor, John Norris, Andreas Haselbacher, and Michael T. Heath.
A system integration framework for coupled multiphysics simulations.
Orion Lawlor, Hari Govind, Isaac Dooley, Michael Breitenfeld, and Laxmikant Kale.
Performance degradation in the presence of subnormal floating-point values.
In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Operating System Interference in High Performance Applications, September 2005.
Xiangmin Jiao, Gengbin Zheng, Orion Lawlor, Phil Alexander, Mike Campbell, Michael Heath, and Robert Fiedler.
An integration framework for simulations of solid rocket motors.
In 41st AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, Tucson, Arizona, July 2005.
Impostors for Parallel Interactive Computer Graphics.
PhD thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, December 2004.
Rashmi Jyothi, Orion Sky Lawlor, and L. V. Kale.
In PADTAD Workshop for IPDPS 2004, page 294. IEEE Press, April 2004.
Gengbin Zheng, Terry Wilmarth, Orion Sky Lawlor, Laxmikant V. Kalé, Sarita Adve, David Padua, and Philippe Geubelle.
Performance modeling and programming environments for petaflops computers and the Blue Gene machine.
In NSF Next Generation Systems Program Workshop, 18th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium(IPDPS), Santa Fe, New Mexico, April 2004. IEEE Press.
Orion Sky Lawlor and John Hart.
Bounding iterated function systems using convex optimization.
In Proceedings of Pacific Graphics 2003, pages 283-292, October 2003.
Orion Sky Lawlor and L. V. Kalé.
Supporting dynamic parallel object arrays.
Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 15:371-393, 2003.
Chao Huang, Orion Lawlor, and L. V. Kalé.
In Proceedings of the 16th International Workshop on Languages and Compilers for Parallel Computing (LCPC 03), College Station, Texas, October 2003.
A voxel-based parallel collision detection algorithm.
In Proceedings of the International Conference in Supercomputing, pages 285-293. ACM Press, June 2002.
A grid-based parallel collision detection algorithm.
Master's thesis, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Illinois, May 2001.
O. Lawlor and L. V. Kalé.
In Proceedings of ACM 2001 Java Grande/ISCOPE Conference, pages 21-29, Stanford, CA, June 2001.
Gregg A. Christopher, Orion Lawlor, and Jason Tedor.
Room capacity analysis using a pair of evacuation models.
Rick Guritz, Mike Ayers, Tom Logan, Shusun Li, and Orion Lawlor.
Automated DEM production using ESA tandem mission data for the Caribou-Poker Creek LTER watershed, Alaska.
In Fringe '99 Meeting, November 1999.
Rick Guritz, Orion Lawlor, Tom Logan, Robert Fatland, Joanne Groves, Shusun Li, and Verne Kaupp.
Automated Digital Elevation Model (DEM) production using ERS SAR tandem pairs.
In Proceedings of IGARSS '98, 1998.
Rick Guritz, Orion Lawlor, Tom Logan, Shusun Li, , and Verne Kaupp.
Repeat-pass satellite interferometric tools available at the Alaska SAR Facility.
In American Geophysical Union 1998 Fall Meeting Transactions, EOS, volume 79.45, pages 21-22, 1998.
Gordon Bower, Orion Lawlor, and James Long.
Pursuit-evasion games in the late Cretaceous.
Shusun Li, Rick Guritz, Tom Logan, Z. Wang, and Orion Lawlor.
Towards operational application of satellite SAR images in hydrological studies.
In American Geophysical Union EOS, volume 78.45, 1997.
Orion Lawlor, Tom Logan, Rick Guritz, Robert Fatland, Shusun Li, Z. Wang, and Coert Olmsted.
Generation of fine resolution DEM at test areas in Alaska using ERS tandem pairs and precise orbital data.
In 12th International Conference on Applied Geologic Remote Sensing, November 1997.
Created prototype code and initial collaboration for a collaborative cosomology grant with the U. of Washington, funded as NSF ITR 0205611.

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A unified school district that provides school bus transportation for its pupils is required to provide school bus transportation for pupils attending private or parochial schools who reside along a regular school route or gather at a place along a regular school route. Further, the school district may provide or furnish transportation for pupils attending private or parochial schools to such extent and upon such conditions as the school district deems appropriate. There is no mandatory obligation placed upon a school district to provide or furnish transportation for pupils attending private or parochial schools who do not reside along a regular school route or gather at a place along a regular school route. Cited herein: K.S.A. 72-8301; K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 72-8302, as amended by L. 2000, Ch. 155, § 4; 72-8303, as amended by L. 2000, Ch. 155, § 2; K.S.A. 72-8306.
As legal counsel for Unified School District No. 489, you request our opinion regarding whether a unified school district is obligated to reimburse a private individual for mileage costs incurred in transporting a pupil from the pupil's residence to a gathering place along the regular school route so that the pupil may be transported by school bus to a private or parochial school.
Unified School District No. 489 (U.S.D. No. 489) furnishes transportation for pupils who are attending public schools located in the territory comprising the school district. The Board of Education for U.S.D. No. 489 has established regular school routes to accommodate its pupils who are to be transported to and from school every school day. If a pupil who attends public school resides more than one mile from a prescribed regular school route, the District has contracted with the pupil's parents to reimburse them for transporting the pupil to a location along a regular school route. Children who attend private or parochial schools within the District's territory are also provided transportation on the District's buses, provided they reside along a regular school route or gather at places located along a regular school route. Parents of children who attend private or parochial schools are not reimbursed by the District for any costs incurred by the parents in transporting children to gathering places, regardless of the distance of their residences from a prescribed regular school route. The parent of a child who attends a parochial school located in the territory comprising U.S.D. No. 489, and whose residence is six miles from a gathering place along a prescribed regular school route, has requested reimbursement from the District for the costs incurred by the parent in transporting the child to the gathering place.
The obligations of a school district in providing transportation for pupils are outlined in K.S.A. 72-8301 et seq.
Under the conditions set forth in subsection (b)(1) of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 72-8302, as amended by L. 2000, Ch. 155, § 4, a school district is obligated to provide transportation for pupils attending the schools of the school district.
However, the authority of a school district to provide transportation to pupils is not limited to providing such service to only those pupils who attend the schools of the school district.
"(a) Whenever any school district shall provide or furnish transportation under authority of this act for pupils attending the public schools, pupils residing in such school district attending private or parochial schools of elementary or high school grades which are accredited by the state board of education, who shall reside on or along the highway or street constituting the regular route of a school bus, or who shall gather at some place on the regular route nearest or most easily accessible to their homes or such schools, where such transportation is provided for pupils attending the public schools, shall be entitled to the privilege of such school bus transportation upon such regular route as arranged for the benefit of pupils attending public schools. For the purposes of this section, regular route shall not include any route arranged by the school district for the transportation of exceptional children to special education services.
"(b) Whenever any school district shall provide or furnish transportation under authority of article 83 of chapter 72 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated for pupils attending the public schools, it may provide or furnish transportation for pupils residing in the district and attending private or parochial schools of elementary or high school grades which are accredited by the state board of education to such extent and upon such conditions as the school district shall deem appropriate. The authorization contained in this subsection (b) shall be in addition to the requirement provided in subsection (a) of this section.
In determining whether a school district is obligated to reimburse a parent of a pupil who attends a private or parochial school for costs incurred by the parent in transporting the pupil to a gathering place along the prescribed regular school route, interpretation of the provisions of K.S.A. 72-8306 is required.
Once the regular school routes are prescribed, the school district's obligation to provide or furnish transportation to pupils attending private or parochial schools within the territory of the school district can be determined. "Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should be."(9) The statute clearly states that "pupils . . . attending private or parochial schools . . . who shall reside on or along the highway or street constituting the regular route of a school bus, or who shall gather at some place on the regular route nearest or most easily accessible to their homes or such schools . . . shall be entitled to the privilege of such school bus transportation upon such regular route as arranged for the benefit of pupils attending public schools."(10) There is an affirmative obligation placed upon a school district that provides school bus transportation for its pupils to provide school bus transportation for pupils attending private or parochial schools who reside along a prescribed regular school route or gather at a place along a regular school route. Further, the school district "may provide or furnish transportation for pupils . . . attending private or parochial schools . . . to such extent and upon such conditions as the school district shall deem appropriate."(11) This authority, however, is permissive.(12) There is no mandatory obligation placed upon a school district to provide or furnish transportation for pupils attending private or parochial schools who do not reside along a prescribed regular school route or gather at a place along a regular school route.
Because there is no mandatory obligation to provide or furnish transportation to private or parochial school pupils, a school district is not required to reimburse a private individual for costs incurred in transporting the private or parochial school pupil to a gathering place along a prescribed regular school route.
1. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 72-8302(a), as amended by L. 2000, Ch. 155, § 4.
2. K.S.A. 72-8306 (emphasis added).
3. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Credit Union 1 of Kansas, 268 Kan. 121, 124-25 (1999) (internal citation omitted).
4. In re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc., 265 Kan. 510, 520 (1998).
5. Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board v. State Corporation Commission, 264 Kan. 363, 389 (1998), quoting Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 176 Kan. 561, Syl. ¶ 1.
6. State ex rel. Stephan v. U.S.D. No. 428, 231 Kan. 579, 584 (1982).
7. Id. at 585. See also K.S.A. 72-8301(c).
8. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 72-8303, as amended by L. 2000, Ch. 155, § 2.
9. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 268 Kan. at 124-25.
10. K.S.A. 72-8306(a) (emphasis added).
11. K.S.A. 72-8306(b) (emphasis added).
12. Attorney General Opinion No. 81-25.
13. 1978 Senate Journal, 1286, March 29, 1978.
14. Attorney General Opinion No. 81-25.
15. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 268 Kan. at 132, quoting KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 635, 643 (1997).

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INDEPENDENCE DAY: Free from what?
While history has uncovered the blatant shortcomings of this dictate, the rights to one’s liberty, or freedom, seem particularly important to highlight on the eve of Independence Day. With nearly 95,000 children incarcerated in adult jails and prisons each year, the vast majority of whom being children of color, we have a responsibility to question this concept of liberty in the shadow of our carceral state.
Liberty, defined as “the state of being free within society from oppressive restrictions imposed by authority on one's way of life, behavior, or political views” has a long history of grotesque unequal application in our country: it certainly wasn’t a protected right for slaves, women, or children, nor was it promised to numerous other special populations--immigrants, the disabled, LGBT communities, Indigenous peoples to name a few--at the birth of our country. Yet, as many scholars have noted, as unique populations have gained access to liberty through the Courts, other structures of oppression have emerged to stifle their ultimate achievement of freedom. Perhaps the most well-known, yet egregious, obstruction of liberty is incarceration.
For our children who sleep in adult jails and prisons, the deprivation of liberty extends far beyond the restrictions on their movement. Despite being treated as adults in the criminal courts, children under 18 who are prosecuted as adults are hypocritically denied the freedoms granted by adulthood (voting, serving in the military, living independent of their parents, completing compulsory education, getting married, etc.). This inconsistency begs the question, Is incarceration itself the punishment, or are we sanctioning further punishment once children are incarcerated? Sadly, the answer lies in the latter.
And, because we have found it acceptable to treat not only adults this way, but also children who are younger than 18, we have effectively undone a core tenant of our country’s founding principles.
In May, the Oregon Supreme Court made an exemplary decision when they reversed a 2015 ruling made by the state’s Court of Appeals in the State v. J.C.N.-V. case. In State v. J.C.N.-V., the appeals court upheld the initial decision to transfer a 13 year old, J.C.N.-V, who was charged with aggravated murder, from juvenile court to circuit court for criminal prosecution. State law in Oregon permits the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and hand over cases to the jurisdiction of the circuit court if it finds the youth to be of “sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” This happened to J.C.N.-V., whose case was originally transferred to the circuit court for criminal prosecution, and whose transfer was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Enter Marsha Levick, Deputy Director and Chief Counsel at Juvenile Law Center, and Angela Sherbo, J.C.N.-V.’s attorney from Youth, Rights, and Justice. They successfully argued a reversal of the transfer in the state’s Supreme Court, which responded with an avowal that the “sophistication and maturity” of a child is too simplistic a measure for determining whether a transfer from juvenile court to circuit court is warranted. The Court urged the legislature to use a more nuanced approach in dictating the guidelines for any potential transfers.
A couple weeks after this decision, District Attorney of Oregon’s Multnomah County, Rod Underhill, announced that his office will no longer automatically prosecute teens ages 15 to 17 in circuit court for certain Measure 11crimes. Unlike the defendant in State v J.C.N.-V., children charged with Measure 11 crimes do not have the benefit of a hearing before a juvenile court judge; instead they are automatically prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system. Furthermore, if convicted, they serve the same mandatory sentences that would apply to adults; however, they can begin serving their sentence in a youth prison until they are age 25.
District Attorney Underhill has agreed that if certain considerations are met, his office will be willing to start some Measure 11 cases in juvenile court. Examples of these considerations include: Whether the teen has no past criminal record, whether he or she didn’t seriously hurt anyone, or whether he or she wants to get treatment or turn his or her life around. Cases that will now originate in juvenile court would then be bound by the ruling in J.C.N.-V, and judges would have to consider the “sophistication and maturity” of the child before determining whether or not to transfer the child to the adult system.
While the Campaign for Youth Justice advocates that all children’s cases should originate in juvenile court, these are still steps in the right direction, and nice examples of the ways that litigation and practice interface forpositive reforms. All these efforts combined will hopefully set an example for other states to come around on this issue.
June is Children’s Awareness Month. One would typically think of a child as a 10 year-old in the prime of his/her life, happily going to school, swinging on the playground with friends, helping parents around the house, growing and learning more every day. Unfortunately, for many American children this is not the reality. In 22 states and the District of Columbia, children as young as 7 can be prosecuted as adults. In fact, fourteen states have no minimum age for trying children as adults. Some states set the minimum age at 10, 12, or 13, which is still way too young. As the U.S. Supreme Court has found 5 times in the past decade, children are not the same as adults, and Courts need to ensure they are considering the age, maturity, and brain development before issuing adult punishments.
Children’s Awareness Month is a great occasion to remember these too often forgotten children, and to act on their behalves in order to end the harmful practice of trying, sentencing and incarcerating youth as adults. Instead we should invest in age appropriate approaches that work and tend to the underlying trauma that so many of these youth are exposed to before they ever come in contact with the law. This failed policy of treating children like adults is contradicted by neuroscience leads to poor outcomes for public safety, since youth prosecuted as adults are 34% more likely to recidivate than those handled by the juvenile justice system.
All children deserve to be children, and provided the opportunity to correct bad decisions and afforded second chances.
This month like every year, the Campaign for Youth Justice celebrates Father’s Day, a time to recognize the amazing dads, grandfathers, and other men who have served as role models to so many children.
Dads can play many roles in children’s lives—they can help provide for their well-being, coach them through difficult times, advocate for them when they need extra support, celebrate their accomplishments, and provide the structure and stability that is needed if children fall off track. They even play and roughhouse on demand! In short, dads make a big difference in the lives of children.
This month we’re asking you to make a contribution in honor of fathers everywhere.
A few years ago, CFYJ CEO Marcy Mistrett met two fathers who, back when they were still in high school, were arrested for carjacking. Dwayne Betts, and his friend, Marcus Bullock, just fifteen and sixteen at the time, were tried and sentenced as adults and spent a significant part of their young adulthood incarcerated in adult facilities. Now, years later, both are married and dedicated fathers to their children.
While incarcerated, Dwayne completed high school and began reading and writing poetry and is now a nationally renowned poet and author, a recent graduate of Yale Law School, an advocate for those facing parole and returning home, and member of the CFYJ Board of Directors. Marcus, also a married father of two, is a successful entrepreneur, having started several businesses since he has been home. He is the CEO of Perspectives Premier Contractors (PPC), where he regularly employs other returning citizens, and a technology entrepreneur – he created Flikshop, a mobile app that allows those in prison to connect with their families. Marcus also developed the Flikshop School of Business, classes that he brings to incarcerated youth to help them develop the life skills needed for reentry, he also was recently appointed by the DC Mayor to serve on the board of returning citizens. Both dads are featured at the Aspen Ideas Festival this summer to generate support for their re-entry work.
Dwayne and Marcus are not only committed fathers, but serve as mentors to hundreds of others who are returning home and trying to get their lives back on track—a transition that is riddled with challenges. As CFYJ writes in our recently released report, Collateral Consequences, incarcerating youth as adults very often results in long-term mental health issues, lowered employment opportunities, restrictions to further education, and thousands of other barriers to re-socialization.
By supporting CFYJ, you’re supporting spokespeople like Dwayne and Marcus to help mitigate these consequences and keep youth out of the adult criminal justice system altogether.
We often get asked what type of financial support is the most helpful for a nonprofit organization. With so much uncertainty in nonprofit fundraising, a recurring monthly contribution of $50, $25 or even $10 a month (as little as $120 a year!) would help give CFYJ more stable funding from month to month as we seek to invest in people like Dwayne and Marcus who are working to turn the system around.
Your monthly contribution is a perfect way to help sustain our important work – just like so many dads have sustained us throughout our lives.
Please join us as we thank all the fathers and others that support our young people through good times and bad.
As the year 2016 moves towards its half-way point, one trend has been unmistakable: states are moving to keep more youth out of the adult criminal justice system. And it’s not a regional but a national phenomenon. Led by South Carolina, which is poised to “Raise the Age” of adult court jurisdiction from 17 to 18 – bills have passed both chambers and only minor reconciling of bill language remains – states are adopting a variety of policies designed to treat youth as youth.
Michigan and Louisiana have both seen “Raise the Age” bills pass in one of their legislative chambers – Michigan in the House, Louisiana in the Senate – and in both cases the prospect of the bills ultimately becoming law this year is good. In New York and Louisiana, the governors have vocally backed the “Raise the Age” efforts. In fact, eight of the 9 remaining states that have ages of criminal court jurisdiction lower than 18 have introduced legislation to “Raise the Age” over the past 2 legislative sessions.
But current reform efforts aren’t limited to “Raise the Age”. In Louisiana, Michigan, New York and Missouri, proposed reforms go beyond “Raise the Age” to include larger efforts to change the ways youth are treated by the criminal justice system.
In Alabama and Missouri, proposals to remove pre-trial youth from adult jails have made serious progress. Alabama’s bill passed in the Senate but fell short of the finish line when their session ended on May 6, while Missouri’s bill looks very likely to become law. Similar legislation has been proposed in Washington, D.C., as part of an omnibus youth justice package.
Indiana has passed a law allowing some youth sent to adult court to access to a “reverse transfer” process that could send them back into the juvenile system, and in Vermont the power of prosecutors to “Direct File” youth into adult court has been drastically curtailed.
In Florida, where such prosecutorial discretion is used more than in any other state, a bill to curb “Direct File” passed unanimously out of two Senate committees before running out of time at the end of that state’s short 60-day session. Another attempt to reform the use of “Direct File” by prosecutors is underway in California, where a governor-supported ballot initiative on the issue may go before voters in November.
While there are still too many mechanisms for transferring youth into the adult system, it is clear that the states have come to recognize how harmful and counter-productive such transfers are. The results of this year will be better justice for more youth, with powerful positive momentum and strong prospects for even greater gains in the coming years.
The juvenile court was founded in Chicago in 1899 on the ideas that children were different than adults, should not be subject to adult prisons, and rehabilitation should be the main focus of juvenile detention. Over the years, the court has oscillated between treating children as completely different than adults where their trials require no standard procedural protections, or giving children the same floor of procedural protections as adults but then not allowing for their adolescent traits to inform the circumstances of their hearings or culpability.
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning a 15 year old Morris Kent. In Kent v. United States the court addressed the fear that, “the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." The court went out of its way to include information about the differences between a child and adult in court. Kent’s case held procedural protections were required when a child is being transferred into the adult system.
Kent has had a lasting legal legacy; several cases expanding or further defining the rights of youth are rooted in the holding from Kent. Following the year after Kent, In re Gault built on Kent’s due process protection of waiver by stating that due process encompasses procedural protections for juveniles in delinquency proceedings including right to notice, confrontation of witnesses, right to counsel, and the right against self-incrimination. A few years later Kent’s due process reasoning was used in support of finding that jeopardy attaches with a juvenile court conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy prohibition, meaning that children cannot be tried and convicted in both juvenile and adult court for the same charge (Breed v. Jones, USC). Kent’s reasoning has helped youth in certain jurisdictions assert rights to rehabilitative treatment (Pena v. New York State Div. For Youth), full investigations to support court’s findings (Virgin Islands ex rel. N.G.), and access to all proceedings for a child’s guardian ad litem (Inge v. Slayton, 4th cir.).
Decided the same year, Miranda v. Arizona gave individuals questioned by the police the right to be informed of their rights. The Miranda warnings are known by most people because of their use in TV and movies. Subsequently police went on to give individuals Miranda warnings but there were no specialized warnings for children. The warning was assumed to be age neutral and an adequate procedure to ensure that an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination was upheld.
More and more the Court is considering the effects of age on the application of criminal procedure and juvenile interaction with the criminal justice system. In Kent, the Court touched on the difference between youth and adults in its ruling but the development of brain science and what is known about how differently the adolescent brain works has had a huge impact on Supreme Court treating children differently. Because adolescent brains are different than adults, what actions are appropriate to ensure their constitutional rights are upheld should be different than adults.
While we look back to see how far the court has come in its understanding of juvenile rights, we shouldn’t forget to look forward also and continue to push for juvenile rights. In every state there are still laws that allow for youth to be tried in adult courts. The Supreme Court has established that children are not adults. Not only is treating children both as people who need to be taken care of and people who are mature enough to make life altering confusing, it also does not allow for a system in which we can determine what states should do to protect youths’ constitutional rights.
On February 1st the Louisiana legislature released a report supporting the need for, and impact of, raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction. This report was commissioned by the legislature through Resolution No. 73 in 2015 and completed by The Institute for Public Health and Justice at the Louisiana State University’s Health Science Center. The ultimate recommendation of this comprehensive report is that Louisiana should raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to include 17 year old offenders. Louisiana remains one of nine states that fails to recognize that youth under 17 year olds should not be prosecuted automatically in the adult criminal justice system.
It further recommends that a five year comprehensive plan be developed to address a variety of issues specific to youth such as transition, community based interventions, services while in detention, and other ways to ensure that youth are rehabilitated and do not recidivate.
The report highlights current brain science on adolescents and specifically how 17 year olds are unable to consistently reason and make responsible decisions. Due to this increased awareness of how adolescent brains work, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that treating 17 year olds the same as adults is not appropriate. The data shows that 17 year olds are capable of change when rehabilitated and generally stop reoffending. Most delinquent behavior does not follow the youth into adulthood.
The effects of the adult system on youths are troubling because rates of juvenile recidivism rise when placed in adult facilities. Additionally, youth are subject to a variety of harms both physical and psychological when they are subject to adult courts and facilities. To address the issue of placing 17 year olds in adult facilities the report examined the capacity of existing juvenile facilities. The report found that on any given day only facilities are only 56% filled, “…it can be estimated that 258 beds could be available on any given day in Louisiana’s juvenile detention facilities.” The addition of 17 year olds would not cause the current facilities to be overburdened.
The Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights (LCCR) has been a vital advocate for Raise the Age Reform and helping shepherd a bill into law. Raise the Age Louisiana Act, SB 324 will ensure that 17 year olds are under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. LCCR has reported that, “polling by LSU shows that 66% of Louisianans – a majority of both parties – believe that 17-year-olds should be included in the juvenile justice system.” On March 15, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards has announced that he supports SB 324 and raising the age. Widespread support from Louisianans will ensure that legislators know that their constituencies want what is best both for communities and for adolescents, to raise the age.
March marks the annual Juvenile Justice Month of Faith and Healing. This month brings together congregations of all faiths, schools and universities in prayer, service and action. The goal is to offer young offenders hope and alternatives to a lifetime as a hardened criminal by raising awareness and creating engagement with issues pertaining to juvenile justice.
Place a bulletin in your faith organization’s newsletter.
Throughout the month of March discuss juvenile justice in your weekly faith service.
Post a flyer in your place of worship.
Host a candle light vigil in your faith community in remembrance of youth in the justice system.
Host a discussion after a faith service in your community about juvenile justice issues. Such topics could be sentencing laws, sending children into the adult court system, willful defiance or the classification process in the prison system that sends youthful offenders to higher level prisons than adults for the same crime.
Support neighborhood groups that work to create cooperative relationships between neighbors, faith communities, and law enforcement to create a safe and secure community.
Support or volunteer with programs that promote victim ministry in your place of worship.
Support or volunteer with the ministry at your local detention center.
Provide spiritual, material, or emotional assistance to those reentering society, both youth and adult. Schools and places of worship are encouraged to invite formerly incarcerated youth to share their experiences and insights about the juvenile justice system.
The events through the month will initiate a dialogue between offenders, victims and the community regarding the causes of crime and will suggest structures needed to prevent youth from becoming engaged in the cycle of violence. Find out how you can participate here.
For talking points for Juvenile Justice Faith Week, visit here.
The year 2016 has started off very well for youth justice issues, as actions and movements throughout the country have raised hopes of a positive evolution towards reforming and ending the adultification of youth. On the national level, the most important step at the beginning of this year was taken by President Obama, who used his executive authority to end the use of solitary confinement for youth in the federal prison system. Almost at the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that its Miller v. Alabama decision, which found that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for juveniles is unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment, was retroactive.
At the state level too, great movement is underway, from California where Governor Brown officially showed his support for a sentencing reform referendum that would include ending direct file, to Wisconsin where a report recommending raising the age of juvenile jurisdiction has just been released. Legislation in Wisconsin to do just that is pending. Earlier this month, another report, authorized by the Louisiana legislature, analyzed the benefits of raising the age in Louisiana and advocated strongly in favor of doing so. Louisiana’s legislative session starts in mid-March.
Additionally, a lot of legislative action is already happening across the country, with the potential of improving the lives of thousands of kids. This week should be crucial for the future of key bills dealing with juvenile justice issues, starting on Wednesday in Missouri with a Senate Committee hearing on SB 618 and SB 684, two bills that would keep more kids out of adult facilities.
In Florida, a second hearing on SB 314 was held today, February 11th. This bill would modify the direct file statutes to decrease the number of offenses in which a child can be direct filed in criminal court and create a reverse waiver mechanism. The bill was approved unanimously by the Committee today, after passing unanimously out of the Senate Criminal Justice Committee late last year. Today also, the conservative James Madison Institute released a report analyzing the long-term costs of the bill, and recommending that it be supported.
Additionally today, another hearing took place in Maryland on SB 243, a bill which would repeal laws that allow the automatic transfer of kids into the adult system. Finally, Michigan’s House Committee on Criminal Justice is expected to vote on a raise the age reform any day now.
Show your support, take action and be part of this movement of change. Together, we can create a better future for our children and a safer, fairer society.
The anniversary of Rev Martin Luther King Junior’s birthday presents us with a call of action to get involved in local, state and federal campaigns to end the prosecution, sentencing and incarceration of youth in the adult criminal justice system.
Treating children as though they are mini adults: Research has proven that childrens’ brains handle decision-making, impulsivity, and causal relationships differently from adults. Furthermore, they show great capacity to change. Not taking these differences into account is a gross injustice to our children.
Failing to provide children with appropriate protections at their arrest and during trial. Children who are charged as adults are not afforded the protections of having their parents or guardians present during police interrogation. Research has demonstrated that youth are much more likely to sign confessions, admit guilt, and feed law enforcement the answers that “they want” in order to go home. Despite having the greatest influence and support for their children, parents are often times left out of the equation which rehabilitation is considered.
Treating children differently based on their race and ethnicity. Children of color are much more likely to be prosecuted, sentenced and incarcerated as adults than their white counterparts. These disparities are gross and unacceptable (African American youth are 9 times more likely to be sentenced to adult prison than white children for the same crimes; latino youth are 4 times more likely; and Tribal youth are nearly twice as likely).
Incarcerating children in adult facilities. Children charged and sentenced as adults are housed in adult facilities. They have very little access to developmentally appropriate education, mental health, substance abuse, or vocational services. Rather, children are often held in solitary confinement to “protect” them from the adult population, isolating them 20-22 hours/day.
Punishing children the rest of their lives for poor decisions made in their childhood. We know that a critical aspect of adolescence is learning to make good decisions; and having the opportunity to right the wrongs we make. Children who are sentenced as adults carry their conviction the rest of their lives.
For the past decade, the Campaign for Youth Justice has partnered with states, advocates, and impacted youth and families to challenge these practices. We have seen the impact that unified voices can have in challenging injustices. In fact, in the past ten years, 30 states have changed nearly 50 laws making it more difficult to prosecute, sentence and incarcerate children in the adult criminal justice system.
As we enter the 2016 legislative session, we encourage you to get involved in the local, state or federal campaigns that challenge this practice. Legislation has already been introduced in Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New York, and South Carolina. We expect several other states to introduce legislation in upcoming weeks to decrease the number of youth entering the adult criminal justice system. We can only change these laws if communities are willing to stand for justice, and we need your help.
Raise your voice in support—offer to write op eds or letters to the editor to call on policymakers to do what is right for children.

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D.C. Law Library - § 47–2608. Rates on insurance companies; exceptions; marine insurance excluded; payment schedule; revocation of certificate of authority for failure to pay tax.
↪ § 47–2608. Rates on insurance companies; exceptions; marine insurance excluded; payment schedule; revocation of certificate of authority for failure to pay tax.
§ 47–2607. Revocation of license for failure to file statement.
§ 47–2608. Rates on insurance companies; exceptions; marine insurance excluded; payment schedule; revocation of certificate of authority for failure to pay tax.
(B) Fees and charges provided for by the insurance laws of the District including amendments made to such laws by this chapter.
(ii) Fees and charges provided for by the insurance laws of the District.
(B) This paragraph shall apply as of October 1, 2008.
(B) Dividends paid in cash or used by the policyholders in payment of renewal premiums.
(C) All premiums received from policies or contracts issued in connection with a pension, annuity, profit-sharing plan or individual retirement annuity qualified or exempt under section 401, 403, 404, 408, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, or successor provisions.
(3) Nothing contained in this section or in § 47-2603 or § 47-2609 shall apply with respect to marine insurance written within the said District and reported, taxed, and licensed under Chapter 26 of Title 31.
(a-1) A hospital service corporation or medical service corporation may deduct, in an amount not to exceed $550,000, the corporation’s payment to the rate stabilization fund under § 31-3514 and payments and expenditures pursuant to a public-private partnership entered into in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 31 from the amount otherwise due by the corporation under subsection (a) of this section.
(b)(1) The tax imposed by subsection (a) of this section shall, for each calendar year prior to calendar year 1977, be paid before the first day of March of the next succeeding calendar year.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, the tax imposed for calendar year 1999, and for each calendar year thereafter, shall be paid on or before the first day of June of the calendar year in which the income to be taxed is received and before the first day of March following the close of each calendar year. The June payment shall be an amount equal to 1/2 of the total premium tax liability determined for the preceding calendar year. In accordance with rules prescribed by the Mayor, each company shall determine its total tax liability for each calendar year and pay the remainder, if any, on or before the first day of March following the close of each calendar year. Overpayments of tax may be refunded to the company or credited to the company’s next installment payment, at the election of the company.
(3) The installment payment provision of subsection (b)(2) of this section shall not apply in the case of any company having a tax liability for the preceding calendar year less than $1,000. In such cases the tax shall be paid on or before the first day of March following the close of the calendar year.
(c) The certificate of authority of any company may be revoked for failure to pay the tax required by this chapter.
This section is referenced in § 31-3514 and § 31-3514.01.
D.C. Law 16-192 added subsec. (a-1).
D.C. Law 17-219, in subsec. (a), inserted “Except as provided in paragraph (1A),” in par. (1), and added par. (1A).
D.C. Law 18-104, in subsec. (a-1), substituted “payment to the rate stabilization fund under § 31-3514 and payments and expenditures pursuant to a public-private partnership entered into in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 31” for “payment to the rate stabilization fund under § 31-3514”.
D.C. Law 18-223, in subsec. (a)(1), substituted “2%” for “1.7%”.
Hospital and medical services corporation regulation, conversion to a mutual company, open enrollment program, see § 31-3516.
Hospital and medical services corporation regulation, conversion to a stock company, open enrollment program, see § 31-3515.
Hospital and medical services corporation regulation, open enrollment, effect on premium tax rate, see § 31-3514.
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5013(b)(2) of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-477, August 8, 2006, 53 DCR 7068).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5013(b)(2) of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-499, October 23, 2006, 53 DCR 8845).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5013(b)(2) of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2007 (D.C. Act 17-1, January 16, 2007, 54 DCR 1165).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 4(c) of Hospital and Medical Services Corporation Regulatory Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-277, January 11, 2010, 57 DCR 935).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2183 of Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2010 (D.C. Act 18-463, July 2, 2010, 57 DCR 6542).
Section 4(c) of D.C. Law 18-134 substituted “payment to the rate stabilization fund under § 31-3514 and payments and expenditures pursuant to a public-private partnership entered into in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 31” for “payment to the rate stabilization fund under § 31-3514”.
Section 6(b) of D.C. Law 18-134 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.