THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS LEROY TEALE and RUTH ELIZABETH CHAPMAN, Defendants and Appellants.
Nels B. Fransen, Thomas R. Krehbiel and Richard E. Johnson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Simonelli & Fransen for Defendants and Appellants.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On October 17, 1962, defendants registered at a motel in Fresno, where they gave a bad check in payment of their room rental. At approximately 10 p.m. on that same day they entered a tavern near Lodi where they remained for nearly three hours and together consumed five bottles of beer. Mrs. Chapman went outside for awhile and upon her return was heard to say to Teale: "Let's go, we are not going to do anything here," or "We can't do anything here, let's go." They then left the tavern together.
Defendants next appeared at about 2 a.m. the following day at the "Spot Club" in Lodi. The only persons in the bar at that time were the defendants and Adcock, the bartender. Shortly thereafter three persons, including the bartender and a woman of Mrs. Chapman's general description, were observed in front of the Spot Club. The third person in the group, a man resembling the defendant Teale in general appearance, was standing behind the bartender, who apparently was locking the door of the tavern.
The following morning the owner of the bar found it to be in unusual disarray. The cash register had been broken into and approximately $260 was missing.papers usually kept in the register were scattered about the floor. Routine housekeeping tasks which the bartender generally completed before leaving had not been performed.
Later that morning the victim's body was found in a remote area north of Lodi. It was half submerged in an open ditch by the side of a road. The clothing was torn and there was blood on the face and on the surface of the road nearby. The victim had been shot three times in the head, two bullets apparently penetrating through the same wound on the left side of the head from a gun held as close as two inches. The third bullet entered the back of the head from a gun held [63 Cal. 2d 184] some 18 inches away. The time of death from the gunshot wounds was estimated at 3 on the morning of the 18th.
The bullets which inflicted the deceased's wounds were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to a gun purchased by the defendant Chapman in Reno, Nevada, while there with Teale six days before the killing. Neither the gun which she purchased, nor the gun which fired the fatal bullets was located.
Numerous items of personal property were found in the vicinity of the body, including the victim's wallet from which $50 to $65 in cash had been removed, and a check for $2.00 bearing a stamp "Refer to Maker," which had been signed by Mrs. Chapman.
Evidence connecting defendants with the commission of the crime was submitted by an expert witness for the People who testified that the victim's blood was Type A; that Type A blood was found on the right side of the front floor mat, spattered on the overhead fabric liner, the dome light and clothes rack in the back of defendants' vehicle; that blood had spattered or radiated out from the right front side of the automobile; that Type A blood was found on Mrs. Chapman's fur stole and spattered on a dress, blouse, skirt and shoes in her possession; that Type A blood was also found on defendant Teale's shirt and jacket; that numerous fibers taken from the victim's shoes matched those found in the defendants' automobile, that hairs were found in the automobile which matched those of the victim; that red paint found on the floor mat of the defendants' automobile came from the shoes of the victim, and that in the opinion of the expert the victim had been in the defendants' automobile.
Defendant Teale was arrested in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. At that time he carried a gun which had been purchased by Mrs. Chapman in Reno on the same day on which she purchased the .22 caliber weapon hereinbefore mentioned, and he was driving the automobile which had been in the defendants' possession before and at the time of the killing.
After his return to California Teale was confined with one Waldo Vowel, another prisoner, who testified as to a conversation he had with Teale wherein Teale stated that "he hoped Mrs. Chapman did not break down and start saying anything, because they didn't have anything on them yet." Later, the witness testified, he had another conversation with Teale in the prison yard: "I told him I knew Bill [the deceased], [63 Cal. 2d 185] and he [Teale] told me he didn't plan for it to happen that way, and he started relating to me how it happened. He said that they were arguing over money all afternoon, and he said it was his idea to rob him and said he was going to take him out in the country and just run him off up through the vineyard, or something like that, but had no idea of killing him. But he said when they pulled up and stopped, that he opened the door, he didn't say who was driving or nothing, just said when they stopped that he got out to go around--go around to the other side of the car to get Adcock out, and said that Mrs. Chapman shot him once in the back of the head, and then said when he fell, before he could get around the car, he said she shot him two more times."
Teale further stated, according to the witness, that "they" would never find the gun. In response to a question as to any statements Teale might have made regarding expected punishment, the witness stated: "Well, he said out there in the yard, he said if they had anything on him, he said he was going anyway, and he didn't want Mrs. Chapman to 'cop out' or anything, because he said if she didn't, you'd have to prove which one of them done it. Said he was going anyway, it didn't make any difference. So he said if she just kept quiet that she might get off with just seven or eight years." The foregoing testimony of conversations had with Teale was received under an admonition that the jurors could consider it only as to Teale. No claim is made and the record does not disclose that Teale's fellow prisoner was acting in complicity with the state.
The record is mute as to the factual basis for certain of the requirements which must be satisfied before testimony of Mrs. Chapman's statements could have been properly introduced by the prosecution. However, the conflicting testimony relative to her whereabouts on October 17 and 18 was elicited on direct examination from the federal agent appearing as a witness for Mrs. Chapman. On cross-examination the officer testified, relative to the conflict in her statements, that she denied she suffered from "blackouts."
Neither defendant appeared as a witness.
[1a] Mrs. Chapman's first contention, that she was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial, is not borne out by the record. She voluntarily waived the 60-day limit (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2) and trial was set for February 5, 1963. On that date appointed counsel, the public defender, withdrew due to a conflict in interest in his representation of both her and the defendant Teale. New counsel appointed for Mrs. Chapman on February 5 instituted discovery proceedings and trial was postponed until March 19, presumably in the defendant's interest. (People v. Donohoe, 200 Cal. App. 2d 17 [19 Cal. Rptr. 454].)prior to the March 19 trial date Mrs. Chapman filed an affidavit that the public defender's prior representation of her would prejudice her right if a joint trial was had, and the court permitted the public defender to withdraw as counsel for Teale also. New counsel was appointed for Teale and trial was again postponed, to give such counsel an opportunity to prepare, until April 16, when trial was had.
 Where a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced. (People v. McFarland, 209 Cal. App. 2d 772 [26 Cal. Rptr. 596]; Ferenz v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 2d 639 [128 P.2d 48].) [1b] Moreover, assuming without concluding that there was an improper denial of a speedy trial, the error must be prejudicial to merit a reversal therefor. (People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 152 [32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452].) Although Mrs. Chapman asserts that the delay caused her an emotional upset which persuaded her not to testify in her own behalf she still fails to show how her testimony would have aided her cause.
Both defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdicts. The defendant Teale further contends that the evidence presented to the grand jury failed to establish reasonable or probable cause to hold him to answer for [63 Cal. 2d 187] the crimes charged. Teale unsuccessfully moved in the trial court to set aside the indictment on grounds of insufficiency (see Pen. Code, § 995), and his petition for prohibition upon the ground that the indictment was found without reasonable or probable cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal (see Pen. Code, § 999a). [3a] The evidence before the grand jury was substantially the same as that herein recited other than that of the People's expert witness and the fellow prisoner to whom Teale made certain admissions.  We recently stated in People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503 at page 532 [30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394]: " 'Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344].) An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.' (Bompensiero v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal. 2d 178, 183-184 [281 P.2d 250], emphasis added; see also Weber v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 68, 69 [216 P.2d 871].)  'If there is some evidence to support the indictment, the courts will not inquire into its sufficiency. ...' (Lorenson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 49, 55 [216 P.2d 859]; Greenberg v. Superior Court (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 319, 322 [121 P.2d 713].)"
Both defendants also contend that the court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on conspiracy when no conspiracy was charged in the indictments and the prosecution did not indicate that it would try the case as a conspiracy. It is true that there was no count in conspiracy but the court nevertheless fully instructed thereon, not only a first time as a part of its general instructions but also a second time upon request by the jury after it had initially retired. If the giving of such instructions constitutes error [63 Cal. 2d 188] the prejudicial effect thereof is manifest where, as in the instant case, a determination as to which of two defendants might have delivered the fatal blow is a difficult one. Furthermore, as will be seen, the question of the admissibility of certain real evidence as to one or both of the defendants depends, in part at least, upon the presence or lack of a conspiracy and the propriety of taking it into consideration.
 It must be deemed to be established law that "a conspiracy need not be pleaded in the indictment or information if the evidence actually shows the existence of one. (People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 415, 447  [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714]; People v. Davis (1957) 48 Cal. 2d 241, 250  [309 P.2d 1]; People v. Tanner (1935) 3 Cal. 2d 279, 299  [44 P.2d 324]; People v. Wells (1960) 187 Cal. App. 2d 324, 329-330  [9 Cal. Rptr. 384].)" (People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 88 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656].)  In the instant case there was evidence that the parties were together in Reno where Mrs. Chapman purchased two guns; that thereafter they remained in each other's company until after the commission of the crimes charged; that immediately before appearing at the victim's bar they departed from another bar upon Mrs. Chapman's conclusion that they were not "going to do anything here"; that they were left in the bar alone with the victim; that they departed from the tavern with the victim under unusual circumstances; that the victim entered their automobile; that while in the automobile the victim was robbed and killed with a gun of the caliber purchased by defendants; that the defendants disposed of his body and went together to a motel. Based on the foregoing and other evidence the jury could reasonably have inferred the existence of a conspiracy between the defendants to commit the crimes with which they were charged (Pen. Code, § 31), and no error is apparent in the giving of an instruction on conspiracy.
 Objection is further made that the instruction, as submitted by the prosecution and given by the court made references to the "alleged conspiracy" and the "alleged conspirators." Even if we assume such references were inaccurate it does not appear that any prejudice resulted therefrom. As concluded, the conspiracy, if the jury found it to be a fact, could have been considered in determining the substantive crimes whether or not a conspiracy was alleged, and defendants were found guilty only of the substantive crimes. [63 Cal. 2d 189] Nor is there any merit to defendants' further implication that they were misled by the prosecution's strategy. The People indicated during the trial in open court but out of the presence of the jury that the consequences of the conspiracy would be placed in issue if the evidence justified it.
 Teale further contends that because the court at first sustained his objection to the introduction of the registration card he was influenced to waive his right to cross-examine the authenticating witness and that the later admission of the card, in effect, deprived him of his right of cross-examination. While the contention has some basis in theory, Teale was not precluded from recalling the witness had he reason for doing so. In any event he fails to establish the nature of the testimony he might have elicited on cross-examination and in what manner he had been prejudiced by the claimed denial. The error, if any, manifestly was not prejudicial.
 Both defendants further contend that the dress referred to above was improperly admitted on the further ground that the People failed to establish a foundation as to the source of the dress. It was confiscated with other clothing in Mrs. Chapman's possession at the time of her arrest in St. Joseph. She admitted at that time that the dress was her property. The impropriety is claimed to exist, however, because the People failed to establish that the dress was in Mrs. Chapman's possession or in the automobile at the time of the homicide. It appears that two cartons of personal effects were shipped to St. Joseph prior to the homicide and the implication thus raised by the objection is that the People should [63 Cal. 2d 190] have established, as part of the foundation, that the dress was not a part of that shipment.
The contention raised does not go to the question of whether the real evidence offered is in fact the identical property confiscated without alteration, or to the integrity of the chain of possession between confiscation and admission into evidence. (See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 580 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 113-114 [193 P. 92]; People v. Lugo, 203 Cal. App. 2d 772, 776 [21 Cal. Rptr. 871].) The significance of the blood stains on the dress was a matter which the jury had the right to consider and it was for the jury to determine as a question of fact from all the evidence whether the dress had been in the automobile at the time of the homicide. (People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 485 [165 P.2d 3].) The dress tended to throw light on an issue in dispute and the question thus was not its admissibility but rather the weight to be accorded to it.  Nor was it error, as further claimed by defendants, to exclude their offer of another dress which was claimed to have been worn by Mrs. Chapman on the evening and early morning of the 17th and 18th of October. The relevancy of the dress itself was not demonstrated, and defendants were in no manner foreclosed from disputing the significance of the blood spots on the dress which was put into evidence.
[14a] Defendants next complain that they were not permitted to place before the jury for its determination evidence that the prosecution had failed to comply with a discovery order. It was brought out on cross- examination of a number of the prosecution witnesses that they had been interrogated by police officers who made notes and records of the interview and, in some cases, tape recordings. Such original notes, records and recordings were covered by the discovery order but were not made available to defendants for the stated reason that after the officers' field notes had been transcribed into integrated reports the original notes and records were discarded and tapes erased, in accordance with routine practices of the department.
There is, in fact, no basis for a reasonable belief that the prosecution withheld any information in its possession or otherwise frustrated the defendants. There is no claim that particular information, as distinguished from the nature of the recording thereof, has been withheld. The trial court, however, did not let the question of the prosecution's compliance with the discovery order get before the jury, and [63 Cal. 2d 191] advised counsel that the question of compliance was for the court on proper motion in proceedings which were independent of the trial of the causes. It further advised that the question of compliance with discovery was to be distinguished from the suppression or destruction of evidence, which latter matters were pertinent for the jury's consideration.
In this regard the court invited defense counsel to submit evidence of suppression, if any they had, and instructed the jury as follows: "If the People do not present evidence which is available to them which they would naturally be expected to bring before the court, and which is not available to the defendants, you may infer, if it seems reasonable to you to do so, that this evidence would have been unfavorable to the People.
"If you find that any investigating officers wilfully concealed or destroyed evidence in order to prevent its being brought before the court in this trial, you may presume that the evidence, if presented, would have been adverse to the People's case, and you may consider such conduct in determining the merits of their case.
"Note, I do not say that any investigating officers have wilfully concealed or destroyed evidence. This is a question which you must first determine before you may consider the presumption which I have referred to."
The court did not give an instruction on second degree murder or manslaughter, and instructed that defendants were either not guilty of murder at all or were guilty of murder of the first degree. It must be presumed that defendants, if guilty of murder of the first degree, were guilty under the felony murder doctrine, as no instructions on premeditation and deliberation were given. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Thus, the jury was instructed, in effect, that if it found defendants committed the unlawful killing then it must further [63 Cal. 2d 192] find that the killing occurred in the perpetration of a robbery. That a robbery had been committed is uncontroverted and appears as a matter of law.
The defendant Teale's only defense was a denial of the commission of the homicide. (See People v. Turville, 51 Cal. 2d 620, 633 [335 P.2d 678]; People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 715 [21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304].) Mrs. Chapman, in addition to a denial, submitted evidence tending to show that she lacked mental capacity to form the requisite intent. However, such testimony was to the effect that she suffered from a "disassociative reaction"; that when she found herself in an uncontrollable situation she would " 'black out' by simply not knowing."
 Defendants, who did not request an instruction on second degree murder or manslaughter, now complain that the court should have given such instructions on its own motion, and that the same were required on the theory that the homicide occurred in the perpetration of a felony other than one of those mentioned in section 189 of the Penal Code, that is, simple kidnaping. Thus, it is claimed, that since the jury found a simple kidnaping as well as the robbery had occurred such additional criminal act made it incumbent upon the court to instruct on second degree murder.
The foregoing contention is obviously without merit. Where, as here, the evidence compels a conclusion that a murder, if committed at all, was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and for that reason is murder of the first degree, it does not follow that if it further appears that such murder was committed in the perpetration of robbery and simple kidnaping it now becomes murder of the second degree. The fact that a second, lesser homicide has also been committed does not require instructions thereon where, conceding the homicide, the greater offense appears as a matter of law. The only real question before the jury was thus whether defendants were the perpetrators of the homicide.
 It is contended that, at least as to Mrs. Chapman, her crime might have been manslaughter because she could not have entertained the specific intent to murder, but might have entertained the lesser intents associated with involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722 [31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) But an objective evaluation of the defendant's evidence as to her mental capacity does not permit a reasonable conclusion that she could not have acted with "malice aforethought" (Pen. Code, § 187), and at the [63 Cal. 2d 193] same time have entertained an intent to commit an "unlawful act, not amounting to a felony" or a lawful act "in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection." (Pen. Code, § 192.) According to her expert witness' testimony she did not have the mental capacity to commit any crime. Hence, the jury was properly instructed that defendants were guilty of murder of the first degree or were not guilty of the unlawful commission of any homicide.
 Error is claimed by Mrs. Chapman in instructions given on the effect which intoxication of an accused may bear on the question of specific intent where such intent is an element of the crime charged. fn. 1 The challenged instructions are similar to those condemned in People v. Spencer, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 86-87 [31 Cal. Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134]. Although further instructions which immediately followed properly stated the law, and, as in Spencer, "it appears that upon rather elaborate analysis a correct understanding of the relevant law can be gleaned from the instructions construed as a whole," nevertheless it was error to burden the jury with the confusing and contradicting instructions in such circumstances. However, for the reasons which follow, the error was harmless.
As in Spencer, the evidence of the defendant's intoxication was minimal and for that reason the erroneous instruction must be deemed nonprejudicial. (People v. Spencer, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 87.) Moreover, the defendant did not rely on intoxication in the ordinary sense. Her defense was that due to her emotional instability, coupled with the presence of alcohol in her system, she "blacked out" and suffered a complete mental disassociation. This theory was fully exploited by the defendant and in such circumstances the instant error on the effect of intoxication on ability to form a specific intent was not prejudicial.
While it is true that the instruction on confessions and admissions was couched in general terms and, standing alone, would reasonably be construed to apply to Mrs. Chapman as well as Mr. Teale, it further appears that other instructions negated the error, if any, in the circumstances here prevailing. Moreover there was evidence of statements made by Mrs. Chapman, probably not amounting to admissions, which were testified to during the trial. Mrs. Chapman also made several statements which constituted admissions but which were not put into evidence. Nevertheless, constant references were made to such statements by the various psychiatrists who testified, and defense counsel argued vigorously for the admission of an exhibit consisting of an 84-page statement by Mrs. Chapman. In each instance where a statement by Mrs. Chapman was referred to by a psychiatrist witness, the jury was admonished that the statement was not to be received as proof of the matters asserted, but only as going to the basis upon which the doctor had formulated his opinions. In addition the court instructed the jury at the close of the trial as follows: "During the course of this trial, psychiatrists have testified concerning the mental and emotional condition of defendant Ruth Chapman. During their testimony they related certain statements made by Mrs. Chapman to them. These statements were not evidence of the facts related, but were admissible only as they explained or formed a basis for the expert opinion of the psychiatrists concerning the mental and emotional condition of defendant Ruth Chapman."
It must be deemed, in view of the foregoing, that the jury was not misled as to those statements of Mrs. Chapman not received in evidence. As to extrajudicial statements which were received in evidence, the court instructed as follows immediately preceding the general instructions on confessions and admissions: "Where evidence has been received against one of the defendants but is not received as against the other, the jury may consider such evidence only as against the defendant against whom it was permitted to be [63 Cal. 2d 195] received. It may not be considered by the jury for any other purpose, or against the other defendant.
"In the trial of this case, there were instances when certain evidence was admitted as against one of the defendants, but denied admission as against the other.
"Your attention was called to these matters when the rulings were made. But I would urge you again to keep in mind the distinctions pointed out in such rulings, and their effect. It may be difficult for you, when considering the case for or against any one defendant to completely disregard any evidence that you have heard or seen, but that is your plain duty with respect to evidence not admitted by the court as against that defendant, and you must try conscientiously to so treat such a situation.
"Where evidence has been received of a statement of a defendant after his or her arrest and in the absence of his codefendant, such statements can be considered only as evidence against the defendant who made such statement and cannot be considered for any purpose as evidence against the codefendant.
"If in this trial any evidence has been received of a statement or admission of Thomas Leroy Teale after his arrest and in the absence of his codefendant, such statement can be considered only as evidence against Mr. Teale and cannot be considered for any purpose as evidence against Ruth Elizabeth Chapman.
"Likewise any evidence of a statement or admission of Ruth Elizabeth Chapman after her arrest and in the absence of her codefendant can be considered only as evidence against Mrs. Chapman and cannot be considered for any purpose as evidence against Thomas Leroy Teale."
In view of the foregoing specific instructions immediately preceding the general instructions on admissions and confessions we are persuaded to the conclusion that the jury reasonably could not have applied either Mrs. Chapman's excluded extrajudicial statements or the admissions which the defendant Teale made to his fellow inmate in determining the individual guilt of Mrs. Chapman.
 As stated, neither defendant testified in his or her own behalf in the exercise of their constitutional privilege. The prosecuting attorney, during his summation to the jury, commented on numerous occasions regarding the failure of either defendant to explain certain factual matters established by independent evidence. Such comments went to the motives for the procurement and handling of guns purchased by Mrs. Chapman, funds or the lack thereof in Mr. Teale's possession immediately prior to the killing, the amount of intoxicating liquors consumed by defendants at the Spot Club and other taverns, the circumstances of the shooting in the automobile and the removal of the victim's body therefrom, who fired the fatal shots, why defendants used a false registration at a motel shortly after the killing, the meaning of a letter written by Mrs. Chapman several days after the killing, why Teale had a loaded weapon in his possession when apprehended, the meaning of statements made by Teale after his apprehension, why certain clothing and articles of personal property were shipped by defendants to Missouri, what clothing Mrs. Chapman wore at the time of the killing, conflicting statements as to Mrs. Chapman's whereabouts immediately preceding the killing and, generally, the overall commission of the crime. In addition to the foregoing the court, in instructions to the jury and in accordance with the California Constitution provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13), stated, among other things, that the failure of defendants to testify from facts within their knowledge in explanation of incriminating evidence, may be deemed as tending to indicate the truth of such incriminating evidence and "that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable."
It clearly appears that the error in allowing the comments and in giving the improper instruction could not have resulted in a miscarriage of justice as to the defendant Teale. While he may not have confessed to the crime, nevertheless the admissions which he made to his fellow inmate are so damaging that, when considered with the other substantial evidence, the proof of his guilt must be deemed overwhelming. His statements, of course, were not admissible against the defendant Chapman. Nevertheless the persuasive, circumstantial web of evidence which implicated her was not refuted, and the only real defense which she urged at the trial level was her claimed inability to form a criminal intent, which she sought to establish through expert witnesses. The comments and instruction on her failure to explain away the circumstantial web of evidence become of less significance in view of the defense's complete failure to refute such evidence by any means whatsoever. That evidence, in effect, stands unchallenged and the prosecutor's and court's remarks add little to its stature. Moreover, we are unable to discern what bearing, if any, the remarks would have on the defense of an inability to form the requisite intent, as interposed by Mrs. Chapman. This being a technical defense based upon expert opinion, comments on her failure to testify could not be material thereto. In view of the almost complete failure to submit any rebuttal, the comments and instruction added little which was not already apparent to the jurors, that is, the defendants were not disposed to question the truth of the facts asserted by the prosecution's witnesses.
We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of the erroneous comments and instructions a result more favorable to defendants was not reasonably probable in view of the entire record (People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), and that there has been no miscarriage of justice as to either Mrs. Chapman or Mr. Teale.
 Contention is also made by the defendant Teale that prejudicial error occurred in the penalty phase in the court's instructions, and the prosecutor's arguments going to the role played by the Adult Authority in fixing parole for those convicts sentenced to life terms. (People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33].) However, the instructions [63 Cal. 2d 198] and arguments fall far short of those condemned in Morse.
The instruction to which exception is taken is as follows: "Further the law of this state provides that every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole." And the language of the prosecutor to which particular objection is taken is as follows: "For example, if you feel that a term in prison, for example --, with all of the facilities for rehabilitation and so forth, would insure, insofar as human reason can infer, that these defendants, even if they are ultimately and they will be one day perhaps--there is a possibility if they are--the death penalty is not invoked, possibly they may be paroled.--They may not be, but again they may be. It is the law."
The jury was not advised of the role which the Adult Authority plays, the conditions under which parole is granted, statistical information relative to past and current practices in granting parole, or any of the other matters condemned in Morse as improper for the jury to consider. Insofar as appears the jury was advised only that a convict undergoing a life sentence might someday be paroled and the further obvious inference might be drawn from the prosecutor's remarks that if the death penalty is invoked there is no possibility of parole. Manifestly, the invitation to the jury to speculate and surmise as to the improper release of a defendant to society in the future if a life instead of a death sentence is imposed, upon which Morse turned, is completely lacking in the instant case.
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Schauer, J., fn. * and Dooling, J., fn. * concurred.
FN 1. The portion of the instructions objected to were as follows: "Our law provides that no act committed by persons while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in such condition. This means that such a condition, if shown by the evidence to have existed in the defendants at the time when allegedly they committed the crimes charged, is not of itself a defense. It may throw light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place; but when a person in a state of intoxication, voluntarily produced in himself, commits a crime, the law does not permit him to use his own vice as a shelter against the normal, legal consequences of his conduct."


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Prisoners have a right to receive medical treatment. By arresting and detaining a person, the State takes full responsibility at international law for providing health care to ensure their lives and wellbeing. While prisoners generally do not have a right to choose a specific medical treatment, international human rights law requires State authorities to provide the most appropriate treatment in accordance with professional medical standards.
Article 10 on the right to humane treatment of prisoners.
This does not necessarily mean that prisoners are free to choose a particular treatment. Authorities are only compelled to provide for the most appropriate treatment in accordance with professional medical standards. In Fabrikant v. Canada, a prisoner wanted to be transferred from Quebec to British Columbia for an angiography. The prisoner said he had a doctor in British Columbia who was willing to perform the surgery. The State argued that the prisoner had been evaluated by twelve Canadian heart specialists who concluded that angioplasty was not appropriate in his case and that he should be treated with a bypass or with medication. The State argued that the ICCPR should not be interpreted as guaranteeing the prisoner the medical treatment of his choice. The prisoner was ultimately transferred to British Columbia and received an angioplasty with the doctor of his choice. The HR Committee affirmed that the State “remains responsible for the life and well-being of its detainees,’’ but did not decide the issue; the prisoner’s communication was ruled inadmissible because he did not provide information as to how authorities failed to determine the most appropriate treatment in accordance with professional medical standards.
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) provides the broadest right to healthcare for prisoners. Article 4 provides the right to life. Article 5 provides the right to humane treatment for prisoners and has been interpreted to include an implied duty on States to provide detainees with regular medical care and adequate treatment. Professor Van Kempen wrote that authorities must facilitate and allow medical assistance to detainees by a physician of their choice but that this does not mean that all of the detainee’s wishes have to be satisfied.
In Vera Vera v. Ecuador, the accused had sustained a gunshot to his chest during his arrest. He was not taken immediately to hospital after his arrest and later died of his injuries. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) reiterated that the State has a negative obligation to respect Article 4 of the ACHR (right to life) and a positive obligation to take the appropriate measures to ensure them in fulfilling its general obligation established in Article 1(1). Since the State is the institution responsible for detention establishments, it is the guarantor of the rights of those under its custody. This implies the State’s duty to guarantee the health and welfare of inmates by providing them, among other things, with required medical care, and it must also ensure that the manner and method of any deprivation of liberty do not exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The States cannot invoke economic hardships to justify imprisonment conditions that do not comply with minimum international standards and respect the inherent dignity of the human being. The IACtHR held that the State had violated the prisoner’s right to life under Article 4 and right to humane treatment under Article 5.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not expressly provide a right to healthcare. Article 2 on the right to life and Article 3 on the prohibition of inhuman treatment provide a duty on the State to provide adequate medical assistance. There is no general obligation for authorities to release a detainee on health grounds or place him in a civil hospital to obtain a specific treatment. Prisoners do not have a right to choose a particular medical treatment under the ECHR. States are allowed to transfer a prisoner to another facility in order to provide the necessary treatment.
In Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held there was a violation to the right to life in a case where a prisoner was refused medical treatment which led to his death. Mr. Salakhov was HIV positive. His health in prison began to deteriorate. He suffered from a constant fever, weight loss and other symptoms. The authorities downplayed his complaints. He was handcuffed to his hospital bed throughout his hospitalization. He was released from prison and died two weeks later. The ECtHR held that the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment imposes an obligation on the State to ensure that the health of a prisoner is adequately secured. The ECtHR found that the failure by the detention centre and hospital to provide Mr. Salakhov with adequate medical care violated his rights. The ECtHR also found that handcuffing Mr. Salakhov during his hospitalization, despite his critical state of health and the fact that he had never behaved violently, also constituted a violation of the ECHR prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The ECtHR restated its right-to-life case law that a positive obligation of the State arises when it has been established that “the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. The Court found there was a violation to the right to life in this case.
In Gulay Cetin v. Turkey, the applicant was a prisoner who was diagnosed after imprisonment with metastic gastric cancer. An oncologist’s assessment found her condition was life-threatening and recommended transferring her to a more suitable facility. The authorities refused to move her. The prisoner was unable to carry out everyday activities without assistance. The prisoner’s sister was allowed to stay with her in the prison ward to provide her with constant care. The prisoner deteriorated and died when she was transferred to an intensive care unit. The applicant relied on Article 2 (right to life) and alleged that the prison doctor has been responsible for the fatal progression of her cancer. Unfortunately, the ECtHR dismissed this complaint for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as the applicant had not applied to the Turkish administrative courts for a ruling on whether her condition might have been caused by medical negligence. The ECtHR did conclude that her detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3. Authorities decided to keep her in detention despite the fact that her health had been continually deteriorating. The authorities’ actions prevented the application from dying in dignity with her family.
 Lines, Rick, “The right to health of prisoners in international human rights law,” International Journal of Prisoner Health, March 2008; 4(1): 3_53, available at http://www.ahrn.net/library_upload/uploadfile/file3102.pdf, citing Lantsova v. Russian Federation (26 March 2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/74/763/1997 para 9.2.
 Van Kempen, Piet Hein, Positive Obligations to Ensure the Human Rights of Prisoners: Safety, Healthcare, Conjugal Visits and the Possibility of Founding a Family under the ICCPR, the ECHR, the ACHR and the AfChHPR (2008), at http://www.internationalpenalandpenitentiaryfoundation.org/Site/documents/Stavern/05_Stavern_Contribution%20Van%20Kempen.pdf.
 See the following cases: Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Georgia’ (2002) UN Doc A/57/40 vol I 53 para 78(7); Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago (Communication No. 232/1987) Report of the Human Rights Committee vol 2 UN Doc A/45/40 p. 69 para 12.7; Kelly v. Jamaica (2 April 1991) UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 para 5.7; Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Portugal’ (2003) UN Doc A/58/40 vol I 56 para 83(11); Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Cambodia’ (1999) UN Doc A/54/40 vol I 57 para 306; Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Congo’ (2000) UN Doc A/55/40 vol I 43 para 282; Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Mongolia’ (2000) UN Doc A/55/40 vol I 49 para 332; Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/40 vol I 70 para 81(13).
 Lantsova v. Russian Federation (note 129) para 9.2.
 Fabrikant v. Canada (6 November 2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/D/970/2001) para 9.3.
 Van Kempen, supra note 1.

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Timothy Wayne Arnett appeals the judgment of the district court against him after a jury found him guilty of armed bank robbery and use of a short-barreled shotgun during a crime of violence. Arnett does not appeal the robbery conviction, only his conviction and sentencing on the firearm charge.
The parties are familiar with the procedural history, the facts and the issues raised on appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Mr. Arnett makes a host of arguments, and we will address each one in turn.
First, the district court did not err by denying Arnett's motion to suppress evidence of his stop, arrest and subsequent confession. The Medford police reasonably stopped Arnett because he fit the general description of the robbery suspect and he was in the vicinity of the bank. When asked, Arnett told the police he was carrying a shotgun--the weapon used in the robbery--thus forming probable cause for his arrest. After he was read his Miranda rights, Arnett made an equivocal request for counsel and the interrogating officers thereafter limited their questioning to Arnett's desire to have counsel present. United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-1405, (9th Cir. 1985). From Arnett's subsequent statement, "an attorney would have told me not to talk to you, but I want to," reiteration that he wanted to make a statement and his following two-hour confession, it is evident that he voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The district court correctly denied Arnett's motion.
Second, Arnett argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting "prior crimes or acts" evidence. The prosecution introduced Arnett's statements that he did "scope out or case a couple of local banks," and that he "wanted to rob the bank unfortunately, you can't really drive by 'em without ... looking at'em, you know, in a different way ... it's hard to explain." These statements are not evidence of prior crimes or acts, however, so the issue is moot. United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1502 (9th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the district court did not err by admitting evidence of Arnett's preparation for the crime because, notwithstanding Arnett's decision not to dispute that he committed the robbery, the government still had the burden to prove its case. This evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged acts.
Third, the district court committed no error by allowing Arnett to proceed at trial pro se. The court on two occasions made a searching inquiry into Arnett's desire and ability to represent himself, it warned him about the dangers of self-representation and Arnett clearly stated that he understood but wanted to represent himself anyway.
Fourth, the district court correctly denied Arnett's motions for a new trial and to disclose information about Joe Vorisek, an expert witness for the government who testified that Arnett's weapon fit the statutory definition of a firearm. There was no Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation because the government timely disclosed that Vorisek had once been the subject of a federal investigation and because that investigation--which had ended before Vorisek was contacted in relation with this case--was not material to this case. For the same reason, the district court did not err by prohibiting Arnett from cross-examining Vorisek about the investigation: It was not relevant. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986).
Fifth, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Arnett's weapon fit the statutory definition of firearm and was not an "antique," an exception to the statute if the weapon was manufactured before 1899. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a) (3), (16). Two government witnesses testified that the weapon could not have been an antique. The district court properly denied Arnett's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Sixth, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Arnett under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) for using a short-barreled shotgun. The evidence showed, and the jury specially found, that Arnett had sawed off his shotgun's shoulder stock, thus meeting § 924(c) (1)'s length requirement. The fact that Arnett altered the shotgun's shoulder stock, as opposed to its barrels alone, is irrelevant under the statute. The statute specifically includes shotguns that are sawed off "whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise"
Finally, the district court had jurisdiction over the firearm charge because the government produced undisputed evidence that Arnett had stolen the weapon in California and brought it with him into Oregon to rob the bank. The interstate nexus requirement was thus satisfied.
We have considered all arguments advanced by the parties and have concluded that no further discussion is necessary.


Lately there’s been a lot of discussion about the Philadelphia Soda Tax. Basically, the City of Philadelphia has decided to tax all beverages that contain sugar (high fructose corn syrup). This affects a whole lot of beverages.
This regressive tax stands to hurt Philadelphia’s lower-income families and small businesses the most, burdening them with higher costs even though they are still struggling to emerge from the recession. It could also hurt retailers and restaurants, which are likely to lose sales and customers. It’s a slippery slope – this discriminatory tax is singling out beverages. Which grocery items are next?
So why would I support this, especially as a conservative? Shouldn’t I be supporting everyone’s right to do what they want, and oppose any taxation to regulate one’s freedom of choice?
It was 11.13am. We had 19 days to trial. Barnaby Jones sat across the conference table in my office, and he was indignant.
We’d been talking about this case for the last half-hour or so, and he was still giving me the same story. Every defense lawyer has heard it a million times. “It wasn’t me!” In defense circles we call this the SODDI defense — “some other dude did it” (it even has a Wikipedia entry). Mr Jones wasn’t the first client to give me this line nor would he be the last. Naturally, I was skeptical, especially in light of the Commonwealth’s discovery I’d reviewed since ADA Shea sent it to me yesterday.
“Yes, Mr. Leo, I get it.” My client nodded.
I looked across the table at my client, in silence, for a minute. He wasn’t getting it. I took off my glasses, folded them, and placed them to my right. I signed deeply and rubbed my face with my hands in frustration. “This guy”, I thought to myself, “straight up case of denial”.
My next cards are going to look like this.
There is a space on my potential client interview form that prompts me to ask my potential clients if they gave any statements to the police, whether on the scene where they’re arrested or back at the station.
I am considering removing it, because it is useless.
Invariably, when I first ask them this questions, 9/10 clients say “No, man, I know my rights”. Great! I love when my clients know their rights. It makes my job a lot easier.
Then I start talking with my clients about what happened when they got arrested, and that “No” becomes “well, I guess I said it wasn’t me”. Or “I told them I didn’t have any drugs on me because I wasn’t a dealer, I was a user”. Or, my favorite “Why are you arresting me? I didn’t shoot anyone!”. Or “I just wrote down everything that happened, and I apologized for taking all the money”.
The sound of the judge’s voice speaking my name startled me from my stupor. I’d been sitting in the courtroom for an hour waiting for the District Attorney in my case to show up.
Until a moment ago, I had been bored. All criminal defense lawyers are familiar with the “hurry up and wait” endemic to the system, and today had been no different.
It was June 10 at 10.03am. I’d been in the courtroom since 8.59am, intermittently checking my phone while waiting to have my case called so I could get back to the office and address the approximately 372 things outstanding on my to-do list. With no secretary or staff, all my administrative work was my own, and it was piling up every second I waited for the DA.
“Yes, Your Honor?” Because I was too busy looking at LOLCAT memes, I hadn’t caught what the Judge said. I hoped he didn’t notice.
“You’re appointed in Commonwealth versus Barnaby Jones. Trial date to remain, July 20 for a three-day jury. Mr Mulvihill, you’re attached, and it’s must-be-tried”.
I felt as if I’d swallowed a lead brick.
Appellant brings this appeal challenging the constitutionality of one of Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1, following the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Alleyne v. United States, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). We find that Alleyne does indicate that the sentencing practice under Section 9712.1 is unconstitutional.
-Judge Ford Elliot, August 20, 2014, writing for an en banc Superior Court.
Just yesterday, the Pennsylvania Superior Court released an opinion in Commonwealth v. Newman, that seems to provide some direction to divided Pennsylvania Common Pleas Courts left to fend for their own in the wake of the United States Supreme Court Alleyne v. United States decision.
Let’s break this down simply. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that all facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In many states, Pennsylvania included, mandatory minimum sentences could be imposed by a judge who found certain facts to be true only by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.
Alleyne held this scheme unconstitutional.
Prosecutors in Pennsylvania have been fighting to apply mandatory minimum sentences ever since. But one by one, counties across Pennsylvania have been finding mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutional.
In Commonwealth v. Newman, the defendant was arrested following several controlled drug buys at an apartment in Glenside, Pa. Based on those buys, the police got a search warrant for the property, and found a “large quantity” of crack cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun a few feet away from the drugs.
The defendant went to trial, where the jury found him guilty of possession with intent to deliver, among other crimes. The prosecutor filed a “Notice of Intent to Seek Mandatory Sentence” under Pennsylvania’s gun & drug law, 42 Pa. C.S. §9712.1, which means a mandatory 5-10 years for a person found in possession of a firearm and drugs. The defendant was sentenced overall to 5-10 years.
He appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed his sentence on June 12, 2013. But just days later, on June 17, 2013, the United States Supreme Court released its Alleyne opinion, so Newman filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Superior Court granted.
Skipping over the legalese, after a review of trial court opinions from the Courts of Common Pleas across Pennsylvania, the Superior Court in Newman ultimately found that “the very trial courts entrusted with the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences after Alleyne have found Section 9712.1 as a whole to be no longer workable[.]” Specifically, the Court found that the mandatory minimum sentencing provision at issue were not severable, and that under the statutory construction rules of Pennsylvania (1 Pa. C.S. §1925, Constitutional construction of statutes) the statute therefore as a whole must fail.
The Court then ruled that §9712.1 was unconstitutional, vacated Newman’s judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing “without consideration of any mandatory minimum sentence provided by Section 9712.1”.
If you’re not currently facing charges where mandatory minimum sentences may apply, then nothing, really.
But if you or a loved one is facing a case with a potential mandatory minimum sentence, then things change a lot.
Just today, I filed my first motion to bar application of a mandatory minimum sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. §9712.1 under Commonwealth v. Newman, in expectation of a hearing scheduled tomorrow in a client’s case.
We don’t yet know if the Commonwealth (the prosecutors trying to keep people locked up) is going to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allocatur (aka ask them for permission to appeal the Superior Court’s judgment), but we’ll find out soon.
I’ll be paying close attention in the meantime.
Congrats to Patrick I. McMenamin, Jr. for this victory for the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Update 2014.8.22: The Judge granted my motion without even requiring argument.
Sometimes, those ridiculous threats warrant an equally ridiculous response.
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Aquamarine, the birthstone of March, has a rich color and has long been a symbol of youth, health and hope. Its mesmerizing color ranges from pale to deep blue and is reminiscent of the sea. A perfect birthstone for March, the Aquamarine creates a beautiful accent to spring and summer. Brighten your home and enrich your walls with artwork that reflects the color of March. With bright blue skies and melting snow (at least it is melting in New Hampshire) now is the time to bring a new color into your life. Get out of the winter doldrums with the addition of some aquamarine and remind yourself what the summer holds in store.
Techniques associated with oil painting are as varied as the colors available.
Putting all of this together with the variety of materials allows an artist to create a work of art that will last through the generations.
For centuries, painting with oils has been the favored method for creative visual expression. Although complex in its completion, it is one of the simplest ways to put color on canvas or paper. Applied thickly or thinly, the slow drying time encourages the development of ideas and the reflective nature of creation. Oil paint is durable, resistant to damp and offers great versatility and richness of color.
Acrylics are considered to be the most versatile and permanent material at artists’ disposal today. Acrylis colors are composed of the same pigments used in oil colors mixed in a base of acrylic resin. They are quick drying, have a super-brilliant quality, reflecting light from within the paint film, and a rubbery flexibility which they retain as they age.
The biggest drawback in working with acrylics is matching color. Different pigments tend to darken or lighten when dry, so practice is needed to achieve consistent results. Techniques are the same as for oil painting, though a painting can be completed in a much shorter time.
Our lives are bombarded with information; the days can feel saturated with digital overload. It can be challenging to find quiet, a space in the day to think, meditate and be creative. Artwork expresses a response to the world, offering answers, ideas and escapes. Joni Taube, owner and art consultant at Art 3 Gallery explains that “Distractions” developed from clients’ suggestions. “Art has always been about escape, and we all need an escape sometimes. Our gallery works with business and residential clients, and often they have a goal – use art to reflect, relax and regroup. A momentary distraction is definitely not a bad thing, at home or in the workplace”. Art 3 Gallery presents the work of over 75 local and regional artists who welcome the opportunity to distract viewers with art!
The summer show at Art 3 Gallery will open on June 21 with an afternoon reception from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. Join us to view the work of over 90 local and regional artists, focusing on the perspective of the world as seen through an artist’s eye.
All artists celebrate beauty, recognizing what is special about even the most ordinary. In a collection of shapes, colors and textures, “Through the Artist’s Eyes” is all about the artists’ interpretations of life, and the stories and meanings depicted in their art.
“I am always in awe of the artwork we have here at the Gallery, and this show explodes in a kaleidoscope of color”, says Joni Taube, owner and curator of Art 3 Gallery. “Visual language allows the viewer to explore the artist’s imagination, providing insight into life and to transform moments, memories and the mundane into a work of art.” Capturing the morning light, the reflection of water, or the noise of a street scene, the artwork is alive with energy. “Through the Artist’s Eye” features a mixture of traditional, contemporary and abstract works exploring the patterns and rhythms of everyday life.
Any time is an opportune time for renovations and it sounds like many of you are taking on bathroom projects! Most types of artwork can enhance a bathroom with no shower. Steam and humidity in your private or guest bath have to be considered when decidng on the type of artwork to hang. Mildew and mold are always an issue in a bathroom with a shower. A general rule of thumb is to avoid anything on paper. Oil and acrylics will work if done on masonite, panel, or board. Dimensional pieces such as ceramic, glass, and metals are great options to finish the space. If you need suggestions or another set of eyes, give us a call!
We are here Monday through Friday from 9:00 am – 4:00 pm. And evenings and weekends by appointment.
Use custom framing to enhance the beauty of any artwork. Personalize the artwork for your office or home to make it truly unique. At Art 3 Gallery, we take special care with every frame job to make sure that your artwork is a reflection of your own personal style as well as preserved for generations to come.
When matting your artwork, always choose 100% acid-free or archival matting. Paper mats will cause your artwork to suffer from “burning” – this is where the acid in the mat leaches into the artwork and causes discolorations and stains which, over time, are irreversible. You can add color to the frame design with a properly chosen mat or you can choose a neutral color, such as ecru or antique white, that will set off the artwork. Sometimes a very small piece can be surrounded by a very large mat which will enable you to focus on the art more easily.
As with the mat, be sure to choose a tape or adhesive that is also acid-free. Tape especially can cause yellowing and often will dry out over time causing your artwork to slip inside of the mat. To avoid this, framers use hinges made of handmade paper. The fibers in hinging tape adhere to the fibers in the mat and paper, forming a bond that will hold the artwork in place safely and securely. Hinging is most often used for illustrations and paper pieces, such as watercolors.
Do not let the glass directly touch the surface of the artwork being framed. Over time moisture in the air will cause the glass to stick and ruin your piece. Avoid this by using spacers that go behind the glass, separating it from the artwork. Spacers can also be used as an aesthetic element creating depth in the framing design. A properly chosen mat will also achieve separation of glass and art. Choose conservation or museum glass to protect your art from the damaging effects of the sun which can dry out, fade or yellow the work.
Visit Art 3 Gallery and let one of our framing professionals help you to make your artwork the best that it can be.

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Gary Halling was the Practice Group Leader of Sheppard Mullin’s Antitrust and Competition Group from 2001-2016. Mr. Halling was with the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, where he was a trial attorney in the General Litigation Section from 1976-1981.
Mr. Halling specializes in complex business litigation with emphasis on antitrust and unfair competition matters. He has extensive experience in civil and criminal antitrust matters involving both federal and state enforcement agencies. Chambers USA noted that he is held in high regard for his amazing antitrust litigation practice and instant credibility into the courtroom and is a straightforward, no-nonsense, upstanding lawyer.
1975-1976 Law Clerk to United States District Judge William B. Enright (S.D. Cal.).
1976-1981 Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1981-1993 Partner, Broad, Shulz, Larson & Wineberg, San Francisco.
1993 Partner, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, San Francisco.
Defend various DOJ antitrust international cartel price fixing cases, including coordinating defense of international enforcement investigations in the EC, Japan, Korea, Canada, Brazil, etc., and defending related U.S. nationwide direct and indirect civil class actions (2002-2014).
Antitrust counsel for Samsung Electronics defending IP-related antitrust claims in multi-billion dollar litigation with Rambus, coordinating with patent counsel in worldwide related proceedings (2004-2010).
Represent Samsung Electronics in global patent and standards related antitrust governmental proceedings, and private antitrust actions involving major technology companies including Apple, Qualcomm, and Ericsson (2011-present).
Co-counsel for the United States in the first successful felony price fixing case under the Sherman Act (real estate commissions). Convictions affirmed on appeal, United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
Defend nationwide TFT-LCD DOJ grand jury and foreign governmental enforcement investigations, and related direct and indirect class action price fixing actions (over 70 cases), and opt out plaintiff cases by Nokia, Motorola and others, on behalf of Samsung Electronics and Samsung SDI defendants (2007-2015).
Defend SDI America and Samsung SDI entities in DOJ Antitrust Division grand jury criminal price fixing and foreign enforcement investigations involving cathode ray tubes (CRT), and related civil direct and indirect antitrust class actions, and opt out cases (2007-present).
Defend SDI America and Samsung SDI entities in DOJ Antitrust Division grand jury criminal price fixing and foreign enforcement investigations involving lithion-ion batteries (Batteries), and related civil direct and indirect antitrust class actions (2011-present).
Tried federal court antitrust case for The Hearst Corporation which resulted in the consummation of Hearst's $660 million acquisition of the San Francisco Chronicle. Reilly v. The Hearst Corporation, 107 F.Supp.2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Represent MediaNews Group and California Newspapers Partnership defending billion dollar acquisition of San Francisco Bay Area newspapers in private litigation and related DOJ proceedings. Reilly v. MediaNews Group et al. (N.D. Cal, 2006-07).
Co-lead trial counsel defending MasterCard International Incorporated in a representative action challenging foreign currency exchange practices under California's Unfair Competition statute, Schwartz v. Visa and MasterCard, Alameda Superior Court (2002). Dismissal of action on appeal against MasterCard and Visa, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1452 (2005).
Defend and resolve DOJ antitrust criminal price fixing action on behalf of Samsung Electronics involving DRAM memory chips, and related national MDL direct and indirect civil class actions and suits by over 40 state attorneys general, and coordinate worldwide defense. In Re DRAM Antitrust Litigation (MDL) (N.D. Cal. 2002-present).
Defend Samsung companies in direct and indirect civil class actions alleging price fixing of SRAM, FLASH memory chips and other products, and U.S. DOJ and foreign enforcement agency proceedings (2007-2011).
Defend senior foreign and domestic executives in DOJ antitrust grand jury investigations, Auto Parts and Real Estate Foreclosure cases (2011-present).
Defend DOJ Antitrust Division grand jury criminal price fixing investigations representing European multinational corporation (shipping), and NYSE traded U.S. corporation (road construction) (2007-2008).
As co-counsel tried federal court antitrust case against Exxon in 1992 on behalf of the City of Long Beach as trustee for the State of California. Case was part of related litigation involving major oil companies which resulted in settlements to the State of over $300 million. Successfully argued Ninth Circuit appeals in these cases, People of the State of California v. Chevron, et al., 872 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990).
As lead counsel, tried federal court jury case to dedicate Texaco's California crude oil transportation system to common carrier use and public utility status (E.D. Cal., July, 1994). Unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, Mission Resources v. Texaco Trading and Transportation (9th Cir. 1995).
Represented DHL as lead counsel in federal court action to enforce terms of DHL Shareholder Agreement permitting the Company to purchase outstanding shares from the Saipan estate of a deceased shareholder, which resulted in successful acquisition of a controlling interest. DHL v. Estate of Larry Hillblom (N.D. Cal., 1998).
While at the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, tried various administrative evidentiary hearings, under the Newspaper Preservation Act (15 U.S.C. 1803), including involving mergers of newspaper business operations in Cincinnati (1977) and Seattle (1981); and counsel for the United States in Section 7 Clayton Act litigation challenging book publishing acquisition by CBS. United States v. CBS Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,478 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Mr. Halling has been a regular speaker before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, and presents to major national corporations on antitrust topics.

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Thank you for your interest in our website. Protecting your personal data upon your visit to our website is a particularly high priority for the management of SCHOLPP Holding GmbH. We have set out the following information to give you an overview of how your personal data is processed by us and your rights under data protection legislation. Personal data is any data that can be related to you personally, for example, your name, address, e-mail addresses, and user behavior.
Where a data subject wishes to use particular services offered by our company via our website, such as our contact form, it may be necessary to process personal data. If the processing of personal data is necessary and there is no legal basis for the processing, we generally obtain the consent of the data subject. Data is processed at all times in compliance with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and in accordance with the country-specific data protection regulations that apply to SCHOLPP Holding GmbH.
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However, it is impossible to guarantee complete protection due to fundamental security vulnerabilities in web-based data transmission.
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Unless otherwise provided for in the detailed descriptions of our services, those units within our company that need your data to fulfill our contractual and statutory obligations will have access to it. We will only disclose information relating to you where statutory duties to provide information require us to do so, where you have given your consent and/or where the disclosure is legitimate under another legal basis.
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Unless otherwise provided for in the detailed descriptions of our services, we process and store your personal data as long as is necessary to fulfill our contractual and statutory obligations.
Your personal data is periodically deleted or blocked where it is no longer required to fulfill contractual or statutory obligations, you have exercised your right to erasure, all reciprocal claims have been settled, and no other statutory retention obligations or legal bases for storing the data exist.
Each time a data subject or an automated system accesses our website, a series of general data and information is collected in log files. This includes an Internet protocol address (IP address), the directory protection user, the browser types and versions used, the website from which the accessing system accesses our website (so-called referrer), the sub-pages on our website accessed by the accessing system, data volume, date and time of the access to our website, and other similar data and information for risk prevention purposes in case of attacks on our IT systems.
The legal basis for the temporary storage of data and log files is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR in connection with the aforementioned legitimate interests.
Temporary storage of the IP address by the system is necessary to ensure that the website is transmitted to the user’s computer. In this case, the user’s IP address must be stored for the duration of the session.
Data is stored in log files to ensure that the website functions properly. The data also helps us to optimize the website and ensure the security of our IT systems. This also forms the basis for our legitimate interest in the data processing pursuant to Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR. The data is deleted as soon as it is no longer required to achieve the purpose for which it was collected. Where data is collected to provide the website, this is the case when the respective session has ended. The collection of data for the provision of the website and the storage of data in log files is necessary to operate the website. The log files may also be inspected where, on the basis of specific indications, there is legitimate reason to suspect illegal use or a specific attack on our website. Here, our legitimate interest in the processing lies in identifying and prosecuting the individuals behind such attacks or illegal use.
In addition to the data set out above, cookies are stored on your computer when you use our website. Cookies are small text files that are assigned to your browser and stored on your hard drive, and by means of which specific information is transmitted to the body setting the cookie (in this case, us). Cookies cannot run programs or transmit viruses to your computer. Their purpose is to make the website more user-friendly and more efficient as a whole.
Transient cookies: Transient cookies are automatically deleted when you close your browser. This includes session cookies in particular. These store a so-called session ID, which is used to assign various requests from your browser to the same session. This allows your computer to be recognized when you return to our website. Session cookies are deleted when you log out or close your browser.
Persistent cookies: These are deleted automatically after a specified time, which may vary depending on the cookie. You can delete the cookies at any time in the security settings of your browser.
Besides the purely informational use of our website, we also offer various services which you can use if interested. You will generally be asked to provide further personal data in this case, which we will use to provide the respective service. The above data processing principles apply to the personal data provided.
We provide a contact form, which can be used to contact us electronically, on our website. The data entered by the user on this form is transmitted to us and stored. This includes the following required fields: your name, e-mail address, and your message. All other details are voluntary and not required. Before the contact form is transmitted, we obtain your consent to the processing of your data and refer you to this Data Protection Policy. Art. 6 (1) a) GDPR provides the legal basis for the processing of data using the contact form.
Alternatively, you can contact us using the e-mail address provided. In such cases, we store the personal data of the user that is transmitted in the e-mail. The data is used solely for the ongoing dialogue with you and will not be shared with third parties. We have a legitimate interest in processing the personal data transmitted in an e-mail under Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR.
Where the purpose of the e-mail contact is to conclude a contract, Art. 6 (1) b) GDPR applies additionally to steps taken prior to entering into a contract and, where applicable, for subsequent processing in order to perform a contract.
We only store personal data that is processed by us within the context of a general request sent via the contact form or in an e-mail until such time as our dialogue has ended. The dialogue is deemed to have ended when it can be seen from the circumstances that the issue in question has been conclusively resolved.
Consent to the processing of your personal data can be withdrawn at any time. If you contact us by e-mail, you can, of course, also object at any time to the storage of your personal data. In such cases, we will not be able to continue the dialogue with you.
By granting your consent, you can subscribe to our newsletter with which we keep you informed at regular intervals about our current projects, company innovations, and other interesting offerings. We use the so-called double opt-in process for newsletter subscriptions. This means that we will send an e-mail to the address that you have provided in which we ask you to confirm that you want to receive the newsletter. If you do not confirm your subscription within 24 hours, your information will be blocked and automatically deleted after 14 days. We also store the IP addresses used by you as well as the time of subscription and confirmation. The purpose of this procedure is to enable us to document your subscription and to investigate any potential misuse of your personal data.
The only information we require in order to send you the newsletter is your e-mail address. The provision of other separately indicated data is voluntary and will be used to address you personally. Upon receipt of your confirmation, we will store your e-mail address in order to send you the newsletter. The legal basis for this is Art. 6 (1) a) GDPR.
You can withdraw your consent to the sending of the newsletter at any time and unsubscribe from the newsletter. You can do so by clicking the link provided for this purpose in each newsletter e-mail, by sending an e-mail to info(at)scholpp.de, or by sending a message to us using the contact details provided on the page About this website.
We should point out that the newsletter is sent and analyzed using the e-mail marketing solution provided by Mailingwork GmbH, Birkenweg 7, 09569 Oederan, Germany. The data you provide to allow us to send you the newsletter is stored on Mailingwork’s servers in Germany. To ensure that Mailingwork processes your personal data solely in line with our instructions and in compliance with the applicable data protection legislation, we have concluded a data processing agreement with Mailingwork.
During the sending of newsletter e-mails, technical information (e.g. time of access, IP address, browser type, and operating system) is collected in order to analyze user behavior. For the purposes of this analysis, these e-mails contain so-called web beacons that establish a connection with Mailingwork’s servers in Germany. This enables us to record if and when you read our newsletters and the links you click in them, and to use this data to identify your personal interests. The data generated in this way is used solely to enable us to understand our subscribers’ expectations better and to adapt the content accordingly. At no time will Mailingwork write to you for its own purposes on the basis of your personal data, nor will your data be shared with third parties.
You can object to this tracking at any time by clicking the separate link provided in each e-mail or by contacting us through a different channel. The information will be stored until you unsubscribe from the newsletter. After you unsubscribe from the newsletter, we store the data anonymously and solely for statistical purposes.
By granting your consent, you can subscribe to our job newsletter, which keeps you informed of all new job vacancies on the SCHOLPP job portal at regular intervals. We use the so-called double opt-in process for newsletter subscriptions. This means that we will send an e-mail to the address that you have provided in which we ask you to confirm that you want to receive the newsletter. If you do not confirm your subscription within 14 days, your information will be blocked and automatically deleted after one month. We also store the IP addresses used by you as well as the time of subscription and confirmation. The purpose of this procedure is to enable us to document your subscription and to investigate any potential misuse of your personal data.
Ensuring the highest possible level of protection for your personal data in the application process is important to us. All personal data that is collected and processed by us as part of an application is protected against unauthorized access and manipulation by technical and organizational measures.
In addition to the option of e-mailing your application to bewerbung(at)scholpp.de, you can also send your application details directly via our online application platform. The data entered by applicants on this platform is transmitted to us and stored. Mandatory data for an online application includes your first name, last name, and e-mail address; any additional information such as address, phone numbers, and your application documents are voluntary. Before the contact form is transmitted, we obtain your consent to the processing of your data and refer you to this Data Protection Policy. Art. 6 (1) a) GDPR and/or Section 26 BDSG provide the legal basis for the processing of data where the online application form is used.
Your personal data is collected and processed solely for the purpose of selecting or recruiting potential employees with the objective of filling job vacancies within our corporate group.
Your data is deleted once it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was collected; it will, however, be retained for as long as is necessary to defend legal claims or against accusations under the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG). This is usually 6 months. Particularly interesting applicants to whom we are unable to offer a position at that point in time are asked to provide separate consent so that their data can be retained for a longer period (usually one year). Where accounting-related processing takes place, for example the reimbursement of travel expenses, the data required for this is deleted in accordance with the statutory retention periods, which are usually 6 or 10 years.
If the application is successful and we are able to offer you a contract of employment within our company, we will transfer the data collected during the application process to our personnel files.
This website uses Google Tag Manager. This service enables website tags to be managed via an interface. Google Tag Manager only implements tags. This means that no cookies are set and no personal data is collected. Google Tag Manager triggers other tags that in turn may collect data. However, Google Tag Manager does not access this data. In the event that domains or cookies have been disabled, this also applies to all tracking tags, provided that these were implemented using Google Tag Manager.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service provided by Google Inc. (“Google”). Google Analytics uses “cookies,” which are text files that are stored on your computer and enable an analysis of how you use the website. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is usually sent to a Google server in the USA and stored there. If IP anonymization is activated on this website, your IP address will first be truncated by Google within the Member States of the European Union or other countries that are party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the USA and truncated there. Google will use this information on behalf of the operator of this website to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports on website activity, and to provide the website operator with other services relating to website activity and Internet usage.
Your IP address transmitted by your browser will not be associated by Google with any other data during the use of Google Analytics.
You can prevent the storage of cookies by configuring your browser settings accordingly. However, please note that in this case you may not be able to use all of the functions of this website to their full extent. You can also prevent the collection and processing of data generated by the cookie and related to your use of the website (including your IP address) by Google by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available at the following link: https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en.
Opt-out cookies prevent your data from being collected in future when you visit this website. To prevent the collection of data by Universal Analytics on various devices, you should set the opt-out cookie on all of the systems that you use. To set the opt-out cookie, click here: deactivate Google Analytics.
This website uses Google Analytics with the extension “_anonymizeIp()”. This means that IP addresses are only processed in truncated form, meaning that they cannot be related to a specific individual. Any possibility of relating the data collected on you to you personally is immediately excluded, and the personal data is deleted immediately.
We use Google Analytics to analyze the use of our website and in order to make regular improvements. We use these statistics to improve our presence and to make the content more interesting for you as the user. For the exceptional cases in which personal data is transmitted to the USA, Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework. The legal basis for the use of Google Analytics is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR.
This website also uses Google Analytics for the cross-device analysis of website traffic, which is performed via a user ID. You can disable the cross-device analysis of your user behavior in your customer account by going to My Data > Personal Data.
This website uses the MINQ service, a technology provided by ADDVALUE GmbH. MINQ uses a so-called tracking script that is embedded in the website. This tracking script analyzes the visitors to the website. The information generated about the visitors to this website is transmitted to ADDVALUE GmbH and processed further there. The information is collected, stored, and provided for sales purposes and to recognize website visitors. Data relating to visits by specific individuals/private persons is not stored or processed. Only companies are identified. Cookies are also used in this process. Cookies are small text files that are stored on your computer. You can prevent the installation of the cookies by setting your browser software accordingly.
MINQ cookies are installed on the basis of our legitimate interest in analyzing user behavior in order to optimize both our online presence and our advertising. The legal basis for this is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR. We are assisted in this context by ADDVALUE GmbH as a processor.
You can object at any time to the collection of data by clicking the following link: http://minq.info/index.php?id=48.
This website uses the analytics software Smartlook, provided by Smartsupp.com s.r.o., Milady Horakove 13, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic.
This tool records movements on the viewed websites in so-called heatmaps. These enable us to anonymously identify where visitors click and how far they scroll. We use this information to improve the design of our website and to make it more customer-friendly. Protecting your personal data is very important to us when using this tool. All the data is collected without us being able to associate it with specific users. We can only track how users moved their mouse, where users clicked, and how far they scrolled. The screen size and type of the device used, information on the browser, the country from which the website was accessed, and language preferences are also recorded. If personal data relating to you or third parties is displayed on a website, this is automatically hidden by Smartlook. This means that we cannot trace this data.
We use Smartlook on the basis of our legitimate interest in providing a technically flawless online presence and ensuring its economically efficient design and optimization. The legal basis for this is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR.
You can prevent the use of the Smartlook tool by setting a Do Not Track header. In this case, no data relating to your visit to our website will be collected. To do so this, you must configure your browser settings accordingly. You can find German-language instructions at: http://www.akademie.de/wissen/do-not-track-datenschutz.
You can deactivate the Smartlook tool simply by clicking the opt-out button at: https://www.smartlook.com/opt-out.
We have no influence on the data collected or the manner in which it is processed, nor are we aware of the full scope of the data collection, the purposes of the processing or the storage periods. We also have no information about the deletion of the collected data by the plug-in provider.
The plug-in provider stores the collected data relating to you in the form of user profiles and uses these for the purpose of advertising, market research and/or the needs-based design of its website. Such an evaluation is carried out in particular (even if users are not logged in) in order to display appropriate ads and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the creation of these user profiles; however, you must contact the respective plug-in provider to exercise this right. We use this plug-in to enable you to interact with the social media networks and other users so that we can improve our online presence and make the content more interesting for you as the user. The legal basis for the use of plug-ins is Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR.
The data is transmitted regardless of whether or not you have an account with the plug-in provider and are logged into it. If you are logged into the plug-in provider, the data relating to you collected by us is directly assigned to your account with the plug-in provider. If you click the activated button and, for example, link the page, the plug-in provider also stores this information in your user account and shares it publicly with your contacts. We recommend that you routinely log out after using any social media network, and in particular before activating the button, as this prevents the plug-in provider from linking this data to your profile.
Further information on the purpose and scope of the data collection and processing by the plug-in provider can be found in the providers’ privacy policies listed below. These policies also contain further information on your rights in this context and the settings to protect your privacy.
d) Twitter, Inc., 1355 Market St, Suite 900, San Francisco, California 94103, USA; https://twitter.com/privacy. Twitter has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework.
e) YouTube, LLC, 901 Cherry Ave., San Bruno, CA 94066, USA. YouTube, LLC is a subsidiary of Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA; policies.google.com/technologies/partner-sites. Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework.
We use Google Maps on this website in the form of a link. An interactive map is displayed when you click this link, making the map function easy for you to use.
When you visit this website, Google receives the information that you have accessed the respective sub-page of our website. The data specified in the section “Use of server log files” of this Data Protection Policy is also transmitted. This occurs regardless of whether or not you have a user account with Google and are logged into it. If you are logged into Google, your data is directly assigned to your account. If you do not want this data to be assigned to your Google account, you should log out before activating the button. Google stores the data relating to you in the form of user profiles and uses these for the purpose of advertising, market research and/or the needs-based design of its website. Such an evaluation is carried out in particular (even if users are not logged in) in order to display appropriate ads and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the creation of these user profiles; however, you must contact Google in order to exercise this right.
We have embedded YouTube videos on our website. These videos are stored at http://www.YouTube.com and can be played directly from our website. They are all embedded in privacy-enhanced mode, which means that no data relating to you as the user is transmitted to YouTube if you do not play the videos. The data specified in Paragraph 2 is only transmitted if you play the videos. We have no influence on the transmission of this data.
When you visit the website, YouTube receives the information that you have accessed the respective sub-page of our website. The data specified in Section III of this policy is also transmitted. This occurs regardless of whether or not you have a user account with YouTube and are logged into it. If you are logged into Google, your data is directly assigned to your account. If you do not want this data to be assigned to your YouTube account, you should log out before activating the button. YouTube stores the data relating to you in the form of user profiles and uses these for the purpose of advertising, market research and/or the needs-based design of its website. Such an evaluation is carried out in particular (even if users are not logged in) in order to display appropriate ads and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the creation of these user profiles; however, you must contact YouTube in order to exercise this right.

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The article is dedicated to the ideas of Eros and Femininity of poet Alexander Blok. The central place in the work is given to the problem of ontological status of Blok’s Fair Lady. The authors show that the poet has been looking for ontological place of Femininity in nature, society and universe on the whole for a long period of time. As a result, Blok finds the true kingdom of Fair Lady in time and in history.
Andreev, D. (1992). The Rose of World. [In Russian]. Moscow: Inoj Mir.
Etkind, A. (1998). Khlyst (Sects, Literature and Revolution). Moscow: New Literary Observer.
Florovsky, G. (1991). The Ways of Russian Theology. [In Russian]. Kiev: Put k istine.
Gurevich, A. (1981). The Problems of Medieval Folk Culture. [In Russian]. Moscow: Iskusstvo.
Jasenskiy, S. U. (1991). The role and importance of reminiscences and allusions in the poem «Night Violet». [In Russian]. In Yu. K. Gerasimov et al. (Eds.), Alexander Blok: Research and Materials (pp. 64-77). Leningrad: Nauka.
Jonas, H. (1998). The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God & the Beginnings of Christianity. [In Russian]. (K. Shchukina, Trans.). St. Petersburg: Lan’.
Julien, N. (1999). Dictionnary of Symbols. [In Russian]. Cheliabinsk: Ural LTD.
Krohina, N. (2012). Sophia of V. Solovyov and A. Blok. Solovyov Studies, 36, 74-82.
Lubimova, O. E. (1998). Blok and sectarianism: «Song of Destiny», «The Rose and the Cross». [In Russian]. In V. N. Bystrov et al. (Eds.), Alexander Blok: Research and Materials (pp. 69-89). St. Petersburg: Dmitryi Bulanin.
Medvedeva, P. (Ed.). (1928). The Diary of Alexander Blok in 2 vol. [In Russian]. Leningrad: Izdatelstvo pisatelej v Leningrade.
Novikov, V. I. (2010). Alexander Blok. [In Russian]. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardia.
Obatinina, E. R. (1998). A. Blok's Marks on the «Letter» of Belinsky to Gogol. [In Russian]. In V. N. Bystrov et al. (Eds.), Alexander Blok: Research and Materials (pp. 55-68). St. Petersburg: Dmitryi Bulanin.
Panchenko, A. M. (1984). Russian culture on the eve of the Petrine reforms. [In Russian]. Leningrad: Nauka.
Record of Conversations «lighting by wisdom» spiritual guide Chán Linji Yixuan (I. Gurevich, Trans.). [In Russian]. In E. A. Torchinov (Ed.), Buddhism in translations. Almanac (Iss. 2, pp. 127-179). St. Petersburg: Andreev i synovja.
Renan, E. (1991). Life of Jesus. [In Russian]. Moscow: Politizdat.
Shchedrovitskiy, D. V. (2008). Introduction to the Old Testament. Pentateuch. [In Russian]. Moscow: Oklik.
Solovyov, B. I. (1980). Poet and his feat. [In Russian]. Moscow: Sov. pisatel.
Stepanov, A. N. (2010). Aesthetics of the «Three Conversations ...» in the works of A. Bely & A. Blok («Twelve», «Scythians»). [In Russian]. Solovyov Studies, 28, 98-108.
Titarenko, S. D. (2011). Blok and Pre-Raphaelites. (Some visual sources and nature of the transformations of Eternal Feminine’s archetypal image). [In Russian]. In N. Yu. Griakalova (Ed.), Alexander Blok: Research and Materials (Vol. 4, pp. 113-141). St. Petersburg: Pushkin House.
Tokarev, S. A. (Ed.). (1991). Myths of nations of the world. Encyclopedia: in 2 vol. [In Russian]. Moscow: Sovetskaya Encyclopedia.
Vatsuro, V. E. et al. (Eds.). (1980). Alexander Blok in Memoirs of Contemporaries (Vol. 1-2). [In Russian]. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura.

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