§ 193-3 Business license required.
§ 193-4 Massage therapist's license required.
§ 193-5 Application for business license.
§ 193-7 Investigation of applicant.
§ 193-8 Investigation of premises.
§ 193-9 Inspections by departments.
§ 193-10 Submission of application to City Manager.
§ 193-11 Placement of application on Council meeting agenda.
§ 193-12 Review of application and reports; issuance of license.
§ 193-13 Denial of application.
§ 193-14 Request for hearing to reconsider denial.
§ 193-15 Submission of evidence.
§ 193-16 Review of evidence and determination by Council.
§ 193-17 Evidence of exceptional circumstances.
§ 193-18 Granting of variance.
§ 193-19 Inspections; compliance required.
§ 193-20 Display of licenses.
§ 193-21 Notification of Police Chief of change in information.
§ 193-25 Licenses not transferable.
§ 193-26 Periodic inspections; minimum standards.
§ 193-30 Services to be carried on in one room.
§ 193-31 Advertising regarding nurse in attendance.
§ 193-32 Advertising regarding physician in attendance.
§ 193-33 Restrictions on advertising.
§ 193-34 Safety of patrons.
§ 193-36 Hands of attendants; washing before attending patrons.
§ 193-37 Covering of patrons; certain contact prohibited.
§ 193-38 Supervision of premises.
§ 193-39 Persons under 18.
§ 193-40 Hours of operation.
§ 193-41 Alcoholic beverages prohibited.
§ 193-44 Violations and penalties.
Health Department — See Ch. 5, Sec. 5.4.
This chapter shall be known and cited as the "Massage Parlor Ordinance of the City of Roseville" and will be referred to herein as "this chapter."
Any person over 18 years of age, other than a massage therapist, who renders any service in connection with the operation of a massage parlor and receives compensation from the operator of the parlor or patrons.
Any place of establishment where massage therapy, as defined in this chapter, is made available.
Any individual engaged in the practice of massage therapy.
The application of a system of structured touch, pressure, movement and holding to the soft tissue of the human body in which the primary intent is to enhance or restore the health and well-being of the client. The practice of massage therapy includes complementary methods, including the external application of water, heat, cold, lubrication, salt scrubs, body wraps or other topical preparations; and electromechanical devices that mimic or enhance the actions possible by the hands. Practice of massage therapy does not include medical diagnosis; practice of physical therapy; high-velocity, low-amplitude thrust to a joint; electrical stimulation; application of ultrasound; or prescription of medicines.
A person who owns or controls or who has the duty to control the operation of a massage therapy business. This includes individuals, licensees, managers, lessees, sponsors, partnerships, corporations, societies, organizations, associations or any combination of individuals of whatever form or character.
Any person over 18 years of age who receives massage therapy under such circumstances that it is reasonably expected that he or she will pay money or give any other consideration therefore.
No owner-operator shall engage in or carry on the operation of a business engaged in massage therapy unless he or she has a valid massage business license issued by the City pursuant to the provisions of this chapter for each and every separate office or place of business conducted by such owner-operator.
No person shall practice massage as a massage therapist, employee, instructor or otherwise unless the person has a valid and subsisting massage therapist's license issued by the State of Michigan.
The exact nature of the massage to be administered and the facilities therefor.
A complete list of the names and residence addresses of all massage therapists and employees in the business and the name and residence address of the manager or other person principally in charge of the operation of the business.
The massage or similar business history and experience, including but not limited to whether or not such person, in previously operating in this or another city or state under license or permit, has had such license or permit denied, revoked or suspended, the reason therefor and the business activities or occupations subsequent to such action of denial, suspension or revocation.
All criminal convictions, other than misdemeanor traffic violations, fully disclosing the jurisdiction in which convicted and the offense for which convicted and the circumstances thereof.
Such other information, identification and physical examination of the person as shall be deemed necessary by the Police Chief to discover the truth of the matters hereinafter required to be set forth in the application.
Authorization for the city, its agents and employees to seek information and conduct an investigation into the truth of the statements set forth in the application, the qualifications of the applicant for the permit and the criminal history of the applicant, including the use of the Law Enforcement Information Network (L.E.I.N.).
The names and addresses of three adult residents of the county who will serve as character references. These references must be persons other than relatives and business associates.
A written declaration by the applicant, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing information contained in the application is true and correct, said declaration being duly dated and signed in the city.
Upon receiving the application for a massage business license, the Police Chief shall conduct an investigation into the applicant's moral character and personal and criminal history. The Police Chief may, in his or her discretion, require a personal interview of the applicant and such further information, identification and physical examination of the person as shall bear on the investigation.
The Police Chief shall cause to be conducted an investigation of the premises where the massage business is to be carried on for the purpose of assuring that such premises comply with all the sanitation requirements as set forth in this chapter and with the ordinances of public health, safety and welfare for the City of Roseville.
Any applicant for a massage business license shall submit to lawful inspections by the Department of Buildings and Inspection, Police Department, Fire Department, Health Department and such other departments as may be necessary to ensure that the proposed business and applicant complies with all applicable ordinances and regulations of the city. The Roseville Police Chief may refuse to submit any application for approval to the Roseville City Council until the Chief has a report from any department he or she feels necessary to make an inspection that the applicant or proposed premises comply with all ordinances and regulations.
Before the Roseville Police Chief shall issue any license under this chapter, he or she shall first submit, within 45 days of the receipt of an application, the application with a report of investigations and inspections and his or her recommendation to the Roseville City Manager.
The Roseville City Manager, on receipt of an application, reports and recommendations of the Roseville Police Chief, shall place the application for a license upon the agenda for the next regularly scheduled Council meeting; provided, however, that the Council meeting is not less than six days from the date of receipt of the application by the City Manager, and in the event it is less than six days, an application shall be placed upon the agenda for the following meeting of the City Council.
The correct license fee has not been tendered to the city and, in the case of a check or bank draft, honored with payment upon presentation.
The operation as proposed by the applicant, if permitted, would not comply with all applicable laws, including but not limited to the city's building, fire, zoning and health ordinances.
Editor's Note: See Ch. 88, Building Construction, Ch. 142, Fire Prevention, and Ch. 370, Zoning.
The applicant, if an individual, or any of the stockholders holding more than 10% of the stock of the corporation and any of the officers and directors, if the applicant is a corporation; or any of the partners, including limited partners, if the applicant is a partnership; or any of the members, if the applicant is a limited liability company; and the manager or other person principally in charge of the operation of the business, have been convicted of any crime involving dishonesty, fraud or deceit, unless such conviction occurred at least five years prior to the date of the application.
The applicant has had a massage business, massage therapy or other similar permit or license denied, revoked or suspended for any of the above causes by the city or any other state or local agency within five years prior to the date of the application.
The applicant, if an individual; or any of the officers and directors, if the applicant is a corporation; or any of the partners, including limited partners, if the applicant is a partnership; or any of the members, if the applicant is a limited liability company; and the manager or other persons principally in charge of the operation of the business, is not over the age of 18 years.
In the event that the Roseville City Council shall deny an application, it shall specify the particular grounds for such denial and shall direct the City Attorney or City Manager to notify the applicant by regular mail addressed to the applicant at the address shown on the application. Said notice shall specify the grounds for which said application is denied.
Within 20 days of the date of denial of an application for a massage business license or a masseur's license, the applicant may request, in the form of a written application to the Roseville City Manager, a hearing before the Roseville City Council for reconsideration of the application for license or for a variance of any of the provisions or requirements of any ordinance, the violations of which constituted grounds for the original denial of the application.
At a reconsideration hearing, the applicant and his or her attorney may present and may submit evidence on his or her behalf to show that the grounds for the original denial no longer exist.
After reviewing an applicant's evidence, the City Council shall determine whether to sustain the denial or to grant the application for license.
There are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances or conditions applying to the proposed massage business applicant referred to in the appeal application submitted to the Roseville City Manager, which circumstances or conditions do not apply generally to any proposed massage business.
The granting of such massage business license will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, materially affect adversely the health, safety or welfare of the persons residing or working in the neighborhood or attending any massage parlor and will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be materially detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the immediate neighborhood or the city at large.
In all cases where the Roseville City Council shall grant a variance of any provision or requirement of this chapter, the Roseville City Council shall find that the granting of the variance under such conditions as the Roseville City Council may deem necessary or desirable to apply thereto will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this chapter and that it will not be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare.
Every licensee/applicant under this chapter shall permit all reasonable inspections of the business premises and shall at all times comply with the laws and regulations applicable to such business premises and shall refrain from operating the licensed business on the premises after the expiration of said license and during the period the license may be revoked or suspended.
The massage business licensee/applicant shall display the license, and that of each and every massage therapist employed in the establishment, in an open and conspicuous place on the premises of the massage business.
If, while any application for a massage business license is pending or during the term of any license granted hereunder, there is any change in fact, policy or method which would alter the information provided in such application, the applicant/licensee shall notify the Roseville Police Chief thereof, in writing, within 72 hours after such change.
The annual fee for a massage business shall be as provided in Chapter 133, Fees.
All licenses granted under the provisions of this chapter shall expire on February 1 of each and every year.
Every person who operates a massage business or practices or provides massage therapy shall at all times keep an appointment book in which the name, age and address of each and every patron shall be entered, together with the time, date and place of service and the service provided. Such appointment book shall be available at all times for inspection by the Police Chief or authorized representatives, and said appointment book shall be kept on file for one year from the date of the last entry therein.
No massage business license is transferable, separate or divisible, and such authority as a license confers shall be conferred only on the licensee named therein.
Walls shall be clean and painted with washable, mold-resistant paint in all rooms where water or steam baths are given.
Floors shall be free from any accumulation of dust, dirt or refuse.
All equipment used in the massage operation shall be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition.
Towels, linen and items for personal use of masseurs and patrons shall be clean and freshly laundered. Towels, cloths and sheets shall not be used for more than one patron. Heavy, white paper may be substituted for sheets, provided that such paper is changed for every patron.
Toilet facilities shall be provided in convenient locations. When five or more employees and patrons of different genders are on the premises at the same time, separate toilet facilities shall be provided. A single water closet per gender shall be provided for each 20 or more employees or patrons of that gender on the premises at any one time. Urinals may be substituted for water closets after one water closet has been provided. Toilets shall be designated as to the gender accommodated therein.
Lavatories or washbasins provided with both hot and cold running water shall be installed in either the toilet room or a vestibule. Lavatories or washbasins shall be provided with soap in a dispenser and with sanitary towels.
Separate dressing room and/or locker room facilities shall be provided for the employees and patrons of different genders. The dressing room and/or locker room facilities shall be designated as to the gender accommodated.
All massage services enumerated in this chapter must be carried on in one cubicle, room, booth or area within the massage establishment. No massage service enumerated in this chapter may be carried on in any other cubicle, room, booth or area except where such cubicle, room, booth or area has transparent doors or walls, such that all activity within the cubicle, room, booth or area is visible from outside the same.
Advertising that there is a nurse in attendance is prohibited unless there is a registered graduate nurse constantly in attendance during the business hours of the massage business.
Advertising that there is a doctor in attendance is prohibited unless there is a registered physician constantly in attendance during the business hours of the massage business.
No massage business granted a license under the provisions of this chapter shall place, publish or distribute or cause to be placed, publish or distributed any advertising matter that depicts any portion of the human body that would reasonably suggest to prospective patrons that any service is available other than those services as described in the definition of “massage therapy” in § 193-2 of this chapter or that employees or massage therapists are dressed in a manner other than that described in § 193-35 of this Chapter, nor shall any massage business indicate in the text of such advertising that any service is available other than those services described in the definition of "massage therapy" in § 193-2.
Licensees shall exercise every precaution for the safety of patrons. They shall watch for early signs of fatigue or weakness and immediately discontinue whatever form of service is being given upon the appearance of such signs.
Uniforms or garments covering the torso shall be worn by massage therapists or employees while attending patrons, which shall be of washable material and shall be kept in a clean condition. The sleeves shall not reach below the elbow.
The skin of the hands of those attending patrons shall be clean and in healthy conditions, and the nails shall be kept short. The hands shall be washed thoroughly before giving the patron any attention.
The private parts of patrons shall be covered when in the presence of any massage therapist or employee. Any contact with the patron's genital area is prohibited.
A business licensee shall have the premises supervised at all times when open for business. Any business rendering massage therapy shall have one person who is qualified as a massage therapist on the premises at all times while the establishment is open. The licensee shall personally supervise the business and shall not violate or permit others to violate any applicable provision of this chapter. The violation of any such provision by any agent or employee of the licensee shall constitute a violation by the licensee.
No person shall permit any person under the age of 18 years to come or remain on the premises of any massage business establishment, as massage therapist, employee or patron, unless such person is on the premises on lawful business.
No person shall open or cause to be opened or operate or cause to be operated, within the city limits, any massage parlor between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
No person shall sell, give, dispense, provide or keep or cause to be sold, given, dispensed, provided or kept any alcoholic beverage on the premises of any massage business.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to hospitals, nursing homes, medical clinics or sanitariums or to persons holding an unrevoked certificate to practice the healing arts under the laws of the State of Michigan or to persons working under the direction of any such persons or in any such establishment, nor shall this chapter apply to barbers or cosmetologists lawfully carrying out their particular professions or businesses and holding a valid, unrevoked license or certificate of registration issued by the State of Michigan.
The Roseville Police Chief or the Roseville City Manager shall establish reasonable administrative procedures necessary to the operation and enforcement of this chapter.
Every person, except those persons who are specifically exempted by this chapter, whether acting as an individual, owner, employee of the owner, operator or employee of the operator or whether acting as a mere helper for the owner, employee or operator or acting as a participant or worker in any way, who gives massages or conducts a massage establishment without first obtaining a permit, and paying a license fee to do so, from the City of Roseville or who shall violate any of the provisions of this chapter shall be punished as provided in Chapter 1, General Provisions, Article I.


4. Where online transmission cannot be initiated or could not be completed for whatever reasons, document can be handed over or send by post to Patent office within the stipulated time frame.
In case of Individual Applicant Govt has proposed to provide assistance in E-filing to those for whom e filing is not convenient. And Controller has been vested with power of direct acceptance of their Patent documents in other forms and manner than explained above.
It's good news for businesses which are planning to protect their business methods as they are to be considered as patentable subject matter as per the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in Bilski v. Kappos case. In response to the Supreme Court's decision, the USPTO has published interim guidelines for examiners on how to evaluate a patent application claim which falls within the scope of patentable subject matter based on 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The current standard in examining the business method claims has been relaxed for claims to be patentable subject matter unlike earlier examination prior to the ruling when business methods were curtailed. The guideline instructs examiners 1) to determine what the applicant has invented and is seeking to patent, 2) to conduct thorough search of the prior art before evaluating the claimed invention and also 3) to determine if the claim complies with the subject matter eligibility requirements.
The claim needs to demonstrate on how it meets the criteria of machine or transformation test or show evidence that the abstract idea can be practically applied to become patent eligible; claims which doesn't meet the criteria cannot be patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Machine or transformation test is a test of patent eligibility and the claims need to qualify either of the two main criteria (1) the business method is implemented with a use of machine or (2) transforms an article from one state to another. To simplifier it further, claims should relate to systems or software that implements the business method or transform a particular article into a different state or thing.
The court felt that the machine or transformation test overly narrowed the inventions that could be patentable but nevertheless felt that the test is a useful and important clue but could not be the only test in determining patentable subject matter. Hence examiners as per the guideline, can reject claims even if it meets the criteria of machine or transformation test based upon 35 U.S.C. § 101. Even mere field of use limitations cannot convert a claim which is not patent eligible into a claim that is patent eligible. The patentability process doesn't stop here as the examiner needs to examine the claim for compliance against requirements § 102, 103 and 112.
As a next step, examiners would look for novelty in the invention by comparing the prior art and the claimed invention. If no differences are found between them they would label it non patentable even after satisfying the § 101 patent eligibility as it lacks novelty under § 102. Also examiners would assess the differences made out between the prior art and the claimed invention to determine if the invention was non-obvious during the time of invention to be complacent under § 103. The examiner would need to determine if the claimed invention complies with § 112 for adequate written descriptions.
Hence examiners should avoid focusing on issues of subject matter patent eligibility under § 101 to the detriment of considering compliance with requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and adequate written description under § 102, 103 and 112 respectively. Only in extreme cases, examiners would reject patents under § 101. After reviewing the claimed invention under all the requirements § 101, 102, 103 and 112, the examiner would list all the reasons and bases for rejecting claims in the First Office action. The First Office action would clearly mention the findings, summary and the reasons for the rejection.
Bilski has opened the possibility of claims that do not meet § 101 might still be patent eligible. The subject matter § 101 requirement would just not be the sole deciding factor as there are many other factors like novelty, non-obviousness, adequate written description which are to be considered. The guidelines ensure that examiners evaluate claims in a logical order and the subject matter requirement should be evaluated first and other requirements in a sequence. This provides inventors an opportunity to resolve the patentability issue before it gets rejected and helps them to save time and money.
Carmel Irudayanathan is an editor for the law firm of Kunzler Needham Massey & Thorpe. Learn more about patentable subject matter at kunzlerip.com.
The Patents Act 1977 implements a statutory regime whereby an employee of a company may become entitled to a measure of financial reward or compensation where the employer has obtained a large benefit from a patented invention made by an employee. The measure of compensation relies upon the contribution made by the employee to the patent.
An invention is made by an employee is usually owned by the company for which they work. This is the case where an invention is made during the ordinary course of the employee's duties and either i. it could be expected that a patentable invention would result from that work; or ii. a special obligation or duty was owed by the employee to the employer. In short then, if an employee creates a patentable invention outside the ordinary course of his usual job specification, it is likely that he owns the right to apply for a patent, and the proceeds of exploitation of the patent. If the employee's job was to design and invent, it is more likely that the invention is owned by the employer; equally an invention made by a senior employee or company officer whose engagement foresees a furtherance of the company's interests, is also likely to an invention owned by the company rather than the employee.
Where the employee applies for a patent where the employer was entitled, the employer is entitled to a transfer of the patent and vice versa.
Exploitation of a patent granted to an employee brings with it the unusual benefit of obtaining immunity from infringement proceedings in respect to the use of the employers' copyright and design rights in exploiting the patent.
An entitlement for compensation arises regardless of the country in which a patent is obtained by an employer. Where the invention is of ‘outstanding benefit' to an employer, the employee becomes entitled to a fair share of the benefit. The benefit must be derived from the patent, and not simply the invention. The size and nature of the employer's undertaking is taken into consideration in determining whether an outstanding benefit has been derived. An outstanding benefit is considered to be one that is superlative return or something out of the ordinary.
When an employee contributes to an invention, the patent right – and the right to apply for the patent – rests either with the employer or the employee. If the employee owns the right to apply, they are entitled to the proceeds for exploitation. In the event that the employer owns the right to apply, the employee may be entitled to fair value compensation as a statutory reward for their labours. In addition, there may be joint inventors who are entitled to apply for a patent together.
It is important to remember that any public disclosure of a patentable invention prior to an application puts a patent application at risk. Disclosures should only be made after a non-disclosure agreement has been signed by the party receiving the information about the invention.
Leigh Ellis is a business solicitor and intellectual property solicitor advising on management of intellectual property rights disputes and infringement. Based in London, he is provides legal advice on technology and technical issues.
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, F.3d 1284; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19416; 79 USPQ2d 1583 (Fed. Cir. August 2, 2006), the CAFC held patent claim 6 invalid under the fourth paragraph of 35 USC 112 for failing to further limit the claim from which it depends.
Claim 1 reads as follows: "1. [R-(R*,R*)]-2-(4-fluorophenyl)-[beta],[delta]-dihydroxy-5-(1-methylethyl)-3-phenyl-4-[(phenyla mino)-carbonyl]-1H-pyrrole-1-heptanoic acid n4 or (2R-trans)-5-(4-fluorophenyl)-2-(1-methylethyl)-N,4-diphenyl-1-[2-(tetrahydro-4-hydroxy-6-oxo -2H-pyran-2-yl)ethyl]-1H-pyrrole-3-carboxamide; n5 or pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof."
Claim 2 reads as follows: "2. A compound of claim 1 which is [R-(R*R*)]-2-(4-fluorophenyl)-ß-d-dihydroxy-5-(1-methylethyl)-3-phenyl-4-[(phenylamino)carb onyl]-1H-pyrrole-1-heptanoic acid."
Claim 6 reads as follows: "6. The hemicalcium salt of the compound of claim 2."
The important points are that claim 2 is limited to an acid compound, and that claim 6 attempts to define the salt of the acid compound of claim 2 by refering to claim 2. The Court found claim 6 invalid because it interpreted claim 6's reference to claim 2 to require claim 6 to include all limitations of claim 2, and therefore to define an acid. However, claim 6's recitation "hemicalcium salt" does not define (and in fact is inconsistent with) an acid.
We recognize that the patentee was attempting to claim what might otherwise have been patentable subject matter.[note 7 omitted] Indeed, claim 6 could have been properly drafted either as dependent from claim 1 or as an independent claim - - i.e., "the hemicalcium salt of atorvastatin acid." But, we "should not rewrite claims to preserve validity." Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[I]f the only claim construction that is consistent with the claim's language and the written description renders the claim invalid, then . . . the claim is simply invalid."). Ranbaxy correctly argues that claim 6 fails to "specify a further limitation of the subject matter" of the claim to which it refers because it is completely outside the scope of claim 2. We must therefore reverse the district court with respect to this issue and hold claim 6 invalid for failure to comply with § 112, ¶ 4.
The opinion also notes in footnote 3 that both parties stipulated that claim 6 was in fact a dependent claim. However, the stipulation was not a factor in the court relied upon it in its legal reasoning.
What this means in practical terms (unless this holding is overruled, and barring unusual facts) is that any claim in the form: "A first 'thing' of the second 'thing' of claim X" has a good chance of being invalid if the first 'thing' is not a species of the second 'thing.' In particular, claims like "2. A salt of the acid of claim 1" are likely invalid. The 'may' caveat exists for two reasons. As the opinion states, the parties stipulated that claim 6 was a dependent claim. Otherwise, it might have been construed as an incorporation claim. I find this possibility unlikely in view of the Court's reasoning. Second, a specification thoeretically could expressly define "acid" to also include within its meaning "salt" since a patentee can be his own lexicographer. I doubt many issued patents having this type of claim contain such a definition.
Clearly, a large number of issued patent claims are likely invalid in view of this decision. An obvious course of action for all patentees in view of this decision is to review their portfolio of patents, licenses, and due diligence files, to see which U.S. patents and applications have claims of this nature, and then determine suitable follow up actions. Such actions would include canceling licenses, reissuing patents, presenting new claims in continuation applications, and proceeding with commercial activity otherwise precluded.
If you have any other questions or need further information please feel free to contact us via email at http://www.neifeld.com.
Former chair of the Interference Committee and current chair of the Services Subcommittee of the Interference Committee of the American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association (AIPLA). Member of the AIPLA, American Bar Association, Maryland Patent Lawyers Association, and the Patent Information Users Group. Extensive experience in "specialty matters" in the U.S. patent office, such as appeals, petitions, reexaminations, reissues, public protests, and extensive experience in foreign prosecution, and interferences and related litigation. Extensive experience in due diligence work, including investigations, database searching, and opinions.
Admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Virginia State Courts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Widely published in IP law publications, frequent lecturer to patent attorneys on patent law topics, and an active member of the patent bar associations. Founder and moderator for the popular "patentinterference" group on the groups.yahoo.com/group/patentinterference web site, which is a forum for general information on patent law and practice with a focus on patent interference issues.
Co-founder of the www.PatentValuePredictor.com automated patent valuation service, co-inventor of the underlying macro-economic model for valuing patents, and programmer of some of the code powering the automated valuations.
Five years of scientific research in applied physics areas of electro-optics, III-V materials, microwaves, vacuum deposition technology, superconductors, and electronics directed towards the U.S. Army's electronics, communication, and signal processing needs.


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Alvares, A. J., Souza Jr., J. L. N., Teixeira, E. L. S. & Ferreira, J. C. E. (2009). Web-based Production Management and Control in a Distributed Manufacturing Environment. Collaborative Design and Planning for Digital Manufacturing. London: Springer v. , p. 365-388.
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Idrobo-Pizo, G. A., Teixeira, E. L. S. & Motta, J. M. S. T. (2011). Design and implementation of a motion controller for a spherical welding robot specially constructed for repairing damaged hydraulic turbines using a 3-D vision surfase map. In: COBEM, 2011, Natal. 21st International Congress of Mechanical Engineering.
Alvares, A. J., Souza Jr., J. L. N., Teixeira, E. L. S. & Ferreira, J. C. E. (2008) A Methodology For Web-Based Manufacturing Management and Control. In: IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, IEEE CASE 2008, Washington DC, EUA. IEEE Robotics and Automation Society, 2008. v. CD-ROM.
Teixeira, E. L. S. & Alvares, A. J. (2007). Web ShopFloor Controller for a Flexible Manufacturing Cell. In: 19th International Congress of Mechanical Engineering - COBEM2007, 2007, Brasília. COBEM2007-1229 Web ShopFloor Controller for a Flexible Manufacturing Cell.
Teixeira, E. L. S. & Alvares, A. J. (2006). Modeling and Implementation of a Management Unit integrated to a CAD/CAPP/CAM System for a Flexible Manufacturing Cell. In: 16 th Conference on Flexible Automation and Intelligent Manufacturing, 2006, Limerick. Proceedings of 16 th Conference on Flexible Automation and Intelligent Manufacturing.
Teixeira, E. L. S. & Alvares, A. J. (2006). An architecture for a Management Unit integrated to a CAD/CAPP/CAM System for a Flexible Manufacturing. In: IV Congresso Nacional de Engenharia Mecânica, CONEM2006, 2006, Recife. Anais do IV Congresso Nacional de Engenharia Mecânica, CONEM2006.
Teixeira, E. L. S., Villanueva, C. C. & Alvares, A. J. (2005). Modeling and Implementation of a Flexible Manufacturing Cell (FMC). In: 18th International Congress of Mechanical Engineering, COBEM2005, Ouro Preto - Minas Gerais. Proceeedings of the 18th International Congress of Mechanical Engineering, COBEM2005.

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When the United States ratified the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) in 1994, it undertook to implement Article 18 of the Berne Convention (a provision the United States had left unaddressed when the U.S. ratified the Berne Convention in 1988). This text requires that member States who join the Berne Union extend copyright protection to works from other member States so long as the copyright in the foreign work’s country of origin has not expired. The treaty thus obliged the United States, as a new member State, to restore copyrights in foreign works that remain protected at home but that may have lost protection in the United States, for example because of failure to comply with formalities such as affixation of notice of copyright or renewal of copyright registration, or which may not have enjoyed U.S. copyright protection at all because at the time of the foreign work’s first publication, the country of origin had no copyright relations with the United States. The Berne Convention allows the State implementing Article 18 to provide for transitional measures to accommodate the interests of persons who previously exploited the foreign work in reliance on its public domain status.
I do not propose in this column to analyze Golan v. Holder further. Rather, consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s emphasis on the benefits to U.S. copyright holders of U.S. implementation of Berne Convention Article 18, I will focus on the mutuality of interests that Article 18 furthers. The text is in fact a two-way street: New Berne members must restore copyrights in foreign Berne works, but old Berne members also must extend copyright protection to the new Berne member’s works. The only condition is that the work must not have “fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.” The French Cour de cassation, that nation’s highest civil law court, has recently construed Article 18 in a controversy concerning infringement in France of the classic American film “His Girl Friday” (with Rosalind Russell and Cary Grant).4 The plaintiffs, who were selling unauthorized DVDs and videocassettes of the film, sought a declaration that because the film had fallen into the public domain in the United States 28 years after its publication in 1939 due to non-renewal of registration of copyright, the U.S. film producer and its French licensee had no basis on which to object to plaintiffs’ exploitation of the film in France. The copyright claimants rejoined that under Article 18 of the Berne Convention, once the United States ratified that treaty, U.S. works that may previously have been in the public domain at home and accordingly in France, now would be protected anew in other Berne Union members, including France, even if the works remained in the public domain in the United States. This seems a rather bold argument. After all, why should a foreign country extend coverage to a work that the country of origin will no longer protect?
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the conditions for applying article 18.1 of the Berne Convention must be analyzed in light of article 5.2 of this same Convention, by virtue of which the enjoyment and exercise of copyright are not subject to any formality; the Court of Appeals correctly deduced that [the obligation of protection under] the Convention applied to works fallen into the public domain for any cause other than the expiration of the term of protection; thus the work “His Girl Friday” of Howard Hawks, which, registered in 1939, had not fallen into the public domain at the time of the entry into force of the Berne Convention in the USA, in 1989, “through the expiry of the term of protection,” which, at the time, and setting aside any formalities, was 56 years….
On the other hand, Article 5.3 of the Berne Convention allows member States to accord their own works less protection than required with respect to works from other Berne Union members. Thus, a Berne member State may not impose formalities on foreign works, but it may require that domestic works comply with conditions such as notice and registration of copyright. As a result, the Berne Convention did not oblige the United States to restore copyright in U.S. works that fell into the public domain for non-renewal of copyright, and, indeed, the film “His Girl Friday” remains in the public domain in the United States. But, as the French high court recognized, Berne’s tolerance of domestic formalities is limited to the country of origin. If other Berne member States denied protection to foreign works on the ground of non-compliance with formalities in the foreign work’s country of origin, then the domestic formalities would take on international effect, and this is a result plainly inconsistent with the Berne Convention. Indeed, it was precisely to prevent domestic formalities from compromising international protection that the Berlin revisers added Article 5.2.
But this argument encounters another Berne-based objection. It is implicit in Article 18.1 as well as in Article 7.8, which provides for a comparison of copyright terms, and directs member States to apply the shorter of the term of protection in the country of origin or in the country for which protection is sought, that the “term” must be consistent with the minimum durations of copyright set out in Article 7. For most works, that term is 50 years post mortem auctoris,though for cinematographic works member States may apply a term of 50 years from publication. The (first) term of protection under the U.S. 1909 Copyright Act being only 28 years from publication, this term fell below the substantive minimum requirements Berne imposes on member States.
On the other hand, where it is clear that the Berne Convention forbids member States from internationally extruding the formalities with which they may freight domestic works, the Berne Convention, through the “rule of the shorter term,” does give limited international effect to domestic copyright terms. While the general approach of the Berne Convention is “national treatment,” meaning that member States must accord foreign Berne works at least the same level of protection as local works; duration of protection is an exception to the rule of national treatment. Article 7.8 specifically instructs member States to ascertain what is the duration of protection in the country of origin; if it is shorter, then the foreign work will not receive national treatment; rather, the Berne member State will apply the term of protection of the foreign work’s country of origin. Article 7.8 does not explicitly limit how much shorter the country of origin’s domestic term may be. If there is no limit, so that the “rule of the shorter term” would allow the application of a copyright term that falls below the Berne minimum term, then “the term of protection” that serves as the reference point for Article 18.1 might also be sub-normal, and the host country need not restore copyright in works that fall into the public domain in the country of origin because of the expiration of a very short (28-year) term of protection.
But this argument twists the two axes of the treaty. The Berne Convention works on two bases: first, the rule of national treatment, which, according to Article 5.1, makes international protection distinct from protection in the country of origin (with a few exceptions, including Article 7.8, permitting member States to apply the rule of material reciprocity); second, substantive minima of protection, which prescribe a threshold of substantive coverage that may with respect to some member States afford more protection to foreign Berne authors than that State grants its own authors. Indeed, the substantive minima are designed to counter the possibility that a member State’s domestic protection is so low that national treatment will yield inadequate protection. The argument drawn from Article 7.8 would allow domestic norms of duration to override the substantive minimum term for international protection. But an exception to the rule of national treatment does not authorize or imply an exception to the application of the substantive minima.
The French high court’s decision in the “His Girl Friday” controversy demonstrates the importance to U.S. copyright holders of international compliance with the Berne Convention’s requirement of restoration of copyright upon accession to the Convention. As the Tenth Circuit recognized, restoration imposes costs at home – which Article 18.3 of the Convention also permits member States to attenuate – but Congress may, consistent with the First Amendment, determine that the gains to U.S. copyright holders from restoration of copyright in their works in foreign markets sufficiently offset those costs.
1 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
2 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009).
3 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).
4 Soc. Eds. Montparnasse v. Gaumont Columbia Tristar Home Video, Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, decision of 17 Dec. 2009, Juris-Data No. 2009-050769; Communication Commerce Électronique, July-August 2010 p. 13, note Yves Gaubiac pp. 10-12. The author of the present column submitted an affidavit regarding U.S. and international copyright law on behalf of the defendants before the Court of Appeals of Versailles, whose decision of 11 Sept. 2007 was affirmed by the Cour de cassation.
5 See Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, para. 6.118 and note 373 (2006).
6 Professor André Lucas makes this argument in his critical commentary on the Cour de cassation decision, 35 Propriétés Intellectuelles 733-36 (April 2010).
7 See, e.g., Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679 (2nd Cir.1993).
8 Note, however, that under Article 19, the host country may grant the additional protection; the “rule of the shorter term” is not mandatory. The United States, for example, does not apply it. See 17 USD Sec. 104.
9 See, e.g., Berne Conv. Arts. 9.1 (reproduction); 11, 11bis (communication to the public); 8 (translations); 12 (other adaptations); 14 (cinematographic adaptations).


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With more than 30 years of experience, our accomplished attorneys are here to guide you through these difficult times and get the compensation you deserve.
Work Comp - KA v. CSI (2018) - Our client was physically threatened by a tenant by phone, text and in person resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder. The insurance carrier downplayed the injury and PTSD claimed that the panel qualified medical examiner's reports were not persuasive. Our client's prior lawyer agreed with the insurance carrier was ready to settle the case for less than $100,000.00. We advised KA that the offer was too low and that we recommended taking the deposition of the panel qualified medical examiner to defeat the defense arguments. KA followed our advice and we took over the case. Within a matter of months we effectively deposed the panel qualified medical examiner to bolster his opinions and pressed the case to trial. On the eve of trial the matter settled for $280,000.00.
Work Comp - JC v. CR, Inc. (2018) - Our client suffered a significant shoulder injury and underwent several surgeries by doctors selected by the insurance carriers and the surgeries were not very successful in restoring function. The insurance company offered to settle our client's case for $75,000.00. We recommended that our client reject that he allows us to develop the evidence. He agreed and we developed both the medical evidence and the vocational rehabilitation evidence including the depositions of the treating doctors and the defense rehabilitation expert. That expert wrote in his report that our client was fully employable, but on cross-examination admitted that he had purposely omitted evidence of our client's pain in his analysis and that if he included that evidence then our client was indeed likely not employable. The matter settled just before trial for $475,000.00.
Insurance Fraud - Court of Appeal Published Decision (2017) - People ex rel Alzayat v. Hebb, Sunline Transit Agency: In a case of first impression before the Court of Appeals we persuaded the Court that the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act liability extends to employers including public self-insured agencies and that the general litigation privilege does not immunize the fraud. We alleged that Hebb falsely denied that Alzayat has suffered and injury and made those false denial both in a written report and in a deposition. A courageous co-employee came forward and confirmed the injury event and workers' compensation did pick up and pay the claim. Sunline claimed that government self-insured agencies could not be sued for workers' compensation fraud and that any statements made, no matter how false, were privileged under the general litigation privilege and also subject to the exclusive remedy bar. The Court of Appeal rejected all of these contentions and ordered the opinion published. This case shows that bad actor employers can be held to account for falsely denying injury, falsely reporting wages, etc.
Work Comp - JA v. Kroger Food 4 Less (2017) - While lifting a box our client felt a sharp pain in his neck. The MRI revealed cord compression and our client should have been afforded immediate decompression surgery. Unfortunately Food 4 Less (Kroger) and its administrator Sedgwick insisted on returning our client to work. In fact, we uncovered an email that should the nurse case manager stating that although the doctor would likely not return him to work given the severity of symptoms the doctor should be persuaded to return him to work anyway. Our client's prior lawyer selected this doctor and this doctor did return our client to work. Our client was frustrated and came to us and we immediately stepped in and secured surgery. The defense initially suggested a settlement of about $250,000.00 and we recommended rejection. It also claimed that the neck injury was really due to a prior dirt bike accident several years earlier, that there was a genetic defect component, or that this was not one injury but several which would have the effect of reducing the ultimate award. The Panel QME was deposed four times, the operating surgeon twice. We set the matter for trial as defense counsel would not respond to our requests to try and resolve the matter. On the day of trial Kroger Food 4 Less agreed to pay the full value of the case, about $2,500,000.00.
Work Comp - GC v. BP Co. (2016) - Our client, a journeyman plumber, suffered a cumulative injury over the years to his neck culminating in fusion surgery. His prior lawyer recommended a settlement of $165,000.00, which we recommended he reject because the evidence showed that additional surgery was need to fix a broken plate and we believed the offer to be too low. We secured that surgery which repaired the problem and settled the case for $465,000.00.
Work Comp - LC v. HGD Co. (2016) - Our client underwent lumbar surgery and the result was not optimal. The defense insisted that the case rated out to no more than 28% disability and on that basis offered only $125,000.00 to settle the matter. We deposed the numerous doctors involved and secured a vocational rehabilitation expert report showing that our client's pain profile due to the poor surgery prevented him from holding regular work. We settled the case for $525,000.00 shortly before trial.
Work Comp - ML v. School District (2016) - Our client teacher tried to break up a fight and was punched and then her head hit the ground causing a fracture. School District consistently obstructed medical care including plastic surgery to repair the fracture near the eye and the nose. Our client's rprio counsel did not secure that additional surgeries and treatment, but we did. The district offered $85,000.00 plus a resignation from the teaching position which our client rejected on our advice. Ultimately, our client was awarded full retirement, full medical care for her and her family and $450,000.00 to settle the workers' compensation case.
Personal Injury and Work Comp VR v. JC, DDP (2014) - The injured worker suffered third degree burns on his toros and legs and underwent lumbar surgery. He was injured when he was testing an underground pool heater which had been placed in an unventilated subterranean vault. Because of a lack of venting the gas accumulated and exploded during testing. The insurance carrier made a take it or leave it offer of $350,000.00, then $500,000.00 during trial. The jury returned a verdict of $6,750,000.00. Because of employer negligence the workers compensation lien has been wiped out and the workers compensation will also be obligated to contribute further.
Personal Injury and Work Comp RR v. TA, BF (2012) – The injured workers suffered cranial factures and partial blindness in one eye when the wheel from a hose cart separated when its tire was being inflated. The wheel was improperly designed and built by a Chinese manufacturer and it was then sold by a national hardware chain. One defendant settled for its insurance policy of $2,000,000.00. The other defendant offered $400,000.00 and the matter was prepared for trial. On the day of trial the second defendant also agreed to pay $2,000,000.00. The workers compensation carrier then waived all credit as the employer was also negligent and paid an additional $250,000.00, bringing the total gross recovery to $4,250,000.00.
Work Comp - EC v. GGS, LLC (2014) — Mr. C suffered a partial finger amputation that resulted in reflex sympathetic dystrophy or complex regional pain syndrome in the arm. Mr. C's prior workers' compensation lawyer recommended a settlement of $150,000. Mr. C thought this was inadequate and retained us. We settled the matter for $790,000.
Personal Injury - N.G. v. SAC (2014) — In this rear end automobile accident the insurance adjuster offered $35,000 and then at mediation offered $325,000. The week before a jury trial was to commence the matter was settled for $550,000.
Work Comp - JA v. HD (2014) — Our client was kicked by a cow he was milking causing an arm injury. The employer denied that our client was disabled to any serious degree. After taking the deposition of the doctors involved and setting the matter for trial the insurer agreed to pay our client $500,000.
Work Comp - JL v. C, Inc, (2013) — Mr. L's prior counsel recommended a settlement of $100,000.00 after having the case for four years. Immediately upon being retained we secured an additional $14,000.00 of past temporary disability which prior counsel overlooked and then settled the matter for $460,000 within eighteen months.
Personal Injury (2011) JG v. JP — Mr. G, a motorcyclist, contended he was cut off by JP and could not avoid rear-ending her car. Mr. G required shoulder arthroscopic surgery was a result. The insurer for JP denied liability contending Mr. G was speeding recklessly and that he caused the rear-end collision. The insurer was confident of its position because their expert was a former California Highway Patrol motorcycle officer and accident investigator. An offer of $20,000 was rejected on our advice. We obtained an award of $265,000.
Work Comp - PR v AF, Inc. (2013) — Mr. R suffered and ankle injury when hit by a forklift. Defense offers began at $40,000 and rose to $75,000. Mr. R accepted our advice to reject these offers. The matter was set for trial and just before trial the case was settled for $265,000.
Personal Injury - SR v. P Insurance Company (2013) — While driving the employer's car Mrs. R was struck by a drunk driver and required arthroscopic shoulder surgery. The drunk driver's insurance paid $15,000. PIC contending that the injury was not covered. The matter was settled for $250,000.
Work Comp - FJ v. DP (2013) — Our client suffered a low back injury and the defense offer was $35,000 and then at the deposition of a doctor the defense attorney stated that the new offer of $45,000 was final and not one penny more would be paid. The matter was settled at trial for $77,500.
Work Comp - RG v. SB (2012) — The employer denied that the employee had ever been hurt at work and refused to provide benefits. We established that injury did occur and the matter was resolved for $70,000.
Wage & Hour - JR v. MC (2014) — Mr. R contended that even though he was called a manger and not paid overtime he was in reality a cook entitled to overtime. Employer contended that Mr. R was owed nothing because even though he may have been entitled to overtime he was paid on an agreed basis that included overtime. The matter was settled for $50,000.
Wage & Hour - DLC v. EIM (2012) — Mr. C contended that he and his co-workers were owed overtime and meal pay. Employer contended that nothing was owed because the workers were managers and further that they had not worked overtime. The matter was resolved with Ms. C receiving $50,000 for his whistleblower fee and past wages and all his co-workers were also paid their past wages. The employer also paid our attorney fees.
Work Comp - MA v. SLTA (2014) — Defendant denied that Mr. A was hurt as his job as his supervisor testified that no injury had occurred and that any back injuries were due to a prior automobile accident. We found co-workers that testified that the supervisor was untruthful in his reports. The matter was resolved in Mr. A's favor for $40,000.
Wage & Hour - KK v. ACH (2012) — Plaintiff contended she was not paid for meal periods or overtime. Ultimately, Plaintiff was paid her past due wages with interest, a whistleblower fee for securing fines due the State of California, her co-workers were also paid their past due wages and the employer paid our attorney fees.
Work Comp - OS v. PBD and JR (2013) — Defendant employer and its president owner denied ever having employer our client, Mr. S. They also denied, under oath, doing any construction business in the Palm Springs area. Through our investigation we located documents showing that the employer was being untruthful including construction invoices, cancelled checks, contracts, photos and other witnesses. The employer's insurance carrier accepted and settled the claim and we turned over our investigatory materials to the District Attorney. The employer was charged with multiple felonies based on our investigation.
The above cases are examples only and you should not make any inference about the outcome of your case and each case is unique and dependent on its own facts.

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COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & EXCISE v. CHANDIRAMI FACV 8 of 2002. Court of Appeal reversed. Unmanifested cargo was rightly subject to and liable to forfeiture by C & E Department.
AQUA – LEISURE INC v. AQUA SPLASH CACV 175 of 2002. Application for leave to appeal by 2 directors found in contempt of Court in a passing off action.
DESMOND YIU v. WILLIAM CHOW and OTHERS FACV 18 of 2004. Solicitor cleared of professional negligence; nor was there any assumption of responsibility under the Hedley Byrne principle.
SFC v. TO SHU FAI FAMC 11 of 2008. Defendant convicted of providing false or misleading information to the SFC in a company’s Public Announcement. Appeals dismissed.
KOON WING YEE v. SFC FAMV 53 of 2008. The applicant is not entitled to invoke the privilege against self – incrimination and then refuse to answer questions put by the SFC under its SFO powers.
PACIFIC ELECTRIC WIRE & CABLE CO. LTD. v. HARMUTTY and OTHERS FAMV 28 of 2009. Order 14 Summary Judgment inappropriate where fraud is a live issue.
KULEMESIN YURIY v. HKSAR FAMC 72 of 2011. Prosecution of ship’s captain for endangering life at sea by colliding with a bulk carrier, where 18 crew members drowned. Conviction upheld .
WANG RUIYUN v. GEM GLOBAL LTD. FAMV 42 of 2011. Leave granted to appeal Court of Appeal decision on whether damages to be assessed at the date of breach.
KWOK CHIN WING v. 21 HOLDINGS LTD. FACV 9 of 2012. Claim by director to recover inter – company loans.
MAEDA JV v. HKSAR FAMV 8 of 2013. Correct approach to re – rating items in the Bill of Quantities ; whether a change in quantities renders the original BQ price unreasonable or inapplicable.

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SPOUSES LYDIA FLORES-CRUZ and REYNALDO I. CRUZ, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES LEONARDO and ILUMINADA GOLI-CRUZ, SPOUSES RICO and FELIZA DE LA CRUZ, SPOUSES BOY and LANI DE LA CRUZ, ZENAIDA A. JACINTO and ROGELIO DE LOS SANTOS, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the August 23, 2005 decision2 and April 5, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81099.
On appeal by respondents to the CA, the latter, in a decision dated August 23, 2005, ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession because petitioners had been dispossessed of the property for less than a year. It held that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC. Thus, it ruled that the RTC decision was null and void. Reconsideration was denied on April 5, 2006.
The issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over this case.
According to the CA, considering that petitioners claimed that respondents were possessors of the property by mere tolerance only and the complaint had been initiated less than a year from the demand to vacate, the proper remedy was an action for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC.
The necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.18 Petitioners alleged that the former owner (Estanislao, their predecessor) allowed respondents to live on the land. They also stated that they purchased the property on December 15, 1999 and then found respondents occupying the property. Yet they demanded that respondents vacate only on March 2, 2001. It can be gleaned from their allegations that they had in fact permitted or tolerated respondents' occupancy.
Based on the allegations in petitioners' complaint, it is apparent that such is a complaint for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the owner.19 It is a settled rule that in order to justify such an action, the owner's permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.20 Such jurisdictional facts are present here.
Since petitioners' complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC and it contained no allegation on the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.34 It follows that the CA was correct in dismissing the case.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 18-24.
5 Lot 30, Cad. 349. The property was declared under Property Index No. 99-1010-00931 of the Municipal Assessors Office of Angat, Bulacan. Id., p. 7.
7 Id., pp. 19 and 22.
8 Respondents made inquiries from the Municipal Assessors Office (in Pandi, Bulacan), Provincial Assessors Office and CENTRO Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan as to the status of the land. Information was given that it was alienable public land. Id., p. 20.
10 Docketed as Civil Case No. 516-M-2001. Id., p. 51.
11 Id., pp. 53 and 82.
13 Barbosa v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 133564, 10 July 2007, 527 SCRA 99, 103, citing Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, 11 March 2004, 425 SCRA 376 and Ching v. Malaya, G.R. No. L-56449, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 413.
14 Laresma v. Abellana, 484 Phil. 766, 777 (2004).
15 Barbosa v. Hernandez, supra note 13.
19 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 121.
20 Heirs of Melchor v. Melchor, 461 Phil. 437, 445 (2003), citing Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172 (2001).
21 Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155179, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 104, 111.
22 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It amended [BP 129] (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), was approved on March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994.
23 Laresma v. Abellana, supra note 14, p. 782.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
25 Barbosa v. Hernandez, supra note 13, p. 105.
26 Id.; De Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, 12 September 2008.
27 PAG-ASA Fishpond Corporation v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 164912, 18 June 2008, 555 SCRA 111, 130, citations omitted.
28 Republic of the Phil. v. Estipular, 391 Phil. 211, 218 (2000).
29 Suarez v. Saul, G.R. No. 166664, 20 October 2005, 473 SCRA 628, 637.
30 Laresma v. Abellana, supra note 14, pp. 782-783.
32 Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, p. 115.
33 De Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, supra note 26; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130841, 26 February 2008, 546 SCRA 532, 542; Dela Rosa v. Roldan, G.R. No. 133882, 5 September 2006, 501 SCRA 34, 57; Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 825, citation omitted.
34 Id. There is no estoppel or laches in this case because respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction right after it was filed.


Petitioner David Riley, belonging to the Lincoln Park gang in San Diego, California, opened fire on a rival gang member on August 2, 2009. A few weeks later on August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over for driving on expired license registration tags; as a result of driving with expired tags, the car was to be impounded by the police. As part of the impoundment process, police were to perform an inventory search on the vehicle, including its internal components, to discover possible contraband as well as protect against any liability claims slated towards the driver of the vehicle in the future. Regarding the pullover in this particular case, the police found two guns in the vehicle, then arresting Riley for possession of firearms. Upon Riley’s arrest, the police also found a cellphone within Riley’s pockets, which was seized by police and then searched; evidence of gang involvement were found on the cellphone. The shooting that occurred on August 2, 2009 was tied to Riley in addition to charges for attempted murder, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle.
Riley was convicted of all three counts and was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
The Supreme Court decided that the evidence seized from the cell phone of a gang member was not to be used in Court as it was a part of an unreasonable search. Digital data (which may contain evidence) has the ability to be preserved while waiting for a warrant by using a “Faraday Bag.” Thus, the evidence collected without a warrant from the cell phone, in this particular case, was protected under the Fourth Amendment of unreasonable search and seizure.
Officer conducted an inventory search of the car. Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms when that search turned up two handguns under the cars hood. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§12025(a)(1), 12031(a)(1) (West 2009).
An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed that some words (presumably in text messages or a contacts list)were preceded by the letters “CK”—a label that, he believed, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the Bloods gang.
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The detective testified that he “went through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because . . . gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of themselves with the guns.” App. in No. 13–132, p. 20. Although there was “a lot of stuff ” on the phone, particular files that “caught [the detective’s] eye” included videos of young men sparring while someone yelled encouragement using the moniker “Blood.” Id., at 11–13. The police also found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier.
Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, an aggravating factor that carries an enhanced sentence. Compare Cal.
Penal Code Ann. §246 (2008) with §186.22(b)(4)(B) (2014).Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone. He contended that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth Amendment, because they had been performed without a warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court rejected that argument. App. in No. 13–132, at 24, 26. At Riley’s trial, police officers testified about the photographs and videos found on the phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into evidence. Riley was convicted on all three counts and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.
Source identified as “my house” on the phone’s external screen. A few minutes later, they opened the phone and saw a photograph of a woman and a baby set as the phone’s wallpaper. They pressed one button on the phone to access its call log, then another button to determine the phone number associated with the “my house” label. They next used an online phone directory to trace that phone number to an apartment building.
When the officers went to the building, they saw Wurie’s name on a mailbox and observed through a window a woman who resembled the woman in the photograph on Wurie’s phone. They secured the apartment while obtaining a search warrant and, upon later executing the warrant, found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash.
As the text makes clear, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006). Our cases have determined that “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrong doing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 653 (1995). Such a warrant ensures that the inferences to support a search are “drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5–6).
Misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §5.2(b), p. 132, and n. 15 (5th ed. 2012).
The first, Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), laid the groundwork for most of the existing search incident to arrest doctrine. Police officers in that case arrested Chimel inside his home and proceeded to search his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic and garage. In particular rooms, they also looked through the contents of drawers. Id., at 753–754.
Four years later, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), the Court applied the Chimel analysis in the context of a search of the arrestee’s person. A police officer had arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked license. The officer conducted a pat down search and felt an object that he could not identify in Robinson’s coat pocket. He removed the object, which turned out to be a crumpled cigarette package and opened it. Inside were 14 capsules of heroin. Id., at 220, 223.
was reasonable even though there was no concern about the loss of evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific concern that Robinson might be armed. Id., at 236. In doing so, the Court did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found during that search. It merely noted that, “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it.” Ibid. A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 15 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991).
The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with Gant, which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. Gant, like Robinson, recognized that the Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation underlie the search incident to arrest exception. See 556 U. S., at 338. As a result, the Court concluded that Chimel could authorize police to search a vehicle “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” 556 U. S., at 343. Gant added, however, an independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment“when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Ibid. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632 (2004) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment)). That exception stems not from Chimel, the Court explained, but from“circumstances unique to the vehicle context.” 556 U. S., at 343.
to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy. A smart phone of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of ten years ago;a significant majority of American adults now own such phones. See A. Smith, Pew Research Center, SmartphoneOwnership—2013 Update (June 5, 2013). Even less sophisticated phones like Wurie’s, which have already faded in popularity since Wurie was arrested in 2007, have been around for less than 15 years. Both phones are based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and Robinson were decided.
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999). Such a balancing of interests supported the search incident to arrest exception in Robinson, and a mechanical application of Robinson might well support the warrantless searches at issue here.
U. S., at 235. Rather than requiring the “case-by-case adjudication” that Robinson rejected, ibid., we ask instead whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects would “untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception,” Gant, supra, at 343. See also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 119 (1998) (declining to extend Robinson to the issuance of citations, “a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all”).
Perhaps the same might have been said of the cigarette pack seized from Robinson’s pocket. Once an officer gained control of the pack, it was unlikely that Robinson could have accessed the pack’s contents. But unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest. The officer in Robinson testified that he could not identify the objects in the cigarette pack but knew they were not cigarettes. See 414 U. S., at 223, 236, n. 7. Given that, a further search was a reasonable protective measure. No such unknowns exist with respect to digital data. As the First Circuit explained, the officers who searched Wurie’s cell phone “knew exactly what they would find therein:data. They also knew that the data could not harm them.”728 F. 3d, at 10.
exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”).
v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, 331–333 (2001); Chadwick, supra, at 13, and n. 8. And once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.
renders a phone all but “unbreakable” unless police know the password. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 13–132, p. 11.
764. With respect to remote wiping, the Government’s primary concern turns on the actions of third parties who are not present at the scene of arrest. And data encryption is even further afield. There, the Government focuses on the ordinary operation of a phone’s security features,apart from any active attempt by a defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence upon arrest.
p. 48. Similarly, the opportunities for officers to search a password-protected phone before data becomes encrypted are quite limited. Law enforcement officers are very unlikely to come upon such a phone in an unlocked state because most phones lock at the touch of a button or, as a default, after some very short period of inactivity. See, e.g., iPhone User Guide for iOS 7.1 Software 10 (2014) (default lock after about one minute). This may explain why the encryption argument was not made until the merits stage in this Court, and has never been considered by the Courts of Appeals.
19. Cell phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an individual anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the phone is completed, which might be at the station house hours later. Likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not be able to begin his search in the short time remaining before the phone locks and data becomes encrypted.
In any event, as to remote wiping, law enforcement is not without specific means to address the threat. Remote wiping can be fully prevented by disconnecting a phone from the network. There are at least two simple ways todo this: First, law enforcement officers can turn the phone off or remove its battery. Second, if they are concerned about encryption or other potential problems, they can leave a phone powered on and place it in an enclosure that isolates the phone from radio waves. See Ayers 30–31.Such devices are commonly called “Faraday bags,” after the English scientist Michael Faraday. They are essentially sandwich bags made of aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, and easy to use. See Brief for Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 9. They may not be a complete answer to the problem, see Ayers 32, but at least for now they provide a reasonable response. In fact, a number of law enforcement agencies around the country already encourage the use of Faraday bags. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders 14, 32(2d ed. Apr. 2008); Brief for Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 4–6.
those concerns. If “the police are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation,”—for example, circumstances suggesting that a defendant’s phone will be the target of an imminent remote-wipe attempt—they may be able to rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 10) (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 505 (1973); some internal quotation marks omitted).Or, if officers happen to seize a phone in an unlocked state, they may be able to disable a phone’s automatic-lock feature in order to prevent the phone from locking and encrypting data. See App. to Reply Brief in No. 13–132, p.3a (diagramming the few necessary steps). Such a preventive measure could be analyzed under the principles set forth in our decision in McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, which approved officers’ reasonable steps to secure a scene to preserve evidence while they awaited a warrant. See id., at 331–333.
ing and an inspection of the cigarette pack found in his pocket constituted only minor additional intrusions compared to the substantial government authority exercised in taking Robinson into custody. See Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 16, n. 10 (searches of a person are justified in part by “reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest”).
U. S., at 766–767, n. 12. Because a search of the arrestee’s entire house was a substantial invasion beyond the arrest itself, the Court concluded that a warrant was required.
Robinson is the only decision from this Court applying Chimel to a search of the contents of an item found on an arrestee’s person. In an earlier case, this Court had approved a search of a zipper bag carried by an arrestee, but the Court analyzed only the validity of the arrest itself. See Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 310–311 (1959). Lower courts applying Robinson and Chimel, however, have approved searches of a variety of personal items carried by an arrestee. See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 809 F. 2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (CA5 1987) (billfold and address book); United States v. Watson, 669 F. 2d 1374, 1383–1384 (CA11 1982) (wallet); United States v. Lee, 501 F. 2d 890, 892 (CADC 1974) (purse).
United States in No. 13–212, p. 26. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.
1 Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras,video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy. See Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 404–405 (2013). Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in Chadwick, supra, rather than a container the size of the cigarette package in Robinson.
v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803, 806 (CA7 2012). We expect that the gulf between physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen in the future.
Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cellphone, with all that it contains, who is the exception. According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smartphone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower. See Harris Interactive, 2013 Mobile Consumer Habits Study (June 2013). A decade ago police officers searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled across a highly personal item such as a diary. See, e.g., United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F. 2d 337 (CA2 1967) (per curiam). But those discoveries were likely to be few and far between. Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. See Ontario v. Quon, 560 U. S. 746, 760 (2010). Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.
Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building. See United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
Previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.
n. 4 (1981) (describing a “container” as “any object capable of holding another object”). But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is what cell phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do by taking advantage of “cloud computing.” Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself. Cell phone users often may not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center in No. 13–132, at 12–14, 20. Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally on the device for one user and in the cloud for another.
to the vehicle context” to endorse a search solely for the purpose of gathering evidence. 556 U. S., at 343. JUSTICE SCALIA’s Thornton opinion, on which Gant was based, explained that those unique circumstances are “a reduced expectation of privacy” and “heightened law enforcement needs” when it comes to motor vehicles. 541 U. S., at 631; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S., at 303–304. For reasons that we have explained, cell phone searches bear neither of those characteristics.
At any rate, a Gant standard would prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches. In the vehicle context, Gant generally protects against searches for evidence of past crimes. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §7.1(d), at 709, and n. 191. In the cell phone context, however, it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information will be found on a phone regardless of when the crime occurred. Similarly, in the vehicle context Gant restricts broad searches resulting from minor crimes such as traffic violations. See id., §7.1(d), at 713, and n.
204. That would not necessarily be true for cell phones. It would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone. Even an individual pulled over for something as basic as speeding might well have locational data dispositive of guilt on his phone. An individual pulled over for reckless driving might have evidence on the phone that shows whether he was texting while driving. The sources of potential pertinent information are virtually unlimited, so applying the Gant standard to cell phones would in effect give “police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.” 556 U. S., at 345.
Information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be discovered. See Brief for United States in No. 13–212, at 51–53. This approach would again impose few meaningful constraints on officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of information, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance what information would be found where.
We also reject the United States’ final suggestion that officers should always be able to search a phone’s call log,as they did in Wurie’s case. The Government relies on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), which held that no warrant was required to use a pen register at telephone company premises to identify numbers dialed by a particular caller. The Court in that case, however, concluded that the use of a pen register was not a “search” at all under the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 745–746. There is no dispute here that the officers engaged in a search of Wurie’s cell phone. Moreover, call logs typically contain more than just phone numbers; they include any identifying information that an individual might add, such as the label “my house” in Wurie’s case.
Range of items contained on a phone, even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical form. In Riley’s case, for example, it is implausible that he would have strolled around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets. But because each of those items has a pre-digital analog, police under California’s proposal would be able to search a phone for all of those items—a significant diminution of privacy.
U. S. 1, ___ (2011) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 7)(discussing the Court’s analog test under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971). Recent technological advances similar to those discussed here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11–12); id., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 8) (describing jurisdiction where “police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads [and] judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes”).
U. S., at ___. In Chadwick, for example, the Court held that the exception for searches incident to arrest did not justify a search of the trunk at issue, but noted that “if officers have reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to the stationhouse without opening the luggage.” 433 U. S., at 15, n. 9.
—————— 2In Wurie’s case, for example, the dissenting First Circuit judge argued that exigent circumstances could have justified a search of Wurie’s phone. See 728 F. 3d 1, 17 (2013) (opinion of Howard, J.) (discussing the repeated unanswered calls from “my house,” the suspected location of a drug stash). But the majority concluded that the Government had not made an exigent circumstances argument. See id., at 1. The Government acknowledges the same in this Court. See Brief for United States in No. 13–212, p. 28, n. 8.
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.” Id., at 248 (quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625 (1886)).
Interpretation 28 (1969); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 764 (1994). In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914), we held that the Fourth Amendment did not disturb this rule. See also Taylor, supra, at 45; Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L. J. 393, 401 (1995) (“The power to search incident to arrest—a search of the arrested suspect’s person . . .—was well established in the mid-eighteenth century, and nothing in . . . the Fourth Amendment changed that”). And neither in Weeks nor in any of the authorities discussing the old common-law rule have I found any suggestion that it was based exclusively or primarily on the need to protect arresting officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence.
On the contrary, when pre-Weeks authorities discussed the basis for the rule, what was mentioned was the need to obtain probative evidence. For example, an 1839 case stated that “it is clear, and beyond doubt, that . . . constables . . . are entitled, upon a lawful arrest by them of one charged with treason or felony, to take and detain property found in his possession which will form material evidence in his prosecution for that crime.” See Dillon v. O’Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245, 249–251 (1887) (citing Regina, v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 173 Eng. Rep. 771)). The court noted that the origins of that rule “deriv[e] from the interest which the State has in a person guilty (or reasonably believed to be guilty) of a crime being brought to justice, and in a prosecution, once commenced, being determined in due course of law.” 16 Cox Crim. Cas., at 249–250. See also Holker v. Hennessey, 141 Mo. 527, 537– 540, 42 S. W. 1090, 1093 (1897).
defendant are bound to take from his person any articles which may be of use as proof in the trial of the offense with which the defendant is charged”); J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure §§210–212, p. 127 (2d ed. 1872) (if an arresting officer finds “about the prisoner’s person, or otherwise in his possession, either goods or moneys which there is reason to believe are connected with the supposed crime as its fruits, or as the instruments with which it was committed, or as directly furnishing evidence relating to the transaction, he may take the same, and hold them to be disposed of as the court may direct”).
taken away from an arrestee (something that obviously must be done before the items are read), there is no risk that the arrestee will destroy them. Nor is there any risk that leaving these items unread will endanger the arresting officers.
The idea that officer safety and the preservation of evidence are the sole reasons for allowing a warrantless search incident to arrest appears to derive from the Court’s reasoning in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), a case that involved the lawfulness of a search of the scene of an arrest, not the person of an arrestee. As I have explained, Chimel’s reasoning is questionable, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 361–363 (2009) (ALITO, J., dissenting), and I think it is a mistake to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these that concern the search of the person of arrestees.
the bill lists an incriminating call to a long-distance number. He also has in his a wallet a few snapshots, and one of these is incriminating. Suspect number two has in his pocket a cell phone, the call log of which shows a call to the same incriminating number. In addition, a number of photos are stored in the memory of the cell phone, and one of these is incriminating. Under established law, the police may seize and examine the phone bill and the snapshots in the wallet without obtaining a warrant, but under the Court’s holding today, the information stored in the cell phone is out.
Since that time, electronic surveillance has been governed primarily, not by decisions of this Court, bu by the statute, which authorizes but imposes detailed restrictions on electronic surveillance. See ibid.
Modern cell phones are of great value for both lawful and unlawful purposes. They can be used in committing many serious crimes, and they present new and difficult law enforcement problems. See Brief for United States in No. 13–212, pp. 2–3. At the same time, because of the role that these devices have come to play in contemporary life,searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that this Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate. Many forms of modern technology are making it easier and easier for both government and private entities to amass a wealth of information about the lives of ordinary Americans, and at the same time, many ordinary Americans are choosing to make public much information that was seldom revealed to outsiders just a few decades ago.