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• ensuring the implementation of the service provision contract.
• integrity and confidentiality of the processing, and ensuring an adequate level of security of personal data.
• fulfilling its obligations to the National Revenue Agency, the Ministry of Interior and other state and municipal authorities.
• Registration of a consumer in the e-shop and execution of a distance-purchase contract - the purpose of this operation is to create an account for the use of the e-shop for the purchase of goods and the provision of contact data for the delivery of purchased goods. Registering and creating an online store account is not a mandatory step in providing the service, and it is accessible to a significant extent without creating an account through the "Fast Order" option, as well as by signing in through your Google+ or Facebook account.
Conclusion of the Impact Assessment: Based on the Impact Assessment carried out, the Data Protection Officer considers that the Operation "Registration of an e-shop user and the execution of a distance-purchase contract" is permissible for performance and provides sufficient safeguards to protect the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects in line with GDPR requirements.
• Conclusion and execution of a trade deal with a client or a partner - the purpose of this operation is to conclude and execute a contract with a trading partner or a client and its administration. Given the limited scope of personal data collected and the fact that part of it is collected from publicly available sources, the Data Protection Officer considers that an impact assessment is not required to conduct an impact assessment of the operation.
• Sending a newsletter (newsletter) - the purpose of this operation is to administer the process of sending newsletters to clients who have declared they wish to receive. Given the limited scope of personal data collected, the Data Protection Officer considers that an impact assessment is not required to carry out an impact assessment of the operation.
• Exercise of a right of withdrawal or claim - the purpose of this operation is to administer the process of exercising the right of withdrawal or claim by the client. Given the limited scope of personal data collected, the Data Protection Officer considers that an impact assessment is not required to carry out an impact assessment of the operation.
⎫ Goal for which data is collected: 1) Making a contact with the user and sending information to him, 2) For the purpose of registering a user in the online shop, and 3) Sending a newsletter.
⎫ Reason for processing your personal data - By accepting the terms and conditions and registering in the online shop or ordering without a registration or upon entering into a written agreement between the Administrator and you, a contractual relationship is created on which we process your personal data - Art. 6, para. 1, b. (b) GDPR. Your data for sending a newsletter is processed on the basis of your explicit consent - Art. 6, para. 1, b. (s) GDPR.
⎫ Purpose for which the data are collected: Execution of obligations of the controller under a distance and delivery contract of the purchased goods, including the exercise of the right of return and the replacement or refusal of purchased goods.
⎫ Reason for processing your personal data - By accepting the terms and conditions and registering in the online shop or ordering without a registration or upon entering into a written agreement between the Administrator and you, a contractual relationship is created on which we process your personal data - Art. 6, para. 1, b. (b) GDPR.
⎫ Purpose for which data is collected: 1) Making a contact with the user and sending information to him and 2) For the purpose of registering a user in the online store.
⎫ Reason for processing your personal data - By accepting the terms and conditions and registering in the e-shop via a social networking account, a contractual relationship is created between the Administrator and you, on which basis we process your personal data - 6, para. 1, b. (b) GDPR.
• genetic and biometric data, health data, or data on sexual life or sexual orientation.
(3) The personal data are collected by the Administrator from the persons to whom they refer.
(4) The Company does not make automated decision making with data.
Art. 5. (1) The Administrator shall store your personal data for a period no longer than the existence of your online store or ordering through the "Fast Order" option. After deleting your account or successfully completing it, the Administrator takes the necessary care to erase and destroy all your data without undue delay or to anonymize them (ie to bring them in a form that does not reveal your personality).
(2) The Administrator shall store your personal data provided in connection with online orders for a period of 5 years for the purpose of protecting the legal interests of the Administrator in judicial or administrative disputes with online shop users, the accounting documents being kept for the relevant statutory term.
(3) The Administrator shall notify you in the event that the period for storing the data is required to be extended in order to comply with a statutory obligation or with respect to the legitimate interests of the Administrator or otherwise.
Art. 6. The administrator keeps the personal data of the legal representatives of its trading partners for the term of performance of the contract, respecting the legitimate interests and legal obligations of the Administrator, which may exceed the term of the concluded contract.
Art. 7. (1) The administrator may, at its own discretion, transmit all or part of your personal data to processor personal data for the fulfillment of the processing purposes with which you have agreed, subject to the requirements of Regulation (EC) 2016/679 (GDPR) .
(2) The Administrator notifies you in case of intent to transfer some or all of your personal data to third countries or international organizations.
Art. 8. (1) If you do not wish all or any of your personal data to continue to be processed by the Company for any particular or for any processing purpose, you may at any time withdraw your consent to processing by filling in the form in your account or by request in free text.
(2) The Administrator may ask you to certify your identity and identity with the data subject by asking you to enter an email address and a password to access the site at the office of the Company before our employee.
(3) By withdrawing the consent to process personal data that is required to create and maintain an online store account, your account will become inactive. Of course, you will be able to browse the online store and offer the products and make orders as a guest or make a new registration.
(4) If there is an order you are currently processing, the earliest date at which you can withdraw your consent to processing is the successful completion of the order.
Art. 9. (1) You have the right to request and obtain from the Administrator a confirmation that personal data relating to you are being processed, as if you are a registered user, you may at any time see in your profile the personal data you have provided and processed for You.
(2) You have the right to access the data relating to you as well as information relating to the collection, processing and storage of your personal data.
(3) The Administrator shall provide you, upon request, with a copy of the processed personal data relating to you in electronic or other appropriate form.
(4) The provision of access to the data is free of charge, but the Administrator reserves the right to impose an administrative fee in case of repeatability or excessive demand.
Art. 10. You may correct or fill in inaccurate or incomplete personal data relating to you directly through your website account or by requesting the Administrator.
• personal data have been gathered in connection with the provision of information society services.
• for the establishment, exercise or protection of legal claims.
• e-mail with which you registered with the online store.
(4) In order to exercise your right to be forgotten, you must submit a request via your online store account or by sending an email request to the Administrator.
(5) The administrator may ask you to certify your identity and identity with the data subject.
(6) If there is an order you are currently processing, the earliest point at which you can ask to be "forgotten" is when you successfully complete the order.
(3) By deleting your personal information, your account will become inactive. Of course, you will be able to browse the online store and offer the products and make orders as a guest or make a new registration.
(7) The administrator does not delete the data, which he has a legal obligation to store, including for protection against claims against him or proof of his rights.
• You have reproached the processing pending verification that the legal grounds of the Administrator have an advantage over your interests.
Art. 13. (1) You may at any time download or receive in a machine-readable format the data stored and processed for you in connection with the use of the Services of the Administrator, directly through your account through the Export Data option or email request.
(2) You may request the Administrator to directly transfer your personal data to an administrator you provide when it is technically feasible.
Art. 14. You may request the Administrator to inform you of all recipients to whom the personal data for which the correction, deletion or limitation of the processing has been requested has been disclosed. The administrator may refuse to provide this information if this would not be possible or would require disproportionate effort.
Art. 15. You may at any time object to the processing of personal data by the Administrator that relates to it, including whether it is being processed for profiling or direct marketing purposes.
Art. 16. (1) If the Administrator detects a breach of security of your personal data that may pose a high risk to your rights and freedoms, he shall notify you without undue delay of the violation as well as of the measures taken or to be taken .
• Notification would require disproportionate efforts.
Art. 17. For the purpose of processing your personal data and providing the service in its full functionality and in view of your interests, the Administrator may provide the data to the following data processors - see the list of data processors. These processing personal data comply with all legal and security requirements for the processing and storage of your personal data.
Art. 18. The administrator does not transfer your data to third countries.
Art. 20. You may exercise all of your rights to protect your personal data through the forms enclosed with this information. Of course, these forms are not mandatory and you can make your claims in any form that contains a statement about it and identifies you as the data holder.
Art. 21. If the consent relates to a transfer, the Administrator shall describe the possible risks for the transfer of data to third countries in the absence of a decision on adequate protection and appropriate remedies.

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Paul ends his powerful and thorough masterpiece with greetings to many friends and co-workers in the Lord.
16 I commend to you our sister Phoebe, a servant of the church in Cenchrea. 2 I ask you to receive her in the Lord in a way worthy of the saints and to give her any help she may need from you, for she has been a great help to many people, including me.
3 Greet Priscilla and Aquila, my fellow workers in Christ Jesus. 4 They risked their lives for me. Not only I but all the churches of the Gentiles are grateful to them.
I know we need well-educated leaders, but I often wonder what would happen if we had more house churches in the U.S. We need an authority structure but the bureaucracy and seemingly inevitable bad teaching that comes from larger organizations is disappointing.
6 Greet Mary, who worked very hard for you. 7 Greet Andronicus and Junias, my relatives who have been in prison with me. They are outstanding among the apostles, and they were in Christ before I was.
8 Greet Ampliatus, whom I love in the Lord. 9 Greet Urbanus, our fellow worker in Christ, and my dear friend Stachys.
10 Greet Apelles, tested and approved in Christ.
11 Greet Herodion, my relative.
Consider how many women Paul greeted and how he acknowledged their hard work in the Lord. He is falsely considered a chauvinist but if you study all of what he said and the context of the culture in which he said it, Paul is quite the feminist (in the good sense).
17 I urge you, brothers, to watch out for those who cause divisions and put obstacles in your way that are contrary to the teaching you have learned. Keep away from them. 18 For such people are not serving our Lord Christ, but their own appetites. By smooth talk and flattery they deceive the minds of naive people. 19 Everyone has heard about your obedience, so I am full of joy over you; but I want you to be wise about what is good, and innocent about what is evil.
Note how Paul desired that all nations would believe in and obey Jesus and that God is the only wise God. There is a good reason you’ll rarely, if ever, hear false Christian teachers preach from Romans.
v.1 – Phoebe was probably the carrier of the letter to Rome and served as a deaconess. She came from Cenchrea, a port located about six miles east of Corinth on the Saronic Gulf.
v.3 – Priscilla and Aquila were close friends of Paul who worked in the same trade of tentmaking.
v.7 – Junias is a feminine name.
v. 8,9,10 – Ampliatus…Urbanus…Stachys…Apelles…are all common slave names found in the imperial household.
v. 10 – The Aristobulus mentioned could very well be the grandson of Herod the Great and brother of Herod Agrippa I.
v. 11 – Narcissus is sometimes identified with Tiberius Claudius Narcissus, a wealthy freedman of the Roman emperor Tiberius.
v. 12 – Tryphena and Tryphosa were perhaps sisters, even twins, because it was common for such persons to be given names from the same root. Persis means “Persian Woman”.
v. 13 – It is possible that Rufus is the same person mentioned in Mark 15:21, as also Mark no doubt wrote his Gospel to the Christians in Rome and Italy.
v. 16 – Justin Martyr (A.D. 150) tells us that the holy kiss was a regular part of the worship service in his day. It is still a practice in some churches.
v. 17 – Paul warned against factions, which plagued the church at Corinth and was also the place where he wrote his letter to the Romans. However, he wasn’t meaning just any divisions and obstacles, but those which were contrary to the teaching they had learned.
v. 19 – Christians are to be adequate judges of false doctrine. This is why I feel Bible study is so important.
v. 27 – To God be the glory! The ultimate purpose of all things.
Good points. I especially agree on your v. 19 comment. I’m not saying it is easy, but Jesus expects us to understand correct doctrine.
Thanks, for this post. I always wondered why passages like this were included in the bible. Your post did a great job of explaining the relevance. I like what you said about people seeing the bible as a chauvinist book. I thought that ,when I was in college and that was hindrance for me. It slowed my progress at seeking a relationship with God. I always like to see text where women were acknowledged for their faith and their works.
Thanks, Ly Syin, great to hear from you!
I’ve always been deeply touched by Paul identifying specific persons to greet.
Most of these persons were probably quite ordinary, but stood out among the early Christians for their simple dedication to Christ, generosity towards others, and love of the Gospel.
Whenever I read Paul greeting others it reminds me of just how all knowing and all seeing God is. No faith, no witness, no good work, no matter how small, goes unnoticed and unrecorded in the Book of Life. The simple acts of faith of these persons resulted in them being forever recorded in Sacred Scripture, and their very existence forever intertwined with the Word of God in a unique and special way.
The witness of the early Christians is always near to my heart, because many of them (especially many of the early martyrs) are forgotten in all but name. We know little of what they did or who they were. But at the appointed hour they followed Christ to glorious martyrdom and received the martyr’s crown for all eternity.
The empires of this word are powerless when they confront faithful Christians. Christ Jesus has defeated even death. Death has no sting. What power do these earthly empires, these kingdoms of the wicked ruled by the prince of this world, have left if not the power of death? None at all.
Powerful points! That was a great message to read to start the day.

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Evidence at a criminal trial was sufficient to warrant submission of the case against the defendant to the jury on the theory that he was a principal [643-646] or a joint venturer [646-647].
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Brockton Division of the District Court Department on April 3, 1998.
Patrick C. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
possession of a firearm and for the assaults to five consecutive terms [Note 2]. The defendant's main contention on appeal is that three of his four assault convictions must be vacated because the evidence showed that the shooter intended to commit, at most, one battery. The defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him either as a joint venturer or as a principal on the assault counts as well as the count for malicious damage to a motor vehicle [Note 3]. We affirm the convictions.
We rehearse the facts the jury could have found. On the evening of April 1, 1998, Daniel Marcellus (Daniel) was a passenger in a 1991 Honda Accord automobile traveling on Main Street in Brockton. In the vehicle were Daniel's brother Michael, Johnson Danger, Gael Calixce, and Shamond Rowell. As the Honda proceeded down Main Street, it passed the defendant, who was standing in front of a bar with David Benedict, Donald Everett, and Catima. Andrews. One or two of the individuals in the latter group "threw their hands up," which Daniel interpreted as a solicitation to engage in a fight. The Honda turned around and came back to where the defendant and his group were standing. Daniel and Michael stepped out of the Honda, and Michael asked what was the problem. There previously had been tension between the defendant and Daniel regarding a friend of the defendant (referred to as "Gerald"), who had been killed in a car accident. Apparently prompted by Michael's suggestion that the dispute be settled, there was an agreement that the defendant and Daniel would fight, "one-on-one." Daniel testified that the defendant took off his jacket and sweater, removed a gun from his waistband [Note 4], and then wrapped the gun in his sweater or jacket, briefly went out of sight behind a building [Note 5], and returned, apparently without the weapon.
Daniel and the defendant fought with fists, "blow for blow."
Shortly thereafter, the parties backed away from each other, the defendant appearing "winded." The defendant's friends, however, encouraged him to continue fighting. The fight apparently had concluded as the police arrived. Both parties apparently emerged relatively unscathed. Daniel told the police that the fight was over and that no weapons had been used. Daniel testified that David Benedict was a passive spectator during this incident and that he did not see Benedict with a weapon.
or because the occupants of the Honda had ducked down after hearing the noise.
After the shot was fired, the other vehicle sped off, and Daniel accelerated in an attempt to obtain the license plate number. After the others in the Honda expressed concern about the possibility of another incident, Daniel drove directly to the police station. He testified that he told the police that he "figured" that it was the defendant who had fired the shot.
The next day, however, when Daniel went to school at Brockton High School, he spoke with several persons, including the defendant's girlfriend, Ruth Andrade, who told him that it was David Benedict who fired the shot [Note 8]. Daniel testified that he began to have second thoughts about his identification of the defendant because the hand which came out of the window was not a "dark-skinned hand," as inferentially that of the defendant was. Daniel testified at the grand jury that he told Officer Linehan and Detective Reardon that it "probably wasn't even [the defendant] who really shot" at the Honda. Officer Linehan subsequently testified that Daniel told him that he wasn't sure at that time if it was the defendant's hand that came out of the window, and that it was Benedict, known to Daniel as "Dag," who was the shooter. Linehan also stated that at the station Daniel told him that he was unable to identify anyone else in the vehicle [Note 9].
attempt to do bodily harm, or by placing the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm") [Note 10]. See also Commonwealth v. Musgrave, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 519 , 521-525 (1995), S.C., 421 Mass. 610 (1996).
The defendant was charged with separate counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon for each of the four occupants of the Honda. He argues that evidence of a single gunshot fired with no warning and followed by the immediate departure of the shooter is not sufficient to prove that the shooter attempted to batter four victims rather than one, and that in these circumstances, it would not have been possible to have shot all four occupants with a single bullet [Note 11].
held that the defendant properly could be convicted on multiple counts of assault, and in the judge's discretion, given consecutive sentences. The defendant concedes this point but stresses that the present case is distinguishable because only a single shot was fired at the Honda. In Dello Iacono, the court referred to the fact that, in the Levia case, the court considered the legislative design and held that the number of persons intimidated measured the number of offenses, noting that the offense of armed robbery fell under the statutory heading "Crimes Against the Person," the text defining the person as the object of protection [Note 14]. Commonwealth v. Dello Iacono, supra at 89.
The decision in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 459 (1996), cited by both parties, and involving the offense of armed assault with intent to murder, a specific intent crime, is not inconsistent with these principles. There, the defendant pointed a weapon at two pursuing police officers three times. The defendant may have fired once at the officers, the gun jamming after he had fired the single shot. The court did not accept the defendant's argument that a single act ok pointing a gun at the officers and shooting once was insufficient to prove two separate armed assaults with intent to murder. In fact, the court held, it was irrelevant that the weapon jammed because the specific intent is measured at the moment the defendant pointed the pistol at the officers. Id. at 465-466. See People v. Mimms, 40 Ill. App. 3d 942, 945-946 (1976).
The defendant's argument that Commonwealth v. Gordon, supra, is not dispositive in the present circumstances because it could be inferred that the defendant there intended to fire not one but several shots to accomplish his purpose to kill both officers misses the mark. That the court looks to the legislative intent in these circumstances to determine whether to charge the defendant with multiple counts as the result of a single act is made clear in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1997), a case involving a prosecution under G. L. c. 266, s. 14, for armed burglary and assault. The opinion borrowed from the analysis in the Levia case but reached a different conclusion.
The court held that the provisions of the statute that require the burglar to be armed or to commit an actual assault merely aggravate the principal crime of burglary, and therefore there could be only one conviction under that statute no matter how many occupants were assaulted inside the dwelling. Id. at 605. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 182 , 196 (1999). In Gordon, the court took note of the fact that burglary was essentially a crime against a person's possessory interest in his dwelling, and that the Legislature had placed G. L. c. 266, s. 14, in the chapter of the General Laws entitled "Crimes against Property." 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 604-605. Contrast Commonwealth v. Dello Iacono, supra.
Here, the shooter fired at point blank range from a vehicle traveling at a high speed. He endangered the lives of all four occupants in doing so. In these circumstances, the state of the evidence does not suggest that the shooter's intent was to injure Daniel alone [Note 15].
The teaching of our cases is that, where the intent of the Legislature in the enactment of a criminal statute is primarily to protect the safety of individuals, as opposed to one's possessory interest in property, the number of victims determines the number of units of legitimate prosecution [Note 16]. In the present case, it was not error to charge the defendant with four counts of assault, and the judge within his discretion appropriately could impose consecutive sentences. [Note 17] Commonwealth v. Dello Iacono, supra.
unanimously that the defendant was either the principal or the joint venturer). Hence, "[u]nder either theory, the Commonwealth must present sufficient evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of that theory." Commonwealth v. Green, 420 Mass. 771 , 779 (1995). See Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra at 761.
The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to warrant submission to the jury on the theory that he was a principal, observing that the Commonwealth "essentially conceded" that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the shooter. He also points out that the verdict slips did not require the jury to record what theory, principal or joint venture, they were convicting on. Therefore, the defendant maintains, as it cannot be ascertained whether the defendant was convicted on a theory for which there was no evidentiary support, the convictions must be vacated.
As noted, the record indicates that the defense challenged joint venture liability. The record does not indicate that the defense counsel discussed principal liability. "The relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a jury to find guilt [on the basis of principal liability], not whether the evidence requires such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745 , 747 (1988).
some time later, "at the grand jury [Note 19]," the defendant told the police that he was unsure whether the hand that came out of the window was the defendant's, and that he believed at that time that David Benedict was the shooter.
Under Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 , 60-63 (1984), and related cases, if a witness at trial makes no in-court identification, and disclaims any pretrial identification, third party evidence of a pretrial identification is not admissible for substantive purposes. "Thus, a police officer's attribution to a witness of a positive identification denied by the witness at trial is not admissible to prove the identification. Its effect is limited to impeachment." Id. at 61. Therefore, Officer Linehan's testimony at trial that Daniel informed him at the police station that the defendant was the shooter was not admissible as independent substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, because the evidential value of the prior identification is diminished. See Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268 , 273 n.3 (1975). Cf. Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402 , 407-409 (1978) (prior identification of defendants by witness admissible not merely to impeach but as substantive evidence where witness testified at trial that the defendants were not the offenders, but affirmed that she had made earlier photographic identifications as to which there was no claim that they were made under suggestive conditions, and thus could be cross-examined concerning them). Compare Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735 , 744-745 (2000) (where one of the victims at a probable cause hearing identified the defendant as the person who assaulted her but at trial disclaimed any memory of the defendant's having done so, the judge properly ruled that the victim's probable cause testimony could be admitted in evidence for substantive purposes, the court noting that probable cause testimony, as opposed to grand jury testimony, is inherently more trustworthy and that corroboration is not required).
In the instant case, however, the Commonwealth presented additional circumstantial evidence on the defendant's liability as a principal. Commonwealth v. Daye, supra at 74. See and compare Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 135 , 145 (1993), S.C., 416 Mass. 736 (1994).
The defendant and Daniel had a confrontation shortly before the shooting incident. See Commonwealth v. Ferrer, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 645 , 646-647 (1999). Daniel saw the defendant with a weapon just prior to their fight, and he recognized the weapon as the same one brandished by David Benedict on an earlier occasion. The defendant, sitting in the rear passenger seat, was in the best position to fire the shot. Commonwealth v. Ferrer, supra. Cf. Commonwealth v. Salemme, 395 Mass. 594 , 599-601 (1985). Furthermore, Daniel testified that, on the evening of his confrontation with the defendant, David Benedict was a passive observer of the fight, and that there was no exchange of words or argument between him and Benedict. Although various witnesses testified that there was apparently no clear winner in the fist fight between Daniel and the defendant, Daniel testified that after the defendant "got a couple of blows in," causing Daniel to slip to the ground, he (Daniel) got up and picked up the defendant and slammed him to the ground. At the close the defendant appeared winded, stepped back from the affray, and stood on the curb. In the circumstances, the jury could have inferred that the defendant may have suffered some embarrassment in front of his friends, and that he (the defendant), more than Benedict, had a motive on that occasion to pursue Daniel's vehicle and to fire the shot. Commonwealth v. Ferrer, supra. "In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary to show that it was not in the power of any other person than the defendant to commit the crime." Cf. Commonwealth v. Salemme, supra at 601, quoting from Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196 , 200 (1965) (other citation omitted).
The instant facts clearly distinguish this case from a case such as Commonwealth v. Lane, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 527 , 527529 (1989), cited by the defendant, in which there was no evidence linking the defendant to the incident beyond the identification testimony, which proved only that one of two individuals committed the crime. We think that, while the question may be considered close, the present case is not one in which the jury could have convicted the defendant on a theory for which there was no evidentiary support. The Commonwealth presented sufficient circumstantial identification evidence to withstand the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty as to principal liability and to take the case to the jury.
each defendant was (1) present at the scene, (2) with knowledge that another intends to commit the crime, and (3) by agreement is willing and available to help the other if necessary. Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482 , 486 (1988). See Commonwealth v. Caramanica, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 376 , 380-382 (2000), and cases cited. Daniel identified the defendant as being present in the Chrysler at the time of the shooting. That the defendant shared the intent with Benedict (if, indeed, Benedict was the shooter) is demonstrated by the prior hostility between Daniel and the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 612 , 613 (1999) (both the defendant and the shooter were in the vehicle, but it was the defendant, not the shooter, who had had a quarrel with the victim). See and compare Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375 , 380-381 (1992). As to willingness to assist, it was a reasonable inference for the jury to draw that the defendant had supplied the gun to Benedict. This would be enough for joint venture liability. See Commonwealth v. Daughtry, 417 Mass. 136 , 139 (1994). Indeed, the shared possession of the weapon by the defendant and Benedict on various occasions has the aura of a moveable feast. For joint venture liability, it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to present direct evidence as to which one fired the shot, so long as there is strong circumstantial evidence that one of them did. Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167 , 174 (1980). There was sufficient evidentiary support to warrant sending the case to the jury on a theory of joint venture, as well as on principal, liability.
[Note 1] The defendant was convicted of four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (G. L. c. 265, s. 15[b]), as well as of additional counts charging him with unlawful possession of a firearm and of ammunition, and malicious damage to a motor vehicle. Counts for armed assault with intent to murder were dismissed.
[Note 2] Concurrent sentences were imposed on the remaining counts.
[Note 3] The defendant makes no argument on appeal with respect to the possession convictions. Cf. Commonwealth v. Brown, ante 253 (2000).
[Note 4] Daniel described the gun as "all black," with a seven- or eight-inch long barrel, and stated that it "looked like a Glock." Daniel had seen the weapon before; David Benedict had "pulled it on [Daniel]" during a fight which the two had had a few weeks prior to the present incident. On that occasion, Benedict fired the gun in the air as he was moving away.
[Note 5] Gael Calixce testified that the defendant went into the bar briefly, and when he returned he did not have the jacket in which he had wrapped an object. Shamond Rowell and Michael Marcellus testified that the defendant handed the jacket to someone near an alley.
[Note 6] Gael Calixce later testified that the bullet shattered a window in the Honda. Officer Richard Linehan testified that he observed evidence of one gun shot which penetrated the Honda's door and shattered a window next to the rear seat.
[Note 7] Neither the blue Chrysler nor the gun nor the spent round was ever found. The bullet presumably went through the rear passenger window of Daniel's vehicle, the only open window in the car.
[Note 8] Daniel testified on cross-examination that, on April 2, Benedict approached him at school and "tried to play dumb," asking Daniel what had happened. There was an argument, and school officials pulled them apart. Andrade, the only defense witness, testified that Benedict had approached her and told her that he had fired the shot.
[Note 9] The prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument that the evidence showed that it was "most likely" that Benedict, not the defendant, fired the shot.
[Note 10] The verdict slips indicated, with respect to the assault counts, that the jury had based their verdict on the attempted battery theory rather than on the theory of an imminently threatened battery.
[Note 11] The defendant did not make this argument below. This is evident from a summary of sidebar conference" which is part of an expanded record on appeal. The summary makes clear that, during argument on the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, counsel argued only that there was insufficient evidence presented to establish joint venture. Nevertheless, we review to determine whether there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
[Note 12] The Levia case was an armed robbery prosecution in which the defendant pointed, but did not fire, a weapon at two store employees. The defendant contended that there was only one robbery and that the imposition of consecutive sentences was improper. The court had to determine whether the Legislature intended that the putting in fear and robbery from two individuals of money belonging to a single entity would constitute one robbery or two. The Commonwealth argued that the armed robbery statute was designed to protect persons, and the court agreed, holding that the offense is against the person assaulted and not the entity that owns or possesses the property taken. Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. at 347-351.
[Note 13] We observe that, unlike the present case, the court in Dello Iacono did not discuss the question whether the case was prosecuted under the attempted battery theory or the immediately threatened battery theory. This does not change the result we have reached because the issue is whether a defendant may be prosecuted on an offense-per-person theory. We conclude that, if the jury had returned a verdict in the present case on the immediately threatened battery theory, the verdicts would stand. See and compare Commonwealth v. Domingue, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 990 ("nothing inconsistent with the jury's having found . . . that the defendant fired the weapon . . . towards the bar ... and that he also fully intended to frighten its bartender at the same time, and with the same shots") (emphasis added).
[Note 14] In Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477 , 480 (2000), the court cited Commonwealth V. Levia, supra, for the proposition that the Commonwealth is permitted, although not required, to request multiple indictments (or multiple counts, for that matter), in circumstances where there are multiple victims.
[Note 15] We observe for what it is worth that Daniel was driving and that the shot penetrated the rear seat area of the car.
[Note 16] The annotation, Single Act Affecting Multiple Victims as Constituting Multiple Assaults or Homicides, 8 A.L.R. 4th 960 (1981), collects cases which indicate that courts in various jurisdictions are not in agreement as to whether a single act affecting multiple victims constitutes multiple assaults or rather a single offense.
[Note 17] The record on appeal discloses that the defendant, while arguing for lesser offenses, did not object to the imposition of the consecutive sentences at the time they were imposed. Nor does the District Court docket indicate that the defendant filed a motion to revise or revoke the sentences.
[Note 18] On cross-examination, the judge sustained the prosecutor's objection, on the grounds that it was argumentative, to the question, "[T]here's no question in your mind today that it was not [the defendant's] hand that held that gun, right?"
[Note 19] The record is not clear as to whether Daniel testified under oath at the grand jury that he then believed that Benedict was the shooter, or whether the statement came during an interview of Daniel by the police at the time of the grand jury proceedings.

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D.C. Law Library - § 37–201.16a. Quantity markings required for packages; exemption.
↪ Chapter 2. Weights, Measures, and Markets Generally.
↪ Subchapter I. Weights and Measures Generally.
↪ § 37–201.16a. Quantity markings required for packages; exemption.
§ 37–201.16. Substitutes for dry measure prohibited.
§ 37–201.17. Sale of wood.
§ 37–201.16a. Quantity markings required for packages; exemption.
No person shall sell, offer, or expose for sale in the District of Columbia any food in package form unless the quantity of contents is plainly and conspicuously marked on the outside of each package in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count. The Council of the District of Columbia is authorized to establish and allow reasonable variation, tolerances, and exemptions as to small packages.
This section originated at a time when local government powers were delegated to a Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia (see Acts Relating to the Establishment of the District of Columbia and its Various Forms of Governmental Organization in Volume 1). Section 402(195) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967 (see Reorganization Plans in Volume 1) transferred all of the functions of the Board of Commissioners under this section to the District of Columbia Council, subject to the right of the Commissioner as provided in § 406 of the Plan. The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, 87 Stat. 818, § 711 ( D.C. Code, § 1-207.11), abolished the District of Columbia Council and the Office of Commissioner of the District of Columbia. These branches of government were replaced by the Council of the District of Columbia and the Office of Mayor of the District of Columbia, respectively. Accordingly, and also pursuant to § 714(a) of such Act ( D.C. Code, § 1-207.14(a)), appropriate changes in terminology were made in this section.


PROVIDED NOTICE THAT RAILUSA, LLC AND AMERICAN RAIL PARTNERS, LLC FILED A NOTICE OF EXEMPTION TO CONTINUE IN CONTROL OF FLORIDA GULF & ATLANTIC RAILROAD, LLC.
RailUSA, LLC (RailUSA) and American Rail Partners, LLC (ARP), each a noncarrier, have filed a verified notice of exemption pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1180.2(d)(2) to continue in control of Florida Gulf & Atlantic Railroad, LLC (FGA), upon FGA’s becoming a Class III rail carrier. FGA is a newly formed noncarrier entity that is wholly owned by RailUSA. RailUSA, in turn, is wholly owned by ARP. Thus, RailUSA directly controls FGA, and ARP indirectly controls FGA.
This transaction is related to a concurrently filed verified notice of exemption in Florida Gulf & Atlantic Railroad—Acquisition & Operation Exemption With Interchange Commitment—CSX Transportation, Inc., Docket No. FD 36247. In that proceeding, FGA seeks an exemption under 49 C.F.R. § 1150.31 to acquire and operate approximately 373 miles of rail line in Florida and Georgia currently owned and operated by CSX Transportation, Inc., consisting of the following: (1) the Tallahassee Subdivision between Baldwin, Fla., at or near CSXT milepost SP 653.3, and Chattahoochee, Fla., at or near CSXT milepost SP 842.5; (2) the P&A Subdivision between Chattahoochee, at or near CSXT milepost 00K810.7, and Pensacola, Fla., at or near CSXT milepost 00K651.0; and (3) portions of the Bainbridge Subdivision between Tallahassee, Fla., at or near CSXT milepost SLC 52.0, and Attapulgus, Ga., at or near CSXT milepost SLC 79.0.
RailUSA and ARP currently control one rail carrier, Grenada Railroad, LLC (GRR), a Class III carrier that leases and operates on lines in Mississippi and Tennessee. RailUSA and ARP represent that: (1) the lines to be acquired and operated by FGA do not connect with the GRR lines; (2) the continuance in control is not part of a series of anticipated transactions that would connect any rail line to be operated by FGA with any GRR rail line; and (3) the transaction does not involve a Class I rail carrier. Therefore, the proposed transaction is exempt from the prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 11323. See 49 C.F.R. § 1180.2(d)(2).
Under 49 U.S.C. § 10502(g), the Board may not use its exemption authority to relieve a rail carrier of its statutory obligation to protect the interests of its employees. Section 11326(c), however, does not provide for labor protection for transactions under §§ 11324 and 11325 that involve only Class III rail carriers. Accordingly, the Board may not impose labor protective conditions here, because only Class III carriers are involved.
If the notice contains false or misleading information, the exemption is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 10502(d) may be filed at any time. The filing of a petition to revoke will not automatically stay the effectiveness of the exemption. Petitions to stay must be filed no later than December 28, 2018 (at least seven days before the exemption becomes effective).
An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to Docket No. FD 36248, must be filed with the Surface Transportation Board, 395 E Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, a copy of each pleading must be served on Peter W. Denton, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20036.


1. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, under Jud. Code § 234, and in fulfillment of its power under Rev.Stats. § 917 to regulate the equity practice, this Court has discretion to issue the writ directly to the district court in a case of which it has ultimate power to review the merits, for the purpose of inquiring into and correcting a practice of assigning all patent causes to a master, adopted by the district judges in alleged disconformity to the Equity Rules. P. 272 U. S. 705.
2. Under Equity Rules 46 and 59, trials are, generally, to be oral, in open court, and references to a master exceptional, and this applies to patent cases. P. 272 U. S. 706.
3. District courts must exercise a discretion in reference to the order of business, and congestion of the calendar with many cases, including a large number of criminal cases, ahead of the patent cases may furnish cause for referring the patent cases to a master. P. 272 U. S. 707.
Original application for leave to file a petition for mandamus directed to one of the district judges of the Southern District of California.
"This cause now appearing on the call of the court's calendar to be set for trial, and it being the desire of both counsel for the plaintiff and defendant, as expressed in open court, that a date be fixed for the trial hereof, and counsel for the plaintiff insists that, because of alleged acts of infringement committed by the defendant, plaintiff will suffer damage by reason of the great delay in the hearing and determination of the issues herein, and it appearing that, because of the congestion of the court's calendar, there are many other causes entitled to be first heard, including a large number of criminal causes which are entitled to preference over civil matters as to the trial thereof, and it further appearing that, because of the protracted length of patent trials, the result has been and is that other civil litigants having causes to be tried have not been accorded a fair proportion of the time of the court, and it appearing that this condition will continue unless many of the patent cases, including this cause, now pending can be disposed of in the manner herein provided, and, hence, that, in order to fairly and within a reasonable time dispose of the business before the court, it is necessary that this order be made:"
"It is now ordered that this cause be referred to Charles C. Montgomery, Esq., standing master in chancery, to take and hear the evidence offered by the respective parties and to make his conclusions as to the facts in issue and recommend the judgment to be entered thereon; the standing master in chancery is authorized and empowered to do all things and to make such orders as may be required to accomplish a full hearing on all matters of fact and law in issue in this cause; the objection of counsel for the defendant to the making of this order referring the cause to the master is hereby noted, and an exception is allowed in favor of the defendant."
those litigants to unnecessary trouble and expense because proceedings before a master are invariably protracted and expensive, and the cost of such proceedings must be borne by the litigants.
By § 917 of the Revised Statutes, this Court is given power from time to time, in any manner not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, to regulate the whole practice to be used in suits in equity or admiralty by the district courts. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1. This was taken from § 13 of the original Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 80, c. 20. The same thirteenth section provided that the Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law to any courts appointed under the authority of the United States. This part of the original § 13 became embodied in § 688 of the Revised Statutes, and is now to be found in § 234 of the Judicial Code.
"In what case such a writ is warranted by the principles and usages of law it is not always easy to determine. Its use has been very much extended in modern times, and now it may be said to be an established remedy to oblige inferior courts and magistrates to do that justice which they are in duty, and by virtue of their office, bound to do. It does not lie to control judicial discretion except when that discretion has been abused, but it is a remedy when the case is outside of the exercise of this discretion, and outside the jurisdiction of the court or officer to which or to whom the writ is addressed."
this Court and the district court of an intermediate appellate court would prevent the issue of mandamus by this Court direct to the district court in matters in which the circuit court of appeals would or should ordinarily have power to issue a mandamus to the same end in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. However that may be, we think it clear that, where the subject concerns the enforcement of the equity rules, which by law it is the duty of this Court to formulate and put in force, and in a case in which this Court has the ultimate discretion to review the case on its merits, it may use its power of mandamus and deal directly with the district court in requiring it to conform to them. Ex parte Abdu, 247 U. S. 27, 247 U. S. 28; Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet.190, 30 U. S. 192-194. This is not to say that, in every case where the equity rules are the subject of interpretation and enforcement in the district court, such questions may as of course be brought here and considered in a direct proceeding in mandamus. The question of thus using the writ of mandamus would be a matter of discretion in this Court, and it would decline to exercise its power where the issue might more properly come up by mandamus in an intermediate appellate court or in regular proceedings on review. If it clearly appeared, however, that a practice had been adopted by district judges as to the order or procedure in hearing causes at variance with the equity rules, our writ might well issue directly to such judges.
after a thorough revision. Committees of the bar from the nine different circuits were invited to assist the Court in the matter. The Court, after much consideration, concluded that the then method of taking evidence in patent and other causes in equity had been productive of unnecessary expense and burden to the litigants and caused much delay in their disposition, and that the effective way to avoid the making of extended records, unnecessary to a consideration of the real issues of the causes, was to require, so far as it might be possible and practicable, that the evidence taken in patent and other cases should be taken in open court, and that in only exceptional cases should be cause be referred after issue to a special master. Though there has been some criticism and complaint of the inconveniences that arise from this change of the rules, the Court is strongly convinced that the change has justified itself, and has no purpose to amend the provisions of Rule 46 and Rule 59. Were it to find that the rules have been practically nullified by a district judge or by a concert of action on the part of several district judges, it would not hesitate to restrain them. One of the causes for complaint of the general administration of justice is the expense it entails upon the litigations, and, so far as it reasonable may do so, this Court is anxious to minimize the basis for such complaints. There is no reason why a patent litigant should be subjected to any greater expense than any other litigant, except as it may be involved in the inherent and inevitable difference between the presentation of the issues as to the merit and validity of a patent grant and that which obtains in the litigation of an ordinary bill for relief in equity, or of an action at law upon a debt or for a tort.
in one class of cases, and then in another, provided each class may be given an opportunity within a reasonable time. Arguments based on humanity and necessity for the preservation of public order require that criminal cases should be given a reasonable preference, but even this must be conceded with moderation, and what time there is of the court in view of the whole docket must be equitably distributed. The reason given in the order for referring these cases to a special master is that there is congestion in the court's calendar and that there are many other cases entitled to be heard first, including a large number of criminal causes which should be preferred over civil causes as to the trial thereof, that other civil litigation has not been accorded a fair proportion of the time of the court, and that the condition will continue unless many of the patent cases, including this cause, be disposed of by such a reference.
In view of the recitals of the order, we are not inclined to infer that there has been any deliberate abuse of discretion in this matter or to hold that there may not sometimes be such congestion in the docket as to criminal cases as would justify a district judge in not literally complying with the requirements of the two rules in question. There was been an emergency due to a lack of judges in some districts which we cannot ignore. We shall therefore deny leave to file this petition, but are content to state our views on the general subject, with confidence that the district judges will be advised how important we think these two rules are, and that we intend, so far as lies in our power, to make them reasonably effective for the purpose had in view in their adoption.


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Cayuga occupation, May 12/08: OPP refuses to remove illegal occupiers. Builder obtains injunction and also authorizes CANACE’s Gary McHale to gather evidence and lay charges. 9 Charges – Extortion, Intimidation, Mischief laid. Crown dropped all charges at 1st opportunity. OPP then laid 1 count Mischief vs. each vs. Floyd Montour and Ruby Montour (red hat).
re Haldimand Tract ownership: Ontario Court of Appeal – Isaac v. Davey (Ontario Court of Appeal, 1974).
re Aboriginal rights claims: Supreme Court of Canada (x3) – R. v. Sparrow (1990); R. v. Van der Peet (1996) and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997).
re injunctions in context of aboriginal rights: Henco Industries v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council (Court of Appeal, 2006); City of Brantford v. Haudenausanee Development Institute (Superior Court, 2008).
Order to end illegal occupation by native protesters.
 The remaining defendants’ [native protesters] resort to self-help, taken with the authorities’ refusal to defend the plaintiff’s property rights, has put the plaintiff in a most unfair position. The same government that advises the plaintiff not to pay extra-governmental development fees refuses to enforce its property rights and threatens to arrest its agents if they try to enforce these rights on their own.
 I would be the last person to interfere with the proper exercise of discretion by the authorities. I do think that it might be helpful to clear up some misapprehensions that they appear to have.
1. The police have the right to remove unwanted persons from private property at the request of the owners with or without an injunction.
2. The police have the right to use their discretion in the enforcement of the law and private property rights. A blanket refusal to assist a property owner or a class of property owners, however, would be an abuse of that right.
3. The police have no right to prevent the plaintiffs from acting within their rights under s.41 of the Criminal Code. Their warning to the plaintiff that they would arrest anyone who is involved in a physical confrontation, regardless of the circumstances, is an abuse of the power conferred on them by s.31 of the Criminal Code.
On May 12/08 members of CANACE were asked by a developer to gather evidence for the purposes of laying criminal charges against native protesters who had blocked access to their Cayuga townhouse development because the Ontario Provincial Police refused to enforce the law by removing them.

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DA SILVA, CAMILA FERNANDA; ZACAGNINI AMARAL, ANTONIA CECILIA. Scyphoproctus Gravier, 1904 (Annelida, Capitellidae): description of three new species and relocation of Heteromastides Augener, 1914 in Scyphoproctus. Zootaxa, v. 4560, n. 1, p. 95-120, FEB 22 2019. Citações Web of Science: 1.
STORI, FERNANDA TERRA; SHINODA, DEBORAH CAMPOS; TURRA, ALEXANDER. Sewing a blue patchwork: An analysis of marine policies implementation in the Southeast of Brazil. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 168, p. 322-339, FEB 1 2019. Citações Web of Science: 0.
DOS SANTOS ALITTO, RENATA APARECIDA; ZACAGNINI AMARAL, ANTONIA CECILIA; DE OLIVEIRA, LETICIA DIAS; SERRANO, HELENA; SEGER, KARIN REGINA; BORGES GUILHERME, PABLO DAMIAN; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; CHRISTENSEN, ANA BEARDSLEY; LOURENCO, LUCIANA BOLSONI; TAVARES, MARCOS; BORGES, MICHELA. Atlantic West Ophiothrix spp. in the scope of integrative taxonomy: Confirming the existence of Ophiothrix trindadensis Tommasi, 1970. PLoS One, v. 14, n. 1 JAN 23 2019. Citações Web of Science: 0.
GRILLI, NATALIA DE MIRANDA; XAVIER, LUCIANA YOKOYAMA; JACOBI, PEDRO ROBERTO; TURRA, ALEXANDER. Integrated science for coastal management: Discussion on a local empirical basis. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 167, p. 219-228, JAN 1 2019. Citações Web of Science: 0.
SILIPRANDI, CAROLINA C.; TUSET, VICTOR M.; LOMBARTE, ANTONI; FARRE, MARC; ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, CARMEN L. D. B. Optimal fishing samplers to reveal the morphological structure of a fish assemblage in a subtropical tidal flat. Neotropical Ichthyology, v. 17, n. 1 2019. Citações Web of Science: 0.
ALCANTARA-CARRIO, JAVIER; MAHIQUES, MICHEL M.; CAZZOLI Y GOYA, SAMARA; FONTAN-BOUZAS, ANGELA. Sedimentary dynamics of a subtropical tidal flat sheltered inside a coastal channel (Araca Bay, SE Brazil). OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 32-41, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 4.
ANGELINI, RONALDO; CONTENTE, RIGUEL F.; ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, CARMEM L. D. B.; SOARES, LUCY S. H.; SCHAEFFER-NOVELLI, YARA; LOPES, RUBENS M.; MANCINI, PATRICIA L.; COLL, MARTA; AMARAL, ANTONIA C. Z. Ecosystem modeling as a framework to convert a multi-disciplinary research approach into a useful model for the Araca Bay (Brazil). OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 92-103, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
CHECON, HELIO H.; VIEIRA, DANILO C.; CORTE, GUILHERME N.; SOUSA, EDIUNETTY C. P. M.; FONSECA, GUSTAVO; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. Defining soft bottom habitats and potential indicator species as tools for monitoring coastal systems: A case study in a subtropical bay. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 68-78, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
CIOTTI, AUREA M.; FERREIRA, AMABILE; GIANNINI, MARIA F. C. Seasonal and event-driven changes in the phytoplankton communities in the Araca Bay and adjacent waters. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 14-31, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
DIAS, GUSTAVO M.; CHRISTOFOLETTI, RONALDO A.; KITAZAWA, KARINA; JENKINS, STUART R. Environmental heterogeneity at small spatial scales affects population and community dynamics on intertidal rocky shores of a threatened bay system. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 52-59, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
MANCINI, PATRICIA LUCIANO; REIS-NETO, ARMANDO S.; FISCHER, LUCIANO GOMES; SILVEIRA, LUIS FABIO; SCHAEFFER-NOVELLI, YARA. Differences in diversity and habitat use of avifauna in distinct mangrove areas in Sao Sebastiao, Sao Paulo, Brazil. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 79-91, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
MI KIM, BIANCA SUNG; BICEGO, MARCIA CARUSO; TANIGUCHI, SATIE; SIEGLE, EDUARDO; OLIVEIRA, RENATO; ALCANTARA-CARRIO, JAVIER; LOPES FIGUEIRA, RUBENS CESAR. Organic and inorganic contamination in sediments from Araca Bay, Sao Sebastido, Brazil. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 42-51, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 4.
SANTOS, CLAUDIA REGINA; GRILLI, NATALIA MIRANDA; GHILARDI-LOPES, NATALIA PIRANI; TURRA, ALEXANDER. A collaborative work process for the development of coastal environmental education activities in a public school in Sao Sebastiao (Sao Paulo State, Brazil). OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 147-155, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
SCHAEFFER-NOVELLI, YARA; CINTRON-MOLERO, GILBERTO; REIS-NETO, ARMANDO S.; ABUCHAHLA, GUILHERME M. O.; NETA, LUIZA C. P.; LIRA-MEDEIROS, CATARINA F. The mangroves of Araca Bay through time: An interdisciplinary approach for conservation of spatial diversity at large scale. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 60-67, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
SIEGLE, EDUARDO; DOTTORI, MARCELO; VILLAMARIN, BARBARA C. Hydrodynamics of a subtropical tidal flat: Araca Bay, Brazil. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 4-13, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 4.
SOARES, L. S. H.; ARANTES, L. P. L.; LAMAS, R. A.; LIMA, F. A.; PUCCI, M. C. J.; ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, C. L. D. B. Fish feeding interactions in a subtropical coastal system in the southwestern Atlantic. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 115-127, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
SOARES, L. S. H.; ARANTES, L. P. L.; PUCCI, M. C. J. Food web of a subtropical tidal flat, Atlantic Southwestern: Temporal and spatial variability of the primary organic sources. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 164, n. SI, p. 104-114, OCT 1 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
DE FARIA, LAIZA CABRAL; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; ANDRADE, SONIA C. S.; DOS SANTOS, MONIQUE CRISTINA; FONSECA, GUSTAVO; ZANOL, JOANA; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. The use of metabarcoding for meiofauna ecological patterns assessment. MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, v. 140, p. 160-168, SEP 2018. Citações Web of Science: 0.
GORMAN, DANIEL; RAGAGNIN, MARILIA N.; MCCARTHY, IAN D.; TURRA, ALEXANDER. Risk-taking and risk-avoiding behaviors by hermit crabs across multiple environmental contexts. Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology, v. 506, p. 25-29, SEP 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
CORTE, GUILHERME N.; GONCALVES-SOUZA, THIAGO; CHECON, HELIO H.; SIEGLE, EDUARDO; COLEMAN, ROSS A.; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. When time affects space: Dispersal ability and extreme weather events determine metacommunity organization in marine sediments. MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, v. 136, p. 139-152, MAY 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
ALITTO, RENATA A. S.; BUENO, MARISTELA L.; GUILHERME, PABLO D. B.; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; CHRISTENSEN, ANA BEARDSLEY; BORGES, MICHELA. Shallow-water brittle stars (Echinodermata: Ophiuroidea) from Araca Bay (Southeastern Brazil), with spatial distribution considerations. Zootaxa, v. 4405, n. 1, p. 1-66, APR 6 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
XAVIER, LUCIANA YOKOYAMA; JACOBI, PEDRO ROBERTO; TURRA, ALEXANDER. On the advantages of working together: Social Learning and knowledge integration in the management of marine areas. MARINE POLICY, v. 88, p. 139-150, FEB 2018. Citações Web of Science: 2.
RANDSO, PHILLIP V.; DOMENICO, MAIKON D.; HERRANZ, MARIA; LORENZEN, ELINE D.; SORENSEN, MARTIN V. Population genetic structure of the intertidal kinorhynch Echinoderes marthae (Kinorhyncha; Cyclorhagida; Echinoderidae) across the Sao Sebastiao Channel, Brazil. Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, v. 131, n. 1, p. 36-46, JAN 15 2018. Citações Web of Science: 1.
CHECON, HELIO H.; CORTE, GUILHERME N.; MUNIZ, PABLO; BRAUKO, KALINA M.; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; BICEGO, MARCIA C.; SIEGLE, EDUARDO; FIGUEIRA, RUBENS C. L.; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. Unraveling the performance of the benthic index AMBI in a subtropical bay: The effects of data transformations and exclusion of low-reliability sites. Marine Pollution Bulletin, v. 126, p. 438-448, JAN 2018. Citações Web of Science: 3.
CONTENTE, RIGUEL FELTRIN; DEL BIANCO ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, CARMEN LUCIA. COMPARING THE USE OF BEACH SEINE AND CAST NET AT CHARACTERIZING INTERTIDAL FISH FAUNA STRUCTURE OF A SUBTROPICAL BAY. BOLETIM DO INSTITUTO DE PESCA, v. 44, n. 3 2018. Citações Web of Science: 0.
DOI, SONIA ASSAMI; PINTO, ALINE BARTELOCHI; CANALI, MARIA CAROLINA; POLEZEL, DAIANE RAQUEL; MERGUIZO CHINELLATO, ROBERTA ALVES; FERNANDES CARDOSO DE OLIVEIRA, ANA JULIA. Density and diversity of filamentous fungi in the water and sediment of Araca bay in Sao Sebastiao, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Biota Neotropica, v. 18, n. 1, p. -, 2018. Citações Web of Science: 0.
VIEIRA, EDSON A.; FILGUEIRAS, HELOISA ROMEU; BUENO, MARILIA; PEREIRA LEITE, FOSCA PEDINI; DIAS, GUSTAVO MUNIZ. Co-occurring morphologically distinct algae support a diverse associated fauna in the intertidal zone of Araca Bay, Brazil. Biota Neotropica, v. 18, n. 1, p. -, 2018. Citações Web of Science: 0.
GORMAN, DANIEL; CORTE, GUILHERME; CHECON, HELIO HERMINIO; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z.; TURRA, ALEXANDER. Optimizing coastal and marine spatial planning through the use of high-resolution benthic sensitivity models. ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS, v. 82, p. 23-31, NOV 2017. Citações Web of Science: 5.
ALCANTARA-CARRIO, JAVIER; SASAKI, DALTON KEI; DE MAHIQUES, MICHEL MICHAELOVITCH; TABORDA, RUI; PEREIRA DE SOUZA, LUIZ ANTONIO. Sedimentary constraints on the development of a narrow deep strait (Sao Sebastiao Channel, SE Brazil). GEO-MARINE LETTERS, v. 37, n. 5, p. 475-488, OCT 2017. Citações Web of Science: 10.
GORMAN, DANIEL; TURRA, ALEXANDER; CONNOLLY, ROD M.; OLDS, ANDREW D.; SCHLACHER, THOMAS A. Monitoring nitrogen pollution in seasonally-pulsed coastal waters requires judicious choice of indicator species. Marine Pollution Bulletin, v. 122, n. 1-2, p. 149-155, SEP 15 2017. Citações Web of Science: 6.
CHECON, HELIO HERMINIO; CORTE, GUILHERME NASCIMENTO; SILVA, CAMILA FERNANDA; SCHAEFFER-NOVELLI, YARA; AMARAL, ANTONIA CECILIA Z. Mangrove vegetation decreases density but does not affect species richness and trophic structure of intertidal polychaete assemblages. Hydrobiologia, v. 795, n. 1, p. 169-179, JUL 2017. Citações Web of Science: 8.
CORTE, GUILHERME NASCIMENTO; CHECON, HELIO H.; FONSECA, GUSTAVO; VIEIRA, DANILO CANDIDO; GALLUCCI, FABIANE; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. Cross-taxon congruence in benthic communities: Searching for surrogates in marine sediments. ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS, v. 78, p. 173-182, JUL 2017. Citações Web of Science: 9.
REGAUDIE-DE-GIOUX, AURORE; CASTAGNA, ALEXANDRE; FERREIRA, AMABILE; ABBRECHT, MEDEA; BRAGA, ELISABETE S.; CIOTTI, AUREA M. Influence of mixed upwelled waters on metabolic balance in a subtropical coastal ecosystem: Sao Sebastiao Channel, southern Brazil. MARINE ECOLOGY-PROGRESS SERIES, v. 573, p. 61-72, JUN 21 2017. Citações Web of Science: 2.
CONTENTE, RIGUEL FELTRIN; DEL BIANCO ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, CARMEN LUCIA. Improving the characterization of fish assemblage structure through the use of multiple sampling methods: a case study in a subtropical tidal flat ecosystem. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT, v. 189, n. 6 JUN 2017. Citações Web of Science: 4.
GARRAFFONI, ANDRE R. S.; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; HOCHBERG, RICK. New records of marine Gastrotricha from So Sebastio Island (Brazil) and the description of a new species. MARINE BIODIVERSITY, v. 47, n. 2, p. 451-459, JUN 2017. Citações Web of Science: 3.
PARDAL-SOUZA, ANDRE LUIZ; DIAS, GUSTAVO MUNIZ; JENKINS, STUART REES; CIOTTI, AUREA MARIA; CHRISTOFOLETTI, RONALDO ADRIANO. Shading impacts by coastal infrastructure on biological communities from subtropical rocky shores. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECOLOGY, v. 54, n. 3, p. 826-835, JUN 2017. Citações Web of Science: 9.
SILVA, CAMILA F.; SEIXAS, VICTOR C.; BARROSO, ROMULO; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; AMARAL, ANTONIA C. Z.; PAIVA, PAULO C. Demystifying the Capitella capitata complex (Annelida, Capitellidae) diversity by morphological and molecular data along the Brazilian coast. PLoS One, v. 12, n. 5 MAY 31 2017. Citações Web of Science: 3.
CORTE, GUILHERME N.; SCHLACHER, THOMAS A.; CHECON, HELIO H.; BARBOZA, CARLOS A. M.; SIEGLE, EDUARDO; COELMAN, ROSS A.; AMARAL, ANTONIA CECILIA Z. Storm effects on intertidal invertebrates: increased beta diversity of few individuals and species. PeerJ, v. 5, MAY 23 2017. Citações Web of Science: 6.
MACHADO, FABRIZIO MARCONDES; MORTON, BRIAN; PASSOS, FLAVIO DIAS. Functional morphology of Cardiomya cleryana (d'Orbigny, 1842) (Bivalvia: Anomalodesmata: Cuspidariidae) from Brazilian waters: new insights into the lifestyle of carnivorous bivalves. Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, v. 97, n. 2, p. 447-462, MAR 2017. Citações Web of Science: 3.
GORMAN, DANIEL; TURRA, ALEXANDER. The role of mangrove revegetation as a means of restoring macrofaunal communities along degraded coasts. Science of The Total Environment, v. 566, p. 223-229, OCT 1 2016. Citações Web of Science: 5.
ZAMPIERI, BRUNA DEL BUSSO; PINTO, ALINE BARTELOCHI; SCHULTZ, LEONARDO; DE OLIVEIRA, MARCOS ANTONIO; CARDOSO DE OLIVEIRA, ANA JULIA FERNANDES. Diversity and Distribution of Heavy Metal-Resistant Bacteria in Polluted Sediments of the Ara double dagger a Bay, So Sebastio (SP), and the Relationship Between Heavy Metals and Organic Matter Concentrations. MICROBIAL ECOLOGY, v. 72, n. 3, p. 582-594, OCT 2016. Citações Web of Science: 9.
COLO GIANNINI, MARIA FERNANDA; CIOTTI, AUREA MARIA. Parameterization of natural phytoplankton photo-physiology: Effects of cell size and nutrient concentration. Limnology and Oceanography, v. 61, n. 4, p. 1495-1512, JUL 2016. Citações Web of Science: 7.
GORMAN, DANIEL; TURRA, ALEXANDER; BERGSTROM, ELLIE R.; HORTA, PAULO A. Population expansion of a tropical seagrass (Halophila decipiens) in the southwest Atlantic (Brazil). Aquatic Botany, v. 132, p. 30-36, JUL 2016. Citações Web of Science: 4.
GARRAFFONI, ANDRE R. S.; DI DOMENICO, MAIKON; AMARAL, A. CECILIA Z. Patterns of diversity in marine Gastrotricha from Southeastern Brazilian Coast is predicted by sediment textures. Hydrobiologia, v. 773, n. 1, p. 105-116, JUN 2016. Citações Web of Science: 4.
MANI-PERES, CAIUA; XAVIER, LUCIANA Y.; SANTOS, CLAUDIA R.; TURRA, ALEXANDER. Stakeholders perceptions of local environmental changes as a tool for impact assessment in coastal zones. OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, v. 119, p. 135-145, JAN 2016. Citações Web of Science: 17.
ANDRÉ MARTINS VAZ-DOS-SANTOS; BÁRBARA GRIS. Length-weight relationships of the ichthyofauna from a coastal subtropical system: a tool for biomass estimates and ecosystem modelling. Biota Neotropica, v. 16, n. 3 2016. Citações Web of Science: 2.
BRENHA-NUNES, MARINA R.; CONTENTE, RIGUEL F.; ROSSI-WONGTSCHOWSKI, CARMEN L. D. B. A protocol for measuring spatial variables in soft-sediment tide pools. Zoologia, v. 33, n. 2 2016. Citações Web of Science: 1.
DOTTORI, MARCELO; SIEGLE, EDUARDO; CASTRO, BELMIRO MENDES. Hydrodynamics and water properties at the entrance of Ara double dagger A Bay, Brazil. OCEAN DYNAMICS, v. 65, n. 12, p. 1731-1741, DEC 2015. Citações Web of Science: 15.
VIEIRA, LEANDRO M.; MIGOTTO, ALVARO E.; WINSTON, JUDITH E. Ctenostomatous Bryozoa from Sao Paulo, Brazil, with descriptions of twelve new species. Zootaxa, v. 3889, n. 4, p. 485-524, DEC 3 2014. Citações Web of Science: 9.
SORENSEN, MARTIN V. First account of echinoderid kinorhynchs from Brazil, with the description of three new species. MARINE BIODIVERSITY, v. 44, n. 3, p. 251-274, SEP 2014. Citações Web of Science: 21.

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1. Parties. The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services.
2. Authority. The authorities for entering into this MOU are the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 372 and 381(m), 19 C.F.R § 12.1, 19 C.F.R. § 147.23, and 44 U.S.C. § 3510.
3. Purpose. The purpose of this MOU is to allow FDA to commission CBP officers. These commissioned officers will assist FDA with examinations and investigations pursuant to, or based on information obtained under, the prior notice requirements found in 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) and its implementing regulations, at ports and other facilities and locations subject to CBP jurisdiction.
1. To commission all CBP officers deemed necessary by the Commissioners of CBP and FDA to conduct examinations and investigations in accordance with the prior notice requirements in 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) and its implementing regulations.
2. To provide appropriate training for the commissioned officers and employees that would allow them to conduct FDA examinations and investigations subject to this MOU.
3. To provide 24 hour operational and technical assistance to CBP for the stated purpose of this MOU.
4. To reimburse CBP for costs for training and costs incurred while performing FDA functions for which the CBP officers have been commissioned. Such reimbursement shall be pursuant to the terms of an interagency agreement to be negotiated between FDA and CBP.
5. To not disclose information received from CBP unless CBP approves, in advance, its disclosure in writing, including information contained in CBP databases.
6. To share information with CBP to fulfill the stated purpose of this MOU, such as information relating to bioterrorism threats, except as restricted by law.
7. To jointly develop and implement additional agreements and plans to help fulfill the stated purpose of this MOU.
1. To assist FDA in the execution of the prior notice requirements in 21 U.S.C. § 381 (m) and its implementing regulations.
2. To collect samples upon FDA's request, and to forward those samples to FDA for analysis.
3. To collect and analyze samples upon FDA's request and to forward the results of the CBP analyses to FDA.
4. To share information with FDA to fulfill the stated purpose of this MOU.
5. To not disclose information received from FDA unless FDA approves, in advance, its disclosure in writing, including information contained in FDA databases.
6. To jointly develop and implement additional agreements and plans to help fulfill the stated purpose of this MOU.
5. Date Effective. The terms of this MOU will become effective upon signature of the parties. They will remain in effect until either modified or terminated as described in this MOU.
6. Modification. This MOU may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration.
7. Confidentiality. CBP and FDA agree that any sharing of non-public information pursuant to this agreement will occur according to all applicable laws and regulations. Each agency understands that disclosure by the recipient of nonpublic information could be a violation of federal law.
8. Termination. Either party may revoke this MOU upon 30 days written notice.
9. Severability Clause. Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with the current laws, regulations, or directives of CBP or FDA. If a term of this MOU is inconsistent with such authority, then that term shall be invalid, but the remaining terms and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.
10. Emergency Situations. In the event that a national or regional disaster disrupts communications between FDA and CBP, an emergency contingency plan shall become operational. The procedures of that system are to be agreed upon an annex to this MOU.
11. No Private Right of Action Created. This intra-governmental MOU is not intended to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits for any private person or party.
12. Relationship to Other Authorities. Nothing in this MOU is intended to restrict CBP or FDA from taking any action that the agencies would be otherwise authorized to take under law.
The undersigned approve the terms and conditions of this MOU and represent that they have the requisite authority to enter into it.


As we reported through our Fish & Richardson Bulletin and related webinar, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. announced a new standard for imposing fines under the false marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292. The ruling supplanted the former “per occurrence” basis (which considered mismarking of multiple articles or an entire product line as a single statutory violation) with a “per article” rubric. Now, parties found liable for false marking face fines of up to $500 for each mismarked product.
Two recent opinions implement the Federal Circuit’s approach in Bon Tool, and a third case addresses the applicable statute of limitations.
Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., Civil Action No. H-05-4127 (S.D. Tex. April 27, 2010) (Memorandum and Order).
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the Bon Tool district court set out to recalculate false marking fines on a “per article” basis in this high-profile case. After summarily denying as speculative plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery regarding the falsely-marked spring-loaded parallelogram stilts, the court imposed a fine of $180 per mismarked article, even though the stilts were sold at a price ranging between $103 and $180. The resulting penalty amounts to $6,840.
The court explained that it set the fine at $180 per article because “[t]his will deprive [plaintiff] of more than it received for the falsely-marked stilts, fulfilling the deterrent goal of § 292’s provision.” Id. at *5. In accordance with § 292, $3,420 will be awarded to Forest Group, as Relator, and the remaining half goes to the United States.
Presidio Components Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp., No. 08-CV-335-IEG (NLS), 2010 WL 1462757 (S.D. Cal. April 13, 2010).
In a patent litigation case Presidio brought in the Southern District of California, defendant American Technical Ceramics Corp. asserted a false marking counterclaim based on Presidio’s monolithic, multilayered capacitors sold for broadband application. On October 24, 2008, Presidio conceded a mistaken belief that its products embodied the inventions claimed in the patent but were, in fact, falsely marked.
The court later granted summary judgment for false marking that occurred after October 24, 2008, but denied summary judgment on the issue prior to that date. During trial in December 2009, the jury found no intent to deceive the public as to marking that occurred before October 24, 2008.
Post-trial, the court faced two issues: (1) determining the number of falsely-marked units post-October 24, 2008, and (2) determining the amount of the fine per unit.
On the first issue, the court found that Presidio shipped 651,675 units of falsely marked products during the relevant time period. This amount is based on actual and interpolated sales data pertaining to both marked and unmarked capacitors, as Presidio referred to the patent at issue in its advertising for all the products, thus satisfying § 292.
The court then attempted to “strike a balance” and avoid a disproportionate liability for an inexpensive, mass-produced article – “by penalizing Presidio at a rate of about 32% of Presidio’s overall average sales price of $1.07 per BB capacitor, the fine is substantial enough to enforce the public policy embodied in the statute and to deter any similar violations in the future” without “over-penalizing.” Id. at *42. Specifically, the court adopted a fine of $0.35 per unit, resulting in a total penalty of $228,086.25 to be shared equally between the Relator and the United States.
Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. Cabela’s, Inc., 3-09-cv-00102 (S.D. Cal. April 20, 2010) (Huff, J.).
Rather, the court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to mean that a finding of false marking under § 292 “requires a fine to be imposed for every offense of marking any unpatented article.” A new claim for false marking therefore accrues and resets the limitations period each time a mismarked article is sold. Accordingly, to the extent the Cabela’s false marking claim is based on markings that occurred before that five-year cutoff, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Click here to view this .pdf.


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In 1996, an amateur artist named Frederick Bouchat designed a logo for the Baltimore Ravens that the club later adopted as a team symbol without his awareness. The infringing symbol then appeared on Ravens merchandise sold at home football games. After winning on copyright liability in the District Court of Maryland, Bouchat pressed for disgorgement of defendant profits, which is an allowable financial remedy under the Copyright Act.
Bouchat got nothing. The District Court ruled in 2002 that the transacted merchandise payments were based on contracts signed before the actual logo was chosen. In the District Court’s view, there was no demonstrable causal connection between the later infringement and the profit enrichments related to these contracts. The Fourth Circuit upheld in 2004.
Judge James Whittemore of the Middle District of Florida reviewed in 2008 the Bouchat decisions and other related decisions in an independent copyright matter of Thornton v. J Jargon, Co. Here the infringing work before Judge Whittemore was an offbeat quiz that appeared in a playbill that was distributed every night at a live theater production of Menopause: The Musical. As no audience member conceivably could have bought tickets to the show with an awareness of the contents of the playbill, the defense claimed that there was no causal connection between the theater’s infringement and the dollars earned and thus sought summary judgment.
With no precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Whittemore considered equity and Congressional intent behind the Copyright Act to favor an alternative view – reasonable relationship – that avoided the questionable decision in Bouchat. In Judge Whittemore’s view, the producers of the musical were obliged under Actors’ Equity rules to distribute a playbill; no bill, no show. In meeting a contract requirement for the theater production, the producers were then responsible for all components of its execution. Citing On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001), Judge Whittemore saw then a reasonable relationship between contents of the playbill (i.e., the infringing work) and – subject to apportionment over infringing and non-infringing elements — subsequent profits of the theater production. But apportionment is the defendant’s burden to prove, and cannot be dodged in the summary judgment that defendant sought.
Bouchat came back to haunt in the cases of Fahmy v. Jay-Z, et. al and Marino v. Usher, et. al. When confronted with the possibility that one of their concert songs was infringing, both Jay-Z and Usher separately invoked Bouchat to argue that they were paid largely through guarantees in negotiated contracts that did not specify any specific playlist or song as a condition for signature. Moreover, fans did not know the playlists before the concert – hence no causal connection between the purported infringement and concert revenues.
So now we can imagine the scene. Using the causal connection, how would you prove without speculation that totemic film songs like Over the Rainbow, Gonna Fly Now, and My Heart Will Go On actually increased ticket sales for movies like The Wizard of Oz, Rocky, and Titanic.
Forget the causal connection. To my mind, each song yet qualifies for remedy under Judge Whittemore’s reasonable relationship. Music is synchronized into a film in post-production after contracts have been signed. Nonetheless, parties to a movie contract must put forth best effort in the performance of their efforts, and the choice of any component of a soundtrack is certainly part of the expected effort. The song is then commingled in the final product that earned attracted audiences for the defendant. The defendant bears the statutory responsibility of apportioning the respective value of the infringing and non-infringing elements that are components of profits.
And what would the Supreme Court say? A stated concern in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et. al. concerned possible market harm arising from overly generous allowances for fair use – the Court invoked the consequences of behavior writ large. “Isolated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented.” I would suggest that Judge Whittemore’s decision is consistent with this critical point made by the nation’s High Court and deserving of national recognition.
Michael A. Einhorn, Ph.D. is an economic consultant and expert witness in the areas of intellectual property, media, entertainment, technology, cyberspace, , and product design. Dr. Einhorn is the author of Media, Technology, and Copyright: Integrating Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2004). He is also a former professor of economics at Rutgers University a Senior Research Fellow at the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, and the author of seventy professional and academic articles related to intellectual property and economic analysis. More detail on this topic can be found at his recently published article Copyright, Causality, and the Courts and “Copyright Settlement Strategies from a Damages Expert”.
 Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc. et. al., 215 F. Supp. 2d 611 (D. Maryland 2002).
 Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc. et. al., 346 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 2003).
 580 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
 835 F. Supp. 2d 783 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
 22 F. Supp. 3d 437 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
 Id. at 482 (internal citations omitted).

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You were interviewed and hired by a private firm, but sent to work at a government agency as a government contractor. You report your hours, receive healthcare benefits, and receive your paycheck from the firm, but your office is at the government agency. The growth and popularity of government contract workers at various local and federal government agencies may lead to confusion about who is technically the “employer.” When government contract employees have an unlawful termination claim, whether due to discrimination or harassment, whistleblower, retaliation, or overtime and other wage claims, both the private firm and the government agency could be on the hook as joint employers. Thus, a government contractor should pursue his or her claims against both entities if either the private sector employer or government agency mistreated the employee and violated state or federal law.
Courts determine whether a contract worker is deemed a government employee for purposes of an employment discrimination lawsuit by looking at whether the employer “has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer.” Lopez v. Johnson, 333 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted)); Strolberg v. Akal Sec. Co., 2005 WL 5629026, at *6 (D. Idaho Jan. 19, 2005). The courts look at “the extent of the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance [as] a primary factor,” as well as other factors including whether the employer furnished the employee’s equipment and place of work, the length of time the employee worked, and whether the work was an integral part of the employer’s business. Lopez at 962-63 (citing Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) and Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Mem’l Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1988)).
In Strolberg v. Akal Sec. Co., the court found employees of Akal Security Co., a private security company, to also be government employees of the United States Marshal’s Service (“USMS”) for purposes of a claim under the Rehabilitation Act – even though the USMS had limited control over the terms and conditions of the employees’ work. Strolberg at *1. Akal Security was responsible for managing court security officers’ (“CSO”) work hours and assignments, payment of salaries, and scheduling of vacation, discipline, and performance of services. Id. at 7. Also, the USMS did not normally direct CSOs’ activities nor have intent to enter into an employment relationship. Id. at *8. Yet, the court found the USMS to be the CSOs’ joint employer. Id. Examples indicating that the USMS was a joint employer included the USMS providing training; furnishing radio, weapons, handcuffs, and identification; determining routes, schedules, and operating procedures for CSO patrols and stations; and providing the premises where the CSOs worked. Id. at *7-8. The USMS could not directly fire CSOs, but could evaluate CSOs and direct CSOs in the event of emergencies. Id. at *8. The Strolberg case shows that the employer need not control everything about the contract worker’s employment, but just some significant aspect of it.
Be cautioned: the government may well try to tell you that you are not its employee, and that you have no right to file claims against it. Do not believe it. You should make sure that you register a complaint with the proper government authorities very quickly after you suffer an adverse employment action, because the government tends to have very short deadlines for filing complaints. Often, if you do not file against the government quickly, you will lose the right to hold the government accountable.
In one example, Bryan Schwartz Law’s client Garnett Gebhardt sought to hold both the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) and Northrop Grumman liable as joint employers for her claims of harassment and discrimination. Gebhardt v. Chu, 2010 WL 5211459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010). While contracting firm Northrop Grumman signed Ms. Gebhardt’s paychecks and provided employee benefits, Ms. Gebhardt worked in DOE facilities, used a DOE email address, and worked directly under a Senior Counterintelligence Officer and federal employee. Id. With limited exceptions, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations require that federal employees (or federal contract employees) consult with the proper Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor at the agency within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory in order to file a civil suit. Id. at *6.
In the Gebhardt case, although (before hiring Bryan Schwartz Law) Ms. Gebhardt complained to DOE officials and attempted multiple times to contact a DOE Human Relations Specialist in order to properly file an EEO complaint, the DOE took the position that Ms. Gebhardt never properly filed an administrative complaint against it. Id. at *3-4. The DOE argued that the DOE Human Resources Specialist was not an “EEO” official that was logically connected with the EEO process. Id.at *9. The DOE also argued that if there was an EEO complaint filed by Ms. Gebhardt, she had directed it to Northrop Grumman and not the DOE. Id. at 10. However, Bryan Schwartz Law successfully convinced the court that it should reject the DOE’s arguments that Ms. Gebhardt’s complaints were untimely (under the legal principle of equitable tolling) because Ms. Gebhardt and her counsel were told by the DOE that her complaint was being handled, even though it was not. Id. at *13.
Though Bryan Schwartz Law ultimately succeeded in saving her claims against the DOE, the Gebhardt case shows how important it is to be quick and persistent in pursuing your employment claims with the appropriate channels at both your government agency and contracting firm. The agency or firm may mislead you into filing a complaint with one employer only, or with an individual or office not charged with handling EEO complaints.
If you are unsure who your “employer” is or where to file a complaint, you could very well have joint employers and should pursue action against both. In particular, if you are a government contractor and you have a discrimination, whistleblower, or wage and hour claim arising out of either your contracting firm or government agency, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.


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June 8, 1982. Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied July 16, 1982. Application to Transfer Denied September 13, 1982.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF WARREN, ROY L. RICHTER, J.
James J. Knappenberger, Clayton, for appellant.
Darryl L. Hicks, Warrenton, for respondent.
Husband appeals from the property distribution provisions of a dissolution decree. We affirm.
Wife was 58 and the husband 61 when they married; it was the second marriage for each. Before the marriage, wife lived on a farm which she owned. Husband lived in his own home, but sometime before the marriage, he sold it and moved in with wife. They then jointly operated the farm. The parties separated in October, 1980.
The evidence revealed some improvements were made on the property during the marriage. In addition, a mortgage of $750.00 was paid off with marital funds.
In the dissolution decree, the court awarded each party various items of separate property. It awarded wife her farm as separate property. The court then allocated specific items of marital property to each party on an equal basis. The remaining unspecified property was to be sold at public auction and the proceeds divided equally.
On appeal, husband's main contention centers on the failure of the trial court to make allowance for the increase in the value of wife's separately owned property. Husband asserts the increase in value is attributable to his labor, personal money and marital funds expended toward improving the property and reducing the mortgage.
Wife's farm is her separate property as it was acquired before the marriage. Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270 (Mo.App. 1979). The trial court, when allocating marital assets, may consider physical efforts and the value of marital and separate funds expended upon separate property to reduce a mortgage or to make improvements. It may also place a charge upon the separate property to the extent that separate or marital funds are expended to reduce a mortgage or enhance its value. Rickelman v. Rickelman, 625 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Mo.App. 1981); Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.App. 1979).
No request for findings of fact and conclusions of law were made. We have carefully reviewed the record presented, in light of the scope of review in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976), and find that the trial court committed no error in allocating the marital property or in failing to place a charge upon wife's separate property.
Exhibit C, husband's cancelled checks, was not filed with this court.
Husband's other complaints are without merit. His complaint that the court failed to place a valuation upon each of the items of marital property is groundless because no request for findings of fact and conclusions of law were made. See, Reynolds v. Reynolds, 610 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Mo.App. 1980).
Husband also contends that the wife was permitted over objection to introduce evidence of his misconduct when it had not been pleaded. Husband asserts this evidence of alleged misconduct caused the court to enter an excessive award in favor of the wife. For the purposes of the distribution of marital property, evidence of marital misconduct may be admitted into evidence, even though it is not pleaded. See, McMillin v. McMillin, 633 S.W.2d 223 (Mo.App. 1982). Moreover, the decree here reveals the trial court attempted to divide the marital property equally. Wife was not awarded a disproportionate share of the marital property. This point is ruled against husband.
SNYDER and CRIST, JJ., concur.