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(2) a multiple of such other number of cents as provided by law of the host jurisdiction, for interstate combined wagering pools.
(b) "Commission" means the Kansas racing and gaming commission created by this act.
(c) "Concessionaire licensee" means a person, partnership, corporation or association licensed by the commission to utilize a space or privilege within a racetrack facility to sell goods or services.
(d) "Contract" means an agreement, written or oral, between two or more persons, partnerships, corporations or associations, or any combination thereof, which creates an obligation between the parties.
(e) "Crossover employment" means a situation in which an occupational licensee is concurrently employed at the same racing facility by an organization licensee and a facility owner licensee or facility manager licensee.
(f) "Dual racetrack facility" means a racetrack facility for the racing of both horses and greyhounds or two immediately adjacent racetrack facilities, owned by the same licensee, one for racing horses and one for racing greyhounds.
(g) "Executive director" means the executive director of the commission.
(h) "Facility manager licensee" means a person, partnership, corporation or association licensed by the commission and having a contract with an organization licensee to manage a racetrack facility.
(i) "Facility owner licensee" means a person, partnership, corporation or association, or the state of Kansas or any political subdivision thereof, licensed by the commission to construct or own a racetrack facility but does not mean an organization licensee which owns the racetrack facility in which it conducts horse or greyhound racing.
(j) "Fair association" means an association organized pursuant to K.S.A. 2-125 et seq. and amendments thereto or a nonprofit association determined by the commission to be otherwise organized to conduct fair activities pursuant to findings of fact entered by the commission in a license order.
(k) "Financial interest" means an interest that could result directly or indirectly in receiving a pecuniary gain or sustaining a pecuniary loss as a result of ownership or interest in a business entity or activity or as a result of a salary, gratuity or other compensation or remuneration from any person.
(l) "Greyhound" means any greyhound breed of dog properly registered with the national greyhound association of Abilene, Kansas.
(3) none of the officers, directors, members or shareholders of which holds another facility owner license or is an officer, director, member or shareholder of another facility owner licensee.
(2) which is applying for or has been issued an organization license authorizing the conduct of horse races at Eureka Downs, Anthony Downs or a racetrack facility on or adjacent to premises used by a fair association to conduct fair activities.
(o) "Host facility" means the racetrack at which the race is run or, if the race is run in a jurisdiction which is not participating in the interstate combined wagering pool, the racetrack or other facility which is designated as the host facility.
(p) "Host jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction where the host facility is located.
(q) "Interstate combined wagering pool" means a parimutuel pool established in one jurisdiction which is combined with comparable parimutuel pools from one or more racing jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing the amount of money returned on a successful wager in the participating jurisdictions.
(r) "Intertrack wagering" means wagering on a simulcast race at a licensed racetrack facility or at a facility which is licensed in its racing jurisdiction to conduct live races.
(s) "Intrastate combined wagering pool" means a parimutuel pool which is combined with comparable parimutuel pools from one or more racetrack facilities for the purpose of establishing the amount of money returned on a successful wager at the participating racetrack facilities.
(t) "Kansas-whelped greyhound" means a greyhound whelped and raised in Kansas for the first six months of its life.
(u) "Minus pool" means a parimutuel pool in which, after deducting the takeout, not enough money remains in the pool to pay the legally prescribed minimum return to those placing winning wagers, and in which the organization licensee would be required to pay the remaining amount due.
(w) "Occupation licensee" means a person licensed by the commission to perform an occupation or provide services which the commission has identified as requiring a license pursuant to this act.
(x) "Off-track wagering" means wagering on a simulcast race at a facility which is not licensed in its jurisdiction to conduct live races.
(y) "Organization licensee" means a nonprofit organization licensed by the commission to conduct races pursuant to this act and, if the license so provides, to construct or own a racetrack facility.
(z) "Parimutuel pool" means the total money wagered by individuals on one or more horses or greyhounds in a particular horse or greyhound race to win, place or show, or combinations thereof, as established by the commission, and, except in the case of an interstate or intrastate combined wagering pool, held by the organization licensee pursuant to the parimutuel system of wagering. There is a separate parimutuel pool for win, for place, for show and for each of the other forms of betting provided for by the rules and regulations of the commission.
(aa) "Parimutuel wagering" means a form of wagering on the outcome of horse and greyhound races in which those who wager purchase tickets of various denominations on one or more horses or greyhounds and all wagers for each race are pooled and the winning ticket holders are paid prizes from such pool in amounts proportional to the total receipts in the pool.
(bb) "Race meeting" means one or more periods of racing days during a calendar year designated by the commission for which an organization licensee has been approved by the commission to hold live or simulcast horse or greyhound races at which parimutuel wagering is conducted, including such additional time as designated by the commission for the conduct of official business before and after the races.
(cc) "Racetrack facility" means a racetrack within Kansas used for the racing of horses or greyhounds, or both, including the track surface, grandstands, clubhouse, all animal housing and handling areas, other areas in which a person may enter only upon payment of an admission fee or upon presentation of authorized credentials and such additional areas as designated by the commission.
(dd) "Racing jurisdiction" or "jurisdiction" means a governmental authority which is responsible for the regulation of live or simulcast racing in its jurisdiction.
(ee) "Racing or wagering equipment or services licensee" means any person, partnership, corporation or association licensed by the commission to provide integral racing or wagering equipment or services, as designated by the commission, to an organization licensee.
(ff) "Recognized greyhound owners' group" means the duly recognized group elected in accordance with rules and regulations of the commission by a majority of the Kansas licensed greyhound owners at the racetrack facility voting in the election. The commission may designate an organization such as the national greyhound association of Abilene, Kansas, to conduct the election.
(gg) "Recognized horsemen's group" means the duly recognized group, representing the breeds of horses running at a racetrack facility, elected in accordance with rules and regulations of the commission by a majority of the licensed owners and trainers at the racetrack facility voting in the election. If the licensee does not have a recognized horsemen's group, the commission shall designate as the recognized horsemen's group one that serves another organization licensee, but not one that serves a fair association organization licensee.
(hh) "Simulcast" means a live audio-visual broadcast of an actual horse or greyhound race at the time it is run.
(ii) "Takeout" means the total amount of money withheld from each parimutuel pool for the payment of purses, taxes and the share to be kept by the organization licensee. Takeout does not include the breakage. The balance of each pool less the breakage is distributed to the holders of winning parimutuel tickets.
History: L. 1987, ch. 112, § 2; L. 1989, ch. 246, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 27, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 286, § 1; L. 1994, ch. 228, § 1; L. 1994, ch. 332, § 1; L. 1996, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1998, ch. 178, § 1; May 21.

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(B) Achievement of governmentwide goals.-Each agency shall have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small business concerns owned and controlled by women to participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency. The Small Business Administration and the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy shall, when exercising their authority pursuant to paragraph (2), insure that the cumulative annual prime contract goals for all agencies meet or exceed the annual Governmentwide prime contract goal established by the President pursuant to this paragraph.
(3) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed as precluding an award of a contract with a value not greater than $100,000 under the authority of subsection (a) of section 637 of this title, section 712 3 of the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 (Public Law 100–656; 15 U.S.C. 644 note), or section 7102 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.
(1) Assignment and role.-The Administrator shall assign to each major procurement center a procurement center representative with such assistance as may be appropriate.
(3) Appeals.-A procurement center representative is authorized to appeal the failure to act favorably on any recommendation made pursuant to paragraph (2). Such appeal shall be filed and processed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and limitations as an appeal filed by the Administrator pursuant to subsection (a).
(B) Compensation.-The Administrator shall establish personnel positions for procurement center representatives assigned under this subsection, which are classified at a grade level of the General Schedule sufficient to attract and retain highly qualified personnel.
(i) In general.-Consistent with the requirements of clause (ii), a procurement center representative shall have a Level III Federal Acquisition Certification in Contracting (or any successor certification) or the equivalent Department of Defense certification, except that any person serving in such a position on or before January 3, 2013, may continue to serve in that position for a period of 5 years without the required certification.
(I) Timing.-The certification described in clause (i) is not required for any person serving as a procurement center representative until the date that is one calendar year after the date such person is appointed as a procurement center representative.
(6) Major procurement center defined.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "major procurement center" means a procurement center that, in the opinion of the Administrator, purchases substantial dollar amounts of goods or services, including goods or services that are commercially available.
(A) Authorization.-At such times as the Administrator deems appropriate, the breakout procurement center representative 6 shall conduct familiarization sessions for contracting officers and other appropriate personnel of the procurement center to which such representative is assigned. Such sessions shall acquaint the participants with the provisions of this subsection and shall instruct them in methods designed to further the purposes of such subsection.
(B) Limitation.-A procurement center representative may provide training under subparagraph (A) only to the extent that the training does not interfere with the representative carrying out other activities under this subsection.
(8) Annual briefing and report.-A procurement center representative shall prepare and personally deliver an annual briefing and report to the head of the procurement center to which such representative is assigned. Such briefing and report shall detail the past and planned activities of the representative and shall contain such recommendations for improvement in the operation of the center as may be appropriate. The head of such center shall personally receive such briefing and report and shall, within 60 calendar days after receipt, respond, in writing, to each recommendation made by such representative.
All procurement center representatives (including those referred to in subsection (k)(6)), in addition to such other duties as may be assigned by the Administrator, shall increase, insofar as possible, the number and dollar value of procurements that may be used for the programs established under this section and section 637(a) of this title.
(B) information about the agency's past performance in definitizing requests for equitable adjustments in accordance with paragraph (2).
(A) For the 3-year period preceding the issuance of the notice, to the extent such information is available.
(iii) beginning 3 years after August 13, 2018, and each year thereafter, for the 3-year period preceding the issuance of the notice.
(A) Not more than 30 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(B) Not more than 60 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(C) Not more than 90 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(D) Not more than 180 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(E) Not more than 365 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(F) More than 365 days after receipt of a request for an equitable adjustment.
(G) After the completion of the performance of the contract through a contract modification addressing all undefinitized requests for an equitable adjustment received during the term of the contract.
If an agency awards a prime contract to Puerto Rico business during the period beginning on August 13, 2018, and ending on the date that is 4 years after such date, the value of the contract shall be doubled for purposes of determining compliance with the goals for procurement contracts under subsection (g)(1)(A)(i) during such period.
Along with the report required under subsection (h)(1), the head of each Federal agency shall submit to the Administrator, and make publicly available on the scorecard described in section 868(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (15 U.S.C. 644 note), an analysis of the number and dollar amount of prime contracts awarded pursuant to paragraph (1) for each fiscal year of the period described in such paragraph.
The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, referred to in subsec. (h)(2)(F), is Pub. L. 109–282, Sept. 26, 2006, 120 Stat. 1186 , which is set out as a note under section 6101 of Title 31, Money and Finance.
Section 712 of the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 (Public Law 100–656; 15 U.S.C. 644 note), referred to in subsec. (j)(3), was repealed by Pub. L. 111–240, title I, §1335(a), Sept. 27, 2010, 124 Stat. 2543 .
Section 868(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, referred to in subsec. (x)(2), is section 868(b) of Pub. L. 114–92, which is set out as a note under this section.
In subsec. (c)(1)(A), "section 8502 of title 41" substituted for "the first section of the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Committee on Purchases of Blind-made Products, and for other purposes', approved June 25, 1938 (41 U.S.C. 46)" on authority of Pub. L. 111–350, §6(c), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3854 , which Act enacted Title 41, Public Contracts.
In subsec. (c)(2)(B), "section 8503 of title 41" substituted for "section 2 of the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Committee on Purchases of Blind-made Products, and for other purposes', approved June 25, 1938 (41 U.S.C. 47)" on authority of Pub. L. 111–350, §6(c), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3854 , which Act enacted Title 41, Public Contracts.
In subsec. (q)(2)(A), "section 1302(a) of title 41" substituted for "section 25(a) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 4219(a) [421(a)])" and "section 1303(a) of title 41" substituted for "section 25 of such Act" on authority of Pub. L. 111–350, §6(c), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3854 , which Act enacted Title 41, Public Contracts.
In subsec. (r)(2), "section 4106(c) of title 41" substituted for "section 303J(b) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253j(b))" on authority of Pub. L. 111–350, §6(c), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3854 , which Act enacted Title 41, Public Contracts.
Prior similar provisions were contained in section 214 of act July 30, 1953, ch. 282, title II, 67 Stat. 238 , as amended by act Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 628, §9, 69 Stat. 551 , which was previously classified to section 643 of this title. The provisions of section 215 of act July 30, 1953, formerly classified to this section, were transferred to section 2 of Pub. L. 85–536, and are classified to section 639 of this title. See Codification note set out under section 631 of this title.
2018-Subsec. (j)(3). Pub. L. 115–232, §812(a)(2)(C)(viii)(I), struck out "section 2323 of title 10," after "section 637 of this title,".
Subsec. (k)(10). Pub. L. 115–232, §812(a)(2)(C)(viii)(II), substituted "subsection (a) or" for "subsection (a)," and struck out "or section 2323 of title 10, which shall be made with due regard to the requirements of subsection (m)," after "or 657f of this title,".
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 115–232, §812(a)(2)(C)(viii)(III), amended subsec. (m) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (m) related to policies and procedures for each agency subject to former section 2323 of title 10 to follow when implementing requirements under that section.
Subsec. (w). Pub. L. 115–232, §855, added subsec. (w).
Subsec. (x). Pub. L. 115–232, §861(b), added subsec. (x).
2017-Subsec. (a)(1)(C). Pub. L. 115–91, §1702(c), substituted "total purchases and contracts for goods and services" for "total purchase and contracts for goods and services".
2016-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 114–328, §1801, amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) related to determination of awards or contracts, including notice requirement for certain large, consolidated, or bundled proposed procurements.
2015-Subsec. (e)(3). Pub. L. 114–92, §863(a), amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) set forth required elements for a proposed procurement strategy for a procurement involving a substantial bundling of contract requirements.
2014-Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 113–76 added par. (3).
2013-Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 112–239, §1623, substituted "a Federal department or agency" for "the various agencies" and ", and each such Federal department or agency shall-" and subpars. (A) and (B) for period at end.
2010-Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 111–240, §1347(b)(2), inserted "and subcontract" before "awards for fiscal year 2003" in fourth sentence.
2000-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(9) [title VIII, §806(a)], in eighth sentence, substituted "definition of a 'United States industry' under the North American Industry Classification System, as established" for "four-digit standard industrial classification codes contained in the Standard Industrial Classification Manual published".
1999-Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 106–50, §502(a)(3), inserted "small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans," after "the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns," in penultimate sentence.
1997-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 105–135, §413(b), in third sentence, inserted "or the solicitation involves an unnecessary or unjustified bundling of contract requirements, as determined by the Administration," after "discrete construction projects,", substituted "(4)" for "or (4)", and inserted before period at end ", or (5) why the agency has determined that the bundled contract (as defined in section 632(o) of this title) is necessary and justified".
1996-Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 104–106 struck out second comma after "goals for the participation by small business concerns,".
1994-Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103–403, §305(1), amended subpar. (A) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (A) read as follows: "During each of fiscal years 1989 through 1993, public or private organizations for the handicapped shall be eligible to participate in programs authorized under this section in an aggregate amount for each year as follows: In 1989 not more than $30,000,000, in 1990 not more than $40,000,000, and in each of 1991, 1992 and 1993 not more than $50,000,000."
1992-Subsec. (c)(1)(A). Pub. L. 102–569 substituted "From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled" for "from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped".
1991-Subsec. (k)(5). Pub. L. 102–190 amended par. (5) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (5) read as follows: "assist small business concerns to obtain payments, late payment interest penalties, or information due to such concerns, in conformity with chapter 39 of title 31;".
1990-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101–574 inserted after second sentence "If a proposed procurement includes in its statement of work goods or services currently being performed by a small business, and if the proposed procurement is in a quantity or estimated dollar value the magnitude of which renders small business prime contract participation unlikely, or if a proposed procurement for construction seeks to package or consolidate discrete construction projects, the Procurement Activity shall provide a copy of the proposed procurement to the Procurement Activity's Small Business Procurement Center Representative at least 30 days prior to the solicitation's issuance along with a statement explaining (1) why the proposed acquisition cannot be divided into reasonably small lots (not less than economic production runs) to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement, (2) why delivery schedules cannot be established on a realistic basis that will encourage small business participation to the extent consistent with the actual requirements of the Government, (3) why the proposed acquisition cannot be offered so as to make small business participation likely, or (4) why construction cannot be procured as separate discrete projects. The thirty-day notification process shall occur concurrently with other processing steps required prior to issuance of the solicitation. Within 15 days after receipt of the proposed procurement and accompanying statement, if the Procurement Center Representative believes that the procurement as proposed will render small business prime contract participation unlikely, the Representative shall recommend to the Procurement Activity alternative procurement methods which would increase small business prime contracting opportunities."
1989-Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 101–37, §19, inserted "individuals" after "economically disadvantaged".
1988-Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 100–590, §133(a), amended subsec. (c) generally, substituting provisions relating to programs for blind and handicapped individuals for provisions relating to eligibility, participating organizations, monitoring and evaluation, and report to Congressional committees.
Subsec. (l)(6). Pub. L. 100–590, §110(4), amended par. (6) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (6) read as follows: "For purposes of this subsection, the term 'major procurement center' means a procurement center of the Department of Defense that awarded contracts for items other than commercial items totaling at least $150,000,000 in the preceding fiscal year, and such other procurement centers as designated by the Administrator."
1987-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–26, §10(a)(1), made technical amendment to directory language of section 921(a)(1) of Pub. L. 99–500, Pub. L. 99–591, and Pub. L. 99–661. See 1986 Amendment note below.
1986-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–500 and Pub. L. 99–591, §101(c) [§921(a), (b)], Pub. L. 99–661, §921(a), (b), as amended by Pub. L. 100–26, §10(a)(1), amended subsec. (a) identically, inserting "in each industry category" in cl. (3), and inserting provision identifying an industry category, providing for determination of such category by the Administrator, and permitting segmentation of a market for goods and services under certain circumstances and provision that a contract not be awarded if the award would result in a cost to the awarding agency which exceeds a fair market price.
1984-Subsecs. (l), (m). Pub. L. 98–577 added subsec. (l) and redesignated former subsec. (l) as (m).
1980-Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 96–302, §116, substituted provisions covering participation of not-for-profit organizations in certain authorized programs during fiscal years 1981, through 1983, the monitoring and evaluation of such participation as causing severe economic injury to for-profit small businesses and transmission of report to congressional committees not later than Jan. 1, 1982, respecting impact of contracts on the for-profit small businesses for provisions respecting eligibility during fiscal year 1978, of public and private organizations and individuals to participate in the award of contracts and requiring transmission of a report by March 1, 1979.
1978-Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 95–507, §232, substituted "September 30, 1980" for "September 30, 1979".
1977-Pub. L. 95–89 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) to (f).
Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title XVII, §1703(b), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1806 , provided that: "The Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall be required to report on the information required by clauses (i)(V), (ii)(VI), (iii)(VII), (iv)(VII), (v)(VI), (vi)(VI), (vii)(VI), and (viii)(IX) of section 15(h)(2)(E) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(h)(2)(E)) beginning on the date that such information is available in the Federal Procurement Data System, the System for Award Management, or any new or successor system."
Pub. L. 100–180, div. A, title VIII, §809(a)(1), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1130 , provided that the amendment made by that section is in effect until Sept. 30, 1988.
Pub. L. 100–180, div. A, title VIII, §809(a)(2), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1130 , as amended by Pub. L. 100–656, title VII, §731, Nov. 15, 1988, 102 Stat. 3897 , provided that the amendment made by that section is effective Oct. 1, 1989.
Pub. L. 99–272, title XVIII, §18003(b), Apr. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 364 , provided that: "The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect on the ninetieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act [Apr. 7, 1986].
Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XVIII, §1814(b), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2654 , provided that: "After receipt of information from the Administrator of the Small Business Administration pursuant to section 15(v) of the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. 644(v)], the Defense Acquisition University (established under section 1746 of title 10, United States Code) and the Federal Acquisition Institute (established under section 1201 of title 41, United States Code) shall periodically update the training provided to the acquisition workforce to incorporate such information."
"(2) Use of scorecard.-Beginning in fiscal year 2017, the Administrator shall establish and carry out a program to use the scorecard developed under paragraph (1) to evaluate whether each Federal agency is creating the maximum practicable opportunities for the award of prime contracts and subcontracts to small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small business concerns owned and controlled by women, by assigning a score to each Federal agency for the previous fiscal year.
"(5) Publication.-The scorecard used by the Administrator under this subsection shall be submitted to the President and Congress along with the report submitted under section 15(h)(2) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(h)(2)).
"(A) Administrator.-The term 'Administrator' means the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
"(B) Federal agency.-The term 'Federal agency' has the meaning given the term 'agency' by section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code, but does not include the United States Postal Service or the Government Accountability Office.
"(i) In general.-The terms 'small business concern', 'small business concern owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans', 'qualified HUBZone small business concern', and 'small business concern owned and controlled by women' have the meanings given such terms under section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632).
"(ii) Small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.-The term 'small business concern owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals' has the meaning given that term under section 8(d)(3)(C) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(d)(3)(C))."
"(1) In general.-Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 27, 2010], the Administrator [of the Small Business Administration] shall implement a 3-year pilot electronic procurement center representative program.
"(2) Report.-Not later than 30 days after the pilot program under paragraph (1) ends, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the Senate and the Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives a report regarding the pilot program."
"(b) Establishment.-The Administrator shall establish a Small Business Teaming Pilot Program for teaming and joint ventures involving small business concerns.
"(c) Grants.-Under the Pilot Program, the Administrator may make grants to eligible organizations to provide assistance and guidance to teams of small business concerns seeking to compete for larger procurement contracts.
"(d) Contracting Opportunities.-The Administrator shall work with eligible organizations receiving a grant under the Pilot Program to recommend appropriate contracting opportunities for teams or joint ventures of small business concerns.
"(e) Report.-Not later than 1 year before the date on which the authority to carry out the Pilot Program terminates under subsection (f), the Administrator shall submit to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the Senate and the Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives a report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program.
"(f) Termination.-The authority to carry out the Pilot Program shall terminate 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 27, 2010].
"(g) Authorization of Appropriations.-There are authorized to be appropriated for grants under subsection (c) $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2015."
Pub. L. 103–403, title III, §303, Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4188 , authorized the Small Business Administration to promote the award of Federal manufacturing contracts to small business concerns that participate in manufacturing application and education centers by working with the Department of Commerce and other agencies to identify components and subsystems that are both critical and currently foreign-sourced, such authority to terminate on Sept. 30, 1997.
Pub. L. 103–403, title III, §304, Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4188 , as amended by Pub. L. 105–135, title V, §508, Dec. 2, 1997, 111 Stat. 2627 ; Pub. L. 106–554, §1(a)(9) [title V, §503(c)], Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763 , 2763A-695, required the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to establish and carry out a pilot program related to improved access to Federal contract opportunities for very small business concerns beginning not later than Aug. 30, 1995, and expiring on Sept. 30, 2003.
"(b) Rule of Construction.-Nothing in this section shall be considered as creating any rights under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 ([former] 41 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) [see 41 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.].
"(c) Definition.-In this section, the term 'small business concern' means a business concern that meets the requirements of section 3(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632(a)) and the regulations promulgated pursuant to that section."
"(1) In general.-The Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to provide for uniform implementation of the authority provided in subsection (a).
"(c) Termination.-This section shall cease to be effective at the end of September 30, 2003."
Pub. L. 103–355, title VII, §7104, Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3369 , formerly set out as a note under this section, was transferred to section 644a of this title.
Pub. L. 102–366, title II, §202(h), Sept. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 996 , provided for procurement procedures under the Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program Act of 1988 prior to implementation of improvements to the collection of data regarding prime contract awards and of a system for collecting such data.
Pub. L. 102–366, title II, §202(i), Sept. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 996 , required the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to issue certain modifications to the test plan and policy direction under the Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program Act of 1988.
Pub. L. 102–366, title III, §321, Sept. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 1006 , provided that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration was to conduct a study regarding the impact of the practice known as "contract bundling" on the participation of small business concerns in the Federal procurement process and, not later than May 15, 1993, to submit a report on the results of the study to the Committees on Small Business of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Pub. L. 100–656, title VII, §§701–722, Nov. 15, 1988, 102 Stat. 3889–3895 , as amended by Pub. L. 101–37, §§23–29, June 15, 1989, 103 Stat. 75 , 76; Pub. L. 101–574, title II, §243, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2827 ; Pub. L. 102–54, §13(e), June 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 275 ; Pub. L. 102–366, title II, §§201–202(g), 203, Sept. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 993–996 ; Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title VIII, §801(h)(9), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2446 ; Pub. L. 102–564, title III, §307(a), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4263 ; Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title VIII, §850(2), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1726 ; Pub. L. 103–446, title XII, §1202(a)(1), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4689 ; Pub. L. 104–208, div. D, title I, §108(a)–(c)(1), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–732 , 3009-733; Pub. L. 105–18, title II, §2002, June 12, 1997, 111 Stat. 174 ; Pub. L. 105–135, title IV, §§401–405, Dec. 2, 1997, 111 Stat. 2616 ; Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title VIII, §821, Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 2016 , known as the Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program Act of 1988, established a Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 111–240, title I, §1335(a), Sept. 27, 2010, 124 Stat. 2543 .
Pub. L. 100–656, title VII, §741, Nov. 15, 1988, 102 Stat. 3897 , authorized the Small Business Administration to segment the industry category of shipbuilding and ship repair, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 111–240, title I, §1335(a), Sept. 27, 2010, 124 Stat. 2543 .
Pub. L. 100–590, title I, §133(b), Nov. 3, 1988, 102 Stat. 3006 , provided that not later than Sept. 30, 1992, the General Accounting Office was to prepare a report describing the impact that contracts awarded under subsec. (c) of this section had on for-profit small business concerns for fiscal years 1989 through 1991, and transmit the report to the Committees on Small Business of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Pub. L. 100–590, title I, §133(c), Nov. 3, 1988, 102 Stat. 3006 , provided that: "There is established within the Small Business Administration a task force on purchases from the blind and severely handicapped which shall consist of one representative of the small business community appointed by the Administrator of the Small Business Administration and one individual knowledgeable in the affiars [sic] of or experienced in the work of sheltered workshops appointed by the Executive Director of the Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped established under the first section of the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Committee on Purchases of Blind-made Products, and for other purposes', approved June 25, 1938 ([former] 41 U.S.C. 46) [now 41 U.S.C. 8502]. The task force shall meet at least once every six months for the purpose of reviewing the award of contracts under section 15(c) of the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. 644(c)] and recommending to the Small Business Administration such administrative or statutory changes as it deems appropriate."
7 So in original. No subpar. (B) has been enacted.


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More frequently than not, cases settle prior to trial. Often these settlements are subject to confidentiality provisions and therefore, we cannot report those extremely favorable results. The following are a few recent cases which were either matters of public record or were settled prior to the filing of an action and not subject to confidentiality provisions.
Confidential Equine Matter. Our client, a beginning rider with no prior experience with horses hired a trainer to help her purchase a suitable horse. The trainer urged our client to go out of state with her to the HITS Thermal Horse Show instead of seek a local horse. The trainer advised our client to pay $27,000 for a horse that had a difficult and spirited nature, failed its pre-purchase exam, and had a suspensory ligament injury. The trainer instructed our client to pay the purchase price in cash to the Seller without a bill of sale and, of course, also collected a commission on the sale without a written commission agreement. Our client was able to obtain a five figure confidential settlement from the trainer.
Chadwick v. Baglama, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2015-00808740. 2015. Successfully evicted and secured $29,000 judgment against non-paying residential tenant in Coto de Caza.
Confidential Americans With Disabilities Act Settlement. Questionable claim by Plaintiff who claimed to have an action under the ADA was settled and dismissed immediately due to our aggressive litigation of this matter.
Confidential Commercial Lease Dispute. We were able to negotiate the full release of our client, a tenant in an office building in Laguna Beach, from their long term lease due to noise and odor issues.
Zephyr Equities etc. v. Brookfield Natomas, LLC. Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2013-00648089. Our client provided construction project management and entitlement services to Brookfield for nearly a decade under a consulting agreement. Brookfield dishonored the contract and claimed it constituted an illegal real estate sales contract. After our client prevailed in binding arbitration against Brookfield, Brookfield tried to have the award vacated. The award was confirmed by the Orange County Superior Court and judgment was entered on February 14, 2014.
Confidential Landlord Tenant Matter. Assisted a client who was the victim of domestic violence negotiate an early termination of her lease.
Commercial Landlord Tenant Dispute. After signing a multi-year lease, Tenants discovered during their build-out period that there was no water line that would enable them to have a kitchen in their restaurant. We assisted them in being able to terminate their lease early based on impossibility of performance.
Confidential Horse Ownership Dispute. A dispute arose between a former couple as to who owned the horse. A lawsuit ensued and we were able to secure ownership rights for our client prior to trial.
El Indio Tortilleria v. Tortilla Flats. Our clients, who had sold their restaurant business, were wrongfully sued for the debts of the buyer. We were able to secure the unconditional dismissal of our clients and obtain indemnity from the buyer.
Hanks v. Grubb. Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2010-00390155. Our client, Richard Hanks, sued the defendant for Wrongful Interference with Contract. After a several day bench trial our client was awarded $317,192.35 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages resulting in a total award in excess of $560,000.
Brand Family Trust v. Harding et al. Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 487284. Our client owned residential income property along with her sister. When her sister passed away, her daughter took over the property and started making unauthorized changes to the property. We sued for partition of the property and were able to negotiate a favorable settlement for our client in which she was bought out at the current market rate.
Claim Against Allianz Travel Insurance. Our client purchased trip cancellation protection from Allianz Travel Insurance. For medical reasons they needed to cancel their trip. Allianz initially denied their claim stating that the medical condition was "pre-existing." Once we became involved we were able to recover full reimbursement for the cost of the trip on behalf of our clients without resorting to litigation.
CACH, LLC v. Mackay, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2013-00642286. Our client purchased a sofa from JC Penny and financed the purchase. They returned the sofa but the finance company kept billing our client and damaged their credit by claiming they had an upaid debt. The finance company sued our client and we were able to obtain a settlement which required not only that the finance company dismiss the case but also requiring it to correct our clients' credit and reimburse them for attorney fees.
Confidential Real Estate Matter. In connection with the sale of their home, our client was entitled to stay in the home after the close of escrow. The Buyers delayed the close of escrow but then wanted our clients to leave the home early. We were able to assist our clients and let them stay in the home until they were in a position to move into their new home.
FNMA v. Molina, Riverside Superior Court Case No. MCV1300995. Our clients leased a home from Landlord Molina. Molina defaulted on his loan and FNMA foreclosed on the property. FNMA tried to evict our client without complying with the Obama Act. Not only were we able to prevail and have the unlawful detainer case dismissed but we also enabled our client to buy the property from FNMA and they lived in the home rent free for nearly a year prior to the purchase.
Confidential Settlement in Dispute Between Homeowner and Homeowner's Association. We represented a homeowner who tried to sell their condominium but encountered resistance from their HOA which claimed that funds were due because of water damage allegedly caused by our clients. The sale was able to proceed under a temporary settlement which allowed the parties to set aside the disputed funds from escrow. Later, after the filing of an interpleader action we were able to recover all of these funds for our client.
Palm Beach Park Association v. Beardslee. Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2011-00469463. After losing her case in the trial court, Florence Beardslee came to our firm days before she was to be evicted from her mobile home. We were able to secure an emergency writ on her behalf keeping her from being evicted from her home and successful filed and briefed her appeal. The Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court not only reversed the judgment against Ms. Beardslee but ordered judgment entered in her favor in a case the Appellate Division recommended for publication. We obtained a six figure judgment on Ms. Beardslee's behalf against Palm Beach Park Homeowners Association.
Zone 101 v. Radco Management, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2010-00433819. Our client performed services for the defendant but was not paid in full. We obtained an order freezing the defendant's bank accounts and a judgment in excess of $80,000 against the defendant.
Confidential Real Estate Matter. Our clients needed a bit more time to close escrow and seller wanted to cancel the sale. We were able to find a loophole in the legal documentation that enabled them the time they needed to obtain their loan and close escrow.
Confidential Landlord Tenant Dispute. We represented tenants who lived in a house that flooded. Landlord wanted them to continue their lease during repairs, we negotiated a settlement releasing our client and compensating them for damages.
Confidential Equine Dispute. Our client purchased a horse and the purchase agreement had a "right of return" clause which said that if the horse became unsound, the Seller would need to take possession of the horse. The Seller refused to honor the clause until we got involved. We were able to enforce the clause and the horse was placed by the Seller in a good home.
Confidential Settlement in Equine Fraud Action. After seeing a video of a horse, our client entered into an oral contract to purchase a horse. When the horse arrived, our client discovered that the horse had tumors that were not shown in the video. The seller refused to return our client's money and refused to take the horse back. We obtained a favorable settlement for our client prior to initiating litigation.
Confidential Settlement of Landlord Tenant Dispute. Investors acquired a property in foreclosure and wanted to evict our client without complying with the "Obama Act." We were able to keep our client in the home under the existing term and its option.
Dolensky v. Devine Developers, Inc., Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2011-00476458-CL-PT-HLH. We successfully petitioned the court to remove a wrongful mechanic’s lien from our client’s property.
Confidential Settlement of Embryo Transfer Dispute. Our client purchased a brood mare and as part of the agreement gave the seller the right to one embryo transfer from the mare. A dispute arose as to how much time the mare had to be out of service to provide the embryo transfer and at what point the buyer had fulfilled their obligation to provide the embryo transfer. Our firm negotiated a mutually satisfactory resolution to this problem for all concerned.
Kiely v. Leyva, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 11FL000017. Ms. Kiely was an elderly woman whose “friends” moved into her apartment when she was hospitalized. They then refused to move out. We were able to get Ms. Kiely her apartment back by bringing a successful elder abuse action.
Roman James v. Kimberlee Drake, San Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVSS810305. The plaintiff in this action claimed an interest in our client's real and personal property including her ranch and several show horses. After we were able to win a series of demurrers on behalf of our client, Mr. James dismissed his case. Our client, Ms. Drake, obtained a cost judgment.
Jeffrey Parkhurst v. Capistrano Animal Rescue Effort, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2008-00115040 (2008). Even though Mr. Parkhurst's wife, Katherine Hammersly, lost her case against our client, CARE, a non-profit organization, her husband attempted to sue the charity for malicious prosecution and unfair competition. The malicious prosecution cause of action was stricken after our first demurrer and the entire case was dismissed when the summary judgment motion filed by us on CARE's behalf was granted. Mr. Parkhurst appealed the judgment and lost on appeal as well.
Successful Representation of Tenant in Unlawful Detainer Action following Foreclosure. Our client entered into a long term lease of a high end residential property. The Landlord lost the property in foreclosure and the new owner tried to evict them. We were able to keep our client in the home for the duration of the lease as well as the option period.
Confidential Legal Malpractice Action. Two individuals entered into a transaction with one another. To maintain confidentiality we will refer to them as Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones was represented by an attorney and Mr. Smith was not. Later, Mr. Jones breached his agreement with Mr. Smith and then filed for bankruptcy. Since Mr. Smith could no longer sue Mr. Jones, he instead sued our client, Mr. Jones' attorney claiming malpractice and fraud. The trial was bifurcated (divided into two phases.) After we won the first phase of trial, this case immediately settled.
Dennis Harris and Joena Harris v. Wickstrom Structural Engineering, Inc., Riverside Superior Court Case No. RIC 495298 (2009). Our client was owed money for engineering work performed. In order to avoid paying their bill, Plaintiffs sued our client. After preparing both a motion for sanctions and a demurrer, and before these motions were even heard, the case was dismissed by the Plaintiffs and our client obtained a cost judgment on March 26, 2009.
Katherine Hammersly v. Capistrano Animal Rescue Effort, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 06CC09192 (2006). Our client, CARE, a non-profit organization, was sued by a former board member. CARE cross-complained against plaintiff for professional negligence and a number of other torts. We brought a successful motion for summary judgment on our client's behalf which resulted in the dismissal of Ms. Hammersly’s action in early 2008. CARE’s cross-complaint was settled however the terms of that settlement are confidential. The summary judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on July 21, 2009.
Confidential Business Fraud Claim (2008). We represented an individual who purchased a restaurant business in a shopping center. The seller of the business failed to disclose that a competing business was moving into the same shopping center. The sales contract called for mediation prior to litigation. During mediation we negotiated a $75,000.00 settlement for our client and litigation was avoided.
McTeggart v. Moldovan Orange County Superior Court Case No. 05 CC 10650 (2008). Contractor who was not properly licensed sued our clients for sums allegedly due in connection with a tenant improvement build-out. Our client cross-complained for damages caused by the contractor’s defective workmanship. After a court trial of the case, Plaintiff was awarded nothing and our client was awarded a judgment for in excess of $173,000 which included an award of attorney fees and court costs.
Holland v. Hicks, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 07CC08896 (2008). The Plaintiffs in this case contended that our client's back yard skateboard ramp constituted a nuisance. Plaintiffs dismissed their action and our client obtained a cost judgment.

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[285 U.S. 112, 113] Messrs. James M. Guiher, Philip P. Steptoe, and Louis A. Johnson, all of Clarksburg, W. Va., for petitioner.
Messrs. Charles J. Schuck and Carl G. Bachmann, both of Wheeling, W. Va., for respondent.
To each defense the plaintiff replied that the warranty recited had been modified by a rider added to the policy; and also that prior to the fire she had no knowledge or control, as alleged, of the circumstances relied upon as showing breach of the warranty. The rider set forth in the reply altered the occupancy clause of the policy, which had originally described the insured building as 'occupied as Produce Store,' so that it read, 'occupied for bottling automobile oils, offices, and other mercantile purposes not more hazardous.' Another clause of the policy permitted the insured 'for present and other occupancies not more hazardous' 'to do such work and [285 U.S. 112, 115] to keep and use such materials as are usual in such occupancies;' and a rule of the West Virginia Fire Underwriters' Association (concededly a part of the insurance contract) provides that 'the word 'materials' as used above, includes gasoline and such other materials as are prohibited by the printed conditions of the policy, when kept and used for such purposes as are usual to the occupancies permitted.' Gasoline is used in the business of bottling automobile oils.
The case was tried before a jury. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the premises were occupied at the time of the fire by a tenant engaged in the illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquors; and that a large quantity of gasoline was kept on the premises for use in that connection. But it failed in its effort to prove that the plaintiff had knowledge of these facts. The verdict was for the plaintiff; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 49 F.(2d) 158. The writ of certiorari was granted because of alleged conflict with decisions of this Court and of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 284 U.S. 605 , 52 S. Ct. 31, 76 L. Ed. -.
In so holding the court was in error. Because of the terms of the rider, a determination of the hazard involved was essential to maintaining the defense under the prohibited articles warranty as well as that under the increase of hazard warranty. But the two warranties are distinct. The latter is not violated, unless there is increase of hazard within the knowledge and control of the insured. The former may be violated if a tenant keeps the prohibited article on the premises, even if this was done without the knowledge and control of the insured. Liverpool & London Insurance Co. v. Gunther, 116 U.S. 113, 128 , 129 S., 6 S. Ct. 306; Gunther v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co., 134 U.S. 110, 116 , 10 S. Ct. 448. Compare Imperial Fire [285 U.S. 112, 117] Insurance Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 463 , 464 S., 14 S. Ct. 379. The rider attached to the policy altered the prohibition against gasoline only to the extent of permitting it to be kept and used for the purpose of bottling automobile oils, or for 'other mercantile purposes not more hazardous.' The court could not say as a matter of law whether the business of operating moonshine stills was or was not more hazardous than that of bottling automobile oils. Compare Royal Exch. Assur. of London v. Thrower (C. C. A.) 246 F. 768, 772; Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Franklin Brass Co. (C. C. A.) 58 F. 166, 171; Schaffer v. Hampton Insurance Co., 183 Minn. 101, 235 N. W. 618. If it was more hazardous, the presence of the gasoline constituted a violation of the warranty. The question should have been submitted to the jury.
It is urged on behalf of the respondent that the insurance company is not in a position to complain of this error. Stress is laid on the circumstance that in its specifications of defense the company alleged knowledge and control by the insured of the presence of the gasoline and the operation of the stills; and it is argued that the parties are bound by the issue as thus joined. But the pleading set forth the prohibited articles warranty and asserted a defense under it. Any additional matter, which might by implication be read as an attempted construction of the warranty, is to be regarded as surplusage. Compare Lawrence v. Hyde, 77 W. Va. 639, 643, 88 S. E. 45; Lohr v. Wolfe, 71 W. Va. 627, 628, 77 S. E. 71; Jones v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 265 Ill. 98, 100, 101, 106 N. E. 473; Hall v. Spaulding, 42 N. H. 259, 262. When the defendant later sought instructions that proof of knowledge and control by the insured was not essential to establishment of the defense, the plaintiff made no effort to show that it had been prejudiced.
A more serious difficulty is that the defendant did not itself seek proper instructions. The burden was upon [285 U.S. 112, 118] it to prove that the occupancy was not one to which the gasoline permit extended. Compare Logan v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, 57 W. Va. 384, 390, 50 S. E. 529. Yet it presented no request that the jury be instructed as to the meaning of the rider. Nor did it request an instruction that the jury find whether the occupancy at or before the time of the fire was more hazardous than that of bottling automobile oils. Its request was merely that the jury be charged that the plaintiff could not recover if at and prior to the time of the fire substantial quantities of gasoline were being kept on the premises 'either for the purpose of operating moonshine stills or for any other purpose not permitted by the policy.' Thus, it requested the court to hold as a matter of law that operating moonshine stills was outside the scope of the permitted occupancies. The court could not take judicial notice that the operation of the stills was more hazardous than bottling automobile oils or say that it was not a mercantile purpose.
But the defendant's failure to ask proper instructions does not cure the error in the instructions which were given, and excepted to. Compare Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Volk, 151 U.S. 73, 78 , 14 S. Ct. 239. At the plaintiff's request the trial judge charged that, 'unless the plaintiff ... had control or knowledge of the keeping and using of such gasoline or the operation of such stills, such keeping, using and operation ... constitute no defense'; that 'the defendant by the issuance of the rider ... is estopped to avoid the policy because of the fact that quantities of gasoline were kept and used upon the premises since the said rider permitted the bottling of automobile oils which according to the uncontradicted evidence contained gasoline.' These instructions, while correct in so far as they bore upon the defense under the increase of hazard warranty, were erroneous in respect to that under the prohibited articles war- [285 U.S. 112, 119] ranty. The fact that the defendant had incorporated errors of law in the instructions which it sought upon the second defense did not justify putting the case to the jury solely upon the first. Compare Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Fitzpatrick (C. C. A.) 2 F.(2d) 651, 654; Sutherland v. Payne (C. C. A.) 274 F. 360, 361; Rothe v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. A.) 195 F. 21, 25; Audubon Bldg. Co. v. F. M. Andrews & Co. (C. C. A.) 187 F. 254, 260. We are constrained to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, with directions that the case be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

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IN RE: Judge Charles R. JONES. November 28, 2001 No. 0101-O-2304.
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY v. PARISH SCHOOL BOARD OF THE PARISH OF ST CHARLES November 28, 2001 No. 2001-C-0511.
IN RE: Lionel “Lon” BURNS (State of Louisiana v. George Lee November 28, 2001 No. 2001-KK-1080.
STATE SNW CJW CLM CNM JAM IMM v. MITCHELL November 28, 2001 No. 2001-CJ-2128.
GOINS v. WAL MART STORES INC November 28, 2001 No. 2001-CC-1136.
DELANEY v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA November 28, 2001 No. 2001-CC-1076.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. ROTTMAN November 28, 2001 No. 2001-C-0678.
STATE v. DEAL November 28, 2001 No. 2000-KA-0434.
STATE v. WILLIAMS November 28, 2001 No. 2000-K-1725.
LaBOVE v. RAFTERY November 28, 2001 Nos. 2000-C-1394, 2000-C-1423.
JENNINGS v. TURNER November 28, 2001 No. 2001-C-0631.
STATE v. WILLIAMS November 28, 2001 No. 2001-KK-0732.
FINK v. BRYANT November 28, 2001 No. 2001-CC-0987.
RIVET v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENT November 28, 2001 No. 2001-CC-0961.
HAND v. HAND November 28, 2001 No. 2001-C-0714.
VASALLE v. WAL MART STORES INC November 28, 2001 No. 2001-C-0462.
STATE v. YOUNG November 28, 2001 No. 2000-K-1437.
IN RE: Stanley S. SPRING November 16, 2001 No. 2001-B-2515.
WOMEN HEALTH CLINIC v. STATE November 9, 2001 No. 2001-CA-2645.
IN RE: Stephen E. CAILLOUET. November 9, 2001 No. 2001-B-2461.
IN RE: Iona A. RENFROE. November 9, 2001 No. 2001-B-1947.
IN RE: Barry G. FEAZEL. November 9, 2001 No. 2001-B-2309.
STATE v. DANIELS III November 2, 2001 No. 2000-K-3369.
IN RE: Joyce H. WATTS. November 2, 2001 No. 2001-B-2060.
STATE v. CAMPBELL November 2, 2001 No. 2001-K-0329.

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ALICE R. ALLEN & others, trustees, vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION.
Present: RUGG, C.J., PIERCE, WAIT, & FIELD, JJ.
When a stockholder in a corporation receives from the corporation rights to subscribe for more of its stock and later sells them for a price greater than a market value which they had at the time he received them, he is taxable, under G. L. c. 62, s. 5 and 7, as amended, respectively, by s. 1 and 2 of St. 1928, c. 217, only upon the excess of such sale price over the market value of the rights when acquired by him, and not upon the entire sale price.
If the meaning of a statute is plain, it cannot be affected by resort to proceedings incident to its passage or by a construction put upon it by a department of the Commonwealth charged with its application and enforcement.
COMPLAINT, filed in the Superior Court for the county of Suffolk on October 5, 1929, under G. L. C. 62, s. 47, by trustees under the will of Thomas Allen, for abatement of an income tax.
tember 1, 1929, the commissioner of corporations and taxation assessed upon the complainants an income tax at the rate of three per cent on the whole amount received by the complainants from the sale of the said rights to wit, $15,484.71, which tax was in the amount of $464.54. The tax then was paid under protest, an application for abatement was made to and was refused by the commissioner, and these proceedings were instituted.
"If it be material, it is agreed that since the enactment of St. 1916, c. 269, the defendant commissioner and his predecessor in office have uniformly construed the said income tax statute as imposing a tax at the rate of three per cent upon the sale of rights declared upon corporate stock owned by inhabitants of Massachusetts, the said tax on rights being levied upon the whole amount received by any Massachusetts inhabitant from the sale of the said rights declared upon stock owned by him. This construction of St. 1916, c. 269, especially s. 5 (c) and 7 thereof, and of G. L. c. 62, especially s. 5 (c) and 7 thereof, has been uniform since 1916, despite amendments to the said acts, chapters, and sections, including the amendment to G. L. c. 62, s. 7, contained in St. 1928, c. 217, s. 2."
The contention of the complainants was that the tax should have been assessed on the difference between the amount for which the rights were sold and their value when they were acquired by the complainants, i.e., on $1,043.39; and should be only $31.31.
The judge ordered judgment for the respondent. The complainants appealed.
T. Allen, for the complainants.
R. A. Cutter, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
makes as such trustee. If, in any exchange of shares upon the reorganization of one or more corporations or of one or more partnerships, associations or trusts, the beneficial interest in which is represented by transferable shares, the new shares received in exchange for the shares surrendered represent the same interest in the same assets, no gain or loss shall be deemed to accrue from the transaction until a sale or further exchange of such new shares is made." Section 7 as finally amended: ". . . In determining gains or losses realized from sale of capital assets, the basis of determination, in case of property owned on January first, nineteen hundred and sixteen, shall be the value on that date, and in case of property acquired by purchase thereafter, the cost thereof. If the property other than stock dividends in new stock of the company issuing the same was acquired otherwise than by purchase, the basis of determination of the gain or loss shall be the value on the date when it was so acquired."
c. 217, s. 2, governing the case at bar. The amendment has no effect on the meaning of "value." The meaning established by the Parker decision must stand.
It has been earnestly argued that this result was not intended by the General Court; the history of the origin of said c. 217 is invoked in support of that argument. The plain meaning of a statute cannot be affected by resort to proceedings incident to its passage. Light may be sought from that source only to illumine statutory language of doubtful import. Other information than that afforded by the words of the statute can be examined only to aid in the solution of an ambiguity. We can only interpret the words of the statute: we cannot speculate as to the probable intention of the Legislature apart from those words. Selectmen of Natick v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 210 Mass. 229, 232. Old South Association v. Boston, 212 Mass. 299, 304-305. United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 278 U. S. 269, 278.
sess before," and that the "amount for which he sells them is a gain," were used by way of argument to show that in their nature gains arising from the sale of such rights constituted income which might be treated by the General Court as income under the Forty-fourth Amendment. That statement cannot rightly be wrested from its context and construed as an interpretation of the basis of taxation established by the statute. See Vigeant v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 343. (2) The governing statute in the case at bar, St. 1928, c. 217, s. 2, is different from St. 1916, c. 269, s. 7, in force at the time of the decision of the Putnam case. As already pointed out, the words of the latest amendment, in view of the decision in Parker v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, supra, make clear the intention of the Legislature to tax gains from the sale of such rights, not on the basis that the amount for which they are sold is a gain, all of which may be made subject to the income tax, but only on the basis that the gain subject to the tax is measured by the difference between the market value of such rights when received by the taxpayer and the market value for which they are sold. That is the measure established for ascertaining the gain or loss from the sale of all capital assets (except stock dividends) acquired otherwise than by purchase. It comprehends the gains from the sale of rights to subscribe in new stock. (3) The departmental construction of St. 1928, c. 217, s. 2, the statute at present governing the subject, has not been long continued and the rule as to weight to be attributed to such construction when long continued and sanctioned. by the acquiescence of the Legislature illustrated by Burrage v. County of Bristol, 210 Mass. 299, 301, is not applicable. Moreover, that rule cannot be invoked against the plain words of a statute.
It follows that abatement ought to have been granted. The order of judgment for the defendant is reversed. Decree is to be entered granting abatement on the footing that the gain of the complainants subject to tax as income was $1,043.39.

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jim on Thursday, September 21, 2017.
Sentencing—Presentence Confinement Credit—Residential Community Corrections Placement.
Defendant was sentenced to 18 months in community corrections. He escaped two months after reporting to community corrections. Following his arrest, the district court resentenced him to 18 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC), and he was given 67 days of presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the time he was confined in the county jail before his initial sentencing and 23 days of PSCC for the time he spent in jail between his arrest and resentencing. The court denied defendant’s request for PSCC related to the time he spent in community corrections because he had escaped.
On appeal, defendant contended and the People conceded that the court erred by not awarding him PSCC for the time he spent in the residential community corrections program. Time spent by a defendant in jail, in a DOC facility, or as a resident in a community corrections facility constitutes confinement under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-405, because those facilities limit an individual’s liberty. Thus, when a defendant is resentenced to DOC custody after revocation of a direct sentence to community corrections, he is entitled to credit for time served in a residential community corrections placement. Here, defendant is entitled to 62 days of PSCC for the 62 days he spent in a residential community correction placement. Further, his escape from community corrections did not negate his right to PSCC because C.R.S. §18-1.3-301(1)(k) does not apply to PSCC awards.
The order was reversed and the was case remanded for the district court to correct the mittimus to reflect that defendant is entitled to a total of 152 days of PSCC.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Espinoza on Thursday, September 21, 2017.
Arson—Attempted Murder—Custody—Motion to Suppress—Consecutive Sentences—Identical Evidence—Crime of Violence—Concurrent Sentences—Discretion.
Espinoza set fire to an apartment complex. As part of the investigation, police transported Espinoza to the police station, where he waited for several hours before being interviewed. Police ended the interview when Espinoza invoked his right to counsel. Espinoza filed a motion to suppress his statements from the videotaped interview with police, alleging that he was in custody and police failed to give him Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion. A jury found Espinoza guilty of 10 counts of attempted murder, 23 counts of first degree arson, 10 crime of violence counts, and multiple misdemeanors.
On appeal, Espinoza contended that the trial court failed to consider several factors in finding that he was not in custody at the police station, including the several-hour wait in the interview room, the presence of two armed detectives during the interview, and the confrontational question near the end of the interview. The record showed that Espinoza agreed to speak with the detectives, consented to a pat-down search, and rode unrestrained to the police station. The detectives told Espinoza that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, Espinoza was not physically restrained, and the tone of the interview was conversational. The trial court’s detailed factual findings, supported by the record, show that Espinoza was not in custody when interviewed by the detectives.
Espinoza next contended that the trial court misapprehended the applicable law when it ruled that it was required to impose consecutive sentences for his attempted first degree murder convictions. Despite naming different victims, Espinoza’s 10 attempted murder convictions were supported by identical evidence because the same evidence (the single act of fire-setting) formed the basis of each conviction. The court of appeals held that separately named victims do not create separate crimes of violence under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) when identical evidence supports each conviction, and in such circumstances, a court has discretion to impose concurrent sentences under C.R.S. § 18-1-408(3). Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences under the mistaken belief that it had no discretion to impose concurrent sentences.
The judgments of conviction were affirmed. The sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing.
On Tuesday, September 26, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and two unpublished opinions.


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Re: New York City Administrative Code ("Admin. Code") §§ 3-702(8), 3-703(1)(d), 3-703(1)(f), 3-703(1)(l), 3-708(5), 3-711(1), 3-719(2)(b); New York City Campaign Finance Board Rules 1-02, 1-04(e), 1-04(g), 1-08(f)(1), (2), (4), 2-02(c); Op. No. 2009-7.
The New York City Campaign Finance Board (the "Board") is issuing an advisory opinion in response to a July 7, 2009 letter from Jerry H. Goldfeder of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP on behalf of Green for New York, Mark Green's principal committee for the 2009 public advocate election, in which Mr. Goldfeder requested an advisory opinion as to how the Board "intends to interpret and implement the law relating to third party expenditures, and, specifically, what constitutes sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of improper ‘coordination'."1 The issues raised by this request are extremely important and the Board is committed to ensuring that the law with respect to non-independent expenditures is enforced vigorously and consistently. The Board is issuing this advisory opinion in order to provide guidance as to how it interprets the New York City Campaign Finance Act (Admin. Code §§ 3-701, et seq.) (the "Act") and the rules of the Board promulgated pursuant thereto (the "Board Rules") with respect to third party expenditures.
The determination of whether a particular expenditure is independent or non-independent is necessarily fact-specific.17 Of course, the Board is not privy to the communications that campaigns have with third parties. Thus, the information about whether campaign-related activity has been discussed or otherwise coordinated between a campaign and a third party is uniquely within the campaign's possession. For this reason, each campaign bears the burden of demonstrating that any third party activity conducted on the campaign's behalf is indeed independent.18 Further, it is very difficult in the abstract to say whether a particular activity would or would not lead to a conclusion that activity is non-independent. Evidence of non-independent activity is usually largely circumstantial and must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.
Common vendors: 1199 SEIU served as a vendor to Ms. Palma's campaign for, among other things, phone banking, literature production and distribution, and election day activities, yet also allegedly provided these same services as independent third party expenditures.
Literature production and distribution: Campaign literature paid for by Ms. Palma's campaign and literature paid for by 1199 SEIU contained identical or substantially similar photographs, text, contribution cards and contact information.
Election day activities: Various activities on primary election day and the days leading up to primary election day were conducted by Ms. Palma's campaign in conjunction with 1199 SEIU, including recruitment of election day workers, staffing at the campaign's election day space and the campaign's headquarters, campaign management and oversight, poll-site operations, literature distribution, get-out-the-vote efforts, use of a sound truck, food for election workers, and use of a "mobile office."
Shared office space: Ms. Junior's campaign shared office space with the Unity Democratic Club, which also made purportedly independent third party expenditures on Ms. Junior's behalf for, among other things, campaign literature, food and transportation.
Election day activities: Primary day workers operating on behalf of Ms. Junior's campaign were materially supported (e.g., provided food and transportation) by the Unity Democratic Club, but were supervised by an employee of the campaign.
Joint strategy meeting: 1199 SEIU officials attended a campaign strategy meeting in the month preceding the election, which Mr. Ferrer and campaign staff also attended.
Common employees: Key personnel on leave from their positions at 1199 SEIU were involved with organizing the campaign's field operations and get-out-the-vote efforts, which extensively utilized 1199 SEIU members, as evidenced by accounts of election day activities and newspaper reports.
As noted above, campaigns are the best source of information about the true nature of third party expenditures. In determining where to focus its investigative resources, the Board relies on information it receives from and about campaigns, through formal and informal complaints, through disclosure to the Board, and from other sources. The Board investigates fully every complaint it receives.22 Candidates are encouraged to report to the Board any information they come across regarding third party expenditures. Such information will assist the Board in its efforts to enforce the law vigorously and consistently.
2 Third parties are any persons or entities separate from the campaign, including, but not limited to labor organizations, political parties, and political clubs.
3See Admin. Code § 3-702(8) and Board Rules 1-02 and 1-04(g).
4See Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(f).
5 Campaigns are prohibited from accepting contributions from corporations, limited liability companies and partnerships. See Admin. Code §§ 3-703(1)(l), 3-719(2)(b); Board Rule 1-04(e).
6 Admin. Code § 3-702(8).
7 This is also commonly referred to as "coordinated activity."
8See Board Rule 1-08(f). These factors are used for evaluating all third party expenditures, regardless of the intended audience for the activity. With respect to labor organizations, the Act and Board Rules make no distinction between "member-to-member" activity and "member-to-non-member" activity; this distinction exists only in federal law, within the context of an entirely distinct regulatory scheme. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2)(A), 441b(b)(4)(A). The Board's analysis of even purely member-to-member activity turns on the same determination as that of any other third party activity: whether the campaign authorized, requested, suggested, fostered, or otherwise cooperated in such activity. See Admin. Code § 3-702(8). Of course, the Act does not directly regulate the activity of labor organizations or any other third parties, which are fully entitled to engage in campaign-related activity (whether independent or non-independent) in support of campaigns; rather, the Act regulates only a campaign's obligation to account for and report non-independent third party activity.
9 This factor applies to, among others, "common vendors." Once an entity provides goods or services to a campaign for fair market value, it becomes a vendor. A vendor cannot, in most circumstances, logically "sell" goods and services to a campaign and make independent expenditures on behalf of that campaign, particularly for the same kinds of activities for which it billed that campaign, since once a vendor has provided these goods or services to a campaign, it has acquired knowledge and information about the campaign's activities that will render the provision of the same kinds of goods and services a non-independent expenditure. See Board Rule 1-08(f)(1)(v).
17 For this reason, it would not be useful for the Board to opine on the hypothetical examples posed in the Goldfeder Letter, which contain limited facts and vague descriptions. See Goldfeder Letter at 2. The Board would need to evaluate the relevant evidence available in each case. For example, in "Example A," it might be relevant whether the communication by the member organization was a one-time "you can count on our members to help" conversation versus conversation(s) during which a specific strategy of where to deploy members to the best effect was discussed. Instead of opining on hypothetical examples, this advisory opinion provides examples of the indicia of non-independent activity which underlay several recent Board determinations. See discussion infra.
18See Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(d).
19 This is not an exhaustive review of all cases in which the Board has found non-independent activity. Indeed, in addition to the examples discussed herein and others, the Board determined that Mr. Green's 2001 mayoral campaign violated the Act by accepting an over-the-limit in-kind contribution arising from non-independent activity by SEIU Local 32BJ.
20 Of course, by definition, a campaign is not involved in independent expenditures on its behalf. Thus, in many instances, a truly independent expenditure may just as easily risk hurting the candidate it was intended to benefit (e.g., through duplication of efforts or conveying a divergent message).
21 In light of the seriousness of this violation of the Act, "cooperation in alleged independent expenditures . . . that are in fact authorized, requested, suggested, fostered or cooperated in" by the campaign may constitute a fundamental breach of certification, which will result in a candidate being ineligible to receive public funds and the forfeiture of any previously received public funds. See Board Rule 2-02(c). (However, it should be noted that the Board did not find any of the campaigns discussed in this advisory opinion to be in breach of their certification). Candidates and treasurers may also be assessed penalties up to the maximum amount for each violation ($10,000). See Admin. Code § 3-711(1).
22 As part of its investigations, the Board has the authority to, inter alia, depose witnesses, issue subpoenas for documents, require sworn interrogatory responses, and compel all relevant parties (including candidates and any alleged independent actors) to appear before the Board. See Admin. Code §3-708(5).

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Mardan v. Lowe : Prescriptive rights of way and possessory title to unregistered land.
Arabi v. Arabi  EWHC 1384 (Ch): Claim of beneficial interest in property following alleged joint venture between brothers.
Loose v Lynn Shellfish  AC 599 (Supreme Court): Intervention on behalf of the Crown Estate in a case concerning prescriptive rights over the foreshore and the doctrine of accretion.
Lictor Anstalt v Mir Steel UK  EWHC 3316 (Ch): Successful claim on behalf of the owners of a steel mill who had failed to protect their rights on the land register and lost their title due to the mill's annexation to the land. The court held that the sale of the mill by administrators was a breach of contract, procured by the purchasers, and that such claims survived despite non-registration at HMLR.
Nissan v. Four Square : Validity and construction of an easement to park.
Faulkner Investments v. Nassif : Claim concerning the status of occupation of a discretionary beneficiary of an offshore trust.
BOC v. Aeternum Capital  (Comm): Claim for specific performance under a development agreement.
Amin v Amin  EWHC 3356 (Ch): Acting for family and minor partnership interests in a wide-ranging partnership dispute, including claims to a constructive trust interest in the family home.
Volta Developments v Waltham Forest Friendly Society  EWHC 1295 (Ch): Construction of grant of right of way.
Roberts v. Swangrove Estates & others  2 P&CR 17 (Ch) and  Ch 439 (CA): Successful claim by the Crown Estate to adverse possession of the bed of the River Severn, including a determination of the constitutional ability of the Crown to acquire title by adverse possession. Upheld on appeal (led by Frank Hinks QC on appeal).
Backos v. WFW  EWHC 243 (Ch): Claim by LLP for recoupment of drawings from former member.
Prevezer v. WFW  (Comm): Former LLP member's claim for consultancy remuneration.
Hanlon v. Human Capital Investment Group  (Ch): Dispute concerning the acquisition of a recruitment agency, in which the claimants attempted to assert the existence of a joint venture.
Norbrook v. Robson  (QB): Questions of ownership of documents held by the secretary of an unincorporated association.
Metrobrook v. Highland  (Ch): Dispute concerning shopping centre developments, in which the claimants attempted to set aside expert determinations and to assert the existence of a joint venture.
Amin v Amin  EWHC 3356 (Ch): Acting for family and partnership interests in a wide-ranging dispute, including claims to a constructive trust interest in the family home.
Brocket Hall (Jersey) Ltd v. Dykes : Concerning the ownership of chattels at Brocket Hall.
Patel v. Patel  EWHC 2247 (Ch): Proceedings for contempt of court following a finding of forgery of a will.
Re Nina Wang  HKCA 170 (Hong Kong): Proceedings to determine the true construction and effect of a home-made will of reputedly the wealthiest woman in Asia (led by Frank Hinks QC).
H v. O  (Ch): Acting for Isle of Man trustees with respect to claims by liquidator under the Insolvency Act to recover company property.
Page v. West  EWHC 4390 (Ch): Application for the sale of trust property.
Re A Trust  (Bermuda): Successful application to obtain an anti-suit injunction preventing a disaffected beneficiary from taking proceedings in another jurisdiction relating to a Bermuda Trust (led by Nicholas Le Poidevin QC).
Re Matthews  (Ch): Claims in misfeasance against executor.
Re the Estate of M  (Bahamas): Acting for the trustees of the estate of a wealthy Bahamian businessman facing adverse claims against the estate.
G v. S  (Bahamas): Acting for defendants facing claims of breach of trust and dishonest assistance.
Backos v. WFW  EWHC 243 (Ch): Successfully resisted an appeal against an arbitrator's jurisdiction award based on the proper construction of the arbitration agreement.
Simmons Gainsford Corporate Finance v. PSP Facilitating  (Merc): Whether a claim for introducer's success fee survived termination of an agency agreement.
St Vincent v. Robinson  EWHC 1230 (Comm Ct): Acting for a number of Defendants in a multi-jurisdictional fraud claim, resolved by an application to strike out the claim on the basis that the damages claimed constituted reflective loss.
Trimulgherry Investments v. Locke  (Merc): Construction and rectification of share sale agreement.
Vestey Group v. Steller Packing  (Ch D): Obtaining peremptory order for delivery up of stock; assertions of lien.
The Cape Bari  2 Lloyd's Rep 469 (Privy Csl): Advised the successful appellants on a case involving the construction of a clause in an Oil Terminal's standard terms purporting to exclude the Maritime Limitation of Liability Regime.
Pencil Hill v. Citta di Palermo  LTL 27/1/2006: Challenge to enforcement of an arbitration award based on public policy and the law of contractual penalties.
Wych v. Careforce  1 Costs LR 1 (Comm): Successful application for relief from sanction under the new CPR 3.9 following breaches of an unless order relating to e-disclosure.
Tom's work in this field includes unfair prejudice petitions, actions against directors and claims in insolvency.
Re A  (Ch): Acting for shareholders with respect to allegations against a receiver as to the sale of company property.
Re Lifemarque  (Ch): Company valuation in unfair prejudice petition, in which the court considered the merits of differing valuation methodologies (led by Victor Joffe QC).
Blue Station v. Kamyab  EWCA Civ 1073 (CA): Claim against director for recoupment.
Opus Property Finance v. Vantreen  (Ch): Successful appeal against order setting aside statutory demand on the basis that the debt was a penalty and liable to be varied under the Consumer Credit Act.
Ryan v. Tiuta International  BPIR 123 (Ch): Application to set aside statutory demand against guarantor on the basis of allegations of lawful act economic duress.
Lictor v. Mir Steel  EWHC 3316 (Ch): Successful claim of procuring breach of contract brought against a purchaser of assets from a company in administration, the court rejecting a claim that the defence of justification should be available to the purchaser of assets from a company in administration (with Dan McCourt Fritz).
Claim against solicitor for alleged breach of trust in payment of sale proceeds.
Interpleader application on behalf of solicitors allegedly holding trust monies.
Alleged negligence in negotiation of complex share buy out.
Concurrent claims in England and Jersey against advocates and barrister for alleged mishandling of trusts litigation.

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