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A method for context-modeling coding information of a video signal for compressing or decompressing the coding information is provided. An initial value of a function for probability coding of coding information of a video signal of an enhanced layer is determined based on coding information of a video signal of a base layer.
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/654,846 filed on Jan. 6, 2010, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/988,384 filed on Jan. 7, 2008, which is a national stage application of PCT/KR2006/002699 filed on Jul. 10, 2006, which claims priority to Korean App. No. 10-2005-0082195 filed on Sep. 5, 2005, which claims the benefit of U.S. App. No. 60/697,353 filed on Jul. 8, 2005 and U.S. App. No. 60/701,045 filed on Jul. 21, 2005, the contents of each of which is incorporated by reference in their entirety.
The present invention relates to a method for modeling coding information of a video signal in order to compress the coding information or decompress the compressed information.
Scalable Video Codec (SVC) encodes video into a sequence of pictures with the highest image quality while ensuring that part of the encoded picture sequence (specifically, a partial sequence of frames intermittently selected from the total sequence of frames) can be decoded and used to represent the video with a low image quality.
Although it is possible to represent low image-quality video by receiving and processing part of a sequence of pictures encoded according to a scalable scheme, there is still a problem in that the image quality is significantly reduced if the bitrate is lowered. One solution to this problem is to provide an auxiliary picture sequence for low bitrates, for example, a sequence of pictures that have a small screen size and/or a low frame rate.
The auxiliary picture sequence is referred to as a base layer, and the main frame sequence is referred to as an enhanced or enhancement layer. When the base layer is provided, inter-layer prediction is performed to increase coding efficiency.
The SVC, which is a codec extended from Advanced Video Codec (AVC) (also referred to as ‘H.264’), can use Context-Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC) for data compression. The CABAC is an entropy coding scheme which has been suggested for use in compression of a video signal coded in AVC.
The CABAC performs modeling for arithmetic coding of coding information of a macroblock, which is a specific syntax element, simply using corresponding coding information of an adjacent macroblock in the same layer. Appropriate modeling of coding information according to the probabilities of values of the coding information increases the compression rate of arithmetic coding.
However, the CABAC has not defined a standard for modeling coding information using information of a plurality of layers. Thus, when SVC providing a plurality of layers is employed, the CABAC cannot provide suitable modeling for coding information having a correlation between the plurality of layers.
The present invention has been made in view of the above problems, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a method for modeling coding information having a correlation between a plurality of layers in order to increase data compression rate.
In accordance with the present invention, the above and other objects can be accomplished by the provision of a modeling method, wherein an initial value of a function for probability coding of coding information of an image block in a first layer is determined based on coding information of a second layer different from the first layer.
In an embodiment of the present invention, flags, which can be used for determining the initial value of the function for probability coding of the coding information, include a flag “base_mode_flag” indicating whether or not image data coded in an intra mode or motion vector information of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block is to be used for the image block, a flag “base_mode_refinement_flag” indicating whether or not refinement is necessary for the image block to use motion vector information of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block, a flag “residual_prediction_flag” indicating whether or not residual data of the image block has been coded using data predicted from residual data of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block, a flag “intra_base_flag” indicating whether or not image data of the image block has been coded into difference data based on image data of an intra mode block in the second layer corresponding to the image block, a flag “mvd_ref—1X” indicating a refinement value required to obtain a motion vector of the image block using motion vector information of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block, and a flag “motion_prediction_flag—1X” indicating whether or not a motion vector of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block is to be used for a predictive motion vector of the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, coding information, corresponding to the coding information of the image block, of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block is used as the coding information of the second layer.
In another embodiment of the present invention, information indicating whether a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block has been coded in an inter mode or in an intra mode is used as the coding information of the second layer.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on whether or not partition information of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block is identical to partition information of the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on a quantization parameter value of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block or based on the difference between the quantization parameter value and a quantization parameter value of the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on the difference between a motion vector of the image block and a motion vector of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on whether or not a value indicating a reference picture of the image block is identical to a value indicating a reference picture of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on whether or not spatial resolution of the image block is identical to spatial resolution of a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the initial value is determined based on block pattern information indicating whether or not a value other than 0 is present in a block in the second layer corresponding to the image block.
In another embodiment of the present invention, in order to determine the initial value, two constants “m” and “n” are selected based on the coding information of the second layer, an intermediate value is determined based on the selected constants “m” and “n” and information associated with coding of the second layer (for example, a quantization parameter value of the second layer, the difference between quantization parameter values of the first and second layers, or a spatial resolution ratio between the first and second layers), and an initial probability value and an MPS of the coding information are determined based on whether or not the intermediate value is greater than a predetermined value.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a CABAC executer of an enhanced layer decoder, which performs context modeling according to the present invention.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a CABAC executer of the enhanced layer according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The CABAC executer shown in FIG. 1 includes a binarizer 101, a context modeler 102, and an arithmetic coder 110. The binarizer 101 binarizes input non-binary valued coding information according to a specified scheme. Specifically, the binarizer 101 converts a non-binary valued syntax element into a bin string as illustrated in FIG. 1. The context modeler 102 models each bit of binary valued coding information based not only on coding information in an adjacent block in the same layer (in the enhanced layer in this example) but also on base layer coding information correlated with the binary valued coding information or interlayer relationship information 10. The arithmetic coder 110 performs arithmetic coding on an input bit based on a set model.
The arithmetic coder 110 includes a regular coding engine 103 for performing arithmetic coding on bits of the coding information based on variables (specifically, probability functions and initial values of the probability functions) modeled by the context modeler 102, and a bypass coding engine 104 for performing arithmetic coding on coding information which does not benefit from modeling since bits 0 and 1 of the coding information have almost the same probability of occurrence.
The present invention, which involves modeling of input coding information, is not directly related to the arithmetic coding procedure based on the modeled variables. Thus, a description of bit compression (entropy coding) associated with the arithmetic coder 110 is omitted herein since it is not necessary for understanding the present invention.
When the input coding information has a non-binary value, the CABAC executer of FIG. 1 binarizes the value of the input coding information through the binarizer 101. FIG. 2 illustrates an example of the binarization. Coding information used in the example of FIG. 2 is associated with macroblock types (mb_type). The macroblock types (Direct, Intra, P—16×16, P—16×8, P—8×16, and P—8×8) are assigned respective binary values (or bin strings) according to a predetermined scheme (or transform table). Other coding information is binarized according to other schemes (or transform tables) specified for corresponding elements in a similar manner to that of FIG. 2.
For bit compression, bits obtained through the above binarization are input to the arithmetic coder 110 provided subsequent to the binarizer 101. Bits of coding information, which have the same probability of occurrence of bit values 0 and 1, are directly input to the bypass coding engine 104, whereas bits of coding information, which have different probabilities of occurrence of bit values 0 and 1, are input to the context modeler 102 so that the input bits are subjected to a modeling process.
The context modeler 102 performs modeling of each bit of input coding information in the enhanced layer based on bit values of corresponding coding information of an adjacent macroblock and/or base layer coding information correlated with the coding information and a value of corresponding coding information received from a base layer encoder (not shown) or based on information 10 regarding the relationship between the enhanced layer and the base layer. Modeling is a process of selecting a probability function and determining an initial value of the probability function. As illustrated in FIG. 3, an offset value k−1, k, or k+1 is determined according to coding information so that a probability function fk−1, fk, or fk+1 of the coding information is selected, and a value of an index variable “ctxIdxInc” is determined from the offset value according to information correlated with the coding information. The same probability function can be used for all of coding information. In other words, a single probability function can be used irrespective of coding information. As the value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc” is determined, initial values “valMPS” and “pStateIdx” for use with the probability function are determined. As the initial value “pStateIdx” is determined, an initial probability of the LPS (or MPS) is determined as illustrated in FIG. 3. Accordingly, the regular coding engine 103 provided subsequent to the context modeler 102 codes (or compresses) each bit of the input coding information using the selected probability function, starting from the determined initial values “valMPS” and “pStateIdx”. Here, the pStateIdx is a probability state information and the valMPS is most probable value information for the probability fuction.
We now suggest detailed examples of a method for determining the value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc” when the context modeler 102 performs modeling. A variety of examples suggested below are simply examples of the method for modeling specific coding information of the enhanced layer based on coding information correlated with the value of the specific coding information or based on the relationship between the enhanced and base layers. Thus, the present invention is not limited to the examples suggested below, and any method, which is characterized by modeling coding information of the enhanced layer based on coding information correlated with an element value of the coding information or based on the relationship between the enhanced and base layers, falls within the scope of the present invention.
First, a description will be given of a variety of methods for determining an index variable “ctxIdxInc” of a flag “base— mode— flag”, which indicates whether or not coding information (for example, motion vector information or intra-mode image data) of a block in the base layer corresponding to a macroblock is to be used for the macroblock.
Here, “A” and “B” denote adjacent macroblocks located on the upper and left sides of a current macroblock X. A flag “condTermFlagN” (N=A or B) has a value of “0” if a macroblock N is not available or if a flag “base_mode_flag” of the macroblock N is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. Similarly, a flag “condTermFlagBase” has a value of “0” if a block in the base layer corresponding to the current macroblock X is not present or if a flag “base_mode_flag” of the corresponding block is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. That is, a value of corresponding coding information of the base layer is also used as a basis for determining a value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc”. This indicates that an initial value for probability coding varies depending on the value of the corresponding coding information of the base layer.
Here, a flag “conTermFlag′” of a block is assigned a value of “0” or “1” depending on whether the block is in an inter mode or in an intra mode. For example, a flag “condtermFlagBase′” has a value of “0” (or “1”) if a block in the base layer corresponding to the current macroblock X is in an inter mode, and has a value of “1” (or “0”) if the corresponding block is in an intra mode.
In this method, the (inter or intra mode) modes of the two adjacent blocks A and B and the corresponding block in the base layer are used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function for coding the bit of the flag “base_mode_flag”.
Alternatively, only the flag “condtermFlagBase′” (i.e., only the mode of the corresponding block in the base layer) may be used as a basis for determining the value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc” so that the initial value varies depending only on the value of the flag “condtermFlagBase′”.
In this method, a value indicating whether or not a partition of a block in the base layer is identical to that of a block in the enhanced layer (for example, a value of “1” when identical and a value of “0” when not identical) or a value indicating whether or not the size of a block in the base layer is equal to that of a corresponding block in the enhanced layer (for example, a value of “1” when equal and a value of “0” when not equal) is used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function.
Here, a flag “condTermFlag″” of a block is assigned a value of “1” if a quantization parameter of the block has a value equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, otherwise it is assigned a value of “0”. In this method, quantization parameters of the two adjacent blocks A and B and a quantization parameter of the corresponding block in the base layer are used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function for coding the bit of the flag “base_mode_flag”.
The flag “condTermFlag″” of a block can also be assigned a value of “1” or “0” depending on the difference between the value of a quantization parameter of the block and the value of a different quantization parameter, rather than depending on the quantization parameter of the block, so that the value of the index “ctxIdxInc” is determined based on the value of the flag “condTermFlag″”. For example, a flag “condTermFlagN″” of a block N is assigned a value of “1” if the difference between the value of a quantization parameter of the block N and the value of a quantization parameter of a block in the base layer corresponding to the block N is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, otherwise the flag “condTermFlagN″” is assigned a value of “0”. In this example, “condTermFlagBase″” denotes a flag indicating whether the difference between the value of a quantization parameter of the current block X and the value of a quantization parameter of a block in the base layer corresponding to the current block X is greater or less than the predetermined threshold.
Alternatively, only the flag “condTermFlagBase″” (i.e., only the value of the quantization parameter of the block in the base layer corresponding to the current block X (or only the difference between the value of the quantization parameter of the current block X and the value of the quantization parameter of the corresponding block)) may be used as a basis for determining the value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc” so that the initial value varies depending only on the value of the flag “condTermFlagBase″”.
Here, “C” denotes a motion vector of the corresponding block in the base layer or the difference between the motion vector of the corresponding block and a motion vector of one of the adjacent macroblocks or an average motion vector of the adjacent macroblocks.
That is, the motion vector of the base layer is used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function.
In this method, a value indicating whether or not indices of reference picture refIdxL0 and refIdxL1 in picture groups L0 and L1 of a macroblock having coding information, which is to be currently coded, are equal to indices of reference pictures in picture groups L0 and L1 of a corresponding block in the base layer (for example, a value of “2” when both the reference picture indices refIdxL0 and refIdxL1 in the picture groups L0 and L1 are equal to those of the base layer, a value of “1” when one of the reference picture indices refIdxL0 and refIdxL1 is equal to a corresponding one of the base layer, and a value of “0” when none of the reference picture indices refIdxL0 and refIdxL1 is equal to those of the base layer) is used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function, so that the initial value varies depending on the value indicating whether or not the reference picture indices in the enhanced layer are equal to those in the base layer.
A combination of the above methods (1-1 to 1-6), rather than one of the above methods, may be used to determine the initial value of the probability function for entropy coding of the flag “base_mode_flag”.
Next, a description will be given of a variety of methods for determining an index variable “ctxIdxInc” of a flag “base_mode_refinement_flag” indicating whether or not refinement is necessary for a macroblock to use motion vector information of a block in the base layer corresponding to the macroblock.
Since the flag “base_mode_refinement_flag” is not used when a corresponding macroblock in the base layer has been coded in an intra mode, a method assuming the intra mode coding, for example, a method similar to the above method 1-2) are not used for modeling of the bit of the flag “base_mode_refinement_flag”.
A flag “condTermFlagN” (N=A or B) has a value of “0” if a macroblock N is not available or if a flag “base_mode_refinement_flag” of the macroblock N is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. Similarly, a flag “condTermFlagBase” has a value of “0” if a block in the base layer corresponding to the current macroblock is not present or if a flag “base_mode_refinement_flag” of the corresponding block is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. That is, a value of corresponding coding information of the base layer is used as a basis for determining a value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc”.
This method is similar to the above method 1-3).
This method is similar to the above method 1-4).
In this method, a value indicating whether or not spatial resolution of a picture in the base layer is equal to that of a picture in the enhanced layer (for example, a value of “1” when equal and a value of “0” when not equal) is used as a basis for determining the initial value of the probability function.
A combination of the above methods (2-1 to 2-4), rather than one of the above methods, may be used to determine the initial value of the probability function for probability coding of the flag “base_mode_refinement_flag”.
Next, a description will be given of a variety of methods for determining an index variable “ctxIdxInc” of a flag “residual_prediction_flag” indicating whether or not residual data of a macroblock has been coded using data predicted from residual data of a block in the base layer corresponding to the macroblock.
A flag “condTermFlagN” (N=A or B) has a value of “0” if a macroblock N is not available or if a flag “residual_prediction_flag” of the macroblock N is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. Similarly, a flag “condTermFlagBase” has a value of “0” if a block in the base layer corresponding to the current macroblock is not present or if a flag “residual_prediction_flag” of the corresponding block is 0, otherwise it has a value of “1”. That is, a value of corresponding coding information of the base layer is used as a basis for determining a value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc”.
This method is similar to the above method 1-6).
This method is similar to the above method 1-5).
This method is similar to the above method 2-4).
In this method, the initial value of the probability function for coding the flag “residual prediction flag” is determined from a value of a Coded Block Pattern (CBP) of a corresponding block in the base layer. Here, a CBP of a luminance block or a chrominance block of the base layer can be used as the CBP. The CBP of a block has a value other than “0” if any non-zero value is present in the block, otherwise it has a value of “0”. In this method, the initial value of the probability function for coding the flag “residual_prediction_flag” is set differently depending on a value indicating whether or not a value other than “0” is present in the corresponding block in the base layer, which is “1” when any non-zero is present and “0” when a value other than “0” is not present.
This case is explained in more detail. In the event that resolution ratio between current layer and base layer is 2:1, the size of a block on the base layer corresponding to a current 16×16 macroblock is 4×4. Therefore, a bit value associated with the 4×4 block in the CBP of a macroblock including the 4×4 block on the base layer is set to the index variable “ctxIdxInc” to determine initial value of a probability function because the bit value in the CBP indicates whether the 4×4 block has any non-zero value.
Further, if a macroblock ‘BL1_MB’ on the base layer including the 4×4 block is coded in residual prediction manner based on a corresponding block ‘BL2_B’ on a lower layer (the second base layer), that is, if “residual_prediction_flag” of the macroblock ‘BL1_MB’ on the base layer is set to “1”, value of the index variable “ctxIdxInc” is determined according to an associated CBP bit of the corresponding block ‘BL2_B’ on the second base layer.
A combination of the above methods (3-1 to 3-7), rather than one of the above methods, may be used to determine the initial value of the probability function for probability coding of the flag “residual_prediction_flag”.
Modeling (for example, initial value setting) of coding information other than the coding information described above can also be performed in different manners, according to coding information of the base layer or according to an interlayer relationship.
For example, modeling for probability coding of a flag “intra_base_flag” indicating whether or not image data of an enhanced layer block has been coded into difference data based on image data of an intra mode block in the base layer corresponding to the enhanced layer block can also be performed in different manners, using an interlayer relationship (specifically, using corresponding coding information in the base layer) according to a similar method to that of 1-1), using an interlayer relationship of spatial resolution according to a similar method to that of 2-4), or using a quantization parameter representing the image quality level of the base layer according to a similar method to that of 1-4).
In addition, modeling for probability coding of information “mvd_ref—1X,X=0,1” indicating a refinement value required for a macroblock to use motion vector information of a block in the base layer corresponding to the macroblock can also be performed in different manners, using an interlayer relationship (specifically, using corresponding coding information in the base layer) according to a similar method to that of 1-1) or using an interlayer relationship of spatial resolution according to a similar method to that of 2-4).
Further, modeling for probability coding of a flag “motion_prediction_flag—1X,X=0,1” indicating whether or not a motion vector of a block of the base layer corresponding to a macroblock is to be used for a predictive motion vector of the macroblock can also be performed in different manners, using an interlayer relationship (specifically, using corresponding coding information in the base layer) according to a similar method to that of 1-1), using an interlayer relationship of spatial resolution according to a similar method to that of 2-4), or using a block size relationship according to a similar method to that of 1-3).
The variety of modeling methods described above can also be applied to any other coding information whose value may be affected by the interlayer relationship.
Although the above description has been given as if the initial values “valMPS” and “pStateIdx” are determined directly from the index variable “ctxIdxInc”, the two initial values are determined from values “m” and “n” which are determined from the index variable “ctxIdxInc” as illustrated in FIG. 4.
An intermediate value “preCtxState” in the initial value determination routine of FIG. 4 is determined by a function “Clip3()”. The preCtxState determination function “Clip3()” has a luminance quantization parameter “SliceQPY” as an argument (varX), in addition to the values “m” and “n”. This argument (varX) is associated with a macroblock having coding information which is to be currently coded. The argument (varX), which has an influence on the initial value determination in addition to the values “m” and “n”, has no value associated with the interlayer relationship.
Accordingly, if the interlayer relationship is reflected in the argument (varX) so that an initial value based on the interlayer relationship is obtained, the initial value is likely to have a value which is much more advantageous in terms of probability coding. Thus, according to the present invention, the interlayer relationship is reflected in the argument (varX).
Methods for reflecting the interlayer relationship in the argument (varX) are to use a luminance quantization parameter “BaseSliceQPY” of the base layer as the argument (varX), to use the difference between quantization parameters of the enhanced and base layers as the argument (varX), or to use the spatial resolution ratio between the base layer and the current layer as the argument (varX).
Although the above method has been described for probability coding in the encoder, the same method is applied to a CABAC decoder of FIG. 5 for decompressing compressed data, and a description of context modeling in the decoder is omitted herein.
In a similar manner to the method whereby the context modeler 102 in the CABAC coder of FIG. 1 models target coding information, a context modeler 202 in the CABAC decoder of FIG. 5 models target coding information based on base layer coding information and interlayer relationship information 20 and passes a corresponding initial value to a regular decoding engine 203 provided subsequent to the context modeler 202. The regular decoding engine 203 converts bits of input coding information into a decompressed bit string, starting from the same value as the initial value employed in the regular coding engine 103 in the encoder.
The decoder, which includes the context modeler for modeling coding information according to the method described above, can be incorporated into a mobile communication terminal, a media player, or the like.
As is apparent from the above description, a method for modeling coding information of a video signal for compressing and decompressing the coding information according to the present invention performs context modeling of each bit of the coding information using an interlayer correlation, so that an initial value of a function for probability coding of the coding information, which is advantageous in terms of probability coding, (i.e., an initial value which further reduces the initial probability of the LPS), is determined, thereby significantly increasing the data compression rate of probability coding.
Although this invention has been described with reference to the preferred embodiments, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various improvements, modifications, replacements, and additions can be made in the invention without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. Thus, it is intended that the invention cover the improvements, modifications, replacements, and additions of the invention, provided they come within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.
modeling the coding information of the current block using the initial value.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the flag information has a value 0, when the neighboring block is available and the coding information of the neighboring block indicates that the prediction information of the base layer is used to decode the neighboring block in the enhanced layer.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the flag information has a value 1 when the neighboring block is not available or the coding information of the neighboring block indicates that the prediction information of the base layer is not used to decode the neighboring block in the enhanced layer.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the initial value of the function for probability coding is determined using table information, the table information being determined based on the second index variable.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein an image quality or a spatial resolution of the enhanced layer is higher than an image quality or a spatial resolution of the base layer.
determine an initial value of a function for probability coding based on the second index variable.
7. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the flag information has a value 0, when the neighboring block is available and the coding information of the neighboring block indicates that the prediction information of the base layer is used to decode the neighboring block in the enhanced layer.
8. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the flag information has a value 1 when the neighboring block is not available or the coding information of the neighboring block indicates that the prediction information of the base layer is not used to decode the neighboring block in the enhanced layer.
9. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the initial value of the function for probability coding is determined using table information, the table information being determined based on the second index variable.
10. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein an image quality or a spatial resolution of the enhanced layer is higher than an image quality or a spatial resolution of the base layer.
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W. Peng, C. Wang, T. Chiang and H. Hang, "Context-Based Binary Arithmetic Coding with Stochastic Bit Reshuffling for Advanced Fine Granualitiy Scalability," Proc. of the 2004 Int'l. Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS'04), vol. 3, pp. III-953-8, May 23-26, 2004.
Woon li Choi, Byeungwoo Jeon: "The report of CE 3 Improve coding efficiency of entropy coding ", Joint Video Team (JVT) of ISO/IEC MPEG & IT U-T VCEG (ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 and ITU-T SG16 Q6) 15th Meeting: Busan, KR, Apr. 16-22, 2005 [JVT-0021].
Woong Il Choi et al: "The efficient coding technique using inter-layer prediction" Joint Video Team (JVT) of ISO/IEC MPEG & ITU-T VCEG ((ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 and ITU-T SG16 Q6), No. M11667, Jan. 17, 2005, XP030040412.
Woong li Choi, "CE 3, Improve coding efficiency of entropy coding", Joint Video Team (JVT) of ISO/IEC MPEG & IT U-T VCEG (ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 and ITU-T SG16 Q6) 15th Meeting, Busan, KR Apr. 16-22, 2005 [JVT-0303].
Written Opinion of the International Searching Authority issued Oct. 19, 2006 in counterpart International Patent Application No. PCT/KR2006/002699.
Y. Bao et al., "Improvements to Fine Granularity Scalability for Low-Delay Applications", Joint Video Team (JVT) of ISO/IEC MPEG & ITU-T VCEG (ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 and ITU-T SG16 Q.6), 15th Meeting: Busan, Korea, Apr. 18-22, 2005.

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Application No. 2009110693
Application No. 06757769
Application No. 2008
Application No. 10
Application No. 10
Application No. 2008104816
Application No. 2008104816


In a driving under influence (DUI) case a general district court found defendant guilty of drunk driving under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266. Defendant appealed. A jury in the circuit court found defendant guilty as charged. The Circuit Court of Loudoun (Virginia) denied defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and entered final judgment. Defendant appealed.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(i), prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath.
A DUI verdict finding an accused guilty "as charged" in a warrant citing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 requires that an appellate court address on appeal both Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(i) and (ii).
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(i) permits a factfinder to infer that the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level determined by a timely breath test accurately states the BAC level at the time of driving. While sometimes called a "rebuttable presumption," the later-BAC-implies-prior-BAC principle underlying § 18.2-266(i) is no more than a permissible evidentiary inference that the factfinder may accept or reject. Understood that way, the inference violates no constitutional norms.


ORDER adopting Report and Recommendation (Doc. 63 ) as augmented herein. Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Immediate Access and Possession of Easements on Property Owned by Cecyle Klaphake, Trustee of the William Kl aphake and Cecyle Klaphake Revocable Living Trust (Doc. 51 ) is GRANTED, and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mitchell dated April 25, 2018, as augmented herein, is adopted as the opinion of the District Court. See contents of this filing. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 5/8/18. (rdl) (Main Document 67 replaced on 5/8/2018) (rdl).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) AN EASEMENT TO CONSTRUCT, ) OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A 20-INCH ) GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE ) ACROSS PROPERTIES IN ) WASHINGTON COUNTY AND ) ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA., OWNED ) BY MCC INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) Civil Action No. 17-1297 Judge Cathy Bissoon Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell MEMORANDUM ORDER This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(l)(A) and (B), and Rules 72.C, 72.D and 72.G of the Local Rules for Magistrate Judges. On April 25, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 63) recommending that Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Immediate Access and Possession of Easements on Property Owned by Cecyle Klaphake, Trustee of the William Klaphake and Cecyle Klaphake Revocable Living Trust (Doc. 51) be granted. Service of the Report and Recommendation was made on the parties, and Defendant Cecyle Klaphake timely filed objections (Doc. 64). This Court conducted a de novo review of the issues raised by Defendant’s objections, together with the Report and Recommendation (the “Report”). For the reasons that follow, the Court will adopt the Report as the opinion of the District Court, with minor changes described below, and will grant Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff seeks immediate access to and possession of easements on Defendant’s property through this eminent domain action under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z, for the purpose of replacing a segment of Plaintiff’s interstate natural gas pipeline. Plaintiff holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity (“Certificate”) from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) authorizing this replacement. However, the Natural Gas Act makes eminent domain proceedings available only when the Certificate holder “cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of the property to the compensation to be paid for” the necessary rights. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). Defendant argues, in sum, that Plaintiff’s rights to the easements have already been acquired by contract and thus that the instant eminent domain proceedings are unavailable to Plaintiff. Defendant argues that, contrary to the Report: (1) Plaintiff presently possesses a valid agreement with Defendant governing the pipeline easements, (2) Defendant properly may raise her easement agreement as an objection to the condemnation proceedings, (3) the agreement covers the rights that Plaintiff seeks through the instant proceedings, (4) the FERC Certificate disavows coverage of certain rights at issue in this case, and Plaintiff is not entitled to seek condemnation of rights that are beyond the scope of the Certificate, and (5) there is no basis for finding that the existing agreement fails to cover the rights that Plaintiff seeks. The Court finds that many of Defendant’s objections can be addressed through the language of the existing easement agreement, and the Court thus begins its analysis with the agreement. The Report correctly states that the language of the easement agreement contradicts Defendant’s claim that the agreement covers Plaintiff’s right to lay its new pipeline. (Report 13.) The easement agreement—by the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms—provides Plaintiff the right to lay “a second line of pipe alongside of the first line.” Specifically, the agreement provided the right for Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest “to lay a 20 inch pipe line and maintain, operate, repair and remove said line along a line which has been surveyed for the state,” and also the future right to “lay, maintain, operate, repair and remove a second line of pipe alongside of the first line.” (Report 4.) There is no plausible interpretation under which the existing agreement provides Plaintiff the right to lay a new line of pipe wherever it pleases on Defendant’s property once the first line has been laid along the surveyed route. Plaintiff’s right under the agreement is to lay a second line of pipe alongside the first; the route across Defendant’s property authorized by the FERC Certificate is not “alongside” the first. (See Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, Doc. 62-2.) As a result, Defendant’s first, third, and fifth objections are unpersuasive; the existing easement agreement does not cover Plaintiff’s right to lay pipe on the FERC-approved route and Defendant cannot unilaterally amend the agreement for her own benefit by waiving the word “alongside.” Concerning Defendant’s second objection, the Court does not reach the question of whether a party may object to a Natural Gas Act eminent domain proceeding based on the existence of a prior agreement governing the same rights. The facts of this case present no opportunity for the Court to do so, as Defendant’s agreement with Plaintiff does not cover the rights that Plaintiff seeks to acquire. Finally, as to the fourth objection, it is useful to draw a distinction between Defendant’s right to a farm tap on the existing pipeline (or another pipeline alongside the first one), laid pursuant to the easement agreement, and her right to a farm tap on a pipeline laid pursuant to the FERC Certificate and the instant condemnation proceedings. The Court agrees with Defendant that FERC expressly disavowed its ability to determine the rights of the parties under existing easement agreements. Therefore, any rights that Defendant may have to a farm tap or to nonabandonment under the existing agreement, with respect to property covered by that agreement, are yet to be determined.1 The Court finds that the rights of access and possession that Plaintiff seeks to acquire through the instant Motion are clearly within the scope of the FERC Certificate. Accordingly, the following Order is entered: Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Immediate Access and Possession of Easements on Property Owned by Cecyle Klaphake, Trustee of the William Klaphake and Cecyle Klaphake Revocable Living Trust (Doc. 51) is GRANTED, and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mitchell dated April 25, 2018, as augmented above, is hereby adopted as the opinion of the District Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC is granted immediate access to and possession of the easements sought on Parcel ID No. 140-006-00-000025-00, located in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on and after May 15, 2018. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC shall post a bond in the amount of $375,000.2 Concerning a farm tap, the easement agreement states: “Tap to be installed on this line at point nearest the residence.” (Report 4.) Defendant has raised claims concerning her rights under the easement agreement in a parallel lawsuit, Klaphake v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, Civil Action No. 17-1359, also before the Court. 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) states that “the court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongly enjoined.” In setting the amount of the bond, the Court should “err on the high side” because recourse against the bond may be the only recourse available in the event an injunction is wrongful. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. An Easement To Construct, 2017 WL 544596, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2017). In Civil Action No. 17-1359, Columbia Gas Transmission has represented through a sworn affidavit that $375,000 is the approximate cost of removing and disposing of the existing pipeline on the Klaphake Farm. (Exhibit B to Opposition to Remand to State Court at ¶ 7, Civil 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. May 8, 2018 s\Cathy Bissoon Cathy Bissoon United States District Judge cc (via ECF email notification): All Counsel of Record Action No. 17-1359, Doc. 13-4.) The amount of $375,000 is thus an estimate of the costs that one would incur to remove and dispose of a pipeline on the Klaphake Farm, if such removal were to become necessary. This amount can be considered an upward bound on Defendant’s recovery if she is found to have been wrongly enjoined and, as an extreme result, she must pay for the removal of the wrongfully installed pipeline. Cf. Steckman Ridge GP, LLC v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 2008 WL 4346402, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008) (“if a FERC-regulated gas company was somehow permitted to abandon a pipeline project (and possession) in the midst of a condemnation proceeding, the company would be liable to the landowner for the time it occupied the land and for any ‘damages resulting to the [land] and to fixtures and improvements, or for the costs of restoration.’” (quoting 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12E.01 (2018))).


text:
Does Compliance With Plans & Specs Relieve Contractor from Exposure?
Pierce Foundations, Inc. v. JaRoy Construction, Inc.
The Louisiana Public Bid Law requires that public contracts estimated to cost in excess of $100,000 be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder who had bid according to the contract, plans, and specifications as advertised. The Public Bid Law “is a prohibitory law founded on public policy. It was enacted in the interest of the taxpaying citizens and has for its purpose the protecting of them against contracts of public officials entered into because of favoritism and involving exorbitant and extortionate prices. It was not passed for the benefit of the officials and the entities which they represent.” Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 770-71, 14 So.2d 627, 631 (1943).
Historically, public entities had discretion to determine the low bidder subject to judicial review under an abuse of discretion (arbitrary and capricious) standard. Louisiana appellate courts have often said that a public entity “has the right to be wrong, dead wrong; but not unfairly, arbitrarily wrong.” Housing Authority of the City of Opelousas v. Pittman Construction Company, Inc., 264 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1959); Williams v. Board of Supervisors, 388 So.2d 438 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1980); Tide Equipment Co. v. Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury, 312 So.2d 154 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 315 So.2d 38 (1975); Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Company v. City of New Orleans, 264 So.2d 768 (La. App. 4 Cir.), writ refused, 263 La. 102, 267 So.2d 210 (1972).
Through a series of amendments to the Public Bid Law, the Louisiana Legislature has virtually eliminated any discretion previously afforded public entities by instituting a bright line rule forbidding waiver of bidding errors as mere informalities, but recent decisions by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal still allow the public entity considerable discretion in dealing with bidder errors. This article will discuss these recent decisions interpreting the amendments to the Public Bid Law and holding, in effect, that public entities continue to have discretion to determine the low bidder.
The provisions and requirements of this Section, those stated in the advertisement or bids, and those required on the bid form shall not be considered as informalities and shall not be waived by any public entity.
When the variance in the bid does not affect the integrity of the contract; does not result in favoritism or prejudice to the bidders or to the taxpaying public; does not permit circumvention of the Public Bid Law or the rules of open and fair competition and does not discourage public bidding, it is insubstantial, does not constitute “just cause” and the public entity does not have the discretion or right to reject the bid because of that variance.
To deny a public entity the power to waive insignificant deviations in order to select a low bid on every public works project is contrary to the interests of the taxpaying citizens of this state.
The amendments to 2212A(1)(b) were intended as a bright line rule prohibiting waivers in order to reduce the number of bidding disputes and reduce the cost of public work. The Legislature balanced the competing policy interests, as is their role, and found that it is in the best interest of the taxpayers of Louisiana to award contracts in favor of a bidder who had complied with the bidding requirements in all respects. Such a policy prevents fraud and favoritism which is, after all, the ultimate goal of the public bidding system and encourages fair and equal competition.
Furthermore, a contract entered into in violation of the Public Bid Law is null and void ab initio. The court can enjoin further performance of the contract and order that another contractor determined to be the low bidder be awarded the contract. This may occur after work has already begun, and eventually leads to additional disputes and more litigation over payment due one or both contractors, all at the expense of the taxpayer.
The purpose of avoiding bidding disputes would be accomplished by simply applying 2212A(1)(b) as written to require strict compliance with the bidding requirements and prohibiting waiver altogether. The statute is not unclear or unambiguous. Louisiana Civil Code article 9 provides: “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” From the words chosen in 2212A(1)(b), the Legislature could not have been more clear. The First Circuit even acknowledges that the law is clear in subsequent cases by saying: “The Public Bid Law could not be more clear in stating that a bidder’s failure to comply with every detail can invalidate the bid.” Barriere Construction Co., L.L.C. v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, 99 2271 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 1123, 1127, writ denied, 00-0801 (La. 5/5/00), 761 So.2d 546. [Emphasis added.] The court in Boh Bros. did not discuss any reason or rationale to interpret 2212A(1)(b) beyond the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.
Other circuits and the Louisiana Attorney General support a bright line interpretation. Donald Clement Contractor, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish, 524 So.2d 86 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988); V.C. Nora, Jr. Building & Remodeling, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 93-1469 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/30/94), 635 So.2d 466; La. Atty Gen. Op. No. 90-421(1990). In V.C. Nora, (p. 470), the court, in response to DOTD¿s position at the time, said: “[T]he legislature has . . . admonished us to consider no public contract provision as a mere formality.” Judge Lottinger, dissenting in Boh Bros. (p. 682) quoting the Third Circuit in V.C. Nora said: “Even though DOTD’s rigid specifications as to the bid form may have seemingly harsh results, any interpretation but the most literal would contravene the stricti juris nature of the public contract laws.” Also, in Donald Clement Contractor, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish, supra, the Fifth Circuit held that public entities could no longer waive irregularities of form by virtue of the amendment to La. R.S. 38:2212A(1)(b).
In 1982 and 1983 though a series of amendments, the Public Bid Law was also amended to require just cause for rejection of any or all bids. Prior to 1982, cause was not necessary to reject any or all bids. Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. Legislative Budgetary Control Council, 470 So.2d 460, 463 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985).
In construing the statute, the First Circuit in Pittman Construction Company, Inc. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, supra, held that minor or insubstantial deviations of form do not constitute just cause and, in the absence of just cause, the rejection of a bid is reprobated by law. See also, Barriere Construction Co., L.L.C. v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, supra. Therefore, under that reasoning, if a bidding error or irregularity is waivable, then no just cause exists to reject that bid, and the error or irregularity must be waived. However, in Barriere, the First Circuit has now retreated from that holding.
It would put public entities in a totally untenable situation if this court were to require the waiver of certain irregularities in the face of the statutory prohibition. There could never be any certainty for the public entity during the bid opening procedure if a court could simply second-guess the process and state that a particular kind of defect should have been waived. Barriere Construction Co., L.L.C. v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, supra at p. 1127-28.
But wouldn’t “certainty for the public entity during the bid opening” be achieved by a bright line interpretation of 2212A(1)(b) denying waiver of all informalities? The uncertainty the court speaks of is only an issue when public entities are allowed discretion to waive informalities in the first place. If the bidder errs in completing the envelope, the bid should be rejected as irregular. In that case, there is no dispute to resolve and no delay to the project – no uncertainty or confusion.
Fair and equal rules of competition which are disregarded in the process of exercising discretion is detrimental to the best interests of our system of contracting. Thus by allowing the awarding authority discretion to waive informalities, the court then must also find that just cause exists to reject, or else create uncertainty and confusion in the bid process. The effect is to allow public entities discretion to determine the low bidder by either waiving the informality or rejecting the bid in favor of the next lowest bidder. Is this consistent with the purpose and policy of the law to guard against fraud and favoritism?
Where the Legislature, through amendments to the Public Bid Law, has clearly eliminated the discretion of the public entity to determine the low bidder, the First Circuit in Boh Bros. and Barriere has construed the amendments so as to protect that discretion. The Supreme Court has in each case denied writs despite conflicting opinions. Despite the clear and unmistakable language, the First Circuit refuses to find that discretion of the public entity has been eliminated in favor of a bright line standard requiring rejection of any bid that deviates from the strict bidding requirements.
In doing so, the court has read into La. R.S. 38:2212A(1)(b) that only substantive requirements not be waived. But, in neither of these cases did the court address whether 2212A(1)(b) was in some way unclear or in need of interpretation beyond the plain meaning of the words used. When a law is clear, and its application does not lead to absurdity, the court must apply the law as written. What else could the Legislature have said to make its intention to eliminate discretion to waive bidder errors more apparent?

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


cleopade fór corþre ceargealdra full the spirit of hell cried before the multitude, full of dire enchantments, Exon. 74b; Th. 279, 24; Jul. 618.
ceari anxious, Exon. 100a; Th. 376, 29; Seel. 162. v. cearig.
cearian, cearigan, carian; ic cearige, ðú cearast, he cearaþ, pl. ceariaþ; p. ode; pp. od [cearu care] To take care, heed, to be anxious or sorry; curare, sollicitum esse :-- Hwæt bemurnest ðú cearigende why mournest thou sorrowing? Exon. 10b; Th. 11, 27; Cri. 177. He æt gúþe ná ymb his líf cearaþ he cares not about his life in battle, Beo. Th. 3077; B. 1536. Ne ceara ðú fleáme dæ-acute;lan somwist incre care not thou to part your fellowship by flight, Cd. 104; Th. 137, 25; Gen. 2279: 130; Th. 165, 16; Gen. 2732.
cearig, ceareg, ceari; adj. [cearu care, sorrow] Careful, sorrowful, pensive, wary, CHARY, anxious, grieving, dire; sollicitus, cautus, querens, mente turbatus, dirus :-- Hie bidon hwonne bearn Godes cwóme to cearigum they waited till the child of God should come to the sorrowful, Exon. 10a; Th. 10, 6; Cri. 148. Cearegan reorde in a sorrowful voice, Andr. Kmbl. 2218; An. 111. Wæs Meotud on beám bunden fæste cearian clomme the Creator was bound fast on the tree with dire bond, Exon. 116b; Th. 449, 6; Dóm. 67. Ne þurfon wyt beón cearie æt cyme Dryhtnes we need not be anxious at the Lord's coming, Exon. 100a; Th. 376, 29; Seel. 162. DER. earm-cearig, ferhþ-, gnorn-, hreów-, mód-, sorg-, winter-.
cear-leás void of care, careless, reckless, free, v. car-leás.
cearleás-nes freedom from care, security, carelessness. v. carleás-nes.
cear-leást freedom from care, security, carelessness. v. car-leást.
cearo care, sorrow, grief, Exon. 32a; Th. 101, 23; Cri. 1663. v. cearu.
cear-seld, es; n. A place of sorrow; habitaculum mæroris, Exon; 81b; Th. 306, 10; Seef. 5.
cear-siþ, es; m. [síþ fortune, fate] A sorrowful fate, sad fortune; curæ sors, fortuna tristis :-- Cealdum cearsíþum with cold sad fortunes, Beo. Th. 4783; B. 2396.
cear-sorg, e; f. Sorrowful care, anxious sorrow; cura sollicita :-- Me cearsorge of móde asceáf UNCERTAIN Þeóden usser our Lord removed anxious care from my mind, Cd. 55; Th. 68, 9; Gen. 1114.
CEARU, caru, cearo, e; f. CARE, sorrow, grief; cura, dolor, mæror :-- Cearu wæs geniwod geworden in wicum care was become renewed in the dwellings, Beo. Th. 2611; B. 1303: Exon. 22b; Th. 62, 7; Cri. 998: 119b; Th. 459, 10; Hy. 4, 114. Nis ðé nán caru non est tibi curæ, Lk. Bos. 10, 40: Ps. Th. 60, 1. Ðonne biþ þearfendum cwíðende cearo then shall be wailing care to the miserable, Exon. 26b; Th. 79, 5; Cri. 1286: 77a; Th. 289, 29; Wand. 55. Gehýr me, ðonne ic to ðé bidde ceare full hear me, when I, full of care, pray to thee. Ps. Th. 140, 1. Ic sceolde ána míne ceare cwíðan I must bewail my care alone, Exon. 76b; Th. 287, 4; Wand. 9 : Ps. Th. 118, 145, 147. Ne cleopigaþ hí care they speak not their care, 113, 16: 143, 18. Ða ceare seófedun ymb heortan sorrows sighed round my heart, Exon. 81b; Th. 306, 20; Seef. 10. Cearena full full of sorrows, Exon. 22a; Th. 59, 33; Cri. 962. Hý in cearum cwíðaþ they mourn in sorrows, 35b; Th. 115, 23; Gú. 194. Ðe-læs eówer heortan gehefegode sýn on ðises lífes carum ne forte graventur corda vestra in curis hujus vitæ, Lk. Bos. 21, 34: 8, 14. Mid cearum hí cwíðdun sorrowfully [lit. with sorrows] they mourned, Exon. 24b; Th. 69, 35; Cri. 1131: 21a; Th. 55, 31; Cri. 892. [Piers P. kare: Chauc. care: Laym. Orm. care, kare: O. Sax. kara, f: M. H. Ger. kar, f: O. H. Ger. chara, f: Goth. kara, f.] DER. aldor-cearu, breóst-, gúþ-, líf-, mæ-acute;l-, mód-, sorg-, úht-, woruld-.
cearung, e; f. [cearu care] Pensiveness, anguish of mind, a complaint; sollicitudo, Som. Ben. Lye.
cear-wylm, -welm, -wælm, es; m. [wylm heat of mind, emotion] Sorrowful or anxious emotion, agitation; sollicita perturbatio, agitatio :-- Ða cearwylmas cólran wurþaþ the anxious emotions become cooler, Beo. Th. 569; B. 282. Á wæs sæc cnyssed cearwelmum the contest was ever tossed with waves of sorrow, Elen. Kmbl. 2513; El. 1258. Æfter cear-wælmum after anxious emotions, Beo. Th. 4138; B. 2066.
CEÁS, e; f: es; n. A quarrel, strife; lis :-- Gif man mannan wæ-acute;pnum bebyreþ ðæ-acute;r ceás weorþ if a man supply another with weapons where there is strife, L. Ethb. 18; Th. i. 6, 19. On ceáse in strife, L. Alf. 18; Th. i. 48, 17. Mearh mægen samnode to ceáse the horse collected his strength for the strife, Elen. Kmbl. 111; El. 56. [O. Frs. kase, f. quarrel: O. H. Ger. kósa, f. eloquium, fabula.] DER. un-ceás.
ceás chose, Chr. 975; Th. 226, 21; Edg. 22 ; p. of ceósan.
ceásan? p. ceós, pl. ceóson; pp. ceásen [ceás strife] To strive, fight; contendere. v. be-ceásan.
ceásega, an; m. A chooser; elector. DER. wæl-ceásega, q. v.
ceásnes, -ness, e; f. Election, choice; electio, Som. Ben: Lye.
ceást, e; f? es; n? Strife, contention, murmuring, sedition, scandal; lis, rixa, seditio :-- On ceáste in strife, L. Alf. 18; Th. i. 48, note 34. Gif he þurh unnytte ceáste man ofsleá fæste x geár si in inutili rixa hominem occident, x annas jejunet, L. Ecg. P. iv. 68, § 22; Th. ii. 230, 29. Ne he ceaste ne astirige he shall not stir up strife, L. Ælf. P. 50; Th. ii. 386, 12. Folcslíte vel æ-acute;swícung, sacu, ceást seditio,Ælfc. Gl. 15; Som. 58, 39; Wrt. Voc. 21, 30. [Piers P. cheeste, cheste.] v. ceás strife.
ceaster, cæster, cester; gen. dat. ceastre; acc. ceastre, ceaster, pl. ceastra; f. The names of places ending in caster and -chester were probably sites of a castrum a fortress, built by the Romans; the Saxon word is burh, Gen. 11, 4, 5. I. generally f. but sometimes n. vide II. A city, fort, castle, town; urbs, civitas, castellum :-- Ne mæg seó ceaster beon behýd non potest civitas abscondi, Mt. Bos. 5, 14. On ðære heán ceastre in the high city, Bt. 39, 5; Fox. 218, 18. Ðá cómon ða weardas on ða ceastre then the keepers came into the city, Mt. Bos. 28, 11. Ðú in ða ceastre gong go thou into the city, Andr. Kmbl. 1878; An. 941. Ælla and Cissa ymbsæ-acute;ton ceaster Ella and Cissa besieged the city, Chr. 491; Erl. 15, 6. Se Hæ-acute;lend ymbfór ealle burga and ceastra circuibat Iesus omnes civitates et castella, Mt. Bos. 9, 35. II. ceaster; gen. ceastres; n. A city, etc: it is thus declined in the termination of Exan-cester, -ceaster :-- Ymsæ-acute;ton Exancester besieged Exeter, Chr. 894; Erl. 91, 9; Th. 166, 30, col. 1. Ymbsæ-acute;ton Exanceaster, Th. 167, 26, col. l, 2. Ðá wende he hine west wið Exanceastres then he turned west towards Exeter [versus Exanceaster], Chr. 894; Erl. 91, 10; Th. 166, 31, col. 1; 29, col. 2 ; 167, 28, col. 1, col. 2. Se cyning hine west wende mid ðære fierde wið Exancestres the king turned west with the army towards Exeter, 168, 26, col. 1; 24, col. 2; 169, 21, col. 1; 18, col. 2. III. the name of a particular place, as CHESTER, CAISTOR, CASTOR, the city; hæc civitas :-- He him sende scipon æfter, and Hugo eorl of Ceastre he sent ships after him, and Hugh earl of Chester, Chr. 1094; Erl. 230, 28: 1120; Erl. 248, 8.
ceaster-æsc, es; m. Black hellebore; helleborus niger :-- Wyrc gódne drenc ceasteræsces make a good drink of black hellebore, L. M. 3, 30; Lchdm. ii. 324, 20; Nim ceasteræsc take black hellebore, Lchdm. iii. 28, 20: 30, 14: 56, 15.
ceaster-búend, es; m. City-dweller; urbem habitans :-- He áteáh ceasterbúendum he came to the city-dwellers, Beo. Th. 1540; B. 768.
ceaster-hlid, es; n. [hlid a cover; tegmen] Cover of a city, gate; urbis tegmen, porta :-- Ðæt æ-acute;nig meahte ðæs ceasterhlides clustor unlúcan that any one might unlock the inclosure of the city-gate, Exon. 12a; Th. 20, 7; Cri. 314.
ceaster-hof, es; n. [hof a house, dwelling] A city-dwelling; urbis ædes :-- Storm upp arás æfter ceasterhofum a storm arose along the city-dwellings, Andr. Kmbl. 2475; An. 1239.
Ceaster-scír, e; f. [ceaster III. Chester, scír a shire] Cheshire; ager Cestrensis :-- Rodbeard wæs gecoren to bisceope to Ceasterscíre Robert was chosen bishop of Cheshire, Chr. 1085; Erl. 218, 21.
ceaster-ware; gen. -wara; dat. -warum; pl. m. City-inhabitants, citizens; cives :-- Wearþ Húna cyme cúþ ceasterwarum the coming of the Huns was known to the citizens, Elen. Kmbl. 83; El. 42: Andr. Kmbl. 3290; An. 1648.
ceaster-waru, e; f. Townsmen as a body, the citizens or city; cives, civitas :-- Ðá eóde eall seó ceaster-warú then the whole city [citizens as a body] came out, Mt. Bos. 8, 34.
ceaster-wyrhta, an; m. An embroiderer, damask-weaver; polymitarius, Cot. 156.
ceaster-wyrt, e; f. Black hellebore; helleborus niger, Lchdm. ii. 375, 24.
ceást-full; adj. Full of contention, tumultuous; tumultuosus, contentiosus, Scint. 28: Fulg. 23.
ceastra cities, Mt. Bos. 9, 35; pl. of ceaster.
ceat a thing; res. Cot. 100 :-- Ceatta cheats; circumventiones, Som. Ben. Lye.
ceáw, pl. cuwon chewed; p. of ceówan.
Ceawan hlæ-acute;w, es; m. Cheawan low, CHALLOW :-- To Ceawan hlæ-acute;we [MS. læwe] to Challow, Chron. Abing. i. 138, 5: Cod. Dipl. v. 310, 33.
ceawl, ceaul a basket; cophinus, Mt. Lind. Stv. 14, 20: Mk. Skt. Lind. 6, 43. v. cawl.
ced a boat; linter, Mone B. 120. v. cæd.
cedelc, e; f. The herb mercury; mercurialis perennis, Lin :-- Cedelc mercurialis, Glos. Brux. Recd. 41, 44. Herba mercurialis, ðæt is, cedelc the herb mercurialis, that is, mercury, Herb. cont. 84; Lchdm. i. 34, 3. Wið ðæs innoþes heardnysse genim ðás wyrte, ðe man mercurialis, and óðrum naman cedelc nemneþ for hardness of the inwards take this herb, which is called mercurialis, and by another name mercury, Herb. 84, 1; Lchdm. i. 186, 23.
ceder; gen. cedre; f. The cedar; cedrus = GREEK :-- God brycþ ða heán ceder on Libano confringet Dominus cedros Libani, Ps. Th. 28, 5. On eallum cedrum to all cedars, 148, 9.
ceder-beám, cæder-beám, es; m. A cedar-tree; cedrus = GREEK :-- Cederbeám cedrus, Ælfc. Gl. 47; Som. 65, 41; Wrt. Voc. 33. 38: 80, 17. Libanes cederbeámas ða ðú gesettest cedri Libani quas plantasti, Ps. Th. 103, 16. Ic geseah árleásne geuferodne swá swá cedertrýw ðæs wuda oððe cederbeámas ðæs holtes vidi impium elevatum sicut cedros Libani, Ps. Lamb. 36, 35.
ceder-treów, -trýw, es; n. A cedar-tree; cedrus = GREEK :-- Ic geseah árleásne geuferodne swá swá cedertrýw ðæs wuda oððe cederbeámas ðæs holtes vidi impium elevatum sicut cedros Libani, Ps. Lamb. 36, 35.


1. To subject a defendant to trial in a criminal case involving his liberty or property before a judge having a direct, personal, substantial interest in convicting him is a denial of due process of law. P. 273 U. S. 522.
2. A system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so customary in the common law or in this country that it can be regarded as due process where the costs usually imposed are not so small as to be within the maxim de minimis non curat lex. Pp. 273 U. S. 523, 273 U. S. 531.
3. Under statutes of Ohio, offenses against State prohibition, involving a wide range of fines enforceable by imprisonment, may be tried without a jury, before the mayor of any rural village situate in the county (however populous) in which offenses occur; his judgment upon the facts is final and conclusive unless so clearly unsupported as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty; the fines are divided between the State and village; the village, by means of the fines collected, hires attorneys and detectives to arrest alleged offenders anywhere in the county and prosecute them before the mayor; in addition to his salary, the mayor, when he convicts, but not otherwise, receive his fees and cost amounting to a substantial income; the fine offer a means of adding materially to the financial prosperity of the village, for which the mayor, in his executive capacity, is responsible. Held violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 273 U. S. 520, 273 U. S. 531.
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio which declined to review a judgment of the State Court of Appeals, 22 Oh.L.Rep. 634, reversing a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, 25 Oh.Nisi Prius (N.S.) 580, which reversed a judgment of the Mayor of the Village of North College Hill convicting and fining Tumey for violation of the Ohio Prohibition Act and ordering that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid.
because of the pecuniary and other interest which those statutes give the mayor in the result of the trial.
Tumey, the plaintiff in error, hereafter to be called the defendant, was arrested and brought before Mayor Pugh, of the Village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the Mayor to try him, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted the defendant of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton County, as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. He obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment on the ground that the Mayor was disqualified, as claimed. 25 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 580. The State sought review by the Court of Appeals of the first appellate district of Ohio, which reversed the Common Pleas and affirmed the judgment of the Mayor. 23 Ohio Law Reporter, 634.
On May 4, 1926, the State Supreme Court refused defendant's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. The defendant then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the Mayor's Court and of the Appellate Court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On May 11, 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought here upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed. Matthews v. Huwe, Treasurer, 269 U. S. 262; Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 265 U. S. 384. This brings us to the merits of the case.
The defendant was arrested and charged with the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor at White Oak, another village in Hamilton County, Ohio, on a warrant issued by the Mayor of North College Hill. The Mayor acted under the sections of the State Prohibition Act, and Ordinance No. 125 of the Village of North College Hill adopted in pursuance thereof.
Section 6212-15 (Ohio General Code) provides that "No person shall after the passage of this act manufacture possess . . . any intoxicating liquors. . . ."
". . . any person who violates the provisions of this act (General Code, Sections 6212-13 to 6212-20) for a first offense shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars; for a second offense he shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor more than two thousand dollars; for a third and each subsequent offense he shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than two thousand dollars and be imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five years. . . ."
The Mayor has authority, which he exercised in this case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. At the time of this sentence, the prisoner received a credit of sixty cents a day for each day's imprisonment. By a recent amendment, that credit has been increased to one dollar and a half a day. Sections 13716, 13717, Ohio Gen.Code.
may be sitting, shall have final jurisdiction to try such cases upon such affidavits without a jury, unless imprisonment is a part of the penalty, but error may be prosecuted to the judgment of such mayor, justice of the peace, or judge as herein provided."
Error from the Mayor's Court lies to the court of Common Pleas of the County, and a bill of exceptions is necessary to present questions arising on the evidence. Sections 10359, 10361, Ohio General Code. The appellate review in respect of evidence is such that the judgment can only be set aside by the reviewing court on the ground that it is so clearly unsupported by the weight of the evidence as to indicate some misapprehension or mistake or bias on the part of the trial court, or a willful disregard of duties. Datesh v. State, 23 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 273.
"Money arising from fines and forfeited bonds shall be paid one-half into the state treasury credited to the general revenue fund, one-half to the treasury of the township, municipality or county where the prosecution is held, according as to whether the officer hearing the case is a township, municipal, or county officer."
"The council of any city or village may by ordinance authorize the use of any part of the fines collected for the violation of any law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, for the purpose of hiring attorneys, detectives. or secret service officers to secure the enforcement of such prohibition law. And such council are hereby authorized to appropriate not more than five hundred dollars annually from the general revenue funds for the purpose of enforcing the law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, when there are no funds available from the fines collected for the violation of such prohibitory law."
"An ordinance to provide for compensation to be paid from the secret service funds of the Village of North College Hill, Hamilton County, Ohio, created by authority of Section 62137, of the General Code of Ohio, to detectives, secret service officers, deputy marshals' and attorneys' fees, costs, etc., for services in securing evidence necessary to conviction and prosecuting violation of the law of the state of Ohio prohibiting the liquor traffic."
"Be it ordained by the Council of the Village of North College Hill, Hamilton County, Ohio:"
"Section I. That fifty percent of all moneys hereafter paid into the treasury of said village of North College Hill, Ohio, that is one-half of the share of all fines collected and paid into and belonging to said village of North College Hill, Ohio, received from fines collected under any law of the state of Ohio prohibiting the liquor traffic, shall constitute a separate fund to be called the Secret Service Fund to be used for the purpose of securing the enforcement of any prohibition law."
"Section II. That deputy marshals of the village of North College Hill, Ohio, shall receive as compensation for their services in securing the evidence necessary to secure the conviction of persons violating the law of the state of Ohio, prohibiting the liquor traffic, an amount of money equal to 15 percent. of the fine collected, and other fees allowed by law."
"Section II. That the attorney at law of record prosecuting persons charged with violating the law of the state of Ohio, prohibiting the liquor traffic, shall receive as compensation for legal services an amount equal to 10 percent. of the fine collected, in all cases, whether the plea be guilty or not guilty."
persons violating the law of the state of Ohio, prohibiting the liquor traffic, an amount of money equal to 15 percent. of the fine collected."
"Section V. That the mayor of the village of North College Hill, Ohio, shall receive or retain the amount of his costs in each case, in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such cases."
"Section VI. This ordinance is hereby declared to be an emergency ordinance, necessary to the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety, made necessary by reason of the flagrant violation of the laws of Ohio, enacted to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquors, and shall be in effect from and after its passage."
"Section 4248. The executive power and authority of villages shall be vested in a mayor, clerk, treasurer, marshal, street commissioner, and such other officers and departments thereof as are created by law."
"Section 4255. . . . He (the Mayor) shall be the chief conservator of the peace within the corporation. . . . He shall be the president of the council, and shall preside at all regular and special meetings thereof, but shall have no vote except in case of a tie."
"Section 4258. . . . He shall see that all ordinances, bylaws and resolutions are faithfully obeyed and enforced."
"Section 4259. The mayor shall communicate to council from time to time a statement of the finances of the municipality and such other information relating thereto and to the general condition of affairs of the municipality as he deems proper or as may be required by council."
"Section 4262. The mayor shall supervise the conduct of all the officers of the corporation. . . . "
The fees which the Mayor and Marshal received in this case came to them by virtue of the general statutes of the state applying to all state cases, liquor and otherwise. The Mayor was entitled to hold the legal fees taxed in his favor. Ohio General Code, § 4270; State v. Nolte, 111 O.S. 486. Moreover, the North College Hill village council sought to remove all doubt on this point by providing (§ 5, Ord. 125, supra), that he should receive or retain the amount of his costs in each case, in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such cases. But no fees or costs in such cases are paid him except by the defendant if convicted. There is, therefore, no way by which the Mayor may be paid for his service as judge if he does not convict those who are brought before him, nor is there any fund from which marshals, inspectors and detectives can be paid for their services in arresting and bringing to trial and furnishing the evidence to convict in such cases, except it be from the initial $500 which the village may vote from its treasury to set the court going, or from a fund created by the fines thereafter collected from convicted defendants.
By an Act of 1913 (103 O.L. 290), the Mayor's court in villages in Hamilton County and in half a dozen other counties with large cities was deprived of jurisdiction to hear and punish misdemeanors committed in the county beyond the limits of the corporation. The Prohibition Act, known as the Crabbe Act, adopted in 1920 (108 O.L., Pt. 1, 388 and Pt. 2, 1182) changed this, and gave to the Mayor of every village in the State jurisdiction within the county in which it was situate to try violations of that Act.
faced the situation that, in some of the cities the law enforcement agencies were failing to perform their duty, and therefore, in order that those forces that believe in enforcement and upholding of law might have some courts through which process could be had, it gave to mayors county-wide jurisdiction."
It was further pointed out in argument that the system by which the fines to be collected were to be divided between the State and the village was for the proper purpose of stimulating the activities of the village officers to such due enforcement.
The Village of North College Hill in Hamilton County, Ohio, is shown by the federal census to have a population of 1104. That of Hamilton County, including the City of Cincinnati, is more than half a million. The evidence discloses that Mayor Pugh came to office after ordinance No. 125 was adopted, and that there was a division of public sentiment in the village as to whether the ordinance should continue in effect. A petition opposing it and signed by a majority of the voters was presented to Mayor Pugh. To this, the Mayor answered with the declaration that, if the village was in need of finances, he was in favor of, and would carry on, "the Liquor Court," as it was popularly called, but that, if the court was not needed for village financial reasons, he would not do so. It appears that substantial sums were expended out of the village treasury, from the fund made up of the fines thus collected, for village improvements and repairs. The Mayor was the owner of a house in the village.
in that period $1,796.50; the deputy marshals, inspectors and other employees, including the detectives, received $2,697.75, and $438.50 was paid for cost in transporting prisoners, serving writs and other services in connection with the trial of these cases. Mayor Pugh received $696.35 from these liquor cases during that period as his fees and costs, in addition to his regular salary.
no disqualification either by reason of the character of their compensation or their relation to the village government.
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus, matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. Wheeling v. Black, 25 W.Va. 266, 270. But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.
and township can afford is the fees and costs earned by them, and that such compensation is so small that it is not to be regarded as likely to influence improperly a judicial officer in the discharge of his duty, or as prejudicing the defendant in securing justice, even though the magistrate will receive nothing if the defendant is not convicted.
We have been referred to no cases at common law in England prior to the separation of colonies from the mother country showing a practice that inferior judicial officers were dependent upon the conviction of the defendant for receiving their compensation. Indeed, in analogous cases, it is very clear that the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which he was to decide rendered the decision voidable. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke, 118a; s.c. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough's Rep. 255; City of London v. Wood, 12 Modern Rep. 669, 687; Day v. Savage, Hobart 85, 87; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burrows 1847, 1856, 1857 and 1858.
As early as the 12th Richard II, A.D. 1388, it was provided that there should be a commission of the justices of the peace, with six justices in the county once a quarter, which might sit for three days, and that the justices should receive four shillings a day "as wages," to be paid by the sheriffs out of a fund made up of fines and amercements, and that that fund should be added to out of the fines and amercements from the courts of the Lords of the Franchises, which were hundred courts allowed by the King by grant to individuals.
of the defendant. They were paid at a time when the distinction between torts and criminal case was not clear, Holdsworth, Vol. 2, 363, 365; Vol. 3, 328, and they came from a fund which was created by fines and amercements collected from both sides in the controversy. There was always a plaintiff, whether in the action for a tort or the prosecution for an offense. In the latter, he was called the prosecutor. If he failed to prove his case, whether civil or criminal, he was subject to amercement pro falso clamore, while if he succeeded, the defendant was in misericordia. See Comm. v. Johnson, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 195, 198; Musser v. Good, 11 Id. 247. Thus, in the outcome, someone would be amerced in every case, and the amercements generally went to the Crown, and the fund was considerable. The Statute of Richard II remained on the statute book until 1855, when it was repealed by the 18th and 19th Victoria. Meantime, the hundred courts by franchise had largely disappeared. The wages referred to were not part of the costs. The costs at common law were the amounts paid either by the plaintiff or prosecutor or by the defendant for the witnesses or services of the court officers. Burn's Justice, Vol. 1, p. 628. Chitty's Criminal Law, 4 ed. 1841, Vol. 1, 829. See also 14 George III, ch. 20, 1774. For hundreds of years, the justices of the peace of England seem not to have received compensation for court work. Instead of that, they were required, upon entering upon the office, to pay certain fees. Holdsworth, Vol. 1, p. 289; 19 Halsbury's Laws of England, § 1152. Local judges in towns are paid salaries.
proceeding seems indispensably necessary, as in being publicly assaulted or personally abused, or their authority otherwise contemned while in the execution of their duty, yet if another justice be present, his assistance should be required to punish the offender (Stra. 240)."
"And by the common law, if an order of removal were made by two justices, and one of them was an inhabitant of the parish from which the pauper was removed, such order was illegal and bad on the ground that the justice who was an inhabitant was interested, as being liable to the poor's rate. (Rex v. Great Chart, Burr. S.C.194, Stra. 1173.)"
And this strict principle, unless there is relief by the statute, is seen in modern cases. Queen v. The Recorder of Cambridge, 8 Ellis & Blackburn, 637; Regina v. Hammond, 9 Law Times Reports (N.S.) 423; The Queen v. Rand, Law Reports, 1st Queen's Bench, 230; Queen v. Gafford, 1st Queen's Bench Division, 381; 19 Halsbury's Laws of England 1156.
at one time to have obtained in Indiana, Oregon, Illinois and Alabama.
"We cannot recognize the force of this suggestion, founded as it is upon the assumption that the justices will violate their oaths and the duties of their office, and not upon anything that the law authorizes to be done."
considered at length, and was not one which, in such an action, the court would be patient to hear pressed by the justice whose constitutional rights were not affected. Tyler v. Court, 179 U. S. 405, 179 U. S. 409; California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 199 U. S. 318.
In the case of Probasco v. Raine, Auditor, 50 O.S. 378, the question arose whether the fee of 4 percent. payable to county auditors for placing omitted property on the duplicate list for taxation, which required investigation and quasi-judicial consideration, was invalid. The court held that it was not, and that the objection urged there could not be based on the argument that a man could not be a judge in his own case; that the auditor had no case to be adjudged, but that, on the contrary, he was the taxing officer before whom other parties were cited to appear and show cause why they should not bear their equal burden of taxation. The court said that the action of the auditor was not final so as to cut off further inquiry, but that the whole case might be gone into anew by proper proceedings in court. An exactly opposite conclusion was reached by the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Meyers v. Shields, 61 Fed. 713, 725 et seq.
In other States than those above-mentioned, the minor courts are paid for their services by the State or county regardless of acquittal or conviction, except that, in Virginia, the minor courts receive one-half of the usual fees where there is acquittal. Four States have put into their constitutions a provision that the State must pay the costs in such cases in case of acquittal. They are California, Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina.
The strict common law rule was adopted in this country as one to be enforced where nothing but the common law controlled, and citizens and taxpayers have been held incompetent to sit in suits against the municipal corporation of which they have been residents. Diveny v.
Elmira, 51 N.Y. 506; Corwein v. Names, 11 Johns. 76; Clark v. Lamb, 2 Allen 396; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa 565; Fulweiler v. St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479; Petition of New Boston, 49 N.H. 328; Commonwealth v. McLane, 4 Gray 427; Fine v. St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo. 166, 173. With other courts, however, and with the legislatures, the strict rule seemed to be inconvenient, impracticable, and unnecessary, and the view was taken that such remote or minute interest in the litigation might be declared by the Legislature not to be a reason for disqualification of a judge or juror.
were interested, and ought not to be intrusted with the enforcement of their laws against others. The authority given to the city court to try all offenders against the city ordinances impliedly declares that, notwithstanding the common law objection, it was right and proper to give it the power to enforce the city law against all offenders. That there was great reason in this cannot be doubted when it is remembered that the interest of the corporators is so minute as not to be even thought of by sheriff, juror, or judge. It is very much like the interest which similar officers would feel in enforcing a State law the sanction of which was a penalty. The sum thus to be recovered goes in exoneration of some part of the burden of government to which every citizen is subjected, but such an interest has no effect upon the mind. It is too slight to excite prejudice against a defendant. The same thing is the case here. For the judge, sheriff and jurors, are members of a corporation of many thousand members. What interest of value have they in a fine of twenty dollars? It would put a most eminent calculator to great trouble to ascertain the very minute grain of interest which each of these gentlemen might have. To remove so shadowy and slight an objection, the Legislature thought proper to clothe the city court, consisting of its judge, clerk, sheriff and jurors, with authority to try the defendant, and he cannot now object to it."
v. State, 4 Tex.App. 72; Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga.App. 791; State v. Craig, 80 Maine 85.
"interest is so remote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment of or of influencing the conduct of an individual. And where penalties are imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal court, the judge or jurors in which would be interested as corporators in the recovery, the law providing for such recovery must be regarded as precluding the objection of interest."
"But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which is among the fundamentals of judicial authority."
"Even this must be deemed doubtful, since the adoption of the fourteenth article of the amendments to the Federal Constitution, which denies to the state the right to deprive one of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
From this review, we conclude that a system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice either at common law or in this country that it can be regarded as due process of law unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat lex.
for seven months he made about $100 a month, in addition to his salary. We cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant, brought before the Mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence, that the prospect of such a loss by the Mayor should weigh against his acquittal.
These are not cases in which the penalties and the costs are negligible. The field of jurisdiction is not that of a small community engaged in enforcing its own local regulations. The court is a state agency imposing substantial punishment, and the cases to be considered are gathered from the whole county by the energy of the village marshals and detectives regularly employed by the village for the purpose. It is not to be treated as a mere village tribunal for village peccadillos. There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.
days of Coke and Holt and Mansfield, are not nearly so strong. A situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him. City of Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315; Florida ex rel. Colcord v. Young, 31 Fla. 594. It is, of course, so common to vest the mayor of villages with inferior judicial functions that the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power in him cannot be said to violate due process of law. The minor penalties usually attaching to the ordinances of a village council, or to the misdemeanors in which the mayor may pronounce final judgment without a jury, do not involve any such addition to the revenue of the village as to justify the fear that the mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgment by that fact. The difference between such a case and the plan and operation of the statutes before us is so plain as not to call for further elaboration.
in criminal cases as it will, and it may therefore divide the fines as it does here, one-half to the State and one-half to the village by whose mayor they are imposed and collected. It is further said with truth that the legislature of a State may, and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting in the interest of the State and the people. The legislature may offer rewards or a percentage of the recovery to informers. United States v. Murphy & Morgan, 16 Pet. 203. It may authorize the employment of detectives. But these principles do not at all affect the question whether the State, by the operation of the statutes we have considered, has not vested the judicial power in one who, by reason of his interest both as an individual and as chief executive of the village, is disqualified to exercise it in the trial of the defendant.
It is finally argued that the evidence shows clearly that the defendant was guilty, and that he was only fined $100, which was the minimum amount, and therefore that he cannot complain of a lack of due process, either in his conviction or in the amount of the judgment. The plea was not guilty, and he was convicted. No matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.