Daniel E. Troy and Howard J. Symons argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the briefs were Gail L. Polivy, R. Michael Senkowski, Michael F. Altschul, Michelle M. Mundt. David A. Gross, James D. Ellis, Robert M. Lynch, Michael J. Zpevak, William B. Barfield, M. Robert Sutherland, L. Andrew Tollin, Michael Deuel Sullivan, Luisa L. Lancetti, S. Mark Tuller an Matthew B. Pachman. M. Edward Whelan and Theodore C. White house entered appearances.
John Edward Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel, Laurel R. Bergold, Counsel, Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert B. Nicholson, and Robert J. Wiggers, Attorneys. Adam D. Hirsh, Attorney, entered an appearance.
Several parties petition for review of four orders by the Federal Communications Commission implementing the rate integration requirement of § 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(g). The petitioners challenge two determinations made by the Commission: (1) That a telecommunications provider is required to integrate its rates across all commonly owned or controlled affiliates that provide interstate interexchange services; and (2) that the requirement of rate integration applies to providers of Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS), that is, wireless technologies such as cellular and PCS.
We hold first that the Commission's interpretation of § 254(g) as requiring rate integration across affiliates is reasonable and second that the Commission erred in concluding the plain text of § 254(g) required it to apply the rate integration requirement to providers of CMRS. We therefore vacate the order in relevant part and remand this matter to the Commission for further consideration whether, as an exercise of its delegated authority, § 254(g) should be applied to providers of CMRS.
Prior to 1972 rates for interstate long distance telecommunications services to and from non-contiguous domestic locations such as Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were much higher than rates for the same services within the contiguous 48 states. In effect, providers of long distance services treated those locations as foreign for the purpose of setting long distance rates. See Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 856 p 35 (1972) (Domsat II Order).The Commission became concerned that this disparate treatment "inhibited the free flow of communications between the contiguous states and [non-contiguous domestic] points to the disadvantage of all of our citizens." Id. The Commission also recognized that the use of satellites, the cost of which is insensitive to distance, was making it economically feasible to serve non-contiguous locations at rates comparable to those offered in the contiguous 48 states. See id.
In 1972, therefore, the Commission initiated a policy of "rate integration": Telecommunications carriers serving Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico (and later the U.S. Virgin Islands) were required, as a condition of their licenses to use new domestic satellites, to submit a plan that would "give maximum effect to the elimination of overall distance as a major cost factor and ... integrate these three United States points into the uniform mileage rate pattern that now obtains for the contiguous states." Id. at 857 p 37. Thus AT&T was required to develop a tariff that would integrate the rates it charged for interstate long distance service to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico into the domestic rate pattern applicable in the contiguous 48 states. See Integration of Rates, 61 F.C.C.2d 380, 392 (1976) (1976 Rate Integration Order).Rate integration would thus ensure "service between the contiguous states and ... noncontiguous points [ ] at rates that are equivalent to those prevailing for comparable distances in the contiguous 48 states." Integration of Rates, 9 F.C.C.R. 2197, 2198 n.2 (1993).
Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commissionshall adopt rules to require ... that a provider ofinterstate interexchange telecommunications servicesshall provide such services to its subscribers in eachState at rates no higher than the rates charged to itssubscribers in any other State.
New section 254(g) is intended to incorporate the polic [y]of ... rate integration of interexchange services....The conferees intend the Commission's rules ... toincorporate the policies contained in the Commission'sproceeding entitled "Integration of Rates and Servicesfor the Provision of Communications by Authorized Com-mon Carriers between the United States Mainland andthe Offshore Points of Hawaii, Alaska and PuertoRico/Virgin Islands" (61 FCC2d 380 (1976)).H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996).
The Commission promulgated rules requiring rate integration under § 254(g) in a series of four orders: (1) Imple-mentation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 9564 (1996) (Integration Order); (2) First Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 11812 (1997) (First Reconsideration Order); (3) Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15739 (1997) (Stay Order); and (4) Memorandum Opinion & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 391 (1998) (Second Reconsideration Order). The petitioners now challenge two determinations made in the course of those orders.
In the Integration Order the Commission announced without elaboration that it read the term "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" in § 254(g) to include "parent companies that, through affiliates, provide service in more than one state." 11 F.C.C.R. at 9598 p 69.Upon reconsideration at the instance of GTE and U.S. West, Inc., the Commission explained that the statute was ambiguous on the specific issue whether for purposes of rate integration a "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" includes commonly owned or controlled affiliates of the provider. First Reconsideration Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 11819 p 14. Because an interexchange carrier could circumvent rate integration by providing interstate long distance service to each non-contiguous location through a separate subsidiary, the Commission concluded that requiring rate integration among affiliates was most consonant with the purpose of the statute. See id. p 15.Under the resulting rule, for example, the GTE affiliate that provides long distance service only in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is required to integrate its rates with those of all other GTE affiliates providing long distance service anywhere in the contiguous 48 states or in other non-contiguous domestic locations.
Prior to enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the Commission had required only wireline carriers, and not providers of CMRS, to integrate their rates. In the Integration Order the agency gave no indication that it believed § 254(g) either required or authorized a change in this state of affairs. In the First Reconsideration Order, however, the Commission stated, again without elaborating, that CMRS providers were required by § 254(g) to integrate the rates for their interstate interexchange services. 12 F.C.C.R. at 11821 p 18. Several parties petitioned the Commission to reconsider and stay enforcement of that determination.* In the Second Reconsideration Order the Commission explained its rationale for requiring CMRS providers to integrate their rates: Section 254(g) by its terms applies to providers of interstate interexchange service without making an exception for CMRS. 14 F.C.C.R. at 396 p 10.
Because CMRS does not use wireline exchanges, its coverage by § 254(g) raised the following question for the Commission: Which interstate CMRS are "interexchange" services? Noting that the Communications Act defines "telephone exchange service" as "service within a telephone exchange, or ... comparable service provided through a system of switches, transmission equipment, or other facilities," 47 U.S.C. § 153(47), the Commission determined that CMRS within a "major trading area" (MTA) was "comparable" to wireline "service within a telephone exchange," 14 F.C.C.R. at 401 p 23; therefore, CMRS between MTAs was comparable to "interexchange" wireline service, and interstate, inter-MTA CMRS was subject to rate integration.
The petitioners seek review of the rules requiring rate integration among affiliates and the application of rate integration to providers of CMRS. Both challenges turn upon the Commission's interpretation of the phrase "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" in § 254(g). Because the Congress committed administration of the Communications Act to the Commission, we review the petitioners' challenges to the Commission's interpretation of § 254(g) using the two-step analysis of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron step one, we ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." If so, then we "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." If not, then under Chevron step two we will defer to the agency's interpretation of the Act if it is reasonable in light of the text, the structure, and the purpose of the Act. See id. at 842-43.
The petitioners make two arguments for the proposition that the Congress in § 254(g) unambiguously directed the Commission to prescribe rate integration only with respect to each individual provider of telecommunications services and not with respect to all commonly owned or controlled affiliates. They first argue that because "provider" means simply "one that provides," the Congress could not have meant the phrase "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" to include parent companies, which are not licensed to and do not provide telecommunications services.Further, because holding companies are not "providers," they "may not be used as conduits through which rate integration requirements are imposed on commonly owned affiliates."
Both parts of petitioners' argument miss the mark. First, the Commission no longer interprets "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" to include parent companies that are not themselves carriers: In the First Reconsideration Order the Commission, responding to this very argument, narrowed its cross-affiliate rule to apply only to "affiliated carriers"--thereby excluding any parent company that is not itself a carrier. 12 F.C.C.R. at 11819 p 16.And as to the petitioners' derivative claim that the Commission cannot regulate commonly owned affiliates except by impermissibly regulating parent companies as "conduits," the petitioners provide no legal support for this ipse dixit. Nor does the Commission either purport or need to regulate the parent--as a conduit or otherwise--when it requires two or more carriers under common control to coordinate their activities.
The petitioners' second argument turns upon the Congress having expressly extended regulatory obligations to the "affiliates" of a carrier in other sections of the Act; by not similarly including the word "affiliates" in § 254(g), we are told, the Congress unambiguously (albeit implicitly) limited the scope of the integration requirement to the rates charged by individual providers of telecommunications services. The petitioners make a substantial point: In 1996 the Congress added "affiliate" as a defined term in the Communications Act, see 47 U.S.C. § 153(1), and then used that term in 15 sections of the Act, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 222, 224, 228, 251, 260, 271-275, 541, 543, 548, 572, and 573. In many of those sections the Congress specifically extended a regulatory prohibition or obligation from the individual carrier to the carrier's affiliates. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 572 ("No local exchange carrier or any affiliate of such carrier ... [may acquire] more than a 10 percent financial interest, or any management interest, in any cable operator providing cable service within the [LEC's] telephone service area").
If the Congress had written § 254(g) upon a blank slate, announcing an entirely new requirement that rates to noncontiguous points be integrated, then the absence of "affiliates" from the text of § 254(g), coupled with its inclusion in so many other sections, might be strong textual evidence that the Congress spoke directly to this issue. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 160 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Section 254(g) does not, however, announce a new policy; the legislative history makes clear that the Congress intended § 254(g) to carry forward by regulation the Commission's preexisting policy requiring rate integration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996). An undisputed aspect of that policy is that AT & T was required to integrate its rates across all its affiliated providers. The parties dispute whether other carriers were required to integrate rates across affiliates but, regardless of the answer to that question, it is clear that the Commission under its preexisting policy could and in the case of AT&T did mandate integration across affiliates. Against that backdrop, the omission of the word "affiliates" in a statute intended to perpetuate existing Commission policy cannot be read to preclude for the first time integration across affiliates; the most the omission tells us is that the Congress did not specifically require the Commission to order rate integration across affiliates. We agree with the Commission, therefore, that § 254(g) is ambiguous on the precise issue whether affiliates may be included within the phrase "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services."
Turning to Chevron step two, the petitioners argue that the Commission's interpretation is unreasonable because it conflicts with two of the purposes of the 1996 Act, namely, "to promote competition and reduce regulation." Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) (preamble), and with one of the goals of rate integration, namely, the expansion of telecommunications services offered to non-contiguous domestic locations, see Domsat II Order, 35 F.C.C.2d at 856 p 35. The petitioners illustrate their point with the following (not very) hypothetical situation: A carrier provides interstate interexchange service through separate affiliates in the highly competitive mainland market and in a high-cost domestic overseas market (such as Guam, which cannot be served by domestic satellites because of its distance from the continental United States). If rates must be integrated across those affiliates then, according to the petitioners, the carrier must either charge above-market rates on the mainland, and therefore become noncompetitive, or charge below-market rates in the overseas location, and therefore lose money on every call.Faced with this Hobson's choice, the carrier will want to sell its overseas affiliate, presumably to a new owner with no other operations subject to the rate integration requirement.
The problem with the petitioners' argument--passing over the Commission's factual rejoinder that the carrier would not lose money on every call--is that the central purpose of rate integration, namely, ensuring "service between the contiguous states and ... noncontiguous points [ ] at rates that are equivalent to those prevailing for comparable distances in the contiguous 48 states," Integration of Rates, 9 F.C.C.R. 2197, 2198 n.2 (1993), by its nature does nothing to reduce regulation or to promote competition. The real question raised by this argument, therefore, is not whether integration across affiliates is regulatory and anti-competitive but whether it is unreasonable in light of the underlying goal of rate integration (pace the preamble to the 1996 Act), namely, equalized rates to non-contiguous locations. Viewed thus at the margin, the petitioners' hypothetical scenario actually demonstrates the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation: If the Commission did not read affiliates into the term "provider" in § 254(g), then the petitioners' hypothetical carrier would charge higher rates in the non-contiguous market (through one affiliate) than it charges on the mainland (through the other affiliate), and there would be no rate integration of non-contiguous markets at all. We therefore agree with the Commission that interpreting "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" to encompass commonly owned or controlled affiliates is reasonable in light of the text and the regulatory purpose of § 254(g).
Finally, the petitioners challenge the Commission's decision as inconsistent and therefore arbitrary and capricious. Even if interpreting "provider" to include affiliates is permissible, the petitioners claim, the Commission has interpreted "provider" in three inconsistent ways: (1) for wireline carriers, "provider" means a provider and all commonly owned or controlled affiliates; (2) for providers of CMRS, as towhich the Commission has stayed the requirement of affiliate integration, "provider" will likely be interpreted to mean a provider and all affiliates not jointly owned by competing providers; and (3) for the purpose of "geographic rate averaging"-another policy prescribed in § 254(g)--the Commission has "implicitly" excluded affiliates from the scope of the term "provider."
We reject this challenge for two reasons. First, as the Commission notes, it has to date given but a single interpretation to the term "provider" in § 254(g). For the purpose of rate integration, "provider" includes affiliates of both wireline and CMRS providers; the Stay Order did not alter this interpretation, and the Commission may yet adhere to it.And in a separate order not under review here, the Commission gave the same interpretation for the purpose of geographic rate averaging. See Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 12 F.C.C.R. 20787, 20804 p 31 (1997). Second, even if the Commission ultimately does interpret "provider" differently with respect to wireline service and CMRS, that would not necessarily be arbitrary and capricious. The Commission might reasonably conclude that requiring integration among affiliates better advances the purposes of the Congress with respect to wireline service than it does with respect to CMRS, depending upon the competitive structure of the markets in which the two services are offered. On the record presently before us, therefore, we see no infirmity in the Commission's actions, and we deny the petition to review the requirement of integration across affiliates.
The Commission held that the phrase "provider of interstate interexchange telecommunications services" in § 254(g) "unambiguously applies to the interstate, interexchange services offered by CMRS providers. If Congress had intended to exempt CMRS providers, it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in other sections of the Act." Second Reconsideration Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 396 p 10. In an unusually direct confrontation under Chevron step one, the petitioners maintain not that the statute is ambiguous but that it unambiguously means the opposite of what the Commission says it means. For our part, we cannot agree with either the Commission or the petitioners that the Congress spoke unambiguously on the precise issue that divides them.
The Commission's secondary assertion that the Congress would have expressly exempted CMRS from § 254(g) had it so intended is undermined by the Conference Report indicating that the Congress meant § 254(g) to incorporate the Commission's preexisting rate integration policy, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996), which the Commission had never before applied to CMRS. As Commissioner Powell wrote in dissent, "when it is undisputed that CMRS providers were not subject to the Commission's pre-1996 Act rate integration policy, and where Congress seems to say it is merely incorporating that policy, why would we expect to find an explicit and unambiguous indication to exclude them? "Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell, 1999 WL 38420 (Jan. 28, 1999).
This leaves the Commission's primary assertion that the term "interexchange telecommunications service," which is not defined in the Communications Act, "on its face unambiguously" makes CMRS subject to rate integration under § 254(g). The Commission starts out in the hole: Because CMRS does not use exchanges, it is by no means obvious that the Congress, when it used a phrase in which the word "interexchange" is an essential term, was referring to CMRS.True, the Congress provided a functional definition of "telephone exchange service," including not just "service within a telephone exchange" but also "comparable service provided through ... other facilities," 47 U.S.C. § 153(47); therefore, the Commission may characterizeas "exchange service" even services that, like CMRS, do not use exchanges. That the Congress may have extended to providers of CMRS various statutory obligations attaching to "exchange service" does not, however, demonstrate that the Congress, in using the word "interexchange," must have extended the requirement of rate integration to providers of CMRS. The Commission might decide, as an exercise of its delegated authority to interpret ambiguities in the Act, that the phrase "interexchange telecommunications service" in § 254(g) is best read in a manner analogous to the express definition of "exchange service," that is, as applying not only to wireline interexchange service but also to CMRS that the Commission determines is "comparable"; but that interpretation is certainly not compelled by the "unambiguous" text of the statute.
As for the petitioners' Chevron step one arguments, they first claim that the Congress's use of the word "interexchange"--which they say has no relevance to CMRS--demonstrates that § 254(g) must apply only to wireline providers. As we just explained, however, the functional definition of "telephone exchange service" in 47 U.S.C. § 153(47) demonstrates that the Congress has authorized the Commission to characterize as "exchange service" even services that do not use exchanges. Therefore it is not clear that the Congress was referring only to wireline service when it used the word "interexchange." The petitioners' second claim is that by stating in the legislative history that § 254(g) was intended to codify the Commission's preexisting policy, which did not apply to providers of CMRS, the Congress clearly and unambiguously excluded providers of CMRS from the coverage of § 254(g). We think this reads too much into both the Commission's policy and the legislative history. The Commission had never either applied or declined to apply the policy to providers of CMRS. There is no reason to believe that prior to the 1996 Act the Commission was in any way precluded from extending its policy to providers of CMRS, and the Congress, in stating that it was incorporating the Commission's preexisting policy into § 254(g), gave no indication that it meant to freeze rate integration as it then was and to prohibit any further development or extension of the policy.
The petitioners further argue that application of § 254(g) to providers of CMRS "would be inconsistent with the deregulatory intent" of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (authorizing Commission to exempt CMRS from some regulations), the definition of "telephone toll service" in 47 U.S.C. § 153(48), and the proconsumer purpose of the 1996 Telecommunications Act overall. However probative these arguments may be in determining whether the Commission's interpretation of § 254(g) is reasonable, they do not rise to the level of demonstrating that the Congress has spoken directly to this precise issue.
In light of the text and legislative history of § 254(g), then, it is unclear whether CMRS is included in the phrase "interexchange telecommunications service": the Congress may have been referring only to wireline interexchange service, or it may also have meant to include "comparable" CMRS. At this juncture we would ordinarily proceed to step two and consider whether the Commission's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. In this case, however, the Commission never exercised its discretionary authority to interpret the statute, as the Second Reconsideration Order makes clear; because it believed that the plain text of § 254(g) subjected providers of CMRS to the requirement of rate integration, the Commission did not go on to show why, even if it is not the only possible interpretation of the statute, it is nonetheless a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 14 F.C.C.R. at 396 p p 10, 11, 18.
The petition for review is denied insofar as it challenges the Commission's requirement that carriers integrate their interstate long distance rates with those of all commonly owned or controlled affiliates in both contiguous and non-contiguous domestic locations. The petition is granted insofar as it challenges the Commission's requirement that providers of CMRS likewise integrate their rates. The orders under review are vacated in relevant part and this matter is remanded to the Commission for further consideration.
The Commission, without expressing any doubt that § 254(g) applies to CMRS providers, stayed application of the rule requiring CMRS providers to integrate their rates across affiliates pending further consideration whether such integration would produce anticompetitive effects owing to the prevalence of cross-ownership and joint ventures in the CMRS industry. See Stay Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 15746 p 14.
In view of this disposition, we do not address the petitioners' alternative claim that if § 254(g) applies to providers of CMRS then the Commission is required by 47 U.S.C. § 160 to forbear from enforcement of the requirement.


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Nevada knife statutes are long and wordy, but rarely clear or easy to understand, and much of the law regarding owning and carrying knives comes from case law. This article explores the language of the law and applicable case law, and then translates it all into plain English.
(a) Manufacture or cause to be manufactured, or import into the State, or keep, offer or expose for sale, or give, lend or possess any knife which is made an integral part of a belt buckle or any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a switchblade knife, blackjack, slungshot, billy, sand-club, sandbag or metal knuckles; ….
(4) Knife which is made an integral part of a belt buckle.
Nevada code defines switchblade knife as a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, or any other knife having the appearance of a pocketknife, with a blade 2 or more inches long that can be released automatically by pressing a button or other device on the handle of the knife. The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld this definition in Bradvica v. State, when it found that the knife Mr. Bradvica was carrying was not a switchblade because the blade was only 1 15/16th long. A dagger was defined in 1987, by the Nevada Supreme Court, in Huebner v. State, as a short weapon used for thrusting and stabbing and a dirk as a long straight-bladed dagger. When determining if a weapon is a dirk or a dagger, the Court in Bradvica v. State, said that one must look at whether the knife has hand guards and a blade that locks in place. The Bradvica Court found that a steak knife was not a dirk or dagger because it was not primarily designed as a weapon and did not have hand guards to keep a person from cutting themselves if using the knife to stab.
Because previous Nevada law, and Nevada’s current definition of a switchblade knife, mention the length of the blade, there have been many cases where a dispute has arisen over what exactly the “blade” of a knife is. In Bradvica v. State the Court found that the word “blade” should be construed to have its plain and ordinary meaning, which according to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, is the “cutting part of the instrument” or that which was customarily sharpened, and not the entire steal portion of the knife.
Nevada statute defines concealed carry as carrying a weapon upon a person, or in a container carried by the person, in such a manner as not to be discernible by ordinary observation. In 1987, the Court further clarified “concealed carry” in the case of Huebner v. State, when it found that a knife sheathed by what appeared to a ballpoint pen, was “concealed” for purposes of the concealed carry statutes.
The Nevada legislature makes the concealed carry of a “pistol, revolver or other firearm, or other dangerous or deadly weapon” illegal. However, it does not define dangerous or deadly weapon. In 2000, the Nevada Supreme Court, in Knight v. State, following the logic of the Missouri Supreme Court case of State v. Baldwin, said that the determination of whether an object is a dangerous or deadly weapon should be based on several factors. These factors include why the defendant was carrying the instrument, the manner in which it is carried, the instrument itself, the particular person carrying it, and the circumstances under which he or she is found in possession of the weapon. In 2006, the United States District Court in Nevada followed this line of reasoning in U.S. v. Salinas, when it found that an ice pick, partially concealed in Ricardo Salinas’ shirt pocket while he stood in an alley near an apartment complex was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the concealed carry code. The Court stated that because the circumstances indicated that Mr. Salina was carrying the ice pick for a dangerous, not a harmless, purpose, it was illegal for him to carry it in a concealed manner.
A Nevada resident may apply to the Sheriff in his or her county for a concealed carry permit to conceal carry any type of knife except for a switchblade. The written application must describe the weapon to be carried and the reason or purpose for conceal carrying the weapon. Once issued, the permit allows the applicant to conceal carry the weapon described in any county within the state of Nevada.
Nevada law is straightforward on its definitions of various types of knives, using the common ordinary meanings of the words blade, dirk, dagger, and switchblade.
Under Nevada law, it is illegal to own a any knife that is made an integral part of a belt buckle or a switchblade. All other knives are legal to own in Nevada.
It is legal to open carry any type of knife, but it is illegal to conceal carry a dirk, dagger, machete, any knife that is illegal to own in Nevada, or any instrument which could be considered a dangerous or deadly weapon.
Can you legally open carry a machete in the state of Nevada or in Las Vegas?
can i carry the coldsteel talwar or coldsteel recon 1 Xl concealed?
This article is dangerously missing an important detail: There is no state preemption for knives. This means that local municipalities can (and DO) restrict knives however they see fit. What may be generally legal in Nevada, is in fact ILLEGAL in Las Vegas, Henderson, and other cities, counties, and towns. Unfortunately, the current patchwork of laws means it is very difficult to not run afoul of the law. You must evaluate all of the cities, counties and towns you might travel through, and carry the lowest common denominator.
For me, this means I carry a Leatherman. In addition to being in compliance with everywhere I go (the best I can tell), it carries with it the fact that I do actually use it as a multi-tool, for what layer of protection that might offer.
Summary: Don’t ignore local ordinances. Next time we have state knife preemption on the ballot, come out and support it! We almost had it with SB176 in 2016. The verbiage was there. It was pulled after there was pushback from the cities, and there was not enough support in favor of it.
While these groups are generally firearms-centric, the membership there supports knife rights equally. After all, they are ARMS.
Does anyone know the laws/rules/regulations of ordering them for (groomsmen) gifts from an online website like Overstock.com? Would I need to contact anyone like the sheriff’s department or the post office to let them know of my purchase? Any help is appreciated. I am shopping way early for gifts so I have time to adjust accordingly. Thanks in advanced!
I thought that they would be pretty awesome, out of the ordinary gifts for the guys, and would be great to all pose together on the day of the wedding — sheaths on and only for pictures. They are such a great price here in comparison to the shops where they are available here in Las Vegas/Henderson.
Knife Rights’ Nevada Knife Law Reform Bill, SB 176, was signed by Governor Sandoval on June 1st. This act repeals existing bans on switchblade knives (longer than 2-inches), dirks, daggers and belt buckle knives and becomes effective on July 1, 2015.
What do you know about the carry of a switchblade or balisong? I can’t find any info on this.
So what is the max blade length I can carry for a pocket knife?
How about Multi- Tool or Multi Pliers,yes these were not mention,to the fact that these contains sharp instruments,knife straight or serrated,saw,punching /awl etc,A lot of people carry this on their sides on a daily basis,I’ve heard about that, as long as the knives don’t exceed 3 inches ,that’s okay, it is legal, but how legit is that claim? I work with a quilting machine on the warehouse,and from time to time needs fix,so I must have my tool on my side,or any other Handy man there working,anybody can give an answer?
Allow me to preface this by saying 1) I’m not a lawyer or peace officer and 2) this is my interpretation from what I’ve read. Also, this is two years late and you may never see this but its worth a shot. Multi tools are legal to conceal carry for two reasons. Firstly, the lack of a handguard to protect the hand in the event of stabbing makes the knife on a multitude not considered a weapon. I take this from the Bradvica vs. State case where they determined a steak knife not being a weapon due to the lack of a handguard. Secondly, most Multi tools have blades smaller than 2 inches, making them legal to conceal carry in and of themselves.
I am totally confused. I have non-switchblade pocket knife with a 3 inch blade. Is this legal in Nevada or not?

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SEMLER v. OREGON STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS et al.
This case presents the question of the validity of a statute of the state of Oregon, enacted in 1933, relating to the conduct of dentists. Oregon Laws 1933, c. 166, p. 208. Previous legislation had provided for the revocation of licenses for unprofessional conduct, which, as then defined, included advertising of an untruthful and misleading nature. The Act of 1933 amended the definition so as to provide the following additional grounds for revocation: 'advertising professional superiority or the performance of professional services in a superior manner; advertising prices for professional service; advertising by means of large display, glaring light signs, or containing as a part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work or any portion of the human head; employing or making use of advertising solicitors of free publicity press agents; or advertising any free dental work, or free examination; or advertising to guarantee any dental service, or to perform any dental operation painlessly.' Laws 1933, p. 210, § 2.
Plaintiff, a dentist practicing in Portland, Or., brought this suit in the state court against the members of the State Board of Dental Examiners to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, alleging that it was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of section 10, cl. 1, art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. The circuit court, overruling this contention, sustained a demurrer to the complaint and, upon the refusal of plaintiff to plead further, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the state took the same view of the federal question and affirmed the judgment. 34 P.(2d) 311. The case comes here on appeal.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was licensed in 1918; that he had continuously advertised his practice in newspapers and periodicals, and by means of signs of the sort described in the amended statute, and that he had employed advertising solicitors; that in his advertisements he had represented that he had a high degree of efficiency and was able to perform his professional services in a superior manner; that he had stated the prices he would charge, had offered examinations of prospective patients without charge, and had also represented that he guaranteed all his dental work and that his dental operations were performed plainlessly. He further alleged that the statements in his advertisements were truthful and were made in good faith; that by these methods he had developed a large and lucrative practice; that through long training and experience he had acquired ability superior to that of the great majority of practicing dentists; that he had been able to standardize office operations, to purchase supplies in large quantities and at relatively low prices, and thus to establish a uniform schedule of charges for the majority of operations; also, that he had made contracts for display signs and for advertisements in newspapers, and had entered into other engagements, of which he would be unable to take advantage if the legislation in question were sustained, and, in that event, his business would be destroyed or materially impaired.
Plaintiff is not entitled to complain of interference with the contracts he describes, if the regulation of his conduct as a dentist is not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power of the state. His contracts were necessarily subject to that authority. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 363, 36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679, L.R.A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 248 U.S. 372, 375, 376, 39 S.Ct. 117, 63 L.Ed. 309, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 391, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288, 87 A.L.R. 721. Nor has plaintiff any ground for objection because the particular regulation is limited to dentists and is not extended to other professional classes. The state was not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way. It could deal with the different professions according to the needs of the public in relation to each. We find no basis for the charge of an unconstitutional discrimination. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 179, 30 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed. 987; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628, L.R.A. 1915F, 829; State of Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 43, 46 S.Ct. 384, 70 L.Ed. 818; Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc., v. Cruise, 288 U.S. 588, 53 S.Ct. 320, 77 L.Ed. 967.
The question is whether the challenged restrictions amount to an arbitrary interference with liberty and property and thus violate the requirement of due process of law. That the state may regulate the practice of dentistry, prescribing the qualifications that are reasonably necessary, and to that end may require licenses and establish supervision by an administrative board, is not open to dispute. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590; Graves v. State of Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 427, 47 S.Ct. 122, 71 L.Ed. 331. The state may thus afford protection against ignorance, incapacity and imposition. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623; Graves v. State of Minnesota, supra. We have held that the state may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal obligations of individuals (State Board of Dental Examiners v. Miller, 90 Colo. 193, 8 P. (2d) 699; Miller v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 287 U.S. 563, 53 S.Ct. 6, 77 L.Ed. 496), and that it may prohibit advertising that tends to mislead the public in this respect. Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc., v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 363, 182 N.E. 16; Id., 288 U.S. 588, 53 S.Ct. 320, 77 L.Ed. 967.
It is no answer to say, as regards appellant's claim of right to advertise his 'professional superiority' or his 'performance of professional services in a superior manner,' that he is telling the truth. In framing its policy the legislature was not bound to provide for determinations of the relative proficiency of particular practitioners. The legislature was entitled to consider the general effects of the practices which it described, and if these effects were injurious in facilitating unwarranted and misleading claims, to counteract them by a general rule even though in particular instances there might be no actual deception or misstatement. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 429, 22 S.Ct. 425, 46 L.Ed. 623; Purity Extract & Tonic Company v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201, 33 S.Ct. 44, 57 L.Ed. 184; Hebe Company .v Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 303, 39 S.Ct. 125, 63 L.Ed. 255; Pierce Oil Corporation v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 500; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365, 388, 389, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016.

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§ 2634.301 - Interests in property.
§ 2634.303 - Purchases, sales, and exchanges.
§ 2634.304 - Gifts and reimbursements.
§ 2634.306 - Agreements and arrangements.
§ 2634.307 - Outside positions.
§ 2634.309 - Periodic reporting of transactions.
§ 2634.310 - Reporting periods.
§ 2634.311 - Spouses and dependent children.
§ 2634.312 - Trusts, estates, and investment funds.
§ 2634.313 - Special rules.


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The public records law does not specifically identify or address "e-mail" as such, but the definition of records under the act is broad, and emails are clearly encompassed by the PRA, at least so long as they involve official business. The Public Records Act defines the term “public records” in part to mean “books, papers, files, accounts, writings, including drafts and memorializations of conversations, and other items, regardless of format or physical characteristics,” AS 40.25.220(3). While there may be issues about whether e-mails concern public or private matters, or are privileged, or about the logistics of producing them, there is no real question whether e-mails are public records. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized the right of access to emails as public records, and affirmed that there is no room for arguing that the right of access to public records differs depending on whether the record exists in paper or electronic form. McLeod v. Parnell, 286 P.3d 509, 515 (Alaska 2012). In that case, the Court rejected the plaintiff records requester’s argument that it was a per se violation of the Public Records Act for a public employee to use a private email account to conduct public business. However, the Court also rejected the State’s position that the mere failure of a public employee to preserve a given record established that it was not a public record. The Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the PRA’s definition of “public record” to include state agency records preserved or appropriate for preservation under the state’s Records Management Act (AS 41.21.010-.150). The McLeod case arose from requests for emails of then-Governor Sarah Palin relating to state business sent or received using private e-mail accounts. The Court recognized that “not every record a state employee creates, and certainly not every state employee email, is necessarily appropriate for preservation under the Records Management Act.” Id. at 515. But the Court agreed that the plaintiff requester’s interpretation was “necessary to avoid an inconsistency within the Records Management Act’s definition of ‘records,” under which a document appropriate for preservation could be a record—thereby requiring its preservation—but not a ‘public record’ under the Public Records Act. The plaintiff had argued that adopting a literal interpretation of the PRA definition that defined a “public records” as records that “are preserved” would lead to “an absurd result because ‘it grants “elected and appointed official” authority to … simply, and quite privately, decide not to “preserve” a record that, for whatever reason—including avoiding political embarrassment or because the record is evidence of mis or malfeasance—they do not want the public to see.” Id. at 514. The Supreme Court cited with obvious approval the superior court’s conclusions that “if a state employee deliberately does not preserve a document that is ‘appropriate for preservation’ … that employee is breaking the law,” and noted the plaintiff had established that “the duty to preserve emails exists as to both official accounts and private accounts, and that duty cannot be extinguished by a public official’s unreviewable decision simply not to preserve them.” Id.at 516.
In the context of interpreting the state’s ethics laws, the AG advised that “as a general rule, a public officer may not use state equipment for personal benefit, regardless of whether there is financial gain.” However, the AG’s opinion concludes that personal e-mails and call records are not public records and public disclosure of such personal information would likely run afoul of the individual’s right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution. However, it states, because business related calls and business related email messages would also be generated through these personal devices, it is possible that a state official or a court could be required to review all call records and messages in order to locate the calls and email messages that concern state business and thus are public records. The latter would be subject to review and disclosure, unless the Public Records Act permits them to be withheld for other reasons.
The 2008 Attorney General’s opinion states that from the definition of public records, it appears that personal emails and call records from a personal cell phone or a PDA are not “accounts” or “writings” “developed or received by a public agency,” and are not “preserved for their informational value or as evidence of the organization or operation of the public agency.” Instead, they are writings developed or received by people in their personal, non-employee capacities and preserved for personal reasons. The personal emails and call records thus do not fit the definition of public records. Additionally, the Alaska Constitution provides, in article I, section 22, that the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.
This provision of the constitution, according to the AG’s opinion, “provides additional protection from public disclosure by the government of personal emails and call records. …[H]owever, a state official or a court could be required to review personal call records and emails while seeking to locate and identify the business related calls or business related emails sent or received through the personally owned devices. Thus, again, although generally personal call records and emails would not be disclosed to the public, they could be reviewed by a state official or court in the limited circumstances described to comply with the Public Records Act.” This content-based distinction between purely personal call records and emails and emails relating to the conduct of public business, and the treatment of personal emails as outlined in the AG’s opinions summarized here, is at least implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in McLeod. And even before McLeod, this AG’s opinion regarding Personal Use of Electronic Equipment made it clear that when an employee uses personally owned devices for business related calls, the employee has to expect that a state official or a court could be required to review all messages on these personal devices while seeking to locate and identify business related calls or emails. Id. at 13.
Emails on a government computer system that pertain to government business are public records. See Griffis, 215 Ariz. at 5, 156 P.3d at 422. But emails relating solely to personal matters will not have “the requisite substantial nexus with government activities” and therefore are not subject to disclosure. Id.
Arizona courts look at the nature and purpose of the document, not whether it is on a private or public email, to determine whether it is a public record. Id. at 4, 156 P.3d at 421.
Documents that are of a “purely private or personal nature” are not public records. Id.
Because a public record is defined to include “electronic or computer-based information,” Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-103(5)(A), the FOIA reaches electronic mail. Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2001-305. This was also the case prior to the 2001 amendment revising the definition to include this information, because the act reached “data compilations in any form.” See Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. Nos. 2000-096, 99-018 (electronically stored e-mail is public record).
As amended by Act 1653 of 2001, the FOIA defines the term “public record” to include “electronic or computer-based information.” Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-103(5)(A). A court may review e-mails in camera to decide whether they involve a public matter. If the e-mails do concern a public matter, they are considered to be a public record under the FOIA. Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007).
Public matters on government e-mail are considered to be public records and are subject to the FOIA if there is a sufficient nexus between the e-mail messages and the activities of a government entity. Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007).
Not all e-mail on a government computer is considered to be a public record. Although the FOIA carries a presumption that a record is a public record, the facts giving rise to an e-mail message can be examined on a case-by-case basis. The trial court may conduct an in camera review to determine whether an e-mail concerns a matter of purely private concern or there is a substantial nexus between the e-mail and the activities of a government entity. Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007). The Attorney General has opined that a personal e-mail created on a work computer during work hours will not be subject to disclosure if it is shown to be personal in nature. Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-095.
An e-mail concerning a public matter that has been sent to the private email address of a government official is subject to disclosure under the FOIA because the statute does not specify that it only applies to messages sent to or received from government e-mail addresses. Bradford v. Director, Employment Security Department, 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20 (2003).
If an e-mail message concerns a private matter or is personal in nature, it is not subject to disclosure under the FOIA.
The CPRA's definition of "writing" includes e-mail: "'Writing' means any handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic mail or facsimile, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds or symbols, or combination thereof, and any record thereby created, regardless of the manner in which the record has been stored." Cal. Gov't Code § 6252(f) (emphasis added).
The California Supreme Court has held that emails sent to or from private email accounts of public employees relating to the public’s business are “public records” within the meaning of the CPRA. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 5th 608, 616, 623, 214 Cal. Rprt. 3d 274, 389 P.3d 848 (2017). In so holding, the court rejected the argument that a public entity does not “retain” public records within the meaning of the CPRA where those records are maintained instead by individual public employees: “A disembodied governmental agency cannot prepare, own, use, or retain any record. Only the human beings who serve in agencies can do these things. When employees are conducting agency business, they are working for the agency and on its behalf.” Id. at 620-21.
However, not every email (or record) retained by a public employee is a public record. Rather, “the writing must relate in some substantive way to the conduct of the public’s business … Communications that are primarily personal, containing no more than incidental mentions of agency business, generally will not constitute public records.” Id.
As the court explained, whether an email (or other record) is private or public turns on many factors, “including the content itself; the context in, or purpose for which, it was written; the audience to whom it was directed; and whether the writing was prepared by an employee acting or purporting to act within the scope of his or her employment.” Id. at 618.
Email can constitute a public record. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-202(1)(c) & -202(1.2). However, to be a public record, an e-mail message must be made, maintained, or kept for use in the performance of public functions or involve the receipt or expenditure of public funds. Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Arapahoe Cty., 121 P.3d 190, 199 (Colo. 2005).
Purely private matters discussed in government e-mail messages are not public records. For example, sexually-explicit e-mails sent between two county employees were private exchanges and not subject to disclosure. Denver Publ'g Co., 121 P.3d at 203. To extent private matters are discussed along with public matters in the same e-mail, the e-mail should be redacted to protect the parties’ privacy prior to disclosure. Id. at 205.
No case law has yet addressed the issue of whether public matters discussed on private e-mails are public records, but under the terms of the open records statute, any record that is “made, maintained, or kept” for use in the exercise of official functions, or involving the expenditure or receipt of public funds is a public record, regardless of its location on public or private property, so long as it is within the lawful possession, custody or control of a records custodian. This was true of the pages of public official's personal diary in which he discussed public business. Wick Commc'ns v. Montrose Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 81 P.3d 360 (Colo. 2003).
"[A]ny communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power" is defined as a "meeting" under FOIA. Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-200(2) (emphasis added).
The Electronic and Voicemail Management and Retention Guide For State and Municipal Government Employees issued by the Office of the Public Records Administrator and State Archives states that e-mail messages sent or received in the conduct of public business are public records.
Yes. Emails are public records subject to the same rules and exemptions as other records. See definition of public record Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-200(5).
The Act does not specifically address e-mail, but e-mails have been requested under a FOIA request. See, e.g., Del. Op. Att'y Gen., No. 11-iib04 (Mar. 29, 2011). "Public records" includes all information "regardless of the physical form or characteristic…." 29 Del. C. § 10002(g). The Legislative Email Exception allows agencies to withhold any email received or sent by members of the General Assembly or its staff, regardless of the content of the email. 29 Del. C. § 10002(l) (16); see Flowers v. Office of the Governor, 167 A.3d 530 (Super. Ct., 2017).
Although e-mail is not specifically addressed by the statute, it falls within the statutory definition of "public record," which "includes all books, papers, maps, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics prepared, owned, used in the possession of, or retained by a public body" and expressly includes "information stored in an electronic format." D.C. Code Ann. § 2-502(18).
Public matters on government e-mails constitute public records under the act. See, e.g., FOP v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822, 825-27 (D.C. 2012) (noting that the police union successfully requested thousands of pages of Metropolitan Police Department emails related to the union under the D.C. Act). The same goes for public matters on a private e-mail account. See, e.g., Vining v. District of Columbia, 2014 D.C. Super. LEXIS 14, at *6 (July 9, 2014) ("[T]he e-mails contained within Ms. Barnes's personal e-mail account were documents "prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body.").
A party seeking the disclosure of private information on a public e-mail account under the D.C. Act is less likely to be successful. In discussing the disclosure of such information, D.C. courts have noted that the D.C. Act "demands disclosure unless a privacy interest is implicated." District of Columbia v. FOP, 75 A.3d 259, 265 (D.C. 2013) (emphasis added) (holding that the District of Columbia was entitled to redact personal information before complying with a union's request for emails).
E-mail is subject to the Act. The Act requires that “requests to inspect or copy electronic messages, whether in the form of e-mail, text message, or other format, should contain information about the messages that is reasonably calculated to allow the recipient of the request to locate the messages sought, including, if known, the name, title, or office of the specific person or persons whose electronic messages are sought and, to the extent possible, the specific data bases to be searched for such messages.” O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(g) (enacted 2012). Cf. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Agric., 313 Ga. App. 69, 74, 720 S.E.2d 212, 216 (2011) (where request was for e-mail that the custodian no longer maintained on its system but would have to extract from backup tapes using a laborious compilation process, the information sought was not an existing public record, and non-disclosure thereof did not violate the Act).
On a case-by-case basis. In other words, accessibility depends on the substance of the communication and not its form. See Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 92F for analysis.
There is no provision in the Act treating e-mails differently from other public records. The Idaho Supreme Court in Cowles, supra, held that e-mail messages would be considered public records within the meaning of the Act when: (1) the e-mail message contains information relating to the conduct or administration of the public’s business, and (2) was prepared, owned, used or retained by a governmental agency. Id., 144 Idaho at 263.
The FOIA applies to any public record within the control of a public body; government-owned e-mail accounts or hardware constitute public records which are presumptively open. 5 ILCS 140/2; 5 ILCS 140/1.2. That is, a public body can withhold “private matter” contained within this public record only if it can show—by clear and convincing evidence—that the private matter qualifies for any specific exemption under the FOIA. See 5 ILCS 140/1.2; 5 ILCS 140/7. For example, the public body may attempt to invoke 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c), arguing that releasing the private matter would amount to an invasion of privacy. But to do so successfully the public body must provide facts that demonstrate that disclosing the records would be “highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and [that] the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c); see 5 ILCS 140/1.2. The FOIA makes clear that “[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c).
Emails and text messages relating to public business are public records, even if those records are on privately owned devices. City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, 992 N.E.2d 629. See also, the binding PAC opinion issued as PAC 17-013. Information not relating to public business on a privately-owned device is not subject to disclosure. See Quinn v. Stone, 211 Ill.App.3d 809, 570 N.E.2d 676, 156 Ill.Dec. 200 (1st Dist. 1991).
The statute does not specifically address e-mail. However, there is no reason to treat e-mail any differently from any other record under the statute. See Ind. Admin. R. 9(D)(2) (rules for public access to court records apply to all court records, no matter how the information was created, collected, or submitted to the court, and independent of the technology or format of the information). However, certain emails are excluded from the general access rule. See Ind. Admin. R. 9(G)(2)(i) (excluding from public access all “personal notes and e-mail, and deliberative material, of judges, jurors, court staff and judicial agencies, and information recorded in personal data assistants (PDA’s) or organizers and personal calendars”); id. 9(G)(2)(g) (excluding email addresses that specifically identify certain witnesses and certain judicial employees’ places of residence).
Public records requests for emails have the potential to be voluminous. In Anderson v. Huntington Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the “reasonable particularity” requirement, Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-3(a)(1), in the context of email requests. 983 N.E.2d 613, 617–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). There, the plaintiff made four requests (each for a different employee) for emails sent or received within a four-and-a-half month time span. Id. at 614. While the county spent ten hours and bought new software to retrieve 9500 emails, the county was not under a legal obligation to do so because the requests were not reasonably particular. Id. at 615.
E-mail is not specifically addressed. However, the public is permitted access to "data" and "'[d]ata' means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions that has been prepared or is being prepared in a formalized manner and has been processed, or is intended to be processed, in a computer. Data may be stored in any form, including but not limited to a printout, magnetic storage media, disk, compact disc, punched card, or as memory of a computer." Iowa Code § 22.3A(1)(d). This would appear to include e-mail. See also Diercks v. Main, 894 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (interpreting a request for emails as it would a request for a physical record and finding the emails did not need to be produced to the public as they were due diligence work product).
The definition of open records was amended in 2016 to clarify that private emails of “any officer or employee of a public agency” made “pursuant to the officer's or employee's official duties and which is related to the functions, activities, programs or operations of any public agency” are subject to KORA. This amendment to the definition of public records was largely in response to controversy related to an open records request for emails sent by the governor’s budget director and a resulting attorney general opinion, Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 2015-10. The attorney general was instrumental in drafting the legislature’s 2016 amendment which, according to the attorney general’s legislative testimony, applies to “the private email accounts of state employees” if those accounts are used for official purposes.
E-mail messages are not treated differently than any other public record.
E-mail messages constitute public records under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.870(2), which defines a public record as “all books, papers, maps, photographs, cards, tapes, discs, diskettes, recordings, software, or other documentation regardless of physical form or characteristics… .” Id.
Records created on public equipment, whether for agency or personal purposes, must be disclosed under the Act unless the agency can articulate a specific exception. 00-ORD-97. See also 99-ORD-112 (a school district improperly withheld a copy of pornographic materials allegedly copied from an Internet site by a school district employee. "Records which were obtained on public time and on public equipment are, in our view, public records"); 98-ORD-92 ("telephone records for calls originating from a telephone line used in a legislative leadership office may be disclosed"); 98-ORD-31 ("a tape recording documenting a personal conversation of some duration between a Division of Fire and Emergency Service employee and another employee on a telephone extension dedicated to public use for 911 emergency calls may be disclosed"); and 96-ORD-238 (“records reflecting the names and facsimile numbers of all facsimile transmissions made for personal, and not agency purposes on agency equipment, may be disclosed”).
Private matters conveyed over government e-mail are subject to the Open Records Act where the sender is a state employee and the e-mail was sent on a work computer during work hours. Justice and Public Safety Cabinet v. Malmer, Franklin Circuit Court No. 06-CI-1373 (Nov. 19, 2007) (“The public has a right to know the contents of non-work related emails transmitted through the state email system by state employees being paid with tax dollars during working hours.”) This rule does not apply to a private citizen who served solely in a volunteer capacity in state government. Gannett v. Governor Ernie Fletcher, Franklin Circuit Court No. 05-CI-1015 (May. 17, 2006).
The Kentucky Open Records Act defines a public record as any record “prepared, owned, used, in the possession of or retained by a public agency.” Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.870(2). As such, if a public agency prepared, owned, used, possessed or retained the document, it is subject to the Act, even if it were contained on a private e-mail account.
The statutory definition of “public record” includes all “records . . . regardless of physical form or characteristics.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:1. Thus, governmental e-mail should be treated as a public record and should be produced to a requester absent an applicable exemption.
The Act defines “public records,” as records having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body or concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of this state.” There is no limitation based on where the records are located. Thus, private e-mails on government computers or servers should not be held to be “public records,” while public matters on private e-mail should be subject to Act.
Agency e-mail is a public record. 81 Op. Att’y Gen. 140 (1996) (Agency printed and electronically stored versions of e-mail messages are public records). An e-mail discussing public matters via public hardware is a public record, but an e-mail discussing private matters via public hardware is not a public records. Id. An e-mail discussing public matters via private e-mail is a public record, whereas an e-mail discussing private matters via private e-mail is not a public record. Id.
At least one unpublished decision has directly confirmed that “[t]he FOIA definition of ‘writing’ is broad enough to include electronic recording of meaningful content, including email.” Edwards v. Oakland Twp., No. 320133, 2015 Mich. App. LEXIS 590, *30 (March 19, 2015) (unpublished). No published decision has ever held otherwise, and in fact several have evaluated requests for the production of emails by assuming they are “writings” and moving on to examine the applicability of other defenses. See, e.g., Howell Education Association v. Howell Board of Education, 287 Mich. App. 228, 238, 789 N.W. 2d 495 (2010) (noting that “E-mail has in essence replaced mailboxes and paper memos in government offices,” and focusing instead on whether the emails at issue were public or private records). Nevertheless, the courts have also implored the legislature to clarify the application of FOIA to emails, complaining that the issues related to email “could not have been foreseen”, id. at 234, when FOIA was last updated, resulting in a “situation akin to that of a court being asked to apply the laws governing transportation adopted in a horse and buggy world to the world of automobiles and air transportation.” Id. at 235. The holding of the Howell decision was that personal emails are not public records, however, merely because the emails are retained by the public body computer system, “at least ...[when the agency’s acceptable use policy] does not expressly provide that e-mails are subject to FOIA.” Howell Education Association v. Howell Board of Education, 287 Mich. App. 228, 231, 789 N.W. 2d 495 (2010).
Electronic mail information is just like any other information. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-6-1002(13)(a). If the e-mail resides on a government server, it is accessible. Email on a private server is also subject to disclosure if it relates to the transaction of official business.
No statutes or case law address this specific issue. An attorney general opinion, Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 04007, states that e-mails, faxes, or other electronic communications between elected officials and governmental staff are public records unless there is a specific statute that allows particular electronic materials to be kept confidential. Subsequent statements by the Attorney General in Opinions and Disposition letters reinforce the position that emails are public records so long as they are “of or belonging to” government.
Emails may be considered to be public records under the NPRA. NRS 239.010. Private emails will retain their character as private if they relate only to an individual’s personal affairs and do not affect the conduct of agency business. There are pending cases at the Nevada Supreme Court addressing this question.
The Statute has been amended to define information to mean: "knowledge, opinions, facts, or data of any kind and in whatever physical form kept or maintained, including, but not limited to, written, aural, visual, electronic, or other physical form.” RSA 91-A:1-a,IV. Moreover, it expressly covers information maintained in “electronic format.” RSA 91-A:4,V.
The content of the e-mail message would govern whether it must be disclosed. RSA 91-A:2-a states that a public body is not to communicate in a manner that “circumvent[s] the spirit and purpose of this chapter as expressed in RSA 91-A:1.” If the message related to a function of a public body and was on the hardware of an official or employee of that public body, a court probably would rule the message is covered by the Statute and it would have to be disclosed unless it came within an exemption. If the email contains information that does not reveal “what the government is up to,” the message probably would not be disclosed.
Email constitutes a government record. OPRA defines a government record broadly as any paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof, that has been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its official business by any officer, commission, agency or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof, or that has been received in the course of his or its official business by any such officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, including subordinate boards thereof.
“As is the case with other forms of communication, e-mails fall within the scope of this expansive provision.” (See McGee v. Township of East Amwell, 416 N.J. Super. 602, 614 (App. Div. 2010).
Although there are no reported Appellate Division or Supreme Court cases deciding the issues of whether public emails on private computers and private emails on public computers are subject to OPRA, there are unreported Law Division cases finding that public emails on private computers are subject to OPRA, while private emails on public computers are not.
The Inspection of Public Records Act provides a broad definition of public records without regard to physical form or characteristics. NMSA 1978 § 14-2-6(G) (2013) (including in definition of “public records” that all “materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that are used, created, received, maintained or held by or on behalf of any public body and relate to public business.). If public matter is contained in a computer database and relates to public business, the matter constitutes a public record. See NMSA 1978 § 14-2-6(G), NMSA 1978, §§ 14-3-15.1 and 14-3-18(C) (2011). The New Mexico Court of Appeals has recognized that email is a public record subject to inspection. See ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 1, 392 P.3d 181, 183.
Given the definition of public records as those records related to the transaction of public business, all materials on a government-issued computer or email address should be public if they relate to government business.
Given the definition of public records as those records related to the transaction of public business, private matter on a government-issued computer or email address arguably is not a public record. However, Governor Perdue signed Executive order 18, which governs certain executive branch employees and provides that all materials on government-issued equipment or email accounts will be treated as public records regardless of its content.
Because the nature of an email, rather than its location, governs, private email on a private email account would not be considered a public record. However, Governor Perdue signed Executive order 18, which governs certain executive branch employees and provides that all materials on government-issued equipment or email accounts will be treated as public records regardless of its content.
A “record” under North Dakota law means recorded information of any kind, regardless of the physical form or characteristic by which the information is stored, recorded, or reproduced, which is in the possession or custody of a public entity or its agent and which has been received or prepared for use in connection with public business or contains information relating to public business. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-17.1(16) (emphasis added).
E-mail is treated as a record if it is in the possession or custody of a public entity or its agent and has been received or prepared for use in connection with public business or contains information relating to public business. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-17.1(16); see, e.g., N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2008-O-15 (2008); N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2008-O-07 (2008).
Public matter on government e-mail or government hardware is also an open record if both criteria are met and no exception applies. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-17.1(16).
Certain confidential matter on government e-mail or hardware, however, must be redacted before release. See, e.g., N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2006-O-13 (2006) (e-mails containing educational records and other personal information of students required to be redacted under Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act); see also N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2005-O-05 (2005).
As long as an exception does not apply, public matter on private e-mail is an open record, if it is in the possession or custody of a public entity or its agent and has been received or prepared for use in connection with public business or contains information relating to public business. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-17.1(16); see, e.g., N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2008-O-15 (2008); N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 2008-O-07, at 5 (2008) (“To allow a person to circumvent the open records law by maintaining public records on a private computer would be inconsistent with past court decisions and Attorney General’s opinions.”).
Private matter on private e-mail likely would not meet the definition of a public record—being in the possession or custody of a public entity or its agent and received or prepared for use in connection with public business or containing information relating to public business. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-17.1(16).
Although the Public Records Act does not address "email" explicitly, the statute applies to email that would be public if the same information were on paper and kept by a public office.
The Ohio Supreme Court has ordered a county to produce deleted emails and required the county to pay for the forensic analysis needed to find the requested ones. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 899 N.E.2d 961, 2008-Ohio-6253; see State ex rel. Bowman v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., Ohio App. 4th Dist. No. 10CA3, 2011-Ohio-2228, ¶ 17 (May 5, 2011)(teacher’s inappropriate personal emails on public email systems sent during school hours were public records because the school district relied upon them for disciplinary purposes); State ex rel. Bott Law Grp., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res., 2013-Ohio-5219, ¶ 51 (State agency "shall perform the acts necessary to search its journal for responsive e-mail correspondence that were deleted in violation of its records retention policy, and it shall make reasonable efforts to identify all responsive records stored on the shared servers or on the personal computers of all former ODNR employees who are either identified in relator's records requests or whom are known to have generated or received responsive records.”).
The Ohio Supreme Court has not determined whether an e-mail documenting public business that only appears on an administrator’s private account is a public record. State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 894 N.E.2d 686, 2008-Ohio-4788.
Emails generated by county employees on county time using county PCs are not public records where their content does not document any official county activity. State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cty Sheriff's Dept., 82 Ohio St.3d 37, 693 N.E.2d 789 (1998).
If the item is connected with the transaction of official business, the expenditure of public funds, or the administration of public property, electronic mail created by or received by either a State public body or a public body of a political subdivision constitutes a record subject to the Act. 2001 OK AG 46. This would apply even if the email was created, received or stored on the public official’s private electronic device. 2009 OK AG 12. Electronic mail can be retained in either electronic form or on paper. However, if it is retained on paper, the agency must ensure that sufficient documentation in other records exists elsewhere in the agency so a person seeking the information could ascertain all significant material contained in the electronic record. 2001 OK AG 46. A public body shall allow a requester access to specific data in the electronic format file so long as the system permitting the electronic access is secure enough to preserve the records and safeguard them from destruction or alteration. If the record contains information which is required by law to be kept confidential, and the agency cannot protect that confidential information in the electronic format, the agency must provide the information in a format which allows the confidential information to be redacted. Id. An electronic communication "created by" a third-party public body or official and sent to a legislator would be a record of the creating public body or official subject to the Oklahoma Open Records Act in its custody, control or possession. An electronic communication from a legislator sent to a third-party public body or official would become a "record" upon being "received by" the public body or official and thereby become subject to the Act in the custody, control or possession of the third-party public body or official. 2008 OK AG 19. Similarly, an electronic communication from an employee of the Legislature would become a "record" upon being "received by" a third-party public body or official and thereby become subject to the Oklahoma Open Records Act in the custody, control or possession of the third-party public body or official and an electronic communication "created by" a third-party public body and sent to an employee within his or her scope and duties of the Legislature would be a record of the public body subject to the Act in the custody, control or possession of the creating agency. 2008 OK AG 19.
E-mails and other electronic communications made or received in connection with the transaction of public business, the expenditure of public funds or the administration of public property, are subject to the Oklahoma Open Records Act regardless of whether they are created, received, transmitted, or maintained by government officials on publicly or privately owned equipment and communication devices, unless some provision of law makes them confidential. 2009 OK AG 12.
The Oregon Attorney General has determined that e-mails are public records, subject to disclosure if non-exempt and relating to the conduct of the public’s business. Attorney General Manual, § I.C.1.
If it relates to the public’s business, e-mail is treated the same as any other public record under, and is subject to, the same disclosure provisions and exemption claims. In other words, an e-mail that relates to the public’s business is a public record, regardless of where it is stored. ORS 192.311(5)(a) (formerly ORS 192.410). If an e-mail does not relate to the public’s business and it is contained on a privately owned computer, then it is by statutory definition not a public record. ORS 192.311(5)(b) (formerly ORS 192.410).
The Attorney General Manual suggests that if a privately created record is used or retained by a public official and it relates to the public’s business, it may become a public record. See Attorney General Manual, § I.C.2.
The APRA treats electronic mail messages as a public record, except specifically for any electronic mail messages of or to elected officials with or relating to those they represent and correspondence of or to elected officials in their official capacities. R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(i).
Assuming that the provision in the definition of public records "regardless of physical form or characteristics" extends to electronic records, e-mail will be treated just as any other document. S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-20(c).
If an e-mail is “prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body” it is a public record. S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-20(c).
Matter unrelated to the activities or operation of a public body would not be a public record.
Email is not specifically addressed. Generally, the physical form of a record is irrelevant under SDCL §1-27-1.1. Theoretically, at least, email can be a record. However, work-related "correspondence" and "personal correspondence" are protected under SDCL §§1-27-1.5 (12) and (19). If email does not fall within “correspondence” exception, presumably accessible. Private matter in government email is likely confidential. The status of public matter in private email is uncertain, but presumably private matter in private email is confidential.
The Act has no provision specifically dealing with e-mail, except for a provision that specifies that e-mail may be a public record. T.C.A. § 10-7-512. But see T.C.A. § 10-7-504(q)(1)(B) & (t)(I)(B) (certain email addresses are confidential).
Email of public employees is subject to a case-by-case review to determine whether the record qualifies as a public record. Brennan v. Giles County, 2005 WL 1996625 (Tenn. Ct. App., Aug. 18 2005).
Private matter on government email or government hardware is probably not a public record. Id. (adopting a Florida case’s rationale that private or personal email is not a public record).
Public matter on private email is probably a public record. Id.
Private matter on private email is probably not a public record. Id.
Section 552.002(a-2) provides that “public information” includes “any electronic communication” made “in connection with the transaction of official business.” Email is subject to the same “public information” and exception analysis that all material requested under the Public Information Act must go through to determine whether it is subject to disclosure. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-4274 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2017-07695 (2017). If collected, assembled, or maintained or in connection with the transaction of official business, the records will be subject to disclosure. See id.
Under Section 552.137(a)-(b), an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body is confidential and not subject to disclosure unless the member of the public affirmatively consents to its release.
The exemption under Section 552.137(c) does not apply to an e-mail address (1) provided to a governmental body by a person who has a contractual relationship with the governmental body or by the contractor’s agent; (2) provided to a governmental body by a vendor who seeks to contract with the governmental body or by the vendor’s agent; (3) contained in a response to a request for bids or proposals, contained in a response to similar invitations soliciting offers or information relating to a potential contract, or provided to a governmental body in the course of negotiating the terms of a contract or potential contract; or (4) provided to a governmental body on a letterhead, coversheet, printed document, or other document made available to the public.
Under Section 552.137(d), a governmental body is not prevented from disclosing an e-mail address for any reason to another governmental body or to a federal agency.
GRAMA defines a “Record” to include “electronic data,” “documents,” and “other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics.” Utah Code § 63G-2-103(22)(a). Given this definition, communications regarding a public matter on government e-mail or hardware are presumably public unless otherwise specifically exempted. Utah Code § 63G-2-103(22)(a). However, “Record” does not include “personal communication[s] prepared or received by an employee or officer of a governmental entity: in a capacity other than the employee’s or officer’s governmental capacity; or that is unrelated to the conduct of the public’s business.” Utah Code § 63G-2-103(22)(b)(i)(A),(B). The meaning of “capacity other than the employee’s or officer’s governmental capacity,” and whether it extends to text messages or instant messages regarding a private matter on government hardware or a public matter on private hardware, is not addressed.
A public record includes “any written or recorded information, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which is produced or acquired in the course of public agency business.” 1 V.S.A. § 317(b) (emphasis added). Thus, emails would fall under the statute’s definition of a “public record.” Last year the Vermont Supreme Court clarified that even emails “located in private accounts of state employees or officials” are public records if they were “produced or acquired in the course of agency business.” Toensing v. AG of Vt., 2017 VT 99, ¶ 12, 178 A.3d 1000 (Vt. 2017).
Electronic mail falls within the definition of "public records" and is subject to disclosure. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3701. The subject matter determines whether the email qualifies as a public record, regardless of whether it is on public or private hardware. Burton v. Mann, 74 Va. Cir. 471, 474 (Loudoun Cir. Ct. 2008).
E-mail is not treated any differently than other records. E-mail metadata is also a public record, but a requester seeking metadata should say so specifically in the record request. O’Neill v. Shoreline, 170 Wn.2d 138, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010).
In Tiberino v. Spokane County, 103 Wn. App. 680, 13 P.3d 1104 (2000), an appellate court held that personal emails sent by a public employee on her work computer were exempt from disclosure under the PRA’s privacy-based exemption for public employee files. Applying the statute’s privacy test, the court found that disclosure of the records was of no legitimate public interest and that release would be highly offensive. The case does not state a blanket rule regarding private use of public email accounts, but rather appears to turn on the content of the emails. The emails, which the court reviewed in camera, apparently disclose to the employee’s mother and sister that she had been raped.
The definition of a “writing” in the FOIA includes e-mail communications, Syl. Pt. 2, Associated Press v. Canterbury, 224 W. Va. 708, 688 S.E. 2d 317 (2009); see W. Va. Code § 29B–1–2(5). If an email "relates to the conduct of the public's business," judged by either its content or context, it is a public record subject to disclosure. W. Va. Code § 29B–1–2 (4).
There have been no court decisions indicating how public records contained in private e-mail archives should be treated. It is possible that the West Virginia Court may require disclosure upon a finding that private e-mail was used as a ruse to conduct public business while avoiding FOIA disclosure requirements.
Emails are generally covered as electronic records and the statute specifically states that written electronic communication received by a governmental entity are covered, whether at a meeting or outside a meeting. W.S. §16-4-201(v). No Wyoming case has specifically addressed whether it matters that the email was created or received on a government device. An email purely on a private matter probably would not be in the furtherance of the government’s official function. However, if an email that does directly relate to the transaction of official business was used by a governmental entity in the course of an investigation, it may be available for public inspection. Shaeffer v. University of Wyoming, 2006 WY 99.


text:
a. fool, simpleton. Galù ka giyud kun mutúman ka sa íyang dautang tambag, You are a fool if you follow his bad advice; v. fool, bluff someone galùgálù v. tease, make fun of. Ayaw galùgalúa ang bungì, Do not make fun of the harelip.
v. shake, rock back and forth. Kinsay mugalù sa láta sa dáyis? Who will shake the can with the dice in it? galùgálù v. work something back and forth, shake back and forth. Galùgalúa nang bugsuk arun masayung ibtun, Work the stake back and forth so it will be easy to pull it out.
(not without l) n. 1. gallon capacity; 2. gallon container; v. 1. be one gallon. Hápit mugalun ang tubà, There is almost a gallon of toddy; 2. measure out by the gallon. -an(←) n. gallon container.
n. epaulet; v. wear epaulets.
v. 1. attach a rope through the ears or nose of an animal for control; 1a. attach a controlling string to the kite; 2. put a string over the mouth of a vessel as a handle. Gawngig písì ang balding nawad-an sa kuptanan, Put a rope over the mouth of the pail that lost its handle; 3. keep someone in restriction or control. Gigalúngan ang mga Katuliku sa paggáwì sa pils, The Catholics are restrained from using the pill; n. something that controls or restrains something, e.g. rope in the ears or noses of animals, string tied to the main spar of a kite.
v. hug someone playfully. Galusgalúsa lang ímung asáwag masukù, Just hug your wife playfully if she gets angry.
a. haughty and giving oneself airs; v. haughty. Gigalutan kaáyu aku níya kay dílì na siya muípun nátù, I think she’s haughty because she avoids our company.
n. kind of grouper (pugápu): name given to species that are small.
n. cockpit, enclosed space for cockfighting.
n. kind of dry and crisp cracker.
v. 1. mix a small amount of salt with fish to preserve it for a short period of time. Naggam-ul ku sa bulinaw arun magámit pa ugmà, I am mixing a little salt with the anchovies so we can still use them tomorrow; 2. touch food and spoil its appearance or make it so it becomes rancid. Kinsay naggam-ul niíning kík, nga nawad-an sa hitsúra, Who touched this cake; its looks are ruined; 3. become spoiled; a. spoiled food.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.