HARRY B. SMITH, Auditor of Marion County, Indiana, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF INDIANA, on the Relation of Martha and Benjamin Lewis.
Argued: October 22, 23, 1903.
This was a petition filed in the circuit court of Marion county by the state, upon the relation of Martha and Benjamin Lewis, against the auditor of Marion county, for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant, in his official capacity, to allow an exemption of a mortgage of $500 upon a lot of land in Indianapolis owned by the relators, and that the same be deducted from the value of such lot.
The petition was based upon an act passed by the general assembly March 4, 1899, the first section of which declares: 'That any person being the owner of real estate liable for taxation within the state of Indiana, and being indebted in any sum, secured by mortgage upon real estate, may have the amount of such mortgage indebtedness, not exceeding $700, existing and unpaid upon the first day of April of any year, deducted from the assessed valuation of mortgage premises for that year, and the amount of such valuation remaining after such deduction shall have been nade shall form the basis for assessment and taxation for said real estate for said year.' Horner's Anno. Stat. (Ind.) § 6272a.
An alternative writ having been issued, defendant interposed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the court, and the relators declining to plead further, judgment was entered against them.
Messrs. Horace E. Smith and Roscoe O. Hawkins for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Cassius C. Hadley, L. G. Rothschild, and William C. Geake for defendant in error.
The constitutionality of the exemption law of Indiana was apparently the only question raised by the parties. It was argued elaborately, both in the circuit and supreme court of the state, and was finally affirmed by a majority of the latter court. The power of the county auditor, who is charged by law with the duty of making the assessment, to refuse to allow the relators their exemption upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act, does not appear to have been raised in the state courts, and is not noticed in either opinion of the supreme court. In fact, the celerity of the proceedings and the admissions of counsel indicate that the suit was begun and carried on for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the law, and that the litigation was, at least, not an unfriendly one.
We have no doubt of the power of state courts to assume jurisdiction of the case if they chose to do so, although there are many authorities to the effect that a ministerial officer, charged by law with the duty of enforcing a certain statute, cannot refuse to perform his plain duty thereunder upon the ground that, in his opinion, it is repugnant to the Constitution.
It is but just to say, however, that the power of a publice officer to question the constitutionality of a statute as an excuse for refusing to enforce it has often been assumed, and sometimes directly decided, to exist. In any event, it is a purely local question, and seems to have been so treated by this court in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U. S. 97, 101, 30 L. ed. 588, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469.
Different considerations, however, apply to the jurisdiction of this court, which we have recently held can only be invoked by a party having a personal interest in the litigation. It follows that he cannot sue out a writ of error in behalf of third persons. Tyler v. Registration Court Judges, 179 U. S. 405, 45 L. ed. 252, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. ed. 70, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276, 45 L. ed. 527, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368; Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 301, 36 L. ed. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 645, 33 L. ed. 1062, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623. These authorities control the present case. It is evident that the auditor had no personal interest in the litigation. He had certain duties as a publice officer to perform. The performance of those duties was of no personal benefit to him. Their nonperformance was equally so. He neither gained nor lost anything by invoking the advice of the supreme court as to the proper action he should take. He was testing the constitutionality of the law purely in the interest of third persons, viz., the taxpayers, and in this particular the case is analogous to that of Caffrey v. Oklahoma, 177 U. S. 346, 44 L. ed. 799, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664. We think the interest of an appellant in this court should be a personal, and not an official, interest, and that the defendant, having sought the advice of the courts of his own state in his official capacity, should be content to abide by their decision.
It is true there seems to have been a personal judgment in form against the defendant for costs, the amount of which, however, has never been taxed, and when taxed and paid would probably be reimbursed to him. It was formerly held, under the practice which disqualified interested witnesses, that a liability for costs was sufficient to render a witness incompetent. 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 401, 402. But it seems to be well settled that even if the fact that costs are awarded against a party gives him an appealable interest, of which there appears to be considerable doubt (Travis v. Waters, 12 Johns. 500; Reid v. Vanderheyden, 5 Cow. 719, 736), it does not give him an appealable interest in the judgment upon the merits, but limits him to the mere question of costs. Studabaker v. Markley, 7 Ind. App. 368, 34 N. E. 606; Hone v. Van Schaick, 7 Paige, 221; Card v. Bird, 10 Paige, 426; Cuyler v. Moreland, 6 Paige, 273. If plaintiff in error objected to this judgment for costs, he might have moved to modify it in that particular. Not having done so, his appeal is presumptively from the judgment on the merits (American Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 104 Ind. 336, 342, 3 N. E. 892), and as his individual rights were not affected by such judgment, he is not entitled to an appeal.
The fact that the various statutes fixing the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States, and of this court, which, from the original judiciary act of 1789 1 Stat. at L. 73, chap. 20 have, where the amount involved was made the test of jurisdiction, uniformly used the words 'exclusive of costs,' would indicate, so far as the Federal courts are concerned, that a mere judgment for costs could not ordinarily be made the basis of an appeal to this court.
For the reasons above given the appellant did not have the requisite interest to maintain this appeal, and it is therefore dismissed.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White are of opinion that the plaintiff in error was entitled to prosecute the present writ, and that the court should determine the case upon its merits.


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The Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (“VFATA”) allows whistleblowers to file qui tam lawsuits for violations of state law. VFATA makes it unlawful for people to knowingly present false or fraudulent claims for payment with state funds, misappropriate state property, or knowingly conceal or avoid obligations to pay the state, along with other violations.A defendant found to have violated the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act may be liable for a civil penalty between $5,500 and $11,000, along with three times the amount of damages sustained by the Commonwealth due to the defendant’s conduct.
Should the Commonwealth intervene in the case, a whistleblower is entitled to receive between 15% – 25% of the proceeds of the action or settlement. If the Commonwealth does not intervene in the case, a whistleblower is entitled to receive between 25% – 30% of the proceeds of the action or settlement. If the court finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and initiated the action, that person will be dismissed from the civil action and will not receive any share of the proceeds of the action.
Generally a whistleblower (also known as a plaintiff or relator) must file a complaint within six years of the violations they are reporting.
The Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act also protects employees who report the fraudulent conduct from being retaliated against by their employer.
As amended through 2014, chapter 403.
This article may be cited as the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act.
“Attorney General” means the Attorney General of Virginia, the Chief Deputy, other deputies, counsels or assistant attorneys general employed by the Office of the Attorney General and designated by the Attorney General to act pursuant to this article.
“Claim” means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property, regardless of whether the Commonwealth has title to the money or property, that (i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the Commonwealth or (ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient (a) if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Commonwealth’s behalf or to advance a governmental program or interes t and (b) if the Commonwealth provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded or will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property that is requested or demanded. For purposes of this article, “claim” does not include requests or demands for money or property that the Commonwealth has paid to an individual as compensation for employment with the Commonwealth or as income subsidy with no restriction on that individual’s use of the money or property.
“Commonwealth” means the Commonwealth of Virginia, any agency of state government, and any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.
“Documentary material” means the original or any copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, chart, or other document, or data compilations stored in or accessible through computer or other information retrieval systems, together with instructions and all other materials necessary to use or interpret such data compilations, and any product of discovery.
“Employee” includes an employee or officer of the Commonwealth.
“Investigation” means any inquiry conducted by an investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in any violation of this article.
“Material” means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.
“Obligation” means an established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from (i) an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship; (ii) a fee-based or similar relationship; (iii) a statute or regulation; or (iv) the retention of any overpayment.
“Official use” means any use that is consistent with the law, regulations, and policies of the Commonwealth, including use in connection with (i) internal memoranda and reports of the Office of the Attorney General; (ii) communications between the Office of the Attorney General and a federal, state, or local government agency, or a contractor of a federal, state, or local government agency, undertaken in furtherance of an Office of the Attorney General investigation or prosecution of a case; (iii) interviews of any qui tam relator or other witness; (iv) oral examinations; (v) depositions; (vi) the preparation for and response to civil discovery requests; (vii) the introduction into the record of a case or proceeding; (viii) applications, motions, memoranda, and briefs submitted to a court or other tribunal; and (ix) communications with government investigators, auditors, consultants, experts, the counsel of other parties, arbitrators, and mediators, concerning an investigation, case, or proceeding.
“Person” includes any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, business or trust.
“Product of discovery” means (i) the original or duplicate of any deposition, interrogatory, document, thing, result of the inspection of land or other property, examination, or admission, which is obtained by any method of discovery in any judicial or administrative proceeding of an adversarial nature; (ii) any digest, analysis, selection, compilation, or derivation of any item listed in clause (i); and (iii) any index or other manner of access to any item listed in clause (i).
§ 8.01-216.3. False claims; civil penalty.
shall be liable to the Commonwealth for a civil penalty of not less than $5,500 and not more than $11,000, plus three times the amount of damages sustained by the Commonwealth.
A person violating this section shall be liable to the Commonwealth for reasonable attorney fees and costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalties or damages. All such fees and costs shall be paid to the Attorney General’s Office by the defendant and shall not be included in any damages or civil penalties recovered in a civil action based on a violation of this section.
B. If the court finds that (i) the person committing the violation of this section furnished officials of the Commonwealth responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information known to the person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information; (ii) such person fully cooperated with any Commonwealth investigation of such violation; (iii) at the time such person furnished the Commonwealth with the information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced with respect to such violation; and (iv) the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation, the court may assess not less than two times the amount of damages that the Commonwealth sustains because of the act of that person. A person violating this section shall also be liable to the Commonwealth for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
C. For purposes of this section, the terms “knowing” and “knowingly” mean that a person, with respect to information, (i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information and require no proof of specific intent to defraud.
D. This section shall not apply to claims, records or statements relating to state or local taxes.
§ 8.01-216.4. Attorney General; investigation, civil action.
The Attorney General shall investigate any violation of § 8.01-216.3. If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating § 8.01-216.3, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section.
§ 8.01-216.5. Civil actions filed by private persons; Commonwealth may intervene.
A. A person may bring a civil action for a violation of § 8.01-216.3 for the person and for the Commonwealth. The action shall be brought in the name of the Commonwealth. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
B. A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Commonwealth. The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 120 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Commonwealth may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 120 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.
C. The Commonwealth may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal. Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera. The defendant shall not be required to respond to any motion for judgment filed under this section until twenty-one days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon the defendant.
D. Before the expiration of the 120-day period or any extensions obtained under subsection C, the Commonwealth shall proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by the Commonwealth, or notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to prosecute the action.
E. When a person brings an action under this section, no person other than the Commonwealth may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.
§ 8.01-216.6. Rights of private plaintiff and Commonwealth.
A. If the Commonwealth proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action. Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to the limitations of this section.
B. The Commonwealth may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Commonwealth of the filing of the complaint and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the complaint.
C. The Commonwealth may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be held in camera. The Commonwealth may, for good cause shown, move the court for a partial lifting of the seal to facilitate the investigative process or settlement.
D. Upon a showing by the Commonwealth that unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would interfere with or unduly delay the Commonwealth’s prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose limitations on the person’s participation, such as (i)limiting the number of witnesses the person may call; (ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses; (iii) limiting the person’s cross-examination of witnesses; and (iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the litigation.
E. Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense, the court may limit the participation by the person in the litigation.
F. If the Commonwealth elects not to proceed with the action, the person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action. If the Commonwealth so requests, it shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts at the Commonwealth’s expense. When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Commonwealth to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
G. Whether or not the Commonwealth proceeds with the action, upon a showing by the Commonwealth that certain actions of discovery by the person initiating the action would interfere with the Commonwealth’s investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay such discovery for a period of not more than sixty days. Such a showing shall be conducted in camera. The court may extend the sixty-day period upon a further showing in camera that the Commonwealth has pursued the criminal or civil investigation or proceedings with reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in the civil action will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or proceedings.
H. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection B of § 8.01-216.5, the Commonwealth may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available to the Commonwealth, including any administrative proceeding to determine a civil money penalty. If any such alternate remedy is pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if the action had continued under this section. Any finding of fact or conclusion of law made in such other proceeding that has become final shall be conclusive on all parties to an action under this article. For purposes of this subsection, a finding or conclusion is final if it has been finally determined on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, if the time for filing an appeal with respect to the finding or conclusion has expired, or if the finding or conclusion is not subject to judicial review.
§ 8.01-216.7. Award to private plaintiff.
A. Except as hereinafter provided, if the Commonwealth proceeds with an action brought by a person under § 8.01-216.5, such person shall receive at least fifteen percent but not more than twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. Where the action is one that the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific information, other than information provided by the person bringing the action, relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a legislative, administrative, or Auditor of Public Accounts’ report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than ten percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation. Any payment to a person under this section shall be made from the proceeds of the award. Any such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
B. If the Commonwealth does not proceed with an action, the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount that the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages. The amount shall be not less than twenty-five percent and not more than thirty percent of the proceeds of the award or settlement and shall be paid out of the proceeds. Such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
C. Whether or not the Commonwealth proceeds with the action, if the court finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and initiated the violation of § 8.01-216.3 upon which the action was brought, or if the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal conduct arising from his role in the violation of § 8.01-216.3, that person shall be dismissed from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the action. Such dismissal shall not prejudice the right of the Commonwealth to continue the action.
D. If the Commonwealth does not proceed with the action and the person bringing the action conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
§ 8.01-216.8. Certain actions barred.
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under this article against any department, authority, board, bureau, commission, or agency of the Commonwealth, any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, a member of the General Assembly, a member of the judiciary, or an exempt official if the action is based on evidence or information known to the Commonwealth when the action was brought. For purposes of this section, “exempt official” means the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General and the directors or members of any department, authority, board, bureau, commission or agency of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.
The court shall dismiss an action or claim under § 8.01-216.5 unless opposed by the Commonwealth if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing in which the Commonwealth or its agent is a party, in a Virginia legislative, administrative, or Auditor of Public Accounts’ report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. For purposes of this section, “original source” means an individual (i) who either prior to a public disclosure has voluntarily disclosed to the Commonwealth the information on which the allegations or transactions in a claim are based or (ii) who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Commonwealth before filing an action under this article.
§ 8.01-216.9. Procedure; statute of limitations.
A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a trial or hearing conducted under this article may be served at any place in the Commonwealth.
A civil action under § 8.01-216.4 or 8.01-216.5 may not be brought (i) more than six years after the date on which the violation is committed or (ii) more than three years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the Commonwealth charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in that event no more than ten years after the date on which the violation is committed, whichever occurs last.
If the Commonwealth elects to intervene and proceed with an action brought under § 8.01-216.5, the Commonwealth may file its own complaint or amend the complaint of a person who has brought an action under § 8.01-216.5 to clarify or add detail to any claim in which the Commonwealth is intervening and to add any additional claim for which the Commonwealth contends it is entitled to relief. Any complaint filed by the Commonwealth pursuant to this paragraph shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of the person who originally brought the action, to the extent that the claim of the Commonwealth arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in such person’s complaint.
In any action brought under § 8.01-216.4 or 8.01-216.5, the Commonwealth shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a final judgment rendered in favor of the Commonwealth in any criminal proceeding charging fraud or false statements, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential elements of the offense in any action that involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding and which is brought under § 8.01-216.4 or 8.01-216.5.
§ 8.01-216.10. Civil investigative demands; issuance.
A. Whenever the Attorney General or his designee has reason to believe that any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or information relevant to a false claims law investigation, the Attorney General or his designee may, before commencing a civil proceeding or making an election under this article, issue in writing and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person (i) to produce such documentary material for inspection and copying, (ii) to answer in writing written interrogatories with respect to such documentary material or information, (iii) to give oral testimony concerning such documentary material or information, or (iv) to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.
B. Whenever a civil investigative demand is an express demand for any product of discovery, the Attorney General shall cause to be served, in any manner authorized by this article, a copy of such demand upon the person from whom the discovery was obtained and shall notify the person to whom such demand is issued of the date on which such copy was served.
C. Any information obtained by the Attorney General or his designee pursuant to this section may be shared with any qui tam relator and any state or federal governmental entity if the Attorney General or his designee determines that such information is necessary as part of any false claims investigation.
§ 8.01-216.11. Civil investigative demand; contents and deadlines.
Each civil investigative demand issued under this article shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of a false claims law that is under investigation, and the applicable provision of law alleged to be violated.
If such demand is for the production of documentary material, the demand shall (i) describe each class of documentary material to be produced with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified; (ii) prescribe a return date for each such class that will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying; and (iii) identify the false claims law investigator to whom such material shall be made available.
If such demand is for answers to written interrogatories, the demand shall (i) set forth with specificity the written interrogatories to be answered; (ii) prescribe dates at which time answers to written interrogatories shall be submitted; and (iii) identify the false claims law investigator to whom such answers shall be submitted.
If such demand is for the giving of oral testimony, the demand shall (i) prescribe a date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall be commenced; (ii) identify a false claims law investigator who shall conduct the examination and the custodian to whom the transcript of such examination shall be submitted; (iii) specify that such attendance and testimony are necessary to the conduct of the investigation; (iv) notify the person receiving the demand of the right to be accompanied by an attorney and any other representative; and (v) describe the general purpose for which the demand is being issued and the general nature of the testimony, including the primary areas of inquiry that will be taken pursuant to the demand.
Any civil investigative demand that is an express demand for any product of discovery shall not be returned or returnable until twenty-one days after a copy of such demand has been served upon the person from whom the discovery was obtained.
The date prescribed for the commencement of oral testimony pursuant to a civil investigative demand issued under this article shall be a date that is not less than seven days after the date on which the demand is received, unless the Attorney General determines that exceptional circumstances are present that warrant the commencement of such testimony within a lesser period of time.
The Attorney General shall not authorize the issuance of more than one civil investigative demand for oral testimony by the same person unless the person requests otherwise or unless the Attorney General, after investigation, notifies that person in writing that an additional demand for oral testimony is necessary.
§ 8.01-216.12. Civil investigative demands; protected material or information.
A civil investigative demand issued under this article shall not require the production of any documentary material, the submission of any answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of any oral testimony if such material, answers, or testimony would be protected from disclosure under (i) the standards applicable to subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum issued by a court of this Commonwealth to aid in a grand jury investigation or (ii) the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, to the extent that the application of such standards to any such demand is appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purposes of this article.
Any such demand that is an express demand for any product of discovery supersedes any inconsistent order, rule, or provision of law, other than this section, preventing or restraining disclosure of such product of discovery to any person. Disclosure of any product of discovery pursuant to any such express demand does not constitute a waiver of any right or privilege that the person making such disclosure may be entitled to invoke to resist discovery of trial preparation materials.
§ 8.01-216.13. Civil investigative demands; service and jurisdiction.
Any civil investigative demand issued under this article may be served by an investigator, or by any person authorized to serve process on individuals in the Commonwealth.
Any such demand or any petition filed under this article may be served upon any person who is not found within Virginia in such manner as the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the Code of Virginia prescribe for service of process outside Virginia. To the extent that the courts of this Commonwealth can assert jurisdiction over any such person consistent with due process, the courts of this Commonwealth shall have the same jurisdiction to take any action respecting compliance with the provisions of this article by any such person that the court would have if such person were personally within the jurisdiction of the court.
Service of any civil investigative demand issued under this article or of any petition filed under this article may be made upon a partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity by (i) delivering an executed copy of such demand or petition to any partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent of the partnership, corporation, association, or entity, or to any agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of such partnership, corporation, association, or entity; (ii) delivering an executed copy of such demand or petition to the principal office or place of business of the partnership, corporation, association, or entity; or (iii) depositing an executed copy of such demand or petition in the United States mail by registered or certified mail, with a return receipt requested, addressed to such partnership, corporation, association, or entity at its principal office or place of business.
Service of any such demand or petition may be made upon any natural person by (i) delivering an executed copy of such demand or petition to the person, or (ii) depositing an executed copy of such demand or petition in the United States mail by registered or certified mail, with a return receipt requested, addressed to the person at the person’s residence or principal office or place of business.
A verified return by the individual serving any civil investigative demand issued under this article or any petition filed under this article setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of service. In the case of service by registered or certified mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such demand.
§ 8.01-216.14. Civil investigative demands; documentary material.
The production of documentary material in response to a civil investigative demand served under this article shall be made under a sworn certificate, in such form as the demand designates, by (i) in the case of a natural person, the person to whom the demand is directed, or (ii) in the case of a person other than a natural person, a person having knowledge of the facts and circumstances relating to such production and authorized to act on behalf of such person. The certificate shall state that all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has been produced and made available to the investigator identified in the demand.
Any person upon whom any civil investigative demand for the production of documentary material has been served shall make such material available for inspection and copying to the investigator identified in such demand at the principal place of business of such person, or at such other place as the investigator and the person thereafter may agree and prescribe in writing, or as the court may direct. Such material shall be made available on the return date specified in such demand, or on such later date as the investigator may prescribe in writing. Such person may, upon written agreement between the person and the investigator, substitute copies for originals of all or any part of such material.
§ 8.01-216.15. Civil investigative demands; interrogatories.
Each inquiry in a civil investigative demand served under this article shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath and shall be submitted under a sworn certificate, in such form as the demand designates, by (i) in the case of a natural person, the person to whom the demand is directed, or (ii) in the case of a person other than a natural person, the person or persons responsible for answering each inquiry. If any inquiry is objected to, the reasons for the objection shall be stated in the certificate instead of an answer. The certificate shall state that all information required by the demand and in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the person to whom the demand is directed has been submitted. To the extent that any information is not furnished, the information shall be identified and reasons set forth with particularity regarding the reasons why the information was not furnished.
§ 8.01-216.16. Civil investigative demands; oral examinations.
A. The examination of any person pursuant to a civil investigative demand for oral testimony served under this article shall be taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this Commonwealth or of the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall, personally or by someone acting under the direction of the officer and in the officer’s presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically and shall be transcribed. When the testimony is fully transcribed, the officer before whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the testimony to the Attorney General. This section shall not preclude the taking of testimony by any means authorized by and in a manner consistent with the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
B. The investigator conducting the examination shall exclude from the place where the examination is held all persons except the person giving the testimony, the attorney for and any other representative of the person giving the testimony, the attorney for the Commonwealth, any person who may be agreed upon by the attorney for the Commonwealth and the person giving the testimony, the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any court reporter taking such testimony.
C. The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a civil investigative demand served under this article shall be taken in the county or city within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business or in such other place as may be agreed upon by the investigator conducting the examination and such person.
D. When the testimony is fully transcribed, the investigator or the officer before whom the testimony is taken shall afford the witness, who may be accompanied by counsel, a reasonable opportunity to examine and read the transcript, unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness. Any changes in form or substance that the witness desires to make shall be entered and identified upon the transcript by the officer or the investigator, with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making such changes. The transcript shall then be signed by the witness, unless the witness in writing waives the signing, is ill, cannot be found, or refuses to sign. If the transcript is not signed by the witness within thirty days after being afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine it, the officer or the investigator shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver, illness, absence of the witness, or the refusal to sign, together with the reasons, if any, given therefor.
E. The officer before whom the testimony is taken shall certify on the transcript that the witness was sworn by the officer and that the transcript is a true record of the testimony given by the witness, and the officer or investigator shall promptly deliver the transcript, or send the transcript by registered or certified mail, to the Attorney General.
F. Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the investigator shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the witness only, except that the Attorney General may, for good cause, limit such witness to inspection of the official transcript of the witness’ testimony.
G. Any person compelled to appear for oral testimony under a civil investigative demand may be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, with respect to any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the record the reason for the objection. An objection may be made, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on the grounds of any constitutional or other legal right or privilege. Such person may not otherwise object to or refuse to answer any question, and may not directly or through counsel otherwise interrupt the oral examination. If such person refuses to answer any question, a petition may be filed in the circuit court for an order compelling such person to answer such question. If such person refuses to answer any question on the grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person may be compelled in accordance with applicable law.
H. Any person appearing for oral testimony under a civil investigative demand issued under this article shall be entitled to the same fees and allowances paid to witnesses in the circuit court.
§ 8.01-216.17. Civil investigative demands; custodian of documents; answers.
A. The Attorney General shall serve as custodian of documentary material, answers to interrogatories, and transcripts of oral testimony received under this article.
B. An investigator who receives any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony under this section shall transmit them to the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall take physical possession of such material, answers, or transcripts and shall be responsible for the use made of them and for the return of documentary material.
C. The Attorney General may cause the preparation of such copies of documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony as may be required for official use by any investigator, or other officer or employee of the Attorney General or employee of the Department of State Police. Such material, answers, and transcripts may be used by any authorized investigator or other officer or employee in connection with the taking of oral testimony under this article.
D. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony, or copies thereof, while in the possession of the Attorney General, shall be available for examination by any individual other than an investigator or other officer or employee of the Attorney General or employee of the Department of State Police authorized by the Attorney General. The prohibition on the availability of material, answers, or transcripts shall not apply if consent is given by the person who produced such material, answers, or transcripts, or, in the case of any product of discovery produced pursuant to an express demand for such material, consent is given by the person from whom the discovery was obtained. Nothing in this subsection is intended to prevent disclosure to the General Assembly, including any committee or subcommittee of the General Assembly, or to any other state agency for use by such agency in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities.
E. While in the possession of the Attorney General and under such reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, (i) documentary material and answers to interrogatories shall be available for examination by the person who produced such material or answers, or by a representative of that person authorized by that person to examine such material and answers, and (ii) transcripts of oral testimony shall be available for examination by the person who produced such testimony or by a representative of that person authorized by that person to examine such transcripts.
F. Any attorney employed by the Office of the Attorney General designated to appear before any court, grand jury, or state agency in any case or proceeding may use any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony in connection with any such case or proceeding as such attorney determines to be required. Upon the completion of any such case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any such material, answers, or transcripts so delivered that have not passed into the control of the court, grand jury, or agency through introduction into the record of such case or proceeding.
G. If any documentary material has been produced by any person in the course of any investigation pursuant to a civil investigative demand under this article, and (i) any case or proceeding before the court or grand jury arising out of such investigation, or any proceeding before any state agency involving such material, has been completed, or (ii) no case or proceeding in which such material may be used has been commenced within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis of all documentary material and other information assembled in the course of such investigation, the Attorney General shall, upon written request of the person who produced such material, return to such person any material, other than copies furnished to the investigator, or made for the Attorney General that has not passed into the control of any court, grand jury, or agency through introduction into the record of such case or proceeding.
§ 8.01-216.18. Civil investigative demands; judicial proceedings for noncompliance.
A. Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand issued under this article, or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any material requested in such demand cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender the material, the Attorney General may file in the appropriate circuit court for the county or city in which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person a petition for a court order for the enforcement of the civil investigative demand.
B. Any person who has received a civil investigative demand issued under this article may file, in the circuit court of any county or city within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon the investigator identified in such demand a petition for an order of the court to modify or set aside the demand. In the case of a petition addressed to an express demand for any product of discovery, a petition to modify or set aside such demand may be brought only in the circuit court of the county or city in which the proceeding in which such discovery was obtained is or was last pending. Any petition under this section shall be filed (i) within twenty-one days after the date of service of the civil investigative demand, or at any time before the return date specified in the demand, whichever date is earlier, or (ii) within such longer period as may be prescribed in writing by any investigator identified in the demand.
C. The petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking relief, and may be based upon any failure of the demand to comply with the provisions of this article or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person. During the pendency of the petition in the court, the court may stay, as it deems proper, the running of the time allowed for compliance with the demand, in whole or in part, except that the person filing the petition shall comply with any portions of the demand not sought to be modified or set aside.
D. In the case of any civil investigative demand issued under this article that is an express demand for any product of discovery, the person from whom such discovery was obtained may file, in the circuit court of the county or city in which the proceeding in which such discovery was obtained is or was last pending, and serve upon any investigator identified in the demand and upon the recipient of the demand a petition for a court order to modify or set aside those portions of the demand requiring production of any such product of discovery. Any petition under this subsection shall be filed (i) within twenty-one days after the date of service of the civil investigative demand or at any time before the return date specified in the demand, whichever date is earlier, or (ii) within such longer period as may be prescribed in writing by any investigator identified in the demand.
E. The petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking relief and may be based upon any failure of the demand from which relief is sought to comply with the provisions of this article, or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of the petitioner. During the pendency of the petition, the court may stay, as it deems proper, compliance with the demand and the running of the time allowed for compliance with the demand.
F. At any time during which any custodian is in custody or control of any documentary material or answers to interrogatories produced, or transcripts of oral testimony given by any person in compliance with any civil investigative demand issued under this article, such person, and in the case of an express demand for any product of discovery, the person from whom such discovery was obtained, may file, in the circuit court of the county or city within which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for a court order to require the performance by the custodian of any duty imposed upon the custodian by this section. Whenever any petition is filed in any circuit court under this section, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such order or orders as may be required to carry out the provisions of this section. Any final order so entered shall be subject to appeal in the same manner as appeals of other final orders in civil matters. Any disobedience of any final order entered under this section by any court shall be punished as contempt of the court.
G. Any documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony provided under any civil investigative demand issued under this article shall be exempt from disclosure under the Virginia Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.).
§ 8.01-216.19. Application of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall apply to all proceedings under this article, except when those Rules are inconsistent with this article.
The information provided above is not legal advice, and should not be construed as legal advice. The page is intended to help individuals better understand Federal and State False Claims Acts. Although we attempt to keep the information on our site as current as possible, you should always check for recent amendments to the laws.

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Ph. D. Applied Mathematics: Department of Applied Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU) Varanasi.
M. Sc. Mathematics: Department of Mathematics, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi.
Visiting Faculty as IUSSTF Research Fellow: Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Illinois, USA: Sept. 30/2012 - July 17/ 2013 (Under INDO-US Science and Technology Forum).
Visiting Research Fellow: Department of Mathematical Informatics, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (Nov/2010 - Dec/2010).
IASc-INSA-NASI Summer Research Fellow: Physics & Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India (May/2010 - July/2010).
Assistant Professor in Department of Mathematical Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU) Varanasi: June 10, 2014-July 18, 2017.
Assistant Professor in Mathematics, Indian Institute of Information Technology Design & Manufacturing Jabalpur, Jabalpur: July 09, 2009-June 09, 2014.
Lecturer in Department of Mathematics at Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani (BITS-Pilani)-Goa Campus, Goa from: Feb 2009 to June 2009.
S. Yadav, R. K. Pandey, A. K. Shukla, Numerical approximations of Atangana–Baleanu Caputo derivative and its application , Chaos Solitons & Fractals, 118 (2019) 58-64.
Kamlesh Kumar, R. K. Pandey, Shiva Sharma, Comparative study of three numerical schemes for fractional integro-differential equations, Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 315 (2017), 287-302.
R. K. Pandey, Shiva Sharma and Kamlesh Kumar, Collocation method for generalized Abel’s integral equations, Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 302 (2016), 118-128.
R. K. Pandey, S. Suman, K. K. Singh, O. P. Singh, An approximate method for Abel inversion using Chebyshev polynomials, Applied Mathematics & Computation, 237(2014), 120-132.
R. K. Pandey, N. Kumar, A. Bhardwaj and G. Dutta, Solution of Lane-Emden type equations using Legendre operational matrix of differentiation, Applied Mathematics and Computation,218 (14) (2012) 7629-7637.
R. K. Pandey, N. Kumar, Solution of Lane-Emden type equations using Bernstein Operational matrix of Differentiation, New Astronomy 17 (2012) 303-308.
R. K. Pandey and B. N. Mandal, Numerical solution of a system of generalized Abel integral equations using Bernstein polynomials, Journal of Advanced Research in Scientific Computing 2 (2) (2010) 44-53.
D. Singh, R. K. Mishra, V. K. Singh, R. K. Pandey, Bad Data pre-filter for State Estimation, Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 32 (2010) 1165-1174.
V. K. Singh, R. K. Pandey, S. Singh, A Stable Algorithm for Hankel transform using hybrid of Block pulse and Legendre polynomials, Computer Physics Communications 181 (2010) 1-10.
O. P. Singh,V. K. Singh, R. K. Pandey, New stable numerical inversion of Abel’s integral equation using almost Bernstein operational matrix, Journal of Quantitative Spectroscopy and Radiative Transfer 111 (2010) 245-252.
R.K.Pandey, O. P. Singh, V. K. Singh, Numerical solution of system of Volterra integral equations using Bernstein polynomials, International Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Numerical Simulation 10 (7) (2009) 691-695.
O. P. Singh, V. K. Singh, R.K.Pandey, A New Stable Algorithm for Abel inversion Using Bernstein Polynomials, International Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Numerical Simulation 10 (5) (2009) 681-685.
O. P. Singh, R.K.Pandey, V. K. Singh, An analytic algorithm for Lane –Emden equations arising in Astrophysics using MHAM, Computer Physics Communications 180 (2009) 1116-1124.
R. K. Pandey, V. K. Singh, O. P. Singh, An improved method for computing Hankel transform, Journal of The Franklin Institute 346 (2)(2009) 102-111.
R. K. Pandey, O. P. Singh, V.K. Singh, Efficient algorithms to solve singular integral equations of Abel type, Computer & Mathematics with Applications 57(4) (2009) 664- 676.
V. K. Singh, O. P. Singh, R. K. Pandey, Efficient algorithms to compute Hankel transform using wavelets, Computer Physics Communications 179 (2008) 812-818.
V. K. Singh, R. K. Pandey, O. P. Singh, New stable numerical solutions of singular integral equations of Abel type by using normalized Bernstein polynomials, Applied Mathematical Sciences Vol. 3 No. 5 (2008)441-455.
A. K. Shukla, R. K. Pandey and Swati Yadav, Salt and Peper Noise Algorithm Based on Generalized Fractional Operator, International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 119 (16) (2018) 5147-5158.
K. K. Singh, M. K. Bajpayee and R. K. Pandey, A novel approach for enhancement of geometric and contrast resolution properties of low contrast images, IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica, 5(2) (2018) 628-638.
K. K. Singh, M. K. Bajpayee, R K Pandey and P. Munshi, A novel non-invasive method for extraction of geometrical and texture features of wood, Research in Nondestructive Evaluation, 28 (3) (2017), 150-167 DOI: 10.1080/09349847.2016.1148214.
A. Kumar, K. Ranjeet and R. K. Pandey, Beta Wavelet Based ECG Signal Compression using Lossless Encoding with Modified Thresholding, Computer & Electrical Engineering, 39(1) (2013) 130 - 140.
K. Ranjeet, A. Kumar, and R. K. Pandey, Electrocardiogram Signal Compression using Beta Wavelets, Journal of Mathematical Modeling and Algorithms11(3) (2012) 235-248.
K. Ranjeet, A. Kumar, R. K. Pandey, ECG signal compression using different techniques, Communications in Computer and Information Science, 125 (2) (2011) 231-241.
S. Sharma and R. K. Pandey, Jacobi collocation method for fractional-integro differential equations, Vol. 2, pp. 854-862, Proceedings of the International Conference on Fractional Differentiation and its Applications, Novi Sad, Serbia, July 18 - 20, 2016.
R. K. Pandey and O. P. Agrawal, Comparison of Four Numerical Schemes for Isoperimetric Constraint Fractional Variational Problems with A-Operator, ASME 2015 International Design & Engineering Technical Conferences & Computers and Information in Engineering Conference (IDETC/CIE2015), Boston, MA, USA, August 2-5, 2015, Paper No. DETC2015-46570.
K. K.Singh, M. K.Bajpai, and R. K. Pandey, A Novel Approach For Edge Dectection of Low Contrast Satellite Images, Int. Arch. Photogramm. Remote Sens. Spatial Inf. Sci., XL-3/W2, 211-217, doi:10.5194/isprsarchives-XL-3-W2-211-2015, 2015.
Koushlendra Kumar Singh, Manish Kumar Bajpai, Rajesh K. Pandey, Edge Detection in Low Contrast Images, XIII International Conferences on Image Processing 2015, Zurich, Switzerland, January, 13-14, 2015.
K K. Singh, R. K. Pandey and Suraj Suman, Fractional order differentiator using Legendre polynomials, IEEE Proceeding of 5th International Conference Confluence: The Next Generation Information Technology Summit (Confluence), 2014, pp. 246-250.
R. K. Pandey and O. P. Agrawal, Numerical scheme for generalized isoperimetric constraint variational problems with A-operator, Proceeding of the 2013 ASME/IEEE International Conference on Mechatronic and Embedded Systems and Applications, Portland, Oregon, USA, August 4–7, 2013, Paper No. DETC2013-12388, pp. V004T08A017; 6 pages (received Best Paper Award).
Koushlendra K. Singh, R. K. Pandey and B. N. Mandal, An analytical method for solving singular integral equations of Abel type, International Conference on Modeling, Optimization and Computing-2012, Procedia EngineeringVolume 38, 2012, Pages 2726-2738.
K. Ranjeet, A. Kuamr, R. K. Pandey, ECG Signal Compression using Optimum Wavelet Filter Bank Based on Kaiser Window, Procedia Engineering, Volume 38, 2012, Pages 2889-2902.
R. K. Pandey, V. K. Singh, S. Singh: Computation of Fourier Bessel Transform Using Hybrid Functions. 1186-1199, Proceedings of the 5th Indian International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IICAI 2011, Tumkur, Karnataka State, India, December 14-16, 2011. IICAI 2011, ISBN 978-0-9727412-8-6.
Chapter 12: “Stable Algorithm for Computation of Hankel Transform using Chebyshev Wavelets” Wavelets: Classification, Theory and Applications. ISBN: 978-1-62100-308-3 (Imprint: NOVA) 2011.
Chapter 8: “Numerical Solution of a System of Generalized Abel Integral Equations” Applied Singular Integral Equations. ISBN: 978-1-57808-710-5 (CRC Press) 2011.
The research project entitled "Approximation Methods For Problems In Fractional Calculus Of Variations" has been sanctioned by SERB , Govt. of India of Rs. 2156264.00 for a period of three years (2019-2022).
The research project entitled "Development of solution methods for Abel's integral equation and Generalized Abel's integral equation" has been sanctioned by National Board of Higher Mathematics, DAE, Govt. of India of Rs. 332500.00 for a period of three years (2016-2019).
Member, DUGC, Mathematical Sciences, IIT(BHU) Varanasi for 2018-19.
Member, Staff Committee, Mathematical Sciences, IIT(BHU) Varanasi for 2018-19.
Chairman, Ph D Admission, Mathematical Sciences,IIT (BHU) Varanasi for Odd Semester 2018-19.
Member, Faculty Forum IIT (BHU) Varanasi 2017-18.
Admin. Warden, Dr. S. Ramanujan Hostel, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU) Varanasi from May 30, 2018-till date.
Member, DPGC, Mathematical Sciences, IIT (BHU) Varanasi for year 2017-18 & 2018-19.
Member, Time Table Committee, Mathematical Sciences, IIT (BHU) Varanasi.
Convener, Web Committee, Mathematical Sciences, IIT (BHU) Varanasi.
Warden, Aryabhatt Hostel, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU) Varanasi from August 10, 2015-May 29, 2018.
Coordinator-Examination Cell, IIITDM Jabalpur from Dec.2013 – May 2014.
Coordinator-Time Table, IIITDM Jabalpur from Dec.2013 – May 2014.
Warden In-charge, Hall of Residence-III, IIITDM Jabalpur from July 9, 2010 – July 19, 2012.
Member, Student Prizes & Awards Committee of Senate, IIITDM Jabalpur from March 2010 – till date.
Organized AICTE Short Term Course on Computational Methods for Integral and Differential Equations(CMIDE 18) during 10-16, 2018.
Organized GIAN Course on Fractional Derivatives and Its Applications during Jan. 30-Feb.03, 2018 at Department of Mathematical Sciences, IIT (BHU) Varanasi.
AICTE QIP Short term Course on Advanced Numerical and Analytical Methods for Engineers and Scientists (NAMES) 2017 during Jan. 12-18, 2017 at Department of Mathematical Sciences, IIT (BHU) Varanasi.
Workshop on wavelets and its Applications (WoW) during July 12-15, 2012 at IIITDM Jabalpur.
Chaired a Session and Delivered Invited talk on “Numerical Treatments to Isoperimetric Constraint Fractional Variational Problems” at International Conference on Applicable Analysis (ICAA) 2017 held at University of Delhi during Feb. 8-11, 2017.
Presented a paper in ICFDA 2016 at University of Novi sad, Novi sad, Serbia.
International Symposium on Fractional PDEs: Theory, Numeric and Applications Salve Regina University, USA during June 3 - 5, 2013. Title: Fractional Derivative and its Applications.
Fourth International Conference on Mathematical Sciences (ICM 2012) at United Arab Emirates University, UAE during March 11-14, 2012. Title: A New Method for Solving Fractional Differential Equations.
International Workshop on Wavelets, Frames and Applications: Dec. 15-21, 2011 Department of Mathematics, Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi, Delhi, India (Invited Talk).
International Conference on Special Functions in the 21st Century: Theory and Applications (SF21), April 6-8, 2011(held at the Renaissance Washington Dupont Circle Hotel, 1143 New Hampshire Avenue NW) National Institute of Standards & Technology, Washington, DC, USA. (Invited Talk).
Had been offered to join Corporate Planning, SAUDI ARAMCO (Saudi Arabian Oil Company) as Planning and Progress Analyst.
Students are required to have a good understanding of the topic with good knowledge of the Functional Analysis. Studnets interested in Numerical work must have strong background in Numeircal Analysis with good programming skills in Matlab/ Mathematica. Students interested to work on Image processing are required to have knowledge of image processing and programming skills in Matlab.
Interested candidates are encouraged to apply for the post doctoral fellowships (NBHM, SERB-NPDF).

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It is a well known principle of trust law that, if the trust provides for the trustee to be compensated for work performed as trustee, then the trustee is entitled only to the compensation set forth in the trust instrument. See Cal. Prob. Code §15680. So, the Court of Appeal in Thorpe v. Reed ruled that compensation was not payable to a successor trustee of a special needs trust where the trust instrument provided that no compensation was payable to any trustee. Somehow the successor trustee accepted the job as trustee knowing the trust instrument prohibited the payment of compensation, incurred over $100,000 in trustee’s fees, and, ultimately, the Court of Appeal said the successor trustee should get nothing. Tough break…but, as mentioned in the opinion, if the successor trustee thought that the compensation specified in the trust was inadequate, then he could have refused to accept the appointment. This case reminds us of the general principle of American jurisprudence that there is no involuntary servitude except as punishment for those duly convicted of a crime (i.e., the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution). Thus, if you don’t want to work for free (as a trustee), then don’t take the job (as a trustee).
SB 323, the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”), was signed into law and will take effect on January 1, 2014. The RULLCA will apply to all existing California limited liability companies (LLCs), as well as all foreign LLCs previously registered with the California Secretary of State, as of that date. It displaces entirely the current California law governing LLCs (known as the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act) and will be codified at California Corporations Code §§17701.01–17713.13. The new law does not require existing LLCs to file any new documents with the California Secretary of State or any other governmental agency on the occasion of its enactment. The new law will apply automatically to existing LLCs on its effective date—there is no “opt in” or “opt out” procedure. The RULLCA is a modified version of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act first promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2006. It clarifies many issues that existed under present law and includes a more robust set of default rules on many topics which apply if the LLC operating agreement is silent. The RULLCA was intended to bring California LLC law more in line with the LLC laws of other states, making it easier for multi-state businesses to operate, both inside and outside California.
In this case, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court order and judgment, holding that the Chapter 7 Trustee was entitled to reach only up to 25% of the Chapter 7 Debtor’s interests in two spendthrift trusts established in California by the debtor’s parents. Spendthrift provisions in a trust are generally permissible in California, as long as that trust is not self-settled. Ordinarily, a beneficiary’s interest in the income and principal of an otherwise valid California spendthrift trust is protected from the claims of creditors as long as the income and/or principal remains in the trust. However, once the income or principal of a spendthrift trust is distributed to a beneficiary, then it may be reached by creditors. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 15300, 15301. As to be expected, there are a few exceptions to these rules. For instance, Probate Code §15306.5 provides that a judgment creditor may satisfy its judgment out of the payments to which the beneficiary is entitled under the spendthrift trust so long as it does not exceed 25% of the payment that otherwise would be made to the beneficiary. Another exception is found in Probate Code §15307, which provides that, not notwithstanding the spendthrift rules, a creditor may satisfy its judgment out of any amounts that the beneficiary is entitled to receive from the trust which is in excess of the amount that is or will be necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary. The text of Probate Code §15307 seems to suggest that it would permit invasion of the trust income and principal, however the title to the statute references only income. The application of Probate Code §15307 is somewhat unclear, and, unfortunately the interaction of these various statutory exceptions has become muddled in the case law. In this case, the Trustee was permitted to avail himself of the exceptions to the spendthrift rules because the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides that he holds all of the rights of a hypothetical judgment creditor. Because these particular trusts permitted the Debtor only to receive principal distributions, not income, the majority of the judges on the panel ruled that the 25% cap of Probate Code §15306.5 applied and that Prob. Code §15307 did not apply due to its constraint to mere income payments. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis, arguing that Probate Code §15307 was not so constrained and contending that the judgment creditor should be able to seek additional amounts to satisfy its judgments above and beyond the 25% cap of Probate Code §15306.5 so long as that discretion is exercised reasonably in conformity with the provisions of Probate Code §15307. The dissent is remarkably persuasive, and it should be interesting how this law further develops.
Sometimes I wonder why cases ever get as far as they do in the appeal process considering the ever increasing cost and expense of litigation. This is one of those cases. In the case of Diaz v. Bukey, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the beneficiary of a trust could not be compelled to arbitrate disputes arising under the trust in the absence of the beneficiary’s agreement to do so. In general, only parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause may be required to arbitrate their disputes. Although arbitration is a favored method of solving disputes, the policy favoring arbitration does not eliminate the need for an agreement to arbitrate and does not extend to persons who are not parties to an agreement to arbitrate. Here, the arbitration clause was found in the trust instrument, and the beneficiary did not wish to arbitrate her dispute with the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust. In the absence of all of the beneficiaries and interested parties agreeing to resolve their dispute in arbitration rather than in probate court, there was no basis for an order compelling arbitration. Modern trust litigation in the probate court system is generally more expedient than ordinary civil litigation, there is no general right to a jury trial, and the probate court has trained research staff experienced in this interesting but specialized field of law. The appellate opinion is silent on the issue, but it makes me wonder what really may have motivated the trustee to expend such time, effort and money to seek to compel arbitration of this dispute.
You never know what can happen once a case is filed in court. In the case of Christie v. Kimball, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the probate court, on its own initiative, had the authority to order the trustee of a trust to prepare and present a formal, verified accounting where it was deemed necessary in the court’s discretion in order to determine the status of trust assets. The Court of Appeal found that this authority rested upon the probate court’s general power to supervise the administration of a trust, and also pursuant to the catch-all authority provided to the probate court in Cal. Prob. Code §17206. The interesting thing about this ruling is that, despite confirming common assumptions of the probate court’s power, the Court of Appeal ultimately determined that the order compelling the accounting was not, in and of itself, appealable. Those who are considering acting as a trustee should realize that it is both possible and likely that the probate court may order you to prepare and present a formal, verified accounting as a preliminary step in any court dispute which arises regarding the trust and its assets, and that you do not have the right to appeal any such order.
“Hearsay” is a statement made out-of-court that is offered in court as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Under the hearsay rules of evidence (in particular, the California Evidence Code), such statements are inadmissible in court unless the actual person who made the statement testifies in court, or, alternatively, one of the categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule applies to allow evidence of the statement to be received. One such exception is set forth in Cal. Evid. Code §1260, which permits evidence of a statement made by a person that he or she has or has not made or revoked a will, or a statement which identifies such document as his or her will. In most such situations, of course, the person who made the statement is now dead and therefore unavailable to testify. Historically, the best evidence of a dead person’s testamentary intentions would be their will, which is executed with much solemnity and ceremony, and statements made the dead person prior to their death are deemed to be good and reliable evidence as to the existence and identity of such estate planning efforts. SB 1041 amended the Evidence Code to extend the hearsay exception which already applies to wills when the same set of facts is present with respect to a trust. As amended, §1260 now permits hearsay evidence of statement made by a person who is unavailable as a witness (due to death or otherwise) that he or she has or has not established a revocable trust, or has or has not revoked his or her revocable trust, or a statement which identifies his or her revocable trust or any amendment thereto. The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that the hearsay exceptions applicable to wills would apply in the same manner to revocable trusts, because revocable trusts are now commonly used as will substitutes in California estate planning. The problem with this new, expansive exception to the hearsay rule is the assumption that lifetime statements concerning wills and revocable trusts are equivalent, which neglects the fact that the solemnity and ceremonial aspects of executing a will are absent in the context of creating, amending or revoking a trust. Only time will tell how whether or not this exception will come to engulf the hearsay rule. One saving grace may be the still-effective ‘catch-all’ exception to the exception, which provides that evidence of a statement remains inadmissible hearsay if the statement was made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
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ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).1 The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.2 The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.18 In the meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its Decision.19 On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a Decision20 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of CariÃ±o and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.21 It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for Reconsideration,22 the present petition was filed before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,23 factual review may be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to each other.24 Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge CariÃ±o, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin CariÃ±o to notarize the Deed of Sale.
Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.33 However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,34 the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as CariÃ±o may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties.35 The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge CariÃ±o, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge CariÃ±o identified himself in the Deed of Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business.
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.37 The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge CariÃ±o's improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,38 was even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge CariÃ±o, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge CariÃ±o's advanced age, assuming he is still alive.39 However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge CariÃ±o is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its enforceability militates against Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from private documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to revive judgment.44 Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they opposed in court petitioner's successive attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already precluded Tigno's causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgment an existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.45 The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same.46 In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyer's assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident differences between Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge CariÃ±o. In its own appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge CariÃ±o himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed,47 while Judge CariÃ±o testified that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.48 On this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge CariÃ±o and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the testimonies of Judge CariÃ±o and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge CariÃ±o and De Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge CariÃ±o and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge CariÃ±o was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge CariÃ±o, would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge CariÃ±o had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge CariÃ±o. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tigno's right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. A-1257.
2 CA Rollo, p. 31.
4 Petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno herself died on 28 September 1993, and is now substituted in this action by her children Imelda B. Tigno and Armi B. Tigno. Her husband, Camilo D. Tigno, had also died on 21 March 1997. Id. at 8.
5 Tigno appealed such denial to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently withdrew her appeal in March of 1991. Id. at 11.
6 Docketed as Civil Case No. A-1918.
9 Captioned "Sale/Renunciation of Right to Repurchase." Id. at 12.
11 Id. at 32. Order penned by Judge V. Bantugan.
18 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49879.
20 Penned by Justice M. Gonzaga-Reyes, concurred in by Justices R. Mabutas, Jr. and P. AliÃ±o-Hormachuelos.
23 See e.g., Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. 66807, 26 January 1989, 169 SCRA 455.
24 See e.g., Lee Eng Hong v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 423 (1995).
25 S. Guevarra, Legal Forms Annotated 40 (8th rev. ed., 1966); citing Bouvier. For an extended disquisition on the differences between a jurat and an acknowledgment, see Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) Officials, 312 Phil. 100, 104.
26 Act No. 496 (1902).
27 "Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes."
29 Rollo, p. 17. See also TSN dated 25 May 1993, p. 3.
30 322 Phil. 630 (1996).
33 See Ellert v. Hon. Galapon Jr., 391 Phil. 456 (2000).
34 A.M. No. 1765-CFI, 17 October 1980, 100 SCRA 314.
37 Balayon v. Ocampo, A.M. No. MTJ-91-619, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 13.
38 Per Republic Act No. 9025 (2001).
39 Hon. CariÃ±o was sixty-six (66) years old when he testified before the RTC on 25 May 1993, thus he would be at least seventy-seven (77) years old as of this writing. See TSN dated 25 May 1993, p. 2.
40 Joson v. Baltazar, A.C. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114, 119, citing Aspacio v. Inciong, 161 SCRA 181(1988); Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764 (1970). See also BA Finance Corporation v. IAC, G.R. No. 76497, 20 January 1993, 217 SCRA 261, 274; Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenerio, A.C. No. 6139, 11 November 2003, 415 SCRA 353, 361.
42 See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 108292, 108368, 108548-49, 108550, 10 September 1993, 226 SCRA 314, 322-323, citing 4 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 546 Phil. (191). See also Agasen v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 391 (2000), Tapec v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111952, 26 October 1994. "The codal provisions do not require accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the act or contract has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document." Hawaiian Philippine Co. v. Hernaez, 45 Phil. 746 (1924).
43 See Bucton v. Gabar, 154 Phil. 447 (1974); citing Couto v. Cortes, 8 Phil., 459, 460 (1907); Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil., 52, 53 (1908). See also Art. 1405, New Civil Code.