This case involves two men, Dore and Rodrigue, who met their deaths on artificial island drilling rigs located on the outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast.
Each man's family brought suit for wrongful death in the federal courts both under the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (hereinafter "Seas Act"), and under Louisiana law assertedly made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (hereinafter "Lands Act"). Each family's suit was separately heard and decided in the District Courts and in the Court of Appeals below. In both cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirming the District Courts, held that the Seas Act was the exclusive remedy for these deaths. Petitioners sought certiorari, claiming that they are entitled to an additional remedy under the state law adopted by the Lands Act.
"General Maritime Laws, the Death on the High Seas Act, . . . Article 2315 of the [Louisiana Code] and under the other laws of the United States and the State of Louisiana."
for additional elements of damage. The District Judge certified the question pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 391 F.2d 671.
action proceeded to trial and judgment of $75,000, 266 F.Supp. 1, which is not now before us. On appeal of the dismissal of the civil actions, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court per curiam., citing its decision in the Dore case almost two months before. 395 F.2d 216.
Certiorari was granted in both cases, 393 U.S. 932 (1968), and they were argued together here. In light of the principles of traditional admiralty law, the Seas Act, and the Lands Act, we hold that petitioners' remedy is under the Lands Act and Louisiana law. The Lands Act makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these artificial islands as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State. This approach was deliberately taken in lieu of treating the structures as vessels, to which admiralty law, supplemented by the law of the jurisdiction of the vessel's owner, would apply. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907). This was done in part because men working on these islands are closely tied to the adjacent State, to which they often commute and on which their families live, unlike transitory seamen to whom a more generalized admiralty law is appropriate. Since the Seas Act does not apply of its own force under admiralty principles, and since the Lands Act deliberately eschewed the application of admiralty principles to these novel structures, Louisiana law is not ousted by the Seas Act, and, under the Lands Act, it is made applicable.
and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States" apply "to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State." Since federal law, because of its limited function in a federal system, might be inadequate to cope with the full range of potential legal problems, the Act supplemented gaps in the federal law with state law through the "adoption of State law as the law of the United States." Under § 4, the adjacent State's laws were made "the law of the United States for [the relevant subsoil and seabed] and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon," but only to "the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with . . . other Federal laws."
It is evident from this that federal law is "exclusive" in its regulation of this area, and that state law is adopted only as surrogate federal law. The Senate Report on the bill referred to the "precise unequivocal language" of "the provision for the adoption of State laws as Federal law," and referred to the applicable body of law as consisting of the Constitution and laws of the United States, the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, and finally the laws of the adjacent States "adopted as Federal law and made applicable to supplement existing Federal law and regulations." S.Rep. No. 411 of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1953).
statutes or regulations of the Secretary of the Interior are inapplicable."
Id. at 23. This language makes it clear that state law could be used to fill federal voids. And in the conference report, the House managers of the bill noted that laws of adjacent States which are not inconsistent with federal law "are adopted as the laws of the United States for those particular areas." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1031, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1953).
"the fact that the full development of the estimated values in the shelf area will require the efforts and the physical presence of thousands of workers on fixed structures in the shelf area. Industrial accidents, accidental death, peace, and order"
"The real point is . . . that the language in section 4 provides that Federal laws and regulations shall be applicable in the area, but that, where there is a void, the State law may be applicable. . . ."
99 Cong.Rec. 7164. Senator Cordon noted that this view was "entirely correct," and added that: "These laws, by the terms of the act, are enacted as Federal law."
"the laws of such State applicable to the newly acquired area, and . . . the officials of such State [the agents empowered] to enforce the laws of the State in the newly acquired area."
In arguing for his amendment, Senator Long asserted that "[i]t is even more important that State law should apply on the artificial islands than on natural islands. . . ." But the amendment was rejected. See 99 Cong.Rec. 7232-7236. This legislative history buttresses the Court of Appeals' finding that, in view of the inconsistencies between the state law and the Seas Act, the Seas Act remedy would be exclusive if it applied.
accidents here bore no relation to any such function. Admiralty jurisdiction has not been construed to extend to accidents on piers, jetties, bridges, or even ramps or railways running into the sea. [Footnote 6] To the extent that it has been applied to fixed structures completely surrounded by water, this has usually involved collision with a ship and has been explained by the use of the structure solely or principally as a navigational aid. [Footnote 7] But when the damage is caused by a vessel admittedly in admiralty jurisdiction, the Admiralty Extension Act [Footnote 8] would now make available the admiralty remedy in any event.
in is not even suggestive of maritime affairs. It was supplying water to a city and the mere fact of the means being carried under the bed of a river, with extensions through the river to the surface, did not create any maritime right, nor was it in any sense an aid to navigation, which was the distinguishing feature of The Blackheath."
162 F. at 496. In these circumstances, the Seas Act -- which provides an action in admiralty -- clearly would not apply under conventional admiralty principles and, since the Lands Act provides an alternative federal remedy through adopted state law, there is no reason to assume that Congress intended to extend those principles to create an admiralty remedy here. And if the Congress had made the 1920 Seas Act applicable, ousting inconsistent state law, the artificial island worker would be entitled to far less comprehensive remedies in many cases than he is now.
have been treated as vessels. Maritime law, which applies to American vessels, would have applied under that theory to the structures themselves."
"However, further consideration clearly showed that this approach was not an adequate and complete answer to the problem. The so-called social laws necessary for protection of the workers and their families would not apply. I refer to such things as unemployment laws, industrial accident laws, fair labor standards laws, and so forth. . . ."
"[Ultimately, instead,] the whole body of Federal law [was made applicable] to the area [as well as state law, where necessary]. Thus, the legal situation is comparable to that in the areas owned by the Federal Government under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government and lying within the boundaries of a State in the uplands."
Similarly, Senator Ellender asserted that, in the first draft, it "was sought to treat the platforms or artificial islands created in the water as ships," but now the "islands are made subject to our domestic law" instead, so as to be "treated just as though they were islands created by nature insofar as the application of our domestic laws is concerned." 99 Cong.Rec. 7235.
deemed to have occurred or been committed aboard a vessel of the United States on the high seas and shall be adjudicated . . . according to the laws relating to such acts . . . on vessels of the United States on the high seas."
When the Senate bill was reported from committee, this section had been replaced by the present language, omitting entirely any reference to treating the islands as though they were vessels.
hand, federal enforcement of the law in this area was insisted upon by the Department of Justice, and there was substantial doubt whether state law and jurisdiction could or should be extended to the structures. [Footnote 10] A federal solution was thought necessary.
Although the Assistant Attorney General, office of Legal Counsel, persisted to the end in his claim that admiralty law should apply, and that with it should be incorporated the law of the State of the island's owner, this view obviously did not prevail. Instead, a compromise emerged. The administration's opposition to committing these areas solely to the jurisdiction of state courts, state substantive law, and state law enforcement was recognized in that the applicable law was made federal law enforceable by federal officials in federal courts. But the special relationship between the men working on these artificial islands and the adjacent shore to which they commute to visit their families was also recognized by dropping the treatment of these structures as "vessels" and, instead, over the objections of the administration that these islands were not really located within a State, the bill was amended to treat them "as if [they] were [in] an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State." State law became federal law federally enforced.
high seas, were not themselves to be considered within maritime jurisdiction. Thus, the admiralty action under the Seas Act no more applies to these accidents actually occurring on the islands than it would to accidents occurring in an upland federal enclave or on a natural island to which admiralty jurisdiction had not been specifically extended. At a minimum, the legislative history shows that accidents on these structures, which, under maritime principles, would be no more under maritime jurisdiction than accidents on a wharf located above navigable waters, were not changed in character by the Lands Act.
Since the inapplicability of the Seas Act removes any obstacle to the application of state law by incorporation as federal law through the Lands Act, the decisions below are reversed, and the causes remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The District Court dismissed one of the civil causes of action on the ground that, unlike the other, it did not specifically name the Lands Act, but rested instead directly on Louisiana law. This formal omission was inconsequential because of the District Judge's view that there would be no cause of action even under the Lands Act and Louisiana law together. On remand, it may be that both claims can be construed to assert actions under the Lands Act and Louisiana Law, or that any deficiency in this regard can be cured by amendment of the pleadings. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 15.
"§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands."
"(a) Constitution and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; publication of projected State lines; restriction on State taxation and jurisdiction."
"(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter."
"(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as of the effective date of this subchapter are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf."
"(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom."
The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (1866); The Troy, 208 U. S. 321 (1908); T. Smith Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (C.A.4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U. 6. 963 (1965).
The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361 (1904); The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166 (196); Doullut & Williams Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 33 (1925).
62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740.
"the fixed platforms out there do not even touch the waters except for the supporting pipes or 'legs,' which go through the water down into the ground. I think you can treat those platforms as connected with the soil and development of the soil, rather than treating them as vessels."
Hearings 22. Similarly, Acting Secretary of the Treasury Rose opined in a letter to the Committee that these islands might not even be considered to be "upon navigable waters" for the purpose of applying laws requiring safety lights. Hearings 53. A specific provision was added to the statute to permit safety regulation. § 4(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e). Obviously these islands were not constructed principally as aids to navigation, as respondents contend, cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60 (C.A. 5th Cir.1961), but were, instead, hazards to navigation requiring warning facilities. Governor Kennon of Louisiana voiced strong opposition, Hearings 44485, as did Senator Long of that State, e.g., Hearings 275-278. See also Hearings 513-518, 545, 612. And, at Hearings 644-645, the inappropriateness of applying the law of the owner of the artificial island or subsoil lease, rather than the law of the adjacent State, was given special emphasis.
See letter to Senator Cordon from Assistant Attorney General Rankin, Hearings 700; testimony of Mr. Rankin, Hearings 644-645, 664-665, 652-653.
"It is the view of the chairman that, when these individuals leave their vessels and board this structure, they are subject to the law that operates on the structure, which, in this instance, is the same law that operates on board a ship, but becomes that only because of this act."
Hearings 9. (Emphasis added.) And at the end of the hearings, when the Senators were questioning an admiralty lawyer on the treatment these structures would receive absent any statutory provision, he informed them that even a lighthouse would be treated as land, except insofar as it was subject to admiralty jurisdiction as an aid to navigation. Hearings 669-670.
An admiralty expert questioned by the committee took the position that application of maritime law would be unwise.
"Maritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill-adapted for that purpose."
Hearings 668. Since the Act treats seabed, subsoil, and artificial islands the same, dropping any reference to special treatment for presumptive vessels, the most sensible interpretation of Congress' reaction to this testimony is that admiralty treatment was eschewed altogether, except to the extent that the Extension of Admiralty Act might make it applicable.


text:
Kevin SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louie KHOURI, D.D.S., Louie Khouri, D.D.S., P.C., and Advanced Dental Care Clinic, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant.
Robert Gittleman Law Firm, PLC, by (Robert Gittleman), Farmington Hills, for the plaintiff. Van Belkum & Felty, P.C. (by Gary N. Felty, Jr.), Plymouth, for the defendants Amici Curiae. Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Ann M. Sherman, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General. Kienbaum Opperwall Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C. (by Eric J. Pelton and Noel D. Massie), Birmingham, for the State Bar of Michigan. Vandeveer Garzia (by Thomas Peters) and Wascha, Waun & Parillo, P.C. (by Thomas W. Waun), Troy, Grand Blanc, for the Negligence Section of the State Bar of Michigan. Robert M. Raitt, Southfield, for the Michigan Association for Justice.
In this case, we review a trial court's award of “reasonable” attorney fees as part of case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) calculated under some of the factors we listed in Wood v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653 (1982), and Rule 1.5(a) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. We take this opportunity to clarify that the trial court should begin the process of calculating a reasonable attorney fee by determining factor 3 under MRPC 1.5(a), i.e., the reasonable hourly or daily rate customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, using reliable surveys or other credible evidence. This number should be multiplied by the reasonable number of hours expended. This will lead to a more objective analysis. After this, the court may consider making adjustments up or down in light of the other factors listed in Wood and MRPC 1.5(a). In order to aid appellate review, the court should briefly indicate its view of each of the factors.
Given that the trial court made its decision without first determining the reasonable hourly or daily rate customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, we vacate the lower court judgments regarding the case-evaluation sanctions and remand the case to the trial court to revisit the issue in light of the opinion we adopt today.
Plaintiff sued defendants in 2003 for dental malpractice in the Oakland Circuit Court. The case went to case evaluation and was evaluated at $50,000. Plaintiff accepted the award, but defendants rejected it. After a 2 1/212-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The verdict, reduced to present value,1 was $46,631.18.
After defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial was denied, plaintiff filed a motion in January 2005 seeking case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403. Plaintiff sought $68,706.50 in attorney fees for time spent by four lawyers at the firm that represented him. In particular, plaintiff sought $450 an hour for the 102 hours 2 lead trial attorney Robert Gittleman claimed, $450 an hour for 6 hours claimed by another partner, $275 an hour for 59 hours attributable to one associate, and $275 an hour for 14 hours claimed by another associate. Plaintiff's motion was supported by several items, including Mr. Gittleman's curriculum vitae showing his extensive experience in trying dental malpractice cases. Plaintiff's motion also attached copies of three circuit court judgments awarding Mr. Gittleman attorney fees: a 1985 case awarding $200 an hour, a 1998 case awarding $300 an hour, and a 2004 case awarding $400 an hour. Plaintiff also represented that the other partner had been practicing law for 35 years and had tried numerous cases that resulted in favorable verdicts. The motion also indicated that the associates had both tried personal injury cases to conclusion and that $275 an hour was the going rate for their work and research, which were necessitated by the evaluation rejection.
Defendants presented numerous objections, arguing that the requested attorney fees would be highly unreasonable if they were awarded and specifically challenged the rate of $450 an hour and the fact that the fees sought exceeded the judgment. They contrasted the requested $450 an hour rate and the relatively small verdict with those in a recent Court of Appeals case, Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 254 Mich.App. 50, 657 N.W.2d 721 (2002), in which a plaintiff's attorney had sought $350 an hour but had only been awarded $150 an hour in case-evaluation sanctions in a personal injury case where the verdict had been $900,000. An objection was also made that some of the billings were duplicative, in that it was unnecessary for two lawyers to jointly try the same relatively simple two-day case.3 Defense counsel indicated that his challenge was not so much to the hours claimed (other than the duplication claim), but to the rates sought. However, he did not seek an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he agreed to have the court decide the motion on the basis of what had been submitted.
Defendants appealed in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the hourly rates were unreasonable, and attaching an article from the November 2003 issue of the Michigan Bar Journal 5 showing that the median billing rate for equity partners in Michigan was $200 an hour and $150 an hour for associates.
The panel affirmed in an unpublished opinion.6 It rejected defendants' claim that the amount of the attorney-fee award was excessive because it was based on unreasonable hourly rates. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that $450 an hour was a reasonable rate for Mr. Gittleman. The panel conceded that the data submitted by defendants showed lower rates, but concluded that the data did not reflect the range of hourly rates charged by attorneys who specialize in complex litigation such as dental malpractice. It acknowledged that the trial court had not made any findings regarding the other three attorneys. Nevertheless, the panel found sufficient the trial court's overall statements regarding the complexity of dental malpractice cases as well as the skill, time, and cost expended to obtain the favorable verdict. Finally, the Court of Appeals refused to follow Zdrojewski because there was evidence that courts of this state had consistently awarded attorney fees for Mr. Gittleman's services at hourly rates higher than the $150 an hour approved in Zdrojewski.
A trial court's decision whether to grant case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State, 472 Mich. 566, 571, 701 N.W.2d 102 (2005); Allard v. State Farm Ins. Co., 271 Mich.App. 394, 397, 722 N.W.2d 268 (2006). We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs. Wood, 413 Mich. at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 476 Mich. 372, 388, 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006).
The general “American rule” is that “attorney fees are not ordinarily recoverable unless a statute, court rule, or common-law exception provides the contrary.” Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 457 Mich. 16, 37-38, 576 N.W.2d 641 (1998); Haliw v. Sterling Hts., 471 Mich. 700, 706, 691 N.W.2d 753 (2005). Consistently with the American rule, this Court has specifically authorized case-evaluation sanctions through court rule, allowing the awarding of reasonable attorney fees to promote early settlements.8 The examination of those rules and the extent to which fees can be awarded is at issue in this case.
Defendants here have correctly conceded that case-evaluation sanctions were applicable because, even ignoring the costs and interest of $23,623.99 that are to be added to the verdict, the verdict as reduced to its present value of $46,631.18 was not more than 10 percent less than the $50,000 case-evaluation amount.
In determining “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,” the trial courts have routinely relied on data contained in surveys such as the Economics of the Law Practice Surveys that are published by the State Bar of Michigan. See, e.g., Zdrojewski, 254 Mich.App. at 73, 657 N.W.2d 721; Temple v. Kelel Distributing Co. Inc., 183 Mich.App. 326, 333, 454 N.W.2d 610 (1990). The above factors have not been exclusive, and the trial courts could consider any additional relevant factors. Wood, 413 Mich. at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653.
The reasonable hourly rate represents the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, which is reflected by the market rate for the attorney's work. “The market rate is the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question.” Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc., 965 F.2d 422, 424 (C.A.7, 1992) (citation and quotation omitted). We emphasize that “the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services can be established by testimony or empirical data found in surveys and other reliable reports. But we caution that the fee applicant must present something more than anecdotal statements to establish the customary fee for the locality. Both the parties and the trial courts of this state should avail themselves of the most relevant available data. For example, as noted earlier, in this case defendant submitted an article from the Michigan Bar Journal regarding the economic status of attorneys in Michigan.16 By recognizing the importance of such data, we note that the State Bar of Michigan, as well as other private entities, can provide a valuable service by regularly publishing studies on the prevailing market rates for legal services in this state. We also note that the benefit of such studies would be magnified by more specific data relevant to variations in locality, experience, and practice area.
In considering the time and labor involved (factor 1 under MRPC 1.5 [a] and factor 2 under Wood ) the court must determine the reasonable number of hours expended by each attorney.17 The fee applicant must submit detailed billing records, which the court must examine and opposing parties may contest for reasonableness. The fee applicant bears the burden of supporting its claimed hours with evidentiary support. If a factual dispute exists over the reasonableness of the hours billed or hourly rate claimed by the fee applicant, the party opposing the fee request is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the applicant's evidence and to present any countervailing evidence.
Multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable hours billed will produce a baseline figure. After these two calculations, the court should consider the other factors and determine whether they support an increase or decrease in the base number.
Having clarified how a trial court should go forward in calculating a reasonable attorney fee, we find it appropriate to vacate the award and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration under this opinion. We offer the following observations in order to provide guidance to the trial court.
In making its ruling, the trial court indicated it was taking judicial notice of the fact that top trial attorneys in Oakland County charge $450 an hour or more.18 While we do not doubt that some trial attorneys have such rates, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, which likely is different, should be the measure. That is, reasonable fees are different from the fees paid to the top lawyers by the most well-to-do clients. Coulter, supra. The trial court also erred in relying on previous awards Mr. Gittleman obtained without considering whether those fees might have been justified by the particular circumstances of the earlier cases, such as the complexity and the skill required. Moreover, the trial court erred when it conclusorily stated that Mr. Gittleman had tried the case in a “professional manner,” without further explanation, because this is something all attorneys should be expected to do.
As previously noted, the trial court only made findings regarding Mr. Gittleman. On remand, the court should be careful to perform a separate analysis with reference to the other three attorneys, considering both the hourly rates and the number of hours reasonably expended, and should consider whether it was reasonable for plaintiff's firm to have two lawyers “on the clock” during the trial.
The dissent's primary complaint seems to be that a “reasonable fee” for an exceptional lawyer cannot be determined by using the fee charged by the average attorney. But Wood factor 1 mentions the professional standing and experience of the attorney, Wood factor 2 mentions the skill involved, and MRPC 1.5(a)(7) speaks of “the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer.” These factors allow an upward adjustment for the truly exceptional lawyer.
The dissent criticizes our use of the market rate for attorney services to determine a reasonable rate, stating that “the market rate for an individual attorney's work is not some figure that can be plucked from a reference manual or interpolated from a statistical graph.” Post at 490. To an extent, we agree; see note 18 of this opinion, explaining that the fee charged by top trial lawyers in Oakland County is not a proper fact for judicial notice. This is not an exact science; if it were, no factors or analysis would be required. We merely aim to provide a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee-shifting rules and statutes. To that end, we are persuaded by the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court in Blum, and we note that the dissent offers no similar, countervailing guidance.
The dissent agrees with the Supreme Court's assessment in Blum that the market rate, although not always easily discerned, is a “valid inquiry.” Post at 490. Nevertheless, it rejects the principled mechanism the Blum Court chose to best conduct the “valid inquiry” into the market rate. Post at 490-91. We, however, accept the Blum Court's resolution, placing the burden on the fee applicant “to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, supra at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. The dissent concedes that “assessing that rate should include comparisons with rates for similar services,” post at 490, but offers no rubric to guide Michigan courts in doing so. Unlike the dissent, we choose to provide the guidance that has been, and the dissent would allow to remain, sorely lacking for the many Michigan courts that are asked to impose “reasonable attorney fees” under our fee-shifting rules and statutes.
The dissent also faults us for using the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services as a starting point. See post at 487-88. We see no fault in providing an objective baseline, i.e., a starting point, to aid trial and appellate courts alike in assessing a “reasonable fee.” Whimsy is a double-edged sword. If a trial court awarded a highly experienced and skilled attorney, such as Mr. Gittleman, a “reasonable attorney fee” at a rate of $100 an hour-a rate well below the $150 an hour median rate for associate attorneys in Michigan 21 -we would have the same concerns with the absence of an objective framework to assess such a judgment. An objective starting point, at a minimum, provides a more concrete basis for setting and reviewing a reasonable attorney fee. Again, we reject the dissent's argument to leave Michigan courts without guidance.
The dissent asserts that our decision is somehow inconsistent with Randolph, in which we rejected the federal lodestar method for calculating the reasonableness of an attorney fee under our condemnation statute. In Randolph, we specifically noted that MCL 213.66(3) requires consideration of whether actual fees are reasonable, and that this is different from fee-shifting statutes that simply authorize the trial court to award “reasonable attorney fees” without regard to the fees actually charged. Randolph, 461 Mich. at 765-766, 610 N.W.2d 893. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, our opinion today does not contradict, undermine, or overrule Randolph.
In determining a reasonable attorney fee, a trial court should first determine the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. In general, the court shall make this determination using reliable surveys or other credible evidence. Then, the court should multiply that amount by the reasonable number of hours expended in the case. The court may consider making adjustments up or down to this base number in light of the other factors listed in Wood and MRPC 1.5(a). In order to aid appellate review, the court should briefly indicate its view of each of the factors.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court regarding the attorney-fee issue are vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
I concur with the reasoning and result of the lead opinion, with one exception. I disagree with the conclusion that two factors should be eliminated from consideration when determining a reasonable attorney fee for case evaluation sanctions; namely, the “results obtained” and whether the fee is fixed or contingent. See ante at 481 n. 20. Both Wood v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653 (1982), and MRPC 1.5(a) specifically list these two factors as considerations when assessing reasonable attorney fees without limitation. No principled basis exists for excluding these factors from consideration in the case evaluation context, nor is there any textual support for such exclusion in either Wood or MRPC 1.5(a). Therefore, both factors should be considered, along with all the other factors listed in Wood and the MRPC, when assessing reasonable attorney fees for case evaluation sanctions. Consideration of these factors does not, however, affect the trial court's ultimate authority to determine which factors, if any, justify an adjustment to the base calculation of reasonable attorney fees obtained by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended.
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
The lead opinion correctly concludes that trial courts should consider each of these factors when determining whether to adjust the base reasonable attorney fee calculation. Nevertheless, it then contradictorily concludes that when awarding reasonable attorney fees for case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), a court is barred from considering factor # 3 in Wood (# 4 in the MRPC), concerning the “results obtained,” and factor # 8 in the MRPC, “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) requires that a trial court award “a reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial judge for services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation.” The plain language of the rule merely requires that the court award a “reasonable attorney fee”; it does not suggest that “reasonable attorney fee” means something different for case evaluation sanctions than for any other situation. Therefore, no justification exists for the lead opinion's attempt to deviate from the reasonable attorney fee calculation when case evaluation sanctions are involved. This carve-out exception appears to arise from its assessment of what is fair rather than from the plain language of the court rule.
Contrary to the assertion in the lead opinion, consideration of whether a fee is fixed or contingent may be helpful in determining a reasonable attorney fee award for case evaluation sanctions. If a court establishes that an attorney was working under a contingency fee agreement, knowledge of the percentage of the fee may prove to be a useful tool. Contingency fee percentages express an attorney's expectations of the case and the risks involved. While the actual percentage of a contingency fee need not be used in determining a reasonable fee award, this potentially useful information certainly should not be eliminated outright from consideration as a factor in a reasonableness analysis.
Likewise, the results obtained can also be a relevant consideration when determining reasonable attorney fees in a case evaluation situation. Although case authority specifically addressing the “results obtained” factor primarily involves situations where an adverse party is ordered to pay the other party's attorney fees outside the case evaluation context, in “reasonable attorney fee” cases, courts consistently acknowledge the relevance of the results obtained.3 The majority provides no authority for its conclusion that the results obtained should be excluded from consideration when calculating reasonable attorney fees for case evaluation sanctions.
Within the milieu of fee shifting authority, apart from the limited category of case evaluation sanctions, civil rights cases most frequently articulate how a court should evaluate the reasonableness of an attorney fee award. In these cases, the prevailing party is entitled to collect fees from the adverse party. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), states in a plurality opinion that the results obtained is “one of [the] many factors that a court should consider in calculating an award of attorney's fees.” In another civil rights case, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the United States Supreme Court calls the “results obtained” factor “crucial” in the analysis of reasonable attorney fees. Hensley further specifies that its decision applies in cases not involving civil rights. Id. at 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933.
The Court of Appeals also has expressed concern about the proportionality of the attorney fees awarded to damages awards. See Petterman v. Haverhill Farms, Inc., 125 Mich.App. 30, 32, 335 N.W.2d 710 (1983); Burke v. Angies, Inc., 143 Mich.App. 683, 692-693, 373 N.W.2d 187 (1985). In Petterman, the Court of Appeals noted that the $9,304 attorney fee that was charged for a claim evaluated at $12,500 raised serious questions regarding the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. In Burke, the Court of Appeals again considered this aspect but held that the $17,750 attorney fee was not excessive in light of the $175,000 damages award, i.e., approximately 10 percent of the amount of the damages award, and did not rise to the level of Petterman, where the attorney fees were 75 percent of the amount of the damages award.
The lead opinion seems to argue that case evaluation sanctions are singularly distinguishable from all other fee shifting cases. I disagree. An award for attorney fees in a case evaluation sanction context is not so unlike an award for attorney fees in a civil rights case as to render the consideration of the proportionality “crucial” in one context and not a factor at all in the other. Both types of cases involve fee shifting. The majority describes the purpose of case evaluation sanctions as punishment of the party who did not accept the case evaluation and encouragement of parties to take the process seriously.4 But any situation where one party is ordered to pay the other's attorney fees is inherently punitive. Civil rights cases allow the prevailing party to collect from the “losing” party, at least in part, to punish the losing party for necessitating the suit in the first place and to discourage both civil rights infringements and frivolous suits and defenses. Case evaluation situations are not so different from other attorney fee shifting cases to eliminate a factor from consideration that has otherwise consistently been included in the analysis.
The lead opinion suggests that when a party rejects a case evaluation that it “should” have accepted, the adverse party necessitated the accumulation of additional fees, perhaps fees above and beyond the true value of a case. Therefore, the lead opinion asserts that the rejecting party should be responsible for fees even if they are, as in this case, completely disproportionate to the damages award. It is true that some cases will involve parties who correctly valued their claims, accepted case evaluation, and were then forced to incur more fees than they could expect to receive in damages because the other party rejected the case evaluation. It is also conceivable, however, that some attorneys will, after accepting a case evaluation that the other side has rejected, proceed in a way that escalates the fees beyond any damages that could reasonably be expected in the case. To avoid such potential abuse, a trial court must consider whether fees may be disproportionate to a damages award as a part of the overall analysis.
I see no principled reason for altering the factors that should be considered when assessing reasonable attorney fees for case evaluation sanctions. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the lead opinion. Both the “results obtained” and “whether a fee is fixed or contingent” are appropriate factors to consider in assessing the reasonableness of attorney fee awards as case evaluation sanctions, along with all the other factors listed in Wood and the MRPC.
Today the majority says much, but changes little, in its attempt at “fine-tuning,” ante at 479, our longstanding method for assessing reasonable attorney fees under MCR 2.403(O), which has remained unchanged since this Court unanimously adopted it 25 years ago in Wood v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653 (1982).1 In fact, despite the majority's attempt to aid appellate review and increase the consistency of reasonable attorney-fee awards, its new variation of the Wood-factors method changes little because, in the end, it still leaves the trial court with broad discretion in awarding reasonable attorney fees under the rule. Accordingly, I would not tinker with the Wood factors simply because in this case a contingency-fee attorney was awarded an hourly-rate fee that some on this Court would not have accepted had they been the trial judge. The Wood-factors method is not broken; therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's attempt to fix it.
In applying the Wood factors to this case, I would affirm the trial court's determination regarding the reasonable attorney fee for plaintiff's lead attorney, Mr. Gittleman, because that ruling was not an abuse of discretion, as it was guided by several of the Wood factors.2 Further, the trial court's reasoning was supported by the information presented to the trial court, which included Mr. Gittleman's curriculum vitae, previous decisions supporting similar fee awards for his services, and plaintiff's billing records. Also, defendant was offered an opportunity to contest these assertions at a hearing, but he expressly waived the opportunity. Thus, I do not agree with the majority's assertion that the attorney-fee award regarding Mr. Gittleman's services requires further analysis.
However, I do agree with the majority that the trial court did not conduct sufficient analysis to support its award of attorney fees regarding plaintiff's second-, third-, and fourth-chair attorneys. Thus, regarding those awards, I would remand to the trial court for further analysis under our longstanding precedent in Wood.
To be clear, I am not opposed to giving the average fee equal weight in this multifactor reasonable fee analysis; but I am opposed to it playing a paramount role by being the starting point because the average fee does not represent the reality that a reasonable attorney fee under MCR 2.403(O) is not preliminarily derived from an average attorney fee charged in a locality.8 This is evidenced in several respects.
In contrast, the average rate charged in a locality, which the majority's rule initially relies on, involves a prospective focus because it uses the fees on which parties and their lawyers have agreed before the pending litigation. Thus, while this average rate is a relevant factor in the reasonable-fee analysis, it should not be the starting point any more than any other relevant factor should be, because it does not share the retrospective focus that MCR 2.430(O) expressly requires.
I agree with the Court in Blum; the appropriate hourly rate is a valid inquiry, and assessing that rate should include comparisons with rates for similar services. And, like the Court in Blum, I recognize that the market rate for any given attorney is simply not an easily grasped number; thus, I disagree with the majority's attempt to initially set the appropriate hourly rate at the average rate for attorneys in a particular locality.
The majority also does not describe how the survey is to be used to determine the customary fee for similar legal services. This lack of direction creates a problem in this case because the survey does not include a category for dental malpractice; in fact, it does not even include the broader category of medical malpractice. Accordingly, I question this survey's ability to give any guidance beyond that already available to the trial court, especially regarding this case's unique practitioner.16 In this regard, the majority concedes that its lone example of a reliable report is of small utility: “[t]he benefit of such studies would be magnified by more specific data relevant to variations in locality, experience, and practice area.” Ante at 480. Nevertheless, the majority gives the lower courts no direction on how to use this survey while they wait for more specific surveys.
I am also troubled by the ramifications of the majority's rule because any practitioner who reads this opinion now realizes that his voluntary submissions to surveys are powerful enough to affect the future results of attorney-fee awards. In other words, the majority unwittingly invites inflated survey submissions. Further, I do not understand why the majority chooses a survey that was conducted more than four years ago. Noting that the trial in this case occurred in December 2004, it is not clear why the 2003 version of this survey is preferable to a later version.
Thus, while I have no qualms with trial courts using these types of surveys for broad guidance on this multifactor analysis, I would not elevate this survey as the lone representative of reliable reports that courts should use in beginning their reasonable fee analysis.
The majority also does not define the scope of its new rule. The majority has articulated a new rule for attorney-fee awards under MCR 2.403; yet that new test's application to other attorney-fee contexts is left for its readers to ponder. Indeed, the majority's new test specifically incorporates the third factor under MRPC 1.5(a).17 Does this now mean that the third factor of MRPC 1.5(a) is the starting point for all proceedings under that provision of our ethical code? Further, does this new rule apply to other fee-shifting provisions? For example, does the majority's test apply to the fee-shifting provisions of the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act, MCL 213.66, and the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2802, each of which involves reasonable attorney fees? And if today's rule only applies to MCR 2.403, what is the basis for such a limited application of the new rule? I would not forge ahead in the name of consistency and ease of appellate review while concomitantly creating these uncertainties in the wake.
I also note that the majority mandates that the trial court decide whether it was reasonable for plaintiff to have two attorneys representing him at trial. I am aware of no authority that casts doubt upon the reasonableness of a party's decision to retain the services of multiple attorneys at trial. In addition, if this multiple-attorney analysis is a new court-made factor in every reasonable-fee analysis, the majority should state as much. See note 5, supra. It should also note if this element, like all earlier elements, must also always be discussed by the trial court. See note 6, supra.
Simply put, this analysis cannot be molded into the mathematical precision that the majority seeks because, in the end, under either the Wood method or the majority's fine-tuned method, a trial court still exercises its discretion in assessing the reasonable value of the services that a particular advocate delivered in a particular trial. Not all attorneys are created equal, and the reasonable attorney-fee awarded under MCR 2.403(O) should recognize as much. Because the new method adopted by the majority does not reflect this as well as the Wood-factors method does, I respectfully dissent.
1. All but $300 of the verdict consisted of future noneconomic damages, which were set at $2,800 a year for the remaining 36 years of plaintiff's life expectancy. Pursuant to MCL 600.6306, those future noneconomic damages were reduced to their present value.
2. Plaintiff stipulated a reduction of seven hours from the time Mr. Gittleman claimed after defendants objected to the claim.
3. For example, Mr. Gittleman charged eight hours for a full day of trial on December 17, 2004, and one of the associates also charged eight hours for that same day. Further, Mr. Gittleman billed five hours for the third day of trial while an associate charged eight hours for the same day.
4. Plaintiff was awarded $23,623.99 in costs.
5. Stiffman, A snapshot of the economic status of attorneys in Michigan, 82 Mich. B. J. 20 (November 2003).
6. Smith v. Khouri, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 16, 2006 (Docket No. 262139), 2006 WL 3333669.
7. 479 Mich. 852, 734 N.W.2d 600 (2007).
8. In 2000, the name of the process described in MCR 2.403 was changed from “mediation” to “case evaluation.” The term “mediation” now applies to the process described in MCR 2.411 (domestic relations mediation).
10. MCR 2.403(O)(3) provides that a verdict must be adjusted by adding to it assessable costs and interest and that, after this adjustment, the verdict is considered more favorable to a defendant “if it is more than 10 percent below the evaluation․” As we explained in Haliw, 471 Mich. at 711, 691 N.W.2d 753, actual costs do not include attorney fees incurred when responding to appeals. Moreover, as explained in Rafferty v. Markovitz, 461 Mich. 265, 273 n. 6, 602 N.W.2d 367 (1999), attorney fees are not allowed under the court rule if they have already been recovered pursuant to a statute. As we held in Rafferty, double recovery of attorney fees under two different authorities is not appropriate, even if the authorities advance different purposes.
11. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) ( “[T]hese [attorney-fee shifting] statutes were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys․”).
12. “Reasonable fees are not equivalent to actual fees charged.” Zdrojewski, 254 Mich.App. at 72, 657 N.W.2d 721.
13. Accord Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (stating that the party seeking the fee award bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours worked and the hourly rates claimed); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).
14. These factors were traceable to Crawley v. Schick, 48 Mich.App. 728, 737, 211 N.W.2d 217 (1973). Crawley relied in part on then-applicable Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Ethics.We also stated in Wood that a trial court is not limited to those factors in making its determination and that the trial court need not detail its findings on each specific factor considered. Wood, 413 Mich. at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653. We clarify today that in order to aid appellate review, the court should briefly address on the record its view of each of the factors.
15. Wood, 413 Mich. at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653, held that trial courts were “not limited to [the six listed] factors in making [their] determination[s].” To the extent a trial court considers any factor not enumerated in Wood or MRPC 1.5(a), the court should expressly indicate this and justify the relevance and use of the new factor.
16. See n. 5, supra. The trial court did not have this report. It was first submitted to the Court of Appeals.
17. Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (C.A.11, 1988), quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (in determining hours reasonably expended, the Court should exclude “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary” hours regardless of the attorneys' skill, reputation or experience).
18. We note that the hourly rate charged by top trial attorneys in Oakland County was not a proper fact for judicial notice. A judicially noticed fact must be “one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE 201(b).
19. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088; see also Cleary v. Turning Point, 203 Mich.App. 208, 212, 512 N.W.2d 9 (1993).
20. Factor 3 under Wood, 413 Mich. at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653, and factor 4 under MRPC 1.5(a), is “the amount in question and the results achieved.” Although this factor may be relevant in other situations, we conclude that it is not a relevant consideration in determining a reasonable attorney fee for case-evaluation sanctions. As stated, the purpose of MCR 2.403(O) is to encourage serious consideration of case-evaluation awards and penalize a party that “should have” accepted the case evaluation. The rejecting party that does not achieve a more favorable result must pay reasonable attorney fees “for services necessitated by the rejection․” MCR 2.403(O)(6). It would be inconsistent with MCR 2.403(O) to reduce the accepting party's reasonable attorney fees “for services necessitated by the rejection” on the basis of the amount in question or the results achieved. If we were to do so, accepting party could have properly evaluated the case's value, yet be forced to incur additional fees, potentially in excess of the case's value. Reducing the accepting party's reasonable attorney fees necessitated by the rejection because they exceed or are disproportionate to the value the accepting party correctly assessed undermines the rule. MCR 2.403(O) penalizes the rejecting party who incorrectly valued the case, not the accepting party who correctly assessed the case's value at a much earlier and efficient time. Reducing the accepting party's reasonable attorney fees on the basis of more proportionality simply encourages the inefficiency the rule seeks to combat.Although factor 8 under MRPC 1.5(a), “whether the fee is fixed or contingent,” may be relevant in other situations, we conclude that it is not relevant in determining a reasonable attorney fee for case-evaluation sanctions. Again, sanctions under MCR 2.403 are to reimburse a party for reasonable legal fees for services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation. Whether the attorney-fee agreement is fixed or contingent is unrelated to the legal services necessitated by the rejection of a case evaluation.
1. Wood, supra at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653 (citation and quotation omitted).
3. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Davis v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., 924 F.2d 51 (C.A.3, 1991); Kreimes v. Dep't of Treasury, 764 F.2d 1186 (C.A.6, 1985).
4. See ante at 478.
5. See, e.g., Riverside, supra; Hensley, supra; Davis, supra (considering results obtained as a factor but rejecting per se proportionality rule); and Kreimes, supra (holding that proportionality should not be the sole deciding factor).
2. The trial court stated:There's no question Mr. Gittleman's a recognized practitioner in the area of dental malpractice and has superlative standing in that area, has tried numerous cases. His skill, time and labor involved here was evidence [sic] from the professional way in which this case was tried. The amount in question, the results achieved ․ that was significant. The case was of difficulty because of the complexity of the issues involved․ There were significant expense [sic] incurred based on my review of the billings and taking all of those factors into account, I think that the 450 dollars rate is reasonable.
3. The lead opinion states: “We emphasize that ‘the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’ ” Ante at 480. The majority does not explain why a sworn affidavit by an officer of the court and member of the bar is not sufficient proof of the facts attested to within it, especially when those assertions are not countered by competing evidence.
4. Indeed, the Snapshot expressly “concerns ․ the ‘average’ attorney ․ with respect to ․ hourly billing rates․” See p. 5 of the complete survey report, located at:  (accessed June 9, 2008).
5. Under the lead opinion, it is unclear which “remaining factors” are usable in this adjustment calculation. Recall that under Wood, any of the enumerated factors were usable, as well as any other relevant factors. Wood, supra at 588, 321 N.W.2d 653. Also, MRPC 1.5(a), which the lead opinion expressly incorporates, enumerates several factors that are distinct from the Wood factors. Thus, it is unclear whether the “remaining factors” usable for this adjustment are those from Wood, MPRC 1.5(a), any other relevant factor, or all of the above. If the majority aims to make appellate review of these questions more clear, this aspect of its new method is unsuccessful.
6. It is illogical that a trial court would be required to articulate its analysis of the remaining factors that it found to be inapposite. I would not require the trial court to state that it found a particular factor inapplicable, when simply not discussing that factor would suffice to convey that point.
7. The majority attempts to distinguish Randolph so that it may implement its new average-fee method (which is a modified version of the federal lodestar method that Randolph rejected) and claim that Randolph is not affected by today's decision. While I agree that Randolph dealt with a different fee-shifting statute than the case-evaluation court rule at issue here, I note that the differences are irrelevant-at least with respect to the question of reasonableness.Indeed, the statute in Randolph, MCL 213.66(3), mandates that the fee question hinge on the reasonableness of plaintiff's actual attorney fees, whereas the case-evaluation court rule only allows a reasonable attorney fee for the services the aggrieved party was forced to procure as a result of the other party's rejection of the case evaluation. In other words, this difference is only significant in the context that the fee analysis occurs: in MCL 213.66(3), the reasonableness of the fee actually charged is evaluated and under the case-evaluation court rule, the reasonableness of the services necessitated is evaluated. However, that difference does not change the main issue, which is reasonableness. Indeed, the opinion per curiam in Randolph stated that “[i]nitially, the court must determine whether the ‘owner's' attorney fees are ‘reasonable.’ ” Randolph, supra at 765, 610 N.W.2d 893. Further, in this reasonableness analysis, the Randolph Court went on to include the factors in MRPC 1.5(a), id. at 766, 610 N.W.2d 893, which are the very factors that the majority now adds to the case-evaluation fee analysis. Accordingly, despite the majority's attempt to say otherwise, the reasonableness analysis from Randolph is not so unlike that in today's case. Additionally, Randolph expressly rejected any average-fee starting point. Thus, the majority cannot have it both ways. Either the reasonableness analysis under either fee-shifting provision includes an average-fee starting point and Randolph is partially overruled, or Randolph's holding precludes the majority's new fine-tuned average-fee starting point because it expressly rejected such a method.
8. While it is true that MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) relies on the reasonable hourly rate, it nowhere mandates, or even references, a starting point that hinges on the average hourly rate.
9. The majority accepts as much in stating that the rule “only permits an award of a reasonable fee, i.e., a fee similar to that customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, which, of course, may differ from the actual fee charged․” Ante at 478 (citations omitted).
10. The majority acknowledges these purposes of MCR 2.403(O). Ante at 478.
11. It is true that in the “real world” one must assume that the value of the attorney's trial advocacy is the same from one trial to the next because attorneys do not set their fees after trial by adjusting them for the results delivered. But MCR 2.403(O) is not constrained to the pretrial analysis like the average fee is; the rule depends on the reasonable fee for the services that were necessitated by a party's rejection of a case-evaluation award.
12. I am also not persuaded by the majority's unsupported intimations that the Wood factors have been applied inconsistently and that they need a fine-tuned starting point. Nor do I accept the majority's new requirement that trial courts discuss each and every factor in order to make appellate review possible. I note that the majority sees these very problems as inconsequential in other contexts. For instance, in Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109, 133-134, 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004), the majority accepted a similarly subjective list of court-made, nonexclusive factors as giving acceptable guidance to a similar fact-intensive analysis. I dissented in Kreiner, but the majority in that case adopted a list of factors that, like the Wood factors, give no starting point, have led to seemingly disparate results, and have confounded appellate courts, as evidenced in this Court's several peremptory reversals of the genuine attempts by the Court of Appeals to apply Kreiner's amorphous factors. For the most recent examples of this reality, see Jones v. Olson, 480 Mich. 1169, 747 N.W.2d 250 (2008), and Minter v. Grand Rapids, 480 Mich. 1181, 747 N.W.2d 229 (2008). It is not clear why the Kreiner-factors method is not flawed for the same reasons that the Wood method is held to be today.
13. Moreover, this testimonial requirement has no effect on this case because defendant expressly waived an evidentiary hearing on the fee issue when the trial court offered him one.
14. While the majority allows for reference to empirical data found in surveys and other reliable reports, it only directly endorses one such report. It is unclear if there are other such acceptable reports, and what standard any other reports must meet to be admissible. Not knowing the answers to those questions, I limit my analysis to the single source that the majority endorses as acceptable.
15. I also note that this 2003 survey puts the hourly rate for the 95th percentile in the highest paying locality in Michigan at $440.
16. It is undisputed that the plaintiff's lead attorney is a specialist in the field of dental malpractice. He has extensive experience in this state and around the country in this field.
19. The majority misunderstands me when it claims that my protestations are based on the proposition that “a ‘reasonable fee’ for an exceptional lawyer cannot be determined by using the fee charged by the average attorney.” Ante at 482. This is not true. Again, my main contention is that the majority's average-fee starting point gives inordinate weight to that factor, when the rule does not mandate such a starting point. I find that the Wood-factors method provides sufficient guidance. Stated as simply as possible, my position is this: Wood is good.
ROBERT P. YOUNG, JR., J., concurs.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Berenzweig Leonard has deep transactional experience in all elements of corporate and technology law. From formation, to capital raise (angel, seed or venture capital investments), through growth and maturity stages and on to liquidity events (mergers and acquisitions), our firm provides strategic business and legal advice to founders, boards of directors and investors.
Our technology practice has included software development and licensing expertise since the “dot.com” days of 1998. We represent U.S. and international clients in the hardware, software, internet, data hosting, Cloud, government contracting and professional services industries. We have represented overseas companies doing business in the U.S. from the U.K., Scotland, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
Whether you are a start-up or an established technology company, you need knowledgeable and experienced counsel to protect your interests, help you raise capital and support you throughout your entire life cycle. We can help you achieve all of your legal goals in a cost-effective manner.
Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC v. Drew May and Merkle, Inc., Case No. 1:14-cv-1183 (E.D. Va. 2015); No. 16-1032 (4th Cir. 2017), motion for summary judgment granted representing data-based marketing company, dismissing a seven-count complaint in its entirety, which claimed over $55 million dollars in damages alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, violation of the Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia trade secret laws, intentional interference with business expectancies, and unjust enrichment; successfully preserved entirety of decision on appeal with affirmance in full by the Fourth Circuit.
Emerging Asia PTE, Ltd. v. Tinchev, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-287 (D.D.C. 2017), successfully defended against a motion for temporary restraining order by former employer alleging tortious interference, conversion of proprietary information, breach of a confidentiality agreement, civil conspiracy, and other related causes of action.
TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, No. 14-1699 (Fed. Cir.), multi-year patent infringement litigation representing patent owner at both the district court and appellate level involving technology to crowd-source the creation of digital maps; successfully appealed district court claim construction ruling, achieving complete reversal and remand.
Oracle America, Inc. v. Service Key, LLC, No. 4:12-cv-0790 (N.D. Cal.), successfully defended small business against allegations of copyright infringement relating to Unix operating system software.
Seneca One Finance, Inc. v. Kris Bloshuk, Case No. 16-cv-1848 (D. Md. 2016), motion to dismiss granted with prejudice dismissing complaint in its entirety, which alleged breach of a non-solicitation and non-competition agreement, civil conspiracy, violation of the Maryland Trade Secrets Act, and other related causes of action.
Intercom Federal Systems Corporation v. Technical and Management Resources, Inc., et al., Case No. 2013-17672 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014), secured a preliminary injunction order in Fairfax County Circuit Court, enjoining a government contractor from terminating a teaming partner from a joint venture, and also enjoining the government contractor from soliciting and/or hiring any employees or contractors of the teaming partner.
Top5, Inc. v. Core Point Consulting, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-1510 (D. Md. 2013), defended an IT company and its sole owner, who started an allegedly competing business, from claims for breach of contract, including alleged breach of various restrictive covenants. Successfully defended against a motion for temporary restraining order after the court specifically found there was no irreparable harm that would have severely limited the owner and his IT company from continuing operations.
ForceX, Inc. v. Technology Fusion, LLC et al., Case No. 4:11-cv-00088 (E.D. Va. 2011), defended a government contractor and its sole owner against a former employer against claims of breach of duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty, breach of contract, violation of Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and intentional interference with contract, all seeking punitive damages and injunctive relief. Successfully defended against a motion to expedite discovery with the court specifically finding that the former employer was unlikely to succeed on the merits and could not show irreparable harm, which a ruling subsequently resulted in the former employer withdrawing its motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Quantum Systems Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corporation, No. 1:07-cv-00491 (E.D. Va.), successfully defended large company in copyright infringement trial involving network monitoring software.
Research In Motion Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 3:08-cv-2075 (N.D. Tex.), supported counter-claim plaintiff in expert discovery portion of multi-firm patent infringement suit involving object linking and embedding software within Internet browsers.
“Overview of Cybersecurity for Commercial and GovCon Companies,” Presenter, Renaissance Forums, February 9, 2017.
“Workplace Violence & Cybersecurity.” The Business Benefits Group. Presentation, 2017.
“Introduction to the Service Contract Labor Standards.” Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM). Presentation, 2017.
“Key Risks and Common Mistakes in Administering SCA Contracts.” Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM). Presentation, 2017.
“Appeals 101: Preserving Your Trial Record and Maximizing Your Chances at Appeal.” Fairfax Bar Association. Moderator, 2017.
Software Developers Can Relax, Findley, Decoding IP Blog, 2016.
Panelist, George Mason American Inn of Court, 2016.
Panelist, The Washington West Film Festival, 2015 and 2016.
“Cover Your Tunes! Legal Protections for Musicians,” South by Southwest Festival, 2016.
“Trademark and Copyright Infringement in the Digital Age,” International Jazz Day, 2016.
“Bringing Meaning and Contribution to Business – MBA Course.” Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. Lecture, 2016.
“Newly Admitted Attorney Orientation Continuing Legal Education Course.” Fairfax Bar Association. Moderator, 2016.
“Hot Topics and Trends in Employment Law.” Insurance Marketing Center. Presentation, 2016.
Panelist for Virginia State Bar Harry L. Carrico Professionalism Course, 2014 – 2016.
“Joint Employer Doctrine Could Spell More Litigation Trouble.” DRI, The Critical Path, (Volume 19, Issue 13). 2015.
“Examining Legal Issues and Contract Disputes.” Construction Contract Workshop. Stafford County. Dec. Presentation, 2015.
“Avoiding Software Patent Quicksand,” Findley, Decoding IP Blog, 2015.
“Patent FAQs: What Happens During the Patent Process?” Findley, Decoding IP Blog, 2015.
“Patent FAQs: How Much Does it Cost?” Findley, Decoding IP Blog, 2014.
“Patent FAQs: Why Do I Need a Patent Attorney?” Findley, Decoding IP Blog, 2014.
“Five Hot Topics in Employment Law.” BB&T Insurance Services. Presentation, 2014.
Panelist for National Contract Management Association (NCMA) World Congress. 2011 – 2014.
Panelist for National Veterans Small Business Conference. 2011 – 2014.
“Contract Drafting Essentials and Defamation in the Digital Age.” The Association of Bridal Consultants. Presentation, 2013.
Our attorneys are also regularly cited as an authority on business and technology law and litigation issues in such major publications as The Washington Post, Washington Business Journal, SHRM HR Magazine, Smart CEO Magazine, and Lawyers Weekly.
Seth Berenzweig, one of the firm’s managing partners and member of the technology litigation practice, frequently appears on national and local television networks such as Fox Business News, Bloomberg Television, Fox News Channel, CNN, BBC, and D.C. television outlets discussing breaking news, including business and technology law developments, and Supreme Court rulings impacting companies.
The attorneys in our Technology Litigation group are AV® Preeminent Peer Review Rated by Martindale-Hubbell for legal ability and ethics. Several members of our firm have also successfully completed and received extensive litigation training at the National Trial Advocacy College, a week-long intensive trial course.
Berenzweig Leonard has helped us develop mutually beneficial teaming agreements that allow us to expand our range of services in order for us to receive additional revenue through third party agreements including subcontract agreements, to protect our best interests.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Civil forfeiture threatens the property rights of all Americans. These laws allow the police to seize your home, car, cash or other property upon the mere suspicion that it has been used or involved in criminal activity.
Georgia has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in the country. But, in an attempt to at least ensure civil forfeiture is subject to public scrutiny, state law requires local law enforcement agencies to annually itemize and report all property obtained through forfeiture, and what they did with it, to their local governing authorities.
Amazingly, many, perhaps most, local law enforcement agencies simply fail to issue these forfeiture reports. For these agencies, their forfeiture proceeds are “off budget” slush funds shielded from public view. Until the Institute for Justice filed a lawsuit the Atlanta Police Department, Fulton County Police Department, and Fulton County Sheriff all regularly failed to produce mandated forfeiture reports.
This dereliction of duty concerns Georgia citizens, including Ryan Van Meter, Anna Cuthrell, Joseph Kidd, Josiah Neff and Tsvetelin Tsonevski, all taxpaying residents of Atlanta and Fulton County. They filed this lawsuit to force the head officers of these three local law enforcement agencies to disclose all of the property they have seized under applicable Georgian forfeiture statues along with how they have utilized that property, preventing that property from becoming a slush fund. The issue of the case was not complicated: Law enforcement should follow the law.
Faced with no way out, all three agencies agreed to comply with state law, both for past reports and going forward, and submitted to court orders forcing them to do so. With this victory, the Institute for Justice was able to shed some light on the dark world of civil forfeiture.
Law enforcement should follow the law. In Georgia, however, local law enforcement agencies routinely ignore a simple reporting law that requires them to itemize all money and other property they acquire through civil forfeiture, and report what they do with those assets. This evasion of state law enables law enforcement to create what can only be described as hidden slush funds, as up to 100% of civil forfeiture assets can be used for law enforcement purposes. Georgia’s civil forfeiture law themselves are bad, but evading their reporting requirements make the state’s problem even worse.
Under civil forfeiture, the government may confiscate both personal and real property such as homes, cars, and even cash that are allegedly connected to the commission of a crime. Civil forfeiture differs greatly from its criminal counterpart. With criminal forfeiture, it is the owner who is on trial, and the property can only be forfeited if the owner has first been convicted of a crime. But with civil forfeiture, the government can proceed against the property directly under the legal fiction that the property somehow acted to assist in the commission of a crime.
But perhaps the most troubling aspect of modern civil forfeiture laws is the profit incentive at their core. The overriding goal for law enforcement officials—both prosecutors and police—should be fair and impartial administration of justice. Civil forfeiture law at the federal level and in over 40 states, though, dangerously transforms law enforcement priorities away from this goal and instead toward the pursuit of property and profit. Georgia is one of those states that permit police and prosecutors to keep up to 100% of forfeiture proceeds for their own use.
Across the country, civil forfeiture proceeds are notoriously opaque. Only 29 states require reporting of property seized via forfeiture and even in those states, such as in Georgia, reporting laws are not properly enforced.2 Georgia law is clear that local law enforcement agencies must publicly account for the property and assets they obtain through civil forfeiture. Yet many agencies simply chose to ignore the law. This is a breach of the public trust and a betrayal of taxpayers.
The Institute for Justice has filed a lawsuit, Van Meter v. Turner, where a group of Georgia citizens are seeking to make their own local law enforcement agencies—the Atlanta Police Department, Fulton County Police Department, and Fulton County Sheriff—follow Georgia’s forfeiture reporting law. This case, the latest by the Institute to stop forfeiture abuse on a national level, presents an opportunity to shine the light upon Georgia’s civil forfeiture practices through simply enforcing the law.
Unlike a criminal proceeding in which legal action is brought against an individual, in civil forfeiture, the government proceeds against the property directly, as if the property somehow acted to assist in the commission of a crime. It is a scheme based on 17th-century maritime law that permitted courts to obtain jurisdiction over property when it was virtually impossible to obtain jurisdiction over the property owners— pirates, for example—guilty of violating the law.
One key feature of Georgia’s civil forfeiture law is how it shifts the burden of proof in forfeiture cases. In a criminal case, the government must prove its case against the accused, who is presumed innocent. If it cannot, the accused goes free. The burden of proof is on the government. In Georgia, the burden to prove that seized assets were not related to criminal acts rests on the person whose assets were seized. In other words, the property owner is presumed guilty and has to prove his innocence to get his property back.4 And the government only needs to meet a low “preponderance of the evidence” standard to hold on to seized assets.5 This standard is significantly lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard law enforcement must meet to convict a person of a crime, again putting owners at a disadvantage.
Another reason for the D- grade is that up to 100% of forfeiture money can go to law enforcement under Georgia law.6 This provides Georgia police with a strong incentive to go after property instead of criminals. It also provides law enforcement with large amounts of cash and other assets that they do not have to get through the normal budgetary channels, i.e., convincing elected representatives to levy taxes or issue bonds. This money and property becomes a “self-funding” mechanism exempt from the democratic process.
This specific statute concerns forfeitures related to drug crimes (which in itself constitutes most civil forfeiture), but statutes of many other criminal offences incorporate the statute by reference.8 Thus, local law enforcement agencies are legally required to report almost all forfeitures proceeds.
Despite this crystal clear command, many, perhaps most, Georgia law enforcement agencies simply fail to report their forfeitures.9 Thus, millions upon millions of dollars flows every year through law enforcement coffers without notice to outside elected officials or taxpayers. The temptation for abuse with that money is obvious. The money and property obtained through forfeiture can easily turn into a slush fund. Not only that, the failure to report is in violation of state law.
It is not as though the legislature required these reports but then forgot about them. Just last year it passed a new law that requires all local units of government to make their financial records publicly available on a website run by the University of Georgia’s Carl Vinson School of Government. In addition to general budgets, the law singles out forfeiture reports, the exact same ones that law enforcement agencies chronically fail to make. Thus, not only does state law require law enforcement to account for their forfeiture money and property, but they make that accounting publicly available on the Internet. To put it bluntly, Georgia law enforcement is violating the law.
To gain some sense of the extent of forfeiture actions under Georgia law, as well as to find out whether reporting requirements are being followed, we randomly selected 20 Georgia law enforcement agencies10 and requested from each agency’s financing municipality a copy of the annual forfeiture report required by law. Only eight of the 20 surveyed municipalities responded with the relevant information.11 These reports show the receipt and expenditure of amounts between a few thousand dollars and well over half a million dollars in a single year.
However, of the eight localities that sent information only two are in full compliance with the law. The remaining six have several issues which keep them in non-compliance. First, the requests in all six of these localities were passed off to law enforcement agencies, suggesting the municipalities are not in possession of forfeiture information as the law requires. Secondly, two of the six responses did not appear to be formal reports but simply information compiled to fulfill our open records request. Finally, another two of the six municipalities did not report expenditures as required. Thus, based on this random sample, compliance with the law appears spotty at best with only two of the 20 law enforcement agencies reporting as required.
But since the random selection of agencies skewed toward smaller counties and cities, it is possible some of these smaller agencies do not participate as frequently in state-level forfeiture and therefore simply have nothing to report. To test this theory, we requested annual reports for the police departments in the five most populous counties and cities in Georgia.12 We requested these documents from both the financing municipalities and law enforcement agencies themselves to maximize the chances we would find the data we were after. In total we made 20 requests in hopes of obtaining 10 documents. We received one of the 10 reports we sought.
None of the counties sent a forfeiture report. Clayton, Fulton and Gwinnett Counties admitted no report existed in their records. Cobb and DeKalb counties sent some relevant forfeiture data, but had not completed the formal report required by law.
We then followed up by requesting copies of required reports from sheriffs’ offices in the five counties listed above. These offices were equally poor in complying with the law with none of the five supplying us with reports. The Clayton and DeKalb county sheriffs did not respond and the Cobb, Fulton and Gwinnett sheriffs sent some information but not the formal report required by law.
From this evidence it is clear that what routinely happens in Georgia is local law enforcement fails to provide forfeiture reports with their budget request, and their city and county governments fail to ask for them. Law enforcement is thumbing its nose at its citizens, keeping them in the dark on what they are doing with forfeiture money.
Ryan Van Meter is a native Georgia citizen, Atlanta resident and taxpayer, and graduate of the University of Georgia. Anna Cuthrell is also an Atlanta resident and taxpayer. Both cannot believe that their local law enforcement has been allowed to keep forfeited property and not report it to anybody.
These taxpaying residents of Atlanta and Fulton County simply want to have their own law enforcement agencies report their forfeiture practices. Thankfully, these concerned citizens can do something about the law breaking of their own law enforcement. Georgia provides citizens with a cause of action against government officials who refuse to follow mandatory public duties.15 Armed with this, they and three other residents of Atlanta and Fulton County, Joseph Kidd, Josiah Neff, and Tsvetelin Tsonevski, have joined with the Institute for Justice. They are asking the Superior Court of Fulton County to order the chief officers of the Atlanta Police Department, the Fulton County Police Department, and Fulton County Sheriff to file forfeiture reports.
The lawsuit is not the only attempt IJ is making to fight civil forfeiture abuse in Georgia. To help states improve their law, IJ commissioned a team of experts to draft a model asset forfeiture law that every state legislature could adopt completely or in parts. Building on the laws in the handful of states with good forfeiture laws, IJ released comprehensive model legislation that premised on two simple but important ideas: (1) law enforcement agencies should not profit from forfeiture and (2) a jury should find the accused guilty of a crime before the state takes final title to his or her property.
This model legislation is an important component of IJ’s strategy to ensure that every American’s property is safe from the abuse of self-enriching enforcement of asset forfeiture laws.
The model is the basis for legislation that will shortly be introduced in Georgia by Representative Wendell Willard (R – Sandy Springs), chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the Georgia State House of Representatives.
The lead attorney in this case is Institute for Justice Senior Attorney Scott Bullock, who has litigated a number of property rights challenges, especially in the realm of forfeiture and eminent domain abuse. He is joined in the litigation by Anthony Sanders, staff attorney the Institute for Justice Minnesota Chapter. Yasha Heidari of the Heidari Power Group is local counsel for the case.
The case is the latest in IJ’s ongoing forfeiture initiative. The initiative brings together various efforts, including litigation, strategic research projects, and legislation efforts. For example, IJ is currently challenging Texas’ civil forfeiture laws in litigation in that state. At the same time that case was launched in March 2010, IJ unveiled the report Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, which detailed civil forfeiture abuse and rated civil forfeiture systems in all 50 states. Further, IJ is pursuing reform in state legislatures, having authored model legislation that states can adopt in ending civil forfeiture altogether.
State of Texas v. One 2004 Chevrolet Silverado—The State of Texas took the truck of an innocent owner and refused to give it back. To right this outrage, and attack various unconstitutional aspects of Texas’ civil forfeiture laws, the Institute for Justice is representing small businessman Zaher El-Ali, a man the state admits had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity that led to his truck’s seizure.
Utahans for Property Protection—IJ represented a group of Utah citizens that filed a “notice of claim” with the attorney general of Utah, successfully forcing him to take immediate action to secure the return of the funds for forfeitures that should have gone to public education.
Wells v. City of Riviera Beach—In May 2007, the Institute for Justice successfully defeated an attempt in Riviera Beach, Fla., to displace more than 5,000 residents for a massive private development project that included a yacht marina, luxury condominiums and upscale hotels.
City of Norwood v. Horney—In a resounding repudiation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously ruled in July 2006 that the city of Norwood acted unconstitutionally by taking the homes of the Institute for Justice’s clients.
Kelo v. City of New London—Just three years after the landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kelo v. City of New London that allowed private property to be taken for economic development, 43 states have tightened their restrictions on eminent domain. In 2007, IJ client Susette Kelo’s little pink cottage—the home that became a national symbol of the fight against eminent domain abuse—was moved rather than allowing it to be demolished by the government’s wrecking ball.
The Institute for Justice is a public interest law firm that advances a rule of law under which individuals can control their destinies as free and responsible members of society. Through litigation, communication, outreach and strategic research, IJ secures protection for individual liberty and extends the benefits of freedom to those whose full enjoyment is denied by the government.
The Institute for Justice is based in Arlington, Virginia. IJ has state chapters in Arizona, Washington, Minnesota and Texas, as well as a Clinic on Entrepreneurship at the University of Chicago Law School.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Regional Income Tax Agency, acting on behalf of the village of Wellsville, v. Christopher and Amy Plant, Wellsville; collection sought of $5,127 in unpaid village income taxes between 2012 and 2016.
County Treasurer v. Margaret G. Wilkinson, et al; defendant entered into a payment plan, so delinquent property tax foreclosure put on hold.
MB Financial Bank v. Stephen E. Harrington, et al; foreclosure ordered against property on South Surry Road, East Liverpool.
County Treasurer v. Homer H. Higgins III, et al; delinquent property tax foreclosure ordered against property on Lisbon Street, East Liverpool.
County Treasurer v. James A. Herrington, et al; delinquent property tax foreclosure ordered against property on South Broadway, Salem.
PHH Mortgage Corp. v. James M. Welsh, et al; PHH asks the court to void the foreclosure decree from 2012 and dismiss the lawsuit.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.