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ARTHUR M. MANIGAULT, Appt., v. ALFRED A. SPRINGS et al.
This was a bill in equity filed March 4, 1903, by Manigault, to enjoin the damming or otherwise obstructing Kinloch creek, in the county of Georgetown, South Carolina. A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the bill subsequently dismissed. See 123 Fed. 707.
It seems that, in 1898, the plaintiff and the two defendants, Springs and Lachicotte, together with one Ford, were adjoining riparian owners on the Santee river, at the mouth of Kinloch creek. The creek furnished access as a highway to all the proprietors on its banks. At that time the defendants constructed a dam across the creek for their own purposes. Objection was made to this by plaintiff and by Ford as an interference with their rights of passage and irrigation. Plaintiff also complained that the effect was to compel him to raise the dikes around his lands. As a result of long negotiations, a compromise was effected and a contract entered into in August, 1898, between defendants under the name of S. M. Ward & Company, of the first part, and plaintiff and Ford, of the second part, whereby it was agreed that the obstructions should continue until December 31 of that year, when they should be removed, so as to give the parties complaining a clear passage through the creek.
This removal was effected and matters allowed to remain as they were until 1903, when the general assembly of the state passed an act reciting the necessity of draining the lowlands on the Santee river, whereby their taxable value would be greatly enhanced. Authority was given to the defendants by name to erect and maintain a dam across Kinloch creek, with a proviso that they should be liable for all such damages as might be established in any court of competent jurisdiction by any landowner claiming that his land had been damaged by reason of the erection of the dam.
Mr. Henry A. M. Smith for appellant.
Mr. Theodore G. Barker for appellees.
It was also charged that the Constitution of South Carolina, declared hat all navigable waters should forever remain public highways, was a privilege annexed to and constituting a part of the value of the lands, and that the damming of the creek, except for the purpose of the public health, welfare, and safety, and without due compensation therefor, was a destruction of the property of the plaintiff, and a deprivation thereof without due process of law.
The specific injury complained of is that the plaintiff is the owner of a rice plantation on the North Santee river, bordering on Minim creek, a tributary of the Santee, and lying in part just opposite the mouth or entrance of Kinloch creek; that, relying on the agreement of the defendants, he had also purchased a millsite on the Santee, which could be used for a rice mill or a sawmill, the chief element of value of which was the water connection by means of a canal with Bluff Back creek, accessible only through Kinloch creek, and the consequent necessity of keeping Kinloch creek open and unobstructed; that Kinloch creek is a water highway, navigable by vessels into the Santee river and thence into the ocean; that the erection and retention of a dam across Kinloch creek would not only interrupt his use of Kinloch creek and Bluff Back creek by preventing access to the public landing on the state road from his plantation on Kinloch creek, but would obstruct the inflow of the tide of the Santee river through Minim creek, causing the water from the river to flow back upon the banks to the plantation opposite the mouth of Kinloch creek, and would thus compel him to raise and strengthen his banks.
1. The first question considered by the court below was whether Kinloch creek was a navigable water of the United States, as defined in the case of The Montello (United States v. The Montello) 11 Wall. 411, 20 L. ed. 191, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391, or navigable, as navigable streams are defined by the Constitution and the laws of South Carolina. The court was of opinion, based apparently upon affidavits not sent up with the record, that the creek was not a navigable stream under these definitions.
But the bill alleges that 'Kinloch creek is a navigable stream or water highway,' and the cause was determined upon demurrer to the bill, which admits the allegation of the bill that the creek was navigable. As an original proposition we have repeatedly held that, in the absence of legislation by Congress, as state has power to improve its lands and promote the general health by authorizing a dam to be built across its interior streams, though they were previously navigable to the sea by vessels engaged in the coastwise trade. This was decided in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412, in a brief but cogent opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. An act of the state of Delaware gave the defendant the right to build a dam across the Black Bird Marsh creek, the constitutionality of which act was attacked as an abridgment of the rights of those who had been accustomed to use it for the purposes of navigation. 'But this abridgment,' said the court (p. 251, L. ed. p. 414), 'unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance.' The act was sustained. See also Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 24, L. ed. 525; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 732, 18 L. ed. 101; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 30 L. ed. 487, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313.
So also in Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 205, 28 L. ed. 959, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423, a provision in the act admitting California 9 Stat. at L. 453, chap. 50, § 3, that 'all the navigable waters within the said state shall be common highways and forever free,' was held not to deprive the state of the power possessed by it to authorize the erection of bridges over navigable waters. Said the court, page 211, L. ed. p. 961, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 426, 'the clause, therefore, in the act admitting California, quoted above, upon which the complainant relies, must be considered, according to these decisions, as in no way impairing the power which the state could exercise over the subject if the clause had no existence.' To the same effect, Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 31 L. ed. 629, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Hamilton v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. 119 U. S. 280, 284, 30 L. ed. 393, 395, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206.
In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, it was held that the act of September 19, 1890 26 Stat. at L. 426, chap. 907, conferring upon the Secretary of War the authority to direct the alteration of such bridges so as to render navigation easy and unobstructed, did not deprive the states of authority to bridge such streams.
While all of these cases turned upon the power of the state to authorize the erection of bridges, the same principle applies where the legislature deems it necessary to the public welfare to make other improvements for the reclamation of swampy and overflowed lands, though certain individual proprietors may thereby be subjected to expense. The question whether Kinloch creek could be obstructed without the permission of the Secretary of War does not arise in this case, and is specially disclaimed by the plaintiff. See Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 633, 44 L. ed. 914, 919, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U. S. 89, 47 L. ed. 965, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735.
It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of constracts does not prevent the state from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar instances of this are where parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment by a change of policy on the part of the state, prohibiting the establishment or continuance of such traffic; in other words, that parties, by entering into contracts, may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.
While this power is subject to limitations in certain cases, there is wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary,a discretion which courts ordinarily will not interfere with. The leading case upon this point is that of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. ed. 773, in which a franchise to maintain a ferry between Cambridge and Boston, under which a bridge was subsequently erected, was held to be subject to the power of the legislature to establish a parallel bridge between the same points. In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079, a charter to a lottery company for twenty-five years was held to be subject to the power of the state to abolish lotteries altogether. Similar cases announcing the same principle are Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645, 24 L. ed. 302; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City, L. S. L. & S. H. Co.. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 672, 29 L. ed. 516, 524, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 665, 31 L. ed. 205, 211, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581.
It only remains to consider, in connection with this branch of the case, whether the act of the general assembly of 1903 was a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Of this we have no doubt. Although it was not an exercise of that power in its ordinarily accepted sense of protecting the health, lives, and morals of the community, it is defensible in its broader meaning of providing for the general welfare of the people by the reclamation of swampy, overflowed, and infertile lands, and the erection of dams, levees, and dikes for that purpose. We have often held that private interests are subservient to that right, except where property is taken for which compensation must be paid, and must give way to any general scheme for the reclamation or improvement of such lands.
Indeed, this seems to have been within the contemplation of Congress in its act of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat. at L. 519, chap. 84, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1586), to enable the states to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits, the 1st section of which enacts that 'to enable the state of Arkansas to construct the necessary levees and drains to reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein, the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cultivation . . . shall be, and the same are hereby, granted to said state.' Section 4 extends this provision to the other states. Although the act has no direct bearing on this case, it recognizes an intent on the part of Congress to allow the states to regulate the disposal of overflowed lands as the legislature shall deem best for the public interests. That the act of the general assembly in question was passed upon this theory is indicated by its recitals, that 'by reason of the drainage and protection of said lands from overflow, their taxable value will be greaty enhanced, and, without the dam provided for in this bill, a large part of the land bordering on said creek will eventually become abandoned and valueless, as some portions of it now are,' and that this 'is the only feasible and practicable scheme for the drainage of said lands.' This was the reason given for the passage of the act of the general assembly of Delaware in the Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.'s Case already cited. 'Chief Justice Marshall observed (p. 251, L. ed. p. 414): 'The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come into collision with the powers of the general government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the states.' Several subsequent decisions have confirmed the power of the state to deal, in the absence of congressional legislation, with their rivers, for the purposes of their internal improvement, such as Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 15 L. ed. 816, wherein the right of Mississippi to change the channels or courses of rivers within the state for the purpose of improvement was sustained, and Alkinson v. Philadelphia & T. R. Co. (Fed. Cas. No. 615), a decision by Mr. Justice Baldwin of this court.
The whole subject was recently discussed in the case of Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 44 L. ed. 914, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, wherein was vindicated the right of the state of Louisiana to authorize the construction and maintenance of levees, drains, and other structures necessary and suitable to reclaim swamp and overflowed lands, although there was evidence that the stream there concerned (Red Pass) was useful for some minor purposes of interstate commerce. There was testimony that luggers or yawls chiefly used by fishermen to carry oysters to and from their beds sometimes went through this pass, but it was not shown that passengers ever went through it, or that freight destined for any other state was ever carried through it.
While, as already observed, there is a general allegation in the bill that Kinloch creek was a navigable stream, and was capable of navigation by vessels in the Santee river and thence into the ocean, there is no allegation that it was ever used for that purpose, and the opinion of the court was that it certainly was not a navigable water of the United States, or a public highway under the laws of South Carolina. But, however this may be, we are of opinion that the state had full power, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to authorize the construction of this dam for the avowed purposes of this act.
The only allegation of the bill in that connection is that the construction of the dam was not only a destruction of plaintiff's right of navigation and of his access to his lands through Kinloch creek, but has caused the water to fall back to some extent on the plantation on Minim creek, just opposite the mouth of Kinloch, so as to compel the plaintiff to raise his dikes. We do not think the overflow to the minor extent indicated constitutes a taking of property within the meaning of the law, when the damage can be prevented by raising the banks, or that, if the damage stated did in fact result, that it would justify the interposition of a court of equity.
The question whether the overflow of lands constitutes 'a taking' within the constitutional provision has been discussed in several cases in this court. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 336; Gibson v. United States, 106 U. S. 269, 41 L. ed. 996, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 45 L. ed. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Atwater v. Canandaigua, 124 N. Y. 602, 27 N. E. 385.
A recent case is that of United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349, wherein it was held that where the government had placed dams and other obstructions in the Savannah river in such manner as to hinder its natural flow, and to raise the water so as to overflow plaintiff's lands and to cause a total destruction of their value, the proceeding must be regarded as an actual appropriation of the land, and created an obligation upon the government to make compensation for the land. The case was distinguished from that of Mills v. United States, 12 L. R. A. 673, 46 Fed. 738, wherein the damage consisted in obliging the plaintiff to raise the levees around his rice fields to prevent the flooding of the fields in high water. 'Obviously,' said the court, in commenting upon that case, 'there was no taking of the plaintiff's lands, but simply an injury which could be remedied at an expense, as alleged, of $10,000, and the action was one to recover the amount of this consequential injury. The court rightfully held that it could not be sustained.' A still more recent case is that of Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 48 L. ed. 414, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238, in which it is held that damages to lands by flooding as a result of revetments erected by the United States along the banks of the Mississippi river to prevent erosion of the banks from natural causes are consequential, and do not constitute a taking of the lands flooded within the meaning of the Constitution.
We think the rule to be gathered from these cases is that where there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of plaintiff's lands, there is a taking which demands compensation; but otherwise where, as in this case, plaintiff is merely put to some extra expense in warding off the consequences of the overflow.
The damage claimed by the plaintiff in the interruption of access to his lands and the impairment of his right to navigate the creek does not demand separate consideration. We have repeatedly held that where the government of the United States has, for the purposes of improving the navigation of a river, erected piers or other structures by which access to plaintiff's land is rendered more difficult, there is no claim for compensation. Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 41 L. ed. 996, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 45 L. ed. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48. We see no reason why the same principle should not apply to cases where the state legislature, exercising its police power, directs a certain dam to be built, and thereby incidentally impairs access to lands above the dam. In both cases the soverign is exercising its constitutional right,in one case in improving the navigation of the river, and in the other, in draining its lowlands, and thereby enhancing their value for agricultural purposes.
It is suggested that the agreement of 1898 created an easement of access to plaintiff's land (Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481, 24 N. E. 858; Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253), and that the statute of South Carolina must be construed as overriding private rights of property, and not merely as putting an end to the rights of the public, and as giving to plaintiff a claim for damages for the taking of the easement. But it does not necessarily follow that an injunction should issue. Apparently this covenant did not apply to the millsite, since this was purchased after the covenant was made; but, however this may be, a court of equity is not bound to enjoin a public work authorized by statute, until compensation is paid, where no property is directly appropriated. This is particularly true where the damage is difficult of ascertainment at the time, and a reasonable provision is made by the law for compensation. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. 135 U. S. 641, 34 L. ed. 295, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 965; Beasley v. Texas & P. R. Co. 191 U. S. 492, 48 L. ed. 274, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Haverhill Bridge v. Essex County, 103 Mass. 120, 4 Am. Rep. 518; Parker v. Catholic Bishop, 146 Ill. 158, 34 N. E. 473. The state cases are numerous on this point.
In view of the incidental character of the damage probably resulting to plaintiff's land from the erection of this dam, and the careful provision of the act that the defendants shall be liable for such damage, we do not think, at least, in the absence of an allegation that the defendants are financially irresponsible, that a court of equity would be authorized to enjoin the erection until the damages, which, if they exist at all, must be very difficult of ascertainment, shall be paid.
Admitting that, for the purposes of transit and travel, a river may be considered a highway,and that seems to have been adjudged by the supreme court of South Carolina (Heyward v. Chisolm, 11 Rich. L. 253),we think that, in connection with the words 'to lay out, open, alter, or work roads,' the word 'highway' is used in its ordinary sense, and as an equivalent to a public road. The power given by this section is evidently inapplicable to water highways, which are neither laid out, opened, altered, or worked in the ordinary sense of these words.
4. It is also urged that the act was passed without the formality required by the Revised Statutes of South Carolina of 1893, in which it is declared that no bill for the granting of any privilege or immunity, or for any other private purpose whatsoever, shall be introduced or entertained in either house of the general assembly except by petition, to be signed by the persons desiring such privileges, of which sixty days notice shall be given to all person interested, and be published in the newspaper having the largest circulation in the county where such privilege is to be enjoyed, once a week for three weeks, etc.
There was no error in the action of the court below, and its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
CITY OF OWENSBORO, Appt., v. CUMBERLAND TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
OTIS COMPANY, v. LUDLOW MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Ludlow Cordage Company.
UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. CORA WELCH and David Welch, Her Husband, Jesse Wilson, Ella Wilson Brown, et al.
ARKANSAS SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY and F. L. Shaw, Sheriff and Tax Collector, Plffs. in Err., v. LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY.
JOHN F. CALDER, David A. Crow, John E. More, Thomas H. Keogh, and Willard Kingsley, Plffs. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, by the Attorney General, at the Relation of George E. Ellis, Moses Taggart, and Samuel A. Freshney.

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Terms of sale (TOS) changed on 31 December 2018, please refer to the French Version.
These Terms of sale (TOS) apply to any purchase of products or services made by any person (hereafter referred to as “client” or “you”, depending on the context) from the company Euporos SA (hereafter referred to as “Euporos SA” or “we”, depending on the context), via the website www.euporos.ch (and all its sub-domains), or by any other means of long-distance communication, or on (the company's) site. Euporos SA is the seller of products and services.
You acknowledge that all contracts, notices, disclosures and other types of exchange that take place electronically comply with legal provisions, which require that such exchanges take place in writing. Any oral agreement made between you and us must be confirmed in writing – otherwise it is invalid.
Euporos SA reserves the right to change these TOS at its sole discretion; the applicable terms are those in force on the site at the time that you place your order.
The text of the TOS shall prevail in French. The original version, which is written in French, prevails over its translations in any other language.
In addition to the TOS, special stipulations apply for certain products or services: our storage service is governed by the Terms of Storage Contract (SC); the special account intended for children and adolescents is subject to the Terms of the Juni’OR account (JUN); the redemption of old gold/silver (jewellery, silverware, bars, coins ...) is made according to the Terms of Repurchase (RP).
You must be juridically authorized to validly conclude a purchase transaction, i.e. to have reached the age of legal majority and possess legal capacity (not to be under wardship nor guardianship).
If you live outside Switzerland, please find out if your country authorises the importation and the detention of precious metals; Euporos SA cannot be held responsible, if the consignee breaks the law of a foreign State.
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You contract when you give the purchase order, either by phone, or by sending an e-mail, or via your customer account on our online sales site. In the latter case, the prices of products and services are provided through the order process; reached the stage “identification”, you can click on the button “generate PDF” to preview them without commitment on your part, or also can click on the button “proceed to the next step”, then the button “place my order” to buy without right of withdrawal (article 10 TOS).
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Cash: If you wish to pay in cash, you must arrange a meeting immediately and come at the latest on the fifth working-day following the date of your order (saturday and sunday are not considered as working-days).
Bank card: After billing reception, the authorisation of the debit is to be given either on our secure (see the page “Legal Notes”) Internet platform or at the location of our offices.
3. Penalty for late payment: If you are late in paying the price, we are entitled to cancel the transaction. You would then be liable to pay a lump sum of 20 % of the gross amount of your order, with the minimum amount of compensation at least 2000 CHF (two thousand Swiss francs). You are obliged to pay any debt recovery costs, administrative fees, lawyers’ fees and expenses.
4. Transfer of ownership: The ownership of the goods ordered shall be transferred simultaneously with the receipt of your payment and delivery of possession of the said property or its storage.
1. A dependable and reliable offer: The packages are generally sent at the latest two weeks after reception of your payment. Our principal is that our stock, itself alone, must be large enough to fill all orders and to deliver promptly.
2. Exceptional situations: However, when we receive an order for a particularly high amount, or when a rush of buyers in the market of precious metals causes a work-overload on the foundries, there can be a waiting, which is not our fault. We will in this case deliver as soon as possible. If our supplier definitively cannot deliver, we will reimburse you the total amount of your order.
1. Guarantee of protection: Sending of goods to the customers is done via security transport. The goods are 100 %-insured against risks of despoilment or loss during transport. In the event of despoilment or loss of the parcel, Euporos SA has the choice between complete reimbursement (100 % of the amount of the order) of the purchaser and organising another delivery. If only a part of the goods are lost, the compensation or the new delivery will be done on a pro-rata basis.
2. Conditions required to obtain compensation: for you as purchaser to be able to get this protection, you must respect the rules listed below, in particular by making in time your complaint in writing.
When you complete the online order form for precious metals, you must purchase the transport insurance proposed by Euporos SA, so as to have the right to be fully (100 %) compensated for the value of the goods in the event of loss during transport. If you decide not to insure the goods, its transport will be at the risk of the recipient.
3. Damaged or despoiled parcel: Our articles are in perfect condition and are packed carefully. If in spite of that, the conveyor delivered completely or partially a damaged or despoiled parcel, you must write down your reservations on his delivery form when he gives you the parcel (and not afterwards!) AND you must send us immediately a copy of your complaint. If you do not react immediately, you will not have the possibility to appeal to the conveyor nor to the salesman.
4. Non-receipt of the parcel: You can make a complaint if you don’t obtain the parcel during a period of three months from the day of your order. Before worrying, take account of our normal times for processing the order (article 7 TOS), which are added to the parcel’s delivery time.
1. Maximum security: When you buy precious metals from us, you can either order home delivery (article 8 TOS) or request us to store them in Switzerland, a politically stable country and favorable to investors. Bars and coins are stored outside of the banking system, in a vault built in the interior of a high security building, protected by physically present guards.
or storage in a duty-free “open customs bonded warehouse”, which indeed is located within Swiss territory, but where merchandise is kept in a “duty-free” zone, exempt from all taxation for unlimited duration.
3. General terms: To see the Terms of Storage Contract (SC), click here.
In accordance with Swiss law and European law, there shall be no right of cancellation for purchases of precious metals, given that prices are subject to market fluctuations beyond our control. The consumer’s right to cancel an order and return the items ordered is therefore not applicable. Our sales are binding, with no option to cancel. For more information, see the frequently asked question (FAQ) “Can i revoke my order once i have placed it?”.
Please read carefully the article 4 of our Terms of Sale (TOS).
1. Data protection: Discreet and safe treatment of your personal and commercial data is guaranteed. Euporos SA observes the Federal Law on data protection. To see the measures of data safety, go to page “Legal Notes”.
2. Transport insurance: Your parcel is 100 %-insured during transport, under the conditions that are defined in article 8 of the TOS.
3. Hidden defects: You benefit from the stipulations on the legal guarantee of hidden defects.
We decline all responsibility in the case that the delivered article does not comply with the legislation of the country of delivery outside of Switzerland (article 3 TOS).
Our responsibility will not cover delay in delivery; if it is definitively impossible for us to fill your order, you will be entirely reimbursed (article 7 TOS).
We commit ourselves to take all the customary care of our profession for the implementation of the service that is offered to the customer. Nevertheless, our responsibility cannot be retained in a case of a fortuitous occurrence or a case of absolute necessity that the jurisprudence (which was returned by Swiss jurisdictions) has defined.
Our responsibility does not apply in case of unsubstantial differences between the delivered articles and the photographs of presentation of articles on our website or in our brochures. Notably, the trademark and the serial number of ingots, or the year of manufacture of coins put on sale do not inevitably correspond to the presentation photographs.
We art not responsible for your risk of loss-in-value by reason of fluctuations of the prices of precious metals, which are independent of our will and power.
Our responsibility is strictly limited to the above-mentioned cases (article 11 §§ 1 to 3 TOS), unless the applicable law (article 12 TOS) disposes otherwise.
These Terms of Sale (TOS) are regulated and interpreted in accordance with Swiss law, excluding the law on private international law and the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980. Swiss law is applicable to any dispute between you and ourselves.
1. For: In the event of dispute arising from these TOS, the Geneva courts have exclusive jurisdiction, subject to an appeal to the Swiss Federal Court.
2. Execution of the judgment: If you were to refuse to execute a court decision, this clause hereby stipulates that all costs of enforcement of the judgment in Switzerland or abroad will be charged exclusively to you.
If one or more provisions of our TOS are or were to become invalid or unenforceable under the law or a court decision, such provision will be enforced in the strict limits of what is permitted by applicable law. Other provisions shall remain valid and fully enforceable.
These general terms of the storage contract (SC) apply exclusively to any person (“you”) who entrusts to Euporos SA (“us”) the care and storage of their precious metals.
The metal is physically stored in a high-security location in Switzerland, outside the banking system. The warehouse is managed by a reputable Swiss guardianship company, Loomis, which carries out internal inspections on a weekly basis. Euporos SA monitors deposits and withdrawals in real time and can do an onsite inspection at any time without warning. In addition, audits are carried out by an independent external auditor, approved by the Swiss State Federal Audit Oversight Authority (Autorité fédérale en matière de révision, ASR).
The serial number of each ingot bought is individually allocated to the owner. Each of our depositors owns ingots allocated personally to him/her by name.
1. You can have precious metals added to your deposit at any time, by placing new orders with Euporos SA or by bringing precious metals acquired elsewhere.
2. You can remove ingots or coins from your deposit at any time, provided you warn us at least five business days in advance, to make an appointment to do so.
3. For security reasons, you can not charge us to ship part or all of your stock. Only the on-site withdrawal by yourself is authorized, to ensure that it is the rightful owner who withdraws his property.
4. All your objects of value stored with us may not be bound to any crime or offence, and must be properly and fully reported by you in your country of residence in accordance with tax regulations.
You are free to resell your metals to anyone you want.
1. You must pay us annual fees for storage, which depend on the deposit value on 2 January (weight of gold/silver multiplied by the London fixing PM gold/silver price). On 2 January, we calculate the deposit value, and invoice you the fees to be paid in advance for the year just commencing. Storage fees amount to 1 % (one percent) excluding taxes, of the value of the metals bought from Euporos SA. The minimum invoice amount is CHF 20 excl tax.
2. For storage contracts ended during the year, annual fees already paid are not refundable pro-rated to months used/not used.
If you merely want to check that your metal actually exists, an armed courier will remove it temporarily from the depot and we will invoice you 0.2 % (excl tax) of the value of the inspected objects with a minimum invoice of 500 Swiss francs (excl tax).
All entries and exits are free of charge.
However, for the work of sealing/unsealing the lead security seals on your merchandise (“personal packaging and allocation”) we will invoice 10 centimes (excl tax) per silver item and 20 ct per gold item, with a minimum invoice amount of 121 Swiss francs (excl tax).
If you decide to close your deposit during the first year of storage, we will invoice you 0.2 % (excl tax) of the deposit value with a minimum invoice amount of 200 Swiss francs (excl tax).
A major insurance company (Lloyds) protects all the deposits entrusted to Euporos SA against the risk of theft, burglary, fire, natural damage and water damage. Euporos SA liability is limited to the specified risks covered by that insurer. The depositor takes sole responsibility for other risks (war, civil disturbance, confiscation by the State, radioactivity, drop in the price of precious metals, etc.).
You will pay to Euporos SA an annual insurance premium, corresponding to 0.2 % (excl tax) of the value of your deposit on 2 January.
The storage invoice is payable on receipt.
If you do not pay within 15 days after receiving the invoice, you will owe us, in addition, a late payment penalty (article 6 § 3 of GTS). If the payment delay continues (8 weeks from receiving the invoice) we will have the right to unilaterally decide to recover the amount owed to us by liquidating one or more of the items that you have deposited, at the day-rate (London fixing) minus 5 %. We will also have the option of asking a court to freeze your deposit, at your cost and risk.
1. The Storage Contract is concluded for an indefinite period. Either party can terminate it any time, subject to giving two months’ notice by registered letter with receipt confirmation form, without the need to explain its decision.
2. Any subsequent modifications to a Storage Contract decided by Euporos SA must be displayed on the company’s website. The customer’s silence during the following four weeks will be deemed tacit acceptance of the amended terms. Payment of the storage invoice will also be deemed tacit acceptance by the customer. If you express your disagreement in writing, Euporos SA will give you the benefit of unchanged terms until 2 January of the following year, but may close your account before that date.
Additionally, the Euporos SA “general terms of sale” (TOS) published on www.euporos.ch, apply.
As an exemption to articles 3 and 4 of the Storage Contract, so long as the child has not reached the age of majority, no withdrawal can be made from its Juni’OR account.
Euporos SA offers several options: storage in Switzerland where silver is subject to value added tax (VAT), or storage in an "open customs bonded warehouse" exempt from VAT (articles 50 to 57 of the Customs Act and article 23 paragraph 2 point 3 of the VAT Act). The warehouse is on Swiss territory, but the goods are confined in a "customs bonded" zone, exempt from all taxes, with no time limit. If you wish to pick them up or have them shipped to you, in order to be able to remove them from the customs bonded warehouse, you will first have to pay customs duties plus the VAT of the destination country, calculated on the value of the ingot at the time it leaves the depot.
§ 1. Irrevocable agreement: The seller is firmly committed without any possibility of withdrawal. The Euporos SA terms of sale (TOS) apply (published on www.euporos.ch).
The seller that makes its online redemption request via a customer account, click on "current stock" (if there are internal metals, otherwise click on "sell external metal") and then on "request a repurchase", selects items, quantities and payment method, check the acceptance of terms of repurchase (RP). Having reached this point, he can view a pdf quote without obligation, or give its final agreement by pressing the button "validate this repurchase".
The seller who makes his offline redemption request gives final approval by signing the repurchase contract.
Any repurchase request needs to be accepted in writing by Euporos SA (which has the right to refuse, without giving reasons) for the transaction to be concluded validly and definitively. The payment is tacit acceptance.
§ 2. Anti-Money-Laundering Check: The seller declares that the metals are his personal property, that they have not crossed the border smuggling, that they have been declared to the authorities in his country and that he is in compliance with the Law on Anti-Money-Laundering, AML (Loi sur le Blanchiment d’Argent, LBA).
§ 3. Guarantee of transaction: Euporos SA guarantees that the payment order will be given no later than twenty business days following the receipt of the repurchase request sent by the seller from its customer account or the contract signed by the seller at the counter.
§ 4. If the buyer is another customer of Euporos SA: The buyer has granted power to an authorised representative acting for Euporos SA to validate the purchase contract. If, in addition to the sum owed to the seller, the buyer owes a “transaction commission” to the financial intermediary Euporos SA, the commission will be invoiced separately.
§ 5. Internal or external provenance of metals: If the metals to be purchased were acquired previously by the seller from Euporos SA (“internal” provenance), a preferential purchase rate will be applied. If the metals to be purchased come from elsewhere ("external" provenance), the normal rate is used.
The Juni’OR account is a metals account intended for children and adolescents, who benefit from features reserved exclusively for them until they reach the age of majority. The capital payments are safeguarded by investing them in physical precious metals, stored in Switzerland by Euporos SA.
1. The parents (as holders of parental authority) or third parties may create or close a Juni’OR account for a child, in the child’s name. They will manage the account until the youth has reached the age of majority (18). The manager of the Juni’OR account has direct access to the Juni’OR account from his/her own customer account.
2. At age 18, the Juni'OR account automatically turns into a customer account, and the young adult will have the right of disposal over this account or the physical precious metals stored in Switzerland by Euporos SA.
3. Change of ownership: In the event of the death of the child, the Juni’OR account will be closed and the assets will belong to his heirs, who may dispose of them as they wish.
4. Change of manager: The Juni'OR account will remain active until the age of majority. In the event of the death of either parent, the survivor will be the sole manager (an inventory of the child's goods must be conducted by the guardianship authority, see art. 318 of the Swiss Civil Code). If both parents die, the legal guardian will administer it. If the parents divorce, the manager will be the one with custody of the child. If the third party dies, the management is passed to the parents or to a legal guardian.
5. Documents to be provided: To create a Juni'OR account, you must provide the child's identifying details (identity card or extract from birth certificate) and establish the parental or grandparental link (family record book). Any change of ownership or manager must be supported by an administrative or legal document. Euporos SA may demand any other legally necessary document.
1. If the Juni’OR account is created by the holder of parental authority or by a third party, no withdrawal is possible until the child reaches the age of majority (art. 318 and following of the Swiss Civil Code). Third parties expressly waive the right to make withdrawals from this account until the child beneficiary reaches the age of majority.
2. It is possible to accumulate precious metals in the Juni’OR account. The assets as well as any income of the minor must remain deposited with Euporos SA (with the exception of art. 3019 of the Swiss Civil Code) so long as the minor has not reached the age of majority.
3. The precious metals in the Juni’OR account are stored by Euporos SA, for a fee defined in the “storage contract” (SC). A positive balance in Swiss francs (credit linked to the Juni’OR account) does not bear interest.
Estate transfer (gifts to children from parents or third parties) via the Juni’OR account may be subject to transfer tax due in the country of residence, but there may be exemptions for up to certain amounts. Euporos SA does not have to file tax returns, because that is the responsibility of the parental or third-party manager.
1. When a Juni’OR account is created, the company gives a gift voucher worth 100 Swiss francs valid against the first precious metal order.
2. Every January, the company offers a bonus based on the investment effort in the previous year: per tranche of 1,000 francs of purchases made in the previous year, Euporos SA offers the child a 10 franc credit.
3. A surprise high-value gift will be given at the age of majority, on the occasion of his first adult purchase.
1. Any subsequent modifications to a Storage Contract decided by Euporos SA must be displayed on the company’s website. The customer’s silence during the following four weeks will be deemed tacit acceptance of the amended terms. If the manager expresses his disagreement in writing, Euporos SA will give the child the benefit of unchanged terms until 31 December of the current year, but may close the Juni’OR account before that date.
2. Additionally, the Euporos SA general terms of the storage contract (SC) and general terms of sale (TOS) apply.
Data is safeguarded and not disclosed to third parties. The discreet and secure processing of your personal and business data is guaranteed. Euporos SA complies with the Swiss Federal Data Protection Act (Loi fédérale sur la protection des données / LPD).
You customer account on the Euporos SA website is in “https” mode, which offers a high level of protection against unauthorised third-party intrusion (hackers). HTTPS is one of the secure protocols used on the internet to protect data transmission.
Your data and purchases are covered by business confidentiality. All information provided to our company remains strictly confidential. No databank will be sold to anyone. Additionally, you can ask us to close your customer account whenever you want.
Under the Swiss Federal Data Protection Act (LPD), you have the right to see free of charge your personal data held (art. 8 LPD) and to correct it (art. 5 par 2 LPD). You can also require that your data be deleted provided it is not involved in a contractual transaction in the course of being processed. Information requests may be sent to contact[at]euporos.ch.
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text:
SECOND CHURCH IN DORCHESTER vs. CITY OF BOSTON.
Present: WILKINS, C. J., SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE, & SPIEGEL, JJ.
A religious corporation which paid a tax illegally assessed on its parsonage in view of its exemption under G. L. c. 59, Section 5, Eleventh, as amended, but which did not pursue its remedy either for the abatement of such tax under c. 59, Sections 59-74, or for the recovery thereof as a void tax under c. 60, Section 98, showed no special circumstances entitling it to maintain a suit in equity against the city under c. 231A for a declaratory decree that the tax was illegal and void and that the plaintiff was entitled to repayment thereof.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on June 14, 1960.
William H. Kerr, for the defendant.
Richard B. Dellheim, for the plaintiff.
SPALDING, J. On January first of each of the years 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957, the plaintiff, a Massachusetts religious corporation, was the owner of real estate at 6 Melville Avenue in the Dorchester district of the city of Boston. The real estate during these years was used as a parsonage for its house of worship. In each of these years the defendant's assessors included the parsonage in their annual valuation list at a valuation of $7,700 and assessed to the plaintiff taxes respectively of $188.46, $188.46, $212.49, and $232.20 which were the proper taxes payable on a taxable valuation of $2,700. The plaintiff paid each bill within the year it was assessed. None of these payments was made "after . . . a levy on its goods, a notice of a sale or taking of its real estate, a written protest signed by it, or a withholding of money due it." Prior to 1953 the plaintiff was entitled to an exemption of $5,000 for its parsonage under G. L. c. 59, Section 5, Eleventh, as amended by St. 1938, c. 317.
In 1953, the exemption was increased to $10,000, St. 1953, c. 231. Prior to the present proceeding, which was commenced on June 14, 1960, no action to recover any of the aforementioned sums was instituted by the plaintiff.
The present proceeding is for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, and was submitted on the foregoing statement of agreed facts. The judge ordered a decree to be entered declaring (1) that the taxes assessed against the plaintiff were illegal and void and (2) that the plaintiff was entitled to recover back the amounts paid. From a decree in accordance with this order, the defendant appealed.
The defendant concedes that the plaintiff was entitled to an exemption of $10,000 for each of the four years involved, and that the assessments were illegal. The defendant contends, however, that no relief can be given under c. 231A in view of the specific statutory remedies. We agree. The Legislature has set up two methods for recovery of taxes paid. The first is a proceeding in abatement under G. L. c. 59, Sections 59-74. Norwood v. Norwood Civic Assn. 340 Mass. 518, 523. There was obviously no compliance in the present case with the requirements for an abatement. The other procedure for recovery of taxes wrongfully assessed and paid is an action to recover back taxes under G. L. c. 60, Section 98. There are certain conditions precedent to maintenance of such an action, none of which was complied with in the present case: first, the action must be "commenced within three months after payment of the tax"; and second, no action can be brought unless the payment has been made under protest or under certain modes of compulsion, mentioned in the statute.
The plaintiff's contention that Section 98 is not applicable because the assessment was totally void, and therefore not a "tax," is without merit. The very purpose of Section 98 is to allow recovery of void taxes. "An action of contract . . . to recover a tax under G. L. c. 60, Section 98, cannot be maintained unless the tax is wholly void. That has been frequently determined." Central Natl. Bank v. Lynn, 259 Mass. 1, 6.
In certain exceptional instances this court has upheld the granting of declaratory relief in the discretion of the court in certain tax controversies where to do so would constitute "a convenient means of promoting justice and will not unduly interfere with the collection of taxes." Meenes v. Goldberg, 331 Mass. 688, 691. Madden v. State Tax Commn. 333 Mass. 734, 735-737. Squantum Gardens, Inc. v. Assessors of Quincy, 335 Mass. 440, 443. Stow v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn. 336 Mass. 337, 339-340. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, ante, 223, 235-236. In granting declaratory relief in the Squantum Gardens case the court stated, "Nothing here said, however, should be construed as indicating that this court approves use of bills for declaratory relief, rather than the appropriate administrative procedures for tax abatement, in cases which involve no special considerations, comparable to those here present and present in the Madden case" (page 443).
Despite the unfortunate loss to the plaintiff because of having paid, without protest and suit, taxes in the years 1954 to 1957, this is not a case where resort may be had to declaratory relief under c. 231A. The only apparent purpose of seeking such relief is to circumvent the bar of the three months' limitation on actions contained in G. L. c. 60, Section 98, [Note 1] and the provisions applicable to abatements. The plaintiff is not faced with uncertainty about liability for a tax which remains unpaid or about which it and others similarly situated may have to engage in burdensome and duplicating litigation; nor is it faced with a tax as to which it at no time had a convenient and effective statutory remedy. In short, no special circumstances have been shown for invoking declaratory relief in a tax case. Chapter 231A was not intended to enlarge substantive, as opposed to procedural, rights in a case of this sort. See Executive Air Serv. Inc. v. Division of Fisheries & Game, 342 Mass. 356, 357-358.
The plaintiff cannot recover back the tax in these proceedings. That portion of the decree which declared that the tax was void need not be affirmed for it would not terminate the controversy. G. L. c. 231A, Section 3. The final decree, therefore, is reversed and a new decree is to be entered dismissing the bill.
[Note 1] It has been held elsewhere that declaratory procedure cannot be employed to circumvent statutes of limitations. See Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. 23 Cal. 2d 719, 733-734; Leahey v. Department of Water & Power of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. App. 2d 281, 285, 287; Finlayson v. West Bloomfield, 320 Mich. 350, 355-358. See also Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed.) Section 341.

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20-2616. Designation and assignment of retired justices and judges to perform judicial service and duties; revocation; powers; compensation and expense allowances, limitation. (a) Any retired justice of the supreme court, retired judge of the court of appeals, retired district judge or retired associate district judge may be designated and assigned to perform such judicial service and duties as such retired justice or judge is willing to undertake. Designation and assignment of a retired justice or judge in connection with any matter pending in the supreme court shall be made by the supreme court. Designation and assignment of a retired justice or judge in connection with any matter pending in any other court, including any court located within the judicial district in which the justice or judge resides, or to perform any other judicial service or duties shall be made by the chief justice of the supreme court. Any such judicial service or duties shall include necessary preparation and other out-of-court judicial service for hearings or for deciding matters or cases in conjunction with the judicial services and duties assigned under this section. Any designation and assignment may be revoked in the same manner and all such designations and assignments and revocations shall be filed of record in the office of the clerk of the court to which such assignment is made.
(b) A retired justice or judge so designated and assigned to perform judicial service or duties shall have the power and authority to hear and determine all matters covered by the assignment.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this section, each retired justice or judge who performs judicial service or duties under this section shall receive (1) per diem compensation at the rate of per diem compensation in effect under K.S.A. 46-137a, and amendments thereto, (2) a per diem subsistence allowance at the per diem subsistence allowance rate in effect under K.S.A. 46-137a, and amendments thereto, (3) a mileage allowance at the rate fixed under K.S.A. 75-3203a, and amendments thereto, and (4) all actual and necessary expenses for other than subsistence or travel, including necessary stenographic assistance, as may be incurred in performing such service or duties.
(d) No retired justice or judge shall be entitled to receive per diem compensation under this section for any day in a fiscal year after the date that the total of (1) the amount of per diem compensation earned under this section during that fiscal year and (2) the amount of the retirement annuity payable to such retired justice or judge for that fiscal year under the retirement system for judges, becomes equal to or more than the amount of the current annual salary of a district judge paid by the state under K.S.A. 75-3120g, and amendments thereto, but such retired justice or judge shall receive the subsistence allowance, mileage allowance and actual and necessary expenses as provided under this section after such date.
(e) As used in this section, a retired justice or judge shall not include those justices or judges who were not retained in office, were not reelected to office, have been impeached from office or removed by the supreme court from office.
History: L. 1967, ch. 191, § 1; L. 1972, ch. 109, § 1; L. 1976, ch. 145, § 94; L. 1980, ch. 94, § 2; L. 1981, ch. 137, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 42, § 1; July 1.


§ 1. As far as the secondary market yield is used as a reference in federal laws or regulations Federal (SMR-Bund) in this or a different name, the current weighted average yield their place with 1 April 2015 advocates bunds (UDRB).
Section 2 (1) in private agreements, which reference the SMR-Bund in this or a different name, is the UDRB 1 April 2015 in its place.
(2) agreements that have been concluded before 1 April 2015, the UDRB taking a correction value to be determined by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) by regulation applies.
(3) the OeNB has to adopt the regulation on the setting of the correction value at the latest with the first release of UDRB. The regulation is published in the Federal Law Gazette and to publish on the website of the Austrian national library.
(4) paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the parties for eliminating the SMR Federal have agreed otherwise or settle.
3. (1) the OeNB has from 1 April 2015 to calculate the UDRB for every Austrian banking and to publish on its website a week later.
(2) the euro - Government bonds issued under Austrian law of the Republic of Austria with a fixed interest rate and a maturity of over one year are the calculation of the UDRB to use. The UDRB is to make out with the outstanding nominal weighted average yields of these bunds. Consulted for this average yields are calculated due date based on transaction volume weighted average prices. The FMA from its regulatory activities make the basis acquired transaction data.
(3) the FMA has a week to make the necessary for calculating the UDRB anonymous transaction data pursuant to par. 2 of the OeNB. The data underlying the calculation are not to publish by the OeNB.
(4) it is the Austrian national library in particular due to the unavailability of the data underlying the calculation of the UDRB, not possible to calculate the UDRB or to publish, the OeNB has to immediately do the calculation and publication of the UDRB after eliminating these factors or to resume.
(5) the OeNB has the details of the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, to publish in particular the calculation method of the UDRB and the description of the underlying data on its website.
§ 4. Should be available on a date established by federal laws, regulations, or private agreements no value, shall, unless the parties have agreed otherwise or agree to consult the last available value as an indicator prior to this date.
§ 5 (1) in addition to the SMR Federal be by applying the provisions of this Federal Act also the secondary market yields total issuers, secondary market yield domestic issuers and the secondary market yield on domestic non-banks using a specific correction factor on the UDRB transferred.
(2) the correction factors referred to in paragraph 1 shall be determined in a regulation to be issued by the Austrian National Bank in accordance with § 2 paragraph 3 according to the issuer's group.
(3) in the case of contracts entered into from the 1.4.2015 one is secondary market yield derived from as a reference value to apply the UDRB itself or another market indicator, but not by the UDRB.
As far as other federal laws are referenced in this Federal Act, that are 6 (1) if nothing else is arranged, to apply in their respectively valid version.
(2) Regulations under this Federal Act must be adopted from the day following the announcement of the Federal Act to be conducted; they may not however into force prior to the required legal provisions.
§ 7. As far as this federal law are personal names only in the male form, they relate to women and men in the same way. When applied to certain persons, the respective gender-specific form is to use.
§ 8. The Federal Minister of finance is entrusted with the execution of this Federal Act.
§ 9. This federal law shall enter into force 1 January 2015.
"(2) Regulations of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank are to be published in the Federal Law Gazette. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank is entitled to publish falling business terms and conditions legally binding on their homepage within their remit."
"(1) the general meeting shall, taking into consideration article 27 ESCB/ECB Statute for a multi-year period, not longer than for a period of five years to select an auditor and an alternate auditors. Auditors or audit firms are not selectable for Auditors or alternate auditors, which already have received a confirmation notice in accordance with § 274 (UGB) on the audit of the financial statements of the Austrian National Bank in five cases; This applies in cases where the check is not performed by a natural person as auditor, the audit manager and those individuals who have signed the auditor's report. The rotation provisions do not apply after an interruption of the audit activity for at least two consecutive years."
"(4) the Austrian National Bank is, as far as not directly applicable European Union law or national law precludes, or it was not about data, the Bankwesengesetz - BWG, BGBl. 1993/532 sub-plans., are subject to the banking secrecy according to § 38, entitled, data that is to transmit her during one of their televised task area of reporting or respondents on the basis of this or any other federal law or under a State contract, directly applicable European Union law or a regulation of a federal agency" ", also for all other duties that are her assigned by federal law, treaty or directly applicable European Union law, to use."
"(7a) the operator of a payment system are required to report both the recording and the setting of the operation of a payment system of the Austrian National Bank within two weeks in writing. A payment system operators are also obliged to inform participants in the payment system of the Austrian National Bank, as well as to announce any changes of the Austrian National Bank within two weeks in writing."
"§ 44. The Austrian National Bank can provide a data model the detectors for the delivery of messages that are to send you based on this or any other federal law or under a State contract, directly applicable European Union law or a regulation of a federal agency, which is appropriate to comply with the reporting obligations in the form of standardized, electronic. The data model as well as its technical specifications are publicly available to publish in the pages of the Austrian National Bank on the Internet."
"(2) of the net profit ascertained in accordance with paragraph 1 up to 10 vH of the pension reserve should be collected separately, until the pension reserve corresponds to the coverage capital required to ensure the pension rights of the employees of the Austrian National Bank according to actuarial calculation. Should the pension reserve sustainably exceed the required future life policyholder benefits, the difference is to resolve and settle on the profit and loss account."
7. in article 82a, para. 1, the phrase is replaced "Information and template obligations" by the phrase "Information, reporting and template obligations".
"§ 82c." Who 44 b paragraph 2 not or not fully comply with a request for information of the Austrian National Bank in accordance with § or whoever knowingly false information in connection with such a request for information, commits an administrative offence and is fined to punish up to 2,000 euros."
"(3) the Oesterreichische Nationalbank is entitled to finance the loans to be granted by the ERP Fund in secured form. "Such finance are the provisions of article 3 par. 5 of the ERP Fund Act, Federal Law Gazette No. 207/1962, with respect to the loss cover requirement of the Fund, as well as § 12 apply by analogy to ERP-funds-law concerning the right of the Fund to the fixing of the interest rate."
"(2) Regulations of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank are to be published in the Federal Law Gazette".
"(1) Ordinances of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank are to be published in the Federal Law Gazette".