1. Financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2013. Reports of the Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors and the Independent Auditors. Appropriation of profit for the year. Presentation of consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2013. Related and resulting resolutions.
2. Authority, pursuant and for the purposes of articles 2357 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code, article 132 of Legislative Decree 58 of 24 February 1998 and article 144-bis of the CONSOB Regulation adopted with Resolution 11971/1999, as amended, to purchase and sell treasury shares, subject to prior revocation of all or part of the unused portion of the authority granted by the General Meeting of 30 April 2013. Related and resulting resolutions.
3. Resolution on the first section of the Remuneration Report pursuant to art. 123-ter of Legislative Decree 58 of 24 February 1998.
5. Approval of a long-term share-based incentive plan for employees and executive directors of the Company and its direct and indirect subsidiaries. Related and resulting resolutions.
Only those persons may attend and vote at General Meeting who have been notified as having voting rights to the Company by an "intermediary" so authorised in accordance with applicable legislation; such notification having been issued in accordance with records at the close of business on 4 April 2014, being the seventh stock exchange trading day preceding the date set for the General Meeting in first call (the "Record Date"), in conformity with articles 83-sexies of Legislative Decree 58 of 24 February 1998 (the "Consolidated Financial Act”, or “CFA”).
Any deposits in and withdrawals from custody accounts subsequent to the Record Date shall be without effect to a person's right to vote at General Meeting. Persons who are, consequently, registered as having title to shares only subsequent to the Record Date shall have no right to attend or vote at the General Meeting.
Such notification by the intermediary must arrive no later than 10 April 2014, being the close of business of the third stock exchange trading day preceding the date set for the General Meeting in first call. The right to attend and vote at General Meeting, however, shall be valid to the extent that the relevant notice is received by the Company no later than the opening of the General Meeting, regardless of call.
Shareholders still in the possession of share certificates in scrip form are required to provide the intermediary with the share certificates for entry into the centralised scripless share certificate system and apply for the issuance of the above notification.
The Office of the Chairman will be open two hours prior to the time set for the General Meeting in order to identify attendees and verify their right to attend.
All holders of rights to vote at and attend the General Meeting may appoint a representative through the issuance of a written proxy, subject to any legal and regulatory limitations.
The proxy, attesting and accepting personal liability for the conformity of the copy with the original and the identity of the proxy giver, may send a copy of the proxy form, duly completed and signed by the holder of the voting rights, directly to the Company by sending a fax to Servizi Titoli S.p.A. on +39 06- 45417450 or by sending an electronic version of the form to the certified e-mail address atlantia@pecserviziotitoli.it.
Proxies are under a statutory obligation to retain the original of the form and any voting instructions received for one year from the close of business at the General Meeting.
In accordance with the law, all holders of voting rights may, by completing the relevant form, appoint Computershare S.p.A., with registered office in Via Mascheroni 19, Milan, to act as their proxy, this company being the Company’s Appointed Representative pursuant to art. 135-undecies of Legislative Decree 58/98 (the Consolidated Financial Act), to which persons with voting rights my provide a proxy with voting instructions on any and all agenda items on 11 April 2014 with regard to the General Meeting in first call, or by 14 April 2014 with regard to the General Meeting in second call, being the close of business on the second stock exchange trading day preceding the date set for the General Meeting regardless of the call.
The proxy and voting instructions may be revoked within the same deadline, using the same procedure as for the appointment. For the purposes of attendance at the General Meeting and the exercise of voting rights, appointment of the above representative does not exempt the holders of voting rights from the obligation to request the intermediary to provide proof of their right to attend the General Meeting and exercise their voting rights, pursuant to art. 83-sexies of the CFA.
The proxy is without effect with respect to motions for which voting instructions have not been issued. During voting on resolutions for which precise voting instructions have not been provided, the shares relating to the authorisation given to the Appointed Representative are not included in the computation of the majority and the percentage of the issued capital required for approval of the above resolutions, despite having been included in the computation carried out for the purposes of the General Meeting quorum.
It should be noted that, in the event of unforeseen circumstances, having regard to changes or additions to the proposals submitted to the General Meeting, Servizi Titoli S.p.A., acting as the Appointed Representative, and being responsible for managing the accreditation and vote counting procedures at the General Meeting, whilst not being subject to a conflict of interest, will not cast a vote that differs from the instructions received.
The original proxy form with voting instructions for the Appointed Representative, complete with the required information and signed by the person holding voting rights, must be delivered to Computershare S.p.A. at its offices in Via Monte Giberto 29, 00138 Rome no later than 11 April 2014 with regard to the General Meeting in first call, or then 14 April 2014 with regard to the General Meeting in second call, A copy may be sent, by the same date, accompanied by a declaration of conformity to the original, via fax to +39 06-45417450 or by electronic version to the certified e-mail address to atlantia@pecserviziotitoli.it. If, for technical reasons, electronic versions of the proxy forms are not available, the forms may be requested by making a simple phone call to the following number: +39 06-45417413 (lines are open from Monday to Friday from 9.00am to 1.00pm and from 2.00pm to 6.00pm).
All holders of voting rights may, pursuant to art. 127-ter of Legislative Decree 58/98 (the CFA), ask questions on agenda items also before the General Meeting up to three days prior to the Meeting held in first call.
Questions must be sent to the Company by fax to +39 06-43632339 or to the certified e-mail address atlantia@pecserviziotitoli.it or by using this form.
The request must be accompanied by details of the shareholder’s identity (surname and name, if a person, or business name, if an entity or company, place and date of birth and tax code).
The Company may provide a collective answer to questions on the same subject. Answers will be provided, having verified their pertinence and the right of the questioner to ask such questions, no later than the General Meeting.
No reply is, however, required for questions the answers to which can be found in the "Questions and Answers" page on the Company's website.
Pursuant to art. 126-bis of legislative Decree 58/98 (the Consolidated Financial Act), shareholders, who represent, also on a jointly basis, one fortieth of the issued capital may, by 24 March 2014, apply for the addition of agenda or submit proposals for deliberation regarding matters already on the agenda.
All holders of voting rights are entitled to individually submit motions on items already on the agenda at the Meeting.
No agenda items may be added with respect to matters for which the General Meeting is required by law to deliberate on the recommendation, proposal or report of the directors.
Provision has not been made for votes to be cast by mail or electronically.
The Company’s issued capital consists of 825.783.990 ordinary shares with a par value of € 1.00 each. Each share grants the right to one vote (excluding treasury shares, which currently total 12.837.326).
Atlantia S.p.A., with registered office in Rome, via A. Nibby 20 (“Owner of the Processing Data”) hereby informs you that the personal data provided will only be processed for the purposes from time to time required, as indicated in this section of the internet website in relation to the General Meeting.
The conferment of personal data and their processing is required for the purposes indicated in this section of the internet website. The failure to confer the aforementioned personal data may imply the impossibility of following up any requests made from time to time. The processing of personal data for the above purposes is carried out manually and/or using automatic tools, but always in compliance with the laws in force on the matter.
The Owner of the Processing Data is expressly authorised to communicate the personal data to Computershare S.p.A. in order to correctly follow up the exercise of the rights provided in this section of the internet website, in relation to the General Meeting.
The person responsible for data processing is Avv. Pietro Fratta, domiciled in Via Alberto Bergamini 50, Rome, who may at any time be requested to access the details and to exercise the other rights provided by art. 7 of Legislative Decree 196/03.


text:
RGAFD, as it was renamed in 1992, was earlier established as a separate archive in 1967 as TsGAZ SSSR, on the basis of the sound division of the Central State Archive of Film, Photo-, and Phonographic Documents (TsGAKFFD SSSR). RGAFD serves as a centralized repository for documentary and artistic sound recordings from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. Its holdings include wax cylinders, recordings from talking-picture films made with mechanical and photographic methods, metal gramophone mouldings and records, magnetic and paper tapes, and CD-ROM. In recent years, RGAFD has been systematically promoting "oral history" with the creation its own recorded productions about past and current events in the social, political, and cultural life of the country. Since 1997, sound recordings from the former Vladimir Branch of RGAKFD (B-11), having been gathered there from regional studios throughout the RSFSR, have been transferred to RGAFD and intergrated with the previous RGAFD holdings.
N.B. Many sound recordings use for broadcast on state radio are held by the State Fond of Television and Radio Programm (Gosteleradiofond C-17).
All of the materials in the archive are open to researchers. Many of the holdings have already been released in published form.
Obzor fondov Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva fonodokumentov. Compiled by A. G. Evdokimova, A. N. Filippov, T. V. Ivanova, A. V. Kozhevnikova, I. V. Navolokina, E. V. Pleshakov, S. A. Romanov. Edited by V. A. Koliada. Moscow, 2001-.
Vyp. 1, pts. I-II: Zvukovoi arkhiv. 2001.
Vyp. 2, pts. III-IV: Zvukovoi arkhiv. 2002.
Vyp. 3, pt. II: Zvukovoi arkhiv. 2002.
Zvukovoi arkhiv: Perechni dokumentov. Moscow, 1998-. Computer publishing. [Rosarkhiv; RGAFD] Some issues available electronically: http://www.rusarchives.ru/federal/rgafd/nsa.shtml#4.
Vyp. 1: Poeziia "Serebrianogo veka". Compiled by I. V. Navolokina, A. V. Kozhevnikova, E. V. Pleshakov. Edited by T. V. Ivanova, A. N. Filippov. 1998. 169 p.
Vyp. 2: Obzor fondov. 1998. 161 p.
Vyp. 3: Ustnaia istoriia. Compiled by V. I. Gafarova, L. V. Titova, E. V. Pleshakov, M. S. Vikulova. Edited by N. Iu. Khudiakova. 1999. 87 p.
Vyp. 4: A. S. Pushkin, 200 let: Perechen'. Compiled by Iu. A. Pikalov, E. V. Pleshakov, V. P. Savkin, M. S. Enarakhova, A. V. Kozhevnikova. Edited by T. V. Ivanova, A. N. Filippov. 1999. 250 p.

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AMCAR Division, ACF Industries, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
AMCAR Division, ACF Industries, Inc.v.Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
John E. Jay of Parker, Chapin, Flattau Klimpl, New York City, for petitioner; Johnna G. Torsone, New York City, on the brief.
John H. Ferguson, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for respondent; Frederick Havard, Atty., John S. Irving, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Carl L. Taylor, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., on the brief.
Charles A. Werner of Schuchat, Cook Werner, St. Louis, Mo., for intervenor-respondent.
Petition for review of an order from the National Labor Relations Board.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, LAY, Circuit Judge, and VAN PELT, Senior District Judge.
Robert Van Pelt, Senior United States District Judge, District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
VAN PELT, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court upon the petition of AMCAR Division, ACF Industries, Inc. (AMCAR) for review and on cross-petition of the National Relations Board (NLRB) for enforcement of an NLRB Order.
See Amcar Division, ACF Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 231 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1977).
The NLRB affirmed the rulings, findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge who heard this case. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that AMCAR had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1), by subcontracting out bargaining unit production work without notifying the union, by refusing to furnish the union with requested information concerning the subcontracting, and by refusing to provide the union with a requested copy of a handwriting analysis. In a footnote, the NLRB specifically agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the six month statute of limitations under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), did not begin to run in this case until the union discovered the subcontracting.
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their] rights. . .
(a) Reinstate the trailer hitch and hitch components assembly operation and parts fabrication previously performed by its employees represented by the Union, to the extent that Respondent has customer orders, or will have customer orders, or stockpiles, for sale or repair of trailer hitches or components or parts, and uses or will use or stockpiles for use such products in its completion or repair of railroad flatcars.
(b) Offer to those employees, who were discharged or laid off as a result of the subcontracting of the trailer hitch related work, immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions, or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of pay suffered. . . .
(c) Bargain collectively with the Union as to any continuing unremedied effects on the bargaining unit as a result of the unlawful subcontracting of the hitch-related work not remedied by the preceding subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph 2, with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
(d) Give notice to the Union and bargain collectively with it concerning any future subcontracting of work performed by bargaining unit employees, unless specifically provided otherwise by the collective bargaining contract between the Union and Respondent.
(e) Comply with lawful requests of the Union for information concerning subcontracting, processing of grievances, and like matters pertaining to the Union's participation in administering the collective bargaining contract or in collective bargaining negotiations.
Joint Appendix at 59-60. We enforce the order of the Board.
We believe the primary facts set forth in this section are not in dispute. The principal office and plant of the Amcar Division is in St. Louis, Missouri. The St. Louis AMCAR has been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of railroad freight cars and related products, including trailer hitches. These trailer hitches are installed on flatcars used to transport trailers from tractor-trailer trucks.
Respondent has produced, in its plant with its own employees, all of the (fabricated) parts, components, and completed hitches for all five models, and has also produced the various jigs for assembling the different model components and final assemblies. The parts are made from raw steel by the Fabrication Department, where they are punched, formed, and sheared. From Fabrication the parts are moved to the hitch area or areas of Department 125, where the assembly of parts into components and the assembly of components into completed hitches is performed. The main work in assembly is performed by welders who place the parts, and later the components, in suitable jigs for tack welding and final welding. Some of the work is also performed by employees classified as fitters, tackers, and drill press operators. The jigs used in assembly are made in Respondent's tool and die shop.
During the last half of 1972, the company began phasing out the production of Model 4 trailer hitches in order to start the production of Model 5 hitches. In January, 1973, daily production of Model 5 hitches was between 5 and 10, and in March between 25 and 30. In order to produce more Model 5 hitches, the company expanded the hitch department and bought additional equipment. One additional building was equipped to perform final assembly of the Model 5 hitch. In addition, an area used to perform boxcar roof assembly was transformed into an area for performing sub assembly work for the Model 5 hitch by adding various equipment. Once this was completed, the production requirements increased to 50 hitches per day, six days a week, or 300 hitches per week. This continued through April of 1974. The hitch department was not able to meet this requirement; it requested and received better assistance in receiving parts and moving them. In April of 1974, the department was meeting the quota requirement. However, starting in May, 1974, the quota was changed to 60 hitches per day with a five day work week in order to avoid Saturday overtime. Production of 60 hitches per day was never achieved, although production did reach somewhere between 52 and 55. Two shifts daily were being used.
In November, 1974, the production quota was reduced to 30 hitches per day. According to the testimony of Mr. Meacham, who had been superintendent of the trailer hitch department during this time, the reduction was due to cancellations of orders for Model 5 hitches, and the 30 per day quota was largely for stockpiling for future use. The biggest portion of the second shift was eliminated according to Superintendent Meacham. In March, 1975, production of the Model 5 hitch was stopped altogether.
During the 1974-75 time period, the company was subcontracting out hitch components and parts. These subcontracts involved components for both the current Model 5 and for earlier Models A and 2. The contracts involved in excess of 18,000 manhours of work.
There were 14 groups of subcontracts (grouped by subject and contractor) totalling 35 subcontracts, the first let on March 25, 1974, the second on June 14, 1974, the next 29 in the period between July 1 and December 31, 1974, and additional two subcontracts in January and March, 1975, and the last two in May and August 1975, when the plant was on strike.
Joint Appendix at 40. The General Counsel for the NLRB has not complained of the first two subcontracts, which were small. The bulk of the subcontracting started in July of 1974, two months after AMCAR eliminated the Saturday shift for the 120 employees working in the hitch assembly section. As nearly as the union was able to tell from what may have been incomplete records, the first lay-offs from the hitch department occurred in September of 1974. The Administrative Law Judge found that between September, 1974 and November, 1975, there were layoffs of 113 welders, 16 fitters, 6 tackers, and 11 drill press operators and transfers of 5 welders and 1 fitter, either directly from Department 125 or related departments. While it was not clear that all of these persons were engaged in trailer hitch or hitch component production, approximately 120 of them were.
While it was not clear that all of the employees in Department 125 and the related departments, who were laid off or transferred to other jobs in those periods of time were necessarily engaged in trailer hitch or hitch components production, it was clear that among them were the employees laid off or transferred when the two shifts of 60 employees each, or a total of 120 employees, who were engaged through most of 1974 in trailer hitch and components production, were reduced near the end of 1974, by half. (Superintendent Meacham thought it was accomplished by practical elimination of the second shift except for six of eight employees; Union Agent Goodrick said it was by reducing each shift to half its size). And clearly among them were the group of employees laid off or transferred at the end of March 1975, when all Model 5 production was terminated reducing the approximately 60 employees engaged in trailer hitch or component assembly to 5 employees (as both Meacham and Goodrick testified). Goodrick further testified that these five remaining employees were welders engaged in welding of replacement components for various models, and that after the May 2-September 22, 1975 strike the five welders were reduced to one.
A union employee first discovered the subcontracting near the end of September, 1975. The employee talked to hitch department superintendent Meacham, who told him that no more work would be subcontracted out and that they would try to bring back some of the subcontracted work. The employee did not notify the union officials of the subcontracting at this time. In December, 1975 there was only one hitch welder working in Department 125 and he was told he was being removed from his job because AMCAR had decided to subcontract the work. This was reported to the union agent who for the first time learned of possible subcontracting and began to try to verify it with the company.
On December 19, 1975, when the subcontracting was verified, the union agent requested employee compensation for loss of work and earnings, and was informed that there would be no compensation. A formal charge was filed by the union on December 30, 1975, and was twice amended. The formal complaint was issued February 25, 1976 and, among other things, alleged that since on or about July 1, 1975, AMCAR had refused to collectively bargain about the subcontracting of bargaining unit work.
On December 30, 1975, demand was also made upon AMCAR for information relating to all subcontracts during the previous two years, including a job description and the number of man hours involved to perform each job. The union never received this information until the Administrative Law Judge ordered it delivered during the course of the trial. Following this disclosure, General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege that AMCAR had refused to collectively bargain with the union regarding the subcontracting of work since July 1, 1974 rather than July 1, 1975. The Administrative Law Judge reserved ruling on this requested amendment. He allowed the amendment when he decided the case.
on the facts of this case, the "contracting out" of the work previously performed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject about which the National Labor Relations Act requires employers and the representatives of their employees to bargain collectively.
reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime payments. These have long been regarded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework. . . .
Because of the limited grant of certiorari, we are concerned here only with whether the subject upon which the employer allegedly refused to bargain — contracting out of plant maintenance work previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit, which employees were capable of continuing to perform — is covered by the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of § 8(d).
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold, as we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case — the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment — is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.
Id. at 210, 215, 85 S.Ct. at 402, 405.
AMCAR argues that its decision to subcontract (1) does not fall within the limited confines of Fibreboard, (2) was based on operational considerations, (3) was not detrimental to the bargaining unit, and (4) was not based on anti-union animus.
At the outset it should be noted that the Board's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456, 467 (1951); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). We are also aware that the credibility of witnesses is primarily one for determination by the trier of facts. See Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 1978), although the rule is not to be mechanically applied. The Administrative Law Judge here did have to make credibility choices, and chose in large part to believe the union witnesses who testified on behalf of the Board. We believe the record as a whole supports these credibility findings.
There was no finding of anti-union animus in Fibreboard, but nevertheless the company was held to have a duty to bargain. Thus, that factor is not controlling here. AMCAR's other arguments must also fall although they are entitled to greater discussion.
This case involves the balancing of managerial prerogatives with the collective bargaining rights of employees. In Fibreboard, the court found that the requirement to bargain ". . . would not significantly abridge [the employer's] freedom to manage the business" where the subcontracting merely involved the substitution of one set of employees for another. Id. 379 U.S. at 213, 85 S.Ct. at 404.
Subsequent decisions have recognized there must be a substantial adverse effect on the bargaining unit in order for an unfair labor practice to occur. See NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 416 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007, 90 S.Ct. 1234, 25 L.Ed.2d 420 (1970); District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 13942 v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966), which uses the term "immediate" adverse effect. Each of the above cases found there was no duty to bargain with the employees.
We believe that the subcontracting here did have a substantial adverse effect on the employees and does fall within the confines of Fibreboard for the reasons which follow.
Factually this case is similar to Fibreboard in that the company did in some instances provide the subcontractors with company equipment, i. e., jigs used to assemble the hitch parts during production. The work did not differ in any respect from bargaining unit work which had been or was being performed on a daily basis at the plant. The Administrative Law Judge noted that the subcontracting did not appear to be economically motivated. Yet the Administrative Law Judge found that even at the peak of Model 5 production in May of 1974 the company eliminated Saturday overtime, used only two shifts in hitch assembly, did not always use three shifts in fabrication and when it did it was a skeleton crew of eight employees at the most. Eliminating overtime payments was one of the matters which the Fibreboard court found has "long been regarded as . . . peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework. . ." Id. 379 U.S. at 213-14, 85 S.Ct. at 404. As was noted in the fact section, the bulk of the subcontracting started two months after AMCAR eliminated the Saturday work.
AMCAR's argument that it was forced to subcontract out the hitch work because of limitations of space, equipment, air and electric power loses a great deal of its weight in light of the fact that it continued to subcontract out work after the end of October when layoffs allegedly due to cancellations of orders for the Model 5 hitch occurred. It is true that a substantial portion of the subcontracts were let in the early part of October and before the cancellation of orders for Model 5 hitches. However, the company has produced no valid explanation for the fact that during the three month period between November, 1974 and January, 1975, the company let seven subcontracts involving almost 5900 hours of work while union records which allegedly were incomplete showed at least 30 employees laid off or transferred during the period and there was testimony from the union agent that in December alone 40 hitch welders left the department. Joint appendix at 148. The subcontracting of this work obviously had a substantial adverse effect on the bargaining unit. Although the evidence was conflicting, there was testimony that space and equipment were available in another building owned by the company known as the St. Louis Car Plant, and that space in the hitch area could have been rearranged or production schedules changed so as to provide room for the subcontracted work.
AMCAR also argues that it had no duty to bargain regarding subcontracting because the contract in effect at the time contained no reference to subcontracting, but did contain a strong management rights clause and clauses which provided that this contract superseded all previous agreements and covered all the terms and conditions of employment. The Administrative Law Judge admitted testimony showing that the 1969-72 contract had contained a side letter requiring the company to notify the union of and bargain with it concerning subcontracting. This side letter was not present in the 1972-75 contract. However, the uncontradicted testimony showed that the omission was due to a statement by the company's negotiation chairman that the side letter was unnecessary because the company was under a statutory obligation to bargain about subcontracting. There was testimony also that the company had never before subcontracted production work. It had subcontracted maintenance work. The union agent testified that prior to subcontracting maintenance work the company had always notified him and provided an opportunity for discussion. In some cases, the company had decided after discussion with the union that the subcontracting was unnecessary.
The bulk of the contracts were let during the 1972-75 contract period. Two contracts were let after that, but are insignificant to our decision here. The subsequent labor contract arrived at for 1975-78 was also silent on the subject of subcontracting.
We have no difficulty in finding that this testimony concerning prior bargaining over subcontracting was admissible. It is well established that collective bargaining agreements are not governed by ordinary contract law. See Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific RR Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61, 87 S.Ct. 369, 17 L.Ed.2d 264 (1966). For example, Darnel v. East, 573 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1978), held that there need be no consideration for a stipulation that the parties agree to abide by a collective bargaining agreement. The failure to mention a right in a bargaining agreement does not constitute a waiver of it even though there is a clause stating that the contract represents the entire agreement between the parties. See Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163, 168 n. 9 (8th Cir. 1972); Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 321 (10th Cir. 1969). There is even more reason why the contract's silence on the subject of subcontracting is not controlling where the company by its behavior had induced such silence.
Considering all of the above factors, we enforce the Labor Board's finding in this case that prior to subcontracting the unit work there was a duty to bargain. We are not saying that AMCAR would be required to use three shifts or work overtime or rearrange its hitch assembly area or production schedules. We are saying only that AMCAR must notify the union and bargain with it prior to subcontracting unit work.
The charge was filed December 30, 1975. The complaint alleged unfair labor practices occurring during the six month period beginning July 1, 1975. Only one subcontract was let during this period and that was while the union was on strike. The next most recent contract was let in May of 1975, which was also while the union was on strike. As previously detailed, the Administrative Law Judge's decision allowed amendment of the complaint to allege that unfair labor practices occurred during the period beginning July 1, 1974, which was a full year beyond the statute of limitations. This was also the time period when the bulk of the subcontracting occurred.
. . . because Respondent concealed, and the Union had no notice of, the hitch components and parts subcontracting by Respondent, or no actual or constructive knowledge of any part of it until the end of September 1975. . . .
Several circuits, including this one, have recognized that the six month statute of limitations does not start to run until the injured party knows or should have known that his statutory rights were violated. Metromedia, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., Richard Bros. Div., 548 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1977); Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Shawnee Industries, Inc., 333 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1964).
The Employer is estopped from asserting a 10(b) defense, because its fraudulent concealment of vital information from the Union caused the latter to sleep while its opportunity to seek a legal remedy was slipping away. We cannot permit the Employer to benefit from the specific unfair labor practice which the Act explicitly empowers us to remedy. Don Burgess Construction Corporation d/b/a Burgess Construction, 227 NLRB No. 119 (1977); Avila Group, Inc., 218 NLRB 633, 639 (1975).
In Don Burgess the company shifted work from union to nonunion employees while assuring the union that it did not intend to employ any carpenters. The NLRB held that in such a case both the charge and the remedy extended beyond the six month statute of limitations period. Similarly, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was adopted in International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 463 F.2d 907 (1972), where the company told the union it was going out of business but in fact was moving the business to another state. Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the court, found there was no lack of diligence on the part of the union in discovering the fraud despite the fact that a considerable time period had elapsed. Not only was the statute tolled as to the filing of the charges, but back pay was allowed by the Circuit Court of Appeals to the date when the violation first occurred.
We believe the amendment of the complaint was appropriate in this case. There is substantial support for the finding that the union did not learn about the subcontracting until the end of September. When a union agent was apprised of the subcontracting, he took immediate action. The charge was filed well within six months of the union's learning of the subcontracting. In light of the facts, we do not believe the union exhibited any lack of diligence in discovering the subcontracting. The union was misled and deceived by the company. The company's negotiation chairman stated during the course of bargaining negotiations for the 1972-75 contract that no side letter concerning subcontracting would be necessary since the company had a statutory duty to bargain about subcontracting. We have in Section I found such a duty. The union, relying on this statement and the company's past history of notifying the union prior to subcontracting maintenance work, was undoubtedly lulled into a false sense of security. It is not surprising it did not discover the subcontracted work earlier even though deliveries were made by subcontractors to a building next to the hitch area. When the union began experiencing heavy lay-offs in December of 1974 and March of 1975, the union agent inquired as to the reason and was told by the hitch department superintendent that hitch sales were down. The superintendent claimed not to have any knowledge of the subcontracting until a later date. If he was not aware of the subcontracting of work from his own department, it is hard to see how the union should have been aware of the same. The statements of this company official gave the union no reason to investigate further or to send members to other buildings looking for evidence of subcontracted work. If the statute is not held to be tolled under these facts, the company will be allowed to benefit from its own unfair practices.
There is no question that an employer must "provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 568, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967); NLRB v. Western Electric, Inc., 559 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Twin City Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1970). This duty extends beyond the period of contract negotiations. Acme, supra. The information must be relevant and reasonably necessary to the union's role as bargaining agent during the administration of a collective bargaining agreement. Western Electric, supra; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1965). The information requested by the union relating to subcontracting, which the Administrative Law Judge ordered the company to supply, fell within this category. Without this information the union had no idea of the frequency of subcontracting, the amount and type of work involved, and the effect it might have had on the bargaining unit. The information was needed to pursue any claim that the company had a duty to bargain with the union prior to subcontracting out work.
The Administrative Law Judge also ordered the company to supply a handwriting analysis of an employee who was discharged for falsifying two sickness and accident claims. The union was furnished with copies of the two allegedly false claims and copies of the checks issued to the employee. The company had paid the cost of having the analysis made, and clearly felt the union should bear its own expense. The company indicated a willingness to trade handwriting analysis if the union had their own.
There was some indication in the record that an analysis might cost as much as $400 to $500.
Most appellate cases involve a failure to supply information which was readily accessible to the company and which might have been difficult, if not possible, for the union to obtain otherwise. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1972) (wage data); Anaconda Wire and Cable Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1971) (incentive plans); NLRB v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965) (wage data). Unlike Detroit Edison, supra, and NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1967), both of which required disclosure, there was nothing particularly confidential about the material requested by the union. The result of the analysis was apparent from the fact the company decided to discharge the employee. The union was in the position of having to make a decision within ten days as to whether or not it was going to arbitrate the claim on behalf of the employee. Due to the limited time which the union had to make its decision, and the serious consequences of the charges, we conclude that the handwriting analysis was relevant and reasonably necessary to the union's decision of whether to arbitrate.
The company contends that the Board's order is too broad, is excessive and unrealistic and not in keeping with the Act's remedial purpose. The Board's remedy may be set aside only upon a showing that it has abused its broad discretion. NLRB v. Drapery Manufacturing Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 1970). We believe the Board's remedy here is within the confines of the Act. The reinstitution of a subcontracted operation has been approved in cases such as Fibreboard, supra, and NLRB v. Jackson Farmers, Inc., 457 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1972). The order in this case is limited to requiring resumption of the hitch department only to the extent that there are customer orders or the company intends to stockpile trailer hitches. The NLRB has admitted in its brief at note 26 that not all of the employees lost their jobs due to the subcontracting and that the determination of which employees are entitled to back pay is appropriate for litigation during the back pay proceedings. We are in agreement that in computing the awards the Board will have to take into account factors such as the amount of work subcontracted, how much work it would have provided, and which employees would have been laid off first when the subcontracting work began to run out. Section II of this opinion cites cases in support of allowing back pay beyond the 10(b) period of limitations. We reject the company's argument that the back pay awards should be limited to the 10(b) period.
The Board's order will be enforced.


Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1981.
See 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1420.
Federal agents, aware that respondent had been indicted on federal drug charges and had retained counsel, met with her without her counsel's knowledge or permission, seeking her cooperation in a related investigation. The agents disparaged respondent's counsel and indicated that she would gain various benefits if she cooperated and would face a stiff jail term if she did not, but she declined to cooperate and notified her attorney. The agents visited respondent again in the absence of counsel, but she did not agree to cooperate with them nor did she incriminate herself or supply any information pertinent to her case. Subsequently, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on the ground that the agents' conduct violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The agents' egregious behavior was described as having "interfered" in some unspecified way with respondent's right to counsel, but it was not alleged that the claimed violation had prejudiced the quality or effectiveness of her legal representation or that the agents' conduct had any adverse impact on her legal position. The District Court denied the motion and respondent, pursuant to a prior agreement with the Government, entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of the indictment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated and that whether or not any tangible effect upon her representation had been demonstrated or alleged, the appropriate remedy was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.
Held: Assuming, arguendo, that the Sixth Amendment was violated in the circumstances of this case, nevertheless the dismissal of the indictment was not appropriate, absent a showing of any adverse consequence to the representation respondent received or to the fairness of the proceedings leading to her conviction. Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. Absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, from the violation of the Sixth Amendment, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in the criminal proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial, and dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. Pp. 364-367.
602 F.2d 529, reversed and remanded.
Peter Buscemi, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Salvatore J. Cucinotta, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Hazel Morrison, respondent here, was indicted on two counts of distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). She retained private counsel to represent her in the impending criminal proceedings. Thereafter, two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency, aware that she had been indicted and had retained counsel, sought to obtain her cooperation in a related investigation. They met and conversed with her without the knowledge or permission of her counsel. Furthermore, in the course of the conversation, the agents disparaged respondent's counsel, stating that respondent should think about the type of representation she could expect for the $200 retainer she had paid him and suggesting that she could be better represented by the public defender. In addition, the agents indicated that respondent would gain various benefits if she cooperated but would face a stiff jail term if she did not. Respondent declined to cooperate and immediately notified her attorney. The agents visited respondent again in the absence of counsel, but at no time did respondent agree to cooperate with them, incriminate herself, or supply any information pertinent to her case. Contrary to the agents' advice, respondent continued to rely upon the services of the attorney whom she had retained.
Respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on the ground that the conduct of the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The motion contained no allegation that the claimed violation had prejudiced the quality or effectiveness of respondent's legal representation; nor did it assert that the behavior of the agents had induced her to plead guilty, had resulted in the prosecution having a stronger case against her, or had any other adverse impact on her legal position. The motion was based solely upon the egregious behavior of the agents, which was described as having "interfered" in some unspecified way with respondent's right to counsel. This interference, unaccompanied by any allegation of adverse effect, was urged as a sufficient basis for the requested disposition.
The District Court denied the motion and respondent, pursuant to a prior agreement with the Government, entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of the indictment.1 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the judgment of the District Court was reversed. The appellate court concluded that respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated and that whether or not any tangible effect upon respondent's representation had been demonstrated or alleged, the appropriate remedy was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. 602 F.2d 529 (1979). We granted the United States' petition for certiorari to consider whether this extraordinary relief was appropriate in the absence of some adverse consequence to the representation respondent received or to the fairness of the proceedings leading to her conviction. 448 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 3048, 65 L.Ed.2d 1135. We reverse.
The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied. Because we agree with the United States, however, that the dismissal of the indictment was error in any event, we shall assume, without deciding, that the Sixth Amendment was violated in the circumstances of this case.
The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused shall enjoy the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." This right, fundamental to our system of justice is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-463, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Our cases have accordingly been responsive to proved claims that governmental conduct has rendered counsel's assistance to the defendant ineffective. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964).
At the same time and without detracting from the fundamental importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases, we have implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. Our relevant cases reflect this approach. In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, the defendant was totally denied the assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. In Geders v. United States, supra, Herring v. New York, supra, and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), judicial action before or during trial prevented counsel from being fully effective. In Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 190, 17 L.Ed.2d 26 (1966), and O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 87 S.Ct. 1158, 18 L.Ed.2d 94 (1967), law enforcement officers improperly overheard pretrial conversations between a defendant and his lawyer. None of these deprivations, however, resulted in the dismissal of the indictment. Rather, the conviction in each case was reversed and the Government was free to proceed with a new trial. Similarly, when before trial but after the institution of adversary proceedings, the prosecution has improperly obtained incriminating information from the defendant in the absence of his counsel, the remedy characteristically imposed is not to dismiss the indictment but to suppress the evidence or to order a new trial if the evidence has been wrongfully admitted and the defendant convicted. Gilbert v. California, supra; United States v. Wade, supra; Massiah v. United States, supra. In addition, certain violations of the right to counsel may be disregarded as harmless error. Compare Moore v. Illinois, supra, 434 U.S. at 232, 98 S.Ct. at 466, with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, and n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, and n. 8, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705 (1967).
Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. The premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial.
More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.2 This has been the result reached where a Fifth Amendment violation has occurred,3 and we have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment. The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.
In arriving at this conclusion, we do not condone the egregious behavior of the Government agents. Nor do we suggest that in cases such as this, a Sixth Amendment violation may not be remedied in other proceedings. We simply conclude that the solution provided by the Court of Appeals is inappropriate where the violation, which we assume has occurred, has had no adverse impact upon the criminal proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A second count was dismissed as required by the plea agreement. The plea was conditioned on respondent's right to appeal the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit has approved this procedure. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (1978); United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (1975). We express no view on the propriety of such conditional pleas.
There is no claim here that there was continuing prejudice which, because it could not be remedied by a new trial or suppression of evidence, called for more drastic treatment. Cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-326, 92 S.Ct. 455, 465-66, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Indeed, there being no claim of any discernible taint, even the traditional remedies were beside the point. The Court of Appeals seemed to reason that because there was no injury claimed and because other remedies would not be fruitful, dismissal of the indictment was appropriate. But as the dissent below indicated, it is odd to reserve the most drastic remedy for those situations where there has been no discernible injury or other impact.
The Court of Appeals also thought dismissal was appropriate to deter deliberate infringements of the right to counsel. But this proves too much, for it would warrant dismissal, not just in this case, but in any case where there has been a knowing violation. Furthermore, we note that the record before us does not reveal a pattern of recurring violations by investigative officers that might warrant the imposition of a more extreme remedy in order to deter further lawlessness.
The position we have adopted finds substantial support in the Courts of Appeals. United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39, 41-42 (CA7 1980); United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192, 196-197 (CA2 1980); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 861-864 (CA9 1979); United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1196-1197 (CA8 1976); United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670, 674 (CA5 1976); but see United States v. McCord, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 15-18, 509 F.2d 334, 348-351 (1974) (en banc) (dicta). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has adopted a contrary view. See Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 367 N.E.2d 635 (1977).


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Sergio Daniel Bobadilla appeals his jury conviction and 188-month sentence imposed for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a) (1).
Bobadilla first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction as a member of the conspiracy. "Once a conspiracy exists, evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's connection with the conspiracy, even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to convict defendant of knowing participation in the conspiracy." United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1987).
Here the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution shows the prosecution's case is more than sufficient. On November 30, 1995, Bobadilla spent at least two hours at the stash house, where cocaine was later found concealed in the vents. Large amounts of money and drug paraphernalia, as well as weapons, were also found. He left the stash house in a Toyota and engaged in countersurveillance driving, picked up an unidentified male, and returned to the stash house. The next day, December 1, law enforcement stopped Bobadilla as he was driving away from the stash house in a Mazda. The Mazda contained an illegally cloned cellular telephone, and a hidden compartment where drugs had been carried within 24 to 34 hours earlier. Bobadilla was also identified as resembling a man who went to a storage unit loaded with amphetamines, and 5 months later, he himself transported by motor vehicle 43 packages of marijuana. A law enforcement officer provided testimony that his conduct, particularly in being granted access to a stash house that was obviously used for no other purpose, was inconsistent with any conduct other than knowledge and participation in the conspiracy.
The evidence here is far stronger than the cases upon which appellant relies, where the evidence was found to be insufficient because there was an innocent explanation for the defendant's conduct, and the government failed to provide sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. See United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cloughessy, 572 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1977). None of those cases involved a suspect who engaged in countersurveillance driving, possessed unlawful communications devices, and repeatedly visited a stash house.
Appellant next contends that his conviction for possession must be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. However, the conviction may be affirmed on the basis of co-conspirator liability. See United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 645-47 (1946).
Appellant also contends the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his subsequent bad act of transporting marijuana. The district court did not abuse its discretion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that subsequent narcotics transaction was relevant to show "intent, motive, knowledge, lack of accident and opportunity"). The fact that the marijuana transportation occurred five months after the acts charged in the indictment does not make it too remote in time. See United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1994) (11-month period between defendant's arrest and time drug customer was found in defendant's wallet not too remote). Bobadilla's contention that marijuana and cocaine are not similar also lacks merit. See United States v. Bobo-Rodriquez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1991).
Bobadilla's bad act is also admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. This is especially true given the court's limiting jury instruction that jurors could use the evidence of marijuana transportation only to show intent and knowledge to participate in the drug conspiracy. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982).
Bobadilla finally contends that he was entitled to either a minimal or minor role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The circumstantial evidence shows that appellant was a trusted member of a large scale conspiracy. There is no evidence in the record suggesting he had a minor or minimal role.

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Mylan N.V. is a global generic and specialty pharmaceuticals company registered in the ..... In July 2014, Mylan and Abbott Laboratories announced an agreement under ...... show. v · t · e · Pittsburgh corporations within the Pittsburgh Metro Area.
Case opinion for FL District Court of Appeal ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. Read the Court's full decision on FindLaw.
Oct 21, 2008 ... This suit concerns two Abbott Laboratories patents on extended release formulations of the antibiotic ... Novo Nordisk of North America, Inc. v. ... Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. .... Mylan Laboratories, 464 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed.
Jul 7, 1999 ... There are three motions to dismiss pending in FTC v. Mylan and three ... Defendants are Mylan Laboratories, Inc., Cambrex. Corporation .... Typically, the generic manufacturer purchases the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) .... This Court can find no reason to depart from the Abbott Labs holding.
Feb 20, 2019 ... ... MYLAN INC.,. MYLAN LABORATORIES LIMITED, ... Rosenman LLP as counsel for Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Mylan”) in three ... disqualify in Salix Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Pharma- ..... Abbott Labs.,. 692 F. Supp.
Apr 21, 2014 ... Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GLENMARK PHARMACEUTICALS INC., USA. (now known as Glenmark Generics., Inc., USA) AND ... Abbott Laboratories and Abbott Laboratories Inc. (United ..... Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F. 3d.

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Respondent Andrew Sokolow was stopped by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. When respondent was stopped, the agents knew, inter alia, that (1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the DEA agents did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop respondent, as required by the Fourth Amendment. 831 F.2d 1413 (CA9 1987). We take the contrary view.
This case involves a typical attempt to smuggle drugs through one of the Nation's airports.  On a Sunday in July 1984, respondent went to the United Airlines ticket counter at Honolulu Airport, where he purchased two round-trip tickets for a flight to Miami leaving later that day. The tickets were purchased in the names of "Andrew Kray" and "Janet Norian" and had open return dates. Respondent paid $2,100 for the tickets from a large roll of $20 bills, which appeared to contain a total of $4,000. He also gave the ticket agent his home telephone number. The ticket agent noticed that respondent seemed nervous; he was about 25 years old; he was dressed in a black jumpsuit and wore gold jewelry; and he was accompanied by a woman, who turned out to be Janet Norian. Neither respondent nor his companion checked any of their four pieces of luggage.
After the couple left for their flight, the ticket agent informed Officer John McCarthy of the Honolulu Police Department of respondent's cash purchase of tickets to Miami. Officer McCarthy determined that the telephone number respondent gave to the ticket agent was subscribed to a "Karl Herman," who resided at 348-A Royal Hawaiian Avenue in Honolulu. Unbeknownst to McCarthy (and later to the DEA agents), respondent was Herman's roommate. The ticket agent identified respondent's voice on the answering machine at Herman's number. Officer McCarthy was unable to find any listing under the name "Andrew Kray" in Hawaii. McCarthy subsequently learned that return reservations from Miami to Honolulu had been made in the names of Kray and Norian, with their arrival scheduled for July 25, three days after respondent and his companion had left. He also learned that Kray and Norian were scheduled to make stopovers in Denver and Los Angeles.
On July 25, during the stopover in Los Angeles, DEA agents identified respondent. He "appeared to be very nervous and was looking all around the waiting area." App. 43-44. Later that day, at 6:30 p.m., respondent and Norian arrived in Honolulu. As before, they had not checked their luggage. Respondent was still wearing a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry. The couple proceeded directly to the street and tried to hail a cab, where Agent Richard Kempshall and three other DEA agents approached them. Kempshall displayed his credentials, grabbed respondent by the arm, and moved him back onto the sidewalk. Kempshall asked respondent for his airline ticket and identification; respondent said that he had neither. He told the agents that his name was "Sokolow," but that he was traveling under his mother's maiden name, "Kray."
Respondent and Norian were escorted to the DEA office at the airport. There, the couple's luggage was examined by "Donker," a narcotics detector dog, which alerted on respondent's brown shoulder bag. The agents arrested respondent. He was advised of his constitutional rights and declined to make any statements. The agents obtained a warrant to search the shoulder bag. They found no illicit drugs, but the bag did contain several suspicious documents indicating respondent's involvement in drug trafficking. The agents had Donker reexamine the remaining luggage, and this time the dog alerted on a medium-sized Louis Vuitton bag. By now, it was 9:30 p.m., too late for the agents to obtain a second warrant. They allowed respondent to leave for the night, but kept his luggage. The next morning, after a second dog confirmed Donker's alert, the agents obtained a warrant and found 1,063 grams of cocaine inside the bag.
Respondent was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The United States District Court for Hawaii denied his motion to suppress the cocaine and other evidence seized from his luggage, finding that the DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in drug trafficking when they stopped him at the airport. Respondent then entered a conditional plea of guilty to the offense charged.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed respondent's conviction by a divided vote, holding that the DEA agents did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 831 F.2d, at 1423.  The majority divided the facts bearing on reasonable suspicion into two categories. In the first category, the majority placed facts describing "ongoing criminal activity," such as the use of an alias or evasive movement through an airport; the majority believed that at least one such factor was always needed to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id., at 1419. In the second category, it placed facts describing "personal characteristics" of drug couriers, such as the cash payment for tickets, a short trip to a major source city for drugs, nervousness, type of attire, and unchecked luggage. Id., at 1420. The majority believed that such characteristics, "shared by drug couriers and the public at large," were only relevant if there was evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and the Government offered "[e]mpirical documentation" that the combination of facts at issue did not describe the behavior of "significant numbers of innocent persons." Ibid. Applying this two-part test to the facts of this case, the majority found that there was no evidence of ongoing criminal behavior, and thus that the agents' stop was impermissible. The dissenting judge took the view that the majority's approach was "overly mechanistic" and "contrary to the case-by-case determination of reasonable articulable suspicion based on all the facts." Id., at 1426.
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 2033, 100 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988), because of its serious implications for the enforcement of the federal narcotics laws. We now reverse.
The Court of Appeals held that the DEA agents seized respondent when they grabbed him by the arm and moved him back onto the sidewalk. 831 F.2d, at 1416. The Government does not challenge that conclusion, and we assume-without deciding-that a stop occurred here. Our decision, then, turns on whether the agents had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing when they encountered him on the sidewalk. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable cause.
The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' " Id., at 27, 88 S.Ct., at 1883. The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal level of objective justification" for making the stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310, 3312, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact-finders are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers." Id., at 418, 101 S.Ct., at 695.
The rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, in which evidence available to an officer is divided into evidence of "ongoing criminal behavior," on the one hand, and "probabilistic" evidence, on the other, is not in keeping with the quoted statements from our decisions. It also seems to us to draw a sharp line between types of evidence, the probative value of which varies only in degree. The Court of Appeals classified evidence of traveling under an alias, or evidence that the suspect took an evasive or erratic path through an airport, as meeting the test for showing "ongoing criminal activity." But certainly instances are conceivable in which traveling under an alias would not reflect ongoing criminal activity: for example, a person who wished to travel to a hospital or clinic for an operation and wished to concealed that fact. One taking an evasive path through an airport might be seeking to avoid a confrontation with an angry acquaintance or with a creditor. This is not to say that each of these types of evidence is not highly probative, but they do not have the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, the factors in this case that the Court of Appeals treated as merely "probabilistic" also have probative significance. Paying $2,100 in cash for two airplane tickets is out of the ordinary, and it is even more out of the ordinary to pay that sum from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that amount of cash. Most business travelers, we feel confident, purchase airline tickets by credit card or check so as to have a record for tax or business purposes, and few vacationers carry with them thousands of dollars in $20 bills. We also think the agents had a reasonable ground to believe that respondent was traveling under an alias; the evidence was by no means conclusive, but it was sufficient to warrant consideration.  While a trip from Honolulu to Miami, standing alone, is not a cause for any sort of suspicion, here there was more: surely few residents of Honolulu travel from that city for 20 hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during the month of July.
Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326-27, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.); id., at 515-516, 103 S.Ct., at 1333-1334 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); id., at 523-524, 103 S.Ct., at 1337-38 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).  We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam), "there could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." Id., at 441, 100 S.Ct., at 2754.  Indeed, Terry itself involved "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent" if viewed separately, "but which taken together warranted further investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S.Ct., at 1881; see also Cortez, supra, 449 U.S., at 417-419, 101 S.Ct., at 694-696. We noted in Gates, 462 U.S., at 243-244, n. 13, 103 S.Ct., at 2335 n. 13, that "innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause," and that "[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts." That principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the agents' belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA's "drug courier profiles."  Brief for Respondent 14-21. A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a "profile" does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.
Respondent also contends that the agents were obligated to use the least intrusive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions that he was smuggling narcotics. Id., at 12-13, 21-23. In respondent's view, the agents should have simply approached and spoken with him, rather than forcibly detaining him. He points to the statement in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S., at 500, 103 S.Ct., at 1325-26 (opinion of WHITE, J.), that "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." That statement, however, was directed at the length of the investigative stop, not at whether the police had a less intrusive means to verify their suspicions before stopping Royer. The reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. Such a rule would unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions-here, respondent was about to get into a taxicab-and it would require courts to "indulge in 'unrealistic second-guessing.' " Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S., at 542, 105 S.Ct., at 3311, quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1576, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
We hold that the agents had a reasonable basis to suspect that respondent was transporting illegal drugs on these facts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
^1 The facts in this case were developed at suppression hearings held in the District Court over three separate days. The parties also stipulated to certain facts.
^2 In an earlier decision, the Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court, but on the basis of different reasoning. 808 F.2d 1366, vacated, 831 F.2d 1413 (CA9 1987). The Court of Appeals' second decision was issued after the Government petitioned for rehearing on the ground that the court had erred in considering each of the facts known to the agents separately rather than in terms of the totality of the circumstances.
^3 Respondent also claims that the agents should have conducted a further inquiry to resolve the inconsistency between the name he gave the airline and the name, "Karl Herman," under which his telephone number was listed. Brief for Respondent 26. This argument avails respondent nothing; had the agents done further checking, they would have discovered not only that respondent was Herman's roommate but also that his name was "Sokolow" and not "Kray," the name listed on his ticket.
^4 In Royer, the police were aware, inter alia, that (1) Royer was traveling under an assumed name; (2) he paid for his ticket in cash with a number of small bills; (3) he was traveling from Miami to New York; (4) he put only his name and not an address on his checked luggage; and (5) he seemed nervous while walking through Miami airport. 460 U.S., at 493, n. 2, 502, 103 S.Ct., at 1322, n. 2, 1326-27 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
^5 In Reid, the Court held that a DEA agent stopped the defendant without reasonable suspicion. At the time of the stop, the agent knew that (1) the defendant flew into Atlanta from Fort Lauderdale, a source city for cocaine; (2) he arrived early in the morning, when police activity was believed to be at a low ebb; (3) he did not check his luggage; and (4) the defendant and his companion appeared to be attempting to hide the fact that they were together. The Court held that the first three of these facts were not sufficient to supply reas nable suspicion, because they "describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers," while the last fact was insufficient on the facts of that case to establish reasonable suspicion. 448 U.S., at 441, 100 S.Ct., at 2754.
^6 Agent Kempshall testified that respondent's behavior "had all the classic aspects of a drug courier." App. 59. Since 1974, the DEA has trained narcotics officers to identify drug smugglers on the basis of the sort of circumstantial evidence at issue here.


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‘There is nothing – absolutely nothing – half so much worth doing as simply messing about in boats’, says Ratty, one of the heroes of Wind in the Willows. The apostle Paul was similarly a frequent sailor, although his nautical adventures could hardly be described as ‘messing about’. Sailing was a major mode of transport in New Testament times.1 Not counting the incident in this chapter, Paul had already been shipwrecked on three occasions, 2 Cor. 11. 25. Nonetheless, Paul and others willingly ‘hazarded their lives for the name of our Lord Jesus Christ’, Acts 15. 26.
However, our study focuses on individuals who demonstrate care for others. The virtue of caring indicates that humans are created ‘in the image of God’, Gen 1. 27, since ‘He careth for you’, 1 Pet. 5. 7.
Julius the Roman centurion belonged to ‘Augustus’ band,’ v. 1. This elite regiment of crack troops was the equivalent of the modernday SAS. Despite his tough training, Julius showed kindness to Paul, v. 3. We observe that strength and gentleness are not mutually exclusive – a good lesson for believers.
Although the centurion did not heed Paul’s navigation advice, at the very least he listened politely, v. 11. Julius learned his lesson during the journey; two weeks later he followed Paul’s instructions completely, vv. 31, 33. In witnessing as well as general conversation it is important for us to persevere with those whose initial reaction is to disregard our words. The patience and persistence that characterized Paul should also be present in our lives.
At the end of the chapter, Julius was determined to save Paul’s life, despite the bloodthirsty instincts of his soldiers, v. 43. Perhaps Julius recognized Paul’s innocence, or even his godliness? Like the centurion who met the Lord Jesus, Julius appreciated that Paul was God’s man in the same way as a soldier is Caesar’s man, Matt. 8. 9.
The Lord’s servants often face storms, whether literal or metaphorical. Paul, however, stands apart from many believers. Whereas Jonah brought a tempest upon himself and his shipmates because of disobedience, Jonah 1. 12, Paul went through Euroclydon in calm assurance that he was obeying God’s will. Although the disciples doubted Christ’s care during the storm, Mark 4. 38, Paul was reassured that God would bring him through, Acts 27. 25.
The Lord sent an angel, v. 23, with a comforting message for Paul, who immediately broadcast it to the other passengers and crew. He told them, v. 23, of his God-given identity – ‘Whose I am’ – and purpose – ‘Whom I serve’. Could we truthfully use this same language of devotion to describe ourselves? Next, Paul passed on the revelation that all aboard would be safe, v. 24. Here is a challenge to us: do we keep the good news of salvation secret, or are we ready to share it with colleagues and companions? This brings us neatly to the final point.
Notice the repetition of ‘all’ through the chapter, vv. 24, 33, 35, 36, 37, 44. Every soldier, sailor, and passenger was valuable to Paul and to God. There were 276 in total, v. 37. Paul (or Luke?) counted them all. God had even counted the hairs on their heads, v. 34, cf. Matt. 10. 30. All (literally people, hyperbolically hairs) were to be preserved unharmed.
A 100% survival rate seemed unlikely during the massive tempest, especially in the presence of cowardly sailors, v. 30, and murderous soldiers, v. 42. However, Paul must have been praying to God. The angelic message refers to those ‘given’ to Paul, v. 24, presumably in response to the apostle’s intercession for his shipmates’ safety. God granted his request. Almost certainly, Paul also prayed for their souls’ salvation. Did God grant this request? We must be prayerfully aware of both the everyday and the eternal needs of people around us.
Paul could not stop the storm, but he did his best to relieve difficulties aboard the ship. Alongside offering reassurance, he lent a hand to the sailors, v. 19, and encouraged them to eat, v. 35.
Finally, through Paul’s prayer and God’s power, ‘they escaped all safe to land’, v. 44. Have faith and pray! At times it seems unlikely that our friends and family might ever be saved, but God is ‘able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think’, Eph. 3. 21.
1 ‘It is estimated that in the Roman period, the Mediterranean was better connected than at any point until the 19th century’, Julian Wainwright, University of Southampton, 2017, www.futurelearn.com/courses/shipwrecks/0/steps/7964.
2 For example, see A Meteorological Appraisal of Acts 27: 5-26. R.W. White, The Expository Times 113(12), pp. 403-407, 2002.

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It’s the Friday before a domestic violence trial is set to begin on Monday. As a prosecutor, you have just finished meeting with the patrol officer first on the scene and the detective who investigated; next, you are scheduled to meet with Susan, the victim, to talk about what happened that day and to discuss her testimony. You wait. Thirty minutes past the scheduled meeting time, you call your investigator and ask him to contact Susan to find out where she is.
Another 30 minutes goes by, and the investigator comes into your office to tell you that Susan’s family said that she has left town, despite being subpoenaed. The family isn’t sure where she went, but Susan has several friends in other cities and states where she could have gone.
Her family thinks that the defendant threatened her in some way to keep her out of court. In the past couple of weeks, she received several phone calls where she looked concerned during the conversations and said to the caller in a low voice, “You wouldn’t dare.” Family members had asked her if it was her boyfriend, the defendant, who had called, but she wouldn’t say anything other than to shake her head no with tears in her eyes. Susan’s brother said that she told him just before she left that she was afraid for her life if she testified; he also claims to have overheard the defendant stating to others in a bar that he is not worried about his upcoming trial because “it is all taken of.” The investigator tells you that he asked the brother to come in to talk to you, and he is on his way.
You’re not worried—but should you be?
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted this doctrine, applying it in a capital murder case in Gonzalez v. State.7 Police had arrived at the victims’ house, finding that both Maria and Baldomero Herrera had been shot. Maria Herrera described their assailant as a relative of the people who lived across the street; she had recognized him during the assault, and he had stolen the neighbors’ truck. Police, acting on this information, found the stolen truck and set up surveillance. They saw the defendant, Ray Gonzalez, who matched Maria’s description, get into the truck; he then led them in a high-speed chase. After he was apprehended and arrested, Maria’s blood was found on his shoes.8 Maria died from her wounds a few hours after giving her statements.
As one would expect, soon after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Gonzalez other Texas intermediate appellate courts followed the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.11 For example, in Sohail v. State, the defendant allegedly struck his then-pregnant wife in the face after she had allegedly spilled hot tea in his lap. The victim left their home in Sugarland the following day and traveled to Carrollton, where her parents lived. She made a report to the Carrollton police at her parents’ insistence, then went back to Sugarland with her mother to make a report there as well. The victim obtained a protective order against her husband, which she later dropped because the defendant forced her to (according to her mother).
The fundamental difference between the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ “more broad” interpretation and application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in Gonzales, and its limitation as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in its application by Giles, is that now (post-Giles) there has to be some showing that the defendant committed the wrongdoing with the intent to prevent or cause a witness to be unavailable to testify. Unless the State can somehow show or demonstrate that intent to the trial court, the defendant might prevail on his Confrontation Clause claim.
It would seem now that the rather broad interpretation of forfeiture by wrongdoing, such as in Gonzalez25 or by the California courts of appeals in Giles,26 will no longer suffice to allow the State to entreat the trial judge to deny a defendant’s Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation and deny the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements made by a witness who is otherwise unavailable to testify at trial. As was foreshadowed by the New Mexico case Romero,27 the best practice for prosecutors facing this situation is to establish and/or present evidence, during a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, to show the intent to wrongfully prevent the declarant from testifying at trial.
What’s a prosecutor to do?
Admittedly a trial prosecutor may not have much evidence for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law denying a defendant’s confrontational right under the Sixth Amendment. However, in most domestic violence cases, the case that eventually goes to trial is not the first time the protagonists have quarreled. Due diligence means anticipating the possibility that a subpoenaed victim might not appear at trial and a defendant may raise a confrontation objection. Gather evidence from the present case and any threats or inferences made by the defendant to discourage or hamper his victim’s appearance at trial. This should also include recordings of any jail calls. Keep that information and the list of witnesses who will testify regarding those circumstances in a separate part of your file but at the ready to counter any of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause objections, and preserve the record as to the trial court’s finding that the defendant waived his right to confront the witness by his wrongdoing.
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
2 “For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Crawford¸ 541 U.S. at 62, 124 S.Ct. at 1370.
3 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
4 “While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what we said in Crawford: that “the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing … extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds” (citations omitted). That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 833, 126 S.Ct. at 2280.
5 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
6 Crawford¸ 541 U.S. at 62, 124 S.Ct. at 1370; Davis, 547 U.S. at 834, 126 S.Ct. at 2280.
7 Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
8 Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 115.
9 Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004).
10 Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 126.
11 See Sohail v. State, 264 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); See also Carillo v. State, 2007 WL 541598 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (memo. op.) (not designated for publication) (statement made by victim before his death was a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule and the court did not reach issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing even though acknowledging expansion of the doctrine by Gonzalez).
12 Sohail, 264 S.W.3d at 255-256.
14 Carillo v. State, 2007 WL 541598, *6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (memo. op.) (not designated for publication).
15 Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 125.
16 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
17 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
18 Giles, 554 U.S. at 357; 128 S.Ct. at 2681–82.
20 Giles, 554 U.S. at 358; 128 S.Ct. at 2682–83.
22 Giles, 554 U.S. at 360-61; 128 S.Ct. at 2684.
23 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).
24 Giles, 554 U.S. at 367, 128 S.Ct. at 2687.
25 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004).
26 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
27 141 N.M. 403, 156 P.3d 694 (2007).
28 2012 WL 3795447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref’d) (memo. op.) (not designated for publication).
29 Garcia, 2012 WL 3795447 at *1-*3.
33 457 Mass. 858, 933 N.E. 633 (2010) (the defendant had been charged with committing an assault and battery on his girlfriend, they later got married and at a dangerousness hearing the victim refused to testify claiming her spousal privilege.The State successfully moved to admit hearsay statements made by the victim to her sister concerning the matter, before she married the defendant).
34 444 Mass. 526, 830 N.E.2d 158 (2005).
35 “We held that three factual findings are required for forfeiture by wrongdoing to apply: 1) the witness is unavailable; 2) the defendant was involved in or responsible for procuring the unavailability of the witness; and 3) the defendant acted with the intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.” Szerlong, 933 N.E. at 861.

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