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The inviolability of one’s home exists to protect private life and may not be interfered with unless with consent or authorized by the competent authorities. The European Court has established in Niemetz v. Germany (Application No. 13710/88, Judgement of 16 December 1992) that home can include business premises and in Buckley v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 20348/92, Judgement of 25 September 1996) that protection of the home extends to a caravan site. The European system has dealt with blatant violations of the right to respect for the home when home and property is deliberately destroyed as in several cases brought against Turkey (see Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey ,Application No. 23184/94, 23185/94, Judgement of 24 April 1998). The Court found in Cyprus v. Turkey (Application No. 25781/94, Judgement 10 May 2001) that the refusal of the authorities to allow Greek Cypriots to return to their homes in northern Cyprus constituted a violation of Article 8.
In recent years, the European Court has examined applications emphasising the intangible aspects, rather than the property aspects, of the right to respect for the home. For example, in Powell and Rayner v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 9310/81, Judgement of 21 February 1990), the applicants complained that the noise from Heathrow Airport, one of whose runways lay in close proximity to their home, interfered with their family and home life. The Court held that there was no serious ground for maintaining that either the policy approach to the problem or the content of the particular regulatory measures adopted by the United Kingdom authorities gave rise to a violation of Article 8 (see also Hatton et al. v. The United Kingdom ). In contrast, the Court did find a violation of Article 8 in López Ostra v. Spain (Application No. 16798/90, Judgement of 9 December 1994). The applicant in this case lived near an unlicensed waste treatment plant whose fumes, smell and noise were both a serious nuisance and a threat to the environment. The Spanish authorities had continually refused to act in regard to the parallel civil and criminal proceedings pending against the owners of the plant, leading the Court to find a violation of the applicant’s right to respect for her home and her private and family life. In Connors v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 66746/01, Judgement of 27 May 2004), the applicant complained, inter alia, that he was not given the opportunity to challenge in court the allegations made against him which were the basis for his family’s eviction from the plot where they had their caravan and that – unlike the owners of privately run sites, housing associations and local authority landlords – local authorities running gypsy sites were not required to prove allegations against tenants. The Court found that because of the seriousness of what was at stake for the applicant and his family who were evicted from the site where they had lived, with a short absence, for some 14 to 15 years, with consequent difficulties in finding a lawful alternative location for their caravans, in coping with health problems and young children and in ensuring continuation in the children’s education, the family was, in effect, rendered homeless, with the adverse consequences on security and well-being which that entailed. The serious interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 required, in the Court’s opinion, particularly weighty reasons of public interest by way of justification and the necessity for a statutory scheme which permitted the summary eviction of the applicant and his family had not been sufficiently demonstrated by the state. The power to evict, without the burden of giving reasons liable to be examined as to their merits by an independent tribunal, had not been convincingly shown to respond to any specific goal or to provide any specific benefit to members of the gypsy community. In conclusion, the Court found that the eviction of the applicant and his family from the local authority site was not attended by the requisite procedural safeguards, and consequently could not be regarded as justified by a ‘pressing social need’ or proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. There had, accordingly, been a violation of Article 8.
The Human Rights Committee defines the term ‘home’ in General Comment 16 : ‘“home” in English, “manzel” in Arabic, “zhùzhái” in Chinese, “domicile” in French, “zhilische” in Russian and “domicilio” in Spanish, as used in Article 17 of the Covenant, is to be understood to indicate the place where a person resides or carries out his usual occupation.’ The Committee discussed the protection of the home in the following case.
1. The author of the communication is Rafael Armando Rojas García, a Colombian citizen, writing on his own behalf and on behalf of his elderly mother, his two children, his brother and two sisters, three nieces and a domestic helper. He claims that they are the victims of violations by Colombia of article 7, article 14, paragraph 3 (a), article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2, article 19, paragraph 3 (a), article 23 and article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . The facts as submitted seem to raise an issue also under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
2.1 On 5 January 1993, at 2 a.m., a group of armed men wearing civilian clothes, from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación de la Fiscalía), forcibly entered the author’s house through the roof. The group carried out a room-by-room search of the premises, terrifying and verbally abusing the members of the author’s family, including small children. In the course of the search, one of the officials fired a gunshot. Two more persons then entered the house through the front door; one typed up a statement and forced the only adult male (Alvaro Rojas) in the family to sign it; he did not allow him to read it, or to keep a copy. When Alvaro Rojas asked whether it was necessary to act with such brutality, he was told to talk to the Public Prosecutor, Carlos Fernando Mendoza. It was at this juncture that the family was informed that the house was being searched as part of an investigation into the murder of the mayor of Bochalema, Ciro Alonso Colmenares.
2.2 On the same day, Alvaro Rojas filed a complaint for unlawful entry into the family house with the Provincial Attorney-General’s Office in Cúcuta (Procuraduría Provincial de Cúcuta). An inquiry was initiated by the provincial authorities, which was not only not duly completed but was simply shelved on 3 November 1993. The author was not informed about the discontinuation of his complaint. He filed a new complaint with the Administrative Police in Bogotá (Procuraduría General de la Nación, Procuraduría Delegada de la Policía Judicial y Administrativa). The new complaint was also shelved on 24 June 1994, purportedly on the principle of double jeopardy. The author then submitted the case to the Administrative Tribunal in Cúcuta in order to obtain some form of reparation for the raid on his house and the use of a firearm.
3.1 The author claims that the violent assaults on the family home resulted in a severe nervous trauma, psychologically affecting the author’s sister, Fanny Elena Rojas García, who was an invalid. She subsequently died, on 8 August 1993, the violent search being considered the indirect cause of her death. Similarly, the author’s mother, aged 75, never quite recovered from the shock of the search.
3.2 The author states that the authorities, far from conducting a diligent investigation into the matter, have done everything possible to cover up the incident. No attempt was ever made to establish the responsibility either of the authorities that authorized the raid or of those who carried it out, including the officer who fired a gun in a room where there were young children.
3.3 The author contends that the events described constitute violations of article 7, article 14, paragraph 3 (a), article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2, article 19, paragraph 3 (a), article 23 and article 24 of the Covenant.
10.3 The Committee must first determine whether the specific circumstances of the raid on the Rojas García family’s house (hooded men entering through the roof at 2 a.m.) constitute a violation of article 17 of the Covenant. By submission of 28 December 1999, the State party reiterates that the raid on the Rojas García family’s house was carried out according to the letter of the law, in accordance with article 343 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Committee does not enter into the question of the legality of the raid; however, it considers that, under article 17 of the Covenant, it is necessary for any interference in the home not only to be lawful, but also not to be arbitrary. The Committee considers, in accordance with its General Comment No. 16 [?] that the concept of arbitrariness in article 17 is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances. It further considers that the State party’s arguments fail to justify the conduct described. Consequently, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 17, paragraph 1, insofar as there was arbitrary interference in the home of the Rojas García family.
A similar case was brought before the Inter-American Commission, in García v. Peru,Case 11.006, Decision of 17 February 1999, Report No. 1/95. On 5 April 1992, army soldiers forced their way into the home of former Peruvian President Alan García Pérez with ‘a superior order of arrest against him’. The petitioners alleged that Dr. Alan García Pérez’ life and personal safety were threatened, and his wife and children were held incommunicado and under house arrest and a considerable number of private family documents were removed. The petitioners claimed that in the assault on the home of the former President, the right, inter alia, to the inviolability of domicile and of private papers were violated. The Commission found a violation as regards the right to privacy of Mr. Garcia and his family.
The guarantee of the inviolability of the domicile and of private papers must give way when there is a well-substantiated search warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, spelling out the reasons for the measure being adopted and specifying the place to be searched and the objects that will be seized.
The 1979 Constitution of Peru stipulated the inviolability of domicile and of private papers except when an order has been issued by a competent judicial authority authorizing the search, explaining its reasons and, where appropriate, authorizing the seizure of private papers, while respecting the guarantees stipulated by law. See Article 2, subparagraphs 7 and 8 of the Constitution in force until December 31, 1993.
Based on these concepts, the Commission concludes that the warrantless search of Dr. García’s home and the seizure of private family papers - actions committed by Peruvian Army soldiers - were committed in complete disregard of the procedural requirements stipulated in the Constitution. The violation of those requirements indicates that the Government of Peru failed to guarantee to Dr. Alan García and to his family the full exercise of their right to privacy.
The arguments made by the Government of Peru to the effect that the Army soldiers surrounded the residence of Dr. García Pérez in order to protect him are, in themselves, insufficient. Protection of a private residence does not call for action by heavily armed soldiers nor for the use of war tanks equipped with canons, small tanks or armored troop carriers.

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Maurice J. Walsh argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
James W. Knapp argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper.
This case concerns a conviction for violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended. The principal issue is whether the United States District Court committed reversible error when it allowed the Government to refuse to disclose the identity of an undercover employee who had taken a material part in bringing about the possession of certain drugs by the accused, had been present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime, and might be a material witness as to whether the accused knowingly transported the drugs as charged. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that, under the circumstances here present, this was reversible error.
Before trial, petitioner moved for a bill of particulars requesting, among other things, the name, address and occupation of “John Doe.” The Government objected on the ground that John Doe was an informer and that his identity was privileged. The motion was denied.
Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, waived a jury and was tried by the District Court. During the trial John Doe’s part in the charged transaction was described by government witnesses, and counsel for petitioner, in cross-examining them, sought repeatedly to learn John Doe’s identity. The court declined to permit this cross-examination and John Doe was not produced, identified, or otherwise made available. Petitioner was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of $5 on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction, holding that the concurrent sentence was supported by the conviction on Count 2 and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s requests for disclosure of Doe’s identity. 229 F. 2d 812. We granted certiorari, 351 U. S. 936, in order to pass upon the propriety of the nondisclosure of the informer’s identity and to consider an alleged conflict with Portomene v. United States, 221 F. 2d 582; United States v. Conforti, 200 F. 2d 365; and Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627.
At the trial, the Government relied on the testimony of two federal narcotics agents, Durham and Fields, and two Chicago police officers, Bryson and Sims, each of whom knew petitioner by sight. On the night of August 12, 1954, these four officers met at 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago with an informer described only as John Doe. Doe and his Cadillac car were searched and no narcotics were found. Bryson secreted himself in the trunk of Doe’s Cadillac, taking with him a device with which to raise the trunk lid from the inside. Doe then drove the Cadillac to 70th Place and St. Lawrence Avenue, followed by Durham in one government car and Field and Sims in another. After an hour’s wait, at about 11 o’clock, petitioner arrived in a Pontiac, accompanied by an unidentified man. Petitioner immediately entered Doe’s Cadillac, taking a front seat beside Doe. They then proceeded by a circuitous route to 74th Street near Champlain Avenue. Both government cars trailed the Cadillac but only the one driven by Durham managed to follow it to 74th Street. When the Cadillac came to a stop on 74th Street, Durham stepped out of his car onto the sidewalk and saw petitioner alight from the Cadillac about 100 feet away. Durham saw petitioner walk a few feet to a nearby tree, pick up a small package, return to the open right front door of the Cadillac, make a motion as if depositing the package in the car, and then wave to Doe and walk away. Durham went immediately to the Cadillac and recovered a package from the floor. He signaled to Bryson to come out of the trunk and then walked down the street in time to see petitioner re-enter the Pontiac, parked nearby, and ride away.
Meanwhile, Bryson, concealed in the trunk of the Cadillac, had heard a conversation between John Doe and petitioner after the latter had entered the car. He heard petitioner greet John Doe and direct him where to drive. At one point, petitioner admonished him to pull over to the curb, cut the motor, and turn out the lights so as to lose a “tail.” He then told him to continue “further down.” Petitioner asked about money Doe owed him. He advised Doe that he had brought him “three pieces this time.” When Bryson heard Doe being ordered to stop the car, he raised the lid of the trunk slightly. After the car stopped, he saw petitioner walk to a tree, pick up a package, and return toward the car. He heard petitioner say, “Here it is,” and “I’ll call you in a couple of days.” Shortly thereafter he heard Durham’s signal to come out and emerged from the trunk to find Durham holding a small package found to contain three glassine envelopes containing a white powder.
A field test of the powder having indicated that it contained an opium derivative, the officers, at about 12:30 a.m., arrested petitioner at his home and took him, along with Doe, to Chicago police headquarters. There petitioner was confronted with Doe, who denied that he knew or had ever seen petitioner. Subsequent chemical analysis revealed that the powder contained heroin.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in upholding the right of the Government to withhold the identity of John Doe. He argues that Doe was an active participant in the illegal activity charged and that, therefore, the Government could not withhold his identity, his whereabouts, and whether he was alive or dead at the time of trial. The Government does not defend the nondisclosure of Doe’s identity with respect to Count 1, which charged a sale of heroin to John Doe, but it attempts to sustain the judgment on the basis of the conviction on Count 2, charging illegal transportation of narcotics. It argues that the conviction on Count 2 may properly be upheld since the identity of the informer, in the circumstances of this case, has no real bearing on that charge and is therefore privileged.
What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, 254; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311, 316. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action. Most of the federal cases involving this limitation on the scope of the informer’s privilege have arisen where the legality of a search without a warrant is in issue and the communications of an informer are claimed to establish probable cause. In these cases the Government has been required to disclose the identity of the informant unless there was sufficient evidence apart from his confidential communication.
Three recent cases in the Courts of Appeals have involved the identical problem raised here—the Government’s right to withhold the identity of an informer who helped to set up the commission of the crime and who was present at its occurrence. Portomene v. United States, 221 F. 2d 582; United States v. Conforti, 200 F. 2d 365; Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627. In each case it was stated that the identity of such an informer must be disclosed whenever the informer’s testimony may be relevant and helpful to the accused’s defense.
The materiality of John Doe’s possible testimony must be determined by reference to the offense charged in Count 2 and the evidence relating to that count. The charge is in the language of the statute. It does not charge mere possession; it charges that petitioner did “fraudulently and knowingly receive, conceal, buy and facilitate the transportation and concealment after importation of . . . heroin, knowing the same to be imported into the United States contrary to law . . . .” While John Doe is not expressly mentioned, this charge, when viewed in connection with the evidence introduced at the trial, is so closely related to John Doe as to make his identity and testimony highly material.
It is true that the last sentence of subdivision (c) of § 2 authorizes a conviction when the Government has proved that the accused possessed narcotics, unless the accused explains or justifies such possession. But this statutory presumption does not reduce the offense to one of mere possession or shift the burden of proof; it merely places on the accused, at a certain point, the burden of going forward with his defense. The fact that petitioner here was faced with the burden of explaining or justifying his alleged possession of the heroin emphasizes his vital need for access to any material witness. Otherwise, the burden of going forward might become unduly heavy.
The circumstances of this case demonstrate that John Doe’s possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense. So far as petitioner knew, he and John Doe were alone and unobserved during the crucial occurrence for which he was indicted. Unless petitioner waived his constitutional right not to take the stand in his own defense, John Doe was his one material witness. Petitioner’s opportunity to cross-examine Police Officer Bryson and Federal Narcotics Agent Durham was hardly a substitute for an opportunity to examine the man who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction. Doe had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment. He might have thrown doubt upon petitioner’s identity or on the identity of the package. He was the only witness who might have testified to petitioner’s possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the package that he “transported” from the tree to John Doe’s car. The desirability of calling John Doe as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the Government to decide.
Finally, the Government’s use against petitioner of his conversation with John Doe while riding in Doe’s car particularly emphasizes the unfairness of the nondisclosure in this case. The only person, other than petitioner himself, who could controvert, explain or amplify Bryson’s report of this important conversation was John Doe. Contradiction or amplification might have borne upon petitioner’s knowledge of the contents of the package or might have tended to show an entrapment.
This is a case where the Government’s informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged. The informer was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses. Moreover, a government witness testified that Doe denied knowing petitioner or ever having seen him before. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its undercover employee in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his disclosure.
It is with regret that I dissent from the opinion of the Court, not because I am alone, but for the reason that I have been unable to convince the majority of the unsoundness of its conclusion on the facts here and the destructive effect which that conclusion will have on the enforcement of the narcotic laws. The short of it is that the conviction of a self-confessed dope peddler is reversed because the Government refused to furnish the name of its informant whose identity the undisputed evidence indicated was well known to the peddler. Yet the Court reverses on the ground of “unfairness” because of the Government’s failure to perform this fruitless gesture. In my view this does violence to the common understanding of what is fair and just.
First, it is well to remember that the illegal traffic in narcotic drugs poses a most serious social problem. One need only read the newspapers to gauge its enormity. No crime leads more directly to the commission of other offenses. Moreover, it is a most difficult crime to detect and prove. Because drugs come in small pills or powder and are readily packaged in capsules or glassine containers, they may be easily concealed. They can be carried on the person or even in the body crevasses where detection is almost impossible. Enforcement is, therefore, most difficult without the use of “stool pigeons” or informants. Their use has long had the approval of the courts. To give them protection governments have always followed a policy of nondisclosure of their identities. Experience teaches that once this policy is relaxed—even though the informant be dead—its effectiveness is destroyed. Once an informant is known the drug traffickers are quick to retaliate. Dead men tell no tales. The old penalty of tongue removal, once visited upon the informer Larunda, has been found obsolete.
Of course where enforcement of a nondisclosure policy deprives an accused of a fair trial it must either be relaxed or the prosecution must be foregone. The Government is fully aware of this dilemma and solves it every day by foregoing prosecutions in many cases where evidence essential to the defense would require disclosure. But this is not such a case.
“Q. As a matter of fact, [the informant] said he did not have a transaction with him, didn’t he, in Roviaro’s presence?
“A. Do you want the entire conversation?
“Q. Isn’t what I asked you a fact?
“A. No, sir. He didn’t deny it.
“Q. Didn’t [the informant] say he didn’t even know him?
In proper context this merely shows that the informant was carrying out a pretense that he too was arrested, was involved, and was not “squealing.” In fact, officer Bryson attempted in his testimony to explain the “purpose” of the informant in so answering but was prevented by petitioner’s counsel.
Moreover, the uncontradicted evidence is that the petitioner knew the informant and had associated with him for some time. Two officers testified that they had seen petitioner on June 22, 1954, enter the informant’s car on Michigan Avenue in Chicago. Another saw informant and petitioner enter the latter’s home together on June 28, only six weeks prior to the events in question here. Further testimony shows that the informant was indebted to the petitioner, that the petitioner had telephoned several times to informant’s home and “at the place,” that petitioner was going to call again in a couple of days after the date of his arrest, and that he entered informant’s car on the night of the arrest and drove around with him for several miles. The Court asserts that the conversation between the informant and petitioner while on this ride “emphasizes the unfairness of the nondisclosure in this case.” But if we limit the officer’s testimony to the statements of petitioner alone, the testimony would prove the intimacy of the acquaintance between petitioner and the informant. It would show that petitioner directed the informant to the cache and admonished him to turn out the car lights because of a “tail”; that petitioner knew how to reach informant by telephone and had tried to phone him; that he had brought him “three pieces this time,” indicating prior sales; that informant was indebted to him; that when they approached the cache he directed the informant to stop the car; and that finally when he returned with the narcotics, petitioner said “Here it is, I’ll call you in a couple of days.” All of this testimony was admissible against petitioner whether the informant was available or not or whether he was dead or alive. It proves beyond question that the two were closely acquainted. For the Court to conclude in the face of such a record that petitioner did not know the informant is to me fantastic.
But this is not all. The petitioner has not mentioned a single substantial ground essential to his defense which would make it necessary for the Government to name the informer. The Court mentions that there might have been entrapment. Petitioner not only failed to claim entrapment but his counsel appears to have rejected any suggestion of it in open court. I submit the Court should not raise it for him here. It should be noted that petitioner’s counsel stated in open court that petitioner knew the informant and believed he was dead. Were there necessity to establish informant’s identity or, if dead, his death, petitioner could easily have done so.
In truth, it appears that petitioner hoped that the Government would not furnish the name for, if the informant was dead as he believed, petitioner’s ground was cut from under him. If the informant was living he knew that even though his testimony was favorable it would not be sufficient to overcome the presumption of the statute. In fact, a casual reading of the record paints a picture of one vainly engaging in trial tactics rather than searching for real defenses—shadowboxing with the prosecution in a baseless attempt to get a name that he already had but in reality hoping to get a reversible error that was nowhere else in sight. We should not encourage such tactics.
I come now to the necessary proof required for a finding of guilt under Count 2. All that is necessary here is proof of possession of unstamped narcotics, such as heroin. The direct, uncontroverted evidence of possession, as well as transportation, is in the record. Two officers, one a local policeman and the other a regular federal narcotics agent, saw petitioner when he had in his hand a package containing heroin. The package was unstamped. A third officer saw petitioner leave the scene of his crime, get into his car, and ride away. The identification by each of the three is positive and stands uncontradicted. Under the Narcotic Drugs Act, 65 Stat. 767, 21 U. S. C. § 174, this alone is prima facie evidence of guilt. Petitioner did not rebut it. In this connection it is well to point out petitioner’s statement soon after his arrest. The officers asked him: “Are you going to take this [rap] by yourself or are you going to name your connection?” Petitioner replied that they were wasting their time—”There’s no use asking me about anybody else. . . . I don’t want to get anybody else in trouble. You got me. I’ve stood up twice before and I can stand up again. Besides that, you’ve got to convict me anyhow.” (Emphasis added.) In view of this, I submit that there is no question of guilt involved here.
 “(c) Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United States, shall be fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned not less than two or more than five years. . . .
“Whenever on trial for a violation of this subdivision [§ 2 (c)] the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” 65 Stat. 767, 768, 21 U. S. C. § 174.
 The judgment of conviction provided for a $5 fine on “each” count, to “run concurrently.” The Government stated, during the argument before this Court, that this judgment has been construed administratively as imposing only one $5 fine. We therefore assume, without so deciding, that the judgment imposed a fully concurrent sentence.
 Durham, Bryson and Sims, among them, testified that Doe was an “informer” and a “special employee” who had been known to the federal agents for several years.
“Q. Well, did he [John Doe] say anything with reference to an acquaintanceship or any prior association with this man [petitioner] or any transaction with this man?
“Mr. Emanuelson: . . .
“Mr. Walsh: Well, is there any activity of the informer which will be curtailed by reason of the disclosure of his name? Would you answer that?
“Mr. Emanuelson: From this point forward, no.
“Mr. Walsh: Is there any occasion upon which he will be called to testify?
 Since the concurrent sentence did not exceed that which lawfully might be imposed under a single count, the judgment may be affirmed if the conviction on either count is valid. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 641-642, n. 1; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 85; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 619; Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 146-147.
 Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, 189 F. 2d 537, 539-540; VIII Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2374 (1); A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence (1942), Rule 230. But cf. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311, 316.
 Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627, 629; Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 577, 578-580, 66 N. E. 2d 804, 805-806; Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 174-175, 165 N. E. 467, 470; Regina v. Candy, cited 15 M. & W. 175; VIII Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2374 (2).
The record contains several intimations that the identity of John Doe was known to petitioner and that John Doe died prior to the trial. In either situation, whatever privilege the Government might have had would have ceased to exist, since the purpose of the privilege is to maintain the Government’s channels of communication by shielding the identity of an informer from those who would have cause to resent his conduct. The Government suggests that if petitioner knew John Doe’s identity, the court’s failure to require disclosure would not be prejudicial even if erroneous. See Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627. However, any indications that petitioner, at the time of the trial, was aware of John Doe’s identity are contradicted by the testimony of Officer Bryson that John Doe at police headquarters denied knowing, or ever having seen, petitioner. The trial court made no factual finding that petitioner knew Doe’s identity. On this record we cannot assume that John Doe was known to petitioner, and, if alive, available to him as a witness. Nor can we conclude that John Doe died before the trial.
 See United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, 638; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503, 506.
 E. g., Scher v. United States, supra; United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F. 2d 650; Wilson v. United States, supra; United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639.
See also, Crosby v. Georgia, 90 Ga. App. 63, 82 S. E. 2d 38.
 See n. 1, supra, where the material part of the statutory provision is quoted in full.
 Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 418; United States v. Chiarelli, 192 F. 2d 528, 531; Stoppelli v. United States, 183 F. 2d 391; Landsborough v. United States, 168 F. 2d 486.
Petitioner contends that the Government in all cases must make a further affirmative showing that the accused knew that he possessed narcotics. He argues that its failure to do so here entitles him to an acquittal. That contention, however, has been decided against petitioner in the cases cited above.
 Thus far we have dealt largely with the trial court’s refusal, at the trial, to require disclosure of the informer’s identity. In view of the Government’s exclusive reliance here upon Count 2, we have considered this question only with respect to that count. However, we think that the court erred also in denying, prior to the trial, petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, insofar as it requested John Doe’s identity and address. Since Count 1 was then before the court and expressly charged petitioner with a sale of heroin to John Doe, it was evident from the face of the indictment that Doe was a participant in and a material witness to that sale. Accordingly, when his name and address were thus requested, the Government should have been required to supply that information or suffer dismissal of that count.
 On petitioner’s objection this testimony was subsequently stricken. However, police officer Bryson during cross-examination provided substantially this same testimony and the inadvertence of the Government in failing to object permitted it to stand.
“Mr. Walsh: Your Honor, this is the point, actually: He has testified that John Doe [the informant] was present at 11th and State Street with the Defendant. We know that person, We know that person. That person is dead, as I understand it.
“By Mr. Walsh: [Cross-examination of Agent Durham].
“Q. I will ask him if the person as a matter of fact was not Tebbil Holmes?
 A death certificate, State File No. 1665, Dist. No. 16.10, on file at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Cook County Clerk’s Office, 130 N. Wells St., Chicago, Illinois, indicates that a Tevell Holmes, Sr., died in Chicago on January 17, 1955.


Subject to paragraphs (2) through (4), the Secretary may enter into agreements to make available to 1 or more obligors lines of credit in the form of direct loans to be made by the Secretary at future dates on the occurrence of certain events for any project selected under section 602.
The proceeds of a line of credit made available under this section shall be available to pay debt service on project obligations issued to finance eligible project costs, extraordinary repair and replacement costs, operation and maintenance expenses, and costs associated with unexpected Federal or State environmental restrictions.
Before entering into an agreement under this subsection, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and each rating agency providing a preliminary rating opinion letter under section 602(b)(3), shall determine an appropriate capital reserve subsidy amount for each line of credit, taking into account the rating opinion letter.
The funding of a line of credit under this section shall be contingent on the senior obligations of the project receiving an investment-grade rating from 2 rating agencies.
A line of credit under this section with respect to a project shall be on such terms and conditions and contain such covenants, representations, warranties, and requirements (including requirements for audits) as the Secretary determines to be appropriate.
The total amount of a line of credit under this section shall not exceed 33 percent of the reasonably anticipated eligible project costs.
be made only if net revenues from the project (including capitalized interest, but not including reasonably required financing reserves) are insufficient to pay the costs specified in subsection (a)(2).
Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 603(b)(4), the interest rate on a direct loan resulting from a draw on the line of credit shall be not less than the yield on 30-year United States Treasury securities, as of the date of execution of the line of credit agreement.
may have a lien on revenues described in subparagraph (A), subject to any lien securing project obligations.
The full amount of a line of credit under this section, to the extent not drawn upon, shall be available during the 10-year period beginning on the date of substantial completion of the project.
A third-party creditor of the obligor shall not have any right against the Federal Government with respect to any draw on a line of credit under this section.
a trustee on the behalf of such a lender.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a direct loan under this section shall not be subordinated to the claims of any holder of project obligations in the event of bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation of the obligor.
the TIFIA program share of eligible project costs is 33 percent or less.
the obligor shall be responsible for paying the remainder of the subsidy cost.
The Secretary may establish fees at a level sufficient to cover all or a portion of the costs to the Federal Government of providing a line of credit under this section.
A project that receives a line of credit under this section also shall not receive a secured loan or loan guarantee under section 603 in an amount that, combined with the amount of the line of credit, exceeds 49 percent of eligible project costs.
the useful life of the asset being financed.
to conclude, with full repayment of principal and interest, by the date that is 25 years after the end of the period of availability specified in subsection (b)(6).
2012—Pub. L. 112–141 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section related to lines of credit.
2005—Pub. L. 109–59, § 1602(d), renumbered section 184 of this title as this section.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1602(b)(4)(A), substituted “602” for “182”.
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1602(b)(4)(B), substituted “602(b)(2)(B)” for “182(b)(2)(B)”.
“(A) Total amount.—The total amount of the line of credit shall not exceed 33 percent of the reasonably anticipated eligible project costs.
Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1601(e)(1)(B), substituted “but not including reasonably required financing reserves” for “, any debt service reserve fund, and any other available reserve”.
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1601(e)(1)(C), struck out “marketable” before “United States Treasury securities” and substituted “date of execution of the line of credit agreement” for “date on which the line of credit is obligated”.
Subsec. (b)(5)(A)(i). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1601(e)(1)(D), inserted “that also secure the senior project obligations” after “sources”.
Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1601(e)(1)(E), substituted “The full amount of the line of credit, to the extent not drawn upon,” for “The line of credit”.
Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1602(b)(4)(C), substituted “603” for “183”.
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1601(e)(2)(A), struck out “scheduled” before “repayments”, inserted “be scheduled to” after “shall”, and substituted “to conclude, with full repayment of principal and interest,” for “be fully repaid, with interest,”.


text:
other drugs commonly administered to treat hepatitis and HIV.
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.
decision by petitioning the Supreme Court to hear the case.
Defendant, CASE NO. 3:12-CV-01377-SI, (N.D. Calif.).
Berger & Montague, P.C. as Class Counsel.
Honda will be appointed as Settlement Administrator.
later than February 24, 2014.
$800,000.00, and Honda agrees not to contest an award of that sum.
and should finally be approved by the Court.
Maurice R. Greenberg; and Does 1 through 10 inclusive, Case No.
claims for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Collision purchased WC insurance from different insurers.
commercial and industrial insurance in the U.S.
subsidiary or affiliate of AIG.
based in Illinois, and is a subsidiary or affiliate of AIG.
corporation based in New York, and is an affiliate of AIG.
Jersey WC market for decades.
Maurice R. Greenberg is a resident of Key Largo, Florida. Mr.
Paul J. Hanly, Jr., Esq.
Thomas I. Sheridan, III, Esq.
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act.
Drew E. Pomerance Brandt, Esq.
AST Sports manufactures, markets, and sells "Anabolic Rush"
("Anabolic Rush" or "the Product") as a "Dietary Supplement,"
which the Defendant advertises as containing citrulline malate.
and sells the Product, and does business across the United States.
eggs" in assorted colors and one polymer spider. The Be Amazing!
printed on the back of the packaging. Date Code: 15-05-11.
surgery to be removed from the body.
Spirit Halloween Superstores across Canada.
in China and sold from September 2011 to September 2013.
children and contact Be Amazing! Toys for a refund.
wires. This can cause a short circuit and make the globes fall.
incidents and no reports of injuries.
injuries related to these light fixtures.
Approximately 188 light fixtures were sold in Canada.
between January 2013 and September 2013.
Recalling firm: Belmont Meats Ltd.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Belmont Meats Ltd.
food safety investigation at this facility continues.
voluntarily recalling all affected products from the marketplace.
The following products, sold frozen, are affected by this alert.
providers, a class claims in California court.
similarly situated v. The Brickman Group, Ltd., LLC, Case No.
judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
performing landscaping labor under the job title of "Supervisor."
1170 Howell Mill Road, N.W.
owners from natural gas flared by energy companies.
gas in violation of state laws.
Energy and XTO Energy Inc.
of gas instead of capturing and selling it.
the value of flared gas going back six years.
state taxes, Mr. Braaten said.
limits set for the first year and have not sought exemptions.
"It's going to be in the millions," Mr. Braaten said of the cost.
had not seen the details of the lawsuits on Oct. 16.
"I don't quite get what they're after here," Mr. Ness said.
Commission continues to work hard to do just that," Mr. Zent said.
lawsuits, as a courtesy. She had no further comment.
Resources Oil and Gas Division was unanswered on Oct. 16.
The lawsuits can be found at www.ndgasflaringlitigation.com.
flared as of August, the most recent state numbers available.
Nationally only 1 percent is flared.
reining in natural gas flaring.
and gas industry task force looking at ways to reduce flaring.
affected other dairy farmers' payments for raw milk.
for milk products, Judge Ishii said in his ruling.
milk marketing orders]," Judge Ishii wrote in his ruling.
raw milk sold," he wrote.
burdened any more or less than their proportional responsibility,"
Judge Ishii wrote in his ruling.
spokeswoman for the company said.
decision of the district court clearly upholds that contention,"
to requests for comment on Oct. 16.
the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to take the case.
PLLC and by Berman DeValerio.
Kaler, Baker Manock & Jensen and Hanson Bridgett LLP.
Jacob Roberts, and Collective Action Plaintiffs John Does 1-10 v.
been harmed, the Plaintiffs argue.
Jacob Roberts is a resident of Trustville, Alabama.
hauling and delivery of freight across the United States.
the Plaintiffs proper compensation pursuant to the FLSA.
named plaintiffs Joel Faust and Marshall Feldman.
2008, says the court ruling.
MANAGEMENT, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO. WMN-10-2336, (D. Md.).
to the time they disembark.
"This impediment did not exist under the prior dome light system."
with disabilities, according to the complaint.
born or are African-Americans," the new "draconian measures"
violate the Equal Protection Clause, according to the complaint.
outweigh the Internal Revenue Service.
city's negligent hiring of him.
District of Columbia (Washington, DC).
specifically limit enforcement to courts in EU member states.
Illinois make similar claims against other airlines.
they did not receive compensation, according to the ruling.
dismissal "for the sake of completeness."
should be dismissed on international comity grounds.
cancellations is not enforced by a U.S. state.
have dismissed the case on comity grounds.
for comment on Oct. 17.
Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel LLP.
martin.roth@kirkland.com -- of Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
decision and gather more input from affected rate payers.
state-appointed consumer advocate J.R. Kelly.
because he believes the outcome is ideal."
pact is a less than ideal end to a terrible situation.
agreement gives out a fair amount of pain to everyone involved.
perhaps anywhere in the U.S.," he said.
the complex case might take several more years.
to litigate this issue. But that's not a reason to settle."
the commission to delay a decision on the agreement.
The hearing was scheduled to continue on Oct. 17.
unspecified number of class members, minus attorneys' fees.
didn't select and imposing fees for features advertised as free.
the relatively small amounts in dispute for each class member,"
otherwise have had to pay out-of-pocket."
facts to sustain a breach of contract and implied covenant claim.
A final hearing is scheduled for Feb. 14.
Attorneys for Keirsey and eBay declined to comment on Oct. 16.
Raymond E. Walker of Figari & Davenport LLP and by Shawn T.
Leuthold of the Law Office of Shawn T. Leuthold.
auto-dialing her up to and including August 9, 2013.
allege any act by any defendant constituting a RICO violation.
lawsuit is denied as moot, Judge Sands said.
business formerly known as Household International Inc.
HSBC bought the U.S. lender in November 2002.
vast majority of that case was dismissed.
entertained Garry and Kathryn Varnes' Motion to Intervene.
Industry Foreclosure Litigation, Case No. 2500 (U.S.J.P.M.L.
from collapsed American investment bank Lehman Brothers.
million from insurance policies held in the US and Australia.
which collapsed in 2008, PPB chairman Stephen Parbery said.
the court a way to deal with the other 250 contingent creditors,"
distributions can be made to creditors in early 2014, he said.
due to the risk of jeopardizing an insurance recovery.
of the insurers," he said.
of people that buy products."
defendants had led the market to expect during the class period.
financial results for the quarter ended June 30, 2013.
of $19.27, to close at $11.58 per share on August 20, 2013.
numbers, the 5th Circuit ruled.
which were later consolidated into a putative class action.
and/or capacity to a grossly unfair degree."
Writing for the 5th Circuit panel, U.S. Circuit Judge Edward C.
breach of contract into a DTPA claim."
had "fair opportunity" to make their case.
unconscionability claim with prejudice," Prado concluded.
BENZ USA, LLC, Defendant, NO. C12-5493 THE, (N.D. Cal.).
generic version, a federal judge ruled.
until several months later, the complaint states.
Vytorin over Simvastatin alone, the plaintiffs say.
them on or before January 14, 2008.
consistent with the 3rd Circuit's 1975 decision in Girsh v.
a detailed understanding of the case during this time."
case more than $4 million attorneys' fees and costs.
chemical pneumonia, pulmonary damage or death.
incidents or injuries related to the recalled toy.
Canadians' General toy safety tips.
Approximately 3132 units of the recalled toys were distributed.
August 8, 2013 to August 26, 2013.
children and return it to any Walmart store for a refund.
DOCKET NO. 2:12-CV-353-NT, (D. Me.).
without prejudice to the filing of a revised motion.
extinguishment of state law claims for this class of technicians."
in hopes of having the controversial P6 bylaw thrown out.
police at least 24 hours before the march.
right to free expression and free assembly.
student and anti capitalist protests.
echoed Parent's defense of the bylaw.
often kept in the cold for hours so they can receive a ticket."
and investigation damages in the sum of $100,000.00 or greater,"
exemplary and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.
and Order is available at http://is.gd/JJ9jonfrom Leagle.com.
various colors (Brown-White, Green-White, Blue-Red and Pink).
the doll plays music when key located on the back is turned.
small components pose a choking hazard to young children.
of incidents or injuries related to the use of these dolls.
Living retail stores across Canada.
November 2010 to October 2013.
instructions on how to return the product for a full refund.
manufacturer into buying the product, a federal judge ruled.
that has rocked Pilot Flying J.
releasing any specifics until we do."
punitive damages and have requested a jury trial.
lawsuits in state and federal court to nearly 30.
in the alleged fuel rebate scam.
soy, wheat and tree nut (coconut), which are known allergens.
consumption for those not allergic to the above allergens.
The pies were sold between August 11 and October 18.
Saturday and Sunday from 10am - 4pm.
Recalling firm: Regal Snacks Inc.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Regal Snacks Inc.
which is not declared on the labels.
threatening reaction in persons with allergies to egg.
monitoring the effectiveness of the recall.
-- 1 lb RFP Muri - Oil Fried with UPC 8 12042 00197 2.
Recalling firm: Reser's Fine Foods Inc.
This product has been distributed in Walmart stores.
minutes per month and 50 numbers called per day.
claims of false and deceptive advertising and unfair competition.
to amend her claims for intentional and negligent representation.
Noelle Margherita Shanahan Cutts, Esq.
The appellate case is Chapman, et al. v. Skype, Inc., Case No.
Appellate District. The lower court case is Chapman, et al. v.
California for the County of Los Angeles.
stock took a dive in 2009 when it reduced its guidance.
'fraud' in their complaint," according to the documents.
vetted by professionals and were accurate.
Lavender Chevre due to possible improper pasteurization.
causing bacteria such as Listeria monocytogenes and Salmonella.
associated with the recalled Chevre cheese.
products recalls before this one.
the company at 509-997-4812 between 8AM and 6PM PST.
350 Trail Crest boys and girls hooded sweatshirts and jackets.
upper outerwear, such as jackets and sweatshirts.
February 2013 for about $15.
Consumers should immediately take the garments away from children.
the hair of some customers.
move forward and it is headed to court.
and even melted or permanently destroyed their hair.
attorney, Amy Davis, told ABC News.
company still didn't do enough to warn customers.
represents 14 women in the suit.
actually want to go places" added Ms. Millet.
hair should be left to the professionals.
state, you're causing damage to do it," Ms. Monahan explained.
Mileage Plus Holdings, LLC and United Airlines, Inc., Case No.
each award will be set by United and published to the members.
charges them more miles to be able to avail rewards.
The Plaintiffs are residents and citizens of New Jersey.
largest airline in terms of fleet size and number of destinations.
tortious conduct of the UN.
Haiti in October 2010, Haiti had no reported cases of cholera,"
has killed 8,300 people and sickened 679,000 others in Haiti.
Republic, the United States and Cuba.
where a surge in infections had just been reported."
primary water source, the Haitians say.
air pits outside the base where it flowed into the tributary.
cholera introduced to Haiti by the UN.
Americans at the time the complaint was filed.
that 120,000 will contract cholera in Haiti this year.
suffered from nonfatal injuries, according to the complaint.
causing the cholera epidemic, according to the complaint.
Peacekeepers or the Mirebalais camp."
Beatrice Lisa Young Lindstrom, Esq.
The case is Georges, et al. v. United Nations, et al., Case No.
District of New York (Foley Square).
Defendants and certain Verenium insiders, Mr. Jackson contends.
the world's largest chemical company, ahead of Dow and DuPont.
are now in U.S. District Court in Fort Smith.
case to federal court in Fort Smith.
Whirlpool of fraudulent concealment and seeks punitive damages.
properties in an area affected by a Whirlpool chemical leak.
their properties, and punitive damages.
ban on new wells around the site earlier this year.
also added as a defendant.
his responsibilities at the plant between.
plume and warn or inform of the plume.
Benton Harbor, Mich., according to the notice of removal.
The Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality will hold a Nov.
contamination and seek community input.
match what he was told.
conspicuously on Wine.com's Web site.
Terms and Conditions, that were not even displayed to customers."
who have paid for 'free shipping.'"
the annual SSP fee it automatically rebilling customers to $53.29.
disclosures to its Web site.
after several months of negotiations.
destination state to begin navigating the Web site.
California Superior Court for San Francisco County.
stepping tort restrictions in the US.
that was attracting international attention.
redirect more litigation to the austral regions".
national class action firm Maurice Blackburn.
companies intended to deceive shareholders.
in the United States, at least in theory".
much lower initial barrier to overcome".
the use of the loser-pays rule.
often tell a confounding tale," he said.
without American excess," Mr. Watson said.
expected class action growth to be modest and sustainable.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
The General Assembly is the supreme body of the EJC. It defines the general policy of EJC, receives reports from the President and the Executive Vice-President, sets multi annual goals and plans of action, receives and approves annual accounts and budget.
the admission of members and their suspension or exclusion.
§1 – The General Assembly must be held at least once a year.
§2 – In unusual circumstances, an Extraordinary Meeting of the General Assembly can be called at the initiative of (i) the President or (ii) a majority of the members of the Executive or of the Council, or (iii) at the initiative of at least 1/5 of the members. Decisions made at an Extraordinary Meeting of the General Assembly continue and are valid until the next Ordinary Meeting of the General Assembly.
§3 – The agenda for the Extraordinary Meeting of the General Assembly shall include such matters specified by the bodies who initiated such meeting as the reason for calling such Extraordinary Meeting and such other matters in conformity with Article 16 of this Constitution.
§4 – Every General Assembly must be held on the days and at the times and places mentioned in the invitation. Only members must be invited as well as those who qualify as observers duly invited as such by the President. Nevertheless, members, to the extent duly identified by the President, may be allowed to participate by videoconference or, in exceptional circumstances, using a telephone conferencing system.
§5 – Decisions may also be taken following a written procedure, to the extent permitted by law.
§1 – The agenda for the Meetings of the General Assembly shall be proposed by the Executive and shall be delivered, by letter or collective email to each member not less than four weeks before the date of the convening of the Meeting of the General Assembly.
§2 – Proposals submitted not less than 14 days prior to the date of the Meeting of the General Assembly shall be incorporated in the final agenda.
§1 – Each member is entitled to participate and to vote on the General Assembly by sending the number of delegates mentioned in §2. The number of delegates for each community is determined by a key of representation fixed for each country according to its Jewish population, based on the demographic figures stipulated in Annex I.
§3 – The demographic figures stated in Annex I can be modified or updated based on new research certified by an independent professional body. Any modification must be ratified by the General Assembly.
§4 – Each delegate is entitled to one vote.
§5 – The president of each member may direct that a proxy be issued for himself/herself and members of his/her delegation who are not able to attend. No delegate may hold more than two proxies.
Meetings of the General Assembly are chaired by the President of EJC. In his/her absence the President may appoint the Chairman of the Council or a Vice-President to chair the meeting.
§1 – The decisions of the General Assembly are taken by a simple majority of the delegates present or duly represented by proxies confirmed by its community president, and voting, except where otherwise stated.
§2 – Changes in EJC’s Constitution, termination of membership and suspension of membership for more than 3 months shall require a qualified two third (2/3) majority of those present.
§3 – The dissolution of EJC shall require a 2/3 majority of those entitled to vote.§4 – The quorum of the General Assembly is made up of the President (or a designated Vice- President) plus 50 % of the delegates officially appointed. If this quorum cannot be reached, a second Assembly with the exact same agenda must be held in the following 3 months and will be able to deliberate and vote, no matter the number of present delegates.
The General Assembly elects the President, the Chairman of the Council and the members of the Executive for a term of four years. The General Assembly can, with a 2/3 majority of those present, revoke any elected officer of the EJC.
§1 – General Assembly decisions are recorded in a register of minutes signed by all the delegates present at the meeting who wish to do so, and at least by the President and the Executive Vice-President. This register is kept at the registered office where all members can consult it. However, the registry cannot be moved. Third parties who prove a legitimate interest receive a copy of the minutes regarding the decisions that affect them.
§2 – All amendments to the articles are deposited without delay to the court’s registry and extracts are then published in the Annexes of the Moniteur Belge. The procedure is the same for all actions relating to the appointment or termination of the mandates of the Executive’s members.

matches: §1 §2 §3 §4 §5 §1 §2 §1 §2 §3 §4 §5 §1 §2 §3 §1 §2


California DUI laws impose significant penalties for accidents resulting in death or serious injury. If you are involved in a DUI accident that causes bodily injury or fatality, you are looking at heavy fines, potential imprisonment, and other harsh legal consequences if convicted. You may also have difficulty obtaining employment, housing, loans, and college admission, and you may face a denial, suspension, or revocation of a professional license. With so much at stake, it is important to have an experienced DUI defense attorney in your corner fighting hard to protect your rights and interests.
At Burglin Law Offices, P.C., we have successfully defended clients charged with these DUI offenses since 1985. Attorney Paul Burglin co-authors "the Bible of DUI defense", California Drunk Driving Law, a two-volume legal guide relied on by other attorneys throughout the state. Mr. Burglin is one of only five attorneys in the state that is Board-Certified by the National College of DUI Defense as approved by the American Bar Association. His extensive experience and successful track record make him the "go to" attorney for DMV hearing officers, prosecutors, and judges when someone close to them is charged for DUI in an accident resulting in death or serious injury.
California Vehicle Code (VC) §23153 is the statute pertaining to drunk driving resulting in injury. The offense may be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor (VC §23554). A prosecutor's decision whether to charge a VC §23153 offense as a felony or a misdemeanor is usually based on the totality of the circumstances, such as one's prior record, the nature of injury, and the number of victims or evidentiary issues. The offenses described in VC §23153 correspond to those set forth in VC §23152 with regard to driving under the influence, driving while addicted, or driving in violation of the per se alcohol limits.
This act or neglect directly resulted in bodily injury to someone other than the driver.
Penal Code §191.5(a) (with gross negligence): If you are convicted of violating Penal Code (PC) §191.5(a) (vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence), you are subject to four, six, or 10 years in state prison. If you have one or more prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter or DUI, you are subject to 15 years to life in state prison.
Penal Code §191.5(b): A criminal conviction for vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence could be either a misdemeanor or felony. Thus, you are subject to the possibility of one year, 16 months, 2 years or 4 years in the county jail.
The most serious charge related to driving under the influence is that of second-degree murder, Penal Code §187 (also known as "Watson Murder"), based on the implied malice theory. If you are convicted of Penal Code §187 (second-degree murder), P.C. §190 states that you will face an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life, or 25 years to life if the victim is a police officer killed in the performance of his or her duties and you knew or should have known the victim was a police officer.
If you are a defendant in a DUI accident case, there is a reality you should be mindful of. Other persons involved in an accident involving a drunk driver will often tell the police they are not injured or will claim some minor ache or pain and decline medical treatment. Yet days later, they may either start experiencing greater pain or find a civil lawyer willing to make that claim on their behalf. Sometimes, what appears to be a minor injury turns out to be a fractured bone, and then suddenly you are facing a felony DUI charge with great bodily injury - a sentencing enhancement that can land you in prison for six years on a first offense case.
Defendants in DUI accidents resulting in death or serious injury can be subject to heavy fines and years of jail or prison time. If you are in this circumstance, it is critically important that you speak with experienced legal counsel before making any further statements to the police, insurance agents, or investigators.
Attorney Paul Burglin thoroughly understands the California DUI process and the most effective defense strategies to minimize the negative consequences of a DUI with great bodily injury charge. For a personalized consultation with attorney Burglin, contact our office today at 415-729-7300. We serve clients throughout the Bay Area, including Marin County, Tiburon, Sausalito, Mill Valley, Larkspur, San Rafael, Novato, San Anselmo, and Fairfax. We handle locals and tourists cited in the wine country, Sonoma and Napa, as well as those cited in San Francisco, Oakland, and Martinez.


text:
This cause is now before the Court on the defendant's, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, motion to alter or amend the verdict rendered by a jury in this cause on June 21, 2004. DaimlerChrysler has brought this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e)"). In its motion DaimlerChrylser argues that the Court should reduce the jury's award of punitive damages for two reasons: 1) because as a matter of law, a jury should not be able to award punitive damages when it finds intentional discrimination but not a failure to accommodate; and 2) because the jury's award of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages based only on emotional distress are duplicative and improper under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Plaintiff, Melinda Young ("Young"), contends that DaimlerChrysler's arguments are without merit because 1) a finding of a good faith effort to accommodate does not necessarily imply that DaimlerChrysler made a good faith effort not to discriminate at all and 2) a finding of compensatory damages in this case did not necessarily entirely rely upon emotional distress.
DaimlerChyrsler's first argument that the jury verdict for punitive damages should be overturned is stated as a question of law, however, the underlying argument about the jury's findings is a factual one: whether or not the jury believed that DaimlerChrysler acted with malice or reckless disregard to Young's rights to be free from intentional discrimination. DaimlerChrysler contends that the jury's finding that it made good faith efforts to accommodate Young's disability forbids a finding in Young's favor on punitive damages because an "employer may avoid liability by showing . . . that it engaged in good faith efforts to implement an anti-discrimination policy." Bruso v. U. Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 2001). DaimlerChrysler argues that its good faith efforts in one aspect of its dealings with Young should translate into a bar on punitive damages because it couldn't have acted in reckless disregard of her rights.
But the jury in this case found that DaimlerChrysler had intentionally discriminated against Young. It is upon this finding that the jury based its punitive damages award and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that DaimlerChrysler had a policy of discriminating against disabled employees with respect to transfers, that Young was adversely affected by this policy, that at least one if not two persons who either influenced or made transfer decisions related to Young failed to objectively evaluate her capabilities because of her disability, and that there was no good faith effort on DaimlerChrysler's part to implement a different policy with regard to transfers of disabled employees. DaimlerChrysler's attempt to have this Court re-weigh the evidence on this issue is improper.
instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to consider three guide posts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damage awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 481 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of a trial court's application of these principals to the jury's award. See id. The Court addresses each guidepost in turn.
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. at 419. Moreover, the Court should presume Young was made whole for her injuries by the compensatory damages. Id.
Applying these factors to the instant case, the Court finds the degree of reprehensible conduct relatively high. The evidenced showed that the greatest harm caused to Young was physical and mental, although there was some evidence of economic harm because of DaimlerChrysler's failure to assign Young to a department in which she might qualify for overtime for some period of time. It was the repeated failure of DaimlerChrysler to assign Young to a permanent position that met her disability restrictions, and its failure adequately to train her or objectively to evaluate her because of her disability that evidences the carelessness with which DaimlerChrysler apparently handled Young's employment.
In addition, the evidence supports a finding of DaimlerChrysler's indifference or recklessness to the health or safety of Young because it repeatedly put her in positions that aggravated rather than alleviated stress to her disabled arm. Moreover, in the context of a civil rights violation, and in the context of the jury instructions given in this case, the evidence supports the jury's finding that DaimlerChrysler was indifferent to or recklessly disregarded Young's rights. There was also some evidence that supports a finding that Young was financially vulnerable because without the position at DaimlerChrysler, Young would have had to reapply for social security benefits at a lower annual income than her annual income from the plant.
Finally, there was evidence to support a finding that DaimlerChrysler acted with deceit, at a minimum, with respect to intentional discrimination. Each employee asked about whether or not Young was treated consistently with DaimlerChrysler's policy to not transfer disabled employees either testified in the affirmative, or stated they were aware that there were "rumors" among employees about such treatment, but there was no written policy that limited such employees from transferring. Those who testified to the latter appeared to make excuses for the "unwritten" policy by insisting that Young was not in a "particular department" when she was not allowed to transfer. But, when questioned further about this, the latter witnesses admitted that most disabled employees were not assigned to a department. The testimony on all counts was clear: if you are not assigned to a department, you are not entitled to overtime. Therefore, the evidence supports a conclusion that DaimlerChrysler used deceit or trickery when dealing with Young's transfers and her entitlement to certain benefits.
Moreover, DaimlerChrysler offered little testimony about the type of training program or employment discrimination education any of its supervisors or human resources persons received. One DaimlerChrysler witness testified that when he had input into whether or not Young received a transfer, he said she should not receive the transfer because she could not do the job because of her disability. The witness also testified that he never tried to objectively determine whether or not Young could do the job because "it was obvious" to him that she could not. This was the only witness who testified about why Young did not receive a promotion to a position that she felt met her disability limitations. This evidence clearly supports a finding of intentional malice and reckless disregard for Young's rights. In light of the minimal testimony about DaimlerChrysler's training on discrimination issues, the jury was entitled to, and obviously did, find DaimlerChrysler's conduct with respect to Young reprehensible. Having considered the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, the first guidepost weighs heavily in favor of the punitive damages award.
The next guidepost is the disparity between the actual harm suffered by Young and the punitive damages award. Although the Supreme Court has eschewed a particular mathematical formula for drawing a line between a constitutional and an unconstitutional punitive damage award, ratios of punitive damages to actual damages greater than single digits have not been favored unless "`a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.'" 538 U.S. at 425 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). The appropriate ratio "must be based upon the facts and circumstances of [DaimlerChrylser's] conduct and the harm to [Young]." Id. Here, the ratio was 45-to-1. Evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, the harm to Young was both physical, in the aggravation of her injuries, and economic, in the failure to assign Young as a permanent employee of a department so that she could qualify for over time. The harm to Young was largely emotional because of her continual struggle to obtain transfers into a department in which she could perform the job and receive training and advancement opportunities, and because of the stress caused by DaimlerChrysler's failure to address the problems Young faced in the jobs in which it placed her. However, all the harm is tempered by the fact that Young is still employed by DaimlerChrysler. Moreover, it is clear that Young's salary has increased over time and that she is currently employed in a position that she has wanted and that meets her physical limitations.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the punitive damage award is disproportionate to the harm caused. This finding is bolstered by the fact that the legislature has seen fit to cap the amount of damages any one plaintiff may obtain for damages caused by an employer's violation of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). See also Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the remedial structure under Title VII, which provides the model for the remedial structure under the ADA). In addition, in closing argument, Young's counsel told the jury that the range for punitive damage awards was two to three times the amount of compensatory damages, or perhaps up to ten times the amount of compensatory damages. Although Young predicated the amount she suggested on a much higher compensatory damage estimate of $600,000.00, the assessment of punitive damages by the jury at forty-five times compensatory damages well exceeds even Young's suggestion of an appropriate multiplier. This guidepost counsels that a reduction in the jury's punitive damage assessment is appropriate.
The third guidepost, a comparison of awards in similar cases or any civil penalties, reveals that the punitive damages awarded by the jury was also excessive. Although Young points to one Seventh Circuit case in which the plaintiff received $6,000.00 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages, which the court reduced to the statutory maximum of $300,000.00, see Fine v. Ryan Int'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2002), a larger number of similar cases use a maximum three times multiplier as an appropriately constitutional punitive damages amount. See, e.g., David v. Caterpiller, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 865 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's reduction of punitive damages to a 3:1 ratio); Lawyer v. 84 Lumber Co., 991 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Dubin v. LaGrange Country Club, No. 95 C 5316, 1997 WL 323831 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1997). Moreover, in Fine, the plaintiff was fired and there was evidence that both the general counsel and the president of the company concurred in the retaliation in that case. Id. at 756. Here, Young is still employed by DaimlerChrysler and while the evidence shows that the reprehensibility of DaimlerChrysler's conduct was relatively high, there is no evidence that the higher level management in the company explicitly concurred in the adverse employment decisions in Young's case, they merely turned a blind eye to the pervasiveness of the policy that adversely affected Young.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the $4.5 million punitive damage award is unconstitutional, however, the egregiousness of DaimlerChrysler's conduct, coupled with the jury's assessment that its conduct justified a very high punitive damage award convinces the Court that anything less than a 3:1 ratio for fixing the appropriate amount would not accurately reflect the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the jury's punitive damage award is reduced to $300,000.00. As already stated by the Court in the judgment in this matter, application of the statutory cap allows Young to recover $100,000.00 in compensatory damages and $200,000.00 in punitive damages. The Court will assess costs and fees in a separate order.
The Court notes that DaimlerChrysler does not seem to dispute that the jury was correctly instructed on the law of punitive damages that applies to this case. Therefore, the Court consider's the jury's assessment relevant evidence of the circumstances surrounding the punitive damage award.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part, defendant's, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Motion to Amend or Alter the Verdict in this cause. Judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, Melinda Young, on her claim for intentional discrimination against DaimlerChrysler Corporation remains unchanged in the total amount of $300,000.00. Defendant's, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, request for oral argument is DENIED.

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