This article will explore whether Maryland, District of Columbia, and Virginia law (1) allows punitive damages against drunk drivers and, if so, under what circumstances, and (2) supports dram shop liability.
First, a hypothetical story: A regular customer comes into a bar and tells the bartender that he’s had a rough day at work and wants to throw back a few drinks before driving home. Assume this conversation is overheard by a couple sitting at the bar. The customer then has 6 drinks in 2 hours. By the 4 th drink he is slurring his speech. The bartender hears this. The customer gets up and walks a crooked line to the bathroom. The bartender sees this. After the 6th drink, the customer leaves the bar stumbling. The bartender sees this and does nothing. The customer makes it to his SUV. He fires it up, and begins the 25-minute drive home. On the way, he loses control of the SUV, crosses over double-yellow lines into oncoming traffic, and smashes into a small car. In the car was a husband and father of two children in elementary school. The father does not survive the crash.
Under Maryland law, are punitive damages available against the customer? No. Under Komornick v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that in order to maintain an award of punitive damages against a drunk driver, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had “actual malice,” meaning that he intended the harm that he caused.
Okay, so what if the same facts took place in the District of Columbia? First, could the mother and children get punitive damages against the customer of the bar? Answer: Probably not. Punitive damages have not generally been available in DC in cases involving mere drunken driving. Giddings v. Zellan, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 92, 160 F.2d 585, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759 (1947). Twenty years later, the Court of Appeals wrote: “It is our view that Giddings, despite some general language in the opinion, holds only that Maryland law does not permit punitive damages for injuries inflicted by negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Schmidt, 225 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C., 1967).
To recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove more than mere tortious conduct; plaintiff must also prove by clear-and-convincing evidence that the defendant's tortious acts were "accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent." District of Columbia v. Jackson, 810 A.2d 388, 396 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995)). To establish "malice or its equivalent," the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) "the defendant acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or with intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff"; and (2) "the defendant's conduct itself was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward the safety of the plaintiff." District of Columbia v. Jackson, 810 A.2d at 396 (quoting Croley, 759 A.2d at 695). In determining whether the plaintiffs carried this burden at trial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to their cause, asking only "whether there was evidence from which a jury reasonably could find the required malicious intent or willful disregard of another's rights." Tolson v. District of Columbia, 860 A.2d 336, 345 (D.C. 2004) (quoting King v. Kirlin Enters., 626 A.2d 882, 884 (D.C. 1993)).
This reads to this author a lot like Maryland law on this topic.
What about a cause of action against the bartender or bar? D.C. law, unlike Maryland law, does have dram shop liability. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dealt with this issue in Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc. In Zhou, a restaurant’s employees had served alcohol to a customer after he either was, or appeared to be, intoxicated. Sometime later he then left the restaurant and drove into two people, seriously injuring them.
(3) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury or death of the plaintiff.
It may also be possible to establish a common law claim for punitive damages in Virginia if the above statutory requirements cannot be met. In Webb v. Rivers, 256 Va. 460, 507 S.E. 2d 360 (1998), the Virginia Supreme Court found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove the second element of the statutory test for an award of punitive damages (see (2) above). Nonetheless, the Court held that the plaintiff did establish sufficient facts from which the jury could infer the kind of recklessness or negligence that met the common law standard for an award of punitive damages. These facts included that the defendant drove at excessive speed, ran a red light, had a BAC of .21%, and was so drunk that he did not know where he was or what time of night it was.
Additionally, a verdict predicated on intoxication due to alcohol (or another substance) is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 USCA §523(a)(9)(1984). Under this statute, a plaintiff will have 40 years to collect from the defendant any verdict not covered by insurance.
Eric N. Stravitz is the owner of the Maryland-based Stravitz Law Firm, P.C., where he handles A variety of personal injury and medical malpractice claims, lawsuits and trials in federal and state-level courts across the region.
 A “dram” is a measurement of liquid equal to one-eighth of a liquid once. A “dram shop” is an archaic term for a bar or tavern. “Dram shop liability” refers to “[c]ivil liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated customer.” Black's Law Dictionary 568 (9th ed. 2009).
 70 A.3d at 356 (citing Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986)).
 Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc , 534 A.2d 1268 (1987), appeal after remand and reversed and remanded on other grounds by, 699 A.2d 348 (1997), and Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972 (2000).
 Id. at 1276 (emphasis in original).
 Id. at 1277 (citations omitted).
 Id. at 1277 (emphasis in original). The Court explained why: “To permit such a conclusion would be to give force to the very argument that the rule of negligence per se is designed to preempt. The essence of that rule is that ‘the conduct of the defendant or his agent was negligent precisely because it created a risk that a third person would act improperly. In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.’" Id. (citations omitted).
 If the Plaintiff does not prove all three of these things, the statutory punitive damages claim will fail. Webb v. Rivers, 256 Va. 460, 507 S.E. 2d 360 (1998).
 Under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-44.5, a certified copy of a court’s determination of unreasonable refusal to submit to such a blood alcohol test is prima facie evidence that the defendant unreasonably refused to submit to the test. This means that unless the defendant offers evidence to rebut the unreasonable refusal to submit to the blood alcohol test, it will be deemed proven by the trial judge.
 See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc. , 232 Va. 350, 350 S.E. 2d 621 (1986).


§9. The monstrous whale is prominent in medieval traditions, but it is not only kind of whale described. Medieval texts teem with images of mundane whales, seemingly far removed from their monstrous and supernatural kin. Anglo-Saxon texts, including Ælfric's Colloquy, or the Voyage of Ohthere, reveal the economic windfall associated with cetaceans, with little or no apparent concern with the animal's diabolical nature. Likewise, the Icelandic and Norse folk taxonomies, laws, and sagas speak candidly of whale exploitation and various whale species.10 Whales, while oftentimes threatening, appear as creatures found in the seas in great numbers and variety according to most Scandinavian traditions. They are of the highest utility to Norse sailors and settlers, they provide aid in fishing—some species are even protected from harm by stiff financial penalties—and they are the ultimate boon during famine. However, even in these most pragmatic descriptions and discussions of whales, we must ask whether the monstrous whales were ever truly forgotten. "The whale's reputation, already unsavory in antiquity, was only worsened by the accounts of its treachery in the Physiologus and Bestiary" (Ziolkowski 1984, 112). With this pervasive image of the monstrous whale firmly implanted in the minds of medieval audiences, we must question whether the symbolic association of whales with the Devil affected the material usage of whales. Joyce Salisbury (1994, 9), in The Beast Within, concludes that metaphorical meanings behind perceptions of animals "probably did not change the way [people] looked at the many real animals that were serving them." Yet when a massive whale washed ashore, there may have been some question among Christians as to the origin of the whale, that is, whether it was monstrous or mundane.
§10. Medieval authors themselves debated the nature of whales and their apparent monstrosity, one author even going so far as to assert that the monstrous qualities of whales transcended death, imbued within the dead bones of these creatures. Some of the most original descriptions and analyses of whales occur in the works of Albertus Magnus (AD 1193-1280) and Olaus Magnus (AD 1490-1557). Each author claims to derive his data from observation or from direct witnesses of various phenomena.11 As Albertus says: "These facts about the nature of whales have been gleaned from our own experience. We have omitted what the ancients wrote because they do not accord with the practical knowledge of experienced fishermen . . . [who have] examined many whales at close range on innumerable occasions" (Albertus Magnus 14.19, tr. Scanlan 1987, 341). Of Olaus Magnus, Peter Foote declares: "Personal experience is an important element in the Historia [de Gentibus Septentrionalibus] and one can well believe, for example, that Olaus had watched a fishing community deal with a stranded whale" (Foote 1996, lvii).
§11. Albertus Magnus, Dominican friar, saint, bishop, and mentor to St. Thomas Aquinas, described whales at length in his massive encyclopedic work De Animalibus. He included within the discussion of the animal category "Cetus" a host of marine mammals, including dolphins, whales, and even a few monstrous creatures. Albertus's descriptions include whale morphology, behavior, and the various means of capture and butchery employed by fishermen, as he observed at Dutch ports and whale butchering stations. He made an effort to set himself apart from ancient and earlier authors, to act as a good natural philosopher and to dispel myths of capricious whale behavior as described in ancient texts. Albertus writes that "the whale has a capacious mouth from which it spews large quantity of water when it breathes, an amount sometimes sufficient to swamp and sink small boats" (Albertus Magnus 14.15, tr. Scanlan 1987, 336). The whale did not intentionally destroy boats and men, as myth often contends; according to Albertus, such accidents were merely an aspect of their biology or behavior. He asked fishermen whom he observed to dispel myths of certain whale behaviors. For example, the female whale is said to descend to the depths of the sea after mating, where it fattens "to the size of an island . . . . I do not believe this to be true, nor do others who have first hand knowledge of whales" (Albertus Magnus 14.16, tr. Scanlan 1987, 337). Albertus's descriptions of hunting strategies, butchering, and whale behavior are among the most complex and accurate of the pre-modern period. He even offers us a lengthy description of a proto-Nantucket sleigh-ride six centuries before Melville (Albertus Magnus 14.18, tr. Scanlan 1987, 339-340). However, while Albertus seems to transcend the stereotypical definition of the monstrous whale, separating the mythic creature from its materials, other authors embrace medieval traditions, perceiving whales both living and dead as fully monstrous, literally "bad to the bone."
§15. Insight into medieval perceptions of monstrous whales and their utility is most notable in Olaus Magnus, but especially in the Icelandic family sagas or Islendingasögur.13 The Icelandic sagas are perhaps our preeminent source for perceptions of whale utility in the North Atlantic world, as they provide numerous references to whale use, particularly whale strandings. A common topos exists in the sagas involving famine; a large stranded whale, usually a rorqual on disputed or common land; and a dramatic human conflict over the division of the stranded whale. This conflict always sees the invocation of law and often involves a physical struggle over the proper division of the whale. Throughout these stranded whale scenes, the drama is almost fully played out on the human level and is almost certainly played for comic effect, as in the famous whale stranding scene of Grettir's Saga. In this episode, the stranded whale, a great rorqual, serves as nothing more than a pretext for the human drama that ensues. In fact, the whale is quite literally the stage for the drama—serving as the platform upon which the battle is fought, while its bones and blubber become weapons and missiles: "I've heard how steely weapons were used, when whale-blubber was wielded at Rif Skerries. The fighters kept exchanging lethal whale-meat missiles. That's how these boors play the game of battle" (Grettir's Saga 12, tr. Fox and Pálsson 1974, 20). But not all whales in the Northern tradition were so benign.
§19. The most notable episode of a dead whale's monstrous or supernatural essence affecting its material utility is recounted by Olaus Magnus in his description of whalebone houses of Northern Scandinavia. Within these houses the whale's monstrous nature lives on within its disarticulated, now architectural, bones. Whalebone houses are found in a handful of ancient texts and archaeologically throughout the Arctic, Africa, and Asia. 17 Olaus Magnus offered a unique perspective on the whalebone house, unseen in other sources. Olaus explains that the harsh climate of Arctic Norway does not allow sizable trees to grow, so wood is not readily available for building. However, provident Nature has taken thought for the inhabitants and enabled them to construct houses and all the requisite furniture within the gigantic ribs of these animals . . . it is a known fact that the bones which remain are so strong and enormous that people can produce from them entire homes: walls, doors, windows, roofs, chairs, and even tables. The ribs are twenty to thirty feet long, or even more, while the spinal vertebrae and the forked bones of the colossal skull are themselves of no small magnitude . . . . Once the flesh and internal organs of the massive beast have wasted away and perished, only the bones remain, in the shape of a huge keel. After the skeleton has eventually been cleansed by rains and fresh air, strong men are enlisted to erect it in the form of a house. The one who is supervising its construction exerts himself to put windows at the top of the building or in the monster's sides, and divides the interior into several comfortable living quarters. The doors are made from the creature's hide, which has long since been stripped off for this or some different purpose and hardened by the rough winds (Olaus Magnus 21.22, 24, ed. Foote 1996, 1105, 1107).
Even when the whale bones were fashioned into a house, there remained a recognition that the house retained the character of the whale. The windows are described as on top of the structure, but also in "the monster's sides" (Olaus Magnus 21.15, ed. Foote 1996, 1098). The house not only served as a domestic space; it simultaneously retained some elements of its animal form and character.
§23. Few archaeological artifacts tell stories of their construction, their utility, or perceptions held of their material of creation. It is difficult to diagnose the primary function of many objects, much less the perceptions held of them. Objects bearing inscriptions, though, do tell stories, often of their ownership or lineage, their religious dedications, or perhaps function. Few objects speak as voluminously as does the Franks Casket, a small lidded whalebone box from eighth-century Northumbria. The Franks Casket, the most famous medieval whalebone artifact, provides compelling testimony on how perceptions about a creature may affect the use of its material resources. This exquisite casket is bedecked not only with iconography from Christian, Germanic, and Roman traditions, but also bears carved Latin and Runic inscriptions. The front panel of the casket—showing scenes of Weyland the Smith and the Adoration of the Magi—offers the following inscription, which rings the front panel: "The fish (fisc) beat up the sea on to the mountainous cliff. The king of terror became sad where he swam on to the shingle. Whale's bone" (Webster and Backhouse 1991, 101).
§24. In this inscription, the material of the box is identified alongside the manner of the acquisition of the material—the stranding of the whale, the so-called king of terror. This inscription may have elevated the status and value of the object itself, for it was crafted from the bones of the "king of terror." Would this material, like the bones of the whalebone house, not be considered somewhat exotic or powerful? Clearly the material must matter, otherwise its origins would not have merited mention. However, the question remains whether the material was thought to impart any of the essence of its former existence. One must question whether the material would have merited inscription if it had been something more mundane; the archaeological record offers few such examples. The inscription implies that the material itself is as fantastic as any of the magical iconography spanning the box. The Franks Casket, when considered alongside literary evidence for the significance of whale symbolism, reveals that perception of the animal could impact how materials were valued and received, if not used. Most archaeological evidence, though, is less forthcoming in revealing how cultural perceptions impacted the use of an animal. However, consideration of numerous North Atlantic assemblages of whalebone artifacts may reveal more than historians or archaeologists hitherto have appreciated.


Gore v. El Paso Energy: (a)(1)(B) or (a)(3) relief?
I talked about my frustration about the federal judiciary’s collective amnesia regarding pleading in the alternative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) some days ago. You can find those comments here. A new case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit yesterday provides another helpful perspective on the relationship between ERISA §502(a)(1)(B), the section providing recovery for wrongfully denied plan benefits and §502(a)(3), which authorizes courts to provide “other appropriate equitable relief” to redress violations of the plan or the terms of ERISA. Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. LTD Plan, ___ F.3d ___, (6th Cir. 2007), 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3905, deals with an individual who worked for an employer with a disability plan that provided benefits for 24 months if an employee was disabled from their own occupation. After the initial two year period, the employee had to be disabled from any occupation to receive benefits. The company was purchased by another company, El Paso Energy. Representatives from El Paso Energy told Gore that after the purchase, the disability plan would continue to provide two years of “own occupation” disability benefits. However, shortly after the purchase, El Paso Energy funded the disability plan by purchasing an insurance policy from Liberty Life that provided only one year of “own occupation” disability benefits before switching to the “any occupation” standard. Gore became disabled shortly thereafter. Liberty Life paid one year of disability benefits and thereafter determined that even though Gore may have continued to be disabled from his own occupation, he could work in any occupation so it cut off Gore's benefits after one year. Gore sued Liberty Life for wrongful denial of benefits arguing that he was in fact disabled from any occupation after the first year of benefits. He also brought another cause of action against El Paso Energy arguing that they had misrepresented the benefits he was entitled to when they told him they would continue to provide own occupation disability benefits for two years rather than only one. The trial court ruled against Gore on the first claim because it determined he was able to work in any occupation after one year. It then dismissed Gore’s misrepresentation claim against his employer on the basis that it was simply a repackaged claim for benefits duplicating the first claim for unpaid insurance policy money. The Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court on this last point. The appeal court discussed the relationship between (a)(1)(B) claims, those for violation of the terms of the ERISA plan, and (a)(3) claims, those for “appropriate equitable relief” based on violations of the ERISA plan or for violation of the statute itself. It acknowledged the Supreme Court’s language in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) stating that ordinarily equitable claims under (a)(3) will not be necessary where a claim under (a)(1)(B) provides adequate relief for a claimant However, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that Gore’s claim for misrepresentation was independent of his claim for wrongfully denied benefits. Even if he lost his argument that he was entitled to benefits under the terms of the disability insurance policy, he could still argue that the employer’s misrepresentation of the terms of that policy provided a basis to award him those benefits. Furthermore, the relief provided from (a)(1)(B) was not as broad as the “appropriate equitable relief” provided under (a)(3). So, two things were key to the Sixth Circuit analysis. First, the fact that a claim for wrongful denial of benefits under (a)(1)(B) did not address the separate claim for misrepresentation. Second, the fact that the misrepresentation claim was brought by Gore against his employer, not the disability insurer. The decision recognizes that if Gore had prevailed on his claim for benefits against the insurer, his claim for misrepresentation against his employer would have been moot. This is because all the compensation Gore sought under the misrepresentation claim would have been provided under the successful breach of contract claim and he wouldn't be able to recover the same money twice. But because he lost his (a)(1)(B) claim for breach of contract, the misrepresentation claim was still available to provide a potential source for recovery. The Sixth Circuit sent the case back to the trial court with instructions that it evaluate the misrepresentation claim with its request for appropriate equitable relief with the end in mind that potential remedies could be in the form of reformation, rescission, reinstatement, equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel.
Post a Comment to "Gore v. El Paso Energy: (a)(1)(B) or (a)(3) relief?"


text:
1. Мухин К.Ю., Петрухин А.С., Глухова Л.Ю. Эпилепсия. Атлас электро-клинической диагностки - М.: Альварес Паблишинг, 2004.
2. Мухин К.Ю., Миронов М.Б., Ткаченко О.А., Гоева И.А., Петрухин А.С. Гипнагогическая гиперсинхронизация // Рус жур дет невр. - 2010. - Т. V (2). - С. 3-10.
3. Alvarez N., Lombroso S.T., Medina C., Cantlon B. Paroxysmal spike and wave activity in drowsiness in young children: its relationship febrile convulsions // Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol. - 1983. - V. 56(5). - P. 406-413.
4. Benbadis S.R., Heriaud L., O'Neill E., et al. Which Electroencephalogram Patterns Are Commonly Misread as Epileptiform? // Epilepsia. - 2004. - V. 45. - P. 1150-53.
5. Beun A.M., van Emde Boas W., Dekker E. Sharp transients in the sleep EEG of healthy adults: a pitfall in the diagnostic assessment of seizure disorders // Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol. - 1998. - V. 106. - P. 44-51.
6. Blume W.T., Kaibara M. Atlas of pediatric electroencephalography. 2nd ed. - Philadelphia (PA): Lippincott Raven, 1999.
7. Blume W.T., Kaibara M., Young G.B. Atlas of adult electroencephalography. 2nd ed. - Philadelphia (PA): Lippincott Raven, 2002.
8. Crespel A., Gelisse P. EEG and sleep / In: Atlas of electroencephalography. Volume 1. Awake and sleep EEG. Activation procedures and Artifacts. - John Libbey Eurotext, 2005. - P. 147-276.
9. Doose H. EEG in childhood epilepsy. Initial presentation and long-term follow-up. - John Libbey Eurotext, 2003. - P. 48-49.
10. Gibbs F.A., Gibbs E.L. edit. Minimal seizure activity and rare patterns / In: Epilepsy. Vol. II. Atlas of electroencephalography. - Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1952. - P. 346-374.
11. Helou J., Navarro V., Depienne C., Fedirko E., LeGuern E., Baulac M., An-Gourfinkel I., Adam C. K-complexinduced seizures in autosomal dominant nocturnal frontal lobe epilepsy // Clin Neurophysiol. - 2008. - V. 119(10). - P. 2201-4.
12. Kellaway P., Fox B.J. Electroencephalographic diagnosis cerebral pathology in infants during sleep. I. Rationale, technique, and the characteristics of normal sleep in infants // J.Pediatr. - 1953. - V. 41. - P. 262-287.
13. Kellaway P. An orderly approach to visual analysis: Characteristics of the normal EEG of adults and children / In: Daly D.D., Pedley T.A., edit. Current practice of clinical electroencephalography. 2nd ed. - New York: Raven Press, 1990. - P. 139-199.
14. Klass D.W., Westmoreland B.F. Nonepileptogenic epileptiform electroencephalographic activity // Ann Neurol. - 1985. - V. 18. - P. 627-35.
15. MacDonald D. Normal electroencephalogram and benign variants // Neurosciences. - 2003. - V. 8 (2). - P. 110-118.
16. Mirsattari S.M. EEG Course, - CNSF, Quebec City, QE Friday June 11, 2010.
17. Niedermeyer E. Sleep and EEG / In: Niedermeyer E., Lopes da Silva F., edit. Electroencephalography: basic principles, clinical applications, and related fields. 3rd ed. - Baltimore (MD): Williams & Wilkins, 1993. - P. 153-166.
18. Radhakrishnan K., Santoshkumar B., Venugopal A. Prevalence of benign epileptiform variants observed in an EEG laboratory from South India // Clin Neurophysiol. - 1999. - V. 110. - P. 280-285.
19. Reiher J., Lebel M. Wicket spikes: clinical correlates of a previously undescribed EEG pattern // Can J Neurol Sci. - 1977. - V. 4. - P. 39-47.
21. Terzano M.G., Mancia D., Salati M.R., Costani G., Decembrino A., Parino. The cyclic alternating pattern as a physiologic component of normal NREM sleep // Sleep. - 1985. - V. 8. - P. 137-145.
22. Westmoreland B.F. Benign variants and patterns of uncertain significance / In: Daly D.D., Pedley T.A., editors. Current practice of clinical electroencephalography. 2nd ed. - New York (NY): Raven Press, 1990. - P. 243-252.
23. Westmoreland B.F. Benign variants and patterns of uncertain significance / In: Ebersole J.S., Pedley T.A., editors. Current practice of clinical electroencephalography. 3nd ed. - New York (NY): Raven Press, 2003. - P. 235-245.
24. White J.S., Tharp B.R. An arousal pattern in children with organic cerebral dysfunction // Electroncephalogr. - Clin. Neurophysiol. - 1974. - V. 37. - P. 265-268.
25. Zurek R., Scheimann Delgado J., Froescher W., Niedermeyer E. Frontal intermittent rhythmical delta activity and anterior bradyrhythmia // Clin. Electroencephalogr. - 1985. - V. 16. - P. 1-10.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
It now appears that the eight added cases, along with others previously accepted for the new Term, will be heard by the Justices before the end of this calendar year, and by only eight Justices. There appears little prospect that a ninth Justice would be approved by the Senate before then.
Perhaps the most significant of the disputes that the Court agreed to hear, in the final orders of the now-ended Term, is a test of who may sue mortgage lenders and housing operators for racial discrimination in housing. The specific issue is whether city governments — here, the city of Miami, Fla. — are among those whom Congress has given permission to sue to enforce the equality guarantees of the Fair Housing Act. That question will be heard in the consolidated cases of Bank of America v. Miami and Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami. Lower courts are deeply split on the issue.
Another pair of cases, joined for shared review, will test whether major credit card companies can be sued by consumers under federal antitrust law for agreeing among themselves, and with banks, on the fees to be charged when people access their bank accounts by using ATM machines. The consolidated cases are Visa v. Osborn and Visa v. Stoumbos.
The Justices will take on a significant new test of the right to sue for parents of a disabled child who needs assistance while attending schools that receive federal funds. The issue in a case from a small Michigan community (Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools) is whether a disabled child’s family must first try to work out with school officials a dispute over the assistance their child needs, before the parents may sue for damages under federal anti-discrimination law. The dispute in the case involves a claim by a disabled girl’s family that the school would not allow her to bring a service dog to help her during her classes. The Justice Department, asked by the Supreme Court for its views, urged the Justices to hear the case.
Besides taking on the new cases, the Justices turned aside — over the protests of dissenting Justices — two controversial cases.
Again without an explanation, the Court refused to hear a Delaware group’s challenge to a new state law requiring the public disclosure of information about people who gave money to an organization that sought to put out a guide for voters. In Delaware Strong Families v. Denn, Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion for himself alone, arguing that the Court should now reconsider its support for compelled disclosure rules for political donors. Justice Alito separately noted simply that he would have granted review of the Delaware group’s petition.
Following Monday’s ruling striking down a Texas law requiring that doctors who perform abortions must obtain admitting privileges at a hospital near their clinics as part of its decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Justices simply denied review on Tuesday of two other cases by states seeking to defend similar laws: a Mississippi case, Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and a Wisconsin case, Schimel v. Planned Parenthood.
** Lynch v. Morales-Santana, an appeal by the federal government, seeks to defend the constitutionality of less favorable treatment, for purposes of U.S. citizenship, of a child born abroad whose father is a U.S. citizen than the treatment given to a child born abroad whose mother is a U.S. citizen.
** Ivy v. Morath, a case pursued by five hearing-impaired Texans, asks the Court to clarify when a state agency is responsible for discrimination against the disabled when the agency farms out a public program to a private vendor. The dispute in the case involves a plea by the disabled individuals to have a sign-language interpreter provided for classes at privately run driver’s education classes. The Court asked the U.S. Solicitor General for the government’s views on the case, and the response urged the Justices to bypass review; review was granted anyway.
** Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International, a case filed by the South American nation, seeking to have the Court clarify when a foreign government may be sued in U.S. courts for seizing property located in that country but owned by a U.S. firm. The case grows out of that government’s nationalization of the oil industry six years ago. The U.S. Solicitor General urged the Court to grant review only of the pleading standard required for a claim that a foreign government’s action is not immune from a lawsuit in the U.S. under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. That is the only question that will be considered, under the Court’s order.
** Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., is a test of whether a bankruptcy court may dismiss a case that has been settled through an agreement that gives payment to lower-ranking creditors ahead of more senior-ranked creditors. Accepting the suggestion of the Solicitor General, the Court agreed to hear the case. The case involved the failure to follow the priority due to former workers’ benefit claims when their New Jersey trucking company filed for bankruptcy after it was taken over by investors in a leveraged buyout. Nineteen states joined in urging the Justices to decide the case. The case raises a major legal question over how bankruptcy courts are to deal with so-called “structural dismissals” — apparently, an increasing phenomenon in bankruptcy practice.
** Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., involves an appeal by two Californians, involved in a mortgage dispute. They asked the Court to spell out when a federal court has the authority to decide a case against “Fannie Mae” — the Federal National Mortgage Association. That is a federally chartered corporation that Congress has given the right to sue, and be sued. The question is what that provision means. This was another petition that the Court accepted for review at the suggestion of the U.S. Solicitor General.
With Tuesday’s eight new controversies on its docket, the Court has now accepted enough cases for review to take it through its December sitting.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


increase the dollar threshold at which a gaming establishment governed by G.L. c. 23K is required to check winnings against outstanding child support obligations or outstanding tax liabilities.
An Act Establishing Expanded Gaming in the Commonwealth (the Expanded Gaming Act), effective November 22, 2011, added new G.L. c. 23K to the General Laws, which provides for expanded gaming in Massachusetts under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission. The Expanded Gaming Act authorized the Massachusetts Gaming Commission to license one casino in each of three regions in the state, and a single slots parlor. In addition, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission assumed all regulatory duties and responsibilities for the state’s horse racing industry. The Expanded Gaming Act amended various tax statutes with regard to wagering activity, including the General Laws relating to Massachusetts personal income tax and withholding, G.L. cc. 62 and 62B.
A second statutory change, the 2015 Act, effective March 31, 2015, has now further amended the personal income tax and withholding statutes by modifying the income calculation rules regarding winnings and losses from specified wagering activities and by adopting new withholding and reporting thresholds for different types of wagering. This TIR sets forth the statutory changes included in the 2015 Act.
For purposes of the personal income tax, Massachusetts gross income is federal gross income as defined under the IRC of January 1, 2005, with certain modifications not relevant here. G.L. c. 62, § 2(a). Federal gross income is all income from whatever source derived, except from those sources specifically excluded by the IRC. IRC § 61. Federal gross income includes winnings from all types of gambling including, without limitation, the Massachusetts Lottery and other lotteries, casino and slot parlor gaming, charitable gaming (e.g., bingo, beano raffles, dogs and horse track betting (live or simulcast)) and any other type of gambling. A Massachusetts resident must include in Massachusetts gross income any lottery and wagering winnings includible in federal gross income, whether the winnings are from gambling in Massachusetts or in another state or jurisdiction. For Massachusetts tax purposes, lottery and wagering income are Part B income taxed at the applicable rate for the calendar year.
A nonresident must include in Massachusetts gross income items of gross income that arise from Massachusetts sources. Items of gross income from sources within the commonwealth include items of gross income derived from or effectively connected with the participation in any lottery or wagering transaction within the commonwealth, including gaming winnings acquired at or through a gaming establishment licensed under chapter 23K. A nonresident must include in Massachusetts gross income any Massachusetts lottery winnings, wagering winnings from a casino or slot parlor located in Massachusetts, winnings from a multijurisdictional lottery if the winning ticket was purchased within Massachusetts, winnings from pari-mutuel wagering paid by a Massachusetts racetrack or simulcast center and winnings from any other wagering transaction within Massachusetts.
Taxpayers are required to report the full amount of their winnings as gross income on their tax returns, without any reduction for gambling losses. In other words, taxpayers may not offset their gambling winnings with gambling losses and report the difference as gross income, notwithstanding that a deduction for certain gambling losses may be permitted as described below.
[l]osses from wagering transactions, that were incurred at a gaming establishment licensed in accordance with chapter 23K or a racing meeting licensee or simulcasting licensee, only to the extent of the gains from such transactions.
A taxpayer may claim a deduction for gambling losses incurred in a calendar year only if the losses were incurred at any gaming establishment licensed in accordance with chapter 23K or a racing meeting licensee or simulcasting licensee and only if the taxpayer had wagering winnings from any such gaming establishment licensed in accordance with chapter 23K or a racing meeting licensee or simulcasting licensee in the same calendar year. The deduction allowed for such losses may not exceed the amount of such winnings included in gross income for the calendar year.
Because Massachusetts does not adopt the deductions under IRC § 165(d), the deduction for gambling losses set forth in G.L. c. 62, § 3(B)(a)(18) is the only deduction for gambling losses allowed a Massachusetts taxpayer, unless the gambling activities of the taxpayer constitute a trade or business. The new deduction is effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2015.
Massachusetts will follow federal rules and guidance with regards to accounting for gambling winnings and losses. Under that guidance, whether a taxpayer has gambling winnings or gambling losses is determined per occasion. See CCM AM2008-011. In keeping with federal standards, Massachusetts will require taxpayers to keep accurate records showing their winnings or losses for each occasion separately. See Rev. Proc. 77-29, 1977-2 CB 538. As noted above, taxpayers are required to include in gross income on their tax returns the full amount of their winnings for the year, and may not offset their gambling winnings with gambling losses and include in gross income only the difference. Taxpayers may claim a deduction for gambling losses for Massachusetts purposes only as set forth in G.L. c. 62, § 3(B)(a)(18).
gambling losses of $1000 from a casino licensed under chapter 23K.
For Massachusetts income tax purposes, the taxpayer must include all $2500 of its gambling winnings in Massachusetts gross income. The taxpayer may claim a deduction for gambling losses from a casino licensed under chapter 23K but only to the extent of winnings from a casino licensed under chapter 23K. No deduction is available for the taxpayer’s gambling losses from other sources. The taxpayer had winnings of $800 and losses of $1,000 from a casino licensed under chapter 23K. Thus, the taxpayer may claim a deduction of $800. The remaining $200 of loss from the casino licensed under chapter 23K may not be deducted.
Same facts as Example 1, except taxpayer is a nonresident.
For Massachusetts income tax purposes, a nonresident taxpayer must include in Massachusetts gross income gambling winning from Massachusetts sources, which winnings total $1300. The taxpayer may claim a deduction for gambling losses from a casino licensed under chapter 23K but only to the extent of winnings from a casino licensed under chapter 23K. No deduction is available for the taxpayer’s gambling losses from other sources. The taxpayer had winnings of $800 and losses of $1,000 from a casino licensed under chapter 23K. Thus, the taxpayer may claim a deduction of $800. The remaining $200 of loss from the casino licensed under chapter 23K may not be deducted.
gambling losses of $510 from Massachusetts Lottery scratch tickets.
For Massachusetts income tax purposes, the taxpayer must include all $2500 of its gambling winnings in Massachusetts gross income. Since none of the taxpayer’s gambling losses were incurred at a casino licensed under chapter 23K and no deduction is available for the taxpayer’s gambling losses from other sources, the taxpayer may claim no deduction for gambling losses.
For Massachusetts income tax purposes, the taxpayer must include all $1700 of its gambling winnings in Massachusetts gross income. Because the taxpayer does not have any winnings from a casino licensed under chapter 23K, the taxpayer may claim no deduction for its gambling losses incurred at a casino licensed under chapter 23K. No deduction is available for the taxpayer’s gambling losses from other sources.
The Expanded Gaming Act established thresholds for personal income tax withholding that have now been amended by the 2015 Act. Under G.L. c. 62B, § 2, as revised, Massachusetts withholding on specified gambling winnings, with the exception of withholding on lottery winnings, is generally aligned with the federal withholding requirements under IRC § 3402.
The 2015 Act amended the prior withholding rules in G.L. c. 62B, § 2 applicable to gambling income in two ways. First, it amended the provisions of the seventh paragraph of that section as indicated below. Second, it added a new paragraph eight, which is set out subsequently.
Every person, including the United States, the commonwealth or any other state, or any political subdivision or instrumentality of the foregoing, making any payment of lottery or wagering winnings which are subject to tax under chapter 62 and which are subject to withholding under section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, without the exception for slot machines, keno and bingo played at licensed casinos in subsections (q)(5) and (r) of said section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, shall deduct and withhold from such payment an amount equal to 5 per cent of such payment, except that such withholding for purposes of this chapter shall apply to payments of winnings of $600 or greater notwithstanding any contrary provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
The 2015 Act removed from the statute the words shown in strike-out font in the quoted paragraph. The deletions limit the application of paragraph 7 to lottery winnings. Under the amended language, lottery winnings of $600 or more continue to be subject to Massachusetts personal income tax withholding.
A person at a gaming establishment licensed in accordance with G.L. c. 23K making a payment of winnings of $1,200 or more from slot machine play shall file a form W-2G with respect to such payment. A person making a payment of winnings of $600 or more from pari-mutuel wagering shall file a form W-2G with respect to such payment if the proceeds are at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered. For purposes of this section, in determining whether winnings equal or exceed the $1,200 or $600 amounts, the amount of winnings shall not be reduced by the amount wagered. A person making a payment of winnings from wagering at a gaming establishment or from pari-mutuel wagering which are subject to tax under chapter 62 and subject to withholding under section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code shall deduct and withhold an amount equal to 5 percent of such payment. A person who is to receive a payment of winnings which are subject to withholding shall furnish the person making such payment a statement, made under the penalties of perjury, containing the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the person receiving the payment and of each person entitled to any portion of that payment. Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, any review or transmission of information required to be done by a gaming licensee relative to the disbursement of cash or prize winnings shall be administered consistent with this paragraph and based upon real-time information.
New paragraph 8 added by the 2015 Act, quoted above, addresses both income tax withholding and reporting requirements with respect to licensed gaming establishments and pari-mutuel wagering. Withholding is required for taxable winnings under G.L. c. 62B only if the payment of winnings is subject to federal withholding under IRC § 3402. The withholding rate is 5 percent. Reporting is required for slot machine winnings of $1,200 or more and pari-mutuel winnings of $600 or more, provided that the proceeds from the pari-mutuel wagering are at least 300 times the amount wagered. The 2015 Act does not establish reporting requirements for wagering winnings other than those from slot machines or pari-mutuel wagering, such as table games, keno, or bingo played at a licensed casino.
Withholding. Neither the Expanded Gaming Act nor the 2015 Act changed the treatment of lottery winnings, including winnings from the Massachusetts State Lottery. For winnings of $600 or more, the Massachusetts State Lottery is required to deduct and withhold an amount equal to 5 percent of the payment made to any winner, regardless of residency. If the proceeds from the wager are winnings subject to Massachusetts withholding, then the total proceeds from the wager, and not merely the amounts in excess of $600, are subject to withholding. See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(q)-1(b).
Reporting. Reporting on Form W-2G is required on lottery winnings of $600 or more.
Withholding. Under revised G.L. c. 62B, § 2, withholding on slot machine winnings is required if the winnings are subject to federal withholding under IRC § 3402. For federal purposes, withholding under IRC § 3402(q)(5) generally is not required as to winnings derived from slot machines, and as a result of changes made by the 2015 Act, Massachusetts now follows this treatment for winnings at a gaming establishment governed by G.L. c. 23K.
Reporting. Slot machine winnings of $1,200 or more must be reported on Form W-2G. G.L. c. 62B, § 2, ¶ 8. The amount wagered is not subtracted from the winnings in determining whether the $1,200 threshold has been met. Id. The Massachusetts reporting requirement is now the same as the federal reporting requirement.
Withholding. Under the revised G.L. c. 62B, § 2, withholding on table game winnings (including, for example, winnings from blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette, and the big-6 wheel) is required if the payment is subject to federal withholding under IRC § 3402. For federal purposes, under the general rule for withholding on wagering winnings, proceeds of more than $5,000 from a wagering transaction are subject to withholding if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times the amount wagered. Massachusetts follows this withholding threshold with regard to table games at a gaming establishment licensed under G.L. c. 23K. G.L. c. 62B, § 2, ¶ 8. If the proceeds from the wager are winnings subject to Massachusetts withholding, then the total proceeds from the wager, and not merely the amounts in excess of $5,000, are subject to withholding.
Reporting. If withholding is required, the payer of winnings must report the amount paid on Form W-2G.
Withholding. Under the revised G.L. c. 62B, § 2, withholding on winnings from pari-mutuel wagering at any racing meeting licensee or simulcasting licensee is required if the payment is subject to federal withholding under IRC § 3402. Under IRC § 3402(q)(3)(C)(ii), a payment of winnings of $5,000 or greater from horse or dog racing (including winnings from simulcast horse or dog racing) is subject to withholding, but only if the winnings are at least 300 times as large as the amount that was wagered. If the proceeds from the wager are winnings subject to Massachusetts withholding, then the total proceeds from the wager, and not merely the amounts in excess of $5000, are subject to withholding. See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(q)-1(b).
Reporting. Pari-mutuel wagering winnings of $600 or more, not reduced by the amount wagered, must be reported if the proceeds are at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered. The person making the payment of winnings must file a Form W-2G if the reporting threshold has been met.
Withholding. Under the revised G.L. c. 62B, § 2, withholding on winnings from keno and bingo at a gaming establishment licensed under G.L. c. 23K is required if the payment is subject to federal withholding under IRC § 3402. G.L. c. 62B, § 2, ¶ 8. For federal purposes, these forms of wagering generally are exempt from withholding under IRC § 3402(q)(5). Accordingly, keno and bingo winnings from a gaming establishment licensed under G.L. c. 23K are not subject to Massachusetts tax withholding. The reference to keno and bingo in paragraph 7 of G.L. c. 62B, § 2 is limited to payment of lottery winnings.
Reporting. No reporting is required for winnings from keno and bingo played at a gaming establishment licensed under G.L. c. 23K.
Withholding. Massachusetts generally follows the federal withholding rules that apply to the gambling winnings of nonresident aliens. IRC § 3402(q), which requires withholding on certain gambling winnings, references IRC § 1441(a) for the withholding treatment of nonresident aliens. Under IRC § 1441(a), withholding of 30 percent is generally required on the payment of U.S. source income, including gambling income, to nonresident aliens. There are exceptions to the general rule. Winnings paid to a nonresident alien from blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette, or big-6 wheel are not subject to federal withholding. Further, the U.S. wagering winnings of residents of certain countries are exempt from U.S. taxation by treaty.
If federal withholding is required at any rate, Massachusetts withholding at 5 percent is also required.
Reporting. If withholding is required, the payer of winnings must report the amount paid.
Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, any review or transmission of information required to be done by a gaming licensee relative to the disbursement of cash or prize winnings shall be administered consistent with this paragraph and based upon real-time information.
As a result of this amendment, the dollar threshold at which a gaming licensee must check winnings against tax or child support debts pursuant to G.L. c. 23K, § 51, has been increased to the dollar level at which reporting is required under G.L. c. 62B, § 2, for the applicable type of gaming, as described in this TIR. For slot machine winnings, the revised level is $1200, which is not reduced by the amount wagered.
Under the 2015 Act, this reporting is required even where the payment is not subject to federal taxation or withholding under the IRC. Thus, a person making payments of winnings subject to the Massachusetts personal income tax or withholding is required to file an information return in Massachusetts even if the winnings are not subject to federal income tax or withholding.
G.L. c. 10, § 38 provides for the licensing of certain organizations to conduct beano games, raffles or bazaars. The 2015 Act does not change the requirement under G.L. c. 62C, § 18 that every organization operating or conducting a game under G.L. c. 10, § 38 must, within ten days after such game is held, file an information return with the Commissioner containing the names and addresses of all persons receiving prizes over $500 in such game and the amount of every such prize.
 St. 2015, c. 10, §§ 12 -14.
 “Racing meeting licensee or simulcast licensee” refers to a person licensed by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission to conduct live or to simulcast horse or dog races where any form of betting or wagering on the speed or ability of horses and dogs shall be permitted.
(A) In general. — Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), proceeds of more than $5,000 from a wagering transaction, if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered.
(B) State-conducted lotteries.— Proceeds of more than $5,000 from a wager placed in a lottery conducted by an agency of a State acting under authority of State law, but only if such wager is placed with the State agency conducting such lottery, or with its authorized employees or agents.
(ii) a wagering transaction in a pari-mutuel pool with respect to horse races, dog races, or jai alai if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered.
 G.L. c. 62B, § 2, as amended by St. 2011, c. 194, § 28 and St. 2015, c. 10, §§ 13, 13A, & 14.
 Withholding applies to a winning ticket of $600 or more even if several individuals jointly own the ticket and each person’s “share” is less than $600. If winnings are to be split among several winners, winners are reported on Form 5754, Statement by Person(s) Receiving Gambling Winnings.
 IRC § 3402(q)(5) provides that the general withholding rule does not apply to winnings from a slot machine, keno, or bingo. Federal backup withholding is required under IRC § 3406 and Treas. Reg. § 7.6041-1 if the player fails to give a tax identification number.
 Prior to the 2015 Act, paragraph 7 of the Massachusetts withholding statute specifically disallowed the federal exception for withholding on slot machines. No such exception remains in the revised statute.
 G.L. c. 62B, § 2 (paragraph 8); see also G.L. c. 62B, § 5.
 G.L. c. 62B, § 2 (paragraph 8).
 G.L. c. 62B, § 2; IRC § 3402(q)(5).
 Note that winnings from legal wagers initiated outside the U.S. in a pari-mutuel pool with respect to a live horse or dog race in the U.S. are excluded from federal gross income. IRC § 872(b)(5).
 Gambling income of residents (as defined by treaty) of the following foreign countries is, at the time of this writing, not taxable by the U.S.: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Gambling income of residents of Malta is taxed at 10 percent. See Internal Revenue Service Publication 515 for a current list of countries that have treaties with the U.S. regarding the taxation of gambling income.
 G.L. c. 62B, § 2, ¶ 8.
 G.L. c. 62B, §§ 2, 5.
 G.L. c. 62C, § 8. See also DOR Directives 93-5, 94-10, and 97-3 which set out the reporting requirements for filing annual information reports.


text:
Buried in the somewhat obscure details of this reference for a preliminary ruling is a hint of how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is approaching arguments based on human rights principles as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). Put briefly, there has to be a very clear involvement of EU law before a case can be made out under any of its human rights provisions or principles.
The Bulgarian Court of Appeal referred to the CJEU a question for a preliminary ruling arising out of a dispute over penalty points which triggered automatic disqualification from driving under Bulgarian law.
Mr Vinkov was fined just under £9 for negligent driving. However along with the fine came an automatic penalty of reduction of the remaining points on his licence, which means disqualification (in Bulgaria, as in many other EU countries, the points-penalty system works in reverse to that in operation in the UK, with disqualification following the loss of all points). Bulgarian law does not allow any appeal against a fine of 50 Bulgarian lev or below, defining it as an administrative penalty that is not admissible in the appellate system. But there was some doubt over the consequence for an individual if this penalty is accompanied by the automatic deduction of points, which happens to lead to disqualification. If this is an automatic legal consequence on the basis of penalty orders which cannot be challenged, should it be recognised by another EU state or does it offend against the fair trial principles of Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, as reflected in Articles 47 and 48 of the European Charter of Fundamental Freedoms? The right to review of a criminal sentence enshrined in Article 2 to Protocol 7 of the ECHR is also in play here.
The question had to be framed in terms of EU law otherwise there would have been no grounds for seeking a reference to the CJEU in the first place. But it is somewhat surprising that the case got as far as it did, given that the appellant was a Bulgarian resident disputing the outcome of a Bulgarian court decision. Much was made of the EU Convention on Driving Disqualifications, which has been drawn up to ensure that drivers who are disqualified from driving in a Member State other than that in which they normally reside should not escape the effects of their disqualification when they leave the State of the offence. But this was a somewhat contrived argument since the question did not turn upon the enforcement of the Bulgarian judgment in another EU state.
Nevertheless the Bulgarian court based its reference on the principle of mutual recognition of decisions issued in another Member State that concern breaches of road traffic regulations. Should EU law, it asked, preclude national legislation that does not recognise a right of appeal against decisions entailing the deduction of points from driving licences? Put another way, should the principle of mutual recognition, on which judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based, be applied only in compliance with fundamental rights and thus with the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 6 ECHR?
The Strasbourg Court has ruled in Öztürk v. Germany 1984, Series A no. 73, that Article 6 of the ECHR does not preclude the decriminalisation of minor offences, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, but that the associated penalties fall within the scope of that article if they retain their punitive character. Disqualification from driving is arguably of such a character.
The CJEU concluded that the principle of mutual recognition was not relevant to the outcome of the driving penalty dispute. The principle is, by definition, only relevant to cross-border proceedings concerning the recognition and enforcement of a decision in a Member State other than that in which the decision was issued.
In the present case, the dispute in the main proceedings is purely internal. It concerns a person residing in the Republic of Bulgaria who challenged the decision by which the authorities of that Member State imposed a penalty following a traffic accident that occurred in Bulgaria.
it is settled case-law that the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights are binding on Member States whenever they implement EU law (see orders in Case C-339/10 Asparuhov Estov and Others  ECR I-0000, paragraph 13; Case C-457/09 Chartry  ECR I-0000, paragraph 25; and order of 14 December 2011 in Joined Cases C-483/11 and C-484/11 Boncea and Others, paragraph 29).
The imposition of a penalty for a driving offence did not in its view constitute a measure implementing EU law was it connected in any other way with EU law. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the reference for a preliminary ruling in so far as it relates to the fundamental right to an effective remedy had not been established.
Beyond all the boggling detail about interlocking and overlapping EU Treaty provisions, agreements and conventions, the conclusion to this saga was entirely predictable. Maybe Mr Vinkov would have fared differently if he had been challenging the enforcement of the disqualification decision in some other EU country. There was after all no shortage of relevant EU law in the picture; not only the Convention on Driving Disqualifications, but the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16, ‘the Framework Decision‘, which in its preamble declares itself to be “the cornerstone of judicial cooperation” in the EU. Unfortunately for Mr Vinkov, Bulgaria has not signed up to that agreement. In any event what the CJEU really objected to was the invocation of the principle of mutual recognition in a case where the party challenging the decision was a resident of the state that had made it; the weakness of Mr Vinkov’s case, in other words, was not that he had no claim to EU rights, but that he was not resisting the imposition of the penalty imposed by another Member State. If the fine had been imposed by an Italian court, for example, or a Greek one, there may have been a stronger claim to a “cross-border element”. Even so, this may prove to be necessary but not sufficient. The CJEU is clearly sceptical of attempts by parties to reach for EU provisions in order to shoehorn the Charter and consequential ECHR rights into their arguments.

matches: CJEU CJEU v. CJEU CJEU CJEU


text: 636 EXERCISE OF THE APPROPRIATIVE RIGHT The physical interrelationship of upstream and downstream appropriative diversions is such that injury in change of place of use is voiced in most ordinary situations by downstream appropriators against those above. Thus, a change in point of return to the stream of upstream nonconsumptive uses-or the excess from consumptive uses-may deprive the lower diversion of water on which it has been depending, and in that case it is an actionable injury.219 In a number of cases, the downstream user complains of the loss of return flow on which he has been depending when an upstream use is changed to a new locality. This violates the "continuance of conditions" philosophy and, if the original use was not excessive, the change may be enjoined.220 It appears, however, that not in all situations does the downstream appropriator have an unqualified right to the continuance of return flow conditions upstream upon which he claims dependence. Under the circumstances of two cases, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the claim because the return flow from upper lands was so excessive as to impute wastefulness rather than beneficial use to the exercise of the original appropriative right. Thus, in one case, it was held that the upstream owner could not be required to continue to irrigate the original land nor to waste 75 percent of the decreed water for the benefit of the lower appropriator. And in the other case, "It is axiomatic that no appropriator can compel any other appropriator to continue the waste of water whereby the former may benefit." In other words, the rule that a junior appropriator has the right to a continuation of stream conditions as they were when he made his appropriation will not be so construed as to compel the senior to waste his water by use on the original land.221 Statutory authorization to a State administrator to approve applications to change place of use of water appropriated from streams does not clothe him change in the place of use was designed to provide a method for making such changes which would eliminate friction and a multiplicity of lawsuits among water users. But it neither added to nor detracted from a property right which already existed." 219Mannix & Wilson v. Thrasher, 95 Mont. 267, 271, 26 Pac. (2d) 373 (1933); Gassert v. Noyes, 18 Mont. 216, 223,44 Pac. 959 (1896); Last Chance Min. Co. v. Bunker Hill & S. Min. & Concentrating Co., 49 Fed. 430 (C.C.D. Idaho 1892). 220Hall v. Blackman, 22 Idaho 556, 558, 126 Pac. 1047 (1912). A Federal court approved a decree restricting the use of certain water to certain lands, by reason of the fact that approximately two-thirds of the water found its way back to the stream by percolation, so that junior appropriators downstream were afforded the opportunity of making use of that quantity: Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 Fed. 9, 28 (9th Cir. 1917). But a change in place of use from one tributary valley to another is not injurious to a junior appropriator on the main stream below the junction of the two forks because he obtains the benefit of all return flow from water used in the valley of either tributary: Sounders v. Robison, 14 Idaho 770, 774, 95 Pac. 1057 (1908). 221Colthorp v. Mountain Home In. Dist., 66 Idaho 173, 179-182, 157 Pac. (2d) 1005 (1945); Application of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 162-163, 248 Pac. (2d) 540 (1952). See also Jones v. Big Lost River Irrig. Dist., 93 Idaho 227, 459 Pac. (2d) 1009, 1012 (1969).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
IRWIN M. GOLDEN vs. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF FALMOUTH.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on October 27, 1967.
Robert Clayton for the defendant.
George T. Shaw, for Conservation Law Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
KIRK, J. This is a bill in equity brought by the plaintiff against the board of selectmen of the town of Falmouth (the board). The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of land in Falmouth extending from the edge of a pond through a tidal marsh to upland property. In May of 1967, pursuant to Section 36 of the Falmouth zoning by-law, he applied to the board for a special permit to construct in the tidal marsh a twenty-four foot wide channel in which to dock his two boats. Under Section 36 it is the board which is authorized to grant such a permit. See G. L. c. 40A, Section 4. He also filed with the Director of Marine Fisheries, pursuant to G. L. c. 130, Section 27A (the Act), a notice of his intention to construct the channel and a plan of the proposed project. The Director of Marine Fisheries issued an "Order of Conditions" authorizing the project. Thereafter, the board voted to deny the special permit to excavate in the tidal marsh.
after a hearing, ruled that the board exceeded its authority in refusing to grant the plaintiff the special permit. The final decree annulled the board's decision and ordered the board to issue the permit subject to the conditions imposed by the Director of Marine Fisheries.
The board appeals from the final decree. The evidence is reported. The judge made findings of fact and rulings of law. The plaintiff did not submit a brief. Counsel for Conservation Law Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. The only issue presented by the appeal is whether the Act deprives the board, acting under a local zoning by-law, of the power to forbid the filling, dredging, or excavating of coastal wetlands in the town despite the approval of the undertaking by the Director of Marine Fisheries acting under the Act.
The purpose of the Act is to regulate the removal, filling, and dredging of areas bordering on coastal waters. [Note 1] It has been held to be valid legislative enactment. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co. Inc. 349 Mass. 104, 107.
exercise of municipal zoning power. [Note 4] MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 636-637. In the MacGibbon case, this court held that a zoning by-law having the same purposes as Section 36, the one before us (protecting the town's natural resources along its coastal areas) and similar operative provisions (requiring a permit prior to obstructing streams or tidal rivers or dredging and filling wetlands and marsh areas), was expressly authorized by the Zoning Enabling Act, G. L. c. 40A, Section 2. The board, therefore, had the power to deny the permit as long as its decision was not "based on a legally untenable ground, or . . . [was not] unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary." MacGibbon, supra, at 639. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277. There is nothing before us showing that the board's decision did not comply with this standard.
3. Having upheld the validity of Section 36 we turn to the question whether in enacting the Act the Legislature intended to repeal existing laws relating to the same subject. We find nothing in the language of the Act expressly, impliedly or inferentially suggesting that municipalities are deprived or preempted from exercising regulatory control of wetlands situated therein by means of zoning by-laws. The Act establishes a regulatory machinery at the State level in which local boards of selectmen, the Department of Public Works and the Director of Marine Fisheries each has a role. There is no express reference in the statute that municipalities may or may not otherwise undertake wetlands control independent of the Act.
Similarly, we do not construe the Act as impliedly precluding regulation by municipalities. Although it is an established rule of statutory construction that "[T]he enactment of a statute which seems to have been intended to cover the whole subject to which it relates, impliedly repeals all existing statutes touching the subject," (Doyle v. Kirby, 184 Mass. 409, 411-412), this rule has been applied with caution. Doherty case, the test was stated to be whether the prior statute or by-law is so repugnant to and inconsistent with a later enactment covering the same subject that both cannot stand. Doherty v. Commissioner of Adm., supra, at 690. In applying this test, the court endeavors to determine whether the Legislature intended to repeal earlier related laws, including existing town by-laws, as well as whether there is a need for uniformity in the subject of the legislation. Homer v. Fall River, 326 Mass. 673. McDonald v. Superior Court, 299 Mass. 321.
Harbor View because the pier was constructed under a license granted by the Commonwealth's Department of Public Works. The license was `subject to all applicable Federal, State, County and Municipal laws, ordinances and regulations.' Such licenses may not be used contrary to the terms of zoning by-laws." See Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515.
If a local board acting under the zoning by-law authorizes a project in violation of G. L. c. 91, Sections 30 and 30A, and the Department of Public Works vetoes it, that board would clearly be governed by the express legislative enactment and the decision of the Department of Public Works would prevail. There is no provision in the Act, however, which grants to the Department of Public Works the authority to authorize a project which such local board has vetoed. In most cases, a decision of this type by such local board would be final. As was held in the Crawford case, the party seeking the permit does not obtain any absolute rights once he receives State authorization; he is also subject to local ordinances and regulations.
5. The fact that the Act confers upon a local board the advisory power to make recommendations concerning the installation of certain protective measures "as may protect the public interest" does not, we think, preclude the authority of the local board acting under the zoning by-law to initially authorize or bar a project. The Act provides that the local board mentioned therein is to make recommendations and is to transmit them to the Director of Marine Fisheries and to the Department of Public Works. If the local board acting under the zoning by-law approves a project in coastal wetlands which involves shellfish or marine fisheries, then the Director of Marine Fisheries is free under the Act only to impose conditions on the project. In that event the local board pursuant to the Act may make recommendations as to how the work is to be done. There is nothing to suggest, however, that the board acting under the zoning by-law is powerless to refuse initial authorization.
respective governmental bodies, the local board of selectmen under the Act, the Director of Marine Fisheries, the Department of Public Works, and the local board acting under the zoning by-law to carry out effectively the legislative and local policy of preserving and protecting coastal wetlands. Otherwise, if it were unnecessary to protect shellfish or marine fisheries, and if the proposed project were not in violation of G. L. c. 91, Sections 30 and 30A, there would be no regulatory control. The advances thus far made in this Commonwealth with regard to environmental control would be reversed if local communities were prevented from exercising regulatory authority. It is apparent to us that the Legislature in enacting the Act did not attempt to cover the entire field of coastal wetlands regulations to the exclusion of regulation by local authority. The Act does not attempt to create a uniform statutory scheme. It establishes minimum Statewide standards leaving local communities free to adopt more stringent controls.
It follows that the decree must be reversed. A new decree is to be entered stating that the decision of the board of selectmen was within its jurisdiction and no modification of it is required.
[Note 1] The Act provides in pertinent part: "No person shall remove, fill or dredge any bank, flat, marsh, meadow or swamp bordering on coastal waters without written notice of his intention to so remove, fill or dredge to the board of selectmen in a town or to the appropriate licensing authority in a city, to the state department of public works, and to the director of marine fisheries. Said notice shall be sent by registered mail at least thirty days prior to any such removing, filling or dredging. The selectmen or, in the case of a city, the licensing authority, shall hold a hearing on said proposal within twenty days of the receipt of said notice, notice of which hearing shall be given by them by publication in a newspaper published in such town or city, or if there be no newspaper published in such town or city, then in a newspaper published within the county, and shall notify by mail the person intending to do such removing, filling or dredging, the department of public works and the director, of the time and place of said hearing. The cost of such publication of notice shall be borne by the person filing the notice of intention to so remove, fill or dredge. The selectmen or licensing authority, as the case may be, may recommend the installation of such bulkheads, barriers or other protective measures as may protect the public interest and shall transmit forthwith to such person, the director and the department of public works a copy of any such recommendations. If the department of public works finds that such proposed removing, filling or dredging would violate the provisions of sections thirty and thirty A of chapter ninety-one, it shall proceed to enforce the provisions of said sections. If the area on which the proposed work is to be done contains shellfish or is necessary to protect marine fisheries, the said director may impose such conditions on said proposed work as he may determine necessary to protect such shellfish or marine fisheries, and work shall be done subject thereto."
[Note 2] In pertinent part the judge's ruling states: "G. L. c. 130, Section 27A, which is controlling on the issues in this case, requires that a person contemplating the filling or dredging of an area bordering on coastal waters to provide written notice of his intentions to: (1) the board of selectmen; (2) the state department of public works; and (3) the director of marine fisheries. It further requires the board of selectmen to hold a hearing, notice of which must be provided to the department of public works and the director of marine fisheries. After hearing the selectmen `may recommend' certain protective measures to be taken in the execution of the dredging or filling. If, as in the present case, the area on which the proposed work is to be done contains shell fish or is necessary to protect marine fisheries, the director `may impose' such conditions on the proposed work as he deems necessary. There is nothing in Section 27A which lends countenance to the proposition that a board of selectmen has the authority to assume a veto power over proposed dredging or filling. The scope of the authority granted to boards of selectmen by the section is limited to recommending the installation of bulkheads, barriers or other protective devices. It is up to the director of marine fisheries to either reject the suggestions of the local body or to adopt them and impose them as conditions. Under the terms of Section 27A, only the department of public works is given the power to prohibit the commencement of work if it finds that the work would violate the provisions of Chapter 91, Sections 30 and 30A. Perhaps most significant is the use of the words `may recommend' in Section 27A when enumerating the powers conferred . . . [on] the boards of selectmen, and the words `may impose' with respect to the powers conferred on the director of marine fisheries."
[Note 3] The decision of the board states in part, "Whereas, Paragraph 1 of Section 36 of the Zoning By-laws, entitled Wetlands Regulations, states that `The purpose of this section is to provide for the reasonable protection and conservation of certain irreplaceable natural features, resources and amenities for the benefit and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Town,' . . . Be it Resolved, that the Board of Selectmen are of the opinion that the above special permit would not be providing for the reasonable protection and conservation of the natural resources and features of the Town."
[Note 4] Section 36 provides in part: "Wetlands Regulations. 1. The purpose of this section is to provide for the reasonable protection and conservation of certain irreplaceable natural features, resources and amenities for the benefit and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Town. . . . 2. Any person wishing to perform, or cause to be performed, any of the following acts or operations shall first obtain a special permit from the Board of . . . [Selectmen] after a duly advertised public hearing. a) Obstructing, filling, dredging, excavating or changing the course of any stream or tidal river. b) Filling or excavating within any part of any marsh or tidal marsh or in or along the shore of any pond so as to alter the shore line. 3. In granting a permit for any of the foregoing, the Board of . . . [Selectmen] shall be guided by current State and Federal laws, regulations or recommendations pertaining to such acts or operations."


NRS Chapter 600A; Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 117 Nev. 273, 283-84, 21 P.3d 16, 23 (2001); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 466, 999 P.2d 351, 358 (2000) (a customer list can be a trade secret when extremely confidential and where the list was secret and guarded, where the list was missing after an employee had access to the list which went missing after the employee left his employment, then provided customers with “more competitive pricing”); Whitehead v. Nev. Com'n on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 904 n. 6, 878 P.2d 913, 932 (1994); 12 AMJUR POF 3d 711.
Even without a non-disclosure agreement, confidential information obtained by an employee during employment by reason of his or her position cannot be used or disclosed to the detriment of the employer. “An employee is obligated not to reveal employer's confidential information during employment and after termination of employment." 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 224. Nevada codified the Uniform Trade Secret Act (“UTSA” or “NUTSA”) at NRS 600A et. seq. There is a split of authority whether any confidential information is protected if it is not covered by NUTSA. These materials will treat all protected confidential commercial information as being contained in NUTSA and all others to be unprotected information.
At termination of employment, an employee who misuses confidential information (customer lists, formulas, etc.), is precluded from using the information and is required to return the materials to the employer. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 226 (citing NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1985); Advanced Magnification Instruments, Ltd. v. Minutemen Optical Corp., 522 N.Y.S.2d 287, 135 A.D.2d 889 (3d Dept. 1987); Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1990)). An employer, therefore, at common law, has some protection against disclosure of confidential information even without a valid non-disclosure agreement. “However, an employee can use to his or her own advantage all the skills and knowledge commonly used in the trade that the employee acquired during the employee's tenure of employment.” Id. (citing Serv. Ctr. of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 180 Ill.App.3d 447, 535 N.E.2d 1132 (1989)).
How Does Information Become a Protected Trade Secret?
Confidential business information automatically becomes protected in the law once the statutory definition in NRS 600A.030 is met. There is no requirement that the parties expressly identify the information as a “trade secret”. Should a dispute arise as to the use of the information, determining whether the information used is protected is a matter of applying the statutory definition as a question of fact. Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 465 n. 4, 999 P.2d 351, 358 n. 4 (2000). Courts may consider, however, such factors as: (1) the extent to which the information is ascertainable from sources outside the business and the ease with which it can be obtained; (2) whether the information was confidential or secret or was treated as such by the business; and (3) the employee’s knowledge of the confidential information and whether the same was known by competitors. Id., 116 Nev. at 467, 999 P.2d at 358-59. The business is presumed to make reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of information that is marked “Confidential” or “Private” in a reasonably noticeable manner. This presumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information. NRS 600A.032.
How Does a Party Prosecute an Action for Misappropriation of a Trade Secret?
In Frantz, the Nevada Supreme Court found misappropriation of trade secrets based on the fact that: (l) lists containing information were missing after the former employee left the job; (2) the former employee contacted the plaintiff's customers to offer "more competitive pricing;" and (3) the former employee's phone records and other evidence indicated calls to plaintiff's customers. As a result, the former employee was liable for misappropriation of trade secrets. The Court further found that the competitor had misappropriated trade secrets when the competitor hired the former employee, announced that competitor intended to compete against plaintiff by taking all of plaintiff's customers, and the competitor hired employees from other competitive companies and asked them to use their knowledge about their former employers' pricing structure and customer base. Id.


text:
Roden E.E., Urrutia M.M., Mann C.J. Bacterial reductive dissolution of crystalline Fe(II) oxide in continuous-flow column reactors // Appl. Environ.
Microbiol. 2000. V. 66. P. 1062-1065.
Roden E.E., Zachara J.M. Microbial reduction of crystalline Fe(III) oxides: influence of oxide surface area and potential for cell growth // Environ. Sci.
Technol. 1996. V. 30. P.1618-1628.
Rozenson I., Heller-Kallai L. Mossbauer spectra of dioctahedral smectites // Clays Clay Minerals. 1977. V. 25. P. 94-101.
Russell J.D., Goodman B.A., Fraser A.R. Infrared and Mossbauer studies of reduced nontronites // Clays Clay Minerals. 1979. V. 27. P. 63-71.
Saito M, Wada H. Effect of molecular hydrogen on the reduction process of submerged soil // Soil Aci. Plant Nutr. 1984. V. 30. P. 255-259.
Scheinost A.C., Krerzchmar R.S., Prister S., Roberts D.R. Combining selective sequential extractions, X-ray absorptoin spectroscopy, and principal component analysis for quantitative zinc speciation in soil // Environ. Sci. Technol. 2002. V. 36. P. 5021-5028.
Scheinost A.C., Schwertmann U. Color identification of iron oxides and hydroxysulfates: use and limitations // Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J. 1999. V. 63. P. 1463Seabaugh J.L., Dong H., Kukkadapu R.K., Eberl D.D., Morton J.P., Kim J. Microbial reduction of Fe(III) in the Fitian and Muloorina illites: contrasting extents and rates of bioreduction // Clays Clay Mineral. 2006. V. 54. N. 1 P. 69-81.
Shelobolina E.S., Anderson R.T., Vodyanitskii Y.N., Sivtsov A.V., Vuretich R., Lovley D. R. Importance of clay size minerals for Fe(III) respiration in a petrolium-contaminated aquifer // Geobiology. 2004. V. 2. Р. 67-76.
Schuette R., Goodman B.A., Stucki J.W. Magnetic properties of oxidized and reduced smectites // Physics Chemistry Minerals. 2000. V. 27. P. 251-257.
Schwertmann U. Occurrence and formation of iron oxides in various pedoenvironment // Iron in Soils and Clay Minerals. NATO. Dordrecht: Reidel. 1988. P.
Schwertmann U. Solubility and dissolution of iron oxides // Plant and Soil. 1991. V. 130. N 1. P. 1-25.
Schwertmann U. Cornell R.M. Iron oxides in the laboratory. WILEY-VCH. Weinheim (FRG). 2000. 188 p.
Schwertmann U., Kodama H., Fischer W.R. Mutual interactions between organics and iron oxides // Interactions of Soil Minerals with Natural Organics and Microbes. 1986. Madison. P. 223-250.
Schwertmann U., Taylor R.M. Iron oxides // Minerals in Soil Environments. / Madison (Wis.), 1977. P. 145-180.
Schwertmann U., Taylor R.M. Iron oxides // Minerals in soil environments. / Еd. J.B. Dixon and S.B. Weed, Madison (Wis.), 1989. P. 379-438.
Starkey R. L., Halvorson H. O. Studies on the transformations of iron in nature. II. Concerning the importance of microorganisms in the solution and precipitation of iron // Soil Sci. 1927. V. 24. P. 381-402.
Stucki J.W., Golden D.C., Roth C.D. Effects of reduction and reoxidation of structural iron on the surface charge and dissolution of dioctahedral smectites // Clays Clay Minerals. 1984. V. 32. N 5. P. 350-356.
Stucki J.W., Low P.F., Roth C.B., Golden D.C. Effects of oxidation state of octahedral iron on clay swelling // Clays Clay Minerals. 1984c. V. 32. P. 357-362.
Torrent J., Schwertmann U., Schulze D.G. Iron oxide mineralogy of some soils of two river terrace sequences in Spain // Geoderma. 1980. V. 23. P. 191-208.
Taylor R.M., Schwertmann U. The influence of aluminum on iron oxides. I.The influence of Al on Fe oxide formation from the Fe(II) system // Clays Clay Minerals. 1978. V. 26. P. 373-383.
World reference base for soil resources. Draft. Isss/Isric/Fao, Wageningen-Rome. 1994. 161 p.
World reference base for soil resources. Isss/Isric/Fao, Wageningen-Rome. 1998. N 84. 88 p.
Yee N., Shaw S., Benning L., Nguyen T.H. The rate of ferrihydrite transformation to goethite via the Fe(II) pathway // Am. Miner. 2006. V. 91. P. 92-96.
Zachara J.M., Fredrickson J. K., Li S., Kennedy D.W., Smith S.C., Gassman P.L. Bacterial reduction of crystalline Fe3+ oxides in single phase suspensions and subsurfase materials // Am. Miner. 1998. V. 83. P. 1426-1443.
Заведующая редакционно-издательской группой Редактор, компьютерная верстка Е.В. Манахова Подписано в печать с оригинал-макета 10.01.08 г.
Формат 60 90 1/16. Бумага тип. № 1. Усл. печ. л. 9.
Тираж 300 экз. Заказ №. Цена договорная ГНУ Почвенный институт им. В.В. Докучаева 119017, Москва, Пыжевский пер., Типография Россельхозакадемии 115598, Москва, Ягодная ул., д.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.