Sourcing credible and innovative suppliers for experience centres has always been challenging and having worked in the museum and science centre field for nine years, getting the right technology was the highest priority.
Recently, UAE-based technology company Zero.1 has developed a LiFi enabled App, ART4U, specifically tailored for museum, cultural centre and gallery environments.
Hot on the heels of its Smart City IOTA street light and City.1 App launch, Zero.1’s ART4U App delivers a personalised experience for visitors and an added value management solution for museum operators.
According to Marc Fleschen, CEO of Zero.1, Museum and cultural centres are an essential ingredient for a vibrant city, engaging citizens and visitors alike, whether it is reflecting on our heritage, celebrating artistic creativity, or taking a glimpse into our future, such venues provide an opportunity for education, stimulation and conversations.
Most of the clients I worked with for science centres requested an educational and interactive experience. We deal with an ipad generation and the old-fashioned posters and illustrations are not appealing to them anymore.
ART4U was developed for a connected audience. Not only is it capable of delivering a tour guide either in audio or text and in multiple languages, ART4U allows users to personalise their tour. Users can select a quick tour or full tour options, or choose a particular type of exhibit, for example, Art or Sculpture. With that information, the App will then create an individual tour guide and a timeline for the tour.
Users can even choose to have extra information for their favourite exhibits, or artists, enabling the App to provide additional content such as articles and videos and photography, which can be downloaded directly to their smart phone camera roll. The ART4U App is activated through a LiFi beacon positioning system.
For museum managers, ART4U enables a better understanding of visitor behaviour and traits. Managers can identify the venue’s hot and cold zones, and best and least favoured exhibits and services. The App can be easily updated when new exhibits are installed or existing exhibits change location.
LiFi enabled, ART4U brings with it added data security; LiFi Data transmissions does do not travel between walls so the museum data is more secure, and unlike Radio Frequency data transfer technology, such as WIFI, LiFi does not generate any electromagnetic smog. Physical security is also aided with the connection of live feed cameras, and beacons, which alert if an exhibit is disturbed or moved.
The technology certainly changes the way we look at experience centres in the future.


text:
COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSHUA A. BOOKMAN.
Present: GREEN, DREBEN, & MILKEY, JJ.
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, Confrontation of witnesses. Search and Seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis.
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 25, 2006.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Paul A. Chernoff, J., and the cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J.
Patricia Quintilian for the defendant.
justifying the warrantless search of the apartment; (2) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he had constructive possession of the cocaine within the apartment; and (3) the admission of the drug certificates was in violation of his rights under the confrontation clause.
1. Motion to suppress. We take our facts from the findings of the motion judge, supplemented by uncontradicted evidence from the hearing on the motion. On March 17, 2006, a confidential informant told the Somerville police department that an individual named John Holbrook would be participating in a drug transaction near a certain café and that a Ford Explorer with Massachusetts license plate TC7451 would be involved. Police went to the named café where they saw Holbrook, known to them as a drug user, leaving the Ford Explorer, which then drove away. When approached by police, Holbrook, although at first cooperating with the police, named the seller as Josh and then as George, gave them two bags of cocaine, soon ceased to cooperate and was arrested.
Records at the Registry of Motor Vehicles indicated that the vehicle was registered to Cynthia D'Angeli, who lived at 83 Partridge Avenue in Somerville. No sightings of the vehicle were made at this address, but the police observed the Ford Explorer in various locations in Somerville on four or five occasions.
Before April 14, 2006, another confidential informant told the police that an individual named Josh (the defendant) had a connection with the Ford Explorer, that he was selling cocaine to buyers in public places, and that he was living at 19 Central Street, Somerville, a multifamily apartment house, with his girl friend Karen. The informant and police arranged for a controlled buy from the defendant at a specific location, a senior housing facility. Although the police did not see the buy being made, they saw the Explorer parked outside that facility at the time it took place.
a parking lot at Rindge and Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge which involved a quick interaction.
On April 14, 2006, two unmarked police cars followed the Explorer from 19 Central Street to a location where it pulled to the curb, and Manuel Bedugnis, a person known to the police as a drug user, entered the Explorer and after a short drive left the car. After one of the police officers approached Bedugnis, the latter threw two bags of cocaine on the ground and was arrested.
Other police officers continued to follow the Explorer and saw it stop at another location where another drug transaction appeared to take place. The Explorer stopped a third time, where a man, later identified as William Wadlund, leaned into the car holding cash and handed it to the defendant. As the police approached the car, the defendant grabbed the cash and threw the money onto the passenger seat and backed the Explorer into the police vehicle. Wadlund was arrested and two bags of cocaine similar to the ones taken from Bedugnis were found on his person. During his arrest, the defendant put up a struggle and claimed that his name was John Doe and that he was homeless. He said he wanted to be brought to the police station so that he could exercise his right to use a telephone.
No cocaine was found in the car. Its contents included straws and spoons with cocaine residue, keys in the ignition, a cellular telephone, $384.00, and identification with the name Joshua Bookman but with no address. Later during the booking process, the defendant revealed his name and gave 13 Central Street as his address.
While the defendant was being booked, at about 4:30 or 5:00 P.M., police went to 19 Central Street with the keys. They looked for unidentified apartments and went to the nearest unnamed apartment; it was on the first floor. The police knocked and, after receiving no answer, tried the keys. One fit. They unlocked the door and opened it. The defendant's girl friend and her daughter were in the apartment. Drugs were also seen in plain view in the living room.
since March 17th," "the information gathered from an informant," the "surveillance of the location preceding April 14," and the events of April 14th after the defendant left that address "under circumstances that one can infer that he left there with a quantity of drugs." Also important to the judge was the defendant's refusal to give his name or address, his driving a vehicle registered to another person at another address, the vehicle's presence outside the apartment building, and the defendant's "counter-surveillance-type driving" when leaving the residence. Moreover, it could be inferred that his insistence on using a telephone immediately after his arrest was an attempt to locate a person at the place the drugs were kept in order to dispose of them.
We consider Commonwealth v. Smith, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 907 (2003), and Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438 (2009), controlling here and that those cases preclude the finding of a sufficient nexus between the defendant's residence and the location of drugs. In Smith, there were three controlled buys from the defendant. After the first buy, the defendant was observed driving his vehicle back to his home, and before the last buy, he was seen driving from his home directly to the parking lot where the buy took place. There, we held that the observations by the police of the defendant driving, either to or from his house, without more, was insufficient to establish a connection between his home and the controlled buys. Commonwealth v. Smith, supra at 908.
Similarly in Pina, the police orchestrated a controlled purchase of cocaine from the defendant. Police had observed the defendant leave his apartment and drive directly to the location where the informant had been instructed to proceed and where the buy was completed. In addition to that information, the affidavit in support of the warrant indicated that the affiant had received extensive training and experience in narcotics distribution. The affiant explained that it is common for drug distributors "to assign unique meeting and delivery locations . . . ." Commonwealth v. Pina, supra at 440. Such variations "make it difficult for police to establish set patterns and locations for the deliveries and allow drug sales to be conducted away from a dealer's principal residence, where narcotics intended for distribution are concealed." Ibid.
The information that a defendant's actions may be consistent with a known type of drug delivery service without more does not create a sufficient probability that this defendant kept drugs at his home. "When that location is a residence, there must be specific information in the affidavit, and reasonable inferences a magistrate may draw, to provide 'a sufficient nexus between the defendant's drug-selling activity and his residence to establish probable cause to search the residence.' " Id. at 440-441, quoting from Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296 , 304 (2003). That a person is guilty of drug offenses does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search his residence. Nor does the fact that a defendant drives from his home to the location of a drug transaction with no other facts connecting the residence to drug sales establish probable cause. Pointing out that the only particularized information in the affidavit connecting the defendant's observed drug activity with his apartment was a single observation of the defendant driving from the apartment to the place of sale, the Pina court held the affidavit insufficient. [Note 1] Id. at 442. See Commonwealth v. Medina, 453 Mass. 1011 (2009). Compare Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 290 , 298 (2009) (the fact that the defendant possessed more cocaine on his person packaged for sale provided the additional evidence necessary to establish probable cause to search the defendant's home).
quarter placing illegal drugs or drug transactions in the apartment. See Commonwealth v. Pina, supra at 441.
As there was no probable cause to search the apartment for any drugs related to this defendant, [Note 3] we need not reach the closer questions whether exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment or whether there was sufficient evidence to find that the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs in the apartment. The evidence of those drugs was derived entirely from the illegal entry. The motion to suppress should have been allowed.
2. Melendez-Diaz problem. The defendant's contention that his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the drug certificates is supported by the recent cases of Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350 (2010), and Commonwealth v. Charles, 456 Mass. 378 (2010).
Those cases require that the standard of review for matters tried during the period between the decision of Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279 (2005), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), be whether the admission of drug certificates at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot so find in this case. The evidence as to the content of the substances involved, other than the certificates, is similar to the evidence in the Vasquez and Charles cases. In each of those cases the Supreme Judicial Court held the admission of the certificates was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the judgments are reversed, the verdicts are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial consistent with this decision.
[Note 1] A further concern of the Pina court was that the sale occurred three days before the application for the warrant. Commonwealth v. Pina, supra at 442.
[Note 2] In addition, the police on another occasion saw the defendant leave 19 Central Street and go to a parking lot at Rindge and Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, where he had an unexplained "quick interaction" with an unknown individual.
[Note 3] There were other defendants. See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, post 1120 (2010).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Argued: Feb. 7, 8, 9, 1938.
Messrs. Thomas D. Thacher and John F. MacLane, both of New York City, for petitioners.
Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Benjamin V. Cohen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this suit to enforce the provisions of sections 4(a) and 5 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 812, 813, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79d(a), 79e. These sections provide for registration with the Commission of holding companies, as defined, section 5(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79e(a), and prohibit the use of the mails and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to those companies which fail to register. Section 4(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79d(a). Section 5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79e(b), provides for the filing of a registration statement giving information with respect to the organization, financial structure and nature of the business of the registrant, together with various details of operations.
Defendants, including interveners, contested the validity of these provisions and sought by cross-bill a declaratory judgment that the act was invalid in its entirety, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq., as being in excess of the powers granted to Congress by section 8 of article 1, and in violation of section 1 of article 1 and of the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, of the Constitution of the United States. The District Court sustained the validity of sections 4(a) and 5, and granted an injunction accordingly. The cross-bill was dismissed for want of equity and for lack of any actual controversy within the meaning of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, Jud.Code, § 274d, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400. D.C., 18 F.Supp. 131, 139. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. 2 Cir., 92 F.2d 580. Certiorari was granted. 302 U.S. 681, 58 S.Ct. 411, 82 L.Ed. -.
The suit was brought against the Electric Bond & Share Company and fourteen associated public utility companies. Of these, it appears that seven have ceased to be holding companies within the meaning of the act, two 1 before the cause was heard by the District Court and five 2 since the decree. The remaining companies against whom the decree of injunction runs are Electric Bond & Share Company, American Gas & Electric Company, American Power & Light Company, National Power & Light Company, Electric Power & Light Corporation, Lehigh Power Securities Corporation, Utah Power & Light Company, and Pacific Power & Light Company.
The decree further provides that the injunction and the dismissal of the cross bill shall be without prejudice 'to any rights or remedies in law or in equity' which defendants may have after registration, and leaves defendants free to challenge the validity of any of the provisions of the act other than sections 4(a) and 5. The dismissal of the cross-appeal is also declared to be without prejudice 'to any rights or remedies in law or in equity' which the intervening defendants 'may have or be entitled to upon the act being made applicable to them by the registration of any holding company of which they are subsidiary companies.' All rights of defendants, including interveners, are thus fully reserved with respect to the application to them of any provision of the act outside of those contained in the particular sections which are enforced by the decree.
Electric Bond & Share Company is styled in the findings as 'the top holding company' in 'a holding-company system' in which all the other defendants and intervening defendants together with numerous other companies are subsidiaries. Electric Bond & Share Company owns substantial minorities of the voting stocks of the defendants American Gas & Electric Company, American Power & Light Company, National Power & Light Company, and Electric Power & Light Corporation. These companies in turn own directly or through subholding companies substantial majorities, in some cases approximating complete ownership and in all cases sufficient to insure voting control, of the common stocks of operating gas and electric utilities. The 'electric operations' of subsidiaries in the Bond & Share system are conducted in thirty-two states. Some operate only within a single state, some in two or more states, transmitting energy across state lines for their own account, and some sell energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.
Second. Challenging the validity of the act in its entirety, petitioners contend that sections 4(a) and 5, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79d(a), 79e, cannot be separated from the other provisions of the act and thus be separately sustained and enforced. They urge that these sections are purely auxiliary to the subsequent or 'control provisions' of the act, sections 6 to 13, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79f to 79m; that the object of this suit is to compel submission to an integrated system of control and that the sole question is whether the act as a whole, 'or enough to accomplish its general plan,' is constitutional. They insist that this question must be determined before they may be compelled to register.
This provision reverses the presumption of inseparability that the Legislature intended the act to be effective as an entirety or not at all. Congress has established the opposite presumption of divisibility. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242, 49 S.Ct. 115, 117, 73 L.Ed. 287, 60 A.L.R. 596; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 184, 52 S.Ct. 548, 553, 76 L.Ed. 1038; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235, 52 S.Ct. 559, 565, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 86 A.L.R. 403. Congress has thus said that the statute is not an integrated whole, which as such must be sustained or held invalid. On the contrary, when validity is in question, divisibility and not integration is the guiding principle. Invalid parts are to be excised and the remainder enforced. When we are seeking to ascertain the congressional purpose, we must give heed to this explicit declaration.
(2) It is evident that the provisions of sections 4(a) and 5 are not so interwoven with the other provisions of the act that there is any inherent or practical difficulty in the separation and independent enforcement of the former while reserving all questions as to the validity of the latter. The administrative construction of the statute was formulated in that view. Rule 4 of the Commission provided that any person, in filing any statement under the act, might include an express reservation of constitutional and legal rights. It was on the basis of that construction that this suit was prosecuted and was limited to the enforcement of sections 4(a) and 5. All rights and remedies as to all other provisions of the act are, as we have seen, expressly reserved to the defendants by the decree. Nor can it be said that this reservation is illusory. If this decree is affirmed, it will constitute a specific adjudication that registration will be without prejudice to future challenge of the validity of any provision of the act, or requirement of the Commission, outside of sections 4(a) and 5. It is idle to contend that registration pursuant to the decree will subject the defendants to the act as an integrated whole or bring into operation against them what the decree expressly excludes.
(3) Although there is no practical obstacle to the separate enforcement of the provisions of sections 4(a) and 5, the argument is pressed that in reason and design there is an essential unity of these provisions and the so-called 'control provisions' which forbids such enforcement. Petitioners urge that sections 4(a) and 5 'merely implement the system of controls'; that the policy of the act as declared in section 1(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79a(c), is to compel 'the simplification and the elimination of holding company systems'; and that the objective cannot be attained by informatory processes but only by such regulation or control as will 'eliminate' the evils.
We think that the manner in which the act is framed and the variety of provisions it contains, when viewed in the light of the presumption of divisibility, justify that conclusion. The fact that registration underlies the application of subsequent requirements of the statute does not prevent the provisions of sections 4(a) and 5 from having a purpose and a value of their own. Section 5 not only provides in paragraph (a) for the filing of a 'notification of registration,' but also requires by paragraph (b) every registered holding company to submit, within a reasonable time after registration, a 'registration statement' containing a variety of detailed information as to corporate structure and activities. Thus section 5(b) is itself a 'control' provision, which is immediately operative. The duty to supply the described information is separately and definitely prescribed.
It cannot be denied that a requirement of this sort is a regulation which Congress could have regarded as important in itself and could have made the subject of a separate statute. The fact that it is found in a statute imposing other regulations, or that it precedes the application of the others, does not deprive it of its essential character and its capacity to stand alone. Regulation requiring the submission of information is a familiar category. Information bearing upon activities which are within the range of congressional power may be sought not only by congressional investigation as an aid to appropriate legislation, but through the continuous supervision of an administrative body. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 474, 155 U.S. 3, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 15 S.Ct. 19, 38 L.Ed. 1047, 39 L.Ed. 49; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Company, 224 U.S. 194, 211, 32 S.Ct. 436, 56 L.Ed. 729; American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235, 237, 57 S.Ct. 170, 172, 81 L.Ed. 142. Congress may use this method in connection with a comprehensive scheme of regulation, as, for example, in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission; or Congress may employ this informatory process independently. An illustration of the latter is found in the statute relating to newspapers and periodicals, enjoying the privileges accorded to second class mail, which requires an annual statement setting forth the names and addresses of the editor, publisher, business manager, owner, and, in case of ownership by a corporation, the stockholders, and also the names of known bondholders or other security holders, together with a statement as to circulation. 39 U.S.C. 233, 39 U.S.C.A. § 233. See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 33 S.Ct. 867, L.Ed. 1190.
Petitioners refer to the limitations upon publicity contained in section 22, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79v, and contrast this provision with that of the Securities Act of 1933, § 6(d), 48 Stat. 74, 78, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77f(d). But section 22 provides that the information shall be available to the public when in the judgment of the Commission its disclosure would be in the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers. The limitations are plainly intended to safeguard particular information which may be regarded as of a private or confidential character and as not directly concerning the public interest. They do not detract from the value which may be deemed to attach to the requirement that the described information should be furnished, whether as an aid to legislation or as facilitating administrative supervision or as securing a desirable publicity.
Both parties invoke the legislative history of the act. Petitioners contend that this shows that control, not publicity, was intended. The Government insists that the legislative history supports the presumption of separability. It is unnecessary to review the details of the arguments or the cited statements from the legislative halls. The act speaks for itself with sufficient clarity. The Government points to six groups of regulatory provisions contained in the act, viz., registration, sections 4 and 5, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79d, 79e; issuance of securities, sections 6 and 7, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79f, 79g; acquisition of securities and utility assets, sections 8, 9 and 10, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79h to 79j; corporate simplification and reorganization, section 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k; service contracts and other intercompany transactions, sections 12 and 13, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79l, 79m; and reports and accounts, sections 14 and 15, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79n, 79o. We see nothing in the legislative history of the Act which requires the conclusion that all these groups were intended to constitute a unitary system, no part of which can fail without destroying the rest. On the contrary, we think that the intent of Congress is that these various groups of regulations, as well as particular provisions of each group should be regarded as separable so that, if any such group or provision should be found to be invalid, that invalidity should not extend to the remaining parts if by reason of their nature and as a practical matter they could be separately sustained and enforced.
Congress provided in section 18(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79r(f) that the Commission might bring an action to enforce compliance with the act or any rule, regulation or order thereunder, and that upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or decree should be granted. In pursuance of that authority, the present action was brought solely to enforce the provisions of sections 4(a) and 5. We find no basis for holding that these provisions cannot be separately enforced if they are valid and we turn to that question. In view of this conclusion as to separability, it is unnecessary to go through the statute in order to determine whether other provisions are valid or invalid, and we do not intimate that there would not be found in any event a workable system in addition to the registration sections.
Third. Petitioners contend that, standing by themselves, sections 4(a) and 5 transgress constitutional restrictions. These sections have three parts. Section 5(a) provides for the filing of a notification of registration. Section 5(b) makes it the duty of every registered holding company to file a registration statement, with documents and certain detailed information, within a reasonable time after registration. Section 4(a) prescribes the penalty for failure to register under section 5. As the requirement of information is in itself a permissible and useful type of regulation (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Company, supra; American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, supra), the question is whether the particular demand, here assailed, can be validly addressed to the defendants enjoined by the decree, and, if so, whether it exceeds constitutional limits because of the character and extent of the information sought.
The findings of the District Court based upon the stipulation of facts leave no room for doubt that these defendants are engaged in transactions in interstate commerce. That they conduct such transactions through the instrumentality of subsidiaries cannot avail to remove them from the reach of the federal power. It is the substance of what they do, and not the form in which they clothe their transactions, which must afford the test. The constitutional authority confided to Congress could not be maintained if it were deemed to depend upon the mere modal arrangements of those seeking to escape its exercise. Compare Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S.Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed. 679. We need not now determine to what precise extent these defendants are actually engaged in interstate commerce. It is enough that they do have continuous and extensive operations in that commerce, and Congress cannot be denied the power to demand the information which would furnish a guide to the regulation necessary or appropriate in the national interest. Regulation is addressed to practices which appear to need supervision, correction or control. And to determine what regulation is essential or suitable, Congress is entitled to consider and to estimate whatever evils exist.
Congress has further declared in paragraph (b) of that section, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79a(b), upon the basis of facts disclosed by the reports of the Federal Trade Commission and of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, and otherwise ascertained, the circumstances in which the national interest and the interest of investors and consumers may be adversely affected by the operation of public utility holding companies. And after this catalogue of the abuses which may exist in the circumstances described, Congress declares it to be its policy 'to meet the problems and eliminate the evils as enumerated in this section, connected with public-utility holding companies which are engaged in interstate commerce or in activities which directly affect or burden interstate commerce.' 15 U.S.C.A. § 79a(c). Without attempting to state the limits of permissible regulation in the execution of this declared policy, we have no reason to doubt that from these defendants, with their highly important relation to interstate commerce and the national economy, Congress was entitled to demand the fullest information as to organization, financial structure and all the activities which could have any bearing upon the exercise of congressional authority. The regulation found in section 5(b) goes no further than to require this information and we are of the opinion that its validity must be sustained.
In the imposition of penalties for the violation of its rules, Congress has a wide discretion. Sanctions may be of various types. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917, decided March 7, 1938. They may involve the loss of a privilege which would otherwise be enjoyed. Id., note 2. When Congress lays down a valid rule to govern those engaged in transactions in interstate commerce, Congress may deny to those who violate the rule the right to engage in such transactions. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 415, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836; Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436, 437, 45 S.Ct. 345, 346, 69 L.Ed. 699, 37 A.L.R. 1407; Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 552; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 299 U.S. 334, 335, 346, 347, 57 S.Ct. 277, 279, 280, 81 L.Ed. 270. And while Congress may not exercise its control over the mails to enforce a requirement which lies outside its constitutional province, when Congress lays down a valid regulation pertinent to the use of the mails, it may withdraw the privilege of that use from those who disobey. Champion v. Ames, supra; Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 33 S.Ct. 867, 57 L.Ed. 1190.
In the instant case, the penalty attaches to the use of the instrumentalities of commerce and of the mails by those who, engaged in that use, refuse to submit to section 5 and thus through registration and the statement which is incident to registration to supply the information which Congress is entitled to demand, and has demanded, with respect to their organization and practices. Each one of the paragraphs of section 4(a), as related to the requirements of section 5, is addressed to those in that class. We think that the imposition of such a penalty does not transgress any constitutional provision.
Fourth. The District Court did not err in dismissing the cross-bill. Defendants are not entitled to invoke the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in order to obtain an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts. See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 46 S.Ct. 122, 70 L.Ed. 289; United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 55 S.Ct. 789, 79 L.Ed. 1546; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324, 56 S.Ct. 466, 472, 80 L.Ed. 688; Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 355, 57 S.Ct. 816, 824, 81 L.Ed. 1143. By the cross-bill, defendants seek a judgment that each and every provision of the act is unconstitutional. It presents a variety of hypothetical controversies which may never become real. We are invited to enter into a speculative inquiry for the purpose of condemning statutory provisions the effect of which in concrete situations, not yet developed, cannot now be definitely perceived. We must decline that invitation. Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, supra.
The 'title' is 'Title IControl of Public-Utility Holding Companies.' 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq.


text:
Brother Yhugm's tale is an exciting one. Escaping from a life of primitive savagery, he came to the USA and found Jesus. Who could fail to be moved by such an astonishing and true story?
Clothing is not used in the, place from where I come. We only use hides from animals; tigers, lions, etc. We also get our food from those animals. One eats the raw meat from these animals—not cooked. Eating raw meat is what makes my people very strong.
Sometimes the people get very fat. Many cannot run because they are very fat. But they are very strong.
They can conquer an animal with their bare hands, be it a lion or a tiger. But it is not all of them that can do this. The majority of them have the ability to run faster than a horse. The older ones are the ones who can do this.
Once when I was travelling among the mountains, a tiger came at me. But what was really good about this is, we were both babies. The tiger was just a small babe, and I was small also. I was able to conquer him. He only scratched me about three times. I strangled him with all my heart and might. My father was very happy when I got home with it on my shoulders. It was the first time I had ever done that. My father hugged me and carried me all over. He took very good care of me. I was the baby of all. Through that incident, I was encouraged to continue hunting in this way.
you see different kinds of bones of different animals. Someone who didn't know about this would think that some animal had just died there. There are several of these plants.
The people where I am from, eat people. They take a white person, tie and bind him, and kill him. Then they cut off his head and start eating him, all of him, until they finish him completely, even the bones.
Unhappily, one day while out in the jungle the young Yhugm falls into the hands of evil slavers. He escapes from their boat but finds himself lost out on the ocean, floating on a life-raft. Eventually he lands in El Salvador where after a period hiding out in the mountains he is taken in by a family who teach him Spanish. He starts taking an interest in Christianity and decides he must travel to the US.
When he finally reaches the Land of the Free, some tiresome immigration officials want to know who he is and where he has come from. He fobs them off by making constant references to Jesus, and somehow avoids being deported. One can't help feeling that the US border police were a tad lackadaisical in this case. Tut, tut.
One night I saw Evangelist, W. V. Grant, from Dallas, Texas, under a heavy anointing of God's spirit. The blind saw; the lame walked; the deaf heard. I thought, "This is a ministry like Jesus had." Scores of people came forward seeking God. They were filled with the Spirit. I said, "This is beautiful. This is what I want and have been hungry for all my life."
A happy ending to an extraordinary tale, one I am sure you will agree is equally persuasive throughout.
I believe it exactly as much as I believe all the stories of Christians who used to be into heavy metal bands and constantly on drugs.
My own journey has been in the opposite direction. I expect to become a cannibal soon.
In fact the word Tigre, which is standard Spanish for tiger, is used widely in South America to mean a Jaguar. (Not that I beilive the story).
Grant went to prison for tax evasion in 1996. As soon as he got out he went right back to convincing the gullible, the desperate, and the senile to fork over their money. I almost wish that hell was real, just for the pleasure of imagining him roasting in it.
I personally met this man of God Bro.Yhugum when I was a child. My mother carried me to revival in East Praire Mo. He laid hands upon me and prayed for me. I believe his story simply because: in fact there were real cannibalism going on and the details are so explicit. If you had met him like I did you would believe too!
I know this man personally. I am in contact with him , now in the present. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.
The story is true. The man who published it is NOT a man of God. He took advantage of Brother Yhugm and used it for his gain. Yhugm does ministry for the Gospel and has helped many people. He is still alive and can be reached if needed.
He Use to stay with My Husband and in Indianapolis, In. " I have Pictures to Prove It." He was A Good Man, And funny about some of our ways. We Pastor Here Still Today. Still have His book too. If anyone knows where He is Today Please let us know. Last Time we saw Him, He was working out of Sweetwater, Tenn. My Husband Got Him several Places to Speak, and Everyone loved Him.
I know Brother Yhugm personally and have since I've been a child. I am now a missionary licensed and ordained. I know his story is true but I tell you how this book by W.V.Grant explains Bro. Yhugm's story is indeed evagelasticcccc, full of deceit, and utter lies he has had another book out for some time that is legitimate.
I have not read this book only the above in red. Bro Yhugm can not read nor write and didn't even know this was up here until he asked me to search it for him on internet.
I've read some of the above to him and he has said to me "no that is not true I've never said that" "There are no plants that big" "i don't know where in the world they have plants like that" "no only Jaguar, anacondas, big pythons 30ft long, or Boa constrictor; there are no tigers or lions there" "the land is flat no mountains" " I was in the amazon" - in reference to everything above. "No i first went to Assembly Of God church close to Lovelland, Tx with Brother Gibson"
"No they did not teach me Spanish" "I have a hard time with their language"
When he finally reaches the Land of the Free, some tiresome immigration officials want to know who he is and where he has come from.
I wish I could write out his story on here it is just tooo much I can only tell his story is real and true but these people are only trying to make themselves look good and as Bro. Yhugm has just said to me "they completely twisted my story".
So I'm sorry you all had to see the above book.
I met this man of God when I was 10yrs and am now 22yrs old and have heard his story many times and none of the above has he ever mentioned not once.
hello anonymous, I would love to know more about your history with Bro. Yhugm, I am a relative of his researching my family. please contact me if you would. thank you.
Hey my apologies after posting the above Brother Yhugm corrected me and he said the immigration sent him to Lydia Patterson Institute and that was the first place he was associated with and they wanted to teach him how to read but because he had no money they had to release him. -In 1965 was when immigration first caught up with him.
And he says "i've never found Jesus; Jesus found me in the Jungle"
Thanks for the enlightening information. It was pretty clear the book was rubbish but good to hear it from (close to) the horse's mouth.
A corrected version of his Biography can be found at www.yhugm.com and is called, "YHUGM; The Last Survivor of His Tribe." Yhugm asked someone else to re-write his biography and correct the story so his life story could be recorded with 100% accuracy (such as discussing "jaguars", not "tigers", etc). The second book is far more accurate and more interesting and about 3 times longer and goes into more about who he is as a person, not just the sensational stories. Check it out. You can also hear Yhugm tell his story in his own words in a video at that sight as well.
I live in Tennessee and i met Yhumg about 2 years ago. To this day i still work with him every day. if you have any questions about his story, or anything you would like me to ask him feel free to contact me at Schwnick112@gmail.com... I would be glad to ask him!!
I have actually met Yhumg. I confess that while he preached good I was not impressed with him because of all of the Word of Knowledges he gave out. Sometimes he would tell people that they had a heart problem. And when they act hesitant he would say something like, "this is for something down the road!"
I am not impressed with things like that. If God reveals some one has a heart problem they should be having a heart problem and that now! I am not impressed with these "down the road" people and more than severily question them!
So I am not fan of Yhumg. Though I have met him and heard him preach so many years ago somewhere in this great nation(the USA)!
Anyway for the person who says that W. V. Grant went to prison in 1996. It is not the same W. V. Grant who wrote that book in 1960. The one who wrote the book in 1960 is the father of the one who went to prison. The one who wrote the book passed away in 1983!
About Hell. It is real and the vast majority of the world is going there(Matt.7:13&14; Mark 9:43-48; Luke 16:19-31; Rev. 21:8). You need to repent of your sins(Luke 13:1-5; Acts 3:19; Acts 17:30) and recieve Jesus as Savior and Lord today(John 1:12; John 3:16; Rev.3:20; Rom.10:9&10) today and stop letting hypocrites stand in your way. For read all of Matt.23! The hypocrites will surely be in Hell too!
when/where is the last time you heard him preach, I am interested in observing his message.
It has been years since I have heard him preach. And personally I am not interested in hearing him again because of the very things that I observed while listening to him.
My MAIN reason for even saying anything about him was because of what was being said about evangelist W. V. Grant and may I add SR. While never meeting Bro. Grant(and I unapologetically call him brother!) I do know at least one if not more who have.
I asked a certain preacher if he still has a copy of the book "I WAS A CANNIBAL." I looked through his library with full permission and full understanding that I could have it if I found it. No success. I remember when this pastor friend of mine did have it but it was way back around 1987 or 88!
I had rather not say what exact year I heard him preach due to the fact he may remember me! If I didn't say earlier in the other writings I way say hear. But I will say it was before 1987!
Back to the preacher who owned the book. He KNEW the late W. V. Grant Sr. And yes he speaks well of him and thought he was a good man. And the way I understand pretty well to the end. I don't like people slandering good men! Especially when they are not around to defend themselves!
It was his son that went to prison! Not the dad! I have been in the ministry for over 30 years and have seen good men have sons who were devils! So please don't accuse the late W. V. Grant of being in prison for tax evasion when IT WAS TOTALLY 100% impossible!
He went to Heaven in 1983! It is impossible for a man dead to do a crime!
Concerning any troubles that he may have had with Yhumg. I have been in the ministry long enough to see troubles between preachers who were otherwise good men. Though from what I know of the Dad Grant and what I know of Yhumg I confess I will side with the late W. V. Grant first!
Be as it may we are in an hour of deception(read all of Matt.24, Mark 13, and Luke 21. Plus read II Tim.3:1-4:5). Hey I am not above being deceived myself(see I Cor.10:12; Gal.6:1&2). I remember when the late John Todd came out with those stories about being a member of the Illuminati Council of 13 and the various attacks on so-called Christian leaders I actually believed him. That is until some people found out some of the stuff that he had lied about! And it became obvious he was false.
I understand there are some people who still think John Todd was for real to this date!
I am still very skeptical of Yhumg. And let's face it. Even if his story of being saved out of cannibalism turns out to be true. I have seen men who started out real good fall away(I am extremely anti-eternal securitist!) Pride(Prov.16:18&19; Dan.4; Luke 18:9-14), love of money(Luke 12:13-21; I Tim.6:10) and many other things have caused men to fall away.
Let me say this. Until two days ago I was actually defending a certain preacher which I choose not to name. I had heard some horrible accusations against him. I really believed he was 100% innocent. But no more!
Maybe I should go hear him! Maybe he will tell me that my wife is going to be healed! WOW! That would be something! I am not married right now even! Maybe when he says, "it is for something down the road" I ought to rejoice! For he sees me getting married again!
Well whether he was really ever a cannibal or not is not my concern though I am still skeptical of that! I still until I get further proof otherwise plan to stick with my assumption that he was called "Yhumg" because of the word "yum"! However even if proved true is not going to change my mind!
Paul warned the Galatians about they, "did run well but who hindered you that ye should not obey the truth."(Gal.5:7)!
Well it is your choose and do whatever you want. If you want to see and hear Yhumg preach that is your business. I used to go around checking different preachers out. And while I still do I have pretty well learned at my age if there is enough reason for me to doubt that person whether because of moral issues or false doctrine I pretty well stay away. I got more important things to accomplish!
This IS CLEARLY MY LAST POST AND I REFUSE TO ANSWER ANY OTHER QUESTIONS! Thank you!
One last comment. To those who may be critical or wonder why I am so severe on Yhumg's words of knowledge as well as others! First let me explain that I STRONGLY believe in all nine gifts of the Spirit for the Church as found in 1 Cor.12-14 for this day and age!
I have severe trouble with Yhumg or anyone else claiming that God showed him you have a heart condition and you don't! And then turn around and says, "it may be for something down the road" or it is for something down the road" I have some severe troubles!
For one we are commanded in 1 Thess.5:19-22 to "prove all things!". In 1 Cor.14:29 we are to let someone judge! I John 4:1-3 we are to try the spirits.
In Deut.18:18-22 a prophets words must come to pass! If it doesn't it is NOT of God! For God doesn't lie(Num.23:19), God CANNOT lie(Titus 1:2), and it is impossible for God to lie(Heb.6:18)!
And Yhumg isn't the only one to have done this. There was a man on radio once with a call-in broadcast who was praying with a lady about her unsavex husband and started to pray for his drinking problem! The lady interrupted and said, " My husband doesn't have a drinking problem!". To which the man replied, "Oh it is for something down the road!"
Well Yhumg might label me one of those people who have "a tongue 40 foot long!". By the way that was one of the things I actually liked about his preaching by the way!
I won't point out any of my other troubles with Yhumg. The only other I will ask is ," is Yhumg his real name or is it a name some others gave him?".
I have wondered because if you take the h and g out of his name you get "Yum" which to me sounds like someone's sick sense of humor to name a one-time cannibal!
This will be my FINAL posting for this spot. So if anyone has any comments, criticisms, or questions I won't be answering them. I have more important things to be concerned with than Yhumg!

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
William W. Osborne, Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Francis R. Sheed entered an appear- ance.
Tatel, Circuit Judge: A striking union challenges the Department of Labor's certification of an apprenticeship pro- gram to train replacement workers, arguing that the Depart- ment's action conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act, that the agency improperly acted in an NLRA-preempted area, and that the decision rests on an unreasonable reading of Department regulations. Finding neither conflict with nor encroachment upon the NLRA, and deferring to the Depart- ment's interpretation of its own regulations, we affirm the district court's award of summary judgment for the govern- ment.
The largest union of installers of fire protection sprinkler systems, appellant Road Sprinkler jointly operated a collec- tively bargained apprenticeship training program with an employer organization. Because the program had been certi- fied by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training ("BAT"), participating employers could pay apprentices sub-minimum wages. See 29 C.F.R. s 5.5(a)(4).
In September 1993, one of the employer organization mem- bers, appellee Grinnell Fire Protection Systems, began nego- tiating with Road Sprinkler for a new collective bargaining agreement, seeking, among other things, a new apprentice- ship program. Seven months later, after declaring a bargain- ing impasse, Grinnell unilaterally imposed the terms and conditions of its "final offer," which did not include partic- ipation in the joint program.
labor practice, Road Sprinkler filed a complaint with the NLRB and called a national strike. Grinnell responded by hiring striker replacements. The company also asked the BAT to either certify a new apprenticeship program to train replacement workers or allow their enrollment in programs run by other employers.
Under a program proposed for registration by an em- ployer or employers' association, where the standards, collective bargaining agreement or other instrument, provides for participation by a union in any manner in the operation of the substantive matters of the appren- ticeship program, and such participation is exercised, written acknowledgment of union agreement or "no ob- jection" to the registration is required. 29 C.F.R. s 29.3(h). According to the BAT, the Board's resolution of the pending ULP proceedings would determine whether Road Sprinkler had a continuing role in the joint apprenticeship program sufficient to trigger section 29.3(h)'s requirement for union consent. This court ruled the BAT delay improper, finding that regardless of what the NLRB might decide, the still-striking union was not participating in the apprenticeship program for purposes of section 29.3(h). Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Herman, 166 F.3d 1248, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Finding also that the BAT lacked authority to block replacement workers from partici- pating in programs run by other employers, we remanded for immediate consideration of Grinnell's certification request. Id. at 1254-55.
Shortly thereafter, the NLRB completed its consideration of Road Sprinkler's ULP charges. Ruling for the union, the Board directed the company to "restore to unit employees the terms and conditions of employment that were applicable prior" to the unfair labor practice. See Grinnell Fire Protect.
Sys. Co., 328 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 1999 WL 357628, at *5 (May 28, 1999). At this writing, Grinnell's petition for review remains pending in the Fourth Circuit. Grinnell Fire Pro- tect. Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 99-1754(L) (4th Cir. argued June 8, 2000).
In the meantime, the BAT, proceeding on remand from our earlier decision, changed its position. Despite its previous suggestion that an NLRB order reinstating the joint appren- ticeship program would trigger section 29.3(h)'s union consent requirement, the BAT granted Grinnell's certification request over Road Sprinkler's objection. In doing so, the BAT relied on a different part of section 29.3--subsection (i). That subsection provides for unilateral employer apprenticeship programs "[w]here the employees to be trained have no collective bargaining agent." To support its conclusion that Road Sprinkler did not represent Grinnell's striker replace- ments for the purposes of subsection (i), the BAT cited a new NLRB decision, Detroit Newspaper, extending the rule that employers need not bargain with striking unions over terms and conditions of employment for replacement workers to unfair labor practice strikes. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 327 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 1999 WL 145905, at *1 (Mar. 15, 1999).
Filing suit in the U.S. District Court here, Road Sprinkler claimed (1) that the BAT decision conflicts with the NLRB's definition of "collective bargaining agent" as well as its reme- dy for Grinnell's unfair labor practice; (2) that in determining Road Sprinkler's representation status, the BAT improperly acted in an NLRA-preempted area; and (3) that the agency unreasonably interpreted its own regulations in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. s 706. In re- sponse, the Department argued that the BAT's decision has no impact on the labor laws, that in any event, the decision is consistent with Detroit Newspaper, and that the BAT's inter- pretation of section 29.3 was reasonable and therefore worthy of deference. Agreeing, the district court entered summary judgment for the Department. Road Sprinkler appeals. Our review is de novo. See Everett v. United States, 158 F.3d 1364, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Before addressing Road Sprinkler's arguments, we must consider Grinnell's claim, not embraced by the Department, that we lack jurisdiction. According to Grinnell, the APA "is not to be interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction" to the federal courts. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Grinnell overlooks 28 U.S.C. s 1331, which gives federal courts what the APA does not: "jurisdic- tion of all civil actions arising under the ... laws ... of the United States," including those brought under the APA. See Saavedra-Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The company also claims, again without Department support, that Road Sprinkler lacks standing; because Road Sprinkler is not the collective bargaining agent of the replace- ment workers, Grinnell argues, the union has not been in- jured by the BAT's failure to seek its consent. This cannot be. Whether Road Sprinkler has a right under BAT regula- tions to veto Grinnell's new apprenticeship program is pre- cisely the question before us. Recasting such questions as jurisdictional would deny standing to all litigants with unmer- itorious claims. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (standing requires only that litigants allege a legally cogniza- ble injury).
Having satisfied ourselves that we have jurisdiction, we turn to Road Sprinkler's first claim--that the BAT's determi- nation that the union does not represent the striker replace- ment workers violates the NLRB's established rule that a bargaining unit is composed of all employees, including "non- strikers, strikers, returning strikers and striker replacements employed at the time of the refusal to bargain." Nat'l Uphol- stering Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1210 (1993). Because the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to make representation deci- sions within the meaning of the NLRA, see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 155 (1941) ("[A]fter [an NLRB representation order] the employer may not be com- pelled by any other agency of the government to perform any acts inconsistent with that order."), the union also argues that the BAT's departure from the National Upholstering defini- tion encroaches on an NLRA-preempted area. We disagree.
The BAT has done nothing more than resolve Road Sprin- kler's representation status under agency regulations, not under the NLRA. Simply determining the circumstances in which Grinnell may legally pay sub-minimum wages to ap- prentices, the BAT's action in no way interferes with the NLRB's area of concern: union authority to bargain about the provisions (including those relating to apprenticeship training programs) of collective bargaining agreements. See Washington Serv. Contractors Coalition v. Dist. of Columbia, 54 F.3d 811, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that labor law preemption does not apply to laws that regulate employment without "disturb[ing] the labor dispute resolution system established by the NLRA."). Because the BAT and NLRB concern themselves with different questions, the phrase "col- lective bargaining agent" need not mean the same to each. Given the BAT's broad discretion to interpret its own regula- tions, see Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1999), we defer to its decision that Road Sprinkler is not the replacement workers' collective bargaining agent for the purposes of section 29.3.
ing unions should have no authority to negotiate over terms and conditions of employment for replacement workers.
Detroit Newspaper also answers Road Sprinkler's second argument: that the BAT's switch from reliance on subsection (h) to subsection (i) was arbitrary and capricious. It switched, the BAT explains, because after Detroit Newspaper, it no longer considered Road Sprinkler the replacement work- ers' collective bargaining agent within the meaning of subsec- tion (i). How could it be arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change its position in response to new legal devel- opments?
Equally without merit is Road Sprinkler's related challenge that the BAT's understanding of the relationship between subsections (h) and (i) is unreasonable. Reading subsection (i) as creating a residual category that allows unilateral employer programs only where subsection (h) does not apply, Road Sprinkler claims that section 29.3 requires the BAT to first determine the need for union consent under subsection (h). But the agency sees the relationship between subsec- tions (h) and (i) quite differently: when subsection (i) permits a unilateral employer program, subsection (h) need not be considered. Faced with two reasonable interpretations of a regulatory scheme, we defer to the agency's. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Finally, Road Sprinkler argues that the BAT's certification of Grinnell's apprenticeship program conflicts with the NLRB remedy for the company's unfair labor practice. By requir- ing the employer to reinstate the terms and conditions of employment as they existed before the violation, Road Sprin- kler claims that the NLRB has obliged the company to enroll striker replacements in the jointly-administered apprentice- ship program. Road Sprinkler confuses BAT certification with Grinnell's use of its new unilateral program. The BAT has merely given the company a means of training striker replacements. Whether Grinnell's decision to train replace- ment workers in this new program would violate the remedial order is a matter for the NLRB.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


In Wurtz v. The Rawlings Company, LLC, No. 13‐1695‐cv (2nd Cir. 2014), the plaintiffs initially filed the complaint in this case in New York state court, seeking, among other things, to enjoin defendant insurers under N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 from obtaining reimbursement of medical benefits from plaintiffs’ tort settlements (that is, to enjoin the insurers from enforcing subrogation rights to obtain the settlement amounts). The defendants removed this action to the Eastern District of New York. There, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were subject to both “complete” and “express” preemption under ERISA.
Upon review, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Court”) held, first, that the plaintiffs’ claims do not satisfy the Supreme Court’s test for being subject to complete ERISA preemption (in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila) , which would have conferred federal subject‐matter jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction exists, however, under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(d). Accordingly, the Court then reached the merits of the express preemption defense, and concluded that N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 is saved from express preemption under ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, as a law that “regulates insurance.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the plaintiffs’ claims.
Two points to be considered here. First, the Court ruled that the claims were not subject to complete preemption under ERISA, since-contrary to the requirements of the Supreme Court (in Davila)- the claims could not be construed as claims for benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), and there may be independent duties, aside from those arising under ERISA or any employee benefit plan, that the defendants may have breached.
The second point is why N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 is not subject to express preemption under ERISA. This provision states that a personal injury settlement presumptively “does not include any compensation for the cost of health care services” or other losses that “are obligated to be paid or reimbursed by a benefit provider” (such as an insurer), and that benefit providers have no “right of subrogation or reimbursement against any such settling party.” ERISA expressly preempts any state law that “relate[s] to any employee benefit plan,” but not if that law “regulates insurance.” ERISA § 514(a)‐(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)‐(b). In this case, the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 regulates insurance, since this provision is specifically directed toward insurers and substantially affects risk pooling between insurers and insureds. As such, it is saved from express preemption.


Imagine that the head of a foreign state suborned a covert paramilitary group to torture detainees in secret black sites the world over. That paramilitary group, as it happens, had conspired in the past to topple various foreign regimes that it deemed ill-suited to its taste; and the methods of torture it employed were developed as preparation for what to expect a lawless foe to inflict on them. Imagine further that when the grisly details of that torment came to light, the administration responsible not only defended the practice, but insisted on doing it again. It would be very difficult, I posit, to take seriously that state’s commitment to justice and the rule of law, even and especially as it wages war beneath the banner of those two aims. When that state goes on to aid in the prosecution of foreign war criminals, while continuing to exempt itself from international tribunals, it starts to look rather dubious.
What I have described comports by any reasonable standard with the workings of a rogue state. It is also a precise (if perhaps uncharitable) account of the United States’ very own behavior. Following last December’s release of the report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA’s interrogation program, President Obama called the vile acts described therein as “contrary to our values.” This was certainly a step forward from the previous administration—whose most memorable comment on the matter was to reveal the unrepentant urge to “do it again in a minute”—but one cannot help but feel the President had simultaneously understated and overstated reality. In the first, most obvious sense, the prohibition of torture is not simply a question of taste, but quite literally an obligation under both international law and domestic U.S. law. Yet in a different way, if any normative disposition could be said to characterize “our values,” that would be a culture of denial and impunity that frustrates any mealy-mouthed claims of taking the law seriously.
There is truly only one way to rehabilitate our image from that of a nation of outlaws and tormentors, and that is to prosecute those responsible. The question we now face, as the machinery of justice whines to a stall, is this: What is at stake if we do not?
The second (and more insidious) snag comes from those willing to call it torture, yet who absolve it as defensible. Torture apologists rely often on some version of the “ticking bomb” scenario, or on the ready-made excuse that “we’re at war,” to reimagine torture as a necessary, and even noble, act of dirtying one’s hands. Without conceding anything to any side of the torture-efficacy debate, one must see in the apologist camp a glaring rhetorical hole: the law does not countenance any exception to the prohibition of torture. This is, more or less, the whole point of prohibition.
As a jus cogens norm of customary international law, from which there can be no derogation, the prohibition of torture is absolute and applicable erga omnes. The United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), ratified in 1994 by the United States, states explicitly that “[n]o exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture.” The prosecution in all circumstances of torturous acts, then, is an obligation under international human rights law. If the language of the CAT was not conspicuous enough, let there be no quibbling about the specialness of war; international humanitarian law also abounds with bans on that particularly odious abuse of wartime licentiousness. Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 treats torture in international armed conflicts as a “grave breach” of their provisions, and Article 3 common to each convention likewise forbids torture in a non-international armed conflict. And, lest I be dismissed as some zealous internationalist, I shall point simply to the United States’ own domestic laws and to the words of the State Department: “Every act constituting torture under the [CAT] constitutes a criminal offense under the law of the United States. . . . No exceptional circumstance may be invoked as a justification of torture.” The illegality of torture ought really not at all to be belabored.
Why has the American public seemed positively allergic to this unambiguous principle? There must lurk in a terror-stricken populace, brimming with national dread, the temptation of cutting corners in the interrogation room. Forbes described us as a nation “unwilling” to rule out practices we find “abhorrent and barbaric,” which is a subtler way to say we are a nation that harbors and enables international criminals (and domestic ones, for that matter).
Elsewhere I have characterized the United States’ eagerness to exempt itself from law (laws which, it must be said, the United States implemented for itself and which it uses swiftly against others) as an extra-legal appeal to “prerogative power.” John Locke described this entitlement as the executive’s “power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of law, and sometimes even against it.” The invocation of such “prerogative” for the act of torture is troubling in itself, not least because it presupposes what history and the Senate Committee’s report refute: that torture could be an effective means of interrogation. More to the point, it confirms there are no depths to which the security-minded will not sink. It reveals as well the hubristic and tautological reasoning behind our ghoulish practice: torture is permissible when we do it, because we are the ones doing it. The classical fear of prerogative power is that an exceptional and justified act may clear the path for abuse; yet when it comes to torture, that power is not just ripe for abuse—it is the abuse.
The sheer temerity of Yankee exceptionalism has normalized and institutionalized the behavior of individuals who would otherwise sit as the defendants in an international war crime tribunal. Even as it declines to prosecute these torturers for itself, the United States has refused to cooperate with criminal proceedings against U.S. torturers initiated in other competent foreign jurisdictions, thereby violating its international obligation aut dedere aut judicare: to extradite or to prosecute. Sheltering international criminals, flouting international norms and laws, and thwarting the judicial processes of foreign countries—these are the heights of antisocial behavior and the hallmarks of rogue and pariah states. The price of torturers’ impunity is to quarantine our nation from the international community and to cloak our legal system in the colors of criminality.
President Obama’s acquiescence in the crimes of his precursor has not changed much since 2009, when he announced his inclination “to look forward as opposed to looking backwards.” This is rather rich for a man whose job it is to ensure “that the laws be faithfully executed,” among them, inconveniently, the prosecution of torturers—even and especially now that the case against these state-sponsored thugs is more thoroughly founded and known. Perhaps the best argument in defense of non-prosecution was given by Stephen Vladeck, who wrote that the increasing “criminalization of politics” may undermine the development of a historical consensus against these dreadful indiscretions. To be sure, there is something unseemly about a second-term incumbent throwing the books upon disgraced political rivals; and one can almost hear already the clamoring of securitarian lackeys against any ambitious prosecutor or nervous attorney general.
Yet our bigger worry should not be whether a prosecution will be polarizing, but rather which of the options would be tolerable. In the first case, we risk having a politicized (and perhaps fruitless) criminal prosecution; but we would have the pleasure of seeing the apologists and the perpetrators of torture stand before the world to insist—with as straight a face as they can muster—that no crime was committed. In the non-prosecutorial alternative, we would have to sleep nightly with the knowledge that as Videla withered in Argentinian prisons, and while the Chilean courts never tired of pursuing Pinochet—and with the extravagance of American torturers laid openly to air—the United States of America did nothing.
The position I have presented may seem radical, but it is in fact a quite conservative one: that the law should be upheld. As with all regimes that sweep their crimes beneath an ever-bulging rug, all our talk of “justice” and “rule of law” begins to reach a point of diminishing returns.
Torture and Impunity in the United States of America, 3 Cornell Int’l L.J. Online 1 (2015).
* Jordan Calazan Manalastas is a J.D. candidate at Cornell Law School. He was the Cornell International Law Journal Online Associate on Middle Eastern Affairs from 2013–14. His academic writing and legal training has focused on constitutional law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. He holds an A.B. in political theory from the University of California, Los Angeles.
 For a cursory look at how the United States has behaved, see, e.g., J. Dana Stuster, Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has Overthrown, Foreign Pol’y (Aug. 20, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/; Christopher Hitchens, Believe Me, It’s Torture, Vanity Fair (Aug. 2008), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/hitchens200808 [hereinafter Believe Me, It’s Torture]; Chronology of U.S. Actions Related to the International Criminal Court, American Non-Governmental Org. Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Court (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf.
 See S. Select Comm. on Intelligence,Comm. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rep. No. 113-288 (2014), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014.html [hereinafter Report].
 Barack Obama, Statement by the President Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Dec. 9, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/09/statement-president-report-senate-select-committee-intelligence.
 Carrie Dann, Cheney on Interrogation Tactics: “I Would Do It Again in a Minute”, NBC News (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/cheney-interrogation-tactics-i-would-do-it-again-minute-n268041.
 See Findings and Conclusions, Report, supra note 2, at 3–4.
Report, supra note 2, at 4; see also 160 Cong. Rec. S6410-12 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2010) (statement of Sen. John McCain), available at https://www.congress.gov/crec/2014/12/09/CREC-2014-12-09.pdf; CIA Whitewashing Torture, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 21, 2005) http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/11/20/cia-whitewashing-torture (“[T]he CIA is alleged to have authorized interrogation techniques which do constitute torture, and which the United States has historically considered as such.”); Believe Me, It’s Torture, supra note 1.
 See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 22, 2002, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Want-to-torture-Get-a-warrant-2880547.php.
 See Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes, and Other Rules—The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order 28–30 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
 Initial Rep. of the United States to the Committee Against Torture due in 1995, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.pdf. Crucially, 18 U.S.C. § 242 criminalizes the willful deprivation of any right granted by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Whether the protection from torture derives from the U.S. ratification of the CAT or the Geneva Conventions, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or federal criminal statutes (see infra note 23), the prohibition of torture is manifest. Moreover, state laws criminalize, as a general matter, violence against persons.
 Karlyn Bowman & Jennifer Marsico, American Public Opinion on Torture, Forbes (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2014/12/11/american-public-opinion-on-torture/.
 See Jordan Calazan Manalastas, Vigilante Intervention in Syria, 1 Cornell Int’l L.J. Online 19, 20 (2013), http://cornellilj.org/vigilante-intervention-in-syria/.
 John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration § 160 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946).
 For example, the British officer Robin “Tin-Eye” Stephens was renowned in World War II for his effective handling of Nazi detainees, even as he insisted that “[v]iolence is taboo, for . . . it lowers the standard of information.” Simona Tobia, Conclusions to Interrogation in War and Conflict: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis 268, 288 (Christopher Andrew & Simona Tobia eds., 2014).
 See Findings and Conclusions, Report, supra note 2, at 2.
 See, e.g., Universal Jurisdiction: Accountability for U.S. Torture, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, http://www.ccrjustice.org/case-against-rumsfeld (last visited Mar 15, 2015); Jacey Fortin, CIA Terror War Torture and Rendition Program: An Italian Spy Is Sentenced to Jail—Can Tenet, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Ashcroft Be Next?, Int’l Bus. Times, Feb. 22, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/cia-terror-war-torture-rendition-program-italian-spy-sentenced-jail-can-tenet-rumsfeld-cheney (describing President Obama’s hand in suppressing the extradition request for Americans convicted in absentia by an Italian court).
 See, e.g., Geneva III, supra note 11, at art. 129; CAT, supra note 9, at arts. 5, 7. See also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int’l Law Comm., art. 41, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf..
 David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2009, at A1.
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2441.
 See Stephen Vladeck, Why We Shouldn’t Prosecute the Torturers, Just Security (Dec. 11, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/18288/prosecute-torturers/.


text:
Undergraduate Research Topic: Recent and long-term sedimentation and erosion along the Genesee River floodplain in Livingston and Monroe Counties, NY.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A., 2016. Morphometric analysis of graphoglyptid trace fossils in two dimensions: implications for behavioral evolution in the deep sea: Paleobiology, v. 42, p. 317-334.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2014. Analytical tools for quantifying the morphology of invertebrate trace fossils: Journal of Paleontology, v. 88, p. 747-759. Available here.
Lehane, J.R., & Ekdale, A.A., 2013, Pitfalls, traps, and webs in ichnology: Traces and trace fossils of an understudied behavioral strategy: Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology, v. 375, p. 59-69. Available here.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A., 2013, Fractal analysis of graphoglyptid trace fossils: PALAIOS, v. 28, p. 23-32. Available here.
Martz, J.W.; Mueller, B.; Nesbitt, S.J.; Stocker, M.R.; Parker, W.G.; Atanassov, M.; Fraser, N.; Weinbaum, J. and Lehane, J.R, 2013, A taxonomic and biostratigraphic re-evaluation of the Post Quarry vertebrate assemblage from the Cooper Canyon Formation (Dockum Group, Upper Triassic) of southern Garza County, western Texas: Earth and Environmental Science Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, v. 103, p. 1-26. Available here.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2015. Evolution of benthic animal behavior in the deep sea as reflected in the graphoglyptid trace fossil record: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 47, p. 70.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2013. Evolution, chaos, and climate: What is the driving force of evolution: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 45, p. 699.
Martz, J.W., Mueller, B., Nesbitt, S., Stocker, M.R., Parker, W.G., Atanassov, M., Fraser, N.C., Weinbaum, J.C., & Lehane, J.R., 2013, A taxonomic and biostratigraphic re-evaluation of the Post Quarry vertebrate assemblage from the Cooper Canyon Formation (Dockum Group, Upper Triassic) of Southern Garza Country, Western Texas: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 45.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2012. Fractal trace fossils; Food for thought: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 44, p. 442.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2012. Fractals in feeding: Application of non-Euclidean geometry to interpreting deep-sea trace fossils, Ichnia 2012 – The Third International Congress on Ichnology: St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada.
Lehane, J.R. 2012. Fractals in paleontology: quantification of deep-sea feeding patterns in the geologic record, ExxonMobil Student Research Conference: Houston, TX.
Lehane, J.R., & Ekdale, A.A. 2011. Internet databases in ichnology: The benefits and need for a dynamic Universal Ichnological Database. in Rodríguez-Tovar, F.J., and García-Ramos, J.C., eds., Abstract Book of the XI International Ichnofabric Workshop: Museo del Jurásico de Asturias (MUJA); Colunga, Spain, p. 52-55.
Ekdale, A.A., Harding, S.C., Lehane, J.R., & Good, T.R. 2011. Importance of ichnological data in paleoclimatic studies, 28th IAS Meeting of Sedimentology 2011: Zaragoza, Spain.
Lehane, J. 2009. From dinosaurs to volcanoes: Helping students learn from Hollywood's mistakes: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 41, p. 26.
Lehane, J.R., & Over, D.J. 2002. Canid and rodent scavenging on Pleistocene cave bear: Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 34, p. 150.
Lehane, J.R. and Ekdale, A.A. 2012. Fractals in Feeding - Using geometry to study trace fossils of the deep sea.
Session Co-Chair, Biotic Revolutions Recorded in the Trace Fossil Record, Neoproterozoic to Recent I and II, 2017 Annual Geological Society of America Meeting, Seattle, WA.
Responsibilities: Taught 4 and 5 class sections a semester. Developed entire curriculum, including assignments, quizzes, and exams and graded all materials.
Responsibilities: Taught a couple of lectures a month and graded homework assignments.
Responsibilities:Taught labs, developed and graded labs and quizzes, ran field trip.
Responsibilities: Developed the entire course, including quizzes, exams, and lab exercises. The course encompassed 90 minutes lectures, 3 days a week, over a 2-3 month time period.
Responsibilities: Developed and taught lab sections (2 per semester), developed and graded quizzes, proctored exams, and graded labs.
Responsibilities: Taught 8 lab sections, developed and graded quizzes and labs.
Responsibilities: Taught lab sections with fellow undergraduate (3 total), helped with grading labs, proctored class exams, and assisted with the Geology Learning Center.
Responsibilities: Taught lab section with help of lab coordinator (1 total), helped grade class exams, and grade labs.
Managed the creation of Flood Insurance Studies for multiple counties and watersheds nationwide.
Delineated hydrology and flood estimates for watersheds using ArcHydro for FEMA and NHA.
Updated and maintained maps for the Utah Lake Commission.
Updated and created maps for the Wyoming LAUST projects.
Calculated contaminated soil volumes for Iwilei District Participating Parties (IDPP) in Honolulu, HI.
Created 3D renderings of Andrews Air Force base to illustrate groundwater flow.
Created a 3D video to illustrate the installation of a slurry wall.
Created FEMA floodplain maps for Hardin County, IA; Sanpete County, UT; Macon County, AL; and Uintah County, UT.
Uploaded information into the US Army’s Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructures, and Environment (SDSFIE) format for work in Camp Williams, UT and the Military Department of Arkansas.
Upgraded ArcView files and system from version 3.2 to 9.2.
Analysis of soil, groundwater samples, and geological borelogs.
Created and updated maps and information tables.
Writing and editing environmental and procedural reports.
The project involved field collection, performing stream-based digital imagery, GPS surveying, and laser channel measurements of the Genesee River from Mount Morris to Rochester, NY. The project also involved rectifying and converting aerial photographs of the Genesee River into ArcGIS 8 map formats. The river location was traced and erosion rates were then determined. Refer to acknowledgement on page 33.
- Member of both Steering and Working Committees instrumental in designing the parking garage.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
We provide a coherent picture of our efforts thus far in extending real algebra and its links to the theory of quadratic forms over ordered fields in the noncommutative direction, using hermitian forms and "ordered" algebras with involution.
Keywords: algebra with involution, formally real field, hermitian form, signature, Witt group, positivity, sum of hermitian squares, positive cone, real algebra.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 13J30, 11E39; Secondary: 16K20, 16W10.
A. A. Albert, Involutorial simple algebras and real Riemann matrices, Ann. of Math. (2), 36(1935), 886–964. doi: 10.2307/1968595.
E. Artin, Über die Zerlegung definiter Funktionen in Quadrate, Abh. Math. Sem. Univ. Hamburg, 5 (1927), 100-115. doi: 10.1007/BF02952513.
E. Artin and O. Schreier, Algebraische Konstruktion reeller Körper, Abh. Math. Sem. Univ. Hamburg, 5 (1927), 85-99. doi: 10.1007/BF02952512.
V. Astier and T. Unger, Signatures of hermitian forms and the Knebusch trace formula, Math. Ann., 358 (2014), 925-947. doi: 10.1007/s00208-013-0977-3.
V. Astier and T. Unger, Signatures of hermitian forms and "prime ideals" of Witt groups, Adv. Math., 285 (2015), 497-514. doi: 10.1016/j.aim.2015.07.035.
V. Astier and T. Unger, Positive cones on algebras with involution, preprint, 2017, arXiv: 1609.06601.
V. Astier and T. Unger, Signatures of hermitian forms, positivity, and an answer to a question of Procesi and Schacher, preprint, 2016, arXiv: 1511.06330.
V. Astier and T. Unger, Signatures, sums of hermitian squares and positive cones on algebras with involution, Séminaire de Structures Algébriques Ordonnées 2015–2016, 91 (2017).
V. Astier and T. Unger, Stability index of algebras with involution, Contemporary Mathematics, 697 (2017), 41-50. doi: 10.1090/conm/697/14045.
A. Auel, E. Brussel, S. Garibaldi and U. Vishne, Open problems on central simple algebras, Transform. Groups, 16 (2011), 219-264. doi: 10.1007/s00031-011-9119-8.
E. Bayer-Fluckiger and R. Parimala, Classical groups and the Hasse principle, Ann. of Math. (2), 147 (1998), 651–693. doi: 10.2307/120961.
J. Bochnak, M. Coste and M. -F. Roy, Real Algebraic Geometry, Ergebnisse der Mathematik und ihrer Grenzgebiete (3), vol. 36, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998. doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-03718-8.
T. C. Craven, Orderings, valuations, and Hermitian forms over *-fields, in K-theory and Algebraic Geometry: Connections with Quadratic Forms and Division Algebras (Santa Barbara, CA, 1992), Proc. Sympos. Pure Math., 58, Part 2, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, (1995), 149–160.
T. C. Craven, Valuations and Hermitian forms on skew fields, in Valuation Theory and its Applications, Vol. I (Saskatoon, SK, 1999), Fields Inst. Commun., 32, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, (2002), 103–115.
D. Hilbert, Mathematische Probleme. Vortrag, gehalten auf dem internationalen Mathematiker-Congress zu Paris 1900, Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen, Math.-Phys. Kl., (1900), 253-297.
M. Hochster, Prime ideal structure in commutative rings, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 142 (1969), 43-60. doi: 10.1090/S0002-9947-1969-0251026-X.
I. Klep and T. Unger, The Procesi-Schacher conjecture and Hilbert's 17th problem for algebras with involution, J. Algebra, 324 (2010), 256-268. doi: 10.1016/j.jalgebra.2010.03.022.
M. -A. Knus, Quadratic and Hermitian Forms Over Rings, Grundlehren der Mathematischen Wissenschaften, vol. 294, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-75401-2.
M. -A. Knus, A. Merkurjev, M. Rost and J. -P. Tignol, The Book of Involutions, American Mathematical Society Colloquium Publications, vol. 44, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 1998. doi: 10.1090/coll/044.
T. Y. Lam, An introduction to real algebra, in Ordered Fields and real Algebraic Geometry (Boulder, Colo., 1983), Rocky Mountain J. Math., 14 (1984), 767–814. doi: 10.1216/RMJ-1984-14-4-767.
T. Y. Lam, Introduction to Quadratic Forms Over Fields, Graduate Studies in Mathematics, vol. 67, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 2005.
D. W. Lewis and J.-P. Tignol, On the signature of an involution, Arch. Math. (Basel), 60 (1993), 128-135. doi: 10.1007/BF01199098.
D. W. Lewis and T. Unger, A local-global principle for algebras with involution and Hermitian forms, Math. Z., 244 (2003), 469-477. doi: 10.1007/s00209-003-0490-6.
D. W. Lewis and T. Unger, Hermitian Morita theory: A matrix approach, Irish Math. Soc. Bull., 62 (2008), 37-41.
F. Lorenz and J. Leicht, Die Primideale des Wittschen Ringes, Invent. Math., 10 (1970), 82-88. doi: 10.1007/BF01402972.
A. Pfister, Quadratische Formen in beliebigen Körpern, Invent. Math., 1 (1966), 116-132. doi: 10.1007/BF01389724.
A. Prestel, Quadratische Semi-Ordnungen und quadratische Formen, Math. Z., 133 (1973), 319-342. doi: 10.1007/BF01177872.
A. Prestel, Lectures on Formally Real Fields, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 1093, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1984. doi: 10.1007/BFb0101548.
C. Procesi and M. Schacher, A non-commutative real Nullstellensatz and Hilbert's 17th problem, Ann. of Math. (2), 104 (1976), 395–406. doi: 10.2307/1970962.
A. Quéguiner, Signature des involutions de deuxiéme espéce, Arch. Math. (Basel), 65 (1995), 408-412. doi: 10.1007/BF01198071.
W. Scharlau, Induction theorems and the structure of the Witt group, Invent. Math., 11 (1970), 37-44. doi: 10.1007/BF01389804.
W. Scharlau, Quadratic and Hermitian Forms, Grundlehren der Mathematischen Wissenschaften, vol. 270, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-69971-9.
J. J. Sylvester, A demonstration of the theorem that every homogeneous quadratic polynomial is reducible by real orthogonal substitutions to the form of a sum of positive and negative squares, Philosophical Magazine, 4 (1852), 138-142. doi: 10.1080/14786445208647087.
J. -P. Tignol, Algebras with involution and classical groups, in European Congress of Mathematics, Vol. II (Budapest, 1996), Progr. Math., vol. 169, Birkhäuser, Basel, (1998), 244–258.
A. Weil, Algebras with involutions and the classical groups, J. Indian Math. Soc. (N.S.), 24 (1961), 589-623.
Frank Sottile. The special Schubert calculus is real. Electronic Research Announcements, 1999, 5: 35-39.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.