Today the Washington Post has an excellent front page story by Carrie Johnson proving that one crooked Medicare provider with a laptop can steal even more than that–to be specific, one single South Florida Medicare/Medicaid provider bilked the United States out of $105 million.
Hopefully, this will show the importance of the other news of the day: the House Judiciary Committee just announced that it will hold hearings on the False Claims Correction Act of 2008 next Thursday, June 19th.
While the House bill largely tracks the Senate bill, it includes a number of additional provisions, including a provision addressing the interplay between Federal Rule of CIvil Procedure 9(b) and the FCA. This bill includes sponsors from both sides of the aisle, and hopefully more will come on board soon.
The topic of today’s post is the recovery of mandatory attorney’s fees under the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act in Virginia state court. I find it interesting how many attorneys simply do not pay attention to maximizing the fee recovery under fee shifting statutes generally, although federal court practitioners tend to be a little more experienced in this area. There is also a well-developed body of case law in the federal system dealing with attorney’s fee awards and the factors that courts consider in making an award; in Virginia state courts, there is considerably less guidance.
In the Fourth Circuit the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) generally govern. Those factors (i.e., time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues involved; the skill and experience required to handle the case; the opportunity costs from being precluded from other work; the time limitations imposed on the lawyer; the result obtained, the reputation and skill of the attorney, and so forth) have been applied many times over the years.
Additionally, federal practitioners in the D.C. area have the Laffey Matrix which is compiled annually by the Department of Justice’s Civil Division. Although it does not have the force of law, the Laffey Matrix does track the Uniform Price Index compiled by the Department of Labor for attorney’s fees. The Laffey Matrix also seems to be gaining popularity each year, and it is applied widely in major metropolitan areas.
In Virginia state courts, however, the case law is sparse on attorney fee awards, although there is some guidance. In the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, I strongly suggest not following the fee petition suggested by the Fairfax County Bar, which is only two or three pages long. To be fair, the fee petition recommended by the FBA is probably quite sufficient for collections matters, or domestic relations cases, but as long as large fee awards are possible, I suggest practitioners follow the Virginia Supreme Court’s guidance.
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that, in evaluating the evidence regarding the reasonableness of counsel fees, the fact finder may consider, (1) the time and effort expended by the attorney, (2) the nature of the services rendered, (3) the complexity of the services, (4) the value of the services to the client, (5) the results obtained, (6) whether the fees incurred were consistent with those generally charged for similar services, and (7) whether the services were necessary and appropriate. See, Schlegel v. Bank of America, N.A., 271 Va. 542, 556, 628 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2006). In making an attorney’s fee award, the trial court will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Virginia Bank, 243 Va. 94 (1992).
It is important to remember that attorney’s fees are mandatory under the VFATA, and should be seen as a major portion of damages from the very start of the litigation. Even an award of a single $5,000 penalty under the VFATA would entitled the plaintiff to mandatory attorney’s fees. In litigation under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Virginia Supreme Court has upheld sizable awards of attorney’s fees. See, RF & P Corp. v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 440 S.E.2d 908 (Va.1994). In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s award of $133,000 in attorneys fees for violations of Virginia’s FOIA statute, even where petitioner did not prevail on all counts in the initial ccomplaint.
A party entitled to an award of attorney’s fees must establish a prima facie case that the fees requested are reasonable. Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1998). I have attached /files/116785-109034/bruggemann_decla.pdf”>example.
These declarations were for an FLSA case, and so you would generally want to get declarations from attorneys familiar with false claims litigation under the Federal False Claims Act or the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act. However, such specialized knowledge is not necessary to support the hourly fee rate, as we see here.
There is more Virginia case law available, and we will revisit this topic from time to time.
Trouble on the Horizon: Fourth Circuit Affirms Judge Lee’s Dismissal of FCA case in United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR, Holds that Wrongful Terminations Claims under the FCA are Subject to Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts.
On Friday, May 17th, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s dismissal of a lawsuit brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) by two relators against their former employers Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. and Services Employees International, Inc. The relators’ claims—arising out of the defendants’ alleged failure to deliver contractually promised services to the United States pertaining to the maintenance of trucks and other moving equipment in Iraq—were filed under seal in 2004 pursuant to the qui tam procedures of the FCA and served on the United States Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia.
To read the district court opinion dismissing the Complaint in United States ex rel Godfrey v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., click /files/116785-109034/USA_exrel_godfry_v_KBR_4thcir.pdf”>here.
The relators alleged FCA violations in several different scenarios. First, relators alleged that the defendants failed to satisfy the contract’s maintenance and repair requirements by failing to perform routine maintenance procedures on trucks and other vehicles. Relators alleged that defendants (1) made false certifications; (2) wrongfully induced the United States to enter into the contract in violation of the FCA, and (3) engaged in a conspiracy to submit false claims to the United States for payment in violation of the FCA.
Relators also alleged that they experienced unlawful retaliation when they were terminated from their employment, and thus brought claims pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that those claims were stayed pursuant to an arbitration agreement each employee signed at the outset of his employment.
Affirming the district court’s dismissal, the appeals court held that the relators could not state an FCA claim for fraudulent inducement. The court reasoned that the defendants’ statement that they would perform the maintenance and repair work specified under the contract was not an objective falsehood, but was, at best, a disputed legal question.
Turning to the fraudulent inducement claim, the court noted that, since the government form—known as a DD Form 1155—alleged to have been used to fraudulently induce the contract award was not executed until five months after the defendants’ work began, the statements contained in that document could not have induced the Government to contract with the defendants.
Moreover, the court stated that because the DD Form 1155 is a standard, boilerplate government form without an express certification, the repair and maintenance language relied on by the relators in the DD Form 1155 was not material to the contract. Presumably, had the repair and maintenance language been of such profound importance to the contract, it would not have been included on the DD Form 1155, but would have been incorporated from some other, more specific, document attached to the contract.
Much of this will come as no surprise to qui tam practitioners, as the Fourth Circuit has been one of only three circuits to read an implicit materiality requirement into the FCA. The FCA itself, of course, does not contain a materiality requirement, and many find it strange that the Fourth Circuit would take it upon itself to read such a requirement into the statute.
With regards to the arbitration agreement the plaintiffs signed at the outset of their employment, the Fourth Circuit also followed its past precedent and held that the plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) were subject to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §3 and §4).
Careful readers will note that the employment at issue here was for work related to trucks and other moving equipment in Iraq, and thus would seem to fall within the exception to the FAA for those engaged in “foreign commerce.” Interestingly, the employees had also signed a choice of law provision in their agreements, which called for the contract to be governed by principles of Texas law. Thus, the Court ruled, even if the FAA did not apply, the strong presumption in favor of arbitration under Texas law would suffice to compel arbitration.
However, it is always for a Court, and not an arbitrator, to decide whether the provisions of an arbitration agreement apply. A.T. Massey Coal v. International Union, 799 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986). Moreover, general contractual defenses, such as duress, fraud or unconscionability may apply and may be grounds to invalidate arbitration agreements. Doctor’s Associations v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Given the fact that the filing of an arbitration action would undoubtedly count as the sort of public disclosure which is prohibited by the FCA, practitioners should take note that the holding in this case does very little to actually change the basic procedure of a qui tam filing. Qui tam complaints must still be filed under seal, and issues related to the enforceability of claims under §3730(h) can be dealt with at the time of unsealing.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Court’s ruling for qui tam practitioners will be that clients may be more likely to attempt to initiate arbitration proceedings on their own, prior to retaining counsel. Counsel will have to be vigilant to warn potential clients that any such filing will count as a public disclosure, which will almost certainly disqualify them from pursuant a False Claims action later.
Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit receives National Award and Recovers More than $650 million in one year!
Yesterday, the Virginia Office of the Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) recieved the the “Inspector General’s State Medicaid Fraud Control Award.” To view the press release, click here.
On a related note, the Virginia Office of the Attorney General now basically pays for itself! If you ask me, this is a direct result of Virginia’s fine tradition of law enforcement.
This will mark the third blog post in our occasional series dealing with filings under the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act from across the Commonwealth. In previous posts, I shared the first complaint filed under the VFATA, along with the first “Notice of Intervention” ever filed by the Office of the Attorney General in Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Va. Turf Management v. Resolute, et al.
(1) a private party with evidence of wrongdoing hires private counsel, assembles his or her evidence with their counsel, prepares a lengthy, detailed disclosure of all of the material evidence they have, and submits this disclosure to the Virginia Office of the Attorney General. The party initiating the action is often called the “relator” instead of “plaintiff.” At this time, of course, the entire case is not to be discussed with anyone outside the Office of the Attorney General and the relator’s counsel. To do so could derail the entire case.
(2) After serving the disclosure statement and all of the evidence in a relator’s possession, the relator, through counsel, files the Complaint under seal in the appropriate Circuit Court. See my earlier posts on filing under seal for more information here.
(3) The sealed Complaint is served on the Office of the Attorney General, who will then have 120 days to investigate. At the end of the 120 day period, the Commonwealth with do one of three things.
The three choices of the Commonwealth are to either file a “Notice of Intervention” (which means that the AGs office will take over prosecution of the case) or the Commonwealth can move to dismiss the entire case, on the grounds that the Complaint is not well-founded, or for some other reason. Finally, the Commonwealth can file a “Notice of Declination.” If the Commonwealth files a Notice of Declination, it means that they are not going to take over prosecution of the case, but that the relator and his counsel should be allowed to prosecute the case on behalf of the Commonwealth as well as on behalf of the private relator.
As noted earlier, it was not until last year that the Commonwealth filed its first notice of declination, which required an Order to unseal the case and issue the summonses, which you can view here. This is my case, and it is still in litigation, so I am somewhat limited in what I can say here, except that I hope this contributes to the public understanding of the statute.
While I am as big a fan of the D.C. Examiner as anyone–and I especially enjoy the work of William Flook, one of their staff writers–I cannot let the blather that was passed off as an editorial yesterday stand without comment.
Of course, I realize that editorials are specifically intended to take controversial positions on pressing issues of the day. Editorials are intended to spark letter writing, discussion, and debate. Moreover, there is no doubt that the False Claims Correction Act of 2007 is among the pressing issues of the day, regardless of whether you agree or disagree with it, so it is fair game for editorial writers.
My problem–and the reason I label the editorial as blather–is not that the article takes a position I disagree with. The article yesterday is blather because it is not an editorial at all. In fact, the article yesterday does a grave disservice to the art and tradition of editorializing in the American press. I would have enjoyed reading a well-written, intelligent editorial raising good arguments against the False Claims Correction Act–although I would still reserve the right to blog in response.
The simple fact is that this editorial was written by someone without any understanding at all of basic legal terminology and basic legal concepts–never mind the political history and economics of the False Claims Act. It was obviously written by someone with an obvious bias who was not concerned with being taken seriously by educated readers–in other words, someone with no business writing editorials for a D.C. area newspaper.
First, the author’s complete ignorance of basic legal terminology is offensive. The article consists of 408 words total, and the words “class action” appear no less than seven times. This is complete stupidity, because the FCA does not, never has, and never will, have anything to do with class actions. Rather, I mention this first because it shows the author’s obvious ignorance, and highlights his or her efforts to trot out the old familiar terminology instead of actually contributing something to the debate. Any further discussion of this logical error would quickly devolve into dry legal stuff, so I will move on.
Leaving aside the fact that the FCA enjoys bipartisan support, Republicans have often been at the forefront of the FCA. The primary proponent of the original statute was Abraham Lincoln, the very founder of the Republican Party. In fact, the FCA was known for years as “Lincoln’s Law.” In 1986, Ronald Reagan breathed new life into the FCA by signing the 1986 FCA amendments. John Ashcroft, the first Attorney General under President Bush, was a zealous advocate for the FCA–and he was in no way in favor of class actions or plaintiffs lawyers. These are just two examples that occur to me off the top of my head–the list could go on and on.
for alleged fraud that in most cases doesn’t even exist.
Fraud against the federal government doesn’t exist? The author obviously has no clue–about government contracting, healthcare, social security, the budget process, politics, or anything else. I wonder why the Department of Health and Human Services bothers to publish all of those work plans for fraud investigations if there is no fraud? Why do we even have an Office of the Inspector General at all? Why do we have so many criminal laws criminalizing Medicare and Medicaid fraud if there is so little fraud?
And then I saw the next page, and everything became clear. The next page features a quarter-page advertisement from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Institute for Legal Reform, two voices against the FCA. Obviously, this ignorant editorial was quickly written to pander these deep-pocket advertisers, whom the D.C. Examiner can scarcely afford to lose.
I cannot resist the urge to throw in a jab at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce here. Government, in all of its forms, does not create wealth; rather, government redistributes wealth. A large part of politics today turns on the who, where, when, why and how the wealth of the American people is redistributed. Players like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, I think it is fair to say, are generally against increased government, and in favor of the privatization of government functions.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce would, I think, agree with me that private industry is, as a rule, more efficient and cost effective than government. So I find it interesting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce protests so vehemently against the privatization of law enforcement by statutes such as the FCA.
Could we not get more efficient and cost effective law enforcement through privatization? You bet, and that is why we have laws such as the FCA. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is only in favor of some privatization, however, and they are all in favor of redistribution of wealth, so long as the money is redistributed to business.
The False Claims Correction Act of 2007, like everything in civil society, is and should be the subject of intelligent debate and discussion. The D.C. Examiner’s Editorial of May 6, 2008 contributes nothing to the public debate about the False Claims Correction Act. Moreover, by trotting old familiar emotion-laden words like “class action” that have nothing to do with the FCA, the editorial became nothing more than a rant–and a pandering one designed to keep a deep pockets advertiser happy, at that.
An article published by two professors at the University of Chicago should be of some interest to readers of this blog. See, Blowing the Whistle: Which External Controls Best Reveal Corporate Fraud?
The link is to a newsletter distributed by the University of Chicago and not to the paper itself. The sub-title of the linked article says, “New research suggests that the best way to promote fraud detection is to extend the Federal False Claims Act to corporate fraud.” At the risk of sounding snobby, I would like to point out that is not, strictly speaking, an accurate way to conceptualize what the study says.
The Federal False Claims Act, of course, applies to “any person”–whether a natural person, a corporation or other limited-liability entity, or an unincorporated entity, or any combination thereof–who makes a false claim to the government for money. The law levels the playing field for the government by removing the more onerous burden of proving fraud — instead, one needs only to prove that a party made a claim to the government that it new was false.
But the real power of the statute lies in its qui tam provisions, which give any person with non-public knowledge of a false claims being made to the government the right to retain a lawyer and prosecute the case in conjunction with the United States Department of Justice (or, under our VFATA, the Office of the Virginia Attorney General).
So, what the subheading means to say, I think, is that the unique qui tam structure of the Federal False Claims Act–which allows private citizens to prosecute cases on behalf of the government and calls for a percentage of the government’s recovery to be paid to the party who blew the whistle on the fraud–should be extended to the corporate governance sphere.
In other words, private citizens should be deputized in the corporate world.
And thus the article strikes upon one of the themes of this blog: the utility and effectiveness of private law enforcement generally. We do not need to go so far as qui tam to see that private law enforcement is effective.
At any rate, check out the study, it is worth a read.
It is well known that the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act–like its counterpart the Federal False Claims Act–provides for treble damages against anyone submitting false claims to a government entity for payment.
But the VFATA and the Federal False Claims Act also create civil penalties for each violation of the law–that is, for each false claim submitted for payment. These civil penalties are, for all practical purposes, a liquidated damages provision that encourages individuals to blow the whistle, and encourages lawyers to learn about and prosecute these claims, even in cases where the dollar amount of each individual false claim might be very small.
Moreover, civil penalties under the VFATA and the FCA are mandatory. A trial court may exercise its discretion as to whether the higher or lower amount of penalties is awarded, but the Court does not have discretion to reduce the number of penalties. See, United States v. Cato Bros. Inc., 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959).
Civil penalties have been a feature of the Federal False Claims Act since it was first passed during the American Civil War in 1863. The civil penalties called for in the first Federal False Claims Act were $2,000 per claim. Currently, the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act provides for civil penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each false claim submitted to the Commonwealth. The Federal False Claims Act provides for penalties of between $5,500 and $11,000 for each false claim.
If anyone feels that the imposition of such a penalty is too harsh, consider this as proof of Congress’ intent to add teeth to the FCA — after adjusting for inflation, in today’s dollars the original False Claims Act called for penalties of $41,000 for each false claim.
One of my stated purposes in starting this blog was to create interest in the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and in qui tam practice in general. In order for statutes such as the Federal False Claims Act and the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act to achieve their goals, it is necessary to build a public-private partnership between qui tam attorneys in private practice and our counterparts in the Virginia Office of the Attorney General and the United States Department of Justice.


§ MONDAY 11 FEBRUARY—Remaining stages of the British Aerospace Bill.
§ TUESDAY 12 FEBRUARY and WEDNESDAY 13 FEBRUARY—Remaining stages of the Education (No. 2) Bill.
§ At the end of the debate on Tuesday: Second Reading of the Consular Fees Bill.
§ THURSDAY 14 FEBRUARY—Debate on a motion on European Community documents on Community fisheries policy. The relevant numbers will appear in the Official Report.
§ FRIDAY 15 FEBRUARY—Private Members' Bills.
§ MONDAY 18 FEBRUARY—Second Reading of the Broadcasting Bill.
§ R/107/78 Commons Fisheries Policy.
§ 5877/79 Fishery Resources: by catches.
§ 6276/79 Fishery Resources: by catches.
§ 7348/79 Fishery Resources: by catches.
§ 8392/79 Fisheries NW Atlantic.
§ 8608/79 Fisheries: salmon protection/Baltic Sea.
§ 9912/79 Swedish Salmon: permits.
§ 10285/79 1st Report Scientific/Technical Committee for Fisheries.
§ 11035/79 Fishery Conservation/Management objectives.
§ 10966/79 (TAC) Certain Fish Stocks (1980).
§ 11292/79 Fishery conservation/Norway/Sweden/Faroe Islands.
§ 4096/80 Total catch information/fishing operations.
§ 4481/80 Total Catch Quotas for 1980.
§ The relevant reports of the European Legislation Committee are the 12th, 15th and 18th Reports of Session 1977–78, the 6th Report of 740 Session 1978–79, and the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th, 16th and 18th Reports of Session 1979–80.
§ HC 29-XII (1977–78), paragraph 1; HC 29-XV (1977–78) paragraph 3; HC 29-X VIII (1977–78), paragraph 2; HC 10-VI (1978–79), paragraph 2; HC 159-II (1979–80), paragraph 2; HC 159-III (1979–80), paragraph 15; HC 159-V (1979–80), paragraphs 6 and 7; HC 159-IX (1979–80), paragraph 5; HC 159-XI (1979–80), paragraph 5; HC 59-XIII (1979–80), paragraph 3; HC 159-XV (1979–80), paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; HC 159-XVI (1979–80), paragraphs 1 and 12; HC 158-X VIII, paragraph.
In view of the growing unemployment in Scotland and the industrial distress that is being caused there, will the right hon. Gentleman consider providing a day in Government time to discuss Scottish affairs? Secondly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the proposal that has been brought forward in connection with the remaining stages of the Education (No. 2) Bill to remove the obligation to provide nursery education for the first time since it appeared in the Education Act 1944? The right hon. Gentleman is treating the House in an unworthy manner by bringing forward at this late stage—when the timetable motion has been agreed and the business has been allocated—an important issue of this sort.
My hon. Friends the Members for Bedwellty (Mr. Kinnock) and for Bolton, West (Mrs. Taylor) and I have been pressing for a statement for three months. It has come at the very last moment. Instead of trying to sneak it through in this way, will the right hon. Gentleman please consider giving extra time for consideration of this important matter and, if necessary, recall the Business Committee?
New clauses are considered first by the Education Committee. The proposal is not really a great change in practice. When I was at the Department of Education and Science there was a strong body of opinion within the Department that there was not an obligation. This is a clarifying amendment, rather than a basic change of principle.
With regard to the point about Scotland, I am happy to tell the right hon. Gentleman that I hope to accede to his 741 request in the very near future. We have a debate on Welsh affairs, and we should have a debate on Scottish affairs.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that engineering is more important than broadcasting? When will he stage a debate on the Finniston report?
I do not wish to make a judgment of Solomon between those two matters. They are both of very great importance. I shall certainly bear my hon. Friend's point in mind. Perhaps it is a subject that can be fitted in to another general debate.
If the right hon. Gentleman cannot arrange an early debate, will he put pressure on his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to look seriously at this case and to reach a conclusion, and not cause lawyers to have to drag this woman into the courts?
I know that the hon. Gentleman has had consultations on the matter with my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Home Office. There seem to have been various changes of mind on the question whether proceedings should be brought or not, and the position of Mrs. Kakar in relation to those exchanges is unclear. It is because of that that the matter has become unavoidably protracted. I shall certainly discuss it with my right hon. Friend.
However much the right hon. Gentleman may wish to allow his Tory friends in Oxfordshire to abolish nursery education, he must give the House an opportunity to debate such a major issue at some length. Does he realise that if he does not do that it will be debated at considerable length in another 742 place? Does he plan to introduce a timetable there also?
The hon. Gentleman is exaggerating the point beyond all recognition. There is no question of abolishing nursery education. This is a clarifying amendment.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that the arbitrary action of the printers in cutting off the printing of Hansardhalf-way through the afternoon has ceased to become an unfortunate lapse, and is now a very nasty habit—so much so that we did not get last Monday's questions and answers until Wednesday? The report of the debate was issued in two separate parts. Will my right hon. Friend take steps—since it has never happened previously, until recent weeks—to stop that happening?
I have every sympathy with my right hon. Friend and other hon. Members on that point. We are faced with a shortage of staff. [HON. MEMBERS: "Do something about it."] It is all very well to say "Do something about it." If I were to set the type myself it would result in chaos. The newly proposed Hansard Press, under the auspices of the Stationery Office, will shortly be in operation, and I hope that the situation will then improve. I understand that more people are being recruited.
The answer given to the Liberal spokesman is totally unsatisfactory. In our view, and in the view of most people, the Education (No. 2) Bill removes an obligation that has existed since 1944, and that has been understood to exist since 1944, on local education authorities to provide nursery education. There is a difference of view about that, but no one can deny that it has stood for 36 years and that it is regarded as being fundamentally important. Why is the proposal being introduced at this late stage, when the timetable motion and the clauses to be considered have been fixed? I must press the right hon. Gentleman to give time for the House to consider this important principle. If he does not do so, I fear that there will be trouble. He cannot sneak it through in this way and expect co-operation on other matters.
I believe that the right hon Gentleman is exaggerating the issue. Although the provision may have been in the Education Act, there is no example of any effort being made to enforce that principle against an education authority. As I understand it, it is a clarifying amendment.
Will my right hon. Friend confirm that no proposals will be brought forward at present to alter the composition of the House of Lords?
I can give my hon. Friend an undertaking that that is not the first priority of the Government.
May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that he is Leader of the whole House? If the shift contained in the Secretary of State for Education's new clause is so marginal from the 1944 position, why was it necessary to take the advice of the Attorney-General a month ago? Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the matter is being introduced at this late stage in the Bill because there is need to grant immunity to the county of Oxfordshire, which is bent on virtually abolishing education for the rising-fives in defiance of what has been understood to be the law throughout the entire country since 1944?
It really has nothing to do with the situation in Oxfordshire. The fact that the Attorney-General was called in to advise supports the point that I am making. As the Leader of the Opposition suggested, there were two points of view, but there is no example of the principle having been enforced on a local education authority.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman a simple question. Will he accept that there is great feeling about the matter? He may be right. We think that he is wrong. Will he give adequate time now for that principle to be discussed on the Floor of the House? When the timetable motion was arranged, there was clearly no intention of that taking place. The Secretary of State for Education has introduced a new and important issue. Will the right hon. Gentleman give extra time to discuss that? It is a simple request and he should concede it.
I shall certainly consider it. I cannot give an undertaking 744 to the right hon. Gentleman in those terms. However, as he has raised the issue I shall discuss it with my right hon. Friend.
Has my right hon. Friend re-read the terms of early-day motion 345 on the impact of micro-computers and silicon chips?
Bearing in mind the hysterical observations outside the House that these devices might bring about mass unemployment or mass leisure, neither of which is true, will my right hon. Friend give the House an opportunity to debate their political, social and economic impact?
I am aware that the Department of Industry is proceeding with a comprehensive programme to encourage the application and development of microelectronics through the microprocessor application product and the microelectronics industry support programme. It is an important issue, but I am afraid that I cannot hold out promise of an early debate.
Does the Leader of the House recognise that an element in parliamentary democracy rests on the single-Member constituency? If so, will he give time to debate the conduct of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) in not only challenging the decisions of Sandwell local authority, which is quite outside her area, but also in referring those decisions to what the hon. Lady calls "the highest possible level?" Will the right hon. Gentleman give time for a debate on the fundamentals of the democratic process, so that the hon. Lady may be informed of how to uphold and not abuse that process?
I would be the last person to interfere in a quarrel between ladies.
Will my right hon. Friend accept that any intervention that I may have made in matters that cut across another hon. Member's constituency occurred because those matters have 745 a direct bearing on my constituency? Will he further accept that the matter to which the hon. Member for West Bromwich, West (Miss Boothroyd) refers concerns to some degree a community school in my constituency? I hope that my right hon. Friend will agree that I am well aware of the rules of the House, and that there is no need whatsoever for a debate.
I thank my hon. Friend for throwing new light on the question and for having stated her case so cogently. I can add nothing whatsoever to it.
Will the Leader of the House find time for at least a short debate on the facilities available for members of the public when they come here on a mass lobby or on an individual basis? Will he accept that the two large lobbies in the past two weeks have demonstrated the inadequacy of the facilities available for people who come to the House to consult their Members of Parliament? Many hon. Members have had to resort to meeting constituents in the park. May we have a debate in the near future?
I do not believe that we can have a debate on the matter, although I appreciate the difficulties that some constituents may have. I ask the hon. Gentleman to also consider the great strain placed on the staff of this House by mass lobbies. May I also tell him that my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Stradling Thomas) and the right hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Harrison) have devoted a great deal of time to trying to make the problems more manageable? This week they have been working particularly hard.
In view of the disappointing outcome of this week's Common Market discussions on the yarn processing industry, will my right hon. Friend find time for a statement by the Secretary of State for Trade?
I shall pass my hon. Friend's request for a statement to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade.
Will the Leader of the House go further than that? Is he aware that there was a clear impression that the Secretary of State may be making a statement in the House this week, follow- 746 ing those negotiations? Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that the failure of the Secretary of State to reach agreement on action against cheap American imports is viewed with great dismay in textile areas, especially in West Yorkshire, where the carpet industry is under disastrous pressure? May I urge the Leader of the House to find time for the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House?
I agree that it is an extremely important commercial matter. It is of concern to all parts of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. As I have said, I shall pass the request to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and tell him of the anxiety in the House.
Has the right hon. Gentleman given further consideration to the problem of Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Overseas Development Agency questions, which was discussed with him by my right hon. Friend the Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore) and myself?
Yes, I have. I am pleased to tell the right hon. Lady that agreement has been reached between all the interested parties on a scheme that will increase the time spent on general Foreign Office questions by 25 per cent. and, at the same time, free hon. Members to ask questions on general Foreign Office matters and overseas development in close proximity.
Under that plan, general Foreign Office questions will go on on the usual day until 3.10 pm. European Community questions will proceed until 3.30 pm. Overseas development questions will be taken for the same 10 minutes as now, but I have transferred them to Monday, when Trade questions are first on the Order Paper. I stress that that in no way reflects on the integral position of ODA within the Foreign Office, which will continue. Church Commission questions will be taken on the appropriate Monday at 3.10 pm, before arts questions.
A revised question roster will be issued lo take effect from the beginning of March. I hope that the right hon. Lady will agree that I have tried in a difficult matter to reach a more satisfactory arrangement.
May I, on behalf of my right hon. Friend and myself, welcome the efforts that the right hon. Gentleman has made, without in the least sharing his definition of the differential role of FCO and ODA? We hope that those arrangements will prove more satisfactory.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is no doubt that the split printing of Hansard is causing a great deal of difficulty, as is the occasional shortage of other Government papers? Therefore, following true Tory principle, if the Government themselves, through Her Majesty's Stationery Office, cannot get the printing right, can my right hon. Friend put it out to public tender, so that we can have some competition?
I am reluctant to do that. However, if these troubles continue we shall have to explore a number of other possibilities. The difficulty is the shortage of staff in the typesetting area. I have inquired into these matters and have been informed that that is now being remedied. I am distressed about this, but it is a difficult situation, Tory or any other principles notwithstanding.
I welcome the Minister's decision on overseas aid, but does he accept that his decision to transfer those questions to the Monday when trade questions are considered is wholly unacceptable, since he has already cut down the amount of time available for questioning the Government on prices by incorporating the responsibility for prices and consumer protection within the Department of Trade? This is an abuse that will not protect the Government from continuing attack on the prices front.
I was not considering prices here. I was trying to meet the representations that have been made to me by the right hon. Member for Lanark (Dame Judith Hart), the right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore) and hon. Members on the Government Benches who are all very interested in foreign affairs.
As 150 men from South Wales are trying to stop people working at Sheerness, in Kent, 100 people from South Yorkshire and 748 Corby are trying to close the pressed steel factory in Birmingham, and police officers have been injured in both cases, will my right hon. Friend consider, with the Home Secretary, the need for a statement being made by the Minister in this House next week about the implications for public order?
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is keeping in daily touch with the situation over picketing but I shall certainly convey to him what my hon. Friend said.
Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, which shows that as consumers we pay £2,200 million a year to the European Economic Community? Has he seen the statements today that say that the price of butter is to increase by 13p and the New Zealand imports to this country are to be reduced to 90,000 tons a year if the EEC has its way? Is it not about time that the House reconsidered its position in relation to the EEC, and that we had a full-scale debate about it?
In view of the expression of will by the nation in the referendum supporting our membership of the EEC, I do not think it right that we should revise the whole matter.
I have read the report of the Institute of Fiscal Studies. I understand that the figure of £2,200 million has been challenged and is not accepted. Of course, if we are buying food in a world with high market prices we would expect to pay a certain premium on that food for a guaranteed supply. A steady supply of food is more important than the actual price.
What is the reason for the delay in laying the new immigration rules before the House?
There is no delay. It is an important matter, and my right hon. Friend is going into it with his customary thoroughness.
Has the Leader of the House seen the various early-day motions from all parts of the House about the possible closure of sub-post offices as a result of possible changes in payment of benefits?
§ Will the leader of the House make time for a debate on sub-post offices, if not next week, say, on 20 February?
I am aware of the concern about the future of sub-post offices in relation to the payment of social security benefits, and I shall raise the matter with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services.
Will my right hon. Friend give fresh consideration during the coming weeks to the problems that have been caused for a long time now in trying to secure debates in the House on important Royal Commission and other reports? Very often there are delays and often these debates do not take place at all. Specifically, will my right hon. Friend direct his attention to the import Lindop report on data protection which this House has still not debated?
Yes, I will. But I am afraid that there is a limited amount of time for debate. All these matters are important to individual Members but we cannot debate them all at once.
I am sure that the Leader of the House is well aware of the fact that many hon. Members are worried about the future of the common agricultural policy. Unless it is reformed in the next two years it will disintegrate within five years. In view of the seriousness of the tone of the Prime Minister's answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel) this afternoon, will the right hon. Gentleman give us time to make suggestions on and debate the CAP on the Floor of the House? I believe that it would be beneficial to our Minister in Brussels if he were able to express the opinion of hon. Members in future deliberations.
I am afraid that I cannot promise an early debate, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is championing British interests in this regard with skill and determination.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of a serious development, which has gone largely unremarked this week, in that the Secretary of State for the Environment has announced and clearly confirmed that he proposes to monitor the speeches of local government representatives before he decides upon the disbursement of central support for local government? Does the right hon. Gentleman, with his record, not regard that as a serious matter, was he aware of it, and does he not agree that it is such an important development that it should be discussed by the House as a matter of urgency?
I shall certainly raise the matter with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. I am sure that if he is going to monitor these speeches there must be an important reason for doing so.
Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that unemployment in Scotland is such that we cannot accept his answer that there will be a debate soon? Will he give us a guarantee that there will be a debate, if not next week, the week after? Will he ask his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to make a statement in the House next week on the serious allegations being made about widespread bugging of embassies, trade union offices and the delegation to the recent conference at Lancaster House, as he must be alarmed at what appears to be the growing lack of control of the security services, which brings us far nearer the police State than we care to imagine?
I am concerned—as I think all hon. Members are—about bugging. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made it clear that he will make a statement in the House within a reasonable time. As to the debate on Scotland, I have gone as far as I can in indicating my determination to have an early debate on this matter. It would be foolish for me to commit myself to a precise date when I have just made a statement about next week's business.
Is there not a need to debate in the near future the disturbing and repeated allegations about telephone tapping—many of which seen to be unauthorised—and similar operations by the security services? Is it not important for the House of Commons to have a debate to make sure that there is effective political control over the security services?
Yes, I agree that the responsibility for the security services must ultimately rest with the political authority. But on the subject of telephone tapping, I remind the hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said that he will make a statement on this important matter reasonably soon.
Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that the Secretary of State 752 for Trade receives the full, clear and strong message from the House that there was an understanding that, following the EEC discussions about American manmade fibre imports, he would make a statement in the House? Does he realise that every week mills are closing in the textile industry in the West Riding of Yorkshire and that a mill closure was announced in my constituency only this week? To give the industry confidence it is urgent and important that the Secretary of State makes a statement as soon as possible.
Lastly, can the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the Secretary of State for the Environment will not be using electronic surveillance equipment to monitor local councillors' speeches?
With regard to the question of a statement, the hon. Gentleman's argument reinforces the plea that has been made already on that point.
With regard to surveillance of the speeches of local government dignitaries, I should have thought that it might be better to do it through electronic equipment rather than personally.
Order. I shall call the the hon. Gentlemen who have been rising if they will co-operate with me and be brief.
As the Leader of the House recognises that the textile question is so important, does he not think it quite wrong that hon. Members have been fobbed off today with a written statement by the Secretary of State, rather than having the advantage of an oral statement? Will he undertake, because of the mill closures not only in West Yorkshire, which are very serious, but also in Lancashire, to ask the Secretary of State to make a statement on the question in the House tomorrow, given the breakdown in negotiations it appears to have occurred this week in Brussels?
I have seen the written answer that is being given today. It will be published this afternoon. But as I have said, I shall indicate the concern felt in the House about this matter.
I welcome the decision to hold a debate on fisheries. However, will the Leader of the House 753 accept, first, that there is a very large number of documents involved in this debate and, secondly, given the present difficulties associated with the fishing industry, about 40 or 50 hon. Members will wish to be involved, and restricting the debate to the period between 4 o'clock and 7 o'clock next. Thursday will place an intolerable burden on Mr. Speaker? Will the right hon. Gentleman indicate whether he could extend the debate?
I was most anxious to have an early debate because of the matters that were raised in the House last week. With regard to the duration of the debate, I am aware of the number of hon. Members who wish to speak and the number of documents concerned. The debate can be resumed after 10 o'clock; it can be extended until 11.30.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his agreement to have further discussions through the usual channels about further time for the Report stage of the Education (No. 2) Bill. On reflection, does he not think that to discuss before 10 o'clock on the first guillotine day 17 clauses, including a whole new assisted places scheme and a whole new school allocation scheme, and, on top of that, a completely new change, which allows local authorities to abolish nursery education, is an abuse of the procedures of this House, even under the guillotine procedure? When he has his discussions will he bear all those matters in mind and try to find some more time?
I shall certainly bear in mind what the hon. Gentleman said.
When are we likely to get a debate on the Boyle report on research assistants' and secretaries' salaries, especially as the Leader of the House has had the report on his desk since December? When are we to expect a statement on this matter from the Government? Will the right hon. Gentleman explain the delay in making such a statement? Could it be that the Cabinet are divided on this crucial question?
I have been proceeding very quickly on this matter. The hon. Gentleman is mistaken. I did not have the document on my desk before Christmas. The Prime Minister received it on 15 January. I received it from her 754 on 16 January. Since then I have been proceeding very swiftly in these matters, and I hope that it will be possible to make a statement next week.
Will the Leader of the House go a little further than just reconsidering the amout of time for the Report stage of the Education (No. 2) Bill? Will he also reconsider taking it next week? Does he not realise that with five pages of new amendments on the Amendment Paper today, particularly the amendments on nursery education, it is grossly unfair to all the interested groups outside the House, who have virtually no time to read them, to consider their implication and to make representations to hon. Members? If the Government proceed in this way, it means that interested groups will have to make their representations to their Lordships, and that will prolong debate in the other place. Will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the decision to start next Tuesday, as well as giving us more time?
It is a matter for the Business Committee rather than myself. I regret any curtailment of discussion, but I do not think that I could have a guillotine debate all over again.


Whenever the terms "Collective Bargaining Agreement," "Individual Employer," "Employee," "Associate Employee," "Fund," and "Trustees" are used herein, they shall have the meanings given to these terms in the Trust Agreement.
Except where otherwise indicated, the words "Employees" and "Associate Employees" shall have the same meaning in administrating the Plan, except where otherwise specifically provided as to "Associate Employees."
"Annuity Starting Date" shall mean the first day of the first period for which an amount is payable as an annuity, or in the case of a benefit not payable as an annuity, the first day on which all events have occurred which entitle the Employee to such benefit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of an Employee retired on a Disability Retirement, the "Annuity Starting Date" shall mean the date the Employee attains age 65.
"Actuarial Equivalent" or "Actuarially Equivalent" shall mean, for determining Plan benefits, calculations made to produce equal present values.
1.3.1 Benefit Accruals On and After January 1, 2017. For benefit accruals earned on and after January 1, 2017, the determination of whether benefits are Actuarially Equivalent, including Actuarial Equivalence of the 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent Joint and Survivor and Contingent Benefit Options, shall be based on the applicable mortality assumption prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury under Code § 417(e)(3)(B) and the Hurdle Rate as described in Article 6.1.3(b)(1).
1.3.2 Benefit Accruals Prior to January 1, 2017. For benefit accruals earned prior to January 1, 2017, the determination of whether benefits are Actuarially Equivalent shall be made based on the 1984 Unisex Pension Mortality Table, and an interest rate of seven percent (7%). Actuarial reductions for the 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent Joint and Survivor and Contingent Benefit Options are explicitly stated in an Appendix to the Plan. The mortality table applicable for adjusting benefits or limitations under Internal Revenue Code (Code) § 415(b)(2) and for determining the present value of Plan benefits under Code § 417(e)(3) shall be the applicable mortality assumption prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury under Code § 417(e)(3)(B).
1.3.3 Assumptions for Purposes of Internal Revenue Code § 415 Limitations. Notwithstanding subsections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, for distributions after December 31, 2003 and before January 1, 2006, the applicable interest rate assumption for adjusting benefits under Code § 415(b) in a form subject to Code § 417(e)(3) shall be the greater of 5.5% or the rate specified in Code § 417(e) for the fifth month preceding the stability period, which shall be the Plan Year, provided that amounts payable before January 1, 2005 shall not be less than the amount payable using the interest rate assumption in effect on December 31, 2003. For distributions after December 31, 2005, the applicable interest rate assumption for adjusting benefits under Code § 415(b) in a form subject to Code § 417(e)(3) shall be the greater of 5.5% or the rate that provides a benefit of not more than 105% of the benefit that would be provided if the applicable interest rate (as defined in § 417(e)(3)) were the interest rate assumption for the fifth month preceding the stability period, which shall be the Plan Year.
"Compensation" means an Employee's wages within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 3401(a) and all other payments of compensation to an Employee by the Individual Employer (in the course of an Individual Employer's trade or business) for which the Individual Employer is required to furnish the Employee a written statement under Code § 6049(d) and § 6051(a).
"Compensation" shall also include elective deferrals defined in Internal Revenue Code § 402(g)(3), including elective deferrals under § 401(k), § 402(e)(3), § 402(h), § 403(b) or § 408(p)(2)(A)(i), elective contributions or deferrals not included in gross income under Internal Revenue Code § 125 and § 457, and elective reductions under Internal Revenue Code § 132(f)(4).
"Combined Service Credit" shall mean the total of an Employee's Credited Service under this Plan and Reciprocal Service under Article 5.2.1. No more than one year of Combined Service Credit shall be counted for the benefit of any Employee in any calendar year.
"Computation Period" shall mean the Plan Year for all purposes.
"Covered Service" shall mean the Hours of Service of an Employee for which a contribution to the Retirement Plan is required to be made under the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, or other written contribution agreement.
1.8.1 "Credited Future Service" shall mean the years of service credited to any Employee after January 1, 1960. From January 1, 1960 through December 31, 1964, an Employee will be credited with one-half of a year of Future Service for any calendar year in which he has at least 500, but less than 1,000 Hours of Service, and one year of Future Service for any calendar year in which he has 1,000 or more Hours of Service. On or after January 1, 1965, an Employee will be credited with one-half of a year of Future Service for any calendar year in which he has at least 500, but less than 750 Hours of Service, and three-quarters of a year of Future Service for any calendar year in which he has at least 750, but less than 1,000 Hours of Service, and one year of Future Service for any calendar year in which he has 1,000 or more Hours of Service. An Employee will receive no credit for Future Service in a calendar year in which he has less than 500 Hours of Service.
1.8.2 Effective January 1, 1968, after an Employee has reached his Normal Retirement Date, and prior to his actual retirement, he may continue to accumulate Credited Future Service as a result of Covered Hours of Service.
1.8.3 After January 1, 1976, or the Unit Entry Date, if later, an Employee shall also be entitled to a year of Credited Future Service for vesting purposes and to avoid a Break in Service (but not for benefit accrual purposes) for each year of Non-Covered Service with any Employer required to make contributions under this Plan, if the service is contiguous. Non-Covered Future Service is contiguous if: (1) the Non-Covered Service precedes or follows Covered Service; and (2) no quit, discharge, or retirement occurs between such Covered Service and Non-Covered Service.
Contiguous Non-Covered Service may be used to satisfy the requirement of 750 Hours of Service in this Plan in the three (3) consecutive Plan Year periods immediately preceding an Employee's Special Early or Rule of 80 Early Retirement Dates under Articles 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, an Employee's Disability Retirement Date under Article 4.3, or for the Pre-retirement Survivor Benefit of Article 8.2.
1.8.4 An Employee with at least one (1) previous year of service in this Plan shall also be entitled to Credited Future Service for vesting purposes and to avoid a Break in Service (but not for benefit accrual purposes), for service under a residential bargaining agreement that does not require contributions to this Plan, if the employer is required to make contributions on behalf of the Employee for that service to the Carpenters Health and Security Plan of Western Washington. The amount of service earned in this Plan will be equal to the hours of service earned in the Health and Security Plan.
The maximum years of service that can be earned under this Article 1.8.4 is four years.
This Article 1.8.4 will be effective for retirements with an Annuity Starting Date on or after January 1, 1995, for service rendered prior to or after January 1, 1995.
1.8.5 Effective April 1, 2009, an Employee shall receive one year of Credited Future Service for vesting purposes and to avoid a Break in Service (but not for benefit accrual purposes) for each consecutive Plan Year in which the Employee worked 1,000 hours or more in work of the type covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement which is with an Individual Employer immediately preceding the date that Individual Employer first begins contributing to the Plan. An Employee is only entitled to Credited Future Service under this Article 1.8.5 if: (1) the Employee's Individual Employer first begins contributing to the Fund on or after April 1, 2009; (2) the Employee is employed by the Individual Employer on the date the Individual Employer first begins contributing to the Fund; and (3) the Employee earns 1,000 or more Hours of Service with that Individual Employer in the Plan Year in which the Individual Employer first begins contributing to the Plan, or in the immediately following Plan Year. The maximum years of service that can be earned under this Article 1.8.5 is four years. Credited Future Service earned under this Article 1.8.5 will not be used for purposes of determining whether an Employee qualifies for the Rule of 80 Early Retirement.
No more than one year of Credited Future Service will be counted under this Article 1.8 for the benefit of any Employee in a calendar year.
Subject to such maximum, an Employee will be entitled to Credited Past Service for each calendar year during his most recent period of continuous service in which he was employed for 500 or more Hours of Service. The continuous service of an Employee will be considered to have been broken in any calendar year in which he had less than 500 Hours of Service. For purposes of this Article 1.9 and to the extent required by applicable law, periods of service with the Armed Forces of the United States may also be used to establish continuous service or to prevent a break in continuous service. For the purpose of substantiating entitlement to Credited Past Service, the Trustees shall consider all credible evidence thereof presented by the Employee, and may consider proof of the Employee's continuous dues paid membership in the Union as evidence of such continuous service during a particular calendar year.
In order for an Employee to be entitled to any Credited Past Service, Employer Contributions must have been made on his behalf for an aggregate of at least 750 hours of covered service under one or more of the following trusts, namely the Carpenters Health and Security Trust Fund, the Home Builders and Carpenters Health and Security Trust Fund, the Home Builders Security Trust Fund of the State of Washington, and the AGC Security Plan during the three calendar years of 1957, 1958 and 1959.
"Credited Service" shall mean Credited Past Service, if any, and Credited Future Service.
"Employer Contributions" shall mean the contributions that an Individual Employer is required to make to the Fund under the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement or under the terms of a written contribution agreement between an Individual Employer and the Trustees.
An amount recommended by the Plan actuary and approved by the Board of Trustees to fund the Rule of 80 surcharge for Hours of Service on and after June 1, 2000. The reduction shall be expressed as a cents per hour or percentage of contributions. Effective June 1, 2000, the Rule of 80 surcharge adopted by the Board is 16.7% which is applied to the Employer Contributions after the reduction under Article 1.11.1(b).
26% effective for Hours of Service on and after June 1, 2009, but not to exceed a reduction of $1.25 per hour; provided that for Hours of Service worked under a public job or project agreement and performed at a pre-determined and/or prevailing wage rate established under the federal Davis-Bacon Act or Washington State, Prevailing Wage on Public Works statute, this Article 1.11.1(b) is effective on the earlier of the date the rate is reset to the rate maintained by the Master Agreement or June 1, 2010.
"Highly Compensated Employee" for purposes of complying with nondiscrimination provisions under Internal Revenue Code § 401(a)(4) and § 410(b), shall mean a non-collectively bargained Employee who during the Plan Year being tested: (a) is a five percent owner at any time during the year or the preceding year; or (b) for the preceding year, had compensation in excess of $85,000 (adjusted under Internal Revenue Code § 414(q)). The Plan shall use January 30th, as a snapshot day, for purposes of complying with the nondiscrimination provisions and determining who is Highly Compensated.
"Hour of Service" shall mean each hour for which an Employee is paid or entitled to payment for Covered Service by an Individual Employer on account of: (1) performance of duties for the Individual Employer; (2) non-performance of duties due to vacation, holiday, illness, incapacity (including disability), layoff, jury duty, military duty or leave of absence; and (3) an award of back pay, irrespective of mitigation of damages, agreed to by the Individual Employer. Hours shall not be credited under both (3) and (1) or (2). Hours of Service shall be determined on the basis of actual hours for which the Employee is paid or entitled to payment. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no more than 501 Hours of Service shall be credited to an Employee for any single continuous period during which the Employee performs no duties. Hours for non-performance of duties shall be credited in accordance with DOL Regulation §2530.200b-2(b). Hours shall be credited to the applicable Computation Period in accordance with DOL Regulation §2530.200b-2(c).
"Lump Sum Present Value" shall be determined using the 1984 Unisex Pension Mortality Table and the applicable interest rate, equal to the rate which would be used by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in valuing a Lump Sum Distribution for a plan terminating on January 1 of the year of determination. In no event shall the value of the lump sum be less than that calculated using the applicable mortality table and applicable interest rate specified in Internal Revenue Code § 417(e)(3). The applicable interest rate under Internal Revenue Code § 417(e)(3) shall be that specified for the second month preceding the Plan Year in which the lump sum value is determined.
"Non-Covered Service" shall mean service with one of the Individual Employers who is required to make contributions to the Fund but in an employment category which is not covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement or written contribution agreement.
"Participant" shall mean an Employee who participates in the Plan pursuant to Article 3.1.
"Plan Administrator" shall mean the Board of Trustees under the Trust Agreement. The Trustees will employ an administrator to assist them in administering the Plan.
"Plan Year" shall mean the period from January 1 through December 31 of each year.
"Reciprocal Credited Service" or "Reciprocal Service" shall mean such form of service credit as shall have been accumulated by an Employee under a Reciprocal Plan pursuant to Article 5.2. For purposes of determining eligibility for a Pro Rata Reciprocal Pension under Article 5.2 "Reciprocal Credited Service" or "Reciprocal Service" includes hours transferred by this Plan to a Reciprocal Plan in a money-follows-the-man transfer under Article 5.3 for which credit is provided by the Reciprocal Plan, and such hours are not treated as Credited Service under this Plan. The Trustees shall compute Reciprocal Credited Service on the basis of that credit which has been earned and credited under the Reciprocal Plan and certified by the Reciprocal Plan to the Trustees of this Plan.
"Reciprocal Pensions" shall mean the benefits provided under Article 5 hereto for Employees whose work has been divided among areas with which the Carpenters Retirement Trust of Western Washington has a subsisting "Reciprocal Pension Agreement," providing for some form of reciprocity in the accumulation of Pension Credit or Service Credit or in the transfer of contributions.
"Reciprocal Plan" shall mean any other pension plan which is a party to a "Reciprocity Agreement" and which has been recognized by the Board of Trustees.
"Retirement Plan" shall mean this Carpenters Retirement Plan of Western Washington.
"Trust" shall mean that Trust originally created and established on January 1, 1960, as amended.
"Union" shall mean the Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters and its Union Locals who are signatory to a Collective Bargaining Agreement.


text:
This study was conducted to investigate the potential of organic acids and bioactive compounds present in rawbeans to differentiate the sensory quality of coffee from different genotypes and processing methods. During the 2010, 2011 and 2012 crop seasons, beverage quality was analyzed, as well as the profile of organic acids and bioactive compounds caffeine, trigonelline and chlorogenic acids (3,4 and 5-CQA) in raw coffee beans from genotypes Bourbon Amarelo and Acaiá. The samples were collected in commercial fields with altitudes ranging from 932 to 1391 m, in the municipality of Carmo de Minas, MG, Brazil. Two processing methods were adopted: dry process (natural) and wet process (mechanically pulped and demucilaged coffee). All harvest and post-harvest procedures were carried out according to the main technologies for the production of specialty coffees. The sensory analysis was performed using the methodology proposed by the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA). Chemical analyses were performed by High performance liquid chromatography. Data were investigated using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The variations in the contents of organic acids and bioactive compounds were due to the coffee processing method. For genotypes Bourbon Amarelo and Acaiá, the differences in the organic acid profile, associated with caffeine, trigonelline and chlorogenic acids (3,4 and 5-CQA), were essential to differentiate the quality of mechanically pulped and demucilaged coffee. No significant differences were observed in the sensory quality of natural coffee due to the analysis of organic acids and bioactive compounds.
Coffea arabica L., sensory analysis, mechanical demucilaging, natural coffees, chromatographyc analyses.
ALPIZAR, E. et al. Incidence of elevation on chemical composition and beverage quality of coffee in Central America. In: ASIC 2004. 20th International Conference on Coffee Science, Bangalore, India, 11-15 October 2004. Association Scientifique Internationale pour le Café (ASIC), 2005. p. 322-327.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE CAFÉS ESPECIAIS, BSCA. Café especial: produção no Brasil deve ultrapassar Colômbia em menos de dois anos. Varginha, 2017. Disponível em: < http://bsca.com.br/noticia.php?id=453 >. Acesso em: 20 de mai. 2017.
AVELINO, J. et al. Effects of slope exposure, altitude and yield on coffee quality in two altitude terroirs of Costa Rica, Orosi and Santa María de Dota. Journal of the Science of Food and Agriculture, London, v. 85, n. 11, p. 1869-1876, May. 2005.
BERTRAND, B. et al. Comparison of the effectiveness of fatty acids, chlorogenic acids, and elements for the chemometric discrimination of coffee (Coffeaarabica L.) varieties and growing origins. Journal of agricultural and food chemistry, Washington, v. 56, n. 6, p. 2273-2280, Mar. 2008.
BERTRAND, B. et al. Climatic factors directly impact the volatile organic compound fingerprint in green Arabica coffee bean as well as coffee beverage quality. Food chemistry, London, v. 135, n. 4, p. 2575-2583, July. 2012.
BICCHI, C. P. et al. Characterization of green and roasted coffees through the chlorogenic acid fraction by HPLC-UV and principal component analysis. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, Washington, v. 43, n. 6, p. 1549-1555, 1995.
BORÉM, F. M. Protocolo de identidade, qualidade e rastreabilidade para embasamento da indicação geográfica dos cafés da Mantiqueira. In: BORÉM, F. M. (coord.). Relatório Final de Prestação de Contas. Edital CNPq/MAPA/SDA Nº 064/2008. Lavras: UFLA, 2012. 128p.
BORÉM, F. M.; ISQUIERDO, E. P.; TAVEIRA, J. H. S. Coffee Processing. In: BORÉM, F. M. (Org.). Handbook of coffee post-harvest technology. Norcross, Georgia: Gin Press, 2014. v. 1, p. 49-68.
BORÉM, F. M. et al. The relationship between organic acids, sucrose and the quality of specialty coffees. African Journal of Agricultural Research, Ebene, v. 11, n. 8, p. 709-717, Fev. 2016.
BYTOF, G. et al. Influence of processing on the generation of γ-aminobutiric acid in green coffee beans. European Food Research Technology, Heidelberg, v. 220, n. 3, p. 245-250, Nov. 2005.
CAMPA, C. et al. Trigonelline and sucrose diversity in wild Coffea species. Food Chemistry, Oxford, v. 88, n. 1, p. 39-43, Nov. 2004.
DAMATTA, F. M. et al. Ecophysiology of coffee growth and production. Brazilian Journal of Plant Physiology, Londrina, v. 19, n. 4, p. 485-510, Oct./Dec. 2007.
FARAH, A. et al. Effect of Roasting on the Formation of Chlorogenic Acid Lactones in Coffee. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, Washington, v. 53, n. 5, p. 1105-1113, Feb. 2005.
FARAH, A. et al. Correlation between cup quality and chemical attributes of Brazilian coffee. Food Chemistry, London, v. 98, n. 2, p. 373-380, 2006.
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