text:
Within the Patagonian distribution of the species, a distinct stock is described from the Chilean coast down to the southern tip of the continent (IFOP 2018) . As only a small portion of its distribution lies within the Argentinian EEZ, the stock is managed and assessed by Chile.
This is a discrete population with clear boundaries that mostly don’t go outside of the Chilean jurisdiction, which facilitates the management of this fishery.
There is a management plan in place since 2016 with clear management objectives.
There is a plan for the reduction of discards and bycatch in place since 2017, and good information on bycatch levels especially in the industrial fisheries.
There is a seasonal fishing ban in August every year.
The resource is officially recognized as overexploited.
Illegal and unreported fishing is officially recognized as a real problem for the stock by Subpesca (Subsecretary of Fisheries), the Management Authority..
Fishing mortality rates have been above the recommended FMSY.
There is no detailed information on the impact of the fishing gears used to harvest southern hake on bottom habitats, although it is supposed to be low.
Engage with authorities in prompt implementation of the approved management plan for the fishery.
Ensure adequate reporting of catches (landing and discards) and bycatch, especially from the artisanal fleet operating in the fishery.
Improve the regulatory compliance of the fishery to eliminate all IUU fishing, especially unreported landings by the artisanal fleet.
The IFOP is in charge, since 1992, of monitoring and evaluating this and other fisheries in Chile, including stock assessment and evaluation of advised quotas. Advice is provided through reports produced by the CCT-RDZSA (Scientific and Technical Committee for the Demersal Resources Zone South and Austral), which bases the decisions and advice on the stock assessment reports elaborated annually by IFOP and the management plan.
The advised quota taking into account discards for 2018 was 16,334-20,418 tons for the fishery unit (which is itself divided in two areas, one north - between 41° 28,6’S and 47°S - and one south -between 47°S and 57°S- and each of those divided into an inshore and an offshore area), but given the overexploited status of the resource, CCT-RDZSA suggested to adopt the lower end of the range. Outside the fishery unit (north to 41° 28,6’S) , the advised range was 86.4-108 tons (with no advice on adopting the lower or upper end of the range) (CCT-RDZSA 2017) .
The decision on quotas was based on the implementation of the decision rule regarding F as stated in the management plan, so that F=FMSY when SSB/SSB0>0.2, as currently is the case (SSB/SSB0=0.31). However, the CCT-RDZSA argued that applying such a rule may be insufficient when the stock is considered over-exploited (i.e. SSB/SSB0 is between 0.2 and 0.4), and under these circumstances, the CT-RDZSA suggested that F should be smaller than FMSY (CCT-RDZSA 2017) . FMSY as estimated in the last stock assessment was 0.26 yr-1 whereas SSBMSY was set at 167,456 tons (IFOP 2018) .
Southern hake was considered overexploited in the last stock assessment conducted in 2017 (IFOP 2018) . Spawning biomass as estimated from stock assessment models was 125,000 tons which represents 31% of virginal spawning biomass levels. This is considerably lower than the target reference point (SSBMSY=40%SSB0=167,456 tons). Fishing mortality levels in 2016 were 0.36 yr-1, i.e. above the F target reference point (FMSY=0.26).
According to the last acoustic survey, biomass in the spawning area in 2017 was 96,082 tons, which is the highest value since 2001 and 43% higher than estimated biomass in 2016 (CCT-RDZSA 2017) . Abundance was estimated as 33,988,081 individuals (32% males; 68% females), which is 54.4% higher than the previous year (CCT-RDZSA 2017) .
In absolute terms, IFOP reported an average discard of 5500 tons/yr during 2000-2016 in the trawler component of the industrial fishery and 1300 tons/year during 2000-2016 in the artisanal long-line fishery (IFOP 2018) .
The industrial fraction can only operate with trawls or longlines. Artisanal fishers can only operate with longlines with a maximum hook size of 18mm. No new licenses are granted (Subpesca 2014) . Other current management regulations include a closed fishing season in August every year (Subpesca 1996) , a minimum mesh size of 130 mm in trawls nets and a minimum catch size of 60 cm (Subpesca 1990) . A plan for the reduction of discards (Subpesca 2017) and bycatch is in place since 2017 (Subpesca 2017) . The plan established the prohibition of discarding except under the conditions stated in article 7B of the General Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Subpesca 2014) . More specific measures contained in the plan are described under the Bycatch - other species section.
A quota of 108 tons was set for southern hake out of its fishery unit. Quotas are sometimes transferred between the artisanal and the industrial sector and within the artisanal sector (CCT-RDZSA 2017) . Resulting effective quotas for 2018 were 13,988 tons for the industrial sector and 6290 tons for the artisanal sector (Subpesca 2019) .
In recent years, landings have been around the level of catch quotas set by managers. However, illegal fishing and lack of compliance with current management measures have been flagged as relevant problems for the fishery for southern hake in Chile (Subpesca 2016) .
A plan for the reduction of bycatch and discards was approved in 2017. The plan was based on a study on the bycatch and discards conducted during 2015 and 2016 made by scientific observers (Bernal et al. 2017) . Results on bycatch of ETP species composition are provided separately for each component of the fishery. Chile is a member of the Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels and as such it is committed to achieve and maintain a favorable conservation status of albatrosses and petrels. The list of species to which the agreement applies includes 22 species of albatross and 9 species of petrels (ACAP 2018) .
Review permitted bycatch percentage of the roughskin skate Dipturus trachyderma and large-nose ray Zearaja chilensis during the fishing ban of these species.
Release alive all chondrichthyes especially when they have chances to survive.
In 2008, the National plan to reduce the bycatch of seabirds in longline fisheries (in Spanish) was approved by the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction (Subpesca 2007) . Some of the measures established in the Plan specifically designed for this fishery are: nocturnal deployment of fishing gears, use of long bird-scaring lines, reduce the presence of lights in the rear of the vessel so birds are not attracted and throw away fishing debris from the opposite side of the boat where fishing gears are hauled.
A plan for the reduction of discards and bycatch in the fishery of southern hake and pink cusk-eel was approved in 2017 (Subpesca 2017) . The elaboration of the plan stems from the Law of Discards (MEFT 2012) which, among other actions and objectives promoted research on historic levels of discards and bycatch that could serve as a basis for new research programs on the topic and ultimately plans for the reduction of bycatch and discards for the most important fisheries in Chile.
In the case of southern hake, the plan for the reduction of discards and bycatch (the "plan") was based on a research program for these fisheries conducted during 2015 and 2016 made by scientific observers (Bernal et al. 2017) . Results on bycatch species composition are provided separately for each component of the fishery.
The plan established a variety of management measures with the general objective of reducing bycatch and discards levels. Management measures are provided separately for 1) target species, 2) species subject to annual catch quota, fishing bans, minimum size or other management measures, 3) species subject to no regulation and 4) incidental catch (defined by Subpesca as marine mammals, reptiles and seabirds). For each of these groups of species, measures are established at five different levels. These are some of the most meaningful measures established by the plan at each level. Measures are common to any type of bycatch species (with regulations, without regulations and incidental catch) and for the industrial and artisanal fleets.
Administrative and conservation level: no discard of any bycatch species is allowed except under the conditions established in article 7B of the General Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Subpesca, 2017). These conditions do not apply in the case of incidental catch (marine mammals, seabirds and reptiles) which should be always released back to the sea except if they are severely damaged. Any allowed discard must be recorded and imputed to the catch quota if applicable.
Evaluation of the Plan: mandatory presence of onboard observers and image recording devices to detect and record any discard action (for all industrial vessels and artisanal vessels >15 m).
Dissemination and education measures: training of observers and vessels crew in the identification of bycatch species.
Best practices: help onboard observers, avoid and inform rest of the fleet about sensitive areas with high proportion of bycatch species.
Technological improvements in fishing gears: assess and improve current fishing gears and escapement devices.
The measures in the Plan are to be implemented gradually from the second semester of 2017 until 2020.
There are some other important measures directed specifically at incidental catch which are discussed under the Bycatch: ETP species section as most ETP species belong to the group of “incidental catch”. Note however that the relationship is not 1:1 and there is incidental catch which are not ETP species (e.g. South Atlantic sea lion), and ETP species which are not incidental catch (e.g. the roughskin skate Dipturus trachyderma).
An exhaustive review of previous works addressing many aspects of the bottom habitats of the Chilean continental shelf.
A list of descriptors of the abiotic and biotic characteristics of the seabed.
A characterization of the seabed using the descriptors described in the Report.
Maps with bathymetry, salinity, oxygen and bottom habitats.
Maps with granulometry and organic matter content.
Information on the presence of corals at each sampling station.
Information on the presence of fish and macrobenthos at each sampling station.
Description of the bentho-demersal community including predator-prey relationships and and ecotrophic model.
However this report didn’t include the XI and XII regions which are important areas for the fishery of southern hake. Information for those regions still exists but it is more incomplete and scattered.
In Chile, there are five marine reserves (only two in the area where this fishery operates): La Rinconada in Region II, Isla Chañaral in Region III, Isla Choros-Damas in Region IV, Putemún and Pullinque in Region X. The main objective of these reserves is to conserve natural banks of northern scallop Argopecten purpuratus, Chilean oyster Tiostrea chilensis and giant mussel Choromytilus chorus among others and also to protect aquatic vertebrates such as dolphins and penguins (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente (MMA) 2008) , spawning areas and productive zones. Additionally, five Marine Parks (only one in the areas where this fishery operates) are declared in order to protect units of ecological interest, and associated diversity and habitats (SERNAPESCA, 2018). Fishing activities inside Marine Reserves and Parks are strictly regulated (Subpesca 2004) .
Also, since the enactment of the General Law on Fisheries and Aquaculture in 1991 (Subpesca 2014) , a Reserve Zone for Artisanal Fishing has been established by law. It extends over 5 nautical miles measured from the coast from Region I to 41º28,6’S (located in the first third of Region X) and from south of 41°28,6’ up to 5 nm west of the straight baselines. This regulation is also in force around the oceanic islands and in inland waters. This measure, besides justifying the development and promotion of the artisanal fishing activity, prevents the industrial fleet from entering the coastal zone to carry out extractive fishing operations. It has also become a conservation measure for the bulk of fishery resources that spawn near the coast and inland waters. The modified version of the General Law for Fisheries and Aquaculture (SUBPESCA 2017) includes a definition of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (seamounts, hydrothermal vents, cold water corals, submarine canyons). There is a fishing ban in August every year (Subpesca 1996) .
A number of studies described the ecosystem and trophic relationship of the bentho-demersal community of southern Chile, some of them using ECOPATH models (Jurado-Molina et al. 2016) (Payá 1992) (Rada and Patricia 2018) .
The southern hake exhibits a key trophic role in the bentho-demersal ecosystem of southern Chile and predation on blue grenadier (hoki) and southern blue whiting drives the main trophic interactions in the ecosystem (Jurado-Molina et al. 2016) . Therefore removal of Southern hake is likely to have profound consequences by affecting the whole ecosystem structure.
At present the management of southern hake (through the management plan) is not following an ecosystem approach. Actually, the need for such an approach is highlighted in the management plan as a future need that will complement the current management measures (Jurado-Molina et al. 2016) (Subpesca 2016) .
The recently approved Bycatch Reduction Plan may help to protect the whole bentho-demersal ecosystem as this fishery is characterized by its high bycatch (Rada and Patricia 2018) (Subpesca 2017) .
A management plan was implemented in 2016 (Subpesca, 2016) and it established a reduction of 50% in Ftrp when SSB is less than 10% of SSB0, but only a reduction of 20% when SSB is between 10% and 20% of SSB0. Several management measures are in place to control catch and effort: annual catch limits, minimum landing sizes, gear restrictions, and closed seasons (Subpesca, 2016).
This measures the Set TAC as a percentage of the Average advised catch.
The Set TAC is 20.3 ('000 t). The Average advised catch is 16.3 ('000 t) .
The underlying Set TAC/Average advised catch for this index is 124%.
Total catches (industrial + artisanal sector) have been below the total set TACs in recent years. A recent study suggests that discards levels are being reduced (Beltrán et al., 2016) representing now <5% in the trawl fishery (which is the one with more discards). Illegal and unreported fishing however is explicitly recognized as one of the main problems of this resource in the Management Plan (Subpesca, 2016).
As calculated for 2016 data.
This measures the SSB as a percentage of the 40%B0.
The SSB is 125 ('000 t). The 40%B0 is 167 ('000 t) .
The underlying SSB/40%B0 for this index is 74.6%.
The F is 0.360 . The F management target is 0.260 .
The underlying F/F management target for this index is 138%.
There is a harvest control rule that anticipates reducing the target Fishing mortality if biomass drops to the limit reference point but we ignore if such reference points are precautionary, and there is no scientific target, so the score on management precaution was determined qualitatively.
Information on landings, current values of the target and limit reference points, and current SSB and F were obtained from (IFOP 2018).
Advised and set TACs refer to the combined TAC for inside (major fraction) and outside the fishery units of the Chilean Southern hake. The 2016 TAC for these two fractions was set at 16,219 t and 108 t, respectively (MEFT 2015b, 2016).
The Scientific and Technical Committee recommended a combined Acceptable Biological Catch between 16,334-20,418 tons in 2018 with a preference for the lower end of the range.
Even though total catches (industrial + artisanal sector) have been below the total set TACs in recent years, a recent study suggests discards may be considerable in this fishery (Bernal et al. 2017) and illegal fishing has been recognized as one of the main problems of this resource. The score on fishers' compliance was thus determined qualitatively.
Aguayo, M. y A. Zuleta. 1989. Captura total permisible del recurso merluza del sur, aguas exteriores 1989. IFOP – SUBPESCA (Informe restringido).
Aguayo, M., Z. Young, R. Bustos, V. Ojeda, T. Peñailillo, R. Gili, C. Vera, H. Robotham. 1986. Diagnóstico de las principales pesquerías nacionales demersales (peces) zona sur austral 1985. Estado de situación del recurso. Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (AP 86/55). Instituto de Fomento Pesquero. Chile, 143 p.
Aguayo, M. 1995. Biology and fisheries of chilean hakes, fisheries, ecology and markets. J. Alheit and T. Pitcher (Ed.). Chapman & may, London. 305-337.
Aguayo, M., I. Payá, R. Céspedes, H. Miranda, V. Cataste, S. Lillo, P. Galvéz, L. Adarme, F. Balbontín, R. Bravo. 2001. Dinámica reproductiva de merluza del sur y congrio dorado. FIP 99-15. 114 pp+ tablas y figuras.
Avilés, S., y M, Aguayo. 1979. Merluza española. En: bases para un desarrollo pesquero. Peces. Estado actual de las principales pesquerías nacionales. CORFO. IFOP (AP 79-18), 29, p.
Balbontín, F. y R. Bravo. 1993. Fecundidad, talla de la primera madurez sexual y datos biométricos en la merluza del sur (Merluccius australis). Rev. Mar.28:111-132.
Céspedes, R., L. Adasme, L. Chong, V. Ojeda, L. Muñoz, H. Hidalgo, R. Bravo, L. Cid, K. Hunt. 2008. Investigación situación pesquera demersal austral, 2007. Informe Final. Subsecretaria de Pesca – IFOP. 255 pp + anexos.
Céspedes, R., L. Adasme, H. Reyes, M. Braun, E. Figueroa, V. Valenzuela, V. Ojeda y R. Roa. 1996. Identificación de las áreas de reclutamiento de merluza del sur en la XII región. Informe final. FIP 94-24.
Lillo, S., V. Ojeda, R. Céspedes, F. Balbontín, J. Donoso y J. Osses. 1996. Evaluación directa del stock desovante de merluza del sur en la zona sur austral. Informe final. FIP 96-38.
Ojeda, V. y M. Aguayo. 1986. Edad y crecimiento en merluza del sur (Merluccius australis) (Gadiformes, merlucciidae). Inv. Pesq. (Chile). 33:47-59.
Ojeda, V., T. Peñailillo y M. Aguayo. 1986. Estimación de la tasa instantánea de mortalidad natural de algunas especies demersales explotadas en la zona sur austral de Chile (Merluccius australis, Macruronus magellanicus y Genypterus blacodes). La Pesca en Chile. Esc. de Ciencias del Mar, Univ. Cat. de Valparaíso.
Rubilar, P., R. Céspedes, V. Ojeda, L. Adasme, A. Cuevas, F. Cerna y G. Ojeda. 2000. Análisis de la estructura y condición biológica de los recursos merluza del sur y congrio dorado en aguas interiores de la X, XI y XII regiones. Informe final. FIP 98-02.
SUBPESCA. 2007. Informe Técnico (R.Pesq.) N° 094-2007. Cuota Global Anual de Capturas de Merluza del sur (Merluccius australis), Año 2008. Valparaíso, Noviembre de 2007.

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ATLAS FINANCE CORPORATION vs. FRED V. TROCCHI & another.
The payee of a corporation's note, who gave incorrect directions as to the authorization of its mortgage securing the note, was estopped as against an indorser of the note to assert that the mortgage was invalid for want of proper authorization.
An indorser of a note secured by a mortgage of property of ample value was relieved of liability to the payee when, in bankruptcy proceedings of the maker, the payee without the indorser's consent relinquished the mortgage for a fraction of the amount due on the note.
CONTRACT. Writ in the District Court of Brockton dated April 23, 1936.
The action was heard by Rowe, J.
H. Freed, (A. P. Rudnick with him,) for the plaintiff.
R. G. Clark, Jr., for the defendants, submitted a brief.
DOLAN, J. In this action of contract the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants, husband and wife, a balance alleged to be due from them as indorsers of a note of which Lincoln Bakery, Inc., was the maker, and which was secured by a chattel mortgage of all the assets of that corporation. The action was brought in the District Court of Brockton, where the judge found for the defendants. It now comes before us on an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division dismissing the report.
mortgage." She then said: "Well, there is enough machinery to cover the mortgage taken out, because we bought trucks not so long ago." Lipkin said: "Well, this is just to cover the company" and she said: "As long as it doesn't reflect on me." Thereupon the defendants indorsed the note. The fair value of the assets covered by the mortgage could have been found to be $8,000 to $10,000, while the note and mortgage were for $1,200. The note and mortgage were dated August 21, 1935.
On January 6, 1936, the corporation was adjudicated bankrupt and the property covered by the mortgage came into the possession of the receiver. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a petition before the referee in bankruptcy to establish the validity of its mortgage. The referee held the mortgage invalid as having been one of all the assets of the corporation and as having been authorized by the directors and not by the stockholders as, he held, was required under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 156, Section 42. The plaintiff "appealed the decision" to the District Court of the United States, which confirmed the findings, rulings and orders of the referee. The plaintiff thereupon entered an appeal from the decision of the judge of the District Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiff agreed with the trustee in bankruptcy to compromise by accepting as on a "priority claim" the sum of $125, and by proving as an unsecured creditor the balance of $1,075. The trustee in bankruptcy filed with the referee in bankruptcy a petition to be allowed to compromise the plaintiff's claim on that basis and the petition was allowed. The defendants were not parties to this agreement and did not know of the allowance of the petition. The plaintiff received by priority $125 and, as an unsecured creditor, $182.75, a total of $307.75.
property was the primary fund which the parties on the note were entitled to have applied on the mortgage debt. He ruled that, if the defendants had paid the mortgage (had it been properly executed), they would have been subrogated to the plaintiff's rights. He further found that it was the plaintiff's directions which led the defendants to do that under which there could be no subrogation, assuming the mortgage to have been thus rendered invalid, and also found or ruled that the plaintiff had by the conduct of its agent created an estoppel against itself.
While the plaintiff contends that the judge erred in refusing to grant certain requested rulings, it has not addressed its argument to them specifically, but has contended generally that the plaintiff's conduct with respect to the collateral security was not such as would discharge the defendants from liability on the note. We think this contention is pertinent to the question whether the judge erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for a finding in its favor as a matter of law, on the ground that the liability of the defendants to it is fixed by the note in the case, and on the further ground that the defence set up by the defendants is not open to them "because the issues they set up are res judicata, by the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts," and to requested rulings to the same effect which were denied.
under the mortgage. Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 Mass. 174, 176. Ricker v. Ricker, 248 Mass. 549, 551. Hill v. Wiley, 295 Mass. 396, 403. Sheldon, Subrogation (2d ed.), Section 123. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Restitution, Section 162 (e). In either event the defendants would have had the benefit of the security.
or exchange of all the assets of a corporation, did not enable the trustee in bankruptcy representing the corporation and its creditors to question the validity of a mortgage of all its assets authorized only by a vote of its directors. One reason assigned for this holding, and stated to be persuasive, is that such statutes "as the one relied on are intended for the protection of stockholders and have nothing to do with the interests and rights of creditors," and that "creditors have no standing to plead statutory requirements not intended for their protection."
The question of the validity of the mortgage involved in the case at bar was pending in the same Circuit Court of Appeals that later decided the Greene case. If that case be accepted as stating the true law governing such questions in bankruptcy proceedings, it but emphasizes that the conduct of the plaintiff, in compromising the question of the validity of the mortgage before awaiting final judicial determination thereof and without the consent or knowledge of the defendants, was prejudicial to the latters' interest, and operated to release them from all liability on the note, since its amount was far exceeded by the value of the mortgaged property. A creditor who has his debt secured by sureties and also has property pledged to him by the principal debtor as security for the debt is bound to keep the security for the benefit of the surety as well as of himself. If he relinquishes the property, as in the case at bar, without the consent of the sureties, he loses his claim against them to the amount of the property given up. Baker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122. Carpenter v. King, 9 Met. 511. Guild v. Butler, 127 Mass. 386. Boston Penny Savings Bank v. Bradford, 181 Mass. 199, 200-201. Durfee v. Kelly, 228 Mass. 571, 573. Sheldon, Subrogation (2d ed.), Section 119.

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§ 10-1 Statement of purpose and intent.
§ 10-2 Meaning of certain words.
§ 10-3 Defense against legal actions; employment of private counsel.
§ 10-4 Procedure for settlement and payment of claims.
§ 10-5 Conditions for defense or indemnification.
§ 10-6 Rights of other parties unaffected; Workers' Compensation Law.
§ 10-7 Effect on insurers.
§ 10-8 Application of provisions.
§ 10-9 Provisions not to limit additional rights.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide legal and financial protection for those individuals serving the Village of Manlius from losses which may be brought against them in their individual capacities for actions taken while in the performance of their official duties and responsibilities. In enacting this chapter, the Board of Trustees finds that the State of New York has enacted similar provisions for the legal and financial security of its officers and employees and further finds that such security is also required for local personnel. By the enactment of this chapter, the Village Board does not intend to limit or otherwise abrogate any existing right or responsibility of the village or its employees with regard to indemnification or legal defense. It is solely the intent of this chapter to provide similar coverage for local employees as is presently provided for state employees, so as to continue to attract qualified individuals to local government service.
Any person holding a position by election, appointment or employment in the service of the village, whether or not compensated, or a volunteer expressly authorized to participate in a municipally sponsored volunteer program, but shall not include an independent contractor. The term "employee" shall include a former employee, his estate or judicially appointed personal representative.
Upon compliance by the employee with the provisions of § 10-5 of this chapter, the village shall provide for the defense of the employee in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or which is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties or which is brought to enforce a provision of Section 1981 or 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. This duty to provide for a defense shall not arise where such civil action or proceeding is brought by or on behalf of the village.
Subject to the conditions set forth in § 10-5, the employee shall be entitled to be represented by the Attorney for the village; provided, however, that the employee shall be entitled to representation by private counsel of his choice in any civil judicial proceeding whenever the Attorney for the village determines, based upon his investigation and review of the facts and circumstances of the case, that representation by the Attorney for the village would be inappropriate or whenever a court of competent jurisdiction, upon appropriate motion or by a special proceeding, determines that a conflict of interest exists and that the employee is entitled to be represented by private counsel of his choice. The Attorney for the village shall notify the employee in writing of such determination that the employee is entitled to be represented by private counsel of his choice. The Attorney for the village may require, as a condition to payment of the fees and expenses of such representation, that appropriate groups of such employees be represented by the same counsel. If the employee or group of employees is entitled to representation by private counsel under the provisions of this section, the Attorney for the village shall so certify to the Village Board. Reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses shall be paid by the village to such private counsel from time to time during the pendency of the civil action or proceeding, subject to certification that the employee is entitled to representation under the terms of this section by the head of the department, commission, division, office or agency in which such employee is employed and upon an audit and warrant of the Mayor. Any dispute with respect to representation of multiple employees by! a single counsel or the amount of litigation expenses or the reasonableness of attorney's fees shall be resolved by the court upon motion or by way of a special proceeding.
Where the employee delivers process and a request for a defense to the Attorney for the village as required by § 10-5 of this chapter, the Attorney shall take the necessary steps, including the retention of private counsel under the terms and conditions provided in Subsection B above, on behalf of the employee to avoid entry of a default judgment pending resolution of any question pertaining to the obligation to provide for a defense.
The village shall indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against such employees in any state or federal court or in the amount of any settlement of a claim, provided that the act or omission from which such judgment or settlement arose occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duty; the duty to indemnify and save harmless prescribed by this section shall not arise where the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing or recklessness on the part of the employee.
An employee represented by private counsel shall cause to be submitted to the Village Board any proposed settlement which may be subject to indemnification by the village, and, if not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the Mayor shall certify such settlement and submit such settlement and certification to the Attorney for the village. The Attorney shall review such proposed settlement as to form and amount and shall give his approval if, in his judgment, the settlement is in the best interest of the village. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the village to indemnify or save harmless an employee with respect to a settlement not so reviewed and approved pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Upon entry of a final judgment against the employee or upon the settlement of a claim, the employee shall cause to be served a copy of such judgment or settlement, personally or by certified or registered mall, within 30 days of the date of entry or settlement, upon the Mayor, and, if not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, such judgment or settlement shall be certified for payment by such Mayor. If the Attorney concurs in the certification, the judgment or settlement shall be paid upon audit by the Village Treasurer.
The full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding and in defense of any action or proceeding against the state based upon the same act or omission and in the prosecution of any appeal. Such delivery shall be deemed a request by the employee that the village provide for his defense pursuant to this chapter.
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all actions and proceedings pending upon the effective date of this chapter or thereafter instituted.
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall not be construed in any way to impair, alter, limit, modify, abrogate or restrict any immunity available to or conferred upon any unit, entity, officer or employee of the village or any right to defense and/or indemnification provided for any governmental officer or employee by, in accordance with or by reason of any other provision of state or federal statutory or common law.


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During the course of an investigatory interview at which an employee of respondent was being interrogated by a representative of respondent about reported thefts at respondent's store, the employee asked for but was denied the presence at the interview of her union representative. The union thereupon filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In accordance with its construction in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052, enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842, and Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N. L. R. B. 197, enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018, rev'd, post, p. 276, the NLRB held that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice and issued a cease-and-desist order, which, however, the Court of Appeals subsequently refused to enforce, concluding that an employee has no "need" for union assistance at an investigatory interview. Held: The employer violated 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act because it interfered with, restrained, and coerced the individual right of an employee, protected by 7, "to engage in . . . concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection . . .," when it denied the employee's request for the presence of her union representative at the investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believed would result in disciplinary action. Pp. 256-268.
(a) The NLRB's holding is a permissible construction of "concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection" by the agency charged by Congress with enforcement of the Act. Pp. 260-264.
(b) The NLRB has the "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life," NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 , and its special competence in this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination. Pp. 264-267.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 268. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 269.
Patrick Hardin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher.
[ Footnote * ] Jerry Kronenberg and Milton Smith filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Respondent operates a chain of some 100 retail stores with lunch counters at some, and so-called lobby food operations at others, dispensing food to take out or eat on the premises. Respondent's sales personnel are represented for collective-bargaining purposes by Retail Clerks Union, Local 455. Leura Collins, one of the sales personnel, worked at the lunch counter at Store No. 2 from 1961 to 1970 when she was transferred to the lobby operation at Store No. 98. Respondent maintains a companywide security department staffed by "Loss Prevention Specialists" who work undercover in all stores to guard against loss from shoplifting and employee dishonesty. In June 1972, "Specialist" Hardy, without the knowledge of the store manager, spent two days observing the lobby operation at Store No. 98 investigating a report that Collins was taking money from a cash register. When Hardy's surveillance of Collins at work turned up no evidence to support the report, Hardy disclosed his presence to the store manager and reported that he could find nothing wrong. The store manager then told him that a fellow lobby employee of Collins had just reported that Collins had purchased a box of chicken that sold for $2.98, but had placed only $1 in the cash register. Collins was summoned to an interview with Specialist Hardy and the store manager, and Hardy questioned her. The Board found that several times during the questioning she asked the store manager to call the union shop steward or some other union representative to the interview, and that her requests were denied. Collins admitted that she had purchased some chicken, a loaf of bread, and some cake which she said she paid for and donated to her church for a church dinner. She explained that she purchased four pieces of chicken for which the price was $1, but that because the lobby department [420 U.S. 251, 255] was out of the small-size boxes in which such purchases were usually packaged she put the chicken into the larger box normally used for packaging larger quantities. Specialist Hardy left the interview to check Collins' explanation with the fellow employee who had reported Collins. This employee confirmed that the lobby department had run out of small boxes and also said that she did not know how many pieces of chicken Collins had put in the larger box. Specialist Hardy returned to the interview, told Collins that her explanation had checked out, that he was sorry if he had inconvenienced her, and that the matter was closed.
The Board's construction that 7 creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his discipline was announced in its decision and order of January 28, 1972, in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N. L. R. B. 197, considered in Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276. In its opinions in that case and in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052, decided May 12, 1972, three months later, the Board shaped the contours and limits of the statutory right.
"An employee's right to union representation upon request is based on Section 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for [420 U.S. 251, 257] `mutual aid and protection.' The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Thus, it is a serious violation of the employee's individual right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer denies the employee's request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee's right to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action." Ibid.
"We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill [420 U.S. 251, 258] shop-floor conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of work techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus we would then see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance of his representative." 195 N. L. R. B., at 199.
"The employer may, if it wishes, advise the employee that it will not proceed with the interview unless the employee is willing to enter the interview [420 U.S. 251, 259] unaccompanied by his representative. The employee may then refrain from participating in the interview, thereby protecting his right to representation, but at the same time relinquishing any benefit which might be derived from the interview. The employer would then be free to act on the basis of information obtained from other sources." 196 N. L. R. B., at 1052.
"This seems to us to be the only course consistent with all of the provisions of our Act. It permits the employer to reject a collective course in situations such as investigative interviews where a collective course is not required but protects the employee's right to protection by his chosen agents. Participation in the interview is then voluntary, and, if the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the interview will adversely affect his continued employment, or even his working conditions, he may choose to forego it unless he is afforded the safeguard of his representative's presence. He would then also forego whatever benefit might come from the interview. And, in that event, the employer would, of course, be free to act on the basis of whatever information he had and without such additional facts as might have been gleaned through the interview." 195 N. L. R. B., at 198-199.
Fifth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview. The Board said in Mobil, "we are not giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predisciplinary discussions which it otherwise was not able to secure during collective-bargaining negotiations." 196 N. L. R. B., at 1052 n. 3. The Board thus adhered to its decisions distinguishing between disciplinary [420 U.S. 251, 260] and investigatory interviews, imposing a mandatory affirmative obligation to meet with the union representative only in the case of the disciplinary interview. Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N. L. R. B. 361 (1967); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968). The employer has no duty to bargain with the union representative at an investigatory interview. "The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have knowledge of them. The employer, however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in hearing the employee's own account of the matter under investigation." Brief for Petitioner 22.
"`When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.'"
The Board's construction plainly effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act. In 1, 29 U.S.C. 151, the Act declares that it is a goal of national labor policy to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom [420 U.S. 251, 262] of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection." To that end the Act is designed to eliminate the "inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers." Ibid. Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate, and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided "to redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965). Viewed in this light, the Board's recognition that 7 guarantees an employee's right to the presence of a union representative at an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline reasonably inheres is within the protective ambit of the section "`read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.'" NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
The Board's construction also gives recognition to the right when it is most useful to both employee and employer. 7 A single employee confronted by an employer [420 U.S. 251, 263] investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need not transform the interview into an adversary contest. Respondent suggests nonetheless that union representation at this stage is unnecessary because a decision as to employee culpability or disciplinary action can be corrected after the decision to impose discipline has become final. In other words, respondent would defer representation until the filing of a formal grievance challenging the employer's determination of guilt after the employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined. 8 At that point, however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the [420 U.S. 251, 264] value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The employer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than re-examining them.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Board's construction as foreclosed by that court's decision four years earlier in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (1969), and by "a long line of Board decisions, each of which indicates - either directly or indirectly - that no union representative need be present" at an investigatory interview. 485 F.2d, at 1137.
The Board distinguishes Texaco as presenting not the question whether the refusal to allow the employee to have his union representative present constituted a violation of 8 (a) (1) but rather the question whether 8 (a) (5) precluded the employer from refusing to deal with the union. We need not determine whether Texaco is distinguishable. Insofar as the Court of Appeals there held that an employer does not violate 8 (a) (1) if he denies an employee's request for union representation at an investigatory interview, and requires him to attend the interview alone, our decision today reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment based upon Texaco supersedes that holding.
In respect of its own precedents, the Board asserts that even though some "may be read as reaching a contrary conclusion," they should not be treated as impairing the validity of the Board's construction, because "[t]hese decisions do not reflect a considered analysis of the issue." Brief for Petitioner 25. 9 In that circumstance, and in the [420 U.S. 251, 265] light of significant developments in industrial life believed by the Board to have warranted a reappraisal of the question, 10 the Board argues that the case is one where "[t]he nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a comprehensive answer. And so, it is not surprising that the Board has more or less felt its way . . . and has modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating experience." Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
We agree that its earlier precedents do not impair the validity of the Board's construction. That construction in no wise exceeds the reach of 7, but falls well within the scope of the rights created by that section. The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect [420 U.S. 251, 266] of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking. "`Cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight by which judgments . . . are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process." NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board. The Court of Appeals impermissibly encroached upon the Board's function in determining for itself that an employee has no "need" for union assistance at an investigatory interview. "While a basic purpose of section 7 is to allow employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, such a need does not arise at an investigatory interview." 485 F.2d, at 1138. It is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine whether or not the "need" exists in light of changing industrial practices and the Board's cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management relations. For the Board has the "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life," NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196 -197 (1941), and its special competence in this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S., at 316 . Reviewing courts are of course not "to stand aside and rubber stamp" Board determinations that run contrary to the language or tenor of the Act, NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). But the Board's construction here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible [420 U.S. 251, 267] under it, and insofar as the Board's application of that meaning engages in the "difficult and delicate responsibility" of reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management, the balance stuck by the Board is "subject to limited judicial review." NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). See also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Brown, supra; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra. In sum, the Board has reached a fair and reasoned balance upon a question within its special competence, its newly arrived at construction of 7 does not exceed the reach of that section, and the Board has adequately explicated the basis of its interpretation.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to enter a judgment enforcing the Board's order.
[ Footnote 1 ] Section 8 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (1), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be [420 U.S. 251, 253] affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title."
[ Footnote 3 ] Accord: NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (CA4 1973), rev'd, Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276; Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (CA7 1973). The issue is a recurring one. In addition to this case and Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276, see Western Electric Co., 205 N. L. R. B. 46 (1973); New York Telephone Co., 203 N. L. R. B. 180 (1973); National Can Corp., 200 N. L. R. B. 1116 (1972); Western Electric Co., 198 N. L. R. B. 82 (1972); Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (CA7 1973); Lafayette Radio Electronics, 194 N. L. R. B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 834 (1971); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N. L. R. B. 935 (1969), aff'd on another ground, 440 F.2d 85 (CA2 1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N. L. R. B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N. L. R. B. 839 (1969), aff'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 1328 (CA6 1970); Dayton Typographic Service, Inc., 176 N. L. R. B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N. L. R. B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (CA5 1969); Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149 N. L. R. B. 1432 (1964); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N. L. R. B. 1565 (1964); Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607 (CA7 1947). See generally Brodie, Union Representation and the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329 (1974).
[ Footnote 4 ] The charges also alleged that respondent had violated 8 (a) (5) by unilaterally changing a condition of employment when, the day after the interview, respondent ordered discontinuance of the free lunch practice. Because respondent's action was an arbitrable grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement, the Board, pursuant to the deferral-to-arbitration policy adopted in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971), "dismissed" the 8 (a) (5) allegation. No issue involving that action is before us.
[ Footnote 5 ] The Board stated in Quality: "`Reasonable ground' will of course be measured, as here, by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case." 195 N. L. R. B. 197, 198 n. 3. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969), the Court announced that it would "reject any rule that requires a probe of an employee's subjective motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry," and we reaffirm that view today as applicable also in the context of this case. Reasonableness, as a standard, is prescribed in several places in the Act itself. For example, an employer is not relieved of responsibility for discrimination against an employee [420 U.S. 251, 258] "if he has reasonable grounds for believing" that certain facts exist, 8 (a) (3) (A), (B), 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (3) (A), (B); also, preliminary injunctive relief against certain conduct must be sought if "the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe" such charge is true, 10 (l), 29 U.S.C. 160 (l). See also Congoleum Industries, Inc., 197 N. L. R. B. 534 (1972); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N. L. R. B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (CA6 1965).
The key objective fact in this case is that the only exception to the requirement in the collective-bargaining agreement that the employer give a warning notice prior to discharge is "if the cause of such discharge is dishonesty." Accordingly, had respondent been satisfied, based on its investigatory interview, that Collins was guilty of dishonesty, Collins could have been discharged without further notice. That she might reasonably believe that the interview might result in disciplinary action is thus clear.
[ Footnote 6 ] "The quantum of proof that the employer considers sufficient to support disciplinary action is of concern to the entire bargaining unit. A slow accretion of custom and practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary disputes. If, for example, the employer adopts a practice of considering [a] foreman's unsubstantiated statements sufficient to support disciplinary action, employee protection against unwarranted punishment is affected. The presence of a union steward allows protection of this interest by the bargaining representative." Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329, 338 (1974).
"[Participation by the union representative] might reasonably be designed to clarify the issues at this first stage of the existence of a question, to bring out the facts and the policies concerned at this stage, to give assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express themselves in their cases, and who, when their livelihood is at stake, might in fact need the more experienced kind of counsel which their union steward might represent. The foreman, himself, may benefit from the presence of the steward by seeing the issue, the problem, the implications of the facts, and the collective bargaining clause in question more clearly. Indeed, good faith discussion at this level may solve many problems, and prevent needless hard feelings from arising . . . . [It] can be advantageous to both parties if they both act in good faith and seek to discuss the question at [420 U.S. 251, 263] this stage with as much intelligence as they are capable of bringing to bear on the problem."
[ Footnote 8 ] 1 CCH Lab. L. Rep., Union Contracts, Arbitration 59,520, pp. 84,988-84,989.
[ Footnote 9 ] The precedents cited by the Court of Appeals are: Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N. L. R. B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N. L. R. B. 839 (1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1328 (CA6 1970); Dayton [420 U.S. 251, 265] Typographic Service, Inc., 176 N. L. R. B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Dobbs Houses Inc., 145 N. L. R. B. 1565 (1964). See also NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607 (CA7 1947).
[ Footnote 10 ] "There has been a recent growth in the use of sophisticated techniques - such as closed circuit television, undercover security agents, and lie detectors - to monitor and investigate the employees' conduct at their place of work. See, e. g., Warwick Electronics, Inc., 46 L. A. 95, 97-98 (1966); Bowman Transportation, Inc., 56 L. A. 283, 286-292 (1972); FMC Corp., 46 L. A. 335, 336-338 (1966). These techniques increase not only the employees' feelings of apprehension, but also their need for experienced assistance in dealing with them. Thus, often, as here and in Mobil, supra, an investigative interview is conducted by security specialists; the employee does not confront a supervisor who is known or familiar to him, but a stranger trained in interrogation techniques. These developments in industrial life warrant a concomitant reappraisal by the Board of their impact on statutory rights. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 ." Brief for Petitioner 27 n. 22.
"[A]n employee is entitled to the presence of a Committeeman at [420 U.S. 251, 268] an investigatory interview if he requests one and if the employee has reasonable grounds to fear that the interview may be used to support disciplinary action against him." Allied Paper Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 226 (1969); Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262 (1968); Waste King Universal Products Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 283, 286 (1966); Dallas Morning News, 40 Lab. Arb. 619, 623-624 (1963); The Arcrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 784, 788-789 (1962); Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. 769, 771 (1960); Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 57, 60 (1959); Singer Mfg. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 570 (1957); Braniff Airways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 892 (1957); John Lucas & Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 344, 346-347 (1952). Contra, e. g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 646, 652 (1957); United Air Lines, Inc., 28 Lab. Arb. 179, 180 (1956).
Today the Court states that, in positing a new 7 right for employees, the "Board has adequately explicated the basis of its interpretation." Ante, at 267. I agree that the Board has the power to change its position, but since today's cases represent a major change in policy and a departure from Board decisions spanning almost 30 years the change ought to be justified by a reasoned Board opinion. The brief but spectacular evolution of the right, once recognized, illustrates the problem. In Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N. L. R. B. 197, 198 (1972), the Board distinguished its prior cases on the ground, inter alia, that "none of those cases presented a situation where an employee or his representative had been disciplined or discharged for requesting, or insisting on, union representation in the course of an interview." Yet, soon afterwards [420 U.S. 251, 269] the Board extended the right without explanation to situations where no discipline or discharge resulted. Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052 (1972); J. Weingarten Inc., 202 N. L. R. B. 446 (1973).
The tortured history and inconsistency of the Board's efforts in this difficult area suggest the need for an explanation by the Board of why the new rule was adopted. However, a much more basic policy demands that the Board explain its new construction. The integrity of the administrative process requires that "[w]hen the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must `disclose the basis of its order' and `give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.' Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197 ." NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443 (1965). Here, there may be very good reasons for adopting the new rule, and the Court suggests some. See ante, at 260-261; 262-264; 265 n. 10. But these reasons are not to be found in the Board's cases. In Metropolitan Ins. Co., supra, at 444, we made it clear that "`courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action.'" The Court today gives lip service to the rule that courts are not "`to stand aside and rubber stamp'" Board determinations. Ante, at 266.
I would therefore remand the cases to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the Board so that it may enlighten us as to the reasons for this marked change in policy rather than leave with this Court the burden of justifying the change for reasons which we arrive at by inference and surmise.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 157, guarantees to [420 U.S. 251, 270] employees the right to "engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The Court today construes that right to include union representation or the presence of another employee 1 at any interview the employee reasonably fears might result in disciplinary action. In my view, such an interview is not concerted activity within the intendment of the Act. An employee's right to have a union representative or another employee present at an investigatory interview is a matter that Congress left to the free and flexible exchange of the bargaining process.
Quality Mfg. Co. was the first case in which the Board perceived any greater content in 7. It did so, not by relying on "significant developments in industrial life," ante, at 265, but by stating simply that in none of the earlier cases had a worker been fired for insisting on union representation. The Board also asserted, for the first time, that its earlier decisions had disposed of only the union's right to bargain with the employer over the discipline to be imposed, and had not dealt with the employee's right under 7 to insist on union presence at meetings that he reasonably fears would lead to disciplinary action. 195 N. L. R. B. 197, 198. Even this distinction was abandoned some four months later in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (CA7 1973). There the Board followed Quality Mfg., even though the employees in Mobil Oil had not been fired for insisting on union representation and their only claim was that the employer had excluded the union from an investigatory interview. Thus, the Board has turned its back on Dobbs Houses and now finds a 7 right to insist on union presence in the absence of any evidence that the employer has decided to embark on a course of discipline.
Congress' goal in enacting federal labor legislation was to create a framework within which labor and management [420 U.S. 251, 273] can establish the mutual rights and obligations that govern the employment relationship. "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). The National Labor Relations Act only creates the structure for the parties' exercise of their respective economic strengths; it leaves definition of the precise contours of the employment relationship to the collective-bargaining process. See Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
As the Court noted in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 7 guarantees employees' basic rights of industrial self-organization, rights which are for the most part "collective rights . . . to act in concert with one's fellow employees, [which] are protected, not for their own sake, but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife `by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.'" Ante, at 62. Section 7 protects those rights that are essential to employee self-organization and to the exercise of economic weapons to exact concessions from management and demand a voice in defining the terms of the employment relationship. 5 It does not define those terms itself.
The power to discipline or discharge employees has been recognized uniformly as one of the elemental prerogatives of management. Absent specific limitations [420 U.S. 251, 274] imposed by statute 6 or through the process of collective bargaining, 7 management remains free to discharge employees at will. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960). An employer's need to consider and undertake disciplinary action will arise in a wide variety of unpredictable situations. The appropriate disciplinary response also will vary significantly, depending on the nature and severity of the employee's conduct. Likewise, the nature and amount of information required for determining the appropriateness of disciplinary action may vary with the severity of the possible sanction and the complexity of the problem. And in some instances, the employer's legitimate need to maintain discipline and security may require an immediate response.
This variety and complexity necessarily call for flexible and creative adjustment. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 267, the question of union participation in investigatory [420 U.S. 251, 275] interviews is a standard topic of collective bargaining. 8 Many agreements incorporate provisions that grant and define such rights, and arbitration decisions increasingly have begun to recognize them as well. Rather than vindicate the Board's interpretation of 7, however, these developments suggest to me that union representation at investigatory interviews is a matter that Congress left to the bargaining process. Even after affording appropriate deference to the Board's meandering interpretation of the Act, I conclude that the right announced today is not among those that Congress intended to protect in 7. The type of personalized interview with which we are here concerned is simply not "concerted activity" within the meaning of the Act.
[ Footnote 1 ] While the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the presence of a union representative, it must be assumed that the 7 right today recognized, affording employees the right to act "in concert" in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized union. Cf. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
[ Footnote 2 ] In one earlier case the Board had found a 8 (a) (1) violation in the employer's refusal to admit a union representative to an interview. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1012, 1033-1034 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607, 611-614 (CA7 1947). In that case, however, the Board found that the employee, a union committee member, was called in to discuss a pending union issue. The Board found that discharging her for insisting on the presence of the entire committee was a discriminatory discharge under 8 (a) (1). The opinion in Dobbs Houses distinguished Ross Gear on the ground that the matter under investigation was protected union activity. 145 N. L. R. B., at 1571.
[ Footnote 3 ] The Board has not been called upon to pursue its 8 (a) (5) theory to its logical conclusion. Its determination that all disciplinary decisions are matters that invoke the employer's mandatory duty to bargain would seem to suggest that, absent some qualification of the duty contained in the collective-bargaining agreement, federal law will now be read to require that the employer bargain [420 U.S. 251, 272] to impasse before initiating unilateral action on disciplinary matters. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended such a radical restriction of the employer's power to discipline employees. See Fibre-board Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 , 218, 223 (1964) (STEWART, J., concurring).
[ Footnote 4 ] Lafayette Radio Electronics, 194 N. L. R. B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N. L. R. B. 976 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967).
[ Footnote 5 ] By contrast, the employee's 7 right announced today may prove to be of limited value to the employee or to the stabilization of labor relations generally. The Court appears to adopt the Board's view that investigatory interviews are not bargaining sessions and [420 U.S. 251, 274] that the employer legitimately can insist on hearing only the employee's version of the facts. Absent employer invitation, it would appear that the employee's 7 right does not encompass the right to insist on the participation of the person he brings with him to the investigatory meeting. The new right thus appears restricted to the privilege to insist on the mute and inactive presence of a fellow employee or a union representative; a witness to the interview, perhaps.
[ Footnote 6 ] Section 8 (a) (1) forbids employers to take disciplinary actions that "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" the employee's exercise of 7 rights. Other federal statutes also limit in certain respects the employer's basic power to discipline and discharge employees. See, e. g., 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. 623.
[ Footnote 7 ] The Board and the courts have recognized that union demands for provisions limiting the employer's power to discharge can be the subject of mandatory bargaining. See Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S., at 217 , 221-223 (STEWART, J., concurring).
[ Footnote 8 ] The history of a similar case, Mobil Oil, 196 N. L. R. B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (CA7 1973), illustrates how the Board has substituted its judgment for that of the collective-bargaining process. During negotiations leading to the establishment of a collective-bargaining agreement in that case, the union advanced a demand that existing provisions governing suspension and discharge be amended to provide for company-union discussions prior to disciplinary action. The employer refused to accede to that demand and ultimately prevailed, only to find his efforts at the bargaining table voided by the Board's interpretation of the statute.

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WE, MARGRETHE the SECOND, by the grace of God Queen of Denmark, do indeed: the Danish Parliament has adopted and we know Our consent confirmed the following law: § 1 of the Act on integration of aliens in Denmark (the Integration Act), see. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1593 by 14. December 2007, as amended by section 32 of Act No. 1344 of 19. December 2008, § 8 of law No. 286 of 15. April 2009, section 5 of law No. 479 of 12. June 2009, § 4 of the lov nr. 480 of 12. June 2009, section 9 of Act No. 482 of 12. June 2009, section 13 of the Act No. 483 of 12. June 2009, § 2 of the law No. 485 of 12. June 2009, section 18 of Act No. 429 of 28. April 2010 and § 6 of the law No. 431 of 28. April 2010, is amended as follows: 1. Everywhere in the law the term ' induction programme ' to: ' integration programme ', ' introduction programmes ' to: ' integration programmes ', ' induction programme ' to: ' integration programme ' and ' Induction Programme ' to: ' Integration Programme '.
2. paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ' article 1. The Act's purpose is to ensure that newly arrived aliens will be given the opportunity to utilize their skills and resources in order to be participating, self-employed and performance fellow citizens on an equal footing with other citizens in accordance with the society's fundamental values and norms of Danish society.
(2). This must be done through an integration effort, 1) takes as its starting point in the individual's responsibility for its own integration, 2) contribute to the newly arrived foreigners ensured the opportunity for participation on an equal footing with other citizens in society's political, economic, labour, social, religious and cultural life, 3) contributes to that newly arrived foreigners as soon as possible become self-supporting through employment, and 4) brings the individual alien an understanding for the Danish society's basic values and norms.
(3). The law also aims to promote the possibility that society's citizens, businesses, public authorities, institutions, organizations and associations and others. can contribute to the integration effort, so that anyone can contribute to the successful integration of newly arrived foreigners.
3. paragraph 2 shall be replaced by the following: ' article 2. Covered by this law is without prejudice to the status of refugees. (2) without prejudice to article aliens reunited. paragraph 3, and immigrants, see. (4).
(2). By a refugee within the meaning of this law 1) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act § § 7 or 8, 2) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 b, 3) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 c, paragraphs 2 or 3, or 4) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 (e).
(3). By a family were resident for the purposes of this law 1) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 or 2) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 c, paragraph 1, as a result of a family links to a living person, which is not covered by paragraph 4.
(4). By an immigrant for the purposes of this law 1) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 a, 2) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 c, paragraph 1, for the purpose of school term, internships, au pair stay or studies, 3) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 c, paragraph 4, 4) an alien with a residence permit pursuant to section 9 (d), 5) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with section 9 of the Act on foreigners (f) , 6) an alien with a residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act section 9 c, paragraph 1, because of a family links to a foreigner subject to no. 1-5 or 7) an alien registration certificate or a residence card for foreigners law § 6.
(5). Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 shall not apply to immigrants.
(6). The Danish immigration service decides whether an alien is covered by the Integration Act '.
4. paragraph 3 shall be repealed.
8. Under section 5 shall be inserted in Chapter 2:» section 5 (a). The Municipal Council may, for the purpose of strengthening the newly arrived foreigners personal network in the local community and, through their integration into Danish society establish host arrangements whereby private individuals resident in the municipality can act as hosts for newly arrived foreigners and receive support to cover expenses for private dinners, small individual excursions and the like, which attach themselves to their host function.
9. The title of Chapter 4 shall be replaced by the following:» integration programme for refugees and family reunification of foreigners ' 10. section 16 is replaced by the following: ' § 16. Refugees and family reunification of foreigners, if at the time of the Municipal Board's assumption of responsibility is 18 years of age, have offered an integration programme, organised by the responsible local authority, see. However, paragraph 8.
(2). For refugees and family reunification foreigners who are eligible to receive introductory benefit, see. § 25, includes integration program 1) Danish education, see. § 21, 2) course in Danish society and Danish culture and history, see. section 22, and 3) employment-oriented offerings, see. § 23.
(3). For other refugees and family reunification of foreigners than those referred to in paragraph 2 includes integration program 1) Danish education, see. § 21, 2) course in Danish society and Danish culture and history, see. section 22, and 3) employment-oriented offerings, see. Article 23, paragraph 5, if the person concerned is entitled to and would like to receive such.
(4). Foreigners who are offered an integration program, have the duty to participate actively in the programme's individual parts. The scope and content of the induction programme individual items defined in an integration contract entered into between the alien and the Municipal Council, see. § 19.
(5). The integration programme shall commence not later than 1 month after the Municipal Council has taken over responsibility for a foreigner.
(6). Integration program has a duration of not more than 3 years, after that the Municipal Council has taken over responsibility for the alien. Integration programme must be tailored to the individual's assumptions so that the alien can implement the programme as soon as possible, and the offers may not be impeded in for the alien's ability to perform a job.
(7). Minors, unaccompanied refugees with residence permit in accordance with the Aliens Act, section 7, section 8 or section 9 c (3), may be offered an integration programme.
11. section 18 (a) be repealed.
13. In article 19, paragraph 4, 3. paragraph, the words ' section 16, paragraph 7 ' to: ' section 16, paragraph 8 '.
14. In article 19, paragraph 8, 2. paragraph, the words ' section 16, paragraph 5 ' to: ' section 16, paragraph 6 ', and ' section 16, paragraph 2 or 7 ' shall be replaced by: ' section 16, paragraph 2, 3 or 8 '.
16. Article 21 is replaced by the following: ' article 21. The Municipal Council shall, within 1 month after having taken over responsibility for an alien subject to section 16, refer the question to the Danish education in accordance with Danish law on education for adult foreigners and others.
17. section 22 is replaced by the following: ' § 22. The Municipal Council shall ensure that the alien, not later than 4 months after the Municipal Council has taken over the responsibility for that, can commence a course in Danish society and Danish culture and history.
(2). The Municipal Council must organise the course, so that with respect to time, place and content adapted to the alien's employment needs, etc. and the Municipal Council can partly or wholly fail to offer an alien participation in course in Danish society and Danish culture and history, when exceptional reasons justify it.
20. Under section 24 (b) is inserted: ' Chapter 4 (a) induction training for immigrants section 24 c. Immigrants must, if they are at the time of the Municipal Board's assumption of responsibility is 18 years of age, have offered an introductory course, organised by the responsible local authority.
(2). Introductory course consists of 1) Danish education, see. section 24 d, 2) course in Danish society and Danish culture and history, see. paragraph 24 (e), and (3)) the employment-oriented offerings, see. paragraph 24 (f), if the migrant is entitled to and would like to receive such.
(3). Introductory course must begin no later than 1 month after the Municipal Council has taken over responsibility for a foreigner.
(4). Introductory course has a duration of not more than 3 years, after that the Municipal Council has taken over responsibility for the alien. Introductory course must be adapted to the individual's circumstances and the purpose of his/her stay in Denmark so that the alien can complete the process as soon as possible, and the offers may not be impeded in for the alien's ability to perform a job.
(5). § 17 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
(6). The Municipal Council of the municipality to which an alien who has not completed its induction training, moving must take over responsibility for the introductory course.
paragraph 24 (d) section 21 shall apply mutatis mutandis to foreigners, who are offered an introductory course.
§ 24 e. section 22 shall apply mutatis mutandis to foreigners, who are offered an introductory course.
§ 24 f. section 23, paragraph 5, shall apply mutatis mutandis to foreigners, who are offered an introductory course.
section 24 (g). The Municipal Council may provide support to a company that establishes a supervisor function for an alien who is subject to section 2, paragraph 4, nr. 1 and 7. By a supervisor function means that an employee of the company or an outside consultant performs a special task to give the alien insights into opportunities and conditions in the labour market in Denmark. The effort must lie beyond what the employer usually is expected to perform.
(2). Aid shall be granted to cover salary costs by redeeming the employee who carries out the supervisor function, or fees to external consultants.
(3). On the basis of a specific assessment of the needs and conditions of the foreigner, who need a tutor, establishes Municipal Council in cooperation with the company an hour for tutor function.
(4). In order to improve an employee's ability to perform the supervisor function may be granted subsidies for the purchase of training to the employee.
(5). The Minister for refugees, immigration and integration Affairs may lay down detailed rules concerning aid for a supervisor function, including a grant for the purchase of training to the supervisor. "
21. Pursuant to section 41 (a) shall be inserted: ' Chapter 7 a Citizenship test section 41 (b). The Minister for refugee, immigration and integration Affairs establishes a citizenship test.
25. In section 45, paragraph (6), 1. point, there will be (7) 1. paragraph, the words ' 7150 «to» 7.866 «, and» § 7 or 9 (c) (3) ' shall be replaced by: ' section 7, section 8 or section 9 c (3) '.
26. section 45, paragraph 7, which becomes paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: ' (8). State grants to the Municipal Council, that is, or by induction period, see. section 16, paragraph 6, has been responsible for integration efforts, see. § 4, for each alien covered by the integration programme, which has been drawn up an integration contract under section 19, the following result grants: 1) 44006 DKK, if the alien within the introduction period, see. section 16, paragraph 6, comes in ordinary employment and continues in ordinary employment for a continuous period of at least 6 months.
2) 44006 DKK, if the alien within the introduction period, see. section 16, paragraph 6, starting a study or completion of professional training and continuing education for a continuous period of at least 6 months and during the study course can receive SU, elevløn etc., that ensures the alien a maintenance basis.
3) 33005 DKK, if the alien within the introduction period, see. section 16, paragraph 6, sets out to test in Danish and not later than the first tests after the introductory period, the test consists in Danish on the level of cooperation with the provider of the Danish education is laid down as an objective of the integration contract, see. § 19.
27. In article 47, paragraph 1, shall be replaced by ' paragraph 45, paragraphs 4-7 ' is replaced by: ' § 45, paragraphs 4-8 '.
29. In paragraph 51 (b) of paragraph 1, the words ' section 16, paragraph 5 ' to: ' section 16, paragraph 6 '.
31. section 52 is repealed.
32. In article 53, paragraph 1, the words ' paragraph 4 ', to: ' section 2, paragraph 6 '.
33. section 53, paragraph 5, shall be repealed.
34. § § 54-56 is repealed.
35. In paragraph 57, the words ' § § 54-56 ' to: ' section 2, paragraph 2-4 '.
§ 2 of the law on the Danish education for adult foreigners and others., see. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 259 of 18. March 2006, as amended by section 13 of the Act No. 523 of 24. June 2005, § 2 of the law No. 104 of 7. February 2007, section 12 of Act No. 483 of 12. June 2009, § 1 of lov nr. 485 of 12. June 2009, law No. 1512 of 27. December 2009 and § 19 of the lov nr. 429 of 28. April 2010, is amended as follows: 1. Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be replaced by the following: ' Municipal Council offers Danish education for foreigners 1) is 18 years of age, 2) have a residence permit, the EU-registration certificate, EU residence card or otherwise fixed, legally resident in Denmark and 3) are registered in the municipality, see. However, section 2 (b), paragraph 2.
2. § 5, paragraph 5, shall be repealed.
section 4 of the Act on an active employment efforts, see. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1428 of 14. December 2009, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 431 of 28. April 2010, is amended as follows: 1. section 2, nr. 10 is replaced by the following: ' 10) persons not in employment, and which do not fulfil the conditions for receiving public assistance for maintenance, including daily subsistence allowance in accordance with the law on unemployment insurance, etc., cash assistance or start Help for the Act on active social policy or the law on the State's education aid after SU, as well as persons who cannot get deals after the Integration Act '.
2. section 31 (a), paragraph 3, are repealed.
Paragraph 4-7 becomes paragraph 3-6.
3. In section 31 (a), paragraph 7, which becomes paragraph 6, the words ' status and '.
section 6 of the law on municipal and regional elections, see. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 144 of 24. February 2009, is amended as follows: 1. In article 1, paragraph 1, no. 4, and section 3 (a), paragraph 1, shall be replaced by ' 3 years ' to: ' 4 years '.
§ 7 paragraph 1. The law shall enter into force on the 1. August 2010, see. However, paragraph 2.
(2). § 2, nr. 2, and § 3 shall enter into force on the 15. June 2010.
(3). This law § 1, nr. 1, 4 and 9, and the Danish Integration Act § 2, paragraph 1, article 4, paragraphs 1 and 4, article 5, paragraph 2, article 16, article 19, paragraph 4, 2. and (3). paragraph, article 19, paragraph 8, 2. section, § 22, § § 24 c-24 g, § 45, paragraph 4, 1. section, § 45, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8, article 47, paragraph 1, article 48, paragraph 1, § 51 (b), paragraph 1, and section 57 as amended, inserted or amended by this Act, section 1, no. 3, 5-7, 10, 12-14, 17, 20, 22-24, 26-29 and 35 shall not apply for foreigners who have obtained a residence permit before the entry into force of the Act. For such foreigners find the existing rules apply.
(4). § 6 shall apply for municipal and regional elections to be held after the Act's entry into force, the first time the 3. Tuesday in november 2013.
§ 8 the law does not apply to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, but section 3 may by Royal Decree in whole or in part be put into force for Greenland and the Faroe Islands with the derogations which the Faroese and Greenlandic conditions warrant.


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