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The protection of your personal data is of concern to us. We therefore process your data exclusively based on the legal regulations (GDPR).
Responsible for the processing of personal data is the Mountain Management Consulting C.E.
The address of our website is: http://best-skiresorts.com.
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Legal basis are Art 6 para 1 lit b (necessary for the performance of the contract) and lit f (legitimate interests) GDPR.
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Data processing takes place based on the legal provisions of Art 6 para 1 lit a (consent) and lit f (legitimate interests) of the GDPR.
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Data processing takes place based on the statutory provisions of Art 6 para 1 lit a (consent) and lit f (legitimate interests) of the GDPR.
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The legal basis for this processing of personal data is Art 6 para 1 lit a (consent), lit b (necessary for the performance of the contract) GDPR.
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The legal basis for this processing of personal data is Art 6 para 1 lit a (consent), lit f (legitimate interests) GDPR.
Which rights can you claim?
If you believe that the processing of your data violates data protection law, or your privacy claims have otherwise been violated in any way, you are free to complain to the supervisory authority.

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The Complainant is Radio Systems Corporation of Tennessee, United States of America, represented by Pitts & Brittian, P.C., United States of America.
The Respondent is Media Plus Solutions, Kenneth Yap of Singapore.
The disputed domain name <petsafebarkcontrol.com> is registered with DomainPeople, Inc.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on May 20, 2010. On May 21, 2010, the Center transmitted by email to DomainPeople, Inc. a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On May 25, 2010, DomainPeople, Inc. transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on May 27, 2010. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was June 16, 2010. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent's default on June 22, 2010.
The Center appointed J. Nelson Landry as the sole panelist in this matter on July 12, 2010. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Complainant, Radio Systems Corporation, is, since 1998, in the business of making and selling pet control and training products worldwide under the trademark PETSAFE. The Complainant has registered a family of trademarks around the expression “petsafe”, either the expression alone or in association with other terms, such as PETSAFE BARK CONTROL, PETSAFE TRAINING SYSTEMS, PETSAFE WELLNESS BED, PETSAFE WIRELESS PET CONTAINEMENT SYSTEM, PETSAFE VILLAGE, PETSAFE RESCUE SERVICE and different logos associated therewith ( herein the “Trademark”, the “PETSAFE Trademark” or the “PETSAFE Trademarks”).
The PETSAFE products of the Complainant are marketed and available for purchase around the world through its own network of authorized retailers identified by the PETSAFE logo as well as on the Internet at “www.petsafe.net/Where-To-Buy/Authorized-Retailers.aspx”, since as early as 1998.
The Complainant has registered the PETSAFE Trademark in numerous countries and continents, including in the United States, Canada, Mexico, European Community, United Kingdom and Australia. Furthermore the Complainant has registered and operates over 80 domain names incorporating its PETSAFE Trademark since as early as June 5, 1998.
The Complainant has not licensed any of its Trademarks to the Respondent and it has not otherwise authorized the Respondent to register or use the disputed domain name nor to represent itself as a retailer of the Complainant's products. The Complainant has no relationship with the Respondent, contractual or otherwise.
The disputed domain name was registered on October 16, 2008.
The Complainant submits that it has rights in the Trademark PETSAFE which it has been using alone since 1998 or within a family of Trademarks adopted from 1998 until 2010 in association with pet control and training products worldwide. According to the Complainant, the family of Trademarks consists of the expression “petsafe” either alone or in association with other terms, such as PETSAFE BARK CONTROL, PETSAFE TRAINING SYSTEMS, PETSAFE WELLNESS BED, PETSAFE WIRELESS PET CONTAINEMENT SYSTEM, PETSAFE VILLAGE, PETSAFE RESCUE SERVICE and different logos associated therewith.
The Complainant further submits that its PETSAFE products are extensively marketed, promoted and sold around the world through its own network of authorized retailers identified by the PETSAFE logo as well as on the internet at “www.PETSAFE.net/Where-To-Buy/Authorized-Retailers.aspx” and over 80 domain names incorporating its PETSAFE Trademarks and has thus built up substantial goodwill in its family of PETSAFE Trademarks.
The Complainant represents that it has not licensed any of its Trademarks to the Respondent, has not otherwise authorized the Respondent to register or use the domain name <petsafebarkcontrol.com>, has not entered into any contract with Respondent such as making the Respondent an authorized retailer of its products and has no relationship with the Respondent.
According to the Complainant, the disputed domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to its PETSAFE Trademark in that, as already established, when the said domain name reproduces the Trademark in its entirety, it is confusingly similar to the Trademark. See Oki Data Americas Inc. v. ASD Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0903 and Turkcell IIetisim Hizmetleri A.S. v. Vural Kavak, WIPO Case No. D2010-0010.
Relying on to an earlier UDRP decision, the Complainant claims that the addition of generic top-level “.com” domain to the end of the domain name does not distinguish the disputed domain name from the Complainant's PETSAFE BARK CONTROL Trademark. See Bang & Olufsen a/s v. Unasi Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0728. The Complainant concludes that the disputed domain name is identical to the said Trademark.
The Complainant further represents that it is critical to recall that it has not licensed any of its Trademarks to the Respondent, has not otherwise authorized the Respondent to register or use the disputed domain name, has not entered into any contract with the Respondent whereby the Respondent would be an authorized retailer of the Complainant's products or have any other relationship with the Complainant.
According to the Complainant, when the Respondent registered the disputed domain name, it was aware of the Complainant's activities, its Trademarks and its domain name <petsafe.net> and these facts establish a prima face case that the Respondent has no right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name and that pursuant to the Policy the burden shifts to the Respondent to show it does have a right or legitimate interests. See Croatia Airlines d.d. v. Modern Empire Internet Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2003-0455 and Clerical Medical Investment Group Limited v. Clericalmedical.com (Clerical & Medical Services Agency), WIPO Case No. D2000-1228.
The Complainant claims in its evidence that the Respondent cannot show any use of or preparation to use the disputed domain name or a name corresponding to the said domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, that it is commonly known by disputed the domain name, or is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name.
According to the Complainant, in order to show its use of the disputed domain name is in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, the Respondent must meet several requirements including: the Respondent must actually be offering the goods or services at issue; see World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Ringside Collectibles, WIPO Case No. D2000-1306; must use the site to sell only the trademarked goods; otherwise, it could be using the trademark to bait Internet users and then switch them to other goods; see also Nikon, Inc. and Nikon Corporation v. Technilab, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-1774; the site may not falsely suggest that the Respondent is the Trademark owner, or that the website is the official site; see Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Weatherman, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0211; R.T. Quaife Engineering, Ltd. and Autotech Sport Tuning Corporation d/b/a Quaife America v. Bill Luton, WIPO Case No. D2000-1201 and Easy Heat, Inc. v. Shelter Products., WIPO Case No. D2001-0344.
The Complainant further claims that the Respondent must not try to cover the market in all domain names, thus depriving the trademark owner of reflecting its own trademark in a domain name. See Magnum Piering, Inc. v. Mudjackers and Garwood S. Wilson, Sr., WIPO Case No. D2000-1525; Oki Data Americas, Inc., supra; ITT Manufacturing Enterprises, Inc., ITT Corporation v. Douglas Nicoll, Differential Pressure Instruments, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0936, wherein the panel recognized Oki Data as the “prevailing view” on whether an offering of goods or services by a reseller may be regarded as bona fide for the purposes of paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy.
Considering that the Respondent is not an authorized retailer of the Complainant's PETSAFE pet products, is not licensed to use any of the Complainant's Trademarks, and was not otherwise authorized to register or use the disputed domain name, although, as is shown in the Respondent's webpages, the Respondent claims on each page that it is an authorized retailer of the Complainant's PETSAFE products by displaying on the top of each page the PETSAFE logo and the terms “Authorized Retailer” when in fact it is not, the Complainant suggests that the Respondent falsely suggests it is associated with it, is sponsored by or affiliated with the Complainant which in fact it is not, these facts being a misrepresentation by the Respondent which would cause a visitor to the Respondent's website to believe that the Respondent is an authorized retailer of the Complainant's products when in fact it is not. See Houghton Mifflin Co. v. The Weathermen, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0211; The Stanley Works and Stanley Logistics, Inc. v. Camp Creek Co., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0113 and Lockheed Martin Corporation v. NBPro Hosting, WIPO Case No. D2003-0859.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent cannot show that it is commonly known by the disputed domain name since the Respondent's WHOIS information identifies the Respondent as “Media Plus Solutions” and fails to indicate that the Respondent is commonly known by the domain name <petsafebarkcontrol.com>. See America West Airlines, Inc. v. Ilyoup Paik a/k/a David Sanders, NAF Claim No. 206396.
According to the Complainant, the Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name where the Respondent registered and is using the said domain name with intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the Trademark of the Complainant.
According to the Complainant, the disputed domain name involves a business of advertising and selling of pet related products in exchange for monetary value which lead to the only conclusion that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used by the Respondent with the intent for commercial gain. See Charles Jourdan Holding AG v. AAIM, WIPO Case No. D2000-0403.
The Complainant submits that the registration and use of the disputed domain name by the Respondent is clearly in bad faith in that the Respondent cannot show rights or legitimate interests in the said domain name. See Imerys v. Unknown (gfg fdgdf, dfgdfg), WIPO Case No. D2007-0045. The Complainant further submits that the Respondent incorporated its Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL in its entirety with the knowledge that the Trademark is owned by the Complainant with the result that such use of the Trademark in the disputed domain name was done for the purpose of disrupting the business of the Complainant and is using the said Trademark to attract internet users and consumers for commercial gain.
The Complainant contends that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name to resell Complainant's products while falsely claiming that it is an authorized retailer for said party when in fact it is not. The Complainant further contends the absence of any plausible explanation by the Respondent for its registration and use of the disputed domain name supports its representation that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. See RRI Financial, Inc. v. Ray Chen, WIPO Case No. D2001-1242.
According to the Complainant this bad faith behaviour is further corroborated by the use of the Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL in the disputed domain name by the Respondent and the inclusion by the latter of a false claim on the website for the disputed domain name that the Respondent is an authorized retailer of the PETSAFE products which inclusion is improper because the customers are being attracted to the said website and being mislead into believing that the Respondent is associated with, sponsored by or connected with the Complainant when in fact the Respondent is not and that this is clearly done by the Respondent for commercial gain.
Finally the Complainant claims as additional evidence of bad faith in the part of the Respondent the fact that it has contacted the Respondent on numerous occasions to request that it ceases any such improper use of its Trademark in the disputed domain name and that the Respondent never responded but continued its infringing and unauthorized activities.
The Trademark PETSAFE was adopted by the Complainant in 1998 and thereafter, the Complainant adopted and commenced using the Trademark PETSAFE as well as several other trademarks incorporating the expression PETSAFE therein to constitute a family of Trademarks used in association with electronic animal confinement and training systems, training devices and in particular commenced using in July 2004 the Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL in association with animal training collars. These various Trademarks were registered by the Complainant in the United States and also in several other countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan and as an European Community Trademark.
The Complainant has continuously used the Trademark PETSAFE in association with said animal training systems and products which were sold through a worldwide network of authorized retailers who were operating under the PETSAFE logo of the Complainant pursuant to a contractual arrangement with the Complainant and the latter has spent considerable sums of money to promote its products under the said Trademarks. As a result of this continuous and progressive worldwide use and promotion of the Trademarks, substantial goodwill was built up and associated therewith. The Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the Trademarks PETSAFE and PETSAFE BARK CONTROL and also in the family of PETSAFE Trademarks.
The disputed domain name incorporates the PETSAFE Trademark as well as the PETSAFE BARK CONTROL Trademark. As previously established in several UDRP decisions including the Oki Data Americas Inc., and Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S., supra, cited by the Complainant which the Panel adopts, when a domain name reproduces the Trademark in its entirety, it is confusingly similar to the Trademark as it is the case in the present circumstances. The addition of generic top level “.com” domain to the Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL does not diminish in any respect the similarity or confusion between the disputed domain name and the PETSAFE BARK CONTROL Trademark of the Complainant. The Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the PETSAFE Trademarks and identical to the PETSAFE BARK CONTROL Trademark.
The Respondent has not filed any response in this proceeding. Therefore the Panel may accept all reasonable inferences and allegations included in the Complaint as true. The Complainant has made a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks right or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name by stating that the Respondent has never been known by the disputed domain name, is not making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name. Furthermore, the Complainant has never given a license nor in any way authorized the Respondent to make use of the former's Trademark. There is no evidence that the Respondent has ever engaged is any legitimate business under the complainant's Trademark.
When the Respondent registered the disputed domain name, the Complainant was already for a decade in the exploitation and business of selling its products under the family of PETSAFE Trademarks including, in particular, the Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL. The Complainant has not licensed or authorized the Respondent to use any of its Trademarks or to register and use the disputed domain name and furthermore, there was no contractual relationship or authorization by the Complainant so that the Respondent can reproduce the authorized retailers logo of the Complainant and thereby cause Internet visitors to believe that the Respondent was one of the numerous authorized retailers.
Not only has the Complainant met its initial burden of proof by showing that the Respondent's activities were totally focused and associated with those of the Complainant under its Trademarks, the Respondent did not even attempt to show that it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
In the absence of any evidence by the Respondent, on the one hand and the close association of the disputed domain name with the activities of the Complainant, already significantly present for a decade, on the other hand, it is clear to this Panel that the Respondent is not using the disputed domain name in connection with a bone fide offering of goods and services and has never been commonly known by the said domain name. Furthermore, upon considering the reiterated written objections from the Complainant to the use by the Respondent of the Complainant's logo and falsely representing itself as an authorized retailer of the Complainant, the Panel also finds that the Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name and does not have a right or interests in said domain name. In so determining the Panel has taken into account the UDRP decisions cited by the Complainant in support of its contention and the Panel concurs with said earlier panel decisions.
As previously stated herein, the identity of the disputed domain name with the Trademark PETSAFE BARK CONTROL, the unauthorized association of the Respondent with the retailers of the Complainant under the later logo does not allow any doubt about the awareness by the Respondent of the Trademarks and activities of the Complainant and eagerness to capitalize on these and to use the disputed domain name and the Trademark to attract Internet users and consumers for commercial gain. Considering the identity of the disputed domain name and the said Trademark and the decade of earlier substantial activities and promotion of the Complainant, this Panel finds that the Respondent has registered the said domain name in bad faith.
As held by the panel in RRI Financial, Inc. supra, “there is no plausible explanation as to why the Respondent selected the name at issue, which incorporates the Complainant's entire mark as part of the domain name other than to trade on the goodwill of the Complainant”.
The evidence which is not challenged is clear about the inclusion of a false claim on the website under the disputed domain name that the Respondent is an authorized retailer of the Complainant's PETSAFE products, as rightfully contented by the Complainant. Such improper attraction and attempt at misleading Internet visitors to believe that the Respondent is associated with, sponsored by or connected with the Complainant when in fact, it is not, and maintaining such activities and implicit representation despite written reiterated demands by the Complainant, clearly establish in this Panel's view that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.
Therefore, in accordance with paragraphs 4(a) and 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name <petsafebarkcontrol.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

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R.C. SMITH, et al., Respondents.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Chief Magistrate Judge Carmen E. Garza's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (the “PFRD”), (Doc. 24), filed March 20, 2018; and Petitioner Cecil Boyett's Objections to the U.S. Magistrate's Recommendations/Findings on Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed March 27, 2018 (the “Objections”), (Doc. 25), filed March 29, 2018. In the PFRD, the Chief Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and therefore recommended denying Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”), (Doc. 1) and his Motion for Order of Release from Custody; Second Request for Appointment of Counsel (the “Motion for Release”), (Doc. 19). (Doc. 24 at 19). Also before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Produce; or in the Alternative-Issuance of Subpoena to April Perea, State Trial Jury Member-Pursuant to Rule 45(3)(c)(i), Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion to Produce”), (Doc. 26), filed June 18, 2018; Respondents' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Produce; or in the Alternative Issuance of Subpoena to April Perea, State Trial Jury Member-Pursuant to Rule 45(3)(c)(i), Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 26], (Doc. 27), filed June 25, 2018; and Petitioner's Reply in Opposition to Respondent's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Produce; or in the Alternative . . . , (Doc. 28), filed July 2, 2018.
The parties were informed that objections to the PFRD were due within fourteen days. Id. Petitioner timely objected to the PFRD. (Doc. 25). Respondents did not object to the PFRD or respond to the Objections, and the time for doing so has passed. See Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts (the “Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(B)(2). Following a de novo review of the Petition, Motion for Release, PFRD, Objections, and Motion to Produce, the Court will overrule the Objections, adopt the PFRD, deny the Petition, Motion for Release, and Motion to Produce, and dismiss this case with prejudice.
This case arises from Petitioner's trial and conviction related to the shooting death of Deborah Roach. On February 5, 2004, Petitioner shot Ms. Roach, killing her, in front of his house. Petitioner pursued two defenses at trial: first, that he was innocent because he shot Ms. Roach in self-defense, defense of another, and defense of his home, or “habitation;” and second, that he was innocent of first-degree murder because he was incapable of forming specific intent to murder at the time of the incident. (Doc. 11-2 at 4-5). In support of these theories, Petitioner testified that he knew Ms. Roach regularly carried a gun, that she drew her gun first, and that he shot her before she could shoot him. Id. Petitioner also testified that he suffered serious brain injuries years earlier, and he theorized those injuries made him incapable of forming the intent to murder. Id. at 13-14. Petitioner also planned to call an expert witness in support of his incapacity theory. Id. at 4-5; see (Doc. 22-1 at 2). However, before her scheduled testimony, the expert witness informed Petitioner's counsel she would not testify on his behalf. (Doc. 22-1 at 2). Petitioner did not call any other experts or request a continuance to do so.
At the conclusion of trial, Petitioner requested jury instructions on both of his theories. The trial court granted instructions on self-defense and defense of another, but denied instructions on defense of habitation or inability to form specific intent. (Doc. 12-2 at 33-34). The trial court first declined to instruct on defense of habitation because there was no evidence Petitioner shot Ms. Roach inside his home, which the trial judge thought was necessary under New Mexico law. (Doc. 11-2 at 5). The trial court next denied an instruction on inability to form specific intent because it required expert testimony and none had been provided. Id.
The jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree, willful and deliberate murder in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994). (Doc. 11-1 at 1-2). Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, arguing in part that he was prejudiced by the lack of expert testimony on his ability to form specific intent. (Doc. 22-1 at 2, 11-13). The trial court denied the motion and imposed the mandatory life-sentence. Id. at 25-26.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instructions and his motion for a new trial. (Doc. 11-1 at 22-23). The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed on all grounds. (Doc. 11-2 at 1-21); State v. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 555. First, the court affirmed the denial of an instruction on defense of habitation. The court reasoned that, in New Mexico, defense of habitation requires evidence that the commission of a felony inside the home was imminent and that deadly force was necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 15. The court found that such evidence was absent in Petitioner's case. Id., ¶ 25. Second, the court agreed that expert testimony was necessary to link Petitioner's brain injury with his alleged inability to form specific intent; therefore the court found that the trial court properly denied the instruction. Id., ¶ 29. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial because Petitioner failed to show how he was prejudiced by the lack of expert testimony. Id., ¶¶ 34-35.
Next, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, claiming he was denied his rights to effective assistance of counsel and to be present at every stage of the trial. (Doc. 11-2 at 23-39). Petitioner argued his trial counsel was ineffective in part by failing to ask for a continuance or secure a different expert witness. (Doc. 1 at 5). Petitioner also claimed that he was denied his right to be present at all critical stages of trial because a juror was replaced with an alternate outside his presence. Id. at 7.
On April 13, 15, and 18, 2016, the Thirteenth Judicial District Court of New Mexico held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from several witnesses. First, Petitioner testified that at the end of trial the jury was sworn in and dismissed for lunch, and when they returned, an alternate juror was in the jury box while an original juror, April Perea, was seated in the gallery. (Doc. 11-3 at 14-17). Susan McLean, the trial prosecutor, testified that Petitioner's recollection was mistaken. (Doc. 11-4 at 42-47). Ms. McLean testified instead that the jurors were sworn in and sequestered, not dismissed, and returned to court to render their verdict, and that no juror was replaced. Id. Further, Ms. McLean testified the trial judge always polled jurors by name, and that the trial record shows Ms. Perea was polled by name. Id. The trial transcript, which was before the state habeas court, reflects that Ms. Perea was polled by name. (Doc. 22-1 at 31); (Doc. 11-4 at 45); see (Doc. 11-5 at 19).
Regarding Petitioner's inability to form specific intent, Dr. Susan Cave testified on Petitioner's behalf. (Doc. 11-3 at 17). Dr. Cave stated that if she had been called as an expert witness at trial, she would have testified that Petitioner could not form specific intent at the time of incident due to a combination of factors, including his brain injuries. Id. at 31-32. On cross examination, Dr. Cave opined that it was “highly likely” that Petitioner's “ability to form specific intent was likely impaired.” Id. at 37. Dr. Cave's opinion, “to a reasonable degree of certainty, ” was that Petitioner was not capable of forming specific intent to kill at the time of the incident. Id. at 52.
Next, Sheila Lewis, Petitioner's appellate counsel, testified that Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective due to his failure to secure an expert like Dr. Cave. (Doc. 11-4 at 7). Ms. Lewis believed it was ineffective assistance, rather than a tactical decision, given trial counsel's proposed jury instructions and the motion for a new trial. Id. at 12-13, 17-23. On questioning by the state court, Ms. Lewis agreed that a reasonable trial attorney could have chosen to abandon the incapacity theory, but she maintained that Petitioner's trial counsel did not consciously choose to abandon the theory. Id. at 15, 21-22. Instead, Ms. Lewis felt that Petitioner's trial counsel negligently failed to pursue the incapacity theory. Id. at 22-36.
Finally, attorney Paul Kennedy testified as an expert witness in criminal defense litigation. (Doc. 22-1 at 31-71). In response to Ms. Lewis' testimony, Mr. Kennedy stated there is inherent tension between defenses based on self-defense and an inability to form specific intent. Id. at 43-46. Mr. Kennedy testified it can be difficult to explain to jurors how a defendant is unable to form specific intent to kill but still able to intentionally defend himself. Id.; see Id. at 65. Further, Mr. Kennedy believed the self-defense theory was stronger than the incapacity theory. Id. at 41-47. In Mr. Kennedy's opinion, emphasizing self-defense over incapacity was a reasonable trial tactic. Id. at 46-48.
Following the evidentiary hearings, the state court found Petitioner was not entitled to relief under either of his claims. (Doc. 11-5 at 17-25). First, the state court found Petitioner's trial counsel pursued a plausible, rational trial strategy; therefore Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 24-25. Second, the court found that no juror was replaced outside Petitioner's presence; therefore he was present at all stages of trial. Id. at 24-25. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the New Mexico Supreme Court, (Doc. 11-5 at 27-37). That petition was denied, (Doc. 11-5 at 48).
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition. As originally filed, the Petition contains four broad claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of the right to be present at all critical stages of trial; (3) denial of the right to due process; and (4) prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 5-10). The Petition and supporting documents included several other claims, for instance that the trial judge should have recused himself because of his personal and business relationship with Petitioner's trial counsel, (Doc. 1 at 25); that New Mexico Supreme Court Justice Petra Jimenez Maes improperly participated in Petitioner's case after recusing herself, (Doc. 1 at 16); and that Petitioner was denied his right to compulsory process, (Doc. 16 at 4).
The Chief Magistrate Judge reviewed the Petition and found that it contains four exhausted claims under § 2254(b)(1)(A): (1) ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to present expert testimony about Petitioner's brain injuries; (2) denial of Petitioner's right to be present at all stages of trial; (3) denial of due process arising from the denial of the defense of habitation jury instruction; and (4) denial of due process arising from the denial of the inability to form specific intent jury instruction. (Doc. 17 at 14-15). The Chief Magistrate Judge found that all other claims in the Petition were not properly before this Court because Petitioner had not presented them in state court. Id.
Because the Petition contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the Chief Magistrate Judge recommended allowing Petitioner to choose between amending his Petition to contain only exhausted claims, or dismissing the Petition without prejudice so he could exhaust all of his claims. Id. at 16-17. The Chief Magistrate Judge explained that if Petitioner chose to amend the Petition to delete his unexhausted claims, those claims would be deemed abandoned. Id. Petitioner chose to voluntarily dismiss all claims except for the four identified as exhausted. (Doc. 18 at 2-3). Petitioner also filed his Motion for Release, asking to be released from state custody pending a ruling on the Petition. (Doc. 19).
The Chief Magistrate Judge proceeded to analyze Petitioner's four exhausted claims. (Doc. 24). The Chief Magistrate Judge explained that, under § 2254, Petitioner must show that the state courts' decisions were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that they were unreasonable determinations of fact. § 2254(d). The Chief Magistrate Judge found that the state habeas court's decision that Petitioner's trial counsel was not ineffective was not contrary to federal law. (Doc. 24 at 11-12). In addition, the Chief Magistrate Judge found that the state habeas court's conclusion that Ms. Perea was not replaced outside Petitioner's presence was not unreasonable given the evidence and testimony presented. Id. at 13-15. Finally, the Chief Magistrate Judge found that the denial of Petitioner's requested jury instructions was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Id. at 15-18. The Chief Magistrate Judge therefore recommended that Petitioner's Petition and Motion for Release be denied. Id. at 19.
Petitioner has timely objected to the PFRD. Petitioner states generally that the state proceedings were fundamentally unfair to him, referring to Justice Maes' participation in his case. (Doc. 25 at 2). Petitioner poses a number of questions for the Court to consider, including: “Did the state habeas court err by disregarding expert witness testimony in favor of defendant?”; “Did the court err by failing to produce April Perea for required testimony?”; and “Did the court err by failing to grant Defendant a new trial based on multiple constitutional violation claims?” Id. at 4. Petitioner argues that § 2254's standard of review does not apply in his case because he claims he is actually innocent of first degree murder, and also argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he diligently developed his claims in state court. Id. at 5, 10.
Petitioner reiterates that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure expert witness testimony and cites several cases in support of this argument. Id. at 6-7, 9-11. In addition, Petitioner raises his prior arguments that the trial court judge should have recused himself and that his right to compulsory process was violated. Id. at 7-8. Petitioner also raises two new arguments in his Objections: first, that the trial court erred by denying a motion for a directed verdict, id., and second that the “equity of the statute” rule was not applied in his case, id. at 11-12. Petitioner did not object to the Chief Magistrate Judge's analysis of any claim other than ineffective assistance of counsel or to the recommendation regarding his Motion for Release. Respondents did not respond to the Objections, and the time for doing so has passed.


Today, I post on Thompsom v. Commissioner, 148 T.C. ___, No. 3 (2017), here, in which the Tax Court held (i) based on a contemporaneous case, that the President's limited removal power for Tax Court Judges does not violate the Constitution and (ii) the penalty in § 6662A, here, penalty on reportable transaction understatements does not violate the Eight Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. I focus this blog entry only on the Excessive Fines Issue because that issue has arisen in prior blogs, particularly with respect to the FBAR willful penalty (see blogs listed and linked at the end of this blog).
Section 6662A(a) imposes a penalty on any reportable transaction understatement. If a taxpayer fails to adequately disclose a reportable transaction giving rise to an understatement under section 6662A, the penalty is imposed at a rate of 30%, and there are no available defenses. Secs. 6662A(c), 6664(d)(2). However, if a taxpayer sufficiently discloses the details of the transaction, the penalty rate is 20% of the amount of the reportable transaction understatement. Sec. 6662A(a). In this latter instance, a taxpayer may be able to avoid the penalty under section 6662A if he or she shows reasonable cause and good faith, as well as that there is or was substantial authority for a position he or she took on a tax return, and the taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment of the transaction in question. Sec. 6664(d)(1) and (2).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” “The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-610 (1993) (emphasis in Austin) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
In a case discussing application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a State tax on possession of illegal drugs, the Supreme Court stated: “Criminal fines, civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain features: They generate government revenues, impose fiscal burdens on individuals, and deter certain behavior. All of these sanctions are subject to constitutional constraints.” Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994). At the same time, the Supreme Court recognized that taxes are typically motivated by revenue raising rather than punitive purposes. Id. at 779-780. “[N]either a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks * * * [a] tax as a form of punishment.” Id. at 780. Nevertheless, “at some point, an exaction labeled as a tax approaches punishment, and our task is to determine * * * [when it] crosses that line.” Id.
To pass the constitutional proportionality inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause, the amount of the forfeiture or fine must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). The Court in Bajakajian noted that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. Id. at 336. The Court then came up with the following test to be used by the trial courts: “If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense, it is unconstitutional.” Id. at 337. Thus, to answer the question whether section 6662A violates the Eighth Amendment, we need to answer two questions: (1) whether section 6662A constitutes punishment for an offense; and (2) whether the punishment is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.
The Court then analyzes the cases to show distinguish between a civil tax penalty, remedial in nature, and a punishment, punitive in nature. Only the latter would potentially implicate the Excessive Fines Clause. The history of § 6662A and a companion section, Section 6707A, here, Penalty for failure to include reportable transaction information with return, show that they are remedial.
And, applying the Bajakajian test of disproportionality which might indicate punishment, the Court finds that the penalty was not disproportional to the remedial goal to which it is directed.
Supreme Court Passes On Exessive Fines Issue with Regard to Restitution in a NonTax Case (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/24/14), here.
Excessive Fines -- Forfeiture and FBAR Penalties (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 7/8/10), here.
FBAR Penalties and Excessive Fines (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 3/5/10), here.


§ 11-11 Traffic control signals.
§ 11-31 Prohibition of left turns.
§ 11-32 Prohibition of right turns.
§ 11-33 Prohibited turns by signs.
§ 11-51 Maximum speed limits.
§ 11-63 Parking prohibited in designated locations.
§ 11-64 Standing prohibited in designated locations.
§ 11-65 Stopping prohibited in designated locations.
§ 11-66 Parking time limited in designated locations.
§ 11-67 Responsibility of owner for violations.
§ 11-81 Authority to impound vehicles.
§ 11-82 Storage and charges; towing registry.
§ 11-83 Notice of removal.
§ 11-93 Immobilization, impounding and/or towing of vehicles.
§ 11-94 Notice and warning to owner.
§ 11-95 Tampering or attempted removal prohibited.
§ 11-96 Vehicle release to owner.
§ 11-101 Truck route system.
§ 11-113 No passing zones.
§ 11-131 Crossing at right angles.
§ 11-134 Crossing with walk lights.
§ 11-141 Designation of bus stops.
§ 11-142 Parking, standing and stopping prohibited.
§ 11-143 Stopping of buses.
§ 11-151 Covering refuse vehicles.
§ 11-152 Horn or other signaling device.
§ 11-153 Discontinuance and abandonment of portions of East Court Street and Central Avenue.
§ 11-154 Discontinuance and abandonment of John Street.
§ 11-155 Parking in front yards.
§ 11-165 Parking, standing and stopping.
§ 11-166 Parking time limited in designated locations.
§ 11-171 Enforcement by Police Department.
§ 11-172 Penalties for offenses: violations of parking, standing and stopping regulations.
§ 11-173 Penalties for offenses: other violations.
§ 11-174 Disposition of fines and forfeitures.
§ 11-175 Traffic Violations Bureau.
§ 11-176 Jurisdiction and procedure.
§ 11-181 Effect of repeal of prior ordinances.
Bicycles — See Ch. 87.
Parades, processions and assemblies — See Ch. 199.
Vehicles in parks — See Ch. 202.
Outside storage of junk vehicles — See Ch. 220, Art. IV.
Transportation of radioactive materials — See Ch. 226.
Use of streets and sidewalks — See Ch. 245.
Taxicabs — See Ch. 258.


1. YOLLIA CAMERON brings this employment discrimination and equal rights action seeking to remedy discrimination she suffered based on gender, pregnancy, and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), as amended, and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq. ("NYCHRL") with respect to the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment.
During the academic year 2009-2010 school year, YOLLIA CAMERON was hired as a substitute teacher at P.S. 25 in Brooklyn, New York. During the fall of 2010, Principal ANITA M. COLEY and Assistant Vice-Principal ESTHER WALKER WILSON, learned of Plaintiff s pregnancy and, in violation of law, perceived her physical condition as a disability that could prevent her from functioning in her position as a substitute teacher and stopped assigning her work. YOLLIA CAMERON also lost an advancement opportunity to apply for a school secretarial position opening, which had been previously offered to her in the spring of2010 by ANITA M. COLEY, after Ms. COLEY learned of Plaintiff s pregnancy.
Plaintiff Yollia Cameron brings this Title VII and New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") action against the New York City Department of Education ("DOE"), Anita M. Coley, and Esther Walker Wilson (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her for being pregnant by not giving her substitute teaching assignments and by not hiring her for a secretary position. Defendants deny Plaintiffs allegations and have now moved for summary judgment.
Although Coley's statements are admissible if offered against Coley or DOE, they are not admissible if offered against Wilson. A statement by one employee is admissible against another employee under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) only if the declarant was "directly responsible" to the employee against whom the statement is being used. Rioux, 97 F.3d at 660 (quoting Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975, (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Wilson was "directly responsible" to Coley (as discussed in greater detail below), there is no evidence that Coley was "directly responsible" to Wilson. Coley therefore was not Wilson's agent, and for this reason, Coley's statement to Cameron is not admissible against Wilson. See id.
To survive summary judgment, in particular, a Title VII plaintiff who does not have direct evidence of discrimination must satisfy the "three-part burden-shifting test" established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002)). First, the plaintiff must establish a "prima facie case of discrimination" by showing that "(l) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he is competent to perform the job or is performing h[er] duties satisfactorily; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on [her] membership in the protected class." Id. (citing Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001). Second, if the plaintiff successfully establishes her prima facie case, "the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision or action." Id. Third, if the defendant does proffer such a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove "that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasonsS but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At this stage, the plaintiff "must adduce enough evidence of discrimination so that a rational fact finder can conclude that the adverse job action was more probably than not caused by discrimination."Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
On this record, there is no direct evidence that the reason Cameron was not offered the secretary position was because she was pregnant. Although there is direct evidence that Defendants refused to call Cameron forsubstitute teaching positionsdue to her pregnancy, this evidence does not directly relate to the secretary position. Because Cameron has provided no direct evidence of discrimination with respect to the secretary position, the McDonnell burden-shifting framework applies. On summary judgment, then, Cameron has the burden of proving that "( 1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; (3) she was rejected for that position; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the plaintiffs qualifications." Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, 627 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Petrosino v Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 226 (2d Cir. 2004)), abrogated on other grounds by Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2013). Cameron has not met this burden. With respect to requirement (2), there is no evidence in the record thnt Cameron ever formally applied for the secretary position and regardless, Cameron admits that she was unqualified because she never obtained a secretarial license. (Defs.' Statement & Pl.'s Resp., ¶ 45.) With respect to requirement (3), there is no evidence that Cameron was formally rejected from the position. And with respect to (4), the record shows that the secretary position was filled in August 2010, shortly after Cameron informed Defendants that she still had not obtained a secretarial license. For these reasons, Cameron cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell with respect to her claim that she did not receive the secretary position because she was pregnant.
The NYCHRL prohibits "an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived . . . gender . . . of any person" from "discriminat[ing] against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-107(1)(a)(3). "Pregnancy discrimination is a form of gender discrimination under the NYCHRL." Chauca v. Abraham, 841 F.3d 86, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016), as amended (Nov. 8, 2016). Before 2005, courts in this district "construed the NYCHRL to be coextensive with its federal and state counterparts." Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 108. But, in 2005, the New York City Council passed the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (the "Restoration Act"), which clarified that NYCHRL claims should be construed more liberally than Title VII claims. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130(a) ("The provisions of this title shall be construed liberally . . . regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to provisions of this title, have been so construed."). In the wake of the Restoration Act, "interpretations of state and federal civil rights statutes can serve only as ajloor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall." Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109 (emphasis in original) (quoting Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Relying on the existence of this work-sharing agreement, the majority of judges in this District who have considered this issue have held that the statute of limitations for NYCHRL claims is tolled when the plaintiff files a related complaint with the EEOC. See Nixon, 2017 WL 4712420, at *4; United States v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 16-CV-4291 (LAK) (JCF), 2017 WL 435940, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017) (Francis, J.),report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-4291 (LAK), 2017 WL 1319695 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2017) (Kaplan, J.); Taylor v. City of New York, 207 F. Supp. 3d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Abrams, J.); Negron v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 15-CV-8296 (DLC), 2016 WL 7238959, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (Cote, J.); Goodwine v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-2868 (JMF), 2016 WL 3017398, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2016) (Furman, J.); Mohamed v. NYU, No. 14-CV-8373 (GBD) (MHD), 2015 WL 3387218, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (Dolinger, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-8373 (GBD) (MHD), 2015 WL 5307391 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (Daniels, J.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Mohamed v. New York Univ, No. 14-CV-8373 (GBD), 2015 WL 7076124 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015); Allen v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 51 F. Supp. 3d 504,511 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Karas, J.); Pagan v. Morrisania Neighborhood Family Health Ctr., No. 12-CV-9047 WHP, 2014 WL 464787, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (Pauley, J.); E.E.O.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 967 F. Supp. 2d 816, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Preska, J.); Sesay-Harrell v. NYC Dep't of Homeless Servs., No. 12-CV-925 (KPF), 2013 WL 6244158, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013) (Failla, J.); Hanley v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-4418 (ER), 2013 WL 3192174, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (Ramos, J.); Regan v. Benchmark Co. LLC,No. 11-CV-4511 CM, 2012 WL 692056, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (McMahon, J.); Wilson v. New York City Police Dep't, No. 09-CV-2632 (PAC) (HBP), 2011 WL 1215735, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011) (Crotty, J.); Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club, 768 F. Supp. 2d 516, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Maas, J.); Esposito v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 07-CV-6722 (RJS), 2008 WL 5233590, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008) (Sullivan, J.).
Ayazi and Cincotta are inapposite because the claims there were against a school district or its officers. See Ayazi, 2012 WL 4503257, at *8; Cincotta, 2016 WL 4536873, at *18. Cincotta, in particular, held that claims brought against school districts or officers under New York State Human Rights Law are not tolled by filing a complaint with the EEOC or the NYSDHR. 2016 WL 4536873, at *18. The Cincottacourt relied on decisions reasoning that the one-year statute of limitations imposed by section 3813 of the New York Education Law ("NYEL") on claims against school districts and their officers is not tolled by EEOC filings. Id at *17-18 (quoting, e.g., Smith v. Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 03-CV-7951 (PGG), 2009 WL 3170302, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)). Here, by contrast, NYEL § 3813 is inapplicable because Defendants Coley and Wilson are not "officer[s] of a school district." See NYEL § 2(13) (not identifying "principals" or "assistant principals" as officers); Collins v. City of New York, 156 F. Supp. 3d 448,460 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Caproni, J.) ("Superintendents qualify as officers . . . but principals do not."); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that an assistant principal is not an "officer" under NYEL § 3813). In sum, the cases Defendants cite do not overcome the clear trend in this district that the statute of limitations on NYCHRL actions is tolled during the pendency of a complaint filed with the EEOC.
In addition to bringing claims for "gender discrimination" under NYCHRL, Cameron alleges that the pregnancy discrimination she faced was "disability discrimination" because Coley and Wilson perceived her as disabled. (See Pl.'s Opp'n, at 24-25.) There is no evidence, however, that Coley and Wilson understood Cameron to be suffering from a pregnancy-related complication or non-pregnancy-related disability. The evidence instead suggests that Coley or Wilson discriminated against Cameron merely for being pregnant. (See Ex. 1, at 54:11-22.) As discussed above, there is no question that discrimination on the basis of normal pregnancy is prohibited by Administrative Code section 107(1)(a)'s prohibition against "gender" discrimination. The question, then, is whether discrimination on the basis of normal pregnancy is also prohibited by Administrative Code section 107(1)(a)'s prohibition on "disability" discrimination. For several reasons, this Court agrees with the New York Supreme Court's decision in Krause, which held that discrimination on the basis of a normal pregnancy is not "disability" discrimination under NYCHRL. See 965 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
Second, because the Administrative Code's prohibition of "gender" discrimination undeniably prohibits discrimination on the basis of normal pregnancy, it would be duplicative for discrimination on the basis of "disability" to also cover discrimination on the basis of normal pregnancy. Thus, for the same reasons that courts have held that normal pregnancy is not a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, this Court holds that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not "disability" discrimination under Administrative Code section 8-107(1)(a). See, e.g., Johnson v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Title VII and the PDA specifically covered employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, thereby obviating the need to extend the coverage of the ADA to protect pregnancy and related medical conditions.");Lehmuller, 944 F. Supp. at 1093 ("Courts have generally held that pregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the ADA.").
Third, the structure of the Administrative Code suggests that the term "disability" does not include normal pregnancy. In particular, whereas section 8-107(15) of the Administrative Code requires employers to make reasonable accommodatiorn for disabled individuals, section 8-107(22) of the Code requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for pregnant individuals. The fact that separate and distinct sections require employers to make reasonable accommodations for "disability" (on the one hand) and "pregnancy" (on the other hand) suggests that pregnancy is not a "disability." Indeed, when the New York City Council added section 8-107(22) to the Administrative Code, section 8-107(15) was already in effect. The Council nevertheless added section 8-107(22) because it was concerned about reports of discrimination against pregnant women, including those with normal pregnancies. See Administrative Code § 8-102, Note 3 (Provisions of L.L. 78/2013). The Council therefore appears to have understood that section 8-107(15) did not require reasonable accommodations for pregnant women, and thus understood that normal pregnancy is not a "disability."
 Many judges in the Eastern District of New York, as well, have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g, Berlyavsky v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 14-CV-03217 (KAM) (RER), 2015 WL 5772266, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 14-CV-3217 (KAM) (RER), 2015 WL 5772255 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015), reconsideration dented, No. 14-CV-3217 (KAM) (RER), 2016 WL 1383486 (E.D.N Y. Apr. 7, 2016), aff'd, 671 F. App'x 836 (2d Cir. 2016); Bowen-Hooks v. City of New York, 13 F. Supp. 3d 179, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Shah v. MTA New York City Transit, No. 12-CV-4276 (ERK) (RLM), 2013 WL 504387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat Labs, 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).


On September 16, 2012, the USPTO began accepting petitions seeking to initiate inter partes review proceedings (“IPR petitions”) and petitions for post grant review against certain patents directed to covered business methods (“CBM petitions”). As of February 28, 2013, 167 petitions for IPR or CBM proceedings have been identified in the PTAB’s listing of proceedings. During February 2013, 30 petitions for IPR were filed. For the third straight month, there were no reported petitions for CBM filed.
So far, petitions in 23 proceedings have been evaluated for institution. In total, 21 trials have been instituted, while two have been denied. In February, the following 12 trials were instituted: CBM2012-00003, -00010, and -00011, CBM 2013- 00002, IPR2012-00005, -00018, -00019, -00020, -00023, -00033, and -00042, and IPR 2013-00010. In 11 of these 12, trials were instituted on less than all the grounds for unpatentability asserted by the petitioner. In both Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., IPR2012-00041, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2013-00001 (discussed below) the petition was denied. See the spreadsheet for dates of institution or denial (click HERE).
On February 22, 2013, a three judge panel (Medley, Blankenship and Bisk) refused to institute inter partes review as to any of the challenged claims because the panel was not convinced “that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims [i.e., 1-14 and 7-20] is unpatentable based on the asserted grounds.” (Op. at 18).
· Same References As In Ex Parte Examination Not Necessarily an Impediment. The panel did not reject the petition because “all the references asserted in the petition are the same or substantially the same as prior art considered during prosecution.” (Op. at 8-9). In this case, the record appeared to indicate that the art at issue was cited regarding a claim limitation that was not in the claims under reexamination now.
Thus, we are not persuaded that the petition’s arguments regarding Sample ’191 and the challenged claims were previously considered by the Office. We decline to reject the petition solely on the ground that Sample ’191 was considered by the Examiner during prosecution.
· Obviousness. Regarding the requester’s obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (which may have been an effort to avoid the trap of asserting a § 102 rejection only to have the panel conclude that some minor feature was missing), the panel observed (Op. at 13-14) that Petitioner did not “clearly explain the reasoning behind” the “unsupported assertions” that “[a]t a minimum, each challenged claim element would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of the ’191 patent” (Pet. 11). The Board found the Petitioner’s conclusory statements lacking sufficient detail at least because the petition: (i) did not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), by specifying where each element of a challenged claim is found in the prior art; (ii) did not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 104(b)(5) by providing the relevance of the evidence supporting the challenge, including identifying the portions of the evidence that support the challenge; (iii) does not clearly point out the differences between the claimed invention and Sample ’191; and (iv) does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found the claimed subject matter obvious in spite of those differences.
· Other Action Involving the Same Parties. On the same date, in IPR2012-00042, a petition involving the same parties but a different patent was granted and trial was instituted by the same panel.
· Case Management. Although Judge Medley was originally assigned to manage the proceeding, Judge Bisk authored the decision. As the chart below shows, Judge Medley has the second largest docket based on original assignment of cases; as predicted, assignment of decision writing responsibility (as distinct from proceeding management) can serve as a way to spread out the work to keep up with filings, while maintaining procedural consistency.
PTAB Denies Petition in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2013-00001: On February 27, 2013, a three judge panel (Lee, Chang and Zecher) held that no trial would be instituted based on proposed rejections involving a patent to Peterson (“the information in the petition does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that claims 1-59 are unpatentable”) (Op. at 2). On the same date, in CBM2013-00002, a petition involving the same parties and the same patent, but different prior art, was granted and trial was instituted.
· Meaning of “Technological Invention” Explored. The panel engaged in a lengthy discussion en route to determining that method claim 53 is not a “technological invention” under 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b), avoiding the statutory exception and thus making the patent eligible for a covered business method patent review (Op. at 3-12).
o The panel noted that the legislative history explains the definition of a covered business method patent was drafted to encompass patents “claiming activities that are financial or complementary to financial activity.” 157 Cong. Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (Sen. Schumer). Further, the legislative history appears to exclude only “those patents whose novelty turns on a technological innovation over the prior art and are concerned with a technical problem which is solved with a technical solution and which requires the claims to state the technical features which the inventor desires to protect.” 157 CONG. REC. S1364 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (Sen. Schumer).
o The panel stated that a patent needs only one claim directed to a covered business method to be eligible for review.
2. solves a technical problem using a technical solution.
Progressive argued that the claimed software modules provide a technical solution to the technical problem (for example, allowing direct verification of insurance policy parameters by a user in real-time without needing an insurance agent). However, the panel rejected this assertion because the technology useable for implementing the claimed features was generally available and required no technical innovation.
. . . whether filing a Declaratory Judgment of noninfringement in District Court bars Ariosa from later filing a petition for Inter Partes Review under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a), and whether the express mention of a counterclaim of invalidity in 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3) mandates interpreting the statute such that raising an affirmative defense of invalidity in response to a compulsory counterclaim of infringement deprives Ariosa of standing to file for inter partes review.
PTAB Trial Section Judges: Docket assignments continue to show a heavy load of cases being assigned to several experienced inter partes APJs, as reflected in the following information drawn from the spreadsheet.
The GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN keePing TABs NEWSLETTER is issued by GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C., an intellectual property firm, to provide timely news in the field of intellectual property. The NEWSLETTER provides monthly updates on recent issues of general interest in this field. The views and/or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.LC. Information regarding the contents of the Newsletter can be obtained by contacting Bruce Stoner at GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C., 1950 Roland Clarke Place, Reston, VA 20191. © 2013 GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C.


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Messrs. John G. Milburn and Francis Raymond Stark, both of New York City, and William L. Clay, of Rochester, N. Y., for plaintiff in error.
This is a suit by the State of Georgia and the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway for a decree enjoining the Western Union Telegraph Company from occupying or using any part of the right of way of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, a road built and owned by the State and let by it to the Railway Company that joins with it as a plaintiff in this suit. The Telegraph Company claims a perpetual right of way over the State owned road by virtue of three alleged contracts. The trial Court decided that the Telegraph Company had no right in the premises, ordered it to remove its wires, poles and structures from the plaintiff's right of way within twelve months from the final determination of the cause, and enjoined it from occupying or using the right of way after that time. This decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia by an equally divided Court. 156 Ga. 409, 119 S. E. 649. The case is brought here by writ of error on the ground that the statutes warranting these proceedings impaired the obligation of the alleged contracts. There is also a petition for a writ of certiorari filed out of caution, but the only federal question is that raised by the writ of error and therefore the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
The first, and in this case the only question to be decided is whether the statutes relied upon have been given an effect impairing the obligation of any contract that the Telegraph Company may have. The statutes are an Act of November 30, 1915 (Acts 1915 (Ex. Sess.) p. 119), and one of August 4, 1916 (Acts 1916, p. 146), amending the former. The Act of 1915 provided for the letting of the Western & Atlantic Railroad and created a Commission to determine among other things the extent and character of every use of the right of way by anyone other than the lessee, and the authority for the same. The Commission was to prepare bills for the General Assembly [269 U.S. 67, 69] carrying into effect any recommendation that it might make with respect to what steps should be taken to assert the title of the State to any part of the right of way or the road that might be adversely used. By the amendment the Commission was given power to deal with encroachments on the way and to determine whether they should be moved and discontinued and to take such action as it deemed proper to cause the removal, and to that end 'the Commission is authorized and empowered to institute and prosecute, in the name and behalf of the State of Georgia, such suits and other legal proceedings as it may deem appropriate in protection of the State's interest, or the assertion of the State's title.' Acts Ga. 1916, p. 146. Under this statute the Commission, reciting that it was advised by its counsel that the occupation of the way by the Telegraph Company was without lawful authority, resolved that the counsel be instructed to institute suit for the removal of the encroachment in the name of the State provided that the lessees should join in the suit and pay the costs. Thereupon this proceeding was begun.
This is all, and it is not enough to give the Telegraph Company a standing here. The statutes do not prejudge the Telegraph Company's case, or any case. They do not purport to subject the Company to any prohibition or command, or to determine or qualify the Company's rights; they do not attempt to delegate power to do so to the Commission. They do not even point out the Telegraph Company. So far as material to this case they simply authorize the Commission to inquire, and in case it finds any encroachment that it believes unlawful, to sue. In Columbia Ry. Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 , 43 S. Ct. 306, the State law undertook to treat what this Court held to be only a covenant as a condition subsequent and as having entailed a forfeiture. The suit was brought upon this statute and a judgment rendered for the State in its courts was held to have given effect to the [269 U.S. 67, 70] statutory attempts to enlarge the obligations of the Railway Company under a grant from the State. The difference between that case and this is plain. A mere authority to test disputed rights by a suit does not impair the obligation of a contract upon which a defendant relies. When a claim is set up under a contract the Constitution does not forbid litigation to decide whether one was made or what it means. St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149 , 21 S. Ct. 575; Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. Columbus, 203 U.S. 311, 321 , 27 S. Ct. 83; Des Moines v. Des Moines City R. Co., 214 U.S. 179 , 29 S. Ct. 553; South Covington & Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Newport, 259 U.S. 97, 99 , 100 S., 42 S. Ct. 418.
The statutes in question are still more remote from those which while valid on their face are construed by the State Courts to apply to a matter not subject to State control. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Boundurant, 257 U.S. 282 , 42 S. Ct. 106. Here there was no attempt to control otherwise than by the result of a suit in which the Telegraph Company could set up all its alleged contracts and protect all its constitutional rights. The plaintiff in error shows no law impairing the obligation of contracts and therefore no ground for coming here. See Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U.S. 632, 639 , 32 S. Ct. 577; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 , 44 S. Ct. 197.

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In Cholly v. The Uptain Group Inc., et al, the defendant debt collector moved to dismiss the plaintiff consumer's putative class action complaint and strike the consumer's proposed class. Although the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division) declined to dismiss consumer's complaint pursuant to the Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins decision, the court dismissed the consumer's class allegations, constituting a significant victory for the debt collector.
In her complaint, the consumer alleged that the debt collector called her using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS"). During the phone call, the consumer told the debt collector to stop calling her and that she was filing for bankruptcy. The consumer further alleged that, thereafter, the debt collector continued to contact her using an ATDS, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").
Relying on Spokeo, the debt collector alleged that the consumer failed to demonstrate that she suffered a concrete harm and therefore lacked standing to bring the action pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The court denied the debt collector's motion to dismiss, holding that the alleged violations of the TCPA gave rise to a concrete injury as required by Article III. The Court reasoned that all unsolicited calls prohibited by § 227 of the TCPA "invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients," thereby causing a concrete harm even if there are no allegations of tangible harm.
The court, however, granted the debt collector's motion to strike the proposed class. In her complaint, the consumer defined the proposed class, in part, as persons contacted by the debt collector who had not given express consent to be contacted. The court held that the consumer could not be a class representative because her claims were not typical of the purported class. The court explained that plaintiff consumer had given the debt collector express permission to contact her, in contrast to the proposed class of people who never gave express consent. Similarly, with respect to a proposed subclass of persons who directly informed the debt collector to stop calling them, the court held that the plaintiff consumer could not maintain the subclass. Individual inquiries within the subclass would predominate over questions of law and fact affecting all members of the class. This decision further clarifies the application of Spokeo and limits exposure of debt collectors with respect to TCPA claims in class actions by narrowly reading a plaintiff's proposed class.
According to a federal judge in the Eastern District of New York, a debtor sufficiently demonstrated a "concrete" injury to meet the Constitution's standing requirements, even though she did not allege a specific harm. In Bautz v. ARS National Services, Inc., a borrower alleged that a debt collector's letter offering a lower amount to settle a debt violated the FDCPA. The borrower alleged that the letter included misleading language indicating that any debt forgiveness would be reported to the IRS. The debt collector sought to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing because the debtor did not allege any actual harm.
By way of background, the Supreme Court in Spokeo held that when a statutory violation is "substantive," merely alleging the violation demonstrates a "concrete injury" that meets the "injuryin-act" requirement of Article III of the Constitution. According to the court in Bautz, simply alleging the Section 1692e violation conferred standing. The court explained that the letter presented a "risk of real harm" to debtors' rights to be free from abusive debt collection practices—the interest identified by Congress in enacting the FDCPA. In analyzing Section 1692e, the court found that Congress created an enforceable right to receive truthful information. The debt collector's statement regarding IRS reporting may have impacted how the debtor would approach the offer to settle the debt—even if the debtor did not allege this or any actual harm.
Although the court's decision is limited to one provision of the FDCPA, it noted that most post-Spokeo decisions have found that false, deceptive, or misleading representations establish a concrete substantive injury, precluding debtors' need to allege actual harm. This decision creates uncertainty about how courts will determine whether plaintiffs have met the standing requirement, as a case-by-case determination will often be needed. However, it also suggests that alleged FDCPA violations regarding representations will be considered substantive and can be sufficiently pled by debtors without alleging actual harm.
For more information, please contact Jordan S. O'Donnell or your regular Hinshaw Attorney.
[T]he Defendant Calumet City, Illinois, agrees to allow Plaintiff Marquise Wright to take a judgment against it, comprised of $5,000.00 to Plaintiff for all claims brought under this lawsuit, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs to date accrued in pursuing this action on Plaintiff's behalf, but excluding all attorneys' fees and costs accrued in pursuing this lawsuit as a class action.
Wright accepted the City's offer of judgment without qualification. Following his acceptance, Wright appealed the denial of one of the two classes.
In its analysis of whether Wright had standing, the court looked to Supreme Court case Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S.Ct. at 663 (2016) and Seventh Circuit case Espenscheid v. Directsat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2012) for guidance. Both Campbell and Espenscheid address the issue of standing after Defendant makes an offer of judgment. Campbell held that "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot plaintiff's case." Espenscheid, on the other hand, demonstrates how a plaintiff is able to maintain a stake in a case or controversy after accepting an offer of judgment. There, plaintiff included a provision in the agreement that plaintiff sought an incentive award for plaintiff's services as class representative, contingent on certification of the class. According to the court, Wright was no longer "an aggrieved person with a personal stake in the case or controversy." The court looked to the plain language of the offer, which read "$5,000.00 to Plaintiff for all claims brought under this lawsuit." The court determined that settlement involved the individual claim and the class claim. By accepting the offer of judgment without qualification, Wright accepted the offer as full redress.
For more information, please contact Brittney N. Cato or your regular Hinshaw Attorney.


058 Pa. Code § 131.10. Pennsylvania Hunting Heritage registration plate fee.
§ 131.10. Pennsylvania Hunting Heritage registration plate fee.
Applicants seeking authorization to request a Pennsylvania Hunting Heritage registration plate issued under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1355.1 (relating to Pennsylvania Hunting Heritage registration plates) will be assessed a fee of $25 in addition to fees collected by the Department of Transportation under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1931(b) (relating to personal and organization registration plates).
The provisions of this § 131.10 issued under the Game and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa.C.S § 2102(a).
The provisions of this § 131.10 adopted January 30, 2015, effective January 31, 2015, 45 Pa.B. 560.


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what your rights are associated with our processing of your data.
More information can be found in the Site notice section of this website.
For additional support, we have retained a privacy officer. They can be reached at: schramm@comtection.de.
The service of providing this website requires the processing of various types of information. Furthermore, the scope of data processing depends on your use of the functionalities of the website, e.g. whether you register in the job portal, communicate with us via the contact form or consent to the processing of data.
You are not required to provide us with personal data. However, if the provision of data is technically required when you access our site, refusal will result in your being unable to access and use our website.
As a visitor to our websites, you are not subject to any automated decision-making within the meaning of Art. 22 GDPR.
The legal basis for the processing of personal data is explained in the following section.
Contract fulfillment or precontractual activities Art. 6 para. 1 b) Processing will only take place to the extent necessary to carry out and exercise the rights and obligations arising from the contract. Unless expressly stated otherwise, data will only be processed by us to this extent.
Consent Art. 6 para. 1 a) The data will be processed if you have expressly consented to the type and scope of data processing in question. You may withdraw your consent at any time going forward. However, this will not affect what has already been processed up until that point in time.
Legal obligation Art. 6 para. 1 c) Processing will occur to the extent it is necessary to fulfill German or European statutory requirements.
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In order to set up a fully functionable website for you, it is necessary to process certain types of information. This happens each time you visit our website. In addition, we offer various functionalities on our website which require additional data processing.
The data cannot be merged with any other data sources. The storage of log files including your IP address serves the legitimate interest of providing our website and preventing its misuse. Stored log files will be deleted after 30 days at the latest, unless longer storage is necessary, for example to ward off or investigate an attack on our website.
Session Cookie Session ID Session Receipt of session, technical implementation of website.
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As a rule, the legal basis for the processing of your data is the necessity to fulfill our contractual obligations. If you submit an application independently, the legal basis consists of your consent to share your data.
You may send us an inquiry at any time using the various contact forms on our website. To facilitate your inquiry, we request that you submit the following information: Email address, subject and content of your request (if you contact our sales team, also include: industry). The information is marked as mandatory fields. The provision of any other data you transmit to us as part of the inquiry, also via free text field or in documents uploaded and attached to your inquiry, is voluntary.
We use this data exclusively to respond to your inquiry and to facilitate associated communications. The legal basis of this type of data processing depends on the content of your request. As a rule, our legitimate interest in providing contact functionality and responding to your inquiry by using the transmitted data applies here. If your request is aimed at entering into a contract with us, any processing is based on the extent of this precontractual obligation.
Your data will be deleted as soon as your request has been processed. In the event of a contract being entered into, we may conduct additional processing to fulfill our contractual obligation.
An essential component of our services offered on the job portal is to draw your attention to appealing job opportunities. If you register, we will also use your email address to inform you about suitable job opportunities and services offered by JobLeads via email notifications and newsletters. You can unsubscribe from these notifications at any time by clicking on the unsubscribe link at the bottom of each newsletter and in the notification settings in the "My Account" section of your account. You will not incur any additional costs. The legal basis for the processing of your data is tied to the necessity of providing the services of the job portal and our ability to tell you about our own range of services and our legitimate interest in maintaining and expanding the existing user relationship.
On our website, we use the map service Google Maps (API) from Google LLC, 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA ("Google") to show our location.
When you enter the page on which the Google map is integrated, our website sends various pieces of information including your IP address to Google USA where they will be stored on its servers. If you have a Google Account and are logged in at the time you visit our site, the information will be associated directly with your account. But even without a user account, Google will create a user profile about you. This happens regardless of whether Google provides a user account that you are logged in to or no such user account exists.
Our transfer of data to Google supports our legitimate interest in offering you the map function of Google Maps on our website.
We would like to further improve the usability of this website and the appeal of our services. For this reason, we also collect data on usage behavior that we evaluate for this purpose when you visit our website. For this reason, the following tracking and analysis cookies are used on our website in addition to the technically required cookies described below.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service by Google. Using a cookie, Google collects information about your use of this website (including your IP address) in the USA and stores this information. We use Google Analytics exclusively using an anonymization feature. This means that, before transmitting it, Google will shorten the IP address of users within member states of the European Union or in other countries that are party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in rare cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the USA and shortened there. Analyzing the information collected, Google sends us reports on usage activities on our website while providing us with additional services for this purpose. The IP address transmitted by your browser via Google Analytics will not be merged with other Google data.
As an alternative to the browser plugin or within browsers on mobile devices, please click on the following link to set an opt-out cookie that will prevent future collection by Google Analytics within this website (this opt-out cookie only works in this browser and only for this domain; if you delete your cookies in this browser, you must click this link again): Disable Google Analytics.
Our website uses the advertising tool "Google AdWords" from Google including its conversion tracking. We use this tool to determine the success rate of advertising for our services on websites other than our own. For this purpose, a conversion cookie is set when you click on one of our advertisements. This cookie enables us to recognize that you have accessed our website via this ad. We use such usage statistics to compile statistics for evaluating the conversion of our advertisements. We do not receive any information about you personally. The conversion cookie set in your browser is unique and cannot be used by other Google AdWords customers for their statistics.
You can prevent tracking by disabling the conversion tracking cookie in your browser settings.
JobLeads also uses Google's Doubleclick service. As part of this service, a cookie is set and a pseudonymous identification number (ID) is assigned to your browser. The cookie determines whether and which advertisements were displayed and clicked in your browser. This enables us to tailor your advertising even closer to your interests. Since we have activated Google's IP anonymization on this website, your IP address is also shortened within the scope of Doubleclick before being transmitted by Google within member states of the European Union or in other signatory states to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and only in exceptional cases is the full IP address transmitted to Google in the USA and only shortened there. Analyzing the information it collects, Google sends us reports on usage activities on our website while providing us with additional services for this purpose. The IP address transmitted by your browser via Google Analytics will not be merged with other Google data.
In addition to the above-mentioned general options for preventing cookies, you can also prevent Google from saving the Doubleclick cookie by downloading a browser plugin. This can be found here.
We use Facebook pixels on our websites. This pertains to the function of a web analysis service provided by Facebook. Facebook pixels are invisible graphic files built into our website. When you visit our website, information from the pixel is stored in your browser. This enables us to track which of our subpages you have visited. We share this information with Facebook to better match our ads there to your real interests and to analyze the effectiveness of our ads on Facebook. Depending on your use of our website, Facebook assigns you to certain groups of interested parties known as custom audiences. The information generated by the cookie is usually transferred to a Google server in the USA and stored there. For more information on how Facebook’s tracking pixel captures data, click here https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ or here https://business.facebook.com/pixels/tos/.
The legal basis of our data processing activities for analytical purposes is our legitimate interest in obtaining a statistical analysis of your user activities in order to improve services and marketing of our website on an ongoing basis.
During your visit to our website, data processing for usage analysis only occurs until the time you withdraw your consent.
If any data processing is linked to your consent or legitimate interest, you have the right to object to the processing or to revoke your consent at any time. Your objection or revocation has forward-looking effect only. If the analytics cookies used carry their own technical options for deactivation, this is shown in the explanation above. You may at any time exercise your right of objection or revocation by contacting service@jobleads.com. If you object to processing on the basis of our legitimate interest, we may nevertheless continue processing if we can prove compelling reasons for protecting processing which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms.
If personal data is processed, you are a data subject within the meaning of Art. 4 para. 1 GDPR. As the data subject, you have the following rights with regard to your personal data. To exercise these rights, please contact us using the contact details above.
You have a right of access to information about your personal data processed by us. This includes the mandatory information set out in Art. 15 GDPR.
You have the right to correct incorrect personal data without delay and to amend incorrect personal data.
You have the right to request the deletion of your personal data if one of the reasons mentioned in Art. 17 GDPR takes precedence, in particular if there is no longer a legal basis for the processing.
Instead of having your data deleted, you also have the right to demand that the processing of your personal data be restricted, if one of the reasons mentioned in Art. 18 GDPR prevails, especially if any restrictive action is triggered by your request.
You have the right to access all personal data stored by us about you in a structured, current and machine-readable format and to share this data with another person authorized to handle it without obstruction by the person responsible to whom the personal data was originally provided.
According to Art. 77 GDPR, you have the right to file a complaint with the appropriate authority in your jurisdiction.
Processing of your personal data within the context of providing this website and the job portal is in part carried out by contracted processors. In particular, this applies to payment processing, hosting of the website, maintenance and servicing of the IT systems, sending emails, answering user inquiries and the use of analytical tools. Such activities are included exclusively on the basis of a supplemental agreement to an order agreement in accordance with Art. 28 para. 3 GDPR.
The personal data we collect from you through the website will not generally be transferred to third countries outside the European Economic Area.
In exceptional cases described above, your full IP address may be transmitted to Google and only shortened there when using Google Analytics. When using Google Maps, your IP address will also be transmitted.
The use of Facebook Custom Audience and the LinkedIn Insight tag also result in the transmission of data to Facebook in the USA.
Google, Facebook and LinkedIn are domiciled in the USA and thus in a so-called "third country" according to Art. 44 GDPR. All companies are certified under the "EU-US Privacy Shield" data protection agreement, which guarantees compliance with a European data protection level.

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