D.C. Law Library - § 5–525.01. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund.
↪ Subchapter II-A. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund.
↪ § 5–525.01. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund.
Subchapter II-A. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund.
§ 5–525.01. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund.
(a) There is established as a special fund the Fire and Emergency Medical Services Overtime Settlement Fund (“Fund”), which shall be administered by the Office of the City Administrator in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.
(B) Immediately upon completion of the fiscal year-end close, the undesignated and unreserved end-of-the-year fund balance of the General Fund of the District of Columbia.
(2) The Chief Financial Officer shall deposit into the Fund only the amount necessary to fully satisfy the District’s obligations referenced in subsection (c) of this section. Any excess above that amount shall be deposited into the unrestricted fund balance of the General Fund of the District of Columbia, subject to any allocation required by § 47-392.02.
(c) The Fund shall be used to pay the District’s obligations arising from the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board, et al., 105 A.3d 992 (D.C. 2014).
District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board, et al.
(d) The money deposited into the Fund, and interest earned, shall not revert to the unrestricted fund balance of the General Fund of the District of Columbia at the end of a fiscal year, or at any other time.
For temporary (90 days) addition of this section, see § 7062 of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-127, July 27, 2015, 62 DCR 10201).


Ann M. Hause, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado (Ken Salazar, Attorney General, with her on the briefs), for Appellant.
R. Eric Solem, Solem, Mack & Steinhoff, P.C., Denver, Colorado (David F. Steinhoff, Solem, Mack & Steinhoff, P.C., Denver, Colorado; Mary Helen Miller, Boulder, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Appellees and Cross-Appellant.
This appeal requires our examination of the Social Security Act ("Act"), in particular those provisions relating to the Medicaid program, established in 1965, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. We recognize, as have other courts, that "[t]he Social Security Act is among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress. Its Byzantine construction, as Judge Friendly has observed, makes the Act 'almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.'" Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (hereinafter Gray Panthers) (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)).
Before us are essentially two issues to determine: (1) whether a particular section of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (1986), though repealed effective August 10, 1993, still applies to trusts established before that date and (2) whether recipients of Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled ("SSI") are also entitled to Medicaid benefits under Colorado's medical assistance program. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) and, for the reasons stated below, affirm.
For purposes of clarity, we provide first a brief discussion of the relevant provisions of the Act, namely the Medicaid program and the SSI program.
The Medical Assistance program, commonly known as "Medicaid," "is a cooperative federal-state venture designed to afford medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the financial demands of necessary care and services." New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs. v. Department of Health & Human Servs. Health Care Fin. Admin., 4 F.3d 882, 883 (10th Cir. 1993). Under this federal program administered by the states, participating states receive partial reimbursement for the costs of providing medical services as well as reimbursement for the costs of administering the program.
Each participating State develops a plan containing reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance. An individual is entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the State in which he lives. State Medicaid plans must comply with requirements imposed both by the Act itself and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services ["Secretary of HHS"] . . . .
Colorado is currently a participant in the Medicaid program. See Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1995) (observing that "because Colorado has decided to participate and accept federal Medicaid funds, it must do so on the terms established by Congress").
Prior to 1972, the SSI program did not exist. Instead, the Act provided for four welfare programs known as Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 573 n.2 (1982). In 1972, Congress attempted to streamline these various programs, combining the first three into a new program known as Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled. See Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 38 (noting that "Congress replaced three of the four categorical assistance programs with [SSI]"). The purpose of the newly created program was to afford cash assistance for basic necessities (but not medical expenses) to disabled persons who met the resource eligibility requirements. See Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D. Colo. 1990).
portended increased Medicaid obligations for some states . . . . Congress feared that these States would withdraw from the cooperative Medicaid program rather than expand their Medicaid coverage in a manner commensurate with the expansion of [SSI]. [I]n order not to impose a fiscal burden on these States or discourage them from participating [in Medicaid], Congress offered what has become known as the § 209(b) option[:] Under it, States could elect to provide Medicaid assistance only to those individuals who would have been eligible under the state Medicaid plan in effect on January 1, 1972 [i.e., before SSI]. States thus became either SSI States or § 209(b) States depending on the coverage that they offered.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Colorado is a SSI state. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26-4-201(1)(i) (1999).
Under SSI, states, at their option, may provide assistance not only to the "categorically needy," but also to the "optionally categorically needy," who are those applicants eligible for SSI but are not receiving it or who are ineligible for SSI but meet other statutory criteria. See New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 4 F.3d at 883. For instance, one of the groups covered under Colorado law are persons in institutions, provided the applicant meets the specified income level. See id. § 26-4-301(1)(g).
"In structuring the Medicaid program, Congress chose to direct [the] limited funds to persons who were most impoverished . . . .." Mattingly v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 258, 266 (7th Cir. 1986). Similarly, Congress created the SSI program "to guarantee a minimum subsistence income level for aged, blind, and disabled persons." White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779, 781 n.1 (10th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, eligibility for both Medicaid and SSI benefits is a function of the applicant's "available" assets. If the applicant's "available" assets exceed a statutory ceiling, then coverage is denied. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(I)(II).
In an effort to maximize their income that would not tally as an "available" asset, many applicants for Medicaid and SSI tried to "shelter," or shield, their assets. One common instrument for sheltering was an irrevocable trust. Not surprisingly, Congress responded to the use of this technique with condemnation. For example, in 1986, Congress reiterated its intent that Medicaid was designed to provide basic medical care for those without sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves and thus passed 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k).
a trust, or similar legal devise, established (other than by will) by an individual (or an individual's spouse) under which the individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments from the trust and the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more trustees who are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the individual.
the maximum amount of payments that may be permitted under the terms of the trust to be distributed to the grantor, assuming the full exercise of discretion by the trustee or trustees for the distribution of the maximum amount to the grantor.
In the years that followed, Congress remained true to its conviction that MQTs were an impermissible means of sheltering assets for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. In fact, in 1993, § 1396a(k) was repealed by Congress and replaced by another statute even less forgiving of such trusts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (1993). This statute added stringent criteria regarding the treatment of MQTs such as the inclusion of the corpus and proceeds of various irrevocable trusts as countable resources. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 207-08 (1993).
In the instant case, we are concerned with the eligibility of three persons for Medicaid benefits who are also in possession of certain trusts established before August 10, 1993. The Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing ("Colorado Department") contends that the trusts of Ms. Ramey, Ms. Farmer, and Ms. Shupe are MQTs, which therefore disqualifies them from receiving Medicaid benefits. The following material facts are not in dispute.
Ms. Ramey, currently residing in an assisted living facility, first qualified as a categorically eligible SSI recipient  and therefore a Medicaid recipient as well  in 1992. See Gray Panthers, 243 U.S. at 38 (noting that all SSI recipients are also entitled to Medicaid). On July 22, 1992, Ms. Ramey's father, Donald Ramey, established an irrevocable trust for her benefit and for the express purpose of protecting her from losing her SSI and Medicaid benefits. The trust's assets later grew when Ms. Ramey was awarded proceeds during divorce proceedings with her spouse.
In 1994, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") reviewed Ms. Ramey's trust and found that it met the SSA's requirements so that Ms. Ramey was still entitled to SSI  and therefore Medicaid  benefits. In 1998, however, the Colorado Department, upon its own review of the trust (which by then had assets totaling approximately $90,000), determined that the trust was a MQT. The Colorado Department thereby terminated Ms. Ramey's Medicaid benefits beginning May 31, 1998.
Ms. Farmer, who currently resides in a full-service nursing home, created an irrevocable "special needs" trust for her benefit on December 30, 1992, with proceeds she received from an inheritance. In April 1996, she began to receive Medicaid benefits. In 1997, the Colorado Department reviewed her trust and determined that, because the trust's assets were a countable resource for purposes of Medicaid (i.e., the trust qualified as a MQT), Ms. Farmer was no longer Medicaid eligible.
Ms. Shupe's situation is largely comparable to that of Ms. Ramey. In January 1990, Ms. Shupe was found to be categorically eligible for SSI benefits and therefore qualified for Medicaid benefits, too. Subsequently, during divorce proceedings, the overseeing court issued an order creating a trust for the benefit of Ms. Shupe. In January 1998, the Colorado Department concluded that the trust was a MQT and therefore terminated her Medicaid benefits effective August 31, 1998.
This case, which originated as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has had a complicated procedural history. Plaintiffs Ms. Ramey and Ms. Farmer ("plaintiffs") and intervenor Ms. Shupe ("intervenor") appealed the termination of their Medicaid benefits by the Colorado Department.(1) The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to a class action complaint, and two classes were subsequently created. Subclass (a) consisted of individuals who had been denied Medicaid benefits by the Colorado Department on the basis that they held MQTs. This subclass included Ms. Farmer. Subclass (b) consisted of individuals who received SSI benefits and who had been denied Medicaid benefits by the Colorado Department, once again, because they held MQTs. This subclass included Ms. Ramey and Ms. Shupe. For purposes of this appeal, we shall address the plaintiffs and the intervenor by name, cognizant that they represent the interests of the subclasses.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed soon after class certification. Upon the district court's referral, the magistrate judge determined that Ms. Ramey's and Ms. Shupe's trusts were not MQTs. More important, the magistrate judge also determined that, because the Secretary of HHS evaluated the two trusts and found both Ms. Ramey and Ms. Shupe eligible for SSI benefits, they were automatically entitled to Medicaid benefits. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 268 (1982) (noting that a SSI state "is required to make Medicaid assistance available to all recipients of SSI benefits"). Upon de novo review, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge on the latter point. It declined, however, to make any finding as to whether Ms. Ramey's and Ms. Shupe's trusts were in fact MQTs.
As for Ms. Farmer's trust, the magistrate judge rejected Ms. Farmer's argument that her trust was a "special needs" trust exempt from calculation as a resource under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a). She then concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k), though now repealed, was applicable to her trust and that her trust did qualify as a MQT under the statute. Therefore, the Colorado Department properly denied Ms. Farmer Medicaid benefits. The district court adopted this reasoning in a subsequent order.
This appeal concerns the Colorado Department's contention that the district court erred in its conclusions as to Ms. Ramey's and Ms. Shupe's trusts. The Colorado Department proffers three interpretations of the Act, two promulgated by the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") Department of HHS, and one by SSA, in support of its argument that the state must make Medicaid eligibility determinations independent of the Secretary of HHS.
Ms. Farmer also cross-appeals, arguing that the Colorado Department improperly terminated her Medicaid benefits on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k). Ms. Farmer does not dispute that, under § 1396a(k), her trust would qualify as a MQT. Rather, she simply asserts that, if § 1396a(k) had not been applied, then her trust would not be counted toward her gross income and therefore she would qualify for Medicaid benefits.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court.
We begin by addressing Ms. Farmer's challenge as to whether trusts such as hers, created before August 10, 1993, continue to be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k), which was repealed in 1993 and replaced by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d). See page 7, supra. According to Ms. Farmer, because Congress repealed § 1396a(k), that provision cannot apply to her trust. In response, the Colorado Department argues that Congress intended that § 1396a(k) be applied to all trusts established on or before August 10, 1993, with the even more stringent criteria of § 1396p(d) to be reserved for trusts established after August 10, 1993. We hold that the Colorado Department is correct.
The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts [i.e., MQTs] and similar "techniques" to qualify for the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This is unacceptable to the Committee.
We believe it is clear that, when Congress amended the Medicaid qualifications in 1993 to provide even more restrictive requirements on MQTs (i.e., the repeal of § 1396a(k) and the enactment of § 1396p(d)), it did not at the same time intend to abandon all eligibility requirements for trusts created before August 10, 1993, and once again allow persons to "divert scarce Federal and State resources." Id. In other words, the 1993 amendments did not remove trusts dated before August 10, 1993 from the ambit § 1396a(k). See Cook v. Department of Soc. Servs., 570 N.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Notably, the few cases that have addressed this very issue have reached the same conclusion. See Williams v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 899 P.2d 452, 455 (Kan. 1995) (acknowledging that § 1396a(k) "was repealed in 1993, but it applies" to the trust at issue, created in 1992); Sanders v. Pilley, 684 So. 2d 460, 464 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that trust created in 1991 was reviewed "[u]nder the prior law applicable to this case," i.e., § 1396a(k)); Cohen, 668 N.E.2d at 773 n.14 (holding that the 1986 Medicaid eligibility test, which includes § 1396a(k), is still applicable to trusts created before August 10, 1993); National Bank of Detroit v. Department of Soc. Servs., 614 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (applying the 1986 Medicaid eligibility test, which includes § 1396a(k), to pre-August 10, 1993, trusts); Cook, 570 N.W.2d at 687 (holding that the 1986 Medicaid eligibility test, which includes § 1396a(k), is still applicable to trusts created before August 10, 1993); Ronney v. Department of Soc. Servs., 532 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (applying § 1396a(k) to a trust established before August 10, 1993); In re Kindt, 542 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (applying § 1396a(k) to a trust created before August 10, 1993, even though "Congress repealed this provision in 1993").
In addition, the federal agency responsible for the Medicaid program, the Department of HHS, has indicated in its State Medicaid Manual "that trusts established before August 1993 continue to be governed under the 1986 statutory scheme." Cook, 570 N.W.2d at 686 (citing the HCFA, Department of HHS, State Medicaid Manual § 3257 (1995)). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's application of § 1396a(k), enacted in 1986, to trusts dated before August 10, 1993, and its determination that Ms. Farmer was ineligible for Medicaid benefits.
The Colorado Department asserts that the district court erred in determining that, as SSI recipients, Ms. Ramey and Ms. Shupe were automatically entitled to receipt of Medicaid benefits. According to the Colorado Department, it was required to conduct its own independent review of assets held in trust by SSI recipients to determine their Medicaid eligibility. We disagree.
As noted above, Colorado is a SSI state. The Supreme Court has emphasized that, in a SSI state, "the State is required to make Medicaid assistance available to all recipients of SSI benefits." Herweg, 455 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added); see also DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 319 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that "eligibility for SSI confers automatic eligibility for Medicaid") (emphasis added); Ross v. Giardi, 680 A.2d 113, 118 n.7 (Conn. 1996) ("recogniz[ing] that states are statutorily required to provide [M]edicaid benefits . . . to those individuals who are receiving SSI benefits"). Whether an applicant is entitled to SSI depends on whether he or she meets SSI's eligibility requirements  an inquiry that is different from a state's Medicaid eligibility requirements.
(i) Individuals receiving supplemental security income [i.e., SSI] . . . .
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26-4-201(I)(i) (emphasis added). The three arguments raised by the Colorado Department, primarily based on instructions in the HCFA, Department of HHS, State Medicaid Manual, do not lead us to conclude otherwise.
The HCFA is the administrative arm of the Department of HHS. In its State Medicaid Manual, it instructs that, in order to determine eligibility for Medicaid, payments from a MQT should be considered as an "available" asset  even if the person is "categorically needy." See Aplt's Addendum at 112 (HCFA § 3215). Because SSI recipients fall into the "mandatory categorically needy" category, see 42 C.F.R. § 435.120, the Colorado Department argues that it is obligated to review a SSI recipient's MQT assets for Medicaid eligibility.
To begin, we note that this court  as the Colorado Department points out  must give deference to HCFA's interpretations. See New Mexico Dep't, 4 F.3d at 884-85. However, even though deference is required, we stress that the State Medicaid Manual does not have the force and effect of law, nor is it binding on this court, because it was not promulgated pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ("APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1996) (noting that notice and comment procedures of the APA do not apply to "interpretative rules"). Thus, to the extent the State Medicaid Manual conflicts with the purpose of the Act, we do not follow it. See New Mexico Dep't, 4 F.3d at 885.
We hold that HCFA § 3215 does not dictate an independent review by the Colorado Department of the MQTs of SSI recipients because to bind SSI recipients to the instruction would controvert the goal of SSI  i.e., to assist low-income individuals who are aged, blind, and disabled who qualify for benefits through SSI's own internal eligibility requirements. Our conclusion is buttressed by the following points. First, the Colorado Department offers no case law casting doubt upon the coextensiveness of SSI and Medicaid eligibility. See Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 38 (emphasizing that all SSI recipients are also entitled to Medicaid benefits). Second, the subset of the "mandatory categorically needy" includes persons other than SSI recipients  for example, AFDC participants, certain aliens, expectant mothers, and newborns. HCFA § 3215, then, does not become moot because it is not applicable to SSI recipients. It still may be applied to other "mandatory categorically needy" individuals and to § 209(b) states.
[u]nder the trust provisions in § 1917(d) of the Act, you must consider whether and to what extent a trust is counted in determining eligibility for Medicaid. . . . These instructions apply to eligibility determinations for all individuals, including cash assistance recipients and others who are otherwise automatically eligible and whose income and resources are not ordinarily measured against an independent Medicaid eligibility standard.
Aplt's Addendum at 114 (HCFA § 3259) (emphasis added). Based on this instruction, the Colorado Department contends that the MQTs of SSI recipients are subject to an independent review by the state for Medical eligibility determinations.
Ms. Ramey and Ms. Shupe argue that this section simply does not apply to SSI recipients because it does not mention SSI recipients. More importantly, we note that this instruction effects only those "trusts established on or after August 10, 1993." Id. at 113. Ms. Ramey's and Ms. Shupe's trusts were established prior to this date, and so HCFA § 3259 is clearly inapplicable.
In addition, § 3259.1 cites section 1917(d), which applies to a variety of circumstances beyond initial Medicaid eligibility, such as "spend down" requirements for 209(b) States and "deeming" of income determinations for both SSI and § 209(b) States. See Hayes v. Stanton, 512 F.2d 133, 140 (7th Cir 1975) (examining spend down requirements); Herweg, 455 U.S. at 269 (reviewing "deeming" of income requirements for optionally categorically needy). Clearly, the instruction grants States the power to reasonably regulate and may have a practical effect for a variety of situations and will apply to trusts established on or after August 10, 1993. However, the instruction is of no consequence here.
The SSA's policy guidelines are provided in the Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"), which is a set of policies issued by the SSA "to be used in processing claims." McNamar v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1999).(2) POMS No. SI 01730.048(E) is entitled "Procedure Development and Documentation, Section 1634 States." See id. at 117 (POMS No. SI 01730.048(E)). It provides that the "existence of a Medicaid trust will result in a referral of the case to the Medicaid State agency for a Medicaid eligibility decision." Id. According to the Colorado Department, this policy guideline indicates that the state must conduct its own review of MQT trusts of SSI recipients for purposes of Medicaid, regardless of what the Secretary of HHS has determined with respect to SSI eligibility.
We hold that the policy guideline has no effect on the instant case because, as with HCFA § 3259, it applies only to trusts established after August 10, 1993. See id. at 115. We also note that Colorado and the Secretary of HHS have entered into a written agreement which specifies that the Department of HHS shall "[m]ake determinations . . . of Medicaid eligibility on behalf of the State" of Colorado. See Aplt's App. vol. I, at 523-24 (agreement between the Secretary of HHS and Colorado). Finally, we can find nothing in Colorado's statutes to support the Department's arguments, but only to undercut them. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 26-4-106(1) ("Local social security offices also determine eligibility for medicaid benefits at the same time they determine eligibility for supplemental security income"). To the extent that the POMS No. SI 01730.048(E) conflicts with the Act's requirement that SSI recipients are entitled to Medicaid benefits, the Act prevails. We agree with the district court that because Ms. Ramey and Ms. Shupe are undisputedly SSI recipients, they are entitled to Medicaid benefits from the State of Colorado.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court's order.
*. Judge Henry vouched in for oral arguments.
**. The Honorable Richard Owen, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1. There were various proceedings before an administrative law judge regarding Ms. Farmer's trust that are not before this court.
2. Like the HCFA's interpretative rules above, we defer to the POMS provisions unless we determine they are "arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law." Id.


If a partnership owns an LLC it treats as a disregarded entity under the check the box rules, may partners of the partnership be treated as employees of the disregarded entity, receiving a W-2 and obtaining certain tax beneficial fringe benefits open to employee but not partners? The IRS says the answer has always been no, but since some read the existing regulations otherwise the agency has issued Temporary Regulation §301.7701-2T(e)(8)(i) (TD 9766) and an identical proposed regulation (REG-114307-15).
The “check the box” provisions found in Reg. §301.7701-2 were created to deal with state law entities that had no direct equivalent under federal law (with the prime example being limited liability companies (LLCs)). Under those rules, the taxpayer elects to treat the entity “as if” it was an entity the IRC has a treatment for, picking from a list that depends on the number of owners.
But this “pretend” treatment of an entity as something it really isn’t sometimes creates issues, which the IRS quickly discovered when dealing with payroll taxes and such entities—leading the IRS to create a modified set of rules for payroll tax issues and entities that elected “disregarded” treatment. The problem was that, under state law, any liabilities of those entities did not “leak out” to owner.
Section 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) states that, except as otherwise provided, a business entity that has a single owner and is not a corporation under §301.7701-2(b) is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner (a disregarded entity). However, §301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(B) provides that an entity that is a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation for purposes of employment taxes imposed under subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Therefore, the disregarded entity, rather than the owner, is considered to be the employer of the entity’s employees for purposes of employment taxes imposed by subtitle C.
But the “lack of liability leakage” problem isn’t really a problem for self-employment taxes, since there the liability would not exist for the LLC but rather the entity owning the interest. So the IRS sought to add more “clarification” that held that for self-employment tax purposes the income tax treatment would apply (that is, total disregard of the entity).
But it turns out in the example found in the regulations explaining the application of the self-employment tax rule the IRS had only discussed the case of a sole proprietor—leading some partnerships to take the position that while an LLC held 100% by an individual could not treat that individual as an employee under Reg. §301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(C)(2).
Under this reading, which was not intended, some taxpayers have permitted partners to participate in certain tax-favored employee benefit plans. The Treasury Department and the IRS note that the regulations did not create a distinction between a disregarded entity owned by an individual (that is, a sole proprietorship) and a disregarded entity owned by a partnership in the application of the self-employment tax rule. Rather, §301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(C)(2) provides that the general rule of §301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) applies for self-employment tax purposes for any owner of a disregarded entity without carving out an exception regarding a partnership that owns such a disregarded entity. In addition, the Treasury Department and the IRS do not believe that the regulations alter the holding of Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CB 256, which provides that: (1) bona fide members of a partnership are not employees of the partnership within the meaning of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and the Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages (chapters 21, 23, and 24, respectively, subtitle C, Internal Revenue Code of 1954), and (2) such a partner who devotes time and energy in the conduct of the trade or business of the partnership, or in providing services to the partnership as an independent contractor, is, in either event, a self-employed individual rather than an individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee.
Also, if a partnership is the owner of an entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for any purpose under §301.7701-2, the entity is not treated as a corporation for purposes of employing a partner of the partnership that owns the entity; instead, the entity is disregarded as an entity separate from the partnership for this purpose and is not the employer of any partner of the partnership that owns the entity. A partner of a partnership that owns an entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for any purpose under §301.7701-2 is subject to the same self-employment tax rules as a partner of a partnership that does not own an entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for any purpose under §301.7701-2.
In order to allow adequate time for partnerships to make necessary payroll and benefit plan adjustments, these temporary regulations will apply on the later of: (1) August 1, 2016, or (2) the first day of the latest-starting plan year following May 4, 2019, of an affected plan (based on the plans adopted before, and the plan years in effect as of, May 4, 2019) sponsored by an entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for any purpose under §301.7701-2. For these purposes, an affected plan includes any qualified plan, health plan, or section 125 cafeteria plan if the plan benefits participants whose employment status is affected by these regulations. For rules that apply before the applicability date of these regulations, see 26 CFR part 301 revised as of April 1, 2016.


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Each year around 37,000 breaking and entering crimes are reported throughout Maryland. Depending on the nature of the crime and the factual circumstances of each case, an individual convicted of burglary could be sentenced to up to 20 years of jail time. Consulting with an experienced and reputable Maryland criminal attorney will provide you with a better understanding of how to best fight your charge(s). Retaining qualified representation from a local attorney with knowledge of Maryland criminal statues, will take the burden of navigating the complex and harsh criminal justice system off of your shoulders. En Español.
Burglary is a criminal offense that is sometimes referred to as trespassing, housebreaking, or B&E (breaking and entering). In the state of Maryland, the criminal offense of burglary is broken down into four different degrees. Fourth degree burglary is a misdemeanor under the Maryland criminal code, § 6-205(a)(b). The other burglary-related violations, degrees one through three, are all felonies. The varying degrees can also be broken into sub-categories, such as second-degree burglary/firearm. Furthermore, there are specific types of burglary which may be classified as a felony or misdemeanor under certain circumstances that must be met. Breaking and entering with explosives is one example of this. Depending on the severity of the crime and which degree of burglary you are accused of committing, the potential jail time will vary greatly if you are in fact convicted.
First degree burglary, as stated under § 6-202 of the criminal code, is the breaking and entering into a “dwelling” with some sort of intent to commit a theft or a violent crime. The intent to commit theft could be a misdemeanor or a felony. This crime is punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment and is a felony in the state of Maryland.
In Maryland, second degree burglary is similar to the first degree, with the main difference being that the crime is committed on a “storehouse” as opposed to a private residence. Generally a storehouse means any building, such as a farm barn, factory, educational facility, or public building, but it can also include certain vehicles, such as a train car, airplane or helicopter. The law also dictates in § 6-203(a) that burglary of the second degree must involve intent to commit violent crime, robbery (theft), or arson. Second degree burglary is a felony and punishable up to 15 years in prison.
Almost identical to the general second degree burglary statute, CR 6-203(b) explains that one must have the intent to take a firearm. This section also notes that it must be a storehouse that is broken into. However, if the convicted person does so with intent to steal a firearm, he or she may be punished with up to 20 years in prison, instead of the 15-year maximum prescribed for general second degree burglary.
Breaking and entering in the fourth degree, in the state of Maryland, is charged as a misdemeanor. This does not mean that one cited with this crime can take the charges lightly. Maryland state law § 6-205(a)(b) says that one who enters a dwelling or a store house by breaking in may be charged – irrespective of whether or not there is the intent to commit a crime. In other words, the act of “breaking in” alone is in violation of the law. Fourth degree burglary is punishable by up to three years in prison.
§ 6-205(d) forbids the possession of tools with the intention of using them for the commission of breaking and entering. Again, this is a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of three years.
Under Maryland state law it is illegal to be in possession of burglary tools with the intention of breaking into and entering an automobile or any other motor vehicle. This criminal offense is similar to fourth-degree tools, except that it specifically applies to the burglary of a motor vehicle. § 6-206(a) does however carry the same penalties as the above. A subsection of this law, titled Rogue and Vagabond (§ 6-206(b)), carries the same penalty for merely being present in the motor vehicle with the intent to commit theft of the motor vehicle.
This specific statute explains what must be done to be charged with this crime and the potential ramifications. In order to be charged for burglary with explosives under § 6-207, one must commit first through third degree burglary using explosives to open some sort of lock, safe, or vault. Oftentimes the charge of fourth-degree burglary with tools is accompanied with burglary with explosives. This crime is a felony with a maximum potential jail time of 20 years.
A person charged with burglary definitely needs to have an attorney who understands the criminal law and has had experience with trials. It is essential to work with an attorney who has a strong familiarity with the laws of burglary. There are a lot of different case scenarios, and depending on what the State may be able to prove, there can be serious penalties.
An experienced Maryland burglary lawyer is going to work hard to understand the evidence in the case and try to provide proof that there was no burglary that took place. An experienced defense attorney is going to understand the different scenarios that change the burglary misdemeanor to a felony. It would be wise to retain an experienced defense attorney if you are facing burglary charges in Maryland.

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IN RE: August L. GOMEZ. June 30, 2005 No. 2005-B-0134.
IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE R.E. CHAFFIN June 29, 2005 No. 2005-O-0782.
AGUILLARD v. AUCTION MANAGEMENT CORP June 29, 2005 Nos. 2004-C-2804, 2004-C-2857.
IN RE: J. Clemille SIMON. June 29, 2005 No. 04-B-2947.
IN RE: JUSTICE OF the PEACE Wade COOK June 29, 2005 No. 2005-O-0783.
IN RE: Judge Kirk GRANIER June 29, 2005 No. 2004-O-3031.
FILSON v. WINDSOR COURT HOTEL June 29, 2005 No. 2004-CC-2893.
STATE v. ALLEN June 29, 2005 No. 2003-KA-2418.
STELLUTO v. STELLUTO June 29, 2005 No. 2005-CC-0074.
WORLD TRADE CENTER TAXING DISTRICT v. ALL TAXPAYERS PROPERTY OWNERS June 29, 2005 No. 2005-CA-0374.
MALLARD BAY DRILLING INC v. KENNEDY June 29, 2005 No. 2004-C-1089.
LONG v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT June 29, 2005 No. 2004-C-0485.
STATE v. SKIPPER June 29, 2005 No. 2004-KA-2137.
STATE v. JUNIORS June 29, 2005 No. 2003-KA-2425.
IN RE: Roger W. JORDAN June 29, 2005 No. 2004-B-2397.
IN RE: Arthur L. CARTER. June 24, 2005 No. 2005-B-0725.
STATE in the Interest of B.J. June 24, 2005 No. 2005-CK-0913.
IN RE: Duke Ellington TILLEY June 24, 2005 No. 2005-B-0338.
STATE v. SMITH June 24, 2005 No. 2004-KK-3140.
IN RE: Michael F. MELTON. June 17, 2005 No. 2005-B-0409.
HANKS v. SEALE June 17, 2005 No. 2004-C-1485.
IN RE: Bobby K. PITRE. June 17, 2005 No. 2005-B-0853.
STATE v. CUNNINGHAM June 13, 2005 No. 2004-KA-2200.
IN RE: Robert E. RANDOLPH. June 3, 2005 No. 2005-B-0125.
IN RE: Judge Pamela Taylor JOHNSON. June 3, 2005 No. 2004-O-2973.

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In Conway v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 13-11164, 2014 WL 3708533 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2014), the plaintiff is a 27-year personal injury defense attorneys. Roughly five years ago, he suddenly lost hearing in his left ear. Though the plaintiff returned to work three days later-and has continued to work as an attorney ever since-his hearing loss has required him to reduce the number of hours he works per week. Before losing his hearing, the plaintiff typically worked seventy hours per week; now he is only able to work fifty hours per week. Considering the plan provisions, and all of the evidence in the administrative record, the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide satisfactory proof of Total Disability. Though there was medical evidence showing that he experienced significant hearing loss, a loss of balance, and tinnitus, in the court’s view, the record did not show by objectively satisfactory evidence that these conditions rendered the plaintiff unable to perform any of the material duties of his occupation as an attorney.
No Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failing to Inform of Retirement Package. In Soland v. George Washington Univ., — F.Supp.2d —-, 2014 WL 3686329 (D.D.C. July 25, 2014), the plaintiff is a former George Washington University (“GW”) professor who alleged that the university breached a fiduciary duty owed to him under ERISA by failing to inform him of a department-wide retirement plan that he claims was in the works while he was negotiating his retirement. The plaintiff contended that GW’s omission caused him to agree to a less-beneficial retirement package. The court found in favor of GW, finding that the retirement plan was in too nascent a stage to constitute material information when the plaintiff sought to retire and that the plaintiff did not offer evidence establishing that GW made a misstatement or failed to disclose necessary information.
Retaliation Claim Under ERISA Permitted. In Najmola v. Women’s Healthcare Grp. of PA, CIV.A. 13-6519, 2014 WL 3700260 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2014), the plaintiff alleged that she utilized her ERISA protected short-term disability plan and that she worked as a medical assistant for several years, received favorable reviews, and was cleared by her doctor to return to work full-time. She also alleged that she was terminated shortly after she informed her employer that she was able to return to work. The plaintiff’s employment ended on the exact date that she was being released by her doctor to return to work. She also alleged that she received favorable performance evaluations up until her termination. Section 510 of ERISA prohibits employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order to keep them from obtaining employee benefits. In addition to protecting future benefits, Section 510 supports a claim where an employee alleges that he or she was terminated in retaliation for the past exercise of protected rights. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had the “specific intent” to violate Section 510. Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s ERISA claim. The Court found that these facts were sufficient to infer a causal connection and that the defendants had the intent to interfere with or retaliate against the plaintiff for utilizing ERISA protected benefits. As such, it denied the defendants’ motion.
(v) employment or self-employment … in any position covered by a Teamster contract between that employer and any affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters….
The dispute boiled down to whether cessation of covered employment is sufficient for retirement or merely one of two necessary requirements (the other being cessation of the enumerated activities in section 6.05(a)(i)-(v)). The district court reasoned that, because the definition of “retire” took the form cessation of X or Y, the trustees were free to interpret it disjunctively: that is, to treat cessation of X as a sufficient condition. The Court of Appeals found that the trustees never suggest why “cessation of being employed … or engaging” should be read disjunctively, rather than as a conjunctive prohibition that applies to both sides of the “or.” In these circumstances, there simply was no analysis or reasoning to which the Court could defer under the arbitrary and capricious standard. An ERISA plan must be read as a whole, considering separate provisions in light of one another and in the context of the entire agreement. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the trustees’ interpretation is untenable when viewed in the context of the rest of the plan, specifically with an accompanying plan provision that covers suspension of benefits. In the context of the entire agreement, the only sensible interpretation of section 6.05(a) is that a participant must cease both covered employment and the activities listed in section 6.05(a)(i)-(v) to be deemed “retired.” Given the plan administrator’s flimsy defense of its own interpretation and that it is clear cut that it would be unreasonable for the plan to deny the application for benefits on any ground, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court rather than remanding the matter back to the plan administrator.
Court Upholds Aetna’s Denial of Disability Benefits. In Jensen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 13-2091, 2014 WL 3686092 (W.D. Tenn. July 23, 2014), the plaintiff was a FedEx worker who was disabled from performing his normal forty-hour workweek as a result of chronic migraines. From March 24, 2012, to October 12, 2012, the plaintiff missed a total of two hundred and two days of work due to migraine pain. The plaintiff informed FedEx that the intensity and frequency of the migraines is treatable only by opiate medication. However, FedEx policy prevents him from working while on that medication. The plaintiff participated in both the FedEx Short-Term Disability (“STD”) Plan and the FedEx Long-Term Disability (“LTD”) Plan through his employment and Aetna is the claims-paying Administrator of the Plans and makes eligibility determinations for the Plans. The plaintiff filed or STD benefits and could only be eligible for LTD benefits after he first exhausted his STD benefits. The disability plans require that any alleged disability be “substantiated by significant objective findings which are defined as signs which are noted on a test or medical exam and which are considered significant anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities which can be observed apart from the individual’s symptoms.” Aetna denied his claim for benefits and the plaintiff filed suit. The court granted Aetna’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the evidence the plaintiff submitted to Aetna was “subjective” in nature despite that the plaintiff’s treating doctors found that he was disabled.
Court Dismisses ERISA Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim. In Donati v. Ford Motor Co. Gen. Ret. Plan, Ret. Comm., 13-14496, 2014 WL 3663966 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2014), the plaintiff’s personal representative brought suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), alleging that the retirement plan administrators improperly excluded benefits owed under a QDRO in calculating a lump-sum payment. The plaintiff brought a second claim, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), alleging a breach of fiduciary duty arising from the defendant’s alleged misstatements of the amount of the plaintiff’s lump-sum benefits. The defendant moved for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, asserting that the plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law because ERISA does not allow simultaneous claims under Section 1132(a)(1) (B) and (a)(3), in order to remedy the same injury. The plaintiff argued that she has not sought identical remedies because her allegation under § 1132(a)(3) “references matters entirely external to the Plan document, namely the misrepresentation to Plaintiff of the terms of the Plan and her benefits thereunder.” The court found that the plaintiff’s alleged violations of the ERISA plan at issue can be adequately remedied under § 1132(a)(1)(B), and thus, she may not seek relief for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a) (3), which the court described as “a mere repackaging of her claim to recover benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B).” The court granted defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Court Finds Dignity Health is Not Exempt from ERISA. In Rollins v. Dignity Health, 13-CV-01450-TEH, 2014 WL 3613096 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2014), the court considered whether Dignity’s Plan is exempt from ERISA. The plaintiff argued that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the Plan was established by Dignity’s predecessor, Catholic Healthcare West (“CHW”), that CHW was not a church, and that therefore the Plan is not an exempt church plan under the statute. Dignity opposed Rollins’s motion and argued that there is a genuine dispute of material fact because at the time the Plan was established in 1989, CHW was controlled by various religious women’s orders known as the “Sponsoring Congregations,” which would be considered churches for purposes of the statute. Dignity argued that the Sponsoring Congregations established the Plan jointly with CHW, and alternatively that by way of the Sponsoring Congregations’ control over CHW, the Sponsoring Congregations indirectly established the Plan. Therefore, the Plan was “established by a church” for purposes of the ERISA statute and is an exempt church plan. The court determined that it would not depart from its earlier ruling, that pursuant to the ERISA statute, mere association with a church does not give an entity the authority to establish a church plan. Under the court’s reading of the statute, a church plan may only be established by a church. There is no genuine dispute of material fact that CHW established the Plan here, and that CHW is not a church. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on her claim for declaratory relief that the plan established by CHW-the Dignity Plan at issue here-is not a church plan as defined by ERISA, and is therefore not exempt from ERISA.
Court Permits Discovery into Aetna’s Conflict of Interest. In Kasko v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., CIV.A. 5: 13-243-DCR, 2014 WL 3586085 (E.D. Ky. July 21, 2014), the court partially granted plaintiff’s motion for discovery into Aetna’s alleged conflict of interest as the administrator and insurer of the plaintiff’s long-term disability policy. The court found that the plaintiff made a sufficient showing of potential bias to permit further discovery. More specifically, she offered proof that approximately 85% to 90% of the claims that Aetna’s reviewing doctor, Dr. Elana Mendelssohn, has reviewed have been recommended “not disabled.” Further, Dr. Mendelssohn has been criticized by other courts for the content and frequency of reviews she makes for Aetna. The court found this additional information was sufficient to justify discovery outside the administrative record. The court permitted discovery into the compensation and opinions of doctors and vendors for the insurance company.


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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 2017 › Buren v. Doctor's Associates Inc.
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 16-1652 IN RE: SUBWAY FOOTLONG SANDWICH MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION. APPEAL OF: THEODORE FRANK, Objector. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. MDL No. 13-02439 — Lynn Adelman, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 25, 2017 ____________________ Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. SYKES, Circuit Judge. In January 2013 an Australian teenager measured his Subway Footlong sandwich and discovered that it was only 11 inches long. He photographed the sandwich alongside a tape measure and posted the photo on his Facebook page. It went viral. Class-action litigation soon followed. Plaintiffs’ lawyers across the United States sued 2 No. 16-1652 Subway for damages and injunctive relief under state consumer-protection laws, seeking class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The suits were combined in a multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In their haste to file suit, however, the lawyers neglected to consider whether the claims had any merit. They did not. Early discovery established that Subway’s unbaked bread sticks are uniform, and the baked rolls rarely fall short of 12 inches. The minor variations that do occur are wholly attributable to the natural variability in the baking process and cannot be prevented. That much is common sense, and modest initial discovery confirmed it. As important, no customer is shorted any food even if a sandwich roll fails to bake to a full 12 inches. Subway sandwiches are made to order in front of the customer; meat and cheese ingredients are standardized, and “sandwich artists” add toppings in whatever quantity the customer desires. With no compensable injury, the plaintiffs’ lawyers shifted their focus from a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) to a class claim for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). The parties thereafter reached a settlement. For a period of four years, Subway agreed to implement certain measures to ensure, to the extent practicable, that all Footlong sandwiches are at least 12 inches long. The settlement acknowledged, however, that even with these measures in place, some sandwich rolls will inevitably fall short due to the natural variability in the baking process. The parties also agreed to cap the fees of class counsel at $525,000. The district court preliminarily approved the settlement. No. 16-1652 3 Theodore Frank objected. A class member and professional objector to hollow class-action settlements, see, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016), Frank argued that the settlement enriched only the lawyers and provided no meaningful benefits to the class. The judge was not persuaded. He certified the proposed class and approved the settlement. Frank appealed. We reverse. A class action that “seeks only worthless benefits for the class” and “yields [only] fees for class counsel” is “no better than a racket” and “should be dismissed out of hand.” Id. at 724. That’s an apt description of this case. I. Background In January 2013 Matt Corby, an Australian teenager, purchased a Subway Footlong sandwich and, for reasons unknown, decided to measure it. The sandwich was only 11 inches long. He took a photo of the sandwich next to a tape measure and posted the photo on his Facebook page. Thus a minor social-media sensation was born. A few media outlets and some Subway customers were inspired to conduct their own sandwich-measuring experiments. See, e.g., Kaylee Osowski, Some Subway “Footlong” subs don’t measure up, N.Y. POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/01/17/ some-subway-footlong-subs-dont-measure-up. Subway immediately issued a press release announcing that it had “redoubled” its efforts “to ensure consistency and correct length in every sandwich.” The franchisor assured its customers that its “commitment remains steadfast” to ensure that every Footlong sandwich sold at each of its restaurants “worldwide” is at least 12 inches long. 4 No. 16-1652 Within days of Corby’s post, the American class-action bar rushed to court. Plaintiffs’ lawyers sued Subway seeking damages and injunctive relief under the consumerprotection laws of various states. 1 Subway moved to transfer the cases to a single district court for a multidistrict litigation. The cases—nine in total—were eventually consolidated in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In the meantime, the parties agreed to conduct limited informal discovery in anticipation of mediation. The early discovery revealed that the claims were factually deficient. For starters, the vast majority of Subway Footlong sandwiches are, as the name implies, at least 12 inches long. The few that do not measure up generally fall short by only about a quarter-inch, and the shortfalls are the inevitable consequence of natural—and unpreventable—vagaries in the baking process. Additionally, all of Subway’s raw dough sticks weigh exactly the same, so the rare sandwich roll that fails to bake to a full 12 inches actually contains no less bread than any other. What’s more, Subway standardizes the amount of meat and cheese in each sandwich, and sandwich makers prepare each one to order right in front of the customer, adding toppings on request. So the length of the bread has no effect on the quantity of food each customer receives. This early discovery, limited though it was, extinguished any hope of certifying a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). The overwhelming majority of Subway’s sandwiches lived 1 Doctor’s Associates, Inc., the franchisor for Subway restaurants, is the actual defendant in the suits. For ease of reference, we’ll refer to the defendant as Subway. No. 16-1652 5 up to their advertised length, so individual hearings would be needed to identify which purchasers actually received undersized sandwiches. But sandwich measuring by Subway customers had been a fleeting social-media meme; most people consumed their sandwiches without first measuring them. Proof of injury was nigh impossible because no customer whose sandwich roll actually failed to measure up received any less food because of the shortfall. In addition, the element of materiality—a requirement for a damages claim under most state consumer-protection statutes—was an insurmountable obstacle to class certification. Individualized hearings would be necessary to identify which customers, if any, deemed the minor variation in bread length material to the decision to purchase. Rather than drop the suits as meritless, class counsel refocused their efforts on certifying an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2) and eventually filed a consolidated class complaint seeking only injunctive relief. Following mediation, the parties agreed in principle to a settlement in which Subway committed to institute a number of practices designed to ensure, to the extent practicable, that its sandwich rolls measure at least 12 inches long and to keep those practices in place for four years. More specifically, Subway agreed that (1) franchisees would “use a tool” for measuring sandwich rolls; (2) corporate quality-control inspectors would measure a sampling of baked bread during each regularly scheduled compliance inspection; (3) the inspectors would check bread ovens during each compliance inspection “to ensure that they are in proper working order and within operating specifications”; and (4) Subway’s website and each franchised restau- 6 No. 16-1652 rant would post a notice explaining that the natural variability in the bread-baking process will sometimes result in sandwich rolls that are shorter than the advertised length. The settlement also explicitly acknowledged that “because of the inherent variability in food production and the bread baking process,” Subway could not guarantee that each sandwich roll will “always be exactly 12 inches or greater in length after baking.” Having agreed in substance to the terms of a settlement, the parties spent the next year or so dickering over fees for class counsel and incentive awards for the named plaintiffs. They eventually agreed to cap attorney’s fees at $525,000 and incentive awards at $1,000 for each named plaintiff. The district judge preliminarily approved the settlement and scheduled a fairness hearing. Class counsel filed a motion seeking $520,000 in attorney’s fees and a $500 incentive award for each of ten named plaintiffs. Frank objected to the settlement and class certification. He argued that the proposed injunction didn’t benefit the class in any meaningful way and so the settlement was worthless. The judge was unmoved. He approved the settlement and certified a class of “all persons in the United States who purchased a 6-inch or Footlong sandwich at a Subway restaurant between January 1, 2003[,] and … October 2, 2015.” The judge also accepted class counsel’s request for $520,000 in fees as reasonable and approved the proposal for a $500 incentive award for each class representative. Final judgment was entered in accordance with these rulings. Frank appealed. No. 16-1652 7 II. Discussion A. Standing The first issue on appeal concerns Frank’s standing. The plaintiffs and Subway insist that he lacks standing to appeal because he doesn’t have any interest in the amount of attorney’s fees awarded as part of the settlement. Because the settlement provides only injunctive relief to the class—not monetary relief—any reduction in attorney’s fees will return to Subway and not to class members like Frank. See Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If the class cannot benefit from the reduction in the award of attorneys’ fees, then the objector, as a member of the class, would not have standing to object, for he would have no stake in the outcome of the dispute.”). But Frank’s appeal does not take aim at the judge’s ruling on class counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. He challenges the certification of the class and the approval of the settlement. True, a decision to reverse the judgment will unwind the award of attorney’s fees, and neither Frank nor any other class member will benefit from reducing the fees of class counsel to zero. But as a class member who is bound by the settlement, Frank clearly has standing to appeal. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). He properly objected at the fairness hearing and may “appeal the approval of a settlement … that will ultimately bind [him].” Id. B. Class Certification and Settlement Approval Although the standard of review is deferential—the decision to certify a class and approve a class settlement is committed to the discretion of the district judge—our duty in this context is “far from pro forma.” Pearson, 772 F.3d at 8 No. 16-1652 780. We have explained that a district judge in this situation is akin to “a fiduciary of the class” and “is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.” Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, and especially in the settlement context, the judge must give the requirements for class certification “undiluted, even heightened, attention.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). The judge is called to “exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.” Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279). Rule 23(a) requires that the class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), and a class-action settlement may not be approved unless it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Underpinning both requirements is a concern for the unnamed class members whose interests the named plaintiffs represent and the settlement is meant to serve. We have remarked on the tendency of class settlements to yield benefits for stakeholders other than the class: Class counsel “support the settlement to get fees; the defendants support it to evade liability; the court can’t vindicate the class’s rights because the friendly presentation means that it lacks essential information.” Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996). That is why “objectors play an essential role in judicial review of proposed settlements of class actions and why judges must be both vigilant and realistic in that review.” Pearson, 772 F.3d at 787. We put the point more bluntly in another appeal by Frank as the objector: A class settlement that results in fees No. 16-1652 9 for class counsel but yields no meaningful relief for the class “is no better than a racket.” In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724. If the class settlement does not provide “effectual relief” to the class and its “principal effect” is to “induce the defendants to pay the class’s lawyers enough to make them go away,” then the class representatives have failed in their duty under Rule 23 to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752–53 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)). And if the class representatives have agreed to a settlement that provides meaningless relief to the putative class, the district court should refuse to certify or, alternatively, decertify the class. “No class action settlement that yields zero benefits for the class should be approved, and a class action that seeks only worthless benefits for the class should be dismissed out of hand.” In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724. The plaintiffs and Subway defend this settlement by insisting that it actually provides meaningful benefits to the class because Subway has bound itself, for a period of four years, to a set of procedures designed to achieve better bread-length uniformity. A simple comparison of the state of affairs before and after the settlement exposes the cynicism in this argument. Before the settlement, class members could be fairly certain that a Subway Footlong sandwich would be at least 12 inches long. They could rest assured that because all loaves are baked from the same quantity of dough, each sandwich contained the same amount of bread even if an occasional loaf failed to bake to the full 12 inches in length. And if a loaf happened to bake up slightly shorter than 12 inches, customers could be assured of receiving the same 10 No. 16-1652 quantity of meat and cheese as any other customer; no class member, regardless of bread length, was cheated on the amount of ham or turkey, provolone or pepper jack. As for other sandwich ingredients, class members could be as profligate or as temperate as they pleased: Subway’s “sandwich artists” add toppings at the customer’s request. In sum, before the settlement there was a small chance that Subway would sell a class member a sandwich that was slightly shorter than advertised, but that sandwich would provide no less food than any other. After the settlement—despite the new measuring tools, protocols, and inspections—there’s still the same small chance that Subway will sell a class member a sandwich that is slightly shorter than advertised. Indeed, the settlement explicitly acknowledges that “because of the inherent variability in food production and the bread baking process, [Subway] will never be able to guarantee that each loaf of bread will always be exactly 12 inches or greater in length after baking.” It’s safe to assume that Subway customers know this as a matter of common sense, but the settlement requires Subway to include a disclaimer on its website and in a poster prominently displayed at each restaurant: “Due to natural variations in the bread baking process, the size and shape of bread may vary.” And after the settlement, just as before, the rare sandwich that falls short of the full 12 inches will still provide the customer the same amount of food as any other. The injunctive relief approved by the district judge is utterly worthless. The settlement enriches only class counsel and, to a lesser degree, the class representatives. No. 16-1652 11 The plaintiffs and Subway observe that the class can return to court with a motion for contempt sanctions in the event of any violation of the injunction. They rely on Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014), as support for this point, but that case doesn’t help them. In Eubank the defendant window manufacturer had offered extended warranties to purchasers before the class litigation; under the proposed settlement, the manufacturer could not revoke the extended warranties. That, we said, “confer[red] a bit of extra value” on the class members. Id. at 725. Here, the procedures required by the settlement do not benefit the class in any meaningful way. The settlement acknowledges as much when it says that uniformity in bread length is impossible due to the natural variability of the bread-baking process. Contempt as a remedy to enforce a worthless settlement is itself worthless. Zero plus zero equals zero. Because the settlement yields fees for class counsel and “zero benefits for the class,” the class should not have been certified and the settlement should not have been approved. In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724. Because these consolidated class actions “seek only worthless benefits for the class,” they should have been “dismissed out of hand.” Id. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Buren v. Doctor's Associates Inc.

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.....and early 911's & 912's!
This is what your early Blaupunkt Radio looks like inside!
The purpose of this website is to assemble as much information as possible about Blaupunkt radios for 356, early 911 and 912 Porsches. Blaupunkt radios are considered by many to be the premier radio of the 1950's, 60's, and early 70's and most Porsche enthusiasts of this period consider the Blaupunkt, the radio of choice. Information will be presented here about which Blaupunkt radios were offered by Porsche as factory accessories during the 356 and early 911/912 era. Additional information will be presented on how to determine the age and year of manufacture of your Blaupunkt radio.
You can help. If you have any information about the Blaupunkt radios you see covered in this website, please contact me. I would be happy to add it to this website with proper credits to contributors!
1. Blaupunkt Radios that were Factory Accessories for 356 Porsches.
2. Radio Wave "Bands" AM, FM, M, SW, etc.
3. Blaupunkt Radio Serial numbers by Year.
4. Euro v. US Version Blaupunkt Radios.
5. Tube v. Tube & Transistor v. All Transistor.
6. Voltage and Polarity Conversion.
7. The "Green Dial-Face" Controversy.
8. The First Transistorized Blaupunkt Autoradio.
9. Radio Descriptions by Year and Model with Serial Numbers.
10. Correct Knobs of Blaupunkt Radios in 356 Porsches.
11. Two, Three & Five Pushbuttons Blaupunkts.
12. Two Piece Case v. 1 Piece Case.
13. US v. Euro Radio Tube Conversion Chart.
14. Face Plates, which one?
16. A Factory 356-B/C Installation Kit.
17. So what about the wires?
18. Blaupunkt Short Wave Adaptor.
19. Odds and Ends of Information.
20. Blaupunkt Service and Instruction Manuals.
21. Blaupunkt Radio Technical Manuals Avaliable.
Blaupunkt Radio Identification Website! ID your unknown Blaupunkt Radio!
the time period 1953 to 1955.
for 356 and early 911 & 912 Porsches.
New information has been added to this Section. The information comes from 356, 911 and 912 Porsche factory accessory booklets and pricelists. These radios are the ones Porsche said it would offer as factory accessories, whether they ended up in your car or not is another matter. Blaupunkt offered many other models of auto radios, only the ones specifically offered by Porsche as factory accessories are listed below. Dealers installed many other brands and models, including Becker radios, Bendix Sapphires, and others.
1. 356-A Factory Accessory Brochure - 1956.
Blaupunkt Bremen, AM/Long Wave ($89.50*).
Blaupunkt Stuttgart, AM/SW/Long Wave ($109.00*).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, AM/FM/Long Wave ($126.00*).
Blaupunkt Koln. AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic ($165.50*).
2. 356-A Factory Accessory Brochure - February 1959.
Blaupunkt Bremen, AM/Long Wave (transistor).
Blaupunkt Stuttgart, AM/SW/Long Wave/ (transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, AM/FM/Long Wave push button.
Blaupunkt Koln, AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic (transistor).
3. 356-B T-5 Factory Accessory Brochure - February 1960.
Blaupunkt Stuttgart, AM/SW/Long Wave push button (transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, AM/FM/Long wave push button (transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt US, AM/FM/Long Wave push button (transistor).
4. 356-B T-6 Factory Accessory Brochure - September 1961.
Blaupunkt Bremen ATR, M-L (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Stuttgart ATR, AM/SW/Long Wave (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt ATR de Luxe, UKW (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt ATR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Koln ATR de Luxe, UKW Automatic (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Koln ATR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic (all-transistor).
5. 356-B T-6 Factory Accessory Brochure - November 1962.
Blaupunkt Berlin ATR, AM/Long Wave (all-transistor).
Blaupunkt Stuttgart TR, AM/SW/Long Wave (transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt TR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave (transistor).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt TR de Luxe US, AM/FM/Long Wave (transistor).
Blaupunkt Koln TR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic (transistor).
Blaupunkt Koln TR de Luxe US, AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic (transistor).
6. 356-C Factory Accessory Brochure - August 1963.
7. 356-C Factory Accessory Brochure - September 1964.
Blaupunkt Bremen ATR, M-L (all-transistor) ($92.50*).
Blaupunkt Stuttgart ATR, AM/SW/Long Wave (all-transistor) ($113.75*).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt ATR de Luxe, UKW (all-transistor) ($141.25*).
Blaupunkt Frankfurt ATR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave (all-transistor) ($141.25*).
Blaupunkt Koln ATR de Luxe, UKW Automatic (all-transistor) ($185.00*).
Blaupunkt Koln ATR de Luxe, AM/FM/Long Wave Automatic (all-transistor) ($185.00*).
8. 911 Factory accessory Brochure - October 1965.
9322 Frankfurt, AM/FM/SW/LW (Euro band).
9322 Frankfurt, AM/FM/SW/LW (US band).
9325 Koln, AM FM/LW Automatic (Euro band).
9325 Koln, AM/FM/LW Automatic (US band).
9. 911, 912 Factory accessory Brochure - November 1966.
9323 Frankfurt US, AM/FM/SW (US band).
9326 New Yorker, AM/FM/Marine Automatic (US band).
10. 911, 912 Factory accessory Brochure - October 1967.
9327 Boston, AM (US band).
9323 Frankfurt, AM/FM/SW (US band).
11. 911, 911-S, 912 Factory accessory Brochure - September 1968.
12. All 911 Models Factory accessory Catalog, 1970.
13. All 911 Models Factory accessory Catalog, 1971.
US Version Blaupunkt Radios have an FM band of 88-108 MHz, compared to Euro FM band of 88-100 MHz.
Radio Wave "Bands" AM/FM/SW/M, etc.
The following is an explanation of the various wave "bands" found on Blaupunkt radios, both US versions and European versions.
1. US Band "AM" = Euro Band "AM" or "M", Frequency 520-1640 Khz, used for Commercial.
2. US Band "FM" = Euro Band "U", Frequency 87-100 Mgz (87-108 US), used for Commercial.
3. US Band "LW" = Euro Band "L"/"LW", Frequency 150-340 Khz, Commercial/Aviation/Weather.
4. US Band "MB" = Euro Band "MB", Frequency 2-2.8 Mgz, used for Marine.
5. US Band "SW" = Euro Band "K", Frequency Various, used for Short Wave.
As can be seem from the above, Blaupunkt radios came with one or more different frequency bands. The basic one-band radio came with the AM band. The next step was usually AM/FM. A common third band was LW (long wave) or SW (shortwave). In Europe, the LW band is for commercial broadcasts, however in the US, the LW band is used for aviation and weather broadcasts. European version radios are marked with the Euro band designators (M, U, L, MB or K), found on the push buttons.
This is not an FM radio!
Blaupunkt Radio Series by Year.
You can tell when your radio was manufactured by looking at the serial number, which is printed on a paper tag attached to the side of the radio. Blaupunkt serial numbers begin with a letter, and it is this letter which tells you the actual year of manufacture.
Examples of the Paper Serial # Tag on the side of the radio.
Dating a Blaupunkt Radio from its Model Number.
Another way of dating a Blaupunkt radios is by looking at is model number. The forth number from the left in the Model Number will tell the first year that model Blaupunkt radio was manufactured. It is key to understand that the number will reveal the "first" year of manufacture, but not the actual year of manufacture. Certain model Blaupunkt Radios were made for more than one year and bear the same model number. The distinction would be determined by the letter preceding the serial number is described in the prior section. For example, a Blaupunkt Frankfurt radio with model number 7 639 670 was first manufactured in 1969 with the letter in the serial number being an "A". That same radio with the same model number was made in 1970/71 with a "B" preceding the serial number, and again in 1971/1972 with a "C" preceding the serial number.
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, MN 7 639 670,"A" before the serial number, year of manufacture -1969/1970.
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, MN 7 639 670, "B" before the serial number, year of manufacture -1970/1971.
Blaupunkt Frankfurt, MN 7 639 670, "C" before the serial number, year of manufacture -1971/1972.
Above is an ad for a Blaupunkt Koln "Selectomat" (Signal-seeker).
Euro v. US Version Blaupunkt radios.
There are some band frequency differences between Euro version radios and US version radios. Beginning sometime in 1957 or 1958, Blaupunkt started producing radio versions which included US specifications. These radio models were identified in the model name like Frankfurt US, or Koln US. Radio versions without the US designation in the model name are probably Euro version radios, which work fine in the US, but don't pick up the complete US frequencies on certain bands. Euro band radios can also be identified by the letters shown on the pushbuttons. US band radios have AM, FM, SW and/or M on the push buttons. Euro radios have M, U, L, K and/or MB . (See the Euro and US radio band frequencies shown elsewhere on this website).
Tube v. Tube & Transistor v. All Transistor.
There has been a lot of speculation as to when radio tubes were phased out and when transistors were phased in. In the history of Blaupunkt radios during the 1950's and 60's, Blaupunkt used transistors for the first time sometime in 1958. These radios were a combination of transistors and tubes. Typically the model name included "TR" which designated that radio has having transistors, like Frankfurt TR or Stuttgart TR. Later beginning sometime in 1962, "All Transistor" models were introduced with the designation ATR. The chart showing the serial numbers by year of manufacture and model (below) shows which radios were all transistor.
Many Blaupunkt auto radios are 6-volt / 12 volt convertible, and positive-ground / negative-ground convertible, meaning that with very little effort, and a minor adjustment, the radio will work on either 6 volts or 12 volts in cars with the battery grounded at either the positive or the negative terminal. To further explain, the battery of some cars is grounded at the positive (+) terminal, and some cars have their battery grounded to the negative (-) terminal. This positive/negative ground convertibility allows the radio to work in both situations. By the way, batteries in 356 Porsches are negative ground.
Most of the 6v/12v convertible radios prior to about 1961 required changing or soldering jumpers inside the main case and the smaller case ("Power Pack") to change the voltage. After 1961 or thereabouts it appears that various types of plugs, as shown below, were phased in. In looking at individual radio models, appears that most "G" model Blaupunkts (1958/1959) and "D" model Blaupunkts (1960/1961) still required changing or soldering jumpers. "E" model Blaupunkts (1961/1962), except the single band (AM) Bremen, used switches or various types of plugs for 6v/12v conversion, in BOTH the main radio case and the smaller "Power Pack" After this time (1961/1962) most Blaupunkt radios were 6v/12v convertible by way of switches or plugs.
Below is a page out of the Blaupunkt factory manual showing how to change/solder the jumpers in a 6v/12v convertible "D" series Blaupunkt Koln TR de Luxe radio.
Blaupunkt Koln TR de Luxe US radio, "D" series, 1960/1961.
Below are several methods Blaupunkt used to switch their radios back and forth between 6 volts or 12 volts, and between positive and negative ground.
There are some other sneaky methods, but you get the idea!
Here are some images of various other methods/switches Blaupunkt used to change voltage on their radios, 6 volt to 12 volt and vice versa! Look carefully at the back and sides of the radio for one of these conversion methods. Some radios earlier than 1960 or 1961 required changing and/or soldering jumpers inside the radio case. On some models, the 6v/12v change was necessary on both cases of the radio, i.e. the main case, and the smaller "power pack".
Images provided by Jim Breazeale, EASY Porsche, San Francisco, California! At www.easypor.com.
Most everyone knows that the dial faces of 356 Porsche dashboard instruments have green lines and numbers. Take a close look at your Tachometer, Speedometer, or Clock! Assuming it is original to the car, it has green lines and numbers. The same goes for MOST factory accessory Blaupunkt radios! It does make sense. If the factory is going to have an accessory radio, it only makes good sense that their accessory radios would also have a green lines and numbers.
instruments in Porsche cars had green backgrounds."
Some say this is not an definitive answer, and they may be correct. It was the Bosch Company employee's opinion, and some, perhaps most, won't accept an opinion as fact. So there are two sides to this "controversy". One side says that ALL Blaupunkt Radios that came from the factory in 356-C's with "U" or "V" serial number prefixes have white dial faces. The other side say, well, OK, if that is so, first, how do you prove it, and secondly why did Blaupunkt and/or Porsche switch from green dial faces to white faces? Even when the other gauges on the 356 dashs still had green dial faces?
Anybody got a "U" or "V" Blaupunkt Radio with a Green Dial Face?
Factory Workshop Manual of your choice (Pre-A, 356-A, or 356-B/C).
Above is a Euro AM/FM/Long Wave Blaupunkt!
The First Transistorized Blaupunkt Autoradio.
While the transistor was invented in the United States, Sony Corporation of Japan produced the first mass produced, pocket sized transistorized radio in March of 1957. It didn't take long for the transistor to revolutionize the production of auto radios. Blaupunkt started producing auto radios with transistors in late 1957 or early 1958. These early radios were part tube and part transistor, with the transistors mounted on the outside of the back of the radio case. By sometime in 1961, Blaupunkt was producing all transistor (no-tube) radios, designated by "ATR" after the radio name, as in Frankfurt de Luxe ATR. These all-transistor Blaupunkts were first made available with the 356 B T-6 Porsches.
Radio Descriptions by Year and Model with Serial Numbers.
Below is an incomplete listing of the Blaupunkt radios, by model, that were factory accessories for 356 Porsches. Under the year is a letter which is at the beginning of the radio serial number. Additional information includes: number of pushbuttons, one or two piece radio case, Euro and US versions, starting serial number of the series, frequency bands included, whether or not the radio is 6v/12 convertible, and whether or not the radio is tube, part transistor (TR), or all-transistor (ATR). If you happen to have any of the missing information, please contact me so that it can be included in this chart.
*The above models were all the auto radio models produced during this period.
The above information was condensed from many sources. There is no way to determine the completeness of this information. There are probably other serial number series for the various categories shown above. The only radio models included above were those offered as factory accessories for 356 Porsches, as described in the factory Accessory Catalogs. There are numerous other Blaupunkt radio models that are not included, such as the New Yorker, Capri, Hamburg, Kassel, Munchen, Export-Super, Hannover, Manhattan, Toronto, and Viena to name a few. As additional information is found, it will be added to the above chart. If you have any information not included above, we'd love to hear from you. See contact information below.
Correct knobs of Blaupunkt Radios in 356 Porsches.
Most people agree that the correct knobs for Blaupunkt radios in 356 Porsches are the "Tulip" knobs, show below. Radios ordered as factory accessories came with Tulip knobs. The reason for this is that the Tulip knobs on the radios should match the Tulip knobs on the rest of the dashboard. As with everything 356, there are always exceptions. However, it doesn't make a great deal of sense to have mismatched knobs on your dashboard. Some don't care, and that's just fine!
What's wrong here......white lettering on radio, green lettering on clock and everything else! Doesn't it make sense that both should be green? Why, as it has been alleged, were the dial faces on all 356-C's white? Also, white radio pushbuttons and black dashboard knobs! Shouldn't they match!
Two, Three & Five Pushbuttons Blaupunkts.
During the period 1956 to 1965, Blaupunkt radios selected as optional equipment for 356 Porsches had 2, 3 or 5 pushbuttons, depending on the model of the radio and the number of bands (AM, AM, SW, etc). For identification purposes, the chart showing the serial numbers by year of manufacture and model show which radios had 2, 3 or 5 pushbuttons.
Not all the radio knobs depicted above are 356 Porsche styled knobs.
Two piece case v. One piece case.
Blaupunkt radios going back to the early 1950's had two piece cases. In the early radios, the second case, sometimes known as the "powerpack" (an incorrect technical reference), was a big as the main radio. In very early 356 Porsches, this second case was mounted under the floorboards. As radios miniaturized over this period, the second case got smaller, and was hung behind and slightly below the main case of the radio. Some of the Blaupunkt models during this transition period had up to 3 quarter sized transistors mounted on the outside of the second case (see the picture above).
US v. Euro Radio Tube Conversion Chart.
One of the problems in repairing older Euro version tube radios radios is the difficulty associated with getting replacement tubes. The conversion chart below shows US radio tubes that are interchangable with common Euro tubes found in Euro Blaupunkt radios.
Blaupunkt Face plates for 356 and some early 911 & 912 Porsches.
Blaupunkt supplied radios to many European car manufacturers, including Mercedes Benz, Volvo, Volkswagen, and Jaguar to name a few. Each dashboard design was different, and so were the various face places designed for each model. The face plate normally intended for 356 Porsches, at least from about 1956 on, was a chrome square approximately 4 inches by 2 inches that fitted to the face of the radio. The radio without the face place was installed from up underneath the dash with the knob masts and dial face sticking through the dashboard. Once fixed in place with mounting nuts, the chrome face plate was snapped in place on the front of the radio. There are several versions of this chrome faceplate. Some say Blaupunkt on the center bar. There are a few versions that snap onto the radio first, and then the radio is installed in the dash.
Non-standard, but attractive full faceplate!
Porsche Factory Radio Delete Plate.
Factory Radio Delete Plate in a 356-B T-6.
Installation Instructions for Blaupunkt Radios.
The following precautions were found in the factory manuals pertaining to installing Blaupunkt auto radios.
1. Before installation, check voltage and polarity for 6v/12v and +/- convertible radios.
2. Disconnect grounded battery terminal.
3. Remove dummy plate from receiver cutout on dash.
4. Insert receiver in dashboard from the rear, and attach with hanger and nuts provided.
5. Connect battery cable from radio ( yellow wire ) to terminal 54 of ignition lock.
6. Slide protection sleeve over fuse cartridge.
7. Prepare speaker openings in the RH and LH sidewall.
8. Insert speakers with mounting rings.
9. Connect speaker connecting cables to speaker leads.
10. NEVER TURN RADIO ON WITHOUT ONE SPEAKER CONNECTED!
11. Plug connection cable plugs into diagonal speaker connection sockets of receiver.
12. Remove left door wing.
13. Mark antenna hole through upper door hinge.
15. Introduce antenna from below through the upper door hinge and secrue with cap nut.
16. Plug male antenna plug into female antenna receptical on side of radio.
17. Turn on radio and see if it works........! BE SURE THE SPEAKERS ARE HOOKED UP!
Blaupunkt Radio & Speaker Exploded-View Diagrams.
Dotted line with circles on both sides represents dashboard. Chrome face plate mounts onto the radio after it has been installed from behind the dash. Metal hanger with strap attaches up under the dashboard. The nuts and knobs are installed last.
The order of assembly of the speakers. The image to the far right is the carpeted area forward of the doors and above the floor.
An Actual Blaupunkt Factory 356 B/C Installation Kit.
A NOS Blaupunkt radio installation kit for a 356 B/C Porsche! Image by Sebastian Gaeta!
Chrome Face Plate on outside of dash.
Interior Speaker Frame and Speaker Wiring.
Metal Mesh behind Speaker Cloth.
Face Plate behind dash and Radio Hanger.
Blaupunkt Radio Exploded-View for a 356-A Porsche!
Blaupunkt Radio mounting diagrams for a 356-A Porsche!
The Blaupunkt radio mounting instructions for a 356-A Porsche show the second case of the radio, sometimes known as the "Power Pack", should be mounted under the passenger side kick board. The main case of the radio is mounted, from the underneath of the dash, in the cut out already provided in the dash, and is suspended by a hanger attached to the back of the main radio case.
356 Porsche Roadsters, which were produced for model years 1960 thru 1962, did not come with cutouts in the dash for a radio! Because of this Blaupunkt offered a special mounting kit that mounted the radio under the dash utilizing the same radio hanger used in Coupes and Cabriolets, but with the second piece of the radio, sometimes incorrectly called the "power pack", mounted on top of the main case rather than below and behind (see the diagram and parts list below). The Blaupunkt mounting bracket shown below for 356 Porsche Roadsters is shown in the Porsche Factory Accessory Catalog dated March 1961 as accessory #9614, Radio Bracket for Roadsters!
356 Porsche Roadster Blaupunkt Radio Mounting Instructions, Blaupunkt AUTORADIO Bulletin 111-61!
356 Roadster Blaupunt Radio Bracket used by factory. Image by Jon Bunin!
smaller case,which hangs behind and slightly below the main case of the radio.
Above the radio in the line drawings is the clock, and below is the ashtray.
Blaupunkt Radio Speaker Diagram, and Speaker Wires Plug-in!
So What About the Wires?
A lot of the questions I see asked about installing a Blaupunkt radio are about the wires. What wires go to what? Actually, this is a fairly easy to answer, and hopefully this explanation and the pictures below will help. There are several kinds of wires that come out of a Blaupunkt radio. The first is the hot wire by which the radio gets power. On Blaupunkt radios, this hot wire is usually yellow. Most often, this wire contains an in-line fuse, and is connected to a lead on the ignition switch that becomes hot when the key is turned on. If you get this wire hooked up, and there's no power, turn the key to the "on" position, and then check to see if there is a fuse in the inline fuse holder or if the fuse is bad.
On two piece case radios, there is a thick wire mesh bundle of wires with a multi-prong plug on the end coming from the main case of the radio to the so-called "power-pack". On later Blaupunkt radios, there is a short usually light gray wire that comes out of the body of the radio that has a female plug on the end. This is the antenna wire. Plug the "male" end of the wire from your antenna into this female plug.
And lastly, there are the wires that come from the speakers. For most Blaupunkt radios of this era, there are no speaker wires coming from the radio case. There are female plugs on the side of the case of the radio into which are plugged the wires from the speakers. DON'T TURN ON THE POWER TO A BLAUPUNKT RADIO WITHOUT THE SPEAKERS PLUGGED IN!
In the picture above, the yellow wire is the power wire. The thick steel-braded wire connects the main case of the radio to the "power-pack" on the back. The four holes on the power-pack are for the speakers. Use the two bottom holes for one plug, one speaker, and the two to the left and the two to the right for two plugs to connect two speakers if the radio is stereo. It should be noted that different models have different setups, but the above will give you the general idea.
Beginning in the early 1950's, Blaupunkt offered a separate short wave adaptor to be used in conjunction with their line of auto radios. The short wave adaptor was a separate unit, usually mounted under the radio in a 356 Porsche, which provided additional short wave capability to a radio already equipped with a short wave band, or added the capacity to a radio without short wave capacity. The typical unit had nine additional push buttons as shown below. Short wave adaptors like those shown here were not offered as factory accessories for 356 Porsches.
Example above is a VK900. Prior models look very similar.
Odds and Ends of Information.
1. The In-line Fuse in the Hot Wire is 8 Amps for 6-volt systems, and 4 Amps for 12-volt systems.
2. The Dial Face Lamp is 7V / .1 A Osram 3370 for 6-volt systems, and 14V / .1A Osram 3371 for 12-volt systems.
3. On certain Blaupunkt Koln "signal-seeker" automatic radios, there is a knob behind the outside knob that has red, blue and green color markings on it. Many do not know what these colors are for. This knob is a signal sensitivity switch. There may be I, II or III markings where the color shows. The "I" marking is for tuning only the strongest local stations, same but to a lesser extent for the "II" marking, and the "III" marking is for tuning very distant stations. This regulates where the automatic signal seeker stops when using the radio on the automatic setting. See photo below.
Most Blaupunkt Kolns have chrome pushbuttons.
4. If you have a Noticable Blue Dot on the dial face of your radio, it's NOT a 356 Era Radio!
5. If you have Four (4) Bands, like AM/FM/SW/LW on your radio, it's NOT a 356 Era Radio!
6. To Remove Push Buttons, look under the Push Button, & use a screwdriver. You'll figure it out!
7. To Set Push Buttons, find the station you want, pull Bush Button all the way out, then push in!
8. To Change Dial Face Lamp, remove chrome face plate, remove dial face, remove reflector, and push isolation sleeve (1/4") on dial lamp and pull out dial lamp with light pressure turning to the left.
Blaupunkt Radios for 1965 911 Porsches.
Blaupunkt listing of radios available for 911 Porsches, dated June 1965.
Blaupunkt Service & Instruction Manuals.
time during the 356 Porsche era.
Radio Service Locations dated 10.61.
Installation instructions, Porsche 356-B 1962.
Installation instructions, Porsche 356 B & C.
Blaupunkt "T" Series Alignment Instructions.
Blaupunkt "U" Series Printed Circuit Boards.
As mentioned serveral times above, any additional information you may have about Blaupunkt radios from the 1950's and 1960's would be a welcome addition to this website. Again, the purpose is to accumulate and present as much information as possible for anyone to use.
Sales Literature, and lots of other 356, 911 & 912 stuff!
This website was prepared for educational, historical, and informational purposes.
of the pictures and want them removed, they will be removed.

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Anglund, Joan Walsh. Almost a Rainbow. Book of Poems. New York. Harcourt, Brace & World. 1980. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in near fine (small chip at spine tip) dust jacket (in mylar).
Appelt, Kathi. Cowboy Dreams. Sleep Tight, Little Buckaroo. New York. HarperCollins. 1999. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Barry Root. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Appleton, Victor. Tom Swift and His Photo Telephone or The Picture That Saved a Fortune. Photo available. New York. Grosset & Dunlap. 1914. Octavo. Hardcover. Brown binding, black lettering. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy (owner name on end paper) in very good (edge wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Archambault, John. Boom Chicka Rock. Inscribed by the author. Photo available. New York. Philomel. 2004. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Arnold, Caroline. Juggler. New York. Clarion. 1988. 48 pps. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Arnold, Caroline. Juggler. New York. Clarion. 1988. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated by Richard Hewett. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Arnold, Marsha Diane. Heart of a Tiger. Inscribed by the author. New York. Dial. 1995. Octavo. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color by Jamichael Henterly. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Arnold, Tedd. The Simple People. New York. Dial. 1992. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Andrew Shachat. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Arora, Shirley L. The Left-Handed Chank. Chicago. Follett Pub. 1966. 256 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Arrington, Frances. Stella's Bull. Boston. Houghton Mifflin. 1994. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Aileen Arrington. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Asher, Sandy. Too Many Frogs! New York. Philomel Books. 2005. Octavo. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color by Keith Graves. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Atwood, Margaret. Rude Ramsay and The Roaring Radishes. New York. Bloomsbury. 2004. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by Dusan Petricic. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Avi. Crispin. The Cross of Lead. New York. Scholastic. 2002. 262 pps. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Fine copy.
Avi. Silent Movie. New York. Atheneum. 2003. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by C.B. Mordan. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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