text:
Battat 68025AM - Includes 21 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits. Recommended for ages 3 years and up. The take-a-part 4x4 lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time. This set includes twenty-one 21 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with three 3 interchangeable bits.
Car parts and fasteners are oversized, made for small hands to manipulate. Requires two AA batteries not included. Recommended for ages 3 years and up. Battat is a family-owned toy manufacturer that is 114 years old and has been in North America for over 40 years. Every battat toy has an educational value, whether it is didactic or nurturing, or collecting and creating worlds for children playing with them.
Battat Take-A-Part Vehicle 4x4 Old Model - Each product is always manufactured to the highest standards under rigorous safety standards. This product is the discontinued 2013 model, in a red Battat Box. Requires two AA batteries -Not included. Car parts and fasteners are oversized, made for small hands to manipulate. Ages 3 and up. The battat take-a-part 4x4 teaches young minds how little parts go together to make big machines.
Branford LTD BT2520Z - Dimensions: packaging is 11. 75" l x 5. 25" w x 7. 2" h. Age limit: 3 years +. Wipe it clean, and it's ready to go! Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. All of battat's toys are tested and meet or exceed the highest safety standards. Cleaning easy: keep your vintage car shiny. Safe and sturdy: made of strong and durable plastic.
. Heavy-duty fun for itty bitty hands! with battat’s take-apart roadster, your 4 year old engineer will build and discover, over and over and over… The roadster’s 18 colorful and chunky pieces are easy to assemble with the functioning battery-powered drill and it turns in both directions, just like the grown-up version! The 3 bits adapt to the different connectors because using the right tools is always best! Kids get to discover shapes and colors without even knowing they’re learning.
Battat – Take-Apart Roadster Car – Toy vehicle assembly playset with functional battery-powered drill - Early childhood developmental skills toy for kids aged 3 and up - 22 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 18 car parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits. Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly. Righty tighty, lefty loosely: drill rotates in both directions and comes with 2 x AA batteries.
Motor skills: helps with concentration, color and shape sorting, as well as fine and gross motor skills. Go cruising: put all the pieces together and take it for a spin around the room! .
Toysmith 68026AM-2 - Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time. This set includes twenty-one 21 parts and a power screwdriver with three 3 interchangeable bits.
Parts and fasteners are oversized, made for small hands to manipulate. Requires two AA batteries not included. Recommended for ages 3 years and up. Battat is a family-owned toy manufacturer that is 114 years old and has been in North America for over 40 years. Every battat toy has an educational value, whether it is didactic or nurturing, or collecting and creating worlds for children playing with them.
Battat Take-A-Part Toy Vehicles Crane Green - Each product is always manufactured to the highest standards under rigorous safety standards. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time. Age limit: 3 years +. Recommended for ages 3 years and up. Parts and fasteners are oversized, made for small hands to manipulate.
22 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 18 car parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits. Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly.
Battat 68026AM - Safe and sturdy: made of strong and durable plastic. Requires two AA batteries-not included. 22 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 18 car parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits. Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly. Righty tighty, lefty loosely: drill rotates in both directions and comes with 2 x AA batteries.
Motor skills: helps with concentration, color and shape sorting, as well as fine and gross motor skills. Go cruising: put all the pieces together and take it for a spin around the room! A more recent version of this toy is available. Crane size: 11. 25" x 5. 25" x 10". All of battat's toys are tested and meet or exceed the highest safety standards.
Old Model Crane - Cleaning easy: keep your vintage car shiny. Big chunky pieces for small hands to play with. Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time.
This set includes twenty-one 21 parts and a power screwdriver with three 3 interchangeable bits.
Battat 68705AM - Wipe it clean, and it's ready to go! Age limit: 3 years +. All of battat's toys are tested and meet or exceed the highest safety standards. Cleaning easy: keep your vintage car shiny. This product is the discontinued 2013 model, in a red Battat Box. Includes 30 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits.
A more recent version of this toy is available. Crane size: 11. 25" x 5. 25" x 10". Ages 3 and up. Battat products are designed with your pre-schooler in mind. This sturdy take-a-part roadster from Battat is 10" X 5" X 5. 5" in size and features 18 vehicle parts, and a power screw driver with 3 different bits. This product is the discontinued 2013 model, in a red Battat Box.
Battat Take-A-Part Vehicle Roadster Old Model - A more recent version of this toy is available. Roadster size: 10" X 5" X 4. 5". Includes 18 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits. 22 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 18 car parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits. Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly.
Branford LTD BT2518Z - This product is the discontinued 2013 model, in a red Battat Box. Includes 30 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits. Ages 3 and up. Safe and sturdy: made of strong and durable plastic. Age limit: 3 years +. Dimensions: packaging is 11. 75" l x 5. 25" w x 7. 2" h. Big chunky pieces for small hands to play with.
Requires two AA batteries -Not included. Wipe it clean, and it's ready to go! Dimensions: packaging is 11. 75" l x 5. 25" w x 7. 2" h. Big chunky pieces for small hands to play with. Safe and sturdy: made of strong and durable plastic. Age limit: 3 years +. Ages 3 and up. A more recent version of this toy is available. Crane size: 11.
Battat – Take-Apart 4x4 Truck – Toy vehicle assembly playset with functional battery-powered drill - Early childhood developmental skills toy for kids aged 3 and up - 25" x 5. 25" x 10".
Branford LTD BT2514Z - Big chunky pieces for small hands to play with. Ages 3 and up. A more recent version of this toy is available. Roadster size: 10" X 5" X 4. 5". A more recent version of this toy is available. Crane size: 11. 25" x 5. 25" x 10". Ages 3 and up. Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time.
This set includes twenty-one 21 parts and a power screwdriver with three 3 interchangeable bits. Parts and fasteners are oversized, made for small hands to manipulate. Requires two AA batteries not included. Recommended for ages 3 years and up. Battat is a family-owned toy manufacturer that is 114 years old and has been in North America for over 40 years.
Battat – Take-Apart Crane Truck – Toy vehicle assembly playset with functional battery-powered drill - Early childhood developmental skills toy for kids aged 3 and up - Every battat toy has an educational value, whether it is didactic or nurturing, or collecting and creating worlds for children playing with them. Each product is always manufactured to the highest standards under rigorous safety standards. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time.
Includes 30 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits.
Branford LTD BT2517Z - Dimensions: packaging is 11. 75" l x 5. 25" w x 7. 2" h. Big chunky pieces for small hands to play with. Includes 18 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits. Requires two AA batteries -Not included. Dimensions: packaging is 11. 75" l x 5. 25" w x 7. 2" h. 22 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 18 car parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits.
Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly. Righty tighty, lefty loosely: drill rotates in both directions and comes with 2 x AA batteries. Motor skills: helps with concentration, color and shape sorting, as well as fine and gross motor skills. Go cruising: put all the pieces together and take it for a spin around the room!
Battat – Take-Apart Airplane – Toy vehicle assembly playset with functional battery-powered drill - Early childhood developmental skills toy for kids aged 3 and up - Age limit: 3 years +. Ages 3 and up. Safe and sturdy: made of strong and durable plastic. Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. The take-a-part crane lets curious minds explore how pieces work together to make a larger whole, and helps train fine motor skills at the same time. This set includes twenty-one 21 parts and a power screwdriver with three 3 interchangeable bits.
Wonder Wheels by Battat – Airplane – Toy Airplane for Toddlers Age 1 & Up (1 Pc).
Toysmith 68705AM-2 - This sturdy toy roadster features 18 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits for hours of mechanical fun. The roadster size is 10-inches x 5-inch x 4. 5-inches. Recommended for ages 3 and up. Battat is a family-owned toy manufacturer that is 114 years old and has been in North America for over 40 years.
Every battat toy has an educational value, whether it is didactic or nurturing, or collecting and creating worlds for children playing with them. Each product is always manufactured to the highest standards under rigorous safety standards. This sturdy toy roadster features 22 vehicle parts and a power screwdriver with 3 different bits for hours of mechanical fun.
Battat Take-A-Part Toy Vehicles Roadster Sky Blue - Mechanical toys help your pre-schooler develop their fine motor skills. Trustworthy: battat's a family-owned company, established in 1897. 25 colorful pieces: this educational toy set comes with 21 airplane parts, a battery-powered drill, and 3 bits. Tiny hands friendly: chunky pieces are easy to grab and put in place with a drill that's user-friendly.
Righty tighty, lefty loosely: drill rotates in both directions and comes with 2 x AA batteries. Motor skills: helps with concentration, color and shape sorting, as well as fine and gross motor skills. Ready for take-off: put all the pieces together and take it for a spin around the room!

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text:
(1) "Board" means Board of Regents.
(2) "Commission" means the "Advisory Commission on Proprietary Schools" created herein.
(3) "Notice to the school" means written correspondence sent to the address contained in the application or affidavit.
(4) "Owner" of a school means, if the school is owned by one or more individuals, each individual; if the school is owned by a partnership, the owners of the school are the partnership and each partner; if the school is owned by a corporation, the owners of the school are the corporation, the officers and directors of the corporation and any stockholder who owns five percent or more, of the total aggregate number of shares of all types of stock issued by the corporation that owns the school, or of any corporation owning stock, directly or indirectly, of the corporation that owns the school.
(l) A training program that does not have attendance requirements in place for persons taking the courses and which offers for sale only nonsequential and noncontinuous courses of one week duration or less which do not exceed twenty hours of training.
(m) A manufacturer-certified training center that offers, at no additional charge to the person receiving training, manufacturer-authorized training that is included as part of the manufacturer's pricing package to prepare persons for certification conferred by the manufacturer and that uses course equipment and materials which are developed and sold by the manufacturer and course instructors and facilities which are certified by the manufacturer.
(n) A school or business enterprise which offers instruction to prepare students for tests which are required for entry into a postsecondary program of study.
(o) A school or business enterprise which offers yoga teacher training.
(p) A school or business enterprise which provides students with advanced training techniques for police and service dogs.
(q) An educator preparation program that is approved by the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
(6) "School employee" means all instructors, administrators, solicitors, clerical and office personnel employed by the school.
(7) "Solicitor" means a person who solicits business for a proprietary school or who offers to sell or sells in this state any instruction or course of instruction offered by a proprietary school.
(8) "Teach out" means the time remaining in an affected student's course of study.
(9) "Treasurer" means the state treasurer.
Added by Acts 1972, No. 311, §1. Amended by Acts 1980, No. 423, §1; Acts 1980, No. 457, §1; Acts 1989, No. 798, §1; Acts 1991, No. 943, §2, eff. July 24, 1991; Acts 1995, No. 1270, §1, eff. July 1, 1995; Acts 1997, No. 280, §1, eff. June 17, 1997; Acts 1998, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 151, §§1, 3, eff. July 1, 1999; Acts 2000, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 63, §1, eff. April 17, 2000; Acts 2001, No. 140, §1; Acts 2003, No. 267, §1; Acts 2011, No. 80, §1, eff. July 1, 2011; Acts 2016, No. 346, §1; Acts 2017, No. 204, §1.

matches: §1 §1 §1 §1 §2 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1


Visitation/Parent-Time - Pearson Law Firm - A full-service law firm that specializes in family law, bankruptcy, and criminal defense lawyer in Utah.
Weekday: One weekday evening decided by the noncustodial parent from 5:30 – 8:30 p.m.
Weekends: The noncustodial parent shall have the child every other weekend, beginning Friday at 6:00 pm and ending Sunday at 7:00 pm.
Extended Parent-time: The noncustodial parent shall have the child up to four consecutive weeks during the summer break, two weeks shall be uninterrupted parent time.
The other two weeks are subject to parent-time for the custodial parent, consistent with these guidelines.
The custodial parent shall also have two weeks of uninterrupted parent time during the summer break.
A parent must notify the other parent of his or her extended parent-time 30 days prior to the end of the school year.
Both parents should allow the other parent liberal telephone contact with the child during his/her parent-time.
In ODD NUMBERED YEARS the noncustodial parent gets the child on the day before or after the actual birth date from 3:00 pm to 9:00 pm.
In EVEN NUMBERED YEARS the noncustodial parent gets the child on the actual birth date from 3:00 pm to 9:00 pm.
Father’s Day/Mother’s Day – the noncustodial parent gets the child day every year on which ever holiday is applicable to the noncustodial parent.
The custodial parent is entitled to the same holidays, but on the opposite years.
Six hours of parent-time per week divided into three parent-time periods in the custodial home or other environment familiar to the child.
Two hours on holidays, pursuant to the schedule found in Utah Code § 30-3-35 (found above).
Nine hours of parent-time a week divided into three parent time periods in the custodial home or other environment familiar to the child.
Eight hours on holidays, pursuant to the schedule found in Utah Code § 30-3-35 (found above).
Brief telephone contact and other virtual parent-time.
One eight hour visit every other weekend.
On the opposite weekend, overnight visit from 6:00 pm on Friday until noon on Saturday.
One three hour visit per week.Eight hours on holidays, pursuant to the schedule found in Utah Code § 30-3-35 (found above).
One weekday evening between 5:30 pm and 8:30 pm.
Alternate weekends, beginning at 6:00 pm on Friday until 7:00 pm on Sunday.
Holiday parent time pursuant to the schedule found in Utah Code § 30-3-35 (found above).
Extended parent-time may be two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, one week shall be uninterrupted, the other week is subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35.
Extended parent-time may be two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, one two week period shall be uninterrupted, the other two week period is subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35.
Pearson Law Firm can provide an attorney that is experienced in family law matters, and who will be able to counsel you and help you get the parent time that you deserve and are entitled to. Contact Pearson Law Firm now to schedule a free consultation with an experienced Utah divorce attorney/family law attorney, 801-888-0991.


text:
Original Sources - BOOK IX.
Contents: Publishers' Note TO HENRY HOPE PREFACE BOOK I. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. CHAPTER VIII. CHAPTER IX. CHAPTER X. CHAPTER XI. BOOK II. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. BOOK III. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. BOOK IV CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. CHAPTER VIII. CHAPTER IX. CHAPTER X. CHAPTER XI. CHAPTER XII. CHAPTER XIII. CHAPTER XIV. CHAPTER XV. CHAPTER XVI. BOOK V. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. CHAPTER VIII. BOOK VI. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. CHAPTER VIII. BOOK VII. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. CHAPTER VIII BOOK VIII. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII. BOOK IX. CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II. CHAPTER III. CHAPTER IV. CHAPTER V. CHAPTER VI. CHAPTER VII.
Benjamin Disraeli (December 21, 1804–April 19, 1881), British Conservative politician, writer, served two terms as Prime Minister and was a key figure in the creation of the Suez Canal. Disraeli's trilogy of political-historical novels were overt prescriptions for Britain's continuing world-power status. Sybil; or, The Two Nations (1845), the middle volume of the three was the more realistic, less idealistic work. Coningsby; or, The New Generation (1844) and Tancred; or, The New Crusade (1847) bookended this triple examination of the state and future of Britain.
Chicago: "BOOK IX.," Coningsby; Or, The New Generation Original Sources, accessed April 24, 2019, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CNRWYAX8H7428DF.
MLA: "BOOK IX." Coningsby; Or, The New Generation, Original Sources. 24 Apr. 2019. www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CNRWYAX8H7428DF.
Harvard: 1844, 'BOOK IX.' in Coningsby; Or, The New Generation. Original Sources, retrieved 24 April 2019, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CNRWYAX8H7428DF.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Case:   UNITED STATES V. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO.
NO. 3.  ARGUED NOVEMBER 14-15, 1956 - DECIDED JUNE 3, 1957 - 126 F.
SUPP. 235, REVERSED AND REMANDED.
OFFENSIVE TO THE STATUTE.  PP. 588-608.
COME WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ACT.  P. 590.
MAKE THEM A "LINE OF COMMERCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CLAYTON ACT.
MARKET FOR AUTOMOTIVE FINISHES AND FABRICS.  PP. 593-595.
1949, BASED UPON AN ACQUISITION OF STOCK WHICH OCCURRED IN 1917-1919.
LESSENING OF COMPETITION.  PP. 597-598.
AND WAS NOT GAINED SOLELY ON COMPETITIVE MERIT.  PP. 600-605.
SHOW THAT RESTRAINT OR MONOPOLY WAS INTENDED.  P. 607.
UNITED STATES V. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. ET AL.
THE CREATION OF A MONOPOLY OF A LINE OF COMMERCE.
CORPORATION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THE STOCK OF ANY OTHER CORPORATION.
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS OF STOCK OF COMPETITORS.
ACQUISITIONS, 168 (1955), H.R. DOC. NO. 169, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
(THE 1914 ACT) APPLIES ONLY TO THE SO-CALLED HORIZONTAL MERGERS  ..
VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE AS WELL AS HORIZONTAL  ..  .""
COMMERCE IN ANY SECTION OR COMMUNITY BUT ALLEGES THAT THE EFFECT WAS "
..  TOO TEND TO CREATE A MONOPOLY IN PARTICULAR LINES OF COMMERCE  ..
DOES AID AND SUPPORT OUR CONSTRUCTION.
SUIT A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A MONOPOLY OF ANY LINE OF COMMERCE.
DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF A TENDENCY TO MONOPOLY IN  ..  ANNY  ..
WHICH MONOPOLY POWER MIGHT BE EXERCISED MUST FIRST BE DETERMINED  ..
OF FABRIC USED BY THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY.
THE MARKET AFFECTED MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL.  STANDARD FASHION CO. V.
THAT COMPETITION MAY BE "FORECLOSED IN A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF  ..
(THHAT MARKET)."  (FN15)  BOTH REQUIREMENTS ARE SATISFIED IN THIS CASE.
THAT MARKET IS FULLY ESTABLISHED IN THE EVIDENCE.
THE THINNER USED TO APPLY "DUCO" TOTALED $12,224,798 (65%), AND "DULUX"
ARGUMENT MISCONCEIVES THE OBJECTIVE TOWARD WHICH SEC. 7 IS DIRECTED.
NEAR THE TIME OF ACQUISITION.  SEE, E.G., INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. V.
615, REV'D IN PART ON ANOTHER GROUND, 272 U.S. 554; UNITED STATES V.
A THREAT OF THE PROHIBITED EFFECTS IS EVIDENT.
AS IT FORGED AHEAD TO ITS PRESENT PLACE IN THE INDUSTRY.
RECONSTITUTED AS THE DU PONT FABRIKOID COMPANY IN 1913.
CONSUMER OF PRODUCTS OF THE KIND OFFERED BY DU PONT," AND THAT JOHN J.
MORE STOCK IN GENERAL MOTORS.
AUTOMOBILES GIVES ANOTHER COMMON INTEREST."
CONCLUSION THAT THE PURCHASE WAS MADE "SOLELY FOR INVESTMENT."
ADOPTION (DU PONT'S ARTIFICIAL LEATHER)."
ARRANGEMENT SET UP BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE DU PONT SALES ORGANIZATION.
WORKS AND LATER DISSOLVED IT.
BUT THEY WOULDN'T MIND SEEING THINGS GOING A LITTLE FASTER."  PIERRE S.
SUGGESTED THAT "A DRIVE SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE FISHER BODY BUSINESS.
IS THERE ANY REASON WHY THEY HAVE NOT DEALT WITH US?"
FISHER BODY WAS STUBBORNLY RESISTANT TO DU PONT SALES PRESSURE.
ESTABLISHED GIVING THE FISHER BROTHERS BROAD POWERS OF MANAGEMENT.
BY OTHER GENERAL MOTORS DIVISIONS.
GAINED SOLELY ON COMPETITIVE MERIT.
AND SERVICE WERE NOT OVERLOOKED BY EITHER DU PONT OR GENERAL MOTORS.
RESTRAINT OR MONOPOLY WAS INTENDED.
PARTICULAR CASE."  INTERNATIONAL SALT CO. V. UNITED STATES, 332 U.S.
GRANTED.  IT IS SO ORDERED.
PROBABLE JURISDICTION.  350 U.S. 815.
FN2  126 F. SUPP. 235.
FN3  38 STAT. 736, 15 U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  25.
PRIOR TO 1950.  64 STAT. 1125, 15 U.S.C. SEC. 18.
THE SHERMAN ACT.  26 STAT. 209, AS AMENDED, 50 STAT. 693, 15 U.S.C.
FN6  38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  18.
U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  18.
FN8  SEE, E.G., S. REP. NO. 698, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 13; H.R. REP.
NO. 627, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 17.
FN9  51 CONG. REC. 16002.
DU PONT AND FOR WHICH ITS TRADEMARK IS 'DUCO' ..  .
THE CAR WAS DELIVERED  ..  .""
IT ON A LOWER PRICE THAN THAT QUOTED BY ANY OTHER COMPETITOR, DO YOU?
"A.  WELL, WE DON'T KNOW.  WE GO IN AND WE BID BASED ON OUR COSTS.
FINISHES, 126 F. SUPP., AT 288-292, AS TO FABRICS, ID., AT 296-300.
COMMERCE' LITERALLY ARE SATISFIED."  278 U.S., AT 253.
CONSTITUTE A MARKET LARGE ENOUGH FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO RELY ON."
CORPORATIONS, JULY 1956, P. 2.
FN18  N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 3, 1956, P. 1, COL. 3.
USE AS AN AUTOMOTIVE FINISH.
REFRIGERATORS, ALSO MANUFACTURED BY GENERAL MOTORS.
FN21  126 F. SUPP., AT 295.
FN23  STANDARD FASHION CO. V. MAGRANE-HOUSTON CO., 258 U.S. 346.
OF COMPETITION  ..  .""  38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  18.
FN26  126 F. SUPP., AT 335.
FABRICS.  126 F. SUPP., AT 297.
FN30  126 F. SUPP., AT 243.
FN31  126 F. SUPP., AT 241.
FN32  126 F. SUPP., AT 241.
FN33  126 F. SUPP., AT 245.
FN34  126 F. SUPP., AT 267.
IN MY MIND MORE THAN OVER-BALANCES CONSIDERATION OF LOCAL CONDITIONS.
THAT YOU HAVE THE BEST SERVICE AND PRICE POSSIBLE.
SECONDARY, AND I AM SURE THIS IS YOUR FEELING."
ENJOIN ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SECS. 1 AND 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, AND SEC.
UNLAWFULLY WITH GENERAL MOTORS' PURCHASING AND MANUFACTURING POLICIES.
MEANING OF THE CLAYTON ACT."  126 F. SUPP. 235, 335.
TO CHANNEL GENERAL MOTORS' PURCHASES TO DU PONT."
APPLICABLE TO A STOCK ACQUISITION WHICH TOOK PLACE MANY YEARS BEFORE.
PRACTICE, AND ALL THE PRECEDENTS EXCEPT ONE DISTRICT COURT DECISION.
THAT THE FACTS OF THIS CASE FALL WITHIN ITS THEORY OF ILLEGALITY.
MERGERS.  (FN3)  IT DOES NOT APPLY TO ACQUISITIONS OF PHYSICAL ASSETS.
732, 15 U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  18.
RESULT IN EITHER OF THOSE UNLAWFUL EFFECTS.
CONCLUSION THAT SEC. 7 DOES NOT APPLY TO VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS.
HOLDING COMPANIES.  H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 17.
AN ORE PRODUCING CORPORATION, A CLASSIC TYPE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION.
ACQUISITIONS (MAY 1955), 168, H.R. DOC. NO. 169, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
REMEDY ITS INADEQUACIES.  THIS RESULT WAS ACHIEVED IN 1950.  64 STAT.
EVIDENCE OF THE PROPER SCOPE OF SEC. 7.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V.
BUNTE BROS., INC., 312 U.S. 349, 351-352.
FABRICS CO. V. VERNEY BRUNSWICK MILLS, INC., CCH TRADE CASES PARA.
CO. OF AMERICA V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 284 F. 401 (C.A. 3D CIR.
IN TRANSAMERICA CORP. V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 206 F.2D 163 (C.A. 3D CIR.
CREATE A MONOPOLY.    FINALLY, THIS COURT HAS TWICE CONSTRUED OLD SEC.
THE ACQUIRED CORPORATION WAS IN A PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL CONDITION.
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V.
APPARENTLY WILL BE OVERRULED SUB SILENTIO BY TODAY'S DECISION.
OTHER ISSUES WHICH MUST THEN BE REACHED.
CLAYTON ACT, AND ALL EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS.
THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SEC. 7 PROVIDES THAT "NO CORPORATION  ..
CONTINUE TO HOLD  .. THEE STOCK  ..  OFF ANOTHER CORPORATION  ..
IN "TWO OR MORE CORPORATIONS."  CONCEDEDLY, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE.
CONSUMMATION."  S. REP. NO. 698, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 1.
CONSTITUTES A RESTRAINT OF TRADE PROHIBITED BY THE SHERMAN ACT.
RENDERING THE ORIGINALLY LAWFUL ACQUISITION UNLAWFUL AB INITIO.
STRIKINGLY ENOUGH, ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.
THE TIME THEY MADE THEIR DECISION.
TRANSAMERICA CASE, 5 STAN.  L. REV. 179, 220-221.
F.2D 615 (C.A. 3D CIR. 1925), REV'D IN PART ON ANOTHER GROUND, 272 U.S.
554; UNITED STATES V. REPUBLIC STEEL CORP., 11 F. SUPP. 117 (D.C.N.D.
AT THE TIME OF ITS ACQUISITION AND NOT BY ITS SUBSEQUENT USE.
SUCH EFFECTS WERE "REASONABLY PROBABLE" AT THE TIME OF ACQUISITION.
DETERMINED ONLY IN TERMS OF THE MARKET AFFECTED," ANTE, P. 593.
NO RESTRAINT FOR 30 YEARS, THE JUDGMENT BELOW MUST BE AFFIRMED.
SEC. 7 WAS VIOLATED BY THIS 1917-1919 STOCK ACQUISITION.
ARE AUTOMATICALLY AND COMPLETELY FORECLOSED FROM THE CUSTOMER'S TRADE.
FROM DU PONT'S STOCK INTEREST IN GENERAL MOTORS.  ANTE, PP. 588-589.
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.  SEE FED.
PURCHASING AGENT AND PRESENTS A SEPARATE SELLING JOB.
PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURER OF FINISHES WAS ATTAINED MUCH EARLIER.
OLDSMOBILE.  126 F. SUPP., AT 288.
DURABLE LACQUER WHICH CONTAINED A LARGE AMOUNT OF FILM-FORMING SOLIDS.
COMPARABLE CARS "IN A USED CAR LOT" "IS THE PAINT."
WHICH CONTINUES TO FINISH PART OF ITS REFRIGERATORS WITH PORCELAIN.
SELLING A SUBSTANTIAL VOLUME OF THE FINISHES USED BY THAT DIVISION.
SUPPLANTED BY A COMPETITOR OFFERING BETTER SERVICE.
SCRAP BOUGHT FROM DU PONT COMPETITORS.
SUFFERED COMPETITIVELY FROM ITS SUBSTANTIAL USE OF DUCO."  126 F.
COTTON AND WOOL PRODUCTS OF WHICH MOST OF THE UPHOLSTERY IS COMPOSED.
SUPPLIED BY DU PONT'S COMPETITORS.
CHANGING REQUIREMENTS AS TO QUALITY, SERVICE AND DELIVERY."  126 F.
MAKES AND WHICH GENERAL MOTORS BUYS.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY PURCHASING FROM DU PONT.
MATERIALS, SAFETY GLASS, AND SYNTHETIC RUBBER AND RUBBER CHEMICALS.
IMPROVED PRODUCT WAS ADOPTED BY ALL THE LARGE AUTO MANUFACTURERS.
PLEASED."  126 F. SUPP., AT 324.
INTEREST RATHER THAN COMPETITIVE CONSIDERATIONS.
ARE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE IN ANY WAY TO DEALINGS IN THE EARLIER PERIOD.
SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS TO THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY.
DIMINISHING DU PONT'S PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL MOTORS' AFFAIRS.
332, 339; UNITED STATES V. YELLOW CAB CO., 338 U.S. 338, 341-342.
ARE SUPPORTED BOTH BY CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND BY ORAL TESTIMONY.
PRACTICE."  UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORP., 110 F. SUPP.
WILL GO TO SUBSTITUTE ONE COMMODITY FOR ANOTHER."  UNITED STATES V.
IS PRIMARILY ONE OF FACT.
PRODUCTS SUFFICIENTLY DISTINCT FROM ALL OTHER FINISHES AND FABRICS  ..
THAN FIXED PRICE SCHEDULES.  DULUX IS INCLUDED IN THE "AUTOMOBILE"
FABRICS - SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION.
ITS TOTAL SALES, WERE TO PURCHASERS OTHER THAN AUTO MANUFACTURERS.
AS A FINISH HAVING THE UNSPECIFIED BUT "PECULIAR CHARACTERISTICS"
DISTINCTIVE OF "AUTOMOTIVE FINISHES."  ANTE, P. 593.
FROM DU PONT (38.5%) AND $5,815,000 FROM OVER 50 DU PONT COMPETITORS.
AS A MARKET OF DISTINCT PRODUCTS.
LEATHER, AND COATED FABRICS IS NOT SO LIMITED.
MAY BE FORECLOSED FROM A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF THE RELEVANT MARKET.
PRIVATE ACTION FOR TREBLE DAMAGES.
ORIGINAL LANGUAGE OF SEC. 7 AND NOT BY SEC. 7, AS AMENDED.
THAT SEC. 7 DID NOT PROHIBIT ASSET ACQUISITIONS.  1 F.T.C. 541-542.
ORIGINAL CLAYTON ACT HAD BEEN INADVERTENT.  SEE, E.G., 96 CONG. REC.
14316, 14420, 14456; H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 17; S. REP.
NO. 698, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 13.
SYNONYMOUS WITH THE SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN COMPETITION CLAUSE.
CHILTON); ID., AT 16320 (REPRESENTATIVE FLOYD).
CUMMINS, AND OTHERS THOUGHT WOULD BE QUITE DIFFICULT.  SEE 51 CONG.
AGAINST MY AMENDMENT.  I DO NOT CLAIM THAT THIS WILL STOP EVERYTHING.
14455.  NO ONE DISPUTED SENATOR REED'S INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 7.
BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON H.R.
ALLEGATION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SEC. 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT.
SOUGHT TO STRIKE OUT THE "TEND TO CREATE A MONOPOLY" LANGUAGE OF SEC.
LANGUAGE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN IMPLIED REPEAL OF THE SHERMAN ACT.
THAT WHAT THEY DID ADD INCLUDED VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS.
COULD BE DEALT WITH UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT.
PONT'S 23% STOCK INTEREST  ..  .""  ANTE, P. 607, N. 36.
AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM.
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF A MARKET IS RESTRAINED.
PRODUCTS FROM COMPETITORS OF DU PONT.
THE SUSPENSION OF AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION DURING THE WAR.
OR 71% OF THE TOTAL, WAS FINISHES.
OF $30,000 IN THAT YEAR; ONE COMPANY SOLD AS MUCH AS $3,205,000.
GENERAL MOTORS IN THAT YEAR.
DUCO HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE FURNITURE INDUSTRY.
EXCELLENT, AND I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU COULD SAY, ANY BETTER."
IT IS APPROPRIATE BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION.  ANTE, PP. 606-607, N. 35.
CONSIDERATION IS TO DO THE BEST THING FOR DELCO-LIGHT COMPANY  ..  .""
OF DELCO WAS THE RESULT.
..  .""  ANTE, P. 606.
THAT DU PONT PURCHASED GENERAL MOTORS' STOCK SOLELY FOR INVESTMENT.
ON A COMPETITIVE BASIS."  126 F. SUPP., AT 242, 243.
COMMISSION, 66 F.2D 37, AFF'D BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT, 291 U.S.
SEC. 7, EXPRESSLY EXCEPTING ACQUISITIONS MADE "SOLELY FOR INVESTMENT."
AUTOMOBILE DUCO PRODUCTION IN 1941 AND 83% IN 1947."  ANTE, P. 605.
WERE 8.1% OF THE INDUSTRY.
HAD OTHER READILY AVAILABLE SOURCES OF SUPPLY.
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NATIONAL MARKET WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO THEM.
TEND TO CREATE A MONOPOLY OF ANY LINE OF COMMERCE.
THE PENAL PROVISIONS THEREOF OR THE CIVIL REMEDIES THEREIN PROVIDED."
38 STAT. 731-732, 15 U.S.C. (1946 ED.)  SEC.  18.

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text:
This Reply Brief of Appellant City of Toledo was filed for the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls.
This case revolves around legitimate efforts by both the state and local legislative bodies to address a problem with vicious dogs generally and with pit bull dogs specifically. Appellant, City of Toledo, is an urban area where persons and pets live in close proximity in the urban environment. The actions or inaction of one citizen can have an immediate detrimental affect on the neighbors of that citizen. While a loose dog in a bucolic rural setting cause some problem, aggressive dogs running wild within the city could pose more of a threat.
The statutes and ordinance that the Appellee and Amici on his behalf have challenged, Ohio Revised Code 955.22 and Toledo Municipal Code 505.14, are, in reality, rather innocuous, common sense approaches to addressing a problem faced in the City of Toledo. Toledo City Council when enacting Ordinance No. 373-99 in 1999, which was codified as Toledo Municipal Code 505.14, recognized certain problems that it hoped to address with the enactment of the ordinance. Council recognized, for instance, that “pit bulls are being raised in Toledo for the purpose of illegal dog fighting” and that “attacks on individuals by vicious dogs in public places are a continuing concern.” See Ordinance No. 373-99 Appendix to Appellant's Merit Brief pp. 63-64. In an effort to curb these recognized problems City Council enacted an ordinance that required the owner of a pit bull or other vicious dogs to take certain common sense steps to be a responsible dog owner. For instance, a person living in the City of Toledo should, with certain exceptions, only own one pit bull. See Toledo Municipal Code Section 505.14(a). Further, an owner of that pit bull would be required to keep the dog on a leash and muzzled when the dog is in public. The Toledo Municipal Code also adopts common sensical regulations found within the Ohio Revised Code at Sections 955.11 and 955.22 would require the owner of a pit bull to properly confine his/her dog in an effort to prevent its running wild in the neighborhood. *2 Finally, Toledo Municipal Code adopted portions of the state law that would require owners of a pit bull to maintain liability insurance. Undoubtedly, it is not too much to ask that a person choosing to own a pit bull make an effort to be financially responsible for any damages that dog may cause.
Appellee and his supporting amici suggest that evidence was introduced in the trial court which would indisputably prove that the purposes behind Toledo Municipal Code Section 505.14 are no longer valid. Appellee is, mistaken.[FN1] In fact, Appellee's own Brief, at p. 8, acknowledges that pit bulls are used in illegal dog fighting, one of the very purposes behind City Council's enactment of the ordinance.
FN1. Appellee has filed two Merit Briefs in this case. Because both Briefs are similar Appellant, unless otherwise noted, will be referring to the Brief filed by the Appellee, pro se, as it was the later of the Briefs filed.
This court has wisely held “[u]less there is a clear and palpable abuse of power, a court will not substitute its judgment for legislative discretion. Local authorities are presumed to be familiar with local conditions and to know the needs of the community.” Porter v. Oberlin (1965) 1 Ohio St 2d 143 at 149, 30 O.O. 2d 491,494, 205 NE 2d 363, 368. This court should, follow this sound precedent and defer to the legislative finding of the Toledo City Council.
FN2. Contrary to Appellee's argument, however, there has been no proven change of condition that would justify overruling the statutes and ordinance challenged herein.
*3 Just as importantly, this court should be reluctant to affirm the lower court's precedent in this case because such precedent could have far-reaching, negative consequences in many areas of criminal law. Any time a local government or the state legislature enacted a statute or ordinance that prescribed certain conduct, that ordinance or statute would be at the mercy of any defendant that has the wherewithal to bring in expert to testify that the prohibited conduct was not inherently wrong or dangerous. For instance, how could a ban on “Saturday Night Specials” survive when an expert could easily be found to say they are no more dangerous than any other handgun. How could a prohibition on the ownership of a flamethrower survive when statistics could undoubtedly be introduced to show that flamethrowers are used in relatively few crimes? Could marijuana continue to be prescribed when experts can be found to suggest that it is no more dangerous than the legal alcoholic beverages readily available in the community? Precedent like that created in the Court of Appeals in this matter would severely undermine the police powers of both the state and local governments in Ohio.
II. Toledo's Ordinance is Entitled to Strong Presumptions and a Constitutionality which have not been overcome.
Appellee has not presented any evidence to suggest that all or even a majority of pit bull owners are, in fact “responsible.”[FN3] To the contrary, Appellee admits that pit bulls are often employed in the illegal “sport” of dog fighting. Appellee br. p. 8.
FN3. Of course one would think that responsible pit bull owners would not be opposed to confining their animal or maintaining proper insurance to address the contingency of an injury caused by it.
Rather, Appellee claims to have scored a great victory in court because it was proven, he thinks, that pit bulls are not inherently dangerous. This of course is not really the issue in the case. Undoubtedly, just as many responsible persons may safely own a machine gun, some persons may safely raise a pit bull. However, the mere fact that some innocent person may be affected by a statutory proscription does not render the law improper. Village of Hoffman Estate v. Flipside, 455 US 489, FN 9 (1982).
While this court should be disinclined to reweigh the evidence presented at the Municipal Court, it is apparent that Appellee did not present evidence to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the concerns addressed by City Council and the State Legislature when enacting the statutes and ordinance in question.[FN4] “Regulation of items that have some lawful as well as unlawful uses is not an irrational means of discouraging [unlawful conduct].” Id at FN 9.
FN4. Contrary to Appellee's suggestion that breed-specific legislation was based on now discredited studies, even in cursory review of current literature suggests otherwise. See for instance, “Pit Bulls at Top of Fatal Attacks” http://www.sfgate.com/cgi/bin/article cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/23/mngroddh561.dts, “Dog Bite Statistics” http:// www.dogexpert.com/dogb?ites?tatistics/dogbitestatistics.html.
*5 This court has persistently held that legislation should only be invalidated with great caution and in the clearest of cases. See, for instance State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbaher (1955) 164 Ohio St 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 NE 2d 59. This is not one of those cases.
III. Toledo's Ordinance Bears Irrational Relationship to a Legitimate Legislative Goal.
The safety and welfare of the citizens and safety forces of the City of Toledo is a legitimate area for local lawmakers to address with legislation. In this case, the City of Toledo properly sought to exercise its police powers to legislate against the threat of illegal dog fighting and the increased threat of dog bites in public areas. To that end and in exercise of its police powers, the City of Toledo enacted the present version of Toledo Municipal Code 505.14. This Code Section bears a rationale relationship with its intended purpose and should be upheld.
FN5. The United States Supreme Court has stated the same in regards to federal substantive due process challenges: “The evidence presented by the refiners may cast some doubt on the wisdom of the statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary “to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation’...” Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland 437 US 117, 124 (1978).
The Court of Appeals properly recognized that protection of people and property from injuries by dogs is a clearly legitimate government interest. However, the Court of Appeals found no rational relationship between the ordinance and the statute because according to the *6 Court of Appeals logic the problems being addressed, i.e., the danger of aggressive animals in crowded urban setting are not addressed by the statutes and ordinances in question. Rather, according to the Court of Appeals the problems being addressed “are attributable to the owners, not because the pit bulls are inherently dangerous. See Appendix p. 26. Simply put, the Court of Appeals was wrong to make this observation. The law applies to owners, rather than dogs. It is the irresponsible owner that the law seeks to regulate. Lost in the shuffle of court hearings is the real issue in this case.
The real issue in this case is not, as the Court of Appeals and Appellee like to think, whether pit bulls are inherently dangerous. The real issue in this case is whether pit bulls in the hands of irresponsible owners in an urban setting pose a danger to other residents of the City and whether or not they are often used in illegal dog fighting. These issues were not addressed by Appellee in a satisfactory manner to justify reversal. Further, the Court of Appeals logic in claiming the law should be struck down because the dogs themselves are not at fault so much as irresponsible owners flies in the face of common sense.
Under the logic employed by the Court of Appeals, no weapon could be outlawed because the weapon itself in its inert form is rather harmless. There is no inherent danger, for instance, in a sheathed knife or an unloaded cannon. Under the Court of Appeals logic an attempt by a legislature to regulate the concealment or ownership of certain weapons would fall flat unless the weapon itself was inherently dangerous rather than being dangerous in the hands of an irresponsible user.
The activism of the Court of Appeals is hard to conceal. This activism, if it is affirmed, will be paid for by the victims of those irresponsible dog owners in an urban setting that allow *7 their pit bull to remain a threat to neighbors and safety forces in Toledo. Further, the City's laudatory efforts to combat the cruel “sport” of dog fighting will be for naught.
For the foregoing reasons and for those more fully addressed in its Merit Brief, Appellant urges this Court to reverse.
CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee.

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › District Courts › Pennsylvania › Eastern District of Pennsylvania › 2002 › McNEIL-PPC, INC. v. L. Perrigo Co.
L. PERRIGO COMPANY, and Perrigo Company, Defendants.
*357 Dianne Brown Elderkin, Thomas D. Smith, Gwilym J.O. Attwell, Woodcock Washburn, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Steven R. Trybus, Harry J. Roper, George S. Bosy, Sarah L. Taylor, Lisa M. Kattan, Aaron A. Barlow, Greg D. Bonifield, Timothy J. Baron, Eric L. Lohrenz, Raymond N. Nimrod, Roper & Quigg, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Wayne A. Graver, Thomas Finarelli, Lavin, Coleman, O'Neill, Ricci, Finarelli & Gray, Philadelphia, PA, Douglas H. Siegel, *358 James A. Mitchell, Steven L. Underwood, Richena Y. Brown, Price, Heneveld, Cooper, DeWitt & Litton, Grand Rapids, MI, for defendants.
This is a patent infringement action. Plaintiff McNeil-PPC, Inc. ("McNeil") alleges Defendants L. Perrigo Company and Perrigo Company (collectively "Perrigo") infringe four McNeil patents covering a popular version of the Imodium® Advanced antidiarrheal. In a Memorandum and Order issued April 3, 2002, I construed certain disputed claim terms pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996). Beginning April 22, 2002, this matter was tried without a jury, and I enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This action pits a manufacturer of national brand pharmaceuticals against its competitor, a generic drug manufacturer. Four patents owned by Plaintiff McNeil are at issue in this case: United States Patents 5,248,505 ("the '505 patent") (PTX1) and 5,612,054 ("the '054 patent") (PTX2) are referred to as "the Garwin patents"; United States Patents 5,679,376 ("the '376 patent") (PTX3) and 5,716,641 ("the '641 patent") (PTX4) are referred to as "the Stevens patents."
In November 2000, Perrigo filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application with the FDA seeking the approval of a loperamide-simethicone combination tablet. Thereafter, Perrigo sent a Patent Certification Notice Letter informing McNeil that McNeil's patents were invalid or not infringed by Perrigo's ANDA drug. (PTX14.) On March 7, 2001, McNeil filed suit against Perrigo, alleging the infringement of a host of patent claims. Subsequently, McNeil twice amended its complaint, narrowing the patent claims at issue.
[T]here was concern at McNeil that there might be other sleeper patents out there that could inhibit McNeil's ability to work in the area where McNeil was already working or planning to work, and if there were patents to be had, McNeil wanted to havewanted us to think of them first.
A method for treating a human suffering from an intestinal disorder characterized by the symptoms of diarrhea and flatulence or gas comprising administering to said human in a combined pharmaceutical composition, an effective amount of an antidiarrheal compound selected from the group consisting of loperamide, bismuth subsalicyclate, diphenoxylate, polycarbophil, their pharmaceutically acceptable salts and mixtures thereof; and an antiflatulent effective amount of simethicone, wherein the amount of simethicone administered is 125 mg per dosage unit and the amount of loperamide administered is 2 mg per dosage unit.
A composition of treating a human suffering from an intestinal disorder characterized by the symptoms of diarrhea and flatulence or gas comprising: an effective amount of an antidiarrheal compound selected from the group consisting of loperamide, bismuth subsalicyclate, diphenoxylate, polycarbophil, their pharmaceutically acceptable salts and mixtures thereof; and an antiflatulent effective amount of simethicone, comprising 125 mg of simethicone and 2 mg of loperamide.
It is Applicant's recognition of this problem, i.e., the concurrence of diarrhea and flatulence as indicated in a proprietary survey of patents which forms the basis of the present invention. The invention, therefore, lies not in the discovery of a novel solution to this problem, but in the discovery of the problem itself.
Second, McNeil's attorneys permitted the Examiner to believe mistakenly that Dr. Garwin was the first to combine an antidiarrheal with simethicone. In allowing the '054 patent application to issue, the Examiner stated: "The present application . . . is allowable because there was not any prior art or references showing a composition comprising an effective amount of an antidiarrheal compound and an antiflatulent compound." (DX13 at 186.) Despite having an opportunity to comment on the Examiner's reasons for allowance, McNeil *362 failed to take any action to correct this error. (DX13 at 184.) More importantly, as is explained below, prior artincluding prior art not presented to the Examiner disclosed such a combination.
One of ordinary skill in the art of the Garwin '054 and '505 patents would have been a medical doctor with pharmaceutical or clinical research experience, or a chemist, biochemist, or pharmacologist with a doctoral degree and with experience in the pharmaceutical industry, and either of which would also have had ability in identifying appropriate and acceptable combinations of active ingredients for commercial medications for symptoms of diarrhea in conjunction with one or more additional gastrointestinal symptoms.
(DX571, McNeil's Resp. to Interrog. 7).
[At the time of Dr. Garwin's claimed invention] you want to make a combination that treats diarrhea and gas. The concept is out there. The question is what products are you going to use, and you're very likely to use, obvious to use, the best-selling antidiarrheal in the United States and combine it with essentially the only compound you can combine it with, which is simethicone, which is the one compound that is approved as efficacious for gas problems in the United States.
The so-called "secondary considerations" are part of the obviousness analysis. Secondary considerations, which relate to objective evidence of nonobviousness, include evidence of commercial success, unexpected results, and copying of the claimed invention.
Moreover, in assessing McNeil's evidence of unexpected results, it is significant that as a self-limiting disease, diarrhea "go[es] away on its own, without any treatment." (Kaplan TT at 311.) Within forty-eight hours of its onset, diarrhea "tend[s] to go away." (Thibodeau TT at 547). Thus, the amelioration of symptoms may be due to pharmaceutical treatment or the mere passage of time. Among other things, this fact counsels against accepting McNeil's sweeping assertions that the clinical studies show unexpected results and synergy that are not merely statistically significant, but biologically and medically significant as well.
A therapeutically effective amount of simethicone wherein the oral dosage form has a first portion containing the pharmaceutical and a second portion containing simethicone and the first and second portions are separated by a pharmaceutically acceptable polymeric barrier, which is impermeable *367 to simethicone and the pharmaceutical.
2. The solid dosage form of claim 1 wherein the pharmaceutical comprises loperamide HCl.
providing the simethicone in a second portion of said dosage form; and separating said first and second portions with a pharmaceutically acceptable polymeric barrier which is impermeable to simethicone and the pharmaceutical.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the pharmaceutical is selected from the group consisting of loperamide, loperamide-N-oxide, pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof and combinations thereof.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein the pharmaceutical contains loperamide HCl.
Pursuant to Markman, I previously construed disputed claim terms. Specifically, the term "portion" was construed as "a part of the whole"; the term "polymeric barrier" was construed as "a material that is a polymer or contains polymers and which separates the first portion from the second portion"; and the term "impermeable to simethicone and the pharmaceutical" was interpreted as meaning "not permeable, impassable to simethicone and the pharmaceutical."
Simply, Perrigo's product does not contain an impermeable barrier. Rather than being buried in the granules, as McNeil contends, loperamide particles in Perrigo's ANDA product are exposed on the surface of the granules. (Celik TT at 888-90l; DX638.) Additionally, in at least three different ways, Perrigo's granules have been readily shown to be permeable. First, mercury porosity tests show that Perrigo's granules are highly permeable. (Celik TT at 897-99; DX670.) Second, the mercury porosity tests confirm that the loperamide granules have relatively large openings through which simethicone can pass. (Celik TT at 900; DX666.) Third, Perrigo's granules tend to wick, or soak up the simethicone. (Celik TT at 901-02; DX31 at MC6681.) That is, Perrigo's granules in fact absorb simethicone.
The Garwin patents, in Examples I and II, teach the separation of loperamide *369 from simethicone by putting the two into separate tablet layers. (PTX1, 2.) In these examples, the loperamide and the simethicone are separated by placing the two compounds in distinct layers.
The Garwin patents teach the separation of loperamide and simethicone into two separate layers, whereas the Stevens patents add an impermeable polymeric barrier between the two layers. The Rider patent separates simethicone from an antacid by employing an impermeable polymeric barrier.
It is significant that the parties in this action are a drug manufacturer and its generic competitor. In enacting the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration *370 Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc, and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (the "Hatch-Waxman Act"), Congress struck a balance between two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs, and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market. Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a manufacturer that seeks to market a generic drug may submit an ANDA for approval by the FDA, rather than submitting a full New Drug Application ("NDA") concerning the safety and efficacy of the generic drug. Likewise, the generic manufacturer may rely on safety and efficacy studies previously submitted by the pioneer manufacturer by submitting information showing the generic drug's bioequivalence with the previously approved drug product. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A). See generally Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.2002).
Here, as the holder of an approved NDA for a chewable loperamide and simethicone tablet, McNeil enjoys a period of exclusivity for its combination product without regard to the protection, if any, afforded by the patent laws. If the patent-holder files suit, the FDA will not approve a generic for marketing under an ANDA until the patent has expired, thirty months have passed since the patentee received notice of the ANDA, or the suit is resolved. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1996).
With respect to the earlier Garwin patents, Perrigo concedes that its ANDA product literally infringes claims 14 and 16 of the '505 patent, and claim 15 of the '054 patent, if they are valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2) (defining submission of ANDA as act of infringement). Therefore, the issue with respect to the Garwin patents is whether those patents are invalid as obvious.
Patents are presumed valid, and the law requires Perrigo, as the patent challenger, to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2002). Having conceded infringement, Perrigo must clear this high hurdle in order to prove the invalidity of the Garwin patents.
[I]f the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103. "Although it is well settled that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, it is also well understood that there are factual issues underlying the ultimate obviousness decision." McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2001) *371 (citing Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1479.) Specifically, the obviousness analysis is based on four underlying factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966). "`[A] reasonable expectation of success, not absolute predictability' supports a conclusion of obviousness." Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2000) (quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 896 (Fed.Cir.1985)).
"In holding an invention obvious in view of a combination of references, there must be some suggestion, motivation, or teaching in the prior art that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to select the references and combine them in the way that would produce the claimed invention." Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed.Cir.2001). Furthermore, "[the] case law makes clear that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references." In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir. 1999). This evidence may flow from the prior art references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed.Cir.1996). Here, filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art, the prior art disclosed that flatulence is frequently a concurrent symptom of diarrhea, and that this problem can be addressed by combining a known antidiarrheal with simethicone. In addition, by the time of Dr. Garwin's claimed invention, loperamide was a well-known and successful antidiarrheal. Accordingly, there was a clear motivation to combine the loperamide and simethicone.
Considering the date of invention and level of ordinary skill in the art, the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the accused product and prior art, and the motivation to combine, Perrigo has made out a strong prima facie case of obviousness.
A prima facie case of obviousness may be rebutted by secondary considerations. See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998). Indeed, the secondary considerations "may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record" related to the issue of obviousness. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed.Cir.1983). "[S]econdary considerations, when present, must be considered in determining obviousness." Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 667 (Fed.Cir.2000). In this case, McNeil has advanced a number of arguments in an effort to rebut Perrigo's strong prima facie case of obviousness. These efforts, however, are unavailing.
One way for a patent applicant to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness is to *372 make a showing of "unexpected results," i.e., to show that the claimed invention exhibits some superior property or advantage that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have found surprising or unexpected. The basic principle behind this rule is straightforward that which would have been surprising to a person of ordinary skill in a particular art would not have been obvious.
In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed.Cir. 1995). To show unexpected properties, McNeil must show enhancement in "one of a spectrum of common properties" when that enhancement would not have been expected by one of skill in the art. In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646 (Fed.Cir.1987). Here, although McNeil has presented evidence tending to show enhancement, there are compelling reasons to question the validity of the underlying clinical studies upon which that evidence is based, and McNeil's proposition that such evidence was unexpected is doubtful. The results of McNeil's clinical studies are also of limited relevance because they do not compare the loperamide-simethicone with the closest prior art, i.e., another antidiarrheal and simethicone. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed.Cir.1991).
Sales of the Imodium Advanced tablet have been substantial, and the marketed product is the product disclosed in the Garwin patents. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed.Cir.1988) ("[A] prima facie case of nexus is generally made out when the patentee shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing (product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.") Nevertheless, the probative value of the commercial success of Imodium Advanced is significantly mitigated by the fact that Imodium Advanced's sales are the calculated result of an aggressive marketing campaign of unprecedented scope in the antidiarrheal market.
Given the strong prima facie case of obviousness, including the clear motivation to combine, and the limitations and defects in the secondary evidence presented by McNeil, Perrigo has proven by clear and convincing evidence that claims 14 and 16 of the '505 patent and claim 15 of the '054 patent are invalid for obviousness. See Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1483-84.
After determining the meaning and scope of the asserted patent claims pursuant to Markman, an infringement analysis entails a determination of whether the accused product or method meets each and every limitation of the properly construed claim. See, e.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed.Cir.2000). See also Bai v. L & L Wings, 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998) (determination of infringement is question of fact). For the reasons *373 set forth in the findings of fact, Perrigo does not literally infringe the asserted claims of the Stevens patents.
If a claim element is not literally infringed, infringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if the accused product or method contains the equivalent of that claim element. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 137 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1997). As the law stood at the time of trial, when an amendment narrows the scope of a claim for a reason related to the statutory requirements for patentability, prosecution history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the amended claim element. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.Cir.2000), vacated by 535 U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002). McNeil admits that elements of the asserted claims of the Stevens patents were amended during prosecution for reasons related to patentability.
There are some cases . . . where the amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.
Id. at 1842. On the record before me, McNeil has not presented any evidence rebutting the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars McNeil from claiming infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Furthermore, Perrigo has proven the invalidity of the Stevens patents; therefore, I need not reach the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Given the strong prima facie case of obviousness and the minimal secondary evidence presented by McNeil, Perrigo has proven by clear and convincing evidence that claims 1 and 2 of the '376 patent and claims 1 through 3 of the '641 patent are invalid for obviousness.
An award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party is authorized in an "exceptional" case. See 35 U.S.C. § 285. In assessing whether a case qualifies as exceptional, I must consider the totality of *374 the circumstances. See Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 978-79 (Fed.Cir.1986). As the party seeking attorneys' fees, Perrigo must prove the exceptional nature of the case by clear and convincing evidence. See Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 810-11 (Fed.Cir.1990). Exceptional cases are normally those involving bad faith litigation or misconduct by the patentee in procuring the patent. See Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fed.Cir.1992). Particularly during the prosecution of the patents in suit, McNeil's conduct was careless, irresponsible, and, at the very least, tantamount to studied and deceptive ignorance. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1384 (Fed.Cir. 2001). McNeil's repeated erroneous representations, failure to disclose relevant prior art, and overall persistence in prosecuting exceedingly obvious "inventions" make this case exceptional.
Although McNeil's misconduct during prosecution alone makes this case exceptional, there is further evidence warranting an award of attorneys' fees. It is significant that McNeil is a highly sophisticated party, readily capable of assessing not only the merits of its claimed invention, but also its expected profits as compared to the costs that would be incurred in the event that their patents were held invalid. Put differently, the Garwin and Stevens patents amount to a scheme for extending the life of a drug about to go off patent, and McNeil executed this scheme without the slightest regard for the intent and purposes of the patent laws. Indeed, McNeil's sole motive was to compromise these statutes and constitutional protections for the sake of profits.
The patent laws "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by rewarding innovation with a temporary right to exclusivity. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837. Long ago, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 11 How. 248, 267, 13 L. Ed. 683 (1850), the Supreme Court established that the sine qua non of patentability is invention, and as stated in 35 U.S.C. § 100(a), the legal definition of invention is synonymous with discovery. As is widely understood, a discovery is an act of "gaining knowledge of or ascertaining the existence of something previously unknown or unrecognized." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 647 (1993). Over time, patent law has developed its own, new language, and has even come to require special qualifications for lawyers appearing before the PTO. These developments tend to obscure *375 the fundamental notions of invention and discovery.
Acting within this often esoteric area of the law, patent lawyers are called upon to play the roles of chemists, engineers, physicians, and physicistsnow, they are also asked to be magicians. That is, patent lawyers are asked to defendwith smoke and incantations when necessarybusiness-driven decisions having nothing to do with inventing or discovering anything. Consistent with schemes to prolong the legally-protected period of exclusivity, companies hire highly talented attorneys to perform acts of legal legerdemain in order to make modest developments look and feel like inventions, when in reality the purported discovery is nothing more than a creation of an advertising and marketing department. In-house counsel should be cautioned that complicity in patent prosecution for unsanctioned legal purposes may give rise in the future to review of that behavior by the appropriate attorney disciplinary machinery. Advancing a client's economic interests is not a license to forget one's ethical responsibilities.
It is not lost on this Court that by developing ("not inventing") a combination drug, the law automatically permitted McNeil a three-year period of exclusivity, which ran from October 1997 to October 2000. However, by concocting multiple patent applications and litigating their validity, this period of exclusivity has been extended by two years and, with an appeal, will extend even further, effectively doubling the initial period of exclusivity. The business-driven decision that it is worth the investment to "invent an invention" will continue unabated unless a vigorous PTO or a Court sees this transparent attempt to subvert the patent laws for what it is. The patent laws are not the private sandbox of pharmaceutical companies. Regrettably, I am constrained by law to award only counsel fees for Plaintiff's behavior, although I am not unmindful of the fact that while this patent litigation continues, competition in the marketplace is foreclosed and the public is forced to pay higher prices.
While the trial attorneys in this case have proven themselves informed, articulate, and instructive, in the end I was left to dispel the illusions concealing the true nature of the "invention" to reach my own conclusion: as Gertrude Stein phrased it, "there is no there there."
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike New Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims (Document No. 90) is DENIED as moot.
2. Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees (Document No. 101) is GRANTED.
3. It is DECLARED that claims 14 and 16 of United States Patent 5,248,505 are invalid, and judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff's claim for infringement of United States Patent 5,248,505.
4. It is DECLARED that claim 15 of United States Patent 5,612,054 is invalid, and judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff's claim for infringement *376 of United States Patent 5,612,054.
5. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff's claim for literal infringement of United States Patent 5,679,376.
6. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff's claim for literal infringement of United States Patent 5,716,641.
7. It is DECLARED that claims 1 and 2 of United States Patent 5,679,376 are invalid.
8. It is DECLARED that claims 1, 2, and 3 of United States Patent 5,716,641 are invalid.
9. Defendants shall submit a petition for counsel fees by July 10, 2002. Plaintiff shall have until July 29, 2002 to file a response.
 This action arises under the patent laws of the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2) and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c) and 1400(b).
 The '505 patent covers a method for treating gastrointestinal distress; the '054 patent covers the related pharmaceutical composition.
 The trial transcript is cited in the following format: (name of witness) TT at (transcript page(s)).
 Many exhibits contain multiple page number designations. Where more than one designation is present, the clearest page number designation is cited.
 In each of the four patents in suit, loperamide is among a list of antidiarrheals that may be combined with simethicone. No evidence suggests, however, that McNeil seriously considered any antidiarrheal other than loperamide for its Imodium products.
 Claim 14 of the '505 patent incorporates claims 1 and 2 and is set forth accordingly herein to include these limitations.
 Claim 15 of the '054 patent incorporates claims 1 and 2 and is set forth accordingly herein to include these limitations.
 McNeil argues that in the absence of inequitable conduct, evidence relating to improper patent prosecution is irrelevant. This argument appears to miss the mark. See Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., 98 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed.Cir. 1996) ("facts relevant to the issue of obviousness were before the district court, including . . . prosecution history in the PTO"). In any event, what happened before the PTO in this case does not affect the statutory presumption that the Garwin patents are valid. The discussion of the prosecution history is primarily intended to highlight fundamental flaws in McNeil's contention that the Garwin patents are nonobvious. Lastly, the history of the Garwin patents' prosecution reveals that certain comments made by Judge Learned Hand seventy-five years ago are no less apt today: "[T]he antlike persistency of [patent] solicitors has overcome and . . . will continue to overcome, the patience of examiners, and there is apparently always but one outcome." Lyon v. Boh, 1 F.2d 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y.1924).
 McNeil's trial counsel did not represent McNeil during the prosecution of the Garwin or Stevens patents.
 Priority of invention "goes to the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice." Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed.Cir.1993). While Dr. Garwin's notebook includes a memorandum of September 23, 1988 documenting his conception of combining loperamide and simethicone in a single composition to treat diarrhea and gas, at trial McNeil failed to produce any evidence of diligence in reducing the alleged invention to practice. However, because McNeil has not established when the claimed invention was actually reduced to practice, the filing date of the first Garwin patent application serves as the date of constructive reduction to practice. See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.Cir.1998). In light of this date of invention, the Chavkin patent is prior art.
 In view of the fact that the basic loperamide patent was nearing expiration, to a McNeil researcher, the motivation to combine loperamide with simethicone would have been overwhelming.
 McNeil's projections indicate that the total sales of all Imodium Advanced products will approach $200 million by the end of 2002. (PTX57, 455 at MC100885).
 After its claims had been twice rejected for obviousness, as predicted by Judge Learned Hand, McNeil returned to the PTO to argue that unexpected results proved that the Garwin patents were nonobviousness.
 To the extent that a generic drug manufacturer's attempt to create the bioequivalent of a pioneer manufacturer's drug, without more, may be considered copying, I note that a showing of copying is only equivocal evidence of nonobviousness. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1995)).
 Perrigo has taken the position that certain materials used in its ANDA drug are not polymeric, and, on this basis, the Stevens patents are not infringed. At trial, both parties presented evidence related to whether certain materials should be considered "polymeric." At bottom, this dispute raises the question primarily of interest to a semanticistof whether "monomeric" and "polymeric" are mutually exclusive terms. In light of my construction of "polymeric" as "a material that is a polymer or contains polymers," Perrigo's product does contain polymeric materials.
 The figures included in the Stevens patents are identical to those in the earlier Rider patent.
 Significantly, Perrigo's ANDA product also employs the mechanism of adsorbtion to prevent simethicone migration.
Q: What do the Stevens' patents have to say about [the simethicone migration problem]?
A: Well, their invention prevents the simethicone from migrating into the pharmaceutical.
Q: [Y]ou would accept agree with me that Ryder [sic] discloses an invention for preventing simethicone from migrating into the pharmaceutical?
Put differently, Dr. Schwartz considered the Stevens patents and Rider patent as disclosing the same "invention," namely the prevention of simethicone migration into the pharmaceutical.
 In its Answer and Counterclaims, Perrigo pled defenses under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 112. However, Perrigo failed to raise this defense in its claim-by-claim defenses or at trial. At trial, Perrigo's only defense to its admitted infringement of the Garwin patents was that the asserted claims are invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
 McNeil's marketing expenditures appear to be consistent with an overall strategy for stymieing generic competition. By heavily promoting the combination product, McNeil can in effect transfer sales from the nonpatent-protected loperamide product to its combination drug. Regardless of whether the combination drug ultimately gains patent protection, this combination drug enjoys a significant period of exclusivity pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act. Moreover, because loperamide is sold in generic form, McNeil benefits from the transference of sales from the loperamide-alone product to its combination drug.
 Because I have found that the Stevens patents are not infringed, I need not reach Perrigo's alternative arguments that the Stevens claim lack definiteness and fail to distinctly claim the invention. (Def. Post-Trial Br. at 75.) Furthermore, having found that the Stevens patents are invalid for obviousness, I need not reach the host of other arguments Perrigo advances in support of its position that the Stevens patents are invalid. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1369(Fed.Cir.1999).
[The idea's] peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space. . . .