text:
Usage data (visited websites, access times).
This is a privately owned, non-commercial online offer. We do not use analytics, user tracking or advertisements.
Visitors and users of the online offer are affected (hereinafter we refer to the persons concerned as “users”).
Such measures include in particular ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data by controlling physical access to the data, as well as the access, input, transmission, security of availability and its separation. Furthermore, we have established procedures to ensure the exercise of rights of data subjects, deletion of data and reaction to endangerment of data. Furthermore, we already consider the protection of personal data during the development or selection of hardware, software and procedures, in accordance with the principle of data protection through technology design and data protection-friendly presettings (Art. 25 GDPR).
If we disclose data to other persons and companies (contract processors or third parties) within the scope of our processing, transmit it to them or otherwise grant them access to the data, this will only take place on the basis of a legal permission (e.g. if a transmission of the data to third parties, such as payment service providers, in accordance with Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. b GDPR for contract fulfilment is necessary), if you have consented, if a legal obligation provides for this or on the basis of our legitimate interests (e.g. when using agents, web hosting providers, etc.).
If we commission third parties with the processing of data on the basis of a so-called “order-related data processing contract”, this is done on the basis of Art. 28 GDPR.
Specifically, the hosting of the above-mentioned websites takes place via the company regworld internet GmbH, Franzstr. 51, D-52064 Aachen. An order-related data processing contract exists with the company regworld internet GmbH, which includes the requirements of Art. 44 ff. GDPR guaranteed.
Furthermore, these websites use the Antispam Bee Plugin, which works in compliance with GDPR.
No data will be transferred to third countries.
In accordance with Art. 16 GDPR, you have the right to request the completion of data concerning you or the correction of inaccurate data concerning you.
In accordance with Art. 77 GDPR, you also have the right to file a complaint with the responsible supervisory authority. The online offering is situated in Northrhine-Westfalia in Germany – the according authority is the Landesbeauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit Nordrhein-Westfalen.
You can object to the future processing of the data concerning you in accordance with Art. 21 GDPR at any time.
“Cookies” are small files that are stored on the user’s computer. Different data can be stored within the cookies. A cookie is primarily used to store information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his or her visit to an online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies” or “transient cookies”, are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves an online offer and closes his browser. In such a cookie, for example, the content of a shopping basket in an online shop or a login status can be stored. Cookies are referred to as “permanent” or “persistent” if they remain stored even after the browser is closed. For example, the login status can be saved for a visit of the online offer after several days. Third-party cookies” are cookies that are offered by providers other than the person responsible for operating the online offer (otherwise, if they are only its cookies, they are referred to as “first-party cookies”).
Cookies are only used on these pages if content, in particular comments, are left.
On the basis of our legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. GDPR the data of the users are checked for spam detection by the Antispam Bee Plugin, which works in compliance with GDPR.
We or our hosting provider process inventory data, contact data, content data, contract data, usage data, meta- and communication data of customers, interested parties and visitors of this online offer on the basis of our legitimate interests in an efficient and secure provision of this online offer according to Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f GDPR in conjunction with. Art. 28 GDPR (conclusion of order-related data processing contract).
Specifically, the hosting of the above-mentioned websites takes place via the company regworld internet GmbH, Franzstr. 51, D-52064 Aachen. An order-related data processing agreement exists with the company regworld internet GmbH, which includes the requirements of Art. 44 ff. GDPR guaranteed.
We, or our hosting provider, collect access data on the basis of our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. GDPR on each access to the server on which this service is located (so-called server log files). Access data includes the name of the accessed website, file, date and time of access, transferred data volume, notification of successful access, browser type and version, the user’s operating system, referrer URL (the previously visited page), IP address and the requesting provider.
Created by Datenschutz-Generator.de of RA Dr. Thomas Schwenke, translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator and modified by the website operator.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 28
Art. 44
Art. 16
Art. 77
Art. 21
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 28
Art. 44
Art. 6


Argued Dec. 7, 8, 1933.
'make his daily deposits of such sums of money as shall be received by him from all sources of revenue whatsoever, to his credit as treasurer of said city * * * in one or more banks * * * to be selected by the president of said council, the commissioner of accounts and finance, and the treasurer of such city * * * or by any two of them, and any such bank, before any such deposit is made therein * * * shall also execute a good (and) sufficient bond with sureties to be approved by the president of the said council, and conditioned that such bank will safely keep and account for, and pay over said money. * * *' Section 316 (paragraph 374).
Ben Sneeden, the receiver, brought, in the federal court for eastern Illinois, this suit against the city, its treasurer, the surety, and the escrow agent. Setting forth the above facts, he prayed that the pledge be declared ultra vires and void; that the bonds be delivered to him as receiver; and that, meanwhile, the defendants be enjoined from disposing of them. The District Court dismissed the bill. 58 F.(2d) 341. Its decree was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. 64 F.(2d) 721. This Court granted certiorari, 290 U.S. 617, 54 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed. —-.
First. For the reasons stated in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 54 S.Ct. 416, 78 L.Ed. 777, decided this day, we are of opinion that the Act of 1864 did not confer the power to pledge assets to secure and public deposits except those made under section 45 by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The power conferred by each later act, except that of 1930, was limited to securing specific federal funds.2 A national bank could not legally pledge assets to secure funds of a state, or of a political subdivision thereof, prior to the 1930 amendment; and since then it can do so legally only if it is located in a state in which state banks are so authorized. In some states national banks had, prior to the 1930 amendment, frequently pledged assets to secure public deposits of the state or of a political subdivision thereof; comptrollers of the currency knew that this was being done; and they assumed that the banks had the power so to do. But the assumption was erroneous. The contention that such power is generally necessary in the business of deposit banking has not been sustained.
Second. Banks organized under the laws of Illinois do not appear to possess the power of pledging assets to secure the deposit of public moneys of a political subdivision of the state. Illinois corporations have only such powers as are conferred by statute either expressly or by implication; and only those powers are conferred by implication which are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted, People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798, 8 L.R.A. 497, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; Calumet, etc., Dock Co. v. Conkling, 273 Ill. 318, 112 N.E. 982, L.R.A. 1917B, 814. No Illinois statute confers in express terms upon banks organized under its laws either the general power to pledge assets to secure a deposit; or the general power to pledge assets to secure public deposits. A statute confers in terms the power to pledge assets to secure deposits of the States but there is none which so confers the power to pledge assets to secure public deposits of a political subdivision of the state.3 No reported decision rendered by any Illinois court since the enactment of the General Banking Law of 1887 holds that the alleged power exists as one incidental to the business of deposit banking. Nor is there any evidence that in Illinois such power is necessary in the conduct of the business of deposit banking.
Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215, 217, decided in 1880, is relied upon as authority for the proposition that Illinois banks have power to pledge assets to secure deposits. That case arose under the charter of 'The Merchants, Farmers and Mechanics' Savings Bank,' which was granted long before the General Banking Act of 1887. The pledge involved therein was given to secure a transaction which appears to have been a loan as distinguished from a deposit. The transaction dealt with private funds. The statement was there made that banks have authority to pledge assets to secure deposits. If that statement expresses the law of the state, Illinois banks have had for more than half a century power to pledge their assets to secure private deposits as well as deposits of public moneys of its political subdivisions. But the case has never been referred to since on this point in any reported opinion of any Illinois court.4 During that period, many state banks have failed;5 and there must have been much litigation arising therefrom; but no exertion of the alleged power on the part of any state bank has been shown.
An authoritative determination of the question whether Illinois banks have power to pledge assets to secure the deposit of public moneys of a political subdivision of the state can be given only by its highest court. The District Court discussed, but did not decide, that question. Its decision dismissing the bill was rested on the ground that the National Bank Act as enacted in 1864 had conferred the general power to pledge assets to secure deposits; and that the power so granted had not been lessened by the later legislation. The majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals being of opinion that national banks lacked the power to pledge assets to secure deposits (except so far as conferred by the 1930 amendment) necessarily passed upon the applicable Illinois law. After careful consideration, it reached the conclusion that Illinois had not conferred upon its banks the power to pledge assets to secure deposits of political subdivisions of the state. Its reasons set forth fully and persuasively; and the decisions of the courts of other states involving similar questions are fully reviewed. We cannot say that the Circuit Court erred in the conclusion reached.
Third. Since the Herrin bank was without power to make the pledge of bonds here in question, its receiver is entitled to recover them unconditionally in order that they may be administered for the benefit of the general creditors of the bank. See Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 54 S.Ct. 416, 78 L.Ed. 777, decided this day.
Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 101; R. S. § 5136; 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (12 USCA § 24(7).
See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, note 11.
Courts of other states have referred to it as authority for the proposition that banks have the power to pledge assets to secure deposits. See Williams v. Earhart, 34 Ariz. 565, 273 P. 728; First Amer. Bank, etc., v. Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900, 65 A.L.R. 1398; United States Fidelity Co. v. Bassfield, 148 Miss. 109, 114 So. 26; Melaven v. Hunker, 35 N.M. 408, 299 P. 1075; Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 192 N.C. 673, 135 S.E. 795; Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 133 A. 551; Grigsby v. People's Bank, 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S.W.(2d) 673; Pixton v. Perry, 72 Utah, 129, 269 P. 144.
The auditor of public accounts in his annual statement on the condition of state banks (p. 42) gives (Dec. 31, 1932), 1,866 as the aggregate number of the banks existing on December 6, 1888, and organized since. Of these 26 had charters granted prior to December 6, 1888; and 1840 were organized thereafter under the general law. The number of banks in operation December 31, 1932, was 742. The number then in receivership was 444. Between December 31, 1932, and March 1, 1933, 32 more state banks failed. Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1933, pp. 105, 201.


text:
MOSH HOLDING, L.P. V. PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO., ET AL.
BAINS, ET AL. V. MOORES, ET AL.
HUNTSMAN CORPORATION V. CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, ET AL.
SIERRA CLUB, ET AL. V. AGOPA, ET AL.
DMAC CONSTRUCTION V. SURFSIDE INTERESTS, LLC, ET AL.
IN RE NATIONAL CENTURY FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.; THE UNENCUMBERED ASSETS TRUST, ET AL.
APPALOOSA INVESTMENT L.P. I, ET AL. V. J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES, INC., ET AL.
IN RE NATIONAL CENTURY FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
A voltage regulator is a device, or combination of devices. designed to maintain the output voltage of a power supply as nearly constant as possible. It can be regarded as a closed-loop control system because it monitor, output voltage and generates feedback that automatically increases or decreases t he supply voltage, as necessary, to compensate for any tendency of the output tv change. Thus, the purpose of a regulator is to eliminate any output voltage variation that might otherwise occur because of changes in load, changes in line (input) voltage, or changes in temperature. Regulators arc constructed in numerous circuit configurations, ranging from one or two discrete components to elaborate integrated circuits.
One of the simplest discrete regulators consists of only a resistor and a zcner diode. We will study that circuit in detail in Chapter 18, but since zener diodes are also . used in the more complex regulators that are the subject of our present discussion, we will preview the principal feature that makes them useful as voltage references. Figure 17-27 shows the /- V characteristic of a typical zener diode. Notice that the forward-biased characteristic is the same as that of a conventional diode. However, the zcncr is normally operated in its reverse-biased, breakdown region, which is the nearly vertical line drawn downward on the left side of the figure. The diode is manufactured to have a specific breakdown voltage, called the zener voltage Vz, which may be as small as a few volts. The important point to notice is that the nearly vertical breakdown characteristic implies that the voltage Vz across the diode remains substantially constant as the (reverse) current through it varies over a wide range. It therefore behaves much like an ideal voltage source that maintains a constant voltage independent of current. For this reason, the zener diode can be operated as an essentially constant voltage reference in regulator circuits, provided it remains in breakdown.
Voltage regulators may be classified as being of either a series or a shunt design. a functional block diagram of the series-type regulator. While the individual components shown in the diagram may not be readily identifiable in every series regulator circuit, the functional block diagram serves as a useful model for understanding the underlying principles of series regulation. V;,. is an unregulated dc input, such as might be obtained from a rectifier with a capacitor filter. and is the regulated output voltage. Notice IIl:11 the (01′ (/1/ element, vhich is a dcvir£!. whose operating st ••te adjusts as necessary In maintain a constant is in a series path between ViII and V”, A sampling circuit prouuces a feedback voltage proper tional to Vo and this voltage is compared to a reference voltage. The output of the circuit is the control signal that adiusts the operating state of the control element. If Vo decreases, due, for example, to an increased load, then the comparator produces an output that causes the control element to increase Vo. In other words, Vo is automatically raised until the comparator circuit no longer detects any difference between the reference and the feedback. Similarly, any tendency of Vo to increase results in a signal that causes the control element to reduce Vo.
A simple transistor voltage regulator of the series type. Here, the control element is the NPN transistor, often called the pass transistor because it.” passes, all the load current through the regulator. It is usually a power transistor, and it may be mounted on a heat ~iilk in -duty power supply that delivers substantial current. The zener diode provides the voltage reference, and the base-to-emitter voltage of the. transistor is the control voltage. In this case there is no identifiable sampling circuit, since the entire output voltage level V” is used for feedback.
Notice that the zener diode is reverse biased and that reverse current is furnished to it through resistor R. Although Vill is unregulated, it must remain sufficiently large, and R must be sufficiently small, to keep-the zener in its reverse breakdown region, as shown in Figure 17-27. Thus, as the unregulated input voltage varies, Vz remains essentially constant. Writing Kirchhoff’s voltage law around the output loop, we find We now treat Vz as perfectly constant. Since (17-37) is valid at all times, any change in Vo must cause a change in VBE, to maintain the equality. For example, if Vo decreases, VBE must increase since Vz is constant. Similarly, if Vo increases, V6£ mus decrease.
The behavior we have just described accounts for the ability of the circuit to pro ‘:d voltage regulation. When Vo decreases, VB£ increases, which causes the NPN transi tor to conduct more heavily and to produce more load current. The increase in load current causes an increase in Vo since Vo ~ ltRL For example, . suppose the regula or supplies 1 A to a 10-0 load, so Vo = (1 A)(10 0) = 10 V. Now suppose the 10 \d resistance is reduced to 8 O. The output voltage would then fall to (1 A)(8 0) ::::.8 V. However, this reduction in Vo causes toe transistor to’ conduct more heavily, and the load current increases to 1.25 A. Th ,taa output voltage is restored to Vo = (1.25 A)(8 0) = 10 V. The regulating action is similar when Vo increases: VBE decreases, transistor conduction is reduced, load current decreases, and Vo is reduced.
Notice that the transistor is used essentially as an emitter follower. The load is connected to the emitter and the emitter ‘follows the base, which is the constant voltage.
3. the current in the 200-0 resistor.
1. From equation 17-37, Vo = Vz – VBE = 12 V – 0.65 V = 11.35 V.
2. By writing Kirchhoff’s voltage law around the loop that includes, Va, and Vo, we find Va = Viti – Vo = 20 V – 11.35 V = 8.65 V.
3. The voltage drop across the 200-0 resistor is V•• – Vz = 20 V – 12 V = 8 V. Therefore, the current in the resistor is I = (8 V)/(200 0) = 0.04 A.
For successful regulator operation, ‘the pass transistor must remain in jts active region, ViII must not drop to a level so small that the zener diode is no longer in its breakdown region, and the zener voltage Vz should be highly independent of both current and temperature. Also, the feedback loop gain, from output back through the control element, should be very large, so that small changes in output voltage can be detected and rapidly corrected. Figure 17-30 shows an improved series regulator that incorporates an additional transistor in the feedback path to increase gain.
Writing Kirchhoff’s voltage law around the loop containing R2, R), and the zener diode, we have Any decrease in Va will cause a decrease in V2 and, assuming that Vz remains must therefore decrease .A decrease in VIlf: cause~ Va to increase, since 02 is an inverting common-emitter stage. Since the voltage VII on Q. experiences this same increase, O. conducts more heavily, produces more load current, and increases V,,, as previously described. Another way of viewing this feedback action is to recognize that a decrease in V8£1 causes O2 to conduct less, and therefore allows more base current to flow into 0,. Of course, any increase in Vo causes actions that are just the opposite of those we have described and results in less load current.
how an operational amplifier is used in a series voltage regulator. Resistors R, and Rz form a vo1ta~e divider that feeds a voltage proportiona I to v” hack t the inverting input: V = V”R2/(R, + R7)’ The zener voltage V7. on the noninvcrting input is greater than V-, so the amplifier output is positive and is proportional to Vi( – V-. If V” decreases, V- decreases. and the amplifier output increases. The greater voltage applied to the base of the pass trnnsistor causes it to conduct more heavily, and V” increases. Similarly, an increase in V” en uses V to increase, Vi: – V – to decrease, and the amplifier output to decrease. The pass transistor conducts less heavily and V” decreases. The-operational amplifier in Figure 17-31 can be regarded as a nonillverting configuration with input V7. and gain.
Design a series voltage regulator using an operational amplifier and a 6-V zener diode to maintain a regulated output of 18 V. Assume that the umcgutated input varies between 20 V and 30 V and that the current through the zcner diode must be at least 20 mA to keep it in its breakdown region.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


(8) developing new and improved seed varieties that are particularly suited for organic agriculture.
Paragraphs (4), (7), (8), and (11)(B) of subsection (b) of section 3157 of this title shall apply with respect to the making of grants under this section.
Subject to paragraph (3), an entity receiving a grant under subsection (a) shall provide non-Federal matching funds (including funds from an agricultural commodity promotion, research, and information program) equal to not less than the amount of the grant.
Non-Federal matching funds described in paragraph (1) may include in-kind support.
(ii) the recipient is unable to satisfy the matching funds requirement.
Following the completion of a peer review process for grant proposals received under this section, the Secretary may provide a priority to those grant proposals, found in the peer review process to be scientifically meritorious, that involve the cooperation of multiple entities.
On October 1, 2003, and each October 1 thereafter through October 1, 2007, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer $3,000,000 to the Secretary of Agriculture for this section.
(G) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2023 and each fiscal year thereafter.
In addition to amounts made available under paragraph (1), there is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2023.
There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2013.
2018-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 115–334, §7210(1)(A), in introductory provisions, inserted "using funds made available under subsection (e)," after "Board," and "in each of fiscal years 2019 through 2023" after "grants".
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 115–334, §7210(1)(B), inserted ", soil health," after "conservation".
Subsecs. (c) to (e). Pub. L. 115–334, §7614(b)(2)(D), added subsec. (c) and redesignated former subsecs. (c) and (d) as (d) and (e), respectively. Former subsec. (e) redesignated (f).
Subsec. (e)(1)(D) to (G). Pub. L. 115–334, §7210(2)(A), added subpars. (D) to (G).
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 115–334, §7210(2)(B), in heading, struck out "for fiscal years 2014 through 2018" after "funding" and in text, substituted "2023" for "2018".
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 115–334, §7614(b)(2)(D)(i), redesignated subsec. (e) as (f).
2014-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(1)(A), inserted ", education," after "support research" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(1)(B), inserted "and improvement" after "development".
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(1)(C), substituted "of organic agricultural production and methods to producers, processors, and rural communities" for "to producers and processors who use organic methods".
Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(1)(D), substituted ", marketing, food safety, socioeconomic conditions, and farm business management" for "and marketing and to socioeconomic conditions".
Subsecs. (c), (d). Pub. L. 113–79, §7128(b)(2)(D), redesignated subsecs. (d) and (e) as (c) and (d), respectively, and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to matching funds requirement.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 113–79, §7128(b)(2)(D)(ii), redesignated subsec. (f) as (e).
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(2)(A)(i), struck out "for fiscal years 2009 through 2012" after "funding" in heading.
Subsec. (e)(1)(C). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(2)(A)(ii)–(iv), added subpar. (C).
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 113–79, §7211(2)(B), substituted "2014 through 2018" for "2009 through 2012" in heading and text.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 113–79, §7128(b)(2)(D)(ii), redesignated subsec. (f) as (e).
2013-Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 112–240, §701(e)(1)(A), substituted "Mandatory funding for fiscal years 2009 through 2012" for "In general" in heading.
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 112–240, §701(e)(1)(B), substituted "Discretionary funding for fiscal years 2009 through 2012" for "Additional funding" in heading.
Subsec. (f)(3). Pub. L. 112–240, §701(e)(1)(C), added par. (3).
2008-Subsec. (a)(7), (8). Pub. L. 110–246, §7206(a)(1), added pars. (7) and (8).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 110–246, §7406(d)(3), substituted "Paragraphs (4), (7), (8), and (11)(B)" for "Paragraphs (1), (6), (7), and (11)".
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 110–246, §7206(a)(2), added subsec. (f).
2002-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 107–171, §7218(1)(A), inserted ", breeding," after "production".
Subsec. (a)(4) to (6). Pub. L. 107–171, §7218(1)(B)–(D), added pars. (4) to (6).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 107–171, §7218(2), amended heading and text of subsec. (e) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this section for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2002."
Amendment by section 7614(b)(2)(D) of Pub. L. 115–334 applicable to grants, cooperative agreements, or other awards made after Dec. 20, 2018, with matching funds requirement in effect on Dec. 20, 2018, to continue to apply to such grant, cooperative agreement, or other award, see section 7614(c) Pub. L. 115–334, set out as a note under section 3151 of this title.
Amendment by section 7406(d)(3) of Pub. L. 110–246 inapplicable to any solicitation for grant applications issued by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service before June 18, 2008, see section 7406(c) of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as a note under section 3157 of this title.
Pub. L. 110–234, title VII, §7206(b), May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1239 , and Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title VII, §7206(b), June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664 , 2000, provided that: "In carrying out the amendment made by this section [amending this section], the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall ensure that the Division Chief of the applicable Research, Education, and Extension Office established under section 251 of the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (7 U.S.C. 6971) coordinates projects and activities under this section to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that unnecessary duplication of effort is eliminated or minimized."
Pub. L. 107–171, title VII, §7409, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 461 , related to report on producers and handlers of organic agricultural products, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 113–79, title VII, §7408(a), Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 898 .


§ 115.010 Elective Officers — Terms.
§ 115.030 Removal of Officers.
§ 115.040 Officers to Be Voters and Residents — Exceptions.
§ 115.050 Officers' Oath — Bond.
§ 115.060 Salaries Fixed by Ordinance.
§ 115.065 Expense Allowance for Certain Officers; Requirements For Certain Officers; Reimbursement For Certain Expenses.
§ 115.070 Vacancies in Certain Offices — How Filled.
§ 115.080 Powers and Duties of Officers to Be Prescribed by Ordinance.
§ 115.085 Office of City Administrator.
§ 115.090 City Clerk — Election — Duties.
§ 115.100 Treasurer — Duties — Bond.
§ 115.120 Mayor or Board May Inspect Books and Records of Officers.
Section 115.010 Elective Officers — Terms.
Section 115.030 Removal of Officers.
Section 115.040 Officers to Be Voters and Residents — Exceptions.
Section 115.050 Officers' Oath — Bond.
Section 115.060 Salaries Fixed by Ordinance.
Section 115.065 Expense Allowance for Certain Officers; Requirements For Certain Officers; Reimbursement For Certain Expenses.
Section 115.070 Vacancies in Certain Offices — How Filled.
Section 115.080 Powers and Duties of Officers to Be Prescribed by Ordinance.
Section 115.085 Office of City Administrator.
Section 115.090 City Clerk — Election — Duties.
Section 115.100 Treasurer — Duties — Bond.
Section 115.120 Mayor or Board May Inspect Books and Records of Officers.


text:
Joan S. Smyth is senior counsel for the law firm of Kane, Ballmer & Berkman and can be reached at jsmyth@kbblaw.com.
The public entity had notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken steps to protect against the dangerous condition.
Establishing the first element of the defense — a causal relationship between the design and the accident — is relatively easy and is usually done by the plaintiff alleging in his complaint that the design caused the accident. Counsel for the public agency will usually agree to the causal relationship element for the purposes of the design immunity defense.
The second element of the defense — discretionary approval of the plan or design before the construction or improvement — can be more problematic, as the discretionary approvals are often made years before the accident in question. Courts have denied design immunity for public agencies that have failed to introduce sufficient evidence of a plan or design approved in advance by an employee vested with discretionary approval authority. For example, in Martinez v. County of Ventura5, the plaintiff suffered significant injuries when the motorcycle he was riding struck an asphalt berm (top-hat drain system) abutting a raised drain on a county road. The berm was located on the shoulder just off the traveled portion of the road. The plaintiff sued the county, alleging that the berm was a dangerous condition. At trial, the county did not introduce any evidence to show that plans for the berm had been approved prior to construction, but did provide evidence that such plans had “probably” been approved by the county’s road maintenance engineer. The jury found that the drain system was a dangerous condition, but ruled in favor of the county, based on design immunity. The court of appeal reversed the decision, holding that the county’s failure to introduce evidence of plans or designs approved prior to the construction of the berm by an employee with discretionary approval authority precluded the county from relying on the design immunity defense.
Likewise, in Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks6, plaintiffs who were hit by a car while crossing a busy street in a crosswalk sued the city seeking compensation for their injuries. Prior to the accident, the crosswalk had been improved to include a pushbutton-activated flashing beacon that warned cars of pedestrians. The appellate court held that the beacon, which was not part of an approved design plan and was added to the intersection years after the original construction in an effort to increase safety, was not entitled to design immunity because “no warning beacon plan or design was approved in advance of the construction or improvement.” Additionally, it was not enough that the city engineer had authorized the placement of the beacon. Although the city’s municipal code granted the city engineer the authority to purchase and install traffic control devices, the court held this did not give him the necessary discretionary authority to approve a plan. Thus, even though the city was adding a safety measure to the design, because the crosswalk warning beacon had not been on any approved plans before its installation, the city could not rely on the design immunity defense to escape liability.
Although direct evidence is often best to establish prior discretionary approval, evidence other than the direct testimony of the individual who approved the project may be sufficient. In Gonzales v. City of Atwater7, a driver struck and killed a pedestrian. The pedestrian’s family sued the driver and the city for wrongful death, claiming against the city that the intersection where the accident occurred was a dangerous condition. The court determined that the driver was not responsible for the accident. Rather, the court found that the intersection’s dangerous condition was the sole cause of the accident and entered judgment against the city for approximately $3.2 million in damages.
In Hampton v. County of San Diego8, the California Supreme Court addressed whether the employee who approves the plans has to be aware of design standards or the fact that the design deviates from approved standards to give the requisite discretionary approval. In Hampton, the plaintiff was seriously injured in a collision between his vehicle and another vehicle that occurred at an intersection in San Diego County. The plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred when he pulled forward into the intersection and was struck by another driver. In addition to the driver’s negligence, the plaintiff alleged that the design and construction of the intersection where the accident occurred did not meet the county’s approved standards for sight-line visibility because a high embankment covered with vegetation substantially impaired visibility. The court held that the public agency was not required to present evidence to show that the individual who approved the design plans was aware of design standards or was aware that the design met or did not meet those standards in order to show prior discretionary approval. Evidence of whether the design at issue met with relevant standards could be considered in the third element — reasonableness of the design — but was not required in order to meet the second element of discretionary approval prior to construction.
Ensuring that your city code gives the person who approves the plans the discretionary authority for that approval.
These records must exist for all construction projects or improvements, including later “add-ons” made in an effort to improve safety. Unless the local public agency can establish discretionary approval prior to construction or improvement by a person authorized under the local code to give such discretionary approval, the public agency can be left liable years later for a construction or improvement completed many years prior to the injury.
 Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318.
 Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242.
 Cornette v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 63, 67.
 Martinez v. County of Ventura (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 364.
 Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1451.
 Gonzales v. City of Atwater (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 929.
 Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340.
 Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


ACTELION PHARMACEUTICALS LTD., Plaintiff, v. Hon. David J. KAPPOS, Defendant.
Thomas Hoxie, Hoxie & Associates, LLC, Millburn, NJ, for Plaintiff. Mitchell P. Zeff, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“Actelion” or “plaintiff”) brought this suit against defendant David J. Kappos in his official capacity as Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Plaintiff claims that USPTO improperly determined the amount of patent term adjustment to which it is entitled. Before the Court are plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the pleadings, record, and relevant law, plaintiff's motion is DENIED and defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Patents are issued by USPTO for a term ending 20 years from the date the patent application was filed, as opposed to the date the patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). As a result, delays by USPTO in examining a patent application can reduce the effective term of that patent. See Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2010). To address this issue, Congress provided that a patent term will be extended to account for certain delays. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 154(b).
The procedures for determining such a “patent term adjustment” (“PTA”) are governed by § 154(b)(3). Several types of delay can figure into calculating the overall PTA, two of which are relevant for plaintiff in this case. First, so-called “A Delay” days accrue if USPTO fails to take certain specified actions within certain time periods, such as failing to respond to a patent application within 14 months of its filing. See§ 154(b)(1)(A). Second, “B Delay” days accrue if USPTO fails to issue a patent within three years of the filing of the application. See§ 154(b)(1)(B). After determining the proper amounts of A and B Delay, USPTO determines the extent of any overlap between the two types of delay to arrive at the overall PTA. See§ 154(b)(2)(A).
USPTO makes an initial PTA determination prior to patent issue and includes it with the written “notice of allowance” informing an applicant that he is entitled to a patent. See35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(B)(i); 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(a) (2006). The applicant must pay an issue fee within three months; once payment occurs, USPTO issues the patent and determines the final PTA as of the date of the patent grant, noting this determination on the face of the patent. See35 U.S.C. § 151; 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(d) (2006). If the applicant disagrees with the PTA, the statute entitles him to “one opportunityto request reconsideration of any [PTA] determination made by the Director.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(B)(ii).
Effective September 16, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia now has jurisdiction for civil actions brought under this statute. SeePub.L. 112–29 at § 9(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316.
On January 7, 2010, in Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2010), the Federal Circuit rejected USPTO's method for determining A and B Delay overlap, finding that USPTO had relied on an erroneous interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). Following the Wyeth decision, USPTO changed its method for making future PTA determinations to align with the court's holding. In addition, USPTO created an “Interim Procedure,” effective February 1, 2010, that permitted patentees to request a PTA recalculation from USPTO so long as their patent was issued prior to March 2, 2010 and their request for recalculation was filed within 180 days of the patent grant. See Interim Procedure, 75 Fed.Reg. 5043, 5043 (Feb. 1, 2010). Thus, in effect, only patents granted within the 180 days prior to February 1, 2010, were eligible for a PTA recalculation using the new post- Wyeth interpretation of A and B Delay overlap.
Prior to the Wyeth decision, USPTO interpreted the “period of delay” for B Delay to include the entire time between the filing of an application and the issuance of a patent more than three years later. If USPTO took longer than three years to issue a patent, therefore, any A Delay that occurred during the pendency of the application necessarily overlapped with the period of B Delay, and was not credited to the patentee's total PTA. Under this rubric, USPTO used either the greater of the A Delay or B Delay to determine the appropriate adjustment, but did not combine the two. Wyeth, 591 F.3d at 1368. In Wyeth, the Federal Circuit found USPTO's interpretation of the overlap provision to be erroneous, and held that A Delay and B Delay should be aggregated so long as that aggregation would not require counting the same calendar day twice. See id. at 1369–70.
The material facts are not in dispute in the instant case. Plaintiff, a pharmaceutical company, holds U.S. Patent No. 7,094,781 (the “'781 Patent”). Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ¶¶ 3, 9. The application for the '781 Patent was filed on May 27, 2003. Id. ¶ 8. USPTO issued the '781 patent on August 22, 2006, with a PTA of 312 days using its pre- Wyeth method of calculating A and B Delay overlap. Id. ¶ 11; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. and Mem. Supp. [Dkt. # 9] (“Pl.'s Mot.”) at 4. Plaintiff never filed a request for reconsideration of its PTA with USPTO. Def.'s Cross–Mot. Summ. J. and Mem. Supp. [Dkt. # 10] (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 2. And Plaintiff filed this civil action on July 6, 2010—more than 180 days after the August 22, 2006 patent grant. See Compl.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court will accept as true the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw “all justifiable inferences” in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted). A genuine dispute about a material fact only exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, seeking a recalculation of its PTA based on the post- Wyeth methodology for computing A and B Delay overlap. Plaintiff attempts to achieve this result by bringing three claims. First, plaintiff claims USPTO improperly calculated its PTA and directly appeals that calculation under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A). Compl. ¶¶ 18–24; Pl.'s Mot. at 11–13. Next, plaintiff argues USPTO's implementation of its post- Wyeth methodology and its failure to provide plaintiff the remedy of recalculating its PTA under that new methodology violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 25–28; Pl.'s Mot. at 13–15. Lastly, plaintiff argues USPTO's failure to correct its PTA was a “taking” of property without due process or just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 29–30; Pl.'s Mot. at 16–18. Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's appeal under that statute is untimely, and that its APA and “taking” arguments are meritless. See generally Def.'s Mot. Because all material facts in this case are undisputed, and for the reasons discussed below, summary judgment in favor of defendant is appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts that such a recalculation would increase its PTA from 312 days to 361 days. Compl. ¶ 1.
I agree with defendant that plaintiff's “taking” argument is meritless, and thus summarily dispose of it here, because plaintiff has proffered no legal support for the proposition that a patent term is a constitutionally protected property interest. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 503, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101 (1945) (threshold inquiry for Fifth Amendment taking claim is whether the interest is a property right).
Challenges to USPTO's determination of a PTA are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A), which specifically provides that such appeals must be filed with this District Court “ within 180 days after the grant of the patent.” § 154(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 6, 2010, well over 180 days—in fact, nearly four years—after the '781 Patent was granted on August 22, 2006. The plain language of the applicable statute therefore renders plaintiff's complaint untimely. The only question, then, is whether the 180–day filing deadline should not apply to plaintiff for some reason.
Plaintiff argues that the time limit in § 154(b)(4)(A) is not jurisdictional and is instead a “claim-processing rule,” and therefore it should be equitably tolled to allow plaintiff's suit due to the change in the law effectuated by Wyeth. See Pl.'s Mot. at 11–13; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (non-jurisdictional statutes of limitation may be equitably tolled). Defendant counters that § 154(b)(4)(A)'s time limit is jurisdictional and thus bars plaintiff's claim because jurisdictional filing deadlines are not susceptible to equitable tolling. See Def.'s Mot. at 5–10; Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 2538, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010) (court may not extend a jurisdictional deadline for equitable reasons). In the alternative, defendant argues that, even if the time limit is non-jurisdictional, plaintiff does not warrant the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling. See Def.'s Mot at 10–16.
Thus, as an initial matter, this Court must decide whether the statute is jurisdictional. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (“federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press”); Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 788 (D.C.Cir.2012). For the following reasons, I find that the 180–day time limit for seeking judicial review is, in fact, jurisdictional, and because plaintiff filed suit after that deadline, plaintiff's statutory claim under § 154(b)(4)(A) is untimely and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.
For threshold requirements to bringing suit, such as the time limit at issue here, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between “jurisdictional” rules and “claim-processing rules.” A jurisdictional rule is one that “governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.” Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1202;see also Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). By contrast, non-jurisdictional “claim-processing rules” are “rules that seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203.
The distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules is, most unfortunately, less clear than this simple formulation might suggest. In order to determine whether a given rule is jurisdictional, therefore, a court must look to Congress' intent. See id. at 1203 (the court must “look to see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be ‘jurisdictional’ ”). In turn, to ascertain Congress' intent, a court must examine the “ ‘condition's text, context, and relevant historical treatment.’ ” Chevron Mining, Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.3d 1318, 1328 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010)); see also Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1204–06 (examining text of the time limit provision, its placement within the statute, and “the singular characteristics of the review scheme that Congress created” to ascertain Congress' intent). In the absence of such a clear intent, a court should presume that a rule is not jurisdictional. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237;Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1202.
“While perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be confusing in practice. Courts—including [the Supreme Court]—have sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). As a result of “profligate” use of the term “jurisdictional” by courts, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), the Supreme Court has endeavored to narrow the meaning of “jurisdictional” in an attempt to “bring some discipline to the use of this term.” Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1202;see Gonzalez v. Thaler, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). In particular, the Supreme Court has focused the relevant inquiry on Congress' intent and emphasized that rules should be presumed to be non-jurisdictional absent a clear intent otherwise.
In Henderson—in the specific context of statutory time limits for review of administrative agency decisions—the Supreme Court expressly disclaimed applying “a categorical rule regarding review of administrative decisions.” Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1204. Instead, the Court reiterated that ascertaining Congress' intent is the relevant inquiry.
In the instant case, the Court's inquiry starts and ends with the text of the statutory provision because its language clearly indicates Congress' intent for the 180–day time limit to be jurisdictional. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (rule is jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional” (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235)); see also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 614 F.3d 519, 524 (D.C.Cir.2010) (if Congress “clearly stated” the limitation is jurisdictional, “our inquiry is over”). Section 154(b)(4)(A) places jurisdiction in a particular forum—the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia—for review of particular claims—appeals of USPTO PTA determinations filed within 180 days of the patent grant. The statute thus “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms,” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, because it defines and limits the subject matter jurisdiction of this particular District Court: Congress clearly identified not only which court could hear these claims, but when. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–13, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding statute-based time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) is jurisdictional and stating, “[b]ecause Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts hear them”). There can be no doubt that if plaintiff had filed its claim in a different federal District Court, that court would have had no difficulty in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, there is no reason why the 180–day time limit—which is part of the same and only statutory grant of jurisdiction—should be construed any differently by this Court as non-jurisdictional. Because the statutory provision both confers jurisdiction on this Court and identifies the point at which that jurisdiction ends, Congress' jurisdictional grant to this Court is inextricably tied to that time limit. See United States v. McGaughy, 670 F.3d 1149, 1157–58 (10th Cir.2012) (finding time limit set forth in Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 to be jurisdictional because the Rule is incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the statute granting courts authority to correct sentencing errors, and thus the time limit “is an integral part of the statutory grant of authority”); cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (holding Title VII provision specifying time limit for filing charges with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is not jurisdictional, in part because “it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts ” (emphasis added)). Indeed, this Court would not otherwise have jurisdiction over a § 154(b)(4)(A) claim without the very statutory grant that contains the time limit. Cf. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004) (holding statute-based time restriction is not jurisdictional because “[it] relates only to postjudgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court's adjudicatory authority” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, a review of § 154(b)(4)(A)'s context—namely, its structure and the placement of the time limit clause—further bolsters my conclusion that the time limit is jurisdictional. The 180–day time limit is located not only in the same section of the statute, but also in the same provision and the same sentence as the clause placing jurisdiction in this Court. This placement clearly evinces Congress' intent that the time limit be jurisdictional. Cf. Zipes, 455 U.S at 393–94, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (holding Title VII provision specifying time limit for filing charges with EEOC is not jurisdictional, in part because it “appears as an entirely separate provision [from the Title VII jurisdiction provision located in the same section of the statute],” while conversely, “[t]he provision granting district courts jurisdiction ... does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC” (emphasis added)); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16, 126 S.Ct. 1235 (holding employee numerosity requirement for bringing Title VII action is not jurisdictional, in part because it is located in a separate provision in a separate section of the statute from Title VII's jurisdiction-granting provision); Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 163–65, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (holding statute requiring litigant to register his copyright claim before bringing an infringement action is not jurisdictional, in part because the requirement is located in a separate provision in a different statute from the applicable jurisdiction-granting statutes). And while “[m]ere proximity will not turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle,” Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 651, here the 180–day time limit is not simply proximal to the jurisdiction-granting provision, it is an integral part of the sentence itself.
Finally, as for relevant historical treatment, the Court is not aware of, nor have the parties located, any precedent construing § 154(b)(4)(A). In the absence of prior treatment of the particular provision, the Supreme Court's “ ‘interpretation of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.’ ” Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 648 n. 3 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 168, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (2010)). Here, defendant argues that § 154(b)(4)(A) is structurally similar to the statutes held to be jurisdictional in Gonzalez v. Thaler and John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008). See Def.'s Mot. at 8–9; Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n [Dkt. # 14] at 3–4. But the Court need not turn to comparing statutes to decipher Congress' intent in this case because the text of § 154(b)(4)(A) clearly indicates that Congress meant for the 180–day time limit to be jurisdictional. It really is that simple! Accordingly, defendant's motion must be, and is, GRANTED.
Plaintiff argues that my colleague on this Court, Judge Sullivan, recently held that § 154(b)(4)(A) is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. Pl.'s Mot. at 11. But plaintiff is mistaken. In Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Kappos, 841 F.Supp.2d 238 (D.D.C.2012), the court held the statute was subject to general tolling where the plaintiff had filed a timely request for reconsideration with USPTO. The court did not reach the question of whether the statute was jurisdictional, nor did it address equitable tolling. Further, to the extent Actelion's pleadings could be construed as arguing that general tolling should apply, it is clear that argument fails. Under general tolling principles, a request for administrative reconsideration renders an agency's action non-final and thus tolls any time limit for seeking judicial review of that agency action. See Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC, 294 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C.Cir.2002). Since Actelion never sought administrative reconsideration, general tolling does not apply in this case.
In reaching this decision, the Court is mindful of the nuances and complexities of the case law addressing the legal character of threshold requirements. Threshold time limits, in particular, have elicited divergent treatment from courts. Compare Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–13, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)'s time limit for filing appeal is jurisdictional, and highlighting the Supreme Court's “longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional”) and United States v. McGaughy, 670 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir.2012) (“[until Gonzalez v. Thaler,] Bowles seemed to provide clear guidance to the lower courts—statutory time limits are jurisdictional, non statutory time limits are not”) with Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203 (stating “[f]iling deadlines, such as the [statute-based] 120–day filing deadline at issue here, are quintessential claim-processing rules” and rejecting the idea that Bowles held “categorically that every deadline for seeking judicial review in civil litigation is jurisdictional”) and Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 614 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C.Cir.2010) ( “Filing deadlines, statutory or not, are generally nonjurisdictional”). Nonetheless, as I have explained, Congress' intent is sufficiently clear from the text of § 154(b)(4)(A) to resolve the question here. See Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203 (“Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that we would prefer to call a claim-processing rule”).
Plaintiff also argues that USPTO's implementation of Wyeth—its Interim Procedure for PTA determinations that did not apply Wyeth retroactively to all patents—violated the APA because it (1) was arbitrary and capricious, and (2) was not promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553. See Pl.'s Mot. at 13–15. Neither argument is persuasive. First, plaintiff is foreclosed from using an APA claim to circumvent § 154(b)(4)(A)'s 180–day time limit to attain a PTA recalculation. “The APA provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for ‘[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ... [h]owever, a plaintiff may not rely on this waiver ‘if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.’ ” Fraternal Order of Police v. Gates, 562 F.Supp.2d 7, 11 (D.D.C.2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702). Here, a statute—35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A)—expressly waives sovereign immunity for appeals of PTA determinations and makes them reviewable under the APA's judicial review provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. Therefore, plaintiff may not attempt an end-run around that statute's time limit by seeking redress under the APA generally. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 704 (permitting judicial review only for “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy” (emphasis added)). Second, USPTO was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to devise the Interim Procedure because it is a procedural rule, not a substantive rule. See5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. United States Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211 (D.C.Cir.1999).
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS defendant's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.


text:
The crime of criminal mischief in Ohio is much more serious than the term may sound. In some cases, the property damage or computer hacking involved in a criminal mischief offense can result in a felony charge that carries lifelong consequences.
If you are convicted of criminal mischief, you may be sentenced to prison time and ordered to pay substantial fines. Furthermore, the offense will remain on your criminal record and could affect your ability to obtain or maintain future employment.
It is important to speak to an experienced criminal defense attorney as soon as you are charged with criminal mischief in Montgomery County. The Joslyn Law Firm represents clients accused of criminal mischief in Dayton and nearby areas like Huber Heights, Xenia, Beavercreek, and Fairborn.
We pride ourselves on aggressively defending the rights of our clients, and our criminal mischief lawyers will fight to secure the most favorable possible outcome to your case. Contact the Joslyn Law Firm right now at (937) 356-3969 or send us a message online to take advantage of a free consultation.
Knowingly moved, defaced, damaged, destroyed, or otherwise improperly tampered with another person's property without privilege to do so.
Employed a tear gas device, stink bomb, smoke generator, or other device releasing a substance that is harmful or offensive to the persons exposed persons and/or tends to cause public alarm, with the purpose of interfering with another person’s use or enjoyment of his or her property.
Knowingly moved, defaced, damaged, destroyed, or otherwise improperly tampered with a bench mark, triangulation station, boundary marker, or other survey station, monument, or marker without privilege to do so.
Knowingly moved, defaced, damaged, destroyed, or otherwise improperly tampered with any safety device on his or her own property or the property of another person so as to destroy or diminish its effectiveness or availability for its intended purpose.
Set a fire on another person’s land, or placed personal property that had been set on fire on another person’s land, outside and apart from any building or other with the purpose to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the property.
Knowingly altered, damaged, destroyed, or modified a computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, or computer program with the intent to impair function, through means like computer hacking and computer contaminants, without privilege to do so.
Third-degree misdemeanor — With the exception of computer criminal mischief, most criminal mischief scenarios listed in ORC § 2909.07 are charged as third-degree misdemeanors. Convictions may result in up to 60 days in prison and $500 in fines.
First-degree misdemeanor — If criminal mischief was committed on a computer or was one of the scenarios listed under ORC § 2909.07 and resulted in physical harm to another person, it can be charged as a first-degree misdemeanor. A conviction may result in up to six months in prison and $1,000 in fines.
Fifth-degree felony — If criminal mischief was committed on a computer resulting in financial damage between $1,000 and $10,000 or the property involved was an aircraft or any other equipment, implement, or material used in the operation of an aircraft, it can be charged as a fifth-degree felony. A conviction may result in up to 12 months in prison and $2,500 in fines.
Fourth-degree felony — If criminal mischief was committed on a computer resulting in financial damage of more than $10,000 or the property involved was an occupied aircraft or any other equipment, implement, or material used in the operation of an occupied aircraft, it can be charged as a fourth-degree felony. A conviction may result in up to 18 months in prison and $5,000 in fines.
If you are facing criminal mischief charges, it is important to seek legal representation as soon as possible. The Joslyn Law Firm helps individuals accused of criminal mischief in Montgomery County as well as communities like Troy, Kettering, New Carlisle, Piqua, and Springfield.
Our criminal defense attorneys can provide a thorough, honest review of your case during a free, confidential consultation. Contact the Joslyn Law Firm today at (937) 356-3969 or send us a message online to see what our Dayton criminal mischief lawyers can do for you.

matches:
§ 2909
in fine
§ 2909
in fine
in fine
in fine


DARRYL WALKER, Plaintiff, v. C/O MOORE, Defendant.
Darryl Walker ("Plaintiff") is a prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on December 19, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) This action now proceeds with the original Complaint, against defendant C/O Moore ("Defendant") for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The discovery phase for this case concluded on June 25, 2015. (ECF No. 29.) On June 29, 2015, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 34.) On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 35.) Defendant did not file a reply. The motion for summary judgment is pending.
Rule 60(b) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) "is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances . . ." exist. Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The moving party "must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control . . ." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In seeking reconsideration of an order, Local Rule 230(j) requires Plaintiff to show "what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion."
"A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law," Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted, and "[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation . . . " of that which was already considered by the Court in rendering its decision," U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).
In support of reconsideration of his motion for Court-appointed counsel, Plaintiff informs the Court that he is proceeding in this case with assistance by a non-attorney, which Plaintiff requires because Plaintiff is in the mental health care program, on medication, and not consistently mentally stable. Plaintiff asserts that "people are not always able to help me and with limited access and resources I can't learn in the time allotted." (ECF No. 41 at 1.) This, without more, does not make Plaintiff's case exceptional. The Court is faced with similar cases almost daily. As Plaintiff was informed in the Court's order denying Court-appointed counsel, "[i]n determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." (ECF No. 39 at 2:10-13 (emphasis added)). As Plaintiff was advised in the Court's order, the Court is unable to make a determination at this stage of the proceedings that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. (Id. at 3:20-21.) With respect to Plaintiff's argument that he is unable to continue this case without attorney representation, the Court notes that Plaintiff has found the means for two years to litigate this case, and Plaintiff's excessive force is not complex. Plaintiff has not set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature in his motion for reconsideration to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration of the Court's order denying Court-appointed counsel shall be denied.
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's order denying his motion to compel as untimely. Plaintiff asserts that "the information the Defendant used to obtain a ruling was not accurate and the dates and deadlines are inconsistent." (ECF No. 41 at 2.) Plaintiff's conclusory assertion that Defendant's information was inaccurate, without more, is not sufficient to support his motion. As for the dates and deadlines at issue, the Court found that Plaintiff's motion to compel was untimely because discovery closed on June 25, 2015 and Plaintiff filed his motion to compel on September 15, 2015, more than two months later. Based on these facts, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's order denying his motion to compel as untimely shall be denied.
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's order denying him an extension of time to file an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, until after he has conducted further discovery. Plaintiff argues that the Court did not incorporate all rules that apply to the granting of an extension, and that "what [Defendant] told the Court is not consistent with the letter I received." (ECF No. 41 at 2.) Plaintiff also states that the Court failed to properly instruct him. Plaintiff's arguments, without supporting facts, are not persuasive. Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed a timely opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on August 5, 2015, and the motion was fully briefed by mid-August 2015. (ECF No. 35; Local Rule 230(l).) Plaintiff has not set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature in his motion for reconsideration to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration shall be denied.
Plaintiff requests a report of the status of this case. The Court does not ordinarily respond in writing to requests for status of cases. As a one-time courtesy, the Court offers this response, but Plaintiff should not continue to file written requests for status of his case.
Now pending in this case is Defendant's motion for summary judgment, which awaits the Court's ruling. No other dates or deadlines are in place at this stage of the proceedings.
Plaintiff is informed that he shall receive notice in this action as a matter of course. All documents filed in this action shall be served upon all parties who have appeared in this action, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff can rest assured that he will receive notice, at his address of record, of rulings made in this case and deadlines established in this case, provided he keeps the Court informed of his current address.
2. Plaintiff's request for status is RESOLVED.


text:
18-CV-0350 - loanDepot.com, LLC, c/o Cenlar FSB, v. The unknown heirs, devisees, legatees, executors, administrators, spouses and assigns and the unknown guardians of minor and/or incompetent heirs of Rita Kay Kinworthy, address unknown, et al., complaint in foreclosure for property located at 2652 Dwight Road for $71,711.
18-CV-0351 - Ditech Financial LLC v. Clinton R. Huffman, New Carlisle, et al., complaint in foreclosure for property located at 9475 W. National Road, New Carlisle, for $53,577.
18-CV-0352 - Charles D. Leath and Melissa Leath, 1126 Garfield Ave., v. Nationwide Insurance Co., Columbus, Rhonda G. Sloan, St. Paris, et al., complaint in excess of $25,000 for damages and injuries suffered in an auto accident on Aug. 4, 2016.
18-CV-0354 - Lashonda Crislip, 1575 Benin Dr., v. FCA US, LLC, CT Corporation System, Columbus, complaint in excess of $25,000, etc., for Ohio Lemon Law, etc.
18-CV-0355 - Tom Hale, Director, Clark County Community Development, 3130 E. Main St., Ste. 1A, v. Tom Johnson, 1201 W. Perrin Ave., complaint for preliminary and permanent injunction ordering defendants to immediately cease dwelling in camping and/or recreational equipment and/or connecting that stored camping and/or recreational equipment to electricity, water, gas or sanitary sewer facilities, located at 702 Neosha Ave.
18-DP-0619 - Gerald Parish, 3025 Troehler Road, v. Brianna Parish, 120 N. Fountain Ave., petition for domestic violence civil protection order.
18-DP-0623 - David R. Koepp Jr., Donnelsville, v. Ken Parker Jr., Milford, petition for civil sexually oriented offense protection order.
18-DR-0655 - William D. Gaul, 2100 E. High St., v. Sheila J. Gaul, 236 Hedge Dr., complaint for divorce.
18-DP-0656 - Annette L. Propst, 647 E. Southern Ave., v. Deloris A. Gillespie, 2020 Progress Dr., petition for domestic violence civil protection order.
18-DP-0657 - Amanda Penewit on behalf of a minor, 1244 E. Jackson Road, v. Erin Branam, 646 Kramer Road, petition for domestic violence civil protection order.
Southbrook Care Center v. Estate of Doris E. Bess, deceased, c/o David A. Bess, Executor, et al., judgment for $15,523.
State of Ohio v. Nathaniel Arnold, convicted of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, 15 months prison with credit for jail time served.
State of Ohio v. Deborah Geyer, convicted of theft, six months prison with credit for jail time served, $6,171 restitution.
State of Ohio v. Brittany McNeal, convicted of attempted intimidation of a witness, six months prison with credit for jail time served.
State of Ohio v. Gabrielle Bryant, convicted of aggravated assault, six months prison with credit for jail time served.
PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, v. Robert Taylor, et al., decree in foreclosure for $60,826.
First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., v. Richard W. Trumbo, et al., decree in foreclosure for $68,321.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, v. John Doe(s) name(s) unknown, the unknown heirs, devisees, legatees, beneficiaries of Doris L. Hiltibran and their unknown spouses and creditors; the unknown executor, administrator, or personal representative of the Estate of Doris L. Hiltibran and the unknown spouse of Doris L. Hiltibran, et al., decree in foreclosure in rem.
Planet Home Lending, LLC, v. Tammy Pressnell, et al., decree in foreclosure in rem.
MyCUmortgage, LLC, v. Lawrence T. Chambers Sr., et al., decree in foreclosure for $51,299.
Federal National Mortgage Assn., v. Charles L. Adams, et al., decree in foreclosure for $71,322.
Kathleen Anne Thorpe, 40, 6350 S. Tecumseh Road, engineer, and Jacob Levi Campbell, 42, 3811 Quailhollow Crt., engineer.
Timothy Scot Sparks, 49, South Charleston, insurance broker, and Lauren Christine Hutchins, 29, South Charleston.
Brandy Michel Lisenby, 36, 127 Rice St., home health, and Brent Lee Upshaw, 36, 325 W. Liberty St., factory work.
Maria Fernanda Cortes Fuentes, 26, 2650 E. High St., #106, and Edgar Joel Perez-Capella, 24, 2650 E. High St., #106, packaging.
Ankur Shingal, 28, Fremont, Calif., lawyer, and Nanditha Alamelu Ranganathan, 29, 2655 Bally Doyle Dr., dentist.
Stephanie Frances McClanahan, 28, 45 W. Possum Road, cake decorator, and Christopher Lee Karg, 29, 45 W. Possum Road, landscaper.
Alexis Elaine Barlow, 24, Covington, Ky., student/warehouse worker, and Kevin Richard Clemons, 30, Covington, Ky., semi truck driver.
Willow Elizabeth Patton, 20, Yellow Springs, day care teacher, and Jonathan Christian Webb, 21, 4660 Broadway Road, field service technician.
Village 41 LLC to OVD Springfield Holding LLC, 2443 Troy Road, Springfield; $780,000.
Franklin E. and Mary L. Reaver to Karen L. Eversole, 230 Western Ave., Enon; no fee.
Lisa L. Osborne to Patricia Lynne Hardin, 420 S. Xenia St., Enon; $125,000.
Margaret A. Crawford to Jeannine Crawford Taylor, 1217 Cherokee Dr., Springfield; no fee.
William B. Grant to William B. and Cynthia M. Grant, 2247 Sunnyland Blvd., Springfield; no fee.
Clark County Land Reutilization Corp., to Roberta K. Dornon, 2761 Sunset Ave., Springfield; no fee.
HCRA Properties I LLC to Meerkat TRS LLC, 2615 Derr Road, Springfield; no fee.
Edward Leinasars to Michael D. Riley, 729 Cedar St., Springfield; $20,000.
James R. Schuyler and Loraine A. Halula to Loraine A. Schuyler, 2439 Van Buren Ave., Springfield; no fee.
Linda L. Fenton to Ashlee DePriest, 2806 Maplewood Ave., Springfield; no fee.
Phyllis K. Hudson to Mark Q. Atha, 1914 Fulton Ave., Springfield; no fee.
City of Springfield to Melanie L. Alexander, 1809 Sweetbriar Lane, N., Springfield; no fee.
Angela Reasoner to Joel Bustos, 240 W. Perrin Ave., Springfield; $20,000.
City of Springfield to Daryl Johnson, 409-411 Sherman Ave., Springfield; no fee.
Jeffery L. and Rayna L. Dibling to Brandon and Janine E. Ellis, 1840 Crescent Dr., Springfield; $155,000.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.