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Bockelie, J. F. & Briskeby, P. I. 1980. The presence of a bothriocidarid (Echinoid) in the Ordovician of Norway. Norsk Geologisk Tidsskrift 60, 89-91.
Stukalina, G. & Hints, L. 1979. New finds of Echinoderms in the Upper Viruan deposits of North Estonia. Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR. Geology 28, 1, 1-10.
Stukalina, G. A. 1979. A new family of Ordovician crinoids. Paleontologicheski Zhurnal 4, 89-95.
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Franzén, C. 1979. Echinoderms. Sveriges Geologiska Undersökning 73, 3, 216-224. Lower Wenlock faunal and floral dynamics - Vattenfallet section, Gotland. Eds: Jaanusson, V. et al., pp. 216-224.
Moore, R. C., Lane, N. G., Strimple, H. L., Sprinkle, J. & Fay, 1978. Inadunata. Treatise on Invertebrate Paleontology. Part T. Echinodermata 2, pp. T520--T759.
Arendt, Yu. A. 1976. Ordovician echinodermata: Hemistreptocrinida. Bulletin of Moscow Society of Naturalists. Geology 51, 2, 63-84.
Yeltyscheva, R. S. 1975. Crinoids of Ordovician/Silurian boundary beds in Podolia. Voprosy paleontologii VII, 124-144. Voprosy paleontologi, VII, pp. 124-144.
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Regnéll, G. 1973. Tidiga tagghudingar. Fauna och flora 4, 161-165.
Yeltyscheva, R. S. & Sizova, Y. N. 1971. Onto-genetic modifications of the stems of some Paleozoic crinoids (columnals - stems of sea lilies). Voprosy paleontologii VI, 33-40. Voprosy paleontologi, VI, pp. 33-40.
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Yeltyscheva, R. S. 1964. Stems of Ordovician sea lilies of the Baltic area (Lower Ordovician). Voprosy paleontologii IV, 59-82. Voprosy paleontologi, IV, pp. 59-82.
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Öpik, A. 1934. Ristnacrinus, a new Ordovician crinoid from Estonia. Tartu Ülikooli Geoloogia Instituudi Toimetused , 40, 1-7.
Öpik, A. 1934. Üks tsüstiid Eesti Megalaspislubjakivist. Eesti Loodus , 1, 17-20.
Mortensen, T. 1930. Bothriocidaris and the Ancestry of Echinoids. Videnskabelige Meddelelser fra Dansk Naturhistorisk Forening i Kjobenhavn 90, , 313-352.
Teichert, C. 1928. Stratigraphische und paläontologische Untersuchungen im unteren Gotlandium (Tamsal-Stufe) des westlichen Estland und der Insel Dagö.. Neues Jahrbuch für Mineralogie, Geologie und Paläontologie. Monatshefte: Abt. B. Geologie, Paläontologie 60, 1-112.
Jaekel, O. 1927. Über Tormoblastus n.g., eine coronate Blastoidee, aus dem Ordovicium Schwedens. Arkiv För Zoologi 19A, 4, 1-6.
Öpik, A. 1925. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Kukruse-(C2-)Stufe in Eesti. I. Tartu Ülikooli Geoloogia Instituudi Toimetused , 1-18.
Hecker, R. F. 1923. Echinosphaeritidae of the Silurian of Russia. Trav. Mus. Géol. Min. Pierre le Grand Acad. Sci. Russie IV, 1, 1-63.
Jaekel, O. 1902. Ueber verschiedene Wege phylogenetischer Entwicklung. Verhandlungen des V. Internationalen Zoologen-Congresses zu Berlin. 12-16 August 1901, pp. 1058-1117.
Grewingk, C. 1867. Ueber Hoplocrinus dipentas und Baerocrinus Ungerni. Archiv für die Naturkunde Liv-, Ehst- und Kurlands I, 4, 100-114. Archiv für die Naturkunde Liv-, Ehst- und Kurlands. Erster Serie, Bd. IV, pp. 100-114.

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Messrs. Harry W. Colmery, of Topeka, Kan., and Charles L. Kagey, of Wichita, Kan., for petitioner.
The petitioner, Charles A. Shepard, a major in the medical corps of the United States Army, has been convicted of the murder of his wife, Zenana Shepard, at Fort Riley, Kan., a United States military reservation. The jury having qualified their verdict by adding thereto the words 'without capital punishment' (18 U.S.C. 567 (18 USCA 567)), the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The judgment of the United States District Court has been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, one of the judges of that court dissenting. 62 F.(2d) 683; 64 F.(2d) 641. A writ of certiorari brings the case here.
The crime is charged to have been committed by poisoning the victim with bichloride of mercury. The defendant was in love with another woman, and wished to make her his wife. There is circumstantial evidence [290 U.S. 96, 98] to sustain a finding by the jury that to win himself his freedom he turned to poison and murder. Even so, guilt was contested, and conflicting inferences are possible. The defendant asks us to hold that by the acceptance of incompetent evidence the scales were weighted to his prejudice and in the end to his undoing.
The conversation was proved twice. After the first proof of it, the government asked to strike it out, being doubtful of its competence, and this request was granted. A little later, however, the offer was renewed; the nurse having then testified to statements by Mrs. Shepard as to the prospect of recovery. 'She said she was not going to get well; she was going to die.' With the aid of this new evidence, the conversation already summarized was proved a second time. There was a timely challenge of the ruling.
She said, 'Dr. Shepard has poisoned me.' The admission of this declaration, if erroneous, was more than unsubstantial error. As to that the parties are agreed. The voice of the dead wife was heard in accusation of her husband, and the accusation was accepted as evidence of guilt. If the evidence was incompetent, the verdict may not stand. [290 U.S. 96, 99] 1. Upon the hearing in this court the government finds its main prop in the position that what was said by Mrs. Shepard was admissible as a dying declaration. This is manifestly the theory upon which it was offered and received. The prop, however, is a broken reed. To make out a dying declaration, the declarant must have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death. The record furnishes no proof of that indispensable condition. So, indeed, it was ruled by all the judges of the court below, though the majority held the view that the testimony was competent for quite another purpose, which will be considered later on.
We have said that the declarant was not shown to have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death. Her illness began on May 20. She was found in a state of collapse, delirious, in pain, the pupils of her eyes dilated, and the retina suffused with blood. The conversation with the nurse occurred two days later. At that time her mind had cleared up, and her speech was rational and orderly. There was as yet no thought by any of her physicians that she was dangerously ill, still less that her case was hopeless. To all seeming she had greatly improved, and was moving forward to recovery. There had been no diagnosis of poison as the cause of her distress. Not till about a week afterwards was there a relapse, accompanied by an infection of the mouth, renewed congestion of the eyes, and later hemorrhages of the bowels. Death followed on June 15.
Nothing in the condition of the patient on May 22 gives fair support to the conclusion that hope had then been lost. She may have thought she was going to die and have said so to her nurse, but this was consistent with hope, which could not have been put aside without more to quench it. Indeed, a fortnight later, she said to one of her physicians, though her condition was then grave, [290 U.S. 96, 100] 'You will get me well, won't you?' Fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be 'a settled hopeless expectation' (Willes, J. in Reg. v. Peel, 2 F . & F. 21, 22) that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 , 13 S.Ct. 50; Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553 , 16 S.Ct. 388; Id., 164 U.S. 694 , 17 S.Ct. 228; R. v. Perry, (1909) 2 K.B. 697; People v. Sarzano, 212 N.Y. 231, 235, 106 N.E. 87; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 1440, 1441, 1442, collating the decisions. Despair of recovery may indeed be gathered from the circumstances if the facts support the inference. Carver v. United States, supra; Wigmore, Evidence, 1442. There is no unyielding ritual of words to be spoken by the dying. Despair may even be gathered, though the period of survival outruns the bounds of expectation. Wigmore, 1441. What is decisive is the state of mind. Even so, the state of mind must be exhibited in the evidence, and not left to conjecture. The patient must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift and certain doom.
What was said by this patient was not spoken in that mood. There was no warning to her in the circumstances that her words would be repeated and accepted as those of a dying wife, charging murder to her husband, and charging it deliberately and solemnly as a fact within her knowledge. To the focus of that responsibility her mind was never brought. She spoke as one ill, giving voice to the beliefs and perhaps the conjectures of the moment. The liquor was to be tested, to see whether her beliefs were sound. She did not speak as one dying, announcing to the survivors a definitive conviction, a legacy of knowledge on which the world might act when she had gone.
The petitioner insists that the form of the declaration exhibits other defects that call for its exclusion, apart from the objection that death was not imminent and that [290 U.S. 96, 101] hope was still alive. Homicide may not be imputed to a defendant on the basis of mere suspicions, though they are the suspicions of the dying. To let the declaration in, the inference must be permissible that there was knowledge or the opportunity for knowledge as to the acts that are declared. Wigmore, 1445(2). The argument is pressed upon us that knowledge and opportunity are excluded when the declaration in question is read in the setting of the circumstances. On the one side are such cases as Berry v. States, 63 Ark. 382, 38 S.W. 1038; State v. Wilks, 278 Mo. 481, 213 S.W. 118; State v. Williams, 67 N.C. 12; State v. Jefferson, 125 N.C. 712, 34 S.E. 648; Shaw v. People, 3 Hun, 272; Id., 63 N.Y. 36; Stewart v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 670, 679, 32 S.W.(2d) 29; and Commonwealth v. Griffith, 149 Ky. 405, 149 S.W. 825; on the other, Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630, 57 N.E. 519; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 228, 90 N.W. 733; Fults v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 602, 204 S.W. 108; Cook v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 424, 235 S.W. 875; cf. the cases cited in 63 A.L.R. 567, note, and 25 A.L. R. 1370, note. The form is not decisive, though it be that of a conclusion, a statement of the result with the antecedent steps omitted. Wigmore, 1447. 'He murdered me,' does not cease to be competent as a dying declaration because in the statement of the act there is also an appraisal of the crime. State v. Mace, 118 N.C. 1244, 24 S.E. 798; State v. Kuhn, supra. One does not hold the dying to the observance of all the niceties of speech to which conformity is exacted from a witness on the stand. What is decisive is something deeper and more fundamental than any difference of form. The declaration is kept out if the setting of the occasion satisfies the judge, or in reason ought to satisfy him, that the speaker is giving expression to suspicion or conjecture, and not to known facts. The difficulty is not so much in respect of the governing principle as in its application to varying and equivocal conditions. In this case, the ruling that there [290 U.S. 96, 102] was a failure to make out the imminence of death and the abandonment of hope relieves us of the duty of determining whether it is a legitimate inference that there was the opportunity for knowledge. We leave that question open.
2. We pass to the question whether the statements to the nurse, though incompetent as dying declarations, were admissible on other grounds.
The Circuit Court of Appeals determined that they were. Witnesses for the defendant had testified to declarations by Mrs. Shepard which suggested a mind bent upon suicide, or at any rate were thought by the defendant to carry that suggestion. More than once before her illness she had stated in the hearing of these witnesses that she had no wish to live, and had nothing to live for, and on one occasion she added that she expected some day to make an end to her life. This testimony opened the door, so it is argued, to declarations in rebuttal that she had been poisoned by her husband. They were admissible, in that view, not as evidence of the truth of what was said, but as betokening a state of mind inconsistent with the presence of suicidal intent.
(a) The testimony was neither offered nor received for the strained and narrow purpose now suggested as legitimate. It was offered and received as proof of a dying declaration. What was said by Mrs. Shepard lying ill upon her death bed was to be weighed as if a like statement had been made upon the stand. The course of the trial makes this an inescapable conclusion. The government withdrew the testimony when it was unaccompanied by proof that the declarant expected to die. Only when proof of her expectation had been supplied was the offer renewed and the testimony received again. For the reasons already considered, the proof was inadequate to show a consciousness of impending death and the abandonment of hope; but inadequate though it was, there can be no [290 U.S. 96, 103] doubt of the purpose that it was understood to serve. There is no disguise of that purpose by counsel for the government. They concede in all candor that Mrs. Shepard's accusation of her husband, when it was finally let in, was received upon the footing of a dying declaration, and not merely as indicative of the persistence of a will to live. Beyond question the jury considered it for the broader purpose, as the court intended that they should. A different situation would be here if we could fairly say in the light of the whole record that the purpose had been left at large, without identifying token. There would then be room for argument that demand should have been made for an explanatory ruling. Here the course of the trial put the defendant off his guard. The testimony was received by the trial judge and offered by the government with the plain understanding that it was to be used for an illegitimate purpose, gravely prejudicial. A trial becomes unfair if testimony thus accepted may be used in an appellate court as though admitted for a different purpose, unavowed and unsuspected. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 200, 172 N.E. 466. Such at all events is the result when the purpose in reserve is so obscure and artificial that it would be unlikely to occur to the minds of uninstructed jurors, and even if it did, would be swallowed up and lost in the one that was disclosed.
These precepts of caution are a guide to judgment here. There are times when a state of mind, if relevant, may be proved by contemporaneous declarations of feeling or intent. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 , 12 S.Ct. 909; Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112; Wigmore, 1725, 1726, 1730. Thus, in proceedings for the probate of a will, where the issue is undue influence, the declarations of a testator are competent to prove his feelings for his relatives, but are incompetent as evidence of his conduct or of theirs. Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552 , [290 U.S. 96, 105] 571, 572, 573, 21 S.Ct. 474; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N.Y. 157, 62 Am.Dec. 71; Matter of Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 172, 60 N.E. 442. In suits for the alienation of affections, letters passing between the spouses are admissible in aid of a like purpose. Wigmore, 1730; Ash v. Prunier (C.C.A.) 105 F. 722; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, supra, page 297 of 145 U.S., 12 S.Ct. 909; Jameson v. Tully, 178 Cal. 380, 173 P. 577; Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769; Curtis v. Miller, 269 Pa. 509, 512, 112 A. 747. In damage suits for personal injuries, declarations by the patient to bystanders or physicians are evidence of sufferings or symptoms (Wigmore, 1718, 1719), but are not received to prove the acts, the external circumstances, through which the injuries came about. Wigmore , 1722; Amys v. Barton, (1912) 1 K.B. 40; Chicago & A.R.R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 336, 113 N.E. 629; Peoria Cordage Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 90, 119 N.E. 996, L.R.A. 1918E, 822; Larrabee's Case, 120 Me. 242, 113 A. 268; Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749, 15 A.L.R. 1536. Even statements of past sufferings or symptoms are generally excluded (Wigmore, 1722(b); Cashin v. New York, N. H. & H.R.R. Co., 185 Mass. 543, 70 N.E. 930), though an exception is at times allowed when they are made to a physician (Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439, 440; Cleveland, C., C. & I.R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 271, 3 N.E. 836, 54 Am.Rep. 312; contra, Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 228, 237, 30 N.E. 573). So also in suits upon insurance policies, declarations by an insured that he intends to go upon a journey with another may be evidence of a state of mind lending probability to the conclusion that the purpose was fulfilled. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, supra. The ruling in that case marks the high-water line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go. It has developed a substantial body of criticism and commentary. 1 Decla- [290 U.S. 96, 106] rations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored.
The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it spoke to a past act, and, more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker. Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentangled by a jury.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
[ Footnote 1 ] Maguire, The Hillmon Case, 38 Harvard Law Review, 709, 721, 727; Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 Harvard Law Review, 146; Chafee, Review of Wigmore's Treatise, 37 Harvard Law Review, 513, 519.

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In preface, I want to point out that, when I wrote the following article, the voir dire concepts I discuss were more in their infancy. Now, having becoming institutionalized, these concepts are lacking in the sort of novelty that the article conveys and are less of a vanguard of voir dire practices in Oregon. Regardless, the case law and legal authority supporting this article remain sound support for my discussion.
Unfortunately, the modern approach, when coupled with pre-set time limits, impinges upon voir dire’s traditional functions, namely to elicit sufficient information to allow the attorney to intelligently and effectively use peremptory challenges and to establish a basis for cause challenges. See, State v. Nefstad, 309 OR 523, 526 (1990). Pre-set time limits require attorneys to give up probing inquiry, attorneys should be prepared to challenge such limitations and thus, should be aware of the underpinnings of the right to conduct adequate voir dire.
An effective voir dire protects the litigant’s right to trial by fair and impartial jurors as guaranteed in criminal and civil cases by Article I, sections 11 and 17 of the Oregon Constitution. The right to a fair and impartial jury is a right that “is and should be guarded zealously by the courts.” Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 227 Or 223, 230 (1977).
The scope of the voir dire examination is placed within the court’s discretionary power to efficiently and expeditiously conduct the trial. State v. Barnett, 251 Or 234, 237 (1968). However, the court’s discretion is counterbalanced against counsel’s right to engage in relevant inquiry. Barnett, 251 Or at 238. Thus, a litigant is entitled to inquire into a venire person’s qualifications, including case-specific issues and individual predispositions or biases, Barnett, 251 Or at 238, or any interest or matter that may affect a the verdict because the right to an impartial jury means an impartial jury with relation to the actual issues litigated. Leishman v. Taylor, 199 Or 546, 556-57 (1953). Although counsel bears the burden to demonstrate that a particular inquiry is relevant, Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or 1, 4-5 (1964), case law supports a diverse inquiry.
Counsel’s inquiry is not necessarily limited by a venire person’s answers. Barnett, 251 Or at 237. Indeed, counsel may inquire as to particular beliefs so that the parties may make their own determination whether a venire person will be impartial and accordingly exercise peremptory challenges. Barriett, 251 Or at 237.
The court in exercising discretion must find from all of the facts that the juror will be impartial and fair and not be biased consciously or subconsciously. A mere statement by the juror that he will be fair and afford the parties a fair trial becomes less meaningful in light of other testimony and facts which at least suggest the probability of bias.
Lambert, 277 0r at 230.
Venire persons are excused for bias if they have “such a fixed attitude of mind that it would control [their] actions in some appreciable degree” when they assume the position of trier of the fact: State v. Humphrey, 63 Or 540, 548 (1912). Before a venire person is impaneled, the court mus be convinced in the exercise of its discretion that a probability of bias does not exist. Lambert, 227 Or at 230.
In addition, the presence of a biased juror is presumptively prejudicial. If after reviewing the voir dire record the appellate court determines that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to excuse a biased venire person and the litigant had exhausted all peremptory challenges, reversal and remand for a new trial is mandated. Lambert at 231.
The modern voir dire method coupled with pre-set time limits is antithetical to the very process of eliciting information from individual venire persons regarding their potential biases. The time limitations, either explicit or implied, unduly restrict counsel’s inquiry. Simple math demonstrates that counsel’s voir dire time is extremely limited, rendering probative individual questioning impossible. Under the modern method each attorney has at his or her disposal less than a few minutes per venire person.
However, for a satisfactory inquiry, counsel needs the same flexibility available in a witness examination. Counsel must be free to proceed slowly, ask open ended questions, follow up on hedge words, and accurately mirror given answers to allow a juror to comfortably disclose feelings and experiences. Practical experience dictates that once counsel detects a suggestion of bias, they will need at least 10-20 additional minutes to develop the record. Throughout this process, counsel must simultaneously build trust with the venire to obtain necessary candor. This relationship cannot be built by rushing answers. See Jurywork: Systematic Techniques .§ 17.01 (Nat’l Jury Project 2d ed. 1996); Jury Selection Procedures in United States District Courts (Fed. Judicial Center 1982).
Furthermore, because of the limits on information, counsel will obtain a time constrained voir dire. Peremptory challenges must now be exercised to remove venire persons who, had time been allotted, may have demonstrated sufficient bias for challenge for cause. Peremptory challenges may no longer be reserved to remove venire persons whose undesirability does not rise to the level of actual bias. Time constrained voir dire forces counsel into the dilemma of choosing between developing one or two challenges for cause or superficially chatting with the venire and thereafter solely exercising peremptory challenges in the dark.
Attorney: Mrs. Smith, I observed that you did not raise your hand.
Mrs. Smith: No, I didn’t. I personally don’t care who drinks, but I don’t drink.
Attorney: Mrs. Smith, would you share with me your feelings about alcohol?
Mrs. Smith: Well, I think it’s a free world. Some people drink, others don’t. It’s fine with me.
In time-limited voir dire, counsel simply does not have time to develop the record to support a challenge for cause and might instead earmark a peremptory challenge for Mrs. Smith or accept her answer on face value. Had time been available, counsel may have determined that Mrs. Smith’s view of alcohol is based on a fixed religious belief that biased the juror against the defendant and thus should be excused for cause. Alternatively, counsel may have determined that Mrs. Smith merely does not like the taste of alcohol and thus may be a qualified juror. However, under the modern method, counsel either has one less peremptory challenge or risks allowing a biased venire person to be impaneled.
In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting voir dire in this respect, we consider, among other factors, (1) the extent of the court’s initial examination of the venire panel; (2) whether defense counsel attempted to prolong voir dire; (3) whether the questions defense counsel was not permitted to ask were proper voir dire questions; and (4) whether defense counsel was permitted to examine prospective jurors who actually served on the jury.
Id. at 551 (citations omitted). The Court held that because the trial court’s initial questioning provided only general background information, counsel had not abused or prolonged the voir dire process, and most importantly, because counsel had been precluded from adequately questioning jurors about racial bias, the time limitation did not adequately provide defense counsel with “the opportunity to ascertain the existence of grounds of a challenge for cause or to obtain enough information to make an intelligent decision about whether to exercise peremptory challenges.” Id. at 552.
In some instances, judges who impose fixed time limitations grant some latitude in questioning on request. However, the very existence of fixed time limits places a chilling effect on counsel’s ability to effectively probe for actual bias and to intelligently utilize peremptory challenges. Instead of risking the court’s disapproval, counsel will often fit voir dire within time limits, overlook potential juror bias and exercise peremptory challenges based on limited information.
A system with presumptive time limits that preclude sufficient inquiry into bias and prevents the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges may violate litigants’ constitutional and statutory rights to trial by fair and impartial jurors. Furthermore, counsel that fails to conduct a sufficiently probing inquiry, or alternatively, fully develop the record, and preserve issues for appeal potentially abandon duties owed to their client. As a matter of course, counsel should consider furnishing the court with a pretrial memorandum as to the issues of the case, areas of potential bias, and supporting law regarding challenges for cause to ensure adequate voir dire. Encouragingly, there is supportive case law in this jurisdiction and others against arbitrary limitation of relevant voir dire.

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CDFI Fund: Authorized by Treasury to allocate to CDEs the authority to issue to their investors up to the aggregate amount of equity as to which NMTCs may be claimed.
NMTCs: Credits the CDE may allow to investors of qualified equity investments.
Treasury: Manages the CDFI Fund.
An investor who makes an investment to acquire stock or equity in a CDE may take certain tax credits (the “NMTCs”) so long as the investment constitutes a “qualified equity investment” (“QEI”). The credit provided to the investor total 39% of the cost of the investment and is claimed over a seven year period. In the first three years, the investor may claim 5% per year. In the remaining four years, the investor may claim 6% per year. The NMTCs can be subject to RECAPTURE!
CDEs: (a) Must have a primary mission of community development, (b) Maintain accountability to LIC representatives through at least 20% representation on the CDE governing or advisory board, (c) Must be certified by the CDFI Fund, (d) Must be a domestic corporation or partnership including a multiple member LLC.
Substantially All: (a) 85% of QEI must be invested in QLICIs (tested annually), (b) 12 months to invest QEI or to reinvest nonscheduled QLICI repayment, (c) Issuance costs and CDE overhead are not included in the “substantially all” requirement, (d) Up to 5% loan loss reserves do count toward QLICIs.
QEI: (a) Must be investment in CDE, (b) Either stock or capital interest, (c) Acquired at original issue solely in exchange for cash, (d) Substantially all of such cash must be used to make QLICIs, (e) CDE must designate the investment as a QEI and provide notification of designation to investor and CDFI Fund.
QLICIs (Qualified Low Income Community Investment): (a) Any capital or equity investment in, or loan to, any QALICB, (b) The purchase of qualifying loans from another CDE, (c) Financial counseling and other services to businesses located in, and residents of, LICs, (d) Any equity investment in, or loan to, another CDE to the extent the second CDE uses the proceeds as described in paragraphs (a) through (c).
Nonqualified Financial Property Test: Less than 5% of the average of the aggregate unadjusted bases of the property of the entity is attributable to nonqualified financial property (includes debt, stock, partnership interests, options, futures contracts, forward contracts, warrants, notional principal contracts, annuities and other similar property). There are certain safe harbors to this test.
Rental Real Estate Rules: (a) Cannot be Section 168(e)(2)(A) “residential rental property” (building which derives 80% or more of gross rental income from dwelling units), (b) Substantial improvements must be located on property, (c) Any lessee of the property must not be an excluded business, (d) No country club, golf course, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack or other gambling facility or liquor store.
(d) Targeted populations, which include certain individuals or an identifiable group of individuals, including an Indian tribe, who (A) are low-income persons or (B) otherwise lack adequate access to loans or equity investments.
Basic rules regarding RECAPTURE: NMTCs subject to recapture for 7 years after QEI is made in CDE. The amount of the recapture is NMTCs allowed for all prior taxable years + Interest at the IRS underpayment rate.
Investors may not redeem their investment in the CDE prior to the conclusion of the seven year period.
Recapture not triggered if: (a) CDE enters bankruptcy; (b) QALICB goes out of business; (c) Foreclosure of the mortgage on commercial rental real estate.
Cure: If the CDE fails to meet the 85% (substantially all) requirement and the CDE corrects the failure within 6 months after the CDE becomes aware (or should have become aware), such failure is not a recapture event. One cure period per QEI!
Which parties will use the financed facilities?
Sale or ground lease of the site?
Can the loan to the investment fund be disregarded? If the governmental body is the leverage lender (using bond proceeds) and is also the end user (e.g., lessee of the project), is it really a loan? Can bond counsel rely on “ultimate use of proceeds” and ignore intermediate steps?
Loans to lenders and California Health Facilities Authority vs. IRS case.
Use of proceeds: Are proceeds used to “provide” the facility?
Acquired purpose obligation yield: Analyze loan between the issuer and the investment fund, or look at all levels from the issuer to QALICB? Tax credits as investment yield?
The investor entity may be treated as a user of bond proceeds in connection with leveraged tax-exempt bond financings (leveraged in the sense that tax-exempt bond proceeds are loaned to the leveraged lender or investment fund and then further loaned to the QALICB). Some firms are comfortable giving the tax-exemption opinion based on the conclusion that the ultimate use of the moneys (use by the QALICB) is the use that must be considered for tax-exempt bond purposes. Other firms believe that the investor entity is treated as the user of the proceeds (because the investor entity receives the tax credits over the seven-year period), thereby disqualifying the bonds from governmental or qualified 501(c)(3) bond status. In unleveraged structures, it is generally okay to use tax-exempt bonds together with NTMCs, however.
Cannot use multifamily housing bonds under I.R.C. § 142 because of mutually exclusive rules regarding residential rental housing!
Security for the bonds is a significant issue because the NMTC seven-year standstill requirement. The NMTC investor requires a priority security interest, too.
Project consists of renovation of existing dormitories and construction of a mixed-use building for use as a student center and hub for several key community outreach programs administered by students and faculty of the College.
Total development budget is $17.3 million: $15 million in equity from a NMTC investor and $11.5 million leverage loan in the form of a tax-exempt loan purchased directly by a bank, which was also the ultimate parent of the CDE lender.
College itself could not satisfy the NMTC requirements to be a QALICB. To solve the issue, a portion of the College’s business was underwritten as the “QALICB” using the “portion of the business” rule under I.R.C. § 45D.
NMTC funds may not be used to finance businesses that are engaged in the rental of residential rental property. Dormitory space had to be carefully analyzed in order not to violate this rule.
The Treas. Reg. § 1.141-3 regulations state that the ultimate use of the proceeds or the direct and indirect use of proceeds are what govern the qualification of the bond issue under I.R.C. §§ 141 and 145.
Prior IRS approval that loans to private lenders may not have impermissible private business use derived from the loan of the proceeds to the lender where the lender is required to loan the proceeds to a qualified housing development (the so-called “loans-to-lenders” ruling).
Prior case law holdings that the substance, not the form, of the transaction governs the tax law analysis: California Health Facilities Authority v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 832 (May 2, 1988); and GCM 39455 (March 30, 1984).
NMTCs may be combined with other types of tax credits, including the Historical Tax Credits under I.R.C. § 47, energy tax credits under I.R.C. §§ 46 and 48 and various state and federal grants. NMTCs, however, cannot be used together with loan income housing tax credits under I.R.C. § 42.
Q: What is the “equity” investment?
A: The “equity” investment is the investment by the investor in the CDE (or in the corporation established by the CDE).
Q: When does a NMTC allocation to the CDE expire?
A: The CDFI allocates NMTC allocations annually to select CDEs through a competitive process. The CDE must use that allocation within five years.
Q: When does a NMTC allocation to a project expire?
A: The taxpayer’s cash investment received by a CDE must be invested in a QEI within the 12-month period beginning on the date the cash is paid by the taxpayer to the CDE (Treas. Reg. 1.45D-1(c)(5)(iv) and (d)(2)(i)). The CDE’s allocation from the CDFI Fund, however, does not expire until after five years (Section 45D(b)(1)(C)).
Q: Can a CDE in one geographical area make an allocation to a project located in a different geographical area?
A: Each CDE has an assigned “service area” that is established at the time the CDE applies to be recognized as a CDE.
Q: What is the relevance of the Historic Boardwalk Hall case?
A: In a decision in August 2012 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court held that a tax credit investor was not a bona fide partner because the investor lacked a meaningful stake in the success or failure of the project owner. Consequently, the project owner was not a valid partnership for tax purposes, and the investor partner was not entitled to any rehabilitation tax credits. This decision could have far-reaching implications for various federal tax credit investments and affect the structure and economics of many tax credit transactions. Investors in such credits may have to assume additional risk in order to be regarded as having a meaningful state in the partnership’s entrepreneurial risk. Whether such added risk will entitle investors to a larger share of partnership profits or a lower pricing model for the tax credits is yet to be determined. If a tax credit investor has no realistic possibility of upside and is insulated from construction, operational and tax risk, the investor may lose the tax credits. According to the Third Circuit, complete risk mitigation may be inconsistent with a tax credit investor’s status as a partner. The investor was Pitney Bowles. See Bond Attorneys’ Workshop materials for 2013 for additional information.
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text: 502 THE APPROPRIATIVE RIGHT Idaho Supreme Court observed in 1952 that a determination of the duty of water, which involved many factors, is based upon "two primary considerations: beneficial and economical use," and is a determination of a fact.332 The Montana Supreme Court cautioned that the limitation of economy of use is to be applied within reasonable limits; that is, the objective of a determination of the duty of water is the quantity necessary to irrigate land not only economically, but successfully. Emphasis should of course be placed upon economy of use, but not "to such an extent as to imperil success."333 And the system of irrigation in common use in the locality, if reasonable and proper under existing conditions, may be taken as a standard, even though a more economical method might be adopted.334 As considered and applied in the decisions, economical use is an antonym of waste. If an appropriator wastes water, he necessarily is not using it economically. As he has no right to waste water unreasonably or unnecessarily, then of necessity he must make economical as well as reasonable and beneficial use. The limitation of the appropriative right to economical and reasonable use thus precludes any waste of water that can be reasonably avoided.335 The use of water is so necessary as to preclude its being allowed to run to waste. Its "full beneficial and economical use requires" that when the wants of one appropriator are supplied, another may be permitted to use the flow.336 The Colorado Supreme Court "recognizes the urgent and ever increasing necessity" for enforcing economical use of water for irrigation. "Whenever there is a wasteful, or other unnecessary or unlawful use of water, it should be promptly and efficiently dealt with under the law."337 v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73, 113 (C. C. D. Nev. 1897); Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 14, 28 (N. D. Cal. 1905); "A prior appropriator is only entitled to the water to the extent that he has use for it when economically and reasonably used," Washington State Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 27 Idaho 26, 44, 147 Pac. 1073 (1915); "Under the law and the specific terms of the decree as it has been directed to be modified, the allowance of a prior right to plaintiffs for one hundred and eighty-four inches is limited to such times as that quantity, by reasonable and economical use, is necessary for the irrigation of their lands," Twaddle v. Winters, 29 Nev. 88, 109-110, 85 Pac. 280 (1906), 89 Pac. 289 (1907). 332 Uhrig v. Coffin, 72 Idaho 271, 274, 240 Pac. (2d) 480 (1952). 333Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 376, 380, 222 Pac. 451 (1924). 334 Worden v. Alexander, 108 Mont. 208, 215, 90 Pac. (2d) 160 (1939). See Rodgers v. Pitt, 129 Fed. 932, 943-944 (C.C.D. Nev. 1904). 335 Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co., 245 Fed. 30, 33-34, 35 (9th Cir. 1917). 336Hufford v. Dye, 162 Cal. 147, 159, 121 Pac. 400 (1912). 331Comstock v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 58 Colo. 186, 205-206,145 Pac. 700 (1914).

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text:
Present: BECK, SMITH, & DUFFLY, JJ.
Witness, Child. Practice, Criminal, Access to witnesses.
A criminal defendant failed to demonstrate that conditions imposed by a Superior Court judge on the defendant's pretrial interviews of two child witnesses (the children of the defendant and the victim) constituted improper prosecutorial interference with defense access to witnesses [149-150]; further, any argument that the defendant was prejudiced by the judge's failure to follow the procedure called for by Commonwealth v. Carita, 356 Mass. 132 , 142-143 (1969), regarding the availability of witnesses, was waived by the defendant's failure to raise the issue at trial [150-151]; at any rate, the conditions imposed by the judge, which required the presence of a victim-witness advocate during the interviews and prohibited either parent from attending the interviews, were reasonable in the circumstances, and did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, where the defendant's claim that the children's testimony had been unduly influenced by the victim (their mother) was addressed by defense counsel in closing argument and through vigorous and thorough cross-examination of the children and the victim [151-152].
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 4, 1997.
Amy E. Hamill, Assistant District Attorney (David W. Cunis, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.
dismissed after trial as duplicative.) The couple's two sons, then ages six and eight, were nearby at the time of the assaults. When the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to call the children as witnesses, the defendant sought to have defense counsel interview the children. On appeal, the defendant claims that the conditions imposed on these interviews deprived him of his State and Federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to counsel, and to full and fair cross-examination. We affirm.
The relevant historical and procedural facts are these. The victim and the defendant had a turbulent relationship beginning soon after they met in 1985, through the time of their marriage in 1990, and their divorce in 1996. The Commonwealth's evidence was that there were sporadic incidents of physical abuse. In the summer of 1997, the defendant twice sexually assaulted the victim, once in June and a second time in August. The defendant was indicted in September, 1997, and arraigned the next month.
At the pretrial conference in December, the defendant filed a motion for disclosure of the names and addresses of Commonwealth witnesses. The Commonwealth's subsequent responses included as witnesses the victim, the detective assigned to the case, and up to three fresh complaint witnesses. According to defense counsel, when the Commonwealth had contacted him "to inquire whether counsel for the [defendant] would call the children as witnesses[,] [c]ounsel . . . informed [the prosecutor] that he was considering calling them only if necessary to establish the alibi defense [for] the June . . . incident." Shortly before trial in February, 1999, the names of the children appeared on the Commonwealth's list of witnesses for the first time.
despite a restraining order that required the defendant to stay away from the victim. The victim insisted that the victim-witness advocate be present at the interview and that the defendant not be present. In consequence of these conditions, the interview did not take place.
On Monday, February 22, the first day of trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from calling the children or, in the alternative, to allow defense counsel to conduct a voir dire regarding the children's competency and ability to provide relevant testimony. The defendant asserted that the Commonwealth had "prevented reasonable access to the children."
out of there, . . . the victim/witness advocate can assist the child in terminating the interview, but otherwise the victim/witness advocate is certainly not to intervene or talk or suggest answers or coach or help the children or leave them alone, but the victim/witness advocate is not precluded from disclosing to others what is said.
"Counsel's interview with a witness is not privileged. Witnesses are free to talk to others about it as they wish and where the witnesses are minors and have another person present, that other person present may also . . . talk."
Defense counsel then asked the judge to exclude the children's testimony on grounds of the late disclosure. The judge responded that from looking at the file of the case, "the allegation that the children were banging at the door or physically present in the house was made clear from very early on." She ruled that given the children's ages it was "understandable . . . that the Commonwealth would wait . . . to see whether or not the children were old enough to and willing to actually testify in a court proceeding. So I do not see that there is any unfair surprise . . . [that] the Commonwealth has decided now that, yes, they are old enough and can go ahead and testify."
Counsel then asked for a voir dire to determine whether the boys were competent to testify and whether they had been subject to undue influence in the eighteen months since they had last seen their father. The judge told counsel that undue influence went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. As to competence, the judge reserved a decision on that issue until after defense counsel had an opportunity to interview the children.
Defense counsel interviewed the children later that day. Before the boys testified two days later, the judge conducted a voir dire of each boy. Upon completion of the hearings, she ruled that the children were competent to testify. The boys were ten and nine at the time of trial.
door was locked. From the sliding glass door the older son saw his parents come out of the bathroom.
In describing his observations on the day of the second assault, the older boy testified that his mother was "really a mess. Her hair was . . . messed up and her clothes were all wrinkled." She seemed nervous. The bed in the room where they had been was also "a mess."
On cross-examination, the older boy acknowledged that his mother had discussed the case with him "frequently since [he] found out . . . [he] was going to be testifying in court" a few weeks before. In fact she had asked him questions on matters to which he had just testified -- what she looked like, what the bedroom looked like, if he had seen a car or a truck in the driveway, how long the defendant was in the house, whether anyone else was in the car. His mother did not tell him what had happened or what to say.
The younger boy also testified that the front door was locked on the morning of the first attack. He saw the defendant pulling his mother into the bathroom by her hand. His mother was trying to get away. He was "nervous and . . . scared of what was going on."
The younger boy's testimony regarding the day of the second assault was that he saw his parents in the hallway near the guest room in his grandmother's house. His mother's shirt was wrinkled and her hair was "messed up." The defendant went into the bathroom after he came out of the guest room. When the boy went into the bathroom, he saw that there was urine all over, on the floor and on the toilet seat. He cleaned it up so that his mother, who suffered from a chronic disease, would not have to "bend down or anything." On cross-examination, the younger son testified that he did not remember talking much with his mother about the events at issue. Both boys testified that their mother told them they were going to court because their father was going to call them to testify and that she thought it would be better if she called them.
In closing argument, defense counsel stressed that the victim's testimony that she had not talked to the children about the case was belied by the older boy's testimony that she had asked him about matters to which he had testified on direct examination.
Defense counsel pointed out that the victim "had sole control over [the] children from August of 1997 until today" and argued that her testimony was "conflicting . . . inaccurate . . . [and] incorrect." He suggested that the children's testimony was "tainted" by the victim's questions, and that the "facts [had been] burn[ed] into their memory [by the mother] over a period of eighteen months." He asked rhetorically whether the children had been "brainwashed."
Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that his ability to "discover the extent to which the children's memories and perceptions were their own was severely and unnecessarily impeded by . . . the prosecutor." He contends that "the record . . . demonstrates prosecutorial interference with [his] access to the child witnesses prior to trial" and that the trial court "unnecessar[ily] hind[ered] . . . [his] access to those witnesses once trial began" and failed to follow the procedures set out in Commonwealth v. Carita, 356 Mass. 132 , 142- 143 (1969). He further asserts that he was "entitled to a disinterested third person at the interviews [with his sons]." (Although he expresses dismay about the late notice that the boys would testify, the defendant does not argue that the judge abused her discretion in allowing them to do so. See Commonwealth v. Manning, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 695 , 704 .) We examine each of the defendant's arguments in turn.
At the outset, we note that contrary to the defendant's argument, the record does not demonstrate that the prosecutor interfered with defense access to the children. Rather, the record before us, lacking detailed reconstruction of the lobby conference, see Arch Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Bartlett Health Enterprises, Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404 , 406 (1992) (burden on the appellant in first instance to furnish record supporting his claims on appeal), suggests that it was the victim, the children's mother, who requested that the victim-witness advocate be present during the pretrial interviews. The defendant does not dispute the assertion in the prosecutor's affidavit to that effect. He merely denies that he agreed to the idea. The order itself came from the judge.
349 Mass. 505 , 515-516 (1965) (witnesses in custody; district attorney refused to permit interview); or in which the Commonwealth interfered with a defendant's access to a witness, see Commonwealth v. McMiller, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 392 , 400-409 (1990) (prosecution first refused to disclose the witness's identity, and then once the witness had been identified in a newspaper article, refused to grant the witness the same testimonial privilege it had granted her a month before in another case). Compare Commonwealth v. Rivera, 424 Mass. 266 , 271-272 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 934 (1998) (no impermissible interference where witness initially agreed to speak with defense counsel, but changed her mind after meeting privately with prosecutor and then refused to meet with counsel without a representative of the district attorney's office).
The defendant also asserts that "the trial judge . . . failed to follow the procedure called for by [Commonwealth v. Carita, 356 Mass. at 142-143]." Carita provides that when there is an issue as to a prosecution witness's availability, "the defence should . . . file a motion to be allowed to interview the witness. The witness should thereafter be brought to court and instructed on his or her rights to consent or not to consent to an interview. A record should be kept of the proceedings." Ibid. More recently, the Legislature established that a witness has the right "to be informed of the right to submit to or decline an interview by defense counsel or anyone acting on the defendant's behalf, except when responding to lawful process, and, if the . . . witness decides to submit to an interview, the right to impose reasonable conditions on the conduct of the interview." G. L. c. 258B, § 3(m), inserted by St. 1995, c. 24, § 5.
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556 , 563-564 (1967). Even were we to determine that the judge somehow erred in failing "to take the matter in charge [herself]," Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650 , 659 (1979), any error did not create such a risk.
The conditions the judge established were reasonable under the circumstances. At the least, they did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 424 Mass. at 271 (witnesses' insistence on presence of representative of district attorney's office well within their rights to impose reasonable conditions on the interviews). Cf. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680 , 700 (1979) (requirement that correction officer be positioned outside open door of interview room reasonable where witness was inmate who had previously escaped from custody). While the designation of a neutral third party has a certain appeal, aside from the defendant's failure to request such a person, the judge reasonably could have believed that the victim-witness advocate was familiar with the case and that she could help the children understand and tolerate the required court procedures. The condition that neither of the children's parents be present also makes sense. See generally Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 427 Mass. 1201 , 1203 (1998) (children who witness or experience domestic violence suffer "deep and profound harms"). As the Commonwealth points out, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the victim-witness advocate overstepped her limited role, disclosed the content of the interviews to the prosecutor or anyone else in the district attorney's office, or otherwise interfered with the defendant's access to the children.
important to know circumstances such as how many times the children were questioned, what is the hypothesis of the questioner, what is the motivation of the questioner to distort the children's recollection through suggestion or coaching," citing United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 572-574 (8th Cir. 1996), a case involving sexual assaults on children who were subjected to coercive questioning by agency professionals, which is not relevant here. Defense counsel raised the questions set out above in his cross-examination of the victim and the children, and in closing argument. His cross-examination of the children was vigorous and effective on the subject of their conversations with their mother and in establishing the discrepancies in the victim's testimony. He had ample opportunity to cross-examine the victim (although he does not seem to have requested a pretrial interview), including the matter of the child support payments and the inquiries of the Department of Revenue. That the jury nevertheless found the defendant guilty does not appear to be the result of the interview limitations of which the defendant complains. Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458 , 462-463 (1996) ("pretrial taint hearing" not necessary when defendant's offer of proof does not reach certain threshold). Defense counsel properly addressed his arguments about the victim's credibility to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402 , 411 (1978).
"[A]n examination of the whole record . . . [reveals that the children, although nearby,] were not eyewitnesses [to the sexual assaults] . . . [and] [t]he cross-examination of [them] appears to have been thorough." Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. at 659-660. "Thus we hold that any prejudice was minimal and any error not a ground for reversal." Id. at 660. The judgments are therefore affirmed.

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Renewal fees for a European patent application in respect of the coming year are due on the last day of the month containing the anniversary of the date of filing of the European patent application.
According to Rule 51(1) as amended with effect from 1 April 2018 (OJ EPO 2018, A2), the renewal fee in respect of the third year may be paid up to six months before it falls due. All other Renewalrenewal fees may not be validly paid more than three months before they fall due. Examples: if a European application has a filing date in November 2008, according to Rule 51(1) the renewal fee for the third year has a due date of 30 November 2010 and the earliest date for payment is 31 August 2010; if a European application has a filing date in May 2009, according to Rule 51(1) the renewal fee for the third year has a due date of 31 May 2011 and the earliest date for payment is 28 February 2011.
Renewal fee payments made earlier than three months before the due dates permissible prepayment periods are not valid and will be refunded by the EPO, unless made shortly before the permissible prepayment periodthose periods. In this case, however, the payment will only take effect on the first day of the permissible prepayment period.
If the renewal fee has not been validly paid on or before the due date, it may still be validly paid within six months of the said date, provided that the additional fee is paid within this period. The additional fee can be paid until the last day of the sixth month following the month containing the anniversary of the date of filing (see J 4/91, reasons 2.7). This six-month period begins on the last day of the month referred to in Rule 51(1), first sentence, even if the circumstances described in Rule 134(1), (2) and (5) apply. Rule 134 is applicable to the calculation of the expiry of the six-month time limit for payment of the additional fee (see J 4/91, reasons 3.2). Whilst a notice draws the applicant's attention to the possibility under Rule 51(2) and Art. 2(1), item 5, RFees, he may not invoke the omission of such notification (see J 12/84 and J 1/89). For renewal fees for European divisional applications see A‑IV, 1.4.3.
If the applicant requests entry into the regional phase before the expiry of the 31-month period (see Art. 22 PCT and Art. 39 PCT), in order for the request to become effective the renewal fee in respect of the third year has to be paid if the fee has fallen due earlier under Rule 51(1). If the renewal fee is not paid on the date early processing is requested, the request for early processing will be effective only as from the date on which the renewal fee is paid (and all further requirements necessary on the latter date have been complied with).
The obligation to pay renewal fees terminates with the payment of the renewal fee due in respect of the (patent) year in which the mention of the grant of the European patent is published, see Art. 86(2). "Patent years" are calculated as from the date of filing of the application. The first patent year (Art. 86(1), Art. 141(1)) starts on the date of filing and ends on the same date of the following year. For the second and subsequent years, the patent year starts one day after the anniversary of the date of filing and ends on the same day as the date of filing of the following year.
This means that, for the last renewal fee payable to the EPO, it is not the due date but the beginning of the respective patent year that is decisive. If the mention of the grant of the European patent is published on the anniversary of the date of filing, the renewal fee in respect of the next patent year, which has not yet begun, is no longer payable to the EPO but to the national authorities.
Special provisions apply with regard to the due date for renewal fees in respect of cases where there is a successful request for re-establishment of rights under Art. 122 or a successful petition for review of a decision of the board of appeal under Art. 112a.


Rafael NORIEGA-MILLN, a/k/a Rafi, Defendant, Appellant.
Juan David Vilar-Coln, Ponce, PR, on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Jeannette Mercado-Ros, Attorney, Hato Rey, PR, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Antonio R. Bazan, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for plaintiff, appellee.
Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellant Rafael Noriega-Millan petitioned the district court to change his plea from not guilty to guilty as to all eleven counts of a superseding indictment charging him with violating a number of federal firearms laws. Count nine, charging Noriega-Millan with possession of a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), carried a ten-year maximum term of imprisonment. For each of the remaining counts, the maximum term of imprisonment was five years. The district court accepted Noriega-Millan's plea at a joint change-of-plea hearing at which Noriega-Millan and two of his co-defendants, each represented by counsel, pleaded guilty.
Noriega-Millan entered his guilty plea pursuant to an agreement which stipulated that the government would, among other things, reduce the total offense level from 31 to 28, and recommend a sentence of 97 months of imprisonment, a sentence in the middle of the applicable range of 87-108 months of imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court declined to accept the government's recommendation of a 97-month term and imposed the maximum sentence of 108 months, to be served concurrently as to all counts of the indictment.
On appeal, Noriega-Millan argues that his guilty plea should be set aside because, although the district judge complied with Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by warning him that the court was not bound by the government's recommendations, the judge failed, in derogation of Rule 11(e)(2) and Noriega-Millan's substantial rights, to advise him that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea if the court declined to accept the government's recommendations. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence.
The only issue on appeal concerns the procedure by which Noriega-Millan's plea of guilty was entered and accepted, as to which the record reveals the following.
Noriega-Millan's plea agreement states that the agreement was made pursuant to Rules 11(e)(1)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 The agreement provided that Noriega-Millan would plead guilty to all counts of the indictment in exchange for the government's agreement to do the following: (i) reduce the total offense level by three levels from 31 to 28 for acceptance of responsibility; (ii) recommend a sentence of 97 months of imprisonment, based upon an estimated total offense level of 28 and criminal history category of II, for which the sentencing range is 87-108 months of imprisonment; and (iii) raise no opposition to a recommendation of a sentence at the lower end of the applicable range, if such a recommendation were to be made by the United States Probation Office in its Presentence Report.
The defendant is aware that the defendant's sentence is within the sound discretion of the sentencing judge and will be imposed in accordance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, Application, and Background Notes. The defendant is aware that the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum set for the offense to which the defendant pleads guilty. If the Court should impose a sentence up to the maximum established by statute, the defendant cannot, for that reason alone, withdraw a guilty plea, and will remain bound to fulfill all of the obligations under this plea agreement.
Paragraph ten of the agreement states, "Defendant Rafael Noriega-Millan is fully aware that the Court is not bound by this plea agreement, including but not limited to: sentencing guidelines calculations, stipulations, and/or sentence recommendations."
In contrast to plea agreements made pursuant to Rules 11(e)(1)(A) and (C), Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreements cannot be withdrawn if the court chooses to reject the terms of the agreement; once accepted by the district court, a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement "foreclose[s] forever the defendant's other options." United States v. Graibe, 946 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.1991). For this reason, when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement, the district judge is required by Rule 11(e)(2) to advise the defendant that the court is not obligated to accept the government's recommendations and that the defendant will not be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea in the event that the court does not follow the government's recommendations.
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance in Rule 11 proceedings of direct interrogation of the defendant by the district court in order to facilitate the determination of the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). In addition, this court has repeatedly stated that the defendant's acknowledgement of a signed plea agreement or other written document will not substitute for Rule 11's requirement of personal examination by the district court. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1220 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1343, 134 L.Ed.2d 492 (1996); United States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693, 696 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 259, 133 L.Ed.2d 183 (1995); see also United States v. Kennell, 15 F.3d 134, 136, 137 (9th Cir.1994).
A joint change-of-plea hearing was held on July 31, 1995, with Noriega-Millan and two co-defendants present, each represented by counsel. Although the judge sometimes addressed himself to all three defendants collectively, he engaged in individual colloquies with Noriega-Millan and each co-defendant regarding the following: his competence to plead guilty; the voluntariness of his plea; his knowledge and understanding of the charges against him and the penalties attending the charges; and whether he had consulted his attorney regarding the charges and the plea agreement. The judge addressed the defendants collectively regarding their awareness and understanding of the constitutional rights they waived by entering a plea of guilty. Throughout the hearing, the court addressed the defendants through an interpreter, although Noriega-Millan sometimes answered the court's questions in English.
In response to the court's questioning during his individual colloquy, Noriega-Millan acknowledged, inter alia, that he had reviewed the plea agreement with the assistance of counsel prior to the hearing, and that his attorney had explained the agreement to him before he signed it; that he had read the plea agreement and understood everything in it; that he was aware that his criminal history category was II and that the total offense level was 28, based upon the government's recommendation of a three-level reduction from offense level 31 for acceptance of responsibility; that he understood that the sentencing range specified in the plea agreement was 87-108 months of imprisonment; that, pursuant to the plea agreement, the government would recommend a sentence of 97 months of imprisonment; and that he understood that the government's recommendations were not binding upon the court.
The district judge gave the Rule 11(e)(2) warnings to each defendant separately, rather than to all the defendants collectively. During his individual colloquies with Noriega-Millan's co-defendants, the district judge warned each defendant both that the court was not obligated to accept the government's recommendations and that the defendant would not be permitted to withdraw his plea if the court did not follow the government's recommendations. During his individual colloquy with Noriega-Millan, however, the district judge advised him only that the court was not bound to follow the government's recommendations; he did not warn Noriega-Millan that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea in the event that the government's recommendations were not followed.
On November 2, 1995, a sentencing hearing was held at which Noriega-Millan appeared as the sole defendant, again represented by counsel. At the sentencing hearing, as at the change-of-plea hearing, the district judge warned that the government's recommendations were not binding upon the court but did not advise Noriega-Millan that he would not be allowed to withdraw his plea if the court were to reject the government's recommendations.
After permitting Noriega-Millan to address the court regarding his family ties and his desire to rehabilitate himself, the district court accepted the government's recommendation regarding concurrent service of sentence but rejected its recommendation of a 97-month term of imprisonment, instead sentencing Noriega-Millan to the maximum term of 108 months, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on other counts. Noriega-Millan raised no objection to the sentence and made no attempt to withdraw his plea in the district court. This appeal followed.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B), which governs Noriega-Millan's plea agreement, provides a procedure by which a defendant may agree to plead guilty in exchange for the government's agreement to "make a recommendation, or agree[ment] not to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court." Rule 11(e)(2) provides that, before the district court may accept a guilty plea entered pursuant to a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement, "the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea."
Noriega-Millan asserts that he did not move to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing because he had hoped that the district court would follow the government's recommendation of a 97-month sentence, and that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that he would not be allowed to withdraw his plea if the district court did not follow the government's recommendation. He contends that the district court's failure to give this required warning was not harmless error because, as a result of the court's error, he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea and, therefore, his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Noriega-Millan raises these arguments for the first time on appeal.
Because a defendant who enters a guilty plea "simultaneously waives several constitutional rights," McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, due process requires that the defendant's entry of a guilty plea be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act, "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (footnote omitted). Rule 11 gives effect to this principle by requiring district courts to follow certain procedures "designed to ensure that defendants who enter guilty pleas do so with full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of their plea." Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d at 695 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Compliance with Rule 11's procedures enables the district court to determine for itself the voluntariness of the plea and "facilitates that determination in any subsequent post-conviction proceeding based upon a claim that the plea was involuntary." Id. at 696 (citations omitted). We determine the validity of a plea in view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Rule 11 hearing. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d at 522-23 & n. 11; United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 94, 133 L.Ed.2d 49 (1995); Padin-Torres, 988 F.2d at 284.
The effect of a failure to comply with Rule 11 depends upon the nature of the failure. This court has held that a guilty plea should be set aside only for violations that implicate the "core concerns" of Rule 11 and not for mere technical violations of the rule's procedural requirements. See, e.g., Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4; United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1244 (1st Cir.1991). This is "especially true if the defendant was not misled or the omission did not affect his decision." Allard, 926 F.2d at 1244. Rule 11's core concerns are absence of coercion, understanding of the charges, and knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea. See Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4 (citing Allard, 926 F.2d at 1244-45). In determining whether the core concerns of Rule 11 have been satisfied, the court "should not exalt form over substance but should look to the reality of the situation as opposed to the ritual." Allard, 926 F.2d at 1245.
In claiming that, as a result of the district judge's failure to give the second of the two Rule 11(e)(2) warnings, he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea, Noriega-Millan raises a core concern of Rule 11. Nonetheless, we cannot set aside a plea where the appellant "has suffered no concrete prejudice other than entering a plea he now regrets." United States v. Zorrilla, 982 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.1992). We find that, in view of the totality of the circumstances, the district court's failure to advise Noriega-Millan that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea did not amount to a substantial defect in the plea proceedings and did not, as Noriega-Millan claims, adversely affect his substantial rights.
"The heart of the matter is whether the defendant would have entered the guilty plea had he known that there was a probability of receiving a substantially greater sentence than that recommended in the plea agreement." Kennell, 15 F.3d at 136. See Allard, 926 F.2d at 1244; United States v. Diaz-Vargas, 35 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Vaughn, 7 F.3d 1533, 1535 (10th Cir.1993). The record reveals, and Noriega-Millan does not dispute, that the district judge personally warned him that the court was not obligated to follow the government's sentencing recommendations, and personally ensured that Noriega-Millan understood that, although the government had agreed to recommend a 97-month sentence, the maximum sentence that the court could impose was 108 months. Given these facts and Noriega-Millan's willingness to plead guilty in exchange for a 97-month sentence, it seems to us highly unlikely that, properly warned of his inability to withdraw his guilty plea once it was accepted, Noriega-Millan would have chosen to go to trial rather than risk the possibility that the district court might impose a sentence eleven months longer than the government's recommended sentence. We conclude that the district court's failure to warn Noriega-Millan of his inability to withdraw his plea did not affect his decision to plead guilty.
Our conclusion is supported by Martinez-Martinez, in which we found the advisement requirements of Rule 11(e)(2) to be satisfied where the district judge did not explicitly inform the defendant that she could not withdraw her guilty plea, but where the court "personally ensured that [the defendant] understood the non-binding nature of the [government's] recommendation." 69 F.3d at 1223-24. Our view is also supported by similar cases from other circuits, which found the district court's failure to advise the defendant that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea to be harmless error. See United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1574-76 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1011, 136 L.Ed.2d 888 (1997); Diaz-Vargas, 35 F.3d at 1224-25; United States v. Thibodeaux, 811 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. de le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 314-15 (3d Cir.1985).
Noriega-Millan disagrees with Martinez-Martinez. He argues that the proposition that the court is not bound by the government's recommendations is logically distinct from the proposition that the defendant is nonetheless bound if the court declines to accept those recommendations, and that notice of the former proposition does not inform the defendant of the latter proposition; nor does it relieve the court of its responsibility to inform the defendant of the latter proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Zickert, 955 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir.1992); Theron, 849 F.2d at 481; United States v. Iaquinta, 719 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir.1983). Noriega-Millan contends, in other words, that the two warnings relate to different issues and that Rule 11(e)(2) requires the district court to give both warnings.
This argument is not without logic or force. Indeed, a number of courts have held that the district court's failure to warn the defendant of his inability to withdraw his guilty plea once it has been accepted constitutes reversible error, and that the district court's warning that it was not bound by the government's recommendation is insufficient to render the error harmless. See United States v. DeBusk, 976 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir.1992); Zickert, 955 F.2d at 668-69; United States v. Ferrara, 954 F.2d 103, 107-108 (2d Cir.1992); Graibe, 946 F.2d at 1434-35; Theron, 849 F.2d at 481; Iaquinta, 719 F.2d at 85.
We ourselves read Martinez-Martinez as laying down no inflexible rule but as considering the district court's warning as to the non-binding nature of the government's recommendations to be an element in the circumstances that bears on the determination of whether the court's failure to warn the defendant of her inability to withdraw the plea is harmless error. For the reasons we have stated, we find the district court's error to be harmless in this case and therefore we reject Noriega-Millan's argument that his plea should be set aside for the district court's failure to warn him that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea once it had been accepted. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d at 1223-24.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Ministry of Education and Culture), Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AMEREX ELECTRONICS, PHILS. CORPORATION, Respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsioko for Private Respondents.
The government, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, expropriated property owned by Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation. The amount of just compensation for such property is now the subject of this petition for review on certiorari.
Inasmuch as the alleged negotiation did not materialize, on June 3, 1974, Avegon, Inc. sold the property and its improvements to Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation (Amerex for brevity) for P1,800,000. Thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 115571, 115572, 115573 and 115574 were issued in favor of Amerex.
In a motion praying that the plaintiff be authorized to take immediate possession of the property, the then Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., invoking Presidential Decree No. 42, informed the court that said assessed value of the property for taxation purposes had been deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Escolta, Manila on September 30, 1975.
Consequently, on October 9, 1975, the court issued an order directing the sheriff to place the plaintiff in possession of the property. The plaintiff took actual possession thereof on October 13, 1975.
Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating that while it was not contesting the merits of the complaint, the same failed to categorically state the amount of just compensation for the property. It therefore prayed that in consonance with P.D. No. 794, the just compensation be fixed at P2,432,042, the market value of the property determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex’s own declaration.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff reasoning that while indeed the market value as determined by the assessor was lower than that declared by Amerex, the plaintiff intended to present evidence of a much lower market value.
Alleging that its motion to dismiss merely sought a clarification on the just compensation for the property, Amerex filed a motion to withdraw the plaintiff’s deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without prejudice to its entitlement to the amount of P1,128,572, the balance of the just compensation of P2,432,042 insisted upon. The plaintiff interposed no objection to the motion provided that an order of condemnation be issued by the court and that the plaintiff be allowed to present its evidence on the matter of just compensation.
On December 3, 1975, the lower court issued an order vesting the plaintiff with the lawful right to take the property upon payment of just compensation as provided by law. On December 19, 1975, after the parties had submitted the names of their respective recommendees to the appraisal committee, the lower court appointed Atty. Narciso Pena, Aurelio V. Aquino and Atty. Higinio Sunico as commissioners.
Thereafter, the lower court ordered Amerex to submit an audited financial statement on the acquisition cost of the property including expenses for its improvement. Amerex was also allowed by the court, after it had filed a second motion therefor, to withdraw the P1,303,470 deposit with the PNB.
Amerex, however, opposed the motion for leave to amend the complaint contending that the plaintiff was insisting on a valuation given by neither the owner nor the assessor as mandated by P.D. No. 794 but by another person in August 1973 when the peso value was much higher.
The lower court denied the motion to amend the complaint; but after the plaintiff had filed a motion for reconsideration, the lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27, 1976. In the meantime, Amerex submitted to the court "audited financial statements" consisting of an account stating that the cost of its land and buildings was P2,107,479.48, and another account stating that it incurred total expenses of P150,539 for their maintenance. 3 These statements yielded the amount of P2,258,018.48 as the total value of the property.
"Under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 794, abovequoted, we could have safely adopted the valuation of the City Assessor in the sum of P2,432,042.00, this being lower than that declared by the owner in the sum of P2,435,000.00, although by actual appraisal of the undersigned Commissioners the property could command a fair market value of P2,763,400.00 as of the date of our ocular inspection.
Both parties objected to the report of the commissioners. The plaintiff contended that the commissioners’ conclusion that the fair market value of the property was P2,763,400 was unsupported by evidence and that their recommended just compensation of P2,258,018.57 was excessive. It reiterated its stand that the just compensation should only be P1,800,000 it being the price had the sale between the city school board and Avegon, Inc. materialized and also the actual price of the sale between Avegon, Inc. and Amerex. On the other hand, Amerex averred that the recommended just compensation was unjustified in view of the commissioners’ finding that the fair market value of the property was P2,763,400.
"The court believes that the findings of the commissioners are supported by the evidence adduced during the hearings and that their recommendation is reasonable. The property was originally owned by Avegon, Inc. and was assessed at P1,079,370.00 by the City of Manila for the year 1974 (Exh. A-4). Avegon, Inc. offered to sell it to the City School Board on July 21, 1973 at P2,300,000.00 but it accepted the counter-offer of P1,800,000. The negotiations, however, fell through when the city failed to act (Exhs. C, C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4). The property was appraised on February 15, 1974 at P2,100,000.00 at the instance of Commonwealth Insurance Company, an affiliate of Warner, Barnes & Co., Inc. (Exh. G). The defendant company introduced improvements on the property in the middle part of 1974 worth P260,690.50 (Exhs. 4, 4-A to 4-J; 11, 13, 14 to 19). After the renovation, the property was again appraised at the instance of the defendant at P2,300,000.00 on November 15, 1974 (Exh. 2). Due to the world-wide recession, there followed a slump in the demand for electronic products. On June 4, 1975, the Traders Commodities Corporation offered to buy the property at P2,750,000.00 with a deposit of P50,000.00 as earnest money. The offer was formally made by the law firm Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Africano and Associates (Exh. 6). The offer was accepted on June 9, 1975 (Exhs. 7 and 8). The sale was not consummated, however, when the government notified the defendant in a conference held in Malacañang on June 15, 1975 that it wanted to buy the property for the use of the Manuel de la Fuente High School (Exh. 9). Because of the failure of the parties to agree on the price and other conditions of the purchase, the government filed this action on August 2, 1975.
"1.	Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio B. Aquino from membership in the Committee of Appraisal.
2.	Whether or not respondent Court erred in not totally disregarding the ‘audited statement by the defendant’, which is hearsay in nature and was not formally offered in evidence.
Hence, it hardly matters that one of the three commissioners had a preconceived and biased valuation of the condemned property. The veracity or exactitude of the estimate arrived at by the commissioners may not be adversely affected thereby. In fact, the report of only two commissioners may suffice if the third commissioner dissents from the former’s valuation. 10 Indeed, the participation of an allegedly biased commissioner may not result in the total disregard of an appraisal report in the absence of proof that the two other commissioners were unduly influenced by their allegedly partial colleague.
We hold that the courts below made an erroneous determination of just compensation in this case.
"We have checked the details of the transactions indicated in the foregoing schedule of Land and Building Account as at January 31, 1976 with the books and records of Amerex Electronics (Philippines) Corporation which were presented to us for examination and have found the details to be in accordance therewith. We have not made an audit of the books of accounts of Amerex Electronics (Philippines) Corporation.
January 23, 1976 Makati, Rizal"
It is clear from these certifications that the accounting firm which issued them merely compared the figures in the schedules or "audited" statements with those of the records and books of accounts of Amerex. As no investigation was made as to the veracity of the figures in the account, there was no audit in the real sense of the term. To audit is to examine an account, compare it with the vouchers, adjust the same, and to state the balance, by persons legally authorized for the purpose. 16 While the word "audit" is sometimes restricted to a mere mathematical process, it generally includes investigation, the weighing of evidence, and deciding whether items should or should not be included in the account. 17 Audit involves the exercise of discretion; it is a quasi-judicial function. 18 The accuracy of the "audited" statements herein is therefore suspect.
WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the property expropriated for the use of the Manuel de la Fuente High School (Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is hereby fixed at Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00). After deducting the amount of P1,303,470.00 therefrom, the petitioner shall pay the balance with legal interest from October 13, 1975.
Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., took no part.
1.	Original Record on Appeal, p. 3.
2.	Real Property Tax Code.
3.	Original Record on Appeal, p. 47-A.
7.	Original Record on Appeal, pp. 82-83.
8.	Judge Jose C. Colayco, presiding.
9.	Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, L-35861, October 18, 1979, 93 SCRA 503.
10.	See: Republic v. Garcellano, 103 Phil. 231.
11.	Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 57564, January 8, 1986, 141 SCRA 30 citing Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
12.	City Government of Toledo City v. Fernandos, L-45144, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 285.
13.	Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, supra.
14.	Original Record on Appeal, p. 47-B.
16.	Moreno’s Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., citing Ynchausti & Co. v. Wright, 47 Phil. 885.
17.	4A Words and Phrases 578 citing Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Pierce Engine Co., 123 N.W. 643, 644, 141 Wis. 103.
18.	Mabuhay v. Serina, L-28636, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 642.
19.	See: Republic of the Philippines v. Urtula, 110 Phil. 263.
20.	Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305.
21.	Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 55166, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
23.	Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 71412, August 15, 1986, 143 SCRA 466.

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