UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Harry W. MAISONET–GONZÁLEZ, Defendant, Appellant.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges. Marlene Aponte, on brief for appellant. John A. Matthews II, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez–Vélez, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez–Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, on brief for appellee.
Defendant-appellant Harry W. Maisonet–González (“Maisonet”) pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. He was sentenced to a fifty-one-month term of imprisonment, at the top of his Guidelines imprisonment range. Maisonet now appeals, challenging the district court's calculation of loss and other aspects of the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. After careful consideration, we affirm.
Because Maisonet pled guilty, our discussion of the facts is drawn from the change-of-plea colloquy, the Presentence Report (“PSR”), and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Cintrón–Echautegui, 604 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2010).
Between August 2005 and February 2006, Maisonet, owner of Harry Maisonet Auto Sales and Harry Entertainment Group, conspired to devise a scheme to fraudulently obtain money from Pentagon Federal Credit Union (“Pentagon”) by submitting fraudulent automobile and personal loan applications in the name of third parties, some of them deceased. Specifically, Maisonet opened accounts at Pentagon in the name of third parties and then provided these names to a co-defendant who had access to a database maintained by the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury.1 Maisonet's co-defendant provided personal information about these third parties to Maisonet, who, in turn, used this information to obtain loans on their behalf without their knowledge. As result of this scheme, Maisonet obtained a total of $445,000 from Pentagon. Maisonet deposited this money in the Harry Maisonet Auto Sales account at Doral Bank,2 for which he was the sole account holder.
Pentagon eventually detected the fraud and, in April 2006, filed a civil suit against Maisonet in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Part, seeking reimbursement of the money he fraudulently obtained. An additional and related state civil suit was filed involving Pentagon, Doral Bank, and Maisonet.3 The parties eventually reached a private settlement agreement which put an end to these two state cases. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, executed on May 1, 2008, Maisonet paid restitution to Pentagon in the amount of $327,297.32.
Almost two years later, on March 10, 2010, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Puerto Rico returned a twenty-five count indictment against Maisonet and one co-defendant. Pertinently, Count One charged Maisonet with conspiracy and attempt to defraud a financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) and (2).
On June 3, 2011, Maisonet pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment, pursuant to a plea agreement. In the plea agreement, the parties calculated a total offense level of fourteen, broken down as follows: a base offense level of seven pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2B1.1(a)(1); an eight-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) because the amount of loss was more than $70,000 but did not exceed $120,000; a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the offense involved between ten and forty-nine victims; and a three-level decrease pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) due to Maisonet's timely acceptance of responsibility. The parties, which did not stipulate to Maisonet's Criminal History Category, ultimately recommended a sentence of time served, six months of home detention, three years of supervised release, and two hundred hours of unpaid community service. For its part, the government agreed to request the dismissal of the remaining counts.
The PSR, which was disclosed to the parties on February 17, 2012, calculated a total offense level of twenty. The difference between the total offense level calculated in the PSR and the one calculated by the parties in their plea agreement stemmed from the U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) increase for the victim losses attributable to Maisonet's conduct. The PSR used Pentagon's total loss of $445,000 and, thus, applied a fourteen-level increase, as opposed to the parties' calculation which discounted from Pentagon's total loss the amount restituted by Maisonet pursuant to the settlement agreement reached in the state court civil litigation, resulting in only an eight-level increase. The probation officer stated in the PSR that the total loss amount should be used in determining the applicable level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) because Maisonet waited until after Pentagon (the victim) had learned of the fraud to make any restitution. In addition, according to the PSR, Maisonet had a Criminal History Category of III, because he had two prior convictions and he committed the instant offense while on probation for one of his previous convictions.
On July 30, 2012, Maisonet filed his sentencing memorandum, which included objections to the PSR. Specifically, he objected to the victim losses attributable to his conduct and argued that his circumstances warranted a departure. Maisonet asserted that, because he restituted $327,297.32 before he was indicted or was aware he was being investigated by the government, the restitution should have been deducted from the loss calculation, leaving an outstanding loss of $117,703. The probation officer responded and reiterated his conclusion that the total loss should be used to calculate the offense level increase.
The sentencing hearing was held on July 24, 2013. There, Maisonet once again argued that the amount he previously restituted should be deducted from the loss amount calculation for sentencing purposes. He also encouraged the court to consider a non-Guidelines sentence and follow the recommendations made in the parties' plea agreement. The court rejected Maisonet's contentions. It first noted that it was not bound by the stipulation made by the government in the parties' plea agreement. The court then refused to discount any restitution previously made by Maisonet because Pentagon had detected the offense long before Maisonet began to make restitution, and because any restitution was not voluntary, but rather was made due to the settlement agreement in the civil cases. Ultimately, the court calculated a total offense level of twenty, which broke down the same way as in the PSR: a base offense level of seven pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1); a fourteen-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) because the amount of loss was more than $400,000 but did not exceed $1,000,000; a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the offense involved between ten and forty-nine victims; and a three-level decrease pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) due to Maisonet's timely acceptance of responsibility. The court also determined that Maisonet had a Criminal History Category of III, that he had a series of prior arrests and two prior criminal convictions, and that Maisonet committed the instant offense while on probation for a sentence imposed in 2004,4 in clear disregard for the law. The total offense level of twenty and the Criminal History Category of III yielded a Guidelines sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment.
Maisonet challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He contests the “calculation of loss” component of his total offense level, which he claims resulted in an incorrect total offense level of twenty instead of fourteen, and thus a higher Guidelines sentencing range. Maisonet also claims that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him at the higher end of his Guidelines based on his prior criminal record and lack of remorse. He argues that his prior criminal record was already contemplated in his Criminal History Category and, thus, considering his prior criminal record again as part of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors constituted “double counting.” He also alleges that the court's perception of a lack of remorse is not supported by the record. Finally, Maisonet posits that his sentence was “greater than necessary” and that the district court did not “acknowledg[e] the combination of factors that could justify” the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence of time served, as recommended by the parties in the plea agreement. Each of Maisonet's claims fails, as his sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
We review “the reasonableness of a sentence ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’ “ United States v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). First, we determine whether the district court made any procedural errors, such as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Rivera–Moreno, 613 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When assessing procedural reasonableness, our abuse of discretion standard is multifaceted. We review factual findings for clear error, arguments that the sentencing court erred in interpreting or applying the guidelines de novo, and judgment calls for abuse of discretion simpliciter.” United States v. Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 309 (1st Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Serunjogi, 767 F.3d 132, 142 (1st Cir.2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted).
We then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Serunjogi, 767 F.3d at 142. “When conducting this review, we take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance” from the Guidelines. Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d at 309 (quoting Rivera–Moreno, 613 F.3d at 8). “Although we evaluate the reasonableness of a sentence even when it falls within the Guidelines, ‘a defendant who attempts to brand a within-the-range sentence as unreasonable must carry a heavy burden.’ “ Battle, 637 F.3d at 51 (quoting United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir.2006)). A sentence will withstand a substantive reasonableness challenge so long as there is “a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result.” United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir.2008).
Maisonet challenges the calculation of loss component of his total offense level and its resulting Guidelines range. Specifically, he argues that the district court miscalculated the amount of loss by disregarding U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) Application Note 3(E) (Credits Against Loss), which resulted in an incorrect total offense level of twenty instead of fourteen, and thus a higher Guidelines sentencing range. He asserts that, prior to his charge and arrest, he was not on notice of any criminal investigation and that Pentagon did not press criminal charges against him. Maisonet claims that, because he did not know of any criminal investigation when he restituted close to three-fourths of the amount obtained by fraud, the district court erred by failing to discount the restituted amount from the amount of loss and, instead, using the entire amount of loss for sentencing purposes. We disagree.
As discussed above, we review the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its underlying factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Batchu, 724 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2013).
[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected. The time of detection of the offense is the earlier of (I) the time the offense was discovered by a victim or government agency; or (II) the time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the offense was detected or about to be detected by a victim or government agency.
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n. 3(E)(i) (emphasis added).
Maisonet's contention that he was not on notice of any criminal investigation and that Pentagon did not seek to have criminal charges brought against him is irrelevant because what is determinative under the Guidelines is the time of detection of the offense by either the victim or the government. See United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2010) (“The Sentencing Commission's commentary is to be ‘read in a straightforward, commonsense manner.’ “ (quoting United States v. Carrasco–Mateo, 389 F.3d 239, 244 (1st Cir.2004))). Pursuant to the clear language of the Guidelines, in order to be entitled to a deduction in the loss amount, Maisonet must have restituted the money before either Pentagon or the government detected the offense. See id. (“[C]redit for the return of property under Application Note 3(e) is only available if the property is returned before either the victim or law enforcement becomes aware of the crime.”); United States v. García–Pastrana, 584 F.3d 351, 391–92 (1st Cir.2009) (defining “ ‘time of detection’ as ‘the earlier of (I) the time of the offense was discovered by a victim or government agency; or (II) the time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the offense was detected or about to be detected by a victim or government agency’ “ (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(E)(i))). That clearly did not happen here. The district court correctly found that Pentagon detected the offense and filed suit in state court in April 2006 seeking reimbursement of “the monies that had been fraudulently obtained.” The court further found that “any restitution made was a result of the Settlement Agreement” reached by the parties on May 1, 2008, in the civil case. It then correctly concluded that Maisonet did not restitute any money before the offense was detected and, thus, was not entitled to any offset.
In conclusion, because Maisonet failed to begin restitution of the $445,000 loss amount before Pentagon (the victim) discovered the offense, the district court correctly found that the loss amount was more than $400,000 but did not exceed $1,000,000 and, thus, the sentence enhancement of fourteen levels was appropriate pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The resulting total offense level and Guidelines range were also correct.
Maisonet's next procedural challenge—that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting by taking into consideration his prior criminal history in analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, even though this was already accounted for in his Criminal History Category—fails as well.
Double counting concerns usually involve the use of a single factor more than once to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range. See, e.g., Unites States v. Fiume, 708 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir.2013). Here, the district court did not use the same factor twice to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range. It merely used Maisonet's prior criminal history to calculate his Criminal History Category, which in turn was factored into the Guidelines sentencing range, and then considered all the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, which included Maisonet's history and characteristics, the need to promote respect for the law, and to afford adequate deterrence. See United States v. Romero–Galíndez, ––– F.3d ––––, Case No. 13–2205, 2015 WL 1501617, at *8 n. 8 (1st Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (suggesting that applying the same underlying facts via two separate Guidelines provisions to set a base offense level and then enhance a sentence is distinguishable from factoring defendant's prior criminal history into his base offense level and then considering their particular gravity as a factor in determining how stringent his sentence should be). This overlap between the Guidelines and other sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not constitute double counting and is neither surprising nor impermissible. See United States v. Cruzado–Laureano, 527 F .3d 231, 236 (1st Cir.2008) (“The court's consideration of appellant's attitude toward the crime, as well as the serious nature of the offense, was appropriate under both the Guidelines and 18 U.S .C. § 3553(a)․”). In fact, “Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to take into account many of the same factors in construing the guidelines that it directed sentencing courts to consider, along with guidelines, in sentencing individual defendants .” United States v. De Los Santos, 196 F. App'x 7, 8 (1st Cir.2006) (comparing 28 U.S.C. § 994 with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
Maisonet cites United States v. Zapete–García, 447 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.2006), in support of his contention that the district court inappropriately engaged in double counting. However, Maisonet's reliance on Zapete–García is misplaced. There, we stated that “[w]hen a factor is already included in the calculation of the guidelines sentencing range, a judge who wishes to rely on that same factor to impose a sentence above or below the range must articulate specifically the reasons that this particular defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation covered by the guidelines calculation.” Id. at 60 (emphasis added). Here, however, the district court did not impose a non-Guidelines sentence. The court merely considered his prior criminal history in determining to impose a sentence at the higher end of the Guidelines range. Furthermore, even when a non-Guidelines sentence is imposed, Zapete–García does not prohibit the court from relying at sentencing on a factor already included in the calculation of the Guidelines sentencing range. Instead, it only requires the district court to specifically articulate the reasons for doing so. Id. And the district court did so here.
In sum, the district court's imposing a higher sentence than the government recommended based in part on Maisonet's prior criminal history—even though his history was also reflected in his Criminal History Category—did not constitute double counting and, in fact, was both permissible and reasonable.
Maisonet also argues that the court committed clear error by concluding that he lacked remorse for his commission of the offense. We will not find clear error unless “on the entire evidence [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 120, 122 (1st Cir.2002) (alterations in the original) (citation omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court made a specific finding that Maisonet did not show any repentance. The district court supported this finding with the fact that Maisonet was the one responsible for devising and running the entire fraudulent scheme; he was the main player, who recruited and paid others to participate with him in the scheme; and he was the sole holder of the bank account where the fraud proceeds were deposited. Yet, Maisonet had tried to minimize his participation during his allocution. The court stated that the way Maisonet behaved during his allocution was a reflection of how he has always proceeded in life. Specifically, it stated that throughout his life, Maisonet “has displayed a conduct in which he has managed to get away with whatever he wants, and that his conduct reflects so,” and that “even his demeanor ․ betrayed him ․ in court.” Based on the evidence on the record, we do not find that the district court's conclusion that Maisonet lacked remorse was erroneous, clearly or otherwise.
Maisonet next argues that the district court did not “acknowledg[e] the combination of factors that could justify” the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence of time served. He, however, failed to develop this argument. In fact, he did not discuss, or even mention, which were the factors that allegedly justified a sentence below the Guidelines. Thus, this argument is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that arguments raised “in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”).
“A district court's discretionary decision not to depart from the Guidelines is reviewed for reasonableness.” Battle, 637 F.3d at 51–52 (citing United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d 68, 73–75 (1st Cir.2010)). Here, the district court met the reasonableness standard. It considered Maisonet's arguments but found them unpersuasive because of Maisonet's leading role in the offense, his criminal history, his clear disregard for the law and the rights of his victims, the seriousness of his offense, and the timing of its occurrence, having been committed while on probation for a previous offense. We find no abuse of discretion.
In sum, although Maisonet and the government requested a sentence of time served, the district court, within its discretion, found that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines sentencing range was sufficient but not greater than necessary. The district court carefully considered all relevant factors and explained in detail the basis for its conclusion that Maisonet warranted a Guidelines sentence. This was a defensible result, and the court stated a plausible rationale for reaching it. See United States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.2014).
The district court properly calculated the victim's loss attributable to Maisonet for sentencing purposes. After correctly calculating the total offense level and Guidelines sentencing range, it sentenced Maisonet to a within-the-Guidelines sentence, which was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Thus, we affirm his sentence.
1. Maisonet obtained the names for the deceased third parties by going through newspaper obituaries.
2. On February 27, 2015, Doral Bank was closed by the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. See http:// www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2015/pr15024.html.
3. These civil actions were filed under Civil Nos. KDP2006–0508 and KPE2006–1851.
4. According to the district court's findings, in 2004 Maisonet was convicted and sentenced to three years probation stemming from charges related to the distribution of marijuana.
5. By the time of sentencing, Pentagon certified that the amount still owed to it was $89,994.22.
6. We note that even though Maisonet's plea agreement contained a waiver-of-appeal clause, his appeal is properly before us. Here, Maisonet waived his right to appeal to the extent he was subsequently sentenced in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the “Sentence Recommendation” provisions of the plea agreement. The sentence ultimately imposed was not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the “Sentence Recommendation” provisions, which recommended a sentence of time served, three years of supervised release, six months of home detention, and two hundred hours of unpaid community service. Thus, as the government correctly concedes, the waiver-of-appeal clause does not bar the instant appeal. See United States v. Murphy–Cordero, 715 F.3d 398, 400 (1st Cir.2013) (holding that a waiver-of-appeal clause only precludes appeals falling within its scope).
7. We note that the district court was not bound by the parties' plea agreement, and Maisonet was fully aware of this when he decided to plead guilty. Specifically, through the provisions of the plea agreement, and at the change of plea hearing, Maisonet was warned that the plea agreement merely contained a recommended sentence and that the court was free to disregard the recommendations of the parties and impose a different sentence (higher or lower) than the one recommended in the plea agreement.


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In this paper, we deal with the Capacitated Lot Sizing and Scheduling Problem with sequencedependent setup times and costs - CLSD model. More specifically, we propose a simple reformulation for the CLSD model that enables us to define a new branching rule to be used in Branch-and-Bound (or Branch-and-Cut) algorithms to solve this NP-hard problem. Our branching rule can be easily implemented in commercial solvers. Computational tests performed in 240 test instances from the literature show that our approach can significantly reduce the running time to solve this problem using a Branch-and-Cut algorithm of a commercial MIP solver.Therefore, our approach can also improve the performance of other approaches that need to solve partial sub problems of the CLSD model in each iteration, such as Lagrangian approaches and heuristics based on the mathematical formulation of the problem.
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قاضی زاده, مصطفی, صفری, سعید, نوروززاده, فاطمه, حیدری, قاسم. (1394). یکپارچه سازی رویکردهای مدیریت زنجیره تامین در قالب زنجیره تامین لارج با استفاده از تکنیک های تصمیم گیری چند شاخصه در شرکت سایپا. پژوهشنامه مدیریت اجرایی, 7(14), 113-134.
مصطفی قاضی زاده; سعید صفری; فاطمه نوروززاده; قاسم حیدری. "یکپارچه سازی رویکردهای مدیریت زنجیره تامین در قالب زنجیره تامین لارج با استفاده از تکنیک های تصمیم گیری چند شاخصه در شرکت سایپا". پژوهشنامه مدیریت اجرایی, 7, 14, 1394, 113-134.
قاضی زاده, مصطفی, صفری, سعید, نوروززاده, فاطمه, حیدری, قاسم. (1394). 'یکپارچه سازی رویکردهای مدیریت زنجیره تامین در قالب زنجیره تامین لارج با استفاده از تکنیک های تصمیم گیری چند شاخصه در شرکت سایپا', پژوهشنامه مدیریت اجرایی, 7(14), pp. 113-134.
قاضی زاده, مصطفی, صفری, سعید, نوروززاده, فاطمه, حیدری, قاسم. یکپارچه سازی رویکردهای مدیریت زنجیره تامین در قالب زنجیره تامین لارج با استفاده از تکنیک های تصمیم گیری چند شاخصه در شرکت سایپا. پژوهشنامه مدیریت اجرایی, 1394; 7(14): 113-134.
مدیریت زنجیره تامین رویکردهای متفاوتی داشته که هرکدام مزایا و معایبی دارد. طراحی رویکردی یکپارچه که از مزایای تمامی رویکردها بهره گیرد و به نوعی معایب آنها را حذف نماید، یکی از ضروریات مهم در مدیریت زنجیره تامین است. هدف این تحقیق ارائه رویکردی یکپارچه در مدیریت زنجیره تامین با استفاده از تکنیک های تصمیم گیری چندشاخصه است. برای این منظور، ابتدا با مرور ادبیات و بکارگیری نظرات خبرگان، به شناسایی رویکردهای اصلی مدیریت زنجیره تامین و شاخص های مرتبط با آن پرداخته، سپس با استفاده از تکنیک دیمتل، ساختار روابط بین معیارها را استخراج نموده و در ادامه با استفاده از تکنیک فرآیند تحلیل شبکه ای (ANP)، وزن هر یک از شاخص ها بدست آورده ایم. در نهایت، با تجمیع شاخص هایی که بالاترین اولویت را دارا بودند، رویکرد یکپارچه در مدیریت زنجیره تامین ارائه گردیده است. نتایج حاکی از آن است که رویکرد جدید نسبت به یکایک رویکردهای اصلی از مزایای بیشتری برخوردار بوده و می تواند منجر به عملکرد بهتر شرکت گردد.
Supply chain management has different approaches that each of which has advantages and disadvantages. Design an integrated approach that takes advantage of all the approaches to remove some of their disadvantages, is one of the essential principles in the management of the supply chain. The aim of this study is to provide an integrated approach in the supply chain management using the multiple attribute decision making technique. For this purpose, first by literature review and use of experts opinions paid to identifying the main approaches to supply chain management and related indicators, then using Dematel techniques, structure of relationships among criteria was extracted and next, using analytic network process (ANP), obtained weight of each indicator. Finally, with the integration of criteria that had the highest priority, integrated approach to supply chain management is presented. Results show that the new approach has more benefits towards every single approach and can lead to better performance of the company.
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- AzadeganArash, Pankaj C. Patel, AbouzarZangoueinezhad, Kevin Linderman, The effect of environmental complexity and environmental dynamism on lean practices, Journal of Operations Management, Volume 31, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 193-212.
- AzevedoSusana G.GovindanKannan. An integrated model to assess the leanness and agility of the automotive industry, Resources, Conservation & Recycling, 2012, Vol.66, pp.85-94Elsevier.
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- CharlesAurelie, LaurasMatthieu, Luk Van Wassenhove, (2010) "Amodel to define and assess the agility of supply chains: building onhumanitarian experience", International Journal of Physical Distribution& Logistics Management, 40 (8/9): 722-741.
- Christina Maria Dües, Kim Hua Tan, Ming Lim, Green as the new Lean: how to use Lean practices as a catalyst to greening your supply chain, Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 40, February 2013, Pages 93-100.
- Correia, Natacha; Cruz Machado, V &Nunes, I.L (2010). "Strategy in human performance management in lean environment". Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM), China: 554–557.
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- Seuring, S (2012). A review of modeling approaches for sustainable supply chain management. Supply Chain Management, Faculty of Business and Economics, University ofKassel, 34117 Kassel, Germany.
- Srivastava S.K. (2007) Green supply-chain management: a state-of-the-art literature review, International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 53-80.
- Srvulaki, E., & Davis, M. (2010)."Aligning product with supply chainprocesses and strategy". Theinternationaljournal of logistic management, 21, 127-151.
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This Petition for Review from the May 14, 1998 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Second District was heard January 8, 1999 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners Angelo L. dos Santos and Stephen B. Delaney.
ANGELO L. dos SANTOS, COMMISSIONER. The claimant has petitioned for review from the May 14, 1998 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Second District. She argues on appeal that the trier erred by finding that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. We agree with the claimant’s contention that her claim was erroneously dismissed, and reverse the trial commissioner’s decision.
The claimant was employed as a data entry operator by the University of Connecticut on August 23, 1996. Her job was located on the main campus in Storrs at the Research Foundation, which occupies offices on the first floor of the Whetten Graduate Center building on Whitney Road. The claimant’s union contract entitled her to an unpaid lunch break during the middle of her shift, during which she was free to go where she chose. Though there was a shared kitchen area open for use by Research Foundation employees, food was not sold in the Whetten building, and the claimant often left the building during her lunch break. Her supervisor testified that the claimant had never been issued instructions with respect to lunch hour protocol. Findings, ¶ 26. The claimant stated that she normally took a walk on her break, stopped at Jonathan’s1 restaurant to pick up her lunch, and returned to the building to eat it. Jonathan’s is a fast-food restaurant located in the Student Union building on the UConn campus, about ¼-mile from the Whetten Graduate Center.
The claimant testified that, at approximately noon on the above date, she slipped and fell as she stepped up to the curb adjacent to Fairfield Road while en route to Jonathan’s. Consequently, she sustained an injury to her right elbow, which she reported to her employer upon returning to the Whetten building. Counsel for the state stipulated that the area in which the claimant fell and was injured is owned and maintained by the respondent employer UConn. January 8, 1998 Transcript, p. 3. However, the respondents argued that the site of the claimant’s accident should not be considered the employer’s premises for the purpose of this claim.
The trier issued a Memorandum of Law in conjunction with her findings, explaining that “there is no compelling reason to conclude that the place where claimant fell constituted part of the Employer’s premises . . . because that place was no more a part of her workplace than any state-owned road, curb or sidewalk is to any other state employee.” The trier reasoned that, unlike a maintenance worker, for example, whose job duties might encompass the entire campus area, this particular claimant only worked in one building, and the curb upon which she fell was foreign to the locale of her job duties. She also reasoned that there was no risk incidental to the claimant’s employment that led to this injury, as the claimant was not required to remain on campus for lunch, and could in fact have brought her own lunch from home. She concluded that the claimant “was not within the period of employment, was not paid during the time of her injury, and was not on the employer’s premises at the time of injury.” Relying on Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408 (1996), the trier therefore ruled that the claimant had failed to establish a compensable injury. The claimant has appealed that decision.
It is well settled that, in order to recover for an injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant must prove that her injury is causally connected to her employment. Spatafore, supra, 417. In order to establish this connection, the claimant must satisfy a two-part test: she must demonstrate that her injury (1) arose out of her employment, and (2) occurred in the course of her employment. Id., 417-18; Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co., 240 Conn. 788, 792 (1997). The latter requirement, which forms the central issue of this appeal, relates to the time, place and circumstances of the accident, while the former requirement concerns the origin and cause of the accident. Id., 792-93. Whether or not these elements of the test have been established is a question of fact for the trial commissioner, who must draw an inference from the subordinate factual findings to make that decision. Spatafore, supra, 418; LeBlanc v. Aramark Corp., 3693 CRB-2-97-9 (Nov. 24, 1998). “If said inference is supported by the evidence and [consistent] with the law, it cannot be set aside on appeal by a reviewing tribunal.” Id., quoting Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988).
Although almost any workers’ compensation award contains numerous factual findings, the success or failure of a claimant’s case often hinges upon one particular inference that the trier has drawn. Here, the conclusion most vital to the trier’s dismissal of the instant case was her determination that the claimant’s injury did not occur upon the employer’s premises for the purpose of her compensation claim. This finding is highly relevant, because the criteria used in analyzing whether an injury occurred in the course of a claimant’s employment differ depending on whether or not the employer controls the property upon which the claimant is hurt. LeBlanc, supra; McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 553 (1979). “Where . . . a lunchtime injury takes place on the employer’s premises, that injury may be said to have occurred ‘in the course of employment, even though the lunch interval is technically outside the regular hours of employment . . . .” Mazzone, supra, 794, quoting 1A A. Larson & L. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1996), § 21.21 (a), p. 5-6. Off-premises injuries during an unpaid lunch break, on the other hand, are considered outside the scope of employment unless it can be shown that the claimant’s actions benefited her employer in some manner. Spatafore, supra, 421.
Nominally, a trier’s conclusion that a claimant’s injury did not occur on an employer’s premises constitutes a finding of fact. Though such a categorization is technically accurate here, this “factual” finding is based solely on the trier’s analysis of the legal significance of undisputed subordinate facts, rather than her assessment of the credibility of the evidence. Compare Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998) (trier has authority to determine weight of evidence presented and credibility of testimony, even if apparently uncontradicted). The respondent stipulated that the “area where the claimant was injured . . . was owned and maintained by the employer, State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut,” as opposed to another state department. January 8, 1998 Transcript, p. 3. The commissioner nonetheless categorized the spot where the claimant fell as a “state-owned” curb accessible to the general public. She then reasoned that, because the claimant was a clerical worker whose duties were confined to one building on the UConn campus, the situs of the injury was not part of the employer’s premises for the purpose of this case. Having correctly noted that this issue was one of first impression in the State of Connecticut, the trier made a diligent effort to deduce the legal ramifications of the essentially undisputed facts.
Workers’ compensation law does not so narrowly circumscribe the contours of an employer’s business premises, however. This is especially true when one considers our Supreme Court’s admonition that “the humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers’ compensation.” Herman v. Sherwood Industries, Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 511 (1998). At least one other jurisdiction has considered circumstances where an employee works for a college, and has held that the entire campus constitutes the premises for workers’ compensation purposes. See 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 15.41 p. 4-100 to 4-102, discussingWarren’s Case, 326 Mass. 718, 97 N.E.2d 184 (1951).2 A few others have advanced more limited interpretations of “premises 4” in the college campus setting. See Bennett v. Vanderbilt University, 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386 (1955); Salomon v. State, 250 Md. 150, 242 A.2d 126 (Md. App. 1968); see alsoHarris v. Workmen’s Compensation. App. Bd., 90 Pa. Commw. 483, 486 A.2d 87 (1985). We believe that the law in Connecticut favors a more inclusive interpretation of the word “premises” similar to that adopted by the Massachusetts court in Warren’s Case, supra, rather than the more restrictive notion of “premises” adopted by some of its sister states.
This board stated in LeBlanc, supra, that “[f]or the purposes of a workers’ compensation claim, we have used ‘premises’ to refer to any area that is under the care, custody or control of the employer.” Additional restrictions based on the locus of the claimant’s job duties are not generally factored into the definition of “employer premises.” Rather, they are considered with respect to a different facet of the “in the course of the employment” test: whether the employee was in a place he could reasonably have been when he was injured. See Mazzone, supra, 796. Here, the respondent stipulated that the area in which the claimant fell was owned and maintained by UConn, the claimant’s employer. We also note that neither party has cited any evidence indicating that the Research Foundation should not be considered a part of the university under the definition of “employer” in § 31-275(10).
Against that factual backdrop, our delineation of the concept of “premises” is strongly influenced by the Mazzone opinion. In that case, a mechanic eating his lunch in an unoccupied, out-of-service bus parked on his employer’s premises fell while descending the rear steps of the bus, suffering an injury. He and several co-workers were on their unpaid lunch breaks at the time, and (as was their custom) they had opted not to eat their midday meals in the small lunchroom that the employer provided for its staff. Reversing the decisions of both the trial commissioner and this board, our Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the claimant’s injury occurred within the period of his employment, even though he was on an unpaid break and had “punched out” on the time clock. The Court also held (contrary to this board’s decision) that the activity of eating lunch was incident to the claimant’s employment, as “[i]t would be illogical to hold that, if they occur on the employer’s premises, injuries related to such employer sanctioned activities as playing ping-pong or smoking are incidental to employment, while injuries associated with the equally sanctioned activity of eating lunch are not.” Id., 795, citing McNamara, supra, and Puffin v. General Electric, 132 Conn. 279 (1945). The Court remanded the case to determine if the claimant had satisfied the second part of the three-faceted “in the course of the employment” test by proving that, at the time of his injury, he was at a place where he reasonably may have been, i.e., that the employer had approved or acquiesced in his presence on an out-of-service bus during his lunch break. Mazzone, supra, 796.
The philosophy adopted by the Court in Mazzone in analyzing the actions of that claimant on his lunch break favors a finding of compensability when applied to the circumstances of the instant case. See also, Kish v. Nursing & Home Care, Inc., 248 Conn. 379 (1999). In her Finding and Dismissal, the trier referred to the testimony of the claimant and two of her supervisors, each of whom was familiar with the claimant’s habit of walking to Jonathan’s at lunchtime. None of them indicated in any way that the university objected to the claimant’s normal midday routine. The claimant also requested in her Motion to Correct the addition of findings that Jonathan’s is the closest facility to the Whetten Center at which lunch may be purchased, and that the claimant and her supervisor walked to Jonathan’s for lunch two or three days per week. The trier denied these corrections, not on the ground that she found those assertions to be untrue, but because these facts were “irrelevant,” in her opinion.
We disagree with the trier’s assessment. Each of those facts, if accepted, would tend to show that the claimant was in a place she could reasonably have been when she suffered her injury. Although this board cannot make factual findings regarding the credibility of testimony, even if it is apparently uncontradicted, these facts if true would demonstrate that the employer had acquiesced to the claimant’s lunchtime walks across campus, and that it was reasonable for the claimant to obtain hot food at Jonathan’s restaurant. Mazzone, supra, 796; Jusiewicz v. Reliance Automotive, 3140 CRB-6-95-8 (Jan. 24, 1997). Thus, the claimant would have satisfied the three-prong “in the course of the employment” test regarding the time, place and circumstances of her accident, and her injury would be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
We hold that the claimant’s injury occurred on the employer’s premises as a matter of law, and thus, in accordance with Mazzone, supra, her fall took place within the period of her employment, and while she was doing something incidental to her employment, i.e., obtaining her lunch. In light of Mazzone, this matter must be remanded to the trier for reconsideration of the claimant’s requested corrections insofar as they tend to establish that she was at a place she could reasonably have been (based on employer approval or acquiescence) at the time of her injury. If the trier finds that the testimony of the witnesses cited in the Motion to Correct is credible, then she must find this injury compensable under § 31-284 C.G.S.
The trial commissioner’s decision is hereby reversed, and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Commissioner Stephen B. Delaney concurs.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN, DISSENTING. I would affirm the trial commissioner’s decision, as I agree with her conclusion that this claimant, given her particular employment duties, was no longer on her employer’s premises when she fell. The circumstances of this case more closely resemble those of Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408 (1996), and (especially) Renckowski v. Yale University, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 48, 1292 CRD-3-31-9 (March 18, 1993), than do they resemble Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co., 240 Conn. 788 (1997). In Renckowski, supra, the claimant left the premises of Yale University during a paid coffee break in order to obtain a refreshment at Naples Pizza, an adjacent restaurant owned by the university. She fell on the stairs of Naples Pizza, which were not controlled or possessed by Yale, and sought compensation benefits. Although she was injured on a paid break, regularly got her coffee at Naples Pizza, and her employer acquiesced to the activity, the claimant still failed in her attempt to obtain benefits under Chapter 568. Because the injury occurred off the employer’s premises, the claimant had to show that she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of her employment or doing something incidental to it. Id., 50-51. Personal comfort activities are seldom considered to be in the course of one’s employment when they occur off the employer’s premises. Id., 52. The claimant in Renckowski was unable to meet that burden, and thus this board ruled that her workers’ compensation claim should have been denied. Id., 53.
This case warrants the same result. The claimant was injured while walking to a restaurant that is open to the general public, while crossing a street that is also open to the general public. She was on an unpaid lunch break, and was free to go wherever she wanted during that time. As was the case in Renckowski, supra, the fact that the employer may have acquiesced in her lunchtime walks to Jonathan’s is irrelevant. The claimant’s job did not require her to roam the entire UConn campus, and for the purposes of that job, she was no longer on the employer’s premises when she was injured. I disagree with the majority’s opinion that we should adopt the expansive definition of “premises” suggested in Warren’s Case, 326 Mass. 718, 97 N.E.2d 184 (1951). The sounder view is the one espoused in cases such as Bennett v. Vanderbilt University, 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386 (1955), where the definition of “premises” for workers’ compensation purposes was limited to the building where the employee was supposed to be while performing his job duties. Though the site of the claimant’s injury may have been controlled by UConn, it was not a place she would have been while she was on the clock, and should not be considered part of the employer’s premises for the purposes of this case.
Thus, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.


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We have successfully defended trustees in a number of cases by participants alleging violations of ERISA. We also have successfully defended civil RICO, LMRA, and LMRDA cases against trustees and union officials. Below are some examples.
Langman v. Laub: The Second Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the lawsuit, finding that break in service rules did not violate the 133 and 1/3% accrual test under ERISA, that the trustees' interpretation of the plan documents was proper, and that no damages were available for an alleged omission in the summary plan description because the plaintiff was not prejudiced. Langman v. Laub, 328 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2003).
DeVito v. Local 553 Pension Fund: The court dismissed allegations that the trustees violated the anti-cutback rule, the accrual requirements, and the suspension of benefits provisions under ERISA, thereby defeating the proposed class action. DeVito v. Local 553 Pension Fund, No. 02 Civ. 4686 (RCC), 2005 WL 167590 (S.D.N.Y. January 26, 2005).
Duane Reade v. Allied Trades Council: The court dismissed all remaining claims pursuant to LMRA Sections 301 and 302. After pre-motion briefs, we prevailed in persuading the company to withdraw its RICO and LMRA section 301 claims against the union officers. Duane Reade v. Allied Trades Council, No. 04 Civ. 3542 (BSJ), 2005 WL 3038645 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2005).
Andrea Doreen v. Building Material Teamsters Local 282: The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all RICO claims against the trustees. Andrea Doreen v. Building Material Teamsters Local 282, 299 F. Supp.2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
Bona v. Barasch: The court dismissed plaintiffs' RICO and LMRDA claims against the union officers and severely limited ERISA claims against trustees of multiemployer funds. Bona v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 WL 1395932 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2003).

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Pursuant to 29 Del.C. §10119, the State of Delaware Department of Agriculture adopted on December 26, 2017 emergency amendments to the State Forest Regulations, 3 Delaware Administrative Code §402. These regulations were issued by the Secretary pursuant to the power conveyed by the General Assembly for The Agriculture Secretary by 3 Del.C. §101(3), and by the specific authority to devise and promulgate regulations to protect State Forest lands conferred by 3 Del.C. §1011.
The above emergency regulations are intended as interim measures, necessary to avoid the risk of harm to public health, safety, and welfare, pending the formal adoption of regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, within the 120-day period (renewable for an additional sixty days) allotted to emergency regulations. The Department is currently in the process of formally adopting final regulation amendments as it relates to the affected Regulations referenced above. As the 120-day period will expire before such time as it is possible for the Department to finalize its formal adoption of the above regulatory amendments, it is now necessary to renew the emergency order for an additional 60 days, pursuant to 29 Del.C. §10119(3), so as to retain its provisions while the amendments are being finalized pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.
The portions of the Regulations referenced above relating to firearms were affected by the recent decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Bridgeville R&P Club v. DNREC, issued on December 7, 2017. The decision will have binding effect upon the issuance of a mandate by the Court. The Court found that the existing firearms regulations violated the State of Delaware Constitution, in that they were overly broad in their prohibitions. In the absence of interim regulations, firearms would essentially be unregulated on State Forest lands, including facilities such as education centers, lodges, and offices. A risk of harm from gunfire would be present in these and other areas where visitors gather, including families and children. Law enforcement authorities would lack the ability to screen and check for identification, permits, or credentials of armed visitors to these facilities. The Court recognized that restrictions on firearms are appropriate in limited public areas and facilities; but that licensed and qualified persons must be exempt from such prohibitions. The interim regulations are an effort to strike the balance the Court mandated.
The aforementioned emergency order is being renewed for an additional 60 days since there is insufficient time to finalize the formal adoption of the aforementioned regulatory amendments through the Administrative Procedures Act on or before the expiration of the initial 120-day period, which will be April 25, 2018. This action is being taken to maintain the current interim measures, which the Department has deemed necessary to avoid the risk of harm to public health, safety, and welfare.
Subsequent to the adoption of the emergency regulations on December 26, 2017, the Department began the formal regulatory promulgation process with the publication of its initial proposed regulatory amendments in the January 1, 2018 Register of Regulations. Thereafter, the Department held public workshops in each county throughout the State of Delaware in February 2018, and held the public hearing on March 12, 2018. It is anticipated that the formal adoption of the aforementioned regulatory amendments will be finalized prior to the expiration of this 60-day renewal period (on or before June 25, 2018).
The renewal of this emergency order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. on April 26, 2018, and shall remain in effect for no longer than 60 additional days. The Department's formal regulatory amendments, however, shall immediately supersede the interim regulations upon formal approval, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, and 29 Del.C. §10115.
Consistent with the requirements of 29 Del.C. §10119(4) the Department will receive, consider, and respond to petitions by any interested person for the reconsideration or revision of this Order. Petitions should be presented to the Office of the Secretary, Delaware Department of Agriculture, 2320 South Dupont Highway, Dover, Delaware, 19901.
8.8	Target shooting is prohibited. Firearms are allowed for legal hunting only and are otherwise prohibited within designated safe areas on State Forest lands.
8.8.1	Designated areas shall include State Forest Offices, education centers, and lodges, and shall be identified by appropriate signage.
8.8.2	Active duty and qualified retired law enforcement officers may possess firearms within areas administered by the Department, including designated areas, provided that proper and current credentials shall be produced to Departmental authorities upon request.
8.8.3	Delaware residents holding an active current permit to carry a concealed deadly weapon may carry a firearm within areas administered by the Department, including designated areas, provided that the permit shall be produced upon request of Departmental authorities.
8.8.6	Any person possessing a firearm shall display identification upon request, sufficient to enable a law enforcement officer to undertake a background check.


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Family Group Sheet Timothy Ricketson, Sr.
1. TIMOTHY3 RICKETSON, SR. (JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Feb 18, 1709/10 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died 1786 in Richmond Co., GA. He married (1) BATHSHBA WILBUR Feb 3, 1730/31 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, daughter of BENJAMIN WILBUR and ELIZABETH HEAD. She was born Aug 22, 1720 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Bet. 1767 - 1786. He married (2) MARTHA Aft. 1767. She died Aft. 1786.
Timothy Ricketson and his wife Bathsheba Wilbur were born in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA. They were Quakers and in 1745 they requested a certificate to transfer to Nine Partners Monthly Meeting in Dutchess Co, NY. Before they moved charges were brought against Timothy because he tried to collect on a bond which had already been paid. A committee was appointed to investigate the charge which resulted in Timothy being disowned two years later after he had moved to NY. In 1748 Timothy made a trip back to MA to sell land he still owned. The next year he sold part of his land in Nine Partners in Crum Elbow, NY. In 1754 the High Sheriff of Dutchess Co, NY seized all the rest of Timothy's property for debt.
At this time Timothy moved to North Caroline leaving some of his children in New York. In 1765/67 he made a trip to Nova Scotia with his son Abednego. While Abednego stayed in Nova Scotia, Timothy returned to North Carolina and later moved to Richmond Co, GA.
Timothy left a will in Richmond Co, GA. in 1786. He named his wife Martha, children: Timothy, Marmaduke, Abigail Laughtrip. He Names grandson, Jordain (son of Jordan). He names Abigail's five children: Hulda, Bathsheba, Mary, John and Benjamin.
"Timothy Ricketson was a yeoman and in one deed is called a 'merchant'".
On 17th. March, 1734 the widow of Benjamin Wilbur brought in an account of legacies given daughter "Rickerson".
2nd. mo. 1745 Dartmouth Monthly Meeting Record: And Timothy Ricketson hath requested of this meeting a few lines by way of certificate to the monthly meeting at the Nine Partners, he being about to remove there to live with his family.
20 11th mo. 1745, Dartmouth: And there hath been a report concerning Timothy Ricketson that he hath put a bond into an Attorney's hand in order to give it out when the said bond hath been already answered. Therefore the meeting appoint Christopher and Ebenezer Slocum to endeavor to find out the Truth of the matter and let the Monthly Meeting know how they fine it.
16 12th. mo. 1746/7. Committee appointed on case of Timothy Ricketson.
18 3rd. mo. 1747. Timothy Ricketson is disowned by the meeting on account of trying to abtain money on bond already paid.
About this time Timothy Ricketson had moved to Dutchess Co, NY.
1st day 1st mo. 1748/9. Timothy Ricketson, Yeoman, of the Nine Partners in Crum Elbow, sells 32 acres of his homestead to one Daniel Tripp, Jr. of Dartmouth. Apparently his wife was not with him as her name does not appear in the deed, but her signature accompanies his, when on 3rd Aug. 1749, he further sells 142 acres of land in the Great Nine Partners, Lot 27.
25 October, 1754, the dwelling house, lands, farm and Tenements in the great Nine Partners on west side of road, leading from Pell Soper's into Beekman's Patent, containing 361 acres belonging to Timothy Ricketson, Merchant, of Dutchess County were ordered to be seized for debt by Isac Brinkerhoff, Esq., High Sheriff of the County, which seizure duly took place.
After this event Timothy went to North Carolina, whither several of his sons had preceded him, and perhaps to other parts of the South before he settled at his final destination, Richmond county, Georgia, where he made his will.
SMITH, LEONARD H., JR., and NORMA H. SMITH. Nova Scotia Immigrants to 1867. Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1992. 546p.
Date and port of arrival or date and place of mention in the New World. Place of origin, birth date, occupation, reference to original source, and other genealogical information may also be provided.
Bathsheba accompanied Timothy to Nova Sotia in 1765/1767. She died sometime between then and 1786 when Timothy wrote his will naming Martha as his wife.
Bathsheba accompenied Timothy to Nova Scotia in 1765/1767.
2. i. ABEDNEGO4 RICKETSON, b. Sep 23, 1733, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Dec 23, 1797, Annapolis, Annapolis Co, NS.
3. ii. GORDIUS RICKETSON, SR., b. Sep 1, 1735, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Mar 1774, Craven Co, NC.
4. iii. JUDITH RICKETSON, b. Apr 26, 1737, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Dutchess Co, NY.
5. iv. BATHSHEBA RICKETSON, b. Oct 27, 1739, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
6. v. ABIGAIL RICKETSON, b. Abt. 1740, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
7. vi. MARMADUKE RICKETSON, b. 1741, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Aft. 1785, Nova Scotia.
8. vii. HULDA RICKETSON, b. Aug 14, 1742, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Mar 18, 1820, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
9. viii. TIMOTHY RICKETSON, JR., b. 1745, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. 1805, Bardstown, Nelson Co, KY.
10. ix. JORDAN RICKETSON, b. 1746, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
11. x. MIRIAM RICKETSON, b. Abt. 1752, Dutchess Co, NY.
2. ABEDNEGO4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Sep 23, 1733 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Dec 23, 1797 in Annapolis, Annapolis Co, NS. He married PHEBE TUCKER Dec 2, 1757 in Dartmouth, Bristol, MA, daughter of HENRY TUCKER and ELIZABETH RICKETSON. She was born Nov 8, 1736 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Jul 31, 1795 in Granville, Annapolis Co, NS.
Abednego was the oldest child of Timothy Ricketson, Sr.. Abednego appears to have probably moved to Dutchess County, N. Y. as did his parents & siblings, then south to North Carolina, & South Carolina, then moved to Nova Scotia in 1765/1767.
"Abednego & his wife were second cousins. Their grandfathers were brothers. They lived in the Dartmouth, Ma. area until about 1762 as their three oldest children were born in Dartmouth. John James Marshall, great grandson of Abednego, wrote in his family bible for his daughter the family history as follows: "Your grandmother, Nancy [Ricketson] Marshall, emigrated from South Carolina state. Were Quarkers. Came down to Nova Scotia, three brothers settled in Granville. Left Timothy, the other two, they built a brig [named Barsheba] and went home in her & left one brother & said they would not stay where the frosts cleared the land. They came down with plenty of money, and your grandmother's name was Phebe Tucker from South Carolina."
The three brothers were undoubtedly Abednego, Marmaduke & Timothy, as Marmaduke's descendants in the South believe him to have visited Nova Scotia. So far as we can gather, the story of Abednego Ricketson os this: --After 1762, he went to New Bern, North carolina, where his brother, Gordius & sister Mrs. Lipsey were living. Thence he moved to Bridgetown, Annapolis County, Nova Scotia, but before 1770, for the census of that year mentions him as being there, with a family of eight persons, vic: himself, his wife, & seven children. The French had been expelled from Arcadia, & tempting offers were made to induce loyal English subjects to settle in the place; this may have been Abedngo's reason for going there. Immediately after his arrival, he obtained a farm, midway between Bridgetown & the district called Bellside. The estate is still known as the "Ricketson Property" although it has long since passed out of the family.
Abednego was a Methodist minister, and appears to have possessed of some education, intelligence & enterprise. His descendants, especially numerous in the lines of the daughters, have always been respected members of the farming community. The Mrs. Lipsey referred to above would have been Abednego's sister Bathsheba [Ricketson] Lipsey.
29. Page 67, R: 25 Mar 1779: LA to Phebe RICKETSON widow of Abednego RICKETSON of Granville, deceased. Estate Folio R4 (1779): He died 27 Dec 1778. children/heirs: Barsheba RICKETSON, Henry RICKETSON, Elizabeth FOSTER the wife of John FOSTER, Phebe ROACH the wife of Matthew ROACH, Catharine NICHOLS the wife of George NICHOLS, Patience RICKETSON, Mary MESSENGER the wife of Ezekiel MESSENGER, Frederick RICKETSON, Anna RICKETSON.
i. BATHSHEBA5 RICKETSON, b. Jul 2, 1758, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; m. ROBERT SPROUL, JR., Dec 16, 1778, Granville, Annapolis Co, NS; b. 1752, Marlborough, MA; d. Bef. 1835.
Barsheba is listed as widow in her brother, Henry's will dated 1835.
ii. HENRY RICKETSON, b. Jul 30, 1760, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; d. Feb 1, 1835, Anapolis, NS; m. MARY MCKENZIE; b. Abt. 1751; d. Bet. 1835 - Jun 1841.
Henry either had no children or they died without issue before Henry wrote his will in 1835 as he named only his siblings and nephew in his will.
253. Page 225, R: 02 Mar 1835: LWT of Henry RICKETSON of Granville dated 17 Jan 1835. "present wife": Mary. Brothers: Jordon and Frederick. Seven sisters: Beishebe SPROUL, widow, Elizabeth FOSTER, Catherine NICHOLS, Patience LEACH, Mary MESSENGER, Phoebe ROACH and Ann MARSHALL. Nephew: Walter RICKETSON. Page 392, R: 25 Oct 1841: Report of the Commission to divide the estate of Henry RICKETSON of Granville. Assigns to: heirs of late Jordon RICKETSON, deceased, and Frederick RICKETSON, his brothers. Estate Folio R40 (1841). Mary was deceased by Jun 1841.
iii. ELIZABETH RICKETSON, b. Oct 19, 1762, Anapolis, NS; d. Apr 7, 1852, Kings Co. NS; m. JOHN FOSTER, Dec 27, 1781, Annapolis Co, NS; b. Mar 29, 1760, Rockingham Co, NH.
iv. PHEBE RICKETSON, b. Feb 2, 1765, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA; m. MATTHEW ROACH, May 20, 1785, Annapolis Co, NS; b. 1764.
v. JORDAN RICKETSON, b. Oct 20, 1767, Bridgetown, NS; d. Apr 22, 1822, Granville, Nova Scotia; m. (1) ELIZABETH FOSTER, Dec 25, 1789; b. Dec 17, 1768; d. Jul 31, 1795; m. (2) HANNAH PARKER, Sep 21, 1796; b. Mar 27, 1771.
Jordan is listed in his brother, Henry's will but by the time the will was discharged in 1841 his share is assigned to his heirs.
vi. CATHERINE RICKETSON, b. Apr 4, 1770, Bridgetown, NS; d. Jun 23, 1851, Wilmot, NS; m. GEORGE NICHOLS, Jul 26, 1792.
vii. PATIENCE RICKETSON, b. Apr 4, 1770, Bridgetown, NS; m. MANASSAH LITCH, Abt. 1780, Granville, Annapolis Co, NS; b. Sep 15, 1769, Anapolis, NS; d. 1822.
viii. FREDRICK RICKETSON, b. Aug 1, 1772, Bridgetown, NS; d. Aft. 1841, Anapolis, NS; m. (1) MARY THOMAS, 1810; m. (2) CHARLOTTE MCKENSIE, Aft. 1815.
ix. MARY RICKETSON, b. Feb 11, 1775, Bridgetown, NS; m. EZEKIEL MESSENGER; b. 1770; d. 1820, Anapolis, NS.
x. ANNA RICKETSON, b. 1777, Bridgetown, NS; m. JOHN MARSHALL, Oct 17, 1797, Annapolis Co, NS; b. Apr 20, 1772, Anapolis, NS; d. Jul 15, 1858, Anapolis, NS.
3. GORDIUS4 RICKETSON, SR. (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Sep 1, 1735 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Mar 1774 in Craven Co, NC. He married (1) HANNAH RUSSELL 1757 in MA. She was born Abt. 1735, and died Jul 17, 1772. He married (2) ABIGAIL ?? Aft. 1772.
Left will in Craven Co, NC. Sep 24, 1773 - Mentions wife, Abigail; sons: Jesse, Benjamin and Gordius; daughter, Bathsheba.
"Dr. Shadrach Ricketson affirms that Gordius Ricketson "died in the Revolutiionary War to the South." As there were no hostile movements in the South before 1774, the year of his death, we think he may have been killed while visiting his brother, Abednego, in Nova Scotia. The tradition handed down by Jordan Ricketson, to his daughter was that Gordius, and also his brother, Marmaduke, were killed by Indian hirelings employed by the British against the Continental troops. He said that one brother was killed in battle, and the other by a band who broke into his house and murdered him in his bed at night."
i. BATHSHEBA5 RICKETSON, b. 1754.
ii. GORDIUS RICKETSON, JR., b. 1756.
In Last will and testament of Archelaus Weeks 1778 in Craven Co, NC he names son-in-law Gordius Ricketson. This Gordius would have been age 22 but can not identify absoultely.
iii. JESSE RICKETSON, b. Sep 6, 1758, Craven Co, NC; d. Feb 3, 1835, Warren Co, GA; m. MARY POLLY MERRITT, Abt. 1785; b. 1762, New Bern, Jones Co, NC.
iv. BENJAMIN RICKETSON, b. Feb 2, 1760, Craven Co, NC; d. Jan 27, 1845, Warren Co, GA; m. (1) HULDA LAWTHORPE, Nov 25, 1784, NC; b. Nov 5, 1770; d. Bef. 1830.
4. JUDITH4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Apr 26, 1737 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died in Dutchess Co, NY.
The father of Judith's son, Abednego was probably a British Officer.
i. ABEDNEGO5 RICKETSON, b. May 16, 1756.
1800 Peru, Clinton Co, NY - 26/45 - males (2) 0/10 - females (2) 0/10, (2) 10/16, 26/45.
5. BATHSHEBA4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Oct 27, 1739 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA. She married ARTHUR LIPSEY. He was born Abt. 1740 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
In his will dated 1794 (proved 1795) of Jones County, NC, Arthur mentions: wife, Bathsheba; sons, Rasco, Ricketson, Arthur, Lemuel, and Marmaduke; and daughters, Bathsheba and Hulda. Does not mention James and Timothy. They either do not belong to Arthur or they died before 1784.
i. JAMES5 LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1785.
ii. TIMOTHY LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1768.
iii. RICKETSON LIPSEY, b. Mar 6, 1764; d. May 25, 1855; m. ANN POPE, Oct 8, 1792, Robeson Co, NC.
Description: LEPSEY, RICKETSON OF UNION DISTRICT, WILL TYPESCRIPT (MSS WILL: BOOK C, PAGE 112; ESTATE PACKET: BOX 36, PKG 23) (2 FRAMES). **I do not have this will.
iv. ARTHUR THOMAS LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1774; m. MARGARET STOKES.
The Reverend Arthur LIPSEY was born, probably, in North Carolina. His parents were Arthur and Bathsheba (RICKETSON) LIPSEY, and he was most likely born in Jones County, N. C. His brother, Ricketson LIPSEY, Sr. (1764, NC--1855, SC), was also a preacher. He resided in Union Co., SC.
Rev. Arthur's wife was Margaret, or "Peggy" [surname not presently known](abt. 1775-1865). We believe we know two of the chidren from this marriage: Timothy R. (1796-aft. 1880) and Thomas S. LIPSEY. (1801-1863). Timothy R. LIPSEY lived much of his life in Chester. Thomas moved to Pickens County, Alabama.
vi. MARMADUKE LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1774; d. 1810; m. ANN MARSHALL, Oct 3, 1795, Onslow Co, NC.
vii. RASCO LIPSEY, b. Jul 1, 1779, Craven Co, NC; d. Jul 24, 1844, Macon Co, GA; m. MARY BROWN; b. Abt. 1780, Jones Co, NC.
viii. LEMUEL LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1787.
ix. HULDA LIPSEY, b. Abt. 1784.
6. ABIGAIL4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Abt. 1740 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA. She married GEORGE Lathrop Abt. 1760 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA. He was born Abt. 1745 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died in GA.
i. JOHN5 Lathrop, b. Abt. 1762.
ii. BATHSHEBA Lathrop, b. Abt. 1763.
iii. MARY Lathrop, b. Abt. 1765.
iv. JOSEPH Lathrop, b. Abt. 1766.
v. BENJAMIN Lathrop, b. Abt. 1768.
vi. HULDAH Lathrop, b. Nov 5, 1770; m. BENJAMIN RICKETSON, Nov 25, 1784, NC; b. Feb 2, 1760, Craven Co, NC; d. Jan 27, 1845, Warren Co, GA.
7. MARMADUKE4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born 1741 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Aft. 1785 in Nova Scotia.
"Marmaduke Ricketson may have been born before his parents left Dartmouth. He lived for a time at Augusta, Georgia, but between 1765 and 1770 accompanied his brother to Nova Scotia, where his son was born. He and his wife separated and he returned to the South, and must have taken part in the Revolutionary struggle, for on 3rd February, 1785, he was granted 287 1/2 acres on land "On Bounty" in Franklin County for service, being certified by Colonel James McNeil, and on 29 October 1789, he was further granted 17 acres of land in Richmond County, where he had previously purchased land, as the17 acres were bounded by his own domain. In 1786, his father left him ten shillings in his will. The tradition that Marmaduke Ricketson was finally killed by the Indians in Nova Scotia is corroborated by his grandson, the late Nicodemus Boyd Ricketson of Belair, Richmond County; there he must have gone back to Annapolis County, in middle life."
Source Information: Jeffery, Alice. Georgia Tax Index. Orem, UT: Ancestry, Inc., 1998.
i. GORDIUS5 RICKETSON, b. Nova Scotia; d. Columbia Co, GA.
8. HULDA4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Aug 14, 1742 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died Mar 18, 1820 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA. She married JONATHAN WILBUR Oct 29, 1761, son of HENRY WILBUR and ABIGAIL RICKETSON. He was born Jul 7, 1741, and died 1826 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
i. BENJAMIN5 WILBUR, b. Jan 19, 1762, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
ii. ABIGAIL WILBUR, b. Mar 10, 1764, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
iii. BATHSHEBA WILBUR, b. Jul 13, 1767, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
iv. HULDAH WILBUR, b. Jun 24, 1769, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
v. CHARLOTTE WILBUR, b. Apr 19, 1771, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
vi. REBECCA WILBUR, b. Jun 11, 1773, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
vii. ELIZABETH WILBUR, b. Aug 10, 1775, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
viii. JONATHAN WILBUR, b. Jul 10, 1777, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
ix. SATYRA WILBUR, b. Mar 8, 1779, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
x. PHILLIP WILBUR, b. Sep 22, 1781, Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
9. TIMOTHY4 RICKETSON, JR. (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born 1745 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA, and died 1805 in Bardstown, Nelson Co, KY. He married (1) PRUDENCE FISHER Abt. 1775. She died Bef. 1790. He married (2) MARY WILKINS Abt. 1790. She was born Bet. 1765 - 1770.
Timothy Ricketson's first wife was reportedly named Purdence with a surname of possibly Fisher. She has not been definately identified.
Timothy Ricketson moved from NY to NC, and then on to Georgia before moving to Nelson Co, KY.
Timothy Rickerson served in Rev. War in Captain Patrick Carr's Co. of Rangers, Burke Co, GA 1781-1782.
"On 15 Feb, 1785 he was granted 287 1/2 acres of land in Washington County, GA on bounty and on 8 Feb. 1785, he was granted 300 acres in Richmond county; on 21 Feb in the same year 50 acres more and again on 2 Aug, 1786, 200 acres in addition, all in the same county. Timothy Ricketson was a farmer and a tailor.
"He died in Kentucky. He drowned in a freshet which took place at Bardstown, where he made his final home.
"His second wife, Mary Wilkins is thought by some of the descendants to have come from New Orleans."
Some say that Timothy Ricketson was born in Dutchess Co, NY. His father moved from Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA to Dutchess Co, NY about 1747 it is most likely that he was born in MA.
1810 Nelson Co, KY. Listed as Maryl Rickerson - Males: (1) 0/10, (3) 10/16. Females: (1) 0/10, (1) 10/16, (1) 16/26, (1) 26/45.
In 1820 there's a Mary Richeson in Harrison Co, KY. Mary 45/+, female 16/26, male 16/26, male 10/16.
In 1830 this Mary Richeson is 70/80 with on male 20/30.
I think this Mary may be ours. In that case she was born 1850 - 1860 and died after 1830.
i. ABRAHAM5 RICKERSON, b. Feb 18, 1781, Wilkes Co, GA; d. Aft. 1854; m. SUSANNAH OGLETREE, Feb 1, 1810, Wilkes Co, GA; b. Jan 10, 1793; d. Aft. 1860, Wilkes Co, GA.
Abraham's children settled through the middle part of Georgia and possibly into Alabama.
1850 Crawford Co, GA Abraham age 66, Susannah age 58, Winfrey age 23, Nancy age 27, Narcissy age 25, Lucinda age 21, Whitfield age 20, W. (Wilkins) age 18.
In 1860 Crawford Co, GA. Susannah is listed as "Lueuna?" may be Susana age 67. Living with her are: Narcissa 30, Lucinda 29, Winfrey 27, Whitfield 26. Next door is Wesley and his family.
ii. JOSEPH RICKETSON, b. 1784, Burke Co, GA; d. 1820, Montgomery Co, GA; m. SERENA FOY, Jul 17, 1806, Tattnall Co, GA; b. 1786, NC; d. 1856, Coffee County, GA.
Joseph's mother was almost certainly named Purdence and her surname may have been Fisher. No other information about his mother can be found.
He was the great great grandson of William Ricketson, the emigrant. William Ricketson's mother may have been Elizabeth, a widow. All the Ricketsons and Rickersons in America may have descended from this William. I have not been able to determine the origin of the Ricketson name.
Joseph was born in Burke Co, GA. His grandfather, Timothy Ricketson, Sr. left a will in Richmond Co, GA in which he left 10 shillings to Timothy, Jr., Joseph's father. Some say Joseph may have been born in NC as the family seems to have been there before moving to GA.
Joseph's father, Timothy Married a second time to Mary Wilkins and moved to Kentucky leaving Joseph and his other son Abraham in GA. Abraham seems to have settled through the middle part of GA while Joseph settled in the southern part known as the Wiregrass Area. Joseph's half siblings who lived in Kentucky changed their name to Rickerson.
Joseph's children stayed in Wiregrass, Georgia although his grandchildren spread out from Florida to Texas.
Joseph was a shoemaker and farmer. He was justice of the peace in Tatnall and Montgomery counties.
Have not found any reference to Joseph being in the RV but he was certainly old enough to serve in the war of 1812.
Joseph died before the 1820 census was taken and after Oct 15, 1818 when he witnessed a deed.
Serena was previously married to Needham Arnold by whom she had one son, James Arnold.
Serena's last three children were fathered by a neighbor, David Sears. Serena and David Sears were charged with adultry in the courts. The three children took the Ricketson name. *I have not seen any documentation. The information was posted on GenCircles and referenced the Home page of Johnny L. Ricketson on Genealogy.com.
Serena may have been Indian.
iii. CATHERINE5 RICKERSON, m. JOSEPH RYON, Jan 30, 1807, Bardstown, KY.
Catherine may be the daughter of Mary Wilkins. She is mentioned in Timothy's will as Catherine Rickerson and Catherine Wilkins.
Dickison, Catherine married to Joseph Ryan - Name would be easy to mistake.
iv. GEORGE LEON RICKERSON, b. 1795, Bardstown, KY.
George may have married an Indian.
Apr.14 1806 appreticeship of Geo. Rickison a poor child to Nicholas Glasner to learn the art of cabinet making.
v. JOHN RICKERSON, b. Dec 25, 1797, Nelson Co, KY; d. Jun 29, 1875, Shepardsville, Bullitt Co, KY; m. (1) UNKNOWN ??, Abt. 1820; m. (2) ELIZA PURCELL, Oct 27, 1842; b. Apr 27, 1803, Belmont, KY; d. Jul 9, 1876, Shepardsville, KY.
1850 Bullitt Co, KY John age 58, Elizabeth age 47, Nancy A. 22, Laura V. 18, John I. 3.
1860 Bullitt Co, KY John age 64, Elizabeth 58, John 12, George 9.
1870 Bullitt Co, KY John age 74, Elizabeth 64, George 19.
Apr.14 1806 apprenticeship of John Rickison a poor child to Jacob Pratsman to learn the art of cabinet making.
Kentucky Marriages. Could this be his first wife, (Unknown)?
vi. POLLY RICKERSON, b. 1799, Bardstown, KY; m. SANFORD A. MASON, Feb 21, 1814, Bardstown, KY.
1840 Clinton Co, KY. Polly Mason is HH. Males: 10/15. Females: 5/10, 10/15, (2) 15/20, 40/50.
vii. CHARLES SANFORD RICKERSON, b. Aug 15, 1801, Bardstown, KY; d. Nov 1, 1854, Louisville, KY; m. (1) MARY HARRIS, Dec 23, 1823; d. 1830; m. (2) SARAH ELIZABETH WAGNER, Abt. 1831; b. Mar 13, 1814, OH; d. Apr 14, 1868, Louisville, KY.
1850 Louisville, Jefferson Co, KY - Charles age 49, Sarah A. 34, Angeline 16, Ellen 14, Sanford 12, Mary A. 6, Sarah E. 4, Sophia 2.
Charles Rickerson married Mary Harris Dec. 23, 1823.
1860 Jefferson Co, KY - Sarah head of HH age 45, Mary 16, Sarah 13, Sophia 11, Lucy 9, Timothy 7, John 5. Sophia is also listed with her sister Nellie Phillips.
viii. ABIGAIL RICKERSON, b. 1803, Bardstown, KY; d. Oct 27, 1877; m. (1) JOHN MANSON, Jan 12, 1813; m. (2) THOMAS HITE, Abt. 1818, Nelson Co, KY; d. Jan 27, 1847.
Note from Johnny L. Ricketson's web site at Genealogy.com.
"The date of marriage indicates Abby was only 9 or 10 years old when she married. The date of birth was obtained by Jo Ann Hopper from the files of the Latter Day Saints files in Salt Lake Lake City, Utah.
The marriage information was obtained by Johnny Ricketson from the marriage bond files in the court house at Bardstown, Kentucky. While there appears to be a discrepancy, only the date of birth is questionable. A birth date of 1793 could be possible. Abby subsequently married Thomas Hite, a merchant. "
In 1810 Abigail is probably living at home with her mother. I believe she is the female age 16/26 which means she was born between 1784 - 1794.
In 1830 I find Abigal Manson in Nelson Co, KY. She is age 30-40. She has one male 5/10 and females: (2) 5/10 and (2) 0/5.
In 1840 she may be living with Thomas Hite, Sr. He is 50/60 and wife 30/40. They have one male 20/30, 2 females 15/20, one female 5/10 and one female 0/5.
1850. Abigail Manson is 58. She has Amelia Hite age 15 living with her. James Hite age 32 and his family is living next door. Also living near-by are Cora Anderson age 23 with two sons.
1860. Ab Hite is 68. Amelia Hite age 24 and E. Mattingly are living with her.
1870 - Abigal Hite age 87. This age may be reversed - maybe it should be 78?
To me it looks like John Manson died before 1830 and after 1830 she married Hite. The children may be Mansons who were adopted by Hite. Then during the 40's she divorced Thomas Hite. If he had died she probably would not have taken the name Manson again. Then before 1850 she took the name of Hite again.
ix. PEGGY RICKERSON, b. 1805, Bardstown, KY; m. ?? ASHBROOK.
Found an indication on the internet that Peggy Ashbrook may have lived at Helena, AR. I have not been able to find her.
10. JORDAN4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born 1746 in Dartmouth, Bristol Co, MA.
In Grace W. Edes genealogy of William Ricketson and His Descendants, she describes the death of Jordan as follows: "About eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th (September, 1780) the British Troops appeared on the opposite side of the river (at Augusta, Georgia). The weakness occasioned by loss of men in the action and siege and by the desertion of those who preferred plunder to the honour and interest of their country, compelled the Americans to raise the siege and retreat about 10 o'clock, having sustained a loss of about sixty, killed and wounded; among the former were Captains Charles Jourdaine and William Martin ______; such of the Americans as were badly wouded, and not in a condition to be moved, were left in the town _____(and) fell into the hands of the enemy and were disposed of under the sanguine order of Lord Cornallis, in the following manner; - Henry Duke, John Burgamy, Scott Reeden, _____Darling, Jordan Ricketson and two youths, brothers of 17 and 15 years of age, named Glass, were all hanged." (Siege of Augusta, Georgia, by Hugh McCall, published a Savannah, 1816, Vol. II; pp 326-327. In the Will of Timothy Ricketson, Sr., the father of Jordan Ricketson, Timothy Ricketson, at the time of his death, gave to Jordain Ricketson, his grandson who is believed to be the son on Jordan\ Ricketson, all his land and stock, except that reserved for the wife of Timothy Ricketson.
The only indication I can find that his person existed in from his grandfather's will. His name probably should be Jordan Ricketson, Jr.
11. MIRIAM4 RICKETSON (TIMOTHY3, JONATHAN2, WILLIAM1) was born Abt. 1752 in Dutchess Co, NY. She married ABIJAH PARKER, son of OBIDIAH PARKER and HANNAH ??. He was born Mar 11, 1726/27 in Groton, MA, and died 1780.
i. ABIJAH5 PARKER, b. Dec 11, 1766, Granville, Nova Scotia; m. LYDIA BALCOM, 1789, Nova Scotia; b. Abt. 1764, Annapolis, NS.
In 1880 in Onondaga Co, NY there's an Abijah Parker age 80, shoe maker, born in MA. His father was born in Nova Scotia, his mother born in Conn. His wife is Elizabeth age 83. She was born in NY as were her parents. She is afflicted with old age. They are living with daughter, Elizabeth and her husband James ?(W)astraur. Children lsited for James and Elizabeth are: Abraham 18, Miles 17, Milan 17, Harry 14. All children born in NY. **This may be the son of Abijah Parker and Lydia Balcom **.
**Did Miriam marry a Johnson before marrying Abijah Parker?
ii. JAMES PARKER, b. Mar 21, 1769; d. Sep 11, 1868; m. HANNAH YOUNG; b. 1768.
iii. ABEDNEGO PARKER, b. Apr 17, 1780, Paradise, NS; m. LUCY BALCOM, 1803.
iv. HANNAH PARKER, b. Mar 27, 1771; m. JORDAN RICKETSON, Sep 21, 1796; b. Oct 20, 1767, Bridgetown, NS; d. Apr 22, 1822, Granville, Nova Scotia.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. V.