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You have requested my opinion on the constitutionality of three courses that are listed in the State Board of Education’s proposed curriculum that would authorize state funding to local school systems in Georgia if they offer those courses. The courses are: (1) a Virtual High School course to be taught through the Internet entitled "Scientific and Religious Perspectives on Life and Intelligence;" (2) "History of the Old Testament;" and (3) "History of the New Testament." You ask whether it is a violation of the state or federal constitution to offer those courses as electives in public high school. Unfortunately, the issues raised by your request are not susceptible to definitive responses since the method and context in which a course is taught will greatly influence the analysis of its constitutionality. I will, however, endeavor to give you my analysis of the issues so that the Board will be aware of the issues likely to be raised should it decide to approve these courses.
In the materials provided to me, the courses in Bible history are described as designed to equip the student with a fundamental understanding of the important literary forms contained in the Bible, as well as the people and symbols often referred to in literature, art and music. They also emphasize the historic aspects of the Bible. The course outline does not show a chapter on the resurrection but there is a section dealing with the parables of Jesus. There also is a section in the outline that deals with Genesis that could lend itself to a teaching of the Christian beliefs regarding creation. The outline is attached as an exhibit to this opinion.
The Virtual High School Course is described as designed to "help students improve their critical reasoning skills through readings and discussion of the scientific and religious perspectives on life and intelligence." The course proposes to address such questions as whether it is ethical to clone human beings or modify our own genetic makeup and whether a computer will ever really think or have emotions. It is described as requiring critical reasoning and writing. The information provided my Office about this course was very sketchy and an inquiry to the "Virtual High School" which developed the course yielded no additional information. It appears that the course will be directed in large part at the discretion of the teachers, one of whom is suggested to be trained in theology. All three courses will be offered as electives.
The federal and state constitutions differ in their treatment of the principles at issue here. I will discuss the courses in light of these varying principles.
The "establishment clause" of the First Amendment prohibits a state or the federal government from making a law "respecting an establishment of religion." See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States set out a three-part test by which courts may analyze governmental conduct under the Establishment Clause. In order to be declared constitutional, the activity: 1) must have a secular purpose; 2) must not have as its principal or primary effect advancement or inhibition of religion; and 3) must not foster "an excessive governmental entanglement with religion."
relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as a part of a secular program of education may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.
In spite of the above statement, the Schempp Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of the Bible in public schools. Two Supreme Court cases dealing with the teaching of the Biblical theory of creation in the public schools have reached similar results. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Public schools could . . . offer secular courses in comparative religion or religious history without being in violation of the United States Constitution. Nor would it be improper, where such a course is one which is secular in nature and objectively presented (i.e., not limited to a study of Christianity nor presented in a manner favoring Christianity over non-Christian religions), to read, study and discuss the Bible in connection with the course of study.
1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 573, 574.
I would think that any course limited to "Bible Study" or "Bible History" would most likely be declared by a reviewing court to have the furtherance of Christianity as its primary objective and hence be violative of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 576. Although issued thirty-five years ago, I am aware of no case law that would suggest that this opinion does not remain an accurate and reasonable interpretation of the law in this area.
A few federal district courts have considered the constitutionality of offering courses dealing with the Bible as history or literature. In Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431 (W.D. Va. 1970), the court found that a religious education program could be offered in elementary school if the purpose was not religious indoctrination but was only objective instruction about religion. Compare Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Va. 1983) (enjoining the teaching of a Bible teaching program because the program was instituted as a religious exercise and because evidence indicated it was not being taught in an objective manner). In Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), the district court found that a Bible history course could be taught under a strict series of guidelines requiring close supervision by the local school board to ensure objectivity. In Gibson v. Lee County School Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426 (M.D. Fla. 1998), the court found with regard to the Old Testament portion of a Bible history course that the school system had satisfied the "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon test because the curriculum had been modified at the suggestion of counsel to delete sections and lessons that might offend the Constitution. However, the court found it could not make a ruling on the other two prongs of the Lemon test - excessive entanglement with religion and objective effect - without evaluating classroom performance. The court also found that the New Testament portion of the course was constitutionally infirm because it contained the Christian story of the resurrection and "the only reasonable interpretation of the resurrection is a religious interpretation," incapable of being taught as secular history. Id. at 1434. Finally, in Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996), the district court noted that while the study of the Bible in public schools is not per se unconstitutional, a course entitled simply "The Bible" and later renamed "A Biblical History of the Middle East" could not survive constitutional scrutiny because it was not taught in an objective and neutral manner.
Three years ago this Office issued an opinion on the question of whether "creationism" could be included in the science curriculum in Georgia’s public schools consistent with the First Amendment. The conclusion was that "various theories regarding the origin of humankind may be validly taught in the public schools only if there is a ‘clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction.’" The opinion went on to state that creation science "as a theory of the origin of matter, life, and the world may be referenced so long as it is with a secular intent to enhance the effectiveness of science instruction, but such theory may not be otherwise promoted or advanced given its inherently religious nature." 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 96-6, p. 12.
[t]he ultimate test of the constitutionality of any course of instruction founded upon the Bible must depend upon classroom performance. It is that which is taught in the classroom that renders a course so founded constitutionally permissible or impermissible. If that which is taught seeks either to disparage or to encourage a commitment to a set of religious beliefs, it is constitutionally impermissible in a public school setting.
Gibson v. Lee County, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1433 (quoting Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)).
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment clause in elementary and secondary schools.
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
The State Superintendent of Schools has stated that education specialists within the Department of Education have examined the curriculum of the Bible history courses and determined that they have a secular purpose. That statement may be given judicial deference as it was in the Gibson case. However, should the courses be adopted and a suit filed challenging their constitutionality, other education experts may present evidence that the curriculum does not have a secular purpose. Thus, the Bible history courses at issue here may fail even the first prong of the Lemon test in that a court may find that they have a sectarian, not a secular, purpose. See Hall v. Board of Sch. Commissioners of Conecuh County, 656 F.2d. 999 (5th Cir. 1981). Regardless of how that question is determined, however, if the courses are actually taught in a manner that advocates or endorses Christianity, they will be declared unconstitutional. Therefore, I am unable to assure you that if a suit is filed the courses will survive First Amendment scrutiny. Further, as this Office has opined in the past, a course limited only to the history of the Bible is particularly susceptible to being found unconstitutional under federal constitutional precedent because it does not compare the beliefs of other religions with those of Christianity.
The Georgia Constitution prohibits money from being "taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution." Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII. This prohibition is similar to the federal establishment clause in that the problem it seeks to prevent is state discrimination against some religions by providing aid to others. Because the Georgia Constitution explicitly prohibits any "aid" to religion, a prohibition that is only implicit in the First Amendment, it has been interpreted to be more restrictive. See 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 349.
In the context of religious displays on the grounds of the Capitol, this office has ruled that a Christian nativity scene on the Capitol grounds violated the state and federal constitutions because a viewer "could reasonably perceive that one particular religion has the support and approval of the state," and because state money was used to maintain the Capitol grounds. See 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 90-38, p. 76. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (placement of creche in county courthouse was a forbidden endorsement of Christianity). The same observation could be made about the Bible history courses at issue here. In spite of the theoretical objectivity of the course outlines, no other religion’s holy book is the subject of an approved course. Thus, because of the exclusivity of the courses, they could be viewed as endorsing Christianity, sending "a message to nonadherents of Christianity that they are outsiders in the political community." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (O’Connor, concurring).
Even if the courses are electives, public money, both state and local, will be spent to provide them. See O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-140, -160. Although there has been little judicial interpretation of the "aid to religion" provision in the Georgia Constitution, it is susceptible to an interpretation that the use of public funds to present instruction on the Bible, particularly on the New Testament, without parallel instruction on the history and theory of other religions constitutes "aid" to Christianity as a preferred belief and thus violates the Georgia Constitution. Again, I am unable to assure you that the Bible courses will survive judicial scrutiny relating to the Georgia Constitution.
Based on the foregoing, it is my official opinion that courses that include reference to the Bible may survive First Amendment scrutiny only if their content is determined to be secular and they are taught in a secular, objective manner. In addition, I must caution that because the actual teaching of Bible courses will be supervised by local school systems, and not by the State Board of Education, the Board is not in a position to ensure that the courses will actually be conducted in accordance with constitutional standards. This issue should also be considered by the Board.
With respect to the State constitution, the use of public funds to teach the Bible courses in question may be held to constitute "aid" to a particular religion, i.e., Christianity, if appropriate instruction regarding other religions is not included or if the instruction is not offered in a neutral and objective manner.
"This curriculum has been prepared using the King James Bible, but school districts are free to use whichever translation they choose, or they may allow each student to use the translation of his or her choice. Sometimes the students can benefit from comparing translations in and out of class."
Ark for all the animals?
How much manna did the Israelites eat?
V. To inform the students of the importance of religion in world and national history, without imposing the doctrine of any particular religious sect.
For the students to gain an understanding of the history within the Bible and the impact of that history upon our country and the world in the areas of religion, art, literature, and music, the teacher should be flexible, creative, and resourceful. In the following pages under the heading "Activities," many different possibilities have been described for conducting exercises and student learning through involvement. Involvement and variation are necessary to maintain motivation.
The use of lectures, slide projectors and the creation of slide shows, viewing filmstrips and films, creation of VCR films, dramatization by students, use of small group centered activities, incorporation of music, maps, food, dress, and charts all tend to maintain student interest and consequently increase learning.

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016-8-066 – Dominion Pathology Labs v. Anthem Health Plans of Va.
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016-8-052 – Myers v. Riverside Hospital Inc.
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016-8-050 – Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville Inc.
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016-8-034 – Manu v. GEICO Casualty Co.
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CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
Mr. Arnold Raum, with whom Solicitor General Jackson, Assistant Attorney General Clark, and Messrs. Sewall Key and Lee A. Jackson were on the brief, for petitioners in Nos. 110-112, 183, and respondent in No. 399.
Messrs. Walker H. Nye and Ashley M. Van Duzer, with whom Mr. W.B. Stewart was on the brief, for respondents in Nos. 110 and 111. Mr. W.H. Annat submitted for respondent in No. 112. Mr. William R. Spofford, with whom Mr. George V. Strong was on the brief (Mr. Harold D. Saylor entered an appearance), for respondent in No. 183.
Messrs. J. Gilmer Korner, Jr. and David S. Day for petitioners in No. 399.
By leave of Court, Mr. Blatchford Downing, as amicus curiae, filed a brief in Nos. 111 and 183, urging affirmance.
These cases raise the same question, namely, whether transfers of property inter vivos made in trust, the particulars of which will later appear, are within the provisions of § 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. They were heard in succession and may be decided together. In each case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trust property in the decedent’s gross estate. In Nos. 110, 111 and 112 his determination was reversed by the Board of Tax Appeals, 34 B.T.A. 575, and the Board was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 102 F.2d 1. In No. 183, the taxpayer paid under protest, successfully sued for recovery in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and his judgment was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 103 F.2d 834. In No. 399, the Commissioner was in part successful before the Board of Tax Appeals, 36 B.T.A. 669, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Board, 104 F.2d 1011.
Neither here nor below does the issue turn on the unglossed text of § 302 (c). In its enforcement, Treasury and courts alike encounter three recent decisions of this Court, Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., Ibid. 48. Because of the difficulties which lower courts have found in applying the distinctions made by these cases and the seeming disharmony of their results, when judged by the controlling purposes of the estate tax law, we brought the cases here. All involve dispositions of property by way of trust in which the settlement provides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death. Whether the transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime is “intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death” by reason of that which he retained, is the crux of the problem. We must put to one side questions that arise under sections of the estate tax law other than § 302 (c) — sections, that is, relating to transfers taking place at death. Section 302 (c) deals with property not technically passing at death but with interests theretofore created. The taxable event is a transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of the transferred property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment.
We turn to the cases which beget the difficulties. In Klein v. United States, supra, decided in 1931, the decedent during his lifetime had conveyed land to his wife for her lifetime, “and if she shall die prior to the decease of said grantor then and in that event she shall by virtue hereof take no greater or other estate in said lands and the reversion in fee in and to the same shall in that event remain vested in said grantor, . . .” The instrument further provided, “Upon condition and in the event that said grantee shall survive the said grantor, then and in that case only the said grantee shall by virtue of this conveyance take, have, and hold the said lands in fee simple, . ..” The taxpayer contended that the decedent had reserved a mere “possibility of reverter” and that such a “remote interest,” extinguishable upon the grantor’s death, was not sufficient to bring the conveyance within the reckoning of the taxable estate. This Court held otherwise. It rejected formal distinctions pertaining to the law of real property as irrelevant criteria in this field of taxation. “Nothing is to be gained,” it was said, “by multiplying words in respect of the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders. It is perfectly plain that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax imposed.” Klein v. United States, supra, at 234.
The inescapable rationale of this decision, rendered by a unanimous Court, was that the statute taxes not merely those interests which are deemed to pass at death according to refined technicalities of the law of property. It also taxes inter vivos transfers that are too much akin to testamentary dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise. By bringing into the gross estate at his death that which the settlor gave contingently upon it, this Court fastened on the vital factor. It refused to subordinate the plain purposes of a modern fiscal measure to the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law. Surely the Klein decision was not intended to encourage the belief that a change merely in the phrasing of a grant would serve to create a judicially cognizable difference in the scope of § 302 (c), although the grantor retained in himself the possibility of regaining the transferred property upon precisely the same contingency. The teaching of the Klein case is exactly the opposite.
In 1935 the St. Louis Trust cases came here. A rational application of the principles of the Klein case to the situations now before us calls for scrutiny of the particulars in the St. Louis cases in order to extract their relation to the doctrine of the earlier decision.
In Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, the decedent had conveyed property in trust, the income of which was to be paid to his daughter during her life, but at her death “If the grantor still be living, the Trustee shall forthwith . . . transfer, pay, and deliver the entire estate to the grantor, to be his absolutely.” But “If the grantor be then not living” then the income was to be devoted to the settlor’s wife if she were living, and upon the death of both daughter and wife, if he were not living, the trust property was to go to the daughter’s children, or if she left none, to the grantor’s next of kin.
On the authority of the Klein case the Commissioner had included in the taxable estates the gifts to which, in the St. Louis Trust cases, the grantor’s death had given definitive measure. If the wife had predeceased the settlor in the Klein case, he would have been repossessed of his property. His wife’s interests were freed from this contingency by the husband’s prior death, and because of the effect of his death this Court swept the gift into the gross estate. So in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., the grantor would have become repossessed of the granted corpus had his daughter predeceased him. But he predeceased her and by that event her interest ripened to full dominion. The same analysis applies to the Becker case. In all three situations the result and effect were the same. The event which gave to the beneficiaries a dominion over property which they did not have prior to the donor’s death was an act of nature outside the grantor’s “control, design or volition.” 296 U.S. 39, 43. But it was no more and no less “fortuitous,” so far as the grantor’s “control, design or volition” was concerned, in the St. Louis Trust cases than it was in the Klein case. In none of the three cases did the dominion over property which finally came to the beneficiary fall by virtue of the grantor’s will, except by his provision that his own death should establish such final and complete dominion. And yet a mere difference in phrasing the circumstance by which identic interests in property were brought into being — varying forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests — was found sufficient to exclude the St. Louis Trust settlements from the application of the Klein doctrine.
Four members of the Court saw no difference. They relied on the governing principle of § 302 (c) that Congress meant to include in the gross estate inter vivos gifts “which may be resorted to, as a substitute for a will, in making dispositions of property operative at death.” 296 U.S. at 46. To effectuate this purpose practical considerations applicable to taxation and not the “niceties of the art of conveyancing” were their touchstone. “Having in mind,” said the dissenters, “the purpose of the statute and the breadth of its language it would seem to be of no consequence what particular conveyancers’ device — what particular string — the decedent selected to hold in suspense the ultimate disposition of his property until the moment of his death. In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at death we look to substance, not to form . . . However we label the device it is but a means by which the gift is rendered incomplete until the donor’s death.” 296 U.S. at 47. For the majority in the St. Louis Trust Company cases, these practicalities had less significance than the formal categories of property law. The grantor’s death, the majority said, in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., “simply put an end to what, at best, was a mere possibility of a reverter by extinguishing it — that is to say, by converting what was merely possible into an utter impossibility.” 296 U.S. 39, 43. This was precisely the mode of argument which had been rejected in Klein v. United States, supra.
We are now asked to accept all three decisions as constituting a coherent body of law, and to apply their distinctions to the trusts before us.
When the settlor died in 1932, his divorced wife, the life beneficiary, survived him. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had conveyed the “whole interest” of the decedent, subject only to a “condition subsequent,” which left him nothing “except a mere possibility of reverter.” Commissioner v. Hallock, 102 F.2d 1, 3-4.
“In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime of said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income thereof unto the said George F. Uber in fee, free and clear of any trust.
Mrs. Uber outlived her husband, who died in 1934. The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co. controlling against the inclusion of the trust corpus in the gross estate.
There was a further provision giving to the decedent and his wife jointly during their lives, and to either of them after the death of the other, power to modify, alter or revoke the instrument. The wife survived the husband, who died in 1930. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedent’s gross estate only the value of a “vested reversionary interest” which the Board held the grantor had reserved to himself. On appeal by the tax-payer, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this determination.
The terms of these grants differ in detail from one another, as all three differ from the formulas of conveyance used in the Klein and St. Louis Trust cases. It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the technical forms in which interests contingent upon death are cast should control our decision. If so, it becomes necessary to determine whether the differing terms of conveyance now in issue approximate more closely those used in the Klein case and are therefore governed by it, or have a greater verbal resemblance to those that saved the tax in the St. Louis Trust cases. Such an essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass existing intricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it could hardly strengthen the rational foundations of law. The law of contingent and vested remainders is full of casuistries. There are great diversities among the several states as to the conveyancing significance of like grants; sometimes in the same state there are conflicting lines of decision, one series ignoring the other. Attempts by the Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Courts of Appeal to administer § 302 (c) by reference to these distinctions abundantly illustrate the inevitable confusion. One of the cases at bar, No. 399, reveals vividly the snares which inevitably await an attempt to base estate tax law on the “niceties of the art of conveyancing.” In connection with the ascertainment of its own death duties, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut defined the nature of the interest which the decedent in that case retained after his inter vivos transfer. Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233; 171 A. 664. And yet the nature of that interest under Connecticut law and the scope of the Connecticut court’s adjudication of that interest were made the subject of lively controversy before us. The importation of these distinctions and controversies from the law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes. These unwitty diversities of the law of property derive from medieval concepts as to the necessity of a continuous seisin. Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when land dominated social relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible wealth.
Our real problem, therefore, is to determine whether we are to adhere to a harmonizing principle in the construction of § 302 (c), or whether we are to multiply gossamer distinctions between the present cases and the three earlier ones. Freed from the distinctions introduced by the St. Louis Trust cases, the Klein case furnishes such a harmonizing principle. Does, then, the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to accept the distinctions made in the St. Louis Trust cases as starting points for still finer distinctions spun out of the tenuosities of surviving feudal law? We think not. We think the Klein case rejected the presupposition of such distinctions for the fiscal judgments which § 302 (c) demands.
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
Nor have we in the St. Louis Trust cases rules of decision around which, by the accretion of time and the response of affairs, substantial interests have established themselves. No such conjunction of circumstances requires perpetuation of what we must regard as the deviations of the St. Louis Trust decisions from the Klein doctrine. We have not before us interests created or maintained in reliance on those cases. We do not mean to imply that the inevitably empiric process of construing tax legislation should give rise to an estoppel against the responsible exercise of the judicial process. But it is a fact that in all the cases before us the settlements were made and the settlors died before the St. Louis Trust decisions.
Nor does want of specific Congressional repudiations of the St. Louis Trust cases serve as an implied instruction by Congress to us not to reconsider, in the light of new experience, whether those decisions, in conjunction with the Klein case, make for dissonance of doctrine. It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities. Congress may not have had its attention directed to an undesirable decision; and there is no indication that as to the St. Louis Trust cases it had, even by any bill that found its way into a committee pigeon-hole. Congress may not have had its attention so directed for any number of reasons that may have moved the Treasury to stay its hand. But certainly such inaction by the Treasury can hardly operate as a controlling administrative practice, through acquiescence, tantamount to an estoppel barring reexamination by this Court of distinctions which it had drawn. Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.
This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction. Whatever else may be said about want of Congressional action to modify by legislation the result in the St. Louis Trust cases, it will hardly be urged that the reason was Congressional approval of those distinctions between the St. Louis Trust and the Klein cases to which four members of this Court could not give assent. By imputing to Congress a hypothetical recognition of coherence between the Klein and the St. Louis Trust cases, we cannot evade our own responsibility for reconsidering in the light of further experience, the validity of distinctions which this Court has itself created. Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. Surely we are not bound by reason or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the purposes of the statute nor with this Court’s own conception of it. We therefore reject as untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases in applying the Klein doctrine — untenable because they drastically eat into the principle which those cases professed to accept and to which we adhere.
The CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the result upon the ground that each of these cases is controlled by our decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231.
There is certainly a distinction in fact between the transaction considered in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, and those under review in Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48. The courts, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the Treasury have found no difficulty in observing the distinction in specific cases. I believe it is one of substance, not merely of terminology, and not dependent on the niceties of conveyancing or recondite doctrines of ancient property law.
But if I am wrong in this, I still think the judgments in Nos. 110-112, and 183 should be affirmed and that in 399 should be reversed. The rule of interpretation adopted in the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases should now be followed for two reasons: First, that rule was indicated by decisions of this court as the one applicable in the circumstances here disclosed, as early as 1927; was progressively developed and applied by the Board of Tax Appeals, the lower federal courts, and this court, up to the decision of McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, in 1931; and has since been followed by those tribunals in not less than fifty cases. It ought not to be set aside after such a history. Secondly. The rule was not contrary to any treasury regulation; was, indeed, in accord with such regulations as there were on the subject; was subsequently embodied in a specific regulation, and, with this background, Congress has three times reenacted the law without amending § 302 (c) in respect of the matter here in issue. The settled doctrine, that reenactment of a statute so construed, without alteration, renders such construction a part of the statute itself, should not be ignored but observed.
The next sentence: “Nor should anything be included on account of a life estate in the decedent,” has been repeated in substance in the corresponding article of all subsequent regulations.
If by the will of his grandmother, A is given a life estate, with remainder to another, his executor is not bound to return anything on account of the life estate because, in respect of it, nothing passes on A’s death. The estate simply ceases. The Treasury has never contended the contrary. If, however, A’s grandmother gave a life estate to B, and the remainder to A, A has something which, at his death, will pass to someone else under his will, or under the intestate laws. The statute plainly taxes the value of the interest thus transferred at A’s death.
If A’s grandmother, by her will, gave interests in succession to specific persons and then provided that if A should outlive all these persons the property should pass to him, A would have a chance to receive and enjoy the property. If he did so receive it, it would pass as part of his estate. If he died before the other beneficiaries named by his grandmother his death would deprive him of that chance. The chance would not pass to anyone else. No tax would be laid on the supposed value of his contingent interest or chance, because the chance cannot, at his death, pass by his will, or the intestate laws, to another. I do not understand the Government has ever denied this.
Subsection (c) of § 302 lays down no different rule respecting similar interests created by irrevocable deed or agreement of the decedent. The subsection directs that there shall be included in the gross estate the value, at the time of the decedent’s death, of any interest in property of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer “intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death” (excluding sales for adequate consideration).
A transfer can only take effect, within the meaning of the statute, by the shifting of possession or enjoyment from the decedent to living persons. The fact that the terms of the gift bring about some other effect at the decedent’s death is immaterial. The fact that something may happen in respect of the beneficial enjoyment of the property conditioned upon the decedent’s death is irrelevant so long as that something is not the shifting of possession or beneficial enjoyment from the decedent. This is made clear by Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347.
2. These governing principles were indicated as early as 1927 and were thereafter developed, in application to specific cases, in a consistent line of authorities.
It will be noted that this is the equivalent of the Treasury’s statement, supra, that such an interest lapses at death.
That decision is indistinguishable in principle from the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases and the instant cases; and what was there said serves to distinguish the Klein case.
McCormick v. Burnet followed May v. Heiner. The court there held that neither a reservation by the grantor of a life estate with remainders over, nor a provision for a reverter in case all the beneficiaries should die in the lifetime of the grantor, made the gifts transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor’s death. In the Circuit Court of Appeals the Commissioner urged that the provision for payment of the trust estate to the settlor in case she survived all the beneficiaries rendered the transfer taxable. That court dealt at length with the point and sustained his view. (43 F.2d 277, 279.) The Commissioner made the same contention in this court, but it was overruled upon the authority of May v. Heiner.
Then came the two St. Louis Union Trust Company cases, decided upon the authority of May v. Heiner and McCormick v. Burnet. Finally, the McCormick case was followed in Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211.
Since the opinion of the court appears to treat the St. Louis cases as the origin of the principle there announced, it is important to emphasize the fact that the rule had been settled by this court as early as 1930; and to note other decisions rendered prior to the St. Louis cases. In seven, intervening between May v. Heiner and the St. Louis cases, the Board of Tax Appeals reached the same conclusion as that announced in the St. Louis cases. The Board’s action was affirmed in four of them. Four other decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals were to the same effect. In practically all, reliance was placed upon Shukert v. Allen, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, May v. Heiner, and McCormick v. Burnet, or some of them. Thus, when the question came before this court again in the St. Louis cases, there was a substantial body of authority following and applying the Heiner and McCormick cases.
Since the St. Louis cases were decided, the principle on which they went has been repeatedly applied by the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts. The Board has followed the cases in no less than seventeen instances.
The record is the same in the courts. The St. Louis cases have been followed in fourteen cases. In some of these the Government has sought review in this court but in none, except those now presented, has it asked the court to overrule those decisions.
If there ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis should govern, this is it. Aside from the obvious hardship involved in treating the taxpayers in the present cases differently from many others whose cases have been decided or closed in accordance with the settled rule, there are the weightier considerations that the judgments now rendered disappoint the just expectations of those who have acted in reliance upon the uniform construction of the statute by this and all other federal tribunals; and that, to upset these precedents now, must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and the public in the stability of the rulings of the courts and make it impossible for inferior tribunals to adjudicate controversies in reliance on the decisions of this court. To nullify more than fifty decisions, five of them by this court, some of which have stood for a decade, in order to change a mere rule of statutory construction, seems to me an altogether unwise and unjustified exertion of power. As I shall point out, there is no necessity for such action because it has been, and still is open to Congress to change the rule by amendment of the statute, if it deems such action necessary in the public interest.
3. Section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926 imposes a tax upon the value of the net estate of a decedent. Section 302 provides the method for determining the value of the gross estate. Subsections (c) (d) (e) (f) and (g) require inclusion in the gross estate of interests which otherwise might be held not to form a part of the decedent’s estate or not to pass from him to others at his death. These subsections sweep such interests into the gross estate in order to forestall tax avoidance. Section 302 (c) was the successor of analogous sections in earlier acts and the predecessor of similar sections in later acts. The subsection has been amended in successive Revenue Acts. As a result of the Treasury’s experience in the enforcement of the law, Congress has from time to time thought it necessary to extend the scope of the subsection in the interest of more efficient administration. Within constitutional limits such extension is a matter of legislative policy for Congress alone.
It is familiar practice for Congress to amend a statute to obviate a construction given it by the courts. The legislative history of § 302 (c) demonstrates that Congress has elected not to make such an amendment to meet the construction placed upon it by this court in the St. Louis cases.
May v. Heiner was decided in 1930. The Treasury was dissatisfied with the decision and in three later cases attacked the ruling, amongst them McCormick v. Burnet. The court announced its judgments in these cases on March 2, 1931, reaffirming May v. Heiner. On the following day Congress adopted a joint resolution amending § 302 (c) to tax a transfer with reservation of a life estate to the grantor, but, in so doing, it omitted to deal with a contingent interest reserved to the grantor or the possibility of reverter remaining in him, involved in both Heiner and McCormick. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 308-9. The omission is significant.
It may be argued that in the haste of preparing and passing the amendment the point was overlooked. But the joint resolution was reenacted by § 803 of the Revenue Act of 1932, without any alteration to cover the point. The Revenue Act of 1934 amended § 302 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1926 but did not change § 302 (c) as it then stood.
The day the St. Louis cases were decided, this court announced its opinion in White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, construing § 302 (d) of the Act of 1926. In order to make the section apply to such a situation as was disclosed in that case the Congress, on June 22, 1936, by the Act of 1936, amended it to preclude the construction the court had given it. Again Congress let § 302 (c) stand as before and as construed in the St. Louis cases. Three revenue acts have since been adopted, in none of which has the wording of § 302 (c) been altered. If there is any life in the doctrine often announced that reenactment of a statute as uniformly construed by the courts is an adoption by Congress of the construction given it, this legislative history ought to be conclusive that the statute, as it now stands, means what this court has said it means.
Little weight can be given to the argument of the Government that the Treasury has not applied to Congress for alteration of the section because of the difficulty of wording a satisfactory amendment. A moment’s reflection will show that it would be easy to phrase such an amendment. Whatever the reason for the failure to amend § 302 (c), whether hesitancy on the part of the Treasury to recommend such action, or the satisfaction of Congress with the construction put upon the section by this court, or mere inadvertence, the fact remains that the section has been reenacted again and again with the courts’ construction plain for all to read.
4. As shown by the matter above quoted from the Treasury Regulations affecting the estate tax, a contingent interest is not to be included in the taxable estate. In the light of this construction, estate tax provisions were reenacted or amended in 1921, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1931, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937.
At the bar, counsel for the Government stated that it had always been the view of the Treasury that the article in question applied only to § 302 (a) and had no application to § 302 (c). But we are not concerned with what the Treasury thought about the matter. The regulations were issued to guide taxpayers in complying with the Act. Section 302 is an entirety. Subsections (a) and (c) were not intended to contradict each other, but the latter was to supplement the former. The gross estate was to be computed according to the section as a whole. It is hard to understand how the taxpayer was expected to discriminate between a contingent interest of a decedent under the will of his grandmother and a similar interest under an absolute deed executed by him inter vivos. If the one did not pass from the decedent at death neither did the other.
“The statutory phrase, `a transfer . . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,’ includes a transfer by the decedent . . . whereby and to the extent that the beneficial title to the property . . . or the legal title thereto . . . remained in the decedent at the time of his death and the passing thereof was subject to the condition precedent of his death. . . .
If theretofore doubt could have been entertained, it then must have vanished. And with this regulation in force, Congress reenacted § 302 (c) as so interpreted.
What, then, is to be said of the principle that reenactment of a statute which the Treasury, by its regulations, has interpreted in a given sense is an embodiment of the interpretation in the law as reenacted? Surely the principle cannot be avoided, as the Government argues, because the Treasury felt bound so to interpret § 302 (c) by reason of this court’s decisions. That fact should make application of the principle the more urgent.
[*] Together with No. 111, Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, v. Hallock, Executrix, and No. 112, Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, v. Squire, Superintendent of Banks of Ohio, also on writs of certiorari, 308 U.S. 532, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, — argued December 13, 1939; No. 183, Rothensies, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. Huston, Administrator, on writ of certiorari, 308 U.S. 538, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, — argued December 13, 14, 1939; and No. 399, Bryant et al., Executors, v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on writ of certiorari, 308 U.S. 543, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, — argued December 14, 1939.
 Petitioner’s Brief, Klein v. United States, pp. 11-13.
 Some indication of the influence of Klein v. United States upon the lower courts may be found in Sargent v. White, 50 F.2d 410 and Union Trust Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 152, cert. denied, 286 U.S. 547. Cf. Commissioner v. Schwarz, 74 F.2d 712.
 See, for example, the attempts by the Board of Tax Appeals to deal with the peculiarities of New York law in the field of vested and contingent remainders. Elizabeth B. Wallace, 27 B.T.A. 902; Louis C. Raegner, Jr., 29 B.T.A. 1243. In both of these cases limitations which would probably have been “contingent” at “common law” were held to be “vested” under the New York statutory rule. Cf. Commissioner v. Schwarz, 74 F.2d 712; Flora M. Bonney, 29 B.T.A. 45.
 Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194. See Paul, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rules of Property in Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (2nd Series), pp. 23-28; Developments in the Law — Taxation, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1238-41; Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 462.
 See, for example, Fearne, Contingent Remainders, (4th Am. Ed.), pp. 3-241; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (2nd Ed.), pp. 99-118; VII Holdsworth, History of English Law, 81 et seq.; 1 Simes, Future Interests, §§ 64-96. The confusion apt to be engendered by judicial forays into this field is well illustrated by the use of the term “possibility of reverter” by the majority in Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. “A possibility of reverter” is traditionally defined as the interest remaining in a grantor who has conveyed a determinable fee. The definition has not been thought to have any relation to the reversionary interest of a grantor who has transferred either a vested or contingent remainder in fee. See Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (2nd Ed.), §§ 13-51.
 We are not unmindful of amendments to the estate tax law to which other decisions of this Court gave rise. Thus by § 805 of the Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, Congress undid the construction which this Court gave the estate tax law in another connection by a decision rendered on the same day as were the St. Louis Trust cases. Cf. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98. This case arose under § 302 (d) and not § 302 (c). But, in any event, the fact of Congressional action in dealing with one problem while silent on the different problems created by the St. Louis Trust cases, does not imply controlling acceptance by Congress of those cases.
By the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, c. 454, 46 Stat. 1516, Congress displaced the construction which this Court put upon § 302 (c) in those cases wherein it was held that the reservation by a decedent of a life estate in property conveyed inter vivos, did not constitute a sufficient postponement of the remainder to bring it into the grantor’s gross estate. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784. The speculative arguments that may be drawn from ad hoc legislation affecting one set of decisions and the want of such legislation to modify another set of decisions dealing with a somewhat different though cognate problem are well illustrated by this remedial amendment. For it may be urged with considerable plausibility that in 1931 Congress had in principle already rejected the general attitude underlying the St. Louis Trust cases, as illustrated by the fact that in those cases the majority, in part at least, relied upon the Congressionally discarded May v. Heiner doctrine.
Whatever may be the scope of the doctrine that re-enactment of a statute impliedly enacts a settled judicial construction placed upon the re-enacted statute, that doctrine has no relevance to the present problem. Since the decisions in the St. Louis Trust cases, Congress has not re-enacted § 302 (c). The amendments that Congress made to other provisions of § 302 in connection with other situations than those now before the Court, were made without re-enacting § 302 (c). Nor has Congress, under any rational canons of legislative significance, by its compilation of internal revenue laws to form the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 1, impliedly enacted into law a particular decision which, in the light of later experience, is seen to create confusion and conflict in the application of a settled principle of internal revenue legislation.
Here, unlike the situation in such cases as National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146-47, and Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299, 302-3, we have no conjunction of long, uniform administrative construction and subsequent re-enactments of an ambiguous statute to give ground for implying legislative adoption of such construction. See Preface, Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. III; compare Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 373, and Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161.
 Since the Treasury has amended its regulations in an effort to conform administrative practice to the compulsions of the St. Louis Trust cases, it cannot be deemed to have bound itself by this change. Art. 17, Reg. 80 (1937 Ed.), p. 42. Cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39.
 London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council,  A.C. 375. But the rule is otherwise in the Privy Council. Read v. Bishop of Lincoln,  A.C. 644, 655. For the role of precedent in English law, see, inter alia, 2 Yorke, Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, pp. 425, 498; Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. Rev. 40; Holdsworth, Case Law, ibid. 180; Lord Wright in Westminster Council v. Southern Ry. Co.,  A.C. 511, 562-63; Allen, Law in the Making, 3rd ed., pp. 224 et seq.
 §§ 300-303, 44 Stat. 69-72.
 Regulations 37, Art. 12 (1917).
 Regulations 37, Art. 12; Regulations 63, Art. 11; Regulations 68, Art. 11; Regulations 80, Art. 11.
 Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545.
 Wheeler v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 695; Duke v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1104; Peabody v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 787; Dunham v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 286; Taylor v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 220; Wallace v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 902; Bonney v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 45.
 Commissioner v. Duke, 62 F.2d 1057 (affirmed by an equally divided court, 290 U.S. 591); Commissioner v. Wallace, 71 F.2d 1002; Commissioner v. Dunham, 73 F.2d 752; Commissioner v. Bonney, 75 F.2d 1008.
 Commissioner v. Austin, 73 F.2d 758; Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 74 F.2d 851; Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 78 F.2d 534; Helvering v. Helmholz, 64 App. D.C. 114; 75 F.2d 245. I have been able to find only one case decided contra: Commissioner v. Schwarz, 74 F.2d 712.
 Taft v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 671; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1225; Kneeland v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 816; Kienbusch v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1248; Schneider v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 183; Van Sicklen v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 306; Patterson v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 407; Rushmore v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 480; Bryant v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 669; Wetherill v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1259; Mitchell v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1; Stone v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 51; The George D. Harter Bank v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 387; White v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 593; Donnelly v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1234; Pyeatt v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 774; Dravo v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 309.
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 417; Myers v. Magruder, 15 F. Supp. 488; Chase National Bank v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 947; Commissioner v. Brooks, 87 F.2d 1000; Bullard v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 144; Welch v. Hassett, 90 F.2d 833; United States v. Nichols, 92 F.2d 704; Mackay v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 558; Commissioner v. Grosse, 100 F.2d 37; Commissioner v. Hallock, 102 F.2d 1; Commissioner v. Kaplan, 102 F.2d 329; Rothensies v. Cassell, 103 F.2d 834; Corning v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 329; Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 642.
 Revenue Act of 1916, § 202 (b), 39 Stat. 756, 777; Revenue Act of 1918, § 402 (c), 40 Stat 1057, 1097; Revenue Act of 1924, § 302 (c), 43 Stat. 253, 304; Revenue Act of 1932, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 169, 279; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 811 (c), 53 Stat., Part 1, 1, 121.
 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85.
 House Report on H.R. 12793.
 Revenue Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 813; Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 447; Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat., Part 1, p. 1.


On November 7, 2017 voters in Texas approved (by approximately 68.60%) Proposition 2, effectively passing Tex. S.J.R. 60 (2017) and amending Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50. Details about some of the changes made by this amendment can be found at: http://blog.docutechcorp.com/time-texas-home-equity-overhaul-texans-set-amend-constitution. These amendments take effect on January 1, 2018.
We are updating our documents and system functions for these amendments and will post updates periodically on this page as they are made. FNMA is currently assessing impact to their documents (see FNMA Ann. SEL-2017-09) and we will update our versions of their documents after FNMA publishes them.
If you have any questions or concerns about these changes, please contact Client Support at 1.800.497.3584.
As a result of these changes, we are updating our duplicates of these forms to match the latest revisions published on FNMA’s website. The text of the updated versions will print when “Closing Date On or After 01/01/2018” (FI 118148) equals “Yes”. We are also monitoring this website for any changes to the Spanish-version of Form 3044.1 and will update this form accordingly.
These changes will take effect on December 29, 2017. If you have any questions or concerns about these changes, please contact Client Support at 1.800.497.3584.
One of the substantial changes to Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50 is that a Texas home equity loan may now be refinanced by a no-cash out refinance loan, without such loan being considered a home equity loan, if certain conditions are met (see Tex. Const. art 16, § 50[f], as amended by Tex. S.R. 60 ; all citations in this update are to Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50, as amended). Such loans are subject to Ibid. § 50(a)(4), rather than Ibid. § 50(a)(6) (see Ibid. § 50[f] & [f-1]). If the conditions are not met, then the no-cash out refinance loan must be structured as a loan subject to Ibid. § 50(a)(6).
“Texas 50(a)(6) loan” refers to a loan subject to § 50(a)(6), whether it be a home equity loan or a no-cash out refinance of a home equity loan which fails to meet the conditions under Ibid. § 50(f)(2).
“Texas 50(a)(4) loan” refers to a no-cash out refinance loan.
“Texas 50(f)(2) loan” refers to a Texas 50(a)(4) loan which refinances a Texas 50(a)(6) loan and is considered a Texas 50(a)(4) loan under § 50(f)(2) and (f-1).
To make necessary changes to our current documents, we have created a new field entitled “No Cash-Out Refinancing a TX Home Equity 50(a)(6) loan” (FI 118143). This field will primarily be used to determine whether a loan in our system is a Texas 50(f)(2) loan.
We will also be creating new field “Closing Date On or After 01/01/2018” (FI 118148), since the amendments to Texas’ Constitution do not take effect until January 1, 2018.
We will be renaming field “Convert Failed 3% Points and Fees Test to ‘Pass’” (FI 81963) to “Convert Failed 2% Points and Fees Test to ‘Pass’”, due to changes in the amount of fees which may be charged (see Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50[a][E], as amended).
We will also be modifying the optional global field prompt for “Is this a Texas Home Equity Section 50(a)(6) loan?” (FI 29932) by adding “Document Package Type = Initial Disclosure” as a condition to current conditions. This is due to changes we are making to document configurations (as set forth below).
TX Notice Concerning Extensions of Credit – Spanish (Cx3640). We will be modifying the current content of this document to match the forms supplied by the Texas Finance Commission on their website (https://www.fc.texas.gov/homeinfo/homeinfo.html), which reflect the constitutionally-prescribed text set forth in Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50(g) (albeit translated into Spanish, as required under ) which must be provided in connection with a Texas 50(a)(6) loan.
In addition, we are merging into this document the new 12-day notice required to be provided under amended Ibid. § 50(f)(2)(D) for Texas 50(f)(2) loans (we will be modifying the print configurations for this document to print for both types of loans, as described later). The language for this notice is also based on the forms provided by the Texas Finance Commission, which matches the constitutionally-prescribed text set forth in Ibid. (albeit translated into Spanish). We note that this notice is not required to be provided in Spanish, but we will be providing it nevertheless, due to client demand.
TX Affidavit of Fair Market Value of Homestead Property (Cx3653). The text of this document does not need to be changed for a Texas 50(a)(6) loan. However, in order for a Texas 50(a)(4) loan to be considered a Texas 50(f)(2) loan, it must be “of a principal amount that when added to the aggregate total of the outstanding principal balances of all other indebtedness secured by valid encumbrances of record against the homestead does not exceed 80 percent of the fair market value of the homestead on the date the refinance of the extension of credit is made” (amended Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50[f][C]).
Removing the text and field in the third numbered bullet point: “at the office of [Field 1992 ‘Title Company Name’]”. The reason for this is that a Texas 50(f)(2) loan is not required to be closed at the office of a title company, unlike a Texas 50(a)(6) loan, which must be closed at the office of the lender, title company, or an attorney (see § 50[a][N]).
Removing Subparagraph (14)(ii), which affirms that the originating lender has obtained title insurance against land being used for agricultural purposes, and renumbering subsequent subparagraphs.
We note that the Texas Department of Insurance has not modified their handbook and Equity Loan Mortgage Endorsement (T-42) to reflect Ibid. § 50(a)(6)(I), which no longer prohibits a Texas 50(a)(6) loan from being secured by property used primarily for agricultural purposes (see http://www.tdi.texas.gov/title/titlem4i.html#p44). However, the affirmations set forth in Paragraph (14) (renumbered to ) are not an exhaustive attestations of the type of title insurance obtained by the originating lender; thus, absence of a reference to this title insurance does not preclude the lender from obtaining (or not obtaining) such insurance.
These changes will only appear when “Closing Date On or After 01/01/2018” equals “Yes”, else the current text will continue to print.
Changing the revision date in the footer to “(1/18)”.
These changes will appear when “Closing Date On or After 01/01/2018” equals “Yes”, else the current text will continue to appear for Texas 50(a)(6) loans.
TX Home Equity Addendum to Closing Instructions From Lender (Cx5011). While no changes were necessary for this document due to the amendments to Texas’ Constitution, a minor grammatical error was identified in Paragraph 5 and will be corrected.
Important Notice: Currently by default, we provide the 12-day notice required for Texas 50(a)(6) loans (Cx3640 and Cx4549) for all types of refinance transactions and HELOCs, to mitigate any adverse effects which may occur if a borrower changes loan types after Initial Disclosures are provided. For example, the notice is provided in Initial Disclosures for a Texas 50(a)(4) loan, in case the borrower decides later in the loan process to change to a Texas 50(a)(6) loan, and thus avoid adding an extra 12-day waiting period required under Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50(g). We also provide it for all refinance transactions since, under current rules, any refinance of a Texas 50(a)(6) loan must be structured as either a Texas 50(a)(6) loan or a reverse mortgage (see current Ibid. § 50[f]) and we would not know if the refinance loan was refinancing a Texas 50(a)(6) loan or not.
Under these changes, Cx3640 and Cx4549 will only be provided for Texas 50(a)(6) and Texas 50(f)(2) loans. If a Texas 50(a)(4) loan is not otherwise indicated in our system to be one of these, these notices will not be provided for them. In such a case, clients will need to provide these notices separately if it is later determined that they are needed (e.g. if the borrower changes a Texas 50[a] loan to a Texas 50[a] loan).
Docutech will not make any modifications to any CUSTOM changes to any of the documents listed in this announcement to ensure compliance with the constitutional amendments. We strongly encourage clients to review with their own licensed, legal counsel, any customizations they have made to these documents (and any custom documents they have for Texas 50[a] loans).
These changes will be in effect on December 5, 2017. If you have any questions or concerns about these changes, please contact Client Support at 1.800.497.3584.
Note: All of the changes are on Stage servers for testing.


text:
Mahatma Gandhi was once asked what he thought about Western civilization. “I think,” he replied, “that it would be a very good idea”.
When the City of Baltimore threatened to sue our client over ownership of the copyrights and trademarks associated with her “Show Your Soft Side” anti-animal abuse advertising campaign, Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed a complaint for declaratory relief. After defeating the City’s motion to dismiss and engaging in discovery, the case settled with our client securing her rights in the copyrights and trademarks associated with the campaign.
In a published decision, New York’s highest appellate court ruled in favor of Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client—Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., reversing the Appellate Division and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. The New York Court of Appeals determined, after holding oral argument on the matter (in Albany!), that non-staff yoga instructors were independent contractors. Consequently Yoga Vida NYC, Inc. was not required to pay unemployment contributions for those individuals. This case had broad impact on the engagement of independent contractors in New York state.
First Action Security Team, Inc. v. Ross Security Systems, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract on behalf of First Action Security Team, Inc. against one of its dealers who was claiming ownership of the DYNAMARK mark and who was using the mark in a manner that exceeded the scope of his license. The matter was resolved favorably following mediation.
Lisa Masson dba Lisa Masson Photography v. Prizer-Painter Stove Works, Inc.
Represented photographer Lisa Masson in a copyright dispute concerning Prizer’s unauthorized use of her commercial photographs. Ms. Masson sued for copyright infringement and sought statutory damages for willful infringement. Ms. Masson prevailed on Prizer’s motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties (due to the photos containing third party trademarks) and the matter resolved favorably soon thereafter.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit and promptly secured an order granting expedited discovery and a TRO barring the defendants from hosting a weekly radio show, using or disclosing any Everest Wealth Management trade secrets, or otherwise violating the terms of a restrictive covenant agreement between the parties. The dispute was resolved soon thereafter.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed a Petition to Caveat a Will in the Orphan’s Court and soon thereafter a complaint in Circuit Court alleging undue influence and related claims. Both matters were favorably resolved following mediation.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas protected its client’s registered trademark, BAYVIEW PHARMACY, by filing a trademark infringement complaint and negotiating a settlement requiring, among other terms, that defendants change the signage on Bayview Square shopping center.
Hands-On Construction, Inc. v. Hands On Painters, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas successfully defended this trademark dispute between two long-standing Baltimore-area businesses. The matter resolved favorably following mediation with Hands On Painters being able to continue to use its mark in connection with its core business—painting and related services—and creating a new mark for its handyman services.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained a TRO and permanent injunction, recovered all company documents, took the deposition of the former employee defendant, and negotiated a complete resolution of this trade secret and breach of contract matter within approximately ten days.
First Mariner Bank v. The Resolution Law Group, P.C. et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit on behalf of First Mariner Bank to stop The Resolution Law Group from distributing false and misleading statements about First Mariner’s business in order to obtain clients. The Court entered permanent injunctions against The Resolution Law Group and its founder prohibiting them from, among other things, directly or indirectly engaging in any commercial advertising or promotion in which the conveyed message is that First Mariner has engaged in any form of illegal, fraudulent, unethical or improper conduct. The Court also awarded First Mariner over $300,000 in attorneys’ fees.
Brian Schneider Photography v. C&G Sports Management, LLC, et al.
When a professional arena football team reproduced and displayed photographs taken by a professional sports photographer without permission from, or payment to, the photographer, Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit for copyright infringement on behalf of the photographer against the team. The Court ordered the team to permanently cease reproducing or displaying the photographs and, because the infringement was willful, awarded the photographer damages pursuant to the Copyright Act in the amount of $450,000.
LM Restaurants, Inc. v. DMC Enterprises, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the defendant in this trademark infringement case involving use of a design mark for a local restaurant.
Wothke v. Stewart, et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the plaintiff in this trademark infringement case involving the break-up of a Celtic band.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action concerning plaintiff’s use of the trademark PARTY PLUS RENTALS in connection with the rental of tents, tables, linens, chairs and other equipment and supplies for parties and events. The matter settled favorably.
Al Farooq Foundation, Inc. v. Gulamnabi Vahora et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented Al Farooq Foundation, Inc. in litigation over ownership of the real property on which Al Farooq’s mosque (Masjid Fatima) is located. Following a three-week bench trial, the court imposed a constructive trust on the property in favor of Al Farooq. This action saved the property from being sold to a local car dealership and enabled hundreds of families to continue to worship at Masjid Fatima.
Teal Bay Alliances, LLC v. Southbound One, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas defended at trial Southbound One against trademark infringement and unfair competition claims brought by Teal Bay arising out of Southbound One’s use of the mark “Shorebilly” for its brewery and restaurant services and related merchandise sales. After a bench trial, Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained a judgment in favor of our client dismissing all of Teal Bay’s claims against it, ordering the cancellation of Teal Bay’s trademark registration for the “Shorebilly” mark and awarding Southbound One costs and legal fees (the first awarded in a trademark case in this District following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness decision). Teal Bay appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the matter settled favorably for Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client thereafter, with Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client retaining the right to use and register the “Shorebilly” mark for its brewery and restaurant services and related merchandise sales.
Potomac Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma Academy Alumni Assoc., Inc.
Following a two day evidentiary hearing, Astrachan Gunst Thomas and Bouland and Brush obtained preliminary injunctive relief for their client – and a 62 page reported opinion.
Wm. F. Duffy, et. al. v. The Large Art Co.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas successfully defended this claim for copyright infringement and right of publicity misappropriation and obtained valuable rights for our client in settlement.
Everest Wealth Management v. John Doe and Doe, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client claimed it was defamed by an anonymous post on a financial website. Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed an action and the Court authorized discovery to enable us to learn the identity of the poster. The matter quickly settled.
Lee Real Estate Advisors, LLC, et. al. v. O’Neill Properties Group, L.P., et. al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit for copyright infringement over use of architectural plans for the Philadelphia Regional Produce Market, representing the plaintiffs, an architectural firm and a developer. The matter was successfully and confidentially resolved without the need for trial following mediation sessions before a federal magistrate judge.
Broader Healthcare Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Intellicost Enterprises, Inc. and Hertzbach & Company, P.A.
Court: United States District Court, E.D.N.Y.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas defended Intellicost and Hertzbach and won dismissal of the plaintiff's $4 million damage claims in New York. After plaintiff refiled in Maryland, Astrachan Gunst Thomas counter-sued, and won a $400,000 award following a bench trial against all counter-defendants.
Everest Wealth Management, Inc. v. Lance Scott et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented Everest Wealth Management, Inc. and obtained a temporary restraining order against former employees for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of restrictive covenants.
Trademark and breach of settlement action brought by Astrachan Gunst Thomas against Goodyear resulting in payment of all legal fees, discontinuance of use of the infringing mark in Maryland and any state in which our client subsequently establishes a retail location.
Jewish Recovery Houses, Inc. v.Brett Goldenberg et al.
Service mark infringement claims brought by Astrachan Gunst Thomas client resulted in favorable settlement and a consent decree.
Copyright infringement claims against Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ four clients related to infringement of 3-D television were dismissed by the court on our motion to dismiss.
Court held that Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client was denied due process of law when MHIP revoked his health insurance without an evidentiary hearing before a neutral arbiter on his Maryland residency.
First Mariner Bank v. Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas prevented a financial institution from using First Mariner's name in solicitations of services in Maryland and elsewhere.
Anthony McCauley et al. v. Caveo Network Solutions, Inc. et al.
At the conclusion of a 4 day trial, the court found in favor of Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ clients on all claims against them and entered judgment of $248,765.13 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages on counterclaims, including defamation, tortious interference, and breach of duty.
Rosebud Entertainment, LLC v. ABC Design & Promotion, et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas prevented a manufacturer and seller of plaques from using art and content from our client's publication, and use of its trademark, to sell plaques to people featured in our client's Baltimore Magazine.
Rosebud Entertainment, LLC v. That's Great News, LLC, et al.
After settling an infringement action for violations of Baltimore Magazine’s marks and copyright, defendant violated the copyrights and marks of plaintiff’s Baltimore Bride Magazine. This time, plaintiff obtained a substantial, out of court, settlement and injunction.
EMI Media, Inc. v. That's Great News, LLC, et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas prevented a manufacturer and seller of wall plaques from using art and content from our client's publication, and use of its trademark, to sell plaques to people featured in our client's Baltimore SmartCEO magazine and Baltimore Magazine.
e-Complish, LLC v. Public Communications Services, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented e-Complish, LLC ("e-Complish"), a Maryland website design company, against Public Communications Services, Inc. ("PCS"), a California corporation, alleging that PCS used e-Complish's software to operate the PCS website without permission. A confidential settlement of the case was reached shortly thereafter.
Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the defendant and successfully caused the breach of contract claim and the unfair competition claim to be dismissed by the court based on copyright preemption.
Following a week-long trial on complex commercial contract issues in front of the Honorable Stuart R. Berger in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Astrachan Gunst Thomas' client, Design Collective, Inc., prevailed on all counts and counterclaims, and was awarded all damages sought, including professional architectural service fees for the design of a 125,000 square foot commercial office building that the defendant wrongfully refused to pay. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented an architecture firm whose designs and site plan were used to develop a multi-unit townhouse development in Baltimore. The case was resolved following mediation before a federal magistrate judge and Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client received a large settlement.
Cumberland Broadcasting Company, et al. v. Williams J. AuMiller, Superintendent of Schools Allegany County, et al.
After it established violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments at an evidentiary hearing, Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent a county school board and its superintendent from excluding two radio stations from access to county property, news reports and participation in a scholarship program after school board officials were offended by the critical content of the stations' news regarding school safety.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained an award for violation of a doctor's right of publicity when a national publisher used his name as the author of its new "For Dummies" book without authorization.
Maryland Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Healthcare System Connections, Inc., et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas settled, without liability, a copyright case against its client, a health care entity, accused of infringing software.
Following an evidentiary hearing, Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained a TRO and preliminary injunction prohibiting competition and use of trade secrets removed from company computers. The case was then settled.
1st Mariner Bank v. Affiliated Mortgage Protection, et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented a bank whose name was used in mail solicitations for mortgage insurance. A consent order quickly resolved this case.
Following more than four years of EEOC discrimination charges and federal employment discrimination litigation, Astrachan Gunst Thomas' client was exonerated. A complex case against Astrachan Gunst Thomas' client, a Baltimore advertising and communications agency, asserting pregnancy discrimination, unlawful retaliation, violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act was dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland after the parties reached settlement. In the settlement agreement, the plaintiff expressly concedes that Astrachan Gunst Thomas' client engaged in no wrong-doing. Attorneys’ fees, as sanctions, were twice awarded to our client.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented a multi-location gasoline service station operator, accused of purchasing and selling tobacco products bearing counterfeit marks. Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a court order vacating a temporary injunction against Defendants and defeated Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, which led to the eventual settlement of the matter.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the applicant in an opposition proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Following discovery, Astrachan Gunst Thomas negotiated a withdrawal and dismissal of the opposition action, allowing the applicant's mark to be registered.
Stone Care International, Inc. v. PMC Stonecare Enterprises, Inc., et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the Plaintiff in a trade dress infringement action against Defendants, alleging infringement of Plaintiff's packaging for its stone and tile care products. The case was settled with the Defendants agreeing to change its product packaging.
LabWare, Inc. v. ThermoLabsystems, Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the Plaintiff in a false advertising case charging a competitor with false product claims and breach of a previously existing settlement agreement. An initial lawsuit was resolved by settlement with the Defendant agreeing to withdraw many of its ad claims. Six months later, Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented the Plaintiff in a second suit against the Defendant alleging breach of the settlement agreement and additional false advertising claims. Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained preliminary injunctive relief and, at trial, obtained a judgment for breach of the settlement agreement, the advertising claims having become moot.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented United States Surgical Corporation, a member of the Tyco Healthcare Group (a Tyco International Ltd. Company), as Opposer, in an opposition proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and obtained a settlement pursuant to which the Applicant agreed to cease use of its mark and abandon all applications to register its mark.
Davis Media Group, Inc. v. Best Western International, Inc.
Represented by Astrachan Gunst Thomas, Davis Media Group filed a lawsuit against its former client, Best Western International, Inc., charging it with breach of an advertising contract. Astrachan Gunst Thomas recovered close to $1.5 million in damages for Davis Media Group and others.
Poetry.com v. American Poets Society, Inc.
Represented by Astrachan Gunst Thomas, Poetry.com sued for unfair competition and copyright infringement, charging that several of the Defendant's marketing and promotional pieces were copies of Poetry.com's intellectual property. Astrachan Gunst Thomas' aggressive pursuit of its client's rights resulted in the Defendant filing for bankruptcy protection, payment of a monetary settlement and discontinuance of the Defendant's infringing activities.
Applied Signal & Image Technology, Inc. v. Harlesyville Mutual Insurance Co.
Applied Signal & Image Technology v. Harlesyville Mutual Insurance Co. 216 F.Supp. 2d 534 (D. Md. 2002) (denying of Defendant's motion for additional discovery); 252 F.Supp. 2d 215 (D. Md. 2003) (granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
When insurance carrier Harlesyville Mutual Insurance Co. denied coverage under the advertising injury provisions of Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client's General Commercial Liability Policy, Astrachan Gunst Thomas brought suit to recover fees and costs incurred by the client in defending a shareholder suit alleging right of privacy violations and other claims. Trial resulted in a judgment for our client, requiring Harlesyville to pay all fees and costs incurred by Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client in the underlying shareholder suit, as well as all fees and costs incurred in the suit against Harlesyville to enforce its duty to defend under the insurance policy.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented advertising agency W.B. Doner & Company in litigation against former employees and a company that they had organized to compete with W.B. Doner. The parties ultimately resolved the matters that triggered the lawsuit. The terms of the settlement are confidential.
When the Arena Football League sought transfer of Armand F. Lange's domain name, afl.com, Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a decision preventing transfer of the domain name. Astrachan Gunst Thomas established Mr. Lange's good faith registration of his personal initials in a domain name for his consulting business, and established that the name was not confusingly similar to Arena's trademark, AFL.
Xavier Health Care Services, Inc. v. NPF VIII et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented Xavier Health Care Services, Inc., which charged that National Century Financial Enterprises had entered into an illegal Medicare and Medicaid receivables factoring arrangement with nursing homes. The case concluded after NPF filed for bankruptcy amidst government investigations of its improper conduct.
When an Anne Arundel County residential developer launched plans to build a housing community in violation of fair housing laws, Astrachan Gunst Thomas, together with two other Baltimore firms, sued on behalf of a fair housing advocacy group and two disabled citizens to force the developer to redesign its construction plans to assure that disabled citizens could enjoy equal access to the properties. This case was settled favorably for our clients.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas defended an organization that certifies occupational therapy practitioners against a rival organization that sued it for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Astrachan Gunst Thomas defended our client's right to provide certification services to the occupational therapy profession and to fairly and accurately report the public records of state occupational therapy regulatory boards, and ultimately settled the matter.
Rose Art Industries, Inc. v. Raymond Geddes and Co., Inc.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas defended trade dress infringement and trade secret claims brought against our client by a competitor that sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting our client from distributing crayon, marker and pencil products in packaging that the Plaintiff alleged infringed its packaging and trade dress. The competitor also charged our client with violating its trade secrets in connection with our client's award of a supply contract by a major customer. Following expedited but extensive discovery, Astrachan Gunst Thomas defeated the competitor's motion for preliminary injunction and the competitor appealed. The case settled with no monetary or other loss to our client.
Raymond Geddes and Co., Inc. v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas obtained summary judgment and subsequently recovered over $200,000 in costs and fees from the defendant insurance carrier under the advertising injury provisions of Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client's General Commercial Liability Policy to reimburse our client for the legal fees and expenses that it incurred in our successful defense of a trade dress infringement suit brought against it.
GrandBanks Yachts, Pte. Ltd., et al. v. Composite Structures, Inc., et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit on behalf of our client, GrandBanks Yachts, a well-known manufacturer and seller of motor yachts, against a yacht dealer who once sold GrandBank yachts and controlled a GrandBanks yacht owners’ association. After GrandBanks terminated its business relationship with the Defendant, the Defendant sued GrandBanks for theft of trade secrets and Grandbanks counter sued for trademark infringement. The matter was settled prior to trial in favor of Grandbanks.
GrandBanks Yachts, Pte. Ltd., et al v. Oviatt Marine, Inc., et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed suit on behalf of our client for trademark infringement and unfair competition against a competitor who was using marks confusingly similar to the marks of GrandBanks, a well-known manufacturer and seller of motor yachts. Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a mediated settlement of the dispute, through which the Defendant agreed to cancel its federal registration of a mark confusingly similar to GrandBanks' trademark and to cease use of marks confusingly similar to GrandBanks' marks.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed an Opposition Action on behalf of GrandBanks, opposing registration of the mark GRAND BANKS TRADERS for beer. Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a settlement under which Old European Brewery agreed to abandon its application to register the mark GRAND BANKS TRADERS and agreed to refrain from using any mark confusingly similar to our client's GRAND BANKS mark.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas litigated in Pittsburgh to prevent the relocation to New York City’s The Frick Collection of the extensive archives of the turn-of-the-century industrialist and art collector Henry Clay Frick and his family, and to assure that the archives -- an historical treasure of the Pittsburgh region -- stay put. As a result, the archives pertaining to Pittsburgh and presence of Henry Clay Frick in that region remain in Pittsburgh.
D'Leo v. Merritt, et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas successfully defended a real estate developer and an architect who were accused of infringing another architect's building plans for a suburban office building. We did it by acquiring the allegedly infringed plans from the bankruptcy estate of the plaintiff, who had failed to list these plans as an asset of the estate.
When ComputerTraining.com sued ACTT for infringement based on ACCT's use of the generic term "computer training" in a domain name, Astrachan Gunst Thomas successfully obtained the dismissal of all counts asserted against our client.
FiberPlus, Inc. v. Communications Technology, Inc.
When a large contractor failed to pay over a million dollars on a large government contract to our client, FiberPlus, Inc., a full-service telecommunications company, Astrachan Gunst Thomas pursued a claim in arbitration against the contractor. Within approximately four months, the matter was resolved favorably through settlement.
Newport Mobil Service, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented a collection of service station dealers who charged that ConocoPhillips and Getty Petroleum Marketing violated their service station dealers' rights under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act and breached terms of the supply agreements between the dealers and ConocoPhillips by overpricing for gasoline and wrongfully assigning their supply agreements to Getty Petroleum, which seeks to rebrand their stations as LUKOIL. Astrachan Gunst Thomas negotiated a settlement that permitted the dealers to terminate their long-term supply agreements and obtain product on more favorable terms from other suppliers.
Newport Mobil Service, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co.
In litigation that preceded this lawsuit brought against ConocoPhillips and Getty, Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented a collection of New Jersey and Pennsylvania service station dealers who complained that ConocoPhillips had reneged on its promise to sell them their service station locations at prices well below the prices that ConocoPhillips was then demanding from the dealers. Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a settlement under which the dealers were given the option of either purchasing their service stations at reduced prices or accepting individual settlements amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars to each service station dealer.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented a California-based gasoline distributor, Peninsula Petroleum, LLC, in a state court suit brought by a multi-location service station dealer against Peninsula Petroleum and Shell Oil Company, charging them with discriminatory and unfair pricing practices. After extensive discovery, Astrachan Gunst Thomas succeeded in obtaining summary judgment dismissing all claims brought against our client, and our principals attended racing school with Mario Andretti.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas represented Plaintiff, a business providing digitizing, cataloging, archiving and hosting services to media organizations with extensive audio and video libraries, in a trade secrets and copyright action against the Defendants, asserting that they conspired to steal and wrongfully reverse engineer DSMCi's intellectual property. In a unanimous decision authored by now Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the Defendants' argument that their dispute should be referred to arbitration, clearing the way for the litigation to continue in federal district court. The case was then resolved through a confidential settlement agreement following numerous mediation sessions before a federal magistrate judge.
Curtis Jefferson, et al. v. Andre Young (a.k.a. Dr. Dre), et al.
When two Baltimore rap music artists obtained a $43 Billion (no, that's not a typo) judgment against well known rap artist Andre Young a.k.a Dr. Dre, Astrachan Gunst Thomas succeeded in getting the judgment vacated.
Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client, an emerging technology company providing infrastructure services, was left high and dry when its largest customer suddenly failed to make payment and breached its contract. Astrachan Gunst Thomas filed an arbitration action and obtained a multi-million dollar arbitration award for our client for breach of contract, including an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the arbitration.
A retailer of lingerie with multiple brick and mortar stores in the northeastern United States and a nationwide web store brought an unfair competition and trademark infringement action against our client, which operated a retail lingerie store in Maryland under the same mark as the Plaintiff. The suit sought injunctive relief, damages and attorneys' fees from Astrachan Gunst Thomas’ client. Astrachan Gunst Thomas secured a settlement under which our client was able to continue using the disputed trademark and the Plaintiff was required to amend its pending federal trademark application to acknowledge the concurrent lawful use of the mark by our client.

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Family hotels. Prices, reservations and accomodation.
h.r. Tsigov chark. Municipality Batak. State Pazardjik.
c.c. Konstantin and Elena. Municipality Varna. State Varna.
c. Letnitsa. Municipality Letnitsa. State Lovech.
c. Sofia. Municipality Sofia. State Sofia.
v. Ravda. Municipality Nesebar. State Burgas.
v. Yakovtsi. Municipality Elena. State V. Tarnovo.
c. Gabrovo. Municipality Gabrovo. State Gabrovo.
c. V. Tarnovo. Municipality V. Tarnovo. State V. Tarnovo.
c. Sveti Vlas. Municipality Nesebar. State Burgas.
c. Bansko. Municipality Bansko. State Blagoevgrad.
v. Oreshak. Municipality Troyan. State Lovech.
c. Sozopol. Municipality Sozopol. State Burgas.

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