����������� The United States Department of Justice (Department) initiated this matter as a compliance review of Crittenden County, Arkansas under title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, and the Department's implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.� Because the County receives financial assistance from the Department of Justice, the review was also conducted under the authority of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Department's implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart G.
C��������� to provide signage at all inaccessible entrances to each of its facilities, directing users to an accessible entrance or to information about accessible facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 35.163(b).
����������� As part of its compliance review, the Department reviewed the following facilities,� which � because construction or alterations commenced after January 26, 1992 � must comply with the ADA's new construction or alterations requirements: Crittenden County Detention Facility and the Crittenden County Communication Center.
����������� The Department's program access review covered those of the County's programs, services, and activities that operate in the following facilities: Crittenden County Court House, Crittenden County Old Health Center, Crittenden County Office Building, Crittenden County Health Department.
����������� The Department also conducted a program access review of the following facilities that are designated as emergency shelters:� Horseshoe Lake Volunteer Fire Department, Earl City Hall Annex, and Marion Fire Department Station 1.� This review was limited to the areas of the facilities used by members of the public during an emergency:� parking, the route from the parking area to the area used as a shelter, the area used as a shelter, and toilet facilities serving that area.
����������� The Department reviewed the County's policies and procedures regarding voting, emergency management and disaster prevention, and sidewalk maintenance to evaluate whether persons with disabilities have an equal opportunity to utilize these programs.
����������� Finally, the Department reviewed the County Sheriff's Department's policies and procedures regarding providing effective communication to persons who are deaf or hard-of-hearing.
3.�������� The Department is authorized under 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart G, to determine the County's compliance with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to issue findings, and, where appropriate, to negotiate and secure voluntary compliance agreements. �Furthermore, the Attorney General is authorized, under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.530 and 42.108-110, to suspend or terminate financial assistance to the County provided by the Department of Justice should the Department fail to secure voluntary compliance pursuant to Subpart G or to bring a civil suit to enforce the rights of the United States under applicable federal, state, or local law.
4.�������� The parties to this Agreement are the United States of America and Crittenden County, Arkansas.
5.�������� In order to avoid the burdens and expenses of an investigation and possible litigation, the parties enter into this Agreement.
7.�������� The County has a policy of routine maintenance of the detention cells which ensures that the walls are repainted, when necessary, to maintain a clean and neat appearance of the cells.
8.�������� Within two months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will adopt the attached Notice (Attachment A); distribute it to all agency heads; post the Notice on its Internet Home Page; and post copies in conspicuous locations in its public buildings.� It will refresh the posted copies, and update the contact information contained on the Notice, as necessary, for the life of this Agreement.� Copies will also be provided to any person upon request.
9.�������� Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, and on yearly anniversaries of this Agreement until it expires, the County will implement and report to the Department its written procedures for providing information for interested persons with disabilities concerning the existence and location of the County's accessible programs, services, and activities.
10.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will appoint or hire one or more ADA Coordinator(s).� The ADA Coordinator(s) will coordinate the County's effort to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under the ADA, including any investigation of complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance with title II or alleging any actions that would be prohibited under title II.� The County will make available to all interested individuals the name(s), office address(es), and telephone number(s) of the ADA Coordinator(s).
11.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will adopt the attached ADA Grievance Procedure (Attachment B), distribute it to all agency heads, and post copies of it in conspicuous locations in each of its public buildings.� It will refresh the posted copies, and update the contact information contained on it, as necessary, for the life of the Agreement.� Copies will also be provided to any person upon request.
12.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will identify sources of qualified sign language and oral interpreters, real-time transcription services, and vendors that can put documents in Braille, and will implement and report to the Department its written procedures, with time frames, for fulfilling requests from the public for sign language or oral interpreters, real-time transcription services, and documents in alternate formats (Braille, large print, cassette tapes, etc.).
13.������ The County will take steps to ensure that all appropriate employees are trained and practiced in using the Arkansas Relay Service to make and receive calls.
14.������ Within 18 months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will ensure that each 9-1-1 call station is equipped with a TTY or computer equivalent.
15.������ Within 18 months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will develop procedures for answering 9-1-1 calls that include training all call takers to use a TTY to take 9-1-1 calls, to recognize a "silent" open line as a potential TTY call and respond by TTY, and to ensure that TTY calls are answered as quickly as other calls received.
16.������ The County will monitor its incoming 9-1-1 TTY calls to ensure they are answered as quickly and accurately as other calls received.
17.������ The County will incorporate correct TTY call-taking procedures into 9-1-1 call takers' performance evaluations and will amend its personnel policies to include written disciplinary procedures for call takers who fail to perform TTY call-taking consistent with the training and procedures.� The County will implement and report to the Department its evaluation and procedures within three months of the effective date of this Agreement.
18.������ Within six months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will adapt for its own use and implement the Crittenden County Sheriff's Office's Policy Statement on Effective Communication with People Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing [Attachment C] and distribute to all sheriff department officers the Guide for Law Enforcement Officers When in Contact with People Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing [Attachment D].
19.������ Within six months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will contract with one or more local qualified oral/sign language interpreter agencies to ensure that the interpreting services will be available on a priority basis, twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week, to its sheriff department or make other appropriate arrangements (such as contracting directly with or hiring qualified interpreters).
20.������ Within six months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will ensure that each sheriff station or substation and each jail is equipped with a working TTY to enable persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, or who have speech impairments to make outgoing telephone calls.� Where inmate telephone calls are time-limited, the County will adopt policies permitting inmates who use TTY's a longer period of time to make those calls, due to the slower nature of TTY communications compared with voice communications.
C��������������������� will not discriminate on the basis of disability in its hiring or employment practices.
C��������������������� will not ask a job applicant about the existence, nature, or severity of a disability.� Applicants may be asked about their ability to perform specific job functions.� Medical examinations or inquiries may be made, but only after a conditional offer of employment is made and only if required of all applicants for the position.
C��������������������� will make reasonable accommodations for the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified applicant or employee with a disability upon request unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship on the operation of the City's business.� If an applicant or an employee requests a reasonable accommodation and the individual's disability and need for the accommodation are not readily apparent or otherwise known, the County may ask the individual for information necessary to determine if the individual has a disability-related need for the accommodation.
C��������������������� will maintain an employee's medical records separate from personnel files and keep them confidential.
C��������������������� will make an individualized assessment of whether a qualified individual with a disability meets selection criteria for employment decisions.� To the extent the County's] selection criteria have the effect of disqualifying an individual because of disability, those criteria will be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
22.������ Some of the County polling places may be owned or operated by other public entities subject to title II or by public accommodations subject to title III and, as such, would be subject to the obligation to provide program access or to remove barriers to accessibility under the ADA.� This Agreement does not limit such future enforcement action against the owners or operators of these polling places by any person or entity, including the Department.
23.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will request in writing that each of the owners and operators of the polling places listed in Attachment E below will remove the noted barriers to access for persons with disabilities and the County will distribute to them the Department's ADA Checklist for Polling Places (www.ada.gov/votingck.htm).� The request will specify that the remediation be completed within one year of the effective date of this Agreement.� The County will simultaneously send a courtesy copy of the request to the Department.
24.������ Within 14 months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will survey all facilities mentioned in Attachment E to determine whether the actions requested by the County have been implemented.� If not, for each polling place that still contains inaccessible parking, exterior route, entrance, or interior route to the voting area, the County will identify within 18 months of the effective date of this Agreement an alternate location where these elements are accessible.� That identification will utilize the survey instrument that appears as Attachment F to this Agreement.� The County will then take immediate steps to change its polling place to the new location.
25.������ Until all polling places in each precinct or voting district have accessible parking, exterior routes, entrances, and interior routes to the voting area, prior to each election, the County will identify and widely publicize to the public and to persons with disabilities and organizations serving them the most accessible polling place(s) for each precinct or voting district.
26.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will provide opportunities for same-day balloting for voters with disabilities whose assigned polling place does not have accessible parking, exterior route, entrance, and interior route to the voting area.� The method for providing these opportunities may include allowing the individual to vote at another nearby location that is accessible, vote by an absentee ballot that is accepted if postmarked on the day of the election (or picked up by election officials at the home of the voter on the same day as the election), provide curbside voting at the inaccessible polling place, or any other method that ensures that disabled voters have the same degree of information available to them when casting their ballots as others.
27.������ Within one year of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will develop and implement a way for persons who are blind or have low vision to vote independently and privately, whether through ballots and instructions in alternate formats (in-person and absentee), Braille templates and audio instructions, the provision of accessible voting machines, or some other method.
28.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will survey its voter registration locations for accessibility to persons with disabilities by using the form provided at Attachment F and will report the results of this survey to the Department.� If barriers to access are identified, the County will implement and report the Department its plan to provide program access, which may include allowing persons to register to vote through alternative means or at alternative locations.
29.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will make all voter registration materials available in alternate formats, including Braille, large print, audio tape, and computer disk.
30.������ Starting three months from the effective date of this Agreement, when the County purchases or otherwise acquires new voting machines, one such newly-acquired machine per polling location will be the most accessible model for persons with disabilities (including those with mobility and visual impairments) that has been approved for County use by the applicable governing authority (e.g., State Secretary of Elections or other such official).
31.������ Starting three months from the effective date of this Agreement, when setting up its voting equipment, the County will ensure that the equipment's accessibility to persons with disabilities is maximized, such as setting up table-top equipment on accessible tables and within the reach ranges required by the Standards, as shown in Attachment F.
32.������ Within the month prior to the next election that utilizes the County's polling places, and at yearly anniversaries of the effective date of this Agreement until it expires, the County will train poll workers on the rights of people with disabilities and the practical aspects of assuring those rights.� The training will cover, at minimum, the need to maintain the physical accessibility of polling locations; how to assist people with disabilities, as necessary; and how to operate any non-standard voting equipment or accessible features of standard equipment (particularly new, accessible equipment).
33.������ Emergency management is loosely coordinated by the County's Emergency Management Coordinator.� However, each of the twenty municipalities within the County has primary responsibility for emergency and disaster prevention, management, notification, and mitigation.
34.������ The County does not own or operate any emergency shelters.� Some of the emergency shelters used by County residents are owned or operated by other public entities subject to title II or by public accommodations subject to title III and, as such, are subject to the obligation to provide program access or remove barriers to accessibility under the ADA.� This Agreement does not limit such future enforcement action against the owners or operators of these facilities by any person or entity, including the Department.
35.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will send a written request to the appropriate municipality regarding each shelter facility listed in Attachment G will remove the noted barriers to access for persons with disabilities.� The request will specify that the remediation be completed within one year of the effective date of this Agreement.� The County will simultaneously send a courtesy copy of the request to the Department.
36.������ Within 14 months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will survey the shelters listed in Attachment G to determine whether the noted barriers have been removed.� If not all barriers have been removed, within 18 months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will send a second written request to the appropriate municipality to identify appropriate alternate shelters where the parking, exterior routes, entrances, interior routes to the shelter area, and toilet rooms to the shelter area comply with the Standards.
37.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement and until all emergency shelters have accessible parking, exterior routes, entrances, interior routes to the shelter area, and toilet rooms serving the shelter area, the County will request that the appropriate municipalities identify and widely publicize to the public and to persons with disabilities and the organizations that serve them the most accessible emergency shelters.
38.������ The County represents that it does not have any responsibility for sidewalks within the incorporated parts of the County.� It further represents that while it does have responsibility for sidewalks in the unincorporated, rural parts of the county, there are no sidewalks nor does the County have any plans to install sidewalks in these areas.� In the event that the County decides to install sidewalks in any part of the County during the life of this Agreement, the County agrees to abide by paragraphs 39 - 43, below.
39.������ � Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will implement and report to the Department its written process for soliciting and receiving input from persons with disabilities regarding the accessibility of its sidewalks, including, for example, requests to add curb cuts at particular locations.
40.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will identify and report to the Department all streets, roads, and highways that have been constructed or altered since January 26, 1992.� Paving, repaving, or resurfacing a street, road, or highway is considered an alteration for the purposes of this Agreement.� Filling a pothole is not considered an alteration for the purposes of this Agreement.� Within three years of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will provide curb ramps or other sloped areas complying with the Standards or UFAS at all intersections of the streets, roads, and highways identified under this paragraph having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway.
41.������ Beginning no later than three months after the effective date of this Agreement, the County will provide curb ramps or other sloped areas complying with the Standards or UFAS at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway, whenever a new street, road, or highway is constructed or altered.
42.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will identify all street level pedestrian walkways that have been constructed or altered since January 26, 1992.� Paving, repaving, or resurfacing a walkway is considered an alteration for the purposes of this Agreement.� Within three years of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will provide curb ramps or other sloped areas complying with the Standards or UFAS at all places where a street level pedestrian walkway identified under this paragraph intersects with a street, road, or highway.
43.������ Beginning no later than three months after the effective date of this Agreement, the County will provide curb ramps or other sloped areas complying with the Standards or UFAS at all newly constructed or altered pedestrian walkways where they intersect a street, road, or highway.
44.������ The County represents that it does not currently operate any web-based services or programs.� In the event that the County decides to develop and operate any web-based services or programs during the life of this Agreement, the County agrees to abide by paragraphs 45 - 46, below.
45.������ Within 1 month of the effective date of this Agreement, and on subsequent anniversaries of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will distribute to all persons � employees and contractors � who design, develop, maintain, or otherwise have responsibility for content and format of its website(s) or third party websites used by the County (Internet Personnel) the technical assistance document, "Accessibility of State and Local Government Websites to People with Disabilities," which is Attachment H to this Agreement (it is also available at www.ada.gov/websites2.htm).
E.�������� Periodically (at least annually) enlist people with disabilities to test its pages for ease of use.
47.������ The elements or features of the County's facilities that do not comply with the Standards, including those listed in Attachments I, J, K, and L, prevent persons with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying the County's services, programs, or activities and constitute discrimination on the basis of disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149 and 35.150.
48.������ The County will comply with the cited provisions of the Standards when taking the actions required by this Agreement.
49.������ Within three months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will install signage as necessary to comply with 28 C.F.R. § 35.163(b), after having surveyed all facilities that are the subject of this Agreement for the purpose of identifying those that have multiple entrances not all of which are accessible.
50.������ Newly Constructed Facilities:� In order to ensure that the following spaces and elements in County facilities, for which construction was commenced after January 26, 1992, are readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities, the County will take the actions listed in Attachment I.
51.������ Altered Facilities:� In order to ensure that the following spaces and elements in County facilities, for which alterations commenced after January 26, 1992, are readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities, the County will take the actions listed in Attachment J.
52.������ Program Access in County Existing Facilities:� In order to ensure that each of the County's programs, services, and activities operating at a facility that is the subject of this Agreement, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by persons with mobility impairments, the County will take the actions listed in Attachment K.
53.������ Access to County Programs Housed in Others' Facilities:� In order to ensure that the County's programs, services, and activities that are the subject of this Agreement and that are operated by the County at facilities owned or controlled by other entities, when viewed in its entirety, are readily accessible to and usable by persons with mobility impairments, the County will take the actions listed in Attachment L.
54.������ Except as otherwise specified in this Agreement, at yearly anniversaries of the effective date of this Agreement until it expires, the County will submit written reports to the Department summarizing the actions the County has taken pursuant to this Agreement.� Reports will include detailed photographs showing measurements, architectural plans, work orders, notices published in the newspaper, copies of adopted policies, and proof of efforts to secure funding/assistance for structural renovations or equipment.
55.������ Throughout the life of this Agreement, consistent with 28 C.F.R. § 35.133(a), the County will maintain the accessibility of its programs, activities, services, facilities, and equipment, and will take whatever actions are necessary (such as routine testing of accessibility equipment and routine accessibility audits of its programs and facilities) to do so.� This provision does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs.� 28 C.F.R. § 35.133(b).
56.������ Within six months of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will develop or procure a two-hour training program on the requirements of the ADA and appropriate ways of serving persons with disabilities.� The County will use the ADA technical assistance materials developed by the Department and will consult with interested persons, including individuals with disabilities, in developing or procuring the ADA training program.
57.������ Within one year of the effective date of this Agreement, the County will deliver its training program to all County employees who have direct contact with members of the public.� At the end of that period, the County will submit a copy of its training curriculum and materials to the Department, along with a list of employees trained and the name, title, and address of the trainer.
58.������ If at any time the County desires to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical or for any other reason, it will promptly notify the Department in writing, setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification.� Until there is written Agreement by the Department to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect.� These actions must receive the prior written approval of the Department, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.
59.������ The Department may review compliance with this Agreement at any time.� If the Department believes that the County has failed to comply in a timely manner with any requirement of this Agreement without obtaining sufficient advance written agreement with the Department for a modification of the relevant terms, the Department will so notify the County in writing and it will attempt to resolve the issue or issues in good faith.� If the Department is unable to reach a satisfactory resolution of the issue or issues raised within 30 days of the date it provides notice to the County, it may institute a civil action in federal district court to enforce the terms of this Agreement, or it may initiate appropriate steps to enforce title II and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
60.������ For purposes of the immediately preceding paragraph, it is a violation of this Agreement for the County to fail to comply in a timely manner with any of its requirements without obtaining sufficient advance written agreement with the Department for an extension of the relevant time frame imposed by the Agreement.
61.������ Failure by the Department to enforce this entire Agreement or any provision thereof with regard to any deadline or any other provision herein will not be construed as a waiver of the Department's right to enforce other deadlines and provisions of this Agreement.
62.������ This Agreement is a public document.� A copy of this document or any information contained in it will be made available to any person by the County or the Department on request.
63.������ This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties on the matters raised herein, and no other statement, promise, or agreement, either written or oral, made by either party or agents of either party, that is not contained in this written Agreement (including its Attachments, which are hereby incorporated by reference), will be enforceable.� This Agreement does not purport to remedy any other potential violations of the ADA or any other federal law.� This Agreement does not affect the County's continuing responsibility to comply with all aspects of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
64.������ This Agreement will remain in effect for three years.
65.������ The person signing for the County represents that he or she is authorized to bind the County to this Agreement.
66.������ The effective date of this Agreement is the date of the last signature below.


JOHN D. MOONEY, Petitioner, v. GEORGE PICKETT, as Director, etc., et al., Respondents.
Keith C. Sorenson, District Attorney, and James A. Aiello, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondents.
Petitioner John Mooney, for himself and others similarly situated, seeks mandamus to compel the Department of Public Health and Welfare of the County of San Mateo, the director of the department, fn. 1 and its superintendent of the social services division, to grant him General Assistance welfare payments. Respondents, in refusing petitioner General Assistance, rely on county regulation GA-08 [the so-called "employable single man" rule] which denies non-emergency General Assistance to employable single men.  We hold that this rule does not conform to the mandate of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000: the language of that section, its companion provisions, its legislative history, and its judicial construction all compel the conclusion that county General Assistance cannot be denied on grounds of employability. Because of factual questions concerning petitioner's eligibility for General Assistance, we [4 Cal. 3d 672] do not require the payment of General Assistance relief to petitioner; instead we mandate respondents not to deny such aid on grounds of employability.
1. Summary of statutes and regulations pertaining to petitioner's eligibility for General Assistance.
Before recounting the facts of this litigation, we set forth the superstructure of state statute, county ordinance, and county regulation which forms the setting of this case. Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code establishes a variety of public social services; part 5 of this division (§ 17000 et seq.) provides for county aid and relief to indigents. Section 10000, which applies to all services under division 9, states the fundamental purpose of this legislation: "to provide for protection, care, and assistance to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of the state by providing appropriate aid and services to all of its needy and distressed."
The statutory provisions crucial to this action are Welfare and Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001. Petitioner relied upon section 17000, which provides that "Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions." The respondents in turn rely upon section 17001, which states that "The board of supervisors of each county, or the agency authorized by county charter, shall adopt standards of aid and care for the indigent and dependent poor of the county or city and county...."
Article 14, section 2337 of the San Mateo County Ordinance Code effectively reiterates the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000. Section 2339, however, adds the specification that "Employable persons who do not come within the definition of persons eligible for indigent aid as set forth in section 2337 hereof are not eligible for indigent aid; except in those cases in which there is illness in the family or where the welfare of children is threatened, emergency aid may be given for temporary periods with the approval of the Superintendent of Social Service or Director of Public Health and Welfare."
Although the respondents invoke section 2339 to justify their denial of aid to petitioner, this reliance appears misplaced. Section 2339, by its terms, denies aid only to such employable persons as "do not come within the definition of persons eligible ... in Section 2337." Section 2337 includes "all incompetent, poor indigent persons ... lawfully resident [4 Cal. 3d 673] in San Mateo County"; hence section 2339 does not preclude aid to employable indigents lawfully resident in the county.
2. History of this litigation.
We turn now to the facts of the present action as alleged in the petition for mandate and not denied by respondents. Petitioner John Mooney, a resident of San Mateo County, was employed until December 1969, when his employment was terminated by his employer. He received unemployment compensation until May 1970; thereafter, he found temporary employment for one month. He then received unemployment compensation until July 5, 1970, when the unemployment benefits available to him were exhausted. Since December 1969 petitioner has been registered with the job referral service of the Department of Human Resources Development; he is classified by the department as a short-order fry cook and general laborer, but petitioner has placed no restrictions on the kind of work he would accept, the location of work, or the hours.
Because petitioner was still unable to find work, he decided to learn a marketable skill and on July 12, 1970, enrolled in the auto mechanic's [4 Cal. 3d 674] course at Opportunities Industrialization Center West (OICW) in Menlo Park. OICW is a private vocational training and job placement center which is funded by private contributions and by the United States Department of Labor. Its auto mechanics training requires about 37 weeks, but it does not provide any support to trainees during this period.
On July 14, 1970, petitioner applied to the Department of Public health and Welfare of San Mateo County for General Assistance. The department denied his application on July 16, 1970, informing him that "You are ineligible because you are not incapacitated and are able to work, and state that you are registered for employment. According to San Mateo County regulations, only persons with a medically verifiable incapacity, physical or emotional, are eligible for General Assistance."
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandate in the San Mateo Superior Court (action number 151559) asking that court to require respondents to provide General Assistance to petitioner and all other persons similarly situated. In that case, on July 29, 1970, the parties, in lieu of presentation of testimonial evidence, executed and filed affidavits and an agreed stipulation of fact. The stipulated facts include: "... 3. On or about July 16, 1970, petitioner's application for General Assistance was denied on the basis that petitioner is employable and therefore ineligible for General Assistance under the provisions of County Ordinance Code, Art. 14 § 2339.
"4. On the information available to respondents, petitioner would be eligible for General Assistance but for the fact that he is employable.
On the following day the parties filed a further stipulation which stated that "Respondents routinely deny General Assistance to employable applicants pursuant to County Ordinance Code, Art. 14, § 2339, regardless of the cause of applicant's unemployment, failure to find available work, or his efforts to seek employment." On September 30, 1970, the superior court issued judgment denying mandate. Petitioner appealed but also filed the present proceeding as an original action in mandamus in this court.
3. Nonconformity of the employable single man rule with Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.
We shall explain that the provisions of sections 17000, 17001, 17111, and 17200 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the legislative history of [4 Cal. 3d 676] those enactments, and the cases construing them, all demonstrate that a county may not deny aid to otherwise eligible applicants on grounds of employability.
Section 17000 imposes a mandatory duty fn. 7 upon the counties to support "all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident." Although this language imposes no condition of unemployability, respondents attempt to establish such a condition by reading the language of section 17000 in the conjunctive--i.e., that to receive aid an applicant must be poor, indigent, and incompetent;-- they suggest that "incompetent" in this context means "unemployable." This strained construction of the statute, however, succumbs to an examination of other provisions of the laws on county General Assistance.
Petitioner and respondents both ask us to examine the legislative history of section 17000. fn. 9 County General Assistance in California dates from 1855, and for many years afforded the only form of relief to indigents. (See Sen. Com. on Governmental Efficiency, Welfare in California (1970) pp. 98-99.) In 1931, with the increasing poverty and unemployment brought on by the depression, the Legislature amended the Pauper Act of 1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 636) to provide that "Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all pauper, incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions." (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931, Act 5814, p. 3131.) Except for the two underscored words, this language comports identically with that of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.
In 1933 the Legislature repealed the Pauper Act and enacted a new provision, which required aid to "all able-bodied indigent persons and those indigents incapacitated by age, disease or accident...." (Stats. 1933, ch. 761, p. 2005) Then in 1937 the Legislature set out to enact a Welfare and Institutions Code, including all welfare laws, and the Assembly committee recommended incorporation of the language of the 1933 act. fn. 10 The Senate, [4 Cal. 3d 678] however, refused, and passed a bill explicitly excluding employable persons, and limited aid to those "unemployable unemployed indigents incapacitated by age, disease or accident." fn. 11 The Assembly in turn rejected the Senate version, and on recommendation of the conference committee both houses agreed to, and enacted, the language of present section 17000.
The effect of the 1937 legislation was to delete the phrase "able-bodied indigents" in the 1933 act; respondents contend that this omission evidences a legislative intent to deny assistance to able-bodied, and thus employable, persons. Petitioner in turn argues that the refusal of the Legislature to enact the Senate proposal excluding employable persons shows a legislative intent that employable persons receive aid.  Contrary to the suggestions of both petitioner and respondents, we cannot derive the legislative purpose of section 17000 from actions of one house of the Legislature which were rejected by the other house. Instead, we must look to the compromise language concurred in by both Senate and Assembly. That language, as we have observed, was virtually identical to the 1931 act, which had been authoritatively construed in San Francisco v. Collins, supra, to permit aid to persons whose unemployment derives not from personal disability but from general economic depression.
Thus when a case reached this court under the 1937 act, we cited San Francisco v. Collins and declared that "It is made the duty of every county in this state to `relieve and support' all indigent persons lawfully resident therein, `when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives' or by some other means.... The obligation imposed by this statute is a mandatory duty." (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 634, 639 [122 P.2d 526].) (Italics added.) In Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 81, 85 [162 P.2d 630] we again relied on San Francisco v. Collins for the proposition that "It was the mandatory duty of the county to furnish aid according to the plan therefor which is laid down by the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code."
The most recent of these cases, Rosas v. Montgomery, presents a close analogy to the present case. The Department of Social Welfare issued regulations excluding alcoholics from the "Aid to the Needy Disabled" program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 13500 et seq.). Since the regulation did not define the extent of disability required for aid, but instead denied assistance to a class of persons, some of whom were clearly and admittedy totally disabled from employment, the court found the regulation invalid.
We observe also the recent decision of a three-judge federal district court in Remillard v. Carleson (N.D. Cal. 1971) 325 F. Supp. 1272, which held invalid a welfare regulation excluding families of fathers in military service from the federal aid to needy families program. Again the objectionable feature of the regulation was found in its exclusion of an entire class of persons, some of whom would be eligible for aid if their applications were considered on their individual merits.
Finally, respondents contend that the county simply cannot afford to extend General Assistance to employable persons; they present an estimate that abolition of the employable single man rule would approximately double the cost of General Assistance. We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This court, however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the State of California, and while the Legislature addresses itself to that task it remains our task to enforce the existing law. We observe that the county retains extensive authority to establish standards for General Assistance, both as to eligibility and as to amount of aid. In view of this discretion, the county can surely find many ways which do not violate state statute in which it can limit General Assistance payments to the financial resources available.
In summary, county General Assistance was the original, and for many years the only, program of indigent relief; it was not limited to unemployable persons and was used, with judicial approval, for the support of the economically unemployed during the depression. Since that date, many [4 Cal. 3d 681] specialized relief programs have been enacted, including unemployment compensation. General Assistance, however, remains the residual fund by which indigents who cannot qualify for and under any specialized aid programs can still obtain the means of life. A rule excluding from its scope all unmarried employable persons, without regard for the practical impossibility of obtaining employment in a depressed labor market, leaves such individuals without any source of relief whatsoever--a result inconsistent with the language and purpose of section 17000 and other statutes establishing General Assistance relief.
 As we stated in Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 733, 748 [63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697]: "While the construction of a statute by officials charged with its administration, including their interpretation of the authority invested in them to implement and carry out its provisions, is entitled to great weight, nevertheless `Whatever the force of administrative construction ... final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the courts.' (Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal. 2d 753, 757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405] ....) Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations."
4. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents contend that petitioner has not pled that he requested emergency relief under regulation GA-08, and thus has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. This regulation states that "in those cases in which the welfare of children is threatened or where there is illness in the family, emergency aid may be given ...." This language raises a substantial doubt whether petitioner, a healthy, unmarried adult, could possibly qualify for emergency aid under that regulation.
Even if we assume, however, that emergency assistance may have been available to petitioner, respondents' argument fails.  The county maintains no separate program of emergency aid, and no separate procedure by which one applies for that aid. "Emergency" is simply a factor used to determine an applicant's eligibility for regular county General Assistance. Thus when petitioner applied for aid, the county assumed the duty of determining his eligibility, including the ascertainment of the fact of any emergency if such fact would affect eligibility. fn. 14 The county's denial of [4 Cal. 3d 682] General Assistance to petitioner therefore represents a determination that petitioner's circumstances did not constitute an emergency such as to render him eligible for aid. Once the county reached that determination, petitioner could pursue no further administrative remedy.
5. Issues of fact concerning petitioner's eligibility and standing.
Respondents contend that, apart from the issue of employability, petitioner is ineligible for General Assistance because he is not indigent, and has not diligently sought employment; fn. 15 on the same grounds, they assert that he lacks standing to maintain a class action attacking the employable single man rule. These contentions directly contradict the stipulations entered into by the parties in the superior court action, in which the county agreed that "on the information available to respondents, petitioner would be eligible for General Assistance but for the fact that he is employable." Respondents now assert that, since the present matter is not an appeal from the superior court but an original proceeding in mandamus, those stipulations of fact are not binding here; they repudiate the stipulations and decline to enter into any such stipulations before this court.
Respondents have requested a factual hearing pursuant to Code of Civil [4 Cal. 3d 683] Procedure section 1090 to determine issues of petitioner's indigency and efforts to obtain employment. Such a hearing is inappropriate for several reasons. First, section 1090 provides for a trial by jury, a provision "singularly inappropriate for appellate courts." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) p. 2560.) Second, we granted mandamus in order to provide not only petitioner, but all persons similarly situated, with a speedier determination of this issue of major public importance than the normal process of appeal; the delay necessitated by a factual hearing would frustrate that objective. Finally, respondents have had an opportunity for a factual hearing in the superior court. Although presenting documentary evidence, they freely chose not to present testimony of witnesses, but instead entered into the stipulations quoted earlier.
When we granted the petition for hearing and issued the alternative writ in this case, we did so under the assumption that respondents would not enter into stipulations of fact unless they believed the facts so stipulated to be true. Respondents did not oppose issuance of the alternative writ either here or in the Court of Appeal, fn. 16 and it was not until after the alternative writ issued that they repudiated the stipulations.
We are confronted here with the legal issue of whether the employable single man who cannot find employment is entitled to relief or is to be left to his own devices to avoid starvation. This issue has been fully briefed and argued before us; to fail to decide it now would serve no purpose but to incur delay since we shall confront that issue again when petitioner's appeal reaches this court, and in that proceeding respondents cannot escape the binding effect of their stipulations. The legal issue here transcends the facts of this particular indigent's case; we should not be deterred from deciding the vital issue of law by respondents' very belated efforts to raise factual disputes concerning his eligibility. As we set forth later petitioner's own eligibility will be determined in the appropriate manner.
Petitioner has requested that we mandate respondents to grant him General Assistance notwithstanding the fact of his employability. Since respondents have raised factual questions concerning petitioner's eligibility for General Assistance, and the stipulations referred to above resolving those issues are not technically binding in the present proceeding, we cannot grant petitioner the relief he requests. We can, however, issue mandamus directing the county not to deny General Assistance solely on the ground [4 Cal. 3d 684] of employability. fn. 17 The eligibility of petitioner, and other members of the class he represents, for General Assistance, then may be determined by respondents through the normal administrative processes or, alternatively, in the case of petitioner, by a final judgment on his appeal. Any peculiar problems that may arise concerning petitioner's income, support, and efforts to get employment will not delay relief to other persons who may have been unlawfully denied General Assistance on the ground of employability.
 Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondents not to deny General Assistance support to petitioner, or others similarly situated, on the sole and exclusive ground that such applicant is employable.
Wright, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
FN 1. By order of this court December 22, 1970, George Pickett, Director of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of San Mateo County, was substituted as a respondent in place of James Bodie, the former acting director of the department.
FN 2. County regulation GA-010, part d, states that "Employability must be determined through a medical and/or psychological examination of the client. Some emergency situations may arise in which it will be necessary to give temporary aid to provide food and shelter for a short period only. In such cases the aid must be given with the approval of the Section Supervisor." The parties do not discuss this regulation, and have not informed us what emergencies qualify an applicant for this assistance, or for how long such aid may be continued.
FN 3. The parties also stipulated that "Petitioner brings this action for himself and all other persons who have been denied General Assistance solely because they are employable, pursuant to County Ordinance Code, Art. 14, § 2339. Respondents have acted on grounds generally applicable to each member of the class. There are common questions of law and fact uniting petitioner and the members of his class, all of whom seek exactly the same relief in this action. Petitioner will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class in this proceeding."
FN 4. At least 13 counties, including Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, San Diego, and Santa Clara, have regulations similar to the San Mateo County single man rule.
FN 6. Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 states that mandamus may issue "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office...." Respondents contend they are not proper parties to the present action on the ground that not they, but the county board of supervisors, are the persons specially enjoined by state statute to provide aid to indigents. San Mateo County, however, has by ordinance charged respondents with the duty of enforcing and obeying "all County ordinances and State laws" (Ordinance Code, art. 14, § 2331) and with administering assistance programs "in accordance with the State ... statutes and regulations ...." (Ordinance Code, art. 14, § 2333). Respondents thus are persons specially enjoined by county ordinance to follow the state welfare statutes.
FN 7. Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 81, 85 [162 P.2d 630]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 634, 639 [122 P.2d 526]; see County of Los Angeles v. Payne (1937) 8 Cal. 2d 563, 573 [66 P.2d 658]; 18 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 88 (1951).
Section 17000 provides that the county "shall" relieve and support indigents, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 15 specifies that "`Shall' is mandatory and `may' is permissive." Compare Dept. of Social Welfare v. Kern County (1947) 29 Cal. 2d 873 [180 P.2d 1], which held that under a statute providing that a county "may" aid caretakers of indigent children, the county had discretion to grant or refuse such aid.
FN 10. See Assembly Journal (52 Sess. 1937) pages 3298-3301.
FN 11. See Senate Journal (52d Sess. 1937) page 3084.
FN 12. Regulation GA-010 states that "Employability must be determined through a medical and/or psychological examination of the client." Regulation GA-08 requires employable applicants to "verify their efforts to find employment as a condition of receiving aid," thus implying that an applicant is deemed employable although his best efforts do not succeed in finding employment. In the present case the County denied aid to petitioner because he was "able to work"; the notice asserted that "According to San Mateo County regulations, only persons with a medically verifiable incapacity, physical or emotional, arc eligible for General Assistance."
FN 13. The county refers us to the language in County of L. A. v. Dept. of Social Welfare (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 455, 458 [260 P.2d 41], where we stated that "The administration of county relief to indigents, as distinguished from old age security and needy blind assistance, is vested exclusively in the county supervisors who have discretion, without supervision by the state, to determine eligibility for, the type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief." The reference in this language to the lack of state Supervision refers to the holding in that case that the counties, in administering General Assistance, are not required to obey the orders of the California State Department of Social Welfare. There is, however, no question but that the counties must conform to the provisions of state statutes.
FN 14. The county provides persons seeking General Assistance with a single form, number GA 200/1, which is entitled "Application for General Assistance." The application is referred to the appropriate division of the department of public health and welfare; regulation GA-03 provides that "The Family and Children's Section is responsible for the determination of eligibility and authorizing the grant in all family cases.... All adult cases including families consisting of adults alone are carried by the adult section." Regulation GA-011 requires that "In all cases, the employability of the applicant shall be determined and his work history carefully explored at the time of application." Finally, regulation GA-203.1 places upon the social worker assigned to the case the responsibility "to carefully evaluate the current needs of the applicant or recipient."
In sum, the county does not expect a welfare applicant to be conversant with county standards and regulations, nor require him to cite the basis for his eligibility on his application for benefits. Instead, the county itself takes on the role of inquiring into the relevant facts and determining whether, on those facts, the applicant is eligible for any form or amount of General Assistance.
Respondents further contend that petitioner is not indigent in that he has received free housing from a friend from September to December of 1970. We observe, however, that petitioner was denied General Assistance in September, and must find some place to live pending his appeal and the bringing of this writ. As we stated in Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L. A. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 81, 86 [162 P.2d 630]: "The bare fact that an applicant has by one means or another managed to ward off starvation pending receipt of the payments to which he was previously entitled provides no sufficient excuse for a county to refuse to make such payments."
FN 16. Code of Civil Procedure section 1107 and California Rules of Court, rule 56 permit the filing of an answer opposing the issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus.


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[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 75-748, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon finding that the existing state statutory remedies and common-law actions for negligence and wrongful death were inadequate to protect employees from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), under which a new statutory duty was imposed on employers to avoid maintaining unsafe working conditions. Two new remedies were provided by permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working conditions, and (2) to impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. If an employer contests a penalty or abatement order, an evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), who is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate the proposed abatement order and penalty. The judge's decision becomes the Commission's final, appealable order, subject to review by the full Commission. If such review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement and payment of a penalty becomes final unless the employer petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals, but the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary of Labor may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. In the instant cases separate abatement orders were issued and penalties proposed against petitioners for violations of safety standards promulgated under OSHA. After hearings were held before Administrative Law Judges when petitioners each contested the orders [430 U.S. 442, 443] and penalties, and the judges and later the Commission had affirmed the findings of violations and the abatement orders and had assessed penalties, petitioners sought judicial review in the Courts of Appeals, challenging both the Commission's factual findings that violations had occurred and the constitutionality of OSHA's enforcement procedures. Each Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's orders over each petitioner's contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury trial on the question whether it had violated OSHA contravened the Seventh Amendment, which provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Held: The Seventh Amendment does not prevent Congress from assigning to an administrative agency the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA. When Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at common law." That Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases, but took the existing legal order as it found it, and hence there is little or no basis for now interpreting it as providing an impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statutes. The Amendment did not render Congress powerless - when it concluded that remedies available in courts of law were inadequate to cope with a problem within its power to regulate - so to create such new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law (such as an administrative agency) in which facts are not found by juries. Pp. 449-461.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.
McNeill Stokes argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Nathan Lewin, Martin D. Minsker, and Oliver N. Hormell.
Fn [430 U.S. 442, 444] Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, Howard L. Mocerf, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Richard O'Brecht filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Warren L. Johns, Philip B. Kurland, and Alan L. Unikel filed a brief for the Seventh-Day Adventist Church as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 75-748.
After extensive investigation, Congress concluded, in 1970, that work-related deaths and injuries had become a "drastic" national problem. 1 Finding the existing state statutory remedies [430 U.S. 442, 445] as well as state common-law actions for negligence and wrongful death to be inadequate to protect the employee population from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq. The Act created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, and empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards. 2 Two new remedies were provided - permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working conditions and (2) to impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. Each remedy exists whether or not an employee is actually injured or killed as a result of the condition, and existing state statutory and common-law remedies for actual injury and death remain unaffected.
Under the Act, inspectors, representing the Secretary of [430 U.S. 442, 446] Labor, are authorized to conduct reasonable safety and health inspections. 29 U.S.C. 657 (a). If a violation is discovered, the inspector, on behalf of the Secretary, issues a citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for its abatement and, in his discretion, proposing a civil penalty. 658, 659. Such proposed penalties may range from nothing for de minimis and nonserious violations, to not more than $1,000 for serious violations, to a maximum of $10,000 for willful or repeated violations, 658 (a), 659 (a), 666 (a)-(c) and (j).
If the employer wishes to contest the penalty or the abatement order, he may do so by notifying the Secretary of Labor within 15 days, in which event the abatement order is automatically stayed. 659 (a), (b), 666 (d). An evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission consists of three members, appointed for six-year terms, each of whom is qualified "by reason of training, education or experience" to adjudicate contested citations and assess penalties. 651 (3), 659 (c), 661, 666 (i). At this hearing the burden is on the Secretary to establish the elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his proposed abatement order and proposed penalty; and the judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all of these items, giving due consideration in his penalty assessment to "the size of the business of the employer . . ., the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations." 666 (i). The judge's decision becomes the Commission's final and appealable order unless within 30 days a Commissioner directs that it be reviewed by the full Commission. 3 659 (c), 661 (i); see 29 CFR 2200.90, 2200.91 (1976).
If review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement and the payment of any assessed penalty [430 U.S. 442, 447] becomes final unless the employer timely petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. 660 (a). The Secretary similarly may seek review of Commission orders, 660 (b), but, in either case, "[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 660 (a). If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. 666 (k). Thus, the penalty may be collected without the employer's ever being entitled to a jury determination of the facts constituting the violation.
Petitioners were separately cited by the Secretary and ordered immediately to abate pertinent hazards after inspections of their respective worksites conducted in 1972 revealed conditions that assertedly violated a mandatory occupational safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under 5 (a) (2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 654 (a) (2). In each case an employee's death had resulted. Petitioner Irey was cited for a willful violation of 29 CFR 1926.652 (b) and Table P-1 (1976) - a safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under the Act requiring the sides of trenches in "unstable or soft material" to be "shored, . . . sloped, or otherwise supported by means of sufficient strength to protect the employees working within them." The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,500 for this violation and ordered the hazard abated immediately.
Petitioner Atlas was cited for a serious violation of 29 CFR 1926.500 (b) (1) and (f) (5) (ii) (1976), which require that roof opening covers, be "so installed as to prevent accidental displacement." The Secretary proposed a penalty of $600 for this violation and ordered the hazard abated immediately.
Petitioners timely contested these citations and were afforded hearings before Administrative Law Judges of the [430 U.S. 442, 448] Commission. The judges, and later the Commission, affirmed the findings of violations and accompanying abatement requirements and assessed petitioner Irey a reduced civil penalty of $5,000 and petitioner Atlas the civil penalty of $600 which the Secretary had proposed. Petitioners respectively thereupon sought judicial review in the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, challenging both the Commission's factual findings that violations had occurred and the constitutionality of the Act's enforcement procedures.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Commission's orders in the Irey case over petitioner's and a dissenter's contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury trial on the question whether he had violated OSHA was in violation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides for jury trial in most civil suits at common law. 519 F.2d 1200. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, over four dissents, adhered to the original panel's decision. Id., at 1215. It concluded that this Court's rulings to date "leave no doubt that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable, at least in the context of a case such as this one, and that Congress is free to provide an administrative enforcement scheme without the intervention of a jury at any stage." Id., at 1218.
We granted the petitions for writs of certiorari limited to the important question whether the Seventh Amendment prevents Congress from assigning to an administrative agency, under these circumstances, the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA. 5 424 U.S. 964 .
Congress has often created new statutory obligations, provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred. These statutory schemes have been sustained by this Court, albeit often without express reference to the Seventh Amendment. Thus taxes may constitutionally be assessed and collected together with penalties, with the relevant facts in some instances being adjudicated only by an administrative agency. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599 -600 (1931); Murray's [430 U.S. 442, 451] Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). 8 Neither of these cases expressly discussed the question whether the taxation scheme violated the Seventh Amendment. However, in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), the Court said, in rejecting a claim under the Sixth Amendment that the assessment and adjudication of tax penalties could not be made without a jury, that "the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury," id., at 402. Similarly, Congress has entrusted to an administrative agency the task of adjudicating violations of the customs and immigration laws and assessing penalties based thereon. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335 (1932) ("[D]ue process of law does not require that the courts, rather than administrative officers, be charged . . . with determining the facts upon which the imposition of [fines] depends"); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 9 See also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 , 458 (1929).
In sum, the cases discussed above stand clearly for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at common law." 13 Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant field. This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency. Petitioners would nevertheless have us disregard the interpretation of Jones & Laughlin which we recently espoused in Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall Realty, reading it instead as a holding solely that the entire proceeding before the NLRB was really equitable in nature; and they would have us entirely disregard Block v. [430 U.S. 442, 456] Hirsh, supra. They would have us disregard the dictum in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), that the adjudication of congressionally created public rights may be assigned to administrative agencies, as well as the similar holdings in Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (1856); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); and Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
None of the grounds tendered for so reinterpreting the Seventh Amendment is convincing. It is suggested that in some of the cases, Elting, Oceanic, Murray's Lessee, Phillips, and Helvering, the Seventh Amendment was not expressly put in issue. But these cases are clear enough that in the context involved, there was no requirement that the courts be involved at all in the factfinding process in the first instance. It is difficult to believe that these holdings or dicta did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required. Furthermore, there are the remaining cases where the Court expressly held or observed that the Seventh Amendment did not bar administrative factfindings. Jones & Laughlin, Block, Pernell, and Curtis.
Second, it is argued with some force that cases such as Murray's Lessee, Elting, Oceanic, Phillips, and Helvering all deal with the exercise of sovereign powers that are inherently in the exclusive domain of the Federal Government and critical to its very existence - the power over immigration, the importation of goods, and taxation - and that the theory of those cases is inapplicable where the Government exercises other powers that petitioners apparently regard as less fundamental, less exclusive, and less vital to the existence of the Nation, such as the power to regulate commerce among the several States, the latter being the power Congress sought to exercise in enacting the statute at issue here. The difficulty with this argument is that the Court in these cases, and in [430 U.S. 442, 457] others, did not appear to confine its holdings in this manner. In Murray's Lessee the Court referred to "matters, involving public rights [that] congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper." 18 How., at 284. In Oceanic, which sustained the administrative imposition of a fine for the wrongful importation of aliens, the Court said that its ruling was in accordance with "settled judicial construction" that "not only as to tariff but as to internal revenue, taxation and other subjects" Congress could "impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power." 214 U.S., at 339 . (Emphasis added.) Crowell spoke broadly of the distinction between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority "in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments," see supra, at 452, and gave "familiar illustrations" of the permissible use of administrative agencies in connection with the exercise of such congressional powers as "interstate and foreign commerce." 285 U.S., at 51 . Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 402-403, relying on Oceanic and similar cases, stated simply that "the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury." It is also apparent that Jones & Laughlin, Pernell, and Curtis are not amenable to the limitations suggested by petitioners.
Third is the assertion that the right to jury trial was never intended to depend on the identity of the forum to which Congress has chosen to submit a dispute; otherwise, it is said, Congress could utterly destroy the right to a jury trial by always providing for administrative rather than judicial resolution of the vast range of cases that now arise in the courts. [430 U.S. 442, 458] The argument is well put, but it overstates the holdings of our prior cases and is in any event unpersuasive. Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving "public rights," e. g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated.
More to the point, it is apparent from the history of jury trial in civil matters that factfinding, which is the essential function of the jury in civil cases, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973), was never the exclusive province of the jury under either the English or American legal systems at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment; and the question whether a fact would be found by a jury turned to a considerable degree on the nature of the forum in which a litigant found himself. Critical factfinding was performed without juries in suits in equity, and there were no juries in admiralty, Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830); nor were there juries in the military justice system. The jury was the factfinding mode in most suits in the common-law courts, but it was not exclusively so: Condemnation was a suit at common law but constitutionally could be tried without a jury, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375 -376 (1876); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970). "[M]any civil as well as criminal proceedings at common law were without a jury." Kohl v. United States, supra, at 376. The question whether a particular case was to be tried in a court of equity - without a jury - or a court of law - with a jury - did not depend on whether the suit involved factfinding or on the nature of the facts to be found. Factfinding could be a critical matter either at law or in equity. Rather, as a general rule, the decision turned on whether courts of law supplied a cause of action and an [430 U.S. 442, 459] adequate remedy to the litigant. 14 If it did, then the case would be tried in a court of law before a jury. Otherwise the case would be tried to a court of equity sitting without a jury. Thus, suits for damages for breach of contract, for example, were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury; but specific performance was a remedy unavailable in a court of law and where such relief was sought the case would be tried in a court of equity with the facts as to making and breach to be ascertained by the court.
The Seventh Amendment was declaratory of the existing law, for it required only that jury trial in suits at common law was to be "preserved." It thus did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. Moreover, it did not seek to change the factfinding mode in equity or admiralty or to freeze equity jurisdiction as it existed in 1789, preventing it from developing new remedies where those available in courts of law were inadequate. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), is instructive in this respect. We there held that a jury trial is required in stockholder derivative suits where, if the corporation itself had sued, a jury trial would have been available to the corporation. It is apparent, however, that prior to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merging the law and equity functions of the federal courts, the very suit involved in Bernhard would have been in a court of equity sitting without a jury, not because the underlying issue was any different at all from the issue the corporation would have presented had it sued, but because the stockholder plaintiff who was denied standing in a court of law to sue on the issue was enabled in proper circumstances, starting in the early part [430 U.S. 442, 460] of the 19th century, to sue in equity on behalf of the company.
Thus, history and our cases support the proposition that the [430 U.S. 442, 461] right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved. 16 Congress found the common-law and other existing remedies for work injuries resulting from unsafe working conditions to be inadequate to protect the Nation's working men and women. It created a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The Seventh Amendment is no bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside the regular courts of law.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Senate Report stated: "The problem of assuring safe and healthful workplaces for our working men and women ranks in importance with any that engages the national attention today. . . . 14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents; accordingly, during the past four years more Americans have been killed where they work than in the Vietnam war. By the lowest count, 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each year, resulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work - many times more than are lost through strikes. "In addition to the individual human tragedies involved, the economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses. "This `grim current scene' . . . represents a worsening trend, for the fact is that the number of disabling injuries per million man hours worked [430 U.S. 442, 445] is today 20% higher than in 1958." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970), Leg. Hist. 142. See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, pp. 14-15 (1970); Leg. Hist. 844-845 ("The issue of the health and safety of the American working man and woman is the most crucial one in the whole environmental question . . . the worst problem confronting American workers"). House and Senate debates are reprinted, along with the House, Senate, and Conference Reports, in a one-volume Committee Print entitled Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Sub-committee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1971) (cited supra and hereafter as Leg. Hist.).
[ Footnote 2 ] The statute provides in 5 (a), 29 U.S.C. 654 (a), that each employer: "(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; "(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act."
[ Footnote 3 ] Petitioners make no challenge to the absence of mandatory review by the Commission of the administrative law judge's findings of fact.
[ Footnote 4 ] The other Courts of Appeals which have passed on this issue have uniformly (and without a dissent) agreed with these results. Mohawk [430 U.S. 442, 449] Excavating, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 549 F.2d 859 (CA2 1977); Beall Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 507 F.2d 1041 (CA8 1974); Brennan v. Winters Battery Mfg. Co., 531 F.2d 317 (CA6 1975); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 531 F.2d 451 (CA10 1976). See also Underhill Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 526 F.2d 53, 57 n. 10 (CA2 1975).
[ Footnote 5 ] Each petitioner also argued below that the enforcement scheme violates the constitutional requirements that juries decide fact issues in criminal cases - arguing that the fines involved are "penal" in nature. Each petitioner asked this Court in its petition for a writ of certiorari to review the unfavorable rulings of the courts below on this issue.
[ Footnote 6 ] In light of our disposition of these cases we decline the respondents' invitation to decide whether the dictum in these cases correctly divines the intent of the Seventh Amendment or whether, as the respondents [430 U.S. 442, 450] argue, the Seventh Amendment has no application to Government litigation and leaves solely to the Sixth Amendment the function of interposing a jury between the Federal Government and an individual from whom it wishes to exact a fine. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
[ Footnote 7 ] These cases do not involve purely "private rights." In cases which do involve only "private rights," this Court has accepted factfinding by an administrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Art. III court, analogizing the agency to a jury or a special master and permitting it in admiralty cases to perform the function of the special master. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 -65 (1932). The Court there said: "On the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself." Id., at 51.
[ Footnote 10 ] The Court also rejected the Seventh Amendment claim in Jones & Laughlin on the separate ground that that Amendment is inapplicable where "recovery of money damages is an incident to [nonlegal] relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law," 301 U.S., at 48 -49, since in such cases courts of equity would historically have granted monetary relief. In Jones & Laughlin, the NLRB ordered reinstatement of a dismissed employee, an order analogous to injunctive relief historically obtainable only in a court of equity, and consequently this alternative ground was an adequate one to decide Jones & Laughlin. However, this alternative ground would have been insufficient to decide the more general question of the NLRB's power to order backpay where, for one reason or another, no such equitable order was sought. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 54 (1954); NLRB v. National Garment Co., 166 F.2d 233 (CA8 1948); NLRB v. Brookside Industries, Inc., 308 F.2d 224 (CA4 1962); Bon Hennings Logging Co. v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 548 (CA9 1962); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., Inc., 205 F.2d 902 (CA9 1953); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 125 F.2d 311 (CA7 1941); NLRB v. Carpenters, 238 F.2d 832 (CA5 1956); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 757 (CA7 1941).
[ Footnote 11 ] The Court had reference to Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), in which this Court sustained the power of a bankruptcy court, exercising summary jurisdiction without a jury, to adjudicate the otherwise legal issues of voidable preferences. The Court did so on the ground that a bankruptcy court, exercising its summary jurisdiction, was a specialized court of equity and constituted a forum before which a jury would be out of place and would go far to dismantle the statutory scheme.
[ Footnote 12 ] The holding in Pernell was that the Seventh Amendment applies to resolution of disputes of a "legal" nature - those regarding right to possession of real property when the resolution is entrusted to a forum which customarily employs a jury.
[ Footnote 13 ] We note that the decision of the administrative tribunal in these cases on the law is subject to review in the federal courts of appeals, and on the facts is subject to review by such courts of appeals under a substantial-evidence test. Thus, these cases do not present the question whether Congress may commit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.
[ Footnote 14 ] The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 82, which was in this respect declaratory of existing law, provided: "SEC. 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law."
[ Footnote 15 ] Finally, it should be noted that, if the fines involved in these cases were made criminal fines instead of civil fines, the Seventh Amendment would be inapplicable by its terms. The Sixth Amendment would then govern the employer's right to a jury and under our prior cases no jury trial would be required. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975). It would be odd to hold that Congress could avoid the jury-trial requirement by labeling the civil penalties criminal fines but not by assigning their adjudication to an administrative agency.

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