text:
D.C. Law Library - § 10–801. Authorization; description of property; submission and approval of resolution; reacquisition rights; notice.
↪ Title 10. Parks, Public Buildings, Grounds, and Space.
↪ Chapter 8. Sale of Public Lands.
↪ § 10–801. Authorization; description of property; submission and approval of resolution; reacquisition rights; notice.
§ 10–801.01. “Real property” defined.
§ 10–801. Authorization; description of property; submission and approval of resolution; reacquisition rights; notice.
(a)(1) Except for real property disposed of pursuant to § 6-1005(c), the Mayor is authorized and empowered, in his discretion, for the best interests of the District of Columbia (“District”), and with the approval of the Council by resolution, to sell, convey, lease (inclusive of options) for a period of greater than 20 years, exchange, or otherwise dispose of real property, in whole or in part, now or hereafter owned in fee simple by the District, whether purchased with appropriated, grant, or other funds, the proceeds of general obligation bonds or tax revenue anticipation notes issued by the District government, or United States Treasury Notes, or obtained by any other means including exchange, condemnation, eminent domain, gift, dedication, donation, devise or assignment, for municipal, community development, or other public purpose, which the Council finds to be no longer required for public purposes.
(2) The Mayor shall submit separate resolutions for the determination that the real property is no longer required for public purposes pursuant to subsection (a-1) of this section and for the approval of its disposition pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
(3) The Mayor shall submit to the Council a semiannual report explaining the status of each disposition approved by the Council during the previous 2 years, including a schedule for project completion of each disposition, an explanation of impediments, if any, to completion of the project, and a description of the steps that are being taken to resolve them.
(a-1)(1) If the Mayor believes that real property is no longer required for public purposes, the Mayor shall submit to the Council a proposed resolution which includes a finding that the real property is no longer required for public purposes. In the proposed resolution submitted to the Council, the Mayor shall also provide a description of the real property .
(C) A summary of public comments received at the public hearing required under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
(3) The proposed resolution shall be submitted to the Council for a 90-day period of review, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove the proposed resolution within the 90-day period, the proposed resolution shall be deemed disapproved.
(4) Before submitting a proposed resolution pursuant to this subsection, and at least 60 days before seeking proposals for the disposition of the real property or otherwise proceeding to negotiate the disposition of the real property, the Mayor shall hold at least one public hearing to obtain community input on potential public uses of the real property to inform the Mayor's determination whether the real property is no longer required for public purposes. This surplus hearing shall be held at an accessible evening or weekend time and in an accessible location in the vicinity of the real property. The Mayor shall provide at least 30 days written notice of the public hearing to the affected Advisory Neighborhood Commissions and shall publicize the hearing by posting a written notice at the site and placing a notice in the District of Columbia Register at least 15 days before the hearing.
(a-2) If the Council determines that the real property is no longer required for public purposes pursuant to subsection (a-1) of this section, the Mayor shall attempt to dispose of the real property for a use with a direct public benefit as described in a specific government plan adopted by the Mayor or Council, including the Community Development Plan, the Comprehensive Plan, the Strategic Neighborhood Area Plan, or the Comprehensive Housing Strategy Plan.
"The Land Disposition Agreement for the disposition of the real property shall not be inconsistent with the substantive business terms of the transaction submitted by the Mayor with this resolution in accordance with subsection (b-1)(2) of this section, unless revisions to those substantive business terms are approved by the Council."
(D) A pre-disposition economic impact statement in the form of a quantitative analysis that estimates the economic benefits, including revenues, tax receipts, and job creation, that will result from the disposition, including the anticipated benefits of any development project to be undertaken at the property and any offsite property, including direct, indirect, or induced outcomes.
(F) Any other terms that the Mayor finds to be in the best interest of the District.
(3)(A) An appraisal report of the value of the property prepared by an independent licensed appraiser performed no earlier than 5 months before the transmission of the proposed resolution to the Council. The report shall analyze both the highest and best use value of the property and the value of the property under the development proposed pursuant to the disposition. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the term "highest and best use" shall mean the reasonably probable and legal use that is physically possible, appropriately supported, and financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.
(B) An explanation of the difference, if any, between the appraised value (determined pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph) and the purchase or lease price to be paid pursuant to the disposition.
(4) An itemization, together with an explanation, of any government assistance to be received, or contemplated to be received, by the purchaser or lessee under the disposition, including any discount on the price or rent, grants, loans, tax credits, tax abatements, tax increment financing, affordable housing subsidies, land exchange, and negotiated contributions.
(iii) A Certified Business Enterprise (“CBE”) Agreement pursuant to subchapter IX-A of Chapter 2 of Title 2 [§ 2-218.01 et seq.].
(B) Documents in this paragraph shall be transmitted in the most current form available at the time the resolution is transmitted; provided, that ifdocuments transmitted with the proposed resolution are revised during the pendency of Council consideration of the proposed resolution, the revised documents shall be clearly marked and transmitted promptly to the Council.
(C) All documents referenced in this paragraph shall be consistent with the proposed resolution for land disposition and language to that effect shall be included in those agreements prior to execution.
(b-2)(1) Before proceeding to negotiate the disposition of real property pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and after holding the hearing required under subsection (a-1) of this section, the Mayor shall hold at least one public hearing to obtain community comment and suggestions on the proposed use of the property. The hearing shall be held at an accessible evening or weekend time and in an accessible location in the vicinity of the real property. The Mayor shall provide at least 30 days written notice of the public hearing to the affected Advisory Neighborhood Commissions and shall publicize the hearing by posting written notice at the site and placing a notice in the District of Columbia Register at least 15 days before the hearing.
(2) To the extent that redevelopment related to the disposition occurs offsite of the real property, the Mayor shall hold at least one public hearing in the affected off-site community of such proposed redevelopment to obtain community comment. The hearing shall be held at an accessible evening or weekend time and in an accessible location in the vicinity of the off-site real property. The Mayor shall provide at least 30 days written notice of the public hearing to the affected Advisory Neighborhood Commissions and shall publicize the hearing by posting written notice at the site and placing a notice in the District of Columbia Register at least 15 days before the hearing.
(D) The purchase price for the second and subsequent sales of the units dedicated as affordable housing described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall be determined by a formula established by the Mayor.
(B) In the case of ownership units, 50% of the units shall be housing for which a low-income household will pay no more than 30% of its income toward housing costs, and 50% of the units shall be housing for which a moderate-income household will pay no more than 30% of its income toward housing costs.
(3) The Mayor shall take into account the affordable-housing requirements of this subsection when establishing the terms and conditions under which real property is to be disposed of. The Mayor may provide subsidies to a developer, as necessary, to ensure that the affordable-housing requirements imposed by this subsection are met.
(ii) An advisory opinion stating whether or not it is likely that the developer reasonably could be expected to satisfy the affordable-housing requirements set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(5) Paragraph (4) of this subsection shall not apply to the disposition of the building and property owned by the District and located at 425 2nd Street, N.W., unless the District commits to using all of the proceeds from the disposition of the property for the construction of one or more new homeless shelters and affordable housing to serve a homeless population of comparable size to the homeless population at 425 2nd Street, N.W.
(6) The Mayor may reduce the affordable-housing requirements of this section if the proposed disposition of real property finances the development of a significant public facility. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "public facility" means a building, structure, or system that is an asset of the District government eligible for capital spending and subject to depreciation. A public facility may include a fire station, public library, public school, stadium, or homeless shelter. Notwithstanding the priority to finance a significant public facility, the Mayor shall nevertheless endeavor to provide affordable housing, consistent with this section, to the extent economically feasible.
(7) Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the Mayor may waive the affordable-housing requirements of this subsection if the District-owned real property is less than 5,000 square feet, even though the property may be consolidated with a private development of multifamily housing consisting of 10 or more units.
(b-4)(1) If a substantive change is made to the business terms of the transaction described in the term sheet or Memorandum of Understanding, referenced in subsection (b-1)(2) of this section, after the resolution was transmitted to and approved by the Council pursuant to this section, a proposed resolution describing the change and accompanied by the amended documents in redline format shall be transmitted to Council for a 45-day period of review, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove the proposed amendments to the documents, in whole or in part, by resolution within the 45-day review period, the proposed amendments shall be deemed approved.
(A) "Redline format" means the changes that are deletions have a line through them and the changes that are additions are underlined.
(B) "Substantive change" means a change that makes the agreement inconsistent with the executed Memorandum of Understanding or term sheet transmitted with the originally approved resolution.
(J) Northwest One (New Communities) (Ward 6).
(2) The hearing required by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held at an accessible evening or weekend time and in an accessible location in the vicinity of the real property. The Mayor shall provide at least 30 days written notice of the public hearing to the affected Advisory Neighborhood Commission and publish notice of the hearing in the District of Columbia Register at least 15 days before the hearing.
(c) The proposed resolution to provide for the disposition of real property pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be submitted to the Council for a 90-day period of review, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove of the proposed disposition of the property, in whole or in part, by resolution within the 90-day period, the proposed resolution shall be deemed disapproved. Nothing in this section shall affect any requirements imposed upon the Mayor by subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2.
(d) Approval of the disposition of the real property by the Council shall expire 2 years after the effective date of the resolution of approval. If the Mayor determines subsequent to Council approval that the property cannot be disposed of within the 2-year period, the Mayor may submit to the Council a resolution to extend the time for the disposition of the property, and shall include with the transmittal a detailed status report on efforts made toward disposition of the property as well as the reasons for the inability to dispose of the property within the 2-year period. The resolution may extend the time for any specified period up to 2 years. If the Council does not take action to approve or disapprove the resolution within 45 days of receipt of the resolution, not including Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, or days of Council recess, the resolution shall be deemed disapproved.
(d-1)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of the property located at 2341 4th Street, N.E., pursuant to the Unsolicited Proposal Submitted by the H Street Community Development Corporation for the Acquisition and Development of 2341 4th Street, N.E., Resolution of 1999, deemed approved February 10, 2000 (PR13-436), is extended to February 10, 2004.
(2) This subsection shall apply as of February 10, 2000.
(d-2)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of Square 5912, Lot 804 in Ward 8 in accordance with the Request for Proposals for the Disposition of Camp Simms Approval Resolution of 2000, effective December 5, 2000 (Res. 13-715; 47 DCR 9984), is extended to March 2, 2006.
(2) This subsection shall apply as of December 5, 2002.
(B) Lots 848 and 849 in Square 2906 in a manner not inconsistent with the Council’s approval of the dispositions of these parcels pursuant to the Disposition of Lots 848 and 849 in Square 2906 Approval Resolution of 2005, deemed approved July 2, 2005 (Res. 16-280; 52 DCR 7961).
(2) The Mayor’s authority to dispose of the properties listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall expire on November 5, 2009.
(d-4)(1) Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (d) and subsection (e)of this section, the Mayor shall dispose of the property located at 35-41 K Street, N.E., designated for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 0838 in Square 0675 (“K Street property”), through a solicitation to be issued no later than October 1, 2013; provided, that if the contingency set forth in paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection is met, the Mayor may dispose of the K Street property through a solicitation to be issued no later than October 1, 2013.
(2)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, the net proceeds from the disposition by sale, as authorized by subsection (b)(8) of this section, of the K Street property shall be deposited into the Housing Production Trust Fund, established by § 42-2802 (“HPTF”), unless the HPTF has been fully funded pursuant to subparagraph (B) of this paragraph and paragraph (3) of this subsection.
(B) If, before the K Street property disposition, the Chief Financial Officer certifies that there is revenue available to fund section 10002(a)(4) of the Revised Revenue Estimate Contingency Priority List Act of 2012, effective September 20, 2012 (D.C. Law 19-168; 59 DCR 8025) (“priority number 4”), the certified available revenue shall be deposited into the HPTF.
(3) If, after the K Street property disposition and the deposit of the net proceeds into the HPTF, the Chief Financial Officer certifies that there is revenue available to fund priority number 4, the certified available revenue, less any shortfall of the $18 million provided for in priority number 4 that was not deposited into the HPTF, which shall be deposited into the HPTF, shall be available to fund NoMa in accordance with priority number 4.
(d-5) Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of District-owned real property located at the northeast corner of Sixth and E Streets, S.W., known for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 0036 in Square 0494, for the construction of a mixed-use development, which was approved by the Council pursuant to the Fourth/Sixth and E Streets, S.W., Property Disposition Approval Resolution of 2009, effective November 3, 2009 (Res. 18-290; 56 DCR 8799), as extended by the Fourth/Sixth and E Streets, S.W., Property Disposition Extension Approval Resolution of 2011, effective July 12, 2011 (Res. 19-170; 58 DCR 6589), is extended to November 3, 2017.
(d-6) Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of District-owned real property located at 5131 Nannie Helen Burroughs Avenue, N.E., designated for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 801 in Square 5196, for the construction of a mixed-use residential and retail development, which was approved by the Council pursuant to the Strand Theater Disposition Approval Resolution of 2009, effective October 9, 2009 (Res. 18-263; 56 DCR 8410), is extended to December 10, 2018.
(d-7) Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of District-owned real property located at 1336 8th Street, N.W., and known for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 68 in Square 399, for a mixed-use development providing for affordable housing, residential and market rate housing, and retail, and any ancillary uses allowed under applicable law, pursuant to the 8th & O Streets, N.W., Disposition Approval Resolution of 2016, effective February 2, 2016 (Res. 21-374; 63 DCR 1498), is extended to February 2, 2020.
(2) The Official Zoning Map of the District of Columbia adopted pursuant to § 6-641.01.
(e-1) In the case of any real property to be disposed under this section through a request for proposals or competitive sealed proposals, the Mayor shall include economic factors, including revenues, fees, and other payments to the District, as one of the criteria to evaluate the request for proposals or competitive sealed proposals.
(f) The Mayor shall take any steps necessary to ensure continuous community input in the disposition of any real property to be disposed of in accordance with this section, which shall include, for property located within the corporate boundaries of the District, providing notice to any affected Advisory Neighborhood Commission of the final terms and conditions for the sale of the property, for review and comment in accordance with § 1-309.10, prior to the disposition of the property.
(f-1) This section shall not apply to any real property which is acquired under § 42-3171.02.
(g) For real property that the Mayor has determined, after input from affected communities, to be no longer needed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), the Mayor shall submit to the Council a report on whether the Mayor intends to dispose of the real property to a public charter school under § 38-1802.09 or for use by another agency of the District government. The report shall be submitted to the Council by the Mayor within 90 days of the determination that the real property is no longer needed by the DCPS. If the report is not submitted by the Mayor to the Council within the 90-day period, the Mayor shall dispose of the real property in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter and shall transmit to the Council the resolutions required by subsection (a)(2) of this section within 180 days of the Mayor’s determination.
(m) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to real property acquired by the District or an instrumentality of the District (or a subsidiary thereof) under § 47-1353(a)(3).
(E) For a household of more than 4 persons, the area median income for a household of 4 persons, increased by 10% of the area median income for a household of 4 persons for each household member exceeding 4 persons.
(A) In the case of rental units, rent and utilities.
(B) In the case of ownership units, mortgage payments, including principal, interest, and property insurance, taxes, homeowner association, condominium, or cooperative fees, and utilities.
(3) “Low-income household” means a household consisting of one or more persons with a total household income that is more than 30% and less than or equal to 50% of the area median income.
(4) “Moderate-income household” means a household consisting of one or more persons with total household income more than 50% and less than or equal to 80% of the area median income.
(5) “Very low-income household” means a household consisting of one or more persons with total household income less than or equal to 30% of the area median income.
(o) The net proceeds from the disposition of the McMillan Sand Filtration Site approved by the McMillan Residential Townhomes Parcel Disposition Approval Resolution of 2014, effective December 2, 2014 (Res. 20-705; 62 DCR 1091), the McMillan Residential Multifamily Parcels Disposition Approval Resolution of 2014, effective December 2, 2014 (Res. 20-706; 62 DCR 1094), and the McMillan Commercial Parcel Disposition Approval Resolution of 2014, effective December 2, 2014 (Res. 20-707; 62 DCR 1097), shall not be deposited into the unrestricted fund balance of the General Fund of the District of Columbia but instead shall be deposited into the capital fund account associated with the McMillan Site Redevelopment, EB0-AMS11C.
This section is referenced in § 2-351.05, § 2-1217.151, § 6-1005, § 10-901, § 10-1904, § 10-1905, § 16-1332, and § 24-261.05.
D.C. Law 10-216 added subsecs. (h), (i), and (j).
D.C. Law 14-114 added subsec. (f-1).
D.C. Law 14-213, in subsec. (f-1), validated a previously made technical correction.
D.C. Law 14-282 added subsec. (m).
D.C. Law 15-127 added subsec. (d-1).
D.C. Law 15-285 added subsec. (d-2).
D.C. Law 15-354, in subsec. (d-1), validated a previously made technical correction.
D.C. Law 16-112, in subsec. (b), substituted “that contains a finding that the real property is no longer required for public purposes and a description” for “that contains a description”; added subsec. (b-1); in subsec. (c), substituted “shall be deemed disapproved.” for “shall be deemed approved.”; and added subsec. (e-1).
D.C. Law 17-138 added subsec. (d-3).
D.C. Law 18-76 rewrote subsecs. (b) and (b-1).
D.C. Law 18-115, in subsec. (a), designated the existing text as par. (1) and added par. (2); added subsecs. (a-1) and (a-2); repealed subsec. (b)(1); in subsec. (d), substituted “disapproved” for “approved”; in subsec. (e), substituted “pursuant to this section” for “pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this section”; and rewrote subsec. (g).
D.C. Law 18-201 added subsec. (a-1)(5).
The 2012 amendment by D.C. Law 19-168 added (d-4).
The 2012 amendment by D.C. Law 19-171 validated a previously made technical correction in (b)(9).
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 20-193 added (a-3); rewrote (b)(5); and added (n).
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 21-36 added the subsection designated herein as (o).
The 2016 amendment by D.C. Law 21-62 added the subsection designated herein as (d-5).
Advisory Neighborhood Commissions, duties and responsibilities, see § 1-309.10.
Authority of Council, exchange of district-owned land, see § 10-901.
Correctional Treatment Facility, exemptions from leasing and property laws, see § 24-261.05.
District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act, rent, sale, or exchange of lands acquired thereunder, see § 6-101.01 et seq.
Industrial Home School, disposal, see § 44-1303.
Sale of lands not needed for public purposes, see § 16-1332 et seq.
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of Fifth Street, N.W., and I Street, N.W., Emergency Amendment Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-607, Jan. 24, 2019, 66 DCR 1593).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of 8th [and] O Streets, N.W., Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-333, May 3, 2018, 65 DCR 5056).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of 8th [and] O Streets, N.W., Emergency Amendment Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-240, Jan. 31, 2018, 65 DCR 1362).
For temporary (90 days) amendment to the requirement that the Mayor transfer certian properties in fee simple and without charge to the L'Efant Trust, see § 2192 of Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-167, Oct. 24, 2017, 64 DCR 10802).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2052 of Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-167, Oct. 24, 2017, 64 DCR 10802).
For temporary (90 days) amendment to the requirement that the Mayor transfer certian properties in fee simple and without charge to the L'Efant Trust, see § 2192 of Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-104, July 20, 2017, 64 DCR 7032).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2052 of Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-104, July 20, 2017, 64 DCR 7032).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3 of Land Disposition Transparency Emergency Amendment Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-25, Mar. 27, 2017, 64 DCR 3069).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Land Disposition Transparency Emergency Amendment Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-25, Mar. 27, 2017, 64 DCR 3069).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-627, Jan. 24, 2017, 64 DCR 901).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Hardy School Disposition and Lease Authorization Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-609, Jan. 10, 2017, 64 DCR 186).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of 1300 H Street, N.E., and Approval of Amended Term Sheet Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-502, Oct. 12, 2016, 63 DCR 12938).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-497, Oct. 6, 2016, 63 DCR 12609).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-4, Feb. 19, 2015, 62 DCR 2470).
For temporary designation of the building and all property in Square 255, located at 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., popularly referred to as the District Building, under the exclusive authority of the Council of the District of Columbia to determine the use, management, maintenance, operation, repair, renovation, security, lease, sale, or other disposition of the building and property, see § 701 of the Omnibus Spending Reduction Emergency Act of 1993 (D.C. Act 10-102, August 9, 1993, 40 DCR 6144) and § 601 of the Omnibus Spending Reduction Congressional Review Emergency Act of 1993 (D.C. Act 10-145, November 4, 1993, 40 DCR 8081).
For temporary amendment of section, see § 2 of the District of Columbia Board of Education Sale, Renovation, Lease-back, and Repurchase of Franklin School Emergency Amendment Act of 1994 (D.C. Act 10-321, August 4, 1994, 41 DCR 5371) and § 2 of the District of Columbia Board of Education Sale, Renovation, Lease-back, and Repurchase of Franklin School Congressional Adjournment Emergency Amendment Act of 1994 (D.C. Act 10-362, December 15, 1994, 41 DCR 8057).
For temporary amendment of section, see §§ 2(a) and 3 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of District Owned Surplus Real Property Revised Emergency Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Act 12-441, September 3, 1998, 45 DCR 6515).
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Emergency Amendment Act of 1999 (D.C. Act 13-208, December 8, 1999, 46 DCR 10474).
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Act 13-281, March 7, 2000, 47 DCR 2024).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Act 13-476, December 8, 2000, 48 DCR 560).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Act 14-10, March 2, 2001, 48 DCR 2494).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Master Facility Plan Requirement Emergency Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Act 14-34, April 2, 2001, 48 DCR 3351).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Master Facility Plan Requirement Temporary Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Act 14-50, April 19, 2001, 48 DCR 3351).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Act 14-159, November 2, 2001, 48 DCR 10393).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of Tax Clarity and Recorder of Deeds Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-381, June 6, 2002, 49 DCR 5674).
For temporary (90 day) addition of provisions, see §§ 2 to 12 of Abandoned and Vacant Properties Community Development Disposition, and Disapproval of Disposition of Certain Scattered Vacant and Abandoned Properties Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-396, June 25, 2002, 49 DCR 6502).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of Tax Clarity and Related Amendments Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-456, July 23, 2002, 49 DCR 8107).
For temporary (90 day) addition of provisions, see §§ 1 to 12 of Abandoned and Vacant Properties Community Development Disposition, and Disapproval of Disposition of Certain Scattered Vacant and Abandoned Properties Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-484, October 3, 2002, 49 DCR 9624).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of Tax Clarity and Related Amendments Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-510, October 23, 2002, 49 DCR 10247).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-534, December 2, 2002, 49 DCR 11643).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-77, April 16, 2003, 50 DCR 3640).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-339, January 29, 2004, 51 DCR 1818).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District-Owned Surplus Real Property in Ward 8 Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-406, March 18, 2004, 51 DCR 3657).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District-owned Surplus Real Property in Ward 8 Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-449, June 23, 2004, 51 DCR 6568).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of Property for Golden Rule Development Project Emergency Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-588, November 1, 2004, 51 DCR 10714).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Second Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-627, November 30, 2004, 52 DCR 1137).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District-Owned Surplus Real Property in Ward 8 Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-7, January 19, 2005, 52 DCR 2686).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-33, February 17, 2005, 52 DCR 3018).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of Property for Golden Rule Development Project Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-37, February 17, 2005, 52 DCR 3028).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Emergency Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-202, November 17, 2005, 52 DCR 10511).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of School Without Walls Development Project Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-285, February 27, 2006, 53 DCR 1637).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of School Without Walls Development Project Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-373, May 19, 2006, 53 DCR 4386).
For temporary (90 day) re-authorization of agreement provisions, see § 2 of Fringe Lot Real Property Exclusive Rights Agreement Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-412, July 12, 2006, 53 DCR 5774).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of School Without Walls Development Project Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-673, December 28, 2006, 54 DCR 1163).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Old Congress Heights School Emergency Amendment Act of 2008 (D.C. Act 17-303, February 22, 2008, 55 DCR 2512).
For temporary (90 day) additions, see §§ 2 and 3 of Franklin Shelter Closing Requirements Emergency Act of 2008 (D.C. Act 17-518, September 30, 2008, 55 DCR 10898).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of District Land Disposition Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-140, July 16, 2009, 56 DCR 5864).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of District Land Disposition Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-209, October 21, 2009, 56 DCR 8483).
For temporary (90 day) additions, see §§ 2 and 3 of Washington Center for Aging Services Disposition Approval Emergency Act of 2010 (D.C. Act 18-363, April 2, 2010, 57 DCR 3161).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Old Naval Hospital Community Obligation Requirements Emergency Amendment Act of 2010 (D.C. Act 18-399, May 5, 2010, 57 DCR 4365).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Review Period for the Proposed Disposition of the J.F. Cook School Emergency Amendment Act of 2010 (D.C. Act 18-509, July 30, 2010, 57 DCR 7588).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Review Period for the Proposed Disposition of the J.F. Cook School Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2010 (D.C. Act 18-576, October 19, 2010, 57 DCR 10105).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Howard Theatre Easement Disposition Emergency Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Act 19-267, January 15, 2012, 59 DCR 209).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2132 of Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2012 (D.C. Act 19-383, June 19, 2012, 59 DCR 7764).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2132 of Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2012 (D.C. Act 19-413, July 25, 2012, 59 DCR 9290).
For temporary addition of (d-5), see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Eastern Avenue Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Act 19-456, October 4, 2012, 59 DCR 11746).
For temporary addition of (d-6), see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Eastern Avenue Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Act 19-457, October 4, 2012, 59 DCR 11748).
For temporary addition of (d-5), see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Eastern Avenue Property Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-10, February 20, 2013, 60 DCR 3956, applicable as of January 2, 2013).
For temporary addition of (d-6), see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-11, February 20, 2013, 60 DCR 3958), applicable as of January 2, 2013.
For temporary (90 days) extension of time to dispose of Eastern Avenue property, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Eastern Avenue Property Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-10, February 20, 2013, 60 DCR 3956, 20 DCSTAT 462).
For temporary (90 days) extension of time to dispose of Strand Theater property, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-11, February 20, 2013, 60 DCR 3958, 20 DCSTAT 464).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Justice Park Property Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-66, May 15, 2013, 60 DCR 7230, 20 DCSTAT 1416).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Hine Junior High School Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-113, July 23, 2013, 60 DCR 11104, 20 DCSTAT 1814).
For temporary (90 days) African-American Civil War Memorial Museum Development, see §§ 2132 — 2134 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-130, July 30, 2013, 60 DCR 11384, 20 DCSTAT 1827).
For temporary (90 days) African-American Civil War Memorial Museum Development, see §§ 2132 and 2133 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-204, October 17, 2013, 60 DCR 15341, 20 DCSTAT 2311).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Emergency Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-205, October 17, 2013, 60 DCR 15482).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see §§ 2 and 3 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-270, January 16, 2014, 61 DCR 790).
For temporary (90 days) approval of Contract No. DCPL-2013-C-0004 with Martinez and Johnson Architecture to provide architectural and engineering design services for the Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Library, see § 2 of the Proposed Multiyear Contract No. DCPL-2013-C-0004 Approval and Payment Authorization Emergency Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-394, July 29, 2014, 61 DCR 8076).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Second Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-478, Nov. 13, 2014, 61 DCR 12127, 20 STAT 4402).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 8012 of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-127, July 27, 2015, 62 DCR 10201).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Property Located at Sixth and E Streets, S.W., Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-181, Oct. 27, 2015, 62 DCR 14209).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-185, Oct. 27, 2015, 62 DCR 14218).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Sixth and E Streets, S.W., Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-286, Jan. 27, 2016, 63 DCR 1195).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of 8th & O Streets, N.W., Temporary Amendment Act of 2018 (D.C. Law 22-89, Feb. 28, 2018 65 DCR 2372).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Land Disposition Transparency Temporary Amendment Act of 2017 (D.C. Law 22-2, June 10, 2017, 64 DCR 4021).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Stevens School Temporary Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Law 21-205, Feb. 18, 2017, 63 DCR 15049).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of 1300 H Street, N.E., and Approval of Amended Term Sheet Temporary Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Law 21-178, Dec. 28, 2016, 63 DCR 13593).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of District of Columbia Board of Education Sale, Renovation, Lease-back, and Repurchase of Franklin School Temporary Amendment Act of 1994 (D.C. Law 10-196, March 14, 1995, law notification 42 DCR 1513).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 3 of Extension of Time to Dispose of District Owned Surplus Real Property Revised Temporary Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Law 12-198, March 26, 1999, law notification 46 DCR 3424).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Temporary Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Law 12-223, April 13, 1999, law notification 46 DCR 3845).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Temporary Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Law 13-242, April 3, 2001, law notification 48 DCR 3484).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Temporary Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Law 14-71, February 27, 2002, law notification 49 DCR 2281).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of the Tax Clarity and Recorder of Deeds Temporary Act of 2002 (D.C. Law 14-191, Oct. 5, 2002, law notification 49 DCR 9549).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of the Tax Clarity and Related Amendments Temporary Act of 2002 (D.C. Law 14-228, March 25, 2003, law notification 50 DCR 2741).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Temporary Amendment Act of 2002 (D.C. Law 14-294, April 11, 2003, law notification 50 DCR 5852).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District Owned Surplus Real Property Temporary Amendment Act of 2003 (D.C. Law 15-24, July 22, 2003, law notification 50 DCR 6094).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Temporary Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Law 15-137, April 22, 2004, law notification 51 DCR 4921).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Disposal of District-Owned Surplus Real Property in Ward 8 Temporary Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Law 15-170, June 19, 2004, law notification 51 DCR 7335).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of Property for Golden Rule Development Project Temporary Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Law 15-251, March 17, 2005, law notification 52 DCR 4127).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Second Temporary Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Law 15-313, April 8, 2005, law notification 52 DCR 4702).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 5 of Abatement of Nuisance Construction Projects Temporary Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Law 16-4, May 14, 2005, law notification 52 DCR 5427).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Real Property Disposition Economic Analysis Temporary Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Law 16-61, March 8, 2006, law notification 53 DCR 2332).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of School Without Walls Development Project Temporary Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Law 16-116, June 8, 2006, law notification 53 DCR 5354).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of School Without Walls Development Project Temporary Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Law 16-303, March 27, 2007, law notification 54 DCR 6574).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Extension of Time to Dispose of the Old Congress Heights School Temporary Amendment Act of 2008 (D.C. Law 17-160, May 13, 2008, law notification 55 DCR 5894).
“(9) The following statement: ”All documents that are submitted with this resolution pursuant to subsection (b-1) of this section shall be consistent with the executed Memorandum of Understanding or term sheet transmitted to the Council pursuant to subsection (b-1)(2) of this section.
“(C) A description of all disposition methods considered and an accompanying narrative for the proposed disposition method that contains comparisons to the other methods and shows why the proposed method was more beneficial for the District than the others in the areas of return on investment, subsidies required, revenues paid to the District, and any other relevant category, or why it is being proposed despite it being less beneficial to the District in any of the measured categories.
“(F) Any other terms that the Mayor finds to be in the best interest of the District.
“(3) A document reporting the value of the property prepared by an independent appraiser or assessor performed within 12 months of transmission of the proposed resolution.
“(4) For any development project where the total value of the government assistance is greater than $10 million, a description of the project funding and financing plan.
“(iii) A Certified Business Enterprise (’CBE’) Agreement pursuant to the Small, Local and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Development and Assistance Act of 2005, effective October 20, 2005 (D.C. Law 16-33; D.C. Official Code § 2-218.01 et seq.).
“(B) Documents in this paragraph shall be transmitted in the most current form available at the time the resolution is transmitted.
“(C) All documents referenced in this paragraph shall be consistent with the proposed resolution for land disposition and language to that effect shall be included in those agreements prior to execution.
“(6)(A) If a substantive change is made to the term sheet or Memorandum of Understanding referenced in subsection ((b-1)(2) of this section, after the resolution was transmitted to and approved by the Council pursuant to this subsection, a resolution describing the change accompanied by an amended term sheet or Memorandum of Understanding in redline format shall be transmitted to Council for a 30-day period of review, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove the proposed amendments to the term sheet, in whole or in part, by resolution within the 30-day review period, the proposed amendments shall be deemed approved.
“(i) ‘Redline format’ means the changes that are deletions have a line through them and the changes that are additions are underlined.
Section 4(b) of D.C. Law 18-77 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
“(6) The Mayor is deemed to have met the requirements of paragraph (2)(C) and paragraph (4) of this subsection with respect to the District-owned real property known as the Old Naval Hospital, located at 921 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., in Square 0948, for which the Mayor engaged in community outreach efforts regarding the property’s proposed redevelopment plan, and which followed notice to and consent from the applicable Advisory Neighborhood Commission.”.
Section 4(b) of D.C. Law 18-204 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
“(c-1) Notwithstanding subsection (c) of this section, the Council review period for the proposed disposition of the property located at 44 P Street, N.W., commonly known as J.F. Cook School, and designated for purposes of assessment and taxation as Square 0616, Lot 0866, or some portion thereof, is extended for an additional 90 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holiday, and days of Council recess.”.
Section 4(b) of D.C. Law 18-276 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Temporary Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Law 20-162, February 26, 2015, 60 DCR 10751).
For temporary (225 day) addition, see § 2 of Fringe Lot Real Property Exclusive Rights Agreement Extension Temporary Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Law 16-164, September 29, 2006, law notification 53 DCR 8600).
“(1) ‘Low barrier shelter’ means an overnight housing accommodation for individuals who are homeless, provided directly by, or through contract with or grant from, the District, for the purpose of providing shelter to individuals without imposition of identification, time limits, or other program requirements.
“(6) A description of the ability to seasonally increase capacity to reduce incidences of hypothermia among the homeless population.
Section 5(b) of D.C. Law 17-283 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
Section 4(b) of D.C. Law 19-215 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
Section 4(b) of D.C. Law 19-216 provided that the act shall expire after 225 days of its having taken effect.
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Justice Park Property Temporary Approval Act of 2013 (D.C. Law 20-19, October 3, 2013, 60 DCR 10874).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of Hine Junior High School Temporary Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Law 20-41, December 5, 2013, 60 DCR 14714).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Temporary Amendment Act of 2013 (D.C. Law 20-65, January 25, 2014, 60 DCR 16538).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2 of the Extension of Time to Dispose of the Strand Theater Temporary Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Law 21-53, Jan. 30, 2016, 62 DCR 15593).
Section 2131 of D.C. Law 20-61 provided that Subtitle N of Title II of the act may be cited as the “African-American Civil War Memorial Freedom Foundation Inc., Museum Development Act of 2013”.
The functions, powers and duties of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission were transferred to the National Capital Planning Commission by the Act of June 6, 1924, ch. 270, § 9, as added by the Act of July 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 790, ch. 949, § 1.
A description of the Generalized Land Use Maps adopted pursuant to § 1-306.02, referred to in (e)(1), is located at 10 DCMR § 1135 (March 1989).
For an amendment to the requirement that the Mayor transfer certian properties in fee simple and without charge to the L'Efant Trust, see section 2192 of D.C. Law 22-33.
For a requirement that the Mayor transfer certain properties in fee simple and without charge to the L'Enfant Trust, see section 2 of D.C. Law 21-223.
Sale, lease or transfer of certain United States property in District to foreign governments and international organization: See Act of October 8, 1968, Pub. L. 90-553, as amended by Act of May 25, 1982, Pub. L. 97-186, as amended by § 124 of the Act of August 16, 1985, Pub. L. 99-93, as amended by § 120 of the Act of February 16, 1990, Pub. L. 101-246.
Conveyance of property: Pursuant to authority of this section, the Act of March 16, 1978, D.C. Law 2-63, conveying square 491 to the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, was adopted.
D.C. Law 7-94, effective March 16, 1988, authorized the Mayor to convey property located at 525-9th Street, N.E., Lots 32, 33, and 34 of Square 936, commonly referred to as Old Police Precinct #9.
D.C. Law 8-32, effective September 22, 1989, as amended by D.C. Act 8-97, effective October 17, 1989, as amended by D.C. Law 8-171, effective September 26, 1990, authorized the Mayor to convey property located at 1529 16th Street, N.W., Lot 818 of Square 194, commonly referred to as the Jewish Community Center.
D.C. Law 8-82, effective March 15, 1990, authorized the Mayor to convey property located at Lot 13 in Square 4446.
D.C. Law 10-139, effective July 23, 1994, authorized the Mayor to convey property located at 2025 2nd Street, N.W., commonly referred to as the Gage School.
Approval of Prevocational School Site: Pursuant to Resolution 8-291, the “Prevocational School Site Lease Approval Resolution of 1990”, effective November 30, 1990, the Council approved the request by the Mayor to lease the Prevocational School Site for a period not to exceed 99 years.
Disapproval of request to lease Employment Services Building: Pursuant to Resolution 8-292, the “Employment Services Building Lease Disapproval Resolution of 1990,” effective November 30, 1990, the Council disapproved the request by the Mayor to lease the Employment Services Building Site for a period not to exceed 99 years.
Precinct Station Site Lease Approval Resolution of 1991: Pursuant to Resolution 9-146, effective December 13, 1991, the Council approved the request by the Mayor to lease the Old Number 8 Precinct Station (Lot 804; Square 1730) to Iona Senior Services for a period of greater than 20 years.
Proposal to Develop 10 Lots Located at Benning Road, S.E., Lots 309 through 318, Square 5359 Resolution of 1992: Pursuant to Resolution 9-264, effective June 12, 1992, the Council reviewed and approved an unsolicited proposal to develop 10 lots located at Benning Road between Hanna Place and H Street, S.E., Lots 309 through 319, Square 5359.
Lease of the Employment Services Building Site Disapproval Resolution of 1993: Pursuant to Resolution 10-62, effective June 11, 1993, the Council disapproved the lease of the Employment Services Building site for a period of up to 99 years.
Children’s Island Disposition Resolution of 1993: Pursuant to Resolution 10-92, effective July 30, 1993, the Council authorized conditionally the disposition of property in the Anacostia River known as Children’s Island, upon the approval by the Council of the District of Columbia of a transfer of jurisdiction over the property from the National Park Service to the District of Columbia, pursuant to a Lease and Restated Cooperative Agreement between the District of Columbia and National Children’s Island, Inc. and Island Development Corporation, and subject to compliance with the provisions of the Children’s Island Development Plan Emergency Act of 1993 and successor permanent legislation.
Unsolicited Proposal Submitted by Washington Properties, Inc./Square 673 Partners for the Negotiated Disposition of 59 M Street, N.E., Resolution of 1994: Pursuant to Resolution 10-475, effective December 6, 1994, amended by D.C. Law 16-191, § 110, the Council reviewed and provided comments on an Unsolicited Proposal submitted by Washington Properties, Inc./Square 673 Partners for the negotiated disposition of 59 M Street, N.E.
Conveyance of property: D.C. Law 10-96 authorized the Mayor to convey certain real property of the District of Columbia known as Engine Company No. 24, located on Lot 816, Square 2900, with a street address at 3702 Georgia Avenue N.W., to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for the purpose of constructing the Georgia Avenue/Petworth Station facilities.
Disposal of surplus real property: Section 2 of D.C. Law 8-96 provided that for the purposes of this act, the term “real property” means land titled in the name of the District of Columbia (“District”) or in which the District has a controlling interest and includes all structures of a permanent character erected thereon or affixed thereto, any natural resources located thereon or thereunder, all riparian rights attached thereto, or any air space located above or below the property or any street or alley under the jurisdiction of the Mayor.
Authority over the John A. Wilson Building: Section 601 of D.C. Law 10-65, provided, inter alia, that notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the John A. Wilson Building is designated under the exclusive authority of the Council of the District of Columbia to determine the use, management, maintenance, operation, repair, renovation, security, lease, sale, or other disposition of the property pursuant to § 10-1301.
Oyster Elementary School Construction and Revenue Bonds: D.C. Law 12-174, the Oyster Elementary School Construction and Revenue Bond Act of 1998, effective October 21, 1998, pursuant to § 169 of Pub. Law. 105-277, authorized the demolition of the James F. Oyster Elementary School and the construction of a new school, the lease or conveyance of a portion of the Oyster School site to a private developer, and the funding for construction of the new Oyster School facility through the issuance of revenue bonds by the District for the benefit of the District of Columbia Public Schools, with the payments on such revenue bonds secured through payment by the developer of a payment in lieu of taxes.
Glenn Dale Hospital Site Sale Approval Resolution of 1994: Pursuant to Proposed Resolution 11-17, deemed approved January 7, 1995, Council approved the sale of the Glenn Dale Hospital Site.
Transfer of Lot 40 in Square 454 Emergency Approval Resolution of 1995: Pursuant to Resolution 11-150, effective October 10, 1995, the Council approved the transfer of certain real property owned by the District of Columbia Government, further described as Lot 40 in Square 454, a portion of which to be transferred to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and the remaining portion to be used or disposed of in accordance with District of Columbia law.
Request for Proposals to Solicit Development of the Georgetown Incinerator Property, Lot 824 in Square 1189, Approval Emergency Resolution of 1996: Pursuant to Resolution 11-478, effective July 17, 1996, Council approved, on an emergency basis, the request for proposals soliciting proposals to develop the Georgetown Incinerator Property located in the Georgetown Waterfront area and legally described as Lot 824, Square 1189.
Approval of the Negotiated Disposition of the “Golden Rule Property” to Golden Rule Plaza, Inc., and Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1996 for the Business of Public Management Disapproval Resolution of 1996: Pursuant to Resolution 11-569, effective November 7, 1996, Council approved a negotiated disposition and redevelopment of the “Golden Rule Property” to Golden Rule Plaza, Inc., and to disapprove Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1996 for the business of public management.
Negotiated Disposition of Property Upshur Street, N.W., to the National Baptist Convention USA Housing Inc., Twenty-Seven, Approval Resolution of 1996: Pursuant to Resolution 11-632, effective December 3, 1996, Council approved the negotiated disposition of property located in Square 2820, Lot Upshur Street, N.W., to the National Baptist Convention USA Housing Inc., Twenty-Seven, for the development of the “Upshur House” in Ward Four.
Request for Offers for the Disposition for the Roosevelt Apartment for Senior Citizens, 2101 16th Street, N.W., Lot 802, in Square 188, Approval Resolution of 1996: Pursuant to Resolution 11-633, effective December 3, 1996, Council approved the Request for Offers for the disposition of the Roosevelt Apartment for Senior Citizens located at 2101 16th Street, N.W., and legally described as Lot 802, Square 188, in Ward 1.
Unsolicited Proposal to Develop the Anacostia Northern Gateway Project Approval Resolution of 1997: Proposed Resolution 12-0111, the “Unsolicited Proposal to Develop the Anacostia Northern gateway project Approval Resolution of 1997” was deemed approved, effective Feb. 12, 1997.
Extension of Time To Dispose of Square 4107, Lots 227 and 900 and Square 4103, Lots 826 and 827 to Crane Rental Company Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution 12-(PR12-721), effective May 29, 1998, the Council approved a request for additional time for the disposition of property on W Street, N.E., Square 4107, Lots 227 and 900 and Square 4103, Lots 826 and 827, to Crane Rental Company.
Disposition of Lots 90, 91, 92, 105, 106 and 125 in Square 2560 to Adams Morgan Development Company Limited Partnership Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution 12-703, effective October 6, 1998, the Council approved the disposition of Lots 90, 91, 92, 105, 106 and 125 in Square 2560 to Adams Morgan Development Company Limited Partnership.
Disposition of Lot 824 in Square 1189 to Millennium Georgetown Development L.L.C. Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution 12-704, effective October 6, 1998, the Council approved the disposition of Lot 824 in Square 1189 to Millennium Georgetown Development L.L.C.
Authorization to Sell Lots 804, 805 and 806 in Square 3587 Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution PR 12-824. effective December 10, 1998, the Council authorized the sale of Lots 804, 805, and 806 in Square 3587 to existing tenants.
Disposition of Lot 41 in Square 484 Emergency Conditional Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution 12-677, effective August 24, 1998, the Council approved, on an emergency basis, the disposition of Lot 41 in Square 454, located at 614 H Street, N.W., as surplus property.
Disposition of Lot 0061 in Square 555 Emergency Approval Resolution of 1998: Pursuant to Resolution 12-800, effective December 1, 1998, the Council approved, on an emergency basis, the disposition of Lot 0061 in Square 555, real property owned by the District government, as surplus property in accordance with District of Columbia law.
Public Offering Document to Receive Proposals to Develop the McMillan Sand Filter Plan Site Disapproval Resolution of 1998 (PR12-981): Pursuant to Resolution 13-31, effective February 2, 1999, the Council disapproved an offering document to receive proposals to develop the McMillan Sand Filter Plant Site, located in Ward 5.
Request for Offers for the Disposition of the Roosevelt Apartment, 2101 — 16th Street, N.W., Lot 802 in Square 188, Approval Resolution of 1999 (PR12-1115): Pursuant to Resolution 13-32, effective February 2, 1999, the Council reviewed and approved the Request for Offers for disposition of the Roosevelt Apartment, located at 2101 16th Street, N.W., and legally described as Lot 802 in Square 188, in Ward One.
“(1) The Mayor and Council of the District of Columbia certify to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate that existing real property available to the District (whether leased or owned by the District government) is not suitable for the purposes intended.
“(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, there is made available for sale or lease all real property of the District of Columbia that the Mayor from time-to-time determines is surplus to the needs of the District of Columbia, unless a majority of the members of the Council override the Mayor’s determination during the 30-day period which begins on the date the determination is published.
“(3) The Mayor and Council implement a program for the periodic survey of all District property to determine if it is surplus to the needs of the District.
“(4) The Mayor and Council within 60 days of the date of the enactment of this Act have filed with the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report which provides a comprehensive plan for the management of District of Columbia real property assets, and are proceeding with the implementation of the plan.
“(a) AUTHORITY TO SELL—With the approval of the National Capital Planning Commission, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, for the best interests of the District of Columbia, may sell to the highest bidder at public or private sale real estate in the District of Columbia owned in fee simple by the District of Columbia for municipal use that the Council of the District of Columbia and the Commission find to be no longer required for public purposes.
Section 6 of D.C. Law 18-368 provided: “Notwithstanding section 1(d) of An Act Authorizing the sale of certain real estate in the District of Columbia no longer required for public purposes, approved August 5, 1939 (53 Stat. 1211; D.C. Official Code § 10-801(d)), the time period within which the Mayor may dispose of the property located at 1101-1111 24th Street, N.W., known for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 836, Square 37, 2301 L Street, N.W., Lot 837, Square 37, and 2225 M Street, N.W., Lot 822, Square 50, pursuant to the West End Parcels Disposition Approval Resolution of 2010, effective July 13, 2010 (Res.18-553; 57 DCR 7623), is extended to July 13, 2013.” Establishment of the Saint Elizabeths Redevelopment Initiative, see Mayor’s Order 2011-109, June 15, 2011 ( 58 DCR 5348).
African-American Civil War Memorial and Museum Development: Sections 2132 to 2134 of D.C. Law 20-61 provided for a protective covenant on, and restrictions on disposal of, 1925 Vermont Avenue, N.W., known for tax and assessment purposes as Lot 0827, Square 0361 (“the Grimke School”), for the establishment and operation of the African-American Civil War Memorial Museum and Visitor’s Center.
Section 301 of D.C. Law 20-110 provided: “Findings.
“(a) The Property is located at the intersection of Naylor Road, S.E., Good Hope Road, S.E., and Alabama Avenue, S.E., and consists of approximately 18.7 acres of land and is further defined in section 101(22).
“(b) The Property was acquired with the intention of eliminating blight by redeveloping the underused site into retail and residential space to benefit the surrounding community and the District. Therefore, the Property is not required for public purposes and the Property needs to be declared surplus in order to dispose of the Property for redevelopment purposes.
Section 302 of D.C. Law 20-110 provided that the Council determined that the Property is no longer required for public purposes.
Section 401 of D.C. Law 20-110 provided: “Findings.
“(a) The Property is located at the intersection of Naylor Road, S.E., Good Hope Road, S.E., and Alabama Avenue, S.E., consists of approximately 18.7 acres of land, and is further defined in section 101(22).
“(b) The Project shall include affordable housing, such that 20% of the residential units shall be reserved for households with incomes at or below 80% AMI. An additional 10% of the residential units shall be reserved for households with incomes at or below 120% of AMI.
“(c) The Developer shall enter into an agreement with the District requiring the Developer to, at a minimum, contract with Certified Business Enterprises for at least 35% of the contract dollar volume of the Project, and requiring at least 20% equity and 20% development participation of Certified Business Enterprises.
“(d) The Developer shall enter into a First Source Agreement with the District that shall govern certain obligations of the Developer pursuant to section 4 of the First Source Employment Agreement Act of 1984, effective June 29, 1984 (D.C. Law 5-93; D.C. Official Code Section 2-219.03) and Mayor's Order 83-265, dated November 9, 1983, regarding job creation and employment as a result of the construction on the Property.
“(e) The Developer shall comply with the terms set forth in Zoning Commission Order No. 09-03, July 12, 2010, pertaining to the following properties: Square 5640, Lot 33; Square 5640, Lot 35; Square 5640, Lot 816; and Par 0213, Lot 64.
Section 402 of D.C. Law 20-110 provided that the Council approved the disposition of the Property to the Developer pursuant to the terms set forth in D.C. Law 20-110, § 401.
Resolution 14-71, the “Negotiated Sale of District-Owned Property at Brentwood Road, N.E. to Graimark/Walker Urban Land Development, LLC Approval Resolution of 2001”, was approved effective April 3, 2001.
Resolution 14-96, the “Negotiated Sale of District-Owned Property at First Street and New York Avenue, N.E., to the General Services Administration/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Approval Resolution of 2001, was approved effective May 1, 2001.
Resolution 14-429, the “Disposition of Squares 5155, Lots 11-14, 150-152, 835, 838, 839, 849, 851 and 853, also known as the George Carver Elementary School, Emergency Approval Resolution of 2002”, was approved effective April 16, 2002.
Resolution 14-429, the “Disposition of Square 5155, Lots 11-14, 150-152, 835, 838, 839, 849, 851 & 853, Also Known as the George Carver Elementary School Emergency Approval Resolution of 2002”, was approved effective April 26, 2002.
Resolution 14-440, the “Request for Proposals for the Disposition of the Washington Beef Properties, 1240 — 1248 4th St., N.E., Lots 5, 800, and 802 in Square 3587, Approval Resolution of 2002”, was approved effective May 24, 2002.
Resolution 14-539, the “Disposition of the Existing Convention Center Site Emergency Approval Resolution of 2002”, was approved effective July 26, 2002.
Resolution 14-620, the “Disposition of Square 5155, Lot 802 Emergency Approval Resolution of 2002”, was approved effective November 22, 2002.
Resolution 15-64, the “Disposition of Square 1030, Lot 813, also known as the Kingsman Elementary School Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective March 18, 2003.
Resolution 15-128, the “Transfer of Easement for Vehicular and Pedestrian Access to 115 New York Avenue, N.W., Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 8, 2003.
Resolution 15-142, the “Disposition by a Request for Proposals for the Disposition of the Georgia Avenue—Petworth Metro Station Parcel a Site Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 8, 2003.
Resolution 15-202, the “Revised Lease of a Parcel of District Property Held under a Letter Transfer at U.S. Reservation 13 to St. Coletta of Greater Washington, Inc. Emergency Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 8, 2003.
Resolution 15-214, the “Unsolicited Proposal Submitted by Sang Oh & Company for the Negotiated Purchase and Disposition of Surplus Property at 375 Morse Street, N.E., Also Known as the Ironworks Parcel, Emergency Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 8, 2003.
Resolution 15-218, the “Disposition of Square 5359, Lots 307 and 827, Also Known as the Hilltop Terrace Property Emergency Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 14, 2003.
Resolution 15-346, the “Declaration of Square E-710, Lot 801 as Surplus Property Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective December 2, 2003.
Resolution 15-142, the “Request for Proposals for the Disposition of the Georgia Avenue—Petworth Metro Station Parcel A Approval Resolution of 2003”, was approved effective July 8, 2003.
Resolution 15-522, the “Request for Proposals for the Disposition of 201 Florida Avenue, N.E., Square E-710, Lot 801, Approval Resolution of 2004”, was approved effective May 4, 2004.
Resolution 15-523, the “Disposition of the Armstrong Adult Education Center, Square 553, Lot 844, Approval Resolution of 2004”, was approved effective May 4, 2004.
Resolution 15-645, the “Disposition of Certain Vacant Land That Is a Portion of the Area Known as the Anacostia Northern Gateway Site Approval Resolution of 2004”, was approved effective July 13, 2004.

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A Pennsylvania court recently decided in Vu v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp., 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 4261 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2019) whether a ski resort was responsible for a skier’s injuries after they skied over the edge of a trail to avoid colliding with a snowboarder.
Plaintiff, Quan Vu, was skiing at Liberty Mountain when a snowboarder approached him and cut him off, causing Vu to veer toward the edge of he trail. Vu skied over the edge and landed in a pile of rocks. Vu suffered multiple injuries and sued the resort, alleging that his injuries were caused by his skiing over an unmarked artificial cliff at the slope’s edge created by the Defendants’ snowmaking and snow grooming practices. In his complaint, Vu alleged that the defendants were negligent for failing to keep the slope free from unsafe conditions, warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition, and erect a fence or boundary marker to prevent skiers from skiing over the edge and into the rocks below. Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff’s action was barred because skiing off trail is an inherent risk of downhill skiing.
The court decided that, under the Skier’s Responsibility Act, ski resorts have no duty to protect skiers from the inherent risks of the sport that are common, frequent, and expected. Losing control and skiing off the side of a trail is an inherent risk of skiing and inherent risks need not be natural conditions. Because plaintiff failed to identify any particular industry standard that defendant violated, defendants were properly granted summary judgment.
In Ludwig v. McDonald et al., the plaintiff filed suit claiming that she was struck by the defendant’s vehicle when she was exiting into the street from her parked car in Forest City, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleged that after she exited her vehicle, the defendant, who was traveling in the southbound lane, entered the northbound lane to avoid another vehicle and struck her as she was standing by her vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant was operating his vehicle in the scope and course of his employment with LTC Associates, a company in the business of operating a nursing home in Forest City. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged claims of negligence against the defendant and vicarious liability against his employer.
Following discovery, LTC Associates filed for summary judgment, alleging that the defendant personally owned the vehicle involved in the accident, and that the defendant was “on vacation” at the time the incident occurred, and therefore LTC was not vicariously liable. In support of its motion, LTC cited to the defendant’s time off request form that he submitted to request off on the date of the incident. LTC also cited to testimony by the defendant stating that he was on vacation on the date of the accident; however, he did go to work earlier in the afternoon to drop some items off. Further, the defendant’s written time card confirmed that he did take time off on the date of the accident, as he was fixing his porch. Based on those facts, the trial court found that the defendant was not working in the scope of his employment on that date, and granted summary judgment in favor of LTC.
In affirming the trial court’s order, the Superior Court stated that there was no dispute as to employee-employer relationship between the defendant and LTC. However, the Court found no genuine issue of material fact establishing whether the defendant was working on the date of the accident. The Court found that defendant was using his vacation time and was not working, despite the fact that he did stop by his place of employment on that date to drop off something and pick up his tools. The fact that he was driving home from his place of employment when the accident occurred did not place his actions within the scope of his employment, as he freely chose to travel to his place of employment in his personal vehicle to pick something up. He was not exercising the business of LTC at the time, and there was no evidence to show that LTC had any actual or potential control over the defendant’s actions.
Therefore, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of LTC was affirmed by the Superior Court.
Thanks to Alexandra Perry for her contribution to this post.
Don’t forget about John Doe when appealing trial court orders holds Pennsylvania Superior Court. In William Massaro v. Tincher Contracting, LLC, Kenneth E. Tincher II, & John Does 1-10, William Massaro (“Massaro”) sued Kenneth Tincher and his contracting company, Tincher Contracting, LLC (together, “Tincher”) for breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, and unfair trade practices relative to the build of Massaro’s home. Tincher successfully moved for summary judgment on all counts at the close of discovery, and an order was entered dismissing Tincher, but not the John Doe defendants, from the case. Massaro appealed the trial court’s order.
However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the appeal. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have jurisdiction over only final orders. It is established in the Commonwealth that final orders are those judgments that dispose of all claims and all parties. If any claim remains unresolved even after a judgment, then the order is not final, and it cannot be appealed. Here, the grant of summary judgment, the Court concluded, did not resolve the case as between Massaro and the John Doe defendants and, thus, was not final.
Thus, while John Doe defendants are easy to overlook, this case shows that they should not be whenever an attorney is assessing appellate court jurisdiction.
Thanks to Robert Turchick for his contribution to this post. Please email Colleen Hayes with any questions.
Is the Independent Medical Exam Landscape about to Change in Pennsylvania?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted the Third Circuit’s petition for certification of a question of law that has puzzled insurers and their attorneys. The issue is whether an insurer can mandate that claimants undergo an unlimited number of medical exams by a doctor of the carrier’s choosing — without a court order — before they can receive first-party medical benefits.
Insurance companies such as Allstate have been including contractual provisions in their motor vehicle insurance policies that requires insured to submit to independent medical examinations by a physician selected by the insurer, “when and as often as the insurer may reasonably require,” as a condition precedent to the payment of benefits. The problem is that these provisions may conflict with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFLR”), 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796(a), which gives courts the authority to order such examinations.
In Sayles v. Allstate, U.S. District Judge A. Richard Caputo of the Middle District ruled that Allstate’s policy provision conflicted with the state MVFLR because the plain language of Section 1796 prohibits precisely this type of provision. The plaintiff in Sayles argued that Allstate violated the MVFLR because it never petitioned the court to compel the independent medical exam. Allstate argued that the MVFRL does not mandate a court order and it only suggests when a court may order a person to submit to an IME. But there is no prohibition in the MVFLR that requires court intervention before an insurer requests medical examinations before paying 1st party benefits.
Once the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules on this question of law, both auto insurers and insurance attorneys will know how to proceed with respect to independent medical examinations, and whether court intervention will be necessary in advance of every such examination.
American Southern Insurance Company, Inc. was victorious recently when its summary judgment decision regarding a contractual indemnification dispute was upheld on appeal. In American Southern Ins. Co. v. James A. Halbert , et al., PA Superior Court, No. 504 MDA 2018, the Pennsyvlania Superior Court upheld the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of American Southern.
The underlying case involved a performance surety bond for public improvement in North Cornwall Township, PA. Back in 2006, American Southern had entered into an indemnity agreement with the Halbert family (on behalf of the Oaklea Corporation) wherein the Halberts agreed to indemnify American Southern from any claim or liability arising from the issuance of a performance bond. Subsequently, American Southern issued a performance bond in favor of North Cornwall Township to secure completion of improvements for local development by the Oaklea Corporation. In July 2016, the Township informed American Southern that Oaklea refused to respond or perform certain improvements that were demanded by the Township. The Township demanded compensation from American Southern, who in turn, demanded indemnification from the Halberts. The Halberts responded that the improvements demanded by the Township were unnecessary.
In October 2017, American Southern moved for summary judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that American Southern was entitled to indemnification against the Halberts, as a matter of law. In response, the Halberts cited their Answer and defense that the improvements were unnecessary and also argued that the indemnification agreement was an unconscionable contract of adhesion. The trial court concluded that Halbert failed to show that the improvements were unnecessary and that the agreement was not a contract of adhesion. The Halberts appealed.
On appeal, the Superior Court explained that the Pennsylvania rules governing summary judgment explicitly prohibit a non-moving party from merely relying on the allegations or denials of the pleadings, thus rendering the Halberts’ position deficient. The Halberts conceded that an operative provision of the indemnification agreement granted American Southern the exclusive right to determine whether claims such as the ones brought by the Township should be settled or defended; thereby nullifying Halberts’ repeated defense that the demanded improvements were not necessary. Furthermore, while the court entertained the Halberts affirmative defense that the indemnification agreement was a contract of adhesion, it concluded that the Halberts failed to cite to any evidence detailing the circumstances that would support their assertion that the contract was, in fact, a contract of adhesion.
Ultimately, the Superior Court denied the Halberts appeal and affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of American Southern, emphasizing the Halberts’ failure to cite evidence of record that would support their claims. Thanks to Greg Herrold for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
On January 24, 2019, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed an entry of summary judgment in favor of Turkey Hill Minit Markets, the Kroger Co., and D670 Kroger C Stres/Turkey Hill/Minit Mr’s (Collectively “Appellees”) in Brock v. Turkey Hill Minit Markets. The case stems from a slip and fall, when plaintiff Rebecca Brock was walking toward the entrance of the Store when slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot. However, whether the slipping hazard was man-made or made naturally became a point of contention.
The “Hills and Ridges Doctrine” precludes liability “where the accident occurred at a time when general slippery conditions prevailed in the community as a result of recent precipitation.” However, the hills and ridges doctrine can only be applied in cases where the snow and ice complained of are the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a snowfall. Therefore, on appeal, Appellant attempted to argue that the accumulation of ice in the parking lot was due to employees of the Appellees plowing and salting the parking lot.
The defendant-appellees produced an expert report, which cited that the snow/ice was the result of natural accumulation — and this report was unopposed by the plaintiff-appellant. As such, the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Still, the underlying argument in this case is a reminder that a court reading the phrase “natural accumulation” very narrowly could pose problems for defense counsel. Thanks to Garrett Gittler for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.

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The West Virginia Legislature recently amended the Medical Professional Liability Act, W.Va. Code 55-7B-1, et seq. (“MPLA”) through Senate Bill 6. These amendments accomplished several things including broadening the statutory definitions of “health care provider” and “health care” to encompass a wider range of health care professionals, health care related activities, and provide MPLA protections to entities related to health care providers. Statutory prerequisites for expert testimony were also strengthened. Senate Bill 6 was, at least in part, the Legislature’s response to a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia which narrowly interpreted the MPLA, creating a class of claims against health care providers falling outside the MPLA, most notably Manor Care v. Douglas. In Manor Care, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict apportioning an award against a nursing home between “ordinary” and “medical” negligence, and then applying the MPLA only to the portion for “medical” negligence. Below is a summary of a few of the changes to the MPLA occasioned by Senate Bill 6.
Senate Bill 6 also amended section 55-7B-2(g) by adding pharmacists and certified nursing assistants to the definition of “health care provider.” It also adds “any person supervised by or acting under the direction of a licensed professional in a health care facility” in an effort to ensure that persons who carry out orders are subject to the MPLA.
These changes expand (and are intended to expand) the definition of health care and medical professional liability to ensure the MPLA applies to services typically provided to patients in hospitals and nursing homes as part of the overall plan of care, but which could be considered “ordinary” negligence under Manor Care v. Douglas. In Manor Care, the plaintiffs’ claims included understaffing and failure to provide adequate nutrition and hydration. Lawyers for the Douglas family argued these services were not “health care” but rather “ordinary negligence.” They argued that there was evidence as to how non-healthcare decisions like staffing and budgets affected Ms. Douglas’s care. The jury was then allowed to apportion by percentage between “medical” and “ordinary” negligence, with the MPLA applying only to the percentage of the award of noneconomic loss that was “medical” negligence.
(f) "Health care facility" means any clinic, hospital, nursing home or assisted living facility, including personal care home, residential care community and residential board and care home, or behavioral health care facility or comprehensive community mental health/mental retardation center, in and licensed by the State of West Virginia and any state-operated institution or clinic providing health care and any related entity to the health care facility.
These changes are important to nursing homes, which have individual buildings or facilities which are generally owned by parent entities, and have certain services provided by separate corporations, such as budgeting and management services. These changes can also be important to hospitals as they will ensure the MPLA applies to related entities in a hospital system, or which are designed to provide services to several hospitals, and more particularly to entities set up to employ physicians. The changes reflect the evolving way of providing health care services and provide the MPLA is applicable.
Senate Bill 6 also created new rebuttable presumptions (§55-7B-7a)against the introduction of certain information “unless it applies specifically to the injured person or it involves substantially similar conduct that occurred within one year of the particular incident involved….” This section is intended to stop the introduction of state and federal investigative reports, disciplinary actions, accreditation reports or assessment of penalties unless they apply to the injured person or substantially similar conduct within one year of the incident involved. It prohibits the introduction of evidence about staffing levels if state staffing requirements are met. Finally, even if the evidence satisfies these provisions, it may only be admitted if there is a final order which is otherwise admissible under the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.
Senate Bill 6 is an extremely important bill, particularly for hospitals and long-term care facilities and requires close examination. How it will be interpreted and whether all of the changes will pass constitutional muster in the courts remains to be seen.
On June 5, 2013, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a new opinion which expands the power of the West Virginia Attorney General and in so doing overruled more than thirty years of precedent. This case is very significant to any health care entity facing potential actions by the West Virginia Attorney General because it signals that he has more power to institute actions than under prior law.
State ex rel Discover Financial v. Nibert held the West Virginia Attorney General has common law powers, which include the power to retain and pay private outside counsel. In a nutshell, the Court overruled a thirty year old case, Manchin v. Browning, 170 W. Va. 779, 296 S.E.2d 909 (1982), where it held the Attorney General had only those powers specifically prescribed by statute. Thus, even though the Court in State ex rel Discover Financial found there was no statutory authority for the Attorney General to retain private counsel, it held the retention was proper because of the Attorney General’s common law powers. The Court also found no statutory prohibition against the Attorney General retaining and paying counsel, and refused to limit payments.
The Court concluded “[i]n the final analysis, the authority of the Office of Attorney General ‘comes from three sources–the constitution of this state; the legislature; and the common law, from which emanates some of its so-called inherent power.’ State ex rel. McGraw v. Telecheck Servs., Inc., 213 W. Va. 438, 443, 582 S.E.2d 885, 890 (2003).” Thus, the Attorney General, according to the Court, has common law power to retain counsel.
Insofar as W. Va. Code § 5-3-3 does not expressly prohibit the Attorney General from making alternative fee arrangements with special assistant attorneys general, we now hold that the Attorney General has common law authority to provide for compensation to be paid to special assistant attorneys general through a court-approved award of attorney’s fees taken directly from the losing opponent in the litigation.
However, we wish to make clear that we are not addressing the appropriateness of awarding attorney’s fees to special assistant attorneys general directly from any actual monetary judgment award to the State because such a contingent fee agreement is not at issue in this case. We also note that the Legislature attempted to address the issue of contingency fee payment to special assistant attorneys general during the 2013 Regular Session of the West Virginia Legislature, but such proposals failed to be approved.
The recognition of common law powers in the Attorney General’s office is significant, and will hamper arguments that attack whether the Attorney General has statutory authority to bring actions, etc. Common law powers will undoubtedly be used to shore up arguments that the Attorney General can act when allowed by statute, but perhaps more significantly, when not prohibited by statute. Like Pandora, this opinion sets the Attorney General free from the Manchin v. Browning box and may have implications far beyond whether the Attorney General can retain counsel. It opens the door for litigation by the Attorney General even absent statutory authority. West Virginia is not alone, as there was a similar recent ruling in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in Merck Sharp and Dome v. Conway, here.
If a covered entity receives financial remuneration in exchange for disclosing PHI to a third party, that transaction is a sale of PHI.
The original HIPAA Privacy Rule required covered entities to obtain an individual’s authorization before using or disclosing the individual’s PHI for marketing purposes (defined as making communications about a product or service to encourage individuals to purchase or use the product or service). However, there were several broad exceptions to the definition of marketing, including exceptions for communications that describe a product or service provided by the covered entity or that recommend alternative treatments. The effect was that covered entities could use PHI for various purposes that would seem, from a plain-language perspective, to be marketing.
The Final Rule modifies the definition of marketing as required by Section 13406(a) of the Health Information Technology for Economic Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. Marketing now includes any treatment or health care operations communications to individuals about health-related products or services, if the covered entity or its business associate (BA) receives financial remuneration in exchange for making the communication from or on behalf of the third party whose product or service is being described.
The Final Rule defines financial remuneration as “direct or indirect payment from or on behalf of a third party whose product or service is being described.” The commentary to the Final Rule verifies that non-financial benefits, such as in-kind benefits provided to a covered entity in exchange for making a communication about a product or service, are not financial remuneration.
HHS retains existing exceptions to the authorization requirement for communications that are made face-to-face by the covered entity to the individual and for promotional gifts of nominal value provided by the covered entity. There are other limited exceptions, including for communications related to currently prescribed drugs (e.g., refill reminders, communications about generic substitutes or instructions for taking the drug), as long as any remuneration is reasonably related to the covered entity’s cost of making the communications.
In sum, authorization is required for any covered entity or BA receiving financial remuneration from a third party in exchange for making a communication about a product or service, with the exceptions noted above. The authorization must disclose that remuneration is received from a third party and state that the individual may revoke the authorization at any time.
The final rule prohibits the sale of PHI absent an individual’s written authorization. The authorization must state that the disclosure will result in remuneration to the covered entity.
For any other purposes permitted by and in accordance with the applicable requirements of the Privacy Rule, where the only remuneration received by the covered entity is a reasonable, cost-based fee to cover the cost to prepare and transmit the PHI for such purpose, or a fee otherwise expressly permitted by other law.
It is recommended that covered entities review and update their Notices of Privacy Practices to advise individuals about changes imposed by the Final Rule, including the prohibition on the sale of PHI without express written authorization.
 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
 78 Fed. Reg. at 5593.
 78 Fed. Reg. at 5596.
 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii), 164.508(a)(4).
 78 Fed. Reg. 5607 (Jan. 25, 2013).

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