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We began our study of the book of Revelation on April 23rd of last year. Today is our final week in this incredibly challenging yet remarkably glorious book of the Bible. We have seen and heard and learned much, but here are the ten primary themes or points of emphasis in Revelation that have most greatly impacted me.
(1) Christians in this present age can expect to suffer intense persecution at the hands of an unbelieving and idolatrous world. No one is exempt. To suffer is not an indication of God’s disappointment with us but of our identification with Jesus and when embraced with humility and courage can be a tremendous way to make known the sufficiency and beauty of all that God is for us in Jesus.
(2) God is absolutely and comprehensively sovereign over all the affairs of all mankind. I say “all mankind” because not even the most wicked are outside of God’s providential power.
It often appears that the entire world reels with one blow after another. In Egypt dozens of Christians are killed when ISIS detonates a bomb on Palm Sunday. Bloody civil wars continually erupt all around the globe. Racial strife plagues our own country. Threats against Israel by Iran and other Muslim countries is a daily fixture. And drug cartels continue to supply a seemingly endless flow of illegal narcotics into our country. The world, by all external appearances, appears horribly unstable and chaotic and out of control. But the book of Revelation is God’s word to us that he is in complete control.
(3) Jesus Christ is preeminent above all earthly powers and persons. At the heart of human sin is idolatry: the tendency to exalt as god anything or anyone above or in preference to Jesus Christ. But he is the King over all kings and the Lord over all lords.
Jesus Christ is alive from the dead and seated at the right hand of the Majesty on high, reigning and ruling and exercising absolute sovereignty over all the kings of the earth, all the events in the Middle East and throughout Central and South America and even in the lunatic plans of North Korea and China and Russia.
As “the ruler of the kings on earth” he mysteriously governs and regulates what all earthly kings and presidents do, sometimes restraining them from doing evil, sometimes frustrating their plans, sometimes ordering events so that they might serve his purposes. We can’t figure out how he does it, but do it, he does! Thus, Paul declares in 1 Corinthians 15:25 that “he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet.” So don’t just read the newspaper or scour the internet. Read and reflect with the eyes of faith and confidence in the supremacy of Jesus Christ over all things.
(4) We have the assurance that God will accomplish his purposes and bring all things to their consummation in Christ Jesus. No matter how bad circumstances may become, no matter how oppressed the church may be, no matter how successful and powerful the world and its wicked ways appear, nothing can derail or disrupt God’s purpose in history to bring a Bride to the Bridegroom at the wedding feast of the Lamb.
(5) As the global oppression of the church increases and intensifies, there will come a time when it will appear that the church has been destroyed. For a time, its voice will have been silenced and its presence barely noticeable. But this is only in appearance, as the church will rise up in power and be the catalyst for a global harvest of souls.
(6) Satan hates God and hates you and hates the Church and will do all within his power, under God’s sovereignty, to undermine your confidence in God’s goodness and lead you to abandon your faith. But we are assured complete and final victory as we overcome him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of our testimony.
(7) Although the wrath of God against sin and idolatry will intensify and expand as we approach the second coming of Christ, no Christian will be the object of it, but will be preserved eternally safe and secure. God has sealed his servants, all of them, with the Holy Spirit and no amount of suffering or hardship can separate us from the love of God in Christ.
(9) Judgment is certain. The one thing that will guard your heart from becoming cynical and pessimistic is the repeated assurance in Revelation that a time of reckoning is coming when God will bring justice to bear on the earth. Truth will be vindicated. Evil will receive its rightful recompense.
(10) Christ is coming soon. This is the very theme not only of Revelation 19 but also of Revelation 22. This is our only hope. This is our blessed hope!
There is no clear structure in Revelation 22. What we find here is a series of declarations, warnings, and promises, most of which have already appeared in one form or another earlier in the book. I will focus on a dozen of them.
(1) Once again I’m greatly encouraged by what the angel said to John in v. 6. After reading Revelation one is left in a whirlwind of amazement, perhaps a little fear, and especially with a question in mind: Is this all true? Or is it science fiction? Is this the real world or a fantasy land? Jesus knows that we all struggle with the bizarre images and graphically symbolic pictures in the book. It leaves us wondering if we can really trust and believe what we read here. Will the wicked of the earth really be judged? Will Jesus win out in the final day? Is life on the new earth as glorious and splendid as it is portrayed in the final two chapters?
First, the idea in this phrase can be paraphrased: “God over the spirits of the prophets” or “God ruling or inspiring the spirits of the prophets.” In any case, God is clearly portrayed as sovereign over what prophets prophesy. God, as it were, owns, operates, and oversees the ministry of true prophets. This confirms what we see elsewhere, especially in 1 Corinthians 14, that the prophetic is entirely dependent on God, always awaiting his anointing and activity. Prophets may prophesy at will, but they only receive revelation by the initiative of God.
Thus, more so than with the gift of teaching, prophets are somewhat passive, being instruments or conduits for the revelatory word of God, whereas teachers are more active, drawing directly from the Scriptures and expounding what they interpret. This is, in fact, the primary distinction between the prophetic gift and the teaching gift: the former is dependent on a spontaneous revelation while the latter is dependent on an inscripturated text. However, this should not be taken to mean that the Spirit is not also active in the exercise of other spiritual gifts, such as teaching.
Second, is the word “spirits” a reference to the human spirit of each prophet or is it a reference to the Holy Spirit? I think the answer is Yes. Let me explain. Some find it problematic to suggest that the Holy Spirit would be mentioned in the plural. But remember: (1) the plural is used for the Holy Spirit in Rev. 1:4; 4:5; 5:6; and (2) when the human spirit is energized by a charismatic manifestation of the Holy Spirit (i.e., when a spiritual gift is in operation), Paul seems to have in mind both. In 1 Cor. 14 it is difficult to know when one should translate pneuma as “Spirit” and when as “spirit”. Gordon Fee simply renders it S/spirit.
(3) Several times in this concluding chapter we are told that the events in Revelation and the coming of Christ are “near” and will happen “soon” (vv. 6, 7, 10, 12, 20). We talked about this in the very first sermon in this series, but let me remind you of what I think is being said.
Some point to 2 Peter 3:8 (“With the Lord a day is like a thousand years”) and argue that John is writing from the divine perspective. What may seem like incessant delay to us is “soon” and “near” for the Lord who views time from a heavenly perspective. Robert Mounce argues that behind these words is the prophetic principle of imminence; i.e., John’s point is that the events could transpire at any time, even soon (although there is no way for anyone to know that with certainty; therefore, we must always be ready).
G. K. Beale contends that John’s words “quickly” (or “soon”) and “near” are a substitute for Daniel’s phrase “in the latter days” (e.g., Dan. 2:28). In other words, Daniel, in the sixth century b.c., referred to events that would occur in some distant future, in a time that he called “the latter days.” John, in the book of Revelation, understands Daniel’s words as applying to his own time. “What Daniel expected to occur in the distant ‘latter days’ – the defeat of cosmic evil and the ushering in of the divine kingdom – John expects to begin ‘quickly,’ in his own generation, if it has not already begun to happen” (153). John is declaring that prophetic fulfillment has already been inaugurated in his own lifetime, in the first century. But the consummation, however, is yet to come.
(4) There is hardly a more important statement in this final chapter than the blessing pronounced by the angel in v. 7 – “Blessed is the one who keeps the words of the prophecy of this book.” This is a healthy reminder to those who are inclined to dismiss Revelation as too bizarre or obscure to be of any practical benefit.
Compare this with Revelation 1:3 where a similar blessing is announced: “Blessed is the one who reads aloud the words of this prophecy, and blessed are those who hear, and who keep what is written in it.” To “keep” the words of the prophecy of Revelation is not simply to believe them to be true but to respond with obedience to their commands. Note the emphasis on the “words” of the book. We believe in verbal, plenary inspiration of the Bible.
Don’t ever think that Revelation is beyond your ability to understand or that its commands and exhortations are irrelevant to people living in the 21st century. God’s “blessing,” his favor and power rest especially on those who take this book seriously and commit themselves in the power of the Spirit to follow its dictates and to believe its teaching.
(5) You may remember that at the conclusion of his prophecy, Daniel was told to “shut up the words and seal the book, until the time of the end” (Dan. 12:4). John, on the other hand, is told to do precisely the opposite with what has been shown to him. What Daniel was commanded to seal up for a future season, John is told to declare to all openly, for the time of fulfillment of such prophetic truth is at hand.
The sealing of Daniel’s prophecy was due to the fact that the time of fulfillment was still in the distant future, in a different age of God’s redemptive plan for his people. What has been revealed to John, on the other hand, concerns the time in which he lived and the age or epoch of the church, spanning the years between the two comings of Jesus.
If this were merely a statement of fact, no problem would exist. But it is an exhortation. How is it that an angel exhorts unbelievers to be unholy? One commentator suggests that since the end is near “there is no longer time to alter the character and habits of men” (Mounce, 392-93). But we know now that for John and his readers the time of the end has extended for some 1,900 years. Perhaps the angel’s point is that “the bent of one’s choices forms an unchangeable character, so that the imperatives have the sense of ‘be what you always have been as you face judgment’” (Beale, 1132).
Others argue that the meaning is to be found in Isaiah 6:9-10 and its use by Jesus in Matthew 13:9-17,43. In both these passages unbelievers are exhorted not to hear because of their insensitive response to the prophetic word. “To such communities,” explains Beale, “God sent prophets whose words increased the blindness of the apostate but served to shock the elect remnant out of the spiritual torpor characteristic of the majority. The impious were even exhorted not to understand, as a punishment for their apostasy and idol worship” (1132). The exhortation of Revelation 22:11 would thus be a judgment in which those who have rebelled and resisted the word of God are, in a sense, consigned and given over to a deeper aggravation of their chosen behavior.
“The rest of mankind, who were not killed by these plagues, did not repent of the works of their hands nor give up worshiping demons and idols of gold and silver and bronze and stone and wood, which cannot see or hear or walk, nor did they repent of their murders or their sorceries or their sexual immorality or their thefts” (Rev. 9:20-21).
This may then be a command for people to act according to their nature. It establishes human responsibility. Do what you want to do on the basis of who you are. But know that you will be held accountable. Or it may also be that this passage is designed to awaken sinners into the reality of what they are choosing to do and to realize that they will be judged.
Perhaps an illustration will help. Imagine that you are visiting the Grand Canyon. Your tour guide leads you to the precipice. You look over the edge into the canyon below, and he says to you: “Let the self-assertive fool who wants to destroy himself disregard caution, ignore my instructions, and jump over the edge into the canyon below and certain death.” Is that what the guide wants you to do? No. he wants you to be careful and obey his instructions and stay back from what will certainly result in your gruesome death. Thus this “command” is God’s way of saying: “Do you realize who you are, what you are like, and how you have chosen to live? Do you realize this brings judgment?” So stop and turn. (I owe this illustration to James Hamilton).
(7) I mentioned earlier that one of the primary themes of Revelation is that God will bring judgment on those who have lived in willful disobedience and idolatry. When we look around in our world and see murderers and thieves and abusers and ruthless dictators seemingly getting away with their crimes with no repercussions, we can reassure ourselves that this will not last: “I am coming soon,” said Jesus, “bringing my recompense with me, to repay each one for what he has done” (v. 12).
(8) We look next to the glorious promise of v. 14. What does it mean to “wash” your robes in the blood of Christ? It means you acknowledge your robes are dirty, filthy, stained with sin. You can’t get saved until you know you are lost! It means you know you can’t wash them in anything else: not water, not the soap of good deeds, not in the detergent of promises you have kept. It means there is only one solution to the guilt and stain of our idolatry and rebellion: the blood of Jesus. And what does the blood of Jesus refer to? It refers to his substitutionary death in which his blood was shed as he endured the judgment and wrath reserved for us.
(9) We have already seen in Revelation 21:8 and 27 what we encounter yet again here in 22:15. Here John adds one element: “dogs”, which in Scripture are generally regarded as unclean and despised and often refer symbolically to unbelievers (see Phil. 3:2-3; 2 Peter 2). The unbeliever and the rebellious are like a dog because he wallows in filth. Others choose not to submit to God but try to control the world through demonic sorcery. Rather than rejoice in the pleasures of marital intimacy they are sexually immoral. Rather than love and serve others, they kill them. Rather than worship God alone, they are idolaters. Rather than believe and live by the truth, they love and practice lies and falsehoods.
(10) Jesus has been described in many different ways in Revelation. Here in v. 16 he speaks of himself as “the root and descendant of David, the bright morning star” (see Isa. 11:1; Num. 24:17). Jesus is both the root or source of David as well as his descendant. He is thus the fulfillment of all the promises given to David. He is both David’s Lord and his physical descendant!
(11) There are no fewer than three invitations in v. 17. In the first one, the Holy Spirit speaks through the Bride, the people of God, issuing an invitation to Jesus to “Come!” Does that request fill your prayers each day? It does mine! “Oh, Lord Jesus, don’t delay. Come now!” The second invitation is issued by the “one who hears,” again a reference to those of us who are listening to the reading of this book. It is also directed to Jesus for the same purpose. The final invitation is really an exhortation issued to people in general to believe and treasure and embrace Jesus as the only one who can quench their spiritual thirst (see 21:6).
Here is the solution to the problem of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. Do you want to come to Jesus? Then come. He will never cast you out. Do you prefer not to come to Jesus? Then you have what you want and you have no one to blame but yourself. Do you desire the water of life that Jesus offers? If so, then drink! He gives it freely. If you don’t desire it, but prefer to slake your thirst at the well of this world and what it offers, then you can’t complain. Again, you get precisely what you desire.
(12) These verses are clearly built on Deuteronomy 4:1-2 (cf. 12:32) and 29:19-20. Moses commanded Israel, “You shall not add to the word that I command you, nor take from it.” What does it mean to “add” to or “take away” from the words of the prophecy of Revelation? In Deuteronomy it refers to those who taught, contrary to what God had said, that compromise with idolatry was not inconsistent with faith in Yahweh. To “add” or “take away” from the words of Revelation is to distort or twist its teaching to conform to what we want and believe rather than submitting to what God has said. He is talking about deliberate distortions and perversions of the truth of this book, often done in order to justify one’s personal sins.
What are the consequences for disobedience to this exhortation? Some suggest that forfeiting one’s “share in the tree of life and in the holy city” refers to something other and less than the loss of salvation. Perhaps it means heavenly reward or position.
Some contend that true believers can and, in fact, do violate this command and thus forfeit or lose their salvation.
Others contend that whereas loss of salvation is theoretically possible, it will not in fact occur. The threat of loss is the means by which God stimulates his people to obey the command. In other words, if a believer were to “add” or “take away” he/she would lose their spiritual life. But a believer, in point of fact, will not. The threatened consequence is what the Spirit uses to energize and motivate the believer to obey the command.
Others contend that those who “add” or “take away” are not true believers in the first place. A true believer is, by definition in Revelation, one who refuses to compromise with paganism. These are people who by their profession and outward behavior appeared for a time to belong to the church, but whose unregenerate condition is subsequently revealed by their disobedience to John’s command (cf. 1 John 2:19).
I want to close with a word of counsel to each of you regarding the urgent expectation of Christian men and women for the second coming of Christ. When we read in v. 20 the declaration of Jesus, “Surely I am coming soon,” do you respond with unbridled enthusiasm and declare: “Amen! Come, Lord Jesus”? I hope and pray you do.
How seriously and sincerely do you look forward to the Second Coming of Christ? Does it occupy your thinking on a regular basis? I’m not asking whether or not you enjoy engaging in speculative debates with friends about the identity of the Antichrist or whether or not Russia will conspire with other nations to invade Israel. I’m not asking you about your opinion on whether or not there will be a so-called Great Tribulation and where you stand on the timing of the Rapture in relation to it.
I’m asking you: Does your heart pulsate in anxious expectation of seeing your savior, Jesus Christ, face to face? Do you awaken each day with the hope that this day might be THE day of his return? And if your answer to that question is anywhere from “Sort of” to “Absolutely” to “Well, every so often I do,” what is it that you expect him to do? What do you envision the purpose of his Second Coming to be? What is it about the return of Jesus Christ that makes the thought of it so exciting and fascinating?
Do you think about the coming of Jesus primarily as a remedy to the global war with Islamic terrorism? Do you think about the coming of Jesus as the solution to our planet’s problems, whether it be sexual immorality or economic chaos or the on-going reality of abortion or some such other problem? Why do you want Jesus to come back? What is the predominant motive in your heart? What is it that you not only expect him to do when he comes but want him to do when he comes?
The second coming of Christ is not about the anti-Christ or 666 or rebuilt temples or events in Israel. Stop thinking about or arguing and dividing over such stuff and start preparing your hearts to marvel at him! The second coming is all about Jesus Christ and our great privilege of glorifying God by marveling at his Son! Paul tells us that Jesus is coming back “to be marveled at among all who have believed” (2 Thess. 1:10).
Do you know that this is why you exist, this is why you were created, this is why God continues to sustain and uphold you in being? He made you and redeemed you so that you might marvel. Yes, to marvel is primarily a spiritual experience. Even quadriplegics can marvel. But for those with full use of their bodies, to marvel is to behold Jesus Christ with gaping mouths, bulging eyes, flowing tears, endless goose bumps, rapid heartbeat, deep joy, unending gratitude, dancing feet, and unending meditation on truths and ideas and images about Jesus that are so glorious and great that you will live in constant fear that your mind and heart are on the verge of exploding!
For his integrity in having fulfilled all his promises to us.
For eradicating from your mind and will and heart and soul every last vestige/impulse of sin!
For enabling us to experience his intimate presence rather than being cast away from him and the glory of his might.

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2 2 SHEPARD v. UNITED STATES ted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. I Petitioner Reginald Shepard was indicted under 18 U. S. C. 922(g)(1), barring felons from possessing a firearm, and pleaded guilty. At sentencing the Government claimed that Shepard s prior convictions raised his sentencing range from between 30 and 37 months (under the United States Sentencing Guidelines) to the 15-year minimum required by 924(e), pointing to four prior convictions entered upon Shepard s pleas of guilty under one of Massachusetts s two burglary statutes. 1 Whereas the Government said that each conviction represented a predicate ACCA offense of generic burglary, the District Court ruled that Taylor barred counting any of the prior convictions as predicates for the mandatory minimum. 125 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (Mass. 2000). In Taylor we read the listing of burglary as a predicate violent felony (in the ACCA) to refer to what we called generic burglary, an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. 495 U. S., at 599. Because statutes in some States (like Massachusetts) define burglary more broadly, as by extending it to entries into boats and cars, we had to consider how a later court sentencing under the ACCA might tell whether a prior burglary conviction was for the generic offense. 2 We held that the ACCA generally 1 The Government initially cited a fifth prior burglary conviction, but after failing to obtain adequate documentation about this conviction the Government focused on the other four. 2 Although Taylor involved prior burglaries, as this case does, our holding in Taylor covered other predicate ACCA offenses. 495 U. S., at 600.
6 6 SHEPARD v. UNITED STATES facts. Ibid. Our job, then, is to find the right analogs for applying the Taylor rule to pleaded cases. The Taylor Court drew a pragmatic conclusion about the best way to identify generic convictions in jury cases, while respecting Congress s adoption of a categorical criterion that avoids subsequent evidentiary enquiries into the factual basis for the earlier conviction. The Court held that generic burglary could be identified only by referring to charging documents filed in the court of conviction, or to recorded judicial acts of that court limiting convictions to the generic category, as in giving instruction to the jury. The Court did not, however, purport to limit adequate judicial record evidence strictly to charges and instructions, id., at 602 (discussing the use of these documents as an example ), since a conviction might follow trial to a judge alone or a plea of guilty. In cases tried without a jury, the closest analogs to jury instructions would be a bench-trial judge s formal rulings of law and findings of fact, and in pleaded cases they would be the statement of factual basis for the charge, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(a)(3), shown by a transcript of plea colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable findings of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea. 3 With such material in a pleaded case, a later court could generally tell whether the plea had necessarily rested on the fact identifying the burglary as generic, Taylor, supra, at 602, just as the details of instructions could support that conclusion in the jury case, or the details of a generically limited charging document 3 Several Courts of Appeals have taken a similar view, approving the use of some or all of these documents. United States v. Bonat, 106 F. 3d 1472, (CA9 1997); United States v. Maness, 23 F. 3d 1006, (CA6 1994); United States v. Smith, 10 F. 3d 724, (CA ) (per curiam) (construing United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 4B1.2 (Nov. 1990)).
10 10 SHEPARD v. UNITED STATES Opinion of SOUTER, J. III Developments in the law since Taylor, and since the First Circuit s decision in Harris, provide a further reason to adhere to the demanding requirement that any sentence under the ACCA rest on a showing that a prior conviction necessarily involved (and a prior plea necessarily admitted) facts equating to generic burglary. The Taylor Court, indeed, was prescient in its discussion of problems that would follow from allowing a broader evidentiary enquiry. If the sentencing court were to conclude, from its own review of the record, that the defendant [who was convicted under a nongeneric burglary statute] actually committed a generic burglary, could the defendant challenge this conclusion as abridging his right to a jury trial? Taylor, supra, at 601. The Court thus anticipated the very rule later imposed for the sake of preserving the Sixth Amendment right, that any fact other than a prior conviction sufficient to raise the limit of the possible federal sentence must be found by a jury, in the absence of any waiver of rights by the defendant. Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 243, n. 6 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000). The Government dismisses the relevance of the Jones- Apprendi implementation of the jury right here by describing the determination necessary to apply the ACCA as involv[ing] only an assessment of what the state court itself already has been required to find in order to find case each prior conviction grew out of a guilty plea. See post, at 9 ( Taylor itself set no rule for guilty pleas ). But Taylor has no suggestion that its reasoning would not apply in plea cases, and its discussion of the practical difficulties specifically referred to prior guilty pleas. 495 U. S., at 601. Moreover, as we have noted, see supra, at 5, and as the dissent nowhere disputes, the ACCA provides no support for such a distinction. We decline to create a distinction that Congress evidently had no desire to draw, that Taylor did not envision, and that we would be hard pressed to explain.
12 12 SHEPARD v. UNITED STATES generic character of a prior plea, just as Taylor constrained judicial findings about the generic implication of a jury s verdict. 5 IV We hold that enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case. 5 The dissent charges that our decision may portend the extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), to proof of prior convictions, a move which (if it should occur) surely will do no favors for future defendants in Shepard s shoes. Post, at 11. According to the dissent, the Government, bearing the burden of proving the defendant s prior burglaries to the jury, would then have the right to introduce evidence of those burglaries at trial, and so threaten severe prejudice to the defendant. It is up to the future to show whether the dissent is good prophesy, but the dissent s apprehensiveness can be resolved right now, for if the dissent turns out to be right that Apprendi will reach further, any defendant who feels that the risk of prejudice is too high can waive the right to have a jury decide questions about his prior convictions.
Post-Descamps World. Paresh Patel, Federal Public Defender, D.Md.
Post-Descamps World Paresh Patel, Federal Public Defender, D.Md. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (June 20, 2013) Clarified when and how to use the modified categorical framework Overview 1.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. No. 114,107 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, ROBERT JOE BARNES, Appellant.
STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS DERRICK GUMMS NO. 17-KA-222 FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF LOUISIANA ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO.

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§ 9409.1 Purpose and scope.
§ 9409.4 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Commission official.
§ 9409.5 Procedures for demand for testimony or production of documents.
§ 9409.6 Service of subpoenas or requests.
§ 9409.7 Factors to be considered by the General Counsel.
§ 9409.8 Processing demands or requests.
§ 9409.10 Restrictions that apply to testimony.
§ 9409.11 Restrictions that apply to released records.
§ 9409.12 Procedure when a decision is not made prior to the time a response is required.
§ 9409.13 Procedures when the General Counsel directs an employee not to testify or provide documents.
73 FR 54271, Sept. 18, 2008, unless otherwise noted.


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1. Under 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, originally and as amended in 1938, a homestead is exempt in bankruptcy if, under the state law, it was exempt from levy and sale when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. P. 318 U. S. 625.
2. White v. Stump, 266 U. S. 310, distinguished. P. 318 U. S. 625.
3. Historically, and under the theory of the present Act, bankruptcy has the force and effect of the levy of an execution for the benefit of creditors to insure an equitable distribution amongst them of the bankrupt's assets. The trustee is vested not only with the title 318 U.S. 623 of the bankrupt but clothed with the right of an execution creditor with a levy on the property which passes into the trustee's custody. P. 318 U. S. 627.
4. The law of Nevada entitles a debtor to his homestead exemption if the selection of the property and filing for record of the declaration of intention occur at any time before actual judicial sale. P. 318 U. S. 627.
Certiorari, 317 U.S. 621, to review the affirmance of a judgment of the District Court, 47 F.Supp. 558, sustaining a claim of homestead exemption and overruling the referee's denial of the claim.
The petitioner's assertion that the court below misapplied 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, [Footnote 1] in contravention of a decision of this court, [Footnote 2] and contrary to the law of the State of Nevada, as well as a division of opinion of the judges in the court below, moved us to grant certiorari. 317 U.S. 621.
October 24, 1940, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against Marshall R. Matley, the respondent's husband. He appeared and consented to an adjudication which was entered the same day. November 20, 1940, the respondent filed with the Recorder of Washoe County, Nevada, her declaration claiming as a homestead a tract of land in Reno, Nevada, listed in her husband's bankruptcy schedules. November 27, 1940, she filed in the 318 U.S. 624 bankruptcy court a petition claiming the land as exempt. The referee denied her claim, the District Court reversed the referee, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. [Footnote 3] The real estate in question, acquired by the respondent and her husband while married, was community property on which a residence was built and occupied by the couple as a home. While they were absent from it at times, they always considered it their home, and intended to return to it. Although they were separated in 1940, the respondent was residing on the land when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. A divorce action was pending, but was not concluded until May, 1941, when the respondent was granted a divorce and the Reno residence was awarded her as her sole property.
The petitioner asserts that the property cannot be set apart to the respondent as exempt, since her homestead declaration was not filed, as required by State law, until after entry of the petition in bankruptcy.
Section 70(a) originally provided that the trustee shall be vested, by operation of law, with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt "except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, . . . ." The phraseology was altered by the amendment of 1938 to except "property which is held to be exempt. . . ." Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act [Footnote 4] declares that the provisions of the Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions "which are prescribed by the . . . State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition" in the state where the bankrupt has had his domicile. The trustee, as to all property in possession and under the control of the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy, is deemed vested, as of that date, with all the rights and remedies of a creditor then holding a lien on the property 318 U.S. 625 by legal or equitable proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists. [Footnote 5] An adjudication in bankruptcy is not the equivalent of a judicial sale, nor is the trustee given the rights of a purchaser at such a sale.
The question thus arises whether the respondent"s right of homestead under Nevada law, secured by her filed declaration, prevails against the right and title of the trustee. The court below so held, and we think its judgment was right.
1. We conclude that the new phraseology in the amendment of 70(a) does not alter the principles applicable to the exemption of homestead property in bankruptcy. On the face of the legislation, the intent of Congress was merely to clarify the meaning of the section. We are referred to no legislative history indicating that the alteration was intended to work a change of substance. Under the amendment, as under the original provision, a homestead is exempt if, under the state law, it would be held to be exempt.
Accordingly, it was held that, as the claim of exemption was not perfected until after the petition was filed, it was ineffective as against the trustee, as it would have been against a creditor then having a levy on the property. If the law of Nevada respecting homestead exemptions were like that of Idaho, or operated in the same way, White v. Stump would be in point.
~ A homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relation exists; . . . and laws shall be enacted providing for the recording of such homestead within the county in which the same shall be situated.
Section 3315 of the Compiled Laws of Nevada defines property which may be claimed as exempt as a homestead and permits selection by either the husband, the wife, or both, by a declaration of intention in writing to claim the same. After providing what the declaration shall contain 318 U.S. 627 and that it shall be signed, acknowledged, and recorded as conveyances of real estate are required to be acknowledged and recorded, the statute continues: " . . . from and after the filing for record of said declaration, the husband and wife shall be deemed to hold said homestead as joint tenants."
Section 8844 provides that "the following property is exempt from execution, . . . the homestead as provided for by law."
Historically, and under the theory of the present Act, bankruptcy has the force and effect of the levy of an execution for the benefit of creditors to insure an equitable distribution amongst them of the bankrupt's assets. [Footnote 8] The trustee is vested not only with the title of the bankrupt, but clothed with the right of an execution creditor with a levy on the property which passes into the trustee"s custody.
Our question then is whether, under the constitution and statutes of Nevada, a declaration of homestead would be effective as against a creditor to prevent a judicial sale of the property if made and recorded after levy but before sale thereunder. If it would, it must be equally effective as against the trustee, whose rights rise no higher than those of the supposed creditor and attach at the date of the inception of bankruptcy.
~admits that, under the laws of Nevada as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, a 318 U.S. 628 declaration of homestead filed at any time prior to actual execution sale is sufficient to establish the homestead right.
Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 70(a), 30 Stat. 565; Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 1, 52 Stat. 879, 11 U.S.C. 110.
White v. Stump, 266 U. S. 310.
30 Stat. 548, 11 U.S.C. 24.
70(c), 52 Stat. 881, 11 U.S.C. 110(c).
White v. Stump, supra, p. 266 U. S. 311.
White v. Stump, supra, p. 266 U. S. 313.
Remington, Bankruptcy, 4th Ed., pp. 4-6; In re Youngstrom, 153 F. 98, 103, 104, and cases cited.
Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182; McGill v. Lewis, 116 P.2d 581.
In re Trammell, 5 F.2d 326; Clark v. Nirenbaum, 8 F.2d 451; McCrae v. Felder, 12 F.2d 554. Contra: Georgouses v. Gillen, 24 F.2d 292.

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2015/2016 >> Recreating Niobe: The Construction and Re-Construction of Black Femininity through Games and the Social Psychology of the Avatar is in Future Texts: Subversive Performance and Feminist Bodies; Afrofuturism on Web 3.0: Vernacular Cartography and Augmented Space is in Afrofuturism 2.0: The Rise of Astro-Blackness; and other scheduled publications.
2014 >> Deconstructing the Unisphere: Hip Hop on a Shrinking Globe in an Expanding Universe is in Meet Me at the World's Fair: A World's Fair Reader, published by ETC Press; Black Futurism: The Creative Destruction & Reconstruction of Race in Contemporary Art for Art21.
2013 >> 2013 Sundance New Frontier exhibition for Art21; Advancing STEM Through Culturally Situated Arts-Based Learning for Media-N; Ghost Nature, Art and the Secret Realities of an Object-Oriented Universe, an essay featured in the Ghost Nature exhibition catalog, published in English and French.
2012 >> Sanford Biggers’ Conundrum: The Mothership Lands at Mass MoCA, Kara Walker: The Art of War, Yayoi Kusama at the Whitney: Accumulation, Infinity and the Multiverse, Cauleen Smith: A Star is a Seed, A Seed is a Star and Colliding Complexities_Extreme feats of the New York_New Aesthetic for Art21.
2011 >> Cybism and Decoding the Letter for ISEAIstanbul 2011; The Artist is Prescient: Relational Aesthetics and Augmented Reality and Polyculturalist Visions, New Frameworks of Representation: Multiculturalism and the American Culture Wars for Art21; Afro-Futurism: Countering Mass Culture’s Reductional Breakdown Through Creative Forms of Representation for Nictoglobe Magazine, and Urban Metaphysics: Creating Game Layers on Top of the World for UCLA's Mediascape.
2010 >> Alternate Futures: Afrofuturist Multiverses & Beyond, a virtual 3D art exhibition sponsored by IBM Center for Social Software; The Shifting Aura of Contemporary Art and The Paradoxical Art of 'Inception' for Art21.
2009 >> Virtual Artists’ Immersive Discoveries in a Virtual 3D Frontier, went live and soon became one of the most viewed, commented on blog posts for PBS Art21. Performative Interventions: The Progression of 4D Art in a Virtual 3D World features artists exploring time-based art in Second Life.
Fall 2009 >> Boston Artscience 100K program for high school students interested immersive 3D art and design and Mixed Reality performance and collaboration via YouTube.
Spring 2010 >> Advanced level class and open studio begins!
March 2009 >> Keynote presentation for the NMC Symposium on New Media & Learning in Second Life, including an online paper, and a RYMAEC presentation for youth practitioners on how the web platform can transform and converge current technologies into immersive, 3D spaces for art making and learning.


The Navajo Nation and associated left-wing activist groups won this battle in 2017, essentially giving the Navajo Nation majority control over the county, despite the fact that the Navajo reservation comprises only one-tenth of the county’s landmass.
Two recently-elected commissioners in San Juan County, Utah, are preparing resolutions that, if enacted, would undo the will of locals in matters related to the unpopular national monument that was revised by President Trump in December of 2017.
The newly-elected commissioners, Kenneth Maryboy and Willie Grayeyes are both activists associated with the radical environmentalist groups, Dine’ Bikeyah, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Friends of Cedar Mesa. The new commissioners are members of the Navajo Nation and are also Democrats, leaving veteran Republican commissioner, Bruce Adams, in the minority. The population of San Juan County, in contrast, is rural with an agricultural and mining economic base and majority of conservative-leaning voters. But the election of Maryboy and Grayeyes was made possible by the recent race-based redrawing of districts in 2017. As a result, this mostly-Republican county has a Democrat-dominated county commission.
The controversy dogging Grayeyes doesn’t end with the race-based gerrymandering that resulted from a lawsuit against the county. An Arizona resident with his driver’s license, post office box, and a home in Page, Grayeyes has claimed the right to run for public office in San Juan County (SJC) due to the fact that his umbilical cord is buried somewhere in Piute Mesa, just north of the Arizona border. His questionable residency is the subject of an ongoing legal battle.
SJC locals have expressed concerns that the new Democrat county commission will not be representing their interests, but will be forcing liberal policies into county government, and doing the bidding of radical environmental groups. Draft resolutions obtained by Free Range Report, hint strongly that those concerns about the new SJC commission may be warranted.
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THAT REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION BE HELD IN LOCATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE COUNTY AND SETTING A SCHEDULE FOR SUCH MEETINGS.
WHEREAS, San Juan County is one of the largest counties in the United States and its citizens often live far from the County seat in Monticello, Utah. For example, citizens living in Navajo Mountain, Utah, must drive nearly four hours to get to Monticello.
WHEREAS, in light of the size of the County and the requests of communities in the southern part of the County, the San Juan County Commission believes the public business requires that its meetings occasionally be held in locations around the southern part of the County.
Section 1: The regular meeting of the San Juan County Commission on the third Tuesday of February, April, June, August, October and December 2019, shall be held at different locations in the southern part of the County.
Section 2: The County Administrator shall immediately contact the chapter managers of the Navajo Mountain, Oljato, Mexican Water and Aneth chapters, as well as the Town of Bluff, to make arrangements to hold the Commission meeting on the third Tuesday of every even numbered month on a rotating basis at each one of the chapter houses (or in the case of Oljato, at the Monument Valley Visitor Center) and at the Bluff Community Center, The County Administrator shall also make arrangements for Navajo interpretation at those locations.
Section 3: The first such meeting shall be held on the third Tuesday in February 2019. The County Administrator shall report to the Commission at its regular meeting on the first Tuesday in February 2019 on the arrangements he has made for these meetings.
Although the population of SJC is spread out from Spanish Valley, just south of Moab, to the Arizona and Colorado borders, this resolution focuses primarily on the Navajo reservation and Bluff, both Democrat strongholds in the far southern corner of the county. Those communities to the north are not given consideration.
The next questionable resolution (see below) appears to be in response to previous cases in which SJC has sought attorneys from outside the county to represent it in complex and controversial cases. In one such case, the Navajo Nation has litigated against SJC for years over voter districts. Defending against the lawsuits has been extremely costly to the county, which hired a legal team from Salt Lake City. The Navajo Nation and associated left-wing activist groups won this battle in 2017, essentially giving the Navajo Nation majority control over the county, despite the fact that the Navajo reservation comprises only one-tenth of the county’s landmass.
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE SAN JUAN COUNTY ATTORNEY, KENDALL LAWS, TO IMMEDIATELY PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF ALL CIVIL LITIGATION IN WHICH THE COUNTY IS A PARTY.
WHEREAS, San Juan County is a party in various civil cases.
WHEREAS, the San Juan County Commission has sole authority to choose the legal options to be pursued by the County as expressed though official actions of the Commission.
WHEREAS, as is true of any client, the County, through its Commission, needs to be fully informed of the legal issues facing the County. The Commission has two new members who need to understand the status of civil litigation in which the County is a party.
WHEREAS, the San Juan County Attorney, Kendall Laws, is required to implement the directives of his client, San Juan County, as those directives are expressed in official actions of the County Commission. See, Salt Lake County Commission v Salt lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 905 (1999); UCA § 17-18a-802; Rules 1 2 and 1.13, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
WHEREAS, the County, through this officia1 action of the San Juan County Commission, intends to exercise its sole authority to choose the legal options pursued by the County by directing the County Attorney to provide a comprehensive inventory of all civil litigation in which the County is a party.
Section 1: The County Attorney is directed to immediately prepare a comprehensive inventory of all civil litigation to which the County is a party This inventory shall include, for each case, the case name, case number, court in which the case is filed and a summary of the current status of the case. The inventory shall also include any key pleadings in the case and, if the case is being handled by outside legal counsel, a copy of the representation agreement between the outside counsel and the County and copies of all invoices for worked performed by such counsel from January 2018 through the present date.
Section 2: The County Attorney is to prepare and transmit the litigation inventory to the Commission by not later than January 25, 2019.
Section 3: If the County Attorney is unwilling to comply with the directives contained in this Resolution, he is further directed to submit a letter or memorandum to the Commission stating his refusal and the grounds for his refusal by not later than January 18, 2019 .
Another draft resolution seeks to subvert the will of San Juan County citizens in relation to the massive “Bears Ears National Monument” designation, which President Obama made in December of 2017, just days before leaving office.
The majority of Utahans opposed the monument, and an even larger percentage of SJC citizens fought against the proposed designation beginning in 2015. Following Obama’s pronouncement finalizing the creation of the monument, state and local leaders, including Democrat County Commissioner, Rebecca Benally, who is Navajo, took their fight against the 1.4 million acre monument all the way to Washington D.C.. With effective lobbying and compelling stories about how previously-designated monuments have proved economically devastating to southern Utah’s small communities, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke and President Trump listened, and in December of 2017, Trump reconfigured the “Bears Ears” and created two new, much smaller monuments more than sufficient to meet the requirements of the Antiquities Act.
Calling President Trump’s use of the Antiquities Act to shrink the Obama monument “unlawful,” the resolution below is a slap in the face to the majority of SJC citizens, and a gift to the radical environmentalist groups, including Dine’ Bikeyah, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Friends of Cedar Mesa, which have been at war with local economic interests for years. Due to either ignorance of the law, or a sheer contempt for local sentiments regarding the now-defunct Bears Ears monument, this resolution claims that President Trump “violated” the Antiquities Act, when in fact the Antiquities Act is completely subject to the actions of the sitting president.
RESOLUTION RESCINDING ALL PRIOR RESOLUTIONS OF THE SAN JUAN COUNTY COMMISSION OPPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT OR CALLING FOR THE DIS-ESTABLISHMENT OR REDUCTION OF THE BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT, SPECIFICALLY RESCINDING RESOLUTIONS NOS. 2015-09 (A RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH, SUPPORTING LOCALLY-DRIVEN LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND OPPOSING PRESIDENTIAL DESIGNATION OF A NATIONAL MONUMENT(S) THROUGH AUTHORITY OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906), 2016- 08 (DEFICIENCIES OF A PROPOSAL OF A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL MONUMENT IN SAN JUAN COUNTY; NOTIFICATION OF COUNTY PREROGATIVES AND INTENT FOR LAND USE PLANNING), AND 2017-02 (RESOLUTION REQUESTING AND RECOMMENDING THE REVERSAL OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE BEARS EARS AREA AS A NATIONAL MONUMENT),CONDEMNING THE ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP IN VIOLATING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906 BY UNLAWFULLY REDUCING THE BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT THROUGH THE PROCLAMATION OF DECEMBER 4, 2017 (NO. 9681) AND CALLING UPON THE UNITED STATES TO FULLY RESTORE THE BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT.
WHEREAS, for hundreds of generations native peoples have lived in the canyons and mountains and on the mesas that were included in the original Bears Ears National Monument, and as a result the area is one of the most significant cultural landscapes in the United States.
WHEREAS, records of generations of native habitation that tell the story of the subsistence of daily life, traditions, and ceremonies are contained in the rock art, cliff dwellings and other structures, and ceremonial sites within the original Bears Ears National Monument.
WHEREAS, historic remnants of Navajo hogans, pottery, sweat lodges, sheep-herding camps and farming are found throughout the area contained in the original Bears Ears National Monument.
WHEREAS, the cultural importance of the lands and resources in the original Bears Ears National Monument are sacred to many native peoples, including Navajo, Ute, Hopi and Zuni tribes.
WHEREAS, protecting the lands and resources contained in the original Bears Ears National Monument will help protect and preserve the cultural, prehistoric, historic records and legacy of native peoples, and the cultural traditions and practices that continue through today.
WHEREAS, on September 1, 2015, the San Juan County Commission approved Resolution No. 2015-09, A Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners of San Juan County, Utah, Supporting Locally-Driven land Management Planning and Opposlng Presidential Designation of a National Monument(s) Through Authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906 The Commission failed to adequately consult with Indian tribes or citizens of the County who are members of Indian tribes before approving this resolution.
WHEREAS, on October 4, 2016, the San Juan County Commission approved Resolution No. 2016-08, Deficiencies of a Proposal of a Non-Governmental Organization for Establishment of a National Monument). The Commission failed to adequately consult with Indian tribes or citizens of the County who are members of Indian tribes before approving this resolution.
WHEREAS, on December 28, 2016, President Barack Obama issued Proclamation No. 9558, establishing the Bears Ears National Monument.
WHEREAS, on March 8, 2017, the San Juan County Commission approved Resolution No. 2017- 02, Resolution Requesting and Recommending the Reversal of the Designation of the Bears Ears Area as a National Monument. The Commission failed to adequately consult with Indian tribes or citizens of the County who are members of Indian tribes before approving this resolution.
WHEREAS, on December 4, 2017, President Dona Id Trump issued Proclamation No. 9681, effectively dis-establishing and reducing the Bears Ears National Monument, in violation of the Antiquities Act of 1906.
WHEREAS, none of the seven Navajo Nation local governments with lands located withln Utah (the Navajo Mountain; Oljato; Mexican Water; Red Mesa; Dennehotso; Aneth and Teec Nos Pas chapters) supported the opposition of the San Juan County Commission to the designation of the Bears Ears National Monument.
WHEREAS, by Resolution NABIAP-35-17, the NavaJO Nation opposed the initiative of the State of Utah and others to rescind the designation of the Bea rs Ea rs NationaI Monument and by Resolution NABUA-01-17 reaffirmed its support for the designation of the Bears Ears National Monument.
WHEREAS, the decision by President Donald Trump to dis-establish the Bears Ears National Monument was taken without adequate consultation with Indian tribes and in blatant disregard of tribal interests.
WHEREAS, similarly, the recommendations of the San Juan County Commission to oppose the Bears Ears National Monument and to dis-establish the Monument were made without adequate consultation with Indian tribes by the Commlssion and were done in blatant disregard of tribal interests.
Section 1: All prior resolutions or official actions of the San Juan County Commission opposing the Bears Ears National Monument or calling for its dis-establishment or reduction, and specifically Resolution Nos. 2015-09, 2016-08 and 2017-02, are hereby immediately rescinded.
Section 3: The San Juan County Commission cal!s upon President Trump to immediately withdraw Proclamation No. 9681 and for the United States to fully restore the Bears Ears National Monument as originally designated in Proclamation No 9558.
Section 4: The San Juan County Commission directs the County Administrator to immediately transmit this Resolution to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and other interested governmental agencies .
The final draft resolution appears to have been written by one of the radical environmentalist groups mentioned previously. Also related to the “Bears Ears” controversy, the resolution seeks to undo previous SJC Commission actions which supported the Trump Administration’s actions. Most revealing of all is the naming of specific parties in the resolution below, including Donald Trump, Mountain States Legal Foundation, and William Perry Pendley, all of whom are generally despised by environmentalist NGOs. Pendley, who is representing the County in the case mentioned in the resolution, is one of the most respected and effective property rights defense lawyers in the country.
INC., et al., v. DONALD TRUMP, et al., CASE NO. 17-CV-2606 (TSC) AND TO FURTHER IMMEDIATELY TERMINATE ANY AND ALL REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SAN JUAN COUNTY AND THE MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION.
WHEREAS, San Juan County has filed various pleadings in three cases filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, These cases are as follows: HOPI TRIBE, et al v.
DONALD TRUMP, et al,, CASE NO. 1-l 7-CV-2590; UTAH DINE BIKEYAH, et al. v. DONALD TRUMP, et al., CASE NO. 1:17-CV-2605 (TSC); and NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al., DONALD TRUMP, et al., CASE N0. 17-CV-2606 (TSC) (referred to below as “the Cases”).
WHEREAS, the pleadings filed by the County include an Answer to the complaint filed in each case (Dkt. Nos _ 25-1; 25-2; and 25-3), a Declaration of Kendall Laws (Dkt. No. 25-5) stating that the County has authorized intervention in these cases on behalf of the Defendants, a Defendant-Intervenor’s Motion to Intervene (Dkt. No. 25) and San Juan County’s Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene (0kt. No. 70}.
WHEREAS, the County is represented in these cases by the Mountain States legal Foundation and William Perry Pendley.
WHEREAS, the San Juan County Commission has reconsidered its position regarding the Bears Ears National Monument and no longer supports the unlawful reduction of the Monument by President Donald Trump.
WHEREAS, in light of its changed position concerning the Monument, the County will withdraw its prior authorization for intervention in the Cases.
WHEREAS, the San Juan County Attorney, Kendall Laws, is required to implement the directives of his client, San Juan County, as those directives are expressed in official actions of the County Commission. See, Salt Lake County Commission v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 905 (1999); UCA § 17-18a-802; Rules 1.2 and 1.13, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
WHEREAS, in light of the County’s withdrawal from the Cases, the County will no longer require the services of Mountain States Legal Foundation and William Perry Pendley and the County, through this official action, will also exercise its authority to direct the County Attorney to immediately terminate the representation agreement between the County and Mountain States Legal Foundation and William Perry Pendley.
Section 1: The San Juan County Commission has reconsidered its position regarding the Bears Ears National Monument and no longer supports the unlawful reduction of that Monument by President Donald Trump.
Section 2: In light of its changed position concerning the Monument, the County hereby immediately withdraws its prior authorization for intervention in the Cases, as that authorization was expressed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the Declaration of Kendall Laws (Dkt. No. 25-5).
Section 3; The County Attorney is directed to immediately file a motion, or to instruct Mountain States Legal Foundation and William Perry Pendley to file such a motion, withdrawing all pleadings filed by the County in the Cases and to specifically withdraw the County’s motion to intervene in the Cases on behalf of the Defendants.
These resolutions, although in the draft stage, should be very troubling to the citizens of San Juan County. Through a politically-driven gerrymandering lawsuit, the majority of the county no longer has representation, and power has been concentrated in a small geographical region dominated by left-wing politics and radical environmental activism. Maryboy and Grayeyes, however, are immune from the consequences of whatever actions they take at the county level, since they are both members of the Navajo Nation. Their ties to environmental groups who strongly supported Obama’s Bears Ears designation, may explain their willingness to subvert the will of the majority of San Juan County citizens.
*One draft resolution included in those obtained by Free Range Report, which is not included in this post, deals with more typical county business, and is related to the creation of a waste transfer station in Bluff, Utah.


For the latest news and insights concerning trade secret and non-compete issues and trends, please visit and subscribe to Epstein Becker Green’s Trade Secrets & Noncompete Blog.
California employers often face an upward battle when it comes to protecting against competitive activity by former employees. In addition to expressly precluding non-compete contracts under California Business and Professions Code (“B&P”) Section 16600, California imposes hurdles to pursuing claims against former employees for taking business information that is confidential but does not rise to the level of a trade secret. Moreover, the California Code of Civil Procedure further limits employers from bringing a trade secret claim under California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) unless the employer can, as a threshold matter, identify the purported trade secrets with “reasonable particularity.” This impedes companies from using the mechanisms of discovery to learn what an employee has taken in order to validate a claim for trade secret misappropriation; allegedly misappropriated trade secrets must be known at the outset of litigation or the case will get dismissed. Therefore, it is important for companies to identify and properly monitor for potential misappropriation so that they are well positioned to bring a claim for actual or threatened misappropriation when the circumstances arise.
In order to safeguard their trade secrets, companies doing business in California need to be on the offensive to ensure that they are properly protected at both the beginning and end of the employment relationship. At the beginning of an employment relationship, employers may set the groundwork for protecting their trade secrets by entering into confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements with their employees. These agreements will help establish one element of a claim under the UTSA, which is that the employer took reasonable steps to identify its trade secrets and maintain their confidentiality.
While many employers take proper measures at the onset of the employment relationship by entering into trade secret and confidentiality agreements, employers also need to make sure that they are taking similar precautions at the end of the employment relationship to prevent trade secret misappropriation. At a minimum, an employer should monitor and analyze an exiting employee’s use of electronic systems, such as his or her work computer, email, and any mobile drives or devices. An exit interview should also be conducted (see the second article of this Take 5 for a detailed discussion of exit interviews).
In addition to proper monitoring at the end of the employment relationship, employers may also be able to spot instances of misappropriation by staying alert to warning signs—such as an employee working off-hours without authorization, taking home or making unnecessary copies of proprietary or other confidential material, and conducting searches or downloading documents that appear unrelated to the employee’s current projects. Tracking and keeping a record of an employee’s electronic footprint may enable an employer to meet the requirements under Section 2019.210 of the California Code of Civil Procedure in the event of later trade secret litigation.
Further, even if an employer finds evidence or possible evidence of misappropriation, employers must be cautioned from proceeding with trade secret litigation where there is little evidence of damages or misappropriation. For example, in FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a $1.6 million attorney fee award for the defendants (former employees of the plaintiff), finding that the plaintiff’s UTSA action was brought in bad faith. Among other reasons, the court found bad faith because there was no evidence of economic harm to the plaintiff and no actual or threatened misappropriation. While there was evidence that the defendants downloaded confidential information onto a hard drive, the hard drive was later destroyed without being accessed. The plaintiff discovered the download only after it had already filed its complaint, which suggested that the real reason that the plaintiff filed the case was to chill competition by the defendants, who had started a rival business.
The Parrish case serves as a cautionary tale for employers that are keen to utilize trade secret protections as a means of circumventing California’s restraints against competition. Because California strongly favors employee mobility, simply downloading confidential information may not be enough, particularly if an employer is not aware of that taking at the outset of litigation. In addition to monitoring for employee misappropriations, employers are well advised to assess potential economic harm prior to filing litigation. If the court views the litigation as an effort to restrain employees from competing—as opposed to curing an actual or threatened misappropriation—an employer may find itself not only losing the litigation but also paying attorneys’ fees to its former employees under UTSA.
As discussed elsewhere in this Take 5, although California employers generally cannot restrict an employee’s ability to work elsewhere, California employers can protect their trade secrets and confidential information. One pillar of a successful plan to do so is having an employee departure protocol.
The foundation of a solid employee departure protocol is the exit interview. Employers should know who will conduct it, when it will be held, and what will be covered.
There should be a written checklist for the exit interview, and it should cover threshold topics, such as reminding the departing employee of his or her continuing confidentiality obligations, the return of company property and information stored on-site (e.g., access cards, laptops, and iPhones), and arrangements for the return and/or destruction of company property stored off-site.
The discussion of possible company property stored off-site should cover specific locations that a departing employee might not think of unless specifically asked, including thumb drives, personally owned computers, and personal email or cloud storage accounts. Many a lawsuit has been filed over forgotten thumb drives in employee backpacks.
The departing employee should also be asked to sign a certification that he or she has or will return all of the employer’s property by a date certain, and someone needs to follow up to make sure this is done. The signing of such a certification reiterates the importance of the employee’s confidentiality obligation. Additionally, should that certification later prove false (i.e., if it is later determined that the employee, in fact, misappropriated trade secrets), the false certification will be a critical piece of evidence in showing the reasonableness of the employer’s efforts to protect itself—and maliciousness by the former employee.
If an employee is departing under suspicious circumstances, or if there is other reason to suspect possible misappropriation of trade secrets, records of the employee’s computer activity in the days and weeks leading up to his or her termination should be preserved (e.g., by saving the employee’s e-mails and making a forensic image of the employee’s hard drive, rather than simply wiping it and reissuing it). Litigation over trade secret misappropriation frequently turns on evidence of unusual computer activity shortly before a departure. The employer should have a plan for accomplishing this, whether it be an internal resource, such as its information technology department, or an outside forensic computer firm.
Finally, depending on the facts of a particular situation, a formal “cease and desist” letter to a departed employee and/or a less threatening “reminder” letter can be a valuable tool. Such letters can come from the human resources or legal department, and not only serve as useful written reminders to the departed employee, but may also resolve a dispute without proceeding to litigation. Depending on the situation, an employer may also decide to send a copy of the “cease and desist” or reminder letter to the employee’s new employer.
In conclusion, different employers have different needs with respect to the protection of their trade secrets and confidential information, and reasonable precautions for one employer might be completely unreasonable for another. However, regardless of the size or nature of the business, every employer should develop and maintain an employee departure protocol.
There are not many things an employer can do to prevent unfettered competition by a former employee. B&P Section 16600 states that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” The statute provides three exceptions, none of which apply to the typical employer/employee relationship: (1) a person who sells the goodwill of a business or sells substantially all of its operating assets may lawfully agree to refrain from carrying on a similar business; (2) a partner may, upon the anticipation of the partnership dissolution or disassociation from the partnership, lawfully agree not to carry on a similar business; and (3) any member of a limited liability company may lawfully agree not to carry on a similar business.
Those exceptions are not realistic business models for most companies. California courts will carefully scrutinize business structures that ostensibly fall within one of the exceptions to determine whether structures are shams created to circumvent B&P Section 16600.
Outside of the three limited exceptions, one option to prevent an employee from leaving to work for a competitor is to enter into a term agreement for employment with the employee, though such an agreement may not be desirable. Employment in California is generally “at will,” which means that employment may be terminated by an employer for any lawful reason, at any time. However, an employee who has a specified term agreement is less likely to be recruited by a competitor because doing so may lead to liability against the competitor for interference with, or inducing a breach of, a contract. Moreover, if the employee breaches his or her employment agreement by leaving before the term has ended, the employer would have a claim against the employee for breach of contract unless the employee can show willful or permanent breach by the employer. But even with a term agreement, unless the employee has unique talents (such as a professional athlete or entertainer), the employer would still be unable to enjoin the employee from working for a competitor. Although the contract for a specified term provides more security for the employer against an employee leaving and competing, it also means that the employee may be terminated only if the employee commits a willful breach of duty, engages in habitual neglect of duty, or is incapacitated and cannot perform.
If an employer is not interested in divesting itself from the at-will nature of employment, another option to induce continued employment is to provide deferred compensation as an incentive to remain employed over a number of years. An employer may offer stock with strings attached, such that an employee who resigns may be required to forfeit his or her unvested restricted stock. Another alternative for high-level employees is to provide deferred compensation in a retirement plan that is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and to include noncompetition or restrictive covenant language in the plan. Because ERISA preempts state law, it may be another means of avoiding California’s restrictive covenant restrictions. This issue has not been tested under California law.
Covenants not to solicit employees may offer some protection against competition, but the protection actually provided is uncertain at best. Prior to the seminal California Supreme Court decision Edwards v. Arthur Anderson, employee non-solicit provisions were generally considered enforceable. Edwards established a broad interpretation of B&P Section 16600, but the issue of employee non-solicits was not before the Court and the Court stated in a footnote that it would not address the issue. No California appellate court decision has addressed employee non-solicits since 2008, but many practitioners believe that, following Edwards’s expansive view of Section 16600, there is a reasonably good chance that employee non-solicits will be unenforceable as well. Presently, there is appellate court authority holding that employee non-solicits are valid; thus, it is unlikely that terminating an employee for refusing to sign such a covenant (or declining to hire an employee for refusing to do so) would create the same litigation risk as terminating or refusing to hire an employee for not signing an agreement that contained an unenforceable non-competition provision. Nonetheless, employee non-solicit provisions still carry some risk and have limited upsides.
As discussed in the fourth article of this Take 5, while an employer may not compel the enforcement of a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum provision in an agreement with an unrepresented employee, Labor Code Section 925 expressly excludes agreements with employees who are “in fact individually represented” if the employee’s lawyer is involved in negotiating the terms of the forum selection or choice-of-law clause applicable to employment disputes. This carve-out means that high-level employees, who are often represented in negotiating their employment agreements, may be validly bound to choice-of-law or forum selection provisions that open the door to restrictive covenants if they are represented in the negotiation of their employment agreements.
In summary, there is very little that an employer can do contractually to limit competition in California; however, there are mechanisms that an employer may utilize to strengthen the longevity of its relationship with its employees. Nevertheless, an employer’s focus should be on ensuring that proper measures are taken to protect trade secrets, as discussed in the first article of this Take 5.
B&P Section 16600 invalidates contractual restraints on a person’s ability to engage in a profession, trade, or business. This statute, which has been interpreted expansively, expresses a strong California public policy and contains only the three limited exceptions set forth in the third article of this Take 5.
Employers have tried to utilize various contractual provisions and constructs to circumvent this policy without success. Out-of-state employers routinely include choice-of-law provisions in employment contracts to specify that these agreements should be interpreted under the laws of a state that is generally more amenable to restrictive covenants. Even though choice-of-forum provisions that have a reasonable relationship to one or more of the parties to the contract are presumed enforceable in California, that presumption does not apply when the choice-of-law provision is used to circumvent the public policy against non-competes.
Employers have had better luck in the past with choice-of-forum provisions, and federal courts in California have enforced those provisions in some instances. When the choice-of-forum provision is enforced, it can make it difficult on an employee who may have to defend a non-compete lawsuit in another jurisdiction, where those courts may be less inclined to apply California law to the dispute. This “loophole” was substantially closed on January 1, 2017, with new legislation that prohibits employers from requiring, as a condition of employment, that employees who primarily reside and work in California agree to litigate claims outside of California that arise in California or otherwise deprive the employee of the substantive protections of California law. While an employee may nevertheless sign such agreements, they are voidable at the employee’s option unless he or she was individually represented by counsel to negotiate the venue or choice-of-law provisions. The law applies to litigation and arbitration, and to any contract entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017. With respect to agreements after such date, employers will be unable to rely on choice-of-law provisions unless the employee is represented by counsel.
In addition, “narrow restraints” in contracts will not be enforced. In 2008, the California Supreme Court rejected the narrow restraint exception and held that a covenant not to solicit customers was unenforceable. A covenant that prohibits hiring employees or penalizes an employee for competing will likewise not be enforced. As discussed in the third article of this Take 5, it is unclear whether contractual provisions prohibiting solicitation or other conduct by a former employee will be enforced.
The creation of sham agreements that require an employee to purchase stock or other bogus constructs that attempt to come within the scope of one of the exceptions to B&P Section 16600 by suggesting that there has been a “sale of a business” will not be enforced. California courts will examine the realities of the agreement to determine if the agreement complies with the statute’s intent.
Employers should think twice before including the unenforceable provisions in employment contracts merely for their deterrent effect. Such a practice is risky. If an employer terminates an employee who refuses to sign an agreement that contains an unenforceable non-compete provision, such action would constitute a wrongful termination in violation of public policy and would entitle the employee to recover tort damages, including punitive damages, as well as economic damages. We are not aware of any case that expressly holds that the refusal to hire an employee who refuses to sign an agreement that contains an unlawful non-compete as a condition of employment would likewise constitute tortious conduct under California law, yet strong arguments can be made that it would. Moreover, a clause that is void under Section 16600 may also violate the provisions of the California Unfair Practices Act, which could subject an employer to liability for committing an unfair business practice.
Given the strong protections against non-competes in California, it is too risky to require employees to sign employment agreements that contain these provisions. All employment agreements entered into with employees who live or work in California should be carefully reviewed to ensure compliance.
Experience shows that most unfair competition or trade secret theft issues can be resolved without the need for litigation; often, an exchange of letters between the parties’ respective attorneys is sufficient to resolve the matter. However, litigation is sometimes unavoidable, and when it occurs, the employers involved are often surprised by how fast an unfair competition case can move to a practical conclusion, and how little time there might be to prepare for the crucial court hearing.
The most important event in a trade secret or unfair competition litigation is the hearing when the court grants or denies a temporary restraining order, or “TRO.” A TRO is essentially an emergency injunction to prevent the wrongdoing party from taking advantage of his or her illegal activities. The process begins with the filing of a complaint that looks essentially no different than any other lawsuit. The claims are usually pleaded under theories like “conversion” (i.e., theft), fraud, breach of contract, or violations of state and federal trade secret statutes. The difference is that the parties will typically find themselves before a judge in only days, or perhaps only hours, after the lawsuit is filed for a hearing that will, for all practical purposes, resolve the case. This is the TRO hearing.
Another requirement for a TRO is that the moving party show a high likelihood that it would prevail on the merits of its claims if the case was resolved through the ordinary litigation process, ultimately culminating in a trial. In other words, the party seeking a TRO must be prepared to demonstrate to the court that there is very clear and strong evidence of actionable bad behaviors on the part of the alleged wrongdoer.
A risk of irreparable injury and a high likelihood of eventual success on the merits are typically proven to the court by declarations filed with the complaint and TRO papers. Conclusory or vague accusations of illegal conduct will not suffice; the declarations must precisely describe what, when, and how the wrongdoer engaged in unfair competition activities. The challenge of marshalling this information in a very short period of time is further complicated by the fact that unfair competition activities almost by definition are undertaken by the guilty party in secret, and, obviously, he or she is not interested in cooperating with the victims’ attorneys in putting together their case.
Very commonly, the critical evidence in an unfair competition matter comes from forensic examination of IT systems, including email, phone records, and word- processing systems. With surprising regularity, the persons who engage in these sorts of activities do not-so-smart things that leave a clear trail of their wrongdoing, often committed in the final days of their employment with their former employer.
Attempting to get a TRO in an unfair competition case can require a very large amount of work and result in the accrual of significant legal fees in only a matter of days. Before initiating the litigation process, it is critical that the employer accurately assess the viability of its case. Many employers that have thought themselves to be a victim of unfair competition have been disappointed when their case simply did not hold together well enough to justify the issuance of a TRO.
The TRO hearing is often the be-all and end-all of unfair competition litigation because, if it is granted, the unfair competitive activities are immediately stopped, any stolen trade secrets are returned, and the competitive damage to the plaintiff-employer is contained or stopped. The case is usually thereafter resolved by a settlement. Essentially, if the TRO is granted, there typically is not much else of consequence to litigate between the parties.
Conversely, if a TRO is denied, the court’s ruling can effectively take the wind out of the sails of the plaintiff-employer’s case. The court has essentially said, “I don’t see anything wrong going on here,” which means that the employee or person who has allegedly engaged in unfair competition can keep doing what he or she is doing. Here again, it is a rare unfair competition case where a TRO is denied and it makes sense for the plaintiff-employer to continue pressing on with litigation against the supposed wrongdoer. In other words, if you can’t prove to the judge in the context of a TRO hearing that you have a valid claim, it’s probably not going to be any easier to do so later on in the litigation. And it is a very rare situation where an unfair competition claim presents the possibility of a big award of money damages that would make continuing on with protracted litigation worthwhile.
A TRO is deemed to be an “extraordinary remedy,” and an employer seeking one in an unfair competition claim should expect the judge to be cautious and conservative in deciding whether to grant one. Another factor is the often surprisingly small amount of time that the applicant gets in front of the judge to prove its case. Essentially, this is a situation where the TRO applicant is trying to push its way to the head of the line in the court’s crowded docket and saying, “My case can’t wait … I need a court order now.” Skepticism on the part of the judge should be expected.
In California, an employer pursuing a legal claim for redress of unfair competition activities should also recognize that judges in the state superior courts are often suspicious that an unfair competition claim brought by an employer against departed employees may really be a disguised attempt to restrain legitimate competition by the former employees, which, of course, the law of the state strictly prohibits.
In short, an employer going into court to address a possible unfair competition issue is an employer that really needs a good lawyer. The law is there to stop and remedy real unfair competition, but an employer that is asking a court to intervene in what may look like just a business dispute must be realistic about the merits of its case, well prepared, and well represented.
 Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.210.
 Civil Code § 3426, et seq.
 See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1425 (2003).
 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (2009).
 Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601.
 Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284 (1984).
 See, e.g., California Civil Jury Instructions Series 2200; Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244 (1968). Conversely, under California law, competitors are generally free to solicit at-will employees unless they commit an independently wrongful act. Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th 1140 (2004).
 See Cal. Labor Code § 2925.
 Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., No. S161385 (Cal. Nov. 2, 2009).
 Lojeck v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1983).
 Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (1985).
 Edwards v. Arthur Anderson, 44 Cal. 4th 937 (2008).
 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16601, 16602 and 16602.5.
 Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491 (1976).
 Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881 (1998).
 See, e.g., Hartstein v. Rembrandt IP Solutions, LLC, No. 12-2270, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105984 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2012), and Hegwer v. American Hearing Aid Associates, No. C 11-04942, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24313 (N. D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012).
 Cal. Labor Code § 925.
 VL Systems, Inc. v. Unisen, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 708 (2007).
 Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239 (1965).
 D’Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 927 (2000).
 Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.


In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with the law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with Section 1373 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code are not eligible to receive federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement by the Attorney General and the Secretary.
Sanctuary cities across the country responded by challenging the order with litigation. Nearly 300 jurisdictions, including the states of Colorado, California, and Connecticut, have adopted some form of sanctuary policy. In light of Trump Administration and Justice Department policy choices, Denver has emerged as a city opposed to serving as an arm of federal immigration authority. Traditionally, this type of coercion of local governments has been struck down by federalist principles supported by the Supreme Court, leaving Denver and other sanctuary cities with legal arguments to challenge the executive order and similar administration policies.
Among several cities in the United States that have countered federal immigration crackdowns with local ordinances, Denver has taken a similar stance. Denver Police Chief Robert White summarized this position prior to Denver’s immigration ordinance passing into law stating, “We do not do the work of ICE” (referring to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement). But Denver’s stance has not risen to the level of Chicago, San Francisco, and New York which have cut off all communication with ICE agents. Denver has taken a more moderate track by continuing to give ICE agents notice before releasing inmates wanted on a detainer. While Mayor Hancock’s administration has argued in favor of keeping release notifications to limit the ire of federal authorities, Denver still falls short of federal wishes by allowing jail access to agents only if they have a judicial warrant and providing much shorter notice than requested by Attorney General Jeff Sessions.
To be clear, sanctuary cities do not conceal or shelter undocumented immigrants from authorities. Instead, sanctuary cities refuse to be considered a part of federal immigration authority in investigating, arresting, or detaining individuals based on their immigration status. Sanctuary cities will continue to provide services to all and generally not turn over individuals to federal immigration officers. As a city with a large immigrant populous, there are many reasons to take the sanctuary stance. A policy of non-inquiry with regard to immigration status encourages victims and witnesses of crimes to come forward without fear of deportation. Additionally, immigrants will be discouraged from seeking medical treatment and sending their children to school with deportation looming over their heads. Conversely, President Trump’s campaign made immigration a focal point, leading to his executive order days into his administration assuming office. Despite the President’s swift action, many constitutional scholars argue the executive order is unconstitutional, giving sanctuary cities plenty of reasons to continue their non-inquiry-based policies.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues this order violates the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Supreme Court has held it is unconstitutional for Congress to “commandeer” state and local governments by forcing them to adopt federal mandates. Specifically, United States v. Printz declared a provision of the Brady Handgun Control Act unconstitutional. The Act required state and local governments to perform background checks before issuing firearm permits. Justice Scalia held that such compulsion violated principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment.
Applying these cases to the circumstances Denver currently faces, the analysis looks familiar. Printz holds that forcing state and local government officials to act according to Federal mandates violates the Tenth Amendment. While the federal government can use its agencies as it sees fit to enforce federal immigration law, it cannot force local governments to act as an arm of federal immigration enforcement. President Trump’s executive order does just that. By threatening to withhold immigration funding from states that refuse to comply with the executive order and 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the Trump Administration is forcing local government and their administrations to enforce federal immigration law.
Further, thanks to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Sebelius, arguing that lack of proper notice to states results in impermissible economic dragooning in violation of the Tenth Amendment, sanctuary cities like Denver can also argue they were not given any notice that they could lose federal immigration grants by refusing to comply with this new order. While Denver may not be as large of a sanctuary target to the Trump Administration as cities like Chicago, New York, and San Francisco, it has taken considerable steps to indicate it will not operate as an arm of federal immigration enforcement. Cases like Printz and Sebelius give Denver and other sanctuary cities a constitutional argument to continue on with local ordinances and policies promoting non-inquiry with regard to immigration status in the face of President Trump’s executive order.
In Colorado, there is no indication the state legislature will be enacting a ban on sanctuary cities anytime soon. However, multiple measures have been brought to a vote in the Colorado legislature over the past two years that would open up sanctuary city officials to punishment and require local officials to comply with federal immigration officers. Colorado Springs-based state Representative Dave Williams, an immigration ally of President Trump, brought a similar bill to vote last year that died in the Democratic-controlled house. Williams introduced a mirror image of last year’s bill on March 13 of this year, and it is expected to suffer the same fate as last year’s bill. House Bill 1178 would have allowed victims of crimes by individuals in the United States illegally to sue sanctuary cities and their policy makers, and make creation of sanctuary policies a class 4 felony. The bill would also require local law enforcement officers to notify federal immigration authorities if they suspect a person under arrest is living in the United States illegally. Like in 2017, House Bill 1178 failed to get the votes it needed in the house. Challenges to Denver’s immigration policies are likely to persist during the Trump Administration, but the Democratic-leaning house is likely to continue to support Denver’s effort to maintain sanctuary city policies.
The Trump Administration has not shown any signs of backing away from its immigration hard line, but as long as state legislatures are backing the policy decisions of sanctuary city officials, it is unlikely sanctuary cities will be forced to change course because of funding threats. Moreover, the Supreme Court has distinctly held that actions such as President Trump’s executive order violate the Tenth Amendment by forcing state and local officials to serve as an arm of federal enforcement.
[*] Sean Cuff is an Staff Editor for the Denver Law Review, and a 2019 J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
 Jim Hooley, President of Denver Police Union Tells Congress City’s Immigration Ordinance is Unsafe, Fox 31 Denv. (Feb. 15. 2018, 7:12 AM), http://kdvr.com/2018/02/15/president-of-denver-police-union-to-testify-in-front-of-congress-on-citys-immigration-ordinance/.
 Jon Murray, “We Do Not Do the Work of ICE,” Denver Police Chief Says as Immigration Ordinance is Signed into Law, Denv. Post (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:35 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/08/31/immigration-ordinance-denver-police-ice-robert-white/.
 Transcript: Donald Trump’s Full Immigration Speech, annotated, L.A. Times (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html.
 Ahmad Al-Dajani, Current Developments in the Executive Branch: Sanctuary Cities Under the Trump Administration, The Frontlines of the Battle for Immigration, 31 Geo. Immigr. L.J.. 665, 665 (2017).
 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8779 (Jan. 25, 2017), available athttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united.
 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds From Sanctuary Cities, 40 Apr. L.A. Law. 60, 60 (2017); Mitch Smith, Sessions Scolds Chicago for Suing Over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Threat, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/us/chicago-sues-justice-department-over-sanctuary-crackdown.html.
 Al-Dajani, supra note 6, at 665.
 Chemerinksy, supra note 13, at 60. See also Nat. Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebellius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
 Chemerinksy, supra note 13, at 60.
 Trump Administration Makes Significant Down Payment on Immigration Campaign Promises But Has Yet to Achieve Most Substantive Changes, Migration Pol. Inst. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/trump-administration-makes-significant-down-payment-immigration-campaign-promises-has-yet.
 Erwin Chemerisnsky is the Dean at the University of California-Berkley School of Law. His scholarship includes constitutional law, first amendment law, federal courts, and appellate litigation. In January 2017, National Jurist magazine again named Dean Chemerinsky as the most influential person in legal education in the United States. See Faculty Profiles, Erwin Chemerinksy, Berkeley L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/erwin-chemerinsky/.
 U.S. Const. amend. X. (emphasis added).
 Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 60. See also Nat. Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebellius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 542.
 Id. at 581; Chemerinksy, supra note 13, at 60.
 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 587; Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 577, 593 (2013).
 Pasachoff, supra note 38, at 601.
 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (internal quotations omitted)).
 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 582. See also Chemerinksy, supra note 13, at 60; Pasachoff, supra note 38, at 601.
 United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
 Chereminsky, supra note 13, at 60.
 Maggie Astor, Texas’ Ban on Sanctuary Cities’ Begin, Appeals Court Rules, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/texas-immigration-law-sb4.html.
 Jesse Paul, Colorado’s ‘Sanctuary City’ Officials Would Face Lawsuits, Felony Charge in Return of GOP Lawmaker’s Longshot Measure, Denv. Post (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/13/dave-williams-colorado-sanctuary-city-bill/?returnUrl=https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/13/dave-williams-colorado-sanctuary-city-bill/?clearUserState=true.
 Colorado House Bill 1178, LegiScan, https://legiscan.com/CO/bill/HB1178/2018 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).