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The disputed domain name <greenbriarmap.com> is registered with Moniker Online Services, LLC.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on April 20, 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Center transmitted by email to Moniker Online Services, LLC a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On May 14, 2007, Moniker Online Services, LLC transmitted by email to the Center its verification response stating that Registrant : International Domain Names Inc is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. In response to an e-mail communication from the Center of May 15, 2007 indicating that the Registrant information provided by the Registrar is different to the entity named in the Complaint as the Respondent, the Complainant filed an amended Complaint on May 18, 2007. The Amended Complaint named Registrant : International Domain Names Inc, as the current Respondent. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
The Complainant in this administrative proceeding is CSX IA, Inc., a United States of America company organized and existing under laws of Delaware. The Complainant owns various trademarks THE GREENBRIER registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, including THE GREENBRIER (United States registration number 1482046) for resort hotel services with a priority of August 4, 1987 (the GREENBRIER marks). While the GREENBRIER marks were previously owned by the parent company of the Complainant (CSX IP, Inc.), it has become clear from the Complainant’s further submission that they were transferred from CSX IP, Inc. to the Complainant before the filing of the Complaint in this dispute.
The disputed domain name was first registered on June 8, 2006. At least on April 18, 2007, the listed registrant of record was Registrant , Moniker Privacy Services, a privacy service offered by the Registrar to owners of domain names. At some point of time thereafter, the listed registrant of record was disclosed as Registrant : International Domain Names Inc.
(i) The domain name <greenbriarmap.com> is confusingly similar to the GREENBRIER marks as it fully incorporates the Complainant’s trademark GREENBRIER except for a minor misspelling (substitution of “e” by “a”) and the addition of the generic term “map”, which only increases the confusion as Internet users might expect to find travel guidelines or a sitemap to the Complainant’s location on the website under the disputed domain name.
(ii) The Complainant further contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name as no trademarks comprising the word “greenbriar” seem to belong to the Respondent, as the name of the Respondent bears no connection to the disputed domain name, as the Respondent is using the Complainant’s trademark to divert Internet users to a parking website with links to mainly hotel services, as the Respondent is not affiliated with the Complainant, and as the Respondent Registrant , Moniker Privacy Services never replied to the Complainant’s attempts to contact it.
(iii) The Complainant finally contends that the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith. Firstly, the choice of a domain name incorporating a confusingly similar approximation of a well-known and distinctive trademark is in the absence of any rights or legitimate interests itself considered to be an indication of bad faith registration. Secondly, the substitution of the letter “e” by “a” is as typo-squatting considered to be evidence of bad faith and bad faith is reinforced by the addition of the term “map”. Finally, the Respondent is supposed to engage in revenue generating activities called “click-through” by appropriating a domain name confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark, thereby illegitimately capitalizing on the GREENBRIER marks.
The Complainant provided evidence that the disputed domain name was registered in the name of Registrant  Moniker Privacy Services at least until April 18, 2007, i.e. until two days before the Complaint was filed with the Center. The Center was informed by the Registrar on May 14, 2007, that the domain name was registered on such date in the name of Registrant : International Domain Names Inc. Registrant , Moniker Privacy Services is a privacy domain name registration service.
Previous panels have in similar cases been prepared to treat both the initially listed registrant and the subsequently disclosed registrant as Respondent (cf. TDS Telecommunications Corporation v. Registrant  Nevis Domains and Registrant  Moniker Privacy Services, WIPO Case No. D2006-1620; WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature aka WWF International v. Moniker Online Services LLC and Gregory Ricks, WIPO Case No. D2006-0975; Zedge Ltd. v. Moniker Privacy Services/Aaron Wilson, WIPO Case No. D2006-1585). In the present case, Registrant , Moniker Privacy Services appears to have been correctly identified in the Complaint as the listed registrant of record in the Whois at the time the Complaint was filed. The registrar appears to have subsequently disclosed the identity of another shield or a third party beneficial registrant, Registrant : International Domain Names Inc, which has later on also been named by the Complainant in the amended Complaint as a Respondent. Accordingly, it is in the Panel's view appropriate for both of these entities to be included as Respondent in the present case, and the Panel will refer to them collectively as the Respondent except as noted otherwise.
The mere addition of the generic word “map” following the trademark does not eliminate the similarity between the Complainant’s marks and the disputed domain name, as “map” is a common term for a tool helping people find their way. It is well established that a domain name that wholly incorporates a trademark may be confusingly similar to such trademark for purposes of the Policy despite the addition of common or generic words (cf. Dr. Grandel GmbH v. Drg Randel Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0829; Microsoft Corporation v. J. Holiday Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-1493; Quixtar Investments, Inc. V. Dennis Hoffman, WIPO Case No. D2000-0253; RRI Financial, Inc., v. Ray Chen, WIPO Case No. D2001-1242).
Furthermore, the substitution of the letter “e” by an “a” in the Complainant’s GREENBRIER marks must be considered as a case of so-called “typo-squatting”: The term “greenbriar” within the disputed domain name <greenbriarmap.com> is nearly identical to the GREENBRIER marks in their visual impression and identical to them in their sound impression. An Internet user or consumer viewing the disputed domain name is likely to confuse it with the Complainant’s GREENBRIER marks (cf. VeriSign, Inc. v. Onlinemalls, WIPO Case No. D2000-1446; Network Solutions, LLC v. Center for Ban on Drugs, WIPO Case No. D2005-0454; Network Solutions, LLC v. Research Center, WIPO Case No. D2005-0451; Federated Western Properties, Inc. v. John Zuccarini dba Cupcake Patrol, RaveClub, and RaveClub Berlin, WIPO Case No. D2003-0298).
Therefore, the Panel finds that the domain name <greenbriarmap.com> is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s GREENBRIER Marks and that the Complainant has satisfied the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
With a view to the high level of distinctiveness of the GREENBRIER marks and their use by the Respondent, providing already on June 29, 2006 (i.e. shortly after the creation of <greenbriarmap.com>) links on the website under the disputed domain name to golf trips and vacations, also mentioning “greenbrier” (spelled as in the Complainant’s marks), it is inconceivable that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name without knowledge of the Complainant’s rights therein. The Panel is therefore satisfied that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with full knowledge of the Complainant’s marks and thus in bad faith.
Moreover, the Respondent also used the disputed domain name in bad faith: Screen shots of the Respondent’s web page under the disputed domain name show that the domain name redirects users to a parking website that provides links to third parties which compete with the Complainant’s hotel services. These parking websites typically offer domain name holders to earn click through fees for redirecting Internet users to competing websites and thus capitalizing on the goodwill of third parties trademarks. This behavior qualifies as bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy in that the Respondent’s use of the domain name attempts to attract for commercial gain Internet users to the Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainants’ mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent’s website or location or of a product or service on the Respondent’s website. On this evidence, the Panel finds bad faith proven under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name <greenbriarmap.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

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Miranda v. Arizona is a 1966 United States Supreme Court case that required law enforcement to inform a suspect of their rights prior to an interrogation. If a suspect makes incriminating statements in response to interrogation while they are in custody, and they were not informed of their rights, those statements will not be admissible in court.
Miranda was a reaction by the Court to the proliferation of coercive interrogation tactics that were then being employed by law enforcement across the country.
The Court specifically noted that they were reacting to a line of cases in which "the police resorted to physical brutality - beating, hanging, whipping - and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions.
The Miranda decision was essentially an extension of the Court's earlier decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) and Escobedo v. Illinois (1964).
In Gideon, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to legal counsel even for those who cannot afford it, and that this rule applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In cases where an indigent defendant cannot afford counsel, the state must provide counsel for the defendant.
In Escobedo, the Court began to address the problem of coercive interrogations and extended Gideon's holding. The Court held that statements obtained from a defendant who was forced to stand handcuffed for four hours while being interrogated, without access to his attorney, were inadmissible and in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
At a minimum, law enforcement must honor a defendant's request for counsel and must inform the suspect of their right to remain silent.
The Miranda opinion contained an extensive discussion of coercive interrogation tactics that were commonly employed by law enforcement at the time to extract confessions from suspects. This discussion included the Reid technique as an example.
Any statement they make can be used against them.
They have the right to have an attorney present.
If they cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for them.
The defendant can waive their Miranda rights, provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. However, if the defendant expresses that they want an attorney present or that they do not want to answer questions, all interrogation must stop. Any statements that are obtained in violation of Miranda will not be admissible in court.
Harris v. New York (1970): Although a confession obtained in violation of Miranda is not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief, it can be used to impeach the defendant as a prior inconsistent statement should the defendant take the witness stand.
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980): A spontaneous statement made by a defendant who is in custody, not made in response to interrogation, is admissible in court and is not in violation of Miranda.
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984): A person subjected to interrogation while in custody is entitled to the protections of Miranda regardless of the severity of the offense.
New York v. Quarles (1984): Created a "public safety exception" to the requirements of Miranda.
Colorado v. Connelly (1986): "Knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" means that the suspect reasonably appears to understand what they are doing and they are not being coerced into signing the waiver. It is irrelevant that the defendant may have been insane at the time the waiver was obtained.
Dickerson v. U.S. (2000): Miranda's protections are constitutionally compelled and cannot be overruled by an act of Congress.
Missouri v. Seibert (2004): Police cannot obtain a confession, then read Miranda rights, and then obtain a second confession.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010): A defendant must clearly and unambiguously state that they are invoking their Miranda rights. Remaining silent in the face of questioning is not enough.
One particular decision concerning Miranda Rights came in 2013. That decision was Salinas v. Texas, a 2013 United States Supreme Court case that our own Houston criminal defense attorney Neal Davis was a part of.
In Salinas, the Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case, a defendant must invoke the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination or the amendment does not apply.
The defendant in Salinas was not in custody, did not receive Miranda warnings, and voluntarily answered some questions. He then stopped talking when investigators asked if ballistics would match his shotgun to the murder weapon. The Court held that silence is insufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment, and suggested that the defendant must verbally invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and, if they do not expressly invoke that right, their silence can be used against them at trial.
There is no doubt that the requirements of Miranda are still needed in today’s courtroom. Law enforcement investigators are still being trained using the Reid Technique which was one of the primary concerns of the Supreme Court in the Miranda decision.
According to the Innocence Project, 1 in 4 cases where defendants were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated by DNA evidence involved a false confession. In many cases, those false confessions were obtained through the same coercive techniques that the Miranda decision was intended to prevent.
If you or someone you know is in need of criminal defense, contact Houston criminal defense attorney Neal Davis. We will do all we can to protect your rights throughout the legal process. Call today for a free consultation.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Donald P. Zedler, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioners.
Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., David O. Walter, Atty., Tax Division, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Andrew F. Oehmann, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before MAJOR, SCHNACKENBERG and HASTINGS, Circuit Judges.
This petition for review of a decision of the Tax Court of the United States involves deficiencies of approximately $50,000 assessed against taxpayers, Carl G. and Hilda B. Ortmayer, for the year 1948.1 It was found by the Tax Court that taxpayers had received taxable income through a distribution of debentures to them by the Cunningham-Ortmayer Company on July 2, 1948 and, further, that Carl G. Ortmayer had received taxable income in a second transaction on the same day in which his debts to that company were canceled.
No taxable dividend was declared or paid by the company during the period from its incorporation to the date of the questioned transactions in this case. The company showed a profit during each of the years from 1942 through 1948.
Because of the nature of its business, the company required a substantial line of credit. For a period of years the Marine National Exchange Bank (the bank) had extended it credit of $100,000, the loans being secured by assignment of the company's accounts receivable. The company periodically submitted financial statements to the bank. In the spring of 1948, the bank expressed concern that current earnings of the company were being loaned to taxpayer rather than being retained as working capital. However, the bank neither requested the elimination of taxpayer's indebtedness to the company nor suggested a recapitalization. It did insist that there be no further loans of the company's earnings.
Subsequently, the company consulted its accountant on this matter and on June 30, 1948, at a special meeting of stockholders, a decision was made to change the capital stock of the company from 750 shares of $100 par value common stock (issued and outstanding) to 1,500 shares of $1.00 par value common (authorized) and to issue long-term debentures in an amount not to exceed $99,000.
On July 2, 1948 the stockholders surrendered to the company all 750 outstanding shares and these shares were canceled by the company. The stockholders also paid over $1.00 with each share so surrendered and the company thereupon issued, pro rata, 750 shares of $1.00 par value common stock and 750 six percent debentures. The debentures, in the face amount of $100 each, were for a ten-year term and were redeemable on any interest paying date at the option of the company. One such debenture was issued and delivered with each share of $1.00 par value common stock. The taxpayers who had owned 748 of the original 750 outstanding shares of stock thus received 748 of the new shares of stock plus 748 of the debentures. The fair market value of each share of new stock distributed by the company on July 2, 1948 was $350 and that of each debenture was $100.
This transaction did not better the financial position of the company for credit purposes. The bank continued to extend credit but required the assignment of accounts receivable which were the obligations of municipalities as security and would no longer accept, as security, accounts of individuals and corporations.
We agree with the Tax Court's determination that, as to the purported recapitalization, this case falls squarely within the Supreme Court's holding in Bazley v. Commissioner, 1947, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S. Ct. 1489, 91 L. Ed. 1782. See also Heady v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 699.
It is taxpayers' position that the instant case differs materially from Bazley in that the two transactions on July 2, 1948 were undertaken by this closely held corporation for the dominant business purpose of meeting the bank's objections to the then existing indebtedness to the corporation of the taxpayer.6 This contention must fail on the record in this case. The Tax Court's findings, supported by substantial evidence, indicate that the bank did not request recapitalization by the company; that the bank did not consider the new arrangement to have bettered the financial position of the company for credit purposes; that the transaction did not, in fact, in any way change the working capital position of the company; and that the benefit from the transaction went to the taxpayers who emerged with an unaffected equity in the company and with debentures having a fair market value of $74,800. As stated by the Supreme Court in Bazley: " [W]hether in a particular case a paper recapitalization is no more than an admissible attempt to avoid the consequences of an outright distribution of earnings turns on details of corporate affairs, judgment on which must be left to the Tax Court." Supra 331 U.S. at page 742, 67 S. Ct. at page 1491.
But apart from the simple and direct authority of Bazley, the position of the taxpayers is made further untenable by their apparent erroneous assumption that proof of a valid business purpose is alone adequate to establish that the distribution was not essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend. This court has held that the existence of a valid corporate purpose is only one of many factors to be considered, and that it is not necessarily the controlling factor. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Snite, 7 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 819, 823. " [A]ll the factors and all the circumstances should be considered and the net result determined therefrom." Ibid. See also United States v. Fewell, 5 Cir., 1958, 255 F.2d 496, 500; Earle v. Woodlaw, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 119, 122; Ferro v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 838, 841, and Jones v. Griffin, 10 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 885, 887. It is also well-settled that it is not the motive of the parties but the net effect of the transaction which is relevant. McGuire v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 1936, 84 F.2d 431, 432, certiorari denied 299 U.S. 591, 7 S. Ct. 118, 81 L. Ed. 435.
Finally, the question of applicability of Section 115(g) is primarily one of fact7 and, the Tax Court, having considered all the relevant factors and circumstances in determining the net effect of this transaction and its findings being supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say that it was chargeable with clear error in determining the distribution here involved to have been made at such time and in such manner as to make it essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend.
In the second transaction on July 2, 1948 the taxpayer had all his debts to the company canceled and, in return, relinquished his right to salary due him of $11,000, transferred to the company 643 of the newly issued debentures (total market value $64,300) and agreed to the company's cancellation of a $20,851.76 balance which was credited to him in the capital loan account on the company's books as a result of advances he had made in the 1930's. Only two items in this transaction are in issue: First, whether notes payable of $30,000 of taxpayer to the company were any part of the indebtedness of taxpayer to the company and, second, whether the $20,851.76 balance of advances of taxpayer to the company represented loans or contributions to capital.
The $30,000 item represents company funds used by taxpayer to purchase 374 shares of the company's stock which were owned by one Ben A. Froeming when he died in 1945. Taxpayer entered into an agreement with the executors of the Froeming estate to purchase the shares for the $30,000, $10,000 being a down payment and $2,000 to be paid each month for ten months. Commissioner contends, and the Tax Court found that taxpayer borrowed the $30,000 to make the purchase. Taxpayer's position is that he bought the stock as trustee for the company.
The evidence shows that taxpayer, upon entering into the purchase agreement, executed eleven non-interest bearing notes payable to the company, one for $10,000 and ten for $2,000 each. The company issued its checks as payment became due, these checks being made payable to taxpayer who endorsed them over to the executors of the Froeming estate. The receipts signed by the executors each contained substantially the following language: "Received from C. G. Ortmayer (............... dollars) represented by check # .............. of Cunningham-Ortmayer Company." The transaction was recorded as a loan to taxpayer on the books of the company. No repayment of the amount was made to the company either before or on July 2, 1948.
There was no formal entry of assignment to taxpayer on the stock certificate formerly owned by Froeming but the transfer of shares to taxpayer was recorded in the stock record book of the company, and a new certificate was issued to taxpayer covering both the Froeming shares and shares previously owned by taxpayer. Taxpayer signed a receipt for the new certificate. Further, taxpayer listed the shares among his assets and the $30,000 notes payable to the company as a liability on a copy of a statement of assets and liabilities filed with the Internal Revenue Bureau in 1947 covering the years 1940 through 1946. Finally, the shares were a part of the 748 shares taxpayer and his wife turned in to the company on July 2, 1948, and for which they received pro rata the new shares of stock and debentures.
As bearing on taxpayer's contention that he was a trustee for the purchase of the Froeming shares, at a special meeting of the company's stockholders on April 11, 1952, on motion by taxpayer, a resolution was adopted that taxpayer "may and probably was some sort of trustee" for the purchase of the shares of stock, and the company accepted taxpayer's offer to return all proceeds attributable to those shares "without consideration." Pursuant to that agreement taxpayer immediately returned certain shares of stock attributable to the Froeming shares, and, on September 29, 1952, he turned over the proceeds from the sale of other shares likewise attributable to the Froeming shares. On the same day, September 29, 1952, taxpayers sold to the company all their remaining stock and debentures plus other unidentified assets for some $275,000.
We hold that there is more than adequate support in the record for the Tax Court's findings that taxpayer bought the shares of stock for himself and that on July 2, 1948 a debtor-creditor relationship existed between him and the company evidenced by the notes payable of $30,000. The undisputed documentary evidence shows that both the company and taxpayer regarded him as the owner of the stock. This is further strengthened by the fact that he did not return the debentures attributable to the Froeming stock as a trustee but used them as part payment of his personal debts to the company. The belated attempt to convert himself to trustee status lacks weight in view of its timing (coming after there had been examinations of his tax liability for 1948) and in view of its relationship to a concurrent sale of all his remaining stock and securities and that of his wife for a lump sum.
Turning to the second item in issue, taxpayer's advances of $20,851.76 to the company, the facts as found by the Tax Court are as follows: During the years 1930 through 1932 taxpayer made a series of advances to the company aggregating $68,196.62. No note or evidence of indebtedness was given by the company for the sums advanced, and no interest was payable on the sums. A succession of stockholders' resolutions contained in the minute book of the company referred to the sums as "capital loans" and indicated that they were "to be paid * * * out of future earnings when and as such funds are available." Initially, these advances were entered on the records of the company as additions to donated surplus, but, on January 3, 1933, an entry in the company's private journal transferred the amount to an account entitled "Capital Stock Loans." This entry was accompanied by the following explanation: "To correct Donated Surplus Account and to properly record Capital Loans as authorized by the stockholders today."
During the years 1934 through 1944 taxpayer had borrowed money from the company. Taxpayer partially repaid such debts by periodically charging them against the Capital Stock Loan Account, thus reducing the balance in that account to the figure of $20,851.76 by December 31, 1944. This balance remained the same on July 2, 1948. Taxpayer testified that he understood that the advances were to be repaid by the company when and if there were earnings available for payment but that his rights would be subordinate to rights of other corporate creditors. The federal income tax returns filed by the company for the years 1944 through 1948 listed the advances as paid-in surplus contrary to its treatment of them as loans on its books.
The Tax Court's conclusion that the advances made were contributions to capital was based primarily on the weight given by it to a sworn protest filed on behalf of the company in 1947, and signed by the taxpayer here as its president, which urged that the advances were made and treated as paid-in surplus. The Commissioner at that time had determined the advances to be loans and had, on the basis of such determination, reduced the company's excess profits credit.
Reliance by the Tax Court on this protest prompted taxpayer's motion for rehearing in the instant case, subsequently denied, which motion submitted as newly discovered evidence the fact that commissioner had rejected the protest and treated the advances as loans, and that a refund suit by the company had followed which resulted in a compromise and dismissal. Taxpayer's contention in this appeal is that the dismissal of the refund suit on its merits now raises the bar of collateral estoppel against commissioner in this case, that the commissioner is also equitably estopped from taking inconsistent positions, and that the Tax Court erred in not permitting introduction of the evidence to show such inconsistency. In view of our disposition of this issue, however, we need not pass on these contentions.
The protest so heavily relied upon by the Tax Court in its determination amounts only to a summary of the company's arguments, rejected by the commissioner, that the company at that time, "understood and treated * * * [the capital loan account] as the equivalent of paid-in surplus * * *." These arguments were made in the face of a downward adjustment by commissioner of the company's excess profits credits for the years there involved. The protest is not conclusive here, although it is inconsistent with taxpayer's present position, as are the commissioner's present assertions with his former position as to these advances.
The intention of the parties is important in determining the nature of such advances. Maloney v. Spencer, 9 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 638, 641. No single test, however, can provide the answer. Arlington Park Jockey Club, Inc. v. Sauber, 7 Cir., 1959, 262 F.2d 902. The courts have stressed, among other factors, the book entries, the debt-equity ratio, the presence of an agreement to maintain proportionality between the advances in question and the acknowledged risk capital, and the expectation of repayment. See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 399, 406; Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 1949, 13 T.C. 43, as affirmed 9 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 70.
In passing upon the nature of these advances we are considering an ultimate finding of the Tax Court. As characterized by the Supreme Court in Bogardus v. Commissioner, 1937, 302 U.S. 34, 39, 58 S. Ct. 61, 64, 82 L. Ed. 32, such an ultimate finding "is `a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact. It is to be distinguished from findings of primary, evidentiary or circumstantial facts. It is subject to judicial review and, on such review, the court may substitute its judgment for that of the board.' Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 57 S. Ct. 569, 573, 574, 81 L. Ed. 755; Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131, 55 S. Ct. 732, 736, 79 L. Ed. 1343. If the conclusion of the Board be regarded as a determination of a mixed question of law and fact, it has, as we shall presently show, no support in the primary and evidentiary facts. The ultimate determination, therefore, should be overturned, under the doctrine of Helvering v. Rankin, supra, as a matter of law." Therefore, we may determine whether the Tax Court reached the correct result on the basis of its findings.
No conclusive weight attaches to the fact that no note or evidence of indebtedness was issued and that no interest was payable on these advances. Commissioner does rely heavily, however, on the fact that the sums involved were to be repaid only as earnings became available. Such a contingency, though it does indicate an inconsistency with the theory of a fixed obligation to repay and though it is one of the factors to be considered, does not, however, prove conclusive in the circumstances of this case which indicate that taxpayer had a reasonable expectation that he would be repaid. Cf. Gilbert v. Commissioner, supra. The case of Guardian Investment Corp. v. Phinney, 5 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 326, relied upon by commissioner held only that, because the liability of a company to pay interest and principal on a second mortgage note did not become a fixed and definite obligation during the taxable years there involved, there was no indebtedness within the meaning of the federal tax laws on which interest could be accrued and deducted. That is not this case.
We hold that the legal effect of the facts as found by the trial court indicate that the advances were loans and not contributions to capital. The taxpayer thus, on July 2, 1948, properly charged part of his existing debt against the capital stock loan account as he had periodically done in prior years. In view of our holdings on the two items in issue, taxpayer realized no income on the second transaction of July 2, 1948. His total debt of $95,561.52 was properly canceled in return for $64,300 worth of debentures, and in relinquishment by him of $11,000 in salary credits and the $20,851.76 owing him by the company, or a total of $96,151.76.
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed except as to that part determining the sum of $20,851.76 to be a contribution to capital, as to which it is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Tax Court for a redetermination of deficiencies consistent with this opinion.

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The case is pertaining to the manufacture of bidis and interlink with the fundamental right to trade. Here it is pertinent to note that there was no query of res extra commercium but the improper regulation by the state government. The Act has given the authority wide power to issue orders and ultimately gives the power to specify the season and prohibit manufacture. In furtherance of it, two prohibitory orders were passed by the Deputy Commissioner which mandates the petitioners to question the impugned Act.
§3 & 4 of the impugned Act grants power to the Deputy Commissioner to fix the period as the agricultural season with respect to certain villages where the Act applies. The Deputy Commissioner has the power to prohibit the manufacture of bidis and no person is authorized to manufacture the bidis.
On 13th June 1950, an order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar prohibiting the people in certain villages to manufacture bidis. When the case is dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the period mentioned in the order expired and another order covering agricultural period from 8th October, 1950 to 18th November, 1950 was issued and the subsequent order was also questioned in the present case. The question arises whether the impugned Act is falling within the saving clause or excess of its provisions?
Two applications have been presented before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of Art. 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India. The petition is filed by the proprietor and employee of a bidi manufacturing concern located in District Sagar of State of Madhya Pradesh. It is contended that the law in force in State of Madhya Pradesh which authorizes the prohibition of manufacture of bidis in certain villages is inconsistent with Part III of Constitution of India.
Whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?
The impugned Act does not impose reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to engage in business, in the interest of general public but totally negatives it.
The state legislature was a proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute. The legislature only knows the social and economic conditions prevailing in the state and enact an appropriate law that could be effective. The object of the act is to promote the grow more food campaign and help to bring the fallow land under the plough.
To analyse whether the impugned Act is against the fundamental right, it becomes necessary to understand the provisions of the Act. In preamble of the Act, it was mentioned that the Act was passed to provide measures for the supply of adequate labor for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas. The act helps in more food campaign and brings the plough considerable areas of fallow land.
The Deputy Commissioner is having the power to prohibit the manufacture of beedis in certain villages and also can fix the agricultural season. The Contravention will result in imprisonment for six months under §7 of the impugned act.
The reasonable restriction of any fundamental right imposed on personal enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature which is required for public interest. Similarly, the legislation cannot act arbitrarily and there is a need to strike a proper balance between freedom guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) and Art. 19(6) of the constitution.
The impugned act results in complete stoppage of business in certain agricultural seasons and areas. For the purpose of regulation, it is an extreme measure and for allocation of labor, they could have resorted to regulation of working hours. Thus, the provision has no reasonable relation to the object and acts in excess of the requirement of the case. The ban is not only on the manufacture but also restricts the manufacturer from employing any person in business i.e. he cannot input labor from neighboring places also.
The language employed in the impugned provisions is wide enough to cover restriction both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative acts that affect the right.
The word reasonable implies intelligent care and deliberation which is the choice of the course which reason dictates.
The Constitution makers had mentioned certain restrictions under Art. 19(6) which is considered reasonable and it must be used to interpret the laws and understand the nature and extend of restrictions.
The population comprises of women, children, disabled people and old people who are restricted from working in bidi concerns. This ban has no relation to the object as they could work in their leisure time.
The Court is of the opinion that the impugned act does not stand the test of reasonableness and therefore void. In furtherance of it the orders issued by the deputy commissioner were held to be void inoperative and ineffective. Moreover, the respondents are directed not to enforce §4 of the impugned act in whatsoever manner against the petitioners. The petitioners will have the cost of the proceedings. The petitionsare allowed.
No references have been made by the Supreme Court.
Next articleThe Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.
I am Pragash pursuing BBA., LL. B., (Hons.) at SASTRA Deemed to be University. I am an enthusiastic law student who loves to learn new things bearing a inherent interest towards criminal law and forensics. My favourite legal fields include criminal law, cyber laws, intellectual property rights and tax. I love to read books about investigation, Indian and Greek history and mythology with a sprinkle of suspense and thriller. I am also a cinephile with a inclination towards music. In my free time, I like to spend quality time in browsing news and articles which helps me to make a few write-ups and engage in frequent debates with my colleagues. Not but not the least I am a fan of cardio but strictly no diets.
Unni Krishnan J.P & ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors.
State of Gujarat and Ors. vs. Shri. Ambica Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad and Ors.

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Do Security Clearances Trump the ADA/Rehabilitation Act?
Today’s case is from the very end of December of last year and involves a question that I have not seen before. That is, if there is a national-security exemption for having to comply with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act? The case is Hale v. Johnson decided by the Sixth Circuit on December 29, 2016. As is usual, the blog entry is divided into categories: Facts; court’s reasoning; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
The facts are really straightforward. All plant officers working for the Tennessee Valley Authority have to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. From the time the plaintiff began employment in 2009, he had always maintained the level of clearance necessary for his position. However, in 2013, the Tennessee Valley Authority made a pulmonary function test a requirement to obtain medical clearance. Since the plaintiff had chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, he failed that test. Upon failure of the test, the Tennessee Valley Authority terminated him. The Tennessee Valley Authority moved for summary judgment arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a national security exemption. While the District Court disagreed with that claim, it did certify the case for an interlocutory appeal.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does contain a national-security exemption at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(g), but the Rehabilitation Act contains no such exemption.
If Congress intended for all of title VII’s provisions to apply to the Rehabilitation Act, it would not have enumerated specific sections when it came to the remedies for violations of the Rehabilitation Act. In fact, Congress did make its intent clear to have all of title VI applicable to the remedy section of the Rehabilitation Act.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act or §717 of title VII establishes the applicability of the national security exemption.
There is a complete absence of case law applying the national-security exemption to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act. In fact, the Tennessee Valley Authority did not cite a single case, and for that matter, the court was not able to find one either.
While this case, Department of the Navy v. Egan , precludes judicial review of security clearance decisions, that is a completely different kettle of fish than whether a person can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.
Egan pertained to executive control over access to national security information and not to national security concerns such as those pertaining to whether an individual has the physical capacity to guard a nuclear plant. In other words, nothing in that decision suggested that its holding applied to physical fitness judgments even where such judgments are purportedly based upon the interest of national security.
In contrast to deciding whether a person has a propensity to disclose classified information, the determination of an individual’s physical capability to perform a job is based upon hard science and is one that has historically been reviewed by courts and administrative agencies.
Even if Egan extends to sensitive positions and sensitive information, that is still a different matter than a judgment concerning physical fitness.
To hold otherwise, would mean that the Sixth Circuit would find itself in an untenable position where they were precluded from reviewing any federal agency’s employment decision so long as it was made in the name of national security.
While the plaintiff sued under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the court’s reasoning doesn’t mention the ADA at all. That said, since the two have virtually identical requirements, the holding would probably be the same under the ADA as well.
You might get a different result if the position affected national security and access to classified information.
Today, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. In that decision, the United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 ruling with Justice Kennedy being the swing vote, held that mixed motive is dead with respect to retaliation claims under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The reasoning is such that this decision most certainly means mixed motive is dead with respect to retaliation claims under the ADA; thereby, giving a huge victory to ADA defense lawyers. On the other hand, the reasoning of the majority is such, that mixed motive is now in play under title I of the ADA; thereby, giving a huge victory to ADA plaintiff employment lawyers. To understand how this could be is the question we explore in the rest of this blog entry.
In this case, a physician of Middle Eastern heritage brought a claim against his employer alleging that he was discriminated against because of his heritage by his supervisor and also brought a retaliation claim alleging that he was retaliated against for complaining about the treatment he was receiving from his supervisor. The jury found for him on both claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the portion of the jury’s verdict with respect to his constructive discharge claim but affirmed the jury’s verdict with respect to his retaliation claim, adopting a mixed motive standard as the causation standard. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center appealed to the United States Supreme Court. As mentioned above, in a 5 to 4 decision United States Supreme Court held that with respect to alleging a claim for retaliation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act, mixed motive is out and but for causation is in. However, the reasoning of their decision can only lead to the conclusion that mixed motive with respect to title I claims of the ADA is now in and with respect to retaliation claims of the ADA is now out. Here’s why.
First, Justice Kennedy and the majority make a distinction between status-based claims and retaliation claims. Status-based claims are subject to a mixed motive analysis as a result of the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision, which he discusses in some detail. He also discusses how the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991 so as to allow for limited recovery for mixed motive situations.
Second, he spends some time talking about Gross v. FBL Financial Services and that but for causation is required for claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He notes that title VII is very comprehensive, and therefore, its specific structure needs to be taken as it is laid out. In particular, the structure of title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes clear that status discrimination gets treated in one way and that there is no indication that retaliation should be treated in the same way. What is critical here for our purposes is that disability discrimination is status discrimination. That is, the plaintiff is alleging that an employer has discriminated against him based upon his or her status, i.e. having a disability.
Third, Justice Kennedy said that if Congress wanted mixed motive to apply to retaliation claims, “it could have inserted the motivating factor provision as part of the section applying to all such claims, such as 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5, which establishes the rules and remedies for all title VII enforcement actions.” (emphasis added) (Page 14 of decision from the opinion available at United States Supreme Court website, linked to above). With respect to the ADA, this language is a virtual slam dunk that mixed motive is in play with respect to title I claims because the ADA specifically references 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 as the remedies available to a plaintiff alleging discrimination under title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). I should point out here that further support of the argument that the ADA’s reference to § 2000e-5 in title I means that Congress intended to include mixed motive is the legislative history of why “qualified individual with a disability,” was kept in. In particular, Congress wanted to make clear that the indirect burden of proof, which presumes a motivating factor, was still in play. H.R. Rep. 110-730(I) at discussion of, “Discrimination on the Basis of Disability.” Further, that same legislative intent also says that the reason why Congress went from “because,” from the original ADA to “on the basis,” in the amendments act was to make the ADA more like title VII so that the emphasis would be placed on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person with a disability have been discriminated against on the basis of disability and not on appointment preliminary question of whether a particular person was even a person with a disability in the first place. Id.
Fourth, Justice Kennedy specifically cites to the ADA. In particular, he notes that the ADA is also a comprehensive statutory scheme and that Congress in the ADA clearly spoke to retaliation separate and apart from status-based claims. This reasoning necessarily means that mixed motive with respect to retaliation claims under the ADA is dead (a huge victory for defense lawyers).
Fifth, Justice Kennedy and the majority discuss that there are sound policy reasons for making retaliation claims difficult to prove. In particular, the number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has outstripped those for every type of status-based discrimination except for race. Failing to hold otherwise, would contribute to the filing of frivolous claims. It would also raise the costs, financial and reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory retaliatory intent. Finally, to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the text and purpose of title VII.
Sixth, while the EEOC had a technical assistance manual saying that mixed motive applies to retaliation claims, Justice Kennedy was having none of it. In particular, he believed that the manual failed to address the specific provisions of the title VII statutory scheme, the amendments to title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Gross decision.
This decision was one of those decisions with the 5-4 breakdown with the liberal justices and the conservative justices being evenly split and Justice Kennedy being the swing vote. Accordingly, there was a vigorous dissent by the liberal justices. Their reasoning was that the majority decision doesn’t make any sense for a variety of reasons. First, retaliation for complaining about discrimination is tightly bonded to the core prohibition of discrimination based upon status and cannot be disassociated from it.
Second, jurors are going to have one heck of a time figuring out why retaliation has one set of causation standards and status-based decisions has another set of causation standards.
Third, until this decision, the Supreme Court had always held that a ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation.
Fourth, the dissent found it strange that 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m), the employment practices provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which was designed to strengthen the act, was instead being used to actually limit the scope of remedies under that act.
Fifth, the dissent talks about how the statute the majority refers to in §2000e-2 actually goes beyond just retaliation provisions.
Finally, the dissent believes the EEOC technical assistance manual was entitled to deference.
So what does this all mean for the practitioner and ADA plaintiffs and Employers? It breaks down this way. Mixed motive is now available under title I of the ADA. Mixed motive is not available for retaliation claims (title V). What this means of course is that the possibilities for plaintiffs with respect to what they might be able to obtain in a title I matter has just expanded as has the costs of litigation and its ultimate resolution to the defendant. On the other hand, the ability of the plaintiff to successfully prove a retaliation claim just got more difficult. All this said, this case still does not answer the question as to whether when dealing with but for causation you could still have more than one cause, an issue that I discuss in another blog entry.. On a practical level, this means an employer taking adverse action against an employee needs to make sure that they have good cause for that action independent of any possible discriminatory animus or run the risk of at least some liability per the remedies that exist if the plaintiff can show motivating factor under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5.


If the government arrests an alien, because the government believes that the alien is in the United States illegally and therefore deportable, then generally the alien may apply for release on bond or parole while the question of his removal is being decided. 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). An alien may secure his release if he can convince an immigration official or immigration judge that he poses no risk of flight or danger to the community.
Section 1226(c)(2) provides that “an alien described in paragraph (1)” (italics supplied) may be released pending removal proceedings only under extraordinarily limited circumstances involving witness protection, not at issue in the instant case. The practical effect is that virtually all aliens who are taken into custody after release from the criminal justice system, and who are covered by one or more of the four categories described in §1226(c)(1), are denied a bond hearing because of the mandatory limitations of §1226(c)(2).
The respondents are aliens who were detained under §1226(c)(2)’s mandatory-detention requirement and denied a bond hearing pending decision on their removal. Though all respondents had been convicted of crimes covered in §1226(c)(1), none were taken into custody immediately after their release from criminal custody. Indeed, some were not taken into custody until several years later.
The respondents filed a class action in District Court, contending that they could not be denied a bond hearing under §1226(c)(2) even though they had committed crimes specified in §1226(c)(1)(A)-(D). They argued that §1226(c)(1) requires that an alien be taken into custody by the Secretary “when” released from criminal custody, and that means an alien must be taken into custody immediately upon release from the criminal justice system. If the Secretary fails to take them into custody immediately upon release, then the Secretary has no right under the statute to deny them a bond hearing. According to their complaint, only aliens who are arrested immediately upon release can be denied a bond hearing.
The District Court certified a class of all aliens who were not, or will not be, taken into custody immediately upon release from criminal custody for an offense described in §1226(c)(1); and the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the mandatory detention of the members of the class, holding that criminal aliens are exempt from mandatory detention under §1226(c)(2), unless they are taken into custody at the time of release and no later. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four decision.
Justice Alito, writing the majority opinion, analyzed the grammar of §1226(c)(1) and concluded that the phrase “when the alien is released” is not part of the description of those aliens whom the Secretary must take into custody for removal proceedings after the alien is released from the criminal justice system. The four subparagraphs (A)-(D) of Section 1226(c)(1) state the criteria defining the four categories of aliens who must be taken into custody. The words “when the alien is released” are not part of those four subparagraphs and not part of the criteria defining the four categories of aliens who must be taken into custody. Those words are not part of the description of the four categories, and they are not an additional element applying to all four categories. The scope of “any alien who” shall be taken into custody pursuant to §1226(c)(1) is fixed only by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)-(D) of §1226(c)(1). Because those four defining subparagraphs do not include the words “when the alien is released,” anyone who fits the description in those four subparagraphs falls under paragraph (2)’s detention mandate – even if the Secretary did not take them into custody immediately when they were released from the criminal justice system. The practical effect of the Court’s opinion is that the statute’s words “when the alien is released” mean whenever the alien is released or no matter when the alien is released.
Justice Breyer dissented in a long opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Justice Breyer wrote, inter alia, that a well-established canon of statutory interpretation provides that, “if fairly possible,” a statute must be construed “so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts on that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). Indefinite detention without a bond hearing likely deprives a person of his or her liberty without due process of law.


The sale, transfer, transportation, or shipment outside of the U.S. of any product prohibited or restricted for export without complying with U.S. export control laws and regulations, including proper export licensing, documentation or authorization, is strictly prohibited and may result in civil penalties and/or constitute a federal crime. Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC (KaiserUS) will not engage in any transaction that requires the illegal export of any products and will not assist directly or indirectly with the illegal export or re-export of any products. An accurate Automated Export System (AES) filing must be made, whether or not the exportation requires a license.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): Some of the item(s) on this website are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and export is strictly prohibited without authorization or a license issued by the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. By proceeding with a transaction to purchase any ITAR restricted item(s), the Customer certifies that (i) the purchase does not require Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC to export such items, unless Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC is aware of the export and has obtained the appropriate U.S. Government authorization; (ii) the Customer does not intend to export such items after receipt from Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC without the appropriate U.S. Government export authorization; (iii) the Customer does not intend to export, transfer, sell, or furnish the item to any foreign person, whether abroad or in the U.S., including any Foreign Embassy in the U.S., without the appropriate U.S. Government export authorization; (iv) the Customer understands that a foreign person under the ITAR § 120.16 means “any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3),” and can mean “any foreign corporation, business association, trust, society, or any other entity or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the U.S., as well as international organizations, foreign governments, and any agency or subdivisions of government (e.g. diplomatic missions)” (See ITAR § 120.16); (v) the Customer is a U.S. Person as defined by ITAR § 120.15, meaning the Customer is a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), or is a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3), or is a “corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity, organization or group that is incorporated to do business in the U.S., or is a governmental (federal, state, or local) entity” (See ITAR § 120.15).
Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Some of the item(s) on this website are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and export may be restricted by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. By proceeding with a transaction to purchase any restricted item(s), the Customer certifies that (i) the purchase does not require Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC to export such items, unless Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC is aware of the export and has obtained the appropriate U.S. Government authorization; (ii) the Customer does not intend to export such items after receipt from Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC without the appropriate U.S. Government export authorization.
(1) Export of some Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC products is strictly prohibited without a valid export license issued by the U.S. Department of State, in accordance with International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 C.F.R. 120-130) or a valid export license issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 C.F.R. 730-774).
By proceeding with a transaction to purchase any items from Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC, the Customer certifies that it will comply with all requirements imposed by all applicable laws, regulations and administrative policies.
Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC reserves the right to inquire into the end user, end use, and country of ultimate destination of any product ordered on this website.
Export control laws and regulations are complex. Any summaries of such laws and regulations provided by Kaiser Shooting Products, LLC herein are not comprehensive and are not to be taken as legal advice or counseling.


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Anything you say can be held against you in a court of law.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you.
The Supreme Court rarely – if ever – has created a rule that applies so broadly to so many people. It is even rarer that a Supreme Court opinion becomes a fixture of popular culture. As early as 2000, the Supreme Court held that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our national culture.” Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428. They have only become more prevalent and familiar since then.
Despite being familiar with the language of these warnings, many people are not aware of when their Miranda rights apply. Miranda rights apply to a person who is under custodial interrogation. A person is considered to be in custody if he or she has been “deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444. Interrogation occurs when officers know – or should know – that their statements are likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The statements can be either direct questioning or its “functional equivalent.” Id.
Surprisingly, the mere act of remaining silent is not enough to stop questioning by officers. It may seem strange, but until you actually state that you are remaining silent, officers can continue to question you. See Berghuis v. Thompson, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) and Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). Similarly, you must state that you are invoking your right to not answer questions without a criminal defense attorney present. The fact that an attorney has been appointed to represent you is not enough to stop questioning. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). Neither is the fact that your attorney is attempting to contact you at the police station: because the right to counsel is personal, your attorney cannot invoke it on your behalf. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
I am an experienced criminal defense attorney at Rowley Chapman & Barney and I can help you properly invoke your important constitutional rights. Should you or a loved one ever face questioning by law enforcement officials, immediately invoke your rights to silence and counsel and call our 24-hour criminal department line: (480) 833-2341.

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Cather, Willa. My Antonia. Boston. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1977. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Fine copy. Owner name on end paper.
Cather, Willa. My Antonia. Boston. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1988. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Fine copy.
Chandler, Janet Carncross. Significant Relationships. Inscribed by the author. Selected and New Poems. Rancho Cordova. Significant Relationships. 1988. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy.
Chandler, Raymond. Four Complete Philip Marlowe Novels. Deluxe binding. The Big Sleep, Farewell, My Lovely, The High Window, The Lady in the Lake. Photo available. np. Longmeadow Press. 1967. 693 pps. Octavo. Gilt decorated hard cover. Gilt edges. First edition thus. Fine copy.
Chaney, Lisa. Hide-and-Seek with Angels. A Life of J.M. Barrie. Photo available. New York. St. Martin's Press. 2006. 412 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Charney, Noah. The Art Thief. A Novel. Photo available. New York. Atria. 2007. Octavo. Soft cover. Fine copy.
Charteris, Leslie. Follow the Saint. Cleveland. World. 1947. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition thus. Fine copy in very good (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Charters, Ann. Kerouac. A Biography. Photo available. San Francisco. Straight Arrow Books. 1979. 419 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Stated first edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Chaucer, Geoffrey. Canterbury Tales. Photo available. New York. Bantam. 1964. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Fine copy.
Cheever, John. The Wapshot Chronicle. Photo available. New York. Time. 1965. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Fine copy.
Cherryh, C.J. Brothers of Earth. Garden City. Doubleday. 1976. Octavo. Hard cover. Reprint. Near fine copy (light damp stain along bottom edge) in lightly shelf worn dust jacket (in mylar).
Christensen, Paul. Minding the Underworld. Clayton Eshleman & Late Postmodernism. Santa Barbara. Black Sparrow Press. 1991. Unpaginated. Octavo. Pictorial soft cover. Fine copy.
Christie, Agatha, P.D. James, Graham Greene and others. London After Midnight. A Tour of Its Criminal Haunts. New York. Barnes & Noble. 1996. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Clarke, Arthur C. Cradle. A Novel. New York. Warner Books. 1988. 293 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Clarke, Arthur C. Cradle. A Novel. Photo available. New York. Warner. 1988. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Clarke, Arthur C. The Hammer of God. New York. Bantam. 1993. 226 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Clarke, Charles Cowden & Arthur Szyk. Geoffrey Chaucer. Tales from Chaucer. The Canterbury tales by Geoffrey Chaucer: Selected Tales Told for Young People. Photo available. New York. Heritage Press. 1947. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color by Arthur Szyk. Fine copy in near fine slip case.
Clemens, Saml. L. "Mark Twain". Col. Sellers. A Drama in Five Acts. Photo available. [Washington] [The Library of Congress] The Easton Press. nd. 4to. Gilt decorated hard cover. Facsimile edition. Important reference work. Scarce. Fine copy.
Clements, Susan. The Broken Hoop. Vol. 34, No. 3. Marvin. Blue Cloud Quarterly. 1988. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Fine copy.

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The right to make decisions regarding the design and placement of any markers, monuments, or other memorials on a grave in the plot. See Sherman v. Gray, 150 Me. 13, 102 A.2d 867 (1954).
The right to consent—or to withhold consent—to a subsequent interment in the same plot. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §711.0395.
The right to consent—or to withhold consent—to the disinterment of the remains buried on the plot. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §711.004(a).
The complete right of sepulture in the plot following a disinterment and removal of remains from the space.
Thus, whether an attorney is drafting a Last Will and Testament or a Transfer of Right of Sepulture, the attorney should include all burial property owned by the plot owner (or former plot owner, as the case may be)—both used and unused—in the instrument. This is just one more service that a savvy estate planning and probate attorney can offer his clients.
In 2013, the Texas Legislature began to regulate cemetery brokers. See Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., H.B. 52. The Act amends chapter 711, Health and Safety Code, by adding several new sections: §711.0381 (Sale or Resale of Plots by Certain Persons); §711.057 (Emergency Orders); §711.058 (Restitution); and §711.059 (Seizure of Accounts and Records). It also adds two entirely new subchapters: Subchapter C-1 (Cemetery Broker Registration), containing five new sections: §711.045 (Definitions); §711.046 (Cemetery Broker Registration); §711.047 (Exemptions); §711.048 (Complaints); and §711.049 (Termination of Registration), and Subchapter F (Powers and Duties of Department of Banking Relating to Cemetery Brokers), containing four new sections: §711.081 (Definitions); §711.082 (Administration; Fees); §711.083 (Records; Examination); and §711.084 (Examination Fee). Finally, the Act amends the following sections: §711.001; §711.012(a); §711.038; §711.052(a); §711.056(a).
Do you have a Will? My Estate Planning page provides a brief overview of various estate planning instruments as well as some considerations for why it is important to have a will.
Have you done estate planning in the past? It is a good idea to review your estate plan from time to time in view of possible changes in your financial holdings and value, in your family and estate, and in applicable tax, probate, and other laws.
If you would like more information please contact me or call my office to schedule an appointment.


The New York State Education Department’s (NYSED) Bureau of Proprietary School Supervision (BPSS) has the authority under Education Law § 5001 – § 5010, and 8 NYCRR §126.1 – § 126.18 of the Commissioner’s regulations, to grant or deny various forms of permission to private career schools and English as a Second Language (ESL) schools, and to the personnel thereof, including directors, agents, and teachers, as well as to grant or deny permission to use various school-related records, including enrollment agreements, catalogs, attendance registers, and other similar documents, or to conduct certain instructional activities by approving or denying proposed curriculum.
For example, the most basic form of permission that BPSS has the authority to grant or deny is a school license under Education Law § 5001, or an ESL school certification under 8 NYCRR § 126.10(j) of the Commissioner’s regulations, when application for such a license or certification has been made. Other types of permission that BPSS has the authority to grant or deny include allowing (or not) a school to operate in certain quarters (the school’s proposed physical location, classroom space, etc.), to use certain administrative forms in its day-to-day operations, and the like. Another type of permission that BPSS may grant or deny is a renewed school license when application for such a license has been made. BPSS may also grant or deny other permission to private career and ESL schools in other circumstances which are too numerous to be enumerated here.
If the appeal is not submitted within 30 calendar days of receipt of the determination sought to be appealed, then the appeal will be summarily denied as untimely. If the determination is delivered by email, then the date of its receipt will be the same as the date that the determination is sent.
Appeals must specify the factual determinations to which the appealing party objects, which underlie the larger determination being appealed, and must explain why those factual determinations should be modified or reversed, in whole or in part. A general statement by the appealing party expressing dissatisfaction with the determination being appealed, regardless of whether it is accompanied by a request to reverse that determination, will also be summarily denied. Appealing parties must, in other words, explain why the determination being appealed should be changed, and not simply claim that it should be changed.
Upon receipt of the materials submitted, BPSS will review them and issue a written determination addressed to the party that submitted the appeal. This writing shall constitute NYSED’s final decision of the matter appealed.
Others matters of equal magnitude, which are not identified in this Policy Guideline, may also be appealed subject to the reasonable discretion of the Director of BPSS.
Determinations that may be appealed do not include any matter subject to disciplinary action under Education Law § 5003.


On Friday, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited opinion in Carpenter v. United States. The Court held that when law enforcement obtains long-term cell site location information from a suspect’s service provider, it conducts a Fourth Amendment search that normally requires a warrant. Although the majority opinion states that it “is a narrow one,” the dissenting Justices and some scholars see it as a seismic shift that may have many aftershocks. I’ll summarize the case and then use former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s famous approach to address the “known knowns,” the “known unknowns,” and the “unknown unknowns” after Carpenter.
Facts. Carpenter was suspected of participating in a series of store robberies in Michigan and Ohio. The FBI sought and obtained two court orders requiring Carpenter’s cell phone service providers to produce records about Carpenter’s account, including cell site location information. One order covered 152 days, though for reasons not given in the opinion, the service provider only produced records for 127 days. The second order covered seven days, but the service provider only produced records for two days. The cell site location information put Carpenter in the vicinity of several robberies and became important evidence against him.
Procedural history. Carpenter moved to suppress the records, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records and in the location information that they revealed; that the FBI had therefore engaged in a search, for Fourth Amendment purposes, when agents obtained the records; and that the agents had acted without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement and so had violated the Fourth Amendment. It is important to note that the agents had obtained the orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which allows investigators to get a court order for telecommunication records when they can provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” The “specific and articulable facts” standard is something like reasonable suspicion, so it’s less than probable cause and the orders weren’t the functional equivalent of a warrant.
The trial court denied Carpenter’s motion. He went to trial, was convicted, was sentenced to over 100 years in prison, and appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell site location information because he had shared that information with the service providers in the course of using his phone. In other words, the third party doctrine applied to cell site location information just as the Supreme Court has ruled that it applies to bank records, see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and pen register information, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Several other federal courts of appeals had decided similar cases in similar ways. Carpenter sought and obtained Supreme Court review.
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search.
Because accessing CSLI is a search, the majority concluded, law enforcement needs a warrant, or an exception to the warrant requirement, to collect it. The FBI didn’t have one, so it violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit, presumably to consider questions like whether suppression is an appropriate remedy given that the officers acted in conformity with then-existing case law and the pertinent federal statute.
Dissents. The four dissenting Justices each produced a dissent. Justice Kennedy focused mainly on the third-party doctrine, arguing that the records were the providers’ business records and that Carpenter therefore had no expectation of privacy in them. Justice Thomas argued that the entire “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In his view, the proper analysis would focus on whether officers invaded any property interest in Carpenter’s “papers” or “effects,” which he thought plain that they did not. Justice Alito, among other points, contended that obtaining documents using compulsory process — namely, a court order requiring the service provider to produce certain records — rather than by officers’ own rummaging and inspection is not a “search.” Justice Gorsuch wrote a rather informal and conversational opinion, generally endorsing the idea that the Fourth Amendment requires a property-based, not privacy-based, analysis. Together, the opinions cover 119 pages and made for an interesting weekend of reading.
Known knowns. A few impacts of the Court’s decision are plain.
Obtaining long term, historical CSLI is a search and requires a warrant unless an exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, exists. This effectively reverses State v. Perry, 243 N.C.App. 156 (2015).
Obtaining financial records and pen register information from third party institutions like banks and service providers remains covered by the third-party doctrine and is not a search. The majority is clear that the third-party doctrine survives, and that Smith and Miller continue to govern, at a bare minimum, the types of information at issue in each of those cases.
What about short-term historical CSLI? Footnote three of the majority opinion observes that the Court “need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” Future cases involving shorter time periods may present the issue that the Court sidestepped.
What about real-time CSLI? The majority likewise expressly declined to offer any opinion about whether the real-time collection of CSLI constitutes a search.
Finally, what about “tower dumps”? Again, the majority refused to express a view regarding this technique, which provides a snapshot of all the cell phones that connected to a given tower within a specific window of time, usually the time that a particular crime took place.
A cautious officer seeking any of these sorts of information may wish to do so using a warrant or the functional equivalent, such as a court order based on full probable cause. Indeed, my impression is that most agencies in North Carolina are already following this practice. Similarly, a defendant in any case involving information of this kind may wish to assert a Fourth Amendment claim if the information was obtained under a lower standard than probable cause.
[T]he Court’s holding is premised on cell-site records being a “distinct category of information” from other business records. But the Court does not explain what makes something a distinct category of information. Whether credit card records are distinct from bank records; whether payment records from digital wallet applications are distinct from either; whether the electronic bank records available today are distinct from the paper and microfilm records at issue in Miller; or whether cell-phone call records are distinct from the home-phone call records at issue in Smith, are just a few of the difficult questions that require answers.
Records of an individual’s search and browsing histories and social media interactions. These arguably constitute something akin to an individual’s online “location” and they have the potential to reveal a great deal of personal information.
Medical and genetic records pertaining to an individual. Sometimes these will be protected by the physician-patient privilege, but not always — Justice Gorsuch’s opinion offers the example of a person’s DNA profile on 23andme.
Photographs and videos stored on third-party servers. These files often reveal private moments, and may contain metadata indicating the time and location at which they were captured. Thus, a sufficiently extensive photo stream may allow investigators to, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “retrospective[ly] . . . access . . . a category of information otherwise unknowable” and “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts” and even activities.
Data collected through license plate readers, pole-mounted cameras, persistent aerial surveillance, and similar techniques. Although the majority notes that it does not “call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,” future litigants are likely to call those techniques into question. And while the short-term use of a single tool may not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, perhaps a tipping point can be reached beyond which the collective impact of multiple surveillance approaches constitutes a search.
Data collected by data brokers, private companies that aggregate data from myriad sources to come up with comprehensive pictures of individuals’ demographics and preferences. If some of the news stories about data brokers are accurate, these companies have amazingly detailed information. Could it be a “search” for an officer to access a suspect’s profile or dossier?
Further reading. Professor Orin Kerr is the leading scholar in this area, and various articles of his were cited in four of the five opinions. He’s blogging about the case at the Volokh Conspiracy. His first post is here. Jessie Smith’s preview of the case is in this prior post.
Further discussion. I would love to hear others’ perspectives on this case and its implications. Please share your view in the comments — or send me an email directly if you prefer.


A.R.A. MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Dewey L. PIERCE and Rosamond S. Pierce, husband and wife, and Arctic Automotive Air Conditioning Company, Inc., a corporation, Appellees.
No. 6428.Supreme Court of Arizona.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Pima County, Renz L. Jennings, J.
Conner Jones, and A.O. Johnson, Tucson, for appellant.
May, Lesher Dees, and Robert O. Lesher, Tucson, for appellees.
This is an action to recover damages for breach of a contract of exclusive distributorship. It arose by way of a counterclaim by appellees to a claim for moneys owing asserted by appellant (the validity of which was admitted at the trial), and comes to us on appeal from a judgment upon a jury verdict for appellees on their counterclaim.
Appellant, a manufacturer of automobile air conditioning units, conceded that, by written contract, it had granted to appellee Arctic an exclusive distributorship for the sale of appellant’s product in the State of Arizona, effective from March 16 to December 14, 1955; and that on or about July 25, 1955, it mailed to dealers in Arizona, customers or prospective customers of Arctic, an “announcement” that “With the increasing demand brought on by competitive advertising of low prices for less effective units to the public, A.R.A. has decided to place its dealers in a strictly competitive position with such units pricewise,” enclosing “revised prices” to dealers which, in fact, were the prices at which sales were made to Arctic. Appellant assigns as error: (1) the ruling of the trial court that it had breached the contract as a matter of law, relying on proof or offer of proof that the mailing to Arizona dealers was a mistake, that it never sold (and, by implication, that it never meant to offer to sell) to Arizona dealers, but only to Texas and Oklahoma dealers, and that it corrected its mistake by a “Bulletin” dated August 2, 1955, stating that the new prices “were mailed to yo in error and are not effective in the territory of Arizona”; (2) instructions concerning the computation of damages; (3) miscellaneous rulings related to the foregoing; and (4) failure to grant a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. We find none of the assignments meritorious.
Thereafter, Bowyer did no business with Arctic “Until he [Pierce] got the price right,” reducing the price per unit from about $535 to $465. In the circumstances, we do not think it was error to rule that the apparent tendency of appellant’s conduct “to defeat the essential purpose of the parties” made it a material breach as a matter of law. See Helgar Corp. v. Warner’s Features, Inc., 222 N.Y. 449, 453-454, 119 N.E. 113, 114; F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, 3 Cir., 15 F.2d 1003, 1005; Crane v. Colonial Holding Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 316, 319.
stand up under evidence,” was elicited by appellant itself on cross-examination, pressing for “any evidence either direct or indirect” on the subject, and adds little, if any, appeal to appellant’s contention in that regard.
We turn now to appellant’s assignments concerning damages.
Second, appellant argues that the jury was erroneously instructed to award duplicate recovery. The court’s basic instruction with respect to damages was that, if appellees suffered actual damage as a direct and proximate result of the breach of contract, a verdict should be returned “in an amount which will compensate them fairly for such damages as they have suffered as a direct result of the breach of contract and which should have reasonably [have] been foreseen by the parties.” No other guidance was given the jury as to what elements might be considered in computing damages, except that it was told not to consider expenses incurred prior to March 16, 1955, salesmen’s salaries or commissions and advertising or other promotional expenses except to the extent that such expenses benefitted appellant. Appellant complains that the trial judge refused to instruct that the jury should not consider any loss of profits, any loss of inventory value, or, in effect, any promotional expense.
recover for “gains prevented,” appellees were entitled to have the jury consider any loss of profits shown, or, alternatively, any loss in inventory value. Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734; McNutt Oil Refining Co. v. D’Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966. To recover for an additional “loss” inflicted, appellees were entitled to have the jury consider any promotional expenditures which, as a result of appellant’s breach, were wasted. See L. Albert Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 2 Cir., 178 F.2d 182; A.L.I., Restatement of Contracts § 333; 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1031; 5 Williston, Contracts § 1363A (Rev.Ed.). While the subject is not free from difficulty, see Standard Machinery Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 1 Cir., 208 F.2d 61, 63-64, such additional recovery, when justified, may be understood as similar to damages for destruction of good will. Cf. L. Albert Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., supra; Allen v. Elliott Reynolds Motor Co., 33 Tenn. App. 179, 230 S.W.2d 418. Moreover, in cautioning that, “as to those [promotional] expenses, if any, * * * which inure to the benefit of both parties, you should make a fair apportionment,” the trial court may have adopted yet another acceptable point of view — that appellees were entitled to restitution for any benefit conferred on appellant. From whatever point of view, it was not error to refuse appellant’s requested instructions, which, it may be noted, would have prevented any recovery by any practical means of measurement; and the jury was not misled to award double recovery.
262 P. 609; Murphy v. Thompson, 70 Ariz. 250, 219 P.2d 334.
All other assignments of error have been considered and are disposed of by what is said hereinabove.
PHELPS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, UDALL and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.


text:
Kaplan, Fred. The Singular Mark Twain. A Biography. Photo available. New York. Doubleday. 2003. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Fred. The Singular Mark Twain. A Biography. Photo available. New York. Doubleday. 2003. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Justin. Mark Twain and His World. Photo available. New York. Simon and Schuster. 1974. 224 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Justin. Mark Twain and His World. Photo available. New York. Simon and Schuster. 1974. 224 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine (small blemish on front end paper from paper label) copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Justin. Walt Whitman. A Life. Photo available. New York. Simon & Schuster. 1980. 432 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Marshall H. Space Shuttle. America's Wings to the Future. Photo available. Fallbrook. Aero Publishers. 1978. 215 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Marshall H., Ph.D. Space Shuttle. America's Wings to the Future. Photo available. Fallbrook. Aero. 1978. 215 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy (owner notes on end paper and title page).
Kaplan, Philip & Jack Currie. Round the Clock. The Experience of the Allied Bomber Crews Who Flew by Day and Night from England in the Second World War. Photo available. London. Cassell. 1993. 234 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Kaplan, Philip. Little Friends. The Fighter Pilot Experience in World War II England. Photo available. New York. Random House. 1991. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Philip. One Last Look. A Sentimental Journey to the Eighth Air Force Heavy Bomber Bases of World War II in England. Photo available. New York. Abbeville. 1983. 216 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy (owner blind stamp, small gift note) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Philip. The Few. Summer 1940, The Battle of Britain. Photo available. New York. Orion. 2002. 4to. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Philip. Wolfpack. U-Boats at War. 1939-1945. Photo available. London. Aurum. 1999. 4to. Soft cover. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy (very slightly warped).
Kaplan, Robert D. Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts. The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground. Photo available. New York. Random House. 2007. 428 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Robert. The Nothing that Is. A Natural History of Zero. Photo available. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1999. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaposi, Dr. Moriz. Pathology and Treatment of Diseases of The Skin. Photo available. Birmingham. The Classics of Medicine Library. 1985 . Octavo. Full leather. Gilt decorated hard cover. All edges gilt. Marbled end papers. First edition thus. Limited edition, number 1957. Related material laid in. Fine, beautiful copy.
Kapp, Leon and Hiroko. The Craft of the Japanese Sword. Photo available. Tokyo. Kodansha International. 1987. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Karady, Jennifer. In Country. Soldiers' Stories from Iraq and Afghanistan. Photo available. Palm Springs. Palm Springs Art Museum. 2014. 65 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. ir Important reference work. Fine copy.
Karageorghis, Vassos. Ancient Art from Cyprus. The Cesnola Collection in The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photo available. New York. Harry N. Abrams. Metropolitan Museum of Art. 2000. 305 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Karam, Duane. Southern Pacific Consolidation 2-8-0. Pictorial Album Series Volume 3. Photo available. Rialto. Monte Vista. 1998. 72 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Karas, Nicholas. The Complete Book of the Striped Bass. Photo available. New York. Winchester. 1974. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine (owner inscription on end paper) copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Karch, Steven B. (ed). Workplace Drug Testing. Photo available. Boca Raton. CRC Press. 2008. 196 pps. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Karcher, Eva. Otto Dix. 1891-1969. Photo available. Koln. Taschen. 1992. 216 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Karen, Ruth. Song of the Quail. The Wondrous World of The Maya. Photo available. New York. Four Winds. 1972. 222 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Karkel, Dean F. The Saga of Tom Horn. The Story of a Cattlemen's War. Photo available. Lincoln. University of Nebraska Press. 1988. 274 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy (small nick on cover edge).
Karl, Allan. Forks. Inscribed by the author. A Quest for Culture, Cuisine and Connections. Three Years, Five Continents, One Motorcycle. Photo available. Leucadia. WorldRider. 2014. 264 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Full number line. Kickstarter edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Inscribed by the author "Enjoy the ride - and the Adventure! Allan Karl". Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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