But what exactly does it mean to be “registered?” This question has been debated for years and has left the circuit courts split. The Copyright Act outlines the process for registration as: (1) filing an application and paying a fee; (2) depositing a copy of the copyrightable material; (3) an examination of the application by the Register of Copyrights; (4) registration or refusal of registration of the application by the Register; and (5) issuance of a certificate of registration.
Some circuit courts have held that a work is “registered” and the copyright owner can sue an infringer as soon as the applicant files the application, deposits a copy of the work and pays a fee. This is known as the “application” approach. Other circuit courts follow the “registration” approach which requires the Copyright Office to act on the application—by examining it and either approving or refusing it—before the copyright owner may file suit.
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces articles online. It licenses its articles to other websites while retaining the copyrights. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to a variety of articles produced by Fourth Estate. Eventually, Wall-Street.com cancelled its account and under the license agreement it was required to remove all content produced by Fourth Estate from its website. However, Wall-Street.com continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate after cancelling its account.
Fourth Estate then filed this lawsuit against Wall-Street.com alleging copyright infringement. The district court held that the Copyright Act permits a suit for copyright infringement only after the Register of Copyrights approves or denies an application to register a copyright and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the “registration” approach—as it had previously endorsed in M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc and Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley—and rejected the “application” approach.
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration* or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in M.G.B Homes and Kernel Records, registration of a copyright has not been made in accordance with §§410(a) and 411(a) of the Copyright Act until the Register registers the claim. Filing an application does not amount to registration because registration requires action from both the copyright owner and the Copyright Office. Thus, filing for infringement is premature after merely filing the application.
Citing the definition for “after,” the court determined that the examination must occur “later in time than” or “subsequent to” the filing of the application.
Further, §410(b), which deals with refusal of a copyright by the Copyright Office, also supports that registration can only occur after an examination. If merely filing the application were sufficient, there would be no opportunity for the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration which would render this power moot.
Lastly, section 410(d) indicates that, although the registration date relates back to the date that the owner files an application, the registration only occurs after the Register of Copyrights has deemed the application “acceptable.” This can only happen after the application has been examined.
Courts following the “application” approach interpret the Copyright Act using a policy-based methodology in the interest of promoting justice and judicial economy. For one thing, because a copyright owner can sue for infringement regardless of the application ultimately being granted or rejected, it is nonsensical to delay the date the owner can sue to until after the examination of the application: The suit can proceed in either event. This delay could permit an infringing party to continue to profit from its wrongful acts or cause the owner to miss the three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement actions.
Lastly, courts following the “application” approach rely on §408 which states that registration is not a condition of copyright protection and implies that the only requirement for registration is the delivery of the appropriate documents and fees. Further, §410(d) adds that once a copyright is registered, the effective date of the registration relates back to the date the Copyright Office received the last of the filing materials (the application, deposit and fee). And if an owner were to file an application before the statutory deadline but not receive the registration certificate until after the deadline, §410(d) would be moot.
Why does this split matter?
Circuit splits occur when circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals do not resolve the same legal question congruently. Splits can occur because of geographical, political or ideological differences, and can cause some circuits to develop reputations for being more conservative—like the Fourth Circuit—or more liberal than other circuits—like the Ninth Circuit. These splits perpetuate because, generally, under stare decisis federal judges will rule the way a previous court in its circuit ruled on the same issue. And federal judges in one circuit are not bound by the rulings in other circuits, although these rulings may be persuasive, helpful, or instructive. This means that federal law is not similarly applied across the nation and the parties in the various jurisdictions are treated differently.
Here, with the circuits split on which approach to follow, parties can bring, or be prevented from bringing, a lawsuit for copyright infringement at different points of the registration process depending on where the lawsuit is filed. The difference can cost an owner extra time and expense: an owner who brings suit in a “registration” approach jurisdiction cannot sue until the Copyright Office takes an action on the application. This can take several months especially if the owner does not pay additional fees for expedited processing. If the three-year statute of limitations for bringing a copyright infringement claim is nearing, timing may be an issue.
As noted above in Fourth Estate, which was brought in Florida district court, the Eleventh Circuit follows the “registration approach.” The Tenth Circuit held like-mindedly in La Resolana Architects, PA v Clay Realtors Angel Fire, which was brought in a New Mexico jurisdiction.
Brought in a Louisiana district court and following the “application” approach, the Fifth Circuit held in Positive Black Talk, Inc. v Cash Money Records, Inc. that a pleading need only show the copyright owner applied for a registration. In the California district court case Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v IAC/Interactivecorp, the Ninth Circuit also followed the application approach. The Eighth Circuit has also leaned towards the application approach as demonstrated in the Minnesota case Action Tapes Inc. v. Mattson.
The First and Second Circuits have acknowledged the split in the circuit courts but neither have made a formal commitment to either approach as can be seen in Alicea v. Machete Music (Massachusetts) and Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons Inc (New York).
Proponents of both approaches make valid points. Each one seems to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act, ensure the broad copyright protection that the Act was enacted to provide, and accomplish the central purpose of registration, which is to compile a robust national register of existing copyrights. Both attempt to avoid unfairness and wasting judicial resources. It will not be an easy decision, but whatever the Supreme Court decides, it will certainly require some circuits to make adjustments in their views of the registration process.


text:
(a) Except for the City of Baltimore, the provisions of this section do not apply to a municipal corporation in the State in which the municipal or charter elections are regulated by the public local laws of the State or the charter of the municipal corporation.
(11) administer voter registration and absentee voting for nursing homes and assisted living facilities in accordance with procedures established by the State Administrator, subject to the approval of the State Board.
(2) recommend to the Garrett County Delegation to the General Assembly any adjustments of the boundaries of those districts that are necessary to maintain districts of substantially equal population.
(d) In Montgomery County, the local board shall require an affirmative vote of not fewer than three duly confirmed regular members of the local board, at least one of whom shall be a member of the principal minority party, to appoint an election director.
Added as Art. 33, § 2-202, by Acts 1998, c. 585, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1999 . Transferred to Election Law § 2-202 by Acts 2002, c. 291, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2003. Amended by Acts 2002, c. 291, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, c. 21, § 1, eff. April 8, 2003; Acts 2006, c. 61, § 1, eff. April 10, 2006; Acts 2016, c. 295, § 1, eff. June 1, 2016.
Formerly Art. 33, § 2-202.
This section formerly was Art. 33, § 2-202.
Acts 2006, c. 61, § 1, added subsec. (b)(11), relating to nursing homes and assisted living apartments.
Acts 2016, c. 295, § 1, added (d).

matches:
Art. 33
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 4
§ 1
§ 1
§ 1
Art. 33
§ 2
Art. 33
§ 2
§ 1
§ 1


Chapter 23. Persons Presumed Dead.
§ 64.2-2300. Presumption of death from absence or disappearance; when applicable.
c. Disappears in a foreign country, his body has not been found, and he is not known to be alive, and a report of presumptive death by the Department of State of the United States has been issued.
2. Any person who is not a resident of the Commonwealth, but who owns real or personal property located within the Commonwealth, shall be presumed to be dead if such person disappears for seven successive years from the place of his residence outside of the Commonwealth and is not heard from.
3. The presumption created by this subsection shall be applicable in any action where the person's death is in question, unless proof is offered that the person was alive within the time specified or, in the case of a presumed death in a foreign country, at any time following the person's disappearance, whether before or after the report of presumptive death was issued.
B. The fact that any person was exposed to a specific peril of death may be a sufficient basis for determining at any time after the exposure that the person is presumed to have died less than seven years after the person was last heard from.
C. Any person on board any ship or vessel underway on the high seas who disappears from such ship or vessel, or any person on board an aircraft that disappears at sea, who is not known to be alive and whose body has not been found or identified prior to a hearing of a board of inquiry as to such disappearance, shall be presumed to be dead upon the findings of a board of inquiry that the person is presumed dead, or six months after the date of such disappearance, whichever occurs first.
D. Before any final order or decree is entered in a cause under subsection A, B, or C in favor of the alleged heirs, devisees, next of kin, legatees, beneficiaries, survivors, or other successors in interest of the presumed decedent, or persons claiming by, through, or under them, or any of them, proceedings shall be held in conformity with §§ 64.2-2303 through 64.2-2306.
E. The heirs at law, devisees, next of kin, legatees, beneficiaries, survivors, or other successors in interest of the person presumed dead under subsection A, B, or C may be made parties defendant to proceedings in respect to real or personal property in which the presumed decedent may have an undivided interest by order of publication or other process as provided by law. The proceedings shall not be stayed in respect to the division, sale, or other disposition of the entire property. The provisions of subsection D shall be applicable only to the portion of the property set apart or to the share of the proceeds to which such person would be entitled.
Code 1950, § 64-101; 1954, c. 430; 1968, c. 656, § 64.1-105; 1989, c. 153; 1996, cc. 675, 684; 2003, c. 254; 2006, c. 351; 2012, c. 614.
§ 64.2-2301. Distribution of fund when presumption of death not applicable.
A. In any civil action wherein any estate or fund is to be distributed, if the interest of any person to the estate or fund depends upon his having been alive at a particular time and it is not known and cannot be shown by the exercise of reasonable diligence whether such person was alive at that time, and if the legal presumption of death does not apply, the court may enter an order distributing the estate or fund to those who would be otherwise entitled thereto if it were shown that such person was dead at such particular time.
B. Before any distribution is made pursuant to subsection A, the court shall require that, until the person is determined to be dead in accordance with § 64.2-2300, the heir at law, devisee, next of kin, legatee, beneficiary, survivor, or other successor in interest shall give a refunding bond with surety in such form as the court directs upon condition to account for the estate or fund to any person who may establish title thereto adverse to that of such heir at law, devisee, next of kin, legatee, beneficiary, survivor, or other successor in interest.
C. No motion shall be made hereunder except after reasonable notice to all parties upon whom service may be had. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect in any way any requirement of law as to service of process.
Code 1950, § 64-102; 1968, c. 656, § 64.1-106; 1996, cc. 675, 684; 2005, c. 681; 2006, c. 351; 2012, c. 614.
§ 64.2-2302. Appointment of curator when presumption of death not applicable.
A circuit court, upon good cause shown, may appoint in accordance with the provisions of § 64.2-451 a curator for the estate of a resident of the Commonwealth in a case where the legal presumption of death is not applicable if (i) at least one year has expired since the date that the resident was last heard from and (ii) it is not known and cannot with reasonable diligence be shown whether such person is alive. In determining whether good cause exists, the court shall consider the existence and efficacy of any durable power of attorney.
2006, c. 351, § 64.1-106.1; 2012, c. 614.
§ 64.2-2303. Persons presumed dead; authority of clerk.
A clerk of the circuit court has no authority to (i) admit to probate a will of a person presumed to be dead, (ii) grant administration upon the estate of a person presumed to be dead, or (iii) appoint a curator pursuant to § 64.2-2302.
Code 1950, § 64-103; 1968, c. 656, § 64.1-107; 1996, cc. 675, 684; 2006, c. 351; 2012, c. 614.
The costs attendant to the issuing of an order determining death or the revocation of such order shall be paid out of the estate of the presumed decedent. If the petition for the issuance or revocation of an order determining death is not granted, the costs shall be paid by the petitioner.
Code 1950, § 64-111; 1968, c. 656, § 64.1-115; 2006, c. 351; 2012, c. 614.


text:
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1986). Effect of ammonia stress on ureogenesis in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis. Contemporary Themes in Biochemistry, 6: 342-343.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1987). Active ureogenesis in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 241: 137-14.
Saha N., Chakravorty J. and Ratha B. K. (1988). Diurnal variation in renal and extra-renal excretion of ammonia-N and urea-N in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis (Bloch). Proceedings Indian Academy of Sciences (Animal Sci.), 97: 529-537.
Chakravorty J., Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1989). A unique pattern of tissue distribution and sub-cellular localization of glutamine synthetase in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis (Bloch). Biochemistry International, 19: 519-527.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1989). Comparative study of ureogenesis in freshwater air-breathing teleosts. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 252: 1-8.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1990). Alterations in excretion pattern of ammonia and urea in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis (Bloch) during hyper-ammonia stress. Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, 28: 579-599.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1991). Regulation of ureogenesis during hyper-ammonia stress in freshwater air-breathing teleosts. Journal of Scientific Research, 41A: 219-229.
Das J. R., Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1991). Tissue distribution and sub-cellular localization of glutamate dehydrogenase enzyme in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis. Biochemical Systematics and Ecology, 19: 207-212.
Dkhar J., Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1991). Ureogenesis in a freshwater air-breathing teleost: An unusual sub-cellular distribution of ornithine-urea cycle enzymes in the freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis. Biochemistry International, 25: 1061-1069.
Hallbrucker C., Saha N., Lang F., Gerok W. and Häussinger D. (1992). Alterations of cell volume: A major determinant of bile acid excretion. Journal of Hepatology, 16: 16 Suppl. 1, S7.
Saha N., Stoll B., Lang F. and Häussinger D. (1992). Effect of anisotonic cell-volume modulation on glutathione-S-conjugate release, t-butyl-hydroperoxide metabolism and the pentose phosphate shunt in perfused rat liver. European Journal of Biochemistry, 209: 437-444.
Häussinger D., Hallbrucker C., Saha N., Lang F. and Gerok W. (1992). Cell volume and bile acid excretion. Biochemical Journal, 288: 681-689.
Häussinger D., Saha N., Hallbrucker C., Lang F. and Gerok W. (1993). Involvement of microtubules in the swelling-induced stimulation of transcellular taurocholate transport in perfused rat liver. Biochemical Journal, 291:355-360.
Saha N., Schrieber R., vom Dahl S., Lang F., Gerok W. and Häussinger D. (1993). Endogenous hydroperoxide formation, cell volume and cellular K+ balance in perfused rat liver. Biochemical Journal, 296: 701-707.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1994). Induction of ornithine-urea cycle in a freshwater teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis, exposed to high concentrations of ammonium chloride. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 108B: 315-325.
Ratha B. K., Saha N., Rana R. K. and Choudhury B. (1995). Evolutionary significance of metabolic detoxification of ammonia to urea in an ammoniotelic freshwater teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis during temporary water deprivation. Evolucio’n Biolo’gica, 8 & 9: 107-117.
Saha N., Dkhar J., Anderson P. M. and Ratha B. K (1997). Carbamyl phosphate synthetases in an air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 116B: 57-63.
Goswami C. and Saha N. (1998). Glucose, pyruvate and lactate efflux by the perfused liver of an air-breathing teleost, Clarias batrachus during aniso-osmotic exposure. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 119A: 999-1007.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (1998). Ureogenesis in Indian air-breathing teleosts: Adaptation to environmental constraints. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 120A: 195-208.
Tandon V., Paul P. and Saha N. (1998). Anthelmintic efficacy of Flemingia vestita (Leguminoceae): Genistein-induced alterations in the free amino acid pool of the cestode, Raillietina echinobothrida. Journal of Parasitic Diseases, 22: 110-115.
Saha N., Das L. and Dutta S. (1999). Types of carbamyl phosphate synthetases and subcellular localization of urea cycle and related enzymes in air-breathing walking catfish, Clarias batrachus. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 283: 121-130.
Häussinger D., Kubitz R., Schlies F., Wettstein M.,Warskulat U., Kurz A.-K, Saha N. and vom Dahl S. (1999). Regulation of canalicular conjugate export pump by osmolarity, endotoxin and glucocorticoids in rat liver. In: Bile Acids and Cholestasis. Edited by G. Paumgartner, A. Stiehl, W. Gerok and D. Keppler. Kluwer Academic Publisher, The Netherlands, pp. 137-141.
Saha N. and Das L. (1999). Stimulation of ureogenesis in perfused liver of an Indian air-breathing catfish, Clarias batrachus, infused with different concentrations of ammonium chloride. Fish Physiology and Biochemistry, 21:303-311.
Saha N., Dutta S. and Häussinger D. (2000). Changes in free amino acid synthesis in the perfused liver of an air-breathing walking catfish, Clarias batrachus infused with ammonium chloride: A strategy to adapt under hyper ammonia stress. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 286: 13-23.
Dombrowski F., Kubitz R., Wettstein M., Saha N. and Häussinger D. (2000). Electron microscopic demonstration of multidrug resistance protein 2 (Mrp2) retrieval from the canalicular membrane in response to hyperosmolarity and lipopolysaccharide. Biochemical Journal, 348:183-188.
Saha N. and Dkhar J. (2000). Annual variation of ureogenesis in a freshwater air-breathing teleost, Heteropneustes fossilis (Bloch). Tropical Zoology, 2&3: 87-95.
Saha N., Das L., Dutta S. and Goswami U. C. (2001). Role of ureogenesis in the mud-dwelled Singhi catfish Heteropneustes fossilis: under condition of water shortage. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 128A: 137-146.
Tandon V., Kar P. K. and Saha N. (2001). NO nerves in trematodes, too! NADPH-diaphorase activity in adult Fasciolopsis buski. Parasitology International, 50: 157-163.
Saha N., Kharbuli Z.Y., Bhattacharjee A., Goswami, C and Häussinger D. (2002). Effect of alkalinity (pH 10) on ureogenesis in an air-breathing walking catfish, Clarias batrachus. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 132A: 353-364.
Kar P. K., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2002). Anthelmintic efficacy of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae): genistein induced effect on the activity of nitric oxide synthase and nitric oxide in the trematode parasite, Fasciolopsis buski. Parasitology International, 51: 249-257.
Saha N., Dutta S. and Bhattacharjee A. (2002). Role of amino acid metabolism in an air-breathing catfish, Clarias batrachus in response to exposure to a high concentration of exogenous ammonia. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 133B: 235-250.
Tandon V., Das B. and Saha N. (2003). Anthelmintic efficacy of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae): Effect of genistein on glycogen metabolism in the cestode, Raillietina echinobothrida. Parasitology International, 52: 179-183.
Saha N., Datta S., Biswas K. and Kharbuli Z Y. (2003). Role of ureogenesis in tackling problems of ammonia toxicity during exposure to higher ambient ammonia in the air-breathing walking catfish, Clarias batrachus. Journal of Biosciences, 28: 733-742.
Kar P K., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2004). Anthelmintic efficacy of genistein, the active principle of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae): alterations in the free amino acid pool and ammonia levels in the fluke, Fasciolopsis buski. Parasitology International, 53: 287-291.
Das B., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2004). Anthelmintic efficacy of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae): alternations in glucose metabolism of the cestode, Raillietina echinobothrida. Parasitology International, 53: 345-350.
Das B., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2004). Anthelmintic efficacy of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae): alteration in the activities of some enzymes of glycolysis in the cestode, Raillietina echinobothrida. Parasitology Research, 93:253-261.
Das B., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2004). Effects of phytochemicals of Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae) on glucose 6 phosphate dehydrogenase and gluconeogenic enzymes in a cestode (Raillietina echinobothrida). Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 139C: 141-146.
Kubitz R., Saha N., Kühlkamp T., Dutta S., vom Dahl S., Wettstein M. and Häussinger D. (2004). Ca2+-dependent protein kinase C-isoforms mediate cholestasis in rat liver. Journal of Biological Chemistry, 279: 10323-10330.
Donner M. G., Warskulat U., Saha N. and Häussinger D. (2004). Enhanced expression of basolateral multidrug resistance protein isoforms Mrp3 and Mrp5 in rat liver by LPS. Biological Chemistry, 385: 331-339.
Saha N. and Goswami C. (2004). Effects of anisotonicity on pentose-phosphate pathway, oxidized glutathione release and t-butylhydroperoxide-induced oxidative stress in the perfused liver of air-breathing catfish, Clarias batrachus. Journal of Biosciences, 29: 179-187.
Goswami C., Datta S., Biswas K. and Saha N. (2004). Changes of cell volume effect gluconeogenesis in the perfused liver of catfish, Clarias batrachus. Journal of Biosciences, 29: 337-347.
Kharbuli Z. Y., Datta S., Biswas K., Sarma D. and Saha N. (2006). Expression of ornithine-urea cycle enzymes in early life stages of the air-breathing catfish, Clarias batrachus and induction of ureogenesis under hyper-ammonia stress. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 143B: 44-53.
Das B., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2006). Effect of isoflavone from Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae) on the Ca2+ homeostasis in Raillietina echinobothrida, the cestode of domestic fowl. Parasitology International, 55: 17-21.
Goswami C. and Saha N. (2006). Cell volume regulation in the perfused liver of a freshwater air-breathing catfish Clarias batrachus under aniso-osmotic conditions: Roles of inorganic ions and taurine. Journal of Biosciences, 31: 589-598.
Saha N. and Datta S. (2007). Possible biochemical strategies to ameliorate the ammonia toxicity by Indian air-breathing catfishes under environmental constraints. In: Natural and Anthropogenic Hazards on Fish and Fisheries. Edited by U.C. Goswami, Narendra Publishing House, New Delhi, pp. 373-388.
Saha N., Datta S., Kharbuli Z. Y., Biswas K. and Bhattacharjee A. (2007). Air-breathing catfish, Clarias batrachus upregulates the glutamine synthetase and carbamyl phosphate synthetase III to avoid ammonia toxicity during exposure to high external ammonia. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, 147B: 520-530.
Das B., Tandon V. and Saha N. (2007). Genistein from Flemingia vestita (Fabaceae) enhances NO and its mediator (cGMP) production in a cestode parasite, Raillietina echinobothrida. Parasitology, 134: 1457-463.
Saha N. and Ratha B. K. (2007). Review: Functional ureogenesis to ammonia metabolism in Indian freshwater air-breathing catfishes. Fish Physiology and Biochemistry, 33: 283-295.
Kharbuli Z. Y., Biswas K. and Saha N. (2007). Mitochondrial citrulline synthesis in the liver of ureogenic air-breathing catfish (Clarias batrachus). Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, 45: 1073-1079.
Biswas K., Khongsngi J. L., Häussinger D. and Saha N. (2009). Influence of cell volume changes on autophagic proteolysis in the perfused liver of air-breathing walking catfish (Clarias batrachus). Journal of Experimental Zoology, 311A:115-124.
Biswas K., Jyrwa L. M., Häussinger D. and Saha N. (2010). Influence of cell volume changes on protein synthesis in isolated hepatocytes of air-breathing walking catfish (Clarias batrachus). Fish Physiology and Biochemistry, 36:17-27.
Saha N., Jyrwa L. M., Das M. and Biswas K. (2011). Influence of environmental water salinity on gluconeogenesis in the air-breathing walking catfish, Clarias batrachus. Fish Physiology and Biochemistry, 37: 681-692.
Choudhury M. G. and Saha N. (2012). Influence of environmental ammonia on the production of nitric oxide and expression of inducible nitric oxide synthase in the freshwater air-breathing catfish (Heteropneustes fossilis). Aquatic Toxicology, 116-117: 43-53.
Goswami U. C. Rahman S. and Saha N. (2012). Functional ureogenesis and adaptation to nitrogen metabolism in amphihaline shad hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha, Hamilton-Buchanan) while inhabiting in estuary and freshwater habitats. Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, 50: 652-659.
Saha N. (2012) Biochemical adaptation to nitrogen metabolism in Indian air-breathing catfish under environmental constraints. Directorate of Coldwater Fisheries Publication (ICAR), pp. 109-122.
Choudhury M. G. and Saha N. (2012). Expression of inducible nitric oxide synthase and nitric oxide production in the mud-dwelled air-breathing singhi catfish, Heteropneustes fossilis under condition of water shortage. Nitric Oxide: Biology and Chemistry, 27:219-227.
Das M., Banerjee B., Choudhury M.G. and Saha N. (2013). Environmental hypertonicity causes induction of gluconeogenesis in the air-breathing singhi catfish, Heteropneustes fossilis. Plos One, 8(12), e85535.
Banerjee B., Bhuyan G. and Saha N. (2014). Influence of environmental hypertonicity on the induction of ureogenesis and amino acid metabolism in air-breathing walking catfish (Clarias batrachus, Bloch). Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, 52: 728-738.
Choudhury M. G. and Saha N. (2015). Nitric oxide synthetic machineries and possible roles of nitric oxide in various physiological functions in fish. In: Advances in Fish Research, Vol. VI. Edited by U.C. Goswami, Narendra Publishing House, Delhi, pp. 29-67.
KC736973: Chakraborty, A., Banerjee, B and Saha, N. Clarias batrachus glutathione peroxidase 3 (gpx3) mRNA, partial cds.
KF977829: Chakraborty, A., Banerjee, B., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus catalase (CAT), mRNA, partial cds, 629 bp.
AB916361: Banerjee, B., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus 60S ribosomal protein L30 mRNA, complete cds, 479 bp.
LC002613: Koner, D., Banerjee, B., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus caspase-3 mRNA, complete cds, 1863 bp.
LC002614: Koner, D., Banerjee, B. and Saha, N. Clarias batrachus caspase-8 mRNA, partial cds, 592 bp.
AB981194: Banerjee, B., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus glutaminase kidney isoform mRNA, partial cds, 709 bp.
AB23912: Banerjee, B. and Saha, N. Clarias batrachus tubulin-alpha 1, partial cds, 1201 bp.
AB985493: Chakraborty, A., Banerjee, B., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus thioredoxin reductase 1, partial cds, 756 bp.
KP261050: Banerjee, B., Koner, D., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus caspase-9 (casp9) mRNA, complete cds.
KP221298: Banerjee, B., Koner, D., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus mitogen-activated protein kinase 12 (mapk12) mRNA, complete cds.
KP221297: Banerjee, B., Koner, D., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus dual specificity mitogen-activated protein kinase kinase 2 (map2k2) mRNA, complete cds.
KP221296: Banerjee, B., Koner, D., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus dual specificity mitogen-activated protein kinase kinase 6 (map2k6) mRNA, complete cds.
KP221295: Banerjee, B., Koner, D., Saha, N. Clarias batrachus mitogen-activated protein kinase 8 (mapk8) mRNA, complete cds.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
[206 U.S. 474, 475] Messrs. William Herring, Everett E. Ellinwood, and Sarah Herring Sorin for appellant.
[206 U.S. 474, 476] Messrs. Elias S. Clark, William C. Prentiss, and Horace F. Clark for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment on demurrer to a petition for a writ of certiorari. The object of the petition was to vacate proceedings of the board of equalization in 1905, by which the board added very largely to the assessed valuation of patented mines and, in a less degree, of work horses and saddle horses, in Cochise county and other counties in Arizona. It was alleged that by these proceedings the board increased the total valuation of property in the territory and increased the valuation of the petitioner's property of the above-mentioned kinds. The writ had been issued by a single justice, returnable before the full bench, but the case was heard on the demurrer by consent, and by the judgment the demurrer was sustained and the writ was quashed.
The errors alleged are two: First, that while the board, for purposes of equalizing, might add to the total value of the property in one county and diminish that of property in another, it had no power toin crease the total valuation of property in the territory above the sum of the returns from the boards of supervisors of the several counties; and second, that the board was bound to deal with the valuation of each county as a whole, and could not increase or diminish the valuations of particular classes of property within a county. The power of the board depends, of course, upon statute, and it is said that the statute of Arizona was taken almost verbatim from one of Colorado, which had been construed by the supreme court of that state in accordance with the first of the petitioner's above contentions before it was adopted by Arizona. People ex rel. Crawford v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 428. The construction, it is said, goes with the act. Henrietta Min. & Mill. Co. v. [206 U.S. 474, 479] Gardner, 173 U.S. 123, 130 , 43 S. L. ed. 637, 640, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327. The second contention is based on an interpretation of the statutes, the supposed absence of an express grant of power, and later decisions in Colorado and other states.
On the other hand, while this court cannot refuse to exercise its own judgment, it naturally will lean toward the interpretation of a local statute adopted by the local court. Sweeney v. Lomme, 22 Wall. 208, 22 L. ed. 727; Northern P. R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U.S. 349, 361 , 38 S. L. ed. 1009, 1014, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 983; Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U.S. 674, 679 , 39 S. L. ed. 576, 578, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 457. And again, when, for a considerable time, a statute notoriously has received a construction in practice from those whose duty it is to carry it out, and afterwards is re-enacted in the same words, it may be presumed that the construction is satisfactory to the legislature, unless plainly erroneous, since otherwise naturally the words would have been changed. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U.S. 361, 401 , 402 S., 50 L. ed. 515, 525, 526, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272. The statute of Arizona was re-enacted in 1901 and was said by the supreme court to have been construed by the board against the petitioner's contention ever since the board was created, eighteen years before. Even apart from the re-enactment a certain weight attaches to this fact. United States v. Finnell, 185 U.S. 236, 243 , 244 S., 46 L. ed. 890, 893, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; United States v. Sweet, 189 U.S. 471 , 47 L. ed. 907, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638. The presumption that the codifiers of 1901 knew and approved the practice of the board certainly is as strong as the presumption that the original enactors of the statute knew a single decision in another state; and it is more important, since it refers to a later time.
As an original question the construction adopted by the supreme court appears to us at least as reasonable as the opposite one contended for, and the variations in the Arizona act from the prototype, if Colorado furnished the prototype, and the different background against which it was to be construed, seem to us to have warranted the refusal to be bound by the Colorado case.
We give a section of the General Laws of Colorado, 1877, and of the Revised Statutes of Arizona side by side. [206 U.S. 474, 480] 2282. Sec. 43. Said board shall ascertain whether the valuation of real estate in each county bears a fair relation or proportion to the valuation in all other counties of the state, and on such examination they may increase or diminish the aggregate valuation of real estate in any county as much as, in their judgment, may be necessary to produce a just relation between all the valuations of real estate in the state; but in no instance shall they reduce the aggregate valuation of all the counties below the aggregate valuation as returned by the clerks of the several counties.
3880. (Sec. 50.) The said board shall ascertain whether the valuation of property in each county bears a fair relation or proportion to the valuation in all other counties in the territory, and on such examination they may increase or diminish the valuation of property in any county as much as, in their judgmnt , may be necessary to produce a just relation between all the valuations of property in the territory; but in no instance shall they reduce the aggregate valuation of all the counties below the aggregate valuation as returned by the boards of supervisors of the several counties. And said board shall, at the same time, fix the rate of taxes for territorial purposes which is to be levied and collected in each county. For convenience we take up the second of the alleged errors first. It will be seen that the word 'property' takes the place of 'real estate' at the beginning, and that the power given, instead of being only a power to increase or diminish the aggregate valuation of real estate in any county, is to increase or diminish the valuation of property (not the property) in (not of) any county. The word 'aggregate' is left out, and the fact that it was left out favors the construction that apart from that fact would be reasonable, that the power extends to the valuation of any property, and is not confined to the valuation of all the property as one whole. This construction [206 U.S. 474, 481] is further favored by the purpose of the changes in valuation, which is to 'produce a just relation between all the valuations of property in the territory.' This phrase is interstitial in its working. It does not confine the equality to the valuations by county, but extends it to all the valuations of property. Yet a further argument may be drawn from the language of 3874: 'No assessor, board of supervisors, or the territorial board of equalization shall assess any real estate at a less valuation than 75 cents per acre.' This recognizes the power of the board to deal with a special class of property, and we may add, by way of anticipation, by also recognizing a function of assessment, does much to make inapplicable the reasoning of the Colorado decision upon the other point.
It seems to have been argued below that at least the board was confined to dealing with property by the classes mentioned in other sections of the statutes, especially 3849, 3861, 3877. But the classifications and specifications provided for in those sections do not affect the power expressly given by 3880, as we have construed the latter, and further, by 3877 the territorial board is given power in very broad terms to change the list. It is not necessary to rely on this power to change the list for the power of the board to change valuations of a particular class of property. It is mentioned simply to show that the powers given by 3880 are not diminished by other provisions.
The first contention of the petitioner needs but a few words in addition to what we have said. The power to increase the valuation of property in any county is as power to increase it in all, or at least, to increase the valuation of some kinds of property in all, so as to produce a just relation between them and the other valuations left undisturbed. We find nothing in the statute that requires the increase to be so adjusted that the total valuation shall be unchanged. On the contrary, the prohibition against reducing it implies that the board has the power of change, and, but for the prohibition, might reduce [206 U.S. 474, 482] the total. Therefore it may add to the total since the law does not forbid that. The Colorado decision to the contrary turned partly on the notion, which has been shown to be inapplicable to Arizona, that the board of equalization had no function of assessment. It also turned in part, at least, on the Constitution of the state, to which, of course, the statute was subject. There was no Constitution to be conformed to in Arizona, and therefore the construction of the statute depends on the meaning of the words alone, and the supreme court of the territory, in construing them, was left at large.

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