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Respondent public high school student (hereafter respondent) delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for a student elective office at a voluntary assembly that was held during school hours as part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government, and that was attended by approximately 600 students, many of whom were 14-year-olds. During the entire speech, respondent referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Some of the students at the assembly hooted and yelled during the speech, some mimicked the sexual activities alluded to in the speech, and others appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed. Prior to delivering the speech, respondent discussed it with several teachers, two of whom advised him that it was inappropriate and should not be given. The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called respondent into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of the school's "disruptive-conduct rule," which prohibited conduct that substantially interfered with the educational process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. Respondent was given copies of teacher reports of his conduct, and was given a chance to explain his conduct. After he admitted that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech, he was informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises. Review of the disciplinary action through petitioner School District's grievance procedures resulted in affirmance of the discipline, but respondent was allowed to return to school after serving only two days of his suspension. Respondent, by his father (also a respondent) as guardian ad litem, then filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court held that the school's sanctions violated the First Amendment, that the school's disruptive-conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court awarded respondent monetary relief and enjoined [478 U.S. 675, 676] the School District from preventing him from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. The First Amendment did not prevent the School District from disciplining respondent for giving the offensively lewd and indecent speech at the assembly. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 , distinguished. Under the First Amendment, the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the school, and the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 , as well as limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 . Petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon respondent in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech, which had no claim to First Amendment protection. Pp. 680-686.
William A. Coats argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Clifford D. Foster, Jr.
On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington, delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 14-year-olds, attended the assembly. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government. Students who elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to study hall. During the entire speech, Fraser referred [478 U.S. 675, 678] to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.
Two of Fraser's teachers, with whom he discussed the contents of his speech in advance, informed him that the speech was "inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it," App. 30, and that his delivery of the speech might have "severe consequences." Id., at 61.
During Fraser's delivery of the speech, a school counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the day following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class. Id., at 41-44.
The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called Fraser into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. Fraser was presented with copies of five letters submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was given a chance to explain his conduct, and he admitted to having given the speech described and that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises.
Fraser sought review of this disciplinary action through the School District's grievance procedures. The hearing officer determined that the speech given by respondent was "indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of [478 U.S. 675, 679] many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assembly." The examiner determined that the speech fell within the ordinary meaning of "obscene," as used in the disruptive-conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. Fraser served two days of his suspension, and was allowed to return to school on the third day.
Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Respondent alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The District Court held that the school's sanctions violated respondent's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the school's disruptive-conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such removal as a possible sanction. The District Court awarded respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation costs and attorney's fees, and enjoined the School District from preventing respondent from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation speaker by a write-in vote of his classmates, delivered a speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, 755 F.2d 1356 (1985), holding that respondent's speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The court explicitly rejected the School District's argument that the speech, unlike the passive conduct of wearing a black armband, had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The Court of [478 U.S. 675, 680] Appeals also rejected the School District's argument that it had an interest in protecting an essentially captive audience of minors from lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by the school, reasoning that the School District's "unbridled discretion" to determine what discourse is "decent" would "increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools." 755 F.2d, at 1363. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the School District's argument that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it had the power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activity.
This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra, that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id., at 506. The Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any discipline of Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly. That court appears to have proceeded on the theory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make what the speaker considered to be a point in a nominating speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the expression of a political position.
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation." C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 -77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."
In our Nation's legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the debate. The Manual of Parliamentary [478 U.S. 675, 682] Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use of "impertinent" speech during debate and likewise provides that "[n]o person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House." Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice 359, 360, reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No. 97-271, pp. 158-159 (1982); see id., at 111, n. a (Jefferson's Manual governs the House in all cases to which it applies). The Rules of Debate applicable in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or for referring offensively to any state. See Senate Procedure, S. Doc. No. 97-2, Rule XIX, pp. 568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for abusive language directed at other Senators. See Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972, S. Doc. No. 92-7, pp. 95-98 (1972) (Sens. McLaurin and Tillman); id., at 152-153 (Sen. McCarthy). Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse. A sharply divided Court upheld the right to express an antidraft viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 -342 (1985), we reaffirmed that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, "the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket." Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School [478 U.S. 675, 683] Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (opinion concurring in result).
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of the schools." Tinker, 393 U.S., at 508 ; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers - and indeed the older students - demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students - indeed to any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students. See App. 77-81. The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported as [478 U.S. 675, 684] bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.
This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), this Court upheld a New York statute banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material in question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults. And in addressing the question whether the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of public schools to remove books from a public school library, all Members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, acknowledged that the school board has the authority to remove books that are vulgar. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 -872 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 879-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and in judgment); id., at 918-920 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). These cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children - especially in a captive audience - from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.
"These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: `[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., at 572 ." Id., at 746.
"I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose. to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students." 393 U.S., at 526 .
[ Footnote * ] Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the removal of Fraser's name from the ballot for graduation speaker violated his due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a potential punishment in the school's disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this issue has become moot, since the graduation ceremony has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to speak in accordance [478 U.S. 675, 687] with the District Court's injunction. No part of the damages award was based upon the removal of Fraser's name from the list, since damages were based upon the loss of two days' schooling.
"`I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
"`Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.
"`Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and every one of you.
"`So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president - he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.'" App. 47.
The Court, referring to these remarks as "obscene," "vulgar," "lewd," and "offensively lewd," concludes that school officials properly punished respondent for uttering the speech. Having read the full text of respondent's remarks, I find it difficult to believe that it is the same speech the Court describes. To my mind, the most that can be said about respondent's speech - and all that need be said - is that in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational activities, it was [478 U.S. 675, 688] not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent's remarks exceeded permissible limits. Thus, while I concur in the Court's judgment, I write separately to express my understanding of the breadth of the Court's holding.
The Court today reaffirms the unimpeachable proposition that students do not "`shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" Ante, at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). If respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); the Court's opinion does not suggest otherwise. 1 Moreover, despite the Court's characterizations, the language respondent used is far removed from the very narrow class of "obscene" speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First Amendment. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). It is true, however, that the State has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities. Thus, the Court holds that under certain circumstances, high school students may properly be reprimanded for giving a speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted the school's educational [478 U.S. 675, 689] mission. 2 Respondent's speech may well have been protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.
The authority school officials have to regulate such speech by high school students is not limitless. See Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in result) ("[S]chool officials . . . do [not] have limitless discretion to apply their own notions of indecency. Courts have a First [478 U.S. 675, 690] Amendment responsibility to insure that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar"). Under the circumstances of this case, however, I believe that school officials did not violate the First Amendment in determining that respondent should be disciplined for the disruptive language he used while addressing a high school assembly. 3 Thus, I concur in the judgment reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
[ Footnote 1 ] In the course of its opinion, the Court makes certain remarks concerning the authority of school officials to regulate student language in public schools. For example, the Court notes that "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions." Ante, at 683. These statements obviously do not, and indeed given our prior precedents could not, refer to the government's authority generally to regulate the language used in public debate outside of the school environment.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Court speculates that the speech was "insulting" to female students, and "seriously damaging" to 14-year-olds, so that school officials could legitimately suppress such expression in order to protect these groups. Ante, at 683. There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found the speech "insulting." And while it was not unreasonable for school officials to conclude that respondent's remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assembly, the language respondent used does not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), or the indecent speech banned in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Indeed, to my mind, respondent's speech was no more "obscene," "lewd," or "sexually explicit" than the bulk of programs currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema. Thus, I disagree with the Court's suggestion that school officials could punish respondent's speech out of a need to protect younger students.
[ Footnote 3 ] Respondent served two days' suspension and had his name removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises, although he was eventually permitted to speak at the graduation. While I find this punishment somewhat severe in light of the nature of respondent's transgression, I cannot conclude that school officials exceeded the bounds of their disciplinary authority.
When I was a high school student, the use of those words in a public forum shocked the Nation. Today Clark Gable's four-letter expletive is less offensive than it was then. Nevertheless, I assume that high school administrators may prohibit the use of that word in classroom discussion and even in extracurricular activities that are sponsored by the school and held on school premises. For I believe a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the style of student speech in carrying out its educational mission. 1 It does seem to me, however, that if a student is to be punished for using offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the consequences of its violation. [478 U.S. 675, 692] The interest in free speech protected by the First Amendment and the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment combine to require this conclusion.
The fact that the speech may not have been offensive to his audience - or that he honestly believed that it would be inoffensive - does not mean that he had a constitutional right to deliver it. For the school not the student - must prescribe the rules of conduct in an educational institution. 3 But it [478 U.S. 675, 693] does mean that he should not be disciplined for speaking frankly in a school assembly if he had no reason to anticipate punitive consequences.
"In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in certain noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts which disrupt and interfere with the educational process.
"`Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.'" 755 F.2d 1356, 1357, n. 1 (CA9 1985).
"[T]he record now before us yields no evidence that Fraser's use of a sexual innuendo in his speech materially interfered with activities at Bethel High School. While the students' reaction to Fraser's speech may fairly be characterized as boisterous, it was hardly disruptive [478 U.S. 675, 694] of the educational process. In the words of Mr. McCutcheon, the school counselor whose testimony the District relies upon, the reaction of the student body `was not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly.' In our view, a noisy response to the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of a material interference with the educational process that justifies impinging upon Fraser's First Amendment right to express himself freely.
"We find it significant that although four teachers delivered written statements to an assistant principal commenting on Fraser's speech, none of them suggested that the speech disrupted the assembly or otherwise interfered with school activities. See, Finding of Fact No. 8. Nor can a finding of material disruption be based upon the evidence that the speech proved to be a lively topic of conversation among students the following day." Id., at 1360-1361.
Respondent read his speech to three different teachers before he gave it. Mrs. Irene Hicks told him that she thought the speech "was inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it." App. 30. Steven DeHart told respondent "that this would indeed cause problems in that it would raise eyebrows." Id., at 61. The third teacher, Shawn Madden, did not testify. None of the three suggested that the speech might violate a school rule. Id., at 49-50.
Justice Sutherland taught us that a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and intolerable in others. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). Indeed, even ordinary, inoffensive speech may be wholly unacceptable in some settings. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Pacifica, supra, at 744-745.
It seems fairly obvious that respondent's speech would be inappropriate in certain classroom and formal social settings. On the other hand, in a locker room or perhaps in a school corridor the metaphor in the speech might be regarded as rather routine comment. If this be true, and if respondent's audience consisted almost entirely of young people with whom he conversed on a daily basis, can we - at this distance - confidently assert that he must have known that the school administration would punish him for delivering it?
[ Footnote 1 ] "Because every university's resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a particular time - one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet - the First Amendment would not require that the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a `compelling state interest' to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges, and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like `compelling state interest.'" Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 -279 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (footnotes omitted). "Any student of history who has been reprimanded for talking about the World Series during a class discussion of the First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state that a `time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.'" Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 544 -545 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
[ Footnote 2 ] As the Court of Appeals noted, there "is no evidence in the record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive." 755 F.2d 1356, 1361, n. 4 (CA9 1985). In its opinion today, the Court describes respondent as a "confused boy," ante, at 683, and repeatedly characterizes his audience of high school students as "children," ante, at 682, 684. When a more orthodox message is being conveyed to a similar audience, four Members of today's majority would treat high school students like college students rather than like children. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (dissenting opinions).
[ Footnote 3 ] See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
[ Footnote 4 ] The Court's reliance on the school's authority to prohibit "unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process," ante, at 686, is misplaced. The findings of the District Court, which were upheld by the Court of Appeals, established that the speech was not "disruptive." Departing from our normal practice concerning factual findings, the Court's decision rests on "utterly unproven, subjective impressions of some hypothetical students." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S., at 553 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting).

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Celebrity – a person who provides items belonging to him/her for sale by the Seller through the Store.
Service Provider – an entity designated in the Store that provides the Service, usually other than the Seller.
Service – unique experience offered in the Store by the Service Provider indicated in the description of Services, which is each time specified in the description of a given Service. If the Service is offered by a Service Provider other than the Seller, the Seller only makes available a platform mediating in the transaction between the Buyer and the Service Provider. Therefore, the Seller is an intermediary in the conclusion of a contract between the Buyer and the Service Provider and any claims related to the Service should be addressed directly to the Service Provider.
Working days – days from Monday to Friday with the exception of public holidays in Poland.
Consumer – a person who is a consumer within the meaning of the Civil Code/ Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
User Account – a free function of the Store (service) allowing the Buyer to set up an individual user account on the Store.
Buyer – any entity that makes purchases from the Store or undertakes activities for this purpose.
Partner – a foundation, association or other organization, whose data are given in the Store, carrying out charitable or charitable activities within a specified scope, selected by Celebrity, Service Provider or Buyer, to whose account the Amount of support is allocated.
Amount of support – an amount indicated in the Store (named for the needs of the Store “Solidarity Tax”) being a part or all of the price of goods or Services, which the Buyer pays directly to the Partner’s account, the transfer of which is a necessary condition for the purchase of goods or Services available in the Store.
Entrepreneur – a Buyer who is not a Consumer.
Shop/Store – Internet shop “celebrity2use” run by the Seller at www.celebrity2use.com, where Services and collector’s goods, mainly used, previously owned by Celebrities, as well as exclusive goods are offered.
Seller – celebrity2use, registered with Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato e Agricoltura di GENOVA, under the name Malgorzata Ciuksza and partita IVA number 02470490992, REA number GE – 488628, located at Via Enrico Cravero 6/15, CAP 16129 Genova (GE), Italia selling goods through the Store and providing the Service – if so indicated in the description of the Service in the Store.
Postal address: celebrity2use, Via Enrico Cravero 6/15, CAP 16129 Genova (GE), Italia.
Contact details of the Service Provider, if it is not the Seller, will be given in the description of the Service in the Store as a link to the website of the Service Provider.
Due to the modern and solidarity type of business activity expressed for the purpose of sale through the Shop, i.e. direct transfer of part or all of the profit for charity or charity activities carried out by the Partner, the contract with the Seller or Service Provider is concluded only on condition that the indicated in the Shop part or all of the price (Amount of support) is transferred directly to the Partner.
In order to conclude an agreement through the Shop, the Buyer must open a User Account by providing his or her data in the form provided for this purpose in the Shop.
Then, after registration and logging in, the Buyer adds the goods or the Service to the basket and concludes the contract through the “Buy now” option or submits its offer as part of the auction, which is regulated in detail in the following paragraphs.
In the next step, the Buyer enters his data, if different from the data given in the User Account or, if they have not been given in it (including e.g. a different address for sending the order), chooses the method of order processing – if there is a choice in a given case, as well as the Partner whom he intends to support – if there is a choice in a given case.
When the Buyer confirms the order and accepts the Terms and Conditions, a contract is concluded, including the Buyer’s commitment to transfer the Amount of support to the Partner.
b) By selecting “Buy now”.
In the option referred to in paragraph 6 (a), the final price, subject to paragraph 8, results from the actions of persons interested in purchasing goods or Services in an auction (the “Bidders”), who submit their bids through the Store. Submission of an offer is made by indicating the proposed price by the Bidder using the functions available in the Store. Each subsequent price offer must be higher than the previous one. The description of the goods or Services shall indicate the moment (date) when the auction ends – the highest bid at the end of the auction shall be the selling price of the goods or provision of the Service, and the Bidder who submitted this bid shall conclude an appropriate agreement with the Seller (sale or provision of services, depending on what is the subject of the agreement).
The Seller or Service Provider may set a minimum price for the goods or Services, which will be visible in the description of the goods or Services and from which the bidding begins, the exceeding of which is a prerequisite for the commencement of the auction and ultimately for the conclusion of the contract. In the event that an offer higher than the minimum price is not submitted, the contract is not concluded.
The “Buy now” option referred to in paragraph 6(b) consists in the purchase of goods or Services at the price indicated in the description of the goods or Services at the time the Buyer chooses this option.
The prices given in the Shop are total prices, i.e. they include all necessary taxes. Prices given in the Shop are expressed in Euro and PLN.
The total value of the order consists of the price for the goods or Service (which consists of the amount directly transferred to the Seller or Service Provider and the Amount of support) and, in the case of the sale of goods – the cost of delivery of goods visible in the Store when placing an order.
In the case of the Service, the price is the cost of its performance, but it does not include additional costs such as travel to the place of performance of the Service, food, accommodation, etc. unless the description of the Service indicates otherwise.
If the order may involve additional fees other than those specified in section 1 on the part of the Buyer from outside the territory of the Republic of Poland, information about this will appear when placing an order in the Store.
The Buyer is obliged to pay the price in the relevant parts, indicated in the Store, i.e. the amount of support – to the Partner and the remaining part of the amount to the Seller, through Paypal or PayU payment platforms or other integrated with the Store.
The Buyer shall pay for the order immediately, and at the latest within 1 day from the date of conclusion of the contract.
The amount of support is transferred by the Buyer directly to the Partner’s account – in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
The goods purchased in the Store are delivered by courier company or Polish post. Services are provided in accordance with the rules specified by the Seller or Service Provider in the description of the Service.
Details of delivery, including the date needed by the Seller to send the order, are available at the time of placing the order and in the appropriate tab in the Store.
The Service completion date or the method of its determination will be indicated in the description of the Service or when placing an order. The performance of the Service may depend on the availability of the Buyer. If the Service completion date is marked with a specific date and time, the lack of availability of the Buyer within this time limit may result in the inability to complete the Service.
The manner of Service provision is described in each case in the description of the Service. If it is necessary to meet additional requirements (e.g. tests, driving license, etc.), information about this fact will be included in the description of the Service, and failure to do so will result in the inability to provide the Service.
Unless indicated otherwise in the description of the Service, the Buyer may designate another person as the beneficiary of the Service, but only if this person meets the requirements referred to in section 4. In such a case, the Buyer is obliged to inform the Service Provider without undue delay, at least 21 days before the Service is provided.
The term of the Service is calculated from the date of conclusion of the contract, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 and paragraph 3.
The deadline for the completion of the order consists of the time needed to send the goods indicated in the description of goods in the Store and the time needed by a courier company or Polish post office to deliver the goods to the Buyer.
The goods are sent on Tuesdays and Fridays which are Working Days. Sending the goods will take place on one of the days indicated, immediately – not later than within 7 days after meeting other conditions referred to in the Regulations.
Courier company and Polish Post Office deliver the goods in maximum 14 working days, but usually it takes place within 2 working days.
If the order consists of several goods, the completion date of the entire order corresponds to the completion date for goods with the longest delivery time.
Order processing will start after the Seller and the Partner receive the payments due, as specified in the Rules and Regulations.
Countries to which it is possible to deliver goods purchased in the Store are indicated in the Store.
The provisions of this paragraph concerning Services shall also apply accordingly to Services offered by Service Providers other than the Seller if they have not specified these principles differently in the description of the Service.
The consumer has the right to withdraw from the contract concluded by the Store, subject to § 8.1 of the Regulations, within 14 days without giving any reason.
In order to exercise the right to withdraw from the contract, the Consumer must inform the Seller, using the data provided in § 2 of the Regulations, of his decision to withdraw from the contract by way of an unequivocal statement (for example, a letter sent by mail or information sent by e-mail).
If, at the express request of a Buyer who is a consumer, the Service Provider began to provide the Service to that Buyer before the expiry of the period specified in paragraph 2 – the Consumer shall bear the justified costs of this Service, incurred by the Service Provider, equal to the amount proportional to the scope of services provided until the Consumer informed the Service Provider about the withdrawal from the contract.
The consumer may use the model withdrawal form at the end of the Regulations, but it is not obligatory.
In order to meet the deadline for withdrawing from the contract, it is sufficient for the Consumer to send information on the exercise of his right of withdrawal before the expiry of the deadline for withdrawing from the contract.
In the case of withdrawal from the contract, the Seller and the Partner return to the Consumer all payments received from him, including the costs of delivery of goods (except for additional costs resulting from the chosen by the Consumer method of delivery other than the cheapest usual method of delivery offered by the Seller) immediately, and in any case no later than 14 days from the day on which the Seller was informed of the Consumer’s decision to exercise the right to withdraw from the contract of sale. In the case of a contract for the provision of the Service, the above provisions shall apply accordingly, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4.
The return of payments shall be made by the Seller and Partner using the same payment methods as those used by the Consumer in the original transaction, or through a bank account, unless the Consumer consents to another solution. In any event, the consumer shall not incur any fees in connection with this refund.
The Seller and Partner may withhold the return of payment until the Seller has received the goods or until proof of return has been provided to the Seller, whichever is the earlier.
The Seller asks to return the goods to the following address: celebrity2use, Lubelska Street, no. 36, 10¬-409, Olsztyn, Poland – immediately, and in any case not later than 14 days from the date on which the Consumer informed the Seller about the withdrawal from the sales contract. The deadline is met if the Consumer sends back the goods before the expiry of the 14-day period.
The consumer shall only be liable for any diminished value of the goods resulting from the use of the goods other than necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply accordingly to Services offered by Service Providers other than the Seller if they have not specified these principles differently in the description of the Service.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply accordingly to Services offered by Service Providers other than the Seller, unless they have specified these principles differently in the description of the Service.
d) for the purpose of providing services consisting of sound or visual recordings or computer programs supplied in a sealed package, if the package has been opened after delivery.
e) the supply of newspapers, periodicals or periodicals, with the exception of a subscription contract.
In the event of a defect in goods or irregularities concerning the Service, the Buyer is to file a complaint with the Seller, subject to paragraph 2 in the case of second-hand goods.
In the case of second-hand goods, the Seller shall be liable under warranty if the defect in the goods is found within one year of the goods being handed over to the Buyer.
The Seller asks to send a complaint concerning the goods and Services provided by the Seller by e-mail to help@celebrity2use.com or in writing to the appropriate address indicated in § 2 of the Terms and Conditions.
In order to consider a complaint, if necessary, the Buyer is obliged, in the case of a Consumer at the expense of the Seller, to deliver defective goods to the address celebrity2use Lubelska Street, no. 36, 10¬-409, Olsztyn, Poland.
The Seller recommends that the complaint should include the following information: the Buyer’s identification data, a concise description of the defect, the moment when the defect was found and the Buyer’s complaint request.
Each recommendation of the Seller, which is included in the Regulations, is only a non-binding guide for the Consumer, which the Consumer may, but does not have to use. Non-use by the Consumer of the Seller’s recommendations in no way affects the rights of the Consumer, and in particular does not affect the rights related to warranty.
Complaints concerning the functioning of the Shop should be reported electronically to the address help@celebrity2use.com.
The Seller will respond to the complaint within 14 days in the same way as the complaint was submitted.
The rules specified in this paragraph shall also apply accordingly to the Services provided by a Service Provider who is not a Seller if the Seller has not established these rules differently in the description of the Service.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply to agreements with Service Providers other than the Seller if they have not established these principles differently in the description of the Service.
The administrator of the Buyer’s personal data provided to the Seller during the use of the Shop is the Seller or Service Provider to the extent it is necessary for the implementation of the Service, as well as the Partner to the extent it is necessary in connection with the amount of support.
Personal data of the Buyer are processed on the basis of a contract and for the purpose of its implementation, in accordance with the principles set out in the general regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EU) on data protection (FODO). Personal data provided by the Buyer will be processed by the Seller, as well as by the Partner only for the purposes referred to in these Regulations.
In order to use the Store, it is necessary to have a device equipped with a web browser that supports cookies with Internet access, and to make purchases also an active e-mail account and an active account on the PayPal service or a payment card that enables payment via PayU or PayPal without creating an account on this service or a bank account that enables payment via the PayU service.
User account allows the Buyer to place an order, check the status of the order, view the history of orders, as well as edit their own data.
The user account is created by filling in an appropriate form in the Store.
Upon registration (creation of a User Account), a contract for the User Account is concluded between the Buyer and the Seller, for an indefinite period of time, in accordance with the rules set forth in these regulations.
The Buyer may at any time resign from the User Account, without giving any reason and incurring any costs. For this purpose, the Buyer should send to the Seller, to the email address specified in § 2 of the Terms and Conditions, his resignation, which will result in immediate removal of the User Account and termination of the contract in this respect.
The contract concluded on the basis of these regulations concerns a specific and one-time order – it is concluded for the purpose and for the duration of its execution. Each order requires a separate acceptance of the Regulations.
Regardless of the rights referred to in § 7 of the Regulations, each of the Parties to the contract has the right to withdraw from the contract in the event of delay of the other Party in the performance of an obligation within the period specified in the contract concluded on the basis of the Regulations without the need to set an additional period. This provision does not affect the Consumer’s rights resulting from the provisions of law.
Contracts with the Seller are concluded in Polish or English – depending on the Buyer’s choice.
It is forbidden for the Buyer to deliver illegal content.
d) increasing the competitiveness of the Store.
The amendment to the regulations referred to in paragraph 5 shall not apply to sales contracts already concluded, which shall be performed on the basis of the regulations in force on the date of conclusion of such a contract.
The information about the planned amendment to the Regulations will be sent to the Buyer’s email address assigned to his User Account or displayed in the User Account after logging in, at least 7 days before the amendment comes into force. Your continued use of the Store will signify your acceptance of the new Terms and Conditions.
In the event that the Buyer does not object to the planned changes until they come into force, it shall be deemed to have accepted them.
If the Buyer does not accept the planned changes, the Buyer should send information about it to the Seller’s e-mail address indicated in § 2 of the Regulations, which will result in termination of the agreement for the provision of the User Account service at the moment the planned changes come into force.
The Regulations together with the form below are available for download in a .pdf file under this link.
(registered address: celebrity2use, Via Enrico Cravero 6/15, CAP 16129 Genova (GE), Italia) help@celebrity2use.com.
(*) Delete if not needed.

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Civil Appeal No. 11336 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP [C] No. 16742/2016).
and held that the land be acquired under the provisions of the Act of 2013.
by a Division Bench of the High Court of M.P.
notified in the year 1995, the proposed width of the road is 66 mtrs.
Act of 2013’) ought to have been resorted to.
and published as per provisions contained in section 19(4).
part of the structure falling within building line.
is being executed through the nodal agency of Indore Development Authority.
falls within the purview of section 305 of the Act of 1956.
contained in the development plan.
Corporation is within its ken. It is not necessary to acquire the land.
of 1956 for acquisition of land.
note of the various statutory provisions.
shall thereupon become a public street.
the appellant and the Corporation.
deals with town planning. Section 291 mandates for town planning scheme.
the local authorities in such matters in public interest.
which has a reference in the Act of 1956 in section 292 thereof.
Panchayat constituted by or under the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 etc.
defined in section 2(o), 2(q), 2(u) and 2(w) of Act of 1973 respectively.
of the Act. Director is empowered to prepare regional plan under section 5.
revenue. Removal or demolition is contemplated after notice and hearing.
shall cease to be a planning area or part thereof.
works involved in the implementation of the plan.
Director together with all connected documents plans, maps and charts.
alongwith his comments, to the State Government.
directions as the State Government may deem appropriate.
publication of the notice in the Gazette.
the modification in the development plan.
the copies of the approved development plan may be inspected.
violation of the development plan/regional plan, as the case may be.
to acquire the land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
provisions contained in section 56.
the prior approval of the State Government.
provisions of this section with respect of buildings.
or suggestion with regard to the scheme which he may wish to make.
it shall intimate the Government accordingly.
may deem fit shall be paid from the Municipal Fund.
Pradesh which has ultimately consolidated the different Acts into the M.P.
by establishing the authorities under the provisions of sections 38 to 40.
confined to a scheme prepared under sections 49 and 50 of the Act of 1973.
There cannot be two schemes for the same area.
interpretation and ken of powers conferred upon the Municipal Corporation.
building or any part thereof being set back.
used in section 305(1) has to be read for the situation in clause (a) only.
confine of the powers conferred upon them. They cannot commit trespass.
hence no interference is called for.
down, burned down or has fallen down.
Corporation may require by notice such portion shall be set back to.
or burned down or has fallen down”.
any material portion of such building has to be read disjunctively.
exigency of clause (b) itself.
305 and the provision as to public street in the development plan otiose.
of the owner to remove the construction after notice to remove the same.
regular line of public street, the building is necessarily to be removed.
in the provisions contained in section 305.
satisfaction of exigencies specified therein.
such there is no requirement of separate provision for taking possession.
development plan or the town development scheme, as the case may be.
incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction.
provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v.
described as “heroic piece of deeming”.
as provided in section 305.
upon the decision of this Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.
Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533.
thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity.
42. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd., Chandigarh v.
interpretation by a law-applying organ (especially the court) on the other.
so as to modify the legislative policy. In Padma Sundara Rao (dead) & Ors.
109; and Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v. Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors.
error in the bill been noticed.
section 305 of the Act of 1956.
in the year 1995 in which the width of the corridor has been so provided.
Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577.
generally for any class of cases or specially in particular case.
within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
thereupon the said property or easement shall vest in the Corporation.
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
of the erection of any building.
is in force in respect of such building.
members already appointed as above.
shall be appointed, at the instance of either party, by the District Court.
proceedings in manner it thinks fit.
Act of 1956. Private street means a street which is not a public street.
passage, accessible whether permanently or temporarily to the public.
acquisition of land as provided in sections 78 and 79 thereof.
1170 p.1194: (1962) 1 SCJ 417: (1961) 3 SCR 185; Paradip Port Trust v.
Generalibus specialia derogant have to be applied in particular situations.
compensation payable under sections 305 and 306 of the Act of 1956.
Development Plan shall stand defeated.
section 305 read with sections 306 and 387 is just, fair and reasonable.
or 79 of the Act of 1956.
other and if necessary reading down of the provisions has to be made.
“16. The salient concomitants of Section 17(1) deserve enumeration.
excluding the requirement of publishing an award.
present to justify the invocation of these provisions by the Government.
this question does not arise before us.
when the foregoing factors have been formally and strictly complied with.
law as the prescribed mode is being followed.
enactments and they do not admit of any synonymity or interchangeability.
387 where the procedure of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable.
scheme under sections 49 and 50 in the aforesaid writ petitions.
expresssion ‘scheme’ under the provisions of section 292.
mandate of sections 19(5), 25 and other provisions of the Act of 1973.
scheme, as the case may be.
construed strictly as laid down in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v.
be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.
“29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in State of M.P.
in the fact situation of a case. Deprivation connotes different concepts.
decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But it is not the sole judge.
(a) Constitution of a planning area by notification under Section 13.
procedure envisages compliance with principles of natural justice.
been cast on the town and country development authority.
with a view to deal with the same in line with the final development plan.
when a town planning scheme is prepared.
with the rights of usage of the land arising therefrom would continue.
development plan which has to prevail.
finality can be attached to the master plan is an erroneous finding.
50 of the 1973 Act and we hold that KVTDS is ultra vires the 1973 Act.
the appellants cannot be allowed to sustain.
which in the present case is the Raipur Master Plan of 2021.
of any development scheme has to be laid down in the zonal plan.
Act does not contemplate a zonal plan, and which contemplates “DP-TP”.
planning scheme has to be subservient to development plan/zonal plan.
of SLP [C] Nos.14493-96/2016, has been relied on by the learned counsel.
is not open to the appellant to raise the plea of discrimination at all.
(supra) has no legs to stand.
the instant cases as the classification is found to be quite appropriate.
Madras Amendment Act which was struck down by this Court.
been placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in K.T.
and purpose of the statute and host of other factors.
must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive.
provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
be arbitrary or excessive or beyond what is required in public interest.
illusory compensation is provided under section 306 read with section 387.
may be required to be cured.
the compensation cannot be illusory.
qualifies the test of Article 300A.
same have been fairly culled out.
and 19. The provisions of sections 305 and 306 cannot be read in isolation.
quite reasonable method of arriving at compensation as discussed hereafter.
This determination, however, is not final because two appeals are provided.
appeals to the District Court”.
the streets unless parts of lands belonging to the owners are acquired.
the acquisition of the land for the purpose of the street is not possible.
for the payment of compensation for the property acquired.
the loss suffered it provides for adequate indemnification or compensation.
compensation for the property acquired under Section 212.
of the land on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of that Act.
suffered by the owner of the building or other interests in the property.
as he thinks fit and determine the amount of compensation to be paid.
determination of compensation is also specified by the Act.
deprivation suffered to the building or other interests in the property.
judicial norms. There is no limitation on the power of the appellate Judge.
found no violation of Articles 14 and 19 also in the instant cases.
while correlating it with the provisions of section 387 of the Act of 1956.
& Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 183 is of no avail.
74. Reliance has been placed on Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors.
(supra) and Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
laid down any such proposition in K.N. Palsikar (supra), as canvassed.
being demolished. The submission is thus untenable.
Previous Post Both the above suits were clubbed together. Evidence was recorded in Original Suit No.32/1974, whereupon, it was held, that the appellant was a cultivating tenant in respect of the above agricultural land, long prior to the notified date (-17.01.1959), and that, the appellant had occupancy rights over the above land, prior to taking over of the ‘Inam Estates’ by the State Government, under the 1948 Act. And further that, with effect from the notified date – 17.01.1959, the relationship of landlord and tenant, between the erstwhile landowner Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu – respondent no.1, and the ryot stood terminated. And that, the appellant was entitled to a “ryotwari patta” for the suit land. This determination was recorded in Original Suit No.32/74, consequent upon the appellant being able to establish the above position, through the evidence of an “archaka” and a “trustee” (P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively), of the temple in question. The appellant was also able to demonstrate, that the appellant and his predecessors-in-interest, were cultivating tenants of the suit land, long prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959. It is in the aforesaid view of the matter, that Original Suit No.32/1974 came to be decreed. 11. As against the above, the Estate Officer, Devasthanam, could not establish the execution of the alleged rent deed (kadapa), dated 29.11.1970, in favour of the appellant. And as such, the Devasthanam could not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, between Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and the appellant, as alleged. It was therefore, that Suit No.73/1974 was dismissed. The judgment and decree in Original Suit Nos.32/1974 and 73/1974 were passed on 31.10.1977. It is not a matter of dispute between the rival parties, that the aforesaid determination attained finality between the parties.
Next Post Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code=A plain perusal of the above quote also reveals that apart from an omnibus grievance against her in-laws to be responsible for their death, for which according to her, they ought to be punished, there is no reference or disclosure of any specific incident in support thereof. The suicide note divulges her ownership of lands and house which per se belies the charge that she had been denied the share of her husband in the family property. Noticeably, no attempt was made by the prosecution to prove the author of the text through an expert and both the courts below solely based their conclusion, in this regard on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6, the brothers of Surjit, who identified the contents to be that of hers again on eye estimation.-Though for the purposes of the case in hand, the first limb of the explanation is otherwise germane, proof of the willful conduct actuating the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental of physical, is the sine qua non for entering a finding of cruelty against the person charged.-The materials on record, to reiterate, do not suggest even remotely any act of cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to persistently provoke or compel the deceased to resort to self-extinction being left with no other alternative. No such continuous and proximate conduct of the appellant or his family members with the required provocative culpability or lethal instigative content is discernible to even infer that the deceased Surjit Kaur and her daughters had been pushed to such a distressed state, physical or mental that they elected to liquidate themselves as if to seek a practical alleviation from their unbearable earthly miseries.- ingredients of the offence of Section 306 IPC have remained unproved and thus the appellant deserves to be acquitted. The findings to the contrary recorded by the courts below cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the law adumbrated by this Court as well as the facts involved. The appeal is thus allowed.

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United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.
Labor Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp.
HERRON v. PORTLAND STAGES, INC.
ICC v. J-T Transport Co., Inc.
Still v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
McMAHON v. MILAM MANUFACTURING CO.
SUNKIST GROWERS, INC. v. WINCKLER & SMITH CITRUS PRODUCTS CO.
STANDARD DRUG CO., INC. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
COMMISSIONER, INT. REV. v. MILWAUKEE & SUB. TRANSP.
Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co.
CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Central Vermont Ry.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
United States v. Consolidated Edison Co.
LUDWIG v. AMERICAN GREETINGS CORP.
BINKS MFG. CO. v. RANSBURG CORP.
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.
Labor Board v. News Syndicate Co., Inc.
VERRET v. OIL TRANSPORT CO., INC.
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Pwr. Co.
VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK v. BERGEN COUNTY BD. OF TAX.
UTAH CITIZENS RATE ASSN. v. U.S.
ST. REGIS PAPER COMPANY v. U.S.
U.S. v. UNION CENTRAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.
Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Co.
Maynard v. Durham & Southern Ry. Co.
Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc.
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Co.
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.
SYLVANDER v. FARMERS & TRADERS LIFE INSURANCE CO.

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