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The bank answered, admitting the drawing of the check, and alleged in substance that the check did not come lawfully into the possession of the bank in the usual course of business, and that its acquisition by the bank was ultra vires.
The action was begun January 14, 1886, two days after the check was drawn, against the then sole defendant, the First National Bank; and about six weeks thereafter, namely, March 1st, an attachment was issued, upon the ground that the defendant had or was about to assign and dispose of its property with intent to defraud its creditors, and levied upon the moneys, notes, drafts, stock, and other assets of the bank, in the aggregate estimated value of over $120,000. Of this property the sheriff returned or tendered to the defendant, on March 5th, all, except assets of the estimated value of $27,541.21, consisting of coin, notes, etc.
The issue of this attachment was followed by the failure of the bank, and the comptroler of the currency appointed Thompson, plaintiff in error, receiver, on March 11th. On March 31, 1886, the sheriff delivered to Thompson, as receiver, the assets remaining in his hands, in the above amount of $27,541.21. Acting under advice of the comptroller, on December 28, 1886, the receiver applied to the court for an order substituting him as party defendant in the place of the bank, and the court thereupon made him an additional party. The receiver excepted to the order, claiming the absolute right of substitution.
Upon the trial, evidence was introduced tending to show the following facts: On January 12, 1886, the date of the check, Charles K. Howard was county treasurer of the county of Minnehaha, an office which he had held for several years, and [150 U.S. 231, 233] was having his semiannual settlement as such county treasurer with the board of county commissioners. From the time of its organization to the date of this settlement, Howard had kept his official deposit as treasurer with the First National Bank of Sioux Falls, of which J. B. Young and H. L. Hollister, down to a short time before the issue of this check, had been president and cashier, respectively; and at the time of this settlement Young and Hollister, together with C. G. Coats and W. H. Corson, were the sureties of Howard upon his official bond.
'First National Bank, Sioux Falls, Dak., January 12, 1886. The books of the bank show a credit in favor of the county of $15,625.01. If you wish, you have the privilege of examining the books. R. J. Wells, P't. W. F. Furbeck, Cas.' [150 U.S. 231, 234] The board would not make a settlement without the money or a certified check. Howard returned to the bank, and asked the cashier for a certified check, but was refused. The cashier thereupon gave him the check in suit, with the condition that he would retain possession of it, deliver it to no one, and return it in 20 minutes, and would also place to the credit of the county in the bank what money he had in his possession, as county treasurer,-some twelve or fourteen thousand dollars. This was after the closing of the bank for the day's business.
Howard gave nothing for this check, nor was it charged to any one on the books of the bank. He did not return the check, nor make any deposit whatever, but took it to the board of commissioners then in session, and indorsed it at the request of the board. That, with the county money he then had in his possession, was sufficient to balance his account, and discharge his obligation to the county. Thereupon Hollister, Coats, and Corson, three of the four sureties upon his bond, through one Bailey, their attorney, demanded that they be released from further liability upon Howard's official bond.
On the following morning, namely, January 13th, the board of county commissioners, deeming Howard's sureties insufficient for the protection of the county, because one of the sureties, Young, had removed from the state, adopted a resolution requiring the treasurer to furnish additional freehold sureties in the penal sum of $50,000, and at the same time, at the request of the three remaining sureties, resolved that the funds presented to the board of county commissioners by the treasurer, in settlement of his accounts, be turned over to his bondsmen, and the bondsmen but in charge of the office of county treasurer until the additional bond was furnished, the funds to be deposited and remain the funds of Minnehaha county.
The funds of the treasurer, including this check, were then placed in a tin box, and delivered into the hands of the bondsmen, who took them in the box to the Dakota National Bank in the city of Sioux Falls, and offered the same for deposit. In going to the Dakota National Bank they passed the First National Bank, which was located on the opposite side of the street. The Dakota National Bank refused to receive, give [150 U.S. 231, 235] credit, or purchase the check without the indorsement of the bondsmen or indemnity from them. The check was, at the request of the bondsmen, presented to the First National Bank for payment, which was refused. The box containing the funds was left at the Dakota National Bank by the bondsmen during the noon hour. While the bondsmen and officers of the Dakota National were at dinner, or soon after this, Bailey, on behalf of the bondsmen, called at the plaintiff bank, and had an interview with McKinney, its president, in which Bailey said he had been engaged on behalf of the bondsmen of Mr. Howard; that Young had left, and they wished to be released; and that the office had been turned over to the bondsmen with the money. In this conversation McKinney expressed the wish to obtain the deposit for his own bank. Prior to this conversation he had made some inquiries of different parties about the county treasurer's deposit, and about the settlement and the check, and had asked if it was a straight cashier's check. Receiving a reply in the affirmative, he siad: 'I would like to have it. They would either pay it or close their doors.' About 2 o'clock, the bondsmen Hollister, Coats, and Corson went back to the Dakota National Bank; took the box and money, including this check; went out of the back door of the bank, (which was in the same block and on the same side of the street as the plaintiff bank;) and, following along the river bank behind the buildings which border the river, entered the plaintiff bank through the back door; and passing through a sort of storeroom to the directors' room or private office, back of the main office, and in the presence of McKinney, emptied on the table the contents of the box, saying, 'I have brought you the deposit,' or 'Here it is.' McKinney and Hollister began counting the deposit of $27,236.63, and, after the money was counted, the cashier, at the suggestion of Bailey, made out a deposit book in the name of 'H. L. Hollister, C. G. Coats, and W. H. Corson, bondsmen,' and credited them with the amount of the funds. McKinney knew at this time that these were the county funds, and that the depositors were the treasurer's sureties, in charge of his office and funds while he was getting an additional bond. [150 U.S. 231, 236] The check was not indorsed by the bondsmen, and they had no account at that bank. Hollister indorsed several other checks making up the deposit, but was not asked to indorse this one. Bailey then said to McKinney: 'That is a pretty good size check, You had better go and get your money on it.' McKinney said that he would collect it, or see that their doors did not open the next morning. Twice that afternoon plaintiff presented the check to the First National Bank for payment, which was refused, upon the ground that plaintiff had no right to the check, and that it was given without consideration. In the evening a conference was held at the plaintiff bank between its officers and attorney and those of the First National Bank, at which the plaintiff was again notified that the check was without consideration, and had been fraudulently diverted from the purpose for which it was issued, and was urged to charge the same back to the bondsmen. This the plaintiff bank refused to do, the plaintiff's cashier remarking that, if the bank did not pay it, they knew a way to make it.
The next morning, January 14th, the plaintiff commenced this action. On January 18th the board of county commissioners, having found the treasurer's account correct, by resolution approved the same, and thereupon Howard tendered his resignation as treasurer, and C. L. Norton, cashier of the plaintiff bank, was appointed his successor. On the next day, January 19th, by further resolution of said board, the bondsmen were required to turn over to the county commissioners all the evidences of deposit and all funds belonging to the county, and thereupon the check of the bondsmen in the sum of $27,236.63, certified by McKinney, president of the plaintiff bank, was accepted of the county commissioners in full discharge of the bondsmen for the funds received of the county January 13th, and Norton, as county treasurer, receipted to the commissioners for that sum of money in currency. Prior to taking possession of Howard's funds and the check in suit by the county commissioners, there was evidence tending to show that the board was notified by one Wilkes not to take the check under consideration; that the payment of the check would be resisted. This testimony was disputed. [150 U.S. 231, 237] The case was removed for trial to Moody county, and the court, upon motion of the plaintiff at the close of the defendant's testimony, directed a verdict for the amount of the check, upon which judgment was rendered by the district court for $18,417.24. The case was appealed to the supreme court of the territory, where the judgment below was affirmed, ( 50 N. W. Rep. 829,) and the defendant sued out a writ of error from this court.
Thos. B. McMartin and R. J. Wells, for plaintiffs in error.
As the check in this case is admitted to have been obtained without consideration, and to have been invalid in the hands of the immediate payee, the plaintiff, to sustain its own title, must prove either that it was itself a bona fide holder without notice, or that the county commissioners, of whom it received the paper, had taken the same for value without notice of any defect in its inception. Lytle v. Town of Lansing, 147 U.S. 59 , 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254.
The circumstances under which the check was issued were a plain fraud upon the law and also upon the county commissioners. It seems that Howard kept his deposit as county treasurer with the defendant bank, and had been personally [150 U.S. 231, 239] interested with it in different enterprises. He says that, a few days before his semiannual settlement, he had a talk with Mr. Wells, president of the bank, in which the latter agreed to assist him in this settlement. He told them that it would take about $15,0000 to make the settlement. He proposed to the cashier to give him a note for the amount, but the cashier told him it would be better to make some drafts to cover that amount of credit. He thereupon made three drafts, aggregating $15,000, upon M. D. Steevers & Co., of Chicago, who had before this honored his drafts, at the same time telling the cashier that he had not the proper credit to obtain payment of them. The bank thereupon gave him a deposit book showing a balance of $15,625.01 on deposit. This the board refused to accept, and demanded a certified check, which the bank refused to give, but gave the cashier's check in suit.
The substance of the transaction was that the bank, with knowledge that Howard had not funds of the county sufficient to balance his accounts as treasurer,-in short, that he was a defaulter,-consented to give him a fictitious credit, in order to enable him to impose upon the county commissioners. But the vital question is whether the commissioners received this check in the ordinary course of business, believing it to represent an actual debt of the bank to Howard as county treasurer to the amount of the check. To recover upon paper which has been diverted from its original destination and fraudulently put in circulation, the holder must show that he received it in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and paid for it a valuable consideration. Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170; Bank v. Noxon, 45 N. Y. 762. [150 U.S. 231, 240] By the Compiled Laws of Dakota, (section 4487,) 'an indorsee in due course' is defined as 'one who in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and for value, before its apparent maturity or presumptive dishonor, and without knowledge of its actual dishonor, acquires a negotiable instrument duly indorsed to him, or indorsed generally, or payable to the bearer.' And by section 4739, 'good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscionable advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious.' Applying the law thus stated to the facts of this case, it appeared that, before the check was presented, the county commissioners had refused to receive a deposit book, as well as a written statement of the bank that Howard had a credit to the amount of $15,625.01 upon the books of the bank as a part of his official assets, and demanded either the money or a certified check, as they doubtless had a right to do. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the commissioners had a right to recognize anything but current money in the settlement of the treasurer's accounts. By the Compiled Laws of Dakota, (section 1598,) territorial warrants are receivable for general territorial taxes, county warrants for county taxes, city warrants for city taxes, school warrants for school taxes, 'but United States treasury notes or their equivalent only are receivable for such taxes as are or may be required by law to be paid in cash.' And by section 1656, 'if any county treasurer shall fail to make return, fail to make settlement, or fail to pay over all money with which he may stand charged, at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, it shall be the duty of the county clerk, on receiving instructions for that purpose from the territorial auditor, or from the county commissioners of his county, to cause suit to be instituted against such treasurer and his sureties,' etc.
Now, if the county treasurer had no authority to receive anything but coin, treasury notes, national bank notes, or other current money, it is difficult to see what authority the county commissioners had to accept anything less in the set- [150 U.S. 231, 241] tlement of his accounts. If they have the authority to accept checks and other evidences of debt, where does that authority cease? May they not also receive notes, drafts, bonds, or other obligations which in their opinion may then or thereafter be good? As was said in Cawley v. People, 95 Ill. 249, 256, speaking of the duty of auditing boards: 'They are limited and controlled in their official acts, and they are not, unless authorized, empowered to do, or not to do, official acts. In this class of cases they are empowered, and it is enjoined on the board, to require sufficient bond from the treasurer, and to approve it. They have no power to dispense with the duty, nor can they, without a proper consideration, release sureties from their obligations under the bond. If they were to do so, in fraud of the rights of the people, the act would have no binding effect and would be void. ... There can be no question that the treasurer could only discharge himself for county funds in his hands by paying to the county, in money, county orders or jury warrants. The statute requires him to pay in such funds. It is not intended that he may pay in promissory notes, checks, drafts, and other paper.' Indeed, it is doubtful whether the county commissioners, who, under the laws of Dakota, are simply an auditing body, had any authority to receive moneys of the county from the treasurer, for which they gave no bonds, and whether their act in taking possession of his assets, including this check, was not beyond the scope of their authority. They did, however, receive the money and the check, and at the same time, and as a part of the same transaction, turned them over to the sureties upon his bond, although they did not at that time or until six days thereafter pass his accounts or release his sureties. What warrant they had for turning over these securities to the bondsmen does not appear, but there was evidently no intention on their part of releasing the sureties, nor was the county placed in any worse position by that act. If the commissioners had received this check believing it to have been issued in good faith, and retained it, it is possible the county might have stood in the position of an innocent purchaser. But their receipt of it and their turning it over to the sureties [150 U.S. 231, 242] was evidently a single act, and intended to assist the sureties in protecting themselves. It was wholly inconsistent with the idea of releasing them from their obligation.
Aside from the somewhat suspicious circumstances attending the sudden production of a check of this large amount, which could scarcely be said to be in the ordinary course of business, there was evidence tending to show that about the time of the receipt of the check, on January 12th, Mr. Wright, the county attorney, was informed by the counsel of the bank that the board should not take the check into consideration; that the bank would defend against it, as in the hands of Howard, and refuse payment; and that the next day, when the board was in session, a similar notice was given to them. It is true that some of this testimony with regard to the notice is disputed, but, in determining whether the case should have been left to the jury or not, we are to consider only the uncontradicted facts. Beyond this, however, there is some testimony tending to show that the check was not delivered by Howard voluntarily, as such delivery involved a plain violation of the condition upon which he had received it, but was extorted by the bondsmen and commissioners under a show of force. If this be true, it was clearly not a receipt of the check in the ordinary course of business. Be this as it may, it does not appear that the county commissioners took any action prejudicial to their rights against the county treasurer and his sureties until the 18th, when his settlement was approved, and on the 19th the check of the bondsmen, certified by the president of the plaintiff bank, was received in full discharge of such bondsmen.
Without expressing an opinion of our own whether the evidence did or did not establish the fact that the county was an innocent holder for value of this check, we are clear that the testimony upon this point should have been submitted to the jury.
There was certainly evidence enough to go to the jury that the plaintiff bank, as well as the sureties upon the bond, received the paper with notice that its collection would be resisted. The sureties received the paper simply as bailee for [150 U.S. 231, 243] the county. They paid no consideration for it. It simply passed through their hands to the plaintiff bank, which consented to receive it on deposit, and to credit them with the amount.
With regard to the possession of the plaintiff bank, the evident anxiety of McKinney, its president, to obtain for it the treasurer's deposit; his inquiry whether it was a straight cashier's check; his threat that the bank should pay it or close its doors; the substitution of Norton, the cashier of this bank, for Howard, as county treasurer; the suspicious manner in which the money was brought to the bank; the prompt commencement of the action against the defendant on the morning after the check was refused; the conversation on the following morning, the 15th, between the assistant cashier of the plaintiff bank and the editor of a local paper, in which the former said, 'The Sioux Falls National Bank has done a great deal for me, and now was the time for me to stand by them; it was a matter of vital importance to them,'-were all suspicious circumstances tending to throw grave doubt upon the claim of the plaintiff bank to be a bona fide holder of the paper. Add to this the fact that twice during the afternoon of the 13th the plaintiff bank presented the check for payment, which was refused, upon the ground that it was given without consideration, and had been fraudulently diverted from the purpose for which it was issued; that this notice was repeated at a conference between the officers of the two banks the same evening, and the plaintiff bank requested to charge it back to the bondsmen,-and it is too clear for argument that the plaintiff did not itself stand in the position of an innocent holder. Bad as the conduct of the defendant bank was in issuing the check, the testimony is calculated to engender a strong suspicion that the motive of the plaintiff bank in receiving it was to secure to itself the deposit of the county moneys, and perhaps also to crush out a rival institution.
While it is true the plaintiff bank credited the bondsmen with the amount of the check on its receipt, it parted with nothing upon the faith of it until nearly a week thereafter. [150 U.S. 231, 244] If it had canceled the check on the evening of the 13th, as it was requested to do, it would have done no more than the law required of it. The mere credit of a check upon the books of a bank, which may be canceled at any time, does not make the bank a bona fide purchaser for value. If after such credit, and before payment for value upon the faith thereof, the holder receives notice of the invalidity of the check, he cannot become a bona fide holder by subsequent payment. Dresser v. Construction Co., 93 U.S. 92 ; Mann v. Bank, 30 Kan. 412, 1 Pac. Rep. 576; Bank v. Valentine, 18 Hun, 417; Bank v. Newell, 71 Wis. 309, 37 N. W. Rep. 420; Buller v. Harrison, Cowp. 565.
The claim that defendant was estopped by its check to deny that the bank was indebted to the county in the amount of such check depends practically upon the same considerations as the question of innocent purchaser. If, upon the faith of such representations, the county commissioners did any act prejudicial to the interests of the county, an estoppel might arise; but if, before such act was done, the commissioners were informed that the check was fictitious, they could not be said to have acted upon the faith of its representation, and there could be no estoppel. Even if such estoppel had arisen in favor of the county, it is, at least, doubtful whether the plaintiff bank could avail itself of it. Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795; Mayenborg v. Haynes, 50 N. Y. 675.
We have not deemed it necessary to consider whether this check falls within the class upon which we have held that no action will lie in favor of the holder against the drawee before acceptance. Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152; Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 ; Bull v. Bank, 123 U.S. 105 , 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62.
In any view we have been able to take of this case, we think the question of plaintiff's title to this check and its right to recover upon the same should have been left to the jury, under proper instructions.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the supreme court of the state of [150 U.S. 231, 245] South Dakota, with instructions to remand the case to the proper court of Moody county, and to direct the verdict and judgment to be set aside, and a new trial granted.

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The public duties of county personnel now intersect with a relatively new statute in Texas: The Texas Citizens Participation Act, or TCPA. This statute was intended to protect citizens from abusive lawsuits when they address certain activities considered key to democracy, but lately, employers are using it to dismiss suits from former employees. The next time your office receives notification of such a lawsuit, TCPA may be a potential defense.
The TCPA provides litigants with a mechanism for quickly dismissing these retaliatory lawsuits, staying discovery, and awarding these citizens attorney’s fees and costs upon dismissal of the suit.5 Additionally, if the trial court overrules the litigant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to TCPA, the litigant is entitled to an interlocutory appeal. Further, the court may award sanctions against the party who brought the legal action.
The TCPA has been broadly and successfully used as a defense in a variety of cases not originally envisioned;6 most important to those of us in prosecutor offices is the trend of employers using the TCPA as a defense against lawsuits brought by former employees whose job duties fall into the category of a public concern.
In ExxonMobil Pipeline Company v. Coleman, a former employee sued his employer and supervisors for defamation, civil conspiracy, and other torts alleging his supervisors made false statements to his employer about him.7 ExxonMobil moved for dismissal of the lawsuit asserting the TCPA as a defense. The case went to the Supreme Court of Texas, which held that the TCPA defense applied to the statements by the supervisor and investigator about the employee’s failure to record the volume of petroleum products and additives in the storage tanks as the risk of an oil spill is a matter of public concern. Specifically, the Court held the recording of the oil volume is a process completed “to reduce the potential environmental, health, safety, and economic risks associated with noxious and flammable chemicals overfilling and spilling onto the ground.”8 The Supreme Court further stated that communications made in connection with environmental, health, safety, and economic concerns fall under the TCPA.
ExxonMobil and Memorial Hermann held that statements made by supervisors about their employees’ performance of duties transform personnel matters into matters of “public concern.” Consequently, these matters would be subject to similar dismissals in the event government employees filed suits based on statements made by their employers about them or their job performance.
It is clear public employees are treated differently from private employees, but private employers’ ever-expanding use of the TCPA defense has implications for government employers who are sued by former employees. Almost every county employee’s duties may fall into the category of a “public concern,” including law enforcement officers, prosecutors, investigators, deputy district and county clerks, court coordinators, treasurers, and tax assessors. Also, the holding in Brady v. Klentzman that statements regarding the conduct of a deputy and his family fall into the definition of a “matter of public concern” may affect one’s analysis of employment-related issues with deputies and other law enforcement categories of employees.
While TCPA will not be applicable to every case, the potential for its use as a defense to suit from former employees is a trend governmental practitioners should recognize and consider when they are analyzing new litigation filed against them.
1 These 28 states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, District of Columbia and Guam. The Media Law Resource Center, Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, http://www.medialaw.org/topics-page/anti-slapp (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
2 Id.; House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2973, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).
3 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.001(1) states that communication includes the making or submitting or a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.
4 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.001(7).
5 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§27.001–27.011.
6 Watson v. Hardman, 497 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (defamation); Pena v. Perel, 417 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.—E l Paso 2013, no pet.) (slander and defamation); KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (defamation); Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (defamation); Ramsey v. Lynch, No. 10-12-00198-CV, 2013 WL 1846886, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco May 2, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defamation).
7 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2017).
9 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 464 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015), rev’d, 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2017).
10 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. 2017).
11 Mem’l Hermann Health Sys. V. Khalil, No. 01-16-00512-CV, 2017 WL 3389645, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (anesthesiologist sued health care system for defamation, tortious interference with contract, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and age discrimination following corrective action employment plan and failure to recredential anesthesiologist); Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W. 3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (nurse anesthetist brought action against administers at medical facility for allegedly defamatory emails).
12 Mem’l Hermann Health Sys., 2017 WL 3389645, at *5 (internal citations omitted).
13 Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017), reh’g denied (June 2, 2017).
16 Watson v. Hardman, 497 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (defamation); Pena v. Perel, 417 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (slander and defamation); KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (defamation); Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (defamation); Ramsey v. Lynch, No. 10-12-00198-CV, 2013 WL 1846886, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco May 2, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defamation).
17 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.005; ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 512 S.W.3d at 898; In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. 2015).
18 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.001.
19 Id. §27.005(c); ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 512 S.W.3d at 899.


text:
1. a glasslike opaque or semi-transparent coating on metallic or other hard surfaces for ornament or as a preservative lining.
2 a a smooth hard coating. b a cosmetic simulating this.
3 the hard glossy natural coating over the crown of a tooth.
4 painting done in enamel.
5 poet. a smooth bright surface colouring, verdure, etc.
1. inlay or encrust (a metal etc.) with enamel.
2 portray (figures etc.) with enamel.
3 archaic adorn with varied colours.
enamel paint a paint that dries to give a smooth hard coat.
Еще значения слова и перевод ENAMEL с английского на русский язык в англо-русских словарях.
Что такое и перевод ENAMEL с русского на английский язык в русско-английских словарях.
More meanings of this word and English-Russian, Russian-English translations for ENAMEL in dictionaries.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) To form a glossy surface like enamel upon; as, to enamel card paper; to enamel leather or cloth.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) To variegate with colors as if with enamel.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) To lay enamel upon; to decorate with enamel whether inlaid or painted.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) That which is enameled; also, any smooth, glossy surface, resembling enamel, especially if variegated.
ENAMEL — ( v. t. ) To lay enamel upon; to decorate with enamel whether inlaid or painted.
ENAMEL — (v. i.) To practice the art of enameling.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) To disguise with cosmetics, as a woman's complexion.
ENAMEL — (v. t.) A glassy, opaque bead obtained by the blowpipe.
ENAMEL — ( v. t. ) To variegate with colors as if with enamel.
ENAMEL — ( v. t. ) To disguise with cosmetics, as a woman's complexion.
ENAMEL — ( v. t. ) That which is enameled; also, any smooth, glossy surface, resembling enamel, especially if variegated.
ENAMEL — ( v. t. ) A glassy, opaque bead obtained by the blowpipe.
ENAMEL — ( v. i. ) To practice the art of enameling.
ENAMEL — ( a. ) Relating to the art of enameling; as, enamel painting.
ENAMEL — [verb] [T] -ll- or US usually -l-This vase has been enamelled beautifully.
ENAMEL — Type of paint that dries to a smooth, glossy finish .

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Terry Spragg, inventor of the Spraggbag, sent me an e-mail responding to my previous posting on Water, Peace and the Middle East. I thought it worth sharing.
Using waterbag technology to transport Turkish water to Israel and Palestine can eliminate many of the political and economic issues raised in your recent editorial, and by Dr. Shuval, in your comments on the excellent NEW YORK TIMES editorial, “Water for Peace” (July 13, 2009) written by Stanley Weiss.
“Spragg Bag” technology can be visualized as a modular fabric pipeline that can easily and inexpensively move large quantities of water through the ocean in an environmentally safe manner, using large waterbags connected together in long waterbag trains with the world’s strongest zipper. Waterbag economics are easy to calculate. Waterbag technology is easy to demonstrate. It is the politics of waterbag technology that is the most difficult issue that needs to be addressed.
As Prime Minister Netanyahu has correctly analyzed, Peace will not come to the Middle East without the development of a viable Palestinian economy.
A viable Palestinian economy cannot be developed without a reliable and economic water supply.
Transporting Turkish water to Israel and Palestine using waterbag technology is the least expensive and most politically viable way to develop a new water supply for the region.
This is an easy and inexpensive theory to demonstrate and calculate.
Dr. Shuval’s $0.50/m3 cost for desalinated water produced at the Ashkelon plant does not include capital costs, which would almost double this $0.50/m3 cost for desalinated water. An email from Saul Arlosoroff (Director of Mekorot and Chairman of its Finance/Economic Committee) to David Brooks (Friends of the Earth, Canada) confirms this statement. The Ashkelon plant received special financing considerations and natural gas concessions which are not available for the development of the new desalination plants currently under construction and being proposed in Israel.
Using Dr. Shuval’s economics, waterbag technology could deliver water from Turkey to Israel and Palestine in the $0.30/m3 to $0.40/m3 range.
Israel would prefer not to rely on Turkey as a source for some of its water supply. All nations would like to be water independent. However, military and trade relations between Turkey and Israel remain strong (setting aside the brief discussion between Erdogan and Peres at the recent World Water Forum in Israel).
Israel transports most of its energy from sources outside its boundaries using the seas. Water transports using the seas should be no different. The United States seems to be willing to protect Israel’s energy supplies. Protecting Israel’s water supplies should be no different.
Israel proposes to build desalination plants to produce water for the Palestinians. If the Palestinians are expected to rely on Israel for the development of a new water supply it would seem that Israel should be comfortable in relying on an outside source for a portion of its water supply.
Waterbags delivered directly to the Palestinians can avoid this dependency issue. The United States should commit to defending both these water supply transport systems in the name of national security.
Israel can use shipments of Turkish water directly to the Palestinians as a test case for Israel’s analysis of the economic and technical reliability of waterbag technology before it makes a commitment to purchase Turkish water.
The Palestinian concern that by accepting water from another source before it resolves its dispute with Israel over control of the West Bank and Gaza aquifers can be put to rest by using waterbag technology. Israel should agree that transporting Turkish water to Palestine is only a test case to prove the economic and technical reliability of waterbag technology for both parties. The acceptance of Turkish water by the Palestinians should have no relationship to the current dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the water in the West Bank and Gaza aquifers.
As the drought in the Middle East continues this argument should gain more acceptance by both parties.
Past failures of waterbag technology can easily be overcome by implementing a demonstration voyage of “Spragg Bag” technology between Turkey and Israel. This demonstration voyage plan has been presented by Gershon Baskin (co-founder  of the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information [IPCRI], and a representative of Spragg & Associates) to various Israeli, Turkish, Palestinian, Jordanian and American government and business representatives. If the political leaders in the region will publically announce their support for a demonstration of “Spragg Bag” technology in the Middle East to the media, then a demonstration of this technology should be able to be implemented with ZERO COST to the region’s governments.
Stanley Weiss is 100% correct in calling for the United States to take a leadership role in helping to develop a secure water supply for the Israelis and the Palestinians. Water is becoming the most critical national security issue facing the nations of the Middle East, and therefore a critical national security issue for the United States.
The insidious nature of drought in the Middle East poses a major challenge for America’s security interests throughout the region. American political and business leaders must be wise enough to anticipate these events.
As the drought in the Middle East continues, and recognizing that water may become the most explosive issue to be faced between the Israelis and the Palestinians, perhaps the Business Executives for National Security, lead by Stanley Weiss, will be able to take an active leadership role in gaining America’s political and technical support for demonstrating how water can be transported as a tool for helping to bring “Water for Peace” in the Middle East.
· an e-mail from IPCRI’s Gershon Baskin to Terry discussing his July 2008 meeting with the Head of the Palestinian Water Authority, Dr. Shaddad Atilli.
In a recent New York Times Op-Ed, Stanley A. Weiss offers a grave perspective of the water situation in the Middle East. He writes that “the region is headed toward a water calamity that could overwhelm all efforts at peace.” Ominous words, but sadly, true.
Weiss, however, also offers a prescription for averting the tragedy. Among his recommendations, water-rich Turkey should become a purveyor for the parched nations of the Middle East, including Israel, Jordan, Syria, the future Palestine, and possibly others. While such solutions have been proffered in the past, couched in the language of “peace pipeline” and “water plan for peace,” the politics of the region have always thwarted their realization. My sense is that they will continue to do so into the future.
While Turkey does have prodigious amounts of water in relation to its land area and population, and certainly in comparison with its neighbors in the Middle East, transporting water from Turkey to where it is needed will require negotiations of Herculean proportion. As Weiss notes, a water carrier from Turkey will have to run through Syria and possibly Lebanon. Unfortunately, neither of these nations is known for their stability or international cooperation. In particular, the ongoing tensions between Syria and Lebanon (e.g., over the murder of Former Prime Minister Hariri), Syria and Israel (e.g., over the Golan Heights), Lebanon and Israel (e.g., over Israel’s 2006 conflict with Hezbollah), and Israel and the Palestinians (e.g., over security, human rights, and independence) make any cooperation over water seem illusory.
Yet, it must be stated that the reason that such a scheme is unlikely to materialize anytime soon is not just because of regional politics. It is also due to a historically ingrained lack of trust among the region’s countries. In order to implement the Turkish water solution, the nations of the Middle East would have to become comfortable being dependent on Turkey having ultimate control over an indispensible resource. Iraq’s and Syria’s ongoing water relations with Turkey suggest anything but comfort with Turkey’s management of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (see my prior post). Similarly, given the route of the water carrier, some nations would also have to be reliant on the amiability of countries in whose territory the carrier would run.
It has been said multiple times: water is life. Without it, life ceases to exist. Hence, the question: what country would willingly place its life, its peoples’ lives, in the hands of a neighbor, especially one who may be unfriendly? I suppose nations in Europe and North America might be more inclined to accept such a precarious situation in order to ensure their water supply. These, though, are nations with a history of cooperation over security, shared resources, migration, and other issues. I have my doubts, however, about the nations of the Middle East. With their long record of enmity and conflict, any accord that creates dependency would necessitate a significant calamity (such as widespread famine), immense international pressure, or some advantage that the subordinate State could not refuse (no, I cannot think of any examples).
Pessimism aside, Weiss’ other recommendations do hit the mark. Israel should be convinced to share its water expertise and technology with its Arab neighbors. Israel has long been a leader in water management techniques and technology and such an overture would not only help alleviate water scarcity problems in the region, but also serve as a basis for further cooperative opportunities. The U.N. also should mobilize a global effort to improve desalination efforts to make them less expensive, less energy intensive, and more environmentally friendly. Lastly, a new effort on water management should be brokered between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to replace the failed Joint Water Committee.
In addition, though, steps must be taken to overcome the inherent lack of trust shared by the region’s nations as it relates to fresh water. Specifically, Europe and the U.S. should embark on a new strategy with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and with any other nation in the region willing to exchange peace for water, for a comprehensive plan for water management and provision. Such a plan should have two main tenets.
First, the plan should be based on the undeniable reality that there just is not enough water in the Middle East to support everyone’s population, developmental, and environmental needs. There is a dire need to develop new sources of freshwater through desalination of sea water and brackish aquifers, treatment and reuse of grey water (non-industrial wastewater generated from domestic processes), and the capturing of rain and flood waters that otherwise go unused. Hence, a key aspect of the plan would be to generate financial, technical, and management support from Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere to pursue these new water opportunities. It would also involve assistance in developing the necessary infrastructure needed to deliver the water to where it is needed.
The plan also would be founded on the principle that, to the extent possible, no nation should have the ability to control the flow of water into another nation. While the elimination of all control factors is likely unattainable, the reduction of some measure of countries’ dependence on water resources originating or flowing from neighboring states will go a long way to lessening both water stress and political tensions. This principle would be implemented through two alternate but not mutually exclusive approaches. The first approach is through the creation of bilateral or multilateral water management and allocation institutions that have some degree of independence in their operation. Existing institutions that might be look to as models include, among others, the Mexico-US International Boundary and Water Commission, the Franko-Swiss Genevese Aquifer Management Commission, and the Council of Ministers and High Commission of the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River. Preferably as a complementary approach, but possibly as an alternative approach if the institutional strategy is deemed unworkable, the second tactic would pursue the augmentation of local water opportunities in each country as well as the reassessment of access points and allocations of transboundary waters to provide each nation with enhanced water security. For example, desalination on the Israeli Mediterranean coast would be expanded to benefit Israel in exchange for the Palestinians receiving a greater share of the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank. A similar approach could be employed between Israel and Jordan on the Jordan River.
Weiss’ warning of the coming “water calamity” in the Middle East cannot be overstated. Water is a life issue. But, it is also subject to political, economic, and security concerns, climatic variability, and a host of societal, national, and international interests that threaten to overwhelm any effort to achieve a lasting peace in the region. Although water could certainly serve as a basis for peace in the Middle East, success will hinge on generating a level of trust and cooperation that has yet to be seen in the region.
UNESCO-IHP, along with others, is organising a seminar during the upcoming Stockholm World Water Week on “Sharing an Invisible Water Resource for the Common Good: How to Make Use of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (TBA).” This looks to be a fantastic event and line up of speakers.
In preparation for the seminar, the organizers have launched an internet debate to allow contributions from the rest of us. Those contributions will be compiled in a final report and presented during the seminar in Stockholm. Brief comments, thoughts, and case studies can be sent to IHPSeminarWWW2009 “at” unesco.org.
One of my concerns related to the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers pertains to how nations, organizations and others view the articles. To many, I suspect the articles represent the law by which to judge the actions that States may take vis a vis transboundary ground waters (e.g., did the State comply with the legal obligation). And the emphasis is likely to be on the substantive articles of equitable and reasonable utilization (Draft Art. 4); no significant harm (Draft Art. 6); prevention, reduction and control of pollution (Draft Art. 12), etc. In order to employ these principles to their fullest extent, though, they would be applied ex post facto – after a particular action is taken that results in an alleged claim of violation. This is because the objective determination of what use may be equitable and reasonable, or whether a particular project will significantly harm another state, etc., is, at best, a very difficult exercise where the equity and reasonableness of a water use, or the magnitude of the harm, are mere projection.
What I hope is not neglected, thought, is the fact that the Draft Articles are also (or, more so) intended as proactive procedures designed to help nations manage their transboundary aquifers in ways that prevent waste and neglect and, especially, avert disputes among aquifer riparians. Some of the more significant include proactive procedural articles that could easily be implemented prior to or during the implementation of an aquifer-related project, including Draft Art. 8 (Regular exchange of data and information); Draft Art. 9 (Bilateral and regional agreements and arrangements); Draft Art. 13 (Monitoring); Draft Art. 14 (Management); and Draft Art. 15 (Planned Activities). Doing so would likely prevent subsequent violations of the substantive rules. Accordingly, I hope that States, IGOs, NGOs and others place greater emphasis and attention on the procedural provisions of the Draft Articles as a means for encouraging cooperation and collaboration, and for preventing dispute over shared waters.
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