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GEO. W. WILCOX, INC. vs. SHELL EASTERN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, INC.
Present: RUGG, C.J., CROSBY, WAIT, DONAHUE, & LUMMUS, JJ.
(2) The verdict rightly was ordered entered.
contract later to be made was intended to be the contract between the parties and not the instrument which was the basis of the action.
CONTRACT. Writ dated December 26, 1929.
In the Superior Court, the action was tried before Cox, J. Material evidence and proceedings at the trial are described in the opinion. After the recording, with leave reserved, of a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $50,083, the judge ordered entered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.
C. Fairhurst, (J. T. Bartlett with him,) for the plaintiff.
S. H. Pillsbury, (F. E. Allison with him,) for the defendant.
by its president and in the name of the defendant by one Algar, who was an assistant district manager of the defendant. The plaintiff has brought suit on this instrument. The answer of the defendant includes a denial of the signature, execution and delivery of the instrument by the defendant and a specific denial of the authority of Algar to sign, seal, execute or deliver it.
The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court. In answer to written questions submitted by the judge the jury found that Algar had authority to bind the defendant by signing the instrument in its behalf, that the plaintiff was excused by acts of the defendant from procuring a release from the plaintiff's contract with the Gulf Refining Company as required by the plaintiff's contract with the defendant and that the defendant broke its contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff not being in default. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $50,083, the judge having reserved leave with the assent of the jury under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, s. 120, to enter a contrary verdict. On motion of the defendant the judge entered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's exception to this action of the judge is here presented by a bill of exceptions. The defendant has also filed a bill of exceptions setting forth exceptions taken by it to the refusal of the judge to give certain requested rulings and to the admission of certain testimony during the course of the trial. The defendant agrees that if the plaintiff's exceptions are overruled the exceptions taken by the defendant become immaterial.
ice in the summer of 1930. A few days after the day when the instrument was signed the president of the plaintiff corporation went with his attorney to the office of the Gulf Refining Company in Boston and requested a release from the contract. He went there again in November, 1929, and a representative of that company estimated that the plaintiff would have to pay $25,000 or $30,000 to get out of its contract but no definite offer was made. No release was ever obtained.
the parties contemplated a continuing succession of sales by the defendant and the subject of delivery was manifestly of consequence to both. There is no provision as to the quantity of the defendant's products the plaintiff was obligated to take in a given period of time which might throw light on the understanding of the parties as to deliveries nor is there other evidence by which the uncertainty might be made certain. The instrument provides nothing as to the time or terms of payment by the plaintiff. The contemplated transactions of the parties were of such a character that a binding agreement would be expected to contain provisions both as to deliveries and as to payments. In their absence the record does not supply evidence of circumstances or of custom from which the terms of an agreement as to these matters can be inferred.
"It is essential to the existence of a contract that its nature and the extent of its obligations be certain." Knowles v. Griswold, 252 Mass. 172, 175. Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen 242, 254. It is not enough if parties negotiating have agreed upon certain important terms if there has been no agreement on other essential elements of the undertaking, Sibley v. Felton, 156 Mass. 273, 276, although a contract is not necessarily unenforceable because the parties agree that the details of certain of its terms shall be left to be fixed at a future time or by the happening of later events. Evers v. Gilfoil, 247 Mass. 219. Kirkley v. F. H. Roberts Co. 268 Mass. 246, 252. The difficulty here is that the instrument sued on is silent as to material matters important in its interpretation for the ascertainment of the obligations of the parties and the evidence of the circumstances surrounding its making is not such as to permit by inference the supplying of the lack. "Many of the essential terms necessarily involved in the proposed undertaking are not set forth and without them no enforceable contract is shown." Kaufman v. Lennox, 265 Mass. 487, 489, and cases cited. Young v. Titcomb, 268 Mass. 14, 19.
would be prevented from recovery. Since the plaintiff's exceptions must be overruled the defendant's exceptions become immaterial.

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MARY H. DUNLAP vs. ALBERT NAVARRO.
A three year lease of an apartment, made in December, 1948, when the apartment was exempt from Federal rent control, and specifying a rent substantially greater than the maximum rent previously established under the emergency price control act of 1942, as amended, and in effect on June 30, 1947, was and constitutionally could be affected by the Federal housing and rent act of 1949, effective April 1, 1949, so that after that effective date the apartment was recontrolled and the rent which could lawfully be exacted was only such previously established maximum rent.
The fact, that through the enactment of the Federal housing and rent act of 1949, effective April 1, 1949, an apartment which had been leased for three years in December, 1948, when it was exempt from Federal rent control, was recontrolled and the rent which could lawfully be exacted after the effective date of the statute became substantially less than that specified in the lease, did not invalidate the lease nor entitle either party to rescind it, nor was there a breach of the lease by the lessee in refusing to pay more than such reduced rent after the statute took effect; the lease continued in full force and effect at the reduced rent.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on September 30, 1949, for a declaratory decree.
defendant is hereby further directed to pay the plaintiff costs . . .."
E. S. Stutman, for the defendant.
R. S. Sylvester, for the plaintiff.
RONAN, J. This is a bill for a declaratory decree to determine the rights of the parties under a lease of an apartment given by the plaintiff to the defendant. The latter appealed from a final decree adjudicating that the lease was not invalidated by the housing and rent act of 1949, U. S. C. (1946 ed.) Sup. III, Title 50, Appendix, Section 1892, and that the defendant was bound to pay the monthly rental fixed by the lease.
It appears from the statement of agreed facts upon which the suit was submitted to the judge that the parties on December 6, 1948, executed a lease of an apartment located in an apartment house in Brookline for the term of three years from December 15, 1948, at a monthly rental of $125. The defendant paid this rental until January, 1950, and thereafter offered to pay $55 a month, contending that this was the legal rent for his apartment as fixed by the housing and rent act of 1949. The property was located in a defence rental area.
if construed to remove the exemption, would be contrary to the Federal Constitution.
Congress undoubtedly had the power to protect housing accommodations in defence areas by means of price control legislation, and the owner of the demised premises when the maximum rent was established at $55 a month under the emergency price control act of 1942 was lawfully prohibited from charging and accepting any rent in excess of this amount so long as this established rate remained in effect. Marcus Brown Holding Co. Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. 333 U.S. 138. Taylor v. Brown, 137 Fed. (2d) 654. United States v. Porhownik, 182 Fed. (2d) 829. Congress also had the power, which it exercised by the price control extension act of July 25, 1946, to make that act effective as of June 30, 1946, the termination date of the emergency price control act. For instance, the execution on a judgment for possession of a tenement recovered in a State court after June 30, 1946, but before July 25, 1946, was enjoined in Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100. It was said, at page 107, that "Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise the paramount powers of Congress could be nullified by `prophetic discernment.'" See also United States v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, Inc. 338 U.S. 897; Cobleigh v. Woods, 172 Fed. (2d) 167.
of the lease subsequent to April 1, 1949, the effective date of the housing and rent act of 1949, have been answered adversely to these contentions. United States v. Earl Holding Co. 88 Fed. Sup. 1000. United States v. Friedman, 89 Fed. Sup. 957. United States v. Asher, 90 Fed. Sup. 257.
It appears from report No. 215 of the House committee on banking and currency, accompanying H. R. 1731, which afterwards became the housing and rent act of 1949, that "Decontrol of housing units not rented for a 24-month period after February 1, 1945, as provided in existing law has not accomplished the purpose for which it was designed. Instead of resulting in any substantial addition to the supply of rental housing, it has been used to effect decontrol of housing accommodations through mere shift in occupancy; that is, a landlord would evict a tenant from a controlled unit for his own occupancy and then rent on a higher basis the unit which he previously occupied." It also appears from report No. 127 of the Senate committee on banking and currency, accompanying said H. R. 1731, that "Your committee also recommends that there be included authority for recontrolling, on the recommendation of a local board, housing units not rented for a 24-month period after February 1, 1945. Decontrol of housing units not rented for a 24-month period after February 1, 1945, as provided in existing law, has not accomplished the purpose for which it was designed. Instead of resulting in any substantial addition to the supply of rental housing, it has been used to effect decontrol of housing accommodations through mere shift in occupany; that is, a landlord would evict a tenant from a controlled unit for his own occupancy and then rent on a higher basis the unit which he previously occupied." It is therefore plain that Congress intended to recontrol by the act of 1949 housing accommodations which had not been rented during a twenty-four month period after February 1, 1945.
April, 1950, because all that the lessor was entitled to receive for the use and occupancy of the apartment by the lessee was a rental not exceeding $55 a month.
The plaintiff is not entitled to a cancellation of the lease. The refusal of the defendant to pay more than $55 a month did not constitute a breach of the lease. The plaintiff could not demand or accept a higher rental. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. York & Whitney Co. 215 Mass. 36. Papetti v. Alicandro, 317 Mass. 382. The defendant did not become a tenant at will merely by refusing to comply with the terms of the lease only in so far as it purported to fix the amount of the rental. Neither party could on that account rescind the lease which continued in full force and effect at the reduced rental. Bell v. Minor, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 879. Rizzo v. Collosi, 95 Cal. App. (2d) 824. Mayfield v. Frierson, 72 Ga. App. 825.
The final decree declaring that the lease "was not invalidated" by the housing and rent act of 1949 was right although it was based on an erroneous ground. The rest of the decree must be struck out, and provisions should be substituted therefor that the defendant is obliged to pay a monthly rental of $55 in the manner and at the times fixed by the lease for the payment of rent and that the defendant is entitled to occupy the demised premises in accordance with the terms of the lease for the unexpired term provided he pays the rent at the rate mentioned or at any lawful rate that may be subsequently established. The defendant is to have costs.
[Note 1] This act has been further extended by the Joint Resolution of December 20, 1950, to March 31, 1951. See c. 1139 of the 81st Congress.

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As industrialized farming (also known as factory farming) has become more common in our nation’s culture, concern for the welfare of farmed animals has increased, as well. Because of this, many animal protection organizations have made undercover investigations of industrialized farming operations an integral part of their missions. The goal of these investigations is to expose possible abuse of farmed animals that would otherwise be hidden from the public. Many investigations have indeed exposed rampant farmed animal abuse, which has led to grave economic consequences for industrialized farming operations; in some cases the farms even have to shut down.
Ag-gag laws were introduced as a response to undercover investigations. They prohibit or restrict recording at industrialized farming operations. Prior to 2011, similar laws, known as ecoterrorism laws, were passed to protect industrialized farming operations from trespassers looking to damage property. Modern-day (post-2011) ag-gag laws, though, are more focused on preventing economic damage than actual physical harm. Proponents argue that they are a safeguard to protect well-meaning farmers against animal protection organizations who present the footage in a misleading way, while opponents argue ag-gag laws are meant to hide animal abuse from the public and that these laws allow industrialized farming operations to put profit ahead of farmed animal welfare.
Ag-gag laws generally fall into one of three categories or a combination of two or all types. The first modern-day ag-gag laws are known as “agricultural interference” laws, and they ban recording images or sounds at industrialized farming operations without the owner’s consent. “Agricultural fraud” laws were also introduced early on; this kind of ag-gag law bans entering or applying for employment at industrialized farming operations under false pretenses. Many ag-gag bills introduced in 2011-2012 were “agricultural interference” and “agricultural fraud” hybrids. Because legislators ran into problems passing these kind of ag-gag laws, a new type of ag-gag emerged in late 2012. This kind is known as “rapid-reporting” legislation and it mandates that anyone who records an image or sound at an industrialized farming operation turn the recording over to authorities within a specified amount of time, usually twenty-four to forty-eight hours.
Twenty-five states have attempted to pass modern-day ag-gag laws, and six of those states have succeeded. The states that have passed ag-gag laws are (in chronological order), Iowa Utah, Missouri, Idaho, Wyoming, and North Carolina. The first five impose criminal penalties, while North Carolina’s is the first ag-gag law in the nation to impose a civil sanction.
Utah and Idaho’s ag-gag laws were challenged in court on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. Idaho’s law was struck down by the United States District Court in 2015 as a violation of free speech and equal protection. A decision in the Utah court is pending.
Ag-gag laws, also known as “agricultural interference/fraud” laws, are laws designed to prohibit recording or undercover investigations at industrialized farming operations (commonly known as factory farms). Current day ag-gag laws have their roots in the ecoterrorism laws of the early 1990s, but in recent years, there has been a clear shift in priority away from preventing trespassing and property destruction to controlling and stopping recording on industrialized farming operations. This shift is in large part due to the increased prevalence of undercover investigations by animal protection organizations at industrialized farming operations. Over the past few years, numerous investigations have exposed widespread animal abuse and legal violations at various farming operations that have led to economic harm and prosecutions. In some cases, the economic losses are so extreme that industrialized farming operations have gone bankrupt and completely shut down as a result. So, many legislators have introduced ag-gag bills claiming that they will protect well-intentioned farm owners from deceitful or misleading investigations and subsequent dissemination of recordings to the media. Opponents of the bills argue, however, that the true purpose is to prevent whistleblowers from exposing animal abuse and public safety violations that occur at industrialized farming operations.
Rapid-reporting laws, which require anyone who records images or sounds at an industrialized farming operation to turn the recordings over to law enforcement within a designated period of time, usually twenty-four to forty-eight hours.
Violation of these laws results in either criminal or civil punishment depending on the state. Fines range from $500.00 to $5,000.00 per day that the violation of law was committed. In Washington, where an ag-gag law is pending, perpetrators may also be liable for up to three times the amount of economic loss stemming from the undercover recording. Criminal misdemeanors are most often imposed, but some states increase the penalty to a felony for subsequent charges or in extreme cases of damage.
Iowa was the first state to pass a modern-day (post-2011) ag-gag law. The law created a new class of crime, called “agricultural operation interference” which placed a complete ban on recording images or sound at an industrialized farming operation and criminalized applying for employment under false pretenses. Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Missouri, and North Carolina have since followed suit, passing their own forms of ag-gag laws. Iowa’s law is similar to Utah’s in that it is a hybrid of the “interference” and “fraud” type ag-gag laws – it prevents false identification on an employment application with the intent to record images, and it also prohibits recording and distributing recordings taken at an industrialized farming operation. Idaho’s law similarly contains prohibitions on misrepresentation, fraudulent activity, and recording. Wyoming’s law trends toward an “interference” ag-gag law because it prevents trespassing to unlawfully collect data, but it is not considered a classic ag-gag law. Missouri’s ag-gag law is the only rapid-reporting ag-gag law in the country and it imposes a twenty-four hour deadline. North Carolina’s law is unique; proponents argue that it is not an ag-gag law at all because it does not specifically mention the agriculture industry, but opponents claim it will have the exact effect as ag-gag laws in other states. It prohibits employees “exceeding access to authority” at a workplace which includes recording images or sounds in a non-public area of the premises. North Carolina’s law is the only civil ag-gag law to have passed; the rest impose criminal charges.
Two of these laws, Utah’s and Idaho’s have been challenged in court on the grounds that they are unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments. Idaho’s law was recently struck down by the United States District Court in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) (Not Reported in F.Supp.3d), as a violation of free speech and equal protection. A decision in the Utah court is pending.
In 2013, Amy Meyer was the first person to be prosecuted under a state-level ag-gag law. She was prosecuted under Utah’s law for recording an image of a cow at an industrialized farming operation from across the street. The charges against her were eventually dropped. The second instance of prosecution under an ag-gag law occurred a year later, again in Utah, when four people were prosecuted for photographing an industrialized farming operation from a highway. These charges were dropped, as well.
Why Can't I Know How The Sausage Is Made?: How Ag-Gag Statutes Threaten Animal Welfare Groups And The First Amendment, Daniel L. Sternberg, 13 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 625 (2015).
Animal Lovers and Tree Huggers Are the New Cold-Blooded Criminals?: Examining the Flaws of Ecoterroism Bills, Dara Lovitz, 3 J. Animal L. 79 (2007).
ALDF v. Otter, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015). The Animal Legal Defense Fund, and various other organizations and individuals, challenge Idaho Code § 18–7042 as unconstitutional. Section 18-7042 criminalizes undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities. ALDF alleges that § 18–7042 has both the purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture. The Court first found that § 18–7042 is both content and viewpoint based, and thus, must survive the highest level of scrutiny. The Court held that the law does not survive strict scrutiny because it "would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from public scrutiny." Even if the interests in property and privacy of these industries is compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored as it restricts more speech than necessary and poses a "particularly serious threat to whistleblowers' free speech rights."
ALDF v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) (D. Utah July 22, 2013). In a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ First Amendment challenge to an Idaho statute that criminalizes undercover investigations and videography at “agricultural production facilities,” the Animal Legal Defense Fund, as well as various other organizations and individuals, (collectively, “ALDF”), brought suit. The State defendants, Governor Butch Otter and Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, moved to dismiss the ALDF's claims. The claims against the Governor were dismissed under 11th Amendment immunity because the ALDF failed to explain the requisite connection between the Governor and enforcement of section 18–7024. The court also found that since the ALDF failed to allege a concrete plan to violate subsection (e), it lacked standing to challenge section 18–7042(1)(e) and the claim in regards to that provision was therefore dismissed. However, the ALDF’s First Amendment, bare animus Equal Protection, and preemption claims survived the motion to dismiss.
ALDF v. Herbert, 2013 WL 4017889 (D. Utah July 22, 2013). The Animal Legal Defense Fund and other plaintiffs challenged Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112, which criminalizes recording images or sounds at industrialized farming operations, and entering industrialized farming operations by false pretenses or misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs alleged that § 76-6-112 violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Plaintiffs had not suffered actual harm, and thus did not have standing. The U.S. District Court Judge dismissed some Plaintiffs from the case, but allowed it to move forward.


§ 6-303.1 Water connections required.
§ 6-303.2 Sewer connections required.
§ 6-303.3 Premises not accessible to City sewer system.
§ 6-303.4 Permitted private sewer systems.
§ 6-303.5 Care of septic tank or pits.
§ 6-303.6 Deposit of contents of septic tanks.
§ 6-303.7 Septic tank location and design.
§ 6-303.8 Septic tank effluent disposal.
Maintaining a well: see § 6-311.2.
Private sewer systems deemed nuisances: see § 9-501.4.
Public nuisances defined: see 3rd Class Code § 2320 et seq. (53 P.S. § 37320 et seq.).
Sewer connections: see Chs. 9-507 and 9-509.
The water system of all dwellings and other buildings the premises of which are situated within 200 feet of the City water system shall be connected thereto, and any such dwelling or other building shall not use another water supply unless the same is approved by the Health Officer, except that other water supplies may be used in buildings other than dwellings, provided that such water is not used for human consumption.
The sewer system of all dwellings and other buildings the premises of which are situated within 200 feet of the City sewage collection system shall be connected thereto as required by ordinances of the City.
The sewer system of all dwellings and other buildings the premises of which are not now within 200 feet of the City sewage collection system shall be connected thereto when such system becomes so accessible to such dwelling or other building, and any approved sewer system then in use shall be abandoned as required by ordinance of the City.
The sewer system of all dwellings and other buildings not accessible to City sewer system shall be of a septic tank type, and cesspools, french drains or outside pits are prohibited, except that outside pits now in use may be continued in use until the same become unsanitary in the opinion of the Health Officer. Before installation, septic tank sewer systems shall be approved by the Health Officer.
All approved septic tank sewer systems and permitted outside pits shall be maintained in a sanitary condition, shall be cleaned of their contents before overflowing and shall be free of odors, and no such septic tank or outside pit shall be abandoned or filled up without first being completely emptied.
No person shall deposit the contents of any septic tank or outside pit within the City except at a location approved in writing by the Health Officer.
Septic tanks hereafter approved by the Health Officer shall be located, if possible, as least 50 feet from any well, spring or other water supply and upon ground of a lower elevation, shall be of a design to have a capacity of at least 500 gallons, a liquid depth of at least four feet, and shall be of watertight construction of reinforced concrete or other material not subject to corrosion or decay.
Where soil conditions are satisfactory, subsurface tile systems may be used for the disposal of effluents from septic tanks when approved by the Health Officer. Such systems shall be located at least 50 feet from any well, spring or other water supply system, and the length and depth thereof shall be subject to the approval of the Health Officer.
No person shall permit wastewater of any kind from any dwellings or other buildings to drain over the surface of yards or sidewalks.


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No. 72-195 Reversed and remanded.
October 8, 1974. Rehearing denied December 2, 1974.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Williamson County; the Hon. STEWART CLUSTER, Judge, presiding.
William E. Aulgur, of Eldorado, for appellant.
Harris and Lambert, of Marion, for appellee.
The plaintiff, Phil Jacobs Co., sold dress goods to the defendant, Mildred Mifflin, doing business as the Gaiety Shop, for a period from 1967 to 1970. This suit was brought to recover the purchase price for goods delivered from July, 1969 to January, 1970, totaling $1,718.40. The sales procedure was as follows: plaintiff's sales representative, James Hybarger, went to the defendant's store four times a year. He took with him printed order forms filled in with style numbers of goods sold by the company. Hybarger testified that after consulting with defendant, unwanted items were crossed off and desired items not shown were added. Defendant would then sign the forms and Hybarger would send them to the plaintiff who would ship the goods over the succeeding 3 months. There were two orders in the time period involved in the dispute. The first, placed on August 6, 1969, for $736.75, was concluded by telephone. Mrs. Mifflin was not in her store when Mr. Hybarger appeared. He called her from St. Louis. Mr. Hybarger testified that he asked Mrs. Mifflin if he could "order what we had normally been ordering." She agreed, according to Mr. Hybarger. Mrs. Mifflin did not testify as to this transaction. It is evident, however, that she did not sign the order as was the usual custom and there is no evidence that she signed the final order form. The other transaction occurred on November 5, 1969, an order being placed for $952.20. There is some dispute about part of this order. The ordering procedure apparently differed as to one item of clothing — stretch pants. Mr. Hybarger testified that in order to further style, color and size continuity, specific quantities were not added to the form until he consulted his records of the customer's sales for previous years. Thus, quantities and total amounts were not included on the order form when it was signed by Mrs. Mifflin. Mrs. Mifflin's daughter testified that on one occasion in 1968 Mr. Hybarger said to Mrs. Mifflin about the form, "You have to sign it in order to get anything at all and when I leave I will adjust it or mark out some of the things and send you not as much." This statement allegedly was made after Mrs. Mifflin complained that she was being sent too much merchandise. Mr. Hybarger denied making the statement and Mrs. Mifflin did not testify about it. There was no evidence that such a statement was made about any subsequent order, and specifically not the disputed one. Mrs. Mifflin testified that despite what she told Mr. Hybarger when he came, she "always wound up with the same run-of-the-mill and would be overstocked with one item and completely out of another item." She admitted that all material she received was listed on the order form which bore her signature except, of course, the two orders which were taken by telephone.
Mrs. Mifflin's defense generally was that she had been over-supplied by plaintiff for some time with goods not ordered, and that she had offered to return the goods but had been refused. Defendant's exhibits show that on June 17, 1969, plaintiff's credit manager wrote Mr. Hybarger stating that word had been received from Mrs. Mifflin that she was being overshipped by a significant amount and that she should not be sent more than $400.00 per month in merchandise thereafter. Plaintiff's exhibits and testimony and defendant's testimony reveal that the largest monthly shipment during the disputed period totaled from $286 to $289. A letter was received by plaintiff in October, 1969, after a shipment of $289 was received stating "Please! Do not send me anymore [ sic] clothing." On January 5, 1970, in response to a debt reminder from the plaintiff, plaintiff received a letter from defendant stating that during the year of 1969 she had received over $2,000 more merchandise than had been ordered by her and that she desired to return it. In March, 1970 (after the disputed period), plaintiff's credit manager again communicated with Mr. Hybarger. He stated that more trouble with Mrs. Mifflin's account had developed, that she was to be shipped no more merchandise until a part balance was paid and that no more than $250 per month would be shipped after that. Another letter was written by defendant on July 1, 1970, stating again that overshipments were made and that excess was being held for return. At trial, Mrs. Mifflin produced and identified the goods. She admitted, however, that she did not know whether these goods were ordered or delivered during the disputed period, July, 1969, to January, 1970. Mrs. Mifflin later wrote to plaintiff in 1971 asking for reinstatement of service.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment for defendant without opinion and plaintiff appeals.
• 1 Plaintiff first asserts that defendant relied upon, but did not carry the burden of proof upon, an affirmative defense that she had been shipped items not ordered by her, had notified plaintiff of the overshipment, and had offered to return the items. Plaintiff cites several cases to support the major premise that the burden of proving an affirmative defense rests initially and throughout the trial with the party who asserts it (see, e.g., Ellis v. Cothran, 117 Ill. 458; Ermold v. Bear, 358 Ill. 233; Auer v. Wm. Meyer Co., 322 Ill. App. 244; Jones v. Katz, 325 Ill. App. 65). We cannot but agree with this premise. Plaintiff goes on to assert the defendant did not meet this burden since there was no showing that specific items were not ordered, or that plaintiff was notified of overshipment of any specific items, and that defendant was unable to testify that the items held for reshipment included any item shipped during the disputed period. The evidence appears to support this position.
Defendant, however, states that she did not rely on an affirmative defense, but rather simply denied having accepted the goods under section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 2-607). She asserted this defense as a special defense under section 43 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 43). This section provides for the assertion of affirmative defenses and "any ground or defense, whether affirmative or not, which, if not expressly stated in the pleading, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply." The definition of an affirmative defense under section 43 has been held to be "`whether the defense gives color to the opposing party's claim and then asserts new matter by which the apparent right is defeated * * *.'" (S.H.A., ch. 110, § 43, Historical and Practice Notes (1968); Horst v. Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 96 Ill. App.2d 68, 80.) In Horst the court held that a denial of the existence of an agency relationship was not an affirmative defense. Defendant's position that denial of acceptance of goods does not constitute an affirmative defense finds support in Nordstrom, Handbook on the Law of Sales, § 431, which puts the burden of showing conformity on the seller, allowing the buyer simply to deny conformity and force the seller to prove it. But regardless whether the defense asserted was an affirmative one, the evidence simply does not support her position. Section 2-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer, after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, (1) notifies the seller of acceptance, (2) fails to make an effective rejection or (3) "does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership." The buyer (defendant) did not specifically inform plaintiff of the non-conformity of specific commercial units, but rather generally complained of overshipment. Defendant testified that she held goods allegedly not ordered for reshipment to plaintiff. But she could not identify them as having been shipped during the disputed period. There was no evidence of what was done with items allegedly overshipped during that period. But it is a reasonable assumption that if they were not held for reshipment they were offered for sale. This would appear to be an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership and constitute acceptance. Furthermore, the evidence showed complaint of overshipment by the defendant for the years preceding the disputed period. Defendant, however, had paid and continued to pay for those goods. While this fact would not preclude her from rejecting non-conforming goods in the future, it tends to indicate that her dissatisfaction was not such to cause her to terminate dealing with plaintiff.
• 2 Plaintiff next asserts that since defendant paid for all goods received prior to July, 1969, she cannot now claim that they did not conform to the contract. Appellant cites Illinois Glass Co. v. Ozell Co., 197 Ill. App. 626. There, the seller of bottles sued the purchaser for the price of the second of two shipments, the first having been paid for. The purchaser filed a counter-claim, alleging damage of the first shipment. The court held that since the first shipment had been paid for and used by the purchaser, he could not claim damage of that shipment in an action on the other. In Waukesha Canning Co. v. Henry Horner Co., 138 Ill. App. 564, the court held that a buyer of canned corn could not rescind the contract of purchase on the ground that the corn was of substandard quality when he had resold as standard quality a substantial portion of the corn. While neither of these cases dealt exactly with the instant problem, the rationale that one cannot accept and pay for merchandise and then claim some defect in it as a defense to a suit on a subsequent purchase, appears applicable. We are concerned here only with $1,718.40 in merchandise shipped between July, 1969, and January, 1970.
• 3 Defendant argues that this court should not reverse the factual findings of the trial court unless found to be "manifestly erroneous." In Wall v. Lanahan, 79 Ill. App.2d 62, this court stated that the trial judge's unique position as the arbiter of credibility of witnesses and weight of authority in a bench trial is so well established as not to require citation of authority. The plaintiff in the instant case, however, made a strong prima facie showing of defendant's liability on the contract. Defendant's only defense was the rejection of the extra merchandise. As we have noted, there was no showing of effective rejection of the merchandise shipped from July, 1969, to January, 1970. Thus, the trial court erred in entering judgment for defendant.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment for plaintiff for $1,718.40 and costs.
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


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Art. 21
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Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
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Art. 18
Art. 6
Art. 21
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43.03.003 Chapter application—Health benefit exchange.
43.03.010 Salaries of elective state officers.
43.03.011 Salaries of state elected officials of the executive branch.
43.03.013 Salaries of members of the legislature.
43.03.015 Emoluments of office for appointees to office of state legislator.
43.03.020 Expenses of lieutenant governor acting as governor.
43.03.027 Salaries of public officials—State policy enunciated.
43.03.028 Salaries of agency officials—Reports.
43.03.030 Increase or reduction of appointees' compensation.
43.03.040 Salaries of certain directors and chief executive officers.
43.03.049 Restrictions on subsistence, lodging, or travel—Exceptions.
43.03.050 Subsistence, lodging and refreshment, and per diem allowance for officials, employees, and members of boards, commissions, or committees.
43.03.062 State convention and trade center employees—Travel expenses.
43.03.065 Subsistence and lodging expenses—Direct payment to suppliers authorized.
43.03.110 Moving expenses of employees.
43.03.120 Moving expenses of new employees.
43.03.125 Relocation compensation for domiciliary moves.
43.03.130 Travel expenses of prospective employees.
43.03.150 Advance payment of travel expenses—Authorized.
43.03.160 Advance payment of travel expenses—"Department" defined.
43.03.170 Advance payment of travel expenses—Advance warrants—Issuance—Limitations.
43.03.180 Advance payment of travel expenses—Itemized travel expense voucher to be submitted—Repayment of unexpended portion of advance—Default.
43.03.190 Advance payment of travel expenses—Lien against and right to withhold funds payable until proper accounting or repaying of advance made.
43.03.200 Advance payment of travel expenses—Advances construed.
43.03.210 Advance payment of travel expenses—Director of financial management to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out RCW 43.03.150 through 43.03.210.
43.03.220 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class one groups (as amended by 2011 c 5).
43.03.220 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class one groups (as amended by 2011 1st sp.s. c 21).
43.03.230 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class two groups (as amended by 2011 c 5).
43.03.230 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class two groups (as amended by 2011 1st sp.s. c 21).
43.03.240 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class three groups (as amended by 2011 c 5).
43.03.240 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class three groups (as amended by 2011 1st sp.s. c 21).
43.03.250 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class four groups (as amended by 2011 c 5).
43.03.250 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class four groups (as amended by 2011 1st sp.s. c 21).
43.03.265 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class five groups (as amended by 2011 c 5).
43.03.265 Compensation of members of part-time boards and commissions—Class five groups (as amended by 2011 1st sp.s. c 21).
43.03.300 Salaries of elected state officials—Legislative declaration—Purpose.
43.03.305 Washington citizens' commission on salaries for elected officials—Generally (as amended by 2011 c 60).
43.03.305 Washington citizens' commission on salaries for elected officials—Generally (as amended by 2011 c 254).
43.03.3051 Elected officials—Voluntary salary reduction.
43.03.310 Duties of citizens' commission—Travel expenses—Chair—Schedule of salaries—Publication—Hearings.
Compensation for unofficial services permitted: RCW 42.04.070.
Compensation not to be changed during term: State Constitution Art. 2 § 25, Art. 3 § 25, Art. 28 § 1.
Free transportation prohibited: State Constitution Art. 2 § 39, Art. 12 § 20.
Salaries of state officers, payable semimonthly: RCW 42.16.010.


Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a DEA agent at a Georgia airport, searched plaintiffs and seized a large amount of cash. Plaintiffs claim that after they returned to their Nevada residence, Walden helped draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of forfeiture and forwarded it to a Georgia office of the U.S. Attorney. No forfeiture complaint was filed and the funds were returned. Plaintiffs filed a tort suit in a Nevada District Court. The district court dismissed, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a basis for personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Walden submitted the affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with significant Nevada connections. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Walden. The Due Process Clause limits state authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts, requiring that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state. For a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, a relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself created with the forum itself, not with persons residing there. The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Walden lacks those “minimal contacts” with Nevada. None of his conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. Mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. The injury occurred in Nevada simply because that is where plaintiffs chose to be when they desired to use the seized funds. The Court also rejected an argument based on the origin of the funds.
A federal court in one state may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who resides in another state and whose sole contact with the forum state is that the defendant knew his allegedly tortious conduct would affect persons with connections to the forum state.
WALDEN v. FIORE et al.
Petitioner Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a deputized Drug Enforcement Administration agent at a Georgia airport, searched respondents and seized a large amount of cash. Respondents allege that after they returned to their Nevada residence, petitioner helped draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of the funds’ forfeiture and forwarded it to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia. In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and respondents’ funds were returned. Respondents filed a tort suit against petitioner in Federal District Court in Nevada. The District Court dismissed the suit, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction because petitioner had submitted the false probable cause affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with significant Nevada connections.
Held: The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner. Pp. 5–14.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , and requires that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum State, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 . The inquiry into the “minimum contacts” necessary to create specific jurisdiction focuses “on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770 . For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, that relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 , and must be analyzed with regard to the defendant’s contacts with the forum itself, not with persons residing there, see, e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319. The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 –789. Pp. 5–10.
(b) Petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. No part of petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. The Ninth Circuit reached its contrary conclusion by improperly shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with respondents, obscuring the reality that none of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself. Respondents emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by the delayed return of their funds while residing in Nevada, but Calder made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. The proper question is whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way: Here, respondents’ claimed injury does not evince such a connection. The injury occurred in Nevada simply because that is where respondents chose to be when they desired to use the seized funds. Other possible contacts noted by the Ninth Circuit—that respondents’ Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, that cash seized in Georgia originated in Nevada, and that funds were returned to respondents in Nevada—are ultimately unavailing. Pp. 11–14.
688 F. 3d 558, reversed.
ANTHONY WALDEN, PETITIONER v. GINA FIORE et al.
This case asks us to decide whether a court in Nevada may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Georgia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with connections to Nevada. Because the defendant had no other contacts with Nevada, and because a plaintiff’s con-tacts with the forum State cannot be “decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated,” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980) , we hold that the court in Nevada may not exercise personal jurisdiction under these circumstances.
Petitioner Anthony Walden serves as a police officer for the city of Covington, Georgia. In August 2006, petitioner was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport as a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). As part of a task force, petitioner conducted investigative stops and other law enforcement functions in support of the DEA’s airport drug interdiction program.
On August 8, 2006, Transportation Security Administration agents searched respondents Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson and their carry-on bags at the San Juan airport in Puerto Rico. They found almost $97,000 in cash. Fiore explained to DEA agents in San Juan that she and Gipson had been gambling at a casino known as the El San Juan, and that they had residences in both California and Nevada (though they provided only California identification). After respondents were cleared for departure, a law enforcement official at the San Juan airport notified petitioner’s task force in Atlanta that respondents had boarded a plane for Atlanta, where they planned to catch a connecting flight to Las Vegas, Nevada.
When respondents arrived in Atlanta, petitioner and another DEA agent approached them at the departure gate for their flight to Las Vegas. In response to petitioner’s questioning, Fiore explained that she and Gipson were professional gamblers. Respondents maintained that the cash they were carrying was their gambling “ ‘bank’ ” and winnings. App. 15, 24. After using a drug-sniffing dog to perform a sniff test, petitioner seized the cash. Petitioner advised respondents that their funds would be returned if they later proved a legitimate source for the cash. Respondents then boarded their plane.
After respondents departed, petitioner moved the cash to a secure location and the matter was forwarded to DEA headquarters. The next day, petitioner received a phone call from respondents’ attorney in Nevada seeking return of the funds. On two occasions over the next month, petitioner also received documentation from the attorney regarding the legitimacy of the funds.
At some point after petitioner seized the cash, he helped draft an affidavit to show probable cause for forfeiture of the funds and forwarded that affidavit to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia. According to respondents, the affidavit was false and misleading because petitioner misrepresented the encounter at the airport and omitted exculpatory information regarding the lack of drug evidence and the legitimate source of the funds. In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and the DEA returned the funds to respondents in March 2007.
Respondents filed suit against petitioner in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971) . Respondents alleged that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by (1) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping the money after concluding it did not come from drug-related activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable cause affidavit to support a forfeiture action while knowing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory informa-tion; and (5) withholding that exculpatory information from the United States Attorney’s Office.
The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Relying on this Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 (1984) , the court determined that petitioner’s search of respondents and his seizure of the cash in Georgia did not establish a basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The court concluded that even if petitioner caused harm to respondents in Nevada while knowing they lived in Nevada, that fact alone did not confer jurisdiction. Because the court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not determine whether venue was proper.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals assumed the District Court had correctly determined that petitioner’s search and seizure in Georgia could not support exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada. The court held, however, that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction over “the false probable cause affidavit aspect of the case.” 688 F. 3d 558, 577 (2011). According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner “expressly aimed” his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada. Id., at 581. After determining that the delay in returning the funds to respondents caused them “foreseeable harm” in Nevada and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner was otherwise reasonable, the court found the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper. Id., at 582, 585. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with eight judges, in two separate opinions, dissenting. Id., at 562, 568.
We granted certiorari to decide whether due process permits a Nevada court to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner. 568 U. S. ___ (2013). We hold that it does not and therefore reverse.
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6). This is because a federal district court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A). Here, Nevada has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons “on any basis not inconsistent with . . . the Constitution of the United States.” Nev. Rev. Stat. §14.065 (2011). Thus, in order to determine whetherthe Federal District Court in this case was authorized to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner, we ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed by federal due process” on the State of Nevada. Daimler, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresidentdefendant to a judgment of its courts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980) . Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940) ).
This case addresses the “minimum contacts” necessary to create specific jurisdiction. The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977) ). For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State. Two related aspects of this necessary relationship are relevant in this case.
First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum State. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985) . Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, at 291–292. We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 417 (1984) (“[The] unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction”). We have thus rejected a plaintiff’s argument that a Florida court could exercise per-sonal jurisdiction over a trustee in Delaware based solely on the contacts of the trust’s settlor, who was domiciled in Florida and had executed powers of appointment there. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 –254 (1958). We have likewise held that Oklahoma courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an automobile distributor that supplies New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut dealers based only on an automobile purchaser’s act of driving it on Oklahoma highways. World-Wide Volks-wagen Corp., supra, at 298. Put simply, however sig-nificant the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be “decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated.” Rush, 444 U. S., at 332.
Second, our “minimum contacts” analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. See, e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319 (Due process “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual . . . with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”); Hanson, supra, at 251 (“However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him”). Accordingly, we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who have purposefully “reach[ed] out beyond” their State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that “envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts” in the forum State, Burger King, supra, at 479–480, or by circulating magazines to “deliberately exploi[t]” a market in the forum State, Keeton, supra, at 781. And although physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, Burger King, supra, at 476, physical entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact. See, e.g., Keeton, supra, at 773–774.
But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him. See Burger King, supra, at 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot”); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Francisco, 436 U. S. 84, 93 (1978) (declining to “find personal jurisdiction in a State . . . merely because [the plaintiff in a child support action] was residing there”). To be sure, a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction. See Rush, supra, at 332 (“Naturally, the parties’ relationships with each other may be significant in evaluating their ties to the forum. The requirements of International Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction”). Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State. Burger King, 471 U. S., at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted).
These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. In that context, it is likewise insufficient to rely on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” or on the “unilateral activity” of a plaintiff. Ibid. (same). A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the forum.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 , illustrates the application of these principles. In Calder, a California actress brought a libel suit in California state court against a reporter and an editor, both of whom worked for the National Enquirer at its headquarters in Florida. The plaintiff’s libel claims were based on an article written and edited by the defendants in Florida for publication in the National Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper with a California circulation of roughly 600,000.
We held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants was consistent with due process. Although we recognized that the defendants’ activities “focus[ed]” on the plaintiff, our jurisdictional inquiry “focuse[d] on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Id., at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 204). Specifically, we examined the various contacts the defendants had created with California (and not just with the plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous story.
We found those forum contacts to be ample: The defendants relied on phone calls to “California sources” for the information in their article; they wrote the story about the plaintiff’s activities in California; they caused reputa-tional injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; and the “brunt” of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that State. 465 U. S., at 788–789. “In sum, California [wa]s the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.” Id., at 789. Jurisdiction over the defendants was “therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Ibid.
The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “effects” of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff. The strength of that connection was largely a function of the nature of the libel tort. However scandalous a newspaper article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to (and read and understood by) third persons. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §577, Comment b (1976); see also ibid. (“[R]eputation is the estimation in which one’s character is held by his neighbors or associates”). Accordingly, the reputational injury caused by the defendants’ story would not have occurred but for the fact that the defendants wrote an article for publication in California that was read by a large number of California citizens. Indeed, because publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel, see id., §558, the defendants’ intentional tort actually occurred in California. Keeton, 465 U. S., at 777 (“The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated”). In this way, the “effects” caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the California public—connected the defendants’ conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That connection, combined with the various facts that gave the article a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. Hanson, 357 U. S., at 251. It is undisputed that no part of petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada. Petitioner approached, questioned, and searched respondents, and seized the cash at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is alleged that petitioner later helped draft a “false probable cause affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds. 688 F. 3d, at 563. Petitioner never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper lens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.
The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion by shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with respondents. See Rush, 444 U. S., at 332. Rather than assessing petitioner’s own contacts with Nevada, the Court of Appeals looked to petitioner’s knowledge of respondents’ “strong forum connections.” 688 F. 3d, at 577–579, 581. In the court’s view, that knowledge, combined with its conclusion that respondents suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada, satisfied the “minimum contacts” inquiry. Id., at 582.
This approach to the “minimum contacts” analysis impermissibly allows a plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis. Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plain-tiff’s forum connections to the defendant and makes those connections “decisive” in the jurisdictional analysis. See Rush, supra, at 332. It also obscures the reality that none of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself.
Relying on Calder, respondents emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by petitioner’s allegedly tortious conduct (i.e., the delayed return of their gambling funds) while they were residing in the forum. Brief for Respondents 14. This emphasis is likewise misplaced. As previously noted, Calder made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum State. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.
Respondents’ claimed injury does not evince a connection between petitioner and Nevada. Even if we consider the continuation of the seizure in Georgia to be a distinct injury, it is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada in any meaningful way. Respondents (and only respondents) lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because anything independently occurred there, but because Nevada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they desired to use the funds seized by petitioner. Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in California, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting more money than they had. Unlike the broad publication of the forum-focused story in Calder, the effects of petitioner’s con-duct on respondents are not connected to the forum State in a way that makes those effects a proper basis forjurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals pointed to other possible contacts with Nevada, each ultimately unavailing. Respondents’ Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, but that is precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” of a third party that “cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.” Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253. Respondents allege that some of the cash seized in Georgia “originated” in Nevada, but that attenuated connection was not created by petitioner, and the cash was in Georgia, not Nevada, when petitioner seized it. Finally, the funds were eventually returned to respondents in Nevada, but petitioner had nothing to do with that return (indeed, it seems likely that it was respondents’ unilateral decision to have their funds sent to Nevada).
Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case. The proper focus of the “minimum contacts” inquiry in intentional-tort cases is “ ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Calder, 465 U. S., at 788. And it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum State. In this case, the application of those principles is clear: Petitioner’s relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia, and the mere fact that his conduct affected plaintiffs with connectionsto the forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
1 Respondents allege that the sniff test was “at best, inconclusive,” and there is no indication in the pleadings that drugs or drug residue were ever found on or with the cash. App. 21.
2 The alleged affidavit is not in the record. Because this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we take respondents’ factual allegations as true, including their allegations regarding the existence and content of the affidavit.
3 The allegations in the complaint suggested to the Court of Appeals that petitioner “definitely knew, at some point the seizure but providing the alleged false probable cause affidavit, that [respondents] had a significant connection to Nevada.” 688 F. 3d, at 578.
4 Judge Ikuta dissented. In her view, the “false affidavit/forfeiture proceeding aspect” over which the majority found jurisdiction proper was not raised as a separate claim in the complaint, and she found it “doubtful that such a constitutional tort even exists.” ., at 593. After the court denied rehearing en banc, the majority explained in a postscript that it viewed the filing of the false affidavit, which effected a “continued seizure” of the funds, as a separate violation. at 588–589. Petitioner does not dispute that reading here.
5 We also granted certiorari on the question whether Nevada is a proper venue for the suit under . Because we resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether venue was proper in Nevada.
6 “Specific” or “case-linked” jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy’ ” (, an “activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation”). v. , 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 2). This is in contrast to “general” or “all purpose” jurisdiction, which permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit (domicile). Respondents rely on specific jurisdiction only.
8 Respondents propose a substantially similar analysis. They suggest that “a defendant creates sufficient minimum contacts with a forum when he (1) intentionally targets (2) a known resident of the forum (3) for imposition of an injury (4) to be suffered by the plaintiff while she is residing in the forum state.” Brief for Respondents 26–27.
9 Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum contacts in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where intentional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic means ( fraudulent access of financial accounts or “phishing” schemes). As an initial matter, we reiterate that the “minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the interests of the plaintiff. v.,444 U. S., 286, 291–292 (1980). In any event, this case does not present the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual “presence” and conduct translate into “contacts” with a particular State. To the contrary, there is no question where the conduct giving rise to this litigation took place: Petitioner seized physical cash from respondents in the Atlanta airport, and he later drafted and forwarded an affidavit in Georgia. We leave questions about virtual contacts for another day.