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This was a suit commenced in the district court of the First judicial district of the territory of Arizona, sitting in and for the county of Pima, to recover delinquent taxes. Several parties were included as defendants. A decree was rendered May 7, 1892, establishing the taxes and foreclosing the tax liens. The appellants, after a motion for a new trial, carried the case to the supreme court of the territory, by which, on January 17, 1894, the decree was affirmed (37 Pac. 370), and thereupon an appeal was taken to this court.
Charles W. Wright, for appellants.
Wm. H. Barnes, for appellee.
The appellants filed ten objections to the taxes charged against their property, one of which was that 'said delinquent list as published and filed herein is not a copy of the original.' It appears from the bill of exceptions that on the hearing before the court the printed copy of the delinquent list, and not that filed in the office of the county treasurer, was offered and received in evidence. To the introduction of this printed copy appellants made several objections, but not that the original was the best evidence, or should be first offered, or that the printed list was not an exact copy of the original. It would seem from the findings, and the rulings made by the trial court, as well as from the motion for a new trial, that the published delinquent list was treated as though it were the original; and that in the supreme court of the territory was the question for the first time distinctly made that no judgment could be rendered except upon the evidence furnished by the original list. Be that as it may, and conceding, without deciding, that properly, in an action like this, the original list should be offered in evidence, nevertheless we are of opinion that the appellants cannot now take advantage of this. They did not, in their objections, point out wherein the delinquent list was incorrectly published, and they made no objection to the admission in evidence of such published list on the ground that the original had not first been offered, or that the published list was different from the original. It might be that in the description of other property, or the taxes charged thereon, there were such mistakes as to defeat the proceedings as to such property, or in reference to their own property and the taxes charged thereon, that there was some trifling inaccuracy so as to make it true that the published list was not a copy of the original; but it would not follow therefrom that they were entitled to a judgment. 'De minimis non curat lex' might uphold the publication. As they were called upon in the challenge of these taxes to point out specifically their objections, and as they did not show wherein the published list differed from the original, we cannot assume that the variance, if any there were, was sufficient to affect their substantial rights. While, in a general sense, it may be true that in such a proceeding the territory is the plaintiff, and is called upon to prove its case, yet the presumptions which, by the statute, attach to the regularity of the proceedings, and the duty cast upon the objectors to specifically point out the defects, forbid our disturbing the judgment upon such technical ground,—one apparently an afterthough, and not affecting the substantial rights of the appellants.
Again, it is insisted that the court had lost its power to enter judgment by reason of lapse of time. The facts upon which this contention is based are these: Section 2685, which provides for a publication of the delinquent list, requires that the collector append to and publish with the list, in addition to the notice of application for judgment, a notice that on the Monday next succeeding the day fixed by law for the commencement of the term of the district court the property will be sold. Section 2690 directs the clerk of the district court to give a duly-certified copy of the judgment to the tax collector as the process under which the property is to be sold. Section 2693 requires the collector to attend on the day named in the notice, expose the property for sale, and continue the sale from day to day until all the property is sold, completing the sale within 20 days from the commencement thereof. Section 2687 makes special provisions for action by the court at an ensuing term, but is inapplicable to the questions here presented.
The court convened on the 14th of March. The notice published by the tax collector was that the sale would begin on the 20th of March. On March 15th a judgment was entered directing the sale on the 20th of all the property, to which no objection had been filed. As to those parties making objections (and included among them were the present appellants) the case was set down for hearing at a subsequent day, and a trial then had; but the judgment was not entered until the 7th day of May, 1892, and the order was to sell on the 13th day of June. Now, the argument is that, as this is a special statutory proceeding, its exact terms must be complied with, or the court loses its jurisdiction; the effect of which, as applied to a case like the present, would be that, if the objectors present questions which the court cannot conscientiously decide at the moment, and takes time for consideration, it may thereby lose its jurisdiction to act at all. We do not so understand the law. The district court is one of general jurisdiction. Section 2686 provides that upon the completion of the publication and the filing of the complaint the 'court shall acquire full and complete jurisdiction' over the property for all purposes whatever, necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes and intention of the act. The special provisions to which we have heretofore referred will doubtless guide in all cases in which no contest is made. They were evidently designed to secure prompt action on the part of the tax collector, as well as the court; and, if no objections be made, and a delinquent tax list, correct in form, and duly published, is presented, there need be no delay in entering the judgment. But, inasmuch as this proceeding is one is a court of general jurisdiction, it would require very precise and prohibitory language in the statute in order to withhold from that court the ordinary functions and powers of such a tribunal, among which is not only the right, but the duty, of giving such full consideration to all questions presented as its judgment determines is necessary. No such prohibitory language is found. The purposes and intention of the act are the collection of taxes, but only of such taxes as ought to be collected, and judicial determination is invoked to determine what taxes are justly due; and that the court takes time for the examination and consideration of this question does not oust it of jurisdiction.
No other evidence was offered by the territory than the delinquent tax list and the above resolution. It is contended that this evidence is insufficient; that the board of supervisors have no power to act except upon the existence of certain precedent conditions which must be affirmatively shown; and, further, that if this be not so, the recital in the resolution of itself shows that there was no sufficient warrant for charging these taxes against the property. This contention cannot be sustained. The delinquent tax list is made prima facie evidence that the taxes charged therein are due against the property. This means all the taxes,—not only those for the current year, but those for past years; and this tax list was, therefore, prima facie evidence of the rightfulness of the charge against the property for the taxes of the prior year. If there were any valid reason why the property should not be subjected to those taxes, it was the duty of the objectors to state the reason, and give evidence in support thereof. While it may be, as counsel insist, that the section quoted is 'unhappily worded' and 'certainly crude,' yet its meaning is obvious. The clauses, 'the collection thereof prevented by the judgment of any court,' and 'if the real or personal property was properly taxable or assessable, if it be not a proper case to collect by a resale of the property, such tax * * * may be reassessed or relevied upon such property at any time within four years after such judgment,' mean that whenever a suit has been instituted in a court, as provided by the statute heretofore referred to, and fails to become operative through the judgment of the court, then, if the property is properly taxable, and no resale can be had without further action of the court, the board of supervisors may place the property upon the tax roll of the current year, to be collected as other taxes of that year.
From the recital in this resolution it appears that certain proceedings for the collection of taxes for 1889 failed by reason of the judgment of the court declaring the publication insufficient. That put an end to the suit. It was not a defect in the process issued after and upon the judgment, which, perhaps, might be obviated by the issue of new process, but a failure of the court to render judgment because of prior defects. Under those circumstances the power and the duty of the board of supervisors to renew efforts to collect such taxes were given and imposed by this section, and the procedure provided was a reassessment, and the placing of the taxes on the tax roll for the current year. This was done, and nothing more; and no evidence was offered to show that those taxes were not properly chargeable upon the property, or that they had ever been paid. Evidently it was the intention of the legislature—and a just intention—that no property should escape its proper share of the burden of taxation by means of any defect in the tax proceedings, and that, if there should happen to be such defect, preventing for the time being the collection of the taxes, steps might be taken in a subsequent year to place them again upon the tax roll, and collect them.
Again, it is contended that the board of equalization raised the value of the property of appellants arbitrarily, and without notice or evidence. But the testimony does not sustain this contention. The only evidence in respect to the matter was that of a witness, T. A. Judd, who testified that the board of equalization added 6 per cent. to the value of stock cattle; but nowhere does it appear that this was done without proof of the value, or without due notice to all parties interested. We cannot assume, in the face of the prima facie evidence furnished by the delinquent tax list, that any official failed in his duty.
Another objection is that part of the property held to be subject to taxation was an unconfirmed Mexican land grant. It was admitted on the hearing in the district court that certain tracts of land in the list described were 'each Mexican land grants, and that the same are not, and have never been, confirmed.' Upon this it is strongly insisted that no title passes until confirmation; that it may yet be adjudged that these lands are the property of the United States; and that, until that question is definitely decided, the lands are not subject to taxation. The cases relied upon are Colorado Co. v. Commissioners, 95 U. S. 259, Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, 9 Sup. Ct. 525, and Astiazaran v. Mining Co., 148 U. S. 80, 13 Sup. Ct. 457. In the first of these cases a Mexican land grant, covering some 500,000 acres, was confirmed by congress to the extent of 11 square leagues, with a proviso that there should be a survey of those leagues, and that the confirmation should not become legally effective until the claimant had paid the cost thereof; and it was held, following Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, and Railway Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, that, until the survey fees had been paid, the United States retained such an interest in the land as to exempt it from taxation. In the second the decision was that no title to land in California depending upon Spanish or Mexican grants could be of any validity until submitted to and confirmed by the board provided for that purpose under the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 631); but that decision was based upon section 13 of the act, which expressly provided that 'all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented to the said commissioners within two years after the date of this act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as part of the public domain of the United States.' In the last of these cases it was held that under the acts of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat. 308), and July 15, 1870 (16 Stat. 304), a private claim to land in Arizona under a Mexican grant, which had been reported to congress by the surveyor general of the territory, could not, before congress had acted on that report, be contested in the courts of justice. In other words, the validity of such claim could only be determined in the particular tribunal which had been provided for such purpose.
It has been held that possessory rights founded upon mere occupation and improvements upon government land, though invalid as against the government, may be made the subject of barter and sale, and may be treated under the laws of the state and territory as having all the attributes of property. Lamb v. Davenport, 18 Wall. 307; Bishop of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 155, 168, 15 Sup. Ct. 779.
In Railroad Co. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. 885, it was decided that the possessory claim of the railroad company to lands within the state of Nevada was subject to taxation, notwithstanding the fact that the lands might thereafter be determined to be mineral lands, and so excluded from the operation of the railroad grant. See, also, Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 154 U. S. 130, 132, 14 Sup. Ct. 977. Within the reasoning of these decisions, as it does not appear that these lands were not held by perfect grants under the laws of Mexico, or that they were not in the possession of the appellants, and covered with valuable improvements, it must be held that the objection to their taxation cannot be sustained.
Another objection is that a levy of 50 cents on the $100 included in these taxes was made solely for the purpose of raising money to pay interest on bonds; and it is insisted that the bonds for which the levy was made were void under the act of congress (24 Stat. 170) which prohibits a county from becoming indebted to an amount exceeding 4 per cent. of the value of the taxable property within the county. The bonds which were in excess of the 4 per cent. were issued on June 30, 1887, and subsequent to the passage of the act. But, as is shown in the testimony, they were funding bonds. For aught that appears, the real indebtedness of the county had been created long before the passage of the act, and these funding bonds may have been, and probably were, nothing but simply a change in the form of the indebtedness. Even if it were regarded as a new indebtendess, it would not follow that the whole series was invalid, for the circumstances of the transaction might, if fully disclosed, show that, even as new indebtedness, they were valid for a certain amount; that is, an amount equal to 4 per cent. of the value of the county's taxable property. It cannot be that in this indirect way, and without a full disclosure of all the facts concerning the indebtedness, the time when it arose, and the circumstances under which it was created, a court can strike down a levy for the payment of interest on the bonds.
A final objection is that the assessment was grossly unfair, and that there was a fraudulent discrimination in favor of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. It appears that the assessment of ordinary range cattle was fixed by the territorial board at $7.42, while one witness testified that their value was from $6 to $6.50 per head. It also appears that the territorial board valued the railroad property at $6,811.14 per mile, while there was testimony that to duplicate the roadbed and track alone would cost from $21,000 to $22,000 per mile; and appellants offered to prove that the railroad company stated to the board that, if the valuation was fixed at about the rate which was fixed, it would pay the taxes; if much higher, it would resist collection in the courts; and that the board concluded that it was better to get some taxes out of the railroad company than none, and therefore fixed the valuation at the sum named.
There is nothing tending to show that the board, in fixing the value of cattle at $7.42, acted fraudulently or with any wrongful intent, or that that valuation was not the result of its deliberate judgment upon sufficient consideration and abundant evidence; and it would be strange, indeed, if an assessment could be set aside because a single witness is found whose testimony is that the valuation was excessive. No assessment could be sustained if it depended upon the fact that all parties thought the valuation placed by the assessing board was correct. Something more than an error of judgment must be shown,—something indicating fraud or misconduct. Neither is the fact that an officer of the railroad company came before the board and declared its willingness to pay taxes on a certain valuation, and its intention to resist the payment of taxes on any higher valuation, sufficient to impute fraudulent conduct to the board, although it finally fixed the valuation at the sum named by the railroad company. It appears from the testimony of one of the members of the equalization board that it was guided largely by the valuation placed in other states and territories upon railroad property, and that from such valuation, as well as from that given by the railroad company, it made the assessment at something like the average of the valuation of railroads in the various states and territories named. It is unnecessary to determine whether this board erred in its judgment as to the value of this property; whether it would not have been better to have made further examination, and taken testimony as to the cost of construction, present condition, etc. Matters of that kind are left largely to the discretion and judgment of the assessing and equalizing board, and if it has acted in good faith its judgment cannot be overthrown. Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421-435, 14 Sup. Ct. 1114.
These are all the matters presented by counsel. We find in them nothing which justifies us in disturbing the judgment of the court below, and it is affirmed.


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Tom is a versatile junior with a broad practice in commercial litigation, arbitration and public law. He frequently acts as both sole and junior counsel in domestic and international disputes (including arbitrations under the LCIA, UNCITRAL, ICC, SCMA, SIAC and KLRCA rules). Tom is appointed to the Attorney General’s C Panel of Counsel with effect from 1 March 2019 and was appointed to the Welsh Government B Panel of Junior Counsel (Public Law) in 2017. He also undertakes pro bono work in international human rights law.
The majority of Tom's work has an international element and his clients or opposing parties include companies or individuals based in China, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, USA, Russia, India, Qatar, UAE, Columbia, Venezuela, Mozambique, South Sudan, Greece, Romania, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany.
Tom previously worked as the Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance in the UK Supreme Court and studied law at Oxford, Leiden and Toronto.
Acting as sole counsel in a one-week US$1m+ commodities arbitration in Singapore.
Acting as sole counsel in a US$9m+ High Court claim for breach of a hotel management agreement.
Representing the Welsh Ministers in the consequentials hearing for the R (ClientEarth) (No3) judicial review of the 2017 Air Quality Plan.
A six-week US$200m+ arbitration claim for breach of a development agreement, expropriation of concessions, breaches of lease and defamation (led by John Passmore QC).
Enforcement proceedings for a Romanian bank following complex international frauds amounting to US$133m+ (led by Philip Riches).
High Court claim for payment under a referral agreement following the successful marketing and sale of a building for Euros 490m+ (as sole counsel).
High Court claim of US$9m+ for breach of a hotel management agreement (as sole counsel).
Advising a debt-cancellation charity on the potential illegality of major bank loans (amounting to US$1.8b+) to State-backed African companies.
Acting for Joint Liquidators in a £7m+ claim against a co-surety under a facility agreement and a guarantee and indemnity (led by Blair Leahy).
Application for worldwide freezing orders in support of an arbitration concerning a US$12m credit facility (led by Michael Ashcroft QC).
Application for worldwide freezing orders in support of an arbitration concerning an investment fund facility (led by Tim Hill QC).
High Court claim of US$1.6m+ for breach of a design services agreement for the development and sale of residential properties (as sole counsel).
Share-purchase dispute of US$2m+ concerning payments out of an escrow account (as sole counsel.
High Court claim for £800,000 concerning an alleged multi-stage boiler room fraud involving the sale of "fancy" coloured diamonds (as sole counsel).
Acting for an international platform for ticketing services in respect of a claim for breach of a contract for the implementation and configuration of financial accounting software (as sole counsel.
Acting for a company in respect a dispute over rights of access to an online trading platform for transportation services (as sole counsel).
Acting for a national provider of telecommunication services in relation to potential claims under several telemetry agreements.
Acting for a corporate client in relation to termination of a contract for the provision of internet marketing services (as sole counsel.
Acting for a customer in relation to a dispute over the sale and resizing of an engagement ring.
Acting for brokers in relation to a substantial claim for commission arising from the sale of a superyacht.
Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd  UKSC 23: concerning whether the illegality defence bars claims by a company against its directors for breach of their duties and whether section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 has extra-territorial effect (as a Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance).
Bunge SA v Nidera BV  UKSC 43: concerning the construction and application of the GAFTA Default Clause and the application of The Golden Victory  2 AC 353 (as a Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance).
One-week commodities arbitration in Singapore concerning a US$1m+ commodities dispute raising complex issues of sub-agency and jurisdiction (as sole counsel).
KLRCA arbitration concerning an RM37m+ dispute under a lump-sum FIDIC contract for earthworks in Malaysia (led by Murray Pickering QC).
UNCITRAL Arbitration in a US$300m+ dispute under a drilling services contract (led by Duncan Matthews QC and Edward Ho).
Six-week ad hoc arbitration concerning a US$200m+ claim against a Caribbean state for breach of a development agreement, expropriation of concessions, breaches of lease and defamation (led by John Passmore QC).
LMAA arbitration concerning a US$3.5m+ claim under an MOA for the sale of a vessel, giving rise to issues of construction, misrepresentations and rectification.
LMAA arbitration concerning US$7m+ of damage to a chemical tanker following an explosion during line blowing (led by Tim Hill QC).
LCIA arbitration arising out of a dispute under an LLP agreement.
SCMA arbitration concerning alleged short delivery of bundles of electrolytic copper.
Application for worldwide freezing orders in support of an arbitration concerning a US$12m credit facility and in support of an LCIA Award (led by Michael Ashcroft QC).
Energy arbitration claim of £2m+ concerning the charter of a jack-up barge for off-shore borehole drilling.
Arbitration concerning damage to a chemical tanker following overpressurisation of the cargo tanks during loading (assisting Charles Kimmins QC and Thomas Corby).
Five-week arbitration concerning a US$500m+ dispute arising out of the construction and delivery of semi-submersible drilling rigs from Chinese to Brazilian interests (as a pupil).
ICSID and ICC arbitrations involving the Governments of Pakistan and Balochistan and concerning a dispute about a joint venture agreement for the exploration of minerals (as a pupil).
Assuranceforeningen Gard Gjensidig v The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1971  2 Lloyd's Rep 219: concerning a freezing order in support of claims arising out of an oil spill in Venezuela (as a pupil).
Acting for a Romanian bank in enforcement proceedings, including obtaining worldwide freezing orders and permission to serve out, in respect of complex frauds and attempts to evade a Romanian judgment debt of US$133m+ (led by Philip Riches).
Acting for Joint Liquidators in a £7m+ claim against a co-surety under a facility agreements and a guarantee and indemnity (led by Blair Leahy).
Waterfall III insolvency litigation (led by Stephen Atherton QC and Tony Beswetherick).
Advising on the potential illegality of major bank loans (amounting to US$1.8b+) to State-backed African companies.
Drafting submissions for an international bank in a High Court dispute arising out of a revolving loan and overdraft facility.
Advising Joint Liquidators in respect of preferences and transactions alleged to have been made at an undervalue.
Crédit Agricole Corporation and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou  UKPC 13: concerning the test of constructive knowledge for the purposes of determining whether a bank is a bona fide purchaser of assets without notice of a prior interest (as a Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance).
LMAA arbitration concerning a dispute over the supply of corrosive bunkers in Russia (led by Thomas Raphael QC).
Application for worldwide freezing orders in support of an arbitration concerning a US$12m credit facility for the purchase of goods (led by Michael Ashcroft QC).
£2m+ energy arbitration concerning the charter of a jack-up barge for off-shore borehole drilling.
Advising cargo interests in respect of a US$14m+ dispute over a consignment of steel coils following the hijacking and release of the vessel and raising issues of jurisdiction and sub-bailment (with David Lewis QC).
Acting for the defendant in a US$22m+ FOSFA arbitration arising out of an alleged failure to complete loading or accept cargo.
Claim for contribution arising out of a fatality during life-boat testing (led by Malcom Jarvis).
Advising brokers on interim measures in relation to a substantial claim for commission arising from the sale of a superyacht.
British America Tobacco Denmark A/S and others v Kazemir Transport BV; British America Tobacco Switzerland SA v H Essers Security Logistics BV and another  UKSC 65: concerning the jurisdiction of the English court in relation to successive carriers under the CMR Convention 1958 (as a Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance).
Bunge SA v Nibulon Trading BV  1 Lloyd's Rep 393: concerning the relationship between the discretions of first-tier tribunals and boards of appeal to admit claims that are time barred under the GAFTA arbitration rules (as a pupil).
Acting for the Liquidator of a Romanian bank in enforcement proceedings, including obtaining worldwide freezing orders in respect of complex frauds and attempts to evade a Romanian judgment debt of US$133m+ (led by Philip Riches).
Acting as junior counsel in the Waterfall III litigation, arising from an application for directions in the Lehman Brothers insolvency and raising issues of contributory rights, fiduciary duties and recharge liabilities (led by Stephen Atherton QC and Tony Beswetherick).
Advising a Trustee in Bankruptcy on the merits of an appeal and a contribution claim of £11m+ arising out of alleges breaches of fiduciary duty by a company director.
Trustees of the Olympic Airlines SA Pension and Life Assurance Scheme v Olympic Airlines SA  UKSC 27: concerning the meaning of "establishment" in EU Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (as a Judicial Assistant to Lord Mance).
Acting for a billionaire in relation to a receivership order and proceedings in the Turks and Caicos for the recovery of assets, which raise allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
£800,000 High Court claim concerning an alleged multi-stage boiler room fraud involving the sale of "fancy" coloured diamonds.
Advising in relation to fraudulent overbilling for the laying of fibre ducting.
Advising on the liability of an international charity to its institutional funders for potential fraud by its foreign partners.
Acting as sole counsel for the claimant in an on-going £2m+ energy arbitration concerning the charter of a jack-up barge for off-shore borehole drilling.
Acting as junior counsel for major national oil company in a US$300+ million UNCITRAL Arbitration in a dispute under a drilling services contract (led by Duncan Matthews QC and Edward Ho).
Six-week arbitration concerning a US$200m+ claim against a Caribbean state for breach of a development agreement, expropriation of concessions, breaches of lease and defamation (led by John Passmore QC).
Acting for an assured shipowner in respect of a US$20m+ claim under an ITC policy, following a collision in which a naval vessel sank.
Acting for vessel mortgagees in respect of a US$19m+ claim under a Mortgagees Interest Insurance (MII) policy.
Acting for an assured in respect of claims under a buildings insurance policy for alternative accommodation following water damage.
Acting for an assured in respect of claims under a buildings insurance policy for storm and flood damage to flats, including loss of rent and roof repairs.
Representing the Welsh Ministers for the consequential hearing in R (ClientEarth) (No3)) v (1) Secretary of State for Environment, Food And Rural Affairs (2) The Secretary of State for Transport and (3) Welsh Ministers  EWHC 315 (Admin), successfully resisting an extended liberty to apply order which would have by-passed the normal permission stage for subsequent judicial reviews (and was granted, exceptionally, against the Secretaries of State).
Acting for an international NGO in relation to ongoing proceedings arising out of the Bhopal gas disaster in India in 1984, considered to be the world's worst industrial disaster.
Acting for an international NGO in drafting communications to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women concerning sexual violence in South Sudan (with Monica Feria-Tinta).
Acting for Latin American market traders at a Public Inquiry concerning a Compulsory Purchase Order pursuant to a controversial £60m+ redevelopment in Tottenham and raising issues of cultural, property and children's rights (with Monica Feria-Tinta and Alistair Wooder).
Assisting the Commonwealth Secretariat in creating a Legal Knowledge Exchange Portal for countries throughout the Commonwealth.
Advising on the potential liability of an international charity to its institutional funders for potential fraud by its foreign partners.
United States of America v Nolan  UKSC 63: concerning whether the collective redundancy consulting and information obligations imposed by section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consilidation) Act 1992, implementing the EU Collective Redundancies Directive, applied to the redundancies resulting from the jure imperii decision of the United States to close a US Army watercraft repair facility at Hythe.
R (on the application of Bancoult No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  UKSC 35: concerning whether the judgment of the House of Lords in R (on the application of Bancoult No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs should be set aside on the alleged ground of material non-disclosure by the respondent and, if so, whether the appellant should be permitted to adduce fresh evidence at the rehearing of the appeal.
Keyu and others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others  UKSC 69: concerning whether there is a legal duty (under the ECHR or customary international law) to hold a public inquiry into the historic killing of unarmed civilians by a patrol of Scots Guards in Batang Kali, Malaysia. A further issue was whether the UK continued to have legal responsibility for the actions of the Scots Guards following Malaysian independence in 1957.
In the matter of an application by JR38 for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland)  UKSC 42: concerning the Article 8 implications of publishing photos from which children suspected of criminal activity could be identified.
R (on the application of Evans) and another v Attorney General  UKSC 21: concerning correspondence between The Prince of Wales and government ministers and the legality of using the power under section 53 of the Freedom of Information Act to override tribunal decisions.
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 19: concerning statelessness and an order depriving the appellant of his British citizenship.
R (on the application of Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another; R (on the application of T) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis  UKSC 9: joined appeals concerning the power to retain personal data for police purposes under Article 8 ECHR.
R (on the application of Rotherham MBC and others) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills  UKSC 6: concerning a challenge to the distribution of funds provided form EU Structural Funds and the public sector equality duty.
Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill: Reference by the Counsel General for Wales  UKSC 3: concerning whether the Welsh Assembly would, under the Government of Wales Act 2006, have legislative competence to enact the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill.
"Access to justice in the 21st century: how can it be maximised?", winner of the Jonathan Brock Memorial Essay Competition (Runner-Up) Prize 2017.
Non-Party Intervention in Investor-State Arbitration: Bernhard von Pezold v Republic of Zimbabwe, case comment in The Journal of World Investment & Trade.
The Insurer's Obligations of Good Faith and the Insurance Act 2015, in The Modern Law of Marine Insurance: Volume 4 (co-authored with Christopher Hancock QC).
Tom has given talks to law firms and clients on topics which include: EU private international law, good faith obligations in commercial contracts, entire agreement clauses, res judicata, contractual damages and shipbuilding disputes.

matches: UKSC UKSC UKPC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC UKSC


79-32,107. Penalties and interest for noncompliance, exception to penalty imposition for certain underpayments; failure of employer to deduct and withhold; failure to collect, account for and pay tax; attempts to evade or defeat tax. (a) All penalties and interest prescribed by K.S.A. 79-3228, and amendments thereto, for noncompliance with the income tax laws of Kansas shall be applicable for noncompliance with the provisions of the Kansas withholding and declaration of estimated tax act relating to withholding tax which shall be enforced in the same manner as the Kansas income tax act. A penalty at the same rate per annum prescribed by subsection (b) of K.S.A. 79-2968, and amendments thereto, for interest upon delinquent or unpaid taxes shall be applied and added to a taxpayer's amount of underpayment of estimated tax due from the date the estimated tax payment was due until the same is paid or until the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of the taxable year for which such estimated tax is a credit, whichever date is earlier, but such penalty shall not be added if the total amount thereof does not exceed $1. For purposes of this subsection, the amount of underpayment of estimated tax shall be the excess of the amount of the installment which would be required to be paid if the estimated tax were equal to 90% of the tax shown on the return for the taxable year or, if no return was filed, 90% of the tax for such year, over the amount, if any, of the installment paid on or before the last date prescribed for payment. Amounts due from any employer on account of withholding or from any taxpayer for estimated tax may be collected by the director in the manner provided for the collection of state income tax in K.S.A. 79-3235, and amendments thereto. For purposes of this subsection, "underpayment of tax" means the difference between the amount of tax actually paid and the amount of tax which would have been required to be paid to avoid penalty pursuant to subsection (b) or (c).
(3) an amount equal to 66 2/3%, in the case of individuals referred to in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 79-32,102, and amendments thereto, and 90%, in the case of all other individuals, of the tax for the taxable year computed by placing on an annualized basis, pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the secretary of revenue, the taxable income for the months in the taxable year ending before the month in which the installment is required to be made.
(2) (A) an amount equal to 90% of the tax for the taxable year computed by placing on an annualized basis the taxable income: (i) For the first three months of the taxable year, in the case of the installment required to be paid in the fourth month; (ii) for the first three months or for the first five months of the taxable year, in the case of the installment required to be paid in the sixth month; (iii) for the first six months or for the first eight months of the taxable year in the case of the installment required to be paid in the ninth month; and (iv) for the first nine months or for the first 11 months of the taxable year, in the case of the installment required to be paid in the 12th month of the taxable year.
(B) For purposes of this subsection (2), the taxable income shall be placed on an annualized basis by (i) multiplying by 12 the taxable income referred to in subsection (2)(A), and (ii) dividing the resulting amount by the number of months in the taxable year (three, five, six, eight, nine, or 11, as the case may be) referred to in subsection (2)(A).
(d) If the employer, in violation of the provisions of this act, fails to deduct and withhold under this chapter, and thereafter the tax against which such withholding may be credited is paid, the amount otherwise required to be deducted and withheld shall not be collected from the employer. This subsection shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any penalties or additions to the tax otherwise applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and withhold.
(e) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this act, who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall in addition to the other penalties of this section be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. As used in this section, "willfully" has the same meaning as such term has for federal tax purposes in 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
(f) In case of failure by any employer required by subsection (b) of K.S.A. 79-3298, and amendments thereto, to remit any amount of withheld taxes by the date prescribed therefor, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be imposed upon such person a penalty of 15% of the amount of the underpayment. For purposes of this subsection, the term "underpayment" means the excess of the amount of the tax required to be withheld and remitted over the amount, if any, remitted on or before the date prescribed therefor. The failure to remit for any withholding period shall be deemed not to continue beyond the last date prescribed for filing the annual return as required by subsection (d) of K.S.A. 79-3298, and amendments thereto. Penalty and interest as prescribed by K.S.A. 79-3228, and amendments thereto, shall not begin to accrue under subsection (a) of this section on the amount of any such underpayment until the due date of the annual return for the calendar year in which such failure to remit occurs.
(g) Whenever the secretary or the secretary's designee determines that the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the provisions of subsections (a), (e), or (f) of this section was due to reasonable causes, the secretary or the secretary's designee may waive or reduce any of said penalties and may reduce the interest rate to the underpayment rate prescribed and determined for the applicable period under section 6621 of the federal internal revenue code as in effect on January 1, 1994, upon making a record of the reasons therefor.
History: L. 1965, ch. 525, § 14; L. 1977, ch. 343, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 320, § 1; L. 1980, ch. 316, § 9; L. 1981, ch. 385, §4; L. 1983, ch. 326, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 351, § 16; L. 1989, ch. 296, § 3; L. 1993, ch. 22, § 1; L. 1994, ch. 95, § 2; L. 1997, ch. 126, § 27; L. 2010, ch. 123, § 10; Apr. 29.