text:
Nicole Moore’s research is focused on the mafic eruptive products of volcanism. She is interested in how the petrology and geochemistry of basaltic magmas, which are generated in the mantle, can provide insight into their mantle sources, and the extent to which various crustal processes affect the magmas during their ascent to the surface of earth. Moore studies these basaltic products in a variety of tectonic settings, including continental flood basalts and volcanic arcs.
Moore, N.E., Grunder, A.L. and Bohrson, W.A., 2018, “The three-stage petrochemical evolution of the Steens Basalt compared to large igneous provinces and layered mafic intrusions,” Geosphere, in press.
Moore, N.E., and DeBari, S.M., 2012, “Mafic magmas from Mount Baker in the northern Cascadearc, Washington: probes into mantle and crustal processes,” Contributions to Mineralogy and vPetrology, v. 163, p. 521-546, doi: 10.1007/s00410-011-0686-4.
Moore, N.E., Grunder, A.L., Bohrson, W.A., and Carlson, R.W., 2017, “Source and magma processes during the onset of Columbia River Flood Basalt volcanism, the Steens Basalt, SE Oregon,” IAVCEI Scientific Assembly, Abstract ME21B-6.
Bendaña, S., Bohrson, W.A., Graubard, M.A., Moore, N.E., and Grunder, A.L., 2017, “Quantification of Mantle vs. Crustal Contributions to the Steens Flood Basalt Magmatic System,” IAVCEI Scientific Assembly, Abstract ME23C-070.
Louis, M., Toth, C., Bohrson, W.A., Moore, N.E., Bendaña, S., Graubard, M.A., and Grunder, A.L., 2017, “Phase Equilibria Constraints on the Magma Storage System with the Steens Basalt,” IAVCEI Scientific Assembly, Abstract ME23C-071.
Toth, C., Louis, M., Bohrson, W.A., Bendaña, S., Moore, N.E., and Grunder, A.L., 2017, “Open-System Origin of Giant Plagioclase in the Steens Basalt, SE Oregon, USA: Assimilation of Plagioclase Mush or Entrainment of Plagioclase Antecrysts?,” IAVCEI Scientific Assembly, Abstract ME23C-072.
Toth, C.H., Bohrson, W.A., Louis, M., Bendaña, S., Moore, N.E., and Grunder, A.L., 2017, ”Origin of giant plagioclase in a large-volume basaltic magma: entrainment of partially-melted gabbroic cumulate in the Steens Basalt, SE Oregon, USA,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs v. 49, no. 6.
Bendaña, S., Bohrson, W.A., Grunder, A., and Moore, N.E., 2016, “Geochemical Evolution of Steens Basalt: Quantification of Mantle vs. Crustal Contributions to an Evolving Flood Basalt Magmatic System,” Abstract V34B-07 presented at 2016 Fall Meeting, AGU, San Francisco CA, 12-16 Dec.
Moore, N.E., Toth, C., Grunder, A.L., Bohrson, W.A., and Bindeman, I., 2016, “Oxygen isotope composition of plagioclase from the Steens Basalt, Columbia River Basalt Province, SE Oregon,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 48, no. 4.
Lytle, K., Moore, N.E. and Grunder, A.L., 2016, “Olivine compositions of the lower Steens Basalt: Probing into magma histories of early flood basalt events,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 48, no. 4.
Moore, N.E., Lytle, K., Bohrson, W.A., and Grunder, A.L., 2015, “New Petrologic and Geochemical Insights into Differentiation Processes Required to Produce the Lower Steens Basalt, Columbia River Basalt Province, SE Oregon,” Abstract V41C-3090 presented at 2015 Fall Meeting, AGU, San Francisco, CA, 14-18 Dec.
Grunder, A.L., Moore, N.E., and Bohrson, W.A., 2015, “Giant Plagioclase “Mosaicrysts” and Other Textures in the Steens Basalt, Columbia River Flood Basalt Province,” Abstract V31E-3063 presented at 2015 Fall Meeting, AGU, San Francisco, CA, 14-18 Dec.
Moore, N.E., and Grunder, A.L., 2014, “Variations in whole rock and mineral composition of the Lower Steens Basalt, SE Oregon,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 46, no. 6.
Moore, N.E., and DeBari, S.M., 2009, “Origin and geochemical evolution of mafic magmas from Mount Baker in the northern Cascade arc, Washington: probes into mantle and crustal processes,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 41, no. 7, p. 191.
DeBari, S.M., Moore, N.E., and Baggerman, T., 2009, “Variable mantle and crustal influences on magmatism in the Cascade arc,” Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs, v. 41, no. 7, p. 571.
Moore, N.E., and DeBari, S.M., 2008, “Origin and geochemical evolution of mafic magmas from the Cascade arc, Mount Baker, Washington: probes into mantle processes,” 18th Annual Goldschmidt Conference Abstracts, v. 72, no. 12, p. A647.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


§ 98-4 Establishment of reserve fund.
§ 98-5 Report on status of reserve fund.
The Board of Trustees of the Village of Spring Valley finds that the protection of the health, safety and welfare of persons within the village who reside in residential buildings being converted from rental status to cooperative or condominium ownership requires that such persons be informed of the physical condition of such buildings and of any outstanding notices of code violations issued with respect to such buildings. The Board of Trustees further finds that for the health, safety and welfare of residents of the village and for the preservation and improvement of this substantial and increasing form of housing accommodation, it is essential that funds be set aside for the purpose of making capital repairs, replacements and improvements to such buildings.
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to conversions from rental to cooperative or condominium status of a building or a group of buildings or a development for which a plan must be filed with the State Department of Law pursuant to § 352-eee of the General Business Law.
Any building, group of buildings or development.
A building-wide replacement of a major component of any of the following systems: elevator; heating, ventilation and air conditioning; plumbing; wiring; or window, or a major structural replacement to the building; provided, however, that replacements made to cure code violations of record shall not be included.
The offeror, his nominees, assignees and successors in interest.
With respect to condominium conversions, the sum of the cost of all units in the offering at the last price which was offered to tenants in occupancy prior to the effective date of the plan, regardless of the number of sales made.
Within thirty (30) days after the closing of a conversion pursuant to an offering plan, the offeror shall establish and transfer to the Cooperative Corporation or the Condominium Board of Managers a reserve fund to be used exclusively for making capital repairs, replacements and improvements necessary for the health and safety of the residents of such buildings. Such reserve shall be exclusive of any other funds required to be reserved under the plan or applicable law or regulation of the State Attorney General, except a fund for capital repairs, replacements and improvements substantially similar in purpose to and in an amount not less than the reserve fund mandated by this section. Such reserve fund also shall be exclusive of any working capital fund and shall not be subject to reduction for closing apportionments.
Such fund shall be established in an amount equal to either three percent (3%) of the total price or three percent (3%) of the actual sales price of all cooperative shares or condominium units sold by the offeror at the time the plan is declared effective; provided, however, that if such amount is less than one percent (1%) of the total price, then the fund shall be established as a minimum of one percent (1%) of the total price, plus supplemental contribution to be made by the offeror at a rate of three percent (3%) of the actual sales price of cooperative shares or condominium units for each unit or its allocable shares held by the offeror and sold to bona fide purchasers subsequent to the effective date of the plan and within five (5) years of closing of the conversion pursuant to such plan, notwithstanding that the total amount contributed may exceed three percent (3%) of the total price; and provided, further, that if, five (5) years from thirty (30) days after the closing of the conversion pursuant to such plan, the total contribution by the offeror to the fund are less than three percent (3%) of the total price, the offeror shall pay the difference between the amount contributed and three percent (3%) of the total price. Supplemental contributions shall be made within thirty (30) days of each sale.
The contributions required pursuant to this action may be made earlier or in an amount greater than so provided. An offeror may claim and receive credit against the mandatory initial contribution to the reserve fund for the actual cost of capital replacements which he has begun after the plan is submitted for filing to the State Department of Law and before the plan is declared effective; provided, however, that any such replacements must be set forth in the plan, together with their actual or estimated costs; and further provided that such credit shall not exceed the lesser of the actual cost of the capital replacements or one percent (1%) of the total price.
Any building, construction of which was completed within three (3) years prior to the closing of a conversion pursuant to an offering plan, shall be exempt from the requirements of this section.
The Cooperative Corporation or the Condominium Board of Managers shall report to shareholders and unit owners on a semiannual basis with respect to all deposits into and withdrawals from the reserve fund mandated by § 98-4.
Any person who knowingly violates or assists in the violation of § 98-4 shall be guilty of a violation and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not more than two (2) times the amount required to be reserved by § 98-4 which was not so reserved. Any person who violates or assists in the violation of § 98-4 shall also be subject to a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000.) per day for each day that the reserve fund required by § 98-4 is not established; provided, however, that such civil penalty shall not exceed the amount required to be reserved pursuant to § 98-4.
In addition, any other action or proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction that may be appropriate or necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter may be brought in the name of the village, including actions to secure permanent injunctions enjoining any acts or practices which constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter, mandating compliance with the provisions of this chapter or for such other relief as may be appropriate. In any such action or proceeding, the village may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction or to a judge or justice thereof for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining all persons from violating any provision of this chapter, mandating compliance with the provisions of this chapter or for such other relief as may be appropriate, until the hearing and determination of such action or proceeding and the entry of final judgment or order therein. The court or judge or justice thereof to whom such application is made is hereby authorized forthwith to make any or all of the orders above specified, as may be required in such application, with or without notice, and to make such other or further orders or directions as may be necessary to render the same effectual. No undertaking shall be required as a condition of the granting or issuing of such order or by reason thereof.
Nothing contained in this section shall impair any rights, remedies or causes of action accrued or accruing to purchasers of cooperative shares or condominium units.
The New York State Department of Housing and Community Development is empowered to enforce the provisions of this chapter.


text:
Foppe, Patrick E. | Lashly & Baer, P.C.
Patrick E. Foppe practices in civil litigation and represents corporate clients and insurance companies in cases throughout Illinois and Missouri in both state and federal court. He frequently handles claims involving insurance defense, premises liability, personal injury, complex commercial motor vehicle accidents, products liability, wrongful death and general negligence.
He also concentrates in retail and transportation related matters. In addition, he conducts immediate response to serious accidents as part of Lashly & Baer's Rapid Response Team, which helps to achieve early evaluation of serious accidents and ensure the preservation of evidence.
Patrick is an active member of Transportation and Retail Practice Groups of USLAW NETWORK, Inc., which is an international organization, composed of over 180 independent, defense-based law firms. Further, he currently serves on the Defense Research Institute, Inc.'s (DRI) Trucking Committee's Executive Committee and is Chair of Publications. He also serves on the Executive Committee of the Transportation Lawyers Association (TLA) and is Co-Chair of the Transportation Lawyers Association's Membership and Recruiting Committee. He served on the Illinois State Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Evaluations from 2012 to 2016, which reviews judicial candidates for election to all courts in Illinois.
Patrick has an "AV Preeminent" Peer RatingTM with Martindale-Hubbell ®. He was honored by Missouri Lawyers Weekly with its Up & Coming Award for 2013. Also, Patrick has been selected through peer recognition and professional achievement for inclusion in the Missouri & Kansas Rising Stars, as published by Super Lawyers® magazine, each year since 2010. He has been honored by the Missouri Bar for his pro bono work in the community.
Patrick has successfully tried numerous cases. His accomplishments include successful resolution of claims involving: premises liability; personal injury; trucking accidents; disputes involving the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; cargo claims; products liability; subrogation losses; class actions for false advertising and anti-trust; and toxic torts involving asbestos, benzene, and welding fumes.
Patrick is also a regular author on commercial transportation industry issues and is an invited speaker by many industry groups. Patrick and his wife Kate have seven children.
Founding Director of the National Zip-Out Unused Opioids Foundation, 2018 It is well recognized that prescription pain medications have been a driving force in the dramatic rise in this health epidemic. The National Zip-Out Unused Opioids Foundation seeks to educate the public on an easy method to responsibly dispose of unused pain medications in compliance with the Federal Food and Drug Administration guidelines and federal law.
Leader, Service Trip to Guyana, April 2015 Guyana is one of South America’s poorest countries. I had the privilege of leading a group of seven volunteers at the St. John Bosco’s Boys Orphanage and at the David Rose Scholl for Disabled Children.
Haley v. Westfreight Systems, Inc., et al., 15-cv-01161-JPG-SCW, 2016 WL 5394389, Motion to strike punitive damages granted, 2016, U.S. Southern Dist. IL.
Harbison v. Rich Gullet & Sons, Inc., et al., 4:13-CV-1138-SPM, 2015 WL 1602611 , Motion to dismiss granted, 2015, U.S. Eastern Dist. Mo.
Harbison v. Rich Gullet & Sons, Inc., et al., 4:13-CV-1138-SPM, 2014 WL 5483569 , Motion for application of foreign law granted, 2015, U.S. Eastern Dist. Mo.
Penfold v. Martin Transportation Systems, Inc., 10SL-AC22268 , Directed Verdict, 2012, St. Louis County, MO.
Holt v. Galemmo, et al., 11SO-CV00643 , Favorable Settlement, 2012, Stoddard County, Mo.
Keller v. Feinerman, et al., 2011 WL 1519384 , Pro bono case, 2011, U.S. Southern Dist. of Ill.
Murphy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 2010 WL 1268034 , Trial, 2010, U.S. Eastern Dist. of Ill.
Heard v. Metro Moving & Storage, Co., 09SLSC00472 , Defense Verdict, 2009, St. Louis County, Mo.
James v. Express Medical Transport, Inc., 0722CC09197 , Summary judgment, 2009, St. Louis City, Mo.
Holland v. Muscle Relocation, Inc., 04CV746895 , Summary judgment, 2008, Scott County, Mo.
Monke v. General Medicine, P.C., et al., 2008 WL 904734 , Dismissed with prejudice, 2008, U.S. Southern Dist. of Ill.
Johns v. Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., et al., 22032-01197 , Summary Judgment, 2007, St. Louis City, Mo.
Schuette v. Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., et al., 22032-00537 , Summary Judgment, 2007, St. Louis City, Mo.
Woodson v. The Dow Chemical Co., et al., 052-09415 , Voluntarily Dismissed, 2006, St. Louis City, Mo.
Null et al. v. De Beers, et al., 05-516-MJR , Removal of a multi-million dollar class action, 2005, U.S. Southern Dist. of IllU.S. Southern Dist. of Ill.
Siemens v. Energy Systems Group, et al., 04-MR-39 , Summary Judgment , 2005, Wayne County, Ill.
Ratermann et al. v. Tri-County Electric Coop., 02-L-67 , Summary Judgment, 2005, Marion County, Ill.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


1. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Exemptions — Determination. — The purpose for which property is used is controlling in determining whether such property is exempt from taxation under Article 10, § 1 of the Constitution. p. 404.
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Utilities — Light and Power — Police Power. — As a general rule, the operation of an electric plant by a city for the furnishing of lights and power for its own use and the use of its inhabitants is an exercise of its police power, and if this is the purpose, it is a governmental purpose that is served under a power generally vested in cities and towns, and therefore a "municipal purpose" under either the broad or the more restricted meaning of the word "municipal." p. 405.
3. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Municipal Corporations — Governmental Purpose. — Where a governmental purpose is served by a municipal corporation under a power generally vested in cities and towns, and therefore a municipal purpose under either the broad or more restricted meaning of the word "municipal," the exemption of property for such use is within the provision of Article 10, § 1 of the Constitution. p. 405.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Construction of Provisions — Health and Welfare. — The public duty to protect the health and welfare of the citizen outside of the limits of cities rests primarily upon the Legislature. p. 405.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Construction of Provisions — Intent. — In construing the language of the Constitution, courts seek the meaning intended by those who adopted it, and not by those who drafted it. p. 407.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Construction of Provisions — Meaning of Words — Ordinary Sense. — Ordinarily, in construing the provisions of the Constitution, words are treated as used in their ordinary sense. p. 407.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Construction of Provisions — Contemporaneous Construction — Constitutional Debates. — Where there is doubt or ambiguity as to the intent of a constitutional provision, courts will look to the Constitutional Debates and to contemporary construction, both official and popular, for light. p. 407.
8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Governmental Powers and Functions — Educational and Charitable Institutions. — It is clearly within the powers and purposes and ordinary practices of all government, including cities and towns, to maintain educational and charitable institutions. p. 409.
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Construction of Provisions — Meaning of Words — Presumptions. — The words used in the Constitution must be presumed to have been carefully chosen so that each word would have a meaning, and each word must be thought of as having been deliberately and intentionally placed as though it had been hammered into the instrument. p. 409.
10. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Municipal Corporations — Constitutional Provision. — Under Article 10, § 1 of the Constitution, exempting property from taxation that is used for "municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes," the word "municipal" was not intended to be construed as including the same subject-matter as "educational, literary and charitable," but was used in the narrower sense, as referring to cities, towns, or other governmental units, and, therefore, it permits the exemption from taxation of property used for the purposes of cities, towns, or other governmental units. p. 409.
11. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Purposes for Which Used — Exemption. — Article 10, section 1 of the Constitution, providing for exemption from taxation of certain property, means that the Legislature may exempt from taxation property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, and the purposes of municipal corporations. p. 409.
12. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Municipal Corporations — Property as Incident to Powers. — Since municipal corporations are authorized and designed to serve public purposes only, any property which they may acquire in the exercise of their powers to accomplish such purposes, or as an incident thereto, may lawfully be exempted from taxation. p. 409.
13. TAXATION — Liability of Persons or Property — Municipal Corporations — Organization. — Article 10, section 1 of the Constitution, providing for exemption of property used for municipal purposes, does not limit the exemption to municipalities authorized or established by the Legislature. p. 411.
14. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Torts — Liability. — When a municipality has been clothed with powers for the peculiar and special advantages of its inhabitants, rather than for the good of the state at large, the corporation has a private character, and its liability for torts and otherwise is based upon the same principles as that of a private corporation. p. 412.
15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Legislative Control — Municipal Property. — A municipality may have property rights which are so far private that they are not held at the pleasure of the Legislature, and it is only in respect to such matters that the city is spoken of as acting in a private or proprietary capacity. p. 412.
16. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Utilities — Rights and Duties. — In respect to their public properties the rights and duties of a municipality are generally measured by the same rules and the same standards which apply to private individuals or private corporations. p. 412.
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Utilities — Operation — Public Function. — Municipal corporations hold their public utility properties in a private or proprietary capacity, but in the operation of such properties, the municipalities perform a public function under the police power, and not a private function. p. 412.
18. STATUTES — Construction and Operation — Retroactive Operation. — Unless a contrary intention is expressed, statutes are treated as intended to operate prospectively and not retrospectively. p. 414.
19. EVIDENCE — Judicial Notice — Taxes — Time of Payment. — It is a matter of common knowledge that payments of taxes are often made at an earlier date than that required to avoid penalty. p. 414.
20. TAXATION — Liability of Persons and Property — Exemptions — Statute Construed. — The Act of 1939, p. 24, exempting municipalities from taxation on certain property, was intended to operate prospectively only, and not intended to relieve municipalities from liability for taxes already assessed, notwithstanding the wording of the act did not provide specifically as to taxes "heretofore levied," or "to be hereafter levied." p. 414.
21. TAXATION — Liability of Persons and Property — Exemption — Act Constitutional — The Act of 1939, p. 24, exempting municipalities from taxation on certain property, is constitutional and not violative of Article 10, § 1 of the Constitution permitting exemptions of property used for purposes designated therein. p. 415.
22. TAXATION — Collection and Enforcement — Remedies for Wrongful Enforcement — Injunction — Complaint. — A taxpayer who seeks the aid of an injunction against the enforcement or collection of a tax, to first pay or tender the amount which is conceded to be legally and properly due, and an allegation that complainant has paid all taxes which he is legally liable to pay is not sufficient within the meaning of the rule, since it is only an averment of a legal conclusion and not a fact, therefore, the bill should, in all cases allege the facts and particulars which will enable the court to determine whether the legal conclusion is warranted by the facts. p. 416.
23. TAXATION — Collection and Enforcement — Remedies for Wrongful Enforcement — Demurrer. — A complaint which alleges facts showing that some taxes are due is bad upon demurrer, notwithstanding the contention of the plaintiff that, under the facts alleged, there are no taxes due. p. 416.
24. INJUNCTION — Actions — Complaint. — In an action by a taxpayer to enjoin the enforcement of a tax, the court must determine whether the legal conclusion pleaded is warranted by the facts, and the court's conclusion upon examination of the facts will control, and not the conclusion of the pleader or his failure to concede that which appears from the facts alleged. p. 416.
25. PLEADING — Complaint — Conclusions — Facts Warranting. — The court must determine whether the conclusion pleaded is warranted by the facts, and the court's conclusion upon examination of the facts will control, and not the conclusion of the pleader or his failure to concede that which appears from the facts alleged. p. 416.
26. EQUITY — Pleading — Demurrer. — Under chancery practice, where it appears from the bill that a part of a tax sought to be enjoined is due, the bill would be dismissed without prejudice so that the amount due may be paid or tendered, but under the practice of this state, the demurrer should be sustained, with leave to amend showing payment or tender of the amount due. p. 417.
From the Montgomery Circuit Court; Edgar A. Rice, Judge.
Action by the City of Crawfordsville, against H. Grady Chadwick, as Treasurer of Montgomery County, from collecting taxes for the year 1938 and subsequent years upon that part of plaintiff's municipal electric light plant and distribution system devoted to the manufacture and sale of electricity for commercial and electric use, wherein Anson Thomas, a taxpayer, intervened by leave of court as a defendant. From a judgment for plaintiff, upon refusal of defendants to plead over after their demurrers were overruled, defendants appealed.
John B. Newlin, of Crawfordsville; and Harvey B. Hartsock, Charles M. Wells and J.D. Wright, all of Indianapolis, for appellants.
Raymond O. Evans, of Crawfordsville, for appellee.
Petition for rehearing granted. The opinion filed December 22, 1939, is withdrawn, and this opinion substituted.
The appellee sued to enjoin the appellant treasurer from collecting taxes for the year 1938 and subsequent years upon that part of the appellee's municipal electric light plant and distribution system devoted to the manufacture and sale of electricity for commercial and domestic use. The appellant Thomas, a taxpayer, intervened by leave of court as a defendant.
The complaint is based on chapter 15 of the Acts of 1939 (Acts 1939, p. 24), § 64-221, Burns' 1933 (Supp.), § 15518-5, Baldwin's Supp., 1939, which provides: "That every city and town in the State of Indiana shall be exempt from any and all taxes, either real or personal, on properties or services and income therefrom, for any purpose whatsoever, on its public schools, public libraries, on its municipally owned parks, golf courses, playgrounds, swimming pools, hospitals, waterworks, electric utility, gas and heating plants, sewage treatment and disposal plants, cemeteries, auditoriums, gymnasiums, and any and all other municipally owned property, utility or institution: Provided, however, That this act shall not exempt any city or town from the requirement to pay the tax upon its gross receipts under the Gross Income Tax Law." Section 2 repeals all laws in conflict therewith, and section 3 is an emergency clause providing that the act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage. The act was approved February 23, 1939. The defendants demurred to the complaint for want of facts. It is asserted in the memoranda that the complaint is based solely upon the statute above referred to; that the statute contravenes Article 10, Section 1, of the Constitution of Indiana; and that the act is not retroactive. The demurrers were overruled, the defendants declined to plead further, and there was judgment as prayed.
Error is predicated upon the overruling of the demurrers.
Article 10, Section 1, of the Constitution of Indiana, provides: "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and 1. shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law." It was early held that the purpose for which property is used is controlling, and that property owned by a private individual operating an educational institution for his private profit may be exempted under the Constitution. City of Indianapolis v. Sturdevant (1865), 24 Ind. 391. This case has been cited with approval repeatedly, and was followed in Vink, Treasurer, v. Work (1902), 158 Ind. 638, 64 N.E. 83. In Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Kent et al. (1898), 151 Ind. 349, 50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 723, it was held that the lands of a private owner used and occupied by a lessee for school purposes are not exempt, and the reasoning was followed in Spohn v. Stark, Treasurer, et al. (1926), 197 Ind. 299, 150 N.E. 787, where it was held that property rented to the Indiana National Guard for armory purposes, and used for such purposes, is not exempt from taxation.
In City of Crawfordsville et al. v. Braden (1892), 130 Ind. 149, 159, 28 N.E. 849, 852, it was held that municipal corporations have the power to safeguard and protect health and property; that they have power to light the streets and public places, and to construct and own plants for the purpose of generating electricity for that purpose; that there is a public interest in furnishing power for electric lights to private consumers; and that: "To do so is, in our opinion, a legitimate exercise of the police power for the preservation of property and health. . . . . A light thus produced is safer to property, and more conducive to health than the ordinary light. Produced by the heating of a filament of carbon to the point of incandescence in a vacuum, there is nothing to set property on fire, or to consume the oxygen in the surrounding air, and thus render it less capable of sustaining life and preserving health." The same public purpose has been found in the furnishing of pure water for private use from a municipally-owned and operated waterworks plant.
The Constitution permits the exemption of property "for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." The word "municipal," in the 2-4. narrower sense, means pertaining to a local governmental unit, commonly, a city or town. In its broader sense it means pertaining to the public or governmental affairs of a state or nation or of a people. In one sense the term "municipal purposes" is broad enough to cover any purpose which government may achieve, while in the narrower sense the term may refer only to cities and towns and such other local governmental agencies as may be established for special purposes. For a discussion of the various meanings, see Root v. Erdelmeyer, Treasurer, et al. (1872), 37 Ind. 225, and City of Louisville et al. v. Babb, County Treasurer (1935), 75 F.2d 162. It is clear that this court and courts generally have viewed the operation of an electric plant by a city for the furnishing of lights and power for its own use and the use of its inhabitants as an exercise of the police power. If this is the purpose, it is a governmental purpose that is served under a power generally vested in cities and towns, and therefore a municipal purpose under either the broad or the more restricted meaning of the word "municipal," and it must be concluded that the exemption of property for such a use is within the constitutional provision. It is true that when the opinion in the Crawfordsville case was written, the court and the public generally thought of electricity as useful principally for lighting, and that now probably its predominant use is for power. Much of this power is used for domestic purposes, however, which are as conducive to public health, cleanliness, and safety as the use of modern lighting. It is also used commercially to furnish power in factories. This avoids the necessity for the operation of a multitude of private power plants, with the possibility of incidental smoke and soot and greater fire hazard, so that even in this use a public purpose within the police power can be seen. It is also probably true, although it does not appear in the record, that electric current is furnished to consumers outside of the city which owns and operates the plant. The public duty to protect the health and welfare of the citizen outside of the limits of cities rests primarily upon the Legislature, and in exempting these plants from taxation, regardless of the extent of their operations, the Legislature doubtless found a public interest in the protection and welfare of the citizens of the state.
The record of the Constitutional Debates discloses that the member of the Convention who introduced Section 1 of Article 10 in the form in which it was adopted, thought of the word 5-7. "municipal" as referring to "the property of municipal corporations." He said: "I have prepared these sections with some degree of care, and I think they will meet the object intended. According to the provisions contained in them, all the property of the State, whether belonging to individuals or to corporations, must be taxed — with what exception only? Why, school houses, churches, the property of municipal corporations, and property devoted to benevolent or eleemosynary purposes, so far as the Legislature may see fit to exempt such property." Debates in Indiana Convention, 1850, Vol. 1, pp. 941, 942. It is noted that the provision of the Constitution says that property may be exempted for "municipal purposes," and that the member proposing it construed the clause as meaning that "the property of municipal corporations" might be exempted. The constitutional provision for exemption is based on the purpose for which property is used, while the proposing member seems to construe it as providing for an exemption because of ownership. All property of cities and towns was not exempted at first, but after a short time statutes were enacted exempting all such property, and such has been the law until the Act of 1933 (Acts 1933, ch. 190, § 16, p. 928, § 54-610, Burns' 1933, § 14027, Baldwin's 1934), which taxed that part of public utility plants owned by cities which was used for the purpose of selling service to private persons. See Borgman, Treasurer, et al. v. City of Fort Wayne (1939), 215 Ind. 201, 18 N.E.2d 762. The Act of 1933 is the only act repealed by the repealing clause of the statute here in question to which our attention has been called. We know of no case in which the legislative authority to exempt such property was questioned. In Lowe v. Board of Com'rs of Howard County (1884), 94 Ind. 553, 555, this court expressed the view that: "Lands held by public corporations for public purposes are exempt from taxation," and that such exemption "well comports with our Constitution and our statutes, which everywhere evince an intention to relieve from taxes and assessments property owned by the public. . . ." Thus the Legislature early construed the Constitution as authorizing it to exempt from taxation the property of cities and towns, the public has long acquiesced in this interpretation, and this court by the dictum above quoted concurred. But the constitutional provision as submitted to the people does not say that the property of municipal corporations may be exempted; it says that property may be exempted for "municipal purposes." In construing the language of the Constitution we seek the meaning intended by those who adopted it, and not by those who drafted it, and, ordinarily, words are treated as used in their ordinary sense. But where there is doubt or ambiguity, we look to the Constitutional Debates and to contemporary construction, both official and popular, for light. It is probably true that to the average person the word "municipal" suggests a city, town, village, or other governmental agency or entity, and no doubt most of those who voted for the adoption of the Constitution so interpreted the word. This is not difficult to believe in the light of the interpretation put upon it by the Legislature and the courts, and the drafter of the provision, who said: "I have prepared these sections with some degree of care." A careful examination of the language of the provision discloses some basis for such an interpretation in the provision itself.
To maintain educational and charitable institutions is clearly within the powers and purposes and ordinary practices of all government, including cities and towns, and therefore if 8-12. the term "municipal purposes" was used in the broader sense, and if it was intended to refer solely to the purposes for which property was used, it is broad enough to cover and include the words, "educational," "literary," and "charitable," and those words would be mere surplusage. The authorities agree that the words used in the Constitution must be presumed to have been carefully chosen so that each word would have a meaning. It has been said that each word must be thought of as having been deliberately selected and intentionally placed as though it had been hammered into the instrument. Each word therefore must be given effect, and, since the words, "educational," "literary," and "charitable," were deliberately used, it is reasonable to conclude that the word "municipal" was not intended to be construed as including the same subject-matter, and it must have been used in the narrower sense, as referring to cities, towns, or other governmental units. Thus construed it is found to permit the exemption from taxation of property used for the purposes of cities, towns, or other governmental units. This construction conforms to the legislative, and popular and official interpretation long acquiesced in, and the authorities agree that such interpretation is entitled to weight and consideration in construing doubtful constitutional provisions. We construe the constitutional provision to mean that the Legislature may exempt from taxation property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, and the purposes of municipal corporations. Since municipal corporations are authorized and designed to serve public purposes only, any property which they may acquire in the exercise of their powers to accomplish such purposes, or as an incident thereto, may lawfully be exempted from taxation.
It does not follow that we disapprove of the result reached in City of Louisville et al. v. Babb, County Treasurer, supra. The facts in that case were that the Federal government had authorized the city of Louisville to build a bridge across the Ohio River, connecting the city of Louisville and the city of Jeffersonville in this state. The Legislature of Kentucky had authorized the incorporation of the Louisville Bridge Commission for the purpose of constructing, operating, and repairing the bridge. The Commission came into existence and built the bridge. The real estate upon which the bridge, office building, toll houses, etc., are located was taken in the name of the city of Louisville. Part of this property was located in the state of Indiana. Bonds were issued to pay for the construction. It was opened to the public. The bridge was not built for profit, but tolls were to provide sufficient income to maintain, operate, and repair the bridge and to provide a sinking fund sufficient to pay the bonds and interest thereon as they mature. The Commission was to operate the bridge until the bonded indebtedness was fully paid, at which time the Commission was to cease functioning, and the city of Louisville was to assume the operation of the bridge, with the privilege of collecting tolls to cover the cost of maintenance, operation, and repair.
The Legislature of Indiana enacted a statute (Acts 1929, ch. 94, p. 296, § 64-202, Burns' 1933, § 15522, Baldwin's 1934) exempting from taxation any bridge constructed across a navigable stream forming a boundary of this state, and the appurtenances thereto, when owned by the state of Indiana or by any municipality or political subdivision thereof, or by another state or by any municipality or political subdivision of such other state, if such bridge be free of tolls except such as are necessary to pay for the cost, maintenance, repair, and operation of the bridge.
The bridge property was not for private profit. It was devoted to a public use and became and was used as a part of the highway system of Indiana. The bridge was devoted to a municipal 13. purpose. Cities, towns, and other municipal agencies have always had authority to maintain highways and bridges, and it cannot be doubted that they serve a public or municipal purpose and that they are necessary to the welfare of the community. The constitutional provision does not limit the exemption to municipalities authorized or established by the Legislature of this state, and, since the bridge in question serves a public purpose within this state, and is owned and operated, not privately, but by a municipal corporation of another state, for the benefit of the public of both states, no constitutional reason can be seen for denying legislative power to exempt it from taxation. It is within the purpose and spirit of the constitutional provision and does not violate its letter.
The word "municipality" is not limited in its meaning to cities and towns. It is said by McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, § 134, that, in the absence of constitutional limitation, the State Legislature may create any kind of a corporation to aid in the administration of public affairs. Attention is called to many such in addition to cities, towns, and villages. In Edwards et al. v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie et al. (1939), 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741, 744, this court said: "From time to time boards and commissions have been created and authorized and vested with authority to carry out projects for the protection of the public. The name given to such an instrumentality is of no significance, nor do we find any limit upon the character or number of public corporations or bodies politic, which the Legislature may authorize or create to accomplish such purposes." It was said of the Housing Authority projects: "They are as public in character as drainage, levee, sanitary, or highway projects, the property and bonds of which are properly exempted from taxation." It would seem immaterial whether the Legislature establishes the agency or adopts one already in existence, especially where enterprises overlapping the state boundaries are involved.
The appellants cite many cases in which this court has said that, in the operation of a public utility, the city acts in its private and proprietary capacity. But this is so only 14-17. to a limited extent. When a municipality has been clothed with powers for the peculiar and special advantages of its inhabitants, rather than for the good of the state at large, the corporation has a private character, and its liability for torts and otherwise is based upon the same principles as that of a private corporation, and a municipality may have property rights which are so far private that they are not held at the pleasure of the Legislature. It is only in respect to such matters that the city is spoken of as acting in a private or proprietary capacity. Judge Dillon says: "But that a municipal corporation is in any just view a private corporation, or possesses a double character, the one private and the other public, although often asserted, is only true in a modified sense. In their nature and purposes, municipal corporations, however numerous and complex their powers and functions, are essentially public." Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed. Vol. 1, § 38, p. 68. In respect to their public utility properties the rights and duties of a municipality are generally measured by the same rules and the same standards which apply to private individuals or private corporations, and this has led to the repeated statement that they hold their public utility properties in a private or proprietary capacity. But the same courts that use such language uniformly hold that, in the operation of such properties, the municipalities perform a public function under the police power, and not a private function.
The statute under consideration in Borgman, Treasurer, et al. v. City of Fort Wayne, supra, exempted from taxation only municipally-owned utilities operated exclusively for furnishing service to the municipality itself, or that portion of such a utility which was so used. It was held in that case that utility property used for other purposes might be taxed, but it was not held that it might not be expressly exempted, since that question was not before the court.
It is also contended that the statute was not intended to relieve the city from liability for taxes levied on March 1, 1938, and due and payable in May, 1939; that the repeal of a statute levying a tax does not affect taxes which are already a lien.
Unless a contrary intention is expressed, statutes are treated as intended to operate prospectively, and not retrospectively. Section 1-307, Burns' 1933, § 13, 18-20. Baldwin's 1934, changed the common-law rule, and provides that: "The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide; and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purposes of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability." The statute in question is more than a repealing statute; it provides: "That every city and town in the state of Indiana shall be exempt from any and all taxes. . . ." There is no limitation upon the exemption. It does not say "heretofore levied" or "to be hereafter levied." The Legislature undoubtedly had the power to exempt the municipality from the payment of taxes already levied or assessed but unpaid. But it must be noted that the act carried an emergency clause which made it effective after passage, and that it was approved on the 23rd day of February, 1939. Taxes become effective as of the first day of March of each year. If it had been intended that municipalities were to be free from liability for taxes which had already become effective, there would have been no necessity for the emergency clause which made the act effective prior to the first day of March. The taxes for 1938, or the first installment thereof, were required to be paid not later than the first Monday of May to avoid delinquency. It is a matter of common knowledge that such payments are often made at an earlier date, and it might well be supposed that some cities might have paid their 1938 taxes prior to the time the act in question went into effect on February 23, 1939, and yet there is no provision for the reimbursement of such cities. A sense of equality and fairness would have suggested that if cities were to be relieved of the taxes already accrued there would be some provision for the reimbursement of those that might have paid. In view of these considerations, it has been concluded that, notwithstanding the general words of the statute, it must be construed as having been intended to operate prospectively only, and not intended to relieve municipalities from liability for taxes already assessed.
What we have said leads to the conclusion that the statute in question is constitutional, but that it is not retroactive; that therefore the taxes for the year 1938 were legally levied 21. and should not have been enjoined, but that there is no legal basis for the levy of taxes for subsequent years.
The complaint is in one paragraph. It seeks an injunction against the collection of taxes for the year 1938 and all subsequent years. The plaintiff might have separated his complaint into paragraphs, but he did not choose to do so, but treated all of the assessments of taxes as involving a single transaction. The defendants might have moved to separate the complaint into paragraphs, but they chose to file identical demurrers for want of facts to the complaint in one paragraph. By memorandum they assert that the act exempting the property of the municipality from taxes is unconstitutional, and that the act is not retroactive; in other words, that if the act is constitutional it is not retroactive so as to bar the collection of the taxes assessed for 1938. We have concluded that the first objection to the complaint was not well taken, since the act is constitutional, but that the second objection was well taken, since the act is not retroactive.
The appellee contends that, since the complaint states a cause of action as to the taxes for the year 1939 and subsequent years, the demurrers were properly 22-25. overruled, notwithstanding a good cause of action was not stated concerning the taxes for 1938; that the complaint justifies a judgment enjoining the taxes for 1939 and subsequent years; and that, although the judgment enjoins the taxes for 1938 also, there was no motion to modify; and that the judgment cannot be corrected even though it is erroneous. The rule suggested is generally applicable and might furnish a technical obstacle to the correction of an obviously erroneous judgment except for another well-known equitable rule which governs actions to enjoin taxes. "No principle of the law of injunctions is more firmly established than that requiring a taxpayer who seeks the aid of an injunction against the enforcement or collection of a tax, to first pay or tender the amount which is conceded to be legally and properly due." High on Injunctions, 4th Ed. Vol. 1, § 497, p. 467; Wilt et al. v. Bueter, Treasurer, et al. (1917), 186 Ind. 98, 111 N.E. 926, 115 N.E. 49, and cases cited. In the same section (p. 469) it is said: "And an allegation that complainant has paid all taxes which he is legally liable to pay is not sufficient within the meaning of the rule, since it is only an averment of a legal conclusion and not of a fact. The bill should therefore, in all cases allege the facts and particulars which will enable the court to determine whether the legal conclusion is warranted by the facts." See, also, Studabaker v. Studabaker et al. (1899), 152 Ind. 89, 51 N.E. 933. The word "conceded" is thus construed to mean conceded by the facts alleged in the complaint. A complaint which alleges facts showing that some taxes are due is bad upon demurrer, notwithstanding the contention of the plaintiff that, under the facts alleged, there are no taxes due. The court must determine, and the court's conclusion upon examination of the facts will control, and not the conclusion of the pleader or his failure to concede that which appears from the facts alleged.
Under chancery practice, where it appears from the bill that a part of the tax sought to be enjoined is due, the bill would be dismissed without prejudice so that the amount due may be 26. paid or tendered. Under our practice, the demurrer should be sustained, with leave to amend showing payment or tender of the amount due.
It was error to overrule the demurrers. Loesnitz v. Seelinger, Treasurer, et al. (1891), 127 Ind. 422, 25 N.E. 1037, 26 N.E. 887.
The judgment is reversed, with instructions to sustain the demurrers, with leave to amend. There is no question of fact involved. If, by amendment, it shall appear that the plaintiff has paid or tendered the taxes for 1938, the proceedings should result in a judgment enjoining the collection of taxes for subsequent years.
Note — Reported in 24 N.E.2d 937.


Is construction really that dangerous?
Why is “strict liability” important to ensure workplace safety?
Contractors and owners of construction sites are best able to control safety on the sites. In fact, workers have little or no control over equipment on the worksite and are hardly in a position to protect themselves from danger. Also important is the fact that in a construction accident, the worker’s conduct cannot be completely independent from that of the contractor and owner, as would be true in, say, a car accident. In every situation, the contractor/owner/employer will have provided the worker certain devices to use for the job and the worker will use those devices. Thus, the conduct of the worker will never be independent from the duty of contractors, construction site owners and employers to provide proper devices.
That is why, since 1923, the New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the scaffold law is a strict/absolute liability statute and that comparative negligence is not a defense to a claim under the scaffold law. This means that if contractors or owners do not provide “proper protection” to workers as required by the scaffold law, and this results in a worker’s injury, contractors and owners will be held liable (responsible) for the worker’s injury and the worker cannot be blamed.
Does the scaffold law protect undocumented workers?
Yes. This is extremely important as “[u]ndocumented workers are among the most vulnerable and exploited workers in our country, as frequent victims of unpaid wages, dangerous conditions and uncompensated workplace injuries, discrimination, and other labor law violations.” It is essential that such workers are entitled to recover in court as those “who attempt to remedy the abuse routinely face physical and immigration-related threats and retaliation.” In 2006, New York’s highest court ruled that undocumented workers injured at a work site as a result of a scaffold law violation can recover lost wages, as long as the worker has not given false papers to his/her employer.
Are there already limits on the liability of an owner or contractor under current law?
Yes. Under current law, an accident alone does not establish liability. In order to be liable under the scaffold law, the defendant must have violated the required safety standards established by the courts. The worker must then also establish causation. Second, if the contractor/owner has provided the worker with “proper protection” under the scaffold law, and the accident was solely caused by the worker’s negligence (i.e., being intoxicated at work, etc.), the worker’s claim will fail. This is called the “sole proximate cause” defense. Lastly, under the “recalcitrant worker” defense, the worker’s claim will fail if contractors/owners have provided him/her with “proper protection” and specific instructions, and the worker failed to listen to those instructions.
How do owners and contractors want to change the scaffold law?
Worksite owners, contractors and liability insurance companies have recently mounted a strong campaign to change the scaffold law to “establish a comparative negligence standard for claims under Labor Law § 240 and 241 with respect to a recalcitrant worker.” Although contractors, owners and insurance companies defend this bill as being restricted to “limited circumstances,” in practice, at least one of those limited circumstances will always be alleged, completely defeating the safety purpose behind the scaffold law’s strict liability standard. In other words, in every situation where a contractor/owner fails to provide the “proper protection,” they will still be able to try to blame the worker. This totally undermines the safety incentives behind the scaffold law.
Are there any legitimate justifications for these changes to the scaffold law?
No. Proponents of this bill claim that high payouts in scaffold law cases lead to excessive insurance rates and fewer construction jobs. First, construction is very much on the rise in New York. Second, there are no independent data identifying why the insurance industry may be increasing rates (if they are) or any connection whatsoever between rates and claims. Because there is virtually no transparency in this area, the insurance industry should be required to release closed claims information so the public and government officials can see if there is price-gouging, and if there is a problem, determine the proper way to solve it. If rates are too high and are unjustified by claims history, which is likely, the solutions to that problem lie with better insurance regulation. The solutions do not lie with stripping away the rights of workers and making worksites less safe.
What are some examples of scaffold law cases that show the importance of current law?
Gjonaj v. 30 W. 26th St. Associates (2013). Tom Gjonaj, a 60-year-old window washer, was cleaning the second floor windows of an office building at 30 West 26th Street in Manhattan. Gjonaj had suspended himself from the building by attaching his window washer’s belt to a bolt on the outside of the building. The bolt ripped out of the building wall and Gjonaj fell 15 to 20 feet to the ground, suffering multiple fractures of his left arm, pelvis and hip. He underwent several surgeries and procedures. He brought suit under the scaffold law; the defendants, who tried to blame Gjonaj, settled.
Nechifor v. RH Atlantic-Pacific(2012). Gheorghe Nechifor fell approximately twelve feet from a rolling scaffold that was being used to build a sidewalk bridge. The scaffold lacked the proper means to reach the upper level platform, specifically a ladder that was designed to be attached to the scaffold. All parties agreed that the ladder was not on the scaffold that day and that the scaffold was not safe for use that day. Nechifor was required to climb on the scaffold side bars in order to climb up and down the scaffold. This was the way workers on the site regularly used the scaffold, without ladders or safety equipment, as they weren’t provided with any. On the day Nechifor fell, the scaffold bars were wet from melted snow and he slipped on one of the bars while descending the scaffold. Defendants claimed Nechifor should have used a lifeline to climb up and down the scaffold or used some other ladder to get up and down the scaffold, also alleging that he intentionally jumped off the scaffold. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Nechifor since defendants had a duty to furnish proper safety devices. The Appellate Division affirmed; the case recently settled before trial.
Ordonez v. 346 West 17th Street, LLC. (2012). Thirty-three-year-old Jose Ordonez, an asbestos-removal specialist, was working at a renovation site at 346 West 17th Street in Manhattan. Ordonez and a co-worker entered an aerial-lift’s basket and were elevated to 20 feet in order to address a ramp. The base of the lift unexpectedly rolled down an inclined surface and overturned, causing both workers to plummet to the ground. Ordonez suffered spinal fractures, rib fractures, disc herniations, a concussion, a subdural hematoma and a laceration on the back of his head. He has also sustained brain damage, leading to depression, moodiness and impairment of cognitive functions, including memory. He experiences seizure-like symptoms, suffers from residual pain and limitations and cannot return to work. Ordonez’s condition will require lifelong treatment. Ordonez sued under the scaffold law, maintaining that the aerial lift was not properly secured and that he was not provided with a harness or any other type of device that could have prevented his fall. Defense counsel tried to blame Ordonez, arguing that he should have secured the basket to the ramp. The trial court granted Ordonez’s motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants were liable under the scaffold law.
Ritacco & DeGiacomo v. One Bryant Park, LLC.(2012). Marble setters Ernest Ritacco (28) and Sergio Diacomo (37) were working at a construction site at One Bryant Park in Manhattan. While working on the ground, beneath a scaffold, the arm of a crane on the building’s 60th floor struck a steel bucket containing 100 pounds of materials. The bucket was knocked off the building, falling onto and smashing the scaffold’s plywood roof, propelling debris about the site and knocking Ritacco and DeGiacomo down a stairway. Both workers suffered multiple back injuries, requiring spinal fusions and other surgeries, and experience permanent residual pain and limitations that prevent resumption of manual labor. Ritacco and DeGiacomo sued under the scaffold law, arguing that Tishman Construction failed to provide adequate protection. Defense counsel conceded liability and the case settled.
Romanczuk v. Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Co. (2010). Andrzej Romanczuk and three co-workers were renovating bulkhead walls on the roof of Building 453 in Manhattan’s Peter Cooper Village Stuyvesant Town complex. In order to perform the required work, Romanczuk had to access the bulkhead from a scaffold, which was provided by his employer, Westchester Plaza. As a result, Romanczuk was required to climb the inside rungs of the scaffold and step from the scaffold to the roof. His co-workers had accessed the roof in this way and his supervisor was aware of it. As Romanczuk was about to place his foot on the roof while stepping from the scaffold, the scaffold moved towards and away from the wall, causing him to fall three meters between the wall and the scaffold. Romanczuk argued that: 1) the scaffold should have been attached to the wall by an arm in order to prevent its movement; 2) the scaffold did not have the proper planking or any guardrails; and 3) he was not given any safety equipment, such as a safety belt. He testified that “he was given instructions by either his boss or supervisor…that he either used his own tools provided to him by his employer” and that “he never received any instructions as to how he should perform his work from any of the defendants.” Defendants argued that Romanczuk actually fell backwards because his shoelace became caught on the clip of the scaffold and that he would not have fallen if he were wearing long pants, instead of shorts, to cover his shoelaces. The trial court granted summary judgment to Romanczuk since defendants had a duty to provide a proper scaffold and safety devices; the Appellate Division affirmed the ruling.
Zafar v. City of New York(2000). Zafar was struck by a brick that fell five stories from a NYC-owned construction site. A co-worker had wedged the brick under a pulley to help the pulley move more freely. Zafar suffered a fractured skull and subdural hematoma, resulting in “significant cognitive deficit manifesting itself in difficulties with memory and concentration.” He also suffered a fractured orbit, partial loss of vision in one eye and a loss of smell and taste. The employer claimed Zafar was not even working on the day in question and had probably visited the site for personal reasons. The city argued that Zafar had probably been hit by a brick during a mugging at the site. The investigating police officer testified that there had been no mugging at the site on the day Zafar was injured. A jury found defendant liable under the scaffold law.
 N.Y. Lab. Law § 240 (McKinney 2013).
 Kirk Semple, “Contractors and Workers at Odds Over Scaffold Law,” New York Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/nyregion/campaign-underway-to-amend-scaffold-law-protecting-construction-workers.html.
 See Blake v. Neighborhood House. Servs. of N.Y.C., Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 284–85 (2003).
 Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Worker Safety Series: Construction (viewed March 11, 2014), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3252/3252.html.
 Bureau of Labor Statistics: New York-New Jersey Information Office, Fatal Work Injuries in New York City – 2012, September 18, 2013, http://www.bls.gov/ro2/cfoi9660.pdf.
Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 318 (1948).
See, e.g., Maleeny v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 237 N.Y. 250, 253 (1923).
Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313 (1948). Under comparative negligence, if the plaintiff was also negligent in the accident, his/her damages will be reduced in proportion to his/her relevant fault. See Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 220 (2d ed. 2013); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2014).
See generally Lee S. Kreindler et al., New York Law of Torts § 12:85 (2013). As Dan B. Dobbs describes in his famous treatise, Law of Torts, “Strict liability is imposed upon a defendant without proof that he was at fault.” See Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 437 (2d ed. 2013). While the justifications are somewhat unique in each type of strict liability scenario, the general idea is that, “for some activities involving special dangers…liability can be imposed without fault.” Id. at § 433 (emphasis added).
Workplace Fairness, “Hidden America: Undocumented Workers” (viewed March 21, 2014), http://www.workplacefairness.org/sc/undocumentedworkers.php.
 See Lee S. Kreindler et al., New York Law of Torts § 21:52 (2013), citing Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
 See Blake v. Neighborhood House. Servs. of N.Y.C., Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 289 (2003).
 Cahill v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 N.Y.3d 35, 40 (2004).
 S111, 2013-14 Reg. Session (N.Y. 2013).
 The defenses would apply if the plaintiff’s conduct relates to: “a criminal act, use or drugs or alcohol, failure of the employee to use safety devices furnished at the job site, failure to comply with employer instructions regarding the use of safety devices at the job site, or failure of the employee to comply with safe work practices in accord with safety training programs provided by the employer.” S111, 2013-14 Reg. Session (N.Y. 2013).
 “Home Construction Rises, as Do Building Permits,” Reuters, September 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/home-construction-and-building-permits-rise.html.
2011 WL 11073450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2011), aff’d 92 A.D.4d 514 (1st Dept. 2012).
 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 6777 (104175/08, March 2, 2012).
2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 15721 (400129/09, March 14, 2012).
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 30636(U) (Trial Order) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 19, 2009), aff’d 72 A.D.3d 592 (1st Dept. 2010).
 2000 NY Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS 776 (104367/93, March 17, 2000).