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Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. [288 U.S. 218, 219] Messrs. R. Worth Vaughan and Elihu Root, Jr., both of New York City, for appellant.
Messrs. Thomas E. Knight, Jr., and Frontis H. Moore, both of Montgomery, Ala., for the State of Alabama.
Appellant is a New York corporation having its principal office in that state. October 10, 1927, it qualified to do business in Alabama, and March 14, 1930, made and sent to the state tax commission a return showing that its [288 U.S. 218, 221] only property in Alabama on December 31, 1929, the date as of which the statute required the statement to be made, was 33,455,763 pounds of nitrate of soda which had been imported by it from Chile into Alabama and stored in the original packages, the book value of which was $712,846.72. March 31, 1930, the commission under section 54 of No. 163, General Acts 1927,1 assessed against appellant for that year a franchise tax of $1,425. 69, being at the rate of $2 on each $1,000 of the value so reported.
Conformably to state practice appellant appealed to the circuit court of Montgomery county. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts the abridged substance of which follows.
From the date of its qualification in Alabama to the time of the assessment, appellant was engaged in the business of importing nitrate through the port of Mobile and other ports. The nitrate, in bags containing about 100 pounds each, was brought into Mobile and there stored [288 U.S. 218, 222] by appellant in a public warehouse and kept in the original packages until sold and delivered to the ultimate consumers. All was sold upon orders through a salesman who, paying his own expenses, was compensated by commissions on his sales. The orders were taken subject to approval and were not effective until approved by appellant in its New York office. When so accepted, directions were given that the nitrate be forwarded to the customers. These directions were given to and carried out by the Walsh Stevedoring Company at Mobile, an independent contractor, having an arrangement with appellant to handle its importations of nitrate, store it in a public warehouse and forward it as directed.
All transactions were for cash. The customers received the nitrate only upon payment of the purchase price when they took up the shipping documents through a bank of collection by paying the drafts attached. Such payments were sent to the Merchants' National Bank at Mobile and by it immediately transferred to appellant in New York. Appellant had no bank account in Alabama and paid all expenses there by remittances from New York. On the date as of which appellant's return was made it had no accounts or bills receivable in Alabama and had no money there at any time except during the brief intervals that the funds were being so transmitted. It did not have or employ any capital in that State unless the importation through the port of Mobile, the storage and sale of nitrate in the manner above described constitutes capital and its employment there.
Section 54, under which the assessment was made, declares that every corporation organized under the laws of any other state and doing business in Alabama shall pay to the state an annual franchise tax of $2 on each $1, 000 of the actual amount of capital employed therein. Appellant maintained below and here insists that the section, construed to impose the tax in question, [288 U.S. 218, 223] is repugnant to the declarations of the federal Constitution: 'No state shall, without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,' article 1, 10, cl. 2, and, 'The congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states ...' article 1, 8.
The Alabama statute in question was enacted in pursuance of section 232 of the state Constitution which declares: No foreign corporation shall do any business in the state without having a place of business and an authorized agent therein and without filing with the secretary of state a certified copy of its articles of incorporation. 'The legislature shall, by general law, provide for the payment to the State of Alabama of a franchise tax by such corporation, but such franchise tax shall be based on the actual amount of capital employed in this state.' As to the meaning and purpose of the statute, we are governed by the construction put upon it by the state supreme court.
And in the case at bar the court said: 'The defendant duly qualified as a foreign corporation to do business in this state, appointed a resident agent, and that it actually engaged in business in Alabama by selling its nitrate through a selesman both within and without the state appears as an uncontroverted fact. It seeks to be relieved from this franchise tax solely upon the theory the imported nitrate, the sale of which constituted its business, was immune from state taxation. ... The statute here under review has no reference to imports, but is merely of a general character relating to the fixation of the amount of a franchise tax upon foreign corporations doing business in this state.' 142 So. 87, 89. And, aftet referring to the manner of appellant's acceptance of orders and the collections and remittances, the court said: 'These details go to show the corporation was actually engaged in business in this state. ...' 142 So. 87, 91. As appellant did no local business in the state, that decision plainly rests upon the assumption that Alabama had power to tax appellant's sales in original packages of the nitrate it imported into that state only for sale and that such sales constituted a business that is taxable under section 54. The Alabama statute is unlike that of Michigan examined here in Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 U.S. 295 , 53 S.Ct. 137, and Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 342 , 52 S.Ct. 512. There the tax upon a domestic corporation was imposed for the mere right to transact business.
The question whether, consistently with the imports and commerce clauses, the Alabama statute may be construed to require appellant to pay the specified franchise tax is dual in form but single in substance for, upon the facts of this case, it is clear that if the exaction is a tax on imports it necessarily burdens foreign commerce. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 295 , 38 S.Ct. 126.
In support of its conclusion the state court cited and appellee relies upon New York State v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 658 , 19 S.Ct. 58, 70. The question for decision in the case now before us was not involved, presented, or decided there. The statute of New York considered there imposed a tax on the business or franchise of domestic and foreign corporations except, among others, those wholly engaged in carrying on manufacture in the state. The taxpayer, Parke, Davis & Co., was a Michigan corporation. It had its factory in Detroit and a warehouse and depot in New York. It had a manager and over fifty employees there. It did local business and also sold in original packages goods received from its factory and goods imported for it from foreign countries. The tax rate was graded by the statute according to dividends (presumably paid out of net earnings). Cf. U.S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 , 38 S.Ct. 499, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748. The tax base was the amount of capital employed within the state and the comptroller fixed that amount at $90,000. The corporation, seeking to have the assessment set aside, took the case to the state supreme court. It sustained the assessment against the contention that the statute as construed by the comptroller was repugnant to [288 U.S. 218, 228] the privileges and immunities clause, article 4, 2, and held that the business was 'not interstate commerce, which will prevent the corporation carrying it on from being taxed. ...' People ex rel. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Roberts, 91 Hun, 158, 162, 36 N.Y.S. 368, 371. No other federal question was considered. The court of appeals affirmed without opinion. In this court the corporation's principal insistence was that the statute was repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it exempted domestic corporations manufacturing and selling in New York while imposing upon the Michigan corporation a discriminatory tax for selling in New York in original packages products manufactured in its Detroit factory. The court overruled that contention. The opinion shows that as to the amount of its capital employed in New York no federal question was presented. And, as admittedly the corporation did a local business in that state, i.e., business not included in interstate or foreign commerce (New York v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 659 , 19 S.Ct. 58, 70, People ex rel. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Roberts, 91 Hun, 160, 36 N.Y. S. 368), that case is essentially different from this one.
The decisions here since New York State v. Roberts, supra, definitely show that the power of the state to withhold from a foreign corporation permission to exercise its franchise to do business therein does not enable it, when granting the privilege, to burden by taxation interstate commerce carried on by such corporation within the state. And quite recently in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 , we said (page 434, 46 S.Ct. 331, 332): 'Thus the right to exclude a foreign corporation cannot be used to prevent it from resorting to a federal Court. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 , 42 S.Ct. 188, 21 A.L.R. 186; or to tax it upon property that by established principles the State has no power to tax, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 190, and other cases in the same volume and later that have followed it; or to interfere with interstate commerce, Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 203 , 35 S.Ct. 57; Looney [288 U.S. 218, 229] v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 188 , 38 S.Ct. 85; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 , 38 S.Ct. 438, 1 A.L.R. 1278.' See Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, supra; Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 , 45 S.Ct. 477, 44 A.L.R. 1219; Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm. of California, 271 U.S. 583 , 593, et seq., 46 S.Ct. 605, 47 A.L.R. 457; Sprout v. South Bend, Ind., 277 U.S. 163 , 170-171, 48 S.Ct. 502, 62 A.L.R. 45; New Jersey Tel. Co. v. Tax Board of New Jersey, 280 U.S. 338, 346 , 50 S.Ct. 111; East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm. of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 470 , 51 S.Ct. 499.
It follows that the Alabama statute, construed to impose a tax upon appellant for selling in that state in the original packages the nitrate imported by it from Chile, is repugnant to the imports and commerce clauses above quoted. And, as it did no other business in that state, it is not liable for any part of the tax that the state commission assessed against it.
This case does not present the question that would be here if the appellant had not sought for and obtained a privilege or franchise to do a local business in the state of Alabama. There is nothing in the Alabama decisions, and little in her statutes, to indicate that the tax would have been sustained in the absence of such a grant, or that there would have been even an attempt to levy it. Ewart Lumber Co. v. American Cement Co., 9 Ala.App. 152, 156, 62 So. 560; Citizens' National Bank v. Buckheit, 14 Ala.App. 511, 517, 519, 71 So. 82; Tyson v. Jennings Produce Co., 16 Ala. App. 374, 375, 77 So. 986; Ware v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 92 Ala. 145, 149, 9 So. 136; Cook v. Rome Brick Co., 98 Ala. 409, 413, 12 So. 918; Stratford v. City Council of Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 20 So. 127; Alabama Code of 1928, 7217, limiting the application of sections 7209 to 7220. Indeed, the Attorney General informed us on the argument that this would have been the position of his department of the Govern- [288 U.S. 218, 230] ment, charged, as it is, with the collection of the revenues of the state. Alabama has said by her courts that it is beyond the power of the Legislature to restrict by conditions the exercise or enjoyment of a privilege that has its origin and sanction in the Constitution of the nation. See cases supra. Alabama has said by her statutes (Code, 7217) that the permits and franchise taxes exacted of foreign corporations by article 26 of the Alabama Code do not apply to corporations 'engaging in or transacting business of interstate commerce only,' if the privilege they ask for is that and nothing more. The act now in question (Section 54 of Act No. 163, approved July 22, 1927, Alabama General Acts 1927, p. 176) was passed in fulfilment of a mandate laid upon the Legislature by section 232 of the Alabama Constitution. By that section it is provided that no foreign corporation shall do business in that state 'without having at least one known place of business and an authorized agent or agents therein, and without filing with the secretary of state a certified copy of its articles of incorporation or association.' By the same section: 'The legislature shall, by general law, provide for the payment to the State of Alabama of a franchise tax by such corporation, but such franchise tax shall be based on the actual amount of capital employed in this state.' It is this section that the courts of Alabama have adjudged to be inapplicable to interstate business. See cases supra. If that is the construction to be given to the command whereby the Legislature was to establish a franchise tax and measure it in a certain way, there can be no doubt that the same construction must be given to the statute passed thereafter to give effect to the command. The power abjured in one breath was not exerted in the next.
With this approach to the problem, the pathway in made open. When the Legislature of Alabama said in 1927 that an annual tax was imposed upon the fran- [288 U.S. 218, 231] chise of every foreign corporation, it meant to lay the burden upon those franchises and those only which there was power in Alabama to grant or to withhold. If the corporation was there by virtue of a dual right, the one created by the state, and no other, was to be subjected to the charge. The presumption of that intention is hardly to be escaped in view of past disclaimers of a purpose more pretentious. True there is another section of the same act whereby a written permit is exacted for 'the purpose of registration and to prevent the duplication of names and in order to secure for the public record, for taxation, and for other purposes, the names and addresses of the said corporations,' and its officers (Act No. 163, p. 171, 42). True also that for such a permit there is to be paid an annual tax varying from $5, the minimum, to $100, the maximum. The statute provides, however, that the tax imposed by that section shall be 'in addition to other license and privilege taxes required to be paid by law.' There is thus a tax in the nature of a fee to be paid in instalments as compensation for the permit, and another tax, measured by the capital in use within the state, upon the underlying franchise. The fee for the permit does not rebut the inference that there is not to be a tax upon the franchise unless user is a privilege that issues from the state. Doubt, if there is any, will be resolved in favor of the construction that keeps the act alive.
The appellant was not satisfied to stand upon its federal right, though the state had made it plain that the claim of right would be respected. It was seeking something more, the privilege of going over the line that marks the federal immunity; and to that end it asked for and obtained a license or franchise, the name is unimportant, to do a local business as well as one related to interstate or foreign commerce. By the grant thus pro- [288 U.S. 218, 232] cured, it became free, at its unfettered will, to sell at wholesale or at retail, in the original packages or in others, unhampered by the restrictions that would have limited its capacity if it had been there as an importer and with the powers of an importer only. This franchise or privilege, this grant of benefits beyond any conferred by the federal Constitution, the state of Alabama was competent to tax. Home Ins. Co. v. N.Y., 134 U.S. 594 , 10 S.Ct. 593, 594; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 440 , 14 S.Ct. 865; Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 ; Lusk v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 236 , 36 S.Ct. 263; St. Louis, S.W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 , 35 S.Ct. 99; Kansas City Ry. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111, 117 , 37 S.Ct. 58; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 , 31 S.Ct. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 , 51 S.Ct. 170; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 489 , 52 S.Ct. 424; Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corp. Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 U.S. 295 , 53 S.Ct. 137, December 5, 1932. There being competence to tax, there was competence to measure the burden of the payment by capital employed, irrespective of the use to which employment is directed. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra; Home Ins. Co. v. N.Y., supra. There may be a wrong to the taxpayer if the standard of measurement is oppressive and unreasonable. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 , 30 S. Ct. 190. There is none where the standard bears a fair and natural relation, in its normal or average workings, to the privilege conferred.
The argument is made, however, that the tax though declared by the express terms of the statute to be a tax upon the 'franchise' is confined to corporations 'doing business' in Alabama, and hence is to be viewed as a tax upon the kind of business actually conducted, and not upon the franchise to conduct it in that or other ways. More than once a like argument directed to statutes phrased in the same way has been urged upon this court, only to be rejected as unsound. Home Ins. Co. v. N.Y., supra; St. Louis, S.W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, [288 U.S. 218, 233] supra; L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Alabama, 248 U.S. 533 , 39 S.Ct. 18; Id., 201 Ala. 317, 78 So. 93 (involving a statute of Alabama similar to this one); Kansas City Ry. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 , 37 S.Ct. 58, affirming 182 Ala. 138, 62 So. 734; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 145 , 146 S., 31 S.Ct. 342, Ann.Cas. 1912B, 1312. Thus, in Home Ins. Co. v. N.Y., supra, a statute provided that every corporation then or thereafter incorporated under any law of the state or of any other state or country, 'and doing business in the state,' should be subject to a tax 'upon 'its corporate franchise or business," measured by its dividends. The court held that the tax was one upon the privilege 'of doing business in a corporate capacity,' and not upon the business or activities that were the outcome of the privilege. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra, pages 145, 146 of 220 U.S., 31 S.Ct. 342, Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 , 52 S.Ct. 512, Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corp. Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, supra. There would be greater force in the appellant's argument if its construction of the tax as one upon the activity or the business had support in anything decided by the courts of Alabama. To the contrary, the highest court of the state has put that meaning aside by its opinion in this very case. Adopting the reasoning of this court in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra, it has said that 'the tax is an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, and with the advantages derived therefrom.' State v. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. (Ala. Sup.) 142 So. 87, 91; cf. L. & N.R.R. Co. v. State, 201 Ala. 317, 318, 78 So. 93; Ellis v. Handley Mfg. Co., 214 Ala. 539, 108 So. 343; Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Stiles, 182 Ala. 138, 62 So. 734. True indeed it is that the corporation will be relieved of the burden if no business is transacted and no capital employed (State v. National Cash Credit Association, 224 Ala. 629, 141 So. 541), but so was the corporation in the Home Insurance Case, and so also were the corporations in many other cases. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., St. Louis, S.W. [288 U.S. 218, 234] Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Alabama, Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Stiles, supra. If the state has conferred a privilege which it is competent to tax, the competence is not lost, and the validity of the tax destroyed, because the privilege is to be free when the corporation is inactive. There is a requirement in the Alabama Constitution, repeated in the statute, that the tax upon the franchise shall be measured by the capital employed within the state, a measure obviously inapplicable to dormant corporations. In such circumstances, activity is an event that conditions liability, but the privilege, not the event, is still the subject of the burden. To re sume the matter in a few words: The tax is not imposed upon those capacities and privileges that emanate by implication from the power of the nation. The tax is laid upon those privileges, and those only, that emanate either expressly or by implication from the power of the state. Business, it is true, must have been done, for without the doing of business there can be no capital employed. Even so, capital and business are by-products and incidents, like dividends or income. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. They are the yardstick by which the state measures the value of the privilege. They are not the privilege itself.
The argument is made that 'capital employed' is an illegal and arbitrary measure because the appellant has made no use of the taxable franchise emanating from the state, but has confined its activities to interstate or foreign commerce. What has been said in recent cases ( Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra, and Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra) goes far to give the answer. There was no attempt here as there was in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra, or in Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 , 38 S.Ct. 85, or in International Paper Co. v. Mass., 246 U.S. 135 , 38 S.Ct. 292, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 617, or in other cases of that type, to burden a local privilege in close association with one not local by a levy upon values beyond the confines of the state. [288 U.S. 218, 235] Cf. Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111, 119 , 37 S.Ct. 58; Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass., 231 U.S. 68 , 34 S.Ct. 15; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 , 40 S.Ct. 435; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 , 49 S.Ct. 204; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra, at page 391 of 282 U.S., 51 S.Ct. 170. The measure here was capital employed in Alabama (St. Louis, S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, supra; L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Alabama, supra); and it was a mere fortuity that in this instance the capital was made up of imports still intact. Moreover, what was done under the franchise one day might not be done under it the next. Another franchise tax would not be owing for a year. In the meantime the appellant might transact its business as it pleased. If some of its sales, however few and trifing, had been made in broken packages, there would be no denial by any one that the privilege of making them would be subject to taxation by one measure or another. This court has never held that the measure in such circumstances would be arbitrary and unlawful because determined by the value of all the local capital, and not merely the proportion necessary for sales in broken lots. In principle the situation would then be governed by the ruling in Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 , 42 S.Ct. 305, and Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U.S. 511 , 50 S.Ct. 383, where an apportionment very similar had the approval of this court. Especially must the standard hold when the statute is directed against foreign corporations generally, and not particularly against such of them as are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. If the standard is a valid one when the privilege is used, it does not cease to be valid because user is abandoned or postponed. Very likely the statute might have been read in a different way. It might have been read as imposing two conditions, first that business should have been done, and second that what was done could be attributed, at least in part, to the actual exercise of the privileges granted by the state. As to such matters of construction the [288 U.S. 218, 236] courts of the state may speak the final word. All that concerns us here is capacity or power. Here was no covert effort by the state to extend its taxing jurisdiction into an area denied to it. The burden upon interstate business in Western Union v. Kansas and the other cases cited, was an outcome inherent in the statutory scheme; it was the very event intended. The burden here, if there was any, was unforeseen and adventitious. Cf. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 , 20 S.Ct. 829, Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Stiles, supra.
None of the decisions cited by the appellant controls the case at hand.
Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 , 45 S.Ct. 184, is invoked with special confidence. There are obvious distinctions. The statute of Missouri there held to be invalid in its application to a corporation engaged in interstate commerce was very similar in form to the statute of Alabama in controversy here. The conduct of the aggrieved corporation was, however, very different. Its business was the operation of a pipe line from oil wells in Oklahoma passing through Missouri to a distination in Illinois. Nothing was done in Missouri, or so the court interpreted the evidence, except in furtherance of transportation. Oil was neither received nor delivered in that state. In these circumstances the corporation asked for and obtained from Missouri a license to 'engage 'exclusively in the business of transporting crude petroleum by pipe line." 266 U.S. at pages 561, 567, 45 S.Ct. 184, 187. This, however, was the very business that was incidental to the federal right. The privilege to transport upon the interstate journey was an essential incident of commerce, and so an emanation from the federal power. The court did not hold that the tax would have been unlawful if laid upon a franchise emanating from the power of the state. The court condemned the [288 U.S. 218, 237] tax for the reason that it read the statute as designed to lay a burden on the franchise to do business as an interstate carrier. The imputation of that design was borne out in a measure by the remedy, for the state had brought a suit not only to impress a lien upon the property, but to revoke the license altogether (page 561 of 266 U.S., 45 S.Ct. 184, 185), limited though it was. Cf. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119 , 41 S.Ct. 45; Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 530 , 43 S.Ct. 192. If there had been decisions in Missouri, as there are in Alabama, disclaiming a purpose to affect the federal privilege, and if the state and federal privileges had varied substantially from each other in meaning and in function, the parallel would be closer between the Ozark Case and this. But if those conditions had been present, the result must have been changed.
Other cases, emphasized in the briefs, are still more faintly applicable.
Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 , 38 S.Ct. 126, brought before us a tax upon the business of foreign commerce, whether conducted by natural persons or by corporations. Its measure was the gross receipts. 'It bears no semblance of a property tax, or a franchise tax in the proper sense; nor is it an occupation tax, except as it is imposed upon the very carrying on of the business of exporting merchandise.' 245 U.S. 297 , 38 S.Ct. 126, 128. Cf. Phila. S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania 122 U.S. 326 , 7 S.Ct. 1118. The conclusion would have been different if net income, and not gross, had been adopted as the measure. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328 , 38 S.Ct. 499, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748; Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 , 38 S.Ct. 432; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 , 40 S.Ct. 221. The case has no relation to the validity of a tax to be measured by local capital and imposed upon a privilege.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachussetts, 268 U.S. 203 , 45 S.Ct. 477, 44 A.L.R. 1219, dealt with a statute of Massachusetts, different in [288 U.S. 218, 238] form from this, and interpreted as one laid directly upon the operations of the business. Cf. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 , 5 S.Ct. 826. No license or franchise to engage in a local business had been granted by the state.
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, was a case of a discriminatory tax upon the business of importers, and Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 , a case of a discriminatory tax upon an auctioneer selling for importers. In neither was there a franchise, or a tax upon a franchise, or a reference to capital as a standard of measurement. In each the presence of imported packages to be subjected to a burden was an event considered and intended, not an adventitious circumstance developing unexpectedly in the application of the tax to one taxpayer out of many.
The tax imposed by this statute does not discriminate between domestic and foreign corporations to the prejudice of the latter. Domestic corporations pay a franchise tax that is measured by their whole capital; foreign corporations one that is measured by 'the actual amount of capital employed' within the state. It does not discriminate between foreign corporations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and other foreign corporations. It lays a burden on all impartially. Finally, it is not oppressive in amount, nor framed in such a form as to suggest a furtive purpose to stifle activities not covered by its terms. The tax is $2 per thousand dollars until 1932, and $1 per thousand afterwards. General Acts of Alabama, 1927, 56, p. 177.
The appellant is in the enjoyment of a privilege of value which it solicited and received from the state of Alabama, and for that privilege it should pay.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice STONE join in this dissent.
For the derivation of this section, see section 16 of Act No. 464, General Acts 1915, p. 397; section 16 of Act No. 328, General Acts 1919, p. 291; section 11 of Act No. 172, General Acts 1923, p. 164, as ameded by Act No. 263, General Acts 1923, p. 267.
[ Footnote 2 ] Cf. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 359 , 21 S.Ct. 132; Cook v. Marshall County, Iowa, 196 U.S. 261, 270 , 25 S.Ct. 233; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568, 573 , 35 S.Ct. 419; Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446, 454 , 35 S.Ct. 892; Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 304 , 39 S.Ct. 125.

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text: মত2 [ mata2 ] n an opinion, a view; consent; a theory; a doctrine, an ism; a tenet; a creed, a religion; a method, a principle; a mode or means. মত করা v. to agree (to); to intend. মতো করানো v. to persuade. মত দেওয়া v. to consent to, to agree to; to give one's consent; to acquiesce; to pass one's opinion, to opine. মত নেওয়া v. to take or invite one's consent or opinion. মত পাওয়া v. to obtain one's consent or approval. নানা মুনির নানা মত (fig.) many minds many views; no two wise men agree. যত মত তত পথ as many tenets, as many ways to salvation. ~দান n. giving one's opinion or consent; expressing one's views; casting one's vote. ~দ্বৈধ same as ~বিরোধ । ~পরিবর্তন n. change of opinion. ~পার্থক্য n. difference of opinion or views. ~বাদ n. a theory; a doctrine; a tenet. ~বাদী a. adhering to a particular theory or doctrine or tenet. ~বিরোধ, ~ভেদ, মতানৈক্য n. difference of opinion; disagreement; dissension. মতান্তর n. difference of opinion, dissension; a different or contrary opinion or view or doctrine or theory. মতান্তরে adv. in or according to another view. মতাবলম্বন করা v. to accept or adhere to or profess an opinion or view or doctrine or theory or tenet or religion. মতাবলম্বী a. & n. one who accepts or adheres to or follows or professes a particular opinion or view or doctrine or theory or religion. fem. মতাবলম্বিনী । মতামত n. views for and against.

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§ 1422 Those who approach the sacrament of Penance obtain pardon from God’s mercy for the offense committed against him, and are, at the same time, reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by their sins and which by charity, by example, and by prayer labors for their conversion.
§ 1423 It is called the sacrament of conversion because it makes sacramentally present Jesus’ call to conversion, the first step in returning to the Father from whom one has strayed by sin.
§ 1425 YOU were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God. One must appreciate the magnitude of the gift God has given us in the sacraments of Christian initiation in order to grasp the degree to which sin is excluded for him who has “put on Christ.” But the apostle John also says: “If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” And the Lord himself taught us to pray: “Forgive us our trespasses,” linking our forgiveness of one another’s offenses to the forgiveness of our sins that God will grant us.
§ 1426 Conversion to Christ, the new birth of Baptism, the gift of the Holy Spirit and the Body and Blood of Christ received as food have made us “holy and without blemish,” just as the Church herself, the Bride of Christ, is “holy and without blemish.” Nevertheless the new life received in Christian initiation has not abolished the frailty and weakness of human nature, nor the inclination to sin that tradition calls concupiscence, which remains in the baptized such that with the help of the grace of Christ they may prove themselves in the struggle of Christian life. This is the struggle of conversion directed toward holiness and eternal life to which the Lord never ceases to call us.
§ 1427 Jesus calls to conversion. This call is an essential part of the proclamation of the kingdom: “The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel.” In the Church’s preaching this call is addressed first to those who do not yet know Christ and his Gospel. Also, Baptism is the principal place for the first and fundamental conversion. It is by faith in the Gospel and by Baptism that one renounces evil and gains salvation, that is, the forgiveness of all sins and the gift of new life.
§ 1428 Christ’s call to conversion continues to resound in the lives of Christians. This second conversion is an uninterrupted task for the whole Church who, clasping sinners to her bosom, is at once holy and always in need of purification, and follows constantly the path of penance and renewal. This endeavor of conversion is not just a human work. It is the movement of a “contrite heart,” drawn and moved by grace to respond to the merciful love of God who loved us first.
§ 1430 Jesus’ call to conversion and penance, like that of the prophets before him, does not aim first at outward works, “sackcloth and ashes,” fasting and mortification, but at the conversion of the heart, interior conversion. Without this, such penances remain sterile and false; however, interior conversion urges expression in visible signs, gestures and works of penance.
§ 1431 Interior repentance is a radical reorientation of our whole life, a return, a conversion to God with all our heart, an end of sin, a turning away from evil, with repugnance toward the evil actions we have committed. At the same time it entails the desire and resolution to change one’s life, with hope in God’s mercy and trust in the help of his grace. This conversion of heart is accompanied by a salutary pain and sadness which the Fathers called animi cruciatus (affliction of spirit) and compunctio cordis (repentance of heart).
Let us fix our eyes on Christ’s blood and understand how precious it is to his Father, for, poured out for our salvation it has brought to the whole world the grace of repentance.
§ 1433 Since Easter, the Holy Spirit has proved “the world wrong about sin,” i.e., proved that the world has not believed in him whom the Father has sent. But this same Spirit who brings sin to light is also the Consoler who gives the human heart grace for repentance and conversion.
§ 1437 Reading Sacred Scripture, praying the Liturgy of the Hours and the Our Father – every sincere act of worship or devotion revives the spirit of conversion and repentance within us and contributes to the forgiveness of our sins.
§ 1438 The seasons and days of penance in the course of the liturgical year (Lent, and each Friday in memory of the death of the Lord) are intense moments of the Church’s penitential practice. These times are particularly appropriate for spiritual exercises, penitential liturgies, pilgrimages as signs of penance, voluntary self-denial such as fasting and almsgiving, and fraternal sharing (charitable and missionary works).
§ 1439 The process of conversion and repentance was described by Jesus in the parable of the prodigal son, the center of which is the merciful father: The fascination of illusory freedom, the abandonment of the father’s house; the extreme misery in which the son finds himself after squandering his fortune; his deep humiliation at finding himself obliged to feed swine, and still worse, at wanting to feed on the husks the pigs ate; his reflection on all he has lost; his repentance and decision to declare himself guilty before his father; the journey back; the father’s generous welcome; the father’s joy – all these are characteristic of the process of conversion. the beautiful robe, the ring, and the festive banquet are symbols of that new life – pure worthy, and joyful – of anyone who returns to God and to the bosom of his family, which is the Church. Only the heart of Christ Who knows the depths of his Father’s love could reveal to us the abyss of his mercy in so simple and beautiful a way.
§ 1440 Sin is before all else an offense against God, a rupture of communion with him. At the same time it damages communion with the Church. For this reason conversion entails both God’s forgiveness and reconciliation with the Church, which are expressed and accomplished liturgically by the sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation.
§ 1441 Only God forgives sins. Since he is the Son of God, Jesus says of himself, “The Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins” and exercises this divine power: “Your sins are forgiven.” Further, by virtue of his divine authority he gives this power to men to exercise in his name.
§ 1443 During his public life Jesus not only forgave sins, but also made plain the effect of this forgiveness: he reintegrated forgiven sinners into the community of the People of God from which sin had alienated or even excluded them. A remarkable sign of this is the fact that Jesus receives sinners at his table, a gesture that expresses in an astonishing way both God’s forgiveness and the return to the bosom of the People of God.
§ 1444 In imparting to his apostles his own power to forgive sins the Lord also gives them the authority to reconcile sinners with the Church. This ecclesial dimension of their task is expressed most notably in Christ’s solemn words to Simon Peter: “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” The office of binding and loosing which was given to Peter was also assigned to the college of the apostles united to its head.
§ 1445 The words bind and loose mean: whomever you exclude from your communion, will be excluded from communion with God; whomever you receive anew into your communion, God will welcome back into his. Reconciliation with the Church is inseparable from reconciliation with God.
§ 1446 Christ instituted the sacrament of Penance for all sinful members of his Church: above all for those who, since Baptism, have fallen into grave sin, and have thus lost their baptismal grace and wounded ecclesial communion. It is to them that the sacrament of Penance offers a new possibility to convert and to recover the grace of justification. The Fathers of the Church present this sacrament as the second plank of salvation after the shipwreck which is the loss of grace.
§ 1447 Over the centuries the concrete form in which the Church has exercised this power received from the Lord has varied considerably. During the first centuries the reconciliation of Christians who had committed particularly grave sins after their Baptism (for example, idolatry, murder, or adultery) was tied to a very rigorous discipline, according to which penitents had to do public penance for their sins, often for years, before receiving reconciliation. To this “order of penitents” (which concerned only certain grave sins), one was only rarely admitted and in certain regions only once in a lifetime. During the seventh century Irish missionaries, inspired by the Eastern monastic tradition, took to continental Europe the “private” practice of penance, which does not require public and prolonged completion of penitential works before reconciliation with the Church. From that time on, the sacrament has been performed in secret between penitent and priest. This new practice envisioned the possibility of repetition and so opened the way to a regular frequenting of this sacrament. It allowed the forgiveness of grave sins and venial sins to be integrated into one sacramental celebration. In its main lines this is the form of penance that the Church has practiced down to our day.
§ 1448 Beneath the changes in discipline and celebration that this sacrament has undergone over the centuries, the same fundamental structure is to be discerned. It comprises two equally essential elements: on the one hand, the acts of the man who undergoes conversion through the action of the Holy Spirit: namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction; on the other, God’s action through the intervention of the Church. the Church, who through the bishop and his priests forgives sins in the name of Jesus Christ and determines the manner of satisfaction, also prays for the sinner and does penance with him. Thus the sinner is healed and re-established in ecclesial communion.
God, the Father of mercies, Through the death and resurrection of his Son has reconciled the world to himself and sent the Holy Spirit among us for the forgiveness of sins; through the ministry of the Church may God give you pardon and peace, and I absolve you from your sins in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.
§ 1450 Penance requires the sinner to endure all things willingly, be contrite of heart, confess with the lips, and practice complete humility and fruitful satisfaction.
§ 1451 Among the penitent’s acts contrition occupies first place. Contrition is sorrow of the soul and detestation for the sin committed, together with the resolution not to sin again.
§ 1452 When it arises from a love by which God is loved above all else, contrition is called “perfect” (contrition of charity). Such contrition remits venial sins; it also obtains forgiveness of mortal sins if it includes the firm resolution to have recourse to sacramental confession as soon as possible.
§ 1453 The contrition called “imperfect” (or “attrition”) is also a gift of God, a prompting of the Holy Spirit. It is born of the consideration of sin’s ugliness or the fear of eternal damnation and the other penalties threatening the sinner (contrition of fear). Such a stirring of conscience can initiate an interior process which, under the prompting of grace, will be brought to completion by sacramental absolution. By itself however, imperfect contrition cannot obtain the forgiveness of grave sins, but it disposes one to obtain forgiveness in the sacrament of Penance.
§ 1455 The confession (or disclosure) of sins, even from a simply human point of view, frees us and facilitates our reconciliation with others. Through such an admission man looks squarely at the sins he is guilty of, takes responsibility for them, and thereby opens himself again to God and to the communion of the Church in order to make a new future possible.
§ 1456 Confession to a priest is an essential part of the sacrament of Penance: “All mortal sins of which penitents after a diligent self-examination are conscious must be recounted by them in confession, even if they are most secret and have been committed against the last two precepts of the Decalogue; for these sins sometimes wound the soul more grievously and are more dangerous than those which are committed openly.
When Christ’s faithful strive to confess all the sins that they can remember, they undoubtedly place all of them before the divine mercy for pardon. But those who fail to do so and knowingly withhold some, place nothing before the divine goodness for remission through the mediation of the priest, for if the sick person is too ashamed to show his wound to the doctor, the medicine cannot heal what it does not know.
§ 1457 According to the Church’s command, after having attained the age of discretion, each of the faithful is bound by an obligation faithfully to confess serious sins at least once a year. Anyone who is aware of having committed a mortal sin must not receive Holy Communion, even if he experiences deep contrition, without having first received sacramental absolution, unless he has a grave reason for receiving Communion and there is no possibility of going to confession. Children must go to the sacrament of Penance before receiving Holy Communion for the first time.
Whoever confesses his sins is already working with God. God indicts your sins; if you also indict them, you are joined with God. Man and sinner are, so to speak, two realities: when you hear “man” – this is what God has made; when you hear “sinner” – this is what man himself has made. Destroy what you have made, so that God may save what he has made. When you begin to abhor what you have made, it is then that your good works are beginning, since you are accusing yourself of your evil works. the beginning of good works is the confession of evil works. You do the truth and come to the light.
§ 1460 The penance the confessor imposes must take into account the penitent’s personal situation and must seek his spiritual good. It must correspond as far as possible with the gravity and nature of the sins committed. It can consist of prayer, an offering, works of mercy, service of neighbor, voluntary self-denial, sacrifices, and above all the patient acceptance of the cross we must bear. Such penances help configure us to Christ, who alone expiated our sins once for all. They allow us to become co-heirs with the risen Christ, provided we suffer with him.
The satisfaction that we make for our sins, however, is not so much ours as though it were not done through Jesus Christ. We who can do nothing ourselves, as if just by ourselves, can do all things with the cooperation of “him who strengthens” us. Thus man has nothing of which to boast, but all our boasting is in Christ, in whom we make satisfaction by bringing forth “fruits that befit repentance.” These fruits have their efficacy from him, by him they are offered to the Father, and through him they are accepted by the Father.
§ 1462 Forgiveness of sins brings reconciliation with God, but also with the Church. Since ancient times the bishop, visible head of a particular Church, has thus rightfully been considered to be the one who principally has the power and ministry of reconciliation: he is the moderator of the penitential discipline. Priests, his collaborators, exercise it to the extent that they have received the commission either from their bishop (or religious superior) or the Pope, according to the law of the Church.
§ 1463 Certain particularly grave sins incur excommunication, the most severe ecclesiastical penalty, which impedes the reception of the sacraments and the exercise of certain ecclesiastical acts, and for which absolution consequently cannot be granted, according to canon law, except by the Pope, the bishop of the place or priests authorized by them. In danger of death any priest, even if deprived of faculties for hearing confessions, can absolve from every sin and excommunication.
§ 1464 Priests must encourage the faithful to come to the sacrament of Penance and must make themselves available to celebrate this sacrament each time Christians reasonably ask for it.
§ 1465 When he celebrates the sacrament of Penance, the priest is fulfilling the ministry of the Good Shepherd who seeks the lost sheep, of the Good Samaritan who binds up wounds, of the Father who awaits the prodigal son and welcomes him on his return, and of the just and impartial judge whose judgment is both just and merciful. the priest is the sign and the instrument of God’s merciful love for the sinner.
§ 1466 The confessor is not the master of God’s forgiveness, but its servant. the minister of this sacrament should unite himself to the intention and charity of Christ. He should have a proven knowledge of Christian behavior, experience of human affairs, respect and sensitivity toward the one who has fallen; he must love the truth, be faithful to the Magisterium of the Church, and lead the penitent with patience toward healing and full maturity. He must pray and do penance for his penitent, entrusting him to the Lord’s mercy.
§ 1467 Given the delicacy and greatness of this ministry and the respect due to persons, the Church declares that every priest who hears confessions is bound under very severe penalties to keep absolute secrecy regarding the sins that his penitents have confessed to him. He can make no use of knowledge that confession gives him about penitents’ lives. This secret, which admits of no exceptions, is called the “sacramental seal,” because what the penitent has made known to the priest remains “sealed” by the sacrament.
§ 1468 The whole power of the sacrament of Penance consists in restoring us to God’s grace and joining us with him in an intimate friendship. Reconciliation with God is thus the purpose and effect of this sacrament. For those who receive the sacrament of Penance with contrite heart and religious disposition, reconciliation is usually followed by peace and serenity of conscience with strong spiritual consolation. Indeed the sacrament of Reconciliation with God brings about a true spiritual resurrection, restoration of the dignity and blessings of the life of the children of God, of which the most precious is friendship with God.
It must be recalled that this reconciliation with God leads, as it were, to other reconciliations, which repair the other breaches caused by sin. The forgiven penitent is reconciled with himself in his inmost being, where he regains his innermost truth. He is reconciled with his brethren whom he has in some way offended and wounded. He is reconciled with the Church. He is reconciled with all creation.
§ 1470 In this sacrament, the sinner, placing himself before the merciful judgment of God, anticipates in a certain way the judgment to which he will be subjected at the end of his earthly life. For it is now, in this life, that we are offered the choice between life and death, and it is only by the road of conversion that we can enter the Kingdom, from which one is excluded by grave sin. In converting to Christ through penance and faith, the sinner passes from death to life and does not come into judgment.
§ 1471 The doctrine and practice of indulgences in the Church are closely linked to the effects of the sacrament of Penance.
An indulgence is partial or plenary according as it removes either part or all of the temporal punishment due to sin. Indulgences may be applied to the living or the dead.
§ 1472 To understand this doctrine and practice of the Church, it is necessary to understand that sin has a double consequence. Grave sin deprives us of communion with God and therefore makes us incapable of eternal life, the privation of which is called the “eternal punishment” of sin. On the other hand every sin, even venial, entails an unhealthy attachment to creatures, which must be purified either here on earth, or after death in the state called Purgatory. This purification frees one from what is called the “temporal punishment” of sin. These two punishments must not be conceived of as a kind of vengeance inflicted by God from without, but as following from the very nature of sin. A conversion which proceeds from a fervent charity can attain the complete purification of the sinner in such a way that no punishment would remain.
§ 1474 The Christian who seeks to purify himself of his sin and to become holy with the help of God’s grace is not alone. The life of each of God’s children is joined in Christ and through Christ in a wonderful way to the life of all the other Christian brethren in the supernatural unity of the Mystical Body of Christ, as in a single mystical person.
§ 1475 In the communion of saints, a perennial link of charity exists between the faithful who have already reached their heavenly home, those who are expiating their sins in purgatory and those who are still pilgrims on earth. Between them there is, too, an abundant exchange of all good things. In this wonderful exchange, the holiness of one profits others, well beyond the harm that the sin of one could cause others. Thus recourse to the communion of saints lets the contrite sinner be more promptly and efficaciously purified of the punishments for sin.
§ 1476 We also call these spiritual goods of the communion of saints the Church’s treasury, which is not the sum total of the material goods which have accumulated during the course of the centuries. On the contrary the treasury of the Church is the infinite value, which can never be exhausted, which Christ’s merits have before God. They were offered so that the whole of mankind could be set free from sin and attain communion with the Father. In Christ, the Redeemer himself, the satisfactions and merits of his Redemption exist and find their efficacy.
§ 1477 This treasury includes as well the prayers and good works of the Blessed Virgin Mary. They are truly immense, unfathomable, and even pristine in their value before God. In the treasury, too, are the prayers and good works of all the saints, all those who have followed in the footsteps of Christ the Lord and by his grace have made their lives holy and carried out the mission the Father entrusted to them. In this way they attained their own salvation and at the same time cooperated in saving their brothers in the unity of the Mystical Body.
§ 1478 An indulgence is obtained through the Church who, by virtue of the power of binding and loosing granted her by Christ Jesus, intervenes in favor of individual Christians and opens for them the treasury of the merits of Christ and the saints to obtain from the Father of mercies the remission of the temporal punishments due for their sins. Thus the Church does not want simply to come to the aid of these Christians, but also to spur them to works of devotion, penance, and charity.
§ 1479 Since the faithful departed now being purified are also members of the same communion of saints, one way we can help them is to obtain indulgences for them, so that the temporal punishments due for their sins may be remitted.
§ 1480 Like all the sacraments, Penance is a liturgical action. the elements of the celebration are ordinarily these: a greeting and blessing from the priest, reading the word of God to illuminate the conscience and elicit contrition, and an exhortation to repentance; the confession, which acknowledges sins and makes them known to the priest; the imposition and acceptance of a penance; the priest’s absolution; a prayer of thanksgiving and praise and dismissal with the blessing of the priest.
§ 1482 The sacrament of Penance can also take place in the framework of a communal celebration in which we prepare ourselves together for confession and give thanks together for the forgiveness received. Here, the personal confession of sins and individual absolution are inserted into a liturgy of the word of God with readings and a homily, an examination of conscience conducted in common, a communal request for forgiveness, the Our Father and a thanksgiving in common. This communal celebration expresses more clearly the ecclesial character of penance. However, regardless of its manner of celebration the sacrament of Penance is always, by its very nature, a liturgical action, and therefore an ecclesial and public action.
§ 1483 In case of grave necessity recourse may be had to a communal celebration of reconciliation with general confession and general absolution. Grave necessity of this sort can arise when there is imminent danger of death without sufficient time for the priest or priests to hear each penitent’s confession. Grave necessity can also exist when, given the number of penitents, there are not enough confessors to hear individual confessions properly in a reasonable time, so that the penitents through no fault of their own would be deprived of sacramental grace or Holy Communion for a long time. In this case, for the absolution to be valid the faithful must have the intention of individually confessing their sins in the time required. The diocesan bishop is the judge of whether or not the conditions required for general absolution exist. A large gathering of the faithful on the occasion of major feasts or pilgrimages does not constitute a case of grave necessity.
§ 1484 Individual, integral confession and absolution remain the only ordinary way for the faithful to reconcile themselves with God and the Church, unless physical or moral impossibility excuses from this kind of confession. There are profound reasons for this. Christ is at work in each of the sacraments. He personally addresses every sinner: “My son, your sins are forgiven.” He is the physician tending each one of the sick who need him to cure them. He raises them up and reintegrates them into fraternal communion. Personal confession is thus the form most expressive of reconciliation with God and with the Church.
§ 1485 "On the evening of that day, the first day of the week," Jesus showed himself to his apostles. "He breathed on them, and said to them: 'Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained"' (Jn 20:19, (22-23).
§ 1486 The forgiveness of sins committed after Baptism is conferred by a particular sacrament called the sacrament of conversion, confession, penance, or reconciliation.
§ 1487 The sinner wounds God's honor and love, his own human dignity as a man called to be a son of God, and the spiritual well-being of the Church, of which each Christian ought to be a living stone.
§ 1488 To the eyes of faith no evil is graver than sin and nothing has worse consequences for sinners themselves, for the Church, and for the whole world.
§ 1489 To return to communion with God after having lost it through sin is a process born of the grace of God who is rich in mercy and solicitous for the salvation of men. One must ask for this precious gift for oneself and for others.
§ 1490 The movement of return to God, called conversion and repentance, entails sorrow for and abhorrence of sins committed, and the firm purpose of sinning no more in the future. Conversion touches the past and the future and is nourished by hope in God's mercy.
§ 1491 The sacrament of Penance is a whole consisting in three actions of the penitent and the priest's absolution. the penitent's acts are repentance, confession or disclosure of sins to the priest, and the intention to make reparation and do works of reparation.
§ 1492 Repentance (also called contrition) must be inspired by motives that arise from faith. If repentance arises from love of charity for God, it is called "perfect" contrition; if it is founded on other motives, it is called "imperfect."
§ 1493 One who desires to obtain reconciliation with God and with the Church, must confess to a priest all the unconfessed grave sins he remembers after having carefully examined his conscience. the confession of venial faults, without being necessary in itself, is nevertheless strongly recommended by the Church.
§ 1494 The confessor proposes the performance of certain acts of "satisfaction" or "penance" to be performed by the penitent in order to repair the harm caused by sin and to re-establish habits befitting a disciple of Christ.
§ 1495 Only priests who have received the faculty of absolving from the authority of the Church can forgive sins in the name of Christ.
§ 1498 Through indulgences the faithful can obtain the remission of temporal punishment resulting from sin for themselves and also for the souls in Purgatory.