text:
b. The terms used, such as "personal data" or their "processing", refer to the definitions in Art. 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
c. The personal data of users processed within the scope of this online offer include inventory data (e.g. names and addresses of customers), contract data (e.g. services used, names of agents, payment information), usage data (e.g. websites visited on our online offer, interest in our products) and content data (e.g. entries in the contact form), as well as job application data.
d. The term "user" covers all categories of data subjects. These include our business partners, customers, prospective customers, job applicants and other visitors to our online offering. The terms used, such as "user", are to be understood as gender-neutral.
e. We process personal data of users only in compliance with the relevant data protection regulations. This means that user data will only be processed if legal permission has been obtained. This means in particular if data processing is necessary for the provision of our contractual services (e.g. processing of orders) as well as online services, or is required by law, if the user has given his or her consent, or if our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation and security of our online services within the scope of Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR, in particular for range measurement, creation of profiles for advertising and marketing purposes, collection of access data and use of third-party services.
f. We point out that the legal basis of the consent is Art. 6 (1)(a) and Art. 7 GDPR, the legal basis for the processing for the fulfilment of our services and implementation of contractual measures is Art. 6 (1)(b) GDPR, the legal basis for processing to fulfil our legal obligations is Art. 6 (1)(c) GDPR and the legal basis for processing to protect our legitimate interests is Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR.
a. We take organizational, contractual and technical security measures seriously, in accordance with current technical capabilities. This is to ensure that the regulations of data protection laws are observed, and thus protect the data processed against accidental or intentional manipulation, loss, destruction, or access by any unauthorized persons.
b. The security measures include the encrypted transmission of data between your browser and our servers.
a. Data will only be passed on to third parties within the framework of legal requirements. We only pass on user data to third parties if, for example, this is necessary for contractual purposes on the basis of Art. 6 (1)(b) GDPR or on the basis of legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR on economic and effective business operations.
b. If we use subcontractors to provide our services, we take appropriate legal precautions, technical and organisational measures to ensure the protection of personal data in accordance with legal regulations.
c. If tools or other means from external providers (hereinafter jointly referred to as "third providers") are used within the scope of this data protection declaration, and their named registered office is in a third country, it is to be assumed that data is transferred to the country in which the third provider has their registered office. Third countries are considered to be where GDPR is not directly applicable, i.e. in principle countries outside of the EU or the European Economic Area. The transfer of data to third countries takes place either if an appropriate level of data protection, user consent or other legal permission is existing.
a. We process inventory data (e.g. names and addresses as well as contact data of users), contract data (e.g. services used, names of contact persons, payment information) for the purpose of fulfilling our contractual obligations and services pursuant to Art. 6 (1)(b) GDPR.
b. Users can opt to create their own user account, in particular for viewing their orders. During the registration process, the required information will be communicated to the user. The user accounts are not made public and cannot be indexed by search engines. If user terminate their account, their data will be deleted, subject to storage for commercial or tax reasons according to Art. 6 (1)(c) GDPR. It is the user’s responsibility to save their data, before the end of the contract, if they have given notice of termination. We are entitled to irretrievably delete all user data stored during the term of the contract.
a. When contacting us (via contact forms or e-mail), the user's details are processed for conducting the enquiry request and its handling in accordance with Art. 6 (1)(b) GDPR.
b. User information can be stored in our Customer Relationship Management System ("CRM System").
c. We use an internal CRM system, developed by Fast Lane Institute for Knowledge Transfer GmbH, based on our legitimate interests.
a. We collect data on the basis of our legitimate interests within the scope of Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR. This is carried out through our servers within our secure Data Centers. Access data includes the name of the accessed website, file, date and time of access, transferred data volume, notification of successful access, browser type and version, the user's operating system, referrer URL (the previously visited page), IP address, and the requesting provider.
b. Log file information is stored for a maximum of seven days for security reasons (e.g. to investigate misuse or fraud) and then deleted. Data which is required for further storage, for review or evidentiary purposes, is excluded from deletion until the respective incident has been clarified.
a. Cookies are pieces of information that is transferred from our web servers, or third party web servers, to the user's web browser and stored there for later retrieval.
c. If users do not want cookies to be stored on their computer, they are asked to deactivate the corresponding option in the system settings of their browser. Stored cookies can be deleted in the system settings of the browser. The exclusion of cookies can lead to functional restrictions.
b. Google is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thus offers a guarantee to comply with European data protection law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt000000001L5AAI&status=Active).
c. Google will use this information on our behalf to evaluate the use of our online offerings to our users. Google will compile reports, and provide us with insights to other services associated with the online offer which might be of interest to the user.
d. Pseudonymous user profiles can be created from the processed data.
e. We use Google Analytics to display the ads placed by Google and its partners (so-called "remarketing" or "Google Analytics Audiences") only to the users that have shown an interest to our online offer, or who have certain characteristics e.g. interests in certain topics or products that are determined by the web pages visited.
f. We use Google Analytics only with IP anonymization enabled. This means that Google will reduce the IP address of users within Member States of the European Union, or in other states party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the US and shortened there.
g. The IP address transmitted by the user's browser is not merged with other Google data. Users can prevent the storage of cookies by setting their browser software accordingly. Users can also prevent Google from collecting the data generated by the cookie and relating to their use of the online offer and from processing this data by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available under the following link: http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en.
h. Further information on data use by Google, possible settings and objections can be found on Google's websites: https://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/partners ("Data use by Google when using our partners' websites or apps"), http://www.google.com/policies/technologies/ads ("Data use for advertising purposes"), http://www.google.de/settings/ads ("Manage information that Google uses to show you advertising").
a. On the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR) the marketing and remarketing services ("Google Marketing Services" for short) of Google Inc. 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA, ("Google").
c. The Google marketing services allow us to target advertisements to active users, which potentially match their interests. For example, if a user sees an advertisement for a product(s) they have been interested in on other websites, this is referred to as "remarketing". For these purposes, when our and other websites on which Google marketing services are active, Google directly executes a code and (re)marketing tags (invisible graphics or code, also known as "web beacons") are integrated into the website. With their help, an individual cookie, i.e. a small file, is stored on the user's device (comparable technologies can also be used instead of cookies). Cookies can be set by various domains, including google.com, doubleclick.net, invitemedia.com, admeld.com, googlesyndication.com or googleadservices.com. In this file it is noted which websites the user visits, the content viewed, and offers clicked on as a matter of interest, furthermore technical information about the browser and operating system, referring websites, visiting time, and information regarding the use of the online offer. The IP address of the user is also recorded, whereby within the framework of Google Analytics the IP address is shortened within member states of the European Union, or in other signatory states of the European Economic Area Agreement. In exceptional cases the IP address is completely transmitted to a Google server in the US where it is then shortened. The IP address is not combined with the user's data within other Google offers. The above information may also be linked by Google to such information from other sources. If the user then visits other websites, the ads are tailored to their interests.
d. Users' data is processed pseudonymously within the framework of Google marketing services. This means that Google does not store and process, for example, the names or e-mail addresses of users, but processes the relevant data cookie-related within pseudonymous user profiles. This means from Google's point of view, the ads are not managed and displayed for a specifically identifiable person, but for the cookie holder, regardless of who this cookie holder is. This does not apply if a user has expressly permitted Google to process the data without this pseudonymisation. The information collected by Google marketing services is transmitted to Google and stored on Google's servers in the US.
e. Further information on Google's use of data for marketing purposes can be found on the overview page: https://www.google.com/policies/technologies/ads, Google's data protection declaration can be accessed at https://www.google.com/policies/privacy .
f. If you wish to object to interest-based advertising by Google marketing services, you can use the setting and opt-out options provided by Google: http://www.google.com/ads/preferences.
a. On the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR). Social Plugins ("Plugins") of the social network facebook.com, which is operated by Facebook Ireland Ltd, 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland ("Facebook"). The plugins can display interaction elements or content (e.g. videos, graphics or text contributions) and are identified by one of the Facebook logos (white "f" on blue tile, the terms "like", "like" or a "thumbs up" sign) or are marked with the addition "Facebook Social Plugin". The list and the appearance of the Facebook Social Plugins can be viewed here: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
b. Facebook is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thus offers a guarantee to comply with European data protection law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000GnywAAC&status=Active).
c. When a user calls up a function of this online offer that contains such a plugin, his device establishes a direct connection to the Facebook servers. The content of the plugin is transmitted by Facebook directly to the user's device and integrated into the online offer. The processed data can be used to create user profiles. We therefore have no influence on the amount of data Facebook collects with the help of this plugin and therefore inform users according to our level of knowledge.
d. By integrating the plugins, Facebook receives information that a user has called up the corresponding page of the online offer. If the user is logged in to Facebook, Facebook can assign the visit to his Facebook account. When users interact with the plugins, such as pressing the Like button or posting a comment, the information is sent directly from your device to Facebook and stored there. If a user is not a member of Facebook, it is still possible for Facebook to obtain and store their IP address. According to Facebook, only an anonymized IP address is stored in Germany.
e. The purpose and scope of the data collection and the further processing and use of the data by Facebook, as well as the relevant rights and setting options for the protection of users' privacy, can be found in Facebook's data protection information: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/.
f. If a user is a Facebook member and does not want Facebook to collect data about him via this online offer and link it to his membership data stored on Facebook, he must log out of Facebook before using our online offer and delete his cookies. Further settings and objections to the use of data for advertising purposes are possible within the Facebook profile settings: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads or via the US page http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ or the EU page http://www.youronlinechoices.com/. The settings are platform-independent, i.e. they are applied to all devices, such as desktop computers or mobile devices.
a. Due to our legitimate interests in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offer and for these purposes the so-called "Facebook pixel" of the social network Facebook, which is operated by Facebook Inc., 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA, or, if you are based in the EU, Facebook Ireland Ltd, 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland ("Facebook"), is used within our online offer.
c. With the help of the Facebook pixel, Facebook is able to determine the visitors of our online offer as a target group for the presentation of ads (so-called "Facebook ads"). Accordingly, we use the Facebook pixel to display the Facebook ads we post only to Facebook users who have also shown an interest in our online offering or who have certain features (e.g. interests in certain topics or products that are determined by the websites visited) that we transmit to Facebook (so-called "custom audiences"). We also want to use the Facebook pixel to ensure that our Facebook ads meet the potential interest of users and are not a nuisance. The Facebook pixel also helps us understand the effectiveness of Facebook ads for statistical and market research purposes by showing whether users have been redirected to our website after clicking on a Facebook ad (so-called "conversion").
d. The Facebook pixel is integrated directly by Facebook when you visit our website and can store a so-called cookie, i.e. a small file, on your device. If you then log in to Facebook or visit Facebook when logged in, the visit to our online offer will be noted in your profile. The data collected about you is anonymous to us, so it does not provide us with any information about the identity of the user. However, Facebook stores and processes the data so that a connection to the respective user profile is possible and can be used by Facebook as well as for its own market research and advertising purposes. If we send data to Facebook for matching purposes, it is encrypted locally by the browser and only then sent to Facebook via a secure https connection. This is done solely with the purpose of creating a comparison with the data that is equally encrypted by Facebook.
f. You can object to the collection by the Facebook pixel and use of your data to display Facebook ads. To set what types of ads you see within Facebook, you can visit the page set up by Facebook and follow the instructions on usage-based advertising settings: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads. The settings are platform-independent, i.e. they are applied to all devices, such as desktop computers or mobile devices.
g. To prevent your information from being collected via the Facebook pixel on our website, please click the following link: Facebook Opt-Out Note: When you click the link, an opt-out cookie is stored on your device. If you delete the cookies in this browser, you must click the link again. Furthermore, the opt-out only applies within the browser you use and only within our web domain on which the link was clicked.
a. With the following information we will inform you about the content of our newsletters, the registration process, dispatch, statistical evaluation procedure, and your rights of objection. By subscribing to our newsletter(s) you agree to the receipt and the described procedures.
b. Content of the newsletter(s): We send newsletters, e-mails and other electronic notifications containing advertising information (hereinafter "newsletters") only with the consent of the recipient(s), or with legal permission. If the contents of a newsletter are specifically described within the scope of a registration, they describe the extent of the user consent. In addition, our newsletters contain information about our products, offers, promotions and our company / business updates.
c. Double opt-in and logging: Subscription to our newsletter takes through a double opt-in procedure. As a part of this registration process you will receive an e-mail asking you to once again confirm your registration. This confirmation is necessary so that no one can log in with another e-mail addresses. Subscriptions to the newsletter are logged in order to be able to prove the registration process in accordance with legal requirements. This includes the storage of the login, confirmation time, and the IP address. The changes to your data stored with the shipping service provider are also logged.
e. Credentials: To subscribe to the newsletter, simply enter your e-mail address. Optionally, we ask you to enter a name in order to address individuals personally.
f. Statistical data collection and analysis - The newsletters contain a so-called "web-beacon", i.e. a pixel-sized file that is retrieved from the mail order company's server when the newsletter is opened. Within the scope of this retrieval, technical information, such as information about the browser and your system, as well as your IP address and time of retrieval are initially collected. This information is used to technically improve the services based on the technical data or the target groups and their reading behavior based on their retrieval locations (which can be determined using the IP address) or access times. The statistical surveys also include determining whether the newsletters are opened, when they are opened and which links are clicked. For technical reasons, this information can be assigned to the individual newsletter recipients. However, it is not our intention, nor that of the shipping service provider, to observe individual users. The evaluations serve us much more to recognize the reading habits of our users and to adapt our content accordingly, or to send different content in relation to their interests.
g. The use of the shipping service provider, performance of statistical surveys, analysis, and the registration procedure is conducted on the basis of our legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR. We are interested in using a user-friendly and secure newsletter system that serves both our business interests and the expectations of our recipients.
h. Cancellation/Revocation - You can cancel the receipt of our newsletter at any time, i.e. revoke your consent. At the same time, your consent to the dispatch by the shipping service provider and the statistical analysis will expire. A separate revocation of the dispatch by the dispatch service provider or the statistical evaluation is unfortunately not possible. You will find a link to cancel the newsletter at the end of each newsletter. If users have only subscribed to the newsletter and cancelled their subscription, their personal data will be deleted.
a. We use content or service offers from third parties within our online offering (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offering within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO) on the basis of our legitimate interests in order to integrate their content and services, e.g. videos or fonts (hereinafter uniformly referred to as "content").
If our customers use the payment services of third parties (e.g. PayPal), the terms and conditions and data protection information of the respective third party providers, which can be accessed within the respective websites or transaction applications, apply.
The data controller has integrated components of AddThis on this website. AddThis is a so-called bookmarking provider. The service enables a simplified bookmarking of websites via buttons. By moving the mouse over the AddThis component or by clicking on it, a list of bookmarking and sharing services is displayed. AddThis is operated by AddThis, Inc. 1595 Spring Hill Road, Suite 300, Vienna, VA 22182, USA. AddThis displays personalized and interest-based advertising based on a cookie set by the company. This cookie analyses the individual surfing behaviour of the computer system used by the person concerned. The cookie stores the visits to Internet pages coming from the computer system. The person concerned can prevent the setting of cookies by our website at any time, as already described above, by means of an appropriate setting of the Internet browser used and thus permanently object to the setting of cookies. Such a setting of the Internet browser used would also prevent AddThis from placing a cookie on the information technology system of the person concerned. In addition, cookies already set by AddThis can be deleted at any time via an Internet browser or other software programs.
a. Users have the right, upon request and free of charge, to receive information about the personal data that we have stored about them.
b. b.	In addition, users have the right to correct inaccurate data, to limit the processing and deletion of their personal data, if applicable, to assert their rights to data portability and, in the event of the assumption of unlawful data processing, to file a complaint with the competent supervisory authority.
c. Likewise, users can revoke consent at any time.
a. The data stored by us will be deleted as soon as it is no longer required for its intended purpose and there are no legal obligations to keep it in safekeeping. If the user's data is not deleted because it is necessary for legally permissible purposes, their processing is restricted. This means that the data is blocked and not processed for other purposes. This applies, for example, to user data that must be retained for commercial or tax reasons.
a. We reserve the right to change the data protection declaration in order to adapt to amended legal circumstances, or in the event of changes to the service or data processing procedure. However, this only applies with regards to declarations on data processing. If a user’s consent is required or components of the data protection declaration contain provisions of the contractual relationship with the users, the changes will only be made with the users' consent.
b. Users are asked to inform themselves regularly about the contents of the data protection declaration.
Users can object to any future processing of their personal data in accordance with legal requirements at any time. The objection may be lodged against processing for direct marketing purposes.

matches:
Art. 4
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 7
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


text:
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. ; Evtimov T. 2016. Numerical study of the waste heat recovery potential of the exhaust gases from a tractor engine. Proceedings of the institution of mechanical engineers, part D: Journal of automobile engineering 230(1): 37-48.
Clenci, A. ; Niculescu, R. ; Danlos, A. ; Iorga-Siman, V. ; Trica, A. 2016. Impact of biodiesel blends and Di-Ethyl-Ether on a cold starting performance of a compression ignition engine. Energies 9(4): 284-303.
Chiriac, R. ; Racovitza, A. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. 2015. On the possibility to reduce CO2 emissions of heat engines fuelled partially with hydrogen produced by heat recovery. International journal of hydrogen energy 40(45): 15856-15863.
Danel Q. ; Perilhon C. ; Lacour S. ; Punov P. ; Danlos A. 2015. Waste heat recovery applied to a tractor engine. International conference on technologies and materials for renewable energy – TMREES15. Energy procedia 74: 331-343.
Podevin, P. ; Perilhon, C. ; Danlos, A. ; Punov, P. ; Hussain, N. ; Wagner, M. ; Massouh, F. ; Mansilla, R. 2015. Effect of water injection at inlet of turbocharger on compressor performances. Proceedings of the european automotive congress EAEC-ESFA 2015, Bucarest, Romania, pp. 765-782.
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. ; Evtimov T. 2015. Numerical study of the waste heat recovery potential of the exhaust gases from a tractor engine. Proceedongs of the institution of mechanical engineers, part D: Journal of automobile engineering.
Clenci A.C. ; Iorga-Siman V. ; Deligant M. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. ; Niculescu R. 2014. A CFD (computational fluid dynamics) study on the effects of operating an engine with low intake valve lift at idle corresponding speed. Energy 71: 202-217.
Danlos A. ; Ravelet F. ; Coutier-Delgosha O. ; Bakir F. 2014. Cavitation regime detection through proper orthogonal decomposition: dynamics analysis of the street cavity on a grooved convergent-divergent nozzle. International Journal of Heat and Fluid Flow 47: 9-20.
Danlos A. ; Mehal J.-E. ; Ravelet F. ; Coutier-Delgosha O. ; Bakir F. 2014. Study of the cavitating instability on a grooved Venturi profile. Journal of Fluids Engineering 136 (10).
Lacour S. ; Burgun C. ;Perilhon C. ; Descombes G. ; Doyen V. 2014. A model to acess tractor operational efficiency from bench test data. Journal of Terramechanics 54: 1-18.
Haddad C. ; Perilhon C. ; Danlos A. ; François M.-X. ; Descombes G. 2014. Some efficiency solutions to recover low and medium waste heat competitiveness of the thermoacoustic technology. 2014. Energy procedia 50: 1056-1069.
Clenci A. ; Biziiac A. ; Podevin P. ; Niculescu R. 2013. Variable intake valve lift on a port fuel injected engine and its effects on idle operation. Mobility and Vehicle Mechanics: 35-40.
Clenci A. ; Biziiac A. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. ; Deligant M. ; Niculescu R. 2013. Idle operation with low intake valve in a port injected engine. Energies 6: 2874-2891.
Perilhon C. ; Lacour S. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. 2013. Thermal electricity storage by a thermodynamic process: study of temperature impact on the machines. Energy procedia 36: 923-938.
Glavatskaya, Y. ; Podevin P. ; Lemort, V. ; Shonda, O.; Descombes, G. 2012. Reciprocating expander for an exhaust heat recovery Rankine cycle for a passenger car application. Energies 5: 1751-1765.
Lacour, S. ; Chinese, T. ; Alkadee, D. ; Périlhon, C. ; Descombes, G. 2012. Energy and environmental balance of biogas for dual-fuel mobile applications. Renewable Sustainable Energy Rev., 16(3): 1745–1753.
Diango, A. ; Périlhon, C. ; Danho, E. ; Descombes, G. 2011. Influence of heat transfer on gas turbine performance. Advances in Gas Turbine Technology. InTech: ISBN 978-953-307-324‑8: 211-236.
Deligant, M. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. 2011. CFD model for turbocharger journal bearing performances. Appl. Therm. Eng. 31(5): 811-819.
Podevin, P. ; Clenci, A. ; Descombes, G. 2011. Influence of the lubricating oil pressure and temperature on the performance at low speeds of a centrifugal compressor for an automotive engine. Appl. Therm. Eng. 31(2‑3): 194-201.
Diango, A. ; Périlhon, C. ; Descombes, G. ; Danho, E. 2011. Application of exergy balances for the optimization of non-adiabatic small turbomachines operation. Energy 36(5): 2924-2936.
Descombes, G. 2011. Characterization of a spray in the combustion chamber of a low emission gas turbine. Advances in Gas Turbine Technology. InTech: ISBN 978-953-307-324-8: 267-290.
Deligant, M. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. ; Vidal, F. ; Lefebvre, A. ; Lamquin, T. 2010. Computational fluid dynamics calculations of turbocharger's bearing losses. SAE Int. J. Engines, 3(2): 103-114.
Chiriac, R. ; Descombes, G. 2010. Fuel Consumption and Pollutant Emissions Reduction for Diesel Engines by Recovery of Wasted Energy. Environ. Eng. Manage. J. 9(10): 1335-1340.
Descombes, G. ; Boudigues, S. 2009. Modelling of waste heat recovery for combined heat and power applications. Appl. Therm. Eng. 29(13): 2610-2616.
Clenci, A. ; Descombes, G. ; Podevin, P. ; Hara. V. 2007. Some aspects concerning the combination of downsizing with turbocharging, variable compression ratio and variable intake valve lift. Journal of Automotive Engineering, 221(10): 1287-1294.
Deligant M. ; Descombes, G. 2012. Énergies alternatives appliquées à la production d’énergie propre, Conférence-débat au Palais de la découverte sur l’invitation de M. A. Foucault, Professeur émérite du Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, Président de l’Association française pour l’avancement des sciences, 10 mars 2012, Palais de la découverte, Energies durables pour sortir du nucléaire, session nouvelles énergies dans les moteurs.
Descombes, G. ; 2011. Biomasse appliquée à la production d’énergie propre, Tlemcen, Algérie, 24, 25 et 26 Septembre 2011, lettre d’invitation du Pr Benyoucef, Président des JITH 2011 du 25 août 2011.
Chiriac, R. ; Descombes, G. 2010. An assessment on the possibilities of energy recovery process from the engine exhaust gases made by thermodynamic analysis, 5th Edition of the Francophone Colloquium, COFRET2010, May 05-07, 2010, IASI, Romania, pp. 299-312, ISSN 1011 - 2855.
Diango, A. ; Périlhon C. ; Danho, E. ; Descombes, G. 2009. Influence des transferts thermiques sur les performances des micro turbines à gaz, 3rd International Conference on Thermal Engines and Environmental Engineering, June 4-6, 2009, METIME Research Center, GALATI, ROMANIA, pp. 1-21, ISBN 978-973-627-442.
Danlos, A. ; Perilhon, C. ; Descombes, G. ; Podevin, P. ; Gonon, I. ; Punov, P. ; Clenci, A. ; Diango, A. 2016. MOOC (massive open online course) : diffusion numérique des connaissances en énergétique et environnement dans le monde francophone. L’exemple du Cnam. Colloque francophone sur l’énergie – environnement – économie & thermodynamique COFRET’16, Bucarest.
Trica, G. ; Iorga, V. ; Clenci, A. ; Guilan, S. ; Danlos, A. ; Niculescu, R. 2016. A case study regarding the in-cylinder air motion characteristics in a motored gasoline engine: CFD vs PIV. Colloque francophone sur l’énergie – environnement – économie & thermodynamique COFRET’16, Bucarest.
Milkov, N. ; Punov, P. ; Danel, Q. ; Perilhon, C. ; Podevin, P. 2016. Etude paramétrique d’un cycle de Rankine-Hirn pour la récupération d’énergie sur les gaz d’échappement d’un moteur automobile. Colloque francophone sur l’énergie – environnement – économie & thermodynamique COFRET’16, Bucarest.
Calin A.D. ; Enescu N. ; Chiriac R. ; Orasanu N. 2015. The NVH behaviour of a powertrain fixed on a measurement bench. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Radu B. ; Racovitza A. ; Aldhaidhawi M. ; Chiriac R. 2015. Development of a water rankine system to improve diesel engine efficiency. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Racovitza A. ; Radu B. ; Aldhaidhawi M. ; Chiriac R. 2015. On the possibility to reduce diesel engines emissions by operating with biodiesel B20 in PPC mode. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Iorga-Siman V. ; Clenci A. ; Niculescu R. ; Trica A. 2015. Inter-cylinder distribution of di-ethylether injected into the intake manifold of a diesel engine using CFD simulation. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Punov P. ; Milkov N. ; Danel Q. ; Perilhon C. 2015. A study of waste heat recovery impact on a passenger car fuel consumption in new european driving cycle. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Podevin P. ; Perilhon C. ; Danlos A. ; Punov P. ; Hussain N. ; Mark W. ; Fawaz M. ; Raul M. 2015. Effect of water injection at inlet of turbocharger on compressor performances. EAEC-ESFA 2015 The european automotive congress, 25-27 november 2015, Bucarest, Roumanie.
Lacour S. ; Podevin P. ; Punov P. 2015. Fuels saving using direct adiabatic cooling instead conventional air conditioning for a tractor cabin. Scientific conference on aeronautics, automotive and railway engineering and technologies – BulTrnas 2015, 16-18 september 2015, Sozopol, Bulgarie.
Danlos A. ; Dobrev I. ; Zampatti R. ; Djaffardjee V. ; Massouh F. 2015. Passive control of aerodynamic drag of a vehicle using porous rear-view mirrors. Scientific conference on aeronautics, automotive and railway engineering and technologies – BulTrnas 2015, 16-18 september 2015, Sozopol, Bulgarie.
Milkov N. ; Danel Q. ; Punov P. ; Perilhon C. ; Evtimov T. ; Podevin P. 2015. Numerical and experimental study of heat exchanger designed for waste heat recovery system exhaust gases based on Rankine cycle. Scientific conference on aeronautics, automotive and railway engineering and technologies – BulTrnas 2015, 16-18 september 2015, Sozopol, Bulgarie.
Punov P. ; Evtimov T. ; Clenci A. ; Chiriac R. ; Danel Q. ; Descombes G. 2015. Progress in high performances, low emissions and exergy recovery in internal combustion engines. The 7th international exergy, energy and environment symposium IEEES7, 27-30 april 2015, Valenciennes, France.
Punov P. ; Evtimov T. ; Milkov N. ; Descombes G. ; Podevin P. 2015. Impact of rankine cycle WHR on passenger car fuel consumption under various operating conditions. Proceedinds of ECOS 2015 – the 28th international conference on efficiency, cost optimization, simulation and environmental impact of energy systems, june 30 – july 3, Pau, France.
Punov P. ; Perilhon C. ; Lacour S. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. ; Evtimov T. 2014. Injection timing strategy for exhaust heat recovery optimization on a turbocharged diesel engine. International congress SMAT2014, Craiova, Bulgarie.
Milkov N. ; Punov P. ; Evtimov T. ; Descombes G. ; Podevin P. 2014. Energy and exergy analysis of an automotive diect injection diesel engine. Bulltrans 2014 proceedings (Sozopol, Bulgaria) september 17-19.
Punov P. ; Perilhon C. ; Danel Q. ; Lacour S. ; Descombes G. ; Podevin P. ; Evtimov T. 2014. Development of 0D-simulational model for Rankine-Hirn heat exchanger optimization. Bultrans 2014 proceedings (Sozopol, Bulgaria) september 17-19.
Danel Q. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. ; Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Descombes G. 2014. Working fluid selection of Rankine-Hirn cycle according to the heat source. Bultrans 2014 proceedings (Sozopol, Bulgaria) september 17-19.
Clenci A. ; Rodica N. ; Ion I. ; Iorga-Siman V. ; Descombes G. ; Podevin P. 2014. Biocarburant et démarrage à froid : application au moteur diesel d’automobile. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Toussaint M. ; Danlos A. ; Descombes G. 2014. Analyse du fonctionnement en pompage d’un compresseur centrifuge refoulant à travers une vanne rotative. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Chiriac R. ; Racovitza A. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. 2014. Hydrogen on-site production by means of engines waste heat recovery and its usage as a supplementary fuel. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Podevin P. 2014. Numerical optimization of a rankine cycle heat exchanger geometrical parameters intended for a diesel engine. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Danel Q. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. ; Lacour S. ; Punov P. ; Descombes G. 2014. Sélection du fluide de travail d’un cycle de Rankine-Hirn en fonction du profil de température de la source chaude. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. 2014. Optimisation numérique des paramètres géométrique de l’échangeur d’un système de Rankine sur un moteur de tracteur agricole. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Diango A. ; Perilhon C. ; Descombes G. ; Danho E. 2014. Etude analytique de l’efficacité énergétique des mini turbomachines thermiques en fonctionnement non adiabatique. Cofret’14 colloque francophone en énergie, environnement, économie et thermodynamique (Paris, France) 23-25 avril.
Haddad C. ; Perilhon C. ; Danlos A. ; François M.-X. ; Descombes G. 2014. Some efficient solutions to recover low and medium waste heat: competitiveness of the thermoacoustic technology. TRMEES14 international conference on technology and materials for renewable energy, environment and sustainability (Beirut, Lebanon) April 10-13.
Belhi M. ; Deligant M. ; Podevin P. ; Khelladi S. 2014. Inverse methodology for centrifugal compressor design using geneticel algorithm. Bultrans 2013 proceedings (Sofia, Bulgaria) October 16-18.
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. 2013. Possibilities of waste heat recovery on tractor engines. Bultrans 2013 proceedings (Sofia, Bulgaria) October 16-18.
Perilhon C. ; Lacour S. ; Podevin P. ; Descombes G. 2013. Thermal electricity storage by a thermodynamic process: study of temperature impact on the machines. Terragreen13 international conference, advancements in renewable energy and clean environment (Beirut, Lebanon) February 15-17.
Perilhon C. ; Alkadee D. ; Descombes G. ; Lacour S. 2012. Life cycle assessment applied to electricity generation from renewable biomass. Terragreen12 conference (Beirut, Lebanon) February 16-19.
Descombes, G. 2011, The use of exergy in the automobile industry, International Conference on Exergy, University Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, 17th june 2011, 12 pages.
Deligant, M. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. ; Lamquin, T. ; Vidal, F. ; Marchal, A. 2011, Effect of Axial Load on Turbocharger Friction Losses, 13th conference of the European Automobile Engineers Cooperation (EAEC), Valencia, Spain.
Lacour, S., Galiègue, Y., Vaitilingom G., Pradel M., Gallet P., Guiscafré P. 2010. The contribution of field experiments to Life Cycle Assessment of agricultural works: application to spreading works. In Int. Conference on Agricultural Engineering, "towards environmental technologies". Clermont-Ferrand.
Deligant, M. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. 2010, Computational Fluid Dynamics Calculations of Turbocharger’s Bearing Losses, International Congress SAE 2010, Rio de Janeiro 3-5 may.
Deligant, M. ; Podevin, P. ; Descombes, G. 2010, Experimental Study of the Performance of Turbocharger’s Bearings System, International Congress ASME 2010, San Antonio Texas.
Boudfar, M. ; Ammar, M. ; Guilain, S. ; Lahjaily, H. ; Toussaint, M. ; Descombes, G. 2008, Experimental Study of the Compressor Surge of a Diesel High Performance Engine, International Congress THIESEL 2008, Conference on Thermo-and Fluid Dynamic Processes in Diesel Engines, 10-12 September 2008, Valencia, Spain.
Perilhon C. ; Descombes G. ; Pluviose M. 2014. Using the principle of worst action to stabilize control valve flows. In valve world conference 2014 (Dusseldorf, Germany) December 2-4.
Perilhon C. ; Descombes G. ; Diango A. 2011. Application of exergy balances for the optimization of non adiabatic small turbomachines operations. Conférence international sur l’éxergie, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Pôle de ville d’Avray, 17 juin.
Ferrari, L. ; Malburet, F. ; Descombes, G. 2011. Dispositif de largage et de récupération d’un drone et aaéronef associé, brevet n° 2213FR déposé avec Eurocopter en mai 2011, extension US engagée le 9.01.2012.
Chiriac, R. ; Descombes, G. ; Podevin, P. 2010. Dispositif d'alimentation d'un moteur en gaz enrichi en dihydrogène et dioxygène, Brevet français n° 1003455 déposé par le Cnam le 26/08/2010.
François, P. ; Prévond, L. ; Descombes, G. ; 2010. EP PCT FR 0100574, actualisation 2010 applicable en France, Pays Bas, Royaume unis et Allemagne des brevets 2002, Groupe électrogène à mouvement linéaire alternatif à base de moteur Stirling et procédé de mise en œuvre, 2010.
Hara, V. ; Descombes, G. ; Podevin P. ; Boncea S. ; Clenci A. 2008. Moteur suralimenté avec autorégulation du taux volumétrique de compression et de la levée des soupapes d’admission, Brevet français FR 2883927. 2008.
Diango A. ; Perilhon C. ; Danho E. ; Descombes G. 2011. Influence of heat transfer on gas turbine performance. Advances in gas turbine technology, chap. 10, pp 211-236, ISBN 978-953-307-611-9.
Punov P. ; Lacour S. ; Perilhon C. ; Podevin P. 2014. Numerical optimization of a Rankine cycle heat exchanger geometrical parameters intended for a diesel engine. Ingineria Automobilului, vol. 8, n°3(32).
Descombes, G. 2010. Moteurs à récupération d’énergie, BM2595, Collection Techniques de l'ingénieur, Traité mécanique et chaleur, Volume B3, Moteurs thermiques, 48 pages.
Perilhon C. ; Prevond L. ; Nika P. 2009. Les micro et mini-cogénérations : solutions et spécificités. Revue 3EI, vol. 57.
Podevin, P. ; Clenci, A. 2008. Moteurs à taux de compression variable. Techniques de l'Ingénieur, BM2525, 2008, 20 pages.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


Sept. 2 — Claims alleging that a public employee was retaliated against because he or she made a discrimination complaint may now be brought against government officials and supervisors under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled Sept. 2.
The court revived race bias and retaliation claims brought by Carlos Vega under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Section 1983. Vega, a Puerto Rican teacher, alleged that his principal and Hempstead Union Free School District in New York tried to force him to teach only the Hispanic student population and retaliated against him when he complained that this was discriminatory.
Section 1983 is the vehicle for enforcement of certain rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. It provides for actions against government officials, in contrast to Title VII, which allows for claims against employers.
“We acknowledge that there has been considerable confusion surrounding the viability of retaliation claims under § 1983, and we now clarify that retaliation claims alleging an adverse action because of a complaint of discrimination are actionable under § 1983,” Judge Denny Chin wrote for the court. He concluded it was error to dismiss Vega's retaliation claims against his principal, and found that he pleaded sufficient facts to proceed with his race discrimination claim against the school district.
Judges Robert Katzmann and John Walker joined the opinion.
Vega, who is fluent in English and Spanish, has taught math in the school district for at least 24 years, the last 16 years at the district's high school, according to the opinion.
He alleged that he never received a negative performance evaluation since he started teaching at the high school. Chy Davidson was principal from 2006-2011, and Dagoberto Artiles succeeded him.
• the district granted Vega a transfer to the Academy of Math and Sciences, whose principal was Hispanic, even though he never requested the transfer.
Vega also alleged that district officials took retaliatory actions after he filed a formal discrimination complaint.
Vega also claimed that the district purposely assigned him during the 2011-2012 school year students with very poor attendance records, causing his rate of excessively absent students to jump from 20 percent to 75 percent.
Vega sued in December 2012. He received his first negative review in 16 years in early 2013.
The court acknowledged that it has “sent conflicting signals” with respect to the viability of retaliation claims under Section 1983.
It explicitly denied such a claim in Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 1996), saying it wouldn't break new constitutional ground. Lower courts, including the one in the current case, relied on Bernheim to dismiss these claims, Chin noted.
The court's subsequent decision in Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 108 FEP Cases 577 (2d Cir. 2010), however, “squarely recognized that an employer's retaliatory action in response to an employee's participation in discrimination investigations and proceedings constituted an ‘impermissible' reason to treat an employee differently” under the equal protection clause, Chin wrote.
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “retaliation is a form of discrimination” in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 95 FEP Cases 669 (2005), a case brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. That “reasoning applies with equal force to the employment context,” Chin said.
He found that the lower court applied an erroneous standard to Vega's pleadings on his bias claim. “At the pleadings stage of the litigation, Vega was not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination.” Rather, he only had to meet the “minimal” burden of plausibly alleging facts that provide some support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent, the court held.
Scott Michael Mishkin, PC represented Vega. Ingerman Smith, LLP represented the school district parties.
Text of the opinion is available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/CARLOS_VEGA_PlaintiffAppellant_v_HEMPSTEAD_UNION_FREE_SCHOOL_DIST.


New Update! (Dec. 30, 2012)—DC Bar letter essentially admits that the Washington DC legal environment is a system of patronage. DC Bar refuses to investigate any Federal Circuit attorneys involved in Leader v. Facebook. They claim that none of the Federal Circuit attorneys and judges are registered to practice law in Washington D.C.
See "DC Bar refuses to investigate attorneys in Leader v. Facebook - Unwillingness of DC attorneys to self-police may explain why Washington is broken."
The United States of America -or- The Attorney Patronage States of America?
AFI Reader Comment from "EUREKA MOMENT on 01/02/2013:"
"AFI, you may have figured out what's wrong with Washington in addition to the Leader v. Facebook case!
Imagine a company run by 50% of any one profession and common sense says you'll see a BROKEN organization.
Imagine a school run by 50% plumbers.
Imagine a builder run by 50% accountants.
Imagine a non-profit run by 50% hedge fund brokers.
Imagine a water treatment plant run by 50% chemists.
Imagine a farm run by 50% nurses.
Of course these organizations would be broken and couldn't get anything done... just like Washington DC. Too many attorneys! Eureka! We aren't crazy."
UPDATE (Dec. 27, 2012)—AFI Editorial: "Will the U.S. Supreme Court support schemers or real American inventors? Facebook's case dangles on a doctored interrogatory" 18 areas of question shout for attention (also included below).
UPDATE (Dec. 23, 2012)—New AFI essay proposes two public policies that could dramatically change the tenor of America's public discourse . . . quickly (and help fix the judicial corruption exposed in Leader v. Facebook). This is a MUST READ! "Leader v. Facebook triggers grassroots public policy proposal." Click here.
(Dec. 11, 2012)— On Nov. 16, 2012 Leader Technologies filed their petition with the U.S. Supreme Court in Leader Technologies, Inc., v. Facebook Inc., No. 12-617 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2012).
Within days, Facebook notified the Court that they were voluntarily waiving their right to respond to Leader’s challenge. This set the stage for a judges’ conference now set for Jan. 4, 2012. See Supreme Court Docket No. 12-617.
Facebook's failure to respond demonstrates a rarely seen cockiness. When tens of billions of dollars of shareholder value are at stake, such petitions are generally taken seriously.
(2) Facebook has already influenced the U.S. Supreme Court justices and their clerks who are currently writing their recommendations.
If Facebook is playing the statistical odds, then that is their prerogative, however reckless that might be. Did they disclose this risk to their public shareholders? On the other hand, if Facebook has continued their backroom judicial chicanery, then justice in America may be in worse shape than we suspect. The levels of appeal in our judicial system are specifically designed to root out such cronyism.
It is public knowledge that Facebook’s Leader v. Facebook appellate attorney, Thomas Hungar of Gibson Dunn LLP, is well known to the Supreme Court justices and clerks. See former Bloomberg reporter Donna Kline's investigation into Hungar's cozy associations within the Washington D.C. appeals court machinery. The bias problem motivated former Chief Judge William Rehnquist to oppose the current process of pooling the petitions. He said that it created a "clerk activism" and injected bias against one of the parties depending upon the clerk's subjective views (or undue influence?) irrespective of the the objective matters of law.
To be clear, “clerk activism” is a form of corruption whereby the clerk skews a recommendation to a particular point of view so that otherwise busy, unsuspecting judges will accept the clerk’s recommendation as a fair and right assessment of the legal issues without digging into the matter themselves. Such corruption insults the democratic foundations of America regarding fair and unbiased treatment before the law.
Every concerned American should be watching Facebook's Thomas G. Hungar and his cronies closely for signs of U.S. Supreme Court "clerk activism" in Leader v. Facebook (since we have already witnessed such influence over the Federal Circuit Clerk of Court Jan Horbaly).
The outside influencer uses insider relationships to “encourage” the clerk to write a recommendation favorable to his client; offering one or more of an array of favors, bribes, promises, quid pro quos, IOUs, paybacks, future employment, foreign bank accounts, family and friend favors, marker, connections, coercion, blackmail, etc.
(1) Whether the Federal Circuit violated Leader’s Fifth and 14th Amendment right to due process when it fabricated new evidence and arguments “in the secrecy of judges’ chambers.” This new evidence and argument were necessary to prevent Facebook from losing their case since the court had invalidated Facebook’s other evidence.
(2) Whether the Federal Circuit can disregard Supreme Court precedent on verb tense. The lower court did so in its interpretation of a crucial question to the inventor in 2009 (ruling that the present tense verb “is” could be applied to seven years in the past), and whether 14-year old Supreme Court rules for interpreting on-sale bar accusations could be simply waived by the Federal Circuit.
Facebook did not return phone calls prior to press time.
Judge Leonard P. Stark is invested in eight Fidelity Funds. Facebook's Director James W. Breyer and Fidelity's Managing Partner, Robert Ketterson, have been close collaborators for a decade.
Fig. 1: Judge Leonard P. Stark, obama-nominated last minute replacement judge in LEader v. Facebook.. Took over the case one month before trial. Leader proved that Facebook infringes Leader’s patent for social networking on all 11 of 11 claims. Despite this hard proof of Facebook’s theft, Stark protected Facebook anyway. He ignored well-settled patent law in Pfaff Electronics and Group One that require clear and convincing evidence to overturn a patent.
Facebook presented no such evidence. No expert witnesses. No engineering source code. No witnesses at all. Instead, Stark said it was “not impermissible” for him to use an 1896 criminal case that relied on innuendo as evidence. His novel opinion was a total outlier in patent law history.
Tellingly, the Federal Circuit designated this opinion “nonprecedential” so as not to upset well settled law that this opinion contradicted.
Stark had permitted a new Facebook claim just one month before trial. Facebook reversed their legal strategy 180 degrees in this new claim. Nonetheless, Stark also blocked Leader’s request for additional discovery. He simultaneously “bifurcated” the case to prevent Leader from being able to cross-examine Mark Zuckerberg. He even forbade Zuckerberg’s name from being mentioned at trial. Stark had also allowed Facebook to stonewall production of Mark Zuckerberg’s 2003-2004 computer devices for almost a year.
Then, just before trial, Facebook said that the devices were “lost.” However, 28 Zuckerberg computer devices magically surfaced in another case in 2012. Facebook’s forensic experts confirmed that Facebook’s attorney Gibson Dunn LLP had custody of these devices the entire time, and therefore Facebook lied to the Stark court about their existence.
Deposition of Michael G. McGowan, Facebook forensic expert, Jul. 19, 2012 (two months after Facebook’s public offering on May 22, 2012): “Q: When did this examination occur of these 28 devices belonging to Mr. Zuckerberg? A. In around September of 2010 .” “Q. And who paid you to do the work? A. We were paid -- we conducted this work for Gibson, Dunn on behalf of Facebook, I believe it's Facebook that's paying our bills.” See Depositions of Michael F. McGowan and Bryan J. Rose.
The 28 Zuckerberg devices were in the custody of Zuckerberg’s lawyers McManus Faulkner LLP and Gibson Dunn LLP—Facebook’s appeal attorney in Leader v. Facebook. This was fraud, perjury and obstruction of justice, not to mention breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. This same stonewalling of evidence by Deep State lawyers has been on full display in the House Benghazi hearings as well as Judicial Watch FOIA requests.
In addition, Facebook’s attorneys, Cooley Godward LLP and Gibson Dunn LLP, had deep undisclosed, professional relationships with the Leader v. Facebook judges, and also with Barack Obama and James P. Chandler. For example, Facebook’s appeal attorney Thomas G. Hungar actually represented the Federal Circuit judges in an ethics lawsuit against them in 2010. Hungar is also a protégé of Chief Justice John Roberts who did not recuse himself after Leader submitted its petition for writ of certiorari. Justice Roberts also holds substantial holdings of Facebook financial interests. These facts only scratch the surface of this corruption.
(Jun. 13, 2013)— Delaware District Court Judge Leonard P. Stark's 2010 financial disclosure exhibits a similar investing pattern to four other judges. All five judges have one thing in common: the Leader v. Facebook case. No other appeals judges show such lockstep investing associated with Facebook.
These judges focused their investments on T. Rowe Price and Fidelity funds. Stark invested in eight (8) different Fidelity Funds, most of which are invested in stocks related to Facebook and Friends (aka "The Facebook Cabal"). Two of the funds are Fidelity Investments Fidelity Asset Manager __% Funds that are funds which combine other Fidelity funds. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Facebook and Friends are included in those as well.
Among those investments are Facebook, Mail.ru with close ties to the Kremlin (now Facebook's second largest shareholder), four Facebook's underwriters and numerous companies with heavy investments from Accel Partners, Facebook's director and second largest shareholder.
Tellingly, Fidelity Ventures, the venture capital arm of Fidelity Investments, has partnered with many of Facebook principals, including James W. Breyer, Accel Partners LLP, Goldman Sachs, Digital Sky Technologies (Yuri Milner, Alisher Usmanov), Morgan Stanley Ventures and Andreessen Horowitz (Marc Andreessen).
In 2004, Breyer was elected Chairman of the National Venture Capital Association. His board included Fidelity Ventures' Robert Ketterson. Ketterson is now Managing Partner at Fidelity Equity Partners and a Group Managing Director at Fidelity Ventures Telecommunications & Technology. This means that Breyer's venture capital colleague and partner now establishes tech investing policy and strategy for Fidelity. Given the substantial Facebook-related holdings that are unique to Fidelity and T. Rowe Price, Breyer's assistance and influence on Fidelity's portfolio is apparent. What better way to create deniability for any target judge than place the desired stock inside an innocuous looking mutual fund? Visions of the Wizard of Oz.
The direct ties between Fidelity and Facebook and Friends tainted the Leader v. Facebook proceedings. Put another way, for a judge to hold investments in Fidelity introduces profound bias into the proceedings—since the judge benefits financially from his decisions that are favorable to Facebook. At the very least these associations required disclosure so that Leader Technologies could assess the risks of Stark's continued adjudication of the case. Instead, he was stone cold silent.
Since 2005, Accel Partners and Fidelity Ventures have co-invested in the first five rounds of Prosper, Inc., a crowd source financing website. In the subsequent two rounds, Accel continued to invest, but Fidelity did not. Source: Sharespost.com..
Fidelity Venture co-invested in Groupon with numerous Facebook principals, including James W. Breyer, Accel Partners LLP, Goldman Sachs, Digital Sky Technologies (Yuri Milner, Alisher Usmanov), Morgan Stanley Ventures and Andreessen Horowitz (Marc Andreessen). That's two Facebook directors, Facebook's two largest shareholders and two Facebook underwriters. These interests are so closely aligned as to be inseparable with respect to conflicts of interest.
Judges have a robust set of ethics rules that include the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, not to mention Judicial Conferences devoted to the topic. The governing principal is propriety, and the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. Judges mentoring Facebook attorneys. Facebook attorneys advising The White House to protect "likes." Judges investing in Facebook and their friends. Courts timing decision to accommodate Facebook's pre-IPO media needs. Facebook attorneys representing the judges themselves. The improprieties in this matter are jaw dropping.
"The revised code, which takes effect July 1 , defines for the first time the term 'appearance of impropriety,' which judges are commanded to avoid as much as actual impropriety. The definition: 'An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge's honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired."
The pattern of investing among the five Leader v. Facebook judges (Stark, Roberts, Lourie, Moore and Wallach) plainly shows knowledge of certain events and interests that motivated them to invest in Fidelity and T. Rowe Price Funds. The commonality here is Facebook's Director and second largest investor, James W. Breyer and Accel Partners.
T. Rowe Price owns more than 5% of Facebook's stock, so any investment in a T. Rowe Price Fund is a surrogate investment in Facebook. Such holdings raise enough red flags to make them at least disclosable by a judicial employee.
These judges appear to follow their rules of ethics selectively. For example, Justice Roberts followed the rules in Microsoft v. i4i. He recused himself because many of his funds hold Microsoft stock. Remarkably, he then ignored those same rules in Leader v. Facebook—even though it was notoriously known that Microsoft is one of Facebook's largest shareholders, and would benefit greatly from decisions favorable to Facebook. It was also notoriously known that both Fidelity and T. Rowe Price made large investments in Facebook prior to the IPO. The odds that all five of these judges invested independently in these same funds that are directly linked to Facebook, a litigant before them in Leader v. Facebook, are infinitesimally small.
This judicial bias telegraphs the message to small innovators that the U.S. Supreme Court will protect the constitutional rights of large corporations, but will ignore those rights unless you can place them into plum personal investments. Wink, wink.
If one is in a generous mood, one might forgive Stark for a slip here, or there, in checking his funds for holdings that conflict with the litigants arguing in front of him. However, this is very evidently not a simple oversight. This is very intentional investing to enrich himself. Judge Stark’s portfolio stood to benefit handsomely from decisions favorable to Facebook. These holdings demanded disclosure. U.S. judges are supposed to lead by example, not sneak around in the ethical shadows, hoping no one will notice. No wonder these large, unscrupulous law firms exist. These judges are teamed up with them.
Add these holdings to Stark's intentional ignoring of well-settled on-sale bar law, as well as his close relationships to Facebook's attorneys Cooley Godward LLP and Gibson Dunn LLP, and one has the recipe for a toxic brew. By sacrificing the Constitution to get his appointment, Judge Stark sold his soul, as did his brothers and sisters at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court.
 Leonard P. Stark. (May 10, 2011). Financial Disclosure Report, Calendar Yr. 2010. https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/judiciary/Stark-Leonard-P-Financial-Disclosure-Report-for-Calendar-Year-2010-Submitted-05-10-2011.pdf; See also https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2SfG2nEsMfqMjlkeEhXbjNoZzA/edit?usp=sharing.
 NVCA. (May 13, 2004). Jim Breyer of Accel Partners Elected Chairman Of National Venture Capital Association, New Board Directors [incl. Robert Ketterson, Fidelity Ventures; Gilman Louie, In-Q-Tel (C.I.A.); Theodore "Ted" E. Schlein, Kleiner Perkins] also named during the annual meeting. NVCA [Press release]. Accessed Jun. 13, 2013. PRNewsire. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/jim-breyer-of-accel-partners-elected-chairman-of-national-venture-capital-association-74019087.html; See also https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/breyer/Jim-Breyer-of-Accel-Partners-Elected-Chairman-Of-National-Venture-Capital-Association- re-SAN-FRANCISCO-PRNewswire-May-13-2004.pdf.
 Robert C. Ketterson. (Accessed Jun. 13, 2013). Biography. BusinessWeek. https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/breyer/Robert-Ketterson-Executive-Profile-&-Biography-Businessweek-accessed-13-Jun-2013.pdf.
 Prosper. (Accessed Jun. 13, 2013). Financing Rounds Summary. SharesPost. https://www.sharespost.com/companies/prosper; See also https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/breyer/Prosper-Financing-Rounds-SharesPost-accessed Jun-13-2013.pdf.
 Groupon. (Accessed Jun. 13, 2013). Company Profile. CrunchBase. http://www.crunchbase.com/company/groupon; See also http:/www.fbcoverup.com/docs/breyer/Groupon_CrunchBase Profile-accessed-Jun-11-2013.pdf.
 Code of Conduct. (Accessed Jun. 13, 2013). Code of Conduct for United States Judges & Judicial Employees. United States Courts. http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx; See also http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct.aspx.
 28 USC § 455. (Accessed Jun. 13, 2013). Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge. Cornell University Law School. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/455; See also http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/28/I/21/455.
 H.R. 3660. (Nov. 15, 1989). Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub.L. 101-194. 101st Congress, 1989–1990. Accessed Jun. 13, 2013. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/hr3660.
 Tony Mauro. (Mar. 18, 2009). Judicial Conference Adopts New Ethics Code, Seeks New Judgeships. Accessed Jun. 13, 2013. Legal Times. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429149864&Judicial_Conference_Adopts_New_Ethics_Code_Seeks_New_Judgeships&&slreturn=20130513151148; See also https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/articles/Judicial-Conference-Adopts-New-Ethics-Code_Seeks-New-Judgeships-Mar-18-2009-accessed-Jun-13-2013.pdf.
 "Microsoft, i4i Argue Patent Law Before U.S. Supreme Court" by Nicholas Kolakowski, eWeek, Apr. 18, 2011. Accessed Jun. 13, 2013 http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Windows/Microsoft-i4i-Argue-Patent-Law-Before-US-Supreme-Court-365638/; See also https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/articles/Microsoft-i4i-Argue-Patent-Law-Before-US-Supreme-Court-Apr-18-2011.pdf.
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-617 (U.S. Supreme Court Nov. 16, 212) https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/supremecourt/(CLICKABLE-CITES)-Petition-for-Writ-of-Ceriorari-Leader-Technologies-Inc-v-Facebook-Inc-No-12-617-U-S-Supreme-Court-Nov-16-2012.pdf.
 "Fidelity Invests $74 Million in Facebook & $82 Million in Zynga" by Gregory Gomer. BostInno, June 2, 2011 at 2:31 pm. Accessed Jun. 12, 2013 http://bostinno.streetwise.co/2011/06/02/fidelity-invests-74-million-facebook-82-million-in-zynga/; See also https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/articles/Fidelity-Invests-$74-Million-in-Facebook-$82-Million-in-Zynga-BostInno-Jun-2-2011.pdf.
 "T. Rowe Price Invests [$190.5 million] in Facebook" by Mary Pilon. The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 16, 2011 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704495004576264730149910442.html; See also <https://www.fbcoverup.com/docs/articles/T-Rowe-Price-Invests-in-Facebook-WSJ-Apr-16-2011.pdf.
Notice: This post may contain opinion. As with all opinion, it should not be relied upon without independent verification. Think for yourself. Photos used are for educational purposes only and were obtained from public sources. No claims whatsoever are made to any photo. Fair Use is relied upon for all content.


text:
Petitioner was tried in state court on charges of murder and armed robbery stemming from a 1981 store robbery during which his accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were killed in a fight after petitioner left the store. Although petitioner testified that the mother had not even entered the store before he left, and that he had not intended to kill or harm anyone, the jury was instructed "that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon." After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from that court, arguing, inter alia, that the burden-shifting instruction given at trial was unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510. While the habeas corpus application was pending, petitioner also called to the state court's attention this Court's subsequent decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307. After this Court summarily vacated the state court's summary denial of the writ and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Francis," the state court, although acknowledging that the jury instruction suffered from the same infirmities addressed in Francis, denied relief on state law grounds without considering whether Francis might apply retroactively, and without discussing Sandstrom.
Held: As a matter of federal law, petitioner's conviction cannot stand in light of Francis. Pp. 484 U. S. 215-218.
(a) Sandstrom, which had been decided before petitioner's trial took place, established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of proof on the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. Francis was merely an application of that governing principle. Accordingly, respondents' argument that a newly announced constitutional rule should not generally be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review cannot operate to deny petitioner the benefit of Francis. That argument simply does not apply where the "new" holding is merely an application of a rule that was well settled at the time of conviction. Pp. 484 U. S. 215-217.
does not place any limit on the issues it will entertain in collateral proceedings. Having considered the merits of the federal claim, that court has the duty to grant the relief that federal law requires. Pp. 484 U. S. 217-218.
290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E.2d 84, reversed and remanded.
Petitioner and an accomplice robbed a country store in South Carolina in 1981. After petitioner left the store, a fight occurred in which the accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were both killed. Petitioner was convicted of murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1982. State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983).
case involving a burden-shifting instruction, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), and petitioner promptly called that decision to the attention of the State Supreme Court. The court denied the writ without opinion.
Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in this Court. We summarily vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Francis v. Franklin." Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985). On remand, the state court determined that the jury instruction at petitioner's trial "suffered from the same infirmities present in Elmore and addressed in Francis v. Franklin." 290 S.C. 231, 233, 349 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1986). Nevertheless, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief. As an explanation for its holding, the court stated that its decision in Elmore should not be applied retroactively to invalidate a conviction that was final when Elmore was decided. The opinion did not consider whether the decision in Francis v. Franklin might apply retroactively, and also did not discuss our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, on which petitioner had relied.
We granted certiorari because we were concerned that the South Carolina Supreme Court had not fully complied with our mandate. 480 U.S. 945 (1987). We now reverse.
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
In re Winship, [397 U.S. 358, 397 U. S. 364 (1970)]. This "bedrock, axiomatic and elementary' [constitutional] principle," id. at 397 U. S. 363, prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 442 U. S. 520-524; Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 432 U. S. 210, 432 U. S. 215 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 421 U. S. 698-701 (1975); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 342 U. S. 274-275 (1952). The prohibition protects the "fundamental value determination of our society," given voice in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship that "it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 372. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 525-526 (1958).
471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 313.
in Francis" was responsive to our mandate, but the discussion of the question whether the decision in Elmore should be applied retroactively was not. Our mandate contemplated that the state court would consider whether, as a matter of federal law, petitioner's conviction could stand in the light of Francis. Since the state court did not decide that question, we shall do so.
The South Carolina Attorney General submits that we should adopt Justice Harlan's theory that a newly announced constitutional rule should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review unless the rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 401 U. S. 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or enunciates a procedural rule that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," id. at 401 U. S. 693. Under this theory, the Attorney General argues, petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of our ruling in Franklin.
to determine whether we should go further and adopt Justice Harlan's reasoning as to the retroactivity of cases announcing new constitutional rules to cases pending on collateral review.
"The theory that the habeas petitioner is entitled to the law prevailing at the time of his conviction is, however, one which is more complex than the Court has seemingly recognized. First, it is necessary to determine whether a particular decision has really announced a 'new' rule at all, or whether it has simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law. . . . One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize that many, though not all, of this Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation. In such a context, it appears very difficult to argue against the application of the 'new' rule in all habeas cases, since one could never say with any assurance that this Court would have ruled differently at the time the petitioner's conviction became final."
394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 263-264.
"The question before the Court in this case is almost identical to that before the Court in Sandstrom: whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the 'critical question of . . . state of mind,' 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 521, by creating a mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense."
"Sandstrom v. Montana made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from making use of jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 521. Today we reaffirm the rule of Sandstrom and the wellspring due process principle from which it was drawn. The Court of Appeals faithfully and correctly applied this rule, and the court's judgment is therefore affirmed."
Id. at 471 U. S. 326-327.
Francis did not announce a new rule. Second, we do not read the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion as having placed any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings. Since it has considered the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.
See App. 7; Tr. 1208.
"The doctrine against burden-shifting presumptions set out in Francis v. Franklin, [471 U.S. 307 (1985)], is not a clear break with prior law. The United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 . . . (1979), decided prior to Yates, held that conclusive presumptions or instructions which shift the burden of persuasion violate the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that, in every criminal trial, the state is required to prove each element of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court went on to hold, concerning Elmore-type errors, that conclusive presumptions conflict with the presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused. These presumptions, likewise, extend to every element of the crime and invade the truthfinding function which, in a criminal case, the law assigns solely to the jury."
290 S.C. at 239, 349 S.E.2d at 88-89.
"[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that rule in any material way."
See also Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U. S. 527 (1987) (per curiam); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461, 439 U. S. 462 (1979) (per curiam).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Archivnye materially o mongol'skikh i tiurkskikh narodakh v adakemicheskikh sobraniiakh Rossii. Doklady nauchnoĭ konferentsii. Sostavitel' I. V. Kul'ganek, pod red. S. G. Kliashtornogo. Izdanie podgotovili I. A. Alimov, I. V. Kul'ganek, E. V. Pavlova. Sankt-Petersburg; Tsentr "Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie", 2000, 152 str.
Archival materials on Mongolian and Turkic Peoples in Russian Academic Collections. Conference Papers. Compiled by I. V. Kulganek, ed. S. G. Klyashtorny. Prepared by I. A. Alimov, I. V. Kulganek, E. V. Pavlova. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Center for Oriental Studies, 2000, 152 pp.
Prof. Dr. Oleg F. Akimushkin - Head of the Department of the Middle East and Kurdish Studies Group at the Si. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, specialist in Persian culture history and history of Iran, Central Asia and East Turkestan, author of a series of monographs and articles.
Dr. Stephan H. Levitt - Expert in Sinhalese and Indie manuscripts. At present, a private tutor and consultant for the University of Pennsylvania Library, the Center for Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania, and the Burke Library, Union Theological Seminary, also an independent researcher, author of numerous publications.
Dr. Catherina Koch - Restorer at the Conservation Department of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz; specialises in the restoration of Central Asian documents from Turfan.
Dr. Elisabeth Zack - Researcher at the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo; field of scholarly interests - Arabic manuscripts and Arabic dialectology.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


Mr. V. C. Shuttleworth, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for petitioner.
Mr. W. Scott Mcagill, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
This case raises the same statutory question as Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577. The petitioner, Order of Railway Conductors, is the only accredited bargaining representative of conductors employed by the respondent Southern Railway. A dispute arose between certain conductors and the railroad concerning the railroad's obligation under the collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services. The claims of the conductors were referred to the union, which sought by negotiation to persuade the railroad to pay. The railroad refused, and thereafter prayed a South Carolina state court for a declaratory judgment interpreting the agreement as not requiring the claimed payments. The trial court first refused to exercise jurisdiction. Citing Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66 S.Ct. 322, 90 L.Ed. 318, it held that state courts, like federal courts, should leave settlement of such disputes to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The state Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state court did have power to interpret the bargaining agreement and adjudicate the dispute. 210 S.C. 121, 41 S.E.2d 774. After a lengthy trial the lower court held that the collective agreement did not require the compensation sought by the conductors and entered the declaratory judgment requested. The Supreme Court affirmed. 215 S.C. 280, 54 S.E.2d 816.
For reasons set out in the Slocum case, 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, we hold that the South Carolina state court was without power to interpret the terms of this agreement and adjudicate the dispute. We discuss this case separately because it sharply points up the conflicts that could arise from state court intervention in railroad-union disputes. After the railroad had sued in the state court, the union filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board. The state court nevertheless proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. Sustaining the state court's action would invite races of diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one forum to the other. And if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived of the privilege conferred by § 3, First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1191, 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First (i), which provides that after negotiations have failed 'either party' may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.
The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice REED is of the view that the decision below should be affirmed for the reasons set out in his dissent in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577.


text:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 246 › Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.
The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917.
annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case.
The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative -- the political -- departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a foreign territory is a political question the determination of which by the political departments of the government conclusively binds the judges.
When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court as to claims for damages based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency.
In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza government, which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. Held that the act could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.
87 N.J.L. 552, 704, affirmed.
This cases are stated in the opinion.
These two cases, involving the same question, were argued and will be decided together. They are suits in replevin, and involve the title to two large consignments of hides which the plaintiff in error claims to own as assignee of Martinez & Co., a partnership engaged in business in the City of Torreon, Mexico, but which the defendant in error claims to own by purchase from the Finnegan-Brown Company, a Texas corporation which it is alleged purchased the hides in Mexico from General Francisco Villa on January 3, 1914.
The cases were commenced in a circuit court of New Jersey in which judgments were rendered for the defendants, which were affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, and they are brought to this Court on the theory that the claim of title to the hides by the defendant in error is invalid because based upon a purchase from General Villa, who, it is urged, confiscated them contrary to the provisions of the Hague convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land, that the judgment of the state court denied to the plaintiff in error this right which he "set up and claimed" under the Hague Convention or treaty, and that this denial gives him the right of review in this Court.
were seized, and on January 3, 1914, were sold in Mexico to the Finnegan-Brown Company. They were paid for in Mexico, and were thereafter shipped into the United States and were replevied, as stated.
This Court will take judicial notice of the fact that, since the transactions thus detailed and since the trial of this case in the lower courts, the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250.
On this state of fact, the plaintiff in error argues that the "Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land" constitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico; that these "Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of property as we are considering in this case, and that therefore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale made by General Villa, and the property may be recovered by the Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this country.
paid for in cash, and, when not so paid for, a receipt shall be given and payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible. And also for the reason that the "Convention" to which the "Regulations" are annexed, recognizing the incomplete character of the results arrived at, expressly provides that, until a more complete code is agreed upon, cases not provided for in the "Regulations" shall be governed by the principles of the law of nations.
"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this Court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 137 U. S. 212.
jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 96 U. S. 186; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 168 U. S. 253. See s.c., 65 F. 577.
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be available of by sovereign powers as between themselves."
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 168 U. S. 252; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347.
Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted as the legitimate government of Mexico, in the progress of a revolution, and when conducting active independent operations, seizing and selling in Mexico, as a military contribution, the property in controversy at the time owned and in the possession of a citizen of Mexico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error. Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we have seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this Court such action, is not subject to reexamination and modification by the courts of this country.
considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."
It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court did, the validity of the levy of the contribution made by the Mexican commanding general under rules of international law applicable to the situation, since the subject is not open to reexamination by this or any other American court.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
In an eagerly anticipated decision by the asbestos bar, the United States Supreme Court in Air & Liquid Systems et al. v. DeVries et at., Dkt. No. 17-1104, 2019 WL 1245520 (March 19, 2019) rejected the “bare metal defense” as applied to sailors under federal maritime law. The 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Kavanaugh and joined by Justices Roberts, Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor, held that “a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reasons to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger.” Ibid. at *2.
The facts of DeVries mirror the facts of myriad cases that preceded it. Both plaintiffs were sailors who served aboard U.S. Navy warships between the 1950s and 1980s when asbestos was in widespread use. Present on those vessels were pumps, valves, steam traps, boilers, compressors and other equipment that had originally been supplied to the Navy by their manufacturers as “bare metal.” Once acquired, however, the Navy used asbestos-containing components provided by other manufacturers – such as gaskets, packing, and insulation materials – in conjunction with the product for the use the Navy intended. Most frequently, the equipment (and its asbestos-containing components) were placed into service on the high temperature and high-pressure steam systems aboard ship. The sailors were exposed to asbestos as a result of their work on the equipment, as well as being present when that work was performed. In this case, plaintiff John DeVries was a U.S. Navy engineering officer who served aboard the Gearing-class destroyer USS Turner between 1957 and 1960, and plaintiff Kenneth McAfee was a boatswain’s mate who serviced compressors which contained asbestos-containing components on a different vessel during the late 1970s and 1980s.
In reaching its decision, the Court analyzed three approaches that had previously been employed by courts grappling with the defense in the various federal circuits. The first approach was the more “plaintiff-friendly” rule of foreseeability, under which a manufacturer is liable “when it was foreseeable that its product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part.” Id. at *4. The second approach, the more “defendant-friendly” bare metal defense, states that a manufacturer is not liable for the asbestos-containing products of others subsequently installed within or affixed to its products. This rule is dominant in state courts on the west coast. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal.4th 335 (2012), Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 165 Wn.2d 341 (2008), and Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 165 Wn.2d 373 (2008). The Court rejected both of these rules in the maritime context, finding that the “rule of foreseeability would sweep too broadly,” while at the same time holding that “the bare-metal defense goes too far in the other direction.” Ibid.
The dissent, authored by Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito, restated the common law rule that a manufacturer’s duty to warn “is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics of the manufacturer’s own product,” whether or not that product is “integrated” with another product. Ibid. at *7, emphasis in original. The dissent cautioned that “we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about the dangers of its products when we require other people to share the duty to warn and its corresponding costs.” Id. Citing O’Neil, supra, the dissent also noted that “consumer welfare is not well served by requiring manufacturers to warn about the dangerous propensities of products they do not design, make or sell.” Id. Further, it raised pointed questions about the difficulties of defining an “integrated product,” noting that the purpose of tort law is to align liability with responsibility, and “not mandating a social insurance policy in which everyone must pay for everyone else’s mistakes.” Finally, the Court noted that the “silver lining” in the decision was the express limitation of the decision to the maritime context.
The Court’s decision is an unquestionable blow to the “bare metal defense,” and may even result in a resurgence of maritime and Navy asbestos claims on the west coast and elsewhere. But while the “bare metal” defense may no longer be the “absolute” defense it had previously been in some federal jurisdictions, the decision highlights the importance of other defenses.
First, and importantly, the Court’s decision emphasized the liability of a manufacturer for an “integrated product” made dangerous as a direct result of asbestos-containing products selected and installed by the Navy pursuant to military specifications. However, the government contractor defense was not before the Court. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Second, the Court’s holding was expressly dependent upon the fact that the manufacturer “has no reasons to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger.” In jurisdictions such as California, which have recognized both the sophisticated user and sophisticated intermediary defenses, it is likely that these defenses will become more significant. See Johnson v. American Standard 43 Cal.4th 56 (2008); Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. 63 Cal.4th 167 (2016).
Finally, the issue of the application of the “bare metal” product is critical. Given that the first “prong” of the Court’s newly-stated test is that the “bare metal” product “requires incorporation of [an asbestos] part,” it will be critical for a plaintiff to show that the product “required” incorporation of that part to function. Certainly, a “bare metal” product that could have multiple applications – only some of which may require the use of asbestos – may still be entitled to claim the defense under DeVries.
The Court’s decision likely creates more questions than it answers. But for now, both plaintiffs and the defense will continue to test the limits of this new law as the litigation continues.
Beveridge & Diamond's Toxic Tort and Environmental Tort practice group defends large companies in virtually all industries against toxic tort and product liability claims involving a wide range of chemicals and related substances, including metals such as arsenic, lead, and mercury. While the majority of clients tend to be in oil, chemicals, and manufacturing, we represent any type of company with actual or potential exposure to toxic tort liability or product liability. For more information, contact the authors.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.