In a case arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Third Circuit in Munir v. Pottsville Area School District considered whether a student’s parents were entitled to reimbursement for the student’s placement in therapeutic residential treatment programs following several suicide attempts. The court also considered whether the school district violated IDEA by failing to provide an adequate individualized education program (IEP) for the student. The two-judge panel held that a student’s placement in a therapeutic residential treatment program, primarily for mental health treatment and with only incidental educational benefits, does not entitle parents to reimbursement under IDEA. In addition, the court held that the district’s proposed IEP satisfied the requirements of IDEA.
In 2005, O.M., a Pottsville middle school student, first required in-patient hospitalization after making suicidal threats. A psycho-educational evaluation of O.M. conducted by the school revealed no learning disabilities and no eligibility for emotional disturbance services. After three subsequent years of good academic performance and no incidents, O.M. was hospitalized three times in 2008 for suicidal attempts, threats, and gestures. O.M. began the following 2008–09 school year at a boarding school but returned home within the first week after expressing thoughts of harming himself. While reenrolled at Pottsville Area High School, between September and November 2008, O.M. was again hospitalized twice for expressing suicidal thoughts. In response, the district conducted an evaluation of O.M. pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to determine whether he had a disability. Although the district determined O.M. did not require an IEP, it did create a § 504 plan for O.M.
In January 2009, after another hospitalization, Munir enrolled O.M. at Wediko Children’s Services, a therapeutic residential treatment center in New Hampshire. Wediko provided O.M. with individual and group therapy, as well as a state accredited full-day curriculum, which O.M. began attending two to three weeks after his enrollment. The school day at Wediko consisted of small, pass-fail classes with regular debriefing periods to assess emotional and psychological wellbeing.
Wediko conducted a psycho-educational evaluation of O.M. and diagnosed O.M. with emotional disturbance. Based on the evaluation, Wediko suggested that the school district consider an IEP for O.M. In response, the district developed and offered an IEP to O.M., which included emotional and psychological support services and a cognitive-behavioral curriculum. Munir rejected the proposed IEP, however, as it did not include the same class and services program offered at Wediko. Instead, at the beginning of the 2009–10 school year, Munir enrolled O.M. at the Phelps School, a residential school in Pennsylvania that provided small classes and a supportive environment.
In August 2009, Munir filed a due process complaint with the Office of Dispute Resolution, alleging that the district violated IDEA by failing to conduct a timely evaluation of O.M. and to provide the appropriate specialized education services. Munir sought (1) compensatory education for the period between the fall of 2007 and December 2008 and (2) reimbursement for the cost of O.M.’s placement at Wediko and Phelps. The hearing officer denied both forms of relief on January 23, 2010. Following an appeal of the hearing officer’s decision, the district court adopted the same factual findings and legal analysis and granted summary judgment in favor of the district. This appeal followed, challenging only the denial of tuition reimbursement.
Under IDEA, a state is eligible to received federal education funding so long as it provides children with disabilities a free appropriate education (FAPE). Providing a FAPE to students requires evaluating all children who may qualify as disabled under the statute. If a student is identified as disabled, a school must determine the student’s educational needs based on the particular disability. IDEA requires schools to develop, propose, and implement an IEP for each child with a disability to meet those needs. An IEP must be “reasonably calculated” to provide specific educational benefits.
If a school is unable to provide a FAPE to a student that meets his or her specialized needs, the school is required to pay for his or her education at another institution. Children may be placed into private institutions with or without prior consent of state or local officials. If a child’s placement changes without prior consent, however, a hearing officer may deny tuition compensation if the officer finds that the school had provided the student with a timely FAPE. In the alternative, if the officer finds that the school did not provide a FAPE and that the alternative institution served as an appropriate placement, tuition reimbursement may be granted.
Courts have utilized a two-pronged test to determine eligibility for tuition reimbursement under IDEA. To meet this test, parents must show that (1) the school failed to provide the student with a FAPE and (2) the alternative placement was appropriate. An alternative placement is appropriate if it “provid[es] significant learning” and “confer[s] a meaningful benefit.” The alternative placement, however, need not be “perfect” to satisfy IDEA.
The first prong requires a school to have evaluated a student and proposed any necessary IEP to meet the student’s specialized educational needs. To meet the second prong, alternative residential placement must be necessary for educational purposes, beyond any medical, social, or emotional needs of the student. If the placement primarily served psychological needs rather than assisting in the student’s academic learning process, parents are responsible for the cost of such placement. When a child’s psychological and emotional needs are intertwined with his capability to learn, however, special services to meet those needs are a necessary part of his specially designed education. Because all residential placement services may be broadly construed to aid in a child’s learning, courts “assess the link between the supportive service or educational placement and the child’s learning needs.” Incidental educational benefits of a residential placement are insufficient to meet the second prong.
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the Supreme Court noted that a reviewing court has broad discretion to find what relief is appropriate “in light of the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through publicly funded private-school placements when necessary.” In light of this discretion, a court conducting the two-prong reimbursement test must consider all relevant factors to determine whether some or all of the cost of the replacement program is appropriate. Such factors include whether the parents notified the school of their intent to enroll their child in an alternative placement and the school’s opportunities for evaluation of the student.
In determining whether Munir was entitled to reimbursement for Wediko’s and Phelps’s tuition, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and exercised plenary review over its legal conclusions. The Munir court concurred with the district court in its determination that O.M. was enrolled at Wediko primarily for mental health needs, and thus was not entitled to reimbursement for Wediko’s tuition. The court also found no error in the lower court’s finding that Munir was not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of tuition at Phelps, as the school district had thoughtfully drafted an IEP for O.M. that satisfied its obligations under IDEA.
In evaluating whether O.M.’s placement at Wediko was deserving of reimbursement, the Third Circuit turned to the IDEA analysis set forth in prior case law. The court relied on its earlier opinion in Mary T. v. School District of Philadelphia and determined that the critical question is whether the alternative placement was necessary for educational needs or whether the placement treated the student’s mental health needs as “segregable from his educational needs.” The Munir court cited a similar analysis in Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings, in which the Ninth Circuit assessed the link between the private services and the child’s educational needs to conclude that the services were primarily medical. Following this line of reasoning, if O.M.’s placement was an effort to treat his mental health needs, with only incidental educational benefits, the district was not responsible for reimbursement of Wediko’s tuition. A finding that the alternative placement was necessary for educational needs, however, would fulfill the second prong of the test.
One factor the court considered was the availability of an educational program at the alternative placement. In Mary T. and Clovis Unified School District, the alternative placements were directed primarily at the psychological, medical, or emotional needs of the child, as opposed to his or her educational needs. In those cases, there were either no or very limited educational services. The Munir court recognized, however, that Wediko did offer an alternative with an educational component, including a full day of school with a state accredited curriculum.Nevertheless, the court determined this factor to be inconclusive as to whether the placement was in fact educational.
Instead of focusing on the educational services that O.M. received at Wediko, the court determined the initial and primary reason for enrollment—mental health needs—better informed its analysis.The court noted that O.M.’s alternative placement was “prompted by medical emergency” and was in response to his parents’ fear of self-inflicted harm. Furthermore, outside of his suicidal threats and attempts, O.M. did not suffer academically at Pottsville, maintained good attendance, and appeared to socialize with peers. The court weighed these factors more heavily than the fact that O.M. attended specialized classes while at Wediko, and concluded that Munir did not change O.M.’s placement to meet his specialized educational needs. The second prong of IDEA analysis was, therefore, not met.
The Munir court concluded that Munir was not entitled to reimbursement for tuition costs at Phelps because he did not meet the first prong of IDEA analysis. The district’s proposed IEP in 2009 satisfied its obligations under IDEA, as it was “reasonably calculated” to meet O.M.’s specialized educational needs. In drafting the IEP, the district took into account recommendations from Wediko based on its evaluation of O.M.Although the IEP did not provide the same small class sizes and counseling services as offered at Wediko and as requested by Munir, it was not required to be “perfect” or “maximize the potential” of the student.
In evaluating Munir’s claim of compensatory relief, the Munir court applied the two-prong analysis under IDEA improperly in part, and properly in part. Regarding the issue of reimbursement for Wediko’s tuition, the court insufficiently addressed the first prong: whether the school district had provided O.M. with a FAPE prior to attending the new school. Furthermore, despite the integral educational benefit received from the Wediko program, the court erroneously found the initial reason for O.M.’s alternative placement—mental health—dispositive of the inappropriateness of the placement. The court, however, correctly decided that Munir was not entitled to reimbursement of Phelps’s tuition, as the district had proposed an adequate IEP for O.M. prior to his enrollment. Even if Phelps served as an appropriate alternative placement, the district did not fail the first prong of providing O.M. with a FAPE.
In addressing the claim for relief for the Wediko program, the Munir court failed to discuss the question of whether the school district had provided O.M. with a FAPE and skipped right to the second prong to conclude that the alternative placement was not “appropriate.” The hearing officer, who found that the district did not deprive O.M. of a FAPE, provides guidance to the former issue. The officer noted that between 2005 and the spring of 2008, O.M.’s mental health did not appear to affect his ability to learn. However, after the multiple incidents in 2008, the district may have had a greater obligation to evaluate O.M. and provide him with specialized services. The officer concluded, however, that even if the district had violated IDEA, that “violation had no substantive effect” as O.M. was transferred to Wediko before the district had an opportunity to complete the process of instituting an IEP.
The missing fact in the hearing officer’s analysis seems to be that the Munirs had requested an IEP for their son in September 2008, and in response, the district conducted an evaluation. The district implemented a § 504 plan but not an IEP. To determine whether the § 504 plan was sufficient to provide O.M. with a FAPE, or whether the failure to provide an IEP prevented a FAPE, more information would be needed than was provided in the court’s opinion.
The Munir court pointed to O.M.’s maintenance of his grades and attendance record at Pottsville as evidence that his academic learning was not suffering. Nevertheless, O.M.’s self-inflicted harm and suicidal thoughts appeared to significantly interrupt his learning: he had to continually receive in-patient hospital care, and his parents were often required to pick him up from school after he expressed feelings of being upset. There is also indication that O.M. was unable to handle the courses for which he was academically suited. For example, in 2008, O.M. had signed up for honors math classes but began struggling and dropped to the lower-level courses.
In addition, after finishing the 2008–9 school year at Wediko, Munir decided O.M.’s risk level had decreased enough to transfer him to a less intensive environment. O.M. was thus sent to Phelps. This change in placement is evidence of the success of the Wediko program. O.M.’s needs for special services and consistency in programming demonstrate that the link between O.M.’s educational and psychological needs was sufficiently substantial so as to hold the school district financially responsible for the alternative placement.
The Munir court stressed that O.M.’s placement at Wediko was prompted by a medical emergency. However, even if a change to an alternative placement is rooted in psychological or emotional problems, a school may still be obligated to reimburse the costs of such placement if it helps to alleviate the problems that inhibit the ability to learn. Granting tuition reimbursement for the Wediko program is further supported by the Act’s “broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through publicly funded private-school placements,” as recognized by the Supreme Court.
The Munir court properly denied relief for the cost of tuition at Phelps, as the district had offered O.M. a sufficient IEP. It is unrealistic to expect a public school to offer identical services to those offered at a specialized institute to disabled students. Although such services may be superior in aiding a student’s learning capabilities, they may not be necessary to ensure the availability of appropriate and meaningful educational benefits.
In Munir, the school district on two occasions in 2009 proposed an IEP for O.M., taking into account the specific recommendations of Wediko. There is no support in either the statute or in case law that the IEP be perfect; rather, it must measure the student’s current educational capabilities and present annual goals, as well as specifically describe special education and related services that will be provided to meet such goals. Although the court’s opinion does not provide detail of the district’s proposed IEP, Munir demanded compensatory relief due to the district’s failure to provide small class sizes and the type of counseling services provided at Wediko. This suggests that beyond those two specific services, the IEP was otherwise satisfactory. As the IEP did provide for emotional, psychological, and social work services, it is reasonable to conclude that the district met its obligation to provide a FAPE to O.M.
The general policy objective of IDEA—to provide free appropriate education for every disabled child—is frustrated by decisions such as Munir. The Munir court set a stricter precedent for parents seeking compensation for special educational services for their disabled children. The court’s opinion treats the district’s obligations under IDEA leniently by failing to address the lack of a proposed IEP between 2005 and 2009. In addressing the appropriateness of the alternative placement at Wediko, the court set aside the most significant factor—the educational benefits afforded O.M.—and instead concentrated on the medical nature of the root problem.
Schools have an important interest in protection from unreasonable reimbursement demands by parents who simply refuse to cooperate with the school. The two-prong reimbursement test, however, provides sufficient procedural safeguards against this type of abuse. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized the huge financial risk parents take in unilaterally moving their children to an alternative placement without conferring with the public school. This risk, the Court noted, should quell concerns of parents abusing public resources and of the potential financial burden on public schools.
Congress drafted IDEA with the intention of encouraging collaboration between schools and parents in developing IEPs that provide children with FAPEs. While it is always financially safer for parents to confer and collaborate with the school district before transferring a child, it may sometimes be the case, as in the case of O.M., that grave risks are implicated with delay. Nevertheless, following the Third Circuit’s decision, parents must take caution before unilaterally moving their children into alternative placements.
 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013).
 Munir, 723 F.3d at 426.
 29 U.S.C. § 701–797 (2012).
 Id. Emotional disturbance is a qualifying disability under IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a)(i)(2012).
 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); id. § 1414(d).
 Munir, 723 F.3d at 426; see Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (“[Parents] are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under the Act.”).
 See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009) (finding reimbursement authorized under IDEA “when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate”).
 See Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (noting that a child’s placement in private school at public expense is appropriate relief where “a court determines that a private placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate”).
 Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
 Mary T. v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999)).
 See id. at 240 (“School districts provide a FAPE by designing and administering a program of individualized instruction that is set forth in an Individualized Education Plan”).
 See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693–94 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing the issue as “whether placement was required for emotional problems and was therefore the responsibility of the parents or social services agencies or whether full-time placement was a necessary ingredient for learning”).
 Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694.
 Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245–46.
 Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 238 (citing Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1996)).
 Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 430 (3d Cir. 2013).
 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009). In Mary T., the Third Circuit framed the issue as “whether full-time placement may be considered necessary for education purposes, or whether the residential placement is a response to medical, social or emotional problems that are segregable from the learning process.” 575 F.3d at 243–44. The court noted that the school was obligated to bear the cost of tuition only in the former, and not the latter, situation. Id. at 244.
 Munir, 723 F.3d at 433 (citing Mary T., 575 F.3d at 243–44).
 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
 Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d at 645.
 Munir, 723 F.3d at 432.
 See Mary T. v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing the treatment center as a licensed and accredited mental health and rehabilitative long-term psychiatric residential facility, with no educational accreditation, school services, or school affiliation); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 645 (noting that the child required six hours of intensive psychotherapy each day, and received one to two hours per day of classroom instruction).
 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text for a description of the Wediko program.
 Munir, 723 F.3d at 428.
 See supra notes 7–15 and accompanying text for a timeline of in-patient hospital care.
 See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the student’s self-destructive behaviors limited his ability to learn, and thus an environment that reduced such behaviors served as an appropriate placement).
 Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238 (2009).
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV) (2012).
 Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 247.
 See Courtney Rachel Baron, Lessons Learned from Forest Grove School District v. T.A.: How the Supreme Court Can Refine the Approach to Private School Tuition Reimbursement Under the IDEA, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 522, 523 (2009) (noting that the IDEA is “structured” to encourage parent-school district collaboration in providing children with special education services).


Mark and Nzinga TALBERT v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
(Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY). Craig R. Nelson, Nelson Fay, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants. Robert H. Cooper, Robert H. Cooper, Attorney at Law, Mandeville, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
This is an insurance coverage dispute. The parties are State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and Mark and Nzinga Talbert (“the Talberts”). The issue presented is whether State Farm properly denied the Talberts' claim for an allegedly stolen automobile based on material misrepresentations in obtaining coverage. From a judgment in favor of State Farm dismissing their claim, the Talberts appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Immediately after leaving Mid-City's office, Mr. Talbert and Mr. Offray went to the State Farm agency at which the Talberts had insured other vehicles. At the agency, Mr. Talbert presented the documents that he obtained from Mid-City, including the act of donation. Mr. Talbert also presented a 2003 white GMC Yukon Denali that he claimed to be the vehicle described in the documents. At that time, pictures were taken of the vehicle, which show it had a temporary Georgia license plate. Based on Mr. Talberts' representation that he was the sole owner of the vehicle, State Farm added the Yukon Denali to the Talberts' policy. Thereafter, the Talberts paid the insurance premium on the vehicle for the next year.
On June 5, 2004, the Talberts reported to the police and to the On-Star Service that the vehicle was stolen from their home in the Florida Housing Project in New Orleans. The On-Star service located a Yukon Denali with VIN 1GKEK63U13J287031 in Florida. However, the vehicle that On-Star located belonged to Ann Treadwell, a Georgia resident, and was pewter in color, not white. The record reflects that Ms. Treadwell purchased the vehicle new from a Georgia dealership, which acquired it directly from the GMC factory.
The Talberts made a claim with State Farm for the value of the vehicle. State Farm provided the Talberts with a rental car and proceeded to investigate the claim. On November 3, 2004, the Talberts filed suit against State Farm, seeking to recover the following: 1) proceeds allegedly due them under their policy for the theft of the vehicle; 2) damages, including rental costs and premiums paid after the date of the theft; and 3) statutory penalties for bad faith refusal to pay the claim as well as attorney's fees under La. R.S. 22:658 and 22:1220.
On November 14, 2006, a jury trial commenced in this matter. Mr. and Mrs. Talbert both testified. The gist of their testimony was that although Mr. Offray was unemployed, they did not question how he could afford the vehicle because they trusted him. Insofar as Mr. Offray's whereabouts, they indicated that he had lived with his mother in New Orleans. They further indicated that they were unaware of where he was currently living.
Neither of the Talberts offered any explanation for the discrepancies regarding Mr. Offray's Ohio title, his proof of insurance, or the VIN. More specifically, Mrs. Talbert could not explain why her brother, who never lived in Georgia, would have obtained insurance for the Yukon Denali from a Georgia insurance agency. Nor could she explain why the vehicle, which was transferred by a bill of sale that was notarized by an Ohio notary, and which had an Ohio title, would have a Georgia temporary license plate.
The Talberts presented the deposition testimony of Valencia Thomas. Ms. Thomas testified that she was employed by the State Farm agency at which the Talberts purchased the insurance. Ms. Thomas stated that when Mr. Talbert came into the agency to add the Yukon Denali to his existing policy she was training a new employee. Ms. Thomas testified that she and the new employee used the information on the documents Mr. Talbert provided them to complete the application. Although she indicated that they obtained the VIN from those documents, she testified that they are required to physically check the VIN on the vehicle, and that she actually did so. She further testified that they took pictures of the vehicle. She described the vehicle as a white Yukon Denali. Given the documents provided by Mr. Talbert, including the act of donation, Ms. Thomas stated that she was satisfied that he was the owner of the vehicle.
The Talberts also presented the testimony of Richard Rushton, who was qualified as an expert in the field of automobile appraisal. Mr. Rushton opined that the value of the Yukon Denali in June of 2004, when the vehicle was stolen, was $37,300.00.
At the close of the Talberts' case, the trial court granted State Farm's motion for directed verdict on the issue of statutory penalties and attorney's fees. As a result, the trial court found that the Talberts' claim did not meet the $50,000.00 jury trial threshold. Thus, the jury was released.
On November 15, 2006, the trial court heard State Farm's evidence regarding the Talberts' remaining claim as to the value of the vehicle. State Farm presented Ms. Treadwell as a witness. She testified that on August 4, 2003, she purchased a Yukon Denali bearing the VIN indicated on the Talberts' policy from a dealership in Decatur, Georgia for $43,804.15. She also presented her vehicle for inspection at trial. The trial court examined the vehicle and determined that the VIN on that vehicle matched the VIN on Ms. Treadwell's Georgia title. The trial court also determined that the keys that the Talberts provided to State Farm for their vehicle did not turn on the ignition of Ms. Treadwell's vehicle.
State Farm also introduced at trial the deposition testimony of Yvette Worthington, the president of the Georgia dealership from which Ms. Treadwell purchased her vehicle. Ms. Worthington identified the certificate of origin, which established that the 2003 Yukon Denali with VIN 1GKEK63U13J287031 was shipped from the GMC factory to the dealership on April 28, 2003. She also corroborated Ms. Treadwell's testimony that she purchased the vehicle from the dealership on August 4, 2003.
At trial, State Farm presented evidence establishing the questionable nature of the documentation that Mr. Talbert and Mr. Offray presented to Mr. Fearn at Mid-City in order to obtain the act of donation and the Louisiana registration documents.
First, State Farm presented the deposition of Mr. Mayo, a retired bishop of the AME Church who, according to the bill of sale and Ohio title, sold the Yukon Denali to Mr. Offray. Mr. Mayo denied ever owning a Yukon Denali. Mr. Mayo also denied knowing Mr. Offray. Furthermore, Mr. Mayo testified that it was not his signature on either the bill of sale or the Ohio title.
Second, State Farm presented the deposition testimony of Patrick Lightfoot, the Assistant Chief of Investigations for the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Mr. Lightfoot testified that he accessed the Bureau's automated title processing system and determined that there was no record of the State of Ohio ever issuing a title in the number referenced on the Ohio certificate of title. He also testified that there was no record of the State of Ohio ever issuing a title for VIN 1GKEK63U13J287031. Mr. Lightfoot further testified that there were a number of discrepancies on the Ohio title that he had not seen on regularly issued Ohio titles.
Third, State Farm presented the deposition testimony of Allison Thompson, the regional operations manager for Southern General Insurance Company. Ms. Thompson was asked about Southern General's alleged coverage for Mr. Offray on the Yukon Denali from June 10, 2003 to December 10, 2003. More particularly, she was asked about a Georgia Liability Insurance Card that Advantage Insurance Agency allegedly issued to Mr. Offray reflecting such coverage. Ms. Thompson testified that this card did not resemble the proof of insurance cards that Southern General issues. She further testified that she researched Southern General's database and determined that no policy of insurance was written for Mr. Offray or a vehicle with VIN 1GKEK63U13J287031.
The plaintiffs [the Talberts] claim that Mrs. Talbert's brother, Merle Offray, gave them a 2003 Yukon Denali. Mr. Offray, who never held a job except as a dishwasher, could not be found to testify to explain how he was able to be so generous. The plaintiffs insured the donated vehicle with State Farm. A year later, they claim that the vehicle was stolen. Interestingly, this was the third time that they have filed a claim for a stolen vehicle. They filed a claim with State Farm which was denied. This lawsuit was then filed.
For all of the reasons argued by State Farm, the Court has dismissed the Talberts' lawsuit. This Court found the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Talbert to be unworthy of belief.
1. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing plaintiffs' claims for arbitrary and capricious conduct and failure to negotiate in good faith.
2. The trial court erred in dismissing the jury after plaintiffs rested and conducting a bench trial during defendant's case.
3. The trial court erred in failing to follow Louisiana law and find plaintiffs had an insurable interest in the stolen vehicle and failure to find any misrepresentation with intent to deceive by plaintiffs in order to void State Farm's obligation under the policy.
We separately address each of these issues.
In a jury trial, a party may move for directed verdict at the close of an opponent's evidence. La. C.C.P. art. 1810. The standard of review on appeal of a directed verdict is whether reasonable persons could reach a contrary verdict under the evidence. Thomas v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 05-1064, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/31/06), 933 So.2d 843, 858; Davis v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 03-2219, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/17/04), 887 So.2d 722, 727.
As noted, the trial court granted State Farm's motion for directed verdict on the issue of statutory penalties under La. R.S. 22:658 and 22:1220. The prohibited conduct under these two statutes is virtually identical: “the failure to timely pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” Reed v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 03-0107, p. 12 (La.10/21/03), 857 So.2d 1012, 1020 (citing Calogero v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 99-1625, p. 7 (La.1/19/00), 753 So.2d 170, 174).4 Because these two statutes are penal in nature, they are strictly construed. Reed, 03-0107 at pp. 12-13, 857 So.2d at 1020 (citing Hart v. Allstate Insurance Company, 437 So.2d 823, 827 (La.1983)).
The claimant seeking to recover under these two statutes has the burden of establishing three things: 1) the insurer received a satisfactory proof of loss; 2) the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period; and 3) the insurer's failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious. Boudreaux v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 04-1339, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 896 So.2d 230, 233; Sterling v. U.S. Agencies Casualty Co., 01-2360, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/02), 818 So.2d 1053, 1057. When “there is a reasonable and legitimate question as to the extent and causation of a claim, bad faith should not be inferred from an insurer's failure to pay within the statutory time limits.” Reed, 03-0107 at p. 13, 857 So.2d at 1021 (citing Block v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 32,306, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 742 So.2d 746, 751); Boudreaux, supra. A trial court's determination that an insurer's handling of a claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause is a factual finding that may not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Reed, 03-0107 at p. 14, 857 So.2d at 1021 (citing Scott v. Insurance Co. of North America, 485 So.2d 50, 52 (La.1986)).
In this case, State Farm had information that gave it cause to make a reasonable investigation into the title of the vehicle. State Farm's investigation revealed discrepancies as to the title, proof of insurance, and the VIN. Given these findings, which the Talberts were unable to explain, we find no error in the trial court's finding that State Farm was not arbitrary or capricious in handling the Talberts' claim. The trial court thus did not err in granting a directed verdict as to statutory penalties.
The Talberts contend that because the case began as a jury trial, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss the jury in the middle of the trial. State Farm counters that the trial court was required to dismiss the jury after it granted the motion for directed verdict because the amount in controversy was then reduced to $37,300.00, the value of the vehicle as established by the Talberts' expert. We agree. A jury trial is not available “where no individual petitioner's cause of action exceeds fifty thousand dollars exclusive of interests and costs.” La. C.C.P. art. 1732(1). The Talberts cite no authority, nor do we find any authority, for the proposition that a trial court cannot dismiss a jury once the amount in controversy is reduced below the jury trial threshold. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision to dismiss the jury.
The jurisprudence of Louisiana is clear that an insurer must meet a three-tiered burden of proof in an action for denial of coverage for misrepresentation. First, it must be shown that the applicant's statements were false. Second, the insurer must establish that the misrepresentations were made with an actual intent to deceive. Third, the insurer must establish that these misstatements materially affected the risk assumed by the insurer. Deutschmann v. Rosiere, 02-2002, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir.4/9/03), 844 So.2d 1082, 1085. (citing Johnson v. Occidental Life Ins. of Cal., 368 So.2d 1032 (La.1979)).
A. Except as provided in Subsection B of this Section and R.S. 22:692, and R.S. 22:692.1, no oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat or void the contract or prevent it attaching, unless the misrepresentation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive.
B. In any application for life or health and accident insurance made in writing by the insured, all statements therein made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties. The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the right to recovery under the contract unless such false statement was made with actual intent to deceive or unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer.
The courts of appeal in interpreting a similar provision in R.S. 22:619B have reasoned that strict proof of fraud is not required to show the applicant's intent to deceive, because of the inherent difficulties in proving intent. Intent to deceive must be determined from surrounding circumstances indicating the insured's knowledge of the falsity of the representations made in the application and his recognition of the materiality of his misrepresentations, or from circumstances which create a reasonable assumption that the insured recognized the materiality.
Implicit in the trial court's finding that the Talberts' testimony was “unworthy of belief” is a finding that they made material misrepresentations with the intent to deceive. State Farm contends that finding is supported by the following evidence. First, Mr. Offray, who gave the Talberts the vehicle, was unemployed at the time of the donation and had been unemployed for several years. Second, the Talberts testified that Mr. Offray lived across the street from them with his mother, Mrs. Offray, and denied that he ever lived in Georgia. However, Mr. Offray had a Georgia proof of insurance card and the vehicle he donated to the Talberts had a Georgia temporary license plate. State Farm also cites Mrs. Offray's testimony that she had not seen Mr. Offray for years before the donation and that she was neither told about the donation nor shown the vehicle.
In order for the misrepresentations made by the applicant to be found material, they must have affected the risk assumed by the insurer. La. R.S. 22:619 B; Watson v. Life Insurance Company of Louisiana, 335 So.2d 518, 522 (La.App. 1 Cir.1976). “Material” means that the statement must have been of such a nature that, had it been true, the insurer either would not have contracted or would have contracted only at a higher premium rate. West v. Safeway Insurance Co. of Louisiana, 42,028, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/21/07), 954 So.2d 286, 290. In the present case, it is without question that State Farm would not have insured the Yukon Denali had it known that the documents presented and the assertions made regarding ownership and title were false.
As to whether the representation, or lack thereof, was made with the intent to deceive, it is evident from the attendant circumstances that the Talberts knew the falsity of the representation as to ownership of the vehicle, and it is reasonable to assume that they recognized the materiality of this representation. The Talberts' assertion that they did not know Mr. Offray did not have clear title to the vehicle is unsupported by the evidence.
It is a well settled principle that an appellate court may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact unless it is clearly wrong. Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989); Harvey v. Cole, 00-1849 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 808 So.2d 771, 776. Moreover, a trial court's finding regarding an insured's intent to deceive is a factual finding governed by the manifest error standard of review. Holt v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 28,450, 28,451, 28,452 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/3/96), 680 So.2d 117.
The record in this case fully supports the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions. After careful review of the record, we cannot say that the trial judge's evaluations of credibility and her factual finding that State Farm met its burden of proving material misrepresentation with the intent to deceive are clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
I respectfully concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that the record supports the trial court's determination that the Talbert's made a material misrepresentation with the intent to deceive State Farm. The misrepresentation apparently is that the VIN number on the documentation that Mr. Talbert presented to State Farm when he insured the vehicle could not have been correct as that VIN number later was determined to be on another vehicle.
However, there is no evidence that Mr. Talbert was aware that the information he provided to State Farm was not accurate. All of the documentation that Mr. Talbert had in his possession showed the VIN number that he gave to State Farm. Mr. Offray provided Mr. Talbert with an Ohio title to a white Yukon Denali bearing the VIN number that later proved to be incorrect. There was nothing about the title that would have alerted Mr. Talbert to the fact that the information contained thereon, specifically the VIN number, was not correct. In fact, Mr. Lightfoot, the Assistant Chief of Investigations for the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, could not opine that the title was invalid. Nether Mr. Fearn nor the employees at the State Farm agency saw anything that caused them to question the validity of Mr. Talbert's documentation of ownership or the accuracy of the VIN number. Apparently, no one checked the VIN number on the white Yukon Denali that Mr. Talbert insured, and for which he paid premiums for over a year before it was stolen.
While it appears that Mr. Offray did not, in fact, purchase the vehicle that he donated to the Talberts, there was no evidence presented that either Mr. or Mrs. Talbert was aware of that fact. The trial court and the majority opine that the Talberts should have questioned Mr. Offray about how he could have afforded the vehicle he was giving them or why the vehicle had a Georgia temporary tag and why he had a Georgia insurance card. In hindsight, with all the information that has come to light since the donated vehicle was stolen, it would have been prudent of the Talberts to question Mr. Offray. Their failure to do so, however, does not establish that they were aware that the VIN number did not match the vehicle they insured. There is absolutely no evidence that the Talberts did anything other than rely on the Ohio title that Mr. Offray presented.
Because the record does not support the conclusion that the Talberts made a material misrepresentation with the intent to deceive State Farm in obtaining coverage for the vehicle that was donated to them, I would reverse the trial court and find that the Talberts are entitled to recover $37,300, the value of the stolen vehicle at the time of the theft, from State Farm.
1. According to the Talberts, Mr. Offray also spent an additional $3,000.00 installing an alarm system and stereo in the vehicle prior to the donation.
2. State Farm paid $10,342.45 in rental car costs for the Talberts.
3. Mrs. Talbert acknowledged that she never told her mother about the donation.
4. The primary difference between these two statutes is the different time periods allowed for payment-thirty days under La. R.S. 22:658 and sixty days under La. R.S. 22:1220.
ARMSTRONG, C.J., concurs. MURRAY, J., dissents with reasons.


(a) The term "treaty" means the Patent Cooperation Treaty done at Washington, on June 19, 1970.
(b) The term "Regulations", when capitalized, means the Regulations under the treaty, done at Washington on the same date as the treaty. The term "regulations", when not capitalized, means the regulations established by the Director under this title.
(c) The term "international application" means an application filed under the treaty.
(d) The term "international application originating in the United States" means an international application filed in the Patent and Trademark Office when it is acting as a Receiving Office under the treaty, irrespective of whether or not the United States has been designated in that international application.
(e) The term "international application designating the United States" means an international application specifying the United States as a country in which a patent is sought, regardless where such international application is filed.
(f) The term "Receiving Office" means a national patent office or intergovernmental organization which receives and processes international applications as prescribed by the treaty and the Regulations.
(g) The terms "International Searching Authority" and "International Preliminary Examining Authority" mean a national patent office or intergovernmental organization as appointed under the treaty which processes international applications as prescribed by the treaty and the Regulations.
(h) The term "International Bureau" means the international intergovernmental organization which is recognized as the coordinating body under the treaty and the Regulations.
(i) Terms and expressions not defined in this part are to be taken in the sense indicated by the treaty and the Regulations.
2002-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 107–273 made technical correction to directory language of Pub. L. 106–113. See 1999 Amendment note below.
1999-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 106–113, as amended by Pub. L. 107–273, substituted "Director" for "Commissioner".
1986-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–616, §2(a), struck out ", excluding chapter II thereof" after "June 19, 1970".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–616, §2(b), struck out "excluding part C thereof" after "under the treaty".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 99–616, §2(c), substituted "The terms 'International Searching Authority' and 'International Preliminary Examining Authority' mean" for "The term 'International Searching Authority' means".
1984-Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98–622 substituted "Patent and Trademark Office" for "Patent Office".
Pub. L. 99–616, §9, Nov. 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 3487 , provided that: "Sections 2 through 8 of this Act [amending this section and sections 361, 362, 364, 368, 371, and 376 of this title] shall come into force on the same day as the effective date of entry into force of chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty with respect to the United States, by virtue of the withdrawal of the declaration under article 64(1)(a) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. It shall apply to all international applications pending before or after its effective date."
Pub. L. 98–622, title IV, §406(a), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3393 , provided that: "Section 404 of this Act [set out as a note under section 41 of this title] and the amendments made by section 403 of this Act [amending this section and sections 104, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368, 371, 372, 373, and 376 of this title] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 8, 1984]."
"(a) Section 1 of this Act [enacting this part] shall come into force on the same day as the entry into force of the Patent Cooperation Treaty with respect to the United States. It shall apply to international and national applications filed on and after this effective date, even though entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date, and to patents issued on such applications.
"(b) Sections 2 to 10 of this Act [amending sections 6, 41, 42, 102, 104, 112, 113, 120, and 282 of this title] shall take effect on the same day as section 1 of this Act [enacting this part] and shall apply to all applications for patent actually filed in the United States on and after this effective date, as well as to international applications where applicable.
"(c) Applications for patent on file in the Patent Office [now the Patent and Trademark Office] on the effective date of this Act, and patents issued on such applications, shall be governed by the provisions of title 35, United States Code, in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this Act."
Pub. L. 99–616, §1, Nov. 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 3485 , provided: "That this Act [amending this section and sections 361, 362, 364, 368, 371, and 376 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note above] may be cited as the 'Act to authorize the United States to participate in chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty'."


Respondent Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., is a certified public utility providing telephone service to several communities in Kansas. Pursuant to state regulation, Rural publishes a typical telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. It obtains data for the directory from subscribers, who must provide their names and addresses to obtain telephone service. Petitioner Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories covering a much larger geographic range than directories such as Rural's. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist for a directory covering 11 different telephone service areas, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without Rural's consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
(a) Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection. The constitutional requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity. Since facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship, they are not original and, thus, are not copyrightable. Although a compilation of facts may possess the requisite originality because the author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the data so that readers may use them effectively, copyright protection extends only to those components of the work that are original to the author, not to the facts themselves. This fact/expression dichotomy severely limits the scope of protection in fact-based works. Pp. 344-351.
(b) The Copyright Act of 1976 and its predecessor, the Copyright Act of 1909, leave no doubt that originality is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works. The 1976 Act explains that copyright extends to "original works of authorship," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and that there can be no copyright in facts, § 102(b). A compilation is not copyrightable per se, but is copyrightable only if its facts have been "selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." § 101 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute envisions that some ways of selecting, coordinating, and arranging data are not sufficiently original to trigger copyright protection. Even a compilation that is copyrightable receives only limited protection, for the copyright does not extend to facts contained in the compilation. § 103(b). Lower courts that adopted a "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" test  which extended a compilation's copyright protection beyond selection and arrangement to the facts themselves  misconstrued the 1909 Act and eschewed the fundamental axiom of copyright law that no one may copyright facts or ideas. Pp. 351-361.
(c) Rural's white pages do not meet the constitutional or statutory requirements for copyright protection. While Rural has a valid copyright in the directory as a whole because it contains some forward text and some original material in the yellow pages, there is nothing original in Rural's white pages. The raw data are uncopyrightable facts, and the way in which Rural selected, coordinated, and arranged those facts is not original in any way. Rural's selection of listings  subscribers' names, towns, and telephone numbers  could not be more obvious and lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression. In fact, it is plausible to conclude that Rural did not truly "select" to publish its subscribers' names and telephone numbers, since it was required to do so by state law. Moreover, there is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course. Pp. 361-364.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Marshall, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., concurred in the judgment [without issuing an opinion].
[499 U.S. 340, 342] This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages.
Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories. Unlike a typical [499 U.S. 340, 343] directory, which covers only a particular calling area, Feist's area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range, reducing the need to call directory assistance or consult multiple directories. The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white pages listings  compared to Rural's approximately 7,700 listings. Like Rural's directory, Feist's is distributed free of charge and includes both white pages and yellow pages. Feist and Rural compete vigorously for yellow pages advertising.
Unable to license Rural's white pages listings, Feist used them without Rural's consent. Feist began by removing several thousand listings that fell outside the geographic range of its area-wide directory, then hired personnel to investigate the 4,935 that remained. These employees verified [499 U.S. 340, 344] the data reported by Rural and sought to obtain additional information. As a result, a typical Feist listing includes the individual's street address; most of Rural's listings do not. Notwithstanding these additions, however, 1,309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. App. 54 (P 15-16), 57. Four of these were fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect copying.
Rural sued for copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of Kansas taking the position that Feist, in compiling its own directory, could not use the information contained in Rural's white pages. Rural asserted that Feist's employees were obliged to travel door-to-door or conduct a telephone survey to discover the same information for themselves. Feist responded that such efforts were economically impractical and, in any event, unnecessary because the information copied was beyond the scope of copyright protection. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural, explaining that "courts have consistently held that telephone directories are copyrightable" and citing a string of lower court decisions. 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (1987). In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed "for substantially the reasons given by the district court." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a, judgt. order reported at 916 F.2d 718 (1990). We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 808 (1990), to determine whether the copyright in Rural's directory protects the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist.
This case concerns the interaction of two well-established propositions. The first is that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are. Each of these propositions possesses an impeccable pedigree. That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that [499 U.S. 340, 345] "no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). Rural wisely concedes this point, noting in its brief that "facts and discoveries, of course, are not themselves subject to copyright protection." Brief for Respondent 24. At the same time, however, it is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright. Compilations were expressly mentioned in the Copyright Act of 1909, and again in the Copyright Act of 1976.
There is an undeniable tension between these two propositions. Many compilations consist of nothing but raw data  i. e., wholly factual information not accompanied by any original written expression. On what basis may one claim a copyright in such a work? Common sense tells us that 100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one place. Yet copyright law seems to contemplate that compilations that consist exclusively of facts are potentially within its scope.
The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding why facts are not copyrightable. The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. See Harper & Row, supra, at 547-549. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § § 2.01[A], [B] (1990) (hereinafter Nimmer). To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be. Id., § 1.08[C]. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. To illustrate, [499 U.S. 340, 346] assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (CA2 1936).
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress' power to enact copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "secure for limited Times to Authors… the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." In two decisions from the late 19th century  The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)  this Court defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In so doing, the Court made it unmistakably clear that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court addressed the constitutional scope of "writings." For a particular work to be classified "under the head of writings of authors," the Court determined, "originality is required." 100 U.S., at 94. The Court explained that originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity: "While the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engraving, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like." Ibid. (emphasis in original).
In Burrow-Giles, the Court distilled the same requirement from the Constitution's use of the word "authors." The Court defined "author," in a constitutional sense, to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker." 111 U.S., at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted). As in The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court emphasized the creative component of originality. It described copyright as being limited to "original intellectual conceptions of the author," 111 U.S., at 58, and stressed the importance of requiring an author who accuses another of infringement to prove "the existence [499 U.S. 340, 347] of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception." Id., at 59-60.
The originality requirement articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles remains the touchstone of copyright protection today. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-562 (1973). It is the very "premise of copyright law." Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (CA5 1981). Leading scholars agree on this point. As one pair of commentators succinctly puts it: "The originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works." Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 763, n. 155 (1989) (emphasis in original) (hereinafter Patterson & Joyce). Accord, id., at 759-760, and n. 140; Nimmer § 1.06[A] ("Originality is a statutory as well as a constitutional requirement"); id., § 1.08[C] ("[A] modicum of intellectual labor… clearly constitutes an essential constitutional element").
It is this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates the law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual compilations. "No one may claim originality as to facts." Id., § 2.11[A], p. 2-157. This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or "originator." 111 U.S., at 58. "The discoverer merely finds and records." Nimmer § 2.03[E]. Census takers, for example, do not "create" the population figures that emerge from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures from the world around them. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 525 (1981) (hereinafter Denicola). Census data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not "original" in the constitutional sense. Nimmer [499 U.S. 340, 348] § 2.03[E]. The same is true of all facts  scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. "They may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person." Miller, supra, at 1369.
Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite originality. The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws. Nimmer § § 2.11[D], 3.03; Denicola 523, n. 38. Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 547. Accord, Nimmer § 3.03.
This protection is subject to an important limitation. The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author. Patterson & Joyce 800-802; Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1868, and n. 12 (1990) (hereinafter Ginsburg). Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words used to present them. In Harper & Row, for example, we explained that President Ford could not prevent others from copying bare historical facts from his autobiography, see 471 U.S., at 556-557, but that he could prevent others from copying his "subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures." [499 U.S. 340, 349] Id., at 563. Where the compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the facts speak for themselves, the expressive element is more elusive. The only conceivable expression is the manner in which the compiler has selected and arranged the facts. Thus, if the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection. See Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the "White Pages" Are Not Copyrightable), 12 Com. & Law 37, 64 (Dec. 1990) (hereinafter Patry). No matter how original the format, however, the facts themselves do not become original through association. See Patterson & Joyce 776.
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement. As one commentator explains it: "No matter how much original authorship the work displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are free for the taking.… The very same facts and ideas may be divorced from the context imposed by the author, and restated or reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the first to discover the facts or to propose the ideas." Ginsburg 1868.
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not "some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 589 (dissenting opinion). It is, rather, "the essence of copyright," ibid., and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Accord, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original [499 U.S. 340, 350] expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. Harper & Row, supra, at 556-557. This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.
"No author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work  termed 'expression'  that display the stamp of the author's originality.
"Copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those constituent elements that are not original  for example… facts, or materials in the public domain  as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions." 471 U.S., at 547-548 (citation omitted).
This, then, resolves the doctrinal tension: Copyright treats facts and factual compilations in a wholly consistent manner. Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to [499 U.S. 340, 351] the particular selection or arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.
The 1909 Act embodied the originality requirement, but not as clearly as it might have. See Nimmer § 2.01. The subject matter of copyright was set out in § § 3 and 4 of the Act. Section 4 stated that copyright was available to "all the writings of an author." 35 Stat. 1076. By using the words "writings" and "author"  the same words used in Article I, § 8, of the Constitution and defined by the Court in The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles  the statute necessarily incorporated the originality requirement articulated in the Court's decisions. It did so implicitly, however, thereby leaving room for error.
Section 3 was similarly ambiguous. It stated that the copyright in a work protected only "the copyrightable component parts of the work." It thus stated an important copyright principle, but failed to identify the specific characteristic  originality  that determined which component parts of a work were copyrightable and which were not.
Most courts construed the 1909 Act correctly, notwithstanding the less-than-perfect statutory language. They understood from this Court's decisions that there could be no copyright without originality. See Patterson & Joyce 760-761. As explained in the Nimmer treatise: "The 1909 Act neither defined originality, nor even expressly required that a work be 'original' in order to command protection. However, the courts uniformly inferred the requirement from the fact that copyright protection may only be claimed by 'authors'.... It was reasoned that since an author is 'the… [499 U.S. 340, 352] creator, originator' it follows that a work is not the product of an author unless the work is original." Nimmer § 2.01 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases).
But some courts misunderstood the statute. See, e. g., Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (CA9 1937); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (CA2 1922). These courts ignored § § 3 and 4, focusing their attention instead on § 5 of the Act. Section 5, however, was purely technical in nature: It provided that a person seeking to register a work should indicate on the application the type of work, and it listed 14 categories under which the work might fall. One of these categories was "books, including composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations." § 5(a). Section 5 did not purport to say that all compilations were automatically copyrightable. Indeed, it expressly disclaimed any such function, pointing out that "the subject-matter of copyright is defined in section four." Nevertheless, the fact that factual compilations were mentioned specifically in § 5 led some courts to infer erroneously that directories and the like were copyrightable per se, "without any further or precise showing of original  personal  authorship." Ginsburg 1895.
"The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything more than industrious [499 U.S. 340, 353] collection. The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the author" (emphasis added).
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine had numerous flaws, the most glaring being that it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond selection and arrangement  the compiler's original contributions  to the facts themselves. Under the doctrine, the only defense to infringement was independent creation. A subsequent compiler was "not entitled to take one word of information previously published," but rather had to "independently work out the matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common sources of information." Id., at 88-89 (internal quotations omitted). "Sweat of the brow" courts thereby eschewed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law  that no one may copyright facts or ideas. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d, at 1372 (criticizing "sweat of the brow" courts because "ensuring that later writers obtain the facts independently… is precisely the scope of protection given… copyrighted matter, and the law is clear that facts are not entitled to such protection").
Without a doubt, the "sweat of the brow" doctrine flouted basic copyright principles. Throughout history, copyright law has "recognized a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy." Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 563. Accord, Gorman, Fact or Fancy: The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. Copyright Soc. 560, 563 (1982). But "sweat of the brow" courts took a contrary view; they handed out proprietary interests in facts and declared that authors are absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by relying upon the facts contained in prior works. In truth, "it is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts… [is] designed to prevent." Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). "Protection for the fruits of such research… may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair competition. But to accord copyright protection on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles in that it creates a monopoly in public domain materials without the necessary justification of protecting and encouraging the creation of 'writings' by 'authors.'" Nimmer § 3.04, p. 3-23 (footnote omitted).
"Sweat of the brow" decisions did not escape the attention of the Copyright Office. When Congress decided to overhaul the copyright statute and asked the Copyright Office to study existing problems, see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 159 (1985), the Copyright Office promptly recommended [499 U.S. 340, 355] that Congress clear up the confusion in the lower courts as to the basic standards of copyrightability. The Register of Copyrights explained in his first report to Congress that "originality" was a "basic requisite" of copyright under the 1909 Act, but that "the absence of any reference to [originality] in the statute seems to have led to misconceptions as to what is copyrightable matter." Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961). The Register suggested making the originality requirement explicit. Ibid.
Congress took the Register's advice. In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress dropped the reference to "all the writings of an author" and replaced it with the phrase "original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In making explicit the originality requirement, Congress announced that it was merely clarifying existing law: "The two fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] originality and fixation in tangible form.… The phrase 'original works of authorship,' which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present  copyright statute." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 51 (1976) (emphasis added) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 50 (1975) (emphasis added) (hereinafter S. Rep.). This sentiment was echoed by the Copyright Office: "Our intention here is to maintain the established standards of originality.…" Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, p. 3 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965) (emphasis added).
To ensure that the mistakes of the "sweat of the brow" courts would not be repeated, Congress took additional measures. For example, § 3 of the 1909 Act had stated that copyright protected only the "copyrightable component parts" of a work, but had not identified originality as the basis for distinguishing [499 U.S. 340, 356] those component parts that were copyrightable from those that were not. The 1976 Act deleted this section and replaced it with § 102(b), which identifies specifically those elements of a work for which copyright is not available: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Section 102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts. Harper & Row, supra, at 547, 556. Accord, Nimmer § 2.03[E] (equating facts with "discoveries"). As with § 102(a), Congress emphasized that § 102(b) did not change the law, but merely clarified it: "Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate… that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged." H. R. Rep., at 57; S. Rep., at 54.
Congress took another step to minimize confusion by deleting the specific mention of "directories… and other compilations" in § 5 of the 1909 Act. As mentioned, this section had led some courts to conclude that directories were copyrightable per se and that every element of a directory was protected. In its place, Congress enacted two new provisions. First, to make clear that compilations were not copyrightable per se, Congress provided a definition of the term "compilation." Second, to make clear that the copyright in a compilation did not extend to the facts themselves, Congress enacted § 103.
[499 U.S. 340, 357] The purpose of the statutory definition is to emphasize that collections of facts are not copyrightable per se. It conveys this message through its tripartite structure, as emphasized above by the italics. The statute identifies three distinct elements and requires each to be met for a work to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: (1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an "original" work of authorship. "This tripartite conjunctive structure is self-evident, and should be assumed to 'accurately express the legislative purpose.'" Patry 51, quoting Mills Music, 469 U.S., at 164.
At first glance, the first requirement does not seem to tell us much. It merely describes what one normally thinks of as a compilation  a collection of pre-existing material, facts, or data. What makes it significant is that it is not the sole requirement. It is not enough for copyright purposes that an author collects and assembles facts. To satisfy the statutory definition, the work must get over two additional hurdles. In this way, the plain language indicates that not every collection of facts receives copyright protection. Otherwise, there would be a period after "data."
The third requirement is also illuminating. It emphasizes that a compilation, like any other work, is copyrightable only if it satisfies the originality requirement ("an original work of authorship"). Although § 102 states plainly that the originality requirement applies to all works, the point was emphasized with regard to compilations to ensure that courts would not repeat the mistake of the "sweat of the brow" courts by concluding that fact-based works are treated differently and measured by some other standard. As Congress explained it, the goal was to "make plain that the criteria of copyrightable subject matter stated in section 102 apply with full force to works… containing preexisting material." H. R. Rep., at 57; S. Rep., at 55.
[499 U.S. 340, 358] The key to the statutory definition is the second requirement. It instructs courts that, in determining whether a fact-based work is an original work of authorship, they should focus on the manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and arranged. This is a straight-forward application of the originality requirement. Facts are never original, so the compilation author can claim originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are presented. To that end, the statute dictates that the principal focus should be on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit protection.
Not every selection, coordination, or arrangement will pass muster. This is plain from the statute. It states that, to merit protection, the facts must be selected, coordinated, or arranged "in such a way" as to render the work as a whole original. This implies that some "ways" will trigger copyright, but that others will not. See Patry 57, and n. 76. Otherwise, the phrase "in such a way" is meaningless and Congress should have defined "compilation" simply as "a work formed by the collection and assembly of preexisting materials or data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged." That Congress did not do so is dispositive. In accordance with "the established principle that a court should give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute," Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the statute envisions that there will be some fact-based works in which the selection, coordination, and arrangement are not sufficiently original to trigger copyright protection.
As discussed earlier, however, the originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i. e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, [499 U.S. 340, 359] the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. See generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (referring to "the narrowest and most obvious limits"). Such works are incapable of sustaining a valid copyright. Nimmer § 2.01[B].
"The copyright in a compilation… extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." § 103(b).
As § 103 makes clear, copyright is not a tool by which a compilation author may keep others from using the facts or data he or she has collected. "The most important point here is one that is commonly misunderstood today: copyright… has no effect one way or the other on the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting material." H. R. Rep., at 57; S. Rep., at 55. The 1909 Act did not require, as "sweat of the brow" courts mistakenly assumed, that each subsequent compiler must start from scratch and is precluded from relying on research undertaken by another. See, e. g., Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co., 281 F., at 88-89. Rather, the facts contained in existing works may be freely copied because copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the compiler  the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts.
In summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not "sweat of the brow," is the [499 U.S. 340, 360] touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works. Nor is there any doubt that the same was true under the 1909 Act. The 1976 revisions were a direct response to the Copyright Office's concern that many lower courts had misconstrued this basic principle, and Congress emphasized repeatedly that the purpose of the revisions was to clarify, not change, existing law. The revisions explain with painstaking clarity that copyright requires originality, § 102(a); that facts are never original, § 102(b); that the copyright in a compilation does not extend to the facts it contains, § 103(b); and that a compilation is copyrightable only to the extent that it features an original selection, coordination, or arrangement, § 101.
The 1976 revisions have proven largely successful in steering courts in the right direction. A good example is Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d, at 1369-1370: "A copyright in a directory… is properly viewed as resting on the originality of the selection and arrangement of the factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the information. Copyright protection does not extend to the facts themselves, and the mere use of information contained in a directory without a substantial copying of the format does not constitute infringement" (citation omitted). Additionally, the Second Circuit, which almost 70 years ago issued the classic formulation of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co., has now fully repudiated the reasoning of that decision. See, e. g., Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (CA2 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 510 (CA2 1984) (Newman, J., concurring); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (CA2 1980). Even those scholars who believe that "industrious collection" should be rewarded seem to recognize that this is beyond the scope of existing copyright law. See Denicola 516 ("The very vocabulary of copyright is ill [499 U.S. 340, 361] suited to analyzing property rights in works of nonfiction"); id., at 520-521, 525; Ginsburg 1867, 1870.
There is no doubt that Feist took from the white pages of Rural's directory a substantial amount of factual information. At a minimum, Feist copied the names, towns, and telephone numbers of 1,309 of Rural's subscribers. Not all copying, however, is copyright infringement. To establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 548. The first element is not at issue here; Feist appears to concede that Rural's directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid copyright because it contains some foreword text, as well as original material in its yellow pages advertisements. See Brief for Petitioner 18; Pet. for Cert. 9.
The question is whether Rural has proved the second element. In other words, did Feist, by taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from Rural's white pages, copy anything that was "original" to Rural? Certainly, the raw data does not satisfy the originality requirement. Rural may have been the first to discover and report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers, but this data does not "'owe its origin'" to Rural. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S., at 58. Rather, these bits of information are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published a telephone directory. The originality requirement "rules out protecting… names, addresses, and telephone numbers of which the plaintiff by no stretch of the imagination could be called the author." Patterson & Joyce 776.
The question that remains is whether Rural selected, coordinated, or arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original way. As mentioned, originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way. It is equally true, however, that the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of originality is low, but it does exist. See Patterson & Joyce 760, n. 144 ("While this requirement is sometimes characterized as modest, or a low threshold, it is not without effect") (internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted). As this Court has explained, the Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity, see The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S., at 94; and an author who claims infringement must prove "the existence of… intellectual production, of thought, and conception." Burrow-Giles, supra, at 59-60.
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural's white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection. As mentioned at the outset, Rural's white pages are entirely typical. Persons desiring telephone service in Rural's service area fill out an application and Rural issues them a telephone number. In preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by surname. The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.
Rural's selection of listings could not be more obvious: It publishes the most basic information  name, town, and telephone number  about each person who applies to it for telephone service. This is "selection" of a sort, but it lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient effort [499 U.S. 340, 363] to make the white pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.
We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Rural's white pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short of the mark. As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 does not afford protection [499 U.S. 340, 364] from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality. Given that some works must fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold that Rural's white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts could fail.
Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement. This decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural's efforts in compiling its directory, but rather as making clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort. As this Court noted more than a century ago, "'great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this way.'" Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S., at 105.
* The Court ultimately rendered judgment for Associated Press on non-copyright grounds that are not relevant here. See 248 U.S., at 235, 241-242.


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The evaluation of scientific journals with bibliometric indicators has been dominated by the Impact factor since the 70s. However Thomson has recently included in the Journal Citation Reports the Eigen factor and the Article influence score. On the other hand Elsevier has included in Scopus the Source normalized impact per paper (SNIP) and the SCImago journal rank (SJR). In this paper we introduce and describe these indicators. Secondly, to study the similarities we analyze correlations of the traditional indicators and the new ones, detailing the results across 27 scientific fields. It was noted that some couples of indicators such as Eigen-Citations, Impact factor-ArticleScore, Impact factor–SJR and SJR-ArticleScore do correlate in many areas. Correlations showed different trends in Science and Social science; therefore, in the last section we discuss the need to take into account the scientific area when selecting an indicator.
Bibliometric indicators, Indicadores bibliométricos, Thomson-Reuters, Elsevier, Scopus, Scientific journals, Revistas científicas, Rankings, Impact factor, Factor de impacto, Eigen factor, SJR, SNIP.
H. Information sources, supports, channels. > HA. Periodicals, Newspapers.
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