CARDIGAN MOUNTAIN SCHOOL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee.
Before HOWARD, SELYA, and BARRON, Circuit Judges. Scott H. Harris, with whom Nicholas C. Casolaro, Andrew R. Hamilton, and McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A. were on brief, for appellant. Mark D. Sheridan, with whom Jason F. King, Sean P. Neafsey, and Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP were on brief, for appellee.
This appeal arises out of an action for a declaratory judgment. The plaintiff, now the appellant, is a private middle school in Canaan, New Hampshire. The school seeks to prove that, nearly fifty years ago, the insurance company that is the defendant, and now the appellee, issued the school an insurance policy that covers a claim that the school recently received concerning events allegedly occurring during the 1967–1968 academic year.
The twist is that while the school can document that it had a policy with the insurance company at some point, it cannot find a copy of the policy for the year in question. And the insurance company has told the school that it cannot confirm the existence of the policy. Thus, the company contends that it is not obliged to cover the claim and, more significantly for present purposes, that the school's complaint should be dismissed because it fails to make a plausible case that such a policy ever existed.
The District Court sided with the insurance company and dismissed the suit. But although the question is close, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In 2013, the Cardigan Mountain School received a demand letter asserting a claim (about which we have been given no details) based on events that allegedly occurred during the 1967–1968 school year. In response, the school asked the New Hampshire Insurance Company to defend against the claim as the carrier of the school's comprehensive general liability insurance policy at that time.
The New Hampshire Insurance Company rejected the request. The company explained that it had not been able to locate any policy covering the school for the relevant time period, and thus that it was not the school's carrier at that time and therefore had no duty to defend against this claim now.
Not having found a copy of the policy in its own records, the school filed this suit in New Hampshire state court under the New Hampshire declaratory judgment statute. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 491:22. The school sought a judgment “adjudicating and decreeing the existence of, and Cardigan's rights under, any policy issued by” New Hampshire Insurance Company.
New Hampshire Insurance Company—which, notwithstanding its name, is a Pennsylvania corporation with its headquarters in New York—removed the suit to federal court on diversity-of-citizenship grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). New Hampshire Insurance Company then moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To meet that standard, a plaintiff “need not demonstrate that [it] is likely to prevail” on its claim. García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013). Rather, the complaint need include only enough factual detail to make the asserted claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). We review the District Court's dismissal of complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. García–Catalán, 734 F.3d at 102.
To evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8, we first must “distinguish ‘the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’ “ Id. at 103 (quoting Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir.2012)). We then must “determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable․’ “ Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011)).
To perform this two-step analysis, though, we need to be clear about the legal issue that is in dispute. Here, the school seeks to prove that the company must cover the claim made in the 2013 demand letter that the school received. But on appeal, the issue is narrower. The sole legal question in dispute concerns the existence of the policy, not whether that policy, if it exists, covers the claim. And that is because, as in the District Court, the New Hampshire Insurance Company seeks the complaint's dismissal solely on the ground that the complaint does not make a plausible case that the policy was ever in place. See Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 985 F.2d 1113, 1116–17 n. 3 (1st Cir.1993) (“[T]heories not raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.” (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991))).
We thus look at the complaint to determine what facts it sets forth concerning the existence of the policy. We then address whether, accepting the truth of those facts, the complaint makes out a plausible case that the policy does in fact exist.
The allegations in the school's complaint do not include a direct allegation that the insurance policy existed. In fact, the complaint alleges that New Hampshire Insurance Company's representative “has noted that she has searched for the policy and been unable to find it, but has assured the [school] that her search continues.” In place of a direct allegation, the complaint relies on circumstantial evidence. That evidence is as follows.
The complaint alleges that an accounting firm prepared an audit report for the school dated September 1971. That report is attached as an exhibit to the complaint. The report states that from September 1970 to September 1971 the school had a “Special Multi–Peril” insurance policy from the New Hampshire Insurance Company. And, according to the report, that policy included $1,000,000 in “General Liability” coverage.
The complaint further states that Phillip Wheeler, “one of the two principals in the [accounting] firm that prepared” that audit report, “believes that had the school changed carriers” between the 1969–1970 school year and the 1970–1971 school year, “then the auditors would have noted the change.” No such change is noted in the audit report.
The complaint offers one additional, bolstering allegation. It alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that the insurance brokerage the school used “had a close association with” New Hampshire Insurance Company and “advised most of its commercial clients like Cardigan to place their commercial lines of insurance with” New Hampshire Insurance Company.
New Hampshire Insurance Company argues, and the District Court held, that, except for the allegation concerning the audit report, the complaint sets forth “nothing more than speculation and conjecture.” New Hampshire Insurance Company thus argues that we are not “obligated to accept” those other allegations as true. New Hampshire Insurance Company relies for that argument on the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
In each decision, the Supreme Court held that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Iqbal illustrates the sort of “conclusory statements” that are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Iqbal involved a suit by an individual—Iqbal—who was arrested and detained following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Id. at 666. After Iqbal was released, he brought suit against a variety of federal officials, asserting alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Id. The defendants included John Ashcroft, who had been the United States Attorney General at the time, and Robert Mueller, then the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.
The Supreme Court explained that the complaint's “bald allegations” that Ashcroft and Mueller were personally involved in unconstitutional conduct were “conclusory” and thus should have been disregarded by the district court. Id. at 681. In particular, the Supreme Court held that statements that Ashcroft and Mueller “ ‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [the plaintiff]’ to harsh conditions of confinement” based on his “ ‘religion, race, and/or national origin’ “ were not factual allegations that must be taken as true. Id. at 680. And the Court ruled the same with respect to Iqbal's allegations that “Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ “ of the policy and that “Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing it.” Id. at 680–81.
These sorts of allegations, the Court explained, were “nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim.” Id. at 681 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In contrast, Iqbal did credit as factual those allegations in the complaint that made reference to specific events. See id. (crediting allegations including “that ‘the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men” ’).
The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly is similar. Twombly was an antitrust suit. See 550 U.S. at 548. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had conspired “in restraint of trade” in the local telephone market. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1). The plaintiffs lacked any direct evidence of the existence of the conspiratorial agreement on which their claim depended. See id. at 564. Rather, the plaintiffs based their claim largely “on descriptions of parallel conduct” by the defendants—similar actions taken by putatively independent firms that, according to the plaintiffs, showed that those firms were really acting in concert. Id. at 553–54, 564.
The Supreme Court credited those factual allegations of parallel conduct, although it ultimately found them inadequate to state a claim under § 1. See id. at 564–66. But mixed in among the plaintiffs' allegations about parallel conduct were “a few stray statements speak[ing] directly of agreement.” Id at 564 & n. 9. Those “stray statements,” the Supreme Court held, were “on fair reading ․ merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations.” Id. at 564. In particular, the allegation that the defendants “have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy ․ and have agreed not to compete with one another” was, the Supreme Court held, no more than a legal conclusion based on the allegations of parallel conduct. Id. at 564–65. And thus, the Supreme Court held that this direct allegation of agreement did not need to be taken as true. See id.
New Hampshire Insurance Company contends that, under Iqbal and Twombly, we are obliged to disregard the school's allegations outlined above (save for the one concerning the audit report). But New Hampshire Insurance Company's argument is mistaken.
The allegations in the school's complaint described above are specific and factual. The complaint refers to individuals with relevant knowledge who are recalling facts plausibly known to them. Those allegations are thus like the allegations of actual events in Iqbal and of parallel conduct in Twombly that the Supreme Court took as true; they are specific and appear to be based on the knowledge of particular individuals. They are not bare recitations of the legal conclusion the suit seeks to prove. We thus conclude that the school's allegations set forth above are entitled to the presumption of truth at the motion to dismiss stage.
At the same time, precisely because these factual allegations involve a series of particular recollections and beliefs about the school's insurance practices and the role of the auditor, the complaint provides at most circumstantial evidence that the school had an insurance policy with this carrier at the time in question. And so we must proceed to the second step of the analysis, and consider whether “the factual allegations are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that’ “ the insurance policy at issue was in place. García–Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103 (quoting Haley, 657 F.3d at 46).
In undertaking our inquiry, we must “accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.” Id. at 102 (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2012)). In doing so, we recognize that “circumstantial evidence often suffices” to render an asserted claim plausible in the pleading context. Id. at 103 (quoting Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir.2013)). But at bottom, this inquiry requires that we “draw on [our] experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, as the parties have cited no precedent to guide us on the application of the Rule 8 standard to a lost-insurance-policy suit, and we have found very little on our own.3 Instead, nearly every lost-policy case we know of concerns what showing must be made to survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Bianchi v. Florists Mut. Ins. Co., 660 F.Supp.2d 434 (E.D.N.Y.2009); S. Union Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 581 F.Supp.2d 120 (D.Mass.2008); UTI Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 896 F.Supp. 362 (D.N.J.1995); Peterborough v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 824 F.Supp. 1102 (D.N.H.1993).
In our view, although the question is close, the school's allegations, and the “reasonable inferences” we must draw from them, García–Catalán, 734 F.3d at 102 (quoting Grajales, 682 F.3d at 44)), do make a plausible showing that New Hampshire Insurance Company issued an insurance policy to the school for the 1967–1968 school year. The school's allegation of the existence of a New Hampshire Insurance Company policy for the 1970–1971 school year is directly supported by the school's audit report from that year. And the school's factual allegations tending to show no change in coverage in the preceding three years are enough to plausibly support the existence of coverage in the 1967–1968 school year.
The factual allegations are “circumstantial,” to be sure, but there is no requirement for direct evidence. Id. at 103 (quoting Rodríguez–Reyes, 711 F.3d at 56). Neither is there a “probability requirement” at the pleading stage. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Rather, the factual allegations need only be enough to nudge the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible,” thus “rais[ing] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the lost policy. Id. at 556, 570.
The school has alleged specific facts concerning an audit report that tend to show that it had an insurance policy from New Hampshire Insurance Company as of 1971. And the school has then linked that allegation to the recollections of specific individuals who were involved in the relevant events and are of the view both that the school had a general liability policy in the preceding years, including the crucial 1967–1968 school year, and that there had been no change in carrier during that period of time.
This case is not one in which a plaintiff has selected an insurance company at random and filed a declaratory judgment action against it in the hopes that the plaintiff might get lucky and find a policy. The school's complaint instead provides a plausible basis, beyond a mere possibility, for believing that New Hampshire Insurance Company issued the policy in question. Whether the school can elicit the evidence that will be required to make the more demanding showing the school will need to make as the suit moves forward is, of course, a different question that we need not address in this appeal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (noting that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely’ ”); see also Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 10, 12 (1st Cir.2014) (en banc) (vacating the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim as “premature” and remanding “to allow a fuller development of the evidence, and further legal analysis based on that evidence,” before resolving the claim on the merits).
We thus reverse the District Court's dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. The District Court also held that the school's suit was ripe for adjudication, because the school had received a demand letter threatening legal action and the uncertainty over the availability of insurance coverage had “significant implications” for the parties' responses to that letter. Neither party challenges that ripeness holding on appeal.
2. The school does not challenge the District Court's separate holding that New Hampshire law places the burden on the school to prove the existence of the disputed insurance policy, rather than placing the burden on New Hampshire Insurance Company to disprove the existence of the policy, and we therefore do not address that question in this appeal. See Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2002) (issues not raised in the appellant's brief are waived). We thus resolve this appeal on the understanding that the school bears the burden of persuasion on this issue.
3. See Radenbaugh v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 4:13–CV–339–A, 2013 WL 4442024, *2–*4 (N.D.Tex.2013) (granting motion to dismiss because, among other things, the complaint made no allegations that the defendant insurance company had ever issued an insurance policy to him); N. River Ins. Co. v. Bishop of Pueblo, No. 06–cv–01971, 2008 WL 280842, *2 (D.Colo.2008) (denying motion to dismiss a counterclaim because the “ambiguities” and “issues of fact” relating to the existence of a policy must be construed in non-movant's favor); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., No. 88 C 4302, 1993 WL 394769, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Oct.4, 1993) (holding, with little explanation, that unspecified allegations in a complaint adequately alleged the existence of a lost insurance policy).
4. New Hampshire Insurance Company also argues that Bakker may have lacked knowledge regarding the crucial 1967–1968 policy, because that policy could have been purchased before Bakker became the school's business manager at an unspecified time in 1967. But the school alleges that Bakker worked for the school during that 1967–1968 school year, and that Bakker believes the school did not “change[ ] carriers while [Bakker] was business manager.” Any change in insurance carrier between the 1967–1968 school year and the 1969–1970 school year would thus have occurred “while [Bakker] was business manager.” And so it is reasonable to think that Bakker—the one who was responsible for purchasing insurance—would have personal knowledge of such a change, even if—as New Hampshire Insurance Company suggests—Bakker may not have been the one who purchased the 1967–1968 policy. Moreover, as we have discussed, the school's allegations also address the possibility of a change in insurance after Bakker's tenure as business manager ended at an unspecified time in 1970. The school alleges that any change between the 1969–1970 and 1970–1971 school years would have been noted on the 1970–1971 audit report, which showed the existence of a New Hampshire Insurance Company policy and noted no change in insurer from the prior year.


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I would like to expand upon yesterday's post about the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's claims that Cook County has "the second worst legal environment in the country" and that there are "growing lawsuit abuse problems in Cook County courts."
I am not now and never have been a card-carrying member of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. Although I have worked with and for plaintiff's attorneys on occasion (some of whom were and are ITLA members), for most of my 28 years in practice, I've represented insurance companies -- a type of business particularly unpopular among many judges. So when the Chamber or some other business group claims that some judges are inclined to be unfriendly toward (pick one) doctors, businesses, insurers -- I can't say they're entirely wrong.
It is my belief, however, based on experience, that this results more in differences of approach than outcome. One judge, whom I greatly respect, and who has long since retired, was particularly not fond of insurance companies. I appeared before him many times over the years on contested motions.
Sometimes this judge would come out on the bench smiling and complimentary. He'd make a point of saying, on the record, what a fine brief I'd written, what a good argument I'd made -- and then he'd rule against my insurance company client. But, if he came out on the bench red-faced and irritated -- I had a good chance of prevailing. He might not have liked insurers generally or my clients in particular -- but he would follow the law where it led him and he'd have a reasoned explanation for any decision he made, for my client or against.
Judges who follow the law provide the best defense against real "lawsuit abuse." There can be -- and surely are -- suits that even the staunchest ITLA member would agree are "frivolous." And §§2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provide a quick and relatively easy means of disposing of such suits. If a case is particularly frivolous, judges may award sanctions -- monetary penalties against a party or its lawyer -- under Supreme Court Rule 137.
What non-lawyers should keep in mind in evaluating the "jackpot justice" and "judicial hellhole" claims made by business interests, is that these groups have a more expansive idea of what constitutes a "frivolous" lawsuit than just those which are subject to dismissal on motion. It's not just uninformed or "liberal" judges who let these kinds of "frivolous" suits come to trial: The most rock-ribbed, blue-blooded, conservative judge might also find herself obligated, under the law, to reject a challenge to the legal sufficiency of a certain suit -- but the Chamber would still deem that suit "frivolous." What it comes down to is this: These organizations are really more upset with certain laws themselves, rather than the way judges apply the laws.
Rather than try and construct a theoretical model of the many different kinds of law and precedents that the Chamber and its allies might consider as giving rise to "frivolous" litigation -- an essay that would be boring to read and probably inaccurate to boot -- I will try and illustrate the idea with a specific category of case... in my next post.
Rich Miller reports today on claims by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "Illinois has one of the five worst legal climates in the nation." The graphic at left was also on the front page of the Capitol Fax Blog today; the copy here isn't actually linked to any site.
But if you were to click on the graphic on Mr. Miller's page (as I did) it would take you to this page, which is the Illinois page of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce report discussed on the Capitol Fax Blog.
The Chamber report quotes Tom Donohue, president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber as saying, "Recent positive rulings by the Illinois Supreme Court and improvements in Madison County courts have been more than cancelled out by growing lawsuit abuse problems in Cook County courts and by a full-scale trial lawyer assault in the state legislature."
A 2007 amendment to the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. Section 2 of the Act was amended to permit juries in such cases to consider, as elements of damage, the "grief, sorrow, and mental suffering" of "the surviving spouse and next of kin of the deceased person."
A "Mixed Bag of Excessive Verdicts."
According to U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) President Lisa Rickard, trial lawyer allies in the state legislature passed a law last year creating a new amorphous category of damages in wrongful death actions likely to lead to much higher lawsuit awards.
"[L]ast November, a Cook County judge struck down a significant legal reform designed to control runaway awards in medical malpractice lawsuits."
Also cited is pending legislation to revive the Structural Work Act. The original Structural Work Act was repealed on February 14, 1995 by P.A. 89-2 -- but the U.S. Chamber is clearly not saying that the years since 1995 have constituted a Golden Age for Illinois businesses.
I don't mean to be overly basic here, but legislatures enact laws, courts apply the statutes in specific cases. It's not "lawsuit abuse" if a party utilizes a lawfully enacted statute in support of a claim or a defense.
As for Judge Larsen's order on malpractice caps, the Illinois Supreme Court will eventually determine whether she was or was not correct in her analysis. I have not studied Judge Larsen's order and I have no inside information about how it might fare on appeal.
But I do know that a trial judge, like Judge Larsen, is not free to do whatever she pleases in evaluating a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. She is required to follow the law and apply the precedents of past cases. A prior attempt to impose caps on damages in several kinds of tort cases was declared unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). An attempt to impose caps on damages in medical malpractice case was found unconstitutional in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
Is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (or the ATRF or the ILR) really suggesting that trial judges disregard binding precedents as necessary to promote a particular partisan agenda?
I had thought these chamber of commerce types were sober-sided, gray flannel types. Apparently, however, they're really wild-eyed radicals.
A New York State appellate court has put on hold, at least for now, the scheduled April 28 criminal trial of 10 Filipino nurses and their lawyer on charges of conspiracy, endangering the welfare of a child, and endangering the welfare of a disabled person -- apparently because the nurses quit their jobs at a Long Island nursing home.
I was unable to find the New York State Appellate Division order on Westlaw this evening. For more background about this story, see this February 28 post on ABA Journal.com or this March 23, 2007 article in the North Country Gazette.
Students at Oxford University are among the smartest anywhere in the world -- but even students at one of the world's most elite colleges apparently don't have enough sense not to post incriminating photos of themselves on Facebook -- even after they learned that university officials were using the popular social networking program to gather incriminating evidence.
Martha Neil writes about it in an April 18 post on on ABA Journal.com. The post is a follow-up on an article Neil originally posted in July 2007.
In that first post, Neil wrote that university proctors had obtained access to supposedly "private" Facebook pages and were fining students for celebrating exams by "dousing others with champagne, flour and worse." Neil's first article cites Alex Hill, a math and philosophy student at Oxford's St. Hugh's College. Ms. Hill "received an e-mail from Oxford citing her for 'disorderly' conduct after administrators spotted three photographs on her Facebook profile in which she is slathered with shaving cream."
"I don’t know how the proctors got access to it," Neil quotes Hill as saying. "I thought my privacy settings were such that only students could see my pictures."
The Oxford student union got into a lather about "the 'disgraceful' intrusion into" student privacy. It "e-mailed every common room advising how to prevent [Oxford professors from] viewing the photographs."
That was July 2007. These are brilliant students. Did they really figure out how to keep the proctors out of their Facebook pictures? No! And yet, Neil writes, "many haven't been able to resist participating in--and posting online photographs of--excessive celebration of their upcoming graduation."
Thus, according to Neil's article Friday, "the proctors in charge of enforcing Oxford's code of conduct have had a field day fining students for dousing one another with champagne, shaving cream, flour, eggs and worse." University officials have levied "individual fines of between £40 to £500," imposing "penalties totaling more than £10,000--that's almost $20,000 in U.S. dollars, and far more than last year's excessive celebration payday for the university."
You'd think smart kids would know better, wouldn't you? But it isn't just Oxford students who don't understand that, if it's on the Internet, anyone can find it.
Neil's April 18 post cites to this article in the April 17 London Times.
Marked for life by the unauthorized practice of law?
Kashmir Hill reports yesterday on Above the Law about a craigslist ad posted "for a student lawyer who is familar (sic) with the divorce laws of Illinois. Someone who is studying family law and would help assist me in my situation. Thus far I have written out my petition and obtain documents to be filed. But, I need someone to review my petition and statement before it is presented to the court. As a token of appreciation I will issue a check of $45.00 and two tattoo needles for two free tattoos (black and grey)."
The ad was apparently posted by a 27-year old Chicago woman named Lillian. Above the Law says it was tipped by a University of Chicago law student who, presumably, resisted whatever temptation the ad afforded.
Law students can not practice law in Illinois -- without jeopardizing their future careers -- except under certain limited conditions (specified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 711).
According to Rule 711(b)(1), law students may, with appropriate supervision, work for "a legal aid bureau, legal assistance program, organization, or clinic chartered by the State of Illinois or approved by a law school approved by the American Bar Association."
Chicago-Kent also offers "fee for service" clinics in the areas of employment discrimination and civil rights, health and disability, immigration, criminal law, and family law. I was unable to find anything on the Kent website, however, that suggests that their family law clinic will accept tattoos in lieu of money.
Business casual: Contradiction in terms?
An article by Debra Cassens Weiss, posted this morning on ABA Journal.com, addresses one of the more frightening issues facing the legal profession today: what to wear for "business casual."
Weiss' article cites Neonu Jewell, "an export compliance counsel with Accenture in Chicago. She told the Wall Street Journal that moving from one law firm or company to another can mean a costly new casual wardrobe."
When Jewell worked at a Fortune 500 hospitality company, Weiss writes, "employees got around the ban on denim by wearing sweats." But gym wear wasn't allowed when Jewell moved on "to a Washington law firm that even disapproved of open-toed shoes on summer Fridays. On business casual days at Accenture, Jewell often wears suits or nicely tailored pants and blouses."
The Journal article described in Weiss' article "offered its own business casual advice culled from interviews with wardrobe consultants. They said both women and men shouldn’t stray too far from traditional business attire. Men could go without a tie or could wear dress pants and a blazer instead of a suit. Women could wear pants, blouses with collars and unmatched jackets. Accessories should include well-made shoes and good watches."
That seems reasonably safe. Some years ago, I remember having to go out to the home office of an insurance client for a meeting. I was wearing a suit. My host was wearing a golf shirt and slacks. "I should have told you," he apologized, "we're business casual here every day now."
"That's OK," I improvised. "This is a brown suit. For a lawyer, anything other than a blue or gray suit is business casual."
The Chicago Tribune reports that "a southbound CTA Blue Line train was evacuated" this morning after failing near the Clark and Lake subway station.
It wasn't the only one. I was a passenger on a train which -- according to the motorman -- was two trains behind the stalled one. The train in front of us allegedly tried to push the stopped one... but to no avail. The motorman suggested that we might go back to the station at Grand and Milwaukee and travel to the Loop on the track usually reserved for O'Hare-bound traffic.
But no situation is so bad that it can't be made worse by impatient people: Power was cut on our train -- no lights, no fans -- because people had jumped off another train and were trying to leg it through the tunnel.
Eventually, this was the course we were all instructed to take.
These are a couple of passengers on my car, gazing rather apprehensively at the catwalk that we were supposed to follow to the nearest emergency exit.
By this time, we had been stuck, virtually in one spot for 90 minutes (the train did move a few yards a couple of different times during this time).
Once on the catwalk, we stalled again. These two folks got out of the train... but were stuck again, waiting in line.
Unable to see ahead of them toward the alleged emergency exit, they may be looking back to see if another alternative were presented there.
When finally reached, the emergency exit turned out to be not particularly glamorous.
My camera could not quite capture the grunge or the dirt of the place. My trenchcoat, however, did: As I was finally walking to the office, a little after 10:00 a.m., a man approached me on the street and asked me if I knew my coat was covered in dirt. I didn't, I told him, but I was not surprised.
The Fire Department was waiting for us as we emerged from our exit, at Milwaukee and Clinton.
Shuttle buses were also lined up to take passengers to their final destinations.
After the spiral stairway shown above, there was one final stairway to the street -- more of a ladder, really, and emergency personnel were waiting to help people up to the street.
Fortunately, this is not a regular occurrence on the CTA.
The motorman on our train deserves credit for trying to keep the passengers informed: At one point, he told us there were 12 trains backed up behind us, all the way to Jefferson Park. At another he said, "I have 50 people talking all at once on one single channel. I will sort it all out and get back to you in a minute."
While I'm certain there will be stories of passengers becoming hysterical or ill because of the delays, my own observation was that people bore the inconvenience well and with reasonably good humor. Some of that humor faded, perhaps understandably, as passengers stepped in puddles of indeterminate composition at the foot of that spiral staircase leading toward the street.
Update: Going Public, the mass transit blog of Red Eye has this post about this morning's frivolities. There is a sharp division of opinion, obviously, about whether it was appropriate for riders to bolt from the trains without instruction. Apparently the CTA is officially taking the position -- as I'd speculated in the body of this post -- that the persons who left on their own wound up causing the service delays to be longer than they otherwise might have been. Of course, as far as I know, when we were finally instructed to leave the train, the disabled train still had not been moved through the station at Clark and Lake. People seem to have bolted because they received no meaningful information about the status of the problem -- if all the motormen had kept their riders as informed as the motorman on my train, perhaps no one would have bolted at all.
The Supreme Court has announced that Second District Appellate Court Justices Thomas E. Callum (left) and Robert E. Byrne (right) will be retiring from the court effective July 6, 2008.
DuPage County Chief Judge Ann B. Jorgensen has been appointed to the Appellate Court to fill the unexpired term Justice Callum, while DuPage County Circuit Judge Michael J. Burke will serve by appointment in Justice Byrne's stead.
DuPage County Circuit Judge Richard M. Stock, who had been serving by appointment to the vacancy of Judge Edward R. Duncan, Jr., has been appointed to Judge Jorgensen's vacancy. Meanwhile, Associate Judge Blanche Hill Fawell has been appointed to the Duncan vacancy. Fawell is the daughter-in-law of former DuPage County Chief Judge Bruce Fawell and former state Sen. Beverly Fawell (R-Glen Ellyn). Fawell beat Stock for the Duncan vacancy in the February primary; she is unopposed in the November election. Appointing Stock to the Jorgensen vacancy gives him the opportunity to stay on the bench until 2010.
Each of these appointments becomes effective on July 7.
This January 4 story from England's Daily Telegraph came to my attention via this story on techradar.com.
Although I diligently followed the links in the various articles cited, I have yet to see any reference to the father being charged with any sort of a crime.
Learn English or do time?
You may have already forgotten about Peter Paul Olszewski Jr., the Luzerne County, Pennsylvania judge who last week imposed, as a condition of probation, that a number of Spanish-speaking defendants, convicted of robbery, learn English or face prison.
The link is to a Chicago Tribune reprint of a Philadelphia Inquirer story by Angela Couloumbis. There were 50 comments posted to the March 28 Tribune story as I began writing this -- a predictable exchange of sniper fire between those who are pro- and anti-immigrant and between people who think that English should be made the official language of the country and those who think people who think that way are necessarily racist reactionaries. One poster seems to want George Bush deported on account of the President's celebrated difficulties with standard syntax.
However amusing these comments may be, I'm more interested in the idea of whether a non-standard condition of probation like that imposed by Judge Olszewski can really, in a proper case, help a young offender get on a productive path. As a civil lawyer, unfamiliar with criminal law, I couldn't put the issues in perspective without doing a little homework. I could only recall one instance where an Illinois judge had a policy of imposing non-standard conditions of probation: It didn't go well for Samuel G. Harrod III, the haircut judge in the 1970's, although the one month suspension imposed on him by the Illinois Courts Commission was ultimately vacated by the Supreme Court. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission, 69 Ill.2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53 (1978).
In doing a little research I learned that §5-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections gives a sentencing judge to power, at least in Cook County, to require a person on probation to pursue a high school diploma, GED or a court-approved vocational training program. (See, 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(7).) I could find nothing in the Illinois statute, though, about requiring a probationer to learn English.
That’s when he gave eighth-grade dropout Joshua Gyle, then 17, a chance to stay out of jail on a theft charge if he went to go back to school and graduated high school.
If Gyle didn’t make it, that would be a violation of his probation and Olszewski would re-sentence Gyle to prison.
Gyle was thrilled for the chance.
Two years later, at 19 years old, Gyle appeared before Olszewski, a Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judge, after getting arrested and failing to go to school.
Olszewski held his promise and sent Gyle to state prison for two and a half to five years.
But, Weiss writes, sometimes the sentences have proved successful, too.
The judge once touted having a 100 percent employment rate.
“The problem here is most criminal defendants that come before me aren’t employed,” he said in a 2004 interview.
Having a job, he has said, allows defendants to gain income and keeps them occupied, preventing them from having time to commit additional crimes.
Finding a probationer a job seems above and beyond the call of duty; it surely is analogous to (and perhaps more helpful in an individual case than) required enrollment in a vocational program. But the additional wrinkle in this case is that the Pennsylvania judge has also imposed a requirement that these particular defendants learn English. The Tribune notes that Judge Olszewski says this requirement wasn't imposed as punishment; it was added so that the defendants could, quoting the judge, "get a better education, [get] a better job. Period."
Ferris Webby, the attorney representing Guzman-Mateo, Thursday called Olszewski's ruling unusual. But he said he believes the judge's directive to learn English was intended to help the men best meet the conditions of their parole, which includes obtaining their GEDs, and staying away from drugs and alcohol.
"He saw how tough it was for them to communicate on a very serious issue in a courtroom on a very serious charge," Webby said.
According to the Tribune article, Webby was concerned about how his client's progress in English will be measured. Will there be a test at the end of the probationary period? What will be on the test? Presumably, and this is strictly my assumption, Judge Olszewski has some sort of conversational ability in mind as a standard. Anything more than that would be unrealistic and unfair.
The Illinois House approved a measure yesterday afternoon that would allow voters to decide on a constitutional amendment that would allow the recall of statewide officials... including, not coincidentally, embattled Governor Rod Blagojevich.
Rich Miller's take on the move, linked above, is that the measure may sink without a trace in the State Senate, since that body is under the sway of Blogjevich ally Emil Jones. Other commentators seemed in agreement (this link is to a Prairie State Blue post; there several others I saw but did not link).
Seems to me, though, that voters will vote on the recall amendment anyway this November. Even if it is not on the ballot, Con Con will be. For many, that will be the same thing.
Negligent bicyclist not "uninsured motorist"
Jimmie Rogers was driving his son to preschool on September 28, 2005. While he was stopped at an intersection, somebody on a bicycle rode right into Rogers' car, smashing the window on the passenger side. Glass from the broken window injured Rogers' eye.
The Appellate Court's opinion in Standard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 2008 WL 795294 (Ill.App.3d Dist. 3/20/08), does not advise how old the bicyclist was. The case, however, arises from the Circuit Court of Will County -- it may be safe to speculate, therefore, that we are not talking about a bicycle messenger, such as those that careen wildly about Chicago's Loop. Their employers may have some sort of liability coverage. But the bicyclist in that hit Jimmie Rogers' car apparently did not.
So Rogers sought recompense from his own auto carrier under his uninsured motorists coverage. By law, every auto policy must uninsured and underinsured motorists' coverage (UM and UIM coverage) in amounts at least equal to the liability minimums required by law ($20,000 per person, $40,000 per occurrence, $15,000 property damage -- see §7-203 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code).
The Insurance Code does not define "motor vehicle" -- but the Vehicle Code does. Justice McDade's opinion cites §1-146 of the Vehicle Code, which defines "'motor vehicle' as '[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized wheelchairs.'" (Slip op. at p. 5, emphasis in original.) The court also examined the Vehicle Code definitions of "vehicle" and "bicycle."
In light of these statutory definitions, the court concluded "it is clear that a 'bicycle' cannot be considered a 'motor vehicle' for the purposes of the uninsured motor vehicle coverage." Rogers could not collect on his UM claim for the bicycle collision.
Illustration obtained from this site.
Walking and chewing gum ban next?
WBBM Radio reports today about HB4520, a bill introduced by Chicago Rep. Kenneth Dunkin (D-5).
Dunkin's bill would make it a petty offense (punishable by a fine of up to $25) for a pedestrian to use a wireless telephone "while crossing a roadway."
The article posted on the Newsradio 780 Website suggests that Illinois Secretary of State Jesse White takes also takes credit for the idea.
Apparently the concern is that distracted pedestrians may wander into the street without looking -- but, surprisingly, given that concern, arguing with a fellow pedestrian, listening to music on headphones, or thinking about what's on the afternoon schedule aren't included on the list of activities to be proscribed while crossing the street.

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D.C. Law Library - § 22–404. Assault or threatened assault in a menacing manner; stalking.
↪ § 22–404. Assault or threatened assault in a menacing manner; stalking.
(a)(1) Whoever unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned not more than 180 days, or both.
(2) Whoever unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term “significant bodily injury” means an injury that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention.
This section is referenced in § 5-132.21, § 7-2502.03, § 16-2333, § 22-951, and § 23-581.
D.C. Law 18-88 repealed subsecs. (b) to (e).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-317 substituted “not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01” for “not more than $1,000” in (a)(1) and for “not more than $3,000” in (a)(2).
Firearms control, registration certificates, prerequisites for issuance, see § 7-2502.03.
For temporary amendment of section, see § 105(d) of the Omnibus Criminal Justice Reform Emergency Amendment Act of 1994 (D.C. Act 10-255, June 22, 1994, 41 DCR 4286).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 207 of Omnibus Public Safety Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-445, July 19, 2006, 53 DCR 6443).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 207 of Omnibus Public Safety Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-490, October 18, 2006, 53 DCR 8686).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 207 of Omnibus Public Safety Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2007 (D.C. Act 17-10, January 16, 2007, 54 DCR 1479).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 207 of Omnibus Public Safety Second Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2007 (D.C. Act 17-25, April 19, 2007, 54 DCR 4036).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 302 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-181, August 6, 2009, 56 DCR 6903).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 302 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-227, October 21, 2009, 56 DCR 8668).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 201(c) of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-45, April 1, 2013, 60 DCR 5400, 20 DCSTAT 1300).


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Kevin Kenworthy practices in the area of federal income taxation, with an emphasis on tax litigation and other tax controversy matters. Over his 25 plus years in practice, Mr. Kenworthy has represented large multinational clients in a variety of disputes involving billions of dollars before the courts and the Internal Revenue Service. He has led or has been a member of the successful litigating teams for some of the firm's most significant tax cases during this time. Mr. Kenworthy regularly produces extraordinary resolutions for his multinational clients in disputes with the IRS.
Mr. Kenworthy has represented clients in significant disputes ranging from transfer pricing to foreign tax credits, R&E credits, natural resource issues, interest disputes, and methods of accounting. In addition to his advocacy on a broad range of domestic and international tax issues, Mr. Kenworthy has deep subject matter experience in court practice and IRS administrative procedure.
Mr. Kenworthy is a frequent speaker on a variety of tax topics before Tax Executives Institute chapters and other groups across the country. In addition, he is a contributing author to The Transfer Pricing Answer Book 2012 and a co-author of the BNA Tax Management Portfolio No. 891-2nd, Transfer Pricing: Audits, Appeals, and Penalties. Before joining Miller & Chevalier, he served as a clerk to Judge William A. Goffe of the U.S. Tax Court. He earned his BBA in Accounting from the University of Oklahoma and his J.D. from Southern Methodist University School of Law where he served as Managing Tax Editor of the Southwestern Law Review.
The Coca-Cola Company v. Commissioner, Tax Court Dkt. No. 31183-15 (section 482 adjustments related to trademark license royalties) (trial concluded May 2018).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, No. 16-cv-0921 (N.D. Tex.)(whether COGS reduced by the amount of section 6426(b) Alcohol Credits applied as payment of deductible fuel excise tax) (motion for summary judgment pending).
Elizabeth Redleaf v. Commissioner, Tax Court Dkt. No. 13901-17 (whether payments received in divorce settlement are division of marital property or alimony).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 5 (2011), aff'd 689 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2012) (whether taxpayer eligible for interest netting under section 6621(d)).
Howard Hughes Properties Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, Tax Court Dkt. 10565-11 (whether residential real estate developer permitted to use completed contract method of accounting)(trial November 2012).
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, D. Md. Dkt. 8:12cv3725-DKC (issues involving R&E credit claimed for aerospace prototypes and the interaction between section 199 and the extraterritorial income exclusion)(pre-trial proceedings).
Estate of James B. Rehrig and Mary Y. Rehrig, et al. v. Commissioner, Tax Court Dkt. 10067-10 (whether stock held by owners of closely-held company was restricted stock for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(b)(3))(settled before trial).
Represent U.S.-based multinational in a transfer pricing dispute related to the cross-border provision of services (settled at Appeals).
PPL Amicus Brief. On behalf of American Electric Power Company, Inc., in support of the taxpayer in PPL Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Reversing the court of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 1997 U.K. Windfall Tax is a creditable income tax under IRC section 901.
Intel Corporation v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims Dkt. 13-262T (whether taxpayer eligible for interest netting relief under section 6621(d)(pre-trial proceedings)).
Textron Amicus Brief. On behalf of Financial Executives Institute, submitted amicus brief in support of taxpayer in United States v. Textron, Inc. concerning whether tax-accrual workpapers are privileged.
Represent U.S.-based multinational in a dispute concerning the tax consequences of partnership formation (settled at IRS Appeals).
Mobil Corporation v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims Dkt. 03-1508T (multiple-issue case including validity of informal claims, eligibility for enhanced oil recovery credits, worthless stock deductions, and additional depreciation deductions)(substantive issues settled following hearing and ruling on informal claims).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Commissioner, Tax Court Dkt. No. 11805-00 (multiple-issue case including creditability of Australian Petroleum Resource Rent Tax, eligibility for R&E credits, and interest expense sourcing under section 861)(all issues settled following pre-trial discovery).
On December 16, 2011, the IRS and the Treasury Department issued comprehensive final transfer pricing regulations related to cost sharing arrangements for the development of intangibles ("CSAs").

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On October 3, 2017, the Irish High Court announced that it will make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Standard Contractual Clauses, which allow companies in the European Economic Area (EEA) to transfer personal data outside of the EEA. In doing so, the Irish High Court acknowledged that, “there are well founded grounds for believing that the [Standard Contractual Clauses] are invalid,” but clarified that this was a question of EU law for the CJEU to decide.
Maximillian Schrems (an Austrian privacy campaigner who, in 2015, led a case that struck down the EU-US Privacy Shield’s forerunner, Safe Harbor) has a Facebook account. Schrems complained to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) that Facebook Ireland Limited (Facebook Ireland) transferred his data to its US-parent, Facebook Inc. (Facebook US) for further processing.
In order to transfer personal data to a third country outside of the EEA, that third country (in this case, the US) should offer guarantees ensuring an adequate level of protection for personal data essentially equivalent to the level of protection ensured within the EEA. The European Commission (EC) has not considered the US to provide this adequate level of protection for personal data, so companies that wish to transfer data must rely on other data transfer mechanisms, including the Standard Contractual Clauses.
Schrems argued that the US legal regime — particularly its surveillance activities — does not protect his personal data to the extent required by EU law. Schrems argued that, as an EU citizen, he has the right to respect for his private life, home, and communications (Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter)), the protection of his personal data (Article 8 Charter), and the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal to guarantee his rights (Article 47 Charter).
Facebook Ireland argued that the company’s transfers to Facebook US were pursuant to the Standard Contractual Clauses, which were expressly approved by the EC.
The DPC examined Schrems’ complaint and concluded that it raised “well-founded arguments,” insofar as there are deficiencies in the remedial mechanisms under US law for EU citizens whose data is transferred to the US. In essence, the DPC saw reasons for a “well-founded” objection that “there is an absence of an effective remedy in US law compatible with the requirements of Article 47 [Charter] for an EU citizen whose data is transferred to the US where it may be at risk of being accessed and processed by US State agencies for national security purposes in a manner incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 [Charter].” The DPC found that the Standard Contractual Clauses and their underlying decisions do not deal sufficiently with this concern and make no provision for a right in favour of a data subject to access an effective remedy in the event of interference by a US public authority on national security grounds or otherwise.
On this basis, the DPC brought a case to the Irish High Court, asking for a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Standard Contractual Clauses. On considering the arguments, the Irish High Court rejected the argument that the Article 4 mechanism in the Standard Contractual Clauses – which enables a data protection authority to ban or suspend data transfers to third countries – satisfies the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter. While the Irish High Court recognized that the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson mechanism is available to EEA data subjects whose personal data is transferred under the Standard Contractual Clauses, it rejected the argument that this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter. The Irish High Court therefore held that it agreed with the DPC and that a reference for a preliminary ruling should be made to the CJEU.
Notably, the Irish High Court judgment goes to great lengths to emphasize that the judgment is limited to the validity of the Standard Contractual Clauses — the case does not concern national security (as Facebook Ireland argued), mass surveillance, or balancing freedoms in a democratic society.
Standard Contractual Clauses are one of the most commonly used mechanisms to transfer personal data outside of the EEA. If the CJEU strikes down the Standard Contractual Clauses, companies will have to change their data transfer compliance strategies. Further complications might arise from another case, in which Digital Rights Ireland sued the European Commission in 2016 over the Privacy Shield (T-670/16). This case might be inadmissible, but it is still pending. Furthermore, one cannot exclude that the CJEU will use this Schrems case as an opportunity to look into the Privacy Shield as well. Given that data transfer compliance strategies can usually not be changed overnight, companies will have to consider potential consequences long before the potential judgments.
The Irish High Court will list the matter for submissions in which the parties involved can comment on the questions to be sent to the CJEU. The Irish High Court will then determine the questions and refer them to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. All three sets of the Standard Contractual Clauses are based on different decisions of the EC, and these decisions remain valid during the CJEU procedure. If the Irish High Court submits the questions to the CJEU before the end of this year, a judgment in 2019 would be possible (for comparison, in the Schrems case, the CJEU judgement came 16 months after it received the questions from the Irish High Court).
You can read the full judgment of the case here.

matches: CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU CJEU


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Este estudo expõe e discute as teorias mais recentes sobre a gênese da escrita na antiga Mesopotâmia, em particular sob a ótica da articulação entre a gênese do sistema cuneiforme e a diversidade e função dos sistemas comunicativos, no quadro de complexidade social crescente do final do período Neolítico.
cuneiforme; escritura; Mesopotâmia; sistemas de comunicação; complexidade social.
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2B Advice is an established group of companies that deals with all questions relating to data protection. We offer legal and technical competence in data protection consulting, data protection training, data protection software and data protection certification.
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We protect your data through regular internal controls and a modern IT infrastructure. If we work with contract processors to process orders and inquiries, we achieve an equivalent level of data protection through binding agreements, prior verification of the respective contract processor and controls.
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You have the right to know which data we have stored about you and for what purpose (information pursuant to Art. 15 GDPR).
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You have the right to object to the processing (objection pursuant to Art. 21 para. 1 GDPR). This objection must contain an explanation of the particular situation which makes further processing unacceptable to you. The objection is carefully examined and the data is blocked for the duration of the examination.
You have the right to object to the use of your personal data for advertising purposes at any time with effect for the future without incurring any costs other than the transmission costs according to the basic tariffs (the normal costs of your Internet or telephone connection) (advertising objection pursuant to Art. 21 para. 2 GDPR).
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You have the right to request data which you have made available to us and which are automatically processed by us in a common, machine-readable format (data transferability in accordance with Art. 20 GDPR).
If we process your data following your consent, you have the right to withdraw your consent at any time, which prevents future processing of your data based on your consent. However, this will not effect the legality of any processing done before your withdrawal.
If you wish to exercise one or more of these rights, please contact our data protection officer.
The data protection officer is obliged to keep your identity secret if you wish to complain about the processing of your data by us. If he comes to the conclusion that your identity could be deduced in the course of clarifying a complaint, the data protection officer will inform you in advance and, if necessary, ask you to release him from his duty of confidentiality.
Should you assert your right to information, correction, blocking, deletion, data transferability or objection, the confidentiality obligation does not apply insofar as the transfer of the data is necessary to fulfil the request - for example to the database administration.
In addition, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the responsible data protection supervisory authority.
What is the data protection supervisory authority responsible for us?

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