Respondent was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A search of his vehicle revealed more than 100 pounds of marijuana, and he was charged with possession with intent to distribute. The Federal District Court denied respondent's motion to suppress, citing a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Ninth Circuit reversed. In its view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one. It then held that several factors relied upon by the District Court carried little or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible.
stances," as this Court's cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each of Stoddard's observations that was by itself susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to no weight. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, however, precludes this sort of divide-andconquer analysis. And the court's view that it was necessary to clearly delimit an officer's consideration of certain factors to reduce troubling uncertainty also runs counter to this Court's cases and underestimates the reasonable-suspicion standard's usefulness in guiding officers in the field. The de novo standard for appellate review of reasonablesuspicion determinations has, inter alia, a tendency to unify precedent and a capacity to provide law enforcement officers the tools to reach the correct decision beforehand. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 691, 697-698. The Ninth Circuit's approach would seriously undermine the "totality of the circumstances" principle governing the existence vel non of "reasonable suspicion." Here, it was reasonable for Stoddard to infer from his observations, his vehicle registration check, and his border patrol experience that respondent had set out on a route used by drug smugglers and that he intended to pass through the area during a border patrol shift change; and Stoddard's assessment of the reactions of respondent and his passengers was entitled to some weight. Although each of the factors alone is susceptible to innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others, taken together, they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for stopping the vehicle. Pp. 273-278.
232 F.3d 1241, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 278.
Austin C. Schlick argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.
Victoria A. Brambl argued the cause for respondent.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the DKT Liberty Project by Julia M. Carpenter; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Lawrence S. Lustberg and Risa E. Kaufman.
Respondent Ralph Arvizu was stopped by a border patrol agent while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A search of his vehicle turned up more than 100 pounds of marijuana. The District Court for the District of Arizona denied respondent's motion to suppress, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. In the course of its opinion, it categorized certain factors relied upon by the District Court as simply out of bounds in deciding whether there was "reasonable suspicion" for the stop. We hold that the Court of Appeals' methodology was contrary to our prior decisions and that it reached the wrong result in this case.
1 Coronado National Forest consists of 12 widely scattered sections of land covering 1,780,000 acres in southeastern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico. The section of the forest near Douglas includes the Chiricahua, Dragoon, and Pelon cillo Mountain Ranges.
fic on 191 as part of a coordinated effort to stem the flow of illegal immigration and smuggling across the international border. See id., at 20-21. Agents use roving patrols to apprehend smugglers trying to circumvent the checkpoint by taking the backroads, including those roads through the sparsely populated area between Douglas and the national forest. Id., at 21-22, 26, 80. Magnetic sensors, or "intrusion devices," facilitate agents' efforts in patrolling these areas. See id., at 25. Directionally sensitive, the sensors signal the passage of traffic that would be consistent with smuggling activities. Ibid.; Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-24.
Sensors are located along the only other northbound road from Douglas besides Highways 191 and 80: Leslie Canyon Road. Leslie Canyon Road runs roughly parallel to 191, about halfway between 191 and the border of the Coronado National Forest, and ends when it intersects Rucker Canyon Road. It is unpaved beyond the 10-mile stretch leading out of Douglas and is very rarely traveled except for use by local ranchers and forest service personnel. App. 26. Smugglers commonly try to avoid the 191 checkpoint by heading west on Rucker Canyon Road from Leslie Canyon Road and thence to Kuykendall Cutoff Road, a primitive dirt road that leads north approximately 12 miles east of 191. Id., at 29-30. From there, they can gain access to Tucson and Phoenix. Id., at 30.
sensor had gone off several weeks before and that he had apprehended a minivan using the same route and witnessed the occupants throwing bundles of marijuana out the door. Id., at 27.
Stoddard drove eastbound on Rucker Canyon Road to investigate. As he did so, he received another radio report of sensor activity. Id., at 29. It indicated that the vehicle that had triggered the first sensor was heading westbound on Rucker Canyon Road. He continued east, passing Kuykendall Cutoff Road. He saw the dust trail of an approaching vehicle about a half mile away. Id., at 31. Stoddard had not seen any other vehicles and, based on the timing, believed that this was the one that had tripped the sensors. I d., at 31-32. He pulled off to the side of the road at a slight slant so he could get a good look at the oncoming vehicle as it passed by. Id., at 32.
It was a minivan, a type of automobile that Stoddard knew smugglers used. Id., at 33. As it approached, it slowed dramatically, from about 50-55 to 25-30 miles per hour. Id., at 32, 57. He saw five occupants inside. An adult man was driving, an adult woman sat in the front passenger seat, and three children were in the back. Id., at 33-34. The driver appeared stiff and his posture very rigid. He did not look at Stoddard and seemed to be trying to pretend that Stoddard was not there. Id., at 33. Stoddard thought this suspicious because in his experience on patrol most persons look over and see what is going on, and in that area most drivers give border patrol agents a friendly wave. Id., at 59. Stoddard noticed that the knees of the two children sitting in the very back seat were unusually high, as if their feet were propped up on some cargo on the floor. Id., at 34.
still facing forward, put their hands up at the same time and began to wave at Stoddard in an abnormal pattern. Id., at 35, 61. It looked to Stoddard as if the children were being instructed. Their odd waving continued on and off for about four to five minutes. Id., at 35, 73.
Several hundred feet before the Kuykendall Cutoff Road intersection, the driver signaled that he would turn. Id., at 36. At one point, the driver turned the signal off, but just as he approached the intersection he put it back on and abruptly turned north onto Kuykendall. The turn was significant to Stoddard because it was made at the last place that would have allowed the minivan to avoid the checkpoint. Id., at 37. Also, Kuykendall, though passable by a sedan or van, is rougher than either Rucker Canyon or Leslie Canyon Roads, and the normal traffic is four-wheel-drive vehicles. Id., at 36, 63-64. Stoddard did not recognize the minivan as part of the local traffic agents encounter on patrol, id., at 37, and he did not think it likely that the minivan was going to or coming from a picnic outing. He was not aware of any picnic grounds on Turkey Creek, which could be reached by following Kuykendall Cutoff all the way up. Id., at 54. He knew of picnic grounds and a Boy Scout camp east of the intersection of Rucker Canyon and Leslie Canyon Roads, id., at 31, 53, 54, but the minivan had turned west at that intersection. And he had never seen anyone picnicking or sightseeing near where the first sensor went off. Id., at 53,75.
the vehicle. Id., at 43. Respondent agreed, and Stoddard discovered marijuana in a black duffel bag under the feet of the two children in the back seat. Id., at 45-46. Another bag containing marijuana was behind the rear seat. Id., at 46. In all, the van contained 128.85 pounds of marijuana, worth an estimated $99,080. Brief for United States 8.
Respondent was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) (1994 ed.). He moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. After holding a hearing where Stoddard and respondent testified, the District Court for the District of Arizona ruled otherwise. App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. It pointed to a number of the facts described above and noted particularly that any recreational areas north of Rucker Canyon would have been accessible from Douglas via 191 and another paved road, making it unnecessary to take a 40-to50-mile trip on dirt roads. Id., at 22a.
road's use by smugglers, the temporal proximity between respondent's trip and the agents' shift change, and the use of minivans by smugglers-were not enough to render the stop permissible. Id., at 1251. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals because of its importance to the enforcement of federal drug and immigration laws. 532 U. S. 1065 (2001).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981). Because the "balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975), tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity "'may be afoot,'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, supra, at 30). See also Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417 ("An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity").
dent judges and local law enforcement officers). Although an officer's reliance on a mere "'hunch'" is insufficient to justify a stop, Terry, supra, at 27, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard, Sokolow, supra, at 7.
Our cases have recognized that the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract. Ornelas, supra, at 696 (principle of reasonable suspicion is not a "'finely-tuned standar[dJ' "); Cortez, supra, at 417 (the cause "sufficient to authorize police to stop a person" is an "elusive concept"). But we have deliberately avoided reducing it to "'a neat set of legal rules,'" Ornelas, supra, at 695-696 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983)). In Sokolow, for example, we rejected a holding by the Court of Appeals that distinguished between evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and probabilistic evidence because it "create[d] unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 490 U. S., at 7-8.
selves were "quite consistent with innocent travel" collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion).
The Court of Appeals' view that it was necessary to "clearly delimit" an officer's consideration of certain factors to reduce "troubling ... uncertainty," 232 F. 3d, at 1248, also runs counter to our cases and underestimates the usefulness of the reasonable-suspicion standard in guiding officers in the field. In Ornelas v. United States, we held that the standard for appellate review of reasonablesuspicion determinations should be de novo, rather than for "abuse of discretion." 517 U. S., at 691. There, we reasoned that de novo review would prevent the affirmance of opposite decisions on identical facts from different judicial districts in the same circuit, which would have been possible under the latter standard, and would allow appellate courts to clarify the legal principles. Id., at 697. Other benefits of the approach, we said, were its tendency to unify precedent and greater capacity to provide law enforcement officers with the tools to reach correct determinations beforehand: Even if in many instances the factual "mosaic" analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion determination would preclude one case from squarely controlling another, "two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject." Id., at 697-698.
slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona). Stoddard was entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area's inhabitants. See Ornelas, supra, at 699. To the extent that a totality of the circumstances approach may render appellate review less circumscribed by precedent than otherwise, it is the nature of the totality rule.
In another instance, the Court of Appeals chose to dismiss entirely the children's waving on grounds that odd conduct by children was all too common to be probative in a particular case. See 232 F. 3d, at 1249 ("If every odd act engaged in by one's children ... could contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion, the vast majority of American parents might be stopped regularly within a block of their homes"). Yet this case did not involve simply any odd act by children. At the suppression hearing, Stoddard testified about the children's waving several times, and the record suggests that he physically demonstrated it as well.2 The District Court Judge, who saw and heard Stoddard, then characterized the waving as "methodical," "mechanical," "abnormal," and "certainly ... a fact that is odd and would lead a reasonable officer to wonder why they are doing this." App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. Though the issue of this case does not turn on the children's idiosyncratic actions, the Court of Appeals should not have casually rejected this factor in light of the District Court's superior access to the evidence and the well-recognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what happened in the courtroom.
2 At one point during the hearing, Stoddard testified that "[the children's waving] wasn't in a normal pattern. It looked like they were instructed to do so. They kind of stuck their hands up and began waving to me like this." App. 35.
Having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge, we hold that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that respondent was engaged in illegal activity. It was reasonable for Stoddard to infer from his observations, his registration check, and his experience as a border patrol agent that respondent had set out from Douglas along a little-traveled route used by smugglers to avoid the 191 checkpoint. Stoddard's knowledge further supported a commonsense inference that respondent intended to pass through the area at a time when officers would be leaving their backroads patrols to change shifts. The likelihood that respondent and his family were on a picnic outing was diminished by the fact that the minivan had turned away from the known recreational areas accessible to the east on Rucker Canyon Road. Corroborating this inference was the fact that recreational areas farther to the north would have been easier to reach by taking 191, as opposed to the 40-to-50-mile trip on unpaved and primitive roads. The children's elevated knees suggested the existence of concealed cargo in the passenger compartment. Finally, for the reasons we have given, Stoddard's assessment of respondent's reactions upon seeing him and the children's mechanical-like waving, which continued for a full four to five minutes, were entitled to some weight.
stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I join the opinion of the Court, because I believe it accords with our opinion in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 699 (1996), requiring de novo review which nonetheless gives "due weight to inferences drawn from [the] facts by resident judges .... " As I said in my dissent in Ornelas, however, I do not see how deferring to the District Court's factual inferences (as opposed to its findings of fact) is compatible with de novo review. Id., at 705.
The Court today says that "due weight" should have been given to the District Court's determinations that the children's waving was" 'methodical,' 'mechanical,' 'abnormal,' and 'certainly ... a fact that is odd and would lead a reasonable officer to wonder why they are doing this.'" Ante, at 276. "Methodical," "mechanical," and perhaps even "abnormal" and "odd," are findings of fact that deserve respect. But the inference that this "would lead a reasonable officer to wonder why they are doing this," amounts to the conclusion that their action was suspicious, which I would have thought (if de novo review is the standard) is the prerogative of the Court of Appeals. So we have here a peculiar sort of de novo review.
I may add that, even holding the Ninth Circuit to no more than the traditional methodology of de novo review, its judgment here would have to be reversed.


I am reviewing four unpublished Virginia Court of Appeals opinions decided on November 20, 2012.
Woodell v. Lagerquist reversed a finding that a father was a “non-parent”, and restored his parental rights.
Here is what happened: Both parents signed an acknowledgement of paternity under oath and in full compliance with VA Code § 20-49.1. Their joint statement of facts on appeal denied fraud, duress or material mistake of fact associated with the acknowledgement – the only grounds for attacking the document. Thus, the acknowledgement was irrevocable and immutable; and as binding and conclusive as a judgment.
For some reason, the trial judge found that § 20-49.1 conflicted with § 20-49.10 which involves genetic testing. In a veiled rebuke clearly directed at the judge, the Court of Appeals recited the “plain language” of the Code and then laid out the “rather unusual facts”. The appellate court ruled that the Code provisions are not contradictory, the trial judge himself said the case was not about paternity, and the judge had not appointed the guardian ad litem who would have been required had the blood test statute been properly invoked.
The most unusual aspect of this decision is how dramatically the trial court misinterpreted the law.
Burns v. Burns recounts a familiar pattern of court proceedings followed by a consent order modifying custody and visitation, with nothing said about child support.
Later, when the support payor wants to modify support the question is whether the required material change dates from the consent order or from some earlier order or agreement.
Here, the pleadings and consent order did not mention support directly. A paragraph under the custody heading repeats the property settlement terms regarding private school tuition, bus, books and fees; applying them unchanged to a particular year; and then states that other provisions of the agreement and final decree remain in effect except as modified. The order does not use the word “reaffirm” or the word “support” anywhere.
The Court of Appeals looks outside the four corners of the consent order in reaching its conclusion that the parties did not modify support. The pleadings are silent on the subject. The consent order was not accompanied by VA Code § 20-60.3 language or a support worksheet, as would have been required with a support order. Thus, the conclusion is that the trial court erred in limiting the change-of-circumstances time frame to events after the consent order. The trial court should have allowed reference to events back to the date of the final decree. The case is reversed and remanded.
I thought the appellate court’s attention to the language of the agreement, the pleadings, the consent order and the missing statutory invocations and worksheet was meticulous and well handled. This decision is a useful example of how cases are decided. It is also a reminder of how important it is to be careful what you ask for. Since technically the private school tuition is part of child support, and the tuition was specifically discussed in the consent order (even though not modified), this ruling is a much closer call than Woodell.
David v. David examines the evidence necessary to convert assets and debt from separate to marital at equitable distribution (ED). This is a tough subject even for seasoned attorneys, and in this case each side scored a partial victory. Husband got to keep as separate property the appreciation on his separate brokerage account, while wife succeeded in getting the balances on credit cards for her separate business declared to be marital debt.
The Court of Appeals examined the trial transcript and sifted the evidence. Wife could not show husband exerted any “significant” personal effort beyond the selection of some stocks that increased in value (while others declined in value) during the marriage. Further, wife failed to directly connect his personal effort with any substantial appreciation or specific portion of the appreciation. She did not meet her burden of proof under Code § 20-107.3(A). Consequently, the $300,000+ of gains during the marriage stayed in husband’s pocket. The trial judge got this part of the ED trial wrong.
The wife did better with her credit card debt on the cards in her name that were nominally for her separate business. She got that debt labeled marital based on four categories of evidence at trial: (1) She paid household bills. (2) Husband confirmed it. (3) She introduced bank statements showing the expenses, including securing purchase of a Navigator with one of the cards. And (4), income of the separate business supported the family. The trial judge got this part of his opinion right.
Vannatta v. Vannatta is a spousal support appeal in which both parties lose for failing to read their appellate record more carefully before appealing.
A. Read the property settlement agreement and court orders carefully, word for word. If you are analyzing an agreement or a consent order, those are contracts. They are subject to rules of contract interpretation. Apply the rules.
B. It is exceedingly difficult to win an appeal based on an alleged error in applying VA Code § 20-107.1(E). That is the list of factors to be weighed in determining spousal support. If your trial judge says she considered all the factors, then that is all she is required to say. No particular weight is required for any factor.
C. Even if the order being appealed talks about some improper piece of evidence, you will not win your appeal unless it is absolutely clear that your trial judge relied upon it, and it is substantial enough to affect the outcome. Ambiguity is insufficient ground for reversal. The trial court is presumed correct.
D. A reservation is not a right. If your agreement reserves you a right to petition for and receive spousal support based on a list of future contingencies like death or remarriage, don’t complain to the Court of Appeals that you were only awarded support for a finite term of years. The phrase “petition and receive” does not mean the same thing as “receive”. In a contract, every word is presumed to have meaning and is to be interpreted in harmony with every other word to the extent possible. If your contractual right to support comes with a prerequisite; you must comply with the prerequisite. Here, that means you must petition for support. A judge did not re-write your contract by ending your support on a date certain.


text:
Canon 1729. §1. In the penal trial itself an injured party can bring a contentious action to repair damages incurred personally from the delict, according to the norm of can. 1596.
§2. The intervention of the injured party mentioned in §1 is not admitted later if it was not made in the first grade of the penal trial.
§3. The appeal in a case for damages is made according to the norm of can. 1628-1640 even if an appeal cannot be made in the penal trial; if both appeals are proposed, although by different parties, there is to be a single appellate trial, without prejudice to the prescript of can. 1730.
Canon 1730. §1. To avoid excessive delays in the penal trial the judge can defer the judgment for damages until he has rendered the definitive sentence in the penal trial.
§2. After rendering the sentence in the penal trial, the judge who does this must adjudicate for damages even if the penal trial still is pending because of a proposed challenge or the accused has been absolved for a cause which does not remove the obligation to repair damages.
Canon 1731. Even if the sentence rendered in a penal trial has become a res iudicata, it in no way establishes the right of the injured party unless this party has intervened according to the norm of can. 1729.

matches: §1 §2 §1 §3 §1 §2


text:
The cemetery is located at the intersection of S.E. 29th and Sunnylane, in Del City. Exit I-40 at the Air Depot exit. Turn left onto S.E. 29th St., and go west a little more than two miles. Go through the intersection of S.E. 29th and Sunnylane. The cemetery is on the west side of Sunnylane. I have canvassed Section 11 beginning at its northeast corner and working to the west. Within Rows, the low number is at the north end of the row. Example: S11-R1-1 is Row 1 and the first marker with a burial date at the north end of the row. S11-R5-6 is the sixth burial inscription from the north end of Row 5 of Section 11. The cemetery office phone number is (405) 677-8384.
S11-R3-1 ADAMSON FRANCES M. 1929 1991 Wife of Alfred F.
S11-R19-16 ALLEN PATRICIA L. 1932 1986 Wife of Paul B.
S11-R3-22 ARDRAY HENRIETTA 1926 1976 Wife of Roscoe F.
S11-R16-16 ARNOLD ESTER L. 1915 1991 Husband of Edna M.
S11-R12-46 BAIN VERA B. 2/27/1931 1/30/1989 Wife of Garland D.
S11-R19-36 BALDWIN EVELYN M. 11/3/1921 8/10/1990 Wife of James H.
S11-R22-11 BALLIETTE PATSY JEAN 1934 1988 Wife of Charles R.
S11-R20-20 BARBER D. EVELYN 1940 1999 Wife of Nathan L.
S11-R2-20 BARE LAURA L. 1914 1971 Wife of H.F.
S11-R13-39 BASTIN FAMA D. 12/31/1925 12/2/1996 Wife of Charles J.
S11-R1-42 BATES NANCY P. 1924 1977 Wife of Alonzo B.
S11-R2-3 BATES DELLA D. 1921 1992 Wife of Clarence C.
S11-R9-5 BEHRENS FAYE JEAN 1937 1981 Wife of Robert J.
S11-R20-22 BELL GORDON E. 1919 1998 Husband of Wilda M.
S11-R3-25 BITTLE J. L. 1926 1992 Husband of Sarah E.
S11-R4-38 BLACK ROSANNA P. 1927 1997 Wife of Howard G.
S11-R17-37 BLEVINS MARY E. 1924 1997 Wife of Oscar J.
S11-R8-7 BLOSE DONALD P. 1930 1972 Husband of Mary J.
S11-R19-6 BOHANAN VIOLET M. 1934 1990 Wife of Frank L.
S11-R22-13 BOND LUCILLE P. 1918 1968 Wife of Lowery D.
S11-R12-40 BOWLES DEBRA K. "DEBBIE" 6/11/1956 6/22/2002 Wife of Bobby D.
S11-R3-34 BOYETT HONOR L. 1908 1986 Wife of Leburn T.
S11-R12-48 BRANDGARD FAYE H. 9/29/1922 7/29/1992 Wife of Robert H.
DORIS P. 12/21/1918 11/27/1983 SMSGT USAF WW II, Korea & Viet.
S11-R4-7 BRANTLEY TENA M. 1925 1992 Wife of George W.
S11-R11-23 BRYANT ELIZABETH G. 2/3/1916 8/16/1975 Wife of Lucian M.
S11-R14-23 BURGIN RALPH R. 1908 1992 Husb of Gertrude H.
S11-R19-4 BURKHART GUY W. 1905 1991 Husband of Thelma E.
S11-R16-34 BURROWS ELLEN C. 1900 1975 Wife of Russell C.
S11-R7-6 BURTON JOHN P. 1941 1989 Husband of Jo A.
S11-R10-13 CALDWELL JOHN W. 1913 2003 Husband of Etta M.
S11-R16-31 CAMPBELL FLOYD D. JR. 7/11/1942 2/2/1981 Husband of Dolly V.
S11-R14-22 CARY C. ALLEN 1919 1980 Husband of Vera M.
S11-R3-29 CASKEY GUIREINE 1921 1999 Wife of Clarence L.
S11-R19-20 CASTEEL DOLORES I. 1924 1986 Wife of Fred H.
S11-R9-32 CHAMBERS JAMES D. 1914 1994 Husband of Faye H.
S11-R19-25 CHAMBERS BOBBIE JEAN 1934 1999 Wife of Billy R.
S11-R22-14 CHAMBERS FRANCES L. 10/4/1924 4/11/1998 Wife of William B.
S11-R7-8 CHAPMAN PHYLLIS C. 1915 1995 Wife of Ormond M.
S11-R22-4 CHERRY VERA ANN 1912 1970 Wife of Charlie M.
S11-R11-5 CHILDRESS MAJOR P. 5/23/1928 6/1/1993 Husb of Mildred R.
S11-R16-15 CLACK HAROLD E. 1910 1984 Husband of Lena M.
S11-R5-13 CLARK ALMIRA E. 1940 1986 Wife of Elton R.
S11-R18-46 CLYMER WILLIAM H. 1902 1982 Husband of Opal M.
S11-R17-13 COBB EVELYN E. 4/16/1928 10/21/1997 Wife of William H.
S11-R4-24 COLE BILLYE H. 1924 1994 Wife of Murton B.
S11-R8-23 COOK CASSIE 1902 1971 Wife of William F.
S11-R4-5 COWAN JANE (STAMPER) 1916 1999 Wife of George W.
S11-R15-12 CRITES ANNA L. 6/29/1906 3/20/1997 Wife of William I.
S11-R8-27 CRITTENDEN BOBBY G. 1937 1978 Husb of Barbara J.
S11-R18-26 CROSS CAROLYN P. 1916 1988 Wife of Thomas J.
S11-R18-3 CROW HAZEL R. 1914 1988 Wife of F.C.
S11-R22-26 CROWE MARY M. 1915 1969 Wife of M.E.
S11-R7-21 CURRY GERALD E. 1927 1995 Husband of Anna L.
S11-R1-37 CURTIS JESSIE 11/27/1913 8/5/1988 Wife of James E.
S11-R16-2 DAVIS SHIRLEY ANN 1/16/1937 8/9/1996 Wife of Claud H.
S11-R19-15 DAVIS ALBERT N. 1926 1985 Husb of Betty J.
S11-R21-36 DAVIS PAULINE A. 1906 1982 Wife of Homer L.
S11-R22-31 DAVIS MAXINE F. 1916 1997 Wife of Charles K.
S11-R5-15 DEAN KATHARINA L. 1923 10/2002 Wife of Hoyt C.
S11-R1-5 DENNIS EUNICE R. 1907 1996 Wife of Edison O.
S11-R10-19 DEPUE JAMES A. 1927 1996 Husband of Della L.
S11-R2-37 DORLAND BETTY L. 1936 1985 Wife of Derwood O.
S11-R21-33 DOUSETT ALTA C. 1899 1989 Wife of Grady H.
S11-R4-15 DOWNS EDGAR A. 1909 1978 Husband of Annie E.
S11-R20-37 DRAPER CALVIN R. 1937 2002 Husb of Judith A.
S11-R11-31 DUBOIS ANNA B. 1916 2001 Wife of Richard L.
S11-R15-7 DUGAN AMY F. 1923 1988 Wife of John C.
S11-R20-12 EDWARDS LULA M. 3/5/1908 6/19/1999 Wife of William E.
S11-R16-37 ELIFRITS EARL D. 1930 2002 Husb of Evelyn F.
S11-R3-6 ELSEY LOUELLA JEAN 1927 1985 Wife of Calvin K.
S11-R3-16 ESKEW OPAL L. 1909 1988 Wife of Cecil L.
S11-R3-14 ETHRIDGE LEROY 1922 1970 Husband of Betty D.
S11-R21-30 FARLEY RHUDELL 1928 1988 Wife of James C.
S11-R8-11 FARMER NORMA I. 1925 2001 Wife of William M.
S11-R4-28 FLATT LUCILLE D. 1922 1986 Wife of David A.
S11-R2-6 FOX MAXINE DELORES 6/2/1939 1/10/1997 Wife of David L.
S11-R14-37 FRANCIS MELVIN F. 1926 2000 Husband of Lola N.
S11-R2-39 FRYMAN ODESSA A. 7/17/1909 12/14/1993 Wife of Calvin B.
S11-R12-26 FULLER ROY F. 1941 1986 Husb of Romaine V.
S11-R13-25 FYFE CLARA LAVERA 1919 1999 Wife of Ivan L.
S11-R7-4 GALLOPE HENRY A. 1909 1979 Husband of Ethel L.
S11-R14-27 GARNER DAISY H. 1916 1992 Wife of William W.
S11-R22-27 GAYWOOD THELMA E. 1910 1984 Wife of Grover C.
S11-R6-31 GEER HELEN M. 1911 1990 Wife of Lester L.
S11-R12-34 GEUIN LUCILLE 4/14/1920 10/13/2001 Wife of Rosco J.
S11-R10-32 GEYER CHARLEY LEON 4/6/1914 12/31/1989 Husband of Mamie C.
S11-R14-20 GIBSON NEOMA N. 3/28/1929 2/17/1999 Wife of Thomas E.
S11-R13-21 GILBERT TOY A. 1916 1970 Wife of Jesse L.
S11-R21-5 GILSTRAP LESTER R. 1910 1984 Husband of Esther F.
S11-R1-3 GINN LOLA 1903 1997 Wife of W.O. Sr.
S11-R2-28 GOODNER LAURA LEE 7/11/1931 5/26/1992 Wife of Walter A.
S11-R13-33 GOSS ANDY N. 3/9/1920 11/28/1991 Husband of Irene E.
S11-R22-28 GRAY OPAL B. 1927 1994 Wife of Lester S.
S11-R13-17 HALL MARIE ELIZABETH 1914 1993 Wife of Sidney W.
S11-R20-28 HALL WANDA M. 1926 1996 Wife of Garth L.
S11-R2-13 HAMAN EDWARD T. 1910 1996 Husband of Mary A.
S11-R16-24 HAMMETT FAYE I. 6/22/1914 12/7/1994 Wife of Augusta J.
S11-R2-29 HANDLEY VELMA C. 1915 1992 Wife of Linden A.
S11-R14-12 HARJO JOHNNY M. 1952 1976 Husband of Danni J.
S11-R15-21 HARLOW NELSON EUGENE 5/31/1925 8/11/2001 Husb of Claudine M.
S11-R3-43 HARPKE FRANCES A. 1909 1971 Wife of Arthur C.
S11-R21-1 HARRISON IRENE L. 1905 1992 Wife of Raymond R.
S11-R17-1 HARTMAN JUANITA M. 1923 1978 Wife of Marvin D.
S11-R3-8 HAVEN JUANITA 1917 1994 Wife of Henry W.
S11-R15-38 HAWKINS RUTH MAE 1915 1999 Wife of William L.
S11-R21-23 HAYS VERA MABLE 1908 1979 Wife of Jack D.
S11-R10-7 HENRY SYBLE A. 1945 1998 Wife of Art W.
S11-R20-33 HERMAN HAROLD E. 1922 2002 Husband of Martha L.
S11-R21-55 HESSEL HAROLD E. SR. 1916 1980 Husband of Donna J.
S11-R12-13 HEWETT CLARA M. 1929 1969 Wife of Stanley C.
S11-R6-5 HEWLETT MARGARET I. 1929 1976 Wife of Maurice E.
S11-R2-45 HIXON CLINTON V. 1913 1991 Husband of Odessa M.
S11-R4-32 HIXON V. CHARLES SR. 1929 1991 Husband of Edna N.
S11-R1-26 HOOD JAMES R. 1932 1977 Husb of Barbara S.
S11-R7-10 HOPE MARY LOU 1927 1975 Wife of Edward M.
S11-R5-33 HOPKINS MARY L. 1926 1969 Wife of Clarence F.
S11-R9-28 HORN ETTA E. 1909 1979 Wife of Louis A.
S11-R6-1 HORRELL LEOLA V. 1904 No date Wife of Clyde E.
S11-R22-30 HOWARD MILDRED L. 1908 1981 Wife of Jack S.
S11-R16-17 HUDDLESON FLORA B. 1917 1973 Wife of Thomas L.
S11-R10-16 HUDSON WESLEY J. 1911 1994 Husb of Mildred E.
S11-R3-20 HYDE TESSIE A. 1910 1993 Wife of Carmon L.
S11-R3-36 HYDE BILLIE L. 1918 1987 Wife of Samuel T.
S11-R3-12 IVERS JESSE B. 1936 2001 "ETHRIDGE"
S11-R17-32 JACOBY GLADYS R. 1907 1993 Wife of Lyle B.
S11-R16-19 JAMISON WILBURN B. 1913 1988 Husband of Willie L.
S11-R17-21 JARMAN LESTER R. 1913 1987 Husband of Violet G.
S11-R11-29 JEFFREY THELMA B. 1922 1981 Wife of Don W.
S11-R11-3 JOHNSON H. VIRGINIA 1929 1989 Wife of Gust A.
S11-R13-7 JOHNSON BESSIE M. 1914 2000 Wife of Phillip C.
S11-R8-6 JOLLEY BILLY W. 1926 1980 Husb of Dorothy A.
S11-R1-17 JONES BROOKIE MAE 1904 1989 Wife of James W.
S11-R2-1 JONES MARGARET M. 1918 1986 Wife of Howard B.
S11-R19-11 JONES VIRGIL F. 1920 1989 Husband of Joyce E.
S11-R15-37 JORDAN EMMA L. 1928 1994 Wife of Harlin E.
S11-R21-14 KEEFER IDA MARIE 1911 1971 Wife of Clarence E.
S11-R17-45 KENDALL CARRIE LEA 1971 1980 Daughter of Albin L.
S11-R12-3 KIKER MARIA J. 1919 1999 Wife of Henry L.
S11-R11-11 KILLGORE RICHARD L. 1934 1995 Husb of Phyllis A.
S11-R13-36 KILLMAN DANIEL T. SR. 1938 1986 Husb of Sharon Y.
S11-R7-24 KIMBLE ETHEL M. 1920 1983 Wife of James Sr.
S11-R14-19 KING WILFORD A. 1919 1996 Husband of Betty D.
S11-R15-3 KING CARL V. 1940 1995 Husband of Enid A.
S11-R9-21 KLIEWER CARRIE J. 1908 1992 Wife of David P.
S11-R20-23 KOSZELAK MARTHA E. 6/23/1918 6/8/1979 Wife of Stanley N.
S11-R8-2 KYKER PATRICIA A. 2/18/1940 4/14/1983 Wife of Vernon C.
S11-R7-19 LAMBRECHT MARY C. 1922 1995 Wife of William R.
S11-R16-26 LANTZ IRENE L. 1921 1996 Wife of Clifford E.
S11-R17-22 LAPEROUSE JEROME L. 1907 1986 Husband of Audra L.
S11-R22-17 LEAL BEATRICE T. 1920 1998 Wife of Alfred G.
S11-R21-20 LEWIS HAZEL A. 1911 1980 Wife of Roscoe L.
S11-R14-36 LIVESAY ROBERT F. 1912 1980 Husband of Lorene B.
S11-R9-14 LONG CHARLES E. 1919 1995 Husband of Sarah L.
S11-R2-23 LOWERY LOREE L. 1933 1997 Wife of Lemuel J.
S11-R9-25 LOWRANCE OTHAR T. 1914 2001 Husband of Gracie E.
S11-R14-15 LYNCH THELMA A. 1928 1993 Wife of O. T.
S11-R3-7 LYONS DAVID MAXWELL 1918 1985 Husb of Virginia L.
S11-R18-22 MACOM BOB D. 1942 1968 Husband of Myrtle A.
S11-R11-12 MALES LOUISE E. 1922 1986 Wife of Charles O.
WAYNE A. 1909 2000 LT COL USAF 354 Svc Co.
S11-R4-21 MASSENGALE LELIA M. 1935 1985 Wife of Paul E.
S11-R14-2 McCLURE MILDRED A. 1915 2001 Wife of Joseph W.
S11-R13-15 McCOWAN JULIA C. 1920 1998 Wife of Joe L.
S11-R1-36 McGEHEE KENNETH A. 1933 1993 Husb of Dorothy M.
S11-R14-6 McKINLEY WILLIAM F. JR. 1936 1996 Husband of Rosie L.
S11-R14-30 McMULLEN IDA B. 1907 1987 Wife of Charlie A.
S11-R2-11 MELTON MARGUERITE 10/31/1917 1/5/1985 Wife of William L.
S11-R22-35 MERRILL CHARLES W. 1919 1987 Husband of Jessie L.
S11-R10-31 MILLER ELVIN LEE 12/18/1943 11/8/2000 Husb of Donna J.
S11-R14-26 MOODY ELMER L. JR. 1927 1998 Husb of Yvonne B.
S11-R10-9 MOORE VELMA L. 1915 1979 Wife of Harley H.
S11-R5-3 MORGAN DONALD C. 2/8/1911 6/28/1987 Husb of Kathleen M.
S11-R15-17 MORRISON LILLIAN RUTH 4/11/1907 6/8/1984 Wife of Henry B.
S11-R15-30 NEALY SHERMAN H. 1937 1987 Husband of Peggy L.
S11-R6-24 NEWTON LOUISE M. 1925 1999 Wife of Albert Jr.
S11-R3-10 NORMAN MARY Z. 1921 1994 Wife of Frank F.
S11-R2-10 NORTON ALICE 1906 1982 Wife of Marvin W.
S11-R4-20 NUNER DOYL L. 1915 1992 Husb of Sylvia M.
S11-R18-32 OAKES ROBERT L. 1919 1974 Husb of Geneva L.
S11-R7-15 O'BRIEN BERTHA C. 1909 1995 Wife of John L.
S11-R12-6 OLIVAS URSULA CLARISSA 4/22/1928 1/28/2003 Wife of Eddie J.
EDDIE J. 5/27/1926 8/25/2003 TSGT USAF WWII, Korea & Viet.
S11-R17-35 OVIATT RUBY M. 1920 1981 Wife of Robert L.
S11-R13-10 OWENS HAZEL M. 1918 1981 Wife of William N.
S11-R13-22 OXLEY MOYLE D. 10/26/1911 5/3/1989 Husband of Opal M.
S11-R8-3 PARKER LORENE 1928 1994 Wife of Wilbert W.
S11-R6-18 PARTLOW ELPHA E. 4/7/1914 11/30/1997 Wife of Morris F.
S11-R14-24 PATTERSON ABBIE M. 1896 1979 Wife of Ambros W.
S11-R11-38 PATTON ANNA L. 2/22/1929 4/20/1999 Wife of Thomas R.
S11-R15-20 PAYNE HOWARD C. 1922 2002 Husband of Vera M.
S11-R17-6 PEARCE LUCILLE A. 1922 1994 Wife of Raymond H.
S11-R11-1 PERKINS NATHAL A. 1915 1972 Husb of Lucille L.
S11-R13-31 PETERS MILDRED L. 1920 1970 Wife of Clyde F.
S11-R19-22 POOL JENNIE 1914 1990 Wife of John H.
S11-R12-43 PRATER ERNIE L. 1920 1980 Husband of Anna M.
S11-R19-1 PRITCHARD NANCY E. 1893 1976 Wife of Charlie M.
S11-R9-19 PRYOR EDNA D. 1910 1982 Wife of William H.
S11-R22-2 QUICK MARTIN B. 1930 1996 Husb of Dorothy J.
S11-R14-21 QUINN WALLACE A. 1922 2002 Husband of Betty J.
S11-R9-39 RAPER TRELLA LUCILLE 1917 1984 Wife of Neley L.
S11-R13-16 REID HENRY A. JR. 1935 1994 Husband of Jolene G.
S11-R18-23 REID ELMER L. 1927 1986 Husb of Barbara J.
S11-R11-35 REYNOLDS DON S. 1915 2002 Husband of Lois M.
S11-R14-8 RIDEN HAZEL J. 1905 1988 Wife of Charles R.
S11-R15-25 ROADY WANDA L. 2/15/1922 10/31/1991 Wife of Calvin E.
S11-R5-36 ROBBINS ANN M. 1907 1978 Wife of William H.
S11-R4-16 ROBERTS ALBERT LEE 1917 1998 Husb of Margaret L.
S11-R5-30 ROBERTS MARY H. 1913 1972 Wife of George A.
S11-R8-20 ROBINSON ALICE C. 1916 2000 Wife of Bill C.
S11-R2-41 ROSE DOROTHY G. 1913 1986 Wife of John D.
S11-R10-29 ROTHNER JESSIE P. 1913 1999 Wife of Juliues T.
S11-R17-39 SANDERS LILLIAN A. 1903 1978 Wife of Wiley A.
S11-R18-16 SANDERS LORINE 4/9/1926 9/1/1999 Wife of Orville L.
S11-R6-29 SEBREE SETHEL (LEWIS) 11/6/1913 6/12/1982 Wife of Otto D.
S11-R2-16 SHACKELFORD CLARA M. 5/31/1916 1/15/1986 Wife of Milburn T.
S11-R15-16 SHAFFER RAYMOND J. 1916 1994 Husband of Mary P.
S11-R9-31 SHARUM WILLIAM A. R. 1913 1990 Husband of Dura V.
S11-R1-22 SHAW BERTHA (SATERWHITE) 1911 1993 Wife of Ted C.
S11-R5-27 SHAWVER VONDA L. 8/29/1927 6/28/1982 Wife of Billy J.
S11-R1-34 SHORT L. MAE 1905 1984 Wife of John L.
S11-R5-14 SIBEL PATRICIA ANN 6/9/1942 9/11/1992 Wife of Sidney L.
S11-R18-33 SIKES GOLDIE A. 9/16/1909 11/30/1997 Wife of William C.
S11-R6-3 SKINNER CHRISTOPHER 1976 1988 Son of Donita S.
S11-R6-20 SLATE RUBY MAE 2/12/1907 8/22/1988 Wife of Marion B.
S11-R16-3 SLATON JERRY W. 1943 1969 Husband of Linda J.
S11-R16-4 SLATON VERA 4/2/1917 10/22/1991 Wife of Ernest S.
S11-R2-18 SMALLWOOD L. H. 1911 1999 Husband of Helen R.
S11-R12-17 SMITH LUCY H. 1920 1988 Wife of Noel G.
S11-R4-9 SOUTHERN WESLEY M. 1921 1984 Husb of Pauline V.
S11-R21-13 SPENCER AUGUSTINE 1915 1981 Wife of Preston G.
S11-R3-15 SPIRES DONALD C. 1932 1980 Husband of Patsy Y.
S11-R20-9 STARK GENE A. 1924 1998 Husband of Edna L.
S11-R16-6 STEWARD RUBY L. 1909 1981 Wife of Richard L.
S11-R9-23 STRANATHAN OPAL D. 1912 1998 Wife of Glen M.
S11-R7-1 SUGGS MYRTLE 1893 1977 Wife of Thomas A.
S11-R6-22 TAYLOR E. MARCHETA 1926 1969 Wife Dan L. Sr.
S11-R10-20 TAYLOR VIRGINIA B. 1913 1997 Wife of Herbert H.
S11-R18-35 TAYLOR EFFIE 1900 1993 Wife of Jim B.
S11-R18-37 TAYLOR OLGA 1927 1996 Wife of James E.
S11-R13-42 THOMPSON CARL E. 1920 1990 Husband of Hilda L.
S11-R5-38 TIPPETT DONALD W. 1927 1987 Husband of Faye G.
S11-R21-46 TODD EULA M. 1908 1997 Wife of Byrd K.
S11-R9-10 TRENT V. RAY 1914 1981 Husband of Cleta L.
S11-R19-28 TROYER MILDRED C. 1911 1994 Wife of Charles W.
S11-R19-31 TWOMEY JACK K. 1929 1992 Husband of Ouida R.
S11-R5-4 UNDERHILL HAZEL I. 1912 1990 Wife of Dewey C.
S11-R19-30 UNRUH EVA MAE (NORRIS) 11/7/1925 11/11/1994 Wife of Arthur L.
S11-R5-39 VAUGHN HERMAN H. 9/26/1912 10/1/1972 Husb of Florence J.
S11-R15-19 WALLACE MILLARD T. 1914 1986 Husband of Velma O.
S11-R22-21 WALSH THELMA JANE 1918 2002 Wife of Eldon R.
S11-R18-13 WARREN ALBERT B. 1908 1974 Husband of Rose L.
S11-R8-9 WEBB M. EVELYN 8/29/1929 3/8/1999 Wife of Earl J.
S11-R20-31 WEBB HAROLD J. 1939 1985 Husband of Sarah L.
S11-R4-18 WELCH JOHN B. 1919 2002 Husb of Linnie O.
S11-R15-9 WELCH ANNIE O. 1912 1990 Wife of Claude C.
S11-R13-1 WHITEHEAD NINA V. 1926 1986 Wife of Robert L.
S11-R15-24 WHITLEY CLIFFORD J. 1928 1996 Husband of Helen O.
S11-R8-28 WILEY FRANCES L. 1914 1985 Wife of Robert L.
S11-R3-42 WILLIAMS WAYNE H. 1906 1985 Husband of Ethel L.
S11-R11-36 WILLIS EDNA F. 1/4/1903 9/7/1988 Wife of Charles O.
S11-R17-23 WILSON VELDA MARIE 1911 1971 Wife of Dee F.
S11-R22-23 WINKLEMAN LARRY C. 1952 1002 Husband of Cathy L.
S11-R3-45 WINSETT MADELINE M. 8/8/1913 12/9/1985 Wife of John H.
S11-R10-24 WINSTEAD ETHEL R. 1923 1998 Wife of Joseph C.
S11-R5-24 WINTER ELDA R. 1920 1977 Husb of Frances J.
S11-R20-14 WRIGHT MILDRED M. 1922 1978 Wife of Manuel A.
S11-R14-33 YANDLE RUTH JEWEL 1906 1986 Wife of Virgil R.
S11-R14-35 YANDLE MAXINE 1925 1988 Wife of Clovis R.
S11-R21-16 YOUNG MARY CLEO 1913 1995 Wife of Donald W.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.