text:
[285 U.S. 169, 170] Messrs. Marion Smith, of Atlanta, Ga., L. Barrett Jones and W. Calvin Wells, both of Jackson, Miss., and Arthur G. Powell, of Atlanta, Ga ., for appellant.
[285 U.S. 169, 173] Messrs. Gerard H. Brandon and S. B. Laub, both of Natchez, Miss., and Garner W. Green, of Jackson, Miss., for appellees.
Payments to the contractors were made as required by the building contract but they failed to satisfy claims for material furnished by Bunn Electric Company and others. The latter notified the investment company. There [285 U.S. 169, 176] upon, it instituted a proceeding in the chancery court, Adams county, Miss ., against the contractors, the appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and many unpaid materialmen. The bill prayed for a decree declaring the indemntiy bond to be one for faithful performance of the building contract and subject to the rights and liabilities provided by section 3,1 chapter 128, Mississippi Laws of 1918 (section 2598, Hemingway's Miss. Code 1927); also for judgments in favor of those who had furnished materials, etc.
The materialmen answered. Also by cross-bill and interventions they set up their claims and asked for judgments against the contractors and appellant here, surety upon the bond. The chancellor gave judgments in favor of the cross-complainants as prayed. The indemnity company appealed. The Supreme Court approved upon the view that section 3, chapter 128, Mississippi Laws 1918, applied and controlled the obligation of the bond. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Natchez Inv. Co., 132 So. 535. It ordered that the materialmen severally 'do have and recover of and from the appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and of AEtna Casualty & Surety [285 U.S. 169, 177] Company, surety in the appeal bond,' the sums found to be due them.
Upon petition of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company alone, the Chief Justice of Mississippi allowed an appeal to this court July 25, 1931. The AEtna Casualty & Surety Company did not join in the appeal; there was no summons and severance nor any notice equivalent thereto.
The assignment of errors challenges the validity, under the Federal Constitution, of section 3, chapter 128, Mississippi Laws, above cited, as construed and applied.
December 4, 1931, the appellees entered a motion here to dismiss the appeal. They maintain that the judgments in the Mississippi Supreme Court against appellant and AEtna Casualty & Surety Company were joint; the latter company did not join in the appeal; there was no summons and severance; consequently this Court is without jurisdiction.
December 23, 1931, appellant and the AEtna Company asked that the latter be made party to the appeal and for proper amendments to that end.
The motion to amend must be overruled. The motion to dismiss is sustained.
The challenged judgment became final June 15, 1931, more than six months before the AEtna Company applied here for permission to become a party to the pending appeal. If this application and the accompanying motion to amend were granted, the practical effect would be to permit an appeal by a party to a judgment after the prescribed time had expired.
The statute (Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 8, 43 Stat. 940, 28 USCA 350) provides: 'No writ of error, appeal, or writ of certiorari, intended to bring any judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for re- [285 U.S. 169, 178] view shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree. ...' Passage of the three months' period extinguished the right to grant an appeal. Rust Land & Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71, 76 , 39 S. Ct. 424; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 418 , 43 S. Ct. 458.
The judgment is joint in form and no reason appears why either or both of the parties defendant therein might not have appealed to this Court and submitted claims of error for our determination. In matters of this kind we may not disregard the face of the record and treat the judgment as something other than it appears to be. So to do probably would lead to much confusion and uncertainty.
See Estis v. Trabue, 128 U.S. 225, 229 , 9 S. Ct. 58; Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U.S. 173, 175 , 25 S. Ct. 654; Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U.S. 99, 101 , 33 S. Ct. 78; Second Nat. Bank [285 U.S. 169, 180] v. First Nat. Bank, 242 U.S. 600, 602 , 37 S. Ct. 236; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U.S. 18, 19 , 38 S. Ct. 7; Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U.S. 262, 264 , 46 S. Ct. 108.
Mason v. United States, 136 U.S. 581 , 10 S. Ct. 1062. A postmaster and the sureties on his official bond were sued jointly. He and some of the sureties appeared and defended. The suit was abated as to two of the sureties, who had died. The others defaulted, and judgment of default went against them. On the trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon, July 14, 1886, judgment was entered against the principal and all the sureties. The sureties who had appeared sued out a writ of error to this judgment, without joining the principal or the sureties who had made default and the record came here. May 5, 1890, and after expiration of the two years within which the statute then permitted the suing out of such writs, the plaintiff in error moved to amend the writ by adding the omitted parties as complainants, or for a severance of the parties, and it was held that the motion must be denied and the writ of error be dismissed.
The New York, 104 F. 561, 562 (Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, October 13, 1900), is said to support the view that in the circumstances here presented summons and sever- [285 U.S. 169, 182] ance was unnecessary. The proceeding was a cause in admiralty. The surety upon a stipulation for release of the vessel did not join in the appeal. Upon motion to dismiss, the court said: 'It is well settled that all parties against whom a joint judgmnet or decree is rendered must join in proceedings for review in an appellate court, or that it must appear that those who have not joined had notice of the application for the appeal or writ of error, and refused or neglected to join therein.' But it ruled that, though joint in form, the decree was separable in law and fact and, therefore, the surety was not a necessary party to the appeal.
Considering former opinions of this Court and the long-established practice, we cannot accept as applicable to appeals here the doctrine approved in The New York. It is out of harmony with Estis v. Trabue, supra, and other cases cited above. We cannot undertake to explore the record to ascertain what issues were relied upon in courts below. So to do would lead to uncertainty and unfortunate confusion. We must accept the terms of the judgment as entered. As pointed out above, this is the approved practice when it becomes necessary to determine whether a judgment is final or to what court a writ of error should run. Like reasons apply and control here.

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The 112(f) Presumption Still Has Meaning: Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple, Inc. | Shumaker & Sieffert, P.A.
On June 1, 2018, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of California’s decision invalidating Zeroclick’s asserted claims. In a precedential opinion, a Federal Circuit panel held that the district court failed to undertake the relevant inquiry and make factual findings to support its conclusion that Zeroclick’s claims recited means-plus-function terms. The Federal Circuit did not state, with respect to Zeroclick’s claims, that the rebuttable presumption against invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) to interpret a claim limitation not reciting the word “means” could not be overcome. However, the Zeroclick opinion appears to provide the district court with subtle guidance to aid its analysis on remand.
Claim terms that do not recite the word “means” are subject to a rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply. This presumption protects a patent owner whose claim term does not recite the word “means” against having the claim term interpreted as a narrower means-plus-function term, which is interpreted to cover only the structures, materials, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. If the specification does not provide structural support for a claim term that invokes 112(f), the claim can be found to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
The presumption may be overcome if a challenger demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix described the relevant inquiry on this point as “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Although Williamson’s articulation of the relevant inquiry replaced the previously “strong” presumption against invoking § 112(f) to interpret a claim term not reciting the word “means,” Zeroclick emphasizes that proper evidentiary support must be marshaled to overcome the rebuttable presumption.
Zeroclick sued Apple for allegedly infringing claims 2 and 52 of U.S. Patent No. 7,818,691 and claim 19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,549,443, the latter of which is a continuation of the former. As noted by the Federal Circuit, Zeroclick’s claims at issue in the ‘691 and ‘443 patents “contemplate updating existing user interface programs by using a two step method” or “by making two configuration changes to the user interface code.” In response, Apple asserted that the claimed limitations, “program that can operate the movement of the pointer (0)” and “user interface code being configured to detect one or more locations touched by a movement of the user’s finger on the screen without requiring the exertion of pressure and determine therefrom a selected operation,” while not reciting the term “means,” should be interpreted as means-plus-function limitations for which the specifications fail to disclose sufficient structure. The district court agreed and construed Zeroclick’s claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), ultimately finding Zeroclick’s asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness under § 112(b).
However, as noted by the Federal Circuit, Apple provided no evidentiary support for its assertion that the claim limitations at issue must be construed under § 112(f). Thus, Apple failed to carry its burden in rebutting the presumption against interpreting Zeroclick’s claims under § 112(f). The district court adopted Apple’s arguments but did not point to evidence of record to support its conclusions. Instead, the district court merely stated (1) “the term ‘program that can operate the movement of the pointer’ is a means-plus-function term because the claim itself fails to recite any structure whatsoever, let alone ‘sufficiently definite structure’” and (2) “because the use of the phrase ‘user interface code’ provides the same ‘black box recitation of structure’ as the use of the word ‘module’ did in Williamson, and the claim language provides no additional clarification regarding the structure of the term, the [c]ourt concludes that ‘user interface code’ constitutes a means-plus-function term.” Because the district court did not support its conclusion with evidence of record, the Federal Circuit concluded, “The [district] court thus legally erred by not giving effect to the unrebutted presumption against the application of § 112, ¶ 6.” The Federal Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
When viewed at a high level, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Zeroclick is a rebuke of the district court’s failure to undertake the relevant inquiry and make related factual findings in it determination that claim limitations not reciting “means” were to be construed under § 112(f). A closer look at Zeroclick also reveals subtle guidance by which the Federal Circuit may have intended to shape the district court’s analysis on remand. The following discussion provides an interpretation of that guidance as well as a word of caution against its broader application.
The Federal Circuit in Zeroclick gave “three related reasons” for its conclusion that the district court erred in treating Zeroclick’s claim terms “‘program’ and ‘user interface code’ as nonce words, which can operate as substitutes for ‘means’ and presumptively bring the disputed claim limitations within the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6.” With respect to the first reason, the Federal Circuit stated, “The mere fact that the disputed limitations incorporate functional language does not automatically convert the words into means for performing such functions.” With respect to the third reason, the Federal Circuit stated, “The district court made no pertinent finding that compels the conclusion that a conventional graphical user interface program or code is used in common parlance as a substitute for ‘means.’” That is, the first and third reasons pertain to the reasoning behind the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the district court failed, as a matter of procedure, to undertake the relevant inquiry and make related factual findings.
As discussed above, the rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply to a claim limitation not reciting “means” may be overcome if a challenger demonstrates that the claim term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” This can be accomplished by showing that “the words of the claim are [not] understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” In emphasizing the existence in the prior art of the claimed “program” and “user interface code,” the Federal Circuit appears to be suggesting that these terms may have definite meaning by virtue of being known to persons of ordinary skill in the art.
However, the Zeroclick opinion does not explicitly make this assertion, and it does not explicitly tie the prior existence of “program” and “user interface code” to the Williamson test. Specifically, the main inquiry of the Williamson test is whether the words of a claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. The Zeroclick opinion does not ask or answer the question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the terms “program” and “user interface code,” in the context of Zeroclick’s claims or otherwise, to have sufficiently definite meaning as names for structures. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s discussion of the second reason for its conclusion in Zeroclick appears to have been intended to provide limited guidance to the district court on the question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand Zeroclick’s claim limitations to have definite meaning, thus leaving for the district court the question of whether the claim limitations have definite meaning as names for structures.
At least for these reasons, practitioners are advised to avoid interpreting the Federal Circuit’s statements in Zeroclick as generally disfavoring the interpretation of the terms “program” and “user interface code” under § 112(f). Instead, the safer approach for those wishing to avoid the unwanted interpretation of claims under § 112(f) remains the combined use of claim terms that have been found to connote structure (e.g., “circuit” or “circuitry, where appropriate) and a specification that includes a detailed description of the applicable structure and algorithms so that, even if the claim terms are interpreted to invoke § 112(f), the claims are still definite under § 112(b).
Practitioners hoping to find restriction on the application of § 112(f) amongst Zeroclick’s tea leaves may view this decision as unsatisfying. However, the district court’s decision on remand should indicate whether courts are willing to interpret terms such as “program” and “user interface code” as connoting structure. Most significantly, Zeroclick signaled that while the presumption against the application of § 112(f) to a claim limitation not reciting “means” is no longer strong, the Federal Circuit nevertheless intends to enforce the burden on challengers to conduct the relevant inquiry and produce the necessary factual findings in order to rebut the presumption.
 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is an America Invents Act (AIA) citation, and 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph is the corresponding pre-AIA citation. This article uses 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) to mean 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.
 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC. 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is an America Invents Act (AIA) citation, and 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph is the corresponding pre-AIA citation. This article uses 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) to mean 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
 Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple, Inc. No. 2017-126, slip op. at 6 (citing Williamson v. Citrix at 1348).
 Williamson v. Citrix at 1348.


Respondent John Jordan filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, individually and as a representative of a class, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against two former directors of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the director of the Cook County Department of Public Aid, and the comptroller of Cook County. Respondent alleged that these state officials were administering the federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) in a manner inconsistent with various federal regulations and with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
AABD is one of the categorical aid programs administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid pursuant to the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §§3-1 through 3-12 (1973). Under the Social Security Act, the program is funded by the State and the Federal Governments. 42 U.S.C. §§1381-1385. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which administers these payments for the Federal Government, issued regulations prescribing maximum permissible time standards within which States participating in the program had to process AABD applications. Those regulations, originally issued in 1968, required, at the time of the institution of this suit, that eligibility determinations must be made by the States within 30 days of receipt of applications for aid to the aged and blind, and within 45 days of receipt of applications for aid to the disabled. For those persons found eligible, the assistance check was required to be received by them within the applicable time period. 45 CFR §206.10 (a)(3).
During the period in which the federal regulations went into effect, Illinois public aid officials were administering the benefits pursuant to their own regulations as provided in the Categorical Assistance Manual of the Illinois Department of Public Aid. Respondent's complaint charged that the Illinois defendants, operating under those regulations, were improperly authorizing grants to commence only with the month in which an application was approved and not including prior eligibility months for which an applicant was entitled to aid under federal law. The complaint also alleged that the Illinois defendants were not processing the applications within the applicable time requirements of the federal regulations; specifically, respondent alleged that his own application for disability benefits was not acted on by the Illinois Department of Public Aid for almost four months. Such actions of the Illinois officials were alleged to violate federal law and deny the equal protection of the laws. Respondent's prayer requested declaratory and injunctive relief, and specifically requested "a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to the entire class of plaintiffs all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld."
In its judgment of March 15, 1972, the District Court declared §4004 of the Illinois Manual to be invalid insofar as it was inconsistent with the federal regulations found in 45 CFR §206.10 (a)(3), and granted a permanent injunction requiring compliance with the federal time limits for processing and paying AABD applicants. The District Court, in paragraph 5 of its judgment, also ordered the state officials to "release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants for AABD in the State of Illinois who applied between July 1, 1968 [the date of the federal regulations] and April 16, 197 [the date of the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court] and were determined eligible...."
Despite such disclaimers, the very first suit entered in this Court at its February Term in 1791 was brought against the State of Maryland by a firm of Dutch bankers as creditors. Vanstophorst v. Maryland, see 2 Dall. 401 and Warren, supra, at 91 n. 1. The subsequent year brought the institution of additional suits against other States, and caused considerable alarm and consternation in the country.
"When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Id., at 464.
The Court of Appeals in this case, while recognizing that the Hans line of cases permitted the State to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to suit by its own citizens, nevertheless concluded that the Amendment did not bar the award of retroactive payments of the statutory benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld. The Court of Appeals held that the above-cited cases, when read in light of this Court's landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), do not preclude the grant of such a monetary award in the nature of equitable restitution.
The Court of Appeals, in upholding the award in this case, held that it was permissible because it was in the form of "equitable restitution" instead of damages, and therefore capable of being tailored in such a way as to minimize disruptions of the state program of categorical assistance. But we must judge the award actually made in this case, and not one which might have been differently tailored in a different case, and we must judge it in the context of the important constitutional principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled "equitable" in nature. The Court's opinion in Ex parte Young hewed to no such line. Its citation of Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886), and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), which were both actions against state officers for specific performance of a contract to which the State was a party, demonstrate that equitable relief may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
As in most areas of the law, the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night. The injunction issued in Ex parte Young was not totally without effect on the State's revenues, since the state law which the Attorney General was enjoined from enforcing provided substantial monetary penalties against railroads which did not conform to its provisions. Later cases from this Court have authorized equitable relief which has probably had greater impact on state treasuries than did that awarded in Ex parte Young. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Arizona and Pennsylvania welfare officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), New York City welfare officials were enjoined from following New York State procedures which authorized the termination of benefits paid to welfare recipients without prior hearing. But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra.
Were we to uphold this portion of the District Court's decree, we would be obligated to overrule the Court's holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra. There a taxpayer, who had, under protest, paid taxes to the State of Indiana, sought a refund of those taxes from the Indiana state officials who were charged with their collection. The taxpayer claimed that the tax had been imposed in violation of the United States Constitution. The term "equitable restitution" would seem even more applicable to the relief sought in that case, since the taxpayer had at one time had the money, and paid it over to the State pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional tax exaction. Yet this Court had no hesitation in holding that the taxpayer's action was a suit against the State, and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the retroactive portion of the relief awarded by the District Court in this case.
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), reaffirmed the principle that the Eleventh Amendment was no bar to a suit by the United States against a State. Id., at 329. In view of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' vigorous reaffirmation in Monaco of the principles of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, we think it unlikely that the Court in Department of Employment v. United States, in citing Ex parte Young as well as Monaco, intended to foreshadow a departure from the rule to which we adhere today.
Three fairly recent District Court judgments requiring state directors of public aid to make the type of retroactive payment involved here have been summarily affirmed by this Court notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment contentions made by state officers who were appealing from the District Court judgment. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is the only instance in which the Eleventh Amendment objection to such retroactive relief was actually presented to this Court in a case which was orally argued. The three-judge District Court in that case had ordered the retroactive payment of welfare benefits found by that court to have been unlawfully withheld because of residence requirements held violative of equal protection. 270 F.Supp. 331, 338 n. 5 (Conn. 1967). This Court, while affirming the judgment, did not in its opinion refer to or substantively treat the Eleventh Amendment argument. Nor, of course, did the summary dispositions of the three District Court cases contain any substantive discussion of this or any other issues raised by the parties.
This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion. [394 U.S. 618|Shapiro v. Thompson]] and these three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief awarded by the District Court in this case. Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits. Since we deal with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law. Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding today.
The Court of Appeals held in the alternative that even if the Eleventh Amendment be deemed a bar to the retroactive relief awarded respondent in this case, the State of Illinois had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to the bringing of such a suit by participating in the federal AABD program. The Court of Appeals relied upon our holdings in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), and on the dissenting opinion of Judge Bright in Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 827 (CA8 1971). While the holding in the latter case was ultimately affirmed by this Court in 411 U.S. 279 (1973), we do not think that the answer to the waiver question turns on the distinction between Parden, supra, and Employees, supra. Both Parden and Employees involved a congressional enactment which by its terms authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities. Similarly, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, supra, involved congressional approval, pursuant to the Compact Clause, of a compact between Tennessee and Missouri, which provided that each compacting State would have the power "to contract, to sue, and be sued in its own name." The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amendment was found in those cases to turn on whether Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and whether the State by its participation in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity.
But in this case the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent. Thus respondent is not only precluded from relying on this Court's holding in Employees, but on this Court's holdings in Parden and Petty as well.
"When we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
The mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts. And while this Court has, in cases such as J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), "A authorized suits by one private party against another in order to effectuate a statutory purpose, it has never done so in the context of the Eleventh Amendment and a state defendant. Since Employees, supra, where Congress had expressly authorized suits against a general class of defendants and the only thing left to implication was whether the described class of defendants included States, was decided adversely to the putative plaintiffs on the waiver question, surely this respondent must also fail on that issue. The only language in the Social Security Act which purported to provide a federal sanction against a State which did not comply with federal requirements for the distribution of federal monies was found in former 42 U.S.C. §1384 (now replaced by substantially similar provisions in 42 U.S.C. §804), which provided for termination of future allocations of federal funds when a participating State failed to conform with federal law. This provision by its terms did not authorize suit against anyone, and standing alone, fell far short of a waiver by a participating State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Our Brother Marshall argues in dissent, and the Court of Appeals held, that although the Social Security Act itself does not create a private cause of action, the cause of action created by 42 U.S.C. §1983, coupled with the enactment of the AABD program, and the issuance by HEW of regulations which require the States to make corrective payments after successful "fair hearings" and provide for federal matching funds to satisfy federal court orders of retroactive payments, indicate that Congress intended a cause of action for public aid recipients such as respondent. It is, of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court under §1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States. But it has not heretofore been suggested that §1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a §1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.
"[The Attorney General of Indiana] appeared in the federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals and defended the suit on the merits. The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the first time in this Court." 323 U.S., at 466-467.
^ . In his complaint in the District Court, respondent claimed that the Illinois Department of Public Aid was not complying with federal regulations in its processing of public aid applications, and also that its refusal to process and allow respondent's claim for a period of four months, while processing and allowing the claims of those similarly situated, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent asserted that the District Court could exercise jurisdiction over the cause by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343 (3) and (4). Though not briefed by the parties before this Court, we think that under our decision in Hagans v. Lavine, ante, p. 528, the equal protection claim cannot be said to be "wholly insubstantial," and that therefore the District Court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the statutory claim.
^ . Effective January 1, 1974, this AABD program was replaced by a similar program. See 42 U.S.C. §§801-805 (1970 ed., Supp. II).
"(ii) 60 days...[for aid to disabled]. Under this requirement, the applicant is informed of the agency's time standard in acting on applications, which covers the time from date of application under the State plan to the date that the assistance check, or notification of denial of assistance or change of award, or the eligibility decision with respect to medical assistance, is mailed to the applicant or recipient...."
"(6) Entitlement will begin as specified in the State plan, which (i) for financial assistance must be no later than the date of authorization of payment...."
"Within 15 days from the date of this decree, defendant EDWARD T. WEAVER, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, shall submit to the court and the plaintiffs' attorney a detailed statement as to the method for effectuating the relief required by paragraph 5, supra, of this Decree. Any disputes between the parties as to whether the procedures and steps outlined by the defendant WEAVER will fulfill the requirements of this Decree will be resolved by the Court."
On July 19, 1973, the author of this opinion stayed until further order of this Court these two paragraphs of the District Court's judgment. 414 U.S. 1301.
^ . Respondent appealed from the District Court's judgment insofar as it held him not entitled to receive benefits from the date of his applications (as opposed to the date of authorization of benefits as provided by the federal regulations) and insofar as it failed to award punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision against respondent on those points and they are not at issue here. 472 F.2d 985, 997-999.
^ . Citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), petitioner also contends in this Court that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to give the District Court's judgment prospective effect only. Brief for Petitioner 37, incorporating arguments made in Pet. for Cert. 18-22. The Court of Appeals concluded that this ground was "not presented to the district judge before the entry of judgment, so that it comes too late." 472 F.2d, at 995. The Court of Appeals went on, however, to conclude that "even if the ground had been timely presented, defendants' contention would be meritless." Ibid. Noting that one of three tests established by our decision in Huson for determining the retroactivity of court decisions was that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied...or [have decided] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed...," Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra, at 106, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner had not satisfied this test, since the "federal time requirements for processing applications and paying eligible AABD applicants were made effective July 1, 1968, and defendants were well aware of these mandatory maximum permissible time standards." 472 F.2d, at 996.
HEW, pursuant to authority granted to it by 42 U.S.C. §1302, has promulgated regulations, see n. 3, supra, which require that decisions be made promptly on applications within 45 days for the aged and blind and within 60 days for the disabled, and that initiation of payments to the eligible be made within the same periods. Petitioner renews in this Court the contention made in the Court of Appeals that these time limitations in the regulations are inconsistent with the statute and therefore an unlawful abuse of the rulemaking authority. Brief for Petitioner 37, incorporating arguments made in Pet. for Cert. 22-28. Specifically, petitioner argues that the "establishment of arbitrary [forty-five] and sixty day maximums in the HEW regulations for determination of eligibility and initiation of payments without taking into consideration the efficient administration of the Act by the State agencies is inconsistent with the 'reasonable promptness' requirement and must therefore be declared unlawful...." Pet. for Cert. 23. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, holding that "these time requirements, binding on state welfare officials, are an appropriate interpretation of the Congressional mandate of 'reasonable promptness.'" 472 F.2d, at 996. We agree with the Court of Appeals.
"...Madison, in the Virginia Convention, answering objections to the ratification of the Constitution, clearly stated his view as to the purpose and effect of the provision conferring jurisdiction over controversies between States of the Union and foreign States. That purpose was suitably to provide for adjudication in such cases if consent should be given but not otherwise. Madison said: 'The next case provides for disputes between a foreign state and one of our states, should such a case ever arise; and between a citizen and a foreign citizen or subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided, in these courts, between an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they consent, provision is here made.' 3 Elliot's Debates, 533.
"Marshall, in the same Convention, expressed a similar view. Replying to an objection as to the admissibility of a suit by a foreign state, Marshall said: 'He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast; will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary; and, as the federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce.' 3 Elliot's Debates, 557.
"Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 81, made the following emphatic statement of the general principle of immunity: 'It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the State governments would by the adoption of that plan be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.'" Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-325 (1934) (footnotes omitted).
^ . Of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting by designation on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
^ . It may be true, as stated by our Brother Douglas in dissent, that "most welfare decisions by federal courts have a financial impact on the States." Post, at 680-681. But we cannot agree that such a financial impact is the same where a federal court applies Ex parte Young to grant prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, as opposed to an order of retroactive payments as was made in the instant case. It is not necessarily true that "whether the decree is prospective only or requires payments for the weeks or months wrongfully skipped over by the state officials, the nature of the impact on the state treasury is precisely the same." Post, at 682. This argument neglects the fact that where the State has a definable allocation to be used in the payment of public aid benefits, and pursues a certain course of action such as the processing of applications within certain time periods as did Illinois here, the subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the continuing obligations of the public aid system.
"The second federal policy which might arguably be furthered by retroactive payments is the fundamental goal of congressional welfare legislation--the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of impoverished persons. Federal standards are designed to ensure that those needs are equitably met; and there may perhaps be cases in which the prompt payment of funds wrongfully withheld will serve that end. As time goes by, however, retroactive payments become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence between previously ascertained and existing needs becomes less clear."
^ . The Court of Appeals considered the Court's decision in Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), to be of like import. But as may be seen from Griffin 's citation of Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), a county does not occupy the same position as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). The fact that the county policies executed by the county officials in Griffin were subject to the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the county was not able to invoke the protection of the Eleventh Amendment, is no more than a recognition of the long-established rule that while county action is generally state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not necessarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
^ . Brief for Respondent 15-18. Decisions of this Court in which we summarily affirmed a decision of a lower federal court which ordered the payment of retroactive awards and in which the jurisdictional statement filed in this Court raised the Eleventh Amendment defense include: State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), aff'g 347 F.Supp. 1004 (SD Fla. 1971); Sterrett v. Mothers' and Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972), aff'g unreported order and judgment of District Court (ND Ind. 1972) on remand from Carpenter v. Sterrett, 405 U.S. 971 (1972); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 717 (SDNY 1969) (order at CCH Poverty Law Rep. para. 10,506 [1968-1971 Transfer Binder]), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).
^ . In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.... This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
^ . Respondent urges that the traditionally broad power of a federal court sitting as a court of equity to fashion appropriate remedies as are necessary to effect congressional purposes requires that the District Court's award of retroactive benefits be upheld. Respondent places principal reliance on our prior decisions in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Both cases dealt with the power of a federal court to grant equitable relief for violations of federal law; the decision in Mitchell indicated that a federal court could provide equitable relief "complete...in light of the statutory purposes." Id., at 292. Since neither of these cases involved a suit against a State or a state official, it did not purport to decide the availability of equitable relief consistent with the Eleventh Amendment.
^ . HEW sought passage of a bill in the 91st Congress, H. R. 16311, §407 (a), which would have given it authority to require retroactive payments to eligible persons denied such benefits. The bill failed to pass the House of Representatives. See H. R. 16311, The Family Assistance Act of 1970, Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., C169-170 (Comm. Print Nov. 5, 1970).
The Court of Appeals felt that §1983, the enactment of the AABD program, and the issuance by HEW of the above regulation, indicated that Congress intended to include within the Social Security Act the remedy of "effective judicial review" and "the remedy of restoration of benefits withheld in violation of federal law." 472 F.2d, at 994-995 and n. 15. But the adoption of regulations by HEW to permit the use of federal funds in the satisfaction of judicial awards is not determinative of the constitutional issues here presented.
"New York is, of course, in no way prohibited from using only state funds according to whatever plan it chooses, providing it violates no provision of the Constitution. It follows, however, from our conclusion that New York's program is incompatible with §402 (a)(23), that petitioners are entitled to declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District Court against the payment of federal monies according to the new schedules, should the State not develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time.
"We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal court is without power to review state welfare provisions or prohibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact that Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements. We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program.... We adhere to King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), which implicitly rejected the argument that the statutory provisions for HEW review of plans should be read to curtail judicial relief and held Alabama's 'substitute father' regulation to be inconsistent with the federal statute. While King did not advert specifically to the remedial problem, the unarticulated premise was that the State had alternative choices of assuming the additional cost of paying benefits to families with substitute fathers or not using federal funds to pay welfare benefits according to a plan that was inconsistent with federal requirements." Id., at 420-421.
Respondent urges that this language is "tantamount to a finding that Congress conditioned the participation of a state in the categorical assistance program on the forfeiture of immunity from suit in a federal forum...irrespective of the relief sought, [since] the intent of Congress remains constant." Brief for Respondent 42-43. Petitioner contends that this language, coupled with the fact that the Court in Rosado remanded the case to the District Court to "afford New York an opportunity to revise its program...or, should New York choose [not to revise its program], issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies pursuant to the present statute," 397 U.S., at 421-422, indicates that the Court felt that retroactive relief was not a permissible remedy. Brief for Petitioner 17-20. We do not regard Rosado as controlling either way since the Court was not faced with a district court judgment ordering retroactive payments or with a challenge based on the Eleventh Amendment.
^ . Respondent urges that the State of Illinois has abolished its common-law sovereign immunity in its state courts, and appears to argue that suit in a federal court against the State may thus be maintained. Brief for Respondent 23. Petitioner contends that sovereign immunity has not been abolished in Illinois as to this type of case. Brief for Petitioner 31-36. Whether Illinois permits such a suit to be brought against the State in its own courts is not determinative of whether Illinois has relinquished its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-592 (1904).


text:
Mar 22, 2019 ... ... Mississippi-based Accu-Fab & Construction Inc., according to court documents in Colony Insurance Co. v. First Specialty Insurance Corp.
Feb 27, 2011 ... GRAY v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. MOTION for Summary ... DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al v. ...... Colony Ins Co v. ...... Garraway v.
Jun 7, 2016 ... Following the issuance of this Order, all counsel of record should receive a copy via F&S pursuant to ... A. Foto Insurance Agency of Slidell, LLC ...... Garraway, Vibert ...... Langley-Colonial, LLC ...... Hector Ardoin Jr., et al. v.
As the limited efficacy of inhibitors of RAF/MEK/ERK signaling or PI3K/AKT in mutant ... HL60, NOMO-1, NB4, and SKM-1 cells were cultured with 5% CO2 at 37°C, at a ... All cell lines matched >80% with lines listed in the DSMZ Cell Line Bank STR ...... Solit DB, Garraway LA, Pratilas CA, Sawai A, Getz G, Basso A, et al.

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IMPORTANT: THE SUMMARIES BELOW ARE EXAMPLES OF PAST RESULTS OBTAINED FOR SOME OF OUR CLIENTS. EVERY CASE IS UNIQUE AND RESULTS VARY DEPENDING ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE. PAST RESULTS DO NOT REFLECT OR ASSURE OUR FUTURE SUCCESS.
Grievant v. USAID, FSGB 2010-027. Represented a Foreign Service Officer proposed for removal based on allegations of voucher fraud. The case settled after it was shown that high-ranking officials at USAID withheld exculpatory information from the deciding official, pressured HR to proceed with the removal, and exchanged email evidencing serious racial discriminatory animus. The FSO was returned to work with backpay, benefits, retroactive promotion, and attorneys’ fees.
Grievant v. Dep’t. of State, FSGB 2009-032 (Mar. 14, 2011). Represented a Special Agent in the Diplomatic Security Service to be suspended for misuse of official letterhead. After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the Foreign Service Grievance Board held that the agency misapplied the Douglas factors and that a suspension was not warranted. The discipline was reduced to an oral admonishment—the lowest level of discipline available—and the Special Agent was awarded attorneys’ fees. In later proceedings, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia overturned the Grievance Board’s longstanding and arbitrary cap on attorneys’ fees.
Represented a former USAID Supervisory Contracting Officer in debarment proceedings. Our client had been retired from the agency for over two years before it brought the debarment charges. Even though he had retired, the charge would have impacted his ability to obtain work in the future. Such a charge was highly unusual, given the client was no longer engaged in contracting work, or with the agency. We successfully persuaded USAID that this matter was meritless, and that our client should not be debarred. Former employees of federal agencies should be aware that they may still be subject to charges of impropriety after they depart from the agency.
Jail Escape. Represented a group of nine correctional officers terminated in the wake of the 2006 escape of two inmates from the D.C. jail. Seven were eventually reinstated and received a total of more than $1.7 million in settlements for backpay and attorneys’ fees. HANNON LAW GROUP litigated the other two officers' cases through the D.C. Court of Appeals to a final order of reinstatement with full back pay and attorneys’ fees.
Barbusin v. District of Columbia, D.C. Superior Court Case No. 2012 CDC 000913. Represented law enforcement officer charged with possession of an unregistered firearm. The charges were dismissed when it was discovered that prosecutors withheld email showing that officer had permission to purchase the weapon. During the trial, Mr. Hannon uncovered a serious Brady violation by the Office of the Attorney General, which led to a dismissal of the charges by the court. The Washington Post and Washington City Paper reported on this case.
Presentado v. D.C. Dept. of Real Estate Svcs., OEA Case No. 1601-0347-10. Contested D.C.’s proposed removal of a law enforcement officer for failure to qualify with his firearm on the grounds that the agency had failed to follow its own procedures and violated the officer’s due process rights. The case settled and the officer was returned to duty with backpay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees.
Lewis v. Kratos Def. & Sec. Solutions, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 2013). Represented a widow in an ERISA action for life insurance benefits. The employer/plan administrator had enrolled her husband in the plan, accepted his premium payments, and told him he was covered, but the insurance company later denied coverage. Won summary judgment against the employer/plan administrator for breach of fiduciary duty and settled the damages claim. See a copy of the Court’s order here.
Doe v. Department of Justice, 2015 MSPB 65. Represented a former federal prosecutor who was terminated in retaliation for disclosing illegal practices by the DEA. The MSPB found in our clients’ favor, awarding him $1.8 million in backpay and attorneys’ fees. The full decision of the MSPB can be read here and an article about the case can be read here.
United States ex rel. Hood v. Satory Global, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2013). Represented two IT professionals terminated in retaliation for opposing their employer’s fraudulent billing and other anti-competitive practices under a subcontract with the Department of Justice. After the defeating the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the case was settled. See a copy of the Court’s order here.
Davis v. Cmty. Alternatives of Wash., D.C., 74 A.3d 707 (D.C. 2013). Represented an employer sued for wrongful termination under the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Employees claimed they were terminated in retaliation for engaging in union activities; but the trial judge ruled that they failed to present evidence of a "close fit" between their conduct, a public policy, and their termination. The employees appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision in favor of our client. The Court of Appeals’ decision can be found here.
HANNON LAW GROUP represents the victims of medical and legal malpractice in select instances.
Represented a group of local businesses in the Shaw neighborhood in case against the Washington Convention Center to enforce their rights under a grant program established to compensate them for disruptions to their business caused by the construction of the new convention center. The case settled for $295,000. An article about this case appeared in the Washington Times.
Miller v. Michael A. Brown, D.C. Superior Court Case No. 2006 CA 001262 B. Represented a local business owner against his partners, including former D.C. Council member Michael A. Brown, for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and other claims. After trial and numerous appeals, our client received a judgment in excess of $700,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Articles about this case appeared in the Washington Post, Washington Times, and Washington City Paper.
Represented a Shaw neighborhood beauty parlor operator and longtime staple of the community when her landlord sold its building to a developer. When the developer tried to cancel our client’s lease we successfully leveraged our knowledge of the law and the support of the community to negotiate an agreement that provided our client with a storefront in the new building at below-market rent and reimbursement for buildout costs. Our client’s new business was recently showcased by the Washington Post, which can be read here.

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HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
by the facts of the case.
born on J anuary 3, 1981.
family friend of the Clavanos.
he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
3. Her husband had divorced her.
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
their maternal uncle,” petitioner Ronald Clavano.
together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
the court to have “snuggled” close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
verisimilitude” as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not be verified.
265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass.
case study report required by law.
“Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
initiated the “joint complaint” for divorce.
was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court.
expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests.
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it.
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It’s nice to be thought of at X’mas. Thanks again.
when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM.
told him that J oeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner.
thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and J oeton.
expressed his desire that petitioner would come and visit them someday.
mother had told him not to be shy about it.
prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children.
Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v.
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true.
spiritual needs of the child.
a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
capable of supporting her children.
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private respondents.
Clara, is an international flight stewardess.
admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still take care of the children.
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.
wisdom and common human experience show that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.
of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.
not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).
fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
that the petition for adoption was filed.
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Penned by Associate J ustice Serafin E. Camilon and concurred in by Associate J ustices Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna.
Presided by J udge Renato C. Dacudao.
Docketed as Civil Case No. J D-707.
Presided by J udge Maura C. Navarro.
CA Decision, pp.16-17. Penned by J ustice Serafin E. Camilon, Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna, JJ., concurring.
Record of CA-G.R. CV No. 27108, pp.46-53.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, J anuary 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 362.
AQUINO, CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 299 citing Santos v. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160, 167 (1966).
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra, at p. 365.
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, L-30576, February 10, 1976, 69 SCRA 298; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra.
Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 463, 471 (1996).
Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102037, J uly 17, 1996, 259 SCRA 65, 71.
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69901, J uly 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 627.
P.M. Pastera Brokerage v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113657, J anuary 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 365, 371.
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 Phil. 324 (1968).
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, supra at p.304; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra at p. 168.
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, supra.
86 Phil. 554, 559-560 (1950).
See; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014, 1020 (1996).
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 38.
TSN, February 3, 1988, p.13.
TSN. November 17, 1987, p. 24.
TSN, J anuary 12, 1988, p. 10.
TSN, December 8, 1987, p.12.
Silva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114742, J uly 17, 1997.
Chua v. Cabangbang, 137 Phil. 204 (1969).
TSN, December 8, 1987, pp.47-48; February 11, 1988, p. 6.
TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 20.
Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606 (1996).
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra.
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 37.
SCRA 7) citing 59 Am. J ur. 2d 107.
Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, 242 SCRA 407.
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 491 citing 4 Salvat 383.
TSN, February 11, 1988, pp. 9-12.
Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, J anuary 27, 1989, 169 SCRA 575, 579.
The law was approved on J une 7, 1995.
The law was approved on February 25, 1998.
Art. 1, Sec. 2(a), R.A. No. 8552.
Philippines in J uly 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution No. 109.
Art. 1, Sec. 2(c), ii, Ibid.
Art. 5, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Art. 9, parag. 3, Ibid.
Art. 10, parag. 2, Ibid.
Art. 14, parag. 2. Ibid.
See: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra at p.441.
y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
binding and conclusive upon this Court.
portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name.
i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.
and in the orderly administration of justice.
the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding.
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption.
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
the latter relief at law.
reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.
appear to be called for.
of action in a declaration.
of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
applicable joinder rules be joined.
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.
in the problems presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
action is dependent on the other.
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested.
the joinder would be improper.
respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment).
which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name.
Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.
a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.
order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
suspend the operation of the rules.
down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy.
agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.
the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents.
parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child.
it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
judge and must thus set it aside.
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
change of name would prejudice public interest.
as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.
qua non to a change of name.
authorize a change of name.
is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.
as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law x x x.
supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Annex A. Petition; Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding J udge J ose R. Hernandez.
Annex B, Id.; Ibid.; 41-44.
Annex C, Id, Ibid., 47-50.
Annex A, Id.: ibid., 40.
See Art. 183 in relation to Art. 185, Family Code.
See Art. 188, Family Code; Arts. 32-3 8, Child and Youth Welfare Code; Secs. 1-5, Rule 99, Rules of Court.
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37, 38.
Rizal, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591.
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 39.
Cruz vs. Republic, L-20927, J uly 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 693.
See Art. 412, Civil Code; Re Ross, 8 Cal 2d 608,67 P2d 94, 110 ALR 217.
August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 322.
1 C.J .S., Actions, Sec. 61, 1181.
1 Am J ur 2d, Actions, Sec. 81, 776.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 85, 778.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 86, 779.
Francisco V.J ., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I 1973 ed., 186.
1 Am J ur 2d, Actions. Sec. 86, 779.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 89, 781.
Francisco, V.J ., op. cit., 185-189.
November 28, 1983, 126 SCRA 31.
See Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps, et al., G.R. No. 66620, September 24,1986, 144 SCRA 377.
April 30, 1968,23 SCRA 438.
Young vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993, 228 SCRA 718.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 99357, J anuary 27 1992,205 SCRA 537.
Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104437, December 17 1993,228 SCRA 565.
Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46763, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 762.
L-44642, February 20 1989, 170 SCRA 367. See also Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
75041, November 13, 1989 179 SCRA 344.
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, J r., etc., et al., G.R. 73210, February 10, 1994,230 SCRA 9; Buan, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994,235 SCRA 424.
Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. 204 (1905).
Arzadon vs. Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77(1910).
L-16085, November 29, 1961,3 SCRA 519.
Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and J urisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 864.
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra fn. 49.
Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49; Republic vs. Tañada, etc., et al., supra, fn. 19; Secan Kok vs.
Republic. supra, fn. 19. See Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962,4 SCRA 1128.
cited. See also Republic vs. Avila, etc., et al., L-33131, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 483.
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra, fn. 49.
Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, J une 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 484.
Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, supra, fn. 53; Grant vs. Republic, L-23609, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 517.
Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49.
Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 44, 67.
Cruz vs. Republic, supra, fn. 17.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, J anuary 24, 1992,205 SCRA 356.

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