D.C. Law Library - § 1–206.03. Budget process; limitations on borrowing and spending.
↪ Subchapter VI. Reservation of Congressional Authority.
↪ § 1–206.03. Budget process; limitations on borrowing and spending.
§ 1–206.02. Limitations on the Council.
§ 1–206.04. Congressional action on certain District matters.
§ 1–206.03. Budget process; limitations on borrowing and spending.
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as making any change in existing law, regulation, or basic procedure and practice relating to the respective roles of the Congress, the President, the federal Office of Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General of the United States in the preparation, review, submission, examination, authorization, and appropriation of the total budget of the District of Columbia government.
(b)(1) No general obligation bonds (other than bonds to refund outstanding indebtedness) or Treasury capital project loans shall be issued during any fiscal year in an amount which would cause the amount of principal and interest required to be paid both serially and into a sinking fund in any fiscal year on the aggregate amounts of all outstanding general obligation bonds and such Treasury loans, to exceed 17% of the District revenues (less any fees or revenues directed to servicing revenue bonds, any revenues, charges, or fees dedicated for the purposes of water and sewer facilities described in § 1-204.90(a) (including fees or revenues directed to servicing or securing revenue bonds issued for such purposes), retirement contributions, revenues from retirement systems, and revenues derived from such Treasury loans and the sale of general obligation or revenue bonds) which the Mayor estimates, and the District of Columbia Auditor certifies, will be credited to the District during the fiscal year in which the bonds will be issued. Treasury capital project loans include all borrowings from the United States Treasury, except those funds advanced to the District by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions of §§ 47-3401 through 47-3401.05.
(2) Obligations incurred pursuant to the authority contained in subchapter II of Chapter 3 of Title 3, obligations incurred by the agencies transferred or established by §§ 1-202.01 and 1-202.02, whether incurred before or after such transfer or establishment, and obligations incurred pursuant to general obligation bonds of the District of Columbia issued prior to October 1, 1996, for the financing of Department of Public Works, Water and Sewer Utility Administration capital projects, shall not be included in determining the aggregate amount of all outstanding obligations subject to the limitation specified in the preceding paragraph.
(D) If in any 1 fiscal year the sum arrived at by adding subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph exceeds the amount determined under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph then the proposed general obligation bond or such Treasury loan in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph cannot be issued.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, the Council shall not approve any budget which would result in expenditures being made by the District government, during any fiscal year, in excess of all resources which the Mayor estimates will be available from all funds available to the District for such fiscal year. The budget shall identify any tax increases which shall be required in order to balance the budget as submitted. The Council shall be required to adopt such tax increases to the extent its budget is approved. For the purposes of this section, the Council shall use a federal payment amount not to exceed the amount authorized by Congress.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, the Mayor shall not forward to the President for submission to Congress a budget which is not balanced according to the provision of subsection (c) of this section.
(e) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the applicability to the District government of the provisions of §§ 1341, 1342, and 1349 to 1351 and subchapter II of Chapter 15 of Title 31, United States Code.
(f) In the case of a fiscal year which is a control year (as defined in § 47-393(4)), the Council may not approve, and the Mayor may not forward to the President, any budget which is not consistent with the financial plan and budget established for the fiscal year under part B of subchapter VII of Chapter 3 of Title 47.
This section is referenced in § 1-204.24e, § 1-204.43, § 1-204.45a, § 1-204.48, § 1-204.61, § 1-204.75, § 1-204.87, § 1-204.90, § 1-207.23, § 1-301.86, § 1-301.115a, § 1-1162.07, § 34-2202.10, § 38-2652, § 42-2802, § 44-951.16, § 47-306, § 47-317.03a, § 47-318, § 47-340.30, § 47-392.14, § 47-398.01, § 47-398.02, and § 47-1806.03.
Sanitary sewage works, rates and charges agreements with Maryland and Virginia, see § 1-204.87.
Self-government, district charter amendments, see § 1-203.03.
Self-government, legislative power of District, see § 1-203.02.
“§§ 1341, 1342, and 1349 to 1351 and subchapter II of Chapter 15 of Title 31, United States Code,” referred to in subsection (e) of this section, was substituted for “§ 3679 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (s 665 of Title 31, United States Code), the so-called Anti-Deficiency Act” on authority of § 4(b) of Pub. L. 97-258, approved September 13, 1982.
Borrowing of funds for arena preconstruction activities: For provisions permitting a designated authority to borrow funds for preconstruction activities relating to Gallery Place Sports Arena, see § 47-398.01.
Revenues as security for arena construction borrowing: For provisions permitting certain District revenues to be pledged as security for borrowing for preconstruction activities relating to Gallery Place Sports Arena, see § 47-398.02.


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Pybrain Machine Learning Library - see video.
How can autonomous agents learn from pain and pleasure signals to act rationally, that is, to maximize their expected reward? How can they do so in unknown, partially observable environments? Research on Reinforcement Learning (RL) tries to answer such questions.
Work at Schmidhuber's lab has led to the first universal reinforcement learner for essentially arbitrary computable environments - the first optimal general rational agent. Its optimality properties reflect the best possible use of past experiences, but completely ignore issues of computational complexity. So this does not yet quite solve the grand problem of Artificial Intelligence, motivating the recent work on the Goedel machine for universal reinforcement learning with limited computational resources.
Most ongoing and earlier work, however, is a bit less ambitious - see below. Nevertheless, most of it focuses on the general type of situation where the current environmental state is not fully observable by the agent's sensors. This yields a partially observable Markov decision problem (POMDP). Since 1990, Schmidhuber's lab has contributed pioneering POMDP algorithms.
Hierarchical learning & subgoal generation.
Realistic environments are not fully observable. General learning agents need an internal state to memorize important events in case of POMDPs. The essential question is: how can they learn to identify and store those events relevant for further optimal action selection? To address this issue, Schmidhuber has studied reinforcement learners with (a) recurrent neural network value function approximators (1990 -), (b) recurrent network world models (1990 -), (c) actions that address and set internal storage cells, trained by the success-story algorithm (1994 -), (d) direct search in a space of event-memorizing algorithms by policy gradients or artificial evolution or the OOPS or other methods.
78. J. Schmidhuber. On Learning to Think: Algorithmic Information Theory for Novel Combinations of Reinforcement Learning Controllers and Recurrent Neural World Models. Report arXiv:1210.0118 [cs.AI], 2015.
77. J. Schmidhuber. Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview. (Section 6 is on Deep Reinforcement Learning.) Neural Networks, Volume 61, January 2015, Pages 85-117 (DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2014.09.003), published online in 2014. Draft (88 pages, 888 references): Preprint IDSIA-03-14 / arXiv:1404.7828 [cs.NE]. HTML overview page.
76. V. R. Kompella, M. Stollenga, M. Luciw, J. Schmidhuber. Continual curiosity-driven skill acquisition from high-dimensional video inputs for humanoid robots. Artificial Intelligence, 2015, Doi:10.1016/j.artint.2015.02.001.
75.	J. Koutnik, G. Cuccu, J. Schmidhuber, F. Gomez. Evolving Large-Scale Neural Networks for Vision-Based Reinforcement Learning. In Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO), Amsterdam, July 2013. PDF.
74. R. K. Srivastava, F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber. Generalized Compressed Network Search. In C. Coello Coello, V. Cutello, K. Deb, S. Forrest, G. Nicosia, M. Pavone, eds., 12th Int. Conf. on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN XII, Taormina, 2012. PDF.
71. Sun Yi, F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber. On the Size of the Online Kernel Sparsification Dictionary. Proc. International Conference on Machine Learning ICML 2012, Edinburgh. PDF.
70. L. Gisslen, M. Ring, M. Luciw, J. Schmidhuber. Modular Value Iteration Through Regional Decomposition. In Proc. Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-12), Oxford, UK, 2012. PDF.
69. V. R. Kompella, M. Luciw, M. Stollenga, L. Pape, J. Schmidhuber. Autonomous Learning of Abstractions using Curiosity-Driven Modular Incremental Slow Feature Analysis. Proc. IEEE Conference on Development and Learning / EpiRob 2012 (ICDL-EpiRob'12), San Diego, 2012.
68. R. K. Srivastava, B. Steunebrink, J. Schmidhuber Continually Adding Self-Invented Problems to the Repertoire: First Experiments with PowerPlay. Proc. IEEE Conference on Development and Learning / EpiRob 2012 (ICDL-EpiRob'12), San Diego, 2012. PDF.
67. M. Luciw, J. Schmidhuber. Low Complexity Proto-Value Function Updating with Incremental Slow Feature Analysis. Proc. International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks (ICANN 2012), Lausanne, 2012. PDF.
66. H. Ngo, M. Luciw, A. Foerster, J. Schmidhuber. Learning Skills from Play: Artificial Curiosity on a Katana Robot Arm. Proc. IJCNN 2012. PDF. Video.
65. M. Ring, T. Schaul, J. Schmidhuber. The Two-Dimensional Organization of Behavior. In Proc. Joint IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL) and on Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob 2011), Frankfurt, 2011. PDF.
64. Yi Sun, F. Gomez, M. Ring, J. Schmidhuber. Incremental Basis Construction from Temporal Difference Error. Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-11), 2011. PDF.
63. V. Graziano, J. Koutnik, J. Schmidhuber. Unsupervised Modeling of Partially Observable Environments. 22nd European Conference on Machine Learning ECML, Athens, 2011. PDF.
62. T. Schaul, Yi Sun, D. Wierstra, F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber. Curiosity-Driven Optimization. IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC-2011), 2011. PDF.
61. G. Cuccu, M. Luciw, J. Schmidhuber, F. Gomez. Intrinsically Motivated Evolutionary Search for Vision-Based Reinforcement Learning. In Proc. Joint IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL) and on Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob 2011), Frankfurt, 2011. PDF.
60. H. Ngo, M. Ring, J. Schmidhuber. Curiosity Drive based on Compression Progress for Learning Environment Regularities. In Proc. Joint IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL) and on Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob 2011), Frankfurt, 2011.
59. M. Luciw, V. Graziano, M. Ring, J. Schmidhuber. Artificial Curiosity with Planning for Autonomous Visual and Perceptual Development. In Proc. Joint IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL) and on Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob 2011), Frankfurt, 2011. PDF.
58. Sun Yi, F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber. Planning to Be Surprised: Optimal Bayesian Exploration in Dynamic Environments. In Proc. Fourth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-11), Google, Mountain View, California, 2011. PDF.
57. T. Glasmachers, J. Schmidhuber. Optimal Direct Policy Search. In Proc. Fourth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-11), Google, Mountain View, California, 2011. PDF.
56. L. Gisslen, M. Luciw, V. Graziano, J. Schmidhuber. Sequential Constant Size Compressors and Reinforcement Learning. In Proc. Fourth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-11), Google, Mountain View, California, 2011. PDF. Kurzweil Prize for Best AGI Paper 2011.
55. B. Steunebrink, J. Schmidhuber. A Family of Gödel Machine Implementations. In Proc. Fourth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-11), Google, Mountain View, California, 2011. PDF.
54. J. Schmidhuber. Formal Theory of Creativity, Fun, and Intrinsic Motivation (1990-2010). IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, 2(3):230-247, 2010. IEEE link. PDF of draft.
53. T. Schaul and J. Schmidhuber. Metalearning. Scholarpedia, 5(6):4650, 2010.
52. F. Sehnke, C. Osendorfer, T. Rückstiess, A. Graves, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Parameter-exploring policy gradients. Neural Networks 23(2), 2010. PDF.
50. T. Rückstiess, F. Sehnke, T. Schaul, D. Wierstra, S. Yi, J. Schmidhuber. Exploring Parameter Space in Reinforcement Learning. Paladyn Journal of Behavioral Robotics, 2010. PDF.
49. D. Wierstra, A. Förster, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Recurrent Policy Gradients. Logic Journal of IGPL, 18:620-634, 2010 (doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzp049; advance access published 2009). PDF.
47. J. Schmidhuber. Simple Algorithmic Theory of Subjective Beauty, Novelty, Surprise, Interestingness, Attention, Curiosity, Creativity, Art, Science, Music, Jokes. Journal of SICE, 48(1):21-32, 2009. PDF. Extended version (2008, revised 2009): arXiv:0812.4360; PDF (Dec 2008); PDF (April 2009).
46. D. Wierstra, A. Foerster, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Recurrent Policy Gradients. Journal of Algorithms, 2009, in press. PDF.
45. S. Yi, D. Wierstra, T. Schaul, J. Schmidhuber. Stochastic Search using the Natural Gradient. Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-09), Montreal, 2009. PDF.
44. J. Togelius, T. Schaul, D. Wierstra, C. Igel, F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber. Ontogenetic and Phylogenetic Reinforcement Learning. Kuenstliche Intelligenz, 2009, in press. PDF.
43. F. J. Gomez, J. Togelius, J. Schmidhuber. Measuring and Optimizing Behavioral Complexity for Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning . Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks (ICANN-09), Cyprus, 2009. PDF.
42. F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber, R. Miikkulainen. Accelerated Neural Evolution through Cooperatively Coevolved Synapses. Journal of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), 9:937-965, 2008. PDF.
41. J. Schmidhuber. Driven by Compression Progress. In Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems KES-2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS 5177, p 11, Springer, 2008. (Abstract of invited keynote talk.) PDF.
40. T. Rückstiess, M. Felder, J. Schmidhuber. State-Dependent Exploration for Policy Gradient Methods. 19th European Conference on Machine Learning ECML, 2008. PDF.
39. T. Schaul and J. Schmidhuber. A Scalable Neural Network Architecture for Board Games. Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Games CIG-2008, Perth, Australia, 2008, in press. PDF.
38. F. Sehnke, C. Osendorfer, T. Rückstiess, A. Graves, J. Peters, and J. Schmidhuber. Policy gradients with parameter-based exploration for control. In J. Koutnik V. Kurkova, R. Neruda, editors, Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN-2008 ICANN 2008, Prague, LNCS 5163, pages 387-396. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. PDF.
37. D. Wierstra, T. Schaul, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Episodic Reinforcement Learning by Logistic Reward-Weighted Regression. In J. Koutnik V. Kurkova, R. Neruda, editors, Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN-2008 ICANN 2008, Prague. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. PDF.
36. D. Wierstra, T. Schaul, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Fitness Expectation Maximization. Proceedings of Parallel Problem Solving from Nature PPSN-2008, Dortmund, 2008. PDF.
35. D. Wierstra, T. Schaul, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Natural Evolution Strategies. Proceedings of IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation CEC-2008, Hongkong, 2008. PDF.
34. D. Wierstra, J. Schmidhuber. Policy Gradient Critics. 18th European Conference on Machine Learning ECML, Warszaw, 2007. PDF.
33. D. Wierstra, A. Foerster, J. Peters, J. Schmidhuber. Solving Deep Memory POMDPs with Recurrent Policy Gradients. Intl. Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN'07, 2007. PDF.
32. J. Schmidhuber. Developmental Robotics, Optimal Artificial Curiosity, Creativity, Music, and the Fine Arts. Connection Science, 18(2): 173-187, June 2006. PDF.
31. F. Gomez, J. Schmidhuber, and R. Miikkulainen (2006). Efficient Non-Linear Control through Neuroevolution. Proceedings of the European Conference on Machine Learning (ECML-06, Berlin). PDF. A new, general method that outperforms many others on difficult control tasks.
30. J. Schmidhuber. Completely Self-Referential Optimal Reinforcement Learners. In W. Duch et al. (Eds.): Proc. Intl. Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN'05, LNCS 3697, pp. 223-233, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2005 (plenary talk). PDF.
29. F. J. Gomez and J. Schmidhuber. Evolving modular fast-weight networks for control. In W. Duch et al. (Eds.): Proc. Intl. Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN'05, LNCS 3697, pp. 383-389, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. Featuring a 3-wheeled reinforcement learning robot (with distance sensors) that learns without a teacher to balance two poles with a joint indefinitely in a confined 3D environment. PDF.
28. B. Bakker and J. Schmidhuber. Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning Based on Subgoal Discovery and Subpolicy Specialization (PDF). In F. Groen, N. Amato, A. Bonarini, E. Yoshida, and B. Kr�se (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8-th Conference on Intelligent Autonomous Systems, IAS-8, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, p. 438-445, 2004.
27. J. Schmidhuber. Optimal Ordered Problem Solver. Machine Learning, 54, 211-254, 2004. PDF. HTML. HTML overview.
26. B. Bakker, V. Zhumatiy, G. Gruener, and J. Schmidhuber. A Robot that Reinforcement-Learns to Identify and Memorize Important Previous Observations (PDF). In Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, IROS 2003.
24. B. Bakker, F. Linaker, J. Schmidhuber. Reinforcement Learning in Partially Observable Mobile Robot Domains Using Unsupervised Event Extraction. In Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS 2002), Lausanne, 2002. PDF .
22. J. Schmidhuber. Sequential decision making based on direct search. In R. Sun and C. L. Giles, eds., Sequence Learning: Paradigms, Algorithms, and Applications. Lecture Notes on AI 1828, p. 203-240, Springer, 2001. PDF . HTML.
21. I. Kwee, M. Hutter, J. Schmidhuber. Market-Based Reinforcement Learning in Partially Observable Worlds. In G. Dorffner, H. Bischof, K. Hornik, eds., Proceedings of Int. Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks ICANN'01, Vienna, LNCS 2130, pages 865-873, Springer, 2001.
21. M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. HQ-Learning. Adaptive Behavior 6(2):219-246, 1997 (122 K). PDF . HTML.
20. R. Salustowicz and M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. Learning team strategies: soccer case studies. Machine Learning, 1999 (127 K).
19. J. Schmidhuber, J. Zhao, and M. Wiering. Shifting inductive bias with success-story algorithm, adaptive Levin search, and incremental self-improvement. Machine Learning 28:105-130, 1997. PDF . Flawed HTML.
18. J. Schmidhuber, J. Zhao, N. Schraudolph. Reinforcement learning with self-modifying policies. In S. Thrun and L. Pratt, eds., Learning to learn, Kluwer, pages 293-309, 1997. Postscript; PDF; HTML.
17. R. Salustowicz and J. Schmidhuber. Probabilistic incremental program evolution. Evolutionary Computation, 5(2):123-141, 1997.
16. M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. Solving POMDPs using Levin search and EIRA. In L. Saitta, ed., Machine Learning: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference, pages 534-542, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1996. PDF . HTML.
15. M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. HQ-Learning: Discovering Markovian subgoals for non-Markovian reinforcement learning. Technical Report IDSIA-95-96, IDSIA, October 1996.
14. J. Schmidhuber and J. Zhao and M. Wiering. Simple principles of metalearning. Technical Report IDSIA-69-96, IDSIA, June 1996.
13. J. Schmidhuber. On learning how to learn learning strategies. Technical Report FKI-198-94, Fakultät für Informatik, Technische Universität München, November 1994.
12. J. Schmidhuber. Reinforcement learning in Markovian and non-Markovian environments. In D. S. Lippman, J. E. Moody, and D. S. Touretzky, editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 3, NIPS'3, pages 500-506. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1991. PDF . HTML.
11. J. Schmidhuber and R. Huber. Learning to generate artificial fovea trajectories for target detection. International Journal of Neural Systems, 2(1 & 2):135-141, 1991 (50 K - figures omitted!). PDF . HTML.
10. J. Schmidhuber and R. Huber. Using sequential adaptive neuro-control for efficient learning of rotation and translation invariance. In T. Kohonen, K. Mäkisara, O. Simula, and J. Kangas, editors, Artificial Neural Networks, pages 315-320. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., North-Holland, 1991.
9. J. Schmidhuber. Learning algorithms for networks with internal and external feedback. In D. S. Touretzky, J. L. Elman, T. J. Sejnowski, and G. E. Hinton, editors, Proc. of the 1990 Connectionist Models Summer School, pages 52-61. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1990.
8. J. Schmidhuber. An on-line algorithm for dynamic reinforcement learning and planning in reactive environments. In Proc. IEEE/INNS International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, San Diego, volume 2, pages 253-258, 1990.
7. J. Schmidhuber. Reinforcement learning with interacting continually running fully recurrent networks. In Proc. INNC International Neural Network Conference, Paris, volume 2, pages 817-820, 1990.
6. J. Schmidhuber. Temporal-difference-driven learning in recurrent networks. In R. Eckmiller, G. Hartmann, and G. Hauske, editors, Parallel Processing in Neural Systems and Computers, pages 209-212. North-Holland, 1990.
5. J. Schmidhuber. Reinforcement-Lernen und adaptive Steuerung. Nachrichten Neuronale Netze, 2:1-3, 1990.
4. J. Schmidhuber. Making the world differentiable: On using fully recurrent self-supervised neural networks for dynamic reinforcement learning and planning in non-stationary environments. Technical Report FKI-126-90, Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, February 1990 (revised in November). PDF.
3. J. Schmidhuber. Networks adjusting networks. In J. Kindermann and A. Linden, editors, Proceedings of `Distributed Adaptive Neural Information Processing', St.Augustin, 24.-25.5. 1989, pages 197-208. Oldenbourg, 1990. Extended version: TR FKI-125-90 (revised), Institut für Informatik, TUM.
2. J. Schmidhuber. Dynamische neuronale Netze und das fundamentale raumzeitliche Lernproblem. (341 K), (Dynamic neural nets and the fundamental spatio-temporal credit assignment problem.) Dissertation, Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, 1990. PDF . HTML.
1. J. Schmidhuber. A local learning algorithm for dynamic feedforward and recurrent networks. Connection Science, 1(4):403-412, 1989. (The Neural Bucket Brigade - figures omitted!). PDF. HTML.
5. B. Bakker, V. Zhumatiy, G. Gruener, J. Schmidhuber. Quasi-Online Reinforcement Learning for Robots. Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA-06), Orlando, Florida, 2006. PDF. A reinforcement learning vision-based robot that learns to build a simple model of the world and itself. To figure out how to achieve rewards in the real world, it performs numerous `mental' experiments using the adaptive world model.
4. M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. Fast online Q(lambda). Machine Learning, 1998 (80 K).
3. M. Wiering and J. Schmidhuber. Efficient model-based exploration. In R. Pfeiffer, B. Blumberg, J. Meyer, S. W. Wilson, eds., From Animals to Animats 5: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, p. 223-228, MIT Press, 1998.
2. J. Storck, S. Hochreiter, and J. Schmidhuber. Reinforcement-driven information acquisition in non-deterministic environments. In Proc. ICANN'95, vol. 2, pages 159-164. EC2 & CIE, Paris, 1995. PDF . HTML.
1. J. Schmidhuber. Curious model-building control systems. In Proc. International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, Singapore, volume 2, pages 1458-1463. IEEE, 1991. PDF . HTML.

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(c) Time for Filing Complaint Under §523(c) in a Chapter 7 Liquidation, Chapter 11 Reorganization, Chapter 12 Family Farmer’s Debt Adjustment Case, or Chapter 13 Individual’s Debt Adjustment Case; Notice of Time Fixed. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d), a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under §523(c) shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under §341(a). The court shall give all creditors no less than 30 days’ notice of the time so fixed in the manner provided in Rule 2002. On motion of a party in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion shall be filed before the time has expired.
(d) Time for Filing Complaint Under §523(a)(6) in a Chapter 13 Individual’s Debt Adjustment Case; Notice of Time Fixed. On motion by a debtor for a discharge under §1328(b), the court shall enter an order fixing the time to file a complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt under §523(a)(6) and shall give no less than 30 days’ notice of the time fixed to all creditors in the manner provided in Rule 2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion shall be filed before the time has expired.


This article takes a look at domestic violence charges in brought under California Penal Code sections 273.5 and 243.
The great majority of domestic violence cases in California come from emotional and heated arguments between a couple. At some point, someone feels physically threatened and they call the police. When police arrive at the scene, their goal is to diffuse the situation. Unfortunately, that frequently results in someone being arrested for domestic violence and they are hauled off to jail.
Domestic violence cases are emotionally charged. From the time of arrest until the prosecution of the case is completed, the alleged victim and the defendant are highly stressed. The stakes are high for any defendant and if he or she is convicted of a crime. Furthermore, the victim is frequently confused about what to do about the case or is being pressured by others. The victim is not entitled to legal advice, much unlike the defendant.
Unfortunately, many people believe that a domestic violence arrest and charge comes about when an argument becomes physical, such as a slap or a punch. However, California law allows police officers to arrest individuals for very light touching of a boyfriend, girlfriend, wife or husband, the parent of a mutual child, cohabitants, or a person with a previous relationship without their consent.
Allan and Sandy get into an argument. Allan squeezes both of Sandy’s arms firmly as he is yelling at her. If the police were called, Allan would likely be arrested and charged under Penal Code section 243(e).
Unfortunately, police officers who arrive at the scene of a domestic disturbance call encounter a situation where everyone is emotional. In anger, the alleged victim often only presents their side of the story, exaggerates the facts and ignore their own bad actions. Police officers, hoping to avoid potential violence among the couple, will often arrest someone to avoid any liability or later trouble in the day. People have often been wrongfully accused and falsely charged with domestic violence because domestic violence cases do not require that someone is injured.
When Does a Misdemeanor Escalate to a Felony?
Who Can Be a Victim of Domestic Violence under California Law?
Cases involving alleged domestic violence or injury are prosecuted under several California laws. The law used to charge someone depends on the injury suffered by the alleged victim.
California Penal Code section 243(e)(1), commonly known as “Domestic Battery” or “Spousal Battery” is a misdemeanor crime that involves battery against a spouse or someone previous relationship. This is the least serious and most common of California’s domestic violence criminal charges because no injury needs to be suffered by the victim. Because it is often a “he said, she said” situation without injury, criminal charges under PC243(e) can be successful defended.
California Penal Code section 273.5 commonly known as “willful corporal injury on a spouse” or “corporal injury on a spouse” is a “wobbler” and can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony crime that involves the infliction of injury on a person with a prior relationship. Penal Code, § 273.5 is punishable by up to 1 year in jail or 2, 3 or 4 years in prison.
California Penal Code section 243(d) commonly known as “aggravated battery” or battery with serious bodily injury is a misdemeanor or a felony and is punishable by up to 1 year in jail as a misdemeanor or 2, 3 or 4 years as a felony. Penal Code, 243(d) is not limited to domestic situations, but is often charged in domestic disputes with serious injury.
Depending on the charge, punishments for domestic violence charges can include jail or prison time, fines, counselling, restitution and many other conditions.
If your case involves a divorce or a restraining order, a claim of domestic violence can result in serious family law issues involving child custody, child support and possibly lengthy restraining orders.
Custody Time Jail sentence of not more than one year.
Violation Type Can be a felony or a misdemeanor depending on the facts of your case and prosecutor’s discretion.
Custody Time If charged as a misdemeanor: up to one year in jail. If charged as a felony: two, three, or four years in state prison.
Additional Consequences One year or more of domestic violence counselling.
Both Penal Code, § 273.5 and Penal Code, § 243(d) can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor and are known as “wobblers.” Penal Code, § 243(e)(1) can only be charged as a misdemeanor.
Besides a criminal conviction, jail time, significant counselling, and fines, a domestic violence conviction may result in many other consequences. Unlike the vast majority of crimes, a domestic violence conviction may have an impact on immigration, future job applications, and other licensing applications.
Any other occupation or professional licensing requiring a criminal record check or fingerprint. A list of California professions that require licensure by the state of California can be viewed here.
Although most license applications or license renewals will look to the facts of the case and examine the police report, having a domestic violence case dismissed or reduced to something less serious (such as assault) can only improve an applicant’s ability to be successful or to renew their license.
Domestic battery is viewed by man as a minor offense, and the potential penalties are not that severe. However, non-citizen defendants need to be aware of the potential immigration consequences for a conviction of this crime.
Because domestic battery is a crime of domestic violence, it is a deportable crime under federal called immigration law.
This means that—even if you are in the United States legally—you may face deportation proceedings after a conviction for this offense.
Furthermore, a permanent criminal record could affect your ability to stay in the United States or (if you were to leave and were not a U.S. citizen).
Compromising your ability to obtain or keep a professional license, such as a medical doctor or a nurse.
Shirley and John are arguing. Shirley wants to leave the house, but John stops her from leaving by grabbing her wrists. John eventually let’s go and Shirley calls the police. The police arrive and see a slight bruise on Shirley’s wrists. Even though Shirley does not want John arrested, he is arrested for domestic battery under Penal Code 243(e)(1). Bail is set at $20,000.00 for John.
Mark and Linda are watching football and start arguing about whether the Raiders or the Chargers are the better team. They both get emotional and Mark throws the TV remote at Linda and hits her in the leg. Linda has no bruising and did not feel any pain. The police are called and Mark is arrested and jailed for domestic battery under Penal Code, § 243(e)(1). Even though there is no injury, there was an unlawful touching against Linda.
Kristine and Catherine used to date and while drinking one night together as “friends” they start arguing. During their argument, they start daring each other to hit each other. They approach each other and eventually start pushing and shoving each other. No one can remember who started pushing. Kristine pushes Catherine’s face to get away. Catherine develops a swollen lip and a black eye. The police arrive and Kristine is arrested under Penal Code § 273.5 for domestic battery with corporal (physical) injury to Catherine.
Henry and Jeanette are not married, but have a child together. One day, Henry is under the influence of alcohol and drugs and punches Jeanette once in the face with a closed fist and kicks her once when she is on the ground. Jeanette has a broken tooth and a cracked rib. Henry is arrested and charged with battery with a serious bodily injury under Penal Code, § 243(d) and bail is set at $50,000.00.
Any person’s current or former cohabiting situation.
A defendant may reside with multiple people if he or she maintains a substantial relationship for significant periods of time.
Most of the special relationships are self-explanatory. However, “cohabitant” and “dating relationship” are more clearly defined.
The length and the uninterrupted continuation of the relationship.
A dating relationship means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations. A judge or jury presiding over a domestic violence case would determine this by hearing evidence presented in court.
A defendant should not assume that by denying that a dating relationship exists with the victim that he or she will be able to escape a domestic violence charge—a judge or jury would weigh the evidence and decide what they believed was the truth.
A domestic battery is the lowest charge of the possible domestic violence crimes. An example of domestic battery would be if a husband slaps a wife and there is no visible injury from the slap.
You have a special relationship with the alleged victim.
Willfully means that you did it on purpose or intentionally.
An accident is not willful. Harmful or offensive touching doesn’t have to cause injury or pain—if it was done in a disrespectful or angry manner. Touching showing affection would not be domestic battery unless the victim didn’t want to be touched.
did NOT occur for a defendant to be convicted of domestic battery. Otherwise much higher penalties can be imposed, either through incarceration, fines, or both.
As previously mentioned, it is necessary to have a special relationship with the victim to be convicted of a domestic violence crime. Whether a special relationship existed is a question for the judge or jury in the case and can be disputed. The alleged victim may say that the defendant and victim were dating, however the defendant may say something different.
It’s also important to note that a defendant may live with multiple people and each of them is a potential victim of a domestic violence crime.
A corporal or physical injury is when a defendant intentionally inflicts physical injury resulting in a “traumatic condition” upon a victim. It’s important to note that the physical injury may be internal and thus not noticeable to the naked eye.
A “traumatic condition” means a condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury, including, but not limited to, injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force. “Strangulation” and “suffocation” include impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck.
Domestic aggravated battery is serious bodily injury on a significant other.
For example, when a someone breaks the bone of his girlfriend, he has committed the crime of domestic aggravated battery.
There is no single “best” defense strategy that will work for every domestic violence case. Your case cannot be treated like every other case because your case is different from every other case.
A good experienced attorney will put together your best defense from strengths and weaknesses in your case.
Every defense against domestic violence aims to have the case dismissed. However, you alternatively want the prosecutor to acknowledge the case weaknesses and reduce the charge.
Whether a less serious criminal charge fits the facts of your case better.
A felony domestic violence charge should be a misdemeanor instead or public disturbance is more appropriate than a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.
In every criminal case, you are presumed innocent. Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the prosecutor must show you violated every single element of a domestic violence offense law beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fight back against one sided police investigations through your own investigation and presentation of evidence.
Domestic violence cases are unique because only the testimony of the accusing victim is being told . Most police reports will ignore the statements of the defendant and completely accept the victim’s story. To prevail, anyone charged with domestic violence must work hard to present their side of the story in a strong and convincing light (or show that the alleged victims statements are not true or are exaggerated).
Almost invariably, there is only one primary investigator in a domestic abuse case and that is the police officer. Police officers are inclined to build their case by only asking questions that demonstrate guilt or collecting evidence that demonstrates your guilt. Unfortunately, police interviews and reports are often short and often only contain the statements of the victim. Furthermore, if an officer is called to testify at trial he or she may not remember the details of your specific case.
Police officers responding to a domestic violence call often make their decisions after a short investigation that lasts a few minutes. Police officers will usually separate the couple and then speak to each person individually. After listening to each person’s stories, they look for physical evidence of either injury or property damage. After a few minutes of “investigations” or “interviews” the police officers make a guess about each person’s honesty and then decides who to arrest.
Every domestic relationship has a history and there are always several ways to interpret that history. The key in every domestic violence case is to develop facts and evidence that highlight the motives of an alleged victim. A defendant and their attorney must decide on what defense will be most persuasive and then gather information and witnesses that highlight the lies and exaggeration of a complaining witness.
Self-defense is a legal defense in California if the accuser used force first and the defendant then responded with a reasonable amount of force to prevent injury to themselves.
In many cases, the person who starts the fight often blames the other person for starting the fight.
Whether the force used was reasonable for self defense.
Alleged victim has personal beliefs, religious rules or family pressures that do not allow divorce unless the spouse has committed criminal or violent acts.
Injury is not required for a conviction of domestic abuse under Penal Code section 243(e). Only an unlawful touching is required.
The touching does not need to hurt or leave bruising or a mark.
On the other hand, Penal Code section 273.5 does require at least some minor bodily injury.
Strangulation or suffocation by grabbing, choking or applying pressure to the throat or neck.
In People v. Abegro, a defendant was wrongly convicted of Penal Code, § 273.5 after he slapped his wife on the face and head several times. However, the lack of injury or bruising did not support a conviction under Penal Code, 273 because some injury is required.
As a result, the California Appeals court reduced the defendant’s conviction to simple battery—a non-domestic violence conviction.
However, a red mark on the victim’s arm is enough to argue there is a physical injury.
The injury suffered must be the result of your actions and not injuries caused by the alleged victim to themselves. If the alleged victim injured themselves, no conviction for Penal Code, § 273.5 can happen (or at least on that will stand up in court).
In People v. Jackson, a California case, the defendant was wrongly convicted of battery under California penal code § 273.5 against his girlfriend because her injuries happened after she tripped on a sidewalk curb as she was running away. The California Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Jackson’s conviction for Penal Code, § 273.5 because he did not directly cause or inflict the injury to his girlfriend.
When there is an arrest for domestic violence, any California police officer can issue an emergency protective order that lasts for up to 7 calendar days. Additional protective orders must be requested by the protected party after the expiration of the emergency protective order.
Not take any action to obtain the address or location of the protected person.
In addition, an emergency protective order can also require the restrained person to move out of the home they share with the protected person and give them temporary care over any minor children.
Understandably, many couples want to make up and reconcile their relationship with a loved one after an emotional argument and fight. Despite a defendant’s good intentions, contact with the alleged victim in a case (the reporting party) could be a violation of a protective order issued by police officers or the court.
Furthermore, anyone charged with domestic violence risks their actions to make up with the alleged victim being interpreted as witness intimidation under Penal Code §136.
Any defendant who wants to visit their accuser must only make contact AFTER the court gives them permission to do so or lifts the no contact order.
In many cases, your accuser may contact you the defendant to attempt to reconcile. Resist the temptation to be in contact with them—do not violate a court order! You could go to jail! Despite the “permission” of the accuser to contact them, it could be a violation of a court order under California law (Pen. Code, § 166) if the defendant contacts their accuser before the restraining order is lifted. As the defendant, you need to keep in mind that you are on a short leash with the court system.
Any violation of a restraining order can be prosecuted under Penal Code section 273.6 and carries a maximum penalty of up to a year in jail and a fine of $1,000.
The victim’s verbal permission is NOT enough to modify a court order and a violation can result in your arrest. Have your attorney obtain the judge’s modification of the restraining order before you contact the other person. Your freedom depends on it!
Show the prosecutor the complete picture of your case and defend your reputation, your rights, and your freedom.
Unfortunately, those who are charged with spousal abuse or domestic violence are assumed to be guilty. No one charged with any crime should expect justice to be served on its own. You need to make every effort to fight hard to clear your name or reduce the charge against you. District Attorneys and prosecutors usually only rely on the police report as the story of your case unless you confront them with strong contradictory evidence. Proactive and aggressive action is necessary to pressure the district attorney to dismiss your case or make you a fair offer.
Given these special concerns for a domestic violence case, a methodical approach and well-thought out strategy makes a real difference in defending your domestic violence case and having the best result possible.
If you have questions about your case, call the Los Angeles Law Offices of Long Beach Criminal Lawyer at 562-304-5121 for a consultation of your rights and defenses.
Alvarado v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2006) 2006 WL 1049742.
Penal Code, § 243(e)(1); Penal Code, § 273.5(b).
People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323.
People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000.
People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000; People v. Ballard (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 318–319.
See CALCRIM No. 841, Domestic Battery [“The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.”].
CALCRIM No. 841, Domestic Battery.
CALCRIM No. 841, Domestic Battery [“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.”].
In Penal Code § 273.5, California law defines corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant as willfully inflicting a physical injury that causes a “traumatic condition” on a significant other.
People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335 [“We conclude as a matter of law that for purposes of criminal liability under [Penal Code 243(e)(1)], a defendant may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at different locations, during the same time frame, if he maintains substantial ongoing relationships with each and lives with each for significant periods.”].
Serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.
Penal Code §§ 692, 693.
CALCRIM No. 841, Domestic Battery; People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335.
People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.
People v. Belton (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 432, 436.
People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477.
People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 198.
People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 138.
People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086.
People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580.


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Law Web: Whether removal of wall from tenanted premises amounts to damage to suit premises resulting in eviction of tenant?
Whether removal of wall from tenanted premises amounts to damage to suit premises resulting in eviction of tenant?
As observed by the Courts below the front room as used for conducting the shop, appears to be intact, and on the rear side, there is now only one room which is a bigger room instead of two rooms. In my opinion, considering the evidence on record, the appellate Court has correctly negatived the findings as recorded by the learned trial judge on the issue of the petitioner changing the nature of the suit premises by converting into two residential rooms into one big room without the prior written consent of the respondent-landlord as the law would require, thereby causing damage to the suit premises. The observation and findings of the learned trial judge in answering issue No. 4 were patently erroneous and were rightly interfered by the appellate Court. The learned trial judge on the sole basis of the respondent's notice dated 14.10.1985 could not have come to a conclusion that the removal of the wall was a new theory and/or an afterthought and was subsequently introduced by the respondent, when there was a clear admission on the part of the petitioner in the written statement, in accepting the description of the suit tenancy as granted being of three rooms. However, the clear position on record was that there were only two rooms in existence. The Petitioner could not prove that this was not the correct factual position. There was no explanation from the petitioner much less acceptable, to show as to how the nature of the suit premises changed from three rooms into only two rooms. Thus the indefeasible conclusion which could be drawn was that the petitioner had removed one wall to convert the two residential rooms into a one bigger room. There cannot be any other conclusion, which could be deduced from the evidence available on record and as rightly observed by the appellate Court. It is significant that there was no material to show that the petitioner had taken prior permission to undertake any structural change or removal of the wall between the two residential rooms and thus as held by the appellate Court, rightly the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act were applicable. The contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner that such structural alteration would not amount to waste of the suit premises to seek eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, also cannot be accepted. This for the simple reason that the petitioner could not have made a permanent structural alteration of such nature to the suit premises, demised to him. The law does not confer any right on a tenant to act in such manner unless permitted by the landlord to undertake such changes, which only the landlord can do.
18. Thus, it was not open to the petitioner to structurally alter the suit premises by converting two rear rooms into one room by removing one wall. The wall is admittedly part of a building and definitely act of removal of wall amounts to causing a damage to the suit premises and a permanent injury to the larger premises of which the suit premises is a part. Further the nature of the structural alteration, as undertaken by the petitioner has substantially changed the character of the demised premises and thus, necessarily such acts on the part of the petitioner amounted to waste of the suit premises attracting Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act and entitling the respondent to a decree of eviction of the residential premises.
Prafulkumar Damaji Gala Vs. Narayan Govind Gavate and Ors.
1. This is a tenant's petition assailing the judgment and order dated 11th August, 1999 of the learned Additional District Judge, Thane whereby the civil appeal of the respondent-landlord against the judgment and order dated 15th October 1996 in Regular Civil Suit No. 218 of 1993 passed by the Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Thane, dismissing the respondents' suit stands set aside. By the impugned judgment, the respondents' eviction suit is partly decreed inter alia directing to the petitioner to deliver to the respondent vacant possession of the "back side suit residential premises".
The respondent Narayan Govind Gavate (since deceased) was the owner of the chawl situated at Survey No. 365/52 known as Gavate Chawl situated at Vithawa Taluka and District Thane, which is within the limits of Thane Municipal Corporation. In this chawl, a tenement consisting of three rooms was let out to the petitioner in the year 1976 (for short "the suit premises"). The total area of these three rooms/suit premises was 300 sq.ft. The suit premises were let out to the petitioner for the purpose of business and residence. In the front room, the petitioner was undertaking business of a grocery shop, while in the rear two rooms as averred in the plaint, the petitioner was residing with his family members. Respondents 1(a) to 1(d) are the legal heirs and representatives of Narayan. For convenience the legal heirs who represent the landlord are referred as "the respondent".
3. There is something which is very peculiar about this tenancy, which the respondent-landlord has subsequently ratified. The respondent has averred in the plaint that at the inception of the tenancy, the petitioner was minor and his father had taken the suit premises on rent in the name of his minor son. Since inception of the tenancy, the suit premises were used for conducting grocery shop in the front room and the rear two rooms were used for residence. The father of the petitioner was managing the said business. However, on the petitioner becoming a major, he is accepted as a tenant by the respondent-landlord.
4. The rent of the suit premises was Rs. 100/- per month excluding the taxes and permitted increases. Initially, the suit premises were in the Grampanchayat area. In 1982, the area of Vithawa came to be merged in the area of the newly formed Thane Municipal Corporation. Thereafter, the petitioner willingly started paying rent at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month.
5. The case of the respondent in the plaint is that the petitioner was not ready and willing to pay monthly contractual rent regularly. The respondent therefore had issued a notice dated 14.10.1985 to the petitioner terminating his tenancy on various grounds. The petitioner replied to the said notice taking false pleas. However, after the receipt of the said notice, the petitioner paid the amount of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. The respondent averred in the plaint that the petitioner had obtained an alternate residential accommodation in Gunsagar Co-operative Housing Society at Kalwa, which was a suitable and convenient accommodation for the petitioner and his family members. This alternate accommodation was comprising of self-contained two rooms and a kitchen being a flat of an area of 575 sq.ft. The petitioner had shifted to this new premises with his family members and was residing therein. Thus, the petitioner was not in a need of the suit premises.
6. The respondent's case in the plaint was also on the petitioner having changed the user of the suit premises, for which they were let out to him. After shifting to the new alternate premises at Kalwa, the petitioner had started using the entire suit premises for commercial purpose that is for the shop, without the permission and the consent of the respondent. This was objected on several occasions by the respondent. The petitioner had also demolished the wall dividing the two residential rooms and had converted the same in one room. This act of removal of the wall was an act of damage to the suit premises as well as to the chawl. These acts on the part of the petitioner were hit by the provisions of Section 108(O) of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioner was thus liable to be evicted from the suit premises for changing the user of the rooms as well as causing damage/waste to the suit premises. The petitioner had changed the entire nature of the suit premises by converting two rear rooms into one big room.
7. The next contention of the respondent in the plaint was that the respondent was in bona fide requirement of the suit premises. He was a retired Government employee and had no source of income. His four sons were unemployed and they were entirely depending upon the respondents. The respondent had decided to start business of a grocery shop with the help of his sons. However, due to shortage of premises, he was not in a position to start the business and thus the respondents bona fide and reasonably required the suit premises for his business as well as for the residential purposes. It is further averred that also the existing residential accommodation of the respondent was not sufficient. It was stated that the financial position of the petitioner was sound and healthy and that no harm or prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if decree of possession was passed against the petitioner. In paragraph 9 of the plaint, the respondent also averred that the petitioner was causing nuisance to the respondent and his family members as the petitioner was dumping waste material around the suit premises, the adjoining occupants on several occasions and made complaints in that regard. It is on these facts, the regular Civil Suit (Regular Civil Suit No. 283 of 1999) was filed by the respondent before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Thane.
8. The petitioner appeared and resisting the suit filed his Written Statement. The petitioner admitted the contents of paragraph 1 and 2 of the plaint, wherein the respondent had categorically averred that the suit premises consisted of three rooms and the front room was used for the purpose of business of conducting a grocery shop and the rear two rooms were used for the purpose of residence of the petitioner and his family members. As regards the alternate premises at Kalwa, the petitioner stated that he had no concern with the flat at Kalwa as he was residing and doing his business in the suit premises. He stated that he was also holding a ration card for the suit premises. In dealing with the averments in paragraph 6 of the plaint, the petitioner denied the change of user of the suit premises and that he had not converted the suit premises for commercial use. The petitioner averred that he was doing business in the part of the suit premises and was residing in the other part of the suit premises. The petitioner contended that he had not demolished the wall between the two rear rooms of the suit premises and that he had not caused any damage to the suit premises. The petitioner denied the case of the respondent on bona fide requirement. The petitioner further averred that the petitioner was paying monthly rent of Rs. 200/- per month regularly. The petitioner, accordingly, prayed that the suit be dismissed, as there was no cause of action.
9. On the above rival pleas, the parties went on trial. The learned trial judge framed ten issues. The learned trial judge considering the evidence on record held that the petitioner was not a defaulter in payment of monthly rent. It was held that the respondent could not prove that the defendant had acquired suitable alternate accommodation at Kalwa. In reaching to the above conclusion, the learned trial judge referred to the voters list of the area (Ward No. 76 for the year 1995 and 1993) (Exh. 24 and 25) wherein alongwith other family members, name of the petitioner and his wife finds a mention. However, on the contrary evidence produced on behalf of the respondent, it was observed that the name of the petitioner was recorded in the voters list of both the constituencies namely of the alternate premises at Kalwa and where the suit premises are situated. The learned trial judge further held that the alternate premises were not acquired by the petitioner, but by his father, and therefore, there is no case for petitioner to be evicted from the suit premises under Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. The learned trial judge held that the respondent could not prove that the petitioner had changed the user of the premises and was using the entire suit premises for commercial purpose without the permission of the respondent. In reaching to this conclusion, the learned trial judge referred to the report of the Court Commissioner. On the basis of this report, the learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the report indicated that the Commissioner found small bed, racks, some utensils and some household articles as cups and saucer, plates, spoons, refrigerator etc., which were sufficient to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was residing in this suit premises. The learned trial judge observed that the suit premises were taken predominantly for commercial purposes and thus if some commercial articles are kept in the rear side of the suit premises it did not matter. As regards the removal of the wall dividing two residential rooms, the learned trial judge observed that this was a new ground, invented by the respondent for the eviction of the petitioner, as the termination notice dated 14.10.1985 did not mention about removal of the wall dividing two residential rooms. It was observed that the report of the Commissioner (Exh. 51) showed that there are still two rooms divided by a wall with one door, and therefore, the story of conversion of the three rooms into one room cannot be accepted on evidence. The learned trial judge observed that as there was no document in writing, it cannot be said that the main purpose of letting out the suit premises was residential use. It was held that the dominant purpose to let out the suit premises was for a grocery shop. As regards the bona fide requirement and hardship of the respondent, the same was answered against the respondent. On these observations, the learned trial judge dismissed the suit of the respondent by the judgment and order dated 15th October 1996.
10. The respondent being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned trial judge filed an appeal before the Court of Additional District Judge at Thane (Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1997).
The appeal is partly allowed with proportionate costs.
The Judgment and decree passed by the lower Court are set aside and the suit is partly decreed with proportionate costs.
The respondent do deliver vacant possession of the backside suit residential premises to the appellate with proportionate costs of the suit and the appeal and been his own costs.
The respondent has given time till the end of December 1999, to deliver vacant possession of the suit residential premises.
An enquiry may be held under Order 20 Rule 12(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, to determine future mesne of the suit residential premises from the date of the suit till the delivery of the possession.
The Appeal and the suit are dismissed far as the front room used for the shop is concerned.
Decree shall be drawn up accordingly."
12. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court, the petitioner is before this Court in the present proceedings.
(i) The appellate Court has erred in recording a finding that the petitioner had acquired alternate vacant possession of suitable premises. It is submitted that the suit premises were let out by the respondent to the petitioner on a composite tenancy i.e. for residence as well as business. It is submitted that the decree on the ground of acquiring alternate suitable premises is a decree under Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent at 1947, which is not applicable to a composite tenancy as the same is restricted to tenancy which is given for residential purposes. To support this submission, reliance is placed on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of "Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani v. Durgashankar G. Shroff & Ors. MANU/MH/1050/2002 : 2004 (Supp. 1) Bom.C.R. 333,".
(ii) The petitioner has not changed the user of the suit premises. This issue has been decided by the appellate court on inference. The report of the Court Commissioner (Exh. 51) was appropriately considered by the learned trial Judge. However, the same report has been considered differently by the learned appellate Judge. Thus, the findings of the learned appellate Judge are perverse as the learned appellate Court was not justified in substituting its view for the view of the trial Judge on the same evidence.
(iii) The findings of the appellate Court that the petitioner was guilty of causing acts of waste is erroneous, in as much as there was no admission as regard demolition of the wall. At the most, the admission was for the number of rooms, which were admitted by the petitioner to be three rooms. There was no express admission admitting demolition. On the contrary, the petitioner had expressly denied in paragraph 6 of the written statement of the demolition of the wall as alleged by the respondents. The respondent could not succeed in proving his case that the wall is demolished by the petitioner. Thus, the appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit based on inference as drawn in the report of the Court Commissioner, which indicated that the suit premises had two rooms. The inference being that one wall must have been pulled down by the petitioner. It is submitted that there was no direct evidence on pulling down of the alleged wall. So as to attract Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, the respondent was required to plead and prove damage to the property. However, there was no evidence to show that there was any damage to the structure. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the decision in case "(i) Dattatraya Ramchandra Sapkal Vs. Gulabrao Tukaram Bhosale MANU/MH/0260/1977 : 1978 BCI 68, (ii) Waman Limbaji Ashtekar & Co. & Anr. V. Kantilal Maganlal Parekh & Anr. MANU/MH/0539/1983 : 1984 (1) Bom.C.R. 546, (iii) Narayan Bansilal (deceased) v. Bright Brothers & Ors. 1979 Bom.C.R. 288, (iv) Ratanlal Bansilal & Ors. V. Kishorilal Goenka & Ors. MANU/WB/0021/1993 : AIR 1993 Cal 144 (FB), (v) Om Pal v. Anand Swarup MANU/SC/0351/1988 : (1988) 4 SCC 545."
(iv) It is next submitted that the decree of the Appellate Court tantamounts to splitting of tenancy. The Appellate Court having rejected the respondent's case of bona-fide requirement, has rejected decree qua the premises used by the petitioner for commercial purposes, and a decree has been granted by the appellate Court in respect of the rear rooms of the suit premises which was used by the petitioner for residential premises. Such a decree is not permissible as it tantamounts to splitting of tenancy. It is submitted that a composite tenancy entitles the tenant to use any part of premises for residential or commercial purposes and the same can be used inter-changeably. The Court could not pass a partial decree of this nature which literally splits the tenancy. Unless law permits, no Court can pass a decree thereby splitting the tenancy. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the decisions in "T.S. Subramanian (Dr.) v. Andhra Bank Ltd. MANU/SC/0170/1989 : AIR 1989 SC 1420, and S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand MANU/SC/0340/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 438.
(i) Admittedly, the suit premises comprised of three rooms as let out to the petitioner in the year 1976. There was no dispute that the front room was to be used for commercial purpose and the rear side two rooms were to be used for residential purpose. To this effect, specific averments in paragraph 1 and 2 of the plaint are admitted by the petitioner. It is submitted that when such original nature of the suit premises when the tenancy was created, was disturbed and not in existence, the only conclusion which can be drawn was that the petitioner had indulged in making permanent alterations to the suit premises and in the present case, without the prior written permission of the landlord. Thus, on the clear evidence on record, the respondent was entitled to a decree under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act.
(ii) It is submitted that the appellate Court considering the evidence has rightly held that the petitioner had demolished the inner-wall in between the two residential rooms and had converted three rooms into two rooms. The appellate Court thus has appropriately reached to the conclusion that the petitioner had also changed the user of the premises by using the rear portion of the suit premises for commercial purpose by storing the goods and thus the respondent's case was clearly within the purview of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act.
(iii) The findings as recorded by the appellate Court that the actions on the part of the petitioner to demolish the wall between the two residential rooms also amounted to waste cannot be said to be perverse. The removal of the wall was clearly an act of waste and within the purview of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act.
(iv) The appellate Court has rightly interfered with the findings as recorded by the learned trial Judge who had erroneously held that the dominant purpose for which the premises were let out was commercial purpose.
(v) It is submitted that the learned trial judge was in an error in recording a finding relying on the notice of the respondent dated 14.10.1985 to observe that removal of the wall was not referred in the said notice. It is submitted that no notice was required under the Bombay Rent Act to determine a tenancy and thus, the findings of the learned trial Judge in this regard were erroneous and rightly interfered by the appellate Court. This submission is being supported by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of "V. Dhanpal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal MANU/SC/0505/1979 : (1979) 4 SCC 214".
(vi) The learned trial Court was not correct to apply the principles of dominant and servient user as it was not germane to the issue involved in the facts of the case as the tenancy was clearly defined for a composite purpose and the tenant had admitted that the front room was used for commercial purpose and the rear two rooms were used for residential purpose.
15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, I have also perused the impugned judgment of the learned trial judge as also the judgment of the appellate Court. I have also perused the records and proceedings.
16. At the outset, it needs to be observed that as seen from the averments made in paragraph 1 and 2 of the plaint and the reply to it in paragraph 2 of the written statement the petitioner has not disputed that the suit premises consisted of three rooms. The front room being used by the petitioner for doing business of grocery shop, while the rear two rooms being used for residence. There is thus a clear bifurcation of the suit premises for commercial and residential purpose. Such admission of the nature of tenancy cannot be overlooked. Proceeding on this admission of the petitioner and to ascertain the correctness of the rival pleas, the learned trial judge had appointed a Court Commissioner to undertake an inspection of the suit premises and to make a report to the Court. Accordingly, the Court Commissioner made his report dated 09.08.1996 (Exh. 51) setting out a complete description in regard to the structure of the suit premises and its user by the petitioner. There is no dispute on the report of the Court Commissioner. As seen from both the judgments of the Courts below, it appears that there is no dispute that though the suit premises as let out to the petitioner consisted of three rooms, however, what actually existed as on the date of the visit of the Court Commissioner were only two rooms. The existence of two rooms could only be by removal of one of the wall between the two residential premises, thus is an appropriate observation of the learned appellate judge on appreciation of evidence and cannot be said to be perverse.
17. As observed by the Courts below the front room as used for conducting the shop, appears to be intact, and on the rear side, there is now only one room which is a bigger room instead of two rooms. In my opinion, considering the evidence on record, the appellate Court has correctly negatived the findings as recorded by the learned trial judge on the issue of the petitioner changing the nature of the suit premises by converting into two residential rooms into one big room without the prior written consent of the respondent-landlord as the law would require, thereby causing damage to the suit premises. The observation and findings of the learned trial judge in answering issue No. 4 were patently erroneous and were rightly interfered by the appellate Court. The learned trial judge on the sole basis of the respondent's notice dated 14.10.1985 could not have come to a conclusion that the removal of the wall was a new theory and/or an afterthought and was subsequently introduced by the respondent, when there was a clear admission on the part of the petitioner in the written statement, in accepting the description of the suit tenancy as granted being of three rooms. However, the clear position on record was that there were only two rooms in existence. The Petitioner could not prove that this was not the correct factual position. There was no explanation from the petitioner much less acceptable, to show as to how the nature of the suit premises changed from three rooms into only two rooms. Thus the indefeasible conclusion which could be drawn was that the petitioner had removed one wall to convert the two residential rooms into a one bigger room. There cannot be any other conclusion, which could be deduced from the evidence available on record and as rightly observed by the appellate Court. It is significant that there was no material to show that the petitioner had taken prior permission to undertake any structural change or removal of the wall between the two residential rooms and thus as held by the appellate Court, rightly the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act were applicable. The contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner that such structural alteration would not amount to waste of the suit premises to seek eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, also cannot be accepted. This for the simple reason that the petitioner could not have made a permanent structural alteration of such nature to the suit premises, demised to him. The law does not confer any right on a tenant to act in such manner unless permitted by the landlord to undertake such changes, which only the landlord can do.
19. The change of user from residential to commercial is also corroborated from the fact that the petitioner was not residing in the two residential rooms in the suit premises and in fact was using the suit premises partly as commercial premises by not residing in the rear two rooms. The petitioner had admitted in the cross examination that his father is head of the family and at the relevant time prior to the acquisition of the alternate premises, the petitioner alongwith his father was residing in the suit premises. There is evidence on record that the notice dated 14.10.1985 (Exh. 22) terminating the tenancy was received by the petitioner at the address of the alternate premises at Gunsagar Co-op. Housing Society at Kalwa. The petitioner admitted in the cross examination that this notice was issued at the address of the said residential premises and at that time, the age of the petitioner was about 15 years (a minor) and thus the observation that a child of 15 years cannot be said to be residing separately, in my opinion, is a plausible observation as derived from the evidence on record. The new residential premises were admittedly purchased by the father of the petitioner, when the petitioner was aged about 15 years, at that point of time, the father of the petitioner was conducting the suit shop as shop license was in the name of the petitioner's father. Even in the application, which was filed by the petitioner for fixing of standard rate (MA No. 400/1991) the petitioner had stated his address of the said new premises namely flat at Antariksh Building, Gunsagar Society.
20. Resultantly, there was no infirmity in the appellate Court reaching to a conclusion considering the nature of the evidence, that as the residential use of the two rooms was changed by the petitioner to a commercial user, the respondent had become entitled to a decree of possession under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act.
21. The Bombay Rent Act certainly would not afford a protection to such dubious acts of holding to the suit premises in some manner. In fact in the present case it is clear that it is the Petitioner's father who was the person conducting business as the shop license stood in his name. The Petitioner was a minor of five years of age when the tenancy was created, although respondent has not raised any objection overlooking that the basic creation of the tenancy in favour of the minor was itself an illegality. The Court in this petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution would certainly be under an obligation to consider the admitted factual matrix and its non perversity in exercising jurisdiction under these provisions.
22. Now I discuss the decisions as relied on behalf of the petitioner in assailing the decree of the appellate Court under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. The reliance on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of this Court in Waman Limbaji Ashtekar & Co. (supra) is not well founded. In this decision the Court had come to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the pillars were cut and in the absence of any evidence of pillars having been cut, the mere refusal on the part of the defendant could not be the basis for an adverse inference against the defendant. Such are not the facts of the present case. The present case is not a case where on a mere interference the Court has recorded the findings against the petitioner under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. In my opinion, this decision would also not assist the petitioner, in view of the clear admission on the part of the petitioner that the suit premises consisted of three rooms and from the material on record the assertion of the respondent is found to be correct that only two rooms existed, which was obviously a consequence of removal of one wall. There is no evidence on record to prove that the landlord undertook any alteration of the suit premises. In view of the clear admission on the part of the petitioner as clear from paragraph 2 of the written statement, there is no reason for this Court to interfere in this admitted factual position.
23. The decision in Dattatraya Ramchandra Sapkal (supra) would also not assist the petitioner. This was a case where there was nothing in the plaint, nor there was anything in the evidence of the plaintiff to prove his case, that the use of the defendant was damaging the premises and was destructive or permanently injurious to the property. It is in this context, the Court held that the essential ingredients of Section 108(O) of the Transfer of Property Act were neither pleaded nor proved and both the Courts seem to have lost sight of this requirement which is required to be satisfied in a case where the landlord wants to invoke the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, read with Section 108(O) of the Transfer of Property Act. However, at the same time, the Court reaffirmed that the change of user contemplated by Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act would include change from user of one kind to another, involving waste, alterations, destruction or damage of the property etc. or amounting to an act of nuisance.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioner in supporting his contention that the appellate Court could not have acted on a mere inference of the learned trial judge being erroneous in appreciating the evidence has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Panjikaran Paulose Joseph & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Kusum Vithal Patil & Anr. MANU/MH/0653/1992 : 1993 (2) Bom.C.R. 61. It is contended that only if the findings of the trial Court were to be perverse, then the appellate Court could interfere. In my opinion, there cannot be any dispute on the proposition that any perverse finding would be interfered by either the appellate Court or this Court under the jurisdiction of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. However, the fact remains that in the present case the appellate Court on a review of the evidence to which it was entitled to undertake, has come to a conclusion that the findings which were arrived by the learned trial judge were ex-facie perverse and contrary to the evidence on record and/or were supported by the evidence on record. In my opinion this decision thus would certainly not assist the petitioner.
25. In supporting the contention that there is no act of waste as committed by the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in the case "Om Pal v. Anand Swarup (supra)". The contention of the petitioner is that even if it is to be accepted that the petitioner has removed the wall, it has not materially impaired the value or utility of a building. However, the facts are completely different in the case in hand. Undoubtedly in the present case, there was ample evidence for the Court to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had undertaken permanent structural alteration to the suit premises, thereby changing the nature and character of the suit premises. If the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner is accepted, then it would be a situation that the tenant enjoys the suit premises as if he is the owner and there is no fetter on his rights to enjoy the tenanted premises. This is neither the legal position nor acceptable under any law. The sanctity of the landlord's right as conferred by law cannot be left to be breached and thus such proposition being made on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be rejected.
26. The reliance on behalf of the petitioner in the case Ratanlal Bansilal & Ors. V. Kishorilal Goenka & Ors. more particularly paragraphs 154 and 157 is not well founded as the evidence on record is clear that the nature of the suit premises has been permanently altered by removing the wall between two residential rooms of the rear portion of the suit premises.
"In the present case, the rent-note specifically mentions that the premises are leased out for dual purposes, viz., the residence and business and trade. In this connection it has got to be noted that the suit premises were used for running a business and as a godown. The learned trial Judge on the appreciation of the evidence rightly came to the conclusion that having regard to the suit premises and in my view rightly held that the respondent was entitled to a decree for eviction on the said ground."
28. There can be no dispute when the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani (supra), contends that the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act would not be applicable when the tenancy is a composite tenancy namely commercial and residential. In this regard, the findings of the learned appellate Judge on the provision of Section 13(1)(l) being point No. 4 as discussed in the judgment of the appellate Court cannot be sustained. However, as noted above, there was no impediment for the application of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, in the facts in hand when the respondent had come with a specific case asserting application of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. In fact, the decree granted by the appellate Court only pertains to the residential premises, which attracts Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, and thus is required to be sustained on the respondent proving the grounds falling under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. This for the reason that there was plentiful evidence on record to indicate the permanent structural alteration as undertaken by the petitioner by changing the nature and character of the suit premises from three rooms to two rooms.
29. It may not be correct for the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that the decree as passed by the appellate Court under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act would amount to splitting of tenancy, as there is no dispute on the fact that only the front room of the suit premises was being used for the purpose of shop and the rear two rooms were to be used for residence. Thus, there is no cause for any confusion as to why the decree could not have been passed under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, in regard to the residential premises, when the respondent had succeeded to prove the permanent structural alteration as undertaken by the petitioner, amounting to waste of the suit premises. The contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner that the decree in question would tantamount to splitting of tenancy, in my opinion, is also not well founded for the basic reason that the respondent had filed the suit in question seeking a decree on two grounds firstly on the ground of petitioner having acquired alternate suitable accommodation a ground as available under Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. The second ground as asserted by the petitioner was under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, of the petitioner-tenant having committed an act contrary to the provisions of clause (a) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Properties Act, 1882. Admittedly the Appellate Court had awarded a decree under both of these provisions. However, as noted above as Section 13(1)(l) is applicable only to the residential premises, if the decree was to be solely under Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act for the entire premises (which included both commercial and residential) then, it may have amounted to a decree contrary to Section 13(1)(l). However, this is not the position in the present case as the respondent had asserted a ground under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act to assert that the petitioner had caused permanent alteration to the suit premises without the prior permission of the respondent. It is not in dispute that the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act would apply to both the residential and commercial premises as clear from the definition of premises as contained under Section 5(8) of the Bombay Rent Act. Thus, there was no impediment for the appellate court to decree the suit as regards the residential premises more particularly when there was admittedly no dispute between the parties on the demarcation of the suit premises into commercial and residential.
"In the present case the First Appellate Court held that the house was "let out for running a school and for residence". The High Court held that where there is a composite letting, it is open to the Court to disintegrate the contract of tenancy, and if, the landlord proves his case of bona fide requirement for his own occupation to pass a decree in ejectment limited to that part which "is being used" by the tenant for residential purposes. In so holding, in our judgment. the High Court erred. The jurisdiction 'of the Court may be exercised under s. 13(1)(e) of the Act only when the, premises are let for residential purposes and not when the premises being let for composite purposes, are used in specific portions for purposes residential and non-residential. The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts-one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief under s. 13(1)(e) of the Act limited to the portion of the demised property which "is being used" for residential purposes."
However, as noted above the factual matrix in the present case is completely different and clearly the petitioners cannot dispute the applicability of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act and there is no dispute on the demarcation of the suit premises into commercial and residential.
Several High Courts have taken the view - which appears to us to be proper - that where bona fide need for a substantial-portion of the leased-premises is established, and such need respecting a small portion is not shown, the decree for possession of the entire premises may have to be passed, if the provisions of the statutes do not contemplate or enable a splitting-up. In the present case, we think that, prima-facie, the High Court was not justified in equating the "front portion" referred to in the eviction-petition as intended for the son's business as equitable to the entire portion in which the bank was currying on its banking business. Shri P.P. Singh, learned Counsel, was not able to show to us with reference to the material on record, that the "front portion" represented a substantial portion of the ground-floor. Smt. Kumaramangalam, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that having regard to the very structural disposition and lay-out of the ground-floor, the "front portion" could only mean the front verandah and, perhaps, a front, room in addition, at the worst. In any case the "front portion" could not, it is urged, constitute a substantial or major part of the ground floor. The conclusion of the.' High Court would not be supportable unless it was held that the effect of Dr. Subramainan's affidavit was to delete the "front portion" from the schedule of the eviction-petition. That may not be a correct construction or understanding of the effect of the affidavit which merely did not press one of the legal grounds. The question which really required to be considered was whether the "front portion" of the ground-floor was a substantial or major part of the Ground-floor and if it was not, then whether eviction in respect of the entirety of the Ground-floor could be ordered despite the fact that bona fide and reasonable requirement had not been established in respect of the said "front portion".
32. In view of the above discussion, eviction decree as granted by the appellate Court on the ground under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act needs to be sustained and requires no interference. The Writ Petition subject to what is held above, accordingly stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
33. The petitioner shall hand over the suit premises subject matter of the decree of the appellate Court to the respondent within a period of eight weeks from today.

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