On the 5th and 6th of May the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held a full Court hearing in Luxembourg concerning the agreement on the accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to Stian Øby Johansen’s detailed eye-witnessreport, all 28 EU member states and all three EU institutions involved (Commission, Parliament and Council) pleaded to declare the agreement to be in conformity with the EU Treaties. Naturally, the unanimous pro-accession pleadings did not prevent the ECJ from going through a long list of questions. Reading Johansen’s account, the heated discussion about Protocol No 16 to the ECHR catches the eye. Johansen speaks of an “aggressive line of reasoning from the judges“ concerning a potential “forum shopping“ between Luxembourg and Strasbourg which could endanger the autonomy of the EU legal order. Was Daniel Thym right after all contrary to Marten Breuer’s and my opinion?
The ECHR has been amended multiple times in its history. Arguably the most important change came with Protocol No 11 which created the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a standing Court in Strasbourg, to which anyone can apply after exhausting local remedies. The last Protocol to the ECHR that entered into force was Protocol No 14 which paved the way for accession of the EU to the ECHR. Simultaneously with the ensuing accession negotiations, the contracting parties of the ECHR elaborated on Protocols No 15 and 16. The latter shall enable highest national courts and tribunals to ask the ECtHR for advisory opinions. Although modelled after the preliminary reference procedure to the ECJ, the Protocol No 16 advisory opinion is quite distinct from its EU law archetype: it is exclusively open to the highest courts, it is completely voluntary, and the ECtHR’s advisory opinion is not binding. Protocol No 16 will enter into force when ten contracting parties of the ECHR have ratified it (at the moment, ten states have signed the Protocol, including the EU member states Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Whether Protocol No 16 will help to decrease the ECtHR’s workload by diminishing the number of applications or whether the opposite will hold true, is open to debate. In any event, there will be a new option for dialogue between national apex courts and the ECtHR.
Does EU law pose limits to such dialogue? Obviously, there is the preliminary reference procedure which grants the ECJ the last word with regard to the EU legal order. In addition, the ECJ’s case law on the autonomy of the EU legal order could imply that the highest national courts of the EU member states are precluded from asking for advisory opinions in matters of EU law altogether, thus securing the ECJ’s position as the sole interlocutor of national courts in EU law matters.
EU law (Article 267(3) TFEU) prohibits “forum shopping” between Luxembourg and Strasbourg, as it requires national courts of last resort to initiate a preliminary reference procedure to the ECJ if EU law is relevant to deciding the case. Such courts cannot validly discharge that obligation by asking for an advisory opinion of the ECtHR. What if a lower court has already asked for a decision by the ECJ? In this scenario, there is no obligation for the national court of last resort to ask for a preliminary reference decision once again according to the CILFIT-case law. Nevertheless, the ECJ’s judgment on the matter remains binding throughout the entire national procedure up to the court of last resort – at least as long as it has not been overturned by a divergent judgment of the ECJ following a second preliminary reference in the same case. Such new preliminary reference should be admissible if the ECtHR in the meantime has interpreted the corresponding ECHR-right in a different manner. In any event, the national courts of last resort must respect not only their obligations under CILFIT but also under Foto-Frost, to which Tobias Lock was right to point. Hence, should it follow incidentally from an advisory opinion of the ECtHR that an act of EU secondary law is incompatible with the ECHR, the national court of last resort would be obliged to make a preliminary reference on the act’s validity if it shares the ECtHR‘s concerns. Thus the ECJ would have the last word. It would be for Luxembourg to decide either to stick to its previous judgment or to follow Strasbourg.
No advisory opinions of the ECtHR in cases that involve EU law?
On the basis of the rationale underlying the ECJ’s case law on the autonomy of the EU legal order, the highest courts of the EU member states could be precluded altogether from asking for advisory opinions under Protocol No 16, if EU fundamental rights are applicable in the case at hand. Extrapolating from what it held in Opinion 1/91 (EEA agreement) and 1/09 (unified patent litigation system), the ECJ could find that the EU’s judicial system as “a complete system of legal remedies and procedures” does not allow for an intermediate decision (even if not binding) by an external court whose interpretation of international law is relevant for the corresponding EU law. A decision is intermediate in this sense if it precedes the final decision of the national court applying EU law (as the case may be based on a preliminary reference decision by the ECJ). An advisory opinion under Protocol No 16 in a case where EU fundamental rights are applicable would be as such a forbidden intermediate decision. Thus the ECtHR would be limited to an ex post control. The prohibition for highest national courts to ask for advisory opinions under Protocol No 16 resembles Article 344 TFEU which prohibits inter-state applications under Article 33 ECHR by EU member states in matters of EU law. According to the ECJ’s ruling in Moxplant, Article 344 TFEU must be understood as a specific expression of the member states’ general duty of loyalty which now is enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. The ECJ ruled that Ireland had violated this duty by launching dispute-settlement proceedings under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). With a view to advisory opinions under Protocol No 16, the ECJ could come to the same verdict.
Irrespective of the precise limits which EU law poses to the dialogue between highest national courts and the ECtHR, the conformity of the accession agreement with the EU Treaties remains unaffected by that issue. There is an important difference between inter-state applications or advisory opinions under Protocol No 16 on the one hand and individual applications on the other. The individual may bring any case to Strasbourg, including cases that involve EU law, and no one can stop him/her from doing so. For these cases the accession agreement provides for a "co-respondent mechanism" which also ensures that the ECJ gets involved (if it has not had the chance to rule on the matter). In case of inter-state applications or advisory opinions, the EU member states themselves or their highest courts would bring a case that involves EU law to Strasbourg. To prevent such a scenario, it is sufficient to prohibit such course of action under EU law which is binding on the EU member states and on each of their institutions, including courts. This obligation under EU law can be enforced by instruments under EU law, notably infringement procedures. Thus the accession agreement does not need to regulate what is already forbidden under EU law.
The ECJ itself may prevent highest national courts from “forum shopping” by calling for attention to their obligations under EU law. In any event, Protocol No 16 is no suitable scapegoat to stop the EU from acceding to the ECHR, contrary to what some observers suspected, according to Stian Øby Johansen. The ECJ may stress the limits for judicial dialogue between highest national courts and the ECtHR, but Strasbourg must be able to exercise an ex post control as this is the main purpose of the mandatory accession of the EU to the ECHR and has nothing to do with “forum shopping”.
SUGGESTED CITATION Streinz, Thomas: Forum Shopping between Luxembourg and Strasbourg?, VerfBlog, 2014/6/17, https://verfassungsblog.de/forum-shopping-zwischen-luxemburg-und-strassburg/.
Anfang Mai verhandelte der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) auf dem Luxemburger Kirchberg in voller Besetzung über das Abkommen zum Beitritt der Europäischen Union (EU) zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK). Dem lesenswerten Augenzeugenbericht Stian Øby Johansens zufolge plädierten alle 28 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und die drei beteiligten EU-Institutionen Kommission, Parlament und Rat dafür, das Beitrittsabkommen für unionsrechtskonform zu erklären. Die beitrittskritische Rolle fiel so dem Gerichtshof zu, der mit den Verfahrensbeteiligten einen Fragenkatalog abarbeitete. Hierbei sticht vor allem die Diskussion über die Auswirkungen von Protokoll Nr. 16 zur EMRK ins Auge. Stian Øby Johansen berichtet von „aggressiven Fragen der Richter“ hinsichtlich eines möglichen “forum shopping” zwischen Luxemburg und Straßburg, das die Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung gefährden könne. Sollte Daniel Thym entgegen anderen Stimmen doch Recht behalten?
Die EMRK hat im Laufe ihrer Geschichte zahlreiche Ergänzungen erfahren. Die wohl wichtigste Änderung war Protokoll Nr. 11, das den Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) als ständigen Gerichtshof in Straßburg errichtete, an den sich jedermann nach Erschöpfung des nationalen Rechtswegs wenden kann. Zuletzt machte Protokoll Nr. 14 den Weg frei für den Beitritt der EU zur EMRK. Zeitgleich zu den Beitrittsverhandlungen erarbeiteten die EMRK-Vertragsparteien Protokoll Nr. 15 und 16. Letzteres soll nationalen Höchstgerichten die Möglichkeit eröffnen, Gutachtenanfragen an den EGMR zu richten. Obwohl dem Vorabentscheidungsverfahren zum EuGH nachgebildet, unterscheidet sich das Verfahren nach Protokoll Nr. 16 in wesentlichen Punkten: Es steht ausschließlich Höchstgerichten offen, ist stets freiwillig und das Gutachten des EGMR ist nicht bindend. Das Protokoll tritt in Kraft, sobald es zehn EMRK-Vertragsparteien ratifiziert haben (derzeit haben es elf Staaten unterzeichnet, darunter die EU-Mitgliedstaaten Estland, Finnland, Frankreich, Italien, Litauen, Niederlande, Slowakei und Slowenien). Ob das EGMR-Gutachtenverfahren zur Entlastung beiträgt, weil sich Individualbeschwerden erübrigen, oder sich diese Hoffnung in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt, wird die Zukunft zeigen. Jedenfalls eröffnet es eine neue Dialogoption zwischen den nationalen Höchstgerichten und dem EGMR.
Setzt das Unionsrecht diesem Dialog Grenzen? Unstreitig ist der Vorrang des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens, das dem EuGH mit Blick auf die Unionsrechtsordnung das letzte Wort garantiert. Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zur Autonomie des Unionsrechts lässt sich aber auch dahingehend verstehen, dass mitgliedstaatlichen Höchstgerichten Gutachtenanfragen nach Protokoll Nr. 16 in unionsrechtlichen Sachverhalten gänzlich untersagt sind, um sicherzustellen, dass der EuGH der einzige Ansprechpartner für mitgliedstaatliche Gerichte in Unionsrechtsfragen bleibt.
Das Unionsrecht (Art. 267 Abs. 3 AEUV) steht einem „forum shopping“ zwischen Straßburg und Luxemburg entgegen, indem es letztinstanzliche Gerichte zur Einleitung eines Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens zum EuGH zwingt, wenn unionsrechtliche Fragen entscheidungserheblich sind. Dieser Verpflichtung können sich die mitgliedstaatlichen Höchstgerichte nicht durch eine Gutachtenanfrage an den EGMR nach Protokoll Nr. 16 entziehen. Was aber, wenn bereits ein Instanzgericht von seinem Vorlagerecht Gebrauch gemacht hat? Dann entfällt zwar für das nationale Höchstgericht nach der CILFIT-Rechtsprechung die Vorlagepflicht. Aber das Urteil des EuGH entfaltet durch den gesamten nationalen Instanzenzug bis zum Höchstgericht eine „innerprozessuale Bindungswirkung“, die nur durch ein auf eine erneute Vorlage ergangenes abweichendes Urteil des EuGH überwunden werden kann. Eine solche erneute Vorlage im laufenden Instanzenzug dürfte zulässig sein, wenn der EGMR zwischenzeitlich das mit einem EU-Grundrecht korrespondierende EMRK-Grundrecht abweichend vom EuGH ausgelegt hat. Außerdem müssen nationale Gerichte nicht nur CILFIT, sondern auch Foto-Frost beachten, worauf Tobias Lock zu Recht hingewiesen hat: Ergibt sich aus einem EGMR-Gutachten inzident die EMRK-Widrigkeit eines Sekundärrechtsakts, so darf das nationale Höchstgericht diesen nicht schon aus diesem Grund unangewendet lassen. Vielmehr müsste es zwingend eine Gültigkeitsvorlage an den EuGH richten, wenn es die Bedenken des EGMR teilt. Der EuGH hätte folglich in jedem Fall das letzte Wort und müsste selbst entscheiden, ob er sein vorheriges Urteil revidiert und dem EGMR folgt oder nicht.
Verbot von Gutachtenanfragen an den EGMR in unionsrechtlichen Sachverhalten?
Darüber hinaus könnte der EuGH in Fortführung seiner Rechtsprechung zur Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung feststellen, dass mitgliedstaatlichen Höchstgerichten Gutachtenanfragen nach Protokoll Nr. 16 gänzlich untersagt sind, wenn die Auslegung von (mit der EMRK korrespondierenden) EU-Grundrechten für das Ausgangsverfahren entscheidungserheblich ist. Aus den vom EuGH in den Gutachten 1/91 (EWR-Abkommen) und 1/09 (EU-Patentgerichtsbarkeit) entwickelten Maßstäben ließe sich insofern ableiten, dass dem Gerichtssystem der Union als „vollständigem System von Rechtsbehelfen und Verfahren“ jede Zwischenentscheidung (sogar eine nicht bindende) eines externen Gerichts fremd ist, dessen Auslegung des Völkerrechts sich auf (inhaltsgleiches) Unionsrecht auswirkt. Eine solche Zwischenentscheidung läge immer dann vor, wenn sie vor der abschließenden Entscheidung ergeht, in der ein nationales Gericht (ggf. nach Vorlage an den EuGH) das Unionsrecht anwendet. Eine Gutachtenanfrage nach Protokoll Nr. 16 in einem Verfahren, in dem EU-Grundrechte entscheidungserheblich sind, wäre daher eine verbotene Zwischenentscheidung. Die Kontrolle durch den EGMR dürfte nur nachträglich erfolgen, die nationalen Höchstgerichte dürften den EGMR ergo nicht schon zwischenzeitlich mittels einer Gutachtenanfrage einschalten. Ein derartiges Verbot erinnert an die Verpflichtung aus Art. 344 AEUV, demzufolge die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei unionsrechtlichen Streitfragen von der Staatenbeschwerde nach Art. 33 EMRK keinen Gebrauch machen dürfen. In der Lesart des EuGH in der Moxplant-Entscheidung handelt es sich bei Art. 344 AEUV um eine Ausprägung des Grundsatzes der Unionstreue. Der EuGH entschied, dass Irland gegen diesen Grundsatz verstieß, indem es ein Streitschlichtungsverfahren nach dem Seerechtsübereinkommen einleitete. Im Hinblick auf Gutachtenanfragen nach Protokoll Nr. 16 könnte der EuGH zum selben Ergebnis gelangen.
Unabhängig davon, welche Grenzen das Unionsrecht dem Dialog zwischen mitgliedstaatlichen Höchstgerichten und dem EGMR zieht: Die Primärrechtskonformität des Beitrittsabkommens bleibt von der Problematik des Protokolls Nr. 16 unberührt. Denn das Beitrittsabkommen muss nicht völkerrechtlich regeln, was schon unionsrechtlich verboten ist. Die Konstellationen der Staatenbeschwerde oder des EGMR-Gutachtenverfahrens unterscheiden sich insofern grundlegend von derjenigen der Individualbeschwerde, durch die der Einzelne (auch) unionsrechtliche Sachverhalte nach Straßburg bringen kann, ohne dass ihn jemand daran hindern könnte. Für diese Fälle gibt es den Mit-Beschwerdegegnermechanismus („co-respondent mechanism“), der auch sicherstellt, dass der EuGH beteiligt wird (sofern noch nicht geschehen). Im Wege der Staatenbeschwerde oder des EGMR-Gutachtenverfahrens würden dagegen die EU-Mitgliedstaaten selbst bzw. ihre Gerichte unionsrechtliche Sachverhalte nach Straßburg tragen. Um dies zu unterbinden, ist ein unionsrechtliche Verbot vollkommen ausreichend, da die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und jedes ihrer Organe (einschließlich der Gerichte) zur Beachtung des Unionsrechts verpflichtet sind. Diese unionsrechtliche Verpflichtung lässt sich auch mit unionsrechtlichen Mitteln, d.h. dem Vertragsverletzungsverfahren durchsetzen.
Der EuGH kann einem „forum shopping“ selbst Einhalt gebieten, indem er den mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichten ihre unionsrechtlichen Pflichten in Erinnerung ruft. Protokoll Nr. 16 taugt daher auch nicht – wie laut Stian Øby Johansen von einigen Prozessbeobachtern vermutet – als Vorwand, um den Beitritt der EU zur EMRK zu verhindern. Luxemburg mag dem Dialog der mitgliedstaatlichen Höchstgerichte mit Straßburg unionsrechtliche Schranken setzen. Dies ändert aber nichts daran, dass die EuGH-Rechtsprechung jedenfalls nachträglich der externen Kontrolle Straßburgs unterworfen wird, denn das ist gerade Sinn und Zweck des – nach Art. 6 Abs. 2 EUV verpflichtenden – Beitritts der EU zur EMRK und hat mit „forum shopping“ nichts zu tun.
SUGGESTED CITATION Streinz, Thomas: Forum Shopping zwischen Luxemburg und Straßburg?, VerfBlog, 2014/6/17, https://verfassungsblog.de/forum-shopping-zwischen-luxemburg-und-strassburg/.
Sehr spannend! Was das Verbot der Vorlage nach Prot. Nr. 16 wg. Verstoßes gegen den Grundsatz der Autonomie der Unionsrechtsordnung angeht, so habe ich jedoch meine Zweifel, dass sich das überzeugend begründen lässt. Zum einen verpflichtet die Charta selbst ja in Art. 52 III auf eine EMRK-konforme Auslegung und verweist in der Präambel auf den EGMR als Rechtserkenntnisquelle. Insofern kann nicht in Frage stehen, dass der EGMR das letzte Wort hinsichtlich der Auslegung dieses "unionsrechtsidentischen Rechts" hat. Der EuGH hat dies letzlich auch in Roquette Freres lange anerkannt. Zudem ist aber auch zu beachten, dass das Vertragsabschlussverfahren für den Beitritt nach Art.218 VIII a.E. AEUV auch die Zustimmung der Mitgliedstaaten nach ihren verfassungsrechtlichen Vorschriften vorsieht. Auch wenn diese Norm nicht explizit als Vertragsänderungsverfahren bezeichnet wird, so kommt doch nach allgemeinen Grundsätzen primärrechtsähnliche Qualität zu. Im Verbund mit der Beitrittspflicht nach Art. 6 II EUV sollte dies an Argumenten eigentlich genügen, um mit Blick auf die EMRK eine deutlich stärkere Beschneidung der Autonomie des Unionsrechts zu tolerieren als mit Blick auf andere Systeme.


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17.330.020 Joint use of facilities.
17.330.050 Vehicles in residential zones.
17.330.060 Multifamily parking lots and circulation.
17.330.070 Parking requirements of manufactured home parks.
(1) General Parking Requirements. Off-street parking shall be provided in compliance with Table 17.330.010(A).
1 space for each 4 seats or 8 feet of bench length which may potentially be provided in the main room of a church, religious institution, or other auditorium. Such space may not be provided in the required first 10 feet of any yard which abuts a street.
(a) There shall be no off-street parking requirements for any property included within the area identified in Figure 17.330.010(B), Downtown Parking District. This area includes property within the parking lot assessment district, city-owned property, public right-of-way, and private property that has provided land for public parking.
(b) Any use included in the area identified in Figure 17.330.010(C), Exempt Parking Area with Cap, must provide off-street parking for the number of spaces required in Table 17.330.010(A), Off-Street Parking Requirements, in excess of 25 spaces.
[Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.010].
Joint parking and/or loading facilities serving two or more uses, structures, or parcels of land may be approved to satisfy the requirements of both facilities, provided the owners or operators of the uses, structures, or parcels show that their operations and parking needs do not overlap in point of time. If the uses, structures, or parcels are under separate ownership, the right to joint use of the parking space must be evidenced by a deed, lease, contract, or other appropriate written document to establish the joint use. [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.020].
(1) Size of Parking Space. Each off-street parking space shall not be less than nine feet by 18 feet. Up to 25 percent of all required parking spaces can be used for compact vehicles. These compact spaces shall not be less than eight feet by 16 feet. Each space shall be provided with adequate ingress and egress.
(2) Location. Off-street parking facilities shall be located on site to the extent feasible. Off-site parking shall be no further than 300 feet from the site, measured from the nearest point of the parking facility to the nearest point of the nearest building that the facility is required to serve. Off-site parking shall be primarily employee parking.
(3) Materials, Design, and Lighting.
(a) Off-street parking facilities shall be surfaced with a durable and dustless surface, shall be graded and drained so as to dispose of surface water to the satisfaction of the public works department and shall be maintained in good condition, free of weeds, dust, trash, and debris.
(ii) Serve a driveway designed and constructed to facilitate the flow of traffic on and off the site, with due regard to pedestrian and vehicle safety, and shall be clearly and permanently marked and defined. In no case shall two-way and one-way driveways be less than 20 feet and 12 feet, respectively, and arranged so as not to use any part of adjoining public sidewalks, street, or alley rights-of-way, except for ingress and egress.
(c) Delays – Unimproved Rights-of-Way. Off-street parking and loading for residential and nonresidential uses on existing unpaved streets are allowed a delay from the surfacing requirements prior to the issuance of an occupancy permit. However, the property owner must consent and present a recorded deed restriction or covenant which states that remonstrance against any future street improvement project has been waived and that the required paving will be completed within 12 months after the street is improved.
(d) Improvements to the parking facilities of residential uses, such as the addition of a carport or garage, shall require compliance with the surfacing requirements of the driveway and maneuvering areas if the dwelling gains access from an improved street. At a minimum, the paved access must be 20 feet in length measured from the property line in which access is gained.
(e) Lighting used to illuminated off-street parking facilities shall be arranged so as to reflect light away from any adjoining residential area(s).
(4) All uses, except for single-family dwellings and duplexes, required to provide off-street vehicle parking shall provide bicycle parking consistent with the standards in Table 17.330.030.
(a) Bicycle parking space may be located within garage, storage shed, basement, utility room or similar area.
(b) Bicycle Parking Location. Bicycle parking shall be located in lighted, secure locations within 50 feet of the main entrance to a building, but not further from the entrance than the closest general-purpose automobile parking space. Where a building has multiple entrances, required bicycle parking shall be no farther than 50 feet from an entrance. Bicycle parking shall be located and designed so as to not impede or create a hazard to pedestrians (at least 36 inches between bicycles and other obstructions or buildings). [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.030].
(3) A loading berth shall contain space 12 feet wide, 35 feet long, and have a height clearance of 14 feet. Where the vehicles generally used for loading and unloading exceed these dimensions, the required length of these berths shall be increased.
(4) Existing loading space shall not be eliminated, if elimination would result in less space than is required to adequately handle the needs of the particular use.
(5) Off-street parking areas used to fulfill the requirement of this title shall not be used for loading and unloading operations except during periods of the day when not required to take care of parking needs.
(6) Loading docks shall be located on the side or rear of the building. [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.040].
(1) Purpose. Parking lots and outdoor storage of vehicles or recreational vehicles shall not be a primary use for any property located within a single-family residential zone.
(2) Where Applicable. These regulations apply to all residential users in LDR-6 and LDR-8.5 zoning districts unless otherwise expressly indicated.
(3) Off-Street Parking. Each single-family residence, constructed after the date of adoption of the ordinance codified in this title, shall provide for at least two off-street parking spaces. Off-street parking must provide a minimum of 20 feet of lineal parking between the street and the dwelling setback. [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.050].
Except for townhouse structures containing garages, parking lots and garages for developments in MDR zoning districts shall be located in the rear portions of the property, with building construction occurring toward the front, closest to employment centers, shopping centers and transit corridors to minimize walking distance. Parking lots and garages located between buildings and streets are not permitted, except for townhouse structures that contain garages, in which case no more than 40 percent of the front of each townhouse dwelling unit shall be devoted to garage door space.
(1) At least one and one-half parking spaces shall be provided on site for each multiple-family dwelling unit.
(2) A minimum of 10 feet of landscaped buffer area shall separate parking lots from adjoining properties and streets. Driveways to townhouse garages, which provide off-street parking, shall not be considered parking lots.
(3) MDR development projects shall provide access to collector or arterial streets; however, individual dwelling units within an MDR development project shall not have direct access to an arterial or a collector street.
(a) Within an MDR development project, parking lots or driveways to individual dwelling units shall connect directly to a local residential street with direct access to an arterial or collector street.
(b) MDR development projects shall not have direct primary access to existing local residential streets within an MDR zoning district unless the review authority finds, by substantial evidence, that environmental, topographic or other issues relating directly to public safety or welfare require general access to a local, public residential street.
(4) Pedestrian access shall be provided to transit corridors without having to pass through a parking lot whenever possible.
(5) Parking lots associated with conditional or nonconforming uses in these districts are subject to site plan review and approval.
(6) In no event shall on-site parking facilities exceed 50 contiguous spaces per parking cluster. Where more than 50 spaces are required, there shall be a landscaped buffer, not less than 20 feet wide, between parking clusters. Where the applicant desires more than one parking cluster on a lot or contiguous lots, the director, through the site review process, shall require that each cluster be designed to accommodate bicycle parking facilities, and that pedestrian walk lanes are provided and clearly marked.
(7) Through a Type II adjustment request, an applicant may request adjustments to this section if the topography or other environmental constraints associated with the property prevent reasonable compliance with this standard. Where the applicant desires more than one parking cluster on a lot or contiguous lots, the director, through the site review process, shall require that each cluster be designed to accommodate bicycle parking facilities, and that pedestrian walk lanes are provided and clearly marked.
(8) All new townhouse developments shall include four additional off-street parking spaces for every three units. These spaces are to be evenly dispersed throughout the development with no more than four spaces being located in any one specific area. The director is authorized to establish final location of these parking spaces. [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.060].
(1) Off-street parking shall be provided for at least two automobiles per dwelling unit, located on the lot or property which they are intended to serve. Off-street parking shall be provided within a garage or carport.
(2) Visitor Parking. At least one automobile parking space shall be provided for every two manufactured home lots or sites for use by visitors and delivery vehicles. These spaces shall be signed or designated as such. These spaces shall be within 100 feet of the lots to be served. Visitor parking may be provided on streets designed to accommodate parking and two standard lanes of traffic.
(3) All on-site parking shall be designed and constructed in compliance with the parking facility standards of this chapter.
(4) Trucks with a maximum gross vehicle weight more than one and one-half tons, recreational vehicles, boats on boat trailers, and similar equipment shall be parked in one of the two allocated off-street parking spaces if stored on an individual lot or space; provided no more than one passenger vehicle may be parked on a given lot or space. Car-top boats and canoes are exempt from this requirement. [Ord. 503 § 1 (Exh. B), 2018; Ord. 473 § 3 (Exh. A), 2016. Formerly 17.340.070].

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General Order No. 58, of April 23, 1900, amended the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure, and gave the person charged with crime a specified time within which to plead, but even if the trial court misconstrued the provisions of the Order in that respect, such error would not deprive the proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused.
Mere error of law, even though serious, committed by the trial court in a criminal case in the exercise of jurisdiction over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed as a substitute for a writ of error.
The facts, which involve the validity of a conviction and sentence in the Philippine Islands and the extent to which the conviction can be reviewed on habeas corpus, are stated in the opinion.
and the Director of Prisons has appealed. The controversy fairly involves the application of § 5, Organic Act of the Islands (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692, 695), and under § 10 of that statute, we have jurisdiction of the appeal. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174; Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368.
"That said imprisonment and deprivation of his liberty are illegal, because said court of first instance denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights. The said illegalities are as follows: That on December 21, 1910, the petitioner appealed from a judgment of the lower court sentencing him for the crime of theft. That on December 23, the petitioner, without having been asked to answer the complaint, was notified that the case would be heard at 10 A.M. on the 24th. When the case was called at 10 A.M. on December 24th, and while the petitioner was arraigned, he asked for time in which to answer the complaint, which request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record that the petitioner pleaded 'Not guilty' to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was also denied by the same court, to which ruling the petitioner's attorney excepted and asked that the exceptions, together with the requests of the petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record. Wherefore, the petitioner prays the Honorable Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in his favor, reversing the judgment pronounced by the lower court as being contrary to law, and that the petitioner be set at liberty."
facts relates to the question of the alleged permission to take articles, and this, as we have seen, would not have excused the defendant, even had it been proved, though he admits that himself and Frandon are the only witnesses on that point."
"Sec.19. If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the complaint or information. He may, in his answer to the arraignment, demur or plead to the complaint or information. . . ."
"Sec. 30. After his plea, the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial."
"If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appear after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order."
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. . . ."
Kepner v. United States, supra, 195 U. S. 117-118.
occurred after the jurisdiction referred to had attached and after the trial had begun. It rested upon the proposition that, while the trial court had jurisdiction in the first place, it either lost that jurisdiction during the progress of the trial, or so transcended its powers as to render its judgment void."
We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the judgment pronounced by the Court of First Instance was void and without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed, denial of the request for time to answer and to prepare defense was, at most, matter of error which did not vitiate the entire proceedings. The cause -- admitted to be within the jurisdiction of the court -- stood for trial on appeal. The accused had known for weeks the nature of the charge against him. He had notice of the hearing, was present in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other evidence, and seems to have received an impartial hearing. There is nothing to show that he needed further time for any proper purpose, and there is no allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being forced into trial. But for the sections in respect of procedure quoted from General Order No. 58, it could not plausibly be contended that the conviction was without due process of law. The Court of First Instance placed no purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon these sections, and certainly they are not so peculiarly inviolable that a mere misunderstanding of their meaning or harmless departure from their exact terms would suffice to deprive the proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused. Ex Parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 120 U. S. 784; In re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 140 U. S. 585; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 201 U. S. 129; In re Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 203 U. S. 104-105; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309.
over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. That writ cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ of error."
Ex Parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 93 U. S. 21; Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 100 U. S. 375; Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 117 U. S. 250; In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 149 U. S. 75; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 169 U. S. 290; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 171 U. S. 105; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 235 U. S. 229; Frank v. Mangum, supra.
The decree of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, granting the writ of habeas corpus and discharging the prisoner, must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


Consider the tragicomedy of Nikesh Patel, who wound up running a company with the somewhat reassuring name of First Farmers Financial LLC. Things didn't end well for Patel or the farmers. We got about $179 million in bad loans. Patel gets indicted. He pleads guilty. All seems to be following the pathway from charge to plea to sentence to incarceration. Then we run into a variation on the whole remorse and acceptance of guilt thing. Three days before his sentencing in federal court, we find Patel at a Florida airport, attempting to board a flight for Ecuador. Should there be any consequence for his attempted flight? He doesn't think so. The courts didn't agree.
Nikesh Patel, the chairman and CEO of Orlando-based First Farmers Financial LLC, forged signatures and produced false documents to create the appearance that approximately 26 government-backed loans had been issued to borrowers in Florida and Georgia, according to an indictment returned earlier this month in federal court in Chicago. The sham loans purported to contain principal amounts ranging from $2.5 million to $10 million, the indictment states. Patel sold the fraudulent loans to a Milwaukee investment firm for $179 million, according to the indictment.
On December 6, 2017, Patel pled guilty to all five counts. Initially, sentencing was set for April 6, 2017.
Fisher admitted in a plea agreement that he created fictitious financial statements that were sent to the Milwaukee company. After receiving money from the Milwaukee firm, Fisher unlawfully engaged in monetary transactions with a portion of the fraudulently obtained funds, including a wire transfer of $450,000 of scheme proceeds. Fisher caused these proceeds to be transferred from First Farmers' account in Florida to his personal bank account in California. He then transferred these funds to a bank account belonging to a business in Nevada in connection with an investment in that business.
From February 2017 through November 2017, Patel filed several motions to continue his sentencing hearing, all of which the court granted. Most of these requests were made by Patel, and granted by the court, because Patel was purportedly helping the Overall Receiver recover additional funds. Patel represented in his motions that he had various opportunities to earn more money for recovery as a consultant on development projects. For example, on November 28, 2017, Patel filed a motion to continue his sentencing because he had a "unique opportunity to earn an additional $1 million for his victims" by assisting with a redevelopment marketing study. According to the motion, this $1 million was "already sitting in Mr. Patel's attorneys' trust fund account," and the Overall Receiver's counsel supported the request for a continuance "given the opportunity Mr. Patel has to assist his victims" in their recovery. The court granted this request as it did the others and finally set Patel's sentencing date for January 9, 2018.
Three days before that, on January 6, government agents arrested Patel at an airport in Kissimmee, Florida, as he attempted to board a chartered plane to Ecuador. In his possession, Patel had an Indian passport in his name, United States currency, documents relating to his attempt to obtain asylum in Ecuador, financial documents indicating access to accounts holding millions of dollars, and detailed checklists for tasks relating to obtaining asylum in Ecuador and setting up a new life there for himself and his family.
Patel told the agents at the airport he was traveling to Ecuador because he secured political asylum there; he had also applied for asylum in India but chose to seek it in Ecuador instead because of its extradition laws. The documents in his possession indicated Patel had planned his flight for months: he rented a house in Ecuador, opened bank accounts and transferred funds there, obtained a lawyer to help him through the extradition process, and purchased tickets for his wife and family to travel and meet him in the coming days.
The government also discovered that while on bond, instead of earning money to pay back his victims through consulting fees and redevelopment projects, Patel and another associate used fictitious identities and entities to defraud an Iowa lender out of millions of dollars. Approximately $2.2 million of the money Patel had ostensibly earned to pay back the Pennant fraud victims was newly‐stolen money. And after his arrest at the Florida airport, while in custody awaiting transfer to Chicago, Patel continued to direct his associate on how to complete this pending fraud.
three-level reduction for his acceptance of responsibility.
Although Patel had a criminal history Category IV, which fell within 360 months to life imprisonment, the wire fraud counts each had a maximum sentence of 20 years, which reduced the life imprisonment term to 1,200 months.
Following the flight attempt, probation adjusted Patel's offense level to 45 by including a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice and excluding the three‐level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The two‐level enhancement for Patel's leadership role in the offense remained. However, the PSR treated the offense level of 45 as an offense level of 43 for calculating the applicable Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table), app. n.2. Patel remained in criminal history category IV. Based on these calculations, Patel's new Guidelines range was life in prison, which the PSR adjusted to 100 years' imprisonment based on the statutory maximum for wire fraud. The government requested that the district court impose a sentence of 30 years.
[H]e is hatching plans long before February of this year, long before January of this year, to abscond from the jurisdiction and to flee and become a fugitive and to go to, of all places, Ecuador, for political reasons. And what are those reasons? He does not like the United States. Can you imagine that? He is born in this country; educated; in a good family; and, turn around and use his funds, that could be applied to the recovery of people who were victimized by his lies and deceit.
No Excuse -- No Excuse? Ya think??
Patel argued that this three‐to‐one disparity between Patel and Fisher was unjustified, as the two were nearly equally culpable in the First Farmers scheme. Patel further argued that a 30‐year sentence would result in an unwarranted disparity between Patel and other fraudsters involved in schemes much larger than his. Finally, Patel addressed his attempted flight to Ecuador, saying that while it was "uncalled for" and there was "no excuse," it was not a "blank check" to impose an excessive sentence.
Nikesh -- you don't mind if I call you by your first name, do you? Anyways, Nikesh, are you kiddin' me? Seriously? You don't think that the courts are going to take a negative view of your flight by flight to Ecuador? Yeah, sure, you're going to get some credit for grudgingly admitting that your attempted departure was "uncalled for." Good for you! On the other hand, like what -- you think that the court is going to simply make you stay an hour after trial for a week?
But all of the plans were laid. . . . "What explanation can I give Ecuador as to why I want political asylum," there is thought about that, too. And for any citizen to read that, it is a little insulting that the reason is a distaste for the country. I mean, there is a lot of things wrong with America. No two ways about that. And I am not here to wave the flag over the universe we live in here. But it is still a great country. And to turn your back on it for personal selfish reasons, to denigrate it -- you know, the people are in limbo wanting to become citizens. He was born here. His citizenship was a gift of his birth. And he is so quick to throw it out because he is not going to face the piper. He is not going to stand before me and get sentenced, because he is not going to be here.
Having welcomed Patel back to the U.S. court system with open arms, NDIL sentenced him to 20 years on the first wire fraud count and then added consecutively 5 years each on counts two to five. When his sentenced was pronounced, Patel was slammed with 25 years in prison plus three years of supervised release. Patel appealed the NDIL's sentence to 7Cir.
relied on inappropriate considerations at sentencing by focusing on Patel's lack of "patriotism" and by speculating about Patel's psychological state.
7Cir dismissed Patel's "sentencing disparity" arguments by noting, at the outset, that the lower court pointedly found Patel more culpable than the other cited defendants, and, further, that his proposed examples of mitigation were taken into consideration and apparently weighed when the sentencing was calculated.
As to Patel's assertion that NDIL was required to somewhat mechanically list each and every Section 3553(a) sentencing factor in its decision, 7Cir saw no reason for a court to articulate each and every factor provided that the court had reviewed same and demonstrated as much on the record -- moreover, 7Cir noted that Patel had effectively waived this argument at sentencing by not expressing any concern, when asked, about whether "anything" should have been addressed more carefully before the imposition of the sentence, and no objection to the consideration of sentencing disparity was raised.
[T]he district court never uttered the word "patriotism" or indicated that a lack of it on Patel's part served as the basis for his sentence. Instead, in the court's broader discussion of whether Patel had accepted responsibility for his conduct, the court pointed to his flight attempt as proof that he had not done so.
The court's comments about Ecuador being the place that Patel sought to flee to -- that it was "a little insulting that the reason" for seeking asylum in Ecuador was "a distaste for" America -- were admittedly off‐topic, but they do not represent the lengthy diatribe on patriotism that Patel describes. In context, the court's comments reflect its consideration of Patel's lack of remorse rather than its personal offense to Patel's choice of Ecuador as a destination. Far from accepting responsibility for his conduct after pleading guilty, Patel meticulously planned to become a fugitive in Ecuador rather than face the consequences of his conduct in the United States.
As for the court's comments regarding Patel's psychological state and motivations, such as its discussion of Patel refusing "to be called to account," and its reference to Patel as "brazen" in his conduct, these comments relate to various § 3553(a) factors that a court must consider at sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A) (in imposing a sentence, district court shall consider, among other things, "the history and characteristics of the defendant" and the need for the sentence to "promote respect for the law"). Contrary to Patel's representations, there is no indication that the court "did not like" him and sentenced him inappropriately as a result.
[A]lthough the government acknowledged that Patel and Fisher were both heavily involved in the First Farmers scheme, the government charged the two very differently. It charged Fisher with one count of money laundering, subjecting him to a maximum punishment of 10 years' imprisonment; it indicted Patel for five counts of wire fraud, subjecting him to a maximum punishment of 100 years. Patel blindly pleaded to his indictment; Fisher pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Even though these two individuals were both involved in the same scheme, there was not, as the district court explained, any "basis for [the court] to review the discretion of the U.S. Attorney's Office in viewing the two defendants differently. . . based on their view of who is the prime mover in this very substantial fraud and who was a prime mover, but a little less prime." Cf. United States v. Scott, 631 F.3d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 2011) ("In order to ensure that prosecutorial discretion remains intact and firmly within the province of the Executive, judicial review over prosecutorial discretion is limited."); United States v. Duncan, 479 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Absent a showing of invidious discrimination, we shall not second guess a prosecutor's decision regarding the charges it chooses to bring.").
Turning to the merits of the challenge, there is certainly a stark disparity between the sentence of 25 years Patel received and the statutory maximum of 10 years that Fisher faced (a sentence he ultimately received). However, Fisher's much lower sentence "does not negate the reasonableness of the sentence the court imposed on [Patel]." Gill, 889 F.3d at 378 (quoting United States v. Hill, 683 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Duncan, 479 F.3d at 929 ("18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) does not instruct district courts to avoid all differences in sentencing, only unwarranted disparities 'among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.'" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6))). The record reveals several major differences between Patel's and Fisher's conduct that warrants a disparity between their respective sentences. Most notably, as far as the record reflects, Fisher did not engage in an entirely new fraudulent scheme while on bond, attempt to pass off the money received from that fraud as legitimate recovery for Pennant victims, and try to flee the country and seek asylum elsewhere. As Patel noted at sentencing, this conduct is not necessarily a "blank check" to ratchet up Patel's sentence, but it is certainly indicative of differences between his and Fisher's conduct warranting differences in their sentences.
Patel insists, though, that both he and Fisher had the same culpability on the underlying fraud, making this 15‐year disparity inappropriate. But the court adequately explained why despite some "relative parity" between Patel and Fisher, it viewed Patel as more culpable. Pennant dealt almost exclusively with Patel, who told people to "[j]ust deal with me." Patel also completely controlled the bank account to which all the money from Pennant was sent and, as he acknowledges,received a larger share of the stolen funds. Patel alone created the fake USDA loan packages to send to Pennant and forged signatures of USDA employees on them. These differences in Patel's and Fisher's offense conduct, along with the vast difference between their post‐offense behavior, warrants a disparity in their sentences. The district court did not err by taking such differences into account. See Solomon, 892 F.3d at 278.


text:
This is the history of an American branch of the Seidenstricker family that can be traced back 300 years to Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, West Germany. The American progenitor, Johann Sebastian Seidenstricker migrated from Bad Dürkheim to Pennsylvania and settled in Rapho Township of Lancaster County before 1757. Two of his brothers and a sister migrated to Pennsylvania in 1764.
An unrelated family with a similar but slightly different name, Seidensticker, also settled in Lancaster County in the latter half of the 18th century. That family can be traced back to Siegen, Westfalen, West Germany.
It is easy to confuse the members of these two families because the early records do not always make the spelling distinction between Seidenstricker and Seidensticker. The Seidenstrickers were apparently members of the Lutheran church while the Seidenstickers were members of the German Reformed church but they both crossed denominational lines at times for such sacraments as baptism and marriage though not for communion and confirmation.
A number of people are participating in the research of the Seidenstricker family. They include Jack Silknetter of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania who has written a research report about the descendants of Sebastian Seidenstricker.
Doneva Shepard of Portland, Oregon is searching for the ancestors of her great-great grandfather Solomon Silknitter who was born in Pennsylvania in 1815, lived for a time in Montgomery County, Ohio, had children in Indiana and died in Appanoose County, Iowa in 1855.
Bill Diederich of Incline Village, Nevada, has been working on the Seidensticker and Seidenstricker family histories for more than 35 years and admits that it is difficult to figure out who belongs to whom.
1. PHILIPP CASIMIR1 SEIDENSTRICKER was born Abt. 1685 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died in or probably near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany. He married ANNA MARIA ELISABETHA KLAMMEN 10 May 1707 in , probably, Bad Durkheim.
i. ANNA ROSINA2 SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 28 September 1708, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; m. JOHANN GEORG SCHOENN, 12 February 1741/42, at, probably, Bad Durkheim.
ii. JOHANN PHILIPP SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 14 July 1711, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Aft. 26 April 1775, Caernarvon Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania; m. ANNA CATHARINA RATTMANNS, 14 November 1747, , probably, Bad Durkheim.
Johann Philipp Seidenstricker was born 14 July 1711 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Philipp Casimir Seidenstricker and his wife Maria Elizabeth. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488270.
Johann Philipp Seidenstricker and Anna Catharina Rattmanns were married 14 November 1747 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany. Their marriage is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
On 26 September 1764, two brothers, Johann Philip and Otto Philipp Seidenstricker took the required oaths at the court house at Philadelphia and signed their names. A third Seidenstricker signed with his mark after the clerk wrote his name down as Henry Seidenstreicher. They had arrived shortly before on the ship Brittania which had sailed from Rotterdam. Although the records show that 250 whole freights (an adult, male or female, was counted as a whole freight; a child as a half freight) were aboard the Brittania, only 112 adult foreign males were recorded by name.
The Foreigners whose names are underwritten, imported [in] the Ship Brittania, Capt. Thomas Arnot, from Rotterdam, did this day take and subscribe the usual Qualifications. 112 persons in the List. 250 whole Freights. (Benjamin & Samuel Shoemaker).
In 1766, [Johann] Philip Sitenstriker, shoemaker, of Coventry Township, Chester County was recorded on the list of taxables for the 18th pence rate as owning a cow. The tax was also levied on land, horses, sheep and servants but he did not own any of these. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 11, p 176.
In 1767, Philip Sidenstricker of Coventry Township, Chester County, was assessed for a cow on the list of taxables for the 18th pence rate. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 11, p 322.
In 1768, Phip Sidestriker of Coventry Township, Chester County, was recorded on the list of taxables for the 18th pence rate as an inmate. An "inmate" was a tenant who did not own the land he lived on. See PA:3:11:444.
In 1769, Phillip Sidenstriker of Coventry Township, Chester County, was assessed for a cow on the list of taxables for the 18th pence rate. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 11, p 635.
I have not located the 1770 tax lists of Chester County. They were not published in Pennsylvania Archives.
In 1771, Philip Sithenstricker of Coventry Township, Chester County, was recorded as an inmate on the list of taxables for the 18th pence rate. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 11, p 754.
I have not located the 1772 tax lists of Chester County. They were not published in Pennsylvania Archives.
In 1773, Philip Siderstricker, cordw[ainer] was listed in the tax records of Caernarvon Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania with 60 acres in 1773. A cordwainer is a shoemaker. This is the same Philip Sithenstricker whose name appeared on the tax rolls of Coventry Township, Chester County, for 1771 and earlier years. Thus he apparently moved to Berks County about 1772 or 1773.
Philip Sidenstricker was taxed £3 in 1774, according to the tax assessments of Caernarvon Township, Berks County. The tax records for 1775 - 1779 are missing.
John Philip Seydenstricker of Caernarvon Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania signed his will 26 April 1775. He bequeathed his wife Catharine a cow, and Advance, our Bed, her Cloaths and the linnen and one-third of the Residue. "But the other two Parts shall come to my three blood Relations, namely, Sebastian Seidenstricker, Otto Philip Seidenstricker, My Brothers, and my Sister Maria Magdalena Millerin. My nephew God-Son Philip Seidenstricker the younger shall have my gun and Advance." See Berks County Will Book, v 2, p 213.
Note: this is the shoemaker. We have not found the tax records for Caernarvon Township, Berks County for 1775-1779. His name is not on the tax rolls for 1780 and subsequent years. The "God-Son Philip Seidenstricker the younger" referred to in this will was probably the son of Otto Philip Seidenstricker rather than the son of Sebastian Seidenstricker.
Johann Philip Seidenstricker apparently did not have any surviving children nor have we found any records indicating that he ever did have children.
iii. MARIA MAGDALENA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 06 July 1714, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Bef. 1720, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany.
Maria Magdalena Seidenstricker was born 6 July 1714 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the daughter of Philipp Casimir Seidenstricker and his wife Maria Elizabetha. Her birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488270.
2. iv. JOHANN SEBASTIAN SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 22 July 1717, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Aft. 1775, , probably, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
3. v. MARIA MAGDALENA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 25 October 1720, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. probably, Pennsylvania.
vi. JOHANN JACOB SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 06 April 1724, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany.
Johann Jacob Seidenstricker was born 6 April 1724 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Casimir Seidenstrickern and his wife Maria Elizabetha. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
4. vii. OTTO PHILIPP SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Bef. 1730, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Abt. September 1793, East Hanover Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
2. JOHANN SEBASTIAN2 SEIDENSTRICKER (PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 22 July 1717 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died Aft. 1775 in , probably, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He married (1) ANNA MARGARETHA _____?_____ 11 October 1740 in at, probably, Bad Durkheim. He married (2) ANNA BARBARA ____?____ Aft. 1756.
Johann Sebastian Seidenstricker was born 22 July 1717 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Philipp Casimir Seidenstricker and his wife Anna Maria. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
In 1757, Bastian Saydensteiger of Rapho Township, Lancaster County was assessed a province tax of £0.2.6 and a county tax of £0.1.0.
There is no record of Sebastian Seidenstrickers immigration into Pennsylvania. He probably arrived on a ship for which no passenger list survives, or he may have come to Pennsylvania through a port other than Philadelphia. I assume he is the same Johann Sebastian Seidenstricker who was born 22 July 1717 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Philipp Casimir Seidenstricker and his wife Anna Maria. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
I also assume that he is the same Johann Sebastian Seidenstrickern whose son Georg Michael Seidenstrickern was born 21 April 1754 at Bad Dürkheim, the son of Johann Sebastian Seidenstrickern and his wife Anna Margretha. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488272.
The original tax records of Rapho township are held by Lancaster County Historical Society at Lancaster. Relatively few of the early tax records are still in existence. While the tax records for the years 1752 through 1755 are missing, the records for 1751 and 1756 are still in existence but Sebastian Seidenstrickers name does not appear in them.
In 1758, Sebastian Seidenstricker is not listed in Rapho Township tax records. No other Seidenstricker records for that year have been found.
In 1759, the tax records of Rapho Township list Bastian Saydensticker with 15 acres of land, of which eight acres were clear, and one cow. Assuming he owned this land, the deed was never recorded since Lancaster County land records do not indicate that he ever bought or sold this land. The Rapho Township tax records for the period from 1760 through 1768 are missing.
In 1769, Bastian Seidenstiger of Rapho Township, Lancaster County was assessed 0.2.6 pounds for the Kings tax.
Bastian Sydensteigert of Rapho Township, Lancaster County was assessed 0.2.6 pounds for the Kings tax and 0.1.0 for the county levies.
The 1771 tax records of Rapho Township, Lancaster County, list Sebastian Seydenstricker with 15 acres of land, of which 10 acres were cultivated, and a horse.
Also, in 1771, The list of taxables for the 14th 18 penny tax of Lancaster County includes Bastian Sydenstegart of Rapho Township who was assessed £0.2.6 on 15 acres and a cow. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 17, p 133.
In 1772, Sebastian Seydenstricker of Rapho Township, Lancaster County, was assessed £0.2.6 for the Kings tax and £0.1.0 for the county levies.
Also, in 1772, the list of taxables for the 15th 18 penny tax of Lancaster County includes Sebastian Seydenstick of Rapho Township who was assessed £0.2.6 on 15 acres and a cow. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 17, p 261.
In 1773, the list of taxables for the 16th 18 penny tax of Lancaster County includes Sebastian Seydensticker of Rapho Township who was assessed £0.2.6 on 15 acres and a cow. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 17, p 439.
We have searched the cemetery and burial records of Zion Evangelical Lutheran church at Manheim, Pennsylvania and have not found any records of Seidenstricker burials.
Sebastian Seidenstricker and Margaretha _____?_____ were married 11 October 1740 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany. Their marriage is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
5. i. JOHANN HEINRICH3 SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 16 August 1741, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. 15 July 1826, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
ii. JOHANN LORENTZ SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 24 March 1742/43.
Johann Lorentz Seidenstricker was born 24 March 1743 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Sebastian Seidenstricker. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271. The mother's name is not given.
iii. ESTER JOHANNA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 24 February 1744/45.
6. iv. JOHANN JACOB SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 12 July 1747, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Abt. 1824, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
v. JOHANN NICOL SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 06 August 1749.
vi. ANNA MARIA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 12 November 1751.
7. vii. GEORGE MICHAEL SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 21 April 1754, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Abt. 1816, Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania.
8. viii. JOHANN PHILIP SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 12 November 1756, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. Abt. August 1833, Falling Spring, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
ix. HANNAH CATHARINA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 13 January 1760.
x. JOHANN NICOL SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 13 January 1760.
xi. GEORGE FRIEDRICH SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 26 May 1762.
xii. ??ELIZABETH SEIDENSTRICKER, m. ??PHILIP MILLER.
Elizabeth, spouse of Philip Miller, might be daughter of Johann Henrich, son of Sebastian. We don't know where she fits in.
3. MARIA MAGDALENA2 SEIDENSTRICKER (PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 25 October 1720 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died in probably, Pennsylvania. She married ______?_______ MILLER.
Maria Magdalena Seidenstricker was born 25 October 1720 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the daughter of Philipp Casimir Seidenstricker and his wife Maria Elizabetha. Her birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271. This record indicates that the Maria Magdalena Seidenstricker who was born 6 July 1714 had died.
4. OTTO PHILIPP2 SEIDENSTRICKER (PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Bef. 1730 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died Abt. September 1793 in East Hanover Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. He married ANNA CHRISTINA STUETTGENS 19 January 1749/50 in at, probably, Bad Durkheim.
All of the births cited above are recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
In 1771, The list of taxables for the 14th 18 penny tax of Lancaster County includes Philip Sidenstrick of Lebanon Township who was assessed £0.2.6 on a horse and a cow. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 17, p. 142.
In 1773, the list of taxables for the 16th 18 penny tax of Lancaster County includes Philip Leydestricker of Lebanon Township who was assessed £0.2.0 as an inmate. See Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd series, v 17, p 422.
". William Hendel acknowledged full payment of the debt and released the mortgage on 12 May 1797. See Lancaster County deed book T, pp 2-3, recorded 23 May 1775.
i. MARIA MAGDALENA3 SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 05 February 1750/51, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. , probably, Pennsylvania; m. HENRY UMHOLZ.
Maria Magdalena Seidenstrickern was born 5 February 1751 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the daughter of Otto Philipp Seidenstrickern and Anna Christina. Her birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488272.
ii. JOHANN PETER SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 26 April 1754, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany.
Johann Peter Seidenstrickern was born 26 April 1754 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Otto Philipp Seidenstrickern and his wife Anna Christina. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488272.
9. iii. ANNA MARIA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 30 March 1759, or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany; d. 30 April 1831, Swatara Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania.
10. iv. PHILIP SEIDENSTRICKER, d. Abt. March 1809, Bethel, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
11. v. CATHERINE SEIDENSTRICKER, d. , probably, Pennsylvania.
5. JOHANN HEINRICH3 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 16 August 1741 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died 15 July 1826 in Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He married BARBARA OR MARGARETTA BARBARA.
Johann Heinrich Seidenstricker was born 16 August 1741 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Sebastian Seidenstrickern and his wife Anna Margaretha. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488271.
On 29 August 1776, Private Henry Siltneider, Private Michael Siltneider and Private Philip Sidertrecker appear on a list of those serving in Captain Henry Weavers Company, Lancaster County Militia. Henry Weaver owned 100 acres of land in Caernarvon Township. Source: Pennsylvania Archives: 5: 7: 810.
12. i. ROSINA4 SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1761; d. , probably, Pennsylvania.
13. ii. HESTER SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1770; d. Abt. 1837, Perry County, Pennsylvania..
14. iii. ??MAGDALENA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1771; d. , probably, Pennsylvania.
iv. ??DOROTHEA SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1772; m. SEBASTIAN HOFFMAN, 21 October 1792, Trinity Lutheran church at Lancaster, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania..
15. v. MARY M. SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1773; d. 22 December 1816, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania..
16. vi. MICHAEL SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1775; d. 22 October 1826, Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
17. vii. HENRY SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1780.
viii. ??ELIZABETH SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 09 January 1785, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; m. ?? PHILIP MILLER.
?? Is this the Elisabeth Seidenstricker whose birth and baptism are recorded in the baptism records of Trinity Lutheran church at Lancaster, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. According to this record, she was born 9 January 1785 and baptised 25 June 1785.
6. JOHANN JACOB3 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 12 July 1747 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died Abt. 1824 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia). He married ANNA MARGARETTA ____?____.
i. DOLLY4 SILKNITTER, m. JOHN PETERS, Abt. March 1798, Augusta County, Virginia.
ii. GEORGE SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1777; d. Abt. 1845, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia); m. RACHEL HITRICK, 24 September 1807, Augusta County, Virginia.
18. iii. JACOB SILKNITTER, b. 13 January 1780, Robeson Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania; d. 15 February 1856, Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
19. iv. JOHN SEBASTIAN SILKNITTER, b. Abt. May 1782, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. Abt. May 1859, Cheshire Township, Gallia County, Ohio.
7. GEORGE MICHAEL3 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 21 April 1754 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died Abt. 1816 in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. He married BARBARA ____?____.
Georg Michael Seidenstrickern was born 21 April 1754 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the son of Johann Sebastian Seidenstrickern and his wife Anna Margretha. His birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488272.
i. PHILIP4 SILKNITTER, d. Barree Township, Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania; m. MARY ANN DOWLER, 20 April 1815, Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania.
ii. JOHN SILKNITTER, b. 07 December 1790.
iii. CATHARINE SILKNITTER, b. 23 June 1791.
iv. MARGARETTA BARBARA SILKNITTER, b. 02 January 1793.
v. ELIZABETH SILKNITTER, b. 10 August 1794.
vi. MARIA BARBARA SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1795.
vii. MICHAEL SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1803; m. ANN.
8. JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 12 November 1756 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died Abt. August 1833 in Falling Spring, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia). He married ELIZABETH _____?_____.
20. i. HENRY4 SYDENSTRICKER, b. 17 February 1785, Pennsylvania; d. 05 June 1872, Anthony's Creek District, Greenbrier County, West Virginia.
21. ii. DAVID SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1788; d. Bef. 1850.
22. iii. NANCY SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1790.
iv. PHILIP SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1793; d. Saline, Missouri; m. CATHERINE KELLY, 30 November 1815, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
23. v. ELIZABETH SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1795; d. Abt. 1839, Anthony's Creek District, Greenbrier County, West Virginia.
24. vi. JOHN SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1796; d. 03 October 1871, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
25. vii. JACOB SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1803, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).; d. 06 March 1862, Lewisburg, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia)..
9. ANNA MARIA3 SEIDENSTRICKER (OTTO PHILIPP2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 30 March 1759 in or near Bad Durkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, and died 30 April 1831 in Swatara Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania.
Anna Maria Seidenstricker was baptized 30 March 1759 at Bad Dürkheim, Pfalz, Bayern, now West Germany, the daughter of Otto Philipp Seidenstricker and his wife Anna Christina. Her birth is recorded in the records of the Evangelisch-Lutherische church at Bad Dürkheim. See LDS microfilm #488272.
10. PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER (OTTO PHILIPP2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) died Abt. March 1809 in Bethel, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. He married NO.
11. CATHERINE3 SEIDENSTRICKER (OTTO PHILIPP2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) died in , probably, Pennsylvania. She married CHRISTIAN HERMAN.
12. ROSINA4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1761, and died in , probably, Pennsylvania. She married MICHAEL GICK.
13. HESTER4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1770, and died Abt. 1837 in Perry County, Pennsylvania.. She married JAMES STEWART Abt. 1792.
Said to have had 10 children.
i. CATHARINE ANN5 STEWART, b. 05 May 1810; d. 17 April 1882; m. SOLOMAN KERCHNER.
14. ??MAGDALENA4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1771, and died in , probably, Pennsylvania. She married JOHN QUIGLEY.
15. MARY M.4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1773, and died 22 December 1816 in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.. She married JAMES STEWART (OR STEWARD).
Another record says she died 16 December 1816.
She is buried in Dauphin cemetery at Dauphin, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
16. MICHAEL4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1775, and died 22 October 1826 in Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He married (1) BARBARA ____?____. He married (2) CATHARINE SINK?? OR STUART?? 16 August 1796 in Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
In some records, he is referred to as Michael Silknitter.
In the 1800 census, he is listed with one male and three females.
In the 1810 census, he is listed with one male in his household.
He was buried in ________ cemetery on 23 October 1826. Source: Bangor church records.
17. HENRY4 SEIDENSTRICKER (JOHANN HEINRICH3, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1780. He married (1) ELIZABETH ZIEGLER 23 October 1803 in at Trinity Lutheran church at Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania. He married (2) CATHARINE _____?_____ LAPP Aft. 1814.
Was Catharine R. Stahl a spouse? I have a record that she married a Henry Silknitter in 1805.
Was Catherine Sink a spouse? I have a record that she married a Henry Silknitter in 1805.
i. MARIA5 SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 18 July 1809.
ii. JOHANNES SEIDENSTRICKER, b. 19 June 1814.
iii. UNKNOWN FEMALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Bef. 1810.
iv. UNKNOWN FEMALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Bef. 1810.
v. ??SOLOMON?? SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1816.
vi. UNKNOWN MALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Aft. 1810.
vii. UNKNOWN FEMALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Aft. 1810.
viii. UNKNOWN FEMALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Aft. 1810.
ix. UNKNOWN FEMALE SEIDENSTRICKER, b. Aft. 1810.
18. JACOB4 SILKNITTER (JOHANN JACOB3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 13 January 1780 in Robeson Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania, and died 15 February 1856 in Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He married HANNAH _____?_____ 02 January 1815 in Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
i. ELIZABETH5 SILKNITTER, b. 17 June 1817, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 17 January 1897, Caln Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania and is buried in the Upper Octorara cemetery at Sadsbury Township, Chester County.; m. CLIFFORD YOST, Abt. 1836, probably, at Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
ii. ANN SILKNITTER, b. 01 February 1819, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 28 November 1869, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania and is buried in the cemetery of Caernarvon Presbyterian Church at Churchtown, Caernarvon Township..
Ann died aged 50 years, 9 months and 27 days. She is buried next to her parents, Jacob and Hannah Silknitter, and her tombstone says daughter of Jacob and Hannah.
iii. JOHN SILKNITTER, b. 07 May 1820, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 26 December 1902, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; m. CATHARINE.
John died aged 82 years, 7 months and 19 days.
Catharine died aged 81 years, 10 months and 20 days.
iv. JACOB SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1824, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 23 February 1891, ___________ and is buried in the cemetery of Caernarvon Presbyterian Church at Churchtown, Caernarvon Township, Pennsylvania.; m. ELIZABETH RISSEL, 28 May 1846, Pennsylvania.
Jacob was a laborer and had no real estate in 1850. (1850 census, vol 35, p 398).
Elizabeth died aged 55 years and 19 days.
v. SUSAN SILKNITTER, b. 06 February 1828, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 31 March 1912, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania and is buried in the cemetery of Caernarvon Presbyterian Church at Churchtown, Caernarvon Township..
vi. GEORGE W. SILKNITTER, b. 05 October 1830, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. 13 October 1914, probably, Salisbury Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania and is buried in the cemetery of Mount Zion Evangelical United Brethren Church near Cambridge, Salisbury Township.; m. HELEN HOWE.
George W. Silknitter died aged 40 years, 11 months and 23 days.
vii. UNKNOWN SILKNITTER, b. probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
This unknown male child was enumerated in the 1840 census but his name does not appear in the 1850 census.
viii. CLARA SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1837, probably, Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; d. Aft. 1869.
Clara was still living 28 November 1869 when her sister Ann died for she was one of the heirs under her will.
19. JOHN SEBASTIAN4 SILKNITTER (JOHANN JACOB3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. May 1782 in Caernarvon Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and died Abt. May 1859 in Cheshire Township, Gallia County, Ohio. He married JULIA _____?_____.
He was baptized 6 July 1782 at St. Peter's Lutheran church, Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. His sponsors were Henry and Barbara Seidenstricker.
ii. DAVID SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1804.
v. GEORGE W. SILKNITTER, b. Abt. 1816.
20. HENRY4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born 17 February 1785 in Pennsylvania, and died 05 June 1872 in Anthony's Creek District, Greenbrier County, West Virginia. He married ELIZABETH FLESHMAN 21 December 1808 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia), daughter of SAMUEL FLESHMAN and CATY.
i. MICHAEL5 SYDENSTRICKER, b. 16 October 1809; d. 1869; m. HANNAH.
ii. SAMUEL SYDENSTRICKER, b. 11 December 1810; m. SARAH.
iii. LEWIS SYDENSTRICKER, b. 30 May 1812; d. Irish Corners, Greenbriar County, West Virginia; m. ELIZABETH HANNAH ERWIN.
iv. HENRY SYDENSTRICKER, JR., b. 18 January 1814; d. Alvon, Greenbriar County, West Virginia; m. CATHARINE.
v. CATHARINE SYDENSTRICKER, b. 03 January 1816.
vi. JAMES SYDENSTRICKER, b. 27 January 1818; d. 1862, Mercer County, West Virginia; m. ANN.
James' spouse was, possibly, Ann _______, or Rachel Folden.
vii. JOHN SYDENSTRICKER, b. 17 January 1821; d. 15 August 1837.
21. DAVID4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1788, and died Bef. 1850. He married ELIZABETH ARGABRIGHT 16 June 1812 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia), daughter of JACOB ARGABRIGHT and MARY SHATEL.
David was called for service in 1812 but did not serve.
Elizabeth was the eldest daughter of Jacob and Mary (Shatel) Argabright.
i. ANDREW5 SYDENSTRICKER, b. 09 March 1813, Greenbrier County, West Virginia; d. 1892; m. FRANCES COFFMAN, 1834.
22. NANCY4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1790. She married MACK BRUFFY 18 December 1828 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
23. ELIZABETH4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1795, and died Abt. 1839 in Anthony's Creek District, Greenbrier County, West Virginia. She married MICHAEL FLESHMAN 11 June 1811 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
Elizabeth died 1839 aged about 44 years.
Michael Fleshman came to Greenbrier County, West Virginia in 1798 at age 12. He was among the early and prominent settlers in Anthony's Creek District.
Michael died aged 97 years.
i. ANDREW5 FLESHMAN, d. 1862; m. ELIZABETH LIPPS, Anthony's Creek District, Greenbriar County, West Virginia.
ii. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN FLESHMAN, b. 18 March 1829, near Lewisburg, Greenbriar County, West Virginia; m. (1) EVALINE J. HULL; m. (2) ADDIE E. CLEEK, 25 September 1872, Knapp's Creek, Pocahantas County, West Virginia.
Benjamin resided at Alvon, Greenbrier County, West Virginia. He was an elder in the Presbyterian Church.
He was a soldier in the Confederate Army - Company B, Edgars Battalion.
24. JOHN4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1796, and died 03 October 1871 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia). He married (1) MARY COFFMAN (WIDOW) in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia). He married (2) ISABELLA SCOTT 19 August 1826 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).
Military service: John served as Major - training master for soldiers of the Mexican War.
25. JACOB4 SYDENSTRICKER (JOHANN PHILIP3 SEIDENSTRICKER, JOHANN SEBASTIAN2, PHILIPP CASIMIR1) was born Abt. 1803 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia)., and died 06 March 1862 in Lewisburg, Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia).. He married MARY (POLLY) CURRY 19 March 1831 in Greenbrier County, Virginia (now West Virginia), daughter of ALEXANDER CURRY and HANNAH.
i. JEHU5 SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1837; d. Memphis, Tennessee.
ii. JOHN H. SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1839.
iii. ABNER SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1841.
iv. ADALINE SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1843.
vii. PHILANDER SYDENSTRICKER, b. Abt. 1849; d. Ohio.
viii. OLIVER P. SYDENSTRICKER, d. Lewisburg, Greenbrier County, West Virginia.
Please note that the conclusions presented above do not agree in all respects with those in Jack Silknetter's report. This is due to honest differences of opinion concerning the evidence contained in the scanty records of events which occurred 150 to 250 years ago.

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The tracking measures listed below and used by us are carried out on the basis of Art. 6 (1) S.1 lit. f GDPR. With the tracking measures used, we want to ensure that our websites are designed to meet requirements and are continually optimized. On the other hand, we use the tracking measures in order to statistically record the use of our websites and to evaluate them for the purpose of optimizing our services for you. These interests are to be regarded as legitimate within the meaning of the aforementioned provision.
The respective data processing purposes and data categories can be taken from the corresponding tracking tool.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service of Google Inc. ("Google"). Google Analytics uses "cookies", which are text files placed on your computer to help the website analyze how users use the site. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is usually transferred to a Google server in the USA and stored there. However, if IP anonymization is activated on this website, Google will reduce your IP address within Member States of the European Union or in other countries party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area beforehand.
Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the US and shortened there. On behalf of the operator of this website, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports on website activity and to provide the website operator with other services related to website and internet use. The IP address transmitted by your browser as part of Google Analytics will not be combined with other data from Google.
Our sites use Google retargeting technologies. The provider is the Google Inc. 1600 Amphitheater Parkway Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.
This enables visitors to our websites to be targeted with personalized, interest-related advertising. Advertising is displayed using a cookie-based analysis of previous usage and surfing behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no personal data will be stored. For this purpose, a cookie is stored in order to collect anonymous data about the interests of the users and thus adapt advertising individually to this information. These cookies are small text files stored on your computer or mobile device.
This website uses the online advertising program "Google AdWords" and conversion tracking as part of this. The conversion tracking cookie is set when a user clicks on an ad served by Google. These cookies expire after 30 days and are not used for personal identification. If the user visits certain pages of this website and the cookie has not yet expired, we and Google can see that the user has clicked on the ad and has been redirected to this page. Each Google AdWords customer receives a different cookie. Cookies cannot therefore be traced through AdWords advertisers' websites.
The information gathered using the conversion cookie is used to generate conversion statistics for AdWords customers who have opted for conversion tracking. Customers see the total number of users who clicked on their ad and were redirected to a page with a conversion tracking tag. However, you will not receive any information that personally identifies users. Users who do not wish to participate in tracking can easily disable the Google Conversion Tracking cookie via their Internet browser under User Preferences. These users are not included in the conversion tracking statistics.
When you visit a page of our website that contains such a plugin, your browser connects directly to Instagram's servers. Instagram transmits the content of the plugin directly to your browser and integrates it into the page. Through this integration, Instagram receives the information that your browser has accessed the corresponding page of our website, even if you do not have an Instagram profile or are currently not logged in to Instagram. This information (including your IP address) is sent from your browser directly to an Instagram server in the US and stored there.
If you're logged in to Instagram, Instagram can instantly associate your visit to our website with your Instagram account. If you interact with the plugins, for example, pressing the "Insta-gram" button, this information is also transmitted directly to an Instagram server and stored there. The information will also be posted on your Instagram account and displayed there to your contacts.
If you do not want Instagram to directly associate the data collected via our website with your Instagram account, you must log out of Instagram before visiting our website. You can completely prevent the loading of Instagram plugins even with add-ons for your browser, eg. With the script blocker "NoScript" (http://noscript.net/).
to complain to a supervisory authority pursuant to Art. 77 GDPR. As a rule, you can contact the supervisory authority of your usual place of residence or place of work or our company headquarters.
If your personal data are processed on the basis of legitimate interests in accordance with Art. 6 Sec.1 S.1 lit. f GDPR, you have the right to object to the processing of your personal data in accordance with Art. 21 GDPR, provided that there are reasons for this arising from your particular situation or the objection is directed against direct advertising. In the latter case, they have a general right of objection, which we implement without providing details of a specific situation.
If you would like to exercise your right of revocation or objection, simply send an e-mail to the data protection officer dsb@internationale-ba.com.
We use the popular SSL procedure in conjunction with the highest encryption level supported by your browser for your website visits. In general, this is a 256 bit encryption. If your browser does not support them, we will use 128 bit V3 technology instead. Whether a single page of our website is encrypted is indicated by the closed display of the key or lock symbol in the status bar of your browser.
We also use appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect your data against accidental or intentional manipulation, partial or complete loss, destruction or unauthorized access by third parties. Our security measures are continuously improved in line with technological developments.
Due to the further development of our websites and offers above or due to changed legal or official requirements, it may become necessary to adapt this data protection declaration. The current data protection declaration can be downloaded at any time from our website https://www.ibadual.com/Datenschutz.

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