to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.
2. WILLIAMS lost at least two opportunities for employment after SCREENING SOLUTIONS wrongfully, repeatedly, and in violation of the procedures required by the FCRA, matched him with an individual named Ricky Williams, a convicted felon who had been convicted of criminal acts including burglary and assault and battery on a pregnant woman and included this match in a background report. This error was due to SCREENING SOLUTIONS failure to follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of its consumer reports as mandated by 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b). SCREENING SOLUTIONS also improperly inserted previously deleted information in the credit file SCREENING SOLUTIONS created and maintained relating to WILLIAMS in violation of by 15 U.S.C. §1681i(a)(5)(B). Based on this wrongful match, SCREENING SOLUTIONS, which was also hired by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE to go beyond the functions of a credit reporting agency to make judgments about the hiring of WILLIAMS, determined that he was ineligible for employment with RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE.
3. SCREENING SOLUTIONS further violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by not providing WILLIAMS with the background report containing the match between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams and with a written description of his rights under the FCRA before using such information to take the adverse action of determining that he was ineligible for employment. SCREENING SOLUTIONS thereby deprived WILLIAMS of an opportunity to dispute the erroneous match with Ricky Williams before it took the adverse action of judging him to be ineligible for employment. This was in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3).
4. Moreover, both RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE took the action of refusing to hire WILLIAMS for as long as SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending. WILLIAMS attempted to convince RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had erroneously matched him with Ricky Williams and incorrectly determined that he was ineligible for employment but such attempts were futile as they were completely rebuffed without any consideration by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE which arbitrarily adhered to their refusal to hire WILLIAMS while the SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination was pending.Moreover, both RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE quickly followed their refusal to hire WILLIAMS while SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination of ineligibility for employment was pending with a formal denial of employment. The adverse action taken by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE of refusing to hire WILLIAMS while the determination by SCREENING SOLUTIONS that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending was taken well before providing WILLIAMS with the consumer report on which the adverse action was based in violation of §1681b(b)(3). Moreover, RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE’s adverse action in formally denying WILLIAMS employment without giving WILLIAMS sufficient time after the consumer report was received or a real opportunity to dispute the erroneous match between himself and Ricky Williams was also in violation of §1681b(b)(3).
5. This court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681p and 28 U.S.C. §1331 in that all claims brought arise under the FCRA.
6. WILLIAMS is a natural person and a United States citizen and is and, at all material times, was a resident of Levy County, Florida, and is otherwise sui juris. WILLIAMS graduated from St. Leo University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in criminal justice and has lived his whole life at the same address in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida.
7. WILLIAMS is a consumer within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §1681a(c) in that he was, at all material times, and is, an individual.
8. SCREENING SOLUTIONS is a foreign corporation that is authorized to, and doing business in, Levy County, Florida in the federal Northern District of Florida.
for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
10. RENT-A-CENTER EAST, INC. is a foreign corporation that is authorized to, and doing business in, Levy County, Florida in the federal Northern District of Florida.
11. WINN-DIXIE is a Florida corporation that is authorized to, and doing business in, Alachua County, Florida in the federal Northern District of Florida.
12. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to WILLIAMS’ claims occurred in the federal Northern District of Florida and one or more of the Defendants “resides” in the Northern District of Florida.
13. On or about February 20, 2012, WILLIAMS applied for a position with RENT-A-CENTER at its store in Chiefland in Levy County, Florida.
14. RENT-A-CENTER contracted with SCREENING SOLUTIONS to perform background checks of prospective employees and prepare a “background report” of the information gathered and to, based on that background report, make a judgment to determine whether a prospective employee was eligible for employment. A judgment of ineligibility for employment by SCREENING SOLUTIONS was tantamount to a decision not to hire the prospective employee by RENT-A-CENTER.
15. On or about February 28, 2012, SCREENING SOLUTIONS determined that WILLIAMS was “ineligible” for employment using the background report it prepared which was based on the consumer file it created and maintained relating to WILLIAMS in which it had matched WILLIAMS with a Ricky Williams who was arrested for selling cocaine in Palm Beach County in 2009 and for whom there was an outstanding bench warrant.
16. SCREENING SOLUTIONS provided this background report and determination of ineligibility for employment to RENT-A-CENTER on February 28, 2012. WILLIAMS is informed and believes that SCREENING SOLUTIONS provided this report to RENT-A-CENTER immediately, by electronic means, on that date.
17. On its website, SCREENING SOLUTION touts its “unmatched global [background] screening expertise.” However, SCREENING SOLUTIONS made the erroneous match between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams and Ricky Williams’ arrest and bench warrant and determined that he was ineligible for employment with RENT-A-CENTER despite the fact that: (i) in 2009, WILLIAMS lived in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida which is approximately 300 miles away from Palm Beach County, Florida; (ii) that RICHARD and Ricky are different first names; (iii) that WILLIAMS used his middle name of Alexander or a middle initial “A” in any public records he completed and no middle name or middle initial appears in the criminal records for Ricky Williams by which SCREENING SOLUTIONS made the match with WILLIAMS; (iv) that “Williams” is a common name; and (v) that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had no indication of a match of social security numbers for the two persons. These are things that SCREENING SOLUTIONS could have reviewed to easily determine that WILLIAMS was not Ricky Williams.
18. WILLIAMS is not the Ricky Williams to whom he is matched in the background report prepared by SCREENING SOLUTIONS and he has never been arrested for selling cocaine in Palm Beach County or anywhere else and is not the subject of an outstanding bench warrant.
19. SCREENING SOLUTIONS also provided WILLIAMS with notice of its providing the erroneous match of WILLIAMS with Ricky Williams and his arrest for selling cocaine and bench warrant to RENT-A-CENTER. However, unlike the background report to RENT-A-CENTER which WILLIAMS believes was delivered immediately by electronic means, this notice to WILLIAMS was sent on February 28, 2012 by regular mail and received several days later. See Exhibit “A” attached hereto.
20. On February 28, 2012, SCREENING SOLUTIONS, as agent for RENT-A-CENTER, also provided WILLIAMS with a copy of the erroneous background report it provided to RENT-A-CENTER determining that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment and indicating the erroneous match to Ricky Williams and his arrest record along with a cover letter/notice on what appeared to be RENT-A-CENTER’s letterhead. Thus, this correspondence purported to be on behalf of RENT-A-CENTER but was actually sent by SCREENING SOLUTIONS. Included with this notice was a written description of a consumer’s right under the FCRA. A copy of this notice is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” This notice was sent via regular mail and received several days later even though, again, WILLIAMS believes that the erroneous background report was delivered immediately by electronic means to RENT-A-CENTER on February 28, 2012. Thus, by the time WILLIAMS actually received this notice it was several days after the adverse action taken on or about February 28, 2012.
21. This notice stated that “LexisNexis Screening Solutions did not make this employment decision….” However, this statement was false and deceptive as SCREENING SOLUTIONS had determined that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment.
22. It was not until receiving the above-referenced report and notices days after February 28, 2012, that WILLIAMS first discovered that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had erroneously determined that he was ineligible for employment and matched with Ricky Williams and his arrest record and outstanding bench warrant.
23. After receiving the above-referenced erroneous background report and notices, WILLIAMS promptly contacted SCREENING SOLUTIONS to dispute the erroneous match advising SCREENING SOLUTIONS that he was not Ricky Williams and had not been arrested for selling cocaine in 2009 nor was he the subject of a bench warrant.
24. Unfortunately, RENT-A-CENTER refused to hire WILLIAMS for as long as SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ February 28, 2012 determination that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending. Attempts by WILLIAMS to convince RENT-A-CENTER that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had erroneously matched him with Ricky Williams were futile as they were completely rebuffed without any consideration by RENT-A-CENTER which arbitrarily adhered to its refusal to hire WILLIAMS while the SCREENING SOLUTIONS determination was pending. Indeed, Sylvia Bazan, an employee of RENT-A-CENTER in its Human Resources department expressed doubt when WILLIAMS told her he was not the Ricky Williams in the report. Moreover, RENT-A-CENTER quickly followed its refusal to hire WILLIAMS while SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination of ineligibility for employment was pending with a formal denial of employment.
25. WILLIAMS had progressed through several stages of the employment application process with RENT-A-CENTER including having had an interview. WILLIAMS is informed and believes that, but for the erroneous match made by SCREENING SOLUTIONS between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams and his arrest record and Bench warrant along with SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ adjudication of WILLIAMS as ineligible for employment, he would have been hired by RENT-A-CENTER. See an E-mail sent by SCREENING SOLUTIONS on behalf of RENT-A-CENTER dated February 20, 2012 congratulating him on “being selected for the next step towards a great career with RENT-A-CENTER” and requesting such drug test attached hereto as Exhibit “C.” However, after it received SCREENING SOLUTIONS erroneous determination that WILLIAMS was not eligible for employment, Ms. Bazan told WILLIAMS he did not have sufficient experience to be qualified. WILLIAMS believes this statement was false and pretextual in that, as was its practice, RENT-A-CENTER only requested a background report and determination from SCREENING SOLUTIONS after it, or its agents, determined WILLIAMS was otherwise qualified. Due to the actions of SCREENING SOLUTIONS, instead of being gainfully employed by RENT-A-CENTER, WILLIAMS was unemployed.
27. On or about April 4, 2013, WILLIAMS applied to WINN-DIXIE for a position as a “liquor store team member” at its store in Gainesville, Alachua County, Florida.
28. Like the earlier situation with RENT-A-CENTER, WILLIAMS progressed through several stages of the application process including an interview and had, subject to submission of satisfactory proof of his identity, submission of satisfactory proof that he was legally authorized to work in the United States, and successful completion of a drug test and background check, been hired for such position.
29. Regrettably, like RENT-A-CENTER, WINN-DIXIE also contracted with SCREENING SOLUTIONS to perform background checks of prospective employees and prepare a “background report” of the information gathered and based on that background report, make a judgment whether a prospective employee was eligible for employment. A judgment of ineligibility for employment by SCREENING SOLUTIONS was tantamount to a decision not to hire the prospective employee by WINN-DIXIE.
30. Again, on its website, SCREENING SOLUTION touts its “unmatched global [background] screening expertise.” However, despite that fact that: (i) because of the prior notification by WILLIAMS, SCREENING SOLUTIONS knew that there is an individual who had been arrested for committing a felony and for whom there was an outstanding warrant with the same last name and the same birthdate as WILLIAMS named Ricky Williams and that the two should not be matched because they were not the same person; (ii) that WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams use different first names; (iii) that WILLIAMS used his middle name of Alexander or a middle initial “A” in any public records he filled out and there was no middle name or middle initial for Ricky Williams used appearing in the criminal records which SCREENING SOLUTIONS used to match him with WILLIAMS; (iv) that “Williams” is a common name; (v) that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had no indication of a match of social security numbers for the two persons; and (vi) that SCREENING SOLUTIONS, seemingly, based on what was listed in the Clerk of the Court’s records, in the consumer file it created and maintained relating to WILLIAMS, indicated a Delray Beach, Palm Beach County address for Ricky Williams whereas WILLIAMS had always lived in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida which is approximately 300 miles away from Delray Beach, SCREENING SOLUTIONS again had erroneously matched WILLIAMS with Ricky Williams based only on them having the same last name and date of birth.
31. SCREENING SOLUTIONS determined WILLIAMS ineligible for employment using the background report it prepared which was based on the consumer file it created and maintained relating to WILLIAMS in which it had matched WILLIAMS with Ricky Williams who had been convicted of burglary and aggravated battery on a pregnant woman in Broward County in 2004. Curiously, this conviction occurred approximately five years before the arrest of Ricky Williams SCREENING SOLUTIONS had reported to RENT-A-CENTER over a year earlier, yet this conviction did not appear in the background report SCREENING SOLUTIONS prepared for RENT-A-CENTER.
32. SCREENING SOLUTIONS provided this background report and determination of ineligibility for employment to WINN-DIXIE on April 25, 2013. WILLIAMS is informed and believes that SCREENING SOLUTIONS provided this report to WINN-DIXIE immediately, by electronic means, on April 25, 2013.
33. WILLIAMS is not the Ricky Williams to whom he was matched in this background report prepared by SCREENING SOLUTIONS and has never been convicted of burglary or aggravated battery on a pregnant woman or anyone else.
34. SCREENING SOLUTIONS provided WILLIAMS with notice of its providing the erroneous match of WILLIAMS with Ricky Williams and his conviction for burglary and aggravated battery on a pregnant woman in Broward County in 2004 to WINN-DIXIE. However, unlike the background report to WINN-DIXIE, which WILLIAMS believes was delivered immediately by electronic means, this notice was sent to WILLIAMS on April 25, 2013 by regular mail and it arrived several days later. See Exhibit “E” attached hereto.
35. On April 25, 2013, SCREENING SOLUTIONS, as agent for WINN-DIXIE, also provided WILLIAMS with a copy of the erroneous report it provided to WINN-DIXIE adjudicating RICHARD A. WILLIAMS ineligible for employment along with a cover letter/notice on what appeared to be WINN-DIXIE’s letterhead. Thus, this correspondence purported to be on behalf of WINN-DIXIE but was actually sent by SCREENING SOLUTIONS. Included with this notice was a written description of a consumer’s right under the FCRA. A copy of this notice is attached hereto as Exhibit “F.” This notice was sent via regular mail on April 25, 2013 even though, again, WILLIAMS believes that the erroneous background report was delivered immediately on that same date by electronic means to WINN-DIXIE. Therefore, WILLIAMS did not receive the notice until several days after the adverse action taken as to him described herein occurred on or about April 25, 2013.
36. The notice stated that “LexisNexis did not participate in any placement decision at Winn-Dixie…” However, this statement was false and deceptive as SCREENING SOLUTIONS had determined that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment.
37. It was not until WILLIAMS received the above-referenced background report and notices on or about May 2, 2013, that WILLIAMS first discovered that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had again erroneously determined that he was ineligible for employment and matched him with Ricky Williams, this time with his conviction for burglary and battery on a pregnant woman.
38. On May 2, 2013, WILLIAMS contacted SCREENING SOLUTIONS to dispute the erroneous match advising SCREENING SOLUTIONS that he was not Ricky Williams and had not been convicted for burglary and aggravated battery on a pregnant woman in Broward County in 2004.
39. Unfortunately, WINN-DIXIE refused to hire WILLIAMS for as long as SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ April 25, 2013 determination that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending. Attempts by WILLIAMS to convince WINN-DIXIE that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had erroneously matched him with Ricky Williams were futile as they were completely rebuffed without any consideration by WINN-DIXIE which arbitrarily adhered to its refusal to hire WILLIAMS while the SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination was pending. Moreover, WINN-DIXIE quickly followed its refusal to hire WILLIAMS while SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination of ineligibility for employment was pending with a formal denial of employment.
40. WILLIAMS is informed and believes that, but for the erroneous match made by SCREENING SOLUTIONS between Ricky Williams and his conviction for burglary and aggravated battery on a pregnant woman in Broward County in 2004 and SCREENING SOLUTIONS adjudication of him as ineligible for employment, he would have been hired by WINN-DIXIE. Indeed, on April 23, 2013, WINN-DIXIE sent WILLIAMS an E-mail welcoming him as an employee to its “WINN-ing team!” A copy of this E-mail from WINN-DIXIE is attached hereto as Exhibit “G.” WILLIAMS would have had no difficulty submitting satisfactory proof of his identity, submitting satisfactory proof that he was legally authorized to work in the United States, passing a drug test and, if no errors were made, “passing” a background check as required to finalize his being hired by WINN-DIXIE.
43. WILLIAMS has fulfilled all conditions precedent to the bringing of the action.
44. WILLIAMS has been required to retain the undersigned attorneys and is obligated to pay them reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
paragraphs 1 through 8 and 11 through 44, above.
46. SCREENING SOLUTIONS made the matches between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams based only on last name and date of birth.
47. In incorporating matches based only on last name and birthdate between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams in its background reports while ignoring many easily reviewed identifying criteria which differentiated WILLIAMS from Ricky Williams and, as to the background report to WINN-DIXIE, ignoring the prior notice that Ricky Williams was not WILLIAMS, SCREENING SOLUTIONS violated 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) by preparing consumer reports relating to WILLIAMS without following reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning WILLIAMS.
48. SCREENING SOLUTIONS willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) in that it actions were in reckless disregard of the requirements of this provision. Thus, SCREENING SOLUTIONS is liable for punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n.
49. In the alternative, SCREENING SOLUTIONS negligently violated 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) which entitles WILLIAMS to a recovery under 15 U.S.C. §1681o.
50. SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act have caused great and irreparable injury to WILLIAMS. WILLIAMS has suffered damages including, but not limited to, loss of prospective employment and wages and benefits, lost economic opportunities and positions and advances in the future, damage to his reputation, humiliation, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, lasting psychological damage, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, embarrassment, and other losses that are continuing in nature.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o, WILLIAMS demands the entry of judgment against SCREENING SOLUTIONS for damages including punitive and/or exemplary damages, costs, pre and post judgment interest, attorney’s fees and such other relief as the court may deem necessary and appropriate.
51. WILLIAMS realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 and 11 through 44, above.
C. failing to maintain reasonable procedures designed to prevent the reappearance in WILLIAMS’ consumer file, and in the background reports relating to WILLIAMS based on that consumer file, of the previously deleted match between WILLIAMS and Ricky Williams in violation of §1681i(a)(5)(C).
53. SCREENING SOLUTIONS willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) in that its action were in reckless disregard of the requirements of this provision. Thus, SCREENING SOLUTIONS is liable for punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n.
54. In the alternative, SCREENING SOLUTIONS negligently violated 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) which entitles WILLIAMS to a recovery under 15 U.S.C. §1681o.
55. SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act have caused great and irreparable injury to WILLIAMS. WILLIAMS has suffered damages including, but not limited to, loss of prospective employment and wages and benefits, lost economic opportunities and positions and advances in the future, damage to his reputation, humiliation, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, lasting psychological damage, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, embarrassment, and other losses that are continuing in nature.
56. WILLIAMS realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 44, above.
57. The FCRA provides that any person “using a consumer report for employment purposes” who intends to take any “adverse action based in whole or in part on the report,” must provide the consumer to whom the report relates a copy of the consumer report and a written description of the rights of a consumer under the FCRA before taking such adverse action. 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A).
58. An “adverse action” under 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) includes “any…decision for employment purposes …that adversely affects any…prospective employees.” 15 U.S.C. §1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii). Alternatively, an adverse action is an action taken or determination is made in connection with an employment application made by consumer and adverse to the interest of the consumer within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §1681a(k)(B)(iv).
59. Under the FCRA, a “person” includes a corporation under 15 U.S.C. §1681a(a).
60. SCREENING SOLUTIONS was hired by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE to go beyond the functions of a credit reporting agency to make determinations or judgments about the hiring of WILLIAMS.
61. In addition to being a “consumer reporting agency, SCREENING SOLUTIONS was also a “person” who took an adverse action relating to WILLIAMS when it determined that WILLIAMS was “ineligible” for employment.
62. The notices and reports SCREENING SOLUTIONS sent to WILLIAMS on February 28, 2012 and April 25, 2013 on behalf of RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE were sent after SCREENING SOLUTIONS had already taken the adverse action of finding him ineligible for employment. Therefore, SCREENING SOLUTIONS took adverse action before providing WILLIAMS with the consumer report on which it was based or a written description of his rights under the FCRA thereby denying him the opportunity to dispute the erroneous match between himself and Ricky Williams before being denied employment in violation of §1681b(b)(3).
63. RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE were “persons” who took adverse action relating to WILLIAMS when they determined not to hire him.
64. Moreover, both RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE took the action of refusing to hire WILLIAMS for as long as SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending. WILLIAMS attempted to convince RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE that SCREENING SOLUTIONS had erroneously matched him with Ricky Williams and incorrectly determined that he was ineligible for employment but such attempts were futile as they were completely rebuffed without any consideration by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE which arbitrarily adhered to their refusal to hire WILLIAMS while the SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination was pending. Moreover, both RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE quickly followed their refusal to hire WILLIAMS while SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ determination of ineligibility for employment was pending with a formal denial of employment. The adverse action taken by RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE of refusing to hire WILLIAMS while the determination by SCRENNING SOLUTIONS that WILLIAMS was ineligible for employment was pending was taken well before providing WILLIAMS with the consumer report on which the adverse action was based in violation of §1681b(b)(3). Moreover, RENT-A-CENTER’s and WINN-DIXIE’s taking of the adverse action of formally denying employment without giving WILLIAMS sufficient time after the consumer report was received or a real opportunity to dispute the erroneous match between himself and Ricky Williams was also in violation of §1681b(b)(3).
65. These violations of the FCRA were willful or, in the alternative, were negligent.
66. SCREENING SOLUTIONS’, RENT-A-CENTER’s, and WINN-DIXIE’s violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act have caused great and irreparable injury to WILLIAMS. WILLIAMS has suffered damages including, but not limited to, loss of prospective employment and wages and benefits, lost economic opportunities and positions and advances in the future, damage to his reputation, humiliation, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, lasting psychological damage, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, embarrassment, and other losses that are continuing in nature.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o, WILLIAMS demands entry of judgment against SCREENING SOLUTIONS, RENT-A-CENTER, and WINN-DIXIE for damages including exemplary and/or punitive damages, costs, pre and post judgment interest, and attorney’s fees and such other relief as the court may deem necessary and appropriate.
67. WILLIAMS realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 and 11 through 44, above.
69. The notices and reports SCREENING SOLUTIONS sent to WILLIAMS on February 28, 2012 and April 25, 2013 on behalf of RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE contained items of information on consumers which were matters of public record and were likely to have an adverse effect upon a WILLIAMS’ ability to obtain employment.
70. These notices and reports SCREENING SOLUTIONS sent to WILLIAMS were sent after SCREENING SOLUTIONS had reported such information to RENT-A-CENTER and WINN-DIXIE and SCREENING SOLUTIONS failed to maintain strict procedures designed to insure that whenever public record information which is likely to have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability to obtain employment is reported it is complete and up to date. Accordingly, SCREENING SOLUTIONS has violated 15 U.S.C. §1681k(a).
71. These violations of the FCRA were willful or, in the alternative, were negligent.
72. SCREENING SOLUTIONS’ violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act have caused great and irreparable injury to WILLIAMS. WILLIAMS has suffered damages including, but not limited to, loss of prospective employment and wages and benefits, lost economic opportunities and positions and advances in the future, damage to his reputation, humiliation, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, lasting psychological damage, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, embarrassment, and other losses that are continuing in nature.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o, WILLIAMS demands entry of judgment against SCREENING SOLUTIONS for damages including exemplary and/or punitive damages, costs, pre and post judgment interest, and attorney’s fees and such other relief as the court may deem necessary and appropriate.
WILLIAMS demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable.


text:
STACEY HARRIS vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 12, 1989.
The case was heard by Walter E. Steele, J.
David J. Rentsch for the Commissioner of Correction.
Willie J. Davis for the plaintiff.
ABRAMS, J. The plaintiff, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater, was transferred after a classification hearing to a Federal prison in Memphis, Tennessee. This case concerns the sufficiency of that hearing under both the Federal due process clause and State regulations.
In addition, the plaintiff asserts that the transfer denied him access to the courts because the Federal facility does not contain adequate Massachusetts legal materials. The judge granted the plaintiff injunctive relief and entered a judgment ordering that within thirty days the plaintiff be returned from Tennessee to any correctional institution within the Commonwealth. The defendant, the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner), appeals. We reverse the judgment.
We assume that the judgment was a final judgment for a permanent injunction, even though it is not so designated. Nowhere in his memorandum does the judge consider or balance the factors to be considered before issuing a preliminary injunction. See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609 , 617 (1980) (when asked to grant a preliminary injunction, a judge must balance the risk of irreparable harm to the moving party, and the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits against the risk of irreparable harm to the opposing party). See also Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 392 Mass. 79 , 89-90 (1984) (Commonwealth is not required to demonstrate irreparable harm where opposing party's activities may adversely affect the public interest); Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443 , 447 (1983) (in cases in which a town is a party, a judge also may weigh the risk of harm to the public interest in considering a preliminary injunction motion). The judge did not do an analysis consistent with any of the foregoing factors.
`clear and unambiguous notice' and `a full opportunity' to present its case." Cheney, supra at 616-617 n.10, quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1972). The state of the record does not let us know whether the commissioner received these protections. See Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n v. Codex Corp., 395 Mass. 522 , 524 (1985). Moreover, even assuming sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, a hearing resulting in a final judgment "should be conducted in circumstances that can produce a clear indication of the factual basis for the judge's decision. Written stipulations of fact or uncontroverted affidavits (assuming adequate notice) could provide that factual basis, thus making the hearing on the merits substantially similar to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, but, generally speaking, we would expect the proceeding [on the merits] to be transcribed by a stenographer or recorded electronically." Id. at 524-525. Without a transcript of the hearing or some record of the proceedings, we have no way of knowing the evidence on which the judge based his findings of fact and rulings of law. Therefore, we must vacate his judgment unless the facts conceded by the commissioner and the uncontroverted documentary evidence establish the correctness of the rulings. Cf. id. at 525. The correctness of the judgment is not so established.
been determined that you were second in command of a group which was involved in the introduction and distribution of narcotics, racial conflict and planned violence against other inmates at MCI-Cedar Junction."
At the subsequent hearing before a classification board, Sergeant Edward McGonagle of MCI-Cedar Junction testified about information received from two informants regarding the plaintiff's participation in a narcotics distribution operation within the prison. The board found the informants to be reliable and their information credible. Although the plaintiff's attorney represented him at the hearing, McGonagle presented this information while the board was in executive session, out of the presence of both the attorney and the plaintiff. The board provided them with a summary of the testimony afterward. The plaintiff's attorney then cross-examined McGonagle. The cross-examination revealed that the informants provided their information to another officer, not to McGonagle, and that McGonagle had never personally received any information from these informants.
The plaintiff was allowed to make a presentation to the board denying the allegations. He then asked for permission to present testimony from his own witnesses. The board denied the request. After the hearing, the board advised the plaintiff of its decision to recommend to the commissioner that the plaintiff be transferred to a Federal facility. The plaintiff appealed pursuant to 103 Code Mass. Regs. Section 420.10 (c) (1987). The commissioner approved the board's recommendation on March 22, 1989, and thereafter transferred the plaintiff in accordance with the decision.
On appeal, the commissioner claims that the judge erred in ruling that the Federal due process clause accords the plaintiff greater procedural protections than he was granted. He also asserts that the hearing complied with the State regulations, and that the transfer did not deprive the plaintiff of access to the courts.
as contemplated by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). With regard to intrastate prison transfers, the Supreme Court has held that convicted inmates possess no liberty interest in remaining in any particular State prison facility. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379 , 397 (1983). "The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the [plaintiff's] liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Meachum, supra at 224. Therefore, in Meachum no due process claim arose out of a transfer of prisoners to a maximum security facility without an adequate fact-finding hearing. See Nelson, supra at 397. The result was no different when the transfer was to a prison in another State, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), or when the transfer was for disciplinary, rather than administrative, purposes, see Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Nelson, supra at 397. There is no basis for a distinction between transfers to another State's prisons and transfers, such as the one at issue here, from a State to an out-of-State Federal facility. See Sisbarro v. Warden, Mass. State Penitentiary, 592 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 489 (1979).
Because the transfer to an out-of-state Federal prison did not implicate any liberty interest either under the Federal Constitution [Note 7] or as created by State statute or regulation, the hearing accorded the plaintiff did not violate his Federal due process or his statutory rights.
2. The Massachusetts regulations. The regulations under which the board conducted the classification hearing do not provide the plaintiff with the procedural protections he claims. The regulations give the inmate only the right to forty-eight hours' advance notice of the hearing, the right to be represented by an attorney, the right to make a presentation to the board, and the right to appeal. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. Section 420.08 (6) and Section 420.09 (3) (1987). The plaintiff does not deny that he was granted these rights.
hearing under 103 Code Mass. Regs. Sections 420.00 (1987). Although, as the plaintiff points out, both kinds of hearings may result from disciplinary infractions, the regulations are clear on their face that adherence to the informant information standards is required in disciplinary hearings only. [Note 8] There is no basis on the record before us to conclude that the classification proceeding was a pretext. The judge did not so find or rule. Therefore, the commissioner was not required to meet the standards for informant information set forth in 103 Code Mass. Regs. Section 430.15 (1987).
The plaintiff also objects to the board's denial of his request to call witnesses. Again, however, although the regulations provide inmates subject to a disciplinary hearing with a qualified right to call witnesses, see 103 Code Mass. Regs. Section 430.14 (4) (1987), no corresponding right is accorded to inmates in classification hearings. Therefore, the regulations at issue do not provide a basis for the injunctive relief granted.
3. Access to the courts. Finally, the judge found that "[t]he plaintiff will be in a significantly better position to assist his lawyer in the preparation of his appeal, if he is returned to Massachusetts," and therefore ruled that the transfer to Tennessee denied the plaintiff his constitutional right of access to the courts. Even if this finding is supported by the evidence before the judge, it does not adequately address the legal issue raised by a claim of denial of access to the courts.
legal materials, he still may not have suffered any constitutional deprivation. Bounds establishes that adequate legal assistance is an alternative means of fulfilling the obligation to provide prisoners with access to the courts. Neither the judge's findings nor the plaintiff's allegations assert that the plaintiff was or will be denied legal assistance from persons trained in the law. In fact, the plaintiff is represented by counsel both in this action and in his appeal of the conviction which we reversed. See Commonwealth v. Harris, supra.
Moreover, although the burden of proof is ultimately on the commissioner to show that the plaintiff did have adequate access to the courts, see Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1981); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Andrade v. Hauck, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); Blake v. Berman, 625 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (D. Mass. 1986), the plaintiff must at least make a prima facie showing of a lack of access, see Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986); Rich v. Zitnay, supra at 43; Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1021 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987). Due to the posture in which this case was presented to us, see supra, we have no way of knowing whether the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that he was denied adequate legal assistance. Certainly no such showing is apparent from the documentary evidence or facts conceded by the commissioner.
Because the record presented us does not support the judgment, the judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, should further proceedings be needed. If further proceedings are not needed, then the complaint should be dismissed.
[Note 1] It appears that notice of this decision was not sent to the commissioner until June 7, 1989.
[Note 2] Rule 58 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure allows a clerk to "prepare, sign, and enter judgment without awaiting any direction by the court," only if the judgment is on a general verdict of a jury, is for a recovery of "a certain sum or costs," or denies the relief requested. If the decision of the court grants any other relief -- such as the injunctive relief ordered here -- then "the court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it."
[Note 3] On June 26, 1989, the commissioner moved for a reconsideration of the order and a stay of the order pending reconsideration. The judge denied both motions on July 7, 1989. On July 28, 1989, the plaintiff, who still remained in the Federal prison in Tennessee, moved for contempt. On August 2, 1989, the commissioner returned the plaintiff to the Commonwealth. The commissioner should have returned the plaintiff within the thirty-day period set by the judge or, at the latest, immediately after the judge denied the motions. The commissioner could have sought a stay of the injunction from a single justice of the Appeals Court. See G. L. c. 231, Section 118. He did not do so. Although the plaintiff does not raise this issue in his brief, the commissioner clearly was without authority to postpone his compliance with the order.
[Note 4] Because the plaintiff is awaiting a new trial, we address the issues which may recur prior to his retrial. We reversed that conviction. See Commonwealth v. Harris, ante 461 (1991).
[Note 5] General Laws c. 127, Section 97A (1988 ed.), provides: "The commissioner may, with the approval of the appropriate officials of the federal government, transfer any prisoner sentenced to state prison to any available or appropriate correctional institution maintained and supervised by the federal government within the confines of continental United States. . . . Prisoners so removed shall be subject to the terms of their original sentences to the state prison and to the provisions of law governing discharge and parole from the correctional institutions of the commonwealth."
[Note 6] For this reason, the judge's reliance on Nelson, supra, and Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 409 (1983), is misplaced. In those cases, we ruled that a prison disciplinary hearing which can result in the loss of good time credits must comport with due process requirements. The cases clearly are distinguishable. Unlike the asserted interest in not being transferred out of state, the retention of good time credits is a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest because it is guaranteed under State law unless the "prisoner violates any rule of his place of confinement." G. L. c. 127, Section 129 (1988 ed.).
[Note 7] The plaintiff does not argue, and therefore we do not consider, whether the scope of his liberty interest may be broader under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights than under the Federal Constitution.
[Note 8] The plaintiff does not argue that the differing standards violate equal protection or other constitutional requirements.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Huygen, Wil. The Book of the Sandman. And the Alphabet of Sleep. New York. Harry N. Abrams. Inc. 1989. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by Rien Poortvliet. Fine copy (owner name on end paper) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Hyun-Joo, Bae. New Clothes for New Year's Day. La Jolla. Kane/Miller. 2007. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Ichikawa, Satomi. Rosy's Garden. A Child's Keepsake of Flowers. New York. Philomel. 1990. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Ichikawa, Satomi. Suzette and Nicholas and the Sunijudi Circus. New York. Philomel Books. 1980. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First American edition. Fine copy (owner inscription).
Igus, Toyomi. Going Back Home. An Artist Returns to the South. San Francisco. Children's Books. 1996. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by Michele Wood. Fine (owner name on end paper) copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Ihor. Mr. Magic. The Would-Be Wizard. Kauai. Elfworks. 1987. Octavo. Decorated hardcover. First edition. Illustrated by Joyce Harada. Fine copy.
Impey, Rose. My Mom and Our Dad. New York. Viking Press. 1990. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by Maureen Galvani. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Irving, Washington. Gary Kelley illustrations. Rip Van Winkle. Mankato. Creative Editions. 1993. 4to. Hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color by Gary Kelley. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Isadora, Rachel. 1 2 3 Pop! New York. Viking Press. 2000. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Isadora, Rachel. Bring On That Beat. New York. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 2002. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Jakes, John. Susanna of the Alamo. A True Story. San Diego. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich. 1986. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white by by Paul Bacon. Fine copy.
Jakobsen, Kathy. My New York. New Anniversary Edition. New York. np. 2003. 4to. Hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Janovitz, Marilyn. What Could Be Keeping Santa. New York. North-South. 1997. Octavo. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

matches:
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine


Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway et al.
Held: The town of Greece does not violate the First Amendment by opening its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition and does not coerce participation by nonadherents.
Held: An amendment to Michigan’s constitution, which prohibits state universities from considering race as part of its admissions process, does not violate the US Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.
Held: Under the totality of the circumstances, the traffic stop precipitated by an anonymous but reliable tip to 911 complied with the Fourth Amendment because the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck’s driver was intoxicated, making the traffic stop reasonable under the circumstances.
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.
Held: Absent a controlling statute to the contrary, when a participant in an employee benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the plan agree, by contract, to a particular limitations period, that limitations period is enforceable even if it begins to run before the cause of action accrues, so long as the period is reasonable.
2. When a defendant files a §1404(a) motion, a district court should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer. No such exceptional factors appear to be present in this case.
1. The District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the partnerships’ lack of economic substance could justify imposing a valuation-misstatement penalty on the partners.
2. The valuation-misstatement penalty applies in this case.
Held: The Sixth Circuit failed to apply the “doubly deferential” standard of review recognized by the Court’s case law when it refused to credit the state court’s reasonable factual finding and assumed that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent.
Held: The government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan /Dolan requirements even when it denies the permit.
Held: Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.
Held: Employee retaliation claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in the 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).
Held: A drug-sniffing dog at the front door of a house where police suspected drug activity constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Held: The federal anti-lien provision pre-empts North Carolina’s irrebuttable statutory presumption that one-third of a tort recovery is attributable to medical expenses.
Held: The Gonzalez Act direction in §1089(e) abrogates the FTCA’s intentional tort exception and therefore permits Levin’s suit against the United States alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of his employment.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al.
churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws.
2. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer.
Minneci et al. v. Pollard et al.
adequate alternative damages actions—providing both significant deterrence and compensation—no Bivens remedy can be implied here.
Held: Brady requires that Smith’s conviction be reversed. The State does not dispute that the eyewitness’s statements were favorable to Smith and that those statements were not disclosed to Smith. Under Brady, evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 469–470. A “reasonable probability” means that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to “undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434. Evidence impeaching an eyewitness’s testimony may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112–113, and n. 21. Here, owever, the eyewitness’s testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime, and the eyewitness’s undisclosed statements contradicted his testimony. The eyewitness’s statements were plainly material, and the State’s failure to disclose those statements to the defense thus violated Brady.


text:
n. fibers made from the strippings of the outer part of coconut, buri palm fronds, or from bamboo. Pagkúhag láis ibugkus sa sugnud, Get strips of coconut palm fronds to tie the firewood; v. get fibers from the outer part of coconut, buri palm fronds, or bamboo.
n. lock, latch; v. lock. Wà ku kasulud kay gilákan (gilák) man ang gít, I was unable to come in because the gate was locked.
n. a stanza in a poem or song.
v. 1. stand or squat with legs wide apart. Ayaw lak-ángi ang unidúru kun mugámit mu, Do not squat with your feet on the toilet bowl when you use it. 2. set something on a fire to cook. Ang kalapíhan ang ilak-ang pag-úna, Set the pot of coffee on the stove first; 3. miss, skip s.t in a series. Milak-ang ang íyang dugù ug usa ka búlan, She missed her period for one month. Nalak-angan ang íyang ngálan pagrulkul, They skipped his name when they called the roll; 3a. for there to be a gap. Naglak-ang ug dakù ang idad sa íyang mga bátà, Her children were widely spaced; n. 1. something skipped or missed; 2. distance, gap. Dakug lak-ang ang kinaíya nílang duha, There is a big difference in their character.
v. 1. step over something Dílì ku makalákad sa kanal kay pinsil ang ákung palda, I cannot step over the ditch because my skirt is too narrow. Lakárun lang níya nang kurála, He’ll just step over that fence; 2. go beyond, exceed. Kun mulákad sa trayinta díyas dubli na ang bayranan, If it exceeds thirty days you will have to pay double. Kadtung ímung mga sulti nakalákad sa maáyung pamatásan, What you said went beyond the bounds of proper behavior; 3. marry or wed ahead of big brothers or sisters. Dì sà ta magminyù kay dì ku gustung lakdan (lakáran) ang ákung magúwang, We won’t get married because I don’t want to get ahead of my big sister; 4. — sa adlaw v. for someone to be caught by the noon sun still asleep. Gilakdan (hilakdan) siya sa adlawng natúlug, maung nagluya ang láwas, He slept until afternoon so his body is weak; a. 1. — sa beyond a limit. Lákad sa baláud ang ímung buhátun, What you are going to do is a transgression of the law; 2. — ang búlan for the moon to be moving toward the noon position in the early hours of the evening—i.e., the second quarter. (→) v. — ug búlan 1. affliction of individual coconuts whereby the meat of the coconut is hard, grooved, and scanty or there is none at all, and the juice, if there is any, is sour, unfit to drink. A coconut with this disease is called búang nga lubi (lit. ‘crazy coconut’) and is believed to be caused to be so by the moon’s rays; 2. be mentally deranged. A person is so called because he is compared to the coconut afflicted by the moon (called búang ‘crazy’). Mu rag gilakaran (gilakdan) ug búwan ang linihukan ánang tawhána, That man acts as if he had been exposed to the moon (i.e. crazy). -in-an, linakáran n. fine given to the older siblings by a younger sibling who marries ahead of them.
v. chase. Naglákag ang duha ka trák, The two buses are chasing each other. Lakaga (lakga) ang manuk nga nakabuhì, Chase the chicken that escaped. -ay v. chase each other. Naglakagay ang mga bátà, The children are chasing one another.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Constant changes in medical board and other rules make it important that physicians and other health care providers stay up to date with new developments. The Texas Medical Board, for instance, published a slew of new rules in March 2018 that impact Texas physicians and medical practice including many which provide relief from previously more burdensome maintenance of certification and other requirements.. Texas physicians should review these new rules for possible implications on their responsibilities or other aspects of their practice.
The following is a summary of the new Texas Medical Board Rules published in March, 2018, the full text of which may be found in the Texas Administrative Code here.
The amendments to §163.11, concerning Active Practice of Medicine, were adopted in accordance with Senate Bill 1148, adopted by the 85th Legislature, which prohibits the Board from requiring maintenance of certification by an applicant to be eligible for a medical license.
The amendments to §166.3, concerning Retired Physician Exception, and §166.6, concerning Exemption From Registration Fee for Retired Physician Providing Voluntary Charity Care, were adopted in accordance with Senate Bill 1148, adopted by the 85th Legislature, which prohibits the Board from requiring maintenance of certification by an applicant to be eligible for initial or renewal registration permit for a medical license.
The amendments to §172.12, concerning Out-of-State Telemedicine License, were adopted in accordance with Senate Bill 1148, adopted by the 85th Legislature, which prohibits the Board from requiring maintenance of certification by an applicant to be eligible for a medical license.
The amendments to §175.1, concerning Application and Administrative Fees, corrects language in paragraph (1)(H)(i) so that fees related to physician-in-training permits are lowered to $200. Further language is added outlining application and administrative fees for processing licenses for medical physicists, medical radiologic technologists, non-certified technicians, perfusionists, and respiratory care practitioners.
The amendments to §175.2, concerning Registration and Renewal Fees, adds language outlining renewal fees for continuing licenses, permits, and certificates for medical physicists, medical radiologic technologists, non-certified technicians, perfusionists, and respiratory care practitioners.
The amendments to §175.3, concerning Penalties, moves language providing an exemption for individuals serving as military members to new paragraph (11). The amendments further add language outlining penalty amounts for late renewals of licenses for perfusionists, respiratory care practitioners, medical physicists, and medical radiologic technologists.
The amendment to §175.5, concerning Payment of Fees or Penalties, amends language clarifying the rule’s allowance for fee refunds applies to applicants who timely withdraw applications, in addition to other requirements. Further language is added clarifying that refunds of fees may be granted to licensees who retire or request cancellation of their licenses within 90 days of paying a renewal fee.
The amendments to §177.18 (Subchapter E), concerning Purpose and Scope, and §177.20, concerning Call Coverage Minimum Requirements, and repeal of §177.19, concerning Definitions, provide a more flexible framework for call coverage agreements between physicians practicing in Texas so as to provide continuity of care to patients during a regular treating physician’s absence, while ensuring the covering physician’s accountability for meeting the standard of care and documenting the care provided during the call coverage period. The amendments eliminate the two-model approach under §177.20(b), allow all call coverage agreements to be contracted orally or in writing, and eliminate the requirement that certain agreements require real-time access to a patient’s medical records at the time of the call coverage period.
The amendment to §187.76(c)(3), concerning Notice of Intention to Impose Administrative Penalty; Response, removes the undefined term “informal meeting” and replaces it with “ISC,” which is defined in §187.2 of this chapter (relating to Definitions). The amendment to §187.79, concerning Personal Appearance at an Informal Meeting, changes the title to “Personal Appearance at an ISC,” as “Informal Meeting” is not a defined term and “ISC” is a defined term and is the correct reference within the rule. The amendment in subsection (a) corrects the reference to “informal meeting” and replaces it with “ISC.” The amendment in subsection (b) also corrects the reference to “informal meeting” and replaces it with “ISC” and corrects the title of the reference to §187.18 of this chapter, which was recently changed to “ISC Scheduling, Process, and Procedures.” The amendment to §187.80(c), concerning Imposition of Administrative Penalty, removes the undefined term “informal meeting” and replaces it with “ISC,” which is defined in §187.2.
The amendments to §189.11, concerning Process for Approval of Physicians, Other Professionals, Group Practices and Institutional Settings, eliminates the words “or remedial plan” from the provision describing the mechanism under which the Board may require a licensee to practice with an approved physician or other professional to serve as a proctor, monitor, or supervisor or in an approved group practice or institutional setting, as §164.0015 of the Texas Occupations Code states that Remedial Plans may not contain provisions that limit or restrict a licensee’s practice.
The amendments to §183.4, concerning Licensure, add new language under subsection (a)(5) that allows an applicant for licensure to appear before the licensure committee of the Board to request reconsideration of the applicant’s ineligibility based on their failure to pass the NCCAOM examination within five attempts. Such amendment allows the Board discretion to reconsider such ineligibility determination. The proposed amendments delete obsolete language from subsection (a)(7). The proposed amendments to subsection (a)(9) provide an alternate mechanism to cure active practice issues faced by some licensure applicants. The remainder of the changes are corrections to punctuation and grammar.
The amendments to §183.19, concerning Acupuncture Advertising, remove language requiring that an acupuncturist include their license number on print advertising. The amendments to §183.20, concerning Continuing Acupuncture Education, add language to subsection (b)(1) to clarify the criteria for the courses from which the requisite CAE hours are taken. The proposed amendment adds new subsection (b)(2) to specify the number of CAE hours and specific topics which must be taken each year. New subsection (b)(3) is added to clarify the number of CAE hours from courses approved under each category delineated under subsection (b)(1). Spelling corrections were made in subsections (h) and (o).
The amendments to §186.4, concerning Procedural Rules and Qualifications for Certificate Applicants, add language to subsection (a)(2) to specify that application fees are set forth in 22 T.A.C. §175.1. The amendments also add language to subsection (g) to detail alternative certification procedures for military service members and military veterans, in addition to military spouses.
The amendments to §186.6, concerning Biennial Renewal of Certificate, add language to subsections (a), (d), and (j)(1) to reference specific rules in Chapter 175 that list certain fees.
The amendments to §186.7, concerning Temporary Permit, add language to subsection (a)(1) to detail that temporary permits issued under this subsection pertain to applicants who have signed an Agreed Order or Remedial Plan and are awaiting board approval. The amendments also add language to subsection (a)(3) to reference fees listed in 22 T.A.C. §175.1. Additionally, the amendments add language to subsection (c) to make clear that requirements listed in this subsection apply only to those applicants who have active practice issues. The amendments to §186.8, concerning Inactive Certificate, add language to subsection (a) to clarify that inactive certificates must be renewed each year.
The amendments to §186.10, concerning Continuing Education Requirements, add language to subsection (a) to state that at least two hours of the required 24 hours must be in the topic of ethics. Additionally, the amendments add subsection (b)(2) (C) to give non-traditional continuing education credit to those who teach or instruct a course in an accredited respiratory care educational program. The amendments also add language to subsection (b)(3) to clarify that credit may be awarded for credentialing or re-credentialing examinations listed in this subsection. The National Asthma Education Certification Board (NAECB) Certified Asthma Educator (AE-C) and neonatal resuscitation program (NRP) examinations are also added to this subsection. Language is also added to subsection (b)(3)(J) to explain how often credit may be awarded when the same examination is taken for initial credentialing purposes and recredentialing purposes.
The amendments to §186.13, concerning Identification Requirements, adds subsection (b) to require respiratory care practitioners holding a temporary permit to hold themselves out as temporary care practitioners or TRCPs.
The amendments to §186.17, concerning Grounds for Denial of Certification and for Disciplinary Action, adds language in paragraph (4) to make clear that disciplinary action or denial of certification based on criminal history is done in accordance with Chapter 53 of the Texas Occupations Code.
The amendments to §186.28, concerning Retired Certificate, adds language in subparagraph (2)(A) to reference the new definition of voluntary charity care adopted in 22 T.A.C. §186.2 (41).
The amendment to §194.3, concerning Meetings and Committees, deletes subsection (f) and language providing that the board may at a regular or special meeting remove the secretary from office upon a majority vote, with other amendments re-lettering the remaining subsections. Language related to licensure and disciplinary committee functions is revised to clarify that the committees do not draft rules, but rather review draft language prepared by staff. Amendments further add a new paragraph (4) to subsection (f), setting forth new rules related to the creation of a new Education Committee. The proposed committee’s functions include recommending rules to the full board regarding education and training requirements certification as a radiologic technologist or registration as a non-certified technician (NCT), continuing education requirements for renewal of a Texas MRT certificate or NCT registration, and standards for the approval or rescinding approval of radiologic technologist certificate education program curricular and instructors.
The amendments to §194.5, concerning Applicability of Chapter; Exemptions, delete language referring to §194.14 of this title (relating to Alternate Training Requirements for Podiatric Medical Assistants), reflecting the repeal of §194.14.
The amendments to §194.6, concerning Procedural Rules and Minimum Eligibility Requirements for Applicants for a Certificate or Placement on the Board’s Non-Certified Technician General Registry, amend language so that an applicant is not deemed per se ineligible for a certificate or registration, based upon action taken against another license issued by a licensing authority in this or another state that is subject to probation or other disciplinary action not involving revocation or suspension. The board will continue to have the authority to deny a certificate or placement on the general registry based upon all such action, regardless if it is an action not involving revocation or suspension, but the amendments will allow the board more discretion in certain cases. The amendments further delete language under subsection (c)(8) and move it to a new paragraph (2), maintaining the board’s discretion to consider the nature of any final disciplinary action, other than suspension or revocation, when determining whether to issue the certificate or other authorization.
Amendments to subsection (f)(3) and subsection (i), with language referring to §194.14 of this title, are deleted, to reflect the repeal of §194.14. Amendments to subsection (j) adding clarifying language to make it clearer that non-certified technicians must comply with the active practice requirements under the rules in order to show eligibility for placement on the general registry.
Amendment to subsection (l) makes corrections to typographical errors.
The repeal of §194.14, concerning Alternate Training Requirements for Podiatric Medical Assistants, was adopted to comport with S.B. 674, which amended Texas Occupations Code, Chapter 601, and eliminated dual registration for non-certified technicians by certain state licensing boards, including the Podiatry Board. The MRT Board will maintain a single set of minimum training requirements in order to obtain eligibility for placement on a general registry for non-certified technicians (NCT).
The amendment to §194.16, concerning Hardship Exemptions, amends language in order to comport with S.B. 674, which amended Texas Occupations Code, §601.203, so that in order to show that an applicant faces a hardship in hiring a certificate holder or NCT due to an inability to attract and retain medical radiologic technologists, the applicant must also show evidence that the location for which the hardship exemption is sought must be located in a county with a population of less than 50,000.
Amendments further delete subsection (b)(4)(B) (vi), so that the use of only a hand-held fluoroscope with a maximum operating capability of 65 kilovolts and 1 milliampere, or similar type of x-ray unit for upper extremities only, with the radiation produced by the radiographic equipment representing a minimal threat to the patient and the operator of the equipment, no longer qualifies for a hardship exemption. The basis for the repeal is that the use of such equipment should be performed by individuals who have completed minimum training and obtained registration as a NCT or certification as a MRT or LMRT.
The amendment to §194.17, concerning Dangerous or Hazardous Procedures, removes language referring to §194.14 of this title, reflecting the repeal of §194.14.
Physicians and others that may be impacted by TMB rules should check with the TMB monthly for possible changes that could impact their rules of practice.