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Replicated from Ambiente & sociedade, Campinas, v.12, n.1, p.1-18, Jan./June 2009.
This paper develops an analysis of the factors likely to shape future public responses to the social and ethical dimensions of emerging nanotechnologies. The research was designed to offer insight into the following: what sorts of issues are likely under current circumstances to shape public attitudes towards nanotechnologies; what narrative resources do people draw upon to develop their thinking; how do public attitudes evolve through social interaction and knowledge generation; and to what extent can expressed concerns be understood as emblematic of wider societal dilemmas.
Keywords: Nanotechnologies. Anticipatory governance. Public attitudes. Narrative. Metaphysics. Upstream public engagement.
Este artigo desenvolve uma análise dos fatores suscetíveis de moldarem as respostas futuras do público frente às dimensões sociais e éticas das nanotecnologias emergentes. A pesquisa foi construída para oferecer insights sobre as seguintes questões: quais os tipos de questões capazes, nas circunstâncias atuais, de moldar as atitudes do público sobre nanotecnologias; quais as fontes de narrativas em torno das quais as pessoas desenvolvem seu pensamento; como as atitudes do público evoluem através da interação social e geração de conhecimento; e até que ponto as preocupações manifestadas podem ser entendidas como emblemáticas de dilemas societais maiores.
Palavras-chave: Nanotecnologias. Governança antecipatória. Atitudes do público. Narrativa. Metafísica. Upstream public engagement.
The cumulative inability of the UK State to anticipate adverse public reaction to technological risk issues is perhaps one of the more telling examples of institutional failure in recent decades. Following the spectacular failure of the British State to anticipate the political controversy and adverse public reaction to genetically modified (GM) foods and crops in the late 1990s, a number of influential policy reports were written, all calling for, inter alia, more proactive public involvement and deliberation in debates about the social and ethical dimensions of science and technology (DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 2000; HM TREASURY/DTI/DFES, 2004; HOUSE OF LORDS, 2000; ROYAL COMMISSION OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLLUTION, 1998; WILSDON; WILLIS, 2004). In the 1970s and 1980s, the argument runs, there was little meaningful public dialogue on agricultural biotechnology. But by the late 1990s, when controversies about particular GM applications made debate unavoidable, a dominant - and question-begging - regulatory discourse was already in place, with major commitments having already been made by industry and governments (GROVE-WHITE et al., 1997; LEVIDOW; CARR, 2000). Perhaps not surprisingly, by this stage, attitudes had become polarised (AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMISSION, 2001; KELLY, 2002). All of this suggests that 'upstream' forms of public engagement, before lines had been drawn up, might well have been beneficial. Such thinking has contributed to the belief that upstream forms of public engagement might play a role in the development of a more anticipatory and socially robust governance framework.
Perhaps not surprisingly, nanotechnologies have been presented as a key site for experimenting with novel forms of 'upstream public engagement'. Here is a technology with substantial promise of radical transformation seen as in danger of running up against comparable adverse public reaction to that experienced with genetically modified foods and crops. The publication in July 2004 of the Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering report on nanotechnologies signalled a significant moment in the evolution of these debates on anticipation (ROYAL SOCIETY/ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, 2004). Learning from recent experience with biotechnology, policy-makers and scientists have now begun to look to the social sciences for improved insights on the likely future impacts of nanotechnologies, and on the role of public engagement to help fashion more socially robust technologies (MACNAGHTEN et al., 2005). These commitments to more 'upstream' forms of public engagement in processes of scientific-technological innovation are a significant move, and raise many unresolved questions for the social sciences. At what stages in research and development (R&D) processes is it realistic to raise issues of public accountability and social concern? How and on whose terms should such issues be debated? Are dominant institutional discourses of risk, ethics and 'social responsibility' adequate for addressing these issues? Is it realistic to assume that citizen-consumers can exercise constructive influence over the pace and direction of technological (and related social) change? How can these questions be reconciled with the need to maintain the independence of science, and the economic dynamism of its applications?
This paper attempts to make a modest contribution to this debate through an examination of the process through which selected members of the public were able to articulate their responses on the social and ethical dimensions of emerging nanotechnologies (KEARNES; MACNAGHTEN; WILSDON, 2005). There were substantial challenges in negotiating such an 'upstream' conversation, arising from: a) the lack of agreed definition of the term within the nanoscience community; b) the fact that most nanotechnologies remain at an early or pre-market stage of development, existing largely in terms of their promise; c) the reality that most people are unfamiliar with the term, and so presumably do not have pre-existing attitudes as traditionally conceived; and d) the possibility that salient dimensions of public concerns may not align with a broadly conceived 'risk' and 'benefit' rubric (as tends to be assumed by official regulatory and risk assessment vocabularies), and that additional work may have to be conducted to frame the conversation such that it embraces wider public values and sentiment. Indeed, in the related domain of GM foods and animals, a clear research finding was the inadequacy of such official framings in capturing the character of legitimate public concerns (GROVE-WHITE et al., 1997, 2000).
A methodology was developed aimed at understanding the factors likely to shape future public responses to nanotechnologies, and to capture the character of public concerns. A focus group methodology was chosen, designed to encourage discussion of potential issues arising for nanotechnology within a framework set by participants' historical and everyday experience of technology rather than imposed by official regulatory and risk-assessment vocabularies. The sample consisted of five groups, each of which met twice, with a gap of one week between the sessions. Participants were recruited on the basis of their existing participation in local community or political issues, but with no prior involvement or exposure to nanotechnology. They included a group of professional men (doctors, architects, civil servants etc.) - Group 1; a group of professional women (mostly employed as middle managers in business) - Group 2; a mixed gender group with demonstrable political interests - Group 3; a group of women with children at school age - Group 4; and a mixed gender group all of whom expressed an interest in technology - Group 5. The groups were conducted in Manchester and London in the late summer of 2005.
The group discussions were designed to enable participants to develop their understanding of what nanotechnologies were, of how they were being developed in 'real world' circumstances, and of the issues they were seen to pose by different stakeholders. Given the complexity and unfamiliarity of the topics under discussion, the groups were run on two consecutive sessions, each lasting approximately two hours. The first session began with a discussion of science and technology, of how they are impacting on everyday life, on the ways in which they are contributing to 'social' questions and dilemmas, and on what people sensed to be the key issues for the future. Halfway through the session, the concept of nanotechnology was introduced using definitions and a scalar diagram taken from the Royal Society/Royal Society of Engineering report (2004) and setting out domains of application in medicine, materials and information technology. Participants were next presented with some everyday consumer products that had been fabricated using nanotechnology, including a golf ball, a tub of anti-wrinkle cream, and a stain-resistant shirt. Using a set of concept boards as a stimulus, people discussed three different visions of nanotechnology: a mainstream view, which focused on projected incremental developments and economic benefits; a radical utopian perspective, which emphasised more disruptive potentials for nanotechnology to transform human sensory and physical capacities; and a sceptical outlook, which focused on potential risks to the environment and human health, and to wider negative social and ethical potentials. Each of the boards used text taken from publicly accessible government, civil society, media and corporate sources. At the end of the first session, participants were asked to spend the week before the next session exploring the issues with friends and colleagues, consulting websites, and keeping a journal for any reflections arising. The follow-up session explored how participants' perceptions and responses had evolved during the week, and time was set aside to examine in detail particular social and ethical dilemmas. The session finished with a discussion of how key stakeholders, including Government, should proceed and of the conditions necessary for a governance framework.
Given the unfamiliarity of the term, and the undoubted importance of 'framing' to subsequent responses (NISBET; SCHEUFELE, 2007; SCHEUFELE; TEWKSBURY, 2007), the various presentations of the term and its applications were carefully crafted to reflect the range of ways through which nanotechnology is being produced in the public domain. In particular, the three visions of nanotechnology presented in the stimulus materials reflected three dominant frames - or styles of thought (FLECK, 1979; HACKING, 1992; ROSE, 2007) - involving not simply what nanotechnology is, but what it explains, and what is represents. By exposing participants to the multiple frames characteristic of the emerging public debate, and by encouraging discussion and exchange on the credibility, legitimacy and authority of such frames, the design was intended explicitly to simulate the real-world dynamics through which nanotechnologies and their associated social relationships become co-produced.
Both quantitative and qualitative research on public attitudes to science and technology has tended to focus on public responses to particular applications with little thought given to their cumulative impacts and how these diffuse into the felt experience of everyday life. For this reason, prior to examining responses to nanotechnologies, participants were asked to reflect on their historical experience of science and technology, on how it had impacted on day-to-day living, on where this was seen as going, and on what issues this was likely to pose for now and for the future. What emerged was a clear sense of the duality of technological experience.
Eliza: "Well, things like genetics I'm uncomfortable with... It would be interesting to see how it plays out. But I don't feel that I have control over [that], or have any input into how that happens, you know like cloning or genetic modification or [pause]... It's rushing very quickly ahead, I don't ever feel like that's been an election issue or [that] it's been in someone's manifesto. These sorts of things, I think, are going to be really big questions for humanity, and I think that they're not really on the agenda, but I don't feel that ... that I can express my opinion...."
Julie: "What you're saying is we haven't had a say again? ... In that these things are just coming through and... they don't feel the need, no."
Eliza: "But also that the speed with which things are going forward as well, like I was trying to say before, I don't know, there are a lot of quite well sort of publicised questions around um, genetic modification which... haven't been addressed really... that's the way I feel, although I'm a little bit wary about jumping into, rushing forward with another new technology where I feel that the old questions haven't even been addressed... Well, I agree with... the sense that, you know, this idea that we're meddling with things that we don't actually fully understand, and I know that can seem like a very kind of... unadventurous."
This set of exchanges is particularly interesting in the way it weaves together collective expressions of unease as a reflection less of the technology per se but how it is being shaped, in real world circumstances, with apparently little room for wider public involvement and discussion (for analogous accounts of this phenomenon see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2007; GROVE-WHITE et al., 2000; JASANOFF, 2003; MARRIS et al., 2001; WYNNE, 1980). The choice of discussing genetic technologies, unprompted, across the various discussion groups, as somehow paradigmatic of broad-based concern with the trajectories of technological innovation, was widespread and begs explanation. Across the group discussions genetic technologies were discussed as emblematic of trends which included: the perception that technological innovation was speeding up, that such innovation appeared to be increasingly beyond public control, that existing social and ethical questions had not yet been adequately addressed, that domains of life were increasingly subjected to technological intervention with unknown consequences, and that the pace and scope of change was seen as driven by commercial and short-term goals with little regard to public values and sensibilities (GROVE-WHITE et al., 1997; MACNAGHTEN, 2004). Time and again, people looked to the experience of government and corporate handling of genetically modified foods and crops as grounds for a more cautious approach. Such discussion cultivated a backdrop of caution in which public responses to nanotechnologies came to be framed.
Alistair: "It's almost the best of all the terms for being one where I know the idea that nanotechnology is really small technology and occasionally I'll read something in The Guardian or wherever about - 'it's amazing, these guys have written their names in atoms on something' and you're like, wow, that's cool. And you have this very nebulous notion that this is really clever and that there are... all these possibilities that are, you know, waiting to be unlocked in nanotechnology. But I actually have no idea you know what they're really doing and or what these possibilities are. I just have this very vague notion that it's very clever and it could be really important. And that's kind of the epitome of what we were talking about before, about not really knowing the detail."
Phil: "It's just so difficult to grasp..."
Dave: "That's why it's so hard to make a decision on whether you think it's positive or negative. It's so huge, it's not like a single thing like cloning is... it's such a huge area."
Louise: "Now, I don't, I've gone completely the other way. Well, it's when he starts to talk..."
Lynne: "I think they need to... separate the different areas of nanotechnology in order to get a grasp of what it is... because it's very easy to look at everything at once and get a bit overwhelmed. So you could look at - this is where it could go medically, this is where it could go militarily, this is where it could go manufacturing wise sort of thing."
Rochelle: "It's so extreme the way they're using it now. From things like as I said, from packaging to medicines to animals. It is so vast the whole scope."
Karen: "It depends whose hands it falls into."
Renee: "I was surprised [by] the amount of different things they were talking about and in a way I was, I don't know, felt annoyed that I didn't know more about it, because there's obviously scientists actively talking now, developing these sorts of things, and there's been no sort of discussion. I mean I didn't even know really what it was, about whether or not it's appropriate that they should be doing these things."
Examining the narrative process through which people came to develop collective and shared accounts of what was 'at stake' in nanotechnology was a key objective of the research and was found to be linked to people's assessments of the institutional dynamics seen as likely to govern the development, regulation and oversight of the technology. Typically, the evolution of expressed attitudes followed a pattern roughly as follows: from a state of initial ignorance, to surprise at how much research and R&D was being invested by both governments and industry, to enthusiasm as to the potential for social good not least in the medical domain, to unease and anxiety that nanotechnology innovation might lead to largely unanticipated and disruptive problems in real-world circumstances, to pessimism over our ability to govern and regulate the technology for the common good. What led people to positions of unease and apprehension was not simply a consequence of realising that nanotechnology would enable scientists and other actors to extend control radically over matter, nature and the human body; but that such control over the pace, scope and direction of change would be governed by powerful bodies, propelled by the logics of industrial capitalism, and where the lay public would be 'left in the dark'. These perceived 'real world' dynamics led to predictions that nanotechnologies would exacerbate global inequality and facilitate evermore intense subjection of individual bodies. What emerged thus was a dense array of concerns; few specific or unique to nanotechnology but distinctive in their sheer breadth and convergence. For reasons that will be discussed later in this paper, nanotechnology appeared to have intensified response along familiar and consistent themes around the body, unanticipated risks, nature's revenge, control, inequalities, and pace of change. For many people the anxiety potential of nanotechnology came to the fore in relation to the concerns of nanoparticles potentially violating bodily processes, either through cosmetics or foods. Just as genetically modified foods heightened concern on account of being undetectable by texture, smell or appearance (ADAM, 1998), the invisibility of nanoparticles and their potential ubiquity into everyday consumer goods resonated with background fears linked to an enduring narrative of 'bodily invasion'.
Rosie: "I imagine. This face cream which has got very small nanoparticles in it, I don't know whether it's made of nanoparticles or whether it's just using nanotechnology. But if I rub that on my skin or someone's rubbing it into their skin and therefore there's things going into my skin I'm not aware of. We've already said this really but no-one knows exactly what that's going to do and it might have long term effects where, just imagine, free radicals which I'm sure you know potentially make cells get confused and breaks the genes in the cells and makes them grow out of control. Any little bit of dirt, like something that shouldn't be in there pops into the cell, messes with the actual sequence of what that cell does and you know - that's so scary."
Julie: "Yeah because it can happen without you realising, whereas before, things, if they were going to invade your body or invade something, you would see it happening."
Philip: "It's the invisible threat."
Helen: "Because you cannot see it..."
Rochelle: "Since last week I've completely changed my approach to these creams. When you said it had those 'nanosomes', I thought, 'oh great, fantastic, I'd use it' - [now] I wouldn't touch it now with a barge pole [even] if you paid me money to put that stuff on my face now. It's so frightening."
Victoria: "I think we're very trusting as buyers in the market, or in general, the public, we're very trusting of the products we're given and, the thing is, now you find out afterwards - we're suddenly having to become very sceptical because things come out afterwards."
Renee: "Well, you sort of assume it's always been tested."
Renee: "Which clearly obviously things like cosmetics don't have the controls that the drugs do."
Rochelle: "But surely wouldn't they be better to sort of like say, right, we don't know enough, and until we know enough, or we've changed our regulations, or whatever, then we don't let it go on the market."
Victoria: "There's too much money in it I think."
James: "They will find new bacteria and we will be more resistant. Antibiotics and things are becoming resistant. There will be more diseases that will come. We will never completely get rid of disease."
Neil: "I think it's accelerating the evolution of disasters... You were going on - on the board there - about accelerating the evolution of human systems, brain power and healing powers and stuff. It'll get 'out of the cage', I'm sure, and evolve through various bio-strains and mechanisms and it will be adapted, possibly. There are cases with GM super weeds now."
Neil: "If you actually took that wholly on board, everything that's printed on there, it's quite a frightening scenario, isn't it. So this wonderful nanotechnology is going to be a cure all for all human ills, it's going to make us all super brilliant and clever and work that much better, our transport's going to be far better even though the fact that nobody will be dying of old age, nobody will be dying of any illnesses so we won't be able to move on this planet. Yet we'll be able to move about quicker because the trains or whatever will be much more efficient. It's - a lot of what is written there is really [is] in effect going against nature isn't it, it's trying to beat nature at its own game and going back to what I said before about the medical side of it, it is rather frightening I think. It is very welcoming if it's used to treat cancers and stuff like that but I think that somewhere along the line we're getting into this Brave New World scenario here where everything's [pause], it's this ideal world where everyone lives forever and everybody has everything, everybody can do everything... It's [a] very, very frightening scenario."
Steve: "Well there's echoes of science fiction coming through, Brave New World, to space exploration, super new transit systems and just human evolution as well, being accelerated."
Neil: "But going back to our earlier conversation about the pace of change and there doesn't seem to be any stopping it, this is only 10-9, so 20 years on are we on 10-12 and 10-15, this is just the next step ..."
Barry: "Exactly. When do you get to that final point, the absolute if you like? They may be nearly there but they may not be."
These were not gut reactions to some rather optimistic claims of the benefits of a particular technology. Rather, they represented deeper unease with the metaphysical programme driving the technology, its embedded assumptions of what constitutes human progress and improvement, and its potentially troubling implications for wider society. Perhaps even more than biotechnologies, here was a technological programme based on a style of thought that conceives of nature and humans as infinitely malleable, and which presents a thoroughly questionable view of human improvement as given. Jean-Pierre Dupuy has developed a critical analysis of the metaphysical programme that underpins radical nanotechnology and its convergence with biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science (DUPUY, 2007, 2009; DUPUY; GRINBAUM, 2004). For Dupuy, perhaps the most conspicuous element of the nanotechnological dream is its dissatisfaction with the world as inherited through 'bricolage' and 'hit and miss' evolutionary process (DUPUY, 2009). By contrast, the world - and its component constituents of living and non-living matter - is in principle reconstructable and thus available for redesign and improvement, literally from the bottom-up, atom by atom. Indeed, nanotechnology's much cited goal of 'controlling the structure of matter' through interventions at the nanoscale (from 1-100 nm), is at that precise scale at which the distinction between life and non-life has lost all meaning. For Dupuy (2009) this represents a deliberate and clandestine attempt to blur a fundamental distinction that has until now been a significant source of everyday moral judgement and ethical reason.
Sally: "I find it quite daunting actually, I find it a bit scary."
Rochelle: "This is the vision of the robotic environment with everything controlled for you and everything 100% perfect and plastic."
Renee: "It's like even the food... Food has got a process the same as we've got a natural process you know, you're born, you get older, you get wrinkles, you die. Same as fruit, you buy a piece of fruit it's healthy, after a piece of time it wrinkles you throw it away or whatever and that is a natural process and I think in some ways it's kind of fiddling with that natural process."
Moderator: "So you think skin should be allowed to wrinkle?"
Rochelle: "Well at the end of the day it's... it's part of life - if we all looked 36 or 37 or whatever."
Karen: "It's just if you get rid of the wrinkles by whatever, are you going to end up causing cancer or something else you haven't even invented yet."
Julie: "That's the problem, is what we're interfering with again is nature, the natural cycle of things, which is where I have a problem. It's partly that it is sort of right that sometimes crops are wiped out, there's sort of a reason for everything I think."
Rosie: "I wouldn't trust nature not to seize upon it as it's done with these super-weeds..."
Renee: "I mean it's exactly what somebody over here said before, we're turning into robots. That is exactly what it sounds like..."
Renee: "When it comes directly to human beings and trying to make them..., it's like trying to make a perfect race again, going to that."
Karen: "We just don't know the long term effects do we, that's the problem."
Renee: "But you have to know the side effects and what we're letting ourselves in for."
Toni: "So basically our generation's going to be like the ones that they test this all out on, if it all goes horribly wrong, we'll be the guinea pigs."
Paul: "I think the worrying thing for me... is that it's almost as though we lose control of what's going on because the technology itself is capable of almost taking, replicating, and almost making, you know, pretty much making its own decisions."
Philip: "I think that is a big problem. It's like the thing you were saying with the creativity as well. If the human controls the technology that's fine, as soon as it becomes the technology making all the decisions then that's when you have a problem, because... humans are completely different from a computer."
Paul: "There's some scary dark futures where you have strains of children who are, and are not enhanced in some way, and that's a really dodgy thing. I mean enhancement, the ageing process and things like that..."
James: "Do you have your kids injected at birth to enhance their, the way their muscles grow and things..."
The above dynamics contributed to the sensed difficulty of developing robust and effective systems of governance and regulation. One the one hand, there was a perceived requirement for wise and strong forms of government and oversight. Yet, on the other hand, there was a shared concern that governance structures and requirements would be compromised, inevitably, by 'real-world' contingencies arising from the constraints of living in a globalised economy as well as the sensed intractability of nanotechnology's metaphysical programme. Crudely, it was seen as unrealistic to advocate a 'slow down' or to develop a properly cautious approach to nanotechnological innovation. A couple of variations were mobilised in the discussions: that an overly precautionary approach would lead inevitably to outward investment; that Government has a poor track record in sorting out even modest technological controversies such as mobile phone masts; that much of innovation is transnational and pretty much beyond the control of individual governments; and that the pressure for commercial return will inevitably lead to corners being cut.
Karen: "...it is interesting to say that that [referring to previous conversation on the need for research into the toxicity of nanoparticles] will take years and years, yet the whole thing we've been talking about is that these things happen so quickly, so why can't we slow it down, is it going to matter that much if it is slowed down?"
Others: "mmm, yeah, slowed down, yeah"
Rosie: "But the only thing is, say this country does that and slows it down, then you're gonna go abroad...yeah, and it's gonna come back into this country anyway."
This research presents a picture of emergent public opinion characterised by a dense array of issues - moral, social, political, as well as technical - and of the fundamental challenges this poses for governance. Importantly, it suggests that the public can differentiate these issues, and deliberate their social meanings in more complex terms than simply as 'risks' and 'benefits'. Perhaps most significantly it offers an explanation as to why people expressed such bleak and pessimistic views on the future prospects of the technology; that just when we as a collectivity require strong ethical and regulatory governance structures to guide and shape the development of nanotechnologies in socially progressive and responsive directions, that very possibility appears to be denied by a socio-technical system that believes that nothing special is being undertaken, that considers its dreams of control and improvement to require little external endorsement or explanation, and that is embedded within a set of master narratives in which science and technology are staged unambiguously as the solution to a range of social ills (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2007). Faced by such double-blind it is inevitable that people respond to what is at hand, mobilising the range of cultural resources and 'folk theories' through which they can make sense and render familiar a strange, uncanny and potentially transformative set of technologies (Rip, 2006). For this reason it is important to articulate the kinds of narrative argumentative strategies used by participants to justify their positions.
Parallel research has outlined several prominent tropes and narratives underpinning public responses to nanotechnology: ranging from the 'slippery slope' narrative, that technological advances that seem beneficial now will inevitably evoke further technological steps and applications that are morally doubtful; the 'colonisation' narrative, that technology will spread out and ultimately colonise life denying autonomy and agency; the 'Dr Strangelove' narrative, that advanced science designed for 'good use' will become corrupted and manipulated by evil people for evil purposes; the 'Trojan Horse' narrative, that innovations developed for progressive purposes will in the long term have unforeseen and potentially irreversible effects; and the 'it's out' narrative, that involves the accidental release of harmful substances often due to technological and/or human failure (SWIERSTRA; RIP, 2006; REJESKI, 2007). In our research we can add at least five further narrative variations through which people were able to develop viewpoints and argumentative positions. These include: the 'left in the dark' narrative, that nanotechnology reflects a further instance of not being able to participate in decisions that will structure future social relationships; the 'bodily invasion' narrative, that involves the introduction of invisible substances that subsequently violate natural processes; the 'Promethean' narrative, involving nature taking retribution on nanoscience's hubristic sense of its ability to transform both nature and humans to its own will and in violation and disregard for evolutionary process; the 'artificialist' narrative, that inadvertently instrumentalises life and human relationships through conceiving of biological and mental life purely as machines; and the 'false modesty' narrative, involving the pretense that nothing special is being undertaken.
This research thus endorses and compliments David Rejeski's argument that it is illusory to suppose that nano fear will disappear (REJESKI, 2007). By contrast, our research points to a wide range of common narratives that continue to shape and structure popular responses to science and technology. Of course, there exist counter narratives too, around technology as progress, science as salvation and enabler, and so on. But such narratives will be played out on the larger cultural stage whose interplay will depend on complex institutional dynamics, not least around the sensed ability of governments and corporations to provide leadership, authority, effective regulation and adequate control in the face of a scientific enterprise whose purposes and priorities are increasingly questioned.
In this respect this paper contributes to what has been termed the 'new scientific governance' (IRWIN, 2006) but in a manner less concerned with the tacit power relations in public engagement exercises and more concerned with the ways in which master narratives of science and technology may be imposing social order in unaccountable and potentially troubling ways. Building on the analysis undertaken in the European Commission working document 'Taking European Knowledge Seriously', this paper gives empirical grounding to the claim that the institutional framing of advanced science and technology (in this case nanotechnology) is in danger of becoming seriously dislocated from wider cultural values and aspirations (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2007). Developing institutional reflexivity and understanding of the factors underlying public uneasiness with science will be a major challenge in which the social sciences offer a modest contribution.
I would like to acknowledge support from the Economic and Social Research Council for the project 'Nanotechnology, risk and sustainability: developing upstream models of public engagement' (award no: RES-338-25-0006) out of which this analysis was developed. I would like to thanks partners from this project and from the European Commission project 'DEEPEN' for their many stimulating and insightful commentary. I would like to thank the following people: Sarah Davies, Robin Grove-White, Matthew Kearnes, Alfred Nordmann, Arie Rip, James Wilsdon, Brian Wynne. I would also like to thank colleagues at the Instituto de Pesquisa em Riscos e Sustentabilidade at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, and in particular Julia Guivant, Juliana Mezzomo, Ana Carolina Cassiano and Tade-Ane de Amorin for entertaining and rich discussions. Remaining problems are of course my own.
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1 I am in debted to Alfred Nordmann for this observation.

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Larry N. McALLISTER, Plaintiff, v. Pearl D. SCHETTLER, and Suzanne V. Lord, Guardian of the person and property of Pearl D. Schettler, Defendants.
Court of Chancery of Delaware, Kent County.
*618 Glenn E. Hitchens, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Dover, for plaintiff.
Barry W. Meekins and John S. Grady, of Dover, for defendants Pearl D. Schettler and Suzanne V. Lord.
This is the decision, after trial, in an action brought by Larry N. McAllister ("McAllister") seeking specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a farm located at County Roads 94 and 138, Kent County, Delaware. Defendants are Pearl B. Schettler ("Schettler"), an elderly widow who is the owner of the farm and Suzanne V. Lord ("Lord"), Schettler's grandniece and the court appointed guardian of Schettler's person and property.
It is undisputed that McAllister and Schettler executed a sales contract in December, 1983 for the 290 acre farm. Under the terms of the contract, the total purchase price of $425,000 was to be financed as follows: $5,000 earnest money; $350,000 first mortgage from Federal Land Bank; and $75,000 second mortgage from Schettler for 20 years at 10% interest. Other terms of the contract required Schettler to deliver the property free and *619 clear of all leases or assume liability as to any existing leases for the difference, if any, between the lease terms and $100 per acre for 240 acres. She was also required to pay up to $7,500 of McAllister's settlement costs as well as a broker's commission of $35,000. Final settlement was to be held on or before January 15, 1984, but Schettler was entitled to retain possession of the home until June 30, 1984.
Schettler has had no role in this litigation. In April, 1984 she was placed in the Kent Convalescent Center. There is no dispute that she is suffering from senile dementia and has been incompetent since at least April. Lord, as the guardian of Schettler's person and property, argues against specific performance on the alternative grounds that (1) Schettler was incompetent at the time she signed the sales contract, or (2) under all the circumstances, including Schettler's deteriorating mental condition, the allegedly unconscionable terms of the contract and undue influence, it would be inequitable to grant the relief sought. For the reasons that follow, I find that Schettler had contractual capacity when she signed the contract, but that the facts of this case do not warrant the relief of specific performance.
The following is a summary of the relevant facts, as I find them, based upon the credible evidence adduced at trial. Schettler, now 88 years old, had been living alone on her farm of approximately 290 acres for many years prior to the events at issue. She has no children and it appears that Lord, her grandniece, is the person with whom she has had the closest family relationship over the years. Lord describes Schettler as a domineering woman who always seemed to know what she wanted to do and Lord acknowledged that, from time to time, Schettler would say that she was lonely and that she ought to sell the farm and move to town.
For purposes of this action, Schettler's relationship with Joseph Hill ("Hill") and his family also should be noted. The Hills own a farm a few miles from the Schettler farm. For most of the past 12 years, Hill and his father tilled Schettler's land under a lease arrangement. In addition to his business relationship with Schettler, between 1978 and 1983, Hill took a personal interest in Schettler's care. He did chores around the house and generally checked on Schettler to see if there was anything she needed. Schettler apparently appreciated these attentions since she included Hill in one or more of her recent wills.
The events that precipitated this lawsuit began in the summer of 1983. William David Simpson ("Simpson"), a local real estate broker, had been aware since 1981 that Schettler might be interested in selling her farm. On August 1, 1983, Simpson testified that he had a potential purchaser in mind and therefore went to Schettler's farm to obtain a listing agreement. Simpson suggested that the price be set at $500,000 based upon what he called a "top dollar" figure of $2,000 per tillable acre for approximately 240-250 acres. The farm also included 20-30 acres of woodland, a house and several out buildings which were not given an independent value for purposes of Simpson's calculation. Schettler signed the listing agreement and Simpson thereafter attempted to sell the property primarily through telephone calls, letters and other contacts with potential buyers. He also showed the farm to the agent of the client he had in mind when he approached Schettler, but no offer was made.
Approximately two months after listing the farm with Simpson, Schettler called Charles Heritage ("Heritage"), another real estate broker, and asked him to sell the farm for her. Heritage spent several hours with Schettler at her house and specifically asked her whether she had previously listed her property. She reportedly said that she had not and signed the second listing agreement at an offering price of *620 $532,000. Heritage, like Simpson, attempted to generate interest in the property by contacting neighbors and running ads in the paper. Heritage also called McAllister about the farm since McAllister had told Heritage years earlier that he was interested in that type of property. McAllister immediately went to see the farm with Heritage. Schettler showed the two men part of the house and then, according to McAllister, left the house asking Heritage to close up when he and McAllister were through. That was the only time McAllister met with Schettler. At that meeting she apparently understood that McAllister was a prospective buyer and gave no evidence of any confusion or reluctance about the possibility that she would be selling the farm.
Following his inspection of the property, McAllister asked Heritage to draw up a contract to present to Schettler. That contract, dated October 10, 1983, contained all the same terms as the second contract that was executed except that the broker's commission was $22,000 rather than $35,000.
Before Heritage was ready to submit the first contract to Schettler, he got a call from Simpson, who told him about the prior listing agreement. On November 17, 1983 Simpson provided Heritage a copy of that agreement. As a result, on December 2, 1983, a second, co-brokered contract was drawn up. Before the second contract was presented to Schettler, however, Hill learned of its existence, and attempted to intervene.
The evidence indicates that Hill wanted the farm. He did not have enough money to purchase it, but Schettler had shown him a recent will in which, according to Hill, she bequeathed him "almost everything." From this description it would appear that Hill was to inherit the farm. Hill also knew that Schettler had made a new will, but claims not to have known its provisions. In any event, Hill must have known that either the new will or the possible sale could jeopardize his position.
Hill therefore arranged for Schettler to see William H. Vaughn, Esquire ("Vaughn") on December 7, 1983. Vaughn had been the Hills' attorney, and Vaughn's secretary, Diane Hill, was then Hill's wife. One of the purposes of that visit was to have Schettler give Hill a durable power of attorney. Hill testified that he wanted the power of attorney in order to review the sales contract. The other purpose of the December 7th visit was to have Schettler make a new will. It appears that Hill would have gotten the farm under this proposed will.
After Vaughn discussed the new will with Schettler and spoke to James J. Lazzeri, Esquire, the attorney who had prepared several of Schettler's previous wills, Vaughn decided that it would be appropriate for Schettler to be examined by a physician in order to determine her mental capacity to execute a will. No documents were signed on December 7th, and on December 8, 1983, Schettler was examined by Dr. Robert Donlick, her family physician. After Dr. Donlick decided that Schettler was competent to make a will, she was driven back to Vaughn's office, but Schettler did not wish to pursue the matter further at that time, and was taken home.
On December 9, 1983, Simpson went to Schettler's home to have her sign the contract. Hill was either there already or stopped by. A confrontation between Hill and Simpson ensued. Hill asked to see a copy of the contract and Simpson refused. Hill then told Simpson to leave the property. Hill immediately took Schettler to Vaughn's office. To his surprise, Hill found Simpson at the office as well. Both Hill and Simpson waited in an outer office while Vaughn discussed the contract with Schettler. Before Vaughn went through the contract terms at any length, however, Schettler indicated to him that she was not interested in selling the farm. As a result, Vaughn did not highlight for Schettler those contract provisions that Lord now argues are unconscionable (e.g., the $75,000 second mortgage to be held by Schettler). Schettler did not sign the contract or the power of attorney, but the events of the past three days were apparently taking their toll and she left the office in tears.
Mr. Simpson: "Alright. Now, uh, Mrs. Schettler, do you understand what we have done today. We have sold your farm, uh, by the nature of the contract of sale that's reflective of everyone's signatures here today. Uh, you are in agreement to sell the farm as you have done so, uh, at this particular point in time. If you are in agreement, say, `Yes I am'." Mrs. Schettler: "Yes I am." Mr. Simpson: "Okay. You understand the nature of what we have done today. If you do ..." Mrs. Schettler: "Sold the farm." Mr. Simpson: "We sold the farm. Yes maam." Mrs. Schettler: "How much?" Mr. Simpson: "Okay. Uh, the price on the farm after the 20 year note is paid to you will be a total of about $523,000.00 payable this way: $350,000.00 on or before January the 15th and a note that you will hold for $75,000.00 at 10% interest for 20 year period of time. Correct? Okay. If that's correct, just say correct." Mrs. Schettler: "Correct."
One week later, counsel for defendants wrote to McAllister's attorney advising that Schettler had determined not to sell the farm and that an action would be filed to set aside the contract. On or about January 20, 1984, Lord filed a petition in this Court seeking to be appointed the guardian of the person and property of Schettler, and on April 6, 1984, William J. Walls, Jr., Esquire was appointed guardian of Schettler's property and Lord was appointed guardian of her person. This action was instituted on September 20, 1984.
The first issue is whether Schettler was competent to enter into the contract on December 14, 1983. Adults are presumed to have contractual capacity and the burden of proving otherwise rests with the party alleging incapacity. Husband (P.J.O.) v. Wife (L.O.), Del.Supr., 418 A.2d 994 (1980). Lack of contractual capacity will be found if Schettler was "incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the transaction" or her mental faculties were so impaired as to render her "unable to properly, intelligently and fairly protect and preserve [her] property rights." G.A.S. v. S.I.S., Del.Fam.Ct., 407 A.2d 253, 257 (1978). A gradual weakening of mental capacity, even when accompanying extreme old age and serious illness, will not alone disable someone from making a contract. Sims v. Slovin, Del.Ch., 207 A.2d 597, 602 (1965), aff'd., Del.Supr., 213 A.2d 903 (1965). Reviewing the evidence against this standard, I find that Lord has not met her burden of establishing Schettler's mental incapacity at the time the contract was executed.
Lord relied upon the opinion of Dr. Cornelison and the observations of various lay witnesses in support of her claim of mental incapacity. Dr. Cornelison, a psychiatrist, examined Schettler in June, 1986 and concluded that she was suffering from senile dementia and was totally incompetent. In his report, Dr. Cornelison noted that Schettler could not recall what she had eaten at her last meal, nor could she remember *622 his first visit when he returned three weeks later. She did not know her age, where she was born, when her husband died or how long she had been a resident at the Kent Convalescent Center. Dr. Cornelison concluded that Schettler has suffered from gradual mental deterioration and that her condition will continue to worsen. Based upon Schettler's spontaneous comment about her desire not to sell the farm, Dr. Cornelison concluded that this has been a long-term wish of Schettler's and, "[i]f she were persuaded to sign documents in the past allowing her land to be sold, this probably was done at a time when she was incompetent to make such a decision." Report of Psychiatric Evaluation and Opinion re: Pearl Schettler, P5.
Several lay witnesses testified as to their observations of Schettler at various times during the fall of 1983. One realtor, for example, decided that Schettler was incompetent because she was unable to carry on lengthy conversations and was forgetful. Another observed that she did not seem to hear him or understand what he was talking about. In addition, as noted earlier, Schettler signed a second listing agreement for the farm, apparently having forgotten the first, which she signed two months earlier. Several witnesses also testified as to Schettler's lack of competence in February and April, 1984.
From this evidence, one could not help but conclude that Schettler was having difficulty with her memory and attention span for several months prior to December 14, 1983. While this evidence is indicative of incompetency, I find at least equally persuasive the evidence suggesting that Schettler was competent on the date the contract was executed. Dr. Donelick, a general practitioner who has known Schettler for about ten years and has seen her occasionally as a patient, examined Schettler on December 8, 1983 for the specific purpose of determining whether she was competent to execute a document.
He examined Schettler for 15-30 minutes, asking questions about her medical history and present circumstances. Specifically, Dr. Donelick asked where Schettler lived and for how many years and whether she had had medical problems with hearing, vision or stomach ailments. He noted that Schettler's responses seemed logical and that she did not delay in answering his questions and appeared well oriented.
Great weight cannot be given to Dr. Donelick's opinion. He himself acknowledged that a psychiatrist would be better able to determine competency and that he would defer to a specialist's contemporaneous conclusions. Dr. Donelick's examination was relatively brief, he did not question Schettler about the nature of the transactions under consideration and, although he felt that her answers were logical, he did not know whether they were factually accurate. Nonetheless, Dr. Donelick's opinion cannot be totally disregarded. A substantial part of his practice includes the treatment of geriatric patients and his examination was performed a few days before the contract was signed.
In addition, from Simpson's tape recording, it appears that Schettler understood what she was doing when she signed the contract. Finally, since she resisted signing the power of attorney and this contract several days earlier, it is reasonable to conclude that Schettler would have had the strength to refuse to sign the contract on December 14, 1983, if, at that time, she did not wish to sell the farm. The fact that Schettler was ambivalent about the sale does not suggest any mental infirmity. It appears that she had a tendency to change her mind about significant matters since she executed no fewer than seven different wills during the two and a half years prior to October, 1983. In sum, although the question is not free from doubt, I find that Lord has not met her burden of proof on the issue of Schettler's alleged incompetency.
The fact that the contract may not be avoided on the ground of incompetency, however, does not mean that specific performance should be awarded. Plaintiff is seeking an equitable remedy and the Court, in its discretion, may decline to award specific *623 performance where "independent equitable considerations ... directly affect the remedial right of the complaining party." Lee Builders v. Wells, Del.Ch., 95 A.2d 692, 693 (1953), rev'd. on other grounds, Wells v. Lee Builders, Del.Supr., 99 A.2d 620 (1953). Factors such as weakened mental condition in one party, undue influence and unfairness in the contract terms, although not of a sufficient degree to avoid the contract, may justify leaving the plaintiff to a damage remedy. In other words, though the weakening of the mental condition may not rise to the level of incompetency, the efforts to exercise undue influence may not have been successful and the contract may not, by itself, be so unfair as to shock the conscience, the combination of each incomplete factor will justify denial of specific performance. Schiff v. Breitenbach, Ill.Supr., 14 Ill. 2d 611, 153 N.E.2d 549, 551-552 (1958); 11 Williston, Contracts §§ 1427-1428 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1968). Lord argues that all of these factors are present in this case.
The evidence establishes that Schettler's mental faculties were failing and that Hill was attempting to take over her financial affairs and obtain the farm by bequest. In the face of these pressures, there is no evidence that anyone, be it a lawyer or a disinterested friend or business acquaintance, ever pointed out to Schettler the significance of the various contract terms. Two realtors were ostensibly her agents, yet there is no evidence that either of them suggested that she attempt to negotiate more favorable contract terms. Indeed, if the substance of Simpson's response to Schettler's question about how much she was getting from the sale of the farm is fairly stated in the transcript introduced into evidence, she may well have been misled.
At the time she signed the contract, Schettler was told that the price on the farm totaled approximately $523,000. Simpson did explain that $350,000 would be paid at closing and that a $75,000 note would be paid over 20 years at 10% interest. However, a more complete and more accurate response to Schettler's question would have resulted in a "total" of approximately $453,000, not $523,000. The contract required Schettler to pay $35,000 in real estate commissions, $7,500 of McAllister's settlement costs, $4,250 in transfer taxes and $24,000 in lease payments. If the $75,000 note were included in this calculation at face value, Schettler would have found that her net proceeds would be approximately $353,000 or approximately 32% less than the "total" given by Simpson.
An analysis of the contract itself, independent of the manner in which it was explained to Schettler, leads to the conclusion that it was a hard bargain at the time it was made. While the evidence suggests that the $425,000 purchase price was within the range of fairness, none of the realtors opined that $401,000 would be a fair price. The $24,000 difference comes from the lease clause in the contract. As noted at the outset, the contract provides that the property is to be free and clear of all leases or present lessee is to rent the 240 tillable acres for $100 per acre. There was testimony about the fact that neither McAllister nor the realtors were able to obtain copies of the existing leases prior to the execution of the contract. Thus, they assumed (or, more accurately, hoped) that any existing leases were terminable at will. In that event, the lease clause would present no financial burden to Schettler. However, the fact is that Schettler had a two-year written lease at a rent of $50 per acre. As a result, the parties are in agreement that Schettler would be obligated under the contract to pay a total of $24,000 to McAllister under the lease clause.
*624 Another aspect of the contract that bears comment is the second mortgage Schettler was obliged to take back from McAllister. There is nothing inherently unfair about an elderly person taking a second mortgage. Here, for example, there is no evidence that Schettler needs the additional cash to maintain herself comfortably and, if she passes away before the mortgage is paid, the remaining balance will be an asset of her estate. A second mortgage may in some cases be necessary in order to sell one's property at a favorable price. However, Schettler hardly obtained a favorable price and, as a result of the second mortgage, 100% of the purchase price is being financed. Thus, Schettler faces a risk that her security interest in the farm will not fully compensate her in the event of a foreclosure.
It is questionable whether any one of these circumstances, standing alone, would be sufficient to deny specific performance. Viewed collectively, however, I find that equitable relief is inappropriate. Schettler was unsophisticated in business matters, in need of round-the-clock nursing assistance and somewhat mentally impaired. She was being pressured to turn over her affairs to Hill at the same time that she was presented with the contract. Schettler was taken to a stranger's home to sign the contract and, apparently, was never given a full explanation of her contractual obligations or the financing arrangements. The purchase price, after computing in the $24,000 lease payment, is approximately 25% below the higher of her two asking prices and includes the risk of carrying a second mortgage where there is no cushion of equity. Under this unusual combination of facts, I conclude that specific performance should not be granted.
I request that Lord's counsel prepare a form of order in accordance with this opinion, on notice.
 These amounts add up to $430,000. Since the purchase price is $425,000, the earnest money presumably would go to closing or other costs leaving the purchase price 100% financed.
 As will be explained hereafter, Schettler signed two listing agreements one called for a 7% commission and the other a 10% commission. The contract Schettler signed was based on a 10% commission but the commission was reduced by $7,500 to adjust for Schettler's obligation to pay McAllister's settlement costs.
 On July 11, 1985, Lord replaced Walls as guardian of Schettler's property.
 Legally cognizable undue influence consists of four elements: (1) a person who is subject to undue influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a disposition to exert such influence; and (4) a result indicating the presence of undue influence. Robert O. v. Ecmel A., Del.Supr., 460 A.2d 1321, 1323 (1983). Thus, although Hill was undoubtedly trying to influence Schettler's behavior, since he failed completely to achieve his desired result, his actions do not constitute undue influence. They do, however, contribute to the totality of circumstances making specific performance inappropriate.

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