Denver Law Review - DLR Online - Denver's Green Roof Initiative: Is it Susceptible to Developer Challenge?
Denver's Green Roof Initiative: Is it Susceptible to Developer Challenge?
Denver citizens passed the Green Roof Initiative (Initiative) on November 7, 2017, as part of a growing worldwide trend toward greater environmental consciousness in city planning. The Initiative compels builders to install plant material or a combination of plant materials and solar energy collection on a portion of the building’s roof. Buildings over 25,000 square feet of floor area must have a minimum of 20% of their roofs covered in green material. This ratio increases in proportion with the size of the project, with a peak of 60% required for buildings over 200,000 square feet. The Initiative reaches all new construction and remodels or additions undertaken after January 1, 2018.
Based on the novelty of green roof technology and its cost–benefit analysis, there is a nationwide lack of consensus among cities on how best to implement green roof policies. Multiple cities have passed ordinances incentivizing green roof construction through rebates, density bonuses, and tax breaks. For example, Chicago’s green roof ordinance provides developers with tax-increment finance dollars for green roofs installed in the downtown area. A minority of cities, Denver included, have passed ordinances mandating green-roof construction, imposing penalties for failure to comply with the ordinance. The Initiative took effect January 1, 2018; any new construction or remodeling projects undertaken after that date requires applicants to apply for a green roof permit from the Denver Planning Board as part of the general permitting process. The Initiative grandfathers any existing projects if the applicant submitted a complete building permit application or site plan application prior to January 1, 2018. As part of the application process, an applicant must pay an additional fee for the permit and provide information about the project’s “structural design; intended use of the roof and whether or not it will be accessible to the public; and fire safety provisions.” Anyone who violates the Initiative faces a fine of $999.00 or imprisonment of up to one year.
As part of the Initiative, the mayor of Denver appoints members for a Green Roof Technical Advisory Group to assist with “technical issues relating to the creation, implementation[,] and development of the City of Denver Green Roof Construction Standard.” As currently proposed, the Initiative contemplates exemptions from the green roof requirements. If an applicant is unable to comply with the green roof requirements due to infeasibility, the applicant may contact the Denver Planning Board to receive a complete or partial exemption. In the event of a cash-in-lieu of a total or partial green roof exemption, an applicant must pay $25.00 per square foot to cover the cost of the difference between the required green-square-footage and the actual green-square-footage, with the funds directed to the Denver Office of Sustainability. Although the Initiative is still in its infancy and has not yet fully been implemented, its mandatory provisions raise an important land-use issue: exactions.
Here, the Initiative likely bears a sufficient nexus to increased sustainability in order to be considered a legitimate governmental purpose. Consequently, any challenge to the sufficiency of the nexus would likely fail. The stated purpose behind the Initiative is to address a multitude of environmental concerns as addressed in Denver’s 2020 Sustainability Goals. Denver’s Sustainability Goals are undoubtedly a proper use of the police power because increased sustainability may benefit citizens’ health, safety, and welfare. The citizens who proposed the Initiative explain that mandated green roofs will reduce Denver’s urban heat island effect by absorbing solar energy through evapotranspiration, thus reducing heat-flow throughout Denver between 70% and 90% in the summer and 10% and 30% in the winter. They also believe that green roofs will alleviate Denver’s “storm‑water drainage issues” by trapping storm water in the foliage and allowing its release into the Denver storm-water-drainage system at a more measured pace. They also cite Denver’s goal of growing 20% of food in the city, promoting green roofs as a viable solution to achieve the agricultural goal. Finally, they believe that green roofs will help benefit Denver’s air quality by cooling the ambient air and trapping particulates.
Scientific studies suggest green roofs do perform in many of the ways that the citizens who proposed the Initiative suggest. Following increased interest in and installation of green roofs in Hong Kong, the Architectural Services Department completed an extensive study examining green roofs’ costs and benefits in cities throughout the world. The study concluded that green roofs do offer tangible benefits. These results suggest that the Initiative does have a direct relationship to the sustainability goals unlike the ‘out-and-out’ plan of extortion” in Nollan.  Consequently, any challenge brought solely under the Nollan “essential nexus” test is likely to fail. Courts, however, apply Nollan in conjunction with “rough proportionality” as part of a two-pronged test to determine if an exaction occurred.
Here, the Initiative likely fails to be roughly proportionate to the nature and extent of the developments’ impact. A developer may successfully bring suit against Denver for an exaction because the potentially oppressive cost of installing a green roof on a new building, remodel, or addition likely fails to be roughly proportional to the development’s impact on Denver’s environment. The proper inquiry for the development’s impact is the single parcel in question, not the aggregate impact of all developments on Denver’s environment. For example, the Initiative mandates that a 42,800 square-foot grocery store have 20% green roof coverage. To install the green roof, the grocery store faces an added cost of roughly $300,000. The additional $300,000 likely is excessive when considering the effect that such a building would have on Denver’s urban heat index and storm-water-drainage system. Furthermore, the available exemption does not save the Initiative from being declared an unconstitutional exaction. The cash-in-lieu of a total or partial green roof exemption remains susceptible to challenge because it is still an exaction, albeit in a different form than a physical dedication. Consequently, courts would apply the same analysis for the cash-in-lieu of compliance exception and the green roof dedication.
In short, the Initiative is tackling a noble goal, but the current mandate is not the proper method for implementation because it leaves Denver vulnerable to constitutional challenges by irate developers. Instead, Denver should explore amending the Initiative to rely on incentive‑based regulations. Such a change is harmonious with the Initiative because the Initiative contains a provision allowing the Green Roof Technical Advisory Group to review and amend the Denver Green Roof Construction Standard. As evidenced in the Hong Kong study on green roofs, an incentive-based regulatory scheme will not detract from the Initiative’s goals. Green roofs inspired by incentives still achieve the Initiative’s stated goals and have the added benefit of insulating Denver from takings suits.
[*] Kate Madden is an Staff Editor for the Denver Law Review, and a 2019 J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
 Denver’s Green Roof Initiative, City & County Denv., https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/denver-development-services/commercial-projects/green-roof-initiative.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
 See Juliya Litichevskaya, Reviving the World Wonder: Why Rooftop Gardens Should Cover Urban Landscapes, 37 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 58, 59 (2011); Jane Jacobs, The Greening of the City, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/16/magazine/the-greening-of-the-city.html.
 Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, ch. 10, art. XIII, § 10-301(a)(2) (2018).
 Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy Incentives, 112 Penn St. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2008).
 Id. at 756; James D. Brown, Biophilic Laws: Planning for Cities with Nature, 34 Va. Envtl. L.J. 52, 86–89 (2016).
 Bradley Ritter et al., The Chicago Standard , CBA Rec., Nov. 2010, at 54.
 There is an additional fee unless the permit is sought in conjunction with a general building construction permit. § 10-302(b)(1)–(2).
 Boards and Commissions, City & County Denv., https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/mayors-office/about-the-office-of-the-mayor/boards-commissions.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
 The Initiative requires a Green Roof Technical Advisory Group to flesh out the technical standards. Faith Managan, Denver Grappling over How to Enforce Stringent Mandatory Roof Gardens Rule, Fox News (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/01/25/denver-grappling-over-how-to-enforce-stringent-mandatory-roof-gardens-rule.html.
 Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building Laws and the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 Envtl. L. 507, 525–26, 552 (2009). Some studies have shown that green roof installations may cost developers an additional $15.00 to $18.00 per square foot. Catherine Malina, Up on the Roof: Implementing Local Government Policies to Promote and Achieve the Environmental, Social, and Economic Benefits of Green Roof Technology, 23 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 437, 445 (2011).
 Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
 Craig James Doran, First English Evangelical of Glendale v. Los Angeles County and Nolan v. California Coastal Commission: The Big Chill, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 325, 346 (1987).
 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 537–38, 541 (2005) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
 Richard D. Rattner & Patrick M. Ellis, After Koontz: Practical Considerations, Real Implications, 40 Mich. Real Prop. Rev. 105, 105 (2014).
 Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537).
 See W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. & Bryan D. Wenter, Recent Developments in Exactions and Impact Fees, 41 Urb. Law. 513, 514 (2009).
 See Rattner & Ellie, supra note 26.
 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
 Id. at 837 , 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (1981)).
 Our Mission: Why is this Important?, Denv. Green Roof Initiative, http://www.denvergreenroof.org/our-mission (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
 Litichevskaya, supra note 2, at 67.
 Our Mission: Why is this Important?, supra note 38.
 Litichevskaya, supra note 2, at 65.
 See e.g., Shining the Light on Green Roofs: Analyzing Data from the Region 8 EPA Green Roof Study (Part 1), Energy Design Update, Apr. 2013, at 1–9; Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Sitting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions to Alleviate Urban Poverty and Promote Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 41, 51–52, 54 (2010).
 Architectural Servs. Dep’t, Study on Green Roof Application in Hong Kong 6 (2006), https://www.archsd.gov.hk/media/11630/green_roof_study_final_report.pdf.
 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (1981)).
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
 Lauren Reznick, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 725, 736 (2007).
 Madelyn Morris & Mary Griffith, Regulatory Taking Claims in Massachusetts, 82 Mass. L. Rev. 237, 242 (1997) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391).
 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 400–01.
 Carolynne White & Caitlin Quander, Denver Green Roof Initiative Passed by Denver Voters, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.bhfs.com/Templates/media/files/2017_11_09%20Denver%20Green%20Roof%20Initiative%20Passed%20by%20Denver%20Voters.pdf.
 Malcolm M. Murray, Life After Dolan: Will It Ever Be the Same?, 24 Colo. Law. 59, 61 (1995).
 Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code, ch. 10, art. XIII, § 10-305(c)(1)(b)–(c) (2018).
 See Architectural Servs. Dep’t, supra note 43.


§ 165-2 Power vested in Chief.
§ 165-3 Immunities and privileges of firemen.
§ 165-4 Fire limits established.
§ 165-6 Stopping for fire apparatus.
§ 165-7 Stopping by fire hydrants.
§ 165-8 Removal of interfering vehicles.
§ 165-9 Penalties for offenses.
§ 165-11 False fire alarms.
§ 165-12 Interference with fire alarm system.
§ 165-13 Keys to signal boxes.
§ 165-14 Driving over fire hose.
§ 165-15 Obstructing fire hydrants.
§ 165-16 Use of fire hydrants.
§ 165-17 Removing, damaging or destroying fire equipment.
§ 165-18 Interference with fire apparatus or firemen.
§ 165-19 Establishment of fire line.
§ 165-20 Penalties for offenses.
§ 165-21 Certified access to be provided.
§ 165-22 Access required prior to issuance of certificate of occupancy.
§ 165-24 Penalties for offenses.
§ 165-27 Deliveries of petroleum products to service stations.
§ 165-28 Tanks used for storage or maintenance of petroleum products.
§ 165-29 Maintenance of storage tanks.
§ 165-30 Spilling or unlawfully depositing petroleum products.
§ 165-31 Penalties for offenses.
§ 165-35 One- and two-family dwellings.
§ 165-36 Devices to be maintained in good working order.
§ 165-38 Penalties for offenses.
Blasting — See Ch. 89.


In respect of the project to revise the RPBA, we believe that the aim should not be to limit the rights of the parties to the proceedings but to harmonize the practice of the Boards and thereby to make decisions more foreseeable. To this end, it appears appropriate to keep in mind that the RPBA are not a set of Rules to be seen in isolation. Rather, the basic principles of the Convention have to be kept in mind, in particular the fundamental principle of the right to be heard. It should not happen that the right to be heard is interpreted in the light of the RPBA3 but the RPBA should be drafted and interpreted in the light of the right to be heard. The amended text should contain a clear statement that the RPBA have to be applied in conformity with the parties’ right to be heard.
The Draft recites the EBA’s statement in G 9/91 that it is the primary purpose of the appeal proceedings to judicially review the decision under appeal. Implementing this principle, numerous restrictions of the parties’ right to make submissions have been justified in the past and more are now proposed for the future.
The requirement that the appeal shall be directed to the "requests … on which the decision under appeal was based" may be interpreted to restrict the parties to the requests submitted in first instance proceedings. In this respect, see the comments on Art. 12(6).
Making the justification of new submissions a requirement for routine cases would have the consequence that the justification will be an additional point at issue in all inter partes cases. Being obliged to act in the interest of his client, the opponent’s representative will have to object to the amendment in all cases. This will certainly not make appeal proceedings more efficient.
Art. 12(4) RPBA as in force, corresponding to Art. 10a(4) RPBA 2003 was conceived as an exception to the general rule in Art. 12(1) RPBA that appeal proceedings shall be based on the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply thereto, thereby more or less guaranteeing the consideration of any subject matter relating to the case if filed at the very beginning of appeal proceedings. This becomes clear from the structure of the provision, the first paragraph containing the general rule and the fourth paragraph an exception. The wording "Without prejudice to the power … to hold inadmissible … everything shall be taken into account …" also shows that the overriding principle is to take everything into account which is limited by the Board’s power to hold certain submissions inadmissible.
It may be added that the EBA in G 7/93 did not accept the procedural reasons for not allowing the amendment, stating that the amendment, requested at the latest possible date, should be allowed. The EBA concluded that the importance to the party of obtaining a valid patent was decisive, even if the amendment caused a short delay. Thus, the EBA considered the substantive interest of the party in obtaining appropriate protection as a more relevant criterion than the interest of the Examining Division to terminate the case without further effort. It appears that, for justifying restrictions for reviewing the discretion exercised by the departments of first instance, an isolated sentence is taken out from G 7/93 without accepting the EBA’s general message that it is the main task of the EPO to grant appropriate protection for the invention disclosed in the application.
The drafting of both sentences Art. 12 (6) of the proposal that the "Board shall not admit" … submissions … "unless" … will be interpreted to mean that admission is the exception. In practice, it is a quite normal situation, that the appellant, having studied the decision under appeal, accepts the reasoning and pursues his case with claims removing the deficiencies objected to in the requests submitted with his grounds of appeal. For ex parte cases, this is expressly foreseen in Art. 109 EPC, providing for interlocutory revision. The main case for interlocutory revision is that the applicant removes the deficiencies on which the refusal of the application was based. In this situation, the Examining Division is obliged to grant interlocutory revision.19 However, this presupposes that the amendment with claims which could/should have been submitted in first instance proceedings is to be admitted.
Only submissions not made in due time may be disregarded at the Boards’ discretion. This discretion is not free and unlimited. As any discretionary decision in judicial proceedings, the discretion has to be exercised in an objective manner considering all relevant circumstances.20 Thus, as a rule, it is not the admission of submissions which requires justification, but disregarding submissions has to be reasoned in an objective and understandable way.
5.3	Art. 15(7) and (8) rev.
Notwithstanding the above objections to abridged decisions as proposed, decisions could often be drafted more to the point and at the same time more efficiently. Quite often decisions are much too long repeating the whole history of the case and all submissions of the parties. Board members should be trained to write shorter decisions, i.e. decisions not containing details which are not relevant for the Board’s conclusions on which the order of the decision is based.
Anetsberger, Wegner, Ann et al., Increasing Formalism in Appeal Proceedings – The Boards of Appeal Headed to a mere Reviewing Instance?, epi Information 2/15, 63.
G 9/91, OJ EPO 1993, 408 – Power to examine/ROHM AND HAAS, Reasons Pt. 18.
G 7/93, OJ EPO 1994, 775 – Late submissions.


Individuals may often have a complex estate plan, but failure to properly address a retirement plan beneficiary designation can cause havoc. Regardless of what a client’s estate plan may say, the beneficiary designation under the client’s IRA governs. For many clients, their largest asset is their retirement plan. IRAs in particular require special attention because they are subject to both estate taxes and income taxes. Listed below is a summary of “The Good, The Bad and The Ugly” issues to be mindful of as you navigate through the complex rules that govern retirement plans and beneficiary designations.
over the life expectancy of the designated beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-3.
THE GOOD: If the designated beneficiary is the participant’s spouse, there is increased flexibility and the surviving spouse may roll over to his or her own IRA. Note: Where the distribution is made by reason of the death of the participant, distributions from the participant’s account to the surviving spouse under age 59½ are NOT subject to the 10 percent early distribution tax under IRC § 72(t). PLR 9418034 (February 10, 1994).
the life expectancy of the designated beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5.
Note: If the designated beneficiary is the participant’s spouse – increased flexibility.
Designated Beneficiary: Individual identified as a beneficiary of the Plan and is determined as of September 30 following the year of the participant’s death. Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-4.
When will a trust qualify as a “designated beneficiary?” See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4.
THE BAD: Unless the trust includes specific “Stretch IRA Trust” or “Conduit Trust” language and the beneficiary designations are properly updated, even if the trust is treated as a “designated beneficiary,” the OLDEST trust beneficiary is used for purposes of determining the distribution period for the minimum required distribution. Treas Reg § 1.401(a)(9)-4.
Look through the trust to the life expectancies of ALL beneficiaries – including contingent beneficiaries and identify the beneficiary with the shortest life expectancy (oldest beneficiary). Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A 7(c); See also PLR 200228025 (April 18, 2002).
THE UGLY: If a traditional living trust is the beneficiary…there is the potential for increased complications!
Marital Trust Problem: If retirement assets are used to fund the marital trust (a.k.a QTIP Trust), issues arise if a charity is an ultimate beneficiary, and excess income taxes may be incurred. The QTIP Trust may receive a required minimum distribution from the IRA that is greater than the income earned by the IRA and the income will often be taxed at the maximum federal income tax rate.
Credit Shelter Trust: Often the surviving spouse is the applicable measuring life for purposes of the minimum required distribution. The income tax liability associated with the minimum required distribution depletes the assets of the credit shelter trust. But, if assets are distributed to the surviving spouse, this is counter to the purpose of the credit shelter trust.
These issues can be avoided if (i) your existing living trust is amended to include “Stretch IRA Trust” or “Conduit Trust” language which would enable for maximum income tax planning; and (ii) your beneficiary designations are properly updated to correspond with those changes.
Generally, from a tax perspective and in an effort to ease administrative burdens, it is best to appoint an individual beneficiary (vs. a trust); name several contingent beneficiaries so that “disclaimers” / post-mortem planning is an option.
If a client insists on using a trust, consider drafting a 401k trust (also known as a “Stretch IRA Trust” or a “Conduit Trust”), a trust customized to ONLY hold the retirement plan beneficiary designations and circumvent some of the traditional problems associated with naming a trust as a designated beneficiary.
If beneficiary designation is a living trust, include customized language that allows the trustee to accelerate the distribution to any disqualified beneficiary before the September 30 after grantor’s death, or try to have “bad beneficiaries” disclaim interest before September 30 date – not always an option.
We would be happy to discuss your particular circumstances and review your existing estate planning documents and beneficiary designations to ensure effective estate planning and income tax planning.


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STATEMENT BY MR. CHIER JUSTICE FULLER.
Ellis brought his action in the circuit court for Douglas county, Wis., against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, E. L. Johnson, W. H. Sage, and Henry W. Bradford, July 1, 1889, to quiet title to seven lots in the city of Superior, deraigned through one Roberts, to whom the county of Douglas, which held under certain taxdeeds, had conveyed, and then averred that the Northern Pacific Railroad Company asserted title to the lots under a certain deed, a copy of which was given. This deed recited that by resolution of the county board of supervisors, passed on the 7th day of September, 1880, and duly entered in their record of proceedings, the county of Douglas offered and agreed to transfer, by good and sufficient deed or deeds, to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, all the alienable lots or lands belonging to the said county of Douglas, which had been acquired by deed, and to which said county had held undisputed title during two years then last past, upon condition that the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company should, within the year 1881, construct, complete, and equip a railroad from the Northern Pacific junction, entering the state of Wisconsin, and running therein between the St. Louis and the Nemadji rivers to the bay of Superior, at or near the mouth of the Nemadji river, and thence to Connor's point, along or near the westerly side of said bay, with a depot, and conventient connections with docks or piers; that the railroad company, by resolution of its board of directors, duly accepted the offer and terms of the agreement, and constructed, completed, and equipped a railroad as required; and therefore the county 'hereby quitclaims to the Northern Pacific Railroad, grantee, in consideration of the premises, and for the sum of one dollar in hand paid by said grantee,' etc., the lots in question, and others,—the deed being duly executed by the county clerk and sealed with the county seal, with proper witnesses and acknowledgment.
It was further alleged that prior to the issuing of the deed the county board of Douglas county, on or about the 16th day of December, 1880, entered into a contract with the railroad company, substantially as appeared by the recitals in the deed, with the exception of an extension of time for one year in which to complete the road; that the contract was without authority upon the part of the county, and its acts were ultra vires and void; that the railroad company neither paid to the county or for its use, nor contracted to pay, any valuable consideration, nor to issue, nor did it issue, any stock in the company to the county, or for its use, nor did the county ever subscribe for or agree to take any stock in the company; and that the only consideration for the conveyance was the bonus or inducement to the company to locate its road in Superior.
That the defendants Sage, Johnson, and Bradford, respectively, claimed, as owners of the original title, some interest in some of these lots; and abstracts showing the chain of title were affixed as exhibits.
That the value of all the lots was $1,400; and that by reason of the premises the plaintiff was embarrassed and injured in his title, etc.
The prayer was for a decree that the plaintiff be adjudged the owner of the lots in fee-simple, free from any lien, claim, title, or right made or exercised, or attempted to be made or exercised, by the defendants, or any them, by virtue of their several claims of ownership, and that the deed from the county of Douglas to the railroad company be adjudged illegal, null, and void, and the plaintiff quieted in his title and possession, etc.
The railroad company filed its demurrer to the complaint on July 23, 1889, assigning as grounds multifariousness and insufficiency of facts stated to constitute a cause of action.
August 22, 1889, the Douglas county circuit court entered an order overruling the demurrer, from which order the railroad company prosecuted an appeal to the supreme court of Wisconsin.
The supreme court held that 'a conveyance of its lands by a county as a donation to a railroad company is void, and the legislature, having no power to authorize such donation in the first instance, cannot by a subsequent statute validate the conveyance,' and that the deed in question was therefore void; and it gave judgment May 20, 1890, affirming the order of the court below, and remanding the cause for further proceedings. Ellis v. Railroad Co., 77 Wis. 114, 45 N. W. Rep. 811.
The opinion and order were filed in the Douglas county circuit court July 23, 1890, and on August 15, 1890, the company filed its answer, reasserting, among other things, its claim under the deed of the county.
March 11, 1891, the company applied for leave to file a supplemental answer, which was denied; and on March 30th the court made its findings, upon which judgment was rendered April 13, 1891, establishing the title of the plaintiff, and adjudging the invalidity of the railroad company's claim.
A bill of exceptions was duly signed, and contained the supplemental answer, which the railroad company had asked leave to file, and the motion for such leave, and the order thereon denying it. This supplemental answer averred that on December 13, 1889, the railroad company filed its bill of complaint in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Wisconsin against Roberts, Johnson, and Ellis, (the plaintiff in this case,) setting forth the passage of resolutions by the board of supervisors of Douglas county, the acceptance by the company of the proposition therein made, and its compliance therewith by the construction of the line of railroad required to be built, and the conveyance to the company in accordance with another resolution of the board, whereby it was alleged the company became owner in fee-simple of the real estate mentioned therein, of which all but the seven lots embraced in this action was claimed in the complaint; that the identical question involved in this suit was involved in the case in the circuit court of the United States, which was heard, upon bill and answer, November 18, 1890, and taken under advisement, and on February 11, 1891, that court directed a decree in favor of the company and against the defendants, which decree was afterwards, on March 7, 1891, duly entered; it being thereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the company was the full, legal, and beneficial owner of all the lands described in the bill of complaint in said cause, and that the deeds of conveyance by the county to Roberts and by Roberts to Ellis were and are invalid and of no force and effect as against the complainant; and the railroad company insisted upon this decree as an absolute bar to the relief prayed in his action.
The bill of exceptions also showed the evidence offered on the trial in the state court, including the resolutions of the supervisors of Douglas county and of the railroad company, and the record of the suit in the United States court, which was offered in evidence but exclued; exceptions being taken by the railroad company. From the judgment of the circuit court for Douglas county the railroad company appealed to the supreme court of the state, which on November 17, 1891, affirmed it.
A writ of error was thereupon sued out from this court.
Wm. F. Vilas, for the motion.
A. H. Garland and H. J. May, opposed.
The motion to dismiss the writ of error must be sustained. The decision of the supreme court of Wisconsin rested upon an independent ground, not involving a federal question, and broad enough to maintain the judgment. Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141.
The supreme court held that by reason of its decision of May 20, 1890, when the case was presented to the court on the appeal of the railroad company from the order of the lower court upon demurrer, the rights of the parties were res adjudicata, and that it was itself, as the parties were, bound by its own former judgment. Its conclusion had been announced, and its mandate had gone down, and it had no power upon a second appeal to review that judgment. This is the settled rule in Wisconsin (Lathrop v. Knapp, 37 Wis. 307; Fire Department v. Tuttle, 50 Wis. 552, 7 N. W. Rep. 549) and in this court, (Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 464, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 568; Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U. S. 567, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Peck v. Sanderson, 18 How. 42; Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9.) Under these circumstances the judgment of the supreme court is not subject to review here.
The suit in the state court, involving certain lots, was commenced before the institution of the action in respect to other real estate in the circuit court of the United States; and the judgment of the supreme court of the state had become res adjudicata between the parties before the decree was entered by the circuit court. The judgment before us was rendered in accordance with well-settled principles of general law, not involving any federal question, and did not deny to the decree of the circuit court the effect which would be accorded under similar circumstances to the judgments and decrees of the state court.

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KING v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY January 31, 2011 No. 08-35988.
HRDLICKA v. RENIFF January 31, 2011 Nos. 09-15768, 09-16956.
RANGEL ZUAZO v. HOLDER January 31, 2011 No. 07-72316.
STANLEY v. CULLEN January 31, 2011 No. 08-99026.
UNITED STATES v. MUNOZ CAMARENA January 28, 2011 No. 09-50088.
YOUNG v. HOLDER January 28, 2011 No. 07-70949.
ALAMEDA BOOKS INC v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES January 28, 2011 No. 09-55367.
UNITED STATES v. LEYVA MARTINEZ January 27, 2011 No. 10-50269.
MEJIA HERNANDEZ v. HOLDER January 27, 2011 No. 07-74277.
M. AVILA; Ariella Adonnamarie Abbot; Melissa Louise Abbot; Judith N. Alvarez; Aaron Gabriel Arlich; Christina Michelle Arlich; Jarrod Alan Arlich; John Alan Arlich; Matthew J. Arlich; Pamela Jo Arlich, et al. (See Exhibit A of Notice of Appeal for full .. January 27, 2011 Nos. 09-16455, 09-16457, 09-16459, 09-17852.
UNITED STATES v. LICHTENBERG January 27, 2011 No. 09-10191.
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA RIVER WATCH v. WILCOX January 26, 2011 No. 08-15780.
ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES v. COTTRELL January 25, 2011 No. 09-35756.
UNITED STATES v. BURGUM January 25, 2011 No. 09-50449.
UNITED STATES v. JENKINS January 25, 2011 Nos. 09-10109, 09-10110.
COLEMAN PAGA v. ESTES EXPRESS LINES INC January 25, 2011 No. 10-56852.
GREEN v. UNITED STATES January 25, 2011 No. 09-16180.
UNITED STATES v. GONZALEZ DIAZ January 24, 2011 Nos. 10-30002, 10-30030.
PECK v. AT MOBILITY January 24, 2011 No. 09-36113.
GAETA v. PERRIGO PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY BASF January 24, 2011 No. 09-15001.
UNITED STATES v. CAROTHERS January 24, 2011 No. 10-50191.
COLLINS v. GEE WEST SEATTLE LLC January 21, 2011 No. 09-36110.
LINTON v. UNITED STATES January 21, 2011 No. 09-35681.
UNITED STATES v. RICHEY FAWPEAS January 21, 2011 No. 09-35462.
UNITED STATES v. LIU January 21, 2011 No. 09-10136.
DESTFINO v. REISWIG DB January 21, 2011 No. 09-16214.
LOPEZ v. RYAN January 20, 2011 No. 08-99021.
HARRIS v. MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT January 20, 2011 No. 09-15833.
VIRIDIANA v. HOLDER January 19, 2011 No. 06-73335.
LIBERAL v. ESTRADA January 19, 2011 No. 08-17360.
CLAIRMONT v. SOUND MENTAL HEALTH January 19, 2011 No. 09-35856.
LI v. HOLDER January 19, 2011 No. 06-73365.
IN RE: the Matter of the SEARCH OF the PREMISES LOCATED AT 840 140TH AVENUE NE January 19, 2011 No. 09-35096.
UNITED STATES v. LINDSEY January 14, 2011 No. 09-50459.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. JT USA LP JTR LLC January 14, 2011 No. 09-70219.
UNITED STATES v. DOSS January 14, 2011 No. 07-50334.
THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE January 14, 2011 No. 09-35200.
HOWELL v. BOYLE January 14, 2011 No. 09-36153.
PEREZ v. CATE January 13, 2011 No. 09-17185.
UNITED STATES v. BEGAY January 12, 2011 No. 07-10487.
LAS VEGAS SANDS LLC DBA v. NEHME January 11, 2011 No. 09-16740.
HUFF v. CITY OF BURBANK January 11, 2011 No. 09-55239.
DAWSON v. ENTEK INTERNATIONAL January 10, 2011 No. 09-35844.
IN RE: ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS January 7, 2011 No. 09–71265.
CHAPMAN v. PIER IMPORTS INC 1132 January 7, 2011 No. 07-16326.
HAYES v. AYERS January 7, 2011 No. 07-99014.
UNITED STATES v. CARONA January 6, 2011 No. 09-50235.
UNITED STATES v. CARONA January 6, 2011 No. 09–50235.
BYRD v. MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT January 5, 2011 No. 07-16640.
LAKEY v. HICKMAN January 5, 2011 No. 09-15940.
ROSAS CASTANEDA v. HOLDER January 4, 2011 No. 10–70087.
PERRY v. SCHWARZENEGGER January 4, 2011 No. 10-16696.
UNITED STATES v. MONTES January 4, 2011 Nos. 08-10539, 08-10559.
TRUNK v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO January 4, 2011 Nos. 08-56415, 08-56436.
ENYART v. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS INC January 4, 2011 Nos. 10-15286, 10-16392.
PERRY v. SCHWARZENEGGER January 4, 2011 No. 10-16751.
HOOPER v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO January 4, 2011 No. 09-55954.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS January 4, 2011 No. 09-50113.
ROSAS CASTANEDA v. HOLDER January 4, 2011 No. 10-70087.
FIER v. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE CO OF AMERICA January 4, 2011 No. 09-17520.
UNITED STATES v. LIQUIDATORS OF EUROPEAN FEDERAL CREDIT BANK January 4, 2011 Nos. 09-10116, 09-10161, 09-10183.
HAMILTON v. BROWN January 4, 2011 No. 09-15236.
UMG RECORDINGS INC v. AUGUSTO January 4, 2011 No. 08-55998.
UNITED STATES v. CHAUDHRY January 3, 2011 No. 09-10381.
Alfred ALBANO, an unmarried man; Monica Lewis, an unmarried woman; Samantha Baker, an individual; Ariel Barr, an unmarried man; Phillip Barr, a single man; Keith Bodie, husband; Stacy Bodie, wife; Jon L. Bruce, an individual; Craig Burke, husband; Linda.. January 3, 2011 No. 09-15808.
RIZK v. HOLDER January 3, 2011 No. 06-74213.
UNITED STATES v. ANAYA ACOSTA January 3, 2011 No. 09-50610.
UNITED STATES v. CONTRERAS HERNANDEZ January 3, 2011 No. 09-50009.

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text:
A terminal fitting is mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber. The terminal fitting includes a bite resistance increasing part that is formed only at an upper portion of a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance and increases a bite resistance to the lance. An lower portion of the hole edge engagement end face is flat. The bite resistance increasing part has a wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face.
20060172620 Terminal fitting and a connector provided therewith 2006-08-03 Noro et al.
20060172615 Terminal fitting 2006-08-03 Noro et al.
20060063427 CONNECTOR 2006-03-23 Tanaka et al.
International Search Report dated Nov. 8, 2011 issued by the International Searching Authority in counterpart International Application No. PCT/JP2011/069209.
Written Opinion dated Nov. 8, 2011 issued by the International Searching Authority in counterpart International Application No. PCT/JP2011/069209.
Office Action, dated Jan. 17, 2014, issued by the Korean Intellectual Property Office, in counterpart Application No. 10-2013-7004681.
Office Action, Issued by the Korean Intellectual Property Office, Dated Aug. 29, 2014, in counterpart 10-2013-7004681.
Communication dated Jul. 8, 2014, issued by the Japanese Patent Office in counterpart Japanese Application No. 2010-188560.
Office Action dated Sep. 26, 2014 issued by The State Intellectual Property Office Of The People's Republic Of China in counterpart Chinese Application No. 201180040216.5.
Communication dated Mar. 31, 2015 issued by the Korean Intellectual Property Office in counterpart Korean Patent Application No. 10-2013-7004681.
Office Action issued Mar. 3, 2015 in corresponding Japanese patent application No. 2010-188560 with English translation.
Office Action issued on Mar. 25, 2015 in corresponding Chinese patent application No. 201180040216.5 with English translation.
Office Action issued on Jun. 8, 2015 in Korean patent application No. 10-2013-7004681 with English translation.
This application is a continuation of PCT application No. PCT/JP2011/069209, which was filed on Aug. 25, 2011 based on Japanese Patent Applications No. 2010-188560 filed on Aug. 25, 2010, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Also, all the references cited herein are incorporated as a whole.
1. A terminal fitting mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber, the terminal fitting comprising: a bite resistance increasing part that is formed both on an upper portion and a lower portion of a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance and increases a bite resistance to the lance, and the bite resistance increasing part has a wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face.
2. A terminal fitting mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber, the terminal fitting comprising: a bite resistance increasing part that is formed both on an upper portion and an lower portion of a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance and increases a bite resistance to the lance, the bite resistance increasing part has a wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the upper portion and the lower portion of the hole edge engagement end face.
The present invention relates to a terminal fitting which is mounted to a terminal accommodation chamber by being engaged with a lance which is elastically deformably provided in a connector housing.
In order to increase a retaining force of a terminal fitting, a hooking margin of a lance to a front portion of a hole edge of an engaging hole may be increased by increasing a width dimension of the lance. However, since some of the terminal fittings have a stabilizer for stabilizing a posture of the terminal fitting which is projected on a rear end of an outer face of a connection part, there may occur a matter that the lance and the stabilizer are overlapped and interfered with each other when the lance with a large width as described above has substantially the same width over the entire length thereof.
A connector to solve such a problem is disclosed in JP-A-2005-259363, for example. As shown in FIG. 8, in this connector, a stabilizer 509 is projected on an outer face of a connection part 501 and intended to guide an insertion operation of a terminal fitting 507 through an insertion groove 505 provided on an inner wall of a cavity 503. A lance 511 is provided on the inner wall of the cavity 503. The lance 511 is provided with an engaging part 517 and an escape recess part 519. The engaging part 517 can be engaged over the substantially entire width of an engaged face 513 of a protrusion (not shown) and a front part 515 of a hole edge of an engaging hole (not shown), which are provided in the connection part 501. The escape recess part 519 is provided at a portion which is located in the rear of the engaging part 517 and overlapped with the engaging part 517 in a width direction. The escape recess part 519 is communicated with the insertion groove 505 to allow the stabilizer 509 to enter the insertion groove 505.
According to the above configuration, since the engaging part 517 of the lance 511 is engaged over the substantially entire width of the engaged part (the engaged face 513 and the front part 515 of the hole edge of the engaging hole (not shown)) provided in the connection part 501, the terminal retaining force is increased and therefore a structure having a strong shear resistance is achieved. On the other hand, since the lance 511 is provided with the escape recess part 519 which is provided at a portion that is located in the rear of the engaging part 517 and overlapped with the engaging part 517 in a width direction and which is communicated with the insertion groove 505 to allow the stabilizer 509 to enter the insertion groove 505, it is possible to avoid interference between the stabilizer 509 and the lance. Further, since it is not necessary to increase the width of the connection part 501 in order to avoid the interference, it is possible to avoid the increase in size of the connector.
In a recent connector, there is a problem that a terminal retaining force of a lance is decreased as the compactness of the connector progresses. Since the reduction in size of the lance means the decrease in the retaining force as it is, balance of the compactness and the maintenance of the retaining force has become an issue. In the above related art, in order to deal with the decrease in the retaining force of the lance due the compactness, the engaging part 517 of the lance 511 is engaged over the substantially entire width of the engaged part provided on the connection part 501. In this way, a structure having a strong shear resistance is achieved and the retaining force of the lance is increased.
However, in an engagement area of the terminal fitting and the lance, the lance made of resin is engaged with the engaging hole of the terminal fitting made of metal. Accordingly, even if a large engagement area is ensured, the disadvantage occurs as follows. That is, when an edge of the hole edge engagement end face of the engaging hole is sharp, the sharp edge bites into the lance and thus a shear fracture starting strength of the lance is significantly lowered.
The present invention has been made in consideration of the above situation and an object of the present invention is to provide a terminal fitting which is capable of suppressing the increase of shear fracture of the lance due to compactness, thereby improving the retaining force.
The object of the present invention is achieved by the following configurations.
(1) A terminal fitting is mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber. The terminal fitting includes a bite resistance increasing part that is formed only at an upper portion of a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance and increases a bite resistance to the lance. An lower portion of the hole edge engagement end face is flat. The bite resistance increasing part has a wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face.
According to the terminal fitting having a configuration of the above (1), as the terminal fitting is inserted into a predetermined position of the terminal accommodation chamber, the lance elastically returned is engaged with the engaging hole of the terminal fitting. A terminal engaging face of the lance engaged with the engaging hole is brought into contact with the hole edge engagement end face of the engaging hole. As an external force in a pull-out direction is exerted to the terminal fitting in an engaged state, the hole edge engagement end face is adapted to press the engaging part of the lance. At this time, since the bite resistance increasing part is formed on the hole edge engagement end face, a resisting force when the hole edge engagement end face bites into the lance is increased. In addition, even after the hole edge engagement end face bites into the lance, the resisting force is increased in such a manner that the bite resistance increasing part scratches a shearing surface, and a shearing surface area is also increased. In this way, a shear resistance is increased and therefore it is possible to increase the retaining force.
(2) A terminal fitting is mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber. The terminal fitting includes a bite resistance increasing part that is formed both on an upper portion and an lower portion of a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance. The bite resistance increasing part increases a bite resistance to the lance. The bite resistance increasing part has a wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the upper portion and the lower portion of the hole edge engagement end face.
According to the terminal fitting having a configuration of the above (2), since the bite resistance increasing part is configured by the wave-shaped part that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face, the bite resistance increasing part to increase the bite resistance to the lance or a shear resistance is easily formed.
(3) A terminal fitting is mounted on a terminal accommodation chamber formed in a connector housing by being engaged with an elastically deformable lance provided in the terminal accommodation chamber. The terminal fitting includes a bite resistance increasing part that is formed at a hole edge engagement end face of an engaging hole to be engaged with the lance. The bite resistance increasing part increases a bite resistance to the lance. The bite resistance increasing part is a rounded part that is formed by removing a corner part on the engaging side of the hole edge engagement end face.
According to the terminal fitting having a configuration of the above (3), since the rounded part is formed on the hole edge engagement end face, the rounded part is formed simultaneously when removing the corner part on the engaging side of the hole edge engagement end face in a non-processed state. In this way, since the corner part to promote biting is removed, it is possible to prevent the biting and the shear fracture from easily occurring.
FIG. 1A is a sectional view showing a main part of a terminal fitting according to an illustrative embodiment of the present invention, in which a wave-shaped part is formed at an upper part of a hole edge engagement end face and FIG. 1B is a sectional view showing a main part of a terminal fitting according to a modification of the illustrative embodiment, in which the wave-shaped parts are formed at an upper part and a lower part of the hole edge engagement end face.
FIG. 2A is a front view showing a terminal receiving opening in a connector housing and FIG. 2B is a sectional view taken along a line A-A in FIG. 2A.
FIG. 3A is a perspective view showing a male terminal fitting and FIG. 3B is a perspective view showing a female terminal fitting.
FIG. 4A is a front view showing the male terminal fitting and FIG. 4B is a sectional view taken along a line B-B in FIG. 4A.
FIG. 5A is a front view showing the female terminal fitting and FIG. 5B is a sectional view taken along a line C-C in FIG. 5A.
FIG. 6 is a sectional view showing a main part of a terminal fitting according to a comparative embodiment.
FIG. 7A is a sectional view showing a main part of a terminal fitting according to another embodiment, in which a rounded part is formed on the hole edge engagement end face and FIG. 7B is a sectional view taken along a line D-D in FIG. 7A.
FIG. 8 is a perspective view showing a main part of a terminal fitting and a terminal accommodation chamber in a related art.
Hereinafter, a terminal fitting according to an illustrative embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
As shown in FIG. 1A to FIG. 2B, a terminal fitting 15 according to the present embodiment may be either a male terminal fitting 21 (see FIG. 3A) or a female terminal fitting 23 (see FIG. 3B). However, in either cases, it is essential that the terminal fitting 15 includes an engaging hole 27 with which a lance 25 is engaged.
As shown in FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, in a connector 29 on which the terminal fitting 15 is mounted, a terminal receiving opening 19 for receiving a male terminal of a mating connector (not shown) is opened at one end face of a rectangular parallelepiped-shaped connector housing 17 in a longitudinal direction. The terminal receiving opening 19 is communicated with a terminal accommodation chamber 31 which is defined inside the connector housing 17. For the convenience of description, the terminal receiving opening 19 of the connector 29 is referred to as a front side and an opposite side thereof is referred to a rear side, as is used herein.
A female terminal fitting 15 is inserted into the terminal accommodation chamber 31 through a terminal mounting opening 33 which is opened to the rear of the connector housing 17. Here, the female terminal fitting 15 is merely illustrative and the terminal fitting 15 may be a male type. A lance 25 is protruded at a space on which the terminal fitting 15 is mounted. The lance 25 is formed integrally with the connector housing 17 from a synthetic resin material. A base end of the lance 25 is connected to a bottom wall 35 and a leading end thereof is a free end 37. The base end of the lance 25 is supported on the bottom wall 35 in a cantilever manner and thus the lance 25 is elastically deformable. A retreating space 31a is formed between a lower portion of the lance 25 and the bottom wall 35.
A convex part 39 is formed on an upper surface of the lance 25 near the free end 37. A rear section of the convex part 39 is a slanted surface 41 and a front section thereof is an engaging part 43. As the terminal fitting 15 is inserted, an electrical contact leading end 45 of the terminal fitting 15 abuts against the slanted surface 41 and thus a component force to push down the lance 25 toward the retreating space 31a occurs. When the lance 25 is elastically returned to its original position, the engaging part 43 is engaged with the engaging hole 27 of the terminal fitting 15 to prevent the terminal fitting 15 from being detached to the rear.
The male terminal fitting 21 shown in FIG. 3A is provided at its leading end with a male tab 49 which is an electrical contact part 47. Further, the male terminal fitting 21 is provided with a terminal body part 51, a conductor crimping part 53 and a sheath holding part 55, which are sequentially provided at the rear of the male tab. The male terminal fitting 21 is manufactured by sheet-metal processing of a metal plate.
The female terminal fitting 23 shown in FIG. 3B is provided at its leading end with a box part 57 which is an electrical contact part 47 and receives a male tab of a mating terminal. And, a contact spring part 59 (see FIG. 5A and FIG. 5B) coming into contact with the male tab is provided inside the box part. Similar to the male terminal fitting 21, the female terminal fitting 23 is provided with a terminal body part 51, a conductor crimping part 53 and a sheath holding part 55, which are sequentially provided at the rear of the box part 57.
The terminal body part 51 of the male terminal fitting 21 and the female terminal fitting 23 is formed with the engaging hole 27 to be engaged with the lance 25. As shown in FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B, the engaging hole 27 has a rectangular shape. A front side of the engaging hole 27 constitutes a hole edge engagement end face 11. FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B illustrate the hole edge engagement end face 11 of the female terminal fitting 23 as a representative example. FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B are sectional views taken by cutting an approximately central portion of the engaging hole 27, showing a front side of the female terminal fitting 23. That is, FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B are front views of the hole edge engagement end face 11, as seen from the inside of the engaging hole 27. Rather than a flat shape of a comparative embodiment shown in FIG. 6, a bite resistance increasing part 61 to increase a bite resistance to the lance 25 is formed on the hole edge engagement end face 11.
In the present embodiment, the bite resistance increasing part 61 is configured as a wave-shaped part 13 that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face 11. The wave-shaped part 13 may be formed only at an upper part of the hole edge engagement end face 11, as shown in FIG. 1A or may be formed at both an upper part and a lower part of the hole edge engagement end face 11, as shown in FIG. 1B. A direction to press the hole edge engagement end face 11 may be a direction (an up-down direction in FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B) which is directed to the hole edge engagement end face 11 from the upper and lower, or a vertical direction (a left direction in FIG. 4B and FIG. 5B) which is directed to the hole edge engagement end face 11 from the inside of the engaging hole 27. In FIG. 1A, the lower part is flat. In FIG. 1B, both the upper part and the lower part of the hole edge engagement end face 11 are partially pressed. The upper part or both the upper part and the lower part are partially pressed to form a wave-shape in the hole edge engagement end face.
In FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B, a semi-circular bulging part formed at a lower part of the hole edge engagement end face 11 is an indent acting to increase the contact pressure of the contact spring 59 with the male tab of the mating terminal.
In the present embodiment, since the bite resistance increasing part 61 is configured by the wave-shaped part 13 that is formed by partially pressing the hole edge engagement end face 11, the bite resistance increasing part 61 to increase the bite resistance to the lance 25 or a shear resistance is easily formed.
Next, an operation of the terminal fitting 15 having the above configurations will be described.
As the terminal fitting 15 is inserted into a predetermined position of the terminal accommodation chamber 31, the lance 25 elastically returned is engaged with the engaging hole 27 of the terminal fitting 15. The engaging part 43 of the lance 25 engaged with the engaging hole 27 is brought into contact with the hole edge engagement end face 11 of the engaging hole 27. As an external force in a pull-out direction is exerted to the terminal fitting 15 in an engaged state, the hole edge engagement end face 11 is adapted to press the engaging part 43 of the lance 25.
That is, the lance 25 receives a reaction force from the hole edge engagement end face 11. At this time, in the case of the flat hole edge engagement end face 11 as in the terminal fitting of the comparative embodiment shown in FIG. 6, shear begins in a corner part 63 of the flat peripheral edge.
In the terminal fitting 15 according to the present embodiment, since the bite resistance increasing part 61 is formed on the hole edge engagement end face 11, a resisting force when the hole edge engagement end face 11 bites into the lance 25 is increased. In addition, even after the hole edge engagement end face bites into the lance, the resisting force is increased in such a manner that the bite resistance increasing part 61 scratches a shearing surface, and a shearing surface area can be also increased. In this way, a shear resistance is increased and therefore it is possible to increase the retaining force of the terminal fitting 15.
Next, another embodiment of the terminal fitting 15 according to the present invention will be described.
As shown in FIG. 7A and FIG. 7B, a terminal fitting 15A according to another embodiment is intended to increase the resistance when biting into the lance 25 by removing a pointed end face (that is, corner part 63). That is, the bite resistance increasing part 61 according to the present embodiment is a rounded part 65 that is formed by removing the corner part 63 on the engaging side of the hole edge engagement end face 11.
In this terminal fitting 15A, since the rounded part 65 is formed on the hole edge engagement end face 11, the rounded part 65 is formed simultaneously when removing the corner part 63 on the engaging side of the hole edge engagement end face 11 in a non-processed state. In this way, since the corner part 63 to promote biting is removed, it is possible to prevent the biting and the shear fracture from easily occurring.
Accordingly, according to the terminal fitting 15, 15A of the present embodiment, it is possible to suppress the increase of the possibility of shear fracture of the lance 25 due to compactness, and improving the retaining force.
Herein, the above-described illustrative embodiments merely illustrate the representative forms of the present invention and the present invention is not limited to the illustrative embodiments. That is, the illustrative embodiments can be variously modified without departing a spirit and a scope of the present invention.
As described above, according to the terminal fitting of the present invention, it is possible to suppress the increase of the possibility of shear fracture of the lance due to compactness, thereby improving the retaining force.

matches:
Application No. 10
Application No. 2010
Application No. 201180040216
Application No. 10
application No. 2010
application No. 201180040216
application No. 10


Keywords: RCFC 59; Principles of Contract Interpretation; Ambiguities; Mutuality of Consideration; Perpetuity; Extrinsic Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Surplusage.
UNREPORTED OPINION: denying , , and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part  the Government's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; and dismissing the complaint. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby. (rdb) Service on parties made.
Keywords: I.R.C. § 172; Net Operating Loss; Carryback; Theft Loss Deduction; I.R.C. § 165; Bad Debt Deduction; I.R.C. § 166; RCFC 56; Res Judicata; Judicial Notice, re: Unreported Opinion.
UNREPORTED ORDER denying Motion for Summary Judgment; denying  Motion for Summary Judgment; denying  Cross Motion; ( Status Report due by 1/5/2018). Signed by Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink. (jpk1) Copy to parties. (Main Document 80 replaced on 12/15/2017) (jt1).
Keywords: re: Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,, Order on Cross Motion [Dispositive], Unreported Order: Breach of lease; Tax adjustment clause; Reformation; Unilateral Mistake.
Keywords: re: Pro Se Plaintiff; Motion to Dismiss; RCFC 12(b)(1); Tax Refund; Flora Full Payment Rule.
UNREPORTED ORDER Denying as Moot Motion to proceed as pro se; Denying as Moot  Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying as moot  Motion for Extension of Time. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink. U.S. Certified Mail Tracking# 7017 1450 0000 1346 0591.
**RE-DOCKETED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES** UNREPORTED OPINION. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Marian Blank Horn.
UNREPORTED ORDER SEVERING UPSTREAM CLAIMS AND DOWNSTREAM CLAIMS IN 17-1652L INTO TWO SEPARATE DOCKETS. Signed by Chief Judge Susan G. Braden.
UNREPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION and FINAL ORDER. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Susan G. Braden.
Keywords: re: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012); Rule of the United States Court of Federal Claims(RCFC) 12(b)(1) (Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Lack ofStanding); 40.1(b)(Assigning and Transferring Cases); Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP), 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2012); United States Court of Federal Claims Bid Protest Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.§ 1491(b)(1). (ar)Keywords: re:  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012); Rule of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 12(b)(1) (Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Lack of Standing); 40.1(b)(Assigning and Transferring Cases); Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP), 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2012); United States Court of Federal Claims Bid Protest Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.§ 1491(b)(1).
Keywords: re: Rule 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss; Rejection of Sovereign Citizen Theory; Constitutional Claims Not Money-Mandating.
OPINION granting Motion to Certify Interlocutory Appeal; granting  Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Elaine D. Kaplan.
Keywords: re: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2); Interlocutory Appeal; Stay Pending Appeal.
OPINION denying Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Elaine D. Kaplan.
Keywords: re: Order on Motion for Reconsideration; Rails-to-Trails Taking; RCFC 59(a).
UNREPORTED ORDER granting Motion to Compel. Damages computation due 12/13/2017. Signed by Judge Margaret M. Sweeney.
Keywords re: Order on Motion to Compel -- Motion to Compel; RCFC 26(a)(1)(A)(iii); Initial Disclosures; Damages Computation.


text:
CITY OF DETROIT and George C. Edwards, Defendants.
William B. Gould and John E. Mogk, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Michael M. Glusac, Corp. Counsel, Wayne County by Robert D. McClear, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, John E. Cross, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.
Before McCREE, Circuit Judge, THORNTON, Senior District Judge, and ROTH, District Judges.
This action was originally instituted as an action for injunctive relief under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1343(3) and (4). Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Sections 2281 and 2284 a three judge-court was convened.
Plaintiff Mogk attempted to register as a candidate for the City of Detroit Charter Commission but was rejected by the defendant Edwards, City Clerk of the City of Detroit, Michigan, on the ground that he did not meet the residential requirement of the Michigan Home Rule Act, Mich.Comp.Laws, Section 117.18 (M.S.A. Section 5.2097), in that he had not resided in the municipality for three years preceding the then forthcoming election. Upon the hearing for a *699 preliminary injunction to compel the Clerk to accept Plaintiff's Mogk's registration as a candidate for the charter commission the Court issued the relief prayed for. Plaintiff Gould's complaint was that the action of the City Clerk, in denying Mogk a place on the ballot, by reason of the durational residency requirement of the statute, prevented him from exercising his voting franchise in favor of the candidacy of Mogk. As a consequence of the issuance of the preliminary injunction, Mogk's name appeared on the ballot but he failed to survive the primary election as a nominee and accordingly we are no longer concerned with the prayer for injunctive relief. However, following the primary election the plaintiffs amended their complaint to one seeking relief in declaratory form, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
The posture of the case as it now stands is that of an action for declaratory relief respecting the constitutionality of Mich.Comp.Laws, Section 117.18. The defendants moved to dismiss on a claim of mootness. Because the "problem is capable of repetition, yet evading review and the need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy in the federal-state area" we denied the claim of mootness. See, Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, and Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 90 S. Ct. 206, 24 L. Ed. 2d 209. See also, Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323, August 31, 1970, United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
"The right to become a candidate for state office, like the right to vote for the election of state officers * * * is a right or privilege of state citizenship, not of national citizenship which alone is protected by the privileges and immunities clause,"
and that, in any event, there is a presumption of constitutionality of state laws, and the durational residency requirement is a proper and rational classification of eligibility for the office in issue. We note that Snowden relied on such cases as Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S. Ct. 573, 48 L. Ed. 817, decided in 1904. The residential requirement here in question originated in the 1909 Home Rule Act of Michigan. We point to these dates to suggest that vast changes have taken place in our way of living between the turn of the century and 1971. What may have been a rational and justifiable classification of eligibility for public office in 1909 may not necessarily be so regarded in the 1970's. In 1909 Marconi's wireless was in its infancy; the vacuum tube and radio had not yet arrived; and, the carriage makers were just turning to making automobiles.
The several constitutions of the state of Michigan have consistently defined a qualified elector of the state as one with United States citizenship and six months residency in the state. Eligibility to the offices of governor and lieutenant governor has required two years of state residency by the Constitutions of 1835, 1850 and 1908, but the 1963 Constitution increased the residency requirement to four years. Art. 5, § 22, Mich.Const. 1963. By Section 26, Article 5, provision is made for succession to the governorship by the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state and the attorney general. Strangely, however, the state residential requirement for the latter two offices is six months. As for federal officers representing a state the United States Constitution requires that a United States Senator shall "when elected be an inhabitant" of the state. Art. 1, § 3, cl. 3. For the office of representative in Congress there is a similar requirement (Art. 1, § 2, U.S.Const.), but none that he be a resident of the district he represents. All other offices filled by election in the state of Michigan require only that the person be a qualified elector, or a United States citizen who has resided in the state for six months. This applies to all public offices from *700 township offices to state-wide offices, such as justices of the supreme court. Local offices such as township, county or district, require, in addition, thirty days of residency in such unit. See, Mich.Comp.Laws, §§ 168.71, 168.191, 168.391, 168.409, 168.411, 168.431, 168.467.
Measuring the other durational residency requirements of the state against the one here involved, were we to consider that the test outlined in Drueding v. Devlin, D.C., 234 F. Supp. 721, judgment affirmed, 380 U.S. 125, 85 S. Ct. 807, 13 L. Ed. 2d 792, that state durational residency requirements are permissible unless they are "so unreasonable that they amount to an irrational and unreasonable discrimination," remains our guide, we would have to hold that the statutory provision before us does not meet that test. It appears to us, however, that not only the Supreme Court of the United States but the Congress as well has discarded the "reasonableness" test in favor of the "compelling state interest" test. See the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 1970, Pub.L.No.91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24; Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S. Ct. 1752, 26 L. Ed. 2d 370; and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S. Ct. 1990, 26 L. Ed. 2d 523. And when the justification of "compelling state interest" is offered, Kramer and Williams instruct us that we must meticulously scrutinize the evidence.
Defendants claim that the three year residency requirement for candidates for the position of member of a charter revision commission is reasonable and understandable; that it takes into consideration that a person who has lived in the community for three years should be better acquainted with the problems of the city and with how they should be corrected. Curiously, a citizen who moves into the community thirty days before the election is presumably qualified to choose those best qualified for membership on the commission. Does this mean that voters can learn in thirty days what a prospective candidate can learn in not less than three years? It seems to us that there is here a strange inconsistency. It occurs to us further that the premise upon which the requirement rests, that is, that citizens who have resided in the municipality for three years next preceding the election are attached to the community and by some process are more aware of its problems and possess better solutions is tenuous at best. Who is to say that a late arrival in the community is not best qualified to fill the office here in question? The problems of one large city are basically no different from the problems of another; most are shared in common by all large cities. The classification here involved was perhaps a rational *701 one for 1909, when the predominantly rurally-oriented legislature conceived of cities as larger towns towns in which most of the inhabitants knew each other. We take judicial notice of what any city dweller knows, that tenants in a high-rise dwelling building know very few of their fellow tenants, and that even in single-family dwelling neighborhoods, acquaintanceship rarely encompasses more than persons living within the city block. Taking into account the realities of city life and the problems of the cities we can only conclude that the three year residency requirement has neither logic, reason nor experience to support it. Considering the functions and powers of the other public offices we have mentioned and the impact of the exercise of their powers on the lives of the resident electorate, it appears to us patent that no rational or justifiable excuse can be urged for the disparity in the durational residency requirement between candidates for these offices and the office here in question.
The basic scheme in any election system, including that of Michigan, is designed first, to identify and expose to public scrutiny those who come forward as candidates, and ultimately to select from them those who shall hold public office. Generally the time table of the state election machinery will suffice to accomplish the first objective. It is a matter of common knowledge that those who seek public office go to considerable effort and expense to secure exposure, and it may be safely assumed that opponents in an election race will seek out and make known the shortcomings of their opposition and assert their own superior qualifications for a particular post. If a short sojourn in the community is considered to be a disqualification the electorate may voice its sentiment at the ballot box.
"* * * It is unquestioned that a voter has a constitutionally protected right to vote for the candidate of his choice and to have his votes counted. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964). It is also established, as pointed out previously, that a person has a constitutionally protected right to be considered for public office without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S. Ct. 532, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1970). It seems clear to this court that a restriction upon who may be a candidate necessarily affects the efficacy of a person's vote. The effectiveness of the franchise can just as certainly be curtailed by restricting the group from whom candidates may be drawn as by restricting those entitled to cast a vote or by malapportioning a legislative body."

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Appellant Raymond McDonald, Jr., appeals his conviction for cruelty to animals. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (West Supp.2001). After a jury found him guilty, McDonald's attorney and the prosecuting attorney agreed on a punishment of fifty days of confinement to be served on weekends. In this appeal, McDonald alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish two elements of the offense and insufficient to support the punishment, that he was denied a punishment hearing and a chance to present mitigating evidence before sentencing, that the trial court erred in not admonishing McDonald as to the range of punishment, and that he personally did not agree to the sentence. We conclude that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the verdict and that McDonald voluntarily agreed to the sentence; therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence for the punishment is irrelevant. We alsodetermine that after entering into a punishment agreement, McDonald was not entitled to present evidence or have a punishment hearing and that the court's failure to admonish was not error.
On July 24, 1999, McDonald stopped his van on the side of the road in front of the Holly Street power plant near an entrance to the Town Lake Hike and Bike Trail. McDonald opened the back doors of the van, pulled out a black bag, and dropped it on the ground next to the van. A puppy came out of the bag and ran toward the trail. Two security guards from the power plant witnessed these events. One guard approached McDonald and told him to take the dog with him. McDonald refused, saying "[t]hat dog ain't even mine." McDonald presented evidence at trial showing that his son's friend had found the stray dog and placed it in the van without McDonald's knowledge. McDonald and his wife were on their way to the grocery store when his wife first heard a noise coming from the back of the van. McDonald stopped the van by the trail to investigate. He opened the rear doors and saw a black bag that was moving. McDonald testified that he became scared, grabbed the bag, and dropped it on the ground, which is when the puppy jumped out.
*88 The security guards reported the incident to animal control, and an investigator interviewed McDonald at his house three days later. According to the investigator, McDonald first denied knowing of the incident, then acknowledged that a friend of his son's had brought the puppy over and because it was not his dog, McDonald had taken it away. When the investigator indicated that lack of ownership did not excuse abandoning a dog, McDonald changed his story again to indicate he only discovered the dog in his van when he was driving to the store with his wife and was so startled he let it loose at the trail. McDonald maintained at trial that he did not know about the puppy's presence in his van until after he left home. The investigator determined otherwise from the interview and all the facts, concluding that McDonald found the puppy and intended to drive it to a remote area to abandon it because it did not belong to him.
McDonald was found guilty of cruelty to animals under section 42.09(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code, which states: "A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly ... abandons unreasonably an animal in his custody." Id. Following the jury verdict, the judge addressed the issue of punishment.
The Court: It's my understanding that in the event of this verdict, the State and the Defense have discussed an agreement on punishment; is that correct?
The Court: Okay. And what would that agreement be?
[Prosecutor]: The agreement would be 50 days in the Travis County Jail with court costs.
The Court: Is that the agreement, Defense?
[Defense Attorney]: Yes, Your Honor, with the understanding that he be allowed to do weekends.
The Court: All right. At this time, Mr. McDonald, I will sentence you to 50 days and costs of court.
The trial record reflects no objections to punishment by McDonald.
McDonald contends that the evidence is not factually sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had custody of the puppy or that his leaving the puppy at the trail was unreasonable, under the terms of the statute. See id. McDonald also argues that the evidence is not factually sufficient to support the punishment. In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light favoring neither party. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We may only set aside the jury's verdict if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. at 11.
The jury was not required to believe McDonald's assertion that he did not know about the puppy and had nothing to do with putting it in his van. The animal cruelty inspector testified that, based on all the facts, he believed that McDonald found the puppy earlier and intentionally drove to the trail to abandon it because it was not his dog. Considering the conflicting evidence, and McDonald's differing stories to the inspector, the jury could have reasonably found that McDonald put the dog in his van and intentionally drove to the isolated area to abandon it. Even if the jury determined that McDonald discovered the dog in his van and then let it go at the trail entrance, a finding that he exercised sufficient "custody" over the animal *89 to violate the statute is not unreasonable. Custody may be interpreted as guarding or keeping, or taking immediate charge and control; the term is elastic. See Black's Law Dictionary 384 (6th ed.1990); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 559 (1966). A reasonable jury could determine that McDonald had immediate charge and control of the puppy if he discovered it in his van and then decided to leave it in a remote area.
Similarly, the jury's finding that McDonald's abandonment of the dog was unreasonable is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. There was evidence that the puppy was sick and that no one was around to accept responsibility for its care where McDonald left it. A reasonable jury could have found that leaving a puppy in a greenbelt area without food or care was an unreasonable act. Even though the puppy was not his, McDonald was required to remove it by calling the authorities to pick it up or by taking it to a shelter, rather than dumping it. Because there is sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's finding that McDonald committed the offense, we overrule the first issue on appeal.
McDonald asserts that he did not agree to the punishment but offers no evidence of objection to the punishment agreement reached between the prosecuting attorney and his attorney. The record reflects McDonald's voluntary agreement to fifty days' confinement through his attorney. Matters not present in the record provide no basis for an appellate court to make a decision, and the mere allegation of the existence of other facts may not be considered on appeal. Russell v. State, 711 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). Absent additional evidence, this Court may not reverse on this issue. See id.
The assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support punishment of fifty days' confinement is irrelevant because both the prosecuting attorney and McDonald's defense attorney agreed to the punishment. While this punishment agreement seems excessive based on the evidence in this case, [FN1] the fact that it was entered into voluntarily by the defendant through his attorney prevents us from examining the factual sufficiency of the evidence with respect to punishment. Cf. Jones v. State, 931 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). McDonald was present and did not object to the agreed sentence. As long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal, Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), no matter how harsh it may appear under the circumstances of the offense.
FN1. There is no evidence of harm to the puppy. Additionally, McDonald was sixty-nine years old at the time of trial and had a heart condition requiring medication.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (West Supp.2001). The court of criminal appeals has determined that article 37.07 requires the trial court to afford a defendant the opportunity to present evidence regarding punishment after it has found the particular defendant guilty. Borders v. State, 846 S.W.2d 834, 835-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). In Borders, the court of criminal appeals also determined that defense counsel does not waive the right to present punishment evidence by not objecting at trial if she preserves the error by raising the objection in a motion for new trial. Id. at 836. In the instant case, McDonald did not raise an objection regarding the denied opportunity to present evidence or have a punishment hearing in his motion for new trial, so the error was not preserved. Additionally, even if the error had been preserved, McDonald would not have been entitled to a hearing on punishment because he voluntarily agreed to fifty days' confinement. A hearing with a chance to present evidence regarding punishment is purposeless when the defendant enters into a punishment agreement with the State.
McDonald's argument that he was not admonished about the range of punishment for the offense is unsound. Article 26.13(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "[p]rior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of ... the range of the punishment attached to the offense." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1) (West Supp.2001). This statute applies when a defendant enters a plea of guilty but does not apply when a defendant is found guilty by a jury, as McDonald was in this case. Additionally, article 26.13 does not apply to misdemeanors. Empy v. State, 571 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). The court's failure to admonish McDonald is not reversible error. We overrule all issues on appeal challenging the punishment.
The evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict that McDonald exercised custody over this stray dog and unreasonably abandoned it. When viewed in light of other cases in which animals are affirmatively hurt or neglected, McDonald's actions do not seem to merit fifty days' confinement. However, because he voluntarily agreed to the punishment, we overrule all his appellate complaints concerning punishment and affirm the trial court's judgment.


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DEBORAH A. CLAYMAN, individually and as trustee, and RICHARD E.
JOHN T. McLAUGHLIN, et al.
facts as alleged in the SAC, including the documents attached or referenced in the SAC.
marriage, Deborah and Richard entered into a Prenuptial Agreement dated October 13, 2005.
defendant law firm, Berluti McLaughlin & Kutchin, LLP.
shall be entitled to receive the Revere residence outright and free of encumbrances.
by their first names to avoid confusion.
taken place with respect to this Agreement.” Id. at III, C.
except for willful default or bad faith, in retaining, selling or otherwise dealing with such interest.
as a co-trustee of Deborah’s Trust.” Revocable Trust, § 9.1.
Will is, pursuant to the terms of the Revocable Trust, put into a subtrust called the Family Trust.
The beneficiary of the Family Trust is Kate Clayman, Richard’s daughter by a previous marriage.
the principal of Deborah’s Trust.
Trust in a manner to qualify for and be maintained as a Q-Tip Trust.
McLaughlin, as executor, cause the estate to reimburse her for the fees that she incurred.
indemnify is a breach of fiduciary duty.
that describes the transfers of property interests he intended to execute to fund Deborah’s Trust.
trustee of Deborah’s Trust on November 25, 2014.
and the Closely-Held Interests became clients of McLaughlin and his law firm. SAC ¶ 93.
real estate investments though a management company called 5C, Inc. It is alleged that 5C, Inc.
of any ability to affect what income would or could be distributed.
was less than $ 25,000 annually.
aiding and abetting the tort of interference with contract.
duties to Deborah’s Trust arising from being trustee of Richard’s Revocable Trust.
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At the pleading stage, Mass. R. Civ. P.
the statute of limitations.” Epstein v. Seigel, 396 Mass. 278, 279 (1985).
faith. All of these allegations remain to be proven.
fiduciary duty to the trust and its beneficiary.
to the allegations of the SAC, then so should the firm on the basis of potential vicarious liability.
allegations as true at this stage of the case.
statute of limitations.” Epstein v. Seigel, 396 Mass. 278, 279 (1985).
dismiss whether the letter is a “final account”7 or whether it “fully disclosed” the matter.
not objecting to the July 31, 2014 letter within sixty days, as required by the Revocable Trust.
and cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.
after Richard’s death. As a result, Deborah’s claim for reimbursement of attorney’s fees is barred.
receipts and disbursements, including the amount of the trustee’s compensation.
SAC will be addressed in the next section.
fund fully [Deborah’s Trust] with the sum of two million dollars.” SAC ¶ 173.
not deny that he operated the Closely-Held Interests for capital growth, not income production.
gain.” Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 434 (1989).
means or both. Mere interference with a contract is not actionable. See G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v.
interest. Thus, there can be no improper means or motive. Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v.
actor’s own interest is not improper conduct).
in complaint of improper means, while conclusory, were sufficient to resist a motion to dismiss).
circumstances, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” G. S. Enterprises, Inc., 410 Mass.
at 273. This kind of evaluation of the facts cannot be done on a motion to dismiss.
For the reasons stated, Steven’s motion to dismiss counts II and III must be denied.
Massachusetts, 463 Mass. 50, 64 (2012) for the elements of an aiding and abetting claim.
dismiss Count IV must be denied.
distributed to Deborah’s Trust and the Family Trust. For two of the entities, 5C, Inc. and C.C.
business entities to Deborah’s Trust.
business entities and other indispensable parties must remain as parties.
vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of Steven. That is enough to satify the Rule 12 standard.
Count II will not be dismissed.
for her benefit during Deborah’s lifetime.
he has no right of possession at the time . . . .’” Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 Mass. App.
Ct. 407, 412 (2003), quoting from Abington Natl. Bank v. Ashwood Homes, Inc., 19 Mass. App.
deed”). Finally, funds held in an escrow account may be the subject of a conversion claim.
Count V adequately pleads a claim for conversion.
business entities, the motion of the Family Trust must be denied.
transfer of ownership of the Revere residence. Otherwise, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Trust and the business entities are DENIED.

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The Doha W.C Qatar WTA Tour is played on Hard / Outdoors courts. It is an series event with a prize money of $4550000.
In 2010 , Clijsters K. took the Singles crown with victory over Wozniacki C. in the WTA-Singles final on Sunday 31st October 2010.
In 2009 , Williams S. took the Singles crown with victory over Williams V. in the WTA-Singles final on Sunday 1st November 2009.
In 2008 , Sharapova M. took the Singles crown with victory over Zvonareva V. in the WTA-Singles final on Sunday 24th February 2008.
Also in 2008 , Williams V. took the Singles crown with victory over Zvonareva V. in the WTA-Singles final on Sunday 9th November 2008.
2010 WTA-Singles Finals: 31st October Clijsters K. Wozniacki C.
2009 WTA-Singles Finals: 1st November Williams S. Williams V.
WTA-Doubles Finals: 1st November Llagostera V. N. / Mar Black C. / Huber L.
2008 WTA-Singles Finals: 9th November Williams V. Zvonareva V.
WTA-Singles Finals: 24th February Sharapova M. Zvonareva V.
WTA-Doubles Finals: 9th November Black C. / Huber L. Peschke K. / Stubbs R.
2006 WTA-Singles Finals: 4th March Petrova N. Mauresmo A.
2005 WTA-Singles Finals: 26th February Sharapova M. Molik A.
2004 WTA-Singles Finals: 6th March Myskina A. Kuznetsova S.

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NSL feature in the international publications and attend major GNSS conferences as either invited speakers or presenting selected papers.
Vidal Ashkenazi invited to organise and chair the Round Table Panel Discussion at the Munich Satellite Navigation Summit on GNSS IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE AND EQUATORIAL REGIONS, held in Munich on 2 March 2016. The Panel Discussion comprised the following high ranking distinguished participants.
Vidal Ashkenazi chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion at TransNav 2015,the Marine Navigation Conference, 17 to 19 June 2015. The title of the Panel Session is "Resilient Navigation in demanding Maritime Environments". Click on the following two weblinks for full details.
Vidal Ashkenazi chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion session on "GNSS and PNT: Where is it heading?" at the GNSS Summit 2015 in Munich.
Invited by the ESA, Vidal Ashkenazi organises and chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion on the Opening Session of NAVITEC 2014 Conference, December 2014.
Vidal Ashkenazi invited to deliver the Opening Keynote Presentation, GPS, Galileo and the Future of GNSS, at the ICL-GNSS Conference 2013 held in Torino, Italy, on 25-27 June 2013.
Vidal Ashkenazi invited to organise and chair the Round Table Panel Discussion on the Opening Session of the 10th JUBILEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TRANSNAV 2013 ON MARINE NAVIGATION AND SAFETY OF SEA TRANSPORTATION, held in Gdynia on 19-21 June 2013. The Panel Discussion entitled GNSS and e-Navigation, comprised the following high ranking distinguished participants.
Invited by the ESA, Vidal Ashkenazi organises and chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion on the Opening Session of NAVITEC 2012 Conference held on 5 December 2012 at ESA/ESTEC in Noordwijk. The Panel Discussion entitled Multi-GNSS Technologies and Applications: Challenges and Opportunities, comprised the following high ranking distinguished participants.
Invited by the GSA, Vidal Ashkenazi organises and chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion at the special PRS Workshop held on 4th December 2012, during the European Space Solutions Conference in London. The Panel Discussion entitled PRS: A secure Galileo Service for Government Authorised Users and Applications, comprised the following high ranking distinguished participants.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to organise and chair a Round Table Panel Discussion on Galileo and Security at the GNSS Summit 2012, which was held in Munich on 13-15 March 2012.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to organise and chair the only Round Table Discussion Panel session at the European Navigation Conference ENC 2011, which was held in London on 29-30 November 2011. The title of the Panel Discussion was Threats to and Vulnerabilities of GNSS Signals: Resilience and Countermeasures for Critical PNT Applications.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to make a presentation on "European SME's in the Space Sector" at the 4th Conference on EU Space Policy in Europe, which was held on 8-9 November, at the European Parliament Hemicycle in Brussels.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to organise and chair the Opening Session Round Table Panel Discussion, entitled GNSS Challenges in Maritime Navigation, at the TransNav 2011 Maritime Navigation Symposium, which was held in Gydnia, Poland.
Demands of the Road, An Assisted-GNSS Solution Uses the EGNOS Data Access Service, Kevin Sheridan, Tomas Dyjas (NSL), Cyril Botteron, Jrme Leclre (EPFL), Fabrizio Dominici, Gianluca Marucco (ISMB) GPS World Magazine, March 2011.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to chair the Opening Session Round Table Panel Discussion, entitled GNSS in Balance?, at the Satellite Navigation Summit 2011, which was held on 1st March 2011 in Munich, Germany.
EGNOS Gets to Work, Using the Augmentation System with GPS-Equipped Mobile Phones, Lee Banfield (NSL), Franois Boullete, Boris Kennes, Michal Mastier (EC/GSA) GPS World Magazine, February 2011.
PRECISIO presented by Michele Bavaro at the ESA NAVITEC Workshop 2010, held in ESA/ESTEC on -10 December 2010.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to organise and chair a Round Table Panel Discussion entitled GNSS Challenges over the Next 10 Years, on the Opening Session of the ESA NAVITEC Workshop 2010, which was held on 8-10 December 2010 at ESA/ESTEC in the Netherlands.
Vidal Ashkenazi attended and contributed to a Conference on A New Space Policy for Europe: New Challenges, New Opportunities, which was held on 26-27 October 2010, at the European Parliament Hemicycle in Brussels.
Vidal Ashkenazi was invited to chair a Round Table Panel Discussion entitled GNSS for Business, the Citizens and Government, which was held on the Opening Day of the European Navigation Conference, in Braunschweig, Germany.
Lord Stafford Award winners 2009 NSL in collaboration with De Montfort University won the 2009 award for Innovation in Development for the East Midlands for its world-leading ground-breaking GNSS receiver.
Vidal Ashkenazi chairs the Round Table Panel Discussion entitled GNSS and Safety and Security of Marine Navigation at the International Navigation Symposium TransNav 2009 in Gdynia, Poland.
Vidal Ashkenazi chairs the Opening Plenary Session of the European Satellite Navigation Conference (ENC 2009) in Napoli, Italy.
The Royal Institute of Navigation has awarded Vidal the Institute's highest award, the Harold Spencer Gold Medal, for "an Outstanding Contribution to Navigation". The award was presented at the AGM on 9 July 2008, by the Patron of the Institute, HRH The Duke of Edinburgh KG KT.
FIX_8: High Accuracy Positioning using EGNOS and Galileo Products Galileo Workshop for SMEs "Fostering synergies between SMEs involved in Galileo"
12th GNSS Workshop, Korea, 1-2 Dec 2005.
Institude Of Navigation, National Technical Meeting 2004, San Diego, January 2004.
Political and Macroeconomic benefits of Galileo. Why Europe needs it?
V. Ashkenazi, GNSS - 2003, Graz, Austria, April 2003.
V. Ashkenazi, GNSS - 2002, Bonn, Germany, November 2002.
V. Ashkenazi, Intelligent Systems Approach to Safety, Barcelona, Spain, October 2001.
V. Ashkenazi, Salt Lake City, USA, September 2001.
V. Ashkenazi, GNSS - 2001, Seville, Spain 2001.
V. Ashkenazi, Ingenia Issue 7, Feb 2001.

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