text:
MICHAEL GAMALIEL PLATA, Complainant, v. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES, Respondent.
In a sworn letter dated April 21, 2003 addressed to then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Michael Gamaliel J. Plata (Complainant) charged Judge Lizabeth G. Torres (respondent Judge) of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, with grave abuse of discretion, gross negligence, serious inefficiency and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her failure/refusal to resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information dated July 29, 1999, filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Susante J. Tobias of Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case No. 6679 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Michael J. Plata."
The complainant reiterated his charges against the respondent Judge in a verified letter-complaint dated August 14, 2003.
The recitals in both the letter and the complaint-affidavit show that the complainant was accused of attempted homicide before the City Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City, docketed at I.S. No. 97-10732. The City Prosecutor's Office found probable cause to charge the complainant of the imputed crime in a Resolution dated November 21, 1997. Consequently, an Information for Attempted Homicide was filed against him with the MeTC of Mandaluyong City. The case was subsequently raffled to the sala of the respondent Judge.
The complainant appealed the City Prosecutor's resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ). In Resolution No. 305, Series of 1998, the DOJ reversed the appealed resolution and directed it to cause, with leave of court, the withdrawal of the information for attempted homicide. Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas denied the motions for the reconsideration of DOJ Resolution No. 305.
In accordance with the DOJ directive, Prosecutor Tobias filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the respondent Judge's court on July 29, 1999. Two (2) years after, the respondent Judge had not acted on the motion, prompting the complainant to file on August 28, 2001 a manifestation for its early resolution. The respondent Judge set the motion for hearing on December 13, 2001. Instead of proceeding with the hearing, the respondent Judge required the private complainants to file a manifestation within five days supporting their claim that DOJ Resolution No. 305 had been appealed to the Court of Appeals; otherwise the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. No action came from the respondent Judge despite the lapse of the five-day period; this inaction lasted up to the filing of the present administrative complaint.
The complainant claims that the respondent Judge's failure to act on the motion to withdraw the information is a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. He alleges that "[L]ike the sword of Dasmocles, the instant case has hounded me in the exercise of my lawful rights, in the performance of my tasks, and in my need to clear my name and reputation."
On August 26, 2003, we required the respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint. The respondent Judge failed to comply despite the several extensions and a warning we gave.
In her "Consolidated Order," respondent admits that in Criminal Case No. 66879 against the present complaint, a motion to withdraw the information was filed by the public prosecutor on July 30, 1999. Respondent is not necessarily responsible for the court's inaction on the matter before June 1, 2001 when she assumed the position of presiding judge of Branch 60, Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. But after her assumption, it was her responsibility to resolve the pending incident within the period allowed by law.
It appears from the same "Consolidated Order" that Criminal Case No. 66879 was dismissed on September 15, 2006. If we consider the fact that complainant filed, on August 1, 2001, a manifestation praying that the motion to withdraw information against him be given due course, it was quite a long time before respondent resolved the motion as she issued her "Consolidated Order" only on September 15, 2006 or more than five years after.
The excuse given by respondent is that she wanted to have all the cases disposed of at one time. This motive is laudable if by doing so the judge does not go beyond the periods provided by law for the resolution of pending incidents.
The failure of respondent to promptly resolve the motion filed by the public prosecutors to withdraw the information, damaged the complainant. The latter had to keep his bail bond active during all these years that the motion was held in abeyance. If he was paying a yearly premium, to that extent he suffered damages. Instead of being relieved of the anxiety of having a criminal case pending against him, complainant suffered the same for the period that respondent failed to resolved the incident.
Considering that because of her obstinate refusal/failure to submit the comment required of her despite several extensions granted her, the Court had to impose a fine on her, it is recommended that in the present case, respondent be fined in the amount of fifteen (15) thousand pesos and warned that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely by the Court.
In the present case, it took respondent Judge more than five (5) years before she resolved a simple motion to withdraw the information against the complainant. This is indicative of the gross inefficiency that undermines the people's faith in the judiciary and reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind exceedingly slow. We cannot allow this to happen, particularly at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is one of the main complaints against the judiciary.
The respondent Judge attributes her delay in resolving the subject motion on "overwhelming workload, aggravated by lack of court personnel and marital problems." She claims that when she assumed her position as Judge of the MeTC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, she inherited more than 10,000 cases with 2,645 new cases filed with her court; she had to work beyond office hours and even on Saturdays in order to cope. In addition to the heavy workload in her own branch, she had to attend to the more than 7,000 cases in Branch 59 where she was designated as pairing Judge. She was also designated as Executive Judge from November 2002 to May 2006. Thus, she was deciding cases as many as 299 per month on the average, and a low of 58 cases a month on the average as reflected in her monthly reports. The lack of court personnel and her personal problems as a single parent aggravated her professional woes.
Under Rule 140, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision is considered a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Considering that the circumstances the respondent Judge cited are meritorious and are sufficient to mitigate her liability, we see no need to impose on respondent Judge the maximum penalty the Rule decrees. The fine of P15,000.00 that OCA Consultant Quimbo recommended is likewise high and would render meaningless the mitigating circumstances we recognized. To be fair to the respondent Judge, we must limit the fine to P10,000.00.
The resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.
The respondent Judge's extended and repeated failure to comply with the Court's directives constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination.7 The last person to refuse to adhere to the directives of the Court, or, in its stead, the Office of the Court Administrator, is the judge himself. No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a judge on the bench.8 The respondent Judge miserably failed to live up to this expectation.
For her gross misconduct and insubordination, we impose on the respondent Judge a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
WHEREFORE, we hereby impose on respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres of the MeTC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, the penalty of fine of P10,000.00 for undue delay in resolving the Motion to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 6679, and another fine of P10,000.00 for her repeated failure to comply with the Court's directives to file her comment on the administrative complaint against her. We WARN that any repetition of these or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
1 Balajedeong v. del Rosario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1662, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 13.
2 Office of the Court Administrator v. EspaÃ±ol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1872, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 332.
3 Office of the Court Administrator v. Barroso, Jr. (ret.), et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1874, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 334.
4 Balajedeong v. del Rosario, supra note 1.
5 Imbang v. del Rosario, A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 79.
6 A.M. No. MTJ-94-904, 315 SCRA 438.
7 Imbang v. del Rosario, supra note 5.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


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1. The District Court has jurisdiction over suits by receivers of national banks. 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(1) and (16). P. 297 U. S. 617.
2. A suit by a receiver of a national bank to determine his right of participation as cestui que trust in a trust originally set up and administered by the bank but turned over, with the receiver's consent, to a successor trustee appointed by a state court is a suit within the equity jurisdiction of the federal court. P. 297 U. S. 618.
3. Its jurisdiction having been invoked in such a suit, it is the duty of the federal court to determine the issues involved. Id.
4. Such a suit is not in rem; the decree sought determines the right of the receiver against the trustee, but does no interfere with the trustee's possession or with the power of the state court to order distribution of assets, and its prosecution is not opposed to rules of comity. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, and Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189, distinguished. P. 297 U. S. 619.
5. Property in the possession of a trustee is not in custodia legis, as is property in the possession of a receiver. P. 297 U. S. 619.
Certiorari, 296 U.S. 564, to review the question of jurisdiction and its appropriate exercise in a suit by the receiver of a national bank against a trustee appointed by a state court, to establish the rights of the plaintiff in the trust fund. The court below affirmed with modifications the decree of the district court in favor of the receiver.
The order granting this certiorari limited our consideration "to the question of jurisdiction and its appropriate exercise."
The facts, not in serious dispute, were fully set out by the Circuit Court of Appeals. It will suffice now to restate those bearing particularly on the points for decision.
and, to meet the demands of certificate holders, the Bank advanced $40,000.
In September, 1931, the Bank failed; the Comptroller of the Currency appointed first Thomas, then Atwood, and finally respondent Bradford, as receiver to wind up its affairs. Desiring to relinquish control of the mortgage pool, the receiver consented to the appointment by the orphans' court of petitioner, Commonwealth Trust Company, as successor trustee for the pool assets, and delivered all of them to it. The face value of mortgages so delivered exceeded the total outstanding certificates by $291,000.
The orphans' court authorized the trustee to distribute among certificate holders funds collected from mortgage debtors, but nothing went to the receiver of the Bank, "the Court directing that payments to him be suspended pending a judicial determination of" his rights "to participate in such distribution."
Thereupon, the receiver instituted these equity proceedings in the United States District Court. The Commonwealth Trust Company, as trustee, and four certificate holders were made defendants. The prayer of the bill asked an adjudication of the receiver's right to be paid the excess of the mortgage debts over outstanding certificates ($291,000) from assets of the pool; also his privilege to receive therefrom the amount advanced by the Bank ($40,000) on account of agreed interest upon the certificates, and for general relief.
as trustee of the mortgage pool formerly held by the Bank of Pittsburgh National Association from mortgages in said mortgage pool, the sum of $40,213.58 advanced to the mortgage pool by the Bank of Pittsburgh National Association.
2. That the plaintiff, Avery J. Bradford, receiver of the Bank of Pittsburgh National Association, is a participant and cestui que trustent to the amount of $291,020.45 in the mortgage pool formerly administered by the Bank of Pittsburgh National Association and now being administered by the defendant Commonwealth Trust Company as trustee.
3. That there is now due and payable from the defendant Commonwealth Trust Company, trustee as aforesaid, to Avery J. Bradford, receiver of the Bank of Pittsburgh National Association, the sum of $26,191.84, being the amount withheld from said receiver under previous distributions to participants other than said receiver on account of principal, and the sum of $29,225.26, being the amount withheld from said receiver under previous distributions to participants other than said receiver on account of income and the sum of $1,254.84, being the interest earned and collected by the Commonwealth Trust Company, trustee as aforesaid, on the amounts withheld from said receiver.
4. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of making such other orders and decrees, if any, as may become necessary.
5. The claims established in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall have priority of payment over any future distribution of assets to participants in the pool.
Petitioners do not deny that, ordinarily, District Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of suits by receivers of national banks, Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 41(1) and (16); Gibson v. Peters, 150 U. S. 342, 150 U. S. 344; In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 165 U. S. 458; United States v. Weitzel, 246 U. S. 533, 246 U. S. 541, and that the parties were before the trial court.
But they maintain the cause stated by the bill was not one cognizable in equity, since the subject matter was a fund held by a trustee under appointment of the state court against which no adjudication was possible in the absence of an accounting -- the necessity of this was inherent in the cause as presented. Also, that to enforce the remedy sought would necessarily interfere with possession and control of the res in the custody of the orphans' court. And, further, that, under the rule of comity approved in Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, and Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189, the trial court should have dismissed the proceedings.
The original bill revealed that the receiver had been denied participation as a cestui que trust in the assets held by petitioner trust company, and asked an adjudication of his rights therein. He did not seek direct interference with possession or control of the assets; he prayed that his right to partake thereof be determined. The claim was an equitable one, within the ordinary jurisdiction of the chancellor.
"In all cases in which an action of account would be the proper remedy at law, and in all cases where a trustee is a party, the jurisdiction of a court of equity is undoubted. It is the appropriate tribunal."
Fowle v.Lawrason's Executor, 5 Pet. 495, 30 U. S. 503; Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 182 U. S. 479-480; Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222.
practically abandoned its jurisdiction over a case of which it had cognizance, and turned the matter over for adjudication to the state court. This, it has been steadily held, a Federal court may not do. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 148 U. S. 534."
See also Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234.
The trust here involved was created by the Bank's voluntary action, not by the orphans' court. Whatever control the latter possessed resulted solely from appointment of the successor trustee, and, for present purposes, did not materially differ from that exercised by probate courts over such fiduciaries as guardians, administrators, executors, etc. The jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain suits against the latter is clear, when instituted in order to determine the validity of claims against the estate or claimants' interests therein. Such proceedings are not in rem; they seek only to establish rights; judgments therein do not deal with the property and other distribution; they adjudicate questions which precede distribution. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 149 U. S. 620; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U. S. 211, 187 U. S. 227; Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 215 U. S. 43; Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 279 U. S. 223; Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 F. 776, 779. Property in its (the trustee's) possession is not in custodia legis as in case of receivers. Hinkley v. Art Students' League, 37 F.2d 225, 226; Appeal of Hall, 112 Pa. 42, 54, 3 A. 783; Strouse v.Lawrence, 160 Pa. 421, 425, 28 A. 930; Goodwin v. Colwell, 213 Pa. 614, 616, 63 A. 363; Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283, 289, 60 N.E. 500.
of the state concerning liquidation of the business and assets of an insolvent local corporation. The question was whether, under the peculiar circumstances disclosed, the federal court should retain jurisdiction; its power generally to render judgment in personam against fiduciaries appointed by state courts was expressly recognized. Here, there are no extraordinary circumstances. As contemplated by Congress, the receiver sought an adjudication of his rights. The final decree produced no interference with the trustee's possession, nor with the power of the orphans' court to order distribution of assets. The receiver's privilege to participate has been declared; only a judgment in personam was rendered.
Congress has empowered receivers of national banks to sue in federal courts; the obvious importance of permitting them freely to do so cannot be disregarded.
All necessary parties were brought before the trial court. The claim to the contrary is without merit.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


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matches:
Art. 6
Art. 21
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 21
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


text:
36 *> SCHKBD checks the singular value decomposition (SVD) routines.
41 *> and lower bidiagonal if m < n.
43 *> SORGBR generates the orthogonal matrices Q and P' from SGEBRD.
44 *> Note that Q and P are not necessarily square.
50 *> and right singular vectors, respectively, of B.
52 *> singular vectors are not computed.
53 *> 3) A = (UQ) S (P'V'), the SVD of the original matrix A.
55 *> U to a matrix X, useful in least squares applications.
62 *> and right singular vectors, respectively, of B.
64 *> singular vectors are not computed.
71 *> and right singular vectors, respectively, of B.
73 *> singular vectors are not computed.
78 *> singular vectors are not computed.
83 *> singular vectors are not computed.
86 *> type, an M by N matrix A and an M by NRHS matrix X are generated.
111 *> and Z = U' Y.
116 *> (8) S1 contains min(M,N) nonnegative values in decreasing order.
120 *> computing U and V.
144 *> (18) S1 contains min(M,N) nonnegative values in decreasing order.
148 *> computing U and V.
157 *> (23) S1 contains min(M,N) nonnegative values in decreasing order.
161 *> computing U and V.
169 *> (28) S1 contains min(M,N) nonnegative values in decreasing order.
173 *> computing U and V.
181 *> (33) S1 contains min(M,N) nonnegative values in decreasing order.
185 *> computing U and V.
189 *> (1) The zero matrix.
190 *> (2) The identity matrix.
193 *> 1, ..., ULP and random signs.
196 *> 1, ..., ULP and random signs.
198 *> and random signs.
205 *> on the diagonal.
209 *> signs on the diagonal.
213 *> signs on the diagonal.
218 *> (13) Rectangular matrix with random entries chosen from (-1,1).
227 *> (a) SGEBRD is not called to reduce it to bidiagonal form.
229 *> matrix will be lower bidiagonal, otherwise upper.
230 *> (c) only tests 5--8 and 14 are performed.
233 *> the logical array DOTYPE.
243 *> MVAL and NVAL. The matrix sizes are used in pairs (M,N).
249 *> The values of the matrix row dimension M.
255 *> The values of the matrix column dimension N.
264 *> defined, which is to use whatever matrices are in A and B.
266 *> DOTYPE(MAXTYP+1) is .TRUE. .
277 *> DOTYPE(NTYPES) will be ignored.
285 *> operations on the right-hand side will not be tested.
286 *> NRHS must be at least 0.
307 *> be a reasonably small multiple of 1, e.g., 10 or 100.
313 *> where NMAX is the maximum value of N in NVAL.
320 *> where MMAX is the maximum value of M in MVAL.
355 *> The leading dimension of the arrays X, Y, and Z.
377 *> The leading dimension of the array Q. LDQ >= max(1,MMAX).
388 *> The leading dimension of the arrays PT, U, and V.
389 *> LDPT >= max(1, max(min(MVAL(j),NVAL(j)))).
432 *> If 0, then everything ran OK.
439 *> -11: LDA < 1 or LDA < MMAX, where MMAX is max( MM(j) ).
440 *> -17: LDB < 1 or LDB < MMAX.
441 *> -21: LDQ < 1 or LDQ < MMAX.
442 *> -23: LDPT< 1 or LDPT< MNMAX.
443 *> -27: LWORK too small.
446 *> absolute value of it is returned.
453 *> ZERO, ONE Real 0 and 1.
454 *> MAXTYP The number of types defined.
456 *> be performed so far, for the current matrix.
457 *> MMAX Largest value in NN.
458 *> NMAX Largest value in NN.
461 *> MNMAX The maximum value of MNMIN for j=1,...,NSIZES.
463 *> COND, IMODE Values to be passed to the matrix generators.
464 *> ANORM Norm of A; passed to matrix generators.
466 *> OVFL, UNFL Overflow and underflow thresholds.
467 *> RTOVFL, RTUNFL Square roots of the previous 2 values.
468 *> ULP, ULPINV Finest relative precision and its inverse.
471 *> KTYPE(j) The general type (1-10) for type "j".
473 *> generator for type "j".
484 *> \author NAG Ltd.
501 * .. Scalar Arguments ..
506 * .. Array Arguments ..
517 * .. Parameters ..
524 * .. Local Scalars ..
537 * .. Local Arrays ..
543 * .. External Functions ..
547 * .. External Subroutines ..
553 * .. Intrinsic Functions ..
556 * .. Scalars in Common ..
561 * .. Common blocks ..
565 * .. Data statements ..
571 * .. Executable Statements ..
586 $ badmm = .true.
589 $ badnn = .true.
832 * Call SGEBRD and SORGBR to compute B, Q, and P, do tests.
837 * B := Q' * A * P.
843 * Check error code from SGEBRD.
867 * Check error code from SORGBR.
881 * Check error code from SORGBR.
890 * Apply Q' to an M by NRHS matrix X: Y := Q' * X.
908 * B := U * S1 * VT, and compute Z = U' * Y.
920 * Check error code from SBDSQR.
935 * bidiagonal matrix B; U, VT, and Z should not be modified.
944 * Check error code from SBDSQR.
1016 * from the bidiagonal form A := Q B PT.
1053 * Check error code from SBDSDC.
1068 * bidiagonal matrix B; U and VT should not be modified.
1077 * Check error code from SBDSDC.
1158 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.
1181 * bidiagonal matrix B; U and VT should not be modified.
1200 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.
1214 * Save S1 for tests 30-34.
1258 * and corresponding vectors.
1285 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.
1308 * bidiagonal matrix B; U and VT should not be modified.
1319 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.
1373 * singular values in this range.
1409 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.
1432 * bidiagonal matrix B; U and VT should not be modified.
1443 * Check error code from SBDSVDX.

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17-6706. Merger or consolidation of domestic and foreign nonstock corporations; service of process upon surviving or resulting corporation. (a) Any one or more nonstock corporations of this state may merge or consolidate with one or more other nonstock corporations of any other state or states of the United States or of the District of Columbia, if the laws of such other jurisdiction permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another jurisdiction. The constituent corporations may merge into a single corporation, which may be any one of the constituent corporations, or they may consolidate into a new nonstock corporation formed by the consolidation, which may be a corporation of the state of incorporation of any one of the constituent corporations, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section. In addition, any one or more nonstock corporations organized under the laws of any jurisdiction other than one of the United States may merge or consolidate with one or more nonstock corporations of this state if the surviving or resulting corporation will be a corporation of this state, and if the laws under which the other corporation or corporations are formed permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another jurisdiction.
(b) All the constituent corporations shall enter into an agreement of merger or consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) The terms and conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) the manner, if any, of converting the memberships of each of the constituent corporations into memberships of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation, or of cancelling some or all of such memberships; (4) such other details and provisions as shall be deemed desirable; and (5) such other provisions or facts as shall then be required to be stated in articles of incorporation by the laws of the state which are stated in the agreement to be the laws that shall govern the surviving or resulting corporation and that can be stated in the case of a merger or consolidation. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such agreement, if the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the agreement of merger or consolidation. The term "facts," as used in the preceding sentence, includes, but is not limited to, the occurrence of any event, including a determination or action by any person or body, including the corporation.
(c) The agreement shall be adopted, approved and executed by each of the constituent corporations in accordance with the laws under which it is formed and, in the case of a Kansas corporation, in the same manner as is provided in K.S.A. 17-6705, and amendments thereto. The agreement shall be filed and shall become effective for all purposes of the laws of this state when and as provided in K.S.A. 17-6705, and amendments thereto, with respect to the merger of nonstock corporations of this state. Insofar as they may be applicable, the provisions set forth in the last sentence of subsection (c) of K.S.A. 17-6702, and amendments thereto, shall apply to a merger under this section, and the reference to "stockholder" shall be deemed to include "member" hereunder.
(d) If the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolidation is to be governed by the laws of any state other than this state, it shall agree that it may be served with process in this state in any proceeding for enforcement of any obligation of any constituent corporation of this state, as well as for enforcement of any obligation of the surviving or resulting corporation arising from the merger or consolidation, and shall irrevocably appoint the secretary of state as its agent to accept service of process in any such suit or other proceedings and shall specify the address to which a copy of such process shall be mailed by the secretary of state. Service of such process shall be made by personally delivering to and leaving with the secretary of state duplicate copies of such process. The secretary of state shall forthwith send by registered mail one of such copies to such surviving or resulting corporation at its address specified, unless such surviving or resulting corporation shall thereafter have designated in writing to the secretary of state a different address for such purpose, in which case it shall be mailed to the last address so designated.
(e) The provisions of subsection (e) of K.S.A. 17-6701, and amendments thereto, shall apply to a merger under this section, if the corporation surviving the merger is a corporation of this state.
History: L. 1972, ch. 52, § 84; L. 1988, ch. 99, § 44; Revived and amend., L. 1988, ch. 100, § 44; L. 1992, ch. 270, § 19; L. 1993, ch. 163, § 7; L. 1999, ch. 39, § 14; L. 2000, ch. 39, § 33; L. 2004, ch. 143, § 54; Jan. 1, 2005.


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A writ of error does not lie in behalf of the United States in a criminal case.
This was an indictment on sections 5508 and 5509 of the Revised Statutes (copied ante, 144 U. S. 264, note) averring that while one Joseph Wright, a citizen of the United States, was returning to his home after having appeared and testified before the grand jury of the United States in obedience to subpoenas from the circuit court of the United States against persons charged with violations of the internal revenue laws, and while he was still a witness under such subpoenas, the defendants conspired to injure and oppress him in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege, secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to inform the proper officers of the United States of violations of the internal revenue laws, and to testify under and in obedience to such subpoenas, and to return to his home in peace and safety after so testifying, and to be secure, safe, and unmolested in his person and exempt from violence for having exercised and enjoyed those rights and privileges, and further averring that the defendants, in pursuance and prosecution of such conspiracy, assaulted and murdered him.
are no such rights or privileges secured to the party conspired against, by the Constitution and laws of the United States as those set out in the indictment"
and "because, on the facts alleged in said indictment, there is no crime or offense set out of which the courts of the United States can take cognizance."
On October 5, 1891, the circuit court, held by MR. JUSTICE LAMAR and Judge Newman adjudged that the demurrer was well founded in law, and that it be sustained, and the indictment quashed. 48 F. 78.
This writ of error was thereupon sued out by the United States, and was allowed by the presiding justice. The defendants in error moved to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction.
"appeals or writs of error may be taken from the district courts or from the existing circuit courts direct to the supreme court . . . in any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States."
Act March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, 828.
But the question which lies at the very threshold is whether this provision has conferred upon the United States the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case.
This statute, like all acts of Congress, and even the Constitution itself, is to be read in the light of the common law, from which our system of jurisprudence is derived. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 545; Rice v. Railroad Co., 1 Black 358, 66 U. S. 374-375; United States v. Carll, 105 U.S.
611; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 114 U. S. 422; 1 Kent Com. 336. As aids, therefore, in its interpretation, we naturally turn to the decisions in England and in the several states of the union whose laws have the same source.
The law of England on this matter is not wholly free from doubt. But the theory that at common law the King could have a writ of error in a criminal case after judgment for the defendant has little support beyond sayings of Lord Coke and Lord Hale seeming to imply but by no means affirming it; two attempts in the House of Lords, near the end of the seventeenth century, to reverse a reversal of an attainder, and an Irish case and two or three English cases decided more than sixty years after the Declaration of Independence, in none of which does the question of the right of the Crown in this respect appear to have been suggested by counsel or considered by the court. 3 Inst. 214; 2 Hale P.C. 247, 248, 394, 395; Rex v. Walcott, Show.P.C. 127; Rex v. Tucker, Show.P.C. 186, 1 Ld.Raym. 1; Regina v. Houston (1841), 2 Crawford & Dix 191; The Queen v. Millis (1843), 10 Cl. & Fin. 534; The Queen v. Wilson (1844), 6 Q.B. 620; The Queen v. Chadwick (1847), 11 Q.B. 173, 205. And from the time of Lord Hale to that of Chadwick's Case, just cited, the textbooks, with hardly an exception, either assume or assert that the defendant (or his representative) is the only party who can have either a new trial or a writ of error in a criminal case, and that a judgment in his favor is final and conclusive. See 2 Hawk. c. 47, § 12; c. 50, §§ 10 et seq.; Bac.Abr. Trial, L 9, "Error," B; 1 Chit.Crim.Law 657, 747; Stark.Crim.Pl. (2d ed.) 357, 367, 371; Archb.Crim.Pl. (12th Eng. & 6th Amer. ed.) 177, 199.
But whatever may have been, or may be, the law of England upon that question, it is settled by an overwhelming weight of American authority that the state has no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal or upon the determination by the court of a question of law.
In a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the state after judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal have proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of a constitutional provision. See State v. Anderson (1844), 3 Sm. & Marsh. 751; State v. Hand (1845), 6 Ark. 169; State v. Burris (1848), 3 Tex. 118; People v. Webb (1869), 38 Cal. 467; People v. Swift (1886), 59 Mich. 529, 541.
But the courts of many states, including some of great authority, have denied, upon broader grounds, the right of the state to bring a writ of error in any criminal case whatever, even when the discharge of the defendant was upon the decision of an issue of law by the court, as on demurrer to the indictment, motion to quash, special verdict, or motion in arrest of judgment.
"A writ of error or appeal in the nature of a writ of error will not lie for the state in such a case. It is a rule of the common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down, by repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule it is that a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him. This is a rule of such vital importance to the security of the citizen that it cannot be impaired but by express words, and none such are used in"
the statutes of the state.
"Neither does the Constitution, art. 11, sec. 10, apply, for here the punishment does not extend to life or limb. The whole of this case rests upon the common law rule."
"The court are unanimously of opinion that no appeal lies for the state from a verdict and judgment of acquittal on a state prosecution. The state, having established her jurisdiction and tried her experiment, should be content. To permit appeals might be the means of unnecessary vexation."
Hitchcock, cited in 6 Yerger 360. In 1834, the same rule was applied where, after a verdict of guilty, a motion in arrest of judgment had been made by the defendant and sustained by the court. State v. Solomons, 6 Yerger 360.
"The court is unanimously of opinion that the writ of error improvidently issued on the part of the commonwealth, because no writ of error lies in a criminal case for the commonwealth."
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 2 Virg.Cas. 202.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in two early cases as summarily dismissed writs of error sued out by the state, in the one case to reverse a judgment of acquittal upon exceptions taken at a trial by jury and in the other to reverse a judgment reversing for want of jurisdiction a conviction before a justice of the peace. People v. Dill (1836), 1 Scammon 257; People v. Royal (1839), 1 Scammon 557.
"But in none of the cases was the question either made by counsel or considered by the court whether the people could properly bring error. Such precedents are not of much importance."
People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. 9, 15. That decision had been since recognized and acted on by that court except so far as affected by express statutes. People v. Carnal, 6 N.Y. 463; People v. Clark, 7 N.Y. 385; People v. Merrill, 14 N.Y. 74, 76, 78; People v. Bork, 78 N.Y. 346.
after pleading nolo contendere, had moved in arrest of judgment for formal defects in the indictment, and thereupon judgment had been arrested and the defendant discharged, and in the other the indictment had been quashed on the defendant's motion. Commonwealth v. Cummings and Same v. McGinnis, 3 Cush. 212.
"The rule seems to be well settled in England that in criminal cases, a new trial is not grantable to the crown after verdict of acquittal even though the acquittal be founded on the misdirection of the judge. This is the general rule, and obtains in the states of our union. It excludes a rehearing after acquittal upon errors of law, and therefore, it would seem, denies also a rehearing upon judgments of the court upon questions of law even when the jury have not passed upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. If the effect of the judgment is a discharge, there can be no rehearing either by new trial or writ of error. Indeed it may be stated as a general rule that in criminal cases, upon general principles, errors are not subject to revision at the instance of the state. . . . These principles are founded upon that great fundamental rule of the common law, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which rule, for greater caution and in stricter vigilance over the rights of the citizen against the state, has been in substance embodied in the Constitution of the United States, thus: 'Nor shall any person be subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' After observing that this provision of the Constitution could have no direct bearing upon that case, which was of a misdemeanor only, and in which there had been no trial by jury, the court added:"
law, embodied in the federal Constitution -- a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy -- that in several of the states of this union in criminal causes, a writ of error has been denied to the state."
State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 424-425.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in 1856, ordered a writ of error sued out by the state after the defendant had been acquitted by a jury to be dismissed not because to order a new trial would be against art. 1, sec. 12, of the constitution of the state, declaring that "no person shall after acquittal be tried for the same offense," or the court expressly waived a decision of that question, but only because of "there being no law to authorize a writ of error on the part of the state in a criminal case." State v. Johnson, 2 Ia. 549.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in 1864, held that a writ of error did not lie in behalf of the state to reverse a judgment in favor of the defendant upon a demurrer to his plea to an indictment. State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669. The Supreme Court of Missouri in 1877 made a similar decision, overruling earlier cases in the same court. State v. Copeland, 65 Mo. 497. And the Supreme Court of Florida, in 1881, held that the state was not entitled to a writ of error to reverse a judgment quashing an indictment, and discharging the accused. State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185.
In those states in which the government, in the absence of any statute expressly giving it the right, has been allowed to bring error, or appeal in the nature of error, after judgment for the defendant on demurrer to the indictment, motion to quash, special verdict, or motion in arrest of judgment, the question appears to have become settled by early practice before it was contested.
from any statute, but had obtained under judicial sanction by a long practice, and has held that neither art. 4, sec. 8, of the state constitution of 1876, giving that court "jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below upon any matter of law or legal inference," nor art. 4, sec. 27, of the same constitution, providing that in all criminal cases before a justice of the peace, "the party against whom judgment is given may appeal to the superior court, where the matter shall be heard anew," gave any right of appeal to the state, but only to the defendant. State v. Hadcock (1802), 2 Haywood 162; State v. Lane (1878), 78 N.C. 547; State v. Swepson (1880), 82 N.C. 541; State v. Moore (1881), 84 N.C. 724; State v. Powell (1882), 86 N.C. 640.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in 1821, sustained a writ of error by the state to reverse a judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrer to the indictment, citing a number of unreported cases decided in that state in 1793 and 1817. State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & Johns. 317, 324, 330. But the same court, in 1878, refused to construe a statute of 1872 providing that in all criminal trials, it should be lawful for the attorney for the state to tender a bill of exceptions and to appeal, as authorizing the court, on such exceptions and appeal, to order a new trial after a verdict of acquittal. State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301.
In Louisiana, in the leading case, the court admitted that to allow the state to bring a writ of error in a criminal case was contrary to the common law of England, to the law of most of the states, and to the general opinion of the bar, and the later cases appear to be put largely upon the ground that the practice had become settled by a course of decision. State v. Jones (1845), 8 Rob. (La.) 573, 574; State v. Ellis (1857), 12 La.Ann. 390; State v. Ross (1859), 14 La.Ann. 364; State v. Taylor (1882), 34 La.Ann. 978; State v. Robinson (1885), 37 La.Ann. 673.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, from an early period, occasionally entertained without question writs of error sued out by the state in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Taylor (1812), 5 Binney 277; Commonwealth v. McKisson (1822), 8 S.
"There is nothing in the disabling provisos of the statutes to limit the right of the commonwealth, and the powers of this Court, whether deduced from the common law, from the old provincial act of 1722, or from legislation under our state constitutions, are quite competent to the review of any judicial record, when no statutory restraints have been imposed. It would be very strange if the commonwealth might not appeal to her own tribunals for justice without the special consent of certain of her own officers."
This theory that the state may sue out a writ of error unless expressly denied it by statute is opposed to the view maintained by a host of decisions above cited, and it is observable that such judges as Judge Thompson and Judge Sharswood were in favor of quashing writs so sued out. Commonwealth v. Capp (1864), 48 Penn.St. 53, 56; Commonwealth v. Moore (1882), 99 Penn.St. 570, 576.
In many of the states, indeed, including some of those above mentioned, the right to sue out a writ of error, or to take an appeal in the nature of a writ of error in criminal cases has been given to the state by positive statute. But the decisions above cited conclusively show that under the common law as generally understood and administered in the United States, and in the absence of any statute expressly giving the right to the state, a writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in favor of the defendant, whether that judgment has been rendered upon a verdict of acquittal or upon a determination by the court of an issue of law. In either case, the defendant, having been once put upon his trial and discharged by the court, is not to be again vexed for the same cause unless the legislature, acting within its constitutional authority, has made express provision for a review of the judgment at the instance of the government.
of the acts of Congress on the subject of writs of error in criminal cases.
"No question was made in that case as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and the Court does not consider itself as bound by that case."
United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 7 U. S. 172. And it was thenceforth held to be settled that criminal cases could not be brought from a circuit court of the United States to this Court by writ of error, but only by certificate of division of opinion upon specific questions of law. Ex Parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 20 U. S. 42; Ex Parte Gordon, 1 Black 503; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104, 129 U. S. 113; United States v. Perrin, 131 U. S. 55.
"in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute."
"The question of jurisdiction was not considered in fact in that case, nor alluded to in the decision, nor presented to the court by the counsel for the United States, nor referred to by either party at the argument or in the briefs. Probably both parties desired a decision on the merits."
Cannon v. United States, 116 U. S. 55, and 118 U. S. 118 U.S. 355; Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 118 U. S. 354. The question whether the provision of the Act of March 3, 1885, c. 355, § 2, authorizing a writ of error from this Court to the supreme court of any territory in any case "in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States" extended to criminal cases was then left open, but at October term, 1888, was decided in the negative. Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104.
were divided in opinion. 2 Stat. 159; United States v. Tyler, 7 Cranch 285; United States v. Daniel, 6 Wheat. 542; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 267. By the Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 1, "whenever, in any suit or proceeding" in a circuit court there occurred any difference of opinion between the judges, the opinion of the presiding judge was to prevail for the time being, but upon the entry of a final judgment, decree, or order, and a certificate of division of opinion as under the act of 1802, "either party" might remove the case to this Court "on writ of error or appeal, according to the nature of the case." 17 Stat. 196. That act continued in force only about two years, when it was repealed by the Revised Statutes. By sections 650, 652, and 693 of those Statutes, its provisions were restricted to civil suits and proceedings, and by sections 651 and 697 the provisions of section 6 of the act of 1802 were reenacted as to criminal cases. Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 108 U. S. 559. In United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, and in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, argued at October term, 1874, and decided at October term, 1875, which were brought to this Court by the United States by writ of error and certificate of division of opinion after judgment according to the opinion of the presiding judge sustaining a demurrer to the indictment or a motion in arrest of judgment, it appears by the records and briefs on file that the judgment below was entered and the certificate of division made under the act of 1872, and that no objection was taken to the jurisdiction of this Court. The exercise of jurisdiction over those cases on writ of error is therefore entitled to no more weight by way of precedent than the exercise of appellate jurisdiction sub silentio in the cases, above cited, of United States v. Simms, 1 Cranch 252, and Cannon v. United States, 116 U. S. 55.
the respondent" might, on his application, be reexamined, reversed, or affirmed by this Court on writ of error. 25 Stat. 656. The writ of error given by that act was thus clearly limited to the defendant, and the terms and effect of the Act of June 23, 1874, c. 469, § 3, above cited, concerning writs of error from this Court to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, as well as those of the Act of March 3, 1879, c. 176, giving a writ of error from the circuit court of the United States to a district court, were equally restricted. 18 Stat. 254; 20 Stat. 354.
The provisions of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, material to be considered in this case are those of § 5, by which appeals or writs of error may be taken from a circuit court directly to this Court in certain classes of cases, among which are "cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime," and "any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States," and those of § 6 by which the circuit courts of appeals established by this act have appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, final decisions in the district and circuit courts "in all cases other than those provided for in the preceding section of this act, unless otherwise provided by law," and the judgments or decrees of the circuit courts of appeals are made final "in all cases arising under the criminal laws" and in certain other classes of cases, unless questions are certified to this Court, or the whole case ordered up by writ of certiorari, as therein provided. 26 Stat. 827, 828.
validity of a law of the United States, or the validity or construction of a treaty, or in which it is contended that the Constitution or a law of a state contravenes the Constitution of the United States, is not now before us for decision.
The provision of section 6 giving the circuit courts of appeals in general terms appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases says nothing as to the party by whom the writ of error may be brought, and cannot therefore be presumed to have been intended to confer upon the government the right to bring it.
In none of the provisions of this act defining the appellate jurisdiction either of this Court or of the circuit court of appeals is there any indication of an intention to confer upon the United States the right to bring up a criminal case of any grade after judgment below in favor of the defendant. It is impossible to presume an intention on the part of Congress to make so serious and far-reaching an innovation in the criminal jurisprudence of the United States.

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Abstract: Useful information to calibrate instruments used for astrophysical measurements is usually obtained by observing different sources with well-understood characteristics simultaneously with different detectors. To do this well, however, requires a careful modeling of the mean signals, the intrinsic source variations, and measurement errors. Because our data are typically large (>>30) photon counts, we propose an approximate log-normal model, with the advantage of permitting imperfection in the multiplicative mean modeling to be captured by the residual variance. The calibration then takes an analytically tractable form of power shrinkage, with a half-variance adjustment to ensure an unbiased multiplicative mean model on the original scale. We demonstrate the model fitting via data from a combination of observations of AGNs and spectral line emission from the supernova remnant E0102, obtained with a variety of X-ray telescopes like Chandra, XMM-Newton, Suzaku, Swift, etc. The data are compiled by IACHEC researchers.
Abstract: We propose a new soft clustering scheme for classifying different galaxy activity classes using 4 emission-line ratios: log(NII]/Halpha), log([SII]/Halpha), log([OI]/Halpha) and log([OIII]/Halpha). We fit a big number of multivariate Gaussian distributions to the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) dataset in order to capture local structures and subsequently group the multivariate Gaussian distributions to represent the complex multi-dimensional structure of the joint distribution of the 4 galaxy activity classes. We also introduce linear multi-dimensional decision surfaces using support vector machines and we also discuss the sensitivity of our classification scheme when the OI is not available.
Abstract: Cataloguing, the act of identifying emission sources in an observed image and determining their properties, is a fundamental operation in astronomy. However, when there are populations of dim sources that are maginally detectable or when the sources are crowded, a single catalogue cannot capture the ambiguities of source identification. Considering cataloguing as a Bayesian inference problem, we implement a probabilistic cataloguer that samples the posterior distribution of possible catalogues. This ensemble of catalogues better recovers dim and crowded sources. Because the number of sources is an unknown, the catalogue space is transdimensional, introducing many challenges, like how to define a prior on the number of sources.
Abstract: We study the problem of model-free dependence detection. This problem can be difficult even when the marginal distributions are known. We explain this difficulty by showing the impossibility to uniformly consistently distinguish degeneracy from independence with any single test. To make model-free dependence detection a tractable problem, we introduce the concept of binary expansion statistics (BEStat) and propose the binary expansion testing (BET) framework. Through simple mathematics, we convert the dependence detection problem to a multiple testing problem. Besides being model-free, the BET also enjoys many other advantages which include (1) invariance to monotone marginal transformations, (2) clear interpretability of local relationships upon rejection, and (3) close connections to computing for efficient algorithms. We illustrate the BET by studying the distribution of the brightest stars in the night sky.
Abstract: Type Ia supernovae (SN Ia) are faraway exploding stars used as ``standardizable candles'' to determine cosmological distances, measure the accelerating expansion of the Universe, and constrain the properties of dark energy. Inferring peak luminosities of SN Ia from distance-independent observables, such as the shapes and colors of their light curves (time series), underpins the evidence for cosmic acceleration. SN Ia with broader, slower declining optical light curves are more luminous ("broader-brighter") and those with redder colors are dimmer. But the "redder-dimmer" color-luminosity relation widely used in cosmological SN Ia analyses confounds its two separate physical origins. An intrinsic correlation arises from the physics of exploding white dwarfs, while interstellar dust in the host galaxy also makes SN Ia appear redder and dimmer (extinguished). However, conventional SN Ia cosmology analyses currently use a simplistic linear regression of magnitude versus color and light curve shape, which does not model intrinsic SN Ia variations and host galaxy dust as physically distinct effects, resulting in unusually low color-magnitude slopes. I have constructed a probabilistic generative model for the dusty distribution of extinguished absolute magnitudes and apparent colors as the convolution of an intrinsic SN Ia color-magnitude distribution and a host galaxy dust reddening-extinction distribution. If the intrinsic color-magnitude slope differs from the host galaxy dust law, this convolution results in a specific curve of mean extinguished absolute magnitude vs. apparent color. I incorporated these effects into a hierarchical Bayesian statistical model for SN Ia light curve measurements, and analyze an optical light curve dataset comprising 277 nearby SN Ia at z < 0.10. The conventional linear fit obtains an effective color-magnitude slope of 3. My model finds an intrinsic slope of 2.2±0.3 and a distinct dust law of R_B = 3.7±0.3, consistent with the average properties of Milky Way dust, while correcting a systematic distance bias of ~0.10 mag in the tails of the apparent color distribution.
Abstract: Optical observers have monitored the Galactic Bulge for twenty five years, and have discovered roughly 18,000 unique microlensing event candidates.The number is now sufficient that overdensities, such as those associated with clusters of stars, can be identified and studied. We report on the first investigations of such overdensities, which happen to have been produced by Galactic globular clusters lying along directions to the Bulge. We expect that similar studies, using even more data to be collected by new wide-area surveys, will play important roles in identifying and studying the properties of globular clusters and dwarf galaxies in our own and other galaxies. In this talk I will also present an overview of other microlensing-related opportunities for learning which may be addressed through statistical studies.
Abstract: There are many ways to derive catalogs of astronomical objects from images, and most of them fail badly in the crowded-field limit. We are currently exploring two novel approaches. Compressed sensing allows us to rapidly find candidate stars in an image. The "probabilistic catalog" technique produces samples from the posterior probability distribution function on the space of all possible catalogs, allowing trivial marginalization of errors introduced by close neighbors. We have applied this technique to two globular clusters, and found this approach to yield impressive results. We are currently pondering a hybrid of these two techniques that retains the speed of the former and flexibility of the latter, and we welcome input from the astrostats pundits!
Abstract: As the light from quasars transverses different paths through gravitational field of a galaxy, it generated multiple images on earth with time delay, which provides a way to measure some cosmological parameters, i.e. Hubble constant. The magnitude of images fluctuating over time gives a light curve, as the brightness of source varies as well as microlensing, an low frequency extrinsic variation. Multiple images from the same lensed light source, usually double- or quadruply, produce multiple light curves with time shift. Moreover, lights from multiple filters can be measured for the same system. Estimating time delay remains challenging because of observation seasonal gap, microlensing, etc. In the paper, we introduced a hierarchical Bayesian statespace model to estimate time delay among multiple time series. Our method provides a principled way for estimating time delay, which can take into account different modelings of intrinsic variation of light source and microlensing, which adds another layer of variation independently on these light curves. It can also combine information from multiple filters. We applied our method to Q0957+561 two-filters doubly lensed data and showed benefits from combining data from multiple filters.
Abstract: A Gaussian error assumption, i.e., an assumption that the data are observed up to Gaussian noises, can bias any parameter estimation in the presence of outliers. A heavy tailed error assumption based on Student's t-distribution helps reduce the bias, but it may be less efficient in estimating parameters because the heavy-tail assumption is uniformly applied to most of the normally observed data. We propose a mixture error assumption that selectively converts Gaussian errors into Student's t errors according to latent outlier indicators, leveraging the best of the Gaussian and Student's t errors; a parameter estimation becomes not only robust but also accurate. Using simulated hospital profiling data and astronomical time series of brightness data, we demonstrate the potential for the proposed mixture error assumption to estimate parameters accurately in the presence of outliers.
Abstract: The radial velocity technique is one of the two main approaches for detecting planets outside our solar system, or exoplanets as they are known in astronomy. The method works by detecting the Doppler shift resulting from the motion of a host star caused by an orbiting planet. Unfortunately, this Doppler signal is typically contaminated by various ``stellar activity" phenomena, such as dark spots on the star surface. A principled approach to recovering the Doppler signal was proposed by Rajpaul et al. (2015), and involves the use of dependent Gaussian processes to jointly model the corrupted Doppler signal and multiple proxies for the stellar activity. Our work in progress aims to extend the Rajpaul et al. (2015) approach by (i) proposing more informative stellar activity proxies, (ii) extending the model to a class of models that can capture our new proxies, and (iii) proposing a model selection procedure to find the best model in the class.
Abstract: In physics, searches for new particles or new phenomena are mainly conducted via multiple hypothesis testing. Separate tests of hypothesis are implemented at different locations producing an ensemble of local p-values, and the smallest is reported as evidence for the new emission, once adequately adjusted to control the false detection rate. An alternative way to tackle the problem in statistical terms is via Testing One Hypothesis Multiple times (TOHM). A stochastic process or a random field indexed by the various alternatives is used to combine the outcomes of each tests into a single global p-value, that can be used as as overall standard of evidence. The resulting statistical tool is particularly well suited for searches in high energy physics and astrophysics, where the significance level necessary to claim a discovery is usually of order of $5\sigma$. Specifically, TOHM targets the identification of rare signals, and provides valid inference with respect to stringent significance requirements, without encountering the problem of over-conservativeness.
Abstract: Current and upcoming large-scale surveys will collect multi-band images (photometry) for billions of galaxies. Before these data can be used for many science applications, however, we need to infer distances (redshifts) to them. We outline how rigorous (hierarchical) Bayesian inference -- with some "machine learning" -- can be used to quickly and robustly derive joint "photometric redshift (photo-z)" probability distribution functions (PDFs) to individual galaxies and their parent populations from training data in the "big data" limit. In tandem, we describe the ways we deal with noisy and censored data as well as domain mismatches from a statistical and computational perspective. We validate our methods using mock data and showcase preliminary results on a subset of SDSS data; a restricted implementation using HSC data also appears to perform well. Our next steps will be modeling galaxy redshifting using a continuous, latent process and determining how sensitively our redshift posteriors depend on aspects of our training data. Our code and tests can be found on GitHub.
Abstract: Measurements of radial velocity variations from the spectroscopic monitoring of stars and their companions are essential for a broad swath of astrophysics; these measurements provide access to the fundamental physical properties that dictate all phases of stellar evolution and facilitate the quantitative study of planetary systems. The conversion of those measurements into both constraints on the orbital architecture and individual component spectra can be a serious challenge, however, especially for extreme flux ratio systems and observations with relatively low sensitivity. Gaussian processes define sampling distributions of flexible, continuous functions that are well-motivated for modeling stellar spectra, enabling proficient searches for companion lines in time-series spectra. We introduce a new technique for spectral disentangling, where the posterior distributions of the orbital parameters and intrinsic, rest-frame stellar spectra are explored simultaneously without needing to invoke cross-correlation templates. To demonstrate its potential, this technique is deployed on red-optical time-series spectra of the mid-M-dwarf eclipsing binary LP661-13, recently discovered by the MEarth project at Harvard. We report orbital parameters with improved precision compared to traditional radial velocity analysis and successfully reconstruct the primary and secondary spectra. We discuss potential applications for other stellar and exoplanet radial velocity techniques and extensions to time-variable spectra. The code used in this analysis is freely available as an open-source Python package.
Siemiginowska, A. / Connors, A. / Kashyap, V. / Zezas, A. / Devor, J. / Drake, J. / Kolaczyk, E. / Izem, R. / Kang, H. / Yu, Y. / van Dyk, D.
van Dyk, D. / Ratner, M. / Jin, J. / Park, T. / CCW / Zezas, A. / Hong, J. / Siemiginowska, A. & Kashyap, V. / Meng, X.-L.
Lee, H. / Connors, A. / Protopapas, P. / McDowell, J., / Izem, R. / Blondin, S. / Lee, H. / Zezas, A., & Lee, H. / Liu, J.C. / van Dyk, D. / Rice, J.
Connors, A., & Protopapas, P. / Steiner, J. / Baines, P. / Zezas, A. / Aldcroft, T.
Meng X.-L. / Meng X.-L., K. Mandel / A. Siemiginowska / S. Vrtilek & L. Bornn / Lazhi W. / D. Jones / R. Wong / Xu J. / van Dyk D. / Feigelson E. / Gopalan G. / Min S. / Smith R. / Zezas A. / van Dyk D. / Hyungsuk T. / Czerny, B. / Jones D. / Liu K. / Zezas A.
Vegetabile, B. & Aldcroft, T., / H. Jae Sub / Siemiginowska, A. & Kashyap, V. / Pankratius, V. / Tak, H. / Brenneman, L. / Johnson, J. / Lynch, R.C. / Fan, M.J. / Meng, X.-L. / Gopalan, G. / Jiao, X. / Si, S. / Udaltsova, I. & Zezas, A. / Wang, L. / Tak, H. / Eadie, G. / Czekala, I. / Stenning, D. / Stampoulis, V. / Aitkin, M. / Algeri, S. / Barnacka, A.
DePasquale, J. / Tak, H. / Meng, X.-L. / Jones, D. / Huang, J. / Blanchard, P. / Chen, Y. & Wang, X. / Tak, H. / Mandel, K. / Jiao, X. / Wang, X. & Chen, Y. / IACHEC WG / Si, S. / Drake, J. / Stampoulis, V. / Algeri, S. / Stein, N. / Chunzhe, Z. / Andrews, J. / Vrtilek, S. / Udaltsova, I. & Stampoulis, V.
Wang, X. & Chen, Y. / Kashyap, V., Siemiginowska, A., & Zezas, A. / Stampoulis, V. / Portillo, S. / Zhang, K. / Mandel, K. / DiStefano, R. / Finkbeiner, D. & Meade, B. / Gong, R. / Shihao Y. / Zhirui, H. / Xufei, W. / Campos, L. / Tak, H. / Xufei, W. / Jones, D. / Algeri, S. / Speagle, J. / Czekala, I.

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