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The Complainant is Pfizer Inc., a corporation of the State of Delaware, United States of America, having a principal place of business at 235 East 42nd Street, New York, New York, United States of America.
The Respondent is RE THIS DOMAIN FOR SALE - EMAIL located in Darien, Connecticut, United States of America.
The contested Domain Name is <phiser.com>.
The Registrar is eNom, Inc., ("eNom") located at 16771 NE 80th Street, Suite 100, Redmond, Washington, United States of America.
The Complaint was brought pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Policy"), which was adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on August 26, 1999 and approved on October 24, 1999 and in accordance with the ICANN Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Rules") as approved on October 24, 1999 and by the World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in effect as of December 1, 1999 ("the Supplemental Rules").
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center ("the Center") in e-mail form on April 30, 2002, and in hard-copy form on May 3, 2002 with Annexes 1-20 and the appropriate payment.
The Complainant's attorney stated that on April 30, 2002, he served a copy of the Complaint itself together with a copy of the cover sheet, on the Respondent and registrar by first class mail, and on the registrar, presumably without the annexes, by e-mail.
After receiving the original Complaint, the Center, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Supplemental Rules, determined whether the Complaint fully complied with the formal requirements of the Rules and the Supplemental Rules. In that regard, on May 3, 2002, the Center requested confirmation from the Registrar of information set forth in the Complaint relative to the contested domain name; specifically, contact and registrant information for that domain name, as well as whether the Registrar received a copy of the Complaint from the Complainant. The Center also requested the Registrar to specify: (a) whether the ICANN Policy applies to the contested domain name, (b) the current status of that domain name, and (c) whether the registrant has submitted, in its registration agreement, to the jurisdiction at the location of the principal office of the registrar for court adjudication of disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name.
Subsequently, on May 3, 2002 and supplemented by a communication dated May 14, 2002, the Registrar provided its Response to the Center through which the Registrar provided contact information pertinent to the contested domain name from its WHOIS database, confirmed that eNom, Inc. is the registrar of the domain name, stated that the language of the registration agreement is English, and stated that the domain name was then in an "lock" status. The Registrar also informed the Center that the Respondent, through its registration agreement, submitted to the jurisdiction at the location of the principal office of the registrar for court adjudication of disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name.
On May 15, 2002, the Center notified the Respondent of the filing of the Complaint, including an indication that the Center was forwarding a complete copy of the Complaint, both in e-mail and hard-copy form, to the Respondent (with the latter method forwarding a copy of all the annexes as well). The Complaint, and its accompanying documents, and all subsequent communications associated therewith were provided in the preferred manners and to the addresses as mandated by paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) and 4(a) of the Rules.
Hence, the notification to the Respondent having occurred on May 15, 2002, under paragraph 4(c) of the ICANN Policy, this administrative proceeding is deemed to have commenced on that date.
The Respondent was then provided with a 20 calendar day period, expiring on June 4, 2002 to file its Response with the Center and serve a copy of the Response on the Complainant.
As of June 4, 2002, the Center had not received a substantive Response to the Complaint from the Respondent; hence, the Center, in an email letter dated June 11, 2002, notified the Complainant and Respondent of the default of the Respondent.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Rules and Supplemental Rules, by e-mail letter dated June 19, 2002, the Center contacted the undersigned, Mr. Peter L. Michaelson, Esq., requesting his service as a sole panelist for this dispute. Subsequently, on June 19, 2002, Mr. Michaelson accepted and returned, by facsimile to the Center, a fully executed Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence. The Center, through an e-mail letter dated June 20, 2002, notified the parties of the appointment of Mr. Michaelson as sole panelist.
Based on the deadline set forth in paragraph 15 of the Rules, a decision was to be issued by the Panel to the Center on or before July 4, 2002.
This dispute concerns one domain name, specifically: <phiser.com>.
A copy of the WHOIS registration record for the contested domain name appears in Annex 1 to the Complaint. As indicated on this record, the Respondent registered this domain name with eNom on February 21, 2002.
This mark was registered for use in connection with: "pharmaceutical preparations for human and veterinary use - namely, animal feed supplements, antibiotics, derivatives thereof and vitamins either alone or in combination" in international class 5. This mark claims first use and first use in inter-state commerce of November 30, 1951.
This mark was registered for use in connection with various chemical compounds in international classes 1 and 5. This mark claims first use and first use in inter-state commerce of December 31, 1932.
The Complainant is among the largest pharmaceutical enterprises in the world with global operations in more than 150 countries. Specifically, the Complainant discovers, develops, manufactures and markets leading prescription medicines for humans and animals, as well as many of the world�s best-known consumer products. In that regard, the Complainant has expended substantial sums and extensive resources on the research, development and marketing of human pharmaceuticals and animal health products and maintains the world�s largest privately funded biomedical research organization. In calendar year 2000, the Complainant reported revenues of US $ 29.6 billion, with eight of its pharmaceutical products attaining sales of at least US $1 billion each.
The "Pfizer" Marks, and particularly the mark "PFIZER", are universally recognized and relied upon as identifying the Complainant as the sole source of its pharmaceuticals, consumer health care products and animal health products, and as distinguishing the Complainant from other companies and the Complainant's products from the goods and services of others. The mark "PFIZER" symbolizes substantial goodwill to the Complainant and is an extremely valuable commercial asset of the Complainant both in the United States and around the world.
The Respondent does not offer goods or services at a web site to which the contested domain name resolves. Rather, as of April 30, 2002, the Respondent uses that name solely as a link address to re-direct web traffic to the Respondent�s travel web site at <sunfinder.com>. In that regard, the Complainant has provided a print-out of key pages of the <sunfinder.com> web site in Annex 10 to the Complaint.
The Complainant contends that the contested domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's mark "PFIZER".
(v) is so clearly similar to the Complainant�s mark "PFIZER" and its tradename that the contested domain name is likely to cause confusion among the Complainant�s customers.
First, the Complainant states that its adoption and use of its mark "PFIZER" precedes the February 2002 date on which the Respondent registered the contested domain name. The Complainant takes the position that "[i]t is inconceivable that the Respondent did not have knowledge of the Complainant�s famous PFIZER mark prior to the registration of the disputed domain name."
Second, the Complainant states that the Respondent is not and never has been a representative of the Complainant or licensed to use the mark "PFIZER". Furthermore, the Complainant contends that, upon its information and belief, the Respondent is not commonly known by the name "Phiser."
Third, as to the Respondent�s use of the contested domain name for user re-direction, the Complainant contends that there is no connection between the term "phiser" and the Respondent�s <sunfinder.com> web site. Furthermore, the Complainant contends that the Respondent�s use of the term "phiser" to redirect traffic to <sunfinder.com> site likely occurs for a fee.
Fourth, the Complainant contends that the Respondent intentionally chose the term "Phiser" because it is confusingly similar to the mark "PFIZER", and as such cannot constitute a bona fide offering of services. In that regard, the Complainant contends that the Respondent�s use of the contested domain name intentionally and misleadingly redirects or diverts Internet users away from the Complainant�s web site in order to generate commercial gain for the Respondent and does not constitute a legitimate use.
Fifth, although the Respondent currently uses the contested domain name <phiser.com> solely as a link address to the <sunfinder.com> site, the Complainant contends that the Respondent registered the domain name with the intent of offering it for sale. Specifically, the inclusion of the phrase "THIS DOMAIN FOR SALE - EMAIL" in the registrant information and other contact fields of the Respondent�s WHOIS record conveys the Respondent�s intention, from the date of registration, to sell rather than make any legitimate use of the disputed domain name.
Sixth, the Complainant contends that the Respondent has purposefully selected the term "phiser," which contains a common typographical error relative to the Complainant�s mark "PFIZER", in order to divert consumers, who are attempting to locate the Complainant�s site, to the web site of its affiliate <sunfinder.com>. The term "Phiser" also has the same pronunciation as the Complainant�s mark "PFIZER". Given this, the Complainant contends that the Respondent intends to profit from such ensuing confusion and, as a result, the Complainant has been and will continue to be deprived of visits by Internet users.
Lastly, the Complainant believes that the Respondent has registered the contested domain name explicitly for the purpose of making illegitimate or unfair use of the Complainant�s mark "PFIZER". In that regard, the Complainant notes that there is no evidence of record that the Respondent is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name without intent for commercial gain. Given this, the Respondent is instead misleading and diverting the Complainant�s customers to the <sunfinder.com> web site, thereby creating a false impression that <phiser.com> and/or <sunfinder.com> are in some way associated with, or sponsored by, the Complainant.
As to bad faith registration, the Complainant contends that the Respondent, in common with the public, is well aware of the vast and valuable goodwill and reputation represented and symbolized by the mark "PFIZER". Hence, the Complainant contends that "[i]t is therefore inconceivable that the Respondent was not aware that the PFIZER mark, as used by the Complainant, is recognized and relied upon by medical professionals and the public throughout the United States and the world as the sole means to identify and distinguish the Complainant and the Complainant's goods and services from the goods and services of others." Hence, the Complainant contends that the Respondent, "recognizing the value of the Internet to the Complainant in augmenting the Complainant�s ability to communicate with its customers and potential customers, registered the domain name <phiser.com> with the bad faith intent to profit from such registration, and blatantly used the term 'phiser' which looks and sounds virtually identical to the Complainant�s PFIZER trademark, to do so".
(viii) the Respondent�s inclusion of the phrase "THIS DOMAIN FOR SALE - EMAIL," together with the fact that the Respondent provided the Registrar with incomplete and false contact information, such as a non-working telephone number and no street address or post office box, indicates bad faith registration.
(viii) the Respondent provided incomplete registration information to the Registrar.
Because the Respondent provided incomplete registration information to the Registrar and included a direct offer to sell the domain name, the Complainant infers that the contested domain name was registered for the illegitimate purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the Complainant, or its competitor, for valuable consideration in excess of the domain name registrant�s out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name. In that regard, the Complainant notes that the Respondent did not provide a street address or post office box and the telephone number which was provided is a non-working number.
Moreover, the Complainant points to inclusion throughout the Respondent's WHOIS registration record of the phrase "THIS DOMAIN FOR SALE � EMAIL". The Complainant takes the position that such a phrase indicates that the Respondent intended to sell the domain name starting from the date of its registration; which is itself an illegitimate use. Currently, the domain name is being used to forward or redirect Internet consumers, who are likely looking for the Complainant�s web site, to the <sunfinder.com> site for a fee - which the Complainant also views as an illegitimate use. Given this, the Complainant infers that the Respondent has not made nor intends to make any preparatory steps to use the contested domain name in a legitimate commercial or fair use context.
In view of the Respondent's intent to sell the domain name, the Complainant contends that the Respondent's actions clearly evince that the Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith.
Additionally, by using the contested domain name <phiser.com>, the Complainant contends that the Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract for financial gain Internet users to the Respondent�s web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant�s mark "PFIZER" as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the Respondent�s site. In that regard, the Complainant contends that the Respondent�s actions are intentional, willful and in bad faith, and were committed with full knowledge of the ownership by the Complainant of the mark "PFIZER" and the Complainant's exclusive rights to use and license such mark.
Specifically, the Complainant contends that the Respondent�s use of the contested domain name which is confusingly similar to the mark "PFIZER" may prevent or hinder Internet users from accessing the Complainant's services on its own web site <pfizer.com> by confusing and/or frustrating prospective users. Once confused or frustrated, those users may stop searching for the Complainant's web site altogether. Once Internet users find themselves, not at the Complainant's site but, instead, at the <sunfinder.com> web site, those users may assume that the Complainant does not maintain a web site under its mark and may stop looking for such a site. Hence, the Complainant views that the Respondent's use of the contested domain name anticipates, relies on and profits from this consumer confusion or mistake.
Therefore, the Complainant concludes that the Respondent's conduct constitutes bad faith registration and use under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.
The Respondent has not filed any Response to the allegations raised in the Complaint.
In view of the lack of a Response filed by the Respondent as required under paragraph 5 of the Rules, this proceeding has proceeded by way of default. Hence, under paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules, the Panel is directed to decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of the Complainant's undisputed representations. In that regard and apart from judging this proceeding through mere default of the Respondent, the Panel makes the following specific findings.
The Panel finds that confusion would unquestionably arise - and in fact is so intended as a result of the Respondent's current use of the contested domain name. Further, the Panel can conceive of no situation where confusion would not likely arise when and if any third-party not affiliated with the Complainant, to which the Respondent were to transfer the contested domain name, were to use that name with a web site offering goods identical and/or similar to those provided by the Complainant under its name and mark "PFIZER".
Further, merely substituting "f" and "z" in the mark "PFIZER" with "h" and "s", respectively, to yield the contested domain name, that is phonetically equivalent to the mark, are changes that are so de minimus that the only purpose which the Panel envisions behind the Respondent having done so is to cause and opportunistically exploit inevitable user confusion. There can be no question that this is the Respondent's goal. Otherwise, why would the Respondent have chosen a domain name that, given its slight alterations, remains phonetically equivalent to the Complainant's mark "PFIZER"?
Such confusion would undoubtedly cause Internet users intending to access the Complainant's web site, but who reach the Respondent's travel web site through the contested domain name, to think that an affiliation of some sort exists between the Complainant and the Respondent, when, in fact, no such relationship would exist at all. See, e.g., Peter Frampton v. Frampton Enterprises, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0141 (April 17, 2002); MPL Communications, Limited and MPL Communications, Inc. v. LOVEARTH.net, FA 97086 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 4, 2001); MPL Communications, Limited et al v. 1WebAddress.com, FA 97092, (Nat. Arb. Forum June 4, 2001); American Home Products Corp. v. Malgioglio, WIPO Case No. D2000-1602 (February 19, 2001); Surface Protection Indus., Inc. v. The Webposters, WIPO Case No. D2000-1613 (February 5, 2001); Dollar Financial Group, Inc. v. VQM NET, FA 96101 (Nat. Arb. Forum January 25, 2001); eBAY Inc. v. G L Liadis Computing, Ltd, WIPO Case No. D2000-1463 (January 10, 2001); Treeforms, Inc. v. Cayne Indus. Sales Corp., FA 95856 (Nat. Arb. Forum December 18, 2000); and The Pep Boys Manny, Moe and Jack of California v. E-Commerce Today, Ltd., AF-0145 (eResolution May 3, 2000).
In view of the Complainant's substantial and widespread use over the past 70 years of its mark "PFIZER" in connection with its various products, that mark has clearly become so distinctive, acquired such secondary meaning and hence fame to the point where a significant proportion of the world's population is likely to recognize that mark as signifying a specific, unique, and widely recognized source of pharmaceutical and chemical compounds. It is utterly inconceivable that, given this recognition, the Respondent was completely unaware of it when it registered the contested domain name.
Therefore, the Panel finds that the contested domain name <phiser.com> sufficiently resembles the Complainant's mark "PFIZER" as to cause confusion; hence, the Complainant has shown sufficient similarity between its mark and the contested domain name under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
Certainly given its federal (let alone overseas) trademark registrations, the Complainant has acquired exclusive rights to use its "Pfizer" Marks in conjunction with the goods which the Complainant has been providing under the mark "PFIZER" for more than seven decades. Furthermore, by virtue of having registered the mark "PFIZER", the US PTO has long ago recognized that this mark has acquired requisite secondary meaning in the marketplace.
The simple reason is that the contested domain name is phonetically equivalent with nearly identical spelling to the Complainant's mark "PFIZER" under which the Complainant provides its goods and has been doing so for approximately 70 years. Furthermore, the Complainant has never authorized the Respondent to utilize the mark "PFIZER", or a mark confusingly similar thereto, in conjunction with the specific goods which the Complainant provides under that mark, nor does the Complainant have any relationship or association whatsoever with the Respondent.
Hence, any use to which the Respondent were to put the mark "PFIZER" or a mark confusingly similar thereto, in connection with the goods presently provided by the Complainant as well as those set forth in any of the Complainant's registrations would directly violate the exclusive trademark rights now residing in the Complainant. See, e.g., the MPL Communications, FA 97086 and FA 97092 decisions, cited supra; America Online, Inc. v. Xianfeng Fu, WIPO Case No. D2000-1374 (December 11, 2000), and Treeforms, Inc. v. Cayne Ind. Sales Corp., cited supra.
It is eminently clear to this Panel that the Respondent, in choosing a domain name that at its essence is phonetically identical and hence confusingly similar to the Complainant's mark "PFIZER", is intentionally seeking to opportunistically exploit user confusion by diverting, through re-direction and diversion, Internet users away from the Complainant's site to the Respondent's web site for the latter's own pecuniary benefit, i.e., increased traffic to its travel web site and correspondingly increased sales therethrough. The Respondent is doing so by simply relying on expected user misspelling of the Complaint's mark "PFIZER" to directly capitalize on the reputation and fame of that mark to the Complainant's ultimate detriment and the Respondent's financial gain.
Such parasitic use, which at its essence relies on instigating and exacerbating user confusion, can not and does not constitute bona fide commercial or fair use sufficient to legitimize any rights and interests the Respondent might have in the contested domain name. See Peter Frampton v. Frampton Enterprises, Inc., cited supra.
Thus, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the contested domain name within paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.
It is inconceivable to this Panel that, when the Respondent chose and registered the contested domain name in 2002, it had not been fully aware of the Complainant's mark "PFIZER" and particularly the widespread reputation which that mark had attained as a result of the Complainant's long-term and on-going marketing and other efforts in the pharmaceutical field now stretching some 70 years.
There can be no question that the Respondent, having absolutely no association, relationship or affiliation whatsoever with the Complainant, nevertheless chose a phonetically equivalent and commonly misspelled variant of the mark (the latter conduct generally being referred to as "typosquatting") as the contested domain name with a clear intent of creating a likelihood of user confusion by suggesting to Internet users that such an association, relationship or affiliation exists which in fact it clearly does not, and by doing so create opportunities, to commercially benefit itself, that would invariably arise out of that confusion. Current web site naming conventions are such that Internet users now expect to reach a desired third-party site by entering, as a web address for that site, a mark owned by or associated with the third-party. Hence, it is highly foreseeable for such a user, who does not know the exact spelling of the Complainant's mark "PFIZER" to inadvertently misspell it as "PHISER" and through doing so enter the contested domain name rather than that, <pfizer.com>, associated with the Complainant's web site. Having done so, the user is then re-directed and diverted to the Respondent's web site that has absolutely nothing to do with the Complainant.
Such users amount to additional traffic that the Respondent would not otherwise obtain which, in all likelihood, results in a measure of additional revenue to the Respondent through transactions which some of those users might engage in as a result of having been diverted to that site. If the Respondent did not intend to reap financial gain of some sort through registering the contested domain name knowing it was engaging in typosquatting, then what other reason could the Respondent have realistically had in doing so? The Panel infers, by the lack of a Response, that no such reason exists.
The Panel finds such opportunistic registration of the contested domain name, which is a phonetic equivalent of the Complainant's mark, as indicative of bad faith registration and the subsequent use of that domain name, as an agent for re-direction and diversion, by the Respondent in an effort to benefit itself as bad faith use, both collectively actionable under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy. See, e.g., Peter Frampton v. Frampton Enterprises, Inc., cited supra; and Novus Credit Services Inc. v. Personal, WIPO Case No. D2000-1158 (November 29, 2000).
Furthermore, the Panel's finding of bad faith use and registration is buttressed by the fact that the Respondent not only provided the registrar with incorrect contact information but also, and blatantly revealing, explicitly specified, as part of its contact name: "THIS DOMAIN NAME IS FOR SALE-E-MAIL". To any WHOIS user that examines the corresponding registration record, such an entry leaves an unequivocal impression: the Respondent clearly intends to sell the contested domain name and is now actively soliciting offers for its sale -- offers that would clearly exceed the Respondent's cost of registration. It utterly defies belief to think that the Respondent would go to the effort of forming the contested domain name as a phonetic equivalent of the Complainant's mark "PFIZER" and then registering that name if all the Respondent sought to obtain was reimbursement of its direct costs of registration. Clearly, the Respondent, by effectively broadcasting its intent through encapsulating its solicitation message directly within the WHOIS entry for the contested domain name for all WHOIS readers to see, eagerly sought to obtain as much revenue as it possibly could from selling that name.
In the Panel's mind, the Respondent's intentional act of entering such erroneous contact information constitutes bad faith registration. Moreover, the Respondent's intentional act in maintaining this information in the WHOIS entry and, by doing so, perpetuating, through the entry, the continual broadcast of this information to the Internet user community constitutes bad faith use.
Without question, this conduct directly contravenes paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
The contested domain name, specifically <phiser.com>, is ordered transferred to the Complainant.

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THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse and Remand to Agency for Rehearing, with Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 21) filed on February 5, 2018. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(b), the parties have consented to me serving as the presiding judge and entering final judgment. See Docs. 4, 7, 12. Having considered the record, submissions of counsel, and relevant law, the Court finds Plaintiff's motion is well-taken and will be granted.
On September 24, 2013, Ms. Sandra Pluma (Plaintiff) filed applications with the Social Security Administration for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act (SSA), and for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the SSA. Administrative Record (AR) at 193-202. Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of January 1, 2008. AR at 193, 197. Disability Determination Services (DDS) determined that Plaintiff was not disabled both initially (AR at 52-80) and on reconsideration (AR at 81-108). Plaintiff requested a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the merits of her applications. AR at 138-39.
Both Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified during the de novo hearing. See AR at 26-51. ALJ Henry Koltys issued an unfavorable decision on July 1, 2016. AR at 15-25. Plaintiff submitted a Request for Review of Hearing Decision/Order to the Appeals Council (AR at 191-92), which the council denied on July 17, 2017 (AR at 1-5). Consequently, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003).
A claimant seeking disability benefits must establish that she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The Commissioner must use a sequential evaluation process to determine eligibility for benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
The claimant has the burden at the first four steps of the process to show: (1) she is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) she has a “severe medically determinable . . . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments” that has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year; and (3) her impairment(s) meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404; or (4) pursuant to the assessment of the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), she is unable to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-iv), 416.920(a)(4)(i-iv); see also Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “RFC is a multidimensional description of the work-related abilities [a claimant] retain[s] in spite of her medical impairments.” Ryan v. Colvin, Civ. 15-0740 KBM, 2016 WL 8230660, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)). If the claimant meets “the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability[, ] . . . the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that” Plaintiff retains sufficient RFC “to perform work in the national economy, given [her] age, education, and work experience.” Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261 (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
At Step One of the process,  ALJ Koltys found that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2008, the alleged onset date.” AR at 13 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-1576, 416.971-976). At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis and allied disorders; depression; learning disorder; and drug and alcohol dependence.” AR at 14 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)).
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . except that [she] can only occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally reach overhead with her right upper extremities, push/pull with foot controls using her right lower extremity, and push/pull with hand controls using her right upper extremity. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, hazards such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights, and pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, gases, and poor ventilation. She is further limited to simple, repetitive tasks.
AR at 17. ALJ Koltys found that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work.” AR at 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565, 416.965). Instead, Plaintiff “would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as machine operator . . ., assembler . . ., and clerk.” AR at 21 (citations omitted). The ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiff is not disabled. AR at 21.
The Court must “review the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)). A deficiency in either area is grounds for remand. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotation omitted)). “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quoting Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original)). The Court will “consider whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, but [it] will not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for the Commissioner's.” Id. (quoting Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotation marks and quotations omitted)).


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Four years after being expelled from Western Europe, two years after landing in North Africa and while the fighting rages in Italy and especially on the Eastern Front, the Allies land in Normandy on June 6th, 1944.
Everyone knows that the Campaign will be crucial and that its outcome may occur quite fast. Marshal Rommel, who wanted the German troops deployed closer to the shores, has not been successful. Unlike most of his colleagues of the German High Command, he was able to measure the effects of the Allies’ air superiority when he fought in North Africa. In his opinion, deploying reinforcements too far from the coast is pointless: should the weather be too lenient, the sky will be full of Allied planes and the German army will be paralyzed.
That’s what happens. And the German Troops must do everything they can, improvising and trying to stop the Allies’ steamroller. They actually do so by relying on Caen, taking advantage of the terrain including the bocage that slows down the Allied progression and striking when they can with their powerful Panzer Divisions. The Axis’ formations are more flexible than the Allies’ and the German Heavy Tanks Battalions are quite daunting, but it has far less supply than the opponent. Therefore, they must strike hard, and never hesitate to retreat to better regroup – despite the Führer’s hysterical exhortations not to give an inch!
If, in June 1944, Great-Britain is in a much better state than in 1940, when it was standing alone against Germany being sole master on the European continent, four years of war have exhausted both its financial and human resources. On June 6 1944, the British deploy their last resources, which are almost non-existent. Still, their troops are highly experienced, their material is good and they can pull resources from the Commonwealth countries, including Canada. Excellent in defense, the British infantry is not as good in offensive strikes but the British armor’s quality is good, including the Sherman Firefly with the 17-pounder, which can pierce the armor of the biggest German Tanks.
The great American war machine is turned on in late 1941, after the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor. In 1944, it is in full swing and produces every month thousands of tanks and aircrafts. More than five million American soldiers are at boot camp in the United States. General Eisenhower is missing of neither material nor men, but the fighting in North Africa and Italy showed that the US military was inexperienced. In June 1944, it has learnt from its mistakes and can start making a par with the German Army.
Many nationalities have been pulled in the Normandy turmoil, either in the German Army or the Allied Armies.
Canadian Troops landed on Juno Beach June 6, 1944 and immediately distinguished by their courage in this difficult landing and then in the Battle of Caen facing powerful German Armored Divisions.
General Leclerc’s Free French are mostly grouped in the Second Armored Division, which is attached to the Third US Army under the command of General Patton. They are not involved in landing and arrive in France on 1 August. The 2nd Armored Division participated in the famous Cobra operation that allows US troops to break through the German front in the grove. The Free French then distinguish themselves by their strength through the release of Paris.
The 1st Polish Division arrives in Normandy late July 1944. It is attached to the 2nd Canadian Corps. This Division’s glory lies in its decisive role during the fighting at the Falaise Pocket where it managed to junction with US troops from the South and to hold several days Mount Ormel against determined German Troops.
Normandy 1944 is a historical strategy game that simulates the entire Battle of Normandy from 6 June to 25 August 1944, at an operative scale.
For this battle, the key design figures are shown in the following table.
Officer in the French Army, having served in the Foreign Legion and the Cavalry, Commander Peretti has designed this game based on both his passion for wargames and his knowledge of history as well as his military experience. In addition to being a wargamer since the age of 16 and holding a History Masters from the Sorbonne, he has been an Officer for 18 years. What he wanted to achieve in Normandy 1944 was the best balance between playability and historical realism. Based on the fundamental laws of war, such as freedom of action, economy of means and concentration of effort, Normandy 1944 should meet both novices and old veterans’ expectations.
Mechanized: infantry units transported in semi-tracked armored vehicles.
Combat Ratio: this ratio compares the attack value of attacking units to the defense value of defending units. The initial fraction is then rounded to the nearest to allow maximum simplification (1 in the numerator or the denominator).
Each unit holds a specific quality (in descending order): Elite, Veteran, Experienced or Conscript.
The quality of a unit determines its ability to absorb fatigue. And a better quality unit will exceed its fatigue threshold later.
Each unit has Life Points (LP), representing its capacity at resisting to damage. A decrease in LF represents a loss of human resources or equipment.
When the LP decrease, the State of the unit also decreases.
When a unit has lost all its LP, it is destroyed.
See units’ LP in §10.1.
When a unit moves, fights or is bombed, it accumulates fatigue. Fatigue symbolizes both physical and moral strain. That is why this concept is sometimes used in battles of only a few hours.
At the end of each turn, part of the fatigue is cleared out. In addition, a unit that is not activated during a turn sees its fatigue decrease by an extra factor.
Depending on the quality of the unit, fatigue is more or less bearable. But beyond a certain level of fatigue, a status level is lost.
The status of a unit is its ability to conduct combat. It comprehends both its life points and fatigue.
The status has 4 levels. The higher the level, the higher its attack and defense capacities will be.
These are the values used to calculate the combat ratio between attacking units and defenders.
They depend on the unit’s quality and status.
See attack and defense capacities in §10.1.
Each unit has movement points (MP).
Depending on terrain, the distance that a unit can travel changes: it is faster to move on a road than in rough terrain.
Units usually can use a strategic move that allows them to travel twice the distance. Following such a move, they cannot fight.
The weather can influence on a unit’s movement capacity (see §4.2.3).
See movement capacity in §10.2.
In Normandy 1944, units are either fully supplied or OOS (there is no intermediate level).
A detailed order of battle is presented in §10. Almost all units presented in this order of battle are available for players in the full battle. Some units, including Kampfgruppen, are used only for specific historical scenarios.
In Normandy 1944, the destroyed units cannot recover and are taken out of the game, with the exception of air units. The latter recover two turns after their initial destruction.
In Advanced and Battle scenarios, don’t forget to replenish your units regularly, either by removing them from the front on the Allied side or by allocating replenishment points on the German side, in order to avoid losing your units too quickly!
The weather has a great influence on the conduct of operations. In general, the scenarios are based on historical weather, but in some scenarios, the weather can be determined randomly.
The weather impacts air units. Overall, during sunny weather all air units can fly, and during storm all are grounded. Regarding overcast or rainy weather, air unit’s capacity varies. See the table details about air units in §10.3.
In case of storm, Allied and Axis Armored units and Mechanized units of the Axis have their movement capacity reduced.
In case of sunny or overcast weather, German units have their movement capacity reduced to avoid Allied air strikes.
The table below shows units movement capacity as % of their normal capacity.
The second player plays: first they may view the actions of the previous player (or of the AI in case of solo game) and then take their turn. When done, the turn is finished.
For each scenario, activation points are given to each player. These points represent the player’s ability to command: the more points, the higher the player will be able to use their units.
Each action performed on a unit (movement, combat or replenishment) requires an activation point. However, once activated, all other operations on the unit are possible without spending extra points.
Activation points are automatically spent when an action is performed on a unit. However, if the number of activation point is insufficient, the desired action on the unit will be impossible.
Beware of stacked units: If you select a stack comprising two units and one activation point is available, no action will be possible. You will need to ‘unfold’ the stack and select a unit to be able to take action.
The number of points is the same at the beginning of each turn for a given camp.
In case of multi impulses scenarios, the amount of activation points is the same at the beginning of each impulse.
The defending player does not spend activation points.
In general, in simple scenarios, the number of activation points does not affect your ability to move all your units. Conversely, in complex scenarios, the number of activation points is limited.
In Normandy 1944, enemy units are visible only if they are within the player’s units’ line of sight.
Each unit has a capacity to detect enemy units. The ‘View Distance’, namely the number of hexes on which a unit can ‘see’ their enemies, is specified in §10.1.2.
Unit located within one third of the view distance (i.e. up to 2 hexes if the view distance is 6, and in clear weather) → unit identified, i.e. all its characterisitcs are visible.
Unit located between one third and two third of the view distance → unit recognized, i.e. you know the type of unit but do not know its defense capacity nor its detailed characteristics.
Unit located further than two third of the view distance → detected unit. An enemy unit we know exists and is represented by a “?”, and which type is unknown.
A unit cannot enter a hex occupied by an enemy unit.
A unit can move into or through a hex containing other friendly units. However, if such a hex reached the stacking limit, it cannot be crossed.
When selecting a unit all available moves are displayed. When choosing a particular destination hex, the fastest way to do that is automatically calculated (i.e. the least number of traveling points).
A player can move their units individually or in stack. The units moved in stack must begin their movement in the same hex. When moving a stack, it is the unit for which the movement is the most expensive, hex-wise, which is taken into account for the calculation of movement points.
Movement is affected by terrain. The number of points spent to enter a hex depends on its type of terrain and the land between two hexes. The different costs depending on terrain are shown in Table Terrain Effects, see section 10.2.
A unit following a road may use the reduced cost of road movement.
Where a road crosses a river, it is assumed there is a bridge.
When a road enters a town hex, it is assumed that the units use the cost of road movement.
Movement points cannot be set aside from one turn to another. They cannot be transferred from one unit to another.
Strategic movement is faster than normal movement. However, following a strategic move, a unit cannot attack. Strategic movement of a unit is visible because the arrival hexagons are surrounded by dotted lines.
Any unit can perform a strategic move if able to perform this type of movement (see in §10.2), and if the weather allows it.
The weather can slow the movement, particularly in case of storm, and the weather especially affects the presence of Allied aircraft in the sky.
In Normandy 1944, on clear days, the Axis units move slower because they must avoid crossing the path of Allied aircraft on patrol.
The cost for crossing a stream (river or stream) is canceled by the presence of a bridge drawn on the map (crossed by a road / rail).
A thin green line shows the hexes you control. Controlling hexes is important because the supply can only be brought to these hexes. Moreover, if an enemy comes into hexes you control, it is immediately spotted even if you have no nearby units.
Land combat between adjoining units.
Bombing from afar performed by the artillery, ships or heavy bombers.
During this phase, friendly units can fight enemy units, which are adjacent to them.
In Normandy 1944, a player is never compelled to attack.
Units can make only one attack per turn.
The fights are executed in the order chosen by the attacking player.
Only one enemy hex can be attacked at a time. It is always the entire enemy stack which is attacked.
Enemy units are forced to defend themselves if attacked: they cannot retreat voluntarily.
The enemy units adjacent to the attacked unit cannot take part in the fighting, except with respect to air defense.
All units of the attacking stack and all friendly ground units that are adjacent to the enemy unit and are available to fight are automatically selected. However, you may decide to unselect or not to fight.
The units available to support the ground attack (land or naval artillery, aircrafts) are also presented but are not automatically selected. You can select up to 3 support units in each fight.
Units stacked in the same hex may attack different adjacent hexes in 2 different combat phases.
A hex can only be attacked once per turn, but can be bombed several times.
During step 2, the combat ratio is calculated comparing the total attack value of attacking units with the total defense value of defending units.
To determine the combat ratio, total attack value is divided by total defense value. This result establishes a balance of power, in the form of a fraction (4:1, 2:1…).
The initial fraction is then rounded to the nearest to allow maximum simplification (1 in the numerator or the denominator).
The resulting ratio is then the subject of many modifiers detailed below.
Each combat result depends on combat ratio (after modifiers) and a dice roll (after modifiers).
Based on this power struggle and dice roll (2D6), combat is resolved using the Combat Table. The results of this table are expressed in terms of loss of life points (LP).
In the table above, the red figures mean that the defender retreats one hex in addition to the loss of life points.
Example: the attacker has a combat ratio of 6 against 1 and rolls a 5 with a dice modifier + 2 = 7 for dice. The attacker loses 1 LP, the defender 13 LP and the defender retreats one hex.
The LP losses are distributed alternately on the most powerful units and by chance.
In the most advantageous cases for the attacker, defending units must retreat after a fight.
Retreat is performed in the opposite direction to that of the main attacker, unless this hex is fully stacked or occupied by the enemy.
Retreat takes stacking into account: if 3 stacked units must retreat on a hex where 2 units are already stacked, only one unit can retreat in that direction and the other two will have to take a different path. Thus, the retreating units can take different escape routes.
If the unit must retreat into an enemy ZoC, it loses additional LP.
If a unit cannot retreat because it is surrounded or is no longer able to retreat, as friendly stacks are full, it surrenders.
After the opponent’s retreat, some or all the units of the attacking stack can decide to advance after combat on the vacated hex.
All modifiers are cumulative without limitation.
When all units of the same division are involved in a single combat, the attacker (or defender) receives a +1 bonus ratio.
When tanks and infantry units are stacked, the attacker (or defender) receives a +1 bonus ratio.
The type of terrain influences combat for the defender (but roads have no influence on combat).
C1 means a shift of one column in Combat Table impacting the combat ratio. In other words, a defender located in marshes benefits from a + 2 modifying the combat ratio (or C2), i.e. if the initial ratio was 5 against 1 in favor of the attacker, it will ultimately be 3 against 1, to reflect the difficulty of launching an attack in a flooded area.
For example, if 15 points are supporting a ground attack, the attacker will benefit from a L3 bonus representing +3 at dice roll.
Regarding air support, attacking aircrafts may be forced to give up the fight, or can be destroyed by enemy anti-aircraft units and therefore the dice bonus originally planned can be changed depending on the progress of the air attack.
Defenders cannot benefit from any support.
If the German player attacks with a Tiger unit, he benefits from +1 combat modifier to his advantage regardless of the weather, terrain or the enemy.
The area of Cherbourg being fortified, the Allies player attacking in this area suffers from -1 modifier. Besides Cherbourg being a major city, the modifier for attacking Cherbourg is C3 or -3.
For example, if the attacker realizes a bombing with 15 points and rolls 7, the defending stack will lose 4 LP.
In Normandy 1944, land or naval units attacking through bombardment cannot lose LP. However, heavy bombers may lose LP. Moreover, as for the fighters-bombers, the mission of heavy bombers may be canceled if the Anti-aircraft (AA) is efficient.
Bombardment points are fully effective on identified units, but if the units are simply recognized the points will be reduced by 25% and if the units are only detected by 50%.
The Axis units have anti-aircraft capacity, which has a specific scope. These characteristics are specified in the table in § 10.1.
A unit with a 0 AA scope can use AA capacity for its own hex.
A unit with a 1 AA scope can also protect adjacent hexes.
The use of AA capacity in Normandy in 1944 is the only case where friendly units can bring help to the units in defense.
Units cannot enter hexes containing enemy units.
A hex can contain up to 3 units.
However, some units can freely stack (above the 3 units limit): Commanders (Allied and Axis) and the German units which size is smaller than a battalion.
When a hex is full, it cannot be crossed by other units and must therefore be circumvented.
The six hexes adjacent to a unit on the map are called Zone of Control or ZoC.
The ZoC extends across all hexes except through the sea.
The scope of the ZoC is 1 hex.
All units have ZoC except commanders and OOS units.
A unit that enters an enemy ZoC immediately stops moving regardless of the number of movement points left. Besides, when a unit moves within the enemy ZoC, it can only move one hex.
When retreating in a hex controlled by the enemy, the units lose some LP.
A supply line cannot pass through a ZoC unless the hex through which passes the line is occupied by a friendly unit (see § 8.5).
Reinforcements can arrive at any time in each scenario. In Normandy 1944, the reinforcements frequency is high as the Allies landed new troops on the beaches all the time, and Axis reinforcements were coming to stop them.
In Normandy 1944, reinforcements’ arrival time and location are set up from the start in the game design, and therefore cannot be chosen by the player.
In some scenarios, the Allied units can recover automatically. This automatic replenishment is displayed in the journal.
Units must not be in contact with enemy units. Therefore, they must withdraw from the front to be replenished.
Units must have lost at least 25% of their LP.
If a unit had 8 LP and lost only 1 LP, it does not reach the 25% threshold and is not replenished.
Replenishment can increase LP up to 20% (of units’ maximum LP) per turn.
A unit of 8 LP maximum that lost 5 LP can be replenished up to 8*20% = 1,6 LP, rounded to the nearest = 2 LP.
Axis units can also be replenished in some scenarios. When replenishment is available for Axis units, it is also available for Allied units.
Axis units’ replenishment is done manually according to the amount of replenishment points available for each turn.
A unit cannot be replenished after attacking, remember to do it before!
Replenishment can be performed even in contact with the enemy, and all LP can be recovered. This rule aims to highlight the flexibility of the German Army famous ‘Kampfgruppen’.
Unused replenishment points are lost at the end of the turn.
In Normandy 1944, the concept of fatigue corresponds both to physical and moral strain. The units get tired when they fight or move, and recover a little each turn.
Energy is the opposite of fatigue: a 10% exhausted unit has 90% energy.
Unit not activated during a turn: 20% more energy.
A unit can only be supplied if it is linked to a warehouse through a supply line.
A Supply Line is a continuous path of hexes from a unit to a supply source or warehouse. This line cannot cross an enemy unit or a hex adjacent to an enemy unit unless a friendly unit occupies it.
The supply lines can only go through controlled areas.
Supply distances are not taken into account in Normandy 1944.
The consequence is that a unit OOS is no longer a threat to the attacking units… so long as it does not return to a supplied area!
The victory conditions are displayed in the briefing at the beginning of each scenario. This briefing is accessible when the journal is displayed at the end of each turn, and throughout the game if you tap the journal on the table.
One possibility to return to the journal is also to choose this option in the preference menu.
Also at the end of each scenario, a summary table displays the situation in terms of victory points.
The number “1” circled in red means that the goal is a primary objective.
The little curves around the circle mean that this objective (alone or in combination with others) provides an immediate victory when occupied.
Additional information is provided on these objectives (points to be earned per turn and at the end of the scenario, points already earned).
It is important to read the briefing in order to understand the objectives: scenarios may seem difficult when one does not take into account the objectives that yield the most points.
If at the end of the scenario, your victory points are significantly lower than those of the enemy, you will suffer a defeat. Otherwise, it will be a draw.
Marginal Victory is victory by a small gap. The enemy has been defeated but his troops can still fight.
Tactical Victory: the enemy is defeated and the situation at the end of the battle puts the winner in a good position for further operations.
Decisive Victory: you have reached your goals and put the enemy to flight.
For each scenario, the number of victory points to earn varies. The journal displays the number of additional points required for a higher level of victory.
In scenarios where earning points is mainly related to the occupation of objectives throughout the scenario, the player occupying them at the beginning may have the feeling he is winning. In Normandy 1944, as in reality, the course of the war often changes in a short period of time, and after a fierce resistance, enemy defense often tends to collapse, so do not be surprised if your opponent wins at the very end of the scenario.
Victory Points in the Battle scenarios have been set to get a draw. In other words, if you can save time compared to the Allies you will win the battle, but if you take too much time in getting the objectives, the Axis will win (and vice versa). Moreover, insofar as the victory points in the Battle scenarios are highly related to the occupation of objectives, it is logical that the German Troops are winning at the beginning.
Each unit type has its own characteristics that give them different capacities and modifiers.
Life points: Regiments and Brigade generally have 8 LP and the smaller units have 4.
Quality: the higher the quality, the more a unit will maintain its attack and defense capacity despite its fatigue and loss of LP.
Unit bonus: some units benefit from an attack and defense bonus. These are Commanders and Tiger Tanks. C1 means +1 on ratio and L1 means +1 on dice.
Attack points: maximum attack points of a unit. They vary depending on the status of the unit.
Range: units have 1 hex of range, expect for Artillery, which can bomb at 3 hexes.
Advance after combat: all units can advance after combat.
Bombardment capacity: Artillery and Ships have bombardment capacity.
Defense points: maximum defense points of a unit. They vary depending on the status of the unit.
AA defense points: Anti-Aircraft defense points. For Allies these points are theoretical because Axis doesn’t have aircrafts.
AA range: Anti-Aircraft range of units.
ZoC range: range of the Zone of Control of a unit. In Normandy 1944, all units have a range of 1 hexagon but some units (like commanders) don’t have any ZOC.
Probability of availability: Ships are not available every turn.
Replenishment capacity: most units can be replenished (auto or manual).
Line of sight: view distance of a unit. In Normandy 1944, that distance is also influenced by the terrain between the 2 units and by the terrain type of the observed unit.
Stacking weight: each unit is worth 1 stack point, except Commanders and German units of a size less than the battalion whose stacking weight is 0, so it is possible to add them in a stack in addition to 3 other units which gives a slight advantage to the German player if he knows how to use this rule.
Reconnaissance and ground attack squadrons: they bring support to land forces during combat. Attack aircrafts are more powerful, but reconnaissance aircrafts are available during bad weather most of the time.
Bomber squadrons: they can only bombard units. They are very effective, in particular when combined with artillery to reduce Axis forces before an attack.
Life points: number of life points of the unit. In Normandy 1944, only units with antiaircraft (AA) capacity can damage air units.
Defense capacity against AA attack.
Ground attack capacity: used in the support combat table.
Bombing capacity: used in the bombardment table.
Maintenance issue rate: each turn, an air unit can be unavailable because of a maintenance issue.
Number of turns between availabilities: heavy bomber units are not available each turn and have to wait three turns before becoming available again, if the weather allows it.
Number of turns between availabilities after unit destruction: when a unit does not have any life point left, it is destroyed and becomes unavailable for several turns.
Percentage of availability depending on weather: depending on weather, air units are available or not: bad weather reduces significantly the availability of Allied air units.
Note that as part of the campaign, there are 10 scenarios for Allies and 10 for Axis, but among those 10 scenarios, 2 are the same in each, so the campaign includes 18 different scenarios.
The scenarios of the campaign must be completed one by one. Their aim is to make the player discover events of the Battle of Normandy, and the last scenarios offer a real challenge.
The progress in the Axis campaign is distinct from that of the Allied campaign.
Most advanced scenarios are historical scenarios. They offer the player the challenge to replay the main events of the Campaign of Normandy. Some of these scenarios are excellent for a game in multiplayer.
In the historical battle, the victory conditions are set to reach a draw after 42 turns if the Allied troops follow exactly the historical progression (the player must be faster than in history).
On the Axis side, in this plausible scenario, will the player be able reject the Allies to the sea?


Ogham alphabet and was called pin or ifin (iphin), Auraic.
5611 , 5524 - 5 . iphin a fidh ina reimim .i. don fir, 4862 .
The paragraph refs. below are to Thurn. Gramm.
IE r̥ l̥ n̥: riuth, mlith, bind ( § 214 - §215 ).
O.Ir. ī in stressed syllables may represent (a) IE ī : lí (Lat.
20 līuor), rím (Lat. rītus) ; (b) IE ē : rí (Lat. rēx), lín (Lat.
plēnus) ( § 58 ).
berid, suidigthir, timthirecht ( § 103 ).
30lengthening of e : céitbuid ( § 54 ).
íui sometimes occur : ceníul, ceníuil, éiuin, féiuir ( § 55 ).
only when beginning a word in Wb.', Ped.-Lewis § 14 ).
35For its origin see Gramm. § 67.
-tíagat (cf. -tēgot Camb. 38b ), fíada (cf. fēdot (gs.) Camb.
37c ) ; (b) Lat. ē or oe: fíal `uēlum,' pían `poena' § 53 ).
nunciation and were often confused in orthography.
45(< H 3. 18, p. 654 ).
4d33 . í n-éutt, 6b2 . i nneurt, 6d11 . i ndegaid, 30b14 .
55freq. written hi or hí : hi noibad, Wb. 3b31 . hi rect, 3d14 .
libur, 16c10 . hi cairptib, 43d3 . hi far crichaib, 115b10 .
hi fers, Sg. 6b23 . hi roṡoithe, 73a11 . hí frecndairc, 204a5 .
60 hi rogénair, Thes. ii 291.11 ; but : í cach thír, Wb. 1a3 .
i corpu, 2b5 . í rúnaib, 2b10 . i tuil dée, 5c20 . (no exx.
6b1 . í titul, Pcr. 15a3 . i comus, Thes. ii 244.30 (Camb.).
43d3 . innar neurt, 43d3 . inn ecin, Tur. 134. In Wb. freq.
4b11 . inna chridiu, 10b20 . inna corp `in their body', 11d11 .
sendataid, 3977 . a ngaire, BNnÉ 168.10 . a bus, SG 135.6 .
cáit ambí in fer sin, 135.36 . a mmedón, TBFr. 103.
senmim, 13d18 . isind óin uáir, 25b16 . isind laithiu, Ml.
BNnÉ 301.15 . is' taig, Sc.MMD § 6.12 . is tig, BDD² 525.
'sa dorus, Feis TC 75. ansan ūair-sein, Ériu iv 178 § 31.
sechtaib, Críth Gabl. 303. isna airigthib, TBC 3552.
Ml. 23c8 . issa suthin, 21d4 . is' tech, Sc.MMD § 15.2 .
1173 . 'sa mboin, Fianaig. 72.18 . pl. isna bithu, Wb. 4c4 .
isna lucu, Ml. 23d23 .
TD 40 § 2. ionnat, DDána 2 § 11. inneat, 68 § 38 (: mbreac).
s. 3 dat. m. + n. and, Wb. 1a5 . Ml. 45d15 . Sg. 3b5 . ant, Ml.
48c29 . and, Críth Gabl. 100. ann, ML² 45. BDD² 91.
20 annt, ZCP vii 481.29 (Enchir. Aug.). f. indi, Ml. 21c3 . Sg.
18a3 . Críth Gabl. 105. BDD² 745. Laws iv 112.9 .
hindae, BDD² 513. indti, 661 . inde, Laws iv 112.10 .
inti, TBC 5211. TBFr. 200. inte, BDD² 498. acc. m. + n.
Gabl. 219. innte, DDána 1 § 9. pl. 1 indiunn, Wb. 5d18 .
-se (: fionnsoillse), 122 § 12. pl. 3 dat. indib, Ml. 30c17 .
30 Sg. 216b4 . BDD² 475. indeb, 1468 . intib, TBC 174.
(for dat.), Ériu iii 160.24 . ionntadh, Feis TC 1065.
35 30a5 . iom giolla, TBC 5662 (St.). am f[h]ochair, ML² 774.
am chlaidim, TTebe 1309 . s. 2 it senmathir, Wb. 29d11 .
ML² 30. f. inná loc, Sg. 17a5 . pl. 1 innar leid, Wb. 4b11 .
45 Wb. 3b8 . hi far selbad-si, 8d26 . in far n-Ultaib, TBC 1636.
BDD² 1282. ana n-usci, Maund. § 136.5 .
aiset isnaib sechtaib hi tuitet enech cáich, Críth Gabl.
law are observed there are no penalties ...,' Laws iv 70.3 .
gcéill ..., TSh. p. 13. (cf. san áit i bhfuil do thriall, TSh.
70dheanamh in which it were fittest, Luc. Fid. 73.1 . In Mod.
sa ar cuireadh mé, Dán Dé xi 4. áit ar marbhadh C., Keat.
ro was (h)i. Later in came to be used : irrufollnastar, Wb.
'snach cuirthear lá `in quibus dies non ponitur', TSh. 5175.
trí neithe ... is nach raibhe an Tighearna, 9859 .
focal, BCC 436.29 . Occasionally is : is gach sochar, TSh.
A. Folld. in O.Ir. by dat.
is no less occupied with the meaning', Mon. Tall.
25 142.23 . dam ocus tinne in cach coiri, Sc.MMD § 1.12 .
mmedón, TBFr. 103. secht mílchoin i slabradaib argait, 33 .
30raibhe i fāistine nó i ttaircetal accaibh ..., RC xxvii 294 § 58.
dib i ndath snechta ┐ araile a ndath fhola, D iv 2, fo. 42c14 .
than ...,' Keat. ii 5079.
`among whom he is,' v 92.9 .
(c) at, on, upon : hí flid Crist `at Christ's feast', Wb.
isind aurnaigti `mind fixed on prayer,' Mon. Tall. 151.19 .
co túagmílaib argait inti, TBC 5211. gemel crūaid i (v.ll.
ar, um) coiss a hard fetter on the foot, KMMisc. 270 § 43.
... is aibinn in radarc fuil innud (to a tower), ZCP vi 26.31 .
lámh i Mochuda ┐ tug ... as an mainistir amach é, Keat.
ZCP xiii 179.21 . batar a n-itaid ┐ i tart mor, RC xxiv 196.11 .
C. C. a suile ... ┐ e 'sa mbas `and he dying', BCC 414.3 .
90 § 22 . 'san luas na ttreigfitt as quickly as , BNnÉ 148.25 .
green ; to the hearing, by a `light' sound', O'Gr. Cat. 277.27.
names, D iv 2, fo. 45c5 .
nGeistedhaibh why have ye, Gesteda, ..., Ériu v 148.56 .
chomairli-si do gneithi ann ... is 'na chath no biadh, Leb.
6 After verbs of dividing, changing, putting, ending, etc.
75[a]ircha[e] ara rorandathar bés a thige indi, Críth Gabl. 105.
sna sealbhaibh saoghalta, TSh. 364.
la Fēne `most difficult in regard to nursing', BCrólige § 15.
sin `he considers that such desire is no great matter', Mon.
310.11 . do agra Fechín isin saer `to expostulate with F.
fíor if what is said in this regard be true, Dán Dé xxvi 17.
20heaslainte-si, 23 K 42, 186.3 .
being maintained according to native law', BCrólige § 22.
ing to the true nature of scripture and conscience, i 214.6 .
flicting a mortal blood-lying upon him', BCrólige § 1 n. 6 .
Ériu i 101 § 56. rogabus ben ar eicin. Cid indaragbais ?
55n-oenṡillaib `when they do not increase by one syllable', 48b5 .
60laigu cach mí ..., 10.4 .
8 ann 3 s. dat. m. and n. form of i + pron.
an flaith as cóir ann, IGT Introd. 9.7 .
neachaibh ... ann, Keat. iii 2338.
in the water, RC vi 175.44 .
5ann, gerán tuirsech doní an pecach, Mac Aingil 165.10 .
is eadh is treas bás ann .i. bás na péine, TSh. 1948.
Contrast : issí poetica licentia and tormach inna á , Sg.
B. Folld. in O.Ir. by acc.
Pátricc o Themuir hi crích Laigen, Thes. ii 241.5 (Ardm.).
station,' Fél. Sept. 21. arna tailctis isa ndún, Trip.² 1464.
i slánaibh síotha, TD 15 § 45.
§ 9.1 . is inna réir tíagait `they submit to him', BDD² 791.
a cāine comrāidh re chéile, ZCP vi 105.9 .
45cás at anam agad `not to care for thy soul', Ériu viii 195 § 4.
ata mo tairisi ┐ ni ha caruit cumachtaig ele, TTebe 3673 .
i gcraos ┐ i ndrúis, 396 .
ceinnfitis anmmann inte `nouns would be ended in it', Sg.
Studies 1933, 140 § 12 .
70 5 Various abstract meanings.
fudomnuibh pian `in that He doth not ...', Ériu ii 118 § 56.
Cf. indid Niall ... ro malart since it is N. ..., AU i 438.26 .
d'fhagbail `for which he deserves', PH 2719.
15fo[glamma] i n-Espain `als Lehrling', TBC 5662 (Stowe).
plair ogachta na hi Muire, D iv 2, fo. 45c37 .
time, (b) with acc. to express duration.
35 BDD² 111. a láoibh áille `on fine days', Ériu ix 168 § 44.
40gairb, TTebe 2403 . i ndeireadh bheatha, TSh. 885.
course of C.'s reign, BDD² 229.
tucustar duine a fearunn ann-sin, Laws iv 136.7 Comm.
doman `for then they think ...', Maund. § 158.
accalldaim in ríg, RC vi 175.52 .
70saethraib, Arch. iii 10.13 .
shluaguibh ... biadh ionn bur n-aghaidh, Feis TC 1907.
ML² 1136. ná digis t'aenur | i cenn ríg Temra, SG 365.10 .
chele, PH 3647. do-chuirfed tuilled i n-a chend, 7730 .
PH 7210. hi cind Ruis Omna `at the head of ...', BColm.
i nbar ndīaid, TBC² 509. amal atberum i n-ar ndiaid, PH 63.
i ndegaid after : cech consain i ndegaid araile, Sg. 7a4 .
in front of : for-ránaicc ... a ndorus a lis, BDD² 1514.
ML² 774. i fus here : in slog biid i fus, SR 4537.
57.6 . i tossuch at the beginning : i tossoc[h] ná epistle, Wb.
áo i suidiu, Sc.MMD § 18.4 .


Anyone who is denied access to records and whose appeal is denied may sue. AS 40.25.124; 2 AAC 96.350. A court must entertain a suit by a person who has not exhausted the "administrative remedies." In Carter v. APEA, the Supreme Court rejected the University's argument that the APEA should have exhausted procedures for obtaining information set by the Labor Relations Agency before suing. "The doctrine is not applicable where the remedy sought is judicial rather than administrative. . . . Resolution of a question of statutory interpretation is judicial rather than administrative." 663 P.2d at 922-923, n. 19. The 1990 revisions of the Public Records Act expressly state that injunctive relief seeking access to public records can be sought without exhausting administrative remedies. AS 40.25.125.
“Any person who has requested to examine or copy public records pursuant to this article, and who has been denied access to or the right to copy such records, may appeal the denial through a special action in the superior court, pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions against the officer or public body.” A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A).
“Any citizen denied the rights granted him by [the FOIA] may appeal immediately from the denial.” Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-107(a). The Attorney General, acting in his official capacity, is a “citizen” for purposes of this provision. Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 983 S.W.2d 902 (1998). Consequently, the Attorney General can request the same records that have been sought unsuccessfully by someone else and, upon denial of that request, bring an action under the FOIA to force disclosure.
"Any person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public record or class of public records under this chapter." Cal. Gov't Code § 6258. The California Supreme Court has held that the plain meaning of this provision "contemplates a declaratory relief proceeding commenced only by an individual or entity seeking disclosure of public records, and not by the public agency from which disclosure is sought." Filarsky v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 4th 419, 426, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 49 P.3d 194 (2002) (city may not initiate ordinary declaratory relief action to determine its obligation to disclose records to a member of the public as CPRA provides exclusive means for litigating question of whether records must be disclosed).
Any person whose request for access to or inspection of public records has been denied may seek an order directing the custodian to show why inspection should not be permitted. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204(5).
In Rose v. FOIC, 221 Conn. 217, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992), the Supreme Court held that the phrase "any party aggrieved" in Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-206(d) includes anyone who can show that he or she is aggrieved by an FOIC decision, and does not require that the person show that at the FOIC he or she was actually granted party status or was entitled as of right to be made a party. The person need merely show a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the FOIC decision which was specially and injuriously affected by that decision. Id. at 230. See also Kelly v. FOIC, 221 Conn. 300, 603 A.2d 1131 (1992) (aggrievement not restricted to persons to whom FOIC order is directed). In Bd. of Pardons v. FOIC, 210 Conn. 646, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989), the Supreme Court held the Board of Pardons to be "aggrieved" for appeal-standing purposes by an FOIC order requiring it to conduct its deliberations in the future in public because since Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-240(b) made noncompliance with an FOIC order a Class B misdemeanor, there existed "a genuine likelihood of criminal liability or civil incarceration" sufficient to confer standing and providing the individual members of the board with "a specific and personal" interest in the validity of the order. In State Library v. FOIC, 240 Conn. 824, 694 A.2d 1235 (1997), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may prove aggrievement without an evidentiary hearing in the trial court by relying on facts established in the record as a whole, including the administrative record.
Any citizen, 29 Del. C. § 10005(b), or the Attorney General, 29 Del. C. § 10005(e).
Other than with respect to documents in the possession of the D.C. Council, any individual may commence court proceedings to challenge the withholding of documents if: (a) no response is made within the statutory time period following the initial request; (b) the Mayor denies an appeal; (c) the Mayor fails to act on an appeal within the statutory time period; or (d) an agency has failed to release documents, even though the Mayor has authorized the documents to be released. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(a)(1), (2).
Any person denied the right to inspect a public record in the possession of the D.C. Council may initiate court proceedings to challenge the withholding. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(a-1).
Any person, firm, corporation or other entity may sue to enforce compliance, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(a), but only with respect to requests made in writing, § 50-18-71(b)(3).
The Attorney General also has specific statutory authority to bring actions to enforce compliance with the Act and to seek either civil or criminal penalties or both. § 50-18-73(a).
The UIPA provides that any person (including corporations) aggrieved by a denial of access to a government record may bring an action in the state circuit court against the agency to compel disclosure. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 92F-15. A "person" includes an individual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association or any other legal entity. Id. § 92F-3. The court shall hear the matter de novo and may review the documents in question in camera if necessary. Id. § 92F-15(b).
A person filing an action in state circuit court must notify the OIP in writing at the time of filing to allow the OIP the opportunity to intervene. Id. § 92F-15.3 (Supp. 1999).
The “sole remedy” for a “person aggrieved” by the denial of a request for inspection is to institute proceedings in the district court of the county where the records are located. Idaho Code § 74-115(1). The statute is not specific as to who is considered aggrieved by such a denial but unquestionably the person requesting the record may initiate a Court action to protest the denial. It is not clear whether a person who did not actually make the request but was aggrieved as a result of the denial requested by another person, would be able to seek redress.
Any person denied access to inspect or copy any public record by a public body may file a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief. See 5 ILCS 140/11(a). A public body may file suit to initiate an administrative review of a binding opinion of the Attorney General. See 5 ILCS 140/11.5.
Any person or organization who has been denied the right to inspect or copy a public record by a public agency may file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the denial occurred. Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(e).
"Any aggrieved person, any taxpayer to or citizen of the state of Iowa, or the attorney general or any county attorney may seek judicial enforcement." Iowa Code § 22.10(1).
Any person aggrieved by a violation. K.S.A. 45-222(a). This includes the Attorney General and county and district attorneys.
A requester may file an original action in Circuit Court to enforce the Open Records Act and is not required to seek the Attorney General's review before doing so. Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.882(2).
The parties to an Open Records Act appeal or original action are typically only the requester and the public agency. The Attorney General must be notified of original actions and appeals of Attorney General decisions, but may not be named as a party. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.880(3).
In Beckham v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, 873 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1994), the Court permitted teachers to intervene in an Open Records Act lawsuit brought by a newspaper against a board of education. The records which the newspaper sought included disciplinary actions and grievances against the teachers. The court literally interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.882(1), which empowers Circuit Courts to enforce the Open Records Act “by injunction or other appropriate order on application of any person.” 873 S.W.2d at 578. In Lawson v. Office of the AG, 415 S.W.3d 59 (Ky. 2013), the Court held that a person’s standing to oppose a public agency’s disclosure of public records is limited to the disclosure exemptions that are designed to protect the person’s individual interests. In that case, the Court held the individual could assert his personal privacy interests under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.878(1)(a) but lacked standing to assert that the law enforcement exemption, Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.878(1)(h), applied because it was designed to protect the interests of law enforcement agencies and not individuals.
"Any person who has been denied the right to inspect or copy a record. . . ." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:35A.
Any person "aggrieved by a refusal or denial to inspect or copy a record” or failure of an agency or official to comply with the Act may appeal the refusal, denial or failure to comply to Superior Court. 1 M.R.S.A. § 409(1).
The person or governmental unit denied access to a public record may file a complaint with the circuit court for the county where the complainant resides or has a principal place of business or where the public record is located. § 4-362(a); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Abell, 294 Md. 680, 452 A.2d 656 (1982). Blythe v. State, 161 Md. App. 492, 505, 870 A.2d 1246, 1253, cert. granted, 388 Md. 97, 879 A.2d 42 (2005).
Any person whose FOIA request has been denied in whole or in part may commence an action in circuit court under Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.240.
Several items under Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.241 must be published and made available to the public even when not specifically requested. A person may commence an action in the court of claims to compel a state agency to comply with Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.241. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.241(5).
A person seeking to enjoin rather than compel disclosure of public records may file a "reverse FOIA" action, but the FOIA analysis applies in those cases and a "reverse FOIA" plaintiff may not have standing to raise certain exemptions. Bradley, supra, 455 Mich. 285. A plaintiff’s right to prohibit disclosure must have a basis independent of FOIA. Tobin v. Michigan Civil Service, 416 Mich. 661, 331 N.W. 2d 184 (1980).
Any "person" has standing to sue in district court to obtain relief under the constitution and Public Records Act, Mont. Const., Art. II, § 9.
"Any person" denied rights granted by the public records law may seek a writ of mandamus, compelling disclosure of the record. Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.03(1). In addition, under §84-712.03(2), if the attorney general determines that withheld records should be made public, he must demand that the custodian disclose the records. If the custodian does not comply with the attorney general's direction, the attorney general must bring suit in the name of the state. The requester has an absolute right to intervene in any suit brought by the attorney general. Id.
Any requester of records may apply to the district court for an order permitting inspection or copying or for an order requiring the governmental entity to provide a copy to the requester. NRS 239.011(1).
Any "citizen" of New Jersey who has been denied the right to inspect, copy, or obtain a copy of public record may bring an action to enforce the rights granted under OPRA or the common law. Irval Realty Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, supra. "Citizen" includes newspapers published or circulated in New Jersey and any private commercial enterprise, even if motivated solely by "private pecuniary gain." Techniscan Corp. v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, supra.
Although OPRA expressly provides that “government records shall be readily accessible…by citizens of this State” (N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1), the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office has advised of its position that OPRA does not prohibit access by residents of other States.
The Attorney General, the District Attorney, or any person whose written request has been denied. NMSA 1978 § 14-2-12(A).
The Public records law provides that “any person” who is denied access to public records may apply to the appropriate division of the General Court of Justice for an order compelling disclosure. G.S. § 132-9.
An “interested person or entity” may sue. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(1).
Any person denied access may bring a civil action. 51 O.S. § 24A.17.B.
Any party dissatisfied with the appeal review may sue. A public body must issue notice of intent to sue within seven days and must institute suit within a subsequent seven days. ORS 192.411(2); ORS 192.415 (formerly ORS 192.450; ORS 192.460).
Any person or entity seeking access or the Attorney General.
"Any citizen of the State" may bring suit. "Citizen" would include corporations. S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100(A). Because the state may not give citizen to residents of the state, it is an open question whether a U.S. citizen that resides outside South Carolina may bring suit.
Presumably any requestor who has had request denied in whole or in part by a public records officer or objects to the officer’s fee or time estimate. SDCL §1-27-38.
Any citizen of Tennessee may request to inspect a record and shall be entitled to request access subject to judicial review. T.C.A. § 10-7-505(a).
Section 552.321(a) provides that if a governmental body refuses to request an Attorney General’s decision or to supply public information, the person requesting the information or the Attorney General may file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling the governmental body to make the information available to the public. Such mandamus suits are controlled by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Nothing in the Act, case law, or Attorney General opinions state what mandamus approach is preferred and some open records actions have been litigated as normal civil lawsuits. Amendments made to the Act in 1999 permit actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief to be brought against a governmental body that violates the Act. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.3215.
A governmental body may file a declaratory judgment action against the Attorney General to determine its rights and liabilities under the Act. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000). However, the only suit a governmental body or officer for public information may file seeking to withhold information from a requestor is a suit that is filed in accordance with Sections 552.325 or 552.353, and must be brought no later than the thirtieth calendar day after the governmental body receives notice of the Attorney General’s decision that the information must be disclosed. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.324. A governmental body, officer for public information, or other person or entity that files suit seeking to withhold information from the requestor may not file suit against the requestor, although the requestor is entitled to intervene in the suit. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.325(a). The governmental body must make a timely good faith effort to notify the requestor of the existence of the suit and inform the requestor, among other things, of his right to intervene. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.325(b).
Any individual may appeal the State Records Committee’s or the government entity’s decision by filing a petition with the district court. See Utah Code § 63G-2-404(5).
“Any person aggrieved by the denial of a request for public records” can file a court action at the trial level to obtain a de novo review of the administrative decision; the court’s review can include in camera inspection, and the court is specifically authorized to segregate disclosable from non-disclosable records. 1 V.S.A. § 319(a). The agency bears the burden of persuading the court that the refusal to disclose is correct.
Any person, including the Commonwealth's Attorney, who has been denied the rights and privileges conferred by the Act. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3713.A.
An action may be brought by a requester, by the agency, or by any person “named in the record or to whom the record specifically pertains.” RCW 42.56.540, .550.
Just as "any person" may request access to records under the Freedom of Information Act, "any person denied the right to inspect the public record of a public body" may sue to enforce that right. W. Va. Code § 29B-1-5(1).
The person who is denied access to the record. See, e.g., Wyo. R. Civ. P. 17.