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[265 U.S. 14, 15] Messrs. R. Bruce Scott, of Chicago, Ill., and Timothy B. Clark, of Omaha, Neb., for appellant Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
Messrs. Wymer Dressler, of Omaha, Neb., and R. N. Van Doren and F. W. Sargent, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
Messrs. Richard L. Kennedy, of Chicago, Ill., Wymer Dressler, of Omaha, Neb., and R. N. Van Doren and F. W. Sargent, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.
Messrs. George W. Ayres, of Lincoln, Neb., and Hugh La Master, of Tecumseh, Neb., for appellees.
These are bills in equity brought to restrain the collection of taxes upon the respective railroad companies for the year 1922 on the ground that the farm lands in Nebraska were systematically and intentionally undervalued while the railroad properties were valued at their full worth and more. After a hearing by three Judges sitting under section 266 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. 1243), it was held that the plaintiffs 'had an adequate remedy at law under the statutes of the State of Nebraska in prosecuting error proceedings to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska' and for that reason a preliminary injunction was denied. Appeals were taken and the correctness of the above ruling is the only question here. It is not disputed that the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State are purely judicial, so that Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 , 29 Sup. Ct. 67, does not apply to this case. Bacon v. Rutland R. R. Co., 232 U.S. 134 , 34 Sup. Ct. 283; Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 48 , 43 S. Sup. Ct. 466.
If an action to recover the payment were allowed, the suit might be brought in the Courts of the United States, under the usual conditions, as well as in those of the State. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 486 , 33 S. Sup. Ct. 942. But the writ of error of course can be sued out only in the State, and a remedy in the State Courts only has been held not to be enough. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 516 , 18 S. Sup. Ct. 418; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain ( D. C.) 253 Fed. 123, 136; Franklin v. Nevada-California Power Co. (C. C. A .) 264 Fed. 643, 645. That however is not the only objection. On a writ of error the Court is confined to the record. The most that it could do, it would seem, would be, if errors appeared on the face of the record, to set aside an excessive valuation and remit the matter to the same Board to try again, which is hardly satisfactory, if the Board is seeking to evade the law. United States v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128, 133 , 134 S., 40 Sup. Ct. 100. When such a charge as the present is made it can be tried fully and fairly only by a Court that can hear any and all competent evidence, and that is not bound by findings of [265 U.S. 14, 17] the implicated board for which there is any evidence, always easily procuced. We are of opinion that there is jurisdiction in equity over the case stated by the bill and that therefore the Judges 'should dispose of the application for a temporary injunction on the merits and otherwise proceed with the suit in regular course.' Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 287 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 510.

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On September 9, 2010, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause to Robert Leigh Kale, M.D. (Registrant), of Fort Smith, Arkansas.
The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Registrant's DEA Certificate of Registration, BK9514375, as a practitioner in Schedules II through V, on the ground that he does "not have authority to practice medicine or handle controlled substances in the state of Arkansas." Show Cause Order at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The Show Cause Order alleged that as a result of action by the Arkansas State Medical Board, Registrant was "without authority to handle controlled substances in the State of Arkansas, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA," and that therefore, his registration was subject to revocation. Id. (citing cases). The Show Cause Order also notified Registrant of his right to request a hearing on the allegations or to submit a written statement in lieu of a hearing, the procedure for doing either, and the consequence for failing to do either. Id. at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43).
On September 10, 2010, the Government initially attempted to serve the Show Cause Order on Registrant by certified mail to him at the address of his registered location. However, the mailing was returned and marked "Returned to Sender" and "Vacant." GX E. The Government then attempted to serve the Show Cause Order by certified mail to him at his last known address in Oklahoma, where he also previously held a state license. GXs C & F. However, this package was returned as "unclaimed." GX F.
On October 21, 2010, the Government then sent the Show Cause Order as an attachment to an e-mail which was sent to Respondent at an address that he had previously provided to DEA. GX G. In the accompanying e-mail, the Government wrote: "Upon receiving this, please confirm receipt via email." Id. According to the Government's counsel, he "has not received a response to this e-mail." Req. for Final Agency Action at 2. The Government's counsel further represents that upon sending the e-mail, he did not receive an error message or a message that the e-mail was undeliverable. Govt's Statement Regarding Service of the Order to Show Cause, at 1.
On January 7, 2011, the Government filed a Request for Final Agency Action and the Investigative Record with this Office. Req. for Final Agency Action, at 3. Therein, the Government requests that I find that Registrant has waived his right to a hearing because more than thirty days have now passed since the date of service of the Show Cause Order, and that neither Registrant, nor anyone purporting to represent him, has requested a hearing or submitted a written statement in lieu of a hearing. Id. at 1. The Government also requests that I issue a Final Order revoking Registrant's registration.
Before proceeding to the merits, it is necessary to determine whether the means employed by the Government to serve the Show Cause Order on Registrant were constitutionally sufficient. The Supreme Court has long held "that due process requires the government to provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Moreover, " 'when notice is a person's due * * * [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.' " Jones, 547 U.S. at 229 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
In Jones, the Court further noted that its cases "require the government to consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case." Id. at 230. The Court cited with approval its decision in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), where it "held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner's home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison." Jones, 547 U.S. at 230.\1\ See also Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40 ("[T]he State knew that appellant was not at the address to which the notice was mailed * * * since he was at that very time confined in * * * jail. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the State made any effort to provide notice which was 'reasonably calculated' to apprise appellant of the pendency of the * * * proceedings."); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (holding that notice by mailing, publication, and posting was inadequate when officials knew that recipient was incompetent).
\1\ The CSA states that "[b]efore taking action pursuant to [21 U.S.C. 824(a)] * * * the Attorney General shall serve upon the * * * registrant an order to show cause why registration should not be * * * revoked or suspended." 21 U.S.C. 824(c). In contrast to the schemes challenged in Jones and Robinson, which provided for service to the property owner's address as listed in state records, neither the CSA nor Agency regulations state that service shall be made at any particular address such as the registered location. In any event, while in most cases, service to a registrant's registered location provides adequate notice, the Supreme Court's clear instruction is that the Government cannot ignore "unique information about an intended recipient" when its seeks to serve that person with notice of a proceeding that it is initiating. Jones, 547 U.S. at 230.
The Jones Court further explained that "under Robinson and Covey, the government's knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government's part to take additional steps to effect notice." 547 U.S. at 230. The Court also noted that " ' "a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests [such as by updating his address] does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." ' " Id. at 232 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 n.5 (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983))). However, the Government is not required to undertake "heroic efforts" to find a registrant. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002). Nor is actual notice required. Id.
Thus, in Jones, the Court held that where the State had received back a certified mailing of process as unclaimed and took "no further action" to notify the property owner, the State did not satisfy due process. 547 U.S. at 230. Rather, the State was required to "take further reasonable steps if any were available." Id.
I conclude that the Government has satisfied its obligation under the Due Process Clause "to provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " Id. at 226 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). Here, following the failure of the first attempt at service, the Government then attempted to serve Registrant by certified mail to him at his last known address in Oklahoma, where he also practices. While Jones suggests that once this mailing was returned as unclaimed, the Government could have satisfied its constitutional obligation simply by mailing the Show Cause Order by regular mail, see id. at 234-35, the Government then attempted to serve Registrant by e-mailing the Order to him.
Several courts have held that the e-mailing of process can, depending on the facts and circumstances, satisfy due process, especially where service by conventional means is impracticable because a person secretes himself. See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Snyder, et al. v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447-449 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2008); In re International Telemedia Associates, Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 721-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
\2\ To make clear, however, the use of e-mail to serve an Order to Show Cause is acceptable only after traditional methods of service have been tried and been ineffective.
Having found that the service of the Show Cause Order was constitutionally adequate, I further find that Respondent has waived his right to a hearing or to submit a written statement in lieu of a hearing. I therefore issue this Decision and Final Order based on relevant evidence contained in the Investigative Record submitted by the Government. 21 CFR 1301.43(d) and (e). I make the following additional findings of fact.
Registrant is an anesthesiologist and the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration BK9514375, which authorizes him to dispense controlled substances in Schedules II through V as a practitioner, at the registered address of 2300 South 57th Street, Suite 11, Fort Smith, Arkansas 72903. See GX A. His registration expires on December 31, 2011. Id.
On April 7, 2009, the Arkansas State Medical Board (Arkansas Board) issued an Emergency Order of Suspension and Notice of Hearing charging Registrant with violations of the Arkansas Medical Practices Act, including that he violated a statute or rule governing the practice of medicine by a medical licensing authority or agency of another State. See GX B, at 1 (citing Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 17-95-409(a)(2)(r)).\3\ More specifically, the Arkansas Board charged that following a hearing, on March 31, 2009, the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision found that Registrant had violated numerous provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes and Administrative Code and was guilty of Unprofessional Conduct; the Oklahoma Board thus revoked his Oklahoma medical license. Id. at 2 (citations omitted). The Arkansas Board thus suspended Registrant's license to practice medicine "on an emergency basis, pending a disciplinary hearing * * * or further orders of the Board." Id. at 3.
\3\ Under Arkansas law, the "Board may revoke an existing license, impose penalties as listed in Sec. 17-95-410, or refuse to issue a license in the event the holder or applicant * * * has committed any of the acts or offenses defined in this section to be unprofessional conduct." Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 17-95-409(a)(1). The statute further provides that "[t]he words 'unprofessional conduct' as used in the Arkansas Medical Practices Act, Sec. 17-95-201 et seq., Sec. 17-95-301 et seq., and Sec. 17-95-401 et seq., mean * * * [h]aving been found in violation of a statute or a rule governing the practice of medicine by a medical licensing authority or agency of another state." Id. Sec. 17-95-409(a)(2)(r).
Registrant subsequently allowed his Arkansas medical license to expire; his license remains in inactive status as of the date of this order. GX C. I therefore find that Registrant is currently without authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he is registered with DEA.
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a practitioner must be currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the "jurisdiction in which he practices" in order to maintain a DEA registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) ("[t]he term 'practitioner' means a physician * * * licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to distribute, dispense, [or] administer * * * a controlled substance in the course of professional practice"). See also id. Sec. 823(f) (The Attorney General shall register practitioners * * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices."). As these provisions make plain, possessing authority under state law to handle controlled substances is an essential condition for obtaining and maintaining a DEA registration.
The CSA further authorizes the Agency to revoke a registration "upon a finding that the registrant * * * has had his State license or registration suspended [or] revoked * * * and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the * * * distribution [or] dispensing of controlled substances." 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3). Moreover, DEA has consistently held that revocation of a registration is warranted whenever a practitioner's state authority to dispense controlled substances has been suspended or revoked, and has done so even when a practitioner's state authority has been summarily suspended and the State has yet to provide the practitioner with a hearing to challenge the State's action and at which he may ultimately prevail. See Robert Wayne Mosier, 75 FR 49950 (2010) ("revocation is warranted * * * even in those instances where a practitioner's state license has only been suspended, and there is the possibility of reinstatement"); accord Bourne Pharmacy, 72 FR. 18273, 18274 (2007). Finally, because holding state authority is a statutory requirement for registration as a practitioner, see 21 U.S.C. 802(21) and 823(f), DEA has held that revocation is warranted even when a registrant has merely allowed his registration to expire. James Stephen Ferguson, 75 FR 49994, 49995 (2010); Mark L. Beck, 64 FR 40899, 40900 (1999). See also Anne Lazar Thorn, 62 FR 12847, 12848 (1997) ("the controlling question is not whether a practitioner's license to practice medicine in the state is suspended or revoked; rather, it is whether the Respondent is currently authorized to handle controlled substances").
As found above, on April 7, 2010, the Arkansas State Medical Board suspended Registrant's state medical license. Moreover, his Arkansas license is now expired and in inactive status. Because Registrant is without authority to dispense controlled substances in Arkansas, the State in which he holds the DEA registration which is the subject of this proceeding, he is not entitled to maintain the registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), 824(a)(3). Accordingly, Registrant's registration will be revoked and any pending application will be denied.
\4\ For the same reasons cited by the Arkansas Board as warranting its Emergency Order of Suspension, I find that the public interest necessitates that this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR 1316.67.

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Hello all and thank you- heres the story. My recent employer is clueless and im having a hard time getting a proper sea service letter citing the cfr’s and drug test participation along with any other key wording. I am getting down to crunch time and need to renew my license with masters of towing endorsement. Ive got everything on the checklist minus the company letter. Does anyone have a template or even an example with personal info crossed out I could give as an example. I understand there are key phrases and cfr’s to quote and a legitimate example would help me tremendously!!!
[QUOTE=swampy;150171]Hello all and thank you- heres the story. My recent employer is clueless and im having a hard time getting a proper sea service letter citing the cfr’s and drug test participation along with any other key wording. I am getting down to crunch time and need to renew my license with masters of towing endorsement. Ive got everything on the checklist minus the company letter. Does anyone have a template or even an example with personal info crossed out I could give as an example. I understand there are key phrases and cfr’s to quote and a legitimate example would help me tremendously!!!
yes, it’s called USCG 718A.
Im also having a very hard time obtaining a sea service letter from my employer. Is there any way around the company giving you these letters, specifically the sea service letter?
So if a company won’t write you a letter you can basically write your own but you need a signature from either a captain of chief engineer? What captain is going to stick their neck out to sign a letter for someone when they know the company doesn’t want to write one? Can or has the CG ever requested an updated letter directly from the company? This seems to be a pretty common problem, is there nothing in the CFRs requiring the companies to provide these letters?
Now that the US has adopted STCW, the US needs to go back to a Seaman’s Book system just like all the other STCW countries. The Master signs the Seaman’s Book and that’s all the seaman needs.
We are not in the 1920’s anymore. The Master should also be required to sign every crewman on and off — on a secure USCG website at every crew change. Each vessel and each licensed master should have a unique password (both of which would be required) to sign mariner’s on and off.
This company letter thing is subject to too much abuse.
Now that the US has adopted STCW, the US needs to go back to a Seaman’s Book system just like all the other STCW countries. The Master signs the Seaman’s Book and that’s all the seaman needs. We are not in the 1920’s anymore. The Master should also be required to sign every crewman on and off — on a secure USCG website at every crew change. Each vessel and each licensed master should have a unique password (both of which would be required) to sign mariner’s on and off. This company letter thing is subject to too much abuse.
Abuse is the keyword. Peoples careers are being manipulated by the companies control of sea service letters.
it is neither the Master nor the company’s choice if you do not have a continuous discharge book. only certain vessels are excluded from this requirement.
People’s career’s are being manipulated by these BS letters BECAUSE mariner’s let them do so.
been working for an OSV company for a year now, 718A discharge after every hitch because I’ll have it no other way.
The same captain who has no choice in signing YOUR discharge that YOU or HE properly filled out.
any company that would not embrace 718A is foolish for not desiring less paperwork and less responsibility and not worthy of your trust if you decide to leave after upgrading, because they don’t want you to have that opportunity.
topic already covered… http://www.gcaptain.com/forum/professional-mariner-forum/15838-att-ship-mariners.html USCG 718A. it is neither the Master nor the company’s choice if you do not have a continuous discharge book. only certain vessels are excluded from this requirement. People’s career’s are being manipulated by these BS letters BECAUSE mariner’s let them do so. been working for an OSV company for a year now, 718A discharge after every hitch because I’ll have it no other way. - - - Updated - - - The same captain who has no choice in signing YOUR discharge that YOU or HE properly filled out. any company that would not embrace 718A is foolish for not desiring less paperwork and less responsibility and not worthy of your trust if you decide to leave after upgrading, because they don’t want you to have that opportunity.
What if the foolish company in question is one of the biggest and best companies to work for in the region? In other words leaving and going anywhere else would be a huge step backwards. I guess the 718A form that, “has already been covered” is the best bet.
a company so BIG would clearly benefit by using such. if they can not figure it out, they clearly aren’t the BEST.
I can see how in theory they would benefit but it also seems like way more paperwork for them. Having to deal with a piece of paper for every crew member after every hitch? I cant see them jumping at that even if it means they don’t have to worry about writing letters, they’d just have to file one for everyone and send another to the nmc, after every hitch or every month or whenever they feel like sending it. If the company doesn’t want to write a letter then it seems like they may want control over the mariners so can’t see them being happy about taking that away.
I think he means specifically what wording needs to be included to renew the towing license. Last I knew you needed wording stating that you have “participated in drills and training in conformity with 46 CFR 10.227 (e) (6) (ii)”. Does anyone know if you still need this wording or not?
I agree, with mariners working two to four week hitches using discharges adds a ton of paperwork vs simply writing a letter every few years.
So does anyone know if that wording is still necessary?
The USCG is making it too difficult for the office to produce the seatime letters, and too easy for the office to screw them up.
If you sailed different rates or upgraded license in the period the letter covers, detail that by date/vessel and days of service.
It sounds like we’ll have to start hiring license consultants to write the seatime letters for the office.
Yes it’s easy, but I’m trying to confirm the exact CFR citation because I will probably need to tell my company what it is.
§ 10.227 Requirements for renewal.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, an applicant for renewal of a credential must establish possession of all of the necessary qualifications before the renewal MMC will be issued.
(b) A credential may be renewed at any time during its validity and for one year after expiration.
© No credential will be renewed if it has been suspended without probation or revoked as a result of action under part 5 of this chapter or if facts that would render a renewal improper have come to the attention of the Coast Guard.
(D) Present evidence of employment in a position closely related to the operation, construction, or repair of vessels (either deck or engineer as appropriate) for at least three years during the past five years. An applicant for a deck license or officer endorsement with this type of employment must also demonstrate knowledge on an applicable Rules of the Road open-book exercise.
(ii) The qualification requirements for renewal of radar observer endorsement are in § 11.480 of this chapter.
(iii) Additional qualification requirements for renewal of an officer endorsement as first-class pilot are contained in § 11.713 of this chapter.
(iv) An applicant for renewal of a radio officer’s endorsement must, in addition to meeting the requirements of this section, present evidence of a currently valid license as first or second-class radiotelegraph operator issued by the Federal Communications Commission. If submitted, the original license will be returned to the applicant.
(v) An applicant for renewal of an endorsement as medical doctor or professional nurse must, in addition to meeting the requirements of this section, present evidence that he or she holds a currently valid, appropriate license as physician, surgeon, or registered nurse issued under the authority of a state or territory of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia. Any such renewal will retain the limitations placed upon the medical license by the issuing body. There are no professional requirements for renewal of an endorsement as marine physician assistant or hospital corpsman.
That’s what I thought, but the citation has changed to (e) (6) (ii).
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section, an applicant for renewal of a credential must establish possession of all of the necessary qualifications before the MMC will be renewed.
(b) A credential may be renewed at any time during its validity and for 1 year after expiration.
(1) A completed, signed application.
(2) Proof that the mariner either holds a valid TWIC or has applied for a TWIC.
(3)The appropriate fee as set forth in §10.219 of this part.
(4) Any uncanceled MMD, MMC, license, STCW endorsement, Certificate of Registry (COR), or Document of Continuity held by the applicant. If one or more of these credentials are still valid at the time of application, a photocopy—front, back, and all attachments—will satisfy this requirement.
(5) Evidence of having passed a chemical test for dangerous drugs or of qualifying for an exemption from testing in §16.220 of this subchapter.
(6) Applicants seeking a national endorsement must either hold an unexpired medical certificate or submit a medical certificate application.
(7) Consent to a Coast Guard check of the NDR for offenses described in section 205(a)(3)(A) or (B) of the National Driver Register Act of 1982, as amended.
(v) Provide evidence of being a qualified instructor who has taught a Coast Guard-approved or -accepted course relevant to the endorsement or credential being applied for, at least twice within the past 5 years, therefore meeting the standards needed to receive a course completion certificate for that course.
(2) The qualification requirements for renewal of radar observer endorsement as contained in §11.480 of this subchapter.
(3) Additional qualification requirements for renewal of an officer endorsement as first-class pilot as contained in §11.713 of this subchapter.
(4) An applicant for renewal of a radio officer’s endorsement must, in addition to meeting the requirements of this section, present a copy of a currently valid license as first- or second-class radiotelegraph operator issued by the Federal Communications Commission.
(5) An applicant for renewal of an endorsement as medical doctor or professional nurse must, in addition to meeting the requirements of this section, present evidence that he or she holds a currently valid, appropriate license as physician, surgeon, or registered nurse issued under the authority of a State or territory of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia. Any such renewal will retain the limitations placed upon the medical license by the issuing body. There are no professional requirements for renewal of an endorsement as marine physician assistant or hospital corpsman.
(7) An applicant seeking to renew a tankerman endorsement must meet the additional requirements listed in §13.120 of this subchapter.


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Prime Minister Infinity – Canada v. 3.0.2 sneak-peek for Windows and Mac has been released!
This sneak-peek is a major update. It adds Alberta – 2019, attributes are now 0-10 instead of 1-5, introduces Favorability, shows info on the map when you move the mouse over a region, allows for increasing the size of the window, and more.
For more Alberta – 2019 info, go here.
If you are a Prime Minister Infinity – Canada owner on subscription (or if you purchased President Infinity within the last year), you are eligible for this upgrade.
What’s new in this upgrade from the previous release (v. 2.7.9b).
President Infinity v. 3.0.0 sneak-peek for Windows has been released!
This sneak-peek adds 2020 (80+ candidates, 5 parties, 28 issues), improves electoral dynamics to keep party %s relatively consistent when starting from primaries, makes debates matter more, fixes a 0% undecideds bug, improves computer player AI, and more.
What’s new in this upgrade from the previous sneak-peek (v. 2.9.9).
President Infinity v. 2.9.9 sneak-peek for Windows has been released!
This sneak-peek adds Party Identification to each eligible voter (a given party, independent, or alienated) and Party Identification Strength (committed, leaning), and in particular if a voter is committed to a party, all candidates running for that party get +25 to their Favorability score, if voter leaning for a party, all candidates running for that party get +15, and fixes a bug where VP who is also endorser could take back endorsement of player is VP of.
If you already own an Infinity game, you can get another one for just $9.95 (regular $15-20).
Simply purchase ‘Add another game’ with the below button, and then follow the instructions to specify the game you want.
Orders are processed manually, so please give 1 business day for fulfillment.
President Infinity v. 2.9.6 sneak-peek for Windows has been released!
This sneak-peek reduces memory usage and improves speed, fixes a couple bugs with the Sim Screen, and more.
What’s new in this upgrade from the previous sneak-peek (v. 2.9.5).
President Infinity v. 2.9.3 sneak-peek for Windows has been released!
This sneak-peek adds the Favorability system, a complete replacement for the underlying electoral modeling in the game. It allows for more accurate greater-than 2 candidate voter dynamics, including rapid ascents and collapses. It does this by modeling scores for each candidates for each voter (the highest score is the candidate the voter will vote for, assuming it is above a threshold), where the electorate is modeled to the 1/10,000th, allowing for a high degree of segmentation.
Since this is such a big change, things are still being fine-tuned. One challenge is keeping voters ‘in their party lanes’ during games that start in the primaries, and this will continue to be worked on.
What’s new in this upgrade from the previous sneak-peek (v. 2.9.1).
This new feature for campaign designers will be introduced in Congress Infinity, and then rolled out with all the other games.
President Infinity v. 2.8.2 released!
President Infinity v. 2.8.2 for Windows and Mac has been released!
If you are a President Infinity owner, you are eligible for this upgrade.
This is a preview intended for feedback, in particular any features you think should be top priority. We are currently finishing up the Summer 2018 cycle of releases, with a new President Infinity and Congress Infinity to be released in a few weeks – this will be the next cycle after that.
Note that United States – 2020 is planned for Winter 2018-2019 release, after the mid-terms. Networking is planned for after that, and applies for all products.
See President Infinity 1., 2., 4.-6.

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Florida law (Fla. Stat. §832.05) makes it not only a civil offense to write a bad check, or issue a check that the remitter knows has no funds and will not clear, but also makes it a misdemeanor or felony in the State of Florida, depending on the face amount of the worthless check.
In general, the term ‘check’ means a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or a cashier’s check or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described by another term, such as ‘money order.’ Fla. Stat. § 673.1041(6).
Fla. Stat. §68.065 (for civil actions to collect worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment) allows for recovery of treble damages, service charges, attorneys’ fees, and costs if its provisions are not followed. Before litigation is initiated, the form of notice set forth in Fla. Stat. §68.065 must be delivered by certified or registered mail, or by first-class mail, evidenced by an affidavit of service of mail, to the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment. If notice is properly provided, the maker or drawer will be liable to the payee for, in addition to the amount owing on the check, damages of triple the amount owing, a statutory service charge based on the check amount, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and court costs. If the notice is sent via certified mail and the recipient refuses to claim the notice or sign the postal receipt, the statutory notice requirement is satisfied.
Secondary persons receiving a check from the original payee or a successor endorsee have the same rights that the original payee has against the maker of the instrument, provided such subsequent persons give notice in a substantially similar form to that provided above. . Fla. Stat. § 832.07.
In any prosecution or action on a worthless check, payment of the check by the debtor does not constitute a defense or ground for dismissal of the charges. Fla. Stat. § 832.05(5). If the court determines that the failure to satisfy the dishonored check was due to economic hardship, however, the court has the discretion to waive all or part of the statutory damages.
In a criminal prosecution, the maker of the worthless check may be subject to a misdemeanor charge if the violation involves a misdemeanor and the check amount is less than $150.00, or a felony if the check is in excess of that amount. Fla. Stat. § 832.05(4)(c). Penalties may include up to 5 years in prison or a $1,000 fine for Felonies and up to $300 or six months in jail for Misdemeanors.
Please keep in mind there is a statute of limitations as well for processing a claim against the payor of a worthless check and bringing suit.
At the Law Offices of Jacqueline A. Salcines, P.A., we have extensive litigation experience and have been representing clients with bringing suits for worthless checks for over 18 years. Before you decide to write the letter yourself, contact us. We will get it right the first time and process your case in the most efficient manner possible.
Jacqueline A. Salcines, Esq is the Owner and Managing Partner of the Law Offices of Jacqueline A. Salcines, P.A. Real Estate and Business Law Group. With over 18 years experience including holding a dual degree in Accounting, her broad knowledge and experience in litigation including giving numerous pro bono seminars for Legal Aid and Put Something Back project, attorney Salcines serves to aggressively protect and defend our firm’s clients.
If your home or business suffered damage from Hurricane Irma, that affected both your income and ability to pay the mortgage, you are not alone. Thousands of homeowners and business owners across the state experienced the same loss to property and businesses due to Hurricane Irma. While many banks, creditors and agencies granted moratoriums on foreclosures, and agreed to waive late fees or even granted forbearances for 90 days, the time has run. Many homeowners are still not able to get back on their feet and have defaulted on their mortgage and mortgage balances.
If you are one of these homeowners that is now unable to catch up and pay your mortgage, you need to act fast so that the mortgagee or creditor does not foreclose or file a suit. Late payments and past due default or debt can be negotiated and a suit avoided. In order to have a successful negotiation and settlement you need a knowledgeable attorney on your side.
In practice for over 18 years, many of these years have been spent defending foreclosures for client and negotiating mortgage debt, and credit card debt for our clients.
Allow our extensive experience working with mortgage lenders and creditors to go to work for you.
Last week, HUD announced that it was granting $615.9 million dollars in grant funds to the State of Florida to help us recover from damages caused by Hurricane Irma floods. This comes after a November grant of $5 billion for Texas hurricane damages.
The funds, almost $616 million, are to be spread out through the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity and is set to give hurricane assistance for housing damages by Irma, business losses, and damage to infrastructure.
If you experienced serious damage due to Hurricane Irma, to either your property or your business, then you may be eligible to receive the hurricane relief funds set up by HUD.
If you require assistance, call one of the many numbers set up by the State of Florida and HUD. Or call us.


Dr. Peter Venkman: This City is headed for a disaster of biblical proportions!
Dr. Ray Stantz: What he means is Old Testament, Mr. Mayor, real "Wrath of God" type stuff.
Dr. Ray Stantz: Fire and Brimstone coming down from the skies! Rivers and Seas boiling!
Dr. Egon Spengler: Forty-years of Darkness! Earthquakes! Volcanoes!
Dr. Peter Venkman: Human Sacrifice! Dogs and Cats living together....Mass Hysteria!
When I read the U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District of Alabama's Opinion of In re Middleton, 15-01879, et al., I am reminded of the above scene from one of the all-time great movies, "Ghostbusters" (the 1984 edition, not the 2016 remake which I am certain will rank with "Karate Kid" or "Arthur" as one of the worst remakes of all time). The Court begins its analysis by citing the "binding authority" of First National Bank v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1983), where the 11th Circuit applied amended Alabama exemptions only to debts incurred after the onset date of the new exemptions statute, then cites the Antonin Scalia authored U.S. Supreme Court case of Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct. 1833 (1991), which eloquently discusses why the Norris case is wrong (because the United States Bankruptcy Code overrides State Statutes that conflict with the Code), discusses the "Dogs and Cats living together" consequences from trying to apply what will be four different exemption amounts (due to Alabama Code § 6-10-12 automatically adjusting exemption amounts every three years) to differing debts in Bankruptcy cases to be filed 9 or 10 years hence, but then says that Owen v. Owen is not controlling and does not overrule Norris because it is a "lien avoidance" case, and further rules that Alabama Code § 6-10-12 hasn't supplanted § 6-10-1 "yet" because it will not "take effect until April 2018".
RULE ONE: FEDERAL LAW OVERRIDES ANY INCONSISTENT STATE LAW.
RULE TWO: THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE IS A FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW.
RULE THREE: WHEN DEALING WITH STATUTORY LAW, YOU ONLY LOOK TO CASE LAW IF THE STATUTE IS VAGUE OR UNCLEAR.
RULE FOUR: WHEN RESEARCHING CASE LAW, YOU BEGIN WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS, THEN 11TH CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS, AND THEN FINALLY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OR BANKRUPTCY COURT PRECEDENTS.
The Bankruptcy Code is not vague or unclear here. It is not incorporating every provision of State Exemption Laws into the Bankruptcy Code to be utilized by the Bankruptcy Court. It is specifically rejecting use of the Exemption Laws for the state where the Debtor is domiciled on the date of the filing of the Bankruptcy Petition. Instead, it is mandating that the Exemptions Laws for the State where the Debtor was domiciled 730 days prior to the filing of the petition are to be used. It is further stating that you utilize "State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition."
Ah, but Jeff Cook says § 6-10-1 prescribes that you use "the law in force when the debt or demand was created" and § 6-10-1 was applicable on the date of filing the petition. Yes, but Owen v. Owen states that the Bankruptcy Code overrides State Exemption Laws that restrict exemptions to which the Debtor would "otherwise be entitled" and since Owen v. Owen and In re Middleton mandate that you use the exemptions in effect at the time of the filing of the Bankruptcy Petition for purposes of lien avoidance, it would be inconsistent to use the exemption laws in effect when the debts were incurred for Debtors Claim of Exemptions and the Claims Allowance Process if all of the debts were incurred prior to June 11, 2015. Also, Ala. Code § 6-10-1 appears to be clearly inconsistent with § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In re Middleton, despite citing Owen v. Owen and discussing how Bankruptcy Laws override inconsistent State Exemption laws, has somehow reached the wrong conclusion in failing to recognize that the "controlling" 11th Circuit Court opinion of Norris was either overridden by Owen v. Owen, or, that it is not applicable to the BAPCPA version of the Bankruptcy Code, especially where to uphold Norris would result in one set of exemptions being applied for Lien Avoidances, and another to Debtor's Claim Of Exemptions and to the Claims Allowance Process.