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Child support is the obligation of every parent during cohabitation and on separation for so long as their offspring is a “child of the marriage”. Child support in is governed by Child Support Guidelines, provincial or federal. For most cases, the Guidelines operate as a tariff, respecting which the court has very limited discretion.
Child support, unlike spousal support which is almost completely discretionary, is now governed by Child Support Guidelines, the application of which is mandatory in child support cases.
Where the parties do not agree on child support, the court will set it. On divorce, the court has a duty to withhold the divorce unless “reasonable” child support arrangements are in place.
Reasonable child support is deemed to be the amount set out pursuant to the Regulations called Child Support Guidelines which have been made under the Divorce Act (Canada) and The Family Maintenance Act (Manitoba).
The Federal Child Support Guidelines apply to divorce cases in each province, except those provinces, including Manitoba, which have passed their own Guidelines.
The Manitoba Child Support Guidelines apply to all children in the province, with minor exception, whether their parents were married or not, or whether they are divorcing or only separating.
The Manitoba Guidelines are very similar to the federal ones, but there are important differences, particularly when dealing with Section 7 Expenses.
The Child Support Tables, which set out the amounts payable depending on which province the one paying support lives, are the same, whether under federal divorce legislation or Manitoba's legislation.
A sole custody or primary care situation, for Guideline purposes, is one in which the children are in the care of one parent more than 60% of the time throughout the year.
In a sole custody or primary care situation, the non-custodial parent will pay the amount dictated by the tables based on his or her income and the number of children.
Once income is determined, the amount of child support payable will be determined by looking at the provincial table. Look down the left hand column to locate the income figure and then across the row to the column for the number of children.
Where dad has primary custody of the two children, and mom’s income is $75,000, she will pay him $1,355.00 monthly. His income in this example is entirely irrelevant.
A split custody scenario is one in which each parent has custody of one or more children, more than 60% of the time throughout the year.
In a split custody case, one child living primarily with dad and one with mom, we look up the amount payable by each parent for the one child in the other parent’s custody and subtract the lower figure from the higher one.
Where dad’s income is, say, $50,000, he would pay support of $412 for the child living with mom, and mom, whose income is $75,000 would pay him $633 for the child in his care. Typically, in this situation, the higher paying parent would simply pay the “offset” amount to the other, $633 - $412 = $119.
If one parent had two children and the other parent had one child then the look-up would work the same way, except that the amount payable for two children would be used by the parent who has custody of one and vice versa.
Some other figure that the court deems appropriate, based on the increased costs of shared custody.
There are often battles between parents counting the hours to get into that magic zone of “shared custody”, too often for financial reasons. The assessment of time with each parent most typically involves the counting of overnights. For example, a typical formulation of every second weekend (Friday and Saturday overnight with a return on Sunday evening) and one overnight during the week works out to 35.71% whereas if you add one more overnight, the percentage jumps to 42.85%.
For the court to apply an amount different than the basic table or the offset amount requires that the parties lead evidence of the increased costs of the shared custody arrangement, an exercise that few litigants undertake. This is known colloquially as a Contino analysis, named for the famous case.
Most shared custody support cases, particularly where there isn’t a significant disparity in the parents’ incomes, are determined on the “split custody” or offset formula.
Child support is usually a two-part obligation. The first is for the payment of Basic Table support, which is intended to cover the general day-to-day or basic costs of raising a child, and for special or extraordinary expenses, known as Section 7 Expenses, which cover expenses that are unusual and not required in every situation, such as health expenses, daycare and extraordinary costs for activities.
Determine what the custody arrangement is.
For child support purposes there are three main forms of custody, “primary (or sole custody)”, “shared custody” and “split custody”. See the Primer on the Relationship between Custody and Child Support.
Determine the number of children.
The tables take into account, amongst other things, the economies of scale that arise when there is more than one child in a family. Typically, it doesn’t cost double or triple for the cost of utilities, housing, food, etc. for the second or third child. Thus, the amount payable for two children is not double what is payable for one child.
Determine the income of the paying party.
The determination of income is a critical component of the calculation or look-up. In most cases, where the parties earn their incomes from salaried jobs, their incomes for Guideline purposes may simply be exactly the same as the income shown on Line 150 of their most recent income tax return.
Where income fluctuates from year to year, the court may look at a three year average.
There may be adjustments to the determination of income, however, the most common one being the deduction of union dues to determine the party’s income for Guideline purposes.
Because Line 150 may not always be the way to determine a party’s true income for child support purposes, the court has the power to “impute income” where that figure is not representative of actual income or is less that the person should be able to earn with reasonable employment.
Where a person has income from a business, corporation or self-employment the court may look beyond the income tax return to adjust for such things as write-offs, hiding monies in a corporation, or non-taxable benefits of employment. While these write-offs or other deductions are perfectly legal for income tax purposes, the court in a child support case is interested in working from a knowledge of what the payor’s resources actually may be.
The court can “impute income” where a person is seen to be deliberately under-employed, under-reporting income for tax purposes, or is not using available corporate pre-tax income, for examples. Money earned “under the table,” often claimed but difficult to prove, can lead to an imputed income finding.
This will require looking at the Child Support Guidelines table for the province in which the payor lives. Each province has a slightly different tax structure, so a payor living in Alberta, for example, paying support for a child in Manitoba, will pay based on the Alberta Table.
The Tables for Manitoba can be found here. The Basic Table amount payable is the amount shown opposite the payor’s income in the column for the number of children.
Determine if there are eligible Section 7 Expenses.
b. Determine the parties’ respective incomes.
c. Determine if the sharing of Section 7 Expenses should be proportional to the parties’ incomes, less the threshold amount, or in some other manner.
d. If the child is an adult, consider whether and how much the child should contribute to her expenses?
What is a Section 7 Expense?
In addition to the basic table amount, a parent may be required to contribute to the net cost of special or extraordinary expenses as those are defined in Section 7 of the Guidelines.
These "add-ons" must be reasonable, having regard to the means of the parents and the child, necessary in relation to the child’s best interests, and bear a relationship to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation. In Manitoba, only the custodial parent can apply for add-ons.
Section 7 expenses are treated somewhat differently in Manitoba compared to the Federal Guidelines and other provinces, so be extremely careful in reviewing case law from other provinces.
When an expense is determined to qualify as a Section 7 Expense, the Guidelines suggest, as a “guiding principle”, that the expense should be shared proportionately as to incomes after deduction of the “threshold amount” (the amount below which no child support is payable) of approximately $10,000.00.
Payee’s proportion is: $40,000 / $105,000, or 38.10%.
When making the calculation, however, most laypeople will forget about the threshold amount and round the calculation off at $75,000 / $125,000 or 60% and 40%. Often, the parties, or the court, may simply assess the cost sharing at equality.
It is important to remember that the costs sharing is of the net cost, for example, tax deductions or credits will reduce the actual cost of daycare or some sporting costs and insurance may reduce the cost of health expenses. The added cost of the insurance, individual versus family plan, may be added back on as an expense.
The internet is alive with child support calculators, and the federal government maintains a highly informative selection of materials on child support. See it here.
The determination of income is a critical component of the calculation or look-up. In most cases, where the parties earn their incomes from salaried jobs, their incomes for Guideline purposes may simply be exactly the same as the income shown on Line 150 of their most recent income tax return. There may be adjustments to that amount, however, the most common one being the deduction of union dues to determine the party’s income for Guideline purposes.
The child is one to whom one parent stands “in the place of a parent”, or, to use the archaic language, "in loco parentis"
The payor earns more than $150,000 annually. While the court has the power not apply the table amount where the payor’s income is over $150,000, it almost always follows the table amount.
While in these exceptional situations, the court may have some discretion to alter or add on to the table amount, the result, typically, is that the court will stick with the table amount for basic support and order the payment of Section 7 Expenses proportionately.
A person found to be standing in the place of a parent, or to use the archaic phrase standing in loco parentis may be required to provide child support to that child, notwithstanding that there may be a biological parent who has a prior obligation to support that child.
The determination that a person stands in the place of a parent is seen as a declaration of status and is therefore not easily changed. Unfortunately, what often happens is that the non-biological parent who has cared for the child and supported the child, historically, will find himself paying support while the emotional bonds and contact deteriorate rapidly.
Where the child is over the age of 18 and still eligible for support as a “child of the marriage”, the court may order the regular table amount or, if the court considers that amount inappropriate, the court may order a different amount, more or less, "having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the support of the child."
Typically, unless there is a huge disparity between the parents’ incomes or if the child has significant means, the amount awarded will follow the tables.
“Child of the marriage” is a term of art that is defined in the Divorce Act. It allows the court to order support for adult children who continue to be dependent on their parents. It thus can extend the usual parental responsibilities, from moral or emotionally based ones (for example, some parent’s willingness to assist in the financing of a post-secondary education of their children) when the family is intact, into a legal ones where the parents have separated.
This provision may also find application in the cases of disabled or needy children, although at some point in those cases, the burden will likely fall to the state.
Typically, the courts have held that the obligation for separated parents to support their children extends to the completion of a first post-secondary degree or training program, beyond the age of 18. This obligation can be fixed to any particular age, say 21 or 22, or perhaps to the diligent completion of first degree.
The decision to require the support of adult children may include other factors, such as the parent’s own levels of education, evidence of the family’s pre-separation priorities and stated goals for their children, or the children’s talent and commitment. The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in Newman v. Thompson, required a parent to continue to support his child, who was then 23, living primarily away from his mother with whom he had lived in his minority, studying in the United States, in the completion of his PhD program. Len Fishman argued the case for the "custodial" parent, which confirmed the principle that the court is not bound by any fixed rule in this regard, but that the determination of an obligation to continue support depends on the circumstances of the child, the means of the parents, and the agreements or expectations that arose in the family.
In Rebenchuk, which Terry Beley argued in the Court of Appeal, the court clarified a three part test for the support of an adult child, namely, to first determine if the adult child met the test of being a “child of the marriage”, that is, dependent on a parent, should the Guidelines amount apply, and what, if anything, the child can contribute to the cost.
Where the payor's income exceeds $150,000 annually, the court has the discretion to order the amount which would be provided by the tables or, if it considers the amount to be inappropriate, it will order the table amount up to income of $150,000, or more depending on the court's view of the appropriateness of its award "having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children who are entitled to support and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the support of the children".
In the landmark case of Frances v. Baker, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated quite strongly that most of the time the court will order the table amount, notwithstanding that the payment might be excessive in relation to the child's actual needs, that is, that effectively part of the amount paid might be considered a contribution to spousal support, even where there is no spousal support obligation.
The court may award an amount different from the table amount, higher or lower, upon a finding of "undue hardship". Undue hardship is defined in the Guidelines. It can affect the payor, the recipient, or any child of either.
The court, to find undue hardship, must determine that the payor's household's standard of living will be less than the standard of living in the household of the parent receiving the support, and must set out is reasons in writing including, where applicable, its assessment of when the hardship will be relieved.
A complex test, although not specifically required to be followed by the court, is set out in Schedule II to the Guideline Regulation. While a great number of cases begin with a claim for undue hardship, the reality is that very few are actually pursued and the vast majority of those pursued are dismissed by the courts.
Because the Guidelines are income-driven, they contain extensive provision for financial disclosure. A party can demand complete financial disclosure annually, including copies of tax returns and assessments for the preceding three years (if not previously supplied), a statement of income for the year-to-date, and other information if the payor is in business or a partnership.
Most court orders for child support will usually contain a provision for ongoing financial disclosure such as the annual exchange of income tax returns and notices of assessment.
The Supreme Court of Canada in a ruling dealing with 4 cases out of Alberta has stipulated that child support is the "right of the child" and that retroactive child support is appropriate where the payor's income has increased. See D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v. T.A.R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37.
The theory behind the argument for retroactive child support follows the notion that the payor is uniquely aware of his or her own income and, therefore, should have paid the amount that would be ordered on the Tables.
Where there was an explicit obligation to disclose financial information, in a court order for example, that the payor flouted, this “blameworthy conduct” might militate a court going back a number of years, but in the typical case three years is the limit.
When incomes change significantly or child custody arrangements change, such as when a child is no longer eligible to be supported, or where some other material change of circumstances for the parties and/or the children occurs, the courts have the power to alter the child support order. The applicant must prove a “material change of circumstances”.
Although the parties can adjust child support on their own, if the Maintenance Enforcement Program (MEP) is enforcing the order, it is imperative that the parties vary their child support order in a timely way to enact changes in the amount which will be enforced as MEP will not make a change except as dictated by a court order, although a recipient is always free to “opt-out” of the program.
The Manitoba Department of Justice has created a very helpful Guide to Changing Child Support Orders in Manitoba.
The original enactment of the Federal Child Support Guidelines envisioned the automatic recalculation of child support orders based on annual reviews of the parties' incomes. The idea was that the parties would attend upon a court-appointed officer with their tax returns in hand and have their orders adjusted appropriately. This has not yet happened on the federal level, but a few of the provinces, including Manitoba, have created their own recalculation services.
Manitoba's Recalculation Officer deals with cases in which income is determinable readily and the amount payable not subject to discretions. As such, where a payor is self-employed or there is a shared custody arrangement, the service will not generally be involved.
Provisions for recalculation must be explicitly contained in the support order and will require the parties to provide their financial disclosure, changes in employment and residence to the Recalculation Service which will, at the appointed time, gather the information and provide a recalculation order. Such an order, unless it is opposed by either party, becomes an order of the court and enforceable as such.
The taxation or deduction of spousal support and child support are different.
One of the distinguishing features of child support is that the amounts that are paid or received are not subject to the taxation system in Canada, as spousal support is. Monies paid for child support are from tax-paid dollars of the payor and the payee, or recipient of the funds, pays no tax on it.
If a court order provides for both child and spousal support, and there are arrears, CRA will credit firstly the child support payments.
Some provisions of the income tax regime in Canada will apply to the separated parents of children, such as the Child Tax Benefits, the Alternative Eligible Dependent (AED) deduction, and provincial credits for fitness and the like. The rules are complex and can easily be a trap for the unwary. See the Fishman Beley Family Law Primer section on Taxation of Support for greater detail.

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You requested confirmation of the oral advice you received from the staff of the Ethics Commission regarding unexpended funds that are transferred from one campaign account of a candidate for City elective office to another campaign account of that same candidate. Staff advised you that a candidate for City elective office who transfers unexpended funds from one campaign account to another must attribute the transferred funds to specific donors in order to ensure that contribution limits are not exceeded.
After receiving this guidance, you expressed concern and subsequently sent a letter asking the Commission to reconsider its advice. You assert that this advice is at odds with a plain reading of the Ordinance and is inconsistent with the approach that the State takes. In addition, you question how a candidate could determine whose funds have been transferred or redesignated for use in another election and whether the burden of compliance falls solely on the candidate, or on political donors as well.
The Ethics Commission provides two kinds of written advice: formal opinions and informal advice. S.F. Charter § C3.699-12. Written formal opinions are available to individuals who request advice about their responsibilities under local laws. Formal opinions provide the requester immunity from subsequent enforcement action if the material facts are as stated in the request for advice, and if the District Attorney and City Attorney concur in the advice. See id. Informal advice does not provide similar protection. See id.
Because you do not provide specific facts but seek general advice, the Commission is treating your question as a request for informal advice.
1. Must a candidate, who transfers funds from one of his or her campaign accounts for City elective office to another of that same candidate's campaign accounts for City elective office, attribute such funds to particular contributors?
2. If the answer to question one is yes, how may a candidate determine whose funds have been transferred or redesignated for use in another election?
3. If the answer to question one is yes, does the burden of compliance fall solely on the candidate or do contributors also bear the burden of complying with the requirement?
1. Yes, in order to comply with local contribution limits candidates must attribute to particular contributors funds transferred from one campaign account for City elective office to another of that same candidate's campaign account for City elective office.
2. To determine whose funds have been transferred, the Ethics Commission will use the same attribution procedures adopted by the Fair Political Practices Commission, which require a candidate to use either "last in, first out" or "first in, first out" accounting methods.
3. Both candidates and contributors are responsible for complying with local contribution limits. A candidate who receives a contribution that, when aggregated with contributions attributed to the same contributor, would otherwise constitute a violation of the contribution limits, will not be in violation of the law if the contribution is returned following the procedures established by local law. In addition, a contributor who makes a contribution that, in aggregation with contributions attributed to the same contributor, would otherwise violate the contribution limits, is not in violation of local law unless the contributor was aware of the attribution at the time the contribution was made.
I. Candidates Are Required To Attribute Contributions When Transferring Funds From One Campaign Account To Another.
The Commission interprets the Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance ("CFRO" or "Ordinance") to require attribution when a candidate transfers funds between the candidate's committees. Requiring attribution implements the CFRO in a way that is consistent with the language and purpose of the law.
A. Requiring attribution implements the Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance in a way that is consistent with the plain language of the law.
Section 1.114 of the CFRO prohibits any person, other than a candidate, from contributing more than $500 in a general election, or $250 in a run-off election, to any candidate seeking election to City office. See S.F. Campaign and Governmental Conduct ("C&GC") Code §§ 1.114(a) and (b).1 Section 1.122 of the CFRO permits a candidate to transfer unexpended contributions from his or her campaign committee to a legally constituted committee established on behalf of the same candidate. See id. § 1.122.
You have asserted that the plain language of these sections permits a candidate to transfer funds from one of his or her campaign committees to another without attribution. The Commission disagrees. Allowing transfers without attribution would permit a contributor to make donations in excess of these limits, which is contrary to the plain language of section 1.114. In San Francisco, a candidate is not required to close his or her campaign committee within any particular time period and is not required to retire campaign debt within any particular time period. Thus, for example, a candidate for the Board of Supervisors may have a campaign committee from races in 1994 and 1998. When later running for Treasurer, the candidate could ask a single contributor to donate $500 to his 1994 campaign, $500 to his 1998 campaign, and $500 to his Treasurer campaign. If the supervisor is permitted to then transfer contributions from the earlier campaign committees to the Treasurer campaign committee, without attribution, this single contributor will have donated $1500 to the Treasurer campaign, notwithstanding the $500 limit.
Thus, to adhere to the plain language of the CFRO, the Commission requires that transferred contributions be attributed to specific contributors. With attribution, the contributor in the above example would not be able to donate any additional money to the Treasurer campaign if $500 of his money had already been transferred to that campaign. Likewise, with attribution, if the contributor had already donated $500 directly to the Treasurer campaign, the candidate cannot attribute transferred funds from his 1994 or 1998 committee to the contributor.
B. Requiring attribution implements the Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance in a way that is consistent with the purpose of the law.
The Commission would reach the same conclusion even if there were an ambiguity in the plain language of the Ordinance. In any case involving statutory interpretation, the fundamental task is to determine the legislative intent in order to effectuate the law's purpose. See White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572. In determining the legislative intent, we must first look first to the words of the ordinance themselves, "giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose." Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387. But the literal meaning of an ordinance must be in accord with the ordinance's purpose. See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798. Accordingly, we must consider "the object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented by the legislation." Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276.
In adopting the contribution limits, the voters of San Francisco sought "to place realistic and enforceable limits on the amount individuals may contribute to political campaigns in municipal elections and . . . to limit contributions to candidates . . . to eliminate or reduce the appearance or reality that large contributors may exert undue influence over elected officials." C&GC Code § 1.100(b). Allowing transfers without attribution would, as explained above, allow a person to donate more than $500 to a single campaign, which is contrary to the stated intent of the Ordinance and would violate Section 1.114. See, e.g., Service Employees Intern. v. Fair Political Practice Commission (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F. 2d 1312, 1322 (recognizing that restrictions on campaign contribution transfers might be "necessary to prevent contributors from circumventing the contribution limits by funneling contributions through one candidate to another."); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union (Alaska 1999) 978 P.2d 597, 631, cert. denied (2000) 528 U.S. 1153 (stating that such restrictions serve to prevent candidates who are unopposed or opposed by weak candidates from taking contributions in one campaign to avoid limits in the next because without such restrictions, "contribution limits for future campaigns of presently unopposed candidates would effectively double."). Requiring attribution avoids this result and is consistent with the stated purposes of the Ordinance.
Although you claim otherwise, this interpretation is consistent with State law, which requires attribution with every transfer except in a single, narrow, circumstance. The only circumstance in which attribution is not required under State law is when a person transfers contributions from one campaign for state office to a subsequent campaign for the next term of the same state office.2 But the State does not have the same concerns about undermining the contribution limits that San Francisco has. State campaign committees are required to terminate within 9 to 24 months after the earliest date on which the candidate was defeated or leaves office, or the term of office ends. See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 18404.1. In addition, State candidates are prohibited from raising funds after an election in amounts greater than the net debt outstanding on the date of the election. See Cal. Gov't Code § 85316. Thus, unlike in San Francisco, a candidate could not have multiple committees actively raising contributions at the same time.
Finally, although you suggest that staff's informal oral advice is a new interpretation of the CFRO, the City has previously advised that transfers are subject to contribution limits. In December of 2000, the Ethics Commission stated that "although candidates may transfer funds to another committee, it must be a committee of the same candidate, and the transfer is subject to the contribution limits imposed by the CFRO." See March 10, 2000 Ethics Commission Advice Letter to Tom Ammiano. In addition, the City Attorney's Office has opined that "when transferring unused campaign funds to a re-election campaign account, an elected officeholder must carefully account for the source(s) of the transferred funds, and take steps to ensure that solicitation or acceptance of additional contributions from those source(s) does not cause any individual contributor to contribute more than $500 to the re-election campaign." See December 5, 1995 City Attorney Letter to Keith Jackson.
For these reasons, candidates must attribute to particular contributors funds transferred from one campaign account for City elective office to another of that same candidate's campaign accounts for City elective office.
II. A Committee Making The Transfer May Choose Between Two Attribution Methods: "Last In, First Out" or "First In, First Out."
You also inquired how a candidate could determine whose funds have been transferred or re-designated for use in another election. For attributing contributions, the Ethics Commission will use the same attribution procedures adopted by the Fair Political Practices Commission ("FPPC"). The FPPC requires a candidate transferring campaign funds to use a "last in, first out" or "first in, first out" method of accounting for the transfers. Gov. Code § 85306. A committee must designate which method it adopts at the time of transfer, and the designation is irrevocable. 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 18536.
"Last in, first out" ("LIFO") means that the amounts the candidate wishes to transfer are attributed to the transferring committee's contributors in reverse chronological order beginning with the most recent of its contributors or, if there has been a prior transfer, beginning with the most recent contributor for which unattributed contributions remain. See id. § 18536(a)(2). For example, assume that Supervisor Abe Lincoln is running for election as Treasurer. He wishes to transfer $1,000 from his 2000 committee to his 2004 committee, has chosen the LIFO method of attribution, and has received the contributions listed in the chart below.
Using this attribution method, Supervisor Lincoln must start with Kilroy Brown's contribution, which was the last contribution he received, and proceed in reverse chronological order until $1,000 is transferred. Thus, $500 from Kilroy Brown will be transferred and attributed to Kilroy Brown; $150 from Jane Chang will be transferred and attributed to Jane Chang; and $350 of Ted Jones' contribution will be transferred and attributed to Ted Jones. For the remainder of Supervisor Lincoln's 2004 general election campaign, Kilroy Brown can give no more money, Jane Chang can give $350, Ted Jones can give $150, and Mary Smith can give $500.
"First in, first out" ("FIFO") means that the amounts the candidate wishes to transfer are attributed to the transferring committee's contributors in chronological order beginning with the earliest of its contributors or, if there has been a prior transfer, beginning with the earliest contributor for which unattributed contributions remain. See id. § 18536(a)(1).
Thus, in the example above, using FIFO, if there had been no prior transfer, Supervisor Lincoln will transfer $250 from Mary Smith, $500 from Ted Jones, $150 from Jane Chang, and $100 from Kilroy Brown. Using this attribution method, Mary Smith can give Supervisor Lincoln an additional $250 for his 2004 campaign, Ted Jones can give no more money, Jane Chang can give $350, and Kilroy Brown can give $400.
(c) the amount of campaign funds the committee is seeking to transfer that has not yet been attributed.
See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 18536.
III. Both Candidates And Contributors Are Responsible For Complying With Local Contribution Limits.
Finally, you inquired whether the burden of compliance falls solely on the candidate or on potential donors as well. Under local law, both candidates and contributors are responsible for complying with the contribution limits.
When attribution is involved, the Commission will follow the State's approach to assigning responsibility for compliance. Accordingly, a candidate or committee that receives a contribution that, when aggregated with contributions attributed to the same contributor, would otherwise constitute a violation of the contribution limits in S.F. C&GC Code section 1.114, will not be violation of the law if the contribution is returned pursuant to section 1.114(f). A contributor who makes a contribution that, in aggregation with contributions attributed to the same contributor, would otherwise violate the contribution limits in section 1.114, would not be in violation of the law unless the contributor was aware of the attribution at the time the contribution was made. See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 18536(f) and (g).
I hope you find this letter responsive to your inquiry. Please do not hesitate to contact me or Deputy Executive Director Mabel Ng at 581-2300 if you have additional questions.
1 With respect to the office of the Public Defender and Assessor, the limits imposed by subsection (a)(1) apply to the primary election and the limits imposed by subsection (b)(1) apply to the general election. S.F. C&GC Code §§ 1.114(a)(3) and (c)(3).
(3) The funds to be "carried over" are not considered "surplus campaign funds" as defined in Government Code section 89519 (campaign funds that remain when the candidate is either defeated or has left elected office).
FPPC Regulation 18537.1(c) defines "subsequent election for the same elective state office" to mean "the election to the next term of office immediately following the election/term of office for which the funds were raised."


This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, that alternatively seeks a petition for writ of coram nobis or audita querela, filed on his behalf by counsel, (Doc. No. 1). Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence on the basis of the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011). The Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 12), arguing that the Simmons claim is moot because Petitioner is now serving a presidentially commuted sentence. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be dismissed as moot.
On July 21, 2006, following a guilty plea, the Court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of: Count (1), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base; and (Count (2), using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and aiding and abetting the same. (Case No. 3:04-cr-296, Doc. No. 36). The Court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment for Count (1) and 60 months, consecutive, for Count (2), followed by a total of 10 years of supervised release. (3:04-cr-296, Doc. No. 36). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Government's motion to dismiss Petitioner's appeal based on the appellate waiver in his plea agreement, but affirmed the Court's judgment on March 11, 2008. United States v. Williams, 269 Fed.Appx. 279 (4th Cir. 2008). The mandate issued on April 2, 2008. (Case No. 3:04-cr-296, Doc. No. 75).
Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on June 4, 2009, case number 3:09-cv-234-RJC, which the Court dismissed after finding that counsel was not ineffective. Williams v. United States, 2010 WL 3619426 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 9, 2010). The Court declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Williams v. United States, 2010 WL 4226159 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 21, 2010). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal on February 18, 2011. United States v. Williams, 411 Fed.Appx. 659 (4th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner filed a second § 2255 motion to vacate on August 16, 2012, case number 3:12-cv-589-RJC. The Court dismissed the motion to vacate as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 petition on June 10, 2013. Williams v. United States, 2013 WL 2480256 (W.D. N.C. June 10, 2013).
On April 18, 2017, the President of the United States issued an Executive Grant of Clemency that commuted Petitioner's total sentence of imprisonment to 228 months' imprisonment, leaving intact the 10-year term of supervised release. (3:04-cr-296, Doc. No. 116).
Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition through counsel on September 16, 2013. (Doc. No. 1). The Government filed a Response arguing that Petitioner is not eligible for relief under § 2255 because it would be successive, however, he is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2241 and the savings clause because his life sentence for Count (1) is based on a prior conviction that no longer qualifies as a felony conviction after Simmons. (Doc. No. 7).
On July 20, 2017, the Respondent filed an unopposed motion to stay the instant proceedings pending the Fourth Circuit's resolution of United States v. Surratt, No. 14-6851, that the Court granted on August 14, 2017. (Doc. No. 9). On January 4, 2018, the Respondent filed a Case Status Report informing the Court that, on December 11, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Surratt, 138 S.Ct. 554 (2017); (Doc. No. 12). On January 9, 2018, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the instant petition is now moot because Petitioner is now serving a presidentially commuted sentence. (Doc. No. 12). Petitioner has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that courts are to promptly examine motions to vacate, along with “any attached exhibits and the record of prior proceedings . . .” in order to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief on the claims set forth therein. After examining the record in this matter, the Court finds that the motion to vacate can be resolved without a response from the Government and without an evidentiary hearing based on the record and governing case law. See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).
Assuming, arguendo, that the Petition seeking relief from his life sentence is neither successive nor untimely, it must nevertheless be dismissed as moot.


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As you know, in March the firm reorganized and began operating under a new name: Waters, Tyler, Scott, Hofmann & Doane, LLC. We are excited about the new incarnation of our firm, and the services we can provide for our clients.
In that regard, we are pleased to announce four new members of our firm family. Chad Smith joined the firm as a litigation associate in February. Chad is licensed in both Indiana and Kentucky, and came to us from the Jefferson County (Kentucky) County Attorney’s office, where he prosecuted misdemeanor criminal offenses.
Karla Edelen came to us as a legal assistant in May. Karla has considerable experience as a business legal assistant, and is presently pursuing an associate's degree in paralegal studies. She will be working with George Budd.
On July 1, Les Merkley joined our firm as an Associate. Les has operated in private practice in Jeffersonville, Indiana, since 1997, practicing primarily in the areas of family law, municipal law and zoning. We are excited about the depth his expertise brings to our firm’s practice areas. Les was accompanied by former legal assistant, Amanda Due, who is serving as a paralegal in the firm’s business practice. We are happy to have these four great people aboard.
Scott Tyler attended an Advanced Insurance Fraud Seminar in Indianapolis conducted by the National Society of Insurance Investigators. Topics included forensic accounting; body language and voice analysis; and criminal and civil arson.
Rodney Scott presented a legal update to the physicians and administration at Floyd Memorial Hospital on medical malpractice issues and legal updates on April 15, 2008.
George Budd is excited to announce his engagement to Tammy Ray, an emergency room physician at Jewish Hospital South in Louisville. No date has been set as of yet. The whole firm wishes George and Tammy a heartfelt congratulations!
Scott Tyler, Rodney Scott and Tricia Hofmann each recently participated in the “Talk to a Lawyer” program, which conducts a monthly phone bank to make referrals and answer simple legal questions on a pro bono basis. In addition, the firm donated our former multi-line phone system to Legal Associates, which runs the “Talk to a Lawyer” program, to assist them in being better able to serve the public.
Sandra Heeke is part of a competitive adult United States Tennis Association league team consisting of 18 women from the Louisville area. The team plays three courts of doubles and two courts of singles. She typically plays number one court doubles. The team plays matches throughout the winter. Sandy’s team recently qualified for the Kentucky State tennis tournament, beating out approximately 35 other teams. At the State tournament, Sandy and her partner won all three of their matches, and came within one tie-break point of advancing to the State semi-finals. Congratulations, Sandy!
Scott Waters is proud to announce that his daughter Megan Waters was married on May 17, 2008. Megan is a recent graduate of Cedarville University. Scott and his wife Anne have three other daughters, Mallery, Michelle and Molly.
Tricia Hofmann and her husband, John, together with Rodney and Lisa Scott, attended the annual FurBall in Louisville in February. The FurBall is a fundraising event and awards ceremony conducted by Pet Groups United, a non-profit association of pet rescue and animal welfare organizations in the Greater Louisville metropolitan area. More information can be found about Pet Groups United at its website: http://www.petgroupsunited.com.
Scott Tyler served on the Grants Committee of the Community Foundation of Southern Indiana and assisted in the selection of organizations which will receive grants in excess of $50,000 for local community projects.
George Budd will soon be completing his term as Secretary/Treasurer of the Floyd County Bar Association. It is anticipated that he will be nominated for Vice President of the organization at its July meeting.
Rodney and Lisa Scott and their family again spent this spring following daughter Emma’s travelling soccer team - Mockingbird Soccer Club - "92 Girls at http://eteamz.active.com/mvscg13/. Emma's team won the Kentucky State Cup for the third straight year and qualified for the Regional Championships in Rockport, Illinois. Emma was the team captain.
Rodney and Lisa Scott are also pleased to announce that Emma was selected to participate in the Kentucky Governor’s Scholar Program this summer. She will spend five weeks at Morehead State University studying a variety of subjects with an emphasis in music theory. She will then enter her senior year pre-qualified for scholarships at several Kentucky schools.
Rick Bartlett recently served as Chairman of the Boys Scouts of America, Clark County, Indiana campaign. The effort concluded with a luncheon at Papa John’s Cardinal stadium. Other firm members attending the fund raiser were Sandra Heeke, Ken Doane and Scott Waters (himself a former eagle scout).
Scott Tyler served as Ambassador Campaign Chair of the 14th Annual Rotary Community Toast and Benefit Banquet honoring long-time community activist Robert Kleehammer. The Ambassador Campaign generated a record number of the Gold Sponsors for the event and attendance exceeded four hundred. The proceeds will benefit the new downtown New Albany YMCA and Rotary Club of New Albany.
Rodney and Lisa Scott are proud to announce that their son, Dalton Fitzgerald, graduated with a Core 40 diploma from Clarksville High School. He also played baseball for Clarksville and was one of two senior captains. He led the team in batting average while playing shortstop. He also was named the offensive player of the year.
The firm is committed to taking aggressive and proactive steps to reduce the size of its carbon footprint. To that end, last year the firm adopted a “paper-less” system, which employs scanning documents and forwarding documents via e-mail and on-line fax, with substantially fewer paper documents ever generated in the process. This saves considerable paper and toner, and reduces waste. In addition, the firm contracts with Shred-It, a paper-waste recycling business. Virtually all the firm’s paper products are now recycled, and we are proud to report that Shred-It has advised that as of May, 2008, we have saved a total of twelve trees so far this year with our recycling efforts. In 2007, before we operated in a substantially paperless environment, we saved forty-seven trees.
Ken Doane and George Budd received a favorable published opinion from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Bailey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 881 N.E.2d 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Rodney Scott and Ken Doane secured a defense verdict at the trial court level for the client, State Farm, Plaintiff’s underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance carrier. By way of brief background, Caudill allowed Bailey to drive his car, and they were involved in a single-car accident. Both men were intoxicated. Bailey sued Caudill, who subsequently tendered his liability limits, and then pursued a UIM claim against State Farm. At trial, Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint to add a claim of negligent entrustment. The trial court denied this motion and granted State Farm’s motion in limine on the same issue. After the jury entered a defense verdict, Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that a voluntarily intoxicated adult (Bailey) does not have a right to maintain a first-party cause of action against the vehicle owner (Caudill) for negligently entrusting the vehicle to him. The Court of Appeals also held that the evidence at trial also failed to establish Caudill’s actual knowledge of Bailey’s intoxication. The defense verdict was upheld.
Rodney Scott, Rick Bartlett and Chad Smith all contributed to the dismissal of an adult wrongful death action filed by the non-custodial father acting as a personal representative of an Estate opened for that purpose by a personal injury law firm. To the father and law firm’s surprise, the 20 year-old decedent was a full-time student at Ivy Tech and, therefore, an adult wrongful death action was an inappropriate vehicle to seek recovery for her death. J. Scott Waters, IV, of our firm, was helping the residential and custodial mother with her plans for a memorial for her daughter when the mother learned of the lawsuit and her ex-husband’s intentions. We filed a motion to dismiss on her behalf. The Orange County Circuit Court granted the motion and permitted mother to file an intervening complaint against the tortfeasor and the ex-husband. The residential and custodial mother, therefore, should be able to proceed with her initial plans.
Sandra Heeke and George Budd successfully defended the appeal of a summary judgment entered in favor of their client in Wagner v. Yates, 884 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In this permissive use case, the Court of Appeals agreed that American Family – the Plaintiffs’ UIM carrier – was contractually entitled to set off not only the tortfeasor’s liability limits, but any UIM payments made by the Plaintiff’s employer’s insurer. Plaintiffs have since filed a petition to transfer this matter to the Indiana Supreme Court, which is currently pending.
Rodney Scott helped Floyd Memorial Hospital defend a malpractice complaint before a Medical Review Panel. The unanimous opinion of the panel was that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Floyd Memorial Hospital breached the standard of care owed to the patient and further opined that Floyd Memorial's conduct was not a factor in the injuries and damages complained of by the Plaintiff.
Rodney Scott tried a breach of contract and UCC action for Sellersburg Volunteer Fire Department against Shane Williams Enterprises, Inc., Wolverine Fire Apparatus and American Fire Apparatus in Clark Circuit Court in May of 2008. As it turned out, it was Judge Daniel F. Donahue’s last trial. Indeed, he signed the judgment entry on his last day on the bench. The dispute arose after Sellersburg VFD purchased a used ladder truck from the defendants. It was purchased to increase the ability and capacity to fight fires and decrease the community’s insurance ratings for premium purposes. As agreed, the fire truck was sold “as-is except for a pump test, ladder certification, pump cooler repair and a full complement of (USED) ground ladders (85’).” After delivery, Fire Chief Greg Dietz noted several defects and questioned whether the “ladder certification” was legitimate. He had the vehicle inspected by an independent testing company that concluded that it failed the certification standard in multiple respects. Rodney, on behalf of Sellersburg VFD, offered to rescind the transaction and return the truck. Defendants refused. Accordingly, Sellersburg VFD made the necessary repairs at the cost of $27,400. After a two day bench trial, the Judge granted Sellersburg Volunteer Fire Department its damages of $27,400 and ordered specific performance compelling the title transfer that had not yet occurred. Interestingly, the Judge also granted sanctions including mediation costs and attorney’s fees because Defendants failed to appear in person at the mediation without notifying Rodney, the mediator or the court.
Ken Doane and George Budd successfully defended an appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals in McClanahan v. Mason, 881 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Previously, Rodney Scott had defended the case at trial and the jury returned a defense verdict. Plaintiff appealed the jury’s verdict and requested a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the evidentiary issues claimed by Plaintiff's counsel were, at most, harmless error. It further determined that the jury’s defense verdict based exclusively upon Plaintiff's failure to meet his burden of persuasion on the medical causation issue was justified by the evidence.
Rodney Scott successfully mediated Gentry v. Zingg. The injury claim was catastrophic. In addition to $134,000 in medical billings, Plaintiff had been unemployed since the date of the accident with no prospects of returning to his employment because of the significant and permanent injuries sustained in the accident. While Rodney’s client definitely had significant liability and damage exposure, he believed that it should be shared by Plaintiff and, most significantly, by Harrison County. Both parties had accident reconstructions performed which agreed that both Plaintiff and Defendant were across the centerline, that Defendant may have been 4 inches further across the centerline, that both Plaintiff and Defendant were about equal distances from their respective edges and that both vehicles were travelling within the speed limit. After the suit filing, Rodney asked the defense accident reconstructionist to revisit the scene and analyze the road design. The Defendant’s accident reconstructionist concluded that the maximum advisable speed for the roadway – based upon its design – was more in the range of 20 mph than the posted 55 mph limit. Additionally, the road lacked any necessary warnings or advisoriesto notify traffic of the narrowness of the roadway and the visibility limitations at the location of the accident. Harrison County, therefore, was named a non-party to the action and Rodney successfully argued that his 16 year-old client, in particular, needed warnings and advice about speed and visibility and that, as such, Harrison County bore at least 50% of the total fault, for settlement purposes, for the accident and the parties each bore no more than 25% of the fault. The case was settled well within the insured’s available liability limits.
THIS WEBSITE AND THE RESULTS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE NOT INTENDED TO CONSTITUE AN ENDORSEMENT OF ANY PARTICULAR ATTORNEY OR CONSTITUTE A REPRESENTATION ABOUT THE QUALITY OF LEGAL SERVICES. ADDITIONALLY, WATERS, TYLER, SCOTT, HOFMANN & DOANE, LLC DOES NOT CLAIM THAT PAST RESULTS PREDICT FUTURE SUCCESSES AND CANNOT WARRANT OR GUARANTEE RESULTS IN PENDING OR FUTURE CASES.
In Hornberger v. Farm Bureau Insurance, 868 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), a Farm Bureau insured, Brewington, was struck by Hornberger, an insured of Citizens Insurance Company. On November 13, 2003, Citizens informed Brewington and Farm Bureau of its intentions to make a policy limits offer and provided a copy of the policy coverage limits as required by I.C. 27-7-5-6. Brewington refused the offer due to the contingency that he accept 50% fault for the accident. Nonetheless, Farm Bureau notified Brewington of its intention to advance the money and reserve its subrogation rights against the tortfeasor, Hornberger.
On March 23, 2004 Brewington decided to accept Citizens’ offer, and advised Farm Bureau. On April 2, 2004 Farm Bureau advanced payment to Brewington. After suit was filed, Hornberger moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Farm Bureau had waived its subrogation rights by failing to advance the money within thirty days of the initial offer, conveyed on November 13, 2003. The trial court denied his motion.
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. In doing so, the Court concluded that Hornberger’s argument – that only the fact of an offer and proof of policy limits is necessary to trigger the statutory thirty-day period – was against the clear language of the statute. The Court determined that the thirty-day period does not been to run until there is clear evidence of a reciprocal agreement between the tortfeasor and the insured plaintiff to settle for the tortfeasor’s liability limits. There was no reciprocity in November of 2003, as Brewington did not consent to the settlement terms. Farm Bureau’s deadline to advance funds did not expire until April 22, 2004, after it had tendered payment.
As a practical matter, when notifying UIM carriers of a limits tender, insurers must be careful to clearly demonstrate the plaintiff’s willingness to accept the offer and release the tortfeasor. It would be helpful to secure written confirmation of such agreement from plaintiff’s counsel. If this is not possible, the notice should clearly indicate that plaintiff’s counsel has expressed a willingness to accept the funds, and copy plaintiff’s counsel on the letter. Without evidence of such reciprocity, notice of a limits tender will not trigger the thirty-day period established by the statute.
In National Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Insurance Company, 2008 WL 2345019 (7th Cir. 2008), National Athletic (“NAS”) sued Westfield for breach of contract and bad faith after Westfield denied NAS’ burglary claim. Westfield filed an answer and counterclaim for declaratory judgment based on NAS’ refusal to submit to a second examination under oath (“EUO”), in violation of its post-loss duties under the contract.
Westfield’s insurance contract contained a provision which read, “We may examine any insured under oath, while not in the presence of any other insured and at such times as may be reasonably required, about any matter relating to this insurance or the claim, including an insured’s books and records.” The contract also required insureds to fully comply with their contractual duties before filing an action against the company. NAS timely reported the underlying theft and loss of property to Westfield, and Westfield promptly tendered payment to NAS for its loss of business income. Approximately two months later, an attorney for Westfield conducted a lengthy EUO of the president of NAS. The exam was recessed so that NAS could provide additional documentation to Westfield. After receiving numerous documents, Westfield sought to reconvene the EUO to discuss them. Although both parties originally agreed to conduct a second EUO after the documents were provided, NAS subsequently objected and refused to participate. It also sought to limit the length of a second EUO, if one was ordered.
The Court rejected NAS’ argument that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limited EUOs to seven hours, noting that nothing in the insurance contract so limited an EUO’s duration. As this was a contract dispute, the federal rule was “at best, only persuasive or analogous.” There was no legal basis for NAS’ argument that Westfield’s attempt to reconvene the EUO was unreasonable. While conducting repeat EUOs in an attempt to harass or burden an insured could be unreasonable in some situations, that was not the case here. By refusing to submit to a reasonable resumption of the EUO, NAS breached the contract.
The Court also rejected the bad faith claim. There was a rational basis for Westfield’s questioning of NAS’ president. In addition, the underlying disagreement centered around value, not the claim-handling process. A good-faith dispute about value is not grounds for a bad faith claim.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Fields, 885 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), Allstate insured the Fields, who were involved in an auto accident with Jimmy Woodley. The Fields’ Allstate policy contained medical payments coverage, UM coverage and UIM coverage. The Fields filed a lawsuit against Woodley, alleging negligence and loss of consortium, and submitted medical bills to Allstate, which paid the medical payments coverage limits under the policy. After Woodley’s insurance carrier became insolvent, the Fields notified Allstate that they were pursuing a UM claim. Allstate acknowledged this claim, but requested that the Fields complete medical/wage authorizations and proof-of-loss forms. The Fields responded by sending a list of medical bills to Allstate and acknowledging that the submission was incomplete. At the same time, the Fields made a policy limits demand. Allstate responded by sending a second set of forms and iterated that no offers of settlement could be made until they were completed and returned. The Fields claimed that they had provided complete medical records to Allstate and reiterated their policy limits demand, while also stating that Allstate’s continued refusal to pay policy limits was in bad faith. Allstate responded by stating that it still had not received the completed forms.
The Fields moved for leave to amend their complaint to add Allstate as a party defendant and allege a bad faith claim. The court denied Allstate’s subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on the bad faith claim. Ultimately, after several years’ worth of discovery disputes, interlocutory appeals and other procedural hurdles, a jury awarded the Fields $2,000.000 in compensatory damages and $18,000,000 in punitive damages. Allstate, of course, appealed.
The Court stressed that a good-faith dispute as to the amount of a valid insurance claim is not a breach of the duty to exercise good faith. Also, any conduct on the part of an insurance company after a lawsuit has been filed is not evidence of bad faith. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of Allstate in the handling of the Fields’ claim and that the trial court erred in its denial of Allstate’s motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the Court stated that Allstate did not act with ill will by delaying any payments to the Fields, as it was still seeking full compliance with the terms of the insurance contract.
In General Casualty Insurance Company v. Bright, 885 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), Diana Bright and her spouse maintained a homeowner’s insurance policy with General Casualty. The policy itself contained a provision that read: “Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is started within one year after the date of the loss.” According to the policy, “us” referred to General Casualty. In June of 2003, the dwelling burned down, and the Brights submitted a claim to General Casualty.
In September of 2005, General Casualty filed suit against the Brights and alleged that they had caused the fire and had fraudulently submitted an insurance claim regarding the same. Bright eventually filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that General Casualty had failed to file its complaint within one year after the house had burned down. The trial court agreed and dismissed General Casualty’s complaint with prejudice. General Casualty appealed.
On appeal, General Casualty argued that the contractual provision limiting the time for filing lawsuits applies only to insureds. In turn, Bright argued that if the policy was intended to have this meaning, it would have been specifically iterated. The Court of Appeals agreed with General Casualty. The Court determined that the suit limitation clause was clear and only applied to suits filed by insureds against the insurer. General Casualty was free to proceed with its suit against the Brights.
In McSwane v. Bloomington Hospital & Healthcare System, 882 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), Vandeede presented to the emergency room with lacerations and a deep puncture wound sustained when she allegedly fell from a horse. She was accompanied by her visibly controlling ex-husband. Noting that Vandeede appeared intimidated by him, one nurse presented her with a domestic abuse form, which she refused. Even in the ex-husband’s absence, Vandeede maintained she fell from her horse. After she was treated, Vandeede insisted on being released to her ex-husband, and the staff repeatedly questioned her about her safety. Vandeede’s mother told the staff that her daughter was the victim of domestic violence, but Vandeede told her mother to mind her own business and left with her ex-husband. Shortly after being released, the ex-husband killed Vandeede and then committed suicide.
In the mother’s resulting lawsuit, the surgeon and the hospital moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment as to the surgeon, as Plaintiff waived her argument against him by failing to properly present it at the trial level.
In reversing the summary judgment for the hospital, the court first held that a hospital’s general duty of care to a patient may include a duty not to discharge that patient to a suspected abuser. A hospital has a duty to safeguard the welfare of its patients, and this can include a duty to protect them from external circumstances if the hospital observed or unreasonably ignored events that could lead to a risk of harm. The Court cautioned that such risks must be reasonably foreseeable. The Court determined there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the hospital ignored such events in Vandeede’s case.
One judge penned a strong dissent, arguing that the Court had imposed an unreasonably broad duty on hospitals. He emphasized the facts that Vandeede was fully coherent prior to discharge, and that the hospital suggested on several occasions that she not leave with her ex-husband. She voluntarily chose to do so.
In Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192 (Ind. 2008), Plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy. Following the surgery, nurses performed a sponge count and advised the surgeon that all the used sponges were accounted for. Over a year later, plaintiff learned that a sponge had been left in her abdomen, and underwent a second operation to remove it. A medical review panel found that the surgeon failed to meet an adequate standard of care.
At trial, Plaintiff moved for a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, which was denied. Following the entry of a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed various post-trial motions, seeking a new trial. After the trial court ordered a new trial, the surgeon appealed, and the Plaintiff cross-appealed the denial of her partial summary judgment motion.
Ultimately, the Court affirmed denial of Plaintiff’s motion, and reinstated the jury’s verdict. Citing Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932), it explained that a surgeon has a duty as a matter of law to ensure that all sponges are removed after a procedure is completed. Even if a surgeon delegates the task of counting sponges to an assistant, a failure to remove all of them is evidence of medical negligence and will support a jury’s finding of liability on the part of the surgeon. He or she cannot escape liability for such a failure by delegating the duty to another.
The Court noted that a provider “is only required to produce expert evidence refusing the panel’s opinion” to avoid summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. Even without any concrete facts supporting the opinions, the very existence of conflicting expert opinions on whether the standard of care was met is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. As the surgeon introduced evidence of a conflicting opinion, summary judgment was inappropriate.
In Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 2008), Gerald Holmes claimed that while at Speedway’s truck stop, he slipped and fell on a black spot he believed to be diesel fuel. He promptly changed his pants, which he claimed were at least partly covered in diesel fuel. Ten days prior to trial in their suit against Speedway, one of the Holmes’ attorneys asked his clients whether they still had the clothes Mr. Holmes wore on the date of his alleged injury. One day before trial, the Holmes told him that they had located the jeans and boots, which they put in the trunk of their car. The attorney did not physically examine the jeans or boots.
On the day of trial, Holmes’ attorney advised defense counsel for the first time that the Holmes were in possession of the clothing and that the items might be introduced into evidence. Speedway’s attorney did not inspect the items. When the Holmes’ attorneys attempted to introduce the clothing, Speedway objected on the basis the evidence was highly prejudicial, and that the substance had not been identified as diesel fuel via any scientific testing. The trial court allowed the clothing to be admitted, but prohibited any testimony or inferences as to whether the stain was derived from diesel fuel.
The Holmes subsequently testified that the stains on the boots and jeans were present before the accident and appeared as a result of the fall. They explained that they put the clothing in their barn after the accident and had subsequently forgotten until just before trial. Ultimately, the jury found in favor of Mr. Holmes and awarded him $1,125,000 which, after a 50% fault apportionment to him, was reduced to $562,000.
Speedway moved for a new trial and also filed a motion to preserve and test the clothing, the latter of which the trial court granted over the Holmes’ objection. A chemist concluded that the jeans did not contain diesel fuel, turpentine or mineral spirits. In addition, Speedway learned that the jeans had not been manufactured until 2000 and were not available for sale until April or May of 2001, long after Mr. Holmes’ June, 2000, fall. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Speedway’s motion for a new trial, specifically stating that Speedway had not established intentional misrepresentation on the part of the Holmes or their attorneys.
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating that Speedway could have requested a continuance to have the clothing tested. The dissent reasoned that although Speedway would have had an advantage by requesting a continuance to obtain testing, this was a clear case for a new trial due to the post-verdict discovery of new evidence.
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that Speedway was entitled to a new trial based on the chemist’s report and the timeline of the jeans’ manufacture. The Court concluded that Speedway met the nine elements required for granting a new trial due to newly-discovered evidence, that: 1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; 2) it is material and relevant; 3) it is not cumulative; 4) it is not merely impeaching; 5) it is not privileged or incompetent; 6) due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; 7) the evidence was worthy of credit; 8) it can be produced upon a retrial of the case; and 9) it will probably produce a different result at retrial.
The only element Supreme Court questioned was whether Speedway exercised due diligence in obtaining the test results. In the end, the Court found that the Holmes ultimately created the underlying procedural problem by failing to report the existence of the jeans and boots to counsel for Speedway until the morning of trial. The Court concluded that although Speedway could have requested a continuance during trial, failure to do so did not result in failure to exercise due diligence during post-trial testing of the jeans.
In Shafer & Freeman Lakes Environmental Conservation Corp. v. Stichnoth, 877 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), the Plaintiff went to his parent’s property near Lake Shafer. Upon arrival, Plaintiff’s father warned him that there was a newly installed dredge pipe near their dock. Despite this knowledge, Plaintiff dove into the water – like he had done many times in the past – and struck his head on the dredge pipe. Plaintiff fractured several vertebrae and was paralyzed.
Prior to trial, Defendant moved for summary judgment on liability and also moved to bifurcate the liability and damages portions of the. The trial court denied both motions. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff totaling $3,398,000, but attributed 50% fault of the to the Plaintiff, 20% to the Plaintiff’s father (who was named as a non-party) and 30% to Defendant. Defendant appealed the denial of its motions.
The Court of Appeals held that the Plaintiff was an invitee at the lake and, as such, was entitled to a greater degree of protection than if he were merely a licensee. Defendant tried to argue that since a person could only access the lake by crossing private property, requiring permission, anyone at the lake must be a licensee. The Court concluded that lake visitors are invitees, as the lake was open to the public for everyone’s enjoyment. As such, Defendant owed a higher duty of care, and summary judgment was properly denied.
The Court also upheld the trial court’s denial of bifurcation. With the benefit of hindsight, the Court noted that the jury apportioned 50% of the fault to Plaintiff, despite the severe nature of his injuries. This suggested that the jury did not improperly conflate emotion with its liability assessment, and that no actual prejudice occurred. It rejected Defendant’s speculation that, if the case had been bifurcated, Plaintiff would have been assessed more than 50% at fault. Relying on a recent Supreme Court decision, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 866 N.E.2d 747 (Ind.2007), the Court explained that the mere possibility or speculation of prejudice is insufficient to require separate trials on liability and damages.
THIS WEBSITE IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC LEGAL ADVICE. WATERS, TYLER, SCOTT, HOFMANN & DOANE, LLC DOES NOT REPRESENT OR WARRANT THAT THE INFORMATION ACCESSIBLE VIA THIS SITE IS STILL ACCURATE, COMPLETE OR CURRENT.
Indiana law provides that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover the “reasonable value” of the treatment he or she receives as a proximate cause of a defendant’s negligence. Sikora v. Fromm, 782 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)(abrogated on other grounds, Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. 2006)). The question then is what is the “reasonable value” – the amount billed for the services, or the amount the provider accepts in full satisfaction of those bills? There have been four relevant Indiana cases which touch on this issue.
The first case, Chemco Transport, Inc. v. Conn, 506 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), affirmed in relevant part and reversed on unrelated grounds, 527 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. 1988), said that the reasonable value of medical services could be determined either by looking at the amount billed or the amount paid. However, this case did not expressly address insurance write-offs. Nonetheless, in several cases we have tried, our firm has been able to persuade the judge to allow both figures to be introduced.
Next came Brumfiel v. U.S., 2005 WL 4889255 (S.D. Ind. 2005). Brumfiel is a federal case, and is not binding authority on an Indiana state court. In this case, Defendant sought to introduce evidence of insurance write-offs, reducing the amount of medical damages claimed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the introduction of such write-offs would violate Indiana’s collateral source rule, codified at I.C. 34-44-1-2. The collateral source rule, which abrogated the common law rule, allows collateral source evidence to be admitted, unless it is evidence of a collateral source payments from sources for which the plaintiff or his/her family pays directly or benefits received from the government. The judge in Brumfiel concluded that the reason Indiana abrogated the common law rule was to reflect a change in public policy. Instead of focusing on holding a defendant fully accountable (the policy behind the common law rule), the Indiana legislature sought to prevent plaintiffs from receiving a double recovery. He therefore rejected Plaintiff’s citation to cases from states which retained the common law rule, noting they were not relevant to addressing the Indiana statute. The Brumfiel court ultimately concluded that the collateral source rule did not even apply, as it applies to “payments,” and a write-off is not a “payment.” Accordingly, Plaintiff was prohibited from seeking to recover the substantial insurance write-offs in that case.
Although the Brumfiel opinion was not binding on it, the Indiana Court of Appeals relied on it in Butler v. Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 875 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), the third relevant pre-Stanley case. Butler involved substantial Medicare write-offs. Like the judge in Brumfiel, the Butler court limited Plaintiff to only seek the actual payments. The court emphasized that no one will ever be paying for the write-offs, and if Plaintiff were allowed to recover them, it would result in a windfall to him. This is contrary to the public policy behind the collateral source statute. Unfortunately, the Indiana Supreme Court recently granted transfer in this case, and it may not be cited as binding authority.
Since transfer was granted in Butler, the Court of Appeals issued anopinion in Stanley v. Walker, 2008 WL 2246994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The Stanley court reached a conclusion wholly opposite to Butler and Brumfiel. While it referenced Butler in a footnote as a case yielding a different result, it did not mention Brumfiel at all. Stanley is slightly different from Butler, in that it featured write-offs made by a private insurance payor. We believe the Stanley court is problematic largely because it reached its conclusions solely by applying case law from states which retained the common law rule. As stated earlier, the policy objectives of the common law rule are different than the objectives behind the Indiana statute. The Stanley court noted that the statute abrogated the common law rule, and noted specifically that to abrogate means “to do away with” and “to destroy.” It also noted the different public policy goals involved. Then, with no authority, the Court stated that it allowed to follow the policy objectives of the common law rule. It ignored case law from jurisdictions which have statutorily abrogated the common law rule, even though all of them that have addressed the issue have prevented plaintiffs from recovering the written-off amounts. While we disagree with the conclusion of a number of cases, it is unusual to find one with such a profoundly troubling and unreasonable analysis.
We anticipate transfer will likely be granted in Stanley, and that the Supreme Court will rule in both cases together. Until transfer is granted, however, Stanley is the law and is binding precedent. Due to briefing schedules, it will be some months before this issue has been resolved.
In the interim, a footnote located at the end of Stanley offers some direction. The court noted that nothing in its ruling should be construed as preventing defendants from challenging the reasonableness of medical billings. Such evidence could be introduced via a defense expert or other evidence. In appropriate cases, with sizeable differences between the amount billed and the amount paid, it may be worth considering hiring an expert in medical billings. This individual would be qualified to testify about how billing works: how providers set their rates; how contracts between providers and insurance companies or Medicare work; how adjustments and write-offs are handled; and the fact that, as part of those contracts, providers are not allowed to pursue written-off amounts from the patients. This could then be introduced at trial as evidence of what constitutes the “reasonable value” of the services.
In some cases, a treating provider may be willing to candidly testify about these issues and how he/she/it handles write-offs in practice. In those cases, a defense expert would likely be unnecessary. However, many providers, as you well know, are such advocates for their patients that they would not admit anything harmful to the patient’s case. It is in those cases where a defense medical billing expert may be appropriate.
Synopsis: This case arose out of a four-car accident that occurred on the off-ramp of I-65 northbound in Clark County, Indiana, at the Sellersburg exit. Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by his wife, Janice Coffman. Plaintiff was partially reclined and dozing off when his vehicle was struck by the vehicle behind it. Our client was three cars behind Plaintiff’s, and had bumped the car in front of her, causing a four-car chain-reaction collision to occur. Although a vehicle was stopped in front of Plaintiff’s car, no contact was made with this vehicle. While our client’s vehicle suffered significant damage, Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained no visible damage whatsoever in the accident. Plaintiff’s wife and son, who were also in the vehicle, were not injured.

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Jiban Khuntia specializes in health information technology research. He advises the CITI-Digital Health Consortium. Prior to doctoral studies, he worked in top and middle managerial positions in super computing, research and development, and innovation development areas for over ten years.
Khuntia's research examines how organizations leverage information technology (IT) to shape their strategies, workflows and operations to be successful. His work has appeared in major journals such as Production and Operations Management and Decision Support Systems.
Khuntia J., Saldanha T., Mithas S., and Sambamurthy V. (2018) Information Technology and Sustainability: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. Production and Operations Management (POM), 27(4), 756-773.
Khuntia J. with Kathuria A., Mann A., Saldanha T., Kauffmann A. (2018) Understanding the Strategic Value Appropriation Path for Cloud Computing in the Organization. Journal of Management of Information Systems (JMIS), 35(3), 740-775.
Khuntia J., Mithas S., and Agarwal R. (2017). How Service Offerings and Operational Maturity Influence the Viability of HIEs. Production and Operations Management (POM), 26(11), 1989-2005.
Lane V., Khuntia J., Parthasarathy M., Hazarika B. (2017). The Impact of the Internet on Values: Shifts in Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence amongst Indian Youth. Journal of Global Information Management (JGIM), 25(3), 98-120.
Angst C., Agarwal R., Khuntia J., Gao G., McCullough J. (2014). IT and Voluntary Quality Disclosure by Hospitals. Decision Support Systems (DSS), 57(1), 367-375.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Weiner J. (2018). Hospital Leadership in Support of Digital Transformation. Pacific Asia Journal of AIS (PAJAIS), 10(3), 1-24.
Permwonguswa S., Khuntia J., Yim D., Gregg D., Kathuria, A. (2018). Knowledge Sharing in Health Infomediary: Role of Emotional Empowerment and Self-Esteem. Health Systems, 7(3), 181-194.
Permwonguswa S., Hajar C., Cook P., Wong B., Mccarthy. M., Khuntia J., Biggs E. (2018) Provider Empowerment and Satisfaction with Telehealth: Exploring Variation Across Structural and Demographic Factors. Accepted in Health Management Policy and Innovation (HMPI), 3(1), 1-10.
Tanniru M., Khuntia J. (2017). Dimensions of Patient Experience and Overall Satisfaction in Emergency Departments. Journal of Patient Experience (JPE), 4(3), 95-100.
Khuntia J., Yim D., Tanniru M., Lim S. (2017). Patient Empowerment and Engagement with a Health Infomediary. Health Policy and Technology (HPT), 6(1), 40-50.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Fregoli F., Nawrocki M. (2016). Information Systems Impact on Nurse Call Response – Role of Velocity and Uncertainty. Pacific Asia Journal of AIS (PAJAIS), 8(1), 33-64.
Weiner J., Tanniru M., Khuntia J., Bobryk D., Naik M., LePage K. (2016). Digital Leadership in Action in a Hospital through a Real-Time Dashboard System Implementation and Experience. Journal of Hospital Administration (JHA), 5(4), 34-43.
Khuntia J., Hang S., Yim D. (2016). Sharing News through Social Networks. International Journal on Media Management (JMM), 18(1), 59-74.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Weiner J. (2015). Juggling Digitization and Technostress: The Case of Alert Fatigues in the Patient Care System Implementation. Health Policy and Technology (HPT), 4(4), 364-377.
Yim D., Khuntia J., Argyris Y. (2015) Identifying Bands in the Knowledge Exchange Spectrum in an Online Health Infomediary. International Journal of Healthcare Information Systems and Informatics(IJHISI), 10(3), 63-84.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Zervos J. (2015). Extending Care Outside of the Hospital Walls: A Case of Value Creation through Sync. Video Communication for Knowledge Exchange in Community Health Network.International J. of E-Business Research (IJEBR), 11(2), 1-17.
Khuntia J., Karimi J., Tanniru M., Meyers A. (2014). The University of Colorado Digital Health Consortium Initiative: A Collaborative Model of Education, Research and Service. Journal of Commercial Biotechnology (JCB), 20(3), 31-37.
Yim D., Khuntia J., Argyris YA. (2018) User Behaviors and Knowledge Exchange in Health Infomediary. In Handbook of Research on Emerging Perspectives on Healthcare Information Systems and Informatics. Tan J. (ed), IGI Global, PA, 213-233.
Ramakrishnan T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A., Saldanha TJV. (2018) Business Intelligence Capabilities. In Analytics and Data Science: Annals of Information Systems. Deokar A, Gupta A, Iyer L, Jones M. (eds) Springer, Cham. 15-27.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Zervos J. (2017). Extending Care Outside of the Hospital Walls: A Case of Value Creation through Synchronous Video Communication for Knowledge Exchange in Community Health Network. In Public Health and Welfare: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications Hershey, PA: IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-5225-1674-3.ch028, 603-620.
Tanniru M., Khuntia J. (2016). Digital Leadership through Service Computing: Agility Driven by Interconnected System and Business Architectures. In E-Life: Web-Enabled Convergence of Commerce, Work, and Social Life. V. Sugumaran, V. Yoon and J.M. Shaw (eds.). Cham: Springer International Publishing, 112-125.
Hazarika B., Khuntia J., Parthasarathy M., Karimi J. (2016). Do Hedonic and Utilitarian Apps Differ in Consumer Appeal? In E-Life: Web-Enabled Convergence of Commerce, Work, and Social Life. V. Sugumaran, V. Yoon and J.M. Shaw (eds.). Cham: Springer International Publishing, 233-237.
Alnsour Y., Khuntia J. (2016). The Impact of Patient Web Portals on Readmissions through IT Based Reminder Systems. In E-Life: Web-Enabled Convergence of Commerce, Work, and Social Life. V. Sugumaran, V. Yoon and J.M. Shaw (eds.). Cham: Springer International Publishing, 228-232.
Plum AJ, Tanniru M, Khuntia J., An Innovation Platform for Diffusing Public Health Practices across a Global Network, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Maui, Hawaii, 2019.
Ram T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A., and Saldanha T. Business Analytics Capability and Supply Chain Management, Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), New Orleans, LA, 2018.
Saldanha T., Kathuria A., Khuntia J., Konsynski, B. Leveraging Digitization of Services for Performance: Evidence from the Credit Union Industry. International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Seoul, South Korea, 2017 (Best Paper Award).
Yim D., Khuntia J., Lim S., Duan W. To Ask or Not to Ask? An Investigation of User Engagement and Doctor-Seeking Decision in Online Health Infomediary. International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Seoul, South Korea, 2017.
Permwonguswa S., Khuntia J., Yim D. Gregg D. Empowerment and Knowledge Sharing in Health Infomediary: Empirical Evidence from Reconstructive Surgery Patients. Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), Boston, MA, 2017.
Andrade M., Saldanha T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A. Supply Chain Information Integration and Firm Performance: Evidence from India. Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), Boston, MA, 2017.
Al Nuaim A., Khuntia J., Yim D. Do Images Enhance Subjectivity Effect on News Sharing. Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), Boston, MA, 2017.
Kathuria A., Khuntia J., Saldanha T. Contingencies in Value Creation from Digitization of Services: Evidence from Credit Union Industry. Annual Meeting of Academy of Management, Atlanta, GA, 2017.
Kathuria A., Khuntia J., Saldanha T., Rojas M. Growth Oriented Digital Strategy and Long-Term Compensation of Chief Executives. International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Ireland, 2016.
Kathuria A., Khuntia J., Saldanha T., Rojas M. How Information Management Capability Affects Innovation Capability and Firm Performance under Turbulence: Evidence from India. International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Ireland, 2016.
Andrade M., Saldanha T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A. How IT Orientation Affects Obstacles and Facilitators of Innovation in an Emerging Economy. Annual Meeting of Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA, 2016.
Khuntia J., Tanniru M., Zervos J. Aligning Digital Health to Services: A Case of Leadership for Transformation. Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), San Diego, CA, 2016.
Rojas M., Saldanha T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A. IT Orientation effects on Obstacles and Facilitators of Innovation: An Emerging Economy Perspective. AMCIS, San Diego, CA, 2016.
Mann A., Khuntia J., Saldanha T., Kathuria A. Cloud-Integration and Business Flexibility: The Mediating Role of Cloud Functional Capabilities. AMCIS, San Diego, CA, 2016.
Alnsour, Y., Hazarika, B., Khuntia, J., Role of Effectiveness, Appeal and Functionality on Evaluation of Health Apps. AMCIS, San Diego, CA, 2016.
Permwonguswa S., Khuntia J., Gregg D., Chandra G., Sheiner S., Development of a Doctor Rating Criteria for Medical Tourism Portal. European Conference on Information Systems, Istanbul, Turkey, 2016.
Saldanha T., Kathuria A., Khuntia J., Mithas S. Does IT Complement or Substitute for Physical Branches? Evidence from the Financial Services Industry. POMS Annual Conference, Orlando, FL, 2016.
Ram T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A., and Saldanha T. Business Intelligence Capabilities and Effectiveness: An Integrative Model. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Kauai, 2016.
Kathuria A., Saldanha T., Khuntia J., Rojas M. Strategic Intent, Contract Duration, and Performance: Evidence from Micro-Outsourcing. International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Fort Worth, 2015.
Ram T., Khuntia J., Kathuria A., and Saldanha T. Business Intelligence Capabilities and Organizational Performance. Pre-ICIS Business Analytics Conference, Fort Worth, 2015.
Hazarika B., Khuntia J., Parthasarathy M., Karimi, J. Technology Frustration and Consumer Valuation Shift for Mobile Apps. AMCIS, Peurto Rico, 2015.
Saldanha T., Wagelein J., Khuntia J., Kathuria A., Rojas M. Do CEO’s Long-Term Performance Incentive Induces IT Investments? Theory, Evidence, and Industry Contingencies. AMCIS, Peurto Rico, 2015.
Khuntia J., Saldanha T., Kathuria A. Dancing in the Tigers’ Den: MNCs versus Local Firms Leveraging IT-Enabled Strategic Flexibility. ICIS, New Zealand, 2014.
Kathuria A., Rojas M., Saldanha T., Khuntia J. Extent versus Range of Service Digitization: Implications for Firm Performance. AMCIS, Savannah, GA, 2014.
Park Y., Khuntia. J., Tanniru M., Designing an Effective Social Media Platform for Health Care with Synchronous Video Communication, International Conference on Health Informatics, Loire Valley, France, 2014.
Khuntia J., Whitaker J., Mithas S., Kaushik A. Strategic Focus, Client Satisfaction and Firm Performance: Evidence from Offshore Business Process Outsourcing Providers. Conference on Information Systems and Technology, San Francisco, 2014.
Saldanha T., Kathuria A., Khuntia J. Digital Service Flexibility: An Empirical Analysis of Emerging Economy Service Firms. 2014 Annual Conference of the Emerging Markets Conference Board, NCR Delhi, India, 2014.
Saldanha T., Kathuria A., Khuntia J. Digital Service Flexibility and Performance of Credit Unions. AMCIS, Chicago, IL, 2013.
Khuntia J., Mithas S., and Agarwal R. Service Augmentation and Customer Satisfaction: An Analysis of Cell Phone Services in Base-of-The-Pyramid Markets. ICIS, Florida, 2012.
Khuntia J., Mithas S., and Agarwal R. What Determines the Sustainability and Maturity of Health Information Exchanges? Annual Meeting of Academy of Management, San Antonio, Texas, 2011.
Khuntia J., Mithas S., Agarwal R., Lin O. How Economic and Institutional Factors Influence Electronic Medical Records Adoption. Conference on Information Systems and Technology, Austin, Texas, 2010.
Mithas S., Khuntia J., and Roy P.K. Green Information Technology, Energy Efficiency, and Profits: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. ICIS, Saint Louis, Missouri, 2010.
Mithas S., Khuntia J., and Agarwal R. Information Technology and Life Expectancy: A Country-level Analysis. ICIS, Phoenix, AZ, 2009.
Bidyut Hazarika, Advisor, 2014-2016. Placement: Tenure Track Assistant Professor, Western Michigan Univ., Kalamazoo, MI.
Yazan Alnsour, Advisor, 2013-2016. Placement: Tenure Track Assistant Professor, Univ. of Illinois at Springfield, IL.
Sumate Permwonguswa, PhD student, University of Colorado Denver, 2014-2017. Placement: Assumption University, Thailand.
Wall Street Journal, testified and mentioned in the article, “A New Tool to Analyze Medical Records”, by Sara Castellanos, appeared in CIO Journal of WSJ, on 25 Jan 2017.
“A Prescription for Health Information Exchanges-Business Models and Strategy Increasingly Vital”. Smith Brain Trust, University of Maryland, College Park https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/smithresearch/research/prescription-health-information- exchanges, on Sep 21, 2017.

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