text:
Is this woman a murderer for her choice?
One more month and they might have had at least the chance to live, if delivered early. Or, at least they would have not died by the will of their own parents fearful choice, and would have died with at least an attempt to save their lives and dignity and not simply been aborted by parents and doctors who were "playing the numbers".
Not to me, she isn't. It sounds like the most heartbreaking decision she ever had to make, and seeing that the doctors were right about her survival and the non-survival of the babies, she made the right choice.
You know, you really are one stupid cold blooded death scanc. Hard cases make bad law. No one is, nor ever has, advocated the denial of life saving measures. but what your ignorant murderous turn key behind willingly fails to see, is the 98% elective abortions done by pukes like you who just get off on feeling more powerful by bullying womb children to death. You are a miserable excuse for a human being, and hopefully we will be able to put the likes of you in the prison with the inmates you bully now. That would be way to kind. You deserve to have your arms and legs pulled off and your brains sucked out of your skull, just like you advocate for womb children.
That is so sad. I can't imagine the pain they went through.
And in this discussion, they are irrelevant distractions.
The real debate about abortion concerns the HEALTHY mothers that abort HEALTHY babies electively, for various reasons. And they constitute about 95% of all abortions.
I totally agree. They were playing the numbers. I dont think any attempt was made to save them at least enough to let them die a natural death.
Well of course not.....hearbreaking in your opinion?......You are pro-choice anyway, so why should you care? You are pro-abortion remember.
Yea can you just imagine the pain the kids went through.......wow.
Were these children taken to save the mothers life? I dotn think so. They were killed because they would have been an inconvenience. I didnt see any urgency on the part of the medical profession that this had to be done in a hurry to save her life. They gave her time to decide.
" Letting the girls die on their own didn't seem like an option, because we believed they were suffering while endangering my own health. And even if Sierra could survive the operation, what kind of life would she have? My parents said they would quit their jobs to help care for her, but it didn't seem right to bring her into the world with such bleak prospects. I thought about what my pastor had said, and to me, giving her the most life meant releasing her to heaven rather than having her suffer on earth."
How was it endangering her health? Did I miss something? And bring her into the world because it might have been bleak? The pastor is not God. She decided life and death for her children.
And if she were in that much danger she would have been taken to a hospital not some abortion mill.
Probably no hospital would take her because they dissagreed with her decision.
personally i think they were wrong... but in my opinion this would fall short of murder.
i also know how rare this case is... it is not the same thing as a teenager or other woman having an abortion of convienence.
It said in the article that "I was mirroring some of her symptoms and retaining fluids. My body was extremely swollen and I could hardly walk. If I continued the pregnancy, I could put my own health at risk too." She didn't go into detail. I guess I would have gone into alot of detail to justify my decision if I was going to publish this story.
sounds like someone went and did a pick see from tiller's old site.
Absolutely not. As she herself said, "These procedures are protected under Roe v. Wade if the mother's health or life is at risk, which mine was."
That's my concern too. I'm currently fighting on another forum about it. I only oppose abortions in healthy mothers with healthy babies.
yes, they were. You clearly have selective reading. The woman was beginning to mimic the conditon Savanna had, retaining fluids, and it would have lead to her death. The article states several times that her life was at risk.
You didn't want to see it.
"These procedures are protected under Roe v. Wade if the mother's health or life is at risk, which mine was."
It wasn't acute danger, but she WOULD have died if the abortion had not been done. The abortion clinic had better facilities to perform the procedure safely. The hospital did not.
"My doctor also confirmed that Savanna's illness could trigger a rare syndrome in me: I was mirroring some of her symptoms and retaining fluids. My body was extremely swollen and I could hardly walk. If I continued the pregnancy, I could put my own health at risk too."
"We knew what we had to do. Letting the girls die on their own didn't seem like an option, because we believed they were suffering while endangering my own health."
This woman saved her own life. I'll never consider that wrong.
Why are their medical records any of your business?
She did? Where in the article did it say she went to Tiller's clinic? No where, to my knowledge. That's verging on conspiracy theorizing.
You just can't wait to inform us of your pba in a few more months boss. It will be your sacrament by way of sacrifice.
btw, vote mccain blah blah. .
Charlotte Mary, the Streckfuss' second anencephalic child, was delivered by cesarean section June, 21st, 2004. She lived for 5 days, and died on the same day as her brother, Benedict, also anencephalic. Please visit baby Charlotte's website to see her full story and beautiful pictures.
Some people think we carried Benedict and Charlotte to term because we don't agree with abortion, because we are Catholic, or perhaps because our nephew was carried to term after a fatal diagnosis. While these factors probably all played a part in our immediate refusal of the option to 'terminate', this is not what it's all about! It's about love! It's about my baby! It's not about some tragic, fatal medical condition - it's about my child. We do not possess more strength than other people. It's not because we can cope where others wouldn't. There is no way to avoid the sad fact that she cannot live long after birth with this condition, but causing Charlotte to die earlier will not stop this happening. Causing her to die earlier will only take from us the beautiful experience of knowing and loving her.
Yoda, ill unborn children deserve to live the life they are given until a natural death, same as healthy babies. Why aren't their lives worth debating? Why do you consider them "irrelevant distractions"?
I think he's just speaking about generalities vs particulars. Let's have a debate about the 95% and not about the less than 5% and fewer.
But you're also right lukesmom.
To hell with Roe v. Wade.
Sounds like my pregnancy. I retained fluids and I could barely walk. My sister was in the Trendelenburg position for over two weeks. Many women have minor complications but not life threatening.
The article said......."If I continued I COULD PUT......COULD." Her life was not in danger when she decided to end their lives.
And I agree a horrible painful situation to have to live with the rest of your life.
Anyone who is willing to describe thier late term abortion and put thier name to it who has a real story usually provides much more than vauge decriptions of a possible problem... as i stated there are many more careful ways to handle someone whos life is truely at risk.
And yeah i know of what i speak here... trust me this story is full of holes.
Tiller is the ONLY abortionist who sends people to a hotel to dialate... and this story is very similar to 2 that were posted on his site about 4 years ago.
Because those other babies just aren't worth fighting for.
Then stop the lies about how abortion is elective throughout all 9 months. The real debate is abortion, not just the first trimester abortions on non-viable fetii that you so-called lifers like to rant about.
There is such a thing as an induced labor abortion in which the woman wishes a more natural removal of either a dead fetus or a fetus that is terminally ill so that the fetus is intact and can be bonded with by grieving parents.
And Tay Sachs infants can often live up to five years suffering the symptoms of their condition, is it more godly to just let them suffer?
Um, yes she does name it. On top of that, her entire body was beginning to swell. I can't believe how many of you missed this important fact. She was not simply retaining amnionic fluid.
You have no inderstanding of the condition she was suffering from; as she states, it was not simply the retention of amniotic fluid. Her entire body was swelling.
Because you missed the part about her having a life-threatening condition, I can understand why you think this is simply a case of aborting lethally deformed babies, but it's not.
For every story of a woman carrying and being happy, I could find one where she was forced to carry and was in agony or died, or a story where she aborted and was extremely grateful for the procedure.
Because they constitute less than 1% of all abortions performed in America. So do rapes, and abortions done because of extremely low maternal age. They are all extremely rare and are indeed just distractions.
These procedures are protected if the mother's health or life is at risk.
What will you say next, "to hell with the woman"?
No they're not, because the mother's health comes first.
Health should definitely be a consideration, but "happiness" is far too broad an interpretation. (Some people actually are happiest when they are suffering.) The mother is still the major component in the equation. If she dies, so does that fetus unless the pregnancy is far enough advanced to save the VIABLE unborn.
I mean more than the normal amount of risk, I mean something much more serious. It's not a legal cop-out: if I was told I would have a good chance of dying if I stayed pregnant, and the child was not viable yet OR if the only safe option was abortion, I would choose it in a heartbeat. Even more, if not only I was in danger, but my child was also lethally deformed, I would definitely choose an abortion to end their suffering and to save my own life.
To hell with Roe v. Wade because the life of the mother was always priority before Roe v. Wade anyway.
Pro aborts like to live in this fantasy world where before Roe v. Wade doctors were allowing women to die because of their babies. This was never the case and the life of the mother ALWAYS was first priority.
Roe v. Wade can safely be abolished. Most of the abortions will stop and women and their babies will live longer, safer, happier lives.
#1. I will say this again: You have absolutely NO idea what you would do unless you ACTUALLY face this situation, so please stop making assumptions about what you would do.
#2. I deal with pts EVERY DAY whoes "body's swell up with fluid" for various different diagnosises. Same treatment, you remove the fluid. People take medication for this every day with no ill effect to themselves. The ill effect to the unborn would most likely not be as dramatic as abortion.
#3 This woman did not have an "induced" labor per sae as her cervix was unnaturally stretch and her babies removed physically. She had no assurance her children would be removed in one piece. She had no assurance they didn't suffer through this procedure.
#4. She reports her babies had a 5% chance of life. A friend yest lost her 10 yr old daughter to brain cancer. Everyone knew Emma would die but if anyone would have put a pillow over her face to kill her, they would have been tried for murder. Same scenerio here only these children were unborn so, yes, this mother is a murderess for consenting to a procedure she knew would kill her children.
As my father used to say "don't let Julia foolya" this mother let fear of carrying her children to a natural death make this so called "choice". She also is not a very good christian if she can't trust enough in God to carry her and her children through this. Christianity core belief is to simply trust God and accept what we cannot change.
And Mary is right, Tiller is the only one who would do this kind of killing that late in the pregnancy. It is NOT good medical practice to send a pt to a hotel in the middle of a procedure.
How exactly do you remove extra fluid from someone's ankle or stomach or arm, when it is the very cells and tissue that is swollen? It's not a balloon!! The only way to reduce that extra fluid is through delivery of the child and thus removal of the causation of the fluid retention, OR, medication which is probably not safe to use during pregnancy.
I don't believe abortion is ever murder. As much as I absolutely loathe late term abortions, if the mother chooses to do it, it's not murder. If anyone else kills it, then that's murder. I don't feel a healthy mother should be able to make that choice if her child is also healthy, but even if she did, I would still not consider it murder.
You use Lasix, or Hydrochlorthiazide, or Spironolactone. Doesn't matter where to tissue edema is, these will reduce the edema. I also beleive use of these medications is a little (said sarcaticly) more benign and therefore safer for the unborn child than being aborted. Don't you think?
Well, there you go. This is a proabort statement if I ever heard one. If it waddles and it quacks... well you know the rest.
Yup, a duck in disguise.
Do any of those medications harm the woman? Would it be safer for her to abort than to have those chemicals used? I just simply do not believe the doctor would not have advised the woman to abort unless she was truly in danger of dying.
Her life was not in danger at the time she killed them. Hell she played piano for them the week before. Her life was not in danger and the article does not state that it was. She didnt want to deal with imperfect kids.
None of these meds would cause more than possible dehydration in the mom, if she didn't drink enough fluids and wasn't in acute renal failure. 99% of healthy and unhealthy adults I see take one or two of these meds with little ill effect on the pt.
You are living in a dream world if you don't think doctors every day don't recommend abortion to ALL moms carrying a child with a poor prenatal diagnosis. Talk to ANY mom who has faced this and she will tell you her MD advised her to terminate. EVEN my Catholic doctor advised me and a psychologist. Some moms are not even given info that she has a choice, just told to abort or terminate which is the pc term for cases of poor prenatal diagnosis. I can sight you story after story. I have yet to meet one single women who wasn't "pushed" toward termination by her doctor.
Liberal, When you recieve the news that your unborn child/ren is sick you are given very few options. You are terrified of 2 things in probably equal measure, 1. you can't and don't want to watch you child die or carry them to term knowing the most likely result will be watching them die. 2. You are terrified your baby is in pain. It is a horrible, hellish position to be in, a position no parent should have to face but it does happen, much more fequently than anyone knows untill you have been there and actually talk to other parents.
I wish moms were given a true choice by there doctors but this doesn't happen. Most of us are given no info except where we can go to "terminate" and what "termination" entails. Until the last 3-4 years there was NO information about carrying to term. Many of us moms have banded together and through the internet are changing this. Now there is a prenatal hospice option and a few books and internet sites we started so moms can talk to other moms for guidance and support.
It is certainly possible for a dying person to play the piano the SAME DAY that they die. Think terminal cancer or other serious diseases.
Her children were more than "imperfect", they were darn near dead already. Do you REALLY think a woman would abort two WANTED children that she was looking forward to having on a WHIM???????
Not on a whim but because of fear of the unknown and fear of the future, and because her doctor recommended it, yes.
Actually, that would appear to indicate that we are coming out AHEAD by halving the death rate from abortion.
And so has everyone who is pro-life.
Difference is we prolifers are not "for" killing the unborn. We respect the right to live for the unborn, whereas those of you for abortion do not. Do you not already know this?
Those of us who are pro-choice are not "FOR ABORTION" - but we believe that, like any other medical procedure, it should be an option for women with unwanted or dangerous pregnancies.
Our very much loved children are NOT "hideous mutants" or a "mess" and my son was not an "it" and actually was a much better person than you, even without a brain. Maybe you should look in the mirror to see a heartless, hideous mutant, and you questionably have a brain. There IS currently much debate about that but no debate about the fact you have no heart, compassion or soul. There aren't enough nasty names for b####es like you.
Putting an end to their pregnancy is actually KILLING, ie: putting an end to their child, in your words. I hate to tell you but carrying a "hideous mutant" or a "mess" does not make a mother unheathy.
You are an unspeakable b####.
Double speak. Do you get tired chasing your tail like that?
Every child deserves life. Every child's life is worth debating. But to spend time debating the seriousness of various genetic disorders and/or maternal complications during pregnancy takes us far, far away from the basic principle that ought to guide us about every abortion...... that no unborn child ought to be electively killed.
If a discussion of these poor unfortunate children and their unfortunate mothers could be held without falling into the trap of diversion and distraction that the proaborts constantly lay for us, then that would be a perfectly valid thing to use forum time and space for. But in reality, it isn't possible. They can and they will use these subjects to get us completely off the basic reason for being here..... to oppose elective abortion.
Have you been run over by a semi today?
Agreed but termination for medical reasons is also elective and one of my main reasons to be here is to open eyes to the injustice done to our ill children too. So I will continue to fight for ALL unborn children, even the minority.
Actually, the use of the word "elective" here is to indicate that there is no medical indication for the abortion.
Whether or not the medical condition actually justifies taking the baby early is another matter, but 95% of all abortions are done without ANY medical condition being present. And until we can establish that a HEALTHY mother with a HEALTHY baby has no moral justification to kill her baby, we can't begin to deal with the medical issues. It's just a matter of getting things in logical order.
WE'RE ALL IN DANGER OF DYING...JUST BY LIVING!
a stray bullet can come through your window any second...i could drop dead of heart failure 5 seconds from now...DON'T KILL MY CHILD BECAUSE MY LIFE COULD END ANY SECOND. i'm not sure if i'll be alive tomorrow(accidents happen)..BUT DON'T KILL MY CHILD BECAUSE THAT STILL WON'T MAKE ME LIVE FOREVER!
of course you know the answer is YES. um...sounds like she is claiming "self-defense" though.
this case sounds pretty creative and fabricated. if it is true, i feel sorry for a mother who KILLS not one, but two(serial killer?)children to "save her own life."
what quality of life is she left with now....one that involves trying to cover up the truth with fancy wording? Let's call it what it is, then ask the same question. IS THIS WOMAN A MURDERER FOR COMMITTING MURDER?
Actually in the case of "mutants and messes" as pinheady would call them, there is no medical implications to the mother or the child to continue the pregnancy until it's natural end so therefore it IS an elective procedure.
Now I do understand about putting perspective on this and following an order of events but I have my personal crusade also and that will not go away or be forgotten because moms like me won't let it. So you all are stuck with me and my crusade for all the defenceless ill unborn children. GET THAT PINHEADDY? CHILDREN, NOT HIDEOUS MUTANTS OR MESSES!
~what's wrong with MURDERING a baby because the mother is poor?
~what's wrong with MURDERING a baby because his father is not ready to be a father?
~what's wrong with a mother choosing to MURDER her baby because she wants to finish college first?
~what's wrong with a mother murdering her baby because the baby is sick?
~what's wrong with a mother murdering her baby because she already has too many children?
While I would not refer to these unfortunant babies as mutants or messes, they clearly were incompatable with life outside the womb or already dead in utero. Aborting the pregnancy was humane as even if the child had lived briefly outside of the womb, what quality of life would they have had? Many women in this circumstance still bond with the dead child, take pictures, pass the child around to family to create some memories with the child. No, your son was not an "it", he was a human baby who was unfortunantly incompatable with life and you have my sympathies.
Nope, though I'm sure you'd wish such a demise upon me and my unborn child who btw, has made his or her first movements known. After all, pro-choicers and their unborn are not protected by your narrow minded psuedo-life mind set.
there is ABsolutely NO reason to concieve a tay sachs infant as people who are carriers of this gene can be screened BEFORE pregnancy.
If suffering justifies killing the one who is suffering, why would the same logic not apply to born human beings? Who gets to decide which human beings would be "better off dead?"
i did nNOT miss that point... the mirror syndrom...and guess what... it does not require the fetus to be removed in order to fix it... ever heard of diuretics... they can with proper monitering be used in pregnant moms.
Well, here you have it. Pro-lifers don't give a shyte whether the born child suffers, has no quality of life or, no life at all in utero so long as nothing is done to remove the non-viable fetus prior to natural labor and delivery pro-lifers are fine with it. And us pro-choicers are the hideous ones? It's you psuedo-lifers who have no soul, compassion or, even the slightest empathy. Call me a pro-abort if that's what floats your boat but I still come out cleaner.
nope you come out the looser... nothing about what those children in you link had said they were suffering one whit... you need to look up the conditions they had... they were possibly dying... but they were not suffering and there is the diffrence.
Well pinheaddy, what I did was not noble or anything else you want to accuse me of. I actually KNOW and talk to several moms who made the decision to end their pregnancy and their child and would also take huge offence to having their child called a "hideous mutant or a mess". Want me to "sic" them on you here? Just say the word, idiot.
Oh, BTW, moms who terminate their pregnancies because their child is sick, actually name "it" and if labor is induced, bathe "it" and bury "it" and actually take pictures of "it" before burying their "hideous mutant mess of an it". Shove it sunshine.
i would personally LOVE to watch that one!
Boss, Yest my friend's 10 yr old daughter died of brain cancer. She was diagnosed 3 yrs ago and is the same age as my son, Pete. She underwent 2 brain surgeries and maxed out on chemo. Hospice became involved in the spring. Her pain was controlled but she had problems eating and drinking and was frail and we expected the end anytime but on July 3rd she perked up and was mad because she couldn't go to the fair like she wanted. Another friend visited her this weekend and reported she was peaceful beyond words. Now she did suffer during this but would it have been acceptable to kill her prematurely? No, and never did she make mention of wanting to die.
When told of my son's diagnosis a part of me died right then. Every parent no matter what they end up deciding enters hell on diagnosis day. Aborting that child does not end that hell any sooner. What often times these moms don't have that I do, is peace and the answer to the inevitable question of "what if". I also have the added grace of knowing I did nothing to cause his death and everything to ensure his wellbeing while alive.
I have compassion for any parent who goes through this. I know the heartbreak but I also know the joy that overshadows the heartbreak and that is the difference. I wouldn't change a thing.
Just a note, but calling someone noble is a compliment, not an accusation.
I agree you do. I'm in the same boat as you as far as aborting lethally deformed fetuses goes. Of course I can't say for sure how I'd feel, but I know I'd want the choice to end their suffering to be there. Next they'll be taking away the right to humanely euthanize pets who are sick and dying!
Why do you think her doctors felt this was not a good answer?
No offense but I don't want or need compliments about a normal parenting instinct to protect my child's life.
You do not have a high chance of dying right now though. There are conditions that arise during pregnancy that increase a woman's chance of mortality to nearly 100% unless the pregnancy is removed. Her death can be prevented by removing the pregnancy.
No, like someone stabbing/shooting the woman in the stomach, or pushing her down the stairs, or crashing into her car and compressing her stomach and causing a miscarriage.
Say what?! Comparing euthanizing children with euthanizing animals? Oh brother... There IS no comparison. I am hoping you didn't mean your statement the way it sounds.
Straight-edge people can still be for the legal state of alcohol... they simply choose not to drink themselves.
Oh I've tried explaining that to them, it's of no use.
How is that any different than ripping them apart, limb to limb or forcing them to be born before they can effectively breath as in abortion?
Her doctors considered her life endangered enough to advise abortion.
Driving down the road increases your chance of death, crossing a street increases your chance of death but hey, people do it every day. In fact, while we are living parts of us are actually dying. How does any of that justify killing the unborn?
She never says if she was offered this. Most likely she was but as I have said previously, doctors advocate abortion in cases like this. It is cheaper for the "system" and it is considered emotionally "easier" for the mother. Hah, gotta love that one!
Abortion is almost ALWAYS advocated by the doctor regardless.
I know! Isn't it awful? We are so thick headed aren't we? We're just way too biased that way. We should try being more pro choice like you, so we can all just get along. We should try being more understanding, and open minded about killing defenseless, innocent children. We should stop calling it "killing a child" and start calling it a "medical procedure" like you do. Then we could all be friends, and the world would be such a happy place.
We should never compromise our position, never. There is no such thing as sittin the fence on this issue. You either stand up for the unborn, or you believe they can be killed by their mothers.
It is killing. That is the goal of EVERY ABORTIONIST. The procedure is not complete until the unborn is dead, until the heart stops.
And as far as i am concerned we dont have any permission slip from the fetus so......if you intentionally kill.....what is that called?
It is murder and it should be referred to as premeditated murder no less.
without her records we don't know if they gave her this option or not. that is why we need more information... in my line of work this type of therapy is routinely offered to even the worst case scenarios...so i can't think of a single good reason as to why they wouldn't have offered it. Some women however don't want it.. and convienently fail to mention any offer being made, so they do not have to answwer delicate questions.
i know that to be true in many areas... at least in mine this is not always the case... the ones i work with are a bit more open minded to the reality of what happens when a parent aborts a wanted child...thanks in part to your story about luke and others like it... that website is wonderful.
And for that I am greatful Mary. The key to change is education.
I feel terribly for this woman and her husband. What she went through is terrible. The guilt of having her babies killed would only increase the pain and sorrow. Abortion has always been legal for LIFE of the mother, not health. She needed to get the babies out of her. It may be that her life was threatened but aborting the children did not male her health any better than if she would have delivered those babies tight away. Healthy babies born at 28 weeks have an 85 % chance of survival. These babies were 30 weeks when they were killed. Due to their conditions they probably would have died shortly after birth but that is not for sure and we have no right to decide when someone dies. What if she quickly went into labor and delivered them prior to getting to the abortion clinic. Would it be right for her to go into the nursery and have them killed? Shouldn't she have left them die a natural death. You can't kill someone because you don't want to watch them suffer. Instead you pay to have you put to sleep while they suffer with abortion.
When my baby died at 4 1/2 months, I would have loved to hold him alive for a while. It is not the same holding a dead baby. You can't sleep for months wondering how he might have suffered when the died. I can't imagine how much worse this is for a woman who aborts her children. I believe this abortion killed her children and permanenly scared her heart much worse than if she had delivered them alive.
By DAVID STOUT (NYT) 801 wordsWASHINGTON, Feb. 25 -- A prominent member of the abortion rights movement said today that he lied in earlier statements when he said a controversial form of late-term abortion is rare and performed primarily to save the lives or fertility of women bearing severely malformed babies. He now says the procedure is performed far more often than his colleagues have acknowledged, and on healthy women bearing healthy fetuses. Ron Fitzsimmons, the executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, said he intentionally misled in previous remarks about the procedure, called intact dilation and evacuation by those who believe it should remain legal and ''partial-birth abortion'' by those who believe it should be outlawed, because he feared that the truth would damage the cause of abortion rights. But he is now convinced, he said, that the issue of whether the procedure remains legal, like the overall debate about abortion, must be based on the truth.
In an article in American Medical News, to be published March 3, and an interview today, Mr. Fitzsimmons recalled the night in November 1995, when he appeared on ''Nightline'' on ABC and ''lied through my teeth'' when he said the procedure was used rarely and only on women whose lives were in danger or whose fetuses were damaged. ''It made me physically ill,'' Mr. Fitzsimmons said in an interview. ''I told my wife the next day, 'I can't do this again.' '' Mr. Fitzsmmons said that after that interview he stayed on the sidelines of the debate for a while, but with growing unease. As much as he disagreed with the National Right to Life Committee and others who oppose abortion under any circumstances, he said he knew they were accurate when they said the procedure was common.

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RICHARD P. QUINCY, as General Partner of SILVER LEAF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. ROBERT SULLIVAN, ROBERT FOWLER, CHERYL BUSCH, GEORGE DONOVAN and RICHARD KRAUSE, as they are the PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN TEWKSBURY, and the TOWN OF TEWKSBURY.
SUP CT 90-5454 : KEVIN C. SULLIVAN and EDWARD N. BOWLEY, JR., d/b/a FIRST COLONIAL, a partnership, vs. CHERYL L. BUSCH, GEORGE B. DONOVAN, ROBERT A. FOWLER, RICHARD KRAUSE and ROBERT P. SULLIVAN, as they are the PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF TEWKSBURY.
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff Richard P. Quincy as a General Partner of Silver Leaf Limited Partnership ("Quincy") under G.L. c. 40A, §17, 231A and 240, §14A by which he appeals certain conditions contained in a decision of the Defendant Planning Board of the Town of Tewksbury ("Board") approving a site plan special permit for the construction of a shopping center; a declaratory judgment that Quincy's application for said site plan special permit was constructively granted by failure of the Board to timely file its decision and thirdly a declaratory judgment that the Tewksbury Zoning By-law ("By-law") purporting to require a special permit for general retail businesses and restaurants in a General Business District, where such businesses also appear to be permitted, is invalid under G.L. c. 40A, §4 and that Plaintiff may construct its proposed project as of right.
The Superior Court cases seek to annul completely the decision of the Board inasmuch as Plaintiffs therein allege said decision exceeds the authority of the Board.
The Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Mass. R. Civ. P. This cause came on to be heard on the above motion on May 2, 1991. After considering the pertinent documents, pleadings, affidavits and arguments of counsel, I find that there are sufficient material and undisputed facts to be at least partially dispositive of this case, and that accordingly this case is ripe for partial summary judgment. Community National Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 32 (1976).
1. Plaintiff Quincy as a General Partner of Silver Leaf Limited Partnership is the owner of a parcel of land on Main Street, State Highway No. 38 in Tewksbury in an area zoned as a general business district.
2. On February 21, 1990 Plaintiff properly filed an application for modification of site plan special permit No. 88-23 which plan had been approved by the Board on February 27, 1989.
The changes to the site development plans include slight revisions to the building footprints and loading areas to accommodate future tenant requirements. The adequacy of the overall proposed sight design is not affected by these reasons. . . .
4. On April 9, 1990 the Board opened and closed the public hearing on Quincy's application, although certain correspondence and information was received by the Board from Quincy after such date.
5. On July 9, 1990 the Board voted to approve the application with certain conditions in addition to the conditions of the original (1984) approval.
6. On July 24, 1990 the Board took its final action on this matter by filing its written decision with the Town Clerk.
d) Y which requires sidewalk construction over land not owned by Plaintiff.
As to the constructive approval of the site plan special permit, I find that a question of material fact - whether or not Plaintiff complied with certain provisions of G.L. c. 40A, §9 - has been raised in the Superior Court matter and that as to this matter, Quincy's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
The Zoning By-law Section 4.5.D clearly permits a shopping center in the general business district. Section 4.2, however, indicates that certain uses are "Permitted as of right, but all business, institutional, or industrial (uses) are subject to the requirements of Sec. 4.11."
Section 4.11 is titled Site Plan Special Permit and does in fact set out special permit standards and requirements as a prerequisite to site plan approval. It might be argued that the By-law, albeit somewhat awkwardly, is modifying business uses from uses permitted by right to uses permitted by special permit. Such reasoning, however, would leave only residential and agricultural uses, permitted by right in the "General Business" district, and little	or no distinction between business and residential districts. Rather than so find, I find that the By-law has established a business district in which certain uses are permitted by right (as recognized in Section 4.2) and also attempts to make such uses subject to a special permit. As recognized in SCIT, Inc. v. Planning Board of Braintree, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 101 (1989) uses permitted by right cannot be made subject to discretionary special permit provisions, inasmuch as the concepts of a use as of right and a use dependent on discretion are mutually exclusive. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Board of Appeals of Westwood, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 278 , 281 (1986). Accordingly I find the shopping center use in the General Business District is permitted as of right, and I find further those portions of Section 4.11 of the By-law which require the discretionary special permit standards to be applied to Plaintiff's proposed shopping center use in the General Business zone to be void. I allow said portions to stand insofar as they are limited to imposing reasonable site plan terms and conditions on the proposal as set forth in Prudential and as further set forth herein. As set forth below, this matter may be remanded to the Board for reconsideration and a decision not inconsistent with this decision.
The off-site conditions imposed on Plaintiff's site plan exceed the Board's authority. A proper site plan review must be confined to on-site consideration, any traffic related inquiry must be limited to that of access into and out of the site itself and may not include the roadways and intersections beyond the site. In any event the road and sidewalk work required by the conditions can be done only by a governmental decision beyond the control of Quincy. It is well established that it is unreasonable to impose a condition on an applicant, the performance of which lies entirely beyond his power. VHS Realty v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Plymouth, (1991). Accordingly Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to Conditions Q (3), R (1), X and Y is allowed and said conditions are annulled.
Inasmuch as this matter may be remanded to the Board for permissible site plan review, I would respectfully suggest to the Board that this review should probably be limited to the changes proposed to the already existing and approved site plan, particularly if the changes are as insignificant as the Board's engineer would appear to suggest. The earlier plan, while apparently still valid, is not before the Court, and I have little guidance as to the extent of such revision. Accordingly I leave such matter for the Board's determination.
ADJUDGED and ORDERED that at Plaintiff's discretion the remaining issues herein may be marked for trial, or Plaintiff may move to dismiss as to the issue of constructive approval. In the event such motion is allowed, this matter is to be remanded to the Planning Board for further action not inconsistent herewith.
Either of which alternative should protect the rights of Plaintiffs in the Superior Court cases.
[Note 1] Superior Court Civil Action No. 90-5519 originally named Eric Wodlinger as a defendant as did No. 90-5454, which in addition named Richard Quincy d/b/a and Massachusetts Centers, Inc. since Mr. Wadlinger is obviously the attorney of record for Silver Leaf Limited Partnership and apparently as Quincy, Quincy & Company and Massachusetts Centers are former owners of the site in question, I am, acting on motions of these defendants dated September 11, 1991, dismissing them as defendants. Because of the following decision and judgment these participants as parties would appear to be moot, in any event.


(1) The term "act of God" means an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.
(2) The term "Administrator" means the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
(3) The term "barrel" means forty-two United States gallons at sixty degrees Fahrenheit.
(4) The term "claim" means a demand in writing for a sum certain.
(5) The term "claimant" means any person who presents a claim for compensation under this chapter.
(6) The term "damages" means damages for injury or loss of natural resources as set forth in section 9607(a) or 9611(b) of this title.
(7) The term "drinking water supply" means any raw or finished water source that is or may be used by a public water system (as defined in the Safe Drinking Water Act [42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.]) or as drinking water by one or more individuals.
(8) The term "environment" means (A) the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under the exclusive management authority of the United States under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.], and (B) any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.
(9) The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
(10) The term "federally permitted release" means (A) discharges in compliance with a permit under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1342], (B) discharges resulting from circumstances identified and reviewed and made part of the public record with respect to a permit issued or modified under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and subject to a condition of such permit, (C) continuous or anticipated intermittent discharges from a point source, identified in a permit or permit application under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which are caused by events occurring within the scope of relevant operating or treatment systems, (D) discharges in compliance with a legally enforceable permit under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1344], (E) releases in compliance with a legally enforceable final permit issued pursuant to section 3005(a) through (d) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6925(a)–(d)] from a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility when such permit specifically identifies the hazardous substances and makes such substances subject to a standard of practice, control procedure or bioassay limitation or condition, or other control on the hazardous substances in such releases, (F) any release in compliance with a legally enforceable permit issued under section 1412 of title 33 of 1 section 1413 of title 33, (G) any injection of fluids authorized under Federal underground injection control programs or State programs submitted for Federal approval (and not disapproved by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency) pursuant to part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act [42 U.S.C. 300h et seq.], (H) any emission into the air subject to a permit or control regulation under section 111 [42 U.S.C. 7411], section 112 [42 U.S.C. 7412], title I part C [42 U.S.C. 7470 et seq.], title I part D [42 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.], or State implementation plans submitted in accordance with section 110 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7410] (and not disapproved by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), including any schedule or waiver granted, promulgated, or approved under these sections, (I) any injection of fluids or other materials authorized under applicable State law (i) for the purpose of stimulating or treating wells for the production of crude oil, natural gas, or water, (ii) for the purpose of secondary, tertiary, or other enhanced recovery of crude oil or natural gas, or (iii) which are brought to the surface in conjunction with the production of crude oil or natural gas and which are reinjected, (J) the introduction of any pollutant into a publicly owned treatment works when such pollutant is specified in and in compliance with applicable pretreatment standards of section 307(b) or (c) of the Clean Water Act [33 U.S.C. 1317(b), (c)] and enforceable requirements in a pretreatment program submitted by a State or municipality for Federal approval under section 402 of such Act [33 U.S.C. 1342], and (K) any release of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], in compliance with a legally enforceable license, permit, regulation, or order issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
(11) The term "Fund" or "Trust Fund" means the Hazardous Substance Superfund established by section 9507 of title 26.
(12) The term "ground water" means water in a saturated zone or stratum beneath the surface of land or water.
(13) The term "guarantor" means any person, other than the owner or operator, who provides evidence of financial responsibility for an owner or operator under this chapter.
(14) The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(2)(A)], (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1317(a)], (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act [15 U.S.C. 2606]. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
(15) The term "navigable waters" or "navigable waters of the United States" means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.
(16) The term "natural resources" means land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States (including the resources of the fishery conservation zone established by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.]), any State or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.
(17) The term "offshore facility" means any facility of any kind located in, on, or under, any of the navigable waters of the United States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a vessel or a public vessel.
(18) The term "onshore facility" means any facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or under, any land or nonnavigable waters within the United States.
(19) The term "otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" means subject to the jurisdiction of the United States by virtue of United States citizenship, United States vessel documentation or numbering, or as provided by international agreement to which the United States is a party.
(20)(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
(B) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by a common or contract carrier and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall mean such common carrier or other bona fide for hire carrier acting as an independent contractor during such transportation, (ii) the shipper of such hazardous substance shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any release during such transportation which resulted solely from circumstances or conditions beyond his control.
(C) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been delivered by a common or contract carrier to a disposal or treatment facility and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall not include such common or contract carrier, and (ii) such common or contract carrier shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any release at such disposal or treatment facility resulting from circumstances or conditions beyond its control.
(D) The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government which acquired ownership or control through seizure or otherwise in connection with law enforcement activity, or through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
(II) a successor in interest to which the facility was conveyed under section 14(c) of such Act [43 U.S.C. 1613(c)].
(ii) Limitation.-The exclusion provided under this subparagraph shall not apply to any entity described in clause (i) that causes or contributes to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility conveyed as described in such clause.
(i) Indicia of ownership to protect security.-The term "owner or operator" does not include a person that is a lender that, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect the security interest of the person in the vessel or facility.
if the person seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case of a lease finance transaction), or otherwise divest the person of the vessel or facility at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory requirements.
if the actions do not rise to the level of participating in management (within the meaning of clauses (i) and (ii)).
(II) that conforms with regulations issued by the appropriate Federal banking agency or the appropriate State bank supervisor (as those terms are defined in section 1813 of title 12) or with regulations issued by the National Credit Union Administration Board, as appropriate.
(ii) Financial or administrative function.-The term "financial or administrative function" includes a function such as that of a credit manager, accounts payable officer, accounts receivable officer, personnel manager, comptroller, or chief financial officer, or a similar function.
(III) any other formal or informal manner by which the person acquires, for subsequent disposition, title to or possession of a vessel or facility in order to protect the security interest of the person.
(VIII) a person that provides title insurance and that acquires a vessel or facility as a result of assignment or conveyance in the course of underwriting claims and claims settlement.
(v) Operational function.-The term "operational function" includes a function such as that of a facility or plant manager, operations manager, chief operating officer, or chief executive officer.
(vi) Security interest.-The term "security interest" includes a right under a mortgage, deed of trust, assignment, judgment lien, pledge, security agreement, factoring agreement, or lease and any other right accruing to a person to secure the repayment of money, the performance of a duty, or any other obligation by a nonaffiliated person.
(21) The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.
(22) The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
(23) The terms "remove" or "removal" means 2 the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.].
(24) The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means 2 those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials.
(25) The terms "respond" or "response" means 4 remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action;,3 all such terms (including the terms "removal" and "remedial action") include enforcement activities related thereto.
(26) The terms "transport" or "transportation" means 3 the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode, including a hazardous liquid pipeline facility (as defined in section 60101(a) of title 49), and in the case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by a common or contract carrier, the term "transport" or "transportation" shall include any stoppage in transit which is temporary, incidental to the transportation movement, and at the ordinary operating convenience of a common or contract carrier, and any such stoppage shall be considered as a continuity of movement and not as the storage of a hazardous substance.
(27) The terms "United States" and "State" include the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and any other territory or possession over which the United States has jurisdiction.
(28) The term "vessel" means every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.
(29) The terms "disposal", "hazardous waste", and "treatment" shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6903].
(30) The terms "territorial sea" and "contiguous zone" shall have the meaning provided in section 502 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1362].
(31) The term "national contingency plan" means the national contingency plan published under section 311(c) 4 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or revised pursuant to section 9605 of this title.
(32) The terms "liable" or "liability" under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. 1321].
(33) The term "pollutant or contaminant" shall include, but not be limited to, any element, substance, compound, or mixture, including disease-causing agents, which after release into the environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring; except that the term "pollutant or contaminant" shall not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (14) and shall not include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas of pipeline quality (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
(34) The term "alternative water supplies" includes, but is not limited to, drinking water and household water supplies.
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that the defendant has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title, provides full cooperation, assistance, and facility access to the persons that are authorized to conduct response actions at the facility (including the cooperation and access necessary for the installation, integrity, operation, and maintenance of any complete or partial response action at the facility), is in compliance with any land use restrictions established or relied on in connection with the response action at a facility, and does not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional control employed at the facility in connection with a response action.
(cc) prevent or limit any human, environmental, or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous substance.
(ii) Standards and practices.-Not later than 2 years after January 11, 2002, the Administrator shall by regulation establish standards and practices for the purpose of satisfying the requirement to carry out all appropriate inquiries under clause (i).
(I) The results of an inquiry by an environmental professional.
(II) Interviews with past and present owners, operators, and occupants of the facility for the purpose of gathering information regarding the potential for contamination at the facility.
(III) Reviews of historical sources, such as chain of title documents, aerial photographs, building department records, and land use records, to determine previous uses and occupancies of the real property since the property was first developed.
(IV) Searches for recorded environmental cleanup liens against the facility that are filed under Federal, State, or local law.
(V) Reviews of Federal, State, and local government records, waste disposal records, underground storage tank records, and hazardous waste handling, generation, treatment, disposal, and spill records, concerning contamination at or near the facility.
(VI) Visual inspections of the facility and of adjoining properties.
(VII) Specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant.
(VIII) The relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property, if the property was not contaminated.
(IX) Commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property.
(X) The degree of obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect the contamination by appropriate investigation.
(ee) the ability of the defendant to detect the contamination by appropriate inspection.
(II) Property purchased on or after may 31, 1997.-With respect to property purchased on or after May 31, 1997, and until the Administrator promulgates the regulations described in clause (ii), the procedures of the American Society for Testing and Materials, including the document known as "Standard E1527–97", entitled "Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessment: Phase 1 Environmental Site Assessment Process", shall satisfy the requirements in clause (i).
(v) Site inspection and title search.-In the case of property for residential use or other similar use purchased by a nongovernmental or noncommercial entity, a facility inspection and title search that reveal no basis for further investigation shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of this subparagraph.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to such defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter of a defendant who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the action relating to the facility.
(36) The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village but not including any Alaska Native regional or village corporation, which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.
(ii) who accepts for collection, accumulation, and delivery to an oil recycling facility, recycled oil that (I) has been removed from the engine of a light duty motor vehicle or household appliances by the owner of such vehicle or appliances, and (II) is presented, by such owner, to such person for collection, accumulation, and delivery to an oil recycling facility.
(B) For purposes of section 9614(c) of this title, the term "service station dealer" shall, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A), include any government agency that establishes a facility solely for the purpose of accepting recycled oil that satisfies the criteria set forth in subclauses (I) and (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii), and, with respect to recycled oil that satisfies the criteria set forth in subclauses (I) and (II), owners or operators of refuse collection services who are compelled by State law to collect, accumulate, and deliver such oil to an oil recycling facility.
(C) The President shall promulgate regulations regarding the determination of what constitutes a significant percentage of the gross revenues of an establishment for purposes of this paragraph.
(38) The term "incineration vessel" means any vessel which carries hazardous substances for the purpose of incineration of such substances, so long as such substances or residues of such substances are on board.
(A) In general.-The term "brownfield site" means real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.
(ix) a portion of a facility, for which portion, assistance for response activity has been obtained under subtitle I of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6991 et seq.) from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund established under section 9508 of title 26.
(C) Site-by-site determinations.-Notwithstanding subparagraph (B) and on a site-by-site basis, the President may authorize financial assistance under section 9604(k) of this title to an eligible entity at a site included in clause (i), (iv), (v), (vi), (viii), or (ix) of subparagraph (B) if the President finds that financial assistance will protect human health and the environment, and either promote economic development or enable the creation of, preservation of, or addition to parks, greenways, undeveloped property, other recreational property, or other property used for nonprofit purposes.
(aa) The owner of the facility that is subject to the leasehold interest is a person described in clause (i).
(BB) the person who holds the leasehold interest establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each of the criteria described in clauses (i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), and (viii) of subparagraph (B).
(cc) The person who holds the leasehold interest establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each of the criteria described in clauses (i) through (viii) of subparagraph (B).
(i) Disposal prior to acquisition.-All disposal of hazardous substances at the facility occurred before the person acquired the facility.
(I) In general.-The person made all appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses of the facility in accordance with generally accepted good commercial and customary standards and practices in accordance with subclauses (II) and (III).
(II) Standards and practices.-The standards and practices referred to in clauses (ii) and (iv) of paragraph (35)(B) shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of this clause.
(III) Residential use.-In the case of property in residential or other similar use at the time of purchase by a nongovernmental or noncommercial entity, a facility inspection and title search that reveal no basis for further investigation shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of this clause.
(iii) Notices.-The person provides all legally required notices with respect to the discovery or release of any hazardous substances at the facility.
(III) prevent or limit human, environmental, or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous substance.
(v) Cooperation, assistance, and access.-The person provides full cooperation, assistance, and access to persons that are authorized to conduct response actions or natural resource restoration at a vessel or facility (including the cooperation and access necessary for the installation, integrity, operation, and maintenance of any complete or partial response actions or natural resource restoration at the vessel or facility).
(II) does not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional control employed at the vessel or facility in connection with a response action.
(vii) Requests; subpoenas.-The person complies with any request for information or administrative subpoena issued by the President under this chapter.
(II) the result of a reorganization of a business entity that was potentially liable.
(A) In general.-The term "eligible response site" means a site that meets the definition of a brownfield site in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (39), as modified by subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph.
(II) promote economic development or facilitate the creation of, preservation of, or addition to a park, a greenway, undeveloped property, recreational property, or other property used for nonprofit purposes.
(ii) facilities that the President determines warrant particular consideration as identified by regulation, such as sites posing a threat to a sole-source drinking water aquifer or a sensitive ecosystem.
This chapter, referred to in pars. (5), (13), (20)(D), (G), (35)(C), (D), (39)(B)(iii), (D)(ii)(II)(bb), and (40)(A)(ii)(II), (B)(vii), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 96–510, Dec. 11, 1980, 94 Stat. 2767 , as amended, known as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note below and Tables.
The Safe Drinking Water Act, referred to in pars. (7), (10), and (39)(B)(iv), is title XIV of act July 1, 1944, as added Dec. 16, 1974, Pub. L. 93–523, §2(a), 88 Stat. 1660 , as amended, which is classified generally to subchapter XII (§300f et seq.) of chapter 6A of this title. Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act is classified generally to part C (§300h et seq.) of subchapter XII of chapter 6A of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 201 of this title and Tables.
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, referred to in pars. (8) and (16), is Pub. L. 94–265, Apr. 13, 1976, 90 Stat. 331 , as amended, which is classified principally to chapter 38 (§1801 et seq.) of Title 16, Conservation. The fishery conservation zone established by this Act, referred to in par. (16), was established by section 101 of this Act (16 U.S.C. 1811), which as amended generally by Pub. L. 99–659, title I, §101(b), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3706 , relates to United States sovereign rights and fishery management authority over fish within the exclusive economic zone as defined in section 1802 of Title 16. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1801 of Title 16 and Tables.
The Clean Air Act, referred to in par. (10), is act July 14, 1955, ch. 360, as amended generally by Pub. L. 88–206, Dec. 17, 1963, 77 Stat. 392 , and later by Pub. L. 95–95, Aug. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 685 . The Clean Air Act was originally classified to chapter 15B (§1857 et seq.) of this title. On enactment of Pub. L. 95–95, the Act was reclassified to chapter 85 (§7401 et seq.) of this title. Parts C and D of title I of the Clean Air Act are classified generally to parts C (§7470 et seq.) and D (§7501 et seq.), respectively, of subchapter I of chapter 85 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 7401 of this title and Tables.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in pars. (10) and (22), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1, 68 Stat. 919 , which is classified principally to chapter 23 (§2011 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2011 of this title and Tables.
The Solid Waste Disposal Act, referred to in pars. (14), (39)(B)(iv), (vi)(I), (ix), and (41)(B)(i), is title II of Pub. L. 89–272, Oct. 20, 1965, 79 Stat. 997 , as amended generally by Pub. L. 94–580, §2, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2795 , which is classified generally to chapter 82 (§6901 et seq.) of this title. Subtitles C and I of the Act are classified generally to subchapters III (§6921 et seq.) and IX (§6991 et seq.), respectively, of chapter 82 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 6901 of this title and Tables.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, referred to in par. (20)(E), is Pub. L. 92–203, Dec. 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 688 , which is classified generally to chapter 33 (§1601 et seq.) of Title 43, Public Lands. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of Title 43 and Tables.
The Farm Credit Act of 1971, referred to in par. (20)(H)(iv)(III), is Pub. L. 92–181, Dec. 10, 1971, 85 Stat. 583 , as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 23 (§2001 et seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2001 of Title 12 and Tables.
The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, referred to in par. (23), is Pub. L. 93–288, May 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 143 , as amended, known as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which is classified principally to chapter 68 (§5121 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 5121 of this title and Tables.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, referred to in par. (39)(B)(iv), is act June 30, 1948, ch. 758, as amended generally by Pub. L. 92–500, §2, Oct. 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 816 , also known as the Clean Water Act, which is classified generally to chapter 26 (§1251 et seq.) of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters. Section 311(c) of the Act was amended generally by Pub. L. 101–380, title IV, §4201(a), Aug. 18, 1990, 104 Stat. 523 , and no longer contains provisions directing the publishing of a National Contingency Plan. However, such provisions are contained in section 1321(d) of Title 33. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1251 of Title 33 and Tables.
The Toxic Substances Control Act, referred to in par. (39)(B)(iv), (viii)(II), is Pub. L. 94–469, Oct. 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 2003 , as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 53 (§2601 et seq.) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2601 of Title 15 and Tables.
2018-Par. (20)(D). Pub. L. 115–141, §2, substituted "ownership or control through seizure or otherwise in connection with law enforcement activity, or through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government acquires title by virtue" for "ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue".
Par. (20)(E), (F). Pub. L. 115–141, §3(1), (2), added subpar. (E) and redesignated former subpar. (E) as (F). Former subpar. (F) redesignated (G).
Par. (20)(G). Pub. L. 115–141, §3(1), (3), redesignated subpar. (F) as (G) and substituted "subparagraph (F)" for "subparagraph (E)" in introductory provisions. Former subpar. (G) redesignated (H).
Par. (20)(H). Pub. L. 115–141, §3(1), (4), redesignated subpar. (G) as (H) and substituted "of title 12) or" for "of title 12 or" in cl. (i)(II).
"(BB) a site for which there is no viable responsible party and which will be assessed, investigated, or cleaned up by a person that is not potentially liable for cleaning up the site; and".
Par. (40). Pub. L. 115–141, §5(a), made numerous amendments to structure of par. (40), resulting in substitution of subpar. (A) for former introductory provisions, insertion of subpar. (B) designation and introductory provisions, redesignation of former subpars. (A) to (H) as cls. (i) to (viii), respectively, of subpar. (B), and redesignation of cls. and subcls. within former subpars. (A) to (H) as subcls. and items, respectively, within cls (i) to (viii).
Par. (40)(B). Pub. L. 115–141, §5(a)(1)(B)–(D), just prior to redesignation of subpar. (B) as cl. (ii) of subpar. (B), substituted "subclauses (II) and (III)" for "clauses (ii) and (iii)" in subcl. (I) and "clause" for "subparagraph" in subcls. (II) and (III).
Par. (40)(H)(i)(II). Pub. L. 115–141, §5(a)(4)(A)(i), just prior to redesignation of subpar. (H)(i)(II) as cl. (viii)(I)(bb) of subpar. (B), inserted ", by a tenancy, by the instruments by which a leasehold interest in the facility is created," after "financed".
2002-Par. (35)(A). Pub. L. 107–118, §223(1), in introductory provisions substituted "deeds, easements, leases, or" for "deeds or" and in concluding provisions substituted "the defendant has satisfied" for "he has satisfied" and inserted before period at end ", provides full cooperation, assistance, and facility access to the persons that are authorized to conduct response actions at the facility (including the cooperation and access necessary for the installation, integrity, operation, and maintenance of any complete or partial response action at the facility), is in compliance with any land use restrictions established or relied on in connection with the response action at a facility, and does not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional control employed at the facility in connection with a response action".
Par. (35)(B). Pub. L. 107–118, §223(2), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection."
Par. (39). Pub. L. 107–118, §211(a), added par. (39).
Par. (40). Pub. L. 107–118, §222(a), added par. (40).
Par. (41). Pub. L. 107–118, §231(a), added par. (41).
1999-Par. (20)(D). Pub. L. 106–74, which directed the amendment of subpar. (D) by inserting "through seizure or otherwise in connection with law enforcement activity" before "involuntary" the first place it appears, could not be executed because the word "involuntary" does not appear in subpar. (D).
1996-Pars. (8), (16). Pub. L. 104–208, §101(a) [title II, §211(b)], substituted "Magnuson-Stevens Fishery" for "Magnuson Fishery".
Par. (20)(E) to (G). Pub. L. 104–208, §2502(b), added subpars. (E) to (G).
Par. (26). Pub. L. 104–287 substituted "section 60101(a) of title 49" for "the Pipeline Safety Act".
1994-Par. (26). Pub. L. 103–429 substituted "a hazardous liquid pipeline facility" for "pipeline".
1988-Par. (23). Pub. L. 100–707 substituted "Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act" for "Disaster Relief Act of 1974".
1986-Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), struck out ", the term" after "subchapter" in introductory text.
Pars. (1) to (10). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (11). Pub. L. 99–499, §517(c)(2), amended par. (11) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (11) read as follows: "The term 'Fund' or 'Trust Fund' means the Hazardous Substance Response Fund established by section 9631 of this title or, in the case of a hazardous waste disposal facility for which liability has been transferred under section 9607(k) of this title, the Post-closure Liability Fund established by section 9641 of this title."
Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Pars. (12) to (15). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (16). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(a), (f), inserted "The term", struck out "or" after "local government," inserted ", any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe", and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Pars. (17) to (19). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (20)(A). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term".
Pub. L. 99–499, §101(b)(2), amended cl. (iii) generally. Prior to amendment, cl. (iii) read as follows: "in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment."
Pub. L. 99–499, §101(b)(3), in provisions following subcl. (iii), substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (20)(B), (C). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(b)(3), substituted "In the case" for "in the case" and a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (20)(D). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(b)(1), (f), added subpar. (D). The part of §101(f) of Pub. L. 99–499 which directed the amendment of par. (20) by changing the semicolon at end to a period could not be executed in view of the prior amendment of par. (20) by §101(b)(1) of Pub. L. 99–499 which added subpar. (D) ending in a period.
Par. (21). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (22). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(c), (f), inserted "The term" and "(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)", substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (23). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The terms" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (24). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(d), (f), inserted "The terms" and substituted "and associated contaminated materials" for "or contaminated materials" and "welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials." for "welfare. The term does not include offsite transport of hazardous substances, or the storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of such hazardous substances or contaminated materials unless the President determines that such actions (A) are more cost-effective than other remedial actions, (B) will create new capacity to manage, in compliance with subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921 et seq.], hazardous substances in addition to those located at the affected facility, or (C) are necessary to protect public health or welfare or the environment from a present or potential risk which may be created by further exposure to the continued presence of such substances or materials;". The part of §101(f) of Pub. L. 99–499 which directed amendment of par. (24) by changing the semicolon at end to a period could not be executed in view of prior amendment of par. (24) by §101(d) of Pub. L. 99–499 which substituted language at end of par. (24) ending in a period for former language ending in a semicolon.
Par. (25). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(e), (f), inserted "The terms" and ", all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." The part of §101(f) of Pub. L. 99–499 which directed amendment of par. (25) by changing the semicolon at end to a period could not be executed in view of prior amendment of par. (25) by §101(e) of Pub. L. 99–499 inserting language and a period at end of par. (25).
Pars. (26), (27). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The terms" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (28). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (29). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The terms" and substituted a period for the semicolon at end.
Par. (30). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The terms".
Par. (31). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The term" and substituted a period for "; and".
Par. (32). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), inserted "The terms".
Pars. (33) to (36). Pub. L. 99–499, §101(f), added pars. (33) to (36).
Par. (37). Pub. L. 99–499, §114(b), added par. (37).
Par. (38). Pub. L. 99–499, §127(a), added par. (38).
1980-Pars. (8), (16). Pub. L. 96–561 substituted "Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act" for "Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976".
Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title I, §101(a) [title II, §211(b)], Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009 , 3009-41, provided that the amendment made by that section is effective 15 days after Oct. 11, 1996.
Amendment by section 2502(b) of Pub. L. 104–208 applicable with respect to any claim that has not been finally adjudicated as of Sept. 30, 1996, see section 2505 of Pub. L. 104–208, set out as a note under section 6991b of this title.
Pub. L. 99–499, §4, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1614 , provided that: "Except as otherwise specified in section 121(b) of this Act [set out as an Effective Date note under section 9621 of this title] or in any other provision of titles I, II, III, and IV of this Act [see Tables for classification], the amendments made by titles I through IV of this Act [enacting subchapter IV of this chapter and sections 9616 to 9626, 9658 to 9660, and 9661 of this title and sections 2701 to 2707 and 2810 of Title 10, Armed Forces, amending sections 6926, 6928, 6991 to 6991d, 6991g, 9601 to 9609, 9611 to 9614, 9631, 9651, 9656, and 9657 of this title and section 1416 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, and renumbering former section 2701 of Title 10 as section 2721 of Title 10] shall take effect on the enactment of this Act [Oct. 17, 1986]."
Amendment by section 517(c)(2) of Pub. L. 99–499 effective Jan. 1, 1987, see section 517(e) of Pub. L. 99–499, set out as an Effective Date note under section 9507 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Pub. L. 96–561, title II, §238(b), Dec. 22, 1980, 94 Stat. 3300 , provided that the amendment made by that section is effective 15 days after Dec. 22, 1980.
Pub. L. 115–141, div. N, §1, Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1052 , provided that: "This division [amending this section and sections 9604, 9607, and 9628 of this title] may be cited as the 'Brownfields Utilization, Investment, and Local Development Act of 2018' or the 'BUILD Act'."
Pub. L. 115–141, div. S, title XI, §1101, Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1147 , provided that: "This title [amending section 9603 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 9603 of this title] may be cited as the 'Fair Agricultural Reporting Method Act' or the 'FARM Act'."
Pub. L. 107–118, §1, Jan. 11, 2002, 115 Stat. 2356 , provided that: "This Act [enacting section 9628 of this title, amending this section and sections 9604, 9605, 9607, and 9622 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and section 9607 of this title] may be cited as the 'Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act'."
Pub. L. 107–118, title I, §101, Jan. 11, 2002, 115 Stat. 2356 , provided that: "This title [amending sections 9607 and 9622 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 9607 of this title] may be cited as the 'Small Business Liability Protection Act'."
Pub. L. 107–118, title II, §201, Jan. 11, 2002, 115 Stat. 2360 , provided that: "This title [enacting section 9628 of this title and amending this section and sections 9604, 9605, and 9607 of this title] may be cited as the 'Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001'."
Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2501, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–462 , provided that: "This subtitle [subtitle E (§§2501–2505) of title II of div. A of Pub. L. 104–208, amending this section and sections 6991b and 9607 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 6991b of this title] may be cited as the 'Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996'."
Pub. L. 102–426, §1, Oct. 19, 1992, 106 Stat. 2174 , provided that: "This Act [amending section 9620 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 9620 of this title] may be cited as the 'Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act'."
Pub. L. 99–499, §1, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1613 , provided that: "This Act [enacting subchapter IV of this chapter and sections 9616 to 9626, 9658 to 9662, 11001 to 11005, 11021 to 11023, and 11041 to 11050 of this title, sections 2701 to 2707 and 2810 of Title 10, Armed Forces, and sections 59A, 4671, 4672, 9507, and 9508 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, amending this section, sections 6926, 6928, 6991 to 6991d, 6991g, 9602 to 9609, 9611 to 9614, 9631, 9651, 9656, and 9657 of this title, sections 26, 164, 275, 936, 1561, 4041, 4042, 4081, 4221, 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662, 6154, 6416, 6420, 6421, 6425, 6427, 6655, 9502, 9503, and 9506 of Title 26, and section 1416 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, renumbering former section 2701 of Title 10 as section 2721 of Title 10, repealing sections 9631 to 9633, 9641, and 9653 of this title and sections 4681 and 4682 of Title 26, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section, sections 6921, 6991b, 7401, 9620, 9621, 9658, 9660, 9661, and 11001 of this title, section 2703 of Title 10, sections 1, 26, 4041, 4611, 4661, 4671, 4681, 9507, and 9508 of Title 26, and section 655 of Title 29, Labor] may be cited as the 'Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986'."
Pub. L. 96–510, §1, Dec. 11, 1980, 94 Stat. 2767 , provided: "That this Act [enacting this chapter, section 6911a of this title, and sections 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662, 4681, and 4682 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, amending section 6911 of this title, section 1364 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, and section 11901 of Title 49, Transportation, and enacting provisions set out as notes under section 6911 of this title and sections 1 and 4611 of Title 26] may be cited as the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980'."
For transfer of certain functions from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Chairman thereof, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1980, 45 F.R. 40561, 94 Stat. 3585, set out as a note under section 5841 of this title.
"(1) CERCLA.-The term 'CERCLA' means the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.).
"(2) Administrator.-The term 'Administrator' means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency."
1 So in original. Probably should be "or".
2 So in original. Probably should be "mean".