text:
1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 50776/99 and 52912/99) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (�the Convention�) by a Greek national, Mr Mehmet Agga (�the applicant�), on 31 August 1999 and 23 November 1999 respectively.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr H. Aga and Mr S. Emin, both lawyers practising in Xanthi and Komotini (northern Greece). The Greek Government (�the Government�) were represented by Mr K. Georgiadis and Mr V. Kyriazopoulos of the Legal Council of the State, Acting Agents.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his conviction for usurping the functions of a minister of a �known religion� amounted to a violation of his rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.
4. The applications were allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 � 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 � 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 � 1 of the Rules of Court.
5. The Chamber decided to join the proceedings in the applications (Rule 43 � 1).
6. By a decision of 20 September 2001 Court declared the applications partly admissible.
7. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 � 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First Section.
8. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 � 1).
9. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Xanthi.
10. In 1990 one of the two Muslim religious leaders of Thrace, the Mufti of Xanthi, died. On 15 February 1990 the local Prefect (Νομάρχης) appointed the applicant to act as a deputy (τοποτηρητής).
11. In August 1990 the two independent Muslim Members of Parliament for Xanthi and Rodopi requested the State to organise elections for the post of Mufti of Xanthi. Having received no reply, the two independent MPs decided to organise themselves elections at the mosques on 17 August 1990 after the prayers. On that date the applicant was chosen to be the Mufti of Xanthi by those attending Friday prayers at the mosques.
12. On 24 December 1990 the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and under Article 44 � 1 of the Constitution, adopted a Legislative Act (πράξη νομοθετικού περιεχομένου) by which the manner of election of the Muftis was changed. Law no. 1920/1991 retroactively validated the Legislative Act of 24 December 1990.
13. On 20 August 1991, in accordance with the new regulations, the Greek State appointed another Mufti. The applicant refused to step down.
14. Eight sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code for having usurped the functions of a minister of a �known religion�. The Court of Cassation, considering that there might be disturbances in Xanthi, decided, under Articles 136 and 137 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the proceedings should take place in other cities. The applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings by lawyers of his own choice. The courts heard a number of prosecution and defence witnesses.
15. On 17 January 1994 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 11 January 1993 and 19 April 1993 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi.
16. On 28 June 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court (Μονομελές Πλημμελειοδικείο) of Agrinio found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to ten months� imprisonment (decision no. 2206/1996). The applicant appealed (see below paragraph 19).
17. On an unspecified date the applicant was charged for having issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi on 3 January 1994, 19 January 1994 and 10 February 1994.
18. On 28 June 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court of Agrinio found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to ten months� imprisonment (decision no. 2207/1996). The applicant appealed.
19. On 29 April 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court (Τριμελές Πλημμελειοδικείο) of Agrinio upheld the applicant�s conviction in the first and second sets of proceedings. It imposed a global sentence of six months� imprisonment and converted it into a fine (decision no. 682/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29).
20. On 20 January 1996 a third set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant for the same offence on the ground that on 3 May 1995, 11 November 1995, 13 December 1995, 30 December 1995 and 17 January 1996 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi.
21. On 3 April 1997 the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to twelve months� imprisonment (decision no. 1336/1997). The applicant appealed.
22. On 25 February 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia upheld the applicant�s conviction and imposed a sentence of eight months� imprisonment. The court converted this sentence into a fine (decision no. 641/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29).
23. On 10 September 1996 a fourth set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 8 August 1995 he had issued a message in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi.
24. On 3 April 1997 the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia found the applicant guilty and imposed on him an eight months� prison sentence (decision no. 1335/1997). The applicant appealed.
25. On 25 February 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia upheld the applicant�s conviction but reduced the prison sentence to six months and converted it into a fine (decision no. 640/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29).
26. On an unspecified date a fifth set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 6 March 1994, 15 May 1994, 14 August 1994, 22 November 1994, 24 December 1994 and 9 January 1995 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi.
27. On 7 May 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court of Thessaloniki found him guilty and sentenced him to ten months� imprisonment (decision no. 23145/1996). The applicant appealed.
28. On 5 November 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Thessaloniki upheld the applicant�s conviction but reduced the prison sentence to eight months and converted it into a fine (decision no. 14370/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 30).
29. On 12 March 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant�s appeals concerning the first, second, third and fourth sets of proceedings. It considered that the offence in Article 175 of the Criminal Code was committed �when somebody appeared as a minister of a known religion and when he discharged the functions of the minister�s office including any of the administrative functions pertaining thereto�. The court considered that the applicant had committed this offence because he behaved and appeared as the Mufti of Xanthi. It further considered that the applicant�s conviction was not contrary to Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention, because the applicant had not been punished for his religious beliefs or for expressing certain views but for usurping the functions of a Mufti. As regards Article 6 of the Convention, the Court of Cassation considered that the applicant was legally represented by lawyers of his own choice throughout the proceedings and that he had exercised all his defence rights (judgments nos. 592/1999 and 594/1999).
30. On 2 June 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant�s appeal concerning the fifth set of proceedings for the reasons set out in its judgments nos. 592/1999 and 594/1999 (judgment no. 1133/1999).
31. Three more sets of proceedings were instituted against the applicant on the ground that on various dates he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. The applicant was found guilty by the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia (decisions nos. 4660/1997, 2552/1998 and 4699/1997).
32. On 28 March 2001 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia acquitted the applicant in the light of the Court�s judgment in the Serif v. Greece case (no. 38178/97, ECHR 1999�IX). The court held that, by addressing religious messages to a group of people who voluntarily followed him as their religious leader, the applicant had not usurped the functions of a minister of a �known religion�, but had simply exercised his right to manifest his religion, a right guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (decisions nos. 1000/2001, 1001/2001 and 1002/2001).
� La vie, les biens, l�honneur, la religion et les coutumes de ceux des habitants des localit�s c�d�es � la Gr�ce qui resteront sous l�administration hell�nique seront scrupuleusement respect�s.
Les Muftis, outre leur comp�tence sur les affaires purement religieuses et leur surveillance sur l�administration des biens vacoufs, exerceront leur juridiction entre musulmans en mati�re de mariage, divorce, pensions alimentaires (n�faca), tutelle, curatelle, �mancipation de mineurs, testaments islamiques et successions au poste de mut�velli (T�vli�t).
Les jugements rendus par les Muftis seront mis � ex�cution par les autorit�s hell�niques comp�tentes.
35. On 30 January 1923 Greece and Turkey signed a treaty for the exchange of populations. On 24 July 1923 Greece and others, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, signed the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Articles 42 and 45 of this treaty give the Moslem minority of Greece the same protection as Article 14 � 1 of the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities of S�vres. On the same day Greece signed a Protocol with the principal Allied Powers bringing into force the two treaties concluded in S�vres on 10 August 1920. The Greek Parliament ratified the three above-mentioned treaties by a law published in the Official Gazette on 25 August 1923.
36. In its decision no. 1723/1980 the Court of Cassation considered that it was obliged to apply Islamic law in certain disputes between Moslems by virtue of the Treaty of Peace of Athens of 1913, the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities of S�vres of 1920 and the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne of 1923.
37. Law no. 2345/1920 provided that the Muftis, in addition to their religious functions, would have competence to adjudicate on family and inheritance disputes between Moslems in so far as these disputes are governed by Islamic law. It also provided that the Muftis were directly elected by the Moslems who had the right to vote in the national elections and who resided in the Prefectures in which the Muftis would serve. The elections were to be organised by the State and theological school graduates had the right to be candidates. Article 6 � 8 of the law provided for the promulgation of a royal decree to make detailed arrangements for the elections of the Muftis. Such a decree was never promulgated.
38. Under the legislative act of 24 December 1990 the functions and qualifications of the Muftis remain largely unchanged. However, provision is made for the appointment of the Muftis by presidential decree following a proposal by the Minister of Education who, in his turn, must consult a committee composed of the local Prefect and a number of Moslem dignitaries chosen by the State. The act expressly abrogates Law no. 2345/1920. In the act it is envisaged that it should be ratified by law in accordance with Article 44 � 1 of the Constitution.
39. Law no. 1920/1991 retroactively validated the legislative act of 24 December 1990.
�1. A person who intentionally usurps the functions of a State or municipal official is punished with imprisonment up to a year or a fine.
42. The Court of Cassation has considered that this provision applies in the case of a former priest of the Greek Orthodox Church who continues to wear the priest robes (decision no. 378/1980). The priest in question was defrocked after he joined the Old Calendarists, a religious movement formed by Greek Orthodox priests who wanted the Church to maintain the Julian calendar. In decision no. 454/1966 the Court of Cassation considered that the offence in Article 175 of the Criminal Code is also committed by a person who purports to discharge the administrative functions of a priest. In decisions nos. 140/1964 and 476/1971 the Court of Cassation applied Article 175 of the Code to cases of persons who had purported to exercise the religious functions of an Orthodox priest by conducting services, christening children etc.
44. Ministers of the Greek Orthodox Church and other �known� religions enjoy a number of privileges under domestic law. Inter alia, the religious weddings they celebrate produce the same legal effects as civil weddings and they are exempt from military service.
46. The Government argue that there has been no interference with the applicant�s right to freedom of religion because Article 9 does not guarantee for the applicant the right to impose on the others his understanding as to Greece�s obligations under the Treaty of Peace of Athens.
47. In any event, even if there had been an interference, the Government argue that it would have been justified under the second paragraph of Article 9. It was provided by law, namely Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code. These provisions have been interpreted by the courts in a manner which rendered his conviction foreseeable. Moreover, the interference served a legitimate purpose. By protecting the authority of the lawful Mufti the domestic courts sought to preserve order in the particular religious community and in society at large. They also sought to protect the international relations of the country, an area over which States exercise unlimited discretion.
48. The Government further contend that the interference was necessary in a democratic society. To start with, in many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. In Greece, Muftis exercise important judicial functions and judges cannot be elected by the people. This is all the more so that in the instant case the �election� of the applicant had been flawed because it had not been the result of a democratic procedure and the applicant had been used by the local Muslim MPs for party political purposes. Moreover, given that there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time and that the applicant had questioned the legality of the acts of the lawful mufti, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Moslems, between the Moslems and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. In any event, the State had to protect the office of the mufti and, even if there had not existed a lawfully appointed mufti, the applicant would have had to be punished. In this respect, the Government submit that the Court of Cassation did not convict the applicant simply because he appeared as the Mufti. In fact, the courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister and that the acts perpetrated by the applicant fell within the administrative functions of a mufti in the broad sense of the term.
49. Lastly, the Government stress that the judgments of the Court of Cassation were given before the Court�s judgment in the Serif v. Greece case (op. cit.). In this respect, they point out that the applicant was acquitted in the last three sets of proceedings which were instituted against him.
50. The applicant disagrees with the Government�s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.
51. The Court must consider whether the applicant�s Article 9 rights were interfered with and, if so, whether such interference was �prescribed by law�, pursued a legitimate aim and was �necessary in a democratic society� within the meaning of Article 9 � 2 of the Convention.
52. The Court recalls that, while religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also includes, inter alia, freedom, in community with others and in public, to manifest one�s religion in worship and teaching (see, mutatis mutandis, the Kokkinakis v. Greece judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, p. 17, � 31).
53. The Court further recalls that the applicant was convicted for having usurped the functions of a minister of a �known religion�. The facts underlying the applicant�s conviction, as they transpire from the relevant domestic court decisions, were issuing messages of a religious content in the capacity of the Mufti of Xanthi. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant�s conviction amounts to an interference with his right under Article 9 � 1 of the Convention, �in community with others and in public ..., to manifest his religion ... in worship [and] teaching� (see the Serif v. Greece judgement cited above, p. 85, � 39).
54. Despite the parties� disagreement as to whether the interference in issue was �prescribed by law�, the Court does not consider it necessary to rule on the question because, in any event, the applicant�s conviction is incompatible with Article 9 on other grounds (see the Serif v. Greece judgement cited above, p. 86, � 42).
55. The Court accepts that the interference in question pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9 � 2 of the Convention, namely �to protect public order�. It notes in this connection that the applicant was not the only person claiming to be the religious leader of the local Muslim community and that on 20 August 1991 the authorities had appointed another person as Mufti of Xanthi (see the Serif v. Greece judgement cited above, p. 86, � 45).
56. The Court recalls that freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a �democratic society� within the meaning of the Convention. The pluralism inherent in a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. It is true that in a democratic society it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom of religion to reconcile the interests of the various religious groups (see the Kokkinakis judgment cited above, pp. 17 and 18, �� 31 and 33). However, any such restriction must correspond to a �pressing social need� and must be �proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued� (see, among others, the Wingrove v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, p. 1956, � 53).
57. The Court also recalls that the applicant was convicted under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code, which render criminal offences certain acts against ministers of �known religions�. The Court notes in this connection that, although Article 9 of the Convention does not require States to give legal effect to religious weddings and religious courts� decisions, under Greek law weddings celebrated by ministers of �known religions� are assimilated to civil ones and the muftis have competence to adjudicate on certain family and inheritance disputes between Muslims. In such circumstances, it could be argued that it is in the public interest for the State to take special measures to protect from deceit those whose legal relationships can be affected by the acts of religious ministers. However, the Court does not consider it necessary to decide this issue, which does not arise in the applicant�s case.
58. The Court notes in this connection that the domestic courts that convicted the applicant did not mention in their decisions any specific acts by the applicant with a view to producing legal effects. The domestic courts convicted the applicant on the mere ground that he had issued messages of religious content and that he had signed them as the Mufti of Xanthi. Moreover, it has not been disputed that the applicant had the support of at least part of the Muslim community in Xanthi. However, in the Court�s view, punishing a person for merely presenting himself as the religious leader of a group that willingly followed him can hardly be considered compatible with the demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society.
59. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that in Xanthi there existed, in addition to the applicant, an officially appointed Mufti. Moreover, the Government argued that the applicant�s conviction was necessary in a democratic society because his actions undermined the system put in place by the State for the organisation of the religious life of the Muslim community in the region. However, the Court recalls that there is no indication that the applicant attempted at any time to exercise the judicial and administrative functions for which the legislation on the muftis and other ministers of �known religions� makes provision. As for the rest, the Court does not consider that, in democratic societies, the State needs to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership.
60. It is true that the Government argued that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the authorities had to intervene in order to avoid the creation of tension among the Muslims in Xanthi and between the Muslims and the Christians of the area as well as Greece and Turkey. Although the Court recognises that it is possible that tension is created in situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other (see, mutatis mutandis, the Plattform ��rzte f�r das Leben� v. Austria judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139, p. 12, � 32). In this connection, the Court notes that, apart from a general reference to the creation of tension, the Government did not make any allusion to disturbances among the Muslims in Xanthi that had actually been or could have been caused by the existence of two religious leaders. Moreover, the Court considers that nothing was adduced that could warrant qualifying the risk of tension between the Muslims and Christians or between Greece and Turkey as anything more than a very remote possibility.
61. In the light of all the above, the Court considers that it has not been shown that the applicant�s conviction under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code was justified in the circumstances of the case by �a pressing social need�. As a result, the interference with the applicant�s right, in community with others and in public, to manifest his religion in worship and teaching was not �necessary in a democratic society ..., for the protection of public order� under Article 9 � 2 of the Convention (see the Serif v. Greece judgment cited above, pp. 88-89, �� 52-54).
There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
�1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
63. Given its finding that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether Article 10 was also violated, because no separate issue arises under the latter provision.
65. The applicant sought one symbolic Greek drachma for non‑pecuniary damage.
66. The Court is of the opinion that the applicant suffered some non-pecuniary damage, but, given his request, it considers that the finding of a violation of Article 9 of the Convention constitutes in itself adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41 of the Convention.
67. The applicant did not make any claim in respect of costs and expenses.
68. The Court does not consider it appropriate to make an award in this connection of its own motion.
3. Holds that the preceding findings amount in themselves to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 October 2002, pursuant to Rule 77 �� 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

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While the crime of driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified (often referred to as simply DWLS) is usually a misdemeanor offense in Florida, some people can face felony charges. In some cases, the enhanced charges are the result of previous DWLS convictions.
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When do alleged offenders become HTOs?
Where can I learn more about felony driving while license suspended in Broward County?
The alleged offender drove a commercial motor vehicle while his or her driver license or driving privilege was canceled, suspended, revoked, or disqualified and he or she has been previously convicted of DWLS.
Third-degree felony convictions in Florida are punishable by up to five years in prison and/or a maximum fine of $5,000.
A violation of a traffic control signal device as provided in Florida Statute § 316.074(1) or Florida Statute § 316.075(1)(c)1.
Burgess v. State, 198 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) — Donald Burgess was convicted of driving while his license was revoked, but appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss because he had never actually been issued a driver's license. The Second District Court of Appeals agreed with Burgess, reversing his judgment and sentence ordering the trial court on remand to immediately vacate the judgment for the felony offense, dismiss the felony charge, and determine, as a result, whether Burgess was entitled to immediate release. The Second District noted that in reversing Burgess’s conviction, it was receding from its decision in Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) and certified conflict with Newton v. State, 898 So.2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and State v. Bletcher, 763 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), which followed Carroll in unelaborated per curiam decisions.
Driver License Suspensions | Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) — On this section of the DHSMV website, you can learn how to reinstate a license revoked for inadequate vision or after a suspension for a violation (not DUI-related) resulting in death or serious bodily injury. You can also find information about how to clear unpaid tickets, revocation as an HTO, and suspensions for being delinquent in child support. The website also has answers to frequently asked questions.
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D.C. Law Library - § 22–2716. Violation of injunction granted under § 22-2714.
↪ § 22–2716. Violation of injunction granted under § 22-2714.
§ 22–2715. Abatement of nuisance under § 22-2713 by injunction — Trial; dismissal of complaint; prosecution; costs.
§ 22–2716. Violation of injunction granted under § 22-2714.
In case of the violation of any injunction granted under the provisions of § 22-2714, the court, or, in vacation, a judge thereof, may summarily try and punish the offender. The proceedings shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court an information, under oath, setting out the alleged facts constituting such violation, upon which the court or judge shall cause a warrant to issue, under which the defendant shall be arrested. The trial may be had upon affidavits, or either party may at any stage of the proceedings demand the production and oral examination of the witnesses. A party found guilty of contempt, under the provisions of this section, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $200 and not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or by imprisonment in the District Jail not less than three nor more than 6 months or by both fine and imprisonment.
This section is referenced in § 22-2717.
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 230 of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-45, April 1, 2013, 60 DCR 5400, 20 DCSTAT 1300).


§ 67-3 Parades or motorcades for commercial purposes prohibited.
§ 67-4 Interference with parade or motorcade.
§ 67-5 Application for permit.
§ 67-6 Issuance or denial of permit.
§ 67-7 Contents of permit.
§ 67-9 Officials to be notified.
§ 67-10 Revocation of permit.
Peddlers and street vendors — See Ch. 70.
An organized procession containing 25 or more vehicles, except funeral processions, upon any public street, sidewalk or alley.
Any march or procession consisting of people, animals or vehicles, or combination thereof, except funeral processions, upon any public street, sidewalk or alley, which does not comply with normal and usual traffic regulations or controls.
It shall be unlawful for any person to conduct a parade or motorcade in or upon any public street, sidewalk or alley in the borough or knowingly participate in any such parade or motorcade unless and until a permit to conduct some parade or motorcade has been obtained from the Borough Secretary or, as hereinafter provided, from the Borough Council; said permits for parades and/or motorcades shall be issued to borough residents only, following compliance with all other sections of this chapter, by the Borough Secretary, only for routes to be traveled on and along through streets in the Borough of Pennsburg, and no other streets, sidewalks or alleys may be used for the purpose of a parade or motorcade in said borough unless the Borough Council finds unusual circumstances and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, waives the foregoing requirement; the foregoing does not preclude the use of side streets along through streets in the Borough of Pennsburg for assembly and disbanding areas so long as those side streets are enumerated in the application and ultimately approved in the permit subsequently issued.
No permit shall be issued authorizing the conduct of a parade or motorcade which the Borough Secretary finds is proposed to be held for the sole purpose of advertising any product, goods, wares, merchandise or event and is designed to be held purely for private profit.
No person shall knowingly join or participate in any parade or motorcade conducted under permit from the Borough Secretary in violation of any of the terms of said permit, nor knowingly join or participate in any permitted parade or motorcade without the consent and over the objection of the permittee, nor in any manner interfere with its progress or orderly conduct.
The name of the applicant, the sponsoring organization, the parade or motorcade chairman and the address and telephone number of each.
The purpose of the parade or motorcade, the date when it is proposed to be conducted, the location of the assembly area, the location of the disbanding area, the route to be traveled and the approximate time when the parade or motorcade will assemble, start and terminate.
A description of the individual floats, marching units, vehicles and bands.
Such other information as the Borough Secretary may deem reasonably necessary.
A filing fee of $100.
A security deposit of $500 in a form acceptable to the Borough Solicitor. Said deposit will be held by the Borough Secretary and will be used as security for damages to borough property and any costs incurred by the borough as a result of the parade. The borough will refund to the applicant any unused portion of the security deposit.
The time, route and size of the parade or motorcade will disrupt to an unreasonable extent the movement of other traffic.
The parade or motorcade is of a size or nature that requires the diversion of so great a number of police officers of the borough to properly police the line of movement and the areas contiguous thereto that allowing the parade or motorcade would deny reasonable police protection to the borough in general.
Such parade or motorcade will interfere with another parade or motorcade for which a permit has been issued.
The Borough Secretary makes any finding contrary to the findings required to be made for the issuance of a permit.
The information contained in the application is found to be false or nonexistent in any material detail.
The applicant refuses to agree to abide by or comply with all conditions of the permit and any and all other sections of this chapter.
The assembly area and time therefor.
The minimum and maximum speeds.
The route of the parade or motorcade.
What portions of streets to be traversed may be occupied by such parade or motorcade.
The maximum number of platoons or units and the maximum and minimum intervals of space to be maintained between units of such parade or motorcade.
The maximum length of such parade or motorcade in miles or fractions thereof.
The disbanding area and disbanding time.
The number of persons required to monitor the parade or motorcade.
The number and type of vehicles, if any.
The material and maximum size of any sign, banner, placard or carrying device therefor.
The materials used in the construction of floats used in any parade shall be of fire-retardant materials and shall be subject to such requirements concerning firesafety as may be determined by the Fire Chief.
That permittee advise all participants in the parade or motorcade, either orally or by written notice, of the terms and conditions of the permit, prior to the commencement of such parade or motorcade.
That the parade or motorcade continue to move at a fixed rate of speed and that any willful delay or willful stopping of said parade or motorcade, except when reasonably required for the safe and orderly conduct of the parade or motorcade, shall constitute a violation of the permit.
Such other requirements as are found by the Borough Secretary to be reasonably necessary for the protection of persons or property.
All conditions of the permit shall be complied with.
Upon denial by the Borough Secretary of an application made pursuant to § 67-5 of this chapter, the applicant may appeal from the determination of the Borough Secretary within five days thereafter to the Borough Council by filing a written notice of appeal for hearing by the Borough Council at its next meeting. Upon such appeal, the Borough Council may reverse, affirm or modify in any regard the determination of the Borough Secretary.
In the event an application is not filed within the required time as specified in § 67-5, the applicant may request a waiver of such requirement by the Borough Council at its next regular meeting or at a special meeting which may be called prior thereto by said Borough Council to consider such matter, and the Borough Council, if it finds unusual circumstances and in the exercise of its sound discretion, may waive such requirement.
Any permit for a parade or motorcade issued pursuant to this chapter may be summarily revoked by the Borough Secretary at any time when, by reason of disaster, public calamity, riot or other emergency, the Borough Secretary determines that the safety of the public or property requires such revocation. Notice of such action revoking a permit shall be delivered in writing to the permittee by personal service or by certified mail at the address given in regard to § 67-5A of this chapter.


text:
Akhmetshin R. R., Anashkin E. V., Aulchenko V. M., Banzarov V. Sh, Barkov L. M., Baru S. E., Bashtovoy N. S., Bondar A. E., Bondarev D. V., Bragin A. V., Chernyak D. V., Eidelman S. I., Fedotovitch G. V., Gabyshev N. I., Grebeniuk A. A., Grigoriev D. N., Hughes V. W., Ivanov P. M., Karpov S. V., Kazanin V. F., Kha Zin B. I., Koop I. A., Korostelev M. S., Krokovny P. P., Kurdadze L. M., Kuzmin A. S., Logashenko I. B., Lukin P. A., Lysenko A. P., Mikhailov K. Yu, Nesterenko I. N., Okhapkin V. S., Otboev A. V., Perevedentsev E. A., Polunin A. A., Popov A. S., Purlatz T. A., Root N. I., Ruban A. A., Ryskulov N. M., Shamov A. G., Shatunov Yu M., Shekhtman A. I., Shwartz B. A., Sibidanov A. L., Sidorov V. A., Skrinsky A. N., Smakhtin V. P., Snopkov I. G., Solodov E. P., Stepanov P. Yu, Sukhanov A. I., Thompson J. A., Titov V. M., Valishev A. A., Yudin Yu V., Zverev S. G.
The Cryogenic Magnetic Detector (CMD-2) is shortly described. Preliminary results for the cross sections of e+e- annihilation into hadrons and leptons are presented in the c.m. energy range from 0.37 to 1.39 GeV. The total integrated luminosity of about 26 pb-1 has been collected. The new results for the p and u meson parameters are reported. The major decay modes of the φ meson as well as its rare decays have been observed. The tagged kaons and η mesons in φ meson decays were used to look for some decay modes of K0S and η mesons.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


It’s been a busy week at One First Street, with three opinions, a notable concurrence in a cert denial, and a pair of consequential cert grants. Let’s get you caught up to speed.
The big decision of the week was Timbs v. Indiana (No. 17-091), in which a unanimous Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, albeit with some notable disagreement about the method of incorporation.
After his father died, Tyson Timbs used some of the money he received from a life insurance policy to purchase a $42,000 Land Rover SUV. Unfortunately, in addition to transporting himself, he also used the vehicle to transport heroin for sale. When he was arrested on drug charges, the State of Indiana seized the SUV and, after he pled guilty, the State sought civil forfeiture of the vehicle on the grounds that it had been used in the course of his offense. The trial court denied the States’ request, concluding that forfeiting the $42,000 vehicle would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed that decision, not because it found the forfeiture to be proportionate but because it concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause (unlike the prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail) had not been incorporated against the states and therefore constrained only federal action.
Well, now it is. Writing for a mostly unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg traced the roots of the Excessive Fines Clause back to the Magna Carta and through the English Bill of Rights and colonial era state constitutions. The protection against excessive fines has been a constant throughout Anglo-American history, she noted, because such fines undermine other liberties. They can be used to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies, or can be employed as a source of revenue rather than in service of a penal purpose. (Though she didn’t come right out and say it, that certainly appears to have been the case in Indiana, which, along with other state and local governments often hires private law firms to aggressively pursue forfeitures on a contingency basis and depend on fines as a source of general revenue.) Because the protection provided by the Excessive Fines Clause is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, with deep roots in our history and tradition,” the Court held that it is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the states.
That, as you may recall from law school, is the test the Supreme Court has long applied to determine whether a protection of the Bill of Rights applies to the States. But many originalists haven’t embraced that test, instead arguing that the Bill of Rights should be incorporated through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Thomas penned a lengthy opinion concurring in the judgment, explaining why. The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” As Justice Thomas has noted before, “[o]n its face, this appears to grant United States citizens a certain collection of rights—i.e., privileges or immunities—attributable to that status.” This would be the natural way of applying the Bill of Rights to the States, but for the fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was marginalized in Slaughterhouse Cases in the late 19th Century. The Due Process Clause, by contrast, only prohibits a State from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Though the Court has long recognized a substantive component to the Due Process Clause, “substantive due process” has equally long been an originalist bogeyman, leading, in Thomas’s view to “some of the Court’s most notoriously incorrect decisions. E.g. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 450 (1857).” Because the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects enumerated rights without permitting as much mischief as the Due Process Clause, Thomas insisted that it was the proper means of incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause in this case.
Next up, in Dawson v. Staeger (No. 17-419), a unanimous Supreme Court struck a blow for federal employees who want to retire in wild and wonderful West Virginia. When James Dawson retired from the U.S. Marshals Service, his home state of West Virginia began taxing his federal pension. But he soon learned that West Virginia exempted the pension benefits of retired state law enforcement officers from state income taxes. He sued, alleging that this differential treatment violated 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows states to tax federal employees’ pay, but only if the “taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.” A West Virginia trial court agreed with him that there was no meaningful difference between his powers and duties as a U.S. Marshal and the powers and duties of the state law enforcement officers whose pensions were exempt from state income tax. This, the court held, was exactly what Section 111 prohibits. But the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed. It noted that only a small slice of West Virginia state employees benefited from the exemption and that he purpose of the exemption is to help this small slice of favored West Virginians, not to stick it to the Feds.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the trial court was right. The State did not dispute the trial court’s finding that there were no significant differences between the responsibilities of a U.S. Marshal and the responsibilities of the exempted state officers. And if “discrimination” means anything, it surely means treating those who are similarly situated differently. Gorsuch rejected the State’s argument that there was no meaningful interference with the operations of federal government, given the narrow class of state employees who benefitted from the exemption. Section 111 does not care about how many people are discriminated against and it does not care whether the federal government’s purposes are hindered. It only cares about whether similarly situated folks are being treated differently. In the same vein, it did not matter that many state employees with similar responsibilities as federal marshals were also denied the exemption. What matters is whether federal employees are similar to those who are favored, not whether they are also similar to those who are disfavored. The fact that some state employees might complain they too are being treated differently without a good reason is no defense. And it did not matter that the State was not trying to harm federal retirees: Section 111 prohibits discriminatory taxes, not discriminatory animus. The State also argued that the exemption was necessary to close the gap between the meager pension benefits it was able to provide its retirees and the lavish benefits of their federal counterparts, but Justice Gorsuch called BS. If the state law were written to exempt from taxation those state employees whose pension benefits fell below a certain level, then it would be fine for the State to deny the exemption to federal employees whose benefits exceeded the threshold. But that was not how the law was drafted: It exempted certain categories of employees, defined by their job titles and responsibilities. Dawson had the same responsibilities as those employees, so denying him the same exemption was discriminatory. That his pension may be larger than that of state employees did not justify this differential treatment.
But what is most notable about the dissent is who did not join it. The Chief Justice, despite authoring the dissent in the first Moore decision joined the majority in chastising the CCA this time. In a one-paragraph concurrence, he argued once again that the first decision “lacked clarity,” but insisted that it was not up to the CCA to disregard the Supreme Court’s mandate and “repeat the same errors that this Court previously condemned—if not quite in haec verba, certainly in substance.” This is the second time this month that the Chief has joined the majority in rejecting a lower court’s apparent disregard of a prior Supreme Court decision that he dissented in. Just as in June Medical Services, the Chief appears to be letting lower courts know that if Supreme Court precedent is going to be overruled or cut back, he and four other justices, not ambitious lower-court judges, will be the ones to do it.
Needless to say, even in the absence of evident support from any other Justices, Thomas’s call to revisit New York Times was received with alarm by many in the media, particularly in the context of a President who frequently tweets that the country’s libel laws should be relaxed.
Finally, the Court granted cert in two new cases, one of which it agreed to hear this term. In Department of Commerce v. New York (No. 19-966), the Court will review the injunction entered by SDNY judge (and Wiggin alum) Jesse Furman, following a bench trial, preventing the Commerce Department from adding a question about citizenship to the 2020 census. New York and several other plaintiffs sought to block the Commerce Department from adding a citizenship question because, arguing that it was being added for a discriminatory purpose and would deter undocumented immigrants from responding, leading to an artificial depression of the official population of communities with large numbers of immigrants. Back in November, the Supreme Court agreed to review Judge Furman’s decision to order discovery outside the Administrative Record. However, it did not stay the trial in the meantime and, on January 15th, Judge Furman issued a decision enjoining the citizenship question without relying on extra-record evidence. The Supreme Court removed the case from the calendar but indicated that it could reinstate it later in the term. The Commerce Department then sought a writ of certiorari before justice—skipping the Second Circuit—to review Judge Furman’s decision on the merits. Although the Trump administration has been doing that a lot of late, in this instance it had good reason to, since the Census questions need to be finalized by the end of June. The Court has now agreed to review the decision and to grant expedited argument. In addition to the ultimate question of whether the District Court properly enjoined the addition of the citizenship question as a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court will take up the earlier evidentiary question—i.e., whether a district court may order discover outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of an agency decisionmaker in an action to set aside agency action.
The Court also granted cert in County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (No. 18-260), a potentially important environmental case. The Court will address: (1) Whether the Clean Water Act requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint sources, such as groundwater, and (2) whether the County of Maui had fair notice that a Clean Water Act permit was required for its underground injection control wells that operated without such a permit for nearly 40 years.
That’s enough for this week. We’ll be back next week with the latest.
David is an Associate in Wiggin and Dana’s Litigation Department and a member of the firm’s Appellate, Art and Museum Law, and Intellectual Property Litigation practice groups. He has assisted insurers, universities, large companies, cultural institutions, and sovereign nations in a variety of complex civil litigation and appeals. Representative matters include trademark, copyright, and patent cases; insurance class-actions; art-ownership disputes; and high-stakes business litigation. David has also represented private individuals and companies in several criminal matters and internal investigations.
David received his J.D. from the Yale Law School, where he was a Notes Editor for the Yale Law Journal. He earned an M.A. in Classics from the University of Virginia and a B.S. in Classics from the University of Oregon.
Before joining the firm, David held a clerkship with Judge Christopher Droney of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.