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A motor car was owned by and registered and insured in the name of a wife but was regarded by her and her husband as “our car.” The husband used it to go to work, the wife for shopping at the weekends. The husband told the wife that if ever he was unfit to drive through drink he would get a sober friend to drive him or else telephone for her to come and fetch him. On the day in question the husband telephoned the wife after work and told her that he was going out with friends. He visited a number of public houses and had drinks. At some stage he realised that he was unable to drive safely and asked a friend, C, to drive. C drove them to other public houses. After the last had been visited C offered the three respondents a lift and they got in, together with the husband who was in a soporific condition. C then proceeded, at his own suggestion, to drive in a direction away from the husband’s home to have a meal. On the way, due to C’s negligent driving, an accident occurred in which the husband and C were killed and the respondents injured. The respondents brought an action against the wife both in her personal capacity and as administratrix of the husband’s estate. Stirling J. gave judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeal (Megaw L.J. dissenting) dismissed an appeal by the wife in her personal capacity, holding that she was vicariously liable for the negligent driving of C, Lord Denning M.R. saying that the principle of vicarious liability was to put responsibility on to the person, namely, in the case of a motor car, the owner, who ought in justice to bear it, and that in the case of a “family car” the owner was responsible for the use of it by the other spouse.
Held, allowing the appeal, that to fix vicarious liability on the owner of a motor car in a case such as the present it must be shown that the driver was using it for the owner’s purposes under delegation of a task or duty; that the owner’s interest in or concern for the safety of the car or its occupants was not sufficient; and that, on the facts, it was impossible to hold that C had been the wife’s agent in driving the husband about as he had been doing at the time of the accident (post, pp. 135B, F-H, 138D-E, 140C-E, F-G, 141G-H, 144C-F, 146C-E, 149A-C, 150G-H).
Hewitt v. Bonvin  1 K.B. 188, C.A. approved.
Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 1120, C.A. considered.
Per curiam. To extend the doctrine of vicarious liability in the way suggested by Lord Denning M.R. in the instant case, if that is a desirable course, is a matter for the legislature to consider as a matter of policy and not for the courts (post, pp. 137F-G, 138G-H, 142H – 143A, 145G – 146A, 151D-G).
Decision of the Court of Appeal  2 Q.B. 245;  2 W.L.R. 602;  1 All E.R. 642 reversed.
Barnard v. Sully (1931) 47 T.L.R. 557, D.C.
Birch v. Abercrombie (1913) 74 Wash. 486; 133 P. 1020.
Carberry v. Davies  1 W.L.R. 1103;  2 All E.R. 817, C.A.
Hewitt v. Bonvin  1 K.B. 188, C.A.
Hilton v. Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 705;  1 All E.R. 74.
Klein v. Caluori  1 W.L.R. 619;  2 All E.R. 701.
Manatee County v. Rowe  N.Z.L.R. 78.
Norton v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 1057;  2 All E.R. 785, C.A.
Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 409;  1 All E.R. 711;  1 W.L.R. 1120;  2 All E.R. 753, C.A.
Quarman v. Burnett (1840) 6 M. & W. 499.
Rambarran v. Gurrucharran  1 W.L.R. 556;  1 All E.R. 749, P.C.
Beard v. London General Omnibus Co.  2 Q.B. 530, C.A.
Hart v. Hogan (1933) 24 P. (2d) 99.
Herrington v. British Railways Board  2 W.L.R. 537;  1 All E.R. 749, H.L.(E.).
Hobson v. Bartram & Sons Ltd.  1 All E.R. 412, C.A.
Nottingham v. Aldridge  2 Q.B. 739;  3 W.L.R. 1;  2 All E.R. 751.
Pentonville Motors (King’s Cross) Ltd. v. A. D. Thompson Ltd., February 17, 1958, C.A.; Bar Library Transcript No. 75.
Pratt v. Patrick  1 K.B. 488.
Samson v. Aitchison  A.C. 844, P.C.
Soblusky v. Egan (1959) 103 C.L.R. 215.
Storey v. Ashton (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 476.
Wheatley v. Patrick (1837) 2 M. & W. 650.
This was an appeal by Sarah Morgans (widow) by leave of the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Edmund Davies L.J. and Megaw L.J.) from their majority decision (Megaw L.J. dissenting) on January 20, 1971, by which they dismissed her appeal from the judgment of Stirling J. at Swansea on April 24, 1970. By his judgment Stirling J. gave judgment against the appellant in favour of the respondents, Thomas Michael Launchbury, Diane Helen Mary Launchbury (his wife) and Michael Phillips, for damages for personal injuries caused by the negligent driving of the wife’s car by Daniel James Cawfield, deceased.
The facts are stated in their Lordships’ opinions. By her written reasons on appeal the appellant contended (1) that at the time of the accident Mr. Cawfield had been driving the car neither as her servant nor as her agent nor in any circumstances sufficient in law to render her vicariously liable for his negligence; (2) that the law relating to vicarious liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles was no different from that in respect of the use of any other chattel.
The respondents’ case here fails on the facts, even if it were to be held that vicarious liability was a matter of fact and degree. If this accident had occurred on the husband’s way to work, the appellant would not have been liable. The fact that she was interested in the husband earning his living does not mean that he was driving the car for her purposes in pursuance of a task or duty delegated by her to him. The husband here, however, was not on his way to work, and there is no question of the car having been used for the appellant’s purposes, or even benefit, at the material time. Mr. Cawfield cannot have been in a better position than the husband, whatever the “understanding” between the appellant and the husband may have been.
There is no authority for Lord Denning M.R.’s. “family car” proposition, nor any reason in law why a family car should be in any special position. If the proposition were to be applied logically, every member of a family, including children, would be liable for the driving of each of the others. Where each spouse owned a car each would be liable whichever car was being used and whichever of them was driving. The proposition would also mean that, for example, Manawatu County v. Rowe  N.Z.L.R. 78 and Rambarran v. Gurrucharran  1 W.L.R. 556 were wrongly decided, and there would be a major departure of our law from that of Australia and New Zealand. The whole of the law of tort would be distorted because of the motor car, especially unfortunate as the position with regard to passengers is to be dealt with in January 1973: see the Road Traffic Act 1972, s. 148 (3). The proposition would, logically, have to be extended to a wide variety of other chattels. and it would apply to two spinsters living together or to men or girls sharing flats.
 2 K.B. 571; Coward v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau  1 Q.B. 259; Buckpitt v. Oates  1 All E.R. 1145 and Jones v. Padavatton  1 W.L.R. 328 (cases not cited).
John Davies Q.C. and T. E. Lewis-Bowen for the respondents. There is no universal criterion for vicarious liability. The common law has always been very careful about dangers in the highway, putting especial responsibility on those who create them. The principle which justifies differentiating a motor vehicle from other chattels is that a motor vehicle is on the highway where it is productive of very great injury. As soon as other chattels, for example, guns, present a similar threat to society then no doubt the common law will be equal to the occasion and evolve a stricter rule than it at present applies. Since Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd.  A.C. 156 (not cited) the old distinction between chattels dangerous per se and chattels dangerous sub modo is of doubtful validity. The common law is always evolving to meet the needs of the day. Attempted rationalisations of vicarious liability, on the basis, for example, of control, right of control or “non-delegable duty,” are all ex post facto. Nor do the concepts of service or agency assist. Agency, in tort, is only a shorthand way of describing a situation in which A is held in law liable for the act of B. As to service, the question is always what is the definition of “service” which will fix liability in the particular case, Vicarious liability enables the giving of an additional right against another person who is better able to pay or insure. In this light it is a worthy concept. A father who lets his son drive his car will be more to blame for an accident than the injured party: he is partly responsible for putting the car on the road.
It is essential to bear in mind also that whether or not there should be vicarious liability in a particular case is a question of fact: see, for example, per du Parcq L.J. in Hewitt v. Bonvin  1 K.B. 188, 194.
The “frolic” aspect does not come into this case at all. The understanding between the appellant and her husband postulated a frolic: it was directed to what was to be done in the event of a frolic on the part of the husband.
The law as to the criterion of liability which should be applied in the present case has been fairly settled for a number of years. There are small differences between the cases, but the principles deducible are fairly clear. They are: (1) Mere permission to drive is not enough. (2) The owner must have an interest or concern in the use to which the car is being put. (3) That interest need not be exclusive. (4) Whether or not the owner has a sufficient interest is a question of fact. It is quite impossible to predicate in the abstract what is a sufficient interest; one has to have the actual facts of the particular case before one. While, however, agency, de facto service and other possible tests still leave one in difficulty, either a man has an interest or concern or he has not, and this is therefore a more suitable criterion.
In the present case, the facts are strong; they undoubtedly gave the appellant an interest. Even on du Parcq L.J.’s test in Hewitt v. Bonvin  1 K.B. 188, 194-195, there was a delegation by the appellant to the husband or to Mr. Cawfield of a task or duty which was hers in the sense that if the husband did not get someone to drive him she might have had to go out and fetch him or get someone else to. This was not such an out-and-out bailment as to rid the appellant of liability. The appellant’s interest negatived an out-and-out bailment. Devlin J. in Ormrod v. Crosville Accouter Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 409, 410-411 construed the arrangement in that case as being something between a legal contract of agency and mere permission: the situation is the same in the present case.
[Reference was made to Carberry v. Davies  1 W.L.R. 1103; Rambarran v. Gurrucharran  1 W.L.R. 556 and Manawatu County v. Rowe  N.Z.L.R. 78.] Stirling J. here found as a fact that the appellant had an interest in the husband’s driving, and it is difficult to see how he can be said to have erred in law. As to whether the fact that Mr. Cawfield was driving to Swansea for a meal rather than taking the husband home makes any difference, the arrangement was that the husband would get someone “to drive him,” rather than “to drive him home.” The question is whether the appellant had an interest in the driving: any distinction between an interest in the manner in which the car was driven and an interest in the purpose for which it was driven is irrelevant.
Even on the basis of strict agency (as per MacKinnon L.J. in Hewitt v. Bonvin  1 K.B. 188, 191) the appellant here would be liable.
Turning to the wider ground on which liability is based in this case, Denning L.J. in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 1120, 1123, said that a car was a dangerous thing requiring special treatment. Nowadays, this is even more clear.
Ogden Q.C. in reply. As to what social justice requires, the appellant did not know that Mr. Cawfield was driving: she hardly knew him. The respondents, by contrast, were friends or acquaintances of his. It was he who offered them a lift, and they trusted him as their driver. They were not concerned with the husband. There was no evidence that they knew that the car was the appellant’s. They were taking a risk with their eyes open both as to Mr. Cawfield’s competence as a driver and as to his financial standing.
Prosser on Torts, 3rd ed., p. 494 says that there is an element of fiction in the family car concept. This is right. It is unblushing fiction which the courts of this country should be loath to adopt. It is a question of policy for the legislature.
The appellant does not accept the “twilight” conception of Devlin J. in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 409, 410-411, between true agency and interest. This is pure semantics.
The appellant does not ask for costs.
May 9. LORD WILBERFORCE. My Lords, this appeal arises out of a motor car accident in which the three respondents were injured. They were passengers in a Jaguar saloon which was registered in the name of the appellant; she was not using the car at the time. The other persons in it were the appellant’s husband and a friend of his, Mr. D. J. Cawfield, who was driving; both were killed. It is not disputed that the accident was caused by the negligence of Mr. Cawfield. At first instance, the appellant was sued both in her personal capacity and as administratrix for her deceased husband: judgment was given against her in both capacities on the ground that both she personally and her husband were vicariously liable for Mr. Cawfield’s negligence. It is only in her personal capacity that she brings the present appeal and the question involved is therefore whether as owner of the car, and in the circumstances in which it came to be used and driven, she can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver.
Some further facts require to be stated. Before their marriage the appellant and her husband each had their own car, but after they had been married about a year they decided to sell one, and the one sold was the husband’s. The Jaguar was, in the appellant’s words, regarded as “our car.” It was freely used by either husband or wife; the husband normally used it every day to drive to and from his place of work seven miles from his home.
On the day of the accident, the husband had driven in the car to work. In the evening he telephoned to the appellant to say that he would not be returning home for his evening meal and that he was going out with friends. He visited a number of public houses and had drinks. At some stage he realised that he was unable to drive safely and he asked Mr. Cawfield to drive and gave Mr. Cawfield the keys. Mr. Cawfield drove the husband to other public houses. After the last one had been visited Mr. Cawfield offered the three respondents, one of whom was a friend of his, a lift in the car; and, soon after, the husband got into the back of the car and fell asleep: he was certainly and heavily intoxicated. Mr. Cawfield then drove off, not in the direction of the husband’s home, but in the opposite direction, suggesting a meal before he finally drove the passengers home. Soon after, with Mr. Cawfield driving at 90 miles per hour, the car collided with an omnibus.
We must accept the tenor of this finding but it was to be understood in the context of discussion between husband and wife. It is unlikely that it was so crystal clear as it appears from the finding to have been. One other fact: there was no question of the appellant knowing that Mr. Cawfield drove or might drive the car that evening, and he was to her merely an acquaintance.
It is on these facts that liability for the injuries sustained by the passengers must be considered. Whom could they sue? In the first place, there was the estate of Mr. Cawfield as the negligent driver; in the second, the estate of the husband who requested Mr. Cawfield to drive, this resting upon the normal principle of the law of agency. But the respondents seek to go further and to place vicarious liability upon the appellant. As to this, apart from the special circumstances of the “understanding” there would seem, on accepted principle, to be insuperable difficulties in their way. The car cannot by any fair process of analysis be considered to have been used for the appellant’s purposes at the time of the accident. During the whole of the evening’s progress it was as clearly used for the husband’s purposes as any car could be: and if there was any doubt about this the separation from any possible purpose of the appellant’s at the time of the accident can only be intensified by the fact that Mr. Cawfield, the husband’s agent, was taking the car away from the appellant’s (and the husband’s) home for some fresh purpose. It seems clear enough that this was the purpose of Mr. Cawfield, but, even if one attributes this to her husband I am unable to formulate an argument for attributing it to the wife.
It is said, against this, that there are authorities which warrant a wider and vaguer test of vicarious liability for the negligence of another: a test of “interest or concern.” Skilled counsel for the respondents at the trial was indeed able to put the words “concerned” and “interest” into the wife’s mouth and it was on these words that he mainly rested his case.
On the general law, no authority was cited to us which would rest vicarious liability on so vague a test, but it was said that special principles applied to motor cars. I should be surprised if this were so, and I should wish to be convinced of the reason for a special rule. But in fact there is no authority for it. The decisions will be examined by others of your Lordships and I do not find it necessary to make my own review. For I regard it as clear that in order to fix vicarious liability upon the owner of a car in such a case as the present it must be shown that the driver was using it for the owner’s purposes, under delegation of a task or duty. The substitution for this clear conception of a vague test based on “interest” or “concern” has nothing in reason or authority to commend it. Every man who gives permission for the use of his chattel may be said to have an interest or concern in its being carefully used, and, in most cases if it is a car, to have an interest or concern in the safety of the driver, but it has never been held that mere permission is enough to establish vicarious liability. And the appearance of the words in certain judgments (Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.  1 W.L.R. 409, per Devlin J.;  1 W.L.R. 1120, per Denning L.J.) in a negative context (no interest or concern, therefore no agency) is no warrant whatever for transferring them into a positive test. I accept entirely that “agency” in contexts such as these is merely a concept, the meaning and purpose of which is to say “is vicariously liable,” and that either expression reflects a judgment of value – respondeat superior is the law saying that the owner ought to pay. It is this imperative which the common law has endeavoured to work out through the cases. The owner ought to pay, it says, because he has authorised the act, or requested it, or because the actor is carrying out a task or duty delegated, or because he is in control of the actor’s conduct. He ought not to pay (on accepted rules) if he has no control over the actor, has not authorised or requested the act, or if the actor is acting wholly for his own purposes. These rules have stood the test of time remarkably well. They provide, if there is nothing more, a complete answer to the respondents’ claim against the appellant.
I must now consider the special circumstance on which the judge relied – the understanding between the appellant and her husband. What does it amount to? In my opinion, it is nothing more than the kind of assurance that any responsible citisen would give to his friends, any child would give to his parent, any responsible husband would give to his wife: that he intends to do what is his legal and moral duty: not to drive if in doubt as to his sobriety. The evidence is that this assurance originated from the husband and no doubt it was welcomed by the wife. But it falls far short of any authority by the wife to drive on her behalf or of any delegation by her of the task of driving. If the husband was, as he clearly was, using the car for his own purposes, I am unable to understand how his undertaking to delegate his right to drive to another can turn the driver into the wife’s agent in any sense of the word. The husband remains the user, the purposes remain his.
So if one applies accepted principles of the law, the case is clear; I only wish to add that I agree with the judgment of Megaw L.J. in the Court of Appeal  2 Q.B. 245 both on the law and on the facts.
This is not the end of the case. The respondents submitted that we should depart from accepted principle and introduce a new rule, or set of rules, applicable to the use of motor vehicles, which would make the appellant liable as owner. Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal formulated one such rule, based on the conception of a matrimonial car, a car used in common by husband and wife for the daily purposes of both. All purposes, or at least the great majority of purposes, he would say are matrimonial purposes: shopping, going to work, transporting children, all are purposes of the owner; the car was bought and owned for them to be carried out. And, consequently (this is the critical step), the owner is ipso jure liable whatever the other spouse is using the car for, unless, it seems, though the scope of the exception is not defined, the latter is “on a frolic of his own.” Indeed Lord Denning M.R. seems to be willing to go even further and to hold the owner liable on the basis merely of permission to drive, actual or assumed.
"Vicarious Liability Cases | Negligence." Parallelewelten.net. 11 2013. All Answers Ltd. 04 2019 <http://parallelewelten.info/cases/vicarious-liability-cases.php?vref=1>.
"Vicarious Liability Cases | Negligence." Parallelewelten. Parallelewelten.net, November 2013. Web. 19 April 2019. <http://parallelewelten.info/cases/vicarious-liability-cases.php?vref=1>.
Parallelewelten. November 2013. Vicarious Liability Cases | Negligence. [online]. Available from: http://parallelewelten.info/cases/vicarious-liability-cases.php?vref=1 [Accessed 19 April 2019].
Parallelewelten. Vicarious Liability Cases | Negligence [Internet]. November 2013. [Accessed 19 April 2019]; Available from: http://parallelewelten.info/cases/vicarious-liability-cases.php?vref=1.

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In Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC, No. M2016-00447-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2017), the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether parents in Tennessee may “bind their minor children to pre-injury waivers of liability, releases, or indemnity agreements,” affirming the existing common law rule such agreements were not enforceable against a child when signed by a parent. The Court also discussed whether a minor had the right to seek recovery of medical expenses in a personal injury case.
Mother took her son to defendant trampoline park, and on their first visit mother was required to sign a “Customer Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk.” This form purported to waive liability for any injury on behalf of both mother and son, and it contained a choice of law provision naming California law as governing the agreement as well as a forum selection provision stating that litigation would be brought in California. The release stated that it would be effective until the son was eighteen. At a later visit, son was injured, and son and mother both brought this action against defendant trampoline park in the Davidson County Circuit Court.
Defendant filed a motion to enforce the contract in the trial court, arguing that the claims had been waived and that the case had to be brought in California and governed by California law. Mother voluntarily dismissed her claim against defendant, and the trial court subsequently denied defendant’s motion to enforce the contract. The trial court found that “neither the forum selection clause nor the choice of law provision were valid because their enforcement would cause a great hardship for Son to prosecute his action in California and, Tennessee, rather than California, has ‘a more significant relationship to the facts surrounding this case.’” The trial court also held that the liability waiver did not operate to waive son’s claims, as “such a contract is not permissible in Tennessee.” In a lengthy decision, the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed all three of these holdings.
(1) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for reasons other than delay in brining the action; (2) or the other state would be a substantially less convenient place for the trial of the action than this state; (3) or the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means; (4) or it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the agreement.
(quoting Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenback Eng’g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn. 1983)).
The choice of law provision contained in the release was deemed to fail in this case for largely the same reasons as the forum selection clause. The Court ruled that “no material connection exists between the transaction at issue and California,” as the contract was “between Tennessee residents and a Nevada company,” was signed in Tennessee, and “concern[ed] activities taking place in Tennessee.” Because “Tennessee law is clear…that a company’s choice of law provision will only be honored where the proposed state’s law has a material connection to the transaction at issue,” this particular provision was deemed unenforceable.
The Hawk case, which was cited by defendant, dealt with grandparents attempting to obtain visitation rights against parents who had not been deemed unfit. The Supreme Court ultimately denied the state’s ability to grant grandparent visitation in this scenario, holding that “without a substantial danger of harm to the child, a court may not constitutionally impose its own subjective notions of the ‘best interests of the child’ when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married parents is involved.” (quoting Hawk). The Tennessee Supreme Court later extended this holding “to be applicable to all fit parents, not merely those part of ‘an intact, nuclear family.’” (see Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994)). The United States Supreme Court case cited by defendant to argue that parents have the fundamental right to make decisions for their children also involved grandparent visitation rights. (see Troxel).
Based on these cases, defendant argued that “the Hawk Court’s rejection of the state’s parens patriae power to interfere in a parenting decision is also applicable to Mother’s decision to waive Son’s claims against [defendant].” While the Court acknowledged that several states have now deemed these parent-signed liability waivers enforceable against minors, it noted that there was split of authority on this issue and ultimately decided to continue following the rule as set out in Childress.
In support of this holding, the Court pointed out that neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature ever overturned the Childress case. Further, the Court pointed out that in the twenty-five years since Childress, there had been no shortage of children’s activities being offered due to unenforceable waivers, a consequence of which the defendant warned. The Court concluded that “there [was] no basis to depart from this Court’s well-reasoned decision in Childress,” and that the son’s claims in this case could proceed.
Also at issue on this appeal was the son’s ability to make a claim for his pre-majority medical expenses. The trial court had denied son’s motion to amend to add these damages to his complaint, and plaintiff asserted that this denial was in error.
In Wolfe v. Vaughn, 152 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1941), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that there was an exception to the general rule that children could not recover pre-majority medical expenses “where a child has no parent who can sue for such expenses.” In that case, the child’s mother was deceased and father was incompetent. This rule was applied various times, and in a 2006 Court of Appeals case, the Court interpreted the exception to the rule to allow a child to include pre-majority medical expenses when he brought suit through his next friend. (see Palanki ex rel. Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, however, had a different interpretation. In a 2016 case, that Court expressed concern with the broad exception announced in the Palanki decision and stated that the exception allowing minors to claim their own pre-majority medical expenses was meant only to apply in “a situation in which the parents neither paid for nor were legally responsible for the child’s medical expenses,” or where the “expenses were paid for by the minor himself.” (see Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., 2016 WL 6247319 (E.D. Tenn. May 10, 2016)).
[A]llowing the minor child to recover those expenses he himself has paid harmonizes with Tennessee’s public policy of protecting the financial interests of minors. To hold otherwise would prevent the child from being fully compensated for the damages that he actually incurred based upon an arbitrary determination that those expenses were paid by the child’s parent, even in the face of proof to the contrary. Furthermore, to allow the child in this case to claim Mother’s damages despite the fact that she executed a valid release and indemnity agreement would be to frustrate this state’s public policy of enforcing clear and unambiguous exculpatory agreements entered into freely by adults.
The Court held that son could only maintain an action for pre-majority medical expenses he himself actually paid, but that he could present evidence to the trial court of his payments if any such evidence existed.
This case is extremely important for anyone who represents the interests of a minor in tort litigation. First, although it did not establish new law on the issue, it reaffirmed the existing common law rule that a pre-injury waiver signed by a parent is not enforceable against a child. This is vital to remember when evaluating whether a claim exists when a child is injured. Second, it clears up some murky common law regarding whether a child can bring a claim for his or her own pre-majority medical expenses. Based on this case (unless of course the Supreme Court hears this matter on appeal), the current rule appears to be that a minor can only fall into the exception that allows him to bring his own claim for pre-majority medical expenses if the minor truly has no parent to bring the claim and/or paid the expenses himself. I have written an article for the Tennessee Bar Journal on this aspect of the decision that will be published shortly. I will link to the article when it is published.

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[198 U.S. 118, 119] This was a bill exhibited, in September, 1898, by Wyckoff, Seamans, & Benedict, a corporation of New York, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Vermont, against the Howe Scale Company of 1886, a corporation of Vermont, alleging that complainant had been for many years engaged in the manufacture and sale of typewriting machines known in the markets and to the trade and public, and referred to, identified, offered for sale, and sold as the 'Remington typewriter,' and the 'Remington Standard typewriter,' and that the words 'Remington' and 'Remington Standard' had been registered in the Patent Office under the act of Congress; and charging defendant with fraud and unfair competition in making use of the corporate name 'Remington-Sholes Company' and the designations 'Remington-Sholes,' 'Rem-Sho' and 'Remington-Sholes Company,' in advertising for sale, offering for sale, and selling typewriting machines; and praying for an accounting, and for an injunction restraining defendant from advertising or offering for sale or selling typewriting machines manufactured by the 'Remington-Sholes Company,' bearing the name 'Remington' or 'Remington-Sholes' or 'Rem-Sho' or 'Remington-Sholes Company,' and from advertising or offering for sale or selling any such machines under said designation or under any designation of which the name 'Remington' was a part.
Defendant was the sales agent of the 'Remington-Sholes Company,' a corporation of Illinois, and was engaged in selling the typewriting machines called the 'Remington-Sholes' or 'Rem-Sho' typewriter, which were manufactured by the Illinois corporation at Chicago. The right to use those designations in the way they were used was asserted by the defense, of which the Remington-Sholes Company, and subsequently the Fay-Sholes Company, had charge. The word- [198 U.S. 118, 120] 'Rem-Sho' was alleged to have been registered in the Patent Office as a trademark.
The circuit court found that defendant's use of the name 'Remington' was an unjustifiable invasion of complainant's right to the use of that name, and entered a decree, August 14, 1901, denying an account for gains and profits, without prejudice to the recovery thereof from the Remington- Sholes Company; and perpetually enjoining the use of the designation 'Remington,' or 'Rem-Sho,' as the name or part of the name of any typewriting machine whatsoever manufactured by the 'Remington-Sholes Company,' or by defendant, or any person or concern, and from selling, offering, or advertising for sale in any manner, typewriting machines so manufactured 'under the name of or as 'Remington-Sholes' or 'Rem-Sho,' or by any designation of which the word 'Remington' or the abbreviation 'Rem' shall constitute a part.' 110 Fed. 520.
The case was carried by appeal to the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, and was there heard before Circuit Judges Wallace, Lacombe, and Coxe. April 20, 1903, the decree was reversed, without costs, and the cause remanded 'with instructions to decree in favor of complainant only as to the name 'Remington." Lacombe, J., delivered an opinion in support of that decree, Coxe, J., concurring in the conclusion because 'unable to distinguish this cause from R. W. Rogers Co. v. Wm. Rogers Mfg. Co. 17 C. C. A. 576, 35 U. S. App. 843, 70 Fed. 1017;' Wallace, J., dissented, holding that the decree of the circuit court should be reversed with instructions to dismiss the bill. 58 C. C. A. 510, 122 Fed. 348.
It appeared that the mandate of the circuit court of appeals was issued April 22, 1903, and that the circuit court entered a final decree, June 22, 1903, enjoining the use of the word 'Remington,' and also that after the original decree of the circuit court the Remington-Sholes Company changed its corporate name to that of Fay-Sholes Company, and ceased to make its machines marked with the registered trademark 'Rem-Sho,' and with the inscription 'Remington-Sholes Company, Mgrs., Chicago.' [198 U.S. 118, 121] It also appeared that in October, 1901, complainant filed its bill in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois against the Remington-Sholes Company, for alleged unfair trade competition, and that, after answers filed, an order was entered staying proceedings until the determination of this cause, and providing that if this cause resulted in favor of complainant, that cause should be sent at once to an accounting.
On petition of the Howe Scale Company of 1886, and the Fay-Sholes Company, filed October 22, 1903, and on petition of Wyckoff, Seamans, & Benedict, filed December 21, 1903, writ and cross writ of certiorari were granted.
For some years prior to 1860 E. Remington and his three sons were engaged at Ilion, New York in the manufacture of firearms under the firm name of E. Remington & Sons. The father died in 1863, and in 1865 the sons, who had continued the business, organized the corporation E. Remington & Sons under the laws of New York. About 1866 E. Remington & Sons produced a breech-loading rifle that obtained great vogue throughout the world, and was and is known as 'the Remington rifle.' The 'Remington sewing machine' and other machines were also manufactured and sold.
In 1873 E. Remington & Sons began the manufacture of a tpyewriting machine, the most important features of which were invented and patended by Christopher Latham Sholes. It was the pioneer writing machine, and called 'the Typewriter,' and 'the Shoies & Glidden typewriter,' and in 1880 the names 'Remington' and 'Remington Standard' were used instead, as they have since been continuously.
One of complainant's witnesses testified that the typewriter was called 'Remington' 'for the reason that the name Remington was known the world over, owing to their building guns for foreign governments, building sewing machines, and having one of the largest manufacturing works in the world.' In March, 1886, the typewriter branch of the business of E. Remington & Sons was sold to Messrs. Wyckoff, Seamans, & Bene- [198 U.S. 118, 122] dict, and there was also transferred the exclusive right to the name 'Standard Remington Typewriter,' by which name the assignment states the machines were generally known. The assignment contained the express reservation to E. Remington & Sons of the right to engage in the manufacture and sale of typewriters at any time after ten years from its date.
Complainant's typewriting machines have been for years conspicuously marked with the name 'Remington' and with a large 'Red Seal' trademark on the paper table and frame; the name and address 'Remington Standard Typewriter, manufactured by Wyckoff, Seamans, & Benedict, Ilion, N. Y., U. S. A.,' on the cross bar in front of the keyboard; the words and figures 'No. 6 Remington Standard Typewriter No. 6' on the front of the base, and the words 'This machine is protected by 67 American and foreigh patents' on the back. 'Remington' and 'Remington Standard' and the 'Red Seal' have all been registered by complainant as trademarks.
Messrs. Austen G. Fox, George P. Fisher, Jr., James H. Peirce, and William Henry Dennis for the scale company et al.
[198 U.S. 118, 129] Messrs. Edmund Wetmore, Henry D. Donnelly, William W. Dodge, Paul Armitage, and Archibald Cox for Wyckoff, Seamans, & Benedict.
But it is well settled that a personal name cannot be exclusively appropriated by any one as against others having a right to use it; and as the name 'Remington' is an ordinary family surname, it was manifestly incapable of exclusive appropriation as a valid trademark, and its registration as such [198 U.S. 118, 135] could not in itself give it validity. Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 , 35 L. ed. 247, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 163 U.S. 169 , 41 L. ed. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002; Elgin Nat. Watch co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co. 179 U.S. 665 , 45 L. ed. 365, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270.
In the present case, the decree enjoined the use, 'in any manner whatsoever,' 'of the designation 'Remington' as the name, or part of the name, of any typewriting machine whatsoever manufactured by the Remington- Sholes Company, or by defendant or any person or concern, and from selling, offering, exposing or advertising for sale by means of signs, show cards, catalogues, circulars, publications, advertisements, or by word of mouth, or in any manner whatsoever, typewriting machines manufactured by said Remington-Sholes Company or by defendant, or any person or concern under the name of or as 'Remington-Sholes,' or by any designation of which the word Remington shall constitute a part.' This denies the right to use the personal name, rather than aims to correct an abuse of that right, and involves the assertion of the proposition that the use of a family name by a corporation stands on a different footing from its use by individuals or firms. But if every man has the right to use his name reasonably and honestly, in every way, we cannot perceive any practical distinction between the use of the name in a firm and its use in a corporation. It is dishonesty in the use that is condemned, whether in a partnership or corporate name, and not the use itself.
The principle that one corporation is not entitled to restrain another from using in its corporate title a name to which others have a common right, is sustained by the discussion in Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 , 37 L. ed. 1144, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151, and is, we think, necessarily applicable to all names publici juris. American Cereal Co. v. Pettijohn Cereal Co. 72 Fed. 903, 22 C. C. A. 236, 46 U. S. App. 188, 76 Fed. 372; Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co. 142 Ill. 494, 30 N. E. 339; Monarch v. Rosenfeld, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 14, 39 S. W. 236.
It is said that the use of the word 'Remington' in the name Remington- Sholes' was unnecessary,-as if necessity were the absolute test of the right to use. But a person is not obliged to abandon the use of his name or to unreasonably restrict it. The question is whether his use is reasonable and honest, or is calculated to deceive.
'It is a question of evidence in each case whether there is false representation or not.' Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G. 896.
This, of course, assumes not only that the name selected was calculated to deceive, but that the selection was made for that purpose.
In Turton v. Turton, L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 128, plaintiffs had carried on the iron business as 'Thomas Turton & Sons.' Defendant began the same business as John Turton, then traded as John Turton & Co., and finally took in his sons and changed the firm name to 'John Turton & Sons.' Some confusion had arisen, and plaintiffs contended that there was no necessity for defendants to use their own names.
And Lord Macnaghten said in Reddaway v. Banham [198 U.S. 118, 1896] A. C. p. 220: 'I am quite at a loss to know why Turton v. Turton was ever reported. The plaintiff's case there was extravagant and absurd.' And see Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N. Y. 427, 20 Am. Rep. 489; Meriden Brittannia Co. v. Parker, 39 Conn. 450, 12 Am. Rep. 406.
In our opinion the Remingtons and Sholes made a reasonable and fair use of their names in adopting the name 'Remington-Sholes' for their machine, and in giving that name to the corporation formed for its manufacture and sale.
The use of two distinct surnames clearly differentiated the machines of defendant from those of complainant, and when defendant's cards, signs, catalogues, instructions to agents, etc., are considered, it seems to us that the record discloses, to use the language of Mr. Justice Field in the Goodyear Case, a persistent effort on defendant's part 'to call the attention of the public to its own manufactured goods, and the places where they are to be had, and that it has no connection with the plaintiff.' Doubtless the Remington and Sholes, in using the name 'Remington-Sholes, 'desired to avail themselves of the general family reputation attached to the two names; but that does not in itself justify the assumption that their purpose was to confuse their machines with complainant's; or that the [198 U.S. 118, 140] use of that name was in itself calculated to deceive. Remington and Sholes were interested in the old company, and Remington continued as general manager of the new company. Neither of them was paid for the use of his name, and neither of them had parted with the right to that use. Having the right to that use, courts will not interfere where the only confusion, if any, results from a similarity of the names, and not from the manner of the use. The essence of the wrong in unfair competition consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another; and if defendant so conduct its business as not to palm off its goods as those of complainant, the action fails.
As observed by Mr. Justice Strong in the leading case of Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 20 L. ed. 581, 'Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.' And by Mr. Justice Clifford, in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 , 24 L. ed. 828: 'A court of equity will not interfere when ordinary attention by the purchaser of an article would enable him at once to discriminate the one from the other.' And by Mr. Justice Jackson in Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 , 37 L. ed. 1144, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151: 'Even in the case of a valid trademark the similarity of brands must be such as to mislead the ordinary observer.' And see Coats v. Merrick Thread Co. 149 U.S. 562 , 37 L. ed. 847, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Liggett & M. Tobacco Co. v. Finzer, 128 U.S. 182 , 32 L. ed. 395, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60.
We hold that, in the absence of contract, fraud, or estoppel, any man may use his own name, in all legitimate ways, and as the whole or a part of a corporate name. And, in our view, defendant's name and trademark were not intended or likely to deceive, and there was nothing of substance shown in defendant's conduct in their use constituting unfair competition, or calling for the imposition of restrictions lest actionable injury might result, as may confessedly be done in a proper case.
Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed; decree of Circuit Court also reversed, and cause remanded to that court, with a direction to dismiss the bill.

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FindACase | Panaprint, Inc. v. C2 Multimedia, Inc.
Panaprint, Inc. v. C2 Multimedia, Inc.
C2 MULTIMEDIA, INC., AND CORDACO HOMES, INC., Defendants.
Defendants C2 Multi Media and Cordaco Homes have moved to dismiss Plaintiff Panaprint, Inc.'s amended complaint (Doc. 14). Doc. 16. As discussed below, the motion (Doc. 16) is DENIED.
Panaprint alleges that C2 Multi Media, Inc. and Cordaco Homes, Inc. breached their contracts to use Panaprint to print magazines by unilaterally canceling the contracts in violation of the Uniform Commercial Code or, in the alternative, general contract law. See generally Doc. 14. On April 11, 2017, C2 Multi Media and Cordaco Homes, which share the same address and two owners, removed the case to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction as to the claim against C2 Multi Media and diversity or supplemental jurisdiction as to the claim against Cordaco Homes. Docs. 1 at 2-4, 8-10, 12-13; 1-1 at 1. C2 Multi Media and Cordaco Homes also moved to dismiss Panaprint's complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the signed documents that Panaprint alleges are contracts are, instead, price quotations which did not obligate C2 Multi Media and Cordaco Homes to purchase any magazines from Panaprint. Doc. 2. The Court agreed that Panaprint's complaint was deficient but gave Panaprint an opportunity to amend its complaint if Panaprint believed, in good faith, that it could allege additional facts to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Doc. 13.
Panaprint amended its complaint on November 22, 2017. Doc. 14. Now, C2 Multi Media and Cordaco Homes have renewed their motion to dismiss, arguing that Panaprint's amended complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted for the same reasons its original complaint failed: it “contains no factual allegations that support the conclusion that either Defendant was obligated to have a single magazine published by Panaprint.” Doc. 16 at 6.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged facts. Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
The alleged contracts in this case provide that the agreements be interpreted according to Georgia law. Doc. 14 at 16, 19. Further, the documents were drafted by and mailed to Panaprint, whose address is located in Macon, Georgia. Id. at 15-16, 18-19; see In re Club Assocs., 951 F.2d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Executed in Georgia, the security deed is governed by Georgia contract law, lex loci contractus.” (citation omitted)). Panaprint has alleged claims for breach of contract under the Uniform Commercial Code and, in the alternative, under general contract law. See generally Doc. 14.
Except as otherwise provided in this Code section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.

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Amicus Briefs American Psychoanalytic Assn.
4. DOES THE JAFFEE PRIVILEGE APPLY TO ALL MENTAL HEALTH/MEDICAL INFORMATION OR ONLY TO STRICTLY DEFINED "PSYCHOTHERAPY"?
Finley v. Johnson Oil Co.
5. DOES THE 6th AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TRUMP THE JAFFEE PRIVILEGE?
Paul W. Mosher, M.D. and Jerome Beigler, M.D.
JAMA Editorial by Paul Appelbaum, M.D.
On June 13, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the Federal Courts. This important decision was the ultimate societal expression of the need to provide absolute protection from disclosure of communications between psychotherapists and their patients. This WWW site is your link to historical and developing information about this most important factor in protecting the confidentiality of psychotherapy.
Although the JAFFEE privilege has been likened by the Supreme Court to the attorney-client privilege, the JAFFEE privilege lacks the latter's many years of common law experience. The way in which the new privilege develops is of major importance to all psychotherapists and their patients. It is the goal of this WWW site to increase public awareness of the JAFFEE privilege and its important implications for the confidentiality of psychotherapeutic relationships.
March 9, 2012 -- Eighth Circuit Declines to Recognize a "Dangerous Patient Exception" -- Joining Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Eight Circuit has declined to recognize a "dangerous patient exception" to the Jaffee privilege. The Court in U.S. v. Ghane made clear that the issuing of a "Tarasoff warning," even with the patient's explicit consent to the warning, does not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
October 6, 2008 -- Certiorari Denied in U.S. v. Auster -- The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the U.S. v. Auster case (see February 11, 2008 item.) The Fifth Circuit Decision raises troubling questions in regard to what, if anything, patients are told at the inception of treatment about the boundaries of confidentiality, and puts a new spotlight on the previously unexplored implications of Footnote 12 in Jaffee.
July 18, 2008 -- Second Circuit upholds the privilege in the context of "garden variety" complaints of emotional distress in Sims v. Blot. This carefully reasoned decision upholds the principle articulated in Vanderbilt v. Chilmark and other cases.
November 22, 2006 -- Certiorari Petition Filed in Case Raising "At Issue" Exception -- The Supreme Court has been asked to review a Seventh Circuit ruling which supports the so-called "patient-litigant" exception to the Jaffee privilege. In Doe v Oberweis Dairy the Seventh Circuit held that psychotherapy records were not protected by the Jaffee privilege in light of a claim for ordinary mental distress. The petition claims that this holding is in conflict with holdings in two EEOC cases in the Fifth Circuit.
June 13, 2006 -- Tenth Anniversary of Jaffee Decision -- The Jaffee decision, handed down June 13, 1996, has now been on the books for 10 years. Developments in the law following Jaffee have begun to define the "contours" of the privilege, but there is still much to be decided. An article in Psychiatric News (American Psychiatric Association) addresses Jaffee's relevance today.
July 5, 2005 -- Ninth Circuit Rules that Statement Made to Therapist outside Scheduled Session is not Privileged -- The Ninth Circuit has ruled in U.S. v Romo that a statement made to a psychotherapist in a private non-scheduled meeting (a "session?") is not "in the course of diagnosis or treatment" and is therefore not privileged! One judge was of the opinion that such a meeting is part of the treatment relationship and therefore a statement made in such a meeting is protected by Jaffee.
June 27, 2005 -- U.S. Supreme Court declines to hear appeal on reporters' privilege -- Reporters Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper refused to disclose sources to a Federal Prosecutor and were found in civil contempt by a district court. The judgement of the district court was sustained in a decision by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. In this decision the appellate court discussed the issue of a supposed federal reporters' privilege in relation to the absolute Jaffee privilege, and agreed that, if such a reporters' privilege exists, it is not absolute. In refusing to review this decision, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to establish the existence of a federal reporters' privilege despite the existence of "shield laws" in a number of states.
March 26, 2004 -- Seventh Federal Circuit Rejects a Federal Privilege in the "Partial Birth Abortion" Records Case -- An Illinois Federal District Court ruled (full text) that records of patients who underwent abortions are privileged in the Federal Courts either because the HIPAA Privacy Rule "no preemption" provision imports Illinois state privilege law into federal courts in Illinois or because records of such patients are deserving of privilege protection based on the reasoning in Jaffee. A three judge panel of the 7th Circuit has rejected both rationales. In its decision (full text), the panel denied Government access to the records based on the more common "undue burden" provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
January 9, 2004 -- Eighth Federal Circuit Rules on "Confrontation Clause Issue" -- A defendant convicted of first degree murder attempted to impeach the only eye witness by gaining access to that witness's psychotherapy records. In Newton v. Kemna, the Eighth Federal Circuit ruled (Full Text) that the defendant may not invoke a 6th Amendment "confrontation clause" right to access the records because the witness's Jaffee privilege is "absolute," i.e., not subject to case-by-case balancing. The court also ruled that the Supreme Court's no-balancing decision in Jaffee means that an in camera examination of the records to determine their possible relevance is not allowed.
August 21, 2002 -- Another Appellate Ruling on "Dangerous Patient Exception" -- In the case of U.S. v. Chase, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that there is a dangerous patient exception to the Jaffee privilege, adopting a position opposite to that taken by the 6th Circuit in U.S. v. Hayes. In the three Appellate rulings on this issue so far, the opinions have been: two in support of an exception (U.S. v. Chase and U.S. v. Glass) and one holding that that there is is no such exception (U.S. v. Hayes). The issue in large part revolves around the meaning and intent of the so-called "Jaffee footnote" (footnote 19).
August 14, 2002 -- HHS Publishes Final Privacy Rule -- Following its proposed revisions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS published the FINAL Privacy Rule in the Federal Register. The stringent protection for "psychotherapy notes" based on Jaffee remains undisturbed. The starting enforcement date for the Privacy Rule is April 14, 2003.
April 14, 2001 -- The HHS Privacy Rule Becomes Effective -- Despite strenuous lobbying efforts by certain health industry participants, President Bush decided to allow the final HHS Privacy Rule's effective date to remain undisturbed. Therefore, the final Rule, including the stringent protection of psychotherapy information based on the Jaffee privilege, takes on the force of law as of April 14, 2001. The "enforcement date" is two years later.
March 20, 2001 -- Widening the Privilege -- The Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th District has ruled that communications between an unlicensed EAP counselor and a patient are protected from compelled disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient privilege established in Jaffee. The Court took note of the increasing number of employees who must see an EAP counselor as a prerequisite to entering third-party paid psychotherapy. The Court also noted that EAP counselors frequently receive sensitive information from patients under a presumption of confidentiality, in the same sense that psychotherapists do. See Oleszko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund.
January 18, 2001 -- The Outer Limits!! -- In what has to be the broadest imaginable application of Jaffee, a Lower U.S. Court has held that the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege protects the medical records of a general practitioner simply because the record mentions the patient's mental state. The patient did not have a mental diagnosis, and was not in "psychotherapy." See Finley v. Johnson Oil Co.
December 28, 2000 -- HHS Final Privacy Rule Published -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publishes "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; Final Rule" in the Federal Register. In the light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond, the Rule extends stringent protection to "psychotherapy notes" which goes far beyond the protection extended to all other medical information.
The final Rule (which becomes binding in April, 2003 -- changed from February, 2003 by order of HHS, 02/26/01) makes it illegal for an insurer to condition the sale of a policy or payment of claim on a patient's agreement to allow disclosure of psychotherapy notes. The fly in the ointment: a lack of clarity as to what information an insurer will be able to demand, i.e., how the Rule will be interpreted by those who are charged with its enforcement -- and by the courts. This issue will be the next battleground in the protection of genuine confidentiality for psychotherapy.
A summary of all the Rule's provisions relating to psychotherapy notes, as well as links to the entire Rule and information about plans for enforcement, are HERE.
August 18, 2000 - U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit Holds That a Patient "Waives" the Privilege by Placing Mental Condition "At Issue" -- In the case of Schoffstall v. Henderson a Federal Appellate Court ruled that a patient waives the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental state at issue in a claim. This is the first ruling at the appellate level on this issue. Lower federal courts are divided on the issue. See, for example, Vanderbilt v. Chilmark.
November 3, 1999 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Issues Proposed Rules for the Privacy of Electronic Health Information -- In this extremely complicated and detailed proposal, HHS has established very special powerful protection for "psychotherapy notes." Quoting extensively from the Jaffee opinion, HHS proposed to make it illegal for an insurer to sell an insurance policy in which the psychotherapy coverage requires the patient to agree to the disclosure of psychotherapy information. The proposed rule also makes it illegal for an insurer to refuse to pay a claim because a patient doesn't agree to disclosure of such information.
October 7, 1999 - President Clinton Establishes Jaffee-like Privilege for Military Personnel under UCMJ -- President Clinton announced that by executive order he is establishing a psychotherapist-patient privilege for military personnel. The privilege has several stated exceptions tailored to the needs of the armed services. See also.
August 19, 1999 - U.S. Court of Appeals for First Circuit Establishes First Exception to New Privilege -- Following the Supreme Court's paralleling of the Jaffee privilege with the attorney-client privilege, the Court ruled in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette). that the Jaffee privilege is subject to a narrow "crime-fraud" exception similar to that in the attorney-client privilege.
There Be a “Dangerous Patient Exception”?
Mosher, P.W. and Swire, P. P. (2002) The Ethical and Legal Implications of Jaffee v. Redmond and the HIPAA Privacy Rule for Psychotherapy and General Psychiatry.

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Loans secured by 25 acres or more.
Loans made by lenders who are not a "creditor" as defined in Reg Z, which make five or fewer mortgages in one year.
Can we provide a revised Loan Estimate even if the changed circumstance does not result in fees that exceed the applicable tolerance level(s)?
Yes. Creditors are not prohibited from issuing a revised Loan Estimate in these situations. However, creditors may not be able to use the revised fees when determining whether the fees charged are in "good faith". In other words, a voluntary revised Loan Estimate would not "reset" the tolerance levels and creditors would need to look back at a prior disclosure (e.g., the original Loan Estimate) to determine whether the charged fees were within the applicable tolerance levels.
Investment property transactions are covered by the TRID rule if the transaction is primarily for a consumer purpose. The TRID rule does not eliminate the business purpose exemption from Regulation Z or RESPA. If a loan is primarily for a business purpose (eg. The purchase of an investment property), then it is exempt from Regulation Z and RESPA. . . including the TRID rule. If a loan secured by an investment property is primarily for a consumer purpose however (eg. cash-out to pay college tuition), then the transaction is subject to Reg. Z and RESPA and must comply with the TRID rule.
On a 2nd lien transaction, am I required to disclose taxes and insurance information my Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure?
Yes. Actual collection on 2nd liens is not required (unless specifically required when not collected on the first), but per regulation taxes and assessment information is required to be disclosed to reflect all borrower obligations related to the subject transaction. This will be reflected on Page 1 under Taxes and Assessments of both the LE and CD, and under the Escrow Disclosure section on Page 5 of the Closing Disclosure.
(vi) A reference to the information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (g)(3) of this section.
I have a consumer who wants to do a bridge loan on his investment property to purchase a new primary residence. Am I required to disclose per TRID?
Yes. Though using investment property, this would be consumer purpose. Bridge loans for the purchase of a primary residence are covered transactions per TRID.
1026.19(e) Mortgage loans secured by real property—early disclosures. (1) Provision of disclosures.(i) Creditor. In a closed-end consumer credit transaction secured by real property, other than a reverse mortgage subject to § 1026.33, the creditor shall provide the consumer with good faith estimates of the disclosures in § 1026.37.
When there is a credit for interest rate chosen going back to a consumer on the Loan Estimate, Can this be disclosed as a negative number in the % of Loan amount (Points) section?
No. Credits for interest rate chosen are given back to the borrower in Section J under Lender Credits. The %of Loan Amount (Points) section is specifically designated for discount point charges.
1026.37(f)(1)(i) The points paid to the creditor to reduce the interest rate shall be itemized separately, as both a percentage of the amount of credit extended and a dollar amount, and using the label “__% of Loan Amount (Points).” If points to reduce the interest rate are not paid, the disclosure required by this paragraph (f)(1)(i) must be blank.
4. Points. If there are no points charged in connection with the transaction to reduce the interest rate, the creditor leaves blank the percentage of points used in the label and the dollar amount disclosed under § 1026.37(f)(1)(i).
What Section of the Loan Estimate should OTP be disclosed in and what is the tolerance category if a consumer selects from the list of providers?
Owner’s Title Policy is considered an optional fee; therefore, disclosed in Section H under “Other Fees”. Whether or not the provider is selected from the list, Owner’s Title Policy is not subject to tolerance testing. The only case where tolerance testing would be required is when it is specifically required by the lender. §1026.37(g)(4)-Commentary-1. Owner’s title insurance policy rate. The amount disclosed for an owner’s title insurance premium pursuant to § 1026.37(g)(4) is based on a basic owner’s policy rate, and not on an “enhanced” title insurance policy premium, except that the creditor may instead disclose the premium for an “enhanced” policy when the “enhanced” title insurance policy is required by the real estate sales contract, if such requirement is known to the creditor when issuing the Loan Estimate. This amount should be disclosed as “Title – Owner’s Title Policy (optional),” or in any similar manner that includes the introductory description “Title –” at the beginning of the label for the item, the parenthetical description “(optional)” at the end of the label, and clearly indicates the amount of the premium disclosed pursuant to § 1026.37(g)(4) is for the owner’s title insurance coverage. See comment 37(f)(2)-4 for a discussion of the disclosure of the premium for lender’s title insurance coverage.
Why does the Down Payment/Funds from Borrower portion of the Calculating Cash to Close Section on the Closing Disclosure not matching the borrowers actual down payment?
The Down Payment/Funds from Borrower Section is calculated by taking the principal amount of the new lien and subtracting it from the sales price of the subject property.
We are proceeding with a Section 32 transaction for our consumer, with the new TILA-RESPA integration; can you tell me on which page my HOEPA Disclosure will appear that used to be on my Section 32 TIL?
The Section 32 Disclosure on the TIL will not be provided on the Loan Estimate or Closing Disclosure. On a Section 32 Loan the Section 32 TIL will still be required in addition to the TRID documents.
My processor accidentally disclosed the first time use Funding Fee on this VA transaction Loan Estimate, but when I put in the subsequent use fee in on my Closing Disclosure it is showing a cure for the entire difference. Can you tell me why?
The VA Funding Fee now falls into the 0% tolerance category. As operator error is not a valid reason for change in circumstance the creditor will be responsible for the cure for entirety of the difference.
1026.37(f)(2) Services You Cannot Shop For, Commentary-2. Examples of charges. Examples of the services and amounts to be disclosed pursuant to § 1026.37(f)(2) might include an appraisal fee, appraisal management company fee, credit report fee, flood determination fee, government funding fee, homeowner’s association certification fee, lender’s attorney fee, tax status research fee, third-party subordination fee, title – closing protection letter fee, title – lender’s title insurance policy, and an upfront mortgage insurance fee, provided that the fee is charged at consummation and is not a prepayment of future premiums over a specific future time period or a payment into an escrow account. Government funding fees include a United States Department of Veterans Affairs or United States Department of Agriculture guarantee fee, or any other fee paid to a government entity as part of a governmental loan program, that is paid at consummation.
My consumer will be using a POA on the transaction and I need to add a POA recording fee into the Closing Disclosure. Do I need to add this on a different line in Section E. Taxes and Other Government Fees, to identify it for the POA specifically?
No. A separate line may not be added to reflect recording fees, and this will not be separately itemized. This will added into the recording fee in the column as a bulk total.
§1026.37(g)(1) Taxes and other government fees. Under the subheading “Taxes and Other Government Fees,” the amounts to be paid to State and local governments for taxes and other government fees, and the subtotal of all such amounts, as follows: (i) On the first line, the sum of all recording fees and other government fees and taxes, except for transfer taxes paid by the consumer and disclosed pursuant to paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section, labeled “Recording Fees and Other Taxes.” (ii) On the second line, the sum of all transfer taxes paid by the consumer, labeled “Transfer Taxes.” (iii) If an amount required to be disclosed by this paragraph (g)(1) is not charged to the consumer, the amount disclosed on the applicable line required by this paragraph (g)(1) must be blank.
§1026.3737(g)(1) Taxes and other government fees, Commentary-. 1. Recording fees. Recording fees listed under § 1026.37(g)(1) are fees assessed by a government authority to record and index the loan and title documents as required under State or local law. Recording fees are assessed based on the type of document to be recorded or its physical characteristics, such as the number of pages. Unlike transfer taxes, recording fees are not based on the sale price of the property or loan amount. For example, a fee for recording a subordination agreement that is $20, plus $3 for each page over three pages, is a recording fee, but a fee of $1,250 based on 0.5 percent of the loan amount is a transfer tax, and not a recording fee.
2. Other government charges. Any charges or fees imposed by a State or local government that are not transfer taxes are aggregated with recording fees and disclosed under § 1026.37(g)(1)(i).
6. Deletion and addition of items. The lines and labels required by § 1026.37(g)(1) may not be deleted, even if recording fees or transfer taxes are not charged to the consumer. No additional items may be listed under the subheading in § 1026.37(g)(1).
The title company is requiring a new survey on our consumer’s transaction. Which section will we need to disclose this in on our Loan Estimate?
Depending on the situation this will most likely be disclosed in Section B or C. If the title company requires survey in order to insure, then by proxy this would be lender required, as the lender requires lenders title insurance. In most cases the title company selects the surveyor and this would be placed in Section B under Services You Cannot shop for with a 0 tolerance. If the title company allows the borrower to use the lenders list this may be disclosed in Section C. Services You Can Shop For.
37(f)(2) Services you cannot shop for., Commentary-2. Examples of charges. Examples of the services and amounts to be disclosed pursuant to § 1026.37(f)(2) might include an appraisal fee, appraisal management company fee, credit report fee, flood determination fee, government funding fee, homeowner’s association certification fee, lender’s attorney fee, tax status research fee, third-party subordination fee, title – closing protection letter fee, title – lender’s title insurance policy, and an upfront mortgage insurance fee, provided that the fee is charged at consummation and is not a prepayment of future premiums over a specific future time period or a payment into an escrow account. Government funding fees include a United States Department of Veterans Affairs or United States Department of Agriculture guarantee fee, or any other fee paid to a government entity as part of a governmental loan program, that is paid at consummation.
37(f)(3) Services you can shop for, Commentary- 2. Example of charges. Examples of the services to be listed under this subheading pursuant to § 1026.37(f)(3) might include a pest inspection fee, survey fee, title – closing agent fee, and title – closing protection letter fee.
Why do I need to use the Simultaneous Policy Calculator?
In many states, a consumer is entitled to a discount on loan title insurance policy when an owner’s policy will be simultaneously issued. When both a loan and owner’s title insurance policies will be purchased (“simultaneous issuance”), the TRID Rule requires the lender or settlement agent to disclose the title premiums on the Closing Disclosure in a way that is different than what is actually charged. Specifically, the Rule requires both policies to be disclosed at the full premium price with no discounts or enhanced pricing on both the LE and CD. Our calculator will apply the appropriate credits per the ruling to accurately reflect the borrowers Cash to Close.
I don’t know who the Selling Broker is on this transaction, where would I find this information?
This information can be found on the purchase contract, or provided by the title company.
What is the Texas Disclosure?
The Texas Disclosure or T-64, is a disclosure created by the Texas title industry in order to bring Federal and State laws into synchronization for closing purposes come October 3, 2015. It will be simultaneously issued with all closings which require a Closing Disclosure, to provide accurate breakdowns of Lenders Title Insurance and OTP, itemizes any additional recording fees not broken down on the Closing Disclosure, breaks out R.E. commissions paid to third parties, itemizes endorsements if disclosed in bulk, provides acknowledgment of receipt of the CD, and gives authorization to disburse.
I am working on a 12 month Bridge loan for our consumer on his rural primary residence to purchase an investment property up the street. He will be selling another investment property out of state to try and pay off the entire loan or we will consider taking to perm. Am I required to disclose per TRID? And if so, what is my Loan Purpose?
Yes. The technicality here is that the borrower will not be moving out, so additional verbiage cannot be added to the security instrument. Additionally, the property will attach to the borrower’s rural homestead; therefore, the transaction will become a 50(a)(6). The Loan Purpose would be Home Equity.
How to select the correct loan purpose for TRID Documents?
How do I count days?
Loan Estimate must be delivered or placed in the mail within 3 business days of application. A business day in respect to the Loan Estimate is defined in 1026.2(a)(6), as any day in which the creditor’s offices are open to the public to carry out substantially all of its business functions.
Closing Disclosure must be provided to the consumer at least 3 Business days prior to consummation. A business day in respect to the Closing Disclosure is defined as all calendar days except Sundays and federal legal public holidays (5 USC 6103(a) 6 floating + 4 fixed).
Mail delivery: if any disclosures required under § 1026.19(e)(1)(i) or § 1026.19(f)(1)(i) are provided to the consumer in person, they are deemed to have received them the same day. For any other method of delivery, (by mail, email, overnight, etc…) the consumer is considered to have received the disclosures three business days after they are delivered or placed in the mail. The creditor may, alternatively, rely on evidence that the consumer received the disclosures earlier than three business days. For example, if the creditor sends the disclosures via overnight mail on Monday, and the consumer signs for receipt of the overnight delivery on Tuesday, the creditor could demonstrate that the disclosures were received on Tuesday.
Where do I enter Credit Life Insurance on the Closing Disclosure?
As a product which is not required by the creditor, Credit Life Insurance will be disclosed in Section H, with notation of “(optional)”.
If the product is required to be purchased from the creditor in connection with the transaction, the fee will be disclosed in Section A. This will carry a zero tolerance if provided by the creditor or an affiliate, regardless of Section placement.
What is the problem with simultaneous issue title insurance?
In many states, a consumer is entitled to a discount on loan title insurance policy when an owner’s policy will be simultaneously issued. When both a loan and owner’s title insurance policies will be purchased (“simultaneous issuance”), the Rule requires the lender or settlement agent to disclose the title premiums on the Closing Disclosure in a way different than actually charged. Please see our full analysis and calculator for more information.
How do I answer the Liability after Foreclosure question on page 5 of the Closing Disclosure?
When you order documents through our system, we will default the selection based on the state the property is located in and several other factors. We will also provide links to relevant background.
How do I disclose a true one-time close loan under TRID?
The basic rules in Reg. Z around disclosing for a “construction to permanent” loan do not change after October 3. In other words, reg. Z currently allows the creditor to disclose a construction to permanent loan as 1 transaction (ie. 1 combined early and final TIL) or as 2 transactions (2 early and final TILS, 1 for the construction phase and 1 for the permanent phase). Our approach will be to document construction to permanent loans as 2 transactions, seperating the construction phase and the permanent phase.
When can I use the 60 day construction notice under TRID?
Per Reg. Z, Section 1026.19(e)(3)(iv)(F), the 60-day disclosure is used only in a Loan Estimate involving new construction [but not the construction loan itself], including the purchase of a home that has yet to be constructed or is currently under construction. The 60-day disclosure is not applicable to loans for improvement of existing dwellings, or home equity loans where proceeds will be used to construct improvements. For example, if a use and occupancy permit has been issued for the home prior to issuance of the LE, then the home is not considered to be under construction and the 60-day disclosure should not be used.
How has the fee tolerance testing changed under TRID?
Please see our TRID Tolerance Spreadsheet and sections of the applicable TRID regulations re tolerances.
Are prepaid property taxes held to zero tolerance?
No. When the CFPB finalized the TRID rule, it indiciated that its intent was for the final rule to mirror the regulation X tolerance levels for property insurance premiums, property taxes, homeowner's association dues, condominium fees, and cooperative fees. Unfortunately, in the original final rule, the CFPB missed the word "not" in the statement "are [not] subject to tolerances whether or not they are placed into an escrow, impound, reserve, or similar account."
The CFPB clarified its mistake in February 2016 by publishing a correction in the Federal Register to officially add the word "not" and clarify that prepaid property taxes are not subject to tolerance.
What are the signature requirements on TRID forms?
Signature lines may be added to the TRID forms at the lender’s discretion and are entirely optional. The purpose of signature lines on the LE and CD, if selected, is solely for the borrower to acknowledge receipt of the disclosure. Borrower signatures on the disclosures do not constitute borrower acceptance of the content of the disclosures or waive any borrower rights against the lender if there are errors in the disclosures. Whether or not to add signature lines is a business decision for the lender.
Why does the Closing Disclosure have place holders for Deed and Mortgage Recording fees and nothing else?
The CD has hard coded fields for only the deed and mortgage which can result in the total recording fees being greater than the sum of the deed and the mortgage if other documents also have to be recorded. The CFPB does not explain the reasoning behind this methodology in the TRID rule or the official staff commentary. The preamble to the rule, however, reflects that this issue was raised with the CFPB during the comment period. The CFPB’s only response in the preamble is that their consumer testing leads them to believe that disclosing recording fees this way does not cause consumer confusion.
Several national industry trade association commenters stated that the disclosure of the split of recording fees between those required for recording the deed and mortgage would omit recording fees for other documents (such as powers of attorney and subordination agreements), and therefore the disclosed amount under proposed § 1026.38(g)(1) would not equal the sum of the two disclosed components. Some of these commenters suggested deleting the breakout between charges associated with recording the deed and the mortgage. The Bureau’s consumer testing did not indicate that consumers were confused about the breakout. See Kleimann Testing Report at 186-87, 291. The Bureau believes that to introduce further breakouts would require additional space that may not be available on the form as tested and would not demonstrably change consumer understanding of the Closing Disclosure.
Where do I enter Survey Fee on the Closing Disclosure?
As a service required by the lender, a survey fee would be indicated in Section C on the Loan Estimate, with a Provider option listed on the Service Provider List. If selected from the list, the fee will move to Section B of the Closing Disclosure, and will be subject to a 10% tolerance. If not selected from the list, the fee will remain in Section C on the Closing Disclosure and will not carry a tolerance requirement.
Why should I collaborate with settlement agents?
The Closing Disclosure has TILA liability and therefore should be prepared by Lender. However, lenders do not have access to all the necessary information needed to populate the Closing Disclosure. Lenders must get the data such as the recording fee, seller’s realtor contact information, and various license numbers from settlement agents. Lenders should use a collaboration tool to minimize errors and improve efficiency.
What is the re-baseline problem?
The TRID rule does not permit “re-baselining” of the 10% tolerance bucket when a changed circumstance results in a fee increase that does not cause the aggregate fees in that category to increase by more than 10%. The Bureau determined that to allow such incremental “re-baselining” of the 10% tolerance category every time a such a changed circumstance occurred would effectively undermine the 10% tolerance threshold. Lenders should use calculators to determine the correct baseline amount for good faith analysis.
Where do I enter Warranty Deed on the Closing Disclosure?
A Warranty Deed is considered and associated with the transaction as a part of the real estate property contract; therefore, is disclosed in Section H, without the “(optional)” designation. Although the consumer is obligated for the cost, it is not imposed as a requirement by the creditor.
Where do I enter Owners Title Insurance on the Closing Disclosure?
As a fee required by the creditor, Owner’s Title Policy would be placed in Section C on the Loan Estimate with optional Provider indicated on the Service Provider List. If selected from the list, the fee will move to Section B on the Closing Disclosure.
If the Owners Title Policy is not required by the lender, it will be placed in Section H and notated with “(optional)”. If title provider is selected from the list, the 10% tolerance will apply with either Section B or H placement.
Why isn’t PPDocs putting the Owner’s Title Policy in section H when seller is obligated per the sales contract?
What is the alternative method to Calculate Cash to Close?
For transactions without a seller, TRID allows an alternative calculating cash to close table to be displayed on the LE and CD. If the creditor selects the optional method, the total amount of cash provided by the consumer at consummation can be calculated by subtracting the total closing costs, payoffs and payments from the loan amount. The consumer benefits from the alternative method because it omits various amounts not related to the transaction making the disclosures easier to understand.
(h) Calculating cash to close.
37(h)(2) Optional alternative calculating cash to close table for transactions without a seller.
1. Optional use. The optional disclosure of the calculating cash to close table in § 1026.37(h)(2) may only be provided by a creditor in a transaction without a seller. The use of this alternative table for transactions without a seller is optional, but must be used in conjunction with the disclosure under § 1026.37(d)(2).
Will PPDocs prepare Wells Fargo Fee Details Form?
Yes, we have the updated Wells Fargo Form for transaction covered by TRID. We will automatically include the new form when applicable.
Why should lenders show only one provider per service on the written list when they allow the consumer to shop?
Is the Estimate amount required on the Service Provider List?
There is not a definitive statement within the regulation citing you are required to indicate the estimated fee for the service, or conversely allowed to leave it off. The model form implies that the fee should be made available to the consumer if it is on your list. However, due to the lack of absolute requirement on this point we have made an option available to our clients to choose whether or not to include the estimated amount.
Can I upload my own identified service provider list?
Section 19(e)(1)(vi) sets out the regulatory requirement around the written list of service providers. The commentary to that section refers several times to the "model" form in Appendix H-27 to the Reg. The rule does not specifically state that the written list of service providers must be the H-27 form, but that form is set forth as a complaint model form under the rule.
1. The form must comply with all of the requirements of Reg. Z, Section 1026.19(e)(1)(vi). So the lender needs to review that section of the Reg and the official staff commentary, and make sure their form complies.
2. The lender should not use their own form on any secondary market loan. I'm pretty sure investors will want to see the model form. So use of a custom form should be limited to portfolio only.
Can consumer waive the required waiting days?
Yes, but it is very risky. A handwritten note explaining the emergency and approved by the investor may be required. Much like waiving the 3 day Right of Rescission.
After the borrower has received the Loan Estimate and provides an intent to proceed.
How do I add a fee that is not in the pick list?
The fee pick list allows you to quickly add fees to the disclosure. We have tried to prepopulate the list with common fees. If the fee is not in our list, you can still enter the details manually. If it is a fee that is used frequently, please send us the details (Name, section, APR, or FNMA 3% to support@ppdocs.com) and we will be glad to our pick list.
How do I test on PPDocs?
Testing with PPDocs is easy! Click here to register. Ensure you select TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures in the products you are interested in.
Once you have a username and password, we automatically add a Loan Estimate (LE) / Closing Disclosure (CD) loan file.
It gives you the option to view our screens and see how we filled them out.
As always, if you need further assistance, please email support@ppdocs.com and we will be glad to help you.
My system isn't ready. Can you help?
Of course we can! Our TRID system has been available since November 2014 and has been tested by many clients. We support the import of MISMO files or if your system is not capable, we can also utilize templates and profiles in order to minimize data entry and help you comply with the new rules. If you need assistance with getting started please email support@ppdocs.com and we will be happy to get you started.
Will PPDocs be able to interface with my system?
If your LOS is not listed above, as long as they can export a MISMO 2.6 or 3.3.x file we will be able to import the loan information into our system. Also, please send an email to your LOS partner requesting PPDocs to be added as a vendor and CC support@ppdocs.com.
I have uploaded data from my LOS but it does not appear to be populating in PPDocs correctly. What can I do?
We are aware of some discrepancies. A number of Loan Origination System (LOS) did not release their final specs until just a few days before TRID implementation date. We are seeing the data for the first time and we haven’t had sufficient testing. We will continuously make adjustments to the interface and improve it overtime. We constantly revisit our import routines to make them better. Please email support@ppdocs.com with screenshots of items that are not populating correctly.


text:
appeal dismissed, No. 12-30447 (5th Cir. July 3, 2012); see also, e.g., Caillet v. Regions Fin.
Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, Case 5:13-cv-02517-SMH-KLH, USDC W.D. La.
which are regulated by other authorities as to unfair or deceptive trade practices." First Financial Bank, FSB v.
Butler, 492 So.2d 503, 506 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1986).
such, Wells Fargo is exempt from application of the LUTPA under the explicit text of La. Rev.
exempt from application of the LUTPA.") (citing Fitch v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 709 F. Supp.
here, requiring that Plaintiffs' claims against Wells Fargo under the LUTPA be dismissed."
As argued by Wells Fargo Bank in its motion to dismiss.
Fargo Bank, N.A., 709 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (E.D. La. 2010); Hayes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Civ. No.
WL 1736821 at *3 (W.D. La. April 11, 2008) (holing plaintiff failed to state a claim against Chase Bank USA, N.A.
under the LUTPA, inasmuch as Chase is a federally regulated and insured financial institution); Bank One, N.A. v.
So. 2d 503, 506 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/1986) (noting that nationally chartered bank is exempt from LUTPA).
1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 2006); Laborer's Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir.
2002) (taking judicial notice of information on FDIC website); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir.
1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); Liu v. U.S., 93 Fed. Cl. 184, 191 n.7 (Fed. Cl. 2010).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 309 › McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.
McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.
Sales of merchandise for which orders were taken within the City of New York, subject to approval by the vendors in other States, and delivery of which, following such approval, was made to purchasers in that city, either by direct interstate shipment or by interstate shipment to the vendor's New York City agency and delivery by the agent to the purchaser after inspection, tests, and adjustments -- held constitutionally subject to the New York City sales tax, on the authority of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., ante, p. 309 U. S. 33. P. 309 U. S. 76.
279 N.Y. 678, 280 id. 688; 281 id. 608-669, reversed.
Certiorari, 307 U.S. 620, to review judgments setting aside tax levies. See also 254 App.Div. 246; 255 id. 961; 4 N.Y.S.2d 615; 8 N.Y.S.2d 667.
These are companion cases to McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., ante, p. 309 U. S. 33. As in that case, the question for decision is whether the New York City tax laid upon sales of goods for consumption as applied to respondents infringes the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Upon certiorari to review determinations by the Comptroller of the City of New York, that each of the respondents was subject to the tax, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court set the levy aside. Matter of Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 254 App.Div. 246, 4 N.Y.S.2d 615; Matter of A. H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 255 App.Div. 961, 8 N.Y.S.2d 667. The New York Court of Appeals, without opinion, affirmed the judgment in each case, 279 N.Y. 678, 18 N.E.2d 311; 281 N.Y. 608, 22 N.E.2d 172, but, by its amended remittitur, declared that the affirmance was upon the sole ground that the tax infringed the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The relevant provisions of the taxing act are set out in our opinion in the Berwind-White Company case, and need not be repeated here.
are made by the purchaser direct to the Illinois office. The course of business in soliciting and filling orders, so far as now material, is that of the same company, described in Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62.
Respondent, DuGrenier, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation with its factory and principal office in that state, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of automatic vending machines. They are sold throughout the United States by an exclusive sales agent, the respondent Stewart & McGuire, Inc., having an office in New York City. The sales in the city, when not of machines located at the New York office, are effected through solicitations of orders by the agent, which takes from the prospective purchaser a signed order or a contract for a conditional sale on partial payment, which is forwarded by the agent to the Massachusetts office. If accepted there, the order is filled by shipping the purchased machine by rail or truck direct to the purchaser in New York City, who pays the freight.
In both cases, the tax was imposed on all the sales of merchandise for which orders were taken within the city and possession of which was transferred to the purchased there. Decision in both is controlled by our decision in the Berwind-White Company case. For reasons stated at length in the opinion in that case, the tax so laid does not infringe the commerce clause. The judgments will be reversed, and the causes remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS dissent from the judgments in these cases upon the grounds stated in the dissenting opinion in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., ante, p. 309 U. S. 33.
* Together with No. 474, McGoldrick, Comptroller of the City of New York v. A. H. DuGrenier, Inc., et al., also on writ of certiorari, 308 U.S. 545, to the Supreme Court of New York.