HAMER v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF CHICAGO ET AL.
An appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute is considered "jurisdictional," meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210-213. In contrast, a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule is not jurisdictional. It is a mandatory claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited. Ibid. This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this critical distinction. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161.
Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed an employment discrimination suit against respondents. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, entering final judgment on September 14, 2015. Before October 14, the date Hamer's notice of appeal was due, her attorneys filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a motion for an extension of the appeal filing deadline to give Hamer time to secure new counsel. The District Court granted both motions, extending the deadline to December 14, a two-month extension, even though the governing Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(5)(C), confines such extensions to 30 days. Concluding that Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s time prescription is jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer's appeal.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in treating as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. Pp. 5-10.
(a) The 1948 version of 28 U. S. C. §2107 allowed extensions of time to file a notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, "upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment," but the statute said nothing about extensions when the judgment loser did receive notice of the entry of judgment. In 1991, the statute was amended, broadening the class of prospective appellants who could gain extensions to include all who showed "excusable neglect or good cause" and reducing the time prescription for appellants who lacked notice of the entry of judgment from 30 to 14 days. §2107(c). For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run. Rule 4(a)(5)(C), however, does prescribe a limit: "No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion . . . , whichever is later." Pp. 5-6.
(b) This Court's precedent shapes a rule of decision that is both clear and easy to apply: If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specification fits within the claim-processing category.
In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals relied on Bowles. There, Bowles filed a notice of appeal outside a limitation set by Congress in §2107(c). This Court held that, as a result, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over his tardy appeal. 551 U. S., at 213. In conflating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with §2107(c) here, the Seventh Circuit failed to grasp the distinction between jurisdictional appeal filing deadlines and deadlines stated only in mandatory claim-processing rules. It therefore misapplied Bowles. Bowles's statement that "the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' " id., at 209, is a characterization left over from days when the Court was "less than meticulous" in using the term "jurisdictional," Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454. The statement was correct in Bowles, where the time prescription was imposed by Congress, but it would be incorrect here, where only Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits the length of the extension. Pp. 7-10.
This case presents a question of time, specifically, time to file a notice of appeal from a district court's judgment. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210-213 (2007), this Court clarified that an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as "jurisdictional," meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. But a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee. Ibid.; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 456 (2004). Because the Court of Appeals held jurisdictional a time limit specified in a rule, not in a statute, 835 F. 3d 761, 763 (CA7 2016), we vacate that court's judgment dismissing the appeal.
"Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 452 (citing U. S. Const., Art. III, §1); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 370 (1978) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction."). Accordingly, a provision governing the time to appeal in a civil action qualifies as jurisdictional only if Congress sets the time. See Bowles, 551 U. S., at 211-212 (noting "the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress"); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 10 (1941) (noting "the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute"). A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving "to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011).
This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this distinction, "mischaracteriz[ing] claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161 (2010). But prevailing precedent makes the distinction critical. Failure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal--a "drastic" result. Shinseki, 562 U. S., at 435; Bowles, 551 U. S., at 213 ("[W]hen an 'appeal has not been prosecuted . . . within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.' " (quoting United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113 (1848))). The jurisdictional defect is not subject to waiver or forfeiture1 and may be raised at any time in the court of first instance and on direct appeal. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 455.2 In contrast to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system, courts are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own initiative. Shinseki, 562 U. S., at 434.
Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed a complaint against respondents Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2015, and entered final judgment on September 14, 2015. In the absence of a time extension, Hamer's notice of appeal would have been due by October 14, 2015. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A).
On October 8, 2015, before the October 14 deadline for filing Hamer's notice of appeal, her attorneys made two motions.4 First, they sought to withdraw as counsel because of their disagreement with Hamer on pursuit of an appeal. Second, they sought a two-month extension of the notice of appeal filing date, so that Hamer would have adequate time to engage new counsel for her appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57-59. The District Court granted both motions on the same day and ordered extension of the deadline for Hamer's notice of appeal from October 14 to December 14, 2015. Id., at 60. Respondents did not move for reconsideration or otherwise raise any objection to the length of the extension.
In the docketing statement respondents filed in the Court of Appeals, they stated: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. §1291, in that on December 11, 2015, [Hamer] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that disposed of all of [Hamer's] claims against [respondents]." Id., at 63. Respondents' statement later reiterated: "On December 11, 2015, [Hamer] timely filed a Notice of Appeal . . . ." Id., at 64. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, questioned the timeliness of the appeal and instructed respondents to brief the issue. 835 F. 3d, at 762. Respondents did so and, for the first time, asserted that the appeal was untimely, citing the relevant Rule confining extensions to 30 days. Id., at 762-763 (citing Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(5)(C)). Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer's appeal. 835 F. 3d, at 763.5 We granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___ (2017).
"the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal."
In short, current §2107(c), like the provision as initially enacted, specifies the length of an extension for cases in which the appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.8 For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run.
But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) does prescribe a limit: "No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion . . . , whichever is later." Unlike §2107(c), we note, Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits extensions of time to file a notice of appeal in all circumstances, not just in cases in which the prospective appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.
Although Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limit on extensions of time appears nowhere in the text of §2107(c), respondents now contend that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) has a "statutory basis" because §2107(c) once limited extensions (to the extent it did authorize them) to 30 days. Brief for Respondents 17. No matter, respondents submit, that Congress struck the 30-day limit in 1991 and replaced it with a 14-day limit governing, as the 30-day limit did, only lack-of-notice cases; deleting the 30-day prescription, respondents conjecture, was "probably inadverten[t]." Id., at 1. In support of their argument that Congress accidentally failed to impose an all-purpose limit on extensions, respondents observe that the 1991 statute identifies Congress' aim as the enactment of "certain technical corrections in . . . provisions of law relating to the courts." 105 Stat. 1623. They also note the caption of the relevant section of the amending statute: "Conformity with Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id., at 1627. Because striking the 30-day limit from §2107 made the statute less like Rule 4(a)(5)(C), respondents reason, Congress likely erased the relevant paragraph absentmindedly. Hence, respondents conclude, "there is no reason to interpret the 1991 amendment as stripping Rule 4(a)(5)(C) of its jurisdictional significance." Brief for Respondents 2.
In dismissing Hamer's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on our decision in Bowles. We therefore reiterate what that precedent conveys. There, petitioner Keith Bowles did not receive timely notice of the entry of a postjudgment order and consequently failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Bowles v. Russell, 432 F. 3d 668, 670 (CA6 2005). When Bowles learned of the postjudgment order, he moved for an extension under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which implements §2107(c)'s authorization of extensions in lack-of-notice cases. Ibid. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, but inexplicably provided a 17-day extension, rather than the 14-day extension authorized by §2107(c). Bowles, 551 U. S., at 207. Bowles filed his notice of appeal within the 17 days allowed by the District Court but outside the 14 days allowed by §2107(c). Ibid. "Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in §2107(c)," we explained, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Bowles's tardy appeal. Id., at 213.
Quoting Bowles at length, the Court of Appeals in this case reasoned that "[l]ike Rule 4(a)(6), Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is the vehicle by which §2107(c) is employed and it limits a district court's authority to extend the notice of appeal filing deadline to no more than an additional 30 days." 835 F. 3d, at 763. In conflating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with §2107(c), the Court of Appeals failed to grasp the distinction our decisions delineate between jurisdictional appeal filing deadlines and mandatory claim-processing rules, and therefore misapplied Bowles.
Several Courts of Appeals,10 including the Court of Appeals in Hamer's case, have tripped over our statement in Bowles that "the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional.' " 551 U. S., at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)). The "mandatory and jurisdictional" formulation is a characterization left over from days when we were "less than meticulous" in our use of the term "jurisdictional." Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454.11 The statement was correct as applied in Bowles because, as the Court there explained, the time prescription at issue in Bowles was imposed by Congress. 551 U. S., at 209-213. But "mandatory and jurisdictional" is erroneous and confounding terminology where, as here, the relevant time prescription is absent from the U. S. Code. Because Rule 4(a)(5)(C), not §2107, limits the length of the extension granted here, the time prescription is not jurisdictional. See Youkelsone v. FDIC, 660 F. 3d 473, 475 (CADC 2011) ("Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s thirty-day limit on the length of any extension ultimately granted appears nowhere in the U. S. Code.").
For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals erroneously treated as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s 30-day limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. We therefore vacate that court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note, in this regard, that our decision does not reach issues raised by Hamer, but left unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, including: (1) whether respondents' failure to raise any objection in the District Court to the overlong time extension, by itself, effected a forfeiture, see Brief for Petitioner 21-22; (2) whether respondents could gain review of the District Court's time extension only by filing their own appeal notice, see id., at 23-27; and (3) whether equitable considerations may occasion an exception to Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s time constraint, see id., at 29-43.
The terms waiver and forfeiture--though often used interchange-ably by jurists and litigants--are not synonymous. "[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right[;] waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' " United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938)).
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally, however. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455, n. 9 (2004) (citing Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 557-559 (1887)).
Movants were the attorney appointed by the court to represent Hamer and two other attorneys who entered appearances as co-counsel. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57-59.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly stated that respondents, answering the Seventh Circuit's inquiry, asserted that the appeals court "lack[ed] jurisdiction over [Hamer's] appeal." 835 F. 3d, at 763. In fact, respondents maintained that "the timeliness of Hamer's appeal d[id] not appear to be jurisdictional according to [Circuit] law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 71 (capitalization and footnote omitted). That was so, respondents explained, because "the time limits found [in] Fed. R[ule] App. P[roc.] 4(a)(5)(C) . . . lack a statutory basis." Id., at 77. Even if not jurisdictional, respondents continued, the Rule is mandatory and must be observed unless forfeited or waived. Ibid.
As enacted, the pertinent paragraph of §2107 provided in full: "The district court, in any such action, suit or proceeding, may extend the time for appeal not exceeding thirty days from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed, upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment, order or decree." Act of June 25, 1948, §2107, 62 Stat. 963.
The statute describes the 14-day extension permitted in lack-of-notice cases as a "reopening [of] the time for appeal." §2107(c). The "reopening" period is the functional equivalent of an extension. See Brief for American Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 5-6.
In cases not involving the timebound transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another, we have additionally applied a clear-statement rule: "A rule is jurisdictional '[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional.' " Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 141 (2012) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515 (2006)). See also, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 431 (2011) (statutory deadline for filing notice of appeal with Article I tribunal held not jurisdictional). "This is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order to speak clearly," however. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013). In determining whether Congress intended a particular provision to be jurisdictional, "[w]e consider 'context, including this Court's interpretations of similar provisions in many years past,' as probative of [Congress' intent]." Id., at 153-154 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 168 (2010)). Even so, "in applying th[e] clear statement rule, we have made plain that most [statutory] time bars are nonjurisdictional." United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6).
Indeed, the formulation took flight from a case in which we mistakenly suggested that a claim-processing rule was "mandatory and jurisdictional." See United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 224 (1960). We have since clarified that "Robinson is correct not because the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but because district courts must observe the clear limits of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when they are properly invoked." Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 17 (2005) (per curiam).


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The United States has moved the Court to prohibit (insert name of bank) from disclosing to its customers, for a period of ninety days, that the bank has been served with a Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum. [FN1] The motion is filed under the terms of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 3401 et seq., pursuant to the Court's inherent powers, and under the provisions of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S. C. Section 1651. The Government's application is made for the soundest of reasons. [FN2] The Order whose entry is requested is framed in terms that parallel precisely the terms of the delayed-notice provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 3409. And, the Order has been framed to be issued pursuant to the Court's inherent powers, and under the terms of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1651. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-178 (1977). The Order is drawn so that no one will be prohibited from relating "facts within their knowledge acquired beyond the grand jury room;" United States v. Central Supply Association, 34 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1940). Rather, by the least restrictive available means, the Order will simply defer the time at which the (insert name of bank) will become free to disclose publicly what it stated to or learned from the Grand Jury; King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653, 658-659 (N.D. Ohio 1940). In pertinent part, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule." [FN3] Although seemingly absolute on its face, those parts of Rule 6(e) were designed to ameliorate the "unnecessary hardship" of imposing an oath of secrecy upon the witness concerning testimony before the grand jury. See Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 6(e), Advisory Committee Note 2 (emphasis supplied). [FN4] Both prior and subsequent to the enactment of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the courts have recognized that some circumstances exist in which some appropriate limitation upon disclosure of matters may be imposed upon grand jury witnesses, despite the seemingly absolute language of the Rule. In Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939), the court found it "well within the descretionary power of the court to impose an obligation of secrecy not alone upon grand jurors, but upon the witnesses, if the court believes the precaution necessary in the investigation of crime." Id. at 520. And, in United States v. Central Supply Association, 34 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1940), the court enumerated at least five circumstances in which such a precaution might be found "necessary in the investigation of crime." See King v. Jones, supra, 319 F. Supp., at 658. Following the enactment of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, 5 F.R.D. 573, 583 (1946), [FN5] the witness secrecy provision of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was not subjected to judicial scrutiny until the decision in United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Cal. 1952). Finding that the rule enunciated in Goodman survived the enactment of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Smyth court noted that: . . . the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is of substance and not of procedure. The power of the trial court to enforce secrecy is jurisdictional and a necessity if grand juries are to function. The Federal Constitution encysted the common law grand jury with all its incidents. The Rules could not change the Constitution nor prevent the court from imposing secrecy upon everyone in connection with such a proceeding in the public interest. See also United States v. Central Supply Association, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940). Symth, supra, 104 F. Supp. at 280-81, n.5.
FN1. The requested Order would also prohibit the financial institution from notifying its customers of the matter of the documents subpoenaed, and of the nature and extent of compliance by the institutions with the subpoena's terms.
FN2. The reasons advanced by the Government are explicated fully in an Affidavit filed ex parte and in camera together with this pleading. The government contends that the finon and its customers are not entitled to those reasons at this time, and requests the court to retain the Affidavit filed by the government under seal of court.
FN4. Whatever "hardship" may be imposed upon the witnesses served with the requested Orders is clearly not "unnecessary." To the contrary, the imposition of any such "hardship" is essential to preserve the legitimate functions of the grand jury and the integrity of the judicial process itself. And, whatever "hardship" may be imposed is, in any event, not overly burdensome on either those subject to the orders or the customers themselves.
FN5. It is interest one of the framers of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suggested that the Rule itself contemplated the possible imposition of a limited oath of secrecy upon grand jury witnesses, and that the purpose of including the witness secrecy provision of the Rule was only to circumscribe the type of oath which might properly be imposed. After noting that the "Rule is specific that 'no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule,'" George F. Longsdorf, a member of the Advisory Committee that drafted the original version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, suggested in 1951, that the "rules do not prescribe the forms of oaths to be taken by grand jurors or by witnesses called before the grand jury." That fact was mentioned, he added, "to make allusion to the practices sometimes formerly followed of exacting before Federal grand juries a form of oath to witnesses which exacted greater secrecy than Rule 6(e) requires." G.F. Longsdorf, The Beginnings and Background of Federal Criminal Procedure, in 4 W.W. Barron, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 24 (Rules ed. 1951).
The same conclusion has been reached by each of the other courts that have considered the courts' powers to impose some appropriate limitations upon the disclosures which federal grand jury witnesses are able to make. See In re Proceedings Before The Grand Jury Summoned October 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238, 240 (N.D. Ohio 1970); King v. Jones, supra 319 F. Supp., at 657; In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 370 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Furthermore, the entry of an Or requested here is well within the powers of the Court. The grand jury is an arm of the court, which exercises jurisdiction of persons and subjects under the authority and supervision of the Court. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1975), and In re Gompman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976). As the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1958): A grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is the court's process which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and it is the court which must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he refused to do so. [FN6] See also O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1965); In re A & H Transportation, Inc., 319 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 1963); and In re Seiffert, 446 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. N.Y. 1978). The power of a district court to enforce secrecy is jurisdictional and an incident of the court's supervisory authority over grand juries "encysted" by the Constitution. See United States v. Smyth, supra, at 280-81, n.5.
FN6. Since the grand jury is able to compel the attendance of witnesses only through the use of the district court's process, it might well be argued that the district court has the power in this case to issue the requested Orders as a logical derivative of its power to issue the subpoenas duces tecum to which the Order relates, under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In such case the witness secrecy provision of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may not be called into play at all.
Federal courts are endowed by All Writs Act, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1651, with "the power to issue such commands . . . as mao effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders . . . previously issued in (the) exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained." United States v. New York Telephone Co., supra, at 172. While "the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not without limits," id., the district courts should be "trusted to exercise their powers under the All Writs Act only in cases of clear necessity and to balance the burden imposed upon the party required to render assistance against the necessity." Id. at 165, n.5. Though "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed," the power conferred by the All Writs Act is available "as a 'legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve "the rational ends of law" ' " Id. at 172, citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969); and Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948).
The requested Order is sought under the terms of the All Writs Act, to render effective the process of this grand jury. That process consists in the subpoena duces tecum to which the Order relates. The subpoena is no more than "orders . . . previously issued in (the) exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained" and properly exercised, either directly by the district court or through its investigative arm, the grand jury. The requested Order is simply a "command" issued by the court, in the exercise of its discretion, "necessary to effectuate and prevent the frustration" of the grand jury's process. Appropriately balancing "the burden imposed upon the party required to render assistance against the necessity" presented by the facts which compelled the government to seek issuance of the Order, the government contends that the Court should find the Order both permissible and necessary under these circumstances; essential to preserve the legitimate functions of the grand jury; rationally related to the reasons for which it is sought; and not overly burdensome on those subject to the Order or on the customers of (insert name of the bank). Compare United States v. New York Telephone Co., supra at 174.
Finally, the court should note that the entry of an Order such as that sought here is not without precedent. Indeed, in a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit implicitly approved the entry of such an Order under similar circumstances. See In re Swearingen Aviation Corporation, etc., 486 F. Supp. 9 (D. Md.), aff'd 605 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1979).

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text:
Strausbaugh singled to left field (0-1 F).
Stuursma singled through the right side (2-1 FBB); Strausbaugh advanced to third.
Wielansky walked (3-2 BBBKFB); Stuursma advanced to second.
Harwood walked, RBI (3-1 BBSBB); Wielansky advanced to second; Stuursma advanced to third; Strausbaugh scored.
Crum singled to shortstop, RBI (0-1 K); Harwood advanced to second; Wielansky advanced to third; Stuursma scored.
Tornow walked, RBI (3-2 FBKBBB); Crum advanced to second; Harwood advanced to third; Wielansky scored.
Dippman struck out swinging (0-2 KKFS); Tornow advanced to second on a passed ball; Crum advanced to third; Harwood scored, unearned.
Fling struck out looking (3-2 BSBFBFFFK).
Thomson flied out to 3b (3-2 KBBKBF).
V. Suso grounded out to 3b (0-1 K).
C. Caithaml grounded out to p (1-1 KB).
A. Gould grounded out to 3b (3-2 BBKBK).
Strausbaugh struck out swinging (1-2 KFBFS).
Wielansky advanced to second on a passed ball; Stuursma advanced to third.
J. Joyce to p for J. Humphry.
Crum flied out to cf, SF, RBI (0-0); Wielansky advanced to third; Stuursma scored.
Tornow doubled to left field, RBI (0-1 K); Harwood advanced to third; Wielansky scored.
Dippman fouled out to 3b (1-1 BK).
Z. Bailey out at first 1b to p (0-1 K).
PJ Suso grounded out to 2b (2-1 BKB).
A. Perrella reached on a throwing error by ss (2-2 BKFB).
M. Eversole struck out swinging (2-2 BBKKFS).
Fling singled down the lf line (0-1 K).
Thomson grounded out to p, SAC, bunt (0-0); Fling advanced to second.
Fling advanced to third on a passed ball.
Strausbaugh flied out to cf to right center, SF, RBI (1-0 B); Fling scored.
Stuursma tripled to right center (1-1 KB).
Harwood doubled down the lf line, 2 RBI (3-2 KBBBF); Wielansky scored; Stuursma scored.
Crum flied out to cf (3-1 BBBK).
V. Lonigro struck out swinging (0-2 KFS).
Carcioppolo grounded out to ss (0-0).
V. Suso doubled down the rf line (0-0).
C. Caithaml singled to shortstop (2-2 BBFSF); V. Suso advanced to third.
A. Gould flied out to cf (1-0 B).
S. May to p for J. Joyce.
Fling homered to left field, 3 RBI (0-0); Dippman scored; Tornow scored.
Thomson grounded out to 2b (1-0 B).
Strausbaugh grounded out to ss (2-2 BSFB).
Wielansky tripled to left center, RBI (1-0 B); Stuursma scored.
Harwood singled through the right side, RBI (1-2 KKB); Wielansky scored.
Crum grounded out to 1b unassisted (3-2 BBKKB).
Z. Bailey flied out to ss (1-2 KSB).
PJ Suso grounded out to ss (3-2 BFBSB).
A. Perrella out at first 1b to p (0-1 F).
P. Emerine to p for S. May.
Tornow tripled down the rf line (2-0 BB).
Dippman singled to second base, RBI (0-1 K); Tornow scored.
Fling hit by pitch (1-1 FB); Dippman advanced to second.
A. Spidell pinch ran for Fling.
Thomson flied out to lf (0-1 K).
Strausbaugh singled through the left side (2-1 BBF); A. Spidell advanced to second; Dippman advanced to third.
Stuursma singled to left center, 2 RBI (3-2 BBBFK); Strausbaugh advanced to second; A. Spidell scored; Dippman scored.
Wielansky reached on a fielder's choice to third base (3-2 BKBBK); Stuursma advanced to second on a throwing error by 3b; Strausbaugh advanced to third.
Harwood doubled to right field, 2 RBI (1-0 B); Wielansky advanced to third; Stuursma scored, unearned; Strausbaugh scored.
Crum flied out to rf, SF, RBI (2-1 BBK); Wielansky scored, unearned.
Myers pinch hit for Tornow.
Myers flied out to rf (2-2 BBKF).
Witwer-Dukes to 2b for Stuursma.
Sherman to ss for Wielansky.
Gail to 1b for Crum.
Iversen to 3b for Dippman.
M. Eversole walked (3-1 BBBKB).
V. Lonigro singled through the right side (0-0); M. Eversole advanced to second.
Carcioppolo flied out to lf (3-2 SBBKFB).
V. Suso reached on a fielder's choice to shortstop (1-0 B); V. Lonigro out at second ss to 2b; M. Eversole advanced to third.
C. Caithaml flied out to lf to left center (0-0).
AJ Armstrong to p for P. Emerine.
Iversen singled to left center (0-0).
A. Spidell singled to right field (0-0); Iversen advanced to second.
Thomson singled to left field (1-1 KB); A. Spidell advanced to second; Iversen advanced to third.
Kaplan pinch hit for Strausbaugh.
Kaplan grounded into double play p to c to 1b (0-1 K); Thomson advanced to second; A. Spidell advanced to third; Iversen out on the play.
Witwer-Dukes homered to left center, 3 RBI (0-1 K); Thomson scored; A. Spidell scored.
Sherman singled through the left side (1-1 KB).
Walls pinch hit for Harwood.
Walls flied out to cf (0-2 SK).
M. Lackner to p for Murray.
A. Gould grounded out to ss (1-2 KBK).
Z. Bailey fouled out to 3b (2-1 BKB).
PJ Suso singled to third base (2-2 KBBK).
A. Perrella reached on a dropped fly by lf (0-0); PJ Suso advanced to second.
M. Eversole struck out swinging (2-2 KBBSS).
Gail hit by pitch (2-2 BKKB).
Myers popped up to 3b (1-1 BF).
Iversen popped up to 3b (0-1 K).
A. Spidell singled up the middle (2-2 KKFBB); Gail advanced to third.
Z. Schuch pinch hit for Thomson.
A. Spidell advanced to second on a passed ball; Gail scored, unearned.
Z. Schuch walked (3-0 BBBB).
Kaplan struck out swinging (1-2 KKBS).
Hill to p for M. Lackner.
V. Lonigro fouled out to 3b (2-2 FSBB).
Carcioppolo singled up the middle (0-2 KS).
V. Suso flied out to lf (2-0 BB).
C. Caithaml grounded out to ss (3-1 BSBB).
C. Owens to 1b for Z. Bailey.
T. Haas to 2b for PJ Suso.
L. Brown to c for V. Lonigro.
S. Jenkins to p for AJ Armstrong.
Witwer-Dukes grounded out to ss (1-2 BKF).
Sherman flied out to rf (3-2 BSBBK).
Walls hit by pitch (0-0).
Gail doubled down the rf line, out at third rf to 2b to ss to 3b, RBI (0-1 K); Walls scored.
Jones to p for Hill.
A. Gould grounded out to 2b (1-2 KKB).
C. Owens struck out swinging (2-2 KBKBS).
T. Haas grounded out to ss (1-0 B).
Iversen grounded out to p (1-2 FFB); Myers advanced to second.
A. Spidell struck out swinging (3-2 BBBSSS).
Z. Schuch walked (3-1 BBBKB).
Kaplan hit by pitch (1-1 KB); Z. Schuch advanced to second; Myers advanced to third.
Witwer-Dukes doubled to right field, 3 RBI (1-0 B); Kaplan scored; Z. Schuch scored; Myers scored.
D. Paus to p for S. Jenkins.
Sherman singled through the left side (1-1 BK); Witwer-Dukes advanced to third.
Walls reached on a fielder's choice to shortstop (0-0); Sherman out at second ss to 2b.
Faxon to p for Jones.
A. Perrella walked (3-2 KSBBBB).
W. Howell pinch hit for M. Eversole.
W. Howell hit by pitch (1-2 FBF); A. Perrella advanced to second.
W. Howell advanced to second on a passed ball; A. Perrella advanced to third.
L. Brown doubled to left center, 2 RBI (3-2 BSBBF); W. Howell scored, unearned; A. Perrella scored.
Carcioppolo grounded out to ss (1-1 SB); L. Brown no advance.
V. Suso popped up to 1b (2-2 BSBF).
C. Caithaml flied out to ss (1-2 BKS).

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.