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Sharon J. Hall is an ecosystem scientist who explores the ecology of native and managed ecosystems that sustain people and other organisms within the community of life.
To achieve these goals, Hall and her research team focus on understanding the ecological feedbacks between humans and the environment. For example, her team measures the extent to which urban air pollution affects ecosystem health and functioning they work with farmers and agronomists on crop nutrient management to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; they collaborate with teams in other cities to explore the social ecology of residential yard management; and they explore how villages in the developing world cope with rapid environmental change, such as biological species invasions.
Coyer, J. A. and S. J. Hall. 1993. Predation on small northern anchovy (Engraulis modrax) by large silversides (Atherinidae). California Fish and Game 79(2):82-84.
Spielmann, K. A., S. J. Hall, M. R. Kruse-Peeples, D. K. Nakase and J. E. Trujillo. 2016. Soil texture and agricultural resilience in the prehistoric Southwest: Farming on Perry Mesa, Arizona. In: Foster II, H. T., L. M. Paciulli and D. J. Goldstein eds., Viewing the Future in the Past: Historical Ecology Applications to Environmental Issues. University of South Carolina Press. Columbia, SC. ISBN: 978-1-61117-586-8.
Hall, S. J. 2014. Soils and the future of food: Challenges and opportunities for feeding nine billion people. Pp. 17-36 In: Churchman, G. J. and E. R. Landa eds., The Soil Underfoot: Infinite Possibilities for a Finite Resource. CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL. ISBN: 978-1466571563.
Hall, S. J. and P. A. Matson. 2002. Acid rain and N-deposition. Pp. 279-306 In: Gasche, R., H. Papen and H. Rennenberg eds., Trace Gas Exchange in Forest Ecosystems. Vol 3. Springer. ISBN: 978-90-481-6214-7.
Ball, B. A., S. J. Hall and J. Ripplinger. 2016. Influence of climate, plant communities, and land use on long-term patterns of soil properties in the CAP LTER ecosystem. Poster presented at the Central Arizona-Phoenix Long-Term Ecological Research Eighteenth Annual All Scientists Meeting and Poster Symposium, 15 January 2016, Skysong, Scottsdale, AZ.
Larson, K. L., E. M. Cook, J. Brumand, S. J. Hall and K. Feldbauer. 2012. The social ecology of residential land management: Complex effects, tradeoffs and legacies in the Sonoran Desert of Phoenix, AZ. Presented September 12, 2012, at the Long-Term Ecological Research All Scientist Meeting, Estes Park, CO, September 10-13.
Cook, E. M., S. J. Hall, R. A. Sponseller, D. P. Huber, S. R. Earl and N. B. Grimm. 2011. Atmospheric nitrogen deposition fluxes in arid Phoenix, Arizona: A comparison of sampling methods. Poster presented at the 7-12 August 2011 96th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Austin, TX.
Schmoker, M. E., E. M. Cook, S. L. Collins and S. J. Hall. 2011. Impacts of urban soil nitrogen availability and herbivory on primary production of herbaceous annual plants in an arid ecosystem. Poster presented at the 7-12 August 2011 96th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Austin, TX.
Marusenko, Y. Y. and S. J. Hall. 2010. Magnitude, distribution, and fate of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in urban highway soils. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. Poster presented at the January 14, 2010 12th Annual Central Arizona-Phoenix Long-Term Ecological Research Poster Symposium, Global Institute of Sustainability.
Cook, E. M., S. J. Hall, K. L. Larson and C. A. Strawhacker. 2009. An interdisciplinary, multi-scalar framework for understanding the social and ecological dynamics of residential landscapes: A case study in Phoenix, Arizona. Poster presented September 13-17 at the 2009 LTER All Scientist Meeting, Integrating Science and Society in a World of Constant Change. Estes Park, CO.
Funke, B. M., E. M. Cook, S. J. Hall, K. L. Larson, C. Strawhacker and V. Turner. 2009. Legacy effects and the social-ecological dynamics of residential landscapes: An interdisciplinary study in Phoenix, Arizona. Poster presented at the 15 January 2009, 11th Annual Central Arizona-Phoenix Long-Term Ecological Research Symposium, Global Institute of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
Funke, B. M., E. M. Cook, C. Strawhacker, V. Turner, K. L. Larson and S. J. Hall. 2009. Legacy effects and the socio-ecological dynamics of residential landscapes: An interdisciplinary study in Phoenix, AZ. Poster presented at the March 2009 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Las Vegas, NV.
Larson, K. L., E. M. Cook and S. J. Hall. 2009. Social-ecological dynamics of residential landscapes in an urban ecosystem context. Poster presented March 22-27 at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Las Vegas, NV.
Larson, K. L., S. J. Hall, E. M. Cook, B. M. Funke, C. Strawhacker and V. K. Turner. 2009. Social-ecological dynamics of residential landscapes in an urban ecosystem context. Poster presented February 19 at the Colloquium for Social-Ecological Dynamics in Urban Landscapes, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
Marusenko, Y. Y., S. J. Hall and P. Herckes. 2009. The fate of combustion-derived carbon deposition in urban soil. Estes Park, CO. Poster presented at 14-16 September 2009 LTER All Scientists Meeting, Integrating Science and Society in a World of Constant Change.
Marusenko, Y. Y., P. Herckes and S. J. Hall. 2009. Fate of combustion-derived carbon deposition in arid urban soil. Poster presented at August 2-7, 2009 94th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Albuquerque, NM.
Marusenko, Y. Y., P. Herckes and S. J. Hall. 2009. The fate of combustion-derived carbon deposition in urban soil. Tempe, AZ. Poster presented at February 13, 2009 Graduates in Earth, Life, and Social Sciences (GELSS) Symposium, Arizona State University.
Marusenko, Y. Y., P. Herckes and S. J. Hall. 2009. The fate of combustion-derived carbon deposition in urban soil. Tempe, AZ. Poster presented at February 27, 2009, Frontiers in Life Sciences (FiLS) Dynamic Deserts Conference, School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University.
Marusenko, Y. Y., P. Herckes and S. J. Hall. 2009. The fate of combustion-derived carbon deposition in urban soil. Tempe, AZ. Poster presented at March 20, 2009 Graduate and Professional Student Association (GPSA) Appreciation Poster Session, Arizona State University.
Marusenko, Y. Y., D. P. Huber and S. J. Hall. 2009. Denitrification in desert soils: Importance of fungi. Estes Park, CO. Poster presented at 14-16 September 20009 LTER All Scientists Meeting, Integrating Science and Society in a World of Constant Change.
Salem, M. J., E. M. Cook, K. L. Larson and S. J. Hall. 2009. Effects of landscape cover on microclimate in urban residential landscapes of the Phoenix metropolitan area. Poster presented March 22-27 at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Las Vegas, NV.
Cook, E. M., S. J. Hall and K. L. Larson. 2008. A synthesis of the ecological properties and processes of urban residential landscapes. Poster presented July 11-13 at the Regional Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) Symposium. Sponsored by the LTER Network and Sevilleta LTER, Albuquerque, NM.
Cook, E. M., S. J. Hall and K. L. Larson. 2008. A synthesis of the ecological properties and processes of urban residential landscapes. Poster presented August 3-8 at the 93rd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America. Milwaukee, WI.
Cook, E. M., S. J. Hall and K. L. Larson. 2008. Residential landscapes: Synthesis of the literature and preliminary survey results. Poster presented at 1 February 2008 9th annual symposium of Graduates in Earth, Life and Social Sciences (GELSS), Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
McGee, S. J., J. Giron, S. J. Hall and H. Schaafsma. 2008. Effects of ancient agricultural practices on soil nitrogen levels. Poster presented March 28th 15th annual ASU Undergraduate Biology Enrichment Program undergraduate research poster symposium, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
Trujillo, J., S. J. Hall and H. Schaafsma. 2008. Prehistoric agricultural legacies: Do they affect modern biogeochemistry?. Poster presented July 11-13 at the Regional LTER Symposium, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM.
Trujillo, J., S. J. Hall and H. Schaasfma. 2008. Prehistoric agricultural legacies: Do they affect modern biogeochemistry?. Poster preented June 16-19 a the National Science Foundation Division of Human Resource Development Joint Annual Meeting. Omni Shoreham Hotel, WashingtonDC.
Ontl, T. A., H. Schaafsma, S. J. Hall and J. M. Briggs. 2007. Legacies of prehistoric agriculture on herbaceous plant community composition in a desert grassland. Poster presented at the Ecological Society of America/Society of Ecological Restoration International 91st Annual Meeting, Memphis, TN.
Ontl, T. A., H. Schaafsma, S. J. Hall and J. M. Briggs. 2007. Legacies of prehistoric agriculture on herbaceous plant community composition in a desert grassland. Poster presented at the August 6-10, 2007 Ecological Restoration in a Changing World at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America held with the Society for Ecological Restoration 18th International Conference, San Jose, CA.
Davies, R. C. and S. J. Hall. 2006. The effects of urbanization on below-ground processes in the Sonoran Desert. Poster presented at the Sept 2, 2006 meeting of the All Scientists Meeting for the Long-Term Ecological Research Network, Estes Park, CO.
Hall, S. J., N. B. Grimm, J. P. Kaye and J. O. Allen. 2006. Ecosystem response to the urban atmosphere in the Sonoran Desert. Poster presented at the 6-11 August 2006 91st Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Memphis, TN.
Cook, E., C. Strawhacker, K. L. Larson and S. J. Hall. 2009. Values and other social drivers of the management and ecological properties of residential landscapes in Phoenix, Arizona. Presentation at the August 2-7, 2009 94th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Albuquerque, NM.
Hall, S. J., R. A. Sponseller, N. B. Grimm, D. P. Huber, C. F. Clark, S. L. Collins, J. P. Kaye and J. O. Allen. 2009. Ecosystem response to the urban atmosphere in the Sonoran Desert. Presentation at the August 2-7, 2009 94th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Albuquerque, NM.
Larson, K. L., S. J. Hall, E. M. Cook, B. M. Funke, C. Strawhacker and V. K. Turner. 2009. Human drivers of management practices and ecological structures in Phoenix, AZ. Presentation June 22 at the Urban Wildlife Ecology and Management: An International Symposium on Urban Wildlife and the Environment, Amherst, MA.
McHale, M. R., N. B. Grimm, L. A. Baker, B. A. Koerner, K. Li and S. J. Hall. 2009. Impacts of urbanization on regional and global carbon cycling: A complete carbon budget of Phoenix metropolitan region as a case study. Presentation at the August 2-7, 2009 94th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Albuquerque, NM.
Turner, V. K., K. L. Larson, S. J. Hall, E. M. Cook, C. Strawhacker and B. M. Funke. 2009. The socio-ecology of residential landscapes. Presentation June 23 at the Urban Wildlife Conference, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
Allen, J. O., D. A. Gonzales, R. A. Sponseller, S. J. Hall and N. B. Grimm. 2008. Atmospheric dry deposition of gaseous and particulate nitrogen to urban-influenced Sonoran Desert sites in central Arizona. Presentation at the April 2008 18th Conference on Atmospheric Biogeosciences, Orlando, FL.
Hall, S. J., H. Schaafsma, J. Trujillo and J. M. Briggs. 2008. Legacies of prehistoric agriculture in the arid US Southwest. Presentation at the August 3-8, 93rd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Milwaukee, WI; Symposium "Combining Archaeological and Ecological Perspectives to Understand the Reciprocal Dynamics of People Ecosystems that Sustain Them".
Larson, K. L., E. Cook, S. J. Hall and J. Vittal. 2008. Exploring social and ecological aspects of residential landscapes in metropolitan Phoenix, AZ. Presentation 10-14 June 2008 at the International Symposium for Society and Resource Management, Burlington, VT.
Spielmann, K. A., J. M. Briggs, S. J. Hall, M. Kruse and H. Schaafsma. 2008. Legacies on the landscape: The enduring effects of long-term human-ecosystem interactions. Presentation March 19 at the 20th Anniversary Southwest Symposium, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
Spielmann, K. A., H. Schaafsma, J. M. Briggs, S. J. Hall and M. Kruse. 2008. Legacies on the landscape: The enduring effects of long-term human-ecosystem interactions. Presentation at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology meeting. Vancouver, BC Canada.
Davies, R. C. and S. J. Hall. 2007. Soil nutrient pools and dynamics across a gradient of human influence. Presented August 10 at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, San Jose, CA.
Davies, R. C. and S. J. Hall. 2007. Soil nutrient pools and dynamics across a gradient of human influence. San Jose McEnery Conference Center. Presentation at the 6-10 August 2007 joint meeting of 92nd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America and Society for Ecological Restoration 18th International Conference, San Jose, CA.
Hall, S. J., R. A. Sponseller, N. B. Grimm, J. P. Kaye and J. O. Allen. 2007. Ecosystem response to the urban atmosphere in the Sonoran Desert. San Jose McEnery Conference Center. Presentation at the 6-10 August 2007 joint meeting of 92nd Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America and Society for Ecological Restoration 18th International Conference, San Jose, CA.
Schaafsma, H., J. M. Briggs and S. J. Hall. 2007. Legacies on the landscape: On-going research on Perry Mesa. Presentation at the Arizona Archaeological Society meeting, Glendale, AZ.
Schaafsma, H., J. M. Briggs and S. J. Hall. 2007. Legacy effects of prehistoric landscape management on Perry Mesa. Presentation at the Gila River Indian Community Cultural Resource Management Program, Sacaton, AZ.
Schaafsma, H., J. M. Briggs, S. J. Hall and K. A. Spielmann. 2007. Prehistoric anthropogenic changes in the Arizona landscape. Presentation as Key Note Address at the Southwest Vegetation Management Associations Annual Conference, Tucson, AZ.
Schaafsma, H., M. Kruse, J. M. Briggs, S. J. Hall and K. A. Spielmann. 2007. News from the landscape: Ongoing research on the Perry Mesa Culture of Central Arizona. Presentation at the 80th Pecos Conference, Pecos NM.
Grimm, N. B., J. P. Kaye, S. J. Hall, J. O. Allen and D. B. Lewis. 2004. A distinct urban biogeochemistry?. Presented at July 30-August 7, 2004, 89th Annual Meeting of the Ecological Society of America, Portland, OR.
Trujillo, J. E., M. Kruse-Peeples, S. J. Hall, K. A. Spielmann and D. K. Nakase. 2011. Legacies on the landscape: Long-term socio-ecological interaction in the southwestern United States. In: Eaton, M. and P. Landres eds., May 24-28, 2010. Albuquerque, NM. Proceedings RMRS-P-000. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mount.
Larson, K. L., S. J. Hall, E. M. Cook, B. M. Funke, C. Strawhacker and V. K. Turner. 2009. Social-ecological dynamics of residential landscapes: Human drivers of management practices and ecological structure in an urban ecosystem context. Final Report from IGERT workshop Fall 2008 Schools of Geography, Sustainability, Life Science and Hu.
Graf, W. L., L. Aben, L. Amoroso, J. R. Anderson, J. Armstrong, J. B. Bartley, V. Beauchamp, J. R. Cox, J. Curro, B. Dveris, J. W. Edmonds, S. Fairchild, K. C. Fergason, M. Fonstad, R. Gomes, S. J. Hall, M. Henze, G. Hilley, J. Johnson, C. Johnson, J. Keane, C. Levine, S. McGuire, C. O'Day, E. Prudhomme, R. Richter, W. J. Roach, M. Roberge, N. Villa, R. Vose, Z. Washburn, J. R. Welter and M. Zoldack. 1999. Hydraulics and history: Channel change on the Salt River in the Phoenix metropolitan area. As part of the CAP LTER project. Student and faculty created book containing preliminary research results. .

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Prior to the enactment of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA), Texas had no dominant law regarding the duties of executives and employees to protect confidential company information. Employers wishing to protect proprietary company information were left to rely on Texas common law and outdated Restatements of law that proved unfit to deal with the expanding developments in technology. As a result, the Texas Legislature provided a legal framework for litigating trade secret disputes by enacting TUTSA on September 1, 2013.
TUTSA was based upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which has served as the model act for 47 other state trade secret laws. TUTSA outlines a modernized definition of protectable trade secrets, provides a streamlined channel for employers to obtain injunctive relief, and includes a provision for employers to recover attorneys’ fees for willful or malicious conduct by employees.
Four years after its enactment, the Legislature revisited and amended TUTSA to better integrate the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) into Texas law. The DTSA is a federal law passed by Congress in May 2016 that provides a cause of action for employers when employees misappropriate (essentially steal) company trade secrets. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
Below are the key highlights of TUTSA, including a discussion of its most recent amendments, that outlines the duties of executives and employees to safeguard proprietary company information.
Under TUTSA, anyone seeking to recover damages for alleged misappropriation of trade secrets may bring a claim under the act. Interestingly, the statute does not limit claims to those brought strictly by “Owners” of trade secrets (as defined by the statute). Rather, other individuals or entities (such as licensees of trade secrets) are permitted to bring misappropriation claims so long as such individuals or entities have “rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rights in” the given trade secret. Regardless of who is bringing the claim, it is important to keep in mind that TUTSA only applies to claims for misappropriation that began on or after its original enactment date of September 1, 2013.
such trade secret was used without authorization. AHS Staffing, LLC v. Quest Staffing Grp., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 856, 862 (E.D. Tex. 2018).
Under Section 134A.002(6) of TUTSA, a “trade secret” includes information (i) whose secrecy has been protected by “reasonable measures,” and (ii) “derives independent economic value” because such information is not generally known or ascertainable.
Under the original statute, such “information” only included a “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers.” The recent amendment broadened this definition to add “all forms and types of information,” which also includes categories such as “business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,” as well as any “design, prototype, plan, program device, code, or procedure,” whether such information is “tangible or intangible and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(6).
Although most of this new language was pulled directly from the DTSA, TUTSA’s definition reaches even broader than that of the DTSA, with its inclusion of a list of “potential customers or suppliers,” which gives employers stronger protections under state law than those provided under the federal law. Another key difference between the DTSA and TUTSA is that the DTSA requires a trade secret to be “related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce,” whereas such limiting language is omitted from the TUTSA – again, highlighting TUTSA’s greater protection for employers.
Misappropriation is defined as either the (i) “acquisition” of a trade secret by “improper means,” or (ii) the “disclosure” or “use” of a trade secret without consent. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3). Under the statute, consent may either be express or implied.
This statutory definition imposes liability only where there is actual or constructive knowledge that the confidential information was obtained improperly.
A definition of “willful and malicious misappropriation” (the prerequisite recovery of exemplary damages). The willful and malicious standard requires intentional conduct that is taken with “conscious disregard” to the rights of the trade secret owner. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(7).
A definition of “clear and convincing evidence” (the standard of proof required for exemplary damages). Clear and convincing evidence must give the fact-finder a “firm belief or conviction” in the truth of the allegations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(1-a).
An expanded definition of “owner,” which allows certain individuals, such as licensees, to assert a claim for misappropriation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a).
These new definitions are beneficial for executives and employers accused of misappropriation because they impose a slightly higher standard of proof and require intentional conduct for exemplary damages to be awarded.
TUTSA permits injunctive relief to enjoin “actual or threatened misappropriation.” The recent changes make clear that such relief does not extend to prohibit activities where an individual is simply using “general knowledge, skill, and experience” that he or she acquired during prior employment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.003.
The “threatened misappropriation” language included in the statute provides extensive protection for employers seeking to enjoin a former employee who leaves and begins working for a competitor or attempts to start a competing venture because an injunction may be issued before any confidential information has actually been used, disclosed, or acquired by a competitor to the company’s detriment. Some courts have held that simply demonstrating that a former employee “remained in possession” of confidential information was sufficient to obtain injunctive relief without the requirement to prove irreparable harm. Orion Marine Construction, Inc. v. Coyle, No. 4:17-CV-00522, 2017 WL4875596 (S.D. Tex. October 26, 2017).
Besides issuing injunctions, there is a presumption under the statute “in favor of granting protective orders,” which can include limitations granting only the attorneys and experts access to the alleged trade secrets, sealing court records, and ordering individuals involved in the lawsuit not to disclose any alleged confidential information without the court’s approval. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.006(a). This is because courts have a duty to “preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means,” in suits brought under TUTSA. Therefore, courts have the power to compel “affirmative acts to protect a trade secret” under appropriate circumstances.
the stage of the action.
In addition to injunctive relief discussed above, TUTSA allows for monetary damages from actual losses or unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation. Where an executive or employee’s actions are deemed to be willful and malicious (which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence), an employer may also recover exemplary damages.
TUTSA, however, limits such exemplary damages to no greater than twice the amount of actual damages. In addition, courts may award attorneys’ fees for misappropriation claims brought in bad faith or where willful and malicious misappropriation is deemed to exist.
Those who wish to bring a claim under TUTSA must do so within three years of when the alleged misappropriation was discovered or should have been discovered by “reasonable diligence.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010. Therefore, executives and employees are protected from claims that reach beyond this three-year time period.
Upon leaving a company, executives and employees should ensure that they do not take any confidential or proprietary information from their former company to use in their new employment venture, especially information that the executive or employee knows was subject to reasonable protective measures (i.e. password protected, subject to restricted access, subject to a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality policy, or marked “proprietary” or “confidential”).
Executives and employees should return all company property (i.e. laptop, phone, documents, thumb drives, online account passwords, client lists, etc.) that remains in their possession upon termination or resignation.
Further, executives and employees should not attempt to access their former work emails, documents, portals, computer programs, etc. once they have left a company.
Although the definition of trade secret has been expanded, it is important for executives and employees to keep in mind that, under TUTSA, information that is “publicly known or available” or was not subject to “reasonable means of protection” will not be considered protectable information that qualifies under the definition of a trade secret. In addition, executives and employees are permitted to use general knowledge and skills they have previously acquired when transitioning to a new job.
For assistance with workplace trade secret disputes, contact Clouse Brown PLLC. Our attorneys are available to assist employers and business owners in protecting confidential and proprietary information. We also counsel and advise executives and individual employees regarding how to comply with the various laws regarding trade secret protection.


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Respondent Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel were charged with murder and other crimes. Prior to trial, an informant planted in Ventris’s cell heard him admit to shooting and robbing the victim, but Ventris testified at trial that Theel committed the crimes. When the State sought to call the informant to testify to his contradictory statement, Ventris objected. The State conceded that Ventris’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had likely been violated, but argued that the statement was admissible for impeachment purposes. The trial court allowed the testimony. The jury convicted Ventris of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. Reversing, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the informant’s statements were not admissible for any reason, including impeachment.
Held: Ventris’s statement to the informant, concededly elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. Pp. 3–7.
(a) Whether a confession that was not admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief nonetheless can be admitted for impeachment purposes depends on the nature of the constitutional guarantee violated. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination is violated by introducing a coerced confession at trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458–459. But for the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches or seizures, where exclusion comes by way of deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation of the substantive guarantee, admissibility is determined by an exclusionary-rule balancing test. See Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 65. The same is true for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding certain pretrial police conduct. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 225–226. The core of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a trial right, but the right covers pretrial interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not deprive the defendant of “ ‘effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.’ ” Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 204. This right to be free of uncounseled interrogation is infringed at the time of the interrogation, not when it is admitted into evidence. It is that deprivation that demands the remedy of exclusion from the prosecution’s case in chief. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The interests safeguarded by excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes are “outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 488. Once the defendant testifies inconsistently, denying the prosecution “the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process,” Harris, supra, at 225, is a high price to pay for vindicating the right to counsel at the prior stage. On the other hand, preventing impeachment use of statements taken in violation of Massiah would add little appreciable deterrence for officers, who have an incentive to comply with the Constitution, since statements lawfully obtained can be used for all purposes, not simply impeachment. In every other context, this Court has held that tainted evidence is admissible for impeachment. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 723. No distinction here alters that balance. Pp. 6–7.
We address in this case the question whether a defendant’s incriminating statement to a jailhouse informant, concededly elicited in violation of Sixth Amendment strictures, is admissible at trial to impeach the defendant’s conflicting statement.
Prior to trial, officers planted an informant in Ventris’s holding cell, instructing him to “keep [his] ear open and listen” for incriminating statements. App. 146. According to the informant, in response to his statement that Ventris appeared to have “something more serious weighing in on his mind,” Ventris divulged that “[h]e’d shot this man in his head and in his chest” and taken “his keys, his wallet, about $350.00, and … a vehicle.” Id., at 154, 150.
At trial, Ventris took the stand and blamed the robbery and shooting entirely on Theel. The government sought to call the informant, to testify to Ventris’s prior contradictory statement; Ventris objected. The State conceded that there was “probably a violation” of Ventris’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel but nonetheless argued that the statement was admissible for impeachment purposes because the violation “doesn’t give the Defendant … a license to just get on the stand and lie.” Id., at 143. The trial court agreed and allowed the informant’s testimony, but instructed the jury to “consider with caution” all testimony given in exchange for benefits from the State. Id., at 30. The jury ultimately acquitted Ventris of felony murder and misdemeanor theft but returned a guilty verdict on the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery counts.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that “[o]nce a criminal prosecution has commenced, the defendant’s statements made to an undercover informant surreptitiously acting as an agent for the State are not admissible at trial for any reason, including the impeachment of the defendant’s testimony.” 285 Kan. 595, 606, 176 P. 3d 920, 928 (2008). Chief Justice McFarland dissented, id., at 611, 176 P. 3d, at 930. We granted the State’s petition for certiorari, 554 U. S. ___ (2008).
The Sixth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall … have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The core of this right has historically been, and remains today, “the opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 348 (1990). We have held, however, that the right extends to having counsel present at various pretrial “critical” interactions between the defendant and the State, United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224 (1967), including the deliberate elicitation by law enforcement officers (and their agents) of statements pertaining to the charge, Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206 (1964). The State has conceded throughout these proceedings that Ventris’s confession was taken in violation of Massiah’s dictates and was therefore not admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief. Without affirming that this concession was necessary, see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 459–460 (1986), we accept it as the law of the case. The only question we answer today is whether the State must bear the additional consequence of inability to counter Ventris’s contradictory testimony by placing the informant on the stand.
Whether otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of impeachment depends upon the nature of the constitutional guarantee that is violated. Sometimes that explicitly mandates exclusion from trial, and sometimes it does not. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, and so is violated whenever a truly coerced confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458–459 (1979). The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, guarantees that no person shall be subjected to unreasonable searches or seizures, and says nothing about excluding their fruits from evidence; exclusion comes by way of deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation of the substantive guarantee. Inadmissibility has not been automatic, therefore, but we have instead applied an exclusionary-rule balancing test. See Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 65 (1954). The same is true for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding certain pretrial police conduct. See Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 225–226 (1971); Harvey, supra, at 348–350.
Respondent argues that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is a “right an accused is to enjoy a[t] trial.” Brief for Respondent 11. The core of the right to counsel is indeed a trial right, ensuring that the prosecution’s case is subjected to “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 656 (1984). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57–58 (1932). But our opinions under the Sixth Amendment, as under the Fifth, have held that the right covers pretrial interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not render counsel entirely impotent—depriving the defendant of “ ‘effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.’ ” Massiah, supra, at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 468–469 (1966).
Our opinion in Massiah, to be sure, was equivocal on what precisely constituted the violation. It quoted various authorities indicating that the violation occurred at the moment of the postindictment interrogation because such questioning “ ‘contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes.’ ” 377 U. S., at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 9 N. Y. 2d 561, 565, 175 N. E. 2d 445, 448 (1961)). But the opinion later suggested that the violation occurred only when the improperly obtained evidence was “used against [the defendant] at his trial.” 377 U. S., at 206–207. That question was irrelevant to the decision in Massiah in any event. Now that we are confronted with the question, we conclude that the Massiah right is a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation. That, we think, is when the “Assistance of Counsel” is denied.
It is illogical to say that the right is not violated until trial counsel’s task of opposing conviction has been undermined by the statement’s admission into evidence. A defendant is not denied counsel merely because the prosecution has been permitted to introduce evidence of guilt—even evidence so overwhelming that the attorney’s job of gaining an acquittal is rendered impossible. In such circumstances the accused continues to enjoy the assistance of counsel; the assistance is simply not worth much. The assistance of counsel has been denied, however, at the prior critical stage which produced the inculpatory evidence. Our cases acknowledge that reality in holding that the stringency of the warnings necessary for a waiver of the assistance of counsel varies according to “the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular [pretrial] proceeding.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 298 (1988). It is that deprivation which demands a remedy.
The United States insists that “post-charge deliberate elicitation of statements without the defendant’s counsel or a valid waiver of counsel is not intrinsically unlawful.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 4. That is true when the questioning is unrelated to charged crimes—the Sixth Amendment right is “offense specific,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 175 (1991). We have never said, however, that officers may badger counseled defendants about charged crimes so long as they do not use information they gain. The constitutional violation occurs when the uncounseled interrogation is conducted.
This case does not involve, therefore, the prevention of a constitutional violation, but rather the scope of the remedy for a violation that has already occurred. Our precedents make clear that the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes is not worth the candle. The interests safeguarded by such exclusion are “outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 488 (1976). “It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can … provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.” Walder, supra, at 65. Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of “the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process,” Harris, supra, at 225, is a high price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at the prior stage.
On the other side of the scale, preventing impeachment use of statements taken in violation of Massiah would add little appreciable deterrence. Officers have significant incentive to ensure that they and their informants comply with the Constitution’s demands, since statements lawfully obtained can be used for all purposes rather than simply for impeachment. And the ex ante probability that evidence gained in violation of Massiah would be of use for impeachment is exceedingly small. An investigator would have to anticipate both that the defendant would choose to testify at trial (an unusual occurrence to begin with) and that he would testify inconsistently despite the admissibility of his prior statement for impeachment. Not likely to happen—or at least not likely enough to risk squandering the opportunity of using a properly obtained statement for the prosecution’s case in chief.
We hold that the informant’s testimony, concededly elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to challenge Ventris’s inconsistent testimony at trial. The judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
* Respondent’s amicus insists that jailhouse snitches are so inherently unreliable that this Court should craft a broader exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 25–26. Our legal system, however, is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid “establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967). It would be especially inappropriate to fabricate such a rule in this case, where it appears the jury took to heart the trial judge’s cautionary instruction on the unreliability of rewarded informant testimony by acquitting Ventris of felony murder.
In Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344 (1990), the Court held that a statement obtained from a defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment could be used to impeach his testimony at trial. As I explained in a dissent joined by three other Members of the Court, that holding eroded the principle that “those who are entrusted with the power of government have the same duty to respect and obey the law as the ordinary citizen.” Id., at 369. It was my view then, as it is now, that “the Sixth Amendment is violated when the fruits of the State’s impermissible encounter with the represented defendant are used for impeachment just as it is when the fruits are used in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” Id., at 355.
In this case, the State has conceded that it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206 (1964), when it used a jailhouse informant to elicit a statement from the defendant. No Miranda warnings were given to the defendant,[Footnote 1] nor was he otherwise alerted to the fact that he was speaking to a state agent. Even though the jury apparently did not credit the informant’s testimony, the Kansas Supreme Court correctly concluded that the prosecution should not be allowed to exploit its pretrial constitutional violation during the trial itself. The Kansas Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
This Court’s contrary holding relies on the view that a defendant’s pretrial right to counsel is merely “prophylactic” in nature. See ante, at 4. The majority argues that any violation of this prophylactic right occurs solely at the time the State subjects a counseled defendant to an uncounseled interrogation, not when the fruits of the encounter are used against the defendant at trial. Ante, at 5. This reasoning is deeply flawed.
The pretrial right to counsel is not ancillary to, or of lesser importance than, the right to rely on counsel at trial. The Sixth Amendment grants the right to counsel “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” and we have long recognized that the right applies in periods before trial commences, see United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224 (1967). We have never endorsed the notion that the pretrial right to counsel stands at the periphery of the Sixth Amendment. To the contrary, we have explained that the pretrial period is “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings” during which a defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57, 69 (1932); see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 176 (1985) (recognizing the defendant’s “right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State” in all critical stages of prosecution). Placing the prophylactic label on a core Sixth Amendment right mischaracterizes the sweep of the constitutional guarantee.
Treating the State’s actions in this case as a violation of a prophylactic right, the Court concludes that introducing the illegally obtained evidence at trial does not itself violate the Constitution. I strongly disagree. While the constitutional breach began at the time of interrogation, the State’s use of that evidence at trial compounded the violation. The logic that compels the exclusion of the evidence during the State’s case in chief extends to any attempt by the State to rely on the evidence, even for impeachment. The use of ill-gotten evidence during any phase of criminal prosecution does damage to the adversarial process—the fairness of which the Sixth Amendment was designed to protect. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 685 (1984); see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 276 (1942) (“[The] procedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of Rights not as abstract rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness and justice before any person could be deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property’ ”).
When counsel is excluded from a critical pretrial interaction between the defendant and the State, she may be unable to effectively counter the potentially devastating, and potentially false,[Footnote 2] evidence subsequently introduced at trial. Inexplicably, today’s Court refuses to recognize that this is a constitutional harm.[Footnote 3] Yet in Massiah, the Court forcefully explained that a defendant is “denied the basic protections of the [Sixth Amendment] guarantee when there [is] used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words” that were “deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel.” 377 U. S., at 206. Sadly, the majority has retreated from this robust understanding of the right to counsel.
Today’s decision is lamentable not only because of its flawed underpinnings, but also because it is another occasion in which the Court has privileged the prosecution at the expense of the Constitution. Permitting the State to cut corners in criminal proceedings taxes the legitimacy of the entire criminal process. “The State’s interest in truthseeking is congruent with the defendant’s interest in representation by counsel, for it is an elementary premise of our system of criminal justice ‘that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.’ ” Harvey, 494 U. S., at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 655 (1984)). Although the Court may not be concerned with the use of ill-gotten evidence in derogation of the right to counsel, I remain convinced that such shabby tactics are intolerable in all cases. I respectfully dissent.
The likelihood that evidence gathered by self-interested jailhouse informants may be false cannot be ignored. See generally Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae. Indeed, by deciding to acquit respondent of felony murder, the jury seems to have dismissed the informant’s trial testimony as unreliable.
In the majority’s telling, “simply” having counsel whose help is “not worth much” is not a Sixth Amendment concern. Ante, at 5. Of course, the Court points to no precedent for this stingy view of the Counsel Clause, for we have never held that the Sixth Amendment only protects a defendant from actual denials of counsel. Indeed our venerable ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence is built on a more realistic understanding of what the Constitution guarantees. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel”).

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Under § 9 of the Act of May 27, 190, c.199, 35 Stat. 312, the homestead of a full-blood Creek Indian who dies leaving a child born since March 4, 1906, is not freed from the restrictions on alienation by the death of the allottee, but is set apart for the "use and support" of such child during life, but not beyond April 26, 1931. P. 250 U. S. 69.
Whether the special interest of the surviving child in such a case is, strictly speaking, an estate for life or for years, and what effect a removal of the restrictions on the homestead "in the manner provided in section one" of the act, after the death of the allottee, would have on the relative rights of such child and other heirs of the allottee, are questions not here considered. P. 250 U. S. 70.
Where a child holding such a special estate under § 9 of the act joined the other heirs of the allottee, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in leasing the allotment for oil and gas, upon a royalty basis, for the benefit of them all but without any provision for altering their rights inter sese, held that, since the royalties took the place, pro tanto, of the land as the lessee extracted and took the minerals, the special estate attached to the royalties, and the child took the interest or income therefrom while she lived, but not beyond April 26, 1931, leaving the principal, like the homestead, to go to the heirs in general on the termination of her special right. Id.
This is a bill in equity to settle conflicting claims to royalties collected and accruing under an oil and gas lease of lands allotted to a full-blood Creek Indian as a homestead. The allottee died intestate in November, 1908, leaving a husband and two minor children as her only heirs. One of the children was born before, and the other after, March 4, 1906. Under the applicable law of descent, each heir took and undivided one-third interest in the lands, subject to the estate specially given to the child born after March 4, 1906, by § 9 of the Act of May 27, 1908, c.199, 35 Stat. 312. The lease was given in 1912 by the husband and children -- the latter acting through their respective guardians -- in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and was approved by that officer. * The royalties have been and are being regularly paid to an officer of the Indian Bureau under a provision in the lease, and he receives and holds them in trust for the lessors according to their respective interests. The district court held that each heir was entitled to one-third of the royalties, and directed that they be distributed on that basis. Riley v. Kelsey, 218 F. 391. In the circuit court of appeals, that decree was affirmed, one judge dissenting. 243 F. 42.
It is insisted here, as it was in the courts below, that, under § 9 of the Act of May 27, 1908, the child born after March 4, 1906, is entitled to all the royalties accruing during her life, but not beyond April 26, 1931, or, if not to the royalties, to the income or interest therefrom during that period.
Stat. 500, both of which provided that the homestead of each allottee should be inalienable for 21 years and, on his death, should remain for the use and support of his children, if any, born after the date which would entitle them to be enrolled and receive allotments of their own. By the Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, that date was changed to March 4, 1906, and as to certain allotments the restrictions on alienations were extended until April 26, 1931. With these matters in mind, the provisions in the act of May 27, 1908, relied on here will be more readily understood.
"All homesteads of said allottees enrolled as mixed-blood Indians having half or more than half Indian blood, including minors of such degrees of blood, and all allotted lands of enrolled full bloods, and enrolled mixed bloods of three-quarters or more Indian blood, including minors of such degrees of blood, shall not be subject to alienation, contract to sell, power of attorney, or any other incumbrance prior to April twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and thirty-one, except that the Secretary of the Interior may remove such restrictions, wholly or in part, under such rules and regulations concerning terms of sale and disposal of the proceeds for the benefit of the respective Indians as he may prescribe. The Secretary of the Interior shall not be prohibited by this Act from continuing to remove restrictions as heretofore."
"That leases of restricted lands for oil, gas or other mining purposes, leases of restricted homesteads for more than one year, and leases of restricted lands for periods of more than five years, may be made, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, under rules and regulations provided by the Secretary of the Interior, and not otherwise."
"That the death of any allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes shall operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee's land: Provided, that no conveyance of any interest of any full-blood Indian heir in such land shall be valid unless approved by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of said deceased allottee: Provided further that, if any member of the Five Civilized Tribes of one-half or more Indian blood shall die leaving issue surviving, born since March fourth, nineteen hundred and six, the homestead of such deceased allottee shall remain inalienable, unless restrictions against alienation are removed therefrom by the Secretary of the Interior in the manner provided in section one hereof, for the use and support of such issue, during their life or lives, until April twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and thirty-one, but if no such issue survive, then such allottee, if an adult, may dispose of his homestead by will free from all restrictions; if this be not done, or in the event the issue hereinbefore provided for die before April twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred and thirty-one, the land shall then descend to the heirs according to the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Oklahoma, free from all restrictions."
"use and support" of Julia during her life, but not beyond April 26, 1931. We need not stop to consider whether, strictly speaking, the right thus specially given to Julia was an estate for life or for years, for it evidently was not the purpose to make any nice distinctions along that line. Nor need we consider what effect a removal of the restrictions "in the manner provided by section one" after the death of the allottee would have had on the relative rights of Julia and the other heirs, for no such removal was attempted or intended by the Secretary of the Interior.
by properly investing them, during the same period, leaving the principal, like the homestead, to go to the heirs in general on the termination of her special right.
Our conclusion on this point is in accord with the general trend of decisions in the oil and gas mining regions in similar situations. Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 429; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W.Va. 826; Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W.Va. 124; Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W.Va. 559; Barnes v. Keys, 36 Okla. 6.
* It was approved also by a local court.

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