Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › District Courts › Virginia › Western District of Virginia › 1967 › Marsh v. Commercial and Savings Bank of Winchester, Va.
The COMMERCIAL AND SAVINGS BANK OF WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA, Roxy Hockman, and Caroline Hickerson, Defendants.
United States District Court W. D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.
*615 *616 Alexander N. Apostolou and Harvey S. Lutins, Roanoke, Va., for plaintiff.
Henry Whiting, Kuykendall & Whiting, Winchester, Va., for defendants.
This case involves a controversy between a plaintiff who is a citizen and resident of the State of Nevada and three defendants, a bank and two of its employees. The bank is a Virginia corporation located in Winchester, Virginia, which is in the Western District of Virginia and the two employees are citizens and residents of Virginia. The amount sued for is one-million dollars ($1,000,000). While no specific amount of special damages is alleged, it is unlikely that the amount of special damages is as much as $10,000. Assuming liability could be established, the amount of general damages, to be added on to any special damages, would be a matter to be determined at trial. Although the result of such a determination is only a matter for speculation now, we will assume that the claim is made in good faith and would, in total, exceed $10,000. Thus this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
In general, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants are liable for defamation and malicious prosecution of the plaintiff. The complaint grew out of a bank robbery which occurred on September 22, 1965, plaintiff having been identified as the bank robber by the two bank employees. Subsequently he was indicted, tried and found guilty and on April 15, 1966, sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Then after plaintiff had begun serving the sentence, the real bank robber, Charles Abbott Lauritzen, confessed to the crime. The plaintiff was immediately brought to Roanoke and a hearing was held on the basis of the newly discovered evidence. At this hearing the plaintiff was released as a free man on the basis of the testimony of the real bank robber and the two eyewitnesses who acknowledged that they had been mistaken and that the plaintiff was not the man who robbed their bank.
In order to be able to better understand the allegations of plaintiff, hereinafter set out, the basic facts of the case will be recited here.
On September 22, 1965, at approximately two or three minutes after 2:00 p. m. a white male knocked on the front door of the South Branch of the Commercial and Savings Bank of Winchester, Virginia. There were two employees inside, a teller and the branch manager, who were attending to the closing of the bank business for the day. Mrs. Hickerson, the teller, indicated by a nod of the head to the man that the bank was closed. He persisted and she told Mr. Hockman, the branch manager who was at the drive-in window, that someone was at the door. Mr. Hockman went to the glass door, unlocked it and opened it just about twelve inches and asked if he could help the man. When he said "Are you closed?" Mr. Hockman told him that he was and asked if he could be of any assistance. With that the man pushed his way into the bank. Hr. Hockman locked the door again and the robber pulled a gun from his pocket. Mrs. Hickerson sounded a burglar alarm which makes no sound in the bank but rings an alarm in the police station. The robber took a brown paper bag out of his pocket, handed it to Mr. Hockman and told him to "Put the money in the bag and don't say anything." Mrs. Hickerson took the money out of her drawer and laid it on the counter while Mr. Hockman put it in the bag. This continued until the bag was full. Then the robber told Mr. Hockman to get behind the counter and for both of them to lie on the floor. He asked what was in a back room which he saw. He was told that it was a rest room and utility room. Then he went to the front door, encountered some difficulty in getting it unlocked, finally succeeded and left. The *617 robber was in the bank from about eight to twelve minutes all together.
The F.B.I. agents investigated that day and the next day the agents brought some files of pictures in for the two employees to examine. They did not recognize any of them. Several days later, Mr. Thomas of the F.B.I., brought in some eight or ten more pictures. The pictures were laid out on a desk and Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Hockman, out of the presence of Mrs. Hickerson, if there was anyone there that looked like the bank robber. He spent about a minute or two looking at the pictures and identified one picture as that of the robber. Mrs. Hickerson was not with him at any time he was identifying the pictures. Then Mrs. Hickerson was brought in and after she studied the pictures for about five minutes she identified the same picture that Mr. Hockman had. Neither party had, at this time, ever seen a picture of the man they identified as the robber.
About three months later, both Mr. Hockman and Mrs. Hickerson went to Roanoke at the request of the F.B.I. agents to view a line-up in the Roanoke City jail for the purpose of identifying the bank robber. At this time, Mrs. Hickerson went in first without Mr. Hockman, and spent several minutes viewing the five or six men in the lineup. She stated that the men were all about the same height and weight and were dressed the same. She identified the man who was second from the left as she looked at them from her position directly in front of them. Then without conferring with Mrs. Hickerson, Mr. Hockman came in and spent a period of about fifteen seconds looking at the lineup. He identified the same man that Mrs. Hickerson had identified. At this point both witnesses had seen pictures of John Edward Marsh in the newspapers which had been printed following their identification of Marsh's picture at the bank. They both testified, however, that having seen his picture in the paper had no influence on their identification of Marsh in the line-up. They picked him out because they thought he was the man whom they had seen rob the bank.
Another trip was made to Roanoke by both witnesses for the purpose of testifying to the grand jury. They did not see Marsh on this trip. Then their third trip was made for the purpose of testifying at the trial of John Edward Marsh.
With reference to privilege, the case of Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 58 S.E.2d 68 (1950) has no application to the instant case. In Darnell it was held that words written or spoken during the course of a judicial proceeding, when relevant and pertinent, were absolutely privileged. In the instant case, we are not faced with statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding, but rather statements made prior to and resulting in a judicial proceeding.
However, the trial will be discussed later in this opinion when the court concerns itself with the question of malicious prosecution and how the conviction at the trial affects the question of probable cause, one of the elements which must be lacking in order to make a case of malicious prosecution.
The plaintiff's bill of complaint is lengthy. Rather than set it out completely here, it will suffice to say that plaintiff alleges (1) that the defendant employees libeled and slandered the plaintiff by identifying his picture and later identifying him in person in the line-up as the man who had committed the felony of robbery; (2) that the defendants by their same actions have wronged the plaintiff under the terms of the Virginia insulting words statute; (3) that the defendants are liable in damages to the *618 plaintiff for the above two counts as well as for malicious prosecution which they say grew out of the identification and their false and malicious testimony at the trial; (4) that the defendants breached a duty owed to plaintiff to act with reasonable care in identifications made in connection with the robbery; and (5) that as a direct and proximate result of all these misdeeds of defendants, plaintiff has been falsely imprisoned and has suffered other harmful consequences for which he says he is entitled to a money judgment.
Having thoroughly studied the allegations of the plaintiff, the answers of the defendants and the supporting briefs filed by each side along with the affidavits, answers to interrogatories and admissions filed pursuant to the motion for summary judgment, the court now addresses the aforesaid allegations and considers the defendants' motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(4) a lack of probable cause for institution of the proceedings. Wiggs v. Farmer, 205 Va. 149, 135 S.E.2d 829 (1964); * * * 34 Am.Jur. Malicious Prosecution § 6 (1941).
We turn now to an examination of the first element of the charge: "institution of judicial proceedings by or at the instance of the defendant." The facts show that the defendant bank was robbed and that defendant employees reported it to the police. The F.B.I. came into the picture that same day. We assume that they were contacted by the local police. This is, however, of no real consequence. The significant fact is that once the police were involved in the investigation, the defendant employees did nothing but cooperate in the investigation by giving a description of the robber when asked for one by the police; by assisting an F.B.I. artist to make up a drawing of the robber when asked to do this by the F.B.I.; by participating in the identification of photographs when asked to do so by the F.B.I.; and by participating in the identification of the supposed bank robber in a line-up in Roanoke when asked to do so by the police. The facts show that the bank employees did not swear out the warrant for arrest of the supposed robber. Thus by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the judicial proceeding was instituted by or at the instance of the defendants.
But the plaintiff urges that this first element of the charge is satisfied if the prosecution was procured by or through the cooperation of the defendant. Rather than deal in a discussion of the definition of the words "procured by or through the cooperation of the defendant", we prefer to take the facts of this case and apply them to the malicious prosecution case law of the highest court in Virginia. The case of King v. Martin, 150 Va. 122, 142 S.E. 358, 359, 360 (1928) involves a malicious prosecution *619 charge and a state of facts very similar to the case at bar. In that case the defendant, an adult, and his mother were sitting at home when a man came into the house and, with a gun in his hand, went through defendant's pockets and then went into the next room and went through the dresser. The robber got all of Mrs. King's jewelry and some money from the defendant. After the robber left, the defendant and his mother called the police. When the detectives arrived, the defendant gave as good a description to them as he could, but he explained that since the robber had been in a shadow most of the time, while the defendant was in the light, he was not able to distinguish his features very closely, and he limited his description mainly to his size and general appearance. Later the defendant and his mother looked at photographs at the request of police but could not identify any of them. Finally they were asked to go to the police station to participate in a line-up identification. There they identified the robber The evidence is conflicting as to just how positive Mr. King's identification was. After the identification, Mr. King took no affirmative action. He did not request that the identified man be arrested or held. Rather it was the officers who swore out the warrant and had him put in jail. Mr. King participated as a witness before the grand jury and later at the trial. After the accused was acquitted at the trial, he brought the action for malicious prosecution against Mr. King.
If this conduct by a citizen, who has been held up and robbed, and this identification of a suspect are sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution, it would be hard, indeed, to procure testimony with regard to identity in any case, where the fate of the witness from the standpoint of damages was ultimately dependent upon the verdict of a jury in a criminal prosecution, with all the safeguards with which one accused of crime is invested in such a trial.
The court held in this case that "the evidence, in spite of the jury's verdict, as a matter of law, fails to show that the defendant instituted or caused or had anything to do with the prosecution except to appear as a witness when summoned * * *." King v. Martin, supra, 142 S.E. p. 360.
The facts in the King case compare quite favorably with the facts in the instant case. We note that in King, the plaintiff was not arrested until after the line-up identification whereas in our case the arrest took place following the identification of the photographs in the bank and before the line-up identification in Roanoke. This would make no difference in our opinion. Another difference was that in King there was some question as to the positiveness with which the witness identified the suspect. But the court, as pointed out above, assumed that the identification was positive. Thus this difference in facts is of no consequence. We therefore feel that the King case is controlling as to element number one, thus there was no institution of judicial proceedings by or at the instance of the defendants and the cooperation which they gave the police was not enough to fulfill this first element. Their cooperation was merely the cooperation of a good citizen acting in the interest of keeping law and order.
Now since it is necessary to prove all the elements of malicious prosecution in order for such a cause of action to be successfully maintained, the cause must fail because the first element is wanting as shown and stated above.
*620 Additionally we note in passing, that even if it were possible for us to find that the defendant employees' actions did amount to an instigation of the prosecution, we can find absolutely no evidence in the record to support a finding of any actual malice on the part of the employees in their actions regarding the plaintiff. So the cause of action would also fail on this point.
conviction of a crime before a justice, though reversed upon appeal, is conclusive evidence of probable cause, unless it be shown that it was procured by the defendant through fraud, or by means of testimony which he knew to be false, and bars an action for malicious prosecution.
Burks Pleading and Practice, p. 259, § 150, (4th Edition).
Plaintiff's latest brief supports this statement of law when he says that once probable cause has been established by a conviction, (even though later there is an acquittal) the only way plaintiff can prove lack of probable cause is to show that there was fraud or perjury on the part of the defendants.
We can see nothing in the record which would support plaintiff's allegation of such fraud or perjury. Therefore, it is the opinion of this court that, as to the malicious prosecution count, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants, the parties moving for summary judgment, are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
We will therefore treat the two counts as one from this point on because the words and action alleged to be defamatory are those which are, as plaintiff points out in his last brief, generally considered actionable per se in that they impute the commission of a felony to John Marsh.
Since the words uttered by the bank employees to the police at the bank and later at the police line-up are so considered, we are faced with a two part question. First, was the occasion upon which the employees spoke a privileged occasion and if so, was there an abuse of the privilege?
The rule is well settled that when the communication upon which the action is based is one of qualified privilege, the question is not whether the charge was true or false, but only whether the privilege was abused or the language employed was uttered or published with malice, and unless there is evidence from which a jury may fairly conclude there was malice, there can be no recovery.
Peoples Life Ins. Co. of Washington, D. C. v. Talley, 166 Va. 464, 186 S.E. 42, 44 (1936).
Of course it is well established that the existence of a privileged (either absolute or qualified) occasion is a question of law to be decided by the Court. *621 Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 150 Va. 301, 143 S.E. 631, 632 (1928).
A privileged communication is one made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has, a duty, to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, and which contains matter which, without the occasion upon which it is made, would be defamatory and actionable.
Where the defendant acts in performance of a duty, legal or social, or in defense of his own interests, the occasion is privileged * * *.
From the facts in the case at bar, we see that the two bank employees responded to questions asked them by investigating police officers at the bank, and later in Roanoke at the police station. This participation was a non-officious act of cooperation with the officers who had a legal duty to apprehend the bank robber, while the employees had a social and moral duty to cooperate. We find, as a matter of law, that the two occasions, upon which the plaintiff alleges the defamation occurred, were occasions of qualified privilege.
Ordinarily, the law implies malice from the use of words defamatory or insulting. But the presumption is the other way where the occasion of the publication is privileged, and the onus is then upon the plaintiff to prove malice in fact.
Thus, in the case at bar, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption that the defendants acted in good faith and without malice.
Ordinarily, the question of whether the defendant acted with malice is a question of fact to be presented to the jury. But "where the communication is privileged, unless there is evidence from which a jury may fairly conclude that there was malice, there can be no recovery." Peoples v. Talley, supra, 186 S.E. p. 44.
If the plaintiff fails to offer evidence of an extrinsic character to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant, in the publication of a libel on a qualifiedly privileged occasion, and if the language of the communication and the circumstances attending its publication by the defendant are as consistent with the nonexistence of malice as with its existence, there is no issue for the jury, and it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
The "material fact", of course, is the issue of malice. Since the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, both sides have submitted affidavits, interrogatories, admissions, and answers to interrogatories. We are convinced, after studying the record thoroughly, that there is no genuine issue on the question of malice. And as was pointed out in Dyer v. McDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268 (2 Cir., 1952), when the defendants have succeeded in proving that the plaintiff would not have enough evidence to go to the jury on the material issue, summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56. There is certainly no substantial evidence on plaintiff's behalf to overcome the presumption against malice which would have to be overcome before plaintiff could prevail in a jury trial.
To elaborate on this point the plaintiff, aside from avowing that it exists, has produced nothing to give the slightest bit of support to the allegation that there was actual malice. The record shows that the defendants did not know, nor had they ever seen, the plaintiff before this robbery took place. Both defendants testified that they had not been pressured in any way to identify Marsh. It shows that the defendants did not receive any increase in pay, reward or promotion for their identification of the plaintiff. It shows that their identification was not necessary in order for the bank to recover its loss from the insurance company. It shows that the defendant employees were not held personally accountable for money stolen in such a robbery. In short, the record shows absolutely no reason to believe the defendant employees were actuated by any malicious motive in making their identification, but on the other hand all the evidence points to the fact that the employees were acting in good faith.
The record also shows that the defendants did not use any excessive or aggressive language in identifying the plaintiff. They merely identified a picture, each out of the presence of the other, which they each independently thought to be the robber. Subsequently, and again at the request of the police, they identified plaintiff in a line-up in the Roanoke City jail. Again the record shows nothing to indicate any actual malice in their identification of plaintiff at this time. Each defendant simply went into the line-up room, viewed the prisoners, left the room and told the officer in charge which one of the men in the line-up they thought was the robber.
Although we believe that the testimony of defendants at the trial is absolutely privileged we point to it also as a further indication of the complete lack of actual malice of the defendants. They both again identified Marsh as the robber, but they testified in such a manner as to impress this court with their complete honesty and candor. Mrs. Hickerson freely admitted for the jury to hear, for instance, that she remembered the robber as having a "cleft" in his chin and then admitted that Marsh had no such cleft in his chin. This kind of testimony convinces us that the witness was trying to be completely honest and helpful. This is far from being motivated by malice.
Additionally, both the defendants promptly and forthrightly admitted their mistake once they had seen the real bank robber, Lauritzen. They never displayed any attempt to resist setting the record straight. All of this evidence leaves this Court at a loss to find any evidence of actual malice. And actual malice is what *623 we find is necessary in order to abuse a qualified privilege according to the law in Virgina. Peoples Life Ins. Co. of Washington, D. C. v. Talley, supra, 186 S.E. p. 44.
However, in order to be thorough, we must go one step further. Plaintiff alleges that the false identification was so unreasonable and made with such gross indifference to the rights of plaintiff that it amounted to a wanton and wilful act which is equivalent to malice. We are aware of no Virginia defamation case in which the holding turns on such a definition of malice. That would be "constructive malice" and the law in Virginia, as pointed out above, requires actual malice. And even if there were cases in Virginia that held that constructive malice was sufficient to abuse a qualified privilege, we could not let the case at bar go to a jury. In our opinion, there is nothing in the allegations of plaintiff or in the record at any point in this case up to this day which puts the question of "unreasonableness" or "gross indifference" sufficiently in issue to require a jury trial.
Thus, as to the defamation and insulting words count, we find that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
To conclude this is simply a case of two witnesses to a crime making a mistaken identification of a man who resembled the actual robber. To subject the witnesses and their employer to a civil trial based on the mistake which the witnesses made would do a great injustice not only to the defendants who, but for their willingness to cooperate as good citizens in the investigation of a felony, would not be involved today, but also to society which demands and deserves the proper investigation of crimes. Surely a witness to a crime does not have to wait until a verdict of guilty before he can rest assured that his good faith testimony against a defendant cannot be used against him in a defamation suit. If such were the case, our system of justice would be way out of balance.
Witnesses to crime must be permitted and encouraged to speak freely in good faith in order to help protect society from crime. But this does not leave the plaintiff without relief.
Congress has provided the right for such people, as this plaintiff, who have been wronged in the name of society, to seek relief in the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1495 and § 2513.
In consideration of the above opinion, it is adjudged and ordered that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be and the same hereby is granted.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a certified copy of this opinion and order to counsel of record.
 The question of malice will be further examined in the next section dealing with defamation, privilege and the abuse of qualified privilege.


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Hogan, Ben. Five Lessons. The Modern Fundamentals of Golf. Photo available. New York. Golf Digest. 1985. Octavo. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Hogan, Ben. Five Lessons. The Modern Fundamentals of Golf. Photo available. New York. Golf Digest. 1985. Octavo. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Hogan, Elizabeth (ed). Rivers of the West. In slip case. The Story of the Great Western Rivers. Photo available. Menlo Park. Lane Pub. 1974. 224 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine slip case.
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Hogarth, Burne. Dynamic Anatomy. Measurements, Proportions, Anatomical Details, Surface Forms, Foreshortening, Movement. Photo available. New York. Watson-Guptill. 1990. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy.
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GENERAL COMMITTEE v. MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS R. CO.
[320 U.S. 323, 324] Messrs. John W. Madden, Jr., of Dallas, Tex., and Harold N. McLaughlin, of Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner.
Mr. Harold C. Heiss, of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent General Grievance Committee of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen.
Mr. Lucian Touchstone, of Dallas, Tex., for respondent Missouri- Kansas-Texas R. Co. and others.
This case involves a dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A . 151 et seq., concerning the authority of two railroad Brotherhoods to represent certain employees in collective bargaining with the defendant- carriers. The petitioner (hereinafter called the Engineers) is a committee of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers which has been and is the duly designated bargaining representative for the craft of engineers employed by the carriers. The third-party defendant (hereinafter called the Firemen) is a committee of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen which has been and is the duly designated bargaining representative for the craft of firemen on the same lines. Each craft has long had an agreement with the carriers concerning rules, rates of pay, and working conditions. The agreement with the Engineers states that the right to make and interpret contracts, rules, rates and working agreements for locomotive engineers is vested in that committee. The agreement with the Firemen contains a similar provision concerning members of that craft. Both agreements also contain rules governing the demotion of engineers to be firemen, the promotion of firemen to be engineers, and return of demoted engineers to their former work. 1 For many years the two Brotherhoods had an [320 U.S. 323, 326] agreement which established rules and regulations on these subjects and which provided machinery for resolving disputes which might arise between them. This agreement was cancelled in 1927. The present dispute arose since that time and relates to the calling of engineers for emergency service. In general the Engineers and the carriers had a working arrangement providing (1) that, excepting Smithville, Texas, the senior available demoted engineer whose home terminal was at the place where the service was required or the man assigned to the particular run as fireman, if he had greater seniority as engineer, would be chosen when it was necessary to call an engineer for emergency service; (2) that the regulation of the engineers' working lists was to be handled by the Engineer's local chairman, not by the management; and (3) that at Smithville, emergency work would be performed by advancing the assignment of engineers in the so-called 'pool',2 instead of calling in emergency engineers. These arrangements were not satisfactory to the Firemen. After protest to the carriers and after a failure of the Brotherhoods to resolve their dispute the matter was submitted to the National Mediation Board for mediation. The engineers did not participate. The Firemen and the carriers entered into the Mediation Agreement of December 12, 1940, the validity of which is here challenged. The effect of that agreement was in general to eliminate the preference previously given to engineers of the home terminal and the special arrangement at Smithville in favor of the pool engineers. It also changed the practice respecting the handling of the engineers' working lists- [320 U.S. 323, 327] thereafter the assignments would be handled by the management assisted by the local chairmen of the two groups. After making the agreement the carriers gave notice to the Engineers that they were cancelling previous arrangements with that Brotherhood.
The Engineers then brought this action for a declaratory judgment, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U.S.C. 400, 28 U.S.C.A. 400, that the agreement of December 12, 1940, was in violation of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq., and that the Engineers should be declared to be the sole representative of the locomotive engineers with the exclusive right to bargain for them. The carriers in their answer prayed that the court declare the respective rights of the parties. And the Firemen, though challenging the jurisdiction of the court, in the alternative asked that the agreement of December 12, 1940, be declared valid. The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that the carriers had a right to contract with either of the crafts with reference to the problems in question. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that both crafts were interested in the subject matter of the dispute, that neither craft had an exclusive right to bargain concerning the matters in issue, that the representatives of both crafts should confer and if possible agree, and that the agreement of December 12, 1940, might be terminated by the carriers if not acquiesced in by the Engineers, 5 Cir., 132 F.2d 91.
It is our view that the issues tendered by the present litigation are not justiciable-that is to say that Congress [320 U.S. 323, 328] by this Act has foreclosed resort to the courts for enforcement of the claims asserted by the parties.
Thus what had long been a 'right' of employees enforcible only by strikes and other methods of industrial warfare emerged as a 'right' enforcible by judicial decree. The right of collective bargaining was no longer dependent on economic power alone.
Further protection was accorded that right by the amendments which were added in 1934. Thus 2, Ninth, provided machinery strengthening the representation provisions of the Act. H. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess ., p. 2. That new provision gave the National Mediation Board an adjudicatory function in the settlement of representation disputes. It provided for a reference to that Board of representation disputes arising among a carrier's employees. It charged the Board with the 'duty' upon the request of either party to the dispute to investigate the controversy and to certify the name or names [320 U.S. 323, 331] of the designated and authorized representatives of the employees. And Congress added the command that 'Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.' It was that specific command for disobedience of which this court held in the Virginian R. Co. case, 300 U.S. 515 , 57 S.Ct. 592, that courts would provide a remedy. That result was reached over the objection that 2, Ninth, stated a policy but created no rights or duties enforcible by judicial decree. This Court reviewed the history of 2, Ninth-its purpose and meaning. It concluded that the provision in question was 'mandatory in form and capable of enforcement by judicial process.' Id ., 300 U.S. at page 545, 57 S.Ct. at page 598. It observed that if the provision were construed as being precatory only, its addition to the Act was 'purposeless'; that only a requirement of 'some affirmative act on the part of the employer' would add to the 1926 Act. Id., 300 U.S. at page 547, 57 S.Ct. at page 599. The Court accordingly concluded that the command of 2, Ninth could not have been intended to be without legal sanction.
Other similar statutory commands or prohibitions were provided by Congress. The right of the majority of a craft or class to determine who shall be the craft or class representative, 2, Fourth; the right of the employees to designate as their representative one who is not an employee of the carrier, 2, Third; the prohibition against 'yellow dog' contracts , 2, Fifth, are illustrative. 6 Moreover, administrative machinery was provided for the adjudication of certain controversies. Congress established the National Railroad Adjustment Board for the settlement of specific types of disputes or grievances between employees and the carrier . 3. And Congress gave the courts jurisdiction to entertain suits based on the awards of the Adjustment Board. 3, First (p). That [320 U.S. 323, 332] feature of the Act, as well as 2, Ninth, which placed on the Mediation Board definite adjudicatory functions, transferred certain segments of railway labor problems from the realm of conciliation and mediation to tribunals of the law. The new administrative machinery plus the statutory commands and prohibitions marked a great advance in supplementing negotiation and and self-help with specific legal sanctions in enforcement of the Congressional policy.
But it is apparent on the face of the Act that while Congress dealt with this subject comprehensively, it left the solution of only some of those problems to the courts or to administrative agencies. It entrusted large segments of this field to the voluntary processes of conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. Thus by 5, First, Congress provided that either party to a dispute might invoke the services of the Mediation Board in a 'dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not adjusted by the parties in conference' and any other 'dispute not referable' to the Adjustment Board and 'not adjusted in conference between the parties or where conferences are refused.' 7 Beyond the mediation machinery furnished by the Board lies arbitration. 5, First and Third, 7. In case both fail there is the Emergency Board which may be established by the President under 10. In short, Congress by this legislation has freely employed the traditional instruments of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Those instruments, in addition to the available economic weapons, remain unchanged in large areas of this railway labor field. On only certain phases of this controversial subject has Congress utilized [320 U.S. 323, 333] administrative or judicial machinery and invoked the compulsions of the law. Congress was dealing with a subject highly charged with emotion. Its approach has not only been slow; it has been piecemeal. Congress has been highly selective in its use of legal machinery. The delicacy of these problems has made it hesitant to go too fast or too far. The inference is strong that Congress intended to go no further in its use of the processes of adjudication and litigation than the express provisions of the Act indicate.
The Engineers assert that the carriers had no right under the Act to negotiate with the Firemen on the subject of emergency engineers and that the Mediation Agreement of December 12, 1940, is therefore void. They rely on 2, Fourth, of the Act and on 2, First and Ninth. 8 Sec. 2, Fourth states that 'Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.' But that great right, which Congress in 1926 at last supported with legal sanctions, is not challenged here. The Engineers and the Firemen are the collective bargaining agents for their respective crafts and are acknowledged as such. Their authority so to act is not [320 U.S. 323, 334] challenged. Nor is it apparent how the majority rule provision of 2, Fourth, is involved here. It states that 'The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.' But concededly the Engineers represent a majority of the craft of engineers and the Firemen a majority of the firemen's craft. The principle of majority representation is not challenged. Nor does 2, Second, make justiciable what otherwise is not. It provides that 'All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.' As we have already pointed out, 2, Ninth, after providing for a certification by the Mediation Board of the particular craft or class representative, states that 'the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.' That command of 2, Ninth, was enforced in the Virginian R. Co. case. But 2, Second, like 2, First,9 merely states the policy which those other provisions buttress with more particularized commands.
It is true that the present controversy grows out of an application of the principles of collective bargaining and majority rule. It involves a jurisdictional dispute-an asserted overlapping of the interests of two crafts. It necessitates a determination of the point where the au- [320 U.S. 323, 335] thority of one craft ends and the other begins or of the zones where they have joint authority. In the Clerks case and in the Virginian R. Co. case the Court was asked to enforce statutory commands which were explicit and unequivocal. But the situation here is different. Congress did not attempt to make any codification of rules governing these jurisdictional controversies. It did not undertake a statement of the various principles of agency which were to govern the solution of disputes arising from an overlapping of the interests of two or more crafts. It established the general principles of collective bargaining and applied a command or prohibition enforcible by judicial decree to only some of its phases. The contention, however, is that the rule which Congress intended to govern can be found from the implications of the Act. Thus it is argued that the reasons which support the holding in the Virginian R. Co. case that the right of majority craft representation is exclusive also suggest that Congress intended to write into the Railway Labor Act a restriction on the rules and working conditions concerning which the craft has the right to contract. It is pointed out that if the jurisdiction of a craft within which the exclusive right may be exercised is not limited, then disputes between unions may defeat the express purposes of the Act. In that connection reference is made to the statement of this Court in the Virginian R. Co. case, 300 U.S. at page 548, 57 S.Ct. at page 600, that the Act imposes upon the carrier 'the affirmative duty to treat only with the true representative, and hence the negative duty to treat with no other.' That expresses the basic philosophy of 2, Ninth. But that decision does not imply, as is argued here, that every representation problem arising under the Act presents a justiciable controversy. It does not suggest that the respective domains for two or more overlapping crafts should be litigated in the federal district courts. [320 U.S. 323, 336] It seems to us plain that when Congress came to the question of these jurisdictional disputes, it chose not to leave their solution to the courts. As we have already pointed out, Congress left the present problems far back in the penumbra of those few principles which it codified. Moreover, it selected different machinery for their solution. Congress did not leave the problem of inter-union disputes untouched. It is clear from the legislative history of 2, Ninth, that it was designed not only to help free the unions from the influence, coercion and control of the carriers but also to resolve a wide range of jurisdictional disputes between unions or between groups of employees. 10 H. Rep. No. 1944, supra, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. However wide may be the range of jurisdictional disputes embraced within 2, Ninth,11 Congress did not select the courts to resolve them. To the contrary, it fashioned an administrative remedy and left that group of disputes to the National Mediation Board. If the present dispute falls within 2, Ninth, the administrative remedy is exclusive. 12 If a narrower view of 2, Ninth, is taken, it is difficult to believe that Congress [320 U.S. 323, 337] saved some jurisdictional disputes for the Mediation Board and sent the parties into the federal courts to resolve the others. Rather the conclusion is irresistible that Congress carved out of the field of conciliation, mediation and arbitration only the select list of problems which it was ready to place in the adjudicatory channel. All else it left to those voluntary processes whose use Congress had long encouraged to protect these arteries of interstate commerce from industrial strife. The concept of mediation is the antithesis of justiciability.
In view of the pattern of this legislation and its history the command of the Act should be explicit and the purpose to afford a judicial remedy plain before an obligation enforcible in the courts should be implied. Unless that test is met the assumption must be that Congress fashioned a remedy available only in other tribunals. There may be as a result many areas in this field where neither the administrative nor the judicial function can be utilized. But that is only to be expected where Congress still places such great reliance on the voluntary process of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. See H. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. Courts should not rush in where Congress has not chosen to tread.
We are here concerned solely with legal rights under this federal Act which are enforcible by courts. For unless such a right is found it is apparent that this is not a suit or proceeding 'arising under any law regulating commerce' over which the District Court had original jurisdiction by reason of 24(8) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 41(8), 28 U.S.C.A. 41(8). Cf. People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 , 53 S.Ct. 447, 449; Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 , 57 S.Ct. 96; Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.S. 350, 352 , 62 S.Ct. 1171, 1172. When a court has jurisdiction it has of course 'authority to decide the case either way.' The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 , 33 S.Ct. 410, 411. But in this case no declaratory decree should have been entered for the benefit of any of [320 U.S. 323, 338] the parties. Any decision on the merits would involve the granting of judicial remedies which Congress chose not to confer.
Mr. Justice ROBERTS and Mr. Justice REED are of the view that the Court should entertain jurisdiction of the present controversy for the reasons set out in the dissent in Switchmen's Union of North America, etc., v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 , 64 S.Ct. 95, decided today.
[ Footnote 1 ] Generally speaking employees hired under collective bargaining agreements as firemen immediately begin to acquire seniority as such. After a certain period firemen are required to take an engineer's examination. Vacant positions as engineers are filled from the list of those who have passed the qualifying tests. When it is necessary to reduce the force of working engineers those with the lowest seniority are dropped and they resume their positions as firemen in accordance with their seniority in that craft. As a result, firemen with a lower seniority are moved down the ladder of jobs. Thus the most junior firemen are deprived of work and furloughed until their services are needed. When a vacancy occurs in the engineers' ranks or when the work of engineers increases, all move up the ladder of jobs again.
[ Footnote 2 ] Engineers are generally assigned in order of seniority to regular runs (both passenger and freight), then to pool freight service (which rotates irregular runs among the pool members on a first in first out basis), and then to extra boards of engineers from which assignments are made as positions are available. If no engineer in those categories is available, the senior available qualified engineer working as a fireman is called as an 'emergency' engineer.
[ Footnote 3 ] The first of seven statutes enacted during this period was the Arbitration Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 501. This act provided for the voluntary arbitration of disputes and authorized the President to set up investigating committees. It was superseded in 1898 by the Erdman Act, 30 Stat. 424, which provided machinery for arbitration and also introduced for the first time the policy of mediation. The mediators were the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States Commissioner of Labor. Next came the Newlands Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 103, 45 U.S.C.A. 101 et seq. which established a permanent Board of Mediation and Conciliation. Under both the Erdman and Newlands acts, mediation was to be employed first, and upon failure of that the mediators were to attempt to have the parties arbitrate. In 1916 Congress passed the Adamson Act, 39 Stat. 721, in settlement of a dispute over the eight-hour day. That act provided for an eight-hour day for train operators and a commission to enforce it. Upon return of the railroads to private ownership, the Esch-Cummins law was passed. See Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 45 U.S.C.A. 131 et seq. This act differed from the earlier legislation by providing for publis representation on a newly created Railroad Labor Board, by permitting the Board to investigate all disputes of its own initiative, and by placing the primary burden of settlement of disputes on direct negotiations between the parties. In 1926 Congress passed the first Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, which was amended in 1934, 48 Stat. 1185. See Alderman, The History of Federal Legislation Dealing with Machinery for Settling Disputes Concerning Wages and Working Conditions of Employees of Interstate Railroads (1938); The Railway Labor Act and the National Mediation Board (1940), pp. 7, 8, 67-76; Fisher, Industrial Disputes (1940 ), pp. 154-186; Johnson, Government Regulation of Transportation (1938), pp. 190-206; Parmelee, The Modern Railway (1940), pp. 420-435; Spencer, The National Railroad Adjustment Board (1938) pp. 1-16; Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (1932), pp. 238-244; Wolf, The Railroad Labor Board (1927), pp. 1-13; Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567.
[ Footnote 4 ] The Railway Labor Act and the National Mediation Board (1940) pp. 1- 8.
[ Footnote 5 ] S.Rep. No. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4.
[ Footnote 6 ] Criminal penalties were added by 2, Tenth, for the wilful violation of certain provisions of the Act including the three just mentioned.
[ Footnote 7 ] The Mediation Board also has power of interpretation of mediation agreements. 5, Second. It likewise has duties with respect to the arbitration of disputes. See 5, Third. Mediation is the Board's 'most important task'. Eighth Annual Report, National Mediation Board (1942) p. 4.
[ Footnote 10 ] This is made clear by Commissioner Eastman, the draftsman of the 1934 amendments, in his testimony at the hearings. See Hearings, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 7650, pp. 39-41, 45, 57-58, 59.
[ Footnote 11 ] It is apparently the view of the National Mediation Board that 2, Ninth, was designed to cover only those disputes entailing an election by employees of their representatives. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. National Mediation Board, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 135 F.2d 780, 782. In an election case the Board may have to make a preliminary determination as to the eligibility of voters involving the type of problem presented here. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. National Mediation Board, 66 App.D. C. 375, 88 F.2d 757, dealing with the question whether brakemen having seniority as conductors could vote in the conductors' election.
[ Footnote 12 ] Whether judicial power may ever be exerted to require the Mediation Board to exercise the 'duty' imposed upon it under 2, Ninth, and, if so, the type of types of situations in which it may be invoked present questions not involved here.

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[J1] D. W. Kurtz, P. Martinez, P. Tripe and A. Hanbury, The oblique dipole pulsation mode of the rapidly oscillating AP star HD80316, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, Vol. 289, Issue 3, pages 645-650, 1997.
[J15] R. Khan, A. Hanbury, R. Sablatnig, J. Stöttinger, F. Ali Khan and F. Alam Khan, Systematic skin segmentation: merging spatial and non-spatial data, Multimedia Tools and Applications, Vol. 69, No. 3, pages 717–741, 2014.
[J16] M. Salampasis and A. Hanbury, PerFedPat: An Integrated Federated System for Patent Search, World Patent Information, Vol. 38, pages 4–11, 2014.
[J18] A. A. Taha and A Hanbury, An Efficient Algorithm for Calculating the Exact Hausdorff Distance, IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 37(11), pages 2153–2163, 2015.
[J19] A. A. Taha and A. Hanbury. Metrics for evaluating 3D medical image segmentation: analysis, selection, and tool. BMC Medical Imaging, 15(29), 2015.
[J20] J. Palotti, A. Hanbury, H. Müller and C. E. Kahn Jr., How Users Search and What They Search for in the Medical Domain: Understanding Laypeople and Experts through Query Logs, Information Retrieval 19(1), pages 189–224, 2016.
[N5] P. Forner, L. Bentivogli, M. Braschler, K. Choukri, N. Ferro, A. Hanbury, J. Karlgren and H. Müller, PROMISE technology transfer day: spreading the word on information access evaluation at an industrial event, SIGIR Forum, Vol. 47, No. 1, pages 53–58, 2013.
[N6] A. Hanbury, M. Lupu, N. Kando, B. Diallo and S. Adams, Guest editorial: Special issue on information retrieval in the intellectual property domain, Information Retrieval, Vol. 17, No. 5, pages 407–411, 2014.
[N7] F. Hopfgartner, A. Hanbury, H. Müller, N. Kando, S. Mercer, J. Kalpathy-Cramer, M. Potthast, T. Gollub, A. Krithara, J. Lin, K. Balog and I. Eggel, Report on the Evaluation-as-a-Service (EaaS) Expert Workshop, SIGIR Forum, Vol. 49, No. 1, pages 57–65, 2015.
[N8] H. Müller and A. Hanbury, Forschungsanwendungen in der digitalen Radiologie: Big data und Co.: Wie Forschungsanwendungen und große Datenmengen in der Radiologie der Zukunft helfen können, Der Radiologe 56(2), pages 176–180, 2016.
[N9] A. Hanbury, G. Kazai, A. Rauber and N. Fuhr, ECIR 2015: 37th European Conference on Information Retrieval, SIGIR Forum, Vol. 49, No. 2, pages 36–46, 2015.
[I3] M. Lupu, M. Salampasis and A. Hanbury, Domain Specific Search, In: Professional Search in the Modern World, Ed. G. Paltoglou, F. Loizides, P. Hansen, Springer, pages 96–117, 2014.
[B1] A. Hanbury and H. Bischof (Eds), Proceedings of the 10th Computer Vision Winter Workshop (CVWW’2005), February 2–4, Zell an der Pram, Austria.
[B2] W. G. Kropatsch, R. Sablatnig and A. Hanbury (Eds.), Pattern Recognition – Proceedings of the 27th DAGM Symposium, Springer LNCS 3663, 2005.
[B3] W. G. Kropatsch, M. Kampel and A. Hanbury (Eds.), Computer Analysis of Images and Patterns – Proceedings of the 12th International CAIP Conference, Springer LNCS 4673, 2007.
[B4] H. Cunningham, A. Hanbury and S. Rueger (Eds.), Advances in Multidisciplinary Retrieval. 1st Information Retrieval Facility Conference, Springer LNCS 6107, 2010.
[B5] A. Hanbury, A. Rauber and A. P. de Vries (Eds.), Multidisciplinary Information Retrieval, 2nd Information Retrieval facility Conference, Springer LNCS 6653, 2011.
[B6] M. Agosti, R. Berendsen, T. Bogers, M. Braschler, P. Buitelaar, K. Choukri, G. M. Di Nunzio, N. Ferro, P. Forner, A. Hanbury, K. Friberg Heppin, P. Hansen, A. Järvelin, B. Larsen, M. Lupu, I. Masiero, H. Müller, S. Peruzzo, V. Petras, F. Piroi, M. de Rijke, G. Santucci, G. Silvello and E. Toms, PROMISE Retreat Report: Prospects and Opportunities for Information Access Evaluation, PROMISE Network of Excellence, ISBN 978-88-6321-039-2, 2012.
[B7] H. Berger, M. Dittenbach, M. Haas, R. Bierig, A. Hanbury, M. Lupu and F. Piroi, Conquering Data in Austria: Technologie-Roadmap für das Programm IKT der Zukunft: Daten durchdringen – Intelligente Systeme, 2014.
[B8] E. Kanoulas, M. Lupu, P. Clough, M. Sanderson, M. Hall, A. Hanbury, and E. Toms (Eds.), Information Access Evaluation meets Multilinguality, Multimodality, and Interaction, 5th Conference and Labs of the Evaluation Forum, Springer LNCS 8685, 2014.
[B9] A. Hanbury, G. Kazai, A. Rauber, and N. Fuhr (Eds.), Advances in Information Retrieval, 37th European Conference on Information Retrieval, Springer LNCS 9022, 2015.
[B10] H. Müller, O. A. Jimenez del Toro, A Hanbury, G. Langs and A. Foncubierta Rodríguez (Eds.), Multimodal Retrieval in the Medical Domain, Springer LNCS 9059, 2015.
[C1] A. Hanbury and F. Gardeux, A Quantitative Description of Wood Texture, 5th International Conference on Quality Control By Artificial Vision, Le Creusot, France, pages 200–205, 2001.
[C3] A. Hanbury, The Taming of the Hue, Saturation and Brightness Colour Space, 7th Computer Vision Winter Workshop, Bad Aussee, Austria, pages 234–243, 2002.
[C70] L. Andersson, P. Mahdabi, A. Hanbury, A. Rauber, Exploring Patent Passage Retrieval using Noun Phrases, In Proc. European Conference on Information Retrieval (ECIR), 2013, Springer LNCS 7814, pages 676–679, Moscow, Russia.
[C76] L. Andersson, M. Lupu, and A. Hanbury, Domain adaptation of General Natural Language Processing tools for a Patent Claim Visualization system, Proc. IRF Conference, 2013, Springer LNCS 8201, pages 70–82, Limassol, Cyprus.
[C77] M. Salampasis and A. Hanbury, A Generalized framework for Integrated Professional Search Systems, Proc. IRF Conference, 2013, Springer LNCS 8201, pages 99–110, Limassol, Cyprus.
[C78] V. Stefanov, A. Sachs, M. Kritz, M. Samwald, M. Gschwandtner and A. Hanbury, A Formative Evaluation of a Comprehensive Search System for Medical Professionals, Proc. Conference on Multilingual and Multimodal Information Access Evaluation (CLEF), 2013, Springer LNCS 8138, pages 81–92, Valencia, Spain.
[C79] F. Piroi, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, Overview of CLEF-IP 2013 Lab: Information Retrieval in the Patent Domain, Proc. Conference on Multilingual and Multimodal Information Access Evaluation (CLEF), 2013, Springer LNCS 8138, pages 232–249, Valencia, Spain.
[C81] L. Kelly, S. Dungs, S. Kriewel, A. Hanbury, L. Goeuriot, G. J. F. Jones, G. Langs and H. Müller, Khresmoi Professional: Multilingual, Multimodal Professional Medical Search, Proc. European Conference on Information Retrieval (ECIR), 2014, Springer LNCS 8416, pages 754–758, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
[C82] R. Bierig, C. Serban, A. Siriteanu, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, A System Framework for Concept- and Credibility-Based Multimedia Retrieval, Proc. International Conference on Multimedia Retrieval (ICMR), 2014, page 543, Glasgow, UK.
[C83] R. Bierig, A. Hanbury, M. Haas, F. Piroi, H. Berger, M. Lupu and M. Dittenbach, A Glimpse into the State and Future of (Big) Data Analytics in Austria: Results from an Online Survey, Proc. 3rd International Conference on Data Management Technologies and Applications (DATA), 2014, Vienna, Austria.
[C84] J. Palotti, V. Stefanov and A. Hanbury, User intent behind medical queries: An evaluation of entity mapping approaches with Metamap and Freebase, Proc. 5th Information Interaction in Context Symposium (IIiX), 2014, pages 283–286, Regensburg, Germany.
[C85] A. Lipani, F. Piroi, L. Andersson and A. Hanbury, An Information Retrieval Ontology for Information Retrieval Nanopublications, Proc. Conference on Multilingual and Multimodal Information Access Evaluation (CLEF), 2014, Springer LNCS 8685, pages 44–49, Sheffield, UK.
[C86] A. A. Taha, O. A. Jiménez del Toro and A. Hanbury, A Formal Method for Selecting Evaluation Metrics for Image Segmentation, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP 2014), pages 932–936, Paris, France.
[C87] M. Salampasis, A. Giachanou and A. Hanbury, An Evaluation of an Interactive Federated Patent Search System, Proceedings of the MUMIA / IRF Conference, 2014, Springer LNCS 8849, pages 120–131, Copenhagen, Denmark.
[C88] A. Lipani, F. Piroi, L. Andersson and A. Hanbury, Extracting Nanopublications from IR Papers, Proceedings of the MUMIA / IRF Conference, 2014, Springer LNCS 8849, pages 53–62, Copenhagen, Denmark.
[C89] L. Andersson, M. Lupu, J. Palotti, F. Piroi, A. Hanbury and A. Rauber, Insight to hyponymy lexical relation extraction in the patent genre versus other text genres, Proc. First International Workshop on Patent Mining and Its Applications, CEUR Workshop Proceedings, Vol-1292, Hildesheim, Germany.
[C90] N. Rekabsaz, R. Bierig, B. Ionescu, A. Hanbury and M. Lupu, On the Use of Statistical Semantics for Metadata-based Social Image Retrieval, Proc. 13th International Workshop on Content-Based Multimedia Indexing (CBMI), Prague, Czech Republic, 2015.
[C91] A. Lipani, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, Splitting Water: Precision and Anti-Precision to Reduce Pool Bias, Proceedings of the ACM SIGIR Conference, 2015, pages 103–112, Santiago, Chile.
[C92] F. Piroi, A. Lipani, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, DASyR(IR) - Document Analysis System for Systematic Reviews (for Information Retrieval), Proc. 13th International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR), 2015, pages 591–595, Nancy, France.
[C93] T. Sierek and A. Hanbury, Using Health Statistics to Improve Medical and Health Search, Proc. Conference on Multilingual and Multimodal Information Access Evaluation (CLEF), 2015, Springer LNCS 9283, pages 287–292, Toulouse, France.
[C94] N. Rekabsaz, R. Bierig, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, Toward Optimized Multimodal Concept Indexing, Proc. 1st International KEYSTONE Conference (IKC2015), Coimbra, Portugal.
[C95] J. Palotti, G. Zuccon and A. Hanbury, The Influence of Pre-processing on the Estimation of Readability of Web Documents, Proc. 24th ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM 2015), Melbourne, Australia.
[C96] A. Lipani, M. Lupu, A. Hanbury and A. Aizawa, Verboseness Fission for BM25 Document Length Normalization, Proc. ACM SIGIR International Conference on the Theory of Information Retrieval (ICTIR 2015), Northampton, MA, USA.
[C97] A. Lipani, M. Lupu, A. Aizawa and A. Hanbury, An Initial Analytical Exploration of Retrievability, Proc. ACM SIGIR International Conference on the Theory of Information Retrieval (ICTIR 2015), Northampton, MA, USA.
[C98] M. Krenn, M. Dorfer, O. A. Jiménez del Toro, H. Müller, B. Menze, M.-A. Weber, A. Hanbury, and G. Langs, Creating a Large-Scale Silver Corpus from Multiple Algorithmic Segmentations, MICCAI Workshop on Medical Computer Vision: Algorithms for Big Data, 2015, Springer LNCS, Munich, Germany.
[C99] C. Nopp and A. Hanbury, Detecting Risks in the Banking System by Sentiment Analysis, Proc. Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP 2015), Lisbon, Portugal.
[C100] A. Lipani, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, The Curious Incidence of Bias Corrections in the Pool, Proc. European Conference on Information Retrieval (ECIR 2016), Springer LNCS 9626, pages 267–279, Padua, Italy.
[C101] J. Palotti, L. Goeuriot, G. Zuccon and A. Hanbury, Ranking Health Web Pages with Relevance and Understandability, Proceedings of the ACM SIGIR Conference, 2016, Pisa, Italy, accepted.
[C102] A. Bampoulidis, J. Palotti, J. Brassey, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, Interactive Exploration of Healthcare Requests, Proc. 14th International Workshop on Content-Based Multimedia Indexing (CBMI), 2016, Bucharest, Romania.
[A1] L. Kaunda and A. Hanbury, How students synthesise research literature and cite references in a science research paper, in SAARMSE Proceedings. Ed. Jaap Kuiper, Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 1999.
[A2] A. Hanbury and J. Serra, Mathematical Morphology in the L*a*b* Space, 8th European Congress for Stereology and Image Analysis, Bordeaux, France, 2001.
[A5] A. Hanbury, Highlight detection by 2D-histogram Analysis, Proceedings of the European Conference on Color in Graphics, Imaging and Vision (CGIV 2004), pages 167–172, Aachen, Germany.
[A10] J. Machajdik, A. Hanbury and J. Stöttinger, Understanding Affect in Images, Proceedings of the ACM Multimedia 2010 – Grand Challenge, October 2010, Florence, Italy.
[A11] A. Hanbury, C. Boyer, M. Gschwandtner and H. Müller, KHRESMOI: towards a multi-lingual search and access system for biomedical information, Med-e-Tel 2011 conference proceedings.
[A12] M. Samwald, M. Kritz, M. Gschwandtner, V. Stefanov and A. Hanbury, An open, trustworthy and multilingual search engine for medical practitioners, Proc. Medical Informatics Europe 2011 (MIE2011), Oslo, Norway.
[A13] H. Müller, A. Hanbury and C. Boyer, Aspects of Medical Information Search, Medical Informatics Europe 2011(MIE2011), Oslo, Norway.
[A15] A. Hanbury and H. Müller, Searching Text and Images in the Medical Domain, Proc. Medical Informatics Europe 2012 (MIE2012), Pisa, Italy.
[A16] M. Samwald, M. Kritz, M. Gschwandtner and A. Hanbury, A curated index of high-quality web resources for medical practitioners, Proc. Medical Informatics Europe 2012 (MIE2012), Pisa, Italy.
[A17] N. Aswani, T. Beckers, E. Birngruber, C. Boyer, A. Burner, J. Bystroň, K. Choukri, S. Cruchet, H. Cunningham, J. Dědek, L. Dolamic, R. Donner, S. Dungs, I. Eggel, A. Foncubierta, N. Fuhr, A. Funk, A. Garcia Seco de Herrera, A. Gaudinat, G. Georgiev, J. Gobeill, L. Goeuriot, P. Gomez, M. Greenwood, M. Gschwandtner, A. Hanbury, J. Hajič, J. Hlaváčová, M. Holzer, G. Jones, B. Jordan, M. Jordan, K. Kaderk, F. Kainberger, L. Kelly, S. Kriewel, M. Kritz, G. Langs, N. Lawson, D. Markonis, I. Martinez, V. Momtchev, A. Masselot, H. Mazo, H. Müller, P. Pecina, K. Pentchev, D. Peychev, N. Pletneva, D. Pottecher, A. Roberts, P. Ruch, M. Samwald, P. Schneller, V. Stefanov, M. A. Tinte, Z. Urešová, A. Vargas and D. Vishnyakova, Khresmoi – multimodal multilingual medical information search, Proc. Medical Informatics Europe 2012 (MIE2012), Village of the Future, Pisa, Italy.
[A19] L. Kelly, L. Goeuriot, G. J. F. Jones and A. Hanbury, Considering subjects and scenarios in large-scale user-centered evaluation of a multilingual multimodal medical search system, CLEF 2012 Workshop on Cross-Language Evaluation of Methods, Applications, and Resources for eHealth Document Analysis (CLEFeHealth 2012), Rome, Italy.
[A20] N. Aswani, T. Beckers, E. Birngruber, C. Boyer, A. Burner, J. Bystroň, K. Choukri, S. Cruchet, H. Cunningham, J. Dědek, L. Dolamic, R. Donner, O. Dušekh, S. Dungs, I. Eggel, A. Foncubierta, N. Fuhr, A. Funk, A. Garcia Seco de Herrera, A. Gaudinat, G. Georgiev, J. Gobeill, L. Goeuriot, P. Gomez, M. A. Greenwood, M. Gschwandtner, A. Hanbury, J. Hajič, J. Hlaváčová, M. Holzer, G. Jones, B. Jordan, M. Jordan, K. Kaderk, F. Kainberger, L. Kelly, S. Kriewel, M. Kritz, G. Langs, N. Lawson, J. Leveling, D. Mareček, D. Markonis, I. Martinez, V. Momtchev, A. Masselot, H. Mazo, H. Müller, M. Novák, J. Petrak, J. Palotti, P. Pecina, K. Pentchev, D. Peychev, N. Pletneva, M. Popel, D. Pottecher, A. Roberts, R. Rosa, P. Ruch, A. Sachs, M. Samwald, P. Schneller, V. Stefanov, A. Tamchyna, M. A. Tinte, Z. Urešová, A. Vargas and D. Vishnyakova, Khresmoi Professional: Multilingual Semantic Search for Medical Professionals, Proc. ACM SIGIR Workshop on Health Search & Discovery, 2013, Dublin, Ireland.
[A21] N. Aswani, T. Beckers, E. Birngruber, C. Boyer, A. Burner, J. Bystroň, K. Choukri, S. Cruchet, H. Cunningham, J. Dědek, L. Dolamic, R. Donner, S. Dungs, I. Eggel, A. Foncubierta, N. Fuhr, A. Funk, A. Garcia Seco de Herrera, A. Gaudinat, G. Georgiev, J. Gobeill, L. Goeuriot, P. Gomez, M. Greenwood, M. Gschwandtner, A. Hanbury, J. Hajič, J. Hlaváčová, M. Holzer, G. Jones, B. Jordan, M. Jordan, K. Kaderk, F. Kainberger, L. Kelly, S. Kriewel, M. Kritz, G. Langs, N. Lawson, D. Markonis, I. Martinez, V. Momtchev, A. Masselot, H. Mazo, H. Müller, J. Palotti, P. Pecina, K. Pentchev, D. Peychev, N. Pletneva, D. Pottecher, A. Roberts, P. Ruch, A. Sachs, M. Samwald, P. Schneller, V. Stefanov, M. A. Tinte, Z. Urešová, A. Vargas and D. Vishnyakova, Khresmoi – multilingual semantic search of medical text and images, Proc. 14th World Congress on Medical and Health Informatics (MedInfo), 2013, page 1266, Copenhagen, Denmark.
[A22] M. Samwald, M. Kritz, M. Gschwandtner, V. Stefanov and A. Hanbury, Physicians searching the web for medical question answering: A European survey and local user studies, Proc. 14th World Congress on Medical and Health Informatics (MedInfo), 2013, page 1103, Copenhagen, Denmark.
[A23] M. Samwald and A. Hanbury, An open-source, mobile-friendly search engine for public medical knowledge, Proc. Medical Informatics Europe (MIE), 2014, Istanbul, Turkey.
[A24] M. Samwald, V. Stefanov, G. Petz, C.-D. Volko, A. Hanbury, Improving the quality and findability of open medical information on the web: Medical Wikidata and the FindMeEvidence search engine, Medicine 2.0 Conference 2014, Malaga, Spain.
[U9] J. Stöttinger and A. Hanbury, Ordnung in die Bilderflut – Arbeitsweise von Content-Based Image Retrieval Systeme, Prozessgestaltung in der Medienproduktion, Berlin, Germany, 2008.
[U10] H. Cunningham, A. Hanbury and S. Rüger, Scaling up High-Value Retrieval to Medium-Volume Data, Advances in Multidisciplinary Retrieval, Springer LNCS 6107, pages 1–5, Vienna, Austria.
[U15] P. Mahdabi, L. Andersson, A. Hanbury and F. Crestani, Report on the CLEF-IP 2011 Experiments: Exploring Patent Summarization, Working Notes of the CLEF 2011 Labs, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
[U16] R. Mörzinger, A. Horti, G. Thallinger, N. Bhatti and A. Hanbury, Classifying Patent Images, Working Notes of the CLEF 2011 Labs, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
[U18] G. Langs, H. Müller, B. H. Menze and A. Hanbury, VISCERAL: towards large data in medical imaging - challenges and directions. Proc. MICCAI 2012 Workshop on Medical Content-based Retrieval for Clinical Decision Support (MCBR-CDS), 2012, Springer LNCS 7723, pages 92–98, Nice, France.
[U20] F. Piroi, M. Lupu, A. Hanbury, A. Sexton, W. Magdy and I. Filippov, CLEF-IP 2012: Retrieval Experiments in the Intellectual Property Domain, Working Notes of the CLEF 2012 Labs, Rome, Italy.
[U21] M. Salampasis, N. Fuhr, A. Hanbury, M. Lupu, B. Larsen and H. Strindberg, Integrating IR Technologies for Professional Search (Full-Day Workshop), Proc. ECIR 2013, Springer LNCS 7814, pages 882–885, 2013, Moscow, Russian Federation.
[U22] F. Piroi, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, Passage Retrieval Starting from Patent Claims. A CLEF-IP 2013 Task Overview, Working Notes of the CLEF 2013 Labs, Valencia, Spain.
[U23] L. Goeuriot, G. J. F. Jones, L. Kelly, J. Leveling, A. Hanbury, H. Müller, S. Salanterä, H. Suominen and G. Zuccon, ShARe/CLEF eHealth Evaluation Lab 2013, Task 3: Information Retrieval to Address Patients' Questions when Reading Clinical Reports, Working Notes of the CLEF 2013 Labs, Valencia, Spain.
[U24] L. Goeuriot, L. Kelly, W. Li, J. Palotti, P. Pecina, G. Zuccon, A. Hanbury, G. J. F. Jones and H. Müller, ShARe/CLEF eHealth Evaluation Lab 2014, Task 3: User-centred health information retrieval, Working Notes of the CLEF 2014 Labs, Sheffield, UK.
[U25] O. A. Jiménez del Toro, O. Goksel, B. Menze, H. Müller, G. Langs, M.-A. Weber, I. Eggel, K. Gruenberg, M. Holzer, A. Jakab, G. Kotsios-Kontokotsios, M. Krenn, T. Salas Fernandez, R. Schaer, A. A. Taha, M. Winterstein, and A. Hanbury, VISCERAL - VISual Concept Extraction challenge in RAdioLogy: ISBI 2014 Challenge Organization, in Proceedings of the VISCERAL Challenge at ISBI, ser. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, O. Goksel, Ed., pages 6–15, 2014, Beijing, China.
[U26] A. Lipani, L. Andersson, F. Piroi, M. Lupu and A. Hanbury, TUW-IMP at the NTCIR-11 Math-2, Proceedings of the 11th NTCIR Conference, 2014, pages 143–146, Tokyo, Japan.
[U28] O. Goksel, A. Foncubierta-Rodríguez, O. A. Jiménez del Toro, H. Müller, G. Langs, M-A. Weber, B. Menze, I. Eggel, K. Gruenberg, M. Winterstein, M. Holzer, M. Krenn, G. Kontokotsios, S. Metallidis, R. Schaer, A. A. Taha, A. Jakab, T. Salas Fernandez and A. Hanbury, Overview of the VISCERAL Challenge at ISBI 2015, in Proceedings of the VISCERAL Challenge at ISBI, ser. CEUR Workshop Proceedings Vol. 1390, pages 6–11, 2015, Boston, USA.
[U29] O. A. Jiménez-Del-Toro, A. Foncubierta-Rodríguez, H. Müller, G. Langs and A. Hanbury, Overview of the VISCERAL Retrieval benchmark 2015, Proc. Workshop on Multimodal Retrieval in the Medical Domain (MRMD 2015), Springer LNCS 9059, 2015, Vienna, Austria.
[U30] H. Müller, O. Alfonso Jimenez-Del-Toro, A. Hanbury, G. Langs and A. Foncubierta-Rodríguez, Overview of the First Workshop of Multimodal Retrieval in the Medical Domain (MRMD 2015), Proc. Workshop on Multimodal Retrieval in the Medical Domain (MRMD 2015), Springer LNCS 9059, 2015, Vienna, Austria.
[R1] A. Hanbury, Lexicographical Order in the HLS Colour Space, Technical Report N-04/01/MM, Centre de Morphologie Mathématique, Ecole des Mines de Paris, 2001.
[R2] A. Hanbury and J. Serra, Mathematical Morphology in the L*a*b* Colour Space, Technical Report N-36/01/MM, Centre de Morphologie Mathématique, Ecole des Mines de Paris, 2001.
[T1] A. Hanbury, Generalised Fourier Analysis of Human Chromosome Images, Masters Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1999.
[T3] A. Hanbury, Morphological Processing and Segmentation of Colour Images, Habilitation Thesis, Vienna University of Technology, 2008.
[D5] A. Hanbury, Information Retrieval in Austria, The Informer, British Computer Society Information Retrieval Specialist Group, April 2014.
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The National Capital Planning Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”) is created as the central Federal planning agency for the Federal Government in the National Capital, and to preserve the important historical and natural features thereof, except with respect to the United States Capitol buildings and grounds as defined in sections 193a and 193m of this title, and to any extension thereof or additions thereto, or to buildings and grounds under the care of the Architect of the Capitol.
The Mayor of the District of Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the “Mayor”) shall be the central planning agency for the government of the District of Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the “District”) in the National Capital. The Mayor shall be responsible for coordinating the planning activities of the District government and for preparing and implementing the District elements of the comprehensive plan for the National Capital, which may include land use elements, urban renewal and redevelopment elements, a multiyear program of public works for the District, and physical, social, economic, transportation, and population elements. The Mayor's planning responsibility shall not extend to Federal or international projects and developments in the District, as determined by the Commission, or to the United States Capitol buildings and grounds as defined in sections 193a and 193m of this title, or to any extension thereof or additions thereto, or to buildings and grounds under the care of the Architect of the Capitol. In carrying out his responsibility under this section, the Mayor shall establish procedures for citizen participation in the planning process, and for appropriate meaningful consultation with any State or local government or planning agency in the National Capital region affected by any aspect of a comprehensive plan (including amendments thereto) affecting or relating to the District.
The Mayor shall submit each District element of the comprehensive plan and any amendment thereto, to the Council for revision or modification, and adoption, by act, following public hearings. Following adoption and prior to implementation, the Council shall submit each such element or amendment to the Commission for review and comment with regard to the impact of such element or amendment on the interests or functions of the Federal Establishment in the National Capital.
(A) The Commission shall, within sixty days after receipt of such a District element of the comprehensive plan, or amendment thereto, from the Council, certify to the Council whether such element or amendment has a negative impact on the interests or functions of the Federal Establishment in the National Capital. If within such sixty days the Commission takes no action with respect to such element or amendment, such element or amendment shall be deemed to have no such negative impact, and such element or amendment shall be incorporated into the comprehensive plan for the National Capital and shall be implemented.
(ii) accept such findings and recommendations and modify such element or amendment accordingly.
If the Council accepts such findings and recommendations and modifies such element or amendment under clause (ii), the Council shall submit such element or amendment to the Commission for it to determine whether such modification has been made in accordance with the Commission's findings and recommendations. If, within thirty days after receipt of the modified element or amendment, the Commission takes no action with respect to such element or amendment, it shall be deemed to have been modified in accordance with such findings or recommendations, and shall be incorporated into the comprehensive plan for the National Capital and shall be implemented. If within such thirty days, the Commission again determines such element or amendment to have a negative impact on the functions or interests of the Federal Establishment in the National Capital such element or amendment shall not be implemented.
(C) If the Council rejects the findings and recommendations of the Commission and resubmits a modified element or amendment to it under clause (i), the Commission shall, within sixty days after receipt of such modified element or amendment from the Council, determine whether such modified element or amendment has a negative impact on the interests or functions of the Federal Establishment within the National Capital. If the Commission finds such negative impact it shall certify its findings (in sufficient detail that the Council can understand the basis of the objection of the Commission) and recommendations to the Council, and such element or amendment shall not be implemented. If the Commission takes no action with respect to such modified element or amendment within such sixty days, such modified element or amendment shall be deemed to have no such negative impact and shall be incorporated into the comprehensive plan and it shall be implemented. Any element or amendment which the Commission has determined to have a negative impact on the Federal Establishment in the National Capital, and which is submitted again in a modified form not less than one year from the day it was last rejected by the Commission shall be deemed to be a new element or amendment for purposes of the review procedure specified in this section.
(2) five citizens with experience in city or regional planning, three of whom shall be appointed by the President and two of whom shall be appointed by the Mayor. The citizen members appointed by the Mayor shall be bona fide residents of the District of Columbia and of the three appointed by the President at least one shall be a bona fide resident of Virginia and at least one shall be a bona fide resident of Maryland. The terms of office of the members appointed by the President shall be for six years, except that of the members first appointed, the President shall designate one to serve two years and one to serve four years. Members appointed by the Mayor shall serve for four years. The members first appointed under this section shall assume their office on January 2, 1975. Any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The citizen members shall each receive compensation at the rate of $100 for each day such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission in addition to reimbursement for necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of such duties.
The President shall designate the Chairman of the Commission and the Commission may elect from among its members such other officers as it deems desirable. The Commission is authorized to employ a Director, an executive officer, and such other technical and administrative personnel as it may deem necessary. Further, without regard to section 5 of title 41, the civil service and classification laws, or section 3109 of title 5, the Commission may employ, by contract or otherwise, the temporary or intermittent (not in excess of one year) services of city planners, architects, engineers, appraisers, and other experts or organizations thereof, as may be necessary to carry out its functions, and in any such case the rate of compensation shall be fixed by the Commission so as not to exceed the rate usual for similar services.
The Commission may establish, with the consent of each agency concerned as to its representation, such advisory and coordinating committees composed of representatives of such agencies of the Federal and District of Columbia Governments as may be necessary or helpful to obtain the maximum amount of cooperation and correlation of effort among the various agencies of such Governments, in order that the National Capital may be developed in accordance with the comprehensive plan. As it may deem appropriate, the Commission may invite representatives of the planning and developmental agencies of the environs to participate in the work of such committees.
As hereinafter more specifically described in sections 71c to 71g of this title, it shall be among the principal duties of the Commission to (1) prepare, adopt, and amend a comprehensive plan for the Federal activities in the National Capital and make related recommendations to the appropriate developmental agencies; (2) serve as the central planning agency for the Federal Government within the National Capital region, and in such capacity to review their development programs in order to advise as to consistency with the comprehensive plan; and (3) be the representative of the Federal and District Governments for collaboration with the Regional Planning Council, as hereinafter provided.
The civil service laws, referred to in subsec. (c), are set forth in Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. See, particularly, section 3301 et seq. of Title 5.
The classification laws, referred to in subsec. (c), are classified generally to chapter 51 (§5101 et seq.) and to subchapter III (§5331 et seq.) of chapter 53 of Title 5.
Section 71e of this title, included within the reference in subsec. (e) to sections 71c to 71g of this title, was repealed by Pub. L. 93–198, title II, §203(e), Dec. 24, 1973, 87 Stat. 782.
In subsec. (c), “section 3109 of title 5” substituted for “section 15 of Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a)” on authority of Pub. L. 89–554, §7(b), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 631, the first section of which enacted Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Section is also set out in D.C. Code, §1–2002.
Provisions relating to the general powers and duties of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, to which the National Capital Planning Commission succeeded under the provisions of section 71h of this title, were contained in section 71 of this title prior to amendment by act July 19, 1952.
1973—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 93–198, §203(a), incorporated existing subsec. (a) text in provisions designated as par. (1), made the Commission the central Federal planning agency only for the Federal Government in the National Capital, except certain areas from the Commission's jurisdiction, and added pars. (2) to (4).
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 93–198, §203(a), substituted as members ex officio: Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Defense, Administrator of General Services Administration, Commissioner, Chairman of District of Columbia Council for former such members: Chief of Engineers of Army, Engineer Commissioner of District of Columbia, Director of National Park Service, Commissioner of Public Buildings, Federal Highway Administrator, and Administrator of National Capital Transportation Agency, and substituted provision for designation of alternates for service in stead of any official for former such provision applicable only to committees on the District of Columbia of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 93–198, §203(a), substituted provisions for: citizen members with experience in planning for former provision for such membership from eminent citizens well qualified and experienced in planning; appointment by President of three members, including one each for Virginia and Maryland, for six year terms, including initial appointments for two and four year terms, and by Commissioner of two members from the District for four year terms for former provision for such appointment by President, including two members from the District or the environs, including one appointee from three nominees of Commissioner of the District, for six year terms; compensation of $100 per each day of actual service and necessary expenses for former provision for a per diem allowance and travel costs; provided for assumption of office by first appointees on Jan. 2, 1975; and deleted provisions respecting: waiver of professional requirements of District appointees of demonstrated capacity for leadership in planning and development of the District, service of unexpired terms of appointive members of National Capital Park and Planning Commission as members of National Capital Planning Commission, and expiration of initial appointments on Apr. 30, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957, and every six years after such appointments.
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 93–198, §203(b)(1), substituted “Federal activities in the National Capital” for “National Capital”.
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 93–198, §203(b)(2), substituted “Government” for “and District Governments,”.
1962—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 87–683 inserted “the Administrator of the National Capital Transportation Agency,” before “the chairmen of the committees”.
Office of Commissioner of District of Columbia, as established by Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1967, abolished as of noon Jan. 2, 1975, by Pub. L. 93–198, title VII, §711, Dec. 24, 1973, 87 Stat. 818, and replaced by office of Mayor of District of Columbia by section 421 of Pub. L. 93–198, classified to section 1–241 of the District of Columbia Code. Accordingly, “Mayor” substituted in text for “commissioner”.
“Council of the District of Columbia” substituted in text for “District of Columbia Council” pursuant to section 401 of Pub. L. 93–198. District of Columbia Council, as established by Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1967, abolished as of noon Jan. 2, 1975, by Pub. L. 93–198, title VII, §711, Dec. 24, 1973, 87 Stat. 818, classified to section 1–211 of the District of Columbia Code, and replaced by Council of District of Columbia, as provided by section 401 of Pub. L. 93–198, classified to section 1–221 of the District of Columbia Code.
Previously, reference to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia had been changed to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia pursuant to section 401 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 F.R. 11669, which transferred the functions of the Board of Commissioners, including functions of the President of the Board and all functions of each other member of the Board, including the executive power vested therein, to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, except as provided by other sections of the Reorganization Plan. For provisions establishing the office of Commissioner of the District of Columbia and abolishing the Board of Commissioners, see sections 301 and 503 of the Plan, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Committee on the District of Columbia of Senate abolished and its jurisdiction given to Committee on Governmental Affairs of Senate, effective Feb. 11, 1977. See Rules XXV of Standing Rules of Senate, as amended by Senate Resolution 4 (popularly cited as the “Committee System Reorganization Amendments of 1977”), approved Feb. 4, 1977.
Committee on the District of Columbia of House of Representatives abolished by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Jan. 4, 1995. References to Committee on the District of Columbia treated as referring to Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of House of Representatives, see section 1(b) of Pub. L. 104–14, set out as a note preceding section 21 of Title 2, The Congress.
National Capital Regional Planning Council abolished by Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1966, eff. Sept. 8, 1966, 31 F.R. 11857, 80 Stat. 1611, set out as a note under section 71b of this title.
The definitions in section 1–202 of the District of Columbia Code apply to this section as amended by Pub. L. 93–198.
This section is referred to in sections 71, 71i, 72, 72a, 136 of this title.