text:
In a partially published opinion in San Francisco Tomorrow v. City and County of San Francisco, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 735, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District upheld denial of a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to overturn approval of a 152-acre redevelopment project near Lake Merced in southwest San Francisco.
The Parkmerced Project involves major modifications to an existing 3,221-unit residential and rental complex containing a mix of 13-story towers and 2-story townhouses. The long-term, mixed-use redevelopment project would demolish the townhouses and add 5,679 residential units over a period of 20 to 30 years. San Francisco Tomorrow and Parkmerced Action Coalition (Petitioners) opposed the project and sought to reverse the trial court’s denial of their petition.
Petitioners first challenged the San Francisco General Plan itself, arguing it did not include adequate standards for population density and building intensity as required by Government Code section 65302. The court emphasized that adoption of a general plan is a legislative act entitled to deference. The court further noted that under section 65302, the City was only required to include recommended densities, rather than inflexible limits as Petitioners contended. The General Plan’s Housing Element included multiple maps, tables, and an index that together provided the required population density information. Similarly, the Urban Design Element incorporated a map with maximum dimensions and heights of buildings in different parts of the city, including the Parkmerced area. The court concluded that a reasonable person could use these elements to determine the population density and building intensity impacts of the project.
Second, Petitioners claimed that their due process rights as Parkmerced tenants were violated because the project was approved without adequate notice. However, only adjudicative decisions are subject to due process considerations, and the court found the project involved only legislative decisions not subject to due process. Petitioners argued that the development agreement approved as part of the project was an entitlement and thus not a law of general applicability, despite its characterization in statute as a legislative action. The court rejected this “novel” argument. The approval was indisputably a legislative act and no due process rights were attached to the action.
Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’ claim that the trial court erred by including transcripts of hearings in the administrative record that were not considered by the Board of Supervisors prior to certification of the EIR. The transcripts were from advisory committee hearings held prior to the Board’s decision and the transcripts were readily available to decision-makers. Accordingly, the court held the transcripts were properly part of the record.
The court declined to publish portions of the opinion challenging compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act and consistency with “priority policies” in the General Plan.
The court distinguished a decision from the Fifth Appellate District, which considered whether an agency was required to include transcripts of hearings in the record. In Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, the court found that the agency was not compelled to produce transcripts for the record where the agency had not prepared them for several hearings and therefore could not produce such documents. Here, the transcripts were readily available and thus properly included in the record.
On August 6, 2014, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (“OPR”) released a Notice of Availability of a Preliminary Discussion Draft of Changes to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) Guidelines Related to SB 743 (Steinberg, 2013; “Preliminary Discussion Draft”). These updates are geared towards the evaluation of transportation impacts under CEQA.
Traffic studies used in CEQA documents have historically focused on the impact of projects on traffic flows. By focusing solely on delay, environmental studies have typically required projects to build bigger roads and intersections to mitigate for traffic impacts. However, under the current practice, potential impacts generated by congestion relief mitigation measures are typically not considered as part of the CEQA compliance process for a project.
To bridge the perceived gap in transportation analysis, SB 743 requires OPR to amend the CEQA Guidelines (Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations) to provide an alternative to the level of service methodology for evaluating transportation impacts. Under SB 743, the focus of transportation analysis will shift from the reduction of driver delay to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, creation of multimodal networks and promotion of a mix of land uses.
Subdivision (a): Purpose – Setting forth the purpose of section 15064.3 and outlining items to consider (such as project effects on the amount and distance of automobile travel, project effects on transit and non-motorized travel, etc.) when analyzing a project’s potential environmental impacts related to transportation.
Subdivision (b): Criteria for Analyzing Transportation Impacts – Outlining specific criteria for determining the significance of transportation impacts. This section is further subdivided into: (1) vehicle miles traveled (“VMT”) and land use projects, (2) induced travel and transportation projects, (3) safety, and (4) methodology.
Subdivision (c): Mitigation and Alternatives – Identifying several potential mitigation measures and alternatives and including a cross reference to Appendix F. Subdivision (c) also explicitly provides that the section does not limit any public agency’s ability to condition a project pursuant to other laws.
Subdivision (d) Applicability – Outlining a phased approach of section 15064.3 implementation to allow lead agencies time to familiarize themselves with the new procedures of the section.
The most significant change that OPR proposes is to amend CEQA Guidelines, Appendix F by providing suggestions of potential mitigation measures and alternatives that might reduce a project’s VMT. New VMT Mitigation Measures include: (a) improving or increasing access to transit; (b) increasing access to common goods and services, such as groceries, schools, and daycare; (c) incorporating affordable housing into the project; (d) improving the jobs/housing fit of a community; and (e) incorporating neighborhood electric vehicle network. The Appendix F revisions also address the potential evaluation of a project alternative that relocates a project to an area of the region exhibiting below average VMT.
In developing the Preliminary Discussion Draft, OPR consulted with a wide variety of affected stakeholders, including local governments, metropolitan planning organizations, state agencies, developers, transportation planners and engineers, environmental organizations, transportation advocates, academics, and others. OPR now seeks public review and comment of the Preliminary Discussion Draft.
All comments should be submitted by October 10, 2014 to CEQA.Guidelines@ceres.ca.gov.
In Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court of Tuolumne County, (August 7, 2014, S207173) __ Cal.4th __, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s issuance of a writ of mandate challenging the City of Sonora’s approval of an ordinance for the expansion of a big box store (Project) without first conducting complete environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
In an effort to streamline approval for construction and operation of the Project, an initiative petition proposed the adoption of a specific plan for the contemplated improvements. The petition was ultimately signed by over 20 percent of the City’s registered voters. The City Council ordered that a section 9212 report be prepared in compliance with the Elections Code to examine the initiative’s consistency with previous planning commission approvals for the Project. After weighing its options, the City adopted the ordinance. Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance (TJSBA) opposed the ordinance and sought a writ of mandate.
The Court’s analysis focused on the interpretation of Elections Code requirements. When presented with a voter initiative, a city council must do one of three things: (1) adopt the initiative without alteration; (2) submit it to a special election; or (3) order an abbreviated report on the initiative. It has been well established that the provisions of CEQA do not apply to land use initiatives proposed by voters and adopted at an election. This case clarified whether a legislative body must obtain full CEQA review before it may directly adopt a voter initiative.
The Court first analyzed the statutory language of the Elections Code. Specifically, the Court found that if local agencies were required to undertake CEQA review before the adoption of initiatives, it would essentially nullify streamlined direct initiative adoption. The only other option would be to order a report exploring potential impacts of the initiative. Considering the time necessary for agencies to complete CEQA review (a process taking months), the Court found that it would be impossible for a city to complete CEQA review within 10 days before adopting a voter initiative, as required by the Elections Code. Moreover, the Court held that if a city undertook full CEQA review of a voter initiative, the more cursory review available under the Elections Code would be duplicative and unnecessary. The Court also found no evidence that the Legislature intended CEQA to supersede direct initiative adoption procedures. Because the timelines for initiatives and CEQA review are fundamentally incompatible, a requirement of CEQA review before direct adoption would limit local governments to submitting most initiatives to election.
Next, the Court turned to the Legislative Intent behind the Elections Code. The Court indicated it was telling that no law extending CEQA to initiatives has been enacted in over 25 years. Citing DeVita v. County of Napa, (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 795, the Court indicated that by not enacting legislation that would subject initiative measures to environmental review, the Legislature has made an attempt to balance the initiative right of the people, with the goal of informing voters and local officials about the consequences of an initiative’s enactment. Thus, local agencies are able to conduct abbreviated environmental review to act promptly on an initiative.
Finally, the Court reviewed whether direct adoption of a voter initiative without fulfilling CEQA mandates is against public policy. The Court found that by amending the constitution, voters intended to empower their government to enact a qualified initiative immediately, without the need for an election and its associated delay and cost. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the Elections Code does not play favorites; the possibility that interested parties may use initiatives to advance their own interests is part of the democratic process. Voters have statutory remedies available through the referendum process if direct adoption of an initiative results in the enactment of an undesirable law.
The Court established that “CEQA review is contrary to the statutory language and legislative history pertaining to voter initiatives.” Accordingly, voter backed initiatives for proposed projects may be considered an effective option for CEQA streamlining. However, as the Court noted, because the initiative process is neutral, it may also be used as a tool by project opponents to thwart development.
In an unpublished decision, Parks Legal Defense Fund v. City of Huntington Beach, (2014) Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5050, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s jurisdiction to discharge a writ of mandate, but reversed and remanded the trial court’s determination that the subsequent environmental impact report complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), finding this determination outside the limited scope of the writ.
In 2008, Parks Legal Defense Fund (Parks) filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the City of Huntington Beach’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for a senior center in a city park. The trial court issued a writ ordering the City to vacate its approvals and prepare a subsequent EIR to address the suitability of alternative off-site locations and requiring the City to a file a return to the writ. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in December 2010, finding that the EIR had multiple flaws.
A second appeal addressing attorney fees was dismissed in April 2011, following the stipulation of the parties in furtherance of a settlement agreement. Once the trial court vacated the fee award pursuant to the settlement agreement, the City requested that the court close the case. The trial court declined to relinquish its jurisdiction until the City complied with the appellate court’s decision requiring the City to set aside certification of the EIR and issuance of project approvals. Once the City took the necessary action, the trial court held another status conference in July 2011, during which the court deemed the matter in compliance with the appellate court’s orders and stated that it would take no further action.
In May 2012, Parks filed a new lawsuit; however, the City continued to pursue the original litigation and filed its return to the writ in February of 2013, along with a motion to discharge the writ. Parks opposed the motion, arguing that the original proceeding was over and the trial court had no further jurisdiction over the matter. The trial court determined that it had jurisdiction and granted the motion, and also held that the subsequent EIR prepared by the City was in compliance with CEQA in all respects.
On appeal, the court rejected Parks’ claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to discharge the charge. Under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b), the trial court retains jurisdiction over the proceedings until it deems that the public agency has complied with the writ. While the City had prepared a subsequent EIR and set aside certification of the original EIR, at no point in the case’s procedural history prior to February, 2013 did the City file a return to the writ. Nor did the trial court dismiss the case.
The appellate court held, however, that the trial court acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction when it issued an order stating that the subsequent EIR complied with CEQA in all respects. The trial court was limited in its review to the matters included in the writ; however, the language in the trial court’s order finding compliance with CEQA in all respects could be interpreted to mean that the City had complied not only with respect to the issues addressed in the original judgment, but also with respect to every conceivable issue arising under CEQA. The appellate court found this language overbroad and remanded to the trial court to issue a new order that only discharged the writ.
Finally, the court made a point to observe that Parks repeatedly failed to organize its brief in a coherent manner and neglected to properly support its arguments with citations to the record or legal authority. The court declined to sort out these muddled arguments and treated them as waived.
On July 25, 2014, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District granted a request to publish a portion of the recent case Citizens Opposing a Dangerous Environment v. County of Kern, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 679. In the decision, the appellate court affirmed Kern County’s approval of a wind farm near a private airport and found that mitigation measures in the environmental impact report (EIR) were legally feasible.
The court published all of the opinion except for parts IV, V, and VI of the Discussion, which addressed the County’s response to late comments on the EIR, the adequacy of the evidence supporting the mitigation measures in the EIR, and the County’s obligation to consider alternatives in addition to the ones already considered in the EIR.
A complete summary of the case (including both the unpublished and published portions) is available here: http://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/court-grounds-lawsuits-challenging-wind-farms-impacts-airport-kern-county/.
The FAA is the federal agency created to ensure safe and efficient use of the nation’s airspace. Therefore, a lead agency may properly mitigate potential aviation hazards by requiring a future determination by FAA’s Obstruction Evaluation Service as to whether the proposed project may present an aviation hazard along with a commitment by the lead agency, pursuant to its police power, to prohibit construction until such a no hazard determination is made.
In an unpublished decision in Save Our Heritage Organisation v. County of San Diego, (2014) Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5121, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed the trial court and ordered the trial court to deny a writ of mandate challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact report (EIR) for a mixed-use development in downtown San Diego (project).
The project site contains a parking lot, warehouse, and an office building built in 1911 that the City of San Diego had previously designated as an historical structure. The first phase of the project included demolition of the warehouse and office building and construction of a parking structure. In the next phase, San Diego County (the County) would partner with a private developer to build a five-story office and retail building and a 19-story residential building on the remaining portions of the parcel.
While acknowledging the significant unmitigable environmental impacts of the project, the County adopted a statement of overriding considerations and approved the proposed development. The County balanced four objectives of the project in the EIR, which included maximizing revenue, providing parking, establishing a public-private partnership, and obtaining a LEED certification.
The court first reversed the trial court’s ruling that maximizing revenue was an improper objective under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO) contended that maximizing revenue was too narrow of an objective because it would preclude meaningful analysis of project alternatives. However, neither CEQA nor the CEQA Guidelines impose limits on the project objectives in an EIR and courts do not have the authority to impose a limitation such as prohibiting a certain project objective in an EIR. Additionally, maximizing revenue was one of four objectives and not the only factor the County considered. As a result, the court held that considering maximizing revenue as a project objective did not by itself constitute an abuse of discretion by the County.
Next, the court held that the EIR contained an adequate range of alternatives and that the evidence was sufficient to support the County’s finding that the alternatives were infeasible. Citing Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, the court stated that the County’s selection of alternatives would be upheld unless they were “manifestly unreasonable.” In this case, the County considered a no project alternative, an alternative that left the historic structure intact with buildings around it, and an alternative that incorporated the historic structure into one of the buildings. Emphasizing that under CEQA courts should be highly deferential to an agency’s decision, the court found these alternatives were not manifestly unreasonable.
In looking at whether substantial evidence supported the County’s decision, the court stated that the feasibility of the project alternatives must be evaluated in the context of the project. An expert analysis of the anticipated revenue from the project expected over 79 million dollars from the proposed project compared to 27 million and 29.6 million for the alternatives. Based on this evidence, the court held that SOHO had failed to meet its burden of proving there was not substantial evidence to support the County’s decision.
Finally, the court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the County’s responses to three public comment letters were inadequate. The three public comment letters at issue included modifications of the project alternatives. However, as the court pointed out, CEQA does not require an analysis of every possible alternative. The County explained why each suggestion was infeasible in reference to the alternatives analyzed in the EIR and, as a result, SOHO failed to meets its burden of showing the County’s responses were inadequate.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


THE RELIABILITY OF A CHEMICAL TEST RESULT IS A MATTER OF RELEVANCE The Williams’ court noted that foundational facts “will insure that the tests retain their reliability and thus their relevance and admissibility…” The Williams’ court reasoned that “… admissibility depends on the reliability and consequent relevance of the evidence…” Thus, the California Supreme Court held that chemical test results must be reliable to be admitted or else they are not relevant.
EVIDENCE CODE §403(a) REQUIRES THE PROPONENT TO PRODUCE “SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE” AS TO THE PRELIMINARY FACTS OR THE EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE E.C. §403 determines foundation and other preliminary facts where relevancy is disputed. Under §403(a) “the proponent of proffered evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact, when the relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence of the preliminary fact. A proffered chemical test result is inadmissible unless there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the test was properly administered, the personnel involved in the test were qualified, and that the testing device was in proper working order and accurate.
The relevance of the test results depends on the existence of proof of preliminary facts, i.e. that correct scientific procedures were followed. The defendant requests special jury instruction #1, which mirrors the language E.C. 403(c) and is tailored to the evidence in this case. Special instruction #1 informs the jury that it must determine whether correct scientific procedures (preliminary facts) have been proved and that the jury must “disregard the proffered evidence unless …” it finds that those foundational elements have been proved. The accuracy of the blood test result is a matter of relevance per Williams, supra, and Evid.C. §403(3) requires that the jury must be instructed as [per special #1] that it “shall disregard” the blood test results if the prosecution did not prove that correct procedures were followed.
The defense has introduced evidence tends to prove the nonexistence of the presumed facts, i.e. that the defendant was a .08% or higher at the time of driving. Evid. C. §607 requires that the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the basic facts exist and may find the presumed fact (permissive inference) only if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that that presumed fact has been proven.
“…the court should instruct the jury that it may find that the presumed fact exists only if: • The jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that certain specified facts (the basic facts giving rise to the presumption) exist; and • The jury is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, from a consideration of all the evidence in the case, that the specified fact (the presumed fact) exists.
The preliminary facts (“correct scientific procedures”) operate to establish presumptively facts essential to the defendant’s guilt, and thus the preliminary facts must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Evid. C. 607. See also P.C. §1096: Presumption of Innocence, right to an acquittal, and burden of proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt in a criminal case.
A mandatory presumption violates a defendant’s due process rights because it would require the defendant to produce some evidence to raise a reasonable doubt, and thus would be construed as lightening the prosecution’s burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable about. In re Winship (1970) 397 US 358; Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 US 140; Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 US 510. Any mandatory presumption lightening the prosecution’s burden of proof in every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt is invalid under those cases.
As requested by the defense, and as required by Evid. C. 403(c) and case law, the court must give special instruction #1 which explains the law and informs the jury that the People must prove the foundational facts or the jury must disregard the chemical test result. The chemical test result is critical evidence and involves presumptions. To not instruct as requested in special #1 would violate Evid. C. §403(c), Due Process of law, and the Right to a Fair Trial.
1 Adams is cited by the People [without thorough analysis] that “failure to comply with Title 17 goes to the weight, not admissibility.” True, if a minor defect of Title 17 that does not go to the accuracy of the results. Not true if the failure to follow correct scientific procedures means the results are not proved accurate. If so, the test results are not accurate, they are not relevant.
2 As demonstrated below in IV, in a criminal case the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt [as opposed to a preponderance of the evidence].


The Texas State Securities Board adopts an amendment to §113.14, concerning Statements of Policy, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7010).
The amendment adopts by reference certain updated North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") statements of policy ("SOPs") that were amended by NASAA on September 11, 2016, and a new SOP that was adopted by NASAA on May 8, 2017. The amendment also updates the reference to the Agency's website in subsection (c).
The amendment to §113.14 increases uniformity with other states when reviewing applications to register securities.
Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on May 23, 2018.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts amendments to §115.19, concerning Texas crowdfunding portal registration and activities, and §115.20, concerning Texas crowdfunding portal registration and activities of small business development entities, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7011). A new related rule, §139.26, creating a new intrastate crowdfunding offering exemption, is being concurrently adopted, as are new related forms for portal registration.
The amendment to §115.19 allows Texas crowdfunding portals to offer and sell securities by issuers using either of the Texas intrastate crowdfunding offering exemptions; limits the website requirements of subsection (b)(1)of the rule to §139.25 offerings; and adds cross references to the new §139.26 exemption.
The amendment to §115.20 allows Texas crowdfunding portals that are small business development entities to offer and sell securities by issuers claiming either of the Texas intrastate crowdfunding offering exemptions.
Texas crowdfunding portals are allowed to sell securities offerings by issuers claiming either of the Texas intrastate crowdfunding offering exemptions.
No comments were received regarding adoption of the amendments.
The amendments are adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-28-1. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes. The amendment to §115.20 is also adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-44. Section 44 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules to regulate and facilitate online intrastate crowdfunding by authorized small business development entities.
The adopted amendments affect Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581‑12, 581-13, 581-14, 581-15, 581-18, and 581-44.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts new §115.21, concerning system addressing suspected financial exploitation of vulnerable customers pursuant to the Texas Securities Act, Section 45, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7013).
New §115.21 implements Section 45 of the Texas Securities Act, which was added by House Bill 3921, passed during the last legislative session. The bill requires securities dealers and investment advisers to adopt internal policies and procedures on the reporting and assessment requirements and on holding transactions involving the account of a vulnerable adult who was believed to be subject to financial exploitation. The policies and procedures require the entity to report suspected financial exploitation to the Securities Commissioner, and other appropriate agencies.
The new rule alerts dealers of the new requirement to adopt policies, programs, plans, or procedures pursuant to Section 45; requires that such policies be reduced to writing; and sets out the content of the report and the procedure a dealer would follow to make the report to the Securities Commissioner. A template for making the report is available on the Agency's website.
The rule informs registered dealers that the procedures required by Section 45 of the Texas Securities Act must be reduced to writing and informs registered dealers of the content of the reports required to be made under Section 45.
One comment letter was received from the Financial Services Institute. The commenter expressed strong support for the new rule that incorporates necessary measures to implement HB 3921. The commenter noted that this change will provide dealers with clarity and a safe harbor to report suspected financial exploitation. The Board agreed and adopted the new rule as published.
The new rule is adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-28-1 and Article 582-45.N. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes. Section 45.N provides the Board with the authority to prescribe the form and content of a report of suspected financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult by a dealer or investment adviser.
The new rule affects Texas Civil Statutes, Articles 581-14 and 581‑45.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts new §116.21, concerning system addressing suspected financial exploitation of vulnerable customers pursuant to the Texas Securities Act, Section 45, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7014).
New §116.21 implements Section 45 of the Texas Securities Act, which was added by House Bill 3921, passed during the last legislative session. The bill requires securities dealers and investment advisers to adopt internal policies and procedures on the reporting and assessment requirements and on holding transactions involving the account of a vulnerable adult who was believed to be subject to financial exploitation. The policies and procedures require the entity to report suspected financial exploitation to the Securities Commissioner, and other appropriate agencies.
The new rule alerts investment advisers of the new requirement to adopt policies, programs, plans, or procedures pursuant to Section 45; requires that such policies be reduced to writing; and sets out the content of the report and the procedure an investment adviser would follow to make the report to the Securities Commissioner. A template for making the report is available on the Agency's website.
The rule informs registered investment advisers that the procedures required by Section 45 of the Texas Securities Act must be reduced to writing and of the content of the reports required to be made under Section 45.
One comment letter was received from the Financial Services Institute. The commenter expressed strong support for the new rule that incorporates necessary measures to implement HB 3921. The commenter noted that this change will provide investment advisers with clarity and a safe harbor to report suspected financial exploitation. The Board agreed and adopted the new rule as published.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts the repeal of §133.15 and §133.20, without changes to the proposal as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7015). The repealed rules adopted by reference the Texas Crowdfunding Portal Registration form and the Texas Crowdfunding Portal registration by an authorized small business development entity form. Repeal of the existing forms allows for the simultaneous adoption of new updated forms which are being concurrently adopted.
Outdated forms have been eliminated.
No comments were received regarding adoption of the repeals.
The repeals are adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-28-1. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes. The repeal of §133.20 is also adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-44. Section 44 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules to regulate and facilitate online intrastate crowdfunding by authorized small business development entities.
The adopted repeals affect Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581‑12, 581-13, 581-14, 581-15, 581-18, and 581-44.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts two new rules, concerning forms adopted by reference, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7016). Specifically, the State Securities Board adopts §133.15, which adopts by reference the Texas Crowdfunding Portal Registration form; and §133.20, which adopts by reference the Texas Crowdfunding Portal Registration by an Authorized Small Business Development Entity form.
Texas crowdfunding entities will be able to use the forms to register as portals to sell securities offered by crowdfunding issuers claiming either the existing intrastate exemption in §139.25 or the new adopted intrastate exemption in §139.26.
The new forms will allow Texas entities to register as Texas crowdfunding portals that can sell securities offerings by crowdfunding issuers under both exemptions without the entities having to submit a separate portal registration for the two different exemptions.
No comments were received regarding adoption of the new rules.
The new rules are adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-28-1. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes. New rule §133.20 is also adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-44. Section 44 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules to regulate and facilitate online intrastate crowdfunding by authorized small business development entities.
The new rules affect Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581‑12, 581-13, 581-14, 581-15, 581-18, and 581-44.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts a new rule §133.21, which adopts by reference the Crowdfunding Exemption Notice (SEC Rule 147A Offerings using §139.26) form, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7017).
Form 133.21 will be used by an issuer to file a crowdfunding exemption notice pursuant to §139.26.
Form 133.21 will allow issuers to take advantage of the relaxed requirements of the more flexible intrastate crowdfunding offering exemption in §139.26.
No comments were received regarding adoption of the new rule.
The new rule is adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-28-1. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes.
The new rule affects Texas Civil Statutes, Article 581-7.
The Texas State Securities Board adopts new §139.26, concerning intrastate crowdfunding exemption for SEC Rule 147A Offerings, without changes to the proposed text as published in the December 15, 2017, issue of the Texas Register (42 TexReg 7017).
The new rule provides an additional registration exemption for securities offered in an intrastate crowdfunding offering. The filing used to claim the exemption is new Form 133.21, which is being concurrently adopted. Amendments to §115.19 and §115.20, concerning Texas crowdfunding portal registration and activities, are also being concurrently adopted to allow Texas crowdfunding portals to offer and sell exempt securities offered pursuant to the new exemption.
The new rule for offerings under SEC Rule 147A allows issuers to take advantage of the relaxed intrastate offering and sales requirements of the Rule 147A exemption by providing a corresponding Texas exemption. Under the new rule, the offering must comply with Rule 147A at the federal level. Accordingly, the issuer must have a principal place of business in Texas and the sales must be limited to Texas residents.
The new rule incorporates much of the flexibility offered under Rule 147A while retaining the safeguards and investor protections built into the existing Texas intrastate crowdfunding structure, including requiring communications between the issuer, prospective purchasers, or investors to take place through the communications channel provided on the Internet website of the registered general dealer or registered Texas crowdfunding portal, and to be visible to others on the site; and granting the Securities Commissioner access to the Internet website prior to and during an offering.
Another of the expansions permitted under Rule 147A is that it permits general solicitation and advertising regardless of whether the information can be seen by persons not located in the offering state. Accordingly, even though the new rule limits communications to the website channel, as in §139.25, the new rule permits an issuer to disseminate limited information to persons outside of Texas without jeopardizing the availability of the exemption.
As with offerings under §139.25, the new rule requires a disclosure statement and financial statements be provided to prospective purchasers and incorporates provisions containing disqualifications and prohibiting certain relationships. Material information and risk factors must be disclosed, and topics to be addressed in the disclosure document are noted. Additional guidance for content of the disclosure statement is posted on the Agency's website with other small business and crowdfunding information.
The new rule requires a notice filing on Form 133.21 (Crowdfunding Exemption Notice for SEC Rule 147A Offerings), which is concurrently adopted, along with a copy of the issuer's disclosure statement and the summary of the offering that appear on the Internet website.
Payments to unregistered persons are prohibited as are certain compensation arrangements and affiliations between an issuer and the general dealer or Texas crowdfunding portal operating the website on which its offering appears.
The rule contains bad actor disqualifications and limits availability of the exemption based on activities involving related issuers or affiliates. Issuers should be aware that, although a prior incident may not be a disqualification under this rule, it may still need to be disclosed to potential purchasers and investors if it is material information.
The new rule is expected to spur small business development in the state by making it easier for entrepreneurs and start-ups to raise capital through Internet crowdfunding by taking advantage of the relaxed requirements of the more flexible intrastate crowdfunding offering exemption in the new rule.
The new rule is adopted under Texas Civil Statutes, Articles 581-5.T, 581-12.C, and 581-28-1. Section 5.T provides that the Board may prescribe new exemptions by rule. Section 12.C provides the Board with the authority to prescribe new dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser representative registration exemptions by rule. Section 28-1 provides the Board with the authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out and implement the provisions of the Texas Securities Act, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and applications; defining terms; classifying securities, persons, and matters within its jurisdiction; and prescribing different requirements for different classes.
The new rule affects Texas Civil Statutes, Articles 581-7, 581-12, 581-13, 581-14, 581-15, and 581-18.


text:
Supreme Court of Mississippi, In Banc.
*528 Vernon H. Broom and Henry E. Pope, for appellant.
*530 Joe T. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Appellant, Luther Musselwhite, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Marion County of the murder of Virgil Price on August 13, 1950, and was sentenced to death.
Appellant first argues that he was entitled to a peremptory instruction in the trial court, and to a new trial *534 after the verdict had been rendered. We have examined carefully the entire record, and are of the opinion that there is no merit in these contentions. Without going into the detailed facts, the State's witnesses testified, and the jury was warranted in concluding that appellant committed a brutal assault and battery with his fists upon the deceased, Price; that appellant is a young man 31 years of age, and that Price was an elderly man 65 years of age; that the assault occurred in Breakfield's Camp, a night club located in Marion County; that appellant beat upon Price with his fists from time to time over a period of about an hour, and that during most of this period Price was wholly disabled from defending himself; that Price had made no assault upon appellant which would warrant the beating in self-defense and in fact was unable to defend himself; that appellant broke his right hand during the assault and that he was the only one who hit Price; and that Price died as a direct result of the brutal and unjustified assault and beating upon him by appellant. Appellant pleaded self-defense, and also claimed that another person beat upon Price, but the jury was amply justified in not accepting his version and in accepting that of several eyewitnesses who testified for the State.
Nor is there any merit in appellant's argument that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a change of venue. (Hn 1) The State introduced eighteen witnesses on the motion, all of whom testified that in their opinions appellant could get a fair and impartial trial in Marion County. These witnesses seem to be a fair cross-section of the community. Defendant offered in support of his motion eight witnesses, only two of whom testified unqualifiedly that they did not think appellant could receive a fair trial in that county. There was ample basis for the trial judge overruling the motion for change of venue. Action upon such a motion is largely in the discretion of the trial court, unless it clearly appears that it abused that discretion, and that element does not *535 exist here. Shimniok v. State, 1944, 197 Miss. 179, 19 So. (2d) 760.
(Hn 2) Appellant also assigns as error the admission of evidence of certain occurrences that happened immediately outside of the building in which Price was killed. This point has particular reference to the evidence that appellant attacked and had a fight with Bob and Harlan Alford outside of the building. However, this fight occurred in the middle of the beating of Price by appellant. While in the process of beating Price, appellant knocked him through the back door, after which appellant went outside. After the scuffle with Bob Alford, appellant and Turnage, who the evidence indicated was an accessory and accomplice of appellant, went back in the building. Turnage then used appellant's gun to hold off other people in the building while appellant again assaulted Price. All of these facts were closely connected with the crime in question, shed light upon appellant's intent and motive, and formed a part of the chain of facts so intimately connected that the whole was relevant in order that the jury might interpret the entire transaction and determine appellant's guilt or innocence. See Stone v. State, 1950, 210 Miss. 218, 49 So. (2d) 263; Collier v. State, 1913, 106 Miss. 613, 64 So. 373. (Hn 3) Moreover, the defendant himself testified to the occurrences outside of the building, both on direct examination by his own attorneys and without objection on cross-examination, so appellant is in no position to complain thereof.
(Hn 4) Nor was there any reversible error in the comments made by the trial judge during the progress of the trial. Two of them may have been improperly phrased, but all of them constituted valid restrictions which the trial judge had the power to impose in order to prevent the record from becoming burdened with immaterial testimony and improper leading questions. The entire record reflects that the learned trial judge *536 was fair and impartial, and that the appellant received a fair and impartial trial.
After the State had closed its case, defendant offered as a witness Luther Turnage, who at that time was also under a separate indictment for the same crime. Turnage was sworn in, asked a few preliminary questions, and defendant's attorney then told him to "go ahead and tell these twelve gentlemen what happened on that occasion" at Breakfield's Camp. The State's evidence had indicated that Turnage had come to the camp with appellant, and had assisted appellant in the beating of Price by holding appellant's gun on other persons in the building and ordering them to stay there, not to interfere, and not to call the police. After Turnage was asked to tell what happened on the night in question, one of defendant's attorneys stated that Mr. Claude Conner represented the witness, and asked the court to have the sheriff call him and request him to come down. Appellant's attorney stated that he wanted to keep the witness from saying anything that might incriminate him or violate the witness's constitutional rights. After a conference between Conner and the attorneys for the State and appellant, Conner dictated into the record an objection to Turnage being questioned about anything he might have done or said on the occasion "for the reason that such testimony, in the opinion of the attorney and of the witness, might incriminate the witness." The witness's attorney stated that he had no objection to Turnage testifying about anything that he might have seen or heard on the occasion, but objected to him testifying about anything the witness might have done or said. The court then ruled that "he does not have to testify, that he has the right to claim his immunity, and the Court now offers him that right and states to him, and to all of the attorneys, that the Court understands the rule to be that if he testifies to any fact whatsoever in connection with the occurrence, he will then be rightfully *537 subjected to cross-examination by the Attorney for the opposite side as to any and everything that occurred there. * * * Therefore, let Mr. Turnage and the Attorneys understand and know that Mr. Turnage is at liberty to leave the witness stand and refuse to testify.
"In view of the ruling of the Court as Attorney for Mr. Luther Turnage I claim for him immunity from testifying in this case on anything that might incriminate him.
"* * * So that, the witness can testify or he can refuse to testify, he being under no compulsion whatsoever to testify, and he may withdraw from the witness stand, or he may testify.
"In view of the ruling of the Court the witness now withdraws himself from the witness stand and will not testify.
"Witness Luther Turnage Withdrawn from Stand."
Appellant's attorneys excepted to this ruling, on the ground that Turnage should be able to testify on matters that do not incriminate him, but would still be immune from testifying on any matters that would incriminate him. Turnage was the only witness other than appellant who was offered by appellant as to the facts.
"It was the duty of the court to have informed the witness of his privilege, and to have left it to the witness alone to waive or claim this protection afforded him by the Constitution. So far as the witness is concerned, there is nothing in the record to suggest that he was unwilling to testify. His lawyers were unwilling, but the witness himself said not a word. He was not even sworn as a witness. The defendant was denied the benefit of his codefendant's evidence, although, so far as the record discloses, the witness was perfectly willing to testify.
"It is our opinion that the attorneys, as officers of the court, might properly ask the court to apprise the witness of his rights; but certainly they have no right to object to his testifying, if he desires to do so. The court cannot assume that the witness is unwilling to give evidence, unless the witness so states."
In Jackson v. State, 1935, 173 Miss. 776, 163 So. 381, 100 A.L.R. 789, and in Hutchins v. State, Miss. 1951, 54 So. (2d) 210, 212, witnesses under indictment for the same offenses and called by the defendants claimed the privilege personally and in their own words. In the Hutchins case, Brown v. State was referred to and it was said "That case was reversed on appeal because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the codefendant was unwilling to testify."
In the instant case, it is manifest that the witness understood and personally claimed his privilege against *539 self-incrimination, and that the trial court so found. The test under the Brown rule is whether it appears in fact that the witness has personally claimed his privilege. In that case the witness was not sworn, was not asked any questions, the court made no explanation to him of his privilege; his attorneys simply objected. Of course, the better procedure in every instance would be to have the witness personally answer an inquiry from the court as to whether he claims his privilege. But the rule in the Brown case means that it must appear as a fact that the witness personally claims the privilege. Here we think that fact exists. The trial judge, at some length and in some detail, explained to the witness and to the attorneys his conception of the privilege. He was told that he could refuse to testify or he could testify. After the explanation by the trial judge, and the lengthy colloquy of the attorneys, the witness, who obviously had heard the trial court's explanation of his rights, by his action claimed his privilege and withdrew from the witness stand. We think that these circumstances comply with the rule in the Brown case and constituted a factual, personal claim of privilege by the witness. See 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 48; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2270; Annotation, 75 Am. St. Rep. 340.
Although our decision is placed on the above basis, it is also relevant to note that appellant made no objection to the court's action on the ground that the witness must claim the privilege personally, nor did he give that reason in his motion for a new trial. Appellant thus afforded the trial judge no opportunity to pass on that proposition. (Hn 6) Appellant's objection was for another and erroneous reason, that the witness should be permitted to testify as to nonincriminating facts in the transaction. Yet where a witness in his direct examination voluntarily opens an account of a transaction, he will, on his cross-examination, be compelled to complete the narrative notwithstanding his claim of privilege *540 from testifying. He will not be allowed to state some facts as to a transaction and afterwards refuse to give the details as to related facts. 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Secs. 94-95; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2276. The opposite rule would permit a witness to give a biased and one-sided version of a transaction.
(Hn 7) Appellant argues that an instruction granted the State authorizing the jury to find from the evidence that appellant murdered Price "whether with or without the aid, assistance, and encouragement of one Luther Turnage" was erroneous, but manifestly the jury was warranted under this record in finding that appellant committed murder under either circumstance. (Hn 8) The instruction granted appellant, to the effect that the jury must find that appellant killed Price while acting in combination or conjunction with Turnage, was improper, but was granted at the request of appellant, who cannot complain of it. Moreover, appellant cannot complain because the instruction which he obtained placed an additional burden upon the State and was more favorable to the appellant than it should have been. Haney v. State, 1946, 199 Miss. 568, 24 So. (2d) 778. We have also examined appellant's other assignments of error, but we find that they have no merit.
For these reasons the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the date for execution of the sentence is set for Friday, December 21, 1951.
Affirmed, and Date for Execution of the Sentence Set for Friday, December 21, 1951.
The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the Court and for the reasons therein indicated, the judgment of the court below is affirmed and Friday, December 21, 1951 is the date set for execution of the sentence.
Hall, J., took no part in decision of this case.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
2001-2003 – Adjunct Assistant Prof.
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, National Agricultural Research Foundation (NAGREF, Athens, Greece).
Loizou E., Mattas K., and Pagoulatos A. (1997). Macro-monetary Effects on Agricultural Prices: the Case of Greek Agriculture. Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 4, pp. 397-401.
Mattas K., Fotopoulos C., Tzouvelekas V., Loizou E. and K Polymeros (1999). The Dynamics of Crop Sectors in Regional Development: The Case of Tobacco. International Advances in Economic Research, Vol. 5, No 2, pp 255-268.
Loizou E., Mattas K., Tzouvelekas V., Fotopoulos C and K Galanopoulos. (2000). Regional Economic Development and Environmental Repercussions: An Environmental Input-Output Approach, International Advances in Economic Research, Vol. 6, Νo 3, pp 373-386.
Michailidis, A., Polymeros, K. and Loizou, E. (2006). Biologic olive oil quality: an illustration of consumers’ perception”. International Review of Applied Economic Research, Vol. 1(1), pp. 35-45.
Kulisic B., Loizou E., Rozakis S. and Segon, V. (2007). Impacts of biodiesel production on Croatian economy. Energy Policy, Vol. 35 (12).
Melfou K., Loizou E., Mamalis, S., Michailidis A. (2007) Income elasticity of import demand for agricultural products in Greece. International Review of Applied Economic Research, Vol 2 (1).
Theodosiou G., Michailidis A., Loizou E., Chatzitheodoridis F. and Sergaki P. (2010). Endogenous Rural Development: evidence from a typical Greek region. Economics and Rural Development Vol.6 (2), pp. 17-23.
Michailidis, A., Nastis S.A., Loizou E. and Mattas K. (2010). Adoption of water saving practices in the region of West Macedonia. Journal of Extension Systems, Vol. 26(2), pp. 14-25.
Michailidis, A., Nastis S.A. and Loizou E. (2012). Mobile Communications Technology in Rural Societies of Developing Countries. Journal of Rural Development, Vol. 31(3) pp. 319 – 334.
Mattas K. and Loizou E. (2013). Agriculture: a powerful tool of rural development in the current economic crisis. Watch Letter, No 24, pp. 3-5.
Loizou E., Michailidis A. and Chatzitheodoridis, F. (2013). Investigating the drivers that influence the adoption of differentiated food products: The case of a Greek urban area. British Food Journal, Vol. 115(7), pp. 917-953.
Loizou E., Michailidis A. and Karasavvoglou A. (2014). Return Migration: Evidences from a Reception Country with Short Migration History. European Urban and Regional Studies, 21 (2), (doi:10.1177/0969776412444507).
Loizou E., Chatzitheodoridis, F. Polymeros K., Michailidis A. and Mattas K. (2014). Sustainable development of rural coastal areas: Impacts of a new fisheries policy. Land Use Policy 38, pp. 41– 47.
Chatzitheodoridis F., Kontogeorgos A., & E., Loizou (2014). The lean years: Private investment in the Greek rural areas. Procedia Economics and Finance 14:137–146, DOI: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00695-9.
Kontogeorgos, Michailidis, A., Chatzitheodoridis. F., & E. Loizou (2014). New Farmers a Crucial Parameter for the Greek Primary Sector: Assessments and Perceptions. Procedia Economics and Finance 14:333 – 341, DOI: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00721-7.
Loizou E, Chatzitheodoridis F, Michailidis A, Tsakiri M, Theodossiou G. (2015). Linkages of the energy sector in the Greek Economy: An input-output approach, International Journal of Energy Sector Management, 9(3):393-411. DOI:10.1108/IJESM-06-2013-0004.
Michailidis, A., Papadaki-Klavdianou, A., Torres, I.L., Pereira, A.F., Hanel, M., Buhagiar, J., Shilev, S., Michaelidis, E., Loizou, E., Chatzitheodoridis, F., Restoy, R.C., Lopez, A.L. (2015). Exploring treated wastewater issues related to agriculture in Europe, employing a quantitative swot analysis, Procedia Economics and Finance, 33: 367-375 (doi: 1016/S2212-5671(15)01721-9).
Melfou, K., Loizou, E., Oxouzi, E. and Papanagiotou E. (2015) Economic Performance of Quality Labeled Saffron in Greece, Procedia Economics and Finance, 24, p.p.419 – 425.
Kontogeorgos, A, Chatzitheodoridis F, Loizou E. (2016). Adaptation Strategies for the Greek Agricultural Cooperatives during the Economic Crisis, Agricultural Economics, 62 (1): 26-34. doi: 10.17221/22/2015-AGRICECON.
Chatzitheodoridis F., Kontogeorgos, A., Liltsi P., Apostolidou I., Michailidis, A. and Loizou E. (2016). Small Women’s Cooperatives in less favored and mountainous areas under economic instability. Agricultural Economics Review, Vol.17 (1).
Karelakis C., Loizou E., Vladu M. (2016). Exploring the Competitiveness, οf the Greek Fisheries Sector. Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Agricultură – Montanologie – Cadastru (Montanology, Cadastre Series) Vol. XLVI 2016, Annals of the University of Craiova – Agriculture.
Chatzitheodoridis F., Kontogeorgos, A. and Loizou E. (2017). Behind the Image: An Investigation of Greek Firefighter’s Body Mass Index. Pakistan Journal Of Nutrition, 16 (7), pp. 525-530. DOI: 10.3923/pjn.2017.525.530.
Giannakas, K., Loizou, S., Mattas, K. and V. Tzouvelekas (2000). Cointegration Analysis and The Demand of Olive-Oil in Greece, in Restructuring of Greek Agricultural Sector, K. Apostolopoulos (ed.), Athens: Stamoulis Press, 2000, pp. 599-608 (in Greek).
Loizou S. and Tzouvelekas V. (2002). Identifying Key Development Sectors in the Greek Economy: An Input-Output Model, in Future Prospects of Greek Agriculture, K. Mattas (ed.), 2001 (in Greek).
Tsakiridou, E., Loizou E. and Karasavvoglou A. (2003): Rural Economies and Migration: Permanent or Temporary Residence, the case of Kavala Prefecture. pp. 485-495, proceedings of the 16th Conference of Statistics, “Statistics Theory & Data Analysis in Social and Economic Sciences, Ziti publications, Thessaloniki.
Karasavvoglou , Tsakiridou, E., Loizou E., Nikolaidis M., Mbatzios C. and Mattas K. (2004). Migrants and their willingness to be legalized in Rural Areas: The case of Kavala Prefecture. Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the Greek Association of Agricultural Economists “The Rural Society in a changing Agricultural Space”, pp. 603-617, Ministry of Agriculture publications, Athens(in Greek).
Loizou S., Tzouvelekas V., Mattas K. and M. Tsakiri (2004). Regional Development Initiatives: An Impact Analysis. In the proceeding of the Seminar “Regional and Rural Development Interface”, Editura SINCRON, Cluj-Napoca.
Polymeros K., Loizou E. and Tsakiridou E. (2005). Competitiveness Indices Estimation of the Greek Fisheries. Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the Greek Association of Agricultural Economists “Greek Agriculture in the Enlarged EU: New Challenges and Orientations”. Agrotypos publications, Athens (in Greek).
Melfou, K. Loizou, E. And Mamalis S. (2005). Income elasticity of import demand for agricultural products in Greece before and after the Accession in the EU. Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the Greek Association of Agricultural Economists “Greek Agriculture in the Enlarged EU: New Challenges and Orientations”. Agrotypos publications, Athens (in Greek).
Tsakiri Μ., Mattas K. and Loizou E. (2005). Developing Priorities in the Region of Anatoliki Makedonia and Thraki: An Input-Output Model. Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the Greek Association of Agricultural Economists “Greek Agriculture in the Enlarged EU: New Challenges and Orientations”. Agrotypos publications, Athens (in Greek).
Mattas Κ., Loizou Ε., Tzouvelekas V. and S. Rozakis (2005). Policy Decisions Evaluation in Agriculture Employing Input-Output Analysis: The Case of Tobacco Sector Regime Reform. Proceedings of the 89th EAAE Seminar, 3-5 February, 2005 entitled “Modelling agricultural policies: State of the art and new challenges”, Monte Universita Parma, Italy.
Mattas Κ., Loizou Ε. and Tzouvelekas V. (2006). Agro-food Linkages in Rural Areas: An Empirical Evaluation of Integrated Development Programs. Proceedings of the OECD workshop entitled “Coherence of Agricultural and Rural Development Policies”, OECD publications.
Michailidis A., Loizou, E. and Theodossiou, G. (2007). Socioeconomic Evaluation and Ranking of Infrastructure Projects”. Proceedings of the 46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), „Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean”, Volos (Greece), 30 August-3 September, 2006.
Michailidis A., Loizou, E., Mattas K. and Melfou, K. (2007). Agro-food Dynamics in a Region’s Growth”. Proceedings of the 46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), „Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean”, Volos (Greece), 30 August-3 September, 2006.
Loizou E., Chatzitheodoridis F, Mattas K. and Polymeros K. (2010). Fisheries Policies Impacts Consideration towards the Development of Rural Coastal Areas. Proceedings of the 118th Seminar of the E.A.A.E. “Rural Development: Governance, Policy Design and Delivery”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp.281-295.
Semerak V., Kresimir Z., Loizou E. and Golemanova-Kuharova A. (2010). Regional Input-Output Analysis: Application On Rural Regions In Germany, The Czech Republic And Greece. Proceedings of the 118th Seminar of the E.A.A.E. “Rural Development: Governance, Policy Design and Delivery”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 897-911.
Michailidis A., Loizou E., Nastis S. and Mattas K. (2010). Mobile Telephony As a Change Driver In Rural Areas. Proceedings of the 118th Seminar of the E.A.A.E. “Rural Development: Governance, Policy Design and Delivery”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 657-666.
Theodosiou G., Michailidis A., Loizou E. and Chatzitheodoridis F. (2010). Rural Areas Development Through Endogenous Potentials. Proceedings of the 118th Seminar of the E.A.A.E. “Rural Development: Governance, Policy Design and Delivery”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 931-938.
Tsakiri M., Loizou E., Michailidis A. and Natos (2012). The interrelation of demographic and employment changes and their impacts upon a regional agricultural economy. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference „The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the changed world” pp. 252-261, ISBN: 978-960-363-042-5 – ISSN: 1792-4383.
Tsourgiannis L., Loizou E., Karasavvoglou A., Tsourgiannis C.A. and Florou (2015). Consumers’ Purchasing Behaviour Patterns Regarding Organic Wine in a Southern E.U. Country, pp. 520-539. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies in Agriculture, Food and Environment (HAICTA), Kavala, Greece, September 17-20, 2015.
Apostolidou I., Michailidis A., Loizou E., Karelakis C., Chatzitheodoridis F. and Kontogeorgos A. (2017). Investment decisions in agriculture under economic instability: Evidence from Greece. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference „The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the changed world” pp. 43-48, ISBN: 978-960-363-066-1, ISSN: 1792-4383.
Fotopoulos Ch., Tzouvelekas V., Loizou E. and Semos A. (1999). Tobacco. In Apostolopoulos K. and Fotopoulos Ch. (eds) “The Mediterranean Products as Traditional Greek Products and the future of the support means”, pp. 184-207, Ministry of Agriculture, Athens.
Mattas K. and Loizou E. (2005). The Role of EU Policies in Technological Innovation in Agriculture. In Land, Shops and Kitchens: Technology and the Food Chain in Twentieth-Century Europe, edited by Sarasua C., Scholliers P. and Van Molle L. BREPOLS, Belgium.
Mattas Κ., Loizou Ε., Rozakis S. and Tzouvelekas V. (2005). Agricultural Modelling: An Input-Output Approach. In Leaves and Cigarettes: Modelling the Tobacco Industry, edited by Ferretti F. FrancoAngeli, Milano, Italy.
Mattas K., Loizou S., Tzouvelekas V., Tsakiri M. and Bonfiglio A. (2006). Deriving regional I-O tables and multipliers. In: Bonfiglio A., Esposti R. and Sotte F. (eds) Rural Balkans and EU Integration: An Input-Output Approach. Franco Angeli.
Mattas K., Loizou S., Tzouvelekas V. and Tsakiri M. (2006). Old EU Member States in Balkans: the Case of Region of Thessalia . In: Bonfiglio A., Esposti R. and Sotte F. (eds) Rural Balkans and EU Integration: An Input-Output Approach. Franco Angeli.
Mattas K., Loizou S., Tzouvelekas V. and Tsakiri M. (2006). A common Input-Output model In: Bonfiglio A., Esposti R. and Sotte F. (eds) Rural Balkans and EU Integration: An Input-Output Approach. Franco Angeli.
Mattas Κ., Loizou Ε. and Tzouvelekas V. (2009). Rural Development through Input-Output Modelling, pp. 273-295. In Papajorgji, P. J. and Pardalos, P. M. (Eds.) Advances in Modelling Agricultural Systems, Springer.
Chatzitheodoridis, F., Michailidis, A., Theodossiou, G. and Loizou, E., (2012). Local cooperation: a dynamic force for endogenous rural development. In A. Karasavvoglou and P. Polychronidou (eds.), Balkan and Eastern European Countries in the Midst of the Global Economic Crisis.,Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/978-3-7908-2873-3_9.
Michailidis, A., Loizou, E., Nastis, S.A., and Chatzitheodoridis, F. (2014). Mobile Phone Applications for Agricultural Extension in Greece. In: Saravanan, R (Ed.). Mobile Phone for Agricultural Extension: Worldwide mAgri Innovations and Promise for Future, New India Publishing Agency, New Delhi. Pp:245-266.
Apostolidou I., Mattas K., Loizou E. and Michailidis A. (2015). Agriculture’s role in economic growth: an exploratory study among southern and northern EU countries”. In: Karasavvoglou et al. (eds.), EU Crisis and the Role of the Periphery, Contributions to Economics, pp 147-162. Springer-Verlag, Germany.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
* used browser and possibly the operating system of your computer as well as the name of your access provider.
* for further administrative purposes.
The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 (1) 1 f GDPR. Our legitimate interest follows from the data collection purposes listed above. In no case we use the collected data for the purpose of drawing conclusions about you.
For questions of any kind, we offer you the opportunity to contact us via a form provided on the website. It is necessary to provide a valid e-mail address so that we know who the request came from and to answer it. Further information can be provided voluntarily.
The data processing for the purpose of contacting us is in accordance with Art. 6 (1) 1 a GDPR based on your voluntarily granted consent.
* this is permitted by law and according to Art. 6 (1) 1 b GDPR is required for the settlement of contractual relationships with you.
The data processed by cookies are for the purposes mentioned for the protection of our legitimate interests as well as the third party according to Art. 6 (1) 1 f GDPR required.
Most browsers accept cookies automatically. However, you can configure your browser so that no cookies are stored on your computer or always a hint appears before a new cookie is created. However, disabling cookies completely may mean that you cannot use all features of our website.
The tracking measures listed below and used by us are based on Art. 6 (1) 1 f GDPR. With the tracking measures to be used, we want to ensure a needs-based design and the continuous optimization of our website. On the other hand, we use the tracking measures to statistically record the use of our website and evaluate it for the purpose of optimizing our offer for you. These interests are to be regarded as justified within the meaning of the aforementioned provision.
You can also prevent the collection of data generated by the cookie and related to your use of the website (including your IP address) and the processing of this data by Google by downloading and installing a browser add-on (https: //tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de).
As an alternative to the browser add-on, especially for browsers on mobile devices, you can prevent the collection by Google Analytics by clicking on this link. An opt-out cookie will be set that will prevent the future collection of your data when you visit this website. The opt-out cookie is only valid in this browser and only for our website and is stored on your device. If you delete the cookies in this browser, you must set the opt-out cookie again.
To statistically record the use of our website and to evaluate it for the purpose of optimizing our website, we also use Google conversion tracking. In doing so, Google Adwords will set a cookie (see section 4) on your computer if you have reached our website via a Google ad.
These cookies lose their validity after 30 days and are not used for personal identification. If the user visits certain pages of the Adwords customer’s website and the cookie has not yet expired, Google and the customer can recognize that the user clicked on the ad and was redirected to this page.
Every Adwords customer receives a different cookie. Cookies cannot be tracked via the websites of Adwords customers. The information gathered using the conversion cookie is used to generate conversion statistics for Adwords customers who have opted for conversion tracking. Adwords customers hear the total number of users who clicked on their ad and were redirected to a conversion tracking tag page. However, they do not receive information that personally identifies users.
* according to Art. 77 GDPR to complain to a supervisory authority. As a rule, you can contact the supervisory authority of your usual place of residence or work or our office.
If your personal data are based on legitimate interests in accordance with Art. 6 (1) 1 f GDPR are processed, you have the right to file an objection against the processing of your personal data in accordance with Art. 21 GDPR, provided that there are reasons for this arising from your particular situation or the objection is directed against direct mail. In the latter case, you have a general right of objection, which is implemented by us without specifying any particular situation.
We use the popular SSL (Secure Socket Layer) method within the site visit in conjunction with the highest level of encryption supported by your browser. In general, this is a 256-bit encryption. If your browser does not support 256-bit encryption, we’ll use 128-bit v3 technology instead. Whether a single page of our website is encrypted is shown by the closed representation of the key or lock icon in the lower status bar of your browser.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 77
Art. 6
Art. 21


DONALD H. FAY vs. TEMPLE H. FAY, JR.
Present: RUGG, C.J., DONAHUE, LUMMUS, QUA, & DOLAN, JJ.
Executor and Administrator, Accounts, Foreign. Probate Court, Jurisdiction, Accounts. Jurisdiction, Nonresident fiduciary.
c. 206, § 4, for the payment of the sum with which the administrator should be charged.
The Probate Court has jurisdiction to state an account for an administrator appointed by it and to charge him thereon, though he is a nonresident and has not appointed a resident agent for the service of process.
PETITION, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on June 1, 1936, by one of the next of kin of Temple H. Fay, for the allowance of an account filed by him in the name of the administratrix.
The respondent, another next of kin, moved that the account be struck from the records. Beane, J., denied the motion and reported his action to this court for determination.
G. Newhall, for Cudworth, guardian.
A. G. Carver & A. E. McCleary, for Donald H. Fay.
DOLAN, J. An interlocutory decree was entered in the Probate Court denying the motion of the guardian of the respondent minor that a paper alleged to be the first account of Mabel H. Fay, administratrix of the estate of Temple H. Fay, late of Watertown, be struck from the records. At the request of the parties the judge reported his action in the matter for the determination of this court. While not phrased with exactness we treat the report as properly before us under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, § 13.
required under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 195, § 8, has never filed an account as obligated by the conditions of her bond, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 205, § 1 (2), First-Third; c. 206, § 1, and has not complied with a specific order of the court that she do so on or before May 22, 1936.
The children of the deceased are now of age with the exception of the respondent, who is still a minor under the guardianship of Cudworth. On June 1, 1936, Donald H. Fay, a son of the deceased, filed an account of the administration of the estate. The account is described as that of Mabel H. Fay, the administratrix, and covers the period from December 22, 1921, to December 22, 1922. It is signed "Donald H. Fay On behalf of the Administratrix" and is sworn to by him. Its figures are based on information derived from an affidavit filed by the administratrix, with the commissioner of corporations and taxation, in connection with the determination of the inheritance taxes due from her on account of her share in the estate of the deceased. We infer that the action of Donald H. Fay in filing the account was taken to compel an adjudication of the subject matter and not as a partisan of the administratrix. The record does not disclose whether any of the personal property of the estate is now within the Commonwealth or whether the administratrix has property of her own in the Commonwealth sufficient to satisfy any judgment or decree that might be rendered against her in an action or petition in equity on her bond or otherwise.
The guardian of the respondent appeared specially "for the sole purpose of objecting to the right or propriety" of the court "to receive or consider any such paper" as the purported account of the administratrix, and moved that "said paper be stricken from the records." After hearing the judge denied the motion. See Madden v. Madden, 279 Mass. 417, 424.
Under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 206, § 4, which was originally enacted as St. 1915, c. 151, § 3, the Probate Court in settling the account of an administrator has authority to direct him to pay any moneys or property with which he may be charged into a proper account in such manner that the same shall be in the control of the persons entitled thereto, "and the proceedings upon every such account shall be considered for all purposes to be proceedings in equity, and orders and decrees of the court therein shall be enforceable accordingly, and execution may issue for any such moneys against the fiduciary personally as upon a judgment at law in favor of the persons entitled to the control thereof, or any of them, for the benefit of all." Under the authority thus conferred an accounting and distribution and effective orders for the payment of distributive shares may be had in the one proceeding in the appropriate court. We think that the provisions of § 4 apply as well where the court states the account upon the neglect and refusal of the administrator to do so as in case of an account rendered by the administrator himself, and that the petitioner is entitled to avail himself of the benefits of that section and to have the account of the administratrix stated by the court. He could secure nothing by an action or petition in equity on the bond without sureties that cannot be accorded him in proceedings under § 4.
held that where there is submission to the jurisdiction in the first instance "we dispense with the necessity of maintaining the physical power and attribute the same force to the judgment or decree whether the party remain within the jurisdiction or not" (page 353), and sustained the validity of a decree entered in the Probate Court of one State in settling itself an account, in the absence of an executor, appointed by it, who had removed to another State and who had failed to account after an order to do so was served on him in the latter State. The same result was reached in Moore v. Fields, 42 Penn. St. 467 (1862), where at page 473 the court said: ". . . in the case of these defendants [domiciled in Philadelphia] the surrogate [New York] had jurisdiction from the time he granted the letters of administration [to them], and it was their legal duty to appear and settle their accounts without any summons whatever from the surrogate. The fact that his notice reached them in Pennsylvania was not, in our judgment, a circumstance of any importance." See also Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 409 Tenn. 416.
We are of opinion that it is within the authority of the Probate Court in the circumstances of the present case, on application by the petitioner or any other person interested in the estate of the deceased, after notice to the administratrix and all other persons interested, and after hearing such competent evidence as may be presented, to state the account itself and to charge the administratrix with whatever may be found due from her and to direct the payment thereof to the persons who may be entitled thereto. That the Probate Court may have difficulty in enforcing a decree thus made, while the administratrix remains out of the Commonwealth, does not affect its validity. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 355-356.
court, at page 534, said: "If an executor or administrator refuses to file an account, it is proper for those interested to ascertain, so far as they can, the amount of property that came into his hands, and to state an account for him." There is also authority that after an administrator has been cited to account and notice thereof has been served on him in a foreign State, the surrogate may proceed without further notice to state the administrator's account, and that the orders made thereon are valid and enforceable against the administrator where found. Moore v. Fields, 42 Penn. St. 467. Without deciding or intimating that the Probate Court could not adopt the procedure last referred to, we think that it will be better to follow that which we have indicated to be appropriate.
The decree of the Probate Court is reversed and a final decree is to be entered that the purported account be struck from its records, but without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner or other persons interested in the estate of the deceased to petition that court to state the account of the administratrix.


text:
R.C. 2935.36 -- Pre-trial diversion programs for certain offenders.
State v. Bales, 195 Ohio App. 3d 538, 2011-Ohio-5336, 960 N.E.2d 1053 (9th Dist) – Defendant entered a guilty plea and was admitted to a diversion program. Prosecutor appealed as a matter of right, contending this was contrary to law because failure to honor the state’s objection diminished the discretion given prosecutors. Dismissed as the prosecutor failed to properly invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction. Admission to the program did not constitute a sentence. Prosecutor was required to seek leave to appeal.
Lane v. Phillabaum, 182 Ohio App. 3d 145, 2008-Ohio-2502 – Miami University students brought suit challenging a diversion program set up by a county court. Summary judgment properly granted as courts have the inherent power to establish such programs, notwithstanding R.C. 2935.36 regulating programs set up by prosecutors. However, the court is advised that payment of a "donation" to specified funds, rather than the county treasury, is unlawful and is further encourage to follow the statue, which among other things requires written standards. Students portrayed as ingrates. Among other things they wanted records unsealed to facilitate a class action.
State v. Wojnarowski, 141 Ohio App. 3d 141, 2008-Ohio-5749 – Defendant changed counsel after entering plea to domestic violence. New counsel sought to vacate plea and have him placed on a mental health court docket. Opinion quotes Cuyahoga County Local Rule 30.1 which contemplates application at arraignment, then lists the ways in which the defendant was ineligible.
State v. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App. 3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604 – Defendant pled no contest to stealing a ball cap. As a result he was later bounced from a diversion program. Motion to withdraw no contest plea was denied. Affirmed. Defendant admitted taking cap and the circumstances do not suggest a manifest injustice.
State v. Leisten, 166 Ohio App. 3d 805, 2006-Ohio-2362 -- Defendant was dropped from a diversion program, then made application for intervention in lieu of conviction. The judge erroneously ruled she was ineligible. Though the judge could have summarily denied the application, following 2000 changes in the law diversion and intervention in lieu of conviction are not mutually exclusive.
In re Paterson (1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 113 -- Diversion program entailed entry of a guilty plea at time of acceptance. When defendant failed to complete restitution, prosecutor discharged him from the program and asked the court to conduct a sentencing hearing. By the time this took place, restitution had been completed and the court sua sponte dismissed charge. Reversed as a violation of separation of powers. Nonetheless, court may take restitution into account in passing sentence. Court notes that the diversion statute does not make entry of a guilty plea a necessary part of a diversion program.
State v. Urvan (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 151 -- Successful completion of a diversion program is the equivalent of serving a sentence or completing probation. If related charges would have merged if pursued initially, they may not be pursued upon completion of diversion. Court views diversion as a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor.
Cleveland v. Mosquito (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 239 -- While R.C. 2935.36 vests the prosecuting attorney with discretion regarding eligibility for placement in a diversion program, it does not outlaw previously established diversion programs which gave such discretion to the judiciary. However, the prosecutor has a practical veto since a nolle prosequi ultimately may be entered only with his consent.
State v. Newberry (1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d 818 -- Defendants held not to have been entitled to a hearing following rejection for participation in a diversion program under the auspices of the prosecutor's office. Also see State v. Newberry (1991), 65 Ohio App. 3d 179 -- Entry overruling original motion seeking hearing on rejection was not a final appealable order.
State v. Long (1990), 70 Ohio App. 810 -- Defendant's application for a diversion program available to those charged with OMVI extended time within which she had to be brought to trial.
State v. Pickens (1996), 109 Ohio App. 3d 147 -- Failed polygraph accepted as basis for expelling defendant from diversion program. Diversion agreement included submission to polygraph on request. Court had previously held a due process hearing was required when a person was to be cut from a diversion program. Court rejects defendant's claim that the prosecutor was required to present clear and convincing evidence establishing basis for expulsion. Instead, the prosecutor has the burden of establishing the basis for termination, after which the defendant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance that the prosecutor violated the agreement and abused its discretion in revoking participation.
Strickland v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (1994), 92 Ohio App. 3d 755 -- BMV suspended license under the implied consent law. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty and entered a diversion program. Written plea did not provide for it to be withdrawn if program was not completed, but did state that the plea would not be accepted and the charge would be dismissed upon successful completion. Held that the Bureau was required to reinstate license.
Cuyahoga Falls v. Simich (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 10 -- Placement in alcohol abuse diversion program involved signing a guilty plea form with the understanding the charge would be dismissed if the defendant completed the form. When the defendant failed to do so, the form was submitted to and accepted by the court. Held that this was improper and that the plea was not voluntarily made in accordance with the applicable rules.
State v. Mintz (1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d 62 -- Defendant was placed in a diversion program for those charged with domestic violence. This entailed entering a no contest plea, waiving his right to a speedy trial and agreeing to have finding entered at a later date. Court found entry of no contest plea alone did not amount to waiver of speedy trial rights and waiver of speedy trial was void when defendant was removed from program.
State v. Monk (1994), 64 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 -- After the defendant completed a diversion program and a domestic violence charge was dismissed, the state could not later indict him for felonious assault based on the same conduct. Decision rests in part of Grady v. Corbin, but same result should still follow under other cases cited.
State v. Radich (1992), 84 Ohio App. 3d 429 -- Court erroneously dismissed OMVI charge at the conclusion of a diversion program where the circumstances of the case failed to mesh with provisions of R.C. 2935.33, 2935.36, 2951.04 or 2951.041.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
The basis for data processing is Art. 6 (1) (b) DSGVO/GDPR, which allows the processing of data to fulfill a contract or for measures preliminary to a contract.
If you contact us via the contact form, any data you provide will be processed according to Art. 6 paragraph 1 lit. b DSGVO/GDPR. User data may be stored in a customer relation management (CRM) system or a similar system. We will delete all data if the purpose for its storage no longer pertains; data cleanups will be performed every two years. Mandatory data retention periods remain unaffected by this provision.
We will process the data provided during registration only based on your consent per Art. 6 (1)(a) DSGVO/GDPR. You may revoke your consent at any time with future effect. An informal email making this request is sufficient. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
We collect, process, and use personal data only insofar as it is necessary to establish, or modify legal relationships with us (master data). This is done based on Art. 6 (1) (b) DSGVO/GDPR, which allows the processing of data to fulfill a contract or for measures preliminary to a contract. We collect, process and use your personal data when accessing our website (usage data) only to the extent required to enable you to access our service or to bill you for the same.
Duration of Data Storage Members, Conference Participants, Customers ENETS e.V. is a non-profit association with its principal seat in Berlin, Germany, and registered with the Registry of Associations of the Berlin-Charlottenburg local court. German tax legislation in general and specific regulations pertaining to non-profit associations oblige ENETS to keep its records on members, conference participants and customers for a period of at least 10 and a maximum of 13 years.
Google Analytics uses so-called "cookies". These are text files that are stored on your computer and that allow an analysis of the use of the website by you. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is usually transmitted to a Google server in the US and stored there.
Google Analytics cookies are stored based on Art. 6 (1) (f) DSGVO/GDPR. The website operator has a legitimate interest in analyzing user behavior to optimize both its website and its advertising.
Google Analytics tracking is currently activated. You can disable tracking by clicking here.
We will, therefore, process any data you enter onto the contact form only with your consent per Art. 6 (1) (a) DSGVO/GDPR. You can revoke consent to the storage of your data and email address as well as their use for sending the newsletter at any time, e.g. through the "unsubscribe" link in the newsletter. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
Our website accepts payments via PayPal. The provider of this service is PayPal (Europe) S.à.r.l & Cie, S.C.A., 22-24 Boulevard Royal, L-2449 Luxembourg.
If you select payment via PayPal, the payment data you provide will be supplied to PayPal based on Art. 6 (1) (a) (Consent) and Art. 6 (1) (b) DSGVO/GDPR (Processing for contract purposes). You have the option to revoke your consent at any time with future effect. It does not affect the processing of data previously collected.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6