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Q: How is property divided in divorce proceeding?
A: In Florida, marital property is divided between spouses by equitable distribution.
Q: What is equitable distribution of assets?
A: Equitable distribution of assets means division of marital property in a divorce under statutory guidelines. Equitable distribution is fair but not necessarily equal division of assets and liabilities between spouses.
Q: What are the statutory guidelines for equitable distribution of property?
“a. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them.
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. 61.075(8), all assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage and not specifically established as nonmarital assets or liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities. Also, all real property held by the parties as tenants by entireties, whether acquired prior or during the marriage, is presumed to be marital.
Assets acquired prior to marriage are nonmarital assets and remain separate property of the owner absent evidence of a gift or conveyance of the assets to the owner’s spouse. Moss v. Moss, 829 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
However, property acquired during the marriage through the exchange of nonmarital assets is nonmarital. Beaty v. Gribble, 652 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Q: What is nonmarital property?
Q: Is an engagement ring marital property?
A: The general rule is that an engagement ring is nonmarital property. Randall v. Randall, 56 So.3d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Q: What is the cut-off date for identifying marital assets?
A: In Florida, the cut-off date for determining whether or not assets and liabilities are marital is “the earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage. The date for determining value of assets and the amount of liabilities identified or classified as marital is the date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable under the circumstances. Different assets may be valued as of different dates, as, in the judge’s discretion, the circumstances require.” Fla. Stat. 61.075(7).
Q: Are assets obtained after filing for dissolution of marriage marital?
A: Assets acquired by one spouse after filing for a divorce are generally deemed to be nonmarital. Beers v. Beers, 724 So.3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Q: Are debts acquired by one spouse during marriage marital?
A: Generally, debts acquired by one spouse during marriage are marital. Fla. Stat. 61.075(6)(a)1.
Q: Are one spouse’s student loans marital debt if they were acquired during marriage?
A: Unfortunately, yes. Florida courts consider student loans of one spouse marital debt that should be shared equally amongst both spouses if the student loans were obtained during marriage. Rogers v. Rogers, 12 So.3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Q: Can nonmarital property become marital?
A: Yes. Nonmarital property may turn to marital asset when it is commingled with marital assets (e.g. money is deposited in joint marital account). Pfrengle v. Pfrengle, 976 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The spouse seeking to have property declared as nonmarital asset has the burden of overcoming the presumption of gift by proving that a gift was not intended. Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla. 1991).
Furthermore, pursuant to Fla. Stat. 61.075(6)(a)1b, a nonmarital asset may be become a marital asset to the extent that its value has been enhanced by marital funds or labor. Cole v. Robert, 661 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). However, it has to be active appreciation in value.
Q: What is active appreciation of an asset?
A: Active appreciation occurs when one spouse’s marital efforts caused the increase in value of the asset.
Q: Is paying off the mortgage considered active appreciation?
A: The mortgage reduction may be considered an “enhancement value” subject to equitable distribution if the mortgage was partially or fully paid off during the marriage from marital funds. Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). When marital assets are used during the marriage to reduce the mortgage on non-marital property, the increase in equity is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. See e.g. Gaetani-Slade v. Slade, 852 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Q: What is passive appreciation of an asset?
A: Passive appreciation occurs when the increase or decrease of value is a result of passive or market forces, rather than the particular actions of a spouse.
Q: Who gets a jointly held business after divorce?
A: When deciding who the closely held business goes to, the court should take into consideration the desirability of retaining an interest in a business intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party. Fla. Stat. 61.075. Generally, it is improper for the court to leave the parties as joint owners of a joint business. Ross v. Bandi, 566 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In many situations forcing the spouses to be business partners after divorce creates an “intolerable situation” especially when the spouses clearly state that they do not want to continue working together after the divorce. Id.
Q: Who gets marital residence after divorce?
A: Whenever children are involved, usually the spouse with the majority of the timesharing is awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach the majority or become emancipated or until the former spouse remarries. See Dolch v. Dolch, 368 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Q: How are the assets valued in a divorce proceeding?
A: Assets are valued according to the fair market value.
Q: What is fair market value?
A: Fair market value is the price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market for a similar property.
Q: Can spouses agree to a different than equitable distribution of assets?
A: Yes, the spouses can always agree to a different distribution of assets in a marital settlement agreement, prenuptial agreement or postnuptial agreement.
A: A prenuptial agreement, also called “prenup” or premarital agreement is “an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon marriage.” Fla. Stat. 61.079.
Q: What are the formalities required for a prenuptial agreement to be valid?
A: It must be in writing and signed by both parties. Fla. Stat. 61.079.
Q: What can a prenuptial agreement contain?
The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located; The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property; The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event; The establishment, modification, waiver, or elimination of spousal support; The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement; The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy; The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of either the public policy of this state or a law imposing a criminal penalty.
Q: Can child support be reduced by a prenuptial agreement?
A: No. The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. Fla. Stat. 61.079.
Q: When does a prenuptial agreement become effective?
A: A premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage of the parties. Fla. Stat. 61.079.
Q: Can a prenuptial agreement be changed or revoked?
A: Yes. A premarital agreement may be amended, revoked, or abandoned but it must be done only by a written agreement signed by the parties. Fla. Stat. 61.079.
Q: How can a prenuptial agreement be challenged?
c. Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
A: Alimony or spousal support is defined as “an allotment of sums of money payable at regular intervals or in lump sum, as distinguished from a portion of a spouse’s estate, and it is an obligation imposed by law separate and distinct from the parties’ property rights.” Cullen v. Cullen, 413 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In other words, it is court-ordered money that one spouse has to pay to the other spouse for maintenance or support during the lawsuit or after the divorce.
Q: What types of alimony are available in Florida?
Q: How does the court determine whether or not to award alimony?
A: Pursuant to Florida Statute 61.08(2)(a)-(j), income must be calculated for each party, which includes all sources of income. Income may also be imputed.
Q: How is alimony paid?
Q: Which factors does the court consider in determining the alimony award and its amount?
(j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(2).
Q: Does it matter if my spouse cheated on me?
A: Yes. Although Florida is a non-fault state, in determination of alimony award courts “may consider the adultery of either spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(1).
Q: How can I ensure that I actually receive my alimony?
A: “To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose. Fla. Stat. 61.08(3).
Q: Does the length of marriage matter in determination of alimony award?
A: “For purposes of determining alimony, there is a rebuttable presumption that a short-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of less than 7 years, a moderate-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of greater than 7 years but less than 17 years, and long-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of 17 years or greater. The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(4).
Q: What is a short-term marriage?
A: A short- term marriage is a marriage of 7 years or shorter. Fla. Stat. 61.08(4).
Q: What is a moderate-term marriage?
A: A moderate- term marriage is a marriage greater then 7 years but shorter than 17 years. Fla. Stat. 61.08(4).
Q: What is a long-term marriage?
A: A long – term marriage is a marriage of 17 years or longer. Fla. Stat. 61.08(4).
Q: What is temporary alimony?
A: Temporary alimony is spousal support and/or suit money, which can be obtained during the divorce proceeding if a spouse can show well founded need for support and the other spouse has the ability to pay. See Vickers v. Vickers, 413 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). “Throughout the pendency of a dissolution of marriage action, a party should not have consume a separate asset in order to support himself/herself in the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.” Byers v. Byers, 910 So.2d 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Q: What is bridge-the-gap alimony? A: “Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(5).
2. The acquisition of education, training, or work experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or credentials.
(b) In order to award rehabilitative alimony, there must be a specific and defined rehabilitative plan which shall be included as a part of any order awarding rehabilitative alimony.
(c) An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated in accordance with s.61.14 based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(6).
Q: What is durational alimony?
A: “Durational alimony may be awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration or following a marriage of long duration if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis. An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. The amount of an award of durational alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances in accordance with s. 61.14. However, the length of an award of durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not exceed the length of the marriage.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(7).
A: “Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage. Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), following a marriage of moderate duration if such an award is appropriate based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), or following a marriage of short duration if there are written findings of exceptional circumstances. In awarding permanent alimony, the court shall include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the parties. An award of permanent alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship in accordance with s.61.14.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(8).
Q: Can the court order alimony to be paid through depository?
A: “If there is no minor child, alimony payments need not be directed through the depository. If there is a minor child of the parties and both parties so request, the court may order that alimony payments need not be directed through the depository.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(10)(c)-(d).
Q: What is permanent alimony?
A: “Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage.” Fla. Stat. 61.08(8). Generally, permanent alimony may be appropriate upon consideration of statutory factors in a long-term marriage of 17 years and more. See generally Levy v. Levy, 900 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In moderate-term marriage, permanent alimony is allowed upon clear and convincing evidence and consideration of statutory factors. Id. Permanent alimony is not appropriate in short-term marriage absent exceptional circumstances. Id.
Q: What is lump sum alimony?
A: Lump sum alimony is a payment of specific amount of spousal support paid at once or in installments. Lump sum alimony can also be awarded to ensure that property acquired throughout marriage is equitably divided.
Q: When is alimony awarded?
A: In every request for alimony, the requesting spouse must proof her/his need for alimony and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Fla. Stat. 60.08(2). In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), the Supreme Court held that both above factors must be present in order for any alimony to be awarded. When determining need, the court should consider the spouses’ earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, and the standard of living during the marriage. Quinones v. Quinones, 84 So.3d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Ability to pay is established based on income available to the spouse. See Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 2005). In Williams v. Williams, 10 So. 3d 651, 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), the court reasoned that alimony awards should leave the paying spouse with significantly less income that the net income of the receiving spouse. In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 127 So.3d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), the trial court erred in ordering the husband to pay child support, temporary alimony and temporary attorney’s fees and costs totaling more than 80% of the husband’s net monthly income.
A: Alimony may be taxable to the receiving spouse if it meets the IRS’s definition of alimony and other requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
A: Alimony may be tax deductible for the paying spouse if it meets the IRS’s definition of alimony and other requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
Q: Can I seek alimony during marriage without filing for a divorce?
Q: Where can I find information about Florida adoption laws?
A: Private adoptions are regulated by Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes – “Florida Adoption Act” Fla. Stat. 63. Public adoptions (permanency proceedings) are regulated by Chapter 39 of Florida Statutes. Fla. Stat. 39.
Q: What does “adoption” mean?
Q: Are adoption records public record?
Q: Who may be adopted or who may adopt?
Q: What are the rights of an unmarried biological father?
A: Generally (with certain exceptions), in order to preserve the right to notice and consent to an adoption, an unmarried biological father has to file a notarized claim of paternity form with the Florida Putative Father Registry maintained by the Office of Vital Statistics of the Department of Health, in which he must confirm his willingness and intent to support the child for whom paternity is claimed in accordance with state law. The claim of paternity must be filed before a petition for termination of parental rights is filed. Fla. Stat. 63.054.
An unmarried biological father has the responsibility to protect his rights and timely comply with the available legal steps to substantiate his parental interest. If he fails to act, he may lose his parental interest and the child may be adopted without his consent. Fla. Stat. 63.053. In every adoption proceeding, in order to avoid entry of the default judgment, the unmarried biological father must: file a claim of paternity with the Florida Putative Father Registry, file a verified response with the court, which includes a pledge of commitment to the child and provide support for the birth mother and a child. Fla. Stat. 63.062.
Q: What is Florida Putative Father Registry?
A: Florida Putative Father Registry is a registry run by the Office of Vital Statistics for the purpose of registration of unmarried biological fathers. Fla. Stat. 63.054.
Q: Is Florida Putative Father Registry public record?
A: No. All information contained in the Florida Putative Father Registry is confidential and not available to public. Fla. Stat. 63.0541.
Q: Whose must consent to adoption?
A: The following persons must execute a consent to adoption: (1) the mother of the minor, (2) the father of the minor (if the minor was born during his marriage to the mother, if he adopted the child or if he was adjudicated by court to be the father before the date of a petition for termination of parental rights was filed), (3) certain unmarried biological fathers, (4) the minor, if 12 years of age or older, (5) any person lawfully entitled to custody of the minor if required by the court, (6) the court having jurisdiction to determine custody of the minor, if the person having physical custody of the minor does not have authority to consent to the adoption. If parental rights to the minor have previously been terminated, the adoption entity with which the minor has been placed for subsequent adoption may provide consent to the adoption. In such case, no other consent is required. In certain situations, the adoption entity’s consent may be waived by court. Fla. Stat. 63.062.
Q: What are the formalities required for the consent to adoption or affidavit of nonpaternity?
A: The consent to adoption or affidavit of nonpaternity must be signed in presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public, who cannot be one of the witnesses. Fla. Stat. 63.082.
Q: Which factors are taken into consideration by court in adoptions proceedings?
8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate placement for the child.” Fla. Stat. 63.082(e).
Q: Who must attend the adoption hearing?
A: The petitioner and the person to be adopted must appear at the hearing, unless the person to be adopted is a minor under 12 years of age or the court excused their appearance for good cause. Fla. Stat. 63.142.
I have just been served with divorce papers in Clearwater, Florida. What should I do?
Can I file for a divorce in Clearwater, Florida if my spouse is not in Clearwater, Florida?
Can I file for a divorce in Clearwater, Florida if my spouse is not in Florida?
Can I file for a divorce in Clearwater, Florida if my spouse is not in the United States?
Can I file for a divorce in Clearwater, Florida if I do not know where my spouse is?
How much does a divorce cost in Clearwater, Florida?
How much does a contested divorce cost in Clearwater, Florida?
How much does an uncontested divorce cost in Clearwater, Florida?
How long does a divorce take in Clearwater, Florida?
How long does a contested divorce take in Clearwater, Florida?
How long does an uncontested divorce take in Clearwater, Florida?
Do I have to be living in Clearwater, Florida to qualify for a uncontested divorce in Tampa, Florida?
Does my spouse have to be living in Clearwater, Florida for me to qualify for a uncontested divorce in Clearwater, Florida?
Do I have to be living in Florida to qualify for a uncontested divorce in Clearwater, Florida?
Does my spouse have to be living in Florida for me to qualify for a uncontested divorce in Clearwater, Florida?
Do I qualify for alimony in Clearwater, Florida?
How is child custody determined in Clearwater, Florida?
Who gets custody of the child during the divorce proceedings in Clearwater, Florida?
Can I get a domestic violence injunction on my spouse in Clearwater, Florida?
How do I get a domestic violence injunction in Clearwater, Florida?
In Clearwater, Florida am I only entitled to equitable distribution of property?
Can I ask for unequitable distribution of property in Clearwater, Florida?
Has a judge ever agreed to the unequitable distribution of property in Clearwater, Florida?
Would signing a marital settlement agreement make the divorce process in Clearwater, Florida quicker?
Would the courts in Clearwater, Florida agree to the modification of prior judgments?
Do I need to contact the court in Clearwater, Florida before relocating with my child after a divorce?
In Clearwater, Florida does it matter if my souse cheated on me?
In Clearwater, Florida does it matter who’s fault it is that the marriage failed?
Can I ask the court in Clearwater, Florida to perform a paternity test during my divorce proceedings?
Can I ask the court to have my spouse pay for my divorce attorney’s fees in Clearwater, Florida?
Do courts in Clearwater, Florida award divorce attorney’s fees?
I, Attorney Aga Piasecka, can answer these and many other Divorce and Family Law questions regarding: Alimony, Child Support, Child Custody, Domestic Violence Injunctions, Equitable, Distribution of Property, Marital Settlement Agreements, Modification of Prior Judgments, Paternity Actions, Post Nuptial Agreements, Pre Nuptial Agreements, and Relocation. I am experienced in divorce, uncontested divorce, contested divorce and high-asset divorce. I have the knowledge and experience needed to obtain the best possible results for my divorce clients. I offer FREE consultations regarding all divorce matters and FLAT FEE uncontested divorces in Clearwater, Florida.
This website is for informational purposes only. Using this site or communicating with Agnieszka Piasecka, Esq. through this site does not form an attorney/client relationship. This site is legal advertising.

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The familiar rule established in Blockburger v. United States of America states that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, cumulative punishment may not be imposed unless each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. The rule is one of statutory construction, applied in order to gauge Congress's intent that two statutory offenses be punished cumulatively. A court applies the test with a focus on the statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.
Defendants were indicted for various crimes arising from their alleged participation in a support cell with the aim of promoting violent jihad as espoused by a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement. The trial court dismissed count one, which charged a violation 18 U.S.C.S. § 956(a)(1), on the basis that it was multiplicitous of counts two and three and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order dismissing count one of the indictment.
Did the trial court err in dismissing count one of defendants’ indictment, the charge of conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim outside the United States in violation of § 956(a)(1), on the ground that it was multiplicitous of count two, the charge of conspiracy to provide material support in violation of § 371, and count three, the substantive offense of § 2339A, and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause?
The trial court erroneously focused on the facts giving rise to the charges rather than on whether the elements of the crimes met the U.S. Supreme Court's Blockburger test. Count one required proof that each defendant agreed with at least one person to commit acts constituting murder, kidnapping, and maiming. Count two, conspiracy to provide material support under 18 U.S.C.S. § 371, required proof that each defendant agreed with at least one other person to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. The common and unlawful plan was that defendants conspired to provide material support in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A, the substantive offense charged in count three, i.e., providing material support or resources with the knowledge or intent that the support would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, one of the object offenses listed in the statute. None of the charges could be merged into another as a lesser-included offense. None of the counts was multiplicitous. The Double Jeopardy Clause was not infringed.


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1st Geelong College - Bow: A. F. McClelland, 2: J. H. Quinton, 3: M. L. McDonald, 4: A. J. Lawson, 5: H. T. Bromell, 6: P. C. Mayne, 7: Roger J. Bade, Str: A. C. Whitehead, Cox: H. McDonell, Cch: Albert B. Bell, Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 8 lb.
2nd Wesley College - Bow: J. A. F. Williams, 2: J. D. Mitchell, 3: D. J. Millikan, 4: R. K. Luff, 5: D. J. Hosking, 6: G. M. Price, 7: G. D. Allen, Str: G. L. Tweddle, Cox: L. F. Royal, Cch: Alan W. Mitchell, Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 4 lb.
3rd Scotch College - Bow: A. Cormack Dilley, 2: John L. McFarlane, 3: Rod S. Olsson, 4: Graeme H. Boykett, 5: Richard E. Johnston, 6: A. Ross McKinnon, 7: Donald K. Bowden, Str: Ian C. Watkins, Cox: Chris J. Newman, Cch: L. H. Christie, Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 0 lb.
Geelong College made it fifth win from six starts with a canvas win over Wesley College with Scotch only another canvas further behind. It was one of the closest races with all thee crwes a chance. Scotch led for the first half of the race before Geelong College made their move. Wesley followed Geelong with their own attack. In a desperate finish Geelong College prevailed. After the race, the Geelong coach Albert Bell claimed that his crew was the only one to limit training to the first term. "Schoolboy oarsmen do not need long preparation".
1st Geelong Grammar - Bow: P. McA. Hose, 2: C. J. Hazzard, 3: A. A. Pickett-Heaps, 4: J. W. Rutter, 5: R. W. Trotter, (5) S. E. Brockman, 7: D. M. Coles, Str: T. E. Laycock, Cox: J. G. Sellar, Cch: H. Ward, Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 0 lb.
2nd Xavier College - Bow: J. G. Loftus-Hills, 2: J. V. Hayes, 3: S. W. Shrimpton, 4: J. F. Exell, 5: T. M. Kearney, 6: N. R. May, 7: J. F. Gurry, Str: Richard J. Garrard, Cox: J. M. Collins, Cch: CHarlie G. Saleh, Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 3 lb.
3rd Melbourne Grammar -Bow: R. N. McArthur, 2: M. G. Sedgley, 3: B. N. Bucknall, 4: B. Gillespie, 5: I. K. M. Galbraith, 6: D. McA. Baillieu, 7: T. R. Pringle, Str: V. B. Gantner, Cox: D. G. Tuck, Cchs: Gordon Sargood Esq. and Anthony J. Smith Esq. Average Weight, 12 st. 11 lb.
2nd Geelong College - Bow: R. A. Agnew, 2: R. A. Both, 3: J. S. Robson, 4: D. H. M. Berney, 5: P. M. McLennan, 6: J. I. Mactier, 7: H. C. Forbes, Str: A. H. McArthur, Cox: R. P. Edge, Cch: J. M. Ferguson, Esq., Average Weight, 11 st. 7 lb.
4th Caulfield Grammar - Bow: H. P. Wilson, 2: J. d'Helin, 3: D. C. Constable, 4: T. R. Glover, 5: I. A. Amiet, 6: B. A. Mitchell, 7: J. E. Gardener, Str: R. L. Eyres, Cox: R. J. Sampson, Cch: W. Victor Nash, Esq., Average Weight 10st. 11lb.
1st Scotch College - Bow: Alan J. Bristow, 2: Alister G. Christie, 3: N. Jim Morrison, 4: Ian L. Evans, 5: Andrew B. Holmes, 6: Peter V. McConnell, 7: A. Jim Hornby, Str: Malcolm S. Lorimer, Cox: Jeffrey J. Oliver, Str: A. Michael H. Aikman, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 3 lb.
4th Geelong College - Bow: A. C. Geddes, 2: G. J. Sheahan, 3: R. J. Rickey, 4: I. W. Urquhart, 5: D. J. Urquhart, 6: J. R. Irvine, 7: R. J. John, Str: R. I. Griffiths, Cox: R. G. Strong, Cch: R. W. Purnell, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 4 lb.
1st St Kevins College - Bow: R. L. Rodda, 2: M. F Hussey, 3: W. V. P. Hunt, 4: P. C Hoy, 5: M. E. O'Connell. 6: P. D. Tozer, 7: B. A. Kurrie, Str: G. W. Phillips, Cox: C. F. Dwyer, cch: Jack Coghlan, Esq. Average Weight 11st. 4lb.
2nd Xavier College - Bow: B. W. Hardy, 2: D. T. MacIsaac, 3: A. J. Conquest, 4: D. B. O'Sullivan, 5: M. W. Richter, 6: T. M. O'Brien, 7: G. L. Mort, Str: M. F. Feely, Cox: H. I. Williams, Cch: K. C. Andrews, Esq.Average Weight 11 st. 12 lb.
3rd Geelong Grammar - Bow: F. N. Cornell, 2: R. H. Coombe, 3: P. H. M. Williams, 4: C. J. Heysen, 5: I. C. Wheatley, 6: P. R. Gunnersen, (5) D. J. H. Cockayne, Str: J. S. Veitch, Cox: J. S. Edgar, Cch: A. E. Laycock, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 9 lb.
1st Geelong College - Bow: C. W. Whitehead, 2: D. H. Millikan, 3: K. R. Kilsby, 4: J. H. Greene, 5: T. P. Cole, 6: R. J. Baker, 7: G. F. Taylor, Str: J. M. Powell, Cox: W. M. Mitchell, Cch: R. George, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 2 lb.
2nd Xavier College - Bow: P. W. Higgins, 2: H. K. Spurting, 3: D. M. Jensen, 4: P. R. Spring, 5: P. R. Gibson, 6: A. C. Gange (6) P. J. Mullins, (7) G. G. Hurley, Cox: M. H. O'Loghlen, Cch: W. R. Galbraith, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 7 lb.
3rd Scotch College - Bow: B. A. Keon-Cohen, 2: R. B. Warton, 3: A. J. McKay, 4: P. J. Mylecharane, 5: Jeff J. Whyte, 6: J. L. Bradfield, (6) H. W. G. Baker, Str: Peter A. Watkins, Cox: M. R. M. Neil, Cch: A. A. Staley, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 1 lb.
4th Melbourne Grammar - Bow: N. Charles, 2: D. R. E. Barraclough, 3: J. H. Goodall, 4: G. W. Hone, 5: D. L. A. Bevan, 6: W. J. Orchard, 7: R. Alsop, Str: J. A. W. Crawford, Cox: C. W. Graham, Cch: N. A. H. Banks, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 4 lb.
1st Wesley College - Bow: R. W. Liley, 2: J. G. Girdwood, 3: J. D. McClelland, 4: W. E. Lowe, 5: W. X. Sanguinetti, 6: K.	A. Nicholson, 7: A. M. Stevenson, Str: M. J. Long, Cox: B. Castles, Cch: Anthony W. Oakley, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 0 lb.
3rd Geelong Grammar - Bow: R. K. Black, 2: G. J. Jennison, 3: M. S. Priestley, 4: I. C. Hingeley, 5: T. D. de P. Alston, (5) D. J. Mackay Sim, 7: W. H. Baker, Str: A. G. Volum, Cox: P. J. E. Haughton, Cch: P. L. J. Westcott, Esq. Average Weight, 10 st. 13 lb.
4th Brighton Grammar - Bow: B. B. Scoullar, 2: D. I. Strachan, 3: R. T. Sharr, 4: A. R. C. Angwin, 5: J. M. Cummins, 6: P. St. J. Sutton, 7: Roger B. Wilson, Str: B. R. Hancock, Cox: D. R. Tolmer, Cch: R. H. Keon-Cohen, Esq. Average Weight, 10 st. 10 lb.
1st Wesley College - Bow: M. J. Oakley, 2: G. J. Pollock, 3: M. L. Ralton, 4: A. S. Coates, 5: R. V. Pitts, 6: M. H. Lindell, 7: J. W. Moffat, Str: R. W. Hartnett, Cox: R. B. Coombes, Cchs: V. T. Gillatt, Esq. and L. E. Pithie, Esq. Average Weight 10 st. 4.5 lb.
2nd Scotch College - Bow: R. E. Harbing, 2: J. H. Kelly, 3: D. M. Werner, 4: A. J. Carr, 5: F. G Edwards, 6: R. J Kimpton, 7: D. L. Rosetield, Str: B. R. Speed, Cox: M. B. Rodd, Cch: L. M. Bell, Esq. Average Weight, 10 st. 6 lb.
3rd Melbourne Grammar - Bow: M. J Blamey, 2: J. McP. Riches, 3: J. K. Stevenson, 4: G. R. Lansell, 5: P. R. McNeillage, 6: R. E. Morton, 7: A. E. Bracy, Str: P. E. Johnstone, Cox: G. D. Richards (Cox), Cch: K. N. Thompson, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 3 lb.
4th Caulfield Grammar - Bow: R. G. Ross, 2: J. C. Nash, 3: R. M. Stewart, 4: P. E. Fox, 5: G. R. Downing, G. J. Austin, 7: H. A. Morris, Str: E. D. Crockett, Cox:I. Beeton, Cch: H. Pennefather, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 8 lb.
1st Xavier College - Bow: P. E. Boston, 2: P. A. Lunn, 3: R. J. Spillane, 4: M. J. Lynch, 5: M. F. Monaghan, 6: D. S. Bolitho, 7: G. F. Baker, Str: J. W. Ellis, Cox: R. D. Grevis-James, Cch: J. W. Galbraith, Esq. Average Weight, 11 st. 1 lb.
2nd Geelong College - Bow: J. C. Hurlston, 2: M. R. Campbell, 3: M. A. Taylor, 4: A. J. Forbes, 5: P. J. Grant, 6: R. O. Burger, 7: J.	R. Hinchliffe, Str: K.	T. Andrews, Cox: W. M. Patterson, Cch: S. Thomas, Esq. Average Weight, 10 st. 9 lb.
3rd Geelong Grammar - Bow: P. L. Crowley, 2: M. S. Stubbs, 3: J. P. Bricknell, 4: B. O. Saxton, 5: D. W. Massy-Greene, 6: W. G. Pincott, 7: P. R. Latreille, Str: N. Lampert, Cox: P. D. Rankin, Cch: G. T. Norton, Esq. Average Weight, 10 st. 6 lb.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Pubblicazioni sull'Ossigeno-Ozono Terapia - A.I.R.O.
Ossigeno-ozono terapia – Bibliografia Ragionata.
Apuzzo Dario, Paoloni M, Di Sante L, Cacchio A, , Marotta S, Razzano M, Franzini M, Santilli V.
L’OZONE MEDICAL: PRODUCTION, POSOLGIE, MODES D’APPLICATIONS CLINIQUE.
MECHANISM OF ACTION OF OZONE ON THE HUMAN LUNG.
TERAPIA CONVENZIONALE O ALTERNATIVA. UN DILEMMA DA RISOLVERE.
Bocci V. – Practice of ozonetherapy 1: 4-9, 1996.
HAS OZONETHERAPY ANY FUTURE IN THE WEST? (SOME CRITICAL COMMENTS).
OZONETHERAPY HAS BECOME OF AGE IN RUSSIA .
EFFECTS OF OZONE ON EPITHE –LIUM AND SENSORY NERVES IN THE BRONCHIAL MUCOSA OF HEALTHY HUMANS.
Bocci V. – British Journal of Medical Science. 1998.
BIOLOGICAL AND CLINICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE. HAS OZONETHERAPY ANY FUTURE IN MEDICINE?
Bocci V. – Aldinucci C. – Corradeschi F. – Valacchi G. – Fanetti G.
OZONETHERAPY AS A COMPLEMENTARY MEDICAL APPROACH. WHERE DO WE STAND TODAY? WERE ARE WE GOING?
Bocci V. – Di Paolo N. – Borrelli E. – Larini A. – Cappelletti F.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 1. INDUCTION OF INTERFERON GAMMA ON HUMAN LEUCOCYTES.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 2: INDUCTION OF TUMOR NECROSIS FACTOR ON HUMAN LEUCOCYTES.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 3: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL INDUCTION OF CYTOKINES.
STUDIES OF THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 6. PRODUCTION OF TRANSFORMING GROWTH FACTOR B1 BY HUMAN BLOOD AFTER OZONE TREATMENT.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 7. GENERATION OF REACTIVE OXYGEN SPECIES (ROS) AFTER EXPOSURE OF HUMAN BLOOD TO OZONE.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 8. EFFECTS ON THE TOTAL ANTIOXIDANT STATUS AND ON INTERLEUKIN – 8 PRODUCTION.
Vesely Keith R., Dallas M. Hyde, Mary Y. Stovall, Jack R. Harkema, Jerry F. Green, and Edward S. Shelegle J. Appl. Physiol. 1999 86(3) : 951-962.
CAPSAICIN –SENSITIVE C-FIBER-MEDIATED PROTECTIVE RESPONSES IN OZONE INHALATION IN RATS.
Bocci V., Valacchi G., Rossi R., Giustarini D., Paccagnini E., Pucci A.M. and Di Simplicio P.-1998.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE 9. EFFECTS OF OZONE ON HUMAN PLATELETS. PLATELETS.
EFFETTI DELL’OZONO IN VITRO SU ALCUNE ATTIVITA’ BIOLOGICHE CELLULARI.
Barber E., Menéndez S., Leon O.S., Barber M.O., Merino N., Calunga J.L., Cruz E. and Bocci V.-Nephron. 1998. Ref Type: Submitted.
PREVENTION OF RENAL INJURY AFTER INDUCTION OF OZONE TOLERANCE IN RATS SUBMITTED TO WARM ISCHEMIA. A MORPHOLOGICAL, FUNCTIONAL AND BIOCHEMICAL STUDY.
B. Clavo, J. L. Perez, L. Lopez, G. Suarez, M. Lloret, V. Rodriguez, D. Macias, M. Santana, J. Morera, D. Fiuza, F. Robaina, M. Gundeeroth – The Journal of alternative and complementary medicine, Volume 9, Number 2, 2003, pp. 251-256.
A REASONABLE APPROACH FOR THE TREATMENT OF HIV INFECTION IN THE ERALY PHASE WITH OZONETHERAPY & AUTOHAEMOTHERAPY). HOW “INFLAMMATORY” CYTOKINES MAY HAVE A THERAPEUTIC ROLE.
Vaughin J. M., Chen Y.S., Novotny F., Strout D. – Journal of Microbiology Vol.36 1990 pp.557-560.
LACK OF EFFICACY OF OZONETHERAPY IN HIV INFECTION.
OZONE OXIDATIVE PRECONDITIONING: A PROTECTION AGAINST CELLULAR DAMAGE BY FREE RADICALS.
ANTIBODIES KILL BY PRODUCING OZONE.
Bocci V. – Ozon – Handbuck. Grundlagen. Pravention. Therapie Ecomed. Landsberg, 1995, pp. 1-16.
OZONE AND BREAST CANCER SERUM MARKERS.
ZUR WIRKUNG VON OZON UND IONISIERENDER STRAHLUNG AM IN-VITRO MODELL EINE PILOTSTUDIE AN VIER GYNAKOLOGISCHEN TUMOREN.
L’EFFETTO DI OZONO E RADIAZIONE IONIZZANTE IN UN MODELLO IN VITRO. UNO STUDIO PILOTA DI QUATTRO TUMORI GINECOLOGICI.
DER EINFLUB VON PARENTERALER OZON-SAUERSTOFF-GEMISCH-APPLIKATION AUF DIE KONZENTRATION VON IMMONOGLOBULIN (IgA, IgG, IgM) VON VITAMIN A UND DIE AKTIVITAT VON LYSOZYM BEI PATIENTINNEN MIT ZERVIXKARZINOM.
L’INFLUENZA DELL’APPLICAZIONE PARENTERALE DI UNA MISCELA DI OZONO OSSIGENO SULLA CONCENTRAZIONE DI IMMUNOGLOBULINA (IgA, IgG, IgM), DI VITAMINA A E L’ATTIVITA’ DI LISOZIMA SULLE PAZIENTI CON CARCINOMA DELLA CERVICE.
STUDIES ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF OZONE: INDUCTION OF TUMOR NECROSIS FACTOR (TNF ) ON HUMAN LEUCOCYTES.
EFFECT OF HYPOXIA AND OZONE TREATMENT ON NORMAL HEMOPOIETIC STEM CELLS AND CLONOGENIC TUMOR CELLS. IN VITRO CLEANSING INTENDED FOR AUTOLOGOUS BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION.
P.Wentworth, Jr., J. E. McDunn, A. D. Wentworth, C. Takeuchi, J. Nieva, T. Jones, C. Bautista.
EVIDENCE FOR ANTIBODY-CATALYZED OZONE FORMATION IN BACTERIAL KILLING AND INFIAMMATION.
Verga C.-Atti 13° Congresso Internazionale Soc. x Study of low Back Phin 19/ 22 Luglio 1992 Glasgow U.K.
Gjonovich A., Sattin G.F., Brusomini A., Preciso G.
EFFETTO DELL’OSSIGENO OZONO TERAPIA SULLA SOGLIA ANAEROBICA DELL’ATLETA.
L’OZONOTERAPIA NEL TRATTAMENTO DELLA LOMBALGIA.
THE THERAPY INVOLVING THE INFILTRATION OF OXYGEN-OZONE INTRADISC AND INTERFACET.
VARIAZIONI ISTOLOGICHE DEL DISCO INTERVERTEBRALE DOPO INFUSIONE DI OZONO (LAVORO SPERIMENTALE SU CONIGLI).
EL TRATAMIENTO DE LA LOMBOSCIATALGIA CON OZONO INTRA-DISCAL.
L’OSSIGENO OZONO TERAPIA NEL TRATTAMENTO PERCUTANEO DELL’ERNIA DISCALE LOMBARE.
INIEZIONE INTRADISCALE ED INTRAFORAMINALE DI 0203 NEL TRATTAMENTO DELLE ERNIE DEL DISCO LOMBARI.
Muto M. Avella F. Interventional Neuroradiology 4: 279-286, 1998.
PERCUTANEOUS TREATMENT OF HERNIATED LUMBAR DISC BY INTRADISCAL OXYGEN OZONE INJECTION.
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE TREATMENT OF LUMBAR DISK DISEASE, WITH A CICLE OF LUMBAR MUSCLE INJECTION OF AN OXYGEN + OZONE MIXTURE.
Cigala F., Piergentili C., Cigala M. – Ernia Del Disco Lombare Spondiliti Tumori Secondari Del Rachide – GIS Società Italiana Di Patologia Vertebrale Vol. XXI – Aulo Gaggi Editore – Bologna LE COMPLICANZE DEL TRATTAMENTO CHIRURGICO DELL’ERNIA DEL DISCO CON METODICA TRADIZIONALE.
Fabris G., Tommasini G., Lavaroni A., Petralia B., Biasizzo E., Aprile I., D’Agostini S., Iaiza F.
Barbara C., Simonetti L., Giatti S., Leonardi M.
TRATTAMENTO PERCUTANEO DELL’ERNIA DISCALE LOMBARE CON INIEZIONE INTRADISCALE DI MISCELA DI OZONO.
Muto M., Bonsignore R., Esposito G., Palmieri A.
Alexandre A., Corò L., Fumo G., Scopetta S. – L’Ozonoterapia nel 2000a cura di F. Ceccherelli e G.P.GironEd. Libreria Cortina, Torino 1999, 65-70.
Leopoldo Alvarez – MUTUAJUDICIAL – Revista De La Mutualidad General Judicial – N°17 enero – Abril 2000 – pp. 18-20.
ERNIE DISCALI LOMBOSACRALI E PATOLOGIA DEGENERATIVA CORRELATA.
NUCLEOLISI E TRATTAMENTO CON OSSIGENO OZONO NELLE RACHIALGIE E RADICULOPATIE.
PHARMACOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING OXYGEN-OZONE THERAPY.
E. Iliakis – V. Valadakis – D.H. Vynios – C.P. Tsiganos – E. Agapitos.
CT-GUIDED PERIGANGLIONIC STEROID TREATMENT AND PAIN RELIEF IN PATIENTS WITH SCIATALGIA PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.
CT-GUIDED INTRAFORAMINAL OXYGEN-OZONE THERAPY IN LUMBAR DISC HERNIATION.
M. Muto, C. Andreula, M. Leonardi – J Neuroradiol. 2004 Jun; 31(3):183-9.
Treatment of herniated lumbar disc by intradiscal and intraforaminal oxygen-ozone (O2-O3) injection.
DOES OZONE THERAPY NORMALIZE THE CELLULAR REDOX BALANCE?
CONTROLLO DELLE INFEZIONI CON L’OZONIZZAZIONE ASPETTI DELL’IGIENE MEDICO.
L’EQUILIBRIO PO2/PCO2 NELLA PATOGENESI DELLA CEFALEA A GRAPPOLO. PROSPETTIVE DELL’O2O3 TERAPIA.
Bocci V. – Forschende Komplementarmedizin 1998, 5, 54-60.
OZONETHERAPY AS A POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE MODIFIER IN CANCER.
EFFECTS OF LOW OZONE-OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS ON THE ACETYLCHOLINE RELEASE AT THE MOUSE NEUROMUSCULAR JUNCTION.
OZONE THERAPY AND MAGNETO THERAPY: NEW METHODS FOR THE REHABILITATION OF PATIENTS WITH SIMPLE CHRONIC GLAUCOMA.
F. Incarbone, G. Perone, M. Franzini, F. Bertè, M. Schmidt – Atti del Congresso: “New Developments in the Treatement of Age Related Macular Desease; Gardone Riviera 22 24 Giugno 1997 .
OSSIGENO OZONO TERAPIA NELLA DEGENERAZIONE MACULARE SENILE.
Bocci V. – Ozon-Handbuch. Grundlagen. Pravention. Therapie Ecomed. Landsberg, 1997, pp. 1-25.
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH (OZONATED AUTOHAEMOTHERAPY) IN AGE-RELATED MACULAR DEGENERATION. AGING.
REACTIVITY OF NUCLEIC ACIDS WITH OZONE: AN FT-IR MICROSPECTROSCOPY STUDY.
OZONO: PROBLEMI TOSSICOLOGICI CON PARTICOLARE RIGUARDO ALLA FORMAZIONE DI RADICALI LIBERI.
INFLUENCE OF OZONE ON THE DEGRADATION OF FATTY ACIDS OF CELLULAR MEMBRANES: A FUORIER TRANSFORM INFRARED MICROSPECTROSCOPY (FT-IR-M) STUDY.
Gabrielli A., Benedetti E., Bramanti E., Agostini G., Franzini M., Vergamini P., Benedetti E.
Amato G., Cattelan E., Lera G.F.
AUTOHAEMOTHERAPY AFTER TREATMENT OF BLOOD WITH OZONE. A REAPPRAISAL.
OZONE: A MIXED BLESSING. NEW MECHANISMS OF THE ACTION OF OZONE ON BLOOD CELLS MAKE OZONATED MAJOR AUTOHAEMOTHERAPY (MAH) A RATIONAL APPROACH.
Coppola L., Verrazzo G., Giunta R., Luongo C., Sammartino A., Ragone R., Vincenti D., Grassia A., Tirelli A. – Trombosis and Atherosclerosis, 3, 83-89, 1992.
NIEKTORE PARAMETRY GOSPODARKI LIPIDOWEJ PO DOTETNICZYCH WSTRZYKNIECIACH OZONU U CHORYCH NA CHOROB. NIEDOKRWIENNA KONCZYN DOLNYCH ORAZ CUKRZYCE.
SOME PARAMETERS OF LIPID METABOLISM FOLLOWING INTRA-ARTERIAL OZONE APPLICATION TO PATIENTS WITH LOWE EXTREMITIES ISCHAEMIA AND DIABETES MELLITUS.
NIEKTORE PARAMETRY HEMOSTAZY PO LECZENIU OZONEM W GRUPIE CHORYCH NA MIAZDZYCE ZAROSTOWA TETNIC KONCZY DOLNYCH ORAZ W GRUPIE CHORYCH NA CUKRZYCE.
OCENA KLINICZNA SKUTECZNOSCI LECZENIA MIAZDZYCY ZAROSTOWEJ KONCZYN DOTETNICZYM WSTRZYKIWANIEM OZONU.
OZONOTERAPIA A LEPKOSC KRWI I OSOCZA, DYSTANS CHROMANIA PRZESTANKOWEGO ORAZ NIEKTORE SKLADNIKI BIOCHEMICZNE KRWI U CHORYCH NA CUKRZYCE TYPU II Z CHOROBA NIEDOKRWIENNA KONCZYN DOLNYCH.
OZONE THERAPY IN PATIENTS WITH DIABETES MELLITUS TYPE II AND OBLITERATIVE ARTERIOSCLEROSIS.
L’O2-O3 TERAPIA NELL’INSUFFICIENZA VENOSA CRONICA: STUDIO CLINICO DI EFFICACIA E TOLLERABILITA’.
VALUTAZIONE DELLA EFFICACIA DELL’OZONOTERAPIA NELLE ARTERIOPATIE CRONICHE OSTRUTTIVE DEGLI ARTI INFERIORI.
ATEROESCLEROSIS OBLITERANTE Y OZONOTERAPIA. ADMINISTRACION POR DIFERENTES VIAS.
Lettieri B. Acta Toxicol. Ther., Vol XVII, n. 2-3 , 1996.
Coppola L., Giunta R., Verrazzo G., La Marca C., Ziccardi P., Grassia A., Tirelli A., Luongo C., Sammartino A. – Atti VI Congresso Nazionale Società Scientifica It. di Ossigeno Ozono Terapia Roma 1996.
L’OSSIGENO-OZONOTERAPIA NELLE MALATTIE VASCOLARI DEGLI ARTI INFERIORI.
IMPORTANZA DELLA VALUTAZIONE MICROANGIOLOGICA PENIENA (V. C.S.O.) NELLA INDIVIDUAZIONE DELLE LESIONI PRECOCI DI NATURA VASCOLARE NELLA IMPOTENZA ERETTILE.
Simonetti V., Liboni W., Biancotti P., Grillo A.
OZONIZED AUTOHEMOTRANSFUSION IMPROVES HEMORHEOLOGICAL PARAMETERS AND OXYGEN DELIVERY TO TISSUES IN PATIENTS WITH PERIPHERAL OCCLUSIVE ARTERIALE DISEASE.
PROPOSTA DI STUDIO OSSERVAZIONALE SPONTANEO SULL’UTILIZZO DELL’OZONOTERAPIA NELLA SCLEROSI MULTIPLA.
BENEFICIAL CLINICAL EFFECTS OF OZONATED AUTOHEMOTHERAPY IN CHRONICALLY DIALYSED PATIENTS WITH ATHEROSCLEROTIC ISCHEMIA OF THE LOWER LIMBS PILOT STUDY.
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2) Ozone Therapy Seems to Be Safe, But is it Really Effective?. International Journal of Artificial Organs Aug 2004.
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7) So what has ozone ever done for us?. The Guardian Unlimited.
8) The Dilemma of Exposing or Burying a Complementary Medical Approach. Journal Biological Regulators & Homeostatic Agents 1996.
9) Biological and Clinical Effect of Ozone. Has Ozone Therapy any Future in Medicine?. British Journal Biomedical Science 1999.
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12) Effects of Ozone Exposure On Lung Function In Man. Reviews of Environmental Health 1981.
13) Is It True That Ozone Is Always Toxic? The End Of A Dogma.. Toxicology Applied Pharmacology. 2006.
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22) Safety of Treated Water for Re-Use Purposes-Comparison. Inter Assoc Water Pollution Research 2006.
24) Ozone Generators Generate Prison Terms for Couple. FDA Consumer 1999.
25) Ozone: A Wide-Spectrum Healer. Dr Gary Null.
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29) Stoker, George. The Surgical Uses of Ozone. Lancet II, Oct. 21, 1916 , page 712.
32) M.Twaities, Ozone Healing. Medical Journal of Australia 1977.
33) Are Worry Free Transfusions Just a Whiff of Ozone Away?. Canadian Medical Association.
34) Oxygenation Therapy: Unproven Treatments for Cancer and AIDS. Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine, 1997.
36) Ozone Therapy Research. Pubmed.
37) A Virology Primer: With Special Reference to Ozone.
38) Oxygenation therapy: Unproven treatments for Cancer and AIDS. Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1997.
39) Studies on the biological effects of ozone: 7. Generation of reactive oxygen species (ROS) after exposure of human blood to ozone. Biological regulators and Homeostatic Agents 1998.
40) Free radical biology and medicine: it’s a gas, man!. American Journal Physiolgy 2006.
41) Effect of autohemotherapy on the blood and blood picture. Hippokrates. 1950.
42) Effect of ozone on red blood cell enzymes and intermediates. Acta Haematology 2000.
43) Inactivation of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 by ozone in vitro. Blood 1991.
44) Ozone inactivates HIV at noncytotoxic concentrations. Antiviral Research 1991.
45) The use of ozone treated blood in the therapy of HIV infection and immune disease: a pilot study of safety and efficacy. AID’s 1991.
46) Studies on the biological effects of ozone: 5. Evaluation of immunological parameters and tolerability in normal volunteers receiving ambulatory autohaemotherapy. Biotherapy 1993-1994 .
47) A realistic evaluation of the action of ozone on whole human blood. International Biological Macromolecules 2006.
48) Effect of ozone on neutrophil function in vitro. Clinical & Laboritory Haematology 2001.
49) Susceptibilities of plasma antioxidants and erythrocyte constituents to low levels of ozone. Haematologia (Budap). 1998.
50) No effects of ozonated autohemotherapy on inflammation response in hemodialyzed patients. Mediators Inflammation 2004.
51) Blood coagulation unaffected by ozonated autohemotherapy in patients on maintenance hemodialysis. Archives Medical Research 2006.
52) Natural killer cell activity unaffected by ozonated autohemotherapy in patients with end-stage renal disease on maintenance renal replacement therapy. International Artificial Organs 2004.
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55) Ozone selectively inhibits growth of human cancer cells. Science 1980.
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60) Investigating Antibody-Catalyzed Ozone Generation by Human Neutrophils.. National Academy Science U S A. 2003.
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matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Law Web: Whether sub tenant can oppose eviction suit on ground of bonfide requirement?
Whether sub tenant can oppose eviction suit on ground of bonfide requirement?
Thus, the present appellant having no privity of tenancy with the plaintiff, it is not open to him to challenge the plaintiff's suit for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement. He having been impleaded merely as a sub-tenant was and is entitled to oppose the suit only on ground of sub-tenancy.
Harveer Singh and Subalal (Deceased) through his L.Rs.
Shri Kishan Singh Tomar and Ors.
This judgment disposes of Second Appeal Nos. 108/00, 62/00 and 206/00, as they arise from a common suit.
Subalal, the original plaintiff, instituted a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent on 04.11.1985 against Harveer Singh and Shri Kishan Singh Tomar with allegations that the defendant No. 1 (Harveer Singh) had obtained the suit shop from the plaintiff on rent @ Rs. 400/- per month vide rent note dated 20.02.1980. He sublet it to defendant No. 2 (Shri Kishan Singh Tomar) and parted with possession of the suit shop in favour of defendant No. 2, who is running a shop of motor parts in it. Suit shop is required bonafide for the plaintiff's son, namely, Bahadurlal to start a business of grains.
Defendant No. 1 submitted his written statement and denied the claim of the plaintiff. He denied to have executed the alleged rent note and equally denied to have obtained the suit shop on rent from the plaintiff. He also denied to have parted with possession of the suit shop in favour of defendant No. 2. Alleged genuine requirement for the plaintiff's son was also denied.
Defendant No. 2 submitted a separate written statement. He asserted his possession as tenant of the plaintiff on account of having obtained the suit shop on rent @ Rs. 25/- per month under oral tenancy. He stated that defendant No. 1 was never a tenant in the suit shop and defendant No. 2 was not and is not sub-tenant of defendant No. 1. Alleged genuine need for the plaintiff's son was also denied.
During pendency of the suit, written statement was amended by defendant No. 2 and it was pleaded, in specific, as a special plea that the plaintiff was not owner and occupant of the suit shop on the date of the institution of the suit, therefore, he has no right to seek eviction. In the light of the aforesaid amended version, plaintiff amended the plaint and pleaded that the mutual partition between his sons was accepted by the Municipality, Morena on 01.07.87 and accordingly the suit shop was allotted to the share of Bahadurlal, plaintiff's son, whose need was pleaded in the plaint.
After the complete trial, learned trial judge vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.98 granted a decree for eviction with a finding that the defendant No. 1 had obtained the suit shop from the plaintiff on rent @ Rs. 400/- per month vide rent note dated 20.02.1980. Suit shop is required bonafide for the business of grain-merchant of Bahadurlal, the plaintiff's son. Defendant No. 2 has not occupied the suit shop as a tenant of the plaintiff and is rather a sub-tenant. Accordingly, a decree under Sections 12(1)(b) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act") was granted in favour of the plaintiff with the arrears of rent and mesne profits @ Rs. 2000/- per month w.e.f. 01.04.1983.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid, defendants No. 1 and 2 preferred separate civil appeals bearing numbers 55A/98 and 42A/98, respectively. Leaned lower appellate judge found that the defendant No. 1 has sublet the suit shop to defendant No. 2 and that the suit shop is bonafide required for the business of grain-merchant of Bahadurlal, plaintiff's son. Accordingly, on these two grounds, judgment and decree of the learned trial judge was confirmed. However, the judgment and decree with regard to mesne profits @ Rs. 2000/- per month has been set aside and instead the same @ Rs. 400/- per month is granted.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 preferred Second Appeal Nos. 108/00 and 62/00, respectively, containing challenge to eviction on ground under Sections 12(1)(b) and (f) of the Act. Simultaneously, plaintiffs/appellants preferred Second Appeal No. 206/00 for grant of future mesne profits @ 2000/- per month.
1. Whether in a suit of eviction a decree can be passed to handover the possession to someone else other than the plaintiff?
Whether the decree of eviction can be passed on the ground of subtenancy only on the ground that the rent-note is proved?
1. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent after the disputed shop falling to the share of another member of family was maintainable?
Whether the maintainability of the suit can be decided on the basis of receipts of rent when the rent was so received in ignorance of family partition and the transaction of payment of rent was governed by Section 50 of the Act?
Whether the receipt of rent in ignorance of the fact of partition was vitiated by mistake as to the right to receive rent and the transaction was void under Section 21 of the Indian Contract Act and in any case it was voidable under Section 22 of Indian Contract Act which could give no right under Section 2(b) Accommodation Control Act?
Whether acceptance of rent by the plaintiff from appellant Shri Krishna Singh attracted the principle of waiver and the right of the plaintiff to file the suit for eviction on the ground of subtenancy is waived and no decree could be passed on this ground?
Whether on the basis of Naval Kishore Mangilal's case finding arrived at by first appellate court regarding mesne profit is without any basis and against evidence led by parties ?
Shri P.K. Patni, learned Counsel for the appellant, in S.A. No. 108/00, submitted that merely on account of the execution of the rent-note having been proved against defendant No. 1, decree for eviction cannot be legally granted on the ground of subtenancy.
On consideration of the aforesaid contention in the light of the material on record, it is observed that the case of the plaintiff, in specific, is that the suit shop was let out to defendant No. 1 vide rent note dated 20.02.1980. Suit shop was obtained by defendant No. 1 on rent @ Rs. 400/- per month from the plaintiff. It is further pleaded in the plaint that after obtaining the suit shop on rent, defendant No. 1 handed it over to defendant No. 2 who happened to be the uncle of defendant No. 1. Since then, defendant No. 2 has been in the actual possession of the suit shop and is running a business of motor parts in it. Defendant No. 1 denied to have executed rent-note in favour of the plaintiff and has also equally denied relationship of tenancy with the plaintiff. According to his own written statement, he is not in possession and it is the defendant No. 2 who is in exclusive possession of the suit shop. Original rent-note dated 20.02.1980 is on record as Ex.P-1 which is duly proved to have been executed by defendant No. 1. Thus, obviously, the case for eviction on ground under 12(1)(b) is made out since the suit shop is occupied by the defendant No. 2 alone without proof of privity of contract with the plaintiff. This finding has been recorded by the courts below after correct appreciation of the evidence on record, therefore, this Court does not find any infirmity in the grant of decree under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act in favour of the plaintiff. Substantial question of law No. 2 is accordingly answered against the appellant.
As regards substantial question of law No. 1, it is contended by Shri Patni, learned Counsel, that the suit shop was already allotted to Bahadurlal, plaintiff's son, prior to the institution of the suit, therefore, the suit instituted by Subalal is not maintainable. Reliance for this purpose is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnada MANU/SC/0535/1999 : (1999) 6 SCC 632. In the case of T.K. Lathika (Supra), a petition for eviction under Section 11(3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, was submitted regardless of the third proviso to Section 11(3) which prescribed that a landlord whose right to recover possession arose under an instrument of transfer inter vivos would be entitled to apply for such possession only after the expiry of one year from the date of instrument.
In the case in hand, it is observed, firstly, that the defendant No. 1/appellant has not taken any such plea in his written statement. Secondly, eviction against appellant is also ordered under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act which enables the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant who has unlawfully sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the accommodation for consideration or otherwise. Plaintiff has already duly proved the rent-note in his favour which was executed by defendant No. 1 who is not in possession of the suit shop. Defendant No. 2 who is running his business in the suit shop has no contractual relationship of landlord and tenant with the plaintiff. Thus, case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 has parted with possession in favour of defendant No. 2 is clearly made out and no interference is called for in the decree for eviction on this ground.
It is further contended by Shri Patni that the learned lower appellate judge has illegally directed the defendant to handover possession of the suit shop to Bahadurlal since the latter is third party and no possession could be directed to be handed over except to the plaintiff.
This submission is also not impressive because during pendency of the appeal before this Court, original plaintiff Subalal has died and Bahadurlal being the son of the deceased/original plaintiff has already been brought on record as plaintiff/respondent. The law cited by Shri Patni, learned Counsel, as MANU/SC/0473/1981 : AIR 1981 SC 1113 M.M Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. MANU/MP/0135/1971 : 1971 JLJ 102 Shankar Sahai v. Kanmal and Ors. and MANU/MP/0001/1965 : 1964 JLJ 436 Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa has no application in the case of decree for eviction on ground under Section 12(1)(b), more so, when Bahadurlal has already been brought on record in place of deceased Subalal. Accordingly, substantial question of law No. 1 is also answered against the appellant.
In the result, Second Appeal No. 108/2000 is found meritless and the same is hereby dismissed.
Shri K.N. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for appellant in Second Appeal 62/2000 contended that the plaintiff in paragraph 6 of the plaint has admitted by virtue of amendment that the partition took place which was accepted by Municipality Morena vide order dated 01.07.1987. In paragraph 36 of the statement on oath plaintiff has further admitted that the partition between him and his sons took place in the year 1979 and an application for mutation in accordance with the partition was submitted in the year 1982. Relying upon Article 340 of the principle of Hindu Law (Mulla 18th Edition), it is contended that after partition in the year 1979, Subalal ceased to be owner of the suit shop and was not competent to represent the estate. Thus, the suit for ejectment at the instance of Subalal is incompetent.
Per contra, Shri S.B. Mishra, learned senior counsel, appearing for the plaintiff, it is contended, firstly, that it was merely a family settlement which was referred to by the plaintiff in paragraph 36. Secondly, no such specific plea is taken in the written statement by the appellant. Thirdly, Bahadurlal to whom the suit shop is allotted in partition is already impleaded in place of deceased Subalal, therefore, objection raised by the appellant's learned senior counsel is not liable to be accepted.
Considered the submissions and perused the record.
On close scrutiny of the plaintiff's statement, it may be seen that the plaintiff categorically admitted in paragraph 36 that there occurred partition between him and his sons in the year 1979. He did not speak about the alleged family settlement. Plaintiff has further admitted that pursuant to the said partition, application for mutation was submitted in the Municipality, Morena in the year 1982 and the mutation was accordingly made in the year 1987. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be termed as a family settlement.
...the plaintiffs were suing in ejectment, and they could only succeed on the strength of their own title. There was no obligation upon the defendants to plead possible defects in the plaintiff's title which might manifest themselves when the title was disclosed. It was sufficient that in the written statements the defendants denied the plaintiffs' title, and under this plea they could avail themselves of any defect which such title disclosed.
On perusal, it is found that the defendant/appellant has not denied the ownership of the plaintiff. On the contrary, he has clearly stated in paragraph 16 of his written statement that the defendant No. 2 alone is occupying the suit shop as tenant of the plaintiff @ Rs. 25/- per month. This has not been found proved. Thus, the present appellant having no privity of tenancy with the plaintiff, it is not open to him to challenge the plaintiff's suit for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement. He having been impleaded merely as a sub-tenant was and is entitled to oppose the suit only on ground of sub-tenancy.
As regards substitution of Bahadurlal, son of the plaintiff in place of deceased/plaintiff alongwith other legal heirs, it is submitted by Shri K.N. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate that the requirement was pleaded for the son of the plaintiff. Bahadurlal was impleaded accordingly as legal representative of the deceased and not in his personal capacity. Therefore, ownership of Bahadurlal in respect of the suit shop cannot be invoked. Reliance for this purpose is placed on the decision of Hon. Supreme Court of India in the case of Vidyawati v. Man Mohan and Ors. MANU/SC/0318/1995 : AIR 1995 SC 1653 wherein it is observed that it is true that when the petitioner was impleaded as a party-defendant, all rights under Order 22, Rule 4(2) and defences available to the deceased defendant become available to her. In addition, if the petitioner had any independent right, title or interest in the property then she had to get herself impleaded in the suit as a party defendant in which event she could set up her own independent right, title and interest, to resist the claim made by the plaintiff or challenge the decree that may be passed in the suit.
In MANU/SC/0528/1986 : AIR 1986 SC 1952 Bal Kishan v. Omprakash, it is observed that Sub-rule 2 of Rule 4 of Order 22 of CPC authorised the legal representative of a deceased defendant to file an additional written statement or statement of objections raising all plea which the deceased-defendant had or could have raised except those which were personal to the deceased-defendant or respondent.
Law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two decisions has also been followed by this Court in the case of Munna Lal S/o Kedarnath Bhandari and Ors. v. Chironjilal S/o Lalluram and Ors. MANU/MP/1403/2006 : 2007(2) MPLJ 104.
...It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice--subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.
Law is to be always applied in progressive manner and subsequent events must be taken into consideration to promote justice. Eviction has been claimed on various grounds including bonafide need of Bahadurlal, who is proved either exclusive owner or co-owner. Since the ownership is not contemplated for eviction on the ground under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, it would not be appropriate to dismiss the suit for eviction despite the proof about bonafide need of Bahadurlal on the ground that his father was not competent to represent the estate, at the time of institution of suit. Bahadurlal has already been impleaded in the present litigation as plaintiff and his bonafide need has already been found established by the courts below in concurrent manner. Defendants have been unable to demonstrate any infirmity in such finding. Thus, it would not be appropriate and justiciable to expect Bahadurlal to institute a fresh suit despite his proven need by dismissing the suit on the ground of earlier partition. Bahadurlal has already been impleaded in the present suit and his alleged need has already been found genuine by the courts below. This being so, this Court declines to interfere in the impugned judgment on the substantial question of Law No. 1, at the instance of sub-tenant. Defendant No. 2 is merely a subtenant and has no right to contest the suit for eviction on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, therefore, denial of ownership by him of the plaintiff is meaningless and the same cannot be availed by defendant No. 1. Hence, substantial question of law No. 1 is answered accordingly.
As regards substantial question of law Nos. 2, 3 and 4, it may be seen that there is no averment in the written statement either of defendant No. 1 or of defendant No. 2 that the rent was paid in ignorance of the family partition. On the contrary, specific plea of defendant No. 1/appellant is that he was never tenant in the suit shop. Contrary to this, it has been found by the courts below that the defendant/appellant was inducted into suit shop vide rent note marked as Ex.P-1. Further case of the plaintiff is that the possession of the suit shop was handed over by the defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 as a sub-tenant within the meaning of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act and decree for eviction on this ground has been sought. Defendant No. 2 has clearly admitted that he is in possession of the suit shop. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances on record, it has been rightly found that the defendant No. 1/appellant has parted with possession in favour of defendant No. 2 and has incurred liability of eviction on ground under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act. There is no proof on record that defendant No. 2 had paid rent as a tenant to the plaintiff. Privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 is not found established by both the courts below in concurrent manner which is obviously finding of fact. Thus, this Court does not find any infirmity in the decree on the ground under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act and accordingly substantial questions of law No. 2, 3 and 4 are decided against the appellant.
In the result, Second Appeal No. 62/2000 stands dismissed for want of substance.
5. It has been further submitted for the appellants that although the learned appellate court had relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of Chandra Kali v. Jagdish Singh Thakur reported in MANU/SC/0366/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 2262. However over-looked the case of Shyam Charan v. Sheoji Bhai AIR 1977 SC 2271 wherein contractual rent was Rs. 1,600/- per month while the mesne profits was awarded by the trial court at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month. This amount of mesne profits was not disturbed even up to the appeal before Hon'ble the Supreme Court.
In case of Nandita Bose (Smt.) v. Ratanlal Nahta 1988(1) MPWN 26, it has been held that mesne profits from the tenant can be claimed more than that of rent-rate. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.C. Oswal v. V.K. Subbiah and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0041/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 184 has observed that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that rental has escalated everywhere and in appropriate cases the rent can also be raised. The Calcutta High Court in case of Jagat Narayan Singh v. Rabinder Mohan Bhandari and Ors. reported in MANU/WB/0030/1992 : AIR 1992 Calcutta 216 after expiry of lease period held tenant liable to pay mense profits for occupation of premises at prevalent rate and not at contractual rate. In a Division Bench decision of Delhi High Court in case of Vinod Khanna and Ors. v. Bakshi Sachdev (deceased Through L.R's and Ors.) reported in MANU/DE/0933/1995 : AIR 1996 Delhi 32, even when no evidence was led by landlord in respect of increase of rent, held, justified in fixing compensation mesne profits by taking judicial notice of the fact of increase in rent.
It is further observed that in the case in hand, defendant No. 1 (i.e. tenant) has incurred liability to be evicted by parting with possession of the suit shop in favour of the defendant No. 2 (sub-tenant) who is running the business of motor-parts in it for last number of years. When the tenant himself has invited action against him by making available to the landlord a ground for eviction, there would be no impropriety in awarding proper and reasonable mesne profits even at the rate higher to contractual one.
Consequently, substantial question of law in Second Appeal No. 206/2000 is answered in favour of the appellant and it is held that the appellant is entitled to receive mesne profit @ Rs. 1,000/- per month in the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, Second Appeal No. 206/2000 stands partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court to this extent is set aside. Decree be modified accordingly. Appellant to receive cost of Rs. 5,000/- from appellants of Second Appeal No. 108/00 and 62/00, if already certified.

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