1. This matter involves financial fraud that occurred at EA Engineering, Science, and Technology, Inc. ("EA Engineering"), which at the time was a Delaware corporation primarily engaged in the business of energy, environmental, and health and safety consulting. During EA Engineering's fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, in order to conceal project contract losses, defendant Stephen R. Becker committed fraudulent acts by, among other things, intentionally recording fictitious revenue on the books of EA Engineering in the form of false unbilled receivables. As a result, for its quarter ended May 31, 1999, unbilled accounts receivable reported to investors by EA Engineering was overstated by $1.4 million and, for its fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, unbilled accounts receivable reported to investors by EA Engineering was overstated by $1.5 million. In addition, the pre-tax loss reported to investors for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, was understated by $93,000.
2. By virtue of the acts alleged herein, Becker, among other things, violated, or aided and abetted violations of, statutes and rules prohibiting fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, requiring that financial information be accurately reported by public companies to the Commission and to investors, and requiring maintenance of accurate books and records by public companies.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 21(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) and (e)].
4. Becker, directly or indirectly, made use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, of the mails, or of the facilities of a national securities exchange in connection with the acts, practices, and courses of conduct alleged herein.
5. Stephen R. Becker, age 38, was EA Engineering's Regional Controller for its Baltimore Branch from 1997 to October 1999, when he left the company. He resides in Timonium, Maryland.
6. EA Engineering was a Delaware corporation with its principal executive offices in Hunt Valley, Maryland. At the time of the violative conduct discussed herein, EA Engineering's common stock was registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and traded on the NASDAQ National Market System. The company's fiscal year-end was August 31. In September 2001, EA Engineering was taken private pursuant to a management-led tender offer. Accordingly, EA Engineering is no longer a public company.
7. During EA Engineering's fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, the defendant, Stephen R. Becker, concealed project contract losses from EA Engineering managers who had emphasized the importance of the company making its projected earnings.
8. Becker hid the losses by recording fictitious revenue in the form of false unbilled receivables of $1,469,000 to offset additional costs associated with the losses, and he assigned the fictitious revenue to other projects, most of which were inactive. For example, for the quarter ended May 31, 1999, Becker made a non-recurring journal entry on June 6, 1999, adding $19,497 in revenue to a project that had been inactive since fiscal year 1996. As a result of Becker's entries, the projects with additional, fictitious revenue, in the aggregate, off-set the problem projects that had "excessive" costs. To conceal his actions, Becker at times split the fictitious revenue into smaller amounts and periodically moved it among various projects to kept the projects' unbilled receivables from aging. In addition to making such entries, Becker overrode the company's contract accounting system so that the inactive projects would not be billed.
9. As a result of Becker's actions, EA Engineering overstated its unbilled accounts receivable at the end of its quarter ended May 31, 1999, by $1,408,800, and at the end of its fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, by $1,469,000. Also as a result of his actions, it understated its loss before income taxes by $93,000 for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1999.
10. As a result of the fraudulent acts set forth herein, EA Engineering filed with the Commission and released to the public a false and misleading quarterly report on Form 10-Q for its quarter ended May 31, 1999, and a false and misleading annual report on Form 10-K for its fiscal year ended August 31, 1999. The quarterly report included financial statements that materially misrepresented the company's unbilled accounts receivable. The annual report included financial statements that materially misrepresented the company's unbilled accounts receivable and its loss before income taxes.
11. On February 4, 2000, the company announced that management had discovered accounting irregularities related to unbilled revenue and that the irregularities would cause the company to restate earnings for prior years. On June 15, 2000, EA Engineering announced that it had restated its fiscal year 1999 financial statements. The restated 1999 financial statements reduced the company's unbilled accounts receivable for its quarter ending May 31, 1999, by $1,408,800, and its unbilled accounts receivable for its fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, by $1,469,000. The restated 1999 financial statements also increased the company's loss before income taxes for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1999, by $93,000.
12. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 11 above.
13. The Exchange Act prohibits use of a manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
14. By reason of the foregoing, Becker, directly and indirectly, violated, and unless restrained will violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5].
15. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 11 above.
16. The Exchange Act and rules promulgated thereunder require every issuer of a registered security to file reports with the Commission which accurately reflect the issuer's financial performance and provide other information to the public.
17. By reason of the foregoing, Becker aided and abetted violations, and unless restrained will continue to aid and abet violations, of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].
18. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 11 above.
19. The Exchange Act requires each issuer of registered securities to make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.
20. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 prohibits the falsification of any book, record, or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act.
21. By reason of the foregoing, Becker aided and abetted violations, and unless restrained will continue to aid and abet violations, of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)].
22. By reason of the foregoing, Becker, directly and indirectly, violated, and unless restrained will violate, Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1].
Permanently restrain and enjoin Becker, and his officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him, and each of them, from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)], and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5 and 13b2-1 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 and 240.13b2-1], and from aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and 78m(b)(2)(A)], and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].
Order the defendant to pay a civil penalty under Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].
Grant such other relief as this Court may deem just and appropriate.


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Jay Lefkowitz is a senior litigation partner at Kirkland. He is also an adjunct professor at Columbia Law School, where he teaches a seminar on Supreme Court advocacy. Jay has served as lead trial and appellate counsel in a wide variety of substantive areas, including shareholder disputes, antitrust, product liability, litigation against the FDA and False Claims Act matters. He has also conducted numerous internal investigations for public companies and audit committees.
In its 2013 release of “The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America,” The National Law Journal describes Jay as “a leading voice on school choice issues” and “a no-nonsense appellate and antitrust lawyer for an array of blue-chip clients.” The Legal 500 U.S. noted that Jay “provides a depth of understanding and influence in some of the highest courts of our country,” and in Chambers USA, America’s Leading Lawyers for Business, clients say, “‘Jay is brilliant; there is no other way to put it.’” Jay was also named a Law360 “MVP of the Year” in 2011 for his Appellate practice, and in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 for his Life Sciences work. Jay is one of only three of the 189 MVPs named to the list five years in a row. The American Lawyer named him its “Lawyer of the Week” in December 2012 for his role in winning an antitrust lawsuit in the pharmaceutical industry.
Jay takes on groundbreaking work for high-profile clients, representing more than a dozen major pharmaceutical, medical device and health care companies in important and frequently precedent-setting matters. Jay has won two landmark 5-4 decisions at the U.S. Supreme Court in favor of the pharmaceutical industry overturning the decision of three Circuit Courts of Appeal. In Pliva v. Mensing in 2011, on behalf of Teva and Actavis, Jay convinced the Court to reject the views of the FDA and the Solicitor General and establish that generic drug companies may no longer be sued for “failure to warn claims,” finding that federal law preempts state law under the Constitution’s supremacy clause. His victory in Mutual v. Bartlett in 2013, overturned a $21 million verdict on behalf of Sun Pharmaceuticals, and extended the Mensing ruling to cover design defect claims.
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Sebelius et al.
Jay currently serves on Advisory Boards for many organizations, including Columbia Law School, NYU Alexander Hamilton Center and Barnard College, and his public service career includes serving as a senior White House advisor to two presidents, and as United States Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea.
Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., et al.
Represented Upsher-Smith Laboratories in a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court regarding antitrust challenges to Upsher-Smith’s patent settlement regarding the drug K-Dur. This case highlighted the circuit split regarding whether patent litigation settlements — so-called “reverse payment” cases — violate antitrust laws, and argued that the Third Circuit applied an incorrect legal standard in holding that such settlements were presumptively unlawful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in June 2013, vacated the Third Circuit decision, and remanded the case to be adjudicated in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the companion case, FTC v. Actavis.
Represented Mutual Pharmaceutical Company in a successful appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court in a preemption case. The Court’s decision overturned a $21 million products-liability verdict, and held that conflict preemption cannot be avoided by asserting that the defendant should not have sold its product. The Court’s decision not only extends Kirkland’s prior win for the generic industry in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, but shields manufacturers of all products from what potentially was the single greatest threat to conflict preemption that the Supreme Court has ever considered.
Sincoskie v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al.; Yamane v. Wyeth, Inc.; Wiley v. Wyeth, Inc.
Represented Baxter Healthcare in three products liability victories in state courts in New Jersey, Hawaii and Alabama. In each case, Baxter argued that because federal law requires generic drug labeling and design to be “the same as” the labeling and design of the corresponding brand-name drug, any and all state-law tort claims that seek to hold generic drug manufacturers liable for failing to unilaterally alter their product warnings or design are preempted under the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Pliva v. Mensing.
Represented Teva, Abbott, and 20 other Pharmaceutical companies in a False Claims Act case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The relator plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Act by causing Medicaid to reimburse the companies for unapproved drugs, vitamins and dietary supplements that were not Medicaid eligible and sought more than $2 billion in total damages. The court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, adopting the argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
PLIVA, Inc. et al. v. Mensing et al.
Represented Teva before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a case that alleged that Teva could be held liable under Florida law for negligently failing to communicate its labeling changes directly to health care professionals. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument on both federal and state law grounds.
Represents Teva and several other pharmaceutical companies in appeals pending throughout the nation in product liability cases. All these appeals raise preemption issues that are related to the Supreme Court’s decision in PLIVA v. Mensing. Already on Jay’s docket for the coming year are appeals in the Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits, as well as the Pennsylvania and California Supreme courts.
Represents Abbott Laboratories in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a case involving a Texas statute that provides drug manufacturers with a rebuttable presumption that FDA-approved drug warnings are adequate in products liability actions.
Lesh, MD, et al v. eV3 Inc.
Represented the former shareholders of Appriva Medical, Inc. in a securities case convincing a jury in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware to award approximately $250 million in damages as a result of eV3 Inc.’s breach of the parties’ 2002 merger agreement. Initially filed in 2005, Kirkland took the lead of this litigation in 2009.
Buettgen, et al. v. Harless, et al.
Represented SuperMedia Inc. (f.k.a. Idearc Inc.) in a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that the defendant misrepresented its bad debt expense with fraudulent intent and thereby caused investors to suffer hundreds of millions of dollars in losses. In June 2013, on the eve of trial and after failed attempts at mediation, the parties reached a settlement.
Represented a German company against a suit brought by several hedge funds and Merrill Lynch International claiming that the company breached the terms of a “Payment-in-Kind” loan. The plaintiffs also sued the directors of the company on an alter ego liability theory and bringing additional claims for intentional and constructive fraudulent conveyances. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in 2010. Plaintiffs appealed to the New York Supreme Court but the parties reached a settlement and the appeal was voluntarily dismissed in June 2011.
Represented three individual directors of Loral Space & Communications, Inc., including its CEO, in a derivative suit and a shareholder class action case arising from a $300 million financing transaction between Loral and its controlling shareholder. The lawsuits, filed in Delaware Chancery Court, alleged that the Loral directors had breached their fiduciary duties by giving the controlling shareholder a preferential deal. After a one-week trial in March 2008, the court did not find that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties and refused to impose liability.
Randy Kopp, et al. v. Klein, et al.; Bruce Fulmer, et al. v. Klein, et al.
Represented Idearc (now, Supermedia, Inc.) and its former ERISA plan fiduciaries defending against an ERISA class action alleging that it was imprudent for Company ERISA plans to hold Idearc stock. In March 2012, the Northern District of Texas granted Idearc’s motion to dismiss all claims. Affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in July 2013.
Straily v. UBS Financial Services Inc.
Represented UBS in a successful defense of an action brought in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in which the court granted summary judgment in favor of UBS in a putative class action seeking more than $650 million in damages on behalf of the class. The suit alleged that UBS had breached fiduciary duties and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it implemented a new program under which uninvested cash, which had previously been automatically swept from customers’ brokerage accounts to UBS money market funds, was swept instead into FDIC-insured deposit accounts at a UBS affiliate, UBS Bank USA.
Represented Tenet Healthcare Corporation and certain current and former officers and directors in a formal SEC investigation concerning whether Tenet’s public disclosures of Medicare outlier and stop-loss payments under managed care contracts were misleading or otherwise inadequate, as well as whether certain former and current Tenet officers and directors engaged in insider trading. The matter was settled for a small financial penalty with no imposition of a monitor.
Conducted an internal investigation of a NASDAQ-listed broker-dealer that was the subject of an SEC fraud investigation. Kirkland interviewed numerous witnesses here and throughout Europe and made numerous findings and recommendations regarding the company’s sales practices, accounting practices, public disclosures, financial controls, records retention practices and personnel decisions. Kirkland worked with and appeared before the SEC, the DOJ, the NASD and the NASDAQ Listing Qualifications Panel.
Represented a New York-based hedge fund and its principal in connection with a SEC investigation of the fund’s short trading related to its investments in PIPEs (Private Investments in Public Equity). The fund had been one of the largest investors in PIPEs, with several hundred transactions. After a two-year investigation involving testimony and expert analysis, in June 2008, the SEC agreed to close its investigation without bringing any charges against any of the parties involved.
Defended UBS in a putative class action alleging that the firm’s prime brokerage unit violated antitrust laws by fixing prices for the interest charged on short sales, particularly naked short sales. The successful defense was upheld on appeal.
Represents several foreign entities in relation to the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. These representations have included filing claims on each client’s behalf, objecting to claim determinations and responding to document subpoenas.
Represents BioScrip, Inc. in connection with the company’s 19 percent stock drop case following the company’s announcement of a government investigation initiated by Department of Justice and the New York Attorney General’s Medicaid Control Fraud Unit.
Represents a major investment bank in several cases nationwide challenging the client’s prime brokerage practices and interest charges on naked short sales under California law.
Represents Herald Fund SPC in an adversary proceeding brought by the Trustee overseeing the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The lawsuit seeks avoidance of more than $550 million in alleged preferences and fraudulent conveyances. After the Fund filed a motion to dismiss all claims, the Trustee voluntarily dismissed nearly half of his claims against the Fund.
Represented Teva in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in a Sherman Act case arising out of a patent litigation settlement between Teva and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). The plaintiffs alleged that, through the litigation settlement, Teva and GSK conspired to delay the marketing of Teva’s generic version (Lamotrigine) of GSK’s branded epilepsy drug Lamictal®. The Court granted a motion to dismiss all claims.
Represented Teva in a multi-district nationwide consumer fraud class action brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Schiller, J.) by more than 2.1 million putative class members seeking more than $12 billion in damages. While our motion for summary judgment and opposition to class certification was pending, the plaintiffs agreed at mediation to settle on a class wide basis; under the settlement, Teva paid no cash compensation to any class members and reimbursed the plaintiffs’ counsel for $2.25 million of its $8 million in fees and expenses (an amount matched by Teva’s co-defendant). Final settlement was approved over objections that it was too favorable to the defendant.
Represented Teva in a case in Southern Nevada (D. Nev. 2011) (Mahon, J.), in which more than 3,000 individual consumers brought separate actions in Nevada state court against Kirkland clients asserting product liability, breach of warranty and infliction of emotional distress claims. Plaintiffs moved in state court to have the individual cases consolidated for a single trial, and Kirkland removed the claims to federal court as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act. After Kirkland successfully defeated the subsequent motion to remand the cases to state court, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of the cases (for zero dollars).
Represented business partners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Impax Laboratories, Inc. in two cases challenging FDA’s approval of Impax’s generic version of Wellbutrin XL antidepressant. In those cases, brand manufacturer Biovail alleged first that the FDA could not approve Impax’s generic version of Wellbutrin XL because Impax’s approved product labeling would have been misleading, and second, that FDA approval of Impax’s ANDA was in any event blocked by a 30-month regulatory stay of approval based on Biovail’s filing of a patent infringement lawsuit against another strength of the product. In the first case, Jay intervened on behalf of Teva and Impax and persuaded the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to reject Biovail’s challenges in both TRO and preliminary injunction proceedings. In the latter case, Jay argued for Teva and Impax in emergency TRO proceedings, successfully obtaining an oral ruling from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland holding that FDA’s approval was not blocked by the 30-month stay.
Represented Teva, as national counsel, in a products liability litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas relating to Teva’s generic version (Budeprion) of the antidepressant drug, Wellbutrin. This particular matter involved allegations that ingestion of Teva’s Budeprion product during pregnancy resulted in heart defects and other injuries to a minor child. While Teva's motion to dismiss was pending, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Sebelius et al.
Represented Teva and Cephalon in a case which involved the 180-day marketing exclusivity provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Kirkland successfully convinced the FDA to depart from its “shared exclusivity” policy and award the sole exclusivity. When Mylan — with support from the Federal Trade Commission — sued to overturn the FDA’s decision, Kirkland convinced the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to uphold the FDA’s decision.
Ranbaxy Labs & Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, et al.
Represented Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. in a dispute with the FDA and argued that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied IVAX Pharmaceuticals (since acquired by Teva) 180 days of marketing exclusivity for its generic version of Merck’s blockbuster drug Zocor following Merck’s request to remove the patents claiming Zocor from the FDA’s Orange Book list of patents. The D.C. Circuit held that the agency’s conduct violated the plain language of the Hatch-Waxman Act and was fundamentally inconsistent with the Act’s incentive scheme.
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Represented Ivax Pharmaceuticals in federal district court in California in a case where the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act to preclude marketing forms of a “DESI” drug, Quinine, that had not received formal FDA approval. We successfully fended off the preliminary injunction because we demonstrated that the plaintiff had not shown likelihood of consumer confusion.
Apotex, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, et al.
Represented Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. in its fight against the FDA over the exclusive rights to sell a generic form of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.’s Pravachol cholesterol drug. The FDA had ruled that a stipulated dismissal of a lawsuit between Bristol-Myers Squibb and Apotex had triggered Teva’s six months of exclusivity. Following argument, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia reversed the FDA, instead ruling that a stipulated dismissal is not a “decision of a court” or a “holding” as required by the Act and granted judgment and injunctive relief to Teva. FDA appealed that decision to the D.C. Circuit, which vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the matter to FDA for reconsideration in light of the district court’s analysis. On remand, FDA fully adopted the district court’s position and awarded Teva exclusivity. When another applicant challenged FDA’s post-remand award of exclusivity, Jay successfully defended the agency’s decision in both the district court and D.C. Circuit.
Represents Barr and Teva against claims under the Sherman Act alleging that several generic manufacturers conspired to keep a generic version (modafinil) of the narcolepsy drug Provigil off the market. The case is pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Fenwick et al. v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.
Represents Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Inc. and certain of its affiliates in connection with allegations of consumer fraud and other similar claims arising out of Ranbaxy’s recall of generic atorvastatin tablets. The case was filed on November 29, 2012.
Represents as lead counsel in seven national antitrust cases challenging patent settlements following the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision involving well known drugs such as Lipitor (Ranbaxy), Provigil (Teva), Cipro (Teva), Solydyn (Ranbaxy), Nexium (Teva), and Niaspan (Teva). The cases are in various stages of discovery with one set for trial in early 2014.
Represents Barr Pharmaceuticals in a California class action alleging that Barr and Bayer Corporation colluded to delay the entry of a lower-priced generic version of the antibiotic Cipro®. Kirkland previously defeated federal antitrust challenges to the Bayer-Barr agreement in a parallel action. In the California action, Kirkland won summary judgment on all claims and argued a winning appeal before the California Court of Appeal in this 10-year-long litigation. Plaintiffs then appealed to the California Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the matter in February 2012. The case was stayed pending the outcome of FTC v. Actavis, an unrelated case with similar legal issues. Following the ruling in Actavis, the plaintiffs asked the California Supreme Court to put their appeal on hold in light of a possible settlement agreement. The plaintiffs’ case against Barr and several other generics companies will continue.
Represents Akorn, Inc., which was sued by drug manufacturer Fera in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a case involving allegations of breach of a commercial supply contract, fraud and trade secret theft. The case is in discovery.
Represents Medicis in a case in which the plaintiff asserts that she was injured when injected with Medicis’ Restylane Class III device. A motion to dismiss on federal preemption and insufficient pleading grounds is pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina.
Represents Teva in a case before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in which the plaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of both manufacturing and design defects in a Paragard® Intrauterine device.
Avantor Performance Materials v. IBM Corp.
Represented IBM when disgruntled customer, Avantor, alleged that IBM fraudulently induced it into an enterprise resource planning/inventory management contract and then breached that contract by providing a flawed product. After convincing the court to stay discovery subject to resolution of IBM’s dismissal challenge, the parties agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice in June 2013.
Chicago Teachers Union v. K12, Inc. and Chicago Virtual Charter School, et al.
Represented K12, Inc. and Chicago Virtual Charter School (CVCS) in a suit brought against CVCS by the Chicago Teachers Union. The union alleged that the virtual nature of CVCS’ educational model violated the Illinois Charter Schools Law’s requirement that charter schools be “non-home based.” The court ruled in favor of K12 and CVCS and granted summary judgment.
Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.
Represented Tenet Healthcare in a case brought by Boca Raton Community Hospital on behalf of a purported nationwide class of hospitals. The plaintiff brought claims in federal court in Miami under the federal RICO statute and California’s unfair competition law alleging that Tenet hospitals, through their charging practices, received “too many” outlier payments from Medicare, and thereby “stole” outlier payments from the plaintiff and other hospitals. Prevailed at class certification stage, won summary judgment, and then upheld the decision at the 11th Circuit.
Represented General Motors in more than one dozen product liability lawsuits nationwide; represented General Motors in several evidentiary proceedings in which plaintiffs sought exceptions to GM’s attorney-client and/or work product privileges under the crime-fraud doctrine; successfully brought mandamus petitions in a variety of federal courts to reverse district court decisions; and led a successful effort to have a plaintiff’s attorney sanctioned with a personal contempt citation for $190,000 for violation of a court order.
Trial counsel for General Motors in a highly publicized case in state court arising out of one of the worst automobile accidents in New York City history. The 24 plaintiffs included six decedents and others with significant brain injuries, burns and loss of limbs. Defect allegation related to the lack of a brake-transmission shift interlock in all GM 1980s vehicles. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. Favorable settlement reached after six weeks of trial.
Serrano v. Cablevison Systems Corp. and CSC Holdings, Inc.
Represented Cablevision in a case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in which the plaintiffs filed a putative consumer class action asserting seven causes of action: (1)-(3) violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; (4) violation of the New York Deceptive Sales Practices Act; (5) violation of the New Jersey Deceptive Sales Practices Act; (6) fraud; and (7) unjust enrichment. In February 2012, the district court adopted all of Cablevision’s arguments and granted summary judgment. The matter is now on appeal to the Second Circuit.
Represented Loral in a suit brought by its insurance company seeking declaratory judgment that there was no insurance coverage for a $19 million fee award granted to plaintiffs’ counsel in underlying litigation. The parties brought cross motions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument, the court ruled that under the plain language of the insurance policy there was clear coverage for the $19 million fee award and granted Loral’s summary judgment motion.
Represented two non-profit institutions in New York State in connection with regulatory inquiries related to losses due to Madoff-related investments. Conducted internal investigations and coordinated revision of internal corporate controls and bylaws. Made presentations to regulators.
Represented Fortune 50 Company in connection with SEC investigation into allegations of earnings smoothing. Interviewed dozens of employees and executives and made presentations to regulators.
Represented Fortune 100 Corporation in connection with DOJ and SEC investigations into allegations of fraudulent accounting practices. Developed protocol for internal investigations. Conducted hundreds of interviews of employees and executives and made presentations to regulators.
United States of America v. Jeffrey Stein, et al.
Defended an investment manager in what has been described as the largest criminal tax fraud prosecution in United States history. The client was charged with 17 co-defendants in a wide ranging conspiracy to evade taxes and defraud the IRS through allegedly abusive tax shelters in the Southern District of New York. The indictment charges that the defendants — most of whom were employees of KPMG — developed sham tax shelter transactions and marketed them to hundreds of wealthy individuals, evading roughly $11 billion in taxes.
Represented the State of Wisconsin at the Wisconsin Supreme Court and later the United States Supreme Court in its successful litigation to become the first state in the country to implement a school voucher program.
Defended the Adat Shalom Reconstructionist Congregation in a lawsuit brought by residential owners in the town of Carderock, Maryland challenging the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, arguing that it amounted to an impermissible endorsement of religion within areas zoned for single-family residential use. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Jay was recognized by The Best Lawyers in America for Product Liability Litigation - Defendants in 2019.
In 2019, Jay has been recognized by Benchmark Litigation as a Local Litigation Star and National Practice Area Star for Antitrust; Appellate; General Commercial; Product Liability; Securities. Benchmark Litigation recognized Jay as one of the “Top 100 Trial Lawyers in America” for 2015 and 2016. The list features attorneys known for their trial acumen and is developed after three years of research with peers and clients.
Jay was named one of “The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America” in 2013 by The National Law Journal and is honored for his pro bono work for the education reform movement under California’s “parent trigger” law.
For four years in a row, Jay was named “Life Sciences MVP” by Law360 in December 2012, November 2013, December 2014, and November 2015.
From 2012–2015, Jay has been recognized by The Legal 500 U.S. for his work in Product Liability and Mass Tort Defense: Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices. He was also recognized for Supreme Court and Appellate Litigation in 2012 and 2013; and was recognized for his work in Commercial Litigation, Product Liability and Mass Tort Defense: Toxic Tort, Trade Secrets and M&A Litigation Defense in 2015.
Jay has been recognized in New York Super Lawyers every year since 2011.
Jay was named “Litigator of the Week,” The Am Law Litigation Daily, December 2012.
In 2011, Jay was named "Appellate MVP,” Law360, November 2011.
In 2019, Jay was honored with the Judge Joseph M. Proskauer Award from the UJA-Federation of New York.
In 2010, Jay was honored with the Gershom Mendes Seixas Award from Columbia/Barnard Hillel.
In 2004, Jay received the Public Service Award from the Orthodox Union, and also represented the U.S. at the International Conference on Anti-Semitism in Berlin, Germany.
In 1990, Jay served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Switzerland.

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Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc.
This case, concerning alleged Wage and Hour violations under the FLSA and the DCWPCL was before the Court on two issues: (1) whether defendant Roberto Donna (“Donna”) was personally liable for minimum wage and overtime violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”); and (2) damages, if any, as to the corporate defendants. The Court held that Donna was personally liable for such violations, but deferred on the remaining issues.
“The Court concludes that Donna is personally liable under the FLSA and DCWPCL for minimum wage, overtime, and equal pay violations because he is an employer under both the FLSA and DCWPCL. To be liable for violations of the FLSA, the defendant must be an “employer.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2010). The FLSA defines “employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S .C. § 203(d). This definition is broadly construed to serve the remedial purposes of the act. Morrison v. Int’l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10 (D.C.Cir.2001). Thus, courts look to the “economic reality” rather than technical common law concepts of agency to determine whether a defendant is an employer. Id. at 11; see also Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir.1983).
In applying the economic reality test, the Court considers “the totality of the circumstances of the relationship between the plaintiff/employee and defendant/employer to determine whether the putative employer has the power to hire and fire, supervise and control work schedules or conditions of employment, determine rate and method of pay, and maintain employment records.” Del Villar v. Flynn Architectural Finishes, 664 F.Supp.2d 94, 96 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Morrison, 253 F.3d at 11). This test may show that more than one “employer” is liable for violations of the FLSA. Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enterprises, Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir.1995). As a result, a corporate officer may qualify as an employer along with the corporation under the FLSA if the officer has operational control of a corporation’s covered enterprise. Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511. To determine whether a corporate officer has operational control, the Court looks at the factors above plus the ownership interest of the corporate officer. See Cole Enterprises, 62 F.3d at 778 (explaining that an individual has operation control if he or she is a high level executive, has a significant ownership interest, controls significant functions of the business, and determines salaries and makes hiring decisions).
Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated that Donna is an “employer” under the FLSA because he has operational control over the corporate defendants. First, Donna is an executive with significant ownership interest in the corporate defendants. He is the president and sole owner of Bebo Foods and was the president and sole owner of RD Trattoria. (Donna Dep. at 18:3-20:11, 29:16-17.) He also owned eighty percent of Galileo. (Id. at 33:7-8.) Second, Donna had the power to hire and fire, control work schedules and supervise employees, determine pay rates, and maintain employment records. For example, Donna transferred employees from Galileo to Bebo Trattoria when Galileo closed in 2006, and he took part in the hiring of other employees. (Pls.’ Opp’n  to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 2; Donna Dep. 54:5-7.) Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, several plaintiffs testified that Donna supervised plaintiffs on the floor of his restaurants. He also approved wage payments to plaintiffs, including the issuance of post-dated or unsigned checks, the payment of partial wages, and the withholding of any payment. (See, e.g., Ventura Aff. ¶¶ 7-9; Vuckovic Aff ¶ 4.) Furthermore, when plaintiffs complained about defendants’ payment practices, he informed them that he withheld wage payments-either in full or in part-from plaintiffs in order to pay Bebo Trattoria’s past debts for which he was behind in payment. (See, e.g., Ventura Aff. ¶ 7; Romic Aff. ¶ 10.) Indeed, plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that Donna exerted operational control over the corporate defendants.
Due to the high volume of claims against restaurants and their chef-owners recently, this case will no-doubt will have wide-reaching reverberations.
To learn more about laws and regulations applicable to tipped employees, click here.
Saleen v. Waste Management, Inc.
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The matter was before the Court on the Defendant’s motion of to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. WMI argued that, because plaintiffs were employed by two of its subsidiaries, and not by Defendant itself, Defendant is not plaintiffs’ “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA. Defendant further argued that, because Defendant is not an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court disagreed with the latter argument, and thus the Court did not take up the former argument at this time.
The Court held that Defendant’s assertion that it is not an “employer” under the FLSA is a defense on the merits and not a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was denied.
The Court declined to treat Defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment, because plaintiffs had not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery.
Chao v. Concrete Management Resources, L.L.C.
Plaintiff filed this wage and hour suit against defendants alleging violations of the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant Concrete Management Resources, L.L.C. (CMR) was formerly known as Concrete Masonry & Restoration, L.L.C. Defendant CMR moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was not a proper party to the action. Specifically, CMR contended that it has never operated as Concrete Masonry & Restoration, L.L.C. and that CMR is a separate legal entity from Concrete Masonry & Restoration, L.L.C. CMR contended that any FLSA violations were committed by Concrete Masonry & Restoration., L.L.C. and that CMR has no relationship with that entity.
In so doing, the Court joined other Courts, namely the Ninth Circuit in expressly recognizing the existence of successor liability in an FLSA context.


§ 192.1001 - What definitions apply to this subpart?
§ 192.1003 - What do the regulations in this subpart cover?
§ 192.1005 - What must a gas distribution operator (other than a master meter or small LPG operator) do to implement this subpart?
§ 192.1007 - What are the required elements of an integrity management plan?
§ 192.1009 - What must an operator report when a mechanical fitting fails?
§ 192.1011 - What records must an operator keep?
§ 192.1013 - When may an operator deviate from required periodic inspections under this part?
§ 192.1015 - What must a master meter or small liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) operator do to implement this subpart?


Full Statute Name: Code of Alabama. Title 21. Handicapped Persons. Chapter 7. Rights of Blind and Otherwise Physically Disabled Persons. Title 3. Animals. Chapter 1. General Provisions Title 32. Motor Vehicles and Traffic. Chapter 5A. Rules of the Road. Article 10. Pedestrians' Rights and Duties.
TITLE 3. ANIMALS. CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
§ 3-1-7 . Refusal to permit guide dog to accompany blind person into place of public accommodation, etc.
TITLE 21. HANDICAPPED PERSONS. CHAPTER 7. RIGHTS OF BLIND AND OTHERWISE PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS.
§ 21-7-1 . Declaration of policy.
§ 21-7-2 . Right to full use of streets, sidewalks, public buildings, public facilities, etc.
§ 21-7-3 . Right to use of public conveyances and transportation facilities, lodging places, places of public accommodation, etc.
§ 21-7-4 . Right of person with a disability to be accompanied by service animal.
§ 21-7-5 . Penalty for denial of or interference with enumerated rights.
§ 21-7-6 . Duty of drivers to pedestrians carrying cane or accompanied by guide dog.
§ 21-7-7 . Rights of blind persons not using cane or guide dog; failure to use cane or guide dog not evidence of contributory negligence.
§ 21-7-8 . Employment by state, political subdivisions of state, public schools, etc.
§ 21-7-9 . Right to housing accommodations.
§ 21-7-10 . Annual proclamation of White Cane Safety Day.
Title 24. Housing. Chapter 8A. Alabama Assistance and Service Animal Integrity in Housing Act.
§ 24-8A-4. Misrepresentation of entitlement to assistance animal or service animal.
§ 24-8A-5. Misrepresentation of animal as assistance animal or service animal.
TITLE 32. MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC. CHAPTER 5A. RULES OF THE ROAD. ARTICLE 10. PEDESTRIAN'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES.
§ 32-5A-220 . Right-of-way to blind persons, guide dogs in training.
§ 3-1-7. Refusal to permit guide dog to accompany blind person into place of public accommodation, etc.
No owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation, amusement or recreation, including, but not limited to, any inn, hotel, restaurant, eating establishment, barbershop, billiard parlor, store, public conveyance, theater, motion-picture house, public educational institution, or elevator shall refuse to permit a guide dog to accompany a blind person entering the place or making use of the accommodations available when the blind person is being led by the guide dog; if the guide dog is wearing a harness; and the blind person presents for inspection credentials issued by an accredited school for training guide dogs or the dog is being trained by a person employed by an accredited school for training guide dogs. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction shall be fined an amount not to exceed fifty dollars ($50).
§ 21-7-1. Declaration of policy.
It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable the blind, the visually handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled to participate fully in the social and economic life of the state and to engage in remunerative employment.
§ 21-7-2. Right to full use of streets, sidewalks, public buildings, public facilities, etc.
The blind, the visually handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled have the same right as the able-bodied to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities and other public places.
§ 21-7-3. Right to use of public conveyances and transportation facilities, lodging places, places of public accommodation, etc.
The blind, the visually handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, streetcars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation, hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
§ 21-7-4. Right of person with a disability to be accompanied by service animal.
(a) For the purposes of this section, the term service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability.
(b) Every person with a disability, including a person who is totally or partially blind, hearing-impaired, or diagnosed on the autism spectrum shall have the right to be accompanied by a service animal in any public place, including a public or private school, and any of the places listed in Section 21-7-3. The person may not be required to pay an extra charge for the service animal.
(c) The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the handler's disability.
(d) A person training a service animal shall be entitled to the same privileges granted to a person with a disability pursuant to subsection (b).
(e) In the case of a disabled child, including a child diagnosed on the autism spectrum, any aide assigned to assist the child shall be trained with the service animal in basic commands in order to assist the child as a team.
(f) This section does not relieve a person accompanied by a service animal from liability for any damages done to the premises or facilities by the service animal.
The 1999 amendment, effective March 1, 2000, inserted “and every person employed by an accredited school for training guide dogs”, substituted “dog however, the” for “guide or hearing dog; provided, that such”, and substituted “the dog” for “such dog”.
The 2001 amendment, effective May 1, 2001, inserted “shall have the right to be accompanied by a guide dog in training”.
The 2011 amendment, effective September 1, 2011, rewrote this section.
§ 21-7-5. Penalty for denial of or interference with enumerated rights.
Any person, firm or corporation, or the agent of any person, firm or corporation, who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities enumerated in Sections 21-7-2 and 21-7-3 or otherwise interferes with the rights of a totally or partially blind or otherwise disabled person under Sections 21-7-2 through 21-7-4 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 21-7-6. Duty of drivers to pedestrians carrying cane or accompanied by guide dog.
The driver of a vehicle approaching a totally or partially blind pedestrian who is carrying a cane predominantly white or metallic in color, with or without a red tip, or using a guide dog, or a person employed by an accredited school for training guide dogs who provides notice through a sign or other method that he or she is training a dog as a guide dog shall take all necessary precautions prescribed by law to avoid injury to the blind pedestrian, and the dog trainer. Any driver who fails to take all necessary precautions shall be liable in damages for any injury caused the pedestrian, or the guide dog trainer.
§ 21-7-7. Rights of blind persons not using cane or guide dog; failure to use cane or guide dog not evidence of contributory negligence.
A totally or partially blind pedestrian not carrying a cane as described in Section 21-7-6 or any totally or partially blind person not using a guide dog in any of the places, accommodations or conveyances listed in Sections 21-7-2 and 21-7-3 shall have all of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon other persons, and the failure of a totally or partially blind pedestrian to carry such a cane or of a totally or partially blind person to use a guide dog in any such places, accommodations or conveyances shall not be held to constitute nor be evidence of contributory negligence.
§ 21-7-8. Employment by state, political subdivisions of state, public schools, etc.
It is the policy of this state that the blind, the visually handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled shall be employed in the state service, the service of the political subdivisions of the state, in the public schools and in all other employment supported in whole or in part by public funds on the same terms and conditions as the able-bodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability prevents the performance of the work involved.
§ 21-7-9. Right to housing accommodations.
(a) Blind persons, visually handicapped persons and other physically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as are other members of the general public, to all housing accommodations offered for rent, lease or compensation in this state, subject to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
(b) "Housing accommodations" means any real property or portion thereof which is used or occupied or is intended, arranged or designed to be used or occupied as the home, residence or sleeping place of one or more human beings, but shall not include any accommodations included within subsection (a) of this section or any single-family residence, the occupants of which rent, lease or furnish for compensation not more than one room therein.
(c) Nothing in this section shall require any person renting, leasing or providing for compensation real property to modify his property in any way or provide a higher degree of care for a blind person, visually handicapped person or other physically disabled person than for a person who is not physically disabled.
(d) Every totally or partially blind person who has a guide dog or who obtains a guide dog shall be entitled to full and equal access to all housing accommodations provided for in this section, and he shall not be required to pay extra compensation for such guide dog, but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by such guide dog.
§ 21-7-10. Annual proclamation of White Cane Safety Day.
(4) He emphasizes the need of the citizens to be aware of the presence of disabled persons in the community and to keep safe and functional for the disabled the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities, other public places, places of public accommodation, amusement and resort and other places to which the public is invited, and to offer assistance to disabled persons upon appropriate occasions.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Alabama Assistance and Service Animal Integrity in Housing Act.
(1) Assistance animal. An animal, other than a service animal, that qualifies as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act, Public Law 90-284, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Public Law 93-112, 29 U.S.C. § 794. This term includes an emotional support animal when the animal qualifies as a reasonable accommodation.
(2) Disability. A physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities.
(3) Landlord. A person or company that owns, manages, or enforces pet policies in housing subject to the Fair Housing Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
(4) Reliable documentation. Documentation allowed to be requested upon receipt of a request for reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act or Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The term only includes documentation from a medical provider of the person in need of the reasonable accommodation.
(5) Service animal. An animal, other than an assistance animal, that qualifies as a service animal under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The term includes those animals being trained to be a service animal.
(1) A disability, only if the disability is not readily apparent or known to the landlord.
(2) A disability-related need for the animal, only if the disability-related need is not readily apparent or known to the landlord.
(b) All documentation obtained pursuant to this section must be kept confidential in accordance with the Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
(1) Misrepresents to another person that a person has a disability or disability-related need for the use of an assistance animal or service animal in housing.
(b)(1) Upon a first offense, a violation of subsection (a) shall be subject to a civil penalty of five hundred dollars ($500) or treated as a Class C misdemeanor.
(2) Upon a second or subsequent offense, a violation of subsection (a) shall be a Class B misdemeanor.
(1) Creates a document that misrepresents an animal as an assistance animal or service animal for use in housing.
(2) Provides a document to another person falsely stating that an animal is an assistance animal or service animal for use in housing.
(3) Fits an animal, which is not an assistance animal or service animal, with a harness, collar, vest, or sign that the pet is an assistance animal or service animal for use in housing.
§ 32-5A-220. Right-of-way to blind persons, guide dogs in training.


§ 25-2 Membership; terms; vacancies.
§ 25-3 Meetings; provision of facilities for aged.
§ 25-6 Advisory boards and committees.
§ 25-8 Membership restrictions and requirements.
§ 25-9 Tenure of members.
§ 25-11 Rules and regulations; review and update.
§ 25-15 Membership; terms; vacancies.
§ 25-16 Powers and duties; conduct of activities; records and reports.
§ 25-17 Rules and regulations.
§ 25-18 Limitation of powers and duties.
Boards and commissions — See Ch. 11.


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Congress is granted the power to carry out the census by Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution, which reads: “The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” The responsibility of administering the census lies with the Secretary of Commerce.
The census has not included a question about citizenship since 1950. However, in March of 2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced that the 2020 Census would include the question “Is this person a citizen of the United States?” This announcement was met with both great support and great outrage.
President Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign sent an email endorsing the proposed change, stating that “The President wants the 2020 United States Census to ask people whether they are citizens. In another era, this would be COMMON SENSE.” Civil rights groups, however, banded together almost instantaneously to bring lawsuits in New York, California and elsewhere, aimed at obtaining an injunction to prevent the question’s inclusion.
Groups urging for the question’s exclusion emphasize that the consequences of adding the question would be grave and far-reaching. The census is the official determinant of a state’s proportion of the national population. This number then determines how many seats in the House of Representatives will be allotted to that state, as well as what proportion of federal funds the state will receive for federal services such as education, transportation, and disaster relief.
The Census Bureau, in the wake of Ross’s announcement, has warned that the question’s addition “could reduce voluntary responses to the 2020 head count by 5.8 percent, or about six million households.” This substantial undercount would render the representation and apportionment of federal funds inappropriate to the actual number of people in each state who need representation and federal services. Strategic plans for emergency preparedness are also based on census data, which could lead to serious problems in the event of an undercount.
Those who support the question’s inclusion, on the other hand, stress its importance for enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, and emphasize the Secretary’s power and discretion over census administration.
Since Ross announced the question’s imminent inclusion, a number of trials have been initiated in federal courts across the country. In two of the cases that have gone to trial thus far, California v. Ross and New York v. Department of Commerce, the plaintiff’s central argument is that the question was not added in order to enable enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, but rather to undercount minority populations. The plaintiffs in both cases are bringing both statutory and Constitutional claims.
The statutory claim is that the decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Under the APA, courts can invalidate agency actions found to be “arbitrary and capricious,” meaning that they were unreasonable or insufficiently supported by the administrative record. The fact that the citizenship question was added without any testing, a departure from the Census Bureau’s typical practice of piloting any new question before its inclusion, makes the plaintiffs’ APA challenge stronger. This case is also strengthened by the fact that the Census Bureau’s chief scientist warned Ross before the official decision was made that there were cheaper and more effective ways of enforcing the Voting Rights Act.
The government’s best argument, on the other hand, is that a ranking decision maker’s “mental processes are generally irrelevant to evaluating the legality of agency action.” By this reasoning, the explanation in the administrative record—that the question will enable more efficient enforcement of the Voting Rights Act—should be the only thing considered by the court when evaluating the action. Should the court find that justification legitimate, any separate discriminatory purpose would not be relevant.
In 2000, in Morales v. Daley, a federal court in Texas considered a challenge to the publishing of racial data collected using the census. In the decision, the court noted that “Plaintiffs argue that if such data is collected, it could only be used for discriminatory purposes. Plaintiffs have not alleged or shown, however, that the data is likely to be used to discriminate against them specifically.” The Court upheld the decision to include those questions, finding that there was no discriminatory purpose, and therefore no breach of the Constitution.
That decision followed neatly from equal protection case law which indicates that the primary inquiry in discrimination claims should be into motive.
However, the general importance of motive in equal protection claims, along with the fact that Morales shows us that intent has previously been considered in a discrimination claim based on the census, indicates that motive may also be the central issue in this case. Discriminatory intent is crucial to this kind of discrimination claim, and if the Court is not permitted to look at motive, the question of whether there was a Fourteenth Amendment violation becomes impossible to answer.
In mid-January Judge Furman, a federal judge in New York, held the addition of the question to be unlawful. In his opinion, Furman wrote that the decision to add the citizenship question and the process leading up to it constitute “a veritable smorgasbord of classic, clear-cut [Administrative Procedure Act] violations.” On the Fourteenth Amendment question, he found that the plaintiffs had not proved discriminatory intent on the part of the Secretary. The Justice Department is expected to appeal.
As more federal judges rule on various challenges to the question, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will ultimately decide the question. It will be interesting to see whether the case’s scope remains confined to the APA challenge, or whether the Fourteenth Amendment claim will be decisive.
In October, the Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs were not permitted to depose Ross, but did allow deposition of other officials, indicating that while Ross is awarded special protection according to his role as a member of the executive, some discovery is appropriate. If the Fourteenth Amendment claim ends up being how the question is ultimately decided, the Court will have to decide how to balance the necessity of looking at purpose when addressing a Fourteenth Amendment claim with the presumption of regularity afforded to members of the executive branch, and whether the statutory claim or the constitutional claims prove more persuasive.
In a recent court filing, the government claimed that the Secretary has “nearly unfettered discretion over the format and content of the census.” The outcome of this case will help define the limits of that discretion, as well as to what extent the court can examine actions of members of the executive in light of discrimination claims.
 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2.
 How the 2020 Census Citizenship Question Ended Up in Court, NPR (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/04/661932989/how-the-2020-census-citizenship-question-ended-up-in-court.
 Fred Barbash, Wilbur Ross: The Simple But Explosive Questions About the Census He’s Fighting Not to Answer, Wash. Post (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/10/11/wilbur-ross-the-simple-but-explosive-questions-about-the-census-hes-fighting-not-to-answer/?utm_term=.8eb8b5f2d809.
The Battle Over a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Census Heats Up, The Economist: Democracy in America (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2018/11/14/the-battle-over-a-citizenship-question-on-the-2020-census-heats-up.
 Michael Wines, Can There Be a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Census? A Judge Will Soon Rule, N.Y. Times (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/27/us/citizenship-question-census.html.
 Louis J. Virelli III, The Census and the APA—Making Citizenship Arbitrary, ACSblog (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-census-and-the-apa-making-citizenship-arbitrary/.
 Press Release, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Opening Statements Begin Today in Federal Trial Challenging Trump Administration’s 2020 Census Citizenship Question, https://lawyerscommittee.org/press-release/opening-statements-begin-today-in-federal-trial-challenging-trump-administrations-2020-census-citizenship-question/.
 See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
 Corinne Ramey, Census Can’t Ask About Citizenship, Judge Rules, Wall St. J (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-rules-trump-administration-cant-ask-about-citizenship-on-census-11547564816.
 Chris Dolmetsch and Erik Larson, The 2024 Presidential Election May be Decided in a New York City Courtroom, Bloomberg: Politics (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-02/are-you-a-citizen-question-on-trial-in-battle-over-voting-power.

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1. DATA CONTROLLER, pursuant to art. 4 and 24 of the Reg. (EU) 2016/679, is Cap Design Spa – registered office Via Via L. Busnelli 5 – Meda (MB), representend by the legal representative pro tempore.
B) –(consent) subscription to the newsletter of CAP DESIGN S.P.A., for promotional communication by e-mail (mailing list service) and for related activities – art.6.1.a) as legal basis for the processing.
C) – (consent) direct marketing set by CAP DESIGN S.P.A., promotional communication and/or invitation to events promoted or organized by the Data Controller, by e-mail, SMS, MMS, phone call also without operator, mail, or other communication tool – art.6.1.a) as legal basis for the processing.
D) – (consent) communication of your Personal Data to the companies of Poltrona Frau’s Group (Cassina Spa and Poltrona Frau Spa) for promotional, marketing and commercial communication porpuses, for sending informative and promotional material by e-mail, mail, SMS, MMS and phone call also without the operator, and connected to the Group’s brand “Cassina” and “Poltrona Frau” - art.6. par. 1 lett. a) as legal basis for the processing.
E) – (consent) for profiling purposes, for letting CAP DESIGN S.P.A. to process user profiles, consumers and / or analyze consumption habits and choices to improve the commercial offer, services, products offered, to make them more compliant with the interests of those concerned – art.6.1.a) as legal basis for the processing.
The provision of personal data and the consent to the processing for purpose B – for the subscription to the newsletter - is optional and the non submittal of personal data will not prevent you from registering to the private area “Architetti e Designers” and “Dealers”, but your Personal Data will not processing for the subscription to the newsletter and you will not be subscribed to the mailing list of CAP DESIGN S.P.A.
The provision of personal data and consent to the processing for purpose C -for the direct marketing from CAP DESIGN S.P.A. – is optional. The non-submittal of personal data will not prevent you from registering to the personal area (purpose A) but your personal data will not be processing for direct marketing.
The provision of personal data and consent to the processing for purpose D – assigned of your Personal Data to the other companies of the Group Poltrona Frau for promotional/marketing purposes- is optional. The non-submittal of personal data will not prevent you from registering to the personal area (purpose A) but your personal data will not be assigned to the other companies of the Group Poltrona Frau for marketing activities.
The provision of personal data and consent to the processing for purpose E – for the profiling- is optional. The non-submittal of personal data will not prevent you from registering to the personal area (purpose A) but your Personal Data will not processing for profiling purpose.
You may exercise your rights as indicated in the Regulation EU 2016/679, by contacting the data Controller, ending an e-mail to privacy@poltronafraugroup.com or contacting the Data Protection Officer by sending an e-mail to dpo.poltronafrau@dpoprofessioanlservice.it . In particular, you have the right to: obtain confirmation that a treatment is underway and if so, to request the data Controller to access of this Data and obtain other information like: kind of Personal Data; recipients or categories of recipients of personal data; data retention period or relevant criteria; the right to ask to rectification, cancellation of your personal data or the limitation of the processing of them; the right to object the processing of your data; the right to lodge a complaint with the Data Protection Authority; if the Personal Data has not been collected by the Data Subject, all the information concerning the origin; the existence of automated decision-making (profiling also art.22 GDPR); appropriate safeguards in case of data transfer to a third country or international organization art 44 and subsequent of GDPR; the right to obtain a copy of your Personal Data.


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Privacy notice and information of persons concerned according to Article 13 and Article 14 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Brainloop AG (hereinafter: "Brainloop") and its affiliated companies take the issue of data protection very seriously and want to ensure that your privacy is protected as a Brainloop customer and user of the Brainloop website.
We have thus prepared this statement on data protection in which we explain how your data is handled. We reserve the right to change the content of this statement from time to time; we therefore recommend that you review it at regular intervals.
In individual areas of the Brainloop website (e.g. the Help section) less data processing takes place than the extent described here.
We process your personal data only with your consent or if permitted by law. We process only the data required to provide our services and to use our website, or data that you voluntarily provide to us.
Personal data includes all information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (hereinafter “person concerned”). A natural person is considered identifiable if he or she can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular through assignment to an identifier such as a name, ID number, location data, an online ID, or one or more particular characteristics that express the natural person’s physical, physiological, genetic, psychological, economic, cultural, or social identity.
Data subject is any identified or identifiable natural person whose personal data is processed by the party responsible for data processing (Brainloop).
Processing means any executed operation in connection with personal data such as collecting, recording, organizing, arranging, storing, editing or changing, selecting, querying, utilizing, disclosing through transmission, dissemination or other means of delivery, comparing, linking, restricting, deleting, or destroying.
A processor is a natural person or legal entity, authority, institution, or other office that processes personal data on behalf of the responsible party.
Consent is any statement of intent voluntarily given by the person concerned in an informed and unambiguous manner for the particular case, in the form of a declaration or other clear affirmative action with which the person concerned indicates that he or she is agreement with the processing of the personal data pertaining to him or her.
3.2 Brainloop saves and uses Data entered by the user on the website (e.g. first name, last name, email address) on the systems of the company Salesforce.com Sàrl, Route de la Longeraie 9, 1110 Morges, Switzerland (hereinafter “Salesforce”) for the purpose of customer relationship management. Salesforce is Brainloop’s data processor and acts exclusively in accordance with Brainloop’s instructions. Brainloop has concluded appropriate contractual agreements with Salesforce in order to comply with the applicable legal requirements.
3.3 The period of data storage is based on the legal retention requirements.
brainloop_contact: This cookie saves information on your visit of the website. It allows users to be recognized on the website and use all of its functionalities. The cookie is necessary to properly display and use the website. It expires when your visit to the website ends.
selected_language:This cookie saves your chosen language for the website. It expires after six months.
In this case an opt-out cookie will be set that will prevent the collection of your data when visiting this website in the future. Further information is available at http://www.google.com/analytics/terms/us.html and at https://policies.google.com/?hl=en. We also use Google Analytics to evaluate data from the double-click cookie for statistical purposes. If you do not wish this, you can deactivate it using Google ads personalization (https://support.google.com/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en).
Further information is available at http://www.google.com/analytics/terms/gb.html and at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/.
4.3 Our website utilizes the remarketing function of Google Inc. (“Google”). The operating company of the Google Remarketing services is Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy, Mountain View, CA 94043-1351. This function allows us to address visitors to our website with specific advertising by displaying ads that are personalized and based on their interests when they visit other websites in the Google Display Network.
4.4 We use the marketing automation software HubSpot on our website.
(1) HubSpot uses a cookie that it places on the user’s computer to collect data.
It collects the following data: information about the computer you are using, your visit to our website, especially your IP address, your location, your browser, the referral source and the duration of your visit to our website. This information is stored on one of HubSpot’s servers. The legal basis for the processing of aforementioned data is § 15 para. 3 TMG and Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
(2) When you register for one of our offers using a web-based form, you give Brainloop consent to use the data collected via the web-based form after you fill it out and confirm the data protection notice. Your contact information – including your name, email address, company name, address and phone number are collected and saved. We only use this data for statistical analyses in order to ensure the trouble-free operation of our offering and to optimize it on an ongoing basis. We also use the data to optimize our marketing activities. We hereby confirm that your data is stored in HubSpot databases and under certain conditions also in Salesforce CRM database. The data stored in Salesforce will only be passed on to affiliated companies of the Diligent group of companies, in particular Diligent Corp., who process the data as contract processors for Brainloop while observing appropriate guarantees in accordance with Art. 44 ff. GDPR -(for details see section 10 below). The personal information we process includes information about you that is freely available on the internet and that HubSpot also stores. We reserve the right to use the information to contact visitors to our website by mail or phone, assuming they have provided their contact details for this purpose, to enable us to find out which of our company’s services they are interested in.
HubSpot is a software company based in the USA with a subsidiary in Ireland. Contact: HubSpot, 2nd Floor, 30 North Wall Quay, Dublin 1, Ireland. Phone: +353 1 518 7500. HubSpot complies with the TRUSTe Privacy Seal standard. Brainloop and HubSpot have signed an agreement that comprises the standard EU contractual clauses in order to regulate data transmission. Further information about HubSpot and its privacy protection is available at http://legal.hubspot.com/privacy-policy. If you do not want the information about your visit to be used, please do not hesitate to contact us (see section 10 for contact details).
If you do not want data regarding your usage to be collected by HubSpot and Google Analytics, you can disable the tracking function of both tools by clicking on the link below.
This places an opt-out cookie in your browser that will prevent your data from being collected in the future when you visit this website.
Brainloop offers social plugins from various social networks (e.g. Xing, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.) on its website.
Access to XING (XING AG, Dammtorstraße 29-32, 20354 Hamburg, Germany) can be found on our website via the “X” or “XING” icon. When you click to activate the “XING” icon a connection with the XING server is established and the XING Share Button functions (especially the calculation/display of the counter value) are loaded on the respective Internet page. XING does not save any personal data from you when you access this Internet page; XING also does not save any IP addresses in particular. There is no evaluation of your usage behavior through cookies in connection with the XING Share Button. The respective current data protection information regarding the XING Share Button as well as supplementary information may be found at https://www.xing.com/app/share?op=data_protection.
In order to protect your privacy regarding the other social plugins (e.g. YouTube), we use a technical solution to integrate them which prevents data (e.g. IP addresses) from already being sent to the respective social networks just through opening our website.
6.1 If you consent into our Data Privacy notice and by completing our web-based-forms we are allowed to use your data (e.g. first and last name, email address) for sending information on Brainloop products and services if you have expressly requested this (e.g. using the contact form) or subscribed to the Brainloop information services. A confirmation email is sent to the email address first entered for information mailing in a double opt-in process for legal reasons. We also send a confirmation email to prospects who contact us via web-based-form. This confirmation email serves to check whether the owner of the email address has authorized receipt of the information email.
In order for Brainloop to receive information about the interactions on the email recipient’s side, a function called “tracking pixel” is used in the HubSpot products. This function uses image resources to recognize when a recipient opens an email sent via one of the HubSpot products. When an email is sent via the HubSpot marketing or sales product, an image tag for a miniscule image is inserted in the body of the email. If the recipient opens the message with an appropriately configured email client, the client sends a request for the image to the HubSpot platform. This request is converted into the email opening rate, which is available to Brainloop for evaluation. These pixel requests contain no information that may be traced back to persons and are masked by a long, randomly generated character sequence.
You may revoke your statement of consent given to us and your consent to the storage of personal data at any time with effect for the future in accordance with section 8 of this Data Privacy notice. If you have subscribed to the Brainloop information services, you may also revoke your consent by clicking the link contained in the respective email.
In addition, you can use the “deactivate tracking” function according to section 4.5.
6.2 We may additionally use your date as permitted by law for sending you information on our products and services through the post, for example. You may object to this use of your data at any time with effect for the future; information on your right to object can be found in section 8.
7.1 We process personal data regarding you for the purposes of your application for employment, in so far as it is required for the decision on employment. The legal basis is § 26 Par. 1 along with Par. 8 S. 2 of the German Federal Data Protection Act (FDPA). This applies to data in connection with your application, such as data on your identity (first and last name, address, contact information), information on your professional qualifications and education, information on professional training, or other information that you provide to us in connection with your application. In addition, we may process professional information that you have made publicly available, such as on profiles in social media networks.
Further, we may process your personal data to the extent necessary to defend against legal claims arising from the application process. The legal basis is Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. f GDPR.
Should an employment relationship be established between us, we may process your personal data already received for the purposes of the employment relationship as well, if required for carrying out or terminating the employment relationship (legal basis: § 26 Par. 1 FDPA).
Applicant data are stored as long as necessary for the decision regarding your application. If no employment relationship is established between us, your application data are deleted four months after the negative decision is announced, if a longer period of storage is not required to avoid litigation.
You have the right to request a confirmation from Brainloop regarding whether your personal data are being processed. You may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time for this purpose.
In addition, you have the right to know whether your personal data were transmitted to a third country or to an international organization. If this is the case, you also have the right to receive information about the appropriate guarantees in connection with the transmission.
If you would like to exercise this right to information, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
You have the right to request the immediate correction of incorrect personal data concerning you. You also have the right, under consideration of the purposes of the data processing, to request that incomplete personal data be made complete – including by means of a supplementary statement.
If you would like to exercise this right to correction, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
You are revoking your consent upon which the processing is based according to Art. 6 Par. 1 a GDPR or Art. 9 Par. 2 a GDPR and there is no other legal basis for the processing.
You are objecting according to Art. 21 Par. 1 GDPR and there are no overriding legitimate reasons for the data processing, or you object to the processing according to Art. 21 Par. 2 GDPR.
The deletion of the personal data is necessary to meet a legal obligation according to the law of the European Union or the Member States to which Brainloop is subject.
In so far as one of the reasons above applies and you would like to effect the deletion of your personal data saved at Brainloop, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
If the personal data were made public by Brainloop and if Brainloop is obliged to delete them as the responsible party according to Art. 17 Par. 1 GDPR, Brainloop will take appropriate measures under consideration of the available technology and the implementation costs to inform other responsible parties processing the published personal data that you have requested that they delete all links to the data and copies of the data, in so far as the data processing is not required.
If one of these prerequisites is given and you would like to request the limitation of personal data stored by Brainloop you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
You have the right to receive the personal data that you have provided Brainloop outside of the Brainloop Secure Dataroom or MyRoom offered by Brainloop in an organized, accessible, and machine-readable format. You are also entitled to transmit the personal data to another responsible party without interference by Brainloop, in so far as the processing is based on consent according to Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. a GDPR or Art. 9 Par. 2 lit. a GDPR, or on a contract according to Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. b GDPR, and in so far as the processing is done with automated procedures and is not necessary for performing a task in the public interest or in the exercise of public authority delegated to the responsible party.
When exercising your right to data portability according to Art. 20 Par. 1 GDPR, you have the further right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one responsible party to another responsible party, if this is technically feasible and does not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other persons.
If you would like to exercise this right to data portability, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
You have the right to object at any time, for reasons resulting from your particular situation, to the processing of your personal data taking place based on Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. e or f GDPR. This also applies to profiling based on these provisions.
Brainloop no longer processes personal data in the case of an objection unless we can demonstrate compelling legitimate reasons for the processing that outweigh the interests, rights, and freedoms of the person concerned, or unless the data processing serves to assert, exercise, or defend legal claims.
If personal data are used for direct advertising purposes, you have the right at any time to object to the processing of your personal data for such advertising. If you object to Brainloop to the data being processed for direct advertising purposes, Brainloop will no longer process your personal data for these purposes.
If you would like to exercise this right to object, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
If you would like to exercise this right to revoke consent, you may contact our data protection officer or the address provided in section 10 at any time.
Without prejudice to any other judicial remedy, you have the right to complain to a supervisory authority responsible for data protection if you are of the opinion that the processing of your personal data violates the GDPR. The responsible supervisory authorities are those of the Member State of your residence, your workplace, or the place of alleged infringement. The supervisory authority to which the complaint was made will inform the complainant of the status and results of the complaint including the possibility of legal remedy according to Art. 78 GDPR.
Besides the legal basis listed in sec. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. above, the following applies: If we obtain consent for the processing of data, the legal basis is Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. a GDPR. If processing personal data is required to fulfil an agreement (e.g. agreement on the use of the Brainloop Services) or to process inquiries regarding Brainloop services before an agreement is concluded, the processing takes place according to Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. b GDPR. If Brainloop is under a legal obligation that requires the processing of personal data, such as meeting tax and social security obligations, the legal basis of such processing is Art. 6 Par. 1 lit. c GDPR.
10.1 Brainloop ensures a high level of security when passing on your data. We therefore only transmit your data to partner companies and service providers who have been carefully selected beforehand and who are contractually obliged in accordance with the relevant data protection regulations (order processing relationships).
In addition, a transfer of data to partner companies and service providers only occurs if this is necessary to perform the services offered, if you have given us your consent, or if the transfer is legally required or permissible. Your data will neither be sold to third parties nor marketed in any other way. The transmission of data to state agencies and authorities only takes place within the framework of mandatory legal provisions.
In order to ensure a uniform level of data protection, data will only be transferred to partner companies and service providers in third countries outside the scope of the GDPR if suitable guarantees in accordance with Art. 44 ff. GDPR have been made with the contract processor. This is done in particular through agreement on "standard contractual clauses (contract processors) pursuant to Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC for the transfer of personal data to contract processors established in third countries where an adequate level of protection is not ensured" ("EU standard contractual clauses (contract processors)") pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) GDPR. A copy of these regulations is available upon request from the office listed in section 11.
An up-to-date list of all partner companies and service providers is available upon request from the office listed in section 11.
10.2 Brainloop will also share your data with companies of the Diligent Group affiliated with Brainloop, in particular Diligent Corp., USA (1385 Broadway, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10018). An up-to-date list of all Diligent Group companies affiliated with Brainloop is available upon request from the office listed in section 11.
to support, prepare and optimize marketing measures.
10.2.2 The applicant data collected by Brainloop (see section 7 above) will be passed on, for example, for the implementation of personnel planning and development measures concerning several companies of the Diligent Group.
10.2.3 Brainloop remains responsible for the processing of personal data when passing on data to affiliated companies of the Diligent Group, in particular Diligent Corp., USA (1385 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10018). The affiliated companies of the Diligent Group act exclusively as contract processors for Brainloop hereby.
10.2.4.1 A uniform level of data protection is established by agreement on “standard contractual clauses (contract processors) pursuant to Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC for the transfer of personal data to contract processors established in third countries where an adequate level of protection is not ensured” (“EU standard contractual clauses (contract processors)”) pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) GDPR. A copy of these regulations is available upon request from the office listed in section 11.
10.2.4.2 Diligent Corp., USA (1385 Broadway, 19th Floor New York, NY 10018), also participates in the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework and the Swiss-US Privacy Shield Framework and is certified for compliance with these Privacy Shields. Diligent Corp., in trusting the respective Privacy Shield, has committed to subjecting all personal data received from member states of the European Union (EU) or Switzerland to the respective principles of the Privacy Shield. For more information about the Privacy Shield, visit the U.S. Department of Commerce's Privacy Shield List: https://www.privacyshield.gov/list.
Website: www.iitr.de Any person concerned may contact our data protection officer directly at any time regarding all data protection questions and suggestions.
The representative according to Art. 27 GDPR of contract processors not established in the European Union of the affiliated companies of the Diligent Group is Diligent Boardbooks Limited, 1 Strand, Grand Buildings, First Floor, London, WC2N 5HR, United Kingdom.

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