text:
This paper presents the Adaptive Theory based Improved Linear Tracer Sinusoidal (ATILS) Control Strategy for PQ Enhancement using DVR in the Distribution System. The proposed DVR effectively mitigates voltage sag/swell, unbalanced voltage sag/swell for linear loads along with harmonic compensation using ATILS Control Strategy. The DVR consists of voltage source converter (VSC), transformer with capacitor. The main advantages are more efficiency, reliability and its effective control of reactive power. The ATILS Control Strategy is used for extraction of fundamental reference load voltages quickly and accurately to mitigate PQ problems. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy for DVR is modeled using RT-LAB and MATLAB/SIMULINK and its performance is verified for various Power Quality (PQ) problems.
The power quality of available supply has direct economic impact on domestic and manufacturing industries which effects the growth of the nation. This is mainly due to increasing usage of power electronics equipment in day to day life . The reactive power demand and level of harmonic components are popular parameters to specify the reactive power demand at particular load and degree of distortion [2, 3]. In the low and medium power level distribution system, the most commonly occurring problems are related harmonic resonance and Power Quality (PQ). Various standards are proposed by IEEE and IEC to limit power quality problems such as IEEE 519-1992, IEEE Std. 141-1993 and IEC 1000-3-2 etc. [4–6]. The CPDs (Custom Power Devices) are used to mitigate reduction of voltage flicker, harmonic compensation, voltage sag/swell, compensation and resonance due to distortion etc. . It includes DVR (Dynamic Voltage Restorer), DSTATCOM (Distribution Static Compensator) and UPQC (Unified Power Quality Conditioner) in the different configurations [8–10]. The dynamic performance of CPDs depends upon control strategy used for reference load voltage estimation and pulse generation gating scheme.
PQ problems such as voltage sag, swell, unbalance voltage sag/swell, harmonics create severe problems for present modern industry and these problems are compensated using DVR . The three-leg VSC (voltage source converter), transformer with capacitor are the main components of DVR. The major advantage of proposed capacitor based DVR is that it is more efficient and reduces the cost when compared to conventional battery based DVR. Regular maintenance is required for battery based DVR and it adds additional cost for battery. The capacitor based DVR absorbs/injects active power to pre-sag/swell compensation in the distribution system [12, 13].
The design, protection and different topologies for capacitor based DVR are reported in literature [14–16]. To mitigate PQ problems the DVR has to respond quickly for extraction of reference load voltages. A few of the many control strategies for DVR are ISCT (Instantaneous Symmetrical Components Theory) , SRFT (Synchronous Reference Frame Theory) [18, 19], Adaline Based Control Algorithm , PQR Instantaneous Power Theory , Control Algorithm based on Space vector PWM , Adaptive Theory based Improved Linear Sinusoidal Control Algorithm for DSTATCOM  etc. SRF theory and PQ theory requires reasonable transformations and computations which takes more execution time. Adaline Algorithm requires convergence factor value is so selected to make a tradeoff between the accuracy and the rate of convergence. ISCT Algorithm applied for DVR then it will show more oscillation the results. All these conventional control strategies take more time for extraction of reference load voltages. The DVR performance is mainly due to effective estimation of reference load voltages with proper control strategy. This paper discusses ATILS control strategy for DVR to mitigate voltage sag/swell for linear/non-linear loads, unbalanced voltage sag/swell. The proposed ATILS control strategy takes less execution time compared to conventional control strategies for generating reference load voltages [24, 25]. The ATILS based DVR is modeled using RT-LAB and MATLAB/SIMULINK and its performance results are validated at different PQ problems.
The ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for generating reference load voltages is shown in Figure 1 along with distribution system. In this proposed control strategy, the phase source voltages (vsa, vsb, vsc), load voltages (vLa, vLb, vLc), phase source currents (isa, isb, isc), load currents (iLa, iLb, iLc), dc bus voltage (vdc) and terminal PCC voltages (vt) are used for estimation of load reference voltages (vLa*, vLb*, vLc*) based on adaptive theory based improved linear tracer sinusoidal control strategy. In the proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR, source currents (isa, isb, isc) are equal to load currents (iLa, iLb, iLc). To mitigate ripple currents, three inductors (Lf) are used at the VSC and a three phase resistor (Rf) & capacitor (Cf) are connected at the DVR injecting transformer to mitigate voltage harmonics.
Figure 1 ATILS Control Strategy for three-leg VSC Based DVR in the Distribution System.
The three-phase instantaneous source currents (isa, isb, isc) may consist of negative sequence components and harmonics. These three phase source currents are given to band pass filters to filter harmonics and noise. The three phase source currents are represented as.
The proposed adaptive theory based improved linear tracer sinusoidal control strategy is used to estimate fundamental active and reactive power components of load voltages of each phase as shown in the Figure 1. In the fundamental source voltage, phase ‘a’ component is the difference from the source voltage to estimate the error voltage signal. The filter output of the voltage signal is the combination of output voltage signal with band pass filter (ψ) and this is multiplied with power frequency signal (–ρ). The output of this signal is integrated to estimate phase ‘a’ fundamental source voltage (Vsfa). Similarly other two phases ‘b’ and ‘c’ fundamental source voltages (Vsfb and Vsfc) are estimated.
The magnitude of three phase fundamental source voltage active components (vsda, vsdb, vsdc) are extracted at positive zero crossing of in-phase unit templates. The output of ZCD1 (Zero Crossing Detector) works as trigger pulse for SHC1 (Sample and Hold Circuit) and fundamental voltage as a input signal of SHC1. The magnitude of fundamental active component is considered as output of SHC1 real component. The average magnitude of fundamental source voltage corresponding to active power component (VsdA) is the sum of three phase fundamental source voltage active power components (vsda,vsdb,vsdc) divided by 3.
Similarly, the magnitude of three phase fundamental source voltage reactive power components (vsqa, vsqb, vsqc) are extracted at positive zero crossing of quadrature-phase unit templates. The output of ZCD2 (Zero Crossing Detector) works as trigger pulse for SHC2 (Sample and Hold Circuit) and fundamental voltage as an input signal of SHC2. The magnitude of fundamental reactive component is considered as output of SHC2 reactive component. The average magnitude of fundamental source voltage corresponding to reactive power component (VsqA) is the sum of three phase fundamental source voltage reactive power components (vsqa, vsqb, vsqc) divided by 3.
Where τ is the LPF time constant and considered as greater than zero.
Where forward gain is G(s)=Ψ/(τs2+(τρ+1)s+(ψ+ρ)) (τs2 and feedback gain of transfer function is H (s) = 1.
Where ψ is the band pass filter frequency, ρ is the power frequency and τ is the LPF time constant. Routh–Hurwitz criterion is used to analyze the stability of the Equation (14).
Routh–Hurwitz criterion array formation is shown in Table 1.
For the stability analysis of ATILS Control Strategy assume band pass filter frequency (ψ) = 250 rad/sec, power frequency (ρ) = 314.14 rad/sec and time constant (τ) = 0.1 sec. By substituting these values in Table 1, it was observed that there is no sign of changes in the first column of Routh–Hurwitz criterion and the characteristic roots are not positive real number. This concludes that ATILS control strategy is stable at different variations in the parameters.
Where vedc(m) and vedc(m – 1) are the error in the DC bus voltage at mth and (m – 1)th sample instants and Kp1 and Ki1 are proportional and integral gain constants.
The magnitude of active power component reference load voltage (VLdt) is the sum of average magnitude of source voltage component (VsdA) and the DC bus PI controller output (vdls).
Where vetp(m) and vetp(m – 1) are the error in the load voltage PI at mth and (m – 1)th sample instants and Kp2 and Ki2 are proportional and integral gain constants.
These three phase reference load voltages (vLa∗, vLb∗, vLc∗) are compared with actual load voltages (vLa, vLb, vLc) and error of the output is compared with triangular carrier wave with 10 kHz frequency for generation of switching pulses DVR.
MATLAB/SIMULINK and SPS (Sim power Sytems) toolbox is used for the development of Simulink model of DVR and proposed control strategy. The performance analysis of ATILS control strategy in the time domain and DVR is simulated for voltage sag/swell for linear/non-linear loads and unbalanced voltage sag/swell using simulink model. The performance of ATILS control strategy based DVR is observed for various time varying linear/non-linear loads.
The performance of three-leg VSC based DVR on ATILS control strategy during voltage sag at linear/non-linear load is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The parameters of performance indices such as supply voltage (vs), compensating voltage (vdvr), load voltage (vL), dc bus voltage (vdc), terminal voltage (vt), load current (iL) at (t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec) linear/ non-linear loads are depicted in Figure 2–Figure 3. At t = 1.42 sec the source voltage (vs), load current (iL) and load voltage (vL) are balanced and sinusoidal under linear loads as observed from Figure 2 and Figure 3. A 20% of voltage sag is introduced under linear loads and non-linear load at t = 1.45 sec to 1.48 sec. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage in such a manner that the load voltage (vL) and load voltage (iL) are sinusoidal and balanced, it was observed that from Figure 2–Figure 3. The actual dc bus voltage (vdc) and its terminal voltage (vt) of DVR are regulated to rated values at 200 V and 339 V as shown under linear/non-linear loads. The proposed ATILS control strategy based DVR in Figure 2–Figure 3 from t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec the performance parameters shows satisfactory results at voltage sag under linear/non-linear loads as per IEC and IEEE standards.
Figure 2 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage sag.
Figure 3 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage sag under non-linear loads.
The dynamic performance of three-leg VSC based DVR on ATILS control strategy during voltage swell at linear/non-linear load is depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The parameters of performance indices such as supply voltage (vs), compensating voltage (vdvr), load voltage (vL), dc bus voltage (vdc), load terminal voltage (vt), load current (iL) at (t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec) linear/non-linear loads are depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. At t = 1.42 sec the source voltage (vs), load current (iL) and load voltage (vL) are balanced and sinusoidal under linear loads as observed from Figure 4 and Figure 5. A voltage swell of 20% is introduced under linear loads and non-linear load at t = 1.45 sec to 1.48 sec. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage in such manner that the load voltage (vL) and load voltage (iL) are sinusoidal and balanced, it was observed that from Figure 4 to Figure 5. The proposed ATILS control strategy based DVR in Figure 4 and Figure 5 from t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec the performance voltage (vdc) and terminal voltage (vt) of DVR are regulated to rated values at 200 V and 339 V as shown under linear/non-linear loads. During harmonic compensation of non-linear load condition, THD of source voltage (vs) is 6.09% and THD of load voltage (vL) is 2.35% which are shown in Figure 8. The proposed ATILS control strategy based DVR in Figure 4 to Figure 5 from t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec the performance parameters shows satisfactory results at voltage swell under linear/non-linear loads as per IEC and IEEE standards.
Figure 4 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage swell under linear loads.
Figure 5 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage swell under non-linear loads.
Figure 6 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for unbalance load at 27% less voltage in one phase.
Figure 7 Performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for unbalance load at 16% more voltage in one phase.
Figure 8 Source voltage and load voltage of harmonic spectra.
Figure 7 that load voltage (vL) and load current (iL) are balanced and pure sinusoidal. The Figure 6–Figure 7 shows that DVR injecting compensating voltage such that load voltage and load current are harmonic free under voltage and over voltage at the one phase. During unbalanced load conditions DVR maintains sensed dc bus voltage and terminal voltage at 200 V and 339 V. The proposed ATILS control strategy based DVR in Figure 6 to Figure 7 from t = 1.42 sec to 1.48 sec the performance parameters shows satisfactory results at unbalanced voltage under linear/non-linear loads as per IEC and IEEE standards.
A prototype 150 KVA, 415 V 50 Hz source and distribution load along with ATILS control strategy based DVR is developed and implemented using RT-LAB. A balanced linear R-L load is taken as linear load to demonstrate sag, swell, unbalanced voltages. A universal diode with R-L load is considered as consumer loads to demonstrate of harmonic Compensation. The ATILS control strategy based DVR is modeled and implemented using RT-LAB 8.2.5 with fixed step size of 35 μs and Runge-Kutta (ODE4 solver). A three leg VSC is used as DVR for a 150 KVA, 415 V 50 Hz Y-connected system at PCC through injecting transformer and inductor filter. A dc bus capacitor value of 3000 μF is used and is regulated at 200 V. Dynamic performance of ATILS control strategy based DVR are recorded using a Fluke 43B power analyzer.
The real time hardware results of ATILS control strategy based DVR under voltage sag/swell, harmonics compensation and unbalance voltages are shown in Figure 9–Figure 14. The parameters indices of distribution system such as supply voltage of ‘a’ phase (vsa), compensating voltage (vdvr), load voltage of ‘a’ phase (vL), dc bus voltage (vdc), source terminal voltage (vst), load terminal voltage (vLt) are shown in Figure 9–Figure 14.
The hardware results of DVR on ATILS control strategy during voltage sag at linear load is depicted in Figure 9. A 20% of voltage sag is introduced under linear load condition. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage (vdvr) in such a manner that load voltage (vLa) is balanced and sinusoidal and it maintains a voltage of 238.0 V. It was observed from Figure 9 that the dc bus voltage (vdc) is maintained at 197.9 V. The source terminal voltage (vst) and load terminal voltage (vLt) are maintained at 312.4 V and 347.3 V in the real time hardware.
Figure 9 Hardware simulation of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage sag.
Figure 10 Hardware simulation of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for 20% voltage swell.
The hardware results of DVR on ATILS control strategy during voltage swell at linear load is depicted in Figure 10. A voltage swell of 20% is introduced under linear load condition. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage (vdvr) in such a manner that the load voltage (vLa) is balanced and sinusoidal and it maintains a voltage of 239.8 V. It was observed from Figure 10 that dc bus voltage (vdc) is maintained at 194.0 V. The source terminal voltage (vst) and load terminal voltage (vLt) are maintained at 368.8 V and 352.5 V in the real time hardware.
The hardware results of DVR on ATILS control strategy during harmonics compensation at non-linear load is depicted in Figure 11. A highly non-linear load is connected at distribution load to demonstrate harmonics compensation. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage (vdvr) in such a manner that load voltage (vLa) is purely sinusoidal, harmonic free and it maintains a voltage of 246 V. It was observed from Figure 11 that dc bus voltage (vdc) is maintained at 191.8 V in the real time hardware. Fluke 43B power analyzer is used to demonstrate %THD of source voltage and load voltage. The source voltage of %THD of 8.9% and its fundamental voltage of 236.7 V whereas load voltage of %THD of 4.2% and its fundamental voltage of 240.0 V are shown in Figure 14.
The hardware results of DVR on ATILS control strategy during unbalanced at linear load is depicted in Figure 12 and Figure 13. A 27% reduced voltage in ‘c’ phase is introduced compared to ‘a’ and ‘b’ phases under linear load condition. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage (vdvr) in such a manner that load voltages (vLa, vLb, vLc) are purely sinusoidal and highly balanced. It was observed that from Figure 12 that dc bus voltage (vdc) is maintained at 195.27 V in the real time hardware.
Figure 11 Hardware simulation of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for harmonic compensation.
Figure 12 Hardware simulation of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for unbalance load at 27% less voltage in one phase.
A 16% increased voltage in ‘c’ phase is introduced compared ‘a’ and ‘b’ phases under linear load condition. The proposed ATILS Control Strategy based DVR introduces mitigating voltage (vdvr) in such a manner that load voltages (vLa, vLb, vLc) are purely sinusoidal, highly balanced. It was observed that from Figure 14 that the dc bus voltage (vdc) is maintained at 196.11 V in the real time hardware.
Figure 13 Hardware simulation of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR for unbalance load at 16% rise voltage in one phase.
Figure 14 Real Time harmonic spectra of source voltage (vs) and load voltage (vL).
The three leg VSC based DVR is implemented by using ATILS Control Strategy. The proposed ATILS control strategy has been used for quick and accurate extraction of reference load voltages for generation of switching pulses of DVR. The proposed DVR is more reliable, efficient and controls reactive power. The dynamic performance of ATILS Control Strategy based DVR shows satisfactory simulation results and hardware results for PQ problems such as compensation of voltage sag/swell under linear/non-linear loads and unbalanced voltage sag/swell. Under different PQ disturbances, the sensed dc bus voltage and terminal voltage are maintained at 200 V and 339 V respectively under MATLAB simulation and hardware results. In ATILS control strategy based DVR during harmonic compensation, THD of source voltage (vs) is 6.09%, THD of load voltage (vL) is 2.35% within IEC and IEEE standards under MATLAB simulation. In ATILS control strategy based DVR during harmonic compensation, THD of source voltage (vs) is 8.9%, THD of load voltage (vL) is 4.2% within IEC and IEEE standards under hardware.
Consumer loads: Non-Linear Load – 3-Φ diode bridge rectifier with R = 4 Ω and L = 500 mH.
 Ortiz, A., Gherasim, C., Manana, M., Renedo, C. J., Eguiluz, L. I., and Belmans, R. J. M. (2005). Total harmonic distortion decomposition depending on distortion origin. IEEE Trans. Power Del. 20, 2651–2656.
 Dugan, R. C., McGranaghan, M. F., and Beaty, H. W. (2006). Electric Power Systems Quality, 2nd edn. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
 Padiyar, K. R. (2008). FACTS Controllers in Power Transmission and Distribution. New Delhi: New Age Int.
 IEEE Std (1992). IEEE Recommended Practices and Requirement for Harmonic Control on Electric Power System. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Standards Association, 519.
 IEEE Std (1993). IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for Industrial Plants, IEEE Std. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Standards Association, 141.
 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). (1995). Part 3: Limits-Section 2: Limits for Harmonic Current Emissions (Equipment Input Current > 16 A per Phase) IEC1000-3-2 Document, 1st Edn. Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Standards Association.
 Lee, T. L., and Hu, S. H. (2011). Discrete frequency-tuning active filter to suppress harmonic resonances of closed-loop distribution power systems. IEEE Trans. Power Electron. 26, 137–148.
 Wu, J.-C., Jou, H. L., Feng, Y. T., Hsu, W. P., Huang, M. S. and Hou, W. J. (2007). Novel circuit topology for three-phase active power filter. IEEE Trans. Power Del. 22, 444–449.
 Singh, B., Jayaprakash, P., and Kothari, D. P. (2008). Power factor correction and power quality improvement in the distribution system. Elect. India Mag. 2008, 40–48.
 Yao, Z., and Xiao, L. (2013). Control of single-phase grid-connected inverters with nonlinear loads. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 60, 1384–1389.
 Fuchs, E. F., and Mausoum, M. A. S. (2008). Power Quality in Power Systems and Electrical Machines. London: Elsevier.
 Fuchs, E. F., and Mausoum, M. A. S. (2008). Power Quality in Power Systems and Electrical Machines. London: Elsevier Academic Press.
 Akagi, H., Watanabe, E. H. and Aredes, M. (2007). Instantaneous power theory and applications to power conditioning. Hoboken NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
 Dahler, P., and Knap, G. (203). Protection of a dynamic voltage restorer. US Patent 6633092.
 Ghosh, A., Jindal, A. K. and Joshi, A. (2004). Design of a capacitor supported dynamic voltage restorer (DVR) for unbalanced and distorted loads. IEEE Trans. Power Deliv. 19, 405–413.
 Nielsen, G. J., and Blaabjerg, F. (2005). A detailed comparison of system topologies for dynamic voltage restorers. IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl. 41, 1272–1280.
 Ghosh, A., and Joshi, A. (2002). A new algorithm for the generation of reference voltages of a DVR using the method of instantenous symmetrical components. Power Eng. Rev. IEEE 22, 63–65.
 Jayaprakash, P., Singh, B., Kothari, D. P., Chandra, V., AIHaddad, H. (2008). Control of reduced rating dynamic voltage restorer with battery energy storage system,” in Proceedings of the Power System Technology and IEEE Power India Conference, Delhi, 1–6.
 Ibrahim, A. O., Nguyen, T. H., Lee, D. C., Kim, S. C. (2011). A fault ride-through technique of DF/G wind turbine systems’ using dynamic voltage restorers. IEEE Trans. Energy Conv. 26, 871–882.
 Singh, B., Jayaprakash, P. and Kothari, D. P. (2009). Adaline based control of capacitor supported DVR for distribution systems. J. Power Electron. 9, 3.
 Lee, S.-J., Kim, H., SuI, S.-K., and Blaabjerg, F. (2004). A novel control algorithm for static series compensators by use of PQR instantaneous power theory. IEEE Trans. Power Electron. 19, 814–827.
 Ding, H., Shuangyan, S., Zhong, D. X., and Jun, G. (2002). Anovel dynamic voltage restorer and its unbalanced control strategy based on space vector PWM. Int. J. Elect. Power Energy Syst. 24, 693–699.
 Singh, B., and Arya, S. R. (2013). Adaptive theory based improved linear sinusoidal tracer control algorithm for DSTATCOM. IEEE Trans. Power Electron. 28, 3768–3778.
 Bangarraju, J., Rajagopal, V., and Jayalaxmi, A. (2014). “Implementation of three-leg VSC based DVR using IRPT control algorithm,” in Proceedings of the 6th IEEE India International Conference on Power Electronics, Delhi, 1–6.
 Bangarraju, J., Rajagopal, V., Rosila, D., Jebarani and Madhuri, C. L. (2016). “A new vcosϕ control scheme of capacitor supported DVR for power quality improvement”, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference On Power & Energy Systems Towards Sustainable Energy, Rome, 1–7.
J. Bangarraju was born in Tanuku, India, in 1982. He received the B.Tech. degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from A.S.R College of Engineering, Tanuku in 2004 and the M.Tech. degree from JNTU, Hyderabad in 2007. Presently working as Associate Professor in B V Raju Institute of Technology, Narsapur, Telangana, India. His area of interest includes power electronics and drives, power quality, FACTS and Artificial neural networks. He is currently working towards Ph.D. degree at the Department of Electrical Engineering, JNTU Hyderabad, India. He is a life member of the Indian Society for Technical Education (ISTE) and Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
V. Rajagopal was born in Kazipet, Warangal, India in 1969. He received the AMIE (Electrical) degree from The Institution of Engineers (India), in 1999, M.Tech. degree from the Uttar Pradesh Technical University India in 2004 and Ph.D. degree in Indian Institute of Technology (I.I.T.) Delhi India, in 2012. Presently working as Professor and HOD in Stanley College of Engineering and Technology for Women, Hyderabad, Telangana, India. His area of interest includes power electronics and drives, renewable energy generation and applications, FACTS, and power quality. He is a life member of the Indian Society for Technical Education (ISTE), Fellow of Institution of Engineers (India) (IE (I)) and a Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
Sabha Raj Arya received Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical Engineering) degree from Government Engineering College Jabalpur, in 2002, Master of Technology (Power Electronics) from Motilal National Institute of Technology, Allahabad, in 2004 and Ph.D. degree from Indian Institute of Technology (I.I.T.) Delhi, New Delhi, India, in 2014. He is joined as Assistant Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering, Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology, Surat. His fields of interest include power quality, design of power filters and distributed power generation.
He received Two National Awards namely INAE Young Engineer Award from Indian National Academy of Engineering, POSOCO Power System Award from Power Grid Corporation of India in the year of 2014 for his research work. He has also received Amit Garg Memorial Research Award-2014 from I.I.T. Delhi from the high impact publication in a quality journal during the session 2013–2014. He is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
Bochu Subhash is a Ph.D. Student at Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University Hyderabad Kukatpally, Hyderabad since 2012. Received B.Tech. degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from RGMCET, Nandyal in 2001 then went on to pursue M.Tech. Course in Energy System from Visveswaraiah Technological University, Belugum, Karnataka in 2004. He is presently working as Sr. Assistant Professor and has been delivering various administration works in reputed Autonomous Engineering College, Warangal, Telangana, India. His area of interest includes power electronics and drives, power quality, wind power generation and smart metering system.
Journal of Green Engineering, Vol. 7, 189–212.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Justin T. Quinn is a litigation partner with Robinson Miller. Mr. Quinn handles complex commercial matters in federal and state courts throughout the country, drawing on his unique background as a deputy clerk to a United States Magistrate Judge and law clerk to a United States District Judge to provide clients with work product and insight informed by virtually every relevant perspective of civil litigation.
Mr. Quinn brings a results-oriented approach to address clients’ most critical problems, whether that be through pre-litigation counseling, motions practice, litigation through trial, or appellate proceedings. Clients and colleagues alike have lauded Mr. Quinn’s aggressive style, thoroughness, and ability to quickly understand their most sophisticated legal issues, including questions of statutory authority and constitutional dimension. As a result, Mr. Quinn has been heralded a “Rising Star” by Super Lawyers Magazine each year since 2014.
Mr. Quinn’s practice focuses on defending complex business and commercial disputes in a variety of areas, including consumer fraud, class action litigation, contract law, employment law, media law, copyright/trademark law, and administrative law.
Mr. Quinn serves on the District of New Jersey’s Lawyers’ Advisory Committee. He graduated from Seton Hall University School of Law in 2010, and is a member of the following bars: State of New Jersey; State of New York; United States District Court for the District of New Jersey; United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York; United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Thomas, et al. v. The City of New York, et al. (E.D.N.Y.) (Counsel for Advance Publications, Inc. and one of its journalists in federal lawsuit involving claims of defamation, federal conspiracy, emotional distress, and federal stigma plus. Successfully obtained with-prejudice dismissal of all claims).
East Coast Test Prep LLC, et al. v. Allnurses.com, Inc., et al. (D. Minn.) (Counsel for Allnurses.com, Inc. in a “sprawling” defamation case brought against the operator of a website. Successfully obtained dismissal of seventeen-count complaint based upon, inter alia , the immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act).
United States v. Lyca Tel, LLC (D.N.J.) (Counsel for Lyca Tel, LLC in forfeiture action brought by the United States following administrative proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission).
The Jersey Journal v. City of Bayonne, et al. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) (Counsel for newspaper in summary action for access to a public government record. After lengthy, embroiled litigation, trial court concluded that The Jersey Journal was a “prevailing party” under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, and awarded The Jersey Journal its counsel fees and costs of nearly $105,000).
Gould v. Advance Local Media, LLC (S.D.N.Y.) (Counsel for Alabama Media in litigation involving allegations of copyright infringement).
McDermott v. Advance Publications, Inc. (E.D.N.Y.) (Counsel for Herald Publishing, LLC in action involving allegations of copyright infringement).
NJ Advance Media LLC v. Middlesex County Prosecutor (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Appellate counsel for NJ Advance Media LLC. Successfully secured affirmance of trial court decision, and was awarded counsel fees and costs).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Several committees advise that such gifts are unacceptable. The Kentucky committee, for example, advised that a judge may not accept even nominal Christmas gifts such as boxes of candy and poinsettias from persons whose interests are likely to come before the judge, and the prohibition extends to the judge’s staff. Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-86 (1995).
During the winter holiday season, attorneys, vendors, and others, offer gifts to judges, judicial assistants, bailiffs and other court employees. In the past, the gifts normally consisted of candy, fruit, nuts, stuffed animals and liquor. That tradition is no longer followed and gifts of money, and certificates redeemable for cash, goods, or services are presented to court personnel.
See also Texas Advisory Opinion 194 (1996) (a judge, court coordinator, court reporter, clerk, or bailiff may not accept seasonal gifts from a lawyer or law firm); West Virginia Advisory Opinion (September 19, 2006) (a judge or court staff should not accept Christmas gifts such as cakes, cookies, candy, fruit baskets, or gift certificates from attorneys who regularly appear in family court or from a court interpreter who provides services to the court).
Those opinions are based on a code of judicial conduct provision stating that a judge may only accept a gift if “the donor is not a party or other person who has come or is likely to come or whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge,” which was Canon 4D(5)(h) of the 1990 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
In contrast, several advisory committee have concluded that inexpensive gifts at holiday time fall within the ordinary social hospitality exception to the gift rule and may be accepted by a judge and court staff even from lawyers who appear before the judge. The Wisconsin committee, for example, advised that a gift of candy or fruit from a law firm would “come within the ambit of ‘ordinary social hospitality’ as long as it is of de minimis value.” Wisconsin Advisory Opinion 1998-10R.
A judge, like other members of society, must be permitted to be involved in ordinary social amenities. “Ordinary social hospitality” . . . would suggest a gift that would not cause reasonable people in the community to believe the donor was obtaining or intending to obtain any special advantage, nor that the donee would have cause to give the donor any unfair advantages.
It is impossible to set specific parameters regarding such gifts. A gift package of homemade cookies at Christmas surely would not be perceived as an impropriety. Larger gifts – season tickets to sporting events, free use of a vacation home, free vacation on a cruise ship – would be more than the perception of impropriety. If a gift is given where gifts are traditional, such as special occasions or holidays, or if the gift is given to all of the judges in the Courthouse, there would seem to be no impropriety.
See also Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 2001-4 (a judge may allow her staff to accept inexpensive gifts from attorneys on special occasions, for example, Christmas); Washington Advisory Opinion 1993-17 (a judicial officer may allow a court employee to accept gifts of nominal value, such as food trays or candy, from local attorneys and court vendors during the holiday season, but should ensure that practice does not create an appearance of partiality or impropriety).
In general, judges and court staff have been permitted to attend law firm holiday parties, although the approval is not unconditional and each invitation requires a fact-specific inquiry.
The cost of the event in the context of community standards for similar events. What may seem excessive in one part of the State or county may be within ordinary hospitality in other places depending on what is customary and reasonable in the community in question.
Whether the benefits conferred are greater in value than that traditionally furnished at similar events sponsored by bar associations or similar groups.
Whether the benefits are greater in value than that which the judge customarily provides his/her own guests. The events which a judge hosts tend to reveal the judge’s view of ordinary social hospitality.
Whether the benefits conferred are usually exchanged only between friends or relatives such as transportation, housing or free admission to events which require a paid admission.
Whether there is a history or expectation of reciprocal social hospitality. If a judge is invited to a social event by an attorney who the judge has invited in the past or is likely to invite in the future to similar events; this is suggestive of ordinary hospitality.
Whether the event is a traditional occasion for social hospitality such as a holiday party or the opening of an office.
Whether the benefits received are reportable to any governmental entity.
Similarly, the Connecticut committee advised that a judicial official may attend a large holiday party hosted by a law firm only if the firm is not actively engaged in litigation or proceedings before the judge and the party constitutes “ordinary social hospitality.” Connecticut Emergency Staff Opinion 2015-23. If the judge does attend, the committee stated, the judge must not permit the host firm to announce his attendance, may not engage in any action that may be perceived as advancing the private interests of the host law firm, and may not discuss any pending matters with the hosts or guests. After the party, the committee stated, the judge must, for a reasonable time, recuse himself or disclose and seek remittal should the firm appear in a case.
The Wisconsin committee also advised that a judge or the judge’s staff may only attend a holiday party given by a law firm if the firm is not involved in a current trial or one about to begin before the judge. Wisconsin Advisory Opinion 1998-10R. The committee also conditioned the judge’s attendance on no clients being in attendance at the party and the hospitality being limited to ordinary social hospitality.
See California Advisory Opinion 47 (1997) (a judge may attend events such as a law firm’s holiday party); New York Advisory Opinion 1987-12(a)(b) (a judge may attend an ordinary holiday-type party given by a law firm or legal agency); New York Advisory Opinion 2010-195 (a judge may attend a holiday celebration hosted by the prosecutor’s office where he worked just prior to assuming the bench); Texas Advisory Opinion 194 (1996) (a judge, the judge’s staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control may attend holiday or seasonal law firm parties if the party is open to people other than judges and court personnel); Washington Advisory Opinion 1991-27 (a judge may attend a law firm holiday open house at which snacks and/or beverages may be offered).
But see New Jersey Advisory Opinion 46-2000 (judges may not attend the county Hispanic Bar Association’s holiday reception if it is held at a law office); New Jersey Advisory Opinion 62-1992 (municipal court judges and court employees may not attend a holiday party hosted by a law firm); New Jersey Advisory Opinion 57-1995 (judges may not attend a holiday party hosted by the county prosecutor’s office).
See also Connecticut Informal Opinion 2013-47 (a judicial official may attend a holiday party at a restaurant hosted by a municipality’s governing body if the municipality does not have any matter pending before her and does not regularly appear before her, if she will pay the full cost to attend, and if the party is not a fund-raiser or a lavish event); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2004-6 (a judge may attend a holiday reception given by an organization whose executive director is the sister of a father in a custody dispute over which the judge presided that is currently on appeal); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2005-4 (a judge may attend a holiday party hosted by the governor that benefits Toys for Tots); New Jersey Advisory Opinion 73-1994 (municipal court judges may not attend a holiday open house at the home of a township trustee); New Jersey Advisory Opinion 47-2000 (a judge may not attend a holiday party given by and for township employees, even though attendees pay their own way); New York Advisory Opinion 2013-192 (a judge who has retained a firm to promote and lobby for a proposed law relating to the courts may briefly attend the firm’s holiday party); New York Advisory Opinion 2006-170 (a judge may attend a holiday party sponsored by law enforcement agencies if the judge avoids any actions that may be perceived to advance the private interests of the organization or of individuals attending or that may otherwise create an appearance of impropriety); New York Advisory Opinion 2007-211 (a judge may not attend a holiday party hosted by a member of Congress and paid by campaign funds even if the host is a friend); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 12/1/2009 (a judge may not attend a holiday reception that is a fund-raiser held by a judge’s-elect’s campaign committee); South Carolina Advisory Opinion 4-1999 (a judge may attend a Christmas party sponsored by an entity that occasionally appears before the judge).
Accepting the recommendation of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, which the judge did not contest, the Arkansas Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay for his confrontation with his estranged wife and her male companion at a Walmart; the Court also ordered the judge to undergo anger management counseling with the Arkansas Judges & Lawyers Assistance Program and to write an apology letter. Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v. Pope (Arkansas Supreme Court October 4, 2012).
The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for violating the Political Reform Act during and after his campaign for judicial office. In the Matter Concerning Brehmer, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance October 25, 2012).
Pursuant to the judge’s agreement, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission made public the fact but not the content of a private reprimand; the report states that the matter originated with news reports of the judge’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and speeding. In re Wommack, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission October 3, 2012).
Accepting the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission, to which the judge consented, the Michigan Supreme Court censured a judge for bringing “shame and obloquy” to the judiciary by his flippant manner in an interview with a reporter about a digital image of himself he had sent to others. In re McCree, 821 N.W.2d 674 (Michigan 2012).
Based on an agreed statement of fact and joint recommendation, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a judge for disguising the source of funds received by her campaign to circumvent contribution limits imposed by law. In the Matter of Anderson, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct October 1, 2012).
Accepting findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the sanction recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended a judge’s law license for 6 months for (1) using vulgar and intemperate language to litigants in his courtroom and (2) injecting himself into an administrative investigation by the police department and allowing his history of conflicts with the department to cloud his judgment; the Court stayed the sanction on the condition that the judge commit no misconduct during the suspension. Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 979 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 2012).
In an advisory opinion, the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct approved a court’s proposal to establish a self-help center where court-appointed lawyers would provide short-term legal assistance to persons of limited means who otherwise would be unrepresented. Ohio Advisory Opinion 2017-7. The lawyers would not represent the litigants before the court but would provide general legal assistance and information, explaining court procedures, addressing service of process issues, ensuring that litigants file the correct court forms, and making referrals to sources or persons for additional information or assistance.
However, “[b]ecause the self-help clinic inevitably will be viewed by the public as a court-provided service,” the opinion states, “it must operate and appear, to the extent possible, as an independent function of the court.” Thus, the Board advises that the court’s oversight and involvement “should be de minimis,” primarily funding and appointment of the lawyers, “not the day-to-day operation.” Further, the opinion suggests, the physical location of the self-help clinic should reinforce the independence of the court and appointing judges.
The California Commission on Judicial Performance removed a judge for (1) failing to dispose of matters promptly and executing false salary affidavits; (2) becoming embroiled in 3 criminal cases; and (3) failing to respond to a letter from the Commission. Inquiry Concerning Spitzer, Decision and Order (California Commission on Judicial Performance October 2, 2007).
The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded a judge for failing to decide a case within the 90 days permitted by law. Public Reprimand of Roue (Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards October 4, 2007).
Based on an agreed statement of facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay and publicly reprimanded him for ex parte communications with and giving legal advice to a litigant. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Fowlkes, 967 So.2d 12 (Mississippi 2007).
Granting a stipulated petition for discipline, the New Mexico Supreme Court suspended a judge for 2 weeks without pay for (1) living in a housing authority home for 20 months without paying rent and (2) dismissing 3 traffic citations issued to the director of the housing authority. In the Matter of Gomez (New Mexico Supreme Court October 25, 2007).
Granting a petition filed by the Commission on Judicial Standards based on stipulated findings of fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for endorsing a mayor for re-election and authorizing the use of his name in an endorsement that was published in the newspaper. Inquiry Concerning Vincent, 172 P.3d 605 (New Mexico 2007).
Adopting the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended a former judge from the practice of law for 2 years for her conduct in 2 civil protection order cases, 2 divorce cases, and 1 case involving a complaint that a child was abused and neglected; the Court stayed 12 months of the suspension on condition that the former judge commit no further violations. Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 876 N.E.2d 933 (Ohio 2007).
Adopting the findings and recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended a judge’s license to practice law for 18 months, with 6 months stayed with conditions, for (1) jailing a gallery spectator for contempt without cause; (2) presiding over a defendant’s plea and sentencing even though he had accompanied the police officer after signing a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment; (3) attempting to coerce plea agreements in 2 criminal cases; (4) insisting that a domestic violence victim’s facial injuries be photographed; (5) calling 911 to have a police officer sent to his chambers to transport a prisoner to court; (6) telephoning a defendant’s alleged drug dealer in open court; and (7) repeatedly mistreating defendants and other participants in court proceedings. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio 2007).
Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a judge for (1) stating, “I would if you pulled it out but you can’t find it,” in response to a vulgar statement by a defendant and (2) referring to the ethnicity of 2 defendants while presiding over mental health court. In the Matter of Chow, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct October 24, 2007).
A lack of candor can be misconduct and/or an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sanction in judicial discipline proceedings, sometimes leading to removal when the underlying misconduct otherwise might not. But courts and judicial conduct commissions have identified different degrees of dishonesty with different consequences. In 2 recent cases, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court and Judicial Tenure Commission discussed actionable falsehoods, statements “unworthy of belief,” selective or incorrect memories, imprecise expressions, intentional misrepresentations, inaccurate or careless answers, lying under oath, guesses, and speculation.
The Court publicly censured 1 judge for directing insulting, demeaning, and humiliating comments and gestures to 3 children during a contempt proceeding in a protracted and highly contentious divorce and custody case. In re Gorcyca (Michigan Supreme Court July 28, 2017). The Commission had also found that the judge committed misconduct by holding the oldest child in contempt for refusing to participate in parenting time with his father and ordering the 3 children confined to a children’s residential center until their father determined they had purged themselves of contempt. The Court agreed that the judge committed legal error but concluded that error did not constitute judicial misconduct because she had acted with due diligence (appointing attorneys for the children and holding a hearing) and her error could not be fairly characterized as willful failure to observe the law (no one in the courtroom offered alternatives for handling the difficult circumstances or suggested that she was crossing a line).
In addition to other inappropriate comments, the judge had said to the father with respect to the oldest child, 13-year-old LT, “Dad, if you ever think that he has changed and therapy has helped him and he’s no longer like Charlie Manson’s cult, then you let us know and we can do it.” While making that statement, she made a circular gesture with her finger near her temple.
In response to the Commission inquiry, the judge denied that she had circled her temple with her finger “to indicate or even imply that [LT] was crazy,” explaining that she believed the motion simulated “a wheel moving forward” to indicate that the father should let her know if LT made any forward movement as a result of therapy.
The fact that a statement may be incorrect does not, by itself, render the statement “false” within the context of a legal proceeding. It may be discredited, or deemed unworthy of belief, but given the limits of human memory and perception, as well as the limitations of language, it would be unfair to impute motives of deception or falsehood to everyone who says something that someone else finds incredible, or that proves to be incorrect. Selective memory does not equal falsehood; incorrect memory does not equal falsehood; imprecision in expression does not equal falsehood; even an answer that one chooses to disbelieve does not equal a falsehood.
Disagreeing on review, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that a misleading statement required an actual intent to deceive or at least some showing of wrongful intent. It concluded that the judge had “merely speculated as to her intent” and that a guess was not akin to a misrepresentation or misleading statement.
In the second case, the Court suspended a judge for 9 months without pay for interfering with a police investigation at the scene of an accident involving his intern, interfering with the prosecution of the intern, and making an intentional misrepresentation to the Commission; the Court also ordered that the judge pay over $7,500 in costs. In re Simpson (Michigan Supreme Court July 25, 2017).
In July 2013, Crystal Vargas accepted an internship with the judge. Within days, the judge and Vargas began communicating with each other frequently by telephone call and text message, exchanging several thousand communications in 4 months, at all times of the day and night and on weekends.
On September 8, the judge and Vargas exchanged 6 text messages between 1:25 a.m. and 2:29 a.m. and 6 text messages between 4:20 a.m. and 4:23 a.m. At about the time of the latter messages, Vargas was involved in a motor vehicle accident less than 2 miles from the judge’s home. Vargas called the judge at 4:24 a.m., shortly after the accident.
While Vargas was still on the phone with the judge, Officer Robert Cole arrived at the scene. As Cole was administering field sobriety tests to Vargas, the judge arrived.
[R]espondent exited his vehicle and approached Ms. Vargas and Officer Cole as sobriety tests were being performed. Indeed, respondent interrupted the sobriety-testing process. Respondent, who had prosecuted numerous drunk-driving cases on behalf of Superior Township before he became a judge, was certainly aware that Officer Cole was investigating whether Ms. Vargas was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Given these circumstances, when respondent began his interaction with Officer Cole by introducing himself as “Judge Simpson,” he appears at best to have failed to prudently guard against influencing the investigation and at worst to have used his judicial office in a not-so-subtle effort to interfere with the investigation. Indeed, but for respondent’s status as a judge, Officer Cole would not have spoken to respondent until Officer Cole completed his investigation. Next, respondent spoke to Ms. Vargas during the investigation without Officer Cole’s permission — another action an ordinary citizen would not have been permitted to take. Finally, respondent’s question — “Well, does she just need a ride or something?”— was a transparent suggestion to Officer Cole to end his investigation and allow respondent to drive Ms. Vargas away from the scene.
Subsequently, the judge twice contacted the township prosecutor, describing Vargas as a “good kid” who was in a “pretty bad relationship,” noting that the prosecutor had met Vargas in the past and would be working with her in the future, raising an evidentiary issue, and discussing potential defense attorneys. The Court concluded that the judge “improperly acted as a legal advocate for Ms. Vargas and used his position as a judge to thwart the township’s criminal prosecution of his intern,” succeeding for a time in delaying the charges, and that his “actions—individually and taken together” constituted judicial misconduct.
The sheer number of communications—which were frequently exchanged during the night and on weekends—is inconsistent with respondent’s explanation that the communications related to court business, including an in camera review of evidence in the Nassif case. Moreover, respondent testified that he learned that the Nassif case was assigned to him on August 11 or 12, and that his court did not receive the evidence for the in camera review until September 12. Yet respondent and Ms. Vargas had already exchanged a surfeit of communications by then. In addition, this explanation was inconsistent with another explanation advanced by respondent—that the communications were attributable to the “problems” that Ms. Vargas was having with her former boyfriend, who allegedly had been violent toward her.
However, the Court disagreed with the Commission’s additional finding that the judge made a separate intentional misrepresentation or misleading statement while testifying under oath at the hearing. In response to the question whether he had any contact with Vargas between midnight and 3:30 that morning, the judge had answered “no” but then added, “I don’t believe there were any text messages. I don’t believe that there was any contact.” In fact, telephone records indicated that the judge and Vargas exchanged 6 text messages between 1:25 a.m. and 2:29 a.m.
[C]onsidering this context, it appears that respondent simply may not have recalled the precise timing of a few of the many communications he had with Ms. Vargas—communications that were not central to the allegations of misconduct in this case. We find that respondent’s testimony on this point was careless and that he provided inaccurate information. However, we do not believe that the JTC has sustained its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent made an intentional misrepresentation or misleading statement regarding his contacts with Ms. Vargas before 4:00 a.m. on September 8, 2013.
The Delaware Supreme Court suspended for 3 months without pay and publicly censured a part-time judge for (1) failing to pay federal, state, and city payroll taxes for his law firm’s payroll and to timely file withholding reports; (2) failing to pay property taxes and to pay delinquent property taxes in accordance with a schedule he and the county had agreed upon; (3) having 29 unpaid parking tickets; and (4) failing to properly maintain his law office records and to correctly answer questions on the certificate of compliance with client account reconciliation requirements. In the Matter of Williams, 701 A.2d 825 (Delaware 1997).
Accepting the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, the Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for, as a candidate, (1) claiming to have circuit judicial experience, when her service was that of a general master; (2) claiming that her opponent had no circuit judicial experience, when she had extensive experience as a county judge who had been assigned to the circuit court; (3) injecting party politics into a non-partisan election by noting the party affiliation of the governor who had appointed her opponent as county judge; (4) including a photograph of her opponent sitting next to a criminal defendant, noting that her opponent “defend[ed] convicted mass murderer, cop killer, William Cruse,” when at the time of the photograph Cruse had not been convicted and her opponent was an assistant public defender; and (5) including a portion of a newspaper editorial implying that she, not her opponent, had been endorsed by the newspaper. Inquiry Concerning Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369 (Florida 1997).
The Mississippi Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay, fined her $1,500, and publicly reprimanded her for (1) issuing an arrest warrant on petit larceny and simple assault charges filed by a friend and distant relative; (2) having license tags from her husband’s car on her car; (3) writing a check she did not have sufficient funds in her checking account to cover; and (4) failing to file with the circuit clerk reports of contributions or expenditures required by statute. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Franklin, 704 So. 2d 89 (Mississippi 1997).
Affirming the determination of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Nevada Supreme Court removed a judge from office for (1) borrowing money from court employees and not always promptly repaying the loans, forcing the employees to make oral and/or written demands for payment; (2) publicly endorsing and campaigning for a judicial candidate and testifying falsely to the Commission that he had only gone to houses where he knew the residents while going door-to-door campaigning for the candidate; (3) storing antiques throughout the courthouse, selling those antiques to persons with whom he came in contact at the courthouse, and directing city employees and jail trustees to move antiques into and out of the courthouse; (4) directing court employees during normal business hours to go to the nursery business owned by his mother to provide Spanish translating services and to perform other personal errands for him, including antique shopping; (5) directing or suggesting to persons appearing before the court who had been found guilty to contribute money to certain charities in lieu of paying fines to the city, diverting approximately $405,916 from the city treasury to his selected charities; and (6) using property he owned in part that was zoned for residential purposes for commercial purposes after been advised by the community planning department of the proper zoning for the property and causing his agents to trespass on adjoining property to hook up water and sewer lines. In the Matter of Davis, 946 P.2d 1033 (Nevada 1997).
Pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a judge for a series of legal and procedural errors in a harassment case and making improper statements that compromised his impartiality and the proper administration of justice. In the Matter of Smith, Determination (New York Commission on Judicial Conduct October 29, 1997).
Accepting the findings and conclusions of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and adopting its recommendation, the Ohio Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for appearing in a television commercial for a law firm. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 684 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio 1997).
Adopting the recommendation of the Judicial Investigation Commission, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals publicly admonished a judge for discussing the reduction of DUI charges against a distance relative with the police officer, communicating ex parte with the relative and other family members about the case at least 3 times, creating the appearance that he had struck a deal to reduce the charge, and accepting gifts of china and an ashtray in appreciation for his assistance. In the Matter of Reese, 495 S.E.2d 548 (West Virginia 1997).


William Arthur Newman, Morgan & Weisbrod, Dallas, TX, for Johnson.
William George Cole, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, Winstanly Fiddian Luke, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, TX, Edward C. Reddington, U.S. Army, Arlington, VA, Richard C. Geisler, Jr., Germer, Bernson, Gertz, Beaman & Brown, Austin, TX, for U.S.
Nita Johnson, individually and as next friend of Talaya Haynes, her minor daughter, filed this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") action, and the district court granted summary judgment for the United States based on Johnson's failure to file her administrative claim within two years after accrual pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court, noting that the summary judgment motion was late according to the pretrial order, nonetheless considered it because the government cited caselaw suggesting that the issue is jurisdictional and thus could be considered at any time. The court further noted that Johnson did not contest whether the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Johnson appeals, arguing that the court did not have authority to address the late summary judgment motion and incorrectly held that limitations had run. We affirm.
Johnson was seventeen years old and pregnant; she received pre-natal care at Blanchfield Army Community Hospital. During a pre-natal checkup on April 20, 1994, a nonstress test was ordered to monitor the fetal heart rate. The results showed variable decelerations, so Johnson was admitted to the labor and delivery ward.
The following day, by means of a "crash cesarean section" procedure, Johnson gave birth to Talaya. Medical records show that she was floppy, apneic (suffering from an absence of breathing), and dusky at birth and "was without a heart rate or respiratory effort." There were two unsuccessful efforts to resuscitate her by providing oxygen, before a third effort succeeded. Talaya was placed on a ventilator.
In her deposition, Johnson remembered that, at Talaya's four-month checkup, a nurse had been concerned about her daughter and had told her that Talaya was not doing what she was supposed to be doing at four months. Johnson later gave a medical history to Nancy Trent, a pediatric nurse practitioner at a children's clinic on November 17, 1994, when Talaya was about seven months old. From her observations of Talaya and her history taken from Johnson, Trent reported that Talaya was very rigid, especially in the upper body, had exaggerated, developed triceps and biceps to hold her torso up, did not breathe at birth for five minutes, and had neo-natal seizures.
On November 21, 1994, Trent referred Talaya to a pediatrician, Quentin Humberd, who stated that he had seen Talaya because of concerns of developmental motor delay; after an examination, he concluded that Talaya had neurological findings that were beyond the range of normal for her age. Humberd wanted to rule out cerebral palsy and referred Talaya to the Tennessee Early Intervention System ("TEIS"). Humberd recalled that at the November 21 visit he obtained most of the history from Johnson and that he learned that Talaya had had a difficult birth, including asphyxia. He indicated that he was trying to relate what the mother was describing about the problems at birth to the developmental problems he was noticing.
On December 2, TEIS received the referral of Talaya from the clinic; the reason given for referral was possible cerebral palsy. The intake form indicated (in the section containing information provided by Johnson) that Talaya had not been breathing when born and had spent two weeks in the hospital on oxygen and that Johnson had had a C-Section because Talaya's heart rate had dropped.
A developmental assessment of Talaya was conducted in January 1995, after which she was seen by the assessor for an hour each week from March 1995 until June 27, 1996, when Johnson moved to Texas. Some time during this period, the assessor was told by Johnson that "it might have happened at birth" and that she had contemplated suing the Army. In cross-examination, the assessor clarified that Johnson had not said that she had been told that the doctors or nurses had been negligent or that anyone had done anything wrong, but only that Johnson "thought that it might have happened at birth."
On February 3, 1995, at a nine-month examination, Humberd assessed Talaya's condition as consistent with a static encephalopathy (brain dysfunction) "and most likely Cerebral Palsy." Humberd recalled that Johnson had come back in for a conference at which he had explained to her that her daughter's problems were not from viral infection or another degenerative condition but instead were the result of something that had happened at some specific time, an event such as low oxygen or trauma. He then gave her a handout on cerebral palsy and a reading list about support "so that [she] could talk to other families . . . that had cerebral palsy, et cetera."
Humberd explained in his deposition that he suspected an association between Talaya's brain injury and her birth by emergency C-section. He explained that he did not definitively know what had caused Talaya's cerebral palsy, so he did not tell Johnson, during their February 3 discussion, specifically what had caused the brain damage. Nonetheless, he did "entertain a `differential diagnosis' that there was a connection between Talaya's birth trauma and [her] cerebral palsy" and "presented it to Mrs.  Johnson as `one of the potential causes of why a child can have this kind of problem . . . .'"
On March 13, 1995, Johnson was interviewed by a physical therapist, Gay Lynn Westover. In her notes of that meeting, Westover stated that she was told by Johnson that Talaya had had breathing problems at birth, a decreased heart rate, had been in an incubator, and had experienced developmental delays as early as three months after birth. Eventually, Talaya was given a definitive diagnosis of cerebral palsy, most likely in April 1995, when she was twelve months old.
In the summer of 1996, Johnson and Talaya moved to Texas, where Talaya continued to receive medical care through the Army. On June 6, 1997, Johnson gave birth to another daughter, Tatyana, who has shown no subsequent signs of developmental problems, at Beaumont Army Medical Center in El Paso. Johnson recalled that, after the baby's heart rate dropped, the doctors delivered Tatyana by C-section.
Johnson recalled no one telling her that Tatyana had stopped breathing at birth. In her deposition, Johnson testified that in 2000, over two years after her second daughter's birth, she "saw a commercial on TV about cerebral palsy," a "lawyer's commercial . . . saying if your child has cerebral palsy this might be the reason." She testified that she contacted her lawyers " [r]ight after" seeing the commercial. On May 10, 2001, she filed an administrative claim, and she sued on December 27, 2002.
Johnson argues that the district court did not have authority to address the late-filed summary judgment motion, because the FTCA's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. We agree with the district court's decision, however, because even if that statute of limitations were not jurisdictional (an issue that, as the district court noted, appears to be undecided by this court), the district court had authority to grant summary judgment notwithstanding the fact that the motion was filed later than provided in the pretrial order.
A closer issue is whether a pretrial order can abridge rights granted to defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).4 It is uncertain whether the "case management dictates" of rule 16(b) must necessarily prevail over the "at any time" dictates of rule 56(b), and not vice versa. There is no indication that one interest is greater than the other, in either rule 16(b) or the advisory notes. Rule 16(b) could certainly also be interpreted to read in harmony with rule 56(b): Although the district court may impose time limits for filing motions, it cannot restrict the limits that are already expressly provided by the rules.
Also unresolved is whether the "case management" concerns are valid in situations such as this one, in which the motion for summary judgment is filed one month in advance of trial. Surely, a defendant who waits that late to file for summary judgment runs the risk that its motion will be denied because the district court may not have enough time to look at it carefully.
This does not mean, however, that "at any time" in rule 56(b) means anything less than what it says. If the motion is denied, the court system is in the same position as if the defendant were not permitted to file at all at that time: The case would go to trial. In the rare case in which a motion for summary judgment will be granted even if it is filed only one month before trial, the plaintiff suffers no prejudice.
Further, it is the scheduling order, not rule 16(b) per se, that conflicts with rule 56(b). Because not even local court rules can diminish rights afforded to parties by the rules,5 it is questionable whether scheduling orders can do so. We need not decide that question here, because Johnson waived the timeliness argument and did not respond to the government's rule 56(b) argument on appeal.
We also note that Johnson did not argue, in the district court, the FTCA's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional; in that court she merely argued that the court had jurisdiction because limitations had not expired. As we have observed, she may not raise, on appeal, theories that she did not raise before the district court. The rule that jurisdictional issues may not be waived but can be raised at any time is not invoked in this case. That rule is grounded on the principle that because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,6 the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction "by indolence, oversight, acquiescence, or consent." United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 768 (1st Cir. 1994). Johnson's challenge is not that subject matter jurisdiction improvidently or erroneously existed, but that the district court should not have considered the late-filed motion. That is an argument she waived by not asserting it in the district court.
Section 2401(b) bars a tort action against the federal government unless the claim is first presented to the appropriate federal agency "within two years after such claim accrues." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979) (citing § 2401(b)). The statute does not define, however, when a claim "accrues." Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1996). The general rule under the FTCA is that a tort action accrues at the time of a plaintiff's injury. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120, 100 S. Ct. 352. For FTCA medical malpractice cases, however, Kubrick adopted a "discovery rule" for claim accrual, under which the time starts to run when the plaintiff has the information necessary to discover "both his injury and its cause." Id. This is because, where "the injury or its cause may not be manifested to the plaintiff until many years after the event," the tort action should not accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, "until the plaintiff is put on notice of the wrong." Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1980).
As the district court noted, there is no dispute that Johnson knew about the injury more than two years before she filed her claim, most likely in April 1995, when Talaya was about a year old (which was about six years before Johnson filed her claim). The dispute is whether she knew, or "in the exercise of reasonable diligence should [have] discover [ed]," the cause of Talaya's injury. MacMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir. 1983)). "The putative plaintiff  need not know the legal or medical significance of an act or an injury for the cause of action to accrue." Id. "Instead, the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff has `knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person (a) to conclude that there was a causal connection between the treatment and injury or (b) to seek professional advice, and then with that advice, to conclude that there was a causal connection between the treatment and injury.'" Id. (quoting Harrison, 708 F.2d at 1027) (emphasis added).
We agree with the district court that MacMillan controls and that a reasonable person in Johnson's position would have been aware of enough facts to trigger the statute of limitations more than two years before she filed her claim. In MacMillan, a case also involving birth problems resulting in neurological injury, we held that a plaintiff with knowledge of the injury and of a "probable" cause of that injury had a duty "to inquire in the medical and legal community" and "to seek professional advice regarding [the baby's] neurological difficulties and the connection, if any, to the problems associated with her birth." 46 F.3d at 381.
Precisely because the "connection" between the birth problems and the neurological problems was not fully known (only "probable"), MacMillan imposed a duty to seek advice once this probable cause was revealed to the plaintiff by the doctor, namely "to seek professional advice regarding [the baby's] neurological difficulties and the connection, if any, to the problems associated with her birth." There would be no need to "seek professional advice" about the "connection" between the birth problems and the injury if the "cause" of the injury was known.
Similarly here, a potential (and most likely cause according to the differential diagnosis) was revealed to Johnson by Humberd, who ruled out genetic issues, stroke, fetal infections such as meningitis, congenital defects, and severe prematurity, which left the most likely cause "going back again to the history . . . an association at [the] time that child was born that she had to have [an] emergency C-section." Humberd presented the birth problems to Haynes-Johnson as "one of the potential causes of why a child can have this kind of problem at seven months of age, and sometimes that diagnosis can be delayed." Therefore, in April 1995, armed with the diagnostic of cerebral palsy, and knowing about the possible connection between birth injury and cerebral palsy, Johnson should have "sought advice" about the connection between the two.
Johnson's contention that she did not know of the potential connection between birth injury and cerebral palsy because, when Humberd told her about the connection, Talaya had not been fully diagnosed with cerebral palsy, is questionable. In February 1995, Humberd told Johnson that Talaya might have cerebral palsy and that if she did, the most likely cause was an injury at birth. The diagnosis of cerebral palsy was finalized in April 1995. Therefore, it is meritless to say that the three month lapse erased the mother's notice of the doctor's statement that if Talaya did have cerebral palsy, it was potentially caused by injury at birth.
Johnson also argues that Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1990), supports her argument, not the district court's, because in that case the claim did not accrue even if the plaintiff had learned of a "connection" between the injury and the treatment. To the contrary, however, there was no such "connection" drawn in that case.
There, a doctor ordered that pertussis be stopped, yet at no point was the pertussis connected to the injury. In fact, the court held that it was not "Dr. Oksol's statement [stopping pertussis] may have demonstrated understandable caution and conservative medical judgment, but it utterly failed to address the issue of causation." Id. at 733. Additionally, in that case plaintiffs had reason not to suspect that pertussis was the cause, because Dr. Schuman had assured her just before the fourth shot was given that it was "perfectly safe." Id. at 726. In contrast, here Johnson does not contend that anyone had assured her that Talaya's birth was perfectly uneventful and that cerebral palsy is never caused at birth.
Johnson further contends that the claim did not accrue until she saw the television commercial in 2000, because until then she could not connect Talaya's cerebral palsy to negligent treatment at birth. As the district court noted, this type of argument was squarely rejected by Kubrick, which explained that as long as the nature and (potential) cause of the injury are known, a plaintiff need not know that the injury was negligently created.
Johnson knew that Talaya had cerebral palsy and that a potential and likely cause was something that happened at birth. Thus, as Kubrick explained, she did not need to know that the treatment at birth was negligent, as long as she knew that some injury could have occurred at birth. Nor, as the district court correctly observed, did she need to know exactly how the injury was inflicted at birth (e.g., asphyxia or improper administration of Pitocin).
Because MacMillan controls, we need not decide the correctness of the district court's alternative holding, which is that Johnson does not benefit from the discovery rule, because she failed diligently to inquire about the cause of Talaya's injury.8 Last, we reject the remainder of Johnson's arguments with respect to when the limitations period begins to run,9 for the same reasons discussed by the district court.
See Guillory v. Domtar Indus., 95 F.3d 1320, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The timing of the summary judgment does not warrant reversal in this case. Rule 56(b) allows a defendant to move for summary judgment at any time. Accordingly, the court may grant summary judgment any time before trial.").
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) "the motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing." This rule does not by implication require the district court to hold an oral hearing. As we have previously interpreted it, the rule requires only that, if there is an oral hearing, there be ten-days advance notice; if there is not a hearing, the adverse party must have at least ten days to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) does not require that a party be given advance notice of a "date certain" on which a motion for summary judgment is to be decided by the trial court.
Although no hearing was held, Johnson had the opportunity to respond to the motion and in fact did so. Therefore, the requirements of rule 56(c) were met. See id. at 276-77 ("When, as here, the parties have been given ample opportunity to respond to the motion for summary judgment, the district judge may rule on it even after a significant delay, without giving the parties advance notice of the court's intention to consider and decide the motion on a `date certain.'"); see also Hamman v. Southwestern Gas Pipeline, Inc., 721 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that where appellants had filed a responsive brief, the requirements of Rule 56(c) were satisfied even if the district court did not advise them of when it would decide the summary judgment motion).
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (en banc) (citing Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1992), and explaining that this court's inquiry "is limited to the summary judgment record and the plaintiffs may not advance on appeal new theories or raise new issues not properly before the district court to obtain reversal of the summary judgment").
Compare Manetas v. Int'l Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 541 F.2d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that "the 45-day Pre-Trial Order limitation for filing motions for summary judgment was not a bar to a later filing because Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) expressly authorizes a `defending party' to move `at any time' for a summary judgment"), with Julian v. Equifax Check Servs., 178 F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Conn. 1998) ("The Supreme Court did not intend Federal Rule 16(b) (2) to be ignored when a party filing a summary judgment motion invokes the `at any time' language of Federal Rule 56. The `at any time' provision of Federal Rule 56 for filing summary judgment motions must be interpreted to be subject to the case management dictates of Federal Rule 16(b)."). See also Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding denial of motion for summary judgment filed outside of scheduling order and suggesting that rule 16(b) prevails over rule 56(b)); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 301 & n. 6 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) states that a defendant may move for summary judgment `at any time,' we do not believe that this precludes the district court from controlling the proceedings before it, at least not to the extent of requiring it to consider disruptive motions on the eve of trial.").
Brown v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1008 (11th Cir. 1992) (invalidating local rule that restricted the right to file a summary judgment motion because " [d]istrict courts . . . must not circumvent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by implementing local rules or `procedures' which do not afford parties rights that they are accorded under the Federal Rules."); see also Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1991) (" [L]ocal court rules . . . cannot conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Acts of Congress, and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court."); Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal Inc., 456 F.2d 677, 678 (1st Cir. 1972) (" [A] local rule cannot be applied if it is contrary to a federal statute or rule.").
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction having subject matter jurisdiction only over those matters specifically designated by the Constitution or Congress Epps v. Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Improvement Dist., 665 F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 1982); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1981).
See MacMillan, 46 F.3d at 381 ("Dr. Pollard's report stated that, `it appears likely that Tanya suffered anoxia at birth and probably sustained some neurological damage as a result.'") (emphasis added).
See., e.g., Osborn, 918 F.2d at 732 (explaining that "an injured plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of the discovery rule simply by waiting passively for the cause of injury to be revealed").