text:
The Complainants are (1) Consitex S.A., a Swiss company with registered office in Stabio, Switzerland; (2) Lanificio Ermenegildo Zegna & Figli S.p.A., an Italian company with registered office in Biella, Italy; and (3) Ermenegildo Zegna Corporation, a U.S. corporation with registered office of New York, NY, U.S.A., hereinafter collectively "the Ermenegildo Zegna Group" or "Complainants", represented by Studio Legale Jacobacci e Associati, of 10152 Torino, Italy.
The Respondent is Mr. Lian Ming, of Torino, Italy.
The disputed domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> is registered with eNom, Inc. (the "Registrar").
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on April 8, 2003. On April 8, 2003, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On April 17, 2003, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the administrative, billing, and technical contacts. Registrar was requested to send its verification response within 2 days to the Center, but replied on April 17, 2003. Payment of the administration fee was duly received. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on April 17, 2003. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the complaint by e-mail on April 18, 2003. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was May 7, 2003. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent�s default on May 8, 2003.
The Center appointed Christopher Kuner as the sole panelist in this matter on May 15, 2003. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Panel has not received any requests from Complainants or Respondent regarding further submissions, waivers or extensions of deadlines. The Panel has also not found it necessary to request any further information from the parties. The Panel is of the opinion that the Complainants are in compliance with the relevant formal requirements, and that Respondent was properly notified in accordance with the Rules, paragraph 2(a). The fact that the Registrar sent its verification response on April 17, 2003, and did not respect the two-day time period stipulated by the Center does not constitute a violation of any procedural requirements, as the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") do not stipulate a formal requirement pursuant to which the Registrar needs to respond within the time limits set forth by the Center. The Panel notes that the Registrar did not explicitly answer all questions posed by the Center to fulfill its obligations pursuant to Paragraphs 2(a) and 4 of the Policy. However, the Panel has studied Registrar�s website and found confirmation that: (1) the Policy applies to the disputed domain name; (2) there is sufficient indication that the language of the registration agreement used by the registrant for the disputed domain name is English; and (3) that the registrant has submitted to the jurisdiction at the location of the principal office of the Registrar, i.e. the State of Washington, for court adjudication of disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name.
The proceedings have been conducted in English.
Complainants are an internationally well-known group in the field of fashion and trades mostly, but not exclusively, clothing, shoes, tissues, fabrics (piece goods), fashion accessories, belts, watches, jewellery, fragrances, services in the field of fashion fabrics (piece goods).
- International registration for ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA No. 410571 of September 13, 1994, in the name of Lanificio Eremengildo Zegna & Figli S.p.A..
A search on the search engines Yahoo, Google and Altavista confirms that ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA is a famous and international trademark.
According to the Registrar�s verification response to the Center, dated April 17, 2003, the Respondent registered the domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> on March 19, 2003. The administrative, billing and technical contacts are registered by Ganimede srl. Internet users using the URL "www.ermenegildo-zegna.net" were referred to a general portal site with search engine (Annex 12 to the complaint).
On March 21, 2003, Mr. PierLuigi Zoccatelli, a consultant acting on behalf of Complainants, asked Respondent whether "he would be interested in selling the domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net>. Respondent answered on the same day that "it is, as your request shows, a very valuable domain name, particularly if you want to sell clothing. I would consider selling if for Euro 30,000. To avoid wasting time, please note that there is room for discussion but not much. On the other hand, I will grant a discount if you are interested in other domain names of mine in addition to this one [translation by Complainants]."
Complainants allege that Respondent has illegally registered other domain names that are identical, or confusingly similar with well known trademarks, such as JAEGERMEISTER.IT, AGNONA-LANERIE.COM, FERRARI-SCUDERIA.COM, KINDER-FERRERO.COM, ICEBERGCLOTHINGS.COM (Annexes 5 - 9 of the Complaint).
The Panel has itself gone to the web site "www.ermenegildo-zegna.net", which takes the user to a kind of web portal offering a variety of goods and services, and contains a search engine for domain names. The site seems to be run by eNom, which offers domain name services.
No specific information is provided about the Respondent�s business activities.
Complainants contend that it is and has been the owner of the trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA since before World War II, and that the ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA mark is a world famous trademark.
A. Respondent�s domain name "ermenegildo-zegna.net" is confusingly similar to the trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA owned by Complainants.
Complainants claim that Respondent�s domain name is virtually identical to the trademark in which Complainants have rights.
B. The domain name <ermenegildo-zegna> has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
(1) Complainants contend that Respondent must have been aware that the famous trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA belongs to Complainants, and that therefore, registration may only have occurred in bad faith. It may be presumed that if "the Respondent (�) knew of the renown of the Complainant�s trademarks", a finding of "opportunistic bad faith" is in order (Banca Sella S.p.A. v. Mr. Paolo Parente, WIPO Case No. D2000-1157; there, the Panel found that Respondent could not have ignored that BANCA SELLA is a famous trademark in Italy for banking services). In Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin v. The Polygenix Group Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163, the Panel noted that "�VEUVECLIQUOT.ORG� is so obviously connected with such a well-known product [VEUVE CLIQUOT champagne] that its very use by someone with no connection with the product suggests opportunistic bad faith." In Parfums Christian Dior v. Javier Garcia Quintas and Christiandior.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-0226, it was also suggested that "the Domain Names are so obviously connected with such a well-known name and products that its very use by someone with no connection with the products suggests opportunistic bad faith [quoting Veuve Cliquot]." Even in a case where the trademark involved (EXPEDIA for online travel services) was somewhat less famous than VEUVE CLIQUOT or CHRISTIAN DIOR, it was decided that "the Respondent knew of or should have known of the Complainant�s trademark and services at the time it registered the domain name XPEDIATRAVEL.COM, given the widespread use of the Complainant�s EXPEDIA website" (Expedia, Inc. v. European Travel Network, WIPO Case No. D2000-0137). Complainants contend that Respondent, located as he is in Italy, cannot conceivably be ignorant of Complainants� trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA.
(2) Complainants allege that Respondent�s bad faith is also evidenced by his registration of several other domain names identical to, or confusingly similar with, well-known trademarks, such as JAEGERMEISTER.IT, AGNONA-LANERIE.COM, FERRARI-SCUDERIA.COM, KINDER-FERRERO.COM, ICEBERGCLOTHINGS.COM (copies in annexes 5 - 9 of the Complaint). The Panel has verified these websites but all of them have been locked.
(3) Complainants never authorised Respondent�s activities, nor did they control them. Complainants have no control over what Respondent at the moment of the Complaint included, or will include in the future, in its web site. By the use of the contested domain name Respondent also diverts traffic which would otherwise go to Complainants� web sites which promote genuine ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA products.
(4) Furthermore, as described above, on March 21, 2003, Mr. PierLuigi Zoccatelli, a consultant acting on behalf of Complainants, asked the Respondent whether "he would be interested in selling the domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net>. On the same day, Respondent answered that "it is, as your request shows, a very valuable domain name, particularly if you want to sell clothing. I would consider selling it for Euro 30,000. To avoid wasting time, please note that there is room for discussion but not much. On the other hand, I will grant a discount if you are interested in other domain names of mine in addition to this one". Complainants assert that much less than this has been regarded as evidence of "use in bad faith" under the Policy.
(3) Upon information and belief, there is no evidence that Respondent is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name.
The Complainants have requested that the Administrative Panel transfer the domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> to Complainant Consitex S.A.
(1) Respondent�s "domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights;"
(3) Respondent�s "domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith."
Each of these three elements must be proven by a Complainant to obtain relief. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy provides nonexclusive criteria for evidencing bad faith registration and use of a domain name. Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides nonexclusive criteria for demonstrating a registrant�s right or legitimate interests in an domain name.
Because the Respondent has defaulted in providing a response to the allegations of Complainants, the Panel is directed to decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of the complaint (Rules, Paragraph 14(a)), and the Panel may draw such inferences from the Respondent�s default as the Panel finds appropriate (Rules, Paragraph 14(a)).
Complainants have provided substantive evidence that they are the legitimate holder of the ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA trademark. The trademark has been registered in Italy since 1952, in the US since 1976, and international registration has been filed in 1994. The Panel determines that the Complainants� rights in the trademark arose prior to the Respondent�s registration, on March 19, 2003.
The domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> is identical to Complainant�s trademark, except that (1) the domain name adds the generic top level domain name ".net;" (2) the domain name employs lower case letters, while the trademark is generally used with capital letters; and (3) the domain name uses a hyphen between the words "ermenegildo" and "zegna," while the trademark does not.
The addition of the generic top-level domain name (gTLD) ".net" is without legal significance from the standpoint of comparing "ermenegildo-zegna.net" to ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA since use of a gTLD is required of domain name registrants. ".net" is one of only several such gTLDs, and ".net" does not serve to identify a specific enterprise as a source of goods or services. The fact that the trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA utilizes capital letters does not preclude the disputed domain name from being confused with the trademark.
The Panel also finds that the use of a hyphen between "ermenegildo" and "zegna" is not sufficient to prevent the domain name from being confusingly similar to the trademark ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA.
Therefore, the Panel decides that the disputed domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> is confusingly similar to the trademark "ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA" in the sense of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
The Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Panel is unaware of any evidence showing Respondent�s use of the disputed domain names, or any names corresponding to the domain names, in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services. There is no evidence demonstrating that Respondent has ever been commonly known by the disputed domain names. No evidence has been forwarded to the Panel establishing that Respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name.
Paragraph 4 (a)(iii) Policy sets forth two conjunctive requirements: It requires that the domain name has been registered "and" used in bad faith. Bad faith registration alone does not suffice to obtain relief under the Policy (Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marhmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003). The Panel finds that the domain name <ermenegildo-zegna.net> has both been registered and used in bad faith.
The registration has been done in bad faith because Respondent could not ignore that ERMENEGILDO ZEGNA is a famous trademark. Other Administrative Panels have decided likewise in analogous cases, as demonstrated by the references to Panel Decisions in the Complaint (Banca Sella P.v.A v. Mr. Paolo Parente, WIPO Case No. D2000-1157; Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin v. The Polygenix Group Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163; Parfums Christian Dior v. JavierGarcia Quintas and Christiandior.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-0226; and Expedia, Inc. v. European Travel Network, WIPO Case No. D2000-0137). The trademark has a long history and was registered in Italy at least back in 1952, and has been registered worldwide.
The Panel finds that the domain name was also used in bad faith. Paragraph 4(b)(i) stipulates that there is bad faith if there are "circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name." Unlike typical "cybersquatting", the Respondent did not actively contact the Complainants to sell the domain name, but offered the domain name for the excessive price of �30,000 in its reply e-mail to Complainants� representative. On the evidence, the Panel finds however that Respondent did register the domain name for the purpose of selling. This can be deduced from the fact that Respondent offers a discount if other domain names are purchased, and that he was not using it for any other purpose.
(iv) the Respondent acknowledged receipt of the complaint, but has wilfully failed to participate in the proceedings.
For all of these reasons, the Panel decides that Respondent�s bad faith has been established.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with Paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name, <ermenegildo-zegna.net> be transferred to Consitex S.A.


§ 187-27 Exemption to be applied to assessed value of property.
§ 187-29 Renewal and eligibility.
This article is enacted pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §§ 12-81(19) and 12-81f, as amended.
Any veteran entitled to an exemption from property tax in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 12-81(19) whose qualifying income does not exceed the applicable maximum amount as provided under Connecticut General Statutes § 12-81 shall be entitled to an additional local exemption in the amount of $500.
The exemption provided for in this section shall be applied to the assessed value of an eligible veteran's property.
Any veteran submitting a claim for the additional exemption shall file an application on a form prepared by the Assessor, not later than the assessment date to which such additional exemption is claimed. When a veteran has filed for an exemption and received approval for the first time, the eligible veteran shall be required to file an application for exemption biennially thereafter. Each application shall include a copy of the veteran's federal income tax return or, in the event that a return is not filed, such evidence related to income as required by the Assessor, for the tax year ending immediately prior to the assessment date when the exemption under this section is claimed.
Any veteran who has submitted an application and been approved in any year for the additional exemption under this section shall be presumed to be qualified for such exemption for the next year. During the year immediately following the approval, the Assessor shall notify in writing each veteran presumed to be qualified. If any veteran has qualifying income in excess of the maximum allowed under § 187-26 or Connecticut General Statutes § 12-81(19), § 12-81f or § 12-81, such veteran shall notify the Assessor on or before the next filing date for such exemption and shall be denied the exemption for the assessment year immediately following and for any subsequent year until the veteran has reapplied and again qualifies for such exemption. A veteran who fails to notify the Assessor of such disqualification shall make payment to the City of Meriden in the amount of property tax loss related to the exemption improperly taken.


PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 22, 2016, I have electronically filed my Motion to Reconsider Order of 2/4/16, a copy of which is attached and served upon you, by filing an original document and twelve copies with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Springfile via USPS first class mail postage prepaid from Niles, IL 60714 and mailing a copy to your offices at the address above.
Prefatory Statement – the Illinois ARDC has begun a war on Honest Attorneys and innocent victim Citizens demanding judicial accountability in the Illinois and US Probate courts.
Now comes Respondent, Joanne M Denison, and respectfully moves this honorable court to reconsider its Order of 2/4/16 denying reconsideration of its 9/21/16 Order for running a blog which discloses in detail numerous frauds and criminal schemes perpetrated upon innocent Illinois citizens and their families in the Illinois Probate court system, and nationwide which are unethical and immoral and illegal, and how the ARDC dismisses valid citizen complaints regarding lawyers and courtroom vendors in Probate. The Respondent has not neglected any clients, has not stolen anything or engaged in any ethical or immoral misconduct, the basis for filing an action against her was primarily a “go after” proceeding that discussed in detail problems and issues in Probate Court and presented the positions of scores of families in Probate who had experienced horrendous injustices and allowed them to freely discuss their complaints and grievances in an open, free and democratic manner.
3) On or about January 11, 2015 Respondent did in fact file a Motion for Reconsideration of the 9/15/16 order suspending her which was based upon new case law and a Harvard Law Review article on Occupation speech, all of which confirmed that her blog which contained political speech should be fully protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the Illinois constitution, which effectively contested the ARDC’s position that it is somehow owed (a particular amount of renumerations) from a charity, Justice4Every1.com which runs the Subject Blog in question. Stealing from a charity is definitively the nadir of the legal system.
4) The present Motion effectively asks in substance that this award of “costs” is improper, that the Subject Blog, http://www.marygsykes.com is protected under numerous state laws respecting protection of the media from assault by the government, and the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
8) Videos on Vimeo.com consistently show that in Dec. of 2009 was competent, had clear and lucid thinking and was engaged in higher level cognitive thinking and reasoning (https://vimeo.com/38694743). This Video was not allowed to be played at trial.
9) Scott Evans would have testified at trial that in Dec. Of 2009 Mary played cards with her Norwood Park Card club and “beat the pants” off of everyone else. The card game? Canasta.
9) in July of 2014, the Respondent and 3 other citizen witnesses, who were also close friends and family of Mary Sykes found her at a nursing home in Naperville–Sunrise of Naperville and took 40 minutes of video showing her to be competent, clear thinking and lucid and able to engage in higher cognitive reasoning and decision making. Mary was walking and talking and engaged in her environment and the persons around her. She was a strict vegan and a devout Roman Catholic and did not believe in hospice or psychotropic drugs. Approximately 20 other senior citizens sat nearby, propped up in wheelchairs in front of a TV which droned on. It is believed that these seniors citizens were drugged with illegal chemical restraints and that Mary had been place in a facility were the use of chemical restraints were common and accepted. The attorneys involved, each of Stern, Farenga, Schmeidel, Soehlig knew or should have known of the use of illegal chemical restrains before placing Mary there.
9) Sometime after leaving the facility, Respondent learned that Naperville police had had a conversation with an Officer Krakow who demanded that she destroy her video of Mary (Mary had given permission to video tape her, the staff said nothing during the 40 minute time period) and most importantly, this running down Respondent in a parking lot and threatening her with arrest only occurred after a conversation had taken place with Attorney Stern. At the ARDC trial, Officer Krakow’s testimony was he remembered nothing about any incidents which transpired at the nursing home. (Cite).
10) on May 22, 2015, Mary was narcotized to death. Gloria Sykes, the younger daughter was called at 3 pm and told she had to be at the nursing home by 5 pm or she “would not be able to see her mother”. When Gloria arrived, her mother was drugged so heavily her mother could not move and could not speak, although she desperately tried to speak to Gloria. The next day, the Guardian took Mary’s body to Suerth Funeral home in Chicago and demanded she be embalmed on the spot (to reduce or eliminate any traces of toxins and psychotropic drugs in her body, that no death announcements be made and that Mary’s body be entombed as soon as possible. Upon information and belief, the Funeral Director found this extremely odd but complied. Mary G. Sykes had no wake, no funeral, no death announcements were placed in any publication or online, save those by the younger Daughter Gloria Sykes. The death certificate lists “natural causes and dementia” as the cause of death, but less than one year prior, Mary G. Sykes showed no evidence of dementia, when 4 close friends/family of hers saw her at a nursing home in July of 2014, she was clear thinking, lucid and able to engage in higher cognitive level reasoning. This death needs to be investigated and the ARDC must be directed to investigate this death and the attorneys involved in the case–Stern, Farenga, Schmeidel and Soehlig who stood by and watched Mary Sykes’ constitutional rights be continually denied her, and then knew or should have known she was drugged to death, and failed to arrange for an autopsy and tox screen.
The ARDC also fails to inform this honorable Court that during Respondent’s Review Board hearing, Gloria Sykes stood up and announced before all witnesses there that the blog was in fact true, that she could confirm all the statements made and that the ARDC’s proceeding was only a sham to protect clouted attorneys.
It is not the policy or stated mission of the Illinois ARDC State Agency to institute and then manipulate and handle “go after” proceedings in a war against honest attorneys Denison, Ditkowsky and Lanre Amu (who was convicted of practicing law and helping poor immigrant Africans “while black”). It is the stated policy of the Illinois ARDC to protect the integrity of the legal profession and to protect the public against unscrupulous attorneys. This the ARDC refuses to do in a steadfast manner, leading to hundreds of blog posts based upon actual client interviews of their experiences in the Illinois and US Probate Court system.
1. In particular, the following case law has been issued since the original filings in June, 2015: Weddigen, Ill. 4th Dist, 4-15-44 and Rosemond v. Markham, 13-CV-42, E.D. Kentucky doct #48 and a new Harvard Law Review Article, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment by Paul Sherman and the Institute for Justice, Vol. 128:183 based upon the Rosemond case.
Respondent herewith incorporates by reference her entire ¶ C (herein ¶ D) from her prior Motion to reconsider filed on or about January 11, 2015, which was decided before her Reply and Motion to File a Reply was considered by the Illinois Supreme Court which issued a Denial on or about February 4, 2016. In this Reply, the Respondent pointed out the cases the ARDC cited which were all blatant misrepresentations of on point Appellate case law and Supreme Court law. This argument is incorporated herewith below.
1) In re Sarelas, 50 Ill.2d 87, 277 N.E.2d 303 (1972). Not at all apposite to a First Amendment Blogging case. In this case, Sarelas “Exhibited a continuous course of conduct…by instituting groundless lawsuits against members of the bar, the bench and laymen… by those who crossed him. In re Sarelas, 50 Ill. 2d 87, 98-99, 277 N.E.2d 313, 219 (1971). This case is not an appellate decision and cannot be cited as precedent. (Stanford and Harvard Rules of Citation). The undersigned’s discipline involved a blog and blogging about corruption to warn the public and is a First Amendment question, not a frivolous lawsuit question. No statements were made in court, and no judges were insulted or denigrated on a face to face basis. More important, all statements made were in accord with other Probate blogs (elderabuse.com, NASGA, Probatesharks.com, etc.) and they all decried the mantra in probate of “target, isolate, medicate, drain the estate, eliminate and cremate” – a most grave problem that the ARDC does not acknowledge and refuses to remedy.
Correct and non misleading quotes from the 7th circuit case in Sarelas: “Some judges are dishonest; their identification and removal is a matter of high priority in order to promote a justified public confidence in the judicial system.” and “[i]f Palmisano had furnished some factual basis for his assertions, then we would need to determine whether either the Constitution or principles of sound judicial administration permit a sanction–for an attorney is not absolutely liable for every statement that turns out to be incorrect. It would unduly quell investigation and exposure of corruption to disbar an attorney who publicized suspicious conduct, just because the suspicions were dispelled. Palmisano, lacked support for his slurs. Id.
2) In re Palmisano, 92 CH 109, 70 F.3d 483 (7th cir. 1995) involved an attorney who made false and misleading statement by calling Judge Siracusa “Frank the Fixer”, Judge Lewis a “crook”, further stating that “most cases in Illinois, in my experience are fixed, not with the passing of money, but on personal relations, social status and judicial preference”, “Chief Justice Peccarelli (sic), your response…[is corrupt] in the 18th judicial circuit”, etc. Each statement appears to be made in a case, not on a blog, and therefore is inapposite. Mr. Palmisano did not furnish any factual basis for his assertions.
Response to Hoffman citation: All of Mr. Hoffman’s statements were made during court proceedings, none were made in the news or on a blog. Mr. Hoffman appeared in these cases, and in some he made offensive and insulting statements directly to the court, to other attorneys and litigants. It is these insulting statements that impugned the integrity of the judges involved. Respondent Denison never spoke personally to any of the judges involved, nor did she insult or denigrate them to their face. Instead, the Subject Blogs presented only the facts and evidence in the cases. One judge would be forced to retire approximately six weeks after trial because she changed her testimony on the stand, and a changed transcript would later appear and the Tribunal ignored the obvious tampering in the case. That is what happened. The blog reported on the facts. The Hearing Board and Tribunal just denied the facts, struck witnesses left and right who would confirm the facts and only allowed attorney and judge witnesses who are part of the problem of “target, isolate, medicate, drain the estate, eliminate and cremate”. The treatment of Ms. Kathie Bakken and Ms. Yolanda Bakken was particularly shameful. Eliminating the testimony of Ms. Gloria Sykes would would say the blog was truthful was a horrendous problem. Eliminating the testimony of Mr. Scott Evans, a former military intelligence staff member with formerly top secret clearance rating was equally as problematic in the proceeding. He would have testified that in Dec. 2009 when Mary Sykes was guardianized, that she was competent, lucid and clear thinking and that when she played canasta, a complicated card game, with her card club, she beat the pants off everyone. Further, refusing to look at a Vimeo video showing Mary G Sykes to be lucid, clear thinking and with higher cognitive functioning in December 2009 when she was guardianized is extremely troubling.
Respondent Denison has done none of what Sarelas, Hoffman or Palmisano did–insult and denigrate judges to their face in open court rooms and public areas. All statements made were on her Blog together with pleadings, evidence and transcripts, and the Tribunal and Board did not differentiate between her opinions and whether she was presenting the opinions of others. No judges were insulted or denigrated to their faces. Nor were any litigants. Nor were any of the attorneys involved: Schmeidel, Farenga, Stern or Soehlig. Moreover, dozens of witnesses supported her and the blog is very popular with approximately 100 views per day, and is now over 100,000 views total. The Tribunal refused to look at any documents and evidence, transcripts and affidavits on the Blog which supported the comments made. Most of the comments, were not in fact those of Respondent, but came from family members and members of the public who were in fact probate victims themselves. The Tribunal did not differentiate between any blog posts that emanated from Respondent versus those emanating from the public and court room corruption victims.
In the present case, more than adequate exhibits, documents and testimony were proffered by Sykes family members to show support for all blog posts. The Mary G. Sykes case 09 P 4585 lacked jurisdiction, a safe deposit box was drilled without authorization, all discovery was quashed to find assets and by the own admissions of the attorneys involved, her $750,000 home was sold for $213,000 to a “real estate investment corporation.” Further, on May 22, 2015, Mary Sykes was narcotized to death and there was no tox screen and no autopsy. Her body was quickly entombed without death announcements, a funeral or wake. GALs Stern and Farenga, appointed to protect Mary from harm, grossly negated their fiduciary duties.
Administrator asserts that running a blog about corruption is akin to shouting “fire” in a crowded theater. This is an incorrect standard. Schenk v. US was decided in 1919 and overturned by Brandenburg v. Ohio. Constitutional Law 101 teaches all law students these principals. The government cannot regulate the media. New York Times v. Sullivan.
“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 372 U. S. 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Government “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 402 U. S. 419 (1971).
“The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. [Footnote 6] Id. At 719-720.
These are but a few examples of the actual holding the ARDC wants to ignore.
(a) The Constitution “demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660.
The Government’s three examples of false-speech regulation that courts generally have found permissible do not establish a principle that all proscriptions of false statements are exempt from rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.
The ARDC misrepresents the law when it says the First Amendment does not apply to attorney speech, and especially when that speech is on a blog and not made in a courtroom or other proceeding. The ARDC admits the speech is political in nature, yet it does not protect the political speech.
Because speech is an essential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people—political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464,127 S.Ct. 2652. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this conclusion. Pp. 896 – 899.
The Administrator has been well made aware of these cases, but does not read the US Constitution and refuses to give it force and effect.
The Federal Arbitration Act is a law of the United States, and Concepcion is an authoritative interpretation of that Act. Consequently, the judges of every State must follow it. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound” by“the Laws of the United States”). Id. at p. 7.
Because the Administrator continues to mislead the court in its pleadings, and because the US Supreme court made it clear in the Direct TV case that US Supreme Court rulings are not mere suggestions, but the Illinois Supreme Court and its ARDC Hearing Board and Tribunals are directed to follow them, the Order of Feb. 4, 2016 must be vacated to conform to the rulings of the US Supreme Court in United States v Alvarez, 132 US. Ct 537, Brown v Entm’t Merchants Asss’n 13 S. Ct 2729, Ashcroft v ACLU 124, et al., In re Weddigen, Rosemont v. Markham and other cases which direct that the government cannot regulate private speech on a blog that is simply discussing corruption in the courts and presenting evidence of that corruption. No judges were maligned or insulted to their faces, citizens were shown how to write proper grievances to the authorities and such speech is and should be fully protected by the First Amendment.
A proposed Order is submitted herewith.
The undersigned attorney – Respondent herewith certifies that an electronic copy of her Motion to Reconsider Order of 2/4/2016 in the above entitled cause was submitted to the Clerk of the above Court for filing on February 22, 2016 On that same date, the undersigned mailed one copy to the person named below in an envelope deposited in a US mail box in Niles, IL, with proper postage prepaid. An original and twelve (12) copies of the Motion will be sent to the Clerk upon receipt of the electronically submitted file stamped pleading.


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by Mark Rappolt. ArtsReview, Oct. 2010, no. 44.
by Keiko Okamura. Flash Art, Oct. 2010.
by Jane Bryce. Small Axe, June 2010, v. 14, no. 2.
by Adam Nayman. POV, Spring 2009, no. 73.
Toward a Feminist "Coney Island of the Avant-Garde"
by Melinda Barlow. Afterimage, Jan. 2007, v. 34, no. 4.
by Richard Cork. New Statesman, Oct 6, 2003.
by B. Ruby Rich and Isaac Julien. Art Journal, Summer 2002, v. 61, no. 2.
by Bruce Morrow. Fuse, Summer 1995, v. 18, no. 5.
by Keith Piper. Variant, 1993, no. 14.
by Robert F. Reid-Pharr. Fuse, Winter 1993, v. 17, no. 2.
by Susan Corrigan. i-D, Jan. 1993, no. 112.
by Kobena Mercer. cineACTION, Fall 1993, no. 32.
by Isaac Julien. cineACTION, Fall 1993, no. 32.
by Richard Fung. Fuse, Winter 1992, v. 15, no. 3.
by Jody A. Benjamin. Fuse, Jan. Winter 1991, v. 14, no. 3.
by Molly Shinhat. Fuse, June 1990, v. 13, no. 5.
by Jewelle Gomez. OutWeek, Sept. 19, 1990, no. 64.
Celebration of Black Cinema V, 1989. Boston: Celebration of Black Cinema Inc., 1989.
by Richard Fung. Fuse, Winter 1987, v. 11, no. 4.
by Isaac Julien. Independent Video, Nov. 1983, no. 23 & 24.

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This will be a two part article as we are waiting for clarification and additional information from the City of Leon Valley.
During the month of December, Leon Valley City Manager, Kelly Kuenstler, received numerous complaints from employees and a fellow City Council member against Bennie Martinez. Unsure of protocol Kuenstler contacted the Texas Municipal League (TML) for direction. The director of the TML advised Kuenstler to secure an outside investigator to create a pre-litigation report for the City of Leon Valley. It became necessary to hire outside legal counsel because one of the complainants against Martinez is the current City Attorney for Leon Valley.
In the Memo Regarding Authority to Hire Outside Investigator for Intercity Complaints attorney Ryan Henry outlined the duties and responsibilities of Kuenstler regarding the City of Leon Valley in her position as City Manager.
When employees of the City feel they have been harassed or if policies have been violated by another agent of the City they are obligated to file a complaint or report with the Director of Human Resources who will forward that complaint to the City Manager with a copy of the report being provided to the Mayor.
Kuenstler in her role as City Manager could not appoint the City Attorney to provide a report because she has filed a complaint. Therefore Kuenstler appointed Henry’s office to create the report.
The memo also specified that the Council Member Rodriguez only had the authority to bring a complaint stating Councilor Martinez violated the City of Charter by his conduct. She could bring a charge outside of Council for violations of sexual harassment and discrimination.
The memo further states “ The City Manager does not have the authority to discipline Councilmember Martinez in any respect. The City Manager may place an item on the agenda for the City Council to consider. See Charter §3.10(A). The City Charter mandates that, to be qualified to hold a position on the City Council, a member must be qualified under Charter §3.03. This requires the member to be compliant with the City Charter at all times. However, it is the City Council, as a body, which has sole and exclusive control over the qualifications of its members. See Charter §3.04. As a result, if the investigation reveals evidence to substantiate a claim of harassment or a Charter violation, the matter must be presented to the City Council for disposition.
During the City Council meeting on Tuesday night, April 2, Council met in executive session to discuss the pre-investigation report.
Alleges Councilor Bennie Martinez has created a Hostile Work Environment.
Alleges Councilor Bennie Martinez of Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work Environment; Charter Violation.
Alleges Councilor Bennie Martinez created a Hostile Work Environment; Charter Violation.
Alleges Councilor Bennie Martinez created a Hostile Work Environment.
An additional complaint by Denise Frederick, City Attorney alleges Zoning Commissioner Larry Proffitt created a Hostile Work Environment/ Race Discrimination/Gender Discrimination/Retaliation.
In a fact report prepared for Council Henry recorded the following.
Frederick maintains Martinez is a bully who does not respect the staff or her professional judgment. She does not have a problem with Martinez or any member of the City Council asking questions or wanting a second legal opinion on an issue but felt his actions in the way he goes about interacting with her is unprofessional and hostile. She further claimed he yells at her, intentionally tries to publicly humiliate her, attempts to act like a lawyer questioning her legal opinions openly, makes aggressive motions with his arms and fingers, and acts physically hostile from the dais overall.
She further maintained Martinez challenges everything she says, causing her to take time away from her other duties to prepare for other councilmembers. She believes Martinez monopolizes her and other staff’s time for his own benefit or the benefit of his friends.
Melland reported tensions between Councilor Martinez and himself over a dispute between Melland’s office and local businessman Mr. Anderson.
Melland contends he informed Mr. Anderson multiple times what was needed for permitting a specific property, including a SUP.
Mr. Anderson wanted to explore exceptions to the regulations. Melland asserts Martinez interjected himself into the situation and claims Melland did not adequately explain the situation to Mr. Anderson.
Melland also maintains Martinez is a bully who routinely yells at him from the dais and does not know if Martinez behaves this way intentionally or is merely a part of his personality. A specific example Melland stated that on November 20, 2018 during a City Council meeting Melland presented to Council possible changes to criteria for the Board of Adjustment (BOA). Martinez kept complaining the City was giving staff too much power and not following state law regarding the BOA.
Martinez was very hostile towards staff, kept aggressively pointing his finger at Melland and raising his voice. Melland stated Martinez had a concern staff is not telling businesses what they are really supposed to do before they appear before the Zoning Commission. Melland maintains City staff can do everything correctly and Martinez will not believe them.
Another issue between Melland and Martinez is the re-zoning of the St. John’s Church. At issue is the directive from Martinez to send notices to additional property owners outside the required 200 feet of proposed change.
Martinez became upset at a later February meeting when Melland did not calculate the opposition numbers from people outside the 200 foot boundary. Melland said he sent out the notices but did not calculate the responses outside the requirement of the law.
Martinez also demanded City staff prepare a matrix of other cities.
Melland believes Martinez’s actions are accusing him of not doing his job and are presented in a hostile manner intentionally designed to publicly humiliate him.
Officers Breton and Azar allege Councilor Martinez disagrees with the policy of wanding (using a handheld metal detector) those attending a council meeting, including city councilmembers, and city staff.
Both officers maintain that Councilor Martinez complies with the request unless he is able to “sneak” past them. The officers feel Martinez challenges their authority and degrades their performance in public and in front of the citizens. Martinez maintains the Police Chief exceeded his authority by implementing this policy and that policy decisions are the responsibility of Council.
Acuna feels uncomfortable with the constant visual inspection of her body in an obvious manner. She claims on two occasions Martinez attempted to look down her shirt, and he kept looking at her breasts when they were reviewing water bills.
Frederick claims during a Zoning meeting on December 11 Commissioner Larry Proffitt “got in her face” and stated she did not belong on the dais. Frederick claims the Chairman requested her presence at the meeting and for her to sit on the dais. She claims the hostility between her and Proffitt has continued.
She interpreted his comment that she did not belong here as a judgment of her race.
According to the report Dr. Rodriquez claims Councilor Martinez has made unwanted advances toward her on different occasions. These incidents included touching and unwanted glances.
In an interview with Henry, Councilor Martinez offered the following responses.
Martinez disputes he treats Frederick any differently than other employees he does not trust, and he took offense to any indication his actions towards Fredericks are associated with gender or race.
He believes that under the Charter the City Attorney works for the City Manager and not the Council and this should be changed.
He believes the City Council is getting only one side of any given issue. Martinez may not be aware of the ethical issues involved or that the City Attorney’s obligation and duty is to the entity, not to any one individual. See Tex. R. Prof. R 1.12.
Martinez believes the citizens are his boss and he answers only to them. He states Kuenstler, as the City Manager, is an employee of the City Council and by conducting this investigation, has flipped the accountability.
In regards to Melland, Martinez openly admitted he does not trust many City employees and Brandon Melland is no exception. Martinez believes Melland evades his questions, “talks in circles”, and does not answer honestly. As a result, Martinez stated he wants to support the citizens against Melland. Martinez believes he has the duty and responsibility to question staff and support the citizens. Martinez also believes the City must be “business friendly” and admitted to having several conversations with Kuenstler, in her role as the City Manager, Melland, and his predecessor (as well as staff) regarding how and when they are supposed to be business friendly.
Martinez admitted one reason he does not trust Melland is because of information provide to him by “Bobby” Anderson and some issues involving Mr. Morehouse and an industrial park. Martinez believes Melland provided Anderson the wrong information which prevented the certificate of occupancy from being timely issued for the business. Martinez believes if Melland was business friendly, Melland should have told Anderson or Morehouse and walked them step-by-step through the process. Martinez was not shy about the fact he does not like the way Melland operates the Planning Department and admitted to telling Melland that his staff were wrong for not being “business friendly” as Martinez believes the term to mean.
Martinez believes Melland defied the City Council’s directive by posting notices of the zoning change to the St. John’s Church beyond the two hundred (200) foot boundary, but not calculating opposition in the extended boundary. Martinez insists Melland was instructed to run the calculations. Martinez admitted to requesting information on a matrix of other cities and RLUIPA2 and was dismayed when you told him staff was too busy. However, he denied the request was an order. Martinez stated he only sought information but also admitted he did not know if the City staff had a matrix of other cities already. He did not think it would be difficult to get or create.
Martinez responded about the Azar and Brenton complaints by saying Martinez stated he has nothing against Officer Azar. He states he knows she was just following orders when wanding people. However, he disagrees the Chief of Police should have the ability to make policy by implementing wanding. He believes if the Chief feels wanding is required, he should have come to the City Council and asked for a policy.
Martinez made it a point to emphasis that he is not opposed to safety policies or procedures. And, if he fully understood why the wanding was necessary, he may have even voted in favor of it at a council meeting. However, the Chief never requested a policy and believes this is just another example of the staff taking over the City. Martinez believes it is important to insist on the City Council being the one to implement policy but agreed Officer Azar had no ability to disobey the Chief’s orders to wand. He denied ever giving Officer Azar any direct orders in regard to the sign posting about the wanding protocol and reiterated that he always complied with the request to wand. He stated he never tried to sneak past the officers to avoid being wanded.
In response to the Acuna complaint, Martinez offered he recalled the time he went to discuss the water rates with her but disputed ever attempting to look down her shirt. He also recalled going to judge door decorations over the Christmas holiday in 2018, but once again denies he ever leered at her or tried to look down her shirt. When asked why he believes Acuna would file a complaint, Martinez stated he suspects the City Manager, put her up to it. Martinez could not add anything further on the subject.
Martinez claims he never touched Councilor Rodriguez except to shake her hand. He never used any comments or language that could be misinterpreted as a sexual advance.
When asked why Rodriguez would interpret his actions in the manner alleged, he stated the only thing he can think of is that Rodriguez and Councilman Jordon are aligned politically and friends. Martinez agreed that he and Jordon have very different philosophical views of the way the City should be run and the way to go about fulfilling their respective roles as council members. He believes the actions are politically motivated. However, Martinez also believes Councilmembers Jordon, Alcocer and Rodriguez give the City Manager whatever she wants. As a result, he believes the City Manager is actually the one behind all of the complaints.
Proffitt offered the following response to Fredericks’ complaint. He recently experience the loss of his wife and the date of the incident happened on his wife’s birthday, the first since her death, and he was emotional and not on his game.
He also was not aware the Chairman of the Zoning Commission had requested the City Attorney’s attendance and that she sit on the dais.
Although it seems Mr. Proffitt has not fully resolved his issue with the City Attorney attending the meetings, the complaint does not meet the requirement of discrimination based on race or gender.
As to the complaints in general only Council has the authority to take action against Councilor Martinez in response to his actions with Councilor Rodriquez and in determining if he did violate the City Charter.
The employees were correct in filing their complaints with the City Manager.
As to the hostile work environment claims, the complaints by Frederick, Melland, Officer Azar and Officer Breton against Martinez did not include any protected classifications. Frederick did list gender and race within the complaint but not as a motivating factor. While, factually, it is clear Martinez can be aggressive, loud, and forceful, his actions apply equally across all classifications. It is certainly within the realm of reason for Frederick, Melland, Officer Azar and Officer Breton to interpret Martinez’s actions as hostile. Martinez’s behavior, especially that observed on video during the council meetings, can be interpreted as verbally abusive at times. However, such cannot form the basis of a hostile work environment claim under labor laws. No protected classifications were listed as the cause or form the basis of the complaints; therefore, the complaints are not sustained.
Acuna’s complaint against Martinez is in a limbo state as certain facts and actions can only be determined by the City Council. Acuna’s complaint does list one of the protected classifications (i.e. gender) as the motivation behind the behavior. However, asserting a protected classification is not enough for a hostile work environment claim and Acuna must establish that the frequency or severity rose to a level which impacted her ability to work. As a result, the decision to hold a public hearing under §3.12 of the Charter to consider Acuna’s complaint rests with the City Council.
In regards to Councilor’s complaint against Councilor Martinez the complaint cannot be sustained or listed as unsubstantiated factually by the investigation. It must be presented to the City Council for a factual determination on 1) whether the allegations occurred, 2) whether the actions found, if any, constitute a violation of §3.08 or §3.09, and 3) if a violation occurred, what remedy the City Council wishes to employ.
Intentionally undercutting Melland’s authority in public in order to disrupt the Community Development Department, at an operational level.
During last night’s Council meeting Council members (Mayor Riley, Councilors Jordan, Edwards, and Alcocer) met in executive session to receive advice from legal counsel regarding the complaints regarding Councilor Martinez and the investigative report prepared by the Law Offices of Ryan Henry, PLLC. No action was taken during executive session and at the conclusion of the meeting Mayor Riley announced the investigation would continue.
The second part of this article will detail possible future action and possible remedies Council could impose on the situations. When responses have been received to the open records request and clarifications have been provided we will post the second part.

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On January 4, 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued examiner guidance for examining definiteness of functional claim limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Although the new guidance does not have the force of law, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of this guidance because it will affect how claims will be examined under § 112.
In short, the patent examination process under § 112 ensures that the claims of an application have proper written description and enablement support under § 112(a) in the disclosure of the application, and that functional limitations (i.e., claim limitations that define an element in terms of the function it performs without reciting the structure, materials, or acts that perform the function) are properly treated as means (or steps) plus function limitations under § 112(f) and sufficiently definite under § 112(b).
Specifically, instead of using the term “means” (or “steps”), a substitute term can act as a generic placeholder for the term “means” where that term would not be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art as being sufficiently definite structure for performing the claimed function. In other words, when a claim term does not recite “means” (or “steps”), the presumption that § 112(f) does not apply can be overcome if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. For example, terms such as “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” “machine for,” or “system for” may invoke § 112(f) claim interpretation.
With respect to § 112(f), examiners will apply § 112(f) to a claim limitation to determine if it meets the 3-prong analysis set forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”). The 3-prong analysis includes evaluating whether (1) the claim limitation uses the term “means” (or “step”) or a generic placeholder, (2) the term is modified by functional language, and (3) the term is modified by sufficient structure, material or acts for performing the function.
In addition, in order to determine whether a word, term, or phrase coupled with a function denotes structure, the new guidance tells examiners to check whether: (1) the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term denotes structure; (2) general and subject matter specific dictionaries provide evidence that the term has achieved recognition as a noun denoting structure; and (3) the prior art provides evidence that the term has an art-recognized structure to perform the claimed function.
The guidance provides that for a computer-implemented claim limitation under § 112(f), the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or the claim is indefinite under § 112(b). In support, the guidance provides that in Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., the Federal Circuit has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor and that the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function. In other words, special purpose computer-implemented § 112(f) claim limitations will be indefinite under § 112(b) when the specification fails to disclose an algorithm to perform the claimed function.
The guidance also warns that the disclosed algorithm must be able to perform all of the claimed functions. For example, when the specification discloses an algorithm that only accomplishes one of multiple identifiable functions performed by a means-plus-function limitation, the specification is treated as if it disclosed no algorithm.
Lastly, the guidance provides that a computer-implemented functional claim may also be indefinite when the 3-prong analysis for determining whether the claim limitation should be interpreted under § 112(f) is inconclusive because of ambiguous words in the claim.
In view of the recent guidance, patent applications directed to computer-implemented inventions will receive heightened scrutiny under 35 U.S.C. § 112 during examination. We will assess how much impact this new 112 guidance will bring with respect to the allowance rate of software patents in the upcoming months. Meanwhile, applicants are advised to be particularly mindful when drafting patent applications directed to computer-implemented inventions, in order to ensure the inclusion of sufficient structural elements in the specification that carry out the functional limitations, and described with enough detail to show that the inventor had possession of how the functional limitation is achieved at the time of filing.
 See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring).
 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 5 (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349).
 See, e.g., MPEP §2181, subsection I.A.
 MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 08. 2017, Jan. 2018).
 See MPEP §2181, subsection I.
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 10 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
 See Noah Sys. Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
 See Noah Sys., Inc. at 1319.
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 18.
 See Vasudevan Software Inc. v. MicroStrategy Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 19 (citing Vasudevan, at 683).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 21 (citing Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., LTD., 896 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(explaining that while “the specification must enable the full scope of the claimed invention[,]” “[t]his is not to say that the specification must expressly spell out every possible iteration of every claim.”).
 See id; See also MPEP § 2161.01, subsection III, and MPEP § 2164.08.


A physical injury done to another shall give a right of action to the injured party, whatever may be the intention of the person causing the injury, unless he is justified under some rule of law. However, intention shall be considered in the assessment of damages.
Orig. Code 1863, § 2910; Code 1868, § 2917; Code 1873, § 2968; Code 1882, § 2968; Civil Code 1895, § 3826; Civil Code 1910, § 4422; Code 1933, § 105-601.


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Frederick J. Schreyer, Albany, N.Y., for appellee.
While this court is obliged to accept the bankruptcy court's undisturbed findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, it is not required to accept its conclusions as to the legal effect of those findings. Montco, Inc. v. Glatzer (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 665 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir.1981) (citing Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.1974); R.Bankr.P. 810 (current version, see R.Bankr.P. 8013); Bank of Pa. v. Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir.1976)). Whether not discharging Brunner's student loans would impose on her "undue hardship" under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(8)(B) requires a conclusion regarding the legal effect of the bankruptcy court's findings as to her circumstances. Therefore, the bankruptcy court's conclusion of "undue hardship" properly was reviewed by the district court.
As noted by the district court, there is very little appellate authority on the definition of "undue hardship" in the context of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(8)(B). Based on legislative history and the decisions of other district and bankruptcy courts, the district court adopted a standard for "undue hardship" requiring a three-part showing: (1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. For the reasons set forth in the district court's order, we adopt this analysis. The first part of this test has been applied frequently as the minimum necessary to establish "undue hardship." See, e.g., Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); North Dakota State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Frech (In re Frech), 62 B.R. 235 (Bankr.D.Minn.1986); Marion v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Marion), 61 B.R. 815 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986). Requiring such a showing comports with common sense as well.
Under the test proposed by the district court, Brunner has not established her eligibility for a discharge of her student loans based on "undue hardship." The record demonstrates no "additional circumstances" indicating a likelihood that her current inability to find any work will extend for a significant portion of the loan repayment period. She is not disabled, nor elderly, and she has--so far as the record discloses--no dependents. No evidence was presented indicating a total foreclosure of job prospects in her area of training. In fact, at the time of the hearing, only ten months had elapsed since Brunner's graduation from her Master's program. Finally, as noted by the district court, Brunner filed for the discharge within a month of the date the first payment of her loans came due. Moreover, she did so without first requesting a deferment of payment, a less drastic remedy available to those unable to pay because of prolonged unemployment. Such conduct does not evidence a good faith attempt to repay her student loans.

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Rehearing Denied October 3, 1955.
Bentley M. McMullin, Denver, Colo., for appellants.
Joseph G. Hodges, Denver, Colo. (Hodges, Silverstein, Hodges & Harrington, Denver, Colo., were with him on the brief), for appellee.
The appellants, Omri E. Daniels, Jr., Barge Hiskey and Bentley McMullin, brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Declaratory Judgment Act1 for a declaratory judgment that a certain judgment rendered against them in the District Court of the City and County of Denver in the State of Colorado, dismissing their claim for relief and entering an affirmative judgment against them in the sum of $2,500, was void for lack of due process, and for an injunction against its enforcement. A motion to dismiss, supported by an uncontroverted affidavit, for failure to state a cause of action was filed and granted. This appeal challenges the correctness of that judgment.
A brief review of the state proceedings is essential to an understanding of the question presented. Appellants, Daniels and Hiskey, by their attorney, Appellant McMullin, filed an action in the above named Colorado State court to compel appellee, C. Sewell Thomas, to convey to them with special warranty deed certain lands which he held as trustee. They further sought to recover damages against him for $1,000. In his answer Thomas offered to execute a quit-claim deed to whomever the court determined were the owners of the land. He alleged that appellant McMullin had an interest in the controversy and asked that he be made an involuntary plaintiff. He also asked monetary damages of the plaintiffs because of delay and malicious prosecution and that the judgment for damages be satisfied out of the property. McMullin was joined as an involuntary plaintiff. He appeared pro se and also as attorney for the remaining plaintiffs. While it does not so appear in the record, McMullin's statement in the petition in this case that he filed a disclaimer of interest in the property is not seriously challenged and will, therefore, be taken as a fact. Apparently he did not ask to be dismissed from the action and was continued as an involuntary plaintiff and also continued throughout the trial to represent the two remaining plaintiffs, the other appellants here, as their attorney.
The state trial judge concluded that Thomas was not required to execute a special warranty deed. He further entered a personal judgment against all three plaintiffs for damages in the amount of $2,500. This judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado, where it was affirmed per curiam without written opinion.2 Appellants' petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.3 Thereafter appellants instituted this action as set out hereinbefore.
In support of their contention that there is presented a federal question of which the trial court had jurisdiction they assert (1) that the state court denied them the right to a trial upon the merits of "substantial meritorious, genuine and material issues of fact" and hence the entry of judgment was beyond the power of the court; (2) that the personal judgment on the counterclaim was entered without due process because Thomas made no claim for personal judgment, only out of the property; (3) that as far as McMullin was concerned he was given no notice that judgment was to be entered against him on the counterclaim and had no opportunity to present a defense or introduce evidence; and (4) that the entry of judgment on the counterclaim was the result wholly of bias and prejudice of the trial judge.
Because of the conclusion we have reached on the basic question controlling the disposition of this case, it will not be necessary to consider or discuss these contentions separately or in detail. It is a principle as old as our dual state and federal judicial systems that a federal court is without jurisdiction to interfere with a judgment in a state court action in which the state court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties thereto.4 It is only when the judgment of a state court is void either because that court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties to the action, or because it entered a judgment which it had no power to enter under the law, that such judgment may be reviewed in a federal court.
It must be conceded that the state trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. In fact, we do not understand appellants to contend otherwise. It is also clear to us that that court had jurisdiction of all three appellants. Certainly it had jurisdiction at all times of Daniels and Hiskey. They instituted the action. McMullin was brought into the case as an involuntary plaintiff by process of the court. While he disclaimed any interest in the property, such disclaimer did not dismiss him from the action. He still remained a party thereto subject to the determination of the right of Thomas to recover damages from the plaintiffs.
McMullin complains of the lack of personal notice of the entry of the personal judgment. The record of the proceedings of the trial in the state court action is fragmentary. It cannot be said therefrom whether personal notice was or was not served upon him, but in any event, and assuming without deciding that he was entitled to personal notice, it is immaterial whether he was handed or received a written notice of the entry of the judgment. Notice he must have had both pro se and as attorney for the remaining two appellants because he took a timely appeal from the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court. This he could not have done in the absence of notice of the entry of the judgment. Whatever the form of notice he had, it enabled him to perfect his appeal and preserved his right to a review of the judgment.
The further contention is made that Thomas in his counterclaim did not ask for personal judgment, that he asked only that any judgment obtained be satisfied out of the property. We do not construe his counterclaim to mean that he asked no personal judgment. True, he did not use the word "personal" when he asked for judgment against plaintiffs but he did ask for a monetary recovery because of their conduct and asked that the judgment be satisfied out of the property. That was merely the prayer of his counterclaim. It is well settled that the prayer for relief is no part of the cause of action and that the parties are entitled to such relief and to such judgment as the complaint — the counterclaim in this case — makes out.5 But, assuming without deciding, that the court should not have entered a personal judgment, that again was an error and does not make its judgment a nullity.
It is our conclusion that the state court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties to this appeal and that its judgment was not void. At most, and in any event, it only could have been erroneous. The final judgment of the state court is, therefore, res judicata and the federal trial court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to entertain the action.
Again, assuming without deciding, that the trial in the state court gave rise to a federal issue of due process, it is an issue which could have been tendered in the state trial court and, on appeal, to the state supreme court. The record is not clear whether such issue was in fact presented in the state court action, but in any event under the decision of the Grubb case and kindred cases, that issue is now res judicata and appellants were precluded from having that issue litigated in this case.
Because the state court had jurisdiction both of the subject matter and the parties, who were the same as the parties herein, and because it undertook to dispose of the case upon its merits, its judgment was not void. When it became final, it became res judicata, and the trial court in this case was without jurisdiction to review the same.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 et seq.
2. See 128 Colo. 577, 265 P.2d 702.
3. See 347 U.S. 1017, 74 S.Ct. 867, 98 L. Ed. 1139.
4. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 1923, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 1932, 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231; Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm., 1930, 281 U.S. 470, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972; Parnacher v. Mount, 10 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 788, certiorari denied, 1954, 347 U.S. 917, 74 S.Ct. 515, 98 L.Ed. 1073; Hurley v. Lindsay, 4 Cir., 1953, 207 F. 2d 410; Spencer v. Gypsy Oil Co., 10 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 935, certiorari denied, 1945, 323 U.S. 798, 65 S.Ct. 439, 89 L.Ed. 636; Noland v. Noland, 9 Cir., 111 F.2d 322, certiorari denied 1940, 311 U.S. 670, 61 S.Ct. 30, 85 L.Ed. 430; Williams v. Tooke, 5 Cir., 108 F.2d 758, certiorari denied, 1940, 311 U.S. 655, 61 S.Ct. 8, 85 L.Ed. 419; Hendron v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 5 Cir., 108 F.2d 759, certiorari denied, 1940, 311 U.S. 664, 61 S.Ct. 21, 85 L.Ed. 426; Borland v. Johnson, 9 Cir., 88 F.2d 376, certiorari denied, 1937, 302 U.S. 704, 58 S.Ct. 24, 82 L. Ed. 544; Daniel B. Frazier Co. v. Long Beach Township, 3 Cir., 1935, 77 F.2d 764; Fryberger v. Parker, 8 Cir., 1928, 28 F.2d 493; Lake v. Central Sav. Bank, 9 Cir., 1928, 27 F.2d 847, certiorari denied, 1929, 279 U.S. 836, 49 S.Ct. 251, 73 L.Ed. 984; Helbush v. Helbush, D.C. S.D.Cal.1931, 53 F.2d 704; Application of Heller, D.C.M.D.Pa.1941, 39 F.Supp. 310; Chirillo v. Lehman, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1940, 38 F.Supp. 65, affirmed per curiam, 1941, 312 U.S. 662, 61 S.Ct. 741, 85 L. Ed. 1108.
5. Colo.R.Civ.P. rule 54(c); Snell v. Public Utilities Comm., 1941, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P.2d 563, 566; See Michael Del Balso, Inc., v. Carozza, 1943, 78 U.S.App. D.C. 56, 136 F.2d 280; see 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 49, pp. 112-113.
6. E. g., Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 1940, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329; Cromwell v. County of Sac. 1876, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195; United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 1904, 192 U.S. 355, 24 S.Ct. 266, 48 L.Ed. 476; Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 1927, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed. 1069.


Athena Diagnostics filed a petition for en banc rehearing of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo on April 8, 2019. Amicus briefs are due April 22, 2019. The Athena decision continues to apply U.S. Supreme Court-created common law to the analysis of 35 U.S.C. §101.
In its brief requesting rehearing, Athena argues that the decision is “precisely the evisceration of patent law against which the U.S. Supreme Court has long warned” and that the claims at issue were patent eligible, as they are “novel, man-made substances”, “do not preempt natural laws” and “serve a new and useful purpose of diagnosing serious diseases”.
“Methods applying natural law have always been eligible,” said the brief.
Whether this Court now recognizes a categorical bias against patent claims to methods of diagnosis, an impermissible expansion of the Supreme Court’s narrowly defined judicial exception to patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Whether courts may now exclude claim elements that they deem “conventional” in determining whether the claim is “directed to” patent eligible subject matter, or does Supreme Court authority requiring that claims be assessed “as a whole” still apply in Section 101 analysis.
Knowles IP Strategies LLC (Sherry M. Knowles) and AddyHart (Meredith Addy) intend to file an amicus brief in support of neither party requesting that the Federal Circuit carry out its constitutional duty to apply strict statutory construction of the literal words of 35 U.S.C. §101 to decide the case (See, Unconstitutional Application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S. Supreme Court; 18 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 144 (2018)).
As with other recent Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court cases on patent eligibility, the Athena decision omits an appropriate analysis of the wording of the statute it is applying (“Whoever invents or discovers”), and its opinion is inconsistent with the wording of the statute. Instead, it applies judicial exceptions to the statute, which have been created by the U.S. Supreme Court, as elaborated in its new common law on the subject. However, as recently well stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White, Inc. (No. 17-1272; January 8, 2019), “This Court may not engraft its own exceptions onto the statutory text”.
If you, your institution, or company have an interest in joining this brief, please send a request to amicus@kipsllc.com by April 17, 2019.
The U.S. Constitution is not self-enforcing. The people and institutions of the United States must demand it.
I encourage everyone and their dog to join this brief.
JOIN THIS BRIEF! Send your email to the address in the article above.
With a reference to the Schein case, you have only one blade of the Kavanaugh Scissors here.
The other blade is also from Kavanaugh in the oral arguments of the California Franchise Tax Board v Hyatt case.
c) the recognition that a Gordian Knot exists to which the will and the Scissors are to be used to cut.
Do we know the identity of the amicus?