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The name of the book alone, HEBREWS, tells us that it is an unique book, written with a specific purpose in mind -- to INSTRUCT THE HEBREWS in the Christian religion.
The date of the book is important. If the date is not kept in mind, one will certainly misunderstand its message. Its date is well before the old Temple worship stopped, and that Temple worship was a public picture of the crucifixion of Christ, which was yet to come. After Christ came and was crucified, the Temple worship became a very evil denial of Christ's work, and this passage reminds the Hebrews of that fact.
1) Hebrews was probably a joint effort by the apostles at Jerusalem, with Paul maybe the lead apostle in that effort. I will speak as though Paul wrote it, though it is by no means certain he did.
2) Hebrews was for the Hebrew people who were saved out of the old Hebrew manner of worship in the Temple at Jerusalem and in the Jewish synagogues around the world. Many Hebrews were converted to Christ, and some were willingly considering departing from their profession of Christ. They were being tempted to return to the old Hebrew manner of worship as carried on at the Temple at Jerusalem.
3) Hebrews tells them that if they return to the old Hebrew manner of worship, they not only have departed from the faith, they openly crucify the Son of God again.
NOTE: v. 6, crucify to themselves. Not that it actually takes place again, but that they act as though Christ must be crucified again.
NOTE: v. 6, open shame. They make a public mockery of Christ and his work if they return to the old Hebrew manner of worship.
4) Finally, Hebrews tells us that the Christian's life in this world is not a flowery bed off ease; rather, it is a battle-field. Sin and death are at work in this world, destroying everything they can.
Hebrews 6:1-8 is built on at least two other passages: Matthew 13:1-9 & Matthew 7:21.
Matthew 13:1-9: This is the Lord's parable of the seed that is cast upon the ground. The Lord identifies this parable as an insight into one of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, v. 11.
V. 4, some seed fall by the wayside, and the birds came quickly and ate it up.V. 19, the individual heard the good word of God, and did not understand it. The wicked one removed the seed from the individual's heart.
V. 5, some seed fall upon stony ground where there is not much earth. This seed springs up quickly, but when the heat of the sun came out, it witheres away because there was not much earth to give it roots.Vv. 20, 21, this person heard the good word of God, and rejoiced in it. For a time, he had all the right words and works of a Christian. But when tribulations and persecutions came, he left the faith, and returned to what he was.
V. 7, some seed fell among thorns, and the thorns soon choked it out.V.22, this person heard the good word of God. He becometh unfruitful, so he had all the Christian works for a while, even the fruit of a Christian. But the cares of this world and the allurement of riches took him over, and hebecame unfruitful. This is the worldly man; he becomes so occupied with the cares of this world that he has no time to be occupied with the care of his soul or with the care of others. He shrivels up, withers away, and becomes nothing for the cause of Christ.
V. 8, some seed fell on good ground, and it brought forth fruit. V. 23, this person heard the word of God; he understandeth it-- that is, he understands the cost involved, and he willingly pays the price.
The Lord's words here confirm his words in Matthew 6:24 (Lk. 16:13) -- No man can serve two masters.Those represented by the first seed heard the word of God, yet were unaffected by it. Though starting out as Christians, the next two over a period of time where presented with the choice of which master to serve. They made their choice, and it was not the Lord Jesus Chhrist.
So based upon Matthew 6:24, we must say that the first three were not saved in the first plalce.
Hebrews 6:6-8 is a clear reference to Matthew 13, for we see there that the briers and thorns are cast into the fire to be burned.
In other words, Hebrews 6:1-6 cannot be understood apart from Matthew 13.
21 Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven. 22 Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? 23 And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity.
In other words, here are people who clearly experienced the power of God, being able to cast out devils in the Lord's name, yet they were cast into the lake of fire.
2 Corinthians 13:5 Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith; prove your own selves. Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?
The Hebrews to whom this is addressed were new Christians in a new religion and in a new church. They are now being told that to even consider returning to the old way of worshiping God was a mark of a serious spiritual problem on their part.
V. 2, they were reminded that Christ is the judge, and they must not try to judge him, which is what they would do if they returned to their old religion.
Now that we have discussed the true meaning of the key verse, v. 6, let us look as some of the major points of the passage.
Vv. 1-8, could be titled "The Duty of Christian Progress" and " The Dangers of Relapse."
The book of Hebrews warns Christians against seeing salvation as a stagnant fact, with no responsibility to grow up on our part. Salvation is victory over sin and death and it is a new life lived in and for Christ. Life means growth, not stagnation.
Hebrews urges Christians to move ahead to perfection, or maturity. Perfect is an old English word meaning mature. The message is to GROW UP.
A blind man is useless as a soldier on the battle filed. So to are Christians who need to be taught endlesslessly the basic precepts of the Christian doctrine. Certainly, there are basic things we need to know very early, but after we learn those things, we are to go on to more mature understandigns of the whole word of God.
Sadly, vv. 1, 2 discribes most of the teachings of many churches. I hear radio preachers sometimes and am on many mailing lists. Most of the messages I read and hear are good, but they are centered in these few basic Christian doctrines. In fact, all the churches I have been in personally and am very familure personaly with stay on John 3:16. Three times a week, the basic message is John 3:16.
They have reduced the Christian doctrine from doing all things for the glory of God and seeking first the kingdom of God to simply man's salvation and happiness. The chruch has been turned into a daycare centerfor baby Christians.
The author of Hebrews insists that we leave those things behind, and go on to maturity. Hebrews tells us that the lack of desire to mature past the "ticket to heaven" is sin; it is not Biblical Christianity. Hebrews speaks against those who do not want thier Christian thinking challenged -- those who want to stay babies in Christ.
People will spend all kinds of time, money and energy increasing their skill in their occupations. Yet many of those same people fail to see the need to have the same dedication to increase in their Christian skills. Many times these same people delight in being baby Christains, unskilled in the use of the word of God.
NOTE HEBREWS 5:10-14, v. 13, For every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness: for he is a babe.
The few things mentioned in vv. 1, 2, are not the sum total of Christianity. We will be held accountable to know and do much more than what is mentioned here. Hebrews tells us there is much more required of Christians. Those who desire to keep the word of God simple are to change their desire; they are to desire to grow in their understanding of the deeper things of the Lord -- things that require work and deep thinking.
V. 2, Baptisms referred to what we call baptism. It also referred to any forms of ritual purification.
The people are warned that there is no second chance for them if they reject the very real Christ as he has presented in the book of Hebrews -- High Priest, Messiah King and Prophet.
It is not for them to judge Christ as to who he is, but he is their judge. Paul tells them that they are part of the crucifying mob if they will not have Christ on his terms and apostates from the fatih.
The early church denounced those who saw Christ as simply someone to save them from hell. Such people were considered heretics.
V. 4.Those who are in the church have been first enlightened. The truth was proclaimed to them.They also have tasted of the heavenly gift, the gift of new life through Christ who came from heaven.They have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost. Because they have been in the church where the Spirit works, and even did mighty works themselves.V. 5.They have tasted the good word of God. The truth has made known unto them. They have tasted the powers of the world to come. They experienced life under the new orders of Christ. They have even entered into the fullness of Christ's work.
Hebrews warns of serious consequences if they turn away from what they have experienced in Christ. Hebrews tells us that when people depart from Christ after experienceing all of this, they show their unsaved, hardened charactor. They have put Christ to an open shame.
V. 6, impossible to renew... I will make the point here that nothing is impossible with God. Man sure can't renew them. But I have not really seen one return who has turned from the Christian path they once followed.
Here we clearly see the reference to the parable of the sower and seed. These verses tell us is that those spoken of in vv. 4-6 may not even be one of the four mentioned in Matthew 13. Rather, they could well be the thorns and briers that were wrongly in the sower's field.
First, if we are content with where we are in our Christian life, we are to question ourselves concerning whether or not we are even in the faith.
Second, Hebrews 6:6 is a call to make sure we are in the faith. If we are growing cold and indifferent concerning Christ and his claims upon us by God's word, we are to question ourselves, not this text.
Third, those who see Christ as no more than a ticket to heaven are in serious trouble - they are obviously one of the first three mentioned in Matthew 13, regardless of the mighty works they may have experienced.
Fourth, if we have heard the truth, but have no desire to move ahead to maturity once we have been enlightenedby the truth, then we must question ourselves to see if we are in the faith. We must not question this text of Scripture.
Fifth, this passage was a strong warning to those who were considering departing from Christ--even the consideration is a mark of being lost.
Job 5:6 Although affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground; 7 Yet man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward.
Life is made up of troubles. Yet people go to church many times a week and are still unprepared to handle the troubles. (Counselors make a killing.) They are unprepared because all they know is the basic doctrine of Christ. The answers to man's troubles are no longer found in Scripture as they once were. Rather, the answers are sought in secular counseling and in medication. According to Hebrews, the answer for man's problems is to grow up, and become mature in the word and life of the Son of God.
Seventh, Hebrews is puting forthis this question to the Hebrew people who were tempted to go back to the old manner of worship: What kind of seed are you?1) one of the three seed that perished in Matthew 13.2) thorns and briers what the Spirit of God has done no work at all in.3) the good seed, #4, that was honestly converted and brought forth good fruit.
Hebrews was writen to the Hebrew believers, and it said, "Grow up; you may be ahead of the Gentile believers, but in understanding the meaning of Christ as prophet, priest and king, you are far behind them." Grow up he said.
The church is being turned into an army of blind men, as they cannot get past the basic principles of Christianity.

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FindACase | Eastern Materials Corp. v. Mitsubishi Plastics Composites America, Inc.
Eastern Materials Corp. v. Mitsubishi Plastics Composites America, Inc.
MITSUBISHI PLASTICS COMPOSITES AMERICA, INC. Defendant.
ARTHUR D. SPATT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The Plaintiffs Eastern Materials Corporation (“Eastern”), and Island Exterior Fabricators, LLC (“Island”) (together, the “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against the Defendant, Mitsubishi Plastics Composites America, Inc. (the “Defendant” or “Mitsubishi”) alleging claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty and negligence regarding materials supplied for a construction project in New York City.
Presently before the Court is a motion by the Plaintiffs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.” or “Rule”) 15 to amend the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty, in accordance with this Court's Memorandum and Order dated September 19, 2017 (the “Order”). For the following reasons, the Plaintiffs' motion to amend is granted with respect to the breach of contract claim and denied with respect to the breach of warranty claim. As such, the Plaintiffs may only proceed with the breach of contract claim against Mitsubishi.
As the Court has already detailed the factual allegations at issue in this motion in its Order, and the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, they will not be repeated here.
On January 27, 2017, the Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing the complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County. The complaint set forth three causes of action: breach of contract, negligence and breach of warranty.
On February 23, 2017, the Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, removing the action to this Court.
On March 20, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In the Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum, the Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their negligence claim.
In the Court's Order, dated September 19, 2017, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) without prejudice, finding both the breach of contract and breach of warranty claim insufficient. Specifically, the Court found that the breach of contract claim “failed to properly specify what the agreement … consisted of and which provisions of any such agreement were violated.” Order at 11-12. Further, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' consequential damages claim was conclusory. Id. at 12-15. With respect to the breach of warranty claim, the Plaintiffs failed to “provid[e] allegations as to the existence of an express promise or representation.” Id. at 15-16. The Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a motion to amend the FAC in a manner consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 within thirty days of the Order. Id. at 20.
On October 18, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the FAC. Attached to the motion was a proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). As this motion was filed within thirty days of the Order, the Court deems it timely. The Plaintiffs claim that the breach of contract claim is addressed by identifying the contract, the terms at issue, and the nature of the breaches. Allegedly, the SAC “specifically pleads that consequential damages were both reasonably foreseeable and specifically contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.” Docket Entry (“DE”) 15-1 at 5. The SAC also purportedly includes the warranty, the terms at issue, as well as the nature of the breaches. See id. at 4-5. The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiffs fail to correct the deficiencies of the FAC.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which typically governs a motion to amend a complaint, states, in relevant part, “A party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Unless there is a showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility or undue prejudice to the non-moving parties, the district court should grant leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (stating that leave to amend “should generally be denied in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.”); Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1998).
The decision on whether to grant a motion to amend rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 603-04 (2d Cir. 2005); Hemphill, 141 F.3d at 420. In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, prejudice to the opposing party is one of the “most important” issues to consider. AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of America, N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
In considering whether a proposed amendment is futile, the Court must determine whether it could withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See, e.g., Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); Bold Elec., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995); Reed v. Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 987 F.Supp.2d 260, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

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Petitioner, then a Member of Congress, was indicted in 1976 for conspiring to solicit and accept, and for soliciting and accepting, bribes in return for being influenced in the performance of official acts, namely, the introduction of certain private bills in the House of Representatives. He moved in District Court to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution because the grand jury had heard evidence of legislative acts, but the motion was denied. Thereafter, he petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to dismiss the indictment. The court declined to issue the writ, holding that the indictment did not violate the Speech or Debate Clause.
Held: Mandamus was not the appropriate means of challenging the validity of the indictment on the ground that it violated the Speech or Debate Clause. Direct appeal to the Court of Appeals was available, and was the proper course. Pp. 442 U. S. 505 -508.
(a) Once the motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, there was nothing further petitioner could do under the Speech or Debate Clause in the trial court to prevent the trial, and an appeal of the ruling was clearly available. Cf. Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 . Pp. 442 U. S. 506 -507.
(b) The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to protect Congressmen "not only from the consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden of defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 , 387 U. S. 85 . Pp. 442 U. S. 507 -508.
"is to avoid exposure to [being questioned for acts done in either House], and thereby enjoy the full protection of the [Speech or Debate] Clause, his . . . challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before . . . exposure [to trial] occurs."
Abney, supra at 431 U. S. 662 . P. 442 U. S. 508 .
Circuit was announced at the time of the District Court's order denying dismissal of the indictment, see United States v. DiSilvio, 520 F.2d 247, and the holding in Abney did no more than affirm the correctness of that holding. P. 442 U. S. 508 .
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 442 U. S. 508 . POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The question in this case is whether mandamus is an appropriate means of challenging the validity of an indictment of a Member of Congress on the ground that it violates the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. [ Footnote 1 ] The Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ. We affirm.
Petitioner Helstoski served in the United States Congress from 1965 through 1976 as a Representative from New Jersey. In 1974, the Department of Justice began investigating reported political corruption, including allegations that aliens had paid money for the introduction and processing of private bills which would suspend the application of the immigration laws so as to allow them to remain in this country.
In June, 1976, a grand jury returned a 12-count indictment charging Helstoski and others with various criminal acts. Only the first four counts are involved in this case. The first count charged that Helstoski and others had conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) by accepting money in return for Helstoski's "being influenced in the performance of official acts, to-wit: the introduction of private bills in the United States House of Representatives." The charge recited 16 overt acts, 4 of which referred to the actual introduction of private bills; a 5th referred to an agreement to introduce a private bill. The entire conspiracy was charged as a violation of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371.
"Whoever, being a public official[,] directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity, in return for:"
"(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act; or"
"(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud on the United States;"
"Shall be fined . . . or imprisoned."
"(a) For the purpose of this section:"
"'public official' means Member of Congress . . . ; and"
"'official act' means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit."
Each count charged that Helstoski, acting through his legislative aide, had solicited money from aliens in return for "being influenced in the performance of official acts, to-wit: the introduction of private bills in the United States House of Representatives on behalf of" the aliens. Essentially, the charges against Helstoski parallel those dealt with in United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966), and United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972).
"in return for his being influenced in the performance of official acts, to-wit: the introduction of private bills in the United States House of Representatives on behalf of"
the aliens. Finally, each count charged that a private bill had been introduced on a particular date.
sought to avoid any challenge resulting from the fact that the District Judge had appeared before one grand jury to rule on Helstoski's claim of that privilege.
Helstoski moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the grand jury process had been abused and that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause. He supported his allegation of abuse of the grand jury by characterizing the eight grand juries as "discovery tools." The effect, he contended, was to permit the prosecutor to select the information presented to the indicting grand jury and to deprive that grand jury of evidence of the demeanor of witnesses, especially that of Helstoski himself.
District Judge Meanor denied the motion after examining a transcript of the evidence presented to the indicting grand jury. He held that there had been no such abuse to justify invalidating the indictment. He found that most of the material not submitted to the indicting grand jury "was either prejudicial to the defendants, or neither inculpating nor exculpating in nature." He also found that the testimony of two grand jury witnesses should have been presented to the indicting grand jury, and concluded that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), required that the Government provide Helstoski with transcripts of their testimony. Judge Meanor also held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require dismissal.
Approximately three months later, in June, 1977, Helstoski petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to dismiss the indictment.
acts, which he argued was in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. The court declined to go behind the indictment, holding that it was valid on its face.
In seeking reversal here of the Court of Appeals holding, Helstoski argues that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is appropriate in this case to protect the constitutional command of separation of powers. He contends that the Speech or Debate Clause assigns exclusive jurisdiction over all legislative acts to Congress. The indictment itself, he urges, is a violation of that Clause, because it represents an impermissible assertion of jurisdiction over the legislative function by the grand jury and the federal courts. He challenges the validity of the indictment on two grounds. First, the indictment itself refers to legislative acts. Any attempt at restricting the proof at trial, as approved by the Court of Appeals, will amount to an amendment of the indictment, thereby violating a Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on an indictment in precisely the form issued by a grand jury. Second, he contends the Speech or Debate Clause was violated when the grand jury was allowed to consider evidence of his legislative acts notwithstanding that such evidence and testimony was presented by him.
"The general principle which governs proceedings by mandamus is that whatever can be done without the employment of that extraordinary writ may not be done with it. It lies only when there is practically no other remedy. "
"Among these are that the party seeking issuance of the writ have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, and that he satisfy "the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.'"
Moreover, it is important to remember that issuance of the writ is, in large part, a matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed."
Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U. S. 394 , 426 U. S. 403 (1976) (citations omitted).
Helstoski contends that his petition for a writ of mandamus should not be governed by the rules which we have developed for assessing mandamus petitions generally. He argues that the writ is especially appropriate for enforcing the commands of the Speech or Debate Clause. We agree that the guarantees of that Clause are vitally important to our system of government, and therefore are entitled to be treated by the courts with the sensitivity that such important values require. We are unwilling, however, to accept the contention that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for assuring protection of the Clause in the circumstances shown here. Helstoski could readily have secured review of the ruling complained, of and all objectives now sought, by direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District Court order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
"pretrial orders rejecting claims of former jeopardy . . . constitute 'final decisions,' and thus satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291."
"[T]here can be no doubt that such orders constitute a complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection of a criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim. There are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee."
Id. at 431 U. S. 659 .
"[T]he very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged. In arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars his prosecution, the defendant makes no challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him. Nor does he seek suppression of evidence which the Government plans to use in obtaining a conviction. Rather, he is contesting the very authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him. [ Footnote 3 ]"
"[T]he rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence. . . . [T]his Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against more than being subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense."
Clause echoed this Court's statement in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 , 387 U. S. 85 (1967), that the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to protect Congressmen "not only from the consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden of defending themselves."
"is to avoid exposure to [being questioned for acts done in either House], and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his . . . challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before . . . exposure [to trial] occurs."
Abney, supra at 431 U. S. 662 .
This case was argued together with No. 78-349, United States v. Helstoski, ante, p. 442 U. S. 477 , which concerns the restrictions the Speech or Debate Clause places on the admissibility of evidence at a trial on charges that a former Member of the House accepted money in return for promising to introduce and introducing private bills.
The proceedings before the various grand juries are described in United States v. Helstoski, ante, p. 442 U. S. 477 .
It is true that Helstoski challenges the admissibility of evidence at his trial; that challenge, however, is raised only if the indictment is allowed to stand.
If the petition for a writ of mandamus were treated as an appeal, it would, of course, have been jurisdictionally out of time. Fed.Rule App. Proc. 4.
to be treated by the courts with the sensitivity that such important values require."
"Helstoski could readily have secured review of the ruling complained of, and all objectives now sought, by direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District Court order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment."
Mr. Helstoski may well be excused if he views the Court's holding as if it were a line out of Joseph Heller's "Catch-22." He cannot utilize mandamus, because he should have sought a direct appeal. But he cannot seek a direct appeal, because that avenue is time-barred. Ante at 442 U. S. 508 n. 4. Of course, the dilemma could have been short-circuited had Helstoski brought an immediate appeal at the time his motion for dismissal of the indictment was denied. Unfortunately, he could not have known that avenue of relief was available until today -- for we have never before held that the denial of a claim that an indictment violates the Speech or Debate Clause is an exception to the longstanding rule forbidding interlocutory appeals. * And, as the Court holds, today it is too late. Values as "vitally important" as those guaranteed by the Speech or Debate Clause are entitled to more sensitive treatment.
* The Court makes the surprising assertion that Helstoski should have anticipated today's holding on the basis of a footnote in a 1975 Third Circuit opinion dealing with a different issue. (That opinion, like this Court's decision in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977), was limited to the double jeopardy issue. Abney was announced far too late to have helped the defendant.) Although I agree with the Court's extension of the Abney principle from double jeopardy claims to those based upon the Speech or Debate Clause, I do not regard the extension as obvious. Nor, apparently, does the Government, as it carefully refrains from endorsing that view. See Brief for United States 92. I certainly would not use it as a basis for penalizing a former Congressman in his assertion of a principle so "vitally important to our system of government." Ante at 442 U. S. 506 .


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TOMÁŠKOVÁ, I. – BAŽANT, V. – **BLEHA, R. – VÍTÁMVÁS, J. – **DELZON, S. – ŠŤASTNÝ, K. – **VAČKAŘ, J. Birds Girdling Activity on Exotic Tree Species as a Form of Adaptive Behavior?. Contemporary Problems of Ecology, 2017, roč. 10, č. 2, s. 193-202. ISSN: 1995-4255.
BAŽANT, V. – SLÁVIK, M. – REMEŠ, J. Dynamika růstu dřevin na výsypce Šmeral na Mostecku. Zpravodaj Hnědé uhlí, 2010, roč. 2010, č 3, s. 24-31. ISSN: 1213-1660.
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POTOP, V. – BAŽANT, V. Podtyp: Příspěvek ve sborníku (mimo kategorie RIV); Effect of moisture conditions at various lags on forest growth in the Most Basin coal forest reclamation areas in the Czech Republic. 2012, In: BIOCLIMATE 2012 "Bioclimatology of Ecosystems" International Scientific Conference, Ústí nad Labem 29.-31.8.2012, s. 96-97. ISBN: 978-80-213-2299-8.
ŠTÍCHA, V. – GAŠPARÍK, M. – HRIB, M. – KABEŠ, A. – KUŠTA, T. – PODRÁZSKÝ, V. – PRKNOVÁ, H. – SLOUP, R. – ŠÁLEK, L. – ŠRŮTKA, P. – TOMÁNEK, J. – URBÁNEK, V. – ZEIDLER, A. – BAŽANT, V. Podtyp: Skripta; Lesní hospodářství. 2015, .

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578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), 76-3422, N.L.R.B. v. Adrian Belt Co.
Party Name: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. ADRIAN BELT COMPANY, Hollywood Leather Creations, Harry Goldberg Belt Company, Inc., Jolie Belts, Inc., Mahler Sales Co., Inc. and Patricia Belt Company, Respondents.
Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for N. L. R. B.
Stephen A. Mazurak, of Rexon & Mazurak, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents.
On Application for Enforcement of an Order of The National Labor Relations Board.
Before CHAMBERS and HUG, Circuit Judges, and FERGUSON, [*] District Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.), has applied for enforcement of its order (224 NLRB No. 167) finding that the respondent companies violated §§ 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the union 1 which had been certified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining agent for the respondents' employees. This court has jurisdiction over the proceedings because the alleged unfair labor practice occurred in Los Angeles where respondents conduct their manufacturing operations. We grant the application for enforcement.
affect the results of the election. As a further challenge to the election the respondents filed objections charging that improper conduct by union representatives had affected the voting.
(5) overruled all of the respondents' charges of improper conduct.
The respondents filed a request for review with the Board, claiming that the Regional Director erred in his rulings regarding Beltran, Garcia, Polanco and King. No review was sought with respect to the other rulings of the Regional Director. The Board denied the respondents' request on the ground that it raised no substantial issues warranting review. Thereafter, the Regional Director issued a revised tally of ballots showing 43 votes for the union and 43 against, thereby making Yvonne King's ballot determinative.
Pursuant to the earlier order of the Regional Director, a hearing was then held to resolve the issue of King's eligibility. Her ballot had been challenged by the Board agent who supervised the election because her name did not appear on the eligibility list submitted by her employer. The employer contended that King had been terminated prior to the election; the union contended that she was merely on a leave of absence and that she should properly be considered an employee for purposes of the representation election. The hearing officer held that the union's position was correct and that King was eligible to vote.
Following the hearing the Regional Director issued his second supplemental decision and order wherein he adopted the hearing officer's findings and accordingly overruled the objection to King's ballot. Respondents filed a request for review with the Board regarding the decision; however, the Board again denied the request on the ground that it raised no issue warranting review. The Regional Director, after counting King's ballot, then issued a second revised tally showing 44 votes for the union and 43 against. Thereafter, in November, 1975, the Director certified the union as the exclusive representative of the respondents' employees in the designated unit.
Following its certification, the union requested the respondents to bargain collectively for the purpose of negotiating a new contract. The respondents, however, refused to enter into negotiations with the union. In December, 1975, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the respondents' failure to bargain constituted a violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In their answer to the charge the respondents admitted their refusal to bargain and challenged the validity of the union's certification on the same grounds raised in their requests for review in the prior representation proceedings.
Upon motion by the General Counsel, the Board granted summary judgment against the respondents on the grounds that the issues raised in the unfair labor practice proceeding had been litigated and determined adversely to them in the earlier proceedings; that they had not offered any newly discovered evidence or specific circumstances warranting reexamination of the prior rulings; and that, therefore, there were no material issues which were properly litigable in the unfair practice proceeding. Accordingly, the Board found the companies in violation of §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) and ordered them to bargain with the union.
The respondents have filed the instant appeal from that order.
On this appeal, the respondents once again raise the issues addressed in their petitions for review in connection with the representation proceedings. 3 If the Board's certification of the union was proper, then the respondents' refusal to bargain violates the Act, and the Board's order must be enforced. The validity of the certification depends, in turn, upon the correctness of the Board's rulings regarding the four challenged ballots of Beltran, Garcia, Polanco and King.
"(T)he Board is presumed to have a certain expertise in conducting and evaluating elections; its decisions should be deferred to unless it has committed an abuse of discretion. Findings of fact should be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).
Hecla Min. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 564 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, we must consider each of the relevant rulings and determine whether the findings and conclusions of the Board are fairly supported by the record.
The issue raised by the challenge to Yvonne King's ballot relates to her status as an employee at the time of the election. Under Board rules, eligibility to vote in a representation election is dependent upon employment in the designated bargaining unit during the eligibility period and on the date of the election. Westchester Plastics of Ohio, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 401 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1968); See N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 438 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1971). Employees on layoff or leave of absence during the relevant period, who have not quit or been terminated and who have a reasonable expectation or recall, qualify as eligible voters because of their continued ties to the employee unit. American Motors Corporation, 206 NLRB 287, 291 (1973); Miami Rivet Company, 147 NLRB 470, 483 (1964). A worker on a leave of absence continues to be regarded as an employee unless it is established by overt action or clear communication that the employment relationship has been terminated. Trailmobile Division, Pullman, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 379 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., supra; Bio-Science Laboratories v. N.L.R.B., 542 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Board found that Yvonne King was an employee of respondent Harvey Goldberg Belt Company, Inc., on leave of absence status at the time of the election, and that she was therefore qualified to vote. The respondents challenge the Board's decision on the grounds that it is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board erred in refusing to seek enforcement of a subpoena to obtain records regarding King's applications for unemployment benefits.
(1) Yvonne King had worked as a floor girl for Harry Goldberg Belt Co. since 1970.
the most experienced employees in the shop.


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Gurney, Gene. The Library of Congress. New York. Crown Pub. 1981. Octavo. Hard cover. Revised edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Gurney, O.R. The Hittites. Photo available. London. The Folio Society. 2001. 242 pps. 4to. Gilt decorated hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Gustafson, Anita. Guilty or Innocent? Lizzie Borden, Gacey, Hinckley, Wallace, Lindbergh, Sacco and Vanzetti, Webster, Sheppard. New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1985. 150 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Gustason, Gerilee. Signing Exact English. Photo available. Los Alamitos. Modern Signs Press. 1980. 4to. Soft cover. Revised edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Guth, William. Revelation and Its Record. Boston. Sherman, French and Co. 1912. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy (owner blind stamp).
Guthrie-Smith, Herbert. Tutira. The Story of a New Zealand Sheep Station. Photo available. Seattle. University of Washington Press. 1999. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Gutirrez, Sofia (ed) & Matt Groening. The Simpsons Futurama Crossover Crisis. Slips case. With Comic Book. Photo available. New York. Abrams Comicarts. 2010. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First edition, later printing. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Simpsons Comics #1 collector's item in rear pocket. Fine copy in fine slip case.
Gutmann, Matthew. The Meanings of Macho. Signed by the author. Being a Man in Mexico City. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1996. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Signed by the Author. Fine copy.
Gutstein, Linda. History of the Jews in America. Photo available. Edison. Chartwell. 1988. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Gwynn, J. Wallace. Great Salt Lake. A Scientific, Historical & Economic Overview. Bulletin 116. Photo available. Salt Lake City. Utah Geological and Mineral Survey. 1980. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in near fine (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Gygi, Alma E. Gifts That Reach Beyond the Sundown. Photo available. Salt Lake City. Self published. 1975. Octavo. Gilt decorated hard cover. First edition. Fine copy.
Gyles, Anna Benson. Of Gods and Men. The Heritage of Ancient Mexico. Photo available. New York. Harper & Row. 1980. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Haag, Carl C. Die Pennsynvaanisch Dietsche. The Pennsylvania Germans. Photo available. Kutztown. The Pennsylvania German Society. 2010. 239 pps 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Haag, Jan & Ann Love. Celebrating 100 Years: Sacramento City College. 1916-2016. Photo available. Sacramento. Sacramento City College. 2017. 137 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Haagen, Victor B. The Pictorial History of Huntsville. 1805-1865. Alabama. Photo available. Huntsville. Self published. 1963. 128 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (spine lightly faded) dust jacket (in mylar).
Haaren, John. Famous Men of Rome. Lebanon. Greenleaf. 1989. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Haaren, John. Famous Men of the Middle Ages. Lebanon. Greenleaf. 1992. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Haaren, John. The Greenleaf Guide to Famous Men of Rome. Lebanon. Greenleaf. 1998. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Habenstein, Robert W. & William M. Lamers. The History of American Funeral Directing. Photo available. Brookfield. National Funeral Directors Assn. 2010. 387 pps. 4to. Soft cover. Seventh edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Hack, Richard. Hughes. The Private Diaries, Memos and Letters. The Definitive Biography of the First American Billionaire. Beverly Hills. New Millennium Press. 2001. 444 pps. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Hack, Richard. Hughes. The Private Diaries, Memos and Letters. The Definitive Biography of the First American Billionaire. Beverly Hills. New Millennium Press. 2001. 444 pps. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Hackett, Pat (ed). The Andy Warhol Diaries. Photo available. New York. Warner Books. 1989. 807 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition, second printing. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Hackett, Pat (ed). The Andy Warhol Diaries. Photo available. New York. Warner Books. 1991. 807 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Hackett, Pat (ed). The Andy Warhol Diaries. Photo available. New York. Warner Books. 1989. 807 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (light wear at spine tips.) dust jacket (in mylar).
Hackwell, W. John. Diving to the Past. Recovering Ancient Wrecks. New York. Charles Scribners & Sons. 1988. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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Cheltenham School Dist. v. JOEL P. BY SUZANNE P.
Gutknecht v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs.
Johnson v. Gerber Products Co.
Stone v. Pennsylvania Merchant Group, Ltd.
Brophy v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co.
Hirsch v. Corban Corporations, Inc.
Dawson v. JG Wentworth & Co., Inc.
Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co.
Glen Lincoln, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co.
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.
Maksymiuk v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co.
Eagle Traffic Control, Inc. v. James Julian, Inc.
Midland Export, Ltd. v. Elkem Holding, Inc.
Sarver v. Capital Recovery Associates, Inc.
Patel v. Sun Co., Inc.
AHV PROPERTIES v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.
Charles Shaid of Pa. v. George Hyman Const. Co.
Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp.
Total Foods Corp. v. Wilfran Agr. Industries, Inc.
Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.
Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc.
Ward v. Ridley School Dist.
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.
New Chemic (US), Inc. v. Fine Grinding Corp.
INTERN. LONGSHORE. UN. 1332 v. Intern. Longshore.
Leo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Holliday v. Personal Products Co.
Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc.
Seasor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Christ's Bride Minist. v. Se Penn. Transp. Auth.
Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co.
Guardian Life Ins. v. American Guardian Life Assur.
Beal Bank, SSB v. Jack's Marine, Inc.
Michael Carbone, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co.
In Re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Lit.
Wein v. Sun Co., Inc.
At & T Corp. v. Pab, Inc.
Penchishen v. Stroh Brewery Co.
Castle v. Colonial School Dist.
Bryan v. Acorn Hotel, Inc.
ALLIED BUILDING PRODS. CORP. v. Delco Roofing Co.
In Re Muratone Co., Inc.
In Re Joshua Hill, Inc.
Brown v. American Motorists Ins. Co.
Overturf v. Penn Ventilator, Co., Inc.
Galullo v. Federal Express Corp.
Burger King Corp. v. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc.
Hornberger v. General Motors Corp.
Walsh v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
Fried v. Sungard Recovery Services, Inc.
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.
First Keystone Bank v. First Keystone Mortg.
LF Driscoll Co. v. American Protection Ins. Co.
Ascolese v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.
Doylestown Elec. Supply v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co.
Surgical Laser Technologies v. CR Bard, Inc.
Feinberg, Inc. v. Central Asia Capital Corp.
Parasco v. Pacific Indem. Co.
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.
Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc.
Whaling v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.
CHRISTEN G. v. Lower Merion School Dist.
Doe v. Methacton School Dist.
HAGER BY AND THROUGH HAGER v. Swanson Group, Inc.
Teti v. Huron Ins. Co.
Miller v. Group Voyagers, Inc.
DiMARK MKT. INC. v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co.
Refac Financial Corp. v. Patlex Corp.
Good v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
In Re Sugarhouse Realty, Inc.
Allied Nut and Bolt, Inc. v. NSS Industries, Inc.
Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Company, Inc.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marty's Exp., Inc.

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“RICCI S.R.L.” with headquarters at Via Fonte Giuliano – 63812 Montegranaro (FM) and VAT No. 01619620444, intends to apply the concept of electronic commerce adopting for the moment only the system and methods of payment for Consumer Customers of Payment on Delivery and Credit Card. “RICCI S.R.L.” also underlines the concept of consumer protection introduced with Italian Legislative Decree 50/1992, Italian Law Decree 22/5 No. 185/1999 on sales outside of commercial premises. In fact, the rules provided for in Italian Law Decree 50/1992 and Italian Law Decree 22/5 No. 185/1999 on contracts negotiated outside of commercial premises and subsequent rules set forth in Italian Legislative Decree No. 70 of 9 April 2003 and in Italian Legislative Decree No. 206 of 6 September 2005 the “Consumer Code”, which harmonises and reorders the regulations concerning purchasing and consumption processes in order to ensure greater protection for consumers, also apply to contracts signed electronically.
The following conditions are valid from 12 April 2012. The present general conditions may be updated or changed at any time by “RICCI S.R.L.” which will ensure that they are communicated through a notice which will be published on our website. The consumer undertakes, each time a change is made to the present general conditions, to print them out and conserve them.
The “online” sales contract is a remote contract, referring to a legal transaction regarding movable goods and/or services signed between a supplier, “RICCI S.R.L.” and a consumer, a customer in the context of a remote sales system organised by the supplier which, for this contract, uses exclusively the remote communication technology known as the “Internet”. All contracts, therefore, will be concluded directly through access by the consumer customer to the website corresponding to the address http://www.rfrfabianoricci.it where, following the procedures indicated, the contract will be concluded for purchase of the goods. Consumer means the natural person who purchases goods and services for purposes not directly linked to the professional business carried on.
“RICCI S.R.L.”’s IT system is designed to guarantee the shipment of orders within 120 working hours following their acceptance. If the goods are unavailable, also temporarily, the supplier must inform the consumer and proceed, if necessary, to refund the amounts already paid for the supply pursuant to Art. 54 of Italian Legislative Decree 206/2005. Except with the consent of the consumer to be expressed before or at the moment of concluding the contract, the supplier may not fulfil its obligations by supplying products different from those agreed even if of an equivalent or higher value.
The consumer undertakes, once the online purchasing procedure has been completed, to print and conserve the present general conditions – which, besides, he or she will already have read and accepted as this is an obligatory step during purchasing – in addition to the specifications of the product being purchased.
3.1. The present conditions may be updated or changed at any time by “RICCI S.R.L.” which will ensure that they are communicated through publication of a notice on the website. The consumer undertakes and promises, each time a change is made to the present general conditions, to print them out and conserve them.
3.2 It is forbidden for the purchaser to enter false, and/or invented data during the registration procedure, required to activate in relation to him/her the process of executing the present contract and subsequent related communications; the personal data and e-mail addresses must be exclusively his or her genuine personal data and not of other people, or imaginary. It is expressly forbidden to make double registrations corresponding to a single person or to enter data of other people. The Management of “RICCI S.R.L.” reserves the right to prosecute for every breach and abuse, in the interest and for the protection of all consumers.
3.3 The Customer relieves “RICCI S.R.L.” of all liability deriving from the issue of erroneous fiscal documents owing to errors related to data provided by the Customer, as the said Customer is solely responsible for correctly entering data.
Filling in the personal data record, during the purchasing procedure, necessary to activate in relation to the Customer the process for execution of the present contract and subsequent related communications, the Customer authorises “RICCI S.R.L.” to communicate the personal-common data (as defined pursuant to Art. 4 of Italian Legislative Decree 196/2003) to trusted couriers and/or shippers for delivery of the goods purchased so as to enable the procedures necessary for this purpose.
All selling prices of the products shown and indicated on the website http://www.rfrfabianoricci.it for which they constitute an offer to the public under the terms of Art. 1336 of the Italian Civil Code, include VAT, which can be seen in the summary list of the “Shopping Basket”. The customer will be charged a contribution towards delivery expenses, which is clearly displayed before the order is completed, and delivery will be made via express courier. The delivery time is approximately 4/5 working days from the shipment date.
The purchase contract is concluded by exact compilation and consent to purchase expressed through acceptance given “online”, or by signing the order form attached to the electronic catalogue present on the website http://www.rfrfabianoricci.it. There is no minimum purchase order constraint. The customer may pay for the goods ordered using the payment services indicated online at the moment of purchase. For greater customer protection “RICCI S.R.L.”’s Administrative office may carry out checks on the details of the person who made the order.
“RICCI S.R.L.” assumes no liability for poor services attributable to force majeure and/or fortuitous events such as accidents, theft and/or robbery of the courier charged with the delivery, fires, explosions, strikes and/or lockouts, earthquakes, floods and other similar events which impede, wholly or in part, execution of the contract in the times and with the methods agreed. “RICCI S.R.L.” will not be liable in relation to any party for damage, losses and costs suffered following non-execution of the contract for the aforementioned reasons, as the consumer only has a right to a refund of the price paid. In the same way “RICCI S.R.L.” is not liable for any fraudulent or illegal use that may be made by third parties at the moment of payment for the products purchased.
of any amount already paid. The obligations assumed by the customer pursuant to Art. 3 (Obligations of the Purchaser), and the guarantee of successful payment that the customer makes with the means pursuant to Art. 5, have an essential character, as also, by express agreement, non-fulfilment, by the Customer, of even only one of the said obligations will determine termination by right of the contract pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Italian Civil Code, without the need for a court judgement, without prejudice to the right for “RICCI S.R.L.” to take legal action for compensation for further damages.
Every dispute relating to the application, execution, interpretation and breach of the purchase contract signed “online” through the “RICCI S.R.L.” website is subject to European jurisdiction; the present general conditions refer, for anything not expressly provided for herein, to the provisions of the Consumer Code. For any dispute between the parties on the subject of the present contract reference will be made to European legislation.
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text:
MEXICHEM SPECIALTY RESINS INC v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY May 29, 2015 Nos. 12–1260, 12–1265, 12–1266, 12–1267.
DHIAB v. OBAMA May 29, 2015 No. 14–5299.
BOOSE v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA May 26, 2015 No. 14–7086.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS v. UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE May 26, 2015 No. 14–5121.
VALIDUS REINSURANCE LTD v. UNITED STATES May 26, 2015 No. 14–5081.
UNITED STATES v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC May 22, 2015 Nos. 13–5028, 14–5161.
PIERCE v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION May 22, 2015 No. 14–1079.
UNITED STATES v. HUNTER May 22, 2015 No. 13–3098.
PRIESTS FOR LIFE v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES May 20, 2015 Nos. 13–5368, 13–5371, 14–5021.
COLEMAN LEE v. GOVERNMENT OF COLUMBIA May 19, 2015 No. 13–7123.
DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS v. BURWELL May 19, 2015 No. 14–5061.
UNITED STATES v. BIGLEY May 15, 2015 No. 12–3022.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY May 15, 2015 No. 13–5290.
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION May 15, 2015 Nos. 13–1250, 13–1253.
ABDELFATTAH v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY May 15, 2015 No. 12–5322.
LASH v. LEMKE May 15, 2015 No. 13–5308.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE v. POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION May 12, 2015 No. 13–1308.
TETON HISTORIC AVIATION FOUNDATION LLC v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT May 8, 2015 No. 13–5039.
BAROT v. EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA May 8, 2015 No. 14–7081.
FALLBROOK HOSPITAL CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD May 8, 2015 Nos. 14–1056, 14–1094.
CBS CORPORATION v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION May 8, 2015 No. 14–1242.
RANGEL v. BOEHNER May 8, 2015 No. 14–5012.
ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS CWA AFL CIO v. HUERTA May 8, 2015 No. 13–1316.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY May 5, 2015 No. 14–1052.
UNITED STATES v. EMOR May 5, 2015 No. 13–3071.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS May 1, 2015 No. 13–3059.
HELMERICH PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO v. BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA PDVSA May 1, 2015 Nos. 13–7169, 13–7170, 14–7008.
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY May 1, 2015 Nos. 13–1093, 13–1102, 13–1104.
MORGAN DREXEN INC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU May 1, 2015 No. 13–5342.

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In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 558 U.S. 310, the United States Supreme Court struck down limits on electioneering communications that were upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) 540 U.S. 93 and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. This decision presents a serious threat to self-government by rolling back previous bans on corporate spending in the electoral process and allows unlimited corporate spending to influence elections, candidate selection, policy decisions, and public debate. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor noted in their dissent that corporations have special advantages not enjoyed by natural persons, such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets, that allow them to spend huge sums on campaign messages that have little or no correlation with the beliefs held by natural persons. Corporations have used the artificial rights bestowed upon them by the courts to overturn democratically enacted laws that municipal, state, and federal governments passed to curb corporate abuses, thereby impairing local governments’ ability to protect their citizens against corporate harms to the environment, consumers, workers, independent businesses, and local and regional economies. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court held that the appearance of corruption justified some contribution limitations, but it wrongly rejected other fundamental interests that the citizens of California find compelling, such as creating a level playing field and ensuring that all citizens, regardless of wealth, have an opportunity to have their political views heard.
A February 2010 Washington Post-ABC News poll found that 80 percent of Americans oppose the ruling in Citizens United.
Corporations have used the artificial rights bestowed upon them by the courts to overturn democratically enacted laws that municipal, state, and federal governments passed to curb corporate abuses, thereby impairing local governments’ ability to protect their citizens against corporate harms to the environment, consumers, workers, independent businesses, and local and regional economies.
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court held that the appearance of corruption justified some contribution limitations, but it wrongly rejected other fundamental interests that the citizens of California find compelling, such as creating a level playing field and ensuring that all citizens, regardless of wealth, have an opportunity to have their political views heard.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765 and Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley (1981) 454 U.S. 290, the United States Supreme Court rejected limits on contributions to ballot measure campaigns because it concluded that these contributions posed no threat of candidate corruption.

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Law defines property as anything that can be tangible (buildings and contents) or intangible (goodwill and copyright) to which a value may be assigned. In the property insurance scenario, by the term property we usually refer to tangible material property, and thus a property insurance policy usually covers such property from physical loss/damage.
The interest must be a legal one. Macaura v. Northern Insurance Co Ltd (1925)– insured had interest in his shares but none in the timber.
The interest must be a current one. Lucena v. Craufurd (1806)- insured a number of enemy ships when they were still on high seas (mere expectancy doesn’t create insurable interest).
Utmost Good Faith is an essential principle when dealing with the buying and selling of insurance policies. The Law imposes a greater duty on the parties to an Insurance contract rather than to other commercial contracts. Thus insurance policies are described as contracts of ‘Uberrima Fides’ (Utmost Good Faith); on the other hand in commercial contract the doctrine of ‘Caveat Emptor’ (let the buyer beware) applies.
Insurer to disclose all relevant information and advice and Insured to disclose all material facts  .
David Curmi ne v. Martin Mifsud (1992)  ; insured had failed to disclose material facts. This case shows that it is the duty of the insured to disclose all material facts.
Rozanes v. Bowen (1928); shows that the underwriter knows nothing about the risk and thus the duty of the proposer is to disclose all material facts.
Duty to tell the truth and not hide anything that is relevant.
Antonio Zammit v. Joseph Micallef ne (1952);  the information declared by the insured in the proposal form didn’t matchup with the facts. The court emphasized that a false declaration invalidates the contract.
Margherita Bonnici v. Capital Insurance Services Ltd noe (1998)  ; the insured cancelled a holiday due to health problems and was claiming for loss of deposits under travel insurance. The insurer refused to meet the claim as the insured concealed a material fact; the health condition.
Kettlewell v. Refuge Assurance (1908); shows misrepresentation on the part of insurers is also possible.
Joseph Muscat v. Joseph Gasan et noe (1998)  15shows that insurers refused to accept a claim due to misrepresentation and non disclosure. The court concluded that the duty of the insured is to disclose all material facts even if not asked specifically by the insurer, and also the duty of the insurer is to ask for those material facts which in his opinion are relevant. In Re Bradely and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society (1912)  it was similarly outlined that the principle of Uberrima Fides is required on both parties; both the insurer and the insured.
Conditions 6 of MSI outline that if there are any Alterations and Removals, the insurance policy will stop operating unless the insured will inform the insurer about the necessary changes. The intention of this condition is to encourage the insured to disclose all material facts in cases where the risk has changed (e.g. a company used to import aluminium; but now the owner of the firm has decided to start manufacturing the raw material himself. Thus the nature of the risk has changed).
Condition 3 of GMI (Other Insurances) outline that the insured shall give notice of any other insurance policies. The aim of this condition is to reduce fraud. This condition can be equally related to the principle of Contribution.
Although the cases Carter v. Boehm (1766) and TEG Industries Limited v. Gasan Insurance Agency Limited (2009) represent very different times, both of them show that there was a breach of Utmost Good Faith by Carter and TEG Industries (failed to disclose all material facts).
‘the active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result without the intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and independent source’.  Pawsey v. Scottish Union and National (1907).
Thus Proximate cause is the initial act which sets off a natural and continuous sequence of events that produces loss. In the absence of the initial act which produces loss, no loss would have resulted.
Tootal Broadhurst Lee Company v. London and Lancashire Fire Insurance Company (1908) – an earthquake caused a stove to overturn. Spilt oil was ignited and the premises caught fire. The fire spread from one building to another. But the loss was not insured since the policy excluded fire caused by earthquake.
Joseph Gerada v. David Westacott and Vincenza Bonnici (1994)-  accident occoured in order to avoid hitting Vincenza Bonnici’s car, David Westacott collided with another car coming from the opposite direction. The court stated that the cause of the loss (Proximate Cause) was the unexpected opening of the door and thus Vincenza Bonnici was liable.
Emanuel Micallef v. Theresa Falzon (1973)-  the defendant collided with Emanuel Micallef’s car in order to avoid hitting pedestrians who suddenly crossed the road. The court stated that the proximate cause was the pedestrians who unexpectedly crossed the road and thus the defendant is not liable for the damages.
Bikor Ebejer v. Joseph Attard (1973)  ; Ebejer in order to avoid hitting a car which suddenly moved into his lane, drove into the lane where the defendant was driving and unfortunately the defendant was unable to avoid colliding into Bikor Ebejer’s car. The court stated that the defendant didn’t have any fault and the proximate cause was the sudden move of the first car.
Ciappara v. Caruana Demajo noe (1995)-  the insured took a personal accident insurance policy with MSI which covered bodily injury resulting externally. Mrs. Ciapparra was hit by a chain feeder and suffered injury to her leg which made her totally unfit for work. The insurer refused to meet the claim as the disability was not caused directly by the hit of the chain feeder but by an infection.
Winicofsky v. Army and Navy Insurance (1919)- during an air raid a group of thieves robbed from a building. The proximate cause was held to be theft which was an insured peril and not the air-raid which was an excluded peril.
Leyland Shipping v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd (1918)- sometimes there is more than one cause operating and thus the most dominant cause must be selected. In this case the Torpedo which hit the ship was the proximate cause.
Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd v. Employers’ Liability Insurance Corporation Ltd (1974); sometimes there is a concurrent cause which produces a loss. Defective equipment and negligence of employee alone could not cause the loss, but both together were enough to produce a loss.
Indemnity insurance policies are those where insurers agree to pay when the insured suffers a loss of a particular type and only for the amount of the loss. The main methods of applying indemnity are: repair, replacement, reinstatement and Cash.
Indemnity is applied at the date and place of loss and thus if the value of the property has increased during the running of the policy, the insured will be entitled to be indemnified on the increased value and not on the original value (Re Wilson and Scottish Insurance (1920)) and vice versa.
And thus the insured cannot claim for loss of future/consequential profits unless these are insured specifically. Re Wright and Pole (1834)- the insured could not recover the loss of trade and costs of hiring new premises.
The insured cannot recover any amount of sentimental/personal value Richard Aubrey Film Productions Ltd v. Graham (1960).
Mifsud Mario v. Montaldo Insurance Agency Limited Noe (2004)  ; Mr.Mifsud suffered a motor accident with his ‘new’ car (purchased 1 month before). The insurer of the other party (which was at fault) agreed to pay Mr.Mifsud for damages but refused to pay him in full since according to the same insurer there were deductions for depreciation. The court concluded that the insurer should indemnify Mr.Mifsud in full without any deductions for depreciation.
Subrogation supports indemnity by ensuring that the insured is not better off or worse off. Castellain v. Preston (1883); shows that the aim of subrogation is make sure that the policyholder is indemnified but should not be over-indemnified. Moreover the insurer cannot recover more than the sum paid to the insured and thus should pay any profits to the insured.
Salvage – The case Holmes v. Payne (1930) shows that if the insured finds his lost property after he has been fully indemnified, the new owner of the property will be the insurer. This condition is listed in the GMI Fire Policy “Rights of Insurer re Salvage”  .
Condition 15 of the MSI policy outlines the principle of Subrogation; insured shall permit “all such acts” that are required by the Insurer “for the purpose of obtaining a relief or indemnity”.  In simple terms this states that on the behalf of the insured the insurer will be able to recover from some third party. One should also note that GMI policy in condition 12 states that “on the happening of any loss/damage the insurer may; enter and keep possession of the building or premises where the loss or damage has happened” (salvage).
Subrogation does not apply to non-indemnity contracts (Bradburn v. Great Western Railway (1874)). The company argued that the liability claim can be reduced by the amount of the Personal Accident payment.
Scottish Union and National Insurance v. Davies (1970); the insurers attempted to claim £350 by way of subrogation but failed since they had paid for useless and no satisfaction note had been signed by the insured.
Middlesea Insurance P.l.c. Noe v. Pss Holdings Limited (2010)-  shows how the principle of subrogation operates. After being presented with the claim, MSI had indemnified the insured. But when the insurer went to recover the costs from the Third Party (Pss Holdings) there wasn’t any agreement and thus everything was to be decided by the court. The final judgement was that PSS Holdings were responsible for the damages and MSI could then recover the costs.
For Contribution to be present there must be at least two indemnity policies which cover; same subject matter, same peril, same period and same interest.
King and Queens Granary (1877)-  both the owner and the bailees had insured the grain. Following damage to the grain, the bailees’ insurer paid the claim and tried to recover their part according to the principle of contribution from the owner’s insurer. But this was not possible since the interest insured by the two policies were different. It was concluded that the bailees were responsible for the damages and thus their insurers were liable to pay.
American Surety Co. Of New York v. Wrightson (1910)-  insurers accepted that contribution should apply since there were 2 policies which covered a common peril (dishonesty of employees).
Condition 3 of GMI outline that the insured is obliged to inform the insurer about other existing insurance policies; otherwise all benefits under the policy will be removed. This is done with the intention of minimizing fraud.
Condition 16 of GMI named Contribution outlines that in case contribution arises, the insurer shall only be responsible to pay his proportion of the loss. If the insured has more than one policy he cannot receive more than strict indemnity.
"Insurable Interest And Property Insurance Policy." LawTeacher.net. 11 2013. All Answers Ltd. 04 2019 <https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/insurable-interest-and-property-insurance-policy-commercial-law-essay.php?vref=1>.
"Insurable Interest And Property Insurance Policy." LawTeacher. LawTeacher.net, November 2013. Web. 20 April 2019. <https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/insurable-interest-and-property-insurance-policy-commercial-law-essay.php?vref=1>.
LawTeacher. November 2013. Insurable Interest And Property Insurance Policy. [online]. Available from: https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/insurable-interest-and-property-insurance-policy-commercial-law-essay.php?vref=1 [Accessed 20 April 2019].
LawTeacher. Insurable Interest And Property Insurance Policy [Internet]. November 2013. [Accessed 20 April 2019]; Available from: https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/insurable-interest-and-property-insurance-policy-commercial-law-essay.php?vref=1.

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On February 26, 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued the long-awaited judgments on the cases concerning the Danish government withholding tax on dividends and interest paid by Danish companies to companies in other EU Member States. More specifically, the cases dealt with the interpretation of the anti-abuse clauses laid down under Art. 1, para. 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU, PSD) and Art. 5 of the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC, IRD).
An in-depth analysis of the judgments will be published in the coming weeks, setting out the implications of the CJEU judgments in a number of EU jurisdictions. This case-based note will be published from the perspective of all main European jurisdictions.
We are dealing with groundbreaking judgments and some time is required to outline all their implications and to consolidate the interpretation of all the principles affirmed therein. As of today, it is only possible to provide some initial commentary.
The CJEU judgments largely support the arguments of the tax authorities, whereas the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott delivered on March 1, 2018 was in favor of taxpayers; On one hand the CJEU attributes no relevance to the beneficial ownership clause in the context of the PSD, whilst on the other the CJEU makes reference to the requisite of beneficial owner in the context of the indications of existence of abusive practices, without clarifying the relevant concept and scope. Furthermore, where a non-EU beneficial owner is involved, it seems that the application of the beneficial owner concept prevents any relevance of the general anti-abuse principle affirmed at EU level, thus almost looking as a prerequisite.
It is our understanding that where a holding company has not a merely passive role and is involved in comprehensive activities aimed at the coordination and support of subsidiaries, at the management of the relationships among unrelated shareholders or investment protection the mere fact that the dividends it receives are passed on to other entities in a short timeframe should not result in the qualification as an abusive practice based on the overall assessment of the holding company’s role within the group. In this sense, it cannot be ignored that one of the natural purposes of a company – including a holding company – is the distribution of dividends to its shareholders.
A careful and balanced interpretation of all the principles affirmed in the judgments will be required by both taxpayers and tax authorities in order not to contradict the purposes of the PSD and IRD. In particular, the goal of the PSD to eliminate double taxation should be considered. A withholding tax on dividends must be very carefully considered as it ultimately frustrates the objective of eliminating double taxation, whilst a withholding tax on interest or royalties may not result in an additional charge, as the Member State where the recipient is resident would generally eliminate double taxation through exemption or, more commonly, credit method.

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Wildsmith, Brian. Professor Noah's Spaceship. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1985. 4to. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy. Owner name on end paper.
Wilhelm, Hans. The Royal Raven. New York. Scholastic. 1996. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Wilhelm, Hans. The Royal Raven. New York. Scholastic. 1996. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Wilkinson, Bruce. Secrets of the Vine. For Young Hearts. np. Thomas Nelson. 2002. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Sergio Martinez. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Wilkinson, Bruce. The Prayer of Jabez. For Young Hearts. Nashville. Tommy Nelson. 2001. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Sergio Martinez. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Wilkinson, Bruce. The Prayer of Jabez. For Young Hearts. Photo available. Nashville. Tommy Nelson. 2001. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Sergio Martinez. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Wilks, Mike. The Ultimate Noah's Ark. New York. Henry Holt. 1995. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Wilks, Mike. The Ultimate Noah's Ark. Photo available. New York. Henry Holt. 1995. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Willard, Nancy. Shadow Story. San Diego. Harcourt Brace. 1999. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by David Diaz. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Willard, Nancy. The Good-Night Blessing Book. New York. Blue Sky. 1996. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Willard, Nancy. The Tale I Told Sasha. Photo available. Boston. Little, Brown Co. 1999. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by David Christiana. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Willems, Mo. Edwina. The Dinosaur Who Didn't Know She Was Extinct. New York. Hyperion. 2006. Octavo. Hard cover. Stated first edition (number line starts with "2"). Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Williams, Garth. Benjamin's Treasure. Photo available. New York. HarperCollins. 2001. 4to. Hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color by Garth Williams. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Williams, Margery. The Velveteen Rabbit (Or How Toys Become Real). London. Unicorn Pub. 1991. 4to. Decorated hard cover. Illustrated in color and black & white by Turi MacCombie. Fine copy.
Williams, Margery. The Velveteen Rabbit (Or How Toys Become Real). Garden City. Doubleday and Co. 1991. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in color and black & white by William Nicholson. Near fine copy. Light damp stain along bottom edge in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Williams, Margery. The Velveteen Rabbit or How Toys Become Real. New York. Simon & Schuster. 1983. 4to. Decorated hard cover. Second edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by Tien. Fine copy.
Willis, Jeanne. The Long Blue Blazer. New York. E.P. Dutton & Co. 1987. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by Susan Varley. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Willis, Val. The Mystery in the Bottle. New York. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 1991. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by John Shelley. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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Mr. Justice STEVENS, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that dredging by the Army Corps of Engineers is exempt from state water-pollution regulations. 543 F.2d 1198 (C.A.8 1976). The Court today refuses to review this ruling despite the fact that the case is here on appeal, and may well be within our mandatory jurisdiction.1 The case deserves plenary review because of its practical importance and because of the likelihood that error has been committed.
"Each department, agency or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government . . . shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements . . . ."
Congress was cautious indeed in allowing exceptions, as shown by the remainder of § 313. Federal agencies may be exempted only by the President himself, and only if he finds the exemption to be in the "paramount interest of the United States." Even then, the exemption lasts only one year unless renewed by the President, and he must report each exemption to Congress "together with his reason for granting such exemption."
Despite the evident intent of Congress to allow even temporary exemptions only under extraordinary circumstances, the Court of Appeals found an implied permanent exemption in § 404 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.2 543 F.2d, at 1202. Section 404 simply provides that dredging permits are issued by the Army Corps of Engineers rather than the EPA. It says nothing about any exemption from state water pollution regulation. Indeed, § 404 does not distinguish between dredging by the Corps and dredging by private industry; private dredgers are concededly subject to state pollution requirements (Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, at 9, and n. 10); and Congress expected that "the disposal activities of private dredgers and the Corps of Engineers will be treated similarly." S.Conf.Rep.No.92-1236, p. 142 (1972); see also H.R.Rep.No.92-911, p. 130 (1972) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 3668.
In State Water Board, the Court emphasized that "(f)ederal installations are subject to state regulation only when and to the extent that Congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous." 426 U.S., at 211, 96 S.Ct. 2022. Perhaps further investigation will disclose that the congressional authorization here is not so "clear and unambiguous" as it now appears to be. Even giving all benefit of the doubt to the Court of Appeals, however, the correctness of its holding is far from apparent.
This case has more than theoretical importance. According to the complaint, the Corps dredges over two million cubic yards of sediment from the Mississippi River alone, and deposits about half that amount in Minnesota. App. A-4. These activities have allegedly caused "severe degradation of the quality of the waters of (that) state." App. A-12. Other States too are concerned amicus briefs urging reversal have been filed on behalf of California, Hawaii, Idaho, Washington, Wisconsin, and Missouri.
I would order the case set for oral argument, postponing until then the issue whether the case should be taken on appeal or by writ of certiorari.
Our mandatory jurisdiction includes cases in which a Court of Appeals holds a state statute "invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). The Secretary of the Army concedes that "(b)y holding that the federal statute did not waive the traditional immunity of the Corps of Engineers from state regulation, the court implicitly held that the purported reach of state laws over the Corps' dredging activities was invalid under the Supremacy Clause. . . ." Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, at 5. In City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 78 S.Ct. 458, 2 L.Ed.2d 441, the Court of Appeals, 234 F.2d 380, had ruled that, as applied, a state taxing statute invaded the Federal Government's immunity from state taxation. This Court postponed the question of appellate jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits, but then held without explanation that an appeal was proper. 355 U.S., at 492, 78 S.Ct., at 460. A similar result should apply to a holding that a state statute invaded the Federal Government's immunity from unconsented state regulation. It is arguable, of course, that our mandatory appellate jurisdiction is defeated by the Court of Appeals' failure to make express its invalidation of the statute as applied to the Corps, but we clearly have power to review the case on writ of certiorari.
"(a) The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.
"(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by the Secretary of the Army (1) through the application of guidelines developed by the Administrator, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, which guidelines shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section 1343(c) of this title, and (2) in any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone would prohibit the specification of a site, through the application additionally of the economic impact of the site on navigation and anchorage.
"(c) The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary of the Army. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make public his findings and his reasons for making any determination under this subsection."


The program will grant tax credits to taxpayers that install energy storage systems between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2022. The amount of tax credits granted from this program will not exceed 30 percent of the total installed costs of the energy storage system. The amount of tax credits granted for a system installed on residential property is further capped at $5,000. The cap amount of a system installed on commercial property is $75,000. The tax credits will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis and are subject to a maximum limit of $750,000 each year. Unused credits from this program cannot be carried forward or backward to offset taxpayers’ tax liability in another taxable year. Please click here to read more on the original Senate Bill and our observations about the incentive tax credit program.
[i] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.04(A).
[ii] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.04(B), (C).
[iv] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.04(D).
[v] See Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.01.
[vi] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.03(B)(4); Md. Code Ann., Tax-General § 10-101(c).
[vii] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.07(A).
[viii] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.05(B).
[ix] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.05(C).
[x] Md. Regs. Code § 14.26.07.05(D).