D.C. Law Library - Chapter 13. Hazardous Waste Management.
↪ Chapter 13. Hazardous Waste Management.
Chapter 12. Hazardous Materials Study Commission. [Repealed].
Chapter 14. Hazardous Materials Transportation.
Chapter 13. Hazardous Waste Management.
Subchapter II. Toxic Source Reduction.
§ 8–1301. Purposes and findings.
(3) To reduce or eliminate at the source, wherever feasible and as expeditiously as possible, the generation of hazardous waste and the release of toxic chemicals in the District of Columbia.
(7) Other states and local jurisdictions that have implemented source reduction technical assistance programs for businesses have shown programs to be cost-effective.
Air quality control regulations enacted: Section 3 of D.C. Law 5-165, as amended by § 15 of D.C. Law 6-192, effective February 24, 1987, enacted air quality control regulations of the District of Columbia as Chapters 1 through 9 of Title 20 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, “Environment and Energy”.
Section 485 of D.C. Law 6-42 amended §§ 100.4 and 105.1 of the Air Quality Control Regulations, effective March 15, 1985 (D.C. Law 5-165; 20 DCMR Chapters 1 through 9) to provide for adjudication of infractions pursuant to Chapter 18 of Title 2. Section 501(b) of D.C. Law 6-42 provided that the provisions of the act shall apply only to infractions which occur or are discovered by inspection after October 5, 1985.
Delegation of authority pursuant to D.C. Law 2-64, the “District of Columbia Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1977”, see Mayor’s Order 98-55, April 15, 1998 ( 45 DCR 2704).
(1) The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
(1A) The term “guarantor” means any person, other than the owner or operator, who provides evidence of financial responsibility for an owner or operator.
(2) The term “hazardous waste” means any waste or combination of wastes of a solid, liquid, contained gaseous, or semisolid form which, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics, as established by the Mayor, may: (1) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (2) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. Such wastes include, but are not limited to, those which are toxic, carcinogenic, flammable, irritants, strong sensitizers, or which generate pressure through decomposition, heat or other means, as well as containers and receptacles previously used in the transportation, storage, use or application of the substances described as a hazardous waste.
(3) The term “generation” means the act or process of producing hazardous waste.
(3A) The term “generator” means any person by site whose act or process produces hazardous waste or whose act first causes a hazardous waste to be subject to regulation.
(3B) The term “manifest” means the form used for identifying the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing and destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from the point of generation to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage.
(4) The term “Mayor” means the Mayor of the District of Columbia or his or her designated agent.
(5) The term “person” means any individual, partnership, corporation (including a government corporation), trust, association, firm, joint-stock company, organization, commission, the District or federal government, or other entity.
(5A) The term “person responsible” means a person who is or has been the generator of hazardous waste, the owner or operator of a site that contains or a vehicle that transports hazardous waste, or a person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranges or has arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous waste.
(ii) Reduces the hazard to public health and the environment associated with the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.
(B) The term “source reduction” includes equipment or technology modifications, process or procedure modifications, reformulation or redesign of products, substitution of raw materials, and improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inventory control.
(C) The term “source reduction” does not include any practice that alters the physical, chemical, or biological characteristics or the volume of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant through a process or activity that is not integral to and necessary for the production of a product or the provision of a service.
(6) The term “storage” means containment in such a manner as not to constitute disposal.
(6A) The term “toxic chemical” means a chemical or chemical category listed in 40 C.F.R. 372.65.
(7) The term “transport” means the movement from the point of generation to any intermediate site, and finally to the point of ultimate storage or disposal.
(8) The term “treatment” means any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of a hazardous waste so as to neutralize or as to render it nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery or storage, or reduced in volume.
(9) The term “treatment facility” means a location for treatment, including an incinerator or a facility where generation has occurred.
This section is referenced in § 8-103.06, § 8-105.02, § 8-1051, § 8-1053, and § 8-1441.
(a) It is unlawful to own, construct, substantially alter, or operate any hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility or site or to generate, store, transport, treat, or dispose of any hazardous waste except in accordance with the terms of the permit issued by the Mayor for the facility, site, or activity.
(b) The Mayor may issue, vary, or modify the terms of a permit or suspend, revoke, or deny a permit to achieve the purposes of this chapter, except that the Mayor may not issue a permit for a period that exceeds 10 years. The terms of any permit for a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall require that the permit holder take corrective action within or beyond the facility boundary if necessary to protect human health and the environment. The Mayor may establish the appropriate permit fee according to costs associated with its issuance.
(c) Any license issued pursuant to this section shall be issued as an Environmental Materials endorsement to a basic business license under the basic business license system as set forth in subchapter I-A of Chapter 28 of Title 47.
This section is referenced in § 8-1309.
D.C. Law 15-38, in subsec. (c), substituted “an Environmental Materials endorsement to a basic business license under the basic” for “a Class A Environmental Materials endorsement to a master business license under the master”.
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3(m) of Streamlining Regulation Emergency Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-145, August 11, 2003, 50 DCR 6896).
§ 8–1304. Hazardous waste management plan.
(3) A comparison of the alternatives, costs and benefits of public and private transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes.
This section is referenced in § 8-1305.
§ 8–1305. Rules and regulations.
(9) Requirements for on-site and off-site corrective action by owners or operators of a disposal, storage, and treatment facility.
(b) At the time of publication of the proposed rules and regulations referred to in this section, a copy of the same shall be provided to the Council of the District of Columbia.
(c) The proposed rules shall be submitted to the Council for a 45-day period of review excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove the proposed rules, in whole or in part, by resolution within this 45-day review period, the proposed rules shall be deemed approved.
District of Columbia Hazardous Waste Management Act Proposed Rulemaking Approval Resolution of 1995: Pursuant to Proposed Resolution 11-174, deemed approved October 11, 1995, Council approved the proposed rulemaking adopting Chapters 40 through 54 (Hazardous Waste Regulations) of Title 20 DCMR issued pursuant to the “District of Columbia Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1977”, as amended.
Delegation of Authority pursuant to D.C. Law 2-64, the District of Columbia Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1977, see Mayor’s Order 2005-70, April 19, 2005 ( 52 DCR 5495).
The Mayor may grant a variance not to exceed 180 days upon a showing that compliance with the requirements of this chapter or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto would result in an unreasonable financial hardship, and that the public health and welfare would not be endangered.
§ 8–1307. Inspections; analyses; right of entry; notice; posting.
(3) Inspect and copy any records, reports, information, or test results relating to the purposes of this chapter. Each such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
(b) If the officer or employee obtains any samples prior to leaving the premises, he or she shall give to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, a receipt describing the sample obtained, and if requested, a portion of each such sample equal in volume or weight to the portion retained. If any analysis is made of such samples, a copy of the results of such analysis shall be furnished promptly to the owner, operator, or agent in charge.
(c) When there is a threat to human health or the environment, or a release of hazardous waste into the environment, and the responsible party or address is unknown, or cannot be located, written notice shall be served by conspicuously posting the notice on the property where the threat exists or the release occurred and sending a copy to the last known address via certified mail.
(d) When dangerous chemicals and hazardous waste on property pose an imminent threat to human health or the environment, the Mayor may post the property and restrict access. The posting shall provide the public with notice that a dangerous condition exists and shall prohibit the owner from removing or handling the waste without prior approval by the Mayor.
Any person adversely affected by an action taken pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations promulgated thereto is entitled to a hearing before the Mayor upon filing with the Mayor, within 15 days of the date of such action, a written request for a hearing. Such hearing shall be held in accordance with other contested case procedures under the provisions of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (§ 2-509). The decision on the appeal shall be final.
§ 8–1309. Suspension and revocation of permit.
(a)(1) The Mayor may suspend a permit issued in accordance with § 8-1303 if the holder of the permit is in violation of this chapter or the rules promulgated pursuant to the chapter.
(2) Written notice of the suspension shall be served upon the affected party or the party’s designated agent.
(b)(1) Where a permit has been suspended, the person affected has the right to reapply for a permit.
(2) If the person is able to demonstrate an ability and willingness to comply with the permit and with the provisions of this chapter and the rules, the Mayor may grant a new permit.
(c)(1) Where there is a history of repeated violations or where a permit has been previously suspended, the Mayor may revoke a permit, upon a showing of subsequent violation, and upon providing the affected party, or the party’s designated agent, with written notice of the intent to revoke the permit and with an opportunity for a hearing prior to revocation.
(2) The revocation shall take effect 15 days after the notice has been given, unless a written request for a hearing is received by the Mayor within that period.
(d) The Mayor may immediately revoke a permit upon an initial violation of the chapter or the rules where the violation presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health, the public welfare, or the environment.
If the Mayor finds that any person is operating a storage, treatment, or disposal facility, or is generating or transporting hazardous wastes in an illegal, unsafe, or otherwise improper manner that endangers the public health, the public welfare, or the environment, the Mayor may request the Corporation Counsel to commence appropriate civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to secure a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, or other appropriate relief.
(a)(1) Whenever the Mayor has reason to believe that there has been a violation of this chapter, the rules promulgated pursuant to this chapter, a threat to human health or the environment, or a release of hazardous waste into the environment, the Mayor may give written notice of the alleged violation, threat, or release to the person responsible and order the person to monitor, test, or take corrective measures that the Mayor considers reasonable and necessary.
(2) The notice shall state the nature of the violation, threat, or release and allow a reasonable time for the performance of the necessary corrective measures.
(A) If a person fails to comply with the notice within the time period stated in the notice, the Mayor shall take corrective action necessary to alleviate or terminate the violation, threat, or release to protect human health or the environment.
(B) The Mayor may recover the costs of corrective action incurred by the District of Columbia government from any person responsible by requesting the Corporation Counsel to commence appropriate civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
(b)(1) Any person who violates this chapter or the rules shall be liable for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation.
(2) For any violation, each day of the violation shall constitute a separate offense and the penalties prescribed shall apply separately to each offense.
(c)(1) Any person who knowingly violates this chapter or the rules shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 1 year, or both.
(3) Prosecutions for violations of this subsection shall be brought by the Corporation Counsel.
(d) Civil fines, penalties, and fees may be imposed as alternative sanctions for any infraction of the provisions of this chapter, or any rules or regulations issued under the authority of this chapter, pursuant to Chapter 18 of Title 2. Adjudication of any infraction of this chapter shall be pursuant to Chapter 18 of Title 2.
Each separate provision of this chapter shall be deemed independent of any other provision of this chapter, and if any provision, sentence, clause, section, or part thereof is held illegal, invalid, or unconstitutional or inapplicable to any person or circumstance, such illegality, invalidity, unconstitutionality, or inapplicability shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions, sentences, clauses, sections, or parts of this chapter or their application to other parts or circumstances. It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that this chapter would have been enacted if such illegal, invalid, or unconstitutional provision, sentence, clause, section, or part had not been included therein, and if the person or circumstances to which this chapter or any part thereof is inapplicable had been specifically exempted therefrom.
§ 8–1313. Dust suppression and road treatment.
The use of waste, used oil, or other material, which is contaminated or mixed with dioxin or any other hazardous waste for dust suppression or road treatment in the District of Columbia, is prohibited.
§ 8–1314. Actions against guarantor.
(2) The owner or operator is likely to be solvent at the time of judgment, but jurisdiction cannot be obtained with reasonable diligence in any state or federal court.
(b) In any claim asserted against a guarantor pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the guarantor shall be entitled to invoke all rights and defenses that would have been available to the owner or operator of the hazardous waste storage, treatment, or disposal facility if an action had been brought against the owner or operator by the claimant and that would have been available to the guarantor if an action had been brought against the guarantor by the owner or operator.
(c) The total liability of any guarantor shall be limited to the aggregate amount that the guarantor has provided as evidence of financial responsibility to the owner or operator.
§ 8–1315. Hazardous waste and toxic chemical source reduction.
(8) Assess and collect a fee on the generation of hazardous waste and emission of toxic chemicals.
Section 6605 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, the Pollution Prevention Act, referred to in (7), is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 13104.
§ 8–1316. Identification of major generators of hazardous waste and releasers of toxic chemicals.
(4) The top 25% of businesses, including any District or United States government operations, that generate or release the largest amount of hazardous waste or toxic chemicals in the District.
(b) Within 30 days after the Mayor has presented the report specified in subsection (a) of this section to the Council, the Mayor shall notify in writing each business identified that the business is subject to the provisions of this subchapter.
(c) Every 4 years following March 8, 1991, the Mayor shall reassess the findings required by subsection (a) of this section and make any change in the reporting or targeting of technical assistance indicated.
This section is referenced in § 8-1315 and § 8-1317.
§ 8–1317. Annual hazardous waste and toxic chemical reports.
(3) Is identified in § 8-1316.
(b) The Mayor shall require the submission of additional source reduction and recycling data collected in accordance with section 6607 of the Pollution Prevention Act, or other federal legislation or regulations.
(c) EPA Form R, and any additional data required, shall be signed by a senior-level manager who shall be liable for any inaccuracies contained in the submission.
This section is referenced in § 8-1318.
The “Pollution Prevention Act”, referred to in (b), is Pub. L. 101-508, § 6601 et seq., codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13101 et seq. Section 6607 of the Pollution Prevention Act, referred to in (b), is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13106.
§ 8–1318. Hazardous waste and toxic chemical source reduction plans.
(a) Pursuant to rules issued by the Mayor in accordance with § 8-1322, beginning on January 1, 1992, and every 4 years thereafter, each business required to submit EPA Form R, and any additional data required, in accordance with § 8-1317, including any District or federal government operations where applicable, shall submit a source reduction plan to the Mayor.
(4) A comprehensive economic and technical evaluation of appropriate technologies, procedures, and training programs to achieve hazardous waste and toxic chemical source reduction, including a schedule for and the estimated costs of implementation of the reduction.
§ 8–1320. Hazardous waste and toxic chemical fee waivers.
(3) Successfully implemented source reduction techniques so that the generation of hazardous waste or toxic chemical usage has been significantly reduced to levels identified in the technical literature for that standard industrial classification as representative of the best source reduction practice.
(b) Industrial classifications that engage in off-site recycling to reclaim the resource value of waste as the best management strategy for minimizing waste may substitute recycling for the source reduction techniques specified in subsection (a)(3) of this section. At no time shall incineration, with or without energy recovery, be regarded as source reduction or recycling for the purposes of this subchapter.
§ 8–1321. Confidential business information.
No trade secret or commercial or financial information submitted by a business to the District government pursuant to the requirements of this subchapter shall be disclosed to the public, if the Mayor determines that the disclosure would result in a substantial harm to the competitive position of the business in accordance with § 2-534(a)(1).
(a) Within 180 days from March 8, 1991, the Mayor shall, pursuant to subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2, issue rules to implement the provisions of this subchapter, including rules regarding the criteria for preparation of source reduction plans and the imposition of source reduction fees. The Mayor shall consult and give significant weight to the recommendations of the Litter and Solid Waste Reduction Commission in the issuance of rules to implement this subchapter.
This section is referenced in § 8-1318 and § 8-1320.
Motor vehicles, moving infractions, application of law, see § 50-2302.01.
Motor vehicles and traffic, uniform classification and commercial drivers’ licenses, “commercial motor vehicle” defined, see § 50-401.


Figure 2. ‘Harp treaty’, unprovenanced Mesopotamian cylinder seal, ca. fourteenth century. London, BM 89359. Drawn from MgB 2/2 fig. 108.
You are the choice bull, the creation of [the great gods].
Your hide and your sinew have been assigned to the mystery of the great gods.
The victim’s heart was extracted, placed in front of the drum, scattered with juniper, and burned. Its skin was removed, treated with flour, beer, wine, fat, alum, and gall-apples, and then applied in many complex steps to a previously prepared drum frame. The rest of the animal was buried.  One of the gods to whom offerings were made was Lumḫa,  whose name is written in some exemplars as ‘Divine Balang’ (dBALAĜ).  Lumḫa himself was therefore a kind of instrument god, his goodwill needed for the new divinized drum.  One should also note the substantial element of seven-magic that underpins the ritual.  On the fifteenth day after the drum’s completion, it was presented to the temple-god. It was now a Divine Lilissu, and could only be played by the priest to whom it was assigned. Through these procedures, as U. Gabbay has convincingly argued, the bull belonged to both the living and the dead. Its ‘heart’ survived in the drum itself, which wore its skin, and continued to beat in the beating of the instrument; this was in turn the beating heart of the god to be soothed through ritual lamentation, when the kalû would imitate the gestures of mourning.  The mechanism was thus sympathetic magic: the kalû enacted the lamenting god(dess), leading his or her heart to release from anger and grief through the performance of mourning.
A divinized instrument, like other cult-objects, was endowed with a name. This could reflect its physical and conceptual properties, or some aspect of the master-god to whom it was devoted.  In either case, the naming ritual endowed the divinized instrument with individual existence.  This bears in turn on the capacity of divine objects to enjoy ‘personal’ relationships with major gods, and hence appear in mythological narratives with them. Thus, for example, in the Babylonian Erra Myth, an Akkadian narrative work of the early first millennium,  the god Erra’s vizier Ishum is perhaps his deified scepter, Ḫendursanga.  His seven weapons are definitely anthropomorphized as warriors.  Much earlier is the N-S poem Lugal-e, telling the adventures of Ninurta.  The god’s mace Sharur is personified as his advisor, who alerts him in a lengthy speech (24–69) to the existence of a new enemy in the mountains—Azag, who has been chosen leader by that region’s plants and stones, the latter represented as warriors.  Later as Ninurta carries his mace it “snarled at the mountains” (79). Notable among Sharur’s several other actions is his transformation into the thunderbird, flying overhead to spy out the enemy and bring news back to Ninurta (109–150).
This balang-god appears as a kind of musical director for the temple orchestra, responsible for the production of celebratory music in times of peace and good order. I shall return to his larger role in the text below.
But if the poem’s mythological imagery is converted back to cult realities, one must conclude that the instrument itself possessed the power of such counsel. This explains the passage quoted above, describing the balang’s communication of Gudea’s message to Ningirsu, whose obedience it will compel. The balang is like a herald and translator who speaks directly to the divine mind, otherwise inaccessible to man, with a special hermeneutic language. One may compare a Hittite text that refers to “the sweet message of the lyre, the sweet message of the cymbals.”  In the Bible, too, one finds evidence, quite abundant, for the kinnōr as a medium through which gods and mortals can communicate.  The god who ‘consults’ with his balang-servants is a mirror image of the king who seeks divine guidance through the medium of balang-music. Gudea submits his query, and receives his response, through the balang. The respective musings of god and king meet precisely in the instrument, which is thus a kind of hotline between king and divine patron.
In the future rituals that are imagined here, as in the earlier balang-rite in which he appealed to Ningirsu, Gudea is the sole visible actor. While this might reflect political posturing vis-à-vis the temple clergy,  it is also consistent with the ideology of the king as a bridge between the human and divine spheres. To all appearances, Gudea will single-handedly supervise the procession of Ušumgal-kalama, and the balang-god will “walk in front.” On the mythological level, this evokes a scene of king and balang-god side-by-side—an epiphany in which the cultic agents necessary for bringing it about are eclipsed, and suggesting a ‘guardian angel’ relationship between Ušumgal-kalama and Gudea, akin to ‘presentation scenes’ on cylinder-seals of the Akkadian and Ur III periods.  But if the scene is imagined on the mundane level, we are still left with Gudea as the leading human agent, escorting his divinized balang at the head of the procession. The two visions suggest a close association between king and balang, perhaps even their identification. Note especially that the king’s duties in the passage just given are strikingly reminiscent of Ušumgal-kalama himself, who is to supervise musical rites of just this sort.
No doubt a king could be well educated, and really cultivate music. Yasmah-Addu of Mari (crowned ca. 1790) may have studied as a boy with his father’s master musician.  One of the Hurrian hymns from Ugarit may have been composed by king ‘Ammurapi of Ugarit.  Psalms were attributed to several Biblical kings.  But Shulgi’s claims are so extravagant as to be incredible. The essentially symbolic nature of his ‘achievements’ is revealed by their deliberate recycling in the royal praise-hymns of Ishme-Dagan (ca. 1953–1935), fourth king of the Isin dynasty.  At the pinnacle of human society, the king was all things to his people—a living god, the ideal embodiment of civilization and all its arts. His preternatural beauty made the royal shepherd a worthy spouse of Inanna, a new Dumuzi. He was the perfect soldier, the wisest judge, the best diviner, the ultimate scribe—and the ideal musician, of celebratory song and lamentation alike.
Thus, although the royal praise hymns are composed in the first person, there is no compelling reason to believe that the king himself was always, or perhaps ever, the actual composer. (If he were, of course, it would be still more interesting.) The mode of presentation allows any king to compose and perform, at least in spirit, through the mouth of a singer or singers who voiced these songs in the first person. This circular conception is similar to the poetics of divinized instruments considered above.  With both, human ministers are effaced, and their offices, actions, and abilities are symbolically co-opted by a higher power—be it god, king, or god-king.
This material lets us glimpse an intricate network of ideas about divinized instruments, the cognitive interaction of instrument and player, and the elaboration of both in the ritual poetics of kingship. Another such case may be a GU4.BALAĜ servant of the moon-god Suen/Sin, called Amar-Suen (‘Calf of Suen’); for this is the name of Shulgi’s successor (ca. 2046–2038), while Suen/Sin was the patron god of the dynasty.  Similarly Ishbi-Erra, first king of the Isin dynasty, dedicated a divinized balang called ‘Ishbi-Erra trusts in Enlil’.  To judge from its name, this instrument was a servant-god of Enlil. And yet, the incorporation of Ishbi-Erra’s own name suggests that the balang was equally an intermediary between the earthly king and his divine counterpart.
These conceptions will be important when considering David, an overt ‘lyre-king’ serving, praising, and giving voice to Yahweh. And the kinnōr-playing David is in turn our best parallel for understanding Kinyras himself—a Divine Lyre lingering on in Greco-Cypriot and Levantine myth, remodeled as an ancient lyre-playing king in the service of ‘Aphrodite’.
The precise nature and purpose of any actual rites underpinning this ideology at various periods remain disputed. Recent studies downplay the more ‘hands-on’ interpretations of Frazer and his followers in favor of symbolic rituals tied to regeneration of the land and periodic renewal of royal legitimacy and social order.  In any case, the poetic treatment of intimacy between king and goddess remains an observable artifact in its own right, with especially rich material from the N-S and OB periods.
In this vignette—a striking example of seven-magic combined with music (see below)—the king receives musical offerings, the godly honors he enjoys with his goddess wife, here still a maiden, performed by his royal musicians. Yet once again, by the logic of genre, it should actually be Shulgi who—presumably inspired by Inanna, as in Shulgi B—sings about his own musicians. This creates an infinite regrade in which Shulgi embodies the entire musical activity of his court.  Subject and object, performer and recipient, merge in a single musical epiphany.
The passage is valuable for envisioning the participation of actual cult-musicians. As presented, however, they merely echo and amplify the king’s own praises of the goddess. It seems they are to sing the very hymn in which they are themselves so described. Once again, a purposefully circular construction blurs the line between king and musicians, spotlighting the royal performance.
Mesopotamian sources present very rich evidence for the practice and ideology of music in many contexts. The material’s abundance varies considerably with time and place through accidents of survival and discovery. I have restricted my discussion to those issues that provide the best parallels for Kinyras, Kinnaru of Ugarit, and Syro-Levantine kinnāru-culture generally: divinized cult-tools, their construction and anthropomorphosis in myth; conceptions of musical cognition and communication with the gods through this medium; and royal ideology and self-representation, including ideas of hierogamy. The separate functions of Ningirsu’s two balang-gods will also be echoed by the celebratory and lamentative contexts in which Kinyras and the knr are found. Mesopotamia is of course a different world from Cyprus and its environs, so one must not expect exact parallels. Nevertheless the material considered here will help illuminate many otherwise obscure facets of Kinyras and his mythology.
[ back ] 1. For the material in this paragraph, see Selz 1997, especially 169–177.
[ back ] 2. See also p580n21.
[ back ] 3. For the ùb, see also PHG:142 et passim.
[ back ] 4. For the identity of the balang, see Appendix A and Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 1 (with 9, 11, 12–13, 15, 17f, 20a–20b, etc. for ED III and later evidence of balang-offerings).
[ back ] 5. Cf. Jean 1931:159; Galpin 1936:65–66; Hartmann 1960:53 and n3, 61–62; MgB 2/2:13, 140; RlA 8:464, 466 (Kilmer, *Musik A I). For offerings to the balang specifically, see references in Sjöberg 1984–, s.v. 1.1.1–2; further material noted by Heimpel 1998a:6–10.
[ back ] 6. Selz 1997:176–177; cf. Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 2b and 13.
[ back ] 7. Selz 1997; Selz 2008.
[ back ] 8. Selz 1997:167 (emphasis added).
[ back ] 9. Lambert 1990:129.
[ back ] 11. Selz 1997:175.
[ back ] 12. Reiner 1958:1 (quotation). The series was cited in connection with Kinnaru by Nougayrol 1968:59. Note that the instruments are not written with divine determinatives. Yet if instruments held such power without being divinized, their divinized counterparts will have been all the more numinous. The evidence is therefore relevant.
[ back ] 13. Reiner 1958:3.
[ back ] 14. Šurpu III:37 and 88–91. The translation of Reiner 1958:20–21 will serve to illustrate the variety of combinations, although the identification of specific instruments may be questionable. Thus we find an “oath of the cymbals or harp” (37); “oath of the drum and kettledrum” (88); “oath of the timbrel and cymbals” (89); “oath of lyre, harp (pa-lag-gi), and timbūtu-harp” (90); “the oath of lute and pipe” (91).
[ back ] 15. Reiner 1958:55.
[ back ] 16. London, BM 89359. See Porada 1980; MgB 2/2:102–104 (fig. 108); Collon 1987 no. 665.
[ back ] 17. Compare perhaps Homer’s use of ἁρμονίαι for an agreement between two warriors overseen by the gods (Iliad 22.254–255), and the invocation of Κενυριστής Apollo in the loyalty oath to Tiberius at Roman Paphos: see p205.
[ back ] 18. See Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 53 III 153–158; cf. V 291 (a balang-servant of Ishtaran, with Heimpel’s comments there).
[ back ] 19. Falkenstein 1966:8; Sigrist and Gomi 1991:317; RIME 3/1:27 (1.1.7, 3); Selz 1997:200n218; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 17b. The precise sequence of Gudea’s regnal years has not been fully established: RIME 3/1:27.
[ back ] 20. Gudea dedicated another balang to the goddess Bau (spouse of Ningirsu), called “Greatly speaking with the Lady”: RIME 3/1 1.1.7.StE iv.12–14; cf. Radner 2005:51 no. 52; Ziegler, FM 9:222 (on 8).
[ back ] 21. Sigrist and Gomi 1991:329, year 22; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 23a1.
[ back ] 22. See p84–85.
[ back ] 23. See p83–84.
[ back ] 24. Lambert 1990:123.
[ back ] 25. DeVale 1988. For drum-construction rituals of several African cultures, see Rattray 1923:258–266; HMI:34–36; Nketia 1963:4–16; Blades 1984:57–64.
[ back ] 26. Thureau-Dangin 1921:1–5; Thureau-Dangin 1922 no. 44–46; Livingstone 1986:187–204; ANET:334–338; Linssen 2004:92–99, 267–282; cf. also Stauder 1970:199–201 and fig. 3a; RlA 8:465 (Kilmer, *Musik A I); Selz 1997:201n215; PHG:118–138.
[ back ] 27. Linssen 2004:94n495.
[ back ] 28. See Livingstone 1986:200; Linssen 2004:267, whose study upholds in general the traditional nature of the late ritual texts (167–168); similarly Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 4a §2.
[ back ] 29. Thus Selz 1997:178–179 assumes that, already in the N-S period, divinization entailed rituals of name-giving, animation, induction to an appropriate cult place, and ongoing offerings and maintenance.
[ back ] 30. The following account conflates elements from several versions; they are, however, essentially compatible.
[ back ] 31. For the gala, see Michalowski 2006; Bachvarova 2008; Gadotti 2010; Shehata 2013; PHG; and further p29–30.
[ back ] 32. Livingstone 1986:201–204; PHG:137–139.
[ back ] 33. Selz 1997:178.
[ back ] 35. See PHG:127–128, 138.
[ back ] 36. A0 6479 II.5, 33–35, III.15, after drum has been made.
[ back ] 37. For example, KAR 60, obv. 15, N-A, seventh century; in this text the bull is placed in front of Lumḫa while being sacrificed.
[ back ] 38. Thureau-Dangin 1921:49n13, calls Lumḫa the god of the tympanum, patron of the kalû; Linssen 2004:96, treats him as a ‘divine harp’, but for this period BALAĜ probably represents a drum: see p531, 573.
[ back ] 39. For the relevance of seven-magic to the larger question of divinized instruments and ritual music, see p40–41. Seven-magic in the lilissu texts includes sevenfold offerings in AO 6479 I.17 and 23. Among the twelve divine figurines are the “seven children of Enmešarra” (enumerated at AO 6479 III.3–14), represented by seven heaps of flour (as stated in K 4806, 5–8). These heaps, accompanied by the god-names, are apparently represented in the diagram of O175 reverse, where they have a definite arrangement vis-à-vis the bull. See Livingstone 1986:194, 203. The seven gods/heaps correspond somehow to seven “hands” or “handles” (on the drum itself?), and stand in an obscure relationship to the “seven defeated Enlils” who also appear in the diagram.
[ back ] 40. PHG:79, 173, 177 (mimetic performance of kalû); 126, 138, 154 (lilissu equated with the divine heart in theological commentaries, and both connected with that of the bull).
[ back ] 41. See PHG:113–114. For examples of ‘conceptual names,’ see below and Heimpel, “Balang-Gods”.
[ back ] 42. Selz 1997:178; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 4b1.
[ back ] 43. Text: Cagni 1969; English translation: Foster 2005:771–805. Despite the work’s late date (Machinist 1983a:221–222), Ḫendursanga himself is known already in the third millennium (Fara; I–II dynasty of Lagash; Ur III): Cagni 1969:138–140 with further references.
[ back ] 44. Cagni 1969:138–140; Foster 2005:742.
[ back ] 45. Machinist 1983a:222. As Divine Heptad, RlA 12/5–6:461 (Wiggerman, *Siebengötter A).
[ back ] 46. Lugal-e: ed. van Dijk 1983 = Exploits of Ninurta, ETCSL 1.6.2; trans./comm. Jacobsen 1987:233–272. The work has been dated to soon after ca. 2150, due to its allusion at 475–478 to Gudea’s building of Ningirsu’s sanctuary Eninnu: see van Dijk 1983:1–9; Jacobsen 1987:234.
[ back ] 47. For the allegory of the stones, see van Dijk 1983:37–47.
[ back ] 48. Livingstone 1986:169–170 (original emphasis).
[ back ] 49. For the Sebettu (vel sim.), their association with the Pleiades, and other variations, see RlA 12/5–6:459–466 (Wiggerman, *Siebengötter A), with ritual uses at 461 §2 and 464 §4. The bulk of the evidence is from the first millennium (especially N-A contexts), but there are scattered antecedents going back to the N-S period. Classicists will recall here W. Burkert’s hypothesis that the myth of the Seven against Thebes derives ultimately from these Seven Warriors (1992:106–114; cf. EFH:455–457), although the pattern of seven against seven suggests Anatolian mediation (for the Hittite doubling of the Divine Heptad, see RlA 12/5–6:466 [Polvani, *Siebengötter B]).
[ back ] 50. See p280–291.
[ back ] 51. Text: RIME 3/1:68–101 (1.1.7 CylA/B); ETCSL 2.1.7 (translation followed here, with exceptions as noted); CS 2 no. 155. For the work’s genre and title (Gudea Cylinders B 24.17), Suter 2000:277. Pantheon of Lagash: Falkenstein 1966.
[ back ] 52. Suter 2000:274 et passim. The musical scenes are Suter 2000:ST.9, 13, 15, 23, 25, 53, 54, with discussion on 190–195; for those showing a giant drum, see p532. A proposal by J. Börker-Klähn to restore a bow-harp on a further fragment is unlikely: see Suter 2000:189, with 172 fig. 19a.
[ back ] 53. Suter 2000:157 and 278, wondering about the audience for the text of the cylinders, notes their reference to the performance of various songs during the construction process, and suggests that the cylinders were a ‘draft’ for a more polished stele-inscription. Be that as it may, the content of the text and the figurative steles are to a large extent parallel, and sometimes mirror each other. Thus, for instance, the steles depict ritual musical performances like those mentioned in the text, which in turn alludes to various decorative schemes on steles set up in the temple. Given that “the verbal composition was probably recited in some form at least once” (Suter 2000:279), it is an easy guess that this was during the same set of events that saw the dedication of the steles—i.e., inauguration of the temple.
[ back ] 54. For this last qualification, see the comments of Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 2a.
[ back ] 55. Gudea Cylinders A 9.24. For the historical conflation of Ninurta (Nippur name) and Ningirsu (Lagash name), see Jacobsen 1987:233–235.
[ back ] 56. Gudea Cylinders A 15.19–25. For “The year in which the wood for the Sharur-weapon was made,” and a further year-name from the making (or repair) of the mace itself, see Falkenstein 1966:8; RIME 3/1:27 (1.1.7, 6).
[ back ] 57. Gudea Cylinders A 22.20, B 7.12–21.
[ back ] 58. Gudea Cylinders B 6.11–23. Cf. Jacobsen 1987:430n22.
[ back ] 59. Gudea Cylinders B 6.24–7.11.
[ back ] 60. See e.g. Elum Gusun (Honored One, Wild Ox) and CLAM:296–297, 314–316.
[ back ] 61. See p280–291.
[ back ] 62. Adapting the formulation of Austin 1962. For theoretical considerations of the intersection of ‘speech-act’ and ‘song’ in the Hellenic sphere, see inter al. Martin 1989 (with illuminating cultural parallels 1–14 et passim); Nagy 1990:30–34.
[ back ] 64. Gudea Cylinders A 6.24–7.6. My translations adapted from ETCSL and Jacobsen 1987. Gudea carries out these instructions at A 7.9–8.1.
[ back ] 65. For the status and organization of nar generally, including the elite offices of “Chief Singer” (nar-gal, a substantially administrative position) and “Singer before the King” (nar lugal, associated especially with the Ur III period), see now Pruzsinszky 2010; Pruzsinszky 2013. The evidence naturally varies from city to city. In the Ur III period there was a ‘great academy’ (e2 umum gu-la) for royal musicians at Ur itself: Pruzsinszky 2013:35–36.
[ back ] 66. Wilson 1996:158.
[ back ] 67. Gudea Cylinders B 10.9–15: translation after Jacobsen 1987 and one by Stephen Langdon in the margin of his copy of Thureau-Dangin 1907, held in the Sackler Library, Oxford. Wilson 1996:159 renders the last line as “(sc. Ušumgal-kalama) passed by the lord Ningirsu with (emblems of the) rituals.” Ušumgal-kalama appears further at B 15.19–16.2, for which see below; and B 18.22–19.1, “Ušumgal-kalama took its stand among the tigi-harps, the alu-lyres roared for him like a storm” (trans. Jacobsen). For these instruments, see 531n1, 532, 575, 606–7n92.
[ back ] 68. Falkenstein 1966:82 (“Herr mit dem schrecklichen Blick”); Selz 1997:178 (“Red-Eyed Lord”). The existence of two distinct balang-gods is justified by their separate functions. The lexical collection An:Anum lists no fewer than seven balang-gods of Ningirsu, all otherwise unattested (Heimpel 1998b:5 and “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c and 53 V 100–106).
[ back ] 71. Cf. also Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 4b2. For the following overview, see PHG:63–64, 70–71, 159–168, et passim. I assume that the detailed first-millennium sources can serve at least as a rough guide to earlier periods. Surviving literary laments: CLAM.
[ back ] 72. The two narratives are The Fashioning of the Gala (BM 29616, balang-composition of OB date): see Kramer 1981; and Inanna’s Descent to the Netherworld (ETCSL 1.4.1) 228–239. See further Shehata 2006a; PHG:76–78; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 3b.
[ back ] 73. PHG:83–84; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 3b.
[ back ] 74. See especially Cooper 2006:43–45; approved by Michalowski 2006:49. For the linguistic evidence itself, Schretter 1990. Whittaker 2002 is a good critical review of theories. See also Bachvarova 2008; PHG:68.
[ back ] 75. The use of ‘male’ and ‘his’ are complicated by the third-gender interpretation. See recently, with earlier literature, Cooper 2006:44–45; Gabbay 2008; PHG:67–68. Evidence for the gala’s funerary function is early (third-millennium and OB), cf. e.g. Gudea’s suspension of funeral rites when purifying the ground for Ningirsu’s temple: “corpses were not buried, the gala did not set up his balang and bring forth laments from it, the woman lamenter did not utter laments” (RIME 3/1 1.1.7.StB v.1–4; translation after Cooper 2006:42–43); see further material in PHG:18–19n19.
[ back ] 76. PHG:79, 172–173.
[ back ] 77. See PHG Part VII.
[ back ] 78. Heimpel 1998a:14–16 with parallels; also “Balang-Gods,” 42a.
[ back ] 79. PHG:164n76, 165–166, 173, 180. For the lilissu ritual, see p23–25. Dada, a well-documented gala attached to the royal palace in the reigns of Shulgi and Shu-Sin, is also known to have supervised the manufacture and repair of instruments. For Dada, see Michalowski 2006; Mirelman 2010; Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 54.
[ back ] 80. Ambos 2004:171–198; PHG: 87, 158, 165–168, 181–182, 187, 272. See further p280–282.
[ back ] 81. Gudea Cylinders A 7.25. “To which he keeps listening,” in the translation of RIME 3/1:73, will yield compatible sense when other evidence for the counseling balang is take into account.
[ back ] 82. Gudea Cylinders B 8.10–22.
[ back ] 84. The following points come from Heimpel 1998b; Gabbay 2014 §9–13.
[ back ] 85. Cf. Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c.
[ back ] 86. Heimpel 1998b:5.
[ back ] 87. Heimpel 1998b:5; “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c.
[ back ] 88. Gabbay 2014 §13.
[ back ] 89. See p28n65, 74.
[ back ] 90. See MgB 2/2:52–53 (fig. 28–29, ca. 2600/2450), 54–57 (fig. 32–34, ca. 2600), 60–61 (fig. 36, ca. 2550), 62–65 (fig. 38–39, 41–43, OAkk. period).
[ back ] 91. See p165–166.
[ back ] 92. KBo 12.88.5–10; also KBo 26.137, 2: see HKm:203.
[ back ] 93. See p158–164.
[ back ] 94. See p24.
[ back ] 95. There may have been occasions, however, when the instrument itself was the focus of a ritual, without actually sounding. In the Ishtar ritual from OB Mari, a balang is said to be ‘placed’—the instrument was heavy—but whether it was actually played is not made clear; it may rather have been the object of lamentation. See further p85, 291–292.
[ back ] 96. Gudea Cylinders B 15.19–16.2.
[ back ] 98. E.g. Collon 1987:36; Asher-Greve and Westenholz 2013:199–202, with emphasis on underlying rituals.
[ back ] 99. Building works of Shulgi and Ur-Nammu: Sallaberger 1999:137–140, 151–152.
[ back ] 100. For divine kingship, see the lucid account of Michalowski 2008, distinguishing between sacred and divine (41–42).
[ back ] 101. Bassetki statue: Al-Fouadi 1976; RIME 2 1.4.10; CS 2 no. 90; Kuhrt 1995 1:48–49, 51–52. Great Revolt: Westenholz 1999:51–54.
[ back ] 102. For the evidence of Shulgi’s divine status, Sallaberger 1999:152–156.
[ back ] 103. Quotation: Michalowski 2008:41. For Isin’s cultural relationship to Ur, and the promotion of legitimate continuity from Ur in royal hymns and other media, see Michalowski 1983:242–243.
[ back ] 104. For the royal promotion and organization of music in this period, see the studies cited in n65 above.
[ back ] 105. Hallo 1963; Klein 1981.
[ back ] 106. For zan(n)aru—with the double-n guaranteed for Akk. by Diri III.043—see further p55, 78–79.
[ back ] 107. Shulgi B, 154–174, trans. adapted from ETCSL 2.4.2.02, partially on the basis of text and commentary in Krispijn 1990 (who attempts some identifications with the catalogue of MgB 2/2). See especially 8–12 for miritum, sabitum, urzababitum, and zan(n)aru. For the first two, which are also found in Enki’s Journey to Nippur as part of the god’s temple orchestra at Eridu (ETCSL 1.1.4, 60–67), see too Hartmann 1960:77–78; cf. Castellino 1972:162–170; Henshaw 1993:84–86. Similar boasts are found in Shulgi C, segment B, 75–101 (especially 77–78, ETCSL 2.4.2.03); Shulgi E, 34–35 (ETCSL 2.4.2.05).
[ back ] 108. Ziegler 2006b:36.
[ back ] 109. See p119, 383.
[ back ] 110. See p178, 383.
[ back ] 111. See p80–81.
[ back ] 112. See p30–33.
[ back ] 113. Could there be a connection here with the obscure but important honorific “King of Kish” which was assumed by several Sumerian rulers of the ED III period and Sargon’s dynasty? See generally RlA 5:608–610 (Edzard, Kiš A); Maeda 1981; Kuhrt 1995 2:41–43.
[ back ] 114. An:Anum I 268 (cited according to Litke 1998). For this god-list, and this entry, see further Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c and 53.
[ back ] 115. Ḫh 79–80 (MSL 6:123); Ḫg 169 (MSL 6:142); Diri III.49 (MSL 6:119, 15:138): see Falkenstein and Matouš 1934:147 §49; Castellino 1972:166 §166; Heimpel 1998b:6 (translating Sum. nârūti as “music”).
[ back ] 116. As U. Gabbay notes, “It is also not coincidental that the Urzababa instrument is the balang of Ninurta, since this god as hero going out to war was often conceived [as] the mythological mirror image of Mesopotamian kings” (communication, March, 2010).
[ back ] 117. See further p86.
[ back ] 119. RIME 4 1.1.1, 13–14; CS 2 no. 92; Radner 2005:56 no. 82; FM 9:222 (on 8); Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 40.
[ back ] 120. For identifications, see p34n107, 35–36. For the zan(n)aru (Krispijn’s “Anatolian lyre”), see further p78–79.
[ back ] 121. By contrast, catastrophic situations are marked by the silencing of music; for example, Ur-Nammu A (The Death of Ur-Nammu, ETCSL 2.4.1.1), 187–188 (“My tigi, adab, flute and zamzam songs have been turned into laments because of me. The instruments of the house of music have been propped against the wall.”); so too the ruin of Isin in The Destroyed House (Jacobsen 1987:475–477, lines 17–24). For the Curse of Agade, see below.
[ back ] 123. Quotation: Michalowski 2008:34. Ishtar appears first in the list of gods who supported Naram-Sin’s divinization (Bassetki statue: RIME 2 1.4.10; Foster I.c3, cd.
[ back ] 124. Westenholz 1997:35, 83, 109, 137–139, etc.
[ back ] 125. The convergence of these themes is seen clearly in Shulgi X (ETCSL 2.4.2.24) and Iddin-Dagan A (ETCSL 2.5.3.1). Shulgi as shepherd: Shulgi D 2, 60, 364; E 5, 11; G 28–30, 49–53, 60–62; P 11–14, 17, 56–66; Q 6, 28, 45–48; R 41, 67, 84, 89; X 9, 37, 40, 53; etc. (these are ETCSL 2.4.2.04, 05, 07, 16, 18, 24, respectively).
[ back ] 126. For an up-to-date survey of approaches formerly and presently taken, see the essays in Nissinen and Uro 2008, especially those of P. Lapinkivi, B. Pongratz-Leisten, and M. Nissinen. Representative recent studies are Cooper 1993; Sweet 1994; Steinkeller 1999; Jones 2003; Lapinkivi 2004. Cf. RlA 4:251–259 (Renger, *Heilige Hochzeit), for cautions about earlier studies, of which one may cite inter al. Jacobsen in Frankfort et al. 1946:198–200; Frankfort 1948:295–299; Gurney 1962; Kramer 1963; Kramer 1969:132–133, for the idea of transmission to Anatolia, Greece, and Cyprus in connection with Adonis; Yamauchi 1973; Jacobsen 1975.
[ back ] 127. Pongratz-Leisten 2008:54–60 (quotation at 60), et passim; further references in Parpola 1997:CIVn237; Jones 2003:291.
[ back ] 128. Parpola 1997:XVIII–XXXVI, XLVII–XLVIII (with reference to antecedents), et passim. Note that here Ishtar often appears in the role of the king’s mother.
[ back ] 129. Shulgi B (ETCSL 2.4.2.01),131–149.
[ back ] 130. Shulgi B, 381–382.
[ back ] 131. Shulgi B, 1–10 (quotation at 9–10).
[ back ] 132. Shulgi X (ETCSL 2.4.2.24), 13–41.
[ back ] 133. Shulgi A (ETCSL 2.4.2.01), 81–83. For the tigi instrument, see p531n1, 575, 606–7n92.
[ back ] 134. Compare the double harpist imagery on a thirteenth-century bronze stand from Kourion: p388–392.
[ back ] 135. Iddin-Dagan A (ETCSL 2.5.3.1), 181–194.
[ back ] 136. Iddin-Dagan A, 3, 9–10, 35–37.
[ back ] 137. See Franklin 2014:224–226.
[ back ] 138. See p114.
[ back ] 139. See p167–174.
[ back ] 140. For the wonder-working lyre in early Greek poetics, and the importance of seven-magic, see Franklin 2002b:17–21; Franklin 2006a:52–63.
[ back ] 141. For the symbolism of seven in the ANE generally, a good source book is Reinhold 2008; for Greece with some discussion of neighboring cultures, Roscher 2003; in Pythagorean cosmology, Burkert 1972a:465–482 et passim.
[ back ] 142. See p24, 39.
[ back ] 144. See index s.v. ‘seven-magic’.
[ back ] 145. Franklin 2006a:58.
[ back ] 146. For an introduction to these texts, see RlA 8:463–482 (Kilmer, *Musik A I) with further literature.
[ back ] 147. From the so-called Retuning Text UET 7/74 (Ur, ca. 1800), as well as CBS 10996 (Nippur, ca. 500–300), which enumerates and names intervals formed from the first seven strings. For these texts, see also p59–60, 97, 119, 392, 451.
[ back ] 148. Horowitz 2006 (ed. princ.); Waerzeggers and Siebes 2007 (connecting to musical texts, suggested emendations); Horowitz and Shnider 2009 (collation and verification of some proposed re-readings); Shnider 2010 (suggesting some connection with astronomical and/or divinatory lore).
[ back ] 149. TSA 1 ix:12–14 (dated to end of first dynasty of Lagash, p. IX).
[ back ] 150. ETCSL 2.1.5, 34–36, 196–204. Translation after Cooper 1983 and Jacobsen 1987; cf. Heimpel, “Balang-Gods,” 43. Discussion: PHG:16–17, 58. For music as symbolizing Agade’s prosperity, Cooper 1983:38–39; 238; 252. For the identity of tigi-lyre, see 531n1, 575, 606–7n92.
[ back ] 151. “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c.
[ back ] 152. Further material: “Balang-Gods,” Section 2c and 9, 11, 37, 43; PHG:91, 117, 141, 161n55–56. Probably relevant is the intersection of balang-cult with the lunar calendar. A monthly offering is known from Umma during the Ur III period, made to the ‘Balang of the Day-of-Laying’, that is, when the moon was invisible before starting again to wax; presumably the occasion called for apotropaic magic. Cited by Heimpel 1998a:6–7 and “Balang-Gods,” 28. Cf. Linssen 2004:93 and 306–320 for the kettledrum’s use in late Babylonian rituals relating to lunar eclipse.


text:
C. A. (S.C.) 26/77 (F)- D.C. BALAPITIYA 418/T.
of Sri Lanka, 1978, Article 138 (1).
Last Will-Burden on propounder- Suspicious circumstances- Duty of Court in considering such question.
been duly executed and that the petitioner was entitled to Probate thereof.
Court should not interfere with the findings of the learned District Judge on what were all questions of fact.
reversed then the Appellate Court "ought not to shrink from that task".
intended the document to be his Last Willthat the said document had been duly executed according to law.
question of fact for the trial judge.
was entitled to Probate of the Last Will.
(1) Fradd v. Brown & Co. Ltd., (1918) 20 N.L.R. 282.
(2) Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home, (1935) A. C. 243.
(3) Munasinghe v. Vidanage, (1966) 69 N.L.R. 97.
(4) Watt v. Thomas, (1947) 1 All E. R. 582.
(5) Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd., (1955) A.C. 370(1955) 2 W.L.R. 418,- (1955) 1 All E. R. 326.
(6) Attorney-General v. Gnanapiragasam, (1965) 68 N.L.R. 49.
(9) Falalloon v. Cassim,(1918) 20 N. L. R. 332.
(10) K. M. Perera v. Martin Dias, (1957) 59 N. L. R. 1.
(11) Yuill v. Yuill, (1945) 1 All E. R. 18329 C L. W 97.
(12) Gunawardena v. Edirisinghe, (1960) 64 N. L. R. 27960 C L. W 40.
(13) S. S. Hontestroom v. S. S. Sagaporack, (1927) A. C. 37.
(14) Mahavithana v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1962) 64 N. L. R. 217.
(15) Abdul Sathar v. Bogstra, (1954) 54 N. L. R. 102.
(16) Selvaguru v. Thaialpagar, (1952) 54 N. L. R. 361.
(17) Barry v. Butlin, 2 Moore P. C. 48012 E. R. (P. C.) 1089.
(18) Tyrrel v. Painton, (1894) P.D. 151.
(19) The Alim Will case, (1919) 20 N. L. R. 481.
(20) Guardhouse v. Blackburn, (1866) L. R. 1 P. and D. 109.
(21) Atter v. Alkinson, (1869) L. R. I P. and D. 66520 L. T. 40433 J.P. 440.
(22) Peries v. Perera, (1947) 48 N. L. R. 560.
(23) Samarakone v. The Public Trustee, (1960) 65 N. L. R. 100.
(24)John Pieris v. Wilbert, (1956) 59 N.L.R.245.
(25)Meenadchipillai v. Karthigesu, (1957) 61 N.L.R. 320.
(26) Robins v. National Trust Co., Ltd., (1927) A. C. 515,- (1927) All E.R. Rep. 73.
(27) Harmes and another v. Hinkson, (1946) 62 T. L. R. 445.
(28) Davis v. Maynew, (1927) 96 L.J. P. 140137 L. T. 61243 T L. R. 648.
(29)Sithamparanathan v. Mathuranayagam, (1970) 73 N.L.R. 53.
APPEAL from the District Court, Balapitiya.
H. W. Jayewardene, Q.C., with Bimal Rajapakse, Miss P. Seneviratne and Lakshman Perera, for the petitioner -respondent.
and sisters, who are the petitioner and the 1st to 6th respondents -respondents.
death of the deceased, as his only heirs.
26.10.71) a last will duly executed on 31.8.1966?
(2) If so, is the petitioner entitled to Probate of the said last will ?
After trial the learned District Judge has answered both issues in favour of the petitioner.
to discharge the burden which, in law, rested upon the petitioner.
before him: that therefore this Court should not interfere with the judgment of the learned District Judge.
irregularity, which has not prejudiced the substantial rights of the parties or occasioned a failure of justice."
a Judge of first instance."
governing fact which in relation to others has created a wrong impression."
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, the Supreme Court should not have set aside the findings of thetrialjudge.
not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion.
to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence.
heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate Court.
and I would say that it would be difficult for it to do so where the finding turned solely on the credibility ofawitness.
between the perception and evaluation of facts."
inferences and assumptions. . .".
case, and the Court must consider the materials before the Judge with such other materials as it may have decidedtoadmit.
be drawn from the behaviour of these witnesses, both before and after the matters upon which they gave evidence."
so convinced it is, in my opinion, entitled and indeed bound to give effect to its conviction."
to the approach adopted by Lord Sumner to this question in the case of S. S Hontestroom vs. S. S.Sagaporack,(13),atp.
misunderstanding or disregard of a material fact, or any 'extreme and overwhelming pressure' that has had the same effect".
Another authority, which needs must be referred to in considering this question, is the judgmentof(H.N.G.)Fernando,J.
to be his last will.
The earliest discussion, according to the authorities cited to us by learned Counsel,oftherelevant"wellestablished"
propounded does express the true will of the deceased."
circumstances exist which excite the suspicion of the Court."
unless that suspicion is removed."
Penzance really meant to lay down has been expressed concisely by Lord Penzance himselfinthelatercaseofAttervs.
intended it to be such.
fact of execution from which the knowledge of and assent to the contents of the instrument are assumed.
of the document he was signing."
suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testatrix knew and approved of the contents of the document."
case made for proving the will". . .
initial suspicion were unfounded the burden of proof which lay on the propounder of the will remained undischarged".
testamentary capacity. Moreover, if a will is only proved in common and not in solemn form, the same rule applies . . . ."
tribunal must always be, in the end, a question of fact."
its contents was laid down in the case of Davis vs. Mayhew (28) at 148.
This principle was once again discussed by Their Lordships of thePrivyCouncilinthecaseofSithamparanathanvs.
the deceased in the sense that he was competent to make the will, is a pure question of fact.
ultimately a question of fact for the trial judge.
deceased and the appellant had, admittedly, been always living together right up to the time of the death of the deceased.
the deceased had married about two years prior to that and who would then have been about 40 years of age. was inexistence.
the appellant and her minor children.
opened the safe. The evidence of Anton on this point is:"
not think that there is room for suspicion on these grounds either.
with his brothers and sisters were at and about the time "A" was signed by the deceased.
of the appellant, and of her two minor children, or occasioned a failure of justice.
the appeal of the appellant is accordingly dismissed, but, having regard to the circumstances of this case, without costs.

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548 Pa. 418, 698 A. 2d 32, reversed and remanded.
This case presents the question whether the exclusionary rule, which generally prohibits the introduction at criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of a defendants Fourth Amendment rights, applies in parole revocation hearings. We hold that it does not.
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence, without a warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Any items, in [sic] the possession of which constitutes a violation of parole/reparole shall be subject to seizure, and may be used as evidence in the parole revocation process. App. 7a.
About five months later, after obtaining an arrest warrant based on evidence that respondent had violated several conditions of his parole by possessing firearms, consuming alcohol, and assaulting a co-worker, three parole officers arrested respondent at a local diner. Before being transferred to a correctional facility, respondent gave the officers the keys to his residence. The officers entered the home, which was owned by his mother, but did not perform a search for parole violations until respondents mother arrived. The officers neither requested nor obtained consent to perform the search, but respondents mother did direct them to his bedroom. After finding no relevant evidence there, the officers searched an adjacent sitting room in which they found five firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows.
At his parole violation hearing, respondent objected to the introduction of the evidence obtained during the search of his home on the ground that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The hearing examiner, however, rejected the challenge and admitted the evidence. As a result, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole found sufficient evidence in the record to support the weapons and alcohol charges and recommitted respondent to serve 36 months backtime.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 698 A. 2d 32, 548 Pa. 418 (1997). The court stated that respondents Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was unaffected by his signing of the parole agreement giving parole officers permission to conduct warrantless searches. Id., at 36, 548 Pa., at 427. It then held that the search in question was unreasonable because it was supported only by mere speculation rather than a reasonable suspicion of a parole violation. Ibid. Carving out an exception to its per se bar against application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings, see Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 120, 305 A. 2d 701, 710 (Pa. 1973), the court further ruled that the federal exclusionary rule applied to this case because the officers who conducted the search were aware of respondents parole status, 548 Pa. at 428432, 698 A. 2d, at 3738. The court reasoned that, in the absence of the rule, illegal searches would be undeterred when officers know that the subjects of their searches are parolees and that illegally obtained evidence can be introduced at parole hearings. Ibid.
the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted). Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S., at 907.
Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. Id., at 909; United States v. Janis, supra, at 447. For example, in United States v. Calandra, we held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings; in so doing, we emphasized that such proceedings play a special role in the law enforcement process and that the traditionally flexible, nonadversarial nature of those proceedings would be jeopardized by application of the rule. 414 U.S., at 343346, 349350. Likewise, in United States v. Janis, we held that the exclusionary rule did not bar the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a civil tax proceeding because the costs of excluding relevant and reliable evidence would outweigh the marginal deterrence benefits, which, we noted, would be minimal because the use of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials already deterred illegal searches. 428 U.S., at 448, 454. Finally, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), we refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings, citing the high social costs of allowing an immigrant to remain illegally in this country and noting the incompatibility of the rule with the civil, administrative nature of those proceedings. Id., at 1050.
As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked to extend the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context. We again decline to do so. Application of the exclusionary rule would both hinder the functioning of state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings. The rule would provide only minimal deterrence benefits in this context, because application of the rule in the criminal trial context already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches. We therefore hold that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it imposes significant costs: it undeniably detracts from the truthfinding process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their actions. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 490. Although we have held these costs to be worth bearing in certain circumstances,4 our cases have repeatedly emphasized that the rules costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
The costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence are particularly high in the context of parole revocation proceedings. Parole is a variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972), in which the State accords a limited degree of freedom in return for the parolees assurance that he will comply with the often strict terms and conditions of his release. In most cases, the State is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition it upon compliance with certain requirements. The State thus has an overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with those requirements and is returned to prison if he fails to do so. Id., at 483. The exclusion of evidence establishing a parole violation, however, hampers the States ability to ensure compliance with these conditions by permitting the parolee to avoid the consequences of his noncompliance. The costs of allowing a parolee to avoid the consequences of his violation are compounded by the fact that parolees (particularly those who have already committed parole violations) are more likely to commit future criminal offenses than are average citizens. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987). Indeed, this is the very premise behind the system of close parole supervsion. Ibid.
The exclusionary rule, moreover, is incompatible with the traditionally flexible, administrative procedures of parole revocation. Because parole revocation deprives the parolee not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions, Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 480, States have wide latitude under the Constitution to structure parole revocation proceedings.5 Most States, including Pennsylvania, see Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 548 Pa., at 427428, 698 A. 2d, at 36; Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 501 A. 2d 1110 (Pa. 1985), have adopted informal, administrative parole revocation procedures in order to accommodate the large number of parole proceedings. These proceedings generally are not conducted by judges, but instead by parole boards, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 489. And traditional rules of evidence generally do not apply. Ibid. ([T]he process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.). Nor are these proceedings entirely adversarial, as they are designed to be  predictive and discretionary as well as factfinding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 480).
Application of the exclusionary rule would significantly alter this process. The exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 349 (noting that application of the exclusionary rule would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings because [s]uppression hearings would halt the orderly process of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jurys primary objective); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S., at 1048 (noting that [t]he prospect of even occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate the character of  the deportation system). Such litigation is inconsistent with the nonadversarial, administrative processes established by the States. Although States could adapt their parole revocation proceedings to accommodate such litigation, such a change would transform those proceedings from a predictive and discretionary effort to promote the best interests of both parolees and society into trial-like proceedings less attuned to the interests of the parolee. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 787788 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 480). We are simply unwilling so to intrude into the States correctional schemes. See Morrisey v. Brewer, supra, at 483 (recognizing that States have an overwhelming interest in maintaining informal, administrative parole revocation procedures). Such a transformation ultimately might disadvantage parolees because in an adversarial proceeding, the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 788. And the financial costs of such a system could reduce the States incentive to extend parole in the first place, as one of the purposes of parole is to reduce the costs of criminal punishment while maintaining a degree of supervision over the parolee.
The deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule would not outweigh these costs. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized, application of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings would have little deterrent effect upon an officer who is unaware that the subject of his search is a parolee. 548 Pa., at 431, 698 A. 2d, at 38. In that situation, the officer will likely be searching for evidence of criminal conduct with an eye toward the introduction of the evidence at a criminal trial. The likelihood that illegally obtained evidence will be excluded from trial provides deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations, and the remote possibility that the subject is a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted at a parole revocation proceeding surely has little, if any, effect on the officers incentives. Cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S., at 448.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus fashioned a special rule for those situations in which the officer performing the search knows that the subject of his search is a parolee. We decline to adopt such an approach. We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence. United States v. Calandra, supra, at 350; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Furthermore, such a piecemeal approach to the exclusionary rule would add an additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the officers knowledge of the parolees status.
In any event, any additional deterrence from the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts rule would be minimal. Where the person conducting the search is a police officer, the officers focus is not upon ensuring compliance with parole conditions or obtaining evidence for introduction at administrative proceedings, but upon obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes. The non-criminal parole proceeding falls outside the offending officers zone of primary interest. Janis, supra, at 458. Thus, even when the officer knows that the subject of his search is a parolee, the officer will be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights by the application of the exclusionary rule to criminal trials.
Even when the officer performing the search is a parole officer, the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule remain limited. Parole agents, in contrast to police officers, are not engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S., at 914; instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees should remain free on parole. Thus, their relationship with parolees is more supervisory than adversarial. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987). It is thus unfair to assume that the parole officer bears hostility against the parolee that destroys his neutrality; realistically the failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his supervising officer. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 485486. Although this relationship does not prevent parole officers from ever violating the Fourth Amendment rights of their parolees, it does mean that the harsh deterrent of exclusion is unwarranted, given such other deterrents as departmental training and discipline and the threat of damages actions. Moreover, although in some instances parole officers may act like police officers and seek to uncover evidence of illegal activity, they (like police officers) are undoubtedly aware that any unconstitutionally seized evidence that could lead to an indictment could be suppressed in a criminal trial. In this case, assuming that the search violated respondents Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence could have been inadmissible at trial if respondent had been criminally prosecuted.
We have long been averse to imposing federal requirements upon the parole systems of the States. A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule, which is itself a grudgingly taken medicant, United States v. Janis, supra, at 454, n. 29 (1976), would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
1. The court also held that the Board of Probation and Parole erred by admitting hearsay evidence regarding alcohol consumption and a separate incident of weapons possession.
2. While this case was pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Commonwealth Court filed an en banc opinion in another case that overruled its decision in respondents case and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings. Kyte v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, ___ Pa. ___, ___, n. 8, 680 A. 2d 14, 18, n. 8 (1996).
3. We also invited the parties to brief the question whether a search of a parolees residence must be based on reasonable suspicion where the parolee has consented to searches as a condition of parole. Respondent argues that we lack jurisdiction to decide this question in this case because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, that respondents consent to warrantless searches as a condition of his state parole did not constitute consent to searches that are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner and its amici contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts opinion was at least ambiguous as to whether it relied on state or federal law to determine the extent of respondents consent, and that we therefore have jurisdiction under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). We need not parse the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts decision in an attempt to discern its intent, however, because it is clear that we have jurisdiction to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies to state parole revocation proceedings, and our decision on that issue is sufficient to decide the case. We therefore express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the search.
4. As discussed above, we have generally held the exclusionary rule to apply only in criminal trials. We have, moreover, significantly limited its application even in that context. For example, we have held that the rule does not apply when the officer reasonably relied on a search warrant that was later deemed invalid, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920922 (1984); when the officer reasonably relied on a statute later deemed unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349350 (1987); when the defendant seeks to assert another persons Fourth Amendment rights, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174175 (1969); and when the illegally obtained evidence is used to impeach a defendants testimony, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627628 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
5. We thus have held that a parolee is not entitled to the full panoply of due process rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972), and that the right to counsel generally does not attach to such proceedings because the introduction of counsel would alter significantly the nature of the proceeding, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).

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