Kevin DVORAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOSTARDI PLATT ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Before EASTERBROOK, DIANE P. WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Patricia Kiper Rummer (argued), Lisle, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Francis M. Pawlak, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Kevin Dvorak was employed by Mostardi Platt Associates, Inc. (Mostardi-Platt) from 1989 until the spring of 1997. Throughout those years, he suffered from arthritis. Dvorak's arthritic pains would come in flare-ups; there were periods during which he was able to function quite well, and other times when his mobility was significantly restricted. In 1997, during one of the flare-ups, Dvorak missed work for a substantial number of days. Shortly thereafter, he was terminated. Believing that he lost his job because of his physical disability, he filed suit against Mostardi-Platt, alleging that he had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mostardi-Platt. Although it found that Dvorak was an individual with a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether he was qualified to perform his job with or without a reasonable accommodation, it concluded that he was terminated for reasons unrelated to his disability, and therefore had no claim under the ADA. We affirm.
Mostardi-Platt is a company that provides professional environmental consulting, compliance, and testing services. Initially hired as one of its technicians, Dvorak eventually became a Service Manager in the Clean Emissions Monitoring department (referred to as the CEM Services Group). In this position, he performed administrative work and was occasionally required to conduct field work, such as on-site visits to clients and supervision of the monitoring being performed at various facilities. (Dvorak disputes the prominence of field work among his duties, but the percentage of time he devoted to it, as opposed to the fact that field work was one component of the job, is not important.) In 1996 and 1997, Dvorak experienced health problems in connection with his arthritis that led him to take a large number of days off from work. By March 1997, he had run out of sick leave days and had to take two weeks of vacation time to undergo arthroscopic surgery on his knee. This was unusual: the last time his arthritis had affected him so strongly had been 15 years earlier.
When he returned to work after the surgery, Dvorak's supervisor, Joseph Macak, asked him to go to Peoria the following week for a field assignment. Dvorak refused, citing his arthritis and the fact that he would still be on crutches from the operation at that time, and relying on a doctor's note following the operation that effectively confined him to desk work. Dvorak also informed Macak that the doctor had concluded that Dvorak had a particularly severe form of arthritis called ankylosing spondylitis (AS). It is unclear-though irrelevant for present purposes-whether any doctor ever so concluded. Although Dvorak was never ultimately diagnosed with this ailment, as opposed to a less severe form of spondyloarthopathy, we mention his allegation only in the interest of presenting the facts in the light most favorable to him.
I want to start out be [sic] reiterating my definition of insanity. Insanity is doing the same thing you have always done and expecting things to change! Mostardi Platt has developed a new definition. Mostardi Platt is doing less today then [sic] it has ever done and is expecting things to change. On the top of everything else every time we turn around we are burdened with tasks that make us less efficient.
In short, the memorandum read more like a tirade against the company than like a constructive proposal for improving work unit performance.
Company management met shortly after Dvorak delivered the memorandum to consider the situation as a whole: his disability, his performance, and his attitude. They decided it would be best for Dvorak to be placed on temporary medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) program. On April 3, 1997, Dvorak was summoned to a meeting with management to discuss, among other things, the option of FMLA leave. Dvorak resisted the idea, claiming that he could do his job and thus that medical leave was not appropriate. Just the previous day, however, he had written Macak stating that he “may never be able to do the same kind of physical work” that he had “been able to do in the past.” At the end of the meeting, it became clear that the leave arrangement was not optional. Platt, Macak, and a third company official told Dvorak that he had to leave the building that very day. Macak accompanied him as he packed up his personal belongings from his office and departed. Although Dvorak characterizes this event as his termination, he admits that it was not the last of his dealings with Mostardi-Platt.
After his departure, the company sent him documents to aid him in his application for FMLA leave. Initially, he took steps toward completing the required forms. While Dvorak was in the process of applying for medical leave, Mostardi Platt discovered that a laptop Dvorak had used had been tampered with, that a customer database had been improperly saved on its hard drive, and that the computer had been used for personal purposes, including the sending of communications to a competitor that were derogatory of Mostardi-Platt. The company made efforts to discuss the matter with Dvorak, but Dvorak was uncooperative. He refused even to meet to discuss the alleged misuse of the laptop. Dvorak continued, however, to communicate in writing with the company. On April 28, 1997, he wrote to Susan Oswalt, Mostardi-Platt's Director of Human Resources, asking “Sue, haven't you really terminated my employment?” He asked to be informed of his status at the company by May 9, 1997. As of April 24, and thus by the time of the April 28 letter, Dvorak's doctor had released him from the desk-only restriction. He never mentioned this to anyone at Mostardi-Platt; thus, the company had no reason to believe that Dvorak could once again perform field work. All it had was an earlier e-mail he had sent to Macak telling the latter that he did not know when, if ever, he would be back in shape.
On May 6, 1997, Oswalt wrote Dvorak and asked for a satisfactory explanation for the alleged computer misuse. Dvorak never responded. A further letter from Mostardi-Platt's counsel, dated May 21, 1997, expressed once again a willingness to meet and discuss the issues that had arisen with respect to Dvorak's employability. Again, Dvorak was not forthcoming, and no such meeting ever took place.
Even though some of the facts are in dispute, we conclude that they are not the critical ones. Naturally, as Dvorak's claim was dismissed on summary judgment, we review the district court's determinations de novo and draw all reasonable factual inferences in Dvorak's favor. Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir.2001).
Dvorak alleged in his complaint that he was terminated in violation of the ADA. While his firing did occur in close temporal proximity to his operation and the latest flare-up of his arthritis, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Dvorak cannot prove a case of disability discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) she has suffered from an adverse employment decision because of her disability. Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 669-70 (7th Cir.2000). The district court found that Dvorak had put enough in the record to survive summary judgment on the first two critera: the severity of his arthritis for purposes of proving a disability, and his ability to perform the functions of his job. He faltered on the most fundamental showing-that the decision to terminate his employment was discriminatory-whether one characterizes that as a failure to show that his adverse employment action was because of his disability, or as an inability to show that Mostardi-Platt's stated reasons were pretextual.
While “it is not always necessary to march through” the entire process of establishing a prima facie case, articulating nondiscriminatory reasons, and evaluating pretext, see Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir.2002), we find it useful under the circumstances to review the various elements of the case that Dvorak would have had to satisfy to survive summary judgment.
Dvorak first had to show that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA's definition of disability encompasses a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” “a record of such an impairment,” or the status of “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). According to the Code of Federal Regulations, a person is “substantially limited” if, compared to the average person in the general population, she cannot perform or is limited in the manner in or extent to which she can perform one of the recognized activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii); see also Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir.2001). As a general matter, arthritis has been recognized as a relevant impairment. Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (7th Cir.2000).
Since Moore was decided, the Supreme Court has spoken directly to the question whether a particular impairment qualifies as a “disability” for ADA purposes. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). In that case, the Court established a higher threshold for the statute than some had believed it contained. “ ‘[S]ubstantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially limits' suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘to a large degree.’ ” Id. at 691 (alteration in original). “The word ‘substantial’ thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities.” Id. The Court did not question the idea that walking is a basic enough activity to qualify as a “major life activity” under the statute. But Dvorak would have to show that his arthritis “prevents or severely restricts” him from walking, in a permanent or long-term way. Id. See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). It is difficult on the present record to make this determination: we would need to see whether Dvorak's arthritis met the Williams standard. Alternatively, we would have to decide whether Mostardi-Platt regarded him as so severely limited in his ability to walk (an alternative method of proof under the statute that Williams did not address). See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Bekker, 229 F.3d at 670; Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 204 F.3d 727, 730-32 (7th Cir.2000) (discussing the guidelines for deciding when an employee is “regarded as” having a disability).
We will assume for the sake of argument that Dvorak presented enough evidence to create a question of fact on the disability issue, though we express no opinion on the point. Dvorak's work had been restricted to desk duty only, and Mostardi-Platt discussed the limitations imposed by the disability on Dvorak's work performance with its labor counsel. Mostardi-Platt believed, as informed by Dvorak, that he might never regain his full ability to walk. The suggestion that Dvorak be placed on long-term medical leave also supports a finding that Mostardi-Platt regarded Dvorak as being physically impaired.
Taking his disability as a given, we must next determine whether there was a genuine issue of fact about Dvorak's qualifications to perform the essential functions of his job. Under the ADA, a “qualified individual with a disability” is one who, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). See also Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (7th Cir.1996). The district court found that there were factual disputes over the exact description of his functions that would have precluded a grant of summary judgment on this ground alone. This is a close call, but we once again assume favorably (and generously) to Dvorak that with the appropriate accommodations he could have still performed either this work or other work Mostardi-Platt might have been required to find for him.
We note, however, that Dvorak would have great trouble reaching the jury on the issue whether he could perform the job without accommodation. However vague his official job description might have been, it is clear from the record that it required a significant degree of field work and mobility. Dvorak himself claimed that he no longer possessed the physical ability to perform those functions. His later position that he could have completed all his “essential duties” with a desk position accommodation is of no avail. Under the ADA, an employer is not required to modify, reduce, or reallocate the essential functions of a job to accommodate an employee. Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d at 514. Mostardi-Platt concluded that a “desk work only” medical restriction could not be accommodated, given the demands of Dvorak's job. Thus, it appears that without accommodation Dvorak could not perform the job.
What about with accommodations? There is little suggestion that Dvorak sought any other available positions, with the exception of an off-handed mention that he might be moved to an accounting position that might have eventually opened. He was deemed unfit for the accounting position, and correctly so: as he himself stated in an e-mail to Macak, he had not as of that time even completed the course work necessary to qualify as an accountant. In addition, to the extent that Dvorak would like to prevail on the theory that Mostardi-Platt failed to accommodate his disability, he runs into problems with the interactive nature of the accommodation process. See Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.1996); Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1284, 1285. Dvorak does not seem to have engaged in good-faith negotiations about possible accommodations: the threshold of cooperation set by Bultemeyer requires serious efforts from both parties. On the other hand, one might see Dvorak's ouster from his office on April 3 as a signal that Mostardi-Platt had already decided that all accommodations were pointless, and thus that further conversation would be similarly futile. Giving Dvorak the benefit of the doubt, we will assume that this is the case and proceed.
With Dvorak's disability, qualifications, and adverse job action established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory motive for the termination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th Cir.2000); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir.1995). If the employer does so, the inference of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. The ultimate burden to prove intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
Although the exact date of termination is partly a factual question, the facts must be evaluated in the light of the proper legal test. Such a test has been established in the context of statute of limitations issues, where the employee generally tries to show as late a date of termination as possible. This court adopted an “unequivocal notice of termination” test in Mull v. ARCO Durethene Plastics, Inc., 784 F.2d 284 (1986), agreeing with the approach developed by the Fifth and the Third Circuit. The Fifth Circuit rule provides that termination occurs when the employer shows, by acts or words, clear intention to dispense with the employee's services. Payne v. Crane Co., 560 F.2d 198, 199 (5th Cir.1977). In Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 191 (3d Cir.1977) the Third Circuit explicitly rejected a rule that focused on an official termination date, on the grounds that, as the employer controls such records, it would be unfair to the employee to have the timeliness of her claim determined by unilateral actions, or statements as to such actions, by the employer. See also Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 952 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir.1992) (termination occurs “when the employee receives unequivocal notice of his termination or when a reasonable person would know of the termination.”); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1992) (endorsing “unequivocal notice of termination” test for actual date of termination).
We too think that one must look at all the circumstances to find out what the employer really did, and when. To that end, Dvorak urges us to find that his orders to clear everything out of his office on April 3 show that Mostardi-Platt had no intention of ever allowing him to return and that the company implemented a de facto termination at that time. But other undisputed evidence in the record precludes this interpretation of the April 3 events. Both the outcome of the April 3 meeting and the conduct of both parties in the weeks that followed are inconsistent with a reasonable understanding of the April 3 action as a final termination. At the close of the meeting, Dvorak was told that he was being placed on medical leave; this is an action consistent only with continued employment. Under the FMLA, an employer has a number of obligations toward an employee on leave, whether or not the leave is with pay. We are sure that Mostardi-Platt does not extend FMLA leave to non-employees, or recently terminated employees. (COBRA benefits are another matter, but no one is arguing that this is what Dvorak was pursuing.) Indeed, had Dvorak truly believed that he had been terminated on April 3, the steps he took to be placed on FMLA leave would now smack of fraud. To be eligible for FMLA benefits, one must at a minimum be an “employee,” not a “recently terminated employee.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (referring to “eligible employee”). A termination decision makes one ineligible for FMLA benefits, and thus both Dvorak's attempt to obtain such benefits and Mostardi-Platt's efforts to process the paperwork belie the contention that Dvorak was terminated on April 3. See Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998).
Further, between April 4 and May 27, Dvorak asked for clarification as to his employment status and was never told that he had been terminated. Rather, Mostardi-Platt's inquiries as to his conduct with respect to the laptop misuse suggest that he was still considered an employee. Dvorak's own request for clarification, likewise, tends to show that any notice he might have received of his termination was not all that unequivocal.
With no competent evidence to support a termination date earlier than May 28, the laptop misuse is not information that the employer learned after the termination; it may thus be considered as one of Mostardi-Platt's nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Dvorak. Furthermore, even if we are wrong about all that and the April 3 date controls, Mostardi-Platt may still rely on its dissatisfaction with Dvorak's performance and its reaction to his inflammatory memorandum of April 1, 1997. Dvorak admitted that his productivity numbers were far below expectations. Employers cite poor performance and insubordination frequently as reasons for dismissing employees. In themselves, these reasons have nothing to do with the employee's disability or any other forbidden category.
Once Mostardi-Platt offered its evidence of nondiscriminatory motive, Dvorak still had a chance to rebut its asserted nondiscriminatory grounds for his termination. But a rebuttal must tend “to show that the employer's reasons for some negative job action are false, thereby implying (if not actually showing) that the real reason is illegal discrimination․ [T]he question is not whether the employer's reasons for a decision are right but whether the employer's description of its reasons is honest.” Kariotis v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.1997). The reasons proffered by Mostardi-Platt easily survive this test.
Dvorak has tried to meet that burden by producing evidence tending to show that he did not really misuse the laptop, and that he was doing a good job. But that evidence is unresponsive to the issue at hand. Dvorak needed to show instead that the decisionmakers at Mostardi-Platt did not believe that he had misused the computer and were lying when they expressed dissatisfaction with his work. As we have often noted, it does not matter whether the employer was ultimately wrong or unfair in the determination, nor whether a jury in the company's shoes would have fired him. Rather, Dvorak would need to show that not even the employer believed the reasons it proffered for firing him. He can point to nothing that suggests that the Mostardi-Platt officials did not genuinely think they were dealing with a problem of computer misuse. Furthermore, Dvorak has not shown that the decisionmakers were dissembling when they characterized the April 1 memorandum as totally unsatisfactory and something that caused them to lose all confidence in Dvorak. In short, he has no evidence from which a trier of fact could legitimately find that the company's reasons were pretextual.
For these reasons, we Affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mostardi-Platt.


Illinois prisoner Giles suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to protect him from other inmates. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of his claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical officials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Giles cannot establish the defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Giles received regular medical attention from psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals; several of his grievances were subjected to emergency review. Giles has not presented evidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled not was there an indication from his medical records that he was not receiving adequate care. The non-medical officials relied on the medical professionals to provide proper treatment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a need to intervene.
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15-3077 BRUCE GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 ____________________ Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Department”) who su ers from schizoa ective disorder. Giles filed this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Department o cials. He alleges the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indi erent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to 2 No. 15-3077 protect him from other inmates. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals. The district court’s conclusion was based largely on its holding that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of his claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical o cials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical professionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the defendants possessed a su ciently culpable state of mind, we a rm. I. Background A. Factual Background At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the custody of the Department and housed in five di erent correctional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois River Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). He su ers from schizoa ective disorder. His symptoms include anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and suicidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while in the Department’s custody. He has at various times been prescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with these symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely. Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he received and the conditions of his confinement at multiple correctional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his complaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his complaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of segregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or No. 15-3077 3 following timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allegations, his medical records, and his deposition testimony. From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was housed at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to mental health professionals and the opportunity to participate in therapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was transferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the health status transfer summary prepared by an o cial at Dixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for psychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been discontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left Dixon. Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October 3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist because he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse noted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three days later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville due to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while Giles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return to medication. Giles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segregation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at Illinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he was transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from February 2012 until approximately November 2012. 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself of these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this suit. 4 No. 15-3077 Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010. This time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that he was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a lapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on November 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and Depakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville. Giles was examined by a medical health counselor on December 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medical records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Prolixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles was placed back on Prolixin. Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten di erent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He was also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group therapy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped showing up for the sessions in February. Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March 2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received his Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in his report that he addressed the medication issue with the prison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation with another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s deposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was talking to himself and another inmate approached him, told him to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate away. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was because he had not received his Prolixin medication, which helps control the voices in his head. Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation. According to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown No. 15-3077 5 in a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t care about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from other inmates in segregation but that he never reported this to prison o cials. He testified inmates in segregation were given yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go because he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where usually everybody fights.” After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles attempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His testimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this time and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night. He also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” particularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges he was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from these combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cellmate notified the prison sta and Giles was rescued. After this, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by mental health professionals. Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on April 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “potential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “coherent” with “no overt distress.” Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13, 2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pontiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication and one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.” He felt this treatment was insu cient. He alleges he was not given his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontinued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psychotropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was again examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing 6 No. 15-3077 to contraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist on May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was “fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The psychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake, alert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agitation”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his “thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal or homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been receiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious concerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time. Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment on July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the prison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health professional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to contraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As best as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed from segregation sometime during July 2011. Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September 2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three times in September, four times in October, twice in November, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. After one of the October examinations, the mental health professional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate and his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a result, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next day. Notes from his examination the following week indicate “notable improvement.” No. 15-3077 7 In February 2012, Giles was involved in another altercation with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original failure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he accidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall while talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was talking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was rendered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposition he had never had trouble with this inmate before and never told the facility sta he felt he was in danger, but that “it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the other inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the investigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently by prison o cials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply responded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate were placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segregation from February until November 2012. Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine more times during the period spanning from March to July 2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Lawrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the anxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations. Giles reported di culties with cellmates and frequently requested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted Giles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did not complete assigned therapy homework. Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nineteen grievances. His complaints related to insu cient medical treatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate suicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in segregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances 8 No. 15-3077 were either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns were not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however, that he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed or investigated. We know from the record that at least three of these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July 2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge (the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses to many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he was not receiving his medication, that segregation placement was not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities lacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were all denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board (the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all available information,” that the complaints were without merit. Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early 2014. B. District Court Proceedings Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named several defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this stage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during the relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illinois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois River), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois River), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke (the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at Lawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence), and Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at No. 15-3077 9 Lawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth Amendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, he asserted a claim of deliberate indi erence to serious medical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treatment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River, Pontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-ofconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infestations and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pontiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect claim based on the February 2012 altercation. The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late 2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for summary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a Report & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended granting summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to show deliberate indi erence. After a de novo review of the R&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted the R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed multiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion on September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to find counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion to reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting unsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again denied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by the district court in November 2012. 10 No. 15-3077 factually complex because discovery had been limited at that time to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his own at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint counsel on July 2, 2013. The court rea rmed its previous decision that Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the current stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel would not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the administrative remedies issue. In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a failure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had expired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel for him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a motion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the court has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but can seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated a request for representation to the court’s list of “approximately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indicated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this district.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to represent Giles immediately. Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek counsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare documents, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The magistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not specified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he would continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles filed another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The magistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already granted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited No. 15-3077 11 volunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruitment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judgment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that the motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted and that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer. Giles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third time. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue litigating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a motion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014, which the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stating that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and that Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take the case. Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16, 2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these motions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the plainti may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [defendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.” Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his claim for deliberate indi erence to serious medical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as well as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to recruit counsel and appoint an expert. II. Discussion We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018). A district court properly grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 12 No. 15-3077 2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts establishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must rely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017). The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments “which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to constitutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their confinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The Supreme Court has further established that prison o cials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when they are deliberately indi erent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary judgment on both a claim of deliberate indi erence to his serious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement claim. We discuss each in turn. A. Deliberate Indi erence to Serious Medical Needs To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indi erence to serious medical needs, the plainti must show two elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). “[T]he plainti must prove that he su ered from ‘(1) an No. 15-3077 13 objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state o cial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indi erent.’” Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though “something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. We have described this subjective element as “’a su ciently culpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate indi erence, he “is not required to show that he was literally ignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has clearly met his burden. His schizoa ective disorder diagnosis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psychotropic medications firmly establish that he su ered from an objectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”). Giles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the defendants possessed the “su ciently culpable state of mind” necessary to establish the subjective element of deliberate indi erence. The district court held that Giles failed to meet this burden. We agree. Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim because the defendants are all non-medical o cials who reasonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We have long recognized that the division of labor within a prison 14 No. 15-3077 necessitates that non-medical o cials may reasonably defer to the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate treatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts … a non-medical prison o cial will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As the Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison o cial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indi erence.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we a rmed summary judgment for non-medical prison o cials who relied on the professional judgment of prison medical sta . Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and filed multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inadequate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition. Id. at 526. Although the non-medical o cials did not ignore the inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate further than the medical sta ’s reports and summaries, and otherwise simply referred the complaints to the medical sta . Id. at 527. We held that the non-medical o cials did not have “any duty to do more than they did, in light of their knowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on the professional judgment of medical prison o cials” and “nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the inmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28. A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his various stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Lawrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from No. 15-3077 15 psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals. Although the record does not contain detailed information about what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it does contain evidence that several of his grievances were subjected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals were reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be without merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented evidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor was there an indication from his medical records that he was not receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical o cials relied on the medical professionals to provide proper treatment, and there was nothing to give notice to the o cials of a need to intervene. Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indi erent by allowing him to “go on and o of his medication many times” despite knowing his health condition required continuous treatment. However, the record does not support this assertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010 while still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical professionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first to Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back on medications soon after he requested them. Although there were other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he brought these to the medical professionals’ attention his concerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review of all available information that he was properly receiving his medication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods where Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a psychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s demeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he displayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the medical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the 16 No. 15-3077 conclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week period in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illinois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure to include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary. While this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not meet the standard of deliberate indi erence: a knowing disregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we have noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-prescribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illinois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical records from Stateville. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety, and thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate. B. Conditions of Confinement Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his conditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint focused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected while in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness, and lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has reframed the violation as being the combined e ect that these conditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his placement in segregation subjected him to conditions which exacerbated his symptoms, or which were more di cult for him 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his mental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement violation.” No. 15-3077 17 to cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even though segregation placement and the conditions of his confinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of an ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual treatment in his case given their combined e ect on his illness. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subjecting prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. According to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in accordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the conditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they are not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal o enders pay for their o enses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. As with a claim for deliberate indi erence to serious medical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an objective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plainti must first establish “an objective showing that the conditions are su ciently serious—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (internal citations omitted). The plainti must next establish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of mind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish liability is deliberate indi erence to the inmate’s health or 18 No. 15-3077 safety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing that placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under conditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has di culty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively serious condition creating an excessive risk to his health and safety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated confinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We have also held that the aggregate e ect of a multitude of individual conditions may constitute a violation even if each individual condition could not establish a violation standing on its own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the conditions “have a mutually enforcing e ect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived the plainti of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65. While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh conditions in segregation, the record does not support a finding that he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, even considering the e ects on his mental condition. He was regularly evaluated by mental health professionals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his condition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And on the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health professional determined that his mental condition was being exacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and No. 15-3077 19 moved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and was found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not established the objective element of his claim. Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condition, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective component of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of mind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of the medical professionals into whose care Giles was entrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants consciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by keeping him in segregation when the mental health professionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so. Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and subjective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s handling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to appoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on these motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on a motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a decision on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the district court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamentally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997). 20 No. 15-3077 We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However, the district court does have the discretion to recruit a volunteer to represent a plainti who cannot otherwise a ord counsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the generosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf of indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018). Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step process. First, the court must determine if the plainti made a reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the di culty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plainti ’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court decides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an indefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.” Wilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008. The insu cient number of volunteer attorneys in some of our districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for indigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018). This case presents the question of what a court should do in the event a court determines that the case’s complexity appears to exceed the plainti ’s capacity to litigate his claims and the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney but is unable to find one. We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plainti filed multiple motions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually granted one such motion and spent several months searching. No. 15-3077 21 After contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court identified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The attorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the court to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change, the plainti did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The court o ered to postpone the trial, but the plainti declined the court’s o er. As a result, the court allowed the plainti to proceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that the court’s e orts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty to the indigent plainti ,” and we held that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the plainti to try his case pro se. Id. at 1008. Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its obligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation to the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three separate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat concerning that at some point the court determined further searching would be futile and, without communicating that update to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the pending motion for summary judgment. Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court must do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as this—where the complexities of litigating are high, having counsel is increasingly important, and a district court has concluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it would be advisable for a judge to communicate with the plainti and consider o ering a reasonable continuance before proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The additional time after a court has exhausted its search e orts might a ord a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek 22 No. 15-3077 counsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some preliminary discovery. The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an expert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary before summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to appoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judgment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness where the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined Giles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to him. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or fact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received consistent treatment from medical professionals and the defendants had relied on the medical judgment of those professionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s failure to establish the defendants’ su ciently culpable state of mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment he received or the su ciency of that treatment. Thus, the district court acted fully within its discretion by denying the motion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation. III. Conclusion Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and we have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition and symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dispositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants against whom he has filed this action are non-medical o cials who were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the medical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section 1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The No. 15-3077 23 defendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of facts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Giles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew such an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this record, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing, and therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish deliberate indi erence. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Inmate failed to establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; the non-medical staff defendants relied on medical professionals to determine treatment and there was no indication of a need to intervene.