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· Fang-Ting Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, “Glitch Energy Reduction and SFDR Enhancement Techniques for Low-Power Binary-Weighted Current-Steering DAC,” accepted by IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems.
· Chung-Chih Hung and Hsing-Chien Chu, “A Current-Mode Dual-Slope CMOS Temperature Sensor,” IEEE Sensors Journal, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 1898-1907, April 1, 2016.
· Z.-Y. Chen and C.-C. Hung, “A 5.8 mW Continuous-Time Delta-Sigma Modulator with 20 MHz Bandwidth Using Time-Domain Flash Quantizer,” IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems (JETCAS), Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 574-583, December 2015.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A Low-Power CMOS Voltage-Controlled Oscillator with Voltage-Controlled Inductor for V-Band WPAN Communication Systems,” IET Microwaves, Antennas & Propagation, Vol. 9, No. 15, pp. 1653-1658, December 2015.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A 65-77 GHz Low Power, Meander-Type Transmission Line CMOS Low-Noise Amplifier,” IEICE Electronics Express, Vol. 12, No. 13, pp. 444-448, July 2015.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Dual-band voltage controlled oscillator with optimized Gm,” IEICE Electronics Express, Vol. 12, No. 7, pp. 20150207, April 2015.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Low-Noise Amplifier with Narrow-Band and Wide-Band Input Impedance Matching Design,” Journal of the Chinese Institute of Engineers, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 603-609, Feb. 2015.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Ultra-wideband wireless receiver front-end for high speed indoor applications,” IET Journal of Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 12, Dec. 2014.
· Fang-Ting Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, “A compact 12-bit DAC with novel bias scheme,” IEICE Electronics Express, Vol. 11, No. 17, pp. 20140572, Sep. 2014.
· Fang-Ting Chou, Chia-Min Chen, and C.-C. Hung, “A Low-Glitch Binary-Weighted DAC with Delay Compensation Scheme,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 277-289, May 2014.
· Chia-Min Chen, Tung-Wei Tsai, and C.-C. Hung, “Fast Transient Low-Dropout Voltage Regulator with Hybrid Dynamic Biasing Technique for SoC Application,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems, Vol. 21, No. 9, pp. 1742-1747, September 2013.
· Jun-Ren Su, Te-Wen Liao, and C.-C. Hung, “An All-Digital Fast-Locking Pulsewidth-Control Circuit with Programmable Duty Cycle,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 1154-1164, June 2013.
· Chia-Min Chen and C.-C. Hung, “Enhanced Active Feedback Technique with Dynamic Compensation for Low-Dropout Voltage Regulator,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 97-108, April 2013.
· Te-Wen Liao, Jun-Ren Su, and C.-C. Hung, “Spur-Reduction Frequency Synthesizer Exploiting Randomly Selected PFD,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 589-592, March 2013.
· Chia-Min Chen, Kai-Hsiu Hsu, and C.-C. Hung, “Freewheel Charge-Pump Controlled Single-Inductor Multiple-Output Step-Up DC-DC Converter,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 215-225, Jan. 2013.
· Te-Wen Liao, Chia-Min Chen, Jun-Ren Su, and C.-C. Hung, “Random Pulsewidth Matching Frequency Synthesizer With Sub-Sampling Charge Pump,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I, Vol. 59, No. 12, pp. 2815-2824, Dec. 2012.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-L. Kuo, and C.-C. Hung, “Negative Current Feedback OTA with Application to 250MHz Gm-C Filter,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 123-129, Sep. 2012.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A 250MHz Low Voltage Low-Pass Gm-C Filter,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 465-472, May 2012.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “An Active Device Based Wide Tuning Range CMOS Transconductor,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 119-122, March 2012.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A 1 GHz Equiripple Low-Pass Filter with a High-Speed Automatic Tuning Scheme,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 175-181, Feb. 2011.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and C.-H. Lo, “Linear Low Voltage Nano-Scale CMOS Transconductor,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 1-7, Jan. 2011.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and C.-H. Lo, “A -68.5dB IM3 Low-voltage CMOS Transconductor with Wide Tuning Range,” IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E93-A, No. 8, August 2010.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and M. Ismail, “CMOS Voltage Reference Based on Threshold Voltage and Thermal Voltage,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 62, No.1, pp. 9-15, Jan. 2010.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and M. Ismail, “A Wide Tuning Range Gm-C Filter for Multi-Mode CMOS Direct-Conversion Wireless Receivers,” IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol. 44, No. 9, pp. 2515-2524, Sept. 2009.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-S. Kao, and C.-C. Hung, “A Gm-C Continuous-Time Analog Filter for IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n Wireless LANs,” Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 197-204, March 2009.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, `` Multimode Gm-C Channel Selection Filter for Mobile Applications in 1-V Supply Voltage,'' IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 314-318, April 2008.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A 40MHz Double Differential-Pair CMOS OTA with -60dB IM3,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 258-265, Feb. 2008.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, ``A 1-V 50MHz Pseudo-Differential OTA with Compensation of the Mobility Reduction,'' IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 1047-1051, Dec. 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, ``A Wide Tuning Range Gm-C Continuous Time Analog Filter,'' IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 713-722, April 2007.
· C.-Y. Yang and C.-C. Hung, “A Reliable Low-Voltage Low-Distortion MOS Analog Switch”, The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEICE) Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E89-A, No. 2, pp. 456-458, February 2006.
· C.-C. Hung, M. Ismail. K. Halonen, and V. Porra, ``A Low-Voltage Rail-To-Rail CMOS V-I Converter,'' IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Analog and Digital Signal Processing, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp.816-820, June 1999.
· S. R. Zarabadi, M. Ismail, and C.-C. Hung, ``High Performance Analog VLSI Computational Circuits,'' IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp.644-649, April 1998.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, V. Porra, and M. Ismail, ``Low Voltage, Low Power CMOS 5th-Order Elliptic (GM-C) Filter For Baseband Mobile/Wireless Communication,'' IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, Vol. 7, No. 4, Special Issue on Multimedia Technology, Systems, and Applications, pp. 584-593, August 1997.
· C.-C. Hung, C. Hwang, M. Ismail, K. Halonen, and V. Porra, ``CMOS Low-Voltage Rail-To-Rail V-I Converters,'' Journal of Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 261-274, July 1997.
· T. Saether, C.-C. Hung, Z. Qi, and M. Ismail, ``High speed, High linearity CMOS Buffer Amplifier,'' IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 255-258, Feb. 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, G. J. Valco, S. M. Aithal, and V. V. Subramaniam, ``Electrical Characteristics of Diamond Films Synthesized from Methane/Hydrogen and Acetone/Hydrogen Mixtures,'' Journal of Applied Physics, Vol. 78, No. 12, pp. 7109-7119, Dec. 15, 1995.
· Fang-Ting Chou, Zong-Yi Chen, Hsing-Chien Chu, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A Novel 12-Bit Current-Steering DAC with Two Reference Currents,” 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Lisbon, Portugal, May 24~27, 2015.
· Mulee Huang and Chung-Chih Hung, “Full-Custom All Digital Phase Locked Loop for Clock Generator,” 2015 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2015.
· Chia-Min Chen, Yen-Wei Liu, and Chung-Chih Hung, "Fast Transient and High Current Efficiency Voltage Regulator with Hybrid Dynamic Biasing Technique," 2015 Workshop on Synthesis And System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Yilan, Taiwan, March 16~17, 2015 (Outstanding Paper Award).
· Zong-Yi Chen and Chung-Chih Hung, “Jitter Compensation Technique for Continuous-Time Sigma-Delta Modulator,” 2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), Ishigaki Island, Okinawa, Japan, Nov. 17-20, 2014.
· Fang-Ting Chou, Chia-Min Chen, Zong-Yi Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A Novel Glitch Reduction Circuitry for Binary- Weighted DAC,” 2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), Ishigaki Island, Okinawa, Japan, Nov. 17-20, 2014.
· Fang-Ting Chou, Zong-Yi Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A 10-Bit 250MS/s Low-Glitch Binary-Weighted Digital-to- Analog Converter,” 2014 IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, Sep. 2-5, 2014.
· Zong-Yi Chen and Chung-Chih Hung, “DLL-Based Pulse-Width Modulation Digital-to-Analog Converter for Continuous- Time Sigma Delta Modulators,” 2014 IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), College Station, Texas, USA, August 3-6, 2014.
· Shang-Hsien Yang, Yuan-Han Yang, Ke-Horng Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, Chin-Long Wey, Ying-Hsi Lin, Tsung-Yen Tsai, Chen-Chih Huang, Chao-Cheng Lee, Zhih Han Tai, Yi Hsuan Cheng, Chi Chung Tsai, Hsin-Yu Luo, Shih-Ming Wang, Long-Der Chen, Cheng-Chen Yang, and Huang Tian Hui, “A Dual-Level Dual-Phase Pulse-Width Modulation Class-D Amplifier with 0.001% THD, 112 dB SNR,” 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Melbourne, Australia, June 1~5, 2014.
· Chia-Min Chen, Chun-Yen Chiang, Chen-Cheng Du, Fang-Ting Chou, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Dual-Output Switched- Capacitor DC-DC Converter With Peseudo-Three-Phase Swap-and-Cross Control and Amplitude Modulation Mechanism,” 2013 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Singapore, Nov. 11~13, 2013.
· Fang-Ting Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, "A 10-bit low-glitch binary-weighted Current-Steering DAC," 2013 Workshop on Synthesis And System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Sapporo, Japan, Oct. 21~22, 2013.
· Zong-Yi Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, “Clock Jitter Compensation for Continuous-Time Sigma-Delta Modulator Through Divided-by-N Feedback DAC,” 2013 Workshop on Synthesis And System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Sapporo, Japan, Oct. 21~22, 2013.
· Te-Wen Liao, Jun-Ren Su, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Sub-Sampling Charge Pump and Random Pulsewidth Matching Technique for Frequency Synthesizer,” 2013 IEEE Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Columbus, Ohio, USA, August 4~7, 2013 (Best Paper Award).
· Te-Wen Liao, Jun-Ren Su, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Ring-VCO Based Low Noise and Low Spur Frequency Synthesizer,” 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Beijing, China, May 19~23, 2013.
· Jun-Ren Su, Te-Wen Liao, and C.-C. Hung, “Delay-Line Based Fast-Locking All-Digital Pulsewidth-Control Circuit with Programmable Duty Cycle,” 2012 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Kobe, Japan, Nov. 12~14, 2012.
· Te-Wen Liao, Chia-Min Chen, and C.-C. Hung, “Ring-VCO Based Low Spur Sub-Sampling Frequency Synthesizer,” 2012 IEEE European Solid-State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC), Bordeaux, France, Sep. 17~21, 2012.
· Chia-Min Chen, Te-Wen Liao, Kai-Hsiu Hsu, and C.-C. Hung, “A Single-Inductor Multiple-Output Boost Converter with Freewheel Charge-Pump Control,” 2012 IEEE European Solid-State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC), Bordeaux, France, Sep. 17~21, 2012.
· Te-Wen Liao, Jun-Ren Su, and Chung-Chih Hung, “Low-Spur Technique for Integer-N Phase-Locked Loop,” 2012 IEEE Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Boise, Idaho, USA, August 5-8, 2012.
· Shin-Jye Hsu, Che-Yu Lu, and Chung-Chih Hung, "40MHz Gm-C Filter with High Linearity OTA for Wireless Applications," 2012 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2012.
· Chia-Min Chen, Kai-Hsiu Hsu, and C.-C. Hung, “An Integrated Smart Current Sensing Current-Mode Buck Converter,” 2012 Workshop on Synthesis and System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Beppu, Japan, March 8-9, 2012.
· Te-Wen Liao, Jun-Ren Su, and C.-C. Hung, “A Spur-Reduction Frequency Synthesizer For Wireless Application,” 2012 Workshop on Synthesis and System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Beppu, Japan, March 8-9, 2012.
· Chiamin Chen and C.-C. Hung, “A Fast Self-Reacting Capacitor-less Low-Dropout Regulator,” 2011 IEEE European Solid-State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC), Helsinki, Finland, Sept. 12-16, 2011.
· Shih-Tung Cheng, Wei-Hsiu Chang, and Chung-Chih Hung, "-65dB HD3 CMOS Tunable OTA with Mobility Reduction compensation," 2011 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2011.
· Jun-Ye Lin, Wei-Hsiu Chang, and Chung-Chih Hung, "15MHz Wide Tuning-Range OTA with -69dB HD3 and Its Application to Gm-C Filter," 2011 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2011.
· Y. Lin, W.-H. Hsieh, C.-C. Hung, and M. Ismail, “A LV/LP CMOS Op-Amp for Bio-Sensing Applications,” 2011 IEEE Latin American Symposium on Circuits and Systems (LASCAS), Bogota, Colombia, Feb. 23-25, 2011.
· T.-W. Liao, J.-R. Su, and C.-C. Hung, “A Low-Noise Wide Range Delta-Sigma Frequency Synthesizer for DTV Broadband,” 2010 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits, and Systems (ICECS), Athens, Greece, Dec. 12-15, 2010 (Best Paper Award).
· Zhe-Yang Huang and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘A 1V 4.8mW 42.6-45.6GHz CMOS Voltage Controlled Oscillator for IEEE 80.15.3c Wireless Communication System,’’ 2010 IEEE Asia Pacific Microwave Conference (APMC), Yokohama, Japan, December 7-10, 2010.
· Zhe-Yang Huang and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘A CMOS Dual-Band Low-Noise Amplifier for World-Wide WiMedia Ultra-Wideband Wireless Personal Area Network System,’’ 2010 IEEE Asia Pacific Microwave Conference (APMC), Yokohama, Japan, December 7-10, 2010.
· Sheng-Wen Huang, Zong-Yi Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, and Chia-Min Chen, “A Fourth-Order FeedForward Continuous-Time Delta-Sigma ADC with 3MHz Bandwidth,” 2010 IEEE Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Seattle, Washington, USA, August 2010.
· Chia-Min Chen, Kai-Hsiu Hsu, and Chung-Chih Hung, “A High Efficiency Current-Mode DC-DC Step-Down Converter with Wide Range of Output Current,” 2010 IEEE Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Seattle, Washington, USA, August 2010.
· De-Wen Liao and Chung-Chih Hung, “A Spur-Reduction Frequency Synthesizer for WIMAX Applications,” 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), pp. 25-28, Paris, France, May 2010.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and C.-H. Lo, “A 250MHz Gm-C Filter Using Negative Current Feedback OTAs,” 2009 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits, and Systems (ICECS), Hammamet, Tunisia, Dec. 13-16, 2009.
· C.-L. Chien and C.-C. Hung, “A Pseudo-Differential OTA with Linearity Improving by HD3 Feedforward,” 2009 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 2009.
· Chia-Min Chen and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘A Capacitor-Free CMOS Low-Dropout Voltage Regulator,’’ 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Taipei, Taiwan, May 24-27, 2009.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Che-Cheng Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, Chung-Chih Hung and Chia-Min Chen, ‘‘An Inductor-Coupling Resonated CMOS Low Noise Amplifier for 3.1-10.6GHz Ultra-Wideband System,’’ 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Taipei, Taiwan, May 24-27, 2009.
· Wen-Lin Yang, Wen-Hung Hsieh and Chung-Chih Hung, "A Third-Order Continuous-Time Single-Bit Active-RC Sigma-Delta Modulator for Bluetooth," 2009 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2009.
· Yung-Chou Lin, Wen-Hung Hsieh and Chung-Chih Hung, "A Continuous-Time Delta-Sigma Modulator Using Feedback Resistors," 2009 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), Hsinchu Taiwan, April, 2009.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A 1-V Gm-C low-pass filter for UWB wireless application,” 2008 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Fukuoka, Japan, Nov. 3-5, 2008.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Che-Cheng Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, and Christina F. Jou, "CMOS Low-Noise Amplifier with Shunt-Peaking Load for Group 1~3MB-OFDM Ultra-Wideband Wireless Receiver", 2008 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), pp. 251-254, April 2008.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Che-Cheng Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, and Christina F. Jou, "A CMOS Low-Noise Amplifier with Impedance Feedback for Ultra-Wideband Wireless Receiver System", 2008 IEEE International Symposium on VLSI Design, Automation and Test (VLSI-DAT), pp. 51-54, April 2008.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A 1 GHz OTA-Based Low-Pass Filter with a High-Speed Automatic Tuning Scheme,” 2007 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Jeju Island, Korea, Nov. 12-14, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-S. Kao, W.-H. Hsueh, and C.-C. Hung, “A CMOS Transconductor with Rail-to-Rail Input Stage under 1.8-V Supply Voltage,” 2007 Workshop on Synthesis and System Integration of Mixed Information technologies (SASIMI), Hokkaido, Japan, Oct. 15-16, 2007.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Che-Cheng Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “CMOS Dual-Wideband Low-Noise Amplifier in 3.1GHz-4.9GHz and 6.0GHz-10.3GHz for Ultra-Wideband Wireless Receiver”, 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Circuits (ISIC), ,Singapore, Sept. 26-28, 2007.
· Zhe-Yang Huang, Che-Cheng Huang, Chun-Chieh Chen, and Chung-Chih Hung, “CMOS Low-Noise Amplifier with Switching Groups for MB-OFDM UWB Wireless Radio System ”, 2007 IEEE International Conference on Ultra-Wideband (ICUWB), Singapore, Sept. 24-26, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “Low-Voltage Multi-Mode Gm-C Channel Selection Filter for Mobile Applications,” 2007 IEEE Custom Integrated Circuits Conference (CICC), San Jose, California, USA, Sept. 16-19, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-C. Hung, and M. Ismail, “A Wide Tuning Range Gm-C Filter for Multi-Mode Direct-Conversion Wireless Receivers,” 2007 IEEE European Solid-State Circuits Conference (ESSCIRC), Munich, Germany, Sept. 11-13, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo, C.-S. Kao, and C.-C. Hung, “A Gm-C Continuous-time Analog Filter for IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n Wireless LANs,”(invited paper) 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Signals, Circuits and Systems (ISSCS), Iasi, Romania, July 12-13, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “1-V Linear CMOS Transconductor with -65 dB THD in Nano-Scale CMOS Technology,” 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), New Orleans, USA, May 27-30, 2007.
· C.-W. Chang, T.-Y. Lo, C.-M. Chen, K.-H. Wu, and C.-C. Hung, “A Low-Power CMOS Voltage Reference Circuit Based On Subthreshold Operation,” 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), New Orleans, USA, May 27-30, 2007.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A High Speed Pseudo-Differential OTA with Mobility Compensation Technique in 1-V Power Supply Voltage,” 2006 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Hangzhou, China, Nov. 13-15, 2006.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “1.5-V Linear CMOS OTA with -60dB IM3 for High Frequency Applications,” 2006 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits conference (ASSCC), Hangzhou, China, Nov. 13-15, 2006.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “A High Speed and High Linearity OTA in 1-V Power Supply Voltage,” 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Island of Kos, Greece, May 21-24, 2006.
· S.-Y. Lee and C.-C. Hung, "A Fifth-Order gm-C Filter with Large Differential Input Signals and Wide Common-Mode Voltage Ranges", 2005 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan (IEEJ) International Analog VLSI Workshop, Bordeaux, France, October 19-21, 2005.
· C.-Y. Yang and C.-C. Hung, “A Low-Voltage Low-Distortion MOS Sampling Switch,” 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Kobe Japan, May 23-26, 2005.
· C.-C. Hung, M. Ismail, K. Halonen, and V. Porra, ``Low-Voltage Rail-To-Rail CMOS Differential Difference Amplifier,'' Proc. 1997 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Hong Kong, June 9-12, 1997.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, M. Ismail, and V. Porra, ``Micropower CMOS GM-C Filters for Speech Signal Processing,'' Proc. 1997 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Hong Kong, June 9-12, 1997.
· M. Ismail and C.-C. Hung, ``An Overview of Low-Voltage Low-Power VLSI Design,'' (invited talk), Proc. 8th International Conference on Microelectronics, Cairo, Egypt, Dec. 16-18, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, C. Hwang, K. Halonen, V. Porra, M. Ismail, and S. Lindfors, ``CMOS Design of Analog Cells for Low-Voltage VLSI Circuits,'' Proc. 14th Norchip Conference, pp.164-171, Helsinki, Finland, Nov. 4-5, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, V. Porra, and M. Ismail, ``Low-Voltage, Micropower Weak-Inversion CMOS GM-C Filter,'' Proc. 3rd IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits, and Systems (ICECS), pp.1178-1181, Rodos, Greece, Oct. 13-16, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, V. Porra, and M. Ismail, ``Low-Voltage CMOS GM-C Filter with Rail-To-Rail Common-Mode Voltage,'' Proc. 39th Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, Ames, Iowa, Aug. 18-21, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, C. Hwang, K. Halonen, V. Porra, and M. Ismail, ``Design of CMOS Analog Cells for Low-Voltage VLSI,'' Proc. 39th Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, Ames, Iowa, Aug. 18-21, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, and M. Ismail, ``A CMOS Low-Voltage Rail-To-Rail V-I Converter Utilizing Maximum-Current Selecting Circuits,'' Proc. International Conference on Circuits and System Sciences (ICCASS), pp. 70-73, Shanghai, China, June 20-25, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, K. Halonen, V. Porra, and M. Ismail, ``CMOS Analog Cells for Low-Voltage VLSI Signal Processing Applications,'' Proc. 17th Nordic Semiconductor Meeting, Trondheim, Norway, June, 1996.
· C.-C. Hung, C. Hwang, and M. Ismail, ``A CMOS Low-Voltage Rail-To-Rail V-I Converter,'' Proc. 38th Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, pp. 1337-1340, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Aug. 13-16, 1995.
· S. Smith, M. Ismail, C.-C. Hung, and S.-C. Huang, ``Layout Design Consideration in MOS continuous-time integrated filters,'' Proc. IEEE Asia-Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), pp.300-305, Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 1994.
· S.-C. Huang, M. Ismail, and C.-C. Hung, ``Primitive cells for the systematic design of analog VLSI systems,'' (invited talk), Proc. 6th International Conference on Microelectronics, pp.285-291, Istanbul, Turkey, Sept. 1994.
· T.-Y. Lo and C.-C. Hung, “1V CMOS Gm-C Filters: Design and Applications,” Springer, April 2009.
· M. Ismail, C.-C. Hung, and C. Hwang, ``Electronics,'' in the McGraw-Hill 1998 Year Book of Science and Technology, (S. P. Parker EIC.), pp. 111-112, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1998.
· H.-Y. To, C.-C. Hung, H. Su, and M. Ismail, ``Statistical Design and Optimization for High-Yield BiCMOS Analog Circuits,'' ch. 17 in Low-Power HF Microelectronics, G. AS Machado (Eds.), IEE Press, May 1996.
· M. Ismail, S.-C. Huang, C.-C. Hung, S. Zarabadi, and F. Larsen, ``Basic CMOS and BiCMOS Analog Cell Design,'' ch. 7-1 in Microsystems Technology for Multimedia Applications: An Introduction, Sheu, Ismail, Sanchez-Sinencio, and Wu (Eds.), IEEE Press, 1995.
· M. Ismail, S.-C. Huang, C.-C. Hung, and T. Saether, ``Canonical Cells of MOSFET Technology,'' ch. 12.2.4 in The Circuits and Filters Handbooks, (W.-K. Chen EIC.), CRC Press Series of Electrical Engineering and IEEE Press, 1995.
· S. R. Zarabadi, M. Ismail, and C.-C. Hung, ``BiCMOS Analog Computational Circuits,'' in Microelectronics for Telecommunications, IV EBMicro - Escola Brasileira de Microeletronica (IV Brazilian Microelectronics School), pp.119-136, Recife, Brazil, Jan. 15-20, 1995.
· Jun-Ren Su and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Cyclic Vernier Ring Time-to-Digital Converter,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent 103130762.
· Chia-Min Chen and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘A Low Dropout Voltage Regulator and Its Method,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I425336, Feb. 1, 2014.
· Wen-Hung Hsieh and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Analog-To-Digital Conversion Device,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I420824, December 21, 2013.
· Wen-Hung Hsieh and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Digital-To-Analog Converter,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I416879, November 21, 2013.
· Fang-Ding Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Digital-To-Analog Conversion Device,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I411233, October 1, 2013.
· Chia-Min Chen, Chung-Chih Hung, and Kai-Hsiu Hsu, ‘‘Charge-Pump Controlled Single-Inductor Multiple-Output DC-DC Converter,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I411210, August 23, 2013.
· Fang-Ding Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Digital-To-Analog Conversion Device,’’ China Patent 1251273, August 14, 2013.
· Ming-Tse Lin and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Current-Mode Dual-Slope Temperature-Digital Conversion Device,’’ Taiwan ROC Patent I402492, July 21, 2013.
· Fang-Ding Chou and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Digital-To-Analog Conversion Device,’’ US Patent 8,427,351B2, Apr. 23, 2013.
· Wen-Hung Hsieh and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Digital-To-Analog Converter,’’ US Patent 8,242,943B2, Aug. 14, 2012.
· Ming-Tse Lin and Chung-Chih Hung, ‘‘Current-Mode Dual-Slope Temperature-Digital Conversion Device,’’ US Patent 8,144,047B2, March 27, 2012.
· C.-C. Hung, `` A CMOS Reference Voltage Circuit Based on MOSFET Threshold Voltage and Thermal Voltage,'' Taiwan ROC Patent I 269402, December 21, 2006.

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§ 149-5 Conditions for construction or development in identified floodplain.
§ 149-6 Definitions incorporated by reference.
§ 149-9 Delineation of flood districts.
§ 149-10 Flood district boundary changes.
§ 149-12 Floodway District (FW).
§ 149-13 Special Floodplain Areas (AE).
§ 149-14 Approximate Floodplain District (A).
§ 149-15 Development which may endanger human life.
§ 149-16 Special requirements for manufactured homes.
§ 149-17 Special requirements for recreational vehicles.
§ 149-18 Special requirements for subdivisions.
§ 149-19 Uses specifically prohibited.
§ 149-20 Nonconforming structures and uses.
§ 149-25 Application procedures and requirements.
§ 149-26 Review of application by others.
§ 149-27 More restrictive provisions to apply.
§ 149-28 Disclaimer; Borough not liable.
§ 149-30 Notice of violation; violations and penalties; appeals.


118 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 332 F.2d 317, reversed.
Despite the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB), sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, the Party failed to register under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and no list of members was filed. The Attorney General, in accordance with § 13(a) and §§ 8(a) and (c) of the Act, asked the SACB to order petitioners, as Party members, to register and submit a registration statement. The SACB did order petitioners to register and submit the registration statement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed these orders, finding the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue not ripe for adjudication.
(a) As distinguished from the Communist Party case, the contingencies upon which the members' duty to register arises have matured, the petitioners have claimed the privilege, and the Attorney General has rejected such claims. Pp. 74-75.
3. The requirement of completing and filing the registration statement (IS-52), considered apart from the registration form, would also be incriminatory because the information might be used as evidence in, or supply leads to, a criminal prosecution. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, distinguished. Pp. 78-79.
4. The Act's immunity provision, § 4(f), does not save the orders to register from petitioners' Fifth Amendment challenge. Pp. 79-81.
(a) The immunity provision does not preclude the use of information called for by the registration statement (IS-52) either as evidence or an investigatory lead. P. 80.
(c) Respondent's argument that, since an order to register follows an SACB finding of Party membership, the admission of Party membership by registering is of no investigatory value, and thus not "incriminatory," would make the right to invoke the privilege depend upon an assessment of information in the Government's possession. This would negate the complete protection from all perils that an immunity statute must provide according to Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547. P. 81.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders without deciding the privilege issue, expressing the view that, under our decision in Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 105-110, the issue was not ripe for adjudication, and would be ripe only in a prosecution for failure to register if the petitioners did not register. 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 121-123, 332 F.2d at 321-323. We disagree. In Communist Party, the Party asserted the privilege on behalf of unnamed officers -- those obliged to register the Party and those obliged "to register for" the Party if it failed to do so. [n7] The self-incrimination claim asserted on behalf of the latter officers was held premature because the Party might choose to register, and thus the duty of those officers might never arise. Here, in contrast, the contingencies upon which the members' duty to register arises have already matured; the Party did not register within 30 days after the order to register became final, and the requisite 60 days since the order became final have elapsed. As to the officers obliged to register the Party, Communist Party held that the self-incrimination claim asserted on their behalf was not ripe for adjudication because [p75] it was not known whether they would ever claim the privilege or whether the claim, if asserted, would be honored by the Attorney General. But, with respect to the orders in this case, addressed to named individuals, both these contingencies are foreclosed. Petitioners asserted the privilege in their answers to the Attorney General's petitions; they did not testify at the Board hearings; they again asserted the privilege in the review proceedings in the Court of Appeals. In each instance, the Attorney General rejected their claims. Thus, the considerations which led the Court in Communist Party to hold that the claims on behalf of unnamed officers were premature are not present in this case.
There are other reasons for holding that petitioners' self-incrimination claims are ripe for decision. Specific orders requiring petitioners to register have been issued. The Attorney General has promulgated regulations requiring that registration shall be accomplished on Form IS-52a and that the accompanying registration statement shall be a completed Form IS-52, [n8] 28 CFR §§ 11.206, 11.207, and petitioners risk very heavy penalties if they fail to register by completing and filing these forms. Under § 15(a)(2) of the Act, 64 Stat. 1002, 50 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2), for example, each day of failure to register constitutes a separate offense punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. [n9] Petitioners must either register without a decision on the merits of their privilege claims, [p76] or fail to register and risk onerous and rapidly mounting penalties while awaiting the Government's pleasure whether to initiate a prosecution against them. To ask, in these circumstances, that petitioners await such a prosecution for an adjudication of their self-incrimination claims is, in effect, to contend that they should be denied the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege intended to relieve claimants of the necessity of making a choice between incriminating themselves and risking serious punishments for refusing to do so.
Indeed, the Government concedes in its brief in this Court that the Court of Appeals' holding of prematurity was erroneous insofar as petitioners' claims of privilege relate to the Board's power to compel the act of registration and the submission of an accompanying registration statement. The brief candidly acknowledges that, since § 14(b) provides for judicial review of a Board order to register, petitioners' claims in that regard, like any other contention that an order is invalid, may be heard and determined by the reviewing court -- thus distinguishing orders that are not similarly reviewable, see Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323. Nevertheless, the Government argues that petitioners' claims are premature insofar as they relate to "any particular inquiry" on Forms IS-52a and IS-52. Two contingencies are hypothesized in support of this contention: (1) that the Attorney General might alter the present forms or (2) that he might accept less than fully completed forms.
The distinction upon which this argument is predicated is illusory. Neither the statute nor the regulations draw any distinction between the act of registering and the submission of a registration statement, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the answering of the inquiries demanded by the forms; the statute and regulations contemplate, rather, that the questions asked on the forms [p77] are to be fully and completely answered. Moreover, the contingencies hypothesized are irrelevant. Petitioners are obliged to register and to submit registration forms in accordance with presently existing regulations; the mere contingency that the Attorney General might revise the regulations at some future time does not render premature their challenge to the existing requirements. Nor can these requirements be viewed as requiring that petitioners answer -- at the risk of criminal prosecution for error -- only those items which will not incriminate petitioners; full compliance is required. Finally, the Government's argument would do violence to the congressional scheme. The penalties are incurred only upon failure to register as required by final orders and, under § 14(b), orders become final upon completion of judicial review. In so providing, Congress plainly manifested an intention to afford alleged members, prior to criminal prosecution for failure to register, an adjudication of all, not just some, of the claims addressed to the validity of the Board's registration orders. We therefore proceed to a determination of the merits of petitioners' self-incrimination claims.
The risks of incrimination which the petitioners take in registering are obvious. Form IS-52a requires an admission of membership in the Communist Party. Such an admission of membership may be used to prosecute the registrant under the membership clause of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964 ed.), or under § 4(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 991, 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (1964 ed.), to mention only two federal criminal statutes. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211. Accordingly, we have held that mere association with the Communist Party presents sufficient threat of prosecution to support a claim of privilege. Patricia Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159; Irving Blau v. [p78] United States, 340 U.S. 332; Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S. 918; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155. These cases involved questions to witnesses on the witness stand, but if the admission cannot be compelled in oral testimony, we do not see how compulsion in writing makes a difference for constitutional purposes. Cf. New York ex rel. Ferguson v. Reardon, 197 N.Y. 236, 243244, 90 N.E. 829, 832. It follows that the requirement to accomplish registration by completing and filing Form IS-52a is inconsistent with the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
[i]f the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making, he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not, on that account, refuse to make any return at all.
274 U.S. at 263. That declaration was based on the view, first, that a self-incrimination claim against every question on the tax return, or based on the mere submission of the return, would be virtually frivolous, and, second, that to honor the claim of privilege not asserted at the time the return was due would make the taxpayer, rather than a tribunal, the final arbiter of the merits of the claim. But neither reason applies here. A tribunal, the Board, had an opportunity to pass upon the petitioners' self-incrimination claims, and since, unlike a tax return, the pervasive effect of the information called for by Form IS-52 is incriminatory, their claims are substantial, and far from frivolous. In Sullivan, the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's questions, in context, might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.
The Government does not contend that the shortcoming of § 4(f) is remedied in regard to information called for on the registration statement, Form IS-52. With respect to Form IS-52a, however, the argument is made that, since an order to register is preceded by a Board finding of Party membership, the admission of membership required on that form would be of no investigatory value, and thus is not "incriminatory" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. On this view, the incompleteness of the § 4(f) grant of immunity would be rendered immaterial, and the admission of Party membership could be compelled without violating the privilege. We disagree. The judgment as to whether a disclosure would be "incriminatory" has never been made dependent on an assessment of the information possessed by the Government at the time of interrogation; the protection of the privilege would be seriously impaired if the right to invoke it was dependent on such an assessment, with all its uncertainties. The threat to the privilege is no less present where it is proposed that this assessment be made in order to remedy a shortcoming in a statutory grant of immunity. The representation that the information demanded is of no utility is belied by the fact that the failure to make the disclosure is so severely sanctioned, and permitting the incompleteness of § 4(f) to be cured by such a representation would render illusory the Counselman requirement that a statute, in order to supplant the privilege, must provide "complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard."
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the Board's orders are set aside.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the reversal for all the reasons set out in the Court's opinion as well as those set out in his dissent in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 137.
5. Both copies of the statement are to be signed. The making of any willful false statement or the omission of any material fact is punishable under 18 U.S.Code, 1001.
6. If the space provided on the form for the answer to any given item is insufficient, reference shall be made [p84] in such space to a full insert page or pages on which the item number and item shall be restated and the answer given.
a. Who is a member of any Communist action organization which has failed to file a registration statement as required by Section 7(a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
b. Who is a member of any organization which has registered as a Communist action organization under Section 7(a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 but which has failed to include the individual's name upon the list of members filed with the Attorney General.
1. Name of the Communist action organization of which Registrant was a member within the preceding twelve months.
The judgment of conviction of the Party for failure to register was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the case remanded for a new trial. Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 331 F.2d 807.
the name and last-known address of each individual who was a member of the organization at any time during the period of twelve full calendar months preceding the filing of such statement.
(a) Any individual who is or becomes a member of any organization concerning which (1) there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register under section 786(a) of this title as a Communist action organization, (2) more than thirty days have elapsed since such order has become final, and (3) such organization is not registered under section 786 of this title as a Communist action organization, shall within sixty days after said order has become final, or within thirty days after becoming a member of such organization, whichever is later, register with the Attorney General as a member of such organization.
(c) The registration made by any individual under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be accompanied by a registration statement to be prepared and filed in such manner and form, and containing such information, as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe.
Whenever the Attorney General shall have reason to believe that . . . any individual who has not registered under section 787 of this title is, in fact, required to register under such section, he shall file with the Board and serve upon such . . . individual a petition for an order requiring such . . . individual to register pursuant to such subsection or section, as the case may be. Each such petition shall be verified under oath, and shall contain a statement of the facts upon which the Attorney General relies in support of his prayer for the issuance of such order.
The party aggrieved by any order entered by the Board . . . may obtain a review of such order by filing in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, within sixty days from the date of service upon it of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Board be set aside. . . . Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall have power to affirm or set aside the order of the Board. . . . The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by the preponderance of the evidence, shall be conclusive. . . . The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari. . . .
The Government's opposition to the petition for certiorari suggested that the case is moot as to petitioner Albertson by reason of his alleged expulsion from the Party. Albertson, however, challenges the suggestion of mootness. There is no occasion to decide the question, since, in any event, we must reach the merits of the issues in respect of an identical order issued against petitioner Proctor.
Petitioners' other challenges assailed the Act and registration orders as denying substantive due process (because they allegedly serve no governmental purpose), as abridging First Amendment freedoms, as violating procedural due process and constituting bills of attainder (because they made the Board's 1953 determination that the Communist Party was a Communist action organization conclusive upon petitioners), and, finally, as denying petitioners the safeguards of grand jury indictment, judicial trial and trial by jury.
The regulations governing Party registration pursuant to § 7(d), 50 U.S.C. § 786(d), are 28 CFR §§ 11.200 and 11.201, and the forms are IS-51a and IS-51. The regulation governing officers obliged by § 7(h), 50 U.S.C. § 786(h) "to register for" the Party if it failed to register is 28 CFR § 11.205. See Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 105-110.
Copies of Form IS-52a and Form IS-52 are reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion.
The case was argued orally by both sides on the premise that the penalty for failure to complete and file Form IS-52 constituted a separate offense punishable by fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both, but that each day of failure to file the form did not constitute a separate offense. We have no occasion, however, to decide the question, and intimate no view upon it. See § 15(b), 50 U.S.C. § 794(b).
The legislative history includes several expressions of doubt that the immunity granted was coextensive with the privilege. See S.Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, pp. 12-13 (Sen. Kilgore) (Minority Report); 96 Cong.Rec. 14479 (Sen. Humphrey); 96 Cong.Rec. 15199 and 15554 (Sen. Kefauver); see also 96 Cong.Rec. 13739-13740 (Rep. Celler), dealing with a more modified immunity grant in H.R. 9490. See generally Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 212-219 (Court opinion), 282-287 (dissenting opinion).
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
would require every Communist political organization and every Communist-front organization to register. . . . In addition to information which would be required of both organizations in common, a Communist political organization would be obliged to disclose [p86] the names and addresses of its members in its registration statement. . . . In case of the failure of any organization to register in accordance with the measure, it would be the duty of the executive officer and the secretary of such organization to register in behalf of the organization. . . . A failure to register . . . subjects the organization and certain of its agents to severe penalties.
the measure might be held (notwithstanding the legislative finding of clear and present danger) to deny freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, and even to compel self-incrimination.
there would not be any voluntary registrations under the measure. Should a Communist organization fail to register, the burden to proceed would shift to the Attorney General . . . to prove that the organization is required to register.
As finally passed, the Act imposed a duty to register upon individual members after the refusal of the Communist Party to register and disclose its membership. Though not in H.R. 5852, about which the Department of Justice expressed constitutional doubts, this more pervasive registration requirement directly abridges the privilege of members against self-incrimination. I therefore join in this reversal.


text:
LEE v RICHCRAFT HOMES LTD.
 The test for extending time is whether the justice of the case requires that an extension be given. While each case depends on its own circumstances, the court will typically take into consideration (a) whether the moving party formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period; (b) the length of, and explanation for, the delay in filing; (c) any prejudice to the responding parties occasioned by the delay; and (d) the merits of the proposed appeal. This is the appropriate test whether the motion is to extend time to appeal, or to extend time to file a motion for leave to appeal: Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131 (CanLII), 114 O.R. (3d) 636, at para. 15.
 Richcraft’s motion to strike was brought under r. 21, as a motion to dismiss a claim that discloses no reasonable cause of action. Since rule 21 motions are required to be heard by judges, the master was unable to hear the motion under this rule. Instead, he agreed at the hearing to consider the motion to strike under r. 25.11 (which permits the court to strike, with or without leave to amend, a pleading that is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or an abuse of the process of the court).
 In Panalpina Inc. v. Sharma (1988), 29 C.P.C. (2d) 222, Master Sandler helpfully explained the difference between motions to strike out pleadings under r. 25.11 and r. 21.01: at pp. 234-35, 241. He correctly stated that, to determine whether there is jurisdiction, the master first needs to decide which rule is the real basis for the motion, regardless of what the moving party is claiming: at p. 231; see also A.B. v. Halton Children’s Aid Society, 2016 ONSC 6195 (Master) (CanLII), at paras. 21-23. The master hearing the motion in this case was required to adjourn the motion to a judge, if it was in fact a motion to strike for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, under r. 21. Here, the primary reason for the master’s dismissal of the claim without leave to amend was that Mr. Lee lacks standing. Standing is a matter that is properly addressed in a r. 21 motion: see George-McCool v. Toronto (City) Police Service Board, 2008 CanLII 54778 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 6. To the extent that the master’s decision was based on Mr. Lee’s lack of standing, it appears to have been made outside the master’s jurisdiction under r. 25.11.
 The master also concluded that the claim was “frivolous” and “an abuse of process”, apparently because of the deficiencies in Mr. Lee’s pleading. “As the exercise of the power set out in rule 25.11 denies a litigant a full trial of the merits of the claim, it must be exercised only in the clearest of cases”: Wernikowski v. Kirkland, Murphy & Ain (1999), 1999 CanLII 3822 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (3d) 124 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 98, at para. 12; M.A.S. (Litigation guardian of) v. Ludwig (2004), 2004 CanLII 30968 (ON CA), 245 D.L.R. (4th) 149 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 154. Reading the statement of claim generously, Mr. Lee’s claim is for damages for the loss of his business and equipment as a result of Richcraft’s conduct in failing to deal with his complaints about the other tenant and in terminating the lease. The master ought to have considered whether the pleadings deficiencies could have been addressed through amendments to the statement of claim under rules 26 and 5.04(2), to clarify Mr. Lee’s personal claim based on his plea of harassment and/or to add Jay-Pee, the tenant under the lease, as a plaintiff. See for example Mazzucca v. Silvercreek Pharmacy Ltd. (2001), 2001 CanLII 8620 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 768, and in particular (with the abolition of the doctrine of special circumstances), the concurring reasons of Laskin J.A. in that case.
 The test for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction is set out in Re Sault Dock Co. Ltd. and City of Sault Ste. Marie, 1972 CanLII 572 (ON CA),  2 O.R. 479 (C.A.), at pp. 480-81; see also Enbridge, at paras. 19-22. Typically, the matter will present an arguable question of law or mixed fact and law requiring the interpretation of Ontario statutes or regulations, principles of law or, where the point in issue involves a question of public importance, a municipal by-law, or agreement. The court may also grant leave to appeal when there has been a departure from established principles of law that would result in a miscarriage of justice, or when there has clearly been an error in a judgment or order of the Divisional Court: see Sault Dock at p. 481; Enbridge at paras. 21-22.

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THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ARMSTRONG, Defendant.
This matter is presently before the Court on Defendant Christopher Armstrong's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff The Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Plaintiff) filed this action against Christopher Armstrong ("Defendant") seeking a declaration of its rights, duties, and obligations under a marine insurance policy issued to Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that it is not obligated to provide insurance coverage to Defendant for damages he caused when his boat collided with an anchored sailboat. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim arguing that, pursuant to Virginia law, the matter is not yet ripe for adjudication. The matter has been fully briefed by both parties. The Court will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court, and oral argument would not aid in the decisional process. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion will be denied.
Although Defendant has filed his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the issue of ripeness is jurisdictional in nature. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (citations omitted) (explaining the concept of "ripeness" as an issue of satisfying the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III). Therefore, the proper vehicle for raising the issue is a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Here, the distinction is immaterial because the parties' jurisdictional arguments rely entirely on the allegations, thus presenting a motion governed by substantially the same standard of review as a motion made under Rule 12(b)(6). See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (assuming the truth of jurisdictional allegations when jurisdiction is challenged on the pleadings). Accordingly, the Court will treat the motion as one challenging jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to a motion challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).
Because Defendant challenges jurisdiction on the pleadings alone, the Court assumes Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations to be true, and views all facts in the light most favorable to it. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Viewed through this lens, the allegations are as follows.
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in this Court on March 9, 2012, seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and invoking this Court's admiralty jurisdiction.Plaintiff seeks the entry of a judgment finding "that it has no obligation to provide insurance coverage pursuant to the Policy for the losses that resulted" from the collision at issue. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, asserting that the claim is not yet ripe for adjudication under Virginia insurance law.
The Court takes judicial notice that Fishing Bay is a navigable water of the United States. See Flath v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 99-2519, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15894, at *8-9 (4th Cir. July 10, 2000) (approving of a district court decision to take judicial notice of admiralty jurisdiction involving a particular body of water); Irby v. Roberts, 504 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Va. 1998) ("The Piankatank River and Fishing Bay are tidal, navigable bodies of water"). Because the collision giving rise to this case occurred on the navigable waters of the United States, admiralty jurisdiction is properly invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. See In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 352 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing admiralty jurisdiction for insurance coverage dispute involving accident on navigable waters).
A motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. If a defendant contends that the complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based, all facts in the complaint are presumed true. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; see also King v. Riverside Reg'l Med. Or., 211 F. Supp. 2d 779, 780-81 (E.D. Va. 2002). Consideration of evidence outside of the pleadings does not necessarily convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to preserve jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
In the instant motion, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment, arguing that the claim is not ripe for adjudication. Citing Anthem Cas. Ins. Group Affirmative Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 49 Va. Cir. 154 (1999), Defendant argues that pursuant to Virginia's insurance laws, the existence of a duty to defend cannot be ascertained until an underlying lawsuit has been initiated. (Def.'s Br. Sup. R. 12(b)(6) Mot. Dismiss at 6.) Plaintiff counters that federal standards apply to determine whether this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action.
While Defendant goes to great lengths to explain that Virginia law applies to the construction of the insurance policy, that issue has no bearing on the jurisdictional ripeness inquiry. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128 n.8 (citations omitted) (explaining the concept of "ripeness" as an issue of satisfying the case or controversy requirement of Article III).
While both parties devote a considerable amount of time in their briefs to Virginia law, federal standards govern federal courts' determination of the propriety of declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472U.S. 797 (1985); Miller v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Fed. App'x 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing White v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 913 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Federal standards guide the inquiry as to the propriety of declaratory relief in federal courts"). Thus, it is irrelevant whether Virginia's courts would entertain a declaratory judgment action under the circumstances of this case.
Nevertheless, it appears that Virginia courts would reach the same result, permitting a declaratory judgment action to proceed under similar circumstances. See Reisen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 302 S.E.2d 529, 533 (Va. 1983) (citation omitted) ("[S]everal courts have failed to observe that even a potential claim . . . is sufficient to cause fear and jeopardy and thus to warrant the institution of an action for a declaration of non-liability").
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes jurisdiction if the Article III case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); Miller, 157 Fed. App'x at 636-37. Unlike some other jurisdictional grants, which may be mandatory, "[a] federal court has the discretion to entertain a declaratory judgment action when it finds that the declaratory relief sought (i) will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue; and (ii) will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Fuscardo, 35 F.3d 963, 966 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although discretionary, "a district court must have 'good reason' for declining to exercise its declaratory judgment jurisdiction." Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 594 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co., 35 F.3d at 965).
The Supreme Court has stated that the case-or-controversy requirement is met where "the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (citation omitted). The dispute must be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." Id. Moreover, the dispute must be "real and substantial," such that a court may provide "specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although no lawsuit has yet been filed by those injured in the subject boat accident, the dispute is sufficiently concrete to satisfy Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement. Regardless of whether any additional litigation ensues, Defendant has already invoked his rights under an insurance contract by submitting a claim to Plaintiff as his insurer. Thus, the dispute involves a "real and substantial" set of facts, as opposed to a hypothetical situation. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that in certain circumstances, the threat of future litigation may give rise to an actual controversy. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., 386 F.3d at 593 n.12 (citing GTE Directories Pub. Corp. v. Trimen Am., Inc., 67 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1995)). Similarly, by denying coverage, Plaintiff has disputed Defendant's contractual rights while placing itself in a position legally adverse to that of Defendant. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (citation omitted). Thus, the dispute before the Court satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement such that the Court may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Action.
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has addressed whether a denial of coverage meets the case-or-controversy requirement in the absence of separate litigation, this Court has previously found that such situations meet the requirements. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Va. 2007). That decision is consistent with the Court's conclusion herein.
Finding that it may appropriately exercise jurisdiction over the matter, the Court may then consider whether there exists any persuasive reason to decline to do so. Beyond the issues already addressed, Defendant offers no good reason to refrain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction and the Court is aware of none. There exists a legitimate dispute over insurance coverage that the Court may resolve through "specific relief. . . of a conclusive character" defining the parties' rights under the Policy. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Such relief is appropriately sought under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be denied. An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.


Richard J. Moore, Appellant, v. Terrell Waller and Square 345 Limited Partnership T/A Grand Hyatt Hotel, Appellees.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. (CA-1522-04). (Hon. Michael L. Rankin, Trial Judge).
COUNSEL: John P. Fatherree for appellant.
Rocco P. Porreco for appellee, Square 345 Limited Partnership.
JUDGES: Before GLICKMAN, KRAMER, and FISHER, Associate Judges.
[*177] FISHER, Associate Judge: Appellant Richard Moore claims that he was injured on February 26, 2001, while participating in a demonstration of kick boxing at Club Fitness, which is operated by the appellee, Square 345 Limited Partnership (hereinafter Grand Hyatt). Relying on a waiver and release of liability Moore signed when he joined the fitness center, the Superior Court granted summary judgment, first for Grand Hyatt and then for Terrell Waller, the instructor who allegedly injured Moore. We affirm.
Plaintiff Moore alleged that he had gone to the fitness center on February 26, 2001, to exercise. Although “he was not participating in the kick boxing classes, the instructor [*178] , defendant Waller, asked [Moore] to hold . . . a detached Everlast body bag, so [Mr.] Waller could demonstrate a kick to his class.” According to Mr. Moore, he “reluctantly agreed, saying to [Mr. Waller], ‘Not hard.’ Defendant [**2] Waller showed [Mr. Moore] how to hold the bag, braced against his body, and then kicked the bag five times, in rapid succession, with great force.” He claims that when Waller finished, “he was out of breath from the strenuous effort, and commented with obvious sarcasm and irony, ‘That wasn’t hard, was it.'” Moore states that he “immediately felt trauma to his body,” felt “stiff and achy” the next day, and consulted a physician about one month later. Mr. Moore asserts that “[h]e has been diagnosed as having torn ligaments and tendons from the trauma of the injury, and may have neurological damage, as well.” The resulting limitations on his physical activity allegedly have diminished the quality of his life in specified ways.
Mr. Moore had joined the fitness center on January 16, 2001, signing a membership agreement and initialing that portion of the agreement that purports to be a waiver and release of liability.
Section 1. The Member hereby acknowledges that attendance at or use of the Club or participation in any of the Club’s activities or programs by such Member, including without limitation, the use of the Club’s equipment and facilities, . . . exercises [**3] (including the use of the weights, cardiovascular equipment, and apparatus designed for exercising), [and] selection of exercise programs, methods, and types of equipment, . . . could cause injury to the Member or damage to the Member’s personal property. As a material consideration for the Club to enter into this Agreement, to grant membership privileges hereunder and to permit the Member and the Member’s guests to use the Club and its facilities, the Member, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Member’s guests, agrees to assume any and all liabilities associated with the personal injury, death, property loss or other damages which may result from or arise out of attendance at or use of the Club or participation in any of the Club’s programs or activities, notwithstanding any consultation on any exercise programs which may be provided by employees of the Club.
By signing this Agreement, the Member understands that the foregoing waiver of liability on its behalf and on the behalf of the Member’s guests will apply to any and all claims against the Club and/or its owners, shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents or affiliates . . . for any such claims, demands, personal [**4] injuries, costs, property loss or other damages resulting from or arising out of any of foregoing risks at the Club, the condominium or the associated premises.
The Member hereby, on behalf of itself and the Member’s heirs, executors, administrators, guests and assigns, fully and forever releases and discharges the Club and the Club affiliates, and each of them, from any and all claims, damages, demands, rights of action or causes of action, present or future, known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated resulting from or arising out of the attendance at or use of the Club or their participation in any of the Club’s activities or programs by such Member, including those which arise out of the negligence of the Club and/or the Club and the Club affiliates from any and all liability for any loss, or theft of, or damage to personal property, including, without limitation, automobiles and the contents of lockers.
[*179] THE MEMBER, BY INITIALING BELOW, ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS CAREFULLY READ THIS WAIVER AND RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT IT IS A WAIVER AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY, AND ASSUMES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM HIS/HER GUESTS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
1 We assume for purposes of analysis that the Grand Hyatt is responsible for the conduct of Mr. Waller at issue here, but we need not determine whether he was an employee or an independent contractor.
The Waiver and Liability section of the contract . . . expresses a full and complete release of all liability for personal injury occurring in the fitness center. Moore signed an acknowledgment indicating that [he] had read and understood that he was releasing Grand Hyatt from all liability for personal injuries that he might sustain. Furthermore, there is no allegation of fraud or overreaching in the amended complaint. In the circumstances, the court finds that the waiver and release is valid and enforceable and is a complete defense for Grand Hyatt in this action.
This court has not often addressed the validity of exculpatory clauses in contracts. We have enforced them, however. For [**6] example, “[i]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that a provision in a bailment contract limiting the bailee’s liability will be upheld in the absence of gross negligence, willful act, or fraud.” Houston v. Security Storage Co., 474 A.2d 143, 144 (D.C. 1984). Accord, Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Firemen’s Insurance Co., 288 A.2d 662, 665 (D.C. 1972) (“gross negligence or willful misconduct”); Manhattan Co. v. Goldberg, 38 A.2d 172, 174 (D.C. 1944) (“a bailee may limit his liability except for gross negligence”). We recently considered such a clause contained in a home inspection contract and concluded that it would be sufficient to waive or limit liability for negligence. Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 181-82 (D.C. 2006). However, after surveying “leading authorities” and cases from other jurisdictions, we recognized that “courts have not generally enforced exculpatory clauses to the extent that they limited a party’s liability for gross negligence, recklessness or intentional torts.” Id. at 181. See also Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (Md. 1994) ( [HN1] “a party will not be permitted to excuse its liability for intentional harms or for the more extreme forms of negligence, i.e., reckless, [**7] wanton, or gross”); Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc., 132 Md. App. 271, 752 A.2d 631, 638 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (exculpatory clause will not be enforced “when the party protected by the clause intentionally causes harm or engages in acts of reckless, wanton, or gross negligence”). In Carleton, the court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the conduct of the defendants “was not just simple negligence, but rather gross negligence.” 901 A.2d at 182.
As Moore’s counsel conceded at oral argument, he does not claim that Waller intentionally or purposefully injured [*180] him. The complaint does allege reckless conduct, however, 2 and he argued to the trial court, as he does to us, that the fitness center could not exempt itself from liability for reckless or wanton behavior or gross negligence. Nevertheless, the defendants had moved for summary judgment, and [HN2] “[m]ere conclusory allegations on the part of the non-moving party are insufficient to stave off the entry of summary judgment.” Musa v. Continental Insurance Co., 644 A.2d 999, 1002 (D.C. 1994); see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 (e) (“the . . . response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific [**8] facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). “‘[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.'” Brown v. George Washington Univ., 802 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). “‘The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].'” LaPrade v. Rosinsky, 882 A.2d 192, 196 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).
2 In his second amended complaint, Moore alleged that “defendant Waller recklessly disregarded [his] duty of due care [and] acted with deliberate indifference to the likelihood that his action would injure the plaintiff. Defendant Waller’s reckless action was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” He also alleged that the Grand Hyatt was responsible for Waller’s actions.
Nothing Moore presented in opposition to summary judgment would be sufficient to prove gross negligence or reckless conduct. Indeed, in one of his affidavits Mr. Moore stated that “as I was shown by defendant [**9] Waller exactly how to hold the body bag while he demonstrated his kick(s), the purpose of his directions as communicated to me as to how to hold the bag were plainly for safety.” Such concern for safety is inconsistent with recklessness or gross negligence. See generally In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C. 2003) (defining “recklessness”); District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 1997) (defining “gross negligence” for purposes of D.C. Code § 2-412 (2001) (formerly D.C.Code § 1-1212 (1981)). Moreover, Moore did not allege that defendant Waller kicked an unprotected portion of his body. Nor did he proffer expert testimony suggesting that the demonstration was so hazardous that it was reckless to undertake it, even with the protection of the Everlast body bag.
Because there is no viable claim for gross negligence, recklessness, or an intentional tort, we turn to the question of whether this particular contractual provision is sufficient to bar claims for negligence. 3 Although this is a suit for personal [*181] injury, not merely for economic damage, the same principles of law apply. See Wright v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2005) (“by voluntarily [**10] signing the Contestant Release Form, plaintiff waived his right to bring any claims for negligently caused personal injury”; applying District of Columbia law). This court has not previously considered the effect of an exculpatory clause in a membership agreement with a health club or fitness center, but many jurisdictions have done so. After surveying the legal landscape, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that most courts hold “that [HN3] health clubs, in their membership agreements, may limit their liability for future negligence if they do so unambiguously.” Seigneur, 752 A.2d at 636. We have found the analysis in Seigneur to be very helpful.
3 Appellant’s brief explains that he “claims damages from Waller based upon negligent infliction of injury, and against Square 345 Limited Partnership based upon respondeat superior and upon apparent agency and authority, as well as negligent failure to properly select, train and supervise a person whose services were retained to provide lessons in an activity which would certainly be dangerous if not expertly and responsibly performed.” He later elaborates: “While kick boxing is an inherently dangerous activity, had the demonstration [**11] been conducted in a responsible, non-negligent way, it would not have been dangerous.” The words “strict liability” appear under the caption of the second amended complaint, but appellant has not cited any statute or regulation that purports to impose strict liability on demonstrations of kick boxing, nor has he alleged the common law elements of strict liability in tort. See Word v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 742 A.2d 452, 459 (D.C. 1999). Neither has he proffered facts which would support such a theory. In sum, the waiver is sufficient to cover any theory of liability which is supported by more than conclusory allegations.
4 Because this waiver expressly refers to “claims . . . which arise out of the negligence of the Club,” its effect is clear. We have held, however, that it is not always necessary to use the word “negligence” in order to relieve a party of liability for such conduct. See Princemont Construction Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 131 A.2d 877, 878 (D.C. 1957) (“the terms of an indemnity agreement may be so broad and comprehensive that although it contains no express stipulation indemnifying against a party’s [**14] own negligence, it accomplishes the same purpose”); see also Avant v. Community Hospital, 826 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)( [HN6] “an exculpatory clause need not include the word ‘negligence’ so long as it conveys the concept specifically and explicitly through other language”).
[*182] Appellant protests that the waiver provisions are so broad that they could be construed to exempt the Club from liability for harm caused by intentional torts or by reckless or grossly negligent conduct. Because such provisions are unenforceable, he argues that the entire release is invalid. We disagree. “‘A better interpretation of the law is that [HN7] any “term” in a contract which attempts to exempt a party from liability for gross negligence or wanton conduct is unenforceable, not the entire [contract].'” Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting Wolfgang v. Mid-American Motorsports, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Kan. 1995) (which in turn quotes RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.” (emphasis added))). See Ellis v. James V. Hurson Associates, Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 617 (D.C. 1989) [**15] (“The Restatement sets forth the relevant principles. Where less than all of an agreement is unenforceable on public policy grounds, a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the agreement ‘in favor of a party who did not engage in serious misconduct.'” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981))).
Nor is Article V (the waiver and release) unenforceable due to unequal bargaining power, as Mr. Moore asserts. We do not suppose that the parties in fact had equal power, but Moore does not meet the criteria for invalidating a contract on the grounds he invokes. He does not invite our attention to any evidence that he objected to the waiver provision or attempted to bargain for different terms. Nor has he shown that the contract involved a necessary service.
[HN8] Even though a contract is on a printed form and offered on a “take it or leave it” basis, those facts alone do not cause it to be an adhesion contract. There must be a showing that the parties were greatly disparate in bargaining power, that there was no opportunity for negotiation and that the services could not be obtained elsewhere.
Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924-25 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis in [**16] original). “Health clubs do not provide essential services[,]” Shields v. Sta-Fit, Inc., 79 Wn. App. 584, 903 P.2d 525, 528 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), and “[t]he Washington metropolitan area . . . is home to many exercise and fitness clubs.” Seigneur, 752 A.2d at 639 (rejecting argument that patron’s bargaining position was grossly disproportionate to that of the fitness club).
5 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to enforce one such clause on grounds of public policy. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 2005). That decision was based on several factors, however, and we do not understand the court to have announced a categorical rule. See id. at 340-42 (waiver was “overly broad [**18] and all-inclusive,” the word “negligence” was not included, the provision was not “sufficiently highlight[ed],” and there was “no opportunity to bargain”).


There are no fines specified in the public meetings laws for violations.
A civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars may be imposed against a person who violates or knowingly aids in the violation of the OML. A.R.S. § 38-431.07(A). Any penalty assessed shall be deposited in the public body’s general fund. Id.
The FOIA contains no provisions for civil penalties or forfeitures. However, a person who negligently violates the FOIA is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and can be fined up to $500. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-4-104, 5-4-201, 5-4-401, 25-19-104.
There is no provision for fines for violation of the open meeting requirements of either of the Acts except those which may be imposed if a member is found to be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Unlike the Open Records Act, the Open Meetings Law does not provide for fines or penalties for its violation.
If the court finds that a member of a public body engages in a pattern or practice of willfully participating in one or more closed meetings in violation of the Act's provisions, it may impose a civil fine of not more than $250 per violation. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-579(e).
The Act makes knowing and willful violation of its provisions a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00. Alternatively, a civil penalty may be imposed by the court in any civil action brought to enforce the Act against any person who negligently violates the Act’s terms, in an amount not to exceed $1,000.00 for the first violation. A civil penalty or criminal fine not to exceed $2,500.00 per violation may be imposed for each additional violation that the violator commits within a 12-month period from the date that the first penalty or fine was imposed. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-6.
The Open Meeting Law provides for three levels of civil penalties. Idaho Code § 74-208(2) imposes a civil penalty not to exceed $250 for any member of the governing body who “conducts or participates in a meeting” which violates the Open Meeting Law. Idaho Code § 74-208(3) imposes a civil penalty not to exceed $1,500 upon any member of a governing body who “knowingly violates” the Open Meeting Act. And, Idaho Code § 74-208(4) provides that any member of a governing body who has violated the Open Meeting Act (knowingly or unintentionally) more than once in a twelve (12) month period shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $2,500.
Idaho Code § 74-208(7) was added to encourage and allow governing bodies to “cure” any violations of the Open Meeting Law. Under section 74-208(7)(a), a violation of the law may be cured by a public agency upon: (a) the agency’s self-recognition of a violation; or (b) the service of a complaint alleging a violation of the Law. Once the agency is put on notice of such a violation, it has 14 days to respond by either acknowledging a violation and an intent to cure it or determining that no violation has occurred. Failure to respond shall be treated as a denial for purposes of proceeding with any enforcement action. I.C. § 74-208(7)(a)(i)-(ii). If the agency acknowledges a violation, it has 14 days to cure the violation “by declaring that all actions taken at or resulting from the meeting in violation of this act void.” Idaho Code § 74-208(7)(b). All enforcement actions are stayed during the “response and cure” periods but may recommence at the discretion of the complainant after the cure period has expired. I.C. § 74-208(7)(c). An agency’s cure of an alleged violation “shall act as a bar to the imposition of the civil penalties” provided in the law. I.C. § 74-208(7)(d).
The Illinois Open Meetings Act provides for civil remedies as well as criminal penalties for violations or impending violations of the Act.
If a complaint has been filed by the State's Attorney, the court may impose penalties. Violation of the Illinois Open Meetings Act is a Class C misdemeanor, which is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,500 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-3, 5/5-9-1.
The Open Door Law authorizes penalties in certain circumstances. See Ind. Code § 5-14-1.5-7.5. The Act also provides defenses to civil penalties. Id. § 5-14-1.5-7.5(d). Notably, individuals are personally liable under the Act, unless directed by a public agency officer. Id. § 5-14-1.5-7.5(h), (k).
Up to $500 per violation under K.S.A. 75-4320(a).
Upon a finding that the public agency willfully violated the Open Meetings Act, a Circuit Court, in its discretion, may award an amount not to exceed $100 to the complaining party for each instance in which the Court finds a violation. Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.848(6). Such award will be assessed against the agency responsible for the violation. Id.
Any member of a public body who "knowingly and willfully" participates in a meeting that violates the Open Meeting Law shall be personally liable for a civil penalty of up to $100 per violation. Suit must be instituted within sixty days of the violation. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42:13.
The Act provides for a civil penalty of up to $250 for the first violation and $1,000 for each subsequent violation occurring within 3 years after the first violation for any public body that willfully convenes a closed meeting knowing that it is being held in violation of the Act. § 3-402.
e. It must have some permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary or occasional.
Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees only.
Knowing violation of Open Meetings Act is Class IV misdemeanor for first violation and Class III misdemeanor for second and subsequent violations. Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-1414(4). Maximum penalty for Class IV misdemeanor is $500 fine; no imprisonment available. Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-106(1). Maximum penalty for Class III misdemeanor is three months imprisonment, $500 fine, or both. Id.
A maximum of a $500 civil penalty.
On complaint of the Attorney General or the County Prosecutor, any person who knowingly violates any provision of the Sunshine Law shall be fined $100 for the first offense and $500 for any subsequent offense. N.J.S.A. 10:4-17.
Theoretically, the statute provides for fines of not more than $500, but fines are rarely pursued. Two successful prosecutions have been reported from 1976 and 2002. See NMSA 1978 § 10-15-4.
The North Carolina Open Meetings Law makes no provision for the imposition of fines or other penalties against public bodies or individual members of public bodies. However, the court may order that any or all of an attorney fees assessment be paid personally “by any individual member or members of the public body found by the court to have knowingly or intentionally committed the violation,” unless that individual sought and followed the advice of legal counsel.
Where the court issues an injunction under the statute, the court "shall" order the enjoined public body to pay $500 to the person who successfully sought the injunction. Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(I)(2); Specht v. Finnegan, 149 Ohio App. 3d 201, 776 N.E.2d 564, 2002-Ohio-4660 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.) (assessing a $500 fee for each unlawful meeting).
Upon conviction in a misdemeanor action, a public official may be fined up to $500. See Hillary, supra.
Fines may be imposed by the Oregon Government Ethics Commission. ORS 192.685(1).
The court may impose a civil fine not exceeding $5,000 against a public body or any of its members who have been found to have committed a willful violation of the OML, not to exceed $1,000 total fine for any meeting. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(d).
The act provides for civil fines of five hundred dollars where the public body acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violating the act. S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-110(F).
No civil fine, but possible criminal fine of up to $200. SDCL §22-6-2.
Arguably, fines are available under a liberal reading of T.C.A. § 8-44-106(a), however, there is no reported case indicating that this has been done. Based upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fannon as it relates to attorney’s fees, fines would be unlikely.
Pursuant to Section 551.144, a member of a governmental body who knowingly calls or aids in calling or organizing a special or called closed meeting, or who knowingly closes or aids in closing a regular meeting to the public, or who knowingly participates in a regular, special, or called meeting that is closed to the public, commits a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500 or confinement in the county jail for not less than one month or more than six months, or both. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the member of the governmental body acted in reasonable reliance on a court order or a written interpretation of this Act contained in an opinion of a court of record, the attorney general, or the attorney for the governmental body.
Section 551.143 provides that a member or group of members of a governmental body who knowingly conspires to circumvent the provisions of the Act by meeting in numbers less than a quorum for the purpose of secret deliberations in contravention of the Act commit a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500 or confinement in the county jail for not less than one month or more than six months, or both.
Section 551.145 provides that a “member of a governmental body commits an offense if the member participates in a closed meeting of the governmental body knowing that a certified agenda of the closed meeting is not being kept or that a tape recording of the closed meeting is not being made.” A violation of this subsection is a Class C misdemeanor.
[the Act] is not about censorship but rather about the disclosure of the speech in question. If [the Act’s] true aim was to suppress the content of a governmental body’s speech, then there would be no disclosure requirement. [The Act] is not directed at the content of the public official’s speech or the effect that speech might have on the general public. [The Act] is concerned with giving the public more access to their government. Thus, this Court finds that [the Act] does not suppress speech.
Under Section 551.146, an individual, corporation, or partnership commits an offense if, without lawful authority, he, she or it “knowingly discloses to a member of the public the certified agenda or tape recording of a meeting that was lawfully closed to the public” under the Act. An offense under Section 551.146 is a Class B misdemeanor and there is a provision for a civil remedy including actual damages (including damages for personal injury or damage), lost wages, defamation, or mental or other emotional distress as well as reasonable attorney fees and court costs and exemplary damages. It is a defense to prosecution and an affirmative defense that the defendant had good reason to believe the disclosure was lawful or the disclosure was the result of a mistake of fact concerning the nature or content of the certified agenda or tape recording.
The Open Meetings Act does not establish any fines or penalties for violating the chapter.
A person who is a member of a public body who knowingly and intentionally violates the open meeting law may be fined up to $500. 1 V.S.A. § 314(a).
If the Court finds that the violation was willfully and knowingly made, it will impose upon the member of the public body, in his individual capacity, a civil penalty not less than $250.00 and not more than $1,000.00. The penalty for the second violation shall not be less than $1,000.00 nor more than $2,500.00. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3714.
The court may assess a civil penalty of $500 against each member of the governing body of the agency who attended the meeting knowing it was in violation of the OPMA, or $1,000 for subsequent violations. RCW 42.30.120(1)(2).
Section 7 of the Open Meetings Act provides that a knowing and willful violation of the Open Meetings Act by a member of a public or governmental body constitutes a misdemeanor. The Act provides for a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500. For second and subsequent offenses a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1000 may be levied. W. Va. Code § 6-9A-7.
A willful and knowing violation of the Act is punishable by a civil penalty of not more than $750.


text:
Appeal from Harlan Circuit Court.
Mrs. R.L. Lee was the owner of a Chrysler 70 sedan, which was insured by the Western Automobile Casualty Company against damage caused by accidental collision or upset. While driving her car, it collided with another car and was wrecked. In this action to recover on the policy, the jury returned a verdict in her favor for $1,100. The casualty company appeals.
The original petition alleged that "her said automobile was forced off of the road, and wrecked; that the said automobile was damaged in that the top was mashed, tires bursted, body bent, glass windshield and doors broken, the doors bent, and mashed, the engine broken, steering rods and radius rods bent, and axles bent, and twisted." During the progress of the trial the court permitted appellee to file an amended petition pleading in substance that the machine was injured to such an extent that it was impracticable to repair it, and that it had no value except for salvage purposes. On the filing of the amended petition, appellant asked for a continuance, which, it is claimed, was improperly refused. The allegations of the original petition were sufficient to show that the machine was practically out of commission. The amended petition did not change the cause of action. At most, it merely amplified the damage. There was no showing that appellant was taken by surprise and unable to meet the issue. On the contrary, it was present with witnesses who had examined the machine, and were prepared to testify, and did testify, to the extent of the damage, and expressed the opinion that the machine could be repaired. In the circumstances, the refusal of the continuance was not prejudicial to appellant's substantial rights.
Another contention is that the court erred in refusing to fix the measure of damages as the cost of repairs and replacement, less depreciation, as provided by the policy. The court gave two instructions; one to the effect that, if it was not practicable to repair the car by replacing parts and repairing other parts not to be replaced, the measure of damages was the difference between the fair market value of the automobile immediately before and after the wreck; and the other to the effect that, if the automobile could be repaired, the measure of damages was the cost of placing the automobile back in as good condition as it was immediately before it was injured. Clearly, if the automobile could not be repaired and restored to its former condition, the measure of damages fixed by instruction No. 1, and not that fixed by the policy, was proper. Weil v. Hagan, 161 Ky. 292, 170 S.W. 618; Federal Ins. Co. v. Hiter, 164 Ky. 743, 176 S.W. 210, L.R.A. 1915E, 575. On the other hand, if it was practicable to restore the car to its former condition by repairing certain parts and replacing others, the measure of damages fixed in the second instruction was substantially the same as that fixed by the policy. In the circumstances, the given instructions covered the law of the case, and it was not error to refuse the offered instruction on the measure of damages.
Appellant also complains of the court's refusal to give offered instructions to the effect that, if appellee failed to give immediate notice in writing of the accident, or failed more than 60 days after the accident to furnish the company with a sworn statement of proof of loss, the jury should find for the company. In her petition, appellee pleaded facts showing a waiver of these provisions. On the hearing it was shown that D.H. Bingham, appellant's local agent, was advised of the accident the day it occurred. Three days later he came to see appellee, and was informed of all the facts concerning the accident. About a week after the accident occurred, appellant sent its adjuster, C.D. Richards, to Harlan. At that time he and Mr. Bingham, the local agent, took a written statement from appellee, which was signed and sworn to. Appellee was then confined to her home, and inquired of them about the insurance. Mr. Bingham, in the presence of the adjuster, told her not to worry about it, as he would attend to everything for her. Thus it will be seen that both appellant's local agent, and its adjuster, not only received and acted on the oral notice, but that the local agent, in the presence of the adjuster, told appellee not to worry about the insurance, that he would attend to it for her. Clearly, any ordinarily prudent person in appellee's situation was justified in believing not only that the oral notice and written statement were sufficient, but that, unless notified by the company, nothing further would be required of her, which, under the repeated decisions of this court, operated as a waiver of the provisions in question. Continental Casualty Co. v. Linn, 226 Ky. 328, 10 S.W.2d 1079; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Weekley, 232 Ky. 548, 24 S.W.2d 292; Royal Exchange Assurance of London, England, Inc., v. Collins, 231 Ky. 31, 20 S.W.2d 1023. Not only so, but, unless the policy provides for forfeitures for failure to make proof of loss within 60 days, such failure is not available as a defense, if proof is furnished within a reasonable time. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Kirtley, 243 Ky. 162, 47 S.W.2d 922, 923. Here the policy did not provide for a forfeiture, and proof of loss was furnished on November 17, 1930, which was only 64 days after the accident, and there can be no doubt that this was within a reasonable time. As the foregoing facts were shown by uncontradicted evidence, the court did not err in deciding the questions as matters of law and refusing the offered instructions.
We deem it unnecessary to review at length the evidence as to whether the machine could be repaired, and as to the extent of the damage. In our opinion, it was sufficient not only to take the case to the jury, but to sustain the verdict.

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