In principle, too, the apology of “virtual representation” is nonsensical.
• First, even if “representatives” elected in the present can properly “represent” the generation that ensconced them in office—which is an highly debatable point—they cannot “represent” future generations the circumstances of which must be entirely unknown to and unknowable by them. How can “representatives” today possibly judge whether “our Posterity” in some future time will be able to afford such a gargantuan debt in the face of the vicissitudes that may then plague them?
• Second, “representatives” elected in the present cannot presume, let alone know, that “our Posterity” would even concur in the actual process—always convoluted, often corrupt—by which the public debt is incurred today, let alone accept the results of that process. To the contrary: As rational beings, “our Posterity” would never agree to afford carte blanche to intertemporal “virtual representation”, because both the “representatives” and their constituents in the present are not neutral arbiters, but instead are patently self-interested parties intent upon enjoying the immediate benefits of deficit finance in the present while sloughing off its inevitable burdens onto the future. Such “representatives” are absolutely disqualified as “trustees” of the public interest as far as “our Posterity” is concerned, because their own interests are inexorably adverse to those of the purported “beneficiaries” of their actions.
The complete corrective to this intergenerational conflict of interests would be to eliminate altogether, or at least drastically curtail, the power of Congress “[t]o borrow Money on the credit of the United States”. That course of action, however, would be cumbersome, because it would require a very specific amendment of the Constitution, which would have to be “propose[d]” by Congress itself—unless Americans want to play political Russian Roulette by calling for a constitutional convention.
In the interim, the best that can be done is to recognize that, if some public debt is arguably justified on the ground that it may become unavoidably necessary—perhaps, for example, during a properly declared and legally justifiable “War”—nonetheless in incurring any such debt the fiduciary responsibility of the present generation to “our Posterity” must be of the very highest order. No debt should be incurred that is not constitutionally “necessary and proper” beyond a reasonable doubt. So, the prudent as well as circumspect approach for the present should be to enforce strict “checks and balances” on the exercise of the power “[t]o borrow Money”.
Now, the ultimate practical “check and balance” on speculation is uncertainty. Lenders do not lend freely to borrowers who are not likely to repay. Public officials have been able to amass the present gargantuan debt, because they have purported to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States”. And lenders have relied on what is called “the full faith and credit of the United States”—or, more descriptively, what has always been the robotic willingness of common Americans to continue to pay the bills passed on to them by public officials in the name of the United States.
At base, though, “the credit of the United States” is a legal fiction. It can extend only to those actions of public officials that are constitutional. So not all purported “public debt” is lawful simply because it comes forth stamped with some official’s approval. The legitimacy of any ostensible “public debt” is contingent upon its rectitude, not simply its naked existence.
The Constitution itself declares that “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, * * * shall not be questioned”. This statement embodies the recognition that some supposed “public debts” may not, after all, be “authorized by law”—as, for instance, when they are unconstitutional or otherwise illegal—and that all alleged “public debts” may be “questioned” on that very ground.
Only if these principles are actually applied to the present “public debt” will America burn the bridges between the financial speculators on Wall Street and the Treasury on Pennsylvania Avenue. And the time for such incendiary action has arrived. Under contemporary circumstances, the purported “public debt” of the United States not only should be but shall have to be more than just “questioned”, because its cancerous growth has set into motion an autocatalytic reaction which, unless soon quenched, will ignite the worst of all possible economic conflagrations: an hyperinflationary depression.
Indeed, the supremacy of the Constitution requires that all ostensible “public debts”—no less than any and all other actions of public officials—should be capable of being “questioned” at all times. For “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause of the constitution is intended to be without effect”. And inasmuch as the power of Congress “[t]o borrow Money on the credit of the United States” is a delegated power, limited by its terms, therefore the burden of establishing that it has been properly exercised in any and every case “is upon those making the claim”—namely, the public officials and the lenders who purport to incur the debt. If that burden cannot be carried with respect to any portion of the purported “public debt”, then such part is null and void. For the alleged assumption of “public debt” always involves some supposed “law”. And if that “law” is unconstitutional, then it is no “law” at all. “[I]t confers no rights * * * imposes no duties * * * [and] is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed”.
The formula for calculating what portion of the purported “public debt” is legitimate and what portion is not is straightforward.
Bills for raising revenue are inevitably tied to governmental spending, the former being the effect and the latter the cause. As the Constitution declares, “Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”. In any particular year, the government’s budget typically provides that so much is to be spent on certain activities—and to pay for it, so much is to be raised through taxes; so much through borrowing; so much (perhaps) through “dispos[al] of * * * the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”; and so much through other sources of governmental income.
So, because governmental income and expenditures are thus inextricably linked, in order to determine the unconstitutional portion of any amount of ostensible “public debt” incurred in any fiscal year, one need only determine what proportion of the expenditures for that year, related to that debt, are unconstitutional.
If a specific program is tied to a particular loan, then the unconstitutionality of that program will determine the unconstitutionality of that loan. If the program is unconstitutional, the debt incurred to float it is null and void.
But if the money the Treasury borrows goes into its general fund, not tied to any particular program, then some formula for allocating the reduction of debt in relation to unconstitutional activities must be employed. For example, let T (TAXES COLLECTED) + D (DEBT INCURRED) + S (SALES OF PROPERTY) = E (EXPENDITURES), and X = THE AMOUNT OF E THAT INVOLVES UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES.
X should be applied to D before T, precisely in order to discourage lending to the General Government, because, more than any other source of governmental income, lending facilitates and encourages unconstitutional expenditures. After all, unlike taxpayers, lenders act voluntarily and presumably with access to adequate information from the General Government’s budget and other official sources. Thus, they lend their money knowing full well (or at least on adequate notice of) how it will be spent and implicitly approving of those expenditures. In addition, just as are the public officials with whom they deal, lenders are chargeable with full knowledge of the powers—and the disabilities—of the General Government, and therefore of which portions of the budget are legitimate or not. So, to the extent that some portion of the public debt subsidizes unconstitutional or otherwise illegal expenditures in the relevant budget, the lenders are in pari delicto with the rogue public officials who borrow the money, aiding those officials in perpetrating a fraud on the American people by purporting to impose a liability on the people to repay a debt for expenditures which cannot be charged to them in the first place. Therefore, when the time comes for repayment of the alleged debt, the lenders are surely not entitled to that portion which was illegally incurred in the first place. Indeed, because of their wrongdoing, arguably they are entitled to nothing at all.
No crime is greater than treason. He who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells goods to the agent of an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing that the purchaser buys them for that treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of treason or a misprision voluntarily aids the treason. He cannot be permitt d to stand on the nice metaphysical distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are too serious and enormous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the consequences of his own voluntary act. For part four click below.
1, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 1, at 325-328.
2, Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1925), at 45 (footnotes omitted).
3, Letter to John Taylor, Monticello, 28 May 1816, in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Paul Leicester Ford, Editor (New York, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, Federal Edition, 12 Volumes, 1904-1905), Volume 11, at 533.
4, A frugal government is the financial speculators’ worst nightmare, because then they would have to invest in private enterprises that, lacking the ability to coerce customers into buying their products, might fail.
5, See 31 U.S.C. § 3102(b). And many investment funds open to the public maintain public debt as significant parts of their portfolios.
7, This is a plan on which the Forces of Darkness have long cogitated. See, e.g., the detailed charts between pages 150 and 151 in Hans Heymann, Plan for Permanent Peace (New York, New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1941).
9, U.S. Const. preamble (emphasis supplied).
11, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
12, See U.S. Const. art. V.
13, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
15, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (emphasis supplied).
16, Amend. XIV, § 4 (emphasis supplied).
18, See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
19, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Accord, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 261 (1898).
20, See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 653 (1948).
21, Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
22, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
24, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
25, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
26, See the discussion of Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wallace) 342 (1871), post.
27, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28, Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4 with art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
29, See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
30, 79 U.S. (12 Wallace) 342 (1871).
31, Id. (12 Wallace) at 345 (emphasis supplied).
32, Id. (12 Wallace) at 346, 347.
33, See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 and Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807).
34, See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
35, See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
36, 12 U.S.C. § 411.
37, An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes, Act of 23 December 1913, CHAP. 6, § 30, 38 Stat. 251, 275.
38, See, e.g., Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694 (1878).
39, What effectively amounts to a “dirt dollar” would hardly be such an innovation as it sounds. After all, silver and gold are simply specific components of “dirt” (that is, earth or ground), that happen to exhibit greater purchasing powers, ounce for ounce, in the marketplace than most other components, such as zinc, copper, lead, or iron. Yet some components of dirt—such as platinum, palladium, rhodium, and rubidium—are more valuable, ounce for ounce, than either silver or gold. So (all constitutional objections aside) if a refined “dirt dollar” of silver or gold is legitimate, no principled objection to an unrefined “dirt dollar” should be tenable.
40, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2. and art. I, § 8, cl. 5, respectively.
41, E,g., 31 U.S.C. § 5118(b) declares that “[t]he United States Government may not pay out any gold coin”. It does not say that the government may not pay out aliquots of public land.
42, See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
43, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. See generally Bill Howard and Bill Redd, Statehood: The Territorial Imperative (Helper, Utah: Bookcliff Publishing, 2005).
44, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
45, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
46, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 431 (1819).
47, See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 171 (1796). See also Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914).
48, See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
To saddle future generations of Americans with a staggering load of public debt is more than just financially imprudent or even morally problematic. At some point, it becomes positively illegal.


Richmond Sunlight » HB1794: Early voting; any registered voter allowed to vote early without providing reason, etc.
HOUSE BILL NO. 1794 Offered January 9, 2019 Prefiled December 27, 2018 A BILL to amend and reenact §§ 24.2-612, 24.2-700, 24.2-701, and 24.2-707 of the Code of Virginia and to amend the Code of Virginia by adding a section numbered 24.2-700.1, relating to early voting.
§ 24.2-612. List of offices and candidates filed with Department of Elections and checked for accuracy; when ballots printed; number required.
Immediately after the expiration of the time provided by law for a candidate for any office to qualify to have his name printed on the official ballot and prior to printing the ballots for an election, each general registrar shall forward to the Department of Elections a list of the county, city, or town offices to be filled at the election and the names of all candidates who have filed for each office. In addition, each general registrar shall forward the name of any candidate who failed to qualify with the reason for his disqualification. On that same day, the general registrar shall also provide a copy of the notice to each disqualified candidate. The notice shall be sent by email or regular mail to the address on the candidate's certificate of candidate qualification, and such notice shall be deemed sufficient. The Department of Elections shall promptly advise the general registrar of the accuracy of the list. The failure of any general registrar to send the list to the Department of Elections for verification shall not invalidate any election.
Each general registrar shall have printed the number of ballots he determines will be sufficient to conduct the election. Such determination shall be based on the number of active registered voters and historical election data, including voter turnout, and shall be subject to the approval by the electoral board.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, the Department of Elections may print or otherwise provide one statewide paper ballot style for each paper ballot style in use for presidential and vice-presidential electors for use only by persons eligible to vote for those offices only under § 24.2-402 or only for federal elections under § 24.2-453. The Department of Elections may apportion or authorize the printer or vendor to apportion the costs for these ballots among the localities based on the number of ballots ordered. Any printer employed by the Department of Elections shall execute the statement required by § 24.2-616. The Department of Elections shall designate a representative to be present at the printing of such ballots and deliver them to the appropriate general registrars pursuant to § 24.2-617. Upon receipt of such paper ballots, the electoral board or the general registrar shall affix the seal of the electoral board. Thereafter, such ballots shall be handled and accounted for, and the votes counted as the Department of Elections shall specifically direct.
The general registrar shall make printed ballots available for absentee voting by mail not later than 45 days prior to any election or within three business days of the receipt of a properly completed absentee ballot application, whichever is later. The general registrar shall make printed ballots available for early voting not later than 15 days prior to any election. In the case of a special election, excluding for federal offices, if time is insufficient to meet the applicable deadline established herein, then the general registrar shall make printed ballots available as soon after the deadline as possible. For the purposes of this chapter, making printed ballots available includes mailing of such ballots or electronic transmission of such ballots pursuant to § 24.2-706 to a qualified absentee voter who is eligible for an absentee ballot under subdivision 2 of § 24.2-700. Not later than five days after absentee ballots are made available, each general registrar shall report to the Department of Elections, in writing on a form approved by the Department of Elections, whether he has complied with the applicable deadline.
Only the names of candidates for offices to be voted on in a particular election district shall be printed on the ballots for that election district.
The general registrar shall send to the Department of Elections a statement of the number of ballots ordered to be printed, proofs of each printed ballot for verification, and copies of each final ballot. If the Department of Elections finds that, in its opinion, the number of ballots ordered to be printed by any general registrar is not sufficient, it may direct the general registrar to order the printing of a reasonable number of additional ballots.
§ 24.2-700. Persons entitled to vote by absentee ballot by mail.
12. Any person granted a protective order issued by or under the authority of any court of competent jurisdiction.
A. Any registered voter may vote early in accordance with the provisions of this section in any election in which he is qualified to vote without providing one of the reasons listed in § 24.2-700 or completing an application for an absentee ballot as prescribed in § 24.2-701. A registered voter voting early shall provide one of the forms of identification specified in subsection B of § 24.2-643. If he does not show one of the forms of identification specified in subsection B of § 24.2-643, he shall be offered a provisional ballot under the provisions of § 24.2-653.
B. Early voting shall be available on the fifteenth day prior to any general election, the seventh day prior to any special election held on a date other than the date of a general election, and the seventh day prior to any primary election, and shall continue until 5:00 p.m. on the Saturday immediately preceding the election. Early voting shall be available during regular business hours each weekday during the applicable period, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on each Saturday during the applicable period, and from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on each Sunday during the applicable period. Notice of the times for early voting shall be given in accordance with the instructions of the State Board. At least two officers of election shall be present during all hours that early voting is available and shall represent the two major political parties, except in the case of a party primary, when they may represent the party conducting the primary.
C. The electoral boards shall provide for early voting in the office of the general registrar or the secretary of the electoral board and may provide for early voting in a central absentee voter precinct established pursuant to § 24.2-712 or an additional location in the county or city approved by the electoral board. Any such location shall be in a public building owned or leased by the county, city, or town within the county and may be in a facility that is owned or leased by the Commonwealth and used as a location for Department of Motor Vehicles facilities or as an office of the general registrar. Any such location shall have adequate facilities for the protection of all records concerning the process of early voting, the voted and unvoted ballots, and any voting systems in use at the location. Notice of the locations for early voting shall be given in accordance with the instructions of the State Board.
D. Any voter who votes early in accordance with this section may cast his ballot on a voting system. The State Board shall prescribe the procedures for use of voting systems. The procedures shall provide for early voting on voting systems that have been certified and are currently approved by the State Board. The procedures shall be applicable and uniformly applied by the Department of Elections to all localities using comparable voting systems. The requirement that two officers of election be present during the hours that early voting is available shall not be applicable when (i) the voting systems being used are located in the office of the general registrar or the secretary of the electoral board and (ii) an officer of election and the general registrar, an assistant registrar, or the secretary of the electoral board are present.
E. The State Board shall provide instructions for the preparation, maintenance, and reporting of ballots, pollbooks, records, and returns for early voting.
§ 24.2-701. Application for mailed absentee ballot.
2. Any other An application for a mailed absentee ballot may be made in person in the office of the general registrar, by mail, by electronic or telephonic transmission to a facsimile device if one is available to the office of the general registrar or the office of the State Board if a device is not available locally, or by other means. The application shall be on a form furnished by the registrar or, if made under subdivision 2 of § 24.2-700, may be on a federal postcard application prescribed pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(2). The federal postcard application may be accepted the later of (i) 12 months before an election or (ii) the day following any election held in the twelfth month prior to the election in which the applicant is applying to vote. The application shall be made to the appropriate registrar no later than 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day prior to the election in which the applicant offers to vote.
15. In the case of a person who has been granted a protective order issued by or under the authority of any court of competent jurisdiction, the name of the county or city in Virginia or the state of the issuing court.
§ 24.2-707. How ballots marked and returned by mail.
On receipt of a mailed absentee ballot, the voter shall, in the presence of a witness, (i) open the sealed envelope marked "ballot within" and (ii) mark and refold the ballot, as provided in §§ 24.2-644 and 24.2-646 without assistance and without making known how he marked the ballot, except as provided by § 24.2-704.
After the voter has marked his absentee ballot, he shall (a) enclose the ballot in the envelope provided for that purpose, (b) seal the envelope, (c) fill in and sign the statement printed on the back of the envelope in the presence of a witness, who shall sign the same envelope, (d) enclose the ballot envelope and any required assistance form within the envelope directed to the general registrar, and (e) seal that envelope and mail it to the office of the general registrar or deliver it personally to the general registrar. A voter's failure to provide in the statement on the back of the envelope his full middle name or his middle initial shall not be a material omission, rendering his ballot void, unless the voter failed to provide in the statement on the back of the envelope his full first and last name. A voter's failure to provide the date, or any part of the date, including the year, on which he signed the statement printed on the back of the envelope shall not be considered a material omission and shall not render his ballot void. For purposes of this chapter, "mail" shall include delivery by a commercial delivery service, but shall not include delivery by a personal courier service or another individual except as provided by §§ 24.2-703.2 and 24.2-705.
An applicant who makes his application to vote in person at a time when the printed ballots for the election are available shall follow the same procedure set forth above except that he may complete the procedure in person in the office of the general registrar, or at another location or locations in the county or city approved by the electoral board, before a registrar, or, if a ballot is cast at that time, before the officers of election appointed by the electoral board. Any such location shall be in a public building owned or leased by the city, the county, or a town within the county, with adequate facilities for the protection of all records concerning the absentee voters, the absentee ballots, both voted and unvoted, and any voting equipment in use at the location. Such location may be in a facility owned or leased by the Commonwealth and used as a location for Department of Motor Vehicles facilities and for an office of the general registrar. Such location shall be deemed the equivalent of the office of the general registrar for the purpose of completing the application for an absentee ballot in person pursuant to §§ 24.2-701 and 24.2-706. On the request of the applicant, made no later than 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day prior to the election in which the applicant offers to vote, the general registrar may send the items set forth in subdivisions 1 through 4 of § 24.2-706 to the applicant by mail, obtaining a certificate or other evidence of mailing.
Failure to follow the procedures set forth above in this section shall render the applicant's ballot void.
The general registrar of any county or city using a central absentee voting precinct may provide for the casting of absentee ballots on voting equipment prior to election day by applicants who are voting in person. The Department of Elections shall prescribe procedures for the use of voting equipment. The procedures shall provide for the casting of absentee ballots prior to election day by in-person applicants on voting equipment which has been certified, and is currently approved, by the Department of Elections. The procedures shall be applicable and uniformly applied by the Department of Elections to all jurisdictions using comparable voting equipment. At least two officers of election, one representing each political party, shall be present during all hours that absentee voting is available at any location at which absentee ballots are cast prior to election day.
The requirement that officers of election shall be present if ballots are cast on voting equipment prior to election day shall not be applicable when the voting equipment is located in the office of the general registrar and the general registrar or an assistant registrar is present.
For a plain English description of this bill, comments, voting, tagging, etc., return to the main page for HB1794.


By a treaty of 1868 between the United States and the Ute Indians, a reservation was established for the Indians in Colorado. Subsequently, an erroneous survey showed the northern boundary to be south of the true boundary, and as excluding the White River Valley lands which actually were in the reservation. Believing the survey to be accurate, and desiring to preserve these lands for the use of the Indians, the President, by an Executive Order of 1875, withdrew from sale and "set apart for the use of the . . . Ute Indians, as an addition to the present reservation in said Territory" a strip of land north "of the present Ute Indian Reservation." Later, in order to punish the Indians for a massacre, dispossess them of the reservation, and remove them from Colorado, Congress passed the Act of June 15, 1880, 21 Stat. 199, which ratified and embodied an agreement by their leaders to cede to the United States all territory of "the present Ute Reservation," and provided that all lands so ceded and not allotted specifically to individual Indians would be restored to the public domain for sale as public lands and that, subject to certain conditions, the proceeds of their sale should be distributed to the Indians. An Executive Order of 1882 declared that the lands "set apart for the use of the . . . Ute Indians" by the Executive Order of 1875 is "hereby restored to the public domain." The Indians brought this suit under the Act of June 28, 1938, 52 Stat. 1209, as amended, 55 Stat. 593, to obtain compensation for the lands north of the original reservation made available to them by the Executive Order of 1875.
1. Insofar as the claim rests on the Executive Order of 1875, it cannot be sustained. P. 330 U. S. 176.
(a) The President had no authority to convey to the Indians a compensable interest in the lands lying north of the true boundary of the reservation created by the treaty of 1868. Pp. 330 U. S. 176, 330 U. S. 180.
(b) The Executive Order of 1875 made the Indians no more than tenants at will of the Government on that part of the land outside the true treaty reservation. P. 330 U. S. 176.
(c) The real purpose of the Executive Order was to protect the Indians' enjoyment of the White River Valley lands conveyed to them by the original treaty, and this purpose has been accomplished. Pp. 330 U. S. 177, 330 U. S. 180.
2. The Act of June 15, 1880, gives the Indians no right to recover for the land north of the true boundary of the treaty reservation set apart for their use by the Executive Order of 1875. Pp. 330 U. S. 177-180.
(a) It contains nothing showing a congressional purpose to convey such lands to the Indians. P. 330 U. S. 177.
(b) Nor was it intended to transform the Executive Order into a conveyance of a compensable interest in lands not included in the original treaty reservation. Pp. 330 U. S. 178, 330 U. S. 180.
(c) It was intended to compensate them only for the lands in the original reservation which they ceded to the United States. P. 330 U. S. 178.
(d) The fact that it provided for the cession of the "present Ute Reservation" is not sufficient to attribute to Congress a purpose to treat as part of that reservation lands which never had been legally conveyed to the Indians and had only been made available to them for the sole purpose of making them secure in their possession of the White River Valley. Pp. 330 U. S. 178-179.
3. Even if the Indians understood in 1880 that they owned the lands described in the Executive Order of 1875 lying north of the White River Valley, that their "present Ute Reservation" included them, and that Congress undertook by the 1880 Act to sell these lands for their benefit, and, even if Congress was aware of this understanding, this would not require a different result, in view of the fact that the Act neither conveyed nor ratified conveyance of these lands. P. 330 U. S. 179.
4. While a treaty with Indians is to be construed so as to carry out the Government's obligations in accordance with the fair understanding of the Indians, this Court cannot, under the guise of interpretation, create presidential authority where there was none, or rewrite congressional acts so as to make them mean something they obviously were not intended to mean. P. 330 U. S. 179.
106 Ct.Cl. 33, 64 F.Supp. 569, affirmed.
In a suit by the Ute Indians under the Act of June 28, 1938, 52 Stat. 1209, as amended, 55 Stat. 593 to recover compensation for lands made available to them by an 1875 Executive Order of the President and subsequently taken from them by the United States, the Court of Claims held that they had no compensable interest in such lands. 106 Ct.Cl. 33, 64 F.Supp. 569. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 694. Affirmed., p. 330 U. S. 180.
Petitioners brought this action in the Court of Claims under the Act of June 28, 1938, 52 Stat. 1209, as amended, 55 Stat. 593, to recover compensation for lands made available to them by an 1875 Executive Order of the President and subsequently taken from them by the United States. Their claim was that, by an Act of June 15, 1880, 21 Stat. 199, Congress had undertaken to sell these lands for the benefit of the petitioners, but that they had never been compensated for them. The Court of Claims, one judge concurring specially, made findings of fact and concluded as a matter of law that petitioners had no compensable interest in the lands, because they "never did acquire title to these . . . lands and . . . the Congress never did agree to sell them for the account of" petitioners. 106 Ct.Cl. 33, 51, 64 F.Supp. 569, 571. We granted certiorari, 329 U.S. 694.
A treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 619, between the United States and petitioners' ancestors, the Ute Indian tribes, established a reservation for them in Colorado. The northern boundary of the 15 million acres there ceded was described in the treaty as a line fifteen miles north of, and parallel to the 40th parallel of north latitude. In the 15-mile wide strip north of the 40th parallel lay the White River Valley, which had been settled by the Utes as a most suitable place for grazing and cultivation. One of the two Government Indian agencies provided for the reservation by the treaty was established in that strip.
As a result of misunderstandings in 1869 and 1874 between the Utes and white settlers to the north as to the true location of the northern treaty boundary, a survey was made in 1875 by one Miller. Miller's instructions, however, required him to stake out a line which he admitted to the local Indian agent and to the Utes themselves to be fifteen to eighteen miles south of the true boundary described in the treaty. If Miller's line had been correct, it would have excluded from the 1868 reservation the fertile White River Valley, and would have also excluded the agency buildings which had been erected there.
"develops the fact that the White River and surrounding valleys. as well as the Agency buildings and improvements at the White River Agency. lie north of the . . . boundary, and consequently are not within the limits of the . . . Ute Reservation."
"all that tract of country lying between the north boundary of the Ute reservation as defined in the treaty of March 2, 1868 . . . which was the boundary surveyed by Mr. Miller. . . . This action fully protects your Indians in the peaceable possession of their improvements in the White River Valley and the Agency buildings, and will enable you to assure the Indians of the exact location of their reservation as enlarged. "
"all the lands not . . . allotted, the title to which is, by the said agreement of . . . the Ute Indians, and this acceptance by the United States, released and conveyed to the United States . . ."
would be restored to the public domain for sale as public lands. The proceeds of the sale of the land so conveyed by the Utes to the United States were, upon satisfaction of indemnity conditions imposed because of the massacre, to be distributed to the Indians. Thereafter, in 1882, an Executive Order declared that the lands withdrawn from the public domain by the Executive Order of 1875 and "set apart for the use of the . . . Ute Indians . . . hereby is restored to the public domain." 1 Kappler, supra, pp. 834-835.
by the Government, as well as the value of certain lands appropriated by the Government to its own use, all of which were part of the 1868 treaty lands. Ute Indians v. United States, 45 Ct.Cl. 440; 46 Ct.Cl. 225. Thus, except for certain treaty lands not at issue here, litigation concerning which is now pending in the Court of Claims, the only lands in Colorado for which the Indians have not been paid are those to the north of and outside the 1868 treaty reservation which were made available to them by the Executive Order of 1875. In pursuit of compensation for these Executive Order lands, petitioners have brought this action pursuant to the Act of June 28, 1938, supra. That Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render final judgment on all legal and equitable claims of the Utes, and to award judgment for the Indians where it is found "that any lands formerly belonging" to them "have been taken by the United States without compensation. . . ."
to make available lands outside the true boundary, it was only to give a transitory, possessory, and not a compensable, interest; that his intent was, in fact, only to secure the Indians in their possession of the White River Valley, but no more, on the mistaken assumption that the White River Valley had been cut off from the reservation by the Miller survey; that the 1880 Act neither by its terms, its legislative history, nor its administrative interpretation suggests that Congress intended to ratify or expand the Executive Order or to compensate the Indians for the Executive Order lands; that the Indians did not have a contrary understanding; that, in the face of such clear legislative language and intent, a contrary understanding of the Indians, even if established, could not justify a holding that the Indians obtained a compensable interest.
by the special concurring opinion, indicate that the Executive Order was promulgated under the mistaken belief that its issuance was necessary in order to give the Indians the use of the White River Valley lands intended to be granted to them by the 1868 treaty, and from which they might otherwise have been excluded by the Miller survey. These findings do not indicate that the Commissioner, the Secretary, or the President intended the order to make available the lands it in fact described lying north of the true treaty boundary. The order was designed only to resolve the misunderstanding created by Miller about the White River Valley lands. [Footnote 3] The fullest possible purpose of the Executive Order has actually been carried out. For the Indians' enjoyment of the White River lands was protected during their stay on the reservation, and the lands have either already been paid for or are the subject of pending litigation in the Court of Claims whereby the Indians seek payment for them. It is with these things in mind that we must consider petitioner's contention that they have a right to recover compensation because of the 1880 Act.
There is not one word in that Act showing a congressional purpose to convey the Executive Order lands, or any other lands, to the Indians. On the contrary, the Act embodied a transaction whereby the Indians were the transferors, and conveyed lands to the Government. For the value of lands so conveyed, and for no other, the Government was to make an account to the Indians after certain deductions had been made.
a purpose to treat as a part of that reservation lands which had never been legally conveyed to the Indians and which had only been made available to them by the Executive Order for the sole purpose of making them secure in their possession of the White River Valley.
States, 318 U. S. 423, 318 U. S. 431-432. We cannot, under any acceptable rule of interpretation, hold that the Indians owned the lands merely because they thought so. Solicitous as the Government is to carry out its promises to the Indians in good faith, we are satisfied from this record that the Government has performed all that it promised.
As we have pointed out, it seems obvious to us from the findings of the Court of Claims that the Executive Order was only intended to secure for these Indians' ancestors possession of the White River Valley lands conveyed to them by the original 1868 treaty, and which was jeopardized by the Miller survey. [Footnote 5] In fact, the President had no authority to convey a compensable interest in these or other lands to the Utes. Fairly to carry out the 1868 treaty was the order's aim. The 1880 Act, we believe, did not enlarge upon the limited purpose of the Executive Order. To compensate these Indians for lands not intended to be conveyed by the 1868 treaty, the Executive Order, nor the 1880 Act would be to pay them for lands which neither they nor their ancestors ever owned and to which they had no claim in equity or justice, so far as the transactions here at issue are concerned. No rule of construction justifies such a result.
"It is hereby ordered that the tract of country in the Territory of Colorado lying within the following-described boundaries, viz: commencing at the northeast corner of the present Ute Indian Reservation, as defined in the treaty of March 2, 1868 (Stats. at Large, vol. 15, p. 619); thence running north on the 107th degree of longitude to the first standard parallel north; thence west on said first standard parallel to the boundary line between Colorado and Utah; thence south with said boundary to the northwest corner of the Ute Indian Reservation; thence east with the north boundary of the said reservation to the place of beginning, be, and the same hereby is, withdrawn from sale and set apart for the use of the several tribes of Ute Indians, as an addition to the present reservation in said Territory."
"set apart [certain land] as a part of the Ute Indian Reservation, in accordance with the first article of an agreement made with said Indians and ratified by Congress. . . ."
1 Kappler, supra, p. 834.
"absence of the finding of an ultimate fact does not require a reversal of the judgment if the circumstantial facts as found are such that the ultimate fact follows from them as a necessary inference."
United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 283 U. S. 120.
See S. 772 and S.Res. 51, 10 Cong.Rec. pt. 1 (1879) 30, 77; H.Res. 142, 10 Cong.Rec. 44; H.R. 2420, 10 Cong.Rec. 17; H.Res. 154, 10 Cong.Rec. 113; H.R. 50 2, 10 Cong.Rec. pt. 2 (1880) 1538.
See p. 330 U. S. 177, supra.
"to use their best endeavors with their people to procure their consent to cede to the United States all the territory of the present Ute Reservation in Colorado."
Congress thereupon passed the Act of June 15, 1880, which recited in its preamble that the chiefs and headmen had "submitted to the Secretary of the Interior an agreement for the sale to the United States of their present reservation in the Colorado." The Act then incorporated the agreement previously made, and provided that all unallotted lands should be deemed to be released and conveyed to the United States.
It seems clear to me that, by 1880, the term "present reservation" included the land which the Executive Order of 1875 stated had been set aside as an addition to the then present reservation. And, when the 1880 agreement and the 1880 Act referred to "present reservation," they must have included that additional land. Adding this informal acknowledgment by Congress of the expanded reservation to the occupation of the land by the Indians and their understanding that it belonged to the reservation, a compensable interest becomes evident. It is immaterial that there was no formal documents conveying a fee simple interest to the Indians; it is likewise irrelevant that there was no formal acknowledgment of the Indian title. Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394; United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U. S. 40. It is enough that the Indians had the right to possess and occupy the land, and that the Indians fairly understood that to be the case. An acknowledgment by Congress, however informal, then adds a legal obligation to the moral duty of the United States to pay for the land involved. Such is the situation here.
The Court indicates, however, that the Executive Order of 1875 does not mean what it says. It clearly set apart for the use of the Indians "as an addition to the present reservation" all the described land up to the "first standard parallel north." But it is now suggested that those responsible for the promulgation of that order did not really intend to set aside all the land up to the "first standard parallel north," despite the explicit language used. It is said, rather, that the order actually was designed to affect only the White River Valley lands -- lands which are some nine miles south of the "first standard parallel north." That interpretation of the intent of the framers of the order would make the northern boundary of the Executive Order land coterminous with the northern boundary of the true treaty reservation.
But there is nothing in the findings of the Court of Claims to justify such an interpretation. To disregard the plain words of the order by subtracting a nine-mile strip from a clearly worded description requires definite findings to that effect which are supported by the record. It is not our function, of course, to supply those findings ourselves. Nor can we infer them from the decision of the Court of Claims. That court alone has the power and the duty to make the necessary findings on material issues. 53 Stat. 752, 28 U.S.C. § 288; United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 328 U. S. 267-268. If it is material that the framers of the Executive Order intended to set aside less land than that described in the order, the case should be remanded to the Court of Claims so that it can make the necessary findings in this respect.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join in this dissent.


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Oct 20, 2010 ... Case opinion for US 8th Circuit MOORE v. ASTRUE. ... Sebastian MOORE, Appellant, v. Michael .... Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.2005).
Da Silva Moore v. Publicis ... Barnhart, 432 F. Supp. 2d 271 ... However, this Court has considered all of Plaintiffs' objections and finds them to be without merit.
Apr 25, 2018 ... Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 2014) (uscourts.gov) (Google ...... Moore v. Barnhart, 413 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2005) (uscourts.gov).
Oct 5, 2015 ... Security Act. The Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and ... substantial evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.

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Law Web: Whether it is necessary for landlord to implead all legal heirs of deceased tenant?
Whether it is necessary for landlord to implead all legal heirs of deceased tenant?
We are of the view that in the light of H.C. Pandey (supra), the situation is very clear that when original tenant dies, the legal heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants and occupation of one of the tenant is occupation of all the joint tenants. It is not necessary for landlord to implead all legal heirs of the deceased tenant, whether they are occupying the property or not. It is sufficient for the landlord to implead either of those persons who are occupying the property, as party. There may be a case where landlord is not aware of all the legal heirs of deceased tenant and impleading only those heirs who are in occupation of the property is sufficient for the purpose of filing of eviction petition. An eviction petition against one of the joint tenant is sufficient against all the joint tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the Rent Controller as joint tenancy is one tenancy and is not a tenancy split into different legal heirs. Thus, the plea of the tenants on this count must fail.
21. Even otherwise, the intervention at this belated stage of execution proceedings, in the fact and circumstances of the case, seems to be a deliberate attempt to nullify the decree passed in favour of the Appellant herein as when Respondent No. 1 filed objections Under Section 47 Order XXI of the Code, he claimed to be in possession of the suit premises, however, he failed to produce any evidence except two rent receipts for the months of December, 1993 and January 1994 that too when the Respondent No. 1 in his objection petition filed in the execution proceedings of the eviction decree has himself admitted that the there exists a dispute between him and Respondent No. 2 and they had parted their ways.
Suresh Kumar Kohli Vs. Rakesh Jain and Ors.
2. The present appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 05.12.2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi in CM (M) No. 880 of 2012 whereby learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein against the judgment and order dated 08.06.2012 passed by the Additional Rent Controller in Ex Petition No. 51 of 2012 wherein the objections filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein Under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 26(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') were rejected.
(a) Suresh Kumar Kohli-the Appellant herein is the owner of shop bearing No. 3, Building No. 2656, Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (in short 'the suit premises'). On 15.11.1975, his father, along with one another, let out the suit premises on a monthly rental of Rs. 450/- to Late Shri Ishwar Chand Jain, father of Respondent No. 1 herein, and Ramesh Chand Jain-Respondent No. 2 herein. The tenants started a family business under the name and style of M/s. Rakesh Wool Store. Shri Rakesh Jain-Respondent No. 1 herein was inducted as a partner in the family business on 02.04.1979.
(b) On 25.04.2009, the owner sent a legal notice to Respondent No. 2 herein and his father Late Shri Ishwar Chand Jain terminating the tenancy with effect from 31.05.2009. Shri Ishwar Chand Jain died on 08.03.2010.
(c) Since the tenant failed to vacate the suit premises, the Appellant herein filed Eviction Petition bearing No. E-304/2010 Under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent (Control) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the ground of bona fide need. The Additional Rent Controller, New Delhi, vide judgment and order dated 30.11.2011, decreed the eviction petition in favour of the Appellant herein.
(d) Being aggrieved by the decree in favour of the Appellant herein, Respondent No. 2 herein preferred Rent Control Revision being No. 212 of 2012 before the High Court. Learned single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 08.05.2012, dismissed the revision. Aggrieved by the above order, Respondent No. 2 herein preferred Review Petition being No. 383 of 2012 before the High Court. Learned single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 17.08.2012, dismissed the review petition filed by Respondent No. 2 herein.
(e) Meanwhile, Respondent No. 1 herein filed objections in Execution Petition No. 51/2012 Under Section 47 Order XXI Rule 26(1) before the Additional Rent Controller, New Delhi claiming that he being a necessary party as he inherited rights in a joint family business and he was not aware of the pendency of the eviction proceedings. The Additional Rent Controller, vide judgment and order dated 08.06.2012, rejected the objection petition filed by Respondent No. 1 herein.
(f) Aggrieved by the order dated 08.06.2012, Respondent No. 1 herein preferred CM (Main) No. 880 of 2012 before the High Court. Learned single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 05.12.2013, allowed the petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein.
(g) Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 05.12.2013, the Appellant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
4. Heard Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior Counsel for the Respondents and perused the records.
5. The only point for consideration before this Court is whether in the light of present facts and circumstances of the case, the status of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased tenant will be of joint tenants or of tenants-in-common.
6. Learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant contended that the High Court failed to appreciate the fact that Respondent No. 2, apart from being a tenant in his own right, was also one of the heirs and legal representative of the deceased-Shri Ishwar Chand Jain and, thus, his estate and interest was amply represented and the absence of Respondent No. 1 was not fatal to the maintainability of the Eviction Petition filed by the Appellant against the tenant-Respondent No. 2. Learned senior Counsel further contended that Respondent No. 2 and his father late Shri Ishwar Chand Jain were joint tenants when their tenancy was determined, and therefore, eviction suit filed by the landlord-Appellant against one of the joint tenant was perfectly valid and maintainable. The death of one of the joint tenant after termination of the tenancy will have no effect as right of the party crystallized on the date of service of the notice and termination of the tenancy.
7. Learned senior Counsel further contended that the High Court erred in holding that Respondent No. 1 was a necessary party to the suit for eviction on the ground that the tenancy between the parties is tenancy-in-common and not a joint tenancy. He finally contended that the High Court erred in law in applying the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 while interpreting the status of Respondent No. 1 qua the suit shop after the death of his father who was the original tenant in the suit premises. The Act, being a special Act and the "tenant" having been defined in the said Act, the provisions of the Rent Act will prevail over the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In support of his plea, learned senior Counsel relied upon the following decisions of this Court, viz., H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul MANU/SC/0209/1989 : (1989) 3 SCC 77, Mohd. Usman v. (Mst.) Surayya Begum MANU/DE/0750/1990 : (1990) 2 RCR (Rent) 408, Mst. Surayya Begum v. Mohd. Usman and Ors. MANU/SC/0590/1991 : (1991) 3 SCC 114 and Harish Tandon v. Addl. District Magistrate, Allahabad, U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0132/1995 : (1995) 1 SCC 537.
8. On the other hand, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents contended that on a careful perusal of the provisions of the Act and the definition of Tenant' given thereunder read with Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the intention of the legislature would not be to exclude the former Act from the operation of the latter and the High Court was right in placing reliance on Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to hold that on the death of a tenant, his legal heirs hold the tenancy estate as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenant.
9. Learned senior Counsel further submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed as the Appellant has acted in a clandestine manner to undermine the interest of Respondent No. 1 in the suit premise and the High Court was right in setting aside the order of the Additional Rent Controller and directing the impleadment of Respondent No. 1 in the eviction petition. He finally contended that the findings of the High Court in the present case should not be interfered with as the same would lead to grave injustice to the Respondents. In support of his aforesaid pleas, learned senior Counsel has relied upon the following decisions of this Court, viz., Boddu Venkatakrishna Rao and Ors. v. Smt. Boddu Satyavathi and Ors. MANU/SC/0199/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 751, Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and Ors. MANU/SC/0381/1985 : (1985) 2 SCC 683 and Uttam v. Saubhag Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0256/2016 : (2016) 4 SCC 68.
10. The issue at hand is what would be the status of the succeeding legal representatives after the death of the statutory tenant. In this regard, it would be worthy to discuss the two capacities, viz., tenancy-in-common and joint tenancy, and the rights that one holds in these two different capacities. Fundamentally, the concepts of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common are different and distinct in form and substance. The incidents regarding the co-tenancy and joint tenancy are different: joint tenants have unity of title, unity of commencement of title, unity of interest, unity of equal shares in the joint estate, unity of possession and right of survivorship.
11. Tenancy-in-common is a different concept. There is unity of possession but no unity of title, i.e. the interests are differently held and each co-tenant has different shares over the estate. Thus, the tenancy rights, being proprietary rights, by applying the principle of inheritance, the shares of heirs are different and ownership of leasehold rights would be confined to the respective shares of each heir and none will have title to the entire leasehold property. Therefore, the estate shall be divided among the co-tenants and each tenant in common has an estate in the whole of single tenancy. Consequently, the privity exists between the landlord and the tenant in common in respect of such estate.
The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family.
and that it was not right to import into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical Rule of English conveyancing. Many years later the principle was reiterated in the case of Mt. Bahu Rani v. Rajendra Baksh Singh..
34. It may be noticed that the Legislature itself treats commercial tenancy differently from residential tenancy in the matter of eviction of the tenant in the Delhi Rent Act and also in various other Rent Acts. All the grounds for eviction of a tenant of residential premises are not made grounds for eviction of a tenant in respect of commercial premises. Section 14(1)(d) of the Delhi Rent Act provides that non-user of the residential premises by the tenant for a period of six months immediately before the filing of the application for the recovery of possession of the premises will be a good ground for eviction, though in case of a commercial premises no such provision is made. Similarly, Section 14(1)(e) which makes bona fide requirement of the landlord of the premises let out to the tenant for residential purposes a ground for eviction of the tenant, is not made applicable to commercial premises. A tenant of any commercial premises has necessarily to use the premises for business purposes. Business carried on by a tenant of any commercial premises may be and often is, his only occupation and the source of livelihood of the tenant and his family. Out of the income earned by the tenant from his business in the commercial premises, the tenant maintains himself and his family; and the tenant, if he is residing in a tenanted house, may also be paying his rent out of the said income. Even if a tenant is evicted from his residential premises, he may with the earnings out of the business be in a position to arrange for some other accommodation for his residence with his family. When, however, a tenant is thrown out of the commercial premises, his business which enables him to maintain himself and his family comes to a standstill. It is common knowledge that it is much more difficult to find suitable business premises than to find suitable premises for residence. It is no secret that for securing commercial accommodation, large sums of money by way of salami, even though not legally payable, may have to be paid and rents of commercial premises are usually very high. Besides, a business which has been carried on for years at a particular place has its own goodwill and other distinct advantages. The death of the person who happens to be the tenant of the commercial premises and who was running the business out of the income of which the family used to be maintained, is itself a great loss to the members of the family to whom the death, naturally, comes as a great blow. Usually, on the death of the person who runs the business and maintains his family out of the income of the business, the other members of the family who suffer the bereavement have necessarily to carry on the business for the maintenance and support of the family. A running business is indeed a very valuable asset and often a great source of comfort to the family as the business keeps the family going. So long as the contractual tenancy of a tenant who carries on the business continues, there can be no question of the heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheriting the tenancy but also inheriting the business and they are entitled to run and enjoy the same. We have earlier held that mere termination of the contractual tenancy does not bring about any change in the status of the tenant and the tenant by virtue of the definition of the "tenant" in the Act and the other Rent Acts continues to enjoy the same status and position, unless there be any provisions in the Rent Acts which indicate to the contrary. The mere fact that in the Act no provision has been made with regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies on the death of the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done in the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises, does not indicate that the Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of commercial premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however flourishing it may be and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant, only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the entire family of a tenant depending upon the business carried on by the tenant will be completely stranded and the business carried on for years in the premises which had been let out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate, as they are afforded no protection under the Act. We are of the opinion that in case of commercial premises governed by the Delhi Act, the Legislature has not thought it fit in the light of the situation at Delhi to place any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of inheritance with regard to succession. It may also be borne in mind that in case of commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises but they succeed to the business as a whole. It might have been open to the Legislature to limit or restrict the right of inheritance with regard to the tenancy as the Legislature had done in the case of the tenancies with regard to the residential houses but it would not have been open to the Legislature to alter under the Rent Act, the law of succession regarding the business which is a valuable heritable right and which must necessarily devolve on all the heirs in accordance with law. The absence of any provision restricting the heritability of the tenancy in respect of the commercial premises only establishes that commercial tenancies notwithstanding the determination of the contractual tenancies will devolve on the heirs in accordance with law and the heirs who step into the position of the deceased tenant will continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the Act and they can only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is another significant consideration which, in our opinion, lends support to the view that we are taking. Commercial premises are let out not only to individuals but also to Companies, Corporations and other statutory bodies having a juristic personality. In fact, tenancies in respect of commercial premises are usually taken by Companies and Corporations. When the tenant is a Company or a Corporation or anybody with juristic personality, question of the death of the tenant will not arise. Despite the termination of the tenancy, the Company or the Corporation or such juristic personalities, however, will go on enjoying the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. It can hardly be conceived that the Legislature would intend to deny to one class of tenants, namely, individuals the protection which will be enjoyed by the other class, namely, the Corporations and Companies and other bodies with juristic personality under the Act. If it be held that commercial tenancies after the termination of the contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an irreparable mischief which the Legislature could never have intended is likely to be caused. Any time after the creation of the contractual tenancy, the landlord may determine the contractual tenancy, allowing the tenant to continue to remain in possession of the premises, hoping for an early death of the tenant, so that on the death of a tenant he can immediately proceed to institute the proceeding for recovery and recover possession of the premises as a matter of course, because the heirs would not have any right to remain in occupation and would not enjoy the protection of the Act. This could never have been intended by the Legislature while framing the Rent Acts for affording protection to the tenant against eviction that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession, even if no grounds for eviction as prescribed in the Rent Acts are made out.
35. In our opinion, the view expressed by this Court in Ganapat Ladha case and the observations made therein which we have earlier quoted, do not lay down the correct law. The said decision does not properly construe the definition of the "tenant" as given in Section 5(11)((b) of the Act and does not consider the status of the tenant, as defined in the Act, even after termination of the commercial tenancy. In our judgment in Damadilal case this Court has correctly appreciated the status and the legal position of a tenant who continues to remain in possession after termination of the contractual tenancy. We have quoted at length the view of this Court and the reasons in support thereof. The view expressed by a seven Judge Bench of this Court in Dhanapal Chettiar case and the observations made therein which we have earlier quoted, lend support to the decision of this Court in Damadilal case. These decisions correctly lay down that the termination of the contractual tenancy by the landlord does not bring about a change in the status of the tenant who continues to remain in possession after the termination of the tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. A proper interpretation of the definition of tenant in the light of the provisions made in the Rent Acts makes it clear that the tenant continues to enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises despite the termination of the contractual tenancy.
It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable there. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the Respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice was served on the Respondent was sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bose (MANU/UP/0011/1977 : AIR 1977 Allahabad 38) (supra) is erroneous where the High Court lays down that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common. In the Transfer of Property Act notice served by the Appellant on the Respondent is a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed.
6. In the light of the above observations of the Supreme Court there can be no doubt that even if one of the legal heirs is not a party to proceedings for eviction filed by the landlord against the legal heirs of the original tenant, that heir who has been left out cannot later on come forward and agitate his or her right in the tenancy. In the present case, I find that Surayya Begum who claims to be living in the same disputed premises alongwith other legal heirs after the death of Khalil Raza has chosen to file her objections after the whole round of litigation is over and after the other legal heirs have lost right upto the Supreme Court. It is thus clear that these objections are filed only to defeat the decree and delay the execution of the decree. In my view, therefore, even if Surayya Begum was not a party to the previous litigation between the parties she has no right to object to the execution of the decree and the Additional Rent Controller ought to have dismissed the objections on that ground alone.
7. In the circumstances, the petition is allowed. The order of the Additional Rent Controller Delhi dated 2nd September, 1989 is set aside. The objections filed by Respondent No. 1 are dismissed. Respondent No. 1 Mst. Surayya Begum is however given on month's time to vacate the premises. No costs.
7. The learned advocates representing the decree holders in these two appeals have argued that when the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of a tenant on his death, the incidence of tenancy remains the same as earlier enjoyed by the original tenant and it is a single tenancy which devolves on them. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable, and the position as between the landlord and the tenant continues unaltered. Relying on Kanji Manji v. Trustees of the Port of Bombay and borrowing from the judgment in H.C. Pandey case it was urged that the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. The learned Counsel for the Appellants have replied by pointing out that as the aforesaid two decisions were distinguished by this Court in the latter case of Textile Association, it was not open to the landlords to support the impugned judgments by relying upon the earlier two cases.
8. So far as Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act is concerned, when it directs that the heirs of a Hindu dying intestate shall take his property as tenants-in-common, it is dealing with the rights of the heirs inter se amongst them, and not with their relationship with a stranger having a superior or distinctly separate right therein. The relationship between the stranger and the heirs of a deceased tenant is not the subject matter of the section. Similar is the situation when the tenant is a Mohammedan. However, it is not necessary for us to elaborate this aspect in the present appeals. The main dispute between the parties, as it appears from their respective stands in the courts below, is whether the heirs of the original tenants who were parties to the proceeding, represented the objector heirs also. According to the decree holder in Miss Renu Sharma's case their interest was adequately represented by their mother and brothers and they are as much bound by the decree as the named judgment debtors. In Surayya Begum's case Respondent 1 has denied the Appellant's claim of being one of the daughters of Khalil Raza, and has been contending that the full estate of Khalil Raza which devolved upon his heirs on his death was completely represented by Respondents 2 to 9. In other words, even if the Appellant is held to be a daughter of Khalil Raza the further question as to whether her interest was represented by the other members of the family will have to be answered.
20. The Act with which we are concerned is a statute which purports to regulate the relationship between the landlord and the tenant and in many respects contains provisions for achieving that object which are different from the Transfer of Property Act. As such it was open to the framers of the Act to look to the interest of the tenant as well as the landlord and to prescribe conditions under which the tenant can continue to occupy a building and having contravened any of the conditions prescribed shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building.
The Full Bench proceeded on the basis that the heirs become joint tenants and answered the main problem by saying that if any member of the family of such joint tenants built or acquired a house in vacant state the tenancy would be deemed to have ceased. In framing these questions for reference and in answering the referred questions, the definition of 'tenant' was lost sight of. All the heirs as normally reside with the deceased tenant in the building at the time of his death become tenants. The definition does not warrant the view that all the heirs will become a body of tenants to give rise to the concept of joint tenancy. Each heir satisfying the further qualification in Section 3(a)(1) of the Act in his own right becomes a tenant and when we come to Section 12(3) of the Act, the words 'the tenant or any member of his family' will refer to the heir who has become a tenant under the statutory definition and members of his family.
It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs.
There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants.
22. The attention of the learned Judges constituting the Bench in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul was not drawn to the view expressed in the case of Mohd. Azeem v. Distt. Judge. There appears to be an apparent conflict between the two judgments. It was on that account that the present appeal was referred to a Bench of three Judges. According to us, it is difficult to hold that after the death of the original tenant his heirs become tenants-in-common and each one of the heirs shall be deemed to be an independent tenant in his own right. This can be examined with reference to Section 20(2) which contains the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted. Clause (a) of Section 20(2) says that if the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand, then that shall be a ground on which the landlord can institute a suit for eviction. Take a case where the original tenant who was paying the rent dies leaving behind four sons. It need not be pointed out that after the death of the original tenant, his heirs must be paying the rent jointly through one of his sons. Now if there is a default as provided in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 in respect of the payment of rent, each of the sons will take a stand that he has not committed such default and it is only the other sons who have failed to pay the rent. If the concept of heirs becoming independent tenants is to be introduced, there should be a provision under the Act to the effect that each of the heirs shall pay the proportionate rent and in default thereto such heir or heirs alone shall be liable to be evicted. There is no scope for such division of liability to pay the rent which was being paid by the original tenant, among the heirs as against the landlord what the heirs do inter se, is their concern. Similarly, so far as ground (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, which says that if the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building, then the tenant shall be liable to be evicted; again, if one of the sons of the original deceased tenant wilfully causes substantial damage to the building, the landlord cannot get possession of the premises from the heirs of the deceased tenant since the damage was not caused by all of them. Same will be the position in respect of Clause (c) which is another ground for eviction, i.e., the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made, any such construction or structural alteration in the building which is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. Even if the said ground is established by the landlord, he cannot get possession of the building in which construction or structural alterations have been made diminishing its value and utility, unless he establishes that all the heirs of the deceased tenant had done so. Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 prescribes another ground for eviction -- that if the tenant has without the consent in writing of the landlord, used it for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building or has been convicted under any law for the time being in force of an offence of using the building or allowing it to be used for illegal or immoral purposes; the landlord cannot get possession of the building unless he establishes the said ground individually against all the heirs. We are of the view that if it is held that after the death of the original tenant, each of his heirs becomes independent tenant, then as a corollary it has also to be held that after the death of the original tenant, the otherwise single tenancy stands split up into several tenancies and the landlord can get possession of the building only if he establishes one or the other ground mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 20 against each of the heirs of original tenant. One of the well-settled Rules of interpretation of statute is that it should be interpreted in a manner which does not lead to an absurd situation.
30. Testamentary succession.--Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him or by her, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus.
Explanation.--The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property or the interest of a member of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru in the property of the tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this section.
14. On application of the principles contained in the aforesaid decisions, it becomes clear that, on the death of Jagannath Singh in 1973, the proviso to Section 6 would apply inasmuch as Jagannath Singh had left behind his widow, who was a Class I female heir. Equally, upon the application of Explanation 1 to the said Section, a partition must be said to have been effected by operation of law immediately before his death. This being the case, it is clear that the Plaintiff would be entitled to a share on this partition taking place in 1973. We were informed, however, that the Plaintiff was born only in 1977, and that, for this reason, (his birth being after his grandfather's death) obviously no such share could be allotted to him. Also, his case in the suit filed by him is not that he is entitled to this share but that he is entitled to a 1/8th share on dividing the joint family property between 8 co-sharers in 1998. What has therefore to be seen is whether the application of Section 8, in 1973, on the death of Jagannath Singh would make the joint family property in the hands of the father, uncles and the Plaintiff no longer joint family property after the devolution of Jagannath Singh's share, by application of Section 8, among his Class I heirs? This question would have to be answered with reference to some of the judgments of this Court.
21. It is necessary to bear in mind the Preamble to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Preamble states that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus.
22. In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not include son's son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The Gujarat High Court view noted above, if accepted, would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be excluded Under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule Under Section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son, etc.
23. Before we conclude we may state that we have noted the observations of Mulla's Commentary on Hindu Law, 15th Edn. dealing with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act at pp. 924-26 as well as Mayne Hindu Law, 12th Edn., pp. 918-19.
24. The express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must prevail. The Preamble to the Act reiterates that the Act is, inter alia, to 'amend' the law, with that background the express language which excludes son's son but includes son of a predeceased son cannot be ignored.
25. In the aforesaid light the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court, the Madras High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court, appear to us to be correct. With respect we are unable to agree with the views of the Gujarat High Court noted hereinbefore.
12. The Act brought about a sea change in the matter of inheritance and succession amongst Hindus. Section 4 of the Act contains a non obstante provision in terms whereof any text, Rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act, ceased to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made therein save as otherwise expressly provided.
13. Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided for devolution of interest in the coparcenary property. Section 8 lays down the general Rules of succession that the property of a male dying intestate devolves according to the provisions of the Chapter as specified in Class I of the Schedule. In the Schedule appended to the Act, natural sons and daughters are placed as Class I heirs but a grandson, so long as father is alive, has not been included. Section 19 of the Act provides that in the event of succession by two or more heirs, they will take the property per capita and not per stirpes, as also tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.
14. Indisputably, Bhima left behind Sant Ram and three daughters. In terms of Section 8 of the Act, therefore, the properties of Bhima devolved upon Sant Ram and his three sisters. Each had 1/4th share in the property. Apart from the legal position, factually the same was also reflected in the record-of-rights. A partition had taken place amongst the heirs of Bhima.
15. Although the learned first appellate court proceeded to consider the effect of Section 6 of the Act, in our opinion, the same was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. In any event, it had rightly been held that even in such a case, having regard to Section 8 as also Section 19 of the Act, the properties ceased to be joint family property and all the heirs and legal representatives of Bhima would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. In a case of this nature, the joint coparcenary did not continue.
19. From a perusal of lease deed dated 15.11.1975, we find that the suit premises was let out jointly to late Shri Ishwar Chand Jain and Shri Ramesh Chand Jain, son of late Shri Ishwar Chand Jain. Thus, both of them were joint tenants and upon the death of Shri Ishwar Chand Jain, Respondent No. 1 inherited the tenancy as joint tenant only. Further, in view of a catena of decisions of this Court on the subject as well as the principles laid down in H.C. Pandey (supra), we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the decisions relied upon by learned senior Counsel for the Appellant are not applicable to the facts of the present case on the premise that in the given case itself the validity and binding nature of the notice given to one of the legal representatives of the deceased tenant Under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 on other legal representatives was determined only on the basis of the fact that they hold the tenancy as joint tenants and notice given to one means notice given to all.
20. We are of the view that in the light of H.C. Pandey (supra), the situation is very clear that when original tenant dies, the legal heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants and occupation of one of the tenant is occupation of all the joint tenants. It is not necessary for landlord to implead all legal heirs of the deceased tenant, whether they are occupying the property or not. It is sufficient for the landlord to implead either of those persons who are occupying the property, as party. There may be a case where landlord is not aware of all the legal heirs of deceased tenant and impleading only those heirs who are in occupation of the property is sufficient for the purpose of filing of eviction petition. An eviction petition against one of the joint tenant is sufficient against all the joint tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the Rent Controller as joint tenancy is one tenancy and is not a tenancy split into different legal heirs. Thus, the plea of the tenants on this count must fail.
22. In light of the above discussion, the judgment and order dated 05.12.2013 passed by learned single Judge of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order dated 30.11.2011 passed by the Additional Rent Controller is hereby restored. The appeal is allowed.

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Comment: Plaintiff/accident victim defeats summary judgment motion by defense on No-Fault "serious injury" threshold. Injured plaintiff defaulted when the motion was on and lost (on default). The plaintiff the went to the Court and asked to vacate her default and defeat the defense summary judgment motion, which the appellate court granted.
Interesting in this case is that it is useless as guidance for other accident victims that find themselves in similar circumstances. Why, you may ask? First, the appeals court forgives the plaintiff=s default in opposing the defense motion, but does not say what argument or excuse plaintiff offered for her default. Second, the appellate court held that plaintiff did suffer a "serious injury" and that her case could proceed to a jury, but the Court never said, (a) what her injury was, or, (b) how it satisfied the New York State No-Fault serious injury threshold requirement.
So, to repeat myself, this case is noteworthy for its utter uselessness. The point being that appellate decisions should be informative to other attorneys for accident victims (and, for that matter, to attorneys for defendants also) so they can improve their lawyering and know what the courts look for in accident and injury cases.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated May 20, 2010, as denied that branch of her motion which was to vacate so much of a prior order of the same court dated October 29, 2009, as granted the unopposed motion of the defendant Ronnie Thornton for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law Sec. 5102(d) and, thereupon, to deny that motion.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to vacate so much of the order dated October 29, 2009, as granted the motion of the defendant Ronnie Thornton for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her and, thereupon, to deny that motion, is granted, so much of that order as granted that motion is vacated, and that motion is denied.
The plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her failure to oppose the motion of the defendant Ronnie Thornton for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her (see CPLR 5015[a]; Political Mktg., Int'l., Inc. v. Jaliman, 67 A.D.3d 661, 888 N.Y.S.2d 552; cf. Felder v. New York City Tr. Auth., 238 A.D.2d 543, 657 N.Y.S.2d 83; Krystofic v. Rapisardi, 112 A.D.2d 196, 196_197, 491 N.Y.S.2d 70). The plaintiff also established the existence of a triable issue of fact constituting a meritorious opposition to Thornton's motion (Political Mktg., Int'l., Inc. v. Jaliman, 67 A.D.3d at 662, 888 N.Y.S.2d 552; see CPLR 5015[a] ). The plaintiff provided competent medical evidence establishing that the alleged injuries to the lumbar region of her spine constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law ' 5102(d) (see Dixon v. Fuller, 79 A.D.3d 1094, 1094_1095, 913 N.Y.S.2d 776). She also provided a reasonable explanation for a cessation of medical treatment (see Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 574, 797 N.Y.S.2d 380, 830 N.E.2d 278; Abdelaziz v. Fazel, 78 A.D.3d 1086, 912 N.Y.S.2d 103).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to vacate so much of the order dated October 29, 2009, as granted Thornton's motion for summary judgment, should have vacated so much of that order as granted Thornton's motion for summary judgment, and thereupon should have denied Thornton's motion (see Political Mktg., Int'l., Inc. v. Jaliman, 67 A.D.3d at 661, 888 N.Y.S.2d 552).

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