58-13C-605 Rules, forms, orders, interpretative opinions and hearings.
58-13C-606 Administrative files and opinions.
58-13C-608 Uniformity and cooperation with other agencies.
A. The director shall administer the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978]. The director shall be appointed by the superintendent of regulation and licensing subject to confirmation by the senate. The director shall be chosen solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office and shall have a minimum of five years relevant experience in the securities or finance field, relevant education and demonstrable knowledge of securities laws and regulations. The division is under the supervision and control of the superintendent of regulation and licensing, subject, however, to the exemptions set forth in Section 9-16-11 NMSA 1978. The director shall, with the approval of the superintendent of regulation and licensing, hire pursuant to the Personnel Act [10-9-1 NMSA 1978] and assign duties to employees necessary to assist the director in the director's duties, and the director may, with the approval of the superintendent of regulation and licensing, appoint commissioned peace officers who shall have the powers of police officers for the purpose of investigating and enforcing the provisions of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act. Such peace officers shall comply with the certification provisions of Section 29-7-6 NMSA 1978.
B. The director may by rule impose fees as necessary for examination, claims of exemption, requests for advisory opinions and other miscellaneous filings for which no fees are specified elsewhere in the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act and may also require payment of reasonable costs of investigation resulting from enforcement actions taken pursuant to Section 602 [58-13C-602 NMSA 1978], 603 [58-13C-603 NMSA 1978] or 604 [58-13C-604 NMSA 1978] of that act.
C. It is unlawful for the director or an officer, employee or designee of the director to use for personal benefit or the benefit of others records or other information obtained by or filed with the director that are not public pursuant to Subsection B of Section 607 [58-13C-607 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act. The New Mexico Uniform Securities Act does not authorize the director or an officer, employee or designee of the director to disclose the record or information, except in accordance with Section 602 of that act, Subsection C of Section 607 of that act or Section 608 [58-13C-608 NMSA 1978] of that act.
D. Except as stated in the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, that act does not create or diminish a privilege or exemption that exists at common law, by statute or by rule or otherwise.
E. The director may develop and implement investor education initiatives to inform the public about investing in securities, with particular emphasis on the prevention and detection of securities fraud. In developing and implementing these initiatives, the director may collaborate with public and nonprofit organizations with an interest in investor education. The director may accept a grant or donation to the securities enforcement and investor education fund established in Subsection F of this section from a person that is not affiliated with the securities industry or from a nonprofit organization, regardless of whether the organization is affiliated with the securities industry, to develop and implement investor education initiatives. This subsection does not authorize the director to require participation or monetary contributions of a registrant in an investor education program.
(4) income from investment of the fund.
G Money in the securities enforcement and investor education fund shall be appropriated by the legislature to the division and shall be used for consumer education and training in matters concerning securities laws and investment issues; education and training of investigative and prosecutorial staff of the division; and costs incurred for the investigation and prosecution of civil and criminal violations of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, including expert and other consultant fees, witness fees, deposition costs and travel and training expenses. Money shall be disbursed from the fund only on warrant of the secretary of finance and administration upon vouchers signed by the director or the director's authorized representative. Any unexpended or unencumbered balance remaining at the end of a fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 601.
(3) publish a record concerning an action, proceeding or an investigation pursuant to or a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act if the director determines it is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
B. For the purpose of an investigation pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, the director or the director's designated officer may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, seek compulsion of attendance, take evidence, require the filing of statements and require the production of any records that the director considers relevant or material to the investigation.
(7) grant any other necessary or appropriate relief.
D. This section does not preclude a person from applying to the appropriate district court or a court of another state for relief from a request to appear, testify, file a statement, produce records or obey a subpoena.
E. An individual is not excused from attending, testifying, filing a statement, producing a record or other evidence or obeying a subpoena of the director pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or in an action or proceeding instituted by the director pursuant to that act on the grounds that the required testimony, statement, record or other evidence, directly or indirectly, may tend to incriminate the individual or subject the individual to a criminal fine, penalty or forfeiture. If the individual refuses to testify, file a statement or produce a record or other evidence on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination, the director may apply to the district court of Santa Fe county or other appropriate district court or to a court of another state, a federal court or a court of a foreign jurisdiction to compel the testimony, the filing of the statement, the production of the record or the giving of other evidence. The testimony, record or other evidence compelled pursuant to such an order shall not be used, directly or indirectly, against the individual in a criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury or contempt or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
F. At the request of the securities regulator of another state or a foreign jurisdiction, the director may provide assistance if the requesting regulator states that it is conducting an investigation to determine whether a person has violated, is violating or is about to violate a law or rule of the other state or foreign jurisdiction relating to securities matters that the requesting regulator administers or enforces. The director may provide the assistance by using the authority to investigate and the powers conferred by this section as the director determines is necessary or appropriate. The assistance may be provided without regard to whether the conduct described in the request would also constitute a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or other law of New Mexico if occurring in New Mexico. In deciding whether to provide the assistance, the director may consider whether the requesting regulator is permitted and has agreed to provide assistance reciprocally within its state or foreign jurisdiction to the director on securities matters when requested; whether compliance with the request would violate or prejudice the public policy of New Mexico; and the availability of resources and employees of the director to carry out the request for assistance.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 602.
A. If the director believes that a person has engaged, is engaging or is about to engage in an act, practice or course of business constituting a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978] or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act or that a person has, is or is about to engage in an act, practice or course of business that materially aids a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act, the director may maintain an action to enjoin the act, practice or course of business and to enforce compliance with the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act.
(3) order such other relief as the court considers appropriate.
C. If a person violates a provision of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act and the violation is directed toward, targets or is committed against a person who, at the time of the violation, is sixty-two years of age or older, the court, in addition to any other civil penalties provided for pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule issued pursuant to that act, may impose an additional civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation.
D. The director shall not be required to post a bond in an action or proceeding pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 603.
(3) issue an order pursuant to Section 204 [58-13B-204 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act.
(11) a final order or order after hearing shall include entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in a record.
C. In a final order pursuant to Subsection B of this section, the director may impose a civil penalty of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation. For purposes of determining the amount of a civil penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection, the director shall consider, among other factors, the frequency and persistence of the conduct constituting a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule or order of the director pursuant to that act, the number of persons adversely affected by the conduct and the resources of the person committing the violation.
D. If a person violates a provision of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act and the violation is directed toward, targets or is committed against a person who, at the time of the violation, is sixty-two years of age or older, the director, in addition to any other administrative penalties provided for pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule issued pursuant to that act, may impose an additional administrative penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation.
E. In a final order, the director may charge the actual cost of an investigation or proceeding for a violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act.
F. If a petition for judicial review of a final order is not filed in accordance with Section 609 [58-13C-609 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, the director may file a certified copy of the final order with the clerk of the appropriate district court. The order so filed has the same effect as a judgment of the court and may be recorded, enforced or satisfied in the same manner as a judgment of the court.
G. If a person does not comply with an order pursuant to this section, the director may petition the district court of Santa Fe county or other appropriate district court or a court of another state, a federal court or a court of a foreign jurisdiction to enforce the order. The court shall not require the director to post a bond in an action or proceeding pursuant to this section. If the court finds, after service and opportunity for hearing, that the person was not in compliance with the order, the court may adjudge the person in civil contempt of the order. The court may impose a further civil penalty against the person for contempt in an amount not greater than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation and may grant any other relief the court determines is just and proper in the circumstances.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 604.
(3) by rule, classify securities, persons and transactions and adopt different requirements for different classes.
B. Pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, a rule or form shall not be adopted or amended, or an order issued or amended, unless the director finds that the rule, form, order or amendment is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors and is consistent with the purposes intended by the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act. In adopting a rule, the director may use the director's own experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and judgment. In adopting, amending and repealing rules and forms, Section 608 [58-13C-608 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act applies in order to achieve uniformity among the states and coordination with federal laws in the form and content of registration statements, applications, reports and other records, including the adoption of uniform rules, forms and procedures.
(3) whether required financial statements shall be audited by an independent certified public accountant.
D. The director may provide interpretative opinions or issue determinations that the director will not institute a proceeding or an action pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act against a specified person for engaging in a specified act, practice or course of business if the determination is consistent with that act. A rule adopted or order issued pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act may establish a reasonable charge for interpretative opinions or determinations that the director will not institute an action or a proceeding.
E. A civil or administrative penalty pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act shall not be imposed for, and liability does not arise from, conduct that is engaged in or omitted in good faith believing that conduct conforms to a rule, form or order of the director pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act.
F. A hearing in an administrative proceeding pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act shall be conducted in public unless the director for good cause consistent with that act determines that the hearing will not be so conducted.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 605.
A. The director shall maintain, or designate a person to maintain, a register of applications for registration of securities; registration statements; notice filings; applications for registration of broker-dealers, agents, investment advisers and investment adviser representatives; notice filings by federal covered investment advisers that are or have been effective pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978] or the predecessor act; notices of claims of exemption from registration or notice filing requirements contained in a record; orders issued pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or the predecessor act; and interpretative opinions or no action determinations issued pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act.
B. The director shall make all rules, forms, interpretative opinions and orders available to the public.
C. The director shall furnish a copy of a record that is a public record or a certification that the public record does not exist to a person that so requests. A rule adopted pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act may establish a reasonable charge for furnishing the record or certification. A copy of the record certified or a certificate by the director of a record's nonexistence is prima facie evidence of a record or its nonexistence.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 606.
A. Except as otherwise provided in Subsection B of this section, records obtained by the director or filed pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978], including a record contained in or filed with a registration statement, application, notice filing or report, are public records and are available for public examination.
(5) any social security number, residential address unless used as a business address and residential telephone number unless used as a business telephone number contained in a record that is filed.
C. If disclosure is for the purpose of a civil, administrative or criminal investigation, action or proceeding or to a person specified in Subsection A of Section 608 of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, the director may disclose a record obtained in connection with an audit or inspection pursuant to Subsection D of Section 411 of that act or a record obtained in connection with an investigation pursuant to Section 602 [58-13C-602 NMSA 1978] of that act.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 607.
A. The director may, in the director's discretion, cooperate, coordinate, consult and, subject to Section 607 [58-13C-607 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, share records and information with the securities regulator of another state, Canada, a Canadian province or territory, a foreign jurisdiction, the securities and exchange commission, the United States department of justice, the commodity futures trading commission, the federal trade commission, the securities investor protection corporation, a self-regulatory organization, a national or international organization of securities regulators, a federal or state banking and insurance regulator and a governmental law enforcement agency to effectuate greater uniformity in securities matters among the federal government, self-regulatory organizations, states and foreign governments.
(3) minimizing burdens on the business of capital formation, without adversely affecting essentials of investor protection.
(13) developing and maintaining a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers and taking other steps to reduce the burden of raising investment capital by small businesses.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 608.
A. A final order issued by the director pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978] is subject to judicial review in accordance with the provisions of Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978.
B. The filing of an appeal pursuant to Subsection A of this section does not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the director's order or rule, and the director may enforce or ask the court to enforce the order pending the outcome of the review proceedings.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 609.
A. Sections 301 [58-13C-301 NMSA 1978] and 302 [58-13C-302 NMSA 1978] of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, Subsection A of Section 401 [58-13C-401 NMSA 1978] of that act, Subsection A of Section 402 [58-13C-402 NMSA 1978] of that act, Subsection A of Section 403 [58-13C-403 NMSA 1978] of that act, Subsection A of Section 404 [58-13C-404 NMSA 1978] of that act and Sections 501 [58-13C-501 NMSA 1978], 506 [58-13C-506 NMSA 1978], 509 [58-13C-509 NMSA 1978] and 510 [58-13C-510 NMSA 1978] of that act do not apply to a person that sells or offers to sell a security, unless the offer to sell or the sale is made in New Mexico or the offer to purchase or the purchase is made and accepted in New Mexico.
B. Subsection A of Section 401 of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, Subsection A of Section 402 of that act, Subsection A of Section 403 of that act, Subsection A of Section 404 of that act and Sections 501, 506, 509 and 510 of that act do not apply to a person that purchases or offers to purchase a security, unless the offer to purchase or the purchase is made in New Mexico or the offer to sell or the sale is made and accepted in New Mexico.
(2) is directed by the offeror to a place in New Mexico and received at the place to which it is directed.
(2) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in a record, outside New Mexico.
(4) the program or communication consists of an electronic communication that originates in New Mexico, but that is not intended for distribution to the general public in New Mexico.
F. Subsection A of Section 403 of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act, Subsection A of Section 404 of that act, Subsection A of Section 405 [58-13C-405 NMSA 1978] of that act and Sections 502 [58-13C-502 NMSA 1978], 505 [58-13C-505 NMSA 1978] and 506 [58-13C-506 NMSA 1978] of that act apply to a person if the person engages in an act, practice or course of business instrumental in effecting prohibited or actionable conduct in New Mexico, whether or not either party is then present in New Mexico.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 610.
A. A consent to service of process complying with this section shall be signed and filed in the form required by a rule or order pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act [58-13C-101 NMSA 1978]. A consent appointing the director as the person's agent for service of process in a noncriminal action or proceeding against the person, or the person's successor or personal representative pursuant to the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act after the consent is filed, has the same force and validity as if the service were made personally on the person filing the consent. A person that has filed a consent complying with this subsection in connection with a previous application for registration or notice filing need not file an additional consent.
B. If a person, including a nonresident of New Mexico, engages in an act, practice or course of business prohibited or made actionable by the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act or a rule adopted or order issued pursuant to that act and the person has not filed a consent to service of process pursuant to Subsection A of this section, the act, practice or course of business constitutes the appointment of the director as the person's agent for service of process in a noncriminal action or proceeding against the person or the person's successor or personal representative.
(2) the plaintiff files an affidavit of compliance with this subsection in the action or proceeding on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within the time that the court, or the director in a proceeding before the director, allows.
D. Service pursuant to Subsection C of this section may be used in a proceeding before the director or by the director in a civil action in which the director is the moving party.
E. If process is served pursuant to Subsection C of this section, the court, or the director in a proceeding before the director, shall order continuances as are necessary or appropriate to afford the defendant or respondent reasonable opportunity to defend.
History: Laws 2009, ch. 82, § 611.


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Schobertechnologies would like to thank you for visiting our website and for your interest in our company, our products and services. The protection of your personal data in the course of using the website is very important to us. We would like to provide you with security when visiting our internet pages. Below we explain what data Schobertechnologies collects when you visit our website and how it is used.
As a rule, we only collect and use the personal data of our users to the extent that this is necessary to provide a fully functional website, our contents and our services. Generally, we only collect and use the personal data of our users after we have obtained the user’s consent. An exception applies only in such cases in which the prior consent cannot be obtained for factual reasons and in which the processing of data is permitted under statutory provisions.
To the extent that we obtain the consent of data subjects for the processing of personal data, Art. 6 (1) letter a of the EC General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is applied as the legal basis for the processing of personal data.
Where the processing of personal data is necessary to fulfil a contract to which a data subject is a party, Art. 6 (1) letter b GDPR is applied as the legal basis. The same applies to processing that is required to carry out pre-contractual measures.
To the extent that the processing of personal data is required to fulfil a legal obligation to which our company is a subject, Art. 6 (1) letter c GDPR is applied as the legal basis.
In the event that vital interests of the data subject or another individual require the processing of personal data, Art. 6 (1) letter d GDPR is applied as the legal basis.
If the processing is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of our company or a third party, and if the data subject’s interests, fundamental rights or fundamental freedom do not override the interests mentioned first above, Art. 6 (1) letter f GDPR is applied as the basis of processing.
The personal data of the data subjects will be deleted or made unavailable as soon as the purpose of their retention is no longer valid. Moreover, the data can be retained if this is provided in EU or member state legislation or other regulations, to which the controller is a subject. The data will be deleted or made unavailable also if a retention period has expired that is required by the mentioned norms, unless it is required to continue to store the data for the conclusion or fulfilment of a contract.
Every time our website is visited, our system automatically collects data and information about the computer system of the visitor.
The data is stored in the log files of our system. This data is not stored together with other personal data of a user.
The legal basis for the temporary storage of data and log files is Art. 6 para 1 letter f GDPR.
The temporary storage of the IP address in the system is necessary to deliver the website to the user’s computer. For this, the user’s IP address must be stored as long as the session lasts.
Storage in log files is necessary to ensure the website’s functionality. Furthermore, we use the data to optimize the website and to ensure the security of our IT systems. In this connection, the data is not analyzed for marketing purposes.
Our legitimate interest in the processing of the data in accordance with Art. 6 para 1 letter f GDPR is also based on these purposes.
The data will be deleted as soon as it is no longer required to fulfil the purpose of its collection. In the event that the data is collected to provide the website, this takes place as soon as the respective session has ended.
In the event that data is stored in log files, this takes place no later than thirty-one days thereafter.
The collection of the data is mandatory to provide the website and the storage of the data in log files is also mandatory to operate the website. Therefore, the user cannot object to it.
Our website uses so-called cookies. Cookies are text files that are stored in or by the user’s internet browser on the user’s computer system. If a user requests a website, cookies can be stored in the user’s operating system. Each of these cookies contains characteristic strings that allow a clear identification of the browser if the website is revisited.
In that case, the following data is stored in the cookies and transferred: language settings.
The data can be transmitted as follows: Google settings.
The data collected in this way is anonymized by technical means. Therefore, the data cannot be attributed to the requesting user any longer. The data is not stored together with any other personal data of a user.
The legal basis for the processing of personal data by means of cookies is laid down in Art. 6 para 1 letter f GDPR.
We need cookies for the following applications: take over language settings.
The user data that is collected by technically required cookies is not used to create user profiles.
These analysis cookies are used to improve the quality of our website and its contents. From analysis cookies, we learn how our website is used and how we can continuously optimize our contents.
Our legitimate interest in the processing of personal data in accordance with Art. 6 para 1 letter f GDPR is also based on these purposes.
Our website uses Google Analytics, the website analysis service of Google Inc. (“Google”). Google Analytics uses so-called cookies, that means, text files that are stored in or by a user’s internet browser on the user’s computer system. If a user requests our website, these analysis cookies by Google Analytics can be stored in the user’s operating system.
The cookies from Google Analytics allow an analysis of the user’s use of the website.
Google uses this information on behalf of the controller to analyze the use of our website, to create reports about website activities, and to perform other services for the controller in connection with the use of our website and the internet. The IP address that is transmitted by your browser through Google Analytics is not combined with any other data from Google.
The information about your usage of this website that is generated by the cookies is usually transferred to one of Google’s servers in the USA and stored there. At our website, however, we have IP anonymization enabled and therefore your IP address is truncated within the member states of the European Union or other states of the European Economic Area before it is transmitted. Only in exceptional cases, the full IP address is transmitted to one of Google’s servers in the USA and truncated there.
Google Analytics is used to improve the quality of our website and its contents. From analysis cookies, we learn how our website is used and how we can continuously optimize our contents.
Analysis cookies help the controller, including but not limited to, to control the analytics software and to differentiate users over periods between 24 hours and up to two years.
The cookies of Google Analytics are stored on the user’s computer for up to 2 years and the information generated by the cookies is transmitted to Google.
(1) Mandatory fields: first name, last name, telephone, E-mail address.
(2) Optional: company name, address, state, country, fax number, message, requested information.
Alternatively, you can contact us by using the provided E-mail address. In that case, the user’s personal data that is transmitted to us by E-mail is stored.
In this connection, we do disclose the data to third parties. The data is used exclusively to handle the correspondence.
The legal basis for the processing of the data, if consent was obtained from the user, is set out under Art. 6 para 1 letter a GDPR.
The legal basis for the processing of the data that was submitted by E-mail is set out under Art. 6 para 1 letter a GDPR. If any E-mail contact is targeted at the conclusion of a contract, the processing of the data is based on Art. 6 para 1 letter b GDPR in addition.
The personal data from the entry screen is only used to make contact. If contact is made by E-mail, this is deemed to be the required justified interest for the processing of the data too.
The data is deleted as soon as it is no longer required to fulfil the purpose of its collection. For personal data entered in the contact form and data that was submitted by E-mail, this is the case as soon as the respective conversation with the user has ended. A conversation is deemed to have ended if, under the circumstances, the relevant facts of a case are finally clarified.
The user can withdraw its consent to the processing of personal data at any time. If a user contacts us by E-mail, they can object to the storage of their personal data at any time. In such case, the conversation cannot be continued.
For a valid withdrawal of the consent and objection to storage, it is sufficient to send a simple E-mail to the data protection officer.
All personal data that is stored while you contacted us is deleted in such case.
You can demand confirmation from the controller as to whether we process personal data relating to you.
(8) The existence of an automated decision making process, including profiling, in accordance with Art. 22 paragraphs 1 and 4 GDPR and – at least in such cases – meaningful information about the involved logic and the significance of the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.
You are entitled to demand information about whether the personal data relating to you are transmitted to a third country or an international organization. In this regard, you can demand to be informed about suitable guarantees in connection with the transmission in accordance with Art. 46 GDPR.
You are entitled to correction and/or completion by the controller to the extent that the processed personal data that relate to you are incorrect on incomplete. The controller must carry out the corrections immediately.
(4) You objected to the processing in accordance with Art. 21 paragraph 1 GDPR and it has not been determined yet whether the controller’s legitimate reasons override your reasons or not.
If the processing of the personal data relating to you is restricted, such data can only be processed – except for storage – with your consent or in order to assert, exercise, or defend legal claims or to protect the interests of another individual or legal entity, or based on an important public interest of the European Union or one of its member states.
If the processing was restricted subject to the above-mentioned requirements, you are notified by the controller before the restriction is lifted.
(2) You withdraw your consent on which the processing was based subject to Art. 6 paragraph 1 letter a or Art. 9 paragraph 2 letter a GDPR and there is no other legal basis for processing.
(3) You object to the processing in accordance with Art. 21 paragraph 1 GDPR and there are no other overriding legitimate reasons for processing, or you object to the processing in accordance with Art. 21 paragraph 2 GDPR.
(5) The erasure of the personal data relating to you is required to comply with a legal obligation under the laws of the European Union or the laws of a member state to which the controller is a subject.
(6) The personal data related to you were collected with respect to information society services in accordance with Art. 8 paragraph 1 GDPR.
If the controller disclosed the personal data that are related to you to the public and if the controller is obligated to erase such subject to Art. 17 paragraph 1 GDPR, they must take appropriate measures – including technical measures and taking into consideration the available technologies and implementation costs – and inform the controllers that process the personal data about your – the data subject’s – demand to erase all links to such personal data or any copies or replications of such personal data.
If you have exercised your right to correction, erasure, or restriction of processing against the controller, the controller is obligated to inform all recipients of personal data related to you about such correction, erasure, or restriction of processing, unless this proves to be impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort.
You are entitled to receive information from the controller about these recipients.
When you exercise this right, you are further entitled to have the personal data relating to you directly transmitted from one controller to another, to the extent that this is technically feasible. The freedoms and rights of other individuals or persons must not be impaired by this.
The right to data portability does not apply to the processing of personal data that is required for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.
For reasons that result from your specific situation, you are entitled to file objections against the processing of personal data relating to you at any time if such processing is based on Art. 6 paragraph 1 letter e or f GDPR; this applies to any profiling based on these provisions too.
The controller will cease to process the personal data relating to you, unless they can prove the existence of absolutely legitimate reasons for the processing that override your interests, rights, and freedoms, or the processing serves the assertion, exercise, or defence of legal claims.
If the personal data relating to you is processed for the purpose of direct marketing, you are entitled to object to the processing of the personal data relating to you with respect to such marketing activities; this also applies to profiling to the extent that it takes place in connection with such direct marketing.
If you object to the processing for the purpose of direct marketing, the personal data relating to you will no longer be processed for such purposes.
In connection with the use of information society services – notwithstanding the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC – you can exercise your right to objection through automated processes that are based on technical specifications.
You are entitled to revoke your declaration of consent with respect to data privacy at any time. A revocation of the declaration of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of any processing based on the consent up to the date of revocation.
(3) Was made with your express consent.
However, such decisions must not be based on particular categories of personal data according to Art. 9 paragraph 1 GDPR, to the extent that Art. 9 paragraph 2 letter a or g does not apply and appropriate measures to protect your rights and freedoms and your legitimate interests were taken.
With respect to the cases mentioned under (1) and (3), the controller must take appropriate measures to protect your rights and freedoms and your legitimate interests, which, as a minimum, include the right to human intervention on the part of the controller, to express a point of view and to contest the decision.
Notwithstanding any other administrative or judicial remedies, you are entitled to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, including but not limited to that of the member state in which you reside, in which you work or in which the alleged violation has occurred if you are of the opinion that the processing of the personal data relating to you violates the GDPR.
The supervisory authority with which the complaint is lodged informs the complainant about the status and the results of the complaint, including the option of judicial remedies.

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On March 8, 2016, Amarin Pharma, Inc. (“Amarin” or “the Company”) and FDA filed a proposed Stipulation And Order Of Settlement (“Proposed Settlement Order”) with Judge Paul Engelmayer in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, that would bring to a close Amarin’s proactive challenge to FDA’s restrictions concerning the Company’s off-label promotion of Vascepa. We do not know when the Court will complete its review of the Proposed Settlement Order and finalize the settlement.
In sum, the parties agree that FDA will be bound by Judge Engelmayer’s prior conclusions that: (1) “Amarin may engage in truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of Vascepa”; and (2) certain statements and disclosures that Amarin proposes to make to doctors are truthful and non-misleading.
Readers can review our previous posts about the Amarin litigation here and here. However, we summarize the relevant background of the litigation below. A more exhaustive review and analysis of the issues presented by the original suit can also be found in our article published in FDLI Update last Fall.
The lawsuit brought by Amarin concerns its drug, Vascepa (icosapent ethyl), an ethyl ester of the omega-3 fatty acid eicosapentaenoic acid (“EPA”). Vascepa is an approved drug indicated as an adjunct to diet to reduce triglyceride levels in adult patients with severe hypertriglyceridemia (triglycerides ≥ 500 mg/dL). See Vascepa (icosapent ethyl) Label, NDA 202057 (June 23, 2015).
As part of the Company’s planned development and marketing of Vascepa, Amarin designed and conducted a Phase 3 clinical study, the ANCHOR trial, to examine the effect of Vascepa on triglyceride levels among statin-treated patients with “persistently high” triglycerides (≥ 200 and ≤ 500 mg/dL), and entered into a Special Protocol Assessment (“SPA”) with FDA (the “ANCHOR SPA”). Amarin believed it had satisfied all of FDA’s requirements to obtain approval of Vascepa for this indication per the ANCHOR SPA agreement. The ANCHOR study achieved its primary endpoint demonstrating statistically significant reductions in triglyceride levels with Vascepa, compared to placebo. Vascepa achieved statistically significant results for its secondary endpoints in the ANCHOR study as well. In addition, Amarin met its obligation under the ANCHOR SPA to enroll at least 50% of a cardiovascular outcomes trial (the REDUCE-IT trial) to examine whether Vascepa would be effective in reducing cardiovascular events. Thus, Amarin submitted its sNDA for the persistently high triglyceride indication in February 2013, and anticipated a timely approval for this additional indication.
The company’s plan to obtain approval of the persistently-high triglyceride level indication was derailed when FDA called into question the clinical validity of the triglyceride lowering endpoint while the sNDA for this indication was under review, despite FDA having agreed to that endpoint in the ANCHOR SPA. Following an FDA-convened Advisory Committee meeting, where Committee members voted 9 to 2 against approval of Vascepa for that indication, FDA rescinded the ANCHOR SPA and issued a Complete Response Letter to Amarin requiring data showing a reduction in cardiovascular events prior to approval of the indication for persistently high triglycerides. FDA concluded the Complete Response Letter “with a warning that any effort by Amarin to market Vascepa for the proposed supplemental use could constitute ‘misbrand[ing] under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [(“FD&C Act”)].’” Complaint at 27, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-3588 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015).
The civil Complaint that Amarin filed claimed that FDA’s threat of prosecution for misbranding Vascepa had a chilling effect on Amarin’s commercial speech that was otherwise protected by the First Amendment. For that reason, Amarin sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the government from prosecuting the Company for truthful and non-misleading speech concerning Vascepa, detailing, in its complaint, certain off-label promotional content regarding Vascepa that the Company proposed to disseminate.
In its Complaint, Amarin stated that it sought only to “engage in truthful, non-misleading speech about Vascepa directly with healthcare professionals” (Compl. at 41), albeit on information that FDA had not approved to appear in Vascepa’s label. First, Amarin wanted to disseminate the results of the ANCHOR study. Amarin proposed to distribute summaries of Vascepa’s effect on triglycerides as well as secondary endpoints on other lipid parameters that were examined in the ANCHOR study. Second, Amarin wanted to make the statement that “[s]upportive but not conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA [(docasohexanoic acid)] omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease,” a claim that EPA- and DHA-containing dietary supplements are allowed to make, under FDA’s rules. Id. at 41, 31-37. Third, Amarin sought to distribute reprints of “peer-reviewed scientific publications relevant to the potential effect of EPA on the reduction of the risk of coronary heart disease.” Id. at 42. Along with this information, Amarin proposed to make relevant “contemporaneous disclosures” to ensure that the messages the Company communicated to healthcare professionals concerning the use of Vascepa in patients with persistently high triglycerides was not misleading.
Amarin filed a motion for preliminary injunction and, on August 7, the court handed down a 71-page opinion that gave Amarin an early victory in the case and presumably provided the impetus for the parties to settle.
Following United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (here), a Second Circuit criminal misbranding case, Judge Engelmayer granted Amarin’s motion for preliminary injunction against FDA. The court held that Amarin’s dissemination of a summary of the ANCHOR study results as well as the reprints regarding the potential cardioprotective effect of EPA, “would be neither false nor misleading.” Op. and Order at 55, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-3588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (“August 7 Order”). The court held that certain statements and disclosures, proposed by Amarin and agreed upon by FDA, concerning the results of the ANCHOR study were “based on current information, truthful and non-misleading.” Id. at 57.
The court also ruled on additional disclosures proposed by Amarin, but initially contested by FDA, that would be made contemporaneously with certain off-label statements concerning Vascepa. In the end, the court approved a disclosure explaining FDA’s decision not to approve Vascepa for use in patients with persistently high triglycerides. The court indicated that such a disclosure was necessary, and the court itself proceeded to revise a disclosure “drawing upon both parties’ final positions, [that] achieve[d] a truthful and non-misleading result.” Id. at 58. The court noted that Amarin and FDA were “at liberty to pursue further refinements . . . .” Id. at 60.
In addition to its rulings on the specific statements proposed by Amarin, the court also addressed Amarin’s general request for First Amendment protection for truthful and non-misleading off-label promotion. The court heavily relied on the precedent-setting analysis in Caronia, although the Amarin court amplified Caronia’s central holding with regard to Amarin’s as-applied challenge to FDA’s threat of prosecution for off-label promotion.
FDA’s counter to Amarin’s challenge was a refinement of its long-standing position that it may use speech as evidence of misbranding, taking the position that it would not seek to prosecute Amarin for the speech in and of itself. Rather, FDA, in its briefs as well as in its oral arguments, stated that it could lawfully use speech to establish the intent and the act of misbranding. In addition to using Amarin’s speech as evidence of intent to misbrand Vascepa, FDA stated that it “may bring a misbranding action where Amarin’s only acts constituting promotion of Vascepa for an off-label use are its truthful and non-misleading statements about that use, provided that these acts support an inference that Amarin intended to promote that off-label use.” Id. at 44. FDA went on to argue that “it does not read Caronia to preclude a misbranding action where the acts to promote off-label use consist solely of truthful and non-misleading speech, provided that the evidence also shows that the drug had been introduced into interstate commerce and that the FDA had not approved it as safe and effective for the off-label use.” Id. at 44-45.
The court flatly rejected FDA’s interpretation of Caronia and stated that “[t]he [c]ourt’s considered and firm view is that, under Caronia, the FDA may not bring such an action based on truthful promotional speech alone, consistent with the First Amendment.” Id. at 45. The court stated that, “[w]here the speech at issue consists of truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of an FDA-approved drug, such speech, under Caronia, cannot be the act upon which an action for misbranding is based.” Id. at 49.
The court rejected FDA’s legal arguments as to why Amarin’s off-label speech should be restricted. First, the court rejected FDA’s argument that Amarin’s proactive challenge constituted a “frontal assault” on FDA’s new drug approval process. Id. To this, the court pointed to the fact that the 1962 amendments predated First Amendment jurisprudence protecting commercial speech (see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)) and found that pharmaceutical speech qualifies for such protection (see Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011)). August 7 Order at 49. Second, the court rejected FDA’s attempt to narrow the applicability of Caronia to only certain types of truthful and non-misleading off-label promotion. The court stated that Caronia applies “across the board to all truthful and non-misleading promotional speech.” Id. at 51. Finally, FDA reprised its argument that Caronia does not prohibit the use of speech as evidence of intent to promote a drug for off-label uses. The court stated that the “construction [of the misbranding provision in the FD&C Act in accord with Caronia] applies no matter how obvious it was that the speaker’s motivation was to promote such off-label use.” Id. The court concluded by stating: “[i]n the end, however, if the speech at issue is found truthful and non-misleading, under Caronia, it may not serve as the basis for a misbranding action.” Id. at 53.
The communications regarding off-label use of Vascepa, as modified and approved in the court’s August 7 Order, are, based on information known at that time, truthful and non-misleading.
All settlement terms are to be interpreted consistent with the August 7 Order, and nothing in the Proposed Settlement Order shall be construed to limit Amarin’s constitutional rights to free speech concerning Vascepa.
Proposed Settlement Order at 2.
Two other provisions of the Proposed Settlement Order warrant attention. First, in addition to generally-available regulatory procedures available to companies regarding FDA review of promotional materials, Amarin may submit to FDA up to two proposed communication pieces per year regarding off-label use of Vascepa under a “preclearance procedure” detailed in the Proposed Settlement Order. Id. The proposed communication pieces that Amarin submits will be reviewed by FDA prior to Amarin disseminating such information. FDA has 60 calendar days to object, unless the parties agree on an extended timeframe. Should FDA object, Amarin must respond to FDA’s concerns or objections within 45 calendar days, again, unless extended by mutual agreement of the parties. FDA will notify Amarin within 30 calendar days of the specifics of any remaining dispute over the proposed communication pieces. Id. at 2-3. This preclearance process will be available to Amarin until December 31, 2020, and is the only provision of the Proposed Settlement Order that will terminate. Id. at 3.
Second, should any other dispute arise between the parties, the Proposed Settlement Order provides for a dispute resolution process. In an effort to promote dialog between the Company and FDA, the parties have agreed that, upon written notice of a dispute by one of the parties, the other party will have 60 days to cure or resolve the dispute. If the party is not satisfied by the other party’s proposed cure or resolution, that party will have 30 calendar days to respond. After this process has been followed, unresolved disputes may be brought before Judge Engelmayer, whose court retains jurisdiction over the Proposed Settlement Order. Id. at 3-4.
Finally, the Proposed Settlement Order applies to both Amarin as well as it representatives. Id. at 4.
In a suit that followed on Amarin’s coat-tails in the Southern District of New York, Pacira Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Pacira”) challenged FDA’s limitations on Pacira’s promotion of its post-surgical analgesic drug, Exparel, to only those specific uses in which the drug has been studied and approved, despite the drug having a general use indication. See Pacira Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-7055 (S.D.N.Y.). Pacira settled its First Amendment challenge against FDA regarding the promotion of its drug, Exparel (see our discussion on the litigation here and the settlement here). Both the terms of settlement and the revised label confirmed that Exparel’s use encompassed a broad range of surgeries, not limited to the clinical studies included in the label. Also, FDA stipulated that this broad use of Exparel does not represent the approval of a new indication, but rather clarifies Exparel’s use, “as initially approved” at the time Exparel’s NDA was approved, back in 2011, thus exculpating Pacira from prosecution related to its past, current, and future promotion of Exparel for specific surgery types that are encompassed by its general indication. We believe there are broader implications to this settlement for products bearing general indications in their label. As we noted previously, medical device companies frequently face this “general versus specific use” issue. We must remember that Pacira was a settlement of a specific legal dispute and does not provide legal conclusions from a court in litigation.
It is also not a crime for a device company or its representative to give doctors wholly truthful and non-misleading information about the unapproved use of a device. If you find that VSI’s promotional speech to doctors was solely truthful and not misleading, then you must find the Defendants not guilty of the misbranding offense.
Final Jury Instructions at 12, United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., 5:14-CR-00926 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2016) (emphasis added).
This was an important case because it showed us that a court outside of the Second Circuit may be following its lead in finding that truthful and non-misleading speech concerning off-label uses of a product does not violate the criminal misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act.
Which brings us back to Amarin . . . The Amarin Proposed Settlement Order may be a sign of how FDA will be regulating off-label promotion in the future. This is the first case where FDA has agreed to allow a company to engage in truthful and non-misleading off-label promotion outside the narrow scope of its two Guidance documents concerning the dissemination of information on unapproved uses of a product. See FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (Dec. 2011); FDA, Revised Draft Guidance for Industry: Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on Unapproved New Uses — Recommended Practices (Feb. 2014). The terms of the Proposed Settlement Order do not limit Amarin’s ability to make claims that were presented during the litigation. Rather, the Proposed Settlement Order broadly allows Amarin to disseminate any truthful and non-misleading off-label information and materials related to Vascepa’s use in patients with persistently high triglyceride levels. See Proposed Settlement Order at 1. As we discussed previously, however, FDA may believe that Amarin presents a somewhat unique sets of facts, given the regulatory history and NDA-quality data underlying the court’s preliminary decision that the speech was truthful and not misleading.
While pharmaceutical and medical device companies have come out on top in recent First Amendment litigation, companies should still tread cautiously in moving beyond their approved labeling.
A company’s review and approval of promotional pieces begins, but does not end, with a review of the product’s prescribing information and labeling. Companies should carefully consider communications it has had with FDA during the development and approval of the product as well as any post-marketing discussions. Often these communications, memorialized in official meetings minutes, regulatory correspondence, or contact reports, provide a rich understanding of FDA’s view on the claims that can be made within the scope of the approved prescribing information.
Finally, we note that the Amarin Proposed Settlement Order does not specifically address the issue of whether, to make a promotional claim, a company must have adequate substantiation for that claim. The government may assert that an unsubstantiated claim is unlawful without regard to the First Amendment, even if that claim is otherwise truthful and not misleading.
In sum, we expect that the next battleground for companies who seek to disseminate off-label information concerning their products will be whether an off-label claim is misleading and/or unsubstantiated.
We may take a deeper dive into these issues in future posts.
UPDATE: Late on March 8, 2016, Judge Engelmayer signed the Stipulation And Order Of Settlement.

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This ruling regarding respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the Claimant’s Petition for Review from the November 4, 1994 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Sixth District was heard March 24, 1995 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners Roberta Smith D’Oyen and Amado J. Vargas.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant filed an untimely petition for review from the Sixth District Commissioner’s November 4, 1994 Finding and Dismissal. To date, the claimant has failed to file his reasons for appeal, a brief, or a motion to correct.
The claimant’s letter of appeal, which we will consider to constitute a petition for review, was filed on November 15, 1994, eleven days after the trial commissioner’s Finding and Dismissal had been issued on November 4, 1994. The claimant’s petition for review was not filed within the time limit prescribed by § 31-301(a) C.G.S., which states that “[a]t any time within ten days after entry of an award by the commissioner, . . . either party may appeal therefrom to the compensation review board by filing in the office of the commissioner . . . an appeal petition . . . .” (Emphasis added). We have consistently ruled that the appealing party must file its appeal within the prescribed time period in order for this Board to have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Corona v. Uniroyal Chemical, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 987 CRD-5-90-3 (March 13, 1991) (dismissing appeal to this Board filed on the eleventh day following trial commissioner’s decision); Famiglietti v. Dossert Corporation, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 65, 804 CRD-5-88-12 (April 17, 1990); Johnston v. ARA Services Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 20, 765 CRD-7-88-8 (June 29, 1989).
The claimant contends that his appeal was filed late due to circumstances beyond his control. Specifically, the claimant contends that his attorney did not notify him of the commissioner’s November 4, 1994 decision until November 9, 1994, and subsequently on November 10, 1994 after 4:00 P.M. his attorney advised him that he would not file an appeal on his behalf. The following day, November 11, 1994, a Friday, was a state holiday. Therefore, the claimant contends that he could not contact the Workers’ Compensation office in order to find out what to do regarding filing an appeal until Monday, November 14, 1994, which is the day that he mailed the appeal letter.
The claimant has not contended that his attorney received the commissioner’s decision in an untimely manner, or that the trial commissioner’s decision was not mailed to the parties in a timely manner.1 Rather, the claimant contends that he was not able to mail a timely appeal because his attorney delayed in advising him that he would not file an appeal on his behalf. Under these circumstances, we do not find that it is necessary to remand this issue for a determination of the date which the commissioner’s decision was sent. See Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, 36 Conn. App. 298 (1994). We are sympathetic to the claimant’s circumstances caused by his legal counsel’s failure to promptly communicate to him regarding his decision not to file an appeal. However, we do not agree with the claimant’s contention that it was impossible to file a timely appeal under these circumstances.2 We conclude that the claimant’s petition for review was not filed within the time limits required by § 31-301(a) and we thus must dismiss it as untimely.
Moreover, even if jurisdiction existed to consider the claimant’s appeal, it is highly unlikely that this Board would reverse the trial commissioner’s decision. This Board does not conduct a de novo review of the facts on appeal. Rather, the conclusions drawn by the trial commissioner from the facts found “must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 118 (1979). We cannot review the commissioner’s conclusions when they depend upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Id. “If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the [trial commissioner’s] inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive.” Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988).


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HODGES v. HODGES et al.
Equitable petition. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Peeler.
The petition alleged a cause of action to establish an implied trust and for injunction and accounting. Hence, it should not have been dismissed upon general demurrer.
A petition seeking to establish an implied trust, and for other relief, was dismissed upon general demurrer and that ruling is here for review. The petition was filed in the Superior Court of DeKalb County by Margaret Josie Hodges against her son, Albert J. Hodges, and his wife, Alice R. Hodges. It charged that the defendants were committing a continuing trespass upon her property, holding title to the property in trust for her, and refusing to convey it to her.
The essential allegations of the mother's petition are those which follow.
In 1959 she "was about to inherit" two lots from the estate of a named person, and "at the time she was to have title vested in her to said lots" she was in prison.
She filed in the court of ordinary a waiver of her interest in the said estate so that the son could take title to it and hold it for her convenience, she then being unable because of her incarceration to attend to business affairs. The son understood that title to the lots would be placed in his name from said estate for her convenience, as aforesaid.
But the son violated such trust, treated the lots as his own, sold them and appropriated the proceeds to his own use. In 1963 he used some of the money to pay for an interest in realty known as 2031 Shady Lane, in DeKalb County and placed title to a one-half interest in the defendant daughter-in-law. He and the daughter-in-law occupied such property as their home.
The mother does not know the amount of money the son received from the sale of the two lots above mentioned, but believes it was in excess of $20,000, and she does not know the amount he invested in the Shady Lane property. If such investment was less than the sale price for the two lots, she seeks an accounting for the surplus.
When the mother was released from the prison she immediately entered the Shady Lane property and advised the son and daughter-in-law that the property was hers and that she wanted title placed in her name. At that time there was no dispute over this, and the son told the mother that he could deliver up the property to her and would convey the title to her.
But later the son and daughter-in-law repudiated their intention to convey title to her, and stated that the property was theirs and they intended to retain it. Notwithstanding this declaration, they moved from such property and left the mother in possession.
In April 1965, they returned and demanded that the mother vacate. She refused to do so. The son now sleeps on said property, and he and the daughter-in-law are continuously trespassing on the property by going thereon and occupying it at times.
They refuse to convey title to the property to the mother who has no remedy at law.
The prayers, in addition to process, were (a) that the son and daughter-in-law be temporarily and permanently enjoined from their continuing trespass upon the property; (b) that the title to it be decreed in the mother; (c) that an attorney's fee of stated amount be awarded her; (d) that an accounting be had of the son as to the money received from sale of the two lots; and (e) general relief.
1. This petition, as we assess it, alleges an implied trust and thus, upon proof, authorizes a decree of title in the mother to an interest in the Shady Lane property commensurable with the amount of trust proceeds invested therein.
Construed reasonable and as a whole, but most strongly against the pleader, the petition alleges that the mother, because of her incarceration, was unable to manage her interest in an estate, and therefore, executed a document waiving that interest in favor of her son, so that he could hold the title for her convenience.
The fact that a writing was involved did not, as contended, militate against an implied trust. While no copy was set forth, that writing was alleged to be "a waiver [filed] in the court of ordinary . . . of her interest in said estate so that her son could take title in her interest in said lots and hold them for her convenience . . ." We do not construe this to allege that such "waiver" was an agreement between her and the son for him to hold the property as trustee for her, so as to create an express trust under Code 108-105. Rather, we construe it to allege a waiver, by the mother in favor of the son, of her inheritance and thus a writing which enabled the son to acquire legal title, so as to make possible an implied trust under Code 108-104, 108-106, and 108-107. In this situation, the parol evidence rule of Code 38-501 would not prevent the introduction of evidence to show the nature of the transaction, or the circumstances, or conduct of the parties, either to imply or rebut a trust, although the effect is to alter or vary a written instrument. Code 108-108; Jenkins v. Lane, 154 Ga. 454 (3) (115 SE 126).
Furthermore, under a proper construction, the allegations show that when the mother executed the waiver she possessed an interest in the estate which she could waive in favor of her son. While the petition alleges at one place that she "was about" to inherit such interest, it is clear from the entire allegations that she then had an interest in the lots. She later alleges that "at the time she was to have title vested in her to said lots," she was in prison and therefore filed the waiver so that her son could take such title and hold it for her convenience. It is also clear that the son recognized that he held such title for her benefit.
Our Code, by 108-104, provides that ". . . Implied trusts are such as are inferred by law from the nature of the transaction or the conduct of the parties;" and by 108-106, establishes that "Trusts are implied--1. Whenever the legal title is in one person, but the beneficial interest, either from the payment of the purchase money or other circumstances, is either wholly or partially in another . . . 3. Where from the nature of the transaction it is manifest that it was the intention of the parties that the person taking the legal title should have no beneficial interest . . ." See also Code 108-107.
That the allegations here come within the orbit of the above Codal provisions of this court on this subject. See, in this connection, Manning v. Manning, 135 Ga. 597 (69 SE 1126); Jenkins v. Georgia Investment Co., 149 Ga. 475 (1, 5) (100 SE 635); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 150 Ga. 106 (102 SE 824); Weldon v. Weldon, 152 Ga. 550 (2) (110 SE 273); Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Ga. 689 (100 SE2d 888).
The mother, as beneficiary of the alleged trust, may follow the proceeds realized from the sale of the trust property and invested in the Shady Lane property. Code 108-424.
2. Since under the ruling made in Division 1, the mother alleged facts which, upon proof, would entitle her to a decree of title in the subsequently acquired property, we now consider her prayers for protection of that interest.
(a) The allegations to the effect that the son and daughter-in-law repeatedly return, go thereon and occupy the property are sufficient to allege the need for injunction against a continuing trespass. See Durrence v. Groover, 160 Ga. 680 (1) (129 SE 29); Dekle v. McLeod, 144 Ga. 289 (2) (case 2) (86 SE 1082).
(b) The allegations are also sufficient for the accounting sought. The mother alleges that she does not know the exact amount received from the alleged trust property, but believes it was in excess of $20,000, and that she does not know the amount of such proceeds that the son invested in the Shady Lane property. These averments indicate that something is actually due the mother. See Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 (3) (52 SE2d 465).
(c) The remaining relief sought, award of an attorney's fee, is not authorized. No allegations are made to bring the facts here within any of the provisions of our Code which allow such fees.
Reversed. All the Justices concur, except Mobley, J., not participating for providential cause.
William B. Morgan, for appellees.
Marvin O'Neal, Jr., for appellant.
SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 9, 1965 -- DECIDED DECEMBER 8, 1965.

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C/O MULLEN, in his official and individual capacity, Defendant.
This matter is before the court sua sponte pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(d). As of the date of this Order, Defendant has not filed a motion for new trial as is permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, although the time within which he may do so has not yet expired. Rule 59(d) authorizes a trial court to order a new trial on its own initiative for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, but limits this authority by requiring such action be taken within twenty-eight days after entry of judgment. The original judgment in this case [Doc. No. 120] was entered on March 9, 2018. Hence, under Rule 59(d), this court's Order for a New Trial is authorized by the Rule. Kain v. Winslow Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984); Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952). The court finds further that it is not required to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the parties prior to entry of this Order for a New Trial because there is no pending Rule 59 motion and therefore this Order is not based upon “a reason not stated in the motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
“A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant [ ] a new trial.” Harvey By & Through Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1989). A federal court may set aside a jury verdict if the ends of justice require it. Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86, 88-89 (10th Cir. 1972).
[t]he motion for a new trial may invoke the discretion of the court in so far as it is bottomed on the claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair . . . .
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). Although motions for a new trial are generally committed to a court's discretion, they are disfavored and should be granted with “great caution.” Richins v. Deere and Co., 231 F.R.D. 623, 625 (D.N.M. 2004); Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 749 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1256 (D.N.M. 2010).
A jury's determination of damages is considered inviolate unless an award is so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and raises an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial. Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1981); Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1020-21 (D. Colo. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Pahoua Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 658 F. App'x 884 (10th Cir. 2016). See also Blangsted v. Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Prot. Dist., 642 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2009). A verdict will not be set aside on this basis, however, unless it is so plainly excessive as to suggest that it was the product of such passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Id. Such bias, prejudice or passion can be inferred from excessiveness. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168. See also Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995); Wells v. Colo. College, 478 F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir. 1973). Focus should be on “whether the compensatory award was excessive in relation to the injury[.]” McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 463 F. App'x 709, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1169; Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1150 (D. Kan. 2017)). Cases analyzing the grant of a new trial where damages shock the conscience with their excess recognize the principle that if the court determines that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, or for any other reason it appears that the jury erred or abused its discretion on not only on the issue of damages but also on the issue of liability, the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168 (emphasis added). See also Minneapolis St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1931) (“In actions under the federal statute no verdict can be permitted to stand which is found to be in any degree the result of appeals to passion and prejudice.”); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1967) (“a verdict based on jury prejudice cannot be sustained even when punitive damages are warranted”). If the court finds that an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, “then the court must order a new trial on all issues because it is impossible to determine the degree to which these factors affected the jury generally and therefore influenced the determination of liability.” Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 564 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1201 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010). See also Higgs v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 840, 860-61 (Colo. 1985); Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168; Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991).
In this case, the jury awarded the Plaintiff compensatory damages of $5, 000, 000.00 on a record supporting, at best, only nominal damages. Additionally, the jury awarded $1, 000, 000.00 in punitive damages on a record which was bereft of any evidence of wrongdoing except that based solely on the testimony of an agitated convicted felon who had known the Plaintiff for only one week, who knew nothing about Plaintiff's seizure disorder nor his use of Coumadin, a blood thinner causing excessive bleeding of any skin laceration, nor the Plaintiff's physical condition at the time his second seizure commenced.
In the late morning on March 7, 2013, the Plaintiff, Jayson Oslund, suffered a seizure during which he fell backward from a full standing position and landed on his head on the cement floor of the Sterling Correctional Facility (“SCF”). Fellow inmate Ernest Montoya, who was with Plaintiff at the time, testified that Mr. Oslund “just fell out and then busted his head on the cement.” Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit where he was examined, his bleeding was stopped and his scalp wound stitched. Dr. Maurice Fauvel, a staff physician at SCF, testified that when he first saw the Plaintiff that day, Mr. Oslund had a laceration on his head consistent with falling backward onto concrete. Dr. Fauvel testified that the Plaintiff knew he had a seizure disorder but Plaintiff refused to take medications which had been prescribed for him to control his seizures. After this seizure, Dr. Fauvel administered anti-seizure medication; however, he explained that such medications are not instantly effective, but rather have to build up in the system of the patient. Dr. Fauvel noted that Plaintiff had a hematoma on his head from swelling and bruising that the doctor found to be predictable because of Plaintiff's use of blood thinners to manage a clotting disorder.
The activities which spawned this case arose five to six hours subsequent to Plaintiff's injury-causing seizure and fall, after Plaintiff left the medical unit in a wheelchair and was transported to his new ground floor cell.

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FindACase | Sheedy v. Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corp.
Sheedy v. Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corp.
ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT BOARD, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE and ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Defendants.
GREGORY A. PRESNELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 62), the Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 73), and the Defendant's Reply (Doc. 76).
The Plaintiff, Donna Sheedy, has filed suit against Adventist Health Systems (“AHS”) and various affiliated entities (collectively, “Defendants”). Her Amended Complaint (Doc. 47) asserts fifteen claims: eleven claims based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), one constitutional claim, and three state law claims. These claims involve two distinct defined-benefit pension plans associated with AHS: the Hospital Plan and the Merged Plan. The Plaintiff, who is a participant in these plans, contends that they are not “church” plans and are thus subject to ERISA requirements. Alternatively, she argues that ERISA's church plan exemption is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count XII). Finally, she asserts three alternative state law claims: breach of contract (Count XIII), unjust enrichment (Count XIV), and breach of fiduciary duty (Count XV).
The Plaintiff's claims all relate to pension plans connected to employment with Adventist Health Systems. In addition to bringing suit against AHS, the Plaintiff also named the Adventist Retirement Board (“Retirement Board”), the Adventist Retirement Plan Administrative Committee (“Hospital Plan Committee”), and the Adventist Health System Benefits Administrative Committee (“Merged Plan Committee”) as Defendants.
The Amended Complaint groups the pension plans at issue into two categories: the “Old Plan” and the “Frozen Plans.” Doc. 47 ¶ 46. Because the Plaintiff's usage of terms describing the Plans is inconsistent in its Memorandum in Opposition, the Court will use the Defendants' terms instead: “Hospital Plan” for the Old Plan and “Merged Plan” for the Frozen Plans.
According to the Amended Complaint, both the Hospital Plan and the Merged Plan “were established and are maintained by [AHS] to provide retirement [benefits] to employees.” Id. ¶ 47. The Plaintiff states that neither Plan qualifies as a “church plan” under ERISA because they are not maintained by a church and the employees covered by the plans are not employed by an entity controlled or associated with a church. Id. ¶ 9. The Plans allegedly were established and maintained by AHS, which the Plaintiff claims is a business and not a church or a convention or association of churches. Id. ¶ 9, 47. According to the Amended Complaint, the underfunding of the Plans violates ERISA. See Id. ¶ 10. The Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants have violated ERISA by failing to comply with reporting and disclosure requirements, failing to establish the Plans pursuant to a written instrument, failing to establish a trust as required, and breaching fiduciary duties. Alternatively, the Plaintiff asserts that even if the Plans are not subject to ERISA, the Defendants are liable for state law claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment for failing to adequately fund the plans. Id. ¶ 11.
The Hospital Plan is a defined-benefit pension plan that was established in 1980, Doc. 63-1 at 7, and suspended in 1992. Doc. 63-5 at 28. The Plan is administered by the Retirement Board and the Hospital Plan Committee. The Plaintiff alleges that AHS did not make contributions to the Hospital Plan in 2012 or 2013, resulting in the Hospital Plan being “underfunded by $112 million as of December 31, 2013.” Doc. 47 ¶ 2-3. However, according to the December 31, 2016 Audited Consolidated Financial Statements, the Hospital Plan is funded at 100.1% of its benefit obligations. Doc. 63-5 at 29.
The Merged Plan, which is also a defined-benefit pension plan, was frozen in 2010. Doc. 47 ¶ 73. It is administered by the Merged Plan Committee. Id. ¶ 21. The 2016 Financial Statement reflects that this Plan is underfunded by $29 Million. Doc. 63-5 at 29.
In reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “courts must be mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” U.S. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). This is a liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with particularity every element of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001). However, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-555 (2007). The complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” id. at 555, and cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).

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As a district court of the United States has jurisdiction under Rev.Stat. § 563 of all suits to recover forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States, including forfeitures of a bail bond, the question whether the forfeiture should be enforced by scire facias under Rev.Stat. § 716, or by proceedings under a law of the state in which the court is held, goes only to the remedy, and not to the jurisdiction, and the action of the district court is binding in a collateral proceeding.
The rule that the death of a party to a suit, either pending the suit or after judgment and before execution, abates the suit does not apply to a case whore land has been sold upon execution, but no deed delivered.
This was a bill in equity brought by the United States to redeem lot 1, block 104, Fort Scott, Kansas, the title to which lot is now held by Elizabeth McElroy, the real defendant in the case. A demurrer was originally filed to the bill upon the ground of laches, and was sustained by the court below, but the decree dismissing the bill was reversed by this Court, United States v. Insley, 130 U. S. 263, and the case remanded with a direction for further proceedings.
made absolute, judgment for $2,000 entered against McElroy, and execution issued April 27, 1871, and levied upon the lot in question. This lot, with another also levied upon, had been bought by McElroy of one Bryant on August 5, 1869, for $6,000. At the time of this purchase, and to pay for one property, McElroy borrowed of one Palmer $3,500, for which he gave a mortgage upon the lots to secure the loan. On May 30, 1871, four weeks after the levy was made, Palmer brought suit to foreclose his mortgage, but did not make the United States a party defendant. On June 6, 1871, the United States bought lot 1 at the execution sale in satisfaction of its debt. On October 4, Palmer obtained judgment of foreclosure in the sum of $3,764.16, with costs. On October 16, the sale to the United States was duly confirmed, and a deed ordered. The deed, however, was not executed until October 30, 1883. On October 25, 1871, Palmer took out execution against McElroy, and on December 4, the property was sold under this execution, and bought in for the debt by Palmer. The sale was confirmed January 4, 1872, and a sheriff's deed executed to Palmer.
1. The property had been sold to the United States by sale confirmed October 16, 1871, on a second lien.
2. The property had been sold to Palmer by a sale confirmed December 26, 1871, on a first lien, the United States not being a party defendant.
3. The United States, not having been made a party, had the right to redeem, and treat the sheriff's deed as a mortgage in the hands of Palmer, and Palmer as a mortgagee in possession.
years. The property had an earning capacity, and the rents and profits went to Moses McElroy. He died in August, 1881, leaving the property partly unpaid for. In the agreed statement of facts, it was admitted that the agreement with the Palmer heirs vested the title and ownership in said land in Mrs. McElroy, except as affected by the claim of the United States in this action, if it should be determined that any such claim or interest existed. After the agreement of purchase had been made by defendant, she improved the lands by erecting buildings at an expense of several thousands of dollars, collected the rents, and enjoyed the use and benefit of the property, the rents and profits exceeding by a small amount the principal and interest which would be due under the mortgage of 1869, by way of redemption. The property was finally deeded by the Palmer heirs to the defendant about five years after her husband's death, and after the filing of the bill in this suit.
Upon the hearing in the circuit court upon an agreed statement of facts, the bill was again dismissed, and the United States appealed to the circuit court of appeals. That court reversed the decree of the circuit court, and a decree was directed in favor of the United States. 54 F. 221. From this decree an appeal was taken by Insley to this Court.
The question in this case is whether the proceedings by scire facias, taken by the United States to enforce the forfeiture of McElroy's recognizance, operated to divest his title to the lands in dispute.
that, under Rev.Stat. § 1014, authorizing commissioners "to take bail in any state where he [the accused] may be found, and agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state," proceedings for the enforcement of bail bonds should conform to the practice in the state where the bond is sued, and that, as the statutes of Kansas do not authorize proceedings by scire facias in such cases, but require a formal action, termed in the Code of Kansas a "civil action" against the bail, this practice should also be pursued in the federal courts, and hence that the judgment of the District Court of Kansas in this case, rendered upon a writ of scire facias, was illegal and void.
But we do not find it necessary to determine whether a scire facias was a proper remedy or not. It is a sufficient answer to the appellant's contention that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter under Rev.Stat. § 563, which confers upon district courts jurisdiction of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States, and § 716, conferring upon district courts power to issue writs of scire facias, and also that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was not only served with the writ, but appeared, and moved to quash the same, apparently for the same reasons which are now urged for holding the proceedings to be a nullity. If McElroy had desired to contest his liability further, he should have prosecuted his writ of error from the circuit court, which he appears to have sued out, but subsequently dismissed. The error, if any were committed, did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, but only to the particular remedy pursued, and the action of that court in respect thereto was binding in a collateral proceeding. Hendrick v. Whittemore, 105 Mass. 23.
130 U. S. 354, 130 U. S. 395; Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231; Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Caines' Cas. 40, 56.
of the United States was precisely the same as would have been that of a third person purchasing the property.


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Compiled for a special part-issue on my work of the Revista Sociologia & Antropologia Rio de Janeiro, 2019.
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What might an anthropology of the internet look like?

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