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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Yotes, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on Thursday, August 15, 2013.
In this unemployment compensation case, petitioner Yotes, Inc. (employer) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) reversing a hearing officer’s decision and awarding unemployment compensation benefits to claimant under CRS § 8-73-108(4). The Court of Appeals set aside the order.
The hearing officer found that claimant resigned because he believed that employer was not acting quickly enough in responding to his complaint of sexual harassment from a coworker. The hearing officer also found that employer was taking the complaint seriously and claimant did not allow employer reasonable time to conduct an investigation and determine the appropriate action. Therefore, the hearing officer concluded that claimant was at fault for the separation and that a disqualification of unemployment benefits was warranted. The Panel reversed the hearing officer’s decision and awarded benefits to claimant.
Employer contended that the Panel erred when it awarded benefits to claimant under CRS § 8-73-108(4)(o). When an employee quits “because of personal harassment by the employernot related to the performance of the job,” benefits must be awarded to the employee. Here, claimant’s coworker was not an employer under the statute. Therefore, the Panel erred as a matter of law when it defined “employer” to include claimant’s coworker. Further, there was no evidence of personal harassment by employer. Because employer had indefinitely removed claimant from the adverse working conditions and claimant did not remain at the job long enough to learn whether the adverse conditions would be eliminated, claimant was not entitled to benefits. Accordingly, the Panel erred in awarding benefits to claimant and the order was set aside.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Russell on Thursday, August 15, 2013.
Defendant Beau Thomas Russell appealed the trial court’s restitution order, which included a mandated statutory penalty following his plea of guilty to one count of forgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Russell’s plea resulted from his receipt of $3,321 of unemployment compensation benefits over a two-month period, after he falsely reported himself as unemployed to the Unemployment Benefits Division of the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. Russell asserted that the trial court erred when it included the statutory penalty in the restitution order. The trial court could not impose the statutory penalty without proof of a correlation between Russel’s actions and the amount of the statutory penalty. Because there was no evidence in the record that the statutory penalty relates in any way to the cost of investigating Russell’s conduct, the trial court abused its discretion by including the statutory penalty in the restitution order. Therefore, the restitution order was reversed as to the penalty, and the case was remanded for the trial court to amend the order by deleting the 50% penalty amount from the restitution award. The order was affirmed in all other respects.
On Monday, February 4, 2013, Sen. Rollie Heath introduced SB 13-157 – Concerning the Continuation of the “Colorado Work Share Program.” This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The “Colorado Work Share Program” (program) was created by the general assembly in 2010 to allow employees whose work hours have been reduced to collect prorated unemployment benefits as long as certain requirements are met by the employer and the employee.
The bill makes changes to the program to bring it into compliance with federal law, including required features of a work share plan to make it eligible for approval by the director of the division of unemployment insurance. The bill extends the program indefinitely. The bill also allows eligible employees to participate in certain job training programs. The bill repeals a mechanism that triggers a repeal of the program.
Currently, the federal government will reimburse states for unemployment compensation benefits paid under the program. The bill clarifies that the employer’s account will only be charged for the unemployment compensation benefits if the federal money is not available. The bill also increases the cap on the number of weeks that employees may be paid benefits under the program from 18 to 26 weeks. On Feb. 27, the Business, Labor, & Technology sent the unamended bill to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Communications Workers of America 7717 v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on August 30, 2012.
Communications Workers of America 7717 (employer) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s decision determining that claimant was entitled to an award of unemployment compensation benefits. The order was affirmed.
From 2003 until February 2011, claimant worked part-time for employer, serving as union president. He was supervised by employer’s executive board. He also worked full-time for another employer (Qwest).
The hearing officer found that when the union wanted claimant to work on union business during times that he would be working for Qwest, employer paid him the equivalent wage he would have received from Qwest. The officer found employee was separated from this employment when employer merged with another local union chapter. The officer found no reason that claimant should be disqualified from receiving benefits based on the reason for the separation, and no reason that employer should be exempt from paying them.
On review to the Panel, employer argued the money it paid to employee did not constitute “wages” under the statute and that employee still had his full-time job with Qwest and therefore suffered no wage loss. The Panel held the nature of the payments made did not exempt employer from paying benefits and that the issue of ongoing work for Qwest was not properly before it. The hearing officer’s decision was affirmed by the Panel.
On appeal, employer renewed its argument that it did not pay “wages” to employee. CRS § 8-70-141(1)(a) defines “wages” as “[a]ll remuneration for personal services.” The undisputed evidence established that claimant provided personal services to employer by performing work as its president and was remunerated by employer with payments. The Court of Appeals saw no error in the finding that claimant was paid “wages” under the statutory scheme.
Employer also argued that claimant suffered no wage loss because he was still employed by Qwest. The Court agreed with the Panel that this was not properly before it for review. The judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in Softrock Geological Services, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Panel on June 7, 2012.
Unemployment Tax Liability—Covered Employment—Colorado Employment Security Act.
In this unemployment tax liability case, petitioner Softrock Geological Services, Inc. (Softrock) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) reversing a hearing officer’s decision and concluding that services performed for Softrock by Waterman Guy Ormsby constituted covered employment under the Colorado Employment Security Act (Act), CRS §§ 8-70-101 to 8-82-105. The order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Panel with directions.
Softrock provides geological services in the oil and gas industry. Ormsby is a geologist who provided well site services to Softrock on a project basis from 2007 through 2010 under a written agreement with Softrock. Softrock did not train him. Ormsby used his own vehicle, clothing, tools, and equipment, except for some specialized and expensive laboratory equipment that he rented from Softrock. He had his own business cards, paid his own liability insurance, and did not represent himself to be a Softrock employee.
In March 2011, the Division of Employment (Division) conducted an audit of Softrock and issued a notice of liability, finding that Ormsby was a covered employee for purposes of the Colorado Employment Security Act (Act). The hearing officer reversed the Division’s decision. The Panel agreed that Ormsby had not been under the direction and control of Softrock, but reversed on the ground that Ormsby’s business as a geologist did not survive independently of his relationship with Softrock, because he only worked for Softrock during 2007 to 2010.
On appeal, Softrock argued that the Panel erred by substituting its findings of fact for those of the hearing officer and in using only one factor to hold that Ormsby was not customarily engaged in an independent trade or business. The Court agreed that the Panel improperly based its decision on only one factor and remanded the case with instructions that it look at other factors.
Under the Act, the putative employer must overcome a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship. Even if the presumption is rebutted, the trier of fact still must determine whether the worker is free from control and direction, and is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed.
The determination of whether a worker is engaged in a separate business venture is a multifactor test. Here, it was undisputed that Ormsby provided no services for others between 2007 and 2010. Softrock, however, argued that other factors support its contention that Ormsby was an independent contractor. The Court found that the Panel needed to at least consider and make findings regarding the other factors and could not make its determination just based on the exclusive service relationship during the noted period. It remanded to the Panel for consideration of all factors relevant to Ormsby’s relationship with Softrock.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOSE JESUS ANDRADE-CALDERON, Defendant - Appellant.
Thomas J. Whelan, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 4, 2016 Pasadena, California Before: REINHARDT, PAEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Jesus Andrade-Calderon pleaded guilty to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 which criminalizes being a removed alien found present in the United States. On December 8, 2014, Andrade-Calderon was sentenced to 30 months in prison for this offense. His projected release date is October 4, 2016.
The central question in this appeal is whether the district court appropriately calculated Andrade-Calderon's sentence range under the sentencing guidelines. In calculating his sentence, the district court applied a 16-level increase to Andrade-Calderon's base offense level, concluding that Andrade-Calderon's prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) & 846 was a "drug trafficking offense" as defined by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). That increase resulted in a guidelines sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. Andrade-Calderon appeals, claiming that a conviction under Section 841(c)(2) is not a "drug trafficking offense" and therefore cannot justify the application of the 16-level enhancement. If the enhancement had not been applied, he argues, the appropriate guidelines range would have been 8 to 14 months, a sentence he has already served.
To determine whether Section 841(c)(2) is a "drug trafficking offense," thereby justifying the 16-level enhancement, we apply the three-step process set forth in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). First, we must compare the elements of Section 841(c)(2) to the elements of the generic "drug trafficking offense" defined by federal law. Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 515, 521 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). If this "categorical approach" reveals that the elements of § 841(c)(2) are "the same as or narrower than the elements" of a drug trafficking offense, then Section 841(c)(2) is a "categorical match and every conviction under that statute qualifies as a [drug trafficking offense.]" Id. (quoting Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2015)). If, however, the statute is "'overbroad,' meaning that it criminalizes conduct that goes beyond the elements of the federal offense, we turn to step two: determining whether the statute is 'divisible' or 'indivisible.'" Id. "If the statute is indivisible, 'our inquiry ends, because a conviction under an indivisible, overbroad statute can never serve as a predicate offense.'" Id. We may turn to step three, the "modified categorical approach," only if the statute is overbroad and divisible. In such case, "we may examine certain documents from the defendant's record of conviction to determine what elements of the divisible statute he was convicted of violating." Id.
1. At step one, we compare the elements of Section 841(c)(2) to the elements of a drug trafficking offense. Section 841(c)(2) criminalizes the knowing or intentional possession or distribution of a "listed chemical" with either knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). A listed chemical is a chemical that has legitimate, legal uses, although it is occasionally used to make a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 802(33)-(35).
In contrast, a "drug trafficking offense" under Guideline § 2L1.2 is an offense that "prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance (or counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv). A "drug trafficking offense" also "include[s] the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit" the above offenses. Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.5.
Section 841(c)(2) cannot categorically be a drug trafficking offense because it criminalizes conduct that is not within the generic guidelines offense. Section 841(c)(2) deals exclusively with the possession of listed chemicals. Listed chemicals are not controlled substances because they have not been placed on the Schedules of 21 U.S.C. § 812. See United States v. Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012) (defining controlled substance).
The government attempts to avoid this obvious conclusion by relying on a series of cases which suggest that an offense qualifies as a drug trafficking offense if it is "sufficiently similar" to the inchoate offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, or attempting to commit a drug trafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 533 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Contreras-Hernandez, 628 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011). According to the government, a conviction under Section 841(c)(2) is sufficiently similar to these inchoate offenses because the possession or distribution of a listed chemical can materially advance the crime of manufacturing a controlled substance. We reject this argument. Under our case law, an offense is sufficiently similar to those inchoate offenses only if "the mens rea and actus reus required for [the crime] are sufficiently similar to those required for aiding and abetting, conspiracy and attempt." Contreras-Hernandez, 628 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Cornelio-Pena, 435 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2006)). Section 841(c)(2) criminalizes conduct that is significantly less serious than aiding and abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting the manufacture of a controlled substance. Namely, it criminalizes the possession or distribution of the chemical with "reasonable cause to believe" that the chemical would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. Such a defendant need not intend that the chemical be used in the manufacture of a drug or even know that the chemical be used for such purpose. Mere reckless possession or distribution falls far short of the specific intent that is ordinarily required of inchoate crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Tran, 568 F.3d 1156, 1157 (9th Cir. 2009) (aiding and abetting requires that the defendant "participate in it as in something that he wished to bring about") (internal quotations omitted).
2. Having determined that Section 841(c)(2) is not categorically a drug trafficking offense, we must determine whether the statute is divisible. A statute is divisible if it has "multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively creates 'several different crimes,'" rather than by providing different means of committing the same crime. Almanza-Arenas, 809 F.3d at 522. Generally, if jury unanimity with regard to the alternatives that the statute proposes is not required, the statute is indivisible. Id. at 526-27; Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions does not require jury unanimity with regard to the defendant's mens rea. See Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 9.28. Accordingly, Section 841(c)(2) is not divisible.
Since Section 841(c)(2) is an overbroad, indivisible statute, it cannot serve as a predicate offense justifying the 16-level enhancement under the guideline. Accordingly, Andrade-Calderon has already served a term well in excess of the appropriate guidelines range. The mandate shall issue forthwith and the case is remanded to the district court for immediate resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED. MANDATE TO BE ISSUED FORTHWITH.


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On March 1, 2000, the Center sent Notification of Respondent�s Default. On March 3, 2000, the Center received Respondent�s Response, which the Center acknowledged to the parties on March 3, 2000. On March 6, 2000, Complainants filed a Reply in the form of a letter. On March 10, 2000, after receiving their completed and signed Statements of Acceptance and Declarations of Impartiality and Independence, the Center notified the parties of the appointment of a three-arbitrator panel consisting of Mr. Richard W. Page as the presiding panelist, Mr. Mark Partridge as Complainants� party-appointed panelist and Mr. M. Scott Donahey as a party-appointed panelist named by the Center.
Complainants objected to and asked the Panel to refuse to consider the late-filed Response, citing the Panel to Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, ICANN Case No. D2000-0009. However, the Panel notes that Talk City, supra, specifically rejected the request filed by a respondent because it was filed two weeks after the response was due and would serve to delay the panel�s decision. Id., paragraph 5(a)(ii), at 4. However, the panel in Talk City also accepted an email filed by Respondent two days after the deadline for a response, because it was received before any substantive review had begun. Id., paragraph 5(a)(i), at 3. This Panel applies the same rationale to the response at issue and will accept it.
Complainants also filed a Reply to the Response. A number of panel decisions have considered a Reply or Rebuttal without comment. See, e.g., Cedar Trade Associates, Inc. v. Ricks, ICANN Case No. FA0002000093633; Aero-Turbine, Inc. v. Mcayman, Ltd., ICANN Case No. FA000200093675; Travel Services, Inc. v. Tour COOP of Puerto Rico, ICANN Case No. FA0001000092524; Heelquick!, Inc. v. Goldman, et al., ICANN Case No. FA0001000092527. Because the distinguished panelists in these cases did not discuss this issue, the Panel in the present case does not have the benefit of their reasoning. However, looking at the Rules and the decision in Easyjet Airline Co., Ltd. v. Steggles, ICANN Case No. D2000-0024, the Panel is persuaded that documents, whether designated "replies" or "rebuttals," are not called for in the Rules. Paragraph 12 of the Rules provides for additional submissions only at the Panel�s request, in its sole discretion. The Panel is persuaded by the reasoning of Easyjet, supra, that such unrequested submissions should not be considered. Id. at paragraph 5,I. Accordingly, the Panel does not consider the Reply of Complainants filed in letter form, dated March 6, 2000.
E. Respondent contends that it has rights and legitimate interest in jpmorgan.org because of Respondent�s contemplated posting of financial information regarding Complainants on a website using the domain name.
Respondent responds without denying the allegations that it has registered other domain names of financial institutions. Accordingly, the Panel can draw adverse inferences. See paragraph 14(b) of the Rules; Mondich and American Vintage Wine Biscuits, Inc., ICANN Case No. D2000-0004. Panel decisions have found that ownership of numerous domain names which are the names or marks of well known business entities suggests an intent to profit from the activities of others. See, Stella D�Oro Biscuit Co., Inc v. The Patron Group, Inc., ICANN Case No. D2000-0012, paragraph 5(b)(1) at 6; Nabisco Brands Co. v. The Patron Group, Inc., ICANN Case No. D2000-0032, paragraph 5(b)(1) at 6; and Parfums Christian Dior v.1 Network, Inc., ICANN Case No. D2000-0022, paragraph 6(c) at 5-6. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent has registered and used the domain name jpmorgan.org in bad faith.

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From a technical standpoint, both the CPP and ACA offer a variety of tools and federal assistance to help states decide how to comply. Under both schemes, states can choose to run their own system, run a system in partnership with the federal government, or not run any system at all (at which point the federal government steps in to run the system for that state). And, once a state decides on a compliance program, it is not stuck with it: both the CPP and the ACA allow a state to transition later on to a different level of involvement in running its own system. Finally, both the CPP and the ACA drew fierce legal challenges immediately upon their promulgation and enactment, respectively.
Electric utilities must make long-range decisions—forecasting decades into the future—about infrastructure, availability of resources, siting of power plants, reliability and security of the electricity grid, rate structures, multi-year or multi-decade power purchase contracts, and so on. Layered onto the years it takes to make and implement these decisions is the time required to comply with federal, state, and local regulations—which, of course, are regularly evolving. Final CPP state implementation plans are due to EPA by September 6, 2016, with the possibility of a two-year extension (which requires an initial submittal, also due on September 6, 2016, demonstrating a state’s progress toward developing a final plan). EPA has stated that it will approve or disapprove of state plans within one year of their submittal.
The CPP’s standards are set to go into effect in 2022, so a state that misses the September 2016 deadline because it dragged its feet preparing an approvable state plan (if it decides to prepare a plan at all) may leave its utilities with only a few years to react to an approved plan before compliance is required. Given the amount of lead time utilities need before they can put many of their business decisions into action, and considering the utilities’ reluctance to be subject to a federal plan, states that have already started their CPP planning give their utilities a head start towards achieving the regulatory certainty they need to engage in long-term planning. Additionally, though the states’ aforementioned commitments to draft their CPP plans predate the D.C. Circuit’s January 21, 2016 denial of the motion to stay the CPP during the court’s review, the denial is all the more reason for states to continue to proactively work toward timely submittal of their plans.
Early attempts to comply with the CPP also make it more likely a state can benefit from the CPP’s optional Clean Energy Incentive Program (CEIP). The CEIP encourages states to invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects that deliver results during 2020 or 2021, rewarding them with emissions allowances or emissions rate credits that can be banked and used to maintain CPP compliance in the event a state has an unforeseen, emergency reliability issue.
Power-plant operations are not all contained neatly within state borders: many plants distribute power across state lines, and electricity grids are similarly interconnected. Naturally, such a system requires detailed coordination among states, as will adapting the system to comply with the CPP. States would rather make these important choices for themselves than allow the federal government to make some choices on their behalf, which is effectively what would happen if a state defaults to a federal CPP plan. Getting started early on their CPP planning has allowed a number of states to productively engage with their neighbors in an effort to lower the costs of compliance by setting up a regional emissions-trading program. The CPP allows intrastate emissions trading and encourages interstate trading, but it is only permitted between states that have adopted the same emissions standards (i.e., mass-based states can only trade with mass-based states, and rate-based states can only trade with rate-based states). States that delay in their CPP planning are missing out on the opportunity to weigh in on regional discussions about which type of emissions standards are best for that region.
The ACA also allows for regional marketplaces, but the states have yet to take advantage of that cost-cutting option. Several states, however, are beginning to consider the regional-marketplace option in light of the sunset on federal funding to help states run their own state-based marketplaces.
Though the public was able to comment on many ACA regulations, including the rules that govern whether a state marketplace is compliant with the law, the Department of Health and Human Services did not seek public comment on a state’s “Exchange Blueprint” before the agency approved it. That means a state’s choice of whether to pursue a state-based marketplace or default to a federally-facilitated marketplace had no impact how much the public could formally weigh in on HHS’s administrative decisions under the APA. The CPP, in contrast, gives the public more opportunities to be involved in the administrative review process when a state opts to submit its own implementation plan. First, the CPP requires a state to demonstrate that its plan was developed through robust public participation, including opportunity for public comment. Second, EPA’s decision to disapprove of a state-submitted plan is subject to notice and comment before a federal plan would take effect.
One of the grounds on which the suing states criticize the CPP is that it is an administrative overreach; that it is the kind of major economic and political decision entrusted to Congress, the body which is directly accountable to the will of the people. Presumably then, these states would want the public to have as many opportunities as possible to involve itself in EPA’s CPP decisions, given that the notice-and-comment process also requires administrative agencies to be accountable to the will of the people (or to at least respond directly to their comments and explain why it did not take their suggestions). States can ensure that there are more opportunities for public comment if they submit their own CPP plans to EPA. And, of course, more solicitations of public comment by EPA means more opportunities for opponents to seek judicial review of the CPP.
The Clean Air Act (CAA), the background legal authority for the CPP, is old hat. The CAA is stable, settled law—enacted in 1970, and without significant amendment since 1990. States have years of experience developing their own implementation plans to comply with the CAA emissions standards for certain types of pollutants. They have routinely opted to create State Implementation Plans to comply with the CAA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which, like the CPP, employs a federal-state partnership to curtail air pollution. Through this process, states and utilities have developed the “muscle memory” necessary for complying with EPA emissions rules.
The ACA, in contrast, was brand new law when it was enacted in 2010. States may have been less inclined to invest their resources in developing insurance marketplaces to comply with a law many were skeptical would even be upheld.
Litigating the CPP will be “a marathon, not a sprint,” and we are still in the nascent stages of that process. States may well end up changing their respective approaches in response to major developments in the litigation, especially if the Supreme Court responds favorably to their January 26, 2016 request for a stay of the CPP. Other things equal, given that most states have already hit the ground running with a proactive approach to the CPP, such a change is not foreseeable—at least not until EPA starts issuing decisions on their individual CPP submissions several years from now.
Jennifer Golinsky is a second-year law school at the Georgetown University Law Center. She is a staff contributor to the Georgetown Environmental Law Review. This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate. The original post can be viewed here.
 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 38,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-18/pdf/2014-13726.pdf. The final rule for the Clean Power Plan—a set of guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants—was promulgated on October 23, 2015 (Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf), along with a proposed federal plan and model trading rules (Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62, and 78), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22848.pdf).
 See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page From Health Care Act, Obama Climate Plan Relies on States, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/politics/obama-epa-rule-coal-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html; David J. Unger, EPA Carbon Limits: An ‘Obamacare’ for Climate Change, Christian Sci. Monitor (June 4, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2014/0602/EPA-carbon-limits-an-Obamacare-for-climate-change-video; Michael Bastasch,‘Obamacare 2.0!’ Critics Slam EPA Climate Rule as Threat to Electrical Grid, Daily Caller (June 6, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/06/obamacare-2-0-critics-slam-epa-climate-rule-as-threat-to-electrical-grid/.
 See Summary of the Affordable Care Act, Kaiser Fam. Found., http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-summary-of-the-affordable-care-act (last modified Apr. 25, 2013), for a detailed summary of the Affordable Care Act, a comprehensive healthcare reform law enacted on March 23, 2010.
 Jason Mark, EPA’s New Regulations to Cut Carbon Emissions are Obamacare for the Air, Daily Beast (June 2, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/02/epa-s-new-regulations-to-cut-carbon-emissions-are-obamacare-for-the-air.html.
 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Overview of the Clean Power Plan (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., State Exchange Implementation Questions and Answers (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/exchange_q_and_a.pdf.
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/Changes_in_Health_Exchange_Structure-2015-_Final2.pdf (last updated July 30, 2015); Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Blueprint for Approval of Affordable State-based and State Partnership Insurance Exchanges – Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/hie-blueprint-states.html.
 See Clean Power Plan Proposed Federal Plan, supra note 6, at 2; Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, supra note 6.
 West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (pending challenge to the CPP); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (district court opinion from ACA challenge filed Mar. 23, 2010); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (district court opinion from ACA challenge filed Mar. 23, 2010).
 This includes (1) the twenty-six states which acted jointly in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. V. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming; (2) Missouri, which filed its own suit that was later joined on appeal (Kinder v. Geithner, 695 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2012)) by twenty-one of the twenty-six states from NFIB; and (3) Virginia, which sued on its own in Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768. For the sake of simplicity—and ease of comparison to the states involved in West Virginia v. EPA—this does not include the states which were not part of the three aforementioned ACA suits but challenged portions of the law in later suits.
 The twenty-two states were: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Health Insurance Exchanges or Marketplaces: State Profiles and Actions, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/Health_Insurance_Exchanges_State_Profiles.pdf (last modified Oct. 20, 2015).
 See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2016, Kaiser Fam. Found., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/#table (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
 On January 1, 2014, twenty-eight states were federally facilitated, fifteen states and the District of Columbia were state based (including Idaho’s state-based marketplace, which used the federal healthcare.gov site instead of a state website (this is called a “federally-supported state-based marketplace,” id.) and seven states ran their marketplaces in partnership with the federal government. See Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, supra note 10. In 2016, twenty-seven states are federally facilitated, sixteen states and the District of Columbia are state based (including four which are federally-supported state-based marketplaces), and seven states operate marketplaces in partnership with the federal government. See Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 11. Kentucky currently has a state-based marketplace, but its governor plans to dismantle it and transition to a federally-facilitated marketplace in 2017. See id. at n.3.
 The twenty-six states opposing the CPP in West Virginia v. EPA are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Petition for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.10.23_states_111d_petition_for_review.pdf. North Dakota filed its own suit. See Petition for Review, North Dakota v. EPA, No 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.10.23_nd_petition_for_review.pdf.
 See Elizabeth Harball, Most States Suing EPA’s Climate Rule are also Mulling How to Comply, ClimateWire (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060027684.
 See E&E’s Power Plan Hub: Legal Challenges, E&E Publishing, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan#legal_challenge_status_chart (last visited January 29, 2016); Rod Kuckro, Ky. Governor to Seek Extension from EPA, EnergyWire (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060031079; Wyoming Regulators Seek $550K for Climate Change Planning, Associated Press (Jan. 18, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/business/national-business/article55267605.html; Missouri Comprehensive State Energy Plan, Mo. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., Div. of Energy 204 (October 2015), https://energy.mo.gov/energy/docs/MCSEP.pdf.
 For example, EPA was told that “New Jersey is not in any way, shape or form working with EPA on complying with the so-called Clean Power Plan.” David Giambusso, Responding to EPA Official, DEP Refuses to Comply with Power Plan, Politico New Jersey (Dec. 11, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/new-jersey/2015/12/8585455/responding-epa-official-dep-refuses-comply-power-plan.
 See Joint Reply in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration—Exhibit A, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.12.23_states_reply_in_support_of_motions_for_stay.pdf; Joel Kirkland, Obama’s A-Team Touts Clean Power Plan’s Enforceability, EnergyWire (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060029064. This is in addition to the states which are either defending the CPP in court or have not taken sides in the suit—each of these states is developing a plan, except for the states which are exempt from the CPP (Alaska and Hawaii because they are noncontiguous, Vermont and the District of Columbia because neither state has power plants that fall under the CPP framework). See E&E Publishing, supra note 15; Clean Power Plan – A Summary, E&E Publishing, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/rule (last visited January 29, 2016).
 See, e.g., State Petitioners’ Motion for Stay and for Expedited Consideration of Petition for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, at 19 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.10.23_states_motion_for_stay_expedited_consideration.pdf.
 See, e.g.,Joint Reply in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, at 2 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.12.23_states_reply_in_support_of_motions_for_stay.pdf.
 For examples of states commenting on the ACA’s economic impact, see Statement from Fla. Att’y Gen. Pam Bondi on the Supreme Court’s Decision in the Health Care Lawsuit (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/76DE42E337565A5D85257A2B0065C6D2; Statement from S.C. Gov. Nikki Haley on Supreme Court’s Health Care Ruling (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.governor.sc.gov/News/June2012/Pages/default.aspx; and Statement from Tex. Gov. Rick Perry on Health Care Mandate Ruling (June 28, 2012), available athttp://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/texas-reacts-to-the-health-care-mandate-ruling/.For an example of the states’ claim that the ACA infringes upon their sovereignty, see State Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NFIB,132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-400), at 8, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/11-400%20Cert%20Petition.pdf.
 See generally U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Energy and Environment Guide to Action ch. 7.1, at 7-7 (2015 ed.), http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/GTA_Chapter_7.1_508.pdf.
 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,860 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf.
 See Gavin Bade, NARUC 2015: Utilities Push Regulators to Shift Focus to Clean Power Plan Compliance, UtilityDive (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/naruc-2015-utilities-push-regulators-to-shift-focus-to-clean-power-plan-co/408939/.
 Order Denying the Motions for Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/order_denying_stay.pdf.
 Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966, 64,982 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62, and 78), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22848.pdf).
 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Components of the Clean Power Plan 3 (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-state-goals.pdf.
 Emily Holden, Despite Political Rhetoric, 41 States Exploring Clean Power Plan Options, ClimateWire (May 18, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060018680 (“Reports from grid organizations and think tanks routinely stress that regional collaboration limits costs. If one state has a tough goal and a neighboring state has an easier goal and the ability to build cheaper zero-carbon energy, both states can benefit . . . .”).
 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5, at 7.
 Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 3, at 4.
 Sarah Ferris, Exclusive: States Quietly Consider ObamaCare Exchange Mergers, The Hill (May 22, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/242885-exclusive-states-consider-obamacare-mergers.
Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. R. 18310, 18,312 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 CFR Parts 155, 156, and 157), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-27/pdf/2012-6125.pdf.
 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,848 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf.
 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Legal Memorandum Accompanying Clean Power Plan for Certain Issues 21-22 (Nov. 2015); http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp-legal-memo.pdf.
 State Petitioners’ Motion for Stay, supra note 19, at 6.
 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Summary of the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last updated Nov. 17, 2015).
 Elana Schor, Casting EPA Rule as the Next Obamacare Could Prove a Tough Sell, E&E Daily (June 18, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060001493.
 Bob Sussman, The Clean Power Plan: Will States Choose to Comply?, PlanetPolicy (Jan. 20, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/01/20-clean-power-plan-states-comply-sussman.
 Robert Walton, States Leaning Toward Mass-Based CPP Compliance, Regional Cooperation, UtilityDive (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/states-leaning-toward-mass-based-cpp-compliance-regional-cooperation/407691/.
 Legal Challenges – Overview & Documents, E&E Publishing, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited January 29, 2016).
 Lyle Denniston, States Move to Block “Clean Power Plan” (UPDATED), SCOTUSblog (Jan. 26, 2016, 9:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/states-move-to-block-clean-power-plan/.
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This psalm is the second in the group of Pss 120-134 designated by their Hebrew titles as “Songs of ascents” or possibly “Pilgrimage Songs”, although there is nothing overtly linking them together as a group connected with pilgrimage. While that is true of the group, there are indications that Psalm 121 could be a pilgrimage psalm. Verses 1-2 have often been read as the nervous words of a pilgrim about to commence a journey maybe either to or from Jerusalem. The hills (lit.: ‘mountains’ in Hebrew) are seen as a place of potential danger, from either bandits or wild animals. The psalmist reassures him or herself in v. 2 that their help comes from the Lord.
However, the beginning of the psalm can be read in other ways. Verse 1b could be read as a statement: ‘I lift up my eyes to the hills from where my help comes.’ The mountains are the place where the Lord resides and hence they are a promise of protection (cf. Pss 48:1-3; 87:1-3; 123:1). However, the grammar in v. 1b would normally imply a question. Another possible reading retains the question but the mountains are seen positively as a source of protection. One scholar (L.C. Allen) translates: ‘I look up to the mountains to see where my help comes from’. Whichever way we read v. 1, the question is answered by the declaration in vv. 3-8, that the psalmist can put their trust in the Lord as protector. The Hebrew verb ‘to keep, guard, or protect’ is used six times in these verses and is the central theme of the psalm. The reason that the psalmist can have confidence is that Lord is the creator of heaven and earth (v. 2b). The personal trust of the psalmist is founded on the cosmic sovereignty of the Lord.
While the psalmist speaks in vv. 1-2, vv. 3-8 are in the second person. Someone else addresses the psalmist as it is unlikely that the psalmist simply reflects and reassures him or herself. Thus a dialogue is set up in the psalm. We might imagine the psalmist being assured by a Jerusalem priest as they are about to return home from their pilgrimage to the holy city. The change in pronouns from vv. 1-2 to vv. 3-8 accompanies a change in form from a statement of trust (v. 2) to one of promise, which is both the foundation of trust and that which sustains it along the way. There is also a movement from statements on the cosmic scale (‘my help comes from the LORD, who made heaven and earth’) to ones more concerned with the wellbeing of the individual (‘he will keep your life’). The trust of the individual, and the promise undergirding that trust, are grounded in the one who is creator and sovereign of all.
Verses 3-8 then divide into two sections, vv. 3-5 and 6-8. In vv. 3-5, the ‘one who keeps’ or ‘keeper’ occurs three times and the psalmist, addressed as ‘you’, is mentioned five times as the object of that keeping. The sense is of total protection. The Lord who protects does not sleep. The psalmist’s assurance lies in this one who is creator beyond time, and yet who is attentive to the least danger for the psalmist. The image of preventing the foot from slipping also brings to mind the rough mountain journey.
The poetic structure of these verses emphasizes the assurance of the psalmist. While at first the psalmist’s protector is described anonymously as ‘he’, in v. 5 the Lord’s name is twice used. The promised protector of the psalmist is one who can be named and potentially held accountable. This is no off hand commitment by the Lord. In addition, in v. 3b ‘he who keeps you’ is parallel to ‘your keeper’ in v. 5a. Between these two lines the protector is described as ‘he who keeps Israel’. The psalmist has the extra assurance that the one who has kept their people from time immemorial is the one who is now promised as their protector. The psalm bases its confidence in the Lord as keeper in both the Lord as creator, who is beyond not only time but also any source of danger that may come, and the Lord as the one who has kept the psalmist’s community throughout its history. The psalmist thus stands in a greater context than they at first possibly perceived, and is hence assured of their future.
In vv. 6-8 the psalm moves from the possibility of danger on a particular journey to the situation of life itself. The trust that the psalmist can have in the Lord is connected to both the particulars of life as well as to life in general. These verses open with a reference to the difficulties of the journey, particularly the heat of the day and the dangers of night. In the psalmist’s world the night represented a time of danger and particular vulnerability. The reference also recalls the mention of the protector who neither sleeps nor slumbers. However, it broadens its scope giving a sense of the Lord’s protection in all the endeavours of life. The verb ‘to keep, watch’ again appears three times, but this time in the form ‘(he) will keep’ and the psalmist addressed as ‘you’ is the object of those verbs on four occasions. In everything the psalmist does, the Lord keeps them.
In this psalm the words ‘the Lord will keep you’ function almost as a mantra. Their repetition undergirds the assurance. The words spoken to the psalmist promise the Lord’s protection at every turn, at every moment. But the psalmist also knows and proclaims in other places that even one who is faithful does not attain a life protected from all harm in every situation (e.g. Psalm 17). Many lament psalms arise out of innocent suffering. Nevertheless, the simple assurance of Psalm 121 has the power to strengthen the believer to face many difficulties and hardships. The prayer of the psalmist is thus not limited by experience and circumstance. They assert the possibility of trusting against the grain of experience. While the promise of the Lord’s protection and presence can be understood neither simplistically nor literally, trust in that promise is grounded in a reality that goes beyond experience. It is grounded in the Lord as creator and in the fact that the larger community of faith has discovered the Lord as one in whom trust can be placed. A prayer of trust is not simply an isolated word about the psalmist’s immediate wellbeing. Of course, in its particulars it is that, but it is more. It evokes and participates in a relationship that stretches beyond both the experienced world and the present. To pray a prayer of trust is to commit oneself to a relationship, or a web of relationships, that incorporates creation and history. And the promise of security, which incorporates our individual needs, spreads to the end of the world and time.
It is little wonder then that the psalm is set up as a dialogue and the promise (vv. 3-8) comes from outside the one who is called to trust. Of course this dialogue might make the psalm seem strange if we pray it today but that need not be a difficulty. If we pray the psalm on our own behalf, it is more than fitting if we hear the words of promise come from another voice, even that of an ancient priest. It helps ground us in the call to trust and the promise of security that span the centuries. On the other hand if we pray the psalm in relation to another who seeks assurance, we can evoke the promise for the other as part of the larger community of faith called to trust and proclaim the promise. This psalm gives the pray-er permission to express every anxiety and seek assurance. It also draws us all into the larger community of trust.
The successive lines with the word ‘keeper’ in them (vv. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8) could be used as congregational responses to particular petitions for the church, the world etc. in the prayers of the people.
Finally, vv. 7-8 could also be used as an introduction to the final blessing.

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– Provision of the online offer, its contents and shop functions.
– Marketing, advertising and security measures.
1.1. “Personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (hereinafter the “data subject”); a natural person is considered as identifiable, which can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular by means of assignment to an identifier such as a name, to an identification number, to location data, to an online identifier (eg cookie) or to one or more special features, are the expression of the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of this natural person.
1.2. Processing “means any process performed with or without the aid of automated procedures or any such process associated with personal data. The term covers a wide range and covers practically every handling of data.
1.3. ‘Responsible person’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, body or body which, alone or in concert with others, decides on the purposes and means of processing personal data.
In accordance with Art. 13 GDPR, we inform you about the legal basis of our data processing. Unless the legal basis in the data protection declaration is mentioned, the following applies: The legal basis for obtaining consent is Article 6 (1) lit. a and Art. 7 GDPR, the legal basis for the processing for the performance of our services and the execution of contractual measures as well as the answer to inquiries is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b DSGVO, the legal basis for processing in order to fulfill our legal obligations is Art. 6 (1) lit. c DSGVO, and the legal basis for processing in order to safeguard our legitimate interests is Article 6 (1) lit. f DSGVO. In the event that vital interests of the data subject or another natural person require the processing of personal data, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. d DSGVO as legal basis.
4.1. We take appropriate technical measures in accordance with Art. 32 GDPR, taking into account the state of the art, the implementation costs and the nature, scope, circumstances and purposes of the processing as well as the different likelihood and severity of the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and organizational measures to ensure a level of protection commensurate with the risk; Measures include, in particular, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data by controlling physical access to the data, as well as their access, input, disclosure, availability and disconnection. In addition, we have established procedures to ensure the enjoyment of data subject rights, the erasure of data and the response to data compromise. Furthermore, we consider the protection of personal data already in the development, or selection of hardware, software and procedures, according to the principle of data protection by technology design and by privacy-friendly default settings considered (Article 25 GDPR).
4.2. The security measures include in particular the encrypted transmission of data between your browser and our server.
5.1. If, in the context of our processing, we disclose data to other persons and companies (processors or third parties), transmit them to them or otherwise grant access to the data, this is done only on the basis of a legal permission (eg if a transmission of the data to third parties, as to payment service providers, in accordance with article 6 paragraph 1 letter b DSGVO is necessary for the fulfillment of the contract), you have consented to a legal obligation or based on our legitimate interests (eg the use of agents, hosting providers, tax, business and legal advisors, customer care, accounting, billing and similar services that allow us to efficiently and effectively fulfill our contractual, administrative and other duties).
5.2. Insofar as we commission third parties to process data on the basis of a so-called “contract processing contract”, this is done on the basis of Art. 28 GDPR.
If we process data in a third country (ie outside the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA)) or in the context of the use of third party services or disclosure or transmission of data to third parties, this will only be done if it is to fulfill our (pre) contractual obligations, on the basis of your consent, on the basis of a legal obligation or on the basis of our legitimate interests. Subject to legal or contractual permissions, we process or have the data processed in a third country only in the presence of the special requirements of Art. 44 et seq. DSGVO. That the processing is e.g. on the basis of specific guarantees, such as the officially recognized level of data protection (eg for the US through the Privacy Shield) or compliance with officially recognized special contractual obligations (so-called “standard contractual clauses”).
7.1. You have the right to request a confirmation as to whether the data in question is being processed and for information about this data as well as for further information and a copy of the data in accordance with Art. 15 GDPR.
7.3. In accordance with Art. 17 GDPR, they have the right to demand that the relevant data be deleted without delay, or, alternatively, to require a restriction of the processing of data in accordance with Art. 18 GDPR.
7.4. You have the right to demand that the data relating to you, which you have provided to us, be obtained in accordance with Art. 20 GDPR and request their transmission to other responsible persons.
You have the right to consent according to. Art. 7 para. 3 DSGVO with effect for the future.
10.1. “Cookies” are small files that are stored on users’ computers. Different information can be stored within the cookies. A cookie serves primarily to store the information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his visit to an online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies” or “transient cookies”, are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves an online service and closes his browser. In such a cookie, e.g. the contents of a shopping cart are stored in an online shop or a login status.
“Persistent” or “persistent” refers to cookies that remain stored even after the browser has been closed. Thus, e.g. the login status will be saved if users visit it after several days. Likewise, in such a cookie the interests of the users can be stored, which are used for range measurement or marketing purposes. As a third-party cookie, cookies are referred to by providers other than the person responsible for the online offer (otherwise, if only their cookies are called first-party cookies).
11.1. The data processed by us are deleted or limited in their processing in accordance with Articles 17 and 18 GDPR. Unless explicitly stated in this privacy statement, the data stored by us will be deleted as soon as they are no longer necessary for their intended purpose and the deletion does not conflict with any statutory storage requirements. Unless the data is deleted because it is required for other and legally permitted purposes, its processing will be restricted. That the data is blocked and not processed for other purposes. This applies, for example for data that must be kept for commercial or tax reasons.
11.2. Austria: According to legal requirements, the storage takes place in particular for 7 years in accordance with § 132 para 1 BAO (accounting documents, receipts / invoices, accounts, receipts, business papers, statement of income and expenses, etc.), for 22 years in connection with land and for 10 years in the case of documents related to electronically supplied services, telecommunications, broadcasting and television services provided to non-EU companies in EU Member States for which the Mini-One-Stop-Shop (MOSS) is used.
12.2. The processed data includes inventory data, communication data, contract data, payment data and the affected persons our customers, prospects and other business partners. Processing is for the purpose of providing contractual services in the context of operating an online shop, billing, delivery and customer service. Here we use session cookies for the storage of the shopping cart contents and permanent cookies for the storage of the login status.
12.3. Processing is based on Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b (execution of order transactions) and c (legally required archiving) DSGVO. The information marked as required for the establishment and fulfillment of the contract is required. We disclose the data to third parties only in the context of extradition, payment or in the context of legal permissions and obligations to legal advisors and authorities. The data will be processed in third countries only if it is necessary for the fulfillment of the contract (for example, at the customer’s request on delivery or payment).
12.4. Users can optionally create a user account, in particular by being able to view their orders. As part of the registration, the required mandatory information will be communicated to the users. The user accounts are not public and can not be indexed by search engines. If users have terminated their user account, their data will be deleted with regard to the user account, subject to their retention is for commercial or tax law reasons according to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c DSGVO necessary. Information in the customer’s account remains until its deletion with subsequent archiving in the case of a legal obligation. It is the responsibility of the users to secure their data upon termination prior to the end of the contract.
12.6. The deletion takes place after expiration of legal warranty and comparable obligations, the necessity of the storage of the data is checked every three years; in the case of legal archiving obligations, the deletion takes place after their expiration (end of commercial law (6 years) and tax law (10 years) retention obligation); Information in the customer account remains until it is deleted.
13.1. In order to operate our business economically, to be able to recognize market trends, customer and user requirements, we analyze the data we have on business transactions, contracts, inquiries, etc. We process stock data, communication data, contract data, payment data, usage data, metadata on the basis of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO, whereby the persons affected include customers, prospects, business partners, visitors and users of the online offer. The analyzes are carried out for the purpose of business analysis, marketing and market research. In doing so, we can display the profiles of the registered users with indications e.g. take into account their purchase transactions. The analyzes serve us to increase the user-friendliness, the optimization of our offer and the business economy. The analyzes are for us alone and will not be disclosed externally unless they are anonymous, aggregated value analyzes.
14.1. When contacting us (via contact form or e-mail), the information provided by the user to process the contact request and its processing acc. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b) DSGVO processed.
14.2. User information can be stored in our Customer Relationship Management System (“CRM System”) or similar request organization.
14.3. We delete the requests, if they are no longer required. We check the requirement every two years; Inquiries from customers who have a customer account, we store permanently and refer to the deletion on the details of the customer account. Furthermore, the legal archiving obligations apply.
15.2. Logfile information is stored for security purposes (for example, to investigate abusive or fraudulent activities) for a maximum of seven days and then deleted. Data whose further retention is required for evidential purposes are excluded from the erasure until the final clarification of the incident.
16.1. Based on our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO Online presence within social networks and platforms in order to communicate with the active customers, prospects and users and to inform them about our services. When calling the respective networks and platforms, the terms and conditions and the data processing guidelines apply to their respective operators.
18.2 Google is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thus offers a guarantee of compliance with European data protection law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt000000001L5AAI&status=Active).
18.3 Google will use this information on our behalf to evaluate the use of our online services by users, to compile reports on the activities within this online service and to provide us with other services associated with the use of this online service and the Internet. Pseudonymous user profiles can be created from the processed data.
18.4 We use Google Analytics only with IP anonymization enabled. This means that the IP address of the user is shortened by Google within member states of the European Union or in other contracting states of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to and truncated by Google on servers in the United States.
18.6 Further information on the use of data by Google, setting and objection options can be found on the websites of Google: https://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/partners (“Use of data by Google for your use of websites or apps of our partners”), https://policies.google.com/technologies/ads (“Use of data for advertising purposes”), https://adssettings.google.com/authenticated (“Manage information that Google uses to show you advertising”).
20.1 Due to our legitimate interests in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online service and for these purposes, the so-called “Facebook pixel” of the social network Facebook, which is operated by Facebook Inc., 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA, or if you are resident in the EU, Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland (“Facebook”), is used within our online service.
20.2 Facebook is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thereby provides a guarantee of compliance with European data protection law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000GnywAAC&status=Active).
20.3 With the help of Facebook pixels, Facebook is able on the one hand to determine the visitors of our online offer as the target group for the presentation of ads (so-called “Facebook ads”). Accordingly, we use the Facebook pixel to display the Facebook ads placed by us only to Facebook users who have shown an interest in our online offering or who have certain characteristics (e.g. interests in certain topics or products that are determined on the basis of the websites visited) that we transmit to Facebook (so-called “custom audiences”). Using Facebook pixels, we also want to ensure that our Facebook ads match the potential interest of users and are not annoying. Using Facebook pixels, we can also track the effectiveness of Facebook ads for statistical and market research purposes by seeing if users were referred to our website after clicking on a Facebook ad (known as “conversion”).
20.4 Facebook processes the data in accordance with Facebook’s Data Usage Policy. Accordingly, general information on the presentation of Facebook ads is provided in Facebook’s data usage policy: https://www.facebook.com/policy.php. Specific information and details about Facebook pixels and how they work can be found in the help section of Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/business/help/651294705016616.
20.5 You may opt out of Facebook pixel collection and use of your information to display Facebook Ads. To set what types of ads you see within Facebook, you can go to the page set up by Facebook and follow the instructions on the settings for usage-based ads: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads. The settings are platform-independent, i.e. they are applied to all devices, such as desktop computers or mobile devices.
21.1 On the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f. of the German Civil Code), we shall use the information contained in this website for our own purposes. DSGVO) Social Plugins (“Plugins”) of the social network facebook.com, which is operated by Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland (“Facebook”). The plugins can display interaction elements or content (e.g. videos, graphics or text contributions) and can be recognized by one of the Facebook logos (white “f” on a blue tile, the terms “like”, “like” or a “thumb up” sign) or are marked with the addition “Facebook Social Plugin”. The list and appearance of the Facebook Social Plugins can be viewed here: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
21.2 Facebook is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thus offers a guarantee to comply with European data protection law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000GnywAAC&status=Active).
21.3 When a user calls a function of this online service that contains such a plugin, his device establishes a direct connection with Facebook’s servers. The content of the plugin is transmitted directly from Facebook to the user’s device and integrated into the online service by the user. User profiles can be created from the processed data. We therefore have no influence on the extent of the data that Facebook collects with the help of this plugin and therefore inform the user according to our state of knowledge.
21.4 By integrating the plugins, Facebook receives the information that a user has called up the corresponding page of the online offer. If the user is logged in to Facebook, Facebook can assign the visit to his Facebook account. When users interact with the plug-ins, for example, by clicking the Like button or posting a comment, the corresponding information is transferred directly from your device to Facebook and stored there. If a user is not a member of Facebook, it is still possible for Facebook to find out his IP address and save it. According to Facebook, only an anonymous IP address is stored in Germany.
21.5 The purpose and scope of the data collection and the further processing and use of the data by Facebook as well as the related rights and setting options to protect the privacy of users can be found in Facebook’s data protection information: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/.
21.6 If a user is a Facebook member and does not want Facebook to collect information about him or her via this online service and link it to his or her member data stored on Facebook, he or she must log out of Facebook and delete his or her cookies before using our online service. Further settings and objections to the use of data for advertising purposes are possible within the Facebook profile settings: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads or via the US page http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ or the EU page http://www.youronlinechoices.com/. The settings are platform-independent, i.e. they are adopted for all devices, such as desktop computers or mobile devices.
27.1 We use means of distance communication such as post, telephone or e-mail for business transactions and marketing purposes. We process inventory data, address and contact data as well as contract data of customers, participants, interested parties and communication partners.
27.2 Processing takes place on the basis of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a, Art. 7 DSGVO, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f DSGVO in conjunction with legal requirements for advertising communications. Contact will only be established with the consent of the contact partners or within the scope of the legal permissions, and the processed data will be deleted as soon as they are not required and otherwise with objection/ revocation or the omission of the authorization bases or legal archiving obligations.
28.1 With the following information we inform you about the contents of our newsletter as well as the registration, dispatch and statistical evaluation procedures and your rights of objection. By subscribing to our newsletter, you declare your agreement with the receipt and the described procedures.
28.2 Content of the Newsletter: We send newsletters, e-mails and other electronic notifications containing advertising information (hereinafter “Newsletter”) only with the consent of the recipient or legal permission. If the contents of the newsletter are specifically described within the scope of registration, they are decisive for the consent of the user. In addition, our newsletters contain information on our products, offers, promotions and our company.
28.3 Double opt-in and logging: The registration to our newsletter takes place in a so-called double opt-in procedure. I.e. after registration you will receive an e-mail in which you will be asked to confirm your registration. This confirmation is necessary so that nobody can register with external e-mail addresses. The registrations for the newsletter are logged in order to be able to prove the registration process according to the legal requirements. This includes the storage of the registration and confirmation time, as well as the IP address. Likewise the changes of your data stored with the Versanddienstleister are logged.
28.5 If we use a shipping service provider, the shipping service provider may, according to its own information, use this data in pseudonymous form, i.e. without allocation to a user, to optimise or improve its own services, e.g. for the technical optimisation of the dispatch and presentation of the newsletter or for statistical purposes in order to determine from which countries the recipients come. However, the dispatch service provider does not use the data of our newsletter recipients to write to them itself or pass them on to third parties.
28.6 Registration data: In order to subscribe to the newsletter, it is sufficient for you to provide your e-mail address. Optionally, we ask you to enter a name in the newsletter in order to address you personally.
28.7 Performance measurement – The newsletters contain a so-called “web beacon”, i.e. a pixel-sized file that is retrieved from our server when the newsletter is opened or, if we use a dispatch service provider, from its server. Within the scope of this retrieval, technical information, such as information about the browser and your system, as well as your IP address and time of retrieval are first collected. This information is used to technically improve the services on the basis of technical data or target groups and their reading behaviour on the basis of their retrieval locations (which can be determined with the help of the IP address) or access times. The statistical surveys also include determining whether the newsletters are opened, when they are opened and which links are clicked. For technical reasons, this information can be assigned to the individual newsletter recipients. It is, however, neither our endeavour nor, if used, that of the dispatch service provider to observe individual users. The evaluations serve us much more to recognize the reading habits of our users and to adapt our contents to them or to send different contents according to the interests of our users.
28.9. Austria: The dispatch of the newsletter and the performance measurement are carried out on the basis of the consent of the recipients in accordance with Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. a, Art. 7 DSGVO in conjunction with § 107 Para. 2 TKG or on the basis of legal permission in accordance with § 107 Paras. 2 and 3 TKG.
28.10. The registration procedure is recorded on the basis of our legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f DSGVO and serves as proof of consent to receive the newsletter.
28.11. Recipients of newsletters can cancel the receipt of our newsletter at any time, i.e. revoke their consent. You will find a link to cancel the newsletter at the end of each newsletter. At the same time, your consent to the measurement of your success will expire. A separate revocation of the performance measurement is unfortunately not possible, in which case the entire newsletter subscription must be cancelled. With the cancellation of the newsletter, the personal data are deleted, unless their storage is legally required or justified, in which case their processing is limited only to these exceptional purposes. In particular, we may store the deleted e-mail addresses for up to three years on the basis of our legitimate interests before we delete them for the purpose of sending the newsletter in order to be able to prove that we have previously given our consent. The processing of this data is limited to the purpose of a possible defence against claims. An individual deletion request is possible at any time, provided that the former existence of a consent is confirmed at the same time.
29.1 Within the scope of our online offer and on the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f. of the German Civil Code), we shall not be liable for any loss or damage arising out of or in connection with the use of our online offer. DSGVO) content or service offers from third parties in order to integrate their content and services, such as videos or fonts (hereinafter uniformly referred to as “content”). This always presupposes that the third-party providers of this content perceive the IP address of the user, since they would not be able to send the content to their browser without the IP address. The IP address is therefore required for the presentation of this content. We make every effort to use only those contents whose respective providers only use the IP address to deliver the contents. Third party providers may also use so-called pixel tags (invisible graphics, also known as “web beacons”) for statistical or marketing purposes. Pixel tags” can be used to evaluate information such as visitor traffic on the pages of this website. The pseudonymous information may also be stored in cookies on the user’s device and may contain, among other things, technical information about the browser and operating system, referring web pages, visit times and other information about the use of our online offering, as well as may be linked to such information from other sources.

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