§ 146-3 Fire lanes; posting of signs to regulate parking.
§ 146-4 Impounding of vehicles.
§ 146-5 Storage of and charges for impounded vehicles.
§ 146-6 Notice of removal.
§ 146-9 Violation of state law.
§ 146-10 Penalties for offenses.
§ 146-11 Other parking requirements.
§ 146-12 Plea of guilty.
§ 146-13 Liability for damages.
Traffic Violations Bureau — See Ch. 51.
Vehicles and traffic — See Ch. 195.
Junked vehicles — See Ch. 198.
The purpose of this chapter shall be to improve and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the community pertaining to traffic regulations at parking areas, which are regularly used by the public within the Town of Greece, to adopt reasonable rules and regulations with respect to traffic and parking in such areas as local conditions may require for the safety and convenience of the public or of the users of the area, to regulate winter parking based upon the findings of the Greece Town Board that the leaving of vehicles on Town streets during periods of snowfall has hindered and obstructed the Commissioner of Public Works in snow removal operations, and that the leaving of vehicles on streets within the Town during snowstorms causes hazards to persons using the streets. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority granted under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 41, Regulation of Traffic by Towns, §§ 1660, 1660-a, 1662-a, 1663 and 1664, under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 42, Regulation of Traffic by Local Authorities and School Districts, § 1670, under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 32 and in accordance with the Municipal Home Rule Law, the Town Board of the Town of Greece does hereby regulate the parking of vehicles within the Town of Greece.
The parking of any vehicle on Town or county streets between 12:00 midnight and 8:00 a.m. for any length of time.
The standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading.
Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.
Any stopping of a vehicle, whether occupied or not.
When required, a complete cessation of movement.
When prohibited, any halting, even momentarily, of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer, flagperson or other person duly empowered to regulate traffic, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1102, or a traffic control sign or signal.
Includes the paved portion of all highways, roads and streets, including all shoulders, whether paved or unpaved, within the Town, excluding tree lawns as designated by the Commissioner of Public Works which tree lawns are adjacent to shoulders.
Every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting baby carriages and devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
Establishment of fire lanes. Pursuant to the authority granted under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 41, Regulation of Traffic by Towns, §§ 1660, 1660-a, 1662-a, 1663 and 1664, under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 32 and in accordance with the Municipal Home Rule Law, the Town Board of the Town of Greece does hereby designate and establish fire lanes of 30 feet in width around the perimeter of a building at all shopping centers and buildings used for commercial, educational, or industrial purposes, and said perimeter shall be maintained by the property owner and be kept open at all times for the movement of emergency vehicles and other traffic. The thirty-foot width shall be measured from the curbline, if established or existing. If no curbline exists, then the thirty-foot width for the fire lane shall be measured from the edge of the building or buildings where such widths will not conflict with the setback requirements of Chapter 211, Zoning. In the event of a conflict with such setback and boundary line requirements, the location and width of said fire lane shall be determined by the Code Enforcement Officer, the Fire Marshal, the Building Inspector or his/her designee so as to provide reasonable access to the building for emergency vehicles. In all cases, fire lanes shall be of such construction as determined by the Code Enforcement Officer, the Fire Marshal, the Building Inspector or his/her designee and shall be located so as to be accessible to the nearest public road or highway. The Fire Marshal shall approve the location, width, layout and construction type of all fire lanes and access roads.
Posting of signs to regulate parking. The owners of shopping centers, industrial facilities, office parks or school district properties in the Town of Greece, upon approval by the Code Enforcement Officer or his designee, are authorized to erect or post a sign or signs regulating parking within such shopping center or office park.
Parked in a fire lane, pursuant to this chapter, Chapter 114, Fire Prevention and Building Construction, or state fire codes.
Abandoned, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1224.
Unattended, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210, where it constitutes an obstruction to emergency traffic or any place where stopping, standing or parking is prohibited by law.
Parked in violation of a posted sign regulating parking within a shopping center or office plaza.
After removal of any vehicle, by persons in § 146-4, Impounding of vehicles, whichever authority may have effectuated said removal shall have the vehicle stored in a designated storage area at the expense of the owner. Such owner or person with legal authority to redeem the vehicle may redeem the same upon payment of all expenses and charges actually and necessarily incurred for such removal and storage and by fulfilling all of the requirements of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1204(d).
Members of the Department of Public Safety, the Code Enforcement Officer, the Fire Marshal, the Building Inspector or their designees and the Commissioner of Public Works shall, without delay, report the removal and the disposition of any vehicle removed by him/her, as provided in this chapter, to the Town of Greece Police Department, and it shall be the duty of said Town police to ascertain to the extent possible the owner or person with legal authority to redeem any vehicle removed and stored pursuant to this chapter and to notify said person(s) of the removal and disposition of such vehicle and of the lawful way to redeem the same.
Limited or no use of one or both legs.
Unable to walk 200 feet without stopping.
Neuromuscular dysfunction that severely limits mobility.
Class III or IV cardiac condition (American Heart Association standards).
Severely limited in ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological or orthopedic condition.
Restricted by lung disease to such an extent that forced (respiratory) expiratory volume for one second, when measured by spirometry, is less than one liter, or the arterial oxygen tension is less than 60 mm/hg of room air at rest.
Has a physical or mental impairment or condition not listed above which constitutes an equal degree of disability, and which imposes unusual hardship in the use of public transportation and prevents the person from getting around without great difficulty.
A person with a temporary disability is any person who is temporarily unable to ambulate without the aid of an assisting device. Examples of an assisting device include, but are not limited to, a brace, cane, crutch, prosthetic device, another person, wheelchair or walker. Temporary permits are issued for six months or less, regardless of expected recovery date.
A person shall be eligible for a handicapped parking permit upon submittal of a completed application for a parking permit to the Town Clerk. The application for a permanent parking permit must be certified by either a medical doctor, doctor of osteopathy, physician’s assistant, nurse practitioner or, in cases involving podiatry, a doctor of podiatric medicine. Applications for a temporary disability may be certified only by a medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy.
Parking spaces reserved for people with disabilities must be marked with conspicuous and permanently installed abovegrade signs displaying the wheelchair symbol. These signs are positioned at a height of five feet to seven feet above the parking space surface. Designation of reserved spaces may include the use of blue painted lines or markings.
Each building servicing the public in the Town of Greece must provide a sufficient number of parking spaces for the handicapped as set forth in New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code Section 1102.4(a) and (b). Such buildings servicing the public shall include, but not be limited to, shopping centers, malls, plazas, multiple dwellings, retail stores, public buildings and restaurants.
No person shall park a vehicle in a parking space designated for parking for handicapped persons without displaying a valid official parking permit for handicapped persons or an official license plate for handicapped persons of any state. Parking is strictly prohibited in the striped area adjacent to handicapped parking spaces and identified by an official traffic control device, regardless of whether or not a parking permit is displayed.
Any vehicle found in violation of this chapter may be impounded pursuant to §§ 146-4, 146-5 and 146-6 of this chapter.
The parking of vehicles is hereby prohibited on all Town and county streets within the Town of Greece between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 8:00 a.m. and between the dates of November 1 and April 15.
Without the vehicle displaying a valid and current certificate of registration.
Without the vehicle displaying a valid and current inspection sticker.
Less than 15 feet from a fire hydrant.
Leaving the vehicle unattended with the engine running.
More than 12 inches from the curb.
With the left side of the vehicle next to the curb.
Less than 20 feet from a crosswalk or intersection.
Within 30 feet from a traffic control device.
Parked in a fire lane, pursuant to this chapter, Chapter 114, Fire Prevention and Building Construction, or state fire code.
Leaving a vehicle unattended, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210, where it constitutes an obstruction to emergency traffic or any place where stopping, standing or parking is prohibited by law.
In violation of a posted sign regulating parking within a shopping center or office complex.
No parking is allowed in a designated handicapped parking space unless a valid handicapped parking permit is visible, or the vehicle has handicapped license plates, issued by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles.
Any violation of this chapter, adopted pursuant to the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1660-a, and of the New York State Municipal Home Rule Law, shall constitute a traffic infraction within the meaning of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1800.
Enforce all of the provisions of this chapter.
Prohibit, regulate, restrict or limit the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles in specified areas of the parking area.
Every person convicted of a violation of this section of this chapter or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to said chapter shall be punished by a fine pursuant to § 146-10 of this chapter. Said fine, if not paid, shall double after 15 days, triple after 30 days and quadruple after 60 days.
For persons found guilty after a hearing, a penalty may be fixed by the judge in an amount not to exceed the maximum fine permitted by this chapter or New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Title IX, Article 45, § 1800. If not otherwise stated, the fines will be set by the court, not to exceed $250.
Upon a showing of good cause, made by the respondent under oath, any scheduled penalties may be reduced by a judge.
In addition to the above, the court may issue a warrant if a person fails to appear before the court.
If the fine is not paid within 60 days of issuance of the notice of violation (parking summons), a default judgment will be entered against the respondent for civil collection. The default judgment will include an additional penalty of $50 for each violation.
Any person who has been issued three summons pursuant to this chapter in the preceding 18 months and has not satisfied the same with the Town of Greece will be certified a scofflaw.
The Town of Greece will notify the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 14, § 401, Subdivision 5a, and Article 20, § 514, Subdivision 4-a.
The provisions of the chapter are in addition to those set forth in Chapter 114, Fire Prevention and Building Construction, § 114-13, Supplementary provisions and requirements for fire prevention and protection, Subsection A(1), (2), (3) and (4)(a), (b) and (c), which will be enforced pursuant to that chapter.
Payment of the fine of a parking summons constitutes a plea of guilty to the specified violation. A plea of guilty to a charge is equivalent to a conviction after trial. Failure of a person to respond to any charge within 60 days shall be deemed an admission of liability to the charge.
This chapter shall not be construed to hold any enforcement officer of the Town of Greece responsible for any damages to persons or property by reason of the issuance of a parking summons or other sections of this chapter while exercising his/her discretion as provided by this chapter.


Disability Under the ADAAA– Applying the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (ADAAA) amended definition of disability under the actual disability prong to the facts in this case, the court concluded that the employee Norton’s renal cancer is capable of qualifying as a disability under the ADA. Neither side disputed that renal cancer, when active, constitutes a “physical impairment” under the statute. Further, the court found that renal cancer, when active, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) “substantially limits” the “major life activity” of “normal cell growth.” See 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(A) & (B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). Therefore, the fact that Norton may have been in remission when he returned to work at the defendant is of no consequence. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D). Norton’s renal cancer qualifies as a disability even if the only “major life activity” it “substantially limited” was “normal cell growth.” See 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(C). The court’s conclusion that Norton’s renal cancer is capable of qualifying as a disability under the ADA is bolstered by the EEOC’s interpretation and implementation of the ADAAA. The EEOC’s final regulations implementing the amendments provide a list of impairments that, because they substantially limit a major life activity, will “in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage under [the actual disability prong].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). One of the impairments listed is “cancer” because it “substantially limits [the major life activity] of normal cell growth.” Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). See also the EEOC’s interpretive guidance accompanying its final regulations, 76 FR 16978-01, 2011 WL 1060575, at 17007, 17011, & 17012 (citing examples in the legislative history of the ADAAA where Congress named cancer as the kind of impairment that would qualify as a disability under the amended Act). See also Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., No. 5:10-cv-08-BR, 2011 WL 891446 (E.D.N.C. March 10, 2011) (holding that employee who suffered from episodic flare ups of multiple sclerosis (MS) had plausible claim of disability under the ADA as amended because when active, the MS substantially limited the employee’s normal neurological functions, which is a major life activity under the amended Act); Chalfont v. U.S. Electrodes, No. 10-2929, 2010 WL 5341846 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2010) (holding that employee with leukemia, heart disease and remissive cancer had plausible claim of disability under the ADA as amended because his maladies substantially limited his normal cell growth and circulatory functions, both of which are major life activities under the amended Act); Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F.Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that employee with HIV positive status had plausible claim of disability under the ADA as amended because the normal functioning of his immune system, a major life activity under the amended Act, was substantially limited). In an unusual move, the court, pursuant to Rule 56(f), gave the defendant notice of the court’s intention to grant summary judgment for Norton under Rule 56(f)(1) on the issue of his cancer constituting a disability under the ADA and gave the defendant twenty days to respond.
Unemployment Compensation Appeal Procedures– Unemployment compensation claimant sought review of a decision of the state Workforce Commission denying his claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer. The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported finding that claimant’s actions in the performance of his job constituted misconduct disqualifying him from receiving unemployment compensation. Judicial review of a TWC determination is by trial de novo based on the substantial evidence rule. Tex.Lab.Code § 212.202(a). The trial court conducts an evidentiary trial to determine wether the agency’s ruling is free of taint of any illegality and is reasonably supported by substantial evidence. In making this determination , the issue is not whether TWC made the correct decision; it is instead whether the evidence introduced before the trial court show facts in existence at the time of the TWC decision that reasonably support the decision; that is , whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. The true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the agency. Because substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of evidence, the evidence may preponderate against the TWC decision but still amount to substantial evidence. TWC remains the primary factfinding body, and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for TWC’s on controverted fact issues; the question before the trial court is one of law. Since this was a summary judgment case, the trial court was required to accept as true all of Blanchard’s evidence, indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in his favor, and determine whether the summary judgment evidence showed, as a matter of law, that facts in existence at the time of TWC’s decision reasonably supported the decision; i.e., whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. Blanchard’s contention was that the trial court must have applied the wrong evidentiary standard because he presented evidence creating genuine issues of material fact in response to defendant’s summary judgment evidence. But the question to be decided by the trial court on summary judgment was whether defendant proved as a mater of law that Blanchard engaged in misconduct as defined by the labor code or whether fact issues precluded summary judgment. The trial court was required to determine whether defendant proved as a matter of law that substantial evidence supported TWC’s decision to deny benefits. In a concurring opinion, the judge called the entire review process involving the TWC to be a “sham” because if there is any evidence amounting to more than a scintilla before the TWC that supports its decision then, as a matter of law, the TWC cannot be reversed. The judge stated that the employee showed substantial conflicting evidence but the applicable standard required it to be ignored. The judge called upon the Supreme Court to come up with a new standard of review to be applied to summary judgment cases involving appeals from administrative decisions based on substantial evidence.
Worker’s Compensation-Underinsured Motorist Policy– Employee who was struck by a drunk driver while working in the course and scope of his employment brought action against his employer and the insurance carrier to collect damages under employer’s underinsured motorist policy, even though he had already received worker’s compensation benefits. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of employer city and insurer. The insurance company conceded on appeal that the judgment for it should be reversed and remanded to trial court. The court of appeals held that worker’s compensation laws barred additional recovery against the employer city. The city had purchased an underinsured policy for its employees, even though the city had worker’s compensation that covered them for injuries in the scope of employment. The employee argued that the worker’s compensation only precluded work related injuries arising from common law torts as opposed to a contract. The court of appeals rejected this contention holding that the worker’s compensation statute prohibits further recovery against the employer.
Civil Rights – Age & National Origin Discrimination – Employee filed suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) based on a national origin and age claim. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals ruling that the employee’s evidence failed to negate employer’s claim that she was fired for violating member confidentiality policy. The Court examined the claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. The Court held that the employee established a prima facie case, which is not an onerous burden. However, the Court held that the employee’s claim was so weak as to fail regarding the national origin discrimination claim. As to the age claim, the Court stated that the employee must prove that she was within the protected class, was discharged, was qualified for the position, and was either replaced by someone outside the protected class, replaced by someone younger, or was otherwise discharged because of her age. The Court held that a showing that the fact that the replacement was only four years younger was not significant enough to prove age discrimination. The Court stated that he overwhelming body of cases in most circuits have held that age differences of less than ten years are not significant enough to make out the fourth part of the age discrimination case.
Civil Rights- Age Discrimination & Retaliation – Former employee brought action against employer alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the TCHRA. The district court entered summary judgment in employer’s favor. The Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment was improper on the employee’s claims and reversed the case. The Court classified the case as a “pretext” case (neither party argued that it was a “mixed-motive” case). The employer argued that the employee should have to prove that age was the “but for” reason for the discharge; however, the Court held that because the TCHRA contains a “motivating factor” language that the test was not “but for” but “a motivating factor”. The Court held that the employee’s affidavit provided more than a scintilla of evidence on all four elements of his prima facie claim. Regarding the retaliation claim, the employee’s affidavit stated that he had complained to his supervisor about being called an “old man” and “old fart”. The Court held that this was sufficient to raise a question as to the employee engaging in a protected activity and being terminated for it.
Federal Credit Union Act Whistleblower Provision– The Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. § 790(b), makes it illegal for an insured credit union to retaliate against an employee who provides information to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) or U.S. Attorney General regarding a possible violation of any law by the credit union. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the credit union finding that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to create an issue of fact whether several adverse employment actions against plaintiff were caused by the report by plaintiff to the NCUA regarding the credit unions’s possible law violations.


On June 8, 2018, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice filed motions to dismiss on behalf of five clients in Alamance County who were charged with voting while being ineligible due to a criminal conviction.
In our the motions, SCSJ asks the court to recognize the unconstitutionality of the criminal statute that allows the state to seek a felony conviction against a person who casts a vote in a primary or general election before that person has completed probation and returned to full citizenship. As stated in the motion, the statute (N.C.G.S. § 163-275(5)) “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, in that the crime was created on the basis of racial animus with the specific purpose to suppress the votes of African Americans in North Carolina, and it continues to have a disparate impact on the basis of race.” (Motion to Dismiss on behalf of Whitney Brown, p.1).
Under current North Carolina law, a person who engages in voter intimidation or breaks up an election “by force or violence” commits a mere misdemeanor. However, a person who casts a single vote before being returned to full citizenship commits a felony subject to up to two years of imprisonment. Our state criminal laws have maintained this backward distinction for over a century, because our statutes criminalizing voting have been re-codified virtually unchanged since they were enacted by an openly racist legislature that came to power through voter intimidation and promises to strip the vote from African Americans by all available means.
Prior to 1900, North Carolina’s Constitution did not expressly exclude those previously convicted of felonies from the right of suffrage. The state also had no poll tax or literacy test. All of this changed with the Suffrage Amendment ratified in 1900 and the general election law passed the following year. These changes to state law, which included the enactment of the statute under which Ms. Brown has been charged came after an open campaign to disenfranchise an emergent African American electorate and install White Supremacy in North Carolina.
There was widespread voter intimidation during the electoral campaign of 1898. Bands of armed men known as Red Shirts rode on horseback through African American communities, particularly in southeastern North Carolina, to intimidate voters. The strategy worked, and the Democrats captured complete control of the General Assembly. The new legislature changed the state constitution, restricted the right to vote, and defined several “infamous crimes” based on casting an illegal vote.
In 1900, the General Assembly ratified a Suffrage Amendment to the state constitution that add a restriction specifically prohibiting those convicted of certain crimes from voting unless they “restored to citizenship.” The same amendment instituted both the literacy test and poll tax. The literacy test contained an exemption for the descendants of any person who was eligible to vote on or prior to January 1, 1867 – exempting White citizens who could vote in the time of slavery.
Sec. 71 If any person be challenged as being convicted of any crime which excludes him from the right of suffrage, he shall be required to answer any question in relation to such alleged conviction; but his answer to such questions shall not be used against him in any criminal prosecution, but if any person so convicted shall vote at the election, without having been restored to the right of citizenship, he shall be guilty of an infamous crime, and punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisoned at hard labor, not exceeding two years, or both.
The act also made it an “infamous crime” to knowingly register in the wrong location or to “illegally vote” in any election. At the same time, the act made it a misdemeanor to break up an election “by force and violence” or to “injure, threaten, oppress or attempt to intimidate any qualified voter of this State.” This dichotomy, in which voter intimidation constitutes a misdemeanor while casting a vote improperly is a felony, persists in North Carolina law in 2018.
Since its enactment in 1901, the only tweak to the language of the crime at issue in this case came in 1931, when the General Assembly made the wording more concise and replaced the term “infamous crime” with “felony.” From 1931 to the present, not one syllable of the definition of the crime of voting while ineligible due to a prior criminal conviction has changed. Along with the other surviving felonies from the 1901 law, the crime of voting while ineligible due to a prior criminal conviction has become a Class I felony under North Carolina Structured Sentencing. A conviction can result in as much as two years’ imprisonment. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17.
The racially disparate impact of the law criminalizing voting before restoration of full citizenship after a criminal conviction persists to this day. In 2016, African Americans were nearly 53% of the prison population in this state. In the same year, African Americans comprised an estimated 21.5% of the total population of North Carolina. Thus, African Americans are more likely to be disfranchised as the result of felony convictions and thus more likely to unintentionally run afoul of § 163-275(5) (2016), which has no express requirement of knowledge or fraudulent intent.
The prosecution of Whitney Brown in Alamance County, as well as other returning citizens, follows the law’s long tradition of a racially disparate impact. On a statewide basis, people identified as “Black” in the voter registration records constituted 290 of the 411 persons listed in the State Board of Elections’ 2016 Audit Report as having allegedly voted in violated of § 163-275(5) – 68.08% of the total when those who did not designate their race are excluded. By contrast, people identified as “White” comprised only 30.75% of the total.
This stark disparity becomes even greater in Alamance County, where the State has indicted twelve individuals for the alleged act of voting in the 2016 general election in violation of N.C.G.S. § 163-275(5). Ms. Brown and eight others – 75% of those facing a possible felony conviction – are African American. The law imposing a potential felony conviction for the act of voting before returning to full citizenship after criminal conviction functions exactly as the 1901 General Assembly intended: as a tool to punish, suppress and discourage voting by African Americans.
The statute at issue, N.C.G.S. § 163-275(5) (2016), was enacted for the express purpose of disfranchising African American voters, and continues to have a disparate impact on African American voters both statewide and in Alamance County. The racially invidious application of this law renders it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina constitution.


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(Walt Disney). Disneyland. The First Quarter Century. Photo available. np. Disney Productions. 1979. 122 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy.
(Walt Disney). Elmer Elephant. Photo available. Philadelphia. David McKay Company. nd. c. 1936. 47 pps. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Very rare in this condition. Fine copy.
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Accorisi, William. My Name is Pocahontas. New York. Holiday House. 1992. Octavo. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Ackerman, Karen. By the Dawn's Early Light. Photo available. New York. Atheneum Books. 1994. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Acredolo, Linda. Baby Signs. How to Talk with Your Baby Before Your Baby Can Talk. Chicago. NTC. 1996. Octavo. Soft cover. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Ada, Alma Flor. Yours Truly, Goldilocks. Photo available. New York. Atheneum. 1998. 4to. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color by Leslie Tryon. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Adamson, Joy. Elsa. The Story of The Famous Lioness of "Born Free". Photo available. New York. Pantheon Books. 1961. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated with photographs by the author. Important reference work. Fine copy (owner inscription on end paper) in very good (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Adamson, Joy. The Story of Elsa. Photo available. New York. Pantheon Books. 1966. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated with photographs by the author. Important reference work. Fine copy in very good (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Adkins, P.H. Edgar Rice Burroughs. Bibliography and Price Guide. New Orleans. PDA. nd. 23 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. Fine copy. Owner name on cover.
Adoff, Arnold. Love Letters. New York. Blue Sky. 1997. 4to. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color by Lisa Desimini. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Aesop (Milo Winter). The Aesop for Children. New York. Checkerboard. 4to. Decorated hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color by Milo Winter. Fine copy.
Aesop (Milo Winter). The Aesop for Children. New York. Checkerboard. 1993. 4to. Decorated hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color by Milo Winter. Fine copy (owner inscription on end paper).
Aesop (Tom Paxton). Androcles and the Lion and Other Aesop's Fables. New York. Morrow Junior Books. 1991. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated by Robert Rayevsky. Fine copy.
Aesop. The Children's Aesop. Selected Fables. Garden City. Doubleday and Co. 1988. 63 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition thus. Illustrated in color and black & white by Robert Byrd. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Akre, Nancy (ed). Miniatures. Compiled for the Cooper-Hewitt Museum. Washington. Smithsonian. 1983. 128 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Albatros (translated by Jarmila Zavadova. Rukavicka. np. np. 1974. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated by Jarmila Maresova. Very good copy. Pencil translation in margins.
Alcott, Louisa M. Under the Lilacs. New York. Grosset & Dunlap. 1928. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. Reprint. Fine copy in very good (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Alexander, Lloyd. Dream-of-Jade. The Emperor's Cat. Chicago. Cricket. 2005. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color by D. Brent Burkett. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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Henry, Joshua B. Frank, Paul Levy, Beth Goodman, Ma- thew Bogin, Margaret Kohn,and Paul Dalton.
Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Office of the Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appel- lees/cross-appellants District of Columbia, et al. With him on the brief were Robert R. Rigsby, Interim Corporation Coun- sel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel. Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.
Alfred Mollin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, ar- gued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant United States of America. With him on the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael Jay Singer, Attorney, and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.
Separate opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.
Tatel, Circuit Judge: A rider to the District of Columbia Appropriations Act imposes limits on fees the District may pay under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, known as IDEA, to attorneys who represent prevailing par- ties in actions against the D.C. Public Schools. In this suit by disabled students and their parents, the district court reject- ed challenges to the fee cap, finding it neither preempted by IDEA nor contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court also held that the rider restricts only the District's authority to pay attorneys' fees, not court authority to award fees pursuant to IDEA. Find- ing no error, we affirm in all respects.
dent living." 20 U.S.C. s 1400(d)(1)(A). As a condition of receiving funds under the Act, IDEA requires school districts to adopt procedures to ensure appropriate educational place- ment of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. s 1413. In addi- tion, school districts must develop comprehensive plans for meeting the special educational needs of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. s 1414(d)(2)(A). Known as "individualized education programs," or IEPs, these plans must include "a statement of the child's present levels of educational perfor- mance, ... a statement of measurable annual goals, [and] a statement of the special education and related services ... to be provided to the child...." 20 U.S.C. s 1414(d)(1)(A).
IDEA guarantees parents of disabled children an opportu- nity to participate in the identification, evaluation, and place- ment process. See 20 U.S.C. ss 1414(f), 1415(b)(1). Parents who object to their child's "identification, evaluation, or edu- cational placement" are entitled to an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. ss 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), at which they have a "right to be accompanied and advised by counsel." 20 U.S.C. s 1415(h)(1). Parents "aggrieved by" a hearing officer's find- ings and decision may bring a civil action in either state or federal court without regard to the amount in controversy. 20 U.S.C. s 1415(i)(2).
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA gives courts authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." Prevailing parents may also recover fees incurred during administrative proceedings. See Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). The amount of fees awarded "shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. s 1415(i)(3)(C).
By 1998, the District of Columbia School System's ... failure to fulfill its obligations under IDEA reached crisis proportions. The District had virtually ceased to con- duct timely hearings requested by parents under IDEA and to issue final decisions within the required timelines. Other of its obligations under IDEA were also not being met to a significant extent. See also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 185 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that DCPS's noncompliance with IDEA has resulted in "significant delays both in the place- ment of children in appropriate educational settings and in the provision of crucial medical services, delays that have the potential to permanently harm the physical and emotional health of many young children."). At a June 1997 public hearing, DCPS identified several factors responsible for its noncompliance, including "inadequate management[,].... poor information management systems, lack of staff training, inappropriate staff allocation and lack of appropriate pro- grams." Notice of Written Findings and Decision and Com- pliance Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 41370, 41373. A year later, the Secretary of Education stated that, after "working with DCPS over a number of years to address its serious and on- going failure to comply with the requirements of [IDEA]," he determined that immediate compliance was "not feasible." Id. at 41371. The Secretary and DCPS entered into a Compliance Agreement mandating that DCPS "be in full compliance with the requirements of [IDEA in] no later than three years." Id. at 41374.
DCPS's failure to meet the special education needs of its disabled students has resulted in an exceedingly large num- ber of parental complaints. The record shows that in 1995, although DCPS served less than two-thousandths of one percent of the nation's disabled students, over forty-five percent of requests for due process hearings nationwide were made in D.C.
million to attorneys. That same year, the Washington Post reported that legal representation of special education stu- dents, once "an obscure niche," had developed into a "boom- ing, lucrative industry." Doug Struck and Valerie Strauss, Special Ed Law Is Big Business; Students' Attorneys Collec- tively Receiving Millions in Fees, The Wash. Post, July 20, 1998, at B7. Describing special education cases as "easy [to] win," the Post stated that "when the city's school system is crying for money to try to build an adequate special education system--and thereby begin to lessen the flood of legal chal- lenges--these attorney fees rankle school officials who say the money should be spent on children." Id.
None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action, including an administra- tive proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. s 1400 et seq.) if-- (1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney exceeds [$50]; or (2) The maximum amount of compensation of the at- torney exceeds [$1,300], except that compensation and reimbursement in excess of such maximum may be approved for extended or complex representation in accordance with section 11-2604(c), District of Colum- bia Code. Congress included a similar rider in the District's fiscal year 2000 appropriations bill. Fearful of the rider's impact on disabled children, President Clinton vetoed the bill. "In the long run," the President's veto message explained, "this provision would likely limit the access of the District's poor families to quality legal representation, thus impairing their due process protections provided by ... IDEA." See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2000--Veto Message from The President of The United States (H. Doc. No. 106-135), 145 Cong. Rec. H8941, H8942 (Sept. 28, 1999). Persisting, Congress included the fee cap (with minor revisions not relevant to this litigation) in a reenacted FY 2000 appropria- tions bill. This time the President signed. See Section 129, District of Columbia Appropriations, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106- 113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (November 29, 1999).
in education law ... who informed me that, due to the passage of Section 130 of the D.C. Appropriations Act, her firm was no longer able to accept special education cases on a contingency basis. She indicated that she was not aware of any other private attorney in the District of Columbia who would...."
The families mounted two challenges to section 130. Rely- ing on the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitu- tion, they argued that section 130--which they referred to as a "local law"--is preempted by IDEA. They also argued that by singling out disabled children residing in the District of Columbia for unfavorable treatment, section 130 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the families sought a declaratory ruling that section 130 does not affect a district court's authority to award reasonable attor- neys' fees under IDEA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2403(a), the United States intervened to defend section 130's constitution- ality. The District of Columbia, which joined the United States' defense of the statute, argued that section 130 amend- ed IDEA, thus barring courts in D.C. from awarding fees in excess of the amount the District is authorized to pay.
Rejecting plaintiffs' challenges to section 130, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District. The court also rejected the District's interpretation of section 130, ruling that the rider had "done nothing to affect the district court's ability under [IDEA] to base a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees [on] rates prevailing in the community."
The families now appeal, and the District of Columbia cross-appeals. Although the United States defends section 130's constitutionality, it takes no position on the proper interpretation of the section. Our review of all issues is de novo. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir.1994) ("Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standards as the district court."); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying de novo review to a question of statutory construc- tion).
Beginning with the families' appeal, we can easily dispose of their Supremacy Clause argument. Because IDEA is national legislation, the families argue, it preempts under the Supremacy Clause any state or local legislation that impedes its accomplishment, such as section 130. In support, the families cite Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), where we stated that "Congress frequently enacts legislation applicable only to the District and.... [a]bsent evidence of contrary congressional intent, such enactments should be treated as local law, interacting with federal law as would the laws of the several states." Even assuming the Supremacy Clause applies to Congress when it legislates for the District under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution--a proposition for which we have found no persuasive support--the families' argument suffers from a fatal weakness: it requires us to believe that Congress enact- ed section 130 for the purpose of having it instantaneously preempted by a statute enacted over a decade earlier. See Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analy- sis.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
section 130 burdens the educational opportunities of a disad- vantaged group, i.e., children with disabilities.
Minorities can usually protect themselves by playing their role in the political process and forming coalitions with other groups to secure a majority. But it is sense- less to remit District residents to the political process, since for them there is no political process.... In this context, ... the normal arguments for judicial restraint become no more than hollow shibboleths grotesquely detached from the logic which once supported them.... Therefore, discriminatory classifications affecting District residents must be subjected to the strictest possible review. Id. at 1341 (internal citation omitted).
[E]ven if one accepts the thesis that the class in question is residents of the District of Columbia, the mere lack of the ballot does not establish political powerlessness, or, if it does, political powerlessness alone is not enough for "suspect class" status. Minors, for example, are not a suspect class. It is, in any event, fanciful to consider as "politically powerless" a city whose residents include a high proportion of the officers of all three branches of the federal government, and their staffs. Id. (internal citation omitted).
within the court. A portion of the court's opinion responds to a concurring opinion's effort to devise a framework by which differential treatment of D.C. residents would, in certain circumstances, raise special equal protection concerns. See id. at 132 n.10, 136 n.12, responding to id. at 141-50 (Mikva, J., concurring). For all of these reasons, a panel of this court may not now depart from the en banc court's conclusion that D.C. residents do not comprise a suspect class for equal protection purposes.
In support of their second argument for heightened scruti- ny--that section 130 burdens the educational opportunities of a disadvantaged group--the families rely on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982), which applied heightened scruti- ny to invalidate a Texas statute denying public education to children not legally admitted to the United States. In subse- quent cases, however, the Supreme Court limited Plyler to its facts. In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, the Court rejected a claim that charging some students a fee for trans- portation to school triggered heightened scrutiny under Plyl- er, saying "we have not extended [Plyler's] holding beyond the unique circumstances that provoked its unique confluence of theories and rationales." 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Those "unique cir- cumstances" are not present here. In Plyler, the doors to the public schools were completely closed to children of undocumented aliens. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205. Although section 130 may make it less likely that disabled children will receive an education that conforms to IDEA, the doors to the schoolhouse remain open, as they did in Kadrmas. And the Supreme Court has made clear that a statute burdening the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children does not by that fact alone trigger heightened scrutiny. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (applying rational basis review to uphold Texas's use of property taxes to finance local school districts even though that funding system resulted in fewer educational opportuni- ties for poor students than for students in districts with richer tax bases).
We thus review the families' equal protection challenge under the rational basis standard. We ask whether "there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). "On rational-basis review, a ... statute ... comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Pointing to The Washington Post article, the District's brief refers to "evidence of abuse by attorneys in the legal services process," presumably implying--though never direct- ly so stating--that section 130 was designed to curb excessive or unjustified fees. The families and their lawyers resist any such charges, and at oral argument counsel for the District conceded that the city has no evidence of attorney miscon- duct. The District, moreover, "adopts" the United States' brief, which argues not that section 130 stemmed from evi- dence of attorney abuse, but that in view of DCPS's manifest inability to meet its obligations under IDEA, Congress could rationally have concluded that "it was more important for the District to spend its funds on remedying these systemic defects and providing primary services rather than upon litigation fees." According to the government, then, section 130's legitimate governmental purpose is to assist disabled children in D.C. by allocating additional funds to primary special education services. The statute is rationally related to that objective, we are left to infer, because limiting payments to attorneys will leave more funds available for direct ser- vices.
section 130 limits attorneys' fees even when paid from sources other than DCPS's budget; while the statute caps fees for both administrative proceedings and court litigation, pay- ments for the latter come from the Corporation Counsel's Settlement and Judgment fund. Finally, the families ask, even if section 130 actually made more funds available for special education, would any improvements that might flow from such expenditures outweigh section 130's harmful ef- fects?
Whatever the doubts about section 130, "rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be recti- fied by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314. Moreover, "courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends." Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.
Applying these highly deferential principles, we cannot conclude that Congress acted irrationally. Assisting disabled children is a legitimate governmental purpose. It is at least conceivable, moreover, that capping fees will produce addi- tional resources for direct educational services, and that, despite limiting parents' ability to use litigation as a means of enforcing IDEA, section 130 will yield a net benefit for disabled children. Notwithstanding the doubts of the families and the President, supra at 12-13, 6, that possibility suffices for the statute to survive rational basis review.
the well-settled principle that "[w]hile appropriation acts are 'Acts of Congress' which can substantively change existing law, there is a very strong presumption that they do not." Building & Construction Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As we have elsewhere observed, "the established rule [is] that, when appropriations measures arguably conflict with the underlying authorizing legislation, their effect must be construed narrowly. Such measures have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs." Donovan v. Carolina Stal- ite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying this principle, we agree with the district court that section 130 limits only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999 appropriations, not court authority to award fees under IDEA.
We begin, as we must, with section 130's plain language: "None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action ... brought against [DCPS] under [IDEA]" in excess of $50 per hour or $1,300 total. Note that nothing in section 130 restricts court authority to award fees under section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA; the rider concerns only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999 appropriations. As the district court observed, section 130 and IDEA regulate different government authorities: "The IDEA attorney's fees provision provides the courts with discretion ... to award reasonable attorneys' fees. By con- trast, section 130 governs the District of Columbia's appropri- ations and right to pay those fees."
130 is "a limitation upon the district court's authority to award attorneys' fees").
In view of the "very strong presumption" that appropria- tion acts do not amend substantive law, we face a straightfor- ward question of statutory construction: has Congress unam- biguously expressed an intent to limit court authority to award fees under IDEA? When Congress wants to use an appropriations act to limit court authority, it knows precisely how to do so. For example, section 311 of the 2000 Appropri- ations Act says, "section 5 of the Y2K Act ... is amended" to state that "punitive damages in a Y2K action may not be awarded against an institution of higher education." Section 311, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (Nov. 29, 1999). Section 130 contains no similar limiting language.
The District argues that even if section 130 does not expressly amend IDEA, the appropriations rider nevertheless represents an implied limit on court authority to award fees. Otherwise, the District claims, section 130 might increase the District's eventual fee liability by encouraging litigation to recover fees in excess of section 130's caps. Repeals by implication, however, are disfavored--a policy that "applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriations Act." TVA, 437 U.S. at 190. "[I]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). No irreconcilable conflict exists here since, as we have pointed out, section 130 and IDEA are directed at different governmental entities.
Congress, by appropriating funds for completion of the dam after learning that the snail darter had been placed on the endangered species list, had implicitly amended the Endan- gered Species Act to allow construction to continue. See id. at 189-90. Disagreeing, the Court explained that "[w]hile it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart- ment to say what the law is, it is equally--and emphatically-- the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation." Id. at 194 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Just as the Supreme Court left it to Congress to resolve the incon- gruity of appropriating funds for a dam that another statute prohibited, we leave to Congress the resolution of the incon- gruity in this case.
The cases relied on by the dissent do not require a differ- ent result. See Slip Op. at 2-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In American Federation of Government Employees, AFL- CIO v. Campbell, 659 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we held that an appropriations rider containing language similar to section 130 "modified pro tanto" a substantive statute. 659 F.2d at 161. The rider provided that "[n]o ... funds appropriated for the fiscal year  may be used to pay the salary or pay of any individual ... in an amount which exceeds [a five and one-half percent raise] as a result of any adjustments ... under [the 'prevailing rate' act]." Pub. L. No. 95-429, s 614(a), 92 Stat. 1001, 1018 (1978). Had the prevailing rate statute been given effect, government employees would have received raises in 1979 of between seven and twelve percent. Because of the appropriations rider, however, pay increases that year were limited to five and a half percent. Govern- ment employees "sued to enforce their alleged rights to wage increases based solely on the ... prevailing rate statute." Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159. We rejected their claim, conclud- ing that the appropriations act, by including a new ceiling on wage increases, and "by express reference to the earlier statute, effectively modified [it]." Id. at 161. We thus gave the appropriations act the effect that its express terms re- quired--limiting pay increases for FY 1979.
Observing that section 130 expressly refers to IDEA and includes a fee schedule, our dissenting colleague relies on Campbell for the conclusion that Congress intended to modify IDEA. See Slip Op. at 4-5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). We think Campbell and this case are different. As in Campbell, we have given the rider the effect that its plain text re- quires--limiting the District's payment of fees for FY 1999-- but this case presents an additional question, one not raised in Campbell: in the absence of clear legislative intent, evi- denced either through statutory language or legislative histo- ry, to amend substantive law, does an appropriations act funding one governmental entity restrict the substantive au- thority of a separate entity, indeed a separate branch of government? Given the "very strong presumption" that ap- propriation acts do not amend substantive statutes, neither section 130's reference to IDEA nor its fee schedule warrants an inference that an appropriations rider directed at the District of Columbia restricts the authority of the federal courts. Indeed, Congress could hardly have identified the class of payments affected by section 130 without mentioning IDEA. Nor could Congress have limited the District's FY 1999 payments without specifying the amounts of those limits.
If, as the dissent claims, section 130's ceiling on payments and reference to IDEA sufficed to modify IDEA, the existing presumption would be reversed and replaced with a presump- tion that appropriation riders do amend substantive law. Under the dissent's theory, Congress could limit the District's fee payments from particular appropriations without also restricting court authority to award fees only by adding an express statement that substantive law remains intact. That is not the law of this circuit.
promulgate, administer, or enforce [the OPM regulations]." Devine, 733 F.2d at 116. The Director of OPM interpreted the rider to mean that "each federal agency would simply have to administer and enforce the regulations without OPM's assistance...." Id. at 116. We rejected this interpretation of the rider, resting our decision on two factors. First, because "the express terms of the regulations require[d] OPM to play a critical and continuing role in their implemen- tation, administration, and enforcement," id. at 119, we doubt- ed whether the regulations could "sensibly ... be effectuated without OPM's continued participation." Id. at 120. Indeed, we viewed the Director's interpretation of the rider as "abdi- cating [OPM's] central responsibility for executing, adminis- tering, and enforcing civil service rules and regulations." Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, after examining the rider's legislative history, we found "clear indications of Congress' intent" to foreclose significant changes in personnel management policies. Id. at 120.
Neither factor is present in this case. To begin with, because the District plays no role in a court's awarding of fees, section 130 does not prevent the implementation of IDEA's fee provision in the same manner as the rider in National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine impeded implementation of OPM's regulations. Nor, for the same reason, does section 130 produce any "abdication" of District responsibility. Moreover, section 130's legislative history demonstrates no clear congressional intent to amend IDEA. Although the House Appropriations Committee wrote of an earlier version of section 130 that it would limit "the award of attorney fees," H.R. Rep. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998), see also Slip Op. at 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), the Conference Re- port accompanying the final bill speaks only of "plac[ing] a limit on the payment of fees to attorneys." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-825, at 1116 (1998). As the Supreme Court has observed, "[l]egislative materials may be without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous, ... and in such cases will not be permitted to control the customary meaning of words...." United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
neither more nor less than its plain text states. The rider's express terms restrict District payment of IDEA fees from FY 1999 appropriations. We give section 130 precisely that effect. If Congress wishes to restrict court authority to award fees against the District, it may do so either through the D.C. appropriations bill or through the enactment of substantive legislation amending IDEA. But until Congress demonstrates clear intent to modify substantive law, either through statutory language or persuasive legislative history, we presume in accordance with circuit precedent that it did not use section 130 to limit the power of federal courts to award fees under IDEA.
Ginsburg, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I concur in Parts I and II of the opinion for the Court and in the judgment in No. 99-5215, rejecting the families' constitutional challenges. I dissent from Part III of the opinion and from the judgment in No. 99-5216 because I believe that for FY 1999 the Congress modified the authority of the district court to award attorneys' fees under s 615 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. s 1415.
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the [district] court, in its discretion, may award reason- able attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. Id. at 92, codified at 20 U.S.C. s 1415(i)(3)(B).
None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action, including an administra- tive proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. s 1400 et seq.) if (1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney exceeds the hourly rate of compensation under section 11-2604(a), District of Columbia Code [i.e., $50 per hour], or (2) the maximum amount of compensation of the attor- ney exceeds the maximum amount of compensation un- der section 11-2604(b)(1), District of Columbia Code [i.e., $1,300 total], except that compensation and reimburse- ment in excess of such maximum may be approved for extended or complex representation in accordance with section 11-2604(c), District of Columbia Code. Obviously, s 130 has some effect upon attorneys' fees under the IDEA. The question before us is what effect: Is s 130 a limitation for FY 1999 upon the court's pre-existing authority in s 615 to award attorneys' fees in excess of $50 per hour and $1,300 per case? Or does it merely "prohibit[ ] the District from paying during the same fiscal year" any fee the district court might award in excess of those caps, Slip Op. at 15, thereby leaving the District liable for such awards after the end of that fiscal year? Today the court, citing an interpretive presumption and then declining to address the evidence offered by the District to overcome that presump- tion, gives the latter answer. I would give the former: s 130 limits the authority of the district court under IDEA s 615 because in s 130 the Congress "by clear implication, if not express statement, modified pro tanto the previous substan- tive law." American Federation of Government Employees v. Campbell, 659 F.2d 157, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In Campbell this court held that an appropriations rider strikingly similar in text and structure to s 130 modified pro tanto the prior substantive statute to which it referred. There, the plaintiffs were federal employees whose wages were determined under the "prevailing rate statute," 5 U.S.C. ss 5341-5349 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). That statute required that wages be "fixed and adjusted from time to time ... in accordance with prevailing rates," as determined by wage surveys of the private sector to be conducted by "lead agenc[ies]." Id. s 5343(a), (a)(3).
No ... funds appropriated for the fiscal year  ... may be used to pay the salary or pay of any individual ... in an amount which exceeds [a 5.5% raise] as a result of any adjustments which take effect during such fiscal year under ... (3) section 5343 of Title 5 ... if such adjustment is granted pursuant to a wage survey.... Pub. L. No. 95-429, s 614(a), 92 Stat. 1001, 1018 (1978). The Civil Service Commission interpreted the rider as prohibiting the employing agencies from granting any pay increase great- er than 5.5%, and the agencies therefore ordered raises of only that percentage. See Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159.
The plaintiffs argued to this court that the rider did not modify the prevailing rate statute, and therefore the employ- ing agencies were still required by law to order pay raises in the 7%-12% range recommended by the lead agencies. See id. at 160. We rejected this argument and concluded that for the fiscal year the appropriations rider modified the prevail- ing rate statute, limiting the plaintiffs' salary increase below the amount that would have been called for under that statute. We reached this conclusion based exclusively upon two elements in the text of the rider, which we accepted as clearly and unequivocally demonstrating that the Congress meant to and did modify the preexisting statute.
recognized the importance of such a reference (or lack there- of) in TVA v. Hill itself, see 437 U.S. at 189, and two of our sister circuits have since done so, see United States v. Joya- Martinez, 947 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1991); Republic Airlines, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 849 F.2d 1315, 1322 (10th Cir. 1988). But compare Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 576 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (express reference "not [ ] meaningful"), with id. at 579 (Trott, J., dissenting) (express reference crucial).
Second, in Campbell we noted that the Congress had "specifically set a ceiling on wage increases" in the appropria- tions rider, which differentiated the rider from a "mere failure to appropriate funds." 659 F.2d at 161 n.10. We distinguished New York Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743 (Ct. Cl. 1966), upon this basis. Again, the Supreme Court had already drawn the same distinction: The mere act of appropriating funds, see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 190, or of failing to do so, see Langston, 118 U.S. at 394, says little about the underlying substantive obligation; but inclusion in an appropriations act of a new framework to govern the substantive obligation indicates that the Congress was modi- fying the prior statutory framework, see, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1883). Therefore we conclud- ed that because the "Congress specifically set a ceiling on wage increases, and directly referred to the prevailing rate statute as one of the substantive statutes affected by the appropriations bill," the appropriations rider "contains words that by clear implication, if not express statement, modified pro tanto the previous substantive law." Campbell, 659 F.2d at 161 & n.10.
__________ * That s 130 expressly limits only the "pay[ment]" of IDEA attorneys' fees raises the possibility--and indeed, as the court notes, the presumption--that the Congress meant to affect only the payment and not the award of such fees. The Supreme Court has long held, however, that the use of "payment" or a similar term in an appropriations act does not end a court's inquiry into congres- sional intent. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1940) ("deny[ing] that such words [prohibiting only payment during a particular fiscal year] when used in an appropriation bill are words of art or have a settled meaning" sufficient to end the court's inquiry into congressional intent).
Both the Supreme Court and this court have found that appropri- ations riders that by their express terms limit or prohibit only payment may nonetheless alter the underlying substantive obli- gation and not just its payment. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 205-08, 223-24 (1980); Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159 n.6; City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Tayloe v. Kjaer, 171 F.2d 343, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
2000 provision identical in relevant part to s 130] would cap the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in [IDEA] cases") (emphases supplied).
Finally, the District argues that the incongruous and plain- ly unintended results ensuing from the court's interpretation suggest that s 130 is a limitation upon the district court's authority to award attorneys' fees; common sense tells us the District is right. Otherwise, one would have to believe that the Congress intended awards of attorneys' fees above the caps to accumulate as IOUs, payable at the end of the fiscal year when the appropriations rider is no longer operative. Of course, the Congress does, not infrequently, decline to appro- priate money for an undertaking authorized under prior law. In cases where the prior statute merely authorizes the under- taking, however, no obligation can lawfully be incurred until funds have been appropriated, see 31 U.S.C. 1341(a); the effect in such a case is to postpone until a later date any steps that actually cause the Government to incur an obligation. This case is entirely different: Under the court's interpreta- tion of s 130, the District will continue to incur additional liabilities, which will continue to accumulate while its authori- ty to pay them remains in suspense.
Congress ... was simply appropriating a part of that which it knew was due." Belknap v. United States, 150 U.S. 588, 595 (1893); see also Will, 449 U.S. at 224 ("Congress intended to rescind [Adjustment Act] raises entirely, not simply to con- sign them to the fiscal limbo of an account due but not payable"); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. De- vine, 733 F.2d 114, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting interpreta- tion of appropriations resolution that would have resulted in "steady accumulation of unreviewed proposals").
As the District points out in its brief, the result of the court's interpretation of s 130 is in fact more than just peculiar--it accomplishes the exact opposite of what the Congress sought to achieve through s 130. Most IDEA complaints filed with the District are resolved in an adminis- trative proceeding before the D.C. school system, that is, without resort to the district court. Before s 130 was enact- ed, the District had adopted guidelines under which, as required by the IDEA, it would award and pay reasonable attorneys' fees in such cases upon the submission of a proper fee application; thus in FY 1998 the District, without any court involvement, approved and paid $10,400,000 in IDEA attorneys' fees for administrative proceedings; during the same year the District paid only $664,000 in fees awarded by the court. When s 130 became effective, however, the Dis- trict revised its guidelines, in conformity therewith, to pre- clude any fee application that sought attorneys' fees above the caps. In other words, the District interpreted s 130 as limiting its authority to award as well as to pay attorneys' fees above the caps during FY 1999--an interpretation the court today necessarily accepts as correct in the way it tries to distinguish Campbell, Slip Op. at 17.
the district court may include in its uncapped award reason- able fees for the attorneys' fee litigation, see Moore v. District of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1987) (awarding $29,357 for IDEA representation and $19,117 for representa- tion in subsequent attorneys' fee litigation before the district court). Under the court's interpretation of s 130, therefore, the Congress not only failed effectively to cap the fees awarded against the District, it managed to increase the District's fee liability--as well as the District's expenditures for its own legal representation--by requiring and enabling families to go to district court to obtain a higher award. I do not think that was what the legislature meant to do or did. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 430 (1998) (rejecting interpretation of statute that "would produce an absurd ... result which Congress could not have intended").
The greatest problem for the court is that no matter how it analyzes s 130 it runs into Campbell. As for the undoubted presumption against finding that an appropriations act effects a substantive modification of law, in Campbell we concluded unequivocally that the appropriations act repealed pro tanto the prevailing rate statute, and the presumption was over- come based upon only the two textual elements that are likewise present in s 130. As for the undoubted rule that repeal by implication is disfavored, even if we treat s 130 as an implied repealer--and I do not believe that either this case or Campbell involves an implied repealer as exemplified by the argument urged upon the Court in TVA v. Hill--the same two textual factors provide the "affirmative showing of an intent to repeal" required under TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 190.
__________ extensive and uncontested evidence regarding incongruous out- comes in order to determine what the Congress most likely meant by s 130. Slip Op. at 15. The portion of TVA v. Hill quoted by the court, however, Slip Op. at 14, 16, merely states that after a court has determined what the Congress commanded in the statute, it should not use its remedial discretion effectively to nullify that command by withholding a remedy based upon its own "appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of [the] particular course consciously selected by the Congress." Id. at 194. This rule certainly does not authorize, let alone require, this court to ignore the District's arguments about what the statute means in the first place.
that we held sufficient in Campbell to show the Congress meant to modify substantive law. The real issue lurking in the court's rhetorical question, then, is not whether evidence of congressional intent is required but whether such evidence can ever show that an appropriations act funding one govern- mental entity is meant to restrict the substantive authority of another entity. As a pair of cases from this court demon- strates, the answer is yes, if that is what the Congress discernably meant the appropriations act to do.
In Devine, 733 F.2d at 114, the Office of Personnel Man- agement had issued new personnel regulations less than a month before the Congress enacted an appropriations rider stating that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this Act [funding the OPM] shall be obligated or expended to imple- ment, promulgate, administer, or enforce the [new OPM regulations]." 733 F.2d at 116. Based upon the precise wording of the rider, the OPM took the position that the rider "does not prevent any agency other than OPM from imple- menting, administering and enforcing the regulations within that agency." Id. at 116-17. We rejected that argument for two reasons, both based expressly upon the intent of the legislature: first, the Congress did not intend personnel regulations to be applied by other agencies without the OPM's involvement; and second, "even assuming arguendo that the regulations could be implemented workably without further participation by the OPM, it is evident that Congress intended to prevent this." Id. at 119-20.
[The appropriations rider] was the beginning of an effort by some members of Congress to shift [certain mining] operations from MSHA to OSHA jurisdiction. That effort ultimately did not succeed and we think it would be wholly unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended a temporary suspension to wreak the procedural havoc with ongoing appeals that [petitioner] urges. We inter- pret [the rider] to indicate only Congress' intent that MSHA initiate no new enforcement litigation. Id. at 1558. Thus, the court did not interpret the rider as doing anything more than limiting new enforcement actions by the MSHA because there was no indication that the Congress had the seemingly unreasonable intent to affect actions already in the hands of the Solicitor.
The text of s 130 makes clear that the Congress modified for FY 1999 the authority of the district court to award attorneys' fees under s 615 of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. s 1415. Even if s 130 is analyzed under the rubric of an implied repealer, the same text provides the clear and manifest "affirmative showing of an intention to [modify]" required under TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 190. I therefore dissent from Part III of the opinion for the Court and from the judgment in No. 99-5216.
__________ view of the absurd results brought on by the contrary interpreta- tion--and only secondarily upon legislative history.

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text:
UNITED STATES v. GOMEZ HERNANDEZ May 31, 2012 No. 10–10441.
UNITED STATES v. PEREA REY May 31, 2012 No. 10–50632.
LEWIS v. AYERS May 30, 2012 No. 11–15309.
FLOURNOY v. SMALL CDCR May 30, 2012 No. 11–55015.
UNITED STATES v. LEAL VEGA May 30, 2012 No. 11–50065.
ORDONEZ v. UNITED STATES May 29, 2012 No. 09–56533.
MARSH v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 100 May 29, 2012 No. 11–55395.
SCHECHNER v. KPIX TV CBS May 29, 2012 No. 11–15294.
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON May 29, 2012 No. 11–10290.
UNITED STATES v. HARRIS May 25, 2012 No. 11–10053.
NATIVE VILLAGE OF POINT HOPE; Alaska Wilderness League; Center for Biological Diversity; Defenders of Wildlife; Natural Resources Defense Council; National Audubon Society, Inc.; Northern Alaska Environmental Center; Oceana; Pacifi May 25, 2012 Nos. 11–72891, 11–72943.
NATIVE VILLAGE OF POINT HOPE; Alaska Wilderness League; Center for Biological Diversity; Defenders of Wildlife; Natural Resources Defense Council; National Audubon Society, Inc.; Northern Alaska Environmental Center; Oceana; Pacific Environment; Resisti.. May 25, 2012 Nos. 11–72891, 11–72943.
WILHELM v. ROTMAN May 25, 2012 No. 11–16335.
FENENBOCK v. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS FOR CALIFORNIA May 24, 2012 No. 11–15880.
FENENBOCK v. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS FOR CALIFORNIA May 24, 2012 No. 11–15880.
UNITED STATES v. ROMO CHAVEZ May 23, 2012 No. 10–10424.
JIMENEZ v. FRANKLIN May 22, 2012 Nos. 10–56199, 10–56292, 10–56294.
UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER May 22, 2012 No. 10–30146.
JAMES v. CITY OF COSTA MESA May 21, 2012 No. 10–55769.
LOPEZ v. RYAN May 15, 2012 No. 12–99001.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. JASPER May 15, 2012 No. 10–17064.
C.O., a minor, Plaintiff, and Pat Oman, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS PPS May 14, 2012 Nos. 10–35340, 10–35402.
SEXTON v. COZNER May 13, 2012 No. 10–35055.
UNITED STATES v. VALLEE May 10, 2012 No. 11–30131.
UNITED STATES v. HUPING ZHOU May 10, 2012 No. 10–50231.
THOMAS v. CHAPPELL May 10, 2012 No. 09–99024.
Sonya RENEE; Candice Johnson, a minor, by Sonya Renee, her guardian ad litem; Maribel Heredia; Jose Aldana, a minor, by Maribel Heredia, his guardian ad litem; B. Doe, a minor, by N. Doe, her guardian ad litem; Mariel Rubio; Danielle Rubio, a minor, by .. May 10, 2012 No. 08–16661.
WARD v. CHAVEZ May 8, 2012 No. 09–17016.
KARL v. CITY OF MOUNTLAKE TERRACE May 8, 2012 No. 11–35343.
VETERANS FOR COMMON SENSE v. E May 7, 2012 No. 08–16728.
CROSBY v. SCHWARTZ May 4, 2012 No. 10–17726.
CHARLES v. WILLDEN May 4, 2012 No. 10–17680.
NEDDS v. CALDERON May 4, 2012 No. 08–56520.
DETRICH v. RYAN May 2, 2012 No. 08–99001.
PADILLA v. YOO May 2, 2012 No. 09–16478.
BELTRAN v. ASTRUE May 2, 2012 No. 09–56255.

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The City University of New York and Hostos Community College (or “the College”), in compliance with Sections 503 and 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), New York State Executive Law §296, and New York City Human Rights Law, provides reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities.
A reasonable accommodation is any adjustment, modification, or action taken which permits qualified individuals the equal opportunity to participate in programs, activities, or employment. Requests for reasonable accommodations shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. It is the policy of Hostos Community College to provide reasonable accommodations to employees, job applicants, and students with disabilities, unless it causes an undue hardship.
The President of the College is responsible for the implementation of these procedures.
The College has a 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator who has the responsibility for coordinating efforts to ensure access and non-discrimination for individuals with disabilities.
The Director of Human Resources is responsible for making arrangements to provide reasonable accommodations to applicants for employment and current employees.
The Director of the College’s Office of Services for Student with Disabilities has the responsibility for providing services and coordinating efforts to ensure access to programs and activities for students with disabilities.
As part of a standard acknowledgment letter, individual applicants are to be instructed to contact the College's Director of Human Resources if an accommodation is needed to participate in the application/interview process. The Human Resource Director will make arrangements with the appropriate individuals to provide a reasonable accommodation.
Upon initial hire, each employee is given the opportunity to self identify as a person with a disability and to request a reasonable accommodation. The self-identification form is to be circulated annually by Human Resources to all current employees to permit the self-identification of employees who may have become disabled subsequent to initial hire.
An employee should make any initial request for accommodation to her/his immediate supervisor. Alternatively, an employee may direct his/her request to the Director of Human Resources. In either case, consultation between the employee's supervisor and the Director of Human Resources should take place to determine whether the requested accommodation, or an alternate accommodation, is appropriate and should be implemented. Appropriate supporting documentation should be provided to the Human Resources Director. If the proffered accommodation is acceptable to the employee, the Human Resources Director should inform the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator of the nature of the accommodation.
When an accommodation is complex or requires college expenditures, the supervisor and the Human Resources Director are required to obtain the input of the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator and/or other college officials. Such consultation shall be confidential, and limited to those officials whose input is necessary to the decision.
Employees may consult with the college's 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator at any time to discuss and understand their rights under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and state and local legislation, and they are encouraged to do so.
Brochures/flyers announcing specific public programs should include a statement identifying the person to contact if an accommodation is needed. The time frame, by which such a request must be made, e.g. forty-eight hours in advance, must be included in the statement. A visitor should make any initial request for accommodation to the individual designated on the flyer. The designee should consult with appropriate college officials to determine the feasibility of granting the requested accommodation. Such consultation shall be confidential, and limited to those officials whose input is necessary to the decision. If the proffered accommodation is acceptable to the visitor, the designee should inform the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator of the nature of the accommodation.
A student should make an initial request for accommodation to the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities, and provide appropriate supporting documentation. The Students with Disabilities Services Director may consult with appropriate college officials such as the instructor or provost to determine the appropriateness of the requested accommodation consistent with the program requirements. Such consultation shall be confidential, and limited to those officials whose input is necessary to the decision.
Students may consult with the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities or the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator at any time to discuss and understand their rights under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and state and local legislation, and they are encouraged to do so.
Applicants whose request for accommodation is denied or who do not agree with a proposed accommodation for the application/interview process, will inform the Human Resource Director. The Human Resource Director will inform the 504/ADA Coordinator who will make the final decision and inform the applicant of the decision.
If an employee does not agree with a proffered accommodation, the employee may discuss the situation with the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator who will review the matter and attempt to resolve it. The Compliance Coordinator may designate one or two members of the 504/ADA Committee to assist in this effort. If the matter is not resolved, the employee may exercise any and all rights available under law without fear of retaliation. If the employee is a union member, the employee may wish to discuss this situation with his/her union representative and exercise any rights available under the collective bargaining agreement. The Compliance Coordinator will keep the President apprised of the matter.
If a visitor finds a proffered accommodation unacceptable, the visitor may discuss the situation with the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator. The Compliance Coordinator shall make the final decision after consultation with the college President.
If a proffered accommodation is unacceptable to the student, the student may discuss the situation with the 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator who will review the matter and attempt to resolve it. The college 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator may designate one or two members of the 504/ADA Committee to assist in this effort. If the proffered accommodation is still unacceptable, the college Compliance Coordinator will apprise the college President of the issues and the college Compliance Coordinator's recommendation. The President shall make the final decision.
The 504/ADA Compliance Coordinator is responsible for collecting the information on all accommodation requests including the number made and type of accommodation provided to employees. Likewise, the Students with Disabilities Services Director is responsible for collecting the information on all accommodation requests including the number made and type of accommodation provided to students. Whether records are maintained on paper or computer, they should be kept in a secure location and protected from damage or loss.
There are very strict limitations on the use of medical information obtained through the reasonable accommodation process. All requests for accommodation and all supporting information, including but not limited to medical information, are to be considered confidential and shared with college officials only on a need-to-know basis. Any medical documentation submitted or obtained may only be used to evaluate the request for accommodation. Medical records for employees must be kept in a separate file in the Human Resources Department. Medical records for students are to be kept in a separate file and maintained in the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities.
Applicants and employees, students and visitors may avail themselves of their legal rights to complain to non-CUNY agencies, without fear of retaliation. An updated list of these non-CUNY agencies may be obtained from the College's Office of Compliance and Diversity.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The term "disability" means...a physical or mental impairment that constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment; or...a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 USC §705(9). Individual with a disability...[T]he term "individual with a disability" means...any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment, 29 USC §705(20)(B).
The Americans with Disabilities Act. The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 USC §12102(2).
New York State Human Rights Law. The term "disability" means (a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held. Executive Law §292(21).
New York City Administrative Code. The term "physical or mental impairment" means a physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin and endocrine; or a mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, developmental disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. It includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, alcoholism, substance abuse, and drug addition. Admin. Code §8-102(16)(b).
Section 503 - Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, administered by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, applies to all federal contractors and subcontractors with contracts of $10,000 or more. It mandates affirmative action to employ and advance in employment, qualified people with disabilities. In addition, it requires all recipients with 50 or more employees and one or more federal contracts of $50,000 or more to prepare and maintain affirmative action programs.
Section 504 - Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in federally funded programs and activities. The Justice Department's Disability Rights Section is responsible for coordinating government-wide efforts to comply with Section 504.
The Americans with Disabilities Act - The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) guarantees disabled people access to employment, public accommodations, transportation, public services and telecommunications. The ADA provides comprehensive federal civil rights protection for people with disabilities.
New York State Human Rights Executive Law 296 - Executive Law §296(1)(a) makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment a disabled individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Executive Law §296(3)(a) requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee, prospective employee in connection with a job or occupation sought or held or participation in a training program. Executive Law §296(b) provides that nothing contained in this subdivision shall be construed to require provision of accommodations that can be demonstrated to impose an undue hardship on the operation of an employer's business program or enterprise. Executive Law §296(7) makes it unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.
Making sure that disabled students receive the same opportunities that other students receive in the most integrated fashion.
Providing training to those who must interact with the disabled.
504/ADA Committee - The 504/ADA Committee serves as an advisory committee to the 504/ADA Coordinator. The committee assists in formulating new ideas and monitoring the College for 504/ADA Compliance. The Committee is comprised of representatives from various divisions, departments, programs, and services that make up the College. The Coordinator for Disabled Student Services is a member of the committee.
Reasonable Accommodations - The term "reasonable accommodation" means actions taken which permit an employee or prospective employee with a disability to perform in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held and include, but are not limited to, provision of an accessible worksite, acquisition or modification of equipment, support services for persons with impaired hearing or vision, job restructuring and modified work schedules; provided, however, that such actions do not impose an undue hardship on the business, program or enterprise of the entity from which action is requested. New York State Human Rights Executive Law §292(21-e).