The Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(a)(b), provides that any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders out of profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, is taxable, and, for the purposes of the Act, every distribution is regarded as made from the most recently accumulated profits to the extent that they have accumulated since that date; but profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913 may be distributed exempt from tax after profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, have been distributed. A corporation with a surplus on March 1, 1913, made a distribution after ensuing years in the earlier of which it suffered losses and in the later of which it made profits. Held that, to determine the amount exempt under the statute, the losses should be deducted from the surplus of March 1, 1913, not be charged against the subsequent profits. P. 291 U. S. 166.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 611, to review two judgments rendered upon appeals taken by two stockholders of the same corporation, in different circuits, from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 24 B.T.A, 480.
"Sec. 201. (a) That the term 'dividend' when used in this title . . . means any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders or members, whether, in cash or in other property, out of its earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913. . . ."
"(b) For the purposes of this Act, every distribution is made out of earnings or profits, and from the most recently accumulated earnings or profits, to the extent of such earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, but any earnings or profits accumulated or increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1, 1913, may be distributed exempt from the tax, after the earnings and profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, have been distributed. . . ."
properly taxable against them as their respective shares of a dividend of $5,100,000 paid by that company on April 14, 1923.
The findings of fact state that, in addition to its original capital of $1,500,000, the company had a surplus on March 1, 1913, of $4,332,684.78. Its profits and losses in the following years, ending on February 28 in each year, were as follows: 1914, a profit of $4,594.62; 1915, a loss of $193,139.67; 1916, a loss of $211,707.32; 1917 to 1923, inclusive, and from February 28, 1923, to April 14, 1923, profits aggregating $2,450,688.30. Prior to the dividend here involved, and for the years 1918 to 1923, the company had paid dividends amounting to $1,290,000.
The question is as to the proper treatment of the losses of 1915 and 1916. If these losses, over the profits of 1914, are not treated as reducing the surplus of March 1, 1913, but are charged against the subsequent profits, the entire amount of that surplus, or $4,332,684.78, was distributable exempt from the tax after the profits subsequent to February 28, 1913, had been distributed. On this basis, for which the taxpayers contend, the profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, would be deemed to amount to $2,050,435.93, leaving subject to the tax, after deducting prior dividends, the sum of $760,435.93.
B.T.A. 480. That decision was overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as to the respondent Canfield in No. 158, 62 F.2d 751, and was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as to the petitioner Thorsen in No. 212, 65 F.2d 234. The cases come here on certiorari.
In deciding between these conflicting views, the outstanding, and we think the controlling, fact is that, on February 28, 1916, the surplus of March 1, 1913, had actually been diminished by losses. The company continued in business after March 1, 1913, and exposed its accumulated profits to the hazard of that business. On February 28, 1914, the company still had those profits and an additional profit of $4,594.62. But, in the next two years, the company lost $404,846.99, so that the surplus of March 1, 1913, was invaded. It is inaccurate to say that this was merely a matter of bookkeeping. Under the findings of fact, the losses must be deemed to have been actual losses, not mere bookkeeping entries. Hence, the decrease of the preexisting surplus was actual -- as real as the preexisting surplus itself, as real as the subsequent profits. The surplus of March 1, 1913, was the amount of net assets over liabilities including capital stock. [Footnote 1] When the losses of 1915 and 1916 were suffered, the net assets of March 1, 1913, shrunk accordingly.
of tax. That the question is one of such a replacement would be strikingly evident if the whole of the surplus of March 1, 1913, had been lost and an attempt had been made to treat later profits as restoring it. The fact that only a part of the surplus was lost does not alter the question as related to that part.
The argument that the surplus of March 1, 1913, constituted capital is unavailing. We are not here concerned with capital in the sense of fixed or paid-in capital, which is not to be impaired, or with the restoration of such capital where there has been impairment. [Footnote 2] No case of impairment of capital is presented. We are dealing with a distribution of accumulated profits. Nor is it important that the accumulated profits as they stood on March 1, 1913, constituted capital of the company, as distinguished from the gains or income which the company subsequently realized. [Footnote 3] When a corporation continued in business after March 1, 1913, the dividends it later declared and paid to its stockholders, whether out of current earnings or from profits accumulated prior to that date, constituted income to the stockholders, and not capital, and were taxable as income if the Congress saw fit to impose the tax. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339. The provision of the act of Congress under consideration was a "concession to the equity of stockholders" with respect to receipts as to which they had no constitutional immunity. There is no question here of the receipt of "capital."
fixed and static amount, not to be changed by happenings after the end of the period." That the statute does relate to two periods, the dividing line being March 1, 1913, and that the periods are distinct, is obvious. But it does not follow because there are two distinct periods that the accumulations for each period constitute "a fixed and static amount," and are to remain unaffected despite the vicissitudes of business. To attribute to the accumulated profits or surplus of March 1, 1913, embarked in a continued business, such a static condition is to ignore the course of business and to impute to the Congress an intention to consider, for tax purposes, the existence of that surplus as still continued notwithstanding its actual diminution or exhaustion. Such an intention to disregard realities so as to afford immunity from a tax is not lightly to be ascribed to the taxing authority. The "equity of stockholders" which we said in Lynch v. Hornby, supra, the Congress probably had in view might reasonably require freedom from taxation on receiving a distribution of the accumulated profits of March 1, 1913, where those profits remained intact, but that equity is not apparent when those profits had been lost in whole or in part, and immunity is sought from the taxation of an equivalent amount of profits subsequently earned.
"every distribution is made out of earnings or profits, and from the most recently accumulated earnings or profits, to the extent of such earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913."
distribution of profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913. Nothing is said as to a restoration of those profits out of subsequent earnings if the former have been lost.
The argument for the stockholders stresses the word "accumulated." We think that the expression is made to carry too heavy a burden. The argument is substantially the same as that which is based on what seems to us to be an artificial conception of the two periods. What had been "accumulated" prior to March 1, 1913, was obviously not immune from the risk of loss. It is urged that the same rule should be applied whether the losses in the subsequent years preceded or succeeded the making of profits. But the actual course of events is not to be ignored. If there had been profits immediately after March 1, 1913, sufficient in amount to absorb later losses incurred before the time of distribution, it is manifest that the profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913, would have remained intact. The case is different where, in the absence of such profits, losses necessarily diminish the prior accumulations. Thus, in the instant case, there were no profits accumulated after March 1, 1913, and prior to February 28, 1916, except the small amount in 1914 which was wiped out by the losses of the two succeeding years. The profits from February 28, 1916, to February 28, 1919, amounted to $327,134.45. If there had been a distribution of these profits on February 28, 1919, it could not have been maintained that they constituted part of the surplus existing on March 1, 1913, or that they should escape taxation on the theory that they made good prior losses which had actually reduced that surplus. And the same is true of the profits subsequently made. Administrative practice appears to have been in accord with this view. See A.R.M. 82, 3 Cumulative Bulletin 36 (1920).
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in No. 158 should be reversed, and that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 212 should be affirmed.
* Together with No. 212, Thorsen v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204, 269 U. S. 214; Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co., 275 U. S. 215, 275 U. S. 218.
Compare Hadden v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 709.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573; Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552.


text:
is corrected to read cocaine-trafficking.
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Agee and Judge Smith joined.
relation to a drug trafficking crime. We affirm Perrys convictions, but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
activity was considered to be consistent with drug distribution.
amount consistent with distribution, and an additional quantity of marijuana.
years, both at Perrys house and at his place of business.
arising from the controlled buy on June 9, 2005 (Count 3).
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp.
well as incriminating statements he made to officers that day.
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
(4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
established reputation as a drug dealer in Franklin County.
[c]ocaine and other controlled substances," as well as "firearms and weapons." J.A. 45.
had probable cause to search. Accordingly, we affirm the district courts denial of Perrys motion to suppress the marijuana and firearms found during the search of his house.
to the Franklin County officers on the day of the search.
after the cocaine was found.
Although it is not entirely clear, Perry apparently believed that Detective Strickland was related to him by marriage.
amount of powder." J.A. 48.
or otherwise terminate the encounter." United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002).
touching by the police of the citizen.
Id. at 309-10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
into the car at the suggestion or request of the police officers."
questioning" prior to his being given his Miranda warnings.
suppress the spontaneous utterance as well as the postMiranda confessions.
drug trafficking crime. We disagree.
the 924(c) violation, the government was required "to present evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug trafficking crime.
(quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)).
the jurys determination that Perry possessed a firearm to further, advance, or help forward his drug trafficking activities.
double-wide trailer with three bedrooms.
drug paraphernalia and firearms found in the master bedroom.
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
invalid under the Fifth Amendment.
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . ."
F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1999)).
of the Count 4 offense.
United States v. Montgomery, 262 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir.
also United States v. Farish, 535 F.3d 815, 823-24 (8th Cir.
504 F.3d 99, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same).
uncharged predicate offense of possession with intent to distribute. See id.
in Randall was not charged in the indictment. Id.
requiring the jury to be unanimous as to which firearm supported the 924(c) conviction.
offenses charged in Count 4 or Count 5.
Perrys reliance upon United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187 (7th Cir.
reliance upon United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
and there was no way to determine which gun the jury had relied upon.
because a specific firearm is not an element of a violation under 18 U.S.C.
924(c)(1)(A)." Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
is not required for either the firearm possessed or the predicate offense it is possessed in furtherance of in order to convict.
possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
charged in Count 4 or Count 5." J.A. 609 (emphasis added).
for the single 924(c) conviction.
assuming that the district court should have required jury unanimity as to the predicate offense, the error was harmless.
is no longer valid in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
whether such a verdict would be proper to another day.
attributable to Perry, and we find no error in its determination.
exceptional circumstances"). Because Perrys asserted sixlevel increase fails to create an "exceptional circumstance,"
standard of proof on this point.
cocaine sentencing ratio could not be a basis for a variance).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


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1.1 Die nachfolgenden Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB) gelten für alle von der JenLab GmbH (nachfolgend "JenLab") zu erbringenden Lieferungen und Leistungen.
1.2 Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen des Kunden werden nicht Vertragsbestandteil, es sei denn, JenLab hat diesen ausdrücklich zugestimmt. Dies gilt auch dann, wenn JenLab ihnen nicht ausdrücklich widerspricht oder die Lieferung oder Leistung ausführt, ohne den AGB des Kunden widersprochen zu haben.
2.1. Unsere Angebote sind freibleibend und unverbindlich. Bis zur Auftragserteilung wird Zwischenverkauf ausdrücklich vorbehalten. Ist die Bestellung als Angebot gemäß § 145 BGB zu qualifizieren, so können wir dieses innerhalb von zwei Wochen annehmen.
2.2. Die Annahme kann entweder schriftlich (z. B. durch Auftragsbestätigung) oder durch Auslieferung der Ware an den Besteller erklärt werden.
2.3. Technische Angaben, Beschreibungen oder Abbildungen des Liefergegenstandes in Angeboten, Prospekten oder sonstigen Unterlagen - auch in elektronischer Form - stellen keine zugesicherten Eigenschaften oder Garantien dar. Sie unterliegen unserem Änderungsvorbehalt.
3.1. Die berechneten Preise beziehen sich auf das jeweilige Angebot.
3.2. Die Art der Verpackung und die Anzahl der Packstücke behalten wir uns vor.
4.1. Unsere Rechnungen werden ohne Abzug mit Lieferung der Ware fällig und sind ab Rechnungsdatum binnen 30 Tagen rein netto zu zahlen. Skonti werden nicht gewährt. Wir behalten uns eine abweichende einzelvertragliche Regelung vor.
4.2. Die Zahlungen sind mit unter Angabe der Rechnungs- und Kundennummer auf das Bankkonto der JenLab GmbH, das auf der Rechnung angegeben ist, zu leisten. Mit dem Tag, an dem der Rechnungsbetrag uns unwiderruflich valutarisch gutgebracht ist, gelten Zahlungen als bei uns eingegangen.
5.1. Kommt der Besteller in Zahlungsverzug gemäß § 286 BGB, so sind wir berechtigt, Verzugszinsen in Höhe von jährlich 8 % über dem Basiszinssatz sowie Mahngebühren in Höhe von 100,00 € für die zweite und 200,00 € für jede weitere Mahnung zu fordern. Falls wir einen höheren Verzugsschaden nachzuweisen können, sind wir berechtigt, diesen geltend zu machen.
5.2. Ist Zahlung in Teilbeträgen vereinbart und befindet sich der Besteller mit zwei aufeinander folgenden Raten, mindestens jedoch mit 50 % des gesamten Kaufpreises in Verzug, so wird der gesamte Rechnungsbetrag aus dem betreffenden Geschäft nach erfolgloser Setzung einer zweiwöchigen Frist zur Zahlung fällig.
5.3. Die Entgegennahme von Teilzahlungen stellt keinen Verzicht auf weitergehende Rechte dar.
5.4. Aufrechnungsrechte stehen dem Besteller nur zu, wenn seine Gegenansprüche rechtskräftig festgestellt, unbestritten oder von uns anerkannt sind. Außerdem ist er zur Ausübung eines Zurückbehaltungsrechts nur insoweit befugt, als sein Gegenanspruch auf dem gleichen Vertragsverhältnis beruht.
6.1. Wir behalten uns das Eigentum an der Kaufsache bis zur vollständigen Bezahlung aller unserer Forderungen aus dem Kaufvertrag und aus der Geschäftsverbindung mit dem Besteller vor.
6.2. Die Geltendmachung unseres Anspruches auf Herausgabe der Kaufsache beinhaltet - ohne dass es einer gesonderten Erklärung bedarf - unsere Erklärung, vom Vertrag zurückzutreten. Dabei ist, soweit zulässig, die Setzung einer Nachfrist nicht nötig.
6.3. Die unter Eigentumsvorbehalt stehende Ware hat der Besteller ordnungsgemäß zu lagern, auf seine Kosten ausreichend zu versichern und uns dieses auf Verlangen nachzuweisen.
Wir behalten uns auch das Eigentum an der Ware vor, bis unsere sämtlichen Forderungen gegen den Besteller aus der Geschäftsverbindung, einschließlich der künftig entstehenden Forderungen auch aus gleichzeitig oder später abgeschlossenen Verträgen beglichen sind. Das gilt auch dann, wenn einzelne oder sämtliche Forderungen von uns in eine laufende Rechnung aufgenommen wurden und der Saldo gezogen und anerkannt ist.
Wertes der Vorbehaltsware mit allen Nebenrechten und Rang vor dem Rest ab. Wir nehmen die Abtretung an. Die in 6.8 genannten Pflichten des Bestellers gelten auch in Ansehung der abgetretenen Forderungen.
Zur Einziehung dieser Forderung ist der Besteller auch nach Abtretung ermächtigt. Unsere Befugnis, die Forderungen selbst einzuziehen bleibt hiervon unberührt; jedoch verpflichten wir uns, die Forderungen nicht einzuziehen, solange der Besteller seinen Zahlungs- und sonstigen Verpflichtungen ordnungsgemäß nachkommt, kein Antrag auf Eröffnung eines Insolvenzverfahrens gestellt ist und kein sonstiger Mangel seiner Leistungsfähigkeit vorliegt. Wir können verlangen, dass der Besteller uns die abgetretenen Forderungen und deren Schuldner bekannt gibt, alle zum Einzug erforderlichen Angaben macht, die dazu gehörigen Unterlagen aushändigt und dem Schuldner die Abtretung mitteilt.
Eine etwaige Be- oder Verarbeitung der Vorbehaltsware nimmt der Besteller für uns vor, ohne dass für uns daraus Verpflichtungen entstehen. Bei Verarbeitung, Verbindung, Vermischung oder Vermengung der Vorbehaltsware mit anderen, nicht uns gehörenden Waren, steht uns der dabei entstehende Miteigentumsanteil an der neuen Sache im Verhältnis des Wertes der Vorbehaltsware zu der übrigen verarbeiteten Ware zum Zeitpunkt der Verarbeitung, Verbindung, Vermischung oder Vermengung zu. Erwirbt der Besteller das Alleineigentum an der neuen Sache, so sind sich die Vertragspartner darüber einig, dass uns der Besteller im Verhältnis des Wertes der verarbeiteten bzw. verbundenen, vermischten oder vermengten Vorbehaltsware Miteigentum an der neuen Sache einräumt und diese unentgeltlich für uns verwahrt.
Wird im Zusammenhang mit der Bezahlung des Kaufpreises durch den Besteller eine wechselmäßige Haftung unsererseits begründet, so erlöschen der Eigentumsvorbehalt sowie die diesem zugrunde liegenden Forderungen aus Warenlieferungen nicht vor Einlösung des Wechsels durch den Besteller als Bezogener.
6.8. Die unter Eigentumsvorbehalt stehende Ware darf vor ihrer vollständigen Bezahlung der gesicherten Forderungen weder an Dritte verpfändet, noch zur Sicherheit übereignet werden. Wird unsere Eigentumsvorbehaltsware durch Dritte beansprucht, so ist uns dies durch den Besteller unverzüglich durch eingeschriebenen Brief mitzuteilen. Der Besteller hat den Dritten auf unsere Eigentumsrechte unverzüglich schriftlich hinzuweisen. Verstößt der Besteller gegen diese gegenüber uns und dem Dritten bestehende Mitteilungspflicht und sollte der Dritte danach nicht in der Lage sein, uns die aus der Durchsetzung unserer Eigentumsrechte entstandenen gerichtlichen und außergerichtlichen Kosten zu erstatten, so haftet der Besteller für den von uns insoweit entstandenen Ausfall.
7.1. Die angegebene Lieferzeit ist für uns unverbindlich.
7.2. Der Beginn der von uns angegebenen Lieferzeit bzw. der Reparatur bzw. Installationszeit setzt die Abklärung aller technischen Fragen sowie den Eingang einer ggf. vertraglich vereinbarten Anzahlung voraus. Die Einhaltung unserer Lieferverpflichtung erfordert zudem stets die rechtzeitige und ordnungsgemäße Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen des Bestellers. Im Falle einer von uns vorzunehmenden Installation ist insbesondere die Anzeige des Bestellers, dass die Voraussetzungen einer ordnungsgemäßen Installation gegeben bzw. hergestellt sind, notwendig. Die Einrede des nicht erfüllten Vertrages bleibt vorenthalten. Die Lieferfrist berechnet sich ansonsten im Zweifel vom Tag der Auftragsbestätigung bis zur Absendung ab Werk.
7.3. Bei Lieferverzug hat der Besteller eine Nachfirst von mindestens vier Wochen zu setzen. Er kann nach Ablauf dieser Frist vom Vertrag zurücktreten.
7.4. Im Falle unvorhergesehener Hindernisse bei uns oder unseren Vorlieferanten, wie Arbeitskonflikte, Betriebsstörungen, Krieg, Einfuhrsperre, höhere Gewalt und ähnliche Ereignisse, sind wir berechtigt, nach unserer Wahl ganz oder teilweise vom Vertrag zurückzutreten oder die Lieferung hinauszuschieben, ohne dass dem Besteller daraus Schadensersatzansprüche gegen uns zustehen.
7.5. Wir sind zu Teillieferungen berechtigt.
7.6. Fixgeschäft. Soweit ein Fixgeschäft im Sinne von § 286 Abs. 2 Nr. 4 BGB oder von § 376 HGB vorliegt, haften wir nach den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. Auch haften wir nach den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen, sofern als Folge eines von uns zu vertretenden Lieferverzugs der Besteller berechtigt ist, geltend zu machen, dass sein Interesse an der weiteren Vertragserfüllung in Fortfall geraten ist.
8.1. Soweit nicht etwas anderes vereinbart ist, sind wir berechtigt, die Art der Versendung selbst zu bestimmen.
8.2. Die Gefahr des zufälligen Untergangs und der zufälligen Verschlechterung der Ware geht spätestens mit der Übergabe auf den Besteller über. Beim Versendungskauf geht jedoch die Gefahr des zufälligen Untergangs und der zufälligen Verschlechterung der Ware sowie die Verzögerungsgefahr bereits mit Auslieferung der Ware an den Spediteur, den Frachtführer oder der sonst zur Ausführung der Versendung bestimmten Person oder Anstalt über. Soweit eine Abnahme vereinbart ist, ist diese für den Gefahrübergang maßgebend.
8.3. Die Abnahme des Liefergegenstandes hat unverzüglich nach unserer Bereitstellungsanzeige bzw. bei Anlieferung zu erfolgen. Bei Nichteinhaltung sind wir berechtigt, nach Mahnung und Setzung einer Frist zur Leistung oder Nacherfüllung von zwei Wochen weitere Lieferungen zu verweigern.
8.4. Kommt der Besteller in Annahmeverzug oder verletzt er schuldhaft sonstige Mitwirkungs-pflichten, so sind wir berechtigt, den uns entstehenden Schaden einschließlich etwaiger Mehraufwendungen zu verlangen, wobei weitergehende Ansprüche vorbehalten bleiben. Der Schadensersatz beträgt 20 % des Verkaufspreises vorbehaltlich eines nachzuweisenden höheren Schadens. Dem Besteller ist es unbenommen, uns einen geringeren oder gar keinen Schaden nachzuweisen. Die Aufrechnung mit erhaltenen Anzahlungen ist zulässig.
8.5. In diesem Fall geht auch die Gefahr eines zufälligen Unterganges oder einer zufälligen Verschlechterung der Kaufsache in dem Zeitpunkt auf den Besteller über, in dem dieser in Annahmeverzug gerät.
9.1. Die Verpackung, Verladung und der Transport aller von uns zum Versand kommenden Güter erfolgt ab Standort auf Rechnung des Bestellers.
9.2. Eine Transportversicherung wird nur auf ausdrückliche Anweisung und auf Kosten des Bestellers abgeschlossen.
9.3. Der Transport, auch wenn er durch uns und mit unseren eigenen Transportmitteln durchgeführt wird, erfolgt ausschließlich auf Gefahr des Bestellers, d.h. die Durchführung des Transports steht der im § 447 Abs. 1 BGB geforderten Übergabe der Kaufsache an den Spediteur, Frachtführer oder sonst zur Ausführung der Versendung bestimmten Person oder Anstalt gleich. Wird der Transport von uns selbst ausgeführt, übernehmen wir für Schäden, deren Eintritt wir zu vertreten haben, nur dann die Haftung, wenn uns Vorsatz oder grobe Fahrlässigkeit zur Last fällt.
9.4. Verzögert sich der Versand durch Verschulden des Bestellers durch Unterbleiben einer von ihm zu erbringenden Handlung oder sonstiger Umstände, die in seinem Verantwortungsbereich liegen, geht die Gefahr bereits an dem Tag der Mitteilung der Versandbereitschaft auf den Besteller über. Wir sind berechtigt, die Ware in diesem Fall auf Kosten und Gefahr des Bestellers einzulagern. Die Lagerkosten betragen mindestens 0,5% des Verkaufspreises für jeden angefangenen Monat.
10.1. Die Installation von Geräten durch uns erfolgt auf Kosten des Bestellers. Der Besteller hat insbesondere die Werkleistung im Zusammenhang mit der Installation, die Fahrtkosten, die Übernachtungskosten unserer Mitarbeiter sowie sonstige Nebenkosten zu tragen. Es gilt die im Sinne von § 632 Abs. 2 BGB übliche Vergütung als vereinbart, wenn nicht schriftlich eine ausdrücklich als „Festpreisvereinbarung" gekennzeichnete Abrede getroffen wurde.
am vereinbarten Installationstermin abrufbereit zur Verfügung hält. Bei Verstoß gegen die oben genannten Pflichten ist der Besteller zum Schadensersatz, insbesondere zur Vergütung zusätzlich entstehender Aufwendungen verpflichtet.
10.3. Sollte die Installation am vereinbarten Termin aus Gründen scheitern, die der Besteller zu vertreten hat, sind wir berechtigt, dem Besteller zur Nachholung der gebotenen Handlung eine angemessene Frist mit der Erklärung zu bestimmen, dass unbeschadet des Fortbestandes des Kaufvertrags über das Gerät der Montagevertrag gekündigt wird, wenn die im Rahmen der Mitwirkung vom Besteller zu erbringende Handlung nicht bis zum Ablauf der Frist vorgenommen wird.
10.4. Bei Vereinbarung einer Montage bzw. Installation durch uns geht die Gefahr für das Kaufobjekt gemäß § 447 Abs. 1 BGB, d.h. mit der Übergabe an die Transportperson durch uns, auch dann auf den Besteller über, wenn der Transport durch unsere Mitarbeiter durchgeführt wird.
10.5. Im Falle der Rücknahme des Gerätes infolge von Zahlungsverzug des Bestellers hat dieser neben dem pauschalen Schadensersatz von 20% gemäß Ziffer. 8.1. die Kosten für die Rückführung des Gerätes, insbesondere die Kosten für Abbau, Rücktransport, Reinigung und Überholung des Systems zu übernehmen.
10.6. Reparatur- und Serviceleistungen außerhalb der Mängelhaftung sind zu vergüten. Es gilt die gemäß § 632 Abs. 2 BGB übliche Vergütung als geschuldet, wenn nicht schriftlich ausdrücklich eine „Festpreisvereinbarung" getroffen wurde.
11.1. Die Mängelansprüche haben zur Voraussetzung, dass der Besteller seinen nach § 377 HGB geschuldeten Untersuchungs- und Rügeobliegenheiten ordnungsgemäß nachgekommen ist. Zeigt sich bei der Untersuchung oder später ein Mangel, so ist uns hiervon unverzüglich schriftlich Anzeige zu machen. Als unverzüglich gilt die Anzeige, wenn sie innerhalb von zwei Wochen erfolgt. Unabhängig von dieser Untersuchungs- und Rügepflicht hat der Käufer offensichtliche Mängel einschließlich Falsch- und Minderlieferung innerhalb von zwei Wochen ab Lieferung schriftlich anzuzeigen. Versäumt der Käufer die ordnungsgemäße Untersuchung und /oder Mängelanzeige, ist unsere Haftung für den nicht angezeigten Mangel ausgeschlossen.
11.2. Schäden an der gelieferten Ware, die durch natürliche Abnutzung, unsachgemäße Behandlung und Handhabung, Eingriffe von fremder Hand, Benutzung fremden Zubehörs oder ungeeigneter Betriebsmittel oder durch chemische, elektrochemische oder elektrische Einflüsse, die nicht nach dem Vertrag vorgesehen sind, entstehen, sind von jeder Gewährleistung ausgeschlossen.
ehl, so ist der Besteller nach seiner Wahl berechtigt, Rücktritt oder Minderung zu verlangen. Bei nur geringfügigen Mängeln ist der Rücktritt vom Vertrag ausgeschlossen.
11.4. Wir sind berechtigt, die geschuldete Nacherfüllung davon abhängig zu machen, dass der Besteller den fälligen Kaufpreis bezahlt. Der Besteller ist berechtigt, einen im Verhältnis zum Mangel angemessenen Teil des Kaufpreises zurückzubehalten.
11.5. Erfolgt eine Ersatzlieferung, ist die mangelhafte Lieferung auf unser Verlangen an uns zurückzusenden.
11.6. Die zum Zweck der Prüfung und Nacherfüllung erforderlichen Aufwendungen, insbesondere Transport-, Wege-, Arbeits- und Materialkosten tragen wir, wenn tatsächlich ein Mangel vorliegt. Stellt sich jedoch ein Mangelbeseitigungsverlangen des Bestellers als unberechtigt heraus, können wir die hieraus entstandenen Kosten vom Käufer ersetzt verlangen.
11.7. Handelt es sich nur um eine Teillieferung oder -leistung oder betrifft der Mangel nur Teile einer funktionellen Einheit, beschränkt sich das Rücktrittsrecht des Bestellers auf den betroffenen Teil.
11.8. Soweit nicht vorstehend etwas Abweichendes geregelt ist oder eine Garantie gem. § 443 BGB von uns übernommen wurde, ist unsere Haftung ausgeschlossen.
11.9. Ansprüche auf Schadensersatz oder Ersatz vergeblicher Aufwendungen bestehen nur nach Maßgabe von Abschnitt 13 und sind im Übrigen ausgeschlossen.
soweit keine Ansprüche aus unerlaubter Handlung geltend gemacht werden.
11.11. Für gebrauchte Ware wird keine Gewährleistung übernommen.
13.1. Unsere Haftung für Schadensersatz ist auf grobe Fahrlässigkeit und Vorsatz beschränkt. Bei einfacher Fahrlässigkeit haften wir nur für Schäden aus der Verletzung des Lebens, des Körpers oder der Gesundheit.
und für Schäden aus der Verletzung einer wesentlichen Vertragspflicht.
13.2. Eine weitergehende Haftung wegen nur leichter Fahrlässigkeit auf Schadensersatz ist - ohne Rücksicht auf die Rechtsnatur des geltend gemachten Anspruchs, also auch für alle Ansprüche wegen Verschuldens bei Vertragsschluss, Verletzung von Nebenpflichten, insbesondere für Ansprüche aus Produzentenhaftung gemäß § 823 BGB - ausgeschlossen.
13.3. Die Regelung gemäß vorstehender Ziffer gilt nicht für Ansprüche gemäß §§ 1, 4 Produkthaftungsgesetz. Gleiches gilt bei anfänglichem Unvermögen oder zu vertretender Unmöglichkeit.
13.4. Wegen einer Pflichtverletzung, die nicht in einem Mangel besteht, kann der Besteller nur zurücktreten oder kündigen, wenn wir die Pflichtverletzung zu vertreten haben. Ein freies Kündigungsrecht des Bestellers (insbesondere gem. §§ 651, 649 BGB) wird ausgeschlossen. Im Übrigen gelten die gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen und Rechtsfolgen.
13.5. Soweit unsere Haftung ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt ist, gilt dies auch für die persönliche Haftung unserer Arbeitnehmer und sonstiger Erfüllungsgehilfen. Darüber hinaus haften wir nicht für das Verschulden unserer sonstigen Erfüllungsgehilfen, soweit sich dieses nicht auf vertragswesentliche Pflichten bezieht.
14.1. Auftragsbezogen gefertigte Waren und/oder Waren können nicht gutgeschrieben oder umgetauscht werden.
14.2. Warenrücksendungen werden nur in Ausnahmefällen nach vorheriger Genehmigung von uns und mit ordnungsgemäß ausgefülltem Retourenschein akzeptiert.
15.1. Sofern der Besteller Kaufmann, juristische Personen des öffentlichen Rechts oder Sondervermögen des öffentlichen Rechts ist, ist unser Geschäftssitz Gerichtsstand für alle Streitigkeiten, die sich unmittelbar oder mittelbar aus dem Vertragsverhältnis ergeben. Wir sind jedoch berechtigt, den Besteller auch an seinem Wohnsitzgericht zu verklagen.
15.2. Sofern sich aus der Auftragsbestätigung nichts anderes ergibt, ist unser Geschäftssitz Erfüllungsort für Lieferung und Zahlung.


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(1) Below, we provide information on the collection of personal information when our website is used. Personal data is all the data that personally refers to you, as for example, name, address, email addresses, user behaviour.
Bohle Glass Equipment (Pty) Ltd.
(3) When you contact us by email or via a contact form, the data you provide (your email address, and, if applicable, your name and your telephone number) will be stored by us in order to answer your questions. We will delete the data collected in this context after storage is no longer required by law, or otherwise limit its further processing if we are required by law to continue archiving it.
(4) If we use contracted service providers for individual functions related to Bohle’s business of our offer or would like to use your data for advertising purposes, we will inform you in detail about the respective processes. In doing so, we will also specify the defined criteria for the storage period.
(2) You also have the right to lodge a complaint to a data protection supervisory authority concerning the processing of your personal data by us.
(2) In addition to the aforementioned data, cookies are stored on your computer when you use our website. Cookies are small text files that are stored on your hard disk in association with the browser you are using, and by which the body which sets the cookie (in this case, us), transmits certain information. Cookies cannot run programs or transfer viruses to your computer. They serve to make our site more user-friendly and effective.
b) Transient cookies are deleted automatically when you close your browser. These include session cookies in particular. These store a session ID which assigns the various requests made by your browser during the joint session. This allows your computer to be recognised when you return to the website. The session cookies are deleted when you log out or close your browser.
c) Persistent cookies are automatically deleted after a specified period, which may vary depending on the cookie. You can delete the cookies in your browser's security settings at any time.
d) You can configure your browser settings as you desire and, for example, refuse to accept third-party cookies or all cookies. Please note that you may not be able to use all functions of this website.
(1) In addition to the purely informational use of our website, we offer various services that you can use if you are interested. For this purpose, you must provide further personal data which we use to provide the respective service and to which the aforementioned data processing principles apply.
(3) Furthermore, we may disclose your personal data to third parties if we offer promotions, competitions, contracts or similar services together with partners. For more information on this, please provide your personal data or see the description of the offer below.
(1) If you have given your consent to the processing of your data, you may revoke this at any time. Any such revocation will affect our ability to process your personal data after you have already given it to us.
(2) Insofar as we base the processing of your personal data on the balance of interests, you may object to the processing. This is the case if processing is not necessary, in particular, to fulfil a contract with you, which is described by us in the following description of the functions. When exercising such an objection, we will ask you to explain the reasons why we should not process your personal data as we have done. In the event of a justified objection by you, we will examine the situation and either stop or adjust data processing or point out to you our compelling reasons worthy of protection, on the basis of which we will continue processing.
(1) If you wish to place an order on our website, you will need to provide us with your personal data for the conclusion of the contract, which we will need to process your order. The information required for the processing of the contracts is marked separately; any further information is voluntary. We use the data you have provided solely to process your order. For this, we can forward your payment details to our bank. The legal basis for this is Art. 6 para. 1 s. 1 lit. b) of the GDPR. You can create a customer account voluntarily through which we can store your data for further purchases. When you create an account under "My account", the data you have provided will be stored revocably.
We may also process the data you provide in order to inform you of other interesting products from our own portfolio or to send you emails containing technical information.
(2) We are obliged by commercial and tax regulations to store your address, payment, and order data for a period of ten years. However, after two years we will limit processing, i.e. your data will only be used to comply with legal obligations.
(4) In order to prevent unauthorised access to your personal data by third parties, in particular, financial data, the ordering process is encrypted using TLS technology.
(1) With your consent, you can subscribe to our newsletter, through which we will inform you about our current offers which may be of interest.
(2) To register for our newsletter, we use the so-called double opt-in procedure. This means that after you have registered, we will send you an email to the specified email address, where we will ask you to confirm that you would like the newsletter to be sent. If you do not confirm your registration within 24 hours, your information will be blocked and automatically deleted after one month. In addition, we store your used IP addresses and the time of registration and confirmation. The purpose of the procedure is to be able to prove your registration and, if necessary, to clarify a possible misuse of your personal data.
(3) The only required information for sending the newsletter is your email address. The indication of further, separately marked data is voluntary, and is used to be able to address you personally. After your confirmation, we will save your email address for the purpose of sending you the newsletter. The legal basis is Art. 6 para. 1 s. 1 lit. a) of the GDPR.
(4) You can revoke your consent to receive the newsletter at any time and unsubscribe from the newsletter. You can declare your revocation by clicking on the link provided in every newsletter email, or by sending an email to unsubscribe@bohle.de. You can object to this tracking at any time by clicking on the separate link provided in each email or by informing us via other means of contact. The information is stored for as long as you have subscribed to the newsletter. After a cancellation, we store the data for purely statistical reasons and anonymously.
(1) This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service provided by Google Inc. ("Google"). Google Analytics uses "cookies", which are text files that are stored on your computer, and which help analyse your use of the website. As a rule, the cookie-generated data regarding your use of this website will be forwarded to a Google server in the USA and stored there. However, if IP anonymisation is activated on this website, your IP address will first be truncated by Google within member states of the European Union or in other states that are contracting parties to the agreement in the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transferred to a Google server in the USA and truncated there. On behalf of the operator of this website, Google will use this information to evaluate your use of the website, for compiling reports on website activity, and for providing other services regarding website activity and internet usage to the website operator.
(3) You can prevent cookies from being stored by selecting the appropriate settings in your browser; however, we wish to point out that by doing so, you may not be able to enjoy the full functionality of this website. You can also prevent the data generated by cookies about your use of the website (including your IP address) from being passed on to Google and the processing of this data by Google by downloading and installing the browser plugin available at the following link : http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en. Alternatively, you can use the following link to disable Google Analytics. This method sets an opt-out cookie that prevents the future collection of your data when visiting this website.
(5) We use Google Analytics to analyse and regularly improve the use of our website. Using the statistics gained, we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US-Framework, for exceptional cases in which personal data is transferred to the USA. The legal basis for the use of Google Analytics is Art. 6 para. 1 s. 1 lit. f) of the GDPR.
(6) Third party information: Google Dublin, Google Ireland Ltd, Gordon House, Barrow Street, Dublin 4, Ireland, Fax: +353 (1) 436 1001. User conditions: http://www.google.com/analytics/terms/de.html, Overview of data protection: http://www.google.com/intl/de/analytics/learn/privacy.html, as well as the data protection declaration: http://www.google.de/intl/de/policies/privacy/.
(1) We currently use the following social media platforms: Facebook and YouTube. In doing so, we use a two-click solution. This means that if you visit our site, initially no personal data will be passed on to the provider. You can recognise the provider of the platform by the logo. We offer you the possibility of getting to the site of the provider via the button on our site. The providers receive information that you have accessed the corresponding website of our online offer only if you click on the field and thereby call it up. In addition, the data mentioned under § 3 of this declaration will be transmitted. In the cases of Facebook and YouTube, the IP address will be anonymised immediately after collection, according to the respective provider in Germany. By calling up the Facebook or YouTube company pages, personal data will be transferred from you to the provider and saved there (at US providers in the USA). Since the provider collects data mainly via cookies, we recommend that you delete all cookies before clicking on the greyed-out box using your browser's security settings.
(2) We have no influence on the data collected and data processing operations, nor are we aware of the full extent of data collection, the purposes of processing, the storage periods. We also have no information on the deletion of data collected by the plug-in provider.
(3) The providers store the collected data about you as user profiles and use these for the purposes of advertising, market research and/or demand-oriented design of their websites. Such evaluation is carried out (also for users who are not logged in) to display customised advertising and to inform other users of the social networks about activities on our website. You have a right to object to the creation of these user profiles. You must contact the respective provider to exercise this right. Through the offer of the providers, we offer you the possibility of interacting with social networks and other users, so that we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. Legal basis for the use is Art. 6 para. 1 s. 1 lit. f) of the GDPR.
(4) The data will be passed on regardless of whether you have an account with the providers and are logged in there. If you are logged in with the provider, your data collected with us will be directly assigned to your existing account with the provider. When pressing the button and linking the page, for example, the provider also stores this information in your user account and communicates this to your contacts in public. We recommend that you log out regularly after using a social network, especially before activating the button, as, in this way, you can avoid being assigned to your profile with the providers.
(5) For more information on the purpose and extent of data collection and its processing by the providers, please refer to the privacy statements of these providers given below. Here, you will also find further information on your relevant rights and settings options for protecting your privacy.
We use the most common SSL (Secure Socket Layer) method in connection with the highest level of encryption supported by your browser. Usually, this is a 256 bit encryption. If your browser does not support 256-bit encryption, we use 128-bit v3 technology instead. Whether a single page of our website is transmitted in encrypted form is indicated by the closed display of the key or lock symbol in the lower status bar of your browser. We also use suitable technical and organisational security measures to protect your data against accidental or intentional manipulation, partial or complete loss, destruction or unauthorised access by third parties. Our security measures are continuously updated according to technological developments.
In the following, we will inform you about the collection of our business partners´ personal data. Personal data include all data which can be personally attributed to you, e.g. name, address, e-mail address, phone numbers.
The collection and processing of your personal data is required for business transactions for the purposes of contract initiation, contract implementation and accounting, as well as for using our services. Your data are therefore processed for the purposes of contract performance and execution of pre-contractual measures as per Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR, and for compliance with the legal obligations as per Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c GDPR. In addition, the data are also used for improving our offers and services due to our legitimate interest in the performance of market research activities. This processing of your data takes place on the basis of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR. Upon request, the data are also processed for the purpose of sending you information. The processing of data then takes place on the basis of your consent to direct advertising as per Art. 6 lit. 1 lit. a GDPR. In addition, a credit assessment can be conducted on the basis of § 31 BDSG (new) (new German Federal Data Protection Act). We make use of the services of credit agencies or other third parties for these assessments, and your data are forwarded to them or requested by them for this purpose. The collection, processing and use of data for this purpose takes place on grounds of a legitimate interest as per Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR. The legitimate interest consists of the collection of data for the purposes of payment handling, admissibility assessment of payment methods and avoidance of payment defaults.
Personal data are deleted if the contractual relationship comes to an end, all mutual claims have been satisfied and no other legally required retention periods or legal grounds of justification for saving the data exist. They include, among others, also required retention periods taken from the German Commercial Code (HGB). That is, the data are deleted at the latest upon expiry of the legally required retention periods, usually 10 years after contract termination.
Those departments within the company are granted access to personal data which is needed by them for the fulfilment of the above-mentioned purposes. This also applies to external service providers and vicarious agents, e.g. providers of print, IT, market data analyses and accounts receivable management services. We have concluded corresponding contract data processing agreements with these service providers as per Art. 28 GDPR. In addition, credit agencies receive personal data. Investigating authorities can also be the recipients of personal data, if the respective statutory requirements are met.
Right of access: You are entitled upon request to be granted access to the personal data concerning you and which are processed by us within the scope of Art. 15 GDPR. For this purpose, you can file a request by ordinary mail or e-mail to the addresses indicated above.
Right to rectification of incorrect data: You are entitled to demand the immediate rectification of personal data concerning you if these data are incorrect. For this purpose, please get in touch with the contact addresses indicated above.
Right to erasure: Under the conditions described in Art. 17 GDPR, you are entitled to demand the erasure of personal data concerning you. These conditions in particular provide a right to erasure, if the personal data are no longer required for the purposes they were collected or in any other way processed for, and in cases of unlawful processing; if a contradiction or erasure obligation exist as per European Union law or the law of a Member State which we are subject to at the time of data processing. Please get in touch with the contact addresses indicated above to exercise your right to erasure.
Right to limitation of processing: You are entitled to demand the limitation of processing in line with Art. 18 GDPR. This right exists in particular, if the accuracy of personal data is disputed between the user and us and for the duration of the corresponding accuracy check, and in case that the user who is entitled to the right to erasure demands a limited processing instead of erasure; in addition, in case the data are no longer required for the purposes pursued by us, however still required by the user for asserting, exercising or defending legal claims, and as long as the successful exercise of a contradiction between us and the user is still disputed. Please get in touch with the contact addresses indicated above to exercise your right to limitation of processing.
Right to data portability: You are entitled to receive the personal data concerning you and which you have provided to us in a clearly structured, conventional, machine-readable format in line with Art. 20 GDPR. Please get in touch with the contact addresses indicated above to exercise your right to data portability.
In addition, you are entitled to address complaints to the responsible supervisory authority.
You are entitled to enter an objection at all times, on grounds relating to your particular situation, against the processing of personal data concerning you conducted on the basis of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. e) or f), as per Art. 21 GDPR. This also includes the right to object against processing for advertising and market research purposes. We will cease the processing of your personal data, unless we can demonstrate compelling and legitimate reasons for such processing which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or if the processing serves for asserting, exercising or defending legal claims.
New technologies and changing statutory requirements may require changing this data protection information. You will find the corresponding up-to-date version of this information at https://www.bohle.com/en-za/disclaimer/privacy-policy/.

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Art. 28
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Art. 17
Art. 18
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The Complainant is BASF SE of Ludwigshafen, Germany, represented by Hogan Lovells International LLP, Germany.
The Respondents are Kang M. Nam of Busan, Republic of Korea and Domain Bar Young N, also of Busan, Republic of Korea.
The disputed domain name <glysantin.com> (the“Domain Name”) is registered with eNom.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 2, 2010, naming as First Respondent Whois Privacy Protection Service Inc. and Second Respondent Kim Hyeonsuk and Domain Bar Young N. On June 2, 2010, the Center transmitted by email to eNom a request for registrar verification in connection with the Domain Name. On the same day, eNom transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the Domain Name which differed from the named Respondent and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on June 4, 2010 providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on June 30, 2010. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondents of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on July 2, 2010. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was July 22, 2010. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondents’ default on July 23, 2010.
The Center appointed Alan L. Limbury as the sole panelist in this matter on July 30, 2010. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Complainant, the world’s largest chemical company, has used the trademark GLYSANTIN in connection with engine coolants since 1929. It has numerous registrations for that mark, including German registration No. 350548, registered on April 12, 1926.
The Domain Name was first registered on January 16, 2005 in the name of Kim Hyeonsuk, with Domain Bar Young N as Administrative Contact. Domain Bar Young N has remained the Administrative Contact throughout the events described below.
In March, 2010 the Domain Name resolved to a website promoting coolants and offering the Domain Name for sale. Following a cease and desist letter from the Complainant dated April 19, 2010 addressed to Kim Hyeonsuk and copied to Domain Bar Young N, by email to the Complainant, Domain Bar Young N claimed to have purchased the Domain Name himself and offered it for sale to the Complainant for 1,500 Euros. The Complainant declined, whereupon, on April 23, 2010, the Domain Name was redirected to a website operated by Domain Bar Young N at which the Domain Name was offered for sale. The registration of the Domain Name was also transferred to Whois Privacy Protection Service Inc. and the Domain Name was again redirected to another sponsored links website. On May 18, 2010, the Complainant’s first cease and desist letter to the former registrant, Kim Hyeonsuk, was returned due to a false address. The identity of the current registrant, Kang M Nam, was revealed only after the Complainant filed its Complaint with the Center naming Whois Privacy Protection Service Inc. as First Respondent.
The Complainant says the Domain Name is identical and confusingly similar to its trademark GLYSANTIN; that the Respondents have no rights or legitimate interest in the Domain Name, which was registered and is being used in bad faith.
As to legitimacy, the Complainant says the Respondents were not commonly known by the Domain Name prior to its registration; they are not, and never have been, licensees of the Complainant, nor otherwise authorized to use the GLYSANTIN mark; are not using the Domain Name for a bona fide offering of goods or services and are not making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of it.
As to bad faith registration, the Complainant says that, given the fame of the GLYSANTIN mark in the field of coolants, the Respondents were evidently aware of the GLYSANTIN mark when the Domain Name was registered. As to bad faith use, the Complainant points to the offer to sell the Domain Name, both on the website and directly to the Complainant; to the confusing use within paragraph 4(b(iv) of the Policy; to the use of false contact information by the initial registrant and an obviously false telephone number of the First Respondent; and to the Respondents’ attempts to conceal their identity after the Complainant’s initial contact, including use of a privacy service immediately after an exchange between the Complainant and the Second Respondent.
The Complainant says the Respondents and the former registrant are identical or at least connected with each other and that, even if they are not, it is evident that the Domain Name has been continuously used in bad faith ever since it was first registered, regardless of changes in the registrant.
A respondent is not obliged to participate in a proceeding under the Policy but if it fails to do so, asserted facts may be taken as true and reasonable inferences may be drawn from the information provided by the complainant: Reuters Limited v. Global Net 2000, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0441. See also Microsoft Corporation v. Freak Films Oy, WIPO Case No. D2003-0109; SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC v. MARK FREEMAN, WIPO Case No. D2000-1080 and ALTAVISTA COMPANY v. GRANDTOTAL FINANCES LIMITED et al., WIPO Case No. D2000-0848.
The Rules, paragraph 1, define “Respondent” as the holder of a domain-name registration against which a complaint is initiated. The current holder is Kang M. Nam. However, the Complainant’s assertion that both Kang M. Nam and Domain Bar Young N are identical has not been denied, and the facts give some reason to accept that this is so. Accordingly the Panel will proceed on the basis that the Respondents are one and the same person. See, eg. General Electric Company v. Marketing Total S.A, WIPO Case No. D2007-1834. Accordingly, the Panel will refer to the Respondents in the singular.
The Domain Name is clearly identical to the Complainant’s GLYSANTIN trademark, the gTLD “.com” being inconsequential.
The Panel finds that the GLYSANTIN mark is distinctive and well-known. The Complainant’s assertions are sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of absence of rights or legitimate interest in the Domain Name on the part of the Respondent. The evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete evidence that the Respondent does have rights or legitimate interests in that name: Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0624 and the cases there cited. The Respondent has made no attempt to do so.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
It is unnecessary to examine the circumstances under which the Domain Name was first registered in the name of Kim Hyeonsuk in 2005, since the relevant registration for the purposes of the Policy is the registration that took place shortly after the offer to sell the Domain Name to the Complainant was rejected. That registration was in the name of a privacy service, which concealed the name of Kang M. Nam.
It is clear that the Respondent, as Administrative Contact for the Domain Name throughout its life, was well aware of the Complainant’s GLYSANTIN trademark when that registration took place, since he had just offered it for sale to the Complainant in response to a cease and desist letter and had been rebuffed. The Panel finds that the change in registration and the use of the privacy service following the cease and desist letter were done in furtherance of the purpose of selling the Domain Name to the Complainant for an amount which must have been in excess of the out-of-pocket costs of registration. This constitutes evidence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use, pursuant to the Policy, paragraph 4(b)(i).
Accordingly the Panel finds that the Domain Name was registered and is being used in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Domain Name <glysantin.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

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GEORGE OSSERMAN & others vs. HERMAN JACOBS & another (and four companion cases [Note 1]).
Present: QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, & KAPLAN, JJ.
FIVE CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Superior Court on August 8, 1974.
The cases were heard by McNaught, J., on motions to dismiss.
Michael R. Coppock for the plaintiffs.
Eric Lund for the defendants.
KAPLAN, J. In what circumstances does a judgment for the defendant upon the sustaining of a demurrer to a declaration preclude a second action on the same cause of action? As urged by the plaintiffs-appellants, we deal with this problem of res judicata apart from the possible influence upon it of the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure effective on July 1, 1974: here the earlier action was concluded before that date, though the later action -- the one under present appeal -- was commenced thereafter.
motion and the plaintiffs appealed. We transferred the matter to this court.
present separate action was commenced, with the result above stated, leading to the present appeal by the plaintiffs as appellants.
adverse judgment, would work preclusively against him. See Hacker v. Beck, 325 Mass. 594 (1950); Elfman v. Glaser, 313 Mass. 370 (1943); Whitney v. Whitney, supra; Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299, 319-320 (1929).
has been given two chances to state his case and is not entitled to burden the courts and the opposing parties with further attempts." [Note 9] See Turner v. Dahlberg, 360 Mass. 854 (1971); cf. McArdle v. Schneider, 228 F. Supp. 506 (D. Mass. 1964).
The conclusion we reach is made the easier because on the motion to vacate the judgment it was open to the plaintiffs to press on the judge any "equities" that might exist: for example, that the omission to move to file a second amended complaint was due to excusable inadvertence or that there was plausible reason for thinking that a solid cause of action could be pleaded and proved notwithstanding earlier failures. The motion to vacate was denied and appeal was not taken. That an appeal from the refusal to vacate the judgment would present difficulties for the plaintiffs because of the discretionary elements in such a decision does not supply a reason, as the plaintiffs seem to suggest, for allowing them to commence a new action.
1B J.W. Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.409 (2d ed. 1974). But cf. 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1357 at 614-616 (1969).
[Note 1] O.C.G. Enterprises, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another; Medical Management Services, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another; Waldo L. Fielding vs. Herman Jacobs & another; and OB/GYN Associates, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another were consolidated with the main case for purposes of appeal as indicated in the text.
[Note 2] A defense of the running of the statute of limitations against the tort aspects of the five complaints was also raised in the motions to dismiss (mentioned below) and on this question there were possible variations among the five complaints. We do not reach the limitations issue because we dispose of the appeals on the basis of res judicata.
[Note 3] The use of the Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to raise the defense of former adjudication was not objectionable here as the materials for decision were official records available and not subject to dispute that could be read together with the complaint. See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice Section 12.13 (1974); 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1360 at 634-635, Section 1357 at 608-610 (1969).
[Note 4] Rule 23 of the Superior Court (1954) stated: "A motion for leave to amend shall contain or be accompanied by the proposed amendment.
"If a demurrer is sustained, and leave to amend is not denied, a case shall be deemed ripe for final judgment or decree only after ten days from the sustaining of the demurrer, or such other time as the court may allow for amendment, and then only after the disposition of any motion to amend the pleading demurred to, filed within such time. After the expiration of such time no motion to amend such pleading shall be filed without leave of court." The rule was repealed effective June 30, 1974.
[Note 5] General Laws c. 250, Section 15, as appearing in St. 1972, c. 434, read thus: "If a final judgment has been entered either party, or any one or more of several plaintiffs or defendants, within one year thereafter may file in the court in which judgment was rendered a petition to vacate same. In the supreme judicial or the superior court, such petition shall be filed in the county where the judgment was entered." The section has been confined by amendment (St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 296) to the District Courts. The analogous rule is Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974) (relief from judgment).
[Note 6] See F. James, Civil Procedure Section 11.17 (1965); Restatement of Judgments Section 50 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 48, comment d at 39-40, reporter's note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Developments in the Law -- Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 836-837 (1952); Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826 (1952) (Traynor, J.).
[Note 7] See 38 Mass. L.Q. No. 1 at 36, No. 5 at 31 (1953).
[Note 8] Appeal was taken from this judgment but was dismissed for want of prosecution.
[Note 9] In the Martin case the first action, instituted in the Massachusetts Superior Court, had been removed to the United States District Court and went to judgment there; the second action was commenced in the Superior Court. The court dealt with the res judicata question as a matter of our State law.
[Note 10] Also referring to the possible bearing of Rule 41 (b), last sentence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (regarding effect of involuntary dismissal), analogous to Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). See 9 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2373 at 238-239 (1971).


A bill quia timet to remove a cloud from a legal title cannot ordinarily be brought in the courts of the United States by one not in possession of the real estate in controversy, but when a local statute of the state authorizes a bill in equity in such case, the remedy allowed in state courts may also be enforced in federal courts, and when a cloud upon the title to real estate prevents the enforcement of a lien at law to secure the payment of money, then the creditor may have his bill to remove the cloud.
In equity. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
the said Allen being at the time insolvent, and the property conveyed being all his property subject to execution, and the conveyance to Wilson being therefore an assignment of all his effects by an insolvent debtor of the United States, within the meaning of § 3466 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; that since this assignment, and since the sale to the United States, the defendant Gill claims to have acquired an interest under Wilson in the said real estate.
The prayer of the bill is that the conveyance by Allen to Wilson be declared fraudulent and void; that the paramount lien of the United States in said land for the said taxes be adjudged and declared; that the priority of the United States be maintained and decreed, and the pretended conveyance of Allen to Wilson be removed as a cloud upon their title, and account for rents and profits, and a writ of possession to put the complainant in possession, and for general relief.
The defendants answered denying the legality of the tax and its assessment and the regularity of the steps taken for its enforcement and the validity of the sale and conveyance to the United States, and denying all the allegations of fraud and trust in reference to the conveyance from Allen to Wilson, insisting that the same was an absolute conveyance, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration. The case was put at issue by a replication, and heard upon the pleadings and proof. The circuit court, finding the preponderance of evidence against the allegation of a demand of payment of the tax, penalty, and interest, as required by § 3185 of the Revised Statutes, and that the title set up by the United States had failed, dismissed the bill. From this decree the United States has appealed.
purchase in pursuance thereof. The United States claims, and, if the allegations of the bill can be supported by proof, owns, the legal title to the lands described -- a title paramount to that under which the appellee claims, for the deed to the United States conveys, if it is effective, the title which Allen had when the tax was assessed in July, 1867, and operates by relation from that time. Having the legal title, then, but being kept out of possession by defendants holding adversely, the remedy of the United States is at law to recover possession. Equity in such cases has no jurisdiction, unless its aid is required to remove obstacles which prevent a successful resort to an action of ejectment, or when, after repeated actions at law, its jurisdiction is invoked to prevent a multiplicity of suits or there are other specific equitable grounds for relief. Bills quia timet, such as this is, to remove a cloud from a legal title cannot be brought by one not in possession of the real estate in controversy, because the law gives a remedy by ejectment which is plain, adequate, and complete. This is the familiar doctrine of this Court. Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568; Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550, 113 U. S. 555.
The case of Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430, 67 U. S. 444, was one of a creditors' bill, where the complainant, having a lien on the real estate of the defendant, by virtue of a decree in admiralty, for the payment of money, was held, as in other cases of creditors by judgment or decree, to be entitled to the aid of a court of equity to remove a cloud upon the title which obstructed or prevented the enforcement at law of his lien. The jurisdiction is invoked in such cases because it is necessary to give to the complainant the benefit of his remedy at law, which, without it, is not plain, adequate, and complete. Where the local statute gives the remedy by a bill in equity to remove a cloud upon the legal title, without requiring the complainant to obtain prior possession, that remedy, it is admitted, may be administered in appropriate cases by the courts of the United States. Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 16; Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405; Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158.
"shall have and exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of all civil actions triable at law, except for injuries to person, property, or character, involving unliquidated damages,"
and it has been decided by the Supreme Court of that state that this gives the chancery court jurisdiction over an action of ejectment. Frazier v. Browning, 11 Lea 253. But this does not efface the distinction between legal and equitable rights and remedies, and if it did, it could not confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction in equity to try cases at common law. Thompson v. Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 134; Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670.
Affirmed without prejudice to the right of the appellant to bring an action at law.


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BABUDOMS - Sorry, definition not available.
BABUISMS - babuisms n. plural of babuism.
BEDUMBED - bedumbed v. simple past tense and past participle of bedumb.
BEJUMBLE - bejumble v. (transitive) To throw into confusion; jumble.
BENUMBED - benumbed v. simple past tense and past participle of benumb.
benumbed adj. Lacking sensation; numb.
benumbed adj. Lacking interest; dulled.
BETHUMBS - bethumbs v. Third-person singular simple present indicative form of bethumb.
BRUMBIES - brumbies n. plural of brumby.
BUMBAZED - bumbazed v. simple past tense and past participle of bumbaze.
BUMBAZES - bumbazes v. Third-person singular simple present indicative form of bumbaze.
BUMBLERS - bumblers n. plural of bumbler.
BUMBLING - bumbling n. An act of bumbling, a mistake or error especially through clumsiness.
bumbling v. present participle of bumble.
BUMBOATS - bumboats n. plural of bumboat.
BUNCOMBE - buncombe n. (archaic) Alternative spelling of bunkum.
CLUBBISM - clubbism n. (archaic) clubmanship; cliquishness.
DIBBUKIM - dibbukim n. plural of dibbuk.
DUMBBELL - dumbbell n. (weightlifting) A weight consisting of two disks or spheres attached to a short bar; used for exercise.
dumbbell n. (pejorative) A stupid person.
DYBBUKIM - dybbukim n. plural of dybbuk.

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