text:
NOTE: Canadian library holdings of most, but not all, titles can be found in the Canadian Union Catalogue, AMICUS. There are links to this online resource at each "filing letter".
v. 1 - v. 54: 7. 1945 - 1998. (Title varies slightly.) Edmonton. Alberta Association of Registered Nurses.
v. 2: 5 - v. 12:2, Edmonton, May 1978 - March 1988. Alberta Association of Registered Nursing Assistants.
Continues: Alberta Association of Registered Nursing Assistants Bulletin.
v.1- v.5:1, Ottawa, June 1967 - June 1971.
Vols. 1 and 5 each had only one issue.
Published by the Association of Canadian Medical Colleges - Association des facultés de médecine du Canada.
v.7:2 - v.19, Ottawa March/April 1974 - 1986.
Continued by: Forum. (ISSN: 1717-6697).
v. 1:2 - v. 5:4.Montréal, juin 1978 - déc 1984.
Charlottetown, PEI. Association of Nurses of Prince Edward Island. ?? - 1984.
Association of Registered Nurses of Newfoundland. St John's, NF. Ceased 1975.
Continued by: News! News! News!
v.1 - v.4:1, Montréal, T. Berthiaume, January 1879 - January 1882.
Besides medical articles this journal contains much polemical material relating to the struggle between the Ecole de Medécine and the Montreal branch of the Laval Faculty of Medicine (See: Heagerty, v. 2,103-112).
Journal mensuel consacré à la défense des intérêts professionnels.
v.1 - v.42:2, Montréal, January 1925 - March 1966.
v.20 - v.36:4, Montréal, 20 January 1974 - November 1990.
Published by the Fédération des administrateurs des services de santé et des services sociaux du Québec.
v.8 - v.24:4, Toronto, Summer 1961 - Winter 1977.
Published by the Addiction Research Foundation of Ontario.
Continues: Alcoholism research, treatment, education.
1955 and New Series v.1, Toronto, 1964 -1970/1971?
Published by and for doctors in the R.C.A.F.
Issued by Institute of Aviation Medicine, Royal Canadian Air Force.
Irregular; between one and four numbers annually.
v.1:1 - v.2:1. Edmonton. 1977- 1978.
(v.1:1 called News bulletin - Alberta Certified Nursing Aide Association).
Continued by: Bulletin - Alberta Association of Registered Nursing Assistants.
Calgary, Alberta Chiropractic Association, 1950 – 195?
v.1 - v.41:2, Calgary, Edmonton, April 1935-1976.
Continued by: Alcoholism research, treatment, education.
Published by Education Dept., Alcoholism Research Foundation.
v.1 - v.8:4, Montréal, May 1930 - May 1961.
This was an annual publication; each volume contains four annual numbers.
"Consacrées a la diffusion scientifique du mouvement medico-chirurgical de l'Hôpital Sainte-Justine, nos Annales remplissent une lacune et ... contribueront, nous osons l'espérer, à l'expansion de la Pédiatrie et de la Chirurgie Infantile."
v.1 - v.35:8, Ottawa, January 1968 - December 2002.
v.10 - v.35 (1977-2002) are also known as: Annals / Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada = Annales / Collège royal des médecins et chirurgiens du Canada.
v.1:1-3, Montréal, 24 December 1885 – 24 February 1886.
1906/07- Trois-Rivieres. Ceased in ?
v.1:2 - v.12:9, Toronto, January 1960 - September 1970.
Vol. 1:1 was an uncirculated prototype prepared in September 1959 in order to secure copyright privileges.
1970s-1983? Toronto, Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College.
The archives was “an anthology of literature relative to the science of chiropractic”.
This title, listed in Gullett, appears to have been the Canadian edition of a British dental publication (variously known as Ash's Circular, Ash's Journal, Ash's Monthly). The British edition started publication in 1884 and continued under various names until 1918. The company also published editions in Moscow (1912-1914) and Vienna (1905-1913); the Canadian edition was, according to Gullett, p. 291, published from 1910-1919 (vols. 1-9). The Canadian publication began as a monthly and ended as a quarterly - Ash's Canadian Quarterly. The British edition became Dental Magazine. The series was published in London by Claudius Ash Sons and Co and contained research articles, and also included extensive advertising for dental equipment and supplies. No copies of the Canadian edition have been located but it is assumed it had the same 'editorial content" as the London edition but with Canadian advertisements.
v.1 - v.13, site of the meeting, 1902-1934.
Published once every second year (publication suspended 1910-1916).
Continues: Revue des infirmières et infirmièrs auxiliaires du Québec.
v. 1- 1979 - 2007 Dartmouth, NS. Canadian Association of Neuroscience Nurses - Association canadienne des infirmier(e)s en sciences neurologique.
Vancouver, May 1958 - June 1969.
Official publication of the British Columbia Dental Association.
Continued by: British Columbia dental bulletin.
v. 1 - 24 [Jan.] 1979 – 2003. Canadian Health Libraries Association / Association des bibliothèques de la santé du Canada.
v.1:1, Hull QC, Autumn 1931.
Though only one issue seems to have been published this was advertised as "Revue trimestrielle d'Hygiène".
Editor: Unknown. See: Saucier, 1937, p, 525.
v. 1 - v. 25:3, janv 1949 - mai/juin 1973, Ottawa, Conseil canadien de développement social.
v.1 - v.6:5, Toronto, 1926 - May 1931.
Devoted to the Advancement of Medical and Physical Sciences in the British-American provinces.
v.1 - v.3, Montreal, J. Lovell, January 1860 - December 1862.
MacDermot states that 'It says much for Dr Hall's tenacity that he should begin his journal again after such frustration. (See note below concerning the British American Medical and Physical Journal.) But his desire to improve professional conditions was so intense, and probably too his impulse to write so strong, that he took up his unremunerative task again in spite of his previous experience. He was a born editor, and if he dipped his pen in gall now and then it was usually with good reason and always with stimulating results. His journalism ranks with the best that Canada has produced."
v.1 - v.5, Montreal, J.C. Becket, April 1845 - April 1850.
Hall was an active and talented, if acerbic, Editor who remained involved in journal editing for almost two decades. His Editorships included those of The British American Medical and Physical Journal (1850-1852) and the British American Journal (1860-1862). The lifespan of The British American Journal of Medical and Physical Science overlapped by one month (April 1845) that of the Montreal Medical Gazette, which apparently gave up the field voluntarily to the new journal. The episode is unusual because Badgley and Sutherland, Editors of the Montreal Medical Gazette, were co-founders of the rival Ecole de Médecine et de Chirurgie de Montréal, whereas Hall and MacDonnell produced a notably pro-McGill journal.
As Edward Bensley says in his article on Hall in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography: " Hall was a good writer and he probably welcomed the opportunity the journals provided to air his views, always strongly held, on virtually any subject he chose. Nevertheless, the task of editor was not easy. Relatively few Canadian medical men had the time, inclination, or even ability to furnish original articles on medicine, and such articles should be the mainstay of professional journals which primarily must disseminate information useful in practice. As a result, considerable space was allotted to abstracts or reprints from British and American journals. There were many medical news items, particularly from the McGill Medical Faculty and the Montreal General Hospital, as well as reports of meetings, including those of the Montreal Medico-Chirurgical Society which Hall himself had helped found in 1843. All this meant a heavy work load for an editor with many other duties, including a busy medical practice. But Hall’s chief worry was financial support. The number of potential subscribers was small and advertising had not yet become an important source of revenue. There was always the danger that the editor might have to assume personal responsibility for debts incurred. Editorship thus required courage and a willingness to make substantial sacrifices, qualities which Hall possessed in abundance."
Continued by: British American Medical and Physical Journal.
May 1850 - January 1852.
In this journal Hall continued his efforts begun with The British American Journal of Medical and Physical Science. As with other titles, money was a major problem and in an appeal (vol. 7:8, January 1852, page 407) he notes that the sum owing had reached £500. His appeal seemed to bring in some funds but he discontinued publication because of financial losses, which he outlined in a circular dated Montreal, February 16, 1852; at that time the total owing and apparently uncollectible exceeded £150. "If the Journal is now discontinued, the fault lies not with the Editor of the Journal, but with those who have proved themselves its patrons but in name.... And in conclusion, to the Subscribers, Exchanges, and Contributors, the Editor: has but to say that word, so painfully difficult to utter after years of intimacy, yet indicative of separation, - Farewell."
MacDermot states that it was hoped to make this journal the organ of the proposed British-American Association, but this organization never got beyond the incubation period.
1969 - v.42: 5, Vancouver, October 1969 - November 1987.
Some issues published as: B.C. Dental Bulletin.
v.1:1 - 13, Vancouver, 1954 -1959. Irregular.
This is a flimsy publication, largely containing notices of meetings.
Superseded the newsletter of the B.C. Division of the Canadian Medical Association, this title is not listed in this bibliography.
Superseded by: British Columbia Medical Journal.
v.1 - v.42:10, Vancouver, January 1959 - December 2000.
The Western Pharmaceutical Review - which started publication in 1932 - and it's successor the Western Druggist - have a cover note: "Perpetuating the B.C. pharmaceutical record, established 1905."
Continues: Alberta Certified Nursing Aide Association Bulletin.
v. 48, no 1-3; sept. 1968 - mars 1969.
Only three issues were published of this separate French language publication and in June 1969 it was merged with the English-language publication of the Association to become a bilingual publication. Bulletin - Canadian Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association.
Official publication of the Association des pharmaciens détaillants de Montréal et de la province de Québec.
Nos. 1 -?, Ottawa, July 1917 - June 1918?
Published by the Invalided Soldier's Commission and the Military Hospitals Commission.
See also: Military Hospitals Commission Bulletin.
v. 1-25, no. 3; 1944 - Oct. 1968, Oshawa, Ont.
Nos. 1 - 26, Toronto, May 1921 - October 1943.
BULLETIN - CANADIAN HEART FOUNDATION. CANADIAN COUNCIL OF CARDIOVASCULAR NURSES - BULLETIN DU CCINC.
Continues: CCCN Bulletin and its French equivalent CCCN Bulletin.
Continued by: Canadian Bulletin of Cardiovascular Nursing - Bulletin canadien du nursing cardiovasculaire.
v. 56, no. 2-v. 63, no. 3; Ottawa, summer 1977-May 1985.
Added title page title: Bulletin - Association pulmonaire du Canada. Text in English and French.
Continues: Canadian Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association Bulletin. ISSN: 0709-0463.
v. 48- v.56, no. 1; Ottawa, Sept. 1968-spring 1977. Other title: CTRDA bulletin June 1972-winter 1976.
Text in English, Sept. 1968 - Mar. 1969, English and French, June 1969-spring 1977.
Absorbed the publication with the same content published in French in June 1969.
BULLETIN - COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
v.8 - v.13:7, Montréal, March 1968 - December 1973.
Published by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of the Province of Québec / Collège des médecins et chirurgiens de la province de Québec.
v.1 - v.7:5, Toronto, September 1954 - March 1961.
Quarterly until 1959, thereafter every other month.
Continued by: Journal - College of General Practice of Canada Journal.
Unnumbered and irregular, Saskatoon, December 1931 - March 1935.
v.1 - ?, Québec, March/April 1956 - ?
Continues: Bulletin - Collège des médecins et chirurgiens du Québec.
Continued by: Bulletin (Collège des médecins du Québec).
Ottawa. v. 2:2 - v. 7:1 1977-1982.
Only v. 1: 1 and 2 have been located, they may be the only numbers issued.
v.1 - v.4:2/3, Montréal, novembre 1946 - mai 1950.
Publié trois fois l'an: en novembre, février et avril par la Faculté de Médecine de l'Université de Montréal.
See also: Revue Médicale Université de Montréal.
Some issues published as: Bulletin mensuel - societé dentaire de Montréal.
v. 1- Montreal, November 1936- Ceased in 1937?
v.33:5 -v. 37:2, Québec, September 1932 - February 1937.
Publié sous la direction de la Société Médicale de Québec et La Société médicale des hôpitaux universitaires de Québec.
v.1- v. 47, Ottawa, 1922-1968. An English edition was published as Bulletin of the Canadian Tuberculosis Association.
Continued by: Bulletin - Association canadienne contre la tuberculose et les maladies respiratoires.
v.1 - v.3, Montréal, 1935 -1937.
Vol. 3: R. Eugene Valin, Marion, Jarry, J. Hector Lapointe, Charles Vézina, and Armand Richard.
Merged into Union Médicale du Canada.
Published by Service de la Santé de Montréal.
Continues: Monthly Bulletin - Bulletin Mensuel - Department of Hygiene and Statistics.
V. 1-? Montreal, April 1902 - ?
v.1 - v. 10:3, Québec. 1934 - avril 1943.
Continued by: Bulletin des infirmières catholiques du Canada. .
It is unclear how often this appeared but to date only two issues are known. 4 juil. 1894 et 26 sept. 1894.
It appears that this French version may only have been published from 1975-1984.
Ottawa, Conseil Canadien d'infirmières(ièrs) du Coeur. v. 1:1 - v.2:2. 1976-77.
v.1 - v.2, Montreal, July 1911 and August 1912.
Editor: Vol. 1; Not cited.
Superseded by: Studies from the Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal.
v.1 - v.33:4, Québec, September 1899 - February 1932.
Publié sous la direction de la Société Médicale de Québec .
Monthly (did not appear September-December 1921).
Vols. 15:1 - 22:12 (1913-1921) published as Bulletin Médical: Journal consacré aux intérêts de la Profession médicale dans le district de Québec.
v.1 - v.58:1, Toronto, November 1927 - 1990.
Editor: None identified until after World War II.
Originally contained only notices and reports, beginning with Vol. 3, February 1930, clinical material appeared sporadically.
Issues from November 1927 through September 1931 have no volume numbering but constitute Vols. 1-3.
The Academy also published three volumes of Transactions from 1919-1922; these contain primarily reprints of material previously published in other journals.
Continued by: Bulletin of the Medical Division of the Alumni Association of the University of Western Ontario.
v.1:1-8, London [England], March 1918 - May 1919.
Issued From the Office of the Director General, Medical Services Overseas Military Forces of Canada.
The NLM catalogue notes that in December 1917 one (?) number of Bulletin of the Army Medical Corps was published by the Canadian Army Medical Training Depot No. 2. No copy of this publication has been found and it is not clear if these publications are connected.
Editors: J. George Adami, Dara J. Cochrane and Andrew Macphail.
v.1 - v.52?, Toronto, 1931 - 1949?
Published by the Canadian Hospital Council / Canadian Hospital Association.
BULLETIN OF THE CANADIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE.
Superseded by: Canadian Journal of Psychology.
Continued by: Bulletin - Canadian Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease Association.
A French edition was published under the title: Bulletin de l'Association canadienne anti-tuberculeuse - Bulletin canadien anti-tuberculeux.
v.1 - v.16:2, Toronto, September 1952 - April 1967.
Every other month until Vol. 8, thereafter quarterly.
v.12 - v.15, London ON, 1937 -1940.
Continues: Bulletin of the Alumni Association of the University of Western Ontario Medical School.
St. John's NF, annual, some years lacking, 1925-1931.
Contains mainly the proceedings and transactions of the Association's annual meetings.
A Journal devoted to the interests of Psychiatry in Ontario.
v.1:3 - v.9:4, Toronto, October 1907 - July 1916.
Published by the Department of the Provincial Secretary of Ontario.
Later revived as: Ontario Journal of Neuro-Psychiatry.
Saskatoon. Ceased publication in 196?
Continued by: Saskatchewan Care (Regina).
v.1:1-2, Toronto, February and June 1907.
Continued by: Bulletin of the Ontario Hospitals for the Insane.
Published by the Department of Health, Ontario.
v. 1 – v. 6:2, 1970 – 1975. Ottawa, Direction générale de la protection de la santé.
v.1 - v.50.1, Montréal and Québec, 1901 - January 1950.
suspended July 1944 - October 1945.
A revival of the Journal d'Hygiene Populaire.
v.37-50:1 (1937-1950) by Ministre de la santé.
Vol. 45 (1945) was not published.
v.1- ? Toronto College of Chiropractic, 1925.-?
Published by the Faculty and Students of the Toronto College of Chiropractic.

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The existing human rights catalogue was drafted in a time when environmental concerns were not yet an issue and hence fail to adequately address all environmental needs. However in a degrading environment no other human right can be secured. Recent decades have witnessed a debate on whether there is a need for an additional human right to a clean environment. As a consequence, environmental rights have been inserted in several international agreements and constitutions of various states.
The first aim of this article is to analyse the nature of the right to the environment and to come to an understanding of whether it is able to guarantee a higher level of environmental protection. The second aim is to analyse how efficiently the sections of the Estonian Constitution can be invoked for the protection of the environment and whether there is a need for amendments.
The development and current status of the right to the environment is analysed on the basis of international documents and the decisions of international tribunals. We face a question of whether there is any need for an additional formulation of environmental right if the existing catalogue of human rights is sufficient to address environmental concerns. Does the success in invoking existing human rights in environmental cases support this position?
The authors of this article are of the view that the environment is an independent value and needs as strict protection as other commonly agreed values such as the right to property or the right to life and health. Enlisting the right to the environment as a basic right in the Constitution would help to protect this value from the detrimental activities of private entities and also states.
The Estonian Constitution addresses environmental concerns explicitly in § 5 and § 53. In the lack of court practice the possible uses of these provisions remain unclear. However a proper interpretation of § 5 and § 53 would allow coherence with the legal system and at the same time maximum environmental protection.
The final question remains — do we have the appropriate legal basis to meet the needs of society in light of emerging environmental degradation or should and could we enact an additional guarantee, the basic right of an individual to a clean environment? The last chapter of this article proposes amendments to the wordings of § 5 and § 53 of the Estonian Constitution, taking into account the concepts of sustainable development and environmental space.
To conclude, even though existing human rights allow pursuit of environmental aims to a certain extent, the requirements for direct causation, level of harm to the claimant and the inability to represent future generations limit their efficiency greatly. In an anthropocentric framework environmental protection remains instrumental and thus unable to achieve its preventive and precautionary aims. As long as groups having direct interest in the state of the environment are prevented from effective remedies, it remains up to individuals to contest environmentally harmful activities. However with a view of the limited resources they possess, this option remains rather weak. Also the few successful cases are unlikely to have any impact within national frameworks and thus are unable to guide states towards allowing higher protection of the environment. Therefore it is submitted that specific environmental rights are necessary in order to fully realise protective aims and through them also sustainable development.
A fair number of states in Europe and the rest of the world have introduced environmental provisions to their constitutions since the 1970s.*20 However, such a right is mostly not directly enforceable and serves only as a state aim. The following chapter analyses the components that make up a clear and enforceable basic right to the environment.
as a state goal or as a principle?
Most of the provisions in European constitutions can be regarded as imposing duties on the state to take regulatory action for the protection and improvement of the environment.*25 They can be viewed either as a legal basis for environmental regulation or as declarations of state goal.
The normative contents of basic right to the environment should allow balancing of different interests. In the situation where the right to the environment is interdependent and indivisible from other basic rights’ norms and finds itself often in collision with them, too strict a rule is not an option. Stating a principle on the other hand, enables to include the aspect of proportionality and therefore to weigh different social, economic and environmental needs; also its necessity and appropriateness in a specific situation.*28 This kind of principle should nevertheless entail a binding nature in that it would be considered as “optimization order”*29 to find the best possible solution in a given factual as well as legal framework.
About 60 national constitutions enacting the right to the environment do it with a great variety of formulations. References are made e.g. to “clean”, “healthy”, “decent”, “viable”, “satisfactory”, “sustainable”.*31 Defining specific focus (such as “healthy environment”) is one option to solve the problem with excessively vague adjectives.*32 However international documents containing this kind of right have in most cases proven to be too narrow and therefore inappropriate to achieve environmental protection.
A second possibility is to amplify the general right with more specific formulations and parameters. This is done in the draft articles annexed to the Ksentini Report.*33 However that option could become too long and cumbersome for the text of the constitution.
The second inevitable question is who can rely on the right to the environment. In the case where the right to the environment is formulated as a basic right in a constitution, then certainly the state is the one obligated to supply means of protection in the form of specific legislation and policies as well as to refrain from activities detrimental to the environment.
Some European constitutions contain a duty of care provision*38 and some have added to the rights-based wording a general responsibility of all persons towards nature and the environment.*39 Such provisions relate to the ethics of responsibility, which implies that instead of rights we should speak about duties towards nature — because nature is not able to defend itself against harmful activities. But what if someone fails to fulfil this duty?
It becomes thus inevitable to vest the basic right to the environment with third-party applicability (Drittwirkung in German legal literature*40), meaning, that the norm should be applicable against the state as well as against third persons (groups, enterprises or individuals) causing environmental degradation.
The key to a successful enforcement process is found in clear definition, explicit and accessible procedures and effective remedies.
The opinions on judicial applicability and clarity of these provisions may not be correct ad infinitum as they have not taken into account that many of these provisions have not been grounds for court cases and that the vague wording may acquire substance case-by-case.
Even though the procedural aspect is decisive in enforcing the right by democratic means, it does not substitute the substantive content of the norm, but acts more like an instrumental right by giving the structural framework necessary for the realisation of the substantive right to the environment as well as other basic rights.*45 The procedure itself does not guarantee that when balanced against other rights, the environment is afforded proper weight and thus increasing availability of information, participation in decision-making and access to justice do not, on their own, lead to environmentally sustainableregulation, decisions or conditions.
Individuals and groups*46 should be able to actively seize the right to the environment and also less-privileged groups should be able to participate in the decision-making process.*47 It would be possible to define or delimit the number of groups by the requirement of special interest in the case. Interest could be shown in the professional aims and purposes of a non-governmental organisation.
The Preamble of the Estonian Constitution says that the Estonian state is, inter alia, a pledge to present and future generations for their social progress and general welfare.
Together with the objective of the state set out in the Preamble to guarantee present and future generations social progress and general welfare, § 5 makes sustainable development as a general state goal. This view has been supported by the Committee of Experts on the Constitution which has concluded in their final paper that § 5 should be viewed as setting a state goal to achieve sustainable use of natural resources and natural wealth.*52 The examination of the protocols of the Constitutional Assembly, where one of the members, speaking about this provision, says that the goal is to preserve the environment suitable for future generations, also supports the idea of sustainable development as a state goal.
“Natural resources and natural wealth”, as stated in § 5, cover all the possible aspects of the environment to which the sustainability imperative applies — starting with mineral wealth, forests, animals, fish and ending with clean air, clean water and biodiversity.
What is meant by “sustainable use of natural resources and wealth” and by the more general “sustainable development”? The definition of sustainable development and sustainable use can be deduced from international instruments Estonia has signed or is a party to.*53 International organisations and states agreed in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 that development viewed only as an increase of material wealth is threatening mankind’s survival and the environment because it exceeds the carrying capacity of the biosphere as an ecosystem. The use of natural resources and wealth is sustainable only when it does not consume natural resources faster than they could be regenerated and does not burden the environment with amounts of waste and residuals that exceed its capacity to absorb them and does not degenerate biodiversity. This normative principle setting the direction and limits for the state action and inaction is binding on the state powers.
4.1.2. Can state goal be relied upon in courts?
The state goal is not granting any individual such rights the infringement of which would give legal standing in the courts, but individuals can rely on it in court cases and in their complaints to the Legal Chancellor. The judges, Legal Chancellor and the President can use conflict with this principle to submit a complaint to the Supreme Court for a law to be declared unconstitutional. The Legal Chancellor can also challenge state inaction to implement this principle.
According to § 53 everyone has a duty to preserve the living and natural environment. The secondary duty of compensation is not an object of current analysis.
The first question that needs an answer is who is bound by the duty. The duty to preserve the environment is primarily addressed to individuals and legal persons. The main problem is whether the state and municipalities are also addressees of this duty.
3. excluding the state leaves an individual no option to challenge the state action or inaction and thus conflicts with the rule of law that demands for procedures and grounds to be set for the individual to go to court against the state.
The next question is about the content of this obligation — what is meant by “preservation of living and natural environment”? These concepts have the same content as the ‘sustainable use’ of the state goal in subchapter 4.1.1.
The basic obligation can be implemented by the state only when the Parliament has further elaborated its content. Private persons can thus be obliged to preserve the nature in a certain way only when the law provides so. This reservation has its roots in § 3 (1) and § 13 (2).*56 The only way to affect situations where there is no law to regulate certain environmental issues that clearly cause irreversible harm to the environment is through the Legal Chancellor. To challenge state inaction in the field of lawmaking through courts is not possible in the Estonian legal system.
The question here is about the level of protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The level of protection is a question of value-judgement. Setting sustainable use of natural resources as one of the fundamental aims of the state and using comparatively radical wording for the environmental section implies great value to environmental protection and environment as such.The level of protection question cannot be decided on an abstract basis. Its contents will wash out in the light of specific cases and it is very clear that the modern world cannot evade tolerating damages to the environment up to a certain level.
The state has been guaranteed a wide discretion in determining the level of protection and means for achieving it. Nevertheless this has partly been determined by international obligations and partly by the existing level of protection. Lowering this level (e.g. closing protected areas, accepting higher emissions) would constitute a breach of § 53 since such action cannot be considered as preserving the environment.
4.1.4. Is there a right to sustainable living and natural environment?
Yes, the obligation of § 53 has a corresponding everyone’s right to sustainable living and the natural environment.
When somebody has a subjective right to something, there is always somebody who has an obligation to either actively or passively respect this right. The same applies to obligations — when there is an obligation, there is always somebody who has a subjective right to the object of this obligation and a relative subjective right to demand the fulfilment of this obligation.
The state obligation*59 that is objectively formulated in the basic rights chapter is not complemented with a subjective right only in cases where there are strong arguments against that. This can be so when the state’s obligation serves collective goals only.*60 Since every individual is interested in a living and natural environment of a certain quality, § 53 serves both collective goals and individual interests. Therefore § 53 gives rise to a subjective right that can be invoked in courts.
For its full realisation the Constitution has to be open for adjudication. For this reason it is important to interpret § 53 as granting subjective rights to individuals and legal persons. The possible difficulties in its application cannot justify declaring this section mere constitutional lyrics or, at best, justification for environmental regulation.
b) to demand compensation for environmental damage according to acts of parliament.
b) duty to compensate for the damages caused to the environment.
b) right to demand creation of guarantees for protection of the environment from the state.
The state may demand preservation of the environment from the individuals insofar as it has been prescribed by law. The state cannot be a subject of a basic right to the preserved environment.
Since most of the environmental threats are caused by private actors rather than the state, it is important to view this right as granting state protection against private environmentally hazardous activities. This would enable individuals to go to court against the state on the grounds that the state is violating its obligation to preserve the environment and the right to the preserved environment of the individual by allowing harmful activities.
– for the corresponding right to sustainable natural environment not being breached.
(1)Everyone has a duty to preserve the living and natural environment in a condition where the use of resources and production of waste does not exceed the environment’s ability to reproduce these resources and absorbing the waste does not degrade biological diversity.
(2)Everyone has a duty to compensate for the excessive use of resources and production of waste and for damage caused to the environment.
(3)The procedure for compensation shall be provided by law.
(4)Everybody shall be guaranteed by law access to justice and the right to participation at all levels of decision-making in environmental matters.
Full implementation of this duty would yield structural changes in economic and social systems. To some extent we have to tolerate environmental harm and this mechanism of tolerance is based on the second paragraph whereby the state by establishing a system of compensation is allowed to determine the level of tolerable environmental harm.
Section 5 should specify more precisely what exactly is meant under ‘sustainable use’. This should again be done through the concept of environmental space. Section 5 should set environmentally and socially sustainable development of the society as a state goal.
The state goal in the field of environmental protection is a sustainable society. Environmental sustainability can be achieved by fitting all the activities in the available environmental space by reducing environmental impact through more effective use of natural resources. This would automatically lead to an environment of high quality and the protection of the rights of future generations.
Existing human rights do not allow protection of the environment before the actual harm has occurred and are thus too anthropocentric and instrumental. Environmental considerations are not always afforded sufficient weight with other interests.
National legal frameworks enable taking into account specificities of each country and thus to formulate the basic right to a clean environment with a proper focus. Development of case law allows the overcoming of further problems with definition and enforcement. Public participation plays a crucial role in it.
The bearers of the basic obligation to preserve the living and natural environment as stipulated in § 53 of the Estonian Constitution are individuals, legal persons, the state and municipalities.
The basic obligation in § 53 of the Estonian Constitution gives rise to a subjective right to sustainable environment that can be invoked in the courts.
The state can demand protection of the environment from the individuals insofar as it has been prescribed by law. The state cannot be a subject of a basic right to sustainable environment.
Although the present wording of the Estonian Constitution can be construed in the light of the concept of environmental space (or the carrying capacity of ecosystems) it should state more clearly what is meant under this concept and connect it to the environmental basic right.
The activities in Estonia must fit into the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. This could be done by setting limits to these actions in the Constitution. Amending the rights chapter provides the advantage of allowing the rights to be invoked in courts by individuals.
1 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, Organization of African Unity (OAU) Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1982) and Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1989).
2 One of the reasons for this could be the fear of additional numerous claims that would devalue or debase the human rights currency. See D. Shelton. The right to environment. – A. Eide, J. Helgesen (eds.). The future of human rights protection in a changing world. Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991. p. 198.
4 Norms that indirectly allow environmental protection can be referred to as “derivative environmental rights”. R. Churchill. Environmental rights in existing human rights treaties. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (eds.). Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, p. 100.
5 P. Sands. Human rights, environment and the Lopez-Ostra case: context and consequences. – European Human Rights Law Review, 1996, No. 6, pp. 597–618.
6 The decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 June 1998, App. No. 23413/94. – European Human Rights Reports (hereinafter: EHRR) 1998, 27, 212.
7 A. A. Cancado Trindade. Human rights and the environment. – J. Symonides (ed.). Human rights: new dimensions and challenges. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1998, p. 117.
8 The court has invoked the proportionality test when deciding over the proper balance between the individual and society interests. Very often such cases concern noise pollution. See the decisions of European Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR) in Arrondelle v. UK, 15 July 1980, App. No. 7889/77. – Decisions and Reports of the Commission of Human Rights (DR) 1980, 19, 186; 13 May 1982. – DR 1982, 26, 5; Baggs v. United Kingdom, 16 October 1985, App. No. 9310/81. – DR 1985, 44, 13 and ECHR, Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, 21 February 1990, App. No. 172. – EHRR 1990, 12, 355; most recent judgment is ECHR, Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, 2 October 2001, App. No. 36022/97. – EHRR 2002, 34, 1.
9 LCB v. United Kingdom (Note 6); see also the judgment of UK High Court in Reay and Hope v British Nuclear Fuels, Queen’s Bench Division, 22 November 1993. – Medical Reports 1994, 5, 1.
10 Noel Narvii Tauira and Eighteen others v. France , 4 December 1995, App. No. 28204/95. – DR 1995, 83, 112. The applicants claimed that nuclear testing on Mururoa atoll could generate a risk of pollution.
11 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 1 July 1996, App. No. 30003/96. – EHRR 1996, 3, 801. The applicants claimed that their right to private and family life has been infringed by the existence of a nearby railway station, which fostered the transport of nuclear waste.
13 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 25 November 1993, App. No. 14282/88. – EHRR 1993, 18, 175.
14 See also the decision of European Commission of Human Rights Balmer-Schafroth and Others v. Switzerland 26 August 1997, App. No. 22110/93. – EHRR 1997, 25, 598, where applicants living within 5 kilometers of a nuclear power station claimed that in view of their right to bodily integrity and their property rights, an operation permit should not have been granted to the plant. Court found article 6 inapplicable, because there was not a sufficient link between the decision to give the permit and the possible harm to physical integrity and because no serious, specific or imminent danger was proven. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Pettiti pointed to the fact that the decision clearly undermined the precautionary principle.
15 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 9 December 1994, App. No. 16798/90. – EHRR 1995, 20, 277. Lopez-Ostra submitted that the fumes and smells from a badly managed waste treatment plant had caused health problems to her family members.
16 The success of Lopez-Ostra gave rise to many cases, especially by gypsies claiming their right to natural surroundings. See M. Demerieux. Deriving environmental rights from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. – Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2001, vol. 21, No. 3, p. 530.
17 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 19 February 1998, App. No. 14967/89. – EHRR 1998, 26, 357.
18 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 18 February 1991, App. No. 12033/86. – EHRR 1991, 13, 784. The case concerned the interpretation of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Protocol No. 1 article 1(2) that allows states to enforce property laws in view of the general interest.
19 In Oerlemans v. The Netherlands, ECtHR, 27 November 1991, App. No. 12565/86. – Reports on Judgments and Decisions Series A-219. The Court stated that it “[…] recognizes that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question”.
21 J. G. Merrills. Environmental protection and human rights: Conceptual aspects. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 38.
22 See the statement that “Often, the real value of a human right is that it is available as a moral trump card precisely when legal arrangements fail.” M. R. Anderson. Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: an overview. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 12.
23 M. Ernits sees § 53 of the Estonian Constitution to be only a guiding principle for the legislator. Põhiõiguste mõiste ja tähtsus õigussüsteemis (The Concept and Importance of Fundamental Rights in the Legal System). – Juridica, 1996, No. 9, pp. 463–471 (in Estonian).
24 See C. Fabre. Social Rights under the Constitution: government and the decent life, chapter 3.2.3. “From moral rights to Constitutional Rights”. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000, pp. 98–105.
25 R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (eds.). Comparative Environmental Law in Europe. An Introduction to Public Environmental Law in EU Member States. Antwerpen: Maklu, 1996. p. 427.
26 M. Rodi. Public Environmental Law in Germany. – R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (Note 25), p. 151.
28 R. Alexy. Kollisioon ja kaalumine kui põhiõiguste dogmaatika põhiprobleemid (Conflict and Weighing in the Doctrine of Fundamental Rights). – Juridica, 2001, No. 1, pp. 5–13 (in Estonian); see also R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 22–39.
29 R. Alexy (Note 28), p. 5.
30 The idea is supported by P. W. Birnie and A. Boyle in that even though they argue against the necessity to construe a right to the environment on an international level, they nevertheless acknowledge, that the same arguments may not hold sway in national frameworks. See P. W. Birnie, A. Boyle. International law and the environment. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 266; also in A. Boyle. The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 64.
31 Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur F. Z. Ksentini, Human Rights and Environment (hereinafter referred to as the Ksentini Report), Annex III Developments in national legislation and practices, UN Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th session, 17 August 1994, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/eeab2b6937bccaa18025675c005779c3?Opendocument (10.06.2003). See also K. Bosselmann. Human Rights and the Environment: Redefining Fundamental Principles. Available at: http://www.arbld.unimelb.edu.au/envjust/papers/allpapers/bosselmann/home.htm (15.04.2003).
32 P. W. Birnie, A. Boyle (Note 30), p. 256.
33 Ksentini Report (Note 31).
34 A. Kiss, D. Shelton. International Environmental Law. New York: Transnational Publications, 1991, p. 24.
35 A. Kiss. Définition et nature juridique d’un droit de l’homme ? l’environnement in Environnement et droits de l’homme, UNESCO, 1987, as cited in S. Prakash. The right to the Environment. Emerging Implications in Theory and Praxis. – Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 1995, vol. 13, No. 4, p. 425.
36 See Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992:3. Helsinki, 1992, pp. 358–359. For a reasoning of whether we should also accord rights to natural objects, see also S. Douglas-Scott. Environmental Rights: Taking the Environment Seriously? – L. Gearty, A. Tomkins (eds.). Understanding Human Rights. London, New York: Pinter, 1999, pp. 440–446.
37 P. Cullet. Definition of an Environmental Right in a Human Rights Context. – Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 1995, vol. 13, No. 1, p. 32.
38 E.g. article 20 of the Finnish Constitution. – Official Journal, 731/1999. Available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9990731.PDF (17.07.2003).
40 See C. Starck. Human Rights and Private Law in German Constitutional Development and in the Jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court. – D. Friedman, D. Barak-Erez (eds.). Human Rights in Private Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001, p. 97.
41 E.g. article 110b of the Norwegian Constitution. Available at http://www.odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/ (17.07.2003); article 45 of the Spanish Constitution. Available at http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html (17.7.2003), article 66 of the Portuguese Constitution. Available at http://www.portugal.gov.pt/en/Political+System/Constitution/default.htm (17.7.2003).
42 Only in cases where the government has drastically lowered the level of environmental protection Austrian and Dutch citizens may have a justiciable claim. (R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (Note 25), p. 427).
43 C. Calliess. Umweltgrundrechte im Recht der Europäischen Union. – K. Bosselmann (ed.). Ökologische Grundrechte. Zum Verhältnis zwischen individueller Freiheit und Natur. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, p. 212.
44 On an international level such rights are afforded by the UN Convention on the Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice. – Environmental Matters, at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (27.04.2003); also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 10.
45 P. Cullet (Note 37), p. 37. It has frequently been argued that procedural rights, contrary to a substantial environmental right, are a powerful tool in environmental protection. See e.g.. K.-H. Ladeur. Environmental Constitutional Law. – G. Winter (ed.). European Environmental Law. A Comparative Perspective. Ashgate: Dartmouth/Aldershot, 1996, p. 24; G. Handl. Human rights and protection of the environment. – A. Eide, C. Krause, A. Rosas (eds.). Economic, social and cultural rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, p. 327.
46 For the discussion on the role of NGOs in environmental protection see J. Cameron, R. Mackenzie. Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights in International Institutions. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), pp. 137–151.
47 Shelton notes, that “High short-term costs involved in many environmental protection measures often make environmental decisions unpopular with economically affected communities. The recognition that environmental protection is a core value and right can be particularly valuable in countering this disapproval and ensuring that the long-term needs of humanity are not sacrificed to short-term interests.” D. Shelton (Note 2), p. 191.
48 This was the case in Hungary, see G. Bandi. The Right to Environment in Theory and Practice: The Hungarian Experience. – Connecticut Journal of International Law, 1993, No. 2, pp. 439–467.
49 S. Prakash (Note 35), p. 423.
50 For a list of effective preventive measures see B. van Dyke. Proposal to introduce the right to a healthy environment into the European Convention regime. – Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 1994, No. 2, p. 338.
51 For analysis of the precautionary principle see J. Morris (ed.). Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Oxford: Butterworth, 2000; T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron (eds.). Interpreting the precautionary principle. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1994.
52 E.-J. Truuväli et al. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented Edition). Tallinn: Õigusteabe AS Juura, 2002, commentary to § 5 at pp. 69–70 (in Estonian).
53 Definition of sustainable use through sustainable development has been founded on Michael Decleris’ work on legal aspects of sustainable development. M. Decleris. The law of sustainable development. General principles. Brussels: European Commission, 2000.
55 R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses (Basic Rights in Estonian Constitution). – Juridica Special Edition, 2001, p. 30 (in Estonian).
57 L. D. Eriksson. Environmental Rights as a Constitutional Problem. – Retfaerd Special Issue, 1994, p. 107.
58 K.-H. Ladeur (Note 45), p. 19.
59 Section 53 gives rise to a state obligation to protect the environment, see subchapter 4.1.3.
60 R. Alexy (Note 55), pp. 20–21, as could be the case with § 27 (1) of the Estonian Constitution.
61 Right to procedure — the decision of the Supreme Court en banc, 28 October 2002, No. (3-4-1-5-02), para. 30. – Riigi Teataja (the State Gazette) III 2002, 28, 308 (in Estonian); right to good governance — the decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 17 February 2003, No. (3-4-1-1-03), para. 16. – Riigi Teataja (the State Gazette) III 2003, 5, 48 (in Estonian).
62 The decision of Tallinn Administrative Court in Hürden v. Harku Municipality in 5 June 2003, administrative case 3-693/2002.
63 The state inaction in the field of lawmaking may not be challenged by individuals in the court, but can be done through the Legal Chancellor.
64 K.-H. Ladeur (Note 45), p. 21.
65 The right to sustainable environment should obtain its content the way state goal has been given a content (see subchapter 4.1.1 and 4.1.3).
66 The concept of environmental space was first used in a study by Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (http://www.foeeurope.org/sustainability/europe/study/t-frame-study.htm (04.04.2003), the ecological constitutional reform and the resulting structural changes in the society and economy have been discussed by Marek Strandberg. – M. Strandberg. Kahe maja kokkupanekust (Uniting Ecology and Economy). Lehed ja Tähed. Tallinn: MTÜ Loodusajakiri, 2003, pp. 179–194 (in Estonian).


§ 125.030 Oath of Office.
§ 125.040 Compensation of Appointed Personnel.
§ 125.050 Commission of Officers.
§ 125.060 Nominations for Offices — Approval by Board.
§ 125.070 Vacancies in Certain Offices, How Filled.
§ 125.080 Removal of Officers.
§ 125.090 Mayor — Qualifications.
§ 125.110 Assumption of Duties by Acting President of Board.
§ 125.120 Signing of Bills — Veto Power.
§ 125.130 Mayor to Sign Commissions.
§ 125.140 Appointment of Committees.
§ 125.150 Authority During Emergencies.
§ 125.160 Mayor or Board May Inspect Books and Records of Officers.
§ 125.170 Authority to Remit Fines and Grant Reprieves.
§ 125.180 Mayor — Communications to Board of Aldermen.
§ 125.190 Mayor to Appoint Certain Officers, Department Heads Hired by Board.
§ 125.200 Adoption of City Administrator Form of Government.
§ 125.210 Creation of Office.
§ 125.280 Interference by Members of Board of Aldermen.
§ 125.285 Assistant City Administrator.
§ 125.290 Election by Board of Aldermen.
§ 125.310 Collection of Fees — Accounts.
§ 125.320 Clerk to Be Election Officer.
§ 125.330 Duties Relating to Taxes — Issuance of Licenses.
§ 125.340 Supervision of City Offices.
§ 125.350 Clerk to Be Chief Accountant.
§ 125.400 Appointment — Qualifications — Oath.
Cross References — As to building inspector, §§505.050 — 505.060; as to police chief, §§200.010 et seq.
Section 125.030 Oath of Office.
Section 125.040 Compensation of Appointed Personnel.
Section 125.050 Commission of Officers.
Section 125.060 Nominations for Offices — Approval by Board.
Section 125.070 Vacancies in Certain Offices, How Filled.
Section 125.080 Removal of Officers.
Section 125.090 Mayor — Qualifications.
Section 125.110 Assumption of Duties by Acting President of Board.
Section 125.120 Signing of Bills — Veto Power.
Section 125.130 Mayor to Sign Commissions.
Section 125.140 Appointment of Committees.
Section 125.150 Authority During Emergencies.
Section 125.160 Mayor or Board May Inspect Books and Records of Officers.
Section 125.170 Authority to Remit Fines and Grant Reprieves.
Section 125.180 Mayor — Communications to Board of Aldermen.
Section 125.190 Mayor to Appoint Certain Officers, Department Heads Hired by Board.
Section 125.200 Adoption of City Administrator Form of Government.
Section 125.210 Creation of Office.
Section 125.280 Interference by Members of Board of Aldermen.
Section 125.285 Assistant City Administrator.
Section 125.290 Election by Board of Aldermen.
Section 125.310 Collection of Fees — Accounts.
Section 125.320 Clerk to Be Election Officer.
Section 125.330 Duties Relating to Taxes — Issuance of Licenses.
Section 125.340 Supervision of City Offices.
Section 125.350 Clerk to Be Chief Accountant.
Section 125.400 Appointment — Qualifications — Oath.


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I want to continue my message on “Why is God so angry.” We need to understand how God is moving. We need to understand the season that we are now in. God is a God of mercy but so many forget that He is also a God of Justice! Just because His justice seems to be delayed doesn’t mean His justice is denied. He has so much patience but when He is ready to move, nobody can stop Him. A true prophet will not talk about how God is going to bless someone with a car or a new house all the time and other things that are pleasant to the ear. A true prophet will know God’s heart and relay this to His children. This is a strange season as I am feeling God’s heart and it is not pleasant. I am feeling Him like I never felt Him before. It has not always been pleasant knowing His heart during this season. I have been feeling some of His anger that He is pouring out right now on some of His people for about four months. He gives His prophet a small taste of what He is doing at certain key times in order to warn His people. During this time so many of His people have been running to “revivals” that are not of Him looking for a “quick fix.” They don’t want to spend time with Him. They just want to have some “man” (who may not be of God) lay hands on them and all their aches and pains will disappear. God does move through a man or woman but this will never be a substitute for spending time in His presence. People who have not repented of what He is convicting them of are running to places to get a miracle in the natural, not knowing that God won’t move in their natural circumstances until they allow Him to move on them spiritually. The word says in Matt. 6 v. 33 to “seek the kingdom of God and all His righteousness and all those things (natural blessings) will be added to him.” God will move in the natural when you start allowing Him to mortify the deeds of the flesh and conform you into the image of Jesus (Rom 8 v. 13, 29).
I want to continue looking in the book of Amos to show you some more of God’s reasons for His anger: In Amos 3 v. 3 the word says “can two walk together except they be agreed?” There are so many people who don’t agree with the lifestyle that the pastor and his elder friends are living but stay in the church because they been there so long or they don’t want to desert a “sinking ship.” They fail to realize that if the head is sick the body will get sick. It will spread to the rest of the body. We have all heard of the health hazards of “second hand smoke.” People can be indirectly affected by the actions of leadership in church. Some people are just “slaves” to the leadership, never consulting with Jesus as to the actions of the ones in charge. We all will be accountable to Christ for the mistakes we make.
In v. 10 the word says that there is robbery and violence in the palaces. I mentioned in the last message that some pastors consider their church to be a “palace” and consider themselves to be “kings.” As I mentioned in the prior message, they place so much emphasis on collecting money from the people that they even call in “heavy hitters” who are “anointed” to raise money. They then “split the take.” They don’t care if the people are having problems paying their own bills, they just think about their own preservation and wants. They squeeze every bit they can. This really upsets God when so called ministers do this to His children. What also upsets God very much is when his people are in a service and are in deep worship with Him and a minister takes advantage of this for self serving motives. One of the ways they do this is by “pushing” an offering at this time to take advantage of this precious moment. They want to “catch” God’s people at a tender moment for their own gain. They are coming between God and His people and this is very serious. God is ready to pour out His wrath on these “ministers.” God has been patient up to this point but no more! Those of you who have children would not allow anyone to come between you and your children. God won’t either!
God said in Chapter 4 v. 4 that people will say “come to Bethel and transgress.” He is saying that people will go to some churches (Bethel) because they can sin and not be exposed. There are some people that will run to a church where they don’t ever preach repentance or turning away from sins! They will feel comfortable there. God is also implying in v. 4 that as long as they pay their tithes and offerings in these places that the Pastors will be happy. Again, these Pastors will never make you feel uncomfortable in your sins. They are just interested in you money!
In v. 7-11 God mentioned that He allowed things to come against His people who refused to repent and He is doing the same thing now. He is trying to shake up His children that are not repenting and turning back to Him from man (idol) worship by allowing circumstances to come against them.
In v. 12 the word said that when they refuse to repent and turn back to Him they need to “prepare to meet their God.” So many of God’s children have not felt His wrath but they are about too.
Allow God to make you part of His remnant by turning your flesh over to Him (Rom. 8 v. 13) and conforming you to the image of Jesus (Rom. 8 v. 29). As part of His remnant go to your brothers and sisters in Christ and warn them that He is coming back soon. Tell them to come back to His presence and get away from worshipping a man. This will help them to get “Rapture Ready” and avoid God’s wrath!

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 218 › United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.
Where the United States claimed in an action in the state court to determine liens on vessels in course of construction, that, under the contract, title had vested in the United States, or that liens had been specially reserved thereon, and also claimed that the rights of the United States were superior to all others, and could not he retarded or impeded by the state lien law, assertions are made of rights and immunities which are the creation of federal authority, and, if denied by the state court, this Court has jurisdiction under § 709, Rev.Stat., to review the judgment.
Stipulations entered into by the United States district attorney to obtain possession of vessels in course of construction and seized by judicial proceedings under state law should not, under §§ 3753, 3754, Rev.Stat., be construed as depriving the United States of any rights asserted under the contracts for constructing such vessels.
Construing the three contracts for construction of vessels involved in this case, the Court construes one contract as vesting title in the United States as the work progressed and the others as not giving the United States a superior lien on the uncompleted vessel as work progressed: in regard to the one contract, the state lien law does not, and in regard to the other contract such law does, apply.
Vessels in course of construction for the United States, the title to which under the contract vests in the government as fast as constructed, become instrumentalities of the government and, for reasons of public policy, cannot be seized under state laws to answer private claims.
Quaere whether a joint resolution has the effect of an act of Congress, but held that the resolution of May 5, 1894, No. 24, 28 Stat. 582, permitting partial payments on vessels under construction for the Treasury Department, did not give the government an express statutory lien on such vessels superior to those given to materialmen by the state lien law.
110 Va. 165 affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The facts, which involve the construction of contracts for the construction of certain vessels for the United States and the relative rights of the United States and others claiming liens on such vessels, are stated in the opinion.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. The controversy grows out of contracts made between the United States and the William R. Trigg Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, carrying on business at Richmond, Virginia, for the construction of certain vessels for the United States, namely, a seagoing suction dredge, called the Benyuard, for the War Department; a revenue cutter, called the Mohawk, for the Treasury Department, and a cruiser, for the Navy Department, called the Galveston. The contract price for the Benyuard, apart from its pumping machinery, was $254,550; for the Mohawk, $217,000, and for the Galveston, $1,027,000. These contracts were dated, for the Benyuard, September 9, 1901; for the Mohawk, April 20, 1900, and for the Galveston, December 14, 1899.
In December, 1902, S. H. Hawes & Company filed a bill in the Chancery Court at the City of Richmond on behalf of themselves and other creditors, asserting liens under the supply lien law of the State of Virginia, averring the insolvency of the Trigg Company, and asking for the appointment of a receiver, which was accordingly made. The receiver took possession of the property of the Trigg Company, including the vessels above named. Under §§ 3753 and 3754 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, a stipulation was executed by the United States district attorney, on behalf of the United States for the release and discharge of the vessels and the material on hand applicable thereto.
dissented from the opinion of the majority, holding that the title to the Benyuard had passed to the United States under the terms of the contract under which it was constructed. The case is reported in 110 Va. 165.
It is contended that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, as no federal question was decided in that court which would lay the foundation for the writ of error. In the third class of cases provided for in § 709 of the United States Revised Statutes, it is expressly provided that where any right, title, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, treaty, or statute of the United States, or an authority exercised under the United States, is specially set up or claimed by either party, and the decision is against such right, title, privilege, or immunity, the same may be reexamined and reviewed by writ of error from this Court.
An examination of the record discloses that the government claimed in the case that, under the contract, the title to the dredge vested in the United States by virtue of the terms of the contract; that a lien was reserved to the United States under the contract for the cutter Mohawk and the cruiser Galveston which was superior to the claims of the supply liens' creditors under the laws of the State of Virginia. The government further contended that the right of the government to its superior claims upon the vessels, whether of title or lien, could not be affected by, and was not subject to, the lien statutes of the State of Virginia. The government also claimed that the state had no power to retard, impede, or control the operation of the federal government in making and carrying out such contracts as are herein under consideration.
by the judgment of the state court brings the case within the provisions of § 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. It is not necessary to lay the foundation for jurisdiction that the claims for federal rights asserted should be well founded; it is enough if they are substantial claims of federal rights within the statute, and such as were duly asserted and directly or necessarily denied in the judgment and decision of the state court.
Nor do we think there is anything in the stipulation entered into on the part of the government by the United States district attorney, with a view to getting possession of the vessels, which were in the hands of the receiver, which in anywise deprived the government of the right to assert any such immunity and privilege as it has because of the nature and character of the contracts and the lien of the government in the premises.
An examination of these sections, 3753, 3754, shows that they are intended to permit the United States to obtain possession of property claimed by it, when the same has been seized by judicial proceedings under the laws of the state, and to give to it and to the persons asserting rights in the property protection in their rights, notwithstanding such changes in possession.
"nothing herein contained shall, however, be considered as recognizing or conceding any right to enforce by seizure, arrest, attachment, or any judicial process any claim against any property of the United States, or against any property held, owned, or employed by the United States, or by any department thereof, for any public use, or as waiving any objection to any proceeding instituted to enforce any such claim."
the proceedings, affirming the rights of the persons asserting claims for the security or satisfaction of which such proceedings were instituted in the state courts against such property, notwithstanding the claims of the United States, the final judgment shall be deemed to all intents and purposes as a final determination of the rights of such persons, and shall entitle such persons, as against the United States, to such right as they would have in case the possession of such property had not been changed. The section provides for the payment of such final judgment out of the treasury of the United States.
The evident purpose of these sections is that neither the United States nor the claimants to the property shall lose any rights because of the release of the property under the stipulation, but, as were the rights of the parties before the change of possession, such they shall continue to be. We do not agree that, by entering into a stipulation which embodied these terms, the United States lost any right which it had to assert claims under the contracts, or rights by reason of the sovereignty of the United States, if any such exist. We think this Court has jurisdiction of this case upon this writ of error.
"Materials furnished and the work done by the William R. Trigg Company were to be subject to rigid inspection by an inspector appointed on the part of the government, his decision to be final as to quantity and quality."
be retained until the final completion and acceptance of the boat. The government was to have the right to recover anything paid for such completion in excess of the original contract price with the William R. Trigg Company, including all extra cost of inspection, and might proceed under § 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States to provide for the completion of the boat by open purchase or contract, unless the time for such completion should be extended."
"It was expressly provided that the William R. Trigg Company should be responsible for and pay all liabilities incurred in the prosecution of the work for labor and materials."
"Section 9 of the contract was as follows:"
" It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that, until final inspection and acceptance of, and payment for, all materials and work herein provided for, no prior inspection, payment, or act is to be construed as a waiver of the right of the party of the first part to reject any defective work or material, or to require the fulfillment of any of the terms of the contract."
"Section 199 of the specification was as follows:"
" The purpose and spirit of these specifications are that the contractor is to provide and deliver a staunch dredge hull and first-class machinery, complete in every respect."
"Section 206 of of the specifications was as follows:"
" It is understood and agreed that the contractor assumes full responsibility for the safety of his employees, plant, and materials, and for any damage or injury done by or to them from any source or cause."
should be made, based on the reports of the inspector, the first when the hull and propelling machinery should be 10 percent complete, the second when 20 percent complete, and so on, to the last payment, to be made when the vessel should be turned over to the United States after successful trial; from each of said payments, except the last, 20 percent to be reserved until final payment."
"Section 211 was as follows:"
" The parts paid for under the system of partial payments above specified shall become thereby the sole property of the United States; but this provision shall not be interpreted as relieving the contractor from the sole responsibility for the proper care and protection of said parts prior to the delivery of the dredge to the United States, or from any other of the provisions of these specifications."
"Section 212 provided for insurance against fire and marine risks at the contractor's cost, for and in behalf of the United States, to at least the amount of each partial payment."
"The evidence shows that the government had paid $142,550.80 on account of this contract when the receiver was appointed in this cause, and that said dredge was then 70 percent complete."
not, of themselves, work the transfer of the title of a vessel to be constructed in advance of its completion. But it is equally well settled that, if the contract is such as to clearly express the intention of the parties that the builder shall sell and the purchaser shall buy the ship before its completion, and at the different stages of its progress, and this purpose is expressed in the words of the contract, it is binding and effectual in law to pass the title. 2 Parsons on Contracts, 8th ed. 259, and cases cited.
All sections of the agreement must be read in the light of the purposes of the contracting parties, as gathered from the entire contract, and must be considered in connection with other provisions of the contract. And it is said that § 212, as to insurance, does not show an intention to protect the title transferred to the government, but must be read in the light of the purpose of the government to acquire title to the dredge in the event that it ultimately elected to take it over as a purchaser, the ownership in the meantime remaining in the builder until such final decision was made, and the insurance was required for the government's security for the partial payments.
"to at least the amount of such partial payment, and the property was to be kept insured to at least the aggregate of the payments made until delivery and final acceptance."
It is insisted that the right to reject the dredge or to annul the contract is inconsistent with the passage of title under the provisions of § 211 of the specification, however positive that section may be in terms.
"It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that, until final inspection and acceptance hereof, and payment for, all the material and work herein provided for, no prior inspection, payment, or act is to be construed as a waiver of the right of the party of the first part to reject any defective work or material, or to require the fulfillment of any of the terms of this contract."
Let it be conceded that this section gave the government the right to reject defective work or material, or even the entire dredge, if, upon trial and before final acceptance, it proved defective -- is that right inconsistent with the vesting of title in the parts as paid for, as specifically provided in § 211? We think not. It may be that, in such contingency, the government might reject the dredge. This might be true consistently with the acquirement of title in parts accepted and paid for after inspection. That is, if the whole, upon final trial, proved defective, all, including the restoration of that acquired, might be within the power of the government. See, in this connection, The Poconoket, 67 F. 262, 266.
The provisions of § 4 look rather to the completion of the vessel by the government in the event of the annulment of the contracts for failure to keep its requirements. In that contingency, it is provided that payments shall cease and reserved payments be retained until the final completion and acceptance of the work. In this section, the United States is given a remedy for the cost of completion upon the failure of the contractor to prosecute the work according to the contract.
was to be responsible for and pay all liabilities for labor and material incurred in the prosecution of the work. We are at a loss to see any inconsistency between this provision and the passing of the title in parts as paid for. Construing the whole contract, we find nothing in its other provisions which cuts down or lessens the binding force of the clear and distinct provisions of § 211 as to ownership. The parties therein dealt with a specific part of the contract, they expressed themselves clearly upon the subject, and it is not to be presumed, in the absence of clear expression or necessary implication, that they intended to supersede this provision in dealing with other specific or general parts of the agreement.
It is suggested, in this connection, that the contract with the government in the case of the Benyuard is not different in effect than the one passed upon in Clarkson v. Stevens, 106 U. S. 505. In that case, the contract provided that the materials received at the yard for the construction of the steamer should be distinctly marked with the letters "U.S." and should become the property of and belong to the United States. There was no provision that title to the vessel should vest in the United States as fast as parts thereof were constructed, and Mr. Justice Matthews, who delivered the opinion of the Court, approved the opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey expressing the view that the declaration as to the materials excluded the implication sought to be raised as to the title in the unfinished ship; "for," said Mr. Justice Matthews, "the inference is obvious, from the particularity of such a provision, that the larger interest would not be left to mere intendment." P. 106 U. S. 516.
"If this were a suit brought by the builders to enforce a lien for materials furnished for the construction of a ship under a contract directly with the government, or for repairs on a public vessel, the title of which was vested in the United States at the time the work was done or the supplies were furnished, the argument founded on public policy, and the suggestions arising from the inconvenience of causing delay and embarrassment to the public service, would be entitled to very great weight. It might in such case be open to grave doubt whether a lien on the property of the United States could be given by virtue of an enactment of the legislature of a state, or whether services rendered and materials supplied directly to the government must not be presumed to have been furnished exclusively on the faith and credit of the United States, to the exclusion of any intent to rely on a lien upon the public property. But considerations of this nature have no application to a case like the present. It would have been competent for the United States, if they wished to avoid the inconvenience or danger of delay arising from liens in favor of private persons, to make their contract in such form as to divest the builder of any title to the property in the vessel during the process of construction, or to stipulate for the application of the purchase money to the extinguishment of all claims for materials furnished to the builder."
of the United States, and that property a vessel intended for the use of the government in carrying on its necessary operations in the exercise of its governmental authority.
It was in recognition of the inability of contractors for labor and material to take liens upon the public property of the United States that Congress passed the Act of August 13, 1894, c. 280 (28 Stat. 278), amended February 24, 1905, c. 778 (33 Stat. 811), providing for bonds in favor of those who furnished labor or materials in the construction of public works. It was in view of this purpose to provide protection for those who could not protect themselves by liens upon public property that the statute was given liberal construction in this Court. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416, 191 U. S. 425; Hill v. Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 200 U. S. 203.
As we read the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, it is not held that a lien was fixed upon the dredge if in fact the title thereto passed to the United States. In any event, it could not be tolerated that property of the United States could be seized or encumbered under state lien laws of the character in question. We are not now dealing with the right of a state to provide for such liens while property to the chattel in process of construction remains in the builder, who may be constructing the same with a view to transferring title therein to the United States upon its acceptance under a contract with the government. We are now treating of property which the United States owns. Such property, for the most obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be seized by authority of another sovereignty, against the consent of the government. The Benyuard, as fast as constructed, became one of the instrumentalities of the government, intended for public use, and could not be seized under state laws to answer the claim of a private person, however meritorious.
Nor do we think the case one for the application of the doctrine governing cases where the United States claims an interest in property lawfully in possession of a court which is administering it, as in equity or in admiralty, and the government intervenes to protect its interest therein. In such instances, its rights must be adjudicated in recognition of the rights and demands of others interested in the same property. In this case, the vessels were released under a stipulation which fully protected the rights of the United States, and the government claims the exclusive right and title in the Benyuard as the parts were completed and paid for.
"Provided, That a lien shall be, and hereby is, reserved to the United States upon the hull, machinery, fittings, and equipment of said vessel, and the materials on hand for use in her construction, respectively and collectively, for all moneys advanced on account thereof, and that such lien shall commence with the first payment, and shall thereupon attach to the work and the materials furnished, and shall in like manner attach from time to time, as the work progresses, and as further payments are made, and shall continue until the completion and acceptance of said vessel."
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, authorized to make partial payments, from time to time, upon existing contracts and all contracts hereafter made for the construction of vessels for the Treasury Department, but not in excess of 75 percent of the amount of the value of the work already done, and that the contracts hereafter made shall provide for a lien upon such vessels for all advances so made: Provided, That nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to hereafter authorize any partial payments except on contracts stipulating for the same, and then only in accordance with such contract stipulation."
On behalf of the government, it is contended that this resolution makes the lien of the government, reserved under the contract, an express statutory lien by authority of the United States, and consequently superior to any asserted rights under the lien laws of a state. But we cannot agree to this contention. The joint resolution, if it be conceded to have the effect of an act of Congress, does not undertake to create a statutory lien, but directs how contracts thereafter made shall provide with reference to liens upon such vessels. As to future contracts, it is directed that they shall provide for liens upon vessels for advances thus made. We think the lien mentioned is only one created by the terms of the contract, and is to be considered in the light of the other provisions thereof.
to other persons who should perform labor or furnish materials in the building of the vessel, who might become entitled, by reason of such claims against the company, to liens upon the property.
The contract was made with the Virginia corporation, and it was intended that the bond required of the Trigg Company should protect the government against rights arising out of labor performed or material furnished in the construction of the vessel. Conceding it to be true for this purpose, as asserted by the counsel for the government, that the United States can make contracts providing liens of this character which shall be superior to the claims of any person for liens under state laws, it is nonetheless certain that it may, if it chooses, recognize the authority of the labor or materials for the construction of labor or materials for the construction of government work. Indeed, such, as we have seen, is the policy of the government in respect to public buildings and structures, upon which liens cannot be taken under the laws of the states. In order that such claims may be satisfied, the United States has made provision for their protection by bonds upon which persons may recover damages, so that those who furnish property of which the government receives the benefit shall not entail a loss by so doing. Read in the light of this policy, so manifestly just and proper, and the requirements of this contract and bond, we think that the government did not intend that the lien which it reserved for itself should be superior to that of contractors for labor and material who had contributed to the work.
"When a payment is made under this contract, as a condition precedent thereto, the Secretary of the Navy may, in his discretion, require, for the protection of the party of the first part, evidence satisfactory to him, to be furnished by the party of the first part, that no lien or rights in rem of any kind against said vessels, or her machinery, fittings, or equipment, or the material on hand for use in the construction thereof, have been or can be acquired for or on account of any work done or any machinery, fitting, equipment, or material already incorporated as a part of said vessel, or on hand for that purpose, or that such liens or rights have either been released absolutely, or so subordinated to the rights of the government as to make its lien for all payments paramount, so as not to encumber or hinder in any way the right of the government to accept or reject said vessel, and so as to become absolutely extinguished in case of the acceptance of the vessel."
The effect which we give this provision is strengthened by the opinion rendered to the Secretary of the Navy by the Attorney General, that in his opinion, the practice of the Navy Department in making such contracts recognized that liens of this class might be acquired on vessels where there was no provision in the contract for vesting title in the same in the United States. 23 Op.Atty.Gen. 174, 176.
We think that this contract, as the one for the Mohawk, was made in recognition of the rights of those who should furnish work or material for the vessel to secure their claims by liens which it was made the duty of the contractor to provide for in order to protect the title of the United States.
and reversed as to the Benyuard, and it is so ordered. The case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.


Publish America Scam: Another Publish America author takes on PA in Federal Court without legal representation and with the same old failed results. When will they learn?
Another Publish America author takes on PA in Federal Court without legal representation and with the same old failed results. When will they learn?
There is a lesson to be learned here. That lesson is how Federal Courts view the arbitration clause in PA's contract.
Texas, the following report is submitted for your review and consideration.
case reflects plaintiff suing under the “Copyright [A]ct, 17 U.S. C. § 501/Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1 Docket no. 5 (Jan. 27, 2011).
2 Docket no. 1 at 1 and civil cover sheet; docket no. 8.
§ 1114.”3 Thus, the Court also has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
had the name of another author behind the copyright trademark” and “[t]he ISBD number . . .
3 Docket no. 1 at civil cover sheet; docket no. 8.
plaintiff’s manuscript; and ex. D, proposed order of dismissal.
9 Docket no. 7 at 1-2.
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
transferred to Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
for the claim of which I filed in Federal Court for 1.7 million dollars without any stipulations.
14 Docket no. 6 at 1-2.
15 Id. at 5 (quoting ex. B to Prather decl. at ¶ 1).
25 Docket no. 6, ex. B to Prather decl. at ¶ 29.
26 Docket no. 6 at 10.
29 Docket no. 9 at 1.
34 9 U.S.C. § 2.
35 9 U.S.C. § 3.
existing external to the arbitration agreement preclude arbitration of the dispute.
36 9 U.S.C. § 4.
37 Fedmet Corp. v. M/V Buyalyk, 194 F.3d 674, 676 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Alford v.
must be submitted to arbitration”).
v. Thind Hotels, LLC., No. H-09-792, 2010 WL 519695, at * 3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2010).
Cir. 2002); Ascension, 2010 WL 519695 at * 3.
Webb v. Investacorp., Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 1996)).
41 Hill, 367 F.3d t 429.
42 Id. (citing Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2003)).
105 S.Ct. at 3354 and Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1996)).
46 Id. (citing Alford, 975 F.2d at 1161).
47 Docket no. 6, attch. B to Prather’s decl.
clause. Thus, the question is whether the arbitration clause covers the dispute at hand.
copyright page with his name.
48 Id. at ¶ 29.
plaintiff has failed to show Congress intended federal copyright disputes would not be arbitrated.
51 Docket no. 1 at 2.
52 Docket no. 1 at civil cover sheet.
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”).
the March 22, 2005 contract, or otherwise show the arbitration clause should not be enforced.
GRANTED and plaintiff’s case should be DISMISSED in favor of arbitration.
55 See Ascension, 2010 WL 519695 at *6 (citing Alford, 975 F.2d at 1161).
any party not represented by an attorney registered as a Filing User.
57 See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 472 (1985).
SIGNED and ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2011.