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Lindner, Speers & Reuland, P.C., Terry W. Heady #11229, Attorney for Plaintiff, 54 West Downer Place, Po. Box 5055, Aurora, Il 60507, (630) 892-8109.
On November 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendants' Forum Non Conveniens Motion to Transfer Venue from Cook to Kane County. Plaintiff asks that the Court reconsider its earlier ruling for three reasons. First, because Plaintiff has determined that the defense made incorrect material statements about two witnesses that were identified as likely trial witnesses. A nurse identified by the defense identified as a likely trial witness was in fact deceased long before Defendant's Motion was filed. A second witness, a doctor, identified by the defense now works for Defendant, Advocate Health Care, in Cook County. In addition, during the hearing on the Motion to Transfer, the Court advised the parties that copies of pertinent medical records had been omitted from the courtesy copy provided to the Court. Therefore, the Court was not fully able to appreciate the nature and extent of the treatment received by the minor Plaintiff, Robert Morales, Jr., at Lutheran General Hospital in Cook County. The Plaintiff has attached portions of the relevant records, as well as an affidavit that provides the Court with specific information as to nature and extent of the care rendered by the doctors and the reason that their testimony will be necessary. In addition, new medical records from Cook County that were not available at the time of the hearing on Defendants' Motion are now available and Plaintiff can identify additional witnesses who will testify at trial. Lastly, the Court erred by failing to consider the numerous delays caused by the Defendants in the instant cause. Because Defendants' Motion to Transfer is based in equity, the Court should consider the substantial delay caused by their failure to file the motion to transfer at an earlier date.
Attached as Exhibit “C “to Defendant Provena's Motion to Transfer Venue, is a “list of likely trial witnesses.” This Exhibit is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Those witnesses included two doctors, the defendant, Dr. Judson Jones, who lives in Kendall County and works in Kane County, and a Dr. Rom M. Kopparthi, who is listed as working in Kane County but his county of residence was unknown. (Ex. 1) With regard to Dr. Kopparthi, according to the website maintained by Defendant, Advocate Health Care, he is now on staff at Advocate Lutheran General, located in Park Ridge, Cook County. A copy of the Dr. Kopparthi's listing on Defendant Advocate's webpage is attached hereto as Exhibit. 2. This listing indicates that Dr. Kopparthi is also a member of the Advocate Medical Group with offices in Park Ridge.
Plaintiff agrees that Dr. Kopparthi is a likely trial witness. Dr. Kopparthi is the doctor who made the decision to transfer the minor plaintiff to Advocate Lutheran General in Park Ridge six hours after his birth. Plaintiff attached a copy of Dr. Kopparthi's four page report to its response to the motion to transfer. A copy of the report is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. As this is a case involving alleged malpractice resulting in a brain injury, Dr. Kopparthi's testimony as the minor's condition at the time that he left the hospital will be important. Dr. Kopparthi performed a physical examination, reported the history of the pregnancy, the condition of the baby on birth, APGAR scores, cord gasses, neurological findings. He reports seven diagnoses and identifies the procedures performed on the baby. The fact that this doctor now practices in Cook County is another reason this case should not be transferred from Cook County.
The remaining nurses Provena identifies as likely witness are from Will (1), Kane (5), Kendall (3), DeKalb (1) and Cook (1). The Will County nurse, Mojisola Ogunbuyide, is listed in public records as residing at 412 Bluebird Dr., in Bolingbrook, Will County, which is actually a couple of miles closer to the Cook County Courthouse than it is to the Kane County Courthouse in Geneva. (Attached as Exhibit 5 are Mapquest maps showing the mileage).
Provena provides two affidavits from nurses. One affidavit is provided by Nurse Enoh, which states where she lives but no information is provided as to the subject of her testimony, what her contact with the minor plaintiff was, or why she is a necessary witness. (Def' s Ex. F) An affidavit was provided by a nurse Linda Lombard (Def's Ex. F), but this nurse is not included on the list of likely witnesses provided by the defense. (Ex 1) The affidavit says nothing about the subject of her anticipated testimony or what care she provided to Plaintiff. The only other affidavit provided by Provena is from a Christine Pike, a Quality/Risk management coordinator, who is also not listed as a likely trial witness, and who is not alleged to have provided any treatment to the minor plaintiff. No other affidavits were provided by Provena.
Dr. Bhagya Puppala, a neonatolgist at Lutheran General Hospital, was the admitting physican, and primary doctor who oversaw the treatment of the minor plaintiff on a daily basis while he was at the hospital during the first admission. A copy of Dr. Discharge Summary is attached as Exhibit 12. Dr. Puppala had contact with the minor Plaintiff on a regular basis during his initial stay at the hospital.
Dr. Shah, a pediatric neurologist, also provided frequent consultations and performed at least three EEG exams on the minor Plaintiff. (Copies of four of Dr. Shah's reports are attached as Group Exhibit 13). Dr. Shah also provided a physical exam, provided medical treatment, ordered an MRI and made a diagnosis, during the second admission to Advocate Lutheran General. Dr. Shah's discharge summary of the second admission is included with Group Exhibit 13. According to the attached reports, the EEGs were abnormal and a diagnosis of severe hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy was made. Because one of the issues presented in this case will be whether the deprivation of oxygen to the minor plaintiff during delivery caused cerebral palsy, Dr. Shah will be a key witness in this case.
Other doctors who will certainly be called to testify are doctors John Phillips and Dr. Barry Rabin, radiologists who performted CT scans of the Brain and an MRI of the brain. (Copies of their reports are attached as Group Exhibit 14) The actual CT and MRI films are located at Lutheran General Hospital. These doctors will need to consult with these MRI films when they testify. As this is a case involving a brain injury, the MRI taken of the child the day after his birth will be critical, and thus, both Drs. Phillips and Rabin will be key witnesses in this case.
In addition to the treatment received at Advocate Lutheran General, the minor Plaintiff has also treated at the University of Illinois Medical Center at Chicago. Because of medications that the minor Plaintiff takes, he sustained serious injuries to his teeth and had to have numerous root canals performed under general anesthesia on November 4, 2005. Dr. Fadavi Shar, from UIC, Department of Pediatric Dentistry, will likely be called to testify regarding his examinations and the oral surgery performed. Copies of these medical records are attached as Exhibit 15. These medical records were not available at the time that Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Transfer because he had not yet undergone the treatment.
Another witness who will testify at trial is Scott Beckman who is the vice-president of risk management for Advocate. When Defendants filed their original Motion to Transfer Venue, Scott Beckman's affidavit was attached in support of the motion. A copy of that affidavit is attached as Exhibit 16. At the hearing on the Motion to Transfer, the Court asked whether the Court could draw an inference of convenience based on the fact that he is located in Oak Brook. (Ex. 6, p. 40) Counsel for Advocate admitted that the Court could draw this inference, but then informed the Court that “no one has indicated that he is going to be a witness that is likely to testify at trial regarding the agency issue. I mean, he hasn't addressed it.” (Ex. 6, p. 50, 1.11) Nevertheless, on page 2, paragraph 5 of the affidavit, Mr. Beckman did in fact represent that “AHCN is not the actual or apparent principal of the Defendants, Judson Jones, M.D., or Dreyer Medical Group, Ltd.” Thus, defense counsel's representation regarding Scott Beckman was not accurate. Based on the affidavit, Plaintiff deposed Scott Beckman where he testified about the agency issue. Because of information learned at that deposition regarding the corporate structure of Advocate, Plaintiff anticipates on calling Mr. Beckman as a witness even if the defense does not. According to public records, Scott Beckman is a resident of Willow Springs, located in Cook County. (Exhibit 17) Thus, only after Defendant's original motion to transfer, alleging that Advocate was not joined in good faith, was denied, did Defendants decide that Mr. Beckman was not a key witness.
It is likely that there will be other witness from Advocate who will testify at trial and these witnesses either maintain their offices in Cook County or in Oak Brook. One likely witnesses from Advocate is Daniel Schmidt, the chief executive of the Physician Services Group. According to Scott Beckman's His office is located in Chicago. (Exhibit 18 at p. 44-45) Mr. Schmidt gave a statement in an interview that differed significantly from Mr. Beckman's testimony concerning the relationship between Advocate and Dreyer Clinic. A copy of the interview is attached hereto as Exhibit 17. Mr. Schmidt explains in the interview the relationship between Advocate and Dreyer, such as their standardization of billings, the fact that they use the same billing system, that they are under the same management system, financial reporting, risk management, purchasing and human resources. (Ex. 17, pg. 3) Because the control by Advocate over Dreyer is a critical and disputed issue in this case, Daniel Schmidt will certainly be a key witness in this case.
A. This Court Should Deny Defendant's Motion To Transfer Venue For Forum Non Conveniens, Because Defendant Has Failed To Present Exceptional Circumstances Which Would Strongly Favor Transfer To Another Venue.
A case should be transferred on intrastate forum non conveniens grounds only in exceptional circumstances where it has been shown that the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum. Paglia v. Goodman, 194 Ill.App.3d 543, 546, 551 N.E.2d 810 (5th Dist. 1990) (citing Torres v. Walsh, 98 I11.2d 338, 346 (1983). In this case, Defendants failed to provide any “exceptional circumstances” which would warrant transfer of this case from Cook County to Kane.
Plaintiff has identified thirteen medical doctors and a dentist from Cook County who are likely to testify in this case. The twelve doctors are part of Advocate Healthcare, a defendant in this suit. The corporate witnesses from Advocate, Scott Beckman and Daniel Schmidt, work and/or reside in Cook County. Thus, Advocate cannot rationally argue that a Kane County venue would be more convenient to Advocate than a Cook County forum. Because the forum is more convenient to one of the parties, Advocate, Defendants cannot meet the required burden of proving that another forum is more convenient to all parties.
Defendant Provena identified one doctor, Dr. Rom Kopparthi, in addition to the defendant who would likely be a trial witness. Since this doctor now practices for Advocate in Cook County, Provena cannot claim that its doctor will be inconvenienced in this case. As to the nurses identified by Provena, the Court cannot give these supposed witnesses any weight when the defense did not provide any information as to the substance of their testimony.
In a forum non conveniens motion the defendants must identify witnesses that will testify and indicate what the substance of their testimony will be. See Elling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill.App.3d 311, 683 N.E.2d 629 (1st Dist. 1997) ; Schoon v. Hill, 207 Ill.App.3d 601, 566 N.E.2d 718 (1st Dist. 1991) (both cases affirming trial court's denial of defendants forum non conveniens where defendants failed to identity the court's substance and necessity” of any witnesses or how they would be inconvenienced if required to testify in Cook County.Defendants completely failed to provide the identity of likely trial witnesses. The defendants did not state why any of the witnesses would be necessary and what the substance of their testimony would be, and whether they would likely be trial witnesses. By naming a nurse that was deceased before the motion was filed, it is evident that Defendant made no genuine effort to identify which nurses would likely be called. In addition, there were far more nurses who treated the minor plaintiff during his 23 day stay at Advocate Lutheran than treated him at Provena. It is far more likely that the doctors, identified by the plaintiff will be actual trial witnesses.
B. The Private and Public Interest Factors Set Forth By The Illinois Supreme Court Weigh in Favor of Giving Deference to Plaintiffs Choice of Forum.
In resolving a forum non conveniens question, this Court must balance private interest factors affecting the litigants and public interest factors affecting the administration of the courts. Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft, Int'l, Inc., 136 I11.2d 101, 105 (1990); citing Bland v. Norfolk & W R.Co., 116 I1.2d 217, 223 (1987). Defendant bears a heavy burden of proof, because the relevant factors must not only weigh in favor transfer, they must strongly favor transfer before a transfer is to be ordered. Griffith, 136 Il.2d at 107. The fact that some other forum might also be appropriate does not diminish the propriety of the chosen forum.
The relevant private interest factors to be considered in a intrastate forum non conveniens motion are: 1) the availability of another forum and the relative capacities of the two courts to provide a fair trial (Adkins v. Chicago. Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company. 54 I11.2d 511, 514 (1973)); 2) the convenience of the forums to the parties; 3) the relative ease of access to the sources of proof in each forum; 4) the accessibility to the forum for witnesses; 5) the possibility of viewing the premises, if such would be appropriate to the action ( Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron, Inc., 113 Ill.2d 112, 118 (1986) ; citing Foster v. Chicago & North Western Transp.Co.,102 I11.2d 378, 382 (1984); Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508; Griffith, 136 I11.2d at 106-107; Torres, 98 I11.2d at 351).
In addition, relevant public interest factors include: 6) the interest of a forum in having localized controversies decided locally; 7) the fairness of imposing jury duty upon residents of each county; 8) the administrative difficulties caused when litigation is handled in congested venues; and 9) “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Griffith 136 111.2d at 105, citing Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507; Torres, 98 L11.2d at 351; McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf RB. Co., 121 Ill.2d 278, 289 (1988). The trial court must evaluate the total circumstances, and no single factor should be given under weight. Guerine, 198 Il1.2d at 518.
A consideration of these factors favors keeping the case in Cook County. As the majority of witnesses who will be testifying in this case are from Cook County, it will be more convenient to all parties to have the case heard in Cook County. The only treating physician employed by Provena, who was identified as a likely trial witness by both Plaintiff and Provena, is now employed in Cook at Advocate. All of Advocate's witnesses either work or reside in Cook County. Although Defendant has argued that Advocate Lutheran General is not a party to this case, Advocate Healthcare, for whom these doctors work, is a party to the case and the presence of these doctors in Cook County makes trying the case in Cook more convenient for Advocate.
Provena argued in its motion that the location of the treating doctors should be given little weight. In making this argument, the First District's decision in Prouty v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 348 Ill.App.3d 490, 810 N.E.2d 173 (1st Dist. 2004). Prouty recognized that generally, the location of treating doctors is not given overdue weight because of the potential that a plaintiff may obtain medical treatment in a forum solely for the purpose of trying to fix venue. However, in Prouty, the Appellate Court held that this concern was not present where the the minor came into contact by these doctors because the defendant transferred the child to the Cook County facility. Id. at 179. Therefore, the Appellate Court held that the Trial Court properly considered the care provided by these doctors. Id.Here too, the minor plaintiff had no choice in where he received treatment. In Prouty, the child stayed a total of two weeks at Advocate Lutheran General in Chicago, where as in the present case, the minor plaintiff spent initially 23 days in Cook County, followed by numerous follow up visits for MRI's and other treatment and a second admission for several days. As in Prouty, the malpractice did not take place in Cook County nor does the plaintiff reside in Cook County. However, in Prouty, the court found that because substantial treatment was provided in Cook County, and because the numerous witnesses were spread out over several counties, the trial court did not error in denying the motion to transfer venue on the basis of forum non conveniens. Id. at 180.
In the present case, as in Prouty, Cook County has a substantial interest in this case. In Prouty, on interest the Court identified that the child had spend two weeks in a Cook County hospital. Id. at 179. Here, the minor plaintiff spent even longer in the same Cook County hospital. Prouty also held that any county to which Advocate provides service has an interest in the outcome of the case. Id. The same defendant in this case, Advocate, provides services in Cook County as thus, Cook County has an interest in the litigation.
As in Prouty, the majority of pertinent medical records, and diagnostic films will be located in Cook County along with the majority of witnesses. One factor that favored the defense, that is not present here, is Court congestion. As the Trial Court noted during oral argument on the rest of the motion, cases on this Court call on the individual Court calendar are disposed of far more rapidly than cases on then the general court calendar. Transferring this case back to Kane County will result in a significant delay as this process generally takes several months before the case is transferred and placed on the new court docket.
In addition, Cook adjoins Kane, and DuPage Counties. It is difficult to demonstrate that a trial in Cook County would be inconvenient or unduly burdensome where it adjoins the counties the Defendant advocates. See Meyers, 113 I11.2d at 121; Griffith 136 I11.2d at 113 (stating that the distance between adjacent counties makes it unlikely that trial in one county would be more costly or inconvenient than trial in the other); Diaber v. Montgomery County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 191 Ill.App.3d 566, 568 (5th Dist. 1989) (“it is most difficult to demonstrate inconvenience when the alternative forum adjoins the county in which venue otherwise property was laid.”); Lint v. Missouri P. R. Co., 200 Ill.App.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Dist. 1990). Furthermore, due to the proximity of the Daley Center to metropolitan airports, mass transit systems, and interstate highways defendant's claim as to inconvenience is groundless.
Both Defendants have also retained counsels that are within walking distance of this Court. As defendants' counsels will be attending the Court calls and depositions, and they have chosen counsel in Cook County, Defendants certainly will not be inconvenienced by a Cook County Venue.
Lastly, the Court erred in failing to consider the numerous delays caused by the Defendants in failing to timely respond to pleadings, filing multiple motions to dismiss that were denied by the Court, and then waiting two years to bring a forum motion. Because Defendants seek equity, the Court erred in refusing to consider this significant factor in its decision. Transferring this case to Kane County, after the Court has decided multiple motions, and after limited discovery has been conducted, will cause considerable delay and additional expense to Plaintiff. There is no just reason why Defendants could not have brought their motion at an earlier date.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Joann Williams, individually and as mother and next friend of Robert Morales, Jr., a minor, prays that this Honorable Court enter an Order Reversing its November 2, 2005 Order granting Defendants' Motion to Transfer, and that this matter be allowed to remain in Cook County, and for whatever other relief this Honorable Court deems just.

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Brayman, Harold. The President Speaks Off the Record. Historic Evenings with America's Leaders, The Press, and Other Men of Power at Washington's Most Exclusive Club - The Gridiron. From Grover Cleveland to Gerald Ford. Princeton. Dow Jones. 1976. 870 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in worn dust jacket (in mylar).
Brecher, Elinor. Schindler's Legacy. True Stories of the List Survivors. New York. Plume. 1994. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Breemer, Jan. U.S. Naval Developments. Annapolis. Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. 1983. 194 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Bregman, Ahron. Israel and the Arabs. An Eyewitness Account of War and Peace in the Middle East. New York. TV Books. 2000. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Very good copy. Light shelf wear.
Breitman, Richard. Official Secrets. What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew. New York. Hill and Wang. 1998. 325 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breitman, Richard. The Architect of Genocide. Himmler and The Final Solution. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 1991. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Brendon, Piers. Ike. His Life & Times. Photo available. New York. Harper and Brothers Pub. 1986. 478 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Brennecke, Gerhard. Die Nurnberger Geschichtsentstellung: Quellen zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des 2. Weltkriegs aus den Akten der deutschen Verteidigung. Deutschen, Hochschullehrer-Zeitung. 1970. 428 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Brenner, Eliot. Desert Storm: The Weapons of War. New York. Orion. 1991. 96 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Brenner, Lenni. Zionism in the Age of Dictators. A Reappraisal. London. Croom Helm. 1983. Octavo. Soft cover. Good copy. Covers lightly damp stained.
Breuer, William B. Death of a Nazi Army. The Falaise Pocket. The Epic German Defeat in France - Rivaling on ly Stalingrad. Photo available. np. Scarborough House. 1985. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine (owner name on end paper) copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breuer, William B. The Air-Raid Warden Was a Spy and Other Tales from Home-Front America in World War II. Photo available. Edison. Castle. 2003. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breuer, William B. Unexplained Mysteries of World War II. Photo available. New York. John Wiley & Sons. 1997. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breuer, William. Hitler's Fortress Cherbourg. The Conquest of a Bastion. The Bloody Battle that Saved the Normandy Invasion. New York. Stein and Day. 1984. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy (owner blind stamp) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breuer, William. MacArthur's Undercover War. Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Mission. New York. John Wiley & Sons. 1995. 257 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Breuer, William. The Secret War with Germany. Deception, Espionage, and Dirty Tricks. 1939-1945. Novato. Presidio. 1988. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy (owner blind stamp) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Brickhill, Paul. The Dam Busters. Pan Grand Strategy. Photo available. London. Pan Books. 1978. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Britton, Jack & George Washington Jr. U.S. Military Shoulder Patches of the United States Armed Forces. Photo available. Tulsa. M.C.N. Press. 1981. 76 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Brokaw, Tom. The Greatest Generation. New York. Random House. 1998. 412 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. Between Two Flags. The Life of Baron Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha. New York. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1972. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy (owner blind stamp) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Brooks, Lester. Behind Japan's Surrender. The Secret Struggle that Ended an Empire. New York. McGraw-Hill. 1967. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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On Monday, 25 March 2019, US President Donald Trump accepted Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights by stating that “the United States recognizes that the Golan Heights are part of the State of Israel” (see here). The Golan Heights are an area located in Syria close to the Israeli border and are of strategic importance, given their location in between the two states. The Six-Day War in 1967 resulted in the occupation of two thirds of the Golan Heights by Israel and was followed by its annexation in 1981. The issue of the Golan Heights has been addressed various times by the UN Security Council (UN SC) – e.g. in Resolution 242 (1967) and in Resolution 497 (1981) – which set out that both Israel’s occupation and annexation are unlawful. The recognition by President Trump is therefore at variance with the Security Council’s explicit resolutions and reignites this territorial dispute.
An annexation is the forcible acquisition of territory belonging to another state (see Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 7th ed., p. 93). The general prohibition of the use of force is enshrined in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and for annexations further specified in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. The latter – though as a resolution by the UN General Assembly (UN GA) not binding – reflects customary international law and provides that annexations are unlawful. Accordingly, the UN SC condemned the annexation in Resolution 497, stating that the Israeli exercise of sovereign rights in the Golan Heights is “null and void”. Notably, this resolution was adopted unanimously, meaning with US support, and, according to Art. 25 UN Charter, all states have to accept and carry out the resolutions by the UN SC. Additionally, as provided not only by the Friendly Relations Declaration, but also by Art. 5 (3) of the UN GA Resolution 3314 (1974) on the definition of aggression, the recognition of an act of aggression, such as an annexation, is unlawful.
Nevertheless, President Trump signed the abovementioned proclamation. According to President Trump, the recognition is required by “unique circumstances” and necessary to achieve future peace in the region. While this sets a precedence of accepting the legality of annexations, this unilateral statement does not affect the legality of the annexation. Nevertheless, the recognition itself by the USA is inconsistent with international law, unless the legal classification of Israel’s annexation would have changed since 1981. In this case, the USA would violate Art. 25 UN Charter in connection with UN SC Resolution 497 as well as customary international law as reflected in the abovementioned UN GA resolutions. Arguably, the recognition of an annexation can also amount to a violation of Art. 2 (1) UN Charter. The International Court of Justice specified in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment that the prohibition of interventions is not limited to the direct use of force, but also encompasses indirect interventions, such as supporting military activities. The legality of President Trump’s recognition therefore depends crucially on the legality of Israel’s activities in the Golan Heights.
An annexation, however, cannot lead to the acquisition of territory by the lapse of time (in line with the principle “ex iniuria ius non oritur”), as this would foil Art. 2 (4) UN Charter (see for the related case of Crimea and the Russian annexation: Behlert, IFHV Working Papers, Vol. 5, Nr. 2 (see here). Moreover, it is no “unique circumstance” that the use of force might be reciprocated with force, unlike President Trump seems to suggest. Besides, Art. 39 UN Charter vests the authority to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security on the UN SC, not on the head of state of one country alone. Therefore, this annexation cannot be justified with considerations of peace or security (irrespective of the fact that it remains unclear on which legal grounds exactly President Trump bases this justification at all).
In conclusion, not only Israel’s annexation, but also President Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights is inconsistent with international law.
Rouven Diekjobst and Judith Prasse are student assistants at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) of Ruhr University Bochum.
Cite as: Rouven Diekjobst & Judith Prasse, “New peak in the dispute concerning the Golan Heights. On the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory by Donald Trump”, Völkerrechtsblog, 3 April 2019, doi: 10.17176/20190403-144553-0.

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Law Web: What is duty of court while deciding domestic violence proceeding?
What is duty of court while deciding domestic violence proceeding?
Regard being had to the nature of the legislation, a more sensitive approach is expected from the courts where under the 2005 Act no relief can be granted, it should never be conceived of but, before throwing a petition at the threshold on the ground of maintainability, there has to be an apposite discussion and thorough deliberation on the issues raised. It should be borne in mind that helpless and hapless "aggrieved person" under the 2005 Act approaches the court under the compelling circumstances. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise the facts from all angles whether a plea advanced by the Respondent to nullify the grievance of the aggrieved person is really legally sound and correct. The principle "justice to the cause is equivalent to the salt of ocean" should be kept in mind. The court of law is bound to uphold the truth which sparkles when justice is done. Before throwing a petition at the threshold, it is obligatory to see that the person aggrieved under such a legislation is not faced with a situation of non-adjudication, for the 2005 Act as we have stated is a beneficial as well as assertively affirmative enactment for the realisation of the constitutional rights of women and to ensure that they do not become victims of any kind of domestic violence.
6. Before the learned Magistrate it was contended by the Respondent that the application preferred by the wife was barred by limitation and that she could not have raised claim as regards Stridhan after the decree of judicial separation passed by the competent court. The learned Magistrate taking into consideration the admitted fact that Respondent and the Appellant had entered into wedlock treated her as an "aggrieved person", but opined that no "domestic relationship" as defined Under Section 2(f) of the 2005 Act existed between the parties and, therefore, wife was not entitled to file the application Under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. The learned Magistrate came to hold that though the parties had not been divorced but the decree of judicial separation would be an impediment for entertaining the application and being of this view, he opined that no domestic relationship subsisted under the 2005 Act and hence, no relief could be granted. Be it stated here that before the learned Magistrate, apart from herself, the Appellant examined three witnesses and the husband had examined himself as DW-1. The learned Magistrate while dealing with the maintainability of the petition had noted the contentions of the parties as regards merits, but has really not recorded any finding thereon.
Section 3. Definition of domestic violence.
Explanation II.-For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the Respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.
Section 12. Application to Magistrate.-(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for Under Sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the Respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off.
We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that in looking into a complaint Under Section 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the PWD Act, could be taken into consideration while passing an order Under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of the PWD Act, 2005.
We are of the view that the act of the Respondent husband squarely comes within the ambit of Section 3 of the DVA, 2005, which defines "domestic violence" in wide terms. The High Court made an apparent error in holding that the conduct of the parties prior to the coming into force of the DVA, 2005 cannot be taken into consideration while passing an order. This is a case where the Respondent husband has not complied with the order and direction passed by the trial court and the appellate court. He also misleads the Court by giving wrong statement before the High Court in the contempt petition filed by the Appellant wife. The Appellant wife having being harassed since 2000 is entitled for protection order and residence order Under Sections 18 and 19 of the DVA, 2005 along with the maintenance as allowed by the trial court Under Section 20(1)(d) of the DVA, 2005. Apart from these reliefs, she is also entitled for compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the Respondent husband. Therefore, in addition to the reliefs granted by the courts below, we are of the view that the Appellant wife should be compensated by the respondent husband. Hence, the Respondent is hereby directed to pay compensation and damages to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000 in favour of the Appellant wife.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, the submission made on behalf of Respondent 2 that the judgment and decree of a civil court granting divorce is null and void and they continued to be the husband and wife, cannot be taken note of at this stage unless the suit filed by Respondent 2 to declare the said judgment and decree dated 20-3-2008 is decided in her favour. In view thereof, the evidence adduced by her particularly the record of the telephone calls, photographs attending a wedding together and her signatures in school diary of the child cannot be taken into consideration so long as the judgment and decree of the civil court subsists. On a similar footing, the contention advanced by her counsel that even after the decree of divorce, they continued to live together as husband and wife and therefore the complaint under the 2005 Act is maintainable, is not worth acceptance at this stage.
....in view of the provisions of Section 468 Code of Criminal Procedure, that the complaint could be filed only within a period of one year from the date of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the 2005 Act read with Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which make the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure applicable and stand fortified by the judgments of this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty MANU/SC/3080/2007 : (2007) 7 SCC 394, and NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA MANU/SC/0570/2011 : (2011) 6 SCC 508.
18. The core issue that is requisite to be addressed is whether the Appellant has ceased to be an "aggrieved person" because of the decree of judicial separation. Once the decree of divorce is passed, the status of the parties becomes different, but that is not so when there is a decree for judicial separation. A three-Judge Bench in Jeet Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0436/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 325 though in a different context, adverted to the concept of judicial separation and ruled that the judicial separation creates rights and obligations. A decree or an order for judicial separation permits the parties to live apart. There would be no obligation for either party to cohabit with the other. Mutual rights and obligations arising out of a marriage are suspended. The decree however, does not sever or dissolve the marriage. It affords an opportunity for reconciliation and adjustment. Though judicial separation after a certain period may become a ground for divorce, it is not necessary and the parties are not bound to have recourse to that remedy and the parties can live keeping their status as wife and husband till their lifetime.
19. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to the authority in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda MANU/SC/0179/2001 : (2001) 4 SCC 125 wherein the issue that arose for determination was whether the husband who had filed a petition seeking dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce Under Section 13(1-A)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be declined relief on the ground that he had failed to pay maintenance for his wife and daughter despite an order of the court. The husband was Appellant before this Court and had filed an application Under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for seeking judicial separation on the ground of adultery on the part of the Appellant. Thereafter, the Appellant presented the petition for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of more than one year after passing of the decree for judicial separation. The stand of the wife was that the Appellant having failed to pay the maintenance as ordered by the court, the petition for divorce filed by the husband was liable to be rejected inasmuch he was trying to get advantage of his own wrong for getting the relief. The High Court accepted the plea of the wife and refused to grant the prayer of the Appellant seeking divorce. It was contended before this Court that the only condition for getting divorce Under Section 13(1-A)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is that there has been no resumption of cohabitation between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of the decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which both the spouses are parties. It was urged that if the said condition is satisfied the court is required to pass a decree of divorce. On behalf of the wife, the said submissions were resisted on the score that the husband had been living in continuous adultery even after passing of the decree of judicial separation and had reasonably failed to maintain the wife and daughter. The Court proceeded to analyse Section 13(1-A)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Analysing the provisions at length and speaking about judicial separation, it expressed that after the decree for judicial separation was passed on the petition filed by the wife it was the duty of both the spouses to do their part for cohabitation. The husband was expected to act as a dutiful husband towards the wife and the wife was to act as a devoted wife towards the husband. If this concept of both the spouses making sincere contribution for the purpose of successful cohabitation after a judicial separation is ordered then it can reasonably be said that in the facts and circumstances of the case the husband in refusing to pay maintenance to the wife failed to act as a husband. Thereby he committed a "wrong" within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act. Therefore, the High Court was justified in declining to allow the prayer of the husband for dissolution of the marriage by divorce Under Section 13(1-A) of the Act.
....The effect of the decree is that certain mutual rights and obligations arising from the marriage are as it were suspended and the rights and duties prescribed in the decree are substituted therefor. The decree for judicial separation does not sever or dissolve the marriage tie which continues to subsist. It affords an opportunity to the spouse for reconciliation and readjustment. The decree may fall by a conciliation of the parties in which case the rights of the respective parties which float from the marriage and were suspended are restored. Therefore the impression that Section 10(2) vests a right in the Petitioner to get the decree of divorce notwithstanding the fact that he has not made any attempt for cohabitation with the Respondent and has even acted in a manner to thwart any move for cohabitation does not flow from a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions. At the cost of repetition it may be stated here that the object and purpose of the Act is to maintain the marital relationship between the spouses and not to encourage snapping of such relationship.
21. It is interesting to note that an issue arose whether matrimonial offence of adultery had exhausted itself when the decree for judicial separation was granted and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is a new fact or circumstance amounting to wrong which will stand as an obstacle in the way of the husband to obtain the relief which he claims in the divorce proceedings. Be it stated that reliance was placed on the decision of Gujarat High Court in Bai Mani v. Jayantilal Dahyabhai MANU/GJ/0060/1979 : AIR 1979 Guj 209. This Court did not accept the contention by holding that living in adultery on the part of the husband is a continuing matrimonial offence, and it does not get frozen or wiped out merely on passing of a decree for judicial separation which merely suspends certain duties and obligations of the spouses in connection with their marriage and does not snap the matrimonial tie. The Court ruled that the decision of the Gujarat High Court does not lay down the correct position of law. The Court approved the principle stated by the Madras High Court in the case of Soundarammal v. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar MANU/TN/0232/1980 : AIR 1980 Mad 294 in which a Single Judge had taken the view that the husband who continued to live in adultery even after decree at the instance of the wife could not succeed in a petition seeking decree for divorce and that Section 23(1)(a) barred the relief.
....a pure and simple entrustment of stridhan without creating any rights in the husband excepting putting the articles in his possession does not entitle him to use the same to the detriment of his wife without her consent. The husband has no justification for not returning the said articles as and when demanded by the wife nor can he burden her with losses of business by using the said property which was never intended by her while entrusting possession of stridhan. On the allegations in the complaint, the husband is no more and no less than a pure and simple custodian acting on behalf of his wife and if he diverts the entrusted property elsewhere or for different purposes he takes a clear risk of prosecution Under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. On a parity of reasoning, it is manifest that the husband, being only a custodian of the stridhan of his wife, cannot be said to be in joint possession thereof and thus acquire a joint interest in the property.
9. A woman's power of disposal, independent of her husband's control, is not confined to saudayika but extends to other properties as well. Devala says: "A woman's maintenance (vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains (labha), are her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except in distress....."
In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law--Principles and Precedents, (8th Edn.) edited by Prof. S. Venkataraman, one of the renowned Professors of Hindu Law para 468 deals with "Definition of Stridhana". In para 469 dealing with "Sources of acquisition" it is stated that the sources of acquisition of property in a woman's possession are: gifts before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts subsequent to marriage etc. Para 470 deals with "Gifts to a maiden". Para 471 deals with "Wedding gifts" and it is stated therein that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the bride, whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni or Adhyavahanika, are the bride's stridhana. In para 481 at page 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the bride by her husband or father constitute her Stridhana property. In para 487 dealing with "powers during coverture" it is stated that saudayika meaning the gift of affectionate kindred, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the time of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In respect of such property, whether given by gift or will she is the absolute owner and can deal with it in any way she likes. She may spend, sell or give it away at her own pleasure.
the property as owner thereof.
A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.
This passage shows that apart from saying that a continuing offence is one which continues and a non-continuing offence is one which is committed once and for all, the Court found it difficult to explain as to when an offence can be described as a continuing offence. Seeing that difficulty, the Court observed that a few illustrative cases would help to bring out the distinction between a continuing offence and a non-continuing offence. The illustrative cases referred to by the Court are three from England, two from Bombay and one from Bihar.
31. Regard being had to the aforesaid statement of law, we have to see whether retention of stridhan by the husband or any other family members is a continuing offence or not. There can be no dispute that wife can file a suit for realization of the stridhan but it does not debar her to lodge a criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust. We must state that was the situation before the 2005 Act came into force. In the 2005 Act, the definition of "aggrieved person" clearly postulates about the status of any woman who has been subjected to domestic violence as defined Under Section 3 of the said Act. "Economic abuse" as it has been defined in Section 3(iv) of the said Act has a large canvass. Section 12, relevant portion of which have been reproduced hereinbefore, provides for procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs. It has been held in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) that Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to the said case under the 2005 Act as envisaged Under Sections 28 and 32 of the said Act read with Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. We need not advert to the same as we are of the considered opinion that as long as the status of the aggrieved person remains and stridhan remains in the custody of the husband, the wife can always put forth her claim Under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. We are disposed to think so as the status between the parties is not severed because of the decree of dissolution of marriage. The concept of "continuing offence" gets attracted from the date of deprivation of stridhan, for neither the husband nor any other family members can have any right over the stridhan and they remain the custodians. For the purpose of the 2005 Act, she can submit an application to the Protection Officer for one or more of the reliefs under the 2005 Act. In the present case, the wife had submitted the application on 22.05.2010 and the said authority had forwarded the same on 01.06.2010. In the application, the wife had mentioned that the husband had stopped payment of monthly maintenance from January 2010 and, therefore, she had been compelled to file the application for stridhan. Regard being had to the said concept of "continuing offence" and the demands made, we are disposed to think that the application was not barred by limitation and the courts below as well as the High Court had fallen into a grave error by dismissing the application being barred by limitation.

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Beginning July 1, 2011 the homeschooling law in Tennessee is changed. This year legislation passed the TN House and the TN Senate and the Governor has signed the SB1468 / HB1631 into law. An official copy of the bill is here.
Compulsory Attendance Ages: “Between the ages of six (6) and seventeen (17) years of age, both inclusive.” Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-6-3001. A parent or guardian who believes that a child is not ready to attend school at age six may apply to the principal of the public school which the child would attend for a one semester or one year deferral in required attendance. § 49-6-3001(D)(5). Section 49-6-3001(c)(2) also exempts from the compulsory attendance law any child who has received a diploma or certificate of graduation from high school, is enrolled in an approved GED program or has received a GED certificate, or is enrolled in a home school and has reached the age of 17 years. The truancy laws of Tennessee are applicable to children and parents who enroll their child in a public school for more than six weeks, even though the child is less than six (6) years of age. § 49-6-3007(g).
Required Days of Instruction: 180 days. § 49-6-3004, 3050(b)(3).
Option I: Home School StatuteundefinedNotify the Public School. § 49-6-3050. “A home school is a school conducted or directed by a parent or parents or legal guardian or guardians for their own children.” Three of the five options fall under the home school statute.
1. Parents must submit a notice of intent to the local superintendent prior to each school year “for the purpose of reporting only.” The notice of intent must include the names, number, ages and grade levels of children involved, location of the school, curriculum to be offered (no particular subjects required), the proposed hours of instruction, and the qualifications of the parent-teacher. § 49-6-3050(b)(1).
2. Parents must maintain attendance records, which are subject to inspection by the local superintendent. The records must be submitted to the superintendent at the end of each school year. § 49-6-3050(b)(2).
3. Instruction must be given 4 hours a day for the same number of days required for public schools.§ 49-6-3050(b)(3).
4. Parents must submit proof of vaccination as required by § 49-6-5001 or “a signed, written statement that such immunization and other preventive measures conflict with the parent’s or guardian’s religious tenets and practices.” §§ 49-6-3050(b)(9) and 49-6-5001(b)(2).
Option II: Home School StatuteundefinedAssociate With a Church-Related School. § 49-6-3050(a)(2)(A).
“Home schools that teach kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12), where the parents are associated with and students are enrolled with a church-related school, as defined by § 49-50-801 ... are exempt” from the home school requirements above.
Option III: Home School StatuteundefinedParent as Teacher in Church-Related School. § 49-6-3050(a)(3).
Option IV: Alternative StatuteundefinedOperate as a Satellite Campus of a Church-Related School.
§ 49-50-801. Parents may have their children attend a church-related school where the home is a satellite or extension of the church-related school. Unlike Options II and III, students in a satellite campus program are not considered home schoolers. Furthermore, parents need not comply with the notice, teacher qualifications, and standardized test requirements for home schools. The Tennessee Department of Education recognized this option in a memorandum from the Commissioner of Education to superintendents and directors of schools dated February 18, 1999.
Option V: Alternative StatuteundefinedEnroll in the Distance Learning Program of an Accredited Private School. § 49-6-3001(c)(3)(A)(iii). Parents may enroll their children in an online, Category III non-public school accredited by one of the six regional accrediting associations (e.g., the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools) “according to the procedures and criteria established by the association.” 0520-7-2-.04 Rules of State Board of Education.
Teacher Qualifications: Option I: The parent-teacher must have a high school diploma or a GED.
Option II: If parents conducting a home school are associated with a church-related school, there are no qualifications for teaching grades K-8, but parents must have a high school diploma or GED to teach grades 9-12. § 49-6-3050(a)(2)(B).
Option III: Qualifications determined by the school in which the child is enrolled.
Option IV: No qualifications required by statute.
Option V: Qualifications determined by the school in which the child is enrolled.
Standardized Tests: Option I: Grades 5, 7 and 9 must take a standardized test administered by the commissioner of education or someone designated by him or by a professional testing service approved by the local education agency. Tests administered by the Commissioner must be without charge. The parent may be present when the home school student is in grade 5. § 49-6-3050(b)(5)(A-B). If a home school child “falls six (6) to nine (9) months behind his appropriate grade level in his reading, language arts, mathematics or science test scores,” the parent must “consult with a teacher licensed by the state.
The parent and teacher shall design a remedial course.” § 49-6-3050(b)(6)(B).
Option II: Church-related schools must “administer or offer standardized achievement tests,” but no particular grade levels for testing are specified in the law. § 49-6-3050(a)(2)(A).
Option III: No testing required by statute.
Option IV: No testing required by statute.
Option V: No testing required by statute.
Religious Freedom Law: Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407 (2009 House Bill 1598, effective July 1, 2009).
Please link to http://www.homeschooling-tennessee.org/law.html now to read about these options.


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As the New Year approaches, it seems appropriate to share the remainder of the case files digitized by The Boston Public Library, The National Archives – Boston, and the Internet Archive. In addition to the three case files, there is a somewhat confusing register of trademarks and labels created by the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts from 1874-1879. Also, I want to wish all my readers a Happy New Year, and to expect lots more on this blog in 2017, including plenty more on common-law copyright for sound recordings, pre-1870 copyright record information, and generally more intellectual property history than you might think possible.
Arthur S. Sullivan el al. v. Louis P. Goulland et al (Unreported, C.C.D.MA. 1879). Case File. This is a case about piracy in the operetta The Pirates of Penzance, by Gilbert & Sullivan – a companion to the Sullivan v. White case discussed in the previous post on these files. I’ve written about this case in my article on the origins of the public performance right in music, and I’m excited to have full-color scans of the case file online. Included in the file are multiple examples of illicit scores of the songs from The Pirates of Penzance.
Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858). Case File. The opinion by Justice Clifford is famous for being one of the first after Folsom v. Marsh (also in the previous post) to discuss fair use, along with the copyrightability of abridgements. The case file tips the scales at 733 pages, and includes substantial evidentiary documents, including lengthy answers to interrogatories.
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). Case File. Another early fair use case from MA, another giant case file at 762 pages. This case concerns whether the copying of the notes on cases from Henry Wheaton’s treatise on international law was fair use.1 The Court’s opinion references the evidence in the case file frequently and excerpts it as well, so it is helpful to see the entire case file. The file is also a bit more readable than the case file in Greene v. Bishop, as parts of it are typeset instead of being entirely handwritten.
In addition to the case files, there is a register of trademarks and product labels registered for copyright with the District Court in Boston from 1874-1879. I’m not entirely sure why this volume exists. Under the 1870 Trademark Act registration was done at the Patent Office, and the 1874 Print and Label Act moved copyright registration for product labels and advertising prints was moved to the Patent Office as well. Copyright registration had of course been in the District Courts until 1870, but the 1870 Copyright Act moved it to the Library of Congress, and no measure moved any part of it back to the District Courts since. Whatever the case, the record book is here, and I welcome comments or suggestions as to why it exists – there is no record of such a book existing in any other District Court.2 There are some fascinating product labels from the 1870s pasted into the record book.


Respondents were indicated for entering a federally insured bank with intent to rob it by force and violence (Count 1) and robbing the bank by force and violence (Count 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), with possessing the funds stolen in the robbery (Count 3), in violation of § 2113(c), and with assaulting four people with dangerous weapons during the robbery (Counts 4-8), in violation of § 2113(d), and thereafter found guilty and sentenced on all counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, and ordered a new trial on the ground that, as held in Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, it was plain error to allow a jury to convict the accused of receiving and possessing the same money taken in the same bank robbery, and that, under Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551, remanding the case for a new trial was the appropriate appellate remedy.
1. A person convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (b), and (d) cannot also be convicted of receiving or possessing the robbery proceeds in violation of § 2113(c). Heflin, supra at 358 U. S. 419-420. Pp. 424 U. S. 547-548.
2. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in requiring a new trial as the remedy for the trial court's not having dismissed Count 3 for lack of proof, since the error can be corrected by vacating the convictions and sentences under that count. Milanovich, supra, distinguished. Pp. 424 U. S. 548-549.
3. The sentences under Counts 1 and 2 should also be vacated. Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322. P. 424 U. S. 549 n. 12.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 424 U. S. 551.
eight counts of the indictment. Specifically, the appellate court held that this Court's decision in Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, had made it clear tat "it is plain error to allow a jury to convict an accused of taking and possessing the same money obtained in the same bank robbery," and that, under this Court's decision in Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551, "the proper appellate remedy is to remand for a new trial." 506 F.2d 352, 354. We granted certiorari because of the discordant views in the Circuits regarding the proper application of the Heflin and Milanovich decisions. [Footnote 7] 421 U.S. 987.
"subsection (c) was not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs a bank, but only to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the robber."
U.S. 322, the merger could not include the conviction under § 2113(c). Receipt or possession of the proceeds of a bank robbery in violation of § 2113(c) is simply not a lesser included offense within the total framework of the bank robbery provisions of § 2113. Rather, § 2113(c) reaches a different "group of wrongdoers," i.e., "those who receive the loot from the robber."
stolen property. [Footnote 11] The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that the petitioner could not be convicted for both stealing and receiving the same currency, and she was convicted and separately sentenced on both counts. This Court held that, under Heflin, the jury should have been instructed that the petitioner could not be separately convicted for stealing and receiving the proceeds of the same theft. Since it was impossible to say upon which count, if either, a properly instructed jury would have convicted the petitioner, and in view of the grossly disparate sentences imposed upon the petitioner and upon her husband (who was convicted only upon the larceny count), her convictions were set aside and the case was remanded for a new trial.
"(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association, in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to the punishment provided by said subsection (b) for the taker."
Two of the men had entered the bank, brandishing pistols, while the third man had remained in the getaway car outside.
A third man indicated, Billy Wayne Davis, had pleaded guilty, and was a principal witness for the Government at the respondents' trial.
The judge imposed 20-year sentences for aggravated bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), 25-year sentences for assaults in the course of the bank robbery (§ 2113(d)), and 10-year sentences for possession of the proceeds of the robbery (§ 2113(c)), all of the sentences to run concurrently.
See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117, 1119 (CA1); United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 119-120 (CA2); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1, 6 (CA3); Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108, 110 (CA4); United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 1281, 1286 (CA4); United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182, 184 (CA4); United States v. Abercrombie, 480 F.2d 961, 964-965 (CA5); Ethridge v. United States, 494 F.2d 351 (CA6); United States v. Dion, 507 F.2d 683 (CA8); United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (CA9); Keating v. United States, 413 F.2d 1028 (CA9); Glass v. United States, 351 F.2d 678 (CA10).
365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 557 (dissenting opinion).
18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 2.
365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 554-555, n. 5.
In light of Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322, the concurrent sentences under Counts 1 and 2 should also be vacated, leaving the respondents under single 25-year prison sentences for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
Such a case is not hard to hypothesize. A grand jury or prosecutor may often possess clear evidence that the proceeds of a bank robbery were found in a certain person's possession, and less certain eyewitness or circumstantial evidence that that person was an actual participant in the robbery.
The statement to the contrary in a dissenting opinion in Milanovich, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 558, is incorrect.
If, on the other hand, the indictment or information charges only a violation of § 2113(c), it is incumbent upon the prosecution at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of that offense, and the identity of the participant or participants in the robbery or theft is irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt. While a mechanistic reading of Heflin's language might not wholly support this rule, it is to be remembered that Heflin ultimately held no more than that a person could not be convicted and separately sentenced under § 2113(a), (b), or (d) and under § 2113(c), because § 2113(c) could not be used to "pyramid penalties." 358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 419. Heflin did not purport to, and did not, add to or alter the statutory elements of the offense under § 2113(c).
Because the Court deems this case distinguishable from Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 (1961), it sees no occasion to consider the continuing validity of that decision; and I do not read the Court's opinion as reaffirming, in addition to describing, the Milanovich rule that a new trial is required when (1) a jury is erroneously permitted to convict a defendant both of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), or (d), and of knowing possession of the proceeds of that robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c), and (2) there is evidence to support both convictions.
offense to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. That the jury went on to find that the defendant also possessed the proceeds of the robbery -- whether on a different date and on different proof or not -- casts no doubt on the trustworthiness of the findings on the robbery count. The problem of erroneously permitting the jury to consider and convict on two counts -- on each of which, considered separately, the jury was properly instructed -- when they should have considered and convicted on only one bears no relation to that presented in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), in which the jury was permitted to convict on a single count on both a valid and an invalid theory. In Stromberg, it was impossible to know whether a properly instructed jury would have convicted the defendant of anything. In the class of cases governed by Milanovich, the robbery count is untainted by the fact that, in addition to its finding of guilty on that count the jury also made findings on the possession count, for those findings are factually consistent with the findings on the robbery count.
case would result in an expenditure of court resources and the possibility of an acquittal -- through loss of evidence or other causes -- of a reliably convicted defendant for no reason.
* If district judges instruct juries as the majority opinion requires, this problem will not arise. However, since this Court's decision in Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 (1961), district judges should have been instructing juries not to consider possession counts, if they convict of robbery. As this case and others attest, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 1281 (CA4 1975), cert. pending, Nos. 74-1476 and 74-6503; Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108 (CA4 1975) (en banc), cert. pending, Nos. 75-167 and 75-5457; United States v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683 (CA8 1974), cert. pending, No. 74-5869, district judges have nonetheless made mistakes, and there is no reason to believe that the mistakes will completely cease just because the Court today reiterates the correct instructions.


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G.R. NOS. 167335 - 167337 and G.R. No. 173152 - Dr. Ulysses A. Brito v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon et al. : Dr. Ulysses A. Brito v. Court of Appeals, et al.
DR. ULYSSES A. BRITO, (In His Capacity as oic-regional director of the ncip region IV), Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, SANDY P. PADILLA AND MONICO A. DINGAL, JR., Respondents.
DR. ULYSSES A. BRITO, (In His Capacity as oic-regional director of the ncip region IV), Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, office of the deputy ombudsman for Luzon, SANDY P. PADILLA AND MONICO A. DINGAL, JR., Respondents.
For the Court's consideration are two consolidated petitions: (1) G.R. NOS. 167335 & 167337, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Joint Order1 dated 7 December 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon which resolved the criminal aspect of the charges against private respondents Sandy P. Padilla and Monico A. Dingal, Jr. in their favor; and (2) G.R. No. 173152, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Resolution2 dated 18 October 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 27 April 2005 which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner against the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on the ground that it was not the proper remedy to assail the joint order of the Ombudsman. Said special civil action questioned the Joint Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dated 7 December 2004 insofar as it disposed of the administrative aspect of the charges against private respondents by finding them not guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest. It merely found them liable under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 67133 and imposed upon them the penalty of reprimand.
These are the facts of the instant consolidated petitions.
Private respondents were assigned as members of a Field-Based Investigation (FBI) team. This team conducts investigations on the impact of a project on any community of indigenous peoples, to determine whether the required Certification Precondition may be properly issued to applicant companies.
A. Requests for NCIP Certification Precondition shall be filed with the concerned NCIP Regional Office. The cost of actual expenses in the conduct of the required field-based investigation, to be undertaken by the concerned NCIP Regional Office, shall be borne by the applicant. x x x.
We are claiming for the per diem and taxi fare only. These companies did not provide us our per diem since they are anticipating that guidelines might require them.
Rio Tuba and La Concepcion, in their respective affidavits executed by their respective officers, however, explicated that the allowances given to private respondents did not include per diems and taxi fares.
On 12 May 2003, convinced that private respondents' acts of claiming per diems and taxi fares from their agency constitute penal and administrative violations, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit charging private respondents of the Complex Crime of Estafa thru Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 which were docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0581-E and OMB-L-C-03-1374-K. From the same set of facts, private respondents were also charged with an administrative case for Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-1059-K.
In their Joint-Counter Affidavit10 filed on 8 August 2003, private respondents admitted that each of them received the amount of P3,900.00 from the three companies. But they asserted that the said amount they received from the companies did not include per diems and taxi fares.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. He insisted that as the one in-charge of the NCIP Region IV, he can, independent of the COA, institute the said charges. The criminal and the civil charges against respondents were malum prohibitum, thus these charges should not be made to depend on the findings of the COA, which will have to separately decide on filing a case against private respondents should the latter be found to have violated COA rules and regulations.
On 11 March 2005, petitioner filed directly before this Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the criminal aspect of the Joint Order dated 7 December 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon which dismissed the criminal cases filed against private respondents.13 The petition was docketed as G.R. NOS. 167335 and 167337.
Believing that the Court of Appeals is vested with the appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman pertaining to administrative disciplinary cases,14 petitioner elevated the administrative aspect of the Joint Order dated 7 December 2004 to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 18 October 2005, dismissed said petition on the ground that petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy by pursuing the administrative case before the Court of Appeals through Rule 65. The appellate court opined that appeals in administrative cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 and not under Rule 65.
Undeterred, petitioner is now before the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 18 October 2005. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 173152.
Petitioner avers that the decision of the Ombudsman finding private respondents administratively guilty and imposing upon them the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable. Inasmuch as the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," then the only legal recourse available to him is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner, likewise, insists that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion when he concluded that the complained acts of private respondents did not constitute gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the public service.
Petitioner is correct in arguing that the decision of the Ombudsman imposing on private respondents the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable. Ironically, though, this is the same argument that struck the death knell to his posturings.
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified Petition for Review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The language of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is explicit and categorical when it states that "any order, directive or decision [of the Office of the Ombudsman] imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable."
Contrary to the Deputy Ombudsman's stance, not all items in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 are rendered void by the Fabian v. Desierto ruling. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that "in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court." This portion of Section 27 was rendered invalid because it violated Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution proscribing the enactment of a statute which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence. Hence, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, which are not final and unappealable, should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provision of Rule 43.
Our ruling in the case of Fabian v. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the decision of the Ombudsman finding respondents guilty of simple misconduct and ordering their suspension for one (1) month without pay is final and unappealable as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 and Administrative Order No. 07, Section 7, Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman implementing Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. x x x.
x x x In the instant case, since the penalty imposed upon respondents was "one month suspension without pay" only, as a matter of law, the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. x x x.
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. x x x.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is quite evident that petitioner employed the wrong remedy. Instead of filing his special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, petitioner should have filed the same directly with this Court. On this score alone, this petition warrants an outright dismissal.
Even if this Court treats the petition filed with the Court of Appeals as one for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner, nonetheless, failed to adduce evidence that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his joint order.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the inquiry is limited essentially to whether or not the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
A tribunal, board or officer acts without jurisdiction if it/he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where, being clothed with the power to determine the case, the tribunal, board or officer oversteps its/his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal, board or officer acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, we are inclined to rule and so hold that the respondents fell short of the conduct expected of them as public officers as mandated under Section 4(a) of R.A. 6713 which states that: "Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All [government] resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and resources."
Contrary to the postulation of petitioner, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's joint order was based on substantial evidence. There is therefore no reason for this Court to render the same void.
In the instant special civil action for certiorari, petitioner insists that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause against private respondents for violating the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. According to petitioner, had the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon made a careful study of the evidence presented by him and had he meticulously weighed the evidence, he would have found out that probable cause exists to indict private respondents.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dated 7 December 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
1 Rollo (G.R. NOS. 167335 &167337), pp. 20-26.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 173152), pp. 29-31.
3 Sec.4(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 states: " Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues."
4 SEC. 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP). - To carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.
5 Section 44 (m) of Republic Act No. 8371.
6 Rollo (G.R. NOS. 167335 & 167337), pp. 28-29.
13 In Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, 9 December 2004 (445 SCRA 655, 665), it was held that "the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, x x x, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals.
14 In Fabian v. Desierto (356 Phil. 787, 799), it was ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 173152), p. 172.
17 390 Phil. 236, 248 (2000).
18 G.R. No. 163089, 6 December 2006.
20 Rollo (G.R. No. 167335 & 167337), pp. 24-25.
21 Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158613-14, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 83, 92-93.
22 Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 539, 554.
23 Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159922, 28 April 2005, 457 SCRA 502, 512.
24 Dir. Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 384 Phil. 848, 857 (2000).
26 Basuel v. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), G.R. No. 143664, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 118, 126.


text:
to mould into smth. - превращать во что-л.
Еще значения слова и перевод MOULD с английского на русский язык в англо-русских словарях.
Что такое и перевод MOULD с русского на английский язык в русско-английских словарях.
More meanings of this word and English-Russian, Russian-English translations for MOULD in dictionaries.
MOULD — (n.) Cast; form; shape; character.
MOULD — (v. i.) To become moldy; to be covered or filled, in whole or in part, with a mold.
MOULD — (v. t.) To cause to become moldy; to cause mold to grow upon.
MOULD — (v. t.) To cover with mold or soil.
MOULD — (v.) Earthy material; the matter of which anything is formed; composing substance; material.
MOULD — ( v. ) Earthy material; the matter of which anything is formed; composing substance; material.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To ornament by molding or carving the material of; as, a molded window jamb.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To knead; as, to mold dough or bread.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To form into a particular shape; to shape; to model; to fashion.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To form a mold of, as in sand, in which a casting may be made.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To cover with mold or soil.
MOULD — ( v. t. ) To cause to become moldy; to cause mold to grow upon.
MOULD — ( v. i. ) To become moldy; to be covered or filled, in whole or in part, with a mold.
MOULD — ( n. ) Cast; form; shape; character.
MOULD — ( n. ) A fontanel.
MOULD — /mohld/ , n., v.t., v.i. Chiefly Brit. mold.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
- To exercise the rights of the owner, for example the right of defense in court.
B) For marketing purposes (submission of commercial information, newsletters, and so on), simultaneously is made aware by the owner of data processing this privacy notice. Data are inserted in the mailing list of the company and will be used only for advertising and information messages on the services supplied by the company.
The processing of your data will happen only for the purposes indicated above and processed by the person in charge of managing the service. You can revoke consent to processing of your data by sending an e-mail to the following address: info@skyservices.it.
Your data will be accessible for the purposes as per art. 3.A) e 3.B) to the employees and members of the staff (also external), as responsible or in charge of data and/ or system managers.
Internal employee who processes the data for the provision of the service (Sky Services FBO manager).
PersonaI data are saved on server located in the EU. If needed, the controller, can move the server in a non EU country. In this case, the controller, ensure that the moving to a non EU country will be done in accordance with the applicable law, after the stipulation of standard clauses as required by European Commission.
Without the need of an explicit consent art. 6 lett. b) and c) of the GDPR), the Data Controller will be allowed to communicate your data for the purposes referred to in art. 3.A) of this privac notice to Supervisory Bodies (such as IVASS), Judicial Authorities, to insurance companies for the provision of insurance services, as well as to those subjects to whom the communication is mandatory by law for the accomplishment of mentioned purposes. These subjects will process data as independent controllers of their processing.
Your data processing will be realized through operations indicated in art. 4 n. 2) GDPR, specifically of collecting, recording, managing, saving, reading, processing, use, interconnection, blocking, communication, erasing and destruction of data.
Your personal data will be subject to paper and digital processing, partly automated.
to oppose, totally or partly: a) to legitimate reasons albeit related to the aim of data collection, to His/her data processing; b) to his/her data processing for the purpose of sending advertising messages or direct sale messages or for the purpose of marketing research and commercial messages, through automated system of calling without telephone operator, through e-mail and/or traditional marketing, through phone call and/or paper post. The right of opposition, stated in the previous point b), to direct marketing purposes through automated modes extend to traditional modes. Data subject can oppose partly too. Therefore, the subject can decide to receive only traditional marketing proposal or receive only automated proposal, or none of the two.
Right to correct personal data in case they have been modified and no longer meets the data previously recorded or communicated (art. 16 del GDPR).
f) under 18’s data are processed as stated in art. 8, paragraph 1 of GDPR.
d) the subject opposes the processing as for art.21, paragraph 1 of GDPR, while waiting the check if the controller’s interests are more significant than the subjects’ interests.
Right to opposition (art. 21-22 of DGPR): the subject has the right to oppose in any moment, for reasons linked to his/her specific situation, to his/her data processing as stated in art. 6, paragraph 1, letters e) or f), including the profiling according to these dispositions. Sky Services SPA does not take decisions for these data starting from digital processing only.
Sky Services SPA notifies to all the subjects the possible changes, limitations or erasing of the data.
Sky Services SPA refrains from further processing of personal data unless there are no legitimate reasons to proceed with the processing that prevail over the interests, rights and freedoms of the interested party or for the assessment, exercise or defense of a right in judicial venue.
The provision of data for the purposes referred to in art. 3. is mandatory. In case of absence of data collection, we will not be able to grant you our offered services as per art.2.

matches:
art. 3
art. 6
art. 3
art. 4
art. 8
art.21
art. 6
art. 3
art.2