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(1) That, the plaintiff having abandoned her suit in the district court, it was too late to move to dismiss the appeal.
(2) That the decree, not having been pleaded in the state court, could not now be resuscitated.
(3) That the judgment of the state court was res adjudicata of all the issues between the parties, and that the decrees of the circuit court and circuit court of appeals reversing the decree of the district court and dismissing plaintiff's bill should be affirmed.
the bill, the bill being amended by a new prayer that the defendants make, execute, and deliver to the plaintiff a deed for the property in question.
The case was heard upon pleadings and proofs, and on June 26, 1879, a decree was rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring her to be the equitable owner of the land in suit; that defendant Cambell was chargeable with notice of her rights, and was bound to convey according to the prayer of the bill. An appeal was immediately taken by Arthurs and Campbell to the circuit court, where the case was docketed August 30, 1879. Here, the case rested, without further action, for sixteen years, and until December 20, 1895.
Meantime, however, and in February, 1880, Jane Bryar and her husband in her right began an action of ejectment in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against Thomas Campbell, John W. Beckett, and William B. Rodgers, for the land in controversy, which resulted, May 19, 1881, in a verdict for the defendants, and a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which, on November 14, 1881, affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas. 30 Pitts.Legal Jour. 12.
for any further proceedings upon the appeal, and that he and his vendees had ever since been in undisputed possession of the land. The motion to dismiss the bill, or rather to declare the appeal deserted, was denied, and the death of the plaintiff Jane Bryar being suggested, it was ordered that her heirs at law, the appellants, be substituted as plaintiffs.
The appeal subsequently went to a hearing in the circuit court upon the former testimony, and new testimony put in by Campbell in support of his answer, and resulted in a reversal of the district court, and a dismissal of the bill. Plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which affirmed the decree of the circuit court, 62 U.S.App. 435, whereupon plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
Plaintiffs ask for a reversal of this decree upon the grounds, first, that the appeal from the district court to the circuit court in bankruptcy was not claimed and notice given to the clerk of the district court within the time prescribed by the rules, and second because it affirmed the decree of the circuit court upon its merits.
It appears that the decree of the district court was entered June 26, 1879, and that a petition for an appeal was addressed to the judge of the circuit court, the jurat to which was dated June 28, and on June 30 a bond for costs on appeal was filed. The appeal, however, to the circuit court was not allowed and filed until July 16, twenty days after the decree of the district court, and it does not appear that any notice was given to the clerk of the district court, or to the defeated party, as required by sec. 4981; but it further appears that the petition for appeal, the allowance thereof, a copy of the docket entries and a bond for costs were filed in the circuit court, August 30, 1879. Here the matter rested until December 20, 1895, when Mrs. Bryar, the prevailing party, moved the circuit court not to dismiss the appeal for the reason that it was not taken in time, but, stating that it had been "duly allowed," to obtain an order declaring it deserted, for the reason that the appellants had failed to bring up the record from the district court, pay the entry costs, or prosecute their appeal. This was apparently treated as a motion to dismiss, and was denied. After a lapse of sixteen years, it is now too late to ask this Court to hold that the appeal should have been dismissed for a reason which does not seem to have been called to the attention of the circuit court when the original motion was made to declare the appeal deserted. If the plaintiffs in that case had intended to insist upon their rights under the decree, they should either have moved to dismiss the appeal within a reasonable time or pressed it to a hearing in the circuit court, instead of abandoning it and bringing a new suit upon the same cause of action in the state court.
1874 by James Bryar, namely, one to Thomas McClintock for $3,000, the other to E. R. James for $2,000, which mortgages were, in 1878, foreclosed and judgment entered. In the opinion of the supreme court of the state, it is stated that William R. Rodgers, one of the defendants in the ejectment action, as the attorney for Campbell, purchased the judgments obtained upon the mortgages, issued execution, sold the seven acres at sheriff's sale, and bought the same for $50. A deed was made by the sheriff to Rodgers, who gave a memorandum to Campbell, stating that he would convey to anyone Campbell might wish when requested so to do. It was not disputed that Rodgers bought and held in trust for Campbell whatever title he obtained by the sheriff's deed.
Upon this state of facts, the court held that the mortgages were valid liens, and the fact that the mortgagees were entirely unaffected by any notice of the secret equity of Mrs. Bryar being undisputed, it necessarily followed that, whether Campbell had notice of not, he stood in their shoes when he purchased the title derived from them.
"It is contended, however, that Campbell having bought at the assignee's sale subject to these mortgages, was bound to pay them off, and when he did so, they were extinguished. But unless he expressly or by necessary implication agreed to pay them, he was not bound to do so, and had an undoubted right to secure his own title by purchasing them and proceeding to perfect his title under them."
It will be seen from this that Campbell did not rely upon his purchase at the assignee's sale, as to which the district court seems to have held that he had notice of Mrs. Bryar's equity in the premises, but upon the purchase of the rights of the mortgagees, who appear to have taken the mortgages, supposing the property to belong to James Bryar, in whose name it stood upon the record.
We are advised of no substantial reason why the judgment of the state court does not operate as res judicata in this case. The original suit in the district court was begun by Mrs. Bryar, one of the original plaintiffs in the ejectment suit, for the purpose of compelling the defendant Thomas Campbell to convey to her as the equitable owner thereof the premises now in dispute.
The ejectment suit was begun by her and her husband, in her right, upon the same title against three defendants, one of whom was Campbell, to obtain possession of the same property. The action was brought by Mrs. Bryar upon her equitable title, a procedure allowable in the courts of Pennsylvania, where an equitable ejectment is the full equivalent of and substitute for a bill in equity. Peterman v. Huling, 31 Pa. 432; Winpenny v. Winpenny, 92 Pa. 440. Such procedure, though not authorized by the practice of the federal courts, will be respected when the question arises upon the effect to be given the judgment. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 36; Faber v. Hovey, 117 Mass. 107. While it appears from the opinion of the supreme court of the state that the decree of the district court was called to its attention, it was not set up as a bar to the ejectment in the state court for the obvious reason that Mrs. Bryar had abandoned it by bringing suit in the state court, and there was no object in pleading it, while Campbell did not plead it because it was adverse to him. It would seem too that under the practice in Pennsylvania, a decree cannot be used as res judicata pending an appeal to a higher court. Souter v. Baymore, 7 Pa. 415. He could not even plead the pendency of the former suit. Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, 93 U. S. 554.
the issues made by the parties, and as neither party saw fit to set up the former decree as a bar to the action, the state court was not bound to notice it. It did not affect in any way the jurisdiction of that court. In addition to this, however, Campbell relied upon a wholly different defense from that set up by him in the former suit, and one which had accrued to him after the decree in that court was rendered. Whether the decree, if properly pleaded, would have operated as a bar it is unnecessary to determine. As the same issues are presented here as were presented in the state court, it is entirely clear that they cannot be relitigated.

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Present: JACOBS, KAPLAN, & DUFFLY, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 3, 1996.
The case was heard by Martha B. Sosman, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
John W. Giorgio & Christopher J. Pollart, for the defendant, submitted a brief.
JACOBS, J. The board of health of Everett (board) appeals from a Superior Court judgment ordering it to issue a site assignment requested by Wood Waste of Boston, Inc. (Wood Waste), under G. L. c. 111, s. 150A. We affirm.
separation of the construction and demolition materials and transportation to other sites for disposal. No materials are disposed of on the Everett site. The record indicates that Wood Waste proposed to construct buildings on the site so as to enclose its operations, including temporary storage of materials, and, as noted by the judge, did not plan to expand either the types or volume of wastes handled at the facility. Simultaneously with its application, Wood Waste negotiated with DEP for an administrative consent order, which was issued in 1995, and under which Wood Waste has been allowed to continue its operations pending issuance or denial of site assignment and required permits. Prior to issuing that order, DEP reported that Wood Waste's application met the statutory and regulatory site suitability criteria under s. 150A 1/2 [Note 2]. After receiving the DEP report, the board held a public hearing. At the conclusion of its review, the board, in April, 1996, denied the application. Wood Waste appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, s. 14. A Superior Court judge, acting on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, allowed that of Wood Waste, essentially concluding that the board had failed to apply the statutory standard of review, and had improperly denied Wood Waste's application.
amended by St. 1987, c. 584, s. 16, provides that an applicant "desiring to maintain or operate a site for a new [solid waste] facility or the expansion of an existing facility" shall submit an application for site assignment to the local board of health and simultaneously provide copies to the DEP, the Commonwealth's Department of Public Health (DPH), and to the board of health of any municipality within one-half mile of the proposed site. Within sixty days the DEP must issue a report stating whether the proposed site meets the criteria established under s. 150A 1/2, and the DPH must comment on any potential impact of the site on public health and safety. If the DEP affirms in its report that the siting criteria in s. 150A 1/2 have been met, the local board must hold a public hearing within thirty days of receipt of the DEP's report, and render its decision within forty-five days of the initial hearing date [Note 3]. Any person aggrieved may appeal a board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, s. 14 [Note 4]. An applicant receiving a site assignment must subsequently obtain a permit from the DEP for the construction and operation of the facility after review of detailed operating plans and specifications.
Discussion. The board in this case principally based its denial of the application on the ground that Wood Waste failed to submit adequate information from which the board could evaluate whether certain of the siting criteria were met [Note 5]. It argues the judge erroneously concluded it was without discretion to deny the application on such a ground.
more information in order to make a detennination of site suitability, "is not a 'finding' . . . and is thus not a basis on which an application may be denied."
The board also made either implicit or express findings of danger with respect to the criteria on air quality, size of the site, and traffic impacts. After a detailed review of the record, the judge correctly concluded the board's findings of danger [Note 8] to public health, safety, or the environment were either not supported in the record or were based upon factors to be considered in a later design and operations review procedured [Note 9].
was presented with a substantial record prior to the deadline for its decision [Note 10], and had an opportunity to comment on its completeness and substance [Note 11]. It selected and engaged an expert to review the application and report its analysis and conclusions to the board [Note 12]. If the board believed the evidence before it at the hearing to be lacking, it could have requested that the hearing officer ask Wood Waste to provide further evidence [Note 13]. See TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, 431 Mass. 9 , 13-14 (2000). An environmental impact review record, established in conformity with the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), was available to the board [Note 14]. Finally, the board received the report of the DEP which determined the application met the site suitability criteria. There is no indication in the record that the board questioned the completeness of the application, or made any requests to Wood Waste for further data or information prior to its decision [Note 15].
The judge properly evaluated the record before the board as established through the public hearing and certified to her, and correctly stated that the DEP decision was to be given no particular weight [Note 16]. Unlike the DEP, a local board of health does not have the benefit of regulatory language expressly permitting it to deny an application based on a determination that it did not contain sufficient information. The board's request for further information in this case essentially ignores a record that adequately addressed each of the relevant criteria, and as the judge concluded, that record does not support findings of public danger.
While a local board of health is limited in the time in which it must make a decision, it receives an application at the same time as the DEP, and has ample opportunity to marshal the resources to conduct its review and ascertain any areas of concern where it may require further information from an applicant. Where, as in this case, the record, without the additional studies requested post-hearing by the board, is adequate for a determination under s. 150A, those requests have no validity.
The present case is unlike TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, supra at 14 [Note 17], where the denial of the application resulted from an applicant's failure to respond adequately during the local board's hearing to a challenge to its ability to comply with a site suitability criterion. Here the board, rather than seeking additional evidence from Wood Waste or through its own resources during the application process, impermissibly rested its decision on a purported insufficiency of information [Note 18].
Conclusion. General Laws c. 111, s. 150A, requires a board, after review, to issue a site assignment unless it makes a finding that the siting would constitute a danger to the public health or safety or the environment. That finding must be supported in the record before it, and where such support is lacking, a reviewing court may, as provided in G. L. c. 30A, s. 14(7), as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, s. 3, either remand the case for further proceedings before the board, or "compel any action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced" by an unlawful or erroneous board decision. We agree with the judge that the appropriate remedy in this case is to order the issuance of the site assignment. Compare Cohen v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 350 Mass. 246 , 253 (1966). As we have noted, the board has made no claim that it was not provided with an adequate opportunity for review, or that the statutory and regulatory procedures were inadequate, or that it was unable to marshal appropriate resources properly to review Wood Waste's application.
The board erroneously asserts that the judge's order compelling it to issue the site assignment is contrary to the board's regulatory authority to attach reasonable conditions to protect the public from threats of danger from operations at the site. Absent record evidence before the board reasonably supporting specific concerns for the environment or the health or safety of the public, a remand for the imposition of conditions is unwarranted. The judge correctly noted the site assignment in this case is "merely an interim step in a lengthy and detailed administrative process." In the circumstances of a local board's unsupported claim of insufficient information, and of danger to the public, a remand would constitute an unjustified interruption of a carefully designed and comprehensive legislative and regulatory process.
"Upon determination that the operation or maintenance of a facility results in a threat to the public health and safety or the environment, such site assignment decision by a board of health may be rescinded or suspended or may be modified through the imposition or amendment of conditions, at any time after due notice and public hearing satisfying the requirements of section eleven of chapter thirty A by the board of health of the city or town where such facility is located or by the [DEP]."
G. L. c. 111, s. 150A, as amended by St. 1987, c. 584, s. 16.
Accordingly, we conclude the judge did not err by reversing the board's decision and ordering it to issue the site assignment requested by Wood Waste.
[Note 1] "In response to a shortage of solid waste facilities in the Commonwealth in the mid-1980's, the Legislature amended [s. 150A]." TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, 431 Mass. 9 , 11 (2000). See St. 1987, c. 584, s. 16. The amendment significantly changed the process for assignment of sites for solid waste facilities. The sole approval authority previously vested in local boards was replaced with a two-step process in which the Department of Environmental Protection and the local board independently must find that the proposed siting meets specific criteria designed to protect the public and the environment. Those criteria are set forth in s. 150A 1/2. Although various amendments have been made in s.s. 150A and 150A 1/2, and the regulations thereunder, since the time of Wood Waste's application, no claim is made, nor do we discern, that those changes are of significance to this decision.
[Note 2] General Laws c. 111, s. 150A 1/2, authorizes the DEP, in cooperation with the Department of Public Health, to promulgate rules and regulations to establish site suitability standards and criteria for siting of facilities, setting forth seventeen areas of potential impact on public health, safety, and the environment which must be considered by the DEP and a local board in a siting decision.
[Note 3] The regulations generally define site assignment as "a determination by a board of health or by the [DEP] ... that: (a) designates an area of land for one or more solid waste uses subject to conditions with respect to the extent, character and nature of the facility that may be imposed by the assigning agency after a public hearing 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.02 (1992).
[Note 4] A local board of health is declared by s. 150A a state agency for appellate purposes. Among the limitations placed on agency decisions by G. L. c. 30A, s. 14(7), are that they must not be in excess of statutory authority or based on error of law, and must be based on substantial evidence.
[Note 5] The board determined that the information accompanying Wood Waste's application was deficient with respect to four site suitability criteria. Incident to holding that the board's request for more information is not a "finding," the judge addressed each of these criteria and correctly found that the record did not support the board's conclusions that further information was required. We summarize the judge's conclusions and note the sections of the regulations at 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.40 (1992), applicable to the specific site suitability criteria in issue.
(1) Separation between site surface and groundwater. s. 16.40(3)(d)(5). The judge concluded that there was record evidence to show that groundwater was more than four to six feet below the site surface and no evidence to show that the required minimum distance of two feet in separation of groundwater from the site surface was violated or that a two-foot separation could not be maintained throughout the site.
(2) Traffic impacts. s. 16.40(4)(b). The judge determined that data from actual operations did not indicate any significant contribution to traffic volume in the site area, nor were any actual safety problems observed or reported; and the record would not support an affirmative finding of danger. The judge also concluded that the board's expert did not opine that a danger existed, only that additional traffic studies were required before he could give an opinion.
(3) Air quality. s. 16.40(4)(e). Because the major concern with Wood Waste's operations is dust, and it proposes to enclose its operations in buildings, it submitted information on the equipment and procedures it would use to control dust. The board's expert criticized operating and maintenance procedures, but no evidence was introduced tending to show that the proposed design or operating procedures were so inadequate as to result in an anticipated failure to meet air quality standards. Thus, the record did not support an affirmative finding of a siting problem requiring further information. In any event, the judge noted this issue is one more properly addressed in the later design and operation permit procedures.
(4) Prior use of area for disposal. s. 16.40(4)(h). The judge concluded there was no record evidence indicating any prior contamination of the site that might adversely affect operations or that any such existing contamination would be disturbed by operations on the site. Accordingly, no further studies or information were required at this stage.
[Note 7] A board may "include in any decision to grant a site assignment such limitations with respect to the extent, character and nature of the facility or expansion thereof, as may be necessary to ensure that the facility or expansion thereof will not present a threat to the public health, safety or the environment." 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.20(12) (1992).
[Note 8] Danger is not defined in the statute or regulations. In any event, nothing in the present case turns on the meaning of that term.
site assignment consideration unless DEP (not the Board on its own) decides that such details are necessary at [this] stage," and that the DEP had not requested such details for Wood Waste's application. She nevertheless analyzed the record and implicitly determined that the board had not introduced evidence tending to rebut the presumption by showing that Wood Waste would later be unable to meet the applicable requirements.
As to issues concerning the size of the site, the judge correctly noted that "[t]here was no evidence that the current operation, which would be upgraded and enclosed but operating at the same volume under the new plan, had encountered size problems . . . and certainly no evidence that the size contraints would result in a danger to public health or safety." The board also purported to find a danger from the trucks awaiting entry to the site. As indicated by the judge, this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Any other site size issues were properly treeated by the judge as operational details to be addressed at a later stage of the statutory process.
While the board found that Wood Waste's site plan did not bear a stamp indicating it was prepared by a registered surveyor as required by regulation, the board does not rely on this ground in its brief. In any event, this alleged failing, while a proper basis for a request for resubmission of a conforming plan, is not sufficient as a ground for the board's rejection of the site application.
[Note 10] An applicant is required to use forms provided by the DEP and to provide "sufficient data and other relevant information to allow the Department and the board of health to determine, independent of additional information, whether the site is suitable." 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.08(5)(a) (1992).
[Note 11] It is open to a local board to comment to the DEP on the completeness of an application during a twenty-one day period after its submission. The DEP must issue a written determination of the completeness of an application, notifying the applicant and the local board. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. s. 16.10(2), (3) (1992).
[Note 12] Section 150A also provides that "[t]he [DEP] shall, upon request by the board of health, provide advice, guidance and technical assistance to said board during its review of a site assignment application. . . . The board of health may charge a reasonable application fee to cover the costs of conducting a hearing and reviewing technical data submitted to the board. The application fee may also include a portion of the reasonable costs of other technical assistance." G. L. c. 111, s. 150A, as amended by St. 1987, c. 584, s. 16.
[Note 13] Pursuant to 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.30(2)(e)(1) (1992), after commencement of the public hearing a board may assess an additional technical fee to enable it to obtain data critical to the determination of site suitability where an applicant has failed to provide the evidence after being requested by the hearing officer.
[Note 14] An applicant must demonstrate compliance with MEPA. 310 Code Mass. Regs. s. 16.08(5)(d) (1992). The Secretary of Environmental Affairs issued a certificate indicating that Wood Waste's final environmental impact report complied with the requirements of MEPA. The record before the board contains the final report.
[Note 15] There is no indication that any new information was submitted or requested at the public hearing. The board received testimony of the board's expert, and representatives of Wood Waste, all of whom were cross-examined, and the testimony of public officials, abutters, and citizens.
[Note 16] The determination of the DEP "is not binding on the local board which must make an independent determination whether the proposed site complies with the criteria [in s. 150A 1/2]. " TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, 431 Mass. at 11-12.
[Note 17] That decision was issued on March 10, 2000, and was not called to our attention after the board's brief was docketed in this court on July 22, 1999. The present case was submitted to the panel on February 12, 2001, on the board's brief. No brief has been filed by Wood Waste.
[Note 18] In TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, supra at 13, the local board at the public hearing received evidence that the proposed facility would not be in compliance with air quality standards, and shifted to TBI the burden "to produce evidence that it could comply." Although given an opportunity, TBI failed to "enumerate specific techniques likely to be feasible and effective." Id. at 14.

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G.R. No. 182295, June 26, 2013 - 7K CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EDDIE ALBARICO, Respondent.
7K CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EDDIE ALBARICO, Respondent.
On appeal by petitioner, the labor arbiter’s Decision was vacated by the NLRC for forum shopping on the part of respondent Albarico, because the NCMB arbitration case was still pending.9 The NLRC Decision, which explicitly stated that the dismissal was without prejudice to the pending NCMB arbitration case,10 became final after no appeal was taken.
The factual findings of the voluntary arbitrator, as well as of the CA, are not clear on what happened afterwards. Even the records are bereft of sufficient information.
On 18 November 2005, the NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a Decision finding petitioner corporation liable for illegal dismissal.15 The termination of respondent Albarico, by reason of alleged poor performance, was found invalid.16 The arbitrator explained that the promotions, increases in salary, and awards received by respondent belied the claim that the latter was performing poorly.17 It was also found that Albarico could not have abandoned his job, as the abandonment should have been clearly shown. Mere absence was not sufficient, according to the arbitrator, but must have been accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee did not want to work anymore. It was noted that, in the present case, the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against the employer, with a prayer for reinstatement, showed that the employee was not abandoning his work. The voluntary arbitrator also found that Albarico was dismissed from his work without due process.
However, it was found that reinstatement was no longer possible because of the strained relationship of the parties.18 Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, the voluntary arbitrator ordered the corporation to pay separation pay for two years at P4,456 for each year, or a total amount of P8,912.
Petitioner corporation subsequently appealed to the CA, imputing to the voluntary arbitrator grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for awarding backwages and attorney’s fees to respondent Albarico based on the former’s finding of illegal dismissal.21 The arbitrator contended that the issue of the legality of dismissal was not explicitly included in the Submission Agreement dated 19 April 1993 filed for voluntary arbitration and resolution. It prayed that the said awards be set aside, and that only separation pay of P8,912.00 and sales commission of P4,787.60 be awarded.
The issue before the Court is whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction to decide the issue of the legality of the dismissal of respondent as well as the latter’s entitlement to backwages, even if neither the legality nor the entitlement was expressedly claimed in the Submission Agreement of the parties.
The Petition is denied for being devoid of merit.
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters . . .
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in said agreement.
From the above discussion, it is clear that voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties, assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute such as the present case, contrary to the assertion of petitioner that they may not.
We now resolve the main issue. Petitioner argues that, assuming that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the present termination dispute, the latter should have limited his decision to the issue contained in the Submission Agreement of the parties – the issue of whether respondent Albarico was entitled to separation pay and to the sales commission the latter earned before being terminated.27 Petitioner asserts that under Article 262 of the Labor Code, the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator is strictly limited to the issues that the parties agree to submit. Thus, it contends that the voluntary arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction when he resolved the issues of the legality of the dismissal of respondent and the latter’s entitlement to backwages on the basis of a finding of illegal dismissal.
According to petitioner, the CA wrongly concluded that the issue of respondent’s entitlement to separation pay was necessarily based on his allegation of illegal dismissal, thereby making the issue of the legality of his dismissal implicitly submitted to the voluntary arbitrator for resolution.28 Petitioner argues that this was an erroneous conclusion, because separation pay may in fact be awarded even in circumstances in which there is no illegal dismissal.
We rule that although petitioner correctly contends that separation pay may in fact be awarded for reasons other than illegal dismissal, the circumstances of the instant case lead to no other conclusion than that the claim of respondent Albarico for separation pay was premised on his allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus, the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of the legality of his dismissal.
The above circumstances, however, do not obtain in the present case. There is no claim that the issue of entitlement to separation pay is being resolved in the context of any authorized cause of termination undertaken by petitioner corporation. Neither is there any allegation that a consideration of social justice is being resolved here. In fact, even in instances in which separation pay is awarded in consideration of social justice, the issue of the validity of the dismissal still needs to be resolved first. Only when there is already a finding of a valid dismissal for a just cause does the court then award separation pay for reason of social justice. The other circumstances when separation pay may be awarded are not present in this case.
The foregoing findings indisputably prove that the issue of separation pay emanates solely from respondent’s allegation of illegal dismissal. In fact, petitioner itself acknowledged the issue of illegal dismissal in its position paper submitted to the NCMB.
Moreover, we note that even the NLRC was of the understanding that the NCMB arbitration case sought to resolve the issue of the legality of the dismissal of the respondent. In fact, the identity of the issue of the legality of his dismissal, which was previously submitted to the NCMB, and later submitted to the NLRC, was the basis of the latter’s finding of forum shopping and the consequent dismissal of the case before it. In fact, petitioner also implicitly acknowledged this when it filed before the NLRC its Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. Thus, it is now estopped from claiming that the issue before the NCMB does not include the issue of the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Besides, there has to be a reason for deciding the issue of respondent’s entitlement to separation pay. To think otherwise would lead to absurdity, because the voluntary arbitrator would then be deciding that issue in a vacuum. The arbitrator would have no basis whatsoever for saying that Albarico was entitled to separation pay or not if the issue of the legality of respondent’s dismissal was not resolve first.
Hence, the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed that the core issue behind the issue of separation pay is the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Moreover, we have ruled in Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin33 that a voluntary arbitrator has plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret an agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority when the said agreement is vague — subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of Albarico was in fact necessarily – albeit not explicitly – included in the Submission Agreement signed by the parties, this Court rules that the voluntary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said issue.
In Sime Darby we ruled that although the specific issue presented by the parties to the voluntary arbitrator was only “the issue of performance bonus,” the latter had the authority to determine not only the issue of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted, but also the related question of the amount of the bonus, were it to be granted. We explained that there was no indication at all that the parties to the arbitration agreement had regarded “the issue of performance bonus” as a two-tiered issue, of which only one aspect was being submitted to arbitration. Thus, we held that the failure of the parties to limit the issues specifically to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over the related issue.
Similarly, in the present case, there is no indication that the issue of illegal dismissal should be treated as a two-tiered issue whereupon entitlement to backwages must be determined separately. Besides, “since arbitration is a final resort for the adjudication of disputes,” the voluntary arbitrator in the present case can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement.35 Thus, we rule that the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of entitlement of respondent Albarico to backwages on the basis of the former’s finding of illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 18 September 2007 Decision and 17 March 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92526, are hereby AFFIRMED.
35Ludo v. Saornido, 443 Phil. 554 (2003).


text:
Appeal - Decisions Reviewable - Moot Questions - Public Interest - In General. An appellate court may decide a moot case, I.E., one in which effective relief can no longer be provided, if the case raises issues of continuing and substantial public interest.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Due Process - Liberty Interest. The involuntary commitment of a person based on mental illness constitutes a significant deprivation of the person's liberty which must satisfy due process standards.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Gravely Disabled - Risk of Physical Harm. To commit a person involuntarily under the "gravely disabled" standard of RCW 71.05.020(1)(a), the State must show a substantial risk of danger of serious physical harm within the near future caused by a mental disorder which has resulted in the person's failure or inability to provide for essential health and safety needs. The neglect of essential human needs must be proved by recent, tangible evidence. The danger of physical harm need not be imminent or present and need not be proved by recent, overt acts.
 Statutes - Construction - Meaning of Words - Literal Meaning. A court will not give effect to the literal meaning of statutory language if to do so would be inconsistent with the Legislature's intent and would result in absurd and potentially harmful consequences.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Gravely Disabled - Deterioration of Functioning. To commit a person involuntarily under the "gravely disabled" standard of RCW 71.05.020(1)(b), the person's severe mental deterioration in routine functioning must be proved by recent evidence of significant loss of cognitive or volitional control. To prove that the person is not receiving or, if released, would not receive care that is essential for his health or safety, the State must show that the person is unable because of a mental disorder to make a rational decision regarding his need for treatment and that harmful consequences are likely to occur if the person is not committed. The fact that a person's condition has stabilized or improved at the time of the commitment hearing does not prevent his commitment.
 Evidence - Standard of Proof - Clear, Cogent, and Convincing - What Constitutes - Review. The clear, cogent, and convincing standard of proof is satisfied by evidence showing that the matter to be proved is highly probable. Appellate review of a finding made under this standard of proof is limited to determining if the finding is supported by substantial evidence which could reasonably be found to be clear, cogent, and convincing.
 Trial - Findings of Fact - Sufficiency. Findings of fact are insufficient if they fail to indicate the factual bases underlying the trial court's conclusions, thereby preventing meaningful review.
 Appeal - Findings of Fact - Resort to Oral Opinion. Inadequate written findings of fact do not necessitate a reversal of the judgment if the appellate court's review of the entire record, including that trial court's oral decision, reveals a sufficient factual basis for the judgment.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Due Process - Determination. The scope of safeguards which due process requires to be present at an involuntary civil commitment proceeding depends on a balancing of the detainee's interest in his liberty and reputation against the State's interest in caring for mentally ill persons and in protecting the public from dangerous persons.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Probable Cause Hearing - Standard of Proof - Validity. The preponderance of the evidence standard of proof required by RCW 71.05.240 at a probable cause hearing to commit a person involuntarily for up to 14 days does not violate the person's right to due process of law.
 Mental Health - Involuntary Commitment - Hearing - Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege. RCW 71.05.250, which provides for the waiver of the physician patient privilege under certain circumstances, applies at a hearing held pursuant to RCW 71.05.320 to extend a person's period of involuntary commitment for 180 days.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Utter and Dore, JJ., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
NATURE OF ACTION: In separate proceedings the State sought to have four persons involuntarily committed to state mental health facilities based on their being gravely disabled.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, Nos. 84-6 02083-5, 85-6-00896-5, 85-6-00584-2, 85-6-00296-7, Shannon Wetherall, Lloyd W. Bever, James D. McCutcheon, Jr., Herbert M. Stephens, and Jim Bates, JJ., on January 17, June 7, April 19, February 19, and July 25, 1985, entered orders committing appellants LaBelle, Marshall, and Richardson for 90 days, and appellant Trueblood for 14 days followed by 180 days of less restrictive treatment.
Supreme Court: Holding that the statutory criteria for determining when a person is "gravely disabled" are valid, that inadequate findings of fact did not prevent appellate review of the commitment orders, that the evidence sufficiently supported some, but not all, of the orders, that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for a 14-day commitment is valid, and that the physician patient privilege was waived at one of the hearings, the court AFFIRMS the orders committing appellants LaBelle and Marshall and the order committing appellant Trueblood for 14 days and REVERSES the order committing appellant Richardson and the order committing appellant Trueblood for 180 days.
COUNSEL: JOHN H. HERTOG, JR., GEORGE YEANNAKIS, and ANI VAJRA SAKYA of SEATTLE-KING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for appellant LaBelle.
JOHN H. HERTOG, JR., and JACQUELINE MCMURTRIE of SEATTLE-KING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for appellant Marshall.
JOHN H. HERTOG, JR., and JEAN RIETSCHEL of SEATTLE-KING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for appellant Richardson.
MARK W. MUENSTER of WASHINGTON APPELLATE DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for appellant Trueblood.
NORM MALENG, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, TERENCE D. HARRINGTON, SPECIAL DEPUTY, and GERALD A. SMITH, DEPUTY, for respondent.
MAJORITY OPINION: Appellants Thomas LaBelle, Maurice Marshall, Harold Richardson, and Gerald Trueblood appeal from separate orders involuntarily committing them for treatment of mental disorders under RCW 71.05 following hearings at which the trial court found them "gravely disabled". In these consolidated cases appellants challenge INTER ALIA the constitutionality of the gravely disabled standard for involuntary civil commitment and the sufficiency of the evidence thereunder. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Appellants LaBelle, Marshall, and Richardson in separate incidents were initially detained at the Highline Evaluation and Treatment Facility for 72-hour evaluation and treatment pursuant to the emergency custody procedures of RCW 71.05.150(2). In each case, a petition for 14-day involuntary treatment was filed, SEE RCW 71.05.230, and following a probable cause hearing held pursuant to RCW 71.05.240, the trial court ordered appellants detained for an additional 14 days of involuntary treatment (Richardson agreed to entry of the 14-day commitment order without a hearing). Thereafter, petitions were filed for an additional 90 days of involuntary treatment. In each case, a full hearing on the petition was held pursuant to RCW 71.05.310 at which the trial court found appellants to be gravely disabled and ordered LaBelle and Richardson committed to Western State Hospital for 90 days and Marshall to Highline Evaluation and Treatment Facility for 90 days. Appellants appeal from these 90-day commitment orders.
Appellant Trueblood appeals from two separate orders. He was also initially detained for 72-hour evaluation and treatment. Following a probable cause hearing, he was found to be gravely disabled and committed for an additional 14 days. Trueblood appeals from this order. He later agreed to entry of an order for continued involuntary treatment in a less restrictive (outpatient) setting for 90 days. A petition for an additional 180 days of less restrictive treatment was filed, and following a full hearing, the trial court found him to be gravely disabled and ordered 180 days of less restrictive treatment. Trueblood appeals from this order as well.
All of these cases were transferred to this court from the Court of Appeals and consolidated. Appellants raise a number of issues, some of which are common to all of the cases, others of which are not. We begin with the common issues.
 A preliminary issue concerns whether we should even reach the merits of these cases because of mootness. In all of the cases, the detentions which are the subject of this appeal have long since ended. Where, as here, we can no longer provide appellants effective relief, the cases are moot. SEE DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, 100 Wn.2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); IN RE CROSS, 99 Wn.2d 373, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).
Although these cases are technically moot, we may nevertheless decide them if they involve matters of continuing and substantial public interest. DUNNER, at 838. We have recognized that "the need to clarify the statutory scheme governing civil commitment is a matter of continuing and substantial public interest." DUNNER, at 838. There is a similar need for clarification here. Appellants raise issues of first impression concerning the gravely disabled standard of the civil commitment statutes, RCW 71.05. We will decide these cases on their merits.
Appellants contend that the "gravely disabled" standard for involuntary commitment is unconstitutionally vague. They also raise an overbreadth issue, although it is not denominated as such.
As constitutional doctrines, both vagueness and overbreadth challenges implicate due process concerns. The issue of vagueness involves the procedural due process requirements of fair notice of the conduct warranting detention and clear standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement by those charged with administering the applicable statutes. HONTZ v. STATE, 105 Wn.2d 302, 308, 714 P.2d 1176 (1986). Overbreadth is essentially a matter of substantive due process; it requires the judiciary to determine whether the statutory criteria provide a constitutionally adequate basis for detention. SEE IN RE HARRIS, 98 Wn.2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982).
 As appellants point out, involuntary commitment for mental disorders is a significant deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law. E.G., DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, SUPRA at 838; IN RE HARRIS, SUPRA. The United States Supreme Court has described involuntary commitment as "a massive curtailment of liberty." HUMPHREY v. CADY, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394, 92 S. Ct. 1048 (1972). Although it is clear that the State has a legitimate interest under its police and PARENS PATRIAE powers in protecting the community from the dangerously mentally ill and in providing care to those who are unable to care for themselves, it is also clear that mental illness alone is not a constitutionally adequate basis for involuntary commitment. SEE O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). CF. DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, SUPRA at 839. Thus, "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends." O'CONNOR, at 576.
With these principles in mind, we turn now to the challenged statutory provisions.
It is apparent that RCW 71.05.020(1) sets forth two alternative definitions of "gravely disabled", either of which provides a basis for involuntary commitment and both of which are challenged by petitioners. We hold that these commitment criteria, as construed below, are neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Appellants contend that the definition of gravely disabled found in subsection (a) of RCW 71.05.020(1) is unconstitutional unless it is construed to require an IMMINENT or PRESENT danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for essential health and safety needs. We do not agree.
 Our decision in IN RE HARRIS, SUPRA, is instructive in this regard. The petitioner in HARRIS challenged the constitutionality of the commitment criteria of RCW 71.05 that required the State to show that an individual presents "a likelihood of serious harm" to himself or others. In upholding the constitutionality of these commitment criteria we held that RCW 71.05's standard of dangerousness to self or others provides an adequate basis for involuntary commitment. HARRIS, at 284-85. We specifically rejected, however, a requirement that the danger of harm to oneself or others be "imminent." HARRIS, at 282. In so doing, we reasoned that "the practical effect of being placed in the hospital will usually eliminate the 'imminence' of one's dangerousness." HARRIS, at 284. A requirement of "imminence" would effectively invalidate commitment as soon as it occurs and would be inconsistent with the State's interest in confining those who pose a substantial risk of harm to themselves or others. HARRIS, at 284.
These same considerations apply here. Subsection (a) of RCW 71.05.020(1) requires the State to show that an individual, as a result of a mental disorder, is in danger of serious physical harm as a result of his or her failure to provide for essential health and safety needs. By the time the State files a petition for 14, 90 or 180 days of involuntary commitment under the gravely disabled standard, the individual will already have been detained in a hospital or treatment center for a period of time. The care and treatment received by the detained person in many cases will have lessened or eliminated the "imminence" of the danger of serious harm caused by that person's failure to provide for his essential health and safety needs. A requirement of "imminent" danger as a prerequisite to continued confinement could result in the premature release of mentally ill patients who are still unable to provide for their essential health and safety needs outside the confines of a hospital setting but who, because of their treatment there, are no longer in "imminent" danger of serious physical harm. The State's continuing interest in confining and treating such individuals would be frustrated by a requirement of "imminent" danger for all commitments.
This does not mean, however, that the State's burden of proving the risk of danger of serious harm is any less when proceeding under the "gravely disabled" standard as defined in RCW 71.05.020(1)(a) than when proceeding under the "danger to self or others" standard as construed in HARRIS. Under the latter standard, the danger to self or others usually arises from ACTIVE behavior as evidenced by "threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self", RCW 71.05.020(3)(a), or as shown by physical harm inflicted upon another or behavior which placed another "in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm," RCW 71.05.020(3)(b), whereas under the gravely disabled standard, the danger of harm usually arises from PASSIVE behavior - I.E., the failure or inability to provide for one's essential needs, RCW 71.05.020(1)(a). Under either standard, the potential for harm must be "'great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.'" HARRIS, at 283, quoting HUMPHREY v. CADY, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394, 92 S. Ct. 1048 (1972). In HARRIS, we held that the risk of danger to self or others must be substantial and the harm must be serious before involuntary commitment is justified. Similarly we construe the gravely disabled standard of RCW 71.05.020(1)(a) to require a showing of a substantial risk of danger of serious physical harm resulting from failure to provide for essential health and safety needs.
In so holding, we do not require, as we did in HARRIS, that the substantial risk of harm be evidenced by recent, overt acts. Such a requirement, which in HARRIS was deemed necessary to mitigate the problems inherent in accurately predicting dangerousness, has little relevance where, as here, any risk of danger arises primarily from passive neglect or inaction rather than from acts, attempts or threats of harm. Nonetheless, the nature of the inquiry under RCW 71.05.020(1)(a), which necessarily involves critical judgments concerning a person's ability to provide for his basic needs, is such that there is a danger of imposing majoritarian values on a person's chosen lifestyle which, although not sufficiently harmful to justify commitment, may be perceived by most of society as eccentric, substandard, or otherwise offensive. In order to avoid the erroneous commitment of such persons under the gravely disabled standard, the State must present recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment which presents a high probability of serious physical harm within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded. Furthermore, the failure or inability to provide for these essential needs must be shown to arise as a result of mental disorder and not because of other factors. So construed, the definition of "gravely disabled" set forth in RCW 71.05.020(1)(a) is neither vague nor overbroad.
The alternative definition of gravely disabled set forth in RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) contains two requirements. The State must show not only that a person "manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control", but also that he or she "is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety". RCW 71.05.020(1)(b). Petitioners contend that these commitment criteria are unconstitutional if not strictly construed so as to exclude those persons whose condition has stabilized or improved, even if minimally (I.E., is not "escalating"), by the time of the commitment hearing. We do not agree.
 As petitioners point out, where as here a significant deprivation of liberty is involved, statutes must be construed strictly. IN RE CROSS, 99 Wn.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). On the other hand, our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. STATE v. KELLER, 98 Wn.2d 725, 728, 657 P.2d 1384 (1983). In so doing, the spirit and intent of the law should prevail over the letter of the law. IN RE R., 97 Wn.2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704 (1982). Furthermore, we will construe a statute so as to avoid strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading. STATE v. KELLER, SUPRA.
The definition of gravely disabled in RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) was added by the Legislature in 1979. SEE Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 215, 5. It was intended to broaden the scope of the involuntary commitment standards in order to reach those persons in need of treatment for their mental disorders who did not fit within the existing, restrictive statutory criteria. SEE Washington State Legislature, FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1979, at 153. SEE GENERALLY Durham & LaFond, THE EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BROADENING THE STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 395 (1985). By incorporating the definition of "decompensation," which is the progressive deterioration of routine functioning supported by evidence of repeated or escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control of actions, RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) permits the State to treat involuntarily those discharged patients who, after a period of time in the community, drop out of therapy or stop taking their prescribed medication and exhibit "rapid deterioration in their ability to function independently." Durham & LaFond, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev., at 410.
Before passage of this expanded "gravely disabled" standard, these chronically ill persons could not be treated until they had decompensated to the point that they were in "danger of serious . . . harm" from their inability to care for themselves. SEE RCW 71.05.020(1)(a). The result is what has been described as the "revolving door" syndrome, in which patients often move from the hospital to dilapidated hotels or residences or even alleys, parks, vacant lots, and abandoned buildings, relapse, and are then rehospitalized, only to begin the cycle over again. SEE Rhoden, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, HOMELESSNESS, AND LIBERTARIAN THEORY, 31 Emory L.J. 375, 391 (1982); M. Hombs & M. Snyder, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 43 (1982). SEE GENERALLY Myers, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL: A SYSTEM IN NEED OF CHANGE, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 367 (1984). By permitting intervention before a mentally ill person's condition reaches crisis proportions, RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) enables the State to provide the kind of continuous care and treatment that could break the cycle and restore the individual to satisfactory functioning. Such intervention is consonant with one of the express legislative purposes of the involuntary treatment act, which is to "provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental disorders". RCW 71.05.010(4).
 A strict and literal reading of RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) as asserted by petitioners is inconsistent with these legislative purposes. It would also result in absurd and potentially harmful consequences, for a court would be required to release a person whose condition, as a result of the initial commitment, has stabilized or improved minimally - I.E., is not longer "escalating" - even though that person otherwise manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning and, if released, would not receive such care as is essential for his or her health or safety. Such consequences could not have been intended by the Legislature in enacting RCW 71.05.020(1)(b).
Nonetheless, the broadened commitment standard found in RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) raises serious constitutional concerns as to its application. There is a danger that persons will be involuntarily committed under this standard solely because they are suffering from mental illness and may benefit from treatment. Involuntary commitment on this basis alone is not supported by a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify such a significant deprivation of liberty. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "there is . . . no constitutional basis for confining . . . [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
In addition, because RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) incorporates medical terminology, a decision to commit under this standard may involve more a medical decision than a legal one. Note, CONSTITUTIONALIZING CIVIL COMMITMENT: ANOTHER ATTEMPT - IN RE HARRIS, 98 WN.2D 276, 654 P.2D 109 (1982), 59 Wash. L. Rev. 375, 397 (1984). Consequently, there is a danger that excessive judicial deference will be given to the opinions of mental health professionals, thereby effectively insulating their commitment recommendations from judicial review. SEE Durham & LaFond, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev., at 430-31.
Accordingly, when the State is proceeding under the gravely disabled standard of RCW 71.05.020(1)(b), it is particularly important that the evidence provide a factual basis for concluding that an individual "manifests severe [mental] deterioration in routine functioning". Such evidence must include recent proof of significant loss of cognitive or volitional control. In addition, the evidence must reveal a factual basis for concluding that the individual is not receiving or would not receive, if released, such care as is essential for his or her health or safety. It is not enough to show that care and treatment of an individual's mental illness would be preferred or beneficial or even in his best interests. To justify commitment, such care must be shown to be ESSENTIAL to an individual's health or safety and the evidence should indicate the harmful consequences likely to follow if involuntary treatment is not ordered.
Furthermore, the mere fact that an individual is mentally ill does not also mean that the person so affected is incapable of making a rational choice with respect to his or her need for treatment. Implicit in the definition of gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) is a requirement that the individual is UNABLE, because of severe deterioration of mental functioning, to make a rational decision with respect to his need for treatment. This requirement is necessary to ensure that a causal nexus exists between proof of "severe deterioration in routine functioning" and proof that the person so affected "is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety". So construed, RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
We turn now to the primary issue in this appeal - whether there was sufficient evidence in each of the cases to support the trial court's finding that appellants were gravely disabled.
 A threshold inquiry concerns the proper standard of review. The burden of proof at 90-day or 180-day involuntary commitment proceedings is by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, RCW 71.05.310, which means the ultimate fact in issue must be shown by evidence to be "highly probable." SEE IN RE PAWLING, 101 Wn.2d 392, 399, 679 P.2d 916 (1984); IN RE SEGO, 82 Wn.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). Generally, where the trial court has weighed the evidence, appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment. RIDGEVIEW PROPERTIES v. STARBUCK, 96 Wn.2d 716, 719, 638 P.2d 1231 (1982). However, where the State must prove its case by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the evidence must be more substantial than in the ordinary civil case in which proof need only be by a preponderance of the evidence, IN RE HALL, 99 Wn.2d 842, 849, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983); in other words, the findings must be supported by substantial evidence in light of the "highly probable" test. IN RE PAWLING, SUPRA at 399. Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court's findings of "grave disability" if supported by substantial evidence which the lower court could reasonably have found to be clear, cogent and convincing.
In all of the cases here, it is undisputed that appellants were suffering from a mental disorder. Thus, our inquiry is limited to determining whether, as a result of the disorder, appellants were gravely disabled as found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
In the LaBelle case, the State alleged and the trial court found that LaBelle was gravely disabled under the subsection (b) definition of RCW 71.05.020(1). The State's evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Stanley Mandell, a licensed clinical psychologist, who testified that in his opinion LaBelle suffers from a mental disorder and as a result manifests such severe deterioration of his ability to function on a routine level that, if released, he would not receive such care as is essential for his health or safety. Dr. Mandell's testimony was based upon his personal observations and interviews with LaBelle, psychological tests, discussions with staff members at the hospital, evidence from the prior 14- day probable cause hearing, and review of the medical records.
The unrebutted evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that LaBelle suffered from severe cognitive and functional impairment as evidenced by impaired memory loss, inability to respond appropriately to questions, and disorientation. Although there was evidence that LaBelle's condition had stabilized or improved slightly while in the hospital, the evidence also indicated that LaBelle's disorientation and mental impairment remained such that he was unaware of his surroundings much of the time.
The evidence also indicated that LaBelle would not receive such care as is essential for his health and safety if released. His deterioration was such that he lacked awareness of hygiene and routine care and was unable to form realistic plans for taking care of himself outside the hospital setting other than resuming a lifestyle of living on the streets without adequate food and shelter. Although uncertainty of living arrangements or lack of financial resources will not alone justify continued confinement in a mental hospital, the evidence here indicates that LaBelle's plans to live on the streets are not the result of a choice of lifestyle but rather a result of his deteriorated condition which rendered him unable to make a rational choice with respect to his ability to care for his essential needs. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's finding of "gravely disabled" was supported by substantial evidence of a clear and convincing nature.
In the Marshall case, the State alleged grave disability under the definition in RCW 71.05.020(1)(b). As in LaBelle's case, the State's evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Mandell.
Dr. Mandell's testimony was based upon two personal interviews with Marshall, the affidavit of a mental health worker at the King County Jail, and Marshall's medical records, which showed six to seven prior hospitalizations. Dr. Mandell testified that Marshall suffered from a mental disorder of a chronic and substantial nature. He indicated that Marshall suffers from hallucinations, delusions, confusion and disorganization, but that his condition had stabilized because of the medication administered at the hospital.
Dr. Mandell also testified that Marshall reacts to situations with paranoia and hostility and tends to see people as doing harm to him. This testimony is based in part on Marshall's statements to him concerning a recent incident just prior to his hospitalization in which he had been arrested and jailed for assaulting a bartender whom he thought was reaching for a gun. There was also evidence of prior arrests for violent behavior. Dr. Mandell described a recent evaluation by a mental health worker a few days after Marshall's most recent arrest and just prior to his hospitalization in the following terms: "decompensated, disorganized, confused, significant latency in his speech, responding to internal stimuli, speaking in gibberish, poor insight into his condition and refusal for psychiatric treatment." Mental Illness Hearing, at 6 (June 7, 1985).
Doctor Mandell's opinion that Marshall was unable to provide for his essential health and safety needs was based in part on Marshall's statements to him that when out of food and money or a place to stay he tended to wind up in jail. Dr. Mandell attributed this pattern to Marshall's difficulty in maintaining himself as a result of his mental disorder. The evidence indicates that just prior to hospitalization, Marshall had been "living on the streets" without any source of income. His opinion that Marshall was unable to care for himself without treatment was also based on Marshall's inability to fill out necessary welfare forms while in the hospital or to seek assistance from hospital employees for this purpose. There is also evidence that Marshall lacked any awareness of his need for the necessary medication to stabilize his symptoms.
Finally, Dr. Mandell testified that inpatient care is necessary because Marshall's condition, although in the process of stabilizing, would decompensate rapidly upon release without treatment. It is also necessary, in his opinion, because Marshall is opposed to medication or follow-up treatment and does not have enough organization to be able to cooperate in a less restrictive setting.
Marshall testified on his own behalf, outlining his plans upon release to live at the Mission or with his sister, to have his sister help him fill out the welfare forms, to obtain welfare and to find his own apartment.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court concluded that Marshall was gravely disabled under the criteria set forth in RCW 71.05.020(1)(a). In so concluding, the court expressly chose not to rely upon Dr. Mandell's opinion of grave disability under RCW 71.05.020(1)(b). The court found that Marshall was a danger to himself because of reactive and hostile conduct which the court found to be uncontrolled and treatable. The trial court concluded that the evidence was clear, cogent and convincing as exhibited by Marshall's recent past conduct.
Although the trial court's finding of grave disability is supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the court's reliance on the criteria of RCW 71.05.020(1)(a) is misplaced. The trial court found that Marshall's hostile and reactive behavior placed him in danger of serious physical harm. We agree that there is a danger that someone will respond in kind to Marshall's potentially violent and hostile conduct. This danger is usually inherent in any hostile confrontation, but it is not the kind of danger contemplated by RCW 71.05.020(1)(a), which involves the likelihood of serious harm to a person from his failure to provide for such essential needs as food, clothing and shelter. Here there is very little evidence of a risk of danger from Marshall's failure to provide for such needs. The evidence of his hostile and reactive behavior, which is supported by his recent acts that led to his arrest for assault, would instead justify commitment based on the "likelihood of serious harm to others" standard of RCW 71.05.280(1)(b).
We need not consider this possibility further, however, because we conclude that the State presented substantial evidence of grave disability under RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) which the trial court could reasonably have found to be clear, cogent and convincing. There is ample evidence in the record of severe deterioration of mental functioning as evidenced by significant impairment of cognitive control immediately prior to and during his stay in the hospital. Although Marshall's deteriorated condition was in the process of stabilizing because of his treatment in the hospital, there is ample evidence that without such treatment, and if released, Marshall would rapidly decompensate.
There is also sufficient evidence that treatment for his mental disorder is essential to Marshall's health and safety. There is clear, cogent and convincing evidence that medication is necessary to stabilize the mental deterioration and the conduct therefrom that resulted in his initial confinement. It is also evident that Marshall is unable to understand his need for treatment and, if released, would not follow through with the prescribed treatment.
Appellant contends that, because he would be able to adequately provide for his essential needs based on his plan to stay at the Mission or his sister's home and to apply for welfare assistance, continued commitment is not justifiable. However, even if appellant were able to provide for his essential food and shelter needs, which is not apparent from the evidence, the evidence indicates that without treatment for his mental disorder he would rapidly exhibit those symptoms which resulted in his initial confinement. Even with his basic food and shelter needs met, the evidence suggests a substantial likelihood that Marshall cannot yet function safely or independently in the community.
Richardson's 90-day commitment was based on the alternative definition of gravely disabled set forth in RCW 71.05.020(1)(a). Again, the State's only evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Mandell, who based his opinion that Richardson was "at substantial risk for serious physical harm" on three factors: (1) When Richardson was initially detained, he was suffering from a serious case of impetigo for which he would not get treatment; (2) Richardson mentioned to Dr. Mandell that he experienced intermittent pain in a tooth and had not been to the dentist in 12 years; and (3) Richardson indicated that he was not eating well before he was hospitalized but was unwilling to consider the possible consequences of that or to seek medical help.
On the basis of this evidence, the trial court concluded that Richardson was gravely disabled because of a risk of physical harm from his failure to provide for his essential needs. We conclude that these findings are not supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. First, the evidence indicated that the impetigo no longer required medical attention. Second, there was no evidence that the dental problem involved any risk of harm to Richardson. And finally, even if Richardson was not eating well, there was no evidence that he was in any danger therefrom or that it was a result of his mental disorder. Under these circumstances, the risk of physical harm from Richardson's tendency to neglect his health was too speculative and insubstantial to justify continued commitment for 90 days under the gravely disabled standard of RCW 71.05.020(1)(a).
Appellant Trueblood challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of grave disability in both his 14-day and 180-day commitment hearings.
The standard of proof at a 14-day probable cause hearing is "preponderance of the evidence." RCW 71.05.240. Here the State presented evidence under subsection (b) of RCW 71.05.020(1). The State's evidence consisted of the testimony of two witnesses: Trueblood's apartment manager and Dr. Thomas Hyde, a licensed clinical psychologist.
The apartment manager, who had known Trueblood for a number of years, testified that Trueblood kept the heat off in cold weather even though it was provided at no cost, kept garbage in the sink and wet clothes in the shower, had piles of newspaper 6 inches from the heater, was noticeably losing weight, talked about communicating with the dead at graveyards and exhibited other bizarre behavior, and was letting personal hygiene deteriorate.
The State's other witness, Dr. Hyde, based his testimony on a personal interview with Trueblood, review of the medical charts and records, and observations during the hearing. His testimony indicates that Trueblood was in an acute phase of chronic schizophrenia. He testified that the weight loss, poor hygiene, delusions and disorganized thinking point to a repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control.
The testimony also indicated that because of Trueblood's deteriorating mental condition he was unable to formulate realistic plans to provide essential care: Trueblood had no place to stay and he mentioned somewhat vague plans to stay all night in a diner or to buy a sleeping bag and a tent and camp out in parks or to go Bellevue and get in contact with dead people. The evidence also indicates that Trueblood lacks insight into his condition, blames prior hospitalizations on other people's problems, and is not interested in taking medication or otherwise seeking treatment. In Dr. Hyde's opinion, Trueblood would not last 24 hours in the community before he would have to be rehospitalized.
Trueblood testified on his own behalf as to his plans if released, including his plans initially to stay at all-night restaurants until he could find an apartment, to camp out, and to visit cemeteries and leave messages there.
Based upon this evidence and its own observation of Trueblood at the hearing, the court found that Trueblood was gravely disabled as a result of severe deterioration of routine functioning that left him unable to care for his basic needs. There is substantial, uncontroverted evidence to support the trial court's findings. Although some of the evidence relied upon by the court, particularly the testimony of the apartment manager, goes only to show that Trueblood was a messy and perhaps somewhat eccentric housekeeper, there is ample evidence in the record to indicate severe deterioration of routine functioning, including escalating and repeated loss of cognitive and volitional control, and an inability to care for essential needs. There is also evidence that Trueblood was unable to make a rational decision with respect to his need for treatment and care and that treatment was essential to his health and safety. We conclude that the trial court's finding of grave disability is amply supported by the evidence.
At Trueblood's hearing on the petition for 180 days of less restrictive treatment, the State alleged grave disability under subsection (a) of RCW 71.05.020(1). The State's evidence consisted of the testimony of two witnesses.
The State's first witness was a social worker in charge of monitoring Trueblood's treatment program during the prior 90-day less restrictive treatment period. He testified that Trueblood began missing appointments with him, with his doctor, and in the medication clinic during the latter half of the 90-day treatment period. He also testified that Trueblood complained of feeling threatened and persecuted, complained of feeling unsafe in his apartment, mentioned that on several occasions he stayed overnight in parks where he felt safer, indicated several times that he wanted to discontinue treatment, and expressed a desire at one time to live in a tent on Snoqualmie Pass.
The State's other witness, Dr. Debra Wothers, a resident in psychiatry, treated Trueblood during the early part of his 90-day treatment period under the supervision of an attending psychiatrist. Dr. Wothers' testimony consisted of the following: that in her opinion Trueblood suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia; that during the time she treated him he was disheveled, unkempt, and losing weight which, given his history, indicated a decompensated state and which placed him in danger of serious harm; that his paranoid thinking made it difficult for him to feel comfortable in places where he is probably safer (E.G., his apartment) and caused him to seek out places that are not as safe (E.G., parks). However, Dr. Wothers also testified that she had last seen or treated Trueblood some 2 to 3 months prior to the hearing, that she was unaware of how he had been functioning in the interim, and that he was cognitively oriented and intact at the time of the hearing.
Trueblood testified that he could adequately take care of himself and would go to treatment on his own, that his apartment had been broken into twice, that he spent several nights in parks because he felt safer there but slept only for 2 hours on one occasion, that lately he had been feeling safer in his apartment and spending nights there, and that he long ago abandoned any plans to live at Snoqualmie Pass because of the difficulty of finding work and an adequate support system.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court found that Trueblood was gravely disabled without indicating which definition under RCW 71.05.020(1) was relied upon. Ostensibly the trial court relied upon the State's evidence under subsection (a).
Under either definition the State's evidence was not sufficiently clear, cogent and convincing to support a finding of "gravely disabled." Under the subsection (a) definition of gravely disabled, there was very little evidence that Trueblood was in substantial risk of serious physical harm because of failure to provide for his essential human needs. There was no evidence of recent weight loss or any other evidence suggesting that Trueblood was neglecting his essential needs of food, clothing and shelter. The only evidence of risk of harm was Trueblood's occasional overnight stays in parks but these incidents were infrequent and not shown to present a substantial risk of danger of serious physical harm.
Nor was there clear, cogent and convincing evidence of grave disability under subsection (b) of RCW 71.05.020(1). Although Dr. Wothers' testimony suggests that Trueblood may have been decompensating when she last saw him, her opinion is based upon observations and interviews some 2 to 3 months earlier. Her only opinion as to recent observations suggests that Trueblood was cognitively oriented and intact as of the time of the hearing. And the social worker's testimony, while based on more recent observations, tends only to prove that Trueblood was still suffering from a mental disorder; it does not provide clear and convincing evidence of grave disability as a result of the mental disorder.
Appellants also contend that the written findings of fact in each of their cases were inadequate. Such findings are required by MPR 3.4(b), which provides: "[u]nless the matter is tried to a jury, the court shall make and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law."
(c) The respondent is gravely disabled.
is an alternative to detention.
We agree with appellants that these findings are inadequate.
 Generally, where findings are required, they must be sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. STATE v. HOLLAND, 98 Wn.2d 507, 517, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983). While the degree of particularity required in findings of fact depends on the circumstances of the particular case, they should at least be sufficient to indicate the factual bases for the ultimate conclusions. GROFF v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUS., 65 Wn.2d 35, 40, 395 P.2d 633 (1964); STATE v. RUSSELL, 68 Wn.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966). The purpose of the requirement of findings and conclusions is to insure the trial judge "'has dealt fully and properly with all the issues in the case before he decides it and so that the parties involved and this court on appeal may be fully informed as to the bases of his decision when it is made.'" STATE v. AGEE, 89 Wn.2d 416, 421, 573 P.2d 355 (1977), quoting ROBERTS v. ROSS, 344 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1965). However, a trial court is not required to make findings of fact on all matters about which there is evidence in the record; only those which establish the existence or nonexistence of determinative factual matters need be made. MAEHREN v. SEATTLE, 92 Wn.2d 480, 487-88, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979), CERT. DENIED, 452 U.S. 938, 69 L. Ed. 2d 951, 101 S. Ct. 3079 (1981). Considered in isolation, the written findings here are not sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. The language used is standardized and of necessity very general. The findings do not indicate the factual bases for the trial court's ultimate conclusion of grave disability; nor is it possible even to determine which alternative statutory definition of "gravely disabled" was relied upon by the trial court. Except for the different headings and signatures, the written findings in these cases are virtually interchangeable despite the factual dissimilarity of the cases.
 Even if inadequate, written findings may be supplemented by the trial court's oral decision or statements in the record. STATE v. HOLLAND, SUPRA at 518. TODD v. SUPERIOR COURT, 68 Wn.2d 587, 414 P.2d 605 (1966). In addition, where, as here, no exceptions are taken below to the findings, we will give them a liberal construction rather than overturn the judgment based thereon. LAURIDSEN v. LEWIS, 50 Wash. 605, 608-09, 97 P. 663 (1908). Although we conclude that the written findings here are inadequate, we think it appropriate in these cases to look to the entire record, including the trial courts' oral decisions, in order to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial courts' ultimate findings of grave disability. In the Marshall and Richardson cases, and in the Trueblood case relating to the 14-day commitment order, the trial court orally recited the evidentiary facts it relied upon in making its decision. In the LaBelle case, the record at least indicates the statutory criteria of "gravely disabled" relied upon. And in the Trueblood case relating to the 180-day commitment order, although the trial court's findings do not indicate the reasons for its conclusion that appellant was gravely disabled, the evidence adduced at trial and the court's oral statements suggest the statutory criteria relied upon.
Nonetheless, our review of these cases is hampered by the trial court's mostly conclusory and general findings, both oral and written. While not fatal in these cases, such findings hereafter are not adequate. Written findings indicating that the court considered the applicable statutory criteria should be entered in all instances where involuntary commitment is ordered, except where the case is tried by a jury. The degree of particularity of the findings will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. At the very least, the findings should indicate the factual basis underlying the court's conclusion that a person is "gravely disabled" and would not benefit from less restrictive treatment.
Appellant Trueblood raises two additional issues not raised by the other appellants. One relates to the order committing him for 14 days, the other to the order of 180-day less restrictive treatment.
Appellant first contends that the standard of proof at his 14-day commitment hearing violates due process. The requisite standard of proof in a probable cause hearing for an additional 14 days of involuntary commitment is by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 71.05.240. In contrast, the burden of proof in 90-day commitment proceedings is by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. RCW 71.05.310. Appellant contends that due process requires that the same standard of proof apply to both proceedings. We do not agree.
Appellant relies upon ADDINGTON v. TEXAS, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil proceeding to commit a person involuntarily to a mental hospital for an indefinite period. ADDINGTON is not applicable, however. The Court addressed minimum due process standards in the context of a full hearing to commit for an indefinite period whereas this case involves a probable cause hearing to commit for a maximum of 14 days.
DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, 100 Wn.2d 832, 839, 676 P.2d 444 (1984), quoting MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
As for the private interest affected by the 14-day commitment proceedings, this court has repeatedly recognized the significant deprivation of liberty and the adverse social consequences to the individual engendered by involuntary commitment. SEE, E.G., DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, SUPRA at 838-39; IN RE HARRIS, 98 Wn.2d 276, 279-80, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). On the other hand, we have also recognized the State's legitimate interest under its police and PARENS PATRIAE powers in protecting the community against dangerously disturbed individuals and in providing care to its citizens who are unable, because of mental illness, to care for themselves. SEE, E.G., DUNNER v. MCLAUGHLIN, SUPRA at 839.
 We are persuaded that the lesser standard of proof adopted by the Legislature strikes a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of the State given the important role served by the probable cause hearing in the involuntary commitment process. On the one hand, the probable cause hearing protects liberty interests by assuring prompt judicial review of the adequacy of the State's grounds for detaining an individual beyond the initial 72-hour evaluation and treatment period of RCW 71.05.150. On the other hand, the lesser standard of proof at a probable cause hearing protects the State's PARENS PATRIAE interests by increasing the probability that those mentally ill persons who remain in serious need of treatment beyond the 72-hour evaluation and treatment period will continue to receive short-term treatment (a maximum of 14 days) until such time as the more formal 90-day commitment hearing under RCW 71.05.310 can be held.
Imposition of a higher standard of proof would create an unreasonable procedural barrier to such short-term involuntary commitments. Under RCW 71.05.240, a probable cause hearing is mandatory within 72 hours of detention if the State wishes to confine an individual beyond the initial evaluation and treatment period. The State's ability to marshal the necessary evidence to meet the statutory commitment criteria by the time of the hearing would be severely hampered by imposition of a stricter burden of proof.
Moreover, the probable cause hearing is accompanied by a number of procedural safeguards which adequately lessen the risk of an erroneous decision under the lesser burden of proof. At the probable cause hearing, a detained person is granted the following rights: (1) to have an attorney represent him; (2) to present evidence on his behalf; (3) to cross-examine witnesses who testify against him; (4) to be proceeded against by the rules of evidence; (5) to remain silent; and (6) to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file. SEE RCW 71.05.200, .250; DUNNER, at 840. In addition, before continued commitment can be ordered, the judge must find that one of the statutory grounds for commitment is present and also that no less restrictive alternatives to commitment are available which would be in the detainee's best interest. RCW 71.05.240. A more formal hearing is required, including the further protections of a right to a jury and proof by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, if commitment beyond the 14-day period is sought. We conclude that these procedural protections are sufficient to satisfy due process without the additional requirement of a "clear and convincing" standard of proof at a probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.250.
Appellant Trueblood also raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in finding a waiver of the physician-patient privilege and in thus admitting the testimony of appellant's treating physician, Dr. Wothers, at the hearing for 180 days of less restrictive treatment.
him to prescribe or act for the patient . . .
 This compulsory waiver statute by its terms applies only to 14-day commitment hearings. In IN RE R., 97 Wn.2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), we held that the waiver statute is applicable to 90-day commitment hearings inasmuch as the statute pertaining to 90-day hearings, RCW 71.05.310, incorporates by reference the evidentiary provisions of RCW 71.05.250, including the compulsory waiver provisions. The statute relating to 180-day extension hearings, RCW 71.05.320, provides that such hearings shall be held as provided in RCW 71.05.310. It thus follows that the compulsory waiver statute applies to 180-day extension hearings as well.
In this case, it is undisputed that Dr. Wothers was appellant's treating physician. At the hearing the attorney for appellant objected to the testimony of Dr. Wothers on the ground of the physician-patient privilege. The trial court overruled the objection. It found that it would be unreasonable to require the State to obtain a nontreating physician's evaluation because appellant had missed appointments and was thus unavailable for evaluation prior to the hearing. Accordingly, the trial court held that the privilege was waived under the mandatory waiver provisions of RCW 71.05.250.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. We do not agree. There is ample evidence in the record that appellant, who was receiving outpatient treatment, missed his treatment appointments for several weeks prior to the hearing and was unavailable for evaluation by a nontreating psychiatrist. From the trial court's unique vantage point in assessing the nature of appellant's mental illness and the history of his treatment, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the court to have determined that the treating psychiatrist's testimony was necessary to enable it to make an informed and intelligent judgment with respect to further need for treatment. Appellant has not alleged that waiver of the privilege in this case would harm the physician-patient relationship or otherwise interfere with his treatment. Nor has appellant alleged that Dr. Wothers told appellant that she was communicating with him for treatment only. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court could justifiably find that it was unreasonable for respondent to obtain a sufficient evaluation by a nontreating psychiatrist.
In summary, we hold that: (1) the "gravely disabled" criteria of RCW 71.05.020(1) are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) the written findings of fact are inadequate; however, the lack of adequate written findings will not preclude review of these cases; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of grave disability in the cases of LaBelle, Marshall and Trueblood (14-day commitment order) but not in the cases of Richardson and Trueblood (180-day commitment order); (4) the statutory standard of proof in a probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05 satisfies due process; (5) the trial court did not err in finding a waiver of the physician-patient privilege at Trueblood's 180-day extension hearing.
Accordingly, the orders committing LaBelle for 90 days, Marshall for 90 days, and Trueblood for 14 days are affirmed. The orders committing Richardson for 90 days and Trueblood for 180 days of less restrictive treatment are vacated.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Dolliver, C.J., Pearson, Andersen, Callow, Goodloe, and Durham, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tem., concur.

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