Neri Ramos and Jerome B. Falk, Jr., under appointments by the Supreme Court, and Anthony G. Amsterdam for Defendant and Appellant.
Ernest L. Graves, Renzi & Kilbride, Fred T. Kilbride, Gerald H. Gottlieb and Earl Klein as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attorneys General, Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Kally and Ronald M. George, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A second trial was had on the issue of the penalty for the murder, and the jury again imposed the death penalty. A motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal is now before us automatically under subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1239.
Before undertaking to examine the constitutionality of capital punishment in light of contemporary standards, it is instructive to note that article I, section 6, of the California Constitution, fn. 2 unlike the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, fn. 3 prohibits the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments. Thus, the California Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty if, judged by contemporary standards, it is either cruel or has become an unusual punishment.
Some commentators have suggested that the reach of the Eighth Amendment and that of article I, section 6, are coextensive, and that the use of the disjunctive form in the latter is insignificant. fn. 4 Our review of the history of the California provision persuades us, however, that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1849, who first adopted the section which was later incorporated into the Constitution of 1879, were aware of the significance of the disjunctive form and that its use was purposeful.
Article I, section 5, of the 1846 Constitution of New York, the first New York Constitution to include such a prohibition, proscribed cruel and unusual punishments. fn. 8 The 1846 Iowa Constitution, after which many of the sections of the proposed Declaration of Rights were patterned, also proscribed cruel and unusual punishments. fn. 9 Thus, it is apparent that the delegates did not make the change in order to correct a "verbal error" in transcribing the provision from the New York original, nor was it an attempt to conform it to the Iowa Constitution.
[2a] The same rules of construction require that wherever possible we construe constitutional provisions in such a way as to reconcile potential conflict among provisions and give effect to each. (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal. 2d 621, 637 [268 P.2d 723].) It has been suggested that we are therefore restrained from considering whether capital punishment is proscribed by article I, section 6, since the death penalty is expressly or impliedly recognized in several other provisions of the California [6 Cal. 3d 638] Constitution. fn. 19 We perceive no possible conflict or repugnance between those provisions and the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 6, however, for none of the incidental references to the death penalty purport to give its existence constitutional stature. They do no more than recognize its existence at the time of their adoption. Thus, the bail clause of article I, section 6, restricts the right to bail in capital cases; the due process clause of article I, section 13, ensures that life will not be taken without due process; and section 8 of article I allows felony defendants represented by counsel to plead guilty at an arraignment before a magistrate only in noncapital cases. Similarly, section 8 of article V gives the Governor power to reprieve and section 11 of article VI vests this court with appellate jurisdiction in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. None of these provisions can be construed as an affirmative exemption of capital punishment from the compass of the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 6.
The provisions of sections 6 and 13 of article I which recognize the existence of capital punishment were carried over into the Constitution of 1879 from the Constitution of 1849. Section 8 of article I was added in 1879 in a modification which discarded the former requirement that the prosecution in capital and other infamous crimes proceed by indictment and permitted instead the use of an information.
To interpret the adoption of Proposition 1-a or the presence in other provisions of the Constitution of references to capital punishment as intended to bar future judicial consideration of the possible cruel or unusual nature of capital punishment would violate the most elementary rules of constitutional construction.  "We do not ... approve of that principle of constitutional construction, which seeks by vague surmises, or even probable conjecture, or general speculation of a policy not distinctly expressed, to control the express language of the instrument; since such a mode would not unfrequently change the instrument from what its framers made it, into what the Judges think it should have been." (People v. Weller (1858) 11 Cal. 77, 86.) [2b] The Constitution expressly proscribes cruel or unusual punishments. It would be mere speculation and conjecture to ascribe to the framers an intent to exempt capital punishment from the compass of that provision solely because at a time when the death penalty was commonly accepted they provided elsewhere in the Constitution for special safeguards in its application.
Having determined that under the California Constitution capital punishment is prohibited if it is either a cruel or an unusual punishment, and that no constitutional impediment exists to restrain our examination of the death penalty in light of contemporary standards, we must also define the [6 Cal. 3d 640] role of the courts in giving effect to the cruel or unusual punishments clause of article I, section 6.
 Our duty to confront and resolve constitutional questions, regardless of their difficulty or magnitude, is at the very core of our judicial responsibility. It is a mandate of the most imperative nature. Called upon to decide whether the death penalty constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Constitution of this state, we face not merely a crucial and vexing issue but an awesome problem involving the lives of 104 persons under sentence of death in California, some for as long as 8 years. There can be no final disposition of the judicial proceedings in these cases unless and until this court has decided the state constitutional question, a question which cannot be avoided by deferring to any other court or to any other branch of government.
 The cruel or unusual punishment clause of the California Constitution, like other provisions of the Declaration of Rights, operates to restrain legislative and executive action and to protect fundamental individual and minority rights against encroachment by the majority. It is the function of the court to examine legislative acts in light of such constitutional mandates to ensure that the promise of the Declaration of Rights is a reality to the individual. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 141 [93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242].) Were it otherwise, the Legislature would ever be the sole judge of the permissible means and extent of punishment and article I, section 6, of the Constitution would be superfluous.
Although we have often considered challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment, we have heretofore approached the question in the Eighth Amendment context of "cruel and unusual" punishment, using that term interchangeably with the "cruel or unusual" language of article I, section 6, of the California Constitution, fn. 21 and have never independently tested the death penalty against the disjunctive requirements of the latter. As a consequence of this emphasis on the Eighth Amendment approach the majority of our prior opinions have focused on justifications for continuation of the death penalty which were then believed to exempt it from the federal constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment without regard to whether it was cruel. This disregard of the cruelty question is understandable when it is realized that at the time article I, section 6, was drafted in 1849, fn. 22 and when it was readopted in [6 Cal. 3d 642] 1879, fn. 23 capital punishment was not considered so cruel as to warrant proscription, and was a widely accepted, customary punishment in the fledgling state. Hanging had been a popular form of vigilante justice, fn. 24 and even after the new state instituted a judicial and penal system, public executions continued. fn. 25 Thus, at the time of our earliest decisions upholding capital punishment, a substantial proportion of California's residents had witnessed executions. It was not a remote or abstract concept, and the question as to whether capital punishment might violate standards of decency then accepted or shock the conscience of the people of that time did not often arise. When it did, the question could be summarily disposed of by a court which then understandably assumed that capital punishment was not so cruel as to be proscribed by the state or federal Constitutions. Since the cruelty of capital punishment was not then a substantial issue, any doubts as to the constitutionality of the death penalty were resolved by resorting to its continuing and usual acceptance. The emphasis of our prior opinions was thus placed on the common or usual rather than the "cruel" aspect of the punishment.
One J. W. Finley appears to have been the first defendant to challenge the death penalty in California on grounds that it violated article I, section 6, of the California Constitution. A life prisoner at Folsom, he had committed a malicious assault on another prisoner, an offense punishable by death. While awaiting trial he challenged the then applicable Penal Code section (Pen. Code, § 246; now Pen. Code, § 4500) on constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeal rejected his challenge, answering its own question "Is the punishment cruel or unusual," by justifying it as among the [6 Cal. 3d 643] "severe penalties ... necessary to deter men from defying law and daring the consequences." (In re Finley (1905) 1 Cal. App. 198, 201 [81 P. 1041].) The Finley court adopted an "excessive" or "disproportionate" test by which to judge whether a punishment was "unusual" and concluded that "only when the punishment is out of all proportion to the offense, and is beyond question an extraordinary penalty for a crime of ordinary gravity committed under ordinary circumstances, that courts may denounce it as unusual." (1 Cal. App. 198, 202; italics in original.) The court, perhaps mindful of our decision in Ex Parte Mitchell, supra, 70 Cal. 1, in which we had used the disjunctive language of article I, section 6, did purport to separately consider whether the penalty was "cruel," but instead of examining that question independently, assumed that the death penalty could not be "cruel per se, for the whole current of law for centuries justifies the infliction." (Ibid.) Thus, California adopted the cruel and unusual punishment approach, which has been followed by the United States Supreme Court, of finding justification for capital punishment in its deterrent effect, and weighing only whether it was an excessive or unusual punishment, without independent consideration of whether it is cruel.
Although Finley did not directly challenge the death penalty in this court on cruel and unusual punishment grounds, the approaches to its constitutionality taken by the Court of Appeal in the first Finley case and by this court in the second Finley case became firmly established in California law in 1909 when we rejected a second challenge to the infliction of the death penalty for aggravated assault by a life prisoner. Jacob Oppenheimer, a life prisoner at San Quentin, undeterred by the existence of the penalty, assaulted another prisoner in the prison dining room with a knife. He was convicted, the death penalty was imposed, and, on appeal to this court, he contended that then section 246 of the Penal Code was unconstitutional. Citing our prior Finley opinion, we noted that the validity of the section had been upheld against an equal protection [6 Cal. 3d 644] challenge. But Oppenheimer had also claimed that the death penalty constituted cruel or unusual punishment. Although we recognized that " 'cruel' or 'unusual' " punishments were barred by section 6 of article I of the California Constitution, we did not examine the possibility that capital punishment might be cruel. Instead we declared: "The infliction of the death penalty by any of the methods ordinarily adopted by civilized people, such as hanging, shooting, or electricity, is neither a cruel nor unusual punishment (see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 447 ...) unless perhaps it be so disproportionate to the offense for which it is inflicted as to meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally, 'as to shock the moral sense of the people.' [Citation.] In view of what is said in People v. Finley, as to the reasons for such provision ..., we are of the opinion that no such conclusion can be reached in regard to the statute under consideration." (People v. Oppenheimer (1909) 156 Cal. 733, 737-738 [106 P. 74].) By adopting what had originally been the basis for rejecting an equal protection challenge to the death penalty, we established justification, proportionment to the offense, and common practice among civilized peoples, as the tests by which to measure capital punishment against constitutional challenge, notwithstanding the alternative criteria of cruel or unusual punishments established by section 6, article I, of the California Constitution. Since the death penalty furthered a permissible purpose of punishment, was commonly practiced among civilized people, and was not disproportionate to the offense, it did not offend the Constitution.
Now, however, as the California constitutional history demonstrates, we must probe the issue on the basis of the disjunctive cruel or unusual punishment.
The Constitutionality of Capital Punishment Today.
Well over a century has now passed since the day when vigilante justice and public hangings made executions an accepted practice of California life. We cannot today assume, as it was assumed in early opinions of this court, that capital punishment is not so cruel as to offend contemporary standards of decency. Appellant has asked that we not only reexamine the validity of the prior bases upon which the death penalty has been upheld, but that we independently examine its cruelty applying contemporary standards. As we shall discuss at greater length below, we have done so and have concluded that capital punishment is "cruel" as that term is understood in its constitutional sense. We have also, at the instance of both appellant and respondent, reexamined the bases upon which capital punishment has been upheld heretofore. As will appear, we have concluded that the death penalty cannot be justified as furthering any of the accepted purposes of punishment. Moreover, we have concluded that it can no longer escape characterization as an "unusual" punishment.
 We do not interpret the constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments either as a license for the indefinite continuance of all punishments known to the common law or practiced at the time California attained statehood, nor as a proscription of innovative types of punishment whose purpose is the rehabilitation or reformation of criminal offenders. Historical analysis suggests that the framers intended to outlaw both cruel punishments and punishments of excessive severity for ordinary offenses. They used the term cruel in its ordinary meaning--causing physical pain or mental anguish of an inhumane or torturous nature.
What our society does in actuality belies what it says with regard to its acceptance of capital punishment. Between 1930 and 1968, a total of 3,859 persons were executed in the United States as punishment for crimes ranging from murder to burglary and aggravated assault. fn. 34 The steady decrease in the number of executions from a high of 199 in 1935 to 2 in 1967, fn. 35 in spite of a growing population and notwithstanding the statutory sanction of the death penalty, persuasively demonstrates that capital punishment is unacceptable to society today.
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain incident thereto, fn. 36 but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due process of law are carried out. fn. 37 Penologists and medical experts agree that the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture. fn. 38 Respondent concedes the fact of [6 Cal. 3d 650] lengthy delays between the pronouncement of the judgment of death and the actual execution, but suggests that these delays are acceptable because they often occur at the instance of the condemned prisoner. We reject this suggestion. An appellant's insistence on receiving the benefits of appellate review of the judgment condemning him to death does not render the lengthy period of impending execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty from constitutional proscription.
The brutalizing psychological effects of impending execution are a relevant consideration in our assessment of the cruelty of capital punishment. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. 349 at page 372 [54 L. Ed. 793 at pp. 800-801], that "it must have come to [the framers of the Eighth Amendment] that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation." In Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. 86, in which the United States Supreme Court squarely held a criminal punishment to be violative of the Eighth Amendment, the psychological impact of the punishment was dispositive. The court there held that denationalization as punishment was barred by the Eighth Amendment, stating in the plurality opinion: "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. ... In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
Although the court suggested in dictum that it believed the death penalty to be permissible then in certain circumstances, it also emphasized that: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." (Id. at p. 100 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 642].) The dignity of man, the individual and the society as a whole, is today demeaned by our continued practice of capital punishment. Judged by contemporary standards of decency, capital punishment is impermissibly cruel. It is being increasingly rejected by society and is now almost wholly repudiated [6 Cal. 3d 651] by those most familiar with its processes. Measured by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," capital punishment is, therefore, cruel within the meaning of article I, section 6, of the California Constitution.
 The People concede that capital punishment is cruel to the individual involved. They argue, however, that only "unnecessary" cruelty is constitutionally proscribed, and that if a cruel punishment can be justified it is not forbidden by article I, section 6, of the California Constitution. We need not decide here whether our Constitution permits the infliction of "necessary" cruelty as punishment for crime, because respondent has not demonstrated that the death penalty can be justified as necessary to any state interest.
In seeking to justify continuance of capital punishment, the People argue that it furthers three of the four acknowledged purposes of punishment. Respondent concedes that death is in no way rehabilitative, but contends that capital punishment may be legitimately imposed in retribution for serious offenses, that it serves to isolate the offender, and that the existence of the death penalty acts as a deterrent to crime. None of these purposes is shown to justify so onerous a penalty as death.
 Although vengence or retribution has been acknowledged as a permissible purpose of punishment under the Eighth Amendment (Williams v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 248 [93 L. Ed. 1337, 1343, 69 S.Ct. 1079]), we do not sanction punishment solely for retribution in California. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal. 2d 740, 745 [48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) We are fully aware that many condemned prisoners have committed crimes of the utmost cruelty and depravity and that such persons are not entitled to the slightest sympathy from society in the administration of justice or otherwise. Nevertheless, it is incompatible with the dignity of an enlightened society to attempt to justify the taking of life for purposes of vengeance.
 Admittedly, isolation of the offender from society is a proper and often necessary goal of punishment and death does effectively serve that purpose. Society can be protected from convicted criminals, however, by far less onerous means than execution. In no sense can capital punishment be justified as "necessary" to isolate the offender from society.
 Respondent contends that the existence of the death penalty may [6 Cal. 3d 652] deter some persons from committing capital offenses. We have recognized that whether a substantial deterrent effect can be proven is a vigorously disputed proposition. (People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 720, 731 [16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 17 Cal. Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809]; People v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 503, 538-539 [30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394].) fn. 39 We are aware of the obvious imponderable and variable characteristics of society which can cause statistical studies of deterrence to be misleading, and of the difficulties inherent in attempting to establish that an offense was not committed because a would-be offender was aware of and restrained by the possibility of the death penalty. Nonetheless, as respondent concedes, many homicides in particular are not deterrable and as to the remainder capital punishment can have a significant deterrent effect only if the punishment is swiftly and certainly exacted. We have already demonstrated that the punishment is not swift. Moreover, it is far from certain.
In California death is authorized as the penalty for eight offenses: treason (Pen. Code, § 37), perjury in capital cases (Pen. Code, § 128), first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 190), kidnaping for ransom or robbery with bodily harm to the victim (Pen. Code, § 209), train wrecking (Pen. Code, § 219), malicious assault by life prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4500), explosion of destructive devices causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12310), and sabotage resulting in death or great bodily injury (Mil. & Vet. Code, § 1672, subd. (a)). The penalty is mandatory for the treason and perjury offenses and for malicious assault by a life prisoner if a non-inmate victim dies. It is discretionary for the other listed offenses.
Notwithstanding the discretion given to judges and juries to impose either death or life imprisonment for first degree murder, fn. 40 it is estimated that in [6 Cal. 3d 653] California 80 percent of those persons convicted receive a sentence of life imprisonment. fn. 41 Of the 20 percent upon whom a sentence of death is imposed, commutation of sentence, reversal of the judgment, and other factors fn. 42 further reduce the number of defendants actually executed to the point where, far from being a certain penalty with acknowledged deterrent effect, capital punishment today is rarely imposed or implemented.
A punishment as extreme and as irrevocable as death cannot be predicated upon speculation as to what the deterrent effect might be if it were actually applied swiftly and with certainty upon all who were potentially subject to it. As stated previously, in reality today it is neither swift nor certain. Respondent offers us no basis upon which to conclude that, as presently administered, capital punishment is any greater deterrent to crime than are other available forms of punishment.
 We have already noted that the death sentence is rarely imposed in California today and that it is even more rarely carried out. But even adopting the broader test of widespread acceptance among civilized peoples, capital punishment can no longer withstand constitutional proscription. Respondent seeks to avoid this conclusion by suggesting that a punishment is not unusual in the constitutional sense unless it is unusual as to form, or method by which it is imposed. We cannot accept this limitation of the meaning of "unusual," however, for to do so would ignore the fact that execution is a form or method of punishment and would embroil us in future [6 Cal. 3d 654] semantic disputes as to whether innovative types of punishment were unconstitutionally "unusual" forms of punishment.
In construing article I, section 6, we have held than an excessive or disproportionate punishment is "unusual." (People v. Oppenheimer, supra, 156 Cal. 733, 737-738.) When a punishment has been challenged as being unconstitutionally "cruel," however, the fact that it was not literally "unusual" has been considered relevant, not to whether the punishment should be proscribed as excessive, but as to whether it was offensive to the standards of decency common to civilized peoples. (In re Finley, supra, 1 Cal. App. 198, 202.) Thus, when doubt existed as to whether a punishment was so cruel as to contravene article I, section 6, that doubt could be resolved in favor of upholding the punishment if it was commonly accepted among civilized societies not limited to our own.
We have concluded that capital punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and that under article I, section 6, a cruel punishment is proscribed irrespective of whether it is excessive. If any doubt remained as to its cruelty, however, we could no longer uphold capital punishment on the ground that it is commonly accepted, for the repudiation of the death penalty in this country is reflected in a world-wide trend towards abolition.
No longer can it be said that capital punishment is not "cruel per se, for the whole current of law for centuries justifies its infliction." (In re Finley, supra, 1 Cal. App. 198, 202.) Although world-wide acceptance of capital punishment at the turn of the century may then have warranted resolving doubts as to its cruelty in favor of its constitutionality, the current has now reversed. It is now, literally, an unusual punishment among civilized nations.
 Insofar as Penal Code sections 190 and 190.1 purport to authorize [6 Cal. 3d 657] the imposition of the death penalty, they are, accordingly, unconstitutional. In view of our decision that the death penalty may not be carried out, it is unnecessary to reach petitioner's other contentions relating to the validity of the penalty judgment.
First: The question here involved is now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, whose decision will be binding upon this court. Therefore, I would not pass upon the merits of the contentions discussed in the foregoing opinion until the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has been rendered.
FN 4. Comment, The Death Penalty Cases (1968) 56 Cal.L.Rev. 1268, 1326, footnote 502. But see, Mosk, The Eighth Amendment Rediscovered (1968) 1 Loyola L.A.L.Rev. 4, 17-18.
FN 5. Browne, Debates in the Convention of California (1850) page 30 (hereinafter "1849 Debates").
FN 6. Id page 31.
FN 7. Id page 458.
FN 8. 5 Thorpe, American Charters, Constitutions, and Organic Laws (1909) page 2654 (hereinafter "Thorpe").
FN 9. 2 Thorpe, page 1125.
FN 11. Id page 221.
FN 12. Id pages 37, 56, 69, 110, 380, 384.
FN 13. E.g., Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838, article IX, section 13 (5 Thorpe, p. 3114); Alabama Constitution of 1819, article I, section 16 (1 Thorpe, p. 98); Delaware Constitution of 1831, article I, section 11 (1 Thorpe, p. 583); Kentucky Constitution of 1799, article X, section 15 (3 Thorpe, p. 1290); Mississippi Constitution of 1832, article I, section 16 (4 Thorpe, p. 2050); Rhode Island Constitution of 1842, article I, section 8 (6 Thorpe, p. 3223); South Carolina Constitution of 1790, article IX, section 4 (6 Thorpe, p. 3264).
FN 14. E.g., North Carolina Constitution of 1776, paragraph X (5 Thorpe, p. 2788); Florida Constitution of 1838, article I, section 12 (2 Thorpe, p. 665); Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, article XXVII of Declaration of Rights (3 Thorpe, p. 1892); New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, Part First, article XXIII (4 Thorpe, p. 2474).
FN 15. E.g., Arkansas Constitution of 1836, article II, section 13: "That all penalties shall be reasonable and proportioned to the nature of the offense." (1 Thorpe, p. 270); Illinois Constitution of 1848, article XIII, section 14: "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense; the true design of all punishment being to reform, not to exterminate mankind." (2 Thorpe, p. 1008); New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, Part First, article XVIII (4 Thorpe, p. 2473).
FN 16. E.g., Indiana Constitution of 1816, article I, section 15 (cruel and unusual punishment) and section 16 ("All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense") (2 Thorpe, p. 1059); Maine Constitution of 1819, article I, section 9 ("shall be proportioned to the offense ... nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted") (3 Thorpe, pp. 1647-1648); Rhode Island Constitution of 1842, article I, section 8 ("nor cruel punishments inflicted" and "all punishments ought to be proportioned to the offense") (6 Thorpe, p. 3223).
One delegate, noting that whipping was permitted in Delaware, and possibly in Kentucky and Virginia, suggested that their constitutions were substantially similar, and if the reason it was permitted there but had been declared unconstitutional by one California appellate court was that California's Constitution included the word "unusual," "then it is a sufficient answer to say that if it is to become fashionable, let it become fashionable elsewhere first, and the objection that it is unusual will cease to apply to our Courts." (1879 Debates, p. 246.) At the time the Kentucky and Delaware Constitutions prohibited only "cruel" punishments, although the Virginia Constitution prohibited "cruel and unusual" punishments. It is apparent that the delegates recognized the distinctions between the constitutions and considered the terms of the California Constitution to be disjunctive.
FN 19. Article I, section 6: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses ..."; article I, section 8: "... If the felony charged is not punishable with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to the defendant and ask him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the offense charged therein [and] the defendant may ... plead guilty to the offense ..."; article I, section 13: "... No person shall ... be deprived of life ... without due process of law; ..."; article V, section 8: "... the Governor, on conditions he deems proper, may grant a reprieve, ..."; article VI, section 11: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of death has been pronounced."
FN 22. On September 11, 1849, L. W. Hastings, an attorney delegate from the Sacramento District, introduced the following resolution: "As the true design of all punishment is to reform and not to exterminate mankind, death shall never be inflicted as a punishment for crime in this state."
Mr. Blackmer, of San Diego County, questioned: "It is stated here that we have a right to take life under the law, and it is admitted on all hands that it is a cruel punishment. I want to ask the gentleman if it deters from the crime of murder. Does the fact that we have the right, and that that law is carried out in many instances, deter people from committing that crime of murder? Not at all." (Id p. 245.) Not all delegates agreed, however, that the death penalty was cruel.
FN 24. 3 Hittell, supra, pages 274, 277-278.
FN 26. See footnotes 17 and 18, supra.
FN 27. 1 Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (1971) 41-43 (hereinafter "Schwartz").
FN 28. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning (1969) 57 Cal.L.Rev. 839.
FN 29. Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 1788, in 2 Schwartz, supra, at page 799. "What has distinguished our ancestors?--That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of ... torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. ... We are then lost and undone."
FN 30. Massachusetts Convention Debates, 1788, in 2 Schwartz, supra, at pages 690-691. "They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline."
FN 31. 2 Schwartz, supra, pages 1053, 1112.
FN 32. See footnote 18, supra.
FN 33. Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have abolished capital punishment. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, Bulletin No. 45 (August 1969) Capital Punishment 1930-1968 page 30 (hereinafter "NPS Bulletin No. 45").
FN 34. NPS Bulletin No. 45, supra, page 7.
FN 36. See, Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Cal.L.Rev. 1268, 1341, supra; Hearings on Senate Bill 1760 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 20, 21 and July 2, 1968 (Published by G.P.O. 1970) page 21.
FN 37. The median elapsed time prisoners now awaiting execution in California had been imprisoned as of the end of 1968 was 20.7 months. The national median elapsed time was then 33.3 months. The California figures do not take into account prisoners who were awaiting execution at that time but who have since had their sentences commuted, judgments reversed, or have been removed from death row for other reasons. As of December 31, 1968, the median elapsed time condemned prisoners then on death row had been awaiting execution was 23.7 months. (NPS Bulletin No. 45, supra, p. 27.) There were a total of 104 persons under sentence of death in California as of December 31, 1971. Of these, two prisoners have been on death row since 1964, five since 1965, and seven since 1966. Eight were received there in 1967, fifteen in 1968, and thirteen in 1969. Thirty-four were received in 1970 and the remaining twenty in 1971.
FN 38. See e.g., Hearings on Senate Bill 1, before the California Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1960) page 9 (1 Sen. J. Appendix (1961)); Hearings on Senate Bill 1760 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 20, 21 and July 2, 1968 (Published by G.P.O. 1760 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comzine (No. 2) 84.
FN 39. See, e.g., European Commission on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, The Death Penalty in European Countries (1962) pages 45-46; Massachusetts Special Commission Established for the Purpose of Investigating and Studying the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Capital Cases, House Report No. 2575 (1958) at page 44; Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Capital Punishment, Staff Report No. 46 (1961) at pages 43-47; Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report (1953) paragraph 65, at page 23; Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital Punishment, Problems of the Death Penalty and its Administration in California, 20 Assembly Interim Committee Report No. 3 (1955-1957) at pages 27-30; Bedau, The Question of Deterrence, in The Death Penalty in America 264-265 (H. Bedau ed. 1964 [hereinafter "Bedau"]); Graves, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in California, in Bedau, supra, at page 322; Savitz, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment in Philadelphia, in Bedau, supra, at page 315; Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty (1952) 284 Annals 54, 62; Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in Capital Punishment 135 (T. Sellin ed. 1967 [hereinafter "Sellin"]).
FN 41. McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator (1964) 28 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 11, 12. In 1967 there were 88 first degree murder convictions in California and 17 death sentences. (Crime & Delinquency in Cal. 1967 (Bureau of Crim. Statistics Rep. 1968) p. 140; NPS Bulletin No. 42 (1968).) During 1969 there were 87 first degree murder convictions and 8 death sentences. (Crime & Delinquency in Cal. 1969 (Bureau of Crim. Statistics Rep. 1970) p. 121.) The ratio of death sentences to first degree murder convictions does not adequately reflect the uncertainty of imposition of capital punishment, however. This uncertainty is better exemplified by the rarity of the death sentence in California in relation to the total number of wilful homicides. In 1969 California experienced a record 1,376 wilful homicides. (Crime and Delinquency in Cal. 1970 (Bureau of Crim. Statistics Rep. 1971) p. 5.) In 1970 there were 1,359 wilful homicides. (Ibid.) There were 1,790 arrests in 1969 and 1,807 arrests in 1970 for all categories of homicide. (Crime & Delinquency in Cal. -- Crime and Arrests 1970 (Reference Tables, Bureau of Crim. Statistics 1971) p. 5.) Yet, in all of 1969, 1970 and 1971 a total of only 67 persons were sentenced to death.
FN 42. Death from natural causes, suicide, and insanity (Pen. Code, § 3704). During the period 1965-1971, 60 percent or 66 death penalty appeals resulted in reversals of the entire judgment or of the penalty. In addition, 19 extraordinary writs were granted setting aside the penalty or the entire conviction and requiring new trials or further proceedings for each defendant.
FN 43. NPS Bulletin No. 45, supra, pages 8-9.
FN 44. Sources for this table are: United Nations, Secretary-General's Note, supra; Ancel, The Death Penalty in European Countries (Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems 1962); Joyce, Capital Punishment: A World View (1961); University of Coimbra, Faculty of Law, Pena do Morte (1967); Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective (1965) 56 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 397, 405. Included among the abolitionist jurisdictions are nine which retained capital punishment for certain extraordinary civil offenses (Canada, Israel, Nepal, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Australian jurisdictions); eight which permit it under military law or in wartime (Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), of which two executed Nazi collaborators after the Second World War (Netherlands and Norway). Belgium executed one soldier in 1918.
The dates shown are those of de jure abolition except for Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, and Surinam, in which the date represents that of the last execution and the beginning of de facto abolition, with the exception of Luxembourg which had one later execution.
The Canadian statute abolishing capital punishment for murder expires five years from the date of its enactment if not renewed.
FN 45. Inasmuch as today's decision is fully retroactive, any prisoner now under a sentence of death, the judgment as to which is final, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court inviting that court to modify its judgment to provide for the appropriate alternative punishment of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without possibility of parole specified by statute for the crime for which he was sentenced to death. Petitions should be filed in the court of territorial jurisdiction in the first instance and transferred by that court to the sentencing court in the event the court with territorial jurisdiction was not the sentencing court.
The issue of the right to bail in cases in which the law has heretofore provided for the death penalty has been raised for the first time by the People and amici curiae on petition for rehearing. Although this question was never an issue in this case, we deem it appropriate to note that article I, section 6, of the California Constitution and section 1270 of the Penal Code, dealing with the subject of bail, refer to a category of offenses for which the punishment of death could be imposed and bail should be denied under certain circumstances. The law thus determined the gravity of such offenses both for the purpose of fixing bail before trial and for imposing punishment after conviction. Those offenses, of course, remain the same but under the decision in this case punishment by death cannot constitutionally be exacted. The underlying gravity of those offenses endures and the determination of their gravity for the purpose of bail continues unaffected by this decision. Accordingly, to subserve such purpose and subject to our future consideration of this issue in an appropriate proceeding, we hold that they remain as offenses for which bail should be denied in conformity with article I, section 6, of the Constitution and Penal Code section 1270 when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great.
FN 1. In my opinion, the fact that for thousands of years death has been accepted as a proper punishment for the most serious criminal offenses indicates that it is neither a cruel punishment (when effected by means such as those used in this state) nor an unusual punishment.
In the Holy Bible, it is stated: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man." (Genesis, ch. 9, v. 6.) The foregoing quotation shows that the death penalty has long been regarded by us and our predecessors as an appropriate punishment for a person who commits murder.
FN 3. As aptly pointed out by Professor Zoll in the conclusion of his article: "Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquility and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a ... necessary, if limited, factor in that maintenance of social tranquility and ought to be retained on this groundTo do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival."


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The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court of California’s judgment on whether the beginning guitar riff of Led Zeppelin’s ‘Stairway to Heaven’ violated the copyright of Spirit’s single ‘Taurus’, and has remanded the case for a new trial.
If the new trial’s ruling goes in favor of Mr. Skidmore, there may be a fear that the result could cause musicians to be afraid to express their creativity and take inspiration from other bands because it may lead to future litigation. This fear may be unwarranted because there is no way of telling if the results of high-profile copyright litigation have had any effect on copyright infringement accusations. This year, the Ninth Circuit ruled on another high-profile copyright infringement case regarding the Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams song, ‘Blurred Lines’ and the Marvin Gaye song, ‘Got to Give It Up’. In that case, the court ruled in favor of Marvin Gaye, stating that the jury’s verdict that the song ‘Blurred Lines’ infringed on ‘Got to Give It Up’ was valid and was “not against the clear weight of evidence.” There is no way of knowing if copyright infringement accusations have increased since the decision of William v. Gaye, but even if there is an increase in allegations, it does not necessarily mean an increase in copyright litigation. However, if the Led Zeppelin retrial goes in favor of Mr. Skidmore, it may cause musicians to be more careful when creating music to avoid being the center of a high profile case. A favorable outcome for Mr. Skidmore, along with the ruling in favor of Mr. Gaye will show a pattern of how the courts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, are likely to rule in copyright litigation.
 Dina Regine, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/divadivadina/465006376/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, Nos. 16-56057, 16-56287, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27680, at *44 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2018).
 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 1442461, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
 Matt Diehl, Led Zeppelin’s ‘Stairway’ Verdict: Inside the Courtroom on Trial’s Last Day, Rolling Stone (June 23, 2016, 8:41 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/led-zeppelin-stairway-verdict-inside-the-courtroom-on-trials-last-day-122522/.
 Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *1, *2.
 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, Nos. 16-56057, 16-56287, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27680, at *12, *29 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2018).
 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
 Lisa Field, Copyright Infringement And Musical Expression: Creating Specific Jury Instructions For Comparing Music, 38 T. Jefferson 152, 160-61 (2016) (defining protected element of work).
 See generally, Oliver Herzfeld, Spirit v. Led Zeppelin: Analysis Of The “Stairway to Heaven” Infringement Lawsuit, Forbes (May 21, 2014, 1:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2014/05/21/spirit-v-led-zeppelin-analysis-of-the-stairway-to-heaven-infringement-lawsuit/#684fa7411aa2.
 Keith Harris, What Happens If Led Zeppelin Lose the ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Trial?, Rolling Stone (June 22, 2016, 5:19 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/what-happens-if-led-zeppelin-lose-the-stairway-to-heaven-trial-224866/.
 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
 Id. at 1127(“[N]early every bar of “Blurred Lines” contains an area of similarity to “Got To Give It Up.”. . . [Experts] testified to multiple other areas of extrinsic similarity including the songs’ signature phrases, hooks, bass melodies, word painting, the placement of the rap and “parlando” sections, and structural similarites on a section and phrasing level.”).
 Harris, supra note 15, at 3.

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§ 1 Legal status of the commercial agent The commercial agent acts as district representative in order to represent the company in the district of…………………… The Company’s right to act in this district itself or through third parties remains unaffected. The exact delimitation of this district is given in the enclosed map attached to this contract (Annex …). Changes concerning the representative district require a supplement to this contract signed by both parties to be effective. The representation covers all products of the company that are currently part of their production and sales program. The Company is required to list in an appendix to this Agreement all customers with whom it had a continuing business relationship in the last 12 months prior to the commencement of the Agreement. The entire customer base existing in the Representation District at the time this Agreement will be taken over by the commercial agent for further support.
§ 2 Obligations of the Commercial Agent The commercial agent has the task to mediate / conclude sales transactions in the name and for the account of the company in the assigned representative district. He has to take care of the interests of the company with the diligence of a proper businessman and to do his utmost to increase sales. He has to cultivate the business relations with the potential customers of the enterprise and process sales orders for them systematically. The sales representative is / is not entitled to collection. The commercial agent shall promptly notify the company in case of any business brokerage / transaction and notify the company in case of initiation of a new business by sending copies of correspondence or file notes thereof. The sales representative also has to give the company the required updates once a month. At the request of the company, the commercial agent is obliged to provide specific information. The commercial agent is obliged to keep a customer file or to set up an electronic customer file and always keep it up to date. The commercial agent is required to monitor the creditworthiness of existing or potential customers as much as possible and to support the company’s ability to pay. Doubts about the creditworthiness of an existing or potential customer must be reported to the company without delay. The commercial agent has no obligations against the credit report service.
The commercial agent agrees to protect the company’s trade and business secrets and to keep the related documents and the commercial agent relationships not accessible to third parties. The commercial agent must keep confidential all those information acquired during the term of the contract, business transactions and internal, especially confidential matters, even after the end of the contract. The representation is personally transferred to the commercial agent. He is not entitled to transfer the commercial agency to a third party without the express consent of the company or to tacitly accept a commercial representation by a third party; however, he is entitled to employee auxiliary persons to carry out his commercial agency work. If the sole proprietorship of the commercial agent passes into other hands, this does not lead to an automatic transfer of the commercial agency contract to the new owner due to the lack of explicit consent of the representative.The same applies if the commercial agent, as contracting party of this agency agreement, converts his sole proprietorship into a company. In such cases, the contractual relationship will not automatically be transferred to the company without the express consent of the company owners.The commercial agent is entitled to sign agreements with subcontractors or travelling employers, whom he wishes to use as subcontractors to fulfill his contractual obligations.
§ 3 Obligations of the Company The company must use its best endeavors to assist the commercial agent in carrying out its activities and to provide it with the necessary documentation and information at all times. In exercising its right to issue, the company must take into account the independent position of the commercial agent. The necessary information includes everything that is essential for the activity and remuneration claims of the commercial agent (e.g. changes in products, prices or terms of business, special advertising measures). The company agrees to punctually inform the sales representative of any changes in the business, work overload, manufacturing or raw material difficulties etc., so that the sales representative can adapt to the respective circumstances with regard to his placement or conclusion. The company must provide the sales representative with the documents required for the performance of his / her activity (samples, drawings, price lists, printed matter, terms of business and … etc.) free of charge, in each case supplementing and keeping them up to date. These documents remain property of the company, as far as they are used as it is not intended.The company always has to provide the commercial agent with the necessary news and information. The company must promptly notify the commercial agent in case of acceptance or rejection of a mediated business or in case of complete or partial failure of a concluded transaction and the reasons for the non-execution. The company must inform the commercial agent without delay if it can or will probably conclude business only to a much lesser extent than the sales representative could expect under normal circumstances. The legal consequences of the total or partial non-execution are determined under Section 6 of this agreement.Copies of the correspondence kept with district-related customers or interested parties must be sent to the sales representative immediately; the sales representative has to be immediately informed on facts regarding negotiations and planned transactions with district-related customers or prospects, which are conducted with the consent of the commercial agent or without his participation.According to paragraph 1, the commercial agent has to be punctually informed about a planned cooperation or mergers with other companies or intended sales or decommissioning of the company so that his business dispositions – in particular with regard to the exercise of his right of termination – will not be affected.
§ 4 Transaction subject to commission The commercial agent has a commission entitlement for all transactions mediated / concluded by him for all district business transactions within the meaning of Section 87 (2) of the German Commercial Code HGB and for all transactions that occur without his direct involvement with third parties those have been customers for similar kinds of business. Prerequisite for the commission claim is that the business transaction takes place without regard to the time of the execution of the business by the entrepreneur during the existing agency contract. For trades arising after the termination of this Agreement, the Agent is entitled to commission only if he arranges, initiates or prepares the transaction so that the transaction is predominantly due to his activity and the business within a reasonable time is concluded after termination of the contractual relationship or if the offer of the customer to conclude the respective business before the end of the agency agreement has been received by the company. The commercial agent also does not acquire a commission claim for such transactions for which a predecessor can claim commissions in accordance with § 87 (3) HGB.
If a transaction with a new customer is not attributable to the sole activity of the sales representative but has been co-created by other commercial agents, the commission claim is to be divided pro rata. This distribution depends in particular on the extent of the contribution made by the respective party to the transaction. Whether a division is to be made and in what proportion the commission is to be divided, is decided by the company in its sole discretion after consulting the representatives involved, taking into account the conflicting interests and avoiding legal recourses, unless the parties agree on the division of the commission.The commission claim of the commercial agent arises as unconditional claim, as soon and as far as the company has carried out the commissionable transactions. In the case of pre-delivery duty of the customer, the right to commission arises already if and as far as the customer satisfies his pre-payment obligation.
§ 5 Commission The commission paid to the commercial agent for all commissionable transactions (referred to in Section 4 of this agreement) is …%. On this commission, the statutory VAT is added and owed, as the sales representative is subject to VAT.The commission calculation is based on the net invoice amount (invoice value excluding VAT), less all price reductions granted by the entrepreneur or used by the customer. Cash discounts are not deductible. The same applies to incidental costs (e.g. for freight, postage, customs, taxes etc.), unless the additional costs are billed separately to the customer.The commission rates and calculation bases for commission calculation mentioned in the preceding paragraphs can only be changed by way of contractual agreements.
§ 6 Elimination of the Commission Claim In the event of the complete or partial non-execution of a concluded transaction, the right to claim the commission shall only lapse if and insofar as this is based on circumstances for which the entrepreneur is not responsible.The commission entitlement is also waived if it is established that the customer does not pay; it diminishes if the customer only partially performs. If a certain amount of money has already been paid, the sales representative has to repay the company.An obligation of the company to assert and enforce the claim for performance against the customer exists only if this measure offers the prospect of success. In other cases, the company is only required to enforce the claim on request of the commercial agent and if it appropriately participates in the costs of the proceedings.
§ 7 Commission Settlement The Company must settle the commissions due to the Agent for each calendar month, no later than the 10th of the following month. In the commission statement, those claims (net commission) which have arisen as unconditional claims until the end of the previous month as a result of the execution of the business are to be collected by the company. In the commission statement, advance payments made must be taken into account; In the commission statement the VAT deducted on the commissions have to be shown separately.The commission claim is due at the end of the billing month.
§ 9 Sickness/Holiday leave of the Commercial AgentIf in case of illness or for other reasons, the commercial agent is exempt from his business duties for more than one week, he shall inform the company without delay. In the event of a sick-leave longer than one week, the entrepreneur is entitled to act on his own behalf or can be represented by other sales representative in the district of the commercial agent, unless the sales representative ensures the care of his customers by means of a suitable substitute. If the sick-leave of the commercial agent excess 4 weeks of permit, the activity of the company or third parties in the district must not result in a reduction of the commissions due to the commercial agent. Insofar as the commercial agent does not provide a suitable substitute, he must pay for the proven costs (salary, travel expenses etc.) of a substitute provided by the company; he must pay up to 50% of the commission claims incurred during this period during the interruption of the activity. However, this rule only applies to the period from the 5th week to the expiration of 6 months since the beginning of the sick-leave. At the end of the 6th month, a further discussion of the situation has to be considered. The commercial agent is obliged to coordinate his holiday with the company at least 6 weeks before the start of your holiday season. The same applies with regard to other temporary interruptions of activity.
§ 10 Competition Agreements The commercial agent will operate for the companies listed in the Appendix…..in the mentioned activities from the entry into force of this agreement. The commercial agent shall notify the company immediately in case any changes or addition to the product / delivery program of other companies will occur. If, by supplementing and / or changing the product / delivery program, these representatives become competitors to the company, the commercial agent is obliged to immediately take distances from the competitor. During the term of the contract, the commercial agent is obliged to refrain from any competition activity against the company. It is only entitled, with the express written consent of the company, to take over representations for other enterprises, to participate directly or indirectly in another companies or to support another company itself, provided that the other company manufactures and / or distributes products and / or other offers services that are the same or similar to those of the company. If the commercial agent also wants to take over the representation of a company that does not manufacture or sell the same or similar products, he shall accordingly inform the company.The commercial agent hereby undertakes to refrain from any commercial activity within the contract territory within the meaning of Section 1 (1) of this agreement with regard to the products and services mentioned in Section 1 (3) for a competitor for a period of 2 years after termination of the contract. This obligation covers employment as well as self-employment (such as a sales representative or authorized dealer). The commercial agent is also prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in a competitor during the specified period. For the period of validity of the post-contractual non-competition clause, the company pays the sales representative a competitive compensation, which is subsequently payable monthly. The compensation shall be 50% of the monthly remuneration, calculated on the basis of the average of the last 3 years – in the case of a shorter contract period during this period – in favor of the commercial agent.
§ 11 Contract period, Termination The contractual relationship begins on …. The parties agree on in an indefinite period of time.The agreement may be signed by either party for a period of one month in the first year of the agreement, two months in the second year, three months in the third to fifth year, and six months thereafter at the end of a calendar month be terminated. The mutual right of termination for good cause remains unaffected.The termination must be presented in written form. Upon termination of the contract, the commercial agent must return the documents, the customer records and any other material provided by the company to him at the beginning or during the contractual relationship, within 14 days, unless otherwise used as intended, as well as all other for the maintenance and operation of the business necessary information.
All claims arising from this contract become time-barred twelve months after the claimant becomes aware of the alleged infringement. However, for a claim regarding Section 89b HGB, this twelve-month limitation period does not commence until the one-year period of application has expired (Section 89b (4) sentence 2) HGB). Excluded from the abovementioned regulations for shortening the limitation period are claims which may not be restricted by mandatory statutory provisions, e.g. of claims from liability for intentional acts under § 202 BGB.
Exclusive local jurisdiction for disputes arising out of this Agreement is the location of the Company.
Subsidiary agreements to this contract are not existent. Contractual supplements must be presented in written form in order to be valid and must be signed by both contracting parties. This formal requirement can be waived only by written agreement.
If this section of the contract does not contain a point that needs to be regulated, the statutory provisions of sections 84 et seq. HGB and the principles developed by the case law will apply.
The nullity of a provision of this contract does not lead to the nullity of the entire contract. The void provision shall be replaced by an agreement which comes closest to the purpose of the contract and the will of the contracting parties.
This contract concerns investments….that are integral parts of this contract.
This contract is made in duplicate. Each party has received a copy signed by the other party.
Note: An English translation is provided herein for mutual convenience. In the case of any dispute or discrepancy between the German and English texts, the German text shall be taken as most correct.


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Complainant is Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. f/k/a Merck & Co., Inc. of Rahway, New Jersey, United States of America, represented by Lowenstein Sandler PC, United States of America.
Respondent is Zhangxianqiong of BaZhong, SiChuan, China.
The disputed domain names <merck-sun.com>, <mercksun.com>, <sun-merck.com>, <sunmerck.com> (the “Domain Names”) are registered with Guangzhou Ming Yang Information Technology Co., Ltd.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on November 2, 2011. On November 2, 2011, the Center transmitted by email to Guangzhou Ming Yang Information Technology Co., Ltd. a request for registrar verification in connection with the Domain Names. On November 3, 2011, Guangzhou Ming Yang Information Technology Co., Ltd transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. On November 3, 2011, the Center transmitted an email communication to the parties in both Chinese and English regarding the language of the proceedings. On November 4, 2011, Complainant confirmed its request that English be the language of the proceedings. Respondent did not comment on the language of the proceedings by the specified due date.
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on November 9, 2011. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was November 29, 2011. Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified Respondent’s default on November 30, 2011.
The Center appointed Yijun Tian as the sole panelist in this matter on December 6, 2011. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
Complainant, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. f/k/a Merck & Co., Inc. is a company incorporated in Rahway, New Jersey, United States of America. It is one of world largest pharmaceutical companies and has over 100,000 employees worldwide.
Complainant is the registered owner of numerous trademarks consisting or including the word “Merck” (MERCK Marks) throughout the world, including 15 trademark registrations in the U.S. (see Exhibit 4 to the Complaint) and approximately 400 trademark registrations incorporating the MERCK Marks in other countries (Exhibit 5 to the Complaint).
The MERCK Marks (e.g. the word mark MERCK was registered in the U.S. on February 15, 1916) was registered long before the registration of the Domain Names (2011). Complainant has also registered over 700 top-level and country code domain names incorporating the MERCK Marks, such as <merck.com>, <merck.biz> and <merck.us> (Exhibit 6 to the Complaint).
Respondent registered the Domain Names <merck-sun.com>, <mercksun.com>, <sun-merck.com>, <sunmerck.com> on April 11, 2011, which is long after Complainant operated websites with URL which contain the MERCK Marks (i.e. <merck.com> was registered on December 9, 19921 ).
MERCK is a well-known and famous brand for pharmaceutical products.
The four Domain Names are virtually identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s famous MERCK Marks. The only difference is that each of the Domain Name adds the word “sun” and in two cases a dash.
The word “sun” is a reference to Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, the Company with which Complainant announced the creation of a joint venture in the same month that Respondent registered the Domain Names. The word “sun” is therefore descriptive of that joint venture.
The addition of the “.com” gTLD does not remove the confusing similarity between the Domain Names and MERCK Marks.
Respondent cannot demonstrate any legitimate interests in the Domain Names.
Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Names.
Respondent has been granted no license or other rights to use Complainant’s MERCK Marks as part of any domain name or for any other purpose. Complainant is in no way associated or affiliated with Respondent.
Respondent is not making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the Domain Names, and is not using any of the Domain Names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
Respondent currently uses the Domain Names as landing pages stating that “This domain is for sale” and provide contact information for potential buyers interested in purchasing the Domain Names. (See Exhibit 7 to the Complaint).
Bad faith is found when “it appears more likely than not from the evidence offered by Complainant that Respondent has registered the domain name in a deliberate attempt to attract users to its planned website for commercial gain due to confusion with Complainant’s mark”. This is exactly the case here.
The use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark, in order to drive traffic to a website and generate revenue, is evidence of bad faith pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of the Policy. This is true whether these efforts consist of an attempt to capitalize on initial interest confusion.
The unauthorized use of Complainant’s trademark for the purpose of selling the Domain Names constitutes bad faith under paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and (iv) of the Policy. This is a classic case of initial-interest confusion.
The registration of a domain name incorporating a widely recognized mark is itself evidence of bad faith registration. Respondent’s registration of the Domain Names is prima facie evidence of such bad faith.
Respondent has no authorization from Complainant to use Complainant’s famous MERCK Marks.
Respondent has had years of constructive notice of Complainant’s registered trademarks, under U.S. Law 15 U.S.C. S1072.
(a) As in the cited cases, the majority of the content featured on Respondent’s websites is in the English language. Respondent’s websites also include English language copyright notices. (See Exhibit 7 to the Complaint).
(b) Respondent has also demonstrated its fluency in English through its English language communication to Complainant. (See Exhibit A to the Language Request). Respondent took it upon himself to contact Complainant and knew full well to initiate such contact in English.
(c) It is apparent from the fluent English displayed on Respondent’s websites and in Respondent’s e-mail communication that Respondent is sufficiently capable of communicating in English. Further, Respondent was adequately familiar with English to target a U.S.-based company and register the four Domain Names, each of which includes MERCK Marks in its entirety.
(d) Complainant is not in a position to participate in these proceedings in Chinese without a great deal of additional expense, burden and delay should translation be required. Given the circumstances of this proceeding, the balance of hardship lies in favor of Complainant.
WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition (the “WIPO Overview 2.0”) further states: “in certain situations, where Respondent can apparently understand the language of the complaint (or having been given a fair chance to object has not done so), and Complainant would be unfairly disadvantaged by being forced to translate, the WIPO Centre as a provider may accept the language of the complaint, even if it is different from the language of the registration agreement”. (WIPO Overview 2.0, paragraph 4.3; see also L’Oreal S.A. v. MUNHYUNJA, WIPO Case No. D2003-0585).
The Panel has taken into consideration the facts that Complainant is a company incorporated in the U.A., and Complainant will be spared the burden of dealing with Chinese as the language of the proceeding. The Panel has also taken into consideration the facts that the Domain Names include English word “sun” (Expoconsult B.V. trading as CMP Information v. Roc Guan, WIPO Case No. D2008-1600; Compagnie Gervais Danone v. Xiaole Zhang, WIPO Case No. D2008-1047).
On the record, Respondent appears to be a Chinese individual and is thus presumably not a native English speaker, but the Panel finds that persuasive evidence in the present proceeding to suggest that Respondent may have sufficient knowledge of English. In particular, the Panel notes that, based on the evidence provided by Complainant, (a) the Domain Names <merck-sun.com>, <mercksun.com>, <sun-merck.com>, <sunmerck.com> are registered in Latin characters and particularly in English language, rather than Chinese script; (b) English has been displayed on Respondent’s websites (See Exhibit 7 to the Complaint) and in Respondent’s e-mail communication that Respondent is sufficiently capable of communicating in English. (See Exhibit A to the Language Request); (d) the Center has notified Respondent of the proceedings in both Chinese and English, and Respondent has indicated no objection to Complainant’s request that English be the language of the proceeding; (e) the Center informed Respondent that it would accept a Response in either English or Chinese.
The Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the MERCK Marks acquired through registration. The MERCK Marks have been registered worldwide including China (registration in China since December 1988; See Exhibit 7 to the Complaint) and it has a widespread reputation in pharmaceutical industry worldwide.
The Domain Names <merck-sun.com>, <mercksun.com>, <sun-merck.com>, <sunmerck.com> comprise the MERCK Marks in its entirety. The Domain Names <merck-sun.com> and <sun-merck.com> only differs from the MERCK Marks by the addition of “-” and the word “sun”. The Domain Names <mercksun.com> and <sunmerck.com> only differs from the MERCK Mark by the addition of the English word “sun”. The Panel finds that these do not eliminate the similarity between Complainant’s registered MERCK Marks and the Domain Names.
Mere addition of the descriptive term “sun” or a dash to Complainant’s MERCK Marks fails to distinguish. Thus, the Panel finds that the additions are not sufficient to negate the confusing similarity between the Domain Names and the MERCK Marks in which Complainant has rights.
(iii) legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Domain Names.
The overall burden of proof on this element rests with Complainant. However, it is well established by previous UDRP panel decisions that once a complainant establishes a prima facie case that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the burden of production shifts to respondent to rebut complainant’s contentions. If respondent fails to do so, a complainant is deemed to have satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy. (Danzas Holding AG, DHL Operations B.V. v. Ma Shikai, WIPO Case No. D2008-0441; see also WIPO Overview 2.0, paragraph 2.1 and cases cited therein).
Complainant has rights in the MERCK Marks throughout the world, including 15 trademark registrations in the US (since 1916; see Exhibit 4 to the Complaint) and approximately 400 trademark registrations in other countries (Exhibit 5 to the Complaint). Complainant has also registered over 700 top-level and country code domain names incorporating the MERCK Marks (Exhibit 6 to the Complaint). According to the information provided by Complainant, as one of world largest pharmaceutical companies, it has over 100,000 employees worldwide.
Moreover, according to Complainant, Respondent is not an authorized dealers of MERCK-branded products. Complainant has therefore established a prima facie case that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names and thereby shifted the burden to Respondent to produce evidence to rebut this presumption (The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, supra; Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0624; and Croatia Airlines d.d. v. Modern Empire Internet Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2003-0455).
(b) There has been no evidence adduced to show that Respondent has been commonly known by the Domain Names. There has been no evidence adduced to show that Respondent has any registered trademark rights with respect to the Domain Names. The four Domain Names were all registered on April 11, 2011, which are long after Complainant operated websites with URL which contain the MERCK marks (e.g. <merck.com> was registered on December 9, 1992.2 The Domain Names are identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s MERCK Marks.
The Panel finds that Respondents have failed to produce any evidence to establish rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names. The Panel therefore holds that the Complaint fulfils the second condition of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.
(iv) by using the Domain Names, Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s websites or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondent’s websites or locations or products.
The Panel finds that Complainant has a widespread reputation in the MERCK Marks with regard to its products. Complainant has registered its MERCK Marks throughout the world (in the U.S. since 1916), including China (since 1988). Based on the information provided by Complainant, as one of world largest pharmaceutical companies, it has over 100,000 employees worldwide. It is not conceivable that Respondent would not have had actual notice of Complainant’s trademark rights at the time of the registration of the Domain Names (in March 2011). The Panel therefore finds that the Domain Names are not one that one could legitimately adopt other than for the purpose of creating an impression of an association with Complainant. (The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, supra).
Thus, the Panel concludes that the Domain Names were registered in bad faith with the intent to create an impression of an association with Complainant’s MERCK Marks.
Complainant has adduced evidence to prove that by using the confusingly similar Domain Names, Respondent has “intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’ websites”. Complainant claimed that Respondent currently uses the Domain Names as landing pages stating that “This domain is for sale” and provide contact information for potential buyers interested in purchasing the Domain Names. (See Exhibit 7 to the Complaint).
Given the widespread reputation of the MERCK Marks, the Panel finds that the public is likely to be confused into thinking that the Domain Names have a connection with Complainant, contrary to the fact. There is a strong likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the websites to which the Domain Names are resolved. In other words, Respondent has through the use of the confusingly similar Domain Names created a likelihood of confusion with the MERCK Marks. Noting also that apparently no clarification as to Respondent’ relationship to Complainant is made on the homepages of the Domain Names, potential partners and end users are led to believe that the Domain Names are either Complainant’s sites or the sites of official authorized partners of Complainant, which they are not. Moreover, Respondent did not respond formally to the Complaint. The Panel therefore concludes that the Domain Names were used by Respondent in bad faith.
In summary, Respondent, by choosing to register and use Domain Names, which are confusingly similar to Complainant’s well-known MERCK Marks, intended to ride on the goodwill of Complainant’s trademarks in an attempt to exploit, for commercial gain, Internet users destined for Complainant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and rebuttal from Respondent, the choice of the Domain Names and the conduct of Respondent as far as the websites to which the Domain Names resolve are indicative of registration and use of the Domain Names in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Domain Names <merck-sun.com>, <mercksun.com>, <sun-merck.com>, <sunmerck.com> be transferred to Complainant.


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We propose theoretically and verify experimentally a method of using electrically tunable liquid crystal q-plate and wave plate for generating arbitrary vector vortex beams on a hybrid-order Poincaré sphere (HyOPS). The generated vector vortex beam is verified and shows decent agreement with the prediction. This method brings many advantages, such as high conversion efficiency, good electrical controllability, and integration. This system can provide fundamental optical system support for various structured beam applications.
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Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of the HyOPS.
Fig. 2 (a). The system to generate arbitrary vector vortex beams. (b). The system to measure the relationship between retardation and the voltage across the cell.
Fig. 3 The relationship between the parameter and the voltage. Cell information: spacer: 4 μm, photoalignment material: 0.5% SD1, LC material: 5CB.
Fig. 4 Experiment setup for the patterned photo-alignment.
Fig. 5 Polarization and intensity distribution of the theoretical and experimental results of vector vortex beams (The left pictures of each points are theoretical results).
Table 1 Applied voltages and spherical coordinates in the HyOPS of each case shown in Fig. 5.
(6) |ψ〉= 2 2 ( e ^ x +iσ e ^ y )exp( ilφ ).
(8) |ψ〉=cos δ 2 2 2 ( e ^ x +iσ e ^ y )exp( ilφ )+sin δ 2 ( e ^ x −iσ e ^ y ) ×exp( imφ )exp[ i( 2σ α 0 − π 2 ) ]exp(iΓ) .
(11) s 3 = I( −45°,0° )−I( 45°,0° ) I( −45°,0° )+I( 45°,0° ) .
Applied voltages and spherical coordinates in the HyOPS of each case shown in Fig. 5.

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It is because of the sincere efforts of His Excellency, Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji the Vedic University was established. He, soon after assuming charge as the Governor of Andhra Pradesh in January, 2006, desired to know the status of the functioning of the Vedic University at Tirupati which was expected to be established according to the decision taken by the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams Board in 1992. Having found that the said University was not established, His Excellency the then Governor of Andhra Pradesh interacted with various stake holders including Vedic Scholars, the Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and other experts on this subject. The Executive Officer, T.T.D took steps to set up a Vedic University with the Ministry of HRD, the Government of A.P and various experts. This matter was referred to the Board of TTD on 10.03.2006 and the Board under the Chairmanship of Shri T. Subbi Rami Reddy resolved "to pursue action on the earlier resolution of TIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS Board to establish the Vedic University at Tirupati" and to come up with necessary proposals.
The Executive Officer, TTD as a first step held a meeting on 15.04.2006 to discuss the modalities for establishment of the Vedic University. The meeting was duly attended by eminent Vedic scholars, including the Principal of S. V. Veda Pathasala. This meeting listed out the following essential provisions that have to be kept in mind while deciding on various options enlisted for the structure of the proposed University.
The University should be absolutely an integral part of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and all special provisions applicable for TTD shall become applicable to the Vedic University..
Provision for teachers who have been trained in their respective areas only through traditional education such as Ghanapathis.
As the posts of Vedapandits / Archakas are treated as unique posts in the TTD Establishment, the faculty of proposed University who are responsible in producing such Vedaparayanamdars etc. should also be treated as unique posts.
The proposed University will be dealing with subjects, which are purely traditional. As per tradition, there are certain restrictions on choice of studies. (For e.g. Training in Vaikhanasa and Pancharatra Agamas is restricted to only Vaikhanasa and Pancharatrins as per the tradition.) Provision must be made in the new University to uphold such traditional conventions.
During his visit to Tirumala on 19.04.2006, His Excellency Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, the then Governor of A.P. suggested to the Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams to associate the following experts for deliberations on the establishment of the Vedic University.
Prof. Vachaspati Upadhyaya, Vice-Chancellor, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Sanskrit Vidya Peeth, and Member Secretary, Ved Vidya Pratishtan, New Delhi and President, All India Vice-Chancellor�s Conference.
Dr. V. R. Panchamukhi, Chancellor, Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati.
Prof. Rama Ranjan Mukherjee, Vedic Scholar & Ex-Chancellor and President of Sri Sri Sitaramdas Omkarnath Sanskrit Siksha Samsad, Kolkata.
Prof. Hare Krishna Satapathi, Vice-Chancellor, Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupathi.
Prof. V. N. Jha, Ex. Director, CASS, Pune University, Pune.
The Executive Officer, T.T.D constituted a High Powered Working Group on 19.04.2006 with the following scholars to work out and formulate the modalities to establish a Vedic University at Tirumala under the aegis of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams.
Prof. V. R. Panchamukhi, Chancellor, RSVP, Tirupati Chairman.
Prof. Vachaspati Upadhyaya, Vice-Chancellor, Lal Bahadur Sastry Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, New Delhi.
Prof. Ramaranjan Mukherji, Former Chancellor, R. S. Vidyapeetha, Tirupati.
Sri Kalanidhi Satyanarayana Murthy, Legal Advisor, A. P. State Election Commission, Secunderabad.
Prof. V. Kutumba Sastry, Vice-Chancellor, Rashtriya Sanskrit Samsthan, New Delhi.
Mr. M. G. Gopal, I.A.S., Secretary to Governor, Hyderabad.
After several meetings, the High Powered Working Group recommended the establishment of a Vedic University under a State Act to be sponsored and funded by Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams. A copy of the draft report and the draft Act have been sent to the Executive Officer, T.T.D.
The Report of the High Powered Working Group was presented to Sri Pinnamaneni Venkateswara Rao, Hon'ble Minister for Higher Education on 21.05.2006 at 11.00 AM at the office of the A. P. State Council of Higher Education in the meeting fixed by the A. P. State Council of Higher Education and chaired by the Hon'ble Minister for Higher Education, Prof. K. C. Reddy, Chairman, A. P. State Council of Higher Education and Shri Asutosh Mishra, I.A.S., Principal Secretary, Higher Education interalia, were also present in the meeting in addition to Shri A.P.V.N. Sharma, I.A.S., the then Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams. A copy of the Report was also submitted to Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, His Excellency the then Governor of Andhra Pradesh on 21.05.2006 at 4.30 PM in Raj Bhavan in the presence of Shri A.P.V.N. Sharma, I.A.S., the then Executive Officer, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams.
Dr. K. C. Reddy, Chairman, Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher Education, Sri P. Venkateswara Rao, Minister for Higher Education and Sri Asutosh Mishra, I.A.S., Principal Secretary to Government, Higher Education Department called on His Excellency the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on 08.06.2006. The Principal Secretary, Higher Education appraised to His Excellency the Governor about the Chief Minister's direction regarding promulgation of an Ordinance for setting up of Sri Venkateswara Vedic University at Tirupati.
The State Government circulated the file duly approved by the Minister for Higher Education and the Chief Minister for promulgation of Ordinance to set up Sri Venkateswara Vedic University on 12th July, 2006,and His Excellency, Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, the then Governor of Andhra Pradesh has promulgated the Ordinance on the forenoon of the same day.
As the appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the University can be taken up by following due procedure prescribed and it will take time. Sri Balaramaiah, I.A.S., the then Joint Executive Officer, T.T.D., was appointed as the Officer on Special Duty in addition to his duties as Joint Eecutive Officer to carry out the activities relating to the proposed Sri Venkateswara Vedic University.
On 22nd July, 2006, His Excellency Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, the then Governor of Andhra Pradesh and the CHANCELLOR accompanied by the First Lady lighted the lamp to mark the inauguration of the courses at Sri Venkateswara Vedic University, at Dharmagiri. On this occasion, S. V. Veda Pathasala arranged a brief invocation function, in which Sri J. C. Diwakar Reddy, Honourable Minister for Panchayat Raj and Endowments, Members of the High Powered Committee, Sri A.P.V.N. Sharma, I.A.S., the then Executive Officer, T.T.D., Sri Balaramaiah, I.A.S., the then J.E.O., T.T.D., and O.S.D., S. V. Vedic University, Prof. Ramaranjan Mukherji, the students and teachers of the Pathasala and other invitees participated. This followed performance of Pooja and lighting of lamp by His Excellency, the Governor at the Administrative Block located temporarily at Purandara Das Complex, Tirupati. Two Sastra Pandits of S.V. Vedapatasala, Dharmagiri, Tirumala Sri K.V.N.Krishna Prasad and Sri M.Venkatacharyulu were deputed to S.V.V.U.to work as Asst. Registrars.
His Excellency Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, the then Governor of A.P. and the Chancellor in his discussions with OSD on 13.07.2006, made it clear that the Vedic University should have sufficient land on which its campus can be developed. Atleast, an extent of 300 acres is necessary to cater the present needs of the University. The OSD promised that a chunk of 300-00 acres would be made available to Vedic University by TTD. Accordingly, the TTD took necessary steps and in the first phase 147.65 acres of land was allotted near Alipiri, down the hill.
In all the activities conducive to the establishment of the Vedic University, Shri M. G. Gopal, I.A.S., Secretary to His Excellency, the Governor of A. P., took an active part. At every stage of inception, he played a key role and paved the way to bring in the shape of Sri Venkateswara Vedic University as envisaged by His Excellency. He continues to co-operate as and when required, in the matters of Sri Venkateswara Vedic University.
Superseding the Ordinance, a bill for the establishment of Vedic University was passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly and it received the assent of the Governor on 12.09.2006. The Act No.29 of 2006 was first published on 15.09.2006 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette for general information.
Under partial fulfillment of the promise, to provide land to the Vedic University, the TTD, allotted 147.65 acres of land near Alipiri, Tirupati. The G.O.Ms.No.1892 Revenue (Endowments III) Department, dt.18.12.2006 was issued to this effect by Dr. I. V. Subba Rao, Secretary, Revenue (Endowments) Department, Govt. of A.P.
Subsequently, His Excellency Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, enquired about the balance of land to be allotted to Vedic University, when Sri B. Karunakara Reddy the chairman and Sri K.V. Ramanachari, I.A.S., E.O. called him at Raj Bhavan. The TTD authorities took immediate steps and issued orders allotting 152.35 acres of land to Vedic University to make it a full extent of 300.00 acres through the proceedings in Roc. No. Prop 1/8577/AEO (Prop)/06, dt.11.06.2007.
The Experts Committee constituted to finalize the appointment of first Vice-Chancellor of S.V.Vedic University met on 01.12.2006 at Tirupati and recommended the name of Prof. Sannidhanam Sudarsana Sarma for appointment as the First Vice-Chancellor of the University and the TTD Trust Board under the chairmanship of Sri B. Karunakara Reddy accepted it. His Excellency Shri Rameshwar Thakur Ji, the then Governor and Chancellor of Sri Venkateswara Vedic University, Tirupati approved it The Government has notified the appointment of Prof.Sannidhanam Sudarsana Sarma, First Vice-Chancellor of Sri Venkateswara Vedic University vide G.O.Ms.No.1932 Revenue (Endowments.III) Department, dt.28.12.2006.
Sri Venkateswara Vedic University has its head quarters located at Tirupati and it shall establish campuses at such other places as it may deem fit within the State of Andhra Pradesh in India. The University is a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the said corporate name. The activities of the University cover teaching, research, publication and allied fields. It is a residential and affiliating University, which consists of a CHANCELLOR, a Vice-Chancellor, an Executive Council and an Academic Council.
Copyright © 2008 svvedicuniversity.ac.in All rights reserved.

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