119 Wn.2d 210, P.2d 1099, BRYANT v. JOSEPH TREE, INC.
BRYANT v. JOSEPH TREE, INC.
ELAINE J. BRYANT, ET AL, Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH TREE, INC., ET AL, Petitioners, MORRIS H. ROSENBERG, ET AL, Respondents.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Court Rule – Construction – Similar Federal Rule. Federal decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 may provide guidance for construing CR 11.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Court Rule – Construction – Balancing Test. When interpreting CR 11, a court must balance the purposes of the rule, which are to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of the judicial system, against the potential chilling effect of the rule on parties seeking to advance meritorious claims.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Complaint – Test. The filing of a complaint cannot subject the plaintiff's attorney to CR 11 sanctions unless the complaint lacks a factual or a legal basis and the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of the claim.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Losing Party. A plaintiff's attorney is not subject to CR 11 sanctions merely because the plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of the claim. It is not a purpose of CR 11 to provide an alternative basis for awarding attorney fees to prevailing parties.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Prefiling Inquiry – Objective or Subjective Standard. For purposes of CR 11, whether an attorney conducted a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of the claim is judged by an objective standard as of the time the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum was submitted.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Prefiling Inquiry – Factors. When determining whether an attorney's inquiry into the factual and legal bases of a claim was reasonable, and sufficient to avoid CR 11 sanctions, a court will consider (1) the time available to the attorney; (2) the extent of the attorney's reliance upon the client for factual support; (3) whether the attorney, upon acceptance of the case from another attorney, acquired sufficient knowledge of the factual and legal bases of the claim; (4) the complexity of the factual and legal issues; and (5) the need for discovery to develop the facts underlying the claim.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Record – Supplementation. At a CR 11 sanctions hearing, a plaintiff's attorney may supplement the factual record to show that there was an adequate factual basis for filing the complaint. The adequacy of the factual basis for the complaint is not determined from the complaint alone.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Review – Absence of Findings – Effect. When a trial court imposes CR 11 sanctions without the proper supporting findings of fact and the relevant evidence consists solely of written documents, a reviewing court may independently review the evidence and make the required findings.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Alternative Rules – Effect. CR 11 sanctions are not appropriate when other court rules more properly apply.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Court Rule – Scope – Appellate Proceedings. Pursuant to RAP 18.7, the provision of CR 11 that an attorney's signature constitutes a certification that the document signed is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law applies to proceedings in appellate courts.
 Constitutional Law – Due Process – Elements. Due process requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard precede a governmental deprivation of a property interest.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Due Process – Appellate Proceedings. An attorney's right of due process is not violated by the imposition of CR 11 sanctions in an appellate proceeding if the party seeking the sanctions provides notice by requesting the imposition of sanctions in its brief and the attorney is given an opportunity to be heard during oral argument.
 Pleading – Supporting Facts – Reasonable Inquiry – Breach of Duty – Sanctions – Purpose of Rule. The sanction imposed under CR 11 should be the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purposes of the rule.
ANDERSEN, BRACHTENBACH, and DURHAM, JJ., dissent in part by separate opinion.
Nature of Action: After separating from her spouse and obtaining a restraining order preventing her spouse from transferring community assets, the plaintiff brought an action to invalidate certain transfers of property made to the defendants in violation of the restraining order.
Superior Court: The complaint was dismissed without prejudice. The Superior Court for King County, No. 88-2-01568-6, Marsha J. Pechman, J., on November 2, 1988, imposed CR 11 sanctions against the plaintiff's three attorneys.
Court of Appeals: The court at 57 Wn. App. 107 reversed the sanctions against the plaintiff's three attorneys and imposed CR 11 sanctions against the defendants' attorney on appeal, holding that the complaint had a factual and legal basis but that the defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on appeal lacked a factual and legal basis.
Supreme Court: Holding that the Court of Appeals had followed proper procedures in finding a factual and legal basis for the complaint and in imposing sanctions against the defendants' attorney on appeal, the court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eugene N. Bolin, Jr., for petitioners.
Malcolm L. Edwards, Howard M. Goodfriend, Catherine W. Smith, and Edwards, Sieh, Wiggins & Hathaway, P.S., for respondents Rosenberg and Koch.
Stephen J. Sirianni and Sirianni & Youtz, for respondent Sellers.
Gary N. Bloom, Bryan P. Harnetiaux, and Daniel E. Huntington on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, amicus curiae for respondents.
JOHNSON, J. – This case requires review of two instances of Civil Rule 11 (CR 11) attorney sanctions. The trial court imposed CR 11 sanctions against the three respondent attorneys: Marilyn Sellers, Morris Rosenberg and Stuart Koch. The Court of Appeals reversed these sanctions and imposed CR 11 sanctions on the petitioners' attorney, Eugene Bolin, Jr. The petitioners, Joseph Tree, Inc., et al. (Joseph Tree), seek review of both of these determinations. We affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the sanctions imposed against the three respondents. We also affirm the Court of Appeals imposition of sanctions on Bolin.
In July 1985, Elaine Bryant filed a dissolution petition against her husband of 30 years, Fred Bryant. Mrs. Bryant obtained a restraining order preventing her husband from transferring community assets.
The Bryants later reconciled, but then separated again. Elaine Bryant commenced a new legal separation action. Marilyn Sellers acted as Mrs. Bryant's attorney. Sellers served Fred Bryant with interrogatories in order to discover the extent of the Bryants' marital community holdings. Fred Bryant refused to answer these interrogatories, citing religious reasons for his refusal.
Mrs. Bryant and Sellers then began reviewing financial statements and researching public records in an effort to determine the extent of the Bryants' assets. They discovered evidence that Fred Bryant had made numerous transfers of community real property to the various petitioners for little or no consideration. Some of these transfers were made while the restraining order was in effect. The petitioners include various corporations in which Fred Bryant has an interest; Gerald Bopp, who was Fred Bryant's attorney; corporations in which Bopp had a substantial interest or involvement; the Bryants' daughter Wendy; an irrevocable trust of which Wendy Bryant is trustee; and various business associates and church members.
Sellers and Mrs. Bryant presented this information to the family law court commissioner. They obtained an order from the commissioner authorizing Mrs. Bryant to commence an action against the parties to whom Fred Bryant allegedly transferred the marital community assets.
Sellers obtained the aid of Morris Rosenberg, another lawyer in her firm, and associated Stuart Koch. The three attorneys signed and filed a complaint on behalf of both Mrs. Bryant and the Bryants' marital community. In this complaint, they sought to invalidate the transfers of property made to the petitioners by Fred Bryant. Mrs. Bryant also signed the complaint.
The petitioners presented a motion for a more definite statement in response to this complaint. A superior court judge granted their motion, ordering that Mrs. Bryant and her attorneys identify the transferred assets, designate the county in which the property was located, and provide the approximate date of each transfer.
Mrs. Bryant's attorneys then filed an amended complaint. The petitioners moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that Mrs. Bryant and her attorneys had not complied with the order for a more definite statement. A second superior court judge, Judge Huggins, heard this motion and dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice.
The petitioners then moved for sanctions against Mrs. Bryant and her three attorneys, alleging they had all violated CR 11 in signing and filing the original and amended complaints. This motion came before a third superior court judge, Judge Pechman (hereinafter the trial court). The parties argued this motion in three separate hearings at which no testimony was taken. The respondents submitted a memorandum and Elaine Bryant's affidavit in opposition to the motion for sanctions. In addition, the three attorneys each submitted declarations. The trial court found that Sellers, Koch and Rosenberg had violated CR 11, but that Mrs. Bryant had not.
The drafting of the complaints, as well as the supporting data supplied by [Elaine Bryant's] Attorneys, was insufficient for the Court to make any determination as to the underlying merits of the cause of action.
Clerk's Papers, at 677. The petitioners submitted a fee request for almost $90,000 in connection with the two motions and the sanctions request. The trial court awarded the petitioners $40,000 in sanctions against Mrs. Bryant's lawyers: $15,000 each against Rosenberg and Koch, and $10,000 against Sellers.
One month after the trial court entered its order imposing CR 11 sanctions, Elaine and Fred Bryant obtained a decree of legal separation. Elaine Bryant was awarded all of the marital community's remaining assets and Fred Bryant was awarded all of the community's liabilities. Eugene Bolin, Jr., represented Fred Bryant in this action.
Rosenberg and Koch retained attorney Malcolm Edwards and appealed the CR 11 sanctions to the Court of Appeals. The petitioners cross-appealed the trial court's determination that Elaine Bryant did not violate CR 11. As a result, Edwards also agreed to represent Elaine Bryant in the appeal. Each of the three clients consented in writing to this joint representation. Sellers retained separate counsel and joined in the appeal.
On the day Joseph Tree's respondents' brief was due in the Court of Appeals, Bolin filed on Joseph Tree's behalf a 2-volume motion for the "immediate disqualification of Malcolm Edwards and Edwards & Barbieri from further participation in the instant appeal". Bolin also requested that independent counsel be appointed for the marital community because the appeal would create "additional liability" for the marital community. Bolin alleged in his motion that a conflict of interest precluded Edwards' joint representation of Rosenberg, Koch, Mrs. Bryant and the marital community. According to Bolin, Rosenberg's and Koch's strategy on appeal was to blame Elaine Bryant for any deficiencies in their pleadings. Bolin asserted that "Rosenberg and Koch are now deliberately aiding [Joseph Tree]" in its argument that the trial court erred in not sanctioning Elaine Bryant.
It does not appear that a cross appeal has been filed by [Joseph Tree] relating to the marital community of Elaine J. Bryant and her husband. . . .
The commissioner denied without prejudice Bolin's motion to disqualify Edwards and his law firm, thus allowing Bolin to renew his motion upon filing Joseph Tree's cross appellants' brief. The commissioner denied the respondents' request for sanctions against Bolin for filing the motion. Bolin requested and was granted permission to remove any materials he deemed appropriate from the record relating to his motion to disqualify. Bolin removed several hundred pages of documents from the record. These documents made reference to an unrelated confidential settlement agreement between the Bryants and four attorneys who are unrelated to this action.
Bolin later filed a brief on Joseph Tree's behalf which contained a cross appeal against Mrs. Bryant, but not against the Bryants' marital community. In response, Rosenberg and Koch requested in their reply brief that the Court of Appeals award them all of their fees on appeal under CR 11. They specifically cited the motion to disqualify as meriting sanctions under CR 11. Reply Brief of Appellant, at 12.
The Court of Appeals reversed the CR 11 sanctions imposed against Sellers, Rosenberg and Koch. The court determined that the trial court erred in imposing CR 11 sanctions without a finding that the complaints lacked a factual and legal basis. After reviewing the record, the court determined the complaints did have both a factual and legal basis, and were thus not the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions. The court also affirmed the trial court's decision not to impose sanctions against Elaine Bryant.
In addition, the Court of Appeals imposed CR 11 sanctions against Bolin for filing the motion to disqualify Edwards and his law firm. The court determined that the motion lacked a factual and legal basis, especially due to the fact that Bolin never filed a cross appeal against the marital community. The court awarded Rosenberg and Koch $2,980.70 in attorneys fees in connection with the motion to disqualify. The Court of Appeals denied Bolin's motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals reversal of sanctions against the respondents and the court's imposition of sanctions against Bolin.
Every pleading, motion, and legal memorandum of a party represented by an attorney shall be dated and signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address and Washington State Bar Association membership number shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign and date the party's pleading, motion, or legal memorandum and state the party's address. . . . The signature of a party or of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the party or attorney that the party or attorney has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum; that to the best of the party's or attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee.
CR 11 addresses two types of problems relating to pleadings, motions and legal memoranda: filings which are not "well grounded in fact and . . . warranted by . . . law" and filings interposed for "any improper purpose". At issue in this case is CR 11's not "well grounded in fact and . . . warranted by . . . law" provision.
«1» The amicus curiae, the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (WSTLA), argues that a court's denial of CR 11 sanctions should receive abuse of discretion review, but that the imposition of sanctions should receive de novo review. As this argument is raised only by the amicus curiae, we do not address it. See Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wn.2d 270, 279, 677 P.2d 173 (1984).
We therefore assume, without deciding, that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion.
The respondents signed and filed on their client's behalf a complaint and an amended complaint. CR 11 imposes requirements on attorneys who sign and file any "pleading, motion, or legal memorandum". A complaint is a "pleading". An attorney who signs and files a complaint must therefore comply with CR 11's requirements.
«2» The petitioners have not sought review of the determination that Elaine Bryant did not violate CR 11. As such, they have not placed at issue the requirements CR 11 imposes on parties to an action.
regardless of whether or not the attorney's complaint has a factual and legal basis. The text of CR 11 does not explicitly require a finding that a pleading lack a factual or legal basis before the court may impose CR 11 sanctions. We must therefore look to the purpose behind CR 11 to determine if such a finding is required.
 The present CR 11 was modeled after and is substantially similar to the present Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11). See Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn. App. 285, 299, 753 P.2d 530, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1007 (1988). We may thus look to federal decisions interpreting Rule 11 for guidance in construing CR 11. In re Lasky, 54 Wn. App. 841, 851, 776 P.2d 695 (1989); see also American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wn.2d 34, 37, 499 P.2d 869 (1972) (construing CR 24 in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24).
 The purpose behind CR 11 is to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of the judicial system. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., ____U.S. ___, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 1160, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). Both the federal rule and CR 11 were designed to reduce "delaying tactics, procedural harassment, and mounting legal costs." 3A L. Orland, Wash. Prac., Rules Practice § 5141 (3d ed. Supp. 1991). CR 11 requires attorneys to "stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983). "[R]ule 11 has raised the consciousness of lawyers to the need for a careful prefiling investigation of the facts and inquiry into the law." Commentary, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (1988).
Were vigorous advocacy to be chilled by the excessive use of sanctions, wrongs would go uncompensated. Attorneys, because of fear of sanctions, might turn down cases on behalf of individuals seeking to have the courts recognize new rights. They might also refuse to represent persons whose rights have been violated but whose claims are not likely to produce large damage awards. This is because attorneys would have to figure into their costs of doing business the risk of unjustified awards of sanctions.
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1990). Our interpretation of CR 11 thus requires consideration of both CR 11's purpose of deterring baseless claims as well as the potential chilling effect CR 11 may have on those seeking to advance meritorious claims.
[3, 4] Complaints which are "grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law" are not "baseless" claims, and are therefore not the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions. The purpose behind the rule is to deter baseless filings, not filings which may have merit. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly determined that a complaint must lack a factual or legal basis before it can become the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions.
If a complaint lacks a factual or legal basis, the court cannot impose CR 11 sanctions unless it also finds that the attorney who signed and filed the complaint failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the claim. See Townsend, at 1362 (a filing may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions where it is both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry). The fact that a complaint does not prevail on its merits is by no means dispositive of the question of CR 11 sanctions. CR 11 is not a mechanism for providing attorneys fees to a prevailing party where such fees would otherwise be unavailable. John Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wn. App. 106, 111, 780 P.2d 853 (1989).
the time that was available to the signer, the extent of the attorney's reliance upon the client for factual support, whether a signing attorney accepted a case from another member of the bar or forwarding attorney, the complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the need for discovery to develop factual circumstances underlying a claim.
Miller, at 301-02 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 199. However, an attorney who accepts a case from another member of the bar must acquire knowledge of facts sufficient to enable him or her to certify that the complaint is well grounded in fact. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Court of Appeals in this case determined that the complaints did not lack a factual or legal basis, and thus were not the proper subject of CR 11 sanctions. The court noted that Elaine Bryant's affidavit, in particular, provided the factual basis for the allegations that the petitioners received property from Fred Bryant which belonged to the marital community. The court determined that the complaints had legal merit since they asserted an equitable claim for restitution of the properties and a claim that Joseph Tree held these properties in a constructive trust for the benefit of the marital community.
 The petitioners have not assigned error to the Court of Appeals determination that the complaints had both a factual and a legal basis. The petitioners instead maintain that Elaine Bryant's affidavit and the declarations of her three attorneys should not have been considered by the court for providing the factual basis behind the complaints. They argue that the court should not allow an attorney to supplement the factual record at a CR 11 hearing. Instead, they argue that a court should determine from the complaint alone whether an adequate factual basis existed for the filing. The petitioners rely on Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) for this proposition. In Rodgers, the Seventh Circuit held that a court need not allow an attorney to supplement the factual record in a Rule 11 proceeding where the attorney's complaint lacked a legal basis under any set of facts. This case is distinguishable from Rodgers. Unlike the plaintiff in Rodgers, Elaine Bryant and her attorneys did have a legal basis for their complaints.
Moreover, Washington's notice pleading rule does not require parties to state all of the facts supporting their claims in their initial complaint. CR 8(a) provides that: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .". (Italics ours.) The notice pleading rule contemplates that discovery will provide parties with the opportunity to learn more detailed information about the nature of a complaint. A court should thus be reluctant to impose sanctions for factual errors or deficiencies in a complaint before there has been an opportunity for discovery. Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987)).
 The petitioners next assert that the Court of Appeals erred when it reviewed the record to determine whether the complaints had a factual and legal basis rather than remanding the matter for the trial court's determination. The trial court in this case failed to enter any finding regarding whether or not the complaints lacked a factual or legal basis. Because of this, the appellate court could not exercise any degree of deference to a trial court's finding, as no such finding even existed. In such situations, instead of remanding a matter to the trial court for a factual finding, an appellate court may independently review evidence consisting of written documents and make the required findings. See Lobdell v. Sugar 'N Spice, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 881, 887, 658 P.2d 1267, review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1016 (1983). The trial court in this case did not hear testimony, only argument from counsel. The documents in the record therefore provide the only evidence regarding whether the complaints had a factual and legal basis. The trial court was thus in no better position to evaluate the evidence than the appellate court. We conclude the Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing the documents in the record in order to determine if the complaints had a factual and legal basis.
 We affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the CR 11 sanctions against the respondents. If the respondents violated a court rule, they violated CR 12(e), not CR 11. CR 12(e) requires attorneys to comply with a court's order for a more definite statement. Judge Huggins imposed the proper sanction under this rule when she dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice. See CR 12(e). CR 11 sanctions are not appropriate where other court rules more properly apply. See Clipse v. State, 61 Wn. App. 94, 808 P.2d 777 (1991) (misleading discovery disclosures may not be sanctioned under CR 11, but can be sanctioned under CR 26(g)'s provisions which govern discovery requests).
 We now turn to the Court of Appeals imposition of CR 11 sanctions against Bolin, the petitioners' attorney. The first question is whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to impose sanctions pursuant to CR 11. CR 11 is a civil rule applicable to attorneys who sign and file pleadings in the superior courts of this state. RAP 18.7 provides, however, that: "Each paper filed pursuant to [the Rules of Appellate Procedure] should be dated and signed by an attorney or party as provided in CR 11 . . .". Under CR 11, an attorney's signature constitutes a "certificate" that "to the best of the . . . attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry [the attorney's document] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . .". Pursuant to RAP 18.7, CR 11's certification requirement therefore applies to proceedings in the appellate courts, as well as in the superior courts. See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Inc., 59 Wn. App. 332, 342, 798 P.2d 1155 (1990).
The petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing CR 11 sanctions against Bolin because the court ruled without the benefit of having the entire record before it. Bolin has resubmitted the documents he removed from the record, and obtained an order sealing them. We have reviewed these documents and find that they do not support the contention that the Court of Appeals erred when it sanctioned Bolin. The documents in the sealed record have no bearing on the question of whether Edwards' joint representation of Rosenberg, Koch and Elaine Bryant created a conflict of interest. Instead, the documents in the sealed record make reference to a confidential settlement agreement unrelated to the present proceeding.
The petitioners also maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in sanctioning Bolin because Rosenberg and Koch never brought a motion to modify the commissioner's denial of sanctions. The commissioner's order, however, can be construed as leaving the question of sanctions open until after Bolin filed a brief on Joseph Tree's behalf.
[11, 12] Finally, Bolin argues that the Court of Appeals sanctioned him without affording him adequate due process rights. The federal advisory committee note to Rule 11 provides that CR 11 procedures "obviously must comport with due process requirements." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 201. Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a governmental deprivation of a property interest. Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrig. Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971)). A party seeking CR 11 sanctions should therefore give notice to the court and the offending party promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200. Rosenberg and Koch requested in their appellants' reply brief that CR 11 sanctions be imposed against Bolin. They specifically cited Bolin's motion to disqualify Edwards and his law firm as meriting the imposition of CR 11 sanctions. The respondents therefore provided Bolin with notice prior to oral argument that they were seeking CR 11 sanctions. At oral argument, Bolin had the opportunity to be heard on this issue. Bolin's due process rights were therefore not violated. We affirm the Court of Appeals imposition of sanctions against Bolin.
 The Court of Appeals imposed monetary sanctions against Bolin in the amount of $2,980.70. We note that in fashioning an appropriate sanction, "the least severe sanctions adequate to serve the purpose should be imposed." Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 – A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1985). Bolin has not assigned error to the monetary amount imposed by the Court of Appeals.
The respondents, however, seek review as to the amount of these sanctions. They contend they should have been awarded all of their attorneys fees incurred before the Court of Appeals. They argue that the petitioners violated CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185 by presenting a meritless defense of the sanctions originally imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the respondents' request, as the proceeding before that court involved unsettled questions regarding CR 11's interpretation. The respondents' request for the fees and costs incurred in this proceeding is denied for the same reason.
The respondents also request that the court sanction Bolin under RAP 18.9 for a misuse of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. They assert that Bolin misused the rules when he withdrew hundreds of pages from the record and then reinserted these pages for this court's review of the case. The respondents' request is denied because Bolin removed these documents pursuant to permission granted by the Court of Appeals commissioner.
DORE, C.J., and UTTER, DOLLIVER, SMITH, and GUY, JJ., concur.
ANDERSEN, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part) – This is the first opportunity this court has had to construe the sanctions provision of CR 11. As the case before us amply demonstrates, this court's guidance regarding the proper interpretation and application of the rule is sorely needed by practitioners, trial judges and appellate courts alike. Unfortunately, to my view, the majority opinion does not adequately provide the necessary guidance, hence this separate opinion.
Sanctions are a sensitive subject. Lawyers are both proponents and victims. Judges are both umpires and advocates. Parties are perpetrators, conspirators and innocent bystanders. Standards are uncertain, but if a violation is found, sanctions can be mandatory. All the players are in place, but their roles are not altogether familiar. The rules are uncertain, and all but the judge are at risk.
On the subject of sanctions the bench and bar are decidedly ambivalent. It is a rare trial lawyer who considers himself outrageous in his litigation practices. But he sees other lawyers, especially opponents, often behaving outrageously. That they should suffer for their misbehavior is more than fair – it can be turned into a litigation advantage.
Uncertain standards and uneven enforcement, however, give everyone reason to pause. The lawyer aggrieved on one occasion may be the target next time. The line separating zeal from rashness is not always bright. Even under objective tests, sanctions decisions often rest on largely subjective judicial assessments, including assessments of the merits before the merits have been litigated and of tactical decisions after tactics have misfired. Not infrequently, it is only after the fact that behavior seems so plainly misbehavior.
(Footnote omitted.) G. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse 1 (1989).
First, the majority opinion correctly declares CR 11 to be an extraordinary remedy and that its "sanctions are not appropriate where other court rules more properly apply." Majority opinion, at 223. For that reason, I would hold that the sanctions imposed against these attorneys in both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals were inappropriate. In the case of attorneys Sellers, Koch and Rosenberg, CR 12(e) (allowing for dismissal of the complaint in this case) is the more specific, more appropriate rule. In the case of attorney Bolin, RAP 18.9(a) (providing for sanctions on appeal) is the more specific, more appropriate rule. I also would hold that the sanctions section of CR 11 is not made a part of the appellate court rules by the reference to the rule contained in RAP 18.7. The factual hearing required before CR 11 sanctions may be imposed makes application of the rule cumbersome in the appellate courts. RAP 18.9(a) is better tailored to the function of appellate courts, essentially serves the same purpose as CR 11 and could have been considered for application in this case.
Second, I would establish and apply a standard of review for CR 11 cases. The majority opinion declines to enunciate a standard of review. See majority opinion, at 218. This leaves trial and appellate courts without the guidance they are entitled to have from this court. To my view, the abuse of discretion standard is the standard of review that should be applied in CR 11 cases. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (establishing a deferential standard in construing the federal counterpart to CR 11); In re Lasky, 54 Wn. App. 841, 852, 776 P.2d 695 (1989); Cooper v. Viking Ventures, 53 Wn. App. 739, 742, 770 P.2d 659 (1989). Contrary to the majority opinion's analysis, this would mean that even where the trial court's decision rested on documentary, rather than testimonial, evidence the abuse of discretion standard would still apply. The standard should not change to de novo review because of the nature of the evidence presented to the trial court. While professing to apply the abuse of discretion standard, the majority reviews de novo both instances of sanctions in this case. With respect to attorney Bolin, the majority additionally considered evidence not before the sanctioning court, thus going beyond both the abuse of discretion and de novo standards.
Third, I believe that the certification mandated by the language of CR 11 means that the signer has read the document and has: (1) conducted a reasonable investigation into the facts that support the pleading, motion, or other paper; (2) has conducted a reasonable investigation into the law to determine that the document is supported by existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and (3) has not filed the document for any improper purpose. See G. Joseph, at 610. I disagree with the majority's 2-prong test, because I believe the first prong (i.e., whether the pleading, motion, or other paper is legally or factually baseless) cannot be determined without determining the second prong; that is, whether, considering all of the circumstances, the attorney's investigation was reasonable. I would thus hold that the issue to be decided by the trial court in a CR 11 case is whether the investigation of the facts and the law was, indeed, reasonable under the circumstances.
Fourth, I would make it clear that CR 11 is not a fee shifting statute. Where fees are to be sought as a sanction, I would hold that due process and case law require that such notice be provided in writing at the earliest opportunity; further, in such cases I would require mitigation on the part of the party requesting sanctions. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 114 Wn.2d 109, 122-23, 786 P.2d 265 (1990). In the present case, attorney Bolin was given limited opportunity to present oral argument in opposition to the request for sanctions. He was not given an opportunity to present evidence or written argument. I would hold that he was thus not provided a fair hearing. That being so, he was denied due process.
In sum, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion with respect to attorneys Sellers, Koch and Rosenberg, because the appropriate sanction was dismissal of the complaint under CR 12(e). I dissent, however, from the approval of sanctions on appeal against attorney Bolin because: (1) I do not believe CR 11 sanctions should be available on appeal; (2) even if CR 11 sanctions were available, the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard; and (3) the denial of an opportunity to have a factual hearing and to make written response to the request for sanctions in this case did not comport with the due process requirements of timely and adequate notice and hearing.
BRACHTENBACH and DURHAM, JJ., concur with ANDERSEN, J.
Reconsideration denied July 1, 1992.


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1. The phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment have separate and distinct meanings. The phrase "arising out of" employment points to the cause of the accident. An injury "arises out of" employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations, and incidents of the employment. The phrase "in the course of" employment relates to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident and means that the injury happened while the worker was at work in the employer's service.
2. Under the "going and coming" rule codified in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 44-508(f), accidents occurring while an employee is going to or coming from work are generally not deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment. There are, however, at least three exceptions to the going and coming rule: the premises exception, the special hazard exception, and the exception for accidents which occur where the coming and going is an incident of the employment itself.
3. Under the "incident of employment" exception to the going and coming rule, injuries incurred while going and coming from places where work-related tasks occur can be compensable where the traveling is either (a) intrinsic to the profession or (b) required in order to complete some special work-related errand or special-purpose trip in the scope of employment.
4. An employee's participation in educational or training programs or seminars may be considered within the scope of employment for workers compensation purposes where such participation was clearly contemplated as incidental to the employment either as a matter of custom or under the contract of employment.
5. Under the facts presented in this case, the employee's accidental injury sustained while leaving a continuing education seminar held at a location other than the employer's workplace was a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
6. A claimant has the burden of proving the degree of loss of access to the labor market which is attributed to a work-related injury. In the absence of such evidence or in the event the claimant does not otherwise sustain the burden of proof, a finding of a 0% loss of access to the open labor market will be affirmed.
7. Negative findings will seldom be set aside by an appellate court if the evidence is limited in quantity and its weight and credibility may be questionable, or if the evidence may be disregarded for any reason.
Appeal from Workers Compensation Board. Opinion filed May 23, 1997. Affirmed.
E. J. Schumacher, of Topeka, for the appellant/cross-appellee.
Andrea S. Stubblefield, of Dickson & Pope, P.A., of Topeka, for the appellees/cross-appellants Brighton Place North and Church Mutual Insurance Company.
Jeff K. Cooper, of Topeka, for the appellee Kansas Workers Compensation Fund.
Before BRAZIL, C.J., LEWIS, J., and JOHN ANDERSON III, District Judge, assigned.
ANDERSON, J.: Judith Elaine Brobst filed a workers compensation claim against respondent, Brighton Place North (Brighton Place), and its insurance carrier, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding injuries suffered in two separate accidents. The administrative law judge (ALJ) granted Brobst an award, and the Workers Compensation Fund (Fund) was ordered to bear 33.33 percent of the total award. The Workers Compensation Board (Board) lowered the ALJ's 71.03 percent work disability award to 21 percent, and Brobst appeals that aspect of the Board's decision. Brighton Place and Church Mutual cross-appeal the Board's decision that Brobst's second accident occurred in the course of her employment. We affirm.
On April 14, 1990, Brobst was working as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for the Brighton Place nursing home when she injured her back and neck lifting a heavy patient. The parties do not dispute the nature and extent of this injury. Brobst reported the incident to Brighton Place and sought treatment from a chiropractor, Dr. Ron Warta. She received treatments from Dr. Warta and continued to see him weekly through the time of the preliminary hearing in this case. From the time of this accident until October 1990, Brobst continued to perform her regular job duties at Brighton Place.
To keep her LPN position at Brighton Place, Brobst had to maintain her nurse's license. On October 12, 1990, Brobst attended an all-day continuing education seminar at Washburn University. Brobst had learned about the seminar from a notice posted on a bulletin board at Brighton Place. After seeing the posting regarding the Washburn seminar, Brobst told her employer she wanted to attend, and, although Brighton Place did not pay Brobst any wages to attend, it gave her a check to cover the tuition for the seminar.
As Brobst was leaving the seminar to go home, she stepped off a curb to cross the street to the parking lot where her car was located, twisted her ankle, and fell to the ground. Brobst informed Brighton Place about the accident but went to work that night because there was no one to cover for her. Her ankle swelled after working on it all night, and Brobst went in to see her personal physician, Dr. Ethan Bickelhaupt. The fall had twisted her back again, and the ankle injury complicated the back problems by imposing an abnormal gait. Dr. Bickelhaupt recommended that Brobst see an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Shaw.
Brobst stayed away from work to rest her ankle until October 30, 1990, when Brighton Place called to see if she could come in. She worked the 30th and 31st of October, but stopped working again when her back and ankle bothered her, and Dr. Bickelhaupt told her she needed to stay off her feet and could not give her a medical release to work. Brobst has not worked at Brighton Place since October 31, 1990, and her position there has been filled in her absence.
Brobst later attempted to work as a private duty personal companion for an elderly lady but had to quit when the job began to require heavy lifting.
Brobst continued to receive treatment from Dr. Warta and Dr. Bickelhaupt. She has additionally been seen by three other doctors: Dr. Shaw, the orthopedic surgeon; Dr. Jeff Wade, of the Back in Action back rehabilitation center; and Dr. Gary Counselman, a chiropractor recommended to Brobst by Dr. Warta. Jerry Zook provided a vocational assessment/evaluation of Brobst.
Dr. Counselman and Dr. Warta each estimated Brobst's whole body impairment from the back injury at 5 percent, and Dr. Counselman recommended that Brobst discontinue future employment as an LPN if she would have to lift patients or stand or walk for extended periods. Dr. Shaw's work restrictions for Brobst include no lifting over 20 pounds, standing or sitting for long periods, or repetitive bending, twisting, or lifting. These work restrictions prevent employment as an LPN because of the nature of the work. Dr. Shaw estimated that Brobst had a 6 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole, with 2 percent attributable to her neck problems and 4 percent attributable to her back injury. In addition, Dr. Shaw estimated that half of the 6 percent impairment was attributable to the April 14 incident and half was attributable to the October 12 incident. Dr. Shaw believed the ankle injury had been resolved and that there was no permanent impairment to the ankle.
Brobst filed workers compensation claims alleging injuries occurring on April 14, October 12, and October 30-31, 1990. Brighton Place and Church Mutual impleaded the Fund.
The ALJ found that the April 14, 1990, injuries arose out of and in the course of Brobst's employment and designated the injury a 4 percent permanent partial general bodily disability, entitling Brobst to a total award of $3,436.20, with no designation for work disability because Brobst did not miss any work as a result of this first accident. The ALJ found that the October 12, 1990, Washburn injuries also arose out of and in the course of Brobst's employment and found Brobst's work disability or permanent partial general bodily disability to be 71.03 percent, entitling Brobst to an award of $60,271.81. The ALJ found no compensable work injuries for the October 30-31, 1990, claim. The Fund was ordered to bear 33.33 percent of the total award on the two compensable claims.
Brighton Place and Church Mutual requested review by the Board, raising several issues, including whether the Washburn injuries were compensable and whether Brobst suffered a 71.03 percent work disability following the Washburn accident. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, except with regard to the work disability rating, which the Board lowered to 21 percent. Brobst appeals to this court, seeking reinstatement of the ALJ's work disability award, and Brighton Place and Church Mutual cross-appeal on the issue of whether the October 12 Washburn injuries arose out of and in the course of Brobst's employment.
The Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, specifically K.S.A. 77-621(c), provides the grounds upon which relief may be granted in appeals of workers compensation awards entered on or after October 1, 1993. See K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 44-556(a).
"(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole . . . ." K.S.A. 77-621(c).
Although this court may substitute its judgment for that of the Board on questions of law, on disputed issues of fact, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determine if there is substantial competent evidence to support the Board's determinations. Helms v. Pendergast, 21 Kan. App. 2d 303, Syl. ¶ 3, 899 P.2d 501 (1995).
Brighton Place and Church Mutual appeal the Board's decision that the injuries sustained in the October 12, 1990, Washburn accident arose out of and in the course of Brobst's employment. The question of whether there has been an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact, and its determination will not be disturbed by an appellate court where there is substantial evidence to sustain it. Harris v. Bethany Medical Center, 21 Kan. App. 2d 804, Syl. ¶ 1, 909 P.2d 657 (1995).
In employment covered by workers compensation laws, an employer must compensate an employee for personal injuries incurred by the employee through accidents arising out of and in the course of employment. Kindel v. Ferco Rental, Inc., 258 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 2, 899 P.2d 1058 (1995); see K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 44-501(a). To affirm the Board's decision on this issue, this court must find substantial competent evidence to support the conclusion that attendance at the Washburn seminar was within the scope of Brobst's employment.
"The two phrases arising 'out of' and 'in the course of' employment, as used in our Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., have separate and distinct meanings . . . . The phrase 'out of' employment points to the cause or origin of the accident and requires some causal connection between the accidental injury and the employment. . . . [A]n injury arises 'out of' employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations, and incidents of the employment. The phrase 'in the course of' employment relates to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred and means the injury happened while the worker was at work in the employer's service. [Citations omitted.]" 258 Kan. at 278.
Brighton Place and Church Mutual first argue that the Washburn seminar was not an incident of Brobst's employment. An employee's participation in educational or training programs or seminars may be considered within the scope of employment where such participation was clearly contemplated as incidental to the employment either as a matter of custom or under the contract of employment. 1A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 27.31(a), (c) (1996).
In Blair v. Shaw, 171 Kan. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951), an auto mechanic employed by a Chevrolet dealership died in an automobile accident on the highway while making the return trip to Fort Scott from Pittsburg, where he and his co-workers had attended an annual auto mechanics examination. The issue was whether the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court examined several circumstances in making its decision.
It was the policy and custom of Chevrolet to give an annual exam for auto mechanics employed by various Chevrolet agencies; the practice had existed for 15 years. Mechanics passing the written exam received certificates which made them more employable and which allowed their employers to advertise that they employed factory-trained mechanics. Although the claimant's employer in Blair provided the information on the time and location of the exam and paid for the gasoline used in the commute, the employer did not provide any other form of compensation for attendance, did not give definite instructions as to whether attendance was required, and had nothing to do with the giving of the exam. Nevertheless, attendance at the examination had become so common and accepted as to amount to a custom; employees expected to go and their employers expected them to. Under these facts and circumstances, the court concluded that the annual trip to take the exam was contemplated by the employment and had become so expected as to become incidental to the employment within the meaning of the Workers Compensation Act. 171 Kan. at 528.
In Brobst's case, attendance at continuing education seminars like the one at Washburn was clearly contemplated by her employment with Brighton Place. Brobst's position with Brighton Place depended upon Brobst maintaining her status as an LPN. In order to maintain that status, Brobst had to acquire 30 hours of continuing education credits. Although Brighton Place did not tell Brobst that she had to specifically attend the Washburn seminar, it posted the information regarding the seminar, knew that Brobst had chosen to attend that particular seminar to obtain some of her needed credits, and paid her tuition. Under these circumstances, and in light of the Blair holding, there was substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that Brobst's attendance at the Washburn seminar was an incident of her employment for workers compensation purposes.
"The words 'arising out of and in the course of employment' as used in the workers compensation act shall not be construed to include injuries to the employee occurring while the employee is on the way to assume the duties of employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which injury is not the employer's negligence."
"An employee shall not be construed as being on the way to assume the duties of employment or having left such duties at a time when the worker is on the premises of the employer or on the only available route to or from work which is a route involving a special risk or hazard and which is a route not used by the public except in dealings with the employer."
For purposes of K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 44-508(f), Kansas narrowly construes the term premises to mean a place controlled by the employer. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 256 Kan. 36, Syl. ¶ 1, 883 P.2d 768 (1994).
Brobst's accident would not fall under either of the statutory exceptions. She was not on her employer's premises when she was injured and was not using a special hazard route within the meaning of 44-508(f). If Brobst had simply been returning home from her ordinary work at Brighton Place when she twisted her ankle, and if this hypothetical accident had not qualified for either of the two statutory exceptions, Brobst would not qualify for compensation due to the going and coming rule. See generally Thompson, 256 Kan. 36 (discussing cases involving slip and fall injuries incurred while going or coming from work and finding no compensation where special premises and special hazard exceptions did not apply). However, Kansas case law recognizes a distinction between accidents incurred during the normal going and coming from a regular permanent work location and accidents incurred during going and coming in an employment in which the going and coming is an incident of the employment itself.
Under this third qualification to the going and coming rule, injuries incurred while going and coming from places where work-related tasks occur can be compensable where the traveling is (a) intrinsic to the profession or (b) required in order to complete some special work-related errand or special-purpose trip in the scope of the employment. This third exception has been noted in several Kansas cases, many of which post-date the 1968 premises and special hazard amendments to the Workers Compensation Act. See, e.g., Kindel, 258 Kan. at 277; Angleton v. Starkan, Inc., 250 Kan. 711, 718, 828 P.2d 933 (1992); Bienz, Administratrix v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 195 Kan. 422, 427-29, 407 P.2d 222 (1965); Blair, 171 Kan. at 528; Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 417-18, 103 P.2d 837 (1940); and Messenger v. Sage Drilling Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 435, 436-37, 680 P.2d 556, rev. denied 235 Kan. 1042 (1984).
"Having concluded that the trip to Pittsburg to take the examination was a part of the employment, it seems entirely logical to conclude that the entire undertaking is to be considered from a unitary standpoint rather than divisible. To take the examination it was necessary for decedents to make the round trip to Pittsburg. That involved travel by private automobile--going and returning--one project, so to speak, and included the normal traffic hazards inherent in such an undertaking. The act does not require that the injury be sustained on or about the employer's premises. We think appellants' contention that the 'employment' was concluded the moment decedents finished the written examination and laid down their pencils is too narrow, particularly in view of the liberal construction of the act to which the workman is entitled under our many decisions." 171 Kan. at 529-30.
The Board in this case relied on this language and on the holding of Blair in arriving at its decision on this issue, and we can find no fault in this reliance. The rule in favor of liberally construing the workers compensation statutes to award compensation where it is reasonably possible to do so is still recognized in Kansas, and Blair is still good law. See Kindel, 258 Kan. at 277 (citing Blair as authority for this exception to the going and coming rule). Having concluded that the Washburn trip, like the trip to Pittsburg in Blair, was part of the employment, Blair requires viewing the entire undertaking as indivisible. Like the Blair employment, the employment in this case did not end with the final words spoken at the seminar. While Brobst's injury did not occur in a moving vehicle on the highway as had occurred in Blair, the undertaking required not only traveling in the vehicle, but also traversing on foot the distance between the seminar classroom and the place where the vehicle was parked. That on-foot portion of the trip included all the normal hazards involved in negotiating lots, streets, curbs, and walkways. If the whole trip is indivisible, then it includes all the normal risks involved in completing it, and Brobst's injuries should be compensable.
Brobst appeals the Board's decision that her work disability was only 21 percent. She asserts that the ALJ properly determined that her work disability was 71.03 percent. The existence, nature, and extent of the disability of an injured worker is a question of fact. Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 21 Kan. App. 2d 750, 756, 907 P.2d 923 (1995), rev. denied 259 Kan. 927 (1996). The question is whether there is substantial evidence to support this factual finding by the Board. Substantial evidence in such a case is evidence that possesses something of substance and relevant consequence or evidence that furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues presented can be reasonably resolved. Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 247 Kan. 407, Syl. ¶ 3, 799 P.2d 1011 (1990).
"The extent of a permanent partial general disability shall be the extent, expressed as a percentage, to which the ability of the employee to perform work in the open labor market and to earn comparable wages has been reduced, taking into consideration the employee's education, training, experience and capacity for rehabilitation, except that in any event the extent of permanent partial general disability shall not be less than percentage of functional impairment." K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 44-510e(a).
In determining the extent of permanent partial general disability, or work disability, both the reduction of a claimant's ability to work in the open labor market and the ability to earn comparable wages must be considered, Hughes, 247 Kan. 407, Syl. ¶ 5, but the weight to be given to each side must be upheld if supported by substantial competent evidence, Brown v. City of Wichita, 17 Kan. App. 2d 72, Syl. ¶ 2, 832 P.2d 365, rev. denied 251 Kan. 937 (1992). Determining the percentage assigned to each element based on the evidence and then averaging the two percentages to arrive at a final disability percentage is an acceptable method of arriving at the extent of permanent partial general disability under the statute. See Hughes, 247 Kan. at 422.
"The client's previous experience as a Certified Nurses Aide, Certification Medication Aide and Licensed Practical Nurse would indicate she possesses transferable skills in the area of medical terminology. Based on the restrictions submitted by Joseph L. Shaw, M.D. and if only these restrictions were to apply it would seem reasonable the client could perform work as a Medical Records Clerk or perform clerical and secretarial work in a medical office or doctor's office. However, since the client has no previous experience in clerical work she would be required to take a nine month re-education and training program either as a Medical Records Clerk or Medical Secretary. Upon completion of such training the client could expect to earn, based on entry level wages in this field, an average of $240.00 a week. After working for several years in this area the average weekly wage could reach $298.00 per week. The entry level wage would not return the client to comparable wage, however, comparable wage could be achieved with several years of experience. If the client were not to complete a re-education and training program and were to obtain work in the open labor market, entry level positions could be obtained. For example, Cashier positions could be obtained that would be within the restrictions assessed by Dr. Shaw, however, these are entry level positions and would pay minimum wage of $4.50 per hour."
"The client is a 48 year old female who was employed as a LPN at Brighton Place North until the injury on October 31, 1990. Dr. Shaw, the treating physician, diagnosed chronic mechanical back dysfunction. The client worked previously as a Cook, a Barmaid, a Certified Nurses Aide and a Certified Medication Aide. Her employer, Brighton Place North, is unable to take the client back due to the physical restrictions. Any effort to identify transferable skills is, at this time impossible, as the client has been too ill to take part in further assessments. The client appears to have significant medical problems unrelated to her industrial injury including a diagnosis of congestive heart failure, COPD and tachycardia. With existing transferable skills and applying only the restrictions directly related to her accident, the client may be employable, however, upon consideration of her complete medical condition, it is my opinion she is not placeable. Further vocational rehabilitation services would not benefit this client."
"Mr. Zook does not offer an opinion concerning claimant's loss of access to the open labor market as a result of her work-related injuries. It is apparent that she cannot return to her regular job duties as an LPN with the respondent. However, it is not apparent from the record what labor market loss could be assigned to this claim. . . .
"[T]he record is lacking with regard to evidence of labor market loss. Mr. Zook's opinion to the effect that claimant is essentially unemployable relates to her overall condition at the time that he evaluated her from a vocational standpoint. This included the medical problems claimant developed or which were diagnosed after her last day of working for the respondent and which were conditions unrelated to her work-related injuries. Nowhere does he give an opinion of labor market loss utilizing the restrictions of Dr. Shaw . . . which result from the work-related injuries alone. As such, the Appeals Board finds that the claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof with regard to the loss of labor market access."
Although work-related aggravation of preexisting conditions can be compensable, Harris v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 334, 336, 678 P.2d 178 (1984), workers compensation is not intended to provide compensation for debilitating medical conditions not created or exacerbated by work-related accidents or conditions. See Boeckmann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 210 Kan. 733, 738, 504 P.2d 625 (1972); and West-Mills v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 561, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 859 P.2d 382 (1993). Nevertheless, one factor to consider in determining work disability is the employee's capacity for rehabilitation, K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 44-510e(a), and this would seem to require consideration of physical and other limitations unrelated to the work injury which limit the capacity for rehabilitation. To this extent, Brobst's nonwork-related medical problems are relevant in determining her loss of access to the labor market and, ultimately, her work disability rating. However, these unrelated conditions should not take over the entire focus, allowing claimants essentially to be compensated for conditions not arising out of and in the course of their employment. The Board was attempting to avoid such an improper result.
In workers compensation proceedings, the claimant has the burden of proof to establish his or her right to an award of compensation and to prove the various conditions on which this right depends. K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 44-501(a). Brobst had the burden to provide the Board with adequate evidence regarding the degree of loss of access to the labor market attributable to her work-related injuries. The Board found no substantial evidence regarding what portion of claimant's unemployability was attributable to her compensable injuries and thus assigned a zero percentage to that aspect of the formula. After averaging the 0.00 percent with the 42.05 percent wage loss figure and rounding down, the Board arrived at the 21 percent work disability rating.
The restrictions placed on claimant as a result of her work-related injuries probably subjected her to some loss of access to the labor market, but how much is indeterminable. Claimant's experts suggested no percentages, and claimant failed to offer some reasonable basis upon which the Board could assign a percentage to this aspect of her claim. The Board was not required to hazard a guess in the absence of competent evidence. The burden was on Brobst to prove each of the elements of her claim. She failed in that regard, and the Board should not have been required to pick a number out of thin air without some basis for determining what number would be too high and what number would be too low. Negative findings will seldom be set aside if the evidence is limited in quantity and its weight and credibility may be questionable, or if the evidence may be disregarded for any reason. Harris, 9 Kan. App. 2d at 335. The evidence in this case suffered from such limitations, and the Board's negative finding and its subsequent work disability determination should therefore be upheld.
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Previously filed as an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court granted a motion to publish by an order dated November 13, 1997, pursuant to Rule 7.04 (1997 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 44).

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Contra Costa County — Contra Costa County Supervisor Candace Andersen joins the East Bay Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, and many other local and state leaders in endorsing businesswoman Debora Allen’s campaign for California’s 14th Assembly district.
Allen is running on a platform bringing more accountability, transparency, and efficiency to California’s state government.
“I’m honored to have the support of Supervisor Andersen, who has been a tireless champion for us on the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors,” Allen said.
The 14th Assembly District includes Concord, Clayton, Martinez, Pleasant Hill and portions of Pittsburg and Walnut Creek in Contra Costa County, as well as Benicia and Vallejo in Solano County. To learn more about Allen’s campaign visit www.deboraallen.com.
Concord – On Monday, May 16, 2016, at 2:36 AM, CPD officers responded to Newhall Park for the report of a body in the pond at that location. A person in the park saw the body and called the police. Upon arrival, officers found an adult female in the water. They pulled her from the water and determined she was deceased.
Major Crimes Unit Detectives were called out and assumed the investigation. It was determined that the female was the victim of a homicide. She has been identified as 25-year-old Concord resident Poinsettia Parks.
Detectives have identified 26-year-old Erick Lamar Nelson as a suspect in this case. There is currently a warrant for Nelson’s arrest and he should be considered armed and dangerous. Nelson is described as a black male adult, 6’1”, 185 pounds with black hair and brown eyes. Nelson was known to the victim.
Detectives are also trying to locate a black, four door 2003 Kia Spectra with CA license plate 5ENY919. Nelson may be in possession of this vehicle.
If Nelson or the Kia are seen, please do not approach and immediately call 911. Anyone with information about his case is asked to call Detective Greg Pardella at (925) 603-5922. Anyone wishing to remain anonymous may call the Concord Police Department Tip-Line at (925)-603-5836.
County Supervisor Federal Glover did not show up for a recent District 5 candidates’ forum sponsored by the League of Women Voters and televised on Contra Costa TV. His absence proved to be a metaphor for the most common refrain among the other four candidates: Glover’s lack of leadership in his district on a variety of issues, including warnings of “horrendous” gridlock when the Concord Naval Weapons Station property is developed.
Glover has served on the Board of Supervisors for 16 years and is seeking a fifth term. He has missed numerous governmental meetings in recent years due to health problems, including a heart and kidney transplant last year.
None of the other candidates mentioned Glover by name. But they all criticized the lack of leadership in his district, which snakes along the northern county waterfront from Antioch to Hercules.
One of Menesini’s top concerns is lack of county input into the planned development of the Concord Naval Weapons Station property at Highway 4 and Willow Pass Road.
“We do have a huge problem that is about to unfold with respect to the Highway 4 corridor, which goes from Hercules out to Antioch,” said Menesini. “The city of Concord is proposing to build a city on top of Willow Pass Road: 12,000 homes, 6 million square feet of commercial space – and not one provision for how transportation is going to be mitigated.
Romero agreed. “Transportation gridlock in the Concord area is absolutely going to be horrendous as the Concord Naval Weapons Station comes on board,” he said. “I feel that the Concord Naval Weapons Station is a failed project right now because of all of the influx on the city council in Concord. I think that the board should be taking a leadership step and being a part of that process.
Farias advocated moving jobs to where the homes are.
“I think [the solution] is passing good policy to create livable communities,” she said. “Live and work in your communities. We have become a community of commuters, which has contributed to a lot of our freeway congestion. I think if we would have had a lot better regional planning within our communities in addition to really creating the job centers. We burden a system that is inadequately funded.
Dandridge said the focus should be on transportation improvements.
Oppose the proposed twin tunnels project transferring water from north of the Delta to southern California.
Oppose moving the urban limit line to allow more development on agricultural and open space lands.
Support providing more affordable housing.
Agree that the county has addressed its pension funding issue for now, but more compensation adjustments may be needed down the road.
Agree that the county supervisor’s job requires more than 40 hours a week.
The entire candidates’ forum can be viewed on Contra Costa TV. CCTV is available to subscribers of AT&T U-verse on Channel 99. Comcast subscribers can watch CCTV on Channel 27. Wave (formerly Astound) subscribers can watch on Channel 32. Following is the schedule for the remainder of May: Sundays – 9:00 AM; Mondays – 8:00 PM; Wednesdays – 12:00 PM; Fridays – 3:00 PM.
In the race for Contra Costa County Supervisor in District 5, the incumbent, Federal Glover has an overwhelming lead in campaign funding in his bid for a fifth term. Reports were due on Thursday, April 28 covering the period of January 1 through April 23, 2016 and only three of the five candidates submitted one.
Glover also has an Officeholder Account which had $68,918.40 in the bank at the beginning of the year. However, he stated today, Thursday, May 12, 2016, that (correcting the record from previous misinformation provided to this reporter) those funds can not be spent on his re-election campaign.
“I wish I had that money for my campaign,” Glover said with a laugh.
The other two who submitted reports were Martinez Vice Mayor AnaMarie Avila Farias, who was in a distant second, having raised $7,000 and Hercules Mayor Dan Romero, who reported raising $5,655.
Neither former Martinez Mayor Mike Menesini nor Martinez resident Conrad Dandridge submitted financial reports.
A supervisor candidate’s campaign committee is required to file a Form 460 financial report to the County Clerk’s Office, if they have raised or spent $2,000 or more in an election. However, the filing and ballot statement fees are not counted against that amount.
“I have just started raising money after the 23rd but, I turned one in anyhow for transparency,” he added. “I hadn’t raised $2,000 but I am at that threshold, now. I got donations, last week.
Glover’s largest contribution during the reporting period was $5,000 from I.B.E.W. Local Union No. 302 PAC. Glover spent a total of $41,915.74 from both accounts, with almost half of that, $20,245.67 paid to Rossi Communications, for his campaign consultant Mary Jo Rossi. He ended the period with $25,388.35 in the bank.
Avila Farias’s largest contribution was $5,000 from the Professional Firefighters in the county. She showed no expenses, although she has large campaign signs up in the District.
She also stated she had received another $5,000 contribution from the Deputy Sheriffs Association, since the reporting period ended.
Romero’s largest contributions were $1,675 received from Republic Services, one of the garbage companies in the county, and $1,500 from Sonnikson Stordahl Construction in Martinez.
Menesini did not respond to efforts to contact him for this story.
Please see the reports, below. Additional reports for Glover have been added for the periods he raised funds for his 2016 re-election campaign committee. All of his reports prior to that period can be seen on the County Elections Office website.
After hearing input from the public at their special meeting on April 13, as well as a public apology from Lennar Urban CEO Kofi Bonner for the causing the controversy over contributions to Councilman Tim Grayson’s Assembly campaign, the Concord City Council, sitting as the Local Reuse Authority (LRA) for the Concord Naval Weapons Station, directed staff to meet with representatives from Lennar Urban to revise their Term Sheet.
Staff will make a presentation on the matter at tonight’s council meeting. The council will also have the opportunity to finalize their decision on selecting Lennar as the Master Developer for Phase I of the weapons station Reuse Plan.
Furthermore, staff states that Lennar is committed to sign the revised Term Sheet, should the council vote to select Lennar as the Master Developer.
Following is the agenda item with a link to the complete, 175 page staff report.
The public is entitled to address the City Council on items appearing on the agenda before or during the City Council’s consideration of that item. Each speaker will be limited to approximately three minutes.
Presentation – of a revised Lennar Term Sheet and consideration of staff’s recommendation that City Council select Lennar Concord LLC as the Master Developer for the Development Phase One Property at the Concord Naval Weapons Station and proceed to the Disposition and Development Agreement (DDA) stage of the negotiation period, as defined in the Agreement to Negotiate between the Local Reuse Authority and Lennar. Report by Guy Bjerke, Director of Community Reuse Planning.
The council meeting begins at 6:30 p.m. at the City Council Chambers at Concord City Hall, 1950 Parkside Drive. Meetings can also be viewed on Concord TV, available on Comcast Channel 28, Wave Channel 29, and U-verse Channel 99.
District Attorney Mark Peterson announced, Friday that after an extensive investigation, 11 felony charges were filed against Nathan and Sarah Moore, owners of NRM Renovations, Inc., in Concord for workers’ compensation fraud, grand theft of labor and payroll tax fraud.
The investigation originally began with a series of wage and labor complaints to the U.S. Department of Labor in June of 2015. Allegations included that workers were not being paid for work they completed doing hotel renovations for NRM Renovations. The Department of Labor forwarded these complaints to the District Attorney’s office, and a joint investigation of suspected labor violations began. The investigation expanded to include three state agencies. The CA Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) assisted in interviewing the employees. The CA Department of Insurance (CDI) investigated allegations regarding the underpayment of workers’ compensation insurance premiums. The Employment and Development Department (EDD) helped investigate tax and payroll issues.
NRM Renovations is alleged to owe over $30,000 in back wages to several employees, approximately $250,000 in workers’ compensation premiums to several different insurance companies, and back taxes to the EDD on over $1,000,000 in wages.
Charges include three counts of violating Insurance Code §11760(a) (Workers’ Compensation fraud), and one violation each of Insurance Code §11880(a) (Workers’ Compensation fraud), Penal Code §487 (grand theft of labor), Unemployment Insurance Code (“UI”) §2108 (nonpayment of contributions), UI Code §2177.5 (failure to file a return), and UI 2118.5 (Failure to account and pay over taxes). Due to the amount of loss, the defendants were also charged with an Aggravated White Collar Crime enhancement under Penal Code §186.11(a)(3).
Multiple agencies assisted the Contra Costa District Attorney’s Office with this investigation including: the US Department of Labor, the Department of Industrial Relations, the Department of Insurance, the Employment and Development Department, the State Compensation Insurance Fund, Norguard and Benchmark Insurance Companies.
Washington, DC – On Thursday, the Committee on Armed Services in the U.S. House of Representatives passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 4909, which authorizes our nation’s defense spending. Included in the bill is a provision offered by Congressman Mark DeSaulnier (CA-11), which would require the Navy to investigate the circumstances surrounding the treatment of sailors at the Port Chicago Naval Magazine in Concord, California. The NDAA now moves to the floor of the House for consideration.
“Today marks an important milestone in the continued fight for recognition of the Port Chicago 50. A provision requiring the Navy to investigate whether racial bias was experienced by this group and to report their findings to Congress passed in the Armed Services Committee and is one step closer to becoming law,” said DeSaulnier.
While facing institutional segregation in the Navy, 435 African American sailors, who were not properly trained or supported, were killed when a cargo vessel exploded. This incident accounted for more than 15 percent of all African American Naval casualties during World War II. When 50 of these men understandably refused to return to the unsafe working conditions that killed their fellow sailors, they were discriminately charged and convicted of mutiny.
“I appreciate the support this measure received from my colleagues, and I will continue working to move this legislative effort forward until all of these sailors are completely exonerated,” DeSaulnier concluded.
Photo of suspect holding gun during the early Monday morning robbery at the California Grand Casino in Pacheco. photos courtesy of CCCSheriff.
Vehicle of suspect in robbery at California Grand Casino in Pacheco on Monday.
On Monday, morning April 25 at about 4:45, Office of the Contra Costa County Sheriff dispatch received a report that an armed robbery was taking place at the California Grand Casino at the 5900 block of Pacheco Boulevard in Pacheco.
Deputies responded along with officers from nearby law enforcement agencies. A perimeter was set up and employees and customers were evacuated.
Officers conducted a security sweep of the building. The suspect was not located. There were no injuries and the loss is still being determined.
Suspect description: Male, 6′, approximately 200 pounds, wearing a full face Halloween mask, black hoodie jacket, dark pants, orange gloves, armed with a semi-automatic rifle.
Anyone with any information on this robbery is asked to contact the Office of the Sheriff Investigation Division at (925) 313-2662. (See more photos on the County Sheriff’s Facebook page).
Proceeds from the IICF CAPP Educational Forum will benefit child abuse prevention programs serving Contra Costa and Alameda Counties.


1. Acts of Congress are to be construed, if possible, so as to avoid grave doubts of their constitutionality. P. 268 U. S. 251.
gross value of his estate as a basis for fixing the transfer tax thereon, though the policies be payable to beneficiaries other than the estate, and allowing the executor to recover from such beneficiaries their proportions of such tax and making them personally responsible therefor if not paid when due, are to be construed as inapplicable to transactions antedating the passage of the Act. P. 268 U. S. 251.
3. A declaration in an Act that a provision in it shall be retroactive helps the conclusion that the same provision in an earlier Act, lacking such declaration, was not retroactive. P. 268 U. S. 252.
Error to a judgment recovered in the district court by the defendants in error in an action to recover the amount of taxes collected by duress.
for the plaintiffs for the whole sum demanded. 298 F. 803. The case was tried without a jury, and the court adopted as its findings, among others, the following facts which were agreed: Henry C. Frick died on December 2, 1919, and his will was admitted to probate on December 6. There were outstanding policies upon his life, four payable to his wife and seven to his daughter. The total amount received under them was $474,629.52, and as his estate apart from this was more than ten million dollars, an additional tax of $108,657.88, or twenty-five percent of the sum received less the statutory deduction of $40,000, was required to be paid. All the policies were taken out before the Revenue Act was passed. The largest one, for $114,000, was a paid-up policy issued in 1901, payable to Mrs. Frick without power in Mr. Frick to change the beneficiary. Another, similar so far as material, was for $50,000. Others were assigned or the beneficiary named (Frick's estate) was changed to Frick's wife or daughter before the date of the statute. All premiums were paid by Mr. Frick, and some seem to have been paid after the statute went into force.
"the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property . . . (f) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life, and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
These last words are the ground of the Collector's claim.
"If any part of the gross estate consists of proceeds of policies of insurance upon the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds, in excess of $40,000, of such policies bear to the net estate."
"By § 409, a personal liability is imposed upon the beneficiaries if the tax is not paid when due. The defendants in error say that, if these policies are covered by the statute these sections show that the beneficiaries are taxed upon their own property, under the guise of a tax upon the transfer of his estate by Mr. Frick, and that this is taking their property without due process of law, citing Matter of Pell, 171 N.Y. 48, and other cases. In view of their liability, the objection cannot be escaped by calling the reference to their receipts a mere measure of the transfer tax. The interest of the beneficiaries is established by statutes of the states controlling the insurance, and is not disputed. It also is strongly urged that the tax would be a direct tax. In view of our conclusion, it is not necessary to state the position of the defendants in error more in detail."
to transactions taking place after it was passed, but the general principle "that laws are not to be considered as applying to cases which arose before their passage" is preserved when to disregard it would be to impose an unexpected liability that, if known, might have induced those concerned to avoid it and to use their money in other ways. Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 258 U. S. 534. This case and the following ones, Union Trust Co. v. Wardell, 258 U. S. 537, Levy v. Wardell, 258 U. S. 542, and Knox v. McElligott, 258 U. S. 546, go far toward deciding the one how before us. They also indicate that the Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, § 302(h); 43 Stat. 253, 305, making(g) (the equivalent of (f) above) apply to past transactions, does not help, but, if anything, hinders the Collector's construction of the present law. Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S. 602.


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(b)A minor may file suit under this chapter in the minor’s own name. The minor need not be represented by next friend. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995.
(b) A parent of the petitioner must verify the petition, except that if a managing conservator or guardian of the person has been appointed, the petition must be verified by that person. If the person who is to verify the petition is unavailable or that person’s whereabouts are unknown, the amicus attorney or attorney ad litem shall verify the petition. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20,1995.
The petitioner shall file the petition in the county in which the petitioner resides.
Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995.
The court shall appoint an amicus attorney or attorney ad litem to represent the interest of the petitioner at the hearing. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995.
The court by order, or the Texas Supreme Court by rule or order, may remove the disabilities of minority of a minor, including any restriction imposed by Chapter 32, if the court or the Texas Supreme Court finds the removal to be in the best interest of the petitioner. The order or rule must state the limited or general purposes for which disabilities are removed. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1303, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
§31.006: EFFECT OF GENERAL REMOVAL.
Except for specific constitutional and statutory age requirements, a minor whose disabilities are removed for general purposes has the capacity of an adult, including the capacity to contract. Except as provided by federal law, all educational rights accorded to the parent of a student, including the right to make education decisions under Section 151.001(a)(10), transfer to the minor whose disabilities are removed for general purposes. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 767, § 9, eff. June 13, 2001.
§31.007: REGISTRATION OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE OR NATION.
(a) A nonresident minor who has had the disabilities of minority removed in the state of the minor’s residence may file a certified copy of the order removing disabilities in the deed records of any county in this state.
(b) When a certified copy of the order of a court of another state or nation is filed, the minor has the capacity of an adult, except as provided by Section 31.006 and by the terms of the order. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995.


text:
Purple Innovation, LLC, v. Honest Reviews, LLC. ,No. 2:17-cv-138-DB, Feb. 12, 2018 Order (D. Utah 2018).
Usa Power, LLC, Usa Power Partners, LLC, and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, v. Pacificorp, Usa Power, LLC, Usa Power Partners, LLC, and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, v. Jody L. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP. ,No. 20130442, March. 16, 2016 Order (D. Utah 2016).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Biamp Systems Corp. , No. 09-4097, Aug. 8, 2011 Opinion (10th Cir. 2011).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Bowers et al. , No. 09-4092, June 27, 2011 Opinion (10th Cir. 2011).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang et al. , No. 2:07cv37 TC, Aug. 13, 2010 Order (D. Utah 2010).
MP Nexlevel, LLC v. Codale Elec. Supply, Inc. et al. , No. 2:08cv727 CW, Apr. 26, 2010 Order (D. Utah 2010).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang et al. , No. 2:07cv37 TC, Nov. 19, 2009 Order (D. Utah 2009).
Macris et al. v. Sevea International, Inc. et al. , No. CIV 070903010, Aug. 13, 2009 Order (3d Judicial District Ct., Salt Lake Co., Utah 2009).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang et al. , No. 2:07cv37 TC, Apr. 20, 2009 Order (D. Utah 2009).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang et al. , No. 2:07cv37 TC, Apr. 8, 2009 Order (D. Utah 2009).
MP Nexlevel, LLC v. Codale Elec. Supply, Inc. et al. , No. CIV 08-273 MCA/CG, Aug. 4, 2008 Memorandum Opinion and Order (D.N.M. 2008).
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang et al. , No. 2:07cv37 TC, Oct. 30, 2007 Order (D. Utah 2007).
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc. , 129 P.3d 287 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
Zoller Labs., LLC v. NBTY, Inc. , No. 03-4252, 2004 WL 2288152 (10th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004).
Covey v. Covey , 80 P.3d 553 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Wesson v. Huntsman Corp. , 206 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2000).
Fitz v. Synthes (USA) ,990 P.2d 391 (Utah 1999).
McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah , 980 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Rosenwinkel v. Bennett , No. 971521-CA, 1998 WL 1758347 (Utah Ct. App. Nov 27, 1998).
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy , 110 P.3d 168 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy , 54 P.3d 1165 (Utah 2002).
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc. , 37 P.3d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc. , 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001).
Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc. , 344 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Utah 2004).
Young & Assocs. Public Relations, LLC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.R.D. 521 (D. Utah 2003).
United States v. Dunne , 134 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Utah 2001).
USA Power, LLC et al. v. PacifiCorp, et al. , May 14, 2010 Opinion (Utah 2010).

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