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Los Angeles – As part of a nationwide crackdown on fraudulent charities, Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. is filing today eight lawsuits against 53 individuals, 17 telemarketers and 12 charities that “shamelessly exploited” people’s generosity and squandered millions of dollars of donations intended to help police, firefighters and veterans.
Brown’s suits are intended to permanently stop the charities’ deceptive practices and require the repayment of all funds raised under false pretenses. Brown is seeking involuntary dissolution of eight of the charities.
In California, just as in the other participating states, the so-called charities raised millions of dollars based on false claims that donors’ contributions would benefit police, firefighters and veterans organizations. But in reality, these charities rarely benefit public safety personnel. And, in most cases, 85 percent to 90 percent of donations are used to pay the fees of for-profit telemarketing firms.
Last year, Brown launched an investigation into 12 of the worst offenders, resulting in the eight cases filed today in Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, and San Mateo counties. It is estimated that since 2005, hundreds of thousands of Californians have been deceived by the solicitation campaigns these charities and their fundraisers have conducted.
•	Law Enforcement Apprenticeship Program, based in Los Angeles.
•	California Police Youth Charities, based in Sacramento.
•	American Association of Police Officers, Police Protective Fund, Inc. and Junior Police Academy -- all of which are based in Los Angeles and are operated by the same directors.
•	Association for Firefighters and Paramedics, based in Santa Ana.
•	Association for Police and Sheriffs, Inc., based in Fullerton.
•	Coalition of Police and Sheriffs, Disabled Firefighters Fund, and American Veterans Relief Foundation – all of which are based in Santa Ana and are operated by the same staff.
•	Homeless and Disabled Veterans Corporation, based in Washington D.C.
•	California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, based in San Bernardino.
People v. Law Enforcement Apprenticeship Program, et al.
Brown today sued Los Angeles-based Law Enforcement Apprenticeship Program, its directors and its for-profit fundraiser, Rambret, Inc., for falsely promising contributors that their donations would be used to operate an apprenticeship program for at-risk youth. The program was never operated and no students were ever enrolled in it.
Instead, donations were used to pay for fundraising expenses, the personal expenses of the charity’s directors and the purchase of a 30-foot sailboat.
In 2003, Law Enforcement Apprenticeship Program raised $529,863, but only $31,501 – just 6 percent -- was spent on its program services. In 2004, the charity raised $372,623, but spent only $5,615 – 1.5 percent -- on program services.
•	Conspired to defraud donors.
•	Engaged in unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.
•	Failed to use contributions for the purpose solicited in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17510.8.
•	Made illegal distributions in violation of Corporations Code section 5237.
•	Knowingly filed false public documents in violation of Corporations Code section 6215.
•	Failed to keep corporate books and records in violation of Corporations Code section 6320.
Brown seeks to dissolve the charity, to prevent the directors from operating a charity in California again, and to prevent the fundraiser from soliciting funds for a charity in California until it complies with state law.
Brown also seeks a court order requiring the charity to file a report of its receipts and expenses, to recover the funds misappropriated by the directors and civil penalties in excess of $150,000.
People v. California Police Youth Charities, et al.
Brown today sued Sacramento-based California Police Youth Charities, its executive director and its for-profit fundraisers -- National Consultants, Inc. and Public Appeals, Inc. -- for falsely promising contributors that 100 percent of donations would go to support the charity’s programs to help at-risk youth. In reality, less than 20 percent of the $9 million raised in 2006 and 2007 was spent on charitable programs.
The charity also filed false documents with the IRS and the Attorney General’s Office. In 2006, the charity reported that it made almost $1 million in grants, when it actually made grants totaling only $110,000.
•	Engaged in deceptive and misleading solicitations in violation of Government Code section 12599.6.
•	Engaged in reporting violations in violation of Government Code sections 12586 and 12599.
•	Used false or misleading statements when soliciting for contributions in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500.
Brown seeks a permanent injunction to end these deceptive solicitation practices. He also seeks to recover misappropriated charitable funds and civil penalties in excess of $100,000 from the charity and its for-profit fundraisers.
People v. American Association of Police Officers, Police Protective Fund, and Junior Police Academy, et al.
Brown today sued Los Angeles-based American Association of Police Officers, Police Protective Fund, and Junior Police Academy, their officers David Dierks and Philip LeConte, and their for-profit fundraisers for misleading donors into thinking that their solicitors were volunteer police officers and that contributions would benefit donors’ local police departments.
The for-profit fundraisers include: West Coast Advertising (known as Professional Communications Network) and Mark Christiansen (doing business as Charitable Fundraising Services).
Additionally, the charities violated both state and federal law when they filed reports with the IRS and the Attorney General’s Office that under-reported fundraising and administrative expenses and over-reported the amount spent on charitable programs.
In 2007, for example, Police Protective Fund raised $6.8 million and claimed in its tax returns that it spent $1.7 million on its charitable program. However, that $1.7 million improperly included fundraising expenses, a $350,000 judgment paid to the State of Missouri and other administrative expenses.
Likewise, in 2007, American Association of Police Officers reported in its tax returns that it spent $493,798 on its charitable program. However, out of that amount, $425,000 was paid to the charities’ officers and other administrative and fundraising personnel. David Dierks and Philip LeConte were each paid $168,000 in salary, and were also provided with vehicles such as a $45,000 Range Rover and a $25,000 Jeep Cherokee.
•	Knowingly filed false public documents in violation of Corporations Code sections 6215 and 6812.
•	Improperly compensated its directors and officers in violation of Corporations Code section 5227.
Brown seeks injunctive relief to prevent defendants from operating any charities in California and to stop future fraudulent solicitation and reporting practices. Brown also seeks to recover misappropriated funds and civil penalties in excess of $150,000.
Brown filed suit today against Santa Ana-based Association for Firefighters and Paramedics, its president, Michael F. Gamboa and its for-profit fundraisers -- Public Awareness, L.L.C., Community Support, Inc., and Courtesy Call, Inc -- for falsely claiming that it used donations to assist local firefighters, paramedics, and burn victims.
Brown’s office discovered that from 2005-2008, only 3 percent of approximately $10 million dollars was spent on assistance to burn victims. No funds were ever used to assist firefighters and paramedics.
The remainder – some $9.7 million -- went to pay for the charity’s fundraising expenses and overhead.
In addition, the charity sent fraudulent invoices to people who had not made a pledge and sent letters to donors who had never given, asking them to mail in their “usual” annual donation.
•	Violated Federal regulations regarding deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices.
Brown is seeking to dissolve the charity. He also seeks a permanent injunction against the charity’s president to prohibit him from any future involvement with a California charity, and civil penalties in excess of $150,000.
People v. Association for Police and Sheriffs, Inc., et al.
Brown today sued Fullerton-based Association for Police and Sheriffs, Inc., its directors and its for-profit fundraisers -- Public Awareness, LLC, and Courtesy Call, Inc., for falsely claiming that the majority of donations would be used to help the victims of domestic violence.
Brown’s investigation revealed that of the $2.6 million raised in 2005 and 2006, 90 percent of the donations went to pay the for-profit fundraisers. Most of the remaining donations were used to pay salary and other personal benefits for its president, Lloyd Jones, and others.
In violation of federal law, the fundraisers blocked donors’ Caller ID. Once on the phone, the fundraisers engaged in aggressive and abusive conduct.
The investigation also found that the charity and its for-profit fundraisers sent pledge confirmation cards to people who never agreed to donate and that some of the charity’s fundraisers represented that they were police officers, when they were not.
•	Committed registration and reporting violations in violation of Government Code sections 12599 and 12599.6.
Brown seeks to dissolve the charity, recover improperly diverted funds, recover civil penalties in excess of $150,000, and to obtain a permanent injunction preventing all defendants from any involvement with a California charity until they comply with California law.
People v. Coalition of Police and Sheriffs, Disabled Firefighters Fund, American Veterans Relief Foundation, et al.
Brown today filed a lawsuit against Santa Ana-based Coalition of Police and Sheriffs, Disabled Firefighters Fund, and American Veterans Relief Foundation, their directors and for-profit fundraisers for falsely claiming that donations would be used for programs to help injured police and firefighters, and homeless veterans.
The for-profit fundraisers include Campaign Center, Inc., KWS Productions, Inc., Tel-Mar Productions, Inc, Community Publications, Inc., and Roman Promotions, Inc.
Through 2005, the charities raised $17 million, but only $351,000 – approximately 2 percent -- was spent on programs for cops, firefighters, and veterans. The vast majority of donations went to paid telemarketers.
The President, Jeffrey Duncan, used charitable funds for his personal expenses, including trips to Hawaii and to Las Vegas, and for meals, including one for $1,200 at Medieval Times.
Joseph Shambaugh, who founded all three of these charities, was indicted by federal authorities on charges of mail fraud and money laundering. He is currently at large.
Brown seeks to dissolve the charity, to prevent the directors from operating a charity or being involved in charitable fundraising in the future, and to prevent the fundraisers from soliciting on behalf of a charity in California until they comply with state law.
He also seeks to recover misappropriated charitable funds and civil penalties in excess of $100,000 from the charities, their directors and for-profit fundraisers.
People v. Homeless and Disabled Veterans, et al.
Brown today sued Washington, D.C.-based Homeless and Disabled Veterans, and its for- profit fundraiser, Atmost, Inc. for falsely representing to donors that their charitable contributions would be used to assist homeless and disabled veterans in California with food, shelter, and self-help programs. Yet no donations were used for these purposes.
Instead, the vast majority of the donations -- over 70 percent -- were used for fundraising expenses, and the rest went for administrative expenses at its headquarters in Washington, D.C.
•	Engaged in solicitation activities in California in violation of the registration and reporting requirements set forth in Government Code sections 12599, 12599.5, and 12599.6.
•	Breached their fiduciary duty to the charity in violation of Corporations Code sections 5231 and 5237.
Brown seeks to dissolve the charity, to prevent the directors from operating a charity in California again, and to prevent the fundraiser from soliciting on behalf of a charity in California until it complies with state law.
He also seeks to recover misappropriated charitable funds and civil penalties in excess of $150,000 from the charity, its directors and its for-profit fundraiser.
People v. California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, et al.
Brown today sued San Bernardino-based California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, its directors, officers and its for-profit fundraisers – Civic Development Group, LLC and Rambret, Inc. -- for falsely representing that donations would be used to benefit law enforcement officers and that 100 percent of each donation would be received by the charity.
Donors were told that their contributions would be used to purchase bullet-proof vests, make grants to families of officers killed or injured in the line of duty, provide veterinary treatment for service animals injured in the line of duty and mentoring of at-risk youths.
Out of the $30 million raised from 2005 to 2007, over $25 million was spent on fundraising.
No money was spent on bullet-proof vests, no grants were made to families of officers, $6,600 was spent on veterinary treatment for service animals, and $16,500 was spent on mentoring.
•	Engaged in deceptive and misleading solicitation in violation of Government Code section 12599.6.
•	Engaged in unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code 17200.
•	Knowingly filed false public documents in violation of Corporations Code section 8215.
Brown seeks to dissolve the charity, to prevent the directors from operating a charity in California again, and to prevent the fundraisers from soliciting on behalf of a charity in California until they comply with state law.
He also seeks to recover misappropriated charitable funds and civil penalties in excess of $150,000 from the charity, its directors and its for-profit fundraisers.
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, , Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The District of Columbia is also participating.
•	If you receive an unsolicited call asking for a donation, it is most likely from a paid telemarketer who may keep a substantial part of your donation as payment of fundraising fees.
•	Recognize that the words 'veterans' or 'military families' in an organization's name don't necessarily mean that veterans or the families of active-duty personnel will benefit from your donation.
•	Donate to charities with a track record and a history. Charities that spring up overnight may disappear just as quickly.
•	If you have any doubt about whether you have made a pledge or a contribution, check your records. If you don=t remember making the donation or pledge, resist the pressure to give.
•	Check out an organization before donating. Some phony charities use names, seals and logos that look or sound like those of respected, well-established organizations.
•	Ask the soliciting charity or the paid fundraiser what percentage of your donation will go towards fundraising expenses and what percentage will go towards the charity’s charitable purpose.
•	Do not send or give cash donations. For security and tax record purposes, it is best to pay by check made payable to the charity.
•	Ask for a receipt showing the amount of your contribution.
•	Be wary of promises of guaranteed sweepstakes winnings in exchange for a contribution. You never have to give a donation to be eligible to win a sweepstakes.
There are a number of resources to obtain information about a charity. The Attorney General’s website is a good place to start ( http://ag.ca.gov/charities.php ).

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Upon review under the standard set forth in G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, this court concluded that a defendant convicted of first degree murder had not been denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate adequately defenses based on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense [710-712], by counsel's alleged concession of malice in his closing argument and indication that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder [712-714], or by counsel's failing to request that the jury be instructed on involuntary manslaughter [714-715].
The case was tried before J. Harold Flannery, J., and a motion for a new trial was considered by him.
Rosemary D. Mellor, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
hearing. Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant argues that his trial counsel provided him with constitutionally inadequate representation, and that the judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial. We examine the ineffective assistance claim under the standard set forth in G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, whether there is a substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. We, therefore, ask as to this claim whether "there was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion." Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678 , 682 (1992). We conclude that no error appears on any issue argued. We also conclude that, although the defendant has not argued for relief under G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, there is no reason to question the fairness of the verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction of first degree murder.
The Commonwealth's case contained the following evidence. [Note 2] On June 4, 1987, the body of the victim, the defendant's seventy-one year old grandmother, was found in her apartment in Hudson by two of her friends. Officer James Murphy of the Hudson police indicated that the victim had been discovered near a smashed coffee table lying on her side, half-in and half-out of a tipped-over chair, face down in a pool of blood. Next to her head the officer noticed a decanter wrapped in a blood-stained magazine. Near the body were several knitting needles, one of which was smeared with blood. Additionally, the police found in the kitchen an opened pocketbook and trash can containing blood-stained tissue. Strewn on the victim's bed were several jars, opened and empty.
wrapped in a magazine. The medical examiner indicated that the victim's left eyeball was torn open and the orbit bone fractured, and that there were additional injuries to the victim's head, ribs, and forearms. The medical examiner also described four small puncture wounds of the left chest area which he felt were consistent with being caused by the knitting needles. These wounds, however, were not a factor in the victim's death.
On June 3, 1987, the nineteen year old defendant, driving his girl friend's automobile, picked up a male friend and drove to a beach in Hudson where they drank vodka mixed with fruit punch. Then, after spotting the victim leaving a store, the defendant drove his friend and himself to the victim's apartment so the defendant could borrow money from her. The friend remained outside in the automobile while the defendant went inside to see the victim. Other witnesses testified that prior to June 3, the defendant had repeatedly asked the victim for money, but that she had refused to loan him anything until he repaid previous loans. When the defendant returned to the vehicle from the victim's apartment after about a half-hour, the friend noticed blood on the defendant's hands. The defendant told his friend that he had cut his hand and admitted that he had hit the victim. He also showed the friend a wallet containing credit cards and other cards which he admitted were taken from the victim. The defendant eventually threw the wallet out of the automobile's window; at the defendant's request, his friend disposed of the credit cards and other cards in a similar fashion.
that day, the defendant drove to visit his girl friend with whom he had argued earlier. He offered the girl friend a necklace and two diamond rings. He said the victim had given him the rings to use as engagement rings.
The defendant was arrested on June 5. When told by the police that the victim had been murdered, he replied that he "didn't know anything about that." Shortly thereafter, however, he told the police that the victim was upset at seeing him with his friend, that he and the victim had argued, and that he "went off the stack and pushed her." The defendant went on to surmise that the victim had tripped, hit her head, or possibly had a heart attack because she was having trouble after heart surgery. The defendant denied that he used anything to hit the victim. The defendant's forearms and palms tested positive for the presence of blood at the time of his arrest. After his arrest, the defendant first told his girl friend that he had pushed the victim, and that a vase had fallen off a table and struck her on the head. About a week before his trial commenced, the defendant told his girl friend that his friend had held the victim's hands and pushed her, while he (the defendant) had taken her money.
1. The defendant alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance in three respects: (a) by failing adequately to investigate defenses based on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense; (b) by conceding malice in his closing argument and indicating that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder; and (c) by failing to request that the jury be instructed on involuntary manslaughter.
this motion was not pressed. It is here that ineffective assistance is claimed. In the defendant's view, an examination by a private psychiatrist might have provided information which his trial counsel could have used to assert claims about his mental state, namely, that he did not possess the ability to premeditate, to harbor malice aforethought, or to commit murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
As a general proposition, a failure by trial counsel to investigate a mental state claim can constitute ineffective assistance, if facts known, or reasonably accessible, to counsel could raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's mental condition. See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443 , 458-459 (1984); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104 , 111 (1979). The difficulty, however, with the defendant's position on this issue is that there are no facts to support the claim he now maintains should have been investigated.
The record of the trial demonstrates that the defendant was lucid and discriminating in his words and conduct before and after the murder. [Note 4] That record, therefore, is devoid of any evidence that the defendant lacked criminal responsibility. There was also no evidence of prior mental illness or hospitalization. See generally Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30 , 36 (1980). The defendant's statement that he "went off the stack and pushed [the victim]" described his version of the events and is not indicative of any mental problem.
of the matters mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. Nothing has been submitted to amplify on what the defendant's previous emotional or substance abuse problems might have been or what his past evaluation as a juvenile disclosed. More particularly, there is no indication that any of these matters might have had a shred of relevance to his mental condition at the time of the victim's killing. [Note 6] In short, nothing in the record remotely suggests that a more thorough investigation would have disclosed evidence tending to support a contention that the defendant lacked the capacity to premeditate, harbor malice, or commit murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. [Note 7] See Commonwealth v. Stevens, 379 Mass. 772 , 773-774 (1980); Osborne v. Commonwealth, supra.
with a decanter (thereby permitting a finding of malice from the intentional use of a dangerous weapon), and when counsel indicated that second degree murder was the appropriate verdict. The inadequacy of the closing was further compounded, the defendant maintains, by trial counsel's failure to argue, based on the defendant's version of the events, that a verdict of manslaughter was the most logical and fair verdict.
We see nothing in the closing argument that might bespeak ineffectiveness. As will be discussed later in this opinion, no rational view of the evidence would warrant an involuntary manslaughter verdict. The defendant's trial counsel appears to have realized this fact. Counsel also recognized that the evidence that the victim had been bludgeoned to death by repeated blows from the decanter was virtually unassailable. The notion that the victim had died in any manner suggested by the defendant was, to say the least, farfetched, and to argue that premise would have strained credulity.
Mindful of these considerations, the defendant's trial counsel made a sufficient closing argument. Counsel emphasized the Commonwealth's heavy burden of proof, pointed out that the defendant had a good relationship with the victim, indicated that the defendant had not entered the apartment with any intent to harm the victim, and stressed that whatever went wrong was the result of a spontaneous reaction on the defendant's part. Counsel maintained that the evidence did not prove a premeditated killing or one committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Counsel strongly urged the jury to reject a verdict of first degree murder, to consider all alternatives, and to keep in mind that the best their collective deliberations would warrant was a verdict of second degree murder.
393 Mass. 792 , 797 (1973). Trial counsel acknowledged the conclusiveness of the medical evidence as to the cause of death and asserted that the evidence warranted a finding of no more than second degree murder because there were no other practical options open to him. Counsel's approach was based on the most realistic and arguable version of what had transpired, taking into account those parts of the defendant's several contradictory statements that the jury might find to have some plausibility. See and compare Commonwealth v. Griffith, 404 Mass. 256 , 263 (1989), and Delle Chiaie v. Commonwealth, 367 Mass. 527 , 537 (1975), with Commonwealth v. Westmoreland, 388 Mass. 269 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Street, 388 Mass. 281 (1983). If successful, the closing argument could have resulted in a conviction of second degree murder. That the defendant was convicted of first degree murder demonstrates no inadequacy of counsel, but rather the near hopelessness of the defendant's position in view of the Commonwealth's evidence. See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 Mass. 1 , 13 (1973) ("When the time came to close to the jury, counsel had evidently concluded that all he could do for his client was to try to mitigate punishment and that complete candor was the best strategy. . . . Counsel's strategy failed, but we are not on that account to say that it was impermissible"). See also Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 228 , 234 (1979).
knew or should have known that the battery he was committing endangered human life"). See also Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 , 785, 787 (1990).
When the evidence permits a finding of a lesser included offense, a judge must, upon request, instruct the jury on the possibility of conviction of the lesser crime. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387 , 392 (1967). No such instruction is necessary, and need be sought by trial counsel, when the evidence provides no "rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the crime charged and convicting him of the lesser included offense." Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299 , 305 (1978). Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass. 220 , 228 (1973). "[A] judge is not required to instruct on a hypothesis that is not supported by the evidence." Commonwealth v. Santo, supra at 305-306.
These principles apply here. The medical evidence indicated that the victim had incurred massive and severe injuries, resulting from multiple blows, including blows with an object like the decanter which had been inflicted with enough force to rupture the victim's eyeball and fracture her orbital bone. The victim also suffered fractures in both arms and one of her ribs and numerous abrasions. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was "blunt force injuries to the head and neck." There was no medical evidence of a heart attack. The medical examiner expressly indicated that the victim's injuries could not have resulted from the type of fall suggested by the defendant. (There was no testimony as to the defendant's vase theory, but it is equally clear from the medical examiner's testimony that the injuries that caused the death could not have been incurred in that manner.) Even if the medical examiner's evidence conceivably could be disbelieved by the jury, there was no evidence to warrant a finding that the victim's injuries and death were brought about in any of the ways contended by the defendant. In the absence of a basis in the evidence to support either of the defendant's hypotheses, a request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction was uncalled for.
2. The defendant's motion for a new trial was, as far as now argued, based on the ineffectiveness points discussed above. The judge ruled on the motion as noted below. [Note 8] For all the reasons previously discussed, this ruling was correct. [Note 9] See Commonwealth v. Little, 384 Mass. 262 , 269 (1981).
3. Although the defendant has sought review under G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, only as to the issues discussed above, we have examined the whole case to determine whether justice requires that a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt be entered or a new trial ordered. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156 , 166-168 (1978). No such relief is appropriate.
Judgment affirmed. Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
[Note 1] The defendant was also convicted of larceny over $100, which was placed on file, and larceny of a motor vehicle on which a prison term was imposed to run concurrently with his life sentence on the murder conviction. The defendant has not appealed from these separate convictions, and they need not be addressed. Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432 , 437-438 (1975).
[Note 2] The defendant did not testify, and no evidence was presented in his case.
[Note 3] The defendant was subsequently evaluated at the Cambridge jail for competency and was found competent to stand trial.
[Note 4] There was evidence that the defendant and his friend shared from a half-pint to a pint of vodka mixed with fruit juice on the day of the murder. There was no evidence that the defendant appeared intoxicated either before or after the murder, and thus no basis for a claim that he was so overcome by the affects of alcohol that he could not form the intent necessary to commit first degree murder by reason of premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty. See Commonwealth v. Sires, ante 292, 298-301 (1992); Commonwealth v. Sama, 411 Mass. 293 , 297-299 (1991).
[Note 5] "3. Prior to my trial I had no discussions with my attorney regarding an independent psychiatric exam.
"4. I did have a discussion with him about going to Bridgewater, but I did not want to go there.
"5. I had received counselling for emotional problems and substance abuse problems while on probation in the Marlboro Juvenile and District Courts. I had also been referred to DYS for an evaluation when I was a juvenile."
[Note 6] The defendant's statement that he discussed with his trial counsel the possibility of going to Bridgewater, but did not want to go there, may suggest that a lack of responsibility claim had been discussed and rejected because, if supported and successful, it could lead to a Bridgewater commitment.
[Note 7] We would expect the defendant to make some showing that a basis for his claim exists. We do not agree with his assertion that he is in an impossible situation without knowing what a private psychiatric examination might reveal. Because no such showing was made, the judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion (accompanying his motion for new trial) for funds to be examined by a psychiatrist in order to determine whether a pretrial psychiatric examination might have assisted in his defense.
[Note 8] "The defendant's motion will be denied without a hearing. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253 , 260 (1981). First, the defendant has not raised a substantial issue concerning his mental state at the time of either the trial or the crime. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure . . . 349, Section 2087 (1983). In September of 1987, before the trial, he declined to be examined by a Cambridge Court Clinic psychiatrist, there was no claim or evidence of lack of responsibility or competency thereafter, and the most that can be said now, according to an affidavit by his present counsel . . . is that he should be `examined by a psychiatrist in order to determine whether such an examination if performed prior to trial might have assisted the defendant.' Such speculation is not an evidentiary showing at all, much less a substantial one. Stewart, above, 383 Mass. at 260.
"Second, defendant's trial counsel, who is known to this court as a seasoned, resourceful trial lawyer, fought hard, but he had nothing to work with. The Commonwealth's evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming."
[Note 9] The judge appears to have also rejected the defendant's affidavit filed in support of the motion, or viewed it as raising nothing to warrant a hearing. The judge could permissibly do this. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 399 Mass. 165 , 167-168 (1987).

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§ 370-3 Community development objectives.
§ 370-4 Interpretation and scope.
§ 370-5 Construal of provisions.
§ 370-8 Interpretation and word use.
§ 370-10 Classes of districts.
§ 370-12 Interpretation of district boundaries.
§ 370-14 RC Resource Conservation District.
§ 370-15 RR Rural Residential District.
§ 370-16 R-1 Residential District.
§ 370-17 V-1 Village District; Cedarville.
§ 370-18 V-2 Village District; Kenilworth.
§ 370-19 TC-1 Town Center Residential District.
§ 370-20 TC-2 Town Center Mixed Use District.
§ 370-21 C-1 Commercial District.
§ 370-22 C-2 Commercial Parking District.
§ 370-23 C-3 Planned Commercial District.
§ 370-24 C-4 Neighborhood Commercial District.
§ 370-25 I-1 Industrial District.
§ 370-26 I-2 Industrial District.
§ 370-28 Flood Plain Conservation Overlay District.
§ 370-29 Natural Resource Conservation Overlay District.
§ 370-30 Interchange Overlay District.
§ 370-31 Scenic Preservation Overlay District.
§ 370-32 Historic Preservation Overlay District.
§ 370-33 Ridgeline Protection Overlay District.
§ 370-34 Communications Towers, Antenna and Equipment Overlay District.
§ 370-34.1 Well Head Protection Overlay District.
§ 370-34.2 Water Budget Impact Zone Overlay District.
§ 370-34.3 Airport Overlay District.
§ 370-34.4 Traditional Neighborhood Development (TND) Overlay District.
§ 370-37 Accessory building or structure.
§ 370-38 Adaptive reuse of an existing structure.
§ 370-39 Adult commercial use.
§ 370-41 Animal hospital, veterinary office, kennel or animal shelter.
§ 370-42 Automobile service station or repair facility/gas station/car wash.
§ 370-43 Banking or other financial institution with drive-through service windows or drive-through automated teller.
§ 370-46 Club or lodge.
§ 370-47 Commercial day-care center.
§ 370-49 Educational use, nonprofit and commercial.
§ 370-52 Hotel, motel and resort.
§ 370-53 Industrial park or office park.
§ 370-56 Mixed use proposal.
§ 370-57 Mobile home park.
§ 370-58 Multifamily or townhouse development.
§ 370-59 Nursing home or convalescent home.
§ 370-60 Shopping center or highway commercial development.
§ 370-62 Recreation (indoor/outdoor commercial facilities).
§ 370-68 Temporary structure or use.
§ 370-72 Federal and state owned property.
§ 370-73 Lot area, yard and height requirements.
§ 370-74 Fences, hedges and walls.
§ 370-78 Utilities, sewer and water.
§ 370-79 Buffering and screening.
§ 370-81 Open space design, management and ownership.
§ 370-82 Access and traffic control.
§ 370-84 Information requirements for conditional use or special exception proposals.
§ 370-86 Alterations to existing structures and uses.
§ 370-87 Required off-street parking spaces.
§ 370-89 Location of parking.
§ 370-91 Off-street parking in required yards.
§ 370-92 Size and design of parking spaces.
§ 370-93 Traffic lane and driveway dimensions.
§ 370-94 Off-street parking surfacing requirements.
§ 370-98 Statement of intent.
§ 370-100 General sign regulations.
§ 370-101 Regulations for specific sign types.
§ 370-105 Signs in residential districts.
§ 370-106 Signs in the mixed use districts.
§ 370-107 Signs in commercial and industrial districts.
§ 370-108 Construction and maintenance.
§ 370-109 Removal of unsafe, unlawful or abandoned signs.
§ 370-110 Permits and applications.
§ 370-114 Dimensional and density standards.
§ 370-115 Dwelling unit and open space determination.
§ 370-126 Application of regulations.
§ 370-127 Administration and enforcement.
§ 370-128 Powers and responsibilities of the Zoning Officer.
§ 370-131 Common permit regulations.
§ 370-133 Issuance or refusal of permits.
§ 370-137 Use and occupancy permits.
§ 370-138 Conditional use process.
§ 370-140 Establishment and membership.
§ 370-141 Membership, appointment, terms, removal.
§ 370-142 Organization of Zoning Hearing Board.
§ 370-143 Applications for hearings.
§ 370-144 Notice of hearings.
§ 370-145 Expenditures for services.
§ 370-148 Granting of variances.
§ 370-149 Granting of special exceptions.
§ 370-150 Expiration of special exceptions and variances.
§ 370-151 Parties appellant before the Zoning Hearing Board.
§ 370-153 Parties to the hearing.
§ 370-154 Stay of proceedings.
§ 370-155 Power of amendment.
§ 370-156 Planning Commission referral.
§ 370-157 Curative amendment procedures.
§ 370-159 Decisions of the Board of Supervisors.
Historical Commission — See Ch. 24.
Planning Commission — See Ch. 61.
Code enforcement — See Ch. 141.
Stormwater management — See Ch. 194.
Impact fees — See Ch. 203.
Junkyards — See Ch. 213.
Mobile home parks — See Ch. 232.
Subdivision and land development — See Ch. 320.


Armed robbery. Ben Hill Superior Court. Before Judge Forrester.
Morris Webster, J. David Tucker, for appellant.
John C. Pridgen, District Attorney, Denise D. Fachini, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Appellant/defendant Julius Connell Wilcox appeals his conviction for armed robbery. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that defendant entered the Suwanee Swifty store in Fitzgerald, Georgia armed with a butcher knife. He distracted the clerk by asking for a certain brand of cigarettes and when she turned back around, he pointed the knife at her and demanded the money from the cash register. After removing the money from the cash register, he cut the telephone receiver cord and fled the store with the telephone receiver, money, cigarettes and knife in his possession.
A man saw defendant ride a bicycle to an overgrown area behind his house. Suspecting that something illegal was occurring, the man flagged down a police officer who was searching for defendant in the area. The police officer found the defendant in the overgrown area along with cigarettes, clothing, a bicycle, a telephone receiver and a butcher knife. Defendant had in his possession $145 at the time of his arrest. A police officer also found $51 in a tennis shoe in the same area.
After defendant was arrested, a police officer took him to the convenience store to see if the store clerk could identify him as the robber. The clerk was not able to make a positive identification.
1. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion in limine and motion to suppress. The defendant sought to exclude any testimony concerning the defendant being shown to the store clerk after his arrest to determine if he was the robber on the ground that it was unduly suggestive and tainted the in-court identification. The store clerk, however, was unable to identify the defendant both at the crime scene and at trial. Therefore, the crime scene confrontation could not have tainted the in-court identification as defendant contends.
2. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial which he made after the State was allowed to reopen its case and present the testimony of a jailer. The jailer testified that defendant's former girl friend, who testified for the State at trial, had visited defendant two days before trial. Defendant argues that allowing the jury to learn that defendant was incarcerated two days before his trial created a prejudicial comment upon the character of the defendant. Assuming arguendo that this statement refers to the defendant's record as he contends, the appellate courts of this state have consistently held that a passing reference to a defendant's record does not place the defendant's character in issue. See Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 604 (2) ( 351 S.E.2d 623) (1987); Ogles v. State, 238 Ga. 716 ( 235 S.E.2d 384) (1977); Cochran v. State, 177 Ga. App. 471 (3) ( 339 S.E.2d 749) (1986); Bell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 527 (1) ( 292 S.E.2d 114) (1982).
3. Defendant further alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case and present the testimony of the jailer because he was not on the State's witness list. OCGA § 17-7-110 allows a prosecuting attorney to present the testimony of a witness whose name does not appear on the State's list of witnesses if the State shows that the evidence sought to be introduced is newly discovered evidence which the State was not aware of at the time it presented the list of witnesses to the defendant. The testimony of the jailer was presented to rebut certain testimony elicited from one of the State's witnesses during cross-examination. The testimony concerned a visit by another witness to defendant two days before trial, well after the witness list was presented to defendant. It was obviously testimony that the State did not expect to present at the time the list of witnesses was presented to defendant. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present the complained of testimony. See Yeomans v. State, 229 Ga. 488 (2) ( 192 S.E.2d 362) (1972).
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur.


text:
WIELAND ELECTRIC welcomes your interest in our company and our products.
We take the protection of your personal data very seriously and we want you to feel comfortable with us. Your data will therefore be collected, stored and processed in accordance with the applicable data protection regulations. We take the security of your personal data into account in our business processes. Our employees and the service providers appointed by us are bound by a duty of confidentiality and are under an obligation to comply with the data protection regulations.
We will inform you about how we ensure the protection of your personal data in the following.
Your data may be merged and stored with the data of other orders, inquiries and business correspondence, which you transmit to us by other means (fax, post, telephone, …).
If required, we also make use of service providers (e.g. logistics service providers for dispatch of the products and banks for payment processing). We will only transmit your data to such third parties to the extent necessary for the performance of these tasks (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b) and (f) of the GDPR). Our legitimate interest in using external service providers, e.g. our logistics service providers for dispatch of your ordered goods, consists in providing our services as efficiently and effectively as possible and therefore as quickly and reasonably priced for you as possible. Third parties which receive personal data of our business partners are obliged to comply with the data protection provisions.
We reserve the right to transmit your personal data to external service providers for carrying out a credit check, in order to protect our legitimate interest in securing our claims (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR). We receive information about your payment history and credit ratings from these credit agencies. This data enables us to assess our business relationship and is used by us to make a decision about whether to supply and for our protection against non-payments.
We store your personal data for the duration of our business relationship or pursuant to the statutory retention periods.
You can also visit our website without the explicit statement of personal data. In this respect, only the use of your complete IP address is required, in order to transmit the data of our website accessed by you to your device (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b) and (f) of the GDPR).
We store the complete IP address for 7 days, so that we can initiate criminal proceedings, if appropriate, in the case of attacks on our IT defensive measures, in order to protect our legitimate interest in our IT integrity (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR).
We use maps from Google Maps on the website to facilitate orientation. Google Maps is a service of Google Inc. In this respect, we have no control options and receive no information from Google as to whether you exchanged map information during your visit to our website.
We have integrated components of YouTube on this website. YouTube is an Internet video portal which enables video publishers to upload video clips free of charge and also enables other users to view, review and comment on them free of charge. YouTube allows to publish all kinds of videos, so you can access both full movies and TV broadcasts via the Internet portal, as well as music videos, trailers, and videos made by users.
Each view of one of the individual pages of this website, which is operated by the controller and on which a YouTube component (YouTube video) has been integrated, automatically prompts the Internet browser on the information technology system of the data subject to download the corresponding YouTube component from YouTube and display it. You will find more information about YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/intl/en/yt/about/. During the course of this technical procedure, YouTube and Google gain knowledge of the specific sub-page of our website which was visited by the data subject.
If the data subject is logged in to YouTube, YouTube recognizes the specific sub-page of our website which was visited by the data subject each time a sub-page which contains a YouTube video is viewed. This information is collected by YouTube and Google and assigned to the respective YouTube account of the data subject.
YouTube and Google will receive information through the YouTube component that the data subject has visited our website, if the data subject is logged in to YouTube at the time of viewing our website; this occurs regardless of whether the person clicks a YouTube video or not. If the data subject does not desire the transmission of such information to YouTube and Google, the transmission can be prevented if the data subject logs off from their YouTube account before viewing our website.
Your data may be merged and stored with the data of other orders, inquiries and business correspondence, which you transmit to us by another ordering method (fax, post, telephone, …).
If required, we also make use of service providers (e.g. logistics service providers for dispatch of your ordered products and banks for payment processing). We will only transmit your data to such third parties to the extent necessary for the performance of these tasks (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b) and (f) of the GDPR). Third parties which receive data of our customers are obliged to comply with the data protection provisions. Our legitimate interest in using external service providers, e.g. our logistics service providers for dispatch of your ordered goods, consists in providing our services as efficiently and effectively as possible and therefore as quickly and reasonably priced for you as possible.
We reserve the right to transmit your personal data to external service providers for carrying out a credit check (legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR). We receive information about your payment history and credit ratings from these credit agencies. This data enables us to assess our customer relationship and is used by us to make a decision about whether to supply and for our protection against non-payments. We have a legitimate interest here.
We store this data for the duration of our business relationship or pursuant to the statutory retention periods.
If you wish to object to the use for other direct marketing purposes, simply send an email to “info@wieland-electric.com”.
This means that you will receive an email from us after registration for the newsletter which requests you to confirm ordering the newsletter. We inform you about news from our company in the newsletter (product innovations, services, special offers, competitions, …). Your data is stored for as long as the newsletter subscription is active. However, you can unsubscribe from the distribution list of this newsletter at any time via the link provided in each newsletter or by sending us an appropriate advice without giving reasons (info@wieland-electric.com) (= Revocation of your Consent).
Generally speaking, the Internet is an insecure medium. As a result, please note that we cannot guarantee the confidentiality of normal email communication via the links provided on our home page and via other email addresses of Wieland Electric GmbH.
If you require encryption of your email communication with Wieland Electric GmbH, please contact your email contact person directly.
You will find links to the email address bewerbung@wieland-electric.com in our Careers section.
You can send speculative applications or applications for advertised vacancies to this address. Please note that the email communication with this address is unencrypted, and the confidentiality of your data is therefore not guaranteed. If you require encryption of your email communication, please contact info@wieland-electric.com.
We use your application documents to contact you personally, in order to verify your suitability for an employment relationship with our company and to process the application. (The legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(b), (c) and (f) of the GDPR). Your application documents are stored at the personnel department for this purpose and may be transmitted to the technical department which comes into consideration for employment.
If we cannot currently consider your application, we will store your application documents for 6 months, in order to be able to consider them at a later date. Your application documents will be erased after this period, provided that the erasure is not contrary to any of our other legitimate interests. Another legitimate interest in this respect is e.g. the burden of proof in proceedings pursuant to the General Act on Equal Treatment (AGG).
You can object to this storage by sending an email to bewerbung@wieland-electric.com.
We will include your application documents in the personal records in the event of an employment relationship and store them for the entire duration of the employment relationship as well as for statutory retention periods extending beyond this (The legal basis for processing is Art. 6(1)(a) and (b) and of the GDPR, Section 26 of the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), Sub-section 1 as amended).
If we obtain consent from the data subject for the processing of personal data, Art. 6(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) serves as a legal basis for the processing of personal data.
In the processing of personal data which is required for fulfilling a contract whose contract party is the data subject, Art. 6(1)(b) of the GDPR serves as a legal basis. This also applies to processing procedures required for carrying out pre-contractual measures.
If the processing of personal data is required for fulfilling a legal obligation which our company is subject to, Art. 6(1)(c) of the GDPR serves as a legal basis.
If processing is necessary to protect a legitimate interest of our company or a third party and if the interests, basic rights and basic freedoms of the data subject do not outweigh the aforementioned interest, Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR serves as the legal basis for the processing.
The personal data of the data subject is erased or the processing restricted as soon as the data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which it was collected. Data may also be stored beyond this if provided for by the European or national legislator in regulations under Union law, legislation or other provisions to which the controller is subject. Data is also erased or the processing restricted when a storage period prescribed by the stated standards expires unless there is a need for continued storage of the data for the conclusion or performance of a contract.
If you have made use of your right to rectify, erase or restrict the processing of your personal data, we are obliged to inform all recipients to whom the personal data relating to you has been disclosed of this rectification or erasure of the data or restriction of the processing, unless this proves to be impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.
For reasons arising from your particular situation, you have the right to object to the processing of personal data relating to you at any time; this is provided on the basis of Article 6 (1)(e) or (f) and also applies to profiling based on these provisions.
We will then no longer process the personal data relating to you, unless we can prove that there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms or the processing serves to establish, exercise or defend legal claims.
Where the personal data relating to you is processed for direct marketing purposes, you have the right to object to the processing of personal data relating to you for such marketing at any time; this also applies to profiling, insofar as it is related to such direct marketing.
You have the right to withdraw your declaration of consent under data protection law at any time without giving reasons. In the event that you withdraw consent, we will erase your personal data immediately and no longer process it. The withdrawal of consent does not affect the legality of the processing carried out on the basis of the consent prior to the withdrawal of consent. If you wish to exercise your right to withdraw consent, please contact info@wieland-electric.com.
Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, you have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of your habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if you consider that the processing of your personal data breaches the GDPR.

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Know your rights and where to learn more.
Did you get stopped? We want to know. Please fill out our Traffic Stop Form.
Communication/wiretapping laws for every state.
Discrimination on the basis of clothing or club membership is illegal.
Removal of disabled vehicle obstructing traffic on state highway, state bridge, or state tunnel.
Temporary detention of suspects Do you need to show your id?
You have the right to remain silent when questioned.
You have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the police and to have an attorney present during questioning now or in the future.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you wish.
If you decide to answer any questions now, without an attorney present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to an attorney.
Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good working order and in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise and annoying smoke. No person shall use a muffler cutout, bypass, or similar device upon a motor vehicle on a highway. Any exhaust system shall be deemed defective if any changes, modifications, alterations, deletions, or adjustments have been made which would cause the exhaust system to generate a higher or louder sound level than would be generated by the exhaust system customarily installed by the manufacturer as original equipment. The defective exhaust system shall be replaced or repaired to restore the exhaust system to the performance specifications of the original equipment. Failure to replace or restore the exhaust system as required in this section within five (5) days shall be deemed a civil violation and violators are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
§ 31-45-1 Noise limits. – (a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle, nor shall the owner of any vehicle allow the vehicle to be operated, at any time, or under any condition of grade, load, acceleration, or deceleration, in such a manner as to exceed the following noise limit based on a distance of fifty feet (50') from the center of the lane of travel within the speed limit. For the purposes of this section, "dbA" means decibels measured with a calibrated sound level meter weighted to the "A" scale.
(b) In speed zones of thirty-five miles per hour (35 mph) or less, not more than eighty-six (86) dbA. In speed zones of more than thirty-five miles per hour (35 mph), not more than ninety (90) dbA.
(c) Violations of this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
§ 31-22-3 Riding on motorcycles. – (a) A person operating a motorcycle shall ride only upon the permanent and regular seat attached to it. The operator shall not carry any other person nor shall any other person ride on a motorcycle unless the motorcycle is designed to carry more than one person, in which event a passenger may ride upon the permanent and regular seat if designed for two (2) persons, or upon another seat firmly attached to the rear or side of the operator.
(b) In no event shall a motorcycle passenger ride in front of the operator. An operator violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a civil violation and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).
§ 31-10.1-4 Required equipment. – Operators of motorcycles, motor scooters, and motor-driven cycles shall use eye protection of a type approved by the administrator of the division of motor vehicles when operating their vehicles on streets and highways. Every motorcycle, motor scooter, and motor-driven cycle shall be equipped with a rear view mirror. Any operator under the age of twenty-one (21) shall wear a helmet of a type approved by the administrator of motor vehicles. In addition, all new operators, regardless of age, shall be required, for a period of one year from the date of issuance of the first license pursuant to § 31-10.1-1, to wear a helmet of a type approved by said administrator. Any person deemed in violation of this provision shall be subject to the fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4, which shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 41.1 of this title. The administrator of the division of motor vehicles is authorized to set forth rules and regulations governing the use of other equipment on those vehicles. All fines collected under this section shall be deposited in a general restricted receipt account for the use of the Rhode Island governor's office on highway safety in order to promote educational and informational programs encouraging helmet use.
Rhode Island General Laws, Section 11-24-1, (1956, as amended), provides that "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons." Further, any persons aggrieved by any violation of this statute has the right to petition the Rhode Island Commission on Human Rights to induce compliance. RL Gen. Laws Section 11-24-4 (1956, as amended).
". . . Any operator under the age of twenty-one (21) shall wear a helmet of a type approved by the administrator of motor vehicles. In addition, all new operators, regardless of age, shall be required, for a period of one year from the date of issuance of the first license pursuant to s 31-10.1-1, to wear a helmet of a type approved by said administrator."
". . . Any person deemed in violation of this provision shall be fined thirty-five dollars ($35.00) which shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 41 of this title."
§ 31-10.1-5 Handlebars. – No person shall operate on a highway or in any parking area for ten (10) or more motor vehicles, any motorcycle, motor scooter, or motor driven cycle equipped with handlebars that are more than fifteen inches (15") in height above the uppermost portion of the seat when depressed by the weight of the operator. Violations of this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
§ 31-10.1-6 Passengers. – Any passenger on a motorcycle, motor scooter, or motor-driven cycle must be provided with a separate rear seat, a separate foot-rest, and an appropriate handlebar or grip for his or her use, and must wear a properly fitting helmet of a type approved by the administrator of the division of motor vehicles. No person shall operate a motorcycle, motor scooter, or motor-driven cycle unless any passenger on it wears a helmet and is able to rest his or her feet upon a foot-rest. Any passenger on a motorcycle, motor scooter, or motor-driven cycle under twelve (12) years of age must have a properly secured back-rest or equivalent, shall have his or her feet placed upon the foot-rest, and shall be seated behind the operator unless a side car is provided. When, however, a side car is provided this age requirement shall not apply to any passenger(s) in the sidecar. Violations of this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
§ 31-10.1-7 Inspection. – Every motorcycle, motor scooter, or motor driven cycle shall be inspected in accordance with the law providing for inspection of motor vehicles and shall display a certificate of inspection as provided in chapter 38 of this title. Inspection standards for the motor vehicles shall be established by the administrator of the division of motor vehicles. Inspection stations shall be specially licensed to inspect motorcycles, motor scooters, and motor-driven cycles. Certificates of inspection for these vehicles shall be clearly distinguishable from those issued to other motor vehicles. Violations of this section are subject to fines enumerated in § 31-41.1-4.
click Woonsocket City Code then Chapter 14-5 noise. Must not hear noise within 100 feet or beyond border line.
No person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on any street, highway, alley, parking lot or driveway, either public or private property, shall operate or permit the operation of any sound amplification system, including but not limited to, any radio, tape player, compact disc player, loud speaker, or any other electrical device used for the amplification of sound from within the motor vehicle or, in the case of a motor vehicle so that the sound is plainly audible at a distance of 100 feet or more from the vehicle or , in the ase of a motor vehicle on private property, beyond the property line as to disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of the neighboring inhabitants. For the purpose of this section, “plainly audible” means any sound which clearly can be heard, by unimpaired auditory senses based on a direct line of sight of 100 feet or more, from the source of the sound and crosses a property boundary line or boundary between dwelling units, however, words or phrases need not be discernible and said sound shall include base reverberation. Prohibition contained in this section shall not be applicable to emergency or public safety vehicles, vehicles owned and operated by the City of Woonsocket or any utility company, for sound emitted unavoidably during job-related operation, or any motor vehicle used in an authorized public activity for which a permit has been granted by the appropriate agency of the City of Woonsocket.


Nice piece in Scientific American on CC license use and adoption. See the CCsite for some examples.
Download some of jonix' shared ambient music.
Redshift is cool, but check out the rest.
Hollywood and Whine: Why are Democrats helping the entertainment industry stamp out new technologies that fuel economic growth? by Brendan I. Koerner at Washington Monthly.
It's a political tale as old as Capitol Hill: A lumbering industry selects a certain corporate-friendly party to be its Beltway patsy. In exchange for the requisite campaign donations and other perks, members of said party use their clout to push through the industry's legislative agenda--an agenda that would rip off consumers and harm the overall economy but enrich the corporate string-pullers immensely. Pundits and public-interest types grumble over the bald-faced cronyism, but as long as the money keeps flowing, the beneficiaries don't seem to care a whit.
Sounds like the buddy-buddy relationship between Republicans and the energy industry, right? The characters cited in the above scenario, however, are the Democrats and Hollywood, one of Washington's coziest couples. For years, Hollywood has poured money into the Democrats' campaign coffers and been rewarded with indispensable assistance on the industry's crusade of the moment--squelching new technologies that allow the dissemination of digital content in ways Hollywood can't control. One bill being hatched by Democrats would allow media companies to hack into networks like KaZaA, a file-sharing service which has replaced Napster as the most popular MP3 clearinghouse on college campuses. Another would outlaw high-tech devices that don't come equipped with government-approved hardware to make it impossible to copy digital media. And yet another would strip consumers of the right to play their legally purchased CDs on multiple devices. The Democrats' Pavlovian alignment with the grossest impulses of the entertainment industry was even written into the Democratic platform back in 2000, when the party urged "all steps necessary" against the leakage of copyrighted materials--a plank pushed on them by Hollywood.
Conclusion, the Dems can afford to lose some entertainment support in favor of new tech support, because it is the future, and the way to innovating news jobs and culture.
Distribution, according to Ernest Miller, is more important to copyright and the First Amendment, than the right of reproduction. Bill Moyers talked with John Nichols and Robert McChesney about the current state of media in the United States and how it affects democracy, earlier tonight. The FCC is planning to overhaul the ownership concentration rules, and with less distribution, think less freedom of expression, because what is out there will be more closely controlled by a very small number of people.
Via John Battelle: See this Brookings Institute paper which concludes that copyright protection does not make good economic sense.
...not only may copyright law’s prohibition against unauthorized copying (17 U.S.C. §106) not be necessary to stimulate an optimal level of new creations, but that §106 appears to have a net negative effect on such output! It observes that the higher revenues that §106 generates for popular creations are, in the lottery-like entertainment markets, generally used for promotional efforts (rent seeking), and that such marketing crowds out many borderline creations. The article also identifies and explains how new technologies and social norms provide many viable business models for financing new creations relying on only a heavily abridged version of §106. Hence, the article questions whether the current §106 [copyright regime] could survive the intermediate scrutiny standards of the First Amendment, given the lack of evidence that the benefits of §106 exceed its costs.
Since they are talking about the economic sense of analog copyright, I would venture that it's possible that an entirely new conception of copyrights might (see Taking the Copy Out of Copyright or here - pdf by Miller/Feigenbaum) help us, something that reflects this new digital world and the issues we face here that are so different than in the analog world. Essentially, digital copyright.
Here is a /. discussion of the paper.
1908 sheet music, Marconi, 50's TV, Disney theme park, 70s and 80s VCR (the Boston strangler), 95 DCMA, today digitial TV and Broadcast flag.


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During his Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 2005, now Chief Justice Roberts exposited, “Judges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent shaped by other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath, and judges have to have modesty to be open in the decisional process to the considered views of their colleagues on the bench.” While a strong principle in the justices’ decision calculi, precedent does not bind the Supreme Court in the manner that stare-decisis functions for lower courts. This is apparent with Chief Justice Roberts’ decisions as with those of other justices. In the 2009 case Montejo v. Louisiana, the Chief Justice sided with a conservative majority led by Justice Scalia to overrule the Court’s prior decision in Michigan v. Jackson which held that evidence obtained through interrogation after the defendant invokes the right to counsel is inadmissible. Then in 2010 Roberts sided with another conservative majority, this time helmed by Justice Kennedy, in the Citizens United v. FEC decision overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s and portions of McConnell v. FEC’s limits on campaign contributions.
Fast-forwarding to 2018, the issue of Roe v. Wade’s staying power was raised time and again during Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings. Responding to Senator Feinstein’s questioning on the matter Kavanaugh stated, “As a judge, it is an important precedent of the Supreme Court… I said that it’s settled as a precedent of the Supreme Court under stare decisis.” He later reinforced these remarks by saying, “[Roe] has been reaffirmed many times over past 45 years.” These remarks were at odds with Kavanaugh’s previous statements while working as a White House attorney when he wrote, “I am not sure that all legal scholars refer to Roe as the settled law of the land at the Supreme Court level since Court can always overrule its precedent, and three current Justices on the Court would do so.” Without reading in to this statement words like “…if given the opportunity, I would vote to overturn it,” Kavanaugh’s expression of doubt regarding Roe’s staying power is actually an accurate depiction of Supreme Court precedent.
While stare decisis binds lower courts to apply the Supreme Court’s precedent, the Supreme Court abides by a principle sometimes described as horizontal stare-decisis, where a precedent may be persuasive but is not binding (this concept is more often described when discussing precedents across various federal courts of appeal). In a 2003 article, potential Supreme Court nominee Judge Amy Coney Barrett described aspects of horizontal stare decisis in an article for Notre Dame Law Review. Suffice it to say, while Supreme Court decisions are far from tenuous, they have very little preclusive effect on the Court’s decision making and instead function as persuasive guidance.
Scholars put forth several reasons for the Court’s overruling of precedent. One explanation by Professors James Spriggs and Thomas Hansford is ideological. According to these scholars, as a Court moves ideologically away from a given precedent, it is more likely to overturn that decision. Professors Jeff Segal and Harold Spaeth offer a realist portrait describing that, “[o]verwhelmingly, Supreme Court justices are not influenced by landmark precedents with which they disagree.” Other studies such as this one by Professors Ryan Black and James Spriggs hypothesis that the value of precedent depreciates over time allowing more room for the Court to overrule older decisions.
Data from the Government Publishing Office, supplemented with decisions from the past two terms shows that the Court has explicitly or implicitly overturned over 300 of its decisions across its history. The rate of overturning has been nowhere near consistent across time. The Court, for instance was very wary of overturning any of its decisions early on. The first figure looks at the count of decisions the Court overturned since its inception by term.
The big spikes are from around the Hughes/Stone Courts through the Burger Court years. The Court had some of its highest decision volume terms during these years though which helps explain a bit of this decision making as well as the Court’s shifting perspectives on various rights enforced through Constitutional Amendments. Although the Court’s rate of overturning its previous decisions did drop slightly during this period, the drop off does not look as significant when the overturned decisions are examined as percent of the Court’s total decision output per term.
In absolute terms, these counts of overturning decisions line up as expected by chief justice with decisions under Burger at the top followed by those under Warren.
When we look at the length of time that the Court’s decisions last before they are overturned, this number has not surprisingly extended overt time. This is most likely a factor of decisions naturally aging as well as the justices deciding to discard older decisions that no longer make sense in the present context. The figure below shows the average amount of time before decisions were overturned by chief justice.
Although the chief justices do not perfectly order themselves in sequence from first to most recent, the three chiefs with the oldest precedents overturned on average are the last three chiefs.
The histogram below shows the distribution of time that all decisions in this dataset lasted before they were overturned.
While the median age for overturned decisions is 18 years, the distribution actually extends from zero years in several instances where the Court reheard the same case in the same year to 137 years when Thurgood Marshall authored the majority opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Line overturning Justice Grier’s decision in Minturn v. Maynard.
Some of the most interesting findings from this data relate to the justices who were most activist in terms of overturning prior precedent. One caveat is that since the justices didn’t overturn many decisions in its early years, not many of those justices were active overturners. The justices are ordered below from those that overturned the most decisions to those that overturned the least.
Justices from the Warren and Burger Court years help comprise the top of this figure. Justice Douglas, the most ideologically liberal justice since at least 1946, tops the list as his decisions overturned 24 of the Court’s prior precedents. Justices Rehnquist and Brennan fill out the top three justices. While Rehnquist is at the top of this figure, it is interesting to note that Rehnquist’s successor at the chief justice position, Justice Roberts falls to the bottom of this figure after overturning just one decision.
The justices at the top of the overturned list look quite different than those from the previous figure.
Justice Sutherland who sat on the Court during most of the 1920’s and 1930’s was the most overturned of the justices followed by Justice Frankfurter who joined the Court soon after Sutherland departed and by Justice Brennan who joined the Court about 15 years after Frankfurter. Complicating the notion that older precedent is easier to overturn, we don’t arrive at a justice from the 19th century until the fifth in this figure with McKenna.
Several justices formed overturned / overturning relationships with multiple such decisions. This series of justices follows neatly from the data with the most dominant combo with Douglas as overturner and Sutherland as overturnee. The figure only looks at combos with more than one decision overturned.
In terms of more modern justices of interest, Kennedy overturned multiple decisions authored by Stevens, Thomas overturned several of Kennedy’s decisions, and several justices including O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia overturned multiple decisions written by Brennan.
These relationships can also be used to construct an overturning case network with the most active justices both in terms of overturning and in having decisions overturned packed towards the center and justices less involved in these decisions towards the periphery. Directed arrows show relationships between overturner and overturnee and the size of an error depicts the magnitude of this relationship.
As the figure confirms, Brennan is close to the center with other active justices including Frankfurter, Harlan II, Rehnquist, and Stone also in the middle. The largest arrows correlate with the combo relationships described above with the largest moving from Douglas to Sutherland and another sizable arrow moving from O’Connor to Brennan.
The Court has not slowed down in overturning its own precedent in recent terms. Just last term the Court overruled four of its prior precedents with decisions in Janus v. American Federation, Trump v. Hawaii, and South Dakota v. Wayfair. These data, however, do not lead to the inference that the Court is especially likely to overturn particular decisions such as Roe v. Wade. The 322 overturned decisions in this dataset account for only a small fraction of the Court’s total decision output over time. These data do show though that modern Courts have become more likely than Courts from the past to review and overturn the Court’s prior decisions. This in turn means that the justices’ rhetoric about the importance of precedent is only as believable as their actions. In the coming terms the justices will inevitably overturn some of the Court’s prior decisions. This doesn’t mean the Court lacks respect for these decisions as some opinions may have become antiquated with the passage of time. It does mean though that we should at least take a cautious approach when evaluating the likelihood that any decision has the power to stay on the books for a prolonged period of time. The justices have free rein in overturning their prior decisions and have exercised this right in varying degrees especially in the past several decades.
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