1. The principle permitting suit against an agent of the Government to restrain execution of an unconstitutional statute protects only legal rights. P. 306 U. S. 137.
2. Franchises to be a corporation and to function as a public utility and nonexclusive franchises to occupy and use public property and places for service of the public do not grant freedom from competition. P. 306 U. S. 138.
3. The validity of a statutory grant of power cannot be challenged merely because its exercise results in harmful competition. The damage is damnum absque injuria. P. 306 U. S. 139.
4. State laws requiring electric power companies to obtain certificates of convenience and necessity as a condition to doing business do not confer upon those possessing such certificates a standing to enjoin operations of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which, though it has no such certificate, operates with consent of the State. P. 306 U. S. 141.
5. The appellant power companies may not raise, in this case, any question of discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment involved in state exemption of the Tennessee Valley Authority from commission regulation. Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, distinguished. P. 306 U. S. 143.
6. The competition of the Tennessee Valley Authority in underselling the power companies and in fixing resale rates by contract does not amount to regulation of their rates in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and gives rise to no cause of action under that Amendment or under the Ninth Amendment. P. 306 U. S. 143.
7. The findings and evidence in this case do not sustain the charge of a conspiracy between the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Public Works Administrator to intimidate the appellant power companies into selling their existing systems where the Authority desires to seize the market for electricity. P. 306 U. S. 144.
Cooperation by two federal officials, one acting under a statute whereby funds are provided for the erection of municipal plants and the other under a statute authorizing the production of electricity and its sale to such plants, in competition with the appellants, does not spell conspiracy to injure their business. P. 306 U. S. 146.
Appeal from a decree of a District Court of three judges which dismissed a bill filed by numerous electric power companies wherein they sought to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority and its three executive officers and directors from generating, distributing, and selling electric power and from other injurious and allegedly unconstitutional activities in harmful and destructive competition with the appellants.
navigation and control floods in the navigable waters of the nation. They affirm that the statutory plan is a plain attempt, in the guise of exerting granted powers, to exercise a power not granted to the United States -- namely, the generation and sale of electric energy; that the execution of the plan contravenes the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, since the sale of electricity on the scale proposed will deprive the appellants of their property without due process of law, will result in federal regulation of the internal affairs of the states, and will deprive the people of the states of their guaranteed liberty to earn a livelihood and to acquire and use property subject only to state regulation. The appellees contest these contentions. For reasons about to be stated, we do not consider or decide the issues thus mooted.
The Authority's acts which the appellants claim give rise to a cause of action comprise (1) the sale of electric energy at wholesale to municipalities empowered by state law to maintain and operate their own distribution systems; (2) the sale of such energy at wholesale to membership corporations organized under state law to purchase and distribute electricity to their members without profit; (3) the sale of firm and secondary power at wholesale to industrial plants.
The appellants are incorporated for the purpose and with the authority to conduct business as public utilities. Several do so only within the states of their incorporation; those chartered elsewhere have qualified as foreign corporations under the laws of the states in which they manufacture, transmit, or distribute electricity. Most of them have local franchises, licenses, or easements granted by municipalities or governmental subdivisions, but it is admitted that none of these franchises confers an exclusive privilege.
While the Authority has not built or authorized any transmission line, has not sold or authorized the sale of electricity, or contracted for, or authorized any contract for, the sale of electricity by others, in territory served by nine of the appellants, it has done some or all of these things in areas served or susceptible of service by five of the companies, and it plans to enter in the same way the territory of other appellants. It is clear, therefore, that its acts have resulted and will result in the establishment of municipal and cooperative distribution systems competing with those of some or all the appellants in territory which they now serve, or reasonably expect to serve by extension of their existing systems, and in direct competition with the appellants' enterprises through the sale of power to industries in areas now served by them or which they can serve by expansion of their facilities. The appellants assert that this competition will inflict substantial damage upon them. The appellees admit that such damage will result, but contend that it is not the basis of a cause of action, since it is damnum absque injuria, -- a damage not consequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law.
The appellants urge that the Tennessee Valley Authority, by competing with them in the sale of electric energy, is destroying their property and rights without warrant, since the claimed authorization of its transactions is an unconstitutional statute. The pith of the complaint is the Authority's competition. But the appellants realize that competition between natural persons is lawful. They seek to stigmatize the Authority's present and proposed competition as "illegal" by reliance on their franchises which they say are property protected from injury or destruction by competition. They classify the franchises in question as of two sorts -- those involved in the state's grant of incorporation or of domestication and those arising from the grant by the state or its subdivisions of the privilege to use and occupy public property and public places for the service of the public.
what is being done is justified by reference to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, they say they have standing to challenge its constitutionality.
The vice of the position is that neither their charters nor their local franchises involve the grant of a monopoly or render competition illegal. The franchise to exist as a corporation, and to function as a public utility, in the absence of a specific charter contract on the subject, creates no right to be free of competition, [Footnote 7] and affords the corporation no legal cause of complaint by reason of the state's subsequently authorizing another to enter and operate in the same field. [Footnote 8] The local franchises, while having elements of property, confer no contractual or property right to be free of competition either from individuals, other public utility corporations, or the state or municipality granting the franchise. [Footnote 9] The grantor may preclude itself by contract from initiating or permitting such competition, [Footnote 10] but no such contractual obligation is here asserted.
laws afford them protection from the Authority's competition, since any utility now seeking to serve in their territory must obtain a certificate, and hence they have standing to maintain this suit against the Authority which has none. The position cannot be maintained. Whether competition between utilities shall be prohibited, regulated, or forbidden is a matter of state policy. That policy is subject to alteration at the will of the legislature. [Footnote 14] The declaration of a specific policy creates no vested right to its maintenance in utilities then engaged in the business or thereafter embarking in it.
with the Authority on terms deemed appropriate, including the fixing of resale prices; [Footnote 19] has authorized the formation of nonprofit membership electric corporations with like powers to contract. [Footnote 20] Kentucky has authorized municipalities to establish and maintain light, heat, and power plants; [Footnote 21] and has provided for the organization of nonprofit cooperative electric corporations which may contract with the Authority for purchase of energy and stipulate as to resale prices. [Footnote 22] Mississippi, which has no state law for regulation of utilities, has empowered municipal and county governments to establish and maintain electric distribution systems which may buy power from the Authority and contract as to resale prices; [Footnote 23] has created a rural electrical authority and authorized the formation of power districts and nonprofit competitives, all competent to purchase energy from the Authority and distribute it and to contract with the Authority as to resale rates to consumers. [Footnote 24] The Authority's action in these states is consonant with state law, but, as has been shown, if the fact were otherwise, the appellants would have no standing to restrain its continuance.
The appellants may not raise any question of discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment involved in state exemption of the Authority from commission regulation. For this reason, Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, on which they rely, is inapplicable. Manifestly there can be no challenge of the validity of state action in this suit.
the price at which the energy supplied shall be resold by its vendees. That is said to be a regulation of the appellant's business. But it is nothing more than an incident of competition; it is but a method of seeking and assuring a market for the power which the Authority has for sale, and a lawful means to that end. [Footnote 26] The sale of government property in competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment. As we have seen, there is no objection to the Authority's operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment. [Footnote 27] These considerations also answer the argument that the appellants have a cause of action for alleged infractions of the Ninth Amendment.
"confederated and acted with the defendants in some of its illegal acts, and is therefore a proper party, he is not a necessary party, and is not joined as a defendant, because he is beyond the jurisdiction of the court."
There is a prayer that the defendants be restrained from confederating and acting in concert with Ickes for the described ends.
The District Court finds that the Authority has not indulged in coercion, duress, fraud, or misrepresentation in procuring contracts with municipalities, cooperatives, or other purchasers of power; has not acted with any malicious or malevolent motive, and has not conspired with municipalities or other purchasers of power. The record justifies these findings. It is claimed, however, that they are inconclusive, since the court erroneously excluded much proffered evidence tending to sustain the charge. An examination of the record discloses that certain of the evidence offered was properly excluded, and that, in other instances, the rejection of that offered constituted, at most, harmless error.
Error is assigned to the trial court's refusal to permit the taking of the deposition of the Public Works Administrator. In view of the prior opportunity which the claimants had to take this deposition, the lateness of the application, and other factors, permission to take the deposition was a matter within the court's discretion, and it does not appear that the discretion was abused.
those omitted apparently not being thought of importance. Scrutiny of them compels the conclusion that, if the rejected evidence had been admitted, the trial court's holding that a conspiracy had not been proved should not be overruled.
The only findings on this subject requested by the appellants were to the effect that the Public Works Administration has cooperated with and assisted the Tennessee Valley Authority in the furtherance of the latter's power program, and that the former has made contracts and allotments for loans and grants to twenty-three municipalities in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, amounting to about fourteen million dollars, for the purpose of constructing municipal systems of distribute the Authority's power in competition with the appellants; that the applications for loan and grant in some instances specify that the municipal system will duplicate a privately owned system, in others that a large business will be done by the municipal plants because of the low promotional rates of the Authority; that some of the applications state they were filed to take advantage of the low rates offered by the Authority, and that, with few exceptions, they state that the electricity to be distributed in the city will be purchased from the Authority. A further requested finding is that the applications of certain Alabama cities recite that they have secured written contracts from practically all consumers; that these contracts refer to lower rates to be secured, provided the rates charged by the city shall be thus prescribed by the Authority for resale at retail. The court refused to make the requested findings, and error is assigned to this refusal. It is apparent that, if the court had made the findings, no conclusion of confederation or conspiracy, with malicious intent to harm the appellants or to destroy their business, would thereby have been required.
municipal plants and the other under a statute authorizing the production of electricity and its sale to such plants in competition with the appellants, does not spell conspiracy to injure their business. As the court below held, such cooperation does not involve unlawful concert, plan, or design, or cooperation to commit an unlawful act or to commit acts otherwise lawful with the intent to violate a statute.
In no aspect of the case have the appellants standing to maintain the suit, and the bill was properly dismissed.
Act of May 18, 1933, 48 Stat. 58, as amended by Act of August 31, 1935, 49 Stat. 1075, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831 et seq.
50 Stat. 751, 752, 28 U.S.C. § 380a,.
Georgia Power Company was enjoined from maintaining the action. See Georgia Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 17 F.Supp. 769; 89 F.2d 218; 302 U.S. 692. Four other complainants have since been permitted to withdraw from the litigation without prejudice to its prosecution by the remaining appellants.
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 223 U. S. 619; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 258 U. S. 512; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 262 U. S. 488. The same rule applies to suits against state officers: Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 857-859; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 263 U. S. 214; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 287 U. S. 393.
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, supra; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557.
See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 548; Washington & B. Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, 3 Wall. 210, 70 U. S. 213; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258, 146 U. S. 268; Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 161 U. S. 664.
Compare Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388.
Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U. S. 150; Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 195 U. S. 383, 195 U. S. 393; Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 291 U. S. 624.
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., supra; Superior Water, L. & P. Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S. 125.
Railroad Co. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 105 U. S. 173; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 302 U. S. 479-483, and cases cited; Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F.2d 986, 997; Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F.2d 665, 676, aff'd, 302 U. S. 302 U.S. 485.
In Mississippi, there is no State Commission, but municipalities are given the authority to regulate utilities within their territorial limits. Mississippi Code (1930) §§ 2400, 2401, 2414.
Alabama Code (1928) § 9795; Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1936) § 3952-25; North Carolina Code (1935) § 1037(d); Williams' Tennessee Code (1934) § 5502-3; South Carolina Code (1934 Supp.) § 8555-2(23); Virginia Code (1936) §§ 3693-3774k; West Virginia Code (1937) § 2562(1).
Compare Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 138 U. S. 287, 138 U. S. 292; Williams v. Wingo, 177 U. S. 601, 177 U. S. 604.
Alabama Acts, Regular Session 1935, No. 1, p. 1.
Alabama Acts, Regular Session 1935, No. 155, p. 201.
Alabama Acts, Regular Session 1935, No. 45, p. 100.
Tennessee Public Acts 1935, chap. 42, p. 98.
Tennessee Public Acts 1935, chap. 32, p. 28; Tennessee Public Acts 1935, chap. 37, p. 78.
Tennessee Public Acts 1937, chap. 231, p. 882.
Caroll's Kentucky Statutes (1936) §§ 3480d-1 to 3480d-22.
Kentucky Acts, Fourth Extraordinary Session, 1936-1937, chap. 6, p. 25.
Mississippi Laws, 1936, chap. 185, p. 354; Chap. 271, p. 531.
Mississippi Laws 1936, chap. 183, p. 334; chap. 187, p. 370; chap. 184, p. 342.
In fact, several of the states in question have statutes which would to some extent, and in some circumstances, permit the purchase and use of power created by the Authority. In all of them, municipalities may establish and operate their own distribution systems: North Carolina Code (1935) § 2807; South Carolina Code (1932) §§ 7278-7280, 8262; Virginia Code (1936) § 3031; West Virginia Code (1937) §§ 494, 591(86). North Carolina and Virginia have statutes permitting the formation of cooperatives which may buy power from the Authority under contracts fixing resale rates: Public Laws of North Carolina, 1935, chap. 291, p. 312; Virginia Code (1936) chap. 159A, section 4057(1), et seq. South Carolina has created a State Rural Electrification Authority with power to buy electricity from any federal agency: South Carolina Code (1936 Supplement) § 6010-2.
Oregon & Calif.R. Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 393; United States v. Gratiot, 26 Fed.Cas. pp. 12-14, aff'd 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 526.
Compare Georgia Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 14 F.Supp. 673, 676.
The decision just announced goes too far. It excludes from the courts complainants seeking constitutional protection of their property against defendants acting, as it is alleged, under invalid claim of governmental authority in setting up and carrying on a program calculated to destroy complainants' business. The issues joined by the parties, tried below and fully presented to this Court, include the question whether, when construed to authorize the things done and threatened by defendants, the challenged enactment is authorized by the Constitution or repugnant to the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. The issues also include the question whether, as being applied, the Act is void because the execution of defendants' program will deprive complainants of their property without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. This Court holds complainants have no standing to challenge the validity of the Act, and puts aside as immaterial their claim that, by defendants' unauthorized acts, their properties are being destroyed.
"The Authority's acts which the appellants claim give rise to a cause of action comprise (1) the sale of electric energy at wholesale to municipalities empowered by state law to maintain and operate their own distribution systems; (2) the sale of such energy at wholesale to membership corporations organized under state law to purchase and distribute electricity to their members without profit; (3) the sale of firm and secondary power at wholesale to industrial plants."
Complainants are 19 public utilities. Each, authorized by law, is engaged in generating and selling electricity within the political subdivisions of various States. Some have long-term contracts under which they furnish large quantities of electricity. They are more than able to fill the needs of the territories in which they operate, and are ready to supply such additional facilities as may be needed in the future. Their properties are modern and economically operated, and possess great value as going concerns. Their rates yield no more than a reasonable return, and are fully regulated by the States in which they serve.
Defendants are the Tennessee Valley Authority, a body corporate created by the Act of May 18, 1933, with the right to sue and be sued, and its three directors, charged with the duty of exercising the powers of the Authority. Harold L. Ickes, the Administrator of the Public Works Administration, has confederated with defendants in some acts charged to be illegal; he is not sued, because beyond the jurisdiction of the court. From its principal office at Knoxville, Tennessee, the Authority carries on a proprietary business as a public utility for the generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity in Tennessee, Mississippi, Georgia and Alabama.
On its face, the Act discloses purpose to authorize a large and indeterminate number of great works for the primary purpose of creating a vast supply of electric power, to use this power to establish the United States in the business of producing, transmitting, and selling electric power, and to dispose of this power in a manner inconsistent with the principles of our dual system and so as to govern the concerns reserved to the States. Any references in the Act to navigation or to any other constitutional objective are unsubstantial, and mere pretenses or pretexts under which it is sought to achieve an object reserved to the States. Except with respect to power available at Wilson Dam prior to the acts complained of, the program is one of creating an outlet for power deliberately produced as a commercial enterprise to be sold in unlawful and destructive competition with power now available in adequate quantities.
The program contemplates ultimately the development of all power sites on the Tennessee River and all its tributaries as an integrated electric power system, the construction and operation of hydroelectric plants at these sites, the use of auxiliary steam plants, the interconnection of all plants, and the elimination of existing privately owned utilities.
calls for 11 completed dams by July 1, 1943. They have prepared plans for the construction of high-tension transmission lines from the dams to at least 14 cities, and indeed to the whole area. They have purchased or are attempting to purchase distribution systems in at least 15 cities. They have entered into contracts to sell power to various communities and industries for a 20-year period, and have agreed to supply firm power to other and larger cities.
The avowed purpose of the program is to effect a federal regulation of intrastate electric rates and service by a so-called "yardstick" method or "regulation by competition." The yardstick for wholesale rates is the wholesale rate charged by the Authority. It is unreasonable and confiscatory as a measure of complainants' rates in that it excludes the cost of the major part of the investment necessary to render the service, and excludes necessary operating expenses. The yardstick for retail rates is the sum of the wholesale rate and the amount which the Authority allows municipalities to add to the wholesale rate to cover cost of local distribution; it excludes many items of necessary cost of rendering the service.
Pursuant to a plan promulgated in 1933, defendants are conducting a systematic campaign for the purpose of disrupting the established business relations between complainants and their customers, destroying the good will built up by complainants, seizing their markets, and inciting the residents of communities served by them to cooperate with defendants in their scheme to develop an absolute monopoly.
inhabitants to build publicly owned systems using power furnished by the Authority, to lead them to believe that they are being charged unreasonable rates, to stir up political agitation against privately owned utilities, and to bring complainants into disrepute and disfavor.
The defendants attempt to coerce complainants to sell distribution systems and transmission lines, in territories which defendants intend to appropriate at prices far below fair value by threatening that, unless complainants accede, they will construct, or cause to be constructed, duplicate facilities subsidized in construction and operation by federal funds and render complainants' properties wholly valueless. The Administrator of the Public Works Administration has cooperated with defendants. Defendants inform the owners that, unless they sell, either the Authority or the municipalities will build duplicate systems with federal funds. At defendants' request, the Administrator authorizes and announces a gift to the municipality of from 30% to 45% of the cost of the duplicate system and agrees to lend the balance, repayable out of earnings, if any, of the duplicate plant, upon condition that the municipality will agree to use power of the Authority and will, as soon as possible, oust the existing utility. If the utility agrees to sell, the allotments are cancelled without regard to the will of the municipality. This policy has already been applied in certain cities. The defendants and Administrator also cooperate to force municipalities to agree to purchase power furnished by the Authority by threats that otherwise federal allotments for public works will be cancelled or denied.
propaganda in behalf of the program. The Electric Home and Farm Authority, a corporation set up as a governmental agency of which the individual defendants are directors, finances sale of electrical devices, prints and circulates costly advertising in praise of the Authority program. Defendants have offered to supply electricity to large industrial customers of some of the complainants at noncompensatory and discriminatory rates. They have attempted to persuade complainants' customers to break existing contracts. Complainants cannot meet this competition, because of the noncompensatory rates and because they are forbidden by state law to make discriminatory rates.
Unquestionably, the bill shows that complainants are not asserting a right held or complaining of an injury sustained in common with the general public. They allege facts that unmistakably show that each has a valuable right as a public utility, nonexclusive though it is, to serve in territory covered by its franchise, and that, inevitably, the value of its business and property used will suffer irreparable diminution by defendants' program and acts complained of. If, because of conflict with the Constitution, the Act does not authorize the enterprise formulated and being executed by defendants, then their conduct is unlawful and inflicts upon complainants direct and special injury of great consequence. Therefore, they are entitled to have this Court decide upon the constitutional questions they have brought here. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 262 U. S. 488; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 278 U. S. 521.


§ 700.010 Rights Reserved by City.
§ 700.020 Waterworks and Sewer System Combined.
§ 700.030 Discharge of Rainwater to Sanitary Sewer System — Prohibited.
§ 700.040 Permit Required for Connection to Public Sewer.
§ 700.050 Connection to City Sewer System Required When Public Sewer Available.
§ 700.060 Placement of Obstructions on Utility Easements.
§ 700.070 Damaging or Interfering With Water or Sewer System.
§ 700.080 Payment of Bills.
Section 700.010 Rights Reserved by City.
Section 700.020 Waterworks and Sewer System Combined.
Section 700.030 Discharge of Rainwater to Sanitary Sewer System — Prohibited.
Section 700.040 Permit Required for Connection to Public Sewer.
Section 700.050 Connection to City Sewer System Required When Public Sewer Available.
Section 700.060 Placement of Obstructions on Utility Easements.
Section 700.070 Damaging or Interfering With Water or Sewer System.
Section 700.080 Payment of Bills.
The City, being the sole and exclusive owner of the entire water and sewer system, reserves the right to and does hereby prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit or grant to any person the privilege to tap any of its water or sewer pipes or mains and use the water, or withhold such privileges if need be, and, in case any act shall be wrongfully committed or thing done by any person holding a grant of such privilege, in violation of any of its ordinances relating to its system of water and sewer works, then such privileges may at the option of the City be suspended, abridged or revoked. All water and sewer privileges extended to any person shall be by ordinance duly passed by the Board of Aldermen and approved by the Mayor, and all rights and privileges not so conferred are hereby withheld.
The waterworks and the sewer system of the City, and all future improvements and extensions thereto, shall be combined and operated and maintained as a combined waterworks and sewer system.
It is unlawful for any person to cause or permit rainwater to be discharged into the sanitary sewer system of the City by means of downspouts or by any other method or means.
Any person connecting a private sewer to any of the public sewers of the City without first having obtained a permit from the City Clerk so to do shall be guilty of an ordinance violation.
Any owner of property upon which there is located any building for human habitation or occupancy shall be required to make connection with the sewer system of the City for the disposal of all human and other sewage, provided sewer service is available to the property.
Permits for the construction or repair of any building shall be granted only on evidence that the applicant has complied with the provisions of this Section.
It shall be unlawful to place any type of obstruction or construct any type of building on permanent utility easements that lawfully belong to the City, unless prior written approval is obtained from the Mayor and Board of Aldermen.
Violation of this Section will result in the City removing the obstruction at the owner's expense, and a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) and not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) shall be imposed by the Municipal Court.
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to change the common law of the State as it relates to the responsibilities of the parties as to construction upon and over an existing utility easement.
The provisions, regulations and criminal penalties of this Section shall not apply to those individuals who have placed obstructions or buildings upon easements on or before the date this Section becomes effective.
Any person who shall, without lawful authority from the City, open or hitch any animal to any hydrant, service pipe, stopcock or valve belonging to or connected with the system of waterworks, or who shall injure, deface, obstruct or impair the waterworks or sewer system or any part thereof at and within the City or at any point along the line of the mains and pipes outside of the limits and within the lawful jurisdiction of the City, in any manner, or by any means whatsoever, shall be deemed guilty of an ordinance violation.
Cross Reference — As to damaging or interfering with facilities of sewage works, §710.170.
All bills for water and/or sewer service shall be due and payable from and after the date such bills are rendered on the first (1st) day of each month, at the office of the City Collector or other place designated by the Board of Aldermen, during regular hours of business. Bills paid after the fifteenth (15th) of the month are subject to a ten percent (10%) late fee.
If any bills for water and/or sewer service shall be and remain as long as thirty (30) days past due and unpaid, service to such customer shall be discontinued and the owner(s) of property shall be notified and shall not be reconnected until all past due bills are paid in full, together with a reconnection charge of thirty dollars ($30.00). It shall be the duty of the City Collector to notify the Director of Public Works of such delinquency and such Director of Public Works or such City employee as the Director of Public Works may designate shall proceed immediately to disconnect water service.
If any bill for sewer services shall be and remain past due and unpaid for as long as thirty (30) days, the City may install a valve at the lateral connection to the main and sewer service shall be disconnected or, if a valve has already been installed for the property, then sewer service shall be disconnected.
Prior to the installation of the valve and/or disconnection of sewer services, the City shall provide the delinquent customer a fifteen (15) day written notice of the valve installation and/or service disconnection. If the account remains past due and unpaid at the end of the fifteen (15) day notice period, the City shall install the sewer valve and/or disconnect the sewer service.
Sewer services shall not be reconnected until all past due bills for both sewer and trash are paid in full, together with a reconnection charge of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00).
Once a sewer connection valve has been installed by the City, subsequent reconnection charges shall be thirty dollars ($30.00).
Upon any customer receiving two (2) fifteen (15) day notices within any six (6) month period and paying prior to the end of the fifteen (15) day notice period and prior to the valve installation, the City may elect to install a valve with a charge of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) to be taxed as follows: The City Clerk shall cause a special tax bill therefor against the property to be prepared and to be collected by the Collector with other taxes assessed against the property; and the tax bill from the date of its issuance shall be a first (1st) lien on the property until paid and shall be prima facie evidence of the recitals therein and of its validity, and no mere clerical error or informality in the same, or in the proceedings leading up to the issuance, shall be a defense thereto. Each special tax bill shall be issued by the City Clerk and delivered to the Collector on or before the first (1st) day of June of each year. Such tax bills if not paid when due shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.
It shall be the duty of the City Clerk to notify the Director of Public Works of the combined waterworks and sewer system of any delinquency in the payment of a sewer bill, and the Director of Public Works or such City employee as the Director of Public Works may designate shall proceed as outlined above to install the valve and disconnect the sewer service to the premises.


text:
WALTER E. BETTENCOURT & others vs. EDNA O. BETTENCOURT.
Present: TAURO, C.J., CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, & HENNESSEY, JJ.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on April 13, 1970.
A demurrer to the bill was overruled by Cahill, J.
The suit was heard on the merits by DeSaulnier, J.
Franklin N. Cunningham for the plaintiffs.
Robert J. Morrissey for the defendant.
CUTTER, J. The plaintiffs, who are all children or stepchildren of Edna O. Bettencourt, [Note 1] by this bill seek to require her to convey to them certain parcels of real estate in Edgartown in accordance with undertakings which the plaintiffs assert Edna made or confirmed in a will executed by her substantially in the same form, and on the same day (February 14, 1967), as a will made by Anthony. A demurrer [Note 2] was overruled.
A Superior Court judge made a report of material facts. He concluded that the wills of the widow and her late husband in fact "were wills" which (as to her will) Edna "could revoke . . . at her pleasure." By final decree, the bill was dismissed. The children appealed. Designated evidence is reported. See S. J. C. Rule 1:02, 351 Mass. 732 -734; 353 Mass. 804 . The facts are stated (except as otherwise indicated) on the basis of the report of material facts.
for the children by will "in case they were both killed during the trip."
A lawyer (who had done earlier work for Anthony and Edna) made a draft will for each of them and then met with them. He told them "that they could change the will at any time." The lawyer "did not inform . . . [them] that he intended to draw a trust, or an agreement." The instruments were signed simultaneously. Edna's will was placed on deposit (G. L. c. 191, Section 10, as amended by St. 1960, c. 118; and Sections 11 and 12) with the register of probate.
On the next day Anthony and Edna left for California. While there they separated. Edna returned in the spring to Martha's Vineyard. She consulted a lawyer and began divorce proceedings in April, 1968. In November, 1968, Edna went to the court house, took her will there on deposit, "put several crosses through" it, and wrote "Revoked" on each page.
In December, 1968, a hearing was held on Edna's libel. "[N]o decree was ever issued." [Note 3] Anthony died on March 27, 1970.
deeds or other instruments may be necessary to accomplish the agreed results."
The lawyer testified that he had been asked "to prepare a document which would provide that the survivor [of Anthony and Edna] would not have an uncontrolled and absolute ownership of the properties which are involved in the agreement, to do with as the survivor saw fit." Such an arrangement "they did not want . . . ." Instead, he said, they wanted "a provision . . . allocating the properties to the children . . . upon the death of the first one of them to die." The lawyer denied that he ever told Edna "that she could change this document at any time."
revocable) to dispose of property in a specified manner. [Note 7] The mere execution of simultaneous and reciprocal wills, however, "does not, of itself, show that the parties had entered into a contract to make such wills" or other disposition. See Page, Wills (Bowe-Parker ed.) Section 10.4; [Note 8] Sparks, Contracts to Make Wills, 29-30. See also Gary v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.  A. C. 391, 400-401; Re Oldham,  1 Ch. 75, 87-89. On the other hand, some cases elsewhere allow enforcement of adequately proved agreements (sometimes set out or referred to in wills) to make dispositions of particular property. See e.g. Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 587-589; Helms v. Darmstatter, 56 Ill. App. 2d 176, 182-187; Estate of Wade, 202 Kans. 380, 385-390 (will held contractual despite absence from it of language to that effect); Wimp v. Collett, 414 S. W. 2d 65, 70-77 (Mo.); Geiger v. Geiger, 185 Neb. 700, 702 (agreement in wills); Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N. Y. 315, 319-321 ("resulting trust" held to result from contract); Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N. Y. 2d 228, 231-234; Godwin v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. 259 N. C. 520, 529-530 (simultaneously executed wills, incorporating an invalidly executed trust agreement, held evidence of a contract); Olive v. Biggs, 276 N. C. 445, 464-465. Cf.
The uncertainties concerning the effect, interpretation, and consequences of joint, mutual, or reciprocal wills are strong reason for strictly construing such instruments, in effect, as presumptively not intended to make or reflect a contract for a particular disposition of property. In the absence of explicit language compelling such a construction, simultaneously made wills with reciprocal provisions, we think, should not be interpreted as expressing a contractual obligation. [Note 10] Even if a contractual obligation in fact is intended in such circumstances as here appear, we are of opinion that the desired result is likely to be accomplished more clearly (and with more complete understanding by the parties) by the use of a carefully expressed trust instrument rather than by the use of wills.
The asserted agreement (at least apart from par. F, fn. 5, supra) is not one to make a devise at Edna's death or to make a will (see G. L. c. 259, Section 5, as appearing in St. 1965, c. 560, Section 1, and Section 5A, inserted by St. 1965, c. 560, Section 2), [Note 11] but is one to make the inter vivos dispositions which each will stipulates. See c. 259, Section 1.
The disposition in Edna's will, if it determined that a contract was intended, in terms is specific enough to constitute a memorandum. It is signed by Edna, the party to be charged. It states the terms of the "agreement" between her and Anthony, and indicates the consideration. It proposes inter vivos transfers of specifically described parcels. The statute of frauds thus can be satisfied by the writing contained in the will. See Herr Estate, 400 Pa. 90, 96; Corbin, Contracts, Section 509. See also Tzitzon Realty Co. Inc. v. Mustonen, 352 Mass. 648, 651-654; Potter v. Bland, 136 Cal. App. 2d 125, 129-132.
that any contract between the parties was based on an express or implied condition that the agreement be dependent upon the continuance of an amicable marriage relationship.
The agreement seems intrinsically a fair one. It was drawn by an attorney who seems to have tried to state clearly an integrated and binding contract. Even parol evidence, admitted without exception, cannot be employed to vary an integrated written agreement. See Gethins v. Breeyear, 252 Mass. 326, 327-328; Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 568. See also Frick Co. v. New England Insulation Co. 347 Mass. 461, 467; Pagliarulo v. National Shawmut Bank, 353 Mass. 449, 450. In the present case, however, the parol evidence was properly considered at least to disclose the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the wills and, to that extent, to assist in determining what the parties intended.
The judge's decision was based on meager subsidiary findings and was at best ambiguous. He concluded only that the instruments "in so far as it is . . . [a] question of fact . . . [from Edna's and the attorney's testimony] were wills, and as such . . . Edna . . . could revoke . . . [her] will at her pleasure" (emphasis supplied). Although he made subsidiary findings, which were consistent with parts of Edna's parol testimony, he did not address himself directly to the issue whether the parties intended to make, or had made, a contract. He also did not deal in explicit terms with whether the instruments stated or recorded an integrated agreement, which would preclude variation by parol evidence. He seems to have reached his conclusion solely on the basis that the instruments were wills and hence revocable, an issue not decisive of the case. Much more complete subsidiary findings and a more detailed statement of conclusions would have been appropriate.
2. The remaining question is whether these plaintiffs can maintain the present suit. This is in part a proceeding for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A. That chapter (see Section 9) is to be construed broadly. See Sun Oil Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 340 Mass. 235, 239; Norwell v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. 358 Mass. 575, 578. See also Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 346 Mass. 677, 684, fn. 6. Even if a plaintiff is not entitled to the particular relief sought, he is entitled to a binding declaration of rights under an agreement. See Hannan v. Enterprise Publishing Co. 341 Mass. 363, 365; Provident Coop. Bank v. James Talcott, Inc. 358 Mass. 180, 193.
may perhaps be sustained on the theory that a trust has been created in substance (see Henry F. Mitchell Co. v. Fitzgerald, 353 Mass. 318, 320-322) if not in form. See Rugo v. Rugo, 325 Mass. 612, 616. Cf. Young v. Young, 251 Mass. 218, 221.
We need not resolve these procedural problems in the present case. One plaintiff is the executor of Anthony, a party to the contract reflected in Edna's will. He may enforce Edna's obligation under the contract, as Anthony's personal representative. We think this plaintiff now should be allowed to amend the bill, to become also a party plaintiff in his capacity as executor. Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 418. See also Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 365.
3. The interlocutory decree overruling the demurrer is affirmed. The final decree is reversed. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further preliminary proceedings and a new trial in a manner consistent with this opinion.
[Note 1] Two plaintiffs are sons of Edna's late husband, Anthony A. Bettencourt, by his first marriage. One plaintiff is Anthony's son by Edna. The plaintiffs assert the right to bring the bill in behalf of another child, the daughter of Anthony and Edna, and of Edna's daughter (adopted by Anthony) of an earlier marriage, if these daughters should see fit to seek to be joined as plaintiffs.
[Note 2] This demurrer asserted (1) absence of grounds for relief in equity; (2) the statute of frauds, G. L. c. 259, Section 5A, and (3) absence of an enforceable right in the children to sue on a contract to which they were not parties and with respect to which no consideration moved from them.
[Note 3] Edna testified that "the divorce was denied" and a support order was issued.
[Note 4] In each of pars. B through E, inclusive, there appears a final sentence, substantially (apart from minor changes appropriate to the particular designated child or children) like the following language in par. B, viz.: "Promptly after the death of my husband, if I survive him, I will execute any deeds or other instruments necessary to convey the said property in fee to our said son and his issue by right of representation if he or any of his issue are then living." Some of the paragraphs refer also to personal property related to the real estate mentioned.
[Note 5] Another possibly relevant provision is par. F of Edna's will, which reads: "If I survive my husband, all the real and personal property which we owned jointly, including any of the properties described in paragraphs A through E above the grantees of which shall have predeceased me, shall belong to me absolutely as survivor to do with as I see fit. I give, devise and bequeath such part of said properties as I may still own at the time of my death, and also all other real or personal property which I may then own, or to which I may be entitled, or over which I may have any power of appointment, in equal shares to our then living children, Richard, Walter, Andreanna, Anthony and Rebecca, the issue of any deceased child to take by right of representation."
[Note 6] There was also introduced in evidence the transcript of parts of Anthony's testimony at the hearing of the divorce libel in which he replied to a question about the conversation among the lawyer, Edna, and himself: "Was anything said . . . that she could not revoke the will?" Answer: "No, there was nothing said about it, not a word."
[Note 7] See cases collected in Page, Wills (Bowe-Parker ed. and 1972 supp.) Sections 10.1 to 10.50; Powell, Real Property, pars. 962-963 (and 1971 supp.); Thompson, Wills (3d ed. and 1962 supp.) Section 16; Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.) Section 1093 (and 1972 supp.); Sparks, Contracts to Make Wills, 190-198; annotation, 169 A. L. R. 9, 23 et seq., 53 et seq.; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sections 680-736; 97 C. J. S., Wills, Sections 1364-1368. See also notes 16 Baylor L. Rev. 167; 20 id. 422. Such arrangements may be productive of litigation, tax uncertainties, and problems of proof and interpretation. See 1 Casner, Estate Planning (3d ed. and 1970 supp.) 71-73; Sparks, A. Draftsman's View of Joint and Mutual Wills, 4 Univ. of Miami Inst. on Estate Planning, c. 70-3; note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 675, 686; note, 39 B. U. L. Rev. 62, 64-71, 90-94.
[Note 8] Other cases include the following: Floerchinger v. Williams, 260 Iowa 53, 57-58 (statutory rule); Estate of Miller, 186 Kans. 87, 98. Some courts, by emphasis on the need for "clear evidence" of such an alleged agreement, indicate their reluctance to find a contractual obligation. See Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N. Y. 2d 385, 389-393; Ernest v. Pezoldt, 223 Ore. 97, 103-104; Rhode's Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 453-454; Pederson v. First Natl. Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 652-654 (but contract found to exist).
[Note 9] See also Bonczkowski v. Kucharski, 13 Ill. 2d 443, 451-455; Tontz v. Health, 20 Ill. 2d 286, 291-292; Rich v. Mottek, 11 N. Y. 2d 90, 93-94; Williams v. Chastain, 221 Ore. 69, 74-80 (contract limited to jointly held property); Herr Estate, 400 Pa. 90, 94-96; Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 344-348. Compare Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 799-802.
[Note 10] One authority has said of reciprocal wills, "Whatever their [the clients'] desires, it is up to the attorney to draft the appropriate documents in such a way as to leave no uncertainty as to what his clients' intentions were. . . . The client cannot be expected to understand the confusion created by the execution of joint and mutual wills. But the attorney should understand and . . . surround the will with sufficient evidence to facilitate proof of the facts involved." See Sparks, A Draftsman's View of Joint and Mutual Wills, 4 Univ. of Miami Inst. on Estate Planning, par. 70:309, p. 3-16. He should also be sure that his clients understand that (if a binding contract for a particular property disposition really is intended and effectively expressed) they will probably be precluded from effecting any different disposition without the assent of both parties, or after the death of one party, if the contract can be enforced.
[Note 11] See West v. Day Trust Co. 328 Mass. 381, 384-385; Foman v. Davis, 316 F. 2d 254, 255-257 (1st Cir.), both decided before the 1965 act amending Section 5 and inserting Section 5A. See also Newhall, Settlement of Estates (4th ed. and 1971 supp.) Section 334.
[Note 12] This testimony (admitted without exception) includes (1) the conflicting testimony of the attorney and of Edna concerning what advice the former gave to her and Anthony; (2) Edna's own testimony concerning her understanding of the effect of her will; and (3) the fact that the wills were executed in contemplation of a particular trip. Cf. Will of Lamerdin, 250 App. Div. (N. Y.) 133, 134-135.
[Note 13] Such issues may include (a) whether the parties intended to make a binding contract; (b) the duration of any such contract (e.g. until changed by mutual assent, or for a reasonable time, or for the period of the then proposed trip); (c) the terms of any such contract, and the extent to which the two wills constituted an integrated expression of such a contract; and (d) whether the parties entered into any such contract because of some mutual mistake. See DeVincent Ford Sales, Inc. v. First Mass. Corp. 336 Mass. 448, 451-453; Piea Realty Co. Inc. v. Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 248. See also Provident Coop. Bank v. James Talcott, Inc. 358 Mass. 180, 189-190. Cf. Scirpo v. McMillan, 355 Mass. 657, 660.
[Note 14] The soundness of any general rule preventing enforcement of such a third party beneficiary's rights has been doubted. See the text authorities just cited; and Boston & Maine R.R. v. Construction Mach. Corp. 346 Mass. 513, 521, fn. 5. See also Restatement 2d: Contracts (Tent. draft no. 3, April 18, 1967) Section 138.

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§ 3
Art. 6


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their parents can be fine, and most of their siblings are also fine. It's usually just one or two pups in a litter who are shy, or da dogs, not the entire litter, just one or two.
I think your comparing it to some of the human inborn disorders, like autism, is how i look at it most of the time too. It's a genetic anomaly, and although i don't know much about pitbulls, i see da as striking any breed, and i see da as a disorder, not a breed thing.
and certainly, the vast bulk of pitbulls are lovebugs, not da dogs.
THEY WEREN'T. cuz i think those dogs probably had 'normal' pitbull brains all along, so those dogs pretty easily defaulted back to their 'normal' brained behavior.
Yes, herding is on the DNA, too, although i doubt they've located the genes that control that behavior. But farmers have known for centuries, that if you want a herding dog, then mate up some dogs good at herding...even though the farmers had no idea what DNA even was.
Lots of dog behaviors ARE on the dog's dna, like the baying of the beagle, the urge to retrieve, breeds who point, chase prey independently, etc, etc.
and behaviors that ARE being neurobiologically driven, are just about impossible to rehab out. Oh, you can control a border collie herding, but, it's probably impossible to eradicate that urge to herd...cuz it is on his DNA.
DNA is one powerful thing, but, we can still help dogs become their best possible selves. I so admire your work with Veronica.
Here's a thread i wrote once, more for owners who are JUST NOW realizing their dog is a da dog, for beginners. Obviously, there's tons of ways to approach da dog rehab, but, this is what worked, and (what didn't), for Buddy.
OH, and yeah, i totally understand how ppl can be brought to feel shame their dog is a da dog. Mmmhm, i used to believe all the myths out there, too, that if only i showed leadership, if only *I* was calm enough, that if my dog is not "right" it's my fault<---cuz everyone "knows" that is true, etc etc, blah blah blah, then my dog would be "fine".
oh yeah, i know what you meant.
and i also think da dogs are not well understood, in general.
and yeah, the more i think about how wintertime reduces our dogs chances to keep practicing being calm while seeing other dogs, and how each spring sort of feels like starting alllllll over again almost from scratch............the more i wonder, if da dogs in say, the carribean, fare better with more ongoing success than snowy climate dogs!!
cuz those dogs won't get have that half of a year of not much work being done. hmm.
Cuz Buddy sure is more rusty at being calm around dogs each spring, cuz he doesn't see many unknown dogs in the winter.
Well, if it was Buddy, who i think sounds much worse than your Veronica, in several little ways, Buddy sounds worse than Veronica is. Veronica, probably through your very careful managment of her, seems to be on a different level than Buddy is, Buddy sounds worse. Almost as if like Buddy HAS crossed lines and deteriorated down, to a worse level than V is at.
I see what you mean, V is not quite like Buddy, i see the differences.
Maybe because as you said; before Buddy came to you he had the opportunity to get in fights. I think that to a certain extent trips the switch as in behavior that is enacted tends to be repeated; especially behavior that is self rewarding...and fighting with the hormonal and adrenaline dump I think can be a "rush" and can in a weird way be a self rewarding, almost addictive behavior.
That's why I think V. isn't DA...yet; and why I think she reacted so badly and so long to that one incident of having a dog snark at her and scrape her snout.
I think, to use an anology; that for V. fighting would be like doing crack. Right now she doesn't really know much about it; she's never experienced it and because it's an unknown it can even seem a little scary at times. However if ever she experienced it and felt the rush of the adrenaline dump and understood it not as an amorphous possibility that she didn't quite get but a sequence of behaviors she had previously enacted...then I tend to think it would become a self rewarding behavior chain that would be much harder to manage - at least for her; although it sounds as if you have done amazing work with Buddy and that his behaviors are or have been much more "serious" and intent driven than are V.'s.
I just wanted to cry reading about the conditions that Buddy was raised in. Thank God he found his way to you!!!
but Buddy LOVES rude, in-your-face dogs, any dog who goes nose-to-nose with Buddy is good chance Buddy will like them. Instantly.
buddy totally respects all alpha dogs, the true alpha dogs, buddy is so good.
I wonder if Buddy would like Veronica? Not a true alpha; but I wonder how he would feel about a "Princess and the pea, drama-Queen, Diva, Biatch, alpha wanna be"?
and Buddy dislikes almost all puppies immediately, and seems disgusted that puppies are allowed to live. but, he doesn't attack puppies, but, will bark loudly at the puppy, and then walk away in disgust, like, "get off my lawn, you kids."
Funny you should say that about puppies. Veronica once managed to get a puppy annoyed at her. We were in training class and someone brought in this cute little pit bull pup they had pulled from the shelter and were going to foster/adopt. So I let V. say "hi" thinking all dogs get along with puppies.
So V. does her usual rude, pushy, intrusive sniffing and poking like the puppy is a day old bit of something found on the sidewalk; only the puppy gets pissed and starts barking at her. So then not to out done, V. spazes and starts barking at the puppy like...the loud mouth she is in the video. So I thought that's my dog; can't even get along with a puppy!
oh yeah, i see what you mean, your lil princess is pretty hepped up there, pretty "in your face", i think Buddy might like her, or, her barkiness might get Buddy TOO excited as well. I guess there can be more than one kind of "in your face" cuz there is less-barky form of "in-your-face", as well, which is a big huge favorite of Buddy. Buddy rather loves dogs who are more quietly rude, that kind of dog that, seem like a "big dumb guy with no manners" type?
V's bark just sounds "I"m so so so excited" not aggressive, to me, anyway. She is cute, i know, we 'should be' all focused on she is TOO excited, but, dawg, she is cute, so so excited her lil doggie brain is exploding "it's my friend! i am so excited i can't stand it" too cute.
IS V HARD TO TIRE OUT?
but wow, does he try to fake it with unknown dogs, goes all gangster.
Sometimes Bud is fairly calm while greeting his friends, othertimes, he will jump around a bit, or do laps. Buddy thinks chasing his friends is big fun, and does sometimes try to get everyone to do laps with him. but sometimes, buddy is very calm, laid back, acts very mature.
guess it depends on which pal he is saying "hi" to, and where they are, and whether or not Buddy is on-leash, or off-leash..oh, and how long it's been since Bud has greeted any of his pals.
How Veronica just greeted her bf, does look like how Cooper across the street greets Buddy, though. (cooper is high energy schnauzer, not a da dog at all).
if i could help Buddy bring that whole "get off my lawn" grouchy old man routine down a notch, or, if Buddy would be unable to generalize learning to be a gentleman around pups....guess i'll never know. It's one thing to "correct" a rude pup, but my dog will yell at a baby dog who is only barely moving. My dog does not often get to meet pups, anyway, as i know Buddy yells at puppies, so i prevent it as often as i can.
But, i'm pleased that Buddy WILL walk away from puppies, on his own. but, i'd never trust him 100% around a puppy for any length of time...nope, not Buddy.
as if embarrassed he "went too far" or something. but Buddy doesn't much kiss anyone at all, or maybe only once.
not unless you ask him to. "Kisses?" is his cue for that, his daddy taught him that one. Still, it's one(1) kiss, and then he looks down again.
but tends to look away if you look back at him very long, but, Buddy isn't that kissy, come to think of it, and mostly ONLY kisses us, his family. If we are sitting down, sometimes Buddy comes over and tends to put his head down, and slightly presses his top of his head into you, which seems very sweet to me . Buddy is a generally respectful dog, and is not one of those pants-sniffers, either, yay! And once a guest has been greeted, he sits or lies down and doesn't "stay" all super stoked the entire time.
Buddy never pesters ppl, either, and hardly ever pesters his dog pals, either.
Buddy is a generally serious type of personality, he often seems to be going for the "dignified" type of persona, lol. He is not above giving "i can not belieeeeeeeeeve you did that" type of looks if someone acts stupid, and i think, if he were human, he'd be the dry, sarcastic type who roll their eyes a lot.
He can be goofy, but, when he is goofy, which is so funny when he is goofy, and sometimes he seems embarrassed about it later. and he is energetic, too, oh yeah.
but Buddy may have been a parole officer or maybe a mortgage officer in a previous life.
but, still has his "YES, LET'S PLAY" side.
and back in, as if the teddybear is real.
and there is Buddy, off leash, about 20 feet away.
and i got Buddy to sit and even smile at other dog who walked by. Totally relaxed, with very very little effort on my part.
but, a year ago, Buddy lost his mind that that dog exists, even seeing that dog used to set Buddy off.
I think, if i saw that dog more often, and if i had chance, i bet that is a dog that Buddy could make friends with.
but geez, it's only taken a year.
even off leash, i can almost always, always, get Buddy to freeze where he is, and wait to be leashed up. not for bunnies, though, but, for other dogs, yes.
even unknown dogs, i can get Buddy to stop and wait for his leash to be put on.
now, that is if other dog is just unexpectedly, suddenly, just right in his face, like around a corner, and dog is right there close in his face, nope, would not risk it!!!!!! nope, i'm not sure what Buddy might do even nowadays in that situation, so i would never ever risk going around a corner off leash.
or even in his street, it's a super low risk that buddy would not stop for and wait for me to leash him.
I can't even remember last time Buddy did not wait for me to leash him upon seeing an unknown dog coming along....it's been a long long long long time.
but not for bunnies, so cuz of bunnies, Buddy is rarely off leash now on his walks.
That Veronica strikes me as one lil energetic dog, too!!
I also think V. is just excited and not at all aggressive, This is why I say I consider her reactive not DA. This is typical V. She get SOOOOOO EXCITED, SOOOOO easily by certain things; dogs being one of them but not by any means the only thing.
1. With strange dogs, I think they react like, "Whoa Nelly, please give me some space, back off a bit". And then V. because she is soooo amped up, and doesn't have good social skills and doesn't know what to do or how to interact then...takes it as a threat, or an offensive move, or as an insult...and she gets verbally pissy in return. But when she gets verbal and gets to the snarling stage...it sounds (I think) way worse than it necessarily is...but her snarl will definitely turn heads and clear a room...and that is what I don't want to happen. I don't want her having an opportunity to engage in that behavior as that will strengthen it and make it more likely to occur; and I don't want her out in public contributing to the negative stereoptype of her breed by sounding like a "vicious dog"...so I think it best that she just not interact with dogs (unless of course they were known and we knew the owners well).
Then the thing about not even being able to play off leash with a dog she does know well....I think it's connected to her level of reactivity/excitement. Think 2 little boys playing cowboys and Indians: 1 accidentally hurts the other in play. The one that was hurt gets a little angry, a little more amped up, a litte more aggressive and now he unintententionally hurts his friend in play...and then it goes back and forth; stimulation and aggravation levels rising - until you have a real fight.
Brenda Aloff the trainer who I love; talks about "play aggression" in her book. She says "These dogs begin inteacting with others by exhibiting play behaviors. However, once a certain threshold of stimulation is exceeded, the dog's behavior begins to excalate rapidly into intense threatening actions. Play stimulates the dog to the extent that she becomes over-aroused given the context, she will begin to display threat behavior or snap and bite the other dog, ignoring clear signals from the other dog that would normally truncate the play."
THAT is how I see V. Discussing it with you helped me put into words and clarify my assessment that she reactive vs. DA; and explain how the issue of intent comes into play. I don't think V. ever starts off intending aggression, but I think she can too easily get worked up to it.
I've never let it play out to say for certain she would escalate to biting; but when she is playing onleash with her boyfriend and we hear that snarl...time out, cool down; can't say exactly where it's going, but it's definitely not going anywhere pleasant!
I think it's sort of sad really; and I feel bad for her - because I really think she wants to interact with other dogs.
In the past when I have tried she also throws out all sorts of submissive signals...crawling towards the other dog, head up to lick it's mouth, rolling over exposing her belly...it's just that once she gets in close enough, she reverts to POKE, POKE, SNIFF, NUDGE, SHOVE and the next thing you she's standing stiff in a dominating position, her hackles are up and there's going to be an explosion.
To answer your question about her energy level... at the thought of V. being energetic. She is the LAZIEST dog on the planet. She is so lazy it is SINFUL. She can't keep up with me, and I am 46 and hardly a dynamo. I could tell you stories forever about the extent of her supreme and shocking laziness. However she is reactive and if something that she reacts to crosses her path she goes from 1 to 60 in under a second; and then of course, it takes a while to calm down from the adrenaline dump.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.