Defendant's Attorney: Kenneth C. Edelin, Jr.
We review sufficiency of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424–25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). In so doing, we must uphold the jury’s verdict unless it “fall[s] below the threshold of bare rationality.” CaraballoRodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431 (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012)). “Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply because another inference is possible—or even equally plausible—is inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges.” Id. at 432.
left the mosque and entered Saber’s car to finish their conversation.
Later that day Saber met with Agent Reed and agreed to participate in the latter’s investigation of Garner. They made a recorded call to him to further discuss the robbery. On another recorded call made February 9, Garner instructed Saber to surveil Apex Bank, and once that was completed, they would meet with a third individual, Ruben Marshall, to draw up a plan. Saber did as Garner instructed and later met with Garner and Marshall to plan the robbery.
Saber and Garner had several more recorded phone calls between February 10 and 12 outlining the robbery. On the morning of February 12—the day before the planned robbery—Saber arrived to pick Garner up in his car. Once Garner was inside the car, the FBI approached and arrested Garner and staged an arrest of Saber. The FBI found on Garner’s person 17 small packets of crack cocaine, and in Saber’s car a backpack not present before Garner entered. The backpack contained ski masks, a loaded gun, gloves, two-way radios, and ammunition.
To prevail on a conspiracy charge, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was “(1) a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators[,] (2) an intent to achieve a common goal[,] and (3) an agreement to work together toward that goal.” United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2001). Each of the elements may be proven “entirely by circumstantial evidence” so long as “the inferences drawn . . . have a logical and convincing connection to the facts established.” United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Garner argues that there was no “unity of purpose” between himself and Saber, as he was merely “conning” Saber into believing he (Garner) intended to rob Apex Bank. Appellant’s Br. at 28. But this is irrelevant. The charged conspiracy was not between Garner and Saber, but between Garner and Marshall. See Indictment as to James Garner, Doc. #11 at 1, United States v. Garner, No. 2:15-cr-00088-001 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2015). Indeed, merely conspiring with Saber, a government informant, would not make Garner criminally liable. This is the rule in other Circuits, see, e.g., United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422, 1422 n.1 (10th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases), and we adopt it as well. Nor was the jury required to credit his alternate interpretation of the facts.
Garner further contends there could not have been a conspiracy because details about the planned robbery— including both the date on which it would occur and potentially also which bank would be robbed—were not final prior to Garner’s arrest. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But his discussions with Marshall, as well as with Saber, about that robbery all centered on Apex Bank. Garner instructed Saber to surveil Apex, and, when Saber reported back, the three men discussed in detail their plan to rob it. J.A. at 163–177; Supp. App. at 8–17, 29– 30. This was enough to support the conspiracy charge.
stops short of “the last act necessary” for the actual commission of the crime. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 644 (3d Cir. 2004) (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). Here Garner engaged in numerous, and substantial, steps toward robbing Apex Bank, including sending Saber to surveil the location and gathering tools for the robbery. (Garner disputes the credibility of the testimony suggesting that he provided the bag of tools seized during his arrest, but the jury was not required to agree.) Sufficient evidence thus backed the attempt charge.
Finally, Garner’s sole argument as to the charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is that he cannot have possessed a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence if he did not actually commit the underlying crime. But because his challenges to the conspiracy and attempt charges fail, his challenge to the § 924(c) charge fails as well.


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Reference: Chistik OF, Prokofyev VA, Mokronosov AG, Kosilova AF. Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(7), 2761-2772.
Reference: Chistik, O. F., Prokofyev, V. A., Mokronosov, A. G., & Kosilova, A. F. (2016). Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(7), 2761-2772.
Reference: Chistik, Olga F., Vladimir A. Prokofyev, Aleksandr G. Mokronosov, and Alina F. Kosilova. "Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education 2016 11 no. 7 (2016): 2761-2772.
Reference: Chistik, O. F., Prokofyev, V. A., Mokronosov, A. G., and Kosilova, A. F. (2016). Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(7), pp. 2761-2772.
Reference: Chistik, Olga F. et al. "Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, vol. 11, no. 7, 2016, pp. 2761-2772.
Reference: Chistik OF, Prokofyev VA, Mokronosov AG, Kosilova AF. Methodological Aspects in Problem Solution of the Determined Factor Analysis. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(7):2761-72.
The urgency of the analyzed problem is due to the fact that the need to study the relationship of economic phenomena and the comparative analysis of the factor ratings not only in time but also in space requires the development of determined factor analysis. The purpose of the article is to develop a generalized method of determined factor analysis, which increases the accuracy of its results, and it will broaden and deepen its scope. The leading approach to solve the problems of determined factor analysis is a systematic approach that allows establishing a more precise assessment of multiplicative component. Results: The proposed generalized integral method of determined factor analysis has a high precision of factorial assessment, and the ground construction allows carrying out a comparative analysis of the impact of factors on a productive indicator of the surveyed economic system of any level. The data of this article may be useful for the analysis of economic activity of organizations, as well as for the development of the economic development strategy.
Arjomand, M., Emami, K. & Salimi, F. (2016) Growth and Productivity: The Role of Budget Deficit in the MENA. Selected Countries Procedia Economics and Finance, 36, 345-352.
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Moskowitz, T. J., Yao H. O. & Pedersen, L. H. (2012) Time series momentum. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2), 228-250.
Procházka, P. & Čermáková, K. (2015) Influence of Selected Institutional Factors on the Economic Growth: Case Open Markets. Procedia Economics and Finance, 30, 702-709.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently vacated a lower court’s grant of summary judgment on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty allegations against the officers of a failed bank. See F.D.I.C. ex rel. Co-op. Bank v. Rippy, 2015 WL 4910473 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). Beginning in 2006, the FDIC began warning a North Carolina bank about its underwriting and credit administration standards. The warnings continued until 2009, when the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist Order requiring the bank to take certain actions to restore capital. The bank failed to do so, and the bank closed three months later, with the FDIC named as receiver. The FDIC claimed to have suffered $216.1 million in losses and filed a lawsuit in 2011 against the bank’s officers and directors personally, alleging negligence, gross negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that North Carolina’s business judgment rule protected the officers and directors against negligence and fiduciary duty claims in the absence of any evidence of self-dealing, fraud or bad faith, and that there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the District Court had misapplied the business judgment rule with regard to the officers. 12 USC 1821(k) provides that a director or officer of an insured depository institution may be liable to the FDIC for monetary damages for “gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law.” The United State Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the gross negligence standard applies to all bank officers and directors, unless a state has a stricter standard. See Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S. 213 (1997). In North Carolina, a bank officer or director may be liable for ordinary negligence, so officer and directors there are held to this stricter standard. See N.C.G.S. § 55–8–30(a) (for directors) and N.C.G.S. § 55–8–42(a) (for officers).
In interpreting North Carolina law, the Fourth Circuit first found that the bank’s directors were protected by the exculpatory clause in the bank’s articles of incorporation, holding that it protected the directors unless they knew or believed that their acts or omissions were clearly in conflict with the bank’s best interests. Because the directors had only made decisions without adequate information and did not “clearly” know such decisions were not in the bank’s best interest, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the directors.
The bank’s officers, however, were not protected by the exculpatory provision and were protected only by North Carolina’s business judgment rule. Though the business judgment rule created a presumption that the officers acted in good faith and on an informed basis, the FDIC could rebut this by, among other things, presenting evidence that the officers failed to act on an informed basis. Notably, the FDIC submitted an expert report as its evidence that the officers failed to act on an informed basis, specifically alleging that the officers approved loans over the telephone without reviewing documents and often did not review documents until after loans were funded. Thus, the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers on the claims of negligence and the breach of a fiduciary duty. Finally, the Fourth Circuit also found there was no evidence of any intentional wrongdoing by the officers and directors, and the gross negligence claim therefore was properly dismissed.
It should be noted that, as in North Carolina, a bank’s director or officer may be liable under New Jersey law for negligence or the breach of a fiduciary duty. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. DiDomenico, 837 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1993). That said, unlike in North Carolina, New Jersey banks may include exculpatory clauses in their articles of incorporation which protect both directors and officers from personal liability claims, as long as the director or officer may not be relieved of liability for acts or omissions “(i) in breach of that person’s duty of loyalty to the association or its members [defined as an act or omission which that person knows or believes to be contrary to the best interests of the association or its members in connection with a matter in which he has a material conflict of interest]; (ii) not in good faith or involving a knowing violation of law; or (iii) resulting in receipt by that person of an improper personal benefit.” See N.J.S.A. § 14A:2-7; N.J.S.A. § 17:12B-38.1; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hovnanian, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19359 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1994) (holding that the business judgment rule protected claims against a bank’s directors). In New York, on the other hand, a bank’s directors or officers also may be liable for simple negligence, and are not protected by the business judgment rule. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ornstein, 73 F. Supp. 2d 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); F.D.I.C. v. Bober, 2002 WL 1929486, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2002). This decision provides a good lesson on the value of well-drafted exculpatory clauses in a bank’s articles of incorporation.
For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com.


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'Sec. 10. The state may continue to collect all specific taxes accruing to the treasury under existing laws. The legislature may provide for the collection of specific taxes from banking, railroad, plank road, and other corporations hereafter created.
'Sec. 11. The legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law.
'Sec. 12. All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its cash value.
'Sec. 13. The legislature shall provide for an equalization by a state board in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and every fifth year thereafter, of assessments on all taxable property except that paying specific taxes.
'Sec. 10. The state may continue to collect all specific taxes accruing to the treasury under existing laws. The legislature may provide for the collection of specific taxes from corporations. The legislature may provide for the assessment of the property of corporations, at its true cash value, by a state board of assessors, and for the levying and collection of taxes thereon. All taxes hereafter levied on the property of such classes of corporations as are paying specific taxes under laws in force on November sixth, A. D. nineteen hundred, shall be applied as provided for specific state taxes in 1 of this article.
'Sec. 11. The legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law: Provided, That the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation for such property as shall be assessed by a state board of assessors, and the rate of taxation on such property shall be the rate which the state board of assessors shall ascertain and determine is the average rate levied upon other property upon which ad valorem taxes are assessed for state, county, township, school, and municipal purposes.
This change in the Constitution was doubtless owing to a decision of the supreme court of the state (Pingree v. Auditor General [Pingree v. Dix] 120 Mich. 95, 44 L. R. A. 679, 78 N. W. 1025), of date of April 26, 1899, holding unconstitutional an act passed in 1881 in respect to the assessment and taxation of telegraph and telephone lines. An act 19 of 1899, passed March 15, 1899, and commonly called the 'Atkinson bill,' was subject to the same objections as the [201 U.S. 245, 249] act of 1881, and was evidently regarded as equally unconstitutional. Indeed, though not directly involved in that suit, it was referred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice Montgomery.
After a full hearing upon pleadings and proofs the circuit court entered a decree dismissing the bill (138 Fed. 223), whereupon the plaintiff appealed directly to this court, under 5 of the circuit court of appeals act.
Messrs. Lloyd W. Bowers, O. E. Butterfield, Benton Hanchett, A. C. Angell, Henry Russell, and Ashley Pond for appellant.
[201 U.S. 245, 266] Messrs. Charles A. Blair, Roger Irving Wykes, Loyal E. Knappen, John E. Bird, and Charles E. Townsend for appellee.
The unconstitutionality of a statute may depend upon its conflict with the Constitution of the state or with that of the [201 U.S. 245, 291] United States. If conflict with the state Constitution is the sole gound of attack, the supreme court of the state is the final authority ( Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461 , 42 L. ed. 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829, and cases cited in the opinion); while, in the other case, the ultimate decision rests with this court. The validity of this act has not been directly presented to or determined by the state court, but the first attack by the parties interested is made in the Federal court and by this suit, and conflict with both Constitutions is alleged. Undoubtedly a Federal court has the jurisdiction, and, when the question is properly presented, it may often become its duty, to pass upon an alleged conflict between a statute and the state Constitution, even before the question has been considered by the state, and therefore of general public interest. of the act, whether springing out of the state or of the Federal Constitution, may be presented in a single suit, and call for consideration and determination. At the same time the Federal courts will be reluctant to adjudge a state statute to be in conflict with the state Constitution before that question has been considered by the state tribunals. Especially is this true when the statute is one affecting the revenues of the suate, and therefore of general public interest. Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 196 U.S. 599 -609, 49 L. ed. 615-618, 25 Sup.Ct.Rep. 342. And this reluctance becomes more imperative when the statute has been before the highest court of the state, and a decision rendered upon the assumption that it is valid, and this, although the direct question of validity was not presented nor determined.
While this case did not directly determine the constitutionality of the statute, a fair implication is that it was not regarded as obviously in conflict with the state Constitution, for in that event the court would scarcely have taken time to consider the validity of proceedings under its authority.
The first and principal matter of attack is the 'average rate.' It is contended that the fixing of the rate of taxation is a legislative function; that in ascertaining the average rate by the method described there is no exercise of the legislative judgment, but that it is determined by the action of the various local assessing and taxing boards, who, though charged with no [201 U.S. 245, 294] duty of inquiry as to the necessities of the state or the proper rate of taxation of railroad property, are in fact the only officials exercising any discretion and judgment.
There might be a question whether, even if there were a clear delegation of legislative functions to other departments of the state government, it would be void under the Federal Constitution. Whatever, in view of the distinct grant in the Federal Constitution to the President, Congress, and the Judiciary of separately the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the nation, may be the power of Congress in the delegation of legislative functions, a very different question is presented when the restrictions of the Federal Constitution are invoked to restrain like action in a state. Crimes against the nation must be prosecuted by indictment, yet a state may proceed by information. Suppose a state, by its Constitution, grants legislative functions to the executive, or to the judiciary, what provision of the Federal Constitution will nullify the action? Will the grant work an abandonment of a republican form of government, or be a denial of due process, or equal protection?
Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 142 U.S. 217 , 35 L. ed. 994, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 807, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 163, is worthy of consideration on this question of legislative determination. The legislature of Maine graded the rate of an excise tax imposed upon railroads by the amount of their gross transportation receipts, and provided that, when a railroad was partly within and partly without the state, the gross receipts chargeable to the road within the state should be ascertained on the mileage basis. The court below held that as the Grand Trunk Railroad was partly within and partly without the state of Maine, the imposition of the tax was a regulation of commerce, and therefore in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce; and rendered judgment for the company.
See also Home Ins. Co. v. New York, supra, and cases cited in the opinion. Of course, a passenger on the Grand Trunk Railroad knew that the fare he was paying was increasing the gross receipts, and therefore indirectly affecting the amount of the tax collectible under the statute. But it was not to be assumed that he would travel and pay fare with that object in view. No more can it be assumed in the present case that the local taxing officers, although knowing that an increase in their local tax levy will increase the tax rate upon railroads, will be led by that knowledge to forget their single duty to the community for which they are acting. No one pays money for the mere sake of compelling others to pay. Some personal advantage must be intended. No more will local tax officers levy a tax upon their neighbors, those who have placed them in position, for the mere sake of increasing the tax burden upon railroads, especially when the local levy is not followed by an equal increase in the amount of the burden cast upon railroads, and but a trifling fraction of that increase inures, either directly or indirectly, to the benefit of the taxpayers of the locality. The total value of other property in Michigan subject to ad valorem taxes was, according to the record, in the neighborhood of $1,500,000,000. A tax levy in the city of Detroit for local purposes of $1,500,000 would, therefore, increase the rate of taxation on railroad property only one mill, and that increase would profit Detroit but little, as the railroad tax is appropriated for state purposes only.
It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a legislature enacts a specific rule for fixing a rate of taxation, by which rule the rate is mathematically deduced from facts and events occurring within the year and created without reference to the matter of that rate, there is no abdication of the legislative function, but, on the contrary, a direct legislative determination of the rate.
Again, it seems more reasonable that the average rate should [201 U.S. 245, 298] be fixed by this mathematical computation from the other rates already established than for the legislature to prescribe in advance that which it may hope will be such rate. In the one case the exact average is determined; in the other an estimate is made, which may turn out to be more or less than the average.
While the peculiar method of ascertaining the average rate prescribed by this statute may be new, yet the application of an average rate to the taxation of railroads in not new, nor confined to Michigan. See 1, chap. 64, Public Statutes and Session Laws of New Hampshire of January 1, 1901, section first enacted in 1878; 1 Mass. Rev. Laws (1902) chap. 12, 93, p. 227; chap. 14, 37, 40, pp. 266, 268, incl., taken from laws of 1864, 1865, and 1880; 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1899) 9363, 9364, pp. 2175, 2176; Wis. Laws (1903) chap. 315, 7-14, incl. pp. 496-499; Boston, c. & M. R. Co. v. State, 60 N. H. 87; State ex rel. Brown v. Missouri P. R. Co. 92 Mo. 137, 6 S. W. 862; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Lamkin, 97 Mo. 496, 10 S. W. 200; State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 161 Mo. 189, 199, 61 S. W. 603.
We have thus far assumed that there was equity and justice in applying to railroad property the average rate of taxation imposed upon other property. But this assumption is challenged. For instance, the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company's property is situate in the upper peninsula of the state of Michigan-- 'and yet the average rate of tax applied to its property depends upon, and increases with, the taxes raised on all the counties of the 'Lower Peninsula' of Michigan, and in all the cities, towns, villages, and school districts of those counties, for purely local purposes. If Detroit spends $10,000,000 for local government, the Northwestern Railway Company has to pay proportionately more tax on its property in northern Michigan than if Detroit's tax for local government were $5,000,000; and, beyond that, if Detroit spends $1,000,000 or $5,000,000 for purely domestic or private enterprises, such as [201 U.S. 245, 299] gas works, waterworks, street railways, parks, baths, libraries, etc., the Northwestern Railway's tax on its property (though wholly outside of Detroit-in the 'Upper Peninsula') is proportionately larger on that account.
But these considerations appeal mainly to the discretion of the legislature, and do not make against its power. Unless there be some specific provisions in the state Constitution compelling other action, the state may treat its entire territory as composing but a single taxing district, and deal with all property as within the district and subject to taxation accordingly. There is no magic in county organization, no inherent necessity of dividing the state into small taxing districts. Frequently railroads are separated from other property, assessed by a state board, and the taxes collected therefrom applied to the general purposes of the state. Sometimes, it is true, a portion of the taxes thus collected is distributed pro rata to the counties along the lines of the roads, but the power of the state to apply the taxes from railroad property to only state purposes cannot be doubted, and is often exercised. If it may take all the taxes received from railroad property and apply it to general state purposes, and, to that extent, relieve counties in which there is no railroad property from their contribution to the support of the state, it has equal power to say that the average rate of taxation shall be determined, not by the rates upon other [201 U.S. 245, 300] property in the immediate localities in which the railroads are located, but by those upon all property wherever situated in the state. We do not mean to hold that cases may not arise in which enforcing this method of taxation works such injustice to a railroad as to call for judicial interference. But we do hold that the mere fact that all the property in the state is taken into account in determining the average rate does not carry with it such proof of injustice and inequality as to compel the courts in all cases to strike the latter down. From the cases that are before us involving this statute it appears that there are many railroad companies in the state, and we may fairly take judicial notice of the fact that the state is traversed in almost every direction by railroads. And while it is possible that there may be a county or two without one, yet it is an exception, and to hold that for each railroad the average rate must be determined from the property in the localities immediately contiguous or through which its road passes might well introduce into the matter of taxation a confusion and inequality resulting in far greater injustice than the uniformity established by the present system.
See also Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 , 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 Sup.Ct.Rep. 1114; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471 , 46 L. ed. 283, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 176; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 196 U.S. 599 , 49 L. ed. 615, 25 Sup.Ct.Rep. 342.
While there may be no provision for an equalization of railroad with other property. it will be perceived that the statute names the time and place for the sessions of the assessing board, gives to any person or company interested the right [201 U.S. 245, 302] to be heard, and also authorizes the board to correct the valuation. So that it cannot be objected that the railroad companies are precluded from a full hearing on the matter of valuation; and, as has heretofore been said by this court, one hearing is sufficient to constitute due process.
Other questions are discussed by counsel in their briefs, but in view of the exhaustive and well-considered opinion of the trial judge, with the general trend of which we concur, it is unnecessary to further extend this discussion. It is sufficient to refer to that opinion for a consideration of those questions. We have noticed those which seem to us paramount and controlling.
It is charged in the bill that there was a systematic undervaluation of other property in the state, which resulted in denying to this plaintiff the equal protection of the law. The trial court found against this charge. It is enough to say that generally we accept the finding of a trial court upon a question of fact when the testimony respecting it is conflicting. It may also be said that a legislature is not bound to impose the same rate of tax upon one class of property that it does upon another. As it may exempt all of one class, so it may impose a different rate of taxation. It is sufficient if all of the same class are subjected to the same rate and the tax is administrated impartially upon them.
484. Escanaba & Lake Superior Railroad Company v. Same. 485. Grand Rapids &Y Indiana Railway Company v. Same. 486. Wisconsin & Michigan Railway Company v. Same. 487. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Same.
462. Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company v. Powers. 463. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. Same. 464. Toledo, Saginaw & Muskegon Railway Company v. Same. 465. St. Clair Tunnel Company v. Same. 466. Michigan Air Line Railway Company v. Same. 467. Grand Trunk Western Railway Company v. Same. 468. Ann Arbor Railroad Company v. Same. 469. Cincinnati, Saginaw & Mackinaw Railroad Company v. Same. 470. Chicago, Detroit & Canada Grand Trunk Junction Railroad Company v. Same. 471. Munising Railway Company v. Same. 472. Lake Superior & Ishpeming Railway Company v. Same. 473. Marquette & Southeastern Railway Company v. Same. 474. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Same. 475. Sault Ste. Marie Bridge Company v. Same. 476. Mineral Range Railroad Company v. Same. 477. Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic Railway Company v. Same. 478. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Company v. Same. 479. Pontiac, Oxford & Northern Railroad Company v. Same. 480. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company v. Same. 481. Copper Range Railroad Company v. Same. 482. Gogebic & Montreal River Railroad Company v.Same. 483. Manistee & Southeastern Railroad Company v. Same.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


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as a gloss to dividere, it seems cognate with Icel. skilja. (l) Áscilian enucleare (the corresponding gloss in An. Ox. 3898 is: enucleare i. manifestare spyrian), Wrt. Voc. ii. 83, 80: 30, 70. Áscyled enucleata (cf. enucleata, i. investigata gecneátade, An. Ox. 176), 75, 35: 30, 69. (2) Áscylidre secretae, An. Ox. 5434. Áscilede (-scelede, Hpt. Gl. 438, 49) beóð dirimuntur, i. dividuntur, 1367. Áscyledum tectis (motibus intus agit), 5410: excipientibus, i. segregantibus, 5448. v. scilian.
á-scímod. v. scímian in Dict.
á-sciran (e, y); p. -scær, pl. -scæ-acute;ron; pp. -scoren To cut off, away:--Gif hé þone beard of áscire (-scyre, v. l.), Ll. Th. i. 84, 8. Wæs án ormæ-acute;te clif áscoren rihte ádúne, Hml. S. 31, 316. Of áscoren raderetur, An. Ox. 2, 337.
á-scíran; p. de To make clear. (1) lit.:--Biþ se flæ-acute;schoma áscýred swá glæs, Bl. H. 109, 36. (2) fig.:--Þæt hálige godspel ne áscýrde hú hí gefreatwode wæ-acute;ron, Hml. Th. i. 298, 33.
á-scirian. Add:--Ic áscirige separo, Ælfc. Gr. Z. 277, 7. I. to separate, part, remove:--Se sácerd sceolde hine (the leper) fram mannum áscirian, Hml. Th. i. 124, 6. Heora sáwle bióþ áscyrede in helle diópnesse, Wlfst. 219, 10. Áscyrede, ásyndrede sequestrantur, i. segregantur, An. Ox. 1366. Áscyredum remotis, 5389. II. to set apart:--Úre Drihten áscyrede tó láfe þ-bar; þ-bar; wé eft of áwócon, Angl. xi. 2, 42. Ásceredre peculiaris, An. Ox. 11, 5. Þá áscyredan privatam, i. singularem, 361. III. to cut off from association, to hold aloof:--Sé þe hine áscyrede for þyssere scearpnysse fram ús, Hml. S. 11, 167. Se man þe his mód áwent fram eallum þisum bócum, and bið him swá ánwille, þæt him leófre bið, þæt hé lybbe be his ágenum dihte áscired fram þisum, Ælfc. T. Grn. 20, 8. IV. with idea of exclusion, expulsion:--Gítsung and unrihtlice welan ðé áscyriað and ásyndriað fram Gode, Hex. 52, 18. Áscyrige man hig fram þæ-acute;re þénunge abscidantur a ministerio, Ll. Th. ii. 198, 3. Áflýman, áscirian eliminare, i. expoliare, An. Ox. 1963. Ðone áscyrian and ámánsumian fram crístenum mannum, Hml. Th. i. 124, 29. Mæ-acute;den þe hine ne móste áscyrian fram his clæ-acute;num lufe, Hml. S. 4, 14. Ne geþafa þú þ-bar; ic beó fram ðé áscired, 15, 72. Hé trúwode þæt hé næ-acute;re áscyred fram martirdóme þæs hálgan weres, Hml. Th. ii. 310, 28. Þ-bar; hé wurðe ne beó þ-bar; hé beó þanon áscyred non talis qui mereatur proici, R. Ben. 108, 22. Beón áscirod and fram áworpen, Hml. S. 23 b, 438. Beón hig áscyrede (abscidantur) fram eallum gehádodum mannum, Ll. Th. ii. 200, 1. Áscirode, Hml. A. 2, 43. V. to cut off, rob:--Ælmyssan þearfan ná áscyra þú elemosinam pauperis ne fraudes, Scint. 157, 5. v. un-áscirod in Dict.
á-scirpan. Add:--His mód and his ondgit ðæt gecynd áscirpð . . . his ondgit bið áscirped, Past. 69, 8, 13. Áscearptun exacuerunt, Ps. Srt. 63, 4.
á-scirpan (v. sceorp) to dress, make ready; succingere:--Sió wiðerweardnes bið simle untæ-acute;lu and wæru, áscirped mid þæ-acute;re styringe hire ágenre frecennesse adversam fortunam videas sobriam succinctamque et ipsius adversitatis exercitatione prudentem, Bt. 20; 5, 47, 27. v. ge-scerpan in Dict.
á-scirred. l. á-scirped. v. preceding word.
á-scortian to run short, run out, be exhausted:--Æt ðám giftum áscortode wín, Hml. Th. ii. 56, 10.
á-screádian. Add:--Þæt hí þá misweaxendan bógas of áscreádian, Hml. Th. ii. 74, 12.
á-screncan. Add: to trip up, cause to stumble:--Hé mid ðæ-acute;re synne ðæt mód áscrenceð mentem peccato supplantat, Past. 415, 11. Áscrencte elideret, i. offenderet, áscrencte elisi, Wrt. Voc. ii. 143, 9-12. Áscrencan elisisse, 87, 52: 31, 41. Ðonne ætspornað hié and weorðað mid ðæ-acute;m áscrencte subjectorum vita quasi in obstaculo itineris offendit, Past. 129, 7. Gif ðá fét weorðað áscrencte, eal se líchoma wierð gebíged and ðæt heáfod gecymð on ðæ-acute;re eorðan, 133, 1. Hié weorðað áscrencte on ðæ-acute;m scyfe ðæ-acute;re styringe motionis impulsu praecipites, 215, 12.
á-screopan. l. -screpan, and add: to clear off:--Þonne áscrypð hió þ-bar; áter áweg, Lch. ii. 144, 17. Áscrep þá greátan rinde of, 270, 17. Áscrepan (-screfan, Erf.) egerere, áscrepen (-aen, Erf., -an, Wrt. Voc. ii. 39, 17) egesta, Txts. 59, 730-1: Wrt. Voc. ii. 29, 16: 142, 68.
a-screpan to bear out. Dele, and see preceding word.
á-scrincan to shrivel up. v. un-áscruncen.
áscung. Add:--Hió þóhtan hwæt seó ácsung beón scolde, H. R. 7, 27. Mé sprekendum is óðer áxung (quaestio) on mód becumen, Gr. D. 137, 29. Áxsung (interrogatio) múð þínne geopenige, Scint. 81, 8. Hit is þeáw þæ-acute;re spræ-acute;ce and þæ-acute;re áscunge talis est materia, Bt. 39, 4; F. 216, 18. Críst áxode Philippum . . . getácnode hé mid þæ-acute;re ácsunge þæs folces nytennysse, Hml. Th. i. 188, 14. Yfele wé dydon mid þissere áxunge, ii. 300, 14. Þá áxunga (áhsunge, v. l.) þæ-acute;re æ-acute;scan tó wríðende interrogationi interrogationem jungens, Hml. S. 23 b, 495. Áxungum, spyrungum adinventionum (-ibus?), An. Ox. 5214. v. ge-áscung.
á-scunelic; adj. Detestable:--Tó áscunelicum ad detestabile, An. Ox. 4016.
a-scúnian. l. á-scunian, and add: I. to abhor, detest:--Eal lufian þ-bar; hé lufað, and eal áscunian þ-bar; hé áscunað, Ll. Th. i. 178, 5. 'Þú gesáwe gehwæ-acute;de mot on þínes bróðor eáge' . . . þæt is on andgite: þú ásceonudest þá læ-acute;stan gyltas on þíne gingran, R. Ben. 12, 5. Æ-acute;lc þæ-acute;ra þinga bétan þe hí ealle áscunedon, Chr. 1014; P. 145, 7. Wé ásittað þ-bar; þá bóceras áscunion þ-bar; wé ymbe heora dígolnyssa þus rúmlíce sprecað, Angl. viii. 332, 34. Hwæt hí lufian sceolon and hwæt hí sceolon hatian and ásceonian, Wlfst. 303, 24. On áscunigendre synne in detestabili flagitio, Scint. 137, 7. I a. to express hate or scorn of:--Hí ásceonodon &l-bar; hyspton (exprobraverunt) sáwle míne, Ps. L. 34, 70. II. to reject because of hate or scorn:--Hé ásceonaþ &l-bar; áwyrpð (reprobat) smeáunga folca, Ps. L. 32, 10. Beón áscunod and fram áworpen, Hml. S. 23 b, 438 note. Áscunad excusso (cf. excussam, expulsam, 21), Wrt. Voc. ii. 146, 12. v. on-scunian.
á-scuniendlic. Add:--Ásceonigendlic &l-bar; gehyspendlic abominabilis, Ps. L. 13, 1. Slipor &l-bar; ásceonigendlic lubricum, 34, 6. Áscuniendlica intestabilis, Germ. 393, 77. Þá áscuniendlican inepta, i. abjecta, An. Ox. 1900. v. on-scuniendlic.
á-scylfan to throw down, destroy:--Wíbed áscylfan aram pessumdare, Germ. 393, 49. Cf. scylf.
á-scyndan. Add: to drive away:--Drihten hí ealle mid gebeáte út áscynde, Hml. Th. i. 406, 8.
á-scywung shadowing. v. for-áscywung: á-sealcan. v. á-seolcan, -solcen.
á-seárian. Add:--Sóna áseáriað ðá twigu, Past. 308, 1. Treówa hé déð fæ-acute;rlíce blówan and eft raðe áseárian, Wlfst. 196, 2.
á-sécendlic; adj. To be sought out:--Ásécendlice exquisita, Ps. L. 110, 2.

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There has been a buzz in the trade press and industry over when a company is required under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDC Act") to submit to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") a 75-day premarket notification for a new dietary ingredient ("NDI"). Although parts of section 413 of the FDC Act are certainly confusing, the law is clear that an NDI does not need to be notified if it is “present in the food supply as an article used for food in a form in which the food has not been chemically altered.” FDC Act § 413(a)(1). Contrary to what has been reported in the press, to qualify for this alternative to the notification requirement, it is not necessary that the NDI be present and marketed in the food supply as an article used for food prior to October 15, 1994. Presence in the food supply at any time, in any part of the world, is sufficient under the terms of § 413(a)(1).
Section 413 of the FDC Act defines an NDI as “a dietary ingredient that was not marketed in the United States before October 15, 1994 and does not include any dietary ingredient which was marketed in the United States before October 15, 1994” (emphasis added). In other words, dietary ingredients that are first marketed in the United States on or after October 15, 1994 are, by definition, new dietary ingredients.
A new dietary ingredient may be marketed immediately—that is, without FDA notification—if it is “present in the food supply as an article used for food in a form in which the food has not been chemically altered.” FDC Act § 413(a)(1). If there is no such evidence, however, the new dietary ingredient may still be marketed provided that a 75-day premarket notification is submitted to FDA and the notification contains, among other things, evidence that the dietary supplement containing the new dietary ingredient will “reasonably be expected to be safe.” FDC Act § 413(a)(2). In contrast, dietary ingredients marketed in the United States before October 15, 1994 are generally referred to in industry as “old dietary ingredients.” Old dietary ingredients may be immediately marketed in dietary supplements; there is no notification required.
Unlike § 413(c), which specifies that to be an old dietary ingredient, an ingredient must have been marketed in the United States prior to October 15, 1994, § 413(a) makes no such specification; the text “present in the food supply” is not qualified and, therefore, applies to any country’s food supply. Thus, for example, if oat extract is eaten in Scotland (and assuming oat extract is not an old dietary ingredient), then oat extract is “present in the food supply”—the Scottish food supply—and is an “article used for food in a form in which the food has not been chemically altered.” FDC Act § 413(a)(1). Therefore, no NDI notification would need to be submitted.


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carry him across the plate.
Brand s drive the same way.
and Brand one base each.
time in three years the V. K. I.
The cadets made but one error.
so well at critical moments.
Jackson. The score by innings | second. Score, 3-0.
side by trving to drive one past mto Owen's glove.
the single necessary to score struck out Moore. Score, 3-1.
Brand, and Moore went to second.
The general register of the V.
it will be noted that Colonel R.
oii the 18th and 20th instant.
on the line of scrimmage.
four periods of 15 minutes each.
the runner to be allowed.
per cent of their tickets.
Full Text Search THE CADET VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 1910 NO. 22 V. M. I. 4, ROANOKE 2, Prettiest Game of Year Results in Victory for Institute. Old Scores Reversed In the prettiest p:ame on the I daring base running failed to niil this year the baseball team on Saturday defeated the Roan-oke College aggregation by the carry him across the plate. Throckmorton gained his base on a hit to Moorehead, which the score of 4 to 2. This is the first! ^^^^^^ fumbled, Smith treated Brand s drive the same way. Bentley, whose bunt to the pitch-er was thrown to first before he reached there, advanced Throck-morton and Brand one base each. Then Perry tightened up and struck out two men, retiring the side. Score, 2-0. time in three years the V. K. I. has beaten the Salemites, a fact which greatly augmented local satisfaction at the result of the game. The cadets made but one error. While their play was at no time sensational, it was at all times! THIRD INNING sure, the kind of playing that I Foxes high one was promptly wins games. The visitors w e r e ! smothered by Chapman; Ander-sadly deficient in their fielding; this clumsiness would have been productive of many more runs for V. M. I. had not Perry pitch-ed so well at critical moments. The Institute team batted well son succumbed to the wily Mosely; Cooper was hit by a pitched ball. Moorehead tried to put one by Chapman and was thrown out at first. Mosely swatted the first one over for a home run; Bryan was at times when hits meant runs, i ^^ f shortstop; Chap- „ , ' man failed to connect with the The stars of the game were , ^^^ ^^^ ^ Mosely, Perry, Cooper, N., and ball, but was caught stealing Jackson. The score by innings | second. Score, 3-0. follows: ! FOURTH INNING I F I R S T I N N I N G | Jackson started off with a home Cooper, H., was t h e first m a n ' ^un; Perry drew a single, and to face Moselv's delivery. He; was sacrificed to second by Coop-solved it by lining one out to N.. who was out at first; Moore, and was thrown out at Roberts laid down a strong one first. Moorehead couldn't hit to shortstop, but didn't beat the the ball. Jackson retired the ball to first; Smith's fly dropped side by trving to drive one past mto Owen's glove. Chapman ' Throckmorton struck out; Brand drew a free pass to the! was given his base, but initial sack; Bentley struck out;; was caught trying to steal sec- Moore allowed four wild o n e s t o jond; Bentley reached first base goby, thus pushing Brand ahead! on a fielders choice, and stole a bag. Owen proved good lor but died there, as Perry the single necessary to score struck out Moore. Score, 3-1. Brand, and Moore went to second. Mosely struck out; Bryan the next man up. drew a walk, and with the bases full Chapman worked the squeeze on the col-legians and Moore scored. Reed found the various puzzles in Perry's repeitory beyond him, and his swings at the ball pain- F I F T H INNING Fox couldn't connect with Mosely's benders; A n d e r s on drove out a clean hit; Cooper, H., lifted an easy one to Owen, and Anderson was tagged two feet from second by Reed's pretty throw from the plate. Cooper, H.. spoiled what look- 1910 REGISTER OUT ed only the atmo.sphere and thei^^^j like a ' h i t for Owen. Mosely three men on bases. Score, 2-0. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ The general register of the V. M. I. for the present session has just come from the presses, and copies are being distributed. The book is well gotten up, and gives in convenient form a great deal of information about thelnstitute. One of the points in which it differs from its predecessors for many years lies in the fact that it names $400 instead of $365.00 as the sum total of all fixed charges of cadets from the state, it will be noted that Colonel R. T. Kerlin, Ph. D., a graduate of Yale, and Johns Hopkins and a Spanish American war veteran, heads the department of English, while Colonel Ford has charge of that of Latin and history. The current register contains un-usually accurate information of the alumni. Military Notes The few days remaining be-fore the visit of the inspector will be spent in perfecting com-pany and battalion drill; a high degree of efficiency has been at-tained in the several special drills. The inspector will be here oii the 18th and 20th instant. Field equipment for two com-panies has been received from the state authorities, and the companies will be instructed in its use as soon as the inspection is concluded. The two who learn this work best will give an exhibition drill in the prepara-tion of a field encampment at finals. The practice marched will be-gin the second week in May and the battalion will be out about eight days. NEW FOOTBALL RULES ADOPTED Changes Will Revolutionize Style of Playing Batting Average S E C O N D INNING Perry stepped forth and diove one down to Chapman, who threw the runner out at first. Cooper, N., tried a hard drive to Moore, who fumbled; while Mosely struck out Roberts and Smith, the next two up, stole second and third, but even his to Moorehead's error, and Chap-man struck out. Score, 3-1. SIXTH INNING M(X)rehead d r o v e a h a rd grounder to Moore, who fielded it neatly in time to catch the run-ner at first. Jackson tried to put Continued on ya^* 4 A.B. H. PC. 400 347 333 318 291 250 200 150 133 050 047 000 W. T. Davant, '(H), is visiting relatives in Louisana. Mosely 15 () Owen 23 8 Walker 3 1 Moore 22 7 Brand 42 7 Reed 1() 4 Robertson 5 1 Bryan 29 3 Throckmorton 15 2 Bentley 20 1 Chapman 21 1 Grove 2 0 The Intercollegiate Rules com-mittee, at a recent meeting in- New York, made the final decis-ions regarding the rules which will govern football next season, and there ended a great deal of discussion among the general public as to what changes would be made. In formulating rules for a game of this sort the finest experts must be in complete ig-norance of the effect of their changes will be until they have stood the test of a season of ac-tualu se. It is hard to tell just how much, if any, the game will be improved, or how much, if any, the danger incident thereto will be lessened. Among South-ern coaches the opinion seems prevalent that it will degenerate to a "game of marbles," as Coach Gloth expresses it. The changes, which are noted below, will revolutionize both the style of coaching and the methods of attack which have heretofore obtained. A brief resumen of the new rules, or the points wherein they differ from the old, appears below: 1. Removal of the require-ment that the player who re-ceives the ball from the snap-back runs five yards to either side before advancing. 2. A requirement that seven men be maintained by the of-fense on the line of scrimmage. 3. Prohibition of the flying tackle. 4. Division of the game into four periods of 15 minutes each. 5. No pushing or pulling of the runner to be allowed. 6. A requirement that the ball in the case of an onside kick must strike the ground at least 20 yards beyond the line of scrimmage, failing which the members of the team kicking the ball are offside. At Amherst 18 men have been ' dropped from the roll on account :of failures in recent examina- I tions. All students are required 1 at Amherst to make at least GO per cent of their tickets.

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Virginia Beach DUI Attorney – Chesapeake DUI Lawyer : § 18.2-270.1. Ignition interlock systems; penalty. | Swango Law P.C.
Virginia Beach DUI Attorney – Chesapeake DUI Lawyer : § 18.2-270.1. Ignition interlock systems; penalty.
B. In addition to any penalty provided by law for a conviction under § 18.2-51.4 or 18.2-266 or a substantially similar ordinance of any county, city or town, any court of proper jurisdiction (i) may, for a first offense, (ii) shall, for a second or subsequent offense and, (iii) shall, for an offense where an offender’s blood alcohol content equals or exceeds 0.15 percent, as a condition of a restricted license or as a condition of license restoration under subsection C of § 18.2-271.1 or 46.2-391, prohibit an offender from operating a motor vehicle that is not equipped with a functioning, certified ignition interlock system for any period of time not to exceed the period of license suspension and restriction, not less than six consecutive months without alcohol-related violations of the interlock requirements, and shall require that such a system be installed on each motor vehicle, as defined in § 46.2-100, owned by or registered to the offender, in whole or in part, for such period of time. Such condition shall be in addition to any purposes for which a restricted license may be issued pursuant to § 18.2-271.1. The court may order the installation of an ignition interlock system to commence immediately upon conviction. A fee of $ 20 to cover court and administrative costs related to the ignition interlock system shall be paid by any such offender to the clerk of the court. The court shall require the offender to install an electronic log device with the ignition interlock system on a vehicle designated by the court to measure the blood alcohol content at each attempted ignition and random rolling retest during operation of the vehicle. The offender shall be enrolled in and supervised by an alcohol safety action program pursuant to § 18.2-271.1 and to conditions established by regulation under § 18.2-270.2 by the Commission during the period for which the court has ordered installation of the ignition interlock system. The offender shall be further required to provide to such program, at least quarterly during the period of court ordered ignition interlock installation, a printout from such electronic log indicating the offender’s blood alcohol content during such ignitions, attempted ignitions, and rolling retests, and showing attempts to circumvent or tamper with the equipment.


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In consequence of this refusal the savings bank brought an action in the supreme court of the state of New York to enforce the payment by preference, which action was resisted by the receiver. Ultimately the case was taken to the court of appeals of the state of New York, where the claim of preference asserted by the savings bank was maintained. The case is reported in 142 N. Y. 590, 37 N. E. 646. To that judgment the present writ of error is prosecuted.
James C. Carter and Edward G. Herendeen, for defendant in error.
National banks are instrumentalities of the federal government, created for a public purpose, and as such necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States. It follows that an attempt by a state to define their duties or control the conduct of their affairs is absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts with the laws of the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the federal government to discharge the duties for the performance of which they were created. These principles are axiomatic, and are sanctioned by the repeated adjudications of this court.
The question which the record presents is, does the law of the state of New York on which the savings bank relies conflict with the law of the United States upon which the comptroller of the currency rests to sustain his refusal? If there be no conflict, the two laws can coexist, and be harmoniously enforced; but, if the conflict arises, the law of New York is, from the nature of things, inoperative and void as against the dominant authority of the federal statute. In examining the question it is well to put in juxtaposition a summary statement of the federal and state statutes. The first directs the comptroller 'from time to time, after full provision has been made for the refunding to the United States of any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such association, ... to make a ratable dividend of the money paid over to him ... on all such claims as may have been proved.' The second-the state law-directs 'the trustee, assignee or receiver' of 'any bank or trust company which shall become insolvent' to apply the assets received by him 'in the first place to the payment in full of any sum or sums of money deposited therewith by any savings bank, but not to an amount exceeding that authorized' by law.
It is clear that these two statutes cover exactly the same subject- matter. Both relate to insolvent banks; both ordain [161 U.S. 275, 284] that the right of preference on the one side and the duty of ratable distribution on the other shall only result from insolvency; both cover the assets of such banks coming, after insolvency, into the hands of the officer or person authorized to administer them. It is equally certain that both statutes relate to the same duty on the part of the officer of the insolvent bank. The one directs the representative to make a ratable distribution; the other requires, if necessary, the application of the entire assets to payment in full, by preference and priority over all others of a particular and selected class of creditors therein named. We have, therefore, on the one hand, the statute of the United States, directing that the assets of an insolvent national bank shall be distributed by the comptroller of the currency in the manner therein pointed out; that is, ratably among the creditors. We have, on the other hand, the statute of the state of New York giving a contrary command. To hold that the state statute is operative is to decide that it overrides the plain text of the act of congress. This results not only from the fact that the two statutes, as we have said, cover the same subject-matter, and relate to the same duty, but also because there is an absolute repugnancy between their provisions; that is, between the ratable distribution, commanded by congress, and the preferential distribution directed by the law of the state of New York.
The conflict between the spirit and purpose of the two statutes is as pronounced as that which exists between their unambiguous letter. It cannot be doubted that one of the objects of the national bank system was to secure, in the event of insolvency, a just and equal distribution of the assets of national banks among all unsecured creditors, and to prevent such banks from creating preferences in contemplation of insolvency. This public aim in favor of all the citizens of every state of the Union is manifested by the entire context of the national bank act.
Nearly 25 years ago (in September, 1871) the secretary of the treasury submitted to the attorney general of the United States the question of whether the ratable division provided for in the act of congress deprived the United States, as a creditor of an insolvent national bank, of the power to avail of the preference given by the statute, which provides that the United States shall be preferred out of the effects of an insolvent debtor. 1 Stat. 515. The opinion of the attorney general was that the ratable distribution required, when read in connection with other [161 U.S. 275, 286] sections of the national bank law, deprived the United States of all preference, except that given for the payment of the notes issued by such banks. 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 528.
This construction has been the rule administered by the comptrollers of the currency in the liquidation of national banks from that date, and was directly sustained in Cook County Nat. Bank v. U. S., supra, where Mr. Justice Field, as the organ of the court, said: 'The sections directing ratable distribution provide for the distribution of the entire assets of the bank, giving no preference to any claim, except for moneys to reimburse the United States for advances in redeeming the notes.' After holding that the United States could not exercise as a creditor the preference in its favor created by a general law of the United States, the conclusion is thus summed up: 'These provisions could not be carried out if the United States were entitled to priority in the payment of a demand not arising from advances to redeem the circulating notes. The balance, after reimbursement of the advances, could not be distributed as directed by ratable dividends to all holders of claims; that is, to all creditors.' Thus, although for many years in the administration of the act, under a construction given by the attorney general of the United States, sanctioned by the decisions of this court, the ratable distribution provided by the act of congress has been deemed so important as to repeal, in so far as it prevented ratable distribution, the general preference given the United States by its own statute, the contention now advanced maintains that this ratable distribution is of so little consequence that it can be overthrown, and rendered nothing worth, by the provisions of a general insolvent statute of the state of New York. In other words, that the statute of the state of New York operating upon the national bank law is more efficacious than would be a statute of the United States.
Nor is it an answer to say that the ratio decidendi of the ruling in Cook County Nat. Bank v. U. S. was the fact that the statute provided that the United States should take security for the debts to become due her by a national bank. In the case presented by the secretary of the [161 U.S. 275, 287] treasury to the attorney general for consideration the security in favor of the United States was inadequate, and therefore the question which arose was the right of the United States to collect an unsecured claim in disregard of the rule of ratable division. And such was the state of facts contemplated by the opinion of this court in the Cook County Case. This makes it evident that the controlling thought which gave rise to the interpretation sanctioned by this court was the fact that to have allowed the preference in favor of the United States ordained by one of its statutes would have destroyed the rule of ratable distribution established as a protection to and for the benefit of all the creditors of a national bank.
It is certain that, in so far as not repugnant to acts of congress, the contracts and dealings of national banks are left subject to the state law, and upon this undoubted premise, which nothing in this opinion gainsays, the proposition is advanced that the deposit here considered of the savings bank with a national bank imported a contract to pay the claim of the former with the preference allowed by the New York statute. But this overlooks the plain terms of the New York law. That statute does not profess to deal with the bank and its relations as a going concern; it wholly and exclusively undertakes to regulate the distribution of the assets after insolvency. Insolvency, and insolvency alone, is made the criterion from which the preference is to arise. Indeed, the statute in terms directs its mandate to discharge the claim with preference, not to the bank eo nomine, but to the assignee, trustee, or agent charged with administering its effects after insolvency has become flagrant. The claim of contract therefore conflicts with the very terms of the statute upon which it is based, and there is, therefore, no room for implying a contract. If such implication, however, could be invoked, it must rest on the contention that, inasmuch as the state statute gave a savings bank making a deposit the right to be preferred in case of insolvency, therefore the general state law must be presumed to have entered into the contract of the parties; and hence also engender the presumption that [161 U.S. 275, 288] in case of insolvency such deposit should be preferred. If the law of the state is to be read into the contract, then, of course, the law of congress should also be read into it. We should thus have to consider all the deposits as made with an implication that they were subject to the federal law, and hence the conflict between the two laws would become evident, and the federal law, being paramount, would prevail.
The New York statute does not profess, however, to change the legal relation which results from a deposit made in a bank. The deposit of money by a customer with his banker is one of loan, with a superadded obligation that the money is to be paid when demanded by a check. Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U.S. 362 ; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252. The argument, therefore, of implied contract, not only is contrary to the letter of the New York statute, but also destroys the very essence of the legal relation resulting from the dealings between the parties. Nor is the repugnancy between the state statute and the act of congress removed by the contention that, inasmuch as ratable distribution applies only to that which belongs to the bank, therefore there is no conflict between the state statute and the act of congress. This argument can only mean that the effect of the state statute is to make the savings bank, in the event of insolvency of the national bank, the owner of a sum equivalent in amount to the sum of money which was by it deposited. But to say this aggravates the conflict between the state law and the act of congress. If the state statute is to be read as saying that whenever the persons named therein deposit money with a national bank they shall be treated as the owners of an equal sum of the assets of the bank when it becomes insolvent, then the state statute precludes in a most flagrant way the possibility of the ratable distribution ordered by the act of congress. True it is that where, by state law, a lien is made to result from a particular contract, that lien, when its existence is not incompatible with the act of congress, will be enforced. True, also, where a particular contract is made by a national bank, which, from its nature, gives rise at the time of the contract to a claim on a specific fund, such claim, if not violative [161 U.S. 275, 289] of the act of congress, will be allowed. To that effect are the authorities relied on.
Thus it was said by this court in Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499 , 13 Sup. Ct. 148, when dealing with the question of set-off: 'The requirement as to ratable dividends is to make them from what belongs to the bank, and that which at the time of the insolvency belongs of right to the debtor does not belong to the bank.' So in the case of San Diego County v. California Nat. Bank, 52 Fed. 59, it was decided that the funds received by a national bank, which the party depositing had no authority of law to deposit, were not part of the assets to be 'ratably distributed,' but must be returned in full to the rightful owner. And again, in Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958, which was a case where an indorser paid the amount of a note to a bank, and took a receipt, but before he took the note from the bank the bank failed, the substance of the decision was that the money did not belong to the bank, but was held by it in trust; and of course in that case it was not part of its assets.
Nothing, of course, in this opinion is intended to deny the operation of general and undiscriminating state laws on the contracts of national banks so long as such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of congressional legislation. Much was said in argument as to the public policy embodied in the law of the state of New York, and the wisdom of upholding it. Our function is judicial, and not legislative. Did we, however, consider motives of public policy, we should not be unmindful of the wise safeguard in favor of all the people of the United States resulting from the provision which secures to every one dealing with a national bank a ratable distribution of the assets thereof, thereby stimulating confidence and uniformity of treatment.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the court of appeals of the state of New York, with instructions to remit the cause to the court in which it originated with directions to dismiss the action.

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The statutes governing the jury system of the Circuit Courts of South Carolina are found in Chapter 7, Title 14, of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976.
The jury system in South Carolina involves both grand juries and petit juries. From the Clerk of Court's perspective, many but not all procedures for the selections of grand juries and petit juries are similar. The Clerk of Court is responsible for summoning of prospective jurors, venire preparation and management, and compensation of jurors for the Circuit and Probate Courts.
Source lists for juror selection are provided by the South Carolina Election Commission (S.C. Code § 14-7-130). The South Carolina Election Commission compiles the source list from information provided by the South Carolina Department of Public Safety and the Election Commission's database and makes this list available to the county jury commissioners in October of each year.
S.C. Code Ann. §14-7-140 provides for the automation of juror selection and summoning. The automated Jury Management System jury selection segment has been implemented statewide by the Judicial Department's Office of Information Technology pursuant to the Supreme Court Order dated May 17, 2004. The JMS jury selection process is random, impartial, and free of discrimination in respect to any group or individual.
The Office of Information Technology has developed a Jury Management System Manual which may be accessed by clicking on the following link: Jury Management System Manual.
S.C. Const., Article I, § 14 guarantees the right to trial by jury for criminal matters, although the accused may waive this right to be tried by a judge without a jury (bench trial).
B. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury.
S.C. Code § 62-1-306 of the Probate Code authorizes "trial by jury in any proceeding involving an issue of fact in an action for the recovery of money only or of specific real or personal property." Additionally, the Court "may call a jury to decide any issue of fact" in an advisory capacity. Further, this code section reads, "The method of drawing, summoning, and compensating jurors under this section shall be within the province of the county jury commission and shall be governed by Chapter 7 of Title 14 of the 1976 Code relating to juries in circuit courts."
The Clerk of Court will be notified by the Probate Court when a Probate Court jury trial needs to be scheduled. If facilities permit, the Clerk of Court should schedule the probate jury trials concurrently with the next regularly scheduled General Sessions or Common Pleas term, and notify the Probate Court in writing of the date of the scheduled term within ten days of that Court's request. When concurrent scheduling is not possible, the Probate Court must submit a request for a special Probate Court jury term to the Chief Justice through Court Administration. If the request is approved, the Clerk of Court and the Probate Court Judge will decide upon a date for the special term. The Clerk of Court is responsible for summoning, venire preparation, and compensation of Probate Court jurors. The Clerk draws the jury panels and provides jury management when the Probate Court is using Circuit Court facilities. When Probate Court facilities are used, the Probate Court is responsible for jury management. For special jury terms, the Clerk's representative must be present for juror qualification, but drawing the panel and jury management become Probate Court responsibilities.
The July 1, 1987 administrative order governing the Probate Court jury procedure can be accessed at the following link: Probate Court Jury Policy.
On June 7, 2012, A200, R257, H4758 was signed into law by Governor Haley and became effective on that date. The Act amended S.C. Code §§ 14-7-110 and 14-7-140, relating to the jury commissioners for the purpose of summoning of jurors in Circuit Court and the use of a computer for the drawing and summoning of jurors in Circuit Court, respectively, both so as to delete references to jury commissioners and allow the clerk of court or the deputy clerk to perform the function of drawing and summoning jurors.
While the jury selection and summoning process is now implemented through the JMS system, there may come a time when JMS is not available. We have included below the instructions for a manual jury selection and summoning process.
Place the numbered jury list inside of the jury box.
Prepare a slip of paper for each number on the jury list, one number per paper.
Insert each slip of paper into a separate opaque capsule.
Place all prepared capsules into the jury box.
Note: All numbered papers and capsules must be of similar construction, weight, and appearance and without distinguishing marks.
Rotate jury box to thoroughly mix capsules.
Each jury commissioner uses his/her key to open the jury box.
Randomly draw the required number of capsules from the jury box.
Open each capsule and read the number enclosed.
Match the number to the name on the jury list.
Record the jurors name on venire list.
Notify the prospective jurors by way of juror summons.
Under an approved plan, as mentioned in 4.0.1, the physical task of drawing and recording the names of individual prospective jurors may be performed by computer. Computerized drawings take place in the clerk's office as a public event to ensure absolute integrity of the random selection process. The clerk of court or the deputy clerk of court must be physically present for the computerized drawing.
The Clerk of Court is responsible for notifying (or summoning) prospective jurors when they have been selected for jury duty in either the Circuit or Probate Court. As required by law, a juror must be notified of selection for service fifteen days prior to the start of the term for which he/she has been summoned (§ 14-7-160).
Issue a writ of venire facias requiring juror attendance for the first day of the term. Unless exempt from service, summoned jurors must attend the first day of the term of court for which they are summoned, or such other time as designated by the court, such for transfers.
Prepare the summons for each prospective juror drawn. Form SCCA 235 is used for this purpose. Include a return envelope with the form. NOTE: Additional materials may be included with the form. For example, a juror questionnaire (SCCA 219) must be included for petit jurors in capital cases.
NOTE: If mail service is used and a summons is returned as not being deliverable, the summons should be forwarded to the sheriff for service.
For many prospective jurors, aside from traffic court, jury duty may be their only substantial contact with the justice system. The attitudes of prospective jurors will range from having pride in performing a civic duty to resentment at being imposed upon, with general apathy falling somewhere in between. Also, first time jurors will be somewhat confused as to what their obligation as a juror will entail. Currently, the media is filled with glamorized depictions of court happenings as well as entertainment based "staged" courts and some jurors will bring these perceptions into the courthouse. The Clerk of Court should be aware of and sensitive to the many facets of dealing with jurors. If a jury manager's approach to his or her job is customer service oriented, the jurors' perspective and the image of the justice system will benefit. Simple efforts such as providing coffee, a clean jury area, and reasonably comfortable chairs can have a positive effect on jurors. Obviously, because the Clerk of Court is popularly elected, the Clerk has substantial experience and talent in dealing with the public. While there is no official guide to public relations for Clerks of Court, a few procedures are necessary for juror management. The following basic jury management procedures will vary from county to county according to tradition and the personal style of the Clerk.
When prospective jurors report to the courthouse for service, they should be directed to an area separate from the general public, i.e. courtroom or jury room, for roll call and qualification. The jury manager should have a master list of summoned jurors to record information relative to each juror, such as attendance, time of service, excuses, etc.
At some point prior to qualification, prospective jurors should be informed of what to expect during their time of service. The Uniform Juror Information Pamphlet, Form 3, SCRCP, is designed to assist in the orientation of jurors and should be distributed to jurors either when they arrive at the courthouse or before, such as including the pamphlet in a confirmation notice. A juror orientation video is also currently available through the S.C. Bar. Finally, jurors must be given a copy or informed of the substance of the Supreme Court orders dated August 25, 2000 and July 20, 2009, pertaining to pagers, cell phones, and other personal communication devices in the courtroom. (See "Orders" section at the end of this chapter). This order also requires that a copy of the same must be posted on courtroom doors.
All jurors must be qualified before they become members of the jury pool. The judge makes the decisions as to who qualifies and who does not qualify based on statutory provisions. To assist in this decision making process, each summons contains a Juror Information Form and Juror Response Form which the recipient must complete and return to the Clerk of Court within three days after receipt. The Juror Response Form serves to indicate if a prospective juror believes they should be disqualified, exempted, or excused from jury duty. The Clerk of Court collects these forms as they are returned and retains them for use by the court during the term.
Between summons issuance and the reporting date, the Clerk's Office must monitor responses to the summonses so that the Clerk and the Judge know who to expect on the first day of the term. This same procedure is used for Circuit Court and Probate Court juries.
Maintain a master copy of the venire lists of individuals summoned for the term of court or for the grand jury.
Note by each name when the Juror Information Form is received. If changes of address are reported, note that on the list.
If the sheriff returns a summons as undeliverable, indicate on the master venire list all individuals who were not served and those for which an affidavit of failure to locate was filed.
2. send confirming correspondence to the prospective juror. Form letters may be helpful for this task.
This transfer must be noted on the master venire list to include the date of the term of court to which the juror has been transferred.
In accordance with an inter-office procedure, ensure that the juror will be transferred to the appropriate term. For example, a juror transfer calendar could be used to keep track of such changes in service.
Notify the juror in writing of his/her new reporting date.
Transferred jurors should be sent a reminder letter or re-summoned for the term of court to which they were transferred.
NOTE: A transferred juror's name is added to the end of the master venire list, i.e. transferred jurors' names appear in addition to the names normally drawn.
Grand jury selection is normally a two step process that results in a complete panel of six experienced, or "holdover", grand jurors and twelve new grand jurors for each grand jury term. Each year, or six months for use of the alternate method, at the last term of court of General Sessions, the Clerk of Court must draw the names of six of the current grand jurors to continue to serve for the next grand jury term. No juror, however, may serve for more than two consecutive terms. Then, at least fifteen days prior to the first term of court for the next year (or alternatively, the next six months), the names of potential new grand jurors will be drawn. The number of names drawn for this purpose is determined by either the Clerk of Court or the Chief Administrative Judge and should be a number sufficient to impanel a grand jury. The remaining twelve grand jurors will be selected from this group. (§ 14-7-1520) Please see Section 4.0.1 regarding automatic grand jury drawing.
Prepare identical slips of paper with the names of the current grand jurors, excluding those who are completing their second term of service.
Place the slips into individual, identical capsules like those mentioned in section 4.3.
Place the capsules into a suitable container and mix the capsules.
The Clerk of Court will then randomly draw six capsules from the container.
The six names drawn will be holdover grand jurors. Record their names and notify see (4.4) the jurors of their selection to serve the following term.
The Clerk of Court will notify the jury commission to convene for the drawing of a sufficient number of potential grand jurors.
The jury box should be prepared as explained in section 4.3.
The clerk or deputy clerk will draw the appropriate number of capsules randomly from the jury box.
At the time designated for reporting to the court, the presiding judge will qualify the prospective grand jurors based upon the information on the Juror Information and Juror Response Forms, and by questions presented on the judge's initiative. Also, jurors will be disqualified, exempted, or excused in accordance with the requirements of Title 14, Chapter 7 of the South Carolina Code of Laws.
NOTE: When a juror is disqualified, exempted, or excused, make a note of the reason for disqualification, exemption, or excuse by that juror's name on the master copy of the venire list.
Once the prospective grand jurors have been qualified, the names of twelve new grand jurors and alternates for the new term will be drawn by the clerk either through the JMS system or manually.
Prepare identical slips of paper for each juror who qualified.
Place the slips into individual, identical capsules like those described in section 4.3.
Place the capsules in a container and mix them.
Clerk of Court then draws twelve names randomly from the container and places those names on the grand juror list.
Additionally, the Clerk of Court draws three or more names to serve as alternate grand jurors.
When making the grand juror list, place the names drawn in the order in which they were drawn. When the use of an alternate grand juror is necessary, use alternates in the order drawn.
Discharge the remainder of the venire.
The drawing of a petit jury is a public affair and must take place in the Clerk of Court's office. At least ten days in advance of a petit jury drawing, the clerk must publish in the local newspaper or on the courthouse door a notice detailing the place, day, and hour of the jury drawing (§ 14-7-220). Drawings must occur at least fifteen days but no more than thirty-five days before the first day of any term requiring a jury (§ 14-7-190 and § 14-7-200).
Section 4.0.1 of this Chapter addresses the procedure for juror selection.
Note: If a drawing is required for a special Probate Court jury term, the number of jurors to be drawn will be determined by the Chief Justice.
At the start of each term, petit jurors will be qualified by the judge in the same manner as provided for qualification of grand jurors, including the processing of juror transfer, disqualification, exemption, or excuse. If a special Probate Court jury term is held, the Clerk of Court shall have a representative in the courtroom during qualification -- subsequent jury management matters are the responsibility of the Probate Court. After the prospective jurors have been qualified and the jury pool established, panels will be drawn as needed for scheduled trials.
§ 14-7-870. Procedures applicable to excused jurors.
Whenever a juror is so excused, unless the cause of the excuse is permanent physical disability of the juror or the juror is a member of one of the classes of persons set forth in § 14-7-840, the name of the juror must be placed by the clerk on the succeeding panel of the same term, or the next term or a subsequent term of court. The name of the juror so placed on any panel must be in addition to the seventy-five names required to be placed on the panel under the provisions of § 14-7-200, and the juror shall attend the court on the first day of the week for which he has been so designated without the issuance or service of any further process.
§ 14-7-840. Exemption from jury service; requirement of direction by court; maintenance of list of persons excused.
No person is exempt from service as a juror in any court of this State except men and women sixty-five years of age or over. Notaries public are not considered state officers and are not exempt under this section. A person exempt under this section may be excused upon telephone confirmation of date of birth and age to the clerk of court or the chief magistrate. The clerk shall not excuse or disqualify a juror under this section. The clerk of court shall maintain a list of persons excused by the court and the reasons the juror was determined to be excused.
NOTE: Please see section 4.6.2 for information regarding juror transfers.
Once all prospective jurors have been qualified by the judge, have the judge sign the annotated master venire list thereby certifying the serving status of the jurors listed. NOTE: At the conclusion of the term, file this judge certified list with other records of the term so that it will be available for if later requested for review.
Prepare identical blank slips of paper by writing on the slips names of each juror who qualified -- one name per slip.
Fold the slips of paper so the name on it cannot be seen and place the folded slips into individual, identical capsules like those described in 4.3.
Place the capsules in an appropriate container (rotating drum) and mix them thoroughly.
The clerk of court will designate a responsible and impartial person to draw the required number of twenty capsules one by one in the presence of the court or the juror names will be drawn by computer, subject to the provisions of Section § 14-7-140.
If the presiding judge so orders, up to six additional names may be drawn for the jury panel to serve as alternate jurors in cases that are anticipated to be tried over an extended period of time.
As the names are drawn, write each name and juror number on a trial jury list sheet which contains the caption for the case to be heard. This sheet should provide space for notations of plaintiff and defendant strikes.
Send at least five copies of the jury list to the courtroom with the bailiff who escorts the jury.
Keep the names of the jury panel drawn separate from those remaining in the drum until the end of the jury trial.
However, the names of jurors struck from the trial jury list can be returned to the drum for subsequent drawing.
Once a panel has been sent to a courtroom, the process of selecting a trial jury from the jury panel by way of plaintiff and defendant strikes, known as "voir dire," will take place. Each juror on the panel must be sworn prior to voir dire. Section § 14-7-1130 provides that a juror may make an affirmation instead of oath with regard to being sworn.
"Place your hand on the Bible (if no objection). You shall truthfully answer all questions asked of you concerning this matter now before the court, by the court, or order thereof. You shall speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. So help you God (if no objection)."
Distribute copies to the judge, the court reporter, plaintiff's attorney, defendant's attorney, and retain at least one copy for the use of the Clerk of Court.
After the attorneys review the list, each side will be allowed alternately to strike four jurors thereby reducing the jury panel of at least twenty to a trial jury of twelve. The plaintiff's attorney strikes first.
Note strikes by each side on the Clerk's list by placing a mark indicating juror stricken and by whom.
Read the names of the remaining jurors and have them seated in the jury box. The names of jurors stricken are returned to the jury pool.
"You shall well and truly try the issue joined in this case of Name of Plaintiff against Name of Defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence. So help you God (if no objection)."
Prepare identical blank slips of paper by writing on the slips the names of each juror who qualified -- one name per slip.
The clerk of court will designate a responsible and impartial person to draw the capsules, one by one, in the presence of the court or the juror names may be drawn by computer, subject to the provisions of Section § 14-7-140.
The juror should come forward and face the prosecution and the defense. At which point the cerk will inquire of the solicitor, "What says the State?" The solicitor will respond with, "Present the juror" or "Excuse the juror." If the solicitor responds "Present the juror," the clerk will present the juror to the defense with the question of, "What says the Defense?" If the defense says, "Swear the juror," the juror should be directed to take a seat in the jury box. If the defense, or the solicitor when first asked, replies, "Excuse the juror," then the juror should be directed to return to his seat with the jury pool.
If either side says to excuse the juror, have the juror sit back with the jury pool and draw another name to repeat the process.
If both sides say to swear the juror, place the name on the jury list and ask the juror to sit in the jury box.
This process will continue until twelve jurors and alternates, if needed, are selected to be sworn.
Excused jurors' names should be set aside, separate from those to be sworn, to be returned to the jury pool after the jury is impaneled.
The slips of paper bearing the names of the sworn jurors should be kept separate from all others until after a verdict is reached.
"You shall well and truly try the case number Read Case Number, The State versus Defendant's Name, indicted for Read Charge, and render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence. So help you God (if no objection)."
When jurors conclude their terms of jury service, several tasks remain for the Clerk before closing the records on that jury. All jurors need to be paid and provided with official acknowledgment of their jury duty.
Establish and maintain attendance records to support requests for per diem payments for each juror.
Complete and forward to the county treasurer the forms necessary to cause the payment of jurors.
If jurors are not paid before they leave the courthouse, tell them how and when they can expect to be paid, and who they should contact if payment is not received within a reasonable period of time.
Employers frequently require that employees provide verification of jury duty for a specific period. Additionally, goodwill may be gained for the court by offering jurors a verbal or written note of appreciation for their service.
§ 14-17-310. Clerk shall make out roll of jurors and constables in attendance; certificates.
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA: I, A. B. Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas and General Sessions for __________ County, in the said State, do certify that __________ attended as a __________ juror (or actually served as a constable, as the case may be) for said county __________ days at __________ Term, A. D. __________, and is entitled to receive for the same __________ dollars, and ___ cents.
Such certificate shall be signed by the Clerk of Court, who shall issue the same, and be countersigned by the sheriff of the county. All certificates so issued and executed shall be valid.