We decide here whether the implied damages action first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), should be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. We decline to so extend Bivens.
Petitioner Correctional Services Corporation (CSC), under contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), operates Community Corrections Centers and other facilities that house federal prisoners and detainees. Since the late 1980’s, CSC has operated Le Marquis Community Correctional Center (Le Marquis), a halfway house located in New York City. Respondent John E. Malesko is a former federal inmate who, having been convicted of federal securities fraud in December 1992, was sentenced to a term of 18 months’ imprisonment under the supervision of the BOP. During his imprisonment, respondent was diagnosed with a heart condition and treated with prescription medication. Respondent’s condition limited his ability to engage in physical activity, such as climbing stairs.
Three years after this incident occurred, respondent filed a pro se action against CSC and unnamed CSC employees in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Two years later, now acting with counsel, respondent filed an amended complaint which named Urena as 1 of the 10 John Doe defendants. The amended complaint alleged that CSC, Urena, and unnamed defendants were “negligent in failing to obtain requisite medication for [respondent’s] condition and were further negligent by refusing [respondent] the use of the elevator.” App. 12. It further alleged that respondent injured his left ear and aggravated a pre-existing condition “[a]s a result of the negligence of the Defendants.” Ibid. Respondent demanded judgment in the sum of $1 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in anticipated future damages, and punitive damages “for such sum as the Court and/or [j]ury may determine.” Id., at 13.
The District Court treated the amended complaint as raising claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, and dismissed respondent’s cause of action in its entirety. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. Relying on our decision in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994), the District Court reasoned that “a Bivens action may only be maintained against an individual,” and thus was not available against petitioner, a corporate entity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. With respect to Urena and the unnamed individual defendants, the complaint was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 229 F.3d 374 (2000). That court affirmed dismissal of respondent’s claims against individual defendants as barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent has not challenged that ruling, and the parties agree that the question whether a Bivens action might lie against a private individual is not presented here. With respect to petitioner, the Court of Appeals remarked that Meyer expressly declined “ ‘to expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens-type actions may be brought to include not only federal agents, but federal agencies as well.’ ” 229 F.3d, at 378 (quoting Meyer, supra, at 484 (emphasis deleted)). But the court reasoned that private entities like petitioner should be held liable under Bivens to “accomplish the … important Bivens goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.” 229 F.3d, at 380.
We granted certiorari, 532 U.S. 902 (2001), and now reverse.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), we recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights. Respondent now asks that we extend this limited holding to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color of federal law. He contends that the Court must recognize a federal remedy at law wherever there has been an alleged constitutional deprivation, no matter that the victim of the alleged deprivation might have alternative remedies elsewhere, and that the proposed remedy would not significantly deter the principal wrongdoer, an individual private employee. We have heretofore refused to imply new substantive liabilities under such circumstances, and we decline to do so here.
Our authority to imply a new constitutional tort, not expressly authorized by statute, is anchored in our general jurisdiction to decide all cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420—421 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373—374 (1983). We first exercised this authority in Bivens, where we held that a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers may bring suit for money damages against the officers in federal court. Bivens acknowledged that Congress had never provided for a private right of action against federal officers, and that “the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by award of money damages for the consequences of its violation.” 403 U.S., at 396. Nonetheless, relying largely on earlier decisions implying private damages actions into federal statutes, see id., at 397 (citing J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)); 403 U.S., at 402—403, n. 4 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (“The Borak case is an especially clear example of the exercise of federal judicial power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence of any express statutory authorization of a federal cause of action”), and finding “no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” id., at 395—396, we found an implied damages remedy available under the Fourth Amendment.
In the decade following Bivens, we recognized an implied damages remedy under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In both Davis and Carlson, we applied the core holding of Bivens, recognizing in limited circumstances a claim for money damages against federal officers who abuse their constitutional authority. In Davis, we inferred a new right of action chiefly because the plaintiff lacked any other remedy for the alleged constitutional deprivation. 442 U.S., at 245 (“For Davis, as for Bivens, it is damages or nothing”). In Carlson, we inferred a right of action against individual prison officials where the plaintiff’s only alternative was a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States. 446 U.S., at 18—23. We reasoned that the threat of suit against the United States was insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals. Id., at 21 (“Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy”). We also found it “crystal clear” that Congress intended the FTCA and Bivens to serve as “parallel” and “complementary” sources of liability. 446 U.S., at 19—20.
Since Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants. In Bush v. Lucas, supra, we declined to create a Bivens remedy against individual Government officials for a First Amendment violation arising in the context of federal employment. Although the plaintiff had no opportunity to fully remedy the constitutional violation, we held that administrative review mechanisms crafted by Congress provided meaningful redress and thereby foreclosed the need to fashion a new, judicially crafted cause of action. 462 U.S., at 378, n. 14, 386—388. We further recognized Congress’ institutional competence in crafting appropriate relief for aggrieved federal employees as a “special factor counseling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy.” Id., at 380. See also id., at 389 (noting that “Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees”). We have reached a similar result in the military context, Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983), even where the defendants were alleged to have been civilian personnel, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987).
In Schweiker v. Chilicky, we declined to infer a damages action against individual government employees alleged to have violated due process in their handling of Social Security applications. We observed that our “decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.” 487 U.S., at 421. In light of these decisions, we noted that “[t]he absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation … does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money damages against the officers responsible for the violation.” Id., at 421—422. We therefore rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy should be implied simply for want of any other means for challenging a constitutional deprivation in federal court. It did not matter, for example, that “[t]he creation of a Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of relief for injuries that must now go unredressed.” 487 U.S., at 425. See also Bush, supra, at 388 (noting that “existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff”); Stanley, supra, at 683 (“[I]t is irrelevant to a special factors analysis whether the laws currently on the books afford Stanley … an adequate federal remedy for his injuries” (internal quotation marks omitted)). So long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability. Chilicky, supra, at 425—427.
Most recently, in FDIC v. Meyer, we unanimously declined an invitation to extend Bivens to permit suit against a federal agency, even though the agency–because Congress had waived sovereign immunity–was otherwise amenable to suit. 510 U.S., at 484—486. Our opinion emphasized that “the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer,” not the agency. Id., at 485 (emphasis in original) (citing Carlson v. Green, supra, at 21). We reasoned that if given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal agency instead of an individual who could assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. To the extent aggrieved parties had less incentive to bring a damages claim against individuals, “the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.” 510 U.S., at 485. Accordingly, to allow a Bivens claim against federal agencies “would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather than its extension.” 510 U.S., at 485. We noted further that “special factors” counseled hesitation in light of the “potentially enormous financial burden” that agency liability would entail. Id., at 486.
From this discussion, it is clear that the claim urged by respondent is fundamentally different from anything recognized in Bivens or subsequent cases. In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens, often for reasons that foreclose its extension here.
The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter that they may enjoy qualified immunity, 510 U.S., at 474, 485, are indemnified by the employing agency or entity, id., at 486, or are acting pursuant to an entity’s policy, id., at 473—474. Meyer also made clear that the threat of suit against an individual’s employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens. See 510 U.S., at 485 (“If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal agencies … there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost”). This case is, in every meaningful sense, the same. For if a corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible for the alleged injury. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that corporations fare much worse before juries than do individuals); id., at 490—492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same) (citing authorities). On the logic of Meyer, inferring a constitutional tort remedy against a private entity like CSC is therefore foreclosed.
Respondent claims that even under Meyer’s deterrence rationale, implying a suit against private corporations acting under color of federal law is still necessary to advance the core deterrence purpose of Bivens. He argues that because corporations respond to market pressures and make decisions without regard to constitutional obligations, requiring payment for the constitutional harms they commit is the best way to discourage future harms. That may be so, but it has no relevance to Bivens, which is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers. If deterring the conduct of a policy-making entity was the purpose of Bivens, then Meyer would have implied a damages remedy against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; it was after all an agency policy that led to Meyer’s constitutional deprivation. Meyer, supra, at 473—474. But Bivens from its inception has been based not on that premise, but on the deterrence of individual officers who commit unconstitutional acts.
There is no reason for us to consider extending Bivens beyond this core premise here. To begin with, no federal prisoners enjoy respondent’s contemplated remedy. If a federal prisoner in a BOP facility alleges a constitutional deprivation, he may bring a Bivens claim against the offending individual officer, subject to the defense of qualified immunity. The prisoner may not bring a Bivens claim against the officer’s employer, the United States or the BOP. With respect to the alleged constitutional deprivation, his only remedy lies against the individual; a remedy Meyer found sufficient, and which respondent did not timely pursue. Whether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability costs on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to decide.
Nor are we confronted with a situation in which claimants in respondent’s shoes lack effective remedies. Cf. Bivens, 403 U.S., at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing”); Davis, 442 U.S., at 245 (“For Davis, as for Bivens, it is damages or nothing” (internal quotaton marks omitted)). It was conceded at oral argument that alternative remedies are at least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41—42, 43. For example, federal prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is unavailable to prisoners housed in government facilities. See Brief in Opposition 13. This case demonstrates as much, since respondent’s complaint in the District Court arguably alleged no more than a quintessential claim of negligence. It maintained that named and unnamed defendants were “negligent in failing to obtain requisite medication … and were further negligent by refusing … use of the elevator.” App. 12 (emphasis added). It further maintained that respondent suffered injuries “[a]s a result of the negligence of the Defendants.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The District Court, however, construed the complaint as raising a Bivens claim, presumably under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Respondent accepted this theory of liability, and he has never sought relief on any other ground. This is somewhat ironic, because the heightened “deliberate indifference” standard of Eighth Amendment liability, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), would make it considerably more difficult for respondent to prevail than on a theory of ordinary negligence, see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence”).
This also makes respondent’s situation altogether different from Bivens, in which we found alternative state tort remedies to be “inconsistent or even hostile” to a remedy inferred from the Fourth Amendment. 403 U.S., at 393—394. When a federal officer appears at the door and requests entry, one cannot always be expected to resist. See id., at 394 (“[A] claim of authority to enter is likely to unlock the door”). Yet lack of resistance alone might foreclose a cause of action in trespass or privacy. Ibid. Therefore, we reasoned in Bivens that other than an implied constitutional tort remedy, “there remain[ed] … but the alternative of resistance, which may amount to a crime.” Id., at 395 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such logic does not apply to respondent, whose claim of negligence or deliberate indifference requires no resistance to official action, and whose lack of alternative tort remedies was due solely to strategic choice.
Inmates in respondent’s position also have full access to remedial mechanisms established by the BOP, including suits in federal court for injunctive relief and grievances filed through the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP). See 28 CFR § 542.10 (2001) (explaining ARP as providing “a process through which inmates may seek formal review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement”). This program provides yet another means through which allegedly unconstitutional actions and policies can be brought to the attention of the BOP and prevented from recurring. And unlike the Bivens remedy, which we have never considered a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy, injunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.
In sum, respondent is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy as in Bivens and Davis. Nor does he seek a cause of action against an individual officer, otherwise lacking, as in Carlson. Respondent instead seeks a marked extension of Bivens, to contexts that would not advance Bivens’ core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing. The caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here.
^ . Petitioner is hardly unique in this regard. The BOP has since 1981 relied exclusively on contracts with private institutions and state and local governments for the operation of halfway house facilities to help federal prisoners reintegrate into society. The BOP contracts not only with for-profit entities like petitioner, but also with charitable organizations like Volunteers for America (which operates facilities in Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Texas), the Salvation Army (Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas), Progress House Association (Oregon), Triangle Center (Illinois), and Catholic Social Services (Pennsylvania).
^ . The Courts of Appeals have divided on whether FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994), forecloses the extension of Bivens to private entities. Compare Hammons v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 156 F.3d 701, 705 (CA6 1998) (“Nothing in Meyer prohibits a Bivens claim against a private corporation that engages in federal action”), with Kauffman v. Anglo-American School of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223, 1227 (CADC 1994) (“[Under] Meyer’s conclusion that public federal agencies are not subject to Bivens liability, it follows that equivalent private entities should not be liable either”). We hold today that it does.
^ . Since our decision in Borak, we have retreated from our previous willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15—16 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979); id., at 717—718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Just last Term it was noted that we “abandoned” the view of Borak decades ago, and have repeatedly declined to “revert” to “the understanding of private causes of action that held sway 40 years ago.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
^ . Justice Stevens’ claim that this case does not implicate an “extension” of Bivens, post, at 2, 8 (dissenting opinion), might come as some surprise to the Court of Appeals which twice characterized its own holding as “extending Bivens liability to reach private corporations.” 229 F.3d 374, 381 (CA2 2000). See also ibid. (“Bivens liability should extend to private corporations”).
^ . Justice Stevens claims that our holding in favor of petitioner portends “tragic consequence[s],” post, at 6, and “jeopardize[s] the constitutional rights of . . . tens of thousands of inmates,” post, at 7. He refers to examples of cases suggesting that private correctional providers routinely abuse and take advantage of inmates under their control. Post, at 7, n. 9 (citing Brief for Legal Aid Society of New York as Amicus Curiae 8—25). See also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 14—16, and n. 6 (citing and discussing “abundant” examples of such abuse). In all but one of these examples, however, the private facility in question housed state prisoners–prisoners who already enjoy a right of action against private correctional providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If it is true that the imperatives for deterring the unconstitutional conduct of private correctional providers are so strong as to demand that we imply a new right of action directly from the Constitution, then abuses of authority should be less prevalent in state facilities, where Congress already provides for such liability. That the trend appears to be just the opposite is not surprising given the BOP’s oversight and monitoring of its private contract facilities, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4—5, 24—26, which Justice Stevens does not mention.
^ . Where the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special circumstance where the contractor may assert a defense. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The record here would provide no basis for such a defense.


Retirement. Public Employment, Retirement. Administrative Law, Decision, Judicial review, Substantial evidence, Agency's interpretation of statute. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board. Words, "Creditable service."
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 23, 2008.
The case was heard by Charles T. Spurlock, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Jennifer Grace Miller, Assistant Attorney General (Paul K. Donohue with her) for the defendants.
Crystal L. Matthews for the plaintiff.
Superior Court. [Note 2] Before us is CRAB's appeal from the allowance by a Superior Court judge of the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
1. Facts. The facts are not in dispute. From October 12, 1988 to October 2, 1993, Barker worked as a revenue and finance planner for the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA). As a member of the MWRA retirement system, she accrued four years and three months of creditable service with MWRA. When Barker resigned in 1993, she withdrew her "accumulated total deductions" from the MWRA retirement system. Subsequently, from March 15, 1995 to June 30, 1997, she worked as a contract employee for the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). During that period, she was not a member of the SERS. In July, 1997, Barker entered full-time State service with the DEP and became a member of the SERS.
In March, 2001, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), in relevant part set forth in the margin, [Note 3] Barker bought back her prior service with the MWRA by paying $19,008.60 to the board.
This provision entitles her "to all creditable service resulting from [her] previous employment." [Note 4] G. L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), as appearing in St. 1955, c. 695, § 5.
In October, 2006, Barker attempted a second buyback, this time pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s), set forth in the margin, [Note 5] for her service from March 15, 1995 to June 30, 1997, when she worked as a contract employee of the DEP. That provision permits certain contract employees to "establish as creditable service up to 4 years [of their contract] service if the member [of the SERS] has 10 years of creditable service with the state employees' retirement system" (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s), inserted by St. 2006, c. 161, § 1. That Barker satisfied the other conditions of c. 32, § 4(1)(s), is not in dispute; the only issue is whether she met the ten-year requirement.
nine years of SERS service and her service in the MWRA retirement system, but not for service as a contract employee with the DEP.
2. Discussion. Our review of CRAB's determination that Barker met the ten-year requirement is narrow and under a deferential standard. The retirement law is "notoriously complex," Namay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 456 , 463 (1985), and we "will reverse only if [CRAB's] decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law or is unsupported by substantial evidence." Foresta v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 Mass. at 676. Where an agency's construction of a statute is reasonable, the court should not supplant it with its own interpretation. Ibid. Boston Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 441 Mass. 78 , 82 (2004). See Damiano v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 259 , 261 (2008). See also Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627 , 633 (2005) (agency in Massachusetts has "considerable leeway in interpreting a statute it is charged with enforcing," unless statute unambiguously bars the agency's approach), quoting from Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587 , 595-596 (1992).
We consider CRAB's interpretation reasonable and may even be required. Creditable service is defined in G. L. c. 32, § 1, inserted by St. 1945, c. 658, § 1, as "all membership service, prior service and other service for which credit is allowable to any member under the provisions of sections one to twenty-eight inclusive." Under G. L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), Barker was entitled to her creditable service resulting from her employment by MWRA, and the board calculated her retirement benefits based on her more than thirteen years of service. See note 4, supra. CRAB's decision that such thirteen years of creditable service to which Barker is "entitled" under G. L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), satisfied the requirement of "10 years of creditable service with the state employees' retirement system" is a reasonable reading of § 4(1)(s).
The board's interpretation, adopted by the Superior Court, construes § 4(1)(s), to require that all creditable service be membership service with SERS. The words of the statute do not require such a limitation. Even if the words are ambiguous, CRAB's interpretation must control.
We see nothing in § 4(1)(s) or in the record that bars CRAB's interpretation. See Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. at 633. Since CRAB's construction of G. L. c. 32, § (4)(1)(s), is a reasonable one, Barker meets the ten-year requirement to buy back her contract services with the DEP under that provision. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and a new judgment shall enter affirming CRAB's decision.
[Note 2] The proceedings began when the board denied Barker's eligibility under G. L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s), on the ground that she did not have the requisite ten-year creditable service. Barker appealed the board's decision to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA); a DALA magistrate affirmed the board's denial, and Barker appealed to CRAB. CRAB reversed the DALA magistrate's decision. After CRAB denied the board's motion for reconsideration, the board filed this action in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.
"Any former member of any contributory retirement system established under the provisions of this chapter . . . or of any special law, who subsequently becomes employed in a position in any other governmental unit in which such a system is operative, may, before the date any retirement allowance becomes effective for him, pay into the annuity savings fund of the system pertaining to his new employment . . . make-up payments of an amount equal to the accumulated regular deductions withdrawn by him from the system from which he last became separated, together with buyback interest . . . . Upon commencing such employment and upon making such payment . . . such former member shall become a member of the system pertaining to his new employment. . . . Upon the completion of such make-up payments such member shall be entitled to all creditable service resulting from his previous employment."
"As the administrative record illustrates, Ms. Barker purchased her prior MWRA service under G. L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b). After completion of the required payments, this service was reinstated as creditable service, with the MWRA Retirement System, to be included in her calculation for retirement benefits from the Board, her current retirement system.
"Although Ms. Barker was credited with her MWRA Retirement System service, that service does not reinstate her membership into the MWRA Retirement System. It only entitles Ms. Barker to include her prior MWRA service for purposes of calculating her retirement benefits, which is administered by the Board."
"(s) Any member in service of the state employees' retirement system who, immediately preceding the establishment of membership in that system or re-entry into active service in that system, was compensated for service to the commonwealth as a contract employee for any department, agency, board or commission of the commonwealth may establish as creditable service up to 4 years of that service if the member has 10 years of creditable service with the state employees' retirement system, and if the job description of the member in the position which the member holds upon entry into service or re-entry into active service is substantially similar to the job description of the position for which the member was compensated as a contract employee. No credit shall be allowed until the member has paid into the Annuity Savings Fund of the state employees' retirement system . . . makeup payments . . . ."


text:
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Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go, L.C.
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Section 414.509. Reconsideration of basis for and amount of payment for a new clinical diagnostic laboratory test.
42 CFR § 414.509 - Reconsideration of basis for and amount of payment for a new clinical diagnostic laboratory test.
§ 414.509 Reconsideration of basis for and amount of payment for a new clinical diagnostic laboratory test.
(a)Reconsideration of basis for payment.
(1)CMS will receive reconsideration requests in written format for 60 days after making a determination of the basis for payment under § 414.506(d)(2) regarding whether CMS should reconsider the basis for payment and why a different basis for payment would be more appropriate. If a requestor recommends that the basis for payment should be changed from gapfilling to crosswalking, the requestor may also recommend the code or codes to which to crosswalk the new test.
(i) A requestor that submitted a request under paragraph (a)(1) of this section may also present its reconsideration request at the public meeting convened under § 414.506(c), provided that the requestor requests an opportunity to present at the public meeting as part of its written submission under paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(ii) If the requestor presents its reconsideration request at the public meeting convened under § 414.506(c), members of the public may comment on the reconsideration request verbally at the public meeting and may submit written comments after the public meeting (within the timeframe for public comments established by CMS).
(3) Considering reconsideration requests and other comments received, CMS may reconsider its determination of the basis for payment. As the result of such a reconsideration, CMS may change the basis for payment from crosswalking to gapfilling or from gapfilling to crosswalking.
(4) If the basis for payment is revised as the result of a reconsideration, the new basis for payment is final and is not subject to further reconsideration.
(i) For 60 days after making a determination under § 414.506(d)(2) of the code or codes to which a new test will be crosswalked, CMS receives reconsideration requests in written format regarding whether CMS should reconsider its determination and the recommended code or codes to which to crosswalk the new test.
(A) A requestor that submitted a request under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section may also present its reconsideration request at the public meeting convened under § 414.506(c), provided that the requestor requests an opportunity to present at the public meeting as part of its written submission under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.
(B) If a requestor presents its reconsideration request at the public meeting convened under § 414.506(c), members of the public may comment on the reconsideration request verbally at the public meeting and may submit written comments after the public meeting (within the timeframe for public comments established by CMS).
(iii) Considering comments received, CMS may reconsider its determination of the amount of payment. As the result of such a reconsideration, CMS may change the code or codes to which the new test is crosswalked.
(iv) If CMS changes the basis for payment from gapfilling to crosswalking as a result of a reconsideration, the crosswalked amount of payment is not subject to reconsideration.
(i) By April 30 of the year after CMS makes a determination under § 414.506(d)(2) or paragraph (a)(3) of this section that the basis for payment for a CDLT will be gapfilling, CMS posts interim Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific amounts on the CMS Web site.
(ii) For 60 days after CMS posts interim Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific amounts on the CMS Web site, CMS will receive public comments in written format regarding the interim Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific amounts.
(iii) After considering the public comments, CMS will post final Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific amounts on the CMS Web site.
(iv) For 30 days after CMS posts final Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific payment amounts on the CMS Web site, CMS will receive reconsideration requests in written format regarding whether CMS should reconsider the final Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific payment amount and median of the Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific payment amount for the CDLT.
(v) Considering reconsideration requests received, CMS may reconsider its determination of the amount of payment. As the result of a reconsideration, CMS may revise the median of the Medicare Administrative Contractor-specific payment amount for the CDLT.
(3) For both gapfilled and crosswalked new tests, if CMS revises the amount of payment as the result of a reconsideration, the new amount of payment is final and is not subject to further reconsideration.
(c)Effective date. If CMS changes a determination as the result of a reconsideration, the new determination regarding the basis for or amount of payment is effective January 1 of the year following reconsideration. Claims for services with dates of service prior to the effective date will not be reopened or otherwise reprocessed.
(d)Jurisdiction for reconsideration decisions. Jurisdiction for reconsidering a determination rests exclusively with the Secretary. A decision whether to reconsider a determination is committed to the discretion of the Secretary. A decision not to reconsider an initial determination is not subject to administrative or judicial review.


text:
Law Web: Whether court can take recourse to plea bargaining in Cheque dishonour case?
Whether court can take recourse to plea bargaining in Cheque dishonour case?
imprisonment for six months also."
complaints for offence punishable under Sec.138 of the N.I.Act.
and personal liberty of an accused.
Dated this the 6th day of July, 2017.
months to the accused for paying the fine/compensation amount.
to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, etc.
bargaining has been complied with, except for the minimal formalities.
court accepting the plea bargaining, etc.
the said interim order has been extended from time to time.
the Cr.P.C and that the Original Petition is liable to be dismissed, etc.
the instant case is bereft of any merit.
findings made by the learned Single Judge in the judgment in Joseph P.J.
reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Girraj Prasad Meena v.
as 12.11.2011. Ext.P-2(3) affidavit does not even contain any date.
this appears to be filed purportedly under Sec.265C of the Cr.P.C.
of the trial court but strangely the date portion is completely left blank.
complainant was duly conducted in terms of Sec.265B(4) of the Cr.P.C.
of Kerala & anr. reported in 2015 (5) KHC 586 and Bala Dandapani v.
into police diary as an accused person but it also includes a suspect.
cases would fall under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
13. The historical origins of the "right against self-incrimination"
clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.' ........"
to extract information through such compulsion as a matter of course.
follows in 378 US 52 (1963) p.55 = 12 L.Ed 2d 678 pp. 681-682.
`a protection to the innocent'."
thereafter consents to be questioned."
case (supra). [see report in 384 US 436 (1965) pp. 457-58].
product of his free choice."
warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end.
any questioning if the defendant so desires."
should be examined and analysed.
The judgment of the U.S Federal Supreme Court in William J.
entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination.
the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him.
whether they understand the action they are taking, etc.
has been obtained in violation of the due process and is therefore void.
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences .
concerning his plea and the petitioner did not address the court.
of these three important federal rights from a silent record.
Court has clearly held in para 20 of the ruling in Girraj Prasad Meena v.
any grievance before the appropriate forum."
court and had remanded the matter to the trial court for disposal afresh.
would vitiate the acceptance of plea bargaining by the trial court, etc.
complainant on this aspect is untenable and is thus overruled.
conviction on the basis of such plea, it would vitiate the conviction.
tried. It is also to be ensured that the accused are duly represented through Advocate.
2. AIR 1966 SC 22, Mahant Kaushalyadas v. State of Madras.
3. 1973 CriLJ 358, S. Chinnaswamy v. The State.
4. 1999 CriLJ 2857, Anand Vithoba Lohakare and Others v. State of Maharashtra.
was set aside and the matter was remitted to the trial court.
plea bargaining, which came into force only with effect from 5.7.2006.
enhancing the sentence in appeal or revision.
this Court, Subramanian Potti (J) as his Lordship then was, in State v.
not automatic and does not follow merely because such plea is made.
accused may not be properly advised because of the situation in which he is placed.
acting upon such plea and convicting the accused without may evidence.
by the prosecution which, even if true, may not be sufficient to constitute an offence.
himself to be a merchant dealing in broken glass pieces and obtained an advance of Rs.
unsustainable. Plea of guilty did not preclude a challenge to the inference drawn."
construed to constrain the meaning of any provision in Chapter XXIA.
Prosecutor appointed under section 25."
the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
provisions in Chapter XXIA of the Cr.P.C are indeed mandatory.
been referred to in detail in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment.
to show that the accused has made such an undertaking in that regard.
notice of the civil court by producing a copy of this judgment.
this judgment to the trial court.
(Criminal) stands finally disposed of.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


One provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), 2 U.S.C. 441a(d)(3), limits the amount that the national committee and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election of a candidate for the United States Senate or House of Representatives. Petitioner National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) is a political committee organized to support Republican candidates for the Senate. Although the Act authorizes the NRSC to contribute up to a certain amount to such candidates, it is not authorized to make expenditures on their behalf. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), however, has permitted the NRSC to act as agent of national and state party committees in making expenditures on their behalf. When certain state Republican Party committees designated the NRSC as their agent for 441a(d)(3) expenditure purposes, the respondent Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee filed a complaint with the FEC, asserting that the NRSC's agreements with the state committees were contrary to 441a(d)(3). The FEC dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was "no reason to believe" that the agreements violated the Act. On review, the District Court granted the FEC's motion for summary judgment, holding that the FEC's decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the "plain language" of 441a(d)(3) precluded the agency agreements between state committees and the NRSC.
Section 441a(d)(3) does not expressly or by necessary implication foreclose the use of agency agreements, such as are at issue here, and the FEC thus acted within the authority vested in it by Congress when it determined to permit such agreements. Pp. 31-43.
(a) While 441a(d)(3) does not authorize the NRSC to make expenditures in its own right, it does not follow that it may not act as agent of a [454 U.S. 27, 28] committee that is expressly authorized to make expenditures. Nothing in the statute suggests that a state committee may not designate another committee to be its alter ego and to act in its behalf for the purposes of 441a(d)(3). Nor does the legislative history of the Act purport to disapprove agency arrangements. Pp. 31-36.
(b) Under the standard of whether the FEC's construction of the Act was "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court, the District Court was correct in accepting the FEC's judgment. The FEC's view that the agency agreements were logically consistent with 441a(a)(4) - which authorizes the transfer of funds among national, state, and local committees of the same party - is acceptable. And the FEC's interpretation of 441a(d)(3) is not inconsistent with any discernible purpose of the Act. Pp. 36-42.
212 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 660 F.2d 773, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 43.
Charles N. Steele argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-939. With him on the brief was Kathleen Imig Perkins. Jan W. Baran argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 80-1129.
Robert F. Bauer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 80-1129, National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), limits the contributions that may be made to candidates or political committees in an election for federal office. One provision of the Act, 441a(d), authorizes limited expenditures by the national and state committees of a political party in connection with a general election campaign for federal office. After authorizing such expenditures, which otherwise would be impermissible, 1 the section specifies the amount a [454 U.S. 27, 29] national committee may spend in connection with a Presidential campaign, 441a(d)(2), and limits the amount that national and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the Senate or the House of Representatives, 441a(d)(3). In this litigation we examine whether 441a(d)(3) is violated when a state committee of a political party designates the national senatorial campaign committee of that party as its agent for the purpose of making expenditures allowed by the Act.
In February 1977, in response to an inquiry submitted late in 1976, the Commission issued an Advisory Opinion, 1976-108, that it would be consistent with the Act for the NRSC to spend its own funds in support of congressional candidates as the designated agent of the Republican National Committee (RNC). In April 1977, the Commission issued a regulation, 11 CFR 110.7(a)(4) (1981), which provides that the national party committees may make expenditures in the general election campaign for President "through any designated agent, including state and subordinate party committees." On the basis of this regulatory authority, the National Committee of the Democratic Party entered into an agreement specifying the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) as its agent for the expenditure of authorized funds in Senate campaigns. In 1978, certain state Republican Party committees designated the NRSC as their agent for 441a(d)(3) expenditure purposes. 2 Complaints were filed with the Commission challenging this practice as inconsistent with the Act. In dismissing these complaints, the Commission twice ruled by unanimous votes that the agency arrangements were not forbidden by the Act. In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review (MUR) 780 (Jan. 19, 1979); In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission MUR 820 (June 17, 1979). In 1980, certain state committees again designated the NRSC as their agent, and on May 19, the DSCC filed its complaint with the Commission asserting that the NRSC's agreements with the state committees were contrary to 441a(d)(3). The complaint did not challenge the contemporaneous agency agreement under which the NRSC acted as the agent of the RNC in connection with the latter's expenditures under 441a(d). [454 U.S. 27, 31] After considering the report of its General Counsel, the Commission unanimously dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was "no reason to believe" that the agreements violated the Act.
The DSCC petitioned for review in the District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 437g(a)(8). 3 That court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the decision of the Commission was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 80-1903 (DC Aug. 28, 1980) (reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. of NRSC B4). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the NRSC leave to intervene and reversed the judgment of the District Court after concluding that the "plain language of Section 441a(d)(3) precludes" the agency agreements between state committees and the NRSC. 212 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 383, 660 F.2d 773, 782. We granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the Commission and the NRSC, 450 U.S. 964 (1981), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Although the Court of Appeals first addressed whether and to what extent it should defer to the Commission's construction of the Act, 212 U.S. App. D.C., at 377, 660 F.2d, at 776, this discussion and the conclusion that little or no deference was due the Commission were pointless if the court was correct that the agency agreements violated the plain language of the Act as well as the statutory purposes revealed by the legislative history. The interpretation put [454 U.S. 27, 32] on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 -746 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). Accordingly, the crucial issue at the outset is whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the Act. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the Court of Appeals. As we understand the Act and its legislative history, 441a(d)(3) does not foreclose the use of agency agreements. The Commission thus acted within the authority vested in it by Congress when it determined to permit such agreements.
If the Court of Appeals is correct that any arrangement is forbidden by which an authorized committee empowers another to exercise its spending authority, then neither of the national committees could legally enter into agency relationships with its congressional campaign committees. Yet, both have regularly done so, and respondent DSCC does not challenge these arrangements. Indeed, the DSCC accepts the Commission's regulation, 11 CFR 110.7 (1981), 6 as valid and interprets that regulation as authorizing the agency agreements which have existed between the parties' national committees and the Republican and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees. 7 Moreover, when the Commission, as required by law, 8 submitted the regulation to Congress, neither House expressed disapproval.
It is clear enough to us without saying more that the statute does not expressly or by necessary implication foreclose the agency agreements at issue in this case. But neither does it expressly permit or require such agreements. If this were a direct enforcement action rather than the review of a decision by the administrative agency charged with the enforcement of the statute, it may be that a court could defensibly arrive at the conclusion that agency agreements of this kind should be forbidden. It may also be that the Commission could have construed the statute to forbid the agreements and that a court would have accepted such a construction by the agency. But that is not this case. The Commission, in dismissing the DSCC's complaint, has determined that agency agreements are not contrary to law and the question is whether the courts should defer to this judgment as a permissible construction of the Act or instead disregard the agency's view and proceed to construe the statute based on its own view of what would best serve the purpose and policy of the Act.
The Court of Appeals determined that the Commission's construction of the Act was entitled to no deference whatsoever. [454 U.S. 27, 37] While acknowledging that deference is often appropriately given to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute, the court refused to accord that deference here because of what it perceived as the lack of a reasoned and consistent explanation by the Commission in support of its decision. We agree that the thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency's reasoning are factors that bear upon the amount of deference to be given an agency's ruling. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 , n. 5 (1978); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). We do not agree, however, that the Commission failed to merit that deference in this case.
Initially, we note that the Commission is precisely the type of agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded. Congress has vested the Commission with "primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109 (1976), providing the agency with "extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers." Id., at 110. It is authorized to "formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act," 437d(a)(9), and has the "sole discretionary power" to determine in the first instance whether or not a civil violation of the Act has occurred. 424 U.S., at 112 , n. 153. Moreover, the Commission is inherently bipartisan in that no more than three of its six voting members may be of the same political party, 437c(a)(1), and it must decide issues charged with the dynamics of party politics, often under the pressure of an impending election. For these reasons, Congress wisely provided that the Commission's dismissal of a complaint should be reversed only if "contrary to law." 437g(a)(8).
Hence, in determining whether the Commission's action was "contrary to law," the task for the Court of Appeals was not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission's construction was "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978). To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court to find that the agency's construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. Ibid.; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S., at 16 ; Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946). Under this standard, we think the District Court was correct in accepting the Commission's judgment.
As we have said, 441a(d) does not expressly or by implication forbid agency agreements. Although the Court of Appeals and the DSCC are of the view that since the section specifically authorized only two committees - the national and state party committees - to make campaign expenditures, no other committee could make such expenditures either on its own account or on behalf of others. But the opposite reading makes equal sense: Congress, having written the statute so precisely, would have made clear that expenditures [454 U.S. 27, 40] by other committees, whether by agency or otherwise, were prohibited.
We also find acceptable the Commission's view that the agency agreements were logically consistent with 441a (a)(4). That section authorizes the transfer of funds among national, state, and local committees of the same party. There can be little question but that the section applies to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, as that Committee is part of the Republican Party organization. 20 Under that provision, by using direct money transfers, instead of an agency agreement, the national committee could write a check to the state committee for the same amount that it would otherwise have spent directly under the agency agreement. That being so, we agree with the dissent below that the difference is "purely one of form, not substance." 212 U.S. App. D.C., at 386, 660 F.2d, at 785.
Money transferred to the state committee presumably would be spent as the state committee decided. Agency [454 U.S. 27, 41] agreements, by comparison, might allow the NRSC to determine what expenditures to make on behalf of the state committees. The Court of Appeals made much of this, asserting that the agency arrangements, unlike 441a(a)(4) transfers, reduced the state committees to "legal shells." The court overlooks that the NRSC easily could insist that funds transferred to a state committee be utilized in a certain manner. Conversely, state committees could retain or share control over how 441a(d)(3) spending authority is exercised by writing conditions into the agency agreement. More fundamentally, state committees are not obligated to enter into agency agreements in the first place. The delegation of spending authority is an option, not a requirement, and it is an option resting entirely with the state committees.
Finally, the Commission's interpretation is not inconsistent with any discernible purpose of the Act. In Buckley v. Valeo, we recognized that the primary interest served by the Act is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. 424 U.S., at 25 . It has not been suggested that this basic purpose of the Act is compromised by agency arrangements. Since the limitations on the amount that can be spent under the Act apply with equal force whether a state committee exercises its authority directly or transfers it to one of the party's national committees, an agency arrangement does not permit the expenditure of a single additional dollar.
Section 441a(d)(3) fits into the general scheme by assuring that political parties will continue to have an important role in federal elections. 21 Although the DSCC would transform this purpose into the more specific objective of stimulating political parties at the state level, none of the limited legislative [454 U.S. 27, 42] history concerning the provision supports this view. 22 The legislative discussion of preserving a role for political parties did not differentiate between the state and national branches of the party unit. It is hardly unreasonable to suppose that the political parties were fully capable of structuring their expenditures so as to achieve the greatest possible return. Agency agreements may permit all party committees to benefit from fundraising, media expertise, and economies of scale. In turn, effective use of party resources in support of party candidates may encourage candidate loyalty and responsiveness to the party. Indeed, the very posture of these cases betrays the weakness of respondent's argument - an argument that, at bottom, features one of the two great American political parties insisting that its rival requires judicial assistance in discovering how a legislative enactment operates to its benefit.
[ Footnote 1 ] Expenditures by party committees are known as "coordinated" expenditures and are subject to the monetary limits of 441a(d). See 6 FEC Record, No. 11, p. 6 (Nov. 1980). Party committees are considered [454 U.S. 27, 29] incapable of making "independent" expenditures in connection with the campaigns of their party's candidates. The Commission has, by regulation, forbidden such "independent" expenditures by the national and state party committees, 11 CFR 110.7(B)(4) (1981), and has indicated in this litigation that the congressional campaign committees fall within that prohibition. See Brief for Petitioner Federal Election Commission in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 10, n. 5 ("[p]arty committees . . . are deemed incapable of making independent expenditures"); Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-939, p. 38 ("NRSC is a party committee"). Thus, as the Commission admits: "Absent 441a(d), party committees could make no expenditures whatsoever in connection with the Congressional campaigns of their party's candidates." Brief for Petitioner Federal Election Commission in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 10, n. 5.
[ Footnote 2 ] In the 1978 senatorial elections, the NRSC spent a total of $2,770,995 under the combined spending authority of the national and state party committees. Jt. App. in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 105.
[ Footnote 3 ] This section provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved" by the Commission's dismissal of a complaint may petition the United States District Court for the District of Columbia which "may declare that the dismissal of the complaint or the action, or the failure to act, is contrary to law" and order the Commission to conform with the court's declaration.
[ Footnote 4 ] The RNC, not the NRSC, is the "national committee" as defined by 2 U.S.C. 431(14) (1976 ed., Supp. IV): "the organization . . . responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level."
[ Footnote 5 ] The Court of Appeals' suggests that it is misleading to characterize the agreements as ones of "agency" because the state committees do not direct how funds are to be raised and spent. We do not understand the lack of such control to be inherent in these arrangements, nor dispositive in deciding whether such agreements can be made under the Act. See infra, at 41. See also n. 6, infra.
[ Footnote 6 ] The regulation, 11 CFR 110.7(a)(1) (1981), allows the "national committee of a political party [to] make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of any candidate for President . . . affiliated with the party," up to "an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States," the amount authorized by 441a(d)(2). These expenditures may be made "through any designated agent, including State and subordinate committees." The regulation goes on to authorize the national committee to make expenditures on behalf of congressional and senatorial candidates of the party.
While the regulation directly authorizes transfers of spending authority only with respect to Presidential campaign expenditures, the significance of the regulation is that it clearly demonstrates that 441a(d) expenditures do not have to be made directly by the committee specified in the statute.
[ Footnote 7 ] In its brief before the Court of Appeals, the DSCC expressly stated that it "does not challenge this regulation or the NRSC's role as agent of the Republican National Committee." See Brief for Appellant DSCC in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 20, n. 16.
[ Footnote 8 ] The Act requires that before prescribing any rule or regulation the Commission shall transmit the proposed rule and an accompanying statement to the Senate and the House. If neither House disapproves the proposed rule within 30 legislative days, the Commission may proceed to issue the rule. 438(d).
[ Footnote 9 ] Section 441a(h) authorizes the "Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, or the national committee of a political party, or any combination of such committees" to contribute "not more than $17,500" to a senatorial candidate.
[ Footnote 10 ] By its terms, the provision does not restrict a senatorial campaign committee from making expenditures on behalf of other committees.
[ Footnote 11 ] During the 1974 legislative debates, Senator Brock proposed an amendment that would have exempted congressional campaign committees from the expenditure limitations of the Act. 120 Cong. Rec. 9549-9551 (1974). The Senate initially adopted the amendment, but reversed itself five days later. Id., at 10062-10064.
[ Footnote 12 ] Section 113 of H. R. 11315 would have prohibited any "movement of funds" between "the political committees of a national political party (including House and Senate congressional campaign committees of such party) and the political committees of a State committee of a political party . . . for the purpose of making contributions to, or expenditures on behalf of, any candidate for Federal office." H. R. 11315, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House rejected a rule for consideration of the bill, 124 Cong. Rec. 7872-7880 (1978). The basis for the rejection may be seen in various comments attacking the bill. Representative Stockman saw the proposed amendment as a "fundamental assault on . . . the continued meaningful role of our political parties." Id., at 7875. Representative Mikva stated that he "deeply regret[ted] that the committee . . . saw fit to change the party financing." Id., at 7876.
[ Footnote 13 ] See First General Counsel's Report, MUR 780 (Jan. 19, 1978).
[ Footnote 14 ] This section provides that the limitations on contributions to and by political committees found in 441a(a)(1) and (2) "do not apply to transfers between and among political committees which are national, State, district, or local committees (including any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party."
[ Footnote 15 ] See First General Counsel's Report, MUR 820 (June 19, 1978).
[ Footnote 16 ] See 11 CFR 110.7 (1981), supra n. 6.
[ Footnote 17 ] See First General Counsel's Report, MUR 1234 (July 11, 1980).
[ Footnote 18 ] The assertion by the Court of Appeals that the Commission has disavowed the relevance of 11 CFR 110.7 (1981) in its brief before that court, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 378, 660 F.2d 773, 777, is belied by its incorporation in the Commission's brief before this Court. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 939, p. 35.
[ Footnote 19 ] Nor does the fact that the Commission, following its customary [454 U.S. 27, 39] practice, did not expressly adopt the General Counsel's report in announcing its decision "depriv[e] a reviewing court of any Commission record on which to base a deferential consideration." 212 U.S. App. D.C., at 378, n. 3, 660 F.2d, at 777, n. 3. The Court of Appeals previously has held that the General Counsel's report to the Commission is sufficient to support the Commission's dismissal of a complaint. See Hampton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) § 9036, pp. 50,439-50,440 (DC 1977), aff'd No. 77-1546 (CADC July 21, 1978). In this case, the General Counsel's report was made public simultaneously with the Commission's ruling. It was the third occasion on which the Commission followed the General Counsel's advice in this matter. Even without an express statement, it is sufficiently clear that the staff report provides the basis for the Commission's action.
[ Footnote 20 ] Section 441a(a)(4) applies to "political committees which are national, state, district or local committees (including any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party." The DSCC does not challenge the applicability of the transfer provision to national senatorial committees. At one point, the Court of Appeals refused to address the issue for that reason. See 212 U.S. App. D.C., at 382, 660 F.2d, at 781 (the "issue was not joined before this court"). At another point, however, the court expressed "some doubt" whether 441a(a)(4) encompasses congressional committees. Surely that doubt must be minimal in light of the broad scope of the statutory language, the fact that senatorial campaign committees are identifiable as part of their respective party. See Cong. Rec. 9552 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Baker), and the Congress' clear intent to include such committees within the scope of 441a(a)(1)-(2), to which 441a(a)(4) serves as an exception. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057, p. 58 (1976) ("the term `political committee established or maintained by a national political party' includes the Senate and House Campaign Committees"). A committee "established or maintained" by a national party would appear to fall squarely within the reach of 441a(a)(4). Indeed, if congressional campaign committees were not considered as part of the national party, their ability to make independent expenditures would seem to escape any limitation prescribed by the Act. See n. 1, supra.
[ Footnote 21 ] See S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 7 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, p. 103 (1977).
[ Footnote 22 ] It should be remembered that the section was considered at a time when Congress contemplated total public funding of general election campaigns for federal office. See 101, S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 71-78 (1974). In that context, statements in Congress about the need to preserve the role of party committees, see, e. g., 120 Cong. Rec. 34372 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cannon); id., at 35136 (remarks of Rep. Frenzel), are properly read as expressing concern over the function of political parties under public campaign finance rather than concern with the role of state committees vis-a-vis party committees at the national level. Thus, by allowing for the pooling of campaign funds, agency agreements increase party resources "to conduct party-wide election efforts." S. Rep. No. 93-689, supra, at 8, reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, supra, at 104.
The issue presented in this case is whether the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) violated the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), by making expenditures that state political committees are authorized to make under 441a(d)(1). Section 441a(d)(1) authorizes "the national committee of a political party and a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee," to make certain expenditures in connection with a candidate's general election campaign, subject to defined limitations. See 441a(d)(3). Since the NRSC clearly is not "the national committee of a political party," 1 or "a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee," 2 it is clear that nothing in 441a(d)(3) limits the permissible expenditure of funds by the NRSC.
The NRSC is, however, a "political committee" as that term is defined in the statute. 3 Section 441a(a)(2)(A) provides [454 U.S. 27, 44] that no multicandidate political committee may make contributions to a candidate that exceed $5,000. 4 Section 441a(h) provides, however, that "amounts totaling not more than $17,500 may be contributed to a candidate for nomination for election, or for election, to the United States Senate during the year in which an election is held in which he is such a candidate, by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee . . . ." No section of the statute directly limits expenditures by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees. 5 However, 441a(a)(7) (B)(i) provides that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate."
Thus, the only way that the NRSC could be said to have violated the statute in this case is if it made expenditures "in cooperation, consultation, or concert" with a candidate that exceeded $17,500. The record discloses that the NRSC in several instances made expenditures that exceeded $17,500. As I understand the record, however, it does not demonstrate that these expenditures were made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with the candidates. The record simply is silent on this point.
The only way that the NRSC could be said to have violated the statute, therefore, is if, as a matter of law, it is incapable of making expenditures that are not made in cooperation, [454 U.S. 27, 45] consultation, or concert with a candidate. In other words, the NRSC could not be said to have violated the statute unless the NRSC is deemed as a matter of law to be an agent of the candidate on whose behalf it expends funds. If this is the case, however, it would appear to me to follow almost automatically that the NRSC may act as an agent for the state committees in spending the amounts that state committees are authorized to spend by 441a(d), since state committees are largely controlled by the state candidates that they serve. It would seem incongruous to hold that the NRSC must be treated as an agent of a candidate when it makes expenditures, but may not act as a lawful agent of that candidate's state committee.
[ Footnote 1 ] Section 431(14) defines the term "national committee" as "the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level, as determined by the Commission." 2 U.S.C. 431(14) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
[ Footnote 2 ] Section 431(15) defines the term "State committee" as "the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the State level, as determined by the Commission." 2 U.S.C. 431(15) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
"(A) any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year . . . ." 2 U.S.C. 431(4) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
"(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000." 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(A).
[ Footnote 5 ] The Act carefully distinguishes between "contributions" and "expenditures." See 431(8) (defining the term "contribution"); 431(9) (defining the term "expenditure").


Do I Have a Case? What Will it Cost? What Should I Do if Injured?
The answers stated are general in nature and are not intended to apply to every personal injury situation. Every case is different and carries its own set of circumstances that must be taken into consideration by our competent legal counsel at Warner Law Offices, PLLC.
What should I do if I'm involved in a car wreck?
What is uninsured and underinsured coverage?
If I make an uninsured or underinsured claim under my own automobile policy, will it increase my premiums?
How long do I have to make a claim for injuries?
What do I do if I am injured by a physician?
What should I do if I'm injured in an oil, gas or mining accident?
Who can make a claim for wrongful death of a family member?
What are the damages for a wrongful death?
Can I make a claim for injuries even if I'm covered by workers' compensation?
Can I be fired while I am receiving workers' compensation benefits?
My insurance company is offering me a nice settlement. Should I take it?
What do I do if the insurance company refuses to investigate my claim or pay me?
Q. What will it cost me to hire an attorney?
A. Warner Law Offices PLLC represents its clients on a contingent fee basis. Under this arrangement, the client pays no fees or costs unless his or her case is settled or won.
Q. What should I do if I'm involved in a car wreck?
A. If you are involved in an automobile collision, which was caused by the other party, make sure that the police are called to the scene of the collision. Protect your legal rights by never admitting to wrongdoing or apologizing for your actions. If you are able to do so, simply exchange driver's licenses, registrations and insurance information with the other driver(s). Ask the law enforcement officer on the scene if you can fill out a motor vehicle accident report form. By having the facts of the accident on file, the law enforcement officer will document the driver's version of events, as well as the law enforcement officer's conclusion. You should also immediately seek treatment, as some injuries sustained in automobile collisions are latent, meaning that they are not readily apparent. Contact your insurance carrier and put them on notice of the claim. Warner Law Offices recommends that you contact an attorney to assist in filing a claim and obtaining a recovery on your behalf.
Q. What is uninsured and underinsured coverage?
A. Uninsured and underinsured coverage is coverage that you purchase under your own automobile policy. Uninsured coverage provides you protection if you are injured in an automobile accident and the other party, who is at fault, does not have automobile insurance. Underinsured coverage provides you protection if you are injured in an automobile accident and the other party, who is at fault, does not have enough insurance coverage to compensate you for all of your damages.
Q. If I make an uninsured or underinsured claim under my own automobile policy, will it increase my premiums?
A. In most cases, a claim made pursuant to your uninsured and/or underinsured coverage will not increase your premiums. It is the policy of Warner Law Offices to contact the client's carrier to confirm this information prior to advising a client to filing a claim on his or her own policy.
A. The first requirement of a personal injury case is that you must have suffered an injury to your person or property. Second, your injury must have been the result of someone else's negligence or fault. However, a physical injury is not always necessary to bring a personal injury lawsuit. Claims may be based on a variety of nonphysical losses as well. Contact Bobby Warner to discuss your issue and determine if you have a personal injury case.
Q. How long do I have to make a claim for injuries?
A. In order to avoid dismissal on the basis of a claim being untimely, a civil lawsuit must be filed within a specified period of time after the accident or dispute occurred. Each state and federal court has its own rules concerning the maximum amount of time that a civil litigant can wait before filing a lawsuit. This time limit is often referred to as the statute of limitations. Claim for injuries received in an automobile accident must be filed within two years from the date of the accident. Claims for injuries resulting from medical negligence must be brought within two years from the date the negligence occurred or within two years from the date that the patient knew, or reasonably should have known of the medical negligence. Thus, it greatly behooves potential litigants to seek the counsel of a lawyer immediately after an accident or dispute to ascertain available options.
Q. What do I do if I am injured by a defective product?
A. A person who is injured by a defective product can recover compensation from the manufacturer or seller of the product under theories of strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence. If you are injured by a product, be sure to keep the product, including any parts of the product that may have broken off. Do not attempt to repair the product. The court can dismiss claims against a manufacturer or suppliers of products if the injured party is not able to produce the defective product for inspection.
The general test for establishing strict liability in tort is whether the product is defective in that it is not reasonably safe for its intended use. The standard of reasonable safeness is based upon what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards should have been at the time the product was made. Once it is shown that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer and that the defect proximately caused the injury, recovery is warranted unless there was conduct by the consumer, which may bar recovery.
Q. What do I do if I am injured or otherwise harmed by a physician?
A. If you are injured by the negligence of a physician, you may have a cause of action against the physician. In West Virginia, in order to recover against a physician, a patient must prove that the physician failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider acting in the same or similar circumstances and that such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or death. W. Va. Code § 55-7B-3.
Q. What should I do if I'm injured in an oil, gas or mining accident?
A. Warner Law Offices is skilled at handling all aspects of such complex personal injury cases. We have experience with electrocutions, roof collapses, rib rolls, oil rig explosions, malfunctioning equipment on mining sites and much more. Contact us, and we will take care of all the legal details for you and your family.
Q. Who can make a claim for wrongful death of a family member?
A. Only the personal representative of the deceased person can bring and maintain an action for wrongful death. The personal representative must be duly appointed by state. W. Va. Code § 55-7-6.
Q. What are the damages for a wrongful death and who can recover these damages?
A. Damages in a wrongful death claim include the following: (1) Sorrow, mental anguish and solace (which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent); (2) compensation for reasonably expected loss of income of the decedent and services, protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent; (3) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitalization of the decedent; and (4) reasonable funeral expenses. W. Va. Code § 55-7-6.
The potential beneficiaries of the damages received in a wrongful death claim are the surviving spouse and children, including adopted and stepchildren, brothers, sisters, parents and any other persons who were financially dependent upon the decedent at the time of his/her death. W. Va. Code § 55-7-6.
Q. Can I make a claim for injuries even if the injury is covered by workers' compensation?
e. That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a direct and proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition.
W. Va. Code § 23-4-2.
Q. Can I be fired while I am receiving workers' compensation benefits?
A. No. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to terminate an injured employee while the injured employee is off work due to a compensable injury and is receiving or is eligible to receive temporary total disability benefits, unless the injured employee has committed a separate dischargeable offense. A separate dischargeable offense is misconduct by the injured employee wholly unrelated to the injury or the absence from work resulting from the injury. W. Va. Code § 23-5A-3.
Q. My insurance company is offering me a nice settlement. Should I take it?
A. No. Tell the insurance company that you will get back to it. Contact Bobby Warner at Warner Law Offices immediately. An insurance company may offer a minimal amount of money in return for your signature stating that you will not sue it. Never take an insurance check without first consulting Bobby Warner to discuss your options.
Q. What do I do if the insurance company refuses to investigate my claim or pay me?
A. In West Virginia, insurance companies are required to perform a reasonable investigation of any claim. If liability is reasonably clear, the insurance company is required to make a fair, prompt settlement offer. Contact an attorney if an insurance company refuses to investigate your claim or make a fair and prompt settlement offer.
Q. Why do I need a lawyer to represent me in my personal injury case?
A. A lawyer's center of attention is obtaining the maximum damages for you, consistent with the nature of your injuries and losses. Bobby Warner and Warner Law Offices will work hard to protect your interests. Further, Warner Law Offices will investigate all sources of recovery and ensure that your medical expenses are submitted to the proper source for payment.