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An apparatus for promoting the clotting of blood and controlling bleeding comprises a receptacle for retaining molecular sieve material in particulate form therein. A pad for controlling bleeding comprises a mesh structure and a rigid or semi-rigid support attached to the mesh structure to facilitate the application of pressure to the pad and the wound. A bandage applicable to a bleeding wound comprises a mesh structure and a flexible substrate attached to the mesh structure, the substrate being a cloth or plastic member that may be adhesively attached to cover a wound. In any embodiment, at least a portion of the receptacle or mesh structure is defined by a mesh having openings therein, and at least a portion of the particulate molecular sieve material is in direct contact with blood.
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/054,918, filed Feb. 9, 2005, which is incorporated by references in its entirety herein.
The present invention relates generally to blood clotting devices and, more particularly, to blood clotting materials, devices incorporating such materials, and methods for the delivery of such materials for use as bleeding control devices.
Blood is a liquid tissue that includes red cells, white cells, corpuscles, and platelets dispersed in a liquid phase. The liquid phase is plasma, which includes acids, lipids, solublized electrolytes, and proteins. The proteins are suspended in the liquid phase and can be separated out of the liquid phase by any of a variety of methods such as filtration, centrifugation, electrophoresis, and immunochemical techniques. One particular protein suspended in the liquid phase is fibrinogen. When bleeding occurs, the fibrinogen reacts with water and thrombin (an enzyme) to form fibrin, which is insoluble in blood and polymerizes to form clots.
Additionally, or alternatively, the previously developed materials can produce undesirable side effects. For example, prior art blood clotting material is generally a powder or a fine particulate in which the surface area of the material often produces an exothermic reaction upon the application of the material to blood. Oftentimes excess material is unnecessarily poured onto a wound, which can exacerbate the exothermic effects. Depending upon the specific attributes of the material, the resulting exothermia may be sufficient to cause discomfort to or even burn the patient. Although some prior art patents specifically recite the resulting exothermia as being a desirable feature that can provide clotting effects to the wound that are similar to cauterization, there exists the possibility that the tissue at and around the wound site may be undesirably impacted.
Bleeding can also be a problem during surgical procedures. Apart from suturing or stapling an incision or internally bleeding area, bleeding is often controlled using a sponge or other material used to exert pressure against the bleed site and/or absorb the blood. However, when the bleeding becomes excessive, these measures may not be sufficient to stop the flow of blood. Moreover, any highly exothermic bleed-control material may damage the tissue surrounding the bleed site and may not be configured for easy removal after use.
Based on the foregoing, it is a general object of the present invention to provide devices for controlling bleeding and methods of their use that overcome or improve upon the prior art.
According to one aspect, the present invention resides in an apparatus for promoting the clotting of blood, thereby controlling bleeding. The apparatus comprises a receptacle for retaining molecular sieve material in particulate form therein. At least a portion of the receptacle is defined by a mesh having openings therein such that when the apparatus is applied to a bleed site, the particulate molecular sieve material comes into contact with blood through the openings.
Other aspects of the present invention include a pad for controlling bleeding and a bandage applicable to a bleeding wound. In both the pad and the bandage, there is a mesh structure and particles of molecular sieve material retained therein. In the pad embodiment, there is a rigid or semi-rigid support attached to the mesh structure to facilitate the application of pressure to the pad and the wound. In the bandage, there is a flexible substrate attached to the mesh structure, the substrate being a cloth or plastic member that may be adhesively attached to cover a wound. In any embodiment, the mesh structure may be defined by a plurality of members (strands, filaments, or strips of synthetic or natural material) interconnected and arranged to define openings. The openings are sized to allow contact to be maintained between the particles of the molecular sieve material and blood.
In yet another aspect of the present invention, a method of dressing a bleeding wound includes providing a molecular sieve material in particle form and retaining the material in a mesh structure, placing the mesh structure on a bleeding wound such that the molecular sieve material comes into contact with blood flowing from the wound, applying pressure to the mesh structure to ensure contact of the material with the blood, and removing the mesh structure from the wound.
An advantage of the present invention is that upon completion of the application of any of the devices of the present invention to a bleeding wound, the devices can be easily removed. In particular, because the zeolite material is in granule, bead, or pellet form and encased in a pouch or mesh structure, the material can be cleanly pulled away from the treated wound and disposed of. Accordingly, little or no irrigation of the wound is required to flush away remaining zeolite. In devices in which the pouch containing zeolite material is incorporated into an adhesive bandage, the device can be left on the wound for the amount of time necessary to cause clotting.
Another advantage is that the particlized form of the zeolite material allows the material to react less exothermically with blood. As the particle size increases (e.g., from fine to coarse), the surface area of the particles that the blood can come into contact with decreases. The porous nature of the material still allows liquid blood constituents to be wicked away to cause thickening of the blood, thereby facilitating the formation of clots. Because the particle surface area exposed to the blood is reduced, a less aggressive drawing of moisture from the blood is realized, which thereby tempers the exothermic effects experienced at the wound site.
Still another advantage of the present invention is that the proper dose of molecular sieve material can be readily applied to an open wound. Particularly when the device is a porous pouch containing zeolite material, the device can be readily removed from sterilized packaging and held directly at the points from which blood emanates to facilitate clotting of the blood without spilling powder or pellets outside the wound area. Guesswork, estimation, or calculation of the amounts of molecular sieve material for application to a bleeding wound is eliminated. Accordingly, little or no molecular sieve material is wasted.
FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a blood clotting device of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a side view of the blood clotting device of FIG. 1 illustrating the retaining of molecular sieve particles in a mesh container.
FIG. 3 is a side view of a pressure pad incorporating the molecular sieve particles encapsulated in a mesh container for pressure application to a bleeding wound.
FIG. 4 is a perspective view of a bandage incorporating the molecular sieve particles in a mesh container for application to a bleeding wound.
Disclosed herein are devices and methods for delivering materials to wounds to promote the clotting of blood and the dressing of the wounds. The devices generally comprise expedients or apparatuses that can be applied to bleeding wounds such that the materials contact the tissue of the wound to minimize or stop a flow of blood by absorbing at least portions of the liquid phases of the blood, thereby promoting clotting. One apparatus comprises a receptacle for retaining molecular sieve material in particulate form therein. At least a portion of the receptacle is defined by a mesh having openings therein, and at least a portion of the particulate molecular sieve material is in direct contact with blood through the openings.
The molecular sieve material used in the present invention may be a synthetic polymer gel, cellulosic material, porous silica gel, porous glass, alumina, hydroxyapatite, calcium silicate, zirconia, zeolite, or the like. Exemplary synthetic polymers include, but are not limited to, stylene-divinylbenzene copolymer, cross-linked polyvinyl alcohol, cross-linked polyacrylate, cross-linked vinyl ether-maleic anhydride copolymer, cross-linked stylene-maleic anhydride copolymer or cross-linked polyamide, and combinations thereof.
The molecular sieve material is preferably a zeolite. Other molecular sieve materials that may be used include, but are not limited to, faujasite. As used herein, the term “zeolite” refers to a crystalline form of aluminosilicate having the ability to be dehydrated without experiencing significant changes in the crystalline structure. The zeolite may include one or more ionic species such as, for example, calcium and sodium moieties. Typically, the zeolite is a friable material that is about 90% by weight calcium and about 10% by weight sodium. The calcium portion contains crystals that are about 5 angstroms in size, and the sodium portion contains crystals that are about 4 angstroms in size. The preferred molecular structure of the zeolite is an “A-type” crystal, namely, one having a cubic crystalline structure that defines round or substantially round openings.
The zeolite may be mixed with or otherwise used in conjunction with other materials having the ability to be dehydrated without significant changes in crystalline structure. Such materials include, but are not limited to, magnesium sulfate, sodium metaphosphate, calcium chloride, dextrin, a polysaccharide, combinations of the foregoing materials, and hydrates of the foregoing materials.
Zeolites for use in the disclosed applications may be naturally occurring or synthetically produced. Numerous varieties of naturally occurring zeolites are found as deposits in sedimentary environments as well as in other places. Naturally occurring zeolites that may be applicable to the compositions described herein include, but are not limited to, analcite, chabazite, heulandite, natrolite, stilbite, and thomosonite. Synthetically produced zeolites that may also find use in the compositions and methods described herein are generally produced by processes in which rare earth oxides are substituted by silicates, alumina, or alumina in combination with alkali or alkaline earth metal oxides.
Various materials may be mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the zeolites to maintain an antiseptic environment at the wound site or to provide functions that are supplemental to the clotting functions of the zeolites. Exemplary materials that can be used include, but are not limited to, pharmaceutically-active compositions such as antibiotics, antifungal agents, antimicrobial agents, anti-inflammatory agents, analgesics (e.g., cimetidine, chloropheniramine maleate, diphenhydramine hydrochloride, and promethazine hydrochloride), bacteriostatics, compounds containing silver ions, and the like. Other materials that can be incorporated to provide additional hemostatic functions include ascorbic acid, tranexamic acid, rutin, and thrombin. Botanical agents having desirable effects on the wound site may also be added.
In one embodiment of the present invention, a device for facilitating the clotting of blood directly at a wound site is shown with reference to FIG. 1. The device is a permeable pouch that allows liquid to enter to contact blood clotting zeolite (or other molecular sieve) material retained therein. Sealed packaging (not shown) provides a sterile environment for storing the device until it can be used. The device, which is shown generally at 10 and is hereinafter referred to as “pouch 10,” comprises a screen or mesh 12 and zeolite particles 14 retained therein by the screen or mesh. The mesh 12 is closed on all sides and defines openings that are capable of retaining the zeolite particles 14 therein while allowing liquid to flow through. As illustrated, the mesh 12 is shown as being flattened out, and only a few zeolite particles 14 are shown.
The zeolite particles 14 are substantially spherical or irregular in shape (e.g., balls, beads, pellets, or the like) and about 0.2 millimeters (mm) to about 10 mm in diameter, preferably about 1 mm to about 7 mm in diameter, and more preferably about 2 mm to about 5 mm in diameter. In any embodiment (balls, beads, pellets, etc.), less particle surface area is available to be contacted by blood as the particle size is increased. Therefore, the rate of clotting can be controlled by varying the particle size. Furthermore, the adsorption of moisture (which also has an effect on the exothermic effects of the zeolite) can also be controlled.
Referring now to FIG. 2, the openings defined by the mesh 12 are dimensioned to retain the zeolite particles 14 but to accommodate the flow of blood therethrough. Because the mesh 12 may be pulled tight around the zeolite particles 14, the particles may extend through the openings by a distance d. If the zeolite particles 14 extend through the openings, the particles are able to directly contact tissue to which the pouch 10 is applied. Thus, blood emanating from the tissue immediately contacts the zeolite particles 14, and the water phase thereof is wicked into the zeolite material, thereby facilitating the clotting of the blood. However, it is not a requirement of the present invention that the zeolite particles protrude through the mesh.
To apply the pouch 10 to a bleeding wound, the pouch is removed from the packaging and placed on the bleeding wound. The zeolite particles 14 in the mesh 12 contact the tissue of the wound and/or the blood, and at least a portion of the liquid phase of the blood is adsorbed by the zeolite material, thereby promoting the clotting of the blood.
Another embodiment of the present invention is a pad which is shown at 20 with reference to FIG. 3 and is hereinafter referred to as “pad 20.” The pad 20 comprises the mesh 12, zeolite (or other molecular sieve) particles 14 retained therein by the mesh 12, and a support 22 to which pressure may be applied in the application of the pad 20 to a bleeding wound. The mesh 12, as above, has openings that are capable of retaining the zeolite particles 14 therein while allowing the flow of blood therethrough.
The mesh 12 is stitched, glued, clamped, or otherwise mounted to the support 22. The support 22 comprises an undersurface 24 against which the zeolite particles 14 are held by the container 12 and a top surface 26. The undersurface 24 is impermeable to the zeolite particles 14 (migration of the particles into the support 22 is prevented) and is further resistant to the absorption of water or other fluids. The top surface 26 is capable of having a pressure exerted thereon by a person applying the pad 20 to a bleeding wound or by a weight supported on the top surface 26. The entire support 22 is rigid or semi-rigid so as to allow the application of pressure while minimizing discomfort to the patient.
To apply the pad 20 to a bleeding wound, the pad 20 is removed from its packaging and placed on the bleeding wound. As with the pouch of the embodiment of FIGS. 1 and 2, the zeolite particles 14 are either in direct contact with the tissue of the wound or are in direct contact with the blood. Pressure may be applied to the wound by pressing on the top surface 26 with a hand or by placing a weight on the surface, thereby facilitating the contact between the zeolite particles 14 and the wound and promoting the adsorption of the liquid phase of the blood. The pad 20 (with or without a weight) may also be held onto the wound using a strapping device such as a belt, an elastic device, hook-and-loop material, combinations of the foregoing devices and materials, and the like.
Referring now to FIG. 4, another embodiment of the present invention is a bandage, shown at 50, which comprises zeolite particles 14 (or some other molecular sieve material) retained in a mesh 12 and mounted to a flexible substrate 52 that can be applied to a wound (for example, using a pressure-sensitive adhesive to adhere the bandage 50 to the skin of a wearer). The mesh 12 is stitched, glued, or otherwise mounted to a substrate 52 to form the bandage 50.
In the preparation of zeolite material for the devices of the present invention (i.e., formation of the material into particle form), an initial level of hydration of the zeolite may be controlled by the application of heat to the zeolite material either before or after the material is formed into particles. However, it has also surprisingly been found that as the particle size of the zeolite is increased, the moisture content has less of a correlative effect on any exothermia produced as the result of mixing the particlized zeolite in blood. As such, formation of the zeolite material into the zeolite particles (shown at 14 in FIGS. 1-4), may be by extrusion, milling, casting, or the like.
sufficiently small so that at least a portion of the particles can protrude through at least a portion of the openings of the mesh to make direct contact with blood outside of the pouch.
2. The device of claim 1, wherein the molecular sieve comprises a zeolite.
3. The device of claim 1, wherein the mesh comprises at least one of polyester, cotton, wool, or silk.
4. The device of claim 1, wherein the particles have a diameter from about 2 mm to about 5 mm.
5. The device of claim 1, further comprising a pharmaceutically-active composition which is mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the molecular sieve.
6. The device of claim 1, further comprising sterile packaging within which the pouch is stored until the pouch is used.
7. A method of promoting the clotting of blood comprising: applying a device of claim 1 to a bleeding area of a mammal in need thereof.
8. The method of claim 6, wherein the molecular sieve comprises an A-type zeolite.
9. The method of claim 7, wherein the mesh comprises at least one of polyester, cotton, wool, or silk.
10. The method of claim 7, wherein the molecular sieve particles are sufficiently large to reduce an exothermia produced by contact with blood.
11. The method of claim 7, wherein the molecular sieve has a moisture content which is sufficiently high to reduce an exothermia associated with contact between blood and the molecular sieve, and wherein the moisture content is sufficiently low for the molecular sieve to be effective to promote the clotting of blood.
12. The method of claim 6, further comprising an antimicrobial agent which is mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the molecular sieve.
13. The device of claim 2, wherein the molecular sieve comprises an A-type zeolite.
14. The device of claim 1, further comprising an anti-inflammatory agent which is mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the molecular sieve.
15. The device of claim 1, further comprising an analgesic which is mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the molecular sieve.
16. The device of claim 1, further comprising an antibiotic which is mixed with, associated with, or incorporated into the molecular sieve.
17. The device of claim 1, further comprising silver ions or a compound containing silver ions.
18. The device of claim 1, further comprising magnesium sulfate, sodium metaphosphate, calcium chloride, dextrin, a polysaccharide, combinations of the foregoing materials, or hydrates of the foregoing materials.
19. The device of claim 1, wherein the mesh is woven.
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WoundStat found to be potentially hazardous, http://armytimes.com.
Wright, J.K. et al. "Thermal Injury Resulting from Application of a Granular Mineral Hemostatic Agent." The Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection, and Critical Care. 2004. pp 224-230. vol. 57, No. 2.
ES2227867T3 (en) 2005-04-01 Improved wound dressing.

matches:
Application No. 2
Application No. 2
Application No. 200580039691
Application No. 200680008795
Application No. 200680008795
Application No. 182630
Application No. 3474
Application No. 2006


By of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Saturday, April 13, 2019.
Last month, one defendant's application to vacate a med-arb award brought about two important developments in ADR case law in Massachusetts.
Giving clarity - and teeth - to a surviving spouse's elective share of the decedent's estate.
By William G. Cosmas of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Friday, April 5, 2019.
Described by the Supreme Judicial Court as "unwieldly and perplexing to apply in most instances," the Massachusetts spousal elective share statute, "is intended to prevent spousal disinheritance, either by inadvertence or design," through allowing "a dissatisfied surviving spouse" to "waive the provisions of a deceased spouse's will and take a statutorily prescribed share of the decedent's estate." Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 175, 186 n12 (2019). In Ciani, the SJC attempted both to clarify and fortify the statute, holding in part that it allows a dissatisfied surviving spouse to bring an action to realize the value of his or her share of the decedent's real estate. Where the decedent has left issue (i.e., offspring or lineal descendants), the statute entitles a dissatisfied surviving spouse to elect - in lieu of his or her formal bequest (or lack thereof) - to receive a share of the decedent's estate comprising one-third of the decedent's personal property and one third of the decedent's real property. The SJC focused its analysis on situations in which that share exceeds $25,000 in value, reading the elective share statute to allow a dissatisfied surviving spouse to receive (1) the first $25,000 from the decedent's personal property or, if necessary, from the decedent's real property as well; (2) income from the a trust containing the remaining third of the personal property for life; and (3) an ownership interest the remaining third of the decedent's real estate, for life.
What Happens if Nothing is Happening in my Divorce Case?
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, March 29, 2019.
Although it may be difficult to imagine for someone going through the difficult process of a divorce, on occasion divorce cases can linger for months, if not years, with little to no activity on the docket. The parties may have filed divorce papers, but never got around to following through with the divorce process. Or, the parties may have separated and then settled into new lives, never actually filing divorce papers or finalizing the divorce. The parties may have even reconciled. It is not unusual to have a client who has been separated for five, ten, sometimes fifteen years without having formalized his or her divorce.
By Malgorzata Mrozek of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Friday, March 29, 2019.
What Qualifies As An Educational Use Under The Dover Amendment?
By Ashly Scheufele of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Thursday, March 21, 2019.
The Superior Court of Massachusetts recently annulled the decision of a local zoning board that had permitted construction of an outdoor aerial adventure park pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the "Dover Amendment" - i.e., G.L. c. 40A, § 3. In Sullivan v. Heritage Plantation of Sandwich, Inc., 35 Mass. L. Rptr. 281 (2018) ("Heritage Plantation"), the Court found that the particular outdoor adventure park at issue did not have a primary goal of educational significance and did not involve a nonprofit organization using its land for educational purposes, and, therefore, could not take advantage of the significant zoning exemptions offered by the Dover Amendment.
By Barbara L. Drury of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Thursday, March 21, 2019.
In a recent summary decision, a panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court considered whether or not certain payments that a former husband received in addition to his base salary constituted "bonus income," of which husband would then be obligated to pay his former wife a percentage as alimony. (See Dunbar v. Dunbar, 2019 WL 993330) (Pursuant to Rule 1:28).
By Jared L. Hubbard of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Thursday, March 21, 2019.
It was bound to happen eventually. Maybe your company just went global or maybe they've been working internationally for years. But eventually, whether through some mistake in translation in an international contract, some global or local change in circumstances, or just picking a poor foreign partner, a dispute has arisen over some international transaction.
By Ethan Z. Davis of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Tuesday, March 5, 2019.
Too often parties to a construction dispute do not focus on the importance of proving and recovering damages until the later stages of the case. A recent bankruptcy case, In re Patrick Gannon, shows why an analysis of damages and recoverability should be the highest priority when a home improvement project turns into a nightmare.
By Lacey Brantley of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Monday, March 4, 2019.
Business valuation arises in divorce cases where one or both spouses have an ownership interest in a closely held corporation - that is, a corporation which has a limited number of shareholders. This ownership interest is usually considered a marital asset, just like real property or a bank account, and is thus subject to equitable division in a divorce. Valuing a spouse's interest in this type of business can be a complex process due to the fact that there is no market on which a spouse could readily liquidate his or her shares. Accordingly, in many cases, the divorcing parties will retain a business valuator to determine the value of the spouse's ownership interest in the company.
By Robert Boutwell of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Monday, March 4, 2019.
In an important decision for foreign companies, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a trial court ruling and held that a foreign manufacturer of an allegedly defective product was subject to personal jurisdiction and could be sued in Massachusetts. In Knox v. Metalforming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 2019), plaintiff Stephen Knox badly injured his hand at his place of work, Cape Cod Copper, while operating a machine manufactured by German company Schechtl Maschinenbau GmbH and sold to Cape Cod Copper by MetalForming, Inc., Schechtl's Georgia-based exclusive U.S. distributor.
I Have A Signed P&S Agreement But The Seller Refuses To Sign The Deed Because She Claims She Does Not Speak And Read English Fluently And Therefore We Have No Valid Agreement. What Can I do?
By Nathalie Salomon of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Wednesday, February 27, 2019.
You can sue for specific performance of the purchase and sale agreement ("P&S agreement").InOcean City Development, LLC v. Barrros,(Mass. Land Court, January 2, 2018), the Land Court addressed that issue, ordering the Seller to convey her property to the Buyer in accordance with the P&S agreement signed by the parties.
By Ashly Scheufele of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Wednesday, February 27, 2019.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has temporarily halted an effort to enforce a foreign arbitral awardagainst Uzbekistan where the prevailing party had previously initiated proceedings in France topartially vacatethe same award. The twist in Gretton Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, 2019 WL 464793 (C.A. No. 18-1755, February 6, 2019) ("Gretton v. Uzbekistan"), is that the prevailing partyinitiated the French proceedings, while the prevailing party'sthird party funder initiated the U.S. proceedings.
"I was laid off --- Will the judge attribute income to me when determining child support?"
By Colleen Laffin of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, February 15, 2019.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently addressed this issue in Miles v. Beusch, Docket 17-P-1511 (Mass. App. Ct. January 24, 2019) (Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28). In that case, the former Husband appealed the trial court's decision to attribute income to him for the purpose of calculating child support.
What happens when a divorcing spouse actively misrepresents his or her income in the context of a child support or alimony analysis or tries to hide assets?
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Thursday, January 24, 2019.
A recent Appeals Court case addressed that issue, affirming the trial court's judgment that found that the husband's misrepresentations about his income were egregious enough that the trial judge's use of discretion to attribute and impute income to the husband was appropriate, and that the assets that he had tried to divert were subject to equitable division.
By Jared L. Hubbard of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Wednesday, January 23, 2019.
Fitch attorney Jared Hubbard was at the Supreme Court this past November on behalf of a group of international law professors-including George Bermann of Columbia Law School and David Stewart of Georgetown Law School-who appeared as amici curiae (friends of the court) in the case of Sudan v. Harrison, Dkt. 16-1094.
By William G. Cosmas of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Wednesday, January 23, 2019.
Under the Massachusetts Uniform Trust Code, the Probate Court generally cannot "entertain proceedings" concerning the administration of trusts "registered or having [their] principal place of administration in another state." But does that mean a Massachusetts court cannot hear breach of fiduciary duty and other related claims against a Massachusetts-based trustee where the situs of the trust is another state? The Superior Court considered this question in Curran v. Berkshire Hills Bancorp, No. 1784CV03580-BLS2, 2018 WL 3431892 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2018), when the beneficiaries of a Vermont trust brought claims of breach of fiduciary duty and violation of Chapter 93A (the Massachusetts consumer protection statute) against the trustee, a Massachusetts bank. Over the bank's objections, the court allowed the suit to proceed, drawing a distinction between actions seeking an order instructing or compelling a trustee to act in a certain way concerning the ongoing management of trust assets, on the one hand, and actions seeking damages under a tort-based theory for the trustee's prior conduct concerning the trust, on the other, as in the present case. Similarly, the court found that, since the beneficiaries brought claims against the trustee itself rather than claims regarding the status or disposition of trust assets (such as for an accounting or other relief concerning ongoing administration of the trust), asserting jurisdiction over those claims in Massachusetts would not raise the potential to disrupt or disrespect any pending Vermont proceedings concerning the administration of the trust.
Condominium Boards and Fiduciary Duty: To Whom Does the Duty Extend?
By Michele Connolly of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Wednesday, January 23, 2019.
Do you know what fiduciary duties your condominium board owes? And to whom the duty is owed?
First, what, exactly, is a fiduciary duty? The nature of fiduciary duties depends on the nature of the relationship between the parties but, at its simplest, it is a duty of loyalty and good faith. It is an obligation to act for the benefit of another. It is a well-established general principle that an organization's board has a fiduciary duty to the organization.
Consistent with this general principle, members (or trustees) of a condominium's board also have certain fiduciary duties. But, you may be asking, to whom is that fiduciary duty owed? The answer is surprisingly clear: In Massachusetts, members of condominium boards owe a fiduciary duty to the condominium association (or trust), not to any individual condominium owner. See, e.g., Cigal v. Leader Dev. Corp., 408 Mass. 212, 219 (1990).
By Jeffrey A. Soilson of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, November 16, 2018.
If you're a parent of a minor child of divorce in Massachusetts, can you relocate to a different state or country with your child (an issue the courts call "removal")?
Assuming no negotiated agreement to relocate with your co-parent (a preferred outcome in resolving these highly contentious disputes), and to help you answer this question in the context of contested litigation, Fitch family law attorneys will walk you through a judge's required functional analysis that is based on current Massachusetts law. It's a complicated process of gathering the facts of your particular case and connecting them to the correct legal standard.
By Ryan M. Cunningham of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Tuesday, November 6, 2018.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that inspections of properties encumbered by defaulted mortgages, even where the property inspector left a hang tag requesting the homeowner contact the mortgage servicer, is not debt collection under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Schlaf v. Safeguard Property, LLC, No. 17-2811, 899 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 2018).
Does ROTC Participation Create an Emancipating Event?
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Saturday, November 3, 2018.
In a recent decision by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, the concept of a child's emancipation was at issue. In Bobblis v. Costa (https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/10/18/17P0557.pdf), the court ruled that enrollment in ROTC does not constitute emancipation pursuant to the parties' separation agreement, as joining an ROTC program is not considered entry into the military for purposes of emancipation.
How does my pension get divided during divorce?
By Jonathan Fitch of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Wednesday, September 12, 2018.
Part II of this blog post focuses on how pension plans are divided during divorce. You can read Part I on our site.
By Lacey Brantley of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, September 7, 2018.
Congress created the classification of "special immigrant juvenile" in the Immigration Act of 1990, providing that a certain percentage of immigrant juveniles would be allowed to petition for lawful U.S. permanent residency (i.e. "Green Card") if they met specific requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (J). In 2008, Congress passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"), which amended and clarified SIJS requirements.
By Ethan Z. Davis of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Tuesday, August 21, 2018.
It has been said that "the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now." These words reflect the wisdom that few things are as beautiful and capable of enhancing the appeal of property as much as a mature tree. It is therefore not surprising that an entire body of law exists concerning tree-related disputes between neighbors.
By Kelly Schwartz of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Friday, August 17, 2018.
In Colucci, Colucci, Marcus & Flavin, P.C. v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, No. CV 15-13536-GAO, 2018 WL 1567605, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts awarded summary judgment to Citizens Bank of Massachusetts ("Citizens Bank") on a law firm's claim of negligent misrepresentation, finding that the law firm's reliance was unreasonable pursuant to New York law.
What are the Rule 410 Mandatory Document Disclosures?
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, August 17, 2018.
The Rule 410 Mandatory Self Disclosure provisions of the Supplemental Probate and Family Court Rules is one of the most basic, yet misunderstood, requirements of divorce litigants.
By Lacey Brantley of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Wednesday, July 18, 2018.
Last month, the Judiciary Committee of the Massachusetts House of Representatives essentially killed any chance of the passage of the Jim Brooks Community Stabilization Act, Bill H.4142, by "referring the Act to study," a euphemism generally understood in the Massachusetts legislature to mean that a bill will languish and, eventually, fail to pass.
By Ryan M. Cunningham of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Wednesday, July 18, 2018.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has split with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and held, en banc, that civil lawsuits alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., must be filed within one year of the alleged violations, and that the statute of limitationsis not tolled until the violations are discovered by the plaintiff. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2018).
What Is the Length of the Marriage When There Is More than One Complaint?
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Wednesday, July 18, 2018.
The Alimony Reform Act specifies statutory limits for the duration of alimony depending on the length of the marriage. The shorter the marriage, the shorter the duration of an alimony obligation. The length of marriage is defined as the "number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint or petition for divorce or separate support." But what happens in the event that there is more than one complaint for divorce, or complaints for support and modification? What becomes the "end date" of the marriage so that one can determine how long the marriage was and, consequently, how long the alimony obligation will last?
How Does My Pension Get Valued During Divorce?
By Jonathan W. Fitch of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, July 6, 2018.
A pension is one of the hardest earned assets a spouse can own. Divorce professionals are acutely aware of this and take great care to apply the same kind of focus, hard work and attention to detail to value a pension as the plan owner applied to earning it. This blog will be divided into two parts. The first part will explain the nature of a defined benefit pension plan and detail the information required to properly value a pension. The second part, to be published August 13, 2018, will focus on how pension plans are divided during divorce.
When Determining Alimony, the "Length of the Marriage" May Start Before "I Do"
By Kelly Schwartz of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Monday, June 18, 2018.
The United States Census Bureau shows the median age of individuals at the time of their first marriage is becoming increasingly older for both men and women. Meanwhile, the number of unmarried individuals cohabiting with their significant others is growing. These trends may be due in some part to couples delaying the responsibilities of marriage as they focus on their careers, but here is something all couples should know: for purposes of determining the length of a marriage for an alimony award, the period of premarital cohabitation could be included regardless of whether both parties were contributing financially.
My Home Contractor Is Unresponsive And Abandoned The Project Before Completion: What Damages Can I Recover?
By Nathalie Salomon of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Friday, June 1, 2018.
Dealing with an unresponsive contractor who abandons a project before its completion is unfortunately a situation that many homeowners face. Left with an incomplete bathroom or kitchen, the homeowner has no choice but to promptly find a new contractor to complete the project, usually at a higher price. As discussed below, there are different categories of damages that a homeowner can recover.
By Barbara L. Drury of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Wednesday, May 23, 2018.
In a decision handed down on May 3, 2018, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a Probate and Family Court Judge's ruling and held that the court must dismiss a petition for grandparent visitation "when the petition does not sufficiently allege why visitation is necessary to protect the child from significant harm." See Martinez v. Martinez-Cintron, No. 17-P-1056 (Mass. App. Ct. May 3, 2018).
By Robert Boutwell of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Tuesday, May 1, 2018.
In a recent case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed a Land Court decision holding that plaintiffs hold easement rights to access and use a beach in Hingham Harbor close to the parties' homes. Kane v. Martel, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1130, at *1 (2018). Litigation between the neighbors over beach rights had been ongoing for more than a decade when the Appeals Court rendered its decision on March 5, 2018, a fact representative of the often bitter and protracted nature of disputes over beach access between neighbors living on the water in Cape Cod and other Massachusetts vacation destinations.
By Michele Connolly of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Tuesday, May 1, 2018.
In an important decision for debt investors, the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that passive debt buyers are not "debt collectors" under the Massachusetts Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("MDCPA"). The decision, Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC, can be found here.
By Lacey Brantley of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Tuesday, May 1, 2018.
Many litigants, particularly in highly contested divorce or custody modification actions, often insist that their case will never settle, and will ultimately need to proceed to a trial. In fact, only a very small portion of such cases which are filed in the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court proceed to a trial. This is due in part to one of the most important court dates for both lawyers and litigants alike: the pre-trial conference.
By Jared L. Hubbard of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in International Litigation & Arbitration on Sunday, April 29, 2018.
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides the rules that govern most arbitrations, and is binding on both state and federal courts. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. But the FAA is "something of an anomaly" in federal legislation as it "bestow[s] no federal jurisdiction." Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008). So motions to compel arbitration or enforcement proceedings must be brought in state courts unless there is some independent basis to assert jurisdiction (such as federal diversity jurisdiction).
A Reverse Mortgage Provision Incorporates The Statutory Power Of Sale Even Though It Omits The Word "Statutory"
By Nathalie Salomon of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Monday, April 2, 2018.
Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state, meaning that a mortgagee is authorized to foreclose on a mortgaged property without obtaining prior court approval. The ability of a lender to exercise its "power of sale," that is without court approval, exists only if such power is granted in the mortgage itself. If the mortgage does not contain a "power of sale" provision, the lender is left with two time-consuming options to recover the amount due under the loan: either file suit or conduct a foreclosure by entry, which takes three years.
By Jeffrey A. Soilson of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Monday, April 2, 2018.
The Probate & Family Court recently announced that the Fiduciary Litigation Pilot Project under Standing Order 3-17 (https://www.mass.gov/probate-and-family-court-rules/probate-and-family-court-standing-order-3-17-fiduciary-litigation) has been expanded to apply to cases filed in Essex and Plymouth Counties. Previously, the pilot project applied to case filed only in Middlesex, Norfolk and Suffolk Counties.
Land Court or Superior Court? Choosing a venue for your property dispute.
By Kate Billman-Golemme of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Real Estate & Lease Litigation on Tuesday, March 27, 2018.
Parties involved in a real estate dispute in Massachusetts are fortunate to have choices when it comes to the venue of the litigation. One of the most strategic decisions that a plaintiff or defendant can make is deciding where to litigate the case. When it comes to real property disputes, the Massachusetts Land Court and the Superior Court have overlapping jurisdiction, also referred to as concurrent jurisdiction, on certain claims. While the Superior Court enjoys broad jurisdiction over a variety of civil and criminal matters, the Land Court specializes in disputes involving real property. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 212, § 26A, permits either party to remove any non-jury civil action involving "any right, title or interest in land" from the Superior Court to the Land Court. The claim must not be one that entitles a party to a jury trial because the Land Court only conducts jury-waived trials, frequently called bench trials.
By Ryan M. Cunningham of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Tuesday, March 27, 2018.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has agreed with the Northern District of Illinois's reasoning in Arora v. Transworld Systems Inc., 2017 WL 3620742 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017), and found that a loan servicer's use of a computer-based phone system to contact an individual's cell phone without permission does not violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, prohibition on the use of Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems ("ATDS"). The plaintiff in Ferrer v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 2018 WL 582584 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2018) alleged that Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC's ("Bayview") calls to her cell phone after she revoked consent constituted prohibited use of an ATDS pursuant to the TCPA.
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Thursday, March 22, 2018.
Removal matters - where one parent seeks to move with a child or children either to another state or to a place within the Commonwealth that is far enough away to cause a significant impact on the parenting plan - are amongst the most fraught cases that attorneys and courts have to wrestle with. Unlike most other issues that arise in the context of parenting, removal matters do start to resemble zero-sum conflicts where the stakes can be enormous.
By Russell Smith of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, February 16, 2018.
One of the new provisions of the new tax reform bill - background here - is that the long-standing tax deduction for alimony will no longer be available for separation agreements and divorces obtained after December 31, 2018. Specifically, the reform applies to "any divorce or separation instrument . . . executed after December 31, 2018" (emphasis added).
By Robert T. Dunlap of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Thursday, February 1, 2018.
By Stephen C. Reilly of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Thursday, February 1, 2018.
Authorized by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the "CFPB") is an agency of the United States government that regulates banks, credit unions, debt collectors, and many other sectors of the American financial services industry.
By Ryan M. Cunningham of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Banking Law on Friday, January 26, 2018.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has found that a debt collector's use of a web-based dialing system to contact an individual's cell phone without permission does not violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, prohibition on the use of Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems ("ATDS"). The plaintiff in Arora v. Transworld Systems Inc., 2017 WL 3620742 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017) alleged that Transworld System Inc.'s ("Transworld") calls to his cell phone without his consent constituted prohibited use of an ATDS pursuant to the TCPA.
By Carlos A. Maycotte of Fitch Law Partners LLP posted in Divorce & Family Law on Friday, January 5, 2018.


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Argued March 13, 14, 1947.
We may assume that location of the exact coastal line will involve many complexities and difficulties. But that does not make this any the less a justiciable controversy. Certainly demarcation of the boundary is not an impossibility. Despite difficulties this Court has previously adjudicated controversies concerning submerged land boundaries. See State of New Jersey v. State of Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 54 S.Ct. 407, 78 L.Ed. 847, Id., 295 U.S. 694, 55 S.Ct. 907, 79 L.Ed. 1659; Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 21—27, 56 S.Ct. 23, 28—31, 80 L.Ed. 9; State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 41 S.Ct. 420, 6 5 L.Ed. 831, Id., 256 U.S. 602, 41 S.Ct. 539, 65 L.Ed. 1115. And there is no reason why, after determining in general who owns the three-mile belt here involved, the Court might not later, if necessary, have more detailed hearings in order to determine with greater definiteness particular segments of the boundary. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 582, 42 S.Ct. 406, 410, 66 L.Ed. 771. Such practice is commonplace in actions similar to this which are in the nature of equitable proceedings. See e.g. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 256 U.S. at pages 608, 609, 41 S.Ct. at page 540, 541, 65 L.Ed. 1115, Id., 260 U.S. 606, 625, 43 S.Ct. 221, 222, 67 L.Ed. 428; Id., 261 U.S. 340, 43 S.Ct. 376, 67 L.Ed. 687. California's contention concerning the indefinitieness of the claim presents no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the highly important jurisdiction conferred on us by Article III of the Constitution.
Second. It is contended that we should dismiss this action on the ground that the Attorney General has not been granted power either to file or to maintain it. It is not denied that Congress has given a very broad authority to the Attorney General to institute and conduct litigation in order to establish and safeguard government rights and properties.3 The argument is that Congress has for a long period of years acted in such a way as to manifest a clear policy to the effect that the states, not the Federal Government, have legal title to the land under the three-mile belt. Although Congress has not expressly declared such a policy, we are asked to imply it from certain conduct of Congress and other governmental agencies charged with responsibilities concerning the national domain. And, in effect, we are urged to infer that Congress has by implication amended its long-existing statutes which grant the Attorney General broad powers to institute and maintain court proceedings in order to safeguard national interests.
But no Act of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the Attorney General the authority and the duty to protect the Government's interests through the courts. See Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502, 503, 12 S.Ct. 453, 460, 461, 36 L.Ed. 232. That Congress twice failed to grant the Attorney General specific authority to file suit against California,4 is not a sufficient basis upon which to rest a restriction of the Attorney General's statutory authority. And no more can we reach such a conclusion because both Houses of Congress passed a joint resolution quitclaiming to the adjacent states a three mile belt of all land situated under the ocean beyond the low water mark, exept those which the Government had previously acquired by purchase, condemnation, or donation.5 This joint resolution was vetoed by the President.6 His veto was sustained.7 Plainly, the resolution does not represent an exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to dispose of public property under Article IIv, § 3, Cl. 2.
Third. The crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns the bare legal title to the lands under the marginal sea. The United States here asserts rights in two capacities transcending those of a mere property owner. In one capacity it asserts the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean. The Government also appears in its capacity as a member of the family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible for conducting United States relations with other nations. It asserts that proper exercise of these constitutional responsibilities requires that it have power, unencumbered by state commitments, always to determine what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the marginal sea and the land under it. See McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403—408, 17 U.S. 316, 403—408, 4 L.Ed. 579; United States v. State of Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194, 46 S.Ct. 298, 300, 301, 70 L.Ed. 539. In the light of the foregoing, our question is whether the state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered may be exploited.
The Government does not deny that under the Pollard rule, as explained in later cases,8 California has a qualified ownership9 of lands under inland navigable waters such as rivers, harbors, and even tidelands down to the low water mark. It does question the validity of the rationale in the Pollard case that ownership of such water areas, any more than ownership of uplands, is a necessary incident of the state sovereignty contemplated by the 'equal footing' clause. Cf. United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, 55 S.Ct. 610, 615, 79 L.Ed. 1267. For this reason, among others, it argues that the Pollard rule should not be extended so as to apply to lands under the ocean. It stresses that the thirteen original colonies did not own the marginal belt; that the Federal Government did not seriously assert its increasingly greater rights in this area until after the formation of the Union; that it has not bestowed any of these rights upon the states, but has retained them as appurtenances of national sovereignty. And the Government insists that no previous case in this Court has involved or decided conflicting claims of a state and the Federal Government to the three-mile belt in a way which requires our extension of the Pollard inland water rule to the ocean area.
It would unduly prolong our opinion to discuss in detail the multitude of references to which the able briefs of the parties have cited us with reference to the evolution of powers over marginal seas exercised by adjacent countries. From all the wealth of material supplied, however, we cannot say that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it,10 even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolution against it. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 316, 57 S.Ct. 216, 219, 81 L.Ed. 255.
At the time this country won its independence from England there was no settled international custom or understanding among nations that each nation owned a three-mile water belt along its borders. Some countries, notably England, Spain, and Portugal, had, from time to time, made sweeping claims to a right of dominion over wide expanses of ocean. And controversies had arisen among nations about rights to fish in prescribed areas.11 But when this nation was formed, the idea of a three-mile belt over which a littoral nation could exercise rights of ownership was but a nebulous suggestion.12 Neither the English charters granted to this nation's settlers,13 nor the treaty of peace with England,14 nor any other document to which we have been referred, showed a purpose to set apart a three-mile ocean belt for colonial or state ownership.15 Those who settled this country were interested in lands upon which to live, and waters upon which to fish and sail. There is no substantial support in history for the idea that they wanted or claimed a right to block off the ocean's bottom for private ownership and use in the extraction of its wealth.
It did happen that shortly after we became a nation our statesmen became interested in establishing national dominion over a definite marginal zone to protect our neutrality.16 Largely as a result of their efforts, the idea of a definite three-mile belt in which an adjacent nation can, if it chooses, exercise broad, if not complete dominion, has apparently at last been generally accepted throughout the world,17 although as late as 1876 there was still considerable doubt in England about its scope and even its existence. See The Queen v. Keyn, L.R. 2 Exch.Div. 63. That the political agencies of this nation both claim and exercise broad dominion and control over our three-mile marginal belt is now a settled fact. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122—124, 43 S.Ct. 504, 506—508, 67 L.Ed. 894, 27 A.L.R. 1306.18 And this assertion of national dominion over the three-mile belt is binding upon this Court. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212—214, 11 S.Ct. 80, 83, 84, 34 L.Ed. 691; Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502, 503, 12 S.Ct. 453, 460, 461, 36 L.Ed. 232.
Not only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt, been accomplished by the national Government, but protection and control of it has ben and is a function of national external sovereignty. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 691; Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502, 12 S.Ct. 453, 460, 36 L.Ed. 232. The belief that local interests are so predominant as constitutionally to require state dominion over lands under its land-locked navigable waters finds some argument for its support. But such can hardly be said in favor of state control over any part of the ocean or the ocean's bottom. This country, throughout its existence has stood for freedom of the seas, a principle whose breach has precipitated wars among nations. The country's adoption of the three-mile belt is by no means incompatible with its traditional insistence upon freedom of the sea, at least so long as the national Government's power to exercise control consistently with whatever international undertakings or commitments it may see fit to assume in the national interest is unencumbered. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62—64, 61 S.Ct. 399, 401—403, 85 L.Ed. 581; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, supra. The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the sea must be able to protect itself from dangers incident to its location. It must have powers of dominion and regulation in the interest of its revenues, its health, and the security of its people from was waged on or too near its coasts. And insofar as the nation asserts its rights under international law, whatever of value may be discovered in the seas next to its shores and within its protective belt, will most naturally be appropriated for its use. But whatever any nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its common usefulness to nations, or which another nation may charge detracts from it,19 is a question for consideration among nations as such, and not their separate governmental units. What this Government does, or even what the states do, anywhere in the ocean, is a subject upon which the nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar international obligations. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331, 332, 57 S.Ct. 758, 761, 762, 81 L.Ed. 1134. The very oil about which the state and nation here contend might well become the subject of international dispute and settlement.
The ocean, even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also becomes of crucial importance should it ever again become impossible to preserve that peace. And as peace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation, rather than an individual state, so, if wars come, they must be fought by the nation. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279, 23 L.Ed. 550. The state is not equipped in our constitutional system with the powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be concomitant with the dominion which it seeks. Conceding that the state has been authorized to exercise local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries,20 these do not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights in and power over this area. Consequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of state sovereignty in relation to inland waters out into the soil beneath the ocean, so much more a matter of national concern. If this rationale of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a conclusion that paramount rights run to the states in inland waters to the shoreward of the low water mark, the same rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 316, 57 S.Ct. 216, 219, 81 L.Ed. 255; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206.
None of the foregoing cases, nor others which we have decided, are sufficient to require us to extend the Pollard inland water rule so as to declare that California owns or has paramount rights in or power over the three-mile belt under the ocean. The question of who owned the bed of the sea only became of great potential importance at the beginning of this century when oil was discovered there.21 As a consequence of this discovery, California passed an Act in 1921 authorizing the granting of permits to California residents to prospect for oil and gas on blocks of land off its coast under the ocean. Cal.Stats.1921, c. 303, p. 404. This state statute, and others which followed it, together with the leasing practices under them, have precipitated this extremely important controversy, and pointedly raised this state-federal conflict for the first time. Now that the question is here, we decide for the reasons we have stated that California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil.
To speak of 'dominion' carries precisely those overtones in the law which relate to property and not to political authority. Dominion, from the Roman concept dominium, was concerned with property and ownership, as against imperium, which related to political sovereignty. One may choose to say, for example, that the United States has 'national dominion' over navigable streams. But the power to regulate commerce over these streams, and its continued exercise, do not change the imperium of the United States into dominium over the land below the waters. Of course the United States has 'paramount rights' in the sea belt of California—the rights that are implied by the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the power of condemnation, the treaty-making power, the war power. We have not now before us the validity of the exercise of any of these paramount rights. Rights of ownership are here asserted—and rights of ownership are something else. Ownership implies acquisition in the various ways in which land is acquired by conquest, by discovery and claim, by cession, by prescription, by purchase, by condemnation. When and how did the United States acquire this land?
5 U.S.C. §§ 291, 309, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 291, 309; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279, 284, 8 S.Ct. 850, 854, 856, 31 L.Ed. 747; Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147, 154, 155, 42 S.Ct. 60, 62, 63, 66 L.Ed. 175; Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425, 426, 45 S.Ct. 176, 178, 179, 69 L.Ed. 352; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584, 15 S.Ct. 900, 906, 39 L.Ed. 1092; United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 24, 55 S.Ct. 610, 619, 79 L.Ed. 1267; United States v. State of Wyoming, 323 U.S. 669, 65 S.Ct. 34, 89 L.Ed. 543; 331 U.S. 440, 67 S.Ct. 1319.
S.J.Res.208, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938); S.J.Res.83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). S.J.Res.208 passed the Senate, 81 Cong.Rec.9326 (1938), was favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R.Rep.2378, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), but was never acted on in the House. Hearings were held on S.J.Res.83 and 92 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, but no further action was taken. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Serveys an S.J.Res.83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). In both hearings objections to the resolutions were repeatedly made on the ground that passage of the resolutions was unnecessary since the Attorney General already had statutory authority to institute the proceedings. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on S.J.Res.208, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 42—45, 59—61 (1938); Hearings on S.J.Res.83 and 92, supra, 27—30.
See, e.g., Fulton, op. cit. supra, 3—19, 144, 145; Jessup, op. cit. supra, 4.
Secretary of State Jefferson in a note to the British minister in 1793 pointed to the nebulous character of a nation's assertions of territorial rights in the marginal belt, and put forward the first official American claim for a three-mile zone which has since won general international acceptance.Reprinted in H.Ex.Doc.No. 324, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872) 553—554. See also Secretary Jefferson's note to the French Minister, Genet, reprinted American State Papers, I Foreign Relations (1833), 183, 384; Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 381; 1 Kent, Commentaries, 14th Ed., 33—40.

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