ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY v. SMITH ET AL.
Illinois law provides for forfeiture of movable personal property used to facilitate a drug crime, permits police to seize the property without a warrant, and allows the State to keep the property nearly five months before beginning judicial forfeiture proceedings. Respondents, six individuals who had cars and cash seized under that law, brought this federal civil rights action, claiming that the failure of the State to provide a speedy postseizure hearing violated the federal Due Process Clause. The District Court dismissed the case based on Circuit precedent, but, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit departed from that precedent and ruled for respondents. This Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit's due process determination, but at oral argument the Court learned that all of the actual property disputes between the parties had been resolved.
1. The case is moot. The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual "Cases" or "Controversies," Art. III, §2, and an actual controversy must exist at all stages of review, not just when the complaint is filed, Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401. Here there is no longer any actual controversy regarding ownership or possession of the underlying property. There is no claim for damages before this Court; there is no properly certified class or dispute over class certification; and this case does not fit within the category of cases that are "capable of repetition" while "evading review." Only an abstract dispute about the law remains. Pp. 4-6.
2. The judgment below is vacated. In moot cases, this Court normally vacates the lower court judgment, which clears the path for relitigation of the issues and preserves the rights of the parties, while prejudicing none by a preliminary decision. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40. Where mootness is the result of settlement rather than happenstance, however, the losing party forfeits the equitable remedy of vacatur. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 25. This case more closely resembles mootness through happenstance than through settlement. In Bancorp, the party seeking review caused the mootness by voluntarily settling the issue contested throughout the litigation. Here, the Court believes that the presence of the federal case played no significant role in the termination of plaintiffs' state-court forfeiture proceedings. Plaintiffs' forfeiture cases took place with no procedural link to the case before this Court; apparently terminated on substantive grounds in their ordinary course; and, to the Court's knowledge, no one raised the procedural question at issue here in those cases. This Court therefore concludes that it should follow its ordinary practice and order vacatur. Pp. 6-9.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Illinois law provides a sufficiently speedy opportunity for an individual, whose car or cash police have seized without a warrant, to contest the lawfulness of the seizure. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1; United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983). At the time of oral argument, however, we learned that the underlying property disputes have all ended. The State has returned all the cars that it seized, and the individual property owners have either forfeited any relevant cash or have accepted as final the State's return of some of it. We consequently find the case moot, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950); see also E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice 941-942 (9th ed. 2007).
Illinois law provides for forfeiture of movable personal property (including cars and cash) used "to facilitate" a drug crime. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §570/505(a)(6) (West 2008). It permits a police officer to seize that property without a warrant where (1) the officer has "probable cause to believe" the property was so used and (2) a "warrantless seizure ... would be reasonable" in the circumstances. §570/505(b). When an officer has seized property without a warrant, the relevant law enforcement agency must notify the State's Attorney within 52 days of the seizure; the State's Attorney must notify the property owner of any impending forfeiture within a further 45 days; and, if the owner wishes to contest forfeiture, the State's Attorney must begin judicial forfeiture proceedings within yet a further 45 days. See ch. 725, §§150/5-150/6. Thus, the statute gives the State up to 142 days, nearly five months, to begin judicial forfeiture proceedings--during which time the statute permits the State to keep the car or cash within its possession.
On November 22, 2006, six individuals (the respondents or "plaintiffs") brought this federal civil rights action against defendants the city of Chicago, the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, and the Cook County State's Attorney (the petitioner here, whom we shall call the "State's Attorney"). See Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Three of the individuals, Chermane Smith, Edmanuel Perez, and Tyhesha Brunston, said that earlier in 2006 the police had, upon their arrests, seized their cars without a warrant. See Complaint ¶25, App. 34a (Smith, seizure on Jan. 19, 2006); id., ¶26, at 34a (Perez, seizure on Mar. 8, 2006); id., ¶27, at 34a (Brunston, seizure on Apr. 8, 2006); Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification ¶8, at 39a. The other three plaintiffs, Michelle Waldo, Kirk Yunker, and Tony Williams, said that earlier in 2006 police had, upon their arrests, seized their cash without a warrant. See Complaint ¶28, at 34a-35a (Waldo, seizure on Jan. 20, 2006); id., ¶29, at 35a (Yunker, seizure on Sept. 26, 2006); id., ¶30, at 35a (Williams, seizure in July 2006); Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification ¶8, at 39a. The plaintiffs added that the police department still had custody of their property. See Complaint ¶¶24-30, at 34a-35a. They claimed that the failure of the State to provide a speedy postseizure hearing violated the federal Due Process Clause. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. And they asked the court (1) to certify the case as a class action, (2) to declare that they had a due process right to a prompt postseizure probable-cause hearing, (3) to declare that the hearing must take place within 10 days of any seizure, and (4) to enjoin the defendants' current practice of keeping the property in custody for a longer time without a judicial determination of probable cause. See Complaint ¶36, App. 36a.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Seventh Circuit precedent made clear that "the Constitution does not require any procedure prior to the actual forfeiture proceeding." Jones v. Takaki, 38 F. 3d 321, 324 (1994) (citing Von Neumann, supra, at 249). On February 22, 2007, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. It also denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The plaintiffs appealed.
On May 2, 2008, the Seventh Circuit decided the appeal in the plaintiffs' favor. Smith v. Chicago, 524 F. 3d 834. It reconsidered and departed from its earlier precedent. Id., at 836-839. It held that "the procedures set out in" the Illinois statute "show insufficient concern for the due process right of the plaintiffs." Id., at 838. And it added that, "given the length of time which can result between the seizure of property and the opportunity for an owner to contest the seizure under" Illinois law, "some sort of mechanism to test the validity of the retention of the property is required." Ibid. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., at 839. Its mandate issued about seven weeks thereafter.
On February 23, 2009, we granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit's "due process" determination. The Court of Appeals then recalled its mandate. The parties filed briefs in this Court. We then recognized that the case might be moot, and we asked the parties to address the question of mootness at the forthcoming oral argument.
At oral argument counsel for both sides confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about ownership or possession of the relevant property. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (State's Attorney); id., at 56-57 (plaintiffs). The State had returned the cars to plaintiffs Smith, Perez, and Brunston. See id., at 5. Two of the plaintiffs had "defaulted," apparently conceding that the State could keep the cash. Ibid. And the final plaintiff and the State's Attorney agreed that the plaintiff could keep some, but not all, of the cash at issue. Id., at 5, 56-57. As counsel for the State's Attorney told us, "[T]hose cases are over." Id., at 5.
The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual "Cases" or "Controversies." U. S. Const., Art. III, §2. An " 'actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)). In this case there is no longer any actual controversy between the parties about ownership or possession of the underlying property.
The State's Attorney argues that there is a continuing controversy over damages. We concede that the plaintiffs filed a motion in the District Court seeking damages. But the plaintiffs filed their motion after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion. And, after this Court granted certiorari, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate, taking the case away from the District Court before the District Court could respond to the motion. Thus, we have before us a complaint that seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages.
The plaintiffs point out that they sought certification of a class. And a class might well contain members who continue to dispute ownership of seized property. But that fact is beside the point. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' class certification motion. The plaintiffs did not appeal that denial. Hence the only disputes relevant here are those between these six plaintiffs and the State's Attorney; those disputes concerned cars and cash; and those disputes are now over. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 404 (1980) ("A named plaintiff whose claim expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits until a class has been properly certified").
The parties, of course, continue to dispute the lawfulness of the State's hearing procedures. But that dispute is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs' particular legal rights. Rather, it is an abstract dispute about the law, unlikely to affect these plaintiffs any more than it affects other Illinois citizens. And a dispute solely about the meaning of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened harm, falls outside the scope of the constitutional words "Cases" and "Controversies." See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937); Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895).
We can find no special circumstance here that might warrant our continuing to hear the case. We have sometimes heard attacks on practices that no longer directly affect the attacking party, but are "capable of repetition" while "evading review." See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 462 (2007); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). Yet here, unlike those cases, nothing suggests that the individual plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State's seizure procedures. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 109 (1983) ("[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality"); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 318-319 (1974) (per curiam). And in any event, since those who are directly affected by the forfeiture practices might bring damages actions, the practices do not "evade review." See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (damages claim saves case from mootness). Consequently, the case is moot. See, e.g., Preiser, supra, at 403-404; Mills, supra, at 658.
It is less easy to say whether we should order the judgment below vacated. The statute that enables us to vacate a lower court judgment when a case becomes moot is flexible, allowing a court to "direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U. S. C. §2106; see also U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21 (1994). Applying this statute, we normally do vacate the lower court judgment in a moot case because doing so "clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties," preserving "the rights of all parties," while prejudicing none "by a decision which ... was only preliminary." Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40.
In Bancorp, however, we described circumstances where we would not do so. We said that, "[w]here mootness results from settlement" rather than " 'happenstance,' " the "losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy ... [and] thereby surrender[ed] his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur." 513 U. S., at 25. The plaintiffs, pointing out that the State's Attorney agreed to return all three cars and some of the cash, claim that, with respect to at least four of the plaintiffs, this case falls within Bancorp's "settlement" exception.
In our view, however, this case more closely resembles mootness through "happenstance" than through "settlement"--at least the kind of settlement that the Court considered in Bancorp. Bancorp focused upon a bankruptcy-related dispute that involved a legal question whether a bankruptcy court could lawfully confirm a debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization plan if the plan relied upon what the debtor said was a special exception (called the "new value exception") to ordinary creditor priority rules. Id., at 19-20. The parties contested that legal issue in the Bankruptcy Court; they contested it in an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's order to the Federal District Court; they contested it in a further appeal to the Court of Appeals; and eventually they contested it in this Court. Id., at 20. While the case was pending here, the parties settled their differences in the Bankruptcy Court (the court where the case originated)--including their differences on this particular contested legal point. Ibid. They agreed upon a reorganization plan, which they said would constitute a settlement that mooted the federal case. Ibid.
Recognizing that the reorganization plan that the Bankruptcy Judge confirmed in the case amounted to a settlement that mooted the case, this Court did not vacate the lower court's judgment. The Court's reason for leaving the lower court's judgment in place was that mootness was not a result of "the vagaries of circumstance." Id., at 25. Rather the party seeking review had "caused the mootness by voluntary action." Id., at 24 (emphasis added). By virtue of the settlement, that party had "voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari." Id., at 25. Hence, compared to mootness caused by "happenstance," considerations of "equity" and "fairness" tilted against vacatur. Id., at 25-26.
Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that the terminations here fall on the "happenstance" side of the line. The six individual cases proceeded through a different court system without any procedural link to the federal case before us. To our knowledge (and we have examined the state-court docket sheets), no one in those cases raised the procedural question at issue here. Rather, the issues in those six cases were issues solely of state substantive law: Were the cars and the cash forfeitable or not? And court docket sheets suggest that the six state cases terminated on substantive grounds in the ordinary course of such state proceedings. In the three automobile cases, the State voluntarily dismissed the proceedings and returned the cars between 11 and 40 months after the seizures, a long enough time for the State to have investigated the matters and to have determined (after the termination of any related criminal proceedings) for evidentiary reasons that it did not wish to claim the cars. See Dockets in People v. 2004 Chevrolet Impala, No. 2006-COFO-000296 (Cook County, IL) (Brunston's car returned on July 27, 2009); People v. Smith, No. 2006-COFO-000036 (Cook County, IL) (Smith's car returned on May 5, 2008); and People v. 1999 Chevrolet Malibu, No. 2006-COFO-000288 (Cook County, IL) (Perez's car returned on Jan. 29, 2007). In the remaining contested case, involving cash, the State voluntarily dismissed the proceedings after 14 months, again a long enough time for the State to have weighed the evidence and found a compromise settlement appropriate on the merits. See Docket in People v. $1,500 in U. S. Currency, No. 2006-COFO-000201 (Cook County, IL) (Waldo's cash returned on Mar. 19, 2007). The disparate dates at which plaintiffs' forfeiture proceedings terminated--11, 14, 27, and 40 months after the seizures--indicate that the State's Attorney did not coordinate the resolution of plaintiffs' state-court cases, either with each other or with plaintiffs' federal civil rights case. Cf. Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 39-40 (stating that a lower court judgment would have been vacated even though an action of the party seeking review had brought about the mootness because that action--a commodity being decontrolled by Executive Order--was basically unrelated); see also Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947).
For these reasons, we believe that the presence of this federal case played no significant role in the termination of the separate state-court proceedings. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that neither party, although aware of Bancorp, suggested the contrary at oral argument. Indeed, both parties argued against mootness at oral argument, a fact that further suggests that a desire to avoid review in this case played no role at all in producing the state case terminations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-11, 33-38. And if the presence of this federal case played no role in causing the termination of those state cases, there is not present here the kind of "voluntary forfeit[ure]" of a legal remedy that led the Court in Bancorp to find that considerations of "fairness" and "equity" tilted against vacatur.
We consequently conclude that we should follow our ordinary practice, thereby "clear[ing] the path for future relitigation of the issues." Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40. Thus, nothing in this opinion prevents the plaintiffs from bringing a claim for damages based on the conduct alleged in their complaint. Id., at 37-40.
ANITA ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, PETITIONER v. CHERMANE SMITH et al.
While I agree that this case is moot and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I would not vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Following the teaching of our decision in U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18 (1994), I would apply the general rule against vacating appellate judgments that have become moot because the parties settled.
Bancorp set forth the basic principles for determining whether to vacate a case that has become moot. The overriding concern is equitable: "From the beginning we have disposed of moot cases in the manner ' "most consonant to justice" ... in view of the nature and character of the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.' " Id., at 24 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 477-478 (1916), in turn quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 302 (1892) (alteration in original)). The "public interest" must be considered as part of this equitable inquiry, Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26, 27, and that interest is generally better served by leaving appellate judgments intact. " 'Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants ... .' " Id., at 26 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Hence, we will typically vacate a judgment when the party seeking review has been "frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance" or "when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below." Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 25. But we will typically decline to vacate when "the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action," id., at 24, including action taken in good faith and in conjunction with the opposing party. Even when "respondent agreed to [a] settlement that caused the mootness," it remains "petitioner's burden, as the party seeking relief from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibility for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur." Id., at 26. "[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review." Id., at 29.
In my view, the Court has misapplied these principles. To be sure, the "settlement" between the parties in this case might be distinguished from the more conventional settlement reached by the parties in Bancorp. And we have no evidence to suggest that petitioner returned respondents' property prior to the conclusion of our review with the purpose or expectation of manufacturing mootness. Nevertheless, petitioner's decision to return the automobiles when it did appears to have been legally discretionary, as was the "compromise settlement" that it reached with respondent Waldo regarding her cash, ante, at 8. In light of petitioner's purposive and voluntary action that caused the mootness--along with its failure to alert us to the relevant facts or to explain why vacatur would serve the public interest--I believe it has failed to carry its burden to "demonstrate ... equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur." Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.
There was a third option for disposing of this case: We could have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Like denying the petition in the first place, that disposition would have preserved the judgment below. At the time we granted certiorari on February 23, 2009, petitioner had already resolved the underlying property disputes for five of the six named respondents. See ante, at 4, 8-9. It was entirely predictable that the final settlement would soon follow. Moreover, the briefing in this case has revealed a disagreement over basic descriptive questions of Illinois law, questions that were not passed upon below. Compare Brief for Petitioner 60-66 with Brief for Respondents 41-44. And, of course, we have no way of knowing how the District Court would have applied the Court of Appeals' remand order, which left it great discretion to "fashion appropriate procedural relief" "with the help of the parties." Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F. 3d 834, 838 (CA7 2008). It has become clear that the Court was overhasty in deciding to review this case; the improvidence of our grant provides an additional reason why we should not vacate the work product of our colleagues on the Court of Appeals.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the Court's opinion and from its judgment.


text:
The term “State aid” thus generally refers to a competitive advantage (1) selectively conferred to one undertaking or group of undertakings (2) by the State or through State resources (3) which distorts or threatens to distort competition (4) and affects trade between the Member States (5).
For the first criterion, the advantage, the European Courts consider whether an undertaking obtains an economic advantage which it would not have received under “normal market conditions”. The reason for granting the aid is not relevant at this stage, neither is the form of the aid, so that all kinds of grants or exemptions can be covered.
The second criterion, selectivity, is given when certain undertakings or the production of certain goods are treated different when compared to others. Renewable energy support schemes may be an example of such selective treatment, as they favour undertakings producing renewable energy over others active in energy generation.
The third criterion requires that the State is somehow involved in the decision to grant the advantage. From some more recent judgments of the European Court of Justice it seems that despite the wording of Article 107(1) TFEU, the condition that the grant is “by the State or through State resources” is cumulative, not alternative. Thus both must be fulfilled and the aid must stem from State resources and be attributable to the State.
In the context of renewable energy, no general answer exists as to whether the criterion “by the State or through State resources” is met. Rather, it will depend on the features of the support measures in question. However, a distinction can be made based on the ways to administer the scheme: For example, the German Feed-In Tariff system has been held not to be State aid, since it was not the State allocating the money to the recipients, but the German system operators themselves as they first paid the minimum prices and then equalized their costs among themselves in the market. The Flemish quota system did not constitute State aid either, because there was no financial sanction for failure to meet the quota obligation, and thus logically there was nobody administrating and re-distributing such payments. Rather, the obligation existed and the certificates were in place as a means to meet the obligation, but no allocation of costs took place and the State did not direct the resources in any way. However, many other renewable energy support schemes have been found to meet the criterion, since they often use specific fund-like institutions for the administration of the cash flows, i.e. the support being paid to producers of renewable energy and the money collected to cover the costs of such support.
As regards the last two criteria, the European Court of Justice has held that when it comes to the question of a potential distortion of competition, it does not matter that the aid is justified by higher production costs of the recipient or because other Member States have similar schemes in place. As long as the position of the recipient is improved compared to the situation he/she would be in without the measure, this criterion will be met. Similarly, an effect on inter-State trade is normally given as aid to one undertaking or one group of undertakings will give those an advantage that other participants in the EU internal market do not have. Further, the Court has held that it is not necessary that there is a real effect on trade, but it suffices to constitute that trade may be affected.
 E.g. ECJ, Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste  ECR I-3547, par. 60; ECJ, Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission  ECR II-2125, par. 78.
 E.g. ECJ, Case C-251/07 France v Commission  ECR I-6639.
 Compare also e.g. ECJ, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  ECR I-2099.
 ECJ, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  ECR I-2099, par. 58-62.
 ECJ, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  ECR I-2099.
 Compare: European Commission, Letter to the Member State, State aid N 254/06 – Belgium ‘Panneaux photovoltaïques’, par. 13.
 For an example of the considerations the European Commission, compare e.g. Commission Decision of 8 March 2011 on State aid measure C 24/09 (ex N 446/08), OJ L235/42, par. 60ff.
 ECJ, Case 173/73 Italy v Commission  ECR 709, par. 73.
 ECJ, Case 78/76 Steinike and Weinlig  ECR 595, par. 109.
 ECJ, Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission  ECR 2671; CFI, Cases T-81, 82 and 83/07 Maas v. Commission  ECR II-2411.
 Compare: CFI, Cases T-298, 312, 313, 315, 600-607/97, 1, 3-6 and 23/98 Alzetta Mauro v. Commission  ECR II-2319, ECJ; C-310/99 Italy v Commission  ECR I-2289; ECJ Case C-211/05 Italy v Commission  ECR II‑2777.
What if a measure is State aid?
Not all measures constituting State aid are prohibited. Rather, according to Article 108 TFEU, all new State aid measures according to the five criteria set out in Article 107 TFEU have to be notified to the European Commission. If they are not, they are in principle unlawful. However, that does not mean that the measure is prohibited per se. Instead, it means that the measure may not be put into effect prior to any decision by the Commission explicitly authorising it, by finding it compatible with the internal market. Thus one has to distinguish between “unlawful”, meaning non-notified, and “incompatible” aid.
In practice, a Member State wanting to adopt a State aid measure first has to submit its plans to the Commission and await authorization. The same applies whenever changes are made to existing and approved aid measures.
Thus, all existing aid that has not been notified and authorized by the European Commission is in principle unlawful. Therefore, anyone can bring a complaint against such measures, upon which the Commission may examine whether this is indeed a case of unlawful State aid, or not. Alternatively, one may turn to a national court which has to apply the European State aid rules as well. However, while a national court can find that a measure constitutes State aid according to Article 107 TFEU, the European Commission has exclusive competence on the decision whether aid is compatible or not with the internal market. So normally only the Commission can give or refuse authorization.
 There are certain exemptions thought, e.g. for aid remaining below a certain “de minimis” treshold, that is aid in the form of direct payments below 200.000 EUR granted over any three-year period or for aid falling under one of the provisions of the General Block Exemption Regulation. See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L 379/1; Commission Regulation 2008/800/EC of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty, OJ L214/3.
 Council Regulation 659/1999/EC laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 3.
 This is often referred to as the “standstill” clause, compare: Council Regulation 659/1999/EC laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 3.
 In exceptional cases, the Council may decide according to Art. 108(2) TFEU.
Which procedures will be followed?
The procedures for State aid notification and authorization process are regulated quite strictly and nowadays an interactive platform for State aid notifications exists. Overall, the procedure involves a more or less intense dialogue between the Commission and the Member State notifying.
Generally, the Commission has to take decisions within a certain timeframe; if not, the aid will be deemed compatible. The time limits are intended to provide an incentive to the Member States to notify the aid: for non-notified, unlawful aid no time limits apply. There is a simplified procedure for certain cases, which includes shorter timeframes, such as cases under the Environmental Aid Guidelines.
The first step in the procedure is the so-called pre-notification phase. This phase is not directly based on the provisions of the Treaties and is not “officially” part of the notification procedure under Article 108 TFEU yet, but has emerged from Commission practice: All Member States are invited to submit a draft notification of their plans for State aid measures. The Commission will examine them and will – within two weeks – get back to the Member State in question. Through teleconferences, emails and possibly even meetings, it will be discussed whether the case qualifies prima facie for a simplified procedure. The latest five days after the last contact, the Commission will communicate to the Member State whether a simplified procedure can be followed.
If the Commission has informed the Member State that a simplified procedure may be followed, then no later than two months the Member State shall submit the final and thus the official notification. The Commission will publish a summary of the notification, including a notice that the measure may go through the simplified procedure, and ask interested parties for comments within ten working days. However, if the comments reveal that the case is more complex than originally thought and therefore not eligible for simplified proceedings, it will be reverted to the normal procedure.
If from the notification and the comments, the Commission is sufficiently convinced that there is no aid or that the aid is compatible with the internal market, a short-form decision (“decision not to raise objections”) will be issued possibly within 20 working days. The decision will be published on the Commission’s website, but it need not necessarily include any reasons.
After notification, a preliminary examination will be done and the Commission has to take a decision within two months. Such a decision may constitute that the measure is no aid or that there are no doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market (“decision not to raise objections”). In other cases, the Commission may find that there are doubts regarding its compatibility (“decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure”). The two months period will start running only after receipt of a complete application, which means from the point that the Commission does not request any further information deemed necessary to come to a decision. When requesting information, the Commission sets the Member State a deadline for answering the request and if no answer is received in time, it will send a reminder. If the requested information is not submitted within the time periods granted for that and the reminder did not help, the Commission will normally deem the notification to be withdrawn, meaning that if the measure does constitute State aid meeting the criteria of Article 107 TFEU, it is non-notified and thus unlawful State aid. The notification will be considered complete if within two months the Commission has not asked for any such additional information,  and the two months period for the preliminary examination will start to run. Furthermore, the two months period may be extended in case both the Commission and the Member State consent. Notably, the Commission is under no obligation to consult with the Member States, beneficiaries of the aid or any other interested party during the preliminary investigation. It must however examine the facts brought to its attention.
If the Commission starts a formal investigation procedure, a final decision normally has to be taken within 18 months. At the beginning of the formal investigation procedure and with the publication of the decision to initiate it, the Commission asks the Member State and interested parties for their comments, each of them being normally given a month to respond.
The term “interested party” in this regard has to be understood as any Member State and any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade associations. The complainant itself will not per definition be considered interested party, but will have to prove its legitimate interest in the assessment of the aid, for example the protection of its competitive position in the market. However, the role of interested parties is rather limited and they do not have to be heard as to their (legal) assessment of the measure, neither does the Commission need to respond to their arguments. Rather, interested parties largely serve as sources of information for the Commission. They cannot debate the case in the same way as the Member State granting the aid.
The comments received are submitted to the Member State in question who is again normally given a month to reply to the comments. Generally, the procedure is only between the Commission and the Member State and can result in a decision addressed solely to that Member State. Being the addressee of the decision, the Member State will thus have certain rights of defence, among which most importantly the right to be heard.
At the end of the formal investigation procedure, the Commission can adopt a positive decision (declaring that the measure does not constitute aid or that it is compatible with the internal market), it can adopt conditional decisions (imposing certain conditions on the measure in order to make it compatible with the internal market) or a negative decision (meaning that the measure is incompatible and may not be put into effect or – in case of existing non-notified aid - has to be recovered).
In case the aid had not been notified, but the Commission learns about it through some other ways such as for example a complaint, then normally no time limits apply while in principle the same procedural steps will be taken as in the course of a notification procedure. The only exception to this is the case in which recovery of the unlawful (as non-notified) aid has already been effectuated, such as in case a national court has ordered such a measure: Then the time limits as in the course of a notification procedure apply.
 See: Article 108 TFEU, also: Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1.
 Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for certain types of State Aid, COM 2009/C 136/03, OJ C136/3, par. 5(a)(ii).
 Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for certain types of State Aid, COM 2009/C 136/03, OJ C136/3, par. 13f.
 Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for certain types of State Aid, COM 2009/C 136/03, OJ C136/3, par. 21.
 For various examples, see the State aid register: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_sa_by_date.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 5(5).
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 4(4).
 E.g. ECJ, Joined Cases 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen BV v. Inspecteur der Vennootschapsbelasting (Heineken)  ECR 3435, par. 22.
 See ECJ Case C-204/97, Portugal v. Commission  ECR I-3175.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 7(6).
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 6.
 Compare D. Grespan, Recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid, in: W. Mederer et al. (eds.) EU Competition Law, Volume IV State Aid Book One, Claeys & Casteels, Leuven 2008, p. 688 (incl. case law).
 Compare D. Grespan, Recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid, in: W. Mederer et al. (eds.) EU Competition Law, Volume IV State Aid Book One, Claeys & Casteels, Leuven 2008, p. 688f (incl. case law).
 See e.g. Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-223/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Commission  ECR II-435, par. 122ff.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 7.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 11(2).
Unlawful and incompatible - what then?
When the Commission finds that an aid measure - no matter whether notified or not - is not compatible (negative decision), the Commission will decide that the measure may not be effected or in case the aid has already been granted that the Member State definitely has to take all measures necessary to recover it. Thus all the aid granted must be actually paid back. Only in exceptional, duly reasoned cases, where it would be in conflict with principles of European law, no recovery shall be ordered. The implementation of the Commission’s decision and thus the recovery procedure itself will be governed by national law and procedures in place in the Member States.
As unlawful aid per definition has already been paid and in most cases continues to be paid while the Commission is examining the case, it is possible, by means of injunction, that the Commission orders suspension or provisional recovery before a final decision is taken. While suspension is less problematic to effect, and would be similar to the “standstill clause” for notification, recovery is quite a difficult exercise. Accordingly, the Commission may only take such a decision in case that “according to an established practice there are no doubts about the aid character of the measure concerned and there is an urgency to act and there is a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to a competitor”. In the absence of Commission practice, it is unclear which could be such cases of urgency. Literature suggests that there is urgency to act when the Commission has to fear that other Member States will grant unlawful State aid as well or when the interest in recovery exceeds the interests of the Member State and the recipient by far. Serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to a competitor is further hard to prove. Though the damage must not be certain but only reach a decent grade of probability, it must reach certain intensity and may not be considered merely marginal. Also the damage has to be irreparable, i.e. it must have effects which cannot be compensated with any form of damages.
In addition, according to the case-law by the Court, if the Commission has established beyond doubt e.g. in its decision to open the formal investigation procedure that a measure is non-notified State aid, the Member State itself may have to stop it, at least until the European Commission has cleared it as being compatible in the course of the running procedure.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 14(1).
 Compare e.g. Case C-415/03 Commission v. Greece  ECR I-3875, par. 44.
 Compare Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 14, also e.g. Commission Decision 93/329/EC of July 1990 concerning aid granted by the Italian Government to a manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses, 1992, OJ L 183 (a case in which the Commission found recovery disproportionate, due to the long time between the moment the aid had become known to the Commission and the final decision).
 Compare D. Grespan, Recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid, in: W. Mederer et al. (eds.) EU Competition Law, Volume IV State Aid Book One, Claeys & Casteels, Leuven 2008, p. 656.
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999, OJ L83/1, Art. 11 (2).
 U. Ehricke, in: U. Immenga, E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht: EG 2007, Pt II, C.H. Beck, München 2007, Art. 88, par. 125.
 A. Sinnaeve, § 32 Procedure regarding unlawful aid, in: M. Heidenhain (eds.), European State Aid Law, C.H. Beck, München, 2010, par. 9.
 ECJ, Case C-400/99 Tirrenia  ECR I-7303, par.57f.
What can national courts do?
As mentioned above, while the Commission has exclusive competence on the question whether aid is compatible with the internal market or not, national courts have to enforce the State aid rules as well. They can thus determine whether a measure constitutes aid and whether it should have been notified. Where doubts exist as to the qualification of State aid, national courts may ask for a Commission opinion or request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice according to the procedure set out in Article 267 TFEU. As article 108(3) TFEU and the notification obligation have direct effect, national courts can take on all cases where there is no question of incompatibility yet or anymore. Such may be complaints about non-notified, thus unlawful aid, or actions against aid granted despite the fact that the Commission had declared it incompatible. According to the Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, national courts can order remedies including (a) preventing the payment of unlawful aid, (b) recovery of unlawful aid (regardless of compatibility), (c) recovery of illegality interest, (d) damages for competitors and other third parties and (e) interim measures against unlawful aid.
However, as the national courts cannot decide on the question of compatibility, it is possible that the European Commission later decides that the measure was unlawful but not incompatible.
 For examples: ECJ Case C-354/90 Federation Nationale du Commerce Exterieur des Produits Alimentaires v. France  ECR I-5505 ; Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse  ECR I-14243, par. 103. However, in exceptional cases, the Council may decide, see Art. 108(2) TFEU.
 For examples: ECJ Case 120/73 Lorenz  ECR 1471 , par. 147; Joined Cases 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen BV v. Inspecteur der Vennootschapsbelasting (Heineken)  ECR 3435, par. 147; Case C-345/02, Pearle BV and Others v Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten  ECR I-7139, par. 106.
 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, 2009, OJ C 85/1, par. 22 ff.
State aid for renewable energy - a problem?
While not all Member States have designed their national renewable energy support schemes in a way that they constitute State aid according to Article 107 TFEU, some have. By itself, there is nothing wrong with this. As mentioned above, State aid is only prohibited in case and so far the aid is incompatible with the common market. When the aid is justified, it can be authorized by the European Commission in the course of the notification procedure. And even non-notified aid can – in case for example it has been brought to the attention of the Commission by a complaint – still be authorized ex post, so that aid already paid need not be recovered.
As regards the circumstances under which an aid measure is to be considered compatible with the common market, the Treaty itself offers some possible exemptions: According to Article 107(2) TFEU aid is deemed compatible when it has a social character, is granted to individual consumers or constitutes aid to make good damage from natural disaster as well as certain aid to compensate the new Bundesländer in Germany for the damage of the past division of the country. Those exemptions apply automatically and although the measures concerned still have to be notified in accordance with Article 108 TFEU, the Commission has no discretion and must declare them compatible.
The following paragraph, Article 107(3) TFEU, sets out some possible justifications for aid, the application of which is discretionary so that the Commission can or cannot declare those measures compatible. Accordingly, measures falling within the scope of this provision have to be notified. Article 107(3) TFEU states that aid to areas where the standard of living is abnormally low, for projects of common European interests or remedies against serious disturbances in the economy of a Member State, as well as for regional and cultural aid may be considered compatible. The Commission has adopted several so-called block exemption regulations based on this provision, such as most importantly the General Block Exemption Regulation, Commission Regulation 800/2008/EC. With those instruments, the Commission even exempts certain categories of aid from the notification requirement, thus declaring them per se compatible with the internal market. The categories of aid which can be exempted from the notification requirement have to be defined by a regulation adopted in the Council in accordance with 109 TFEU.
However, the Regulation foresees the possibility to limit the bidding process to specific technologies, if a bidding process does not seem to be able to deliver the optimal results, for example when it comes to the need to diversify the renewable energy portfolio or network constraints. Generally, however, all technologies shall participate, the aid shall be paid as a premium, it shall not be paid in times of negative prices and the beneficiaries shall be subject to standard balancing responsibilities. New and innovative renewable energy technologies may be granted aid in the course of a special bidding process, open to at least one of those technologies, but only up to 5% of the overall planned renewable energy capacity to be built within one year. Small plants, up to 1 MW (6 MW or 6 turbines for wind) shall receive aid under the conditions mentioned (market premiums, no payments in times of negative prices, standard balancing obligations) without having to bid in the bidding process. Even smaller plants, up to 500 kW (3 MW or 3 turbines for wind) may receive aid even without those conditions to apply.
The Guidelines also allow for investment aid, and here again the same aid intensities as under the General Block Exemption Regulation apply, including the possibility to cover 100% of the eligible costs where the aid is granted in the course of a competitive bidding process.
As under the system aid that falls within the scope of the General Block Exemption Regulation need not be notified to the European Commission while aid under the Guidelines still needs approval, it appears that wherever the Member States want to maintain or introduce support schemes which do not take the form of competitive bidding procedures, they need to get approval for them under the Guidelines. There, proving that the bidding procedure is not appropriate at all is possible, as are market mechanisms. However, in case the aid measure is neither covered by the General Block Exemption Regulation nor the Guidelines, then the Commission will apply Article 107(3) TFEU on a case by case basis.
Most national renewable energy support schemes designed as State aid measures have been authorized in accordance with those Guidelines. So far, thus, it has not been a real problem for a national renewable energy support scheme if it was found to constitute State aid, as authorization by the Commission the aid could always be granted in the end.
However, one may note that the dialogue between the Commission and the Member States in the course of the authorization procedures – after notification or not – may take years. This can have severe negative consequences for investors’ confidence and can delay the development and deployment of renewable energy. Examples from Austria, Slovenia or Luxembourg have shown that discussions between the Member State and the Commission can take years, during which there is no certainty for the industry as regards what the financial support available with look like so that informed business decisions are very difficult to take if not impossible at all.
 In exceptional cases and upon application by the Member State, the Council can declare compatibility as well. See Article 108(2) TFEU.
 See e.g. CFI Case T-268/06 Olympiaki Aerooproia Ypiresies (Olympic Airways) v. Commission  ECR II-01091, par. 53.
 Art. 108(4) TFEU; See also e.g. K. Bacon, European Community Law of State Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 117.
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L187/1.
 Commission Regulation 2008/800/EC of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty, OJ L214/3.
 Note that special rules apply for biomass and biofuels, as the European Commission is trying to take into consideration the rules on sustainability for such sources, and for example support to food-based, first generation biofuels is supposed to be phased out.
 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, 2008, OJ C 82/1.
 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, 2014/C, OJ 200/01, par. 136.
 Note that there are several other instruments with similar regimes, not discussed here, such as the de minimis Regulation (applying to certain aid measures which stay below a certain threshold), Commission Regulation 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L352/1.

matches:
v.
v.
v.
Art. 3
Art. 3
Art. 108
Art. 5
Art. 4
v.
v.
Art. 7
Art. 6
v.
Art. 7
Art. 11
Art. 14
v.
Art. 14
Art. 11
Art. 88
§ 32
v.
Art. 108
v.
v.
Art. 108


6 base game bookcases in AL wood colours, to match my other base game recolours. Many thanks to amythestfenix for the 3 extra wood colours.
Found: Buy Mode > Hobbies > Knowledge.
Price: CinderBooks by Retratech - §200, Craftmeister Booknook - §250, BiblioFile Bookcase - §400, Double-Helix Designer Bookshelf - §650, Novellas Nouveau Bookcase - §800, Renaissance Bookcase by Literary Designs - §950.
CC used in my screenshots Melaka Living Water Bowl by Moune.
Moune for the CC used in my screenshots.
Tags: #AL Wood, #Knowledge, #Hobbies, #Hobby, #Books, #Bookcase, #Bookcases, #BiblioFile Bookcase, #CinderBooks by Retratech, #Craftmeister Booknook, #Double-Helix Designer Bookshelf, #Novellas Nouveau Bookcase, #Renaissance Bookcase by Literary Designs.


410-16-010 Single trip lease of equipment. [Order 1, § 410-16-010, filed 3/29/68, effective 5/1/68.] Repealed by Order 113MV, filed 11/24/71.
410-16-0101 Uniform prorate agreement—Washington party to. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-0101, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110. Later promulgation, see chapter 308-91 WAC.
410-16-020 Trailer interchange privilege. [Order 691113, § 410-16-020, filed 11/19/69; Order 1, § 410-16-020, filed 3/29/68, effective 5/1/68.] Repealed by Order 113MV, filed 11/24/71.
410-16-0201 General provisions. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-0201, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-030 Definitions. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-030, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-040 Prorate eligibility. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-040, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-050 Fleet composition. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-050, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-060 Prorate registration prerequisites. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-060, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-070 Mileage and prorate percentage. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-070, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-080 Filing the applications. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-080, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-090 Vehicle identification. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-090, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-100 Additions and deletions. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-100, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-110 Trailer interchange. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-110, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-120 Leased vehicles. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-120, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-130 Preservation of records. [Order 113MV, § 410-16-130, filed 11/24/71.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-150 Quarterly tonnage—Prorated vehicle. [Order MV-151, § 410-16-150, filed 11/2/72.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-16-170 Utility trailer rentals—Certified average registration plan required. [Order MV-151, § 410-16-170, filed 11/2/72.] Repealed by WSR 84-02-019 (Order 739 DOL), filed 12/28/83. Statutory Authority: RCW 46.01.110.
410-20-010 Application. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-010, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq. Later promulgation, see WAC 308-99-010.
410-20-020 Definitions. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-020, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq. Later promulgation, see WAC 308-99-020.
410-20-030 Basic policy defined. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-030, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq. Later promulgation, see WAC 308-99-030.
410-20-040 Restrictions and conditions. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-19-089 (Order WRC-3), § 410-20-040, filed 9/18/81; WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-040, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq. Later promulgation, see WAC 308-99-040.
410-20-050 Administration. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-050, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq.
410-20-060 Interpretation. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-060, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq.
410-20-070 Regular meeting dates. [Statutory Authority: RCW 46.85.030. WSR 81-02-030 (Order WRC-2), § 410-20-070, filed 1/5/81.] Repealed by WSR 83-19-009 (Order 729-DOL), filed 9/9/83. Statutory Authority: 1982 c 227 § 18 et seq.
Reviser's note: See also Department of Licensing, Title 308 WAC.


text:
Jerome A. CHRISTMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. B&B AIRPARTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Mr. Christmon did not submit the form. Instead, he simply stopped coming to work when he was assigned Saturday shifts. B&B Airparts did not take any disciplinary action, and Mr. Christmon admits that he was not required to work on Saturdays. But he remained dissatisfied because he lost the opportunity to earn overtime hours, which he would have kept if he had been assigned shifts on Sunday. Mr. Christmon was ultimately fired for violating B&B Airparts’ sexual harassment policy.
After the firing, Mr. Christmon sued under Title VII, claiming that B&B Airparts had discriminated against him by failing to change his weekend shifts from Saturdays to Sundays. On this claim, the district court granted summary judgment to B&B Airparts, holding that it had provided a reasonable accommodation to Mr. Christmon.
• the record had not shown a reasonable accommodation.
We reject these arguments. B&B Airparts provided undisputed evidence that Mr. Christmon’s deposition was certified, no obligation existed to support the summary-judgment motion with interrogatory responses, and B&B Airparts provided a reasonable accommodation by allowing Mr. Christmon to miss his Saturday shifts. For these reasons, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying this standard, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Christmon. See Knopf, 884 F.3d at 946.
Mr. Christmon argues that the district court erred by (1) relying on uncertified testimony from Mr. Christmon’s deposition and (2) granting B&B Airparts’ motion even though it had not been supported by interrogatory responses. Mr. Christmon’s arguments fail because B&B Airparts (1) presented undisputed evidence that Mr. Christmon’s deposition transcript had been certified and (2) was not required to support the motion with interrogatory responses.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(f)(1) requires that deposition transcripts be accompanied by a certification “that the witness was duly sworn and that the deposition accurately records the witness’s testimony.” Mr. Christmon argues that the district court could not consider his deposition testimony because B&B Airparts had filed a transcript lacking the required certification.
For this argument, Mr. Christmon relies on three opinions from the Southern District of Ohio: Moore v. Florida Bank of Commerce, 654 F.Supp. 38 (S.D. Ohio 1986), Morphew v. Lawhon & Associates, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-716, 2011 WL 6122638 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2011), and Soliday v. Miami County, No. C-3-91-153, 1993 WL 1377511 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1993). Reliance on these opinions is misguided because in these cases, the parties relying on the deposition testimony failed to provide the court with a deposition certification. Moore, 654 F.Supp. at 41 n.2; Morphew, 2011 WL 6122638 at *2; Soliday, 1993 WL 1377511 at *5 n.4.1 Here, B&B Airparts filed the certification when the plaintiffs raised the issue. Because the certification was filed, the district court did not err in considering the deposition testimony.
Mr. Christmon also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because B&B Airparts had failed to support its motion with interrogatory responses. But Rule 56 did not require B&B Airparts to support its motion with interrogatory responses. Thus, Mr. Christmon’s argument fails.
Mr. Christmon argues that the district court erred in holding that B&B Airparts had provided a reasonable accommodation. We disagree. The undisputed evidence shows that B&B Airparts allowed Mr. Christmon to skip mandatory Saturday shifts after he had explained his religious concern. This relief from Saturday shifts constituted a reasonable accommodation, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to B&B Airparts.
• show an inability to reasonably accommodate Mr. Christmon’s religious beliefs without undue hardship.
Id. at 1156. The district court assumed that Mr. Christmon had met his burden and decided as a matter of law that B&B Airparts’ accommodation had been reasonable. We agree.
“ ‘Accommodate ․ means ․ allowing the plaintiff to engage in [his] religious practice despite the employer’s normal rules to the contrary.’ ” Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 550 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 n.2, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015) (omissions in original) ). But a reasonable accommodation does not necessarily spare an employee from any resulting cost. Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390–91 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, the accommodation may be reasonable even though it is not the one that the employee prefers. Id. at 390.
• once Mr. Christmon had told his supervisor about the conflict between his religious beliefs and the Saturday shifts, B&B Airparts allowed Mr. Christmon to skip Saturday shifts with no disciplinary consequences.
See R. at 141 (deposition testimony of Mr. Christmon stating that B&B Airparts “basically just allowed me to not come in on my scheduled Saturdays”).
Though Mr. Christmon requested an opportunity to make up his overtime hours on Sunday, Title VII did not require B&B Airparts to offer Mr. Christmon’s preferred accommodation. B&B Airparts’ accommodation allowed Mr. Christmon to avoid the conflict with his religious beliefs even if he lost the opportunity for overtime. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (“[U]npaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work.”); Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Defendant’s policy, although it may require teachers to take occasional unpaid leave, is not an unreasonable accommodation of teachers’ religious practices.”).2 Thus, the district court did not err in deciding that B&B Airparts had provided Mr. Christmon with a reasonable accommodation.
• the undisputed evidence shows that B&B Airparts provided a reasonable accommodation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to B&B Airparts.
1. When transcript excerpts are filed, the Southern District of Ohio’s local rules require the filer to include the certification. S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(e). No such requirement exists in the District of Kansas’s local rules. Cf. D. Kan. R. 56.1(d) (requiring attachment of cited deposition excerpts without mention of the certification).
2. Mr. Christmon cites three consent decrees to support his position. Consent Decree, EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-07334-FSH-MAH (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Maita Chevrolet Geo, No. 2:11-CV-03133-MCE-KJN (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Boca Grp., LLC, Nos. 11-CV-80825-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC & 12-CV-80172-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2012). As negotiated documents lacking legal analysis, these consent decrees do not constitute persuasive authority.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.