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After petitioner had been subjected to many hours of day-and-night questioning by police officers as a murder suspect, a state-employed psychiatrist with considerable knowledge of hypnosis was introduced to him as a "doctor" brought to give him medical relief from a painful sinus. By skillful and suggestive questioning, threats and promises, the psychiatrist obtained a confession. At petitioner's first trial in a New York state court, that confession was admitted in evidence and he was convicted; but the State Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the confession was coerced. At petitioner's second trial, that confession was not used to convict him; but other confessions made the same evening were used. The issue as to the "voluntariness" of these later confessions was submitted to the jury and petitioner was again convicted. Held: The use of confessions extracted in such a manner from a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not consistent with the due process of law required by the Constitution, and a Federal District Court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus is reversed. Pp. 556-562.
Osmond K. Fraenkel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Frederick W. Scholem.
William I. Siegel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward S. Silver.
Camilo Leyra, age 75, and his wife, age 80, were found dead in their Brooklyn apartment. Several days later petitioner, their son, age 50, was indicted in a state court [347 U.S. 556, 557] charged with having murdered them with a hammer. He was convicted and sentenced to death, chiefly on several alleged confessions of guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that one of the confessions, made to a state-employed psychiatrist, had been extorted from petitioner by coercion and promises of leniency in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 302 N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553. Petitioner was then tried again. This time the invalidated confession was not used to convict him but several other confessions that followed it the same day were used. Petitioner objected to the admission of these other confessions on the ground that they were also coerced, but the trial court submitted to the jury the question of their "voluntariness." The jury convicted and the death sentence now before us was imposed. 2 The New York Court of Appeals, holding that there was evidence to support a finding that the confessions used were free from the coercive influences of the one previously given the psychiatrist, affirmed, Judge Fuld and the late Chief Judge Loughran dissenting. 304 N. Y. 468, 108 N. E. 2d 673. We denied certiorari. 345 U.S. 918 . Petitioner then filed this habeas corpus proceeding in a United States District Court, charging that the confessions used against him had been coerced, depriving him of due process of law. The District Court properly gave consideration to the petition, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 , but denied it. 113 F. Supp. 556. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, Judge Frank dissenting. 208 F.2d 605. Petitioner then sought review [347 U.S. 556, 558] in this Court, again urging that he was denied due process on the ground that his confessions to a police captain and to two assistant state prosecutors were forced. We granted certiorari because the constitutional question appeared substantial. 347 U.S. 926 .
The use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by coercion - whether physical or mental - is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The question for our decision is therefore whether the present confessions were so coerced. This question can only be answered by reviewing the circumstances surrounding the confessions. We therefore examine the circumstances as shown by the undisputed facts of this case.
When the father failed to appear at his place of business on Tuesday, January 10, 1950, petitioner, his business partner, and others went to the father's apartment about 3 p. m. and found the bodies of the aged parents. Police were called. Although they first suspected a prowling intruder, the presence on the couple's disarranged breakfast table of a third teacup led them to think that the killer was a welcome guest. This and other circumstances drew suspicion toward petitioner. He and others were questioned by the police until about 11 p. m. on the evening of the day the bodies were discovered. On Wednesday, police again questioned petitioner from about 10 in the morning to midnight. Once more, beginning [347 U.S. 556, 559] about 9 Thursday morning petitioner was subjected to almost constant police questioning throughout the day and much of the night until about 8:30 Friday morning. At that time petitioner was taken by police to his parents' funeral. While petitioner was at the funeral and until he returned in the late afternoon, Captain Meenahan, his chief police questioner, went home to get some "rest." After the funeral petitioner himself was permitted to go to a hotel and sleep an hour and a half. He was returned to the police station about 5 p. m. on this Friday afternoon. During his absence a concealed microphone had been installed with wire connections to another room in which the state prosecutor, the police, and possibly some others were stationed to overhear what petitioner might say. Up to this time he had not confessed to the crime.
The petitioner had been suffering from an acutely painful attack of sinus and Captain Meenahan had promised to get a physician to help him. When petitioner returned to the questioning room after the funeral, Captain Meenahan introduced him to "Dr. Helfand," supposedly to give petitioner medical relief. Dr. Helfand, however, was not a general practitioner but a psychiatrist with considerable knowledge of hypnosis. Petitioner was left with Dr. Helfand while Captain Meenahan joined the state District Attorney in the nearby listening room. Instead of giving petitioner the medical advice and treatment he expected, the psychiatrist by subtle and suggestive questions simply continued the police effort of the past days and nights to induce petitioner to admit his guilt. For an hour and a half or more the techniques of a highly trained psychiatrist were used to break petitioner's will in order to get him to say he had murdered his parents. Time and time and time again the psychiatrist told petitioner how much he wanted to and could help him, how bad it would be for petitioner if he did not [347 U.S. 556, 560] confess, and how much better he would feel, and how much lighter and easier it would be on him if he would just unbosom himself to the doctor. Yet the doctor was at that very time the paid representative of the state whose prosecuting officials were listening in on every threat made and every promise of leniency given.
A tape recording of the psychiatric examination was made and a transcription of the tape was read into the record of this case. To show exactly what transpired we attach rather lengthy excerpts from that transcription as an appendix, post, p. 562. The petitioner's answers indicate a mind dazed and bewildered. Time after time the petitioner complained about how tired and how sleepy he was and how he could not think. On occasion after occasion the doctor told petitioner either to open his eyes or to shut his eyes. Apparently many of petitioner's answers were barely audible. On occasions the doctor informed petitioner that his lips were moving but no sound could be heard. Many times petitioner was asked to speak louder. As time went on, the record indicates that petitioner began to accept suggestions of the psychiatrist. For instance, Dr. Helfand suggested that petitioner had hit his parents with a hammer and after some minutes petitioner agreed that must have been the weapon.
Finally, after an hour and a half or longer, petitioner, encouraged by the doctor's assurances that he had done no moral wrong and would be let off easily, called for Captain Meenahan. The captain immediately appeared. It was then that the confession was given to him which was admitted against petitioner in this trial. Immediately following this confession to Captain Meenahan, petitioner's business partner was called from an adjoining room. The police had apparently brought the business partner there to have him talk to petitioner at an opportune moment. Petitioner repeated to his partner in a very brief way some of the things he had told the psychiatrist [347 U.S. 556, 561] and the captain. Following this, petitioner was questioned by the two assistant state prosecutors. What purports to be his formal confession was taken down by their stenographer, with a notation that it was given at 10 p. m., several hours after the psychiatrist took petitioner in charge.
It was error for the court below to affirm the District Court's denial of petitioner's application for habeas corpus.
Excerpts from the transcript of the questioning of petitioner by Dr. Max Helfand, a psychiatrist, at the 88th precinct on January 13, 1950.
"Q. What do they call you for short? A. Buddy."
"Q. How old are you about? A. Fifty."
"Q. Are you married? A. Yes, sir."
"Q. Buddy, will you tell me something about yourself. I'll tell you what the purpose of my talk to you is. I want to see if I can help you. A. Yes, Doctor."
"Q. I know you are in a little trouble. We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a fit of temper or anger we sometimes do things that we aren't really responsible for. I want to see whether or not you did something but which you've done in a fit of temper or anger. Do you understand me? A. Yes."
"Q. Will you tell me something about yourself. What kind of a boy are you? Do you have a lot of friends? A. Yes, I have."
"Q. I can't hear you. A. Yes, I have; and I am very tired. I had two hours sleep. Just now they woke me up. That's since Tuesday. Well, there were questions, after questions, after questions, by the thousands."
"Q. Do you know we sometimes feel tired if we have something on our mind. It's what we call mental tension."
"Q. Do you know we sometimes feel tired if we have something on our mind. It's what we call mental tension. If you talk to me and open up, you're going to feel relieved. Speak up and tell me. Do you have a lot of friends? A. Yes, I have a lot of friends."
"Q. Do you sometimes get into arguments with them? A. No, not as a rule. The first time I was surprised. I always considered myself an even tempered fellow - sociable. It's my sinus. It's bothering me something terrible. It got so in the last year or so. It got worse and worse and worse."
"Q. That made you nervous, didn't it? A. I didn't particularly notice it. For the past two years, my average of work has been about over a hundred hours each week of work for two years. No vacation or anything like that. The first time was anybody noticed it was about - let's see - it's about two weeks ago I went to the doctor with my father."
"Q. I see. A. My sinus was bothering me so bad I use to have to stop work during the day."
"Q. What was the matter with you father? A. Dad had a heart attack a couple of years ago, but I went for myself."
"Q. Your father was a nervous man too, wasn't he? A. Yes, but I went for myself. I didn't think I ever was high strung. I thought I was the opposite. I thought I was pretty calm."
"Q. Your father was high strung? A. Yes."
"Q. Fly off the handle quickly? A. Yes. So I went to the doctor and he examined my sinus. He took the [347 U.S. 556, 564] blood pressure. So he said to me, "When did you go to your doctor?" That was - today is Friday - one week back. The Tuesday of that week. It's ten or 11 days."
"Q. You went with your father? A. With my father."
"Q. Did he give you any treatments? A. Yeah, he examined my sinus."
"Q. Did he tell you to come back? A. No, he sent me down to have X-rays taken. When he examined me, he put the lights up here."
"Q. You didn't have any appointment with the doctor after your visit? Did he tell you to come back? A. Oh, yes. He sent me down to have a set of X-rays made. We had the X-rays made. Then I called the doctor and he said it was a very bad case of sinus. It wasn't something new. It was for many years back, and he said there was a lot of scar tissue there, and he asked me could I come right out. That was last Saturday. So Saturday night, I worked. That was my busiest night of the week. So I told him I wouldn't like to come on Saturday, so he said he doesn't have any patients on Sunday, could I come Monday. Monday, unfortunately, I had to work all alone, so I told him I'd make it Tuesday night. So he said, "You come over Tuesday. I'll be able to do something to stop those pains." So we made the appointment for Tuesday night at six o'clock."
"Q. For you? A. Yes, and he was going to open those - "
"Q. Not for your father? A. No, for myself. My father was with me. He was to go with me on this Tuesday also."
"Q. Why? Did your doctor tell you to bring your father? A. No, he didn't tell me to bring him."
"Q. Why was your father going with you? A. He wanted to go with me. He wanted to see if something couldn't be done to stop those pains. He said, "Lie down [347 U.S. 556, 565] and close my eyes and see if I could stop the beating up there."
"Q. When the pain got so bad, didn't you get nervous?"
"A. Yes, I guess I did. That was the first time anyone ever told me that I was ill. When the doctor took my blood pressure, he said, "You're very irritable." And I said, "I didn't think so." He told me, he said, "You're going to have to - you can't work day and night. It's too much." He said, "You got to slow down."
"Q. I want you to recollect and tell me everything. I am - "
"Q. - (continued) - going to make you remember and recollect back and bring back thoughts - thoughts which you think you might have forgotten. I can make you recollect them. It's entirely to your benefit to recollect them because, you see, you're a nervous boy. You got irritable and you might have got in a fit of temper. Tell me, I am here to help you. A. I wish you could, Doctor."
"Q. I am going to put my hand on your forehead, and as I put my hand on your forehead, you are going to bring back all these thoughts that are coming to your mind. I am going to keep my hand on your forehead and I am going to ask you questions, and now you will be able to tell me. What happened Monday night? Where did you sleep? A. Last Monday night?"
"Q. That's right. A. I worked Monday night."
"Q. After you worked, where did you sleep? Where did you go to sleep? A. To the apartment of 10th Street."
"Q. What time did you sleep to, or get up in the morning? A. She got up about 6:30."
"Q. Well, after she left the house, then you couldn't sleep. Then you got dressed? Your thoughts are coming back to you. Answer me. Come on, you can answer [347 U.S. 556, 566] me. You couldn't go back to bed. You didn't go back to bed. After she left, you got dressed, didn't you? A. Yes, I got dressed."
"Q. What did you do after you got dressed? Come on, now. Your thoughts are coming back to you. Come on. Come on, answer me. A. I went to Brooklyn."
"Q. You went to Brooklyn. Where did you go to Brooklyn? A. To my mother's house."
"Q. To your mother's house. When you came to your mother - now, all your thoughts are beginning to clear up. Now, everything is clear in your mind. You came to your mother. Who opened the door? A. My mother."
"Q. What did you say? A. I said, "Hello, Teddy."
"Q. All right. Now, you are in your house. Your thoughts are coming back to you right away. A. Doctor, can I have a drink of water, my mouth is very dry."
"Q. A drink of water? I'll get you a drink of water. A. (Pause)."
"Q. All right. O.K. now? A. My mouth is dry. I'm not thirsty. Just my mouth is dry. I'm not thirsty."
"Q. Concentrate and look at me. Now you came home. Your mother met you at the door. You said, `Hello, Teddy,' right? A. That's right."
"Q. What did she say to you? A. She said take off my coat, it's all wet."
"Q. What did you do? A. I took the coat off."
"Q. Now, you are back in your apartment, see. Your thoughts are clear now. What did you do after you took off your raincoat? A. She told me, "Come and have some tea."
"Q. She told you what? A. `Come and have a cup of tea. It will warm you up.'"
"Q. Where was Dad sitting? A. At the end of the table."
"Q. Where did you sit down? A. Between them."
"Q. Between whom? A. Mom and Pop."
"Q. Between Mom and Pop? A. That's right."
"Q. Where was Mom sitting? A. Next to the kitchen sink."
"Q. You were sitting between Mom and Pop, right? A. That's right."
"Q. What did you do then? A. I sat down."
"Q. Yeah, what did you do? What did you do when you sat down. Come on, speak up. Don't be afraid now. We're with you? We're going to help you. You're going to feel lots better after you talk to me. A. Gee, I hope so."
"Q. I can't hear you? A. The argument started all over again."
"Q. The argument with your father? A. Yes."
"Q. Did your mother argue with you, too? A. No."
"Q. What was the argument about? A. The business - his business."
"Q. Whose business? A. Our business."
"Q. What did you father tell you - speak up. A. He told me both of us didn't care whether his business was good or bad. I told him our business was getting prosperous."
"Q. What did you say about that? A. He told me it wasn't so."
"Q. Was it a violent argument? Did your father lose his temper? A. Yes, it got more heated."
"Q. As it got more heated, what happened then? Don't be afraid, speak up. Come on, we'll help you. A. He argued more and more."
"Q. You argued more and more. Then what? A. I told him, `Pop, why don't you stay home? Be satisfied. [347 U.S. 556, 568] Our business is getting good. You don't have to work this way.'"
"Q. Yes. A. He says, `I'm going to work. I'm going to have my own business.' He says, "I'd rather make a stinking dollar than make it from somebody else.' So my mother started to get into the argument."
"Q. What did she say? A. She told him, `Why don't you stay home. Why don't you do what your son says.'"
"Q. Go ahead, speak up. A. I'm trying to think, Doctor."
"Q. It's coming all clear to you now. I've got my hand on you. I'll make you think back. All your thoughts are coming back to you. Did your father hit you? A. No."
"Q. What happened next? Speak up. It's coming clear now. You will feel lots better after you tell me. It's all in a fit of argument. Speak up. Speak up. It's coming clear to you. I have my hand on your head. What did you do? Come on. A. I told him that we weren't going to let him work anymore."
"Q. Then? A. That he would be so much better off letting us take care of it. Twenty-five per cent we would give him from our business would be better than his own."
"Q. That's right. Go ahead. Come on, you're going to feel lots better. We're with you one hundred per cent. Then what happened? A. He said he wouldn't take it."
"Q. That's right. A. That we were traitors to him. He said my partner was a louse; that he took his hundred dollars a week and he didn't do anything for it."
"Q. Yes. A. It was like robbing him of a hundred a week."
"Q. That's right, speak up. A. My mother interfered and said, `Bill was a nice fellow and a hard working fellow.' [347 U.S. 556, 569] He said, `I'm the boss.' He told my mother, `You shut up.' He told my mother, `Go sit down.' He pushed her in the chair."
"Q. He pushed her in the chair? A. Yes."
"Q. That's the time you lost your temper? A. No."
"Q. Go ahead, what happened? A. I told him `Pop, think it over. We're silly to argue. It will do us no good.' He said, `Finish your damn tea. I'm going out and get my paper.'"
"Q. Yes. A. He says, `We'll go to the bank,' and he says, `I'll go to Broadway and pick up the box tops and you'll go back and you'll all get out of this place;' and he says, `If your mother agrees with you, she can go with you.'"
"Q. Yes. A. So he went out."
"Q. Did he put his coat on? A. Yes."
"Q. He went out? A. Yes."
"Q. So then what happened? A. Mom said, `Don't get excited.'"
"Q. You were very excited? A. Yes."
"Q. Go ahead. Come on. Tell me what happened then. Come on, now, speak up. You're going to feel lots better. We're with you a hundred per cent. Come on. Come on, we'll help you. A. I can't Doc."
"Q. Yes, you can. All these thoughts are coming back to you. I have my hand on your head. When your father went out, your mother talked to you. Then what happened? What did you do to your mother. Come on. Speak up. Come on. All these thoughts are coming to you now. A. I can't think."
"Q. Sure you can. Look at me. Open your eyes. Now you know what happened. Look at me. I know you know what happened. A. I can't think."
"Q. Sure you can. Come on now. Don't be afraid. Your conscience will be clear. God will be with you, and everybody will help you if you tell the truth. Everybody [347 U.S. 556, 570] will help you, but nobody likes a liar, not even God. Come on now. Tell the truth. A. I can't think."
"Q. Your father went for the paper; then you hit your mother, didn't you? With what did you hit - with a hammer? Your thoughts are coming back to you. What did you use to hit your mother with? A. I loved my mother."
"Q. I know you did. You lost your temper. Don't be afraid. A lot of people do things that they are not responsible for while in a fit of temper. You see? A. My mother was the only thing in the world."
"Q. That's right. What did you hit her with? Come on, now. Speak up. A. I was so mad."
"Q. You were very mad. A. I said he's not going to treat my mother this way. He killed my brother."
"Q. Yes. He killed - A. My brother would have lived many years. The way my father made him work - "
"Q. That's right. A. I said he's not going to kill my mother and he's not going to kill me. The only way we can stop him. He's got to be stopped. He can't be the boss."
"Q. Go ahead. He's got to be stopped, you said. So? A. My mother always said she wanted to be with him."
"Q. Yes. A. Doc, I can't take it."
"Q. Come on, yes, you can. Speak up. So you thought it would be the right thing to do what? Come on. You started - "
"Q. (continued) now. Speak up. Everybody will help you. You're a nice fellow. You're a man now. You don't want to be a coward. Everybody will help you. You were excited. You did it in a fit of anger. A. I was never a coward."
"Q. I can't hear you. A. I was never a coward."
"Q. Sure you can. Speak up now. A. I can't."
"Q. Look at me. Look at me. A. Yes, Doc."
"Q. Your thoughts are coming into you. Don't be afraid Buddy. We're all with you one hundred per cent. We'll help you. We'll help you every way possible. I'm your doctor. I'm going to help you. A. I hope you can."
"Q. I know I can. If you will be honest with me, I'll help you. Everybody thinks a lot of you. You're a nice man. A. Doctor, can I have some water, please."
"Q. Sure have some water. A. Yes, sir."
"Q. Come on, take some more water. A. I'm not thirsty. It's just my mouth is dry."
"Q. That's because you're nervous, you see. Your conscience is bothering you. After you tell me and tell me the truth, then you will feel relieved. We're all with you one hundred per cent. Then you will be fine. Now, let me put my hand on your forehead again. A. It hurts so."
"Q. Sure you can think. Only cowards can't think. You aren't a coward. You can speak up. You know - you know what you did. Come on now. Come on. I have my hand on your forehead and your thoughts are coming back to you. Come on now. Now, your thoughts are coming back to you? A. No, Doc, they don't.
"Q. They're coming back to you. Concentrate on what I say. They're coming right in again. Your mother said - you said he had to be stopped. What did you do? A. I don't know, Doc."
"Q. You know you hit your mother first. You hit your mother on the head. Speak up. What did you do? A. I don't know, Doctor."
"Q. Yes, you do. Speak up, now. Speak up. See, I can make you talk very truly. I can give you an injection [347 U.S. 556, 572] now. It's much better if you tell it to me this way. Come on, now, speak up. A. I can't think, Doctor."
"Q. Just relax and concentrate and listen to me. Speak up. What did you say? You had his what? You had his what? What about your hand back? A. It's all confused."
"Q. Sure it's confused because you don't want to think. You are fighting. You have a conscience. As soon as you talk to me your conscience will be relieved. See, you show tension now. You're pale; your mouth is dry. You have a conflict. As soon as you talk to me everything will be relieved. You are going to feel lots better. Come on. A. Doc, I'm trying to think."
"Q. I'm trying to help you if you tell me the truth. I am on your side. I am going to help you all I can. Come on, now, Buddy. Be a nice fellow. Put your hand here. All right. Tell me what happened. Come on. Tell me what happened. Your father went away, and you said he had to be stopped. What did you take. What did you take in your hand? Speak up, Buddy. I can't hear you. Don't be afraid now. A. I'm not afraid, Doc."
"Q. Don't be afraid. We're all with you. We want to help you. A. I'm not afraid."
"Q. I can't hear you. Speak up. A. I'm not afraid, Doc. I'm not afraid, Doc. I want you to help me."
"Q. Did you finish your tea? A. I finished the tea."
"Q. You finished the tea. So what happened then? What did you do to your mother? Concentrate - just close your eyes and concentrate. A. I can't.
"Q. All right, Buddy, you can think now. Your head is all clear now. Try and get it clear. A. It's not clear."
"Q. Just relax now and everything will come back to you. You know what happened. Everybody - I mean, these people know what happened. It's much better for you to come clean and play ball. Everybody thinks you [347 U.S. 556, 573] are trying to hide something." "A. I don't want to hide anything."
"Q. Then speak up and tell me. You told me so far - you know you did it - you were in there. Did your mother start a fight with you? A. No."
"Q. Did she continue the argument? A. No, my mother was in agreement with me."
"Q. But you had a little argument about going with your father, is that what you said? A. No."
"Q. What then? A. I said, "Mom, if he don't stop, I'll kill him."
"Q. I didn't hear that. What did you say? A. I told her, I said, "Mom, if he don't stop the arguments with me, I'll kill him."
"Q. What did she say? A. So she said, "Calm down. Here, take a drink of water." So I said, "Just wait until he comes back. We'll finish this once and for all."
"Q. So. A. So she said, "Here, take a drink of water."
"Q. Go ahead. I'm with you. Don't be afraid. So. Speak up. So, what did you do then. Now, you know what you did. You've got a story on your mind. Come on. You can speak now. Come on, Buddy, speak." "A. Doc, I'm trying so hard."
"Q. I know you're trying. I'm trying with you because you're a nice fellow. A. I just can't think."
"Q. All right, get to the part where you said, "I'll kill him." So then what happened. You waited until he came back. Come on. A. Doc, I can't."
"Q. Speak up, I can't hear you. All right, what did your mother say when you said, "When he comes back, I'll kill him." What did your mother say? Did you take a drink of water? I can't hear you. A. I don't remember."
"Q. Now, you think. All your thoughts will come back to you. Just think. Just relax. All your thoughts will come back to you. I have my hand on your head. Your thoughts are coming back to you. It's much better for you. You will get along much better and you will feel better. I can't hear you. What did you say? A. Will I ever feel better."
"Q. You will if you tell me the truth. You won't if you don't. You may as well tell us and we'll work with you. We'll play ball with you. We'll help you if we can. It will make you feel better. Come on, now, speak up. You told your mother, "Wait until he comes back. I'll kill him." "A. She said, `Here take a drink of water.' Doc, I can't remember."
"Q. Sure you can. Open your eyes. Don't say you can't. Just look at me. A. I just don't remember."
"Q. Sure you can. A. No, I can't think, Doctor."
"Q. Buddy, it doesn't help you if you say you can't think when you know you did it, so you may as well tell us and get our help. If you don't tell us and get our help, I'll wash my hands of you. All right, close your eyes and think hard. Just close your eyes now and your thoughts will come back to you. All your thoughts are coming back to you. You're a nice fellow and you're excited; and in a fit of temper you said you were going to kill him when he comes back. What did your mother do? Did she try to hold you? A. No."
"Q. I can't hear you. Did she hold you? A. No."
"Q. What did she do? A. She wanted to give me a drink of water. She took the cup and started to run the water."
"Q. She started what? A. She started to run the water."
"Q. I can't hear you? A. She was facing the sink."
"Q. So what did you do. Speak up. I'll positively help you if I can. I'm with you one hundred per cent. I'm going to help you. You're going to feel fine. Your conscience will be clear and everything will be fine. Don't hide anything. You did it in a fit of temper. Your mother went to the sink to give you some water. So you did what? You went up to her? A. I was standing there waiting for him to come back. I picked up the hammer."
"Q. You picked up the hammer? A. Yeah."
"Q. I didn't hear that. What did you say? A. I picked up the hammer."
"Q. Yes . . . say it. Say it. A. I said, `He killed my brother, he'll kill my mother, and he'll kill me'."
"Q. Yes. You picked up the hammer. Where was the hammer? A. It was on the dish closet."
"Q. On the dish closet? A. Yeah."
"Q. In what room? A. In the kitchen."
"Q. What kind of hammer was it? A. A big hammer."
"Q. Was it a carpenter's hammer? A. It was a big hammer."
"Q. A big hammer. You picked it up and then what? Don't be afraid. Say it. A. I can't, Doc."
"Q I'll help you, Buddy. I am with you one hundred per cent, but you got to play ball with me. You know she was standing by the sink. You got to tell me the truth. A. No, she wasn't standing."
"Q. What was she doing? A. She was sitting."
"Q. Your mother was sitting at the end of the table; Joe you will have to speak loudly, I can't hear you? A. I got up from the table."
"Q. And you took a drink of water and you held the hammer in your hand. What did you do then? A. I can't think any more what I did."
"Q. It will come back to you? A. Doc. can I see the results?"
"Q. I can't tell you how you think you killed her? A. I must have; who else could have."
"Q. I want you to recollect your thoughts; tell me all the details. I can make you talk? A. I tried for two days; this thing came last night. Everybody was asking me questions. It didn't do any good to ask me; I couldn't answer them."
"Q. That's right? A. Everybody was nice to me."
"Q. Everybody was nice to you? A. Yes."
"Q. Nobody hurt you, did they? A. No."
"Q. Nobody forced you to answer anything? A. No, I just can't remember."
"Q. Come I am holding my hand on your forehead; I am making your thoughts clear. You know exactly what happened? A. Doc. I can't think. I must have done it but how.
"Q. What did you say? A. I said I must have done it but how.
"Q. Did you have it in mind that your Mother would die with your Father because you always wanted it? A. She always said that.
"Q. She always said what? A. That she wanted to die with him.
"Q. You had it on your mind, didn't you? A. I don't know Doc.
"Q. Think and tell me; just think and tell me. A. She was just like a baby to me.
"Q. Just relax and your thoughts will come back to you because I have my hand on your forehead. Everything will be fine. If you tell us all the details we will know the whole story of what happened. You picked up the hammer and your Mother was sitting on the chair, you said, and you were standing at the sink? A. I was standing by the stove.
"Q. You were standing by the stove, excuse me I made a mistake. What did you do with the hammer, you swung it? A. I must have Doc. Nobody else could have done it.
"Q. Nobody else could have you say you must have swung it? A. I must have.
"Q. And your Mother fell down. How many times did you swing it. You must tell me that. How many times did you swing the hammer? A. I don't know Doctor.
"Q. Was it once or twice or three times? A. I don't know.
"Q. Were you angry with you Father? A. I was very angry with him.
"Q. And you felt that your Mother should die at the same time with your Father? A. I don't know.
"Q. What did you do then, when your Father came in. You heard him come up. What floor do you live on? A. Street floor; I was in the back.
"Q. And your Father opened the door to the apartment, when he came back with the paper? A. I don't know, Doctor.
"Q. Think, think. A. I don't know why, I can't think.
"Q. I am helping you to think, if you want to you can. There is only a question of wanting. A. I want to so bad.
"Q. If you want to you can because you know everything that happened. We know that you are a nice man and I am trying to help you. When your Father came back with the paper; now here you are, you are in the apartment and your Father came back with the paper? A. I can't remember, Doctor.
"Q. Sure you can. A. I don't remember, Doctor.
"Q. Sure you can; try hard. A. I thought sometimes last night. I told the Captain last night I can't remember. That I would have to remember.
"Q. Why do you have to remember? A. Because if I can't remember these things here, my own children may not be safe. I can't remember what happened; I don't know what happened. I can't think.
"Q. What do you think will happen to the children? A. I don't know; it worries me.
"Q. What do you think might happen to the children? A. I was there with a hammer in my hand I know it. I remember having a hammer in my hand.
"Q. Take your time and relax. Now open your eyes and look at me, just open your eyes - look at me your [347 U.S. 556, 579] thoughts will come back, look at me and concentrate. You said you were at the stove with the hammer in your right hand. You were very, very angry you said, right? A. I was never angry at my mother but my Father accused me.
"Q. Accuses you of what? A. That I was trying to put him out of business. The first day we went into the new business we gave him an equal share with us. (Noise) I knew for years that he killed my brother. My brother did the work of six men; he gave him a measly ten dollars a week. He'd sooner lose his son and stay in business so he could save the money and live with my mother.
"Q. Everybody is with you one hundred per cent. You were angry with your Father; you were never so angry like that in all your life? A. I can see what happened Doc but I can't remember.
"Q. I've got my hand on your forehead, your thoughts will come back to you, everything will be clear? A. Hold my temples Doc.
"Q. You say you want me to hold your temples. Now your thoughts are coming back, that's right. The pain was only a tension; it's nervousness. I'm trying to make you speak. I want you to speak up and I want you to tell me everything, now speak up. A. Do I have to?
"Q. Was the Captain good to you? A. He was wonderful.
"Q. Was I good to you? A. Everybody was good to me.
"Q. We are all trying to help you, we are all trying to help you. Your thoughts are coming into you. Now what happened next. You think and you tell me; where were you standing?
"Q. Just close your eyes and it will all come back to you. Just close your eyes and relax. A. I'm trying to Doc. I came back from the cemetery today. All the way down from the cemetery I tried to force myself to remember. I can't. (Noise) I'm trying to remember, how could I do this to my mother. I'm trying to remember.
"Q. I can understand that you loved your mother? A. My mother yes. I can't think. It's awful.
"Q. I can understand how you feel about your mother. A. They told me to rest. I took a good shower and I slept. I was very tired; I was tired, when I got up.
"Q. I can understand how you feel about your Mother. (Noise) You were never so angry in all your life as you were at that time. You told your Mother that you were waiting to kill him. You were waiting for him to come back with the paper. That is what you told me. I can understand that the anger was sufficient to kill your Father? A. Why my mother?
"Q. I don't know about your Mother but as far as your Father was concerned your thoughts were pretty clear, right? A. When he came back I said I was going to settle it once and for all.
"Q. Just take your time now. You were standing there with the hammer. Now your Father came back again? A. I don't remember.
"Q. Close your eyes and your thoughts will come back, relax. I am going to make your mind recollect everything. Your mind is getting clearer and clearer; all your thoughts are coming back now. Now they're coming back. Now your Father went for the paper; your Father came back. Now talk to me. Now your mind is clear. (Noise) Speak up and tell me. A. I can't remember him coming back.
"Q. Yes you can concentrate, just concentrate and you can see your Father come back now. How long did it take for him to get the paper? A. Oh, just a few minutes.
"Q. And in a few minutes, you heard him come in? A. I don't remember him coming in.
"Q. What did you do to your mother in the meantime? A. I don't know. If I could only think.
"Q. What do you think? Come, think, think. I want to tell you something. You are a smart fellow. I may as well be very frank with you. Everything does not alter the case for you. They are not going to work with you and I am not going to work with you if you don't help yourself. A. I want to help myself.
"Q. Now, you see all the details are there. You say yourself, you were the only one there. You say you must have done it? A. We talked this over for twelve hours.
"Q. But you didn't remember all the facts that you told me. Now your mind is clear. A. I can't remember how that happened.
"Q. If you tell us the details and come across like a good man, then we can help you. We know that morally you were just in anger. Morally, you are not to be condemned. Right? A. Right.
"Q. But you have to tell us the details, then we will know that you are above board and on the level. Otherwise, we just don't do nothing to you and you will get the worst of it. A. I can't remember. I must have done it. I don't deny that I did it.
"Q. You don't deny what? A. I don't deny that I did it. I must have done it.
"Q. You don't deny that you didn't do it, you mean?
A. No, I don't say I didn't do it. I know I did it.
"Q. You know you did it? A. Here is the proof of it.
"Q. Do you know you did it? A. I can't remember doing it. I know it happened. Look at my mother, the woman that I love most in the world. Look. How did it happen? I can't even remember. I can't remember him. I can't remember him coming back. Doctor, can anybody be this crazy?
"Q. That is not crazy, my friend. That is not crazy. When you don't remember anything, that is not crazy. If I forget that I owe somebody ten dollars, that doesn't mean that I am crazy. If you forget the incidents of this thing, that does not mean you are crazy. A. I didn't say it that way.
"Q. You said, `Can anybody be that crazy?' You are not crazy. A. I want to remember this thing. I have got to remember it.
"Q. This is what we call amnesia and in other words, a wish to forget because it is not pleasant. It does not mean that you are crazy. A. I didn't say that doctor. You misunderstood me.
"Q. You don't think you are crazy, do you? A. No, I hope not.
"Q. Do you think you might be crazy? A. No, I don't think so.
"Q. Of course not. You are not crazy. You are a nice fellow. I am willing to stay here with you and help you but you have got to help yourself. A. I have tried today for hours to recall from here on, from the time that my mother - I can recall everything. I did it last night. Here, it took hours to piece together things. I sat here. I was so confused that I didn't know whether I owned this suit. I didn't know whether I had a pair of shoes.
"Q. Everything is clear up to the point where you held the hammer in your hand? A. That's right but why can't I remember from there on?
"Q. If you will just stop for a minute, you will remember. And your thoughts will come into you. A. Doctor, I am exhausted, so please be patient.
"Q. I am patient. A. I appreciate that.
"Q. I will stay here with you all night, if you want to? A. The Captain and I last night, he was so patient. He waited for hours until these things came home.
"Q. For hours? A. I appreciate it.
"Q. Do you want me to wait? A. I told him that the last time. It's got to come back. I have been trying to remember all day.
"Q. Take your time. Just take your time. A. I am trying to remember.
"Q. You got a much better chance to play ball, (Then noise) than if you say you don't remember.
"Q. These people are going to throw the book at you unless you can show that in a fit of temper, you got so angry that you did it. Otherwise they toss premeditation in and it's premeditation. See?
"Q. Drink your coffee. Take your time. I got time. You got time. Just relax. Want some more coffee? A. I would like some hot coffee, doc. I would like to speak to the Captain.
"Q. To whom? A. To Captain Meenahan.
"Q. You would like to speak to him? You want me to call him? A. I wish you would.
"Q. Do you want me to come back? A. I don't know. He was awful good hunk last night.
"Q. Well, we were getting along very nicely. I am trying to straighten him out with his troubles. He seemed a little mixed-up. His mind is clear now. I made him concentrate. His mind is much clearer. You can take my seat, Captain. "Q. Can I speak to the Captain?"
[ Footnote 1 ] The confession was also held to have been in violation of state law and the state's due process clause.
[ Footnote 2 ] The death sentence was imposed under a conviction for first degree murder of the father. As to the death of his mother the jury found petitioner guilty of second degree murder which does not carry the death sentence. This second degree conviction is not before us.
[ Footnote 3 ] See, e. g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 . The above cases illustrate the settled view of this Court that coerced confessions cannot be admitted as evidence in criminal trials. Some members of the Court reach this conclusion because of their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the states the Fifth Amendment's ban against compulsory self-incrimination.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON join, dissenting.
This petitioner was charged with murdering his parents by beating the life out of them with a hammer. No one claims that he has a defense to the charge. It is contended, however, that his conviction was not obtained in accordance with due process of law.
He has already had two trials. His first conviction was appealed and reversed. The second one was appealed and affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari on a petition that set up the same constitutional questions now raised. Then habeas corpus proceedings were instituted [347 U.S. 556, 585] in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and relief was denied. That judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and is the one now here on certiorari.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the first conviction on the ground that a confession introduced in evidence at the trial was the result of mental coercion and hence involuntary. The threats, cajoling, and promises of leniency, utilized by Dr. Helfand, a psychiatrist called in by the District Attorney, to induce petitioner to confess were soundly condemned by that court. The confession thus obtained was held inadmissible for the purpose of proving petitioner's guilt. But petitioner's subsequent confessions to Captain Meenahan of the police, to the two assistant district attorneys, and to his business associate, Herrschaft, were not invalidated as a matter of law. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to submit to a jury under proper instructions the question whether the subsequent confessions resulted from or were influenced by the mental coercion which produced the Helfand confession.
The case was tried a second time, and the question of the voluntariness of the subsequent confessions was submitted to the jury under clear and ample instructions as to which petitioner raises no objection here. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder of the father, and a sentence of death was imposed.
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect one who has admitted his guilt because of forbidden inducements against the use at trial of his subsequent confessions under all possible circumstances. The admissibility of the later confession depends upon the same test - is it voluntary."
The only question before us is whether the effects of the coercion practiced by Dr. Helfand so clearly continued to influence petitioner's mind as to make unreasonable any conclusion other than that the later confessions were also coerced. If there was evidence to support contrary inferences as to the continuing effect of the coercive practices, the conviction should not be disturbed. It is not our function to set aside state court convictions on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 180 .
The evidence shows an involuntary confession to Dr. Helfand. * It was followed a few minutes later by a [347 U.S. 556, 587] confession to Captain Meenahan. Some half hour later petitioner confessed to a business associate, Herrschaft, saying, "Well, you know what it's all about; I did it." Herrschaft asked, "Do you mean that you killed your own mother and father?" and petitioner replied, "I did it." This confession was admitted in this Court to have been voluntarily made, and no complaint is made of its admission in evidence. Sandwiched in between the Meenahan confession and the confession to the assistant district attorneys some two and one-half hours later, the Herrschaft confession presents enough evidence in itself to go to the jury on whether these three confessions, one admitted to have been valid, were all given by petitioner voluntarily with the considered purpose of making a clean breast of the whole thing.
Nor was this the only evidence. Petitioner boldly examined Dr. Helfand, the State's witness, for the purpose, among others, of laying a foundation for the introduction of expert testimony by petitioner's psychiatrist that the effect of the coercion carried over to the later confessions. Petitioner's expert testified as expected. The State then placed on the stand another psychiatrist who gave the opposite opinion, based on evidence that petitioner in his later confessions gave details of the crime known only to him and gave them freely without urging. If this disagreement between experts did not under New York law [347 U.S. 556, 588] constitute a conflict in the evidence sufficient standing alone to go to the jury, there was other evidence, such as the Herrschaft confession, to be considered, together with the testimony of the assistant district attorneys that petitioner seemed quite normal and relaxed, and relieved to talk to them. As I said before, it is not our function to weigh the evidence. Whether there was any evidence to go to a jury is the question. In my opinion, there was a question of fact presented by the evidence.
"We cannot say that an inference of guilt based in part upon Lyons' [later] McAlester confession is so illogical and unreasonable as to deny the petitioner a fair trial." Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, at 605.
I cannot say here that the subsequent confessions as a matter of law were so completely under the influence of the first confession that to let a jury pass upon that influence as it affected the voluntariness of the later confessions amounts to a denial of due process of law. To let the jury pass upon this question is not so unfair to petitioner as to violate the fundamental principles of justice.
It is contended that the promises of leniency made by Dr. Helfand stand on a different footing; that once a promise is made, its effect must be presumed to continue until the promise is clearly withdrawn. But such has never been the law. See State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 313, 41 A. 820, 826. As in the case of other forms of coercion and inducement, once a promise of leniency is made a presumption arises that it continues to operate on the mind of the accused. But a showing of a variety of circumstances can overcome that presumption. The length of time elapsing between the promise and the confession, the apparent authority of the person making the promise, whether the confession is made to the same person [347 U.S. 556, 589] who offered leniency, and the explicitness and persuasiveness of the inducement are among the many factors to be weighed.
"But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."
"There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt - that discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment - if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free."
The careful, considerate, fair trial accorded petitioner is in keeping with the fundamental essentials of justice which are due process, and I would affirm.

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The article aims to associate the differences in the pattern of diversification with the differences in the pattern of innovation of the Brazilian industrial sectors. The neo-Schumpeterian literature advocates that the establishment of sectoral patterns of innovation influences the rates and directions of technological change in a distinctive way among sectors. This is an empirical study, based on the statistical information of the Innovation Survey (Pintec 2011) and the Central Register of Companies (Cempre 2010), to investigate the relationship between innovation and diversification, in order to contribute to the understanding of the sectoral patterns of diversification of the Brazilian industry. The statistical results suggest that the introduction of innovations to a large extent has led industries to concentrate their business lines on activities that have some ‘proximity’ in their production functions, independent of innovative activities. Notably, certain sectors, such as ‘science-based’ ones, assume typical behaviour of ‘diversification based on technological activities’.
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URRACA, A. I+D y recursos alternativos a la innovación en la industria española, Economía Industrial, n. 319, p. 91-104, 1998.
URRACA, A. Patrones sectoriales de cambio técnico en la industria española, Economía Industrial, n. 332, p. 99-108, 2000.
WERNERFELT, B. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, v. 5, n. 2, p. 171-180, 1984.

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C. J. THIBODEAUX & COMPANY and Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc., Defendants.
United States District Court S. D. Texas, Houston Division.
*136 Mandell & Wright, Arthur J. Mandell, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.
Eastham, Watson, Dale & Forney, Jon W. Montague, and Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Owen W. Cecil, Houston, Tex., for defendants.
1. On March 27, 1964, plaintiff, a Greek citizen, signed a contract of employment written in the Greek language, for service aboard the S. S. DANIEL *137 PIERCE as third engineer. The contract was signed in Piraeus, Greece, and specified in pertinent part that repatriation expenses were to be borne by the owner only after 18 months of service, and that special terms provided by the G.C.A. (Greek Collective Agreement) were applicable. (Pl.'s Exhibit 1). Under the G.C.A., contract disputes were to be litigated in Greek courts applying Greek law. (Def.'s Exhibit 2). The employment arrangements were handled by the agency of Lycoudi Brothers of Piraeus, Greece, through C. J. Thibodeaux & Company for Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc.
2. Although the contract which plaintiff signed indicated that C. J. Thibodeaux & Company was the owner of the vessel, the true owner of the DANIEL PIERCE was Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc.
3. C. J. Thibodeaux & Company was the United States General Agent for Panama-Florida, and never knowingly held itself out to be the owner of the DANIEL PIERCE. The court finds that plaintiff did not rely to his detriment on the mistaken impression that C. J. Thibodeaux & Company was the owner of the vessel; C. J. Thibodeaux & Company is not estopped to deny that it was not the owner. C. J. Thibodeaux & Company will not be liable for any wages or penalties to the plaintiff. The principal Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc. will be solely liable if any payments are hereafter determined to be due the plaintiff.
4. The DANIEL PIERCE flew the flag of Panama, and its owner, Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc., was incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Panama.
5. Fifty percent of the stock in Panama-Florida was owned by Thibodeaux, Inc., a United States corporation. The entire stock of Thibodeaux, Inc. was owned by defendant C. J. Thibodeaux & Company. The other fifty percent of the stock in Panama-Florida was owned by William Brooks, a citizen of the United States. The court finds that United States citizens were the beneficial owners of the DANIEL PIERCE.
6. Approximately ten to fifteen days after plaintiff signed the contract of employment, he was flown, at the shipowner's expense, to Houston, Texas. The day following his arrival in Houston, he joined the vessel in Galveston, Texas, and thence proceeded to Georgetown, British Guiana, and back to the United States. Several other trips, each of approximately one month's duration, from a United States port to a port in the Caribbean followed.
7. Due to a minor burn sustained aboard ship, and more importantly, to a stomach ailment, plaintiff signed off the ship on June 30, 1964, while the vessel was in port in Trinidad. A statement of account which indicated that he was due $301.50 in wages and overtime was prepared (Def.'s Exhibit 4), and plaintiff requested payment. He was instructed to sign the statement, which constituted a release, and to take it to the local agent for payment. Unknown to the plaintiff, the ship's master included a letter (Pl.'s Exhibit 3) addressed to the agent, informing them that since plaintiff had left the ship at his own request, he had breached his contract. The master instructed the agent to deduct any repatriation expenses from the amount due.
8. Plaintiff did not receive any of the wages due him, but was flown at company expense to Greece. He was employed and/or resided in Greece until approximately November of 1966, when he moved to New York. The present suit was filed soon thereafter.
9. Plaintiff reported the non-payment of his wages to the Greek and Panamanian Consulates in Trinidad soon after he was discharged from the ship (Pl.'s Exhibit 4, p. 42). He never personally wrote to the shipowner demanding payment (Id. at 40). There is evidence, however, that plaintiff made demand through an attorney both in 1964 and in 1966. The court finds that although plaintiff was not diligent in filing *138 suit, the defendant was on notice of his claim.
1. The court has discretion to accept or decline jurisdiction over a controversy between foreigners. Because the beneficial ownership of the vessel was vested in United States citizens, the vessel was regularly engaged in shipping to and from United States ports, the plaintiff signed on the ship in the United States, the plaintiff is now a United States resident making the courts of Greece inconvenient, and despite the fact that the contract provided that any disputes were to be litigated in Greek courts applying Greek law, the court accepts jurisdiction. Anastasiadis v. S. S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5 CA 1965) cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920, 86 S. Ct. 1368, 16 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1966).
2. Section 596, Title 46, U.S. C., relating to penalty wages, is applicable. Section 596 applies to foreign seamen serving on foreign vessels. Caribbean Federation Lines v. Dahl, 315 F.2d 370 (5 CA), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831, 84 S. Ct. 76, 11 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1963); The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4 CA), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897, 74 S. Ct. 220, 98 L. Ed. 398 (1953). The fact that plaintiff was not discharged in a United States port does not render the section inapplicable. Plaintiff signed on in an American port and the vessel made regular voyages to and from American ports. To limit Section 596 only to instances in which the seaman is discharged in an American port would be to unreasonably restrict its effect. In addition, since the beneficial ownership of the ship was in United States citizens, the suit is between foreigners only technically.
3. The deduction of the cost of repatriation from plaintiff's wages was improper, considering the limited statutory instances in which a deduction of wages is proper. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 701; Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 72 S. Ct. 1011, 96 L. Ed. 1294 (1952); Schwark v. S.S. Rio Macareo, 249 F. Supp. 375 (E.D.La.1966).
4. The deduction was "without sufficient cause" within the meaning of 46 U.S.C. Sec. 596. Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 50 S. Ct. 189, 74 L. Ed. 696 (1930); 1 Norris, Law of Seamen, Sec. 384 (1962). A penalty of double wages is therefore in order.
5. "The time for which the penalty provision runs rests within the sound discretion of the court and depends upon the equities of the case." Caribbean Federation Lines v. Dahl, 315 F.2d 370 (5 CA 1963), affirming Dahl v. The S.S. Amigo, 202 F. Supp. 890 (S. D.Ala.1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831, 84 S. Ct. 76, 11 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1963).
6. Plaintiff is required to exercise diligence in the pursuit of his claim to be entitled to the double wage penalty. Dahl v. The S.S. Amigo, id. at 894 and cases there cited.
7. Suit was not filed until over two years after the cause of action accrued. Balancing the equities, the court believes that with due diligence the case could have been filed and the trial held much earlier. Double wages for the four year period since June 30, 1964, are not in order.
8. Had plaintiff filed and pursued his wage claim with diligence, it is probable that the trial of the cause could have been held within ten months after suit was filed. That length of time is the median time interval from issue to trial for non-jury cases in the Southern District of Texas. Administrative Office of the United States Courts Annual Report of the Director II-21 (1968).
9. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to $301.50 at six percent interest from June 30, 1964, to date of judgment, plus double wages for 300 days ($7.50 × 2 × 300 days = $4,500), from defendant Panama-Florida Shipping Lines, Inc.
10. Any finding of fact which is deemed to be a conclusion of law is hereby adopted as a conclusion of law.

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TAMMY CARPENTER o/b/o S.O.C., Plaintiff; v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
Plaintiff, Tammy Carpenter, on behalf of her minor child, S.O.C. ("Claimant"), appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denying her application for Child's Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Ms. Carpenter has timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
When evaluating the disability of a child, the regulations prescribe a three-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). The first step requires a determination of whether the child is "doing substantial gainful activity." Id. If she is, then the child is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the child is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the ALJ to determine whether she suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id. An impairment is considered "severe" if it causes more than minimal functional limitations. Id. § 416.924(c). If the impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. Id. § 416.924(a). However, if the impairments are "severe," the third step requires the ALJ to determine if one or more of the impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404. Id. If the child has such an impairment and it meets the durational requirement, the ALJ will find that she is disabled. Id. If each of the criteria enumerated in the listings is not met, the ALJ must decide whether the impairment or combination of impairments "functionally equals" the severity of any listed impairment. See id. § 416.924(d).
When assessing a child's functional limitations, the ALJ considers all of the relevant factors, such as: how well the child can initiate and sustain activities, how much extra help he or she requires, the effects of structures or supportive settings, how the child functions in school, and the effects of medications or other treatments on the child's health. Id. § 416.926a. To determine functional equivalence, the ALJ must evaluate the child's limitations in the following six functional areas, called domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) the ability to care for herself; and (6) health and physical well-being. See Id. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i-vi). An impairment, or combination of impairments, functionally equals a listed impairment if it results in either "marked" limitations in two of the previously mentioned domains or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. See id. § 416.926a(a).
For purposes of deciding the overall limitation in the six functional domains, a "marked" limitation is one that "seriously" interferes with functioning, and an "extreme" limitation is one that "very seriously" interferes with functioning. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2) and (3).
Applying this sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time relevant to the decision. (Tr. at 23.) Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ concluded that her ADHD is considered "severe" according to 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). (Id.) Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that this impairment did not medically meet or equal the severity of any impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) In evaluating functional equivalence, the ALJ found that Claimant does not have an impairment that meets or medically equals the listings in 20 CFR §§ 416.924(d) and 416.926(a). (Id.) In the domains of acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, and caring for yourself, the ALJ found Claimant has "less than marked limitation." (Id. at 26-30, 32.) In the areas of moving about and manipulating objects and health and physical well-being, the ALJ found Claimant has "no limitation." (Id. at 31, 33.) The ALJ concluded by finding that "Claimant has not been disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, since September 30, 2008, the date the application was filed . . . ." (Id.) II. Standard of Review.
The Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and 'the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for "[d]espite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984). III. Discussion.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 9, 2012, asking for judicial review of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 1.) However, Plaintiff subsequently filed a letter notifying the Court that she was electing not to submit any brief, argument, list of authorities, or statement in support of her appeal. (Doc. 8.) The Commissioner submitted a brief (doc. 9), and Plaintiff did not submit a reply. Deadlines for submissions have passed, and the issues in this case are ripe for decision. Plaintiff has failed to point to any errors in the ALJ's opinion, despite the fact that she had three opportunities to do so: (1) the complaint, (2) an initial brief in support of her claim, and (3) a reply to the Commissioner's brief.
This Court, however, has thoroughly reviewed both the ALJ's opinion and the entire evidentiary record. Based upon that evaluation, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not err when he concluded that Claimant is not disabled. IV. Conclusion.
Because the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration will be affirmed by separate order.


text: 305 Rate-schedule provisions for the foregoing projects are varied. As to Grand Coulee, provisions of the Reclamation Law are applicable.271 As to the Detroit Dam and Chief Joseph Projects, the applicable rate-schedule provisions are those gen- erally governing power produced at reservoir projects under the control of the Department of the Army, discussed above.272 In authorizing the Hungry Horse Project, Congress declared its action for stated multiple purposes "and other beneficial uses primarily in the State of Montana but also in downstream areas."27S Apart from the possible relevancy of this provision, the statute is silent as to marketing requirements generally. But language used in appropriation acts contains conflicting suggestions as to the applicability of Reclamation Law.274 As to Bonneville, McNary, and Lower Snake River Projects, the rate-schedule provisions of the Bonneville Project Act govern.275 These are substantially the same as those applicable to the Fort Peck Project. In addition, contracts must insure that resale rates to ultimate consumers are reasonable and non- discriminatory.276 Moreover, the usual provision for pref- erence to public bodies and cooperatives is extensively augmented by requirements allowing time for their creation, organization, and financing.277 Authority for the integrated transmission network of the Bonneville Power Administration stems from statutory sources varied on a project basis exactly as in the case of provisions relating to rate schedules for those projects. In other words, in the case of the Bonneville, McNary and Lower Snake River Projects, authority for transmission lines is derived from the 271 See supra, pp. 295-296. 272 See supra, pp. 294-295. 278 Act of June 5,1944, § 1, 58 Stat. 270, 43 U. S. C. 593a. 274 Act of July 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 318, 340-341; Act of December 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 632, 648; Act of July .1, 1946, 60 Stat. 348, 367-368; Act of July 25, 1947, 61 Stat. 460, 475; Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1112, 1129. See also Act of August 4,1939, § 2(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 43 U. S. O. 485a (c). 875 Act of August 20, 1937, § 6, 50 Stat. 731, 735, as amended, 16 U. S. O. 832e; § 7, 50 Stat. 735,16 U. S. C. 832f; Act of March 2,1945, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 21-22. 876 § 5, 50 Stat. 734, as amended, 16 U. S. C. 832d. m § 4, 50 Stat. 733, as amended, 16 U. S. C. 832c.

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We are delighted by your interest in the DENSO website and in our products. When you use our website and our online services, the protection of your privacy is very important. If personal data are processed, we observe the applicable data protection regulations.
We shall collect, store and use your personal data only insofar as this is necessary for the provision of a functional website and our contents and services offered on the website. The collection and use of your personal data shall generally only take place with your consent. An exception shall apply in cases in which the processing of the data is permitted due to statutory provisions.
The processing your personal data shall take place on the basis of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG).
If you have granted us consent to process personal data for specific purposes, Art. 6 (1) a GDPR shall serve as the legal basis for the processing of personal data. Consent which has been granted may be revoked you at any time. Please note that the revocation shall only have effect for the future. Data processing which has taken place before the revocation shall not be affected by this.
The processing of personal data within the framework of the execution of contracts in which you are a party, or for the performance of precontractual measures which are carried out on your request shall take place on the basis of Art. 6 (1) b GDPR. The purposes of the data processing shall comply with the respective contractual documents and the subject matter of the contract.
If the processing of personal data is necessary for the fulfilment of a legal obligation to which our company is subject, Art. 6 (1) c shall be the legal basis for this.
If the data processing is necessary to protect a legitimate interest of DENSO or a third party (e.g. for the assertion legal claims and for defence in the event of legal disputes; for guaranteeing IT security; for the prevention of criminal offences; for measures for business management and for the further development of services and products) your interests or fundamental rights and freedoms as the data subject do not outweigh the first-mentioned interest, Art. 6 (1) f GDPR shall serve as the legal basis for the processing.
We shall process and store your personal data for as long as this is necessary for the fulfilment of the respective purpose. The data may be stored beyond this period if this is provided for by statutory provisions to which we are subject as the controller. If the data is no longer necessary or if a storage period prescribed by these provisions has expired, your data shall generally be deleted.
Within the DENSO Group, the departments which require your data to complete their tasks shall receive access to it only when necessary and to the smallest possible extent.
We may only pass data on to third parties outside the DENSO Group if this is necessary, if a statutory provision orders this, if you have consented to this or if order processors commissioned by us have contractually undertaken to comply with the provisions of the GDPR and the BDSG.
Under these conditions, recipients of personal data may be: competent internal specialist departments and external service providers if necessary.
A data transmission to countries outside the EU/EEA (so-called third countries) shall only take place if this is necessary or prescribed by the law, if you have granted your consent to this or in the context of order processing.
The DENSO Group shall employ technical and organisational security measures to protect your data which is administered by us from accidental or deliberate destruction, manipulation, loss or access by unauthorised persons. These security measures shall be adapted to the latest technical options.
Our websites may contain links to websites of other providers. Our data privacy information shall not apply to these third party websites.
When concluding contracts, you must provide the personal data which are necessary for the establishment, execution and termination of the contract and of the obligations for fulfilment arising from this or which DENSO is obliged by law to collect. Without these data, no contract with DENSO can come into effect.
When you visit our website, our web servers shall generally record and collect the name of your internet service provider, your IP address, the website from which you are visiting us, the pages you visit on our website, and the date and duration of your visit. These data shall be stored in the log files of our systems. The use of the IP address shall, however, be limited to the extent which is technically necessary. It shall be shortened and thus only used in an anonymised form, so that an assignment of the IP address to a user is not possible. The data shall not be linked to personal data.
The legal basis for the temporary storage of the data shall be Art. 6 (1) f GPDR.
The temporary storage of the shortened IP address by our systems is technically necessary in order to allow the website to be provided to your device. The storage in log files shall take place to ensure the functionality of the website. An analysis of the data for marketing purposes shall not take place in this context. Our legitimate interest in data processing in accordance with Art. 6 (1) f GDPR shall be found in these purposes.
The recording of the data on the provision of the website and the storage of the data in log files are absolutely necessary for the operation of the website. Consequently, you as the user shall have no option of objecting to this.
Various services are offered on the website which require personal data from you before they can be used. The transmission of personal data by you to us shall always be voluntary.
You can order brochures and websites which are offered on this website. To place an order, you must provide your title, forename and surname, company name, town / country, e-mail address, telephone number. These personal data shall be stored by us and shall, at the same time, be transmitted to the competent department in the DENSO Group and stored there too. At the time of the submission of your order, the date and time of the entry shall also be stored.
The personal data shall be used by us and by our competent department exclusively for the completion of your orders.
The legal basis for the processing of personal data shall be Art. 6 (1) a GPDR.
The personal data and the additional data collected during the order process shall be deleted at our company after six months by order processors engaged by us, after the order and dispatch process has been completed and no statutory retention periods exist anymore.
You have the option of revoking your consent to the processing of your personal data at any time by sending an e-mail to info(at)denso-group.com. In this case, all the personal data which was stored in the course of establishing contact shall be deleted with effect for the future. Depending on the time of your revocation, it may no longer be possible for ordered publications to be sent.
During the order process, cookies shall be placed on your device to save the shopping basket. You can find further information on the cookies used in Section IV of this statement.
Contact and enquiry forms are available on our website and can be used for making contact with us electronically.
To use the enquiry form, you must provide the mandatory information marked with an asterisk in the corresponding input mask (e.g. which project or application you are interested in, the desired product, the construction project, your title, forename and surname, your country and your e-mail address). All the other information shall be optional for you. This personal information shall be transmitted to the competent department of our company and stored in our systems. At the time of the submission of your message, the date and time of the entry shall also be stored. Your consent to the processing of the data shall also be obtained during the enquiry process.
The data provided by you in the input mask shall be used exclusively to process your enquiry.
The legal basis for the processing of your personal data shall be Art. 6 (1) a GPDR.
The data shall be deleted as soon as the communication process has been completed.
You have the option of revoking your consent to the processing of your personal data at any time by sending an e-mail to info(at)denso-group(dot)com. In this case, all the personal data which was stored in the course of establishing contact shall be deleted with effect for the future. Depending on the time of your revocation, it may no longer be possible to get in touch with us.
On the website, we provide the option of directly contacting competent people in the DENSO Group by telephone or e-mail. Sections 1 and 2 shall apply according for the storage of your communication data.
The legal basis for the processing of your personal data after making contact shall be Art. 6 (1) a GPDR.
The data shall be deleted as soon as it is no longer necessary for achieving the purpose of making contact directly with a person. Therefore, the data shall be stored for as long as you are actively in contact with the competent person. You have the option of revoking your consent to the processing of your personal data at any time with effect for the future by sending an e-mail to info(at)denso-group.com. In this case, all the personal data which was stored in the course of establishing contact shall be deleted. A revocation of consent shall not affect the legitimacy of the processing which has taken place on the basis of the consent granted until the revocation.
We want to submit quotations to you which are as customised as possible. We would like to use the information about your user behaviour which is transmitted and automatically generated when you visit our website to design advertising which is tailored to you and your interests. For this purpose, you will be asked for your consent to the creation of a personal user profile.
In the user profile, we shall store the personal data provided by you during your registration for “DENSO Service”, supplemented by your transaction data on this website or in the information and marketing communications sent by us to you. Transaction data is information about your user behaviour, e.g. which sections, articles and contents you access on our website or in our newsletter and at what time, or receipt or reading confirmations for e-mails and newsletters.
We shall analyse this user profile exclusively to send you custom-tailored information and advertising, provided that your express consent to the usage of data for information and advertising purposes is available on the basis of your registration for the “DENSO Service”. For this purpose, we may also engage third parties (service providers) with whom an order processing contract exists, and pass your data on to such third parties.
The legal basis for the processing of your personal data after registration shall be Art. 6 (1) a GPDR.
The data shall be deleted as soon as it is no longer necessary for achieving the purpose of your collection. Therefore, the data shall be stored for as long as your consent to data tracking is active. You have the option of revoking your consent to the processing of your personal data at any time with effect for the future by sending an e-mail to info(at)denso-group.com or by clicking on the “Unsubscribe” link in received messages and thereby of unsubscribing from the data tracking. In this case, all the personal data which was stored in the course of establishing contact shall be deleted. A revocation of consent shall not affect the legitimacy of the processing which has taken place on the basis of the consent granted until the revocation.
Analysis cookies are used for the purpose of improving the quality of our website and its contents. The analysis cookies tell us how the website is used and enable us to constantly optimise our offer.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service of Google Inc. (“Google”). The information about your use of this website generated by cookies is usually transferred to a Google server in the USA, where it is stored. This happens anonymously. Your IP address is anonymised on the web server before transmission to Google. Only in exceptional cases is the full IP address transmitted to a Google server in the USA and anonymised there. Google will use this information on behalf of us as the controller of this website, in order to analyse your use of the website, to compile reports on the website activities and to provide other services associated with the website use and internet use to the website operator. The anonymised IP address transmitted from your browser within the scope of Google Analytics is not merged with other Google data. You can prevent the storage of cookies by making a corresponding setting in your browser software or in accordance with Section IV; however, we would like to point out that in this case you may not be able to make full use of all the functions of this website. You can prevent recording by Google Analytics by clicking on the following link. An opt-out cookie is set, which prevents the recording of your data during future visits to this website. http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de.
Please note that our website contains other links to external websites and that we have no influence on the processing of data on these external websites.
You can demand a confirmation from us as to whether personal data concerning you is being processed by us. If such processing is taking place, you can demand access to the information provided for by the law (see Art. 15 (1) GDPR) and be informed about appropriate safeguards in accordance with Art. 46 GDPR in connection with the transfer if the personal data concerning you is being transmitted to a third country or to an international organisation. The restrictions in Sections 34 and 35 BDSG shall exist.
You have a right to demand rectification and/or completion of us if the processed personal data is incorrect or incomplete. We must perform the rectification immediately.
Under the statutory conditions (see Art. 18 (1) GDPR), you may demand a restriction of the processing of the data concerning you. Please see Art. 18 (2) and (3) GDPR for the consequences of the restriction.
You may demand that the personal data concerning you is deleted immediately, and we are obliged to delete this data immediately if one of the grounds in Art. 17 (1) GDPR applies. A right to erasure shall not exist in the cases of Art. 17 (3) GDPR. The restrictions in Sections 34 and 35 BDSG shall also exist.
If you have asserted the right to rectification, erasure or restriction of the processing to us, we are obliged to inform all the recipients to whom your personal data have been disclosed of this rectification or erasure of the data or restriction of the processing, unless this proves to be impossible or is associated with disproportionate effort. You have the right to be informed by us about these recipients.
You shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning you, which you have provided to us, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format. We refer to Art. 20 GDPR for details.
You shall have the right to to object, on grounds relating to your particular situation, at any time to the processing of personal data concerning you which is based on point Art. 6 (1) e or f GDPR. Further details can be found in Art. 21 GDPR.
Furthermore, you shall have a right to lodge a complaint with the data protection authorities in accordance with Art. 77 GDPR in conjunction with Section 19 BDSG.

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