Copyright© 2005 to 2011 Colin M. Cody, CPA and ProfessionalGamblerStatus.com, LLC, All Rights Reserved.
Online gaming & Casino gambling is fast... exciting... profitable... challenging... and tax deductible!
When you tally up your gambling winnings tax forms W-2G each year - do you see that the IRS is taking away too much from your hard won gaming profits? As an active professional gambler do you find that you have too little time to do the necessary tax planning to avoid paying those excessive taxes?
Here at ProfessionalGamblerStatus.com™ we will bring together in one place the information necessary to help you survive unnecessarily high short-term capital gain taxes, self-employment taxes and state and federal income taxes. To accomplish this, often a separate gaming entity is the answer, but just as often we avoid it as not being cost effective in a particular situation.
We are located in the State of Connecticut, home to the World's Largest Casino Our clients come to us from all over the United States. They come from approximately thirty-five different States, but we're always looking for that someone from the next State!.
Professional Gambler Status until recently has been rarely seen on federal income tax returns, because frankly there were very few people who earned their living traveling from casino to casino.
But with the onsurge of online gaming, the number of IRS filed tax returns showing Professional Gambler Status is expected to increase dramatically over the coming years.
In a 13-page opinion the U.S. Department of Justice has decided to allow online sales of lottery tickets in New York and Illinois - saying that because this does not relate to a "sporting event or contest" that it does not violate the 1961 Wire Act, that otherwise would bans such wagers made via telecommunication systems that cross state and national borders.
Minnesota, New York, North Dakota and New Hampshire already have had online subscriptions to a limited number of their lottery games for State residents.
Online Poker may be the next to get a pass here, since it has been online already at PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker and Cereus Poker Network. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 prohibits the use of the internet for accepting payments, but now the door has been opened to readdress online poker.
The risk for trouble is much greater when players can directly wager with credit card from their own living room, rather than paying cash. Online gambling will expand the lottery's market to vulnerable populations such as the home-bound and disabled.
If I have substantial winnings I would want to avoid being considered a professional gambler so that I would avoid the 15.3% self employment tax, right?
As a casual gambler there's no self-employment tax.
As a professional gambler your net winnings are subject to self-employment tax. Net winnings are the amount remaining after all offsetting gambling wagers (losses) and after other allowable expenses such as travel, meals, and so on. But remember that certain deductions for self-employed health insurance and self-employed 401(k) do not reduce your self-employment tax.
As a casual gambler some if not all of your wagers (losses) are going to be deductible for IRS purposes using Schedule A for itemized deductions rather than taking the automatic standard deduction, but you'll pay the penalty of having a higher "AGI." There are basically no other tax deductions for the casual gambler. And then for your State income taxes, while they may tax the gross winnings, those gambling wagers (losses) may or may not be deductible at all depending on State law.
As a professional gambler all of your wagers (losses) are offset against winnings and if there's still a net win, don't forget that all of your allowable expenses come off before the net is taxed by IRS. You are also allowed a deduction for self-employed health insurance and self-employed 401(k). For the most part, with few exceptions, the States generally will allow most every loss and every expense deduction that is allowable for IRS.
I would like to find a local CPA where I live who has experience with professional gambling. How would I go about finding out what accountants have that specialized experience?
Besides internet searches, you can go to your State CPA Society and get a list of registered firms in the State. When calling them do not ask "can you do work for a professional gambler?" or ask "do you have experience with professional gambling?" since virtually every CPA can honestly answer YES to those questions.
Rather, ask "have you personally prepared any tax returns for people with gambling winnings?" and then ask "have you personally prepared any tax returns for people using professional gambler status?" Listening carefully to their initial responses will ferret out the tax advisor you might want to use.
Is it possible for an individual, who has a regular job, to set up a separate profit- making business for consistently betting on horses via the internet (or telephone) at legal U.S. racetracks, such that all applicable expenses (including information and handicapping intelligence costs) can be deducted from the gross winnings on Schedule C?
IMO, yes it is absolutely possible and I hear from people who do it all the time. But it is ALSO very possible that the gov't will challenge this and say the taxpayer is earning a living with his "regular job" and that the gambling operations, while extensive, are a mere hobby or casual activity.
Hence the concept of forming a separate taxpayer, a separate entity, that is a 100% pure play gambling business. Unless the corporate veil, so-to-speak, is pierced; then this entity is not casually doing gambling while earning a living with other activities... the ONLY activity is gambling and therefore that is how the entity "earns its living"
Of course the gambling must be active, done with continuity and be extensive as well, to reach professional gambler status.
And be aware in no event are gambling losses ever deductible below a zero net loss for the year. Whereas gambling expenses may sometimes bring the net from losses & expenses below zero.
Recent news: Filed on August 1, 2005 A taxpayer who apparently spent all his time gambling (we was otherwise retired) tried going it alone against the IRS and the IRS Tax Court and had his head handed to him on a plate by the judge, losing every argument made to defend his position that his gambling losses should be offset against his $44,833 in gross gambling winnings.
This poor fellow was penny wise and pound foolish thinking he could explain the law to the IRS lawyers and the judge! The lesson learned in this matter (Jimmie Clemons v IRS Commissioner) is if you are looking to take a position of Professional Gambler Status then retain a tax pro. Stick to what you know best: The Gaming. Let the tax pro handle the taxes for you!
For IRS tax purposes there are non-professional or recreational gamblers and then there are professional gamblers (US Supreme Court Commissioner v Groetzinger 1987). The differences can be devastating to the unwary. Illustration by example: Let's assume a gambler has winnings where he received form W-2G's and 1099's for "comps" totaling $400,000 for the year. Let's further assume that at other times during the year he lost $420,000. Bottom line is he is down $20,000 + his travel and other out-of-pocket expenses for the year.
To keep this somewhat realistic, let's say the taxpayer has some interest & dividend income, is collecting Social Security and has a little part-time job earning $10,000 of which $4,500 is put into a Roth IRA.
Filing as a recreational gambler the $400,000 is reported on form 1040, line 21 "other income" and then $400,000* is deducted on Schedule A, line 28 "gambling losses."
* That's not a typo, only $400,000 is deductible, not the full $420,000 in losses.
Filing as a professional gambler the $400,000 is reported on Schedule C, line 1 "gross receipts" and then $400,000 is deducted on Schedule C, line 39 as "other costs" or line 48 as "other expenses."
The professional gambler's Schedule C therefore shows a net of zero with zero coming forward to form 1040, line 12. Basically it is a wash with no negative tax repercussions.
His social security rather than being non-taxable is now 85% taxable because his AGI is over the threshold. This adds $18,000 to his taxable income.
His $10,000 standard deduction is wiped out and replaced with the itemized deduction, this in effect increases his taxable income by $10,000.
Various tax credits, earned income credit, child credits, education credits, and so on are eliminated because his AGI is over the thresholds.
His ability to have a deductible IRA, Roth IRA, or Roth conversion is prohibited because his AGI is over the thresholds.
His $3,650 for each exemption / dependent listed on the tax return is eliminated because his AGI is over the thresholds.
The active gambler who files his taxes as a non-professional gets a raw deal. But if qualified to file as a professional gambler the income tax burden can be reduced by thousands of dollars.
Even better: if the professional gambler is modestly profitable for the year, while this means he is subject to an extra 15.3% self-employment tax (SECA) on top of his regular income taxes - it also opens the door to the earned income credit (EIC) which occasionally can actually exceed the SECA tax, and thereby offsetting it completely.
Having some self-employment income also can allow the professional gambler to deduct health insurance in full without itemizing and without the 7.5% AGI limitation. Also up to a $5,000 IRA contribution can be made or up to a $22,500 self-employed 401(k) plan contribution can be deducted.
Optionally, the forming a separately filing entity (such as a partnership, LLC or s-corporation) can help lock in professional gambler status and further protect all of these tax benefits.
There are actually many benefits to filing under the umbrella of a Professional Gambling Entity, but the main one discussed here is to help thwart the #1 tool the IRS has to deny your Professional Gambler Status - that you did not do your gambling full-time and to the exclusion of all other income producing activities (or even all other social activities for that matter).
The theory here is to have a separately filing taxpayer, an entity, properly formed for the sole purpose of gambling. The only activity of the entity is that of a professional gambler, and there are no other activities that can be pointed to to suggest that the entity had interests other than that of being a for-profit gambling operation.
The entity is a "pure play" as a gambling operation and if the level of play achieved during the year is significant, regular, and continuous in the eyes of the law, then Professional Gambler Status is more readily assured.
Another benefit is that some of the net gambling profits that pass through certain entities can be sheltered from the 15.3% self-employment tax.
Gambling Losses generally may only be deducted up to the amount of your gambling winnings.
Non-professional gamblers report gross winnings as income on Form 1040 and then deduct what was lost as a miscellaneous itemized deductions on Schedule A (which is not subject to the two percent of AGI reduction).
If you spent $2,200 purchasing lottery tickets during the year and you had $500 in winning tickets, you would enter $500 income on Form 1040 and also enter $500 as a miscellaneous itemized deduction on Schedule A, deducting just $500 of the $2,200 you spent on lottery tickets. The good news is that you do not reduce gambling losses by the regular two percent of adjusted gross income as you must for many other miscellaneous itemized deductions.
Professional gamblers deduct gambling losses directly from their gambling income "above the line" instead of deducting them as an itemized deduction on Schedule A.
All gamblers, both professional and nonprofessional need to keep appropriate records to document their gambling losses. Professional gamblers also need to document their gambling related expenses.
Bingo: Record the number of games and ticket costs.
Lottery: Keep records of ticket purchases, payment slips, and unredeemed tickets.
Slot machines: Note the date, time, machine played, and machine number (use a Casino Card to track your play).
Horse or dog races: Keep records of Races Played, Actual Wagers, Losing Tickets and your Racing Program.
Jai Alai: Keep records of Games Wagered, Actual Wagers, Losing Tickets and your Program.
Make sure there are no shoe prints on the losing tickets, once you drop a pari-mutuel ticket and someone steps on it, it is generally "void" for tax deduction purposes.
Do you have Professional Gambler Status?
How does one make certain that he or she would be considered a professional gambler in the eyes of the IRS? You can't be absolutely sure, but if you gamble regularly, frequently, with continuity and with the intent of earning and with the intent of earning your living from the winnings, then you are off to a good start.
Unresolved is whether the losses from an illegal gambling operation are deductible against gaming winnings (illegal winnings or legal winning). Generally illegal payment made, bribes, graft, etc. are not deductible.
Your net profits as a professional gambler are also subject to self-employment taxes. This SECA tax is in addition to the income taxes that you will owe.
Also see "Why use a separate entity for filing as a Professional Gambler?" above.
This case upholds the accepted rules for professional gambler status as laid out by the US Supreme Court in Commissioner v Groetzinger, supra at 33 - that if a taxpayer "devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his intended livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness * * * demand that his activity be regarded as a trade or business."
This ruling is the same ruling that allows daytraders to deduct their expenses "above the line" rather than as an itemized deduction.
security traders, filing with trader status, deduct expenses on Schedule C.
gamblers, filing with professional gambler status, deduct expenses on Schedule C, consequently, a professional gambler does not have to itemize deductions to deduct gaming expenses.
security traders without trader status (i.e. investor status) deduct expenses on Schedule A subject to a reduction of 2% of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).
gamblers without professional gambler status (a/k/a non-professional gamblers or casual gamblers) deduct expenses on Schedule A, subject to a reduction of 2% of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).
security traders, filing with trader status, deduct trading losses either on Schedule D, limited to offsetting capital gains plus an additional $3,000 or on form 4797 where there are no limitations as to the amount deducted.
gamblers, filing with professional gambler status, deduct gaming losses on Schedule C, limited to reported winnings, net of expenses. i.e. the bottom line may not go below zero. Consequently, a professional gambler does not have to itemize deductions to deduct gaming losses.
security traders without trader status (i.e. investor status) deduct trading losses on Schedule D, limited to offsetting capital gains plus an additional $3,000.
gamblers without professional gambler status (a/k/a non-professional gamblers or casual gamblers) deduct gaming losses on Schedule A, limited to reported gaming winnings but these are not subject to a reduction of 2% of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) as are operating expenses.
Ann-Margaret Johnson, CPA author of How to Turn Your Poker Playing Into A Business 2005 chapter 4: "... the IRS will not allow you to deduct more expenses than income..." Chapter 12 "... if your gambling falls into the definition of a business, you can only deduct expenses up to your losses(sic). The IRS is not allowing gamblers to take more than their winnings off their tax return." "A person that is a professional gambler cannot incorporate themselves. There are many court cases where professional athletes have wanted to do this. The IRS feels that you are a personal service that you cannot have anyone else perform..."
Roger & Yolanda Roche, E.A.'s, authors of The Tax Guide for Gamblers 2004 chapter 3: "In the case where the net income is less than zero... just enter [a] zero... Recent case law supports the position that any business expense connected to gambling such as the cost of race track admissions, meals, lodgings, etc. are subject to the gambling loss limitation for the professional. In other words, your losses plus your expenses cannot exceed your winnings."
Walter L. Lewis, CPA author of The Gambler's Guide to Taxes 2003 chapter 4: "the professional gambler is not required to report losses as an itemized deduction. Instead, losses and gains are reported on Schedule C. The net gain or loss is then reported on Form 1040 prior to arriving at adjusted gross income."
Sheldon D. Pollack, University of Delaware, author of Gross Revenue From Gambling: Some Unintended Consequences 1997 "Achieving the cherished trade or business status for gambling activity would mean not only that a gambler's 'inevitable annual net gambling loss' (or 'IANGL') would be deductible against income from other sources, but also that all the costs associated with conducting the trade or business of gambling (e.g., airfare to Las Vegas, hotel rooms, tickets to Wayne Newton concerts, etc.) also would be deductible on the gambler's Schedule C.
The AICPA, The Purpose of Taxation - Tax and the Facts under Tax Facts "Gambling winnings greater than $600 are taxable income and expenses associated with gambling can be deducted from gambling winnings - if you are a professional gambler - in arriving at taxable income. (Gambling losses can not be deducted from income when calculating taxable income!)"
AICPA update: Gambling: The Tax Court overturned a key portion of its 1951 decision in Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951) concerning the deductibility of trade or business expenses by a professional gambler [Mayo, 136 T.C. 81 (2011)]. Under Offutt, ordinary and necessary business expenses of a gambling activity were treated the same as gambling losses and were therefore limited by Sec. 165(d) to gambling winnings. However, in Mayo, the court ruled that a professional gambler may deduct his or her ordinary and necessary business expenses on Schedule C even if they exceed the gambler’s net gambling winnings and produce a loss for the activity. The court noted that various rulings had used a narrow definition of the phrase “gains from wagering transactions” and said a similar reading should be used for the phrase “losses from wagering transactions” in Sec. 165(d). The court also said it felt it needed to address the issue even though the IRS had previously announced its intention to no longer follow Offutt [IRS Chief Counsel Memo. AM 2008-013 (12/19/08)] since history invited the possibility of administrative inconsistency on this issue.
Walter L. Lewis, CPA author of How to Keep More of What You Win 1997 chapter 5: "The professional gambler is not required to report losses as an itemized deduction. Instead, losses and gains are reported on Schedule C. The net gain or loss is then reported on Form 1040 prior to arriving at adjusted gross income."
Colin M. Cody, CPA (yours truly) believes that most of the above opinions are incorrect or are incomplete. Pursuant to Boyd v. U.S., 762 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1985) Internal Revenue Code §165(d) Wagering Losses - Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such transactions. Therefore, Cody asserts, losses emanating from wagering transactions may not exceed the amount of gains. Trivia: note that per TAM 200417004 winnings from activities where no wager was made are not allowable to be offset by wagering losses.
Further, pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §162(a) In General - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. But only so far as the gambling is a legal activity pursuant to §162(c)(2) Other Illegal Payments - No deduction shall be allowed ... for any ... illegal payment under any law of the United States ..., which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business.
Update: Mr. Cody's views, as stated above, have all been "upheld" nice and concisely in Tax Court recently. On February 20, 2007 a decision was rendered against Gloria Tschetschot (alt link) in the matter Tschetschot v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. (alt link) Here the Internal Revenue and the Tax Court allowed the §162 expenses to be deducted in full, thereby bringing the net, net taxable results of her gambling activities to a negative amount, which in turn offset her wages in another profession. Of interest is footnote #7 of the Opinion where the Court opined that while allowing the operating expenses to offset non-gambling winnings in the current year, that any resulting net operating loss (NOL) from operating expenses, would not be allowable as a carryover (or presumably a carryback) of said NOL. The point was not argued at trial because the taxpayer had no NOL and therefore the point was moot. Colin M. Cody, CPA, believes that the Court erred in making this statement as it is illogical to presume that deductible trade or business expenses would be precluded from the NOL provisions when there is nothing in law stating such.
The Court did limit her §165(d) gambling losses to not exceed the amount of her reported winnings, which means that her net gain/loss from the actual gambling transactions (wagers) was zero. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue and the Tax Court allowed professional gambler status, apparently based solely on the taxpayer entering 9 poker tournament series during the year. This was in spite of her significant salary earned in another profession.
The erroneous commentary above about professionals being unable to incorporate "themselves" is patently false. The author failed to cite even one case to support her claim. Suffice it to say that any tax return preparer with some experience eventually sees 1099s and income being paid to professionals' corporations and LLCs of all sorts: Actors, Entertainers, Physicians, Lawyers, Architects, Accountants. The IRS even provides tax forms 1042 and 5754 for gamblers that set up as corporations or LLCs (see IRS instructions). Further, the standard tax form W-2G does not ask for an individual's "social security number," rather it calls for the "winner's taxpayer identification no." Corporations, LLCs and other Businesses have TIN's not SSN's.
/Footnote/ 3 See, e.g., Gajewski v. Comr., 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1984), in which a gambler unsuccessfully argued that he was engaged full time in the trade or business of gambling. The court held that the losses were, under §165(d), deductible only to the extent of the taxpayer's gambling winnings. This effectively precluded the taxpayer from using §162 or even §212(1) (deduction for the production or collection of income).
A subsequent Supreme Court decision, Groetzinger v. Comr., 480 U.S. 23 (1987), held that a gambler could be engaged in the trade or business of gambling, which presumably opens the possibility of deducting under §162, if the taxpayer can prove that he is engaged in the trade or business of gambling.
It has long been established that gambling winnings in Australia are completely free of tax. The only scope for gambling winnings to be considered assessable is if the gambler is considered to be in the "business" of gambling. The word "business" is not defined in the taxation legislation. Whether one's gambling activities constitute a "business" or not is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the Taxation Office and is subject to appeal to various Tribunals and Courts. This very issue was examined in detail by the Federal Court of Australia in three separate cases in 1989: Evans v FC of T 89 ATC 4540; (1989) 20 ATR 922, Babka v FC of T 89 ATC 4963; (1989) 20 ATR 1251, and Brajkovich v FC of T 89 ATC 5227; (1989) 20 ATR 1570. In the first two cases, the gamblers won substantial amounts of money and the Taxation Office was trying to levy tax on those winnings, arguing that the gamblers were in the "business" of gambling. On both occasions the Court refused to characterize the taxpayers activities as a "business," even though they exhibited some elements which could be characterized as business-like. In the final case, the taxpayer lost substantial amounts and was trying to claim a deduction as a "business" expense, trying to argue that he was in the business of gambling. Once again, the Court refused to characterize the activities as a "business."
As a result of these cases, the Commissioner of Taxation issued an income tax ruling about this very issue, IT 2655. Although this ruling specifically dealt with racing not casino gambling, the ruling held that: "...it will be rare for a taxpayer with no connection with racing other than betting to be carrying on a business of betting or gambling."
As a practical matter there are two other reasons which make it unlikely that the Tax Office would ever try to levy tax on a casino player's winnings. Firstly, there is the difficulty of establishing the amount won, and secondly if the Tax Office were ever to levy such tax, it would open the floodgates for high rolling losing gamblers to claim that they are in the business of gambling and therefore to claim a deduction for their losses.
No tax is imposed on nonbusiness gambling income a nonresident alien wins playing blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette, or big-6 wheel in the United States. A Form W-8BEN is not required to obtain the exemption from withholding, but a Form W-8BEN may be required to inform the withholding agent that the person is a foreign person, that is, Form 1099 reporting and backup withholding would not be applicable. When a Form W-8BEN is submitted to the withholding agent solely for the purpose of identifying the payee as a foreign person, a TIN is not required on such Form W-8BEN.
Most gambling winnings are subject to reporting on Form 1042-S. However, proceeds from a wager placed in blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette, or big-6 wheel are not amounts subject to reporting.
On their U.S. federal individual income tax returns, nonresident aliens are taxed at graduated rates on net gambling income won in the U.S. that is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.


§ 94-2 Effect of other provisions.
§ 94-4 Maintenance of buildings and structures.
§ 94-5 Investigation and report.
§ 94-6 Order to repair; order for hearing.
§ 94-7 Contents of notice.
§ 94-8 Service and filing of notice.
§ 94-10 Failure to comply.
§ 94-11 Assessment of expenses.
§ 94-12 Hearing on assessment of expenses.
Unsafe buildings pose a threat to life and property in the Town of Mount Hope. Buildings and structures may become unsafe by reason of damage by fire, the elements, age or general deterioration. Vacant buildings not properly secured at doorways and windows also serve as an attractive nuisance for young children who may be injured therein, as well as a point of congregation by vagrants and transients. A dilapidated building may also serve as a place of rodent infestation, thereby creating a health menace to the community. Debris, rubble or parts of buildings left on the ground and not removed constitute a dangerous, unhealthy and unsightly condition. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide for the safety, health, protection and general welfare of persons and property in the Town of Mount Hope by requiring such unsafe buildings to be repaired or demolished and removed.
The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition to, and in furtherance of, the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code, including but not limited to Sections 107 and 108 of the Property Maintenance Code of New York State.
Any building, structure, or portion thereof used for residential, business, industrial, recreational or other purpose.
The Building Inspector of the Town of Mount Hope or such other person appointed by the Town Board to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
The Code Enforcement Officer of the Town of Mount Hope or such other person appointed by the Town Board to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
Because of its structural condition is or may become dangerous or unsafe to the public.
Is open at the doorways or windows or walls, making it accessible to and an object of attraction to minors under 18 years of age, as well as to vagrants and other trespassers.
Consists of debris, rubble, or parts of buildings left on the ground after demolition, reconstruction, fire or other casualty.
Presents any other danger to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the public.
Is unfit for the purposes for which it may lawfully be used.
It shall be unlawful for any owner, tenant or occupant of any building or structure or portion of any building or structure in the Town of Mount Hope to maintain such building or structure or portion of any building or structure in any condition or manner which shall be unsafe as defined in § 94-3 of this chapter.
When, in the opinion of the Building Inspector, Code Enforcement Officer and/or Town Engineer any building or structure located in the Town of Mount Hope shall be deemed to be dangerous or unsafe to the public as defined in § 94-3, the Building Inspector, Code Enforcement Officer and/or Town Engineer shall make a formal inspection thereof and report, in writing, to the Town Board his findings and recommendations in regard to the building's or structure's removal or repair.
The Town Board shall thereupon consider said report, and, if it finds that such building or structure is dangerous and unsafe to the public, it shall, by resolution order its repair, if the same can be safely repaired, and, if not, its removal and demolition and shall further order that a hearing be held before the Town Board at a time and place therein specified and on at least five days' notice to the owner of the building or structure or persons having an interest therein to determine whether said order to repair or remove shall be affirmed or modified or vacated and, in the event of modification or affirmance, to assess all costs and expenses incurred by the Town in the repair or removal of such building or structure against the land on which said building or structure is located. Said order shall also provide that the securing or removal of said building or structure shall commence within 30 days after service of notice and shall be completed within 60 days thereafter unless, for good cause shown, such time shall be extended by the Town Board.
That the securing or removal of said building or structure shall commence within 30 days of the service of the notice and shall be completed within 60 days thereafter unless, for good cause shown, such time shall be extended by the Town Board.
The date, time and place of the hearing to be held before the Town Board, at which hearing the owner, occupant or other person having an interest in said premises shall have the right to contest the order and findings of the Town Board.
That in the event that such owner, occupant or other person having an interest in said premises shall fail to contest such order and/or fails to comply with the same, the Town Board will order the repair or removal of such building or structure by the Town and that the Town will assess all costs and expenses, including legal expenses, incurred in such repair or removal against the land on which such building or structure is located or will institute a special proceeding against the owner to collect the cost of repair or removal, including all legal expenses incurred in connection therewith.
A copy of said notice shall be personally served upon the owner or someone of the owners, executors, legal representative, agents, lessees, or other person having a vested interest in the premises as shown on the Town tax records or in the records in the Orange County Clerk's office.
If no such person can be reasonably found for personal service, then a copy of said notice shall be mailed to such person by registered mail addressed to his last known address, as shown on said records, and by securely affixing a copy of said notice upon said building or structure.
A copy of said notice shall be filed in the Orange County Clerk's office, which notice shall be filed in the same manner as a notice of pendency pursuant to Article 65 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and shall have the same effect as a notice of pendency as therein provided. The notice so filed shall be effective for a period of one year from the date of filing and may be extended by the Town for an additional period of one year thereafter upon the filing with the Orange County Clerk of a duly verified extension of notice which shall provide for extension thereof and refer to the name and address of the person against whom the notice was served, the date the original notice was filed and a statement that the Town elects to extend the effectiveness of said notice pursuant to this section of this chapter of the Town of Mount Hope. Such notice may be vacated only upon an order of a Judge or Justice of a court of record and of competent jurisdiction upon grounds sufficient to cancel a notice of pendency pursuant to § 6514 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
The Town Board shall conduct the public hearing at the time and place specified in the notice to repair or demolish. It may adjourn the hearing from time to time until all interested parties are heard and until the hearing is completed. Within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing, the Town Board shall determine by resolution to revoke the order to repair or remove, modify said order or continue and affirm said order and direct the owner or other persons to complete the work within a time specified in the order or such other time which shall be determined by the Town Board.
In the event of the refusal, failure or neglect of the owner or person so notified to comply with said order of the Town Board within the time specified in said order and after the public hearing, the Town Board shall provide that such building or structure be made safe and secure or removed and demolished by Town employees or by independent contractors. Except in emergency cases as herein provided, any contract for repair or demolishing and removal of a building or structure in excess of $20,000 shall be awarded through competitive bidding.
Be collected by commencement of a special proceeding against the owner of said unsafe or dangerous building or structure pursuant to General Municipal Law § 78-b.
In the event that the Town takes any action as provided in this chapter which results in the incurring of any expenses and the Town Board seeks to assess such expenses against the land on which the building is located, the Town Board shall conduct a public hearing as to the amount of such expenses.
That in the event that such owner or his representative or agent shall fail to appear and/or fail to successfully contest such expenses, the Town Board shall levy such expenses against the land described in the notice and shall collect them in the same manner as provided for by law for the levy and collection of a special ad valorem levy.
Service of the notice required by Subsection B above shall be made in the manner specified in § 94-8 in this chapter.
Where it reasonably appears that there is present a clear and imminent danger to the life, safety or health of any person or property, unless an unsafe building or structure is immediately repaired and secured or demolished, the Town Board may, by resolution, authorize the Building Inspector, Code Enforcement Officer and/or Town Engineer to immediately cause the repair or demolition of such unsafe building or structure. The expenses of such repair or demolition, at the option of the Town Board, shall be a charge against the land on which it is located and shall be assessed, levied and collected as provided in § 94-11A hereof or shall be the subject of a special proceeding as provided in § 94-11B hereof.
In addition to assessment of costs provided for in § 94-11, any person, firm or corporation who shall violate any provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be punishable by a maximum fine of $250 or by imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, for each offense.


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My multi-disciplinary expertise combines backgrounds in economics, international development, and epidemiology and population health. As of 2016, I am appointed through the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR) contributing to work programs on ageing well and productively. In the past 8 years, I have been a principal analyst working with the Thai health-risk transition: A national cohort study (funded by the Wellcome Trust UK and the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council) resulting in over 50 peer-reviewed articles on equity access to health service, injury epidemiology, and social determinants of health and wellbeing.
In 2014, I was appointed an 18-month Fellowship supported by the World Health Organization Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies leading a comparative study on health system responses to ageing and non-communicable diseases. In 2016, I was also awarded an Endeavour Research Fellowship from the Australian Department of Education and Training to conduct collaborative research based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing at University College London.
I am currently supervising PhD students on a range of topics (ageing and wellbeing in Vietnam, incident diabetes and nutrition labelling in Thailand, and health systems research in South Korea) as well as an honours student and a medical student. I have contributed to postgraduate teaching in contemporary issues in public health, health policy and administration, analysis of public health data, global health, and social determinants of health.
• Yiengprugsawan V. 2017. Book review: World Bank ‘Live long and prosper: Ageing in East Asia and Pacific’. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance. 16(4): 586-592.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Healy J, Kendig H, et al 2017. Reorienting health services to people with chronic health conditions: diabetes and stroke services in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Health Systems & Reform. doi: 10.1080/23288604.2017.1356428.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Rimpeekool W, Papier K.et al. 2017. Relationship between 8-year weight change, body size, and health in a large cohort of adults in Thailand. Journal of Epidemiology. doi: 10.1016/j.je.2016.09.015. [Epub ahead of print].
• Rimpeekool, W, Kirk M, Yiengprugsawan V et al 2017. Nutrition label experience and consumption of transitional foods among a nationwide cohort of 42,750 Thai adults', British Food Journal. Vol. 119, No 2, pp. 425-439.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Hoy D, Buchbinder R, et al. 2017. Low back pain and limitations of daily living in Asia: longitudinal findings in the Thai cohort study. BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders. 19:18(1). doi: 10.1186/s12891-016-1380-5.
• Yiengprugsawan, V., Healy, J. and Kendig, H. (eds). 2016. Health system responses to population ageing and noncommunicable diseases in Asia. Comparative Country Studies. Vol. 2, No. 2. World Health Organization on behalf of the Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Byles J, Kendig H et al 2016. 'Population Ageing and NCDs', in Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan, Judith Healy, Hal Kendig (eds), Health system responses to population ageing and noncommunicable diseases in Asia, Comparative Country Studies. Vol. 2 No. 2 Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. World Health Organization, pp. 9-33.
• Yiengprugsawan, V., Healy, J., Kendig, H. et al. 2016. 'Reflections on health service responses to NCDs in older populations', in Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan, Judith Healy, Hal Kendig (eds), Health system responses to population ageing and noncommunicable diseases in Asia, Comparative Country Studies. Vol. 2, No. 2. World Health Organization, pp. 111-126.
• Tran T, Adams-Bedford J, Yiengprugsawan V et al. 2016. Psychological distress following injury in a large cohort of Thai adults. PLOS ONE (Public Library of Science). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0164767.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Horta BL, Motta JV, et al. 2016. Body size dynamics in young adults: 8-year follow up of cohorts in Brazil and Thailand. Nutriton & Diabetes. 6(7):e219. doi: 10.1038/nutd.2016.24.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Leach L, Berecki-Gisolf J, Kendig H, et al. 2016. Caregiving and mental health among workers: longitudinal evidence from a large cohort of adults in Thailand. Social Science & Medicine - Population Health. doi: 10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.01.004.
• Wakabayashi M, Berecki-Gisolf J, Banwell C,... Yiengprugsawan V. 2016, Non-fatal injury in Thailand from 2005 to 2013: Incidence trends and links to alcohol consumption patterns in the Thai Cohort Study. Journal of Epidemiology. vol.26, no.9, pp.471-480.
• Zhao, J, Pachanee, C, Yiengprugsawan, V et al 2015, 'Smoking, smoking cessation, and 7-year mortality in a cohort of Thai adults', Population Health Metrics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-10.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Lazzarino AI, Steptoe A et al. 2015. Psychological job characteritics, wealth, and culture: differential effects on mental health in the UK and Thailand. Globalization & Health. doi:10.1186/s12992-015-0116-x.
• Wakabayashi M, McKetin R, Banwell C, Yiengprugsawan V, et al. 2015. Alcohol consumption patterns in Thailand and their relationship with non-communicable disease. BMC Public Health. doi: 10.1186/s12889-015-2662-9.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Banwell C, Takeda W, et al. 2015. Health, happiness and eating together: what can a large Thai cohort study tell us? Global Journal of Health Science. doi: 10.5539/gjhs.v7n4p270.
• Tran T, Yiengprugsawan V, Chinwong D et al 2015. Environmental tobacco smoke exposure and health disparities: 8-year longitudinal findings from a large cohort of Thai adults. BMC Public Health. 15(1217): 1-11. doi: 10.1186/s12889-015-2547-y.
• Rimpeekool W, Seubsman S, Banwell C, Kirk M, Yiengprugsawan V, Sleigh AC. 2015. Food and nutrition labelling in Thailand: A long march from subsistence producers to international traders. Food Policy. 56: 59-66.
• Rimpeekool W, Banwell C, Seubsman S, Kirk M, Yiengprugsawan V. 2015. Thai consumer difficulties and barriers in understanding nutrition labels: a qualitative study. J Safety and Health. 8(28): 34-47.
• Zhao J, Pachanee C, Yiengprugsawan V, et al. 2015. Smoking, smoking cessation, and 7-year mortality in a cohort of Thai adults. Population Health Metrics. doi: 10.1186/s12963-015-0062-0.
• Berecki-Gisolf J, Yiengprugsawan V, Kelly M, et al. 2015.The impact of the Thai motorcycle transition on road traffic injury: Thai Cohort Study results. PLoS One. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120617.
• Banwell C, Dixon J, Kelly M, Yiengprugsawan V et al. 2015. Methodological approaches connecting the food system to the urban nutrition transition: fresh food retailing in Thailand. FAO Conference on Food Supply and Distribution Systems in Urban Environments. Rome, 6-7 July 2015.
• Lim LL-Y, Banwell C, Bain C, Banks E, Seubsman S, Kelly M, Yiengprugsawan V, Sleigh AC. 2014. Sugar sweetened beverages and weight gain over 4 years in a Thai National Cohort - A prospective analysis. PLoS One; 9(5):e95309.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2014. Unhappiness and mortality: evidence from a middle-income Southeast Asian setting. BioPsychoSocial Medicine. doi:10.1186/1751-0759-8-18.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Berecki-Gisolf J, McClure R, et al. 2014. The effect of injuries on health measured by Short Form 8 among a large cohort of Thai adults. PLoS One. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0088903.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Berecki-Gisolf J, Bain C, et al. 2014. Predictors of injury mortality: findings from a large national cohort in Thailand. BMJ Open; 4(6):e004668.
• Lazzarino AI, Yiengprugsawan V, Steptoe A et al. 2014. The associations between unhealthy behaviours, mental stress, and low socio-economic status in an international comparison of samples from Thailand and England. Globalization & Health. doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-10-10.
• Hogan A, Phillips RL, Howard D, Yiengprugsawan V. 2014. Psychosocial outcomes of children with ear infections and hearing problems: a longitudinal study. BMC Pediatrics. 14(1):65. doi:10.1186/1471-2431-14-65.
• Korda RJ, Paige E, Yiengprugsawan V, et al. 2014. Income-related inequalities in chronic conditions, physical functioning and psychological distress among older people in Australia: cross-sectional findings from the 45 and up study. BMC Public Health. 14(1):741.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Sbirakos P. 2013. Being right or being happy: pilot study. British Medical Journal - BMJ Rapid Response. www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f7398/rr/679678.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Strazdins L, Lim LL-Y, et al. 2013. Physically and psychologically hazardous jobs and mental health in Thailand. Health Promotion International. doi: 10.1093/heapro/dat080.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Hogan A, Strazdins L. 2013. Longitudinal analysis of ear infection and hearing impairment: findings from 6-year prospective cohorts of Australian children. BMC Pediatrics 13(1):28. doi:10.1186/1471-2431-13-28.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Hogan A. 2013. Ear infections and its associated risk factors, comorbidity, and health service use in Australia. International Journal of Pedriatrics. doi: 10.1155/2013/963132.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Friel S, et al. 2013. Inequalities in risks and outcomes in a health transitioning country: A review of a large national cohort of Thai adults. Sage Open. 3(3) doi: 10.1177/2158244013505603.
• Somkotra T, Yiengprugsawan V et al 2013. Longitudinal associations between oral health impacts and quality of life among Thai adults. Quality of Life Research. 22:122-123.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Strazdins L, et al 2013. The impact of hazardous jobs on mental health and wellbeing among working Thai adults. Quality of Life Research. doi: 10.1007/s11136-013-0543-1.
• Tawatsupa B, Yiengprugsawan V, Kjellstrom T et al 2012. Heat stress, health and well-being: Findings from a large national cohort of Thai adults. BMJ Open. 2(6): doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2012-001396.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Harley D, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2012. Physical and mental health among caregivers: findings from a cross-sectional study of Open University students in Thailand. BMC Public Health. 12:1111. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-12-1111.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2012. Psychological distress and mental health of Thai caregivers. Psychology of Well-Being. 2:(4) doi: 10.1186/2211-1522-2-4.
• Seubsman S, Yiengprugsawan V, Sleigh AC, Thai Cohort Study Team. 2012. A large national Thai cohort study of the health-risk transition based on Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University students. ASEAN J Open Distance Learn. 4(1): 58-69.
• Yiengprugsawan V. 2012. Physical and mental health of family caregivers: findings from 60569 Thai adults. Quality of Life Research. 21:46. doi 10.1007/s11136-012-0248-x.
• Somkotra T, Yiengprugsawan V, Seubsman S et al 2012, 'Oral health-related quality of life and self-rated health in middle and older aged Thai adults', Quality of Life Research. (21): 100-101.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Banwell C, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2012. Short sleep and obesity in a large national cohort of Thai adults. BMJ Open. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2011-000561.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Hogan A, Harley D et al. 2012. Epidemiological associations of hearing impairment and health among Thai adults. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health. 24(6):1013-22.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Stephan K, McClure R et al. 2012. Risk factors for injury in a national cohort of 87134 Thai adults. Public Health (Elsevier). 126: 33-39.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2012. Health and social indicators among monks, prisoners and other Thai Open University adults. Journal of Religion and Health. 51(3): 925–933.
• Yiengprugsawan, V, Seubsman, S, Lim, L et al 2011, Social Capital, Trust, Economic Stress and Religion in a Cohort of 87,134 Thai Adults. Journal of Population and Social Studies. 19(2): 183-196.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Somkotra T et al. 2011. Factors associated with self-reported number of teeth in a large cohort of Thai adults. BMC Oral Health.11(31): doi 10.1186/1472-6831-11-31.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Carmichael GA, et al. 2011. Explanation of inequality before and after universal health insurance in Thailand. Health Policy and Planning. 26(2):105-114.
• Li C, Butler J, Yiengprugsawan V. 2011. Moving towards universal health insurance in China: what can we learn from Thailand? Social Science & Medicine. 73(3): 359-366.
• Stephan K, McClure R, Kelly M, Yiengprugsawan V et al. 2011. Distribution of transport injury and related risk behaviours among Thai adults. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 43(3):1062-7.
• Stephan K, McClure R, Seubsman S, Kelly M, Yiengprugsawan V, et al. 2010. Review of injuries over a one year period among 87134 studying at the Open University in Thailand. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine & Public Health. 41(5):1220-1230.
• Kelly M, Banwell C, Dixon J, Seubsman S, Yiengprugsawan V, Sleigh AC. 2010. Nutrition transition, food retailing and health equity in Thailand. Australasian Epidemiologist. 17(3): 4-7.
• Seubsman S, Kelly M, Yiengprugsawan V. 2010. Gender, socioeconomic status, and self-rated health: evidence from Thailand. Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health. 23(5): 754-765.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Kelly M, et al. 2010. The first 10 years of the Universal Coverage Scheme in Thailand. Australasian Epidemiologist. 17(3): 24-26.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Khamman S, Seubsman S et al. 2010. Personal Wellbeing Index in a national cohort of 87,134 Thai adults. Social Indicators Research. 98(2): 201-215.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Dear K BG, Lim L L-Y, et al. 2010. Decomposing socioeconomic inequality for binary health outcomes: an improved estimation that does not vary by choice of reference group, BMC Research Notes. 3(57): doi 10.1186/1756-0500-3-57.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Seubsman S, Sleigh AC. 2009. Use and foregone health services among 87,134 Thai adults. Southeast Asian J Tropical Medicine & Public Health. 40(6):1347-58.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Lim L L-Y, Carmichael GA, Sleigh AC. 2009. Tracking and decomposing health and disease inequality in Thailand. Annals of Epidemiology. 19(11): 800-7.
• Yiengprugsawan V, Lim L L-Y, Sidorenko A, et al. 2007. Measuring and decomposing inequity in self-reported health in Thailand. International Journal of Equity in Health. 6(23):1-17. doi: 10.1186/1475-9276-6-23.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


§ 27-1403 Area and Bulk Regulations.
§ 27-1404 Parking and Loading.
§ 27-1406 Buffer Areas and Landscaping.
The purpose of this district is to provide for commercial use, including a specialty retail shopping complex related to historic facilities nearby, and to complement the existing large-scale commercial center in the Route 50 corridor.
Business or professional office, minor.
Day-care center, subject to § 27-1906.15.
Major business or professional office, subject to § 27-1906.32.
Major financial institution, subject to § 27-1906.32.
Specialty retail, subject to § 27-1906.55.
Medical marijuana dispensary, subject to § 1403.12.
Fences, subject to § 27-2104.
Off-street parking and loading, subject to Part 22.
Outdoor hydronic heater, subject to § 27-1906.51.
Signs, subject to Part 23.
Solar energy system (small), subject to § 27-1906.51.
Temporary construction trailer or sales office, subject to § 27-2108.
Wind energy system (small), subject to § 27-1906.51.
Other accessory uses customarily incidental to and on the same lot with any permitted use authorized in this district.
Hotel or motel, subject to § 27-1906.26.
Sit-down restaurant, subject to § 27-1906.54.
Mini-warehouse or self storage facility, subject to § 27-1906.35.
Oil and gas wells, subject to § 27-1906.34.
Communications antenna mounted on an existing building or existing public utility storage or transmission structure, subject to § 27-1906.10.
Solar energy system (large), subject to § 27-1906.51.
Uses accessory to an approved conditional use, other than fences or signs, subject to § 27-1903.2.
Truck and heavy equipment rental, sales and service, subject to § 27-1906.57.
Comparable uses not specifically listed, subject to § 27-1905.
Uses accessory to an approved use by special exception, other than fences or signs, subject to § 27-1903.2.
In the B-3 Special Commercial District, all uses shall be subject to the following regulations, except as they may be modified by the express standards and criteria for the specific conditional uses and uses by special exception contained in Part 19.
Minimum Lot Frontage: 50 feet.
Maximum Impervious Surface Coverage: 65%.
Minimum Front Yard: 50 feet.
Adjoining any S-C or R District: 75 feet.
Adjoining a registered historic structure or public park: 100 feet.
Adjoining I-79 or any unenclosed electrical utility substation (in the case of mini-warehouse or self-storage facilities only): five feet.
Adjoining all other districts: 30 feet.
Adjoining all other districts: 20 feet.
Special Yard Requirements: See § 27-2104.
Permitted Projections Into Required Yards: See § 27-2105.
All principal structures: four stories but no more than 45 feet.
All accessory structures: one story but no more than 20 feet.
Height Exceptions: See § 27-2106.
Medical Marijuana Dispensary Buffer Distance. A medical marijuana dispensary may not be located within 1,000 feet of the property line of a public, private or parochial school or a day-care center.


text:
One trend involves what I call “must-carry” claims – Internet users’ assertion of rights to have their accounts or posts included on major platforms, even if the platforms don’t like it. The U.S. seems to have a new right-wing poster child for this claim every week. Their claims don’t pass legal muster in the U.S. But they might in other countries.
The other trend is national governments’ assertion that they can make platforms take down content everywhere in the world. French privacy regulators are making this claim to the EU’s highest court this week, saying Google should remove search results globally based on French “Right to Be Forgotten” laws – even if they constitute protected free expression in other countries. The court is also considering a similar global removal claim involving Facebook. A global takedown order in either of these cases would protect EU citizens’ rights under their own national laws in the short run. In the long run, though, it would speed the day when those rights may be curtailed by global orders from courts in Russia, Turkey, or China.
I had an op ed in the New York Times about global removal claims this week. It wasn’t the right place to get into the deep doctrinal connections between those cases and the must-carry cases, so I’m doing that here. The links come from wonky areas of jurisdiction law that are boring even to lawyers. The upshot is this: The more legal freedom a platform has to reject must-carry claims and take down speech it doesn’t like, the more power governments have to make platforms enforce speech-restrictive laws everywhere in the world. If courts don’t find doctrinal tools to decouple the must-carry issue from the global-takedown issue, we are headed in a bad direction.
Here’s a rundown of the two issues, and why they go together.
Question 1: Can you use “must-carry” claims to force a platform to show people your speech?
Answer 1: Not in the U.S., but maybe in Brazil or Germany.
Whatever the philosophical merits of these must-carry claims, they fail under U.S. law. Two dozen or more plaintiffs have tried suing platforms for taking down their posts or accounts, and the platforms have won every case. For starters, platforms’ Terms of Service and statutory immunities under CDA 230 protect them from having to host speech they disagree with. More importantly, courts have consistently held that platforms’ own First Amendment rights protect them from laws that would force them to host or index content against their will. That means that even the must-carry legislation that some politicians have threatened to pass probably wouldn’t survive a Constitutional challenge.
In Germany and Brazil, though, this question has been playing out differently. At least two Brazilian courts have ordered YouTube to reinstate parody videos, holding that by taking them down, YouTube violated the parodist’s right to free expression. (1, 2.) Both YouTube and the copyright holders who told YouTube to take the parodies down were ordered to pay damages. Germany has had cases like this, too. At least one appeals court has ordered Facebook to reinstate content that the platform said violated its Community Guidelines. So have a couple of lower courts.
It’s hard to fathom where these cases are supposed to lead us in the long run. If platforms have to host all legal speech, are they effectively nationalized? Germany’s NetzDG law also requires platforms to take down “manifestly” unlawful content within 24 hours of being notified, and other illegal content within 7 days. So, is the idea that platforms can’t err on the side of over-removal or under-removal, and must instead perfectly interpret and enforce the law – doing what courts do, but much faster and with less information? Are platforms no longer allowed to define social norms for the communities they host, or to weed out offensive-but-lawful speech – which in many countries includes things like racial slurs, bullying, or anorexia how-to videos? Or are we heading for some strange new legal regime in which platforms are allowed to take down some legal speech, but not all of it? That would be a radical departure from current free expression law, putting legislatures or courts in charge of defining new and more restrictive speech rules for the Internet. These and other problems raised by the Brazilian and German courts’ orders are massively complex. They may be unsolveable.
But these rulings do, perhaps, change the legal landscape for the courts considering global removal claims. That brings us to the second question.
Answer 2: It might depend on the answer to Question 1.
The seemingly separate issue of global content removal orders is mostly playing out in Europe and Canada, for now. In Europe, the CJEU is hearing both France’s claim that Google must apply “Right to Be Forgotten” rules globally, and also Austria’s claim that Facebook should globally remove a post calling a politician “corrupt” and a “traitor” – although the post would plainly be lawful political speech by many countries’ standards.
Global takedowns and platforms’ immunity from must-carry claims go together in U.S. court treatment, too. Two U.S. district court cases make that explicit. In Zhang v. Baidu, democracy activists said that Baidu, China’s main search engine, had violated their rights by excluding their speech from search results. Baidu did so, they said, at the behest of the Chinese government. The court rejected their claim. Even if the Chinese government did prompt Baidu’s actions, it concluded, Baidu’s own First Amendment rights allowed the company to exclude whatever speech it wanted. In Sikhs for Justice v. Facebook, similarly, human rights organizations said the social network had silenced them at a foreign government’s behest – and the court said Facebook was free to do so. The widely misunderstood 2000 Yahoo France case has the same lesson. The French court’s order to remove Nazi memorabilia from auction listings may have been inconsistent with the First Amendment, but that didn’t matter, because the French plaintiffs weren’t asking U.S. courts to enforce it. An appellate court in California ultimately dismissed the case, and Yahoo voluntarily -- and quite legally -- changed its global practices to align better with French law.
The lesson of all these cases is this: As long as a platform can take down user speech in Country A, nothing stops courts in Country B from compelling the platform to do so. That’s a troubling outcome for the citizens of Country A. They may have constitutional rights to prevent their own government from suppressing their speech. But they are helpless when a foreign government makes a private, multinational platform do it.
Putting Questions 1 and 2 together: What is to be done about global takedowns?
Odds are, the CJEU and other courts will grant global content removal orders like the ones France and Austria want in at least some cases. This piecemeal approach will be a step in the wrong direction – and one that will be emulated by courts in other countries.
It doesn’t have to be that way, though. Both courts and legislatures have ample latitude to choose the direction the law takes. The applicable legal doctrines are ambiguous, and the future is not written. Courts could follow recommendations from human rights lawyers, who say that one country shouldn’t overrule another’s free speech rules unless they fall outside the range permitted by international human rights principles. They could adopt jurisdiction scholar Dan Svantesson’s “scope of remedial jurisdiction” test, and apply it either early in a case (when assessing jurisdiction, venue, choice of law or comity) or late in the case (when assessing remedies). They could accept companies’ necessarily-imperfect attempts to comply with national laws on nationally targeted versions of their services, and not insist that any risk of forbidden content crossing borders via VPNs and other tools justifies enforcing one country’s speech laws everywhere. They could find grounds within the data protection, trade secret, or other substantive bodies of law to refrain from global enforcement. The CJEU in particular has the leeway to strike out in the direction of its choice – and its choice will influence courts around the world.
Or then again… Perhaps the must-carry rulings in Brazil and Germany will cause something much more interesting and unpredictable to happen. The CJEU could conclude that Brazil’s and Germany’s embrace of must-carry obligations for platforms has changed things. After all, we now know of at least two places where compelling platforms to take down legal speech would require it to violate local law. That “hard conflict” makes it much harder, under conventional international law principles, to justify global takedown orders like the one Canada issued.
The thing is, copyright law is supposed to be even more similar across borders than trade secret law. Copyright is harmonized by global treaties. (DMCA notice and takedown isn’t, though – it’s other parts of the DMCA that came from a WIPO agreement.) For that reason, Internet jurisdiction specialists routinely name copyright law as an area where global removal orders might make sense. But now, Brazil has surprised everyone (except Brazilian lawyers, who tell me they expected this) by saying YouTube was prohibited from taking down a video, even when it received an infringement notice from the copyright holder. That’s quite a wrinkle in this supposedly harmonized field of law. It should give pause to any court or litigant that thinks it knows how Internet content removal cases would come out in foreign jurisdictions.
Courts and governments aren’t the only decision-makers here, of course. Internet companies choose which laws they will be subject to when they choose which national markets to enter. If making money in China, Vietnam, Russia, or Turkey means being legally required to participate in censorship – and becoming a vector for that censorship to affect the whole world – maybe it’s the wrong thing to do.
But there’s a limit to that reasoning. Plenty of human-rights-respecting countries prohibit speech that is legal in other human-rights-respecting countries. It’s not a moral failing for Google to do business in France, just because France outlaws speech the U.S. allows – or for it to do business in the U.S., just because the U.S. permits privacy violations that are illegal in France. We need a set of rules to make Internet communication work when basically-reasonable counties don’t have the same laws. Only governments can create those rules.
Zooming out a bit, it seems clear that courts should find a way to decouple the must-carry question from the global-content-removal question. Country A should be free to define its own free expression laws – within the parameters of human rights agreements – without effectively inviting Country B’s courts to set the rules for online speech.
More broadly, we need to get better at seeing the ways that government power and Internet platform power are connected. Too often, we are told that the two are in opposition. In the recent past, platforms like Twitter were seen as checks on over-reaching state power, and celebrated as instruments of liberation. The current political climate takes that simplistic model and reverses it. Now platforms are the menace, and pundits welcome government intervention to constrain them.
Those formulations are seriously incomplete, and they are naïve. They ignore a dozen ways that state and platform power can work together – to the detriment of ordinary Internet users’ rights. (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) The global enforcement and jurisdiction questions are just one instance of a larger problem we need to address. The current debate about Internet content regulation won’t go anywhere good until we do.

matches: CJEU v. v. CJEU CJEU CJEU


Solutions to Intellectual property problems.
Many patent applications in the area of EE, software and system engineering contain a microcontroller or variations there of as part of implementation of the invention. The two cases discussed below involve several sections of 35 U.S.C. § 112. They are shown below for reference.
Two decisions of PTAB are discussed below.
The Appellants’ claimed invention is to a method for implementing an on-line incentive system at a merchant’s web site. Claim 1, reproduced below, (with added effect of Bold) is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
providing, at a merchant’s web site, means for a consumer to participate in an earning activity to earn value from a merchant; and transferring value from said merchant to said consumer for participation in said earning activity, if said consumer qualifies, without re-directing said consumer away from said merchant’s web site, whereby said consumer’s focus of activity remains at said merchant’s web site.
The following enumerated findings are supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office).
The Appellants’ Specification does not provide, however, an algorithm by which the consumer can participate in an earning activity and earn value.
The Specification describes in the Background of the Invention different types of incentive programs, such as frequent flyer and “points”-based programs.
This description of prior art incentive programs merely provides examples of the results of the operation of an unspecified algorithm.
When a claim uses the term “means” to describe a limitation, a presumption inheres that the inventor used the term to invoke § 112, 6. Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2003).
“If there is no structure in the specification corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation in the claims, the claim will be found invalid as indefinite.” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technologies Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Donald son, 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (en banc).
In Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v Inter. Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the court set forth that for a claim to a programmed computer, a particular algorithm may be the corresponding structure under § 112, sixth paragraph: For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only a general-purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to “the corresponding structure, material, or acts” that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6.
A new ground of rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Is entered.
The patent application by use of “means for consumer to participate in earing activity “ attracts the § 112, sixth paragraph. Based on finding of facts and principles of law the PTAB was looking for an algorithm as the corresponding structure as means for performing the earning activity function. Since this was missing in the specification the PTAB decision is explainable.
A computer system comprising: memory; and a processor in communication with the memory, the processor programmed to: receive, from a user, a first review of an asset; store the first review of the asset in association with a user identifier in a memory device; receive, from the user, a second review of the asset; store the second review in association with the first review and the user identifier in a memory device; and generate an opinion timeline for the asset for the user associated with the user identifier.
Again, using the preponderance of evidence standard used by PTAB, they are enumerated as follows.
FF3. The Specification discloses that instructions embodying any of the functions described in the Specification may reside within the processor.
FF4. The Specification discloses a system for creating an opinion timeline that includes an opinion timeline engine, which includes a logic layer configured to generate an opinion timeline using data in the data stores.
FF5. The Specification discloses that “[t]he logic layer associates these two user reviews together using the user identification information and/or asset identification information associated with both reviews.. The logic layer can then generate the opinion timeline. Id.
FF6. The Specification discloses a process for creating an opinion timeline that includes allowing a user to submit a first review of an asset on a website, storing the first review of the asset on the website with a user identifier), allowing the user to submit a second review of the asset on the website storing the second review with the first review and the user identifier and generating an opinion timeline for the asset for the user associated with the user identifier.
FF7. The Specification describes an example of steps in which the opinion timeline engine may receive a user review of an asset stored in one of the data stores and stores that user review in the user opinion data store.
FF8. The Specification describes an example of steps in which the opinion timeline engine may receive a user review related to the first review and stores that user review in the user opinion data store. The second review may be an edit of the first review or an addition to the first review. The second review may be based on, for example, a change in opinion over time, a change in opinion based on an update, a comparison of a similar asset, and the like.
FF9. The Specification describes an example in which the opinion timeline engine may generate an opinion timeline using the first review and the second review (e.g., by matching the user identifier of the first review with the user identifier of the second review).
FF11. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1398 (4th ed. 2006) (defining “processor” as “2. Computer Science a. A computer. b. A central processing unit. c. A program that translates another program into a form acceptable by the computer being used.”).
FF12. MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 92 (5th ed. 2002) (defining “central processing unit” as “CPU”); id. at 132 (defining “central processing unit” as “[a]cronym for central processing unit. The computational and control unit of a computer. The CPU is the device that interprets and executes instructions . . . By definition, the CPU is the chip that functions as the ‘brain’ of a computer. In some instances, however, the term encompasses both the processor and the computer’s memory or, even more broadly, the main computer console (as opposed to peripheral equipment.)”).
FF13. MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 239 (5th ed. 2002)(defining “graphics coprocessor” as “[a] specialized microprocessor, included in some video adapters, that can generate graphical images such as lines and filled areas in response to instructions from the CPU, freeing the CPU for other work”); id. at 240 (entry for “graphics processor” indicating “[s]ee graphics coprocessor”).
FF14. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1810 (4th ed. 2006) (defining “timeline” as “2a. A chronology”).
FF15. Brown discloses a system and method for electronically modifying historic sales baselines by evaluating product and consumer characteristics to accurately predict the impact of promotions on sales to specific groups of consumers . A user adjusts a baseline by identifying and assigning values to factors that would have caused the baseline to be different had the factors been included to generate the baseline.
FF17. Brown discloses a preferred embodiment in which the modifying factors can be thought of as describing the nature of the relationship between the product and consumers. When a product is brand new, the user will at first estimate what values should be used for the various factors. As the user gains more experience with the product over time, the user is able to refine the values used for the modifying factors. .
whereas failure to use the word “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that the inventor did not intend the claims to be governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. Id. at 703-04; Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). A claim limitation that “essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure” can overcome the presumption. Flo Healthcare, 697 F.3d at 1374. The presumption may be overcome by a claim limitation that uses a non- structural term that is “simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure” but is merely a substitute for the term “means for” associated with functional language. Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1360. Claim language that further defines a term that otherwise would be a nonce word can denote sufficient structure to avoid construction under § 112, sixth paragraph, MIT v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006), as can a claim limitation that contains a term that “is used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure,” Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1359. Nor will claim language invoke a § 112, sixth paragraph, construction if persons of ordinary skill in the art reading the specification understand the term to be the name for a structure that performs the function, even when the term covers a broad class of structures or identifies the structures by their function. Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Many devices take their names from the functions they perform.”).
An indefiniteness rejection under § 112, second paragraph, is appropriate if the specification discloses no corresponding algorithm associated with a computer or processor. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337-38. Mere reference to a general-purpose computer or processor with appropriate programming without providing an explanation of the appropriate programming, or to “software” without providing detail about the means to accomplish the software function, is not an adequate disclosure. Id. at 1334; Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340-41. In addition, simply reciting the claimed function in the specification, while saying nothing about how the computer or processor ensures that those functions are performed, is not a sufficient disclosure for an algorithm which, by definition, must contain a sequence of steps. Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir. 2009).
If the specification explicitly discloses an algorithm, the sufficiency of the disclosure must be determined in light of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337. The specification must sufficiently disclose an algorithm to transform a general-purpose processor to a special purpose processor so that a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement the disclosed algorithm to achieve the claimed function. Id. at 1338.
35 U.S.C. § 112, First Paragraph.
To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Specifically, the specification must describe the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention. Id.; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
Claim 8 is directed to a computer-implemented method including, among other limitations, “generating an opinion timeline for the asset for the user associated with the user identifier.” As an initial matter, we note that originally-filed claim 8 recited generating an opinion timeline .
Although originally-filed claim 8 may have disclosed the asset for which the opinion timeline is generated, originally-filed claim 8 did not disclose how the “opinion timeline” itself is generated and so does not provide the necessary written description support for pending claim 8. Accord Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349 (indicating original claim language does not necessarily satisfy the written description requirement for the claimed subject matter).
Although Appellant points to paragraph of his Specification as disclosing the generating limitation, the cited portion merely describes a means for associating two user reviews and does not describe how an opinion timeline can be generated. Further, as discussed in the previous section, the Specification only identifies a generic processor and does not disclose an algorithm for “generating an opinion timeline for the asset for the user associated with the user identifier”. Beyond general statements of the function to be performed, which, at most, may render the claimed function obvious, the inventor has not shown how the recited opinion timeline is generated. This disclosure is not sufficient because a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the written description requirement. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
Because Appellant’s disclosure, as originally filed, does not convey to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Appellant had possession of the claimed invention, we conclude that claim 8 does not have sufficient written description support to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
First, we consider how an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the term “processor” as used in claim 1. Based on our review of dictionary definitions, we conclude that a skilled artisan would not recognize “processor” as the name of a sufficiently definite structure for generating an opinion timeline and performing the other functions recited by the “processor” limitation.
The term “processor” in claim 1 is also different from the claim terms “circuit” and “circuitry,” which have been held to denote sufficiently definite structure to avoid the application of § 112, sixth paragraph. See MIT, 462 F.3d at 1354-56; Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The term “circuit” coupled with a description in the claims of the circuit’s operation typically conveys the structural arrangement of the circuit’s components. See MIT, 462 F.3d at 1355; Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320; Apex, 325 F.3d at 1373. In contrast, the recited processor and claim language here do not convey to a person skilled in the art anything about the internal components, structure, or specific operation of the processor.
Having concluded that the “processor” limitation in claim 1 invokes the application of § 112, sixth paragraph, we now consider whether Appellant’s Specification discloses sufficient corresponding structure for performing the claimed functions. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333.Because the limitations of claim 1 are computer-implemented and cannot all be performed by a general-purpose computer without any special programming, we must determine whether the Specification discloses an algorithm that transforms a general-purpose processor into a special purpose processor that performs the claimed functions. Id.; cf. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316.
Decision: A new ground of rejection for claims 1-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and a new ground of rejection for claims 8-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is entered.
Although this case in terms of complexity is more than the previous one, the basic reasons for rejection seem to be similar. That is disclosing a means function in terms of a “processor” without disclosing the corresponding algorithm that would transform the processor in to a structure that could be means for performing the claimed function.


text:
1609 In his mercy God has not forsaken sinful man. The punishments consequent upon sin, “pain in childbearing” and toil “in the sweat of your brow,” 100 also embody remedies that limit the damaging effects of sin. After the fall, marriage helps to overcome self-absorption, egoism, pursuit of one’s own pleasure, and to open oneself to the other, to mutual aid and to self-giving.
1613 On the threshold of his public life Jesus performs his first sign – at his mother’s request – during a wedding feast. 105 The Church attaches great importance to Jesus’ presence at the wedding at Cana. She sees in it the confirmation of the goodness of marriage and the proclamation that thenceforth marriage will be an efficacious sign of Christ’s presence.
1615 This unequivocal insistence on the indissolubility of the marriage bond may have left some perplexed and could seem to be a demand impossible to realize. However, Jesus has not placed on spouses a burden impossible to bear, or too heavy – heavier than the Law of Moses. 108 By coming to restore the original order of creation disturbed by sin, he himself gives the strength and grace to live marriage in the new dimension of the Reign of God. It is by following Christ, renouncing themselves, and taking up their crosses that spouses will be able to “receive” the original meaning of marriage and live it with the help of Christ. 109 This grace of Christian marriage is a fruit of Christ’s cross, the source of all Christian life.
1622 “Inasmuch as it is a sacramental action of sanctification, the liturgical celebration of marriage . . . must be, per se, valid, worthy, and fruitful.” 123 It is therefore appropriate for the bride and groom to prepare themselves for the celebration of their marriage by receiving the sacrament of penance.
1624 The various liturgies abound in prayers of blessing and epiclesis asking God’s grace and blessing on the new couple, especially the bride. In the epiclesis of this sacrament the spouses receive the Holy Spirit as the communion of love of Christ and the Church. 126 The Holy Spirit is the seal of their covenant, the ever-available source of their love and the strength to renew their fidelity.
– not impeded by any natural or ecclesiastical law.
1626 The Church holds the exchange of consent between the spouses to be the indispensable element that “makes the marriage.” 127 If consent is lacking there is no marriage.
1628 The consent must be an act of the will of each of the contracting parties, free of coercion or grave external fear. 130 No human power can substitute for this consent. 131 If this freedom is lacking the marriage is invalid.
1630 The priest (or deacon) who assists at the celebration of a marriage receives the consent of the spouses in the name of the Church and gives the blessing of the Church. The presence of the Church’s minister (and also of the witnesses) visibly expresses the fact that marriage is an ecclesial reality.
– The public character of the consent protects the “I do” once given and helps the spouses remain faithful to it.
1632 So that the “I do” of the spouses may be a free and responsible act and so that the marriage covenant may have solid and lasting human and Christian foundations, preparation for marriage is of prime importance.
1636 Through ecumenical dialogue Christian communities in many regions have been able to put into effect a common pastoral practice for mixed marriages . Its task is to help such couples live out their particular situation in the light of faith, overcome the tensions between the couple’s obligations to each other and towards their ecclesial communities, and encourage the flowering of what is common to them in faith and respect for what separates them.
1637 In marriages with disparity of cult the Catholic spouse has a particular task: “For the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband.” 140 It is a great joy for the Christian spouse and for the Church if this “consecration” should lead to the free conversion of the other spouse to the Christian faith. 141 Sincere married love, the humble and patient practice of the family virtues, and perseverance in prayer can prepare the non-believing spouse to accept the grace of conversion.
1644 The love of the spouses requires, of its very nature, the unity and indissolubility of the spouses’ community of persons, which embraces their entire life: “so they are no longer two, but one flesh.” 153 They “are called to grow continually in their communion through day-to-day fidelity to their marriage promise of total mutual self-giving.” 154 This human communion is confirmed, purified, and completed by communion in Jesus Christ, given through the sacrament of Matrimony. It is deepened by lives of the common faith and by the Eucharist received together.
1650 Today there are numerous Catholics in many countries who have recourse to civil divorce and contract new civil unions. In fidelity to the words of Jesus Christ – “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery” 160 the Church maintains that a new union cannot be recognized as valid, if the first marriage was. If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively contravenes God’s law. Consequently, they cannot receive Eucharistic communion as long as this situation persists. For the same reason, they cannot exercise certain ecclesial responsibilities. Reconciliation through the sacrament of Penance can be granted only to those who have repented for having violated the sign of the covenant and of fidelity to Christ, and who are committed to living in complete continence.
1655 Christ chose to be born and grow up in the bosom of the holy family of Joseph and Mary. The Church is nothing other than “the family of God.” From the beginning, the core of the Church was often constituted by those who had become believers “together with all [their] household.” 166 When they were converted, they desired that “their whole household” should also be saved. 167 These families who became believers were islands of Christian life in an unbelieving world.
1657 It is here that the father of the family, the mother, children, and all members of the family exercise the priesthood of the baptized in a privileged way “by the reception of the sacraments, prayer and thanksgiving, the witness of a holy life, and self-denial and active charity.” 170 Thus the home is the first school of Christian life and “a school for human enrichment.” 171 Here one learns endurance and the joy of work, fraternal love, generous – even repeated – forgiveness, and above all divine worship in prayer and the offering of one’s life.
1659 St. Paul said: “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church. . . . This is a great mystery, and I mean in reference to Christ and the Church” ( Eph 5:25, 32).
1660 The marriage covenant, by which a man and a woman form with each other an intimate communion of life and love, has been founded and endowed with its own special laws by the Creator. By its very nature it is ordered to the good of the couple, as well as to the generation and education of children. Christ the Lord raised marriage between the baptized to the dignity of a sacrament (cf. CIC, can. 1055 § 1; cf. GS 48 § 1).
1664 Unity, indissolubility, and openness to fertility are essential to marriage. Polygamy is incompatible with the unity of marriage; divorce separates what God has joined together; the refusal of fertility turns married life away from its “supreme gift,” the child ( GS 50 § 1).
1666 The Christian home is the place where children receive the first proclamation of the faith. For this reason the family home is rightly called “the domestic church,” a community of grace and prayer, a school of human virtues and of Christian charity.
84 CIC, can. 1055 § 1; cf. GS 48 § 1.
87 GS 48 § 1.
88 Cf. GS 47 § 2.
89 GS 47 § 1.
112 Cf. DS 1800; CIC, Can. 1055 § 2.
127 CIC, can. 1057 § 1.
128 GS 48 § 1; OCM 45; cf. CIC, can. 1057 § 2.
131 Cf. CIC, can. 1057 § 1.
136 GS 49 § 3.
144 GS 48 § 1.
145 GS 48 § 2.
147 LG 11 § 2.
148 LG 11 § 2; cf. LG 41.
149 GS 48 § 2.
155 GS 49 § 2.
157 GS 48 § 1.
162 GS 48 § 1; 50.
163 GS 50 § 1; cf. Gen 2:18; Mt 19:4; Gen 1:28.
171 GS 52 § 1.

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