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The Freedom From Religion Foundation filed suit in May, 2017, challenging President Trump's "religious liberty" executive order as it pertains to church politicking. FFRF and its co-presidents, Dan Barker and Annie Laurie Gaylor, are plaintiffs. The suit named as defendants President Trump and John Koskinen, commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service.
"This executive order directs the IRS not to unfairly target churches and religious organizations for political speech. No one should be censoring sermons or targeting pastors. [Standing ovation.] . . . In America we do not fear people speaking freely from the pulpit, we embrace it."
Trump also told churches that, due to his order, they would not lose their tax exemption for violating the rule against church politicking and could say whatever they wanted: "This financial threat against the faith community is over. . . . You're now in a position where you can say what you want to say." The state/church separation watchdog sued the IRS in 2014 for its failure to enforce the electioneering restrictions and settled the suit after the IRS agreed to begin enforcing existing law.
FFRF had asked the federal court to declare that Trump has violated the Establishment Clause and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and acted in excess of presidential authority under Article II of the Constitution. Due to the admissions by the Justice Department, however, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit in December, 2017. The lawsuit, Case No. 17-CV-330, was in the courtroom of U.S. District Judge James D. Peterson, U.S. District Court, Western District of Wisconsin. FFRF is continuing to monitor legislative initiatives and other efforts meant to undermine the Johnson Amendment, the provision that ensures all nonprofits, including churches, are prohibited from electioneering.
Why did FFRF sue, when others did not?
FFRF filed suit in U.S. District Court in Montana, challenging the Forest Service's decision to renew a special permit for a "shrine to our Lord Jesus Christ" on federal property in the Rockies. The Knights of Columbus, a conservative Roman Catholic men's club, has placed a devotional shrine on Big Mountain near Whitefish Mountain's Resort Chair Two in Flathead National Forest, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution. On June 24, 2013, U.S. District Judge Dana Christensen issued a ruling granting summary judgment for the Defendants.
FFRF news release: "FFRF challenges Catholic shrine on Big Mountain"
FFRF news release: "Judge rules FFRF's Jesus shrine suit can go forward"
FFRF filed a notice of appeal on August 22, 2013. The case was heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In August 2015, the Ninth Circuit, in a comparatively short 2-1 decision, ruled the Catholic shrine could stay. The blistering dissent noted, ". . . despite arguments to the contrary, a twelve-foot tall statue of Jesus situated on government-leased land cannot realistically be looked upon as 'predominantly secular in nature.'"
FFRF sought an en banc review of the case on Aug. 21, 2015.
FFRF news release: "FFRF seeks en banc review over Jesus shrine on Big Mountain"
That review was denied on Nov. 20, 2015.
The Freedom From Religion Foundation and its North Carolina chapter, Triangle Freethought Society, are suing the Internal Revenue Service for giving religious groups preferential treatment.
Under IRS regulations, all 501(c)3 non-profit organizations must file an onerous annual Form-990 — except churches. The Form 990 requires detailed reports on revenue and functional expenses, activities, governance, management, how groups fulfill their mission, and what proportion is spent on programs, management and fundraising.
FFRF and Triangle Freethought spend thousands of dollars each year to complete the 990. We have to track all our money and show the IRS where it all goes. Churches and other religious organizations do not have to file this form, do not have to track their funds, do not have to publicly report their funds, and do not have to pay accountants to complete the form.
The "preferential treatment of churches" directly benefits churches, while discriminating against other non-profit organizations, "solely on the basis of religious criteria."
The District Court initially granted FFRF standing to sue on August 22, 2013. After the Seventh Circuit decided against FFRF on the parsonage exemption lawsuit, the District Court dismissed this lawsuit as well. The court held that FFRF and Triangle did not have "standing" to sue. The court basically said that the IRS had to first officially determine that FFRF was not eligible for the Form-990 exemption before FFRF would have standing to sue.
The Foundation, with the help of Denver-area members and plaintiffs, filed suit on Nov. 12, 2008, against Colorado Gov. Bill Ritter Jr., for showing governmental preference for religion in issuing National Day of Prayer proclamations in tandem with the National Day of Prayer (NDP) Task Force.
The Foundation filed the lawsuit in state court in Denver, both on behalf of four named plaintiffs and its more than 400 Colorado members. The lawsuit seeks to declare Day of Prayer proclamations and dedications by Gov. Ritter in violation of the Religious Freedom clause of the Colorado Constitution, and seeks an order enjoining him from issuing further such proclamations. The Complaint notes that not only has Ritter issued official National Day of Prayer proclamations, but he appears to have aligned himself and the State of Colorado with a national observance called Reign Down USA, an evangelical movement that promotes prayer, ostensibly for restoration of the nation.
On May 20, 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court granted Gov. Hickenlooper's petition for review. The court will decide whether to uphold the appellate decision, which held that FFRF and four of its members have standing and that the state constitution disallows the governor's "Colorado Day of Prayer" exhortations.
The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), along with 19 other plaintiffs is suing the U.S. Treasury for stamping "In God We Trust" on currency. Honorary FFRF board member, Mike Newdow, is acting as legal counsel in the suit, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 1, 2013.
IGWT was first added to coins during the Civil War and then to all currency in the 1950s. Plaintiffs allege that the religious verbiage is proselytizing, discriminatory and a per se establishment of monotheism in violation of the Establishment Clause.
fulfill a flower order on the basis of religion (non-belief), in violation of Rhode Island General Laws." FFRF filed a previous complaint in January 2012 with the state Commission for Human Rights. A preliminary investigating commissioner determined in October that "probable cause" existed to believe that Plowman violated state law. The parties could have engaged in more conciliation with the commission, but the defendant chose to move the matter to Superior Court. FFRF has asked for a jury trial.
The defendant told a TV reporter at the time, "It's my freedom of speech. I refuse orders when I want and I take orders when I want."
FFRF filed a similar complaint with the commission about Flowers by Santilli's refusal to fulfill the order. Flowers by Santilli chose pursue mediation through the commission. Attorney Katherine Godin of Warwick is FFRF's local counsel in the lawsuit.
FFRF, its Valley of the Sun Chapter and several members as well as plaintiffs who were Buddhist, Christian and Muslim, filed suit in state court, challenging the constitutionality of Arizona Gov. Janice K. Brewer's annual Arizona Day of Prayer. The lawsuit was filed in Superior court of Arizona, County of Maricopa in January of 2012. Judge Eileen Willett dismissed the case on August 13, 2012 for lack of standing and for lack of jurisdiction to issue relief to the plaintiffs. On Nov. 16, 2012, FFRF and the individual plaintiffs filed an appeal to Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals arguing that their injuries are sufficient to challenge the Governor's proclaimed days of prayer.
The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal based on a lack of plaintiff standing on June 11, 2013. In an unpublished opinion, Judge Donn Kessler wrote that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the behavior of avoidance of the violative conduct or "that the alleged violation is so pervasive and continuing that it of necessity affects on a practical level how the plaintiffs interact with government." In its earlier briefing, FFRF emphasized court decisions that allowed standing where the plaintiffs had unwelcome contact with government speech promoting religion. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims.
On behalf of a local member, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a federal lawsuit on Dec. 22, 2011, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, charging Mayor James R. Fouts, of Warren, Mich., with government censorship of its nonreligious views and unlawful endorsement of religion. FFRF sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the mayor from continuing to establish religion “by allowing public displays of only religious symbols” and to order him to allow placement of FFRF’s Winter Solstice display. The lawsuit, FFRF v. City of Warren, was filed by the firm of Butzel Long in Bloomfield Hills, Mich., which is representing both FFRF and its member plaintiff pro bono. FFRF alleges censorship, the establishment of Christianity and denial of equal protection under the law by the city of Warren.
The legal complaint summarizes the chronology of the mayor’s endorsement of religion and censorship of the views of FFRF and its member Douglas Marshall of Warren, a named plaintiff. FFRF complained about the nativity display in the city hall atrium more than a year ago, eventually receiving a response on Dec. 8, 2010, in which Fouts wrote that “all religions are welcome to celebrate their religious seasons with a display in city hall.” Marshall tried in vain repeatedly to obtain permission to place the FFRF sign in the city hall atrium. The complaint called Fouts’ denial of a permit to Marshall “an unconstitutional, content-based restriction on plaintiffs’ expression in a traditional public forum.” As the Supreme Court has held, “a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause [is] that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.” The mayor’s preference for the nativity display and discriminatory practice against the plaintiffs also denies them equal protection under the law.
“As a result, Defendants send a clear message to Plaintiffs that they are outsiders and not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message that those who favor the Christian religion are insiders and favored members of the political community," charges the Complaint.
FFRF asks the court to enjoin the mayor from barring the FFRF sign, to find that the city has violated the rights of FFRF and its member, and to award nominal damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.
On May 31, 2012, U.S. District Judge Lawrence Zatkoff issued a ruling granting the city’s motion for summary judgment. FFRF has appealed this decision to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.
On February 25, 2013, a 3-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. In an opinion authored by Judge Sutton, the panel found Warren's display to be permissible government speech.
U.S. District Judge Christopher Conner on Oct. 1, 2012, dismissed the case, ruling House officials had legislative immunity, but chastised House officials for "premeditated pandering" and expressed alarm that the resolution passed unanimously. Conner wrote: "At worst, it is premeditated pandering designed to provide a reelection sound bite for use by members of the General Assembly. But regardless of the motivation . . . its express language is proselytizing and exclusionary. . . . The court is compelled to shine a clear, bright light on this resolution because it pushes the Establishment Clause envelope behind the safety glass of legislative immunity."
Ministers, who are paid in tax-free dollars, also may deduct their mortgage interest and property tax payments. Under both federal and California law, allowances paid to “ministers of the gospel” are not treated as taxable income. “Ministers of the gospel” may uniquely claim these benefits, so the statutes convey a governmental message of endorsement, unconstitutionally favoring religious employees and institutions over all others, the Foundation maintains.
The lawsuit was filed Oct. 16 in California Eastern District Court, Sacramento office. Judge William Shubb will preside over the case. Attorney Richard Bolton, Madison, Wis., with local counsel Michael Newdow, Sacramento, represent the Foundation and its plaintiff members.
The Foundation seeks a declaration that, on their face and as administered, provisions allowing tax benefits for “ministers of the gospel,” provided for by the IRS and Treasury Department, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Defendants are Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury secretary; Douglas Shulman, Internal Revenue Service commissioner; and Selvi Stanislaus, executive officer of the California Franchise Tax Board, who are all providing tax benefits only to “ministers of the gospel,” rather than to a broad class of taxpayers.
Certainly, in these times when we are being threatened by a godless and antireligious world movement we should correct this discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying on such a courageous fight against this foe. Certainly this is not too much to do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare.
Section 107(2) allows ministers to avoid paying taxes on income declared to be a “housing allowance.” The privilege also permits churches to save money on clergy salaries. Most egregiously, clergy may “double-dip,” i.e., deduct their mortgage payments and real estate taxes from income tax, even though they paid for these with tax-exempt dollars, amounting to a government subsidy solely for clergy.
“All other taxpayers pay more because clergy receive this privileged benefit,” said Annie Laurie Gaylor, Foundation co-president.
“The income taxation of ministers of the gospel under the general rules that apply to other individuals would not interfere with the religious mission of churches or other organizations or the ministers themselves,” the legal complaint maintains. The statutes are not an accommodation of religion, therefore, but a subsidy.
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that a tax benefit given only to religion violates the Establishment Clause (Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 1989).
Withdrawn in 2011. See new Sept. 13, 2011 challenge.
FFRF, with four of its Arizona members, filed a lawsuit on March 15, 2010 in U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, to enjoin Arizona Gov. Janice K. Brewer from declaring an Arizona Day of Prayer in this or future years. She has issued such proclamations in conjunction with the National Day of Prayer. The lawsuit also seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that Brewer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in declaring her Arizona Day of Prayer last year.
On July 22, FFRF exposed the use of Gov. Perry on robocalls promoting the rally: “This is Governor Rick Perry and I'm inviting you to join your fellow Americans in a day of prayer and fasting on behalf of our nation. As an elected leader, I am all too aware of government's limitations when it comes to fixin’ things that are spiritual in nature. That's where prayer comes in, and we need it more than ever. With the economy in trouble, communities in crisis and people adrift in a sea of moral relativism, we need God's help. That's why I'm calling on Americans to pray and fast like Jesus did, and as God called the Israelite to do in the Book of Joel. I sincerely hope you will join me in Houston on August the sixth and take your place in Reliant Stadium with praying people asking God's forgiveness, his wisdom and provision for our state and nation. To learn more, visit TheResponseUSA.com, then makes plans to be part of something even bigger than Texas.” On July 25, FFRF filed a motion seeking to enjoin Perry was continuing to promote the prayer rally. FFRF asked that Perry be barred from participating “in his official capacity as governor as a speaker at the event,” and to rescind his proclamation calling Aug. 6 a “day of prayer and fasting for our nation’s responses.” U.S. District Judge Gray Miller dismissed the lawsuit on July 28, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing. “Nobody would have trouble seeing the injury if a governor aligned himself with a radical Muslim group and used his office to call all citizens to a daylong prayer to Allah rally," noted FFRF Co-President Annie Laurie Gaylor.
FFRF held a “dinner of nonprayer and nonfasting” Aug. 5 for Houston-area members to honor the local co-plaintiffs in the case. After being denied use of any billboards near the stadium to protest the entanglement, FFRF commissioned an airplane to fly a banner: "Gov: Keep state/church separate. FFRF.ORG," over the stadium event and leased a mobile billboard with a caricature of the prayerful governor next to this message: "Beware Prayer by Pious Politicians: Get off your knees and get to work."
The Freedom From Religion Foundation has joined Michael Newdow in launching a new challenge of the religious phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Plaintiffs include the Foundation and a Hanover couple with children in the schools who are Foundation members. The suit, filed in federal court on Oct. 31, 2007, names Congress and three local school districts. A 2002 state law requires New Hampshire schools to include recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in every school day, but adds that student participation is voluntary. The parent plaintiffs believe that by including the phrase in the pledge, the district is "endorsing the religious notion that God exists" and thereby creates a "societal environment where prejudice against atheists . . . is perpetuated." "It should be noted that Plaintiffs are making no objection to the recitation of a patriotic Pledge of Allegiance," the Complaint notes. "The government is certainly within its right to foster patriotism, and it may certainly make the determination that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance serves that purpose. However, the government may not employ or include sectarian religious dogma towards this end. By placing the religious words 'under God' into the pledge, Congress not only interfered with the patriotism and national unity the pledge was meant to engender, but it actually fostered divisiveness. . . in a manner expressly forbidden by the Constitution," writes Newdow in the legal complaint.
On Jan. 18, 2008, 51 members of Congress won court permission to intervene in the lawsuit. The interveners, including three U.S. Senators — Sam Brownback, James M. Inhofe, and Ted Stevens — and 48 members of the House, asked the judge to dismiss the lawsuit. A number of individual religionists in the school district, as well as the Knights of Columbus, also intervened in the lawsuit. (The Catholic men's club originally spearheaded the campaign to insert "under God" into the previously secular pledge.) U.S. Dist. Judge Steven J. McAuliffe issued an order on Aug. 7, 2008, agreeing to dismiss Congress as a defendant. But the Court denied the State of New Hampshire's motion to dismiss, as well as the motion to dismiss filed by several intervening individuals and the Knights of Columbus. A 3-judge panel of the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on Nov. 12, 2010 against FFRF's challenge of the New Hampshire School Patriot Act. A request for en banc review was turned down on Dec. 28, 2010. Michael Newdow with plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to review the decision on March 25, 2011.
The Foundation and its Co-Presidents filed suit on July 14, 2009, to stop the prominent engraving of "In God We Trust" and the religious Pledge of Allegiance at the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington D.C. The lawsuit was filed by attorney Richard Bolton in U.S. District Court in the western district of Wisconsin. The House and the Senate passed resolutions in July 2009 directing the Architect of the Capitol to engrave the mottos, with an expected cost of at least $100,000. Religious members of Congress had threatened to delay the opening of the Visitors Center, through which every visitor to the Capitol must now pass, unless "God is welcomed back into the Center." The Foundation contends that the motto, "In God We Trust," is a johnny-come-lately, usurping the original, secular "E Pluribus Unum" (from many, come one), only adopted during the Red Scare in the 1950s. Similarly, the once secular pledge was tampered with by Congress in 1954, when it added "under God" wording.
The Freedom From Religion Foundation, its co-presidents and several of its members are among the many co-plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit, Newdow v. Roberts, filed on Dec. 30, 2008, by attorney Michael Newdow in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to enjoin the Presidential Inaugural Committee from sponsoring prayers at the official Inauguration. The 34-page Legal Complaint also punctures some myths, documenting that for most of our country's history, no clergy-led prayers at inaugurations. The original complaint has been amended to include many more freethinkers, including minor students, from around the nation, as well as a variety of groups. The case was dismissed, and lost on appeal.
The national Freedom From Religion Foundation filed suit on Nov. 26, 2008, in federal court against the City of Rancho Cucamonga, Calif., for taking actions which led to the censorship of its "Imagine No Religion" billboard on Archibald and Foothill Blvd, Route 66. The Foundation had prepaid for the board and contracted for a two-month run beginning in mid-November. The Board had been up for less than a week when it was removed at the apparent instigation of a city official. "The Defendants' actions conveyed a message that religion is favored, preferred, and promoted by the City of Rancho Cucamonga and its officials, despite subsequent attempts to cover up the Defendants' involvement in sending an objectively understood message disapproving FFRF's billboard," said the Foundation.
The Foundation, with three of its North Dakota members, filed a federal lawsuit in North Dakota on June 19, 2007, challenging state and county subsidy of avowedly Christian juvenile detention facilities. The ranch, run by the Lutheran Church/Missouri Synod, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, "attempts to modify behavior by directing children to find faith in the Lord Jesus Christ," the Foundation legal complaint alleges. The facilities incorporate biblical teachings, subscribe to the three Ecumenical Creeds and the Lutheran Confessions, and schedule weekly Spiritual Life Groups activities, church attendance or other spiritual activities on Sundays, individual spiritual discussions, prayers at meals, baptism, confirmation studies, devotions, bible studies and related discussion groups. Post-release mentoring services also incorporate religion and are publicly funded with taxpayer appropriations. The ranches, run by two Lutheran denominations, have monopolized juvenile detention services in the state for many decades.
U.S. Dist. Judge Daniel L. Hovland on July 17, 2008, granted the motion to dismiss the federal lawsuit, saying the Legislature does not explicitly mandate that state officials allocate specific funds for the ranches, so the alleged violation amounts to a discretionary action by the executive branch and may not be challenged by taxpayers.
The Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit April 19, 2006, in federal court, challenging the pervasive integration of "spirituality" into health care by the Department of Veteran Affairs. The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, names VA Secretary R. James Nicholson; Undersecretary for Health Jonathan Perlin, M.D.; Hugh Maddry, director, and A. Keith Ethridge,deputy director, of the National Chaplain Center; and Jeni Cook, program manager of the Spiritual Health Initiative.
The lawsuit alleges that the Veterans Health Administration, the nation's largest integrated health system, "has deeply committed to integrate faith, spirituality and religion into the substantive protocol of its medical treatments," in a manner which unconstitutionally promotes, advances and endorses religion.
The complaint observes that the VA now "provides pastoral services not as an accommodation to veteran's free exercise rights" but because it "deems pastoral services for all patients, including veterans receiving outpatient medical services, to be a necessary part of medical treatment." The VA encourages all patients "to tap into their alleged spiritual resources of faith," with VA chaplains involved as "part of the treatment team for all patients." The VA now plugs in chaplains to outpatients (making up 80% of patients) whose religious needs do not require special accommodation.
In September 2006, Judge Shabaz ruled against a VA motion to dismiss the lawsuit, which contended FFRF had no legitimate Establishment Clause claim. Shabaz ruled that if the facts are as alleged, there is merit in the lawsuit and it may proceed. Read the news release, which contains a link to the judge's Memorandum.
Judge John Shabaz ruled on Jan. 8, 2007, that the integration of religion and "spirituality" into all aspects of medical care is permissible because it is ostensibly "voluntary." The Foundation, which contends coercion is not necessary to show an Establishment Clause violation, appealed the decision to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The government asked to stay the case pending the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in FFRF v. Hein, deciding whether citizens have standing to sue over so-called discretionary spending that violates the Establishment Clause by the Executive Branch. This stay was granted, despite the fact that standing was never raised as an issue at the district court level and had not been contested.
The government's motion to stay the appeal, pending the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hein v. FFRF, was granted by the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Oral arguments were heard in January 2008.
A state-funded fundamentalist Christian prison ministry program ("God pod") in a women's prison in Grants, N.M., was challenged in federal court by the Freedom From Religion Foundation on Nov. 7, 2005. New Mexico contracts with Corrections Corporation of America, also named as a defendant, which is the nation's largest private provider of prison services. CCA partners with the Chicago-based Institute in Basic Life Principles, a fundamentalist Christian ministry run by Christian reconstructionist Bill Gothard "for the purpose of introducing people to the Lord Jesus Christ." Women prisoners are given proselytizing workbooks training them to "submit" to male authority. CCA plans to "franchise" the Christian program in prisons. Read press release.
One of the first casualties of Hein v. FFRF was FFRF's strong lawsuit against the State of New Mexico for establishing an outrageous Christian dominionist "God pod" in a women's prison in Grants, N.M. FFRF withdrew the lawsuit in July 2007, after the judge said he would rule against the right of FFRF's state taxpayers to sue. FFRF hopes to challenge religion programs funded by tax dollars in prisons with prisoner plaintiffs in the future.
Details on Unconstitutional "Faith Pod"
Hein v. FFRF. In June 2004, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed the first lawsuit to challenge the creation of the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives, as well as eight Cabinet-level "offices of faith-based initiatives." The Foundation alleged that conferences arranged by the White House office resemble revival meetings, and demonstrate government preference for funding religious social service agencies. The lawsuit alleged that the Departments of Education, Labor, Justice, and Health and Human Services have shown preference in funding religious organizations, and that many intermediary groups receiving federal funding do likewise.
The case is the Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Jim Towney, et al., 04 C 03981, U.S. District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, Judge John Shabaz.
On March 9, 2005, the Foundation asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit to reinstate its legal challenge of the creation of the White House and other federal "faith-based" offices. On Jan. 13, 2006, a 7th Circuit panel, in a 2-1 decision, reinstated the Foundation's challenge, finding that taxpayers have a right under Art. III of the Constitution to sue over a violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause, even if Congress did not specifically earmark money for the challenged program or activity.
"Taxpayers have standing to challenge an executive-branch program, alleged to promote religion, that is financed by a Congressional appropriation, even if the program was created entirely within the executive branch, as by presidential executive order," wrote Judge Richard A. Posner, joined by Judge Diane P. Wood.
The 11-member panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Chicago voted 7-4 not to rehear the question of standing in the Freedom From Religion Foundation's federal lawsuit challenging creation of federal faith-based offices. This technical victory for the Foundation allowed the lawsuit to continue.
The Administration appealed the Foundation's right to sue to the highest court. The U.S. Supreme Court, on Dec. 1, 2006, agreed to hear the Bush Administration's appeal of the reinstatement of taxpayer standing for the Foundation plaintiffs. Oral arguments were held on Feb. 28, 2007. At issue was whether the Foundation's taxpayer plaintiffs--co-presidents Dan Barker and Annie Laurie Gaylor, along with FFRF president emerita Anne Nicol Gaylor--have standing to sue over the creation of the faith-based offices. The Foundation notes that two of the three Supreme Court cases on the question of taxpayer standing to sue the executive branch over actions which violate the Establishment clause are in its favor. The case is now titled Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation.
Read the news release and pdf files of the Foundation's briefs before both the U.S. 7th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision came down on June 25, 2007. Although FFRF lost its right to sue the executive branch over the creation of faith-based offices at the White House and Cabinets in Hein v. FFRF, FFRF did win the plurality opinion, as The Los Angeles Times pointed out. FFRF had 4 justices solidly in our camp, whereas the bloc of 5 Roman Catholic judges against us-Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy-was divided. Although Kennedy, the swing vote, defected to the majority on FFRF's right to sue, he refused to vote to outright overturn the precedent of Flast v. Cohen, which permits taxpayers to sue over Congressional actions which violate the separation of church and state. The Hein decision says federal taxpayers do not have the right to challenge executive branch violations not explicitly authorized by the legislative branch. The unjust decision means our country has a constitutional separation between church and state, but no way to enforce it in this and many other instances. The punchy dissent, written by Justice Souter and signed by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens, noted: "If the Executive could accomplish through the exercise of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation, Establishment Clause protection would melt away." The Establishment Clause is in for a rough ride in the Roberts Court.
Emory University received a $1.5 million federal grant from Health and Human Service, announced in October 2002, to support faith-based community health programs across the country. Emory's Interfaith Health Program (IHP) disbursed $900,000 of its public grant to nine "religious health conversion" foundations, who in turn were charged with awarding subgrants. The grant application stated that "sub-awards will be granted to 49 faith-based organizations." At the point of the legal challenge, at least 80% of subgrants had gone to religious agencies. The Emory grant application identified religious goals such as the improvement of "government/FBO collaborations." Emory admitted in correspondence with HHS that "some of the Foundations exercise a preference in their private grant making for competent applications which reflect their own religious heritage." On January 11, 2005 (as the Foundation's attorney was at Emory taking depositions), Shabaz ruled the Foundation had not proved the funding was unconstitutionally favoring religion. In the same decision, Shabaz ruled in favor of the Foundation's challenge of federal funding of MentorKids USA.
The Freedom From Religion Foundation went to federal court in Missouri to sue over the phrase "So help me, God" on tax forms, on behalf of a plaintiff in Christian County in 1998. The case was dismissed from federal court since it concerned taxes. The Foundation refiled in state court in 1999. In April 2001, the judge ruled against the Foundation, but ordered that the plaintiff or other citizens be allowed to cross out "So help me God."
After numerous requests by its membership, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, with its attorney Robert R. Tiernan, went to federal court in Denver challenging "In God We Trust." The Freedom From Religion sued the federal government in 1994 to have "In God We Trust" removed from currency and as our national motto. The motto was put on all paper currency by an Act of Congress in 1955. The phrase was chosen as our national motto by an Act of Congress in 1956. It first appeared on paper currency in 1957.
The Foundation lawsuit was dismissed by a 10th Circuit federal judge on the grounds that "In God We Trust" is not a religious phrase (1994). The Foundation appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which did not take the case in 1996.
In January 1996, the Freedom From Religion Foundation sued over the removal of its properly-placed banner, "State/Church: Keep Them Separate," from the rotunda of the Wisconsin State Capitol, at the orders of Gov. Tommy Thompson. The Foundation had obtained a lawful permit to place the sign to counter various seasonal promotions of religion at the State Capitol. The Foundation lost at the federal court level in 1996. However, the State regulations now permit moderate-sized signs.
The Foundation has erected a Winter Solstice sign every year since, which has been called a "tourist attraction."
The Freedom From Religion Foundation went to Colorado state court to remove a Ten Commandments monument on Capitol grounds in Denver in 1989. The trial judge ruled that the Ten Commandments were the basis of constitutional law in 1992. In June 1993, the Foundation won the case before the Colorado Court of Appeals. The State Supreme Court in November 1994 reversed the appeals court ruling, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1995, refused to take the case.
In early 1991, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, with two local plaintiffs, challenged a lighted nativity scene in a public park in Waunakee, Wisconsin, which was stored, lighted and maintained by the town. The Foundation appealed a decision calling the creche a "secular" symbol in 1992. In 1994, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, unbelievably, upheld the creche, saying the constitution required it to "protect the rights of the majority." The Freedom From Religion Foundation no longer takes lawsuits in state court in Wisconsin!
The Freedom From Religion Foundation won the first round of its lawsuit to block the state of Wisconsin from granting $100,000 to assist building a center, with no strings attached, at St. Norbert Catholic College, DePere, Wisconsin, in a lawsuit filed in 1989. The funding was part of a budgetary maneuver and no public hearing was ever held. In 1990, the Foundation won at the Dane County circuit court level. Judge Robert Pekowsky ruled that the legislation did not contain necessary safeguards to assure that the taxpayers' compulsory donation would be used only for nonreligious purposes. The articles and bylaws of incorporation for the "Norbertines" provide that it is "to be operated within the context of the teachings and doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church." In September 1991, a state appeals court overturned the St. Norbert's Victory, and in 1992, the (Catholic-dominated) Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal.
In 1985 the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit challenging a Ten Commandments monument in a public park in La Crosse, Wisconsin, donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Preparing for the trial in 1987, the attorney in the case deposed the Eagles official who came up with the idea, who explained how he and director Cecil B. DeMille got together to promote the Ten Commandments, Minnesota granite and DeMille's new epic movie. The federal judge found that, based on a technicality, the La Crosse plaintiff, a lifelong resident, schoolteacher and daughter of the former local Congressman, did not have standing to sue (1987). This case has been revisited by the Foundation with 22 local plaintiffs, and to date, the Foundation has prevailed in court.
In 1986, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, with Illinois member Steve Van Zandt, filed a federal lawsuit to stop the building of a chapel at the Illinois statehouse. The chapel had been suggested during a visit by TV evangelist Pat Robertson. In December 1986, the Foundation won its lawsuit at the trial level, with a strong, eloquent decision. In January 1988, the appeals court inexplicably ruled that the prayer room had a "secular purpose." The silver lining: the chapel was never used.
In 1978, the Foundation filed a federal lawsuit challenging public payment of prayers by preachers to open the Wisconsin Legislature. The case languished in federal court for five years without being heard, then was dismissed when the U.S. Supreme Court acted on a similar Nebraska case, Marsh v. Chambers (1983), finding that the prayers were "traditional." The Foundation later prevailed on the Wisconsin Senate to drop paid prayers for at least one session (1985).
The Freedom From Religion Foundation was the first to challenge a Congressional proclamation calling 1983 "The Year of the Bible." Gaylor v. Reagan was eventually dismissed as moot by U.S. District Judge James Doyle when Reagan signed the Congressional resolution. But the lawsuit commanded major headlines, TV talkshows and interviews for the Foundation. The proclamation was delayed following the filing of the lawsuit, and the version that was belatedly signed was also weaker than the original wording proposed.

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Reference: Sadovaya VV, Luchinina AO, Reznikov AA. Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(1), 327-337.
Reference: Sadovaya, V. V., Luchinina, A. O., & Reznikov, A. A. (2016). Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(1), 327-337.
Reference: Sadovaya, Victoriya V., Anastasia O. Luchinina, and Aleksandr A. Reznikov. "Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education 2016 11 no. 1 (2016): 327-337.
Reference: Sadovaya, V. V., Luchinina, A. O., and Reznikov, A. A. (2016). Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(1), pp. 327-337.
Reference: Sadovaya, Victoriya V. et al. "Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, vol. 11, no. 1, 2016, pp. 327-337.
Reference: Sadovaya VV, Luchinina AO, Reznikov AA. Students Professional Orientation to the Teaching Profession in Educational Environment. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(1):327-37.
Properly organized pedagogical career guidance for young people can be considered as a means of younger generation’s educational culture increasing, and hence the humanization of the entire society. The purpose of the paper is to reveal the two directions’ contents of the pupils’ pedagogical orientation: pre-professional teacher training in the school and the organization of students’ professional orientation at the University. A leading approach to the study of this problem is a systematic approach involving the relationship of the content, forms and methods of students’ pedagogical orientation as well as interaction of this process’s entities. The paper reveals the content of the developed curriculum for students’ pre-professional pedagogical training, and analyzes the possibilities of interaction between school and University as a factor in the students’ determination in the teaching profession. The paper can be useful for educators who are engaged in students’ professional orientation to the teaching profession.
Alexiane, E. P. (2001). The Formation of value attitude to the teaching profession among senior teenagers. Kurgan: publishing house of the Kurgan State University.
Arefyev, I. P. (2005). Theory and methods of work on the pre-determination of students: Textbook. Shuya : Publishing House "News".
Balakireva, E. V. (2005). Senior school Students in the field of vocational choices: teaching profile: Educational-methodical manual for teachers. SPb: Publishing house "CARO".
Basov, N. F. (1993). Pedclass – College: curricula-methodical materials. Kostroma: Publishing house of Kostroma state pedagogical Institute after N. A. Nekrasov.
Blonsky, P. P. (1961). Selected pedagogical works. M: Publishing house of the Academy of pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR.
Girfanova, R. Z. (2001) Pre-occupational training as a condition of formation of school students’ pedagogical culture: dis. Cand. Ped. Sciences. Kazan.
Grebenev, L. S. (2005). Problems of pre-professional teacher education in modern conditions. Moscow: Publishing House "Pro-Press".
Gromova, C. R. & Alimbekov, A. (2015). Egocentrism and Development of Students Identity (On the Example of Studying of Future Teachers). International Journal of Environmental and Science Education, 10 (4), 571-578.
Ibragimova, E. M. (2002). Continuous pedagogical training of future teachers: theoretical and experimental study. Kazan: Publishing house MEMORY.
Karakovskiy, V. A. (1993). To be human: human values – base of holistic educational process. Moscow: Publishing house "New school".
Kasprzhak, A. G. (1992). Teaching gymnasium. Moscow: Publishing House "Education".
Krasilschikova, A. S. (1993). Humanization of the course of pedagogy in teaching classes of secondary schools. PhD Thesis. Moscow.
Mukhina, T. G. (2003). Primary general pedagogical training as means of formation of school senior students' professional interest in teaching: on the material of pedagogical profile classes. PhD Thesis. N. Novgorod.
Odinokova, N. E. (2005). Design and research activity of school students in pedagogical classes as a means of implementing the profile training. Journal of education of Russia, 12, 75-78.
Rigzinov, S. R. (1997). Organization of students’ pedagogical orientation in the contex of their labor training and education: Textbook. Chita: Publishing house of Zabaikalsky state pedagogical University.
Robotova, A. S. (2005). Profession - a teacher. Moscow: Publishing House "Academy".
Robotova, A. S. (2008). Types of practical training in pedagogy. SPb. Publishing house of Russian state pedagogical University after A. I. Herzen.
Sadovaya, V. V., Khakhlova, O. N. & Reznikov, A. A. (2015). The Formation of Professional Readiness of a Social Teacher to Organization of Children’s Leisure Time Activities. International Journal of Environmental and Science Education, 10 (4),595-602.
Shaikhelislamov, R. F., Shaehova, R. K. (2015). Innovative approach to the problem of teaching staff profession al training.Obrazovanie i samorazvitie, 3(45), 244-257.
Slipchenko, F. F. (2007). Pre-professional training of teachers in the author's profile school: experience of experimental work of Volgograd male Ped. Lyceum: A monograph. Moscow: Publishing house "VLADOS".
Ushinsky, K. D. (1950). Works. Volume 8. Moscow – Leningrad: Publishing house of the Academy of pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR.
Uspensky, V. B. (1999). Theoretical and methodological foundations of pre-professional pedagogical training of school students. Yaroslavl: publishing house of the Yaroslavl state pedagogical University. After K. D. Ushinsky.
Woolfov, B. Z. (1995). Pedagogy of reflection. Moscow: Publishing House "Master".

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G.R. No. 205298, September 10, 2014 - LEOPOLDO QUINTOS Y DEL AMOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
LEOPOLDO QUINTOS Y DEL AMOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July 2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (petitioner) was charged, in conspiracy with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Buni for frustrated homicide and homicide.
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remain at large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly Quintos, Lando Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz with the samurai, but the latter parried the attack with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruz’s chest with the same stone he used to hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulled Felomina dela Cruz’s hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained from the attack. After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz died from his injuries. Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.
The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15 January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the Quintos’ house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the front portion of the house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember how many times he hacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision Mayor in its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 1,650.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive imprisonment, they shall be credited in the service of their sentences with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, alleging that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence, conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below.
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here. The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides, weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the evidence of the prosecution and the defense alike.
Uniform findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect, and in the absence of any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His argument revolves mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the statement of Freddie dela Cruz before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment of the trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court, and none of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely against the accused.
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State’s evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felomina’s possession and concealed under a towel. If this is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro’s narration, it cannot be definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that happened on January 15 as what you are telling now?
In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?
I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident to the police. Pedro’s alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did not prevent them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to report the alleged attack upon them by the dela Cruzes. This omission, therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims negate[s] the accused-appellants’ claim of self-defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered “amputation of left and right hand.” Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar lacerated wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate the lack thereof. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate courts, establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter were retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.
Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1767 dated 27 August 2014.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 32-48. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.
4 Id. at 72-91. Penned by Presiding Judge Robert P. Fangayen.
5 Records, Vol. 2, p. 1.
6 Id., Vol. 3, p. 1.
7 Id., Vol. 1, p. 49.
8 Id., Vol. 1, p. 185.
13 Serra v. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, 14 March 2012, 668 SCRA 335.
14Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199294, 31 July 2013, 703 SCRA 118, 126.
15Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, 6 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345.
18Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, 14 November 2012, 685 SCRA 518, 533.
19 G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 166-167.
20 TSN, 10 November 2009, pp. 11-13; TSN, 30 June 2009, pp. 10-11.
21People v. Aleta, 603 Phil. 571, 581 (2009), citing People v. Caabay, 456 Phil. 792 (2003).
23People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009).
24 People v. Durana, 333 Phil. 148, 156 (1996).
25 Supra note 23, at 720.

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§ 52-2 Compliance required; preliminary planning.
§ 52-3 Actions affecting or not affecting environment.
§ 52-4 Written statement of applicant.
§ 52-5 Time limitations for determination of Planning Board.
§ 52-7 Determination of type of action.
§ 52-8 Draft environmental impact statement.
§ 52-9 Actions involving more than one agency.
§ 52-10 Actions undertaken or approved prior to specified dates.
Air pollution — See Ch. 30.
Unless the context shall otherwise require, the terms, phrases, words and their derivatives used in this chapter shall have the same meaning as those defined in § 8-0105 of the Environmental Conservation Law and Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations.
The Village of Lake Success.
The conducting of contemporaneous environmental, engineering, economic feasibility or other studies and preliminary planning and budgetary processes necessary to the formulation of a proposal for action which do not commit the village to approve, commence or engage in such action.
The granting of any part of an application which relates only to technical specifications and requirements, provided that no such partial approval shall entitle or permit the applicant to commence the action until all requirements of this chapter and Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations have been fulfilled.
Construction of any nonresidential building or addition containing more than one hundred thousand (100,000) square feet of gross floor area.
Parking facilities, not on the premises of any building, for more than twenty-five (25) cars.
Residential development containing three (3) or more residences in an unsewered area or ten (10) or more residences in a sewered area.
Regrading or clear-cutting of one (1) or more contiguous acres with forest cover or any other vegetation, when not in conjunction with an approved building plan.
Amendments to the village's Master Plan and comprehensive land use plans, Building Zone Ordinance or Building Code which do not substantially change existing laws and are not comprehensive in nature.
Editor's Note: See Ch. 105, Zoning, and Ch. 42, Building and Plumbing Administration, respectively.
For the purpose of assisting in the determination of whether an action may or will not have a significant effect on the environment, applicants for permits or other approvals shall file a written statement with the Village Planning Board setting forth the name of the applicant, the location of the real property affected, if any, a description of the nature of the proposed action and the effect it may have on the environment. In addition, applicants may include a detailed statement of the reasons why, in their view, a proposed action may or will not have a significant effect on the environment. Where the action involves an application, the statement shall be filed simultaneously with the application for the action. The statement provided herein shall be known as a preliminary environmental assessment statement and shall be upon a form prescribed by resolution by the Board of Trustees and shall contain such additional relevant information as shall be required in the prescribed form. Such statement shall be accompanied by drawings, sketches and maps, if any, together with any other relevant explanatory material required by the Village Planning Board.
The Village Planning Board shall render a written determination on such application within fifteen (15) days following receipt of a complete application and statement; provided, however, that such period may be extended by mutual agreement of the applicant and the Village Planning Board. The determination shall state whether such proposed action may or will not have a significant effect on the environment. The Village Planning Board may hold informal meetings with the applicant and may meet with and consult any other person for the purpose of aiding it in making a determination on the application.
The time limitations provided in this chapter shall be coordinated with, to the extent practicable, other time limitations provided by statute or local law, ordinance or regulation of the village.
Every application for determination under this chapter shall be accompanied by a reasonable fee to defray the expenses incurred in rendering such determination. The fees shall be as set forth in the Schedule of Fees adopted by resolution of the Board of Trustees.
Editor's Note: See Ch. A111, Fees.
If the Village Planning Board determines that the proposed action is not an exempt action, not an action listed in § 52-3B hereof or Section 617.12 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations as a Type II action and that it will not have a significant effect on the environment, the Planning Board shall prepare, file and circulate such determination as provided in Section 617.7(b) of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, and thereafter the proposed action may be processed without further regard to this chapter. If the Village Planning Board determines that the proposed action may have a significant effect on the environment, the Planning Board shall prepare, file and circulate such determination as provided in 617.7(b) of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, and thereafter the proposed action shall be reviewed and processed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations.
In the case of an action not involving an applicant, prepare or cause to be prepared a draft environmental impact statement.
If the applicant refuses to submit an environmental impact report, the Board of Trustees shall prepare or cause to be prepared the draft environmental impact statement or, in its discretion, notify the applicant that the processing of the application will cease and that no approval will be issued.
The Board of Trustees may require an applicant to submit a fee to defray the expense to it of preparing a draft environmental impact statement or reviewing same if it is prepared by the applicant. Such fees shall be as set forth in the Schedule of Fees adopted by resolution of the Board of Trustees.
Where more than one (1) agency is involved in an action, the procedures of Sections 617.4 and 617.8 of Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations shall be followed.
Actions undertaken or approved prior to the dates specified in Article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law for local agencies shall be exempt from this chapter and the provisions of Article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law and Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations; provided, however, that if after such dates, a governing body, or appropriate department, board, commission, officer or employee, having jurisdiction modifies an action undertaken or approved prior to that date and the Board of Trustees determines that the modification may have a significant adverse effect on the environment, such modification shall be an action subject to this chapter and Part 617 of Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations.


State of New York v LVF Realty Co., Inc.
LVF Realty Co., Inc., et al., Respondents-Appellants, and Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), Appellant-Respondent.
—[*1] Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Robert Brager, Christopher J. McKenzie, Zackary D. Knaub, Megan R. Brillault, Harold L. Segall, Joseph B. Freudenberg, and S. David Devaprasad of counsel), for appellant-respondent.
Robert G. Del Gadio, East Meadow, N.Y. (Bleakley Platt & Schmidt, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. [Susan Galv o and Matthew Parisi], of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany, N.Y. (Andrew D. Bing and Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages resulting from the discharge of petroleum pursuant to article 12 of the Navigation Law, the defendant Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), appeals (1), as limited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (LaMarca, J.), entered June 22, 2007, as, upon so much of a jury verdict as assessed a penalty pursuant to Navigation Law § 192 in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $6,000,000, and upon an order of the same court dated June 5, 2007, denying its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as assessed the penalty against it and for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, to reduce the amount of the penalty as excessive, or alternatively, to set aside that portion of the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial with respect to the penalty, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $6,000,000, and (2) from a supplement to the judgment entered February 1, 2008, and the defendants LVF Realty Co., Inc., and Sun Super Service Centers, Inc., cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from stated portions of the judgment which, inter alia, upon so much of the jury verdict as assessed penalties pursuant to Navigation Law § 192 in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sums of $250,000 and $75,000, upon the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside so much of the verdict as assessed the [*2]penalties against them as excessive or against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial with respect to the penalties, and upon so much of an order of the same court dated March 27, 2007, as denied that branch of the motion by LVF Realty Co., Inc., which was for an award of an attorney's fee against the defendant Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sums of $250,000 and $75,000, and the defendant LVF Realty Co., Inc., also cross-appeals, as limited by the brief, from stated portions of the supplement to the judgment which, inter alia, is in favor of the defendant Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), and against it, dismissing its cross claims for full indemnification and contribution.
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiffs payable by the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
From 1941 to 1985 the defendant Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) (hereinafter Sunoco), owned property located in Inwood (hereinafter the site) upon which a gasoline station was operated. In June 1980 the defendant Sun Super Service Centers, Inc. (hereinafter Sun Super), became a tenant at the site and agreed to operate the site as a Sunoco-brand gasoline station. On or about December 29, 1983 Sunoco installed four underground fiberglass gasoline storage tanks. In 1984 Sunoco removed two steel storage tanks and abandoned two steel tanks in place. On August 20, 1985 the defendant LVF Realty Co., Inc. (hereinafter LVF), purchased the site from Sunoco and subsequently, pursuant to a separate agreement, purchased the underground storage system, identified as the four fiberglass tanks. Sunoco continued to supply gasoline to the station and own the gasoline dispensers on the site. In November 1992 LVF was renovating the gasoline station and, during the excavation, four underground steel tanks were discovered and removed. Subsequently, the State Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC) received an anonymous tip that contaminated soil was being removed from the site. Upon investigation, the State determined that the soil around the steel tanks was heavily contaminated and subsequently discovered additional petroleum product discharges emanating from the vicinity of the fiberglass tanks. From 1993 to 1999 the State submitted several requests to the defendants directing them to assume responsibility for a full investigation of the contamination. Since none of the defendants fully responded to the State's demands for an investigation of the source or extent of the contamination, the New York Environmental Protection and Spill Fund paid for the necessary investigation of the site and incurred costs in the sum of $66,120.95. The State commenced this action to recover costs incurred for the investigation, remediation, and cleanup of contamination pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 and to impose statutory penalties against the defendants pursuant to Navigation Law § 192.
In an order dated August 9, 2006 the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the causes of action against LVF and Sun Super alleging that these entities were strictly liable as dischargers for the State's cleanup and removal costs under article 12 [*3]of the Navigation Law. The Supreme Court held that the State was entitled to the sum of $64,818.60 plus pre-judgment interest on those causes of action. Subsequently, a jury trial was held to determine, among other things, the defendants' respective responsibilities for the discharges of petroleum products at the site and the amount of penalties to be assessed against them. The defendants entered into a stipulation at trial (hereinafter the stipulation), which was included in the charge to the jury, providing, in relevant part, the following: "[I]f Sunoco is held to be 100 percent responsible for the oil discharge, LVF and Sun Super are entitled to recover direct and indirect costs, including attorney's fees of this action. If LVF or Sun Super are in any part at fault with respect to the oil discharge they are not entitled to recover directly costs including attorney's fees of this action."
On November 30, 2006 the jury returned a verdict concluding, inter alia, that Sunoco was responsible for 80% of the State's cleanup and removal costs, LVF was responsible for 15%, and Sun Super was responsible for 5%. Additionally, the jury assessed penalties in favor of the State and against Sunoco, LVF, and Sun Super in the principal sums of $6,000,000, $250,000, and $75,000, respectively, for their failure to "investigate, contain and/or cleanup" the discharges. The court denied the motion of LVF and Sun Super pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as assessed the penalties against them as excessive or against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial with respect to the penalties. In an order dated June 5, 2007, the court also denied Sunoco's motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside so much of the verdict as assessed the penalty against it and for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, to reduce the penalty as excessive, or alternatively, to set aside that portion of the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial with respect to the penalty.
In an order dated March 27, 2007 the Supreme Court denied that branch of LVF's motion which was for an award of an attorney's fee against Sunoco because, inter alia, the jury did not find LVF to be without fault under the Navigation Law. Thereafter, judgment was entered on June 22, 2007 which, among other things, is in favor of the State and against the defendants in the principal sums of the penalties. A supplement to the judgment was entered on February 1, 2008 which, among other things, dismisses LVF's cross claims for full indemnification and contribution against Sunoco.
Contrary to Sunoco's contentions, the penalty imposed against it pursuant to Navigation Law § 192 is supported by legally sufficient evidence. To determine, as a matter of law, that a jury verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, there must be no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial (see Mazzella v Capobianco, 27 AD3d 532 ; Leha v Yonkers Gen. Hosp., 22 AD3d 809, 811 ). In this regard, the State presented ample evidence of Sunoco's failure to investigate and clean up the contamination despite being aware of the contamination emanating from the vicinity of the former location of the steel tanks, which had been abandoned by Sunoco. Moreover, without any testing in the former location of these steel tanks, Sunoco summarily informed the State that the contamination on site was not caused by its prior use of the site.
Additionally, the State presented expert testimony that Sunoco was responsible for contamination arising from the former steel tank bed, as well as expert testimony that residual petroleum products had been improperly left in the steel tanks when they had been abandoned in place by Sunoco. The State's expert witness further testified that releases from the former steel tank [*4]bed had caused extensive contamination to the soil. In sum, the record fully supports the jury's determination of the amount of the penalty imposed against Sunoco given the seriousness of its repeated and continuing violations of its obligations under the Navigation Law occurring over several years. Further, it should be noted that Sunoco and the State stipulated that any penalty, if applicable, would not accrue until December 17, 1999, three years prior to the commencement of this action. Sunoco failed to investigate, contain, and/or clean up the contamination from December 1999 to the date of trial in November 2006. This constituted a continuing violation for which Navigation Law § 192 authorizes the jury to consider a penalty of up to $25,000 per day and, thus, the $6,000,000 penalty was well within the bounds set by the statute.
Similarly, the penalties imposed against LVF and Sun Super also were justified and not excessive based upon the evidence of their inaction and failure to respond to numerous requests from the DEC to investigate and/or remediate the site despite their knowledge of discharges from the areas of the steel and fiberglass tanks (see State of New York v Super Value, 257 AD2d 708 ).
As the Supreme Court properly determined in denying LVF's motion for an award of an attorney's fee against Sunoco, the jury's findings, the stipulation, and the Navigation Law, preclude LVF from recovering direct and indirect costs, including an attorney's fee from Sunoco. The stipulation precluded recovery "if LVF or Sun Super are in any part at fault with respect to the oil discharge" (emphasis added). Although the jury did not find LVF at fault for causing or contributing to the oil spills from either the steel or fiberglass tanks, the jury determined that LVF was at fault for the failure to investigate and clean up the oil discharge. In this regard, the jury properly assessed a penalty in the principal sum of $250,000 against LVF, found that LVF was 15% responsible for the State's cleanup and removal costs, and determined that LVF should pay 100% of its own cleanup costs. Moreover, the jury's finding that Sun Super caused or contributed to the oil spill from the vicinity of the fiberglass tanks is another basis to reject LVF's claim for an attorney's fee.