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The common interest rule or common interest doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that serves to limit the discoverability of certain materials. Many courts describe the common interest rule as an exception to the waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The general rule is that the attorney-client privilege is waived for any material that is disclosed to a third party. The common interest doctrine allows disclosures to a third party to remain privileged, so long as that party has a common legal interest. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the free flow of information to produce the most effective legal advice possible. Courts reasoned that permitting the exchange of communications among defendants with a common defense strategy promotes this same goal; therefore a privilege should exist to protect such communications.
The common interest doctrine developed from the joint defense privilege in criminal cases, was first recognized in 1871. The rule in its initial formulation was limited in its application, stating that a criminal defendant did not waive the attorney-client privilege by disclosing confidential information to co-defendants while in the presence of counsel. The privilege articulated in the Chahoon case was originally very limited in scope, only applying to communications between codefendants and counsel in criminal cases. The privilege was, however, broad enough to apply when the defendants have separate attorneys. The general rule was that a disclosure of material to a third party waives any privilege; however the joint defense doctrine developed as an exception to waiver.
Courts expanded the scope of the joint defense privilege as they were faced with different variations on the original, limited situations in which it applied. Eventually the legal system was presented with cases in which co-defendants in civil actions were attempting to assert the joint defense doctrine. Courts recognized application of this privilege to the civil arena, stating that the same underlying reasons for attorney-client privilege apply to parties in civil cases, so civil defendants should be afforded the privilege as well. Courts first recognized the more expansive common interest doctrine when they were faced with determining whether the joint defense doctrine applied in even more situations. Cases presented questions as to whether the privilege covered communications that civil co-plaintiffs or even parties not involved in the suit, shared while in the presence of counsel in furtherance of a joint strategy. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, for instance, recognized an expanded definition of the privilege, which covers plaintiffs as well. The Court, in the Sedalcek case, reasoned that the extension of the rule was done to achieve fairness, because otherwise cooperating defendants would be better situated than their plaintiff counterparts.
The more expansive statement of the doctrine extended the privilege to any allied party in a civil action, whether plaintiff or defendant. The common interest doctrine operates in the same way as the joint defense privilege and provides an exception to the general rule that a client waives the attorney-client privilege by communicating previously privileged information to a third party. Such an application of the doctrine is more expansive and permits represented parties who share a common legal interest to exchange otherwise privileged information in a confidential manner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice without waiving the attorney-client privilege.
Courts applying the common interest doctrine generally require that the party invoking it prove the following: (1) that an underlying privilege such as the attorney-client privilege protects the communication; (2) that the parties disclosed the communication at a time when they shared a common interest; (3) that the parties shared the communication in furtherance of that common interest; and (4) that the parties have not waived the privilege. The common interest doctrine has been expanded over time, in several ways. Some courts have allowed the doctrine to apply to the work product privilege for attorneys. Courts extended the rule to cover work product because it furthers the fundamental goals of the attorney-client privilege. Parties should be able to share otherwise privileged information freely and without fear of it being used against them later.  Therefore, in some circumstances the work product privilege, not just the attorney-client, can be the underlying privilege for application of the common interest doctrine. Moreover, the common interest doctrine has been expanded by some courts to cover communications that do not occur in the presence of counsel. This is a minority position, but serves to illustrate the expansion of the rule.
The deliberations served the common governmental purpose of resolving disagreements and formulating a mutually agreeable policy to comply with the law. The agencies were engaged in a common effort and sought the advice of counsel about fulfilling their statutory mission… Here, although the documents for which the attorney-client privilege is asserted were shared between multiple agencies, those agencies shared the common goal of reaching a mutually acceptable policy decision that would withstand legal challenge. Accordingly, the common interest doctrine operates to protect these documents from disclosure.
This is a good example of why many courts see the common interest doctrine as an exception to the waiver of attorney-client privilege. This court held that the government did not waive its privilege because it shared information with a party who had a common interest. The court held that all agencies of the federal government were not to be treated as one agency for the purpose of attorney client privilege, but applied the common interest rule to the deliberative process, making certain materials privileged.
One difference between the application of the common interest rule to the attorney-client privilege and the deliberative process privilege is that the deliberative process privilege is qualified, not absolute. Thus, as one court held, “[e]ven once the Court has found that the privilege applies, the documents will still be disclosed if the requesting party’s need for the documents outweighs the agency’s interest in holding them. Any analysis of whether certain material is discoverable must consider not only the circumstance under which it was shared to further a common goal, but also the underlying justification for protecting the information. As in all assertions of deliberative process privilege, the value of free communication among decision-makers must outweigh the public’s reasons for wanting the information disclosed--otherwise the material will be discoverable.
Another way that application of the common interest rule has changed over time is the requirement of confidentiality agreements. Early cases suggested that a confidentiality agreement among the parties was a necessity, or parties could not invoke the common interest doctrine. More recently, courts that have faced this issue have held that if a communication is not first privileged as between a client and his or her attorney, neither the common interest doctrine nor a confidentiality agreement can create a privilege. This is a logical extension of the principle that a formality cannot substitute for the circumstances that establish a genuine attorney-client communication; a confidentiality agreement alone will not create a privilege. The court in Niagara spoke to earlier courts’ analyses, which were predicated on pre-existing requirements of confidentiality agreements, holding that such agreements can be inferred from the actions of the parties. Such agreements may indicate the intent of the parties to ensure that their communications remain confidential. This helps the party seeking to apply the common interest doctrine meet the burden of proof by manifesting the parties’ joint intent that shared information remains confidential. Where the Niagara line of reasoning is adopted, it means that these agreements are no longer required, but they can serve as proof of the intent of the parties attempting to assert the common interest doctrine.
In summary, the common interest rule has been expanded significantly over time by the courts. The rule came from the idea of allowing criminal co-defendants to share confidential information without waiving the attorney-client privilege. The rule eventually spread to the civil arena, where it was eventually applied to any allied parties, whether plaintiff or defendant. The rule has been expanded in some jurisdictions to include the work product and deliberative process privileges as well, allowing more protection for attorneys and the government.
 Bill Brown served as Ohio Attorney General from 1971-1983 after receiving his law degree from Ohio Northern University. The school later established a NAAG scholarship in his honor. Stephen Nevius is a law student from Ohio Northern Petit College of Law.
John Doe, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) ,Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc. 189 B.R. 562, 571 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
 See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822 (1871).
 See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
 See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942)(overruled on other grounds, 215 Minn. 288(Minn.1943; Niagara Mohawk at 562.
 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 406 F.Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
 Sedalcek v. Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 330 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609.
 Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas; In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas at 385; Niagara Mohawk, 189 B.R. at 571; See. An Uncertain Privilege, 15 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 49.
 See Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena; Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.1965).
 See Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Gutierrez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21949 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007).
Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1190.
> 202007 LEXIS 21949, 12.
 Id. at 54-55; See F.T.C. v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1984).
Niagara Mohawk, 189 B.R. at 571.
 Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2005) .

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The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility to impose measures with a view to intercepting a person’s communications following a warrant by the examining magistrate (“juge d’instruction/onderzoeksrechter”). This warrant also needs to be communicated to the public prosecutor.
A warrant is an order coming from the examining magistrate in which s/he imposes special investigation measures, including interception measures. This order needs to explain why such measure are needed and under which circumstances they will be used.
Article 90ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants the examining magistrate, under specified circumstances and for specific cases, the power to issue real-time interception measures.
Article 90quater, §1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that the warrant issued by the examining magistrate and authorising the interception measure needs to contain: (i) the indications and the concrete facts proper to the case justifying the interception measure(s), (ii) the reasons for which the measure is necessary to reveal the truth, (iii) the person, means of communication/telecommunications and/or the place of surveillance, (iv) the period during which the surveillance can be executed (no longer than one month starting from the decision ordering the measure); and (v) the name of the criminal police officer that has been designated to execute the measure.
Article 90quater, §2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that if the interception measure implicates some kind of processing of a communications network the operator of this network or provider of a telecommunications service (“electronic communications operator”) needs to cooperate, if the examining magistrate requests so.
The Royal Decree of 9 January 2003 on the modalities for the legal ‘cooperation duty’ in the case of legal action relating to electronic communications lays down the details of this cooperation duty. Article 6 of the Royal Decree deals with the ability for electronic communication operators to assist in realtime interception operations.
The Royal Decree on legal cooperation duty following legal actions lays down that every electronic communications operator needs to designate one or more persons being charged with the cooperation duty (i.e. the duty to cooperate with the prosecution and investigation authorities with a view to tracking down/identifying/intercepting certain data). These persons form the so-called “Coordination Cell Justice”. Electronic communications operators can decide to form a shared Coordination Cell. This Cell takes the measures which are necessary for interception of private communications or telecommunications following receipt of the warrant of the examining magistrate.
The Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 lays down that intelligence and safety services are allowed to intercept a person’s communications, if national security is at stake. This interception can only be executed after a written request of the Director-General of the State Security (“the Director-General”).
A real-time interception is a so-called “exceptional method for collecting data”. These exceptional methods need to be authorised by the Director-General. With regards to the exceptional methods, article 18/10 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 describes the authorisation to be granted by the Director-General prior to the execution of the interception measures. Before this authorisation becomes final, it has to be made subject to the advice of the Administrative Commission supervising the specific and exceptional methods for collecting data by the intelligence and safety services. The Commission examines in its advice whether the relevant legislation and general principles of subsidiarity and proportionality have been respected. If the advice is negative, the interception measure cannot be executed.
The authorisation needs to be written and contain: (i) a description of the exceptional threats justifying the interception, (ii) reasons why the interception is necessary, (iii) persons or entities whose communications are being intercepted, (iv) the technical means used to intercept, (v) the period of interception; and (vi) names of the intelligence officers involved in the operation.
With regards to an interception measure (in addition to the article 18/10-authorisation), article 18/17, §1 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 lays down that the intelligence services can intercept a person’s communications. §3 lays down that electronic communications operators are required to cooperate with the intelligence services if the interception requires processing by an electronic communications network.
As mentioned above, the Director-General needs to draft a written request to the relevant operator in order for the latter to cooperate. This request contains the advice of the Commission on the general authorisation to use interception measures (as laid down in Article 18/10).
The Royal Decree of 15 October 2010 on specific rules for the legal ‘cooperation duty’ in case of actions of the intelligence services regarding electronic communications lays down the details of this cooperation duty. Every electronic communications operator needs to designate one or more persons being charged with the cooperation duty (i.e. the duty to cooperate with the intelligence services authorities with a view to tracking down/identifying/intercepting certain data). These persons form the so-called “Coordination Cell Justice”. Electronic communications operators can decide to form a shared Coordination Cell. This Cell takes the measures which are necessary for interception of private communications or telecommunications following receipt of the written and reasoned decision of the Director-General of the intelligence service.
Article125, §2 of the, the Electronic Communications Act of 13 June 2005 (relating to interception demands coming from authorities competent for prosecution and investigation of criminal offences and/or the intelligence service), states that the King determines the modalities for the means to be put in place with a view of identifying, tracking down, localising, getting aware of and intercepting electronic communications. These modalities have been determined in the Royal Decree of 15 October 2010 mentioned above.
Article 127, §1, 2° of the Electronic Communications Act lays down the technical and administrative measures electronic communications operators need to take with a view of being able to identify, track down, intercept and become aware of private communications (upon demand of the competent authorities and/or the intelligence service). If the operator does not take such measures (i.e. internal procedures for dealing with these requests), it is not allowed to offer the electronic communication service in respect of which these measure(s) have not been taken.
This Act contains provisions on the duty of electronic communications operators to provide metadata upon demand of the competent prosecution/investigation authorities (see below – Criminal Procedure Code) and of the intelligence services (see below – Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998).
Article 122, §2 of the Electronic Communications Act of 13 June 2005 lays down that electronic communications operators may be required not to remove or to anonymise their traffic data relating to subscribers or end users, if authorities prosecuting criminal offences or the intelligence services require them to do so.
Article 125, §2 states that the King determines the modalities on the means to be put in place with a view to identifying, tracking down, localising, getting aware of and intercepting electronic communications.
Article 127, §2, 1° lays down the technical and administrative measures electronic communications operators need to take with a view to being able to identify, track down and intercept, private communications. If they do not take such measures (i.e. internal procedures for dealing with these requests), they are not allowed to offer the electronic communication services for which these measure(s) have not been taken. The modalities for these measures have been determined in the Royal Decree on legal cooperation duty following legal actions, mentioned below.
Article 6, §1, 1° of the Royal Decree on legal cooperation duty following legal actions, as well as art. 8, §1, 1° of the Royal Decree on cooperation duty following intelligence service actions, specify that the content of communications may be transmitted to the authorities prosecuting and investigating criminal offences as well as the intelligence services.
The requirements of the Electronic Communications Act as described above should also be borne in mind when considering the following criminal procedures and intelligence services-related procedures.
46 bis: Following a reasoned written decision from the public prosecutor, an electronic communications operator may be required to provide data allowing a subscriber/user of an electronic communications service or an electronic communications service to be identified.
88 bis: Following a reasoned court order from the examining magistrate, he or she may require an electronic communications operator to provide data allowing identification and location of a subscriber or an electronic communications service.
For every means of telecommunication used and that is subject to a court order, the day, hour, duration and location of the call are recorded in an official report (“proces-verbaal/procès-verbal”).
Collection of identification and localisation data relating to a subscriber or end-user is classified as a specific method of investigation (whereas interception measures are considered to be exceptional methods).
Article 18/3 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 lays down that the disclosure of identification and localisation data can only be executed after a written and reasoned decision of the Director-General and after notification of this decision to the Administrative Commission supervising the specific and exceptional methods for collecting data by the intelligence and safety services.
Article 18/8, §1 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 lays down that the electronic communications operators have to provide data allowing the tracking of call identification data and locating the origin or the destination of the means of electronic communication. The Royal Decree on cooperation duty following intelligence service actions, mentioned above, lays down the details of these requirements, i.e. this communication of data needs to be done by the Coordination Cell of Justice.
Under Article 4 of the Electronic Communications Act, the King can fully or partially prohibit the provision of electronic communication services in the interest of public security (after consultation within the Council of Ministers).
Under the Civil Contingencies Act of 15 May 2007, the government is given broad powers for a limited period of time during civil emergencies, which could in theory extend to a range of actions in relation to Vodafone’s network and/or customer’s communications data in Belgium.
For instance, Article 181 of the Civil Contingencies Act lays down that the Ministers competent for internal affairs or their delegates may seize everyone and/or everything in the framework of interventions for missions of civil contingency (rescue missions, etc.), if there are no public services available. In theory, this could also include the communications data and/or network of Vodafone.
With regards to the interception measures ordered by the examining magistrate pursuant to the Criminal Code Procedure, the person whose communications have been intercepted can argue that the interception was illegal. He can do this before a pre-trial chamber (“Chambre du conseil/ Raadkamer”), during the pre-sentence stage (before the case is treated on the merits). He can also do this during the treatment of the case on the merits before the Criminal Court, before the Court of Appeal or eventually before the Court of Cassation.
With regards to the interception executed by the intelligence and safety services act of 30 November 1998, there is administrative oversight. Article 18/10, § 6 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 outlines that, at any time, the members of the Commission can exercise control on the legality of the measures (including the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity). In order to exercise this control, they can go to places where the intercepted data are received or registered. They can request all useful documents and they can interrogate members of the intelligence services. If the Commission concludes that the threat(s) present at the origin of the interception measure no longer exist(s) or that the measure is no longer useful, it ends the interception measure (or suspends it in case of illegalities).
If the Commission concludes that the data are being obtained under illegal conditions, they are kept under the supervision of the Commission (after advice of another Commission, i.e. the Commission on the protection of the privacy (“Privacy Commission”)). The Commission prohibits the use of the illegally obtained data and suspends the measure if it is still in place.
Pursuant to Article 43/2 of the Intelligence and Safety Services Act of 30 November 1998 the so-called “Vast Comité I/Comité Permanent R” (“Vast Comité I”) is charged with the a posteriori control on the interception measures (i.e. the legality and the respect for the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity of the decisions in order to execute the interception measures and of the methods used). If the Vast Comité I concludes that the measure is illegal, it orders all data obtained through the measure to be destroyed and prohibits any exploitation of these data. There is no appeal possible against the decisions of the Vast Comité I.
Regarding the disclosure of communications data, pursuant to the Criminal Code Procedure, the persons whose communications data have been disclosed can argue that disclosure was illegal. He can do this before the pre-trial chamber (“Chambre du conseil/Raadkamer”), during the pre-sentence stage (before the case is treated on the merits). He can also do this during the treatment of the case on the merits, before the Criminal Court, before the Court of Appeal or, eventually, before the Court of Cassation.
With regards to the disclosure of metadata executed by the Intelligence and Safety Services act of 30 November 1998, there is administrative oversight. Pursuant to article 18/3, § 2 at the end of every month, a list of executed measures (among which the disclosure measures) is sent to the Commission. At any time the members of the Commission can exercise control on the lawfulness of the measures (including the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity). In order to exercise this control, they can go to those places where the disclosed data are received or registered. They can request all useful documents and they can interrogate members of the intelligence service. If the Commission concludes that the data is being obtained under unlawful conditions, such data may be kept under the supervision of the Commission after taking advice from the Commission on the Protection of Privacy (“Privacy Commission”). The Commission prohibits the use of the illegally obtained data and suspends the measures if they still are in place.
Under the Electronic Communications Act 2005, any Royal Decree can be challenged before the Council of State. The Council of State can then decide to confirm or repeal the Royal Decree.
There is no judicial oversight of the use of powers under the Civil Contingences Act 2007.
Under Article 4 of the Electronic Communications Act the King of Belgium can fully or partially prohibit the provision of electronic communication services in the interest of public security after consultation within Belgium’s Council of Ministers. Such a Royal Decree could order the shut-down of Vodafone’s entire network or some of its services.
A judge can order Vodafone to block IP addresses and/or ranges of IP addresses, if it appears that illegal material is being transmitted through the IP-addresses it manages.
Chapter VI of the Act of 11 March 2003 on legal aspects of information society services lays down that the competent judicial authorities may require internet service providers to terminate or prevent certain infringements consisting in the transmission of illegal material. This Chapter is a transposition of the Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, and more specifically its section 4 on liability of intermediary service providers. For instance, Article 86ter, § 1 of the Copyright Act of 30 June 1994 grants the judge (commercial court) the competence to issue a court order with a view of stopping an infringement (i.e. transmission of material violating copy right legislation). This court order also may be addressed to intermediary entities whose services are being used for committing infringements on copyright law (i.e. internet service providers).
Any Royal Decree by the King can be challenged before the Council of State. The Council of State can then decide to confirm or repeal the Royal Decree.
Any court order will be subject to judicial oversight at the time it is requested. If made, a court order may be subject to an appeal before the Court of Appeal. The judgement of the Court of Appeal may be subject to further appeal before the Court of Cassation.

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The plaintiffs in this case were former Citi loan officers who brought an FLSA collective action against Citi, alleging that the company had misclassified them as exempt employees and unlawfully denied them overtime pay. In this 81-page opinion, Judge Robert Sweet actually decided three motions: (1) defendants' motion to transfer, dismiss, or stay the lawsuit based on a first-filed action in Florida; (2) defendants' motion to compel individual arbitration; and (3) plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs prevailed on all three motions.
While the transfer and conditional certification rulings will be helpful for plaintiff-side employment lawyers, it is the arbitration ruling that makes this opinion so important. Defendants had alleged that two of the plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements in which they explicitly agreed to waive their right to participate in both class and collective actions. Judge Sweet agreed, finding that the fact that plaintiffs had acknowledged receipt of a handbook including an arbitration agreement containing the waiver, or had agreed to a modification adding the waiver, constituted assent to the agreement.
Judge Sweet then proceeded to consider plaintiffs' arguments opposing defendants' motion to compel. First, plaintiffs argued for a sweeping rule that collective action waivers are unenforceable because they prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive statutory rights. As a fallback, they proposed a second, more narrow resolution, asking the court to find that enforcing the waiver in this case would have the practical effect of precluding plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under the FLSA because of the high costs required to pursue their claims on an individual basis.
Judge Sweet rejected plaintiffs' second, narrower argument. Although plaintiffs had submitted affidavits showing that the costs of pursuing individual arbitration and retaining experts would amount to over $100,000, Judge Sweet found that the plaintiffs' potential recoveries, ranging from $84,875 to $617,500, were large enough to provide an adequate incentive for plaintiffs to pursue their claims individually. Therefore, Judge Sweet had to address whether the waiver in question was unenforceable because FLSA collective action waivers are per se unenforceable, a question that was not reached by the one There Southern District case to invalidate an FLSA collective action waiver, Suthereland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
In Suthereland, Judge Kimba Wood denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration in an FLSA collective action after finding that the expert costs that would be involved if the plaintiff were to pursue her individual claim, compared to her potential recovery, would effectively preclude her from seeking relief. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Wood cited In re American Express Merchants Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In re Amex I"), which the Supreme Court had vacated and remanded in light of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). In re Amex I had also found a class waiver to be unenforceable, upon a similar finding that expert costs would make pursuing plaintiffs' antitrust claims on an individual basis prohibitively expensive. Both Suthereland and In re Amex I relied upon a vindication of statutory rights analysis, a rule under the federal substantive law of arbitrability that holds that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if it frustrates a plaintiff's ability to vindicate important statutory rights. On remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the viability of this doctrine and came to the same conclusion as its earlier In re Amex I opinion. See In re American Express Merchants Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) ("In re Amex II").
Although Judge Sweet rejected the plaintiffs' second argument based on the facts of the case, he endorsed the first, much broader, argument: "[A] waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law . . . ." Following Suthereland, In re Amex I, and In re Amex II, he held that, under the federal substantive law of arbitrability, arbitration clauses that preclude plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights are unenforceable. He also cited Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011), agreeing with that case that Concepcion does not overrule Suthereland and In re Amex II, because those cases applied the federal substantive law of arbitrability, and not the kind of state law on unconscionability that Concepcion held was preempted by the FAA. He then reviewed the legislative history of the FLSA and concluded that the right to proceed as a collective action is an important, substantive feature of the FLSA. The upshot: because FLSA collective action waivers deprive plaintiffs of the right to proceed collectively, they are per se unenforceable.
Without such a broad rule, FLSA collective action plaintiffs hoping to defeat a motion to compel arbitration must jump through the hoops of showing that the costs of pursuing their claims individually would effectively prevent them from vindicating their rights. In fact, plaintiffs in There recent FLSA collective action cases have succumbed to defense motions to compel arbitration precisely because they could not show that individual litigation would be prohibitively expensive. See, e.g., D'Antuon v. Service Road Corp., 789 F.Supp.2d 308 (D. Conn. 2011) (granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration in FLSA collective action, where plaintiffs did not show they would incur prohibitively high costs if compelled to arbitrate); Pomposi v. GameStop, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 340, 2010 WL 147196 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2010) (same).


88 TRANSIT LINES, INC., PETITIONER, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER, v. 88 TRANSIT LINES, INC., RESPONDENT.
Nos. 94-3492, 94-3550.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 1, 1995.
Bruce D. Bagley, McNees, Wallace Nurick, Harrisburg, PA, for petitioner/cross-respondent.
Frederick L. Feinstein, Gen. Counsel, Linda Sher, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Charles P. Donnelly, Nancy B. Hunt, N.L.R.B., Washington, DC, for respondent/cross-petitioner.
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, MANSMANN and ALITO, Circuit Judges.
 88 Transit Lines, Inc. (the “Company”) has petitioned this court for review from a final order of the National Labor Relations Board entered in supplemental backpay proceedings (88 Transit Lines, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 324, 1994 WL 363571 (1994)) and the NLRB has cross-applied for enforcement of the same order.
 The supplemental backpay proceeding followed our decision enforcing an earlier NLRB finding that the Company discriminated against its employees when, shortly after a representation election conducted at the Company’s facility, the Company replaced its transit run schedule which had been in effect for many years, Schedule B, with a Schedule C, thereby decreasing the total number of fixed transit runs by one and eliminating run 14, reducing the number of transit runs which were open for bids, and making the fixed runs subject to discretionary assignment by the Company rather than open for bids based on seniority. The Board found that the scheduling change violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) and ordered the Company to “make employees whole for any losses they may have suffered as a result of these unlawful actions” and this court entered judgment enforcing the order See 88 Transit Lines, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 177, 1990 WL 161275 (1990), enforced, 937 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1991).
 When the parties failed to agree on the amount of backpay, the Regional Director issued a backpay specification alleging the amount owed to the discriminatees. Following a hearing, an ALJ recommended amending the backpay specification in two aspects. First, the ALJ recommended not awarding backpay to fourteen replacement workers who had been hired during the backpay period, reasoning that “such employees have no losses to be restored to them, since they were not employed at the time of the elimination of run 14.” Second, the ALJ recommended treating as interim earnings any amount by which post-unfair labor practice earnings exceeded employee earnings during the base-period year.
uncertainties in favor of the wrongdoer.” The Board ordered backpay to be calculated in accordance with the original specification, plus interest and less tax withholdings required by law.
 This court has jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). On questions of law, appellate review of the Board’s decision is plenary, although that decision is entitled to deference due to the Board’s expertise in labor matters. NLRB v. Louton, Inc., 822 F.2d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1987). The Board’s findings of fact in a backpay proceeding will be overturned if the record, considered as a whole, shows no substantial evidence to support those findings. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). We will not disturb a backpay order “`unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.'” Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216, 85 S.Ct. 398, 406, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (quoting Virginia Elec. Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540, 63 S.Ct. 1214, 1218-19, 87 L.Ed. 1568 (1943)).
run 14, a total of 194 weeks. Both parties also agree that the implementation of schedule C represented a loss to the bargaining unit of 2 3/4 hours of work per day, or 13 3/4 hours per week, and that the wage rate for the discriminatees was $6.75 per hour.
 In arguing that the Board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence and an abuse of discretion, the Company raises essentially three claims of error: (1) the Board erred in finding that the fourteen replacement drivers were entitled to compensation; (2) the Board erred in declining to treat as interim earnings the amount by which the discriminatees’ post-unfair labor practice annual earnings exceeded their base-period year earnings with the Company; and (3) the ALJ’s post-hearing amendment of the backpay specification denied the Company procedural due process.
 The Company argues that the fourteen replacement drivers are not entitled to compensation for backpay because they were hired after the schedule change went into effect and, thus, they suffered no change in their schedules entitling them to compensation. By way of analogy, it relies on Systems Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990), to argue that the Board’s award of backpay to the fourteen replacement drivers was punitive rather than compensatory because it “cannot be considered a restoration to any status quo ante, as n status quo ante existed for these employees.” Id. at 308 (quotation omitted).
 The Company’s reliance on Systems Management, however, is misplaced. In Systems Management, this court enforced a cease and desist order and a make-whole order where a successor employer failed to offer employment to its predecessor’s employees or to recognize their bargaining representative, Local 29, and instead contracted with another union, Local 327, at a substantially lower wage rate. Id. at 301. The court declined to enforce a backpay award for new hires affiliated with Local 327 who “if anything . . . were beneficiaries of [the employer’s] discriminatory conduct, because the result of [the employer’s] decision not to employ the Local 29 workers culminated in the employment of the Local 327 workers.” Id. at 308.
 This case presents quite different facts. The fourteen replacement employees were hired to replace original bargaining unit employees who departed in the normal course of business. Therefore, the replacement employees cannot be said to be the “beneficiaries” of the discriminatory conduct. Rather, the change in schedule caused a loss of work for the entire bargaining unit. The Board correctly found that the remedy was to inure to the benefit of the entire bargaining unit. The award of backpay to the fourteen replacement employees was not “`punitive or confiscatory'” and was “`reasonably adapted to the situation that call[ed] for the redress.'” See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1976)).
 The Company’s second argument is that the Board’s refusal to deduct post-unfair labor practice earnings which exceeded base-year earnings from the gross backpay violated the long-standing principle that discriminatees must mitigate damages and that gross backpay must be reduced by interim earnings to derive a net backpay award. The Company refers us to a leading case on the mitigation doctrine, NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C.Cir. 1972), as well as to NLRB guidelines.
orders under the National Labor Relations Act. See Tubari Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1992). In this case, however, the higher post-unfair labor practice earnings by bargaining unit members were attributable to fluctuations in the amount of available work during the applicable time period rather than to the restoration of lost work by the Company. It is reasonable to assume that but for the Company’s discriminatory conduct and the elimination of transit run 14, the earnings of the bargaining unit employees might have been still higher. Thus, the higher post-unfair labor practice earnings were not interim earnings which need be deducted from gross backpay. The Company has provided us with no authority for its argument that it can avoid the payment of backpay liability for its discriminatory schedule change simply because discriminatees happened to do better financially during the backpay period than during the base-year period. The burden was on the Company “to establish facts which would negative the existence of liability to a given employee or which would mitigate that liability.”NLRB v. Brown Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963). Accord Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787, 789-90 (3d Cir. 1968) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828, 90 S.Ct. 77, 24 L.Ed.2d 78 (1969). This it has not done. We find the Company’s argument that the gross backpay should be reduced by the excess earnings to be without merit.
 For the reasons set forth, we will deny the Petition for Review of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board issued on July 12, 1994 and grant the Cross-Application for Enforcement of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board issued on July 12, 1994.
 The Company also argues that the backpay specification failed to establish any loss of earnings by any employee during the backpay period and was therefore speculative and an undeserved windfall to the employees. The Company agrees that a compliance officer may employ a formula other than one of the standard formulae when application of the standard formula is not feasible. In this case, the General Counsel specified the names of the twenty-three discriminatees and the number of hours each worked during the backpay period and, applying the backpay formula, calculated that each discriminatee lost $4.04 per week for each week worked during the backpay period. The backpay formula adopted by the Board is reasonable in light of the nature of the violation and is entitled to our deference. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47, 73 S.Ct. 287, 288-89, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953).
 The Company argues that the Board erred when it suggested in its Supplemental Order that the interim earnings principle applies only with respect to employees who have been unlawfully discharged. It cites Ironton Publications, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1994 WL 189774 (1994), as an example of a case where the Board’s backpay order was reduced by interim earnings for a part-time employee whose hours were discriminatorily reduced but who was not fired. We do not read the Board’s Supplemental Order to mean that reduction for interim earnings is never appropriate in a nondischarge case. Rather, we limit our holding to approval of the Board’s rejection of the need to reduce backpay by interim earnings in this case, where the employees continued to work for the same company and there was no showing that they would not have absorbed the hours stipulated to have been lost by the unfair labor practice.
 The Company’s final argument is that the ALJ’s post-hearing amendment of the backpay specification did not afford the Company an adequate opportunity to produce evidence of employee interim earnings. In light of our holding that the backpay award need not be reduced by what the Company characterizes as “interim earnings,” consideration of the Company’s contentions on this issue is unnecessary.


If monies are deposited into the Highway Account or Mass Transit Account pursuant to a law enacted subsequent to the date of enactment of the FAST Act, the Secretary shall make available additional amounts of contract authority under subsections (b) and (c).
distribute the additional amount under paragraph (1)(B) to each of such programs in accordance with subsection (c).
adjust the amount that the Secretary would otherwise have allocated for the program for such fiscal year by the amount calculated under subparagraph (B).
For a program for which funds are distributed by formula, the Secretary shall add the adjustment to the amount authorized for the program but for this section and make available the adjusted program amount for such program in accordance with such formula.
Adjusted amounts under this subsection shall be available for obligation and administered in the same manner as other amounts made available for the program for which the amount is adjusted.
The Secretary shall exclude the emergency relief program under section 125 and covered administrative expenses from an adjustment of funding under subsection (c)(1).
There is authorized to be appropriated from the appropriate account or accounts of the Highway Trust Fund an amount equal to the amount of an adjustment for a fiscal year under subsection (b) for any of fiscal years 2017 through 2020.
the Secretary shall distribute such limitation on obligations, as revised under subparagraph (A), in accordance with such sections.
any distribution of a revised limitation on obligations under paragraph (1)(B).
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, as authorized under section 31110 of title 49.
The term “Highway Account” means the portion of the Highway Trust Fund that is not the Mass Transit Account.
The term “Mass Transit Account” means the Mass Transit Account of the Highway Trust Fund established under section 9503(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Section 1102 of the FAST Act, referred to in subsec. (f)(1), is section 1102 of Pub. L. 114–94, which is set out as a note under section 104 of this title.
Section 3018 of the FAST Act, referred to in subsec. (f)(1), is section 3018 of Pub. L. 114–94, which is set out as a note under section 5338 of Title 49, Transportation.
Section 4001(a)(6) of the FAST Act, referred to in subsec. (g)(1)(B), is section 4001(a)(6) of Pub. L. 114–94, which is not classified to the Code.
Section 9503(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (g)(3), is classified to section 9503(e)(1) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
A prior section 105, Pub. L. 85–767, Aug. 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 891; Pub. L. 86–624, § 17(b), July 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 415; Pub. L. 89–564, title II, § 206, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 736; Pub. L. 91–605, title I, §§ 106(d), 132, Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1717, 1732; Pub. L. 93–87, title I, § 109(b), Aug. 13, 1973, 87 Stat. 255; Pub. L. 95–599, title I, §§ 111, 112, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2696; Pub. L. 97–424, title I, § 109(a), Jan. 6, 1983, 96 Stat. 2104; Pub. L. 102–240, title I, § 1105(g)(7), Dec. 18, 1991, 105 Stat. 2036; Pub. L. 105–178, title I, § 1104(a), (c), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 127; Pub. L. 105–206, title IX, § 9002(d), July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 835; Pub. L. 109–59, title I, § 1104(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1163; Pub. L. 110–244, title I, § 101(m)(3)(B), June 6, 2008, 122 Stat. 1576, related to the equity bonus program, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 112–141, div. A, title I, § 1519(b)(1)(A), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 575, effective Oct. 1, 2012.


The curriculum for the Bachelor’s degree programme in Nursing, Part-time, at Telemark University College aims to put into practise the National Curriculum and regulations for 3-year nursing education approved by the Ministry of Education and Research 25th January 2008 pursuant to the Act of 1st April 2005 no. 15 “Universities and University Colleges” §3-2(2).
White Paper No. 27 (2000-2001) on reform of the quality of higher education: "Do your Duty - Demand your Rights".
The National Curriculum and regulations for 3-year nursing education approved by the Ministry of Education and Research 25th January 2008 pursuant to the Act of 1st April 2005 no. 15 "Universities and University Colleges" §3-2(2).
The Norwegian Universities Act no. 15, 1st April 2005.
Telemark University College's Examination Regulations adopted by the board 15th December 2005, and internal regulations for nursing education - Faculty of Health and Social Studies.
Telemark University College's Strategic Plan (2005-2009) approved by the board 18th December 2005.
The curriculum for the Bachelor's degree in Nursing (full time) at Telemark University College, 6th November 2006.
Regulations for suitability assessment for health and social studies, which came into force 30th June 2006.
Self-evaluation of the flexible Bachelor's study programme in Nursing: "From intention to reality", June 2006.
External evaluation report on the flexible Bachelor's study programme in nursing: "From intention to reality", January 2007.
The curriculum is valid for 2009 enrolment, part-time programme.
The study programme curriculum is to be understood as the student’s contract with the teaching faculty, and includes a basic description of how this contract should be executed. In addition, the curriculum will serve as a working and guidance tool for distributing information about the department’s professional pedagogical activities.
The curriculum for the Bachelor’s degree in Nursing, part-time, at Telemark University College has been approved by the Dean of the Faculty of Health and Social Studies.
Nursing education in Telemark first began in 1908; in 1994, Telemark College of Nursing was incorporated into Telemark University College. Telemark University College received an enquiry from Telemark county municipality and the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities regarding the possibility of increasing the number of students, and also the possibility of making a study programme available to part-time students, which resulted in the “flexible Bachelor’s degree programme” initiated in 2002. The project was concluded in summer 2006, with both self-evaluation and external evaluation.
The national curriculum’s major course units are formed into four new major course units, where knowledge from the various scientific areas is used thematically in relation to the field of nursing.
Portfolio assessment is used both as a structure for learning and as the basis for assessment.
Organised and obligatory learning-groups are an important element throughout the course of studies.
Care of the elderly is focused on from the first year of study, and also in the form of supervised practical training in a nursing home for a period of 8 weeks.
The study programme is aimed at people with the will and the abilities to develop their knowledge, attitudes and skills with regard to working with sick people, providing care and continual nursing, and taking care of people’s dignity, needs, resources and opportunities.
For admission to the nursing programme, the student must meet general admission requirements. Applicants who do not meet these requirements but who will be 25 years of age during the year they apply may seek admission on the basis of prior experiential learning.
Students whose first language is not Norwegian and students with special needs or functional disabilities may apply for special accommodations at the beginning of their studies, during the course of their studies or in connection with examinations before the relevant deadlines.
The study programme is designed to train informed and reflective nurses for national and international duties. Nursing requires engagement and curiosity, the courage to be creative and the ability to think critically and systematically. We wish to train nurses with a high level of ethical awareness who will take responsibility for their actions and respect the opinions of others.
Values are decisive in all human activities. Respect for the life and values of the individual is a fundamental value in nursing. Other crucial values are care, compassion, solidarity with the weak, respect for personal integrity and the right to be consulted.
Nursing as a subject and profession is concerned with the individuals and groups in society who are in need of care, nursing or treatment relating to failing health or illness. Nursing involves health promotion, disease prevention, rehabilitation and contributing to a peaceful death.
Social changes also influence health problems. The challenges in the health and nursing services are increasing, both with respect to the extent of and the demands for competence. Illness and health-related problems can be related to both local and global social developments. Life-style diseases and advanced age will pose professional challenges to the nursing services.
The programme will stimulate students to follow social developments with a critical and reflective attitude in order to become more aware of circumstances in society which influence the lives, health and welfare of individuals and groups.
In nursing, understanding is cultivated through a mutual dialogue between science and clinical experience. Nursing builds upon a scientific understanding of nursing, and also on knowledge from other areas such as medical/natural sciences and humanistic/social-sciences. In this programme, students acquire scientific knowledge of the healthy and the sick individual, reactions to illness, the consequences of illness and the clinical methods of the nurse.
It is a requirement today that nurses base their actions on the best available knowledge. Knowledge-based practice is understood in this context as combining clinical experience and expertise with the best available research. From the 1st to 4th year, a gradual development of expertise in knowledge-based and systematic methodological approaches to problems is emphasised. Students learn to seek, evaluate and apply research literature in their work.
Throughout the study period, students will learn a variety of job-specific skills and methods, and they will continue to develop the attitudes and personal traits which are required when cooperating with patients, relatives and interdisciplinary teams.
The Bachelor study programme in Nursing provides the necessary requirements for admission to post-Bachelor studies such as: public health nurse; midwife; intensive, anaesthesia and surgery nursing; and mental health work. The programme also provides the basis for Master’s and PhD studies in Nursing Science. Telemark University College offers a Master’s degree in Multicultural Preventative Care with Children and Adolescents.
The part-time Bachelor’s degree in Nursing comprises 180 ECTS, and comprises 4 years of study, each year equivalent to 45 ECTS.
The study programme consists of 4 major course units (one for each year), which include 20 course units distributed between. The subject areas and distribution of ECTS credits are determined by the national curriculum, and this is reflected in the major course units and course units of the programme curriculum. Students have to submit assessment assignments and/or documentation assignments for each course unit; these contribute to the grades for the major course units; receiving passing grades in the major course units is a requirement for being allowed to continue on the programme.
The number of ECTS credits corresponds to the amount of work required for each course unit.
Learning in the Bachelor’s Degree in Nursing, part-time, takes as its point of departure a socio-cultural learning approach in which learning takes place not only as individual learning, but in the relationship between the learner and the context in which the learning takes place. In other words, there is an emphasis on the contextual and social aspects of learning and thinking in such a way that acquirement of knowledge is consolidated in the interaction with others.
One-week workshops will be held 3 – 4 times per semester, and will include lectures and discussion in seminars. Topics will be examined, analysed and problematised in relation to relevant research or development work.
In the university college’s practical experience department students develop their clinical skills and train in simulated situations by, amongst other things, using ICT-supported learning methods.
An important part of the studies takes place in the clinical field where students further develop their knowledge, practical skills and attitudes in conjunction with the nurse’s professional activity in real situations with patients and clients.
In the practice periods, students will be given supervision individually and in groups; the focus will be to reflect on, actively engage in and analyse clinical experiences, and integrate theoretical knowledge. Reflection Groups will contribute to the development of understanding and awareness of students’ attitudes.
Students will engage actively with the programme material through self-study, in learning groups and in work on portfolio assignments. On the basis of this learning approach, learning-groups are established at the beginning of the studies, which will remain fixed throughout the whole course of studies. The learning-groups will maintain an overall perspective of the study programme in which focus on learning, learning processes and gains are given priority. Learning-groups will be allocated supervisors.
The web-based platform Fronter is used as both a teaching support and communication tool, for instance: supervision between learning-groups and teacher-supervisor, submission of portfolio requirements, completion of multiple-choice tests, assessments and also to provide students with course material through stream-video.
ICT is thus an important teaching and learning tool in the study programme, and the part-time student must therefore have their own PC and access to Internet.
The learning environment influences the students’ learning processes and effectiveness in learning. The learning environment in the theoretical parts of the programme are promoted via the regular teaching programme, access to professional and personal supervision, the college’s user-supported IT systems, accessibility to library services as well as the possibility of participation in the democratic fora of the study programme.
The learning environment in the clinical parts of the programme is influenced by the placement institution’s organisational conditions and working structures, and is made more effective by clear agreements between the college and the institution. An open and inclusive working environment contributes to students being perceived as separate individuals, and includes them in decision-making with regard to their own learning plans; it is also important that students are allocated a supervisor who is personally engaged.
The daily activities of the health services are arranged for duties in relation to nursing and treatment. The nursing students focus in clinical studies concerns both specific duties and learning. The college works systematically with various quality-assurance measures in order to improve the nursing students clinical learning environment and consequently the effectiveness of their learning.
The nursing profession is an international profession in its form and character. The Department of Health Studies emphasises students’ opportunities for completing parts of their studies abroad and they endeavour to develop professionally relevant and qualitatively effective learning arenas. The exchange agreements are linked to specific education networks in the Nordic Council of Ministers educational programme, Nordplus and to the EU system’s educational programme, Socrates-Erasmus. Furthermore, the Department also has agreements of intention with nursing programmes in the USA, as well as contacts with voluntary organisations in Africa.
Students may sign study agreements for clinical studies with universities or colleges abroad for periods of between 4-12 weeks, preferably in their fourth year of studies. In addition, students may participate in a 14-day “Intensive Programme”, which is financed by Socrates and Nordplus.
Students who wish to complete parts of their studies abroad must exhibit qualitatively good progression in their studies, as well as participate in obligatory courses in connection with studies abroad.
Practical training studies and preparation comprise 90 ECTS. The part-time students work in clinical studies is equivalent to the work done by the full-time students.
Telemark University College examination regulations (December 15th, 2005) are applicable for all the examinations and assessments that form the basis of a grade.
Assessment: The term refers to the allocation of grades, such as pass/fail, for a specific course, examination or assignment.
Total assessment: (“Examination”) (Norwegian: “eksamen”) refers to the complete assessment that forms the basis for the grade.
Examination: (Norwegian: “prove”) is used to refer to individual written invigilated examinations and for oral examinations individually or in groups.
Final examination: refers to the final examination which is held in connection with the final setting of grades.
Assignment: The term is a collective term that refers to forms of assessment other than examinations.
In the part-time nursing study programme portfolio assessment is used as a structure for learning and as a basis for assessment. An attempt is made to relate what happens in the learning process to that which is assessed. Various assignments are included in the portfolio for each separate year / each major course unit. The portfolio is developed as a systematic collection of work and other forms of documentation which together will provide an impression of the student’s development and learning within a certain field and over a period of time. The portfolio includes both individual and group assignments, and programme requirements.
Two different types of assignments are specified: documentation assignments and assessment assignments; these are called portfolio requirements and are linked to each major course unit.
The term programme requirement is used to refer to various types of course unit assignments and tasks, such as documentation of attendance, skills training, completed practical training, practical training reports, reflection assignments, notes and tests. A programme requirement must be completed / submitted and approved in order to be allowed to take the examination / be awarded credits for the course. The teacher / supervisor approves the programme requirements. If a programme requirement is not approved, then the student in question is given a new deadline to complete / improve the requirement. If the student does not complete the requirement by the new deadline, the student will not be allowed to take the examination / be awarded a grade for the major course unit. The Head of the Department may, upon application, and in special cases, arrange alternative programme requirements for students who repeat a year, and for students who, because of documented illness, are prevented from fulfilling the requirements. Such alternative programme requirements should be very similar to the actual programme requirement with respect to content and scope.
Assessment assignments form the basis for the course grade. Assessment assignments include: examinations, assessment of clinical studies, larger pieces of written work (individual and group work), and final examinations. Assessment assignments are used as a qualitative evaluation of what the student has learnt.
Student representatives, course teachers and external examiners meet twice a year in the portfolio committee in order to discuss and assess portfolio assignments.
A - An excellent performance, clearly outstanding. The candidate demonstrates excellent judgement and a high degree of independent thinking.
B - A very good performance, which is above average. Shows independent thinking.
C - An average performance, which is satisfactory in the most important areas.
D - Below-average performance, with significant shortcomings.
E - A performance that meets the minimum criteria, but no more.
F - A performance that does not meet the minimum academic criteria.
Pass / fail In order to achieve a passing grade the candidate should exhibit sufficient knowledge and also to some extent be able to apply that knowledge in a professional manner in specific patient contexts. The candidate should be able to give an account of the main professional ethical challenges and exhibit the relevant understanding for the subject and its corresponding area of responsibility.
The results of the assessment assignments in each course unit form the basis for the major course unit grade. Assessment assignments may be re-taken three times during the course of studies. As a general guideline, assessment assignments may be taken twice during the course of the academic year. Generally, this means if students do not receive a passing grade at their second attempt they will have to leave the programme (cf. regulation §7). Students may make a third attempt when the next regular assessment assignment is set.
In order to progress on the programme students must attain a passing grade for each major course unit. Generally, this means that students who do not receive a passing grade for the assessment assignments of the course units after a second attempt must leave the programme and, if desirable, continue with the programme the following year.
Overview of assessment assignments for the Bachelor’s Degree in Nursing, part-time.
Assessment is an ongoing and obligatory part of clinical studies. The assessments are made in relation to the study programme’s general aims and the specific aims of the student. In the assessed clinical studies the student will receive both midway and final assessment. As a general rule, the student assessments are made in meetings between the student, supervisor and teacher. The assessment given is pass / fail and the university college is responsible for the final allocation of the grade. In clinical studies, the student’s should complete an average of at least 30 hours of practical training per week. For more information regarding assessment and evaluation arrangements in clinical studies please refer to § 5 in the National Curriculum for Nursing Education adopted January 25th, 2008.
The assessment of the period of practical training is a decision that is made in accordance with the Public Administration Act. At the end of each period of practical training, the supervisor will have submitted an evaluation report; the report will be written by the teacher and supervisor in consultation with the student. The report will be signed by the supervisor, teacher and student. The supervisor, in agreement with the teacher, assess whether the period of practical training will be given a passing mark. In the case of disagreement it is the teacher who will make the final decision. The practical training assessment report is signed by the supervisor, teacher and student. If there is any doubt whether the student will receive a passing grade for the practical training period, then a meeting will be arranged between the parties in question (student, supervisor and teacher), and any other involved parties. Such a meeting must be held no less than three weeks before the completion of the practical training. If there is the possibility of the student not receiving a passing grade, a written plan should be drafted providing an outline of what needs to be done in order for the student to receive a passing grade. The plan should contain specific details regarding the necessary measures and the delegation of responsibility for applying these. The plan also constitutes a formal letter of warning to the student that he/she is in danger of failing his/her practical training. The parties should agree on a date for an assessment meeting to discuss the effect of any corrective measures. The minutes of this meeting should be recorded, which will include the teacher’s decision whether or not the practical training should be given a passing grade.
A student who has not received a written report with regard to doubt concerning the approval of the period of practical training, may nevertheless have his/her period of practical training assessed as failed. This may be the case if there are special reasons why the student in question during the last 3 weeks exhibits significant shortcomings in his/her skills, for instance, if a patient’s life has been exposed to danger. If this turns out to be the case, the studies leader should be contacted immediately. The head of the department should then summon a meeting between the student, teacher and supervisor. A protocol from the meeting should be kept with reasons given for the assessment made. The student should be given a copy of the protocol.
Each period of practical training must be assessed as passed in order for the student to continue on the study programme. A student who does not pass a period of practical training will not be allowed to continue on the next period of practical training. This student must therefore leave the study programme for the year in which they failed the period of practical training, with the consequence that the whole, or part of, the year in question will have to be re-taken.
Students are required to participate (attend) skills instruction, workshop-weeks and the learning groups. The student must have an attendance rate of at least 75%.
Students are required to attend work on assessment assignments in groups. An attendance list must be kept, and the duration of each student’s attendance must be noted, which students must sign. The attendance requirement is absolute with no exceptions.
If the student does not fulfil the attendance requirement with regard to teaching or a group programme requirement, then the student will be given an “absence assignment”, which must be submitted within the stipulated deadline. If the student does not complete this individual assignment, then he/she will not be permitted to complete the next assessment assignment.
If the student does not meet the attendance requirement in skills instruction in the Clinical Skills Centre, he/she will not be permitted to take the practical skills test.
90% attendance of practical training is required with no exceptions. If the practical training is discontinued because of sickness or other justifiable reasons, at least one-half of the period of practical training must have been completed or assessed before the student will be allowed to continue on the programme. The remaining part of the period of practical training must be completed as soon as possible.
Participation in the university college’s official bodies and committees, as well as student organisations locally and nationally, is not counted as absenteeism as long as documentation is submitted.
§ 15. Annulment of an examination or assignment, exclusion from the examination.
Possession, use, or the attempt to use other aids than allowed by an examination or assignment, to present someone else’s work as their own, refusing to specify sources of quotations from others in the written work or in any way disregarding the conditions stipulated for a specific examination or assignment, when this is done intentionally or by gross negligence will be considered as cheating. Cf. also § 4-7 paragraph no. 1 b of the Act.


text:
Transfer of actions; clerk of transferor court; duties; clerk of transferee court; duties; certain support orders; how treated.
(1) For the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice, a district court of any county, the transferor court, may transfer any civil action to the district court of any other county in this state, the transferee court. The transfer may occur before or after the entry of judgment, and there shall be no additional fees required for the transfer.
(2) To transfer a civil action, the transferor court shall order transfer of the action to the specific transferee court requested. The clerk of the transferor court shall file with the transferee court within ten days after the entry of the transfer order a certification of the case file and costs. The clerk of the transferor court shall certify any judgment and payment records of such judgments in the action maintained by the transferor court.
(3) Upon the filing of such documents by the clerk of the transferor court, the clerk of the transferee court shall enter any judgment in the action on the judgment index of the transferee court. The judgment, once filed and entered on the judgment index of the transferee court, shall be a lien on the property of the debtor in any county in which such judgment is filed. Transfer of the action shall not change the obligations of the parties under any judgment entered in the action regardless of the status of the transfer.
(4) If the transferred civil action involves a support order that has payment records maintained by the Title IV-D Division as defined in section 43-3341, the transferor court order shall notify the division to make the necessary changes in the support payment records. Support payments shall commence in the transferee court on the first day of the month following the order of transfer, payments made prior to such date shall be considered payment on a judgment entered by the transferor court, and payments made on and after such date shall be considered payment on a judgment entered by the transferee court.
Laws 2018, LB193, § 6.
For disqualification of judge, see sections 24-723.01, 24-739, and 24-740.
Where record does not show abuse of discretion, a ruling on motion to transfer hereunder will not be disturbed. Johnsen v. Parks, 189 Neb. 712, 204 N.W.2d 804 (1973).
Failure to grant change of venue in equity case was immaterial on appeal, since case was for trial de novo in reviewing court. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 144 Neb. 486, 13 N.W.2d 721 (1944).
Where only showing made in support of motion for change of venue is affidavit which was not offered in evidence and was not incorporated in bill of exceptions, error cannot be predicated on appeal from order overruling motion. Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 136 Neb. 11, 284 N.W. 742 (1939).
Supreme Court will not disturb ruling of lower court on motion for change of venue unless abuse of discretion is shown. Markel v. Glassmeyer, 132 Neb. 716, 273 N.W. 33 (1937).
Ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless discretion is abused. Boyd v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 97 Neb. 238, 149 N.W. 818 (1914).
Unless abuse of discretion is shown, ruling on motion should not be disturbed. Hinton v. Atchison & Nebraska R. R. Co., 83 Neb. 835, 120 N.W. 431 (1909).
Where fair and impartial trial cannot be had, court must change; if fair trial cannot be had in adjoining county, change should be made to other county in district. Gandy v. Bissell's Estate, 81 Neb. 102, 115 N.W. 571 (1908).
Ruling will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Smith, 77 Neb. 824, 110 N.W. 557 (1906).
Judge is not disqualified to sit in contempt case to try violation of own order. Back v. State, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906).
Court on own motion cannot transfer case for trial to another county. Lefferts v. Bell, 57 Neb. 248, 77 N.W. 680 (1898).
This section does not authorize district court, on its own motion, to order a change of venue. Fisk v. Thorpe, 51 Neb. 1, 70 N.W. 498 (1897).
Bias or prejudice of judge preventing fair and impartial trial is ground for change. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105, 66 N.W. 1017 (1896).
When it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had where suit is pending, change of venue should be granted. Omaha S. Ry. Co. v. Todd, 39 Neb. 818, 58 N.W. 289 (1894).
A court which never acquires jurisdiction permitting it to act has no authority to transfer venue. Jackson v. Jensen, 225 Neb. 671, 407 N.W.2d 758 (1987).

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