text:
A Cornerstone of the Jewish Luni-Solar Calendar or a Commandment about the Order of Months?
ב הַחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה לָכֶם רֹאשׁ חֳדָשִׁים רִאשׁוֹן הוּא לָכֶם לְחָדְשֵׁי הַשָּׁנָה.
This month shall mark for you the beginning of the months; it shall be the first of the months of the year for you (NJPS).
This verse offers an excellent example of the various ways later tradition uses to exact meaning from Scripture. Basing itself on meticulous attention to all components of the text and full respect to its context, traditional Jewish interpreters offered two main readings of this verse. These traditional interpretations concentrate almost exclusively on the micro level, while a critical look at the macro level, stressing the wider context, suggests different results.
The medieval Jewish communities, whose works were found in the Cairo Genizah, chose Shabbat Bo as a special occasion for celebrating the Jewish calendar. Some manuscripts of the Aramaic Targum – read every Shabbat alongside the parasha – offer lengthy liturgical poems about the calendar, as well as about the signs of the moon and the Zodiac. These poems were recited by Jews as part of the service on that Shabbat.
Earlier on, Exodus 12 became one of the “Four Parshiot (special weekly Torah portions),” to be added to the weekly portion on that Shabbat before Rosh Chodesh (the new moon of) Nisan. While this assignment has a lot to do with the laws of Pesach contained in the parasha, it bears the title “ha-Hodesh,” indicating that its calendrical worth is central. Indeed, as early as the second century BCE the Jewish-Hellenistic writer Aristobulus derived what we call “the Rule of the Equinox,” which is the most fundamental rule of the Jewish calendar, regulating the distance of Passover from the equinox. Since Passover is dated to the 14th of the first month, this rule has a direct bearing to the fixing of the first new moon day in the year with regard to the equinox. Although Aristobulus does not mention Exodus 12:2 in the fragments extant from his work, his association of Passover with fixing the new moon and with the intercalation attest to his reliance on this verse.
It is a salient part of this midrashic tradition that the word החודש in 12:2 does not mean “month,” but rather “new moon.” God pointed his finger (thus Rashi, based on the word הזה) at the new moon and showed Moses the way to use it as a clock for regulating time. Rashi (following the Mechilta) suggests that since Moses was not confident in how to use astronomical observations in order to sanctify time, God instructed him how to accomplish this task, as reported in Exodus 12:2.
The former interpretation of Exodus 12:2 seems to stretch the context by implying that this verse introduces the entire discipline of the Jewish luni-solar calendar. The context calls for a narrower aim, more befitting of the Pesach commandment, and many midrashists themselves recognized this. Although endorsing the grand-scale interpretation given above, the Rabbis also made sure to state the verse’s more fundamental meaning: to clarify that from now on, “the first month” is in the spring rather than in the autumn (thus Mechilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Pischa 1).
The meaning of חודש according to this interpretation is thus not “new moon” but “month.” The verse does not relate to the entire luni-solar calendar tradition, i.e., to the astronomical discipline of observing the new moon, but rather only to the order of months. Verse 12:2, by way of introduction, defines what “the first month” is – both for the sake of our parasha later on (12:18) and for all the laws of the Torah. This interpretation is more attuned to the verse in its context.
Interpretation 3 – A Modern Critical Answer.
An even closer reading of the context, however, raises additional pressing questions. The Torah continues in verse 3 with the commandment to take a lamb and assign it for the sacrifice, which will take place several days later. The declaration about “this month” as “the head of months” deviates from the overall focus of the Pesach commandment, which primarily deals with the technical details of the sacrifice. While a more focused calendrical statement giving the date of Pesach is expected here, this is not the case at all. Instead, verse 2 conveys general information about the overall structure of the year, with the first month defined in the spring. The relevance of v. 2 in the context of the Pesach commandment seems rather limited.
In addition, the Israeli scholar Meir Paran noted that v. 2 interrupts the report of divine speech, which appears as a fixed formula throughout the books of Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers except for this one case. The regular form, found in Exodus 14:2, 25:2, Numbers 5:2-3 and many more contexts, reads: “The Lord said to Moses: Tell the Israelites…”. Exodus 12, however, interrupts the connection between God’s call to Moses (v. 1) and the command to approach B’nei Israel (v. 3) by the calendrical statement in verse 2.
א וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לֵאמֹר.
2 This month shall mark for you the beginning of the months; it shall be the first of the months of the year for you.
Vv. 1-2 present a further problem. V. 2 notes “for you (masculine plural—לכם), but the previous verse refers only to Moses and Aaron! Much exegetical skill is required to maintain that לכם in its present position refers to all of Israel.
Ramban (Nachmanides, 1194-c.1270), who had great awareness for questions of context, actually noticed both of these difficulties: that v. 2 interrupts the sequence of the order and that the reference of the word לכם is problematic. He solved these problems by declaring that “Moshe and Aaron stand for all of Israel”, i.e. that לכם refers both to Moses and Aharon and to the entire people. He also supplied a reason why the fixed formula was interrupted by v. 2: it clarifies that Kiddush hachodesh, the declaration of the new moon/month, should only be carried out by experts like Moses and Aharon. Both of these answers, admittedly, are ad hoc, and do not relieve the force of the problem.
A critical interpretation would thus claim that v. 2 is a late addition, which interrupts the formulaic flow of the argument. This added line was inserted here precisely because Exodus 12 conveys the first mitzvah that depends on the calendar, and it was added with a view of the entire Torah in mind. Since many subsequent verses in the Torah (esp. Leviticus 23 and Numbers 28-29) relate to the months of the year using numbers (the first, the second etc.), it was important to clarify at the outset that this count begins in the spring. In both style and content, therefore, Exodus 12:2 is not part of its immediate context about the Passover sacrifice, but rather a general remark about the order of the year.
To my mind, the “proper” interpretation of v. 2 really depends on the priorities of the interpreter. The verse shows, on the one hand, a clear interest in the order of the months in the year, which corresponds to the mention of בראשון in v. 18. On the other hand, the verse interrupts the flow of verses 1 and 3. This case thus presents a clash of exegetical interests. While traditional scholars tend to prefer the former interest, based on the atomistic reading of v. 2 and on the enormous historical importance of the Jewish calendar, critical scholars would insist that v. 2 is impossible in the immediate context of verses 1-3, and must be an editorial remark. What would the intelligent reader do? This is up to him or her to decide.
Jonathan (יונתן) Ben-Dov is George and Florence Wise Chair of Judaism in Antiquity at the University of Haifa, and senior lecturer of Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Literature. He has published several books and many articles about early Jewish religion and its context in the ancient world, from ancient Mesopotamia to the Hellenistic world. Among his publications are editions of the calendrical scrolls from Qumran as well as scholarly discussions of scientific themes in Jewish literature. He is co-editor (with Seth Sanders) of the forthcoming book Ancient Jewish Sciences and the History of Knowledge in Second Temple Literature (ISAW and New York University Press).
 See for example the traditional commentaries and midrashim on 1 Chronicles 12:33 ומבני יששכר יודעי בינה לעתים. For the lunar calendar, and Exod 12:2 in particular, as a marker of Jewish identity, see already Philo of Alexandria, Questions on Exodus 1.1 (ed. R. Marcus; Loeb Classical Library, London 1953), pp. 4-5.
 For more on the Cairo Genizah, see: Adina Hoffman and Pete Cole, Sacred Trash: The Lost and Found World of the Cairo Geniza (Schocken, 2011); also Sacred Treasure – The Cairo Genizah: The Amazing Discoveries of Forgotten Jewish History in an Egyptian Synagogue Attic (Jewish Lights, 2010).
 The piyyutim were primarily meant for a special Kiddush on the first day of Nisan. See: Y. Yahalom and M. Sokoloff, Jewish Palestinian Aramaic Poetry from Late Antiquity, Jerusalem 1999 (in Hebrew), pp. 35-39, 220-240. The connection with parshat Bo relies on the inclusion of these poems in manuscripts of the Fragment Targum ad Exodus 12.
 See S. Stern, Calendar and Community: A History of the Jewish Calendar 2nd Century BCE – 10th Century CE, Oxford University Press 2001 pp. 50-53.
 Meir Paran, Forms of the Priestly Style in the Pentateuch (Jerusalem 1989), 94-95 [Hebrew].
 A similar statement appears in 12:18, where it is clarified (once again by means of interrupting the stylistic flow) that the count of day with regards to the consumption of Matzah begins in the preceding evening rather than in the morning. Compare Leviticus 23:32 and contrast Leviticus 7:15, 19:6.

matches: v. v. V. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
The legal basis for the processing required to perform a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority conferring on the controller was Art. 6 para. 1 lit. e DSGVO.
The processing of data for purposes other than those for which they were collected is governed by the provisions of Article 6 (4) GDPR.
If, in the context of our processing, we disclose data to other persons and companies (contract processors, joint controllers or third parties), transmit them to them or otherwise grant access to the data, this will only be done on the basis of a legal permission (eg if the data has been transmitted to third parties, such as payment service providers, to fulfill the contract), users have consented to a legal obligation to do so or on the basis of our legitimate interests (eg the use of agents, webhosters, etc.).
If we process data in a third country (ie outside the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA) or the Swiss Confederation) or in the context of the use of third party services or disclosure, or transmission of data to other persons or companies This will only happen if it is to fulfill our (pre) contractual obligations, on the basis of your consent, on the basis of a legal obligation or on the basis of our legitimate interests. Subject to express consent or contractually required transmission, we process or disclose the data only in third countries with a recognized level of privacy, including those certified under the Privacy Shield, or on the basis of specific warranties, such as limited liability. contractual obligation by so-called standard protection clauses of the European Commission, the existence of certifications or binding internal data protection regulations (Art. 44 to 49 GDPR, information page of the European Commission).
You may, at any time in the future, process the data relating to you in accordance with legal requirements disagree. The objection may in particular be made against processing for direct marketing purposes.
“Cookies” are small files that are stored on users’ computers. Different information can be stored within the cookies. A cookie serves primarily to store the information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his visit to an online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies” or “transient cookies”, are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves an online service and closes his browser. In such a cookie, e.g. the contents of a shopping cart are stored in an online shop or a login status. “Persistent” or “persistent” refers to cookies that remain stored even after the browser has been closed. Thus, e.g. the login status will be saved if users visit it after several days. Likewise, in such a cookie the interests of the users can be stored, which are used for range measurement or marketing purposes. A “third-party cookie” refers to cookies that are offered by providers other than the person responsible for providing the online offer (otherwise, if only their cookies are called “first-party cookies”).
If these analyzes or profiles are personal, they will be deleted or anonymised upon termination of the users, otherwise after two years from the conclusion of the contract. Incidentally, the overall business analysis and general ne tendency determinations created anonymously if possible.
In conclusion, our online offering requires us to be able to keep track of whether users who are interested in affiliate links and / or the offers available to us, then take advantage of the offers on the affiliate links or our online platform. For this, the affiliate links and our offers are supplemented by certain values that are part of the link or otherwise, e.g. in a cookie, can be set. The values include in particular the source website (referrer), time, an online identifier of the operator of the website on which the affiliate link was located, an online identifier of the respective offer, an online identifier of the user, as well as tracking specific values such as Ad ID, affiliate ID, and categorizations.
On the basis of our legitimate interests (ie interest in the economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 (1) lit. DSGVO), we are participants of Amazon EU’s Affiliate Program, which was designed to provide a medium for websites by means of which the placement of advertisements and links to Amazon.de advertising fee refund can be earned (so-called affiliate system). That As an Amazon partner, we earn on qualified purchases.
If users leave comments or other contributions, their IP addresses based on our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO be stored for 7 days. This is for our own safety, if someone leaves illegal content in comments and contributions (insults, prohibited political propaganda, etc.). In this case, we ourselves can be prosecuted for the comment or contribution and sTherefore interested in the identity of the author.
The information provided in the comments and contributions to the person, any contact and website information as well as the content information, are stored by us until the opposition of the users permanently.
The follow-up comments can be made by users with their consent acc. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. subscribed to a DSGVO. Users will receive a confirmation email to verify that they own the email address they entered. Users can unsubscribe from ongoing comment subscriptions at any time. The confirmation email will contain notes on the revocation options. For the purpose of proving the consent of the users, we save the registration time together with the IP address of the users and delete this information when users unsubscribe from the subscription.
You can cancel the receipt of our subscription at any time, ie. Revoke your consent. We may save the submitted email addresses for up to three years based on our legitimate interests before we delete them to provide prior consent. The processing of this data is limited to the purpose of a possible defense against claims. An individual request for cancellation is possible at any time, provided that at the same time the former existence of a consent is confirmed.
Gravatar is a service that allows users to log in and submit profile pictures and their email addresses. If users with the respective e-mail address on other online sites (especially in blogs) leave posts or comments, so their profile pictures can be displayed next to the posts or comments. For this purpose, the e-mail address communicated by the users to Gravatar is transmitted in encrypted form in order to check whether a profile has been stored for it. This is the sole purpose of sending the e-mail address and it will not be used for other purposes, but will be deleted afterwards.
If users do not want a user picture linked to their email address on Gravatar to appear in the comments, you should use an email address that is not registered with Gravatar to comment. We also point out that it is also possible to use an anonymous or even no e-mail address if the users do not want their own e-mail address to be sent to Gravatar. Users can completely prevent the transfer of data by not using our commenting system.
Content of the newsletter: We send newsletters, e-mails and other electronic notifications with advertising information (hereinafter “newsletter”) only with the consent of the recipient or a legal permission. Insofar as the content of a newsletter is concretely described in the context of an application for the newsletter, it is decisive for the consent of the user. Incidentally, our newsletters contain information about our services and us.
Double opt-in and logging: Registration for our newsletter is done in a so-called double opt-in procedure. That After registration, you will receive an e-mail asking you to confirm your registration. This confirmation is necessary so that nobody can register with external e-mail addresses. The registrations for the newsletter are logged in order to complete the registration process in accordance with the legal requirements be able to prove requirements. This includes the storage of the logon and the confirmation time, as well as the IP address. Likewise, changes to your data stored with the shipping service provider will be logged.
Termination / Withdrawal – You can terminate the receipt of our newsletter at any time, ie. Revoke your consent. A link to cancel the newsletter can be found at the end of each newsletter. We may save the submitted email addresses for up to three years based on our legitimate interests before we delete them to provide prior consent. The processing of this data is limited to the purpose of a possible defense against claims. An individual request for cancellation is possible at any time, provided that at the same time the former existence of a consent is confirmed.
The hosting services we use are designed to provide the following services: infrastructure and platform services, computing capacity, storage and database services, e-mail delivery, security and technical maintenance services we use to operate this online service.
Google Tag Manager is a solution that allows us to manage so-called web site tags through one interface (including integrating Google Analytics and other Google marketing services into our online offering). The tag manager itself (which implements the tags) does not process users’ personal data. With regard to the processing of users’ personal data, reference is made to the following information about the Google services. Usage guidelines: https://www.google.com/intl/de/tagmanager/use-policy.html.
Google is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation.
We use the services of Google Ireland Limited, Gordon House, Barrow Street, Dublin 4 on the basis of our legitimate interests (ie interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online service within the meaning of Art. 6 (1) lit. DSGVO) , Ireland (“Google”).
Google is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation , because e.g. the enforcement of user rights could be made more difficult. With respect to US providers certified under the Privacy Shield, we point out that they are committed to respecting EU privacy standards.
Furthermore, the data of the users are usually processed for market research and advertising purposes. Thus, e.g. user profiles are created from the user behavior and the resulting interests of the users. The usage profiles may in turn be used to e.g. Place advertisements inside and outside the platforms that are allegedly in line with users’ interests. For these purposes, cookies are usually stored on the computers of the users, in which the user behavior and the interests of the users are stored. Furthermore, in the usage profiles, data can also be stored independently of the devices used by the users (in particular if the users are members of the respective platforms and logged in to them).
We embed the fonts (“Google Fonts”) of the provider Google Ireland Limited, Gordon House, Barrow Street, Dublin 4, Ireland. According to Google, users ‘data is used solely for the purpose of displaying fonts in users’ browsers.
We use the AdSense service, which allows ads to appear on our website and reward us for their display or other use. For these purposes, usage data, such as the click on an ad and the IP address of the users processed, whereby the IP address is shortened by the last two places. Therefore, the processing of the data of the users is pseudonymized.
To the best of our knowledge, OpenStreetMap uses users’ data solely for the purpose of displaying map features and caching the selected settings. These data may include, but are not limited to, users’ IP addresses and location data, but they are not collected without their consent (usually as part of their mobile device settings).
On the basis of our legitimate interests (ie interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 (1) lit. DSGVO) we use social plugins (“plugins”) of the social network facebook.com, which operated by Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbor, Dublin 2, Ireland (“Facebook”).
For this, e.g. Content such as pictures, videos or text and buttons belong, with which users can share contents of this on-line offer within Facebook. The list and appearance of Facebook Social Plugins can be viewed here: https:// developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
When a user invokes a feature of this online offering that includes such a plugin, their device establishes a direct connection to the Facebook servers. The content of the plugin is transmitted by Facebook directly to the device of the user and incorporated by him into the online offer. In the process, user profiles of the processed data can be created. Therefore, we have no influence on the extent of the data that Facebook collects with the help of this plugin and therefore informs users according to our knowledge.
If a user is a Facebook member and does not want Facebook to collect data about him via this online offer and link it to his member data stored on Facebook, he must log out of Facebook and delete his cookies before using our online offer. Other settings and disagreements on the use of data for promotional purposes are possible within the Facebook profile settings: https:// www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads or via the US-American site http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ or the EU page http://www.youronlinechoices.com/. The settings are platform independent, i. they will be for all devices, like Desktop or mobile devices.
We use the privacy-protected Shariff buttons. “Shariff” is designed to allow more privacy on the web and to replace the usual “share” buttons on social networks. In this case, not the user’s browser but the server on which this online offer is located establishes a connection to the server of the respective social media platforms and asks, for example, the number of likes, etc. The user remains anonymous. More information about the Shariff project can be found at the developers of c’t magazine: www.ct.de.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


text:
Ian Baxendale obtained his first degree from the University of Leicester graduating with a BSc 1st class honours in Chemistry. He remained at Leicester to continue his studies pursuing a PhD under the supervision of Prof. Pavel Kocovsky investigating new Organometallic catalysts based on group 6 transition metals for stereoselective allylic substitution reactions.
In 1999 he moved to a postdoctoral position with Prof. Steven V. Ley at the University of Cambridge initially conducting research into Natural Product synthesis prior to entering the field of Solid Supported Reagents and Scavengers. In 2003 he was awarded a Wolfson Royal Society Fellowship. Then in 2005 he co-founded the Innovative Technology Centre (ITC) with Prof. Ley as a centre of excellence for the study and development of advanced chemical synthesis tools and methodologies where he was the centre's Director. In 2008 he was promoted to a Senior Research Associate within the Department of Chemistry at Cambridge and then in 2009 was awarded a prestigious Royal Society University Research Fellowship and become a member of the Chemistry Departments teaching faculty.
Whilst at Cambridge he was also elected a Fellow at Sidney Sussex College (2000) and soon after took over as the Head of Natural Sciences teaching and for 5 years acted as the Dean of the College.
In 2005 Prof.'s Baxendale and Ley established a spin-out company; Reaxa Ltd, as a joint venture between the University of Cambridge and Avecia plc. The company was focused upon the developed of enabling tools such as immobilised catalysts and metal scavengers for bulk scale production of high volume intermediates and APIs. In 2010 the company sold its scavenger range (QuadraPure™ and QuadraSil™ scavengers - leading technology in metal extraction and purification for pharma manufacturing) to Johnson Matthey. Then divested its EnCat™ encapsulated catalyst technology to S. Amit & Co., a Mumbai-based chemistry services provider. The remaining company assets were integrated into a new venture Yorkshire Process Technology Ltd.
In 2012 Ian moved to Durham to take up the Chair of Synthetic Chemistry as a fully tenured Professor.
His current research interests are the design and implementation of new enabling technologies such as Flow Chemical Synthesis (FCS), Synthesis Automation Methodologies (SAM), microwave reactors and immobilised reagents and scavengers to expedite complex chemical syntheses. The success of his academic career is reflected by >125 publications (H-index=36), including several reviews and book chapters, with a total of >3900 citations.
Ian's research has received considerable interest especially from within the Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical industries consequently he gives on average 20-25 teaching lectures per annum. In addition his laboratory have established a successful training scheme allowing people to visit from companies and other research organisations to perform a period of learning and development within the confines of his laboratories. This has created a network of skilled technical experts who are spreading the story and supporting the British and European chemical industry.
Furthermore, Ian acts as a scientific consultant for a number of major pharmaceutical, agrochemical and fine chemicals companies with regard to advising them upon the latest manufacturing techniques and technologies as well as effective exploitation of modern synthesis techniques for improved chemical synthesis.
His general areas of interest are: Organic synthesis (natural products, heterocyclic and medicinal chemistry), Organometallic chemistry, Catalyst design and application, Meso flow chemistry, Microfluidics, Microwave assisted synthesis, Solid supported reagents and scavengers, and facilitated reaction optimisation using Robotics and Automation.
My primary research direction is the synthesis of biologically potent molecules which encompasses the design, development and integration of new processing techniques for their preparation and solving challenges associated with the syntheses of new pharmaceutical and agrochemical compounds. In our work we utilise the latest synthesis tools and enabling technologies such as microwave reactors, solid supported reagents and scavengers, enzymes, membrane reactors and flow chemistry platforms to facilitate the bond making sequence and expedite the purification procedure. A central aspect of our investigations is our pioneering work on flow chemical synthesis and microreactor technology as a means of improving the speed, efficiency, and safety of various chemical transformations. As a part of these studies we are attempting to devise new chemical reactions that are not inherently feasible or would be problematic under standard laboratory conditions. It is our further challenge to enhance the automation associated with these reactor devices to impart a certain level of intelligence to their function so that repetitive wasteful actions currently performed by chemists can be delegated to a machine; for example, reagent screening or reaction optimisation. We use these technologies as tools to enhance our synthetic capabilities but strongly believe in not becoming slaves to any methodology or equipment.
Baumann, M.; Baxendale, I. R. (The rapid generation of isothiocyanates in flow) Beilstein J. Org. Chem. 2013, 9,1613–1619.
Nakayama, K.; Browne, D. L.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V. (Studies of a Diastereoselective Electrophilic Fluorination Reaction Employing a Cryo-Flow Reactor) Synlett 2013, 24, 1298–1302.
Baxendale, I. R.; Millia, C. J.; Brocken, L.; (Flow chemistry approaches directed at improving chemical synthesis)Green Process Synth. 2013, 2, 211–230.
Battilocchio, C.; Guetzoyan, L.; Cervetto, C.; Mannelli, L. D. C.; Daniela Frattaroli, D.; Baxendale, I. R.; Maura, G.; Sautebin, L.; Biava, M.; Ghelardini, C.; Marcoli, M.; Ley, S. V. (Flow Synthesis and Bio-Pharmacological Studies of a P2X7 Antagonist that Shows Analgesic Activity) A.C.S. Med. Chem. Lett. 2013, 4 (8), 704–709.
Baxendale, I. R.; Cheung, S.; Kitching, M. O.; Ley, S. V. Shearman, J. W. (The Synthesis of Neurotensin Antagonist SR 48692 for Prostate Cancer Research) Bioorg. Med. Chem. 2013, 21, 4378–4387.
Battilocchio, C.; Deadman, B. J.; Nikbin N.; Kitching, M. O.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V. (A Machine-Assisted Flow Synthesis of SR48692: a Probe for the Investigation of Neurotensin Receptor-1) Chem. Eur. J. 2013, 19, 7917–7930.
Fernández, A.; Levine, Z. G.; Baumann, M.; Sulzer-Mossé, S.; Sparr, C.; Schläger, S.; Metzger, A.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V. (Synthesis of (–)-Hennoxazole A: Integrating Batch and Flow Chemistry Methods) Synlett 2013, 514–518.
Baxendale, I. R. (The integration of flow reactors into synthetic organic chemistry) J. Chem. Technol. Biotechnol.2013, 88, 519–552.
Deadman, B. J. Hopkin, M. D.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V. (The Synthesis of Bcr-Abl Inhibiting Anticancer Pharmaceutical Agents Imatinib, Nilotinib and Dasatinib) Org. Biomol. Chem. 2013, 11, 1766–1800.
Hopkin, M. D.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V. (An Expeditious Synthesis of Imatinib and Analogues Utilising Flow Chemistry Methods) Org. Biomol. Chem. 2013, 11, 1822–1839.
Guetzoyan,L.; Nikbin,N.; Baxendale,I. R.; Ley S. V. (Flow Chemistry Synthesis of Zolpidem, Alpidem and other GABAA Agonists and their Biological Evaluation through the use of In-line Frontal Affinity Chromatography)Chem. Sci. 2013, 4, 764–769.
The rapid generation of isothiocyanates in flow.
Baumann, M.; Baxendale, I. R.
Beilstein J. Org. Chem. 2013, 9, 1613-1619.
Isothiocyanates are versatile starting materials for a wide range of chemical reactions. However, their high nucleophilic susceptibility means they are best prepared and used immediately. We report here on a flow platform for the fast and efficient formation of isothiocyanates by the direct conversion of easily prepared chloroximes. To expedite this chemistry a flow insert cartridge containing two immobilised reagents is used to affect the chemical transformation which typically eliminates the requirements for any conventional work-up or purification of the reaction stream.
Studies of a Diastereoselective Electrophilic Fluorination Reaction Employing a Cryo-Flow Reactor.
Nakayama, K.; Browne, D. L.; Baxendale, I. R.; Ley, S. V.
The application of meso-scale flow chemistry in research laboratories continues to increase. Here, we report on the use of a modular cryo-flow device as applied to a diastereoselective fluorination process. The reactor can be incorporated into existing flow chemistry setups to permit continuous processing at low temperatures without recourse to cryogenic consumables.
Flow chemistry approaches directed at improving chemical synthesis.
Baxendale, I. R.; Millia, C. J.; Brocken, L.
Green Process Synth. 2013, 2, 211-230.
Flow synthesis offers many advantages when applied to the processing of difficult or dangerous chemical transformations. Furthermore, continuous production allows for rapid scale up of reactions without significant redevelopment of the routes. Importantly, it can also provide a versatile platform from which to build integrated multi-step transformations, delivering more advanced chemical architectures. The construction of multi-purpose micro and meso flow systems, that utilize in-line purification and diagnostic capabilities, creates a scenario of seamless connectivity between sequential steps of a longer chemical sequence. In this mini perspective, we will discuss our experience of target orientated multi-step synthesis as presented at the recent inaugural meeting of LEGOMEDIC at Namar University, Belgium.
Flow Synthesis and Bio-Pharmacological Studies of a P2X7 Antagonist that Shows Analgesic Activity.
Battilocchio, C.; Guetzoyan, L.; Cervetto, C.; Mannelli, L. D. C.; Daniela Frattaroli, D.; Baxendale, I. R.; Maura, G.; Sautebin, L.; Biava, M.; Ghelardini, C.; Marcoli, M.; Ley, S. V.
A.C.S. Med. Chem. Lett. 2013, 4(8), 704-709.
We report the biological evaluation of a class of adamantane derivatives, which were achieved via modified telescoped machine-assisted flow procedure. Among the series of compounds tested in this work, 5 demonstrated outstanding analgesic properties. This compound showed that its action was not mediated through direct interaction with opioid and/ or cannabinoid receptors. Moreover, it did not display any significant anti-inflammatory properties. Experiments carried out on rat cerebrocortical purified synaptosomes indicated that 5 inhibits the P2X7-evoked glutamate release, which may contribute to its antinociceptive properties. Nevertheless, further experiments are ongoing to characterize the pharmacological properties and mechanism of action of this molecule.
The Synthesis of Neurotensin Antagonist SR 48692 for Prostate Cancer Research.
Baxendale, I. R.; Cheung, S.; Kitching, M. O.; Ley, S. V. Shearman, J. W.
Bioorg. Med. Chem. 2013, 21, 4378-4387.
An improved synthesis of the molecule SR 48692 is presented and its use as a neurotensin antagonist biological probe for use in cancer research is described. The preparation includes an number of enhanced chemical conversions and strategies to overcome some of the limiting synthetic transformations in the original chemical route.
Shahid Beheshti Univ. Med. Sci.
Modern impression of Achaemenidcylinder seal, 5th century BCE. A winged solar disc legitimises the Persian king who subdues two rampant Mesopotamian lamassu figures.
● Development and optimization of solid lipid nanoparticles of amikacin by central composite designJ. Arshosaz, S. Ghafari, M. R. Khoshayand, F. Atyabi, S. Azarmi, F. Kobarfard, Journal of Liposome Research, 2010, 20 (2), 97.
● Terpenes from aerial parts of Euphorbia splendida S. A. Ayatollahi, A. Shojai, F. Kobarfard, M. Nori, M. Fathi, M. I.
spectrometry R. Ahmadkhani, F. Kobarfard, N. Rastkari, M. Khoshayand, M.Amini, A. Shafiee, Food Additive and Contaminants, 2009, 26 (4),453.
● Quantification of endogenous steroids in human urine by gcmass spectrometry using a surrogate analyte approach.
R. Ahmadkhani, A. Shafiee, N. Rastkari, M. Khoshayand, F.Kobarfard, Journal of Chromatography B, 2010, 878, 845.
● Serum copper alterations in pulmonary tuberculosis patients under treatment with ethambutol.
● Two Fravones from Salvia lerifolia S. A. Ayatollahi, A. Shojai, F. Kobarfard, M. Mohammadzadeh, M.
I. Choudhari, Iranian Journal of Pharmaceutical Research, 2009, 8 (3), 179.
electrochemical synthesis of new benzofuran derivative. A. Bayandori Moghadam, F. Kobarfard, S. S. H. Davarani, D.
Mount Damavand, Iran's highest point, is located in Amol County,Mazanderan.
Safir (rocket). Iran is the9th country to put a domestically built satellite into orbit and the sixth to send animals in space.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


Respondent Echazabal worked for independent contractors at one of petitioner Chevron U. S A. Inc.'s oil refineries until Chevron refused to hire him because of a liver condition--which its doctors said would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery--and the contractor employing him laid him off in response to Chevron's request that it reassign him to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him from the refinery. Echazabal filed suit, claiming, among other things, that Chevron's actions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Chevron defended under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation permitting the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.
Held: The ADA permits the EEOC's regulation. Pp. 3-13.
(a) The ADA's discrimination definition covers a number of things an employer might do to block a disabled person from advancing in the workplace, such as "using qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out [such] an individual," 42 U. S. C. §12112(b)(6). And along with §12113(a), the definition creates an affirmative defense for action under a qualification standard "shown to be job-related ... and ... consistent with business necessity," which "may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace," §12113(b). The EEOC's regulation carries the defense one step further, allowing an employer to screen out a potential worker with a disability for risks on the job to his own health or safety. Pp. 3-5.
(b) Echazabal relies on the canon expressio unius exclusio alterius--expressing one item of an associated group excludes another left unmentioned--for his argument that the ADA, by recognizing only threats to others, precludes the regulation as a matter of law. The first strike against the expression-exclusion rule here is in the statute, which includes the threat-to-others provision as an example of legitimate qualifications that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." These spacious defensive categories seem to give an agency a good deal of discretion in setting the limits of permissible qualification standards. And the expansive "may include" phrase points directly away from the sort of exclusive specifications that Echazabal claims. Strike two is the failure to identify any series of terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which are abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded. Echazabal claims that Congress's adoption only of the threat-to-others exception in the ADA was a deliberate omission of the threat-to-self exception included in the EEOC's regulation implementing the precursor Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which has language identical to that in the ADA. But this is not an unequivocal implication of congressional intent. Because the EEOC was not the only agency interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, its regulation did not establish a clear, standard pairing of threats to self and others. And, it is likely that Congress used such language in the ADA knowing what the EEOC had made of that language under the earlier statute. The third strike is simply that there is no apparent stopping point to the argument that, by specifying a threat-to-others defense, Congress intended a negative implication about those whose safety could be considered. For example, Congress could not have meant that an employer could not defend a refusal to hire when a worker's disability would threaten others outside the workplace. Pp. 5-9.
(c) Since Congress has not spoken exhaustively on threats to a worker's own health, the regulation can claim adherence under the rule in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, so long as it makes sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." Chevron's reasons for claiming that the regulation is reasonable include, inter alia, that it allows Chevron to avoid the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). Whether an employer would be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who consents to a job's particular dangers is an open question, but the employer would be courting trouble under OSHA. The EEOC's resolution exemplifies the substantive choices that agencies are expected to make when Congress leaves the intersection of competing objectives both imprecisely marked and subject to administrative leeway. Nor can the EEOC's resolution be called unreasonable as allowing the kind of workplace paternalism the ADA was meant to outlaw. The ADA was trying to get at refusals to give an even break to classes of disabled people, while claiming to act for their own good in reliance on untested and pretextual stereotypes. This sort of sham protection is just what the regulation disallows, by demanding a particularized enquiry into the harms an employee would probably face. Finally, that the threat-to-self defense reasonably falls within the general "job related" and "business necessity" standard does not reduce the "direct threat" language to surplusage. The provision made a conclusion clear that might otherwise have been fought over in litigation or administrative rulemaking. Pp. 10-13.
226 F. 3d 1063, reversed and remanded.
A regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authorizes refusal to hire an individual because his performance on the job would endanger his own health, owing to a disability. The question in this case is whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), permits the regulation.1 We hold that it does.
Beginning in 1972, respondent Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by petitioner Chevron U. S. A. Inc. Twice he applied for a job directly with Chevron, which offered to hire him if he could pass the company's physical examination. See 42 U. S. C. §12112(d)(3) (1994 ed.). Each time, the exam showed liver abnormality or damage, the cause eventually being identified as Hepatitis C, which Chevron's doctors said would be aggravated by continued exposure to toxins at Chevron's refinery. In each instance, the company withdrew the offer, and the second time it asked the contractor employing Echazabal either to reassign him to a job without exposure to harmful chemicals or to remove him from the refinery altogether. The contractor laid him off in early 1996.
Echazabal filed suit, ultimately removed to federal court, claiming, among other things, that Chevron violated the Americans With Disabilities Act in refusing to hire him, or even to let him continue working in the plant, because of a disability, his liver condition.2 Chevron defended under a regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission permitting the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a "direct threat" to his health, see 29 CFR §1630.15(b)(2) (2001). Although two medical witnesses disputed Chevron's judgment that Echazabal's liver function was impaired and subject to further damage under the job conditions in the refinery, the District Court granted summary judgment for Chevron. It held that Echazabal raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company acted reasonably in relying on its own doctors' medical advice, regardless of its accuracy.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked for briefs on a threshold question not raised before, whether the EEOC's regulation recognizing a threat-to-self defense, ibid., exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA. 226 F. 3d 1063, 1066, n. 3 (2000). The Circuit held that it did and reversed the summary judgment. The court rested its position on the text of the ADA itself in explicitly recognizing an employer's right to adopt an employment qualification barring anyone whose disability would place others in the workplace at risk, while saying nothing about threats to the disabled employee himself. The majority opinion reasoned that "by specifying only threats to `other individuals in the workplace,' the statute makes it clear that threats to other persons--including the disabled individual himself--are not included within the scope of the [direct threat] defense," id., at 1066-1067, and it indicated that any such regulation would unreasonably conflict with congressional policy against paternalism in the workplace, id., at 1067-1070. The court went on to reject Chevron's further argument that Echazabal was not " `otherwise qualified' " to perform the job, holding that the ability to perform a job without risk to one's health or safety is not an " `essential function' " of the job. Id., at 1070.
The decision conflicted with one from the Eleventh Circuit, Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F. 3d 446, 447 (1996), and raised tension with the Seventh Circuit case of Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F. 3d 599, 603 (1999). We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 991 (2001), and now reverse.
Section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq., prohibits "discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to" a number of actions by an employer, including "hiring." 42 U. S. C. §12112(a). The statutory definition of "discriminat[ion]" covers a number of things an employer might do to block a disabled person from advancing in the workplace, such as "using qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability." §12112(b)(6). By that same definition, ibid., as well as by separate provision, §12113(a), the Act creates an affirmative defense for action under a qualification standard "shown to be job-related for the position in question and ... consistent with business necessity." Such a standard may include "a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace," §12113(b), if the individual cannot perform the job safely with reasonable accommodation, §12113(a). By regulation, the EEOC carries the defense one step further, in allowing an employer to screen out a potential worker with a disability not only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for risks on the job to his own health or safety as well: "The term `qualification standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace." 29 CFR §1630.15(b)(2) (2001).
Chevron relies on the regulation here, since it says a job in the refinery would pose a "direct threat" to Echazabal's health. In seeking deference to the agency, it argues that nothing in the statute unambiguously precludes such a defense, while the regulation was adopted under authority explicitly delegated by Congress, 42 U. S. C. §12116, and after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-844 (1984). Echazabal, on the contrary, argues that as a matter of law the statute precludes the regulation, which he claims would be an unreasonable interpretation even if the agency had leeway to go beyond the literal text.
As for the textual bar to any agency action as a matter of law, Echazabal says that Chevron loses on the threshold question whether the statute leaves a gap for the EEOC to fill. See id., at 843-844. Echazabal recognizes the generality of the language providing for a defense when a plaintiff is screened out by "qualification standards" that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity" (and reasonable accommodation would not cure the difficulty posed by employment). 42 U. S. C. §12113(a). Without more, those provisions would allow an employer to turn away someone whose work would pose a serious risk to himself. That possibility is said to be eliminated, however, by the further specification that " `qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." §12113(b); see also §12111(3) (defining "direct threat" in terms of risk to others). Echazabal contrasts this provision with an EEOC regulation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 357, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §701 et seq., antedating the ADA, which recognized an employer's right to consider threats both to other workers and to the threatening employee himself. Because the ADA defense provision recognizes threats only if they extend to another, Echazabal reads the statute to imply as a matter of law that threats to the worker himself cannot count.
The argument follows the reliance of the Ninth Circuit majority on the interpretive canon, expressio unius exclusio alterius, "expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned." United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. ___ , ___ , (2002) (slip op., at 8). The rule is fine when it applies, but this case joins some others in showing when it does not. See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at 9); United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U. S. 822, 836 (2001); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 703 (1991).
Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which are abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded. E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes 337 (1940) (expressio unius " `properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference' " (quoting State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps, 134 Ohio St. 295, 299, 16 N. E. 2d 459, 462 (1938)); United States v. Vonn, supra.
Strike two in this case is the failure to identify any such established series, including both threats to others and threats to self, from which Congress appears to have made a deliberate choice to omit the latter item as a signal of the affirmative defense's scope. The closest Echazabal comes is the EEOC's rule interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 357, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §701 et seq., a precursor of the ADA. That statute excepts from the definition of a protected "qualified individual with a handicap" anyone who would pose a "direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals," but, like the later ADA, the Rehabilitation Act says nothing about threats to self that particular employment might pose. 42 U. S. C. §12113(b). The EEOC nonetheless extended the exception to cover threat-to-self employment, 29 CFR §1613.702(f) (1990), and Echazabal argues that Congress's adoption only of the threat-to-others exception in the ADA must have been a deliberate omission of the Rehabilitation Act regulation's tandem term of threat-to-self, with intent to exclude it.
But two reasons stand in the way of treating the omission as an unequivocal implication of congressional intent. The first is that the EEOC was not the only agency interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, with the consequence that its regulation did not establish a clear, standard pairing of threats to self and others. While the EEOC did amplify upon the text of the Rehabilitation Act exclusion by recognizing threats to self along with threats to others, three other agencies adopting regulations under the Rehabilitation Act did not. See 28 CFR §42.540(l)(1) (1990) (Department of Justice), 29 CFR §32.3 (1990) (Department of Labor), and 45 CFR §84.3(k)(1) (1990) (Department of Health and Human Services).4 It would be a stretch, then, to say that there was a standard usage, with its source in agency practice or elsewhere, that connected threats to others so closely to threats to self that leaving out one was like ignoring a twin.
Even if we put aside this variety of administrative experience, however, and look no further than the EEOC's Rehabilitation Act regulation pairing self and others, the congressional choice to speak only of threats to others would still be equivocal. Consider what the ADA reference to threats to others might have meant on somewhat different facts. If the Rehabilitation Act had spoken only of "threats to health" and the EEOC regulation had read that to mean threats to self or others, a congressional choice to be more specific in the ADA by listing threats to others but not threats to self would have carried a message. The most probable reading would have been that Congress understood what a failure to specify could lead to and had made a choice to limit the possibilities. The statutory basis for any agency rulemaking under the ADA would have been different from its basis under the Rehabilitation Act and would have indicated a difference in the agency's rulemaking discretion. But these are not the circumstances here. Instead of making the ADA different from the Rehabilitation Act on the point at issue, Congress used identical language, knowing full well what the EEOC had made of that language under the earlier statute. Did Congress mean to imply that the agency had been wrong in reading the earlier language to allow it to recognize threats to self, or did Congress just assume that the agency was free to do under the ADA what it had already done under the earlier Act's identical language? There is no way to tell. Omitting the EEOC's reference to self-harm while using the very language that the EEOC had read as consistent with recognizing self-harm is equivocal at best. No negative inference is possible.
There is even a third strike against applying the expression-exclusion rule here. It is simply that there is no apparent stopping point to the argument that by specifying a threat-to-others defense Congress intended a negative implication about those whose safety could be considered. When Congress specified threats to others in the workplace, for example, could it possibly have meant that an employer could not defend a refusal to hire when a worker's disability would threaten others outside the workplace? If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being turned away? See 42 U. S. C. §12113(d). Expressio unius just fails to work here.
Since Congress has not spoken exhaustively on threats to a worker's own health, the agency regulation can claim adherence under the rule in Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, so long as it makes sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U. S. C. §12113(a). Chevron's reasons for calling the regulation reasonable are unsurprising: moral concerns aside, it wishes to avoid time lost to sickness, excessive turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under state tort law, and the risk of violating the national Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §651 et seq. Although Echazabal claims that none of these reasons is legitimate, focusing on the concern with OSHA will be enough to show that the regulation is entitled to survive.
Echazabal points out that there is no known instance of OSHA enforcement, or even threatened enforcement, against an employer who relied on the ADA to hire a worker willing to accept a risk to himself from his disability on the job. In Echazabal's mind, this shows that invoking OSHA policy and possible OSHA liability is just a red herring to excuse covert discrimination. But there is another side to this. The text of OSHA itself says its point is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions," §651(b), and Congress specifically obligated an employer to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees," §654(a)(1). Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, see Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 19, n. 7, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of "each" and "every" worker. Courts would, of course, resolve the tension if there were no agency action, but the EEOC's resolution exemplifies the substantive choices that agencies are expected to make when Congress leaves the intersection of competing objectives both imprecisely marked but subject to the administrative leeway found in 42 U. S. C. §12113(a).
Finally, our conclusions that some regulation is permissible and this one is reasonable are not open to Echazabal's objection that they reduce the direct threat provision to "surplusage," see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 698 (1995). The mere fact that a threat-to-self defense reasonably falls within the general "job related" and "business necessity" standard does not mean that Congress accomplished nothing with its explicit provision for a defense based on threats to others. The provision made a conclusion clear that might otherwise have been fought over in litigation or administrative rulemaking. It did not lack a job to do merely because the EEOC might have adopted the same rule later in applying the general defense provisions, nor was its job any less responsible simply because the agency was left with the option to go a step further. A provision can be useful even without congressional attention being indispensable.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner and which we leave to the Ninth Circuit for initial appellate consideration if warranted.
Chevron did not dispute for purposes of its summary-judgment motion that Echazabal is "disabled" under the ADA, and Echazabal did not argue that Chevron could have made a " `reasonable accommodation.' " App. 184, n. 6.
In saying that the expansive textual phrases point in the direction of agency leeway we do not mean that the defense provisions place no limit on agency rulemaking. Without deciding whether all safety-related qualification standards must satisfy the ADA's direct-threat standard, see Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 569-570, n. 15 (1999), we assume that some such regulations are implicitly precluded by the Act's specification of a direct-threat defense, such as those allowing "indirect" threats of "insignificant" harm. This is so because the definitional and defense provisions describing the defense in terms of "direct" threats of "significant" harm, 42 U. S. C. §§12113(b), 12111(3), are obviously intended to forbid qualifications that screen out by reference to general categories pretextually applied. See infra, at 11-12, and n. 5. Recognizing the "indirect" and "insignificant" would simply reopen the door to pretext by way of defense.
In fact, we have said that the regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, which had previously been the regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, are of "particular significance" in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act because "HEW was the agency responsible for coordinating the implementation and enforcement of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. §794," prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by recipients of federal funds. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U. S. 184, 195 (2002). Unfortunately for Echazabal's argument, the congruence of the ADA with the HEW regulations does not produce an unequivocal statement of congressional intent.
Echazabal's contention that the Act's legislative history is to the contrary is unpersuasive. Although some of the comments within the legislative history decry paternalism in general terms, see, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 72 (1990) ("It is critical that paternalistic concerns for the disabled person's own safety not be used to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant"); ADA Conf. Rep., 136 Cong. Rec. 17377 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[A]n employer could not use as an excuse for not hiring a person with HIV disease the claim that the employer was simply `protecting the individual' from opportunistic diseases to which the individual might be exposed"), those comments that elaborate actually express the more pointed concern that such justifications are usually pretextual, rooted in generalities and misperceptions about disabilities. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 74 ("Generalized fear about risks from the employment environment, such as exacerbation of the disability caused by stress, cannot be used by an employer to disqualify a person with a disability"); S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 28 (1989) ("It would also be a violation to deny employment to an applicant based on generalized fears about the safety of the applicant ... . By definition, such fears are based on averages and group-based predictions. This legislation requires individualized assessments").
Similarly, Echazabal points to several of our decisions expressing concern under Title VII, which like the ADA allows employers to defend otherwise discriminatory practices that are "consistent with business necessity," 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(k), with employers adopting rules that exclude women from jobs that are seen as too risky. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 335 (1977); Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 202 (1991). Those cases, however, are beside the point, as they, like Title VII generally, were concerned with paternalistic judgments based on the broad category of gender, while the EEOC has required that judgments based on the direct threat provision be made on the basis of individualized risk assessments.
Respect for this distinction does not entail the requirement, as Echazabal claims, that qualification standards be "neutral," stating what the job requires, as distinct from a worker's disqualifying characteristics. Brief for Respondent 26. It is just as much business necessity for skyscraper contractors to have steelworkers without vertigo as to have well-balanced ones. See 226 F. 3d, at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting). Reasonableness does not turn on formalism. We have no occasion, however, to try to describe how acutely an employee must exhibit a disqualifying condition before an employer may exclude him from the class of the generally qualified. See Brief for Respondent 31. This is a job for the trial courts in the first instance.


granted the motion for rehearing in Texas Parks and Wildlife v. The Sawyer Trust, No. 07â€‘0945 (DB), restoring that previously denied petition to the docket.
City of San Antonio v. Charles Pollock, et al., No. 04-1110 (DB).
This case involves a claim for birth defects alleged to result from the city’s operation of a landfill near a family home. By a 6-2 vote, (( Justice Green did not sit on this case in the Texas Supreme Court. )) the Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the City.
Justice Hecht wrote the majority opinion, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Wainwright, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined, and (in part) by Justice Brister.
The City contends that none of these facts or analyses support Kraftâ€™s conclusion that the Pollocks were exposed to benzene at a level of 160 ppb in the air in their home and on their property. Assuming from Kraftâ€™s data that in 1993-1994, gas in the monitoring well would have been 50% methane and 160 ppb benzene, and that gas of that composition migrated onto the Pollocksâ€™ property, it unquestionably dissipated in the ambient air. Unless the landfill gas was less than 28% of the ambient air â€” and the methane concentration reduced below 14%, with a benzene concentration of 44.8 ppb â€” the Pollocks would have suffocated from the methane. Unless gas like that found in the well were less than 10% of the ambient air â€” and the methane concentration reduced below 5% methane, with a benzene concentration of 16 ppb â€” there would almost certainly have been an explosion from the methane. There is no evidence whatever from which one could infer the concentration to which Tracy Pollock was exposed in the ambient air of her home and yard, but at the highest concentration possible, the methane â€” and consequently the level of benzene â€” could have been only a fraction of that in the sealed monitoring well. Kraftâ€™s opinion that she was chronically exposed to benzene concentrations of 160 ppb has no basis in the record. Indeed, it is directly contradicted by his own data showing such concentrations present only in the well. Kraftâ€™s opinion is the kind of naked conclusion that cannot support a judgment.
The Court concluded that the analytical gap in the expert’s reasoning was the kind of unsubstantiated conclusion that could be challenged for the first time on appeal.
Justice Media, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O’Neill, contended that this question of characterization was really the key. In the dissent’s view, the appellate court should not have been in the business of second-guessing this expert conclusion because it was really about realibility — and the City had failed to challenge the expert’s reliability in the trial court.
Without an objection, a trial court simply cannot be expected to fulfill its role as gatekeeper. Nor can an appellate court assume this role, particularly after the witnesses have testified, been dismissed, and the record closed. Nevertheless, the Court here assumes the role of gatekeeper ex post facto, allowing the City to complain about analytical gaps for the first time on appeal. Because the City did not object to the reliability of either expert witness in the trial court or complain about the analytical gaps it now details in this appeal, I would hold that the complaint has been waived.
The dissent recognized that it is sometimes difficult to tell which defects in expert testimony are about “reliability” (and thus require a timely objection in the trial court) and which defects about it being “conclusory” (and thus can be raised for the first time on appeal).
The dissent’s suggestion was somewhat philosophical — “[t]he distinction apparently is the difference between something and nothing. As the Court recently explained in Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. 2008): An expertâ€™s testimony is conclusory if the expert merely gave an unexplained conclusion or asked the jury to ‘take my word for it’ because of his status as an expert.” Here, because the expert gave a methodology (even if flawed), the dissent would have classified this appellate complaint as going to reliability — and thus to have been waived.
The dissent would, however, have reduced the plaintiffs’ award to fit within the Texas Tort Claims Act cap. So the gap between the majority and dissent is perhaps smaller than first appears, at least insofar as the plaintiffs’ finances are concerned.
The Pollocks contend that the fact the City knew that [gas leakage was] inherent in the operation of a landfill is sufficient to show that the City knew its operation of the landfill was substantially certain to damage their property. We rejected essentially the same argument in City of Dallas v. Jennings, where homeowners attempted to show the cityâ€™s intent to damage their property by sewage flooding from the fact that the city knew that unclogging a sewer can sometimes cause it to back up. The governmental entityâ€™s awareness of the mere possibility of damage is no evidence of intent.
Divided 5-4, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Legislature had not waived the immunity held by a regional hospital district to permit suit by a county hospital district. Thus, the Court reversed and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Johnson and joined by Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, and Justice Green. The dissenting opinion was delivered by the Chief Justice, joined by Justice O’Neill, Justice Brister, and Justice Willett.
A recipient of city government pension benefits sued the board members and the mayor, alleging that her benefits had been improperly reduced contrary to state law.
To reach that result, the Court addressed several points that will interest anyone who litigates against the government. The Court affirmed in part (because the officials sued in their official capacities did not have immunity), reversed in part (because the governmental entities did have immunity and because the court of appeals had been mistaken about the capacity in which the individual defendants were sued), and remanded to the trial court.
The Court first emphasized that suits for prospective relief must indeed be brought against state officials, not against state entities. That is because of the old logic of Cobb that “acts of officials which are not lawfully authorized are not acts of the State.” The Court recognized that, “for all practical purposes,” these types of suits are against the State. But the Court nonetheless followed the traditional rule that had been applied in the federal context and in some state cases. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the governmental entity defendants — they retained immunity against this action.
The best way to resolve this conflict is to follow the rule, outlined above, that a claimant who successfully proves an ultra vires claim is entitled to prospective injunctive relief, as measured from the date of injunction. Cf. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 669 (using entry of injunction to distinguish retrospective from prospective relief). Thus, while the ultra vires rule remains the law, see Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404, Epperson‘s retrospective remedy does not.
Distinguishing between proper and improper relief is likely to be the real sticking point in these cases. The Court’s opinion today provides the framework for those future battles. Retrospective injunctive relief is, as the Court pointed out, often just damages by another name. But prospective injunctive relief — “as measured from the date of the injunction” — is instead a proper attempt to bring government officials back into line.
Because these types of suits require that government officials be named as defendants, they also force courts to sort out whether each named official has been sued in an “official capacity” or an “individual capacity.” An “official capacity” suit asks the official to take some action within the scope of their official powers; an “individual capacity” suit seeks monetary recovery from the individual.
Here, the court of appeals concluded that the officials had been sued in their individual capacities. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that they were sued in their official capacities. The Court construed the pleadings liberally and looked at the overall relief sought.
The Court also rejected the City’s argument that Heinrich’s claim should fail because she did not offer evidence that the particular reduction in her benefits was against the law. The Court held that there was enough evidence to raise a fact question about this point and thus that disposition on a plea to the jurisdiction was improper.
Doris and Raoul Hagenâ€™s 1976 divorce decree awarded a percentage of Raoulâ€™s military retirement pay to Doris to be paid if, as, and when he received it. After Raoulâ€™s subsequent retirement from the Army, he was determined by the Veteransâ€™ Administration (VA) to have a service-connected disability. He then elected to be paid VA disability benefit … [which] reduced the amount of military retirement pay he received. When Doris began receiving her percentage of the reduced Army retirement pay Raoul received, she sought enforcement and clarification of the divorce decree. The trial court determined that the decree divided only the military retirement pay being received by Raoul, it did not divide his VA disability benefits, and Doris was entitled to only a percentage of the military retirement pay. The court of appeals reversed. The appeals court held that the trial court modified the 1976 decree instead of clarifying it, and the modification was barred by res judicata principles. We hold that the trial court correctly clarified the unambiguous original decree, and its action was not a modification barred by res judicata principles. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Justice Johnson wrote a majority opinion joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, and Justice Willett. Justice Brister delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice O’Neill and Justice Medina joined.
In this premise-liability case, we decide whether a seventeen-foot floodgate arm located approximately three feet off a two-lane rural roadway is a “special defect” under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). We hold the floodgate arm does not meet the TTCA’s narrow definition of a special defect. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the case.
This was a rare Rule 59.1 (decision without oral argument) case in which the Court divided. Justice Willett delivered the majority opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined. Justice O’Neill delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Medina joined.
It is hard to imagine anything more dangerous than a seventeen-foot metal pole pointing like a spear in the direction of oncoming traffic. The Court doesn’t appear to disagree. It concludes, however, that ordinary users of the roadway are not expected to veer off the asphalt pavement, so anything they might encounter if they do cannot be a special defect. I would agree with the Court if the particular hazard were further from the road than the metal pole that impaled the plaintiffâ€™s vehicle here. But departing a mere three feet from the road to avoid a collision is not out of the ordinary, and the floodgate arm’s close proximity to the road’s edge posed a threat that normal users of the road would not expect. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.
The Texas Family Code requires that a statement of points on which a party intends to appeal be presented to the trial court within fifteen days after the signing of a final order terminating parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code §263.405(b). The Code further provides that an appellate court is to consider only those issues presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of points. Id. § 263.405(i). The issue in this parental rights termination case is whether the failure to follow these procedural rules in the Family Code precludes appellate review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Along the way, the majority held that §263.405(i) of the Family Code would be unconstitutional if applied to prevent a parent from raising a meritorious complaint about the insufficiency of evidence supporting a parental-termination an issue mentioned this previous post and that the Court had previously reserved judgment upon when denying review in In re D.W., T.W., and S.G., No. 08-0258 (DocketDB).
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be raised on appeal despite the failure to include it in a statement of points. We also agree with the court of appeals that section 263.405(i) is unconstitutional as applied when it precludes a parent from raising a meritorious complaint about the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination order.
Justice Willett’s concurrence makes reference to the amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General of Texas (mentioned in this earlier post) and addresses steps that courts can take to prevent manipulation of this rule by advocates.
In a per curiam decision issued without oral argument, the Court held that a prison inmate was not barred from pursuing his grievance claim in court for failure to file “a copy of the written decision” from the prison’s internal grievance system, as required by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §14.005(a)(2).
It seems that the inmate actually filed a “a hand-typed, verbatim reproduction” rather than an imaged photocopy. The court of appeals held that was insufficient; the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that this copy satisfied the statute.


In PLR 201825013, the Co-Executors of Decedent’s estate hired Attorney to prepare the estate’s Form 706. Attorney prepared Form 706, but did not make the alternate valuation date election under § 2032. The Co-Executors timely filed the Form 706.
At a later date, after the due date of Form 706, the Co-Executors filed a supplemental Form 706 making the alternate valuation date election under § 2032. The IRS issued a letter to the Co-Executors stating that because the § 2032 election was not timely filed, the estate’s assets could not be valued under § 2032 unless an extension of time was granted under the relief provisions of §§ 301.9100-1 and 301.9100-3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations (“9100 Relief”).
Section 20.2032-1(b)(3) of the Estate Tax Regulations provides that a request for an extension of time pursuant to §§ 301.9100-1 and 301.9100-3 will not be granted unless the estate tax return is filed no later than 1 year after the due date of the return (including extensions actually granted).
Under § 301.9100-1(c), the Commissioner may grant a reasonable extension of time to make a regulatory election, or statutory election (but no more than 6 months except in the case of a taxpayer who is abroad), if the taxpayer demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the taxpayer has acted reasonably and in good faith, and granting relief will not prejudice the interests of the government.
The IRS concluded that the standards for 9100 relief had been satisfied granted the estate an extension of time of 120 days from the date of this letter to make the alternate valuation election under § 2032.
Compare to PLR 201815001 where the estate’s CPA intended to make the alternate valuation election, but failed to check the box. The IRS granted 9100 relief there as well.