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Issues of studies of the traditional material and spiritual culture of the Slav population of European Russia, and their Finnic- and Turkic-speaking neighbors, have been a priority since the time of establishment of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (1879).
Later, the Scientific Cabinet for Europe dealt with these themes; for 15 years (from 1925 till the early 1940s) it was headed by D. K. Zelenin, Associate Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
In 1943, when the Moscow part of the Institute of Ethnography was being set up, a department of Eastern Slavs’ ethnography was established, which united Slavic ethnographers in both capitals up to 1992 (i.e. before the splitting of the Institute of Ethnography into the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow and Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography in St. Petersburg). The Department was headed at different times by V. V. Bogdanov, Ye. E. Blomqvist, V. I. Chicherov, P. I. Kushner, V. K. Sokolova; it employed such prominent scientists as T. V. Stanyukovich, N. I. N. I. Hagen-Thorn, B. N. Putilov, N. V. Novikov, and A. K. Baiburin; S. N. Mogilyanskaya and others collaborated with it.
From 1961 till 1990, the Department was led by Kirill Vasilievich Chistov, Doctor of Sciences, Associate Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professor, USSR State Prize winner, one of Russia’s leading specialists in Slavic folklore and ethnography. A web resource was published for the 90th anniversary of Dr. Chistov (1919-2007), assembling printed, audio, video, and photo materials for his biography; a bibliography of his works; the texts of six of his most important books, including a collection of selected articles; a memoir book, and a book of poetry written at different times of his life.
In 1991-2005, the Department was headed by Professor T. A. Bernshtam, Doctor of Sciences, a well-known researcher of the ethnography and folklore of Eastern Slavs and ethnocultural aspects of Christianity and Church ethnography.
From 2006 till 2016, A. I. Teryukov, Candidate of Sciences, was the Head of the Department.
Aspekty buduschego po entograficheskim i folklornym materialam [sbornik nauchnykh statei] [Aspects of the future according to ethnographical and folklore materials [a collection of scientific articles]] / Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera), Russian Academy of Sciences; [Publication editor: T. B. Schepanskaya]. — St. Petersburg: MAE RAN, 2012, 356 pp., ill.
Kon’kova O. I. Etnograficheskiy atlas Leningradskoi oblasti. Albom [Ethnographical atlas of Leningrad Oblast. Album] / [Glinka N. V., Candidate of Sciences; Guzenkova T. S., Doctor of Sciences; Kon’kova O. I. et al. ]. St. Petersburg, 2015, 296 pp.
Mazalova N. Ye. Lichnost russkogo “znayuschego”: etnograficheskiye aspekty issledovaniya ]Personality of a Russian “Wise One”: Ethnographical aspects of research]. St. Petersburg, Peterburgskoye vostokovedeniye, 2011.
Melnikova Ye. A. “Voobrazhaemaya kniga”: ocherki po istorii folklora o knigakh i chtenii v Rossii [“An “imaginary book”: Essays of the history of folklore on books and reading in Russia]. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo Evropeiskogo un-ta v S.-Peterburge, 2011, 182 pp. (Studia Ethnologica. Issue 8).
Salmin A. K. Prazdniki, obryady i verovaniya chuvashskogo naroda [Feasts, rites, and beliefs of the Chuvash people]. Cheboksary: Chuvash Book Publishers, 2016, 688 pp.
Salmin A. K. Traditsionnye obryady i verovaniya chuvashei [Traditional rites and beliefs of the Chuvash people] / Scientific editor: I. M. Steblin-Kamensky, Member of the RAS. – St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2010, 240 pp.
Salmin A. K. Encyclopedia of Chuvash Folk Rites and Beliefs. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2011. – 408 p.
Salmin A. K. (under editing) Traditsionnaya kultura chuvashei. Teksty. Materialy nauchnogo arkhiva Chuvashskogo gosudarstvennogo instituta gumanitarnykh nauk [Traditional Chuvash culture. Texts. Materals of the research archive of the Chuvash State Institute of Humanities]. St. Petersburg: Faculty of Philology, St. Petersburg University, 2014, 368 pp.
Teryukov A. I. Istoriya etnograficheskogo izucheniya narodov komi. Monografiya [History of ethnographical study of the Komi peoples. A mongraph]. MAE RAN. Lema Press, St. Petersburg, 2011, 514 pp.
“Uvedi menya, doroga”: sbornik statei pamyati T. A. Bernshtam [Lead me away, my road: A collection of articles in memory of T. A. Bernshtam] / Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera), Russian Academy of Sciences [ed. by N. Ye. Mazalova et al.]. – St. Petersburg: MAE RAN, 2010, 457 pp.,  ill. plates, portrait: ill., image.
Folklor i etnografiya. K devyanostoletiyu so dnya rozhdeniya K. V. Chistova: [sbornik nauchnykh statei] [Folklore and ethnography. For the 90th anniversary of K. V. Chistov [a collection of scientific articles]] / Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera), Russian Academy of Sciences; [Publication editors: A. K. Baiburin, T. B. Schepanskaya]. – St. Petersburg: MAE RAN, 2011, 315 pp., illustrations.
Schepanskaya T. D. Sravnitelnaya etnografiya professiy: povsednevnye praktiki i kulturnye kody (Rossiya, konets XIX – nachalo XXI v.) [Comparative ethnography of occupations: Everyday practices and cultural codes (Russia, late 19th – early 21st century] / T. B. Schepanskaya; Peter the Great Museum Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera, Russian Academy of Sciences. – St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2010, 338 pp.
Kon’kova O. I., Romanova N. Ye. Izhorskaya traditsionnaya kukla [Traditional Ingrian dolls]. 2nd edition, extended and amended. St. Petersburg, 2011, 80 pp., col. ill.
Kon’kova O. I. (jointly with L. S. Lavrentieva and L. A. Saksa) Korennye narody Leningradskoi oblasti (informatsionno-spravochnoye izdaniye dlya detei) [Indigenous peoples of Leningrad Oblast (information and reference book for children)]. St. Petersburg, 2014, MAE RAN, 84 pp.
Kon’kova O. I. Inkeroin keel. Uchebnoye posobiye po izhorskomu yazyku [Ingrian language learning guide]. St. Petersburg, 2014, MAE RAN, 84 pp.
Kon’kova O. I. Vad’d’a ceeli. Uchebnoye posobiye po vodskomu yazyku [Votic language learning guide]. St. Petersburg, 2014, MAE RAN, 84 pp.
Kon’kova O. I. Izhora. Ocherki istorii I kultury [Izhora. History and culture: Essays]. 3rd edition, extended and amended. St. Petersburg, 2013, 252 pp.
Kon’kova O. I. Izhorskaya traditsionnaya kukla (sovmestno s N. Ye. Romanovoi) [Traditional Ingrian dolls (jointly with N. Ye. Romanova)]. 3rd edition, extended and amended. St. Petersburg, 2013, 64 pp., col. ill.
Kon’kova O. I. Traditsionnye prazdniki narodov Ingermanlandii [Traditional feasts of the peoples of Ingria]. St. Petersburg, 2011, 340 pp.
Kon’kova O. I. Uchebnoye posobiye po vodskomu i izhorskomu yazyku [Votic and Ingrian language learning guide]. St. Petersburg, 2015. A. S. Pushkin Leningrad Oblast University Press, 108 pp.
Kon’kova O. I., Romanova N. Ye. Vodskaya traditsionnaya kukla [Traditional Votic dolls]. 2nd edition, extended and amended. St. Petersburg, 2011, 80 pp, col. ill.

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record, or forward a bet or an offer to bet.
conducting of a lottery or the playing of gambling devices.
charged to play the game or device once or $5, whichever is less.
buildings, transportation facilities, and shops.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
74th Leg., ch. 318, § 19, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
recreational event conducted by the Parks and Wildlife Department.
from the definition of "gambling device" under Section 47.01(4)(B).
eff. Nov. 10, 1981;  Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 957, § 2, eff. Jan.
Leg., ch. 774, § 2, eff. Aug. 30, 1993.  Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.
20, eff. Sept. 1, 1995;  Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 931, § 79, eff.
June 16, 1995;  Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1256, § 124, eff. Sept.
evidence of participation in any lottery.
1987;  Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
expectation that it be so used.
Amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 667, ch. 251, § 1, eff. Aug.
1989.  Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
violation of Section 14.01 of that Act.
subassembly or essential part of a gambling device.
knows is designed as a subassembly or essential part of such device.
transfers commercially, or possesses gambling paraphernalia.
chance of winning is the same for all participants.
or use of the device, equipment, or paraphernalia was legal.
territorial waters of this state to call at a port in this state.
Amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 668, ch. 251, § 2, eff. Aug.
29, 1977;  Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 1865, ch. 741, § 1, eff. Aug.
29, 1977;  Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 167, § 5.01(a)(48), eff.
eff. Sept. 1, 1993;  Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff.
evidence that the event occurred.
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
(c)  For purposes of this section, "adjudicatory proceeding"
Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
the territorial waters of this state.
1994.  Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, § 14.54, eff.
2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1420, § 14.835, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1030, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1989.


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The application for stay of execution of the sentence of death presented to JUSTICE POWELL and by him referred to the Court is denied.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231, 2950, 2973 (1976), we would grant the application for stay in order to give applicant time to file a petition for writ of certiorari, and would grant the petition and vacate the death sentence in this case.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting from the denial of the application for stay of execution.
Roy Allen Stewart was convicted of first-degree murder in Dade County circuit court and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983). The governor signed Stewart's death warrant. Stewart filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court stayed the execution, held an evidentiary hearing, and denied the petition. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Stewart v. State, 481 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1985).
ments because capital punishment is imposed disproportionately on prisoners whose victims were members of the white race. This question is similar to those presented in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, and Hitchcock v. Wainwright, No. 85-6756, cases that are to be argued before this Court on October 15, 1986. The Florida Supreme Court denied Stewart's motion and application for stay, ruling that "Stewart did not raise this claim in his previous 3.850 motion, and he is procedurally barred from raising it in this petition." Stewart v. Wainwright, 494 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla., 1986). Stewart then filed a second motion for post- conviction relief and application for stay in circuit court, raising the McCleskey/Hitchcock claim. The circuit court denied the petition and stay application. State v. Stewart, No. 79-6621, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 26, 1986 ). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's finding of a procedural bar, reasoning that Stewart had shown no justification for his failure to raise the McCleskey/Hitchcock claim in his first motion for post-conviction relief. Stewart v. State, 495 So.2d 164, 165 (1986).
On October 1, 1986, Stewart filed an application for stay of execution pending filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court. A majority of this Court today denies that application. Because this denial may rest, in part, on an incomplete application of the doctrine of procedural default, as recently set forth in Smith v. Murray, --- U.S . ___ (1986), I respectfully dissent.
Smith requires that, before refusing to consider a state prisoner's constitutional challenge to his conviction and sentence on the ground of procedural default, a federal court must answer two separate questions: ( 1) As a matter of state law, is consideration of the claim foreclosed by a valid procedural bar? and (2) As a matter of federal law, notwithstanding the state procedural bar, would rejection of the claim result in a " fundamental miscarriage of justice?" Id. at 2668.
"As we noted in Engle and reaffirmed in Carrier, " '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' " Murray v. Carrier, supra, --- U.S., at ___, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S., [ 107] at 135 [, 1576 (1982) ]. Accordingly, 'where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.' Murray v. Carrier, supra, ___ U.S. ___.
"We acknowledge that the concept of 'actual,' as distinct from 'legal,' innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense. Nonetheless, we think it clear on this record that application of the cause and prejudice test will not result in a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.' Engle, 456 U.S., at 135 . There is no allegation that the testimony about the school bus incident was false or in any way misleading. Nor can it be argued that the prospect that Dr. Pile might later testify against him had the effect of foreclosing meaningful exploration of psychiatric defenses. While that concern is a very real one in the abstract, here the record clearly shows that Dr. Pile did ask petitioner to discuss the crime he stood accused of committing as well as prior incidents of deviant sexual conduct. Although initially reluctant to do so, ultimately petitioner was forthcoming on both subjects. In short, the alleged constitutional error neither precluded the development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of false ones . Thus, even assuming that, as a legal matter, Dr. Pile's testimony should not have been presented to the jury, its admission did not serve to pervert the jury's deliberations concerning the ultimate question whether in fact petitioner constituted a continuing threat to society. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that refusal to consider the defaulted claim on federal habeas carries with it the risk of a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id., at 2668.
In this case, Roy Allen Stewart predicates his application for a stay of execution on a claim that "because the State of Florida has applied its capital sentencing statute in an arbitrary and capricious manner by allowing race to determine, in significant part, who will receive the death penalty, his sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." * As noted, his claim is similar to the claims advanced by the petitioners in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, and Hitchcock v. Wainwright, No. 85-6756.
As a matter of Florida law, it appears that Stewart's claim is procedurally barred. No one, however, has yet carried out the second inquiry mandated by Smith: whether as a matter of federal law the refusal to consider his claim on the merits would constitute a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" if, as Stewart asserts, the fact that his victim was a member of the white race was a critical element in the decision to impose the death sentence upon him. No federal court has yet decided whether this claimed racially discriminatory factor, in the Court's words in Smith, served "to pervert the jury's deliberations concerning the ultimate question" whether he should be put to death.
Today the Court declines to grant Stewart's application for stay of execution even though his procedurally barred claims, if true, raise profoundly serious and as yet unresolved questions about the federal constitutionality of his capital sentence. Arguably, the Court's decision is justified by the facts that this case comes to us as a request for review of the Florida courts' denial of collateral relief and the " fundamental miscarriage of justice" inquiry can better be performed by a federal district court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding which Stewart may now commence. Nevertheless, in order to make sure that this critical inquiry may be performed before the case becomes moot, I would stay Stewart's execution until the Court has decided the McCleskey and Hitchcock cases.
[Footnote *] Application for Stay of Execution Pending Filing and Disposition of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, filed in the Supreme Court of the United States on October 1, 1986, App. at 10 ( Brief to the Supreme Court of Florida on Appeal from the Denial of Motion for Post-Conviction Relief).

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NICHOLAS R. LAMB, WEXFORD, LORIE CUNNINGHAM, DR. STEVE MEEKS, DR. F. AHMED, CLANDIA DOWTY, SHERRY COLLINS, MS. BROOKS, JANE DOE NURSE #1, JANE DOE NURSE #2, JANE DOE NURSE #3, JOHN DOE CORRECTION OFFICERS #1, JOHN DOE CORRECTION OFFICERS #2, JOHN DOE CORRECTION OFFICERS #3, and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
MICHAEL J. REAGAN CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Plaintiff James E. Dunmore, an inmate currently housed at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”), filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other things, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have exhibited deliberate indifference to his chronic back pain. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
Plaintiff underwent back surgery in 2011. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The back surgery left Plaintiff confined to a wheelchair. Id. Additionally, because of his back condition, Plaintiff suffers from serious “physical pain” and “nerve damage pain.” Id. In 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence. Id. At that time, Lawrence physicians prescribed Tramadol (100 milligrams three times a day) and Neurontin (900 milligrams in the morning and afternoon and 1200 milligrams in the evening) to control Plaintiff's pain. (Doc. 1, p. 6). According to Plaintiff, this pain management regimen effectively controlled his pain. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he is a mental health patient and that this pain management regimen was an important aspect of controlling his stress and anxiety. Id.
Tramadol is a controlled medication. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff went to the Health Care Unit to obtain his midday dose from the nurses on duty. Id. On September 14, 2017, Dr. Ahmed told Plaintiff “the nurses no longer want [Plaintiff] to come to the Health Care Unit to receive his 12 noon pain meds, and wanted him (Dr. Ahmed) to take [Plaintiff] off his 12 noon dosage.” Id. Plaintiff objected, stating that Dr. Ahmad, and not the nurses, should be making decisions about Plaintiff's medication. Id. Dr. Ahmed explained that, even though he was the medical director, he needed to get along with the nurses because they run the Health Care Unit. Id. Accordingly, to avoid conflict, Dr. Ahmed complied with the nurses' request. (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Immediately after relaying this information, Dr. Ahmad had Plaintiff speak with Nurse Brooks, “so she [could] tell [Plaintiff] just what was going to take place from this point, not the doctor.” Id. Nurse Brooks told Plaintiff that, from now on, he would receive his pain medication in two doses - morning and night. Id. Plaintiff objected, telling Nurse Brooks that his prior physicians prescribed the noon dosage to address breakthrough pain. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff told Nurse Brooks that taking the same amount of medication in two (as opposed to three) doses would require Plaintiff to take too much medication at one time. Id. The Complaint suggests that Nurse Brooks disregarded Plaintiff's concerns. (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 21-22).
For the next few days, Plaintiff submitted several sick call requests regarding back pain, but did not receive a response. (Doc. 1, p. 7). At approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 19, 2017, Plaintiff began experiencing severe pain. Id. He spoke with the on-duty correctional officer, who said he would place Plaintiff on the sick call list. Id. Then, on the evening of September 19, 2017, Plaintiff spoke with Jane Doe #1 (described in the body of the Complaint as the on duty nurse responsible for delivering medication to inmates) about his severe back pain. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Jane Doe #1 said she would place Plaintiff on the sick call list, but declined to give Plaintiff additional pain medication. Id. Plaintiff waited all day on September 20, 2017, but was not called to see a physician. Id.
On September 21, 2017,  Plaintiff called a family member, Ms. Machado, and explained that he was in severe pain but had not been called to see a physician. Id. Ms. Machado contacted Assistant Warden Brookhart and told him Plaintiff was in extreme pain and, despite several requests, had yet to receive medical attention. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Assistant Warden Brookhart said he would make sure Plaintiff received the necessary medical care. Id. Ms. Machado also called “IDOC in Springfield.” Id. “The IDOC told Ms. Machado that they would contact the Warden.” Id. The following day, Warden Brookhart called Ms. Machado and, once again, assured her Plaintiff would be given access to a doctor. Id.
On September 23, 2017, Plaintiff “broke down and began screaming as a result of the pain he was experiencing.” (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). A correctional officer contacted the Health Care Unit and learned that, per Assistant Warden Brookhart, Plaintiff was supposed to have been seen by a doctor on the previous day. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff was taken to the Health Care Unit to be seen by Dr. Ahmed. Id.
During this visit, Dr. Ahmed reiterated that the nurses did not want him to prescribe midday pain medication for Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 23-24). Dr. Ahmed said he did not want to upset the nurses or have any problems with them. Id. Dr. Ahmed then spoke with Plaintiff's ADA Assistant, telling him the same thing. Id. When Plaintiff objected, Dr. Ahmed contemplated prescribing Tylenol-3. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. Ahmed that, like Tramadol, Tylenol-3 was a controlled medication. Id. Accordingly, Tylenol-3 also had to be dispensed by the nurses. Id. Dr. Ahmed told Plaintiff he would have to speak with one of the nurses. (Doc. 1, p. 24). Shortly after Dr. Ahmed made that statement, Nurse Collins entered the examination room, “telling the doctor what to do.” Id. Ultimately, Dr. Ahmed did not prescribe Tylenol-3 (or any other midday pain medication). (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 24). Instead, “once again Dr. Ahmed did as the nurses told him.” (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Plaintiff submitted emergency grievances to Warden Lamb on September 21, 22, and 23. (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 21-26). In the grievances, Plaintiff claimed as follows: (1) following back surgery in 2011, Plaintiff had been “confined to a wheelchair with both physical and serious nerve damage pain;” (2) between 2011 and 2017 he had an effective pain management regimen, which had been prescribed by previous physicians; (3) on September 14, 2017, Dr. Ahmed and various nurses withdrew Plaintiff's midday Tramadol prescription for nonmedical reasons; and (4) the change in Plaintiff's pain management regimen was causing Plaintiff severe pain. (Doc. 1, pp. 21-26). Warden Lamb concluded the grievances were not an emergency and directed Plaintiff to submit his grievances in the normal manner. Id.
Between September and November, Plaintiff continued to experience pain and submitted numerous sick call requests. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11). He also “stop[p]ed everyone that he [saw] to try and get him to see a doctor for the pain he [had] been suffering with because Defendants at the Health Care Unit failed to adequately manage [his] pain.” (Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff claims that the ongoing pain put his “mental stability in question[, ]” requiring him to contact his mental health specialist. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Plaintiff was not given access to the Health Care Unit again until November 15, 2017. The examining nurse “Jane Doe” expressed annoyance and asked what Plaintiff was crying about. (Doc. 1, p. 11). She then said Plaintiff should see the doctor on November 16, 2017. However, Plaintiff was not called to see the doctor on November 16, 2017.
In connection with the above allegations, Plaintiff states that he is pursuing claims for deliberate indifference, failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-18). Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Before outlining Plaintiff's claims, the Court finds it appropriate to address Plaintiff's failure to include sufficiently specific allegations against Health Care Unit Administrator Cunningham, IDOC Medical Director Meeks, Nurse Dowty, Jane Doe Nurse #2, Jane Doe Nurse #3, and the three groups of John Doe Correction Officers. Plaintiffs are required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Where a plaintiff does not include a defendant in his statement of claim, or includes only conclusory legal statements against him, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements”). Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. Collins, 143 F.3d at 334. And in the case of those defendants in supervisory positions, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
As is set forth more fully below, the Complaint does not include sufficiently specific allegations as to Health Care Unit Administrator Cunningham, IDOC Medical Director Meeks, Nurse Dowty, Jane Doe Nurse #2, Jane Doe Nurse #3, or the John Doe Correction Officers. As such, these defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.


text:
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These data protection regulations were last updated on 24 September 2018.

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Devon Wendall Baer, Pro Se.
Thomas L. Strickland, United States Attorney and Sean Connelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Mr. Baer also appears to make the separate but related argument that he holds full civil rights under the state constitution despite his prior felony conviction, thus making him ineligible for prosecution under sections 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20). Section 922(g)(1) provides that a person convicted of a felony in state or federal court cannot "ship or transport in interstate . . . commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or . . . receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate . . . commerce."(4) Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), a prior felony conviction cannot be used as a predicate felony for purposes of section 922(g) if it has been expunged or set aside, or if it is one for which a person has been pardoned, or if the person has had civil rights restored. United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 533 (10th Cir. 1994).
Mr. Baer contends that sections 922(g)(1) and 922(k) are unconstitutional as violative of the Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. Const. amend. IX. The circuits have uniformly rejected the argument that the Ninth Amendment encompasses "an unenumerated, fundamental, individual right to bear firearms." San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1041 (5th Cir. 1996). We agree and reject Mr. Baer's contention that the federal firearms statutes violate the Ninth Amendment.
Mr. Baer also makes the time-worn argument that his conviction violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held that "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.'" Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). The Court in Lewis concluded that federal legislation regulating the receipt and possession of firearms by felons "do[es] not trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties," including those guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Id. In light of this authority, the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutionality of federal weapons regulations like section 922(g) absent evidence that they in any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated militia. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Wright, 117 F.3d at 1271-74 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which bars possession of machine gun, against Second Amendment challenge); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018-1020 (same); United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding Switchblade Knife Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1242, against Second Amendment challenge); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (upholding 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which bars possession of unregistered machine gun, against Second Amendment challenge). Mr. Baer's prosecution did not violate the Second Amendment.
Finally, we turn to Mr. Baer's argument that he was the victim of vindictive prosecution. "To establish a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, the defendant must prove either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness." United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997). If the defendant meets this burden, the government must present legitimate reasons to justify its decision to prosecute. Id.
A brief review of the record pertinent to Mr. Baer's claim reveals that the indictment in this case was originally filed in 1988. However, Mr. Baer fled the jurisdiction and began living in Florida under an assumed name. Once the government discovered his whereabouts after he was arrested on gun charges, he was brought to Colorado and tried on the instant charges. Mr. Baer believes that the instant prosecution was undertaken at the behest of Florida officials.(7) The government countered with a representation by the prosecuting attorney made as an officer of the court that he had not been urged by anyone to proceed with the case and that he made the decision to pursue prosecution solely on the basis of Mr. Baer's outstanding indictment.
Mr. Baer has offered nothing other than conjecture and speculation to support his contention, and his theories fall far short of proving either actual vindictiveness or a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. The trial court therefore properly rejected this claim.
We AFFIRM Mr. Baer's convictions.
1. Mr. Baer proceeds on appeal pro se and his 45 page brief is handwritten. We have attempted to frame his arguments as succinctly and as accurately as possible in light of the proceedings below, in which Mr. Baer also appeared pro se.
2. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
3. The Supremacy Clause states in relevant part that "[T]he laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
4. It is undisputed that Mr. Baer was previously convicted of a felony in Utah state court.
5. Mr. Baer also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the admission of the Utah constitution into evidence. Again we disagree. As we discuss above, state law is relevant only to determining whether Mr. Baer's prior state conviction is admissible to support his section 922(g)(1) prosecution. We held in Flower that this is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. Flower, 29 F.3d at 536. Accordingly the court here did not err in refusing to place the state constitution before the jury. We note that the trial court did consider the state constitution and other state statutory materials offered by Mr. Baer in deciding that his state felony could support the section 922(g)(1) charge.
6. Mr. Baer also makes an undeveloped argument that his prosecution violated the Tenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment are mirror images. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). A holding that a Congressional enactment does not violate the Commerce Clause is therefore dispositive of a Tenth Amendment challenge. In light of our rejection of Mr. Baer's Commerce Clause argument, we reject his Tenth Amendment argument as well.
Also woven through his arguments is Mr. Baer's assertion that federal firearms regulation denies convicted felons the equal protection of the laws. This argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court, see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 & n.8 (1980), and is thus without merit.
7. Mr. Baer supports his contention by asserting that a state trooper who appeared as a witness in the instant trial committed perjury. We will not credit such an accusation when, as here, it is grounded only on the fact that the witness' testimony conflicted with that of Mr. Baer.


1 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West 1964).
2 See State v. Sharp, 182 So.2d 517, 518 (La. 1966).
3 The state board of medical examiners was empowered to revoke the license of a physician who performed an abortion “unless [the procedure was] done for the relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation with another licensed physician.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1285(6) (West 1964). In Rosen v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217, 1225 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973), the court construed §§ 14:87 and 37:1285(6) in pari materia and upheld their constitutionality.
4 See Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 380 F.Supp. 875 (E.D. La. 1974), summarily affirmed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975); Weeks v. Connick, Civil Action No. 73-469 (E.D. La. 1976), summarily affirmed sub nom. Guste v. Weeks, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977). Prior to Roe, the Louisiana Supreme Court consistently rejected attacks on the constitutionality of § 14:87. See State v. Campbell, 270 So.2d 506 (La. 1972); State v. Scott, 255 So.2d 736 (La. 1971); State v. Shirley, 237 So.2d 676 (La. 1970); State v. Pesson, 235 So.2d 568 (La. 1970).
5 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6 See Weeks v. Connick, 733 F.Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990).
7 1991 La. Acts, No. 26, codified as La Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West 2004).
8 See Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F.Supp. 930 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
9 See 2006 La. Acts Pub. Act 467, § 2 (signed June 17, 2006).
10 Id. § 1 (adding § 1299.30 to the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated).
11 Apart from § 14.87, it is unlikely that Louisiana’s post-viability statute, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 2005), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions because it allows such abortions to be performed to preserve the pregnant woman’s life or health, health not being defined in the statute. In interpreting the undefined health exception in the pre-Roe District of Columbia abortion statute, the Supreme Court held that “the general usage and modern understanding of the word ‘health’ . . . includes psychological as well as physical well-being.” United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (in determining whether an abortion is medically necessary, “all factors– physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age–relevant to the well-being of the patient” may be considered). There would be few, if any, abortions that could not be justified on psychological or emotional grounds.


Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC (1st Cir. Oct. 11, 2017).
Plaintiffs Richard Goren, a Massachusetts attorney, his company Small Justice LLC, and Christian DuPont had sued defendants Xcentric Ventures, LLC and Ripoff Report.com for copyright infringement, libel, interference with a contract, and violation of Massachusetts’ unfair competition statute. Goren had represented DuPont in an unrelated matter; DuPont had subsequently authored two reports critical of Goren and posted them to Ripoff Report, a “consumer protection” website owned by Xcentric that allows users to post complaints about companies or individuals. As part of the posting process, the user grants Ripoff Report an irrevocable exclusive license to the copyright, and further warns users that, once posted, the post will not be taken down even at the request of the poster. When DuPont failed to appear in the libel suit that resulted, Goren was granted an injunction prohibiting DuPont from publishing the reports, and was awarded ownership of the copyright of the reports. He then filed the suit that is the subject of this appeal, seeking the enjoin Ripoff Report from continuing to post the complaints and to require them to take all actions necessary to have cached versions and links removed from Bing, Google, and Yahoo.
Xcentric moved to dismiss the complaint, which Judge Casper granted in part. Specifically, Judge Casper dismissed the libel, tortious interference, and parts of the unfair competition counts as blocked by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which shields interactive computer service providers from liability for information provided by another content provider. The court rejected Goren’s argument that, by holding itself out as the copyright holder and by having “directed” internet search engines to list the postings, Ripoff Report itself became the information provider. Following discovery, Judge Casper granted Xcentric summary judgment on the remaining copyright and Ch. 93A claims, finding the “browsewrap” license conclusive on the copyright claims. Judge Casper modified the judgment to find that the browsewrap license failed to meet the requirements of transferring an exclusive copyright license, and that only an irrevocable non-exclusive license had been granted; this distinction did not, however, change the outcome. Finally, Judge Casper awarded $124,000 in fees and costs to Xcentric pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of the libel and tortious interference claims de novo and affirmed. The § 230 immunity is to be liberally construed, to prevent deterrence of on-line speech; so construed, Xcentric could not be considered to be “responsible … for the creation” of the information, and immunity would apply. Continuing to apply de novo review, the Court affirmed the copyright decision, rejecting Goren’s argument that the license “contract” failed because no consideration was given to DuPont – while consideration is necessary to support an irrevocable license, actually posting the complaints was sufficient consideration under the circumstances. Notably, the Court determined that it need not decide whether a browsewrap agreement can satisfy the exclusive license writing requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 204, leaving this issue open in the First Circuit.
The Court found no fault with Judge Casper’s characterization of the legal and factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims as “at best questionable,” with its noting that Xcentric fought the case for more than two years without the prospect of a damage award, or with its determination that Xcentric prevailed on all counts. Finally, the Court noted that a showing of bad faith on the plaintiffs’ part is not a requirement for a fee award pursuant to the statute. The fee award was thus affirmed as well.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 17, 2017 Categories Appeal, Attorneys' Fees, Copyright, Motion to Dismiss, Summary JudgmentLeave a comment on Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC (1st Cir. Oct. 11, 2017).
Philpot v. Kinder et al. (17-cv-11991).
Larry Philpot, a professional concert and event photographer from Indiana, sued Encore Unlimited, Inc., Printed Guitar Picks Limited, and numerous individuals for copyright infringement. Philpot alleges the defendants uploaded photographs he had taken of Carlos Santana, Neil Young, and Kid Rock, printing them on guitar picks, and advertising and selling them through their own websites as well as on Ebay. He seeks liability for reproduction and public display, as well as for unfair and deceptive trade practices under M.G.L. Ch. 93A. Philpot further alleges that the copyright infringement was willful, based (solely, it appears) on his allegation that the defendants tried to hide their identities by registering their domains under aliases. A review of one of the defendant’s websites (www.printedguitarpicks.com) reveals that the company allows customers to upload pictures to be printed on guitar picks, while also offering stock pictures of various artists; it is unclear from the complaint whether the former or the latter are the subject of the suit. For the latter, the website indicates that all customers submitting photographs warrant that they obtained permission from the copyright holder; it will be interesting to see whether this clause affects the willfulness decision.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 16, 2017 Categories Complaint, Copyright, Willful InfringementLeave a comment on Philpot v. Kinder et al. (17-cv-11991).
DSI Assignments, LLC v. American Road Products, Inc. et al. (17-cv-11963).
DSI Assignments sued American Road Products, Installernet, Inc., Anthony Frangiosa, Stephen Witt, and unknown Does 1-100 for trademark infringement and dilution, false designation of origin, false advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. DSI brought suit for the benefit of creditors of Pearl Automation, Inc., which made driver assistance technology, including a rear view camera contained in a license plate frame that broadcast the video to a cell phone mounted in the vehicle. DSI alleges that Pearl entered into a sales/distribution agreement with InstallerNet whereby InstallerNet was to purchase Pearl’s entire remaining inventory. InstallerNet’s president, Frangiosa, directed delivery of these products to American Road Products; when questioned about this by Pearl, Frangiosa represented that the two entities were “the same company” and that he owned both entities. Pearl was never paid for the inventory, and subsequently ceased operations. DSI subsequently learned that, during the time that InstallerNet placed its order for the remaining inventory, its registration in Massachusetts as a foreign corporation had been suspended. DSI contends that Frangiola and InstallerNet’s other shareholders (Witt and Does 1-100) are not shielded by the corporate form and are individually liable. DSI further contends that American Road Products is an unfunded sham corporation that was set up for the sole purpose of shielding InstallerNet and its shareholders from liability, and that no such shielding should be allowed.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 12, 2017 Categories Complaint, TrademarkLeave a comment on DSI Assignments, LLC v. American Road Products, Inc. et al. (17-cv-11963).
Abiomed, Inc v. Maquet Cardiovascular, LLC (16-cv-10914).
Abiomed sued Maquet seeking a declaratory judgment that its Impella intracardiac heart pumps do not infringe Maquet’s patents, and Maquet counterclaimed for infringement. Abiomed, believing that Maquet’s parent company, Getinge AB, controls the litigation, moved to compel the deposition of Abraham Roani, Getinge’s General Counsel, on valuation, commercialization, validity and enfoceability of the patents-in-suit. Maquet opposed, arguing that any information Roani has would be protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and Maquet offered a non-attorney alternative witness. Magistrate Judge Boal, noting the red flags that are raised by the noticing of deposition of the opposing party’s attorney, referred to the Shelton test adopted by the Eight Circuit, which requires there be no other means to obtain the sought information, the information be relevant and non-privileged, and the information be crucial to the development of the case. She found that Abiomed had not met the first of these criteria, particularly given the proffer of a non-attorney witness, and denied the motion without prejudice.
Maquet fared better with its motion to compel. Abiomed unsuccessfully sought to limit production to documents relating to features of the accused products that are alleged to meet the claim limitations, rather than technical information on all features of the accused products. While Judge Boal compelled production of documents related to the accused products and not just the accused features, she sided with Abiomed that requests seeking all documents “related to” particular topics were overly broad, and limited these requests to the specific examples of types of documents contained in the requests. Finally, Judge Boal required Abiomed to produce technical documents that predate the six-year limitation on damages period set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 286, because such documents go to infringement and not just to damages.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 11, 2017 October 30, 2017 Categories discovery, Patent, PrivilegeLeave a comment on Abiomed, Inc v. Maquet Cardiovascular, LLC (16-cv-10914).
Purdue Pharma LP et al. v. Collegium Pharmaceutical, Inc. (17-cv-11923).
Purdue Pharma sued Collegium for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,522,919 and 9,073,933, which relate to oxycodone hydrochloride compositions and formulations. The suit is based on Collegium’s submission of a supplemental New Drug Application seeking approval for revised labeling for Collegium’s Xtampza® oxycodone extended release capsules. Purdue has been pursuing claims against Xtampza® for some time now, beginning in March 2015, and most recently on September 21, 2017, as discussed here.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 10, 2017 Categories Complaint, PatentLeave a comment on Purdue Pharma LP et al. v. Collegium Pharmaceutical, Inc. (17-cv-11923).
Judge Gorton consolidated seven different antitrust actions against Uber for pretrial purposes. Each complaint asserted substantially similar claims and operative facts and involved the same defendants. The main difference in the lawsuits related to alleged violations of local transportation ordinances, and the different cases generally grouped cab companies from individual cities or towns together – I previously commented on the Boston action here. Judge Gorton reserved the question of whether to consolidate the cases for trial. He also set a schedule for Uber’s motion to dismiss, indicating that a decision will issue on the request for dismissal by the end of the year.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on October 10, 2017 Categories Antitrust1 Comment on Malden Transportation, Inc. et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc. et al. (16-cv-12538).