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When the USPTO rejects patent claims to an invention as being obvious, it often combines two or more prior art references to make the rejection. The rejection may be improper if the combination proposed by the USPTO renders the prior art reference being modified inoperable for its intended purpose.
The case of Plas-Pak Indus. v. Sulzer Mixpac AG, 600 Fed. Appx. 755 (Fed. Cir 2015) provides an example of this principle (it also discloses another basis to challenge an obviousness rejection). Sulzer asserted that claims of Plas-Pak’s US Patent 7,815,384 (“Plas-Pak’s Patent”) were obvious in view of a combination of two references, U.S. Patent 6,241,125 (“Jacobsen”) and U.S. Patent Publication 2002/0170982 (“Hunter”). Plas-Pak’s Patent was directed to a device and method for mixing and dispensing multi-component paints.
Jacobsen discloses a device that dispenses fluid materials into a surface crack so as to minimize leakage. Sulzer proposed to modify the device of Jacobsen to include the spray nozzle from Hunter.
But the court found that the spray nozzle of Hunter would not obtain the objective of dispensing fluid materials into a surface crack so as to minimize leakage.
Therefore the court concluded that modifying Jacobsen to accommodate the spray nozzle of Hunter would render Jacobsen “inoperable for its intended purpose,” and a person of ordinary skill would thus not have been motivated to pursue the combination. As a result, the court concluded that the challenged claims of Plas-Pak’s patent were not obvious.
When an obviousness rejection is received, you must closely study the modified reference to determine whether the proposed modification would render it inoperable for its intended purpose. If it would, then the rejection may be improper and can be overcome on that basis.
“After experiencing a desire to invent a particular thing, I may go on for months or years with the idea in the back of my head,” said Nikola Tesla. Tesla calls this the incubation period, which precedes direct effort on the invention. Science writer, Steve Johnson, called this a slow hunch. And, in his 1940 publication, A Technique for Producing Ideas, James Young also calls it incubation as a part of the metal digestive process.
The first step is to gather raw material. Young says that we constantly try to dodge the work of gathering raw material because its “a terrible chore.” You should gather both material specific to the problem at hand and general material.
The material gathering is a life long job.
In the second step, you actively work the information over in your mind. “What you do is to take the different bits of material which you have gathered and feel them all over…with the tentacles of the mind.” He says after a while you will reach a hopeless stage where “Everything is a jumble in your mind, with no clear insight anywhere.” This is where you move to the third step.
Young says that if you really did steps 1-3 properly, in the fourth step, the idea will seem to appear out of nowhere. It will come to you when you are least expecting it.
In the last step you refine the idea to work in the real world conditions and constrains at issue.
While Young’s field is advertising, the process appears applicable to idea generation generally. Read Young’s full work for more details on the process and stories that accompany it.
When the USPTO rejects patent claims to an invention as being obvious, it often combines two or more prior art references to make the rejection. The rejection may be improper if the combination proposed by the USPTO changes the principle operation of the prior art reference being modified.
The case of Plas-Pak Indus. v. Sulzer Mixpac AG, 600 Fed. Appx. 755 (Fed. Cir 2015) provides an example of this principle. Sulzer asserted that the claims of Plas-Pak’s US Patent 7,815,384 (“Plas-Pak’s Patent”) were obvious in view of a combination of two references, U.S. Patent 4,745,011 (“Fukuta”) and U.S. Patent 3,989,228 (“Morris”). The Plas-Pak’s Patent was directed to a device and method for mixing and dispensing multi-component paints.
Fukuta disclosed a device for mixing two-component coatings but did not disclose two cylindrical cartridges and a mixing gun that were claimed in Plas-Pak’s patent. Morris disclosed two cylindrical cartridges and a mixing gun.
Sulzer proposed to replace Fukuta’s pumps, check valves, stop vales, and escape valves with the two cylindrical cartridges and a mixing gun of Morris. But, the court found that removing those pumps and valves would alter the principle operation of Fukuta. The pumps and valves where essential to the principle operation of Fukuta, which was to prevent back-flow even when the propensity for backflow occurs repeatedly and at high velocity. Fukuta was rife with statement defining the invention as adding stop valves to prevent backflow.
Therefore, when an obviousness rejection is received, you must closely study the modified reference to determine whether the proposed modification would change its principle operation. If it would, then the rejection may be improper and can be overcome on that basis.
When the USPTO rejects patent claims based on alleged obviousness, it often combines two or more prior art references to make the rejection. This combination may be challenged if one of the prior art references teaches away from the proposed combination.
For an example of this principle, consider the case of Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). There, Depuy Spine sued Medtronic Sofamor Danek for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,207,678 (“the ‘678 patent”). The ‘678 patent is directed to a pedicle screw used in spinal surgeries. A jury determined that Medtronic infringed the patent and awarded $149.1 million in lost profits damages for the sale of pedicle screws.
As a defense, Medtronic argued that the asserted claims of the ‘678 patent were invalid as obvious over the combination of two references U.S. Patent No. 5,474,555 (“Puno”) and U.S. Patent No. 2,346,346 (“Anderson”). But, the court found that Puno taught away from the proposed combination and therefore the challenged claim was not obvious over the combination of references.
Therefore, Puno taught away from the use of a compression member, which would have increased rigidity, decreased the shock absorber effect, and possibly increased the chance of failure of the screw or the bone-screw interface according to Puno. The court concluded, due to the teaching away, a person of ordinary skill would have been deterred from combining Puno and Anderson in the manner that Medtronic proposed. As a result, the challenged claim of the ‘678 patent was not invalid as obvious and the infringement judgement was upheld.
When receiving an obviousness rejection, the cited references relied on in the rejection should be studied to determine whether they teach away from the combination. If there is such as teaching away, then a response may be filed with the USPTO arguing against the obviousness rejection on that basis.
Obviousness determinations require a multifaceted consideration of the invention and the prior art.
The framework for obviousness determinations is provided by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). When considering obviousness one must (1) determine the scope and content of the prior art, (2) ascertain differences between the prior art and the claims at issue (the claimed invention), and (3) resolved the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Obviousness or nonobviousness of the invention is determined against this framework.
Further, the USPTO fact finder must provide a rationale of why the invention is obvious. The Supreme Court in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-421 (2007) made it easier for the USPTO to reject inventions as obvious. Prior to KSR, one could argue that an obviousness rejection was inproper if there was not teaching, suggestion, or motiviation to combine the prior art references. But, the court said “The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” This opened the door to the use of additional rationales and evidence to support an obviousness rejection. And, this made life harder for some patent applicants.
These rationales all rely on the predictability of the results of combining references. If the proposed combination would not have been recognized by one skilled in the art to produce predictable results, then these rationales should not apply.
Further, if one takes the example rationales of MPEP 2143 and considers them broadly it is possible that one could conclude that many patentable inventions are actually unpatentably obvious. However, you can’t take the rationales at face value because there are a host of rebuttal circumstances or circumstances where some of rationales don’t apply or would be applied only narrowly. In other words, don’t over generalize the MPEP 2143 rationales and conclude your invention is obvious.
the invention proceeds contrary to accepted wisdom in the art.
Further, the USPTO’s rationale for combining prior art references in an obviousness rejection must have an adequate evidentiary basis and there must be a connection between the rationale and the motivation to combine references in the obviousness rejection. In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); MPEP 2143. If the USPTO fails to meet these requirements the obviousness rejection can be improper.
In addition, so-called “secondary considerations” can be important to show nonobviousness. Secondary considerations may include: (1) commercial success of the claimed invention, (2) a long felt but unsolved need, or (3) failure of others.
As you can see there are several factors and elements to consider when attempting to establish obviousness or rebut it. And, the USPTO, district courts, and appeal courts, often disagree about whether a particular invention is obvious. For example, in Novartis AG v. Noven Pharmaceuticals Inc., 853 F. 3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the PTAB of the USPTO found the challenged claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,316,023 and 6,335,031 were invalid as obvious. But, based on the same evidence, a prior District court found the claims of same patents were not obvious. The different results for the same patents on the same evidence were due in part to the different standards used by the PTAB and the district court. However, these varying results say something about the difficulty in applying and predicting whether an invention is obvious.
Nevertheless, obviousness of an invention can be assessed before a patent application is filed, usually after a patent novelty search is performed. And there are several possible angles for overcoming obviousness rejections at the USPTO.
The patent rules provide that black and white line drawings are normally required for patent drawings. 37 CFR 1.84(a)(1). There is a rule for filing drawings in color, but it requires filing a petition to allow color drawings and paying a fee (for a utility patent application). MPEP 608.02(VIII). Instead of going that route, you can use certain back and white lining patterns to show color according a USPTO key, which is shown below.
The lining key is useful for showing color. But if it is important to show a particular shade of a color, then the linking key will probably not work. In that case, you will likely need to follow the rules for filing actual color drawings, petitioning, and paying the fee (for a utility patent application).
Lost profits and royalties are not the only way to measure patent damages. In Minco Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Federal Circuit recognized that a patent owner might have been entitled to damages resulting from a third parties’ purchase of the infringer’s business, if it had proven that the infringing products were an important factor in the sale.
Patent owner Minco sought damages arising from defendant infringer CE’s sale of its fused silica business to a third party. Minco sought as damages the difference between the sale price of CE’s Business and an expert valuation of CE’s business without the infringing kilns. Minco argued that if CE had not infringed, the third party would have purchased Minco’s business instead of CE’s.
The court recognized that in theory Minco might have been entitled to some recovery from CE’s sale of its business because it included infringing kilns. But, the court determined that Minco did not show that infringing kilns were an important factor in the sale. After the third party acquired CE’s business, the third party switched to its own patented furnace, which undermined Minco’s claim that kilns drove the sale.
A reasonable royalty for the infringer’s use of the invention is one way to measure damages for patent infringement (others include lost profits and established royalties).
A reasonable royalty is a amount determined by a court to result from a hypothetical negotiation between the patent owner and the infringer. The hypothetical negotiation attempts to determine the royalty that the reasonable parties would have agreed to had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began. Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This necessarily involves a degree of approximation and uncertainty.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promotor.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee — who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention — would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
[Ga.-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)].
While the Federal Circuit has approved use of the Georgia-Pacific factors, it has also said that they are a comprehensive list but unprioritized and often overlapping. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc, 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The factors are also not exclusive in that other factors could be considered.
An established royalty is one way to measure damages for patent infringement (others include lost profits and reasonable royalties).
When the patent owner has licensed its patent for comparable acts to those engaged in by the infringer, those prior licenses may define an established royalty rate. The federal circuit has said “When the patentee has consistently licensed others to engage in conduct comparable to the defendant’s at a uniform royalty, that royalty is taken as established and indicates the terms upon which the patentee would have licensed the defendant’s use of the invention.” Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
For prior negotiated royalties to provide an established royalties they need to be: (1) paid or secured before the present infringement, (2) paid by a sufficient number of persons/entities as to indicate a general acquiescence in the reasonableness of the royalty, (3) uniform at the places where the licenses where issued, (4) not paid under threat of suit, and (5) for similar rights or activities as those at issue in the present infringement. Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152 (1889).
Therefore, in many cases it will be hard to show there is an established royalty unless the patent owner is engaged in a campaign of licensing outside of litigation. Established royalties are different from reasonable royalties, which I will discuss in a later post.

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"Governments descend to the level of mere private corporation, and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen where private corporate commercial paper [i.e. Federal Reserve Notes] and securities i.e.[checks, etc] is concerned. ...For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government." Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank, 9 Wheaton (22 U.S.) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24; U.S. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242; In re King - Porter Co., CA 5th, 1971, 446 F.2d 722, 732. And; See also 22 U.S.C.A. 286(e), the real party in interest is not the de jure "United States of America" or "State", but "The Bank" and "The Fund." (22 U.S.C.A. 286, et seq., C.R.S. 11-60-103).
"Governments lose their immunity and descend to level of private corporations when involved in commercial activity enforcing negotiable instruments, as in fines, penalties, assessments, bails, taxes, the remedy lies in the hand of the state and its municipalities seeking remedy." Rio Grande v. Darke, 167 P. 241. And; "Governments are corporations." Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dallas 55. And; Private corporations and their officers are not immune from civil damages.
"The principles of estoppel apply against the state as well as individuals." (Cal. v. Sims, 32 C3d 468).
Clearfield Doctrine Why its Crucial to Know Government is a Corporation and Not a Government!
The Clearfield Doctrine proves when governments descend to the corporate level they CEASE to be governmental entities.
It is well settled that an officer must be either elected, appointed or commissioned. Employees cannot be made officers “by virtue of their employment.” Even if they could, I.C. 59-703 (9) states.
“ . . . the government descended to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character of a mere private citizen . . . For the purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from government.” Bank of U.S. v. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 22 U.S. 904, U.S. v. Erie Ry Co., 106 U.S. 327; Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
“a person appointed or elected to a position of responsibility or authority in government or a private organization.” Random House Webster’s Dictionary of the Law, p. 307.
"That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
"a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
I think we have done that admirably. Just get on the internet and read all about it. The causes are numerous, well documented, articulately presented and undeniable. Problem is, not enough people are well enough informed -- they're getting there, and the bloodsucking leech politicians won't give up their cash cow so easily. So, ultimately, it is not up to us to decide how they will close up shop and go home, it is up to THEM. We need only be willing to implement their choice. And, if organized government is not possible because of inherent human greed and weakness then so be it.
All courts in this State and every other State of the Union, operate under the "Clearfield Doctrine" from the case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. US, 318 US 363, (1943).
The definition of "money" becomes extremely relevant once the above is known and understood. So, the question is now "What is the substance of the money used by the government entity coming against you"? "MONEY" as defined in the Constitution for the several States united at Article I, section 10, clause 1 or "MONEY" as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) adopted by your states legislature? In Michigan, see Michigan Compiled Laws section 440.1101, et seq., under definitions. The UCC itself states that its definitions are controlling over dictionary definitions.
When any State agency come against you, normally no Constitutional arguments can be allowed since it is presumed that you are dealing, knowingly, voluntarily and willfully, in the commercial law of contracts, implied or written. In that "State" (State of the Forum), you loose all protections of both State and Federal Constitutions. If this is your first encounter with the term "State" be advised that it does not mean the geographical area that you live in. The term "state" has at least seven (7) meanings in most dictionaries. Please look it up in a Black's Law Dictionary and you will find there is even a great difference between the defined meanings of the words State" and "state".
The political, colorable, corporate "State" does not appear as a word in the Holy Bible. However, the word State does come from the Greek root word "stato" which means "to stand". A State is something that stands stationary, fixed or established. "Establishments" exist only in the common thoughts created and sustained in the minds of men. It is a "legal fiction" or a "fiction of law". A State is a corporate fiction existing purely in thought. Corporations, and similar creations, are all fictions made up in men's minds. Mere imagination! Fictional, meaning neither natural nor existing of themselves. LIES. They exist by the mutual agreement of the thoughts of men. Likewise a State exists only in the minds of men. It is not the real state, that being the physical ground and the real people located thereupon. The State cannot be seen, talked to, harmed, injured, damaged, touched, made love to, moved to tears or write you a letter. It has all of the emotions of today's computer. It is a political creation designed to protect and/or control a certain object. It is not a Biblical concept.
Point 071(b). Affiant has no record or evidence that the Clearfield Doctrine is not in full force and effect against all fictions, including, among others, all governments, their agents/agencies, officers, employees, and other affiliates.
ADMIT - Libellees listed within this document admit and agree that the Clearfield Doctrine applies to them in its entirety.
"As the use of private corporate commercial paper [Federal Reserve notes], debt currency or securities [checks] is concerned, removes the sovereignty status of the government of "We the People" and reduces it to an entity rather than a government in the area of finance and commerce as a corporation or person. "Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen. This entity cannot compel performance upon its corporate statute or rules unless it, like any other corporation or person is the holder-in-due course of some contract or commercial agreement between it and the one upon whom the payment and performance are made and are willing to produce said documents and place the same evidence before trying to enforce its demands called statutes". For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 318 US. 363-371.
NOTE: Under the Clearfield Doctrine, the courts are no longer government entities in that they are demanding private monies and must have a contract with you to compel performance. They are no more special as a normal business than your local Jack In The Box.
Did the court make payment [on the record, or by way of agreement] of any entry fees, etc.?
If one USD is given, or demanded, [species] HJR 192 is over-riden and all Instruments have become "bogus financial instruments" involving private creditors and all "enjoined in the fraud" may be prosecuted under a variety of statutes; conspiracy (18 U.S.C. Sec 371); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. Sec 1341); uttering a false security (18 U.S.C. Sec 472); bank fraud (18 U.S.C. Sec 1344); and possessing and uttering a counterfeit security (18 U.S.C. Sec 513). SEE, United States v. Uullman, 187 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wells, 163 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 1998).

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[204 U.S. 632, 633] The plaintiff in error, a citizen of New York, brought in the circuit court for the northern district of Texas a petition to try the title to 1, 280 acres of land, against ten defendants, citizens either of Texas, Kentucky, or Illinois. Six of the defendants were warrantors of the plaintiff's title, and questions arising as to them are not material here. The petition alleged that upon January 15, 1902, 'the defendants Reagan, Smith, Greer, and Deven unlawfully entered upon said premises and dispossessed plaintiff thereof, and have since that date unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff the possession thereof, to his damage $2,000. 00;' that the plaintiff's title was derived by mesne conveyances from two patents of adjoining lots of land, known respectively as survey 27 and survey 91; that prior to plaintiff's acquisition of title the two surveys were circumscribed by a fence 2 miles long and 1 mile wide, making a single tract of land of those dimensions; that the value of the land was $ 5,000, and that the defendants have destroyed fences and other improvements and thereby damaged the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000; and prayed possession of the land, and damages.
The answer of Reagan alleged that he was the owner of part of the land described in the petition by a title separate and independent from the other defendants; that his land is inclosed by a fence and in his possession; that he disclaims title to the remainder of the land claimed; that the allegation in the petition that he entered [204 U.S. 632, 634] upon any other than his own land was untrue, 'and made with the intent to confer upon this court jurisdiction over him;' that the value of the land which he entered, is in possession of, and claims is less than $800, and asked that the suit abate as to him.
Treating the foregoing answer as a plea in abatement, Reagan, without waiving it, further answered, disclaiming as to part of the land claimed in the petition and pleading the general issue as to the remainder.
The answer of Greer was substantially the same, except that the value of the land upon which he entered and was possessed of was alleged to be less than $600. Greer further answered, alleging the pendency in the courts of the state of an action 'to try title to recover of S. A. Greer, a defendant in the case at bar, one T. Smith and others, the title and possession of the land described in the petition in the case at bar,' and praying that the cause await the determination of the cause in the state court. The answer of Smith contained the same allegation with regard to the pendency of the action in the state court as that of Greer, disclaimed as to part of the land described in the petition, and pleaded the general issue as to the remainder. Deven filed no answer.
Subsequently Smith amended his answer and alleged that he was the owner and in possession of 443 acres of the land described in plaintiff's petition, which was of the value of $1,500, and disclaimed as to the remainder. He also alleged that the valuation placed by the plaintiff on the land, and the plaintiff's allegation that 'he and S. A. Greer jointly took possession of said lands,' was 'fraudulently claimed and alleged for the intent and purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon this honorable court, when in truth and in fact no such jurisdiction existed, because the whole matter in controversy is and was of less value than $2,000.' He further alleged that the controversy had been adjudicated in the state court. The pleas to the jurisdiction were, on motion of the defendants, tried by the judge, jury being waived, who found that 'the pleas of each of the said defendants Reagan, Lee, Smith, and Greer is fully proved and sustained, and that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter in dispute,' and dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. A writ of error was allowed 'solely upon the question of jurisdiction,' the judge, certifying that no other question was tried, transmitted the record containing a bill of exceptions to this court.
The bill of exceptions shows that it was agreed that the plaintiff owned the two surveys, 91 and 27, containing 1,280 acres, of a value much exceeding $2,000; that Lee owned section 32, Reagan section 31, Smith section 28, and Greer [204 U.S. 632, 636] section 90, all of which were adjoining sections and surrounded three sides of the plaintiff's land. The dispute concerned the situation of the boundaries. As the defendants claimed the boundaries, they owned 1,014 acres of what the plaintiff claimed to be his land, which, when he acquired it, was inclosed by a fence in one parcel of 1,280 acres. Of the 1,014 acres taken from the land claimed by plaintiff, Lee claimed 96, Reagan 288, Smith 443, and Greer 187. The evidence, which is reported in full in the bill of exceptions, shows the following facts: In 1892, before any of the defendants appeared claiming title, the 1,280 acres claimed by the plaintiff was inclosed as one parcel by a substantial fence, and was known as the Pendleton pasture. Subsequently the plaintiff acquired title to the inclosed land. Smith pulled down part and Reagan another part of the Pendleton pasture fence, and Smith and Greer each pastured their cattle throughout the Pendleton pasture.
Messrs. David T. Bomar and Frank E. Dycus for plaintiff in error.
[204 U.S. 632, 638] Messrs. Theodore Mack, Sam J. Hunter, and Ray Hunter for defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error brought an action in the circuit court for the recovery of certain land and damages for the detention thereof, basing jurisdiction upon a diversity of citizenship, which was undisputed. In such case it is essential to the jurisdiction of the circuit court that 'the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of [204 U.S. 632, 640] $2,000.' Act of March 3, 1875, chap. 137, 1, 18 Stat. at L. 470; amended act of August 13, 1888, chap. 866, 1, 25 Stat. at L. 434, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508. The action was dismissed by the authority given by 5 of the act of March 3, 1875, in which it is provided that 'if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court, . . . it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought, . . . that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to such suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined either as plaintiffs or defendants for the purpose of creating a case cognizable . . . under this act,' the court shall dismiss the suit. The propriety of the dismissal is brought here for review by virtue of 5 of the act of March 3 1891 [26 Stat. at L. 827, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 549], and is the only question for decision.
The plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of a quadrangular lot of land 2 miles long and 1 mile wide, containing 1,280 acres, inclosed by a fence, and known as the Pendleton pasture. Its value largely exceeded $2, 000. He sought to recover possession of this land and damages from the defendants Reagan, Smith, Greer, Deven, and Lee, who, as he claimed, had disseised him of the land, and were unlawfully holding possession. In ascertaining the precise nature of the plaintiff's claim we take into account not only the original petition, but that pleading entitled 'First amended original petition,' although it is urged that it does not appear that the amendment was allowed by the court. It is not clear that the amendment adds anything material to the question presented here, to the original petition, but, however that may be, as it is certified to be a part of the record and was answered by one of the defendants, we assume that it was properly allowed, and was not a mere casual intruder among the papers in the case. The plaintiff alleged in substance in the original, and more specifically in the amended, petition that the defendants had jointly entered upon, taken, and held possession of, his land, which was of the value of $5,000, and [204 U.S. 632, 641] inflicted damages of $2,000 upon him by the unlawful entry and possession, and sought to recover of all the defendants the whole parcel of land and all the damages claimed. Thus the plaintiff set forth a case within the jurisdiction of the court. Giving to the defendants' answers the broadest possible effect, they each, for the purpose of disputing the jurisdiction of the court, denied that they had jointly entered upon plaintiff's land, and, each disclaiming as to the remainder, alleged that, under a title separate and independent from the other defendants, he had entered upon and held possession of only a certain part of the plaintiff's land, which, together with the damages inflicted by the entry and possession, was of much less value than $2,000. The answers further alleged that the allegations of the value of the land, the extent of the damages, and the joint action of the defendants in entering, taking, and holding possession, were fraudulently made by the plaintiff with the intent and purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the court, when in truth no such jurisdiction existed, because the matter in controversy was in reality less than the value of $2,000. Upon the motion of the defendants the judge, without a jury, passed upon the question of jurisdiction, and, after hearing evidence, found that the pleas of the defendants as to the jurisdiction were 'fully proved and sustained,' and that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter in dispute, and dismissed the suit.
The order of the court is subject to review in this court in respect of the rulings of law and findings of fact upon the evidence. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115 , 42 L. ed. 682, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293.
(3) That the plaintiff, in his petition, had fraudulently stated the value of his land, the extent of his damages, and the joint character of defendants' action in entering and taking possession of his land, and had done this for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the court.
Nevertheless, however stringent and farreaching the rule may be that it is the plaintiff's statement of his case which governs in determining the jurisdiction, it does not exclude the power of the court to protect itself against fraud. This was pointed out in Smith v. Greenhow, ubi supra, where it was said that, if the court found as a fact that the damages were laid in the declaration colorably and beyond a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating jurisdiction, there would be authority for dismissing the case; and, following this statement of the law, it was held that where the judge of the circuit court, upon sufficient evidence, found that the damages had been claimed and magnified fraudulently beyond the jurisdictional amount, the action should be dismissed. Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co. 190 U.S. 540 , 47 L. ed. 1171, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754. It follows, therefore, as has been said, that if the third finding of the judge in the court below was warranted, his action in dismissing the case should be affirmed. But, after an examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion [204 U.S. 632, 644] that nothing in it warranted any such finding. It appeared clearly that the Pendleton pasture, which the plaintiff sought to recover against all the defendants, was of a value much in excess of the jurisdictional amount. There was not a word of evidence reflecting upon the plaintiff's good faith in bringing the action, in joining the defendants, or in framing his petition. He doubtless preferred to try his controversy in the Federal courts, and, whatever the motive of his preference may have been, he had the right to act upon it. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400 , 50 L. ed. 801, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Chicago v. Mills (decided February 4, this term) 204 U.S. 321 , 51 L. ed. 504, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286. Therefore the validity of the order of dismissal must be considered, after an elimination of the finding that the plaintiff's claim was fraudulently made.
The plaintiff's claim, which we now assume to have been made in good faith, was that the defendants, acting together, took and held from him land of the value of $5,000, and at the same time inflicted damages upon him of $2,000. Upon any possible theory of law this claim states the plaintiff's side of a controversy which is unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. When it is duly put in issue by the defendants' pleadings the record upon its face discloses a controversy between citizens of different states, in which 'the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000 in value,' and, therefore, one which is within the exact words of the act conferring jurisdiction upon that court. It is legally possible for the plaintiff to recover the full amount of all the land and the full amount of the damages claimed. We know of no case that holds that in such a situation the judge of the circuit court is authorized to interpose and try a sufficient part of the controversy between the parties to satisfy himself that the plaintiff ought to recover less than the jurisdictional amount, and to conclude, therefore, that the real controversy between the parties is concerning a subject of less than the jurisdictional value, and we think that, by sound principle, he is forbidden to do so. In exercising the authority to dismiss the action conferred by the act of 1875 [204 U.S. 632, 645] the judge may proceed upon motion of the parties or upon his own motion, and, if he chooses, without trial by jury. Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 , 26 L. ed. 719; Wetmore v. Rymer, ubi supra. Such an authority obviously is not unlimited, and its limits ought to be ascertained and observed, lest, under the guise of determining jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy between the parties be summarily decided without the ordinary incidents of a trial, including the right to a jury. For it must not be forgotten that where, in good faith, one has brought into court a cause of action which, as stated by him, is clearly within its jurisdiction, he has the right to try its merits in the manner provided by the Constitution and law, and cannot be compelled to submit to a trial of another kind. This was clearly stated by Mr. Justice Matthews in Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S., at page 565, 29 L. ed., at page 734, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., at page 509, who said: 'In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and measure of that justice which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional tribunal to award.' In applying these general principles for the purpose of ascertaining the limits of the authority to dismiss summarily for lack of jurisdiction, the circumstance that, in this case, a jury was waived by the parties, is without significance, because, if the judge had authority to adopt this summary method, he could dispense with the jury whether the parties agreed to it or not.
The error into which the judge in the court below has fallen is shown by an analysis of his findings. He did not find that the land which the plaintiff claimed to recover was not of a value in excess of $2,000, but that parts of that land which each defendant claimed that the plaintiff ought only to recover against him were each of less than the value of $2, 000. As the plaintiff alleged, and the defendants denied, that the defendants jointly took and held his whole lot of land, the judge, on the conceded value of the plaintiff's land, in order to have arrived at the conclusion that the case should be dismissed, [204 U.S. 632, 646] must have found that the defendants had not jointly taken and held the whole of the plaintiff's land. In doing this we think he exceeded his authority under the statute, and, in determining the jurisdiction, in effect decided the controversy between the parties upon the merits. In deciding that the defendants had not acted jointly, as the plaintiff alleged and the defendants denied, he determined not a jurisdictional fact, but an essential element of the merits of the dispute upon which the parties were at issue.
An assumption which underlay the action of the court below in dismissing the case evidently was that, if the defendants, as they asserted in their pleadings, had each, acting by virtue of a separate and independent title, taken and held a part only of the plaintiff's land, each part being less than the jurisdictional amount, although the whole was of more than the jurisdictional amount, there was no controversy within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The correctness of this assumption of law has been argued before us by the parties. We do not deem it necessary to decide that question. There is certainly respectable authority which tends to show that in such a case the plaintiff, being the owner of a single lot of land, may maintain one action against all the defendants, and that the measure of jurisdiction is the value of the plaintiff's land, and not the value of the part held by each defendant. The appropriate rule, however, to be applied to the facts of this case, can be better determined in a trial on the merits, where instructions on their varied aspects may be given to the jury, subject to the review provided by law.
Because the circuit court erred in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, its action must be reversed.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed and the cause remanded to that court with directions to take such further proceedings therein as the law requires and in conformity with this opinion.
[ Footnote 1 ] U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 511.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., AND WESTERN THRIFT & LOAN, DEFENDANTS.
 The plaintiffs, Joseph and Roxanne Darling, have designated TJ Henderson, a consumer advocate and self-styled “auditor” of consumer mortgage loans, to offer expert testimony to the effect that, among other things, the Darlings “are unsophisticated borrowers [who] had no idea what was taking place” with a loan issued by defendant IndyMac Bank and brokered by co-defendant Western Thrift & Loan, that the loan in question was fraudulent and predatory due to the way in which the defendants made, or failed to make, required disclosures in various closing documents and other communications, and that these circumstances give rise to “a continuing right to rescind the loan transaction.” (Aff. of TJ Henderson ¶¶ 1-3, Doc. No. 18-2.) In addition to these opinions, Mr. Henderson would testify that the defendants’ conduct violated a number of state and federal laws. (Id. ¶ 3.) The defendants ask the Court to exclude any such testimony on the grounds that the opinions impermissibly intrude upon the Court’s duty to instruct on the law, the designated expert is not qualified to testify about the standard of care that applies to mortgage lenders and brokers, the opinions impermissibly and unhelpfully characterize the plaintiffs’ mental capacity, and the designation fails to fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B). (Mot. to Exclude, Doc. No. 18.) The motion is GRANTED IN PART.
 e. failure to provide the required HUD booklet on loans, referencing 12 U.S.C. § 2406 et seq.
 8. That these violations expose the lender to severe penalties, which he then characterizes (id. ¶ 5).
 Western challenges TJ Henderson’s proposed testimony on Rule 26 and Rule 702 grounds. (Mot. to Exclude, Doc. No. 18.) I address the Civil Rules issue first and then turn to the evidentiary challenge.
 Western argues that Mr. Henderson’s testimony should be excluded because it “consists almost entirely of unsupported legal conclusions that merely advocate the positions of his retainers,” without articulating any industry standards or other reasons in support of his conclusions. (Mot. to Exclude at 12.) Western also notes that the Darlings failed to disclose the expert compensation they are providing to Mr. Henderson. (Id.) Rule 26 and the Court’s scheduling order require that an expert disclosure set forth a “complete statement of all opinions . . . and the basis and reasons therefor.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Scheduling Order at 2, Doc. No. 13. Both the Rule and the scheduling order also call for a disclosure of, among other things, the compensation to be paid to the expert for his or her work and testimony.
 In regard to Mr. Henderson’s compensation, the Darlings report that they made no disclosure because they had engaged and paid Mr. Henderson to conduct an audit of their mortgage loan prior to commencing this litigation, that no fee has been requested for the Henderson affidavit that comprises Mr. Henderson’s “report” because it is just a restatement of his audit, and that the defendants have not deposed Mr. Henderson so there has been no occasion to determine what compensation he would require for services as an expert witness. (Pl.’s Opposition at 4, Doc. No. 23.) Although this manner of proceeding is unorthodox, I can discern no prejudice to the defendants from the mere fact that they do not yet know what, if any, compensation Mr. Henderson will receive for his litigation-related services. This failure of disclosure does not independently warrant the exclusion of Mr. Henderson’s opinions. The Darlings are required, however, to make a supplemental disclosure setting forth the terms of Mr. Henderson’s compensation as soon as they are established, or by the close of discovery, whichever occurs sooner.
 The second aspect of Western’s Rule 26 argument is that Mr. Henderson’s opinions should be excluded because the Darlings have not, in Western’s view, disclosed the basis and reasons for the opinions, only “unsupported legal conclusions.” (Mot. to Exclude at 12.) I conclude that this issue is best addressed as an evidentiary matter under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than as a disclosure matter under Rule 26. The Darlings have made a disclosure of Mr. Henderson’s opinions and the reasons he offers for them. To the extent the Darlings are able to demonstrate that the basis and reasons they offer satisfy the standards of Rule 702 they will to that same extent meet the disclosure requirement of Rule 26.
 Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court discussed the gate-keeping role federal judges play under Rule 702 in screening unreliable expert opinion from introduction in evidence. Id. at 597. That role is “to ensure that an expert’s testimony ‘both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.'” United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2002). The proponent of the expert opinion must demonstrate its reliability, but need not prove that the opinion is correct. Id. at 63. “Once a trial judge determines the reliability of the expert’s methodology and the validity of his reasoning, the expert should be permitted to testify as to inferences and conclusions he draws from it and any flaws in his opinion may be exposed through cross-examination or competing expert testimony.” Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (D. Me. 2005). “Vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. It has been said that, ultimately, the Court must determine simply whether “the testimony of the expert would be helpful to the jury in resolving a fact in issue.” Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., 202 F.3d 376, 380 (1st Cir. 2000).
 1. Legal conclusions cannot be countenanced, but testimony concerning regulatory compliance should be facilitated rather than barred where regulatory compliance is at the heart of the case and the plaintiffs are not independently qualified to discuss the regulatory framework.
 Western’s overarching theme is that the proposed opinion testimony is riddled with statements of legal standards and legal conclusions that are not really opinions at all. (Mot. to Exclude, passim.) It is the Court’s duty, naturally, to instruct the jury*fn3 concerning the applicable legal standards that govern this action. Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1997). It will fall to the fact witnesses to provide the jury with evidence of the facts and circumstances that gave rise to this action. The question, then, is whether Mr. Henderson, by dint of his mortgage auditing experience and any specialized knowledge he possesses, might be able to help the jury better understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue. Id. at 100. The Darlings assert in their opposition that Mr. Henderson will be able to articulate “various improprieties with the loan/mortgage transaction and documentation,” listing his observations that certain required documentation was missing and that the APR and finance charge calculations were erroneous. (Pls.’ Opposition at 1-2.) However, they acknowledge the appearance of a problem, noting, “if and to the extent that Mr. Henderson has gone beyond those factual observations and opined that same represent violation(s) of law, his testimony can be easily limited/prescribed at trial to conform to an appropriate scope.” (Id. at 2.) I fail to understand why this particular problem should not be addressed ahead of trial. Mr. Henderson should not be permitted to take the witness stand and simply state such things as “this loan is fraudulent and consists of unjust enrichment and is predatory in nature.” (TJ Henderson Aff. ¶ 3(i).) However, in fairness, it does not appear likely that that would be the extent of his testimony. Although Mr. Henderson’s affidavit is peppered with recitations of legal conclusions, his material opinions are really quite straightforward: (1) certain required TILA disclosures and/or documents were missing and (2) certain required disclosures were false. He is able to draw the first conclusion based on an audit of the closing documents. He has articulated which documents were missing. He is able to draw the second conclusion based on independent calculations. It is not difficult to conclude that the typical layperson would be unable to review a set of mortgage loan closing documents to assess whether a particular, required document was present or not. Nor is it difficult to imagine that the typical layperson would not be familiar with calculating finance charges and annual percentage rates. In other words, there does not appear to be anything inherently wrong with having an expert state that certain required documents were missing from the closing documents of a transaction or that certain calculations were erroneous, without straying into the territory of legal conclusions such as that the loan is “unjust” or “predatory,” or that it gives rise to liability or justifies any particular remedy. Thus, I conclude that the “legal conclusion” argument for exclusion does not entirely undermine Mr. Henderson’s audit or his opinions as to regulatory compliance. It does, however, call for a limitation to be placed on Mr. Henderson’s testimony. There is no reason apparent in this case why Mr. Henderson should need to tell the jury what the penalties of noncompliance are, what remedies are appropriate (such as contract rescission, which is an equitable remedy reserved to the Court, in any event), that the circumstances demonstrate unjust enrichment, predatory lending or fraud. Those particular opinions are hereby excluded on the ground that they are inappropriate legal conclusions and, as such, would not really help the jury make sense of the facts.
 There remains the matter of how to best address testimony to the effect that certain conduct was “in violation of TILA” or other federal or state laws and regulations. The issue of how to handle testimony concerning regulatory compliance is not as easy to resolve as either party suggests. In this case, although an expert might need to speak in terms of the TILA’s regulatory framework in order to discuss regulatory compliance, that is not necessarily the same thing as instructing the jury on issues of law or merely reciting legal conclusions. On the other hand, for testimony about noncompliance to have meaning there is a need to convey to the fact finder that there exists a regulatory framework that mandates compliance. Probably the most appropriate way to handle a situation like this one is not to preclude the testimony altogether, but to provide the jury with preliminary instructions concerning the regulatory framework and require the expert to couch his compliance testimony in terms of the Court’s instructions on the law, rather than in terms of his private characterizations of the law. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (taking this approach in a criminal case involving FDA regulatory “enforcement policies”). Alternatively, the Court could leave for trial the task of drawing the “fine” distinction between proper expert testimony and legal conclusions, to avoid setting an over-exacting standard in a case that appears to turn almost entirely on regulatory compliance. See, e.g., TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 F. Supp. 2d 171, 181-82 (N.D. N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he Court is reluctant to preclude all testimony regarding FCC criteria at this early stage. If a proper foundation is laid and Kravtin can establish a nexus between the FCC criteria and the facts here, her testimony may be appropriate.”).
 2. The Darlings’ expert disclosure is sufficient to qualify Mr. Henderson to testify about regulatory compliance matters, but not about the customs and practices of mortgage loan brokers and lenders.
 Western’s next argument is that Henderson should not be permitted to testify about any deviation from customary practice because he is not a broker with experience in mortgage lending or any professional license in that commercial practice area. (Mot. to Exclude at 9-10.) The Darlings respond that it is “premature” for the Court to conclude that Mr. Henderson lacks the qualifications “to render opinions describing the applicable yield rate, actual and stated percentage interest rates and the presence of hidden and undisclosed charges.” (Pls.’ Opposition at 3.) They say that they are not required to retain a “blue-ribbon practitioner,” quoting United States v. Malone, 453 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir 2006). (Id. at 3-4.) They do not expand upon the qualifications set forth in Mr. Henderson’s resume and affidavit.
 Based on a review of the expert disclosure materials, Mr. Henderson has been obtaining education in law and consumer protection since 1989, practiced law for five years in certain county courts in Washington, participated in at least eight seminars and workshops on the TILA between 2002 and 2006, and has been active with four “companies” in organized efforts to combat predatory lending. The companies in question are Co3m, Premier Mortgage Auditing, Advocates for Justice, and Consumer Guardian. Henderson is currently the president and owner of Consumer Guardian. Mr. Henderson’s affidavit indicates that he has been “in the mortgage auditing business for 9 years and legal industry for the past 15 years.” (TJ Henderson Aff. at 1.) Henderson’s affidavit does not otherwise elaborate on any of the qualifications sketched out in his resume, such as by better describing the work performed by the companies he has worked for or the type of legal work he used to perform in Washington.
 An expert’s qualifications, like other issues addressed to the admissibility of an expert’s opinions, “should be established by a preponderance of proof.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. The proponent of the challenged evidence carries the burden of proof. The proponent must not assume that an evidentiary hearing will be held; the Court has the discretion to decide the motion on briefs and with reference to expert reports, depositions and affidavits on record. United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2002).
 The trouble here is that the Darlings have designated an unconventional expert and given short shrift to Western’s arguments that their designee has questionable qualifications. The fact that Mr. Henderson is an unconventional expert is not a bar in itself, but there needs to be some reassurance here that Mr. Henderson’s specific training and experience make him a suitable person to educate the jury about issues of fact. Instead, the Darlings rest on Mr. Henderson’s resume and affidavit and casually argue that the record does not in its present state prove he is not qualified, partly because Western has not deposed Mr. Henderson. (Pls.’ Opposition at 3.) I conclude on this record that Mr. Henderson’s qualifications to address the specific issue flagged here by Western, i.e., the customs and practices of mortgage lenders and brokers, are not adequately established. That does not mean, however, that Mr. Henderson is unqualified to serve as an expert witness regarding compliance with the TILA regulatory framework and related consumer law. Mr. Henderson has made a practice of educating himself on consumer law matters, including the requirements of the TILA, and he has worked for several years consulting with borrowers to determine whether the mortgage loans they have entered into have complied with that law and others. Thus, he appears to be suited to the task of helping to shepherd the Darlings’ regulatory compliance claims through the trial process, provided he does so within appropriate parameters set by the Court to prevent him from purporting to state the law to the jury.*fn4 He may not, however, speak to what is customary practice among mortgage lenders and brokers, only to what is required by the regulatory framework.
 3. Mr. Henderson’s views concerning the Darlings’ relative sophistication and their understanding of the terms of the loan are unreliable and unhelpful and must be excluded.
 Western challenges Mr. Henderson’s basis and qualifications to offer opinions about the Darlings’ level of sophistication or their level of knowledge about the terms of the transaction they entered into. (Mot. to Exclude at 11.) The Darlings do not even attempt to preserve these facets of their expert disclosure. As there is no apparent basis to support a finding that Mr. Henderson is qualified to testify-or possesses specialized knowledge enabling him to testify-about the Darlings’ level of sophistication or their understanding of the loan’s terms, these opinions are excluded. Mr. Henderson may discuss what he considers to be noncompliant disclosures without having to opine that the Darlings were actually misled.
 For the reasons stated above, Western’s motion to exclude the testimony of TJ Henderson is GRANTED, IN PART. Mr. Henderson is precluded from testifying about the penalties and remedies available in cases of regulatory noncompliance. He is also precluded from testifying that the circumstances of this case demonstrate unjust enrichment, predatory lending or fraud. Additionally, Mr. Henderson is precluded from testifying about the customary practices observed by mortgage lenders and brokers. Finally, Mr. Henderson is precluded from characterizing the Darlings’ level of sophistication or their level of knowledge about the terms of the transaction they entered into.
 Any objections to this Order shall be filed in accordance with Fed.R.Civ. P. 72. So Ordered.
 *fn1 Components of the Truth in Lending Act are distributed throughout the United States Code. The sections cited here, as cited by the Darlings in their pleadings, refer to the TILA’s consumer credit cost disclosure provisions.
 *fn3 Because the Darlings’ plea for relief requests more than equitable remedies, there is a legal component to their TILA claim that is properly submitted to a jury in light of their jury demand. See Franklin v. Hartland Mortgage Ctrs., Inc., No. 01 C 2041, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24238 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2001) (order on motion to strike jury demand) (concluding in a TILA action that the plaintiff had the right to have his claim for statutory damages submitted to the jury and quoting Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959)) (“[W]hen legal and equitable claims are joined in one action, absent exceptional circumstances, a litigant has a right to have the issues common to the legal and equitable claims tried first to a jury”)). Additionally, the claims against Western are traditional tort claims appropriately tried to a jury.
 *fn4 In its reply, Western argues for the first time that Mr. Henderson’s percentage rate calculations and finance charge calculations should be excluded because there are merely factual matters for which no expert testimony is needed or which should be presented by an accountant. (Def.’s Reply at 1, Doc. No. 24.) I disagree with Western’s contentions. Mr. Henderson discloses that performing these calculations is part of his auditing function and it seems plain that the average layperson is not accustomed to computing annual percentage rates or even finance charges. Having someone other than the plaintiffs articulate the process is apt to save time at trial and prove beneficial to the jury.


Respondent was the successful bidder on an invitation for bids to construct military housing. It received a letter of acceptability which provided that, unless the contract were closed in a specified time, the Air Force could cancel the bid, which decision, under a disputes clause, was final unless appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals within 30 days. A disagreement arose, the contract was not closed, and the bid was cancelled. Respondent appealed to the Board of Contract Appeals, which dismissed the appeal as untimely without considering the merits of the case. Respondent then filed suit in the Court of Claims to recover its bid deposit and for damages. That court held that the appeal to the Board was timely, and that the Board erred in not reaching the merits. The court then remanded the case to its trial commissioner to make a record and consider the merits. The Government challenged this procedure.
Held: The Court of Claims should have returned the dispute to the Board for consideration of the merits, in accordance with the contractual agreement of the parties. United State v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, 373 U. S. 717-718. Pp. 384 U. S. 428-433.
170 Ct.Cl. 688, 345 F. 2d 808, reversed.
courts is limited to the administrative record made below in determining the finality to be given departmental decisions and findings made by a Board of Contract Appeals pursuant to a standard government disputes clause. In the present case, we are called upon to decide whether the reviewing court or the Board of Contract Appeals should make the original record on an issue which the Board did not resolve because it erroneously dismissed the appeal before it as untimely.
first the Housing Commissioner and then the Department of the Air Force to raise the contract price. These requests were refused, and respondent then notified the Air Force that it would be unable to complete the closing until this matter was cleared up. In the ensuing exchange of letters, the contracting officer informed respondent that its bid and the letter of acceptability were being canceled and its deposit was being retained. Pursuant to the disputes clause, respondent appealed this decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, which dismissed the appeal as out of time without considering the merits of the case. Respondent then sued in the Court of Claims to recover its deposit and for damages resulting from the Government's alleged wrongful cancellation. That court concluded that the appeal to the Board was timely, and that the Board had erred in not reaching the merits of the case. With Judges Davis and Laramore dissenting, the court then decided to remand the case to its own trial commissioner, rather than to the Board of Contract Appeals, to make a record and consider the case on its merits. The Government asked us to grant certiorari to consider whether this was in violation of the principles announced in the Wunderlich Act [Footnote 3] and United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., supra. We granted certiorari, 382 U.S. 901, and we now reverse.
"First, there would undoubtedly be situations in which the court would be warranted, on the basis of the administrative record, in granting judgment for the contractor without the need for further administrative action. Second, in situations where the court believed that the existing record did not warrant such a course, but that the departmental determination could not be sustained under the standards laid down by Congress, we see no reason why the court could not stay its own proceedings pending some further action before the agency involved. Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U. S. 202. Such a stay would certainly be justified where the department had failed to make adequate provision for a record that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny, for it was clearly part of the legislative purpose to achieve uniformity in this respect."
United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457; United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U. S. 234; United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730; United States v. Callahan Walker Construction Co., 317 U. S. 56; Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398. Preeminently, this policy is grounded on a respect for the parties' rights to contract and to provide for their own remedies. See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394; United States v. Moorman, supra, at 338 U. S. 461-462. But, beyond that, there is also a belief that resort to administrative procedures is an expeditious way to settle disputes, conducive to speed and economy. [Footnote 4] United States v. Blair, supra, at 321 U. S. 735. Such procedures also facilitate a department's supervisory control over contracting officers, and perhaps enhance the possibility of harmonious agreement. Ibid. Further, reliance upon a few expert agencies to make the records and initially to pass on the merits of the claims properly presented to them will lead to greater uniformity in the important business of fairly interpreting government contracts.
the contractor would always be available to the Court."
See the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1964 ed.). No provision was made in the bid invitation or letter of acceptability for review of the determinations of the Secretary of Labor or the Housing Commissioner. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has held that, in these circumstances, it is without jurisdiction to review such determinations. Len Co. & Associates, 1962 B.C.A. � 3498, 17,854 (ASBCA). This Court has indicated that, as to the wage standards set by the Secretary of Labor, there is no judicial review. United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U. S. 171, 347 U. S. 177.
"Failure to perform all obligations prior to the time prescribed for closing will be just cause for cancelling all commitments undertaken with you in connection with the housing project and for the recovery under your bid security of liquidated damages in the sum of $25,000, together with actual damages to the Department, such actual damages to be itemized and determined by the Contracting Officer, whose decision will be reduced to writing and furnished to you by mail or otherwise. Such decision shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the receipt thereof, you appeal in writing to the head of the Department or his duly authorized representative, and his decision shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal under this paragraph, you will be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of your appeal."
"That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."
"SEC. 2. No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board."
See Hearing before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services on H.R.Res. No. 67, Inquiry Into the Administration and Operation of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 794-795 (1958).
To the extent that the Court of Claims may have been worried about duplicity of evidentiary hearings, see United States v. Carlo Bianchi, supra, at 373 U. S. 717, it partially answered itself in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 833, 170 Ct.Cl. 757, decided the same day. There, the Court of Claims held that, when the Board of Contract Appeals has jurisdiction to consider a certain issue and to award full relief and it makes a record on the factual matters underlying that issue, judicial review of those factual findings, for whatever purposes, shall be limited to the record made by the Board. We hold, in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, that factual findings made by a board pursuant to a claim properly before it, if they otherwise satisfy the standards of the Wunderlich Act, shall not be relitigated even in a court action for relief that is not available under the contract. Hence, there will be only one evidentiary hearing.
"The parties are in complete agreement that it was and is their mutual interpretation that in the event a timely appeal is taken thereunder the 'disputes paragraph' of the Letter of Acceptability confers jurisdiction on the Board to review a decision relating to cancellation of commitments, withholding of bid security, and itemization and determination of actual damages."
Both the Court of Claims and the Trial Commissioner observed that there were "unresolved issues of fact" underlying the issues in this case. 345 F.2d 808, 810, 170 Ct.Cl. 688, 691.
There is analogy for the rule we announce today in other areas of administrative law. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, and Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324 U. S. 515, where this Court ordered the cases remanded to the agencies for further findings and consideration rather than itself curing the inadequacies of the records below. See generally Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 16.01, 20.06 (1958). The same general rule also applies in the area of labor arbitration. In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, the arbitrator had failed to determine the amount of back pay to which reinstated employees would be entitled and this Court ordered the matter remanded to the arbitrator for resolution of this issue. The Court observed there that it was the arbitrator's determination "which was bargained for." Much the same thing can be said here, although of course the findings and conclusions of the Board of Contract Appeals do not have the same finality on review. See also International Association of Machinists v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 300 F.2d 127.


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This research project is to illustrate that ultrashort pulse laser beams with complex polarization and intensity structure can expand functionalities of the existing ultrafast laser micromachining technology by increasing its efficiency and precision.
In the late 90s, it was predicted that tubular, radially-polarized laser beams can cut materials much more efficiently and accurately than conventional laser beams thus offering significant economic and environmental benefits. Since then, the crucial advantages of radial polarization (Fig. 1) over other homogeneous states of polarization (i.e., linear, elliptical, circular) both in cutting efficiency and quality have been experimentally confirmed using continuous wave (CW) and nanosecond (or longer) pulse lasers in various micromachining applications. Long pulse and CW laser systems generating radially polarized beams are now being actively introduced to several high-end manufacturing processes.
Fig.1 Conventional and vector laser beams. For conventional states of polarization, such as linear or circular polarization, the direction of the electric vector does not depend on the spatial location in the beam cross-section. In vector beams the state of polarization is spatially variant.
However, there is a whole range of micromachining, medical and biological applications in which only ultrashort laser pulses can be used due to their ability to process any substance with accuracies and resolutions going below the range of the laser wavelength. The key role of light polarization in ultrashort pulse-matter interaction is now widely recognized and various polarization-related effects are being actively studied. With a very rare exception, these studies have concentrated so far on standard Gaussian beams with homogeneous states of polarization, namely linear and circular polarization.
Fig. 2. Polarization-sensitive micro-optic structures produced inside fused silica substrates with multiple radially polarized (right) and azimuthally polarized (left) femtosecond laser pulses. Bottom images: A cross-polarized light view (left) of a 2-D array of polarization imprints in bulk material (right). Note that the nanostructures shown in the top SEM images grow exactly perpendicular to the light polarization. These sub-wavelength architectures are the finest regular structural changes that can be produced by light inside a pure transparent material.
The goal of this research project is to show that ultrashort pulse laser beams with complex polarization and intensity structure can expand functionalities of the existing ultrafast laser micromachining technology by increasing its efficiency and precision. The enabling technology has already been demonstrated in a series of our recent publications (Fig. 2 and references below). We are planning to use these unconventional light pulses to process materials relevant to semiconductor and biomedical industry and also conduct studies on dissecting biological tissues, specifically in vitro porcine and/or bovine corneas.
C. Hnatovsky, V. G. Shvedov, and W. Krolikowski. The role of light-induced nanostructures in femtosecond laser micromachining with vector and scalar pulses, Opt. Express 21, 12651-12656, (2013).
V. G. Shvedov, C. Hnatovsky, N. Shostka, and W. Krolikowski. Generation of vector bottle beams with a uniaxial crystal. J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 30, 1-6 (2013).
C. Hnatovsky, V. Shvedov, N. Shostka, A. Rode, W. Krolikowski. Polarization-dependent ablation of silicon using tightly focused femtosecond laser vortex pulses. Opt. Lett. 101, 226-228 (2012).
C. Hnatovsky, V. Shvedov, W. Krolikowski, A. V. Rode. Revealing Local Field Structure of Focused Ultrashort Pulses. Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 123901 (2011).
C. Hnatovsky, V. G. Shvedov, W. Krolikowski, A. V. Rode. Materials processing with a tightly focused femtosecond vortex laser pulse. Opt. Lett. 35, 3417-3419 (2010).
V. Shvedov, C. Hnatovsky, W. Krolikowski, A. Rode. Efficient beam converter for the generation of high-power femtosecond vortices. Opt. Lett. 35, 2660-2662 (2010).
R. S. Taylor, E. Simova, C. Hnatovsky. Creation of chiral structures inside fused silica glass. Opt. Lett. 33, 1312-1314 (2008).
R. S. Taylor, C. Hnatovsky, E. Simova. Applications of femtosecond laser induced self-organized planar nanocracks inside fused silica glass. Laser and Photonics Reviews 2, 26-46 (2008).

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«Pseudotoric structures: Lagrangian tori and Lagrangian fibrations».
“Spin dynamics in arbitrarty gravitational and electromagnetic fields”.
Authors: Yu. Obukhov, A. Silenko, O. Teryaev.
“Strong electron correlations in underdoped high-temperature superconductors”.
Authors: A. Ferraz, I. Ivantsov, E. Kochetov, M. Maśka, M. Mierzejewski.
«Delayed neutron emission of exotic nuclei».
Authors: D. Testov, Yu. Penionzhkevich, E. Sokol, E. Kuznetsova, V. Smirnov, M. Ivanov, A. Severyukhin, D. Verney, F. Ibrahim.
«Search for 2p decay of the first excited state of 17Ne(3/2−)”.».
Authors: A. Bezbakh, R. Wolski, M. Golovkov, S. Krupko, Yu. Parfenova, S. Sidorchuk, R. Slepnev, G. Ter-Akopian, A. Fomichev, P. Sharov.
«Development and construction of gas-filled detectors based on a new type of straw tubes for operation in vacuum into a track spectrometer of the NA62 experimental set-up».
Authors: L. Glonti, H. Danielsson, T. Enik, V. Kekelidze, A. Kolesnikov, D. Madigozhin, S. Movchan, Yu. Potrebenikov, V. Samsonov, S. Shkarovskiy.
«Structure of deterministic mass, surface and multiphase fractals: theory and methods of analysing the intensity of small-angle scattering».
Authors: A. Cherny, E. Anitas, V. Osipov, A. Kuklin, M. Balasoiu.
«Development and construction of the permanent magnet ECR ion source, DECRIS-PM, for the DC-280 cyclotron».
Authors: V. Bekhterev, S. Bogomolov, A. Bondarchenko, A. Efremov, K. Kuzmenkov, A. Lebedev, V. Loginov, V. Mironov, N. Yazvitsky, N. Konev.
«Construction of a facility for assembling and testing superconducting magnets, investigation of the characteristics of magnets».
Authors: N. Agapov, V. Borisov, A. Galimov, A. Donyagin, V. Karpinskiy, V. Kekelidze, S. Kostromin, D. Nikiforov, G. Trubnikov, H. Khodzhibagiyan.
«Study of ultracold neutron diffraction by a moving grating».
Authors: G. Kulin, A. Frank, S. Goryunov, D. Kustov, A. Bushuyev, P. Geltenbort, M. Jentschel, A. Panzarella.
«Determination of the decay time of scintillators and investigation of space correlation of nuclear radiation by the autocorrelation method».
«Investigation of the nonlinear dynamics of waves in the terahertz frequency range in condensed media and living systems».
«Monte-Carlo simulation of neutron spectrometers and neutron scattering experiments».
Authors: A. Belushkin, S. Manoshin, V. Bodnarchuk, A. Joffe.
JINR prizes are awarded for outstanding experimental, methodological and applied research on JINR scientific themes. Research papers should correspond to the world science level and should be completed in the current year. Annually 11 people including a secretary are appointed as a jury by the JINR Directorate to consider presented research papers. The jury consists of representatives of the JINR Directorate and leading scientists. Decision on award of JINR prizes becomes operative after confirmation given by the JINR Scientific Council during its winter session.

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§ 225.4 Program management and administration plan.
§ 225.5 Payments to State agencies and use of Program funds.
§ 225.6 State agency responsibilities.
§ 225.7 Program monitoring and assistance.
§ 225.8 Records and reports.
§ 225.9 Program assistance to sponsors.
§ 225.10 Audits and management evaluations.
§ 225.11 Corrective action procedures.
§ 225.12 Claims against sponsors.


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TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF ALEXANDER LVOVICH FRADKOV	Nikiforov Vladimir O, Bobtsov Alexey Alexeevich, Matveev A. S., Proskurnikov A.V., Andrievsky Boris R.
DEPENDENCE OF SPECTRAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SEMICONDUCTOR AND SOLID STATE LASERS OF VISIBLE RANGE ON ACTIVE ENVIRONMENT TEMPERATURE Adamov Anton A. , Baranov Mikhail S. , Khramov Vladimir N.
SPECTRAL SENSITIVITY STABILITY ESTIMATION OF DIGITAL COLOR CAMERAS Pushchin Alexey V.
ENEGETIC EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT OF SPECTRAL COHERENCE TOMOGRAPH OPTICAL-ELECTRONIC SYSTEM	Gurov Igor P, Pimenov Aleksey Yu.
Subject of Research.The paper considers the methods of optical coherence tomography (OCT) based on illuminating a sample by optical radiation with subsequent determination of light reflection degree through a sample depth. Illumination method defines basic characteristics of OCT system such as sensitivity and speed in studies of biological samples. In mechanical scanning-free OCT systems, line- and full-field illumination methods are applied utilizing object illumination by laser source with tunable wavelength. The study is aimed at energetic efficiency quantitative assessment of line-field OCT system with tunable radiation source and in comparison of line-field illumination method with full-field one. Method. Based on the model of OCT optical system, ray tracing has been carried out, and spatial distribution of energy reflected from a sample and registered by photo detector has been determined. Photoelectrical signal and signal-to-noise ratio have been evaluated.Main Results. It has been shown that line-field OCT system providessignificantly higher sensitivity (97 dB) compared to full-field system (78 dB). In addition, line-field system allows obtaining B-scan without moving of mechanical parts. Original scheme of lighting channel has been proposed providing uniform illumination spatial distribution along lighting line without sensitivity decay near edges of image field. Practical Relevance.The obtained results can be applied for creation of compact real-time spectral OCT system.
ADAPTIVE ROBUST DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION IN LINEAR SYSTEMS WITH DELAY Paramonov Alexey V.
ROBUST STABILIZATION OF TWIN-ROTOR MIMO PLANT	Zimenko Konstantin Alexandrovich, Kremlev Artem Sergeevich, Polyakov Andrey E., Efimov Denis V.
POROUS STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF HIGHLY-PERMEABLE POLYPROPYLENE FILMS Kuryndin Ivan S. , Ivchenko Svetlana I. , Nikolaev Oleg O. , Elyashevich Galina K.
FABRICATION OF ACTIVE ADDITIVE TO SHAMPOOS BASED ON DIFFERENT NATURE NANOPARTICLES Zhukov Mikhail V, Ampilogova Elena A. , Volkova Anzhelika V. , Marchenko Maxim A. , Ishmuratov Danil M. , Korovaytseva Anastasiya E.
LASER SYNTHESIS OF SELENIUM NANOPARTICLES IN LIQUID MONOMERS	Zulina Natalia A, Fokina Maria I, Cherkashina Elizaveta G. , Nosenko Tatiana N.
DESIGN CONCEPTS FOR DIGITAL PROJECT AND PRODUCTION COMPANIES OF INDUSTRY 4.0 STANDARD Guryanov Andrey V, Zakoldaev Danil A., Zharinov Igor Olegovich, Nechaev Vladimir A.
MATRIX-ITERATIVE SOLUTION METHOD FOR SYSTEM OF LINEAR EQUATIONS AND ITS APPLICATION IN SPACE TOMOGRAPHY SCANNING USING RADAR	Samoilenko Marina V.
CROSS-DOMAIN WEB AUTHOR IDENTIFICATION	Vorobeva Alisa A. , Pozvolenko Vitaliy A. , Korobitsyna Anastasiya S. , Sharafiev Azamat A.
The paper is devoted to the cross-domain web author attribution (identification), where user's messages are obtained from several sources (web-sites). We focused on the problem of one web-site user identification by his messages from another web-site. We found that there is a stylistic difference between the texts of messages created by one user on different web-sites. The possibility of a single feature space forming for texts received from various sources was determined providing sufficient accuracy of linguistic identification. Two subtasks were studied: 1) mixed sources – training and test datasets include messages from mixed sources (web-sites); 2) separated sources – the text messages sources of the training and test datasets do not intersect; training dataset includes texts from one source, test dataset includes texts from another.The experiment results showed that identification accuracy in mixed sources task is 0.82. The accuracy in separated sources task is 0.74. It is concluded that there is a stylistic difference between texts created by one user, but on the various web-sites. But at the same time, it is possible to form a single feature space for text messages received from various web-sites, ensuring sufficient identification accuracy.
FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEM FOR PAYMENT PROCESS ON MOBILE DEVICES AND WEB-APPLICATIONS	Ivanko Dmitriy V.
The paper deals with the problem of users' identity authentication during payment transactions with the use of mobile devices and web applications. Standard methods of users' identification are considered at performing a payment transaction. The subjects of discussion are the main criteria for the effectiveness of user identification systems in mobile devices and web applications, such as the identification accuracy of the modern systems, time and computational costs, the ability to distribute computations and user convenience. Particular attention is paid to computational and time costs, as they are the most significant for users who make use of practically applicable client-server mobile and web applications. The advantages and disadvantages of face recognition systems application for users' identification and verification are pointed out. Each system element participating in secure banking transaction is described in the course of the payment transaction. A new client-server model is presented for interaction of the face recognition system for security assurance while shopping with the use of mobile devices or web applications. Experimental estimates of the face recognition systems effectiveness are also given. The developed architecture gave the possibility to reduce the time spent by the client for the transaction by an average of 47%, compared with application of standard user authentication tools.
MODELING OF ETHERNET NETWORKS IN OMNET ++ INET FRAMEWORK MEDIUM	Khabarov Sergey P.
Subject of Research. The paper considers one of the possible approaches to the study of Ethernet networks by simulating them in the OMNeT ++ environment with the use of the INET framework. The possibility of studying network models is shown in both the step-by-step execution mode and the mode of obtaining generalized statistical characteristics of their operation. Method. When presenting the proposed approach, the method of sequential complication of network models was used, taking into account the features of existing standard protocols and network implementations. The simplicity of the proposed approach is shown, which is based on a wide range of ready-made components for the description of various network elements within the INET framework. This fact gives the possibility to form quite complex network models by means of only the graphic editor and the built-in NED network description language. A brief description of INET framework main components is given that makes it possible to form the structure of the network under research in the graphical editing mode. Main Result. The paper presents technique for creation of network simulation models with a sufficiently detailed description of the main modeling stages. The simplest methods for launching the network model into work and analyzing the results are considered. The work shows the possibility of creating custom component modules in the INET framework projects, which, being ready-made components, can be used in models of more complex network structures. Based on the generated approach, models were built of both basic and mixed Ethernet topologies that gave the possibility to carry out a sufficiently detailed analysis for each of these topologies. Practical Relevance. The described toolkit makes it possible to carry out research on the justification of design solutions for design of distributed computer networks, as well as for creation of tools supporting the automated design of infocommunication systems and networks.
STUDY OF COMPUTER VISION ALGORITHMS FOR SPACE TRACKING SYSTEMS IN TYPICAL MODES OF THEIR FUNCTIONING	Zakharova Maria V. , Grygoriy Shmyhelskiy, Grigoriev Valeriy V.
AN ALGORITHM FOR COMPACT FIXED-POINT IMPLEMENTATION OF DIGITAL CONTROLLERS Karimov Timur I. , Solnitsev Remir I. , Denis N. Butusov , Ostrovskiy Valeriy Yu.
SIMULATION MODEL FOR MULTICHANNEL PRIORITY SERVICE OF REDUNDANT DATA TRANSFER SYSTEM Slastikhin Ivan A.
PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE APPLICATIONS WITH OUTDOOR-QUESTS Mokretsov Roman M. , Zaslavskiy Mark M.
Subject of Research. The paper presents the review of existing platforms for development of mobile applications with outdoor-quests. A method for automation design and planning of outdoor-quests is proposed. The principles for development automation of mobile applications containing such quests are described. Method. The novelty of the proposed approach lies in procedural quest generation based on a set of limitations. The architecture combines the usage of open technologies with quests generation and includes special tools for automated creation of outdoor quest templates on various subjectsas well as customizable application templates. Main Results. Experimental research was carried out for evaluation of the proposed architecture features. By implementing quest generator and application templates a demo Android application was created. The application consisted of two quests: manually created and generated one. The generated quest was made by quest generator and extended by human. The application was published at Play Market Store. The experiment goal was to measure how long will it take for application users to find different quest object and how long will it take to pass the quest all over in order to determine the differences in generated and manually created quests. As a result of comparative measurements a conclusion was made about allowable difference between quests because it was less than attention cycle duration for humans. This fact demonstrates that generated quests can be used in the same manner as manually created ones. Practical Relevance. The proposed quest generator can be used for wide range of topics because quest object selection is based on keyword search and quest route geometry criterion application. The solution also has practical significance because mobile applications developed with the use of the proposed architecture can be adapted to different domain areas. Wherein mobile application development time is reduced owing to automation and customizable templates usage.
STABILITY OF VISCOUS FILM ON SURFACE OF SLIGHTLY INCLINED ROTATING VERTICAL CYLINDER	Melikhov Ivan F.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF RESONATOR CHAINS IN EXTERNAL MAGNETIC FIELD Melikhova Alina S.
Subject of Research.The paper considers a spectral problem for chains of weakly coupled ball-shaped resonators under the action of an external magnetic field. Two basic geometries are studied composed of identical resonators: the chain with a single kink and the one with symmetric branching. The vector of magnetic field induction is assumed to be perpendicular to the plane including the centers of resonators that are forming the chain. The delta-like potentials with the same intensity are applied to all contact points. Method. The mathematical model of the chain consisting of identical resonators interacting with each other via a single point is constructed in the framework of the theory of self-adjoint extensions of symmetric operators. The modification of Neumann formulas was used for adjoint operator description. Both systems have a periodicity in parts and the model itself is constructed in such way that it becomes possible to use the transfer matrix approach to obtain the spectrum of the model Hamiltonian. Main Results. The structure of the spectrum for both chains is analytically described; namely, all equations and inequalities are obtained, which give the possibility to find the bands of the continuous spectrum, as well as the energy values related to the discrete spectrum. Numerical simulation clearly demonstrates the structure of the continuous spectrum of the systems depending on the model parameters. Practical Relevance. Since the model has different variable parameters, it can be used to construct real systems that have certain spectral properties. The geometries considered in this paper are the basic elements for the construction of more complex systems.


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Ten US Supreme Court decisions caught our eye during the 2015-2016 session that ended today, and two of them were 4-4 "nondecisions." Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association upheld the 9th Circuit decision which followed Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, and affirmed that public-sector “agency shop” arrangements do not violate the First Amendment. This 4-4 decision does not set a precedent, and we expect the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation to get another case rolling to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, a petition for rehearing has been denied. Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians is the other 4-4 split, affirming the 5th Circuit’s judgment that an Indian tribal court has jurisdiction over an intern’s claim that the manager of a store on tribal land sexually molested him while he was working there.
In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro the Court gave no deference to the Department of Labor’s rule regarding exempting “service advisors” at car dealerships from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime-pay requirements. They sent this one back to the 9th Circuit to sort out.
Green v. Brennan decided that for federal employees the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begins to run when an employee resigns, not at the time of an employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC held that a favorable ruling “on the merits” is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant in a Title VII case has prevailed for purposes of being awarded attorney’s fees. The Court gave no opinion on whether a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail, and sent the case back to the lower courts to figure that one out.
Heffernan v. City of Paterson broke new ground by holding that the First Amendment bars the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political candidate.
In two important class action cases Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo held that a class or collective action can be certified where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample, and the class contains members who were not injured, and Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez held that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would fully satisfy an individual plaintiff’s claim does not moot that claim – and does not moot a class action.
Then we had two ERISA cases. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company held that ERISA preempts a Vermont statute that requires health insurers to report payments and other information relating to health care services to a state agency for compilation in an all-inclusive health care database. Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan held that when an ERISA-plan participant wholly dissipates a third-party settlement on non-traceable items, the plan fiduciary may not bring suit to attach the participant’s separate assets under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).

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