The Mannheim District Court had to decide on an infringement action brought against Apple by Motorola Mobility. Apple had raised an "Orange Book" defense, which is the german version a FRAND defense by unconditionally offering a license agreement under FRAND terms for the future but without accepting damages beyond the FRAND license fees for the past.
The hitherto unresolved question whether the FRAND offer has to be made before using the patent has been answered in the negative. However, the court decided that in the case where the patent had been used in the past, the FRAND offer has to include an unconditional acknowledgement of the damages for this past use.
First of all, the patentee behaves contradictory when he admits, in the license agreement, that certain acts in the future use the patent while disputing that the same acts in the past have been infringing the patent. According to the Mannheim Court, antitrust regulations do not require any limitation of damages for the past to amounts corresponding to FRAND-License fees.
Further reasons for the latter decision depend on details of the German jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case. It might therefore be difficult to use the arguments in other jurisdictions.
In the case at issue, a nullity suit was co-pending at the Federal German Patent Court and the Mannheim court had decided not to stay the infringement procedure until the decision in the nullity suit was made. In the event that the patent will be revoked, any damages paid would be refunded, whereas this is not the case for license fees. The party raising the FRAND defense would therefore achieve an economical advantage over the diligent licensee asking for a license before using the patent.
Further, the case-law unambiguously accepts the right of the patentee to terminate a license agreement for good cause if the licensee files a nullity action against the patent. In the case of a co-pending nullity suit, the principle of dolo agit, qui petit, quod statim redditurus est therefore forecloses the licensee from forcing the patentee into an agreement which could then be terminated by the patentee immediately.
As a consequence, the unconditional withdrawal of the nullity action as well as the acceptance of damages for the past appear to be mandatory prerequisites for raising a FRAND-defense in Germany.
Further points discussed but not decided include the question whether the unconditional FRAND offer by the licensee has to encompass all of the standard-essential patents of the patentee (or of the patentee’s parent company?) in all countries so as to terminate all the ongoing litigations between the party and the question whether the FRAND defense may not be raised at all in cases of willful infringement.
The full text of the decision has been published under "Justiz in Baden-Württemberg" here.
“This new judicial body will settle legal argument related to intellectual property and patent rights and will be staffed with 30 judges experiences in the relevant field as well as a number of specialists in specific fields, who will give expert opinions to help judges make a fair ruling.
> the early termination of legal protection for a trademark on the grounds of its non-use."
According to Rapsi Agency, this Court could start working on February 1, 2012.
Experiments in the Patents County Court: when are they allowed?
"The decisive factor to my mind is that the experiments go directly to the question of how the product alleged to infringe actually works. It may be that the correct construction of the claim means that the product infringes either way, regardless of the dispute about how it works. However when I raised the question of whether I should direct a preliminary issue on the question of construction there was no enthusiasm for that course from either side. In my judgment the functioning of the Humira Pen is likely to be a crucial issue in this case.
Ms May submitted that a party is entitled to prove its case in the best way it can so long as it is reasonable and proportionate in the context of the case as a whole. In my judgment that formulation is capable of leading to trouble in relation to the Patents County Court procedure. To say that a party is entitled to prove its case the best way it can subject to caveats puts the matter the wrong way round. The purpose of the Patents County Court procedure is to facilitate access to justice, in part by streamlining and controlling what is admitted into the proceedings. Experiments are capable of becoming an expensive distraction in patent litigation unless they are kept under control. What is reasonable and proportionate is always important. Seeking to justify potentially complex evidence on the basis that it is the best evidence is a path which leads to increases in cost and time. In my judgment in this case the experiments are not complex at all. The claimant may succeed in showing they are entirely worthless but that is different from saying that they are complex or costly. They will be admitted because they satisfy the cost-benefit test".
"Readers will recollect that when the robot octopus became invisible – because Cautious's patent attorney was so working hard on the case for his client, the claimant – and we had got as far as a spat about disclosure and privilege.
Cautious’s dispute centres on a claim that IPOff has infringed Cautious's patent and unregistered design right by making and supplying a robot octopus which could be used to predict football results. At the Case Management Conference (CMC) there was an order for specific disclosure, limited expert evidence (on patent issues only) and exchange of witness statements. In addition the Court ordered provision of a process description (to be limited by agreement at that stage to the expert), that Cautious can rely on the sample IPOff Robot Octopus, Cautious's original design of an octopus toy, and a sample of the current Cautious octopus.
This is an opportune moment to mention the upcoming small claims jurisdiction of the PCC again: I have been told that small claims cases will come before district judges and recorders, rather than before Judge Birss QC.
Cautious would not be caught in a case which progressed in such a manner (described by Judge Birss as “a fraternal dispute ranging over many years”). However, as preparations are clearly underway, Cautious’s patent attorney expects some more turbulence in the proceedings; and has received just the sort of letter that he knew would start arriving as detailed preparations were being made.
IPOff’s solicitor has been doing a little bit more homework, and has realized that the independent design argument was not going very far on the material his client had provided. Now IPOff has dug up some “prior art” in the form of pictures in a text book on octopuses. I can now reveal that the design of the octopus is indeed based on the rare “tiger octopus” – characteristics of which will be revealed in due course. This text book details key features of the tiger octopus and IPOff’s solicitor has provided some photographs from the book, as well as live photographs of tiger octopuses. Cautious's patent attorney suspects that these were taken on his holiday last Christmas and is not at all clear why it should have taken so long for these to have emerged into the proceedings.
IPOff has asked that Cautious consent to amendment of the statements of case to reflect this new angle that he has discovered, saying that it is really necessary to involve an expert now in order to explain why this is material which would, at the relevant time, have been known to interested circles and why Cautious's designs do not create a different overall impression from these pictures.
At the same time, Cautious’s expert has been doing his work. He has now spoken to Cautious’s patent attorney to explain some problems. As instructed he has not prepared a report on this aspect at this stage. He has been provided with the process description and the source code of the IPOff Robot Octopus engine. This is confidential and was not provided to Cautious’s patent attorney, by agreement at the CMC. On reviewing this and comparing it with the operation of the robot octopus, he finds that the robot octopus does not operate as he would expect, based on these descriptions. The descriptions would indeed mean that the robot octopus was not infringing, but they do not, in his view, correspond with reality.
Cautious's patent attorney is considering what steps should be taken, and also whether this is deliberate or accidental. In order to demonstrate the position, Cautious may have to carry out experiments nothing in the CMC order about that, and it looks as though it could start racking up the costs.
Cautious’s patent attorney is pondering each of these issues, and will be reporting on them shortly.
In the meantime, he has also heard sad news. The excitement of a proposed European Unified Patent Court is overshadowed by the fact that this may make the PCC irrelevant in patent cases. The CIPA Briefing paper is here. Readers should know that it is proposed that the Court will have exclusive jurisdiction not only in relation to the proposed European Unitary Patent but also, after a transitional period of only five years, in relation to patents granted under the existing EPC. This appears to mean that all this effort Cautious’s patent attorney has gone to, to learn about the PCC and to persuade SME clients that the PCC will transform the value of their patents, will go to waste. This is something which is made all the more frustrating by the complete absence of public information on the debates over the subject (see IPKat, “Further work is still needed”)".
Background. In April 2011, Apple filed suit against Samsung alleging three basic infringement claims: (1) Samsung infringed Apple’s U.S. Design Patents D618,677 and D593,087 by selling its Galaxy S 4G and Infuse 4G smart phones, (2) Samsung infringed U.S. Design Patent No. D504,889 by selling its Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet computer, and (3) Samsung infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381, entitled “List scrolling and document translation, scaling and rotation on a touch-screen display,” by selling all three devices and the Samsung 4G LTE smart phone. Apple moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the four accused Samsung products from the U.S. market pending a full trial on the merits (perhaps not coincidentally, during the holiday shopping season).
Injunction Standard. The court noted that in order to obtain interlocutory injunction relief, a patentee must establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim, (2) immediate irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (2) that a balancing of the hardships suffered by the parties weighs in favor of an injunction, and (4) that an injunction best serves the public interest. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Based on its review of the limited record assembled for the injunction hearing, the court ruled that Apple failed to establish all four grounds for an injunction against any of the products.
Smart Phone Design Patents. Although the court noted that an ordinary observed was likely to find that the Galaxy S 4G and Infuse 4G smartphones designs were substantially the same as the D’677 patented design, it ruled that Apple failed to prove that it faced irreparable harm without an injunction. Apple advanced the creative argument that Samsung’s sale of infringing phones in the U.S. market would result in irreparable erosion of the distinctiveness of Apple’s brand. It argued that product design was an important factor in consumer decisions to purchase phones, and the design features of its products were “closely entwined with the Apple brand[.]” Thus, it argued that Samsung’s infringement would erode Apple’s design and brand distinctiveness, and lead to the loss of goodwill. The district court rejected the argument, however. It noted that Apple offered no case authority for its theory, and --- if applied in this case – virtually any infringing product design would result in erosion of distinctiveness. The court also noted that Apple’s theory borrowed heavily from dilution in the trademark sense, but there was no legal support for applying that theory to injuries in a design patent claim. Ultimately, however, the court ruled that even if the theory was viable, Apple offered no evidence that Samsung’s products would result in confusion or loss of distinctiveness.
The court also rejected Apple’s argument that the Samsung infringing sales would directly result in loss of customers and market share. Apple and Samsung introduced conflicting evidence concerning the role design plays in customer selection of products in the crowded phone market. Much of that evidence was designated confidential by Apple and redacted from the public opinion. [Note that the court initially issued the opinion in a pdf version that revealed the redacted supposedly confidential information.] Ultimately, the court ruled that Apple failed to prove that design was the primary factor in customer purchases. In addition, the court noted that since 2007 Apple was aware that Samsung was copying the design of its products, yet delayed in seeking an injunction. The court concluded that this delay tipped the scale in Samsung’s favor.
Tablet Design Patent Likely Invalid. The district court then turned to Apple’s D’889 patent. Samsung argued that the patent was invalid for obviousness based on prior art tablet-type devices featuring framed displays. In particular, Samsung pointed to a 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder tablet, which created the same overall visual impression as the D’889 patent. [See figures comparing D'889 patent with prior art].
Apple argued that secondary considerations of nonobviousness, such as commercial success and initial skepticism in the industry, supported a conclusion that the design was not invalid. However, Apple was unable to demonstrate a link between the secondary evidence and the protected tablet design. Thus, the court ruled that a substantial question existed as to the patent’s validity, and thus Apple had not proven a likelihood of success on the merits.
The Court finds this argument persuasive. While Apple undoubtedly uses the patent and produces goods in the same market, Apple has neither alleged, nor established, that the ‘381 patent is either necessary to, or a core functionality of, the products that it seeks to enjoin. Nor has Apple shown that consumers’ purchasing decisions are based on the existence of a snap back feature protected by the ‘381 patent. Accordingly, the fact that the ‘381 patent is but one patent utilized in the accused products, and does not appear to be either necessary for the product to function, or a core technology of the product, weighs against a finding of irreparable harm.
Apple, at 63-64 (citations omitted). That reasoning may set a high standard for patentees seeking to enjoin the use of their patented inventions in complex electronic devices, which generally involve a myriad of technologies.
"Though Nokia does not normally comment on legal proceedings which we are not involved in, comments made by IPCom in its press release about patent #100 (EP 1 186 189 B1) and Nokia require correction.
IPCom claims that the algorithm described in patent #100 has been “adopted as a standard by equipment makers worldwide”. What it does not say is that the functionality is not used by any network in Germany or elsewhere. IPCom also fails to mention that, subsequent to the finding of infringement against HTC, the Federal Patent Court in Germany found the patent invalid as granted but allowed amendments which narrowed the scope of the patent in such a way that nobody implementing the standard could infringe what remains.
IPCom states that it is “seeking similar injunctions against Nokia with regard to this and a number of other standard-essential patents”. By doing so, IPCom is explicitly failing to meet its obligations as an owner of alleged standards-essential patents, which include commitments not to seek injunctions against willing licensees. Following a Nokia complaint to the European Commission, IPCom declared in December 2009 its intent to honour these commitments but its behaviour continues to fall short of these commitments.
IPCom states its hope “that Nokia will swiftly recognize that it … needs to come to terms with IPCom”. Nokia was prepared to take a licence to the portfolio on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms before IPCom began legal actions against us in December 2007. However, IPCom has continually failed to make any offer of terms that could be considered FRAND. Instead, IPCom has chosen to pursue an aggressive strategy of legal actions against Nokia. During the past four years, of all of the 54 IPCom patents which have come to judgment in the UK, Germany and elsewhere, none has been found valid as granted, suggesting that its claims for the value of its portfolio have been grossly overstated.
Nokia had two further EPO hearings last week.
In decisions in the Hague and Munich, the European Patent Office has ruled two further IPCom patents (EP 1 258 110, #116 and EP 1 085 716, #070) as invalid as granted. This brings to 56 the total number of patents found invalid as granted or conceded as invalid by IPCom.
“These two decisions, together with those on the previous 54 IPCom patents which have come to judgment, show that the value of IPCom’s portfolio has been grossly overestimated,” says Paul Melin, VP intellectual property at Nokia. “Rather than continuing its aggressive attempts to extract unrealistic licensing terms and mislead the public, it’s time for IPCom to come to terms with reality"".
Patent Eligibility. The most closely-watched case is Mayo Collaborative Services (d/b/a Mayo Medical Laboratories) v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (No. 10-1153), an appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considering the patent eligibility of medical processes. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. owns U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, entitled “Method of treating IBD/Crohn’s Disease and related conditions wherein drug metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage,” and a subsequent continuation patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302. The patents claim methods for treating gastrointestinal diseases by optimizing dosages of thiopurine drugs. The drugs are effective in carefully controlled doses, but have toxic side effects at incorrect levels. The patents generally claim a process of optimizing the dosage level by “administering” a thiopurine drug, “determining” the level of resulting drug metabolites in the patient’s blood, and then increasing or decreasing the drug dosage where the metabolite level “indicates a need” to do so.
Prometheus sued Mayo Collaborative Services, a unit of the Mayo Clinic, for infringement of the patents. Mayo moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the claimed invention was not eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because it attempts to cover a natural phenomenon – the correlation between thiopurine metabolite levels in a patient’s blood and drug effectiveness or toxicity.
The Mayo case already has been to the Supreme Court once, but was remanded without a decision on the merits. The Federal Circuit originally reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mayo, holding that the claims satisfied the then-dispositive “machine or transformation test.” Prometheus Labs., Inv. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That decision was on appeal to the Supreme Court when the Court decided Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010), broadening the eligibility of method inventions. As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the Mayo case for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit decided once again that the claims were patent-eligible. Prometheus Labs., Inv. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The CAFC reasoned that Prometheus’ steps of “administering” and “determining” were transformative, because the thiopurine drug chemically reacted in the bloodstream to form the detectible metabolites. Thus, the claims did not cover the a naturally-occurring correlation per se, but a specific application of that phenomenon that resulted in drug dosage optimization.
Mayo will be the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to consider the limits of patent eligibility since its Bilski decision. Interest in the case is particularly keen because one Justice, Stephen Breyer, has been critical of a patent involving a step suggesting physician thought processes quite similar to the steps recited in the Prometheus patents. In a 2006 case, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., the Court heard argument on the patentability of claims directed to a method of diagnosing vitamin deficiencies in patients by “assaying” their blood for high levels of homocysteine (known to be associated with vitamin deficiencies) and then “correlating” a high level of homocysteine with vitamin deficiency in the patient. 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006). The Court subsequently dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, because the patent eligibility issue was not briefed or argued in the lower court. But Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Stevens (both now retired), dissented from the dismissal. He argued that the claimed method amounted to nothing more than “an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical knowledge.” Thus, he argued, the claims were directed to natural phenomena, per se, and were not patent-eligible. The same reasoning may cause Breyer to be skeptical of Prometheus’ claims.
The Mayo case will be argued on December 7.
Counterclaims Under Hatch-Waxman Act. In addition to Mayo, two other patent-related appeals will be argued this term. In Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs. Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 10-844, the Supreme Court considers when a generic drug company may bring a counterclaim against a pioneer drug manufacturer under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under that Act, a drug manufacturer lists patents which cover its drug or FDA-approved uses of the drug in the FDA’s Orange Book. If a generic company files an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) seeking approval to market a generic equivalent before the patents expire, it must deliver a “Paragraph IV” certification asserting that each patent is not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). Such a certification is an act of infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), permitting the pioneer drug company to file suit in federal district court. In order to prevent pioneer drug companies from deterring generic applications by listing patent information that is too broad in light of the patents’ claimed subject matter, the Act permits a generic drug company to assert a counterclaim if a patent listed in the Orange Book does not claim either “(aa) the drug for which the [FDA] application was approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug[.]” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I).
In this case, the pioneer drug company, Novo Nordisk, owns a patent covering the brand drug Prandin®, which is approved for three methods for treating diabetes mellitus. Novo Nordisk listed the patent in the Orange Book as covering one method. In fact, the patent claims covered one of the other approved methods. Novo Nordisk asserted that Caraco infringed the patent by filing an ANDA for the listed, but not patented, method. Caraco filed a counterclaim seeking correction of the Orange Book information, and the district court granted summary judgment directing Novo Nordisk to amend the listing. In a 2-1 split decision, however, the Federal Circuit reversed. It ruled that Caraco could not assert a counterclaim because the Orange Book did list “an approved method of using” Prandin (just not the one that was covered by the patent). The dissenting judge argued that the majority’s construction of the law was too “crabbed” and deviated from Congress’ intent to prevent manipulation of the Orange Book listings.
The Supreme Court will hear argument in Caraco on December 5, 2011.
In Hyatt, the examiner rejected the applicant’s pending claims for obviousness. During the ensuing administrative appeal, the BPAI reversed the obviousness rejection, but rejected several claims based on lack of written description. 35 U.S.C. § 112 par. 1. Evidence to rebut that rejection was available to Hyatt, but he did not submit it to the BPAI. After the BPAI’s final ruling, Hyatt filed a civil action under Section 145 and, in that action, attempted to introduce the evidence he failed to submit during the administrative appeal. The district court excluded the evidence.
Hyatt then appealed to the Federal Circuit. In an en banc ruling, the appeals court ruled that a plaintiff in a Section 145 action may introduce any evidence in support of its request for issuance, even though the evidence was not before the BPAI. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc). The USPTO argued for a different rule that would preclude admission of new evidence in the district court action unless the applicant could not reasonably have provided the evidence to the USPTO in the first instance. Supreme Court will be tasked with determining the correct standard for admitting new evidence.
Last year we made reference to Teva vs AstraZeneca action (Crestor) and the negative impact of plaintiff’s own words (here). Yesterday Teva’s appeal has been dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
"Because AstraZeneca conceded infringement for the limited purpose of its summary judgment motion, and because Teva maintains the allegation of infringement upon which its suit is based, it is undisputed for the purpose of this appeal that AstraZeneca's drug is an embodiment within the scope of the asserted claims. See Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Although [defendant] bore the burden of proving that the [asserted prior art/accused product] embodied the patented invention or rendered it obvious for purposes of the summary judgment motion, this burden is met by [plaintiff's] allegation, forming the sole basis for the complaint, that the [asserted prior art/accused product] infringes."). It is undisputed that AstraZeneca conceived and reduced its drug to practice before Teva's first conception of the claimed subject matter."
"Conception occurs "when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand ...." Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., No. 2010-1445, Slip Op. 13 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 24, 2011) quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). But "[a]n inventor need not understand precisely why his invention works in order to achieve an actual reduction to practice." Parker v. Frilette, 462 F.2d 544, 547 (CCPA 1972). In order to establish reduction to practice, the prior inventor must have (1) constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the claim limitations and (2) determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Mycogen Plant Sci., 243 F.3d at 1332."
Yesterday the CJEU ruled in Nokia & Philips cases. Although questions made reference to Trademarks, the conclusions would also apply to every IP right.
– those indications may include, inter alia, the fact that the destination of the goods is not declared whereas the suspensive procedure requested requires such a declaration, the lack of precise or reliable information as to the identity or address of the manufacturer or consignor of the goods, a lack of cooperation with the customs authorities or the discovery of documents or correspondence concerning the goods in question suggesting that there is liable to be a diversion of those goods to European Union consumers.


A lot of questions have continued to arise on the identity of Nonresident Alien Individuals [NRAI]. Due to the conditioning of Americans by the National Government about this foreign sounding term — it warrants some detailed explanation. The National Government definition of NRAI at 26 USC §7701(b)(1)(B) only tells you what it is NOT, rather than what it is! We are going to look deeper into who is actually made liable for the FIT and required to make a return to pay those taxes, and in the process, you will learn what an NRAI actually is!
As you develop your understanding, you will learn that there are several different groups of people who live in, reside in, work in, and are born in the 50 states of the Union. They all have similarities but vary widely in the liability for the FIT and being required to make a return.
We are going to explore them all to find out just who is being referred to by the U.S. Congress in their statutes and regulations that are called “Nonresident Alien Individuals”. This is admittedly a foreign-sounding term that at first glance gives most Americans the impression that the term “Nonresident Alien Individual” can’t possibly describe those who are American Nationals.
So, when you see the phrase “American National” you will know clearly what we are saying. Please keep in mind that we are NOT using the word “National” in a statutory sense. We are using the phrase “American National”. There is a huge difference and in spite of those who have a well-discussed aversion to the use of ‘National’, do not be misled as we are NOT using the term ‘National’ as it is statutorily defined.
Characteristically, there will be those distracters who may claim that I have no right to make definitions on my own in this matter. To that I say, “I am disinclined to acquiesce to your request”, or more simply “Hog Wash”!
Here is why I say that, and in doing so proclaim my right to define terms just as the U.S. Congress did in the IRC of 1954 at section 7701. Each American is a sovereign with identical sovereign status vis-a-vis to that of King George of England! As you know, a Sovereign is a monarch of his or her own domain.
Therefore, if I am one of those Sovereigns being referred to by the United States Supreme Court, and indeed I am, then as a Sovereign who is the “author and source of the law”, I can indeed create a new term for reasons of simplification and clarification — without asking permission from anyone, including the National Government.
I will prove to you in this discussion that American Nationals are indeed those who are referred to by the U.S. Congress as ‘Nonresident Alien Individuals’. Furthermore, I will point out that the National Government has purposely obscured the clarity in understanding of what has been going on related to the Federal Income Tax for over 100 years as a willful and purposeful act by the National Government in order to circumvent the intent of the Constitution.
So, the best place to start is at the beginning and we need to find out how the Federal Income Tax came into existence and more specifically who was made liable for that tax!
Anyone who has even lightly studied the U.S. Constitution, understands that for the National Government to attempt to impose a new form of taxation it cannot be a direct tax upon the People but instead must be a tax upon the various state legislatures who would then decide if the tax were beneficial enough to impose a tax upon the citizens of their particular state.
A tax via the Apportionment Rule means that the U.S. Congress would look at: (1) the most recent Census, (2) determine the population of each state of the Union and (3) then prorate the amount of the cost of some project supported by the proposed tax to the states of the Union. If a certain percentage of the states of the Union saw merit in the project and accepted the Direct Tax by the National Government, then each of those state legislatures would seek to raise the revenue by taxation within their respective states. Once the funds were collected, they would be paid to the U.S. Treasury, and the bill would then no longer be an issue as it would be only a one-time tax.
However, if you read again what POTUS Taft wrote, you will see that he told Congress to “levy the income tax upon the National Government” [meaning those who work for it] and to do so WITHOUT regard to the CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT of the APPORTIONMENT RULE.
In 1894, the U.S. Congress passed the Income Tax Act of 1894. It was designed to directly tax all Americans, including those living and working in the states of the Union. Less than a year later, 1895, the United States Supreme Court heard the case Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
Did you notice the jurisdictional reference as to where this Amendment is only applicable within? It is there but is coded so that the unaware will only read the statement and then accept it without any further consideration. You hear it now, “Just pay the tax”, “Pay your fair share”, and all that verbiage that is the current propaganda seeking conformity from Americans who know something is wrong but just can’'t put their finger on it. Can you see the Jurisdictional reference yet? No? Well let me help you.
What if there were actually two (2) distinct and separate jurisdictions and only in one jurisdiction did the U.S. Constitution have the full force and effect of law? Could that be? Yes, and in fact it must and does exist in order for the U.S. Congress to create such an Amendment. Thus, the 16th Amendment was written ONLY FOR THE SINGULAR JURISDICTION in which the Constitution was null and void as law! That jurisdiction is none other than the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
American Nationals living in the now 50 states of the Union are not part of the jurisdiction assigned to the National Government, which is to say the District of Columbia — a foreign jurisdiction to the Constitutional Republic!
So if one works for the National Government, they are the targeted audience for the Federal Income Tax as it is a privilege to work for the government and privileges are taxable. The Apportionment Rule found in the U.S. Constitution — and in fact the entire Constitution — does not apply as law within the District of Columbia. Most Americans have never thought about this fact!
That is why the United States Supreme Court in 1895 [Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company] denied the National Government the power to impose an income tax upon Americans ‘directly’ unless they attempted to do so via Apportionment Rule [and that such a tax would only be a one-time tax and not an annual self-renewing tax].
Based on the foregoing commentary, you must now recognize that there are two separate and distinct jurisdictions in the land mass that Americans commonly refer to simply as the United States of America.
To be precise is critical in understanding where you are and where you do not want to be.
This is where you enjoy the constitutional protections against an intrusive National Government. That is unless you have subordinated your sovereignty and constitutionally protected rights to become a voluntary indentured servant to the National Government. You need to be aware that there is no democracy here, as it is a Republic! The Federal Income Tax is NOT APPLICABLE here.
The U.S. Supreme Court declare this fact! So did the Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment. If you choose to leave the protections and enter the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, you are in for a real rough experience. Sadly, this is what most American Nationals have done to themselves.
This is the place where the U.S. Constitution is NULL AND VOID. In this jurisdiction, the constitution is a mere historical document. The U.S. Congress can and does operate as a Monarch here. There is only Democracy here for those who choose to live and work in this jurisdiction. The Greeks have long ago learned that even Democracy does not work well when 51% rule over the 49%. This is the jurisdiction in which the Federal Income Tax is alive and well.
It is basically a municipal tax for those who, geographically speaking, live in D.C. or any U.S. Territory. It is also legislatively speaking [meaning by statutory law] a municipal tax for those who have ‘voluntarily’ chosen to be taxed like that of a U.S. Resident Alien no matter where they may actually live geographically because their statutory Tax Home [26 USC §911(d)(3)] is the District of Columbia. Your domicile is now in this jurisdiction by statutory law once you make the ‘voluntary election’ to be taxed like a U.S. Resident Alien. This is so, even if you do not physically reside there.
It is legal and lawful in this jurisdiction. That is why so many Americans have been confused about this matter and if they make the choice to be taxed, they have only one option. Those who have made that choice must pay the FIT. The District of Columbia becomes your Tax Home by statutory law even if you do not live in this jurisdiction. Thus, you must pay their tax no matter where you live in the world. The reason is that you are the ‘property’ of the National Government under this subordination.
If you find yourself within this jurisdiction and bring up the Constitution as a defense of your Rights, in a United States District Court or United States Appellate Court, you will be laughed at, ridiculed, and perhaps even threatened! In my opinion, a more correct name for this jurisdiction is the District of Criminals!
Can you see something now that you have failed to recognize prior to this reading? I hope so! Now, ask yourself this question: In which jurisdiction am I currently located?
If you file and pay or, at one time filed and paid [and did not revoke that ‘election’], the Federal Income Tax then the jurisdiction in which you are located is only that of The District of Columbia! You are NOT any longer considered as an American National domiciled in the Constitutional Republic even if that is where you currently reside. Most Americans never even were aware of that being the fact.
What we have seen, for the first time in American History, was a revelation of two distinct and separate jurisdictions and that in one of those jurisdictions — the District of Columbia — the Constitution had no full force and effect of law upon the US Congress. So the two jurisdictions are: (1) the now 50 states of the Union and, (2) the District of Columbia and the U.S. Territories along with its insular possessions.
Glad that you asked that question!
But before I answer that we need to show that when you read the term “Nonresident Alien Individual” that you must be converting it to read “American National” unless you want to remain in their semantic mental trap the U.S. Congress set up in a premeditated and purposeful manner.
First of all, if you read that ‘definition’ again you will see that the definition at 26 USC §7701(b)(1)(B) only tells you what a Nonresident Alien Individual is not rather than what it actually is.
For any ‘definition’ to be considered a ‘definition’ one must look at what Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition Abridged, page 292, has to say.
The expression of ‘neither a citizen of the United States…’ is addressing only the statutory meaning pertaining to a statutory ‘Person’ or statutory ‘U.S. person’. These are mostly legal fictions created by an Act of Congress or a reference to those who were born in the District of Columbia or one of the territories belonging to the National Government. It in no way reflects on those who are AMERICAN NATIONALS. The term ‘United States’ is defined in Title 26 to mean only the District of Columbia per 26 USC §7408(d) and §7701 (a)(9) / (a)(10).
As to the statement “…nor a resident of the United States” shows that is the jurisdiction the “definition” the U.S. Congress created is referring to foreigners who live and work of the National Government’s jurisdiction [the District of Columbia] or within the Constitutional Republic.
You must learn that you cannot presume you understand the definitions of the everyday terms you use versus the same words that are defined much differently by the U.S. Congress. The immediate presumption by most Americans is that this term NRAI is some kind of a foreigner from another nation.
To eliminate those who are not to be considered for being a target of the National Government, we need to look at the complete set of “potential tax targets” and then slowly reduce them to the actual subset of people in the world who are indeed the actual targets for liability for the Federal Income Tax. Specifically, we are looking to identify those who are ‘Nonresident Alien Individuals’.
There are only 4 groups to consider.
GROUP 1 Potential Targets: The entire world.
Well, we both know that is silly … but allow me some latitude to get us to the actual group of targeted individuals. However, let’s take a few moments to address this group.
People from every nation in the world that live in their own nation and do not wish to live and work in the United States or the 50 states of the Union cannot be a target audience. Hopefully, you can clearly see that the U.S. Government has no power or authority to impose the federal income tax upon every single individual in the entire world. They are ‘foreigners’ to the National Government and solely as citizens of their own country they are immediately eliminated from U.S. Taxation liability.
They may, or may not, owe taxes to their own governments, but they certainly do not owe the U.S. Government. They are ‘foreigners’ without any U.S. tax obligation. These people are ‘Nonresident’ to the two jurisdictions in the United States and they are certainly ‘alien’ to the legislative jurisdiction of the U.S. Congress. Simply stated, the statutory laws of the U.S. Congress do not apply toward this group of people. This group also has no U.S. citizenship whatsoever! Therefore, it can be correctly stated that they have no nexus with the U.S. Government.
If this group of foreigners are the real Nonresident Alien Individuals referenced in 26 CFR §1.871-1(a), 26 USC §7701 (b)(1)(B), and 26 USC §6013(g), then you have to ask yourself a few questions.
Secondly, “Why would these foreign citizens of another country who continue to live and work in their native country ever ‘volunteer’ to file and pay a federal income tax?” Obviously, they would not. One would have to be crazy to actually do such a foolish act.
“Why would they be willing to give their money to the U.S. Government when they have no obligation to do so?” That makes even less sense. There is simply nothing in it for them.
Now we have to stop once again. 26 CFR §1.871-1(b)(4) is clearly referencing a tax liability for Nonresident Alien Individuals and that they lost U.S. citizenship [which they obviously must have previously had]. If you still think that this sub-section of this Implementing Regulation is addressing Group 1, then as the expression goes, “I have some ocean-front property in Arizona that I would like to sell to you”.
Clearly, Group 1 is NOT the target audience that the U.S. Congress was intending to address. Therefore, Nonresident Alien Individuals as found in 26 CFR §1.871-1(a), 26 USC §7701 (b)(1)(B), and 26 USC §6013(g) are only addressing those who have a tax liability and U.S. citizenship.
This is a select group of people from other nations who choose to live and work in the United States. They no longer wish to live and work in their home country. They are, by federal law, U.S. Taxpayers based on their voluntary desire to live and work within the United States as a privilege granted to them by the National Government to do so. These people are ‘foreigners’ who have no citizenship status whatsoever.
Any U.S. Resident Alien who earns a living as a Resident Alien, in effect becomes the property of the National Government by the free-will choice of those people from a different country. This remains in effect even if they choose to leave the United States at a later time. Remember, they have become the property of the National Government.
Some may eventually choose to become Naturalized as an American and with that choice their status is changed forever. They are no longer the property of the National Government unless they make an error that will soon be addressed referred to as “making an election”. Doing that brings them back into the status of being identified as Property of the National Government once more. To pay federal income taxes at that point they would have to make an ‘election’.
Only Nonresident Alien Individuals can make a voluntary ‘election’ to have their income taxed like that of a U.S. Resident Alien. This is clearly stated in the regulation at 26 CFR §1.871-1(a). Additionally, those NRAIs must have a constitutional U.S. citizenship per 26 CFR §1.871-1(b)(4) as only American Nationals can expatriate or leave their constitutional U.S. citizenship behind.
Statutory Persons or U.S. Persons as defined at 26 USC §7701(a) and 26 USC §7701(a)(30) respectively are basically legal fictions created or ‘born legislatively’ by the U.S. Congress.
By their physical birth geographically in the District of Columbia or any U.S. Territory or by Legislative birth as an Act of the U.S. Congress, each of these persons are lawful U.S. Taxpayers. They are imposed with the duty and obligations of filing and paying the Federal Income Tax directly by the Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment written by former POTUS William H. Taft, on June 16, 1909.
Those statutory U.S. citizens are not the same as American Nationals who have a constitutional U.S. citizenship due to the location of their birth outside the Constitutional Republic and to parents who were also born outside the Constitutional Republic. These people are ‘subject to the exclusive jurisdiction’ of the National Government and are the property of that government.
This last group is a reference to those Americans who were born in one of the 50 states of the Union, or born to parents of which at least one was born in one of the 50 states of the Union, or those Naturalized. This group is the only remaining segment of people in the world that can qualify for the expression by the U.S. Congress as “Nonresident Alien Individual”. Those identified in this group also possess a constitutional U.S. citizenship that can be given up or ‘lost’ via expatriation.
“American National” is the expression that I created, so that one does not get entangled with the Constitutional expression of Citizens of the United States and the National Government’s attempt at further confusion by their statutory definitions for U.S. citizens or Citizens of the United States related to their limited jurisdiction.
Due to the similarities in words and the potential for those Constitutional Citizens of the United States being misapplied by the National Government, it is far safer to use “American Nationals” [as previously defined] to reflect the Constitutional reference and completely avoid the statutory term “U.S. Citizen”.
Congressional definitions are not the same as the everyday expressions used by Americans. The U.S. Congress having no power, authority, or dominion over such American Nationals has chosen not to use the obvious but to circumvent the intent of the Constitution by the creation of the statutory term “Nonresident Alien Individual” and then telling you only what it is not rather than what it means.
You will quickly find at 26 CFR §1.871-1(b)(4) those who are Nonresident Alien Individuals are only those who can make an election and also can lose their U. S. citizenship by expatriation.
There is only one group who are constitutional citizens [American Nationals if you will]. They can only be labeled as U.S. Taxpayers if they have made an ‘election’ to have their income treated like that of a U.S. Resident Alien.
So if the term “Nonresident Alien Individual” can finally be viewed correctly and you can see that the U.S. Congress was in fact referring only to American Nationals as expressed in Group 4. The term “Nonresident Alien Individual” is a euphemism for American Nationals! The U.S. Congress had to conceal this fact because the government was “denied” or “deprived” of any taxing authority on the income of Americans by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1895.
As the Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment, based on the United States Supreme Court decision in 1895, Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, Americans born in the now 50 states of the Union have NEVER been made liable for the Federal Income Tax.
American Nationals are in effect, ‘Nonresident’ to the limited geographical jurisdiction of the National Government and ‘Alien’ to the legislative jurisdiction of the National Government.
However, there is another unique distinction that needs to be presented. There are two distinct subgroups of American Nationals that need to be enlarged so that all confusion is entirely eliminated.
Those American Nationals who make this choice for their career path in government service are leaving the protections afforded by the Constitution and entering the world of the District of Columbia. Working for the National Government is a privilege and again, privileges are taxable. This is their free-will choice.
They have willfully and knowingly made the voluntary choice or ‘election’ to have their income taxed like that of a U.S. Resident Alien. They now are classified by the National Government as lawful U.S. Taxpayers! They become the Property of the National Government for as long as they are so employed and will remain so until they make the choice to terminate the election they made when they became a federal worker, federal employee, or elected official of the National Government.
This regulation supports the declaration by former POTUS Taft in the Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment which ONLY LEVIED the Federal Income Tax upon the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
By choosing to work for the National Government, those Nonresident Alien Individuals [American Nationals] in effect made an ‘election’ via 26 USC §6013(g) or (h) to have their income taxed. This was their voluntary choice.
This subgroup of American Nationals are those who choose to work in the private sector. They never leave the protections of the Constitution. They are free to work and earn their living without any Federal Income Tax liability. That is unless they make an ‘election’ under 26 USC §6013(g) to be taxed as U.S. residents for purposes of determining their income tax liability under Chapters 1, 5, and 24 of the IRC.
We know that today, most American Nationals in this subgroup are filing and paying the Federal Income Tax. They started this via a sub silentio ‘election’ and may have been goaded by peer pressure, social convention, or the propaganda created by the IRS. Based on the Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company, the National Government was prohibited from imposing such a tax upon this subgroup of American Nationals living and working in the private sector.
So the National Government found a way to get Americans to ‘volunteer to be taxed’. In order not to violate the U.S. Constitution and the 13th Amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, the National Government ‘gave their own permission via “However, nonresident alien individuals may elect…” to draw Americans into paying this tax. To avoid any question of government-induced financial slavery or involuntary financial servitude, the National Government also provided American Nationals with a statute to terminate the ‘election’.
Think about this frightening question, “If most American Nationals have made the ‘election’ to have their income taxed liked that of a U.S. Resident Alien and no longer enjoy the protections of the U.S. Constitution, then who is left in the 50 states of the Union for the U.S. Constitution to protect?” The answer is: Hardly anyone is left.
Now do you see why former POTUS G.W. Bush stated that the U.S. Constitution is nothing but a “G.D. piece of paper!” In the District of Columbia, the U.S. Constitution has no lawful effect as it only applies to those in the now 50 states of the Union.
Sadly, he may indeed be and probably was, correct! For if all Americans are now Property of the National Government [subject to and under the dominion and control of the National Government, the U.S. Constitution is nothing more than a mere piece of artwork. If this be true, then the U.S. Constitution is little more than a historical footnote with no significance other than for propaganda use by the National Government to keep the American People from revolting.
All this has come about by the sub-silentio permission of the National Government granting American Nationals the option to subordinate their constitutional protections, sovereignty, and freedom from federal income taxation without ever violating the 13th Amendment which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in the now 50 states of the Union. What that Amendment did not outlaw was “voluntary indentured servitude” and which in and of itself is a aberration of slavery in a financial perspective via the Federal Income Tax.
Fortunately, there is hope for all Americans. They can terminate the ‘election’ and all the damage it does to Americans annually by the same statute that was used to entrap them: 26 USC §6013(g)(4)(A) Termination of Election.
Nonresident Alien Individual — Who they really are!
This strange-sounding term only addresses American Nationals born in one of the 50 states of the Union, or to parents of which at least one was born in one of the 50 states of the Union, or those Naturalized. Only such American Nationals have the Constitutional Citizenship of the United States [the Constitutional Republic].
The United States Treasury has formally acknowledged the validity of a Nonresident Alien Individual as one who was born in one of the 50 states of the Union. This term was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Brushaber, v. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
Furthermore, only American Nationals [those referred to by the U.S. Congress as nonresident alien individuals] have the choice to make an ‘election’ or not to make an ‘election’ under 26 USC §6013(g)(1).
Now when you read the statutory definition created by the U.S. Congress at 26 USC §7701(b)(1)(B) you can easily see that the National Government did not want to bring this out in the open for all to clearly see: In this definition you will not find any comment about Nonresident Alien Individuals having a Constitutional U.S. citizenship and never being imposed with a liability by law for paying or filing a federal income tax. That is why you have to continually search the statutes and regulations as I did to locate 26 CFR §1.871-1(b)(4) which shows that ‘Nonresident Alien Individuals’ [American Nationals] have a Constitutional U.S. Citizenship.
Reflect back on the ‘definition’ created by the Harvard- and Yale-educated legal minds to confuse Americans for as long as they have.
We have already covered the statutory definitions of ‘person’, ‘U.S. person’, and ‘United States’. Keep in mind that the reference to “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”' means ‘one who is under the dominion and control of the national government’ via that person being domiciled either geographically or legislatively within the District of Columbia. This does not describe American Nationals who reside in one of the 50 states of the Union and do not derive any income from a statutory trade or business … and have not made an ‘election’ to be treated like a U.S. Resident Alien. If you have done that, you can now take the option to Terminate that election!
In summary, Nonresident Alien Individuals [American Nationals] are the only ones who can make an ‘election’. They are also the only ones who have the right to expatriate. The reason they can expatriate is due to the fact that they first and foremost have a Constitutional U.S. citizenship.
Of the four groups listed above, nonresident alien individuals as they are called by the U.S. Congress can only mean that they are in fact American Nationals [those born in one of the 50 states of the Union or to parents of which at least one of them were born in one of the 50 states of the Union, or by Naturalization].
A government “of the People, by the People, and for the People?” If you believe that dream and want to hold to it, that is your choice. Personally, I know that Arizona does not have any ocean front property!
26 CFR §1.871-1(a) shows that Nonresident Alien Individuals [NRAI] are not imposed with the FIT liability … unless they work for the National Government. Which is to say they “derive their income that is effectively connected with conduct of a statutory trade or business — the performance of the functions of a public office — within or without the District of Columbia [statutorily defined as the United States at 26 USC §7408(d)]”.
Something new is introduced regarding the NRAI and that is the invitation or permission granted by the National Government to make an election to have the income of a NRAI treated [taxed] like that of a U.S. Resident Alien.
“How does an NRAI, or better stated an American National, actually become liable for the FIT?” The answer is found in the statute at 26 USC §6013(g).
The Legislative Intent of the 16th Amendment written by former POTUS Taft on June 16, 1909 and published in the Congressional Records of the U.S. Senate on pages 3344-3345 shows clearly that the Federal Income Tax was only levied upon the National Government itself meaning those who chose to work for it.
The USSC case of Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company slammed the door, if you will, in the face of the National Government informing it that their plan to tax the American People was denied and deprived of any power or authority to tax us due to the lack of Apportionment based on the Census.
Stop right now! Read that statement two more times, please. “Are the lights coming on brighter?” Thus, we need to determine exactly what the National Government ‘carefully planned’ as a strategy to draw trusting American Nationals into the narrow scope of the Federal Income Tax in order to make them liable for this tax that the USSC had previously denied the National Government the power to do so.
The National Government developed a plan of granting ‘permission’ for American Nationals to ‘make an election’ or to ‘voluntarily choose’ to become a U.S. taxpayer. By making this ‘election’, American Nationals ‘volunteered’ to have their earnings taxed like that of a U.S. Resident Alien [a foreigner from another country who now lives and works in the 50 states or the District of Columbia].
But I have to ask each of you who read this narrative: “Did you see the ‘warning label’ in a federal document telling you what was about to happen when you elected to file your first Federal Income Tax return?” If you did get a copy of it, please forward it to me. I never got one!
The use of propaganda [originally developed by the National Government’s Creel Commission prior to WWI by Edward Bernays and Walter Lippman under the Woodrow Wilson Administration] about the Federal Income Tax during and after WWII firmly established the myth that all American Nationals had to file and pay the federal income tax.
Funny thing about the word ‘propaganda’. For years I believed that this word was a Russian word!
For most of my adult life, I was destroyed for a lack of knowledge in so many areas. I have cried out loud many times, “My God, where were all the educators, teachers, mentors, who were looked up to with great expectations for providing us the much-needed guidance in our formative years so that we would not repeat the mistakes of our parents and grandparents when we reached adulthood?” But I digress, so back to the subject.
The other part of the ‘voluntary election’ in which American Nationals were never told openly [like the health hazard warnings you see on packs of cigarettes] about the danger to their financial well-being and the stress from the IRS that would follow if they later failed to continue to pay this tax. This was well hidden from the simplistic term ‘voluntary election’ and never openly stated by the National Government to let Americans know that they indeed had the choice all along to NOT participate in the Federal Income Tax system by NOT making an ‘election’.
Additionally, there was the ingenuous act on the part of the Harvard- and Yale-educated lawyers working for the National Government that they carefully bypassed the potential concerns in the 13th Amendment. Slavery and Involuntary Servitude has been outlawed in the Constitutional Republic. What was never outlawed was methods of government to get Americans to ‘volunteer’ into financial indentured servitude.
However, to protect the National Government from ever being decried as a thief or worse, those Harvard- and Yale-educated lawyers devised ‘dual doors’ in 26 USC §6013(g) — one for entering the U.S. Federal Income Tax system and one for exiting it.
You have previously seen at 26 CFR 1.871-1(a) that the National Government gave American Nationals [again only referred to as Nonresident Alien individuals] their ‘permission’ to make an ‘election’ and thus enter the first ‘door’ of the U.S. income tax system so that the National Government can tax you heavily. They referenced the statute in 26 USC §6013(g)(1) and this is supported by 26 CFR §1.6013-6(a) regarding the ‘election’.
To avoid adverse claims in the future of slavery, or compelled association with the National Government, the same educated lawyers devised in 26 USC §6013(g)(4)(A) the offer to Terminate the Election at any time on the part of the American National [again only referred to as Nonresident Alien individuals]. This is also supported by 26 CFR §1.6013-6(b)(1) Revocation of Election.
Let’s take a closer look at each of these doors so that your questions will be addressed now.
The permission to become one who accepts the national government’s offer to be treated, a rather polite word which means that the National Government will now tax your income like that of a U.S. Resident Alien for purposes of the Federal Income Tax. This financial and stress-filled insult will continue your entire life until you take the time to find the exit door.
I have selected only the needed statutory and regulatory sub-sections that are pertinent to address the doors. Thus, all other subsections are there if you want to read them but they do not pertain to your using the door to enter and exit.
(a) Election for special treatment—(1) In general.
So there you have the essence of the National Government’s permissive expression of “may elect” so that the government can tax you without mercy for an obligation you never had imposed on you from any point in your life when you worked in the private sector!
From the above, you can readily see that you, an American National, can escape the financial indentured servitude, that has eaten away your hard-earned money. You have been duped by the very government that was designed to protect and defend you.
Only one election means that once you terminate the election you can never again re-enter the U.S. tax system. Once out, you are out for the rest of your life and you can never get trapped again.
Here again you see that only one election means that once you terminate the election you can never again re-enter the U.S. tax system. Once out, you are out for the rest of your life and you can never get trapped again.
“An election under this section shall terminate if either spouse revokes the election. An election that is revoked terminates as of the first taxable year for which the last day prescribed by section 6072(a) and 6081(a) for filing the return of tax has not yet occurred.
You might find it interesting to read the United States Department of the Treasury statutes at 31 USC §321(d)(1) and (d)(2) that admits the Federal Income Tax is a mere ‘gift or bequest’ you made to and for the use of the National Government.
The income tax election scheme was well planned and played like a well-tuned Stradivarius violin by those Harvard- and Yale-educated government lawyers.
You need to think over the Revocation of Election that we have for your use. You will never get back the money you paid in to this deceptive scheme, but you can now stop the loss of your money for the rest of your life. Go to our section on Revoke Election and take the next step.


Corrie Lawrence Teague, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court's summary dismissal of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.(1) He also renews his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Teague is serving a twenty year sentence for drug related convictions pursuant to a guilty plea entered on June 14, 1996. Teague does not appeal these convictions or their validity. Instead, Teague asserts he is entitled to a reduction of his sentence under Oklahoma House Bill 1213 which was recently repealed by House Bill 1009X. Specifically, he asserts that "House Bill 1009X deprive[s] me from receiving the retroactive beneficiary Felony Sentencing Policies implemented in House Bill 1213 . . ." (Appellant's Br. at 16(13).) Petitioner asserts violations of his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution.
The Bills to which petitioner refers are part of a prolonged legislative battle over Oklahoma's "Truth in Sentencing Act," 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 133, House Bill 1213 ("the Act"). The Act was adopted in Oklahoma on July 1, 1997, and was originally intended as a get-tough-on-crime measure. It included provisions requiring serious offenders to serve seventy-five to eighty-five percent of their sentences without the availability of parole. It also established a sentencing matrix and abolished jury sentencing in an attempt to standardize sentencing among districts. The sentencing matrix apparently would have reduced the amount of time certain offenders would be required to serve. These provisions spawned a multitude of appeals by prisoners challenging their sentences on the grounds that the Act should be applied to them retroactively. Notably, this Court has held repeatedly that the Act did not create any federal constitutional claims for those seeking habeas relief. See Turner v. Champion, No. 98-6480, 1999 WL 1032972, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (collecting cases).
Teague's petition seems to raise issues of first impression in this Court. On closer review, however, it is obvious that Teague merely repackages the arguments made in previous petitions to this court cited in Turner. Instead of directly asserting that he is entitled to retroactive application of the Truth in Sentencing Act, Teague claims his constitutional rights have been violated by the postponement and subsequent repeal of the Act.(2) In other words, had the Act not been repealed, Teague argues he would have been entitled to retroactive application of its provisions. Teague also asserts that the repeal of the Act violated various provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution.
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 9, "bars application of a law 'that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed . . . .'" Johnson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 1800 (2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (emphasis deleted)). Generally, to be cognizable a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause requires proof that the law challenged operates retroactively and that it raises the penalty from that which would have been imposed when the criminal activity occurred. Id.
Because petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, his request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED. This appeal is DISMISSED. Teague's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
1. Both the magistrate and district judges referred to Teague's petition as brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254. However, because Teague challenges the execution of his sentence rather than the validity of his conviction or sentence, we analyze his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Davis v. Kaiser, No. 00-6080, 2000 WL 895603, at *1 (10th Cir. July 6, 2000). Regardless of whether his petition is considered under § 2241 or § 2254, Teague must be granted a certificate of appealability before we may consider his appeal on the merits. See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867-69 (10th Cir. 2000).
2. House Bill 1002, 1998 Okla. Sess. laws, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 2, postponed the effective date of the Act by one year. House Bill 1009X, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 5, effectively repealed the Act.
3. To the extent that Teague bases his petition on Oklahoma state law, such claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Montez, 208 F.3d at 865.