languagehat.com : CHERIE WOODWORTH, RIP.
Woodworth is not my name; it is one that I acquired, and it was inherited from generations back, from Hezekiah Woodworth, Elisha, Ezekiel, and Abigail Woodworth of 17th c. Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. The name is a corruption (or variant spelling) of “woodward”—the guardian of the wood.
There were “Woodwards” who preserved the name—not the profession—here in New Haven colony. Woodward Ave. is named after that family.
But the name could be mistaken because, in colonial southern New England, the term “woodward” no longer had an active meaning. The American colonists were already using the forest differently—not “warding” it, protecting it and cultivating it, as a limited, but renewable, resource.
I’m sorry I never got a chance to meet her. There’s a moving reminiscence of her here; for more in memoriam links, see her Facebook page. My sincerest condolences go to her family and to everyone who knew and loved her.
Do you mean ‘not “warding” it, [but instead] protecting it and cultivating it, as a limited, but renewable, resource’?
Or do you mean ‘not “warding” it [i.e. not] protecting it and cultivating it, as a limited, but renewable, resource’?
I’m sure she meant the latter. And it occurs to me that her discussion of the name would fit nicely into this thread.
Thanks, Hat. So I suppose “using the forest differently” meant clearing it for the plough.
@John; do you have issues with “passing”?
My sympathies, but I think I will have to found the (probably doomed to be one-person) American Society for the Use of the Words “Dead” and “Death”.
You are, of course, welcome to your preferences, but a lot of people find those words too brutal in connection with a recent personal loss, and faced with the choice between “I like straight talk and simple words, I call a spade a spade, so the hell with your feelings” and “I will use a commonly accepted alternative phrasing so as to spare your feelings,” I tend to go with the latter.
Yes, I was feeling peevish last night and took the opportunity to vent one of my long-standing prejudices against euphemisms for death. As someone or other says, the question “What’s a good euphemism for ‘sociology’?” suggests not only that the word sociology should be avoided, but that there’s something wrong with sociology, the subject matter.
From long ago, I remember New Haven, I remember Woodward, and I salute your lost friend.
Woodward Avenue in Detroit is so well known it has a wikipedia page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-1_(Michigan_highway). By contrast, I didn’t remember Woodward at all from my New Haven days, but I see from google maps it’s on the other side of the Quinnipiac, where I rarely ventured.
Some fraction of bereaved people may on the other hand cordially dislike “passed” and suchlike euphemisms because they don’t want their experience to be euphemized/evaded. But as with a number of other contexts of language use there may be some people rubbed the wrong way no matter which alternative you choose so the best one can hope for is for people to interpret each other’s words charitably (especially when someone who doesn’t necessarily know you particularly well is obviously in context trying to be polite in a potentially awkward context). It is interesting that “RIP” has drifted far enough from its original religious matrix that apparently pretty much no one worries about any risk of giving offense by using it without prior inquiry into the precise religious beliefs of the decedent and/or survivors.
My impression growing up in Virginia in the ’70s was that “pass away” was the standard euphemistic verb (though the noun was “passing”, with no “away”). “Pass” on its own, which I encountered later, seemed to be part of African-American dialect, but then suddenly it was everywhere. Do my impressions have any connection to reality beyond the limits of my own experience?
I correspondended briefly with Cherie a few years ago, occasioned by a comment she made at the Hattery and my subsequent reading of an article she had published in Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, entitled “Where Did The East European Jews Come From?” The article is a review – and much, much more – of the English translation, including its 750 pages of footnotes (!), of YIVO founder Max Weinreich’s magnum opus, History of the Jewish Language.
My link is to a pre-publication proof of Cherie’s article, as evidenced by the occasional interpolation of an editor’s comments. It’s a best-of-breed review, mixing fine scholarship with easy readability. At almost 20 pages, you may want to print it before reading.
That was an interesting article. I am grateful to Paul for having linked it and to the late Dr. Woodworth for having written it. May her memory be for a blessing, as they say in some circles.
“Passed away in his sleep” seems to me to be rather different from dying in a car crash, a suicide, or a sudden heart attack. Anyway, if John’s discomfort arises from a suspicion that to suppress reference to the nature of death is a sign of infantilisation, I’d bow to his superior knowledge of American society.
I’m with John. I don’t like euphemisms for death. Euphemisms imply there’s something wrong with death – which there isn’t (sad though it may be, it’s an inevitable part of life for us all). I also find “passed” to be spooky, and “passed on” and “passed away” to be, at least in Britain, lower-middle-class. When I die, I plan to die. “Passing” is for exams.
Because I trained as an architect in the United States, I tend to use the word “wood” for the material that a Briton calls “timber”. I think of “Timber!” as the caution that a lumberjack shouts when a large tree is about to fall. I once heard a British architect talking about a shiny & fragile maple-veneered plywood reception desk in a shiny jewellery boutique as being made of “timber”. It sounded all wrong to me. Timber is rough-hewn in my mind’s eye.
What have you got against the lower middle class, Crown?
Anyway your wood and timber remark is wildly off the mark: the architect you overheard was being inaccurate and (probably) pretentious. I’ve never heard wood – as in a desk – referred to as timber. Timber is big stuff – trunks or major branches. It’s used in construction or boat-building. That distinction is many hundreds of years old according to the great sage of woodland history, Oliver Rackham.
May I suggest (at least in an AmEng context) the option of “loss,” as in “I’m sorry for your loss” or “Dear X: I was very saddened to hear of the recent loss of your parent/sibling/spouse”? It may be less jarring to some than “death” (if one accepts hat’s point that these issues may come up at a time when telling people they should not be all hiding behind euphemisms and taboos may not be the most helpful message) but is to my ear less evasive (or non-U, if that’s the other thing going on) than “passed” or “passing.” If it’s a euphemism, it’s a very well-established one: ships are traditionally “lost with all hands” and “how many men did we lose” is what not-very-squeamish-about-bloodshed generals say in the old movies after some tactical decision has gone poorly, innit? No one’s really gonna think it implies “temporarily mislaid,” which ought to reduce the odds of anyone getting into a peeving-about-euphemisms mode.
I started looking for the “Farmer” satire and turned up other examples of her Mormon satires, which led me to wonder what was up with her and the LDS in general, which lead me to this comment, also by her.
I don’t like euphemisms for death.
Neither does my wife, and neither do I when it’s a matter of discussing my own future: I say “When I die,” not some circumlocution. But as I said above, I don’t place my own linguistic preferences above the comfort of others, and unless I’m dead certain about their own call-a-spade-a-spade-ism, I use the commonly accepted phrasing. I also say things like “царство ему небесное” (“may he be taken into the kingdom of heaven”) and “alevasholem” in appropriate circumstances, even though I am neither Russian Orthodox nor Ashkenazi Jewish. I like variety.
No, I see why you’re doing it and it’s typical that you’d be so considerate, Language. But how do you know who would prefer that you said “passed” instead of “died”? I try not to use euphemisms and things like “f–k” or “G-d” because I don’t want to give even more power to the words that are being dodged.
A good question, dearie. I’m not sure of the answer. When I was younger, I’d have said they represented everything I hated culturally and politically, but I suppose they’re no more certain to share values than the upper-middle class or any other class.
I think you’ll find many English architects using “timber” much more loosely than you or I would. It may be an architect thing. God knows, they’re all practically illiterate.
Hat, quite rightly, deleted not only my quadruple post at 10:38 above, but my explanation thereof, that my mouse was behaving badly. Equipped with a new mouse ($8.70 at Best Buy including tax), I joyously return to the fray.
Various people on timber: In North America, timber consists of hewn trees (hence Timber! ‘The tree is hewn!’), with occasional extensions to not-yet-hewn trees (standing timber) and minimally worked large poles (as in timber-frame construction). Once milled or sawn or whatever, it becomes lumber. Alas, this useful distinction is not available elsewhere in the Anglosphere, because lumber continues to mean ‘miscellaneous junk’ (possibly influenced by the homonym meaning ‘pawnbroker’s shop’ < Lombard). So the material remains timber until it is actually incorporated into a piece of furniture or whatever. But pace Dearieme, perhaps this is not so in Scotland, or perhaps it is only true of technical usage.
J. W. Brewer: “I’m sorry for your loss” is tainted as officialese for me: it’s something the cops say on Law and Order.
Oops, forgot one. JWB: The people whose ancestors inhabited America before the Europeans came are similarly hard to refer to, for if you call them Indians, there are Native Americans who will object, and if you call them Native Americans there are, by the same token, Indians who will object.
As there’s no “take” (or any other verb) in the original, I wonder if a better translation is possible (given the lack of an identifiable dative in English*). “May he receive the kingdom of heaven”? “May the kingdom of heaven be his”?
* …A literal translation wouldn’t work in German either, though, despite the fact that ihm is unambiguously a dative.
A literal translation wouldn’t work in German either, though, despite the fact that ihm is unambiguously a dative.
Try something like “Ihm sei der Himmel beschert” (with a tip o’ the hat to Schiller).
A literal translation never works. That’s why it’s called literal, a euphemism for “awkward syntactic mimicry”. It’s a consumer warning, like “this product may contain traces of nuts”.
“So the material remains timber until it is actually incorporated into a piece of furniture or whatever.” I’m not clear whether you’re alluding there to American or British practice, but I’m confident that you’re wrong if you mean British. I cite four sources (i) the aforementioned Rackham (ii) my own experience of boat-building as boy and teenager. We used both “timber” (which we pronounced timmer) and wood, and decades later I was struck to learn that we were making just the same ancient distinction that the scholarly Rackham discusses. (iii) My adult experience of working with engineers, and with instrument makers and other skilled tradesmen. (iv) The opinion of the joiner/cabinet-maker who is this morning building us a new wardrobe: his stab at it is that timber is “vast”, “structural”, wood is small stuff. He uses wood.
“The people whose ancestors inhabited America before the Europeans came are similarly hard to refer to”: I don’t see why. Since “aboriginal” might cause confusion – at least outwith the USA – why not “Indigenous Americans”? At least it’s less wrong than “Native Americans” – hell, many of my distant cousins are Native Americans, having been born there.
There is also the point that “natives” used sometimes to be used to imply something like “the local savages” – I’d have thought that might put the Injuns off adopting the term.
And I might add that two of my distant cousins claim to be partly Injun.
More on “timber”: I’ve thought of one caveat to my previous comment. In my experience, the people who sell both wood and timber seem to call themselves “timber merchants” not “wood and timber merchants”.
Does BrEng “timber merchant” = AmEng “lumber store”?
In Canada, or at least the English-speaking parts thereof, you buy wood, even for fine for carpentry work, at a lumber yard. In rural areas, you buy a cord of wood for the fireplace. Timber can refer to a group of trees ripe for the cutting (“a stand of timber”) as well as to cut trees, whose branches are typically removed before felling. To me, the term timber applies anywhere pre-sawmill, after which lumber takes over.
Searching for that pic of a cord of wood took me to the Wiki entry for timber – which redirects to the entry for lumber – and thence to an entry on forestry. There I discovered that at least six early journals about forestry are still published today. The oldest is the Polish-language Sylwan. Sylwan first saw light in 1820 but keeps up with the times: it’s available as PDF and also for Kindle. Only cellulose editions are suitable for kindling.
Okay, time to fire up the mighty engine. Here’s the OED entry, unfortunately not updated since 1912 save for a single quotation 1968; I haven’t marked this up to match the original (too much labor). Note the spelling “timmer” in several of the Scottish quotations, and the interesting specialization of the original Germanic meaning ‘house’ to English ‘material of which a house is made’ vs. German zimmer ‘room (in a house)’.
c825 Vesp. Psalter ci. 8 Swe swe spearwa se anga in timbre [L. unicus in aedificio].
c825 Vesp. Psalter cxxviii. 6 Sien swe swe heg timbra [L. faenum aedificiorum].
a900 tr. Bede Eccl. Hist. (1890) iii. xiv. [xvii.] 204 Þa næglas..þe heo mid þæm to þæm timbre [L. aedificio] gefæstnad wæs.
a900 tr. Bede Eccl. Hist. (1890) iv. iii. 262 Þæt..þa lifigendan stanas þære cirican of eorðlicum seþlum to þæm heofonlican timbre gebær.
c950 Lindisf. Gosp. Mark xiii. 1 gesih hulco stanas & hulig timber [Ags. Gosp. hwylce getimbrunga, L. quales structuræ].
OE Genesis 135 Þa seo tid gewat ofer timber [MS. tiber] sceacan middangeardes.
c1000 Sax. Leechd. II. 198 Sio [liver] is blodes timber, & blodes hus & fostor.
c1330 R. Mannyng Chron. Wace (Rolls) 3692 Þey logged hem, & tymber teld [Petyt MS. timbred teld = constructed tents (which is prob. the correct reading)].
c1000 Sax. Leechd. III. 178 On .vi. nihtne monan..he is..god circan on to timbrane and eac scipes timber on to anginnanne.
†2. Building material generally; material for the construction of houses, ships, etc., or (in extended sense) of any manufactured article; the matter or substance of which anything is built up or composed; matter, material, stuff. Obs. Cf. belly-timber n., flesh-timber (flesh n. Compounds 2).
In early use including 3; in later use prob. fig. from it.
a900 tr. Bede Eccl. Hist. (1890) iii. xvi. [xxii.] 224 Þætte ne meahten godo beon, þa ðe monna hondum geworhte wæron of eorðlicum timbre, oðþe of treom, oðþe of stanum.
a1000 Confess. Ecgberti in B. Thorpe Anc. Laws Eng. (1840) Addit. 16 II. 234 Ne sceal cyrcean timber [L. ligna ecclesiæ] to ænigum oðrum weorce.
a1300 Cursor M. 333–4 (Cott.) , Þis wright..Fra al oþer, sundri and sere, For þai most oþer timber take, Bot he þis self can timber make.
1612 Bacon Ess. (new ed.) 18 Such dispositions are..the fittest timber to make great Politiques of.
1840 M. F. Shepherd in Life of Adam Clarke viii. 261 There is much sound timber in these sermons.
a. spec. Wood used for the building of houses, ships, etc., or for the use of the carpenter, joiner, or other artisan; wood in general as a material; esp. after it has been suitably trimmed and squared into logs, or further adapted to constructive uses.
a1100 Gerefa in Anglia (1886) IX. 261 On wintra erian and in miclum gefyrstum timber cleofan.
c1200 Vices & Virtues 27 And ðe wrihte his timber to keruen after ðare mone.
c1275 (▸?a1200) Laȝamon Brut (Calig.) (1978) l. 11442 Timber me lete biwinnen. and þat beord bi-ginnen.
a1300 Cursor Mundi 1724 Now wat sir noe quat wark to do And hent timber þat fel þar-to.
1398 J. Trevisa tr. Bartholomew de Glanville De Proprietatibus Rerum (Tollem. MS) xiv. ii, Ararat is þe hyȝest hill of Armenia;..and ȝit to þis day þe tymber of þe schip is sene in þe mounteyne.
1466 in J. D. Marwick Extracts Rec. Burgh Edinb. (1869) I. 23 Mak the ruiffes of guid tymmer and theik thame with sclaitt.
1562 W. Turner 2nd Pt. Herball f. 29, Ye tymmer of ye larche tre..is very..profitable for bildyng.
a1674 Milton Brief Hist. Moscovia (1682) i. 4 Their Boats of Timber without any Iron in them.
1712 W. Rogers Cruising Voy. 338 Vessels..chiefly imploy’d in carrying Timber, Salt,..and other Commodities.
1830 J. Lindley Introd. Nat. Syst. Bot. 84 The timber of the Beam Tree (Pyrus Aria) is invaluable for axletrees.
1831 On Planting (Libr. Useful Knowl.) vii. 92 When the wood of a stem or branch of any species of plant attains to the dimensions of 24 inches in circumference, or upwards of eight inches in diameter, it is termed timber.
b. Wood as a substance, or as the material of small utensils or parts of them. Now dial.
1530 J. Rastell New Bk. Purgatory ii. xii, A cup of tymber or metal.
1622 M. Drayton 2nd Pt. Poly-olbion xxvi. 122 Their Arrowes finely pair’d, for Timber, and for Feather.
1663 A. Wood Life & Times (1891) I. 503 For setting up a strip of timber on my window, 6d.
1688 R. Holme Acad. Armory ii. 84/2 The Wood, or Timberr, is between the Sap and Heart.
1793 T. Scott Poems 364 A breast o’ timmer an’ a heart o’ stane.
1834 A. Smart Rambling Rhymes 135 (E.D.D.) Her wheels were made o’ timmer.
a. Applied to the wood of growing trees capable of being used for structural purposes; hence collectively to the trees themselves: standing timber, trees, woods. Rarely in pl. tall timber: see tall adj. 7e.
c893 tr. Orosius Hist. iv. vi. §2 Æfter siextegum daga þæs þe ðæt timber [L. arbores] acorfen wæs.
1426 Lydgate tr. G. de Guileville Pilgrimage Lyf Man 11808 A kanker..the werm..That ffreteth the herte off a tre, And..Doth to tymber gret damage.
1566 in Reg. Mag. Sig. Scot. 1584. 209/1 Habere lie wattillis et lie fallin tymmer de silva de Cleue.
1634 W. Wood New Englands Prospect i. v. 15 The Timber of the Countrey growes straight, and tall.
1718 Free-thinker No. 59. 2 A naked Ground, blest only with a small Group of Timber.
1789 G. White Nat. Hist. Selborne 22 A rough estimate of the value of the timbers..growing at that time in the district of The Holt.
1841 W. Robinson Descr. Acct. Asam 41 Another large and elegant timber indigenous to the forests of Assam, is the Cedrela Toona.
1880 C. R. Markham Peruvian Bark 158 We continued our journey..through a forest of grand timber.
b. spec. in English Law, Trees growing upon land, and forming part of the freehold inheritance: embracing generally the oak, ash, and elm, of the age of twenty years or more; in particular districts, by local custom, including other trees, with various limitations as to age.
As to the legal bearing of this, see quots. 1766, 1818.
1766 W. Blackstone Comm. Laws Eng. II. xviii. §6. 281 Timber also is part of the inheritance. Such are oak, ash, and elm in all places: and in some particular countries, by local custom, where other trees are generally used for building, they are thereupon considered as timber; and to cut down such trees, or top them, or do any other act whereby the timber may decay, is waste.
1818 W. Cruise Digest Laws Eng. Real Prop. (ed. 2) I. 131 By the custom of some countries, certain trees, not usually considered as timber, are deemed to be such, being there used for building… And all the Justices at Serjeants’ Inn were of opinion that in the county of York birch trees were timber, and belonged to the inheritance; therefore they could not be taken by the tenant for life.
1891 Daily News 19 Jan. 5/4 By the custom of the county of Buckingham beech trees are timber.
c. int. The warning call of the feller when a tree is about to fall.
1912 J. Sandilands Western Canad. Dict. (ed. 2) 47 Timber-r-r! the long-drawn melodious warning call of the sawyers in a lumber camp when a tree is about to fall.
1968 Islander (Victoria, Brit. Columbia) 15 Dec. 2/1 The sharp ring of Father’s axe echoed in the icy air, and we cried ‘timber’ as our tree fell.
a. transf. Applied to any object familiar to the speaker, composed wholly or chiefly of wood, as †a spear-shaft; †a bowl; a ship; the stocks (slang); wooden gates and fences (Hunting slang); a wicket (Cricket slang); an arrow (rare); small timber, lucifer matches (street slang).
c1400 Rowland & O. 455 Theyre Ioynynge was so harde that tyde That theyre timbir in sondire gan ryde.
a1500 (▸?c1450) Merlin (1899) vii. 117 [They] mette to-geder on the sheldis, so that the horse ne myght not passe ferther till the tymbres were broken.
a1500 (▸?a1400) Sir Torrent of Portyngale (1887) l. 2349, [I pray] that thou woldist my son lere, Hys Tymber ffor to asay.
1725 A. Ramsay Gentle Shepherd iii. ii, Come, turn the timmer to laird Patie’s health.
1791 ‘G. Gambado’ Ann. Horsemanship vi. 26 The leaps large and frequent, and a great deal of timber to get over.
1840 Bell’s Life in London 2 Aug. 2/2 Morewood joined Morrier, who at length received a ‘Winchester screw’, which shattered his timber.
1851–4 D. Jerrold C. Snub in Men of Char. i, The squire..gives me over to the beadle, who claps me here in the timber.
1857 G. A. Lawrence Guy Livingstone iii. 17 They..would grind over..the March Gibbon double timber as..undauntedly as over the accommodating Bullingdon hurdles.
1871 R. Ellis tr. Catullus Poems iv. 3 Nor yet a timber o’er the waves alertly flew.
1876 in Bettesworth Walkers of Southgate (1900) 332 Appleby..dislodged Webbe’s timbers by his second ball in the first over.
c1879 G. M. Hopkins Poems (1967) 180 Yet Arthur is a Bowman: his three-heeled timber’ll hit The bald and bóld blínking gold when áll’s dóne.
b. spec. A wooden leg: cf. timber-toe n. at Compounds 2; hence transf. a leg. slang.
1807 J. Ruickbie Way-side Cottager 9 in Eng. Dial. Dict.
1821 J. Clare Village Minstrel I. 35 Boys, miss my pegs..and hit my legs, My timbers well can stand your gentle taps.
1862 G. J. Whyte-Melville Inside Bar (ed. 12) I. 230 [The hounds] have a strong family likeness in the depth of their girth..and the quality of the timber on which they stand.
6. A single beam or piece of wood forming or capable of forming part of any structure. Also collectively in pl.
a1575 N. Harpsfield Treat. Divorce Henry VIII (1878) (modernized text) 288 The treasure that was made of the timbers, bells, and leads, and the ornaments of the church.
1623 W. Gouge Serm. Extent God’s Provid. §15 The massy timber [a summer] shivered in two, as suddenly as the other knapped asunder.
1793 J. Smeaton Narr. Edystone Lighthouse (ed. 2) §85 To fasten the outside Timbers.
1859 W. S. Coleman Our Woodlands 8 The original timbers, after this immense lapse of time, are still sound internally.
1894 Labour Comm. in Parl. Papers XXXVIII. Pair of Timber, two timbers placed against the sides of the tunnels in a mine at acute angles with the bottom. They support not only these sides but also another timber, which upholds the roof.
b. pl. spec. Naut. The pieces of wood composing the ribs, bends, or frames of a ship’s hull: see frame n. 5f.
Often preceded by a qualifying word, as cant-, compass-, cross-, filling-, floor-, futtock-, head-, knee-, knuckle-, rising-, side-, square-, stern-, top-timbers: see these words.
1748 B. Robins & R. Walter Voy. round World by Anson ii. iv. 158 Her spirkiting and timbers were very rotten.
1782 W. Cowper Loss Royal George 29 Her timbers yet are sound.
1809 A. Henry Trav. & Adventures Canada 185 We dragged our barges over the neck of land, but not without straining their timbers.
1857 P. Colquhoun Compan. Oarsman’s Guide 29 All the ribs underneath these [floor-boards] are called floor timbers, the rest simply timbers.
1885 Sir J. C. Mathew in Law Times Rep. 52 265/1 Her timbers, no doubt, held together, but she was no longer a ship.
1751 T. Smollett Peregrine Pickle I. xxxvii. 279 My timbers are now a little crazy, d’ye see; and God knows if I shall keep afloat till such time as I see thee again.
1850 B. Taylor Eldorado (1862) xiii. 132, I, whose timbers were somewhat strained, laboured after him.
c. Naut. slang, in exclamations, as my timbers!, shiver my timbers! (see shiver v.1).
1790 C. Dibdin Coll. Songs I. 153 My timbers, what lingo he’d coil and belay.
7. fig. Bodily structure, frame, build. In later use, the ‘stuff’ of which a person is made; personal quality or character; preceded by a qualifying word: suitable quality or character for the specified office, etc. Cf. material adj. 3. Chiefly U.S.
1612 G. Paule Life Whitgift §138. 93 For his small timber, he was of a good quicke strength, straight and well shaped.
1613 F. Beaumont Knight of Burning Pestle ii. sig. D3v, The twelue Companies of London cannot match him, timber for timber.
1670 Milton Hist. Brit. vi. 265 Canute..doubting to adventure his body of small Timber, against a man of Iron sides.
1822 C. Lamb Some Old Actors in Elia 1st Ser., He was not altogether of that timber out of which cathedral seats and sounding-boards are hewed.
1892 Chicago Tribune 4 Apr. 4/5 Senator Cullom of Illinois is better Presidential timber than was generally supposed.
1906 Munsey’s Mag. Jan. 411 His wish to be courteous to men of Cardinal Rampolla’s timber.
1914 Emporia (Kansas) Gaz. 13 Jan. 2/1 He is everlastingly..N.G. as gubernatorial timber.
1954 Sat. Evening Post 6 Nov. 64/4 CIA recruits many employees from our colleges and universities through a process beginning even before individual students realize that they are being singled out as possible CIA timber.
1967 R. S. Churchill Winston S. Churchill II. vi. 193 His parliamentary stature had grown and he had proved that he was of Cabinet timber.
1975 Times Lit. Suppl. 13 June 661/2 My contention that he [sc. J. F. Kennedy] was potential Presidential timber.
a. attrib. or adj. Made or consisting of wood; wooden.
?1530 J. Rastell Pastyme of People sig. *Fvi, The said duke protectour..toke the lorde Hastynges..and..caused his hede to be smytten of vpon a tymber log within the Towre.
1535 Bible (Coverdale) Isa. xxii. B, Then was sene the sege of the tymbre house.
1560 J. Daus tr. J. Sleidane Commentaries f. cccxxiiiv, The Spaniardes with theyr ordenaunce beate downe a timber walle.
1565 T. Cooper Thesaurus at Cassandra, The treason of the tymber horse at the siege of Troye.
1663 B. Gerbier Counsel to Builders 23 The making of Timber partitions.
1700 R. Sinclair in Leisure Hour (1883) 205/2 Timber cups and dishes.
1799 J. Robertson Gen. View Agric. Perth 92 A timber mallet wrought by the hand was all they had..to break the clods.
1890 J. Service Thir Notandums viii. 48 The leg will be stiff for mony a day to come, and like a timmer ane for vera thrawnness.
b. Sc. dial. Unmusical; having no musical ear; dull, ‘wooden’; unimpressionable.
1815 Scott Guy Mannering I. iii. 36 He was a good deal diverted with the harsh timber tones which issued from him.
1874 G. Outram in D. H. Edwards Mod. Sc. Poets (1881) 2nd Ser. 218 The timmer limmer daurs the knife To settle her annuity.
1875 J. Grant One of Six Hundred vi. 46, I regretted my own timbre tones. But I must confess to being enchanted while Louisa sang.
1893 R. L. Stevenson Catriona vii. 75 You have the finest timber face.
1901 Blackwood’s Edinb. Mag. July 58/1 If I were not, so far as music goes, as timber as the table there.
To loop back toward the original topic of the thread, Weinrich’s book renders Yiddish “gehilts” (apparently cognate to modern German “Gehölz”?) as “lumber” rather than “timber.” QED.
Surely the reason for ‘lumber yard’ rather than ‘lumber store’ is that the lumber is mostly stored outside in the open air, i.e. in the yard. Although ‘store’ should be able to mean any place – open-air or enclosed – in which things are stored, it usually implies (in American English, at least) a roofed and lockable building with all the goods for sale safe from the weather inside. A place where the goods are kept out in the yard would be a lumber yard, or a car dealer, or . . . can’t think of a third example at the moment.
A shipyard is another ‘yard’ that may be very well protected from thieves by razor wire and Dobermans, but doesn’t have a roof over its contents. Some ships are kept under roofs (rooves?) when not in use, e.g. the Athenian triremes at the Piraeus: in that case archaeologists refer to the ‘ship sheds’ of the Piraeus, though I imagine they may also refer to the whole place loosely as the shipyard(s). No time to check.
“The people whose ancestors inhabited America before the Europeans came are similarly hard to refer to”: I don’t see why.
dearieme, coming up with an accurate way of saying it is not what’s difficult; what is (sometimes) difficult is knowing what word will not cause offense.
Dearieme: The name “Indigenous Americans” is new to me (as opposed to the mere description “indigenous Americans”, which presumably is uncontroversial, just as it is uncontroversial to refer to “the republic of Ireland” or “the Irish republic”, since it is the only republic on the island of Ireland). Looking in Google, I do see that it has some currency, which is probably a Good Thing: the more names, the better, says I.
The noun “store” in American English is pretty much the exact counterpart of the British English “shop”. It has almost entirely lost its semantic connection with the verb “store”. A store is where they sell things, not where they keep things (although of course you can’t do the former without doing some of the latter).
“Junkyard” is another possibility. Graveyard, switching yard, and many others are perhaps less retail-oriented.
“Indigenous” seems a rather slippery word. On a long enough timescale, the standard account is that human beings are arguably not indigenous to North and South America at all, but descend from rather recent (all things considered) arrivals from elsewhere, whether across the Bering Straits X millenia back or across the Atlantic Y centuries back, or from some other direction by airplane just last year. More substantively, it seems very difficult to get any sort of settled scholarly consensus as to how long the particular Algonquian-speaking societies that were living in the 16th and 17th centuries along the bits of the east coast where I grew up and/or where I now live had been in those locations prior to the arrival of the first Europeans. Maybe as little as 500 years, maybe as much as 1500? Who was living here before the Algonquian-speakers made their way to the Atlantic coast, and were they assimilated or exterminated? It’s not clear to me that anyone knows. The urheimat of proto-Algonquian speakers is apparently contested but often theorized to have been quite a ways inland (somewhere around the Great Lakes), say 2500+ years before present (and thus 2000+ years before Verrazano/Hudson/etc.) If human beings of my own ethnicity have lived in what is now New York / New England / etc., for coming on four centuries now, how much longer before we are not only natives but indigenes?
“Looking in Google, I do see that it has some currency”: what a pity, I had made it up myself and had hoped vaguely that it might be original.
“”Indigenous” seems a rather slippery word.” Surely not for the one practical purpose we’re discussing here. There is, presumably, a vast gap of time between the entry of the ancestors of the Injuns into North America and the arrival of Spanish, French and English settlers. Or even the brief Viking settlement.
It’s not as if we’re discussing NZ history where, on the time scale of North America, there was only the blink of an eye between the arrival of the Polynesians and of the Europeans.
Oh, awesome! That works very well!
I have just read Cherie’s articles on Vasily II’s accession to his father’s throne and the civil wars in Muscovy in 1425-50. She makes a strong case against the idea that Vasily’s ascent signified the triumph of primogeniture over collateral succession. Unfortunately her “Poland and Lithuania before 1500 and the Origins of the Ashkenazi Jews” is nowhere to be found.


President Obama last week signed a defense authorization bill that prohibits the use of federal funds to transfer any Guantanamo detainee into the United States, even for the purpose of prosecution in an Article III court.
The president is the chief federal law enforcement officer and prosecutor. Whether, where and when to bring a particular prosecution lies at the very core of his constitutional power. Conditioning federal appropriations so as to force the president to exercise his prosecutorial discretion in accordance with Congress's wishes rather than his own violates the Constitution's separation of powers.
A congressional limit on transfers for criminal prosecution would upset this careful balance. Prosecutors might well believe that a prosecution in a civilian court for terrorism-related offenses would be the most appropriate path for particular detainees. . . . A bar on civilian trials would also preclude a civilian jury, and make a military commission the sole mode of trial available. Military proceedings can be fair, but a conressional requirement that they be the sole mode of trial for conduct that has already occurred singles out current detainees for harsh treatment, and therefore would violate the Bill of Attainder Clause.
[The prohibition] is an extreme and risky encroachment on the authority of the Executive branch to determine when and where to prosecute terrorist suspects. . . . [It] would undermine my ability as Attorney General to prosecute cases in Article III courts, thereby taking away one of our most potent weapons in the fight against terrorism. . . . The exercise of prosecutorial discretion has always been and must remain an Executive branch function.
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor are newsworthy subjects in these waning days of 2010, and not only because they are half of the number of women who have ever served on the United States Supreme Court (as pictured below).
However, while Kagan as the newest Justice is still being personally profiled, Sotomayor's judicial actions are being analyzed.
Nina Totenberg of NPR's Morning Edition had an discussion of Kagan's first months on the Court: although Kagan "has not written any opinions that have yet seen the light of day," she "already has big fans among her colleagues, from the conservative Justice Antonin Scalia to the liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg." And, Kagan herself is now "relaxed and so able to be herself," because she is "no longer calculating the personal odds of advancement." The 7 minute story is here; and it quotes from the C-SPAN interview with Kagan from earlier in December here.
Meanwhile, Joan Biskupic at USA TODAY and Adam Liptak at NYT are discussing Sotomayor as evinced by her dissents from denials of certiorari. Both Biskupic and Liptak highlight Pitre v. Cain, a prisoner's case, which we discussed here profiling a Linda Greenhouse opinion piece. Biskupic's article describes Sotomayor's "fervent statements protesting the majority's refusal to take some appeals, particularly involving prisoners."
Biskupic and Liptak discuss the seven cases in which there are dissents from denials of certiorari. Biskupic profiles each case in which Justices dissented from the denials of certiorari, noting that while Sotomayor has been the most frequent dissenter, Justice Alito "has been a close second this term in publicly objecting when the majority declines a case. He protested in three cases and authored the opinion in two. On criminal matters, he tends to favor law enforcement."
Liptak phrases it this way: "Not a single member of the court’s four-member liberal wing joined any of the three opinions written by a conservative justice. And not a single member of the court’s four-member conservative wing joined any of the four opinions written by a liberal justice."
Both Liptak and Biskupic also discuss Sotomayor's argument style: assertive.
Deja Vu? Here for some helpful hints and commiserations.
The Center's first interest is to fund the study of the leadership in the Congress, both House and Senate. Topics could include external factors shaping the exercise of congressional leadership, institutional conditions affecting it, resources and techniques used by leaders, or the prospects for change or continuity in the patterns of leadership. In addition, the Center invites proposals about congressional procedures, such as committee operation or mechanisms for institutional change, and Congress and the electoral process.
Awards range from a few hundred dollars to $3,500. The deadline is March 1, 2011. Click here for more information.
Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution requires an "actual Enumeration" every ten years for the purpose of distributing seats in the House of Representatives among the states. Today the Census Bureau released the results of its 23rd enumeration, the 2010 census.
Take a look at the details on this interactive map at the Census Bureau web-site. In short, population gains were greatest in the South and West, with Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, and Texas topping the list (with each above 20% growth since 2000). Michigan is the only state to lose people.
Texas is the big winner for new congressional seats; it gets four. Florida comes in next with two additional seats. Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania each lose a seat; New York and Ohio lose two.
The results seem to favor right-leaning states in Congress, especially because Republicans are in a strong position in state governments for redistricting. But the results also seem to favor right-leaning states in the electoral college (which elect the President): Under Article II, Section 1, the number of electors for each state equals the number of Senators (always two) plus the number of Representatives (which will now change).
Simon Lazarus, public policy counsel at the National Senior Citizens Law Center, writes in the National Law Journal today that challenges to health care reform harken back to an earlier era of judicial activism, the Lochner Era.
Lazarus writes that the challenges, which argue that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the individual health insurance mandate, represent the same kind of activism we saw from the Lochner Court, which overturned hour legislation as interfering with liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The only difference: the constitutional basis of the challenge.
But some don't see it. For example, Lazarus points out that Judge Vinson, who is handling the challenge in the Northern District of Florida by 20 Republican state attorneys general and governors, rejected an argument in his preliminary ruling on October 14 that the mandate violates due process. This way of thinking, he wrote, was a relic of the Lochner Era. Congress determined that the mandate was rationally related to a legitimate end and therefore did not violate due process.
But Judge Vinson also wrote that the mandate exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority, declining to extend the same kind of deference to Congress's judgment on its own authority.
Opponents' challenge to the federal provision stands or falls by the same logic, whether cast as a "fundamental" incident of due process or as an implicit carve-out from Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. Slipping the inquiry from one constitutional shell to another should fool no one. If conservative jurists invalidate this linchpin of the most important domestic legislation in perhaps half a century, they will restore Lochner--letter, spirit, the whole nine yards.
We've previously posted on the problems of marriage monopoly under constitutional federalism and the E-marriage solution proposed by Mae Kuykendall and Adam Candeub.
The United States Senate has passed the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R.2965, by a vote of 65-31 (with 4 Senators not voting). Senator Reid had filed for cloture on the bill on Thursday. Obama is expected to sign the bill into law.
The Don't Ask Don't Tell military policy has been under much pressure. The military itself was no longer supportive of the policy according to an extensive DOD report issued last month. A federal judge in California ruled the policy unconstitutional, a ruling the Obama administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit where it is presently under review. The United States Supreme Court had previously declined to review the policy.
For those interested in teaching and writing about "social change," the Don't Ask, Don't Tell military policy provides rich material. In addition to the recent report and cases, there has been much legal scholarship arguing against the policy, some of which we discussed here and here. Obama has been criticized for not being more assertive in removing the policy.
The United States Army denied Sgt. Perry J. Watkins reenlistment solely because he is a homosexual. The Army refused to reenlist Watkins, a 14-year veteran, even though he had been completely candid about his homosexuality from the start of his Army career, even though he is in all respects an outstanding soldier, and even though the Army, with full knowledge of his homosexuality, had repeatedly permitted him to reenlist in the past. The Army did so despite its longstanding policy that homosexuality was a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment. The issue before the en banc court is whether the Army may deny reenlistment to Watkins solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality.
The court held that the Army was estopped from denying Watkins reenlistment (and a pension), although notably several judges would have held the per se disqualification unconstitutional at that time.
Additionally, any consideration of the constitutional history of Don't Ask Don't Tell should include the related matter of the Solomon Amendment. The Solomon Amendment was aimed at law schools that were barring the military from recruiting on campus because of noncompliance with the school's anti-discrimination policy. The Amendment provided that if any part of an institution of higher education denies military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain federal funds. The challenge did reach the United States Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court upholding the Solomon Amendment in a 8-0 decision.
What is not resolved by the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 is the fate of persons who were discharged under the policy. For example, in September a federal judge ruled that the policy was unconstitutional as applied to Major Margaret Witt and ordered that she be restored to her position as a Flight Nurse in the Air Force. The previously mentioned DOD report has a re-accession policy.
President Obama announced yesterday at the White House Tribal Nations Conference that the U.S. will now lend its support to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The Declaration is a non-binding treaty designed to protect the human rights of indigenous peoples. It incorporates rights in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration, and international human rights law, and specifically protects the right to self-determination and cultural rights, among others. The Declaration was adopted in 2007 over the opposition of the United States and three other member states.
President Obama announced on April 20, 2010, that the U.S. would reconsider its position on the Declaration. (Two days later, the UN special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples told the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues that "[t]he [worldwide] violations of indigenous peoples are deep, systemic and widespread.") There's apparently little publicly available information on the review; DOJ's Office of Tribal Justice mentions it here, and the State Department mentions it here. The Office of Legal Counsel opined in 1996 that the U.S. government could establish the kind of government-to-government relationship that it currently maintains with federally recognized Indian Tribes with "other appropriately constituted indigenous communities within the jurisdiction of the United States." But otherwise there's no publicly available OLC opinion on the Declaration. The only bill in Congress to support the Declaration stalled in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
It's not clear what "support for the Declaration" means to the administration, where the Declaration is non-binding and where many of the rights contained in it (like many of the rights contained in other international human rights instruments) exceed those provided under (or required by) the U.S. Constitution. President Obama committed--and came through on--opening up the government to Native Americans and Native American concerns, but full compliance with the Declaration would go several significant steps further. Given the non-binding nature of the Declaration, its rights (which exceed our own constitutional rights and traditional practices), and the government's historic treatment of Native American peoples, it seems likely that "support for the Declaration" means something like "treat the Declaration as aspirational"--a move toward recognizing the rights contained it, but stopping short of treating it as mandatory.
A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit last Friday upheld California's law providing for a cause of action by Armenian Genocide victims (or their ancestors) against insurance companies that sold them a policy in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923.
Defendant insurance companies in Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG argued that the state law was preempted by "a clear, express federal policy against the use of the term 'Armenian Genocide.'" But the majority ruled that any executive branch communications arguing against recognition of the Armenian Genocide were outweighed by federal government statements in favor of such recognition. Moreover, some forty states recognize the Genocide, and the federal government has never opposed such recognition.
Defendants also argued that the law was preempted under field preemption. But the majority ruled that California's law is a valid regulation of the insurance industry, citing Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, and its effect on foreign affairs is merely incidental, at most.
Judge Thompson wrote in dissent that the law "clearly conflicts with . . . express federal policy" against recognizing the Armenian Genocide, as evidenced by President Clinton's and President Bush's opposition to three House Resolutions to formally recognize the Genocide. Op. at 19662-3. As to field preemption, he wrote that the law interferes with the federal government's "primar[y], if not exclusiv[e]" authority over foreign affairs, citing Zschernig v. Miller and Hines v. Davidowitz.
In a lengthy decision today, the European Court of Human Rights (the Grand Chamber) held Ireland's criminalization of abortion contravened the European Convention on Human Rights as to one of the three women litigants.
The challengers, A, B, and C, all residents of Ireland who traveled to the United Kingdom to obtain an abortion because of the criminalization of abortion in Ireland, argued that their rights under Article 8 were violated.
Each of the women has sympathetic circumstances. Challenger A was impoverished, suffering from depression and recovering from alcoholism, has four children in foster care with whom she is struggling to be reunited. Challenger B was single and feared an ectopic pregnancy. Challenger C was in remission from cancer, and feared both a relapse and that certain treatments may have caused damage to the fetus.
The Court found Article 8 was contravened only with regard to Challenger C. Ireland's violation was a failure to implement its existing constitutional right to an abortion when the pregnant woman's life was at stake.
The decision is thus a narrow one and certainly does not invalidate Ireland's abortion ban.
A good resource on the case is a Q&A from the BBC. The Court's own press release is also excellent.
The Commerce Clause. Judge Hudson ruled that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, because it regulates "inactivity," not economic activity. Judge Hudson described this as unprecedented--leading to unfettered congressional authority. The mandate wasn't saved by an aggregation theory, taking the aggregate economic effect of decisions not to purchase health insurance.
The Necessary and Proper Clause. Judge Hudson ruled that the Necessary and Proper Clause added nothing to the Commerce Clause: If the power's not in the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause doesn't give Congress the power to do it. This is rather breathtaking, given the Supreme Court's ruling last term in U.S. v. Comstock, upholding the federal civil commitment statute under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and, in the course, reinforcing a broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment played a very minor role in the decision. Judge Hudson quoted it at the end of his tax analysis, writing first that Congress has defined authority under the Constitution under Article I, Section 8, and next merely quoting and citing the Tenth Amendment.
Relief. Judge Hudson severed the individual mandate and directly dependent provisions from the rest of the legislation, ruling that only those sections are unconstitutional (and preserving the rest of the legislation). He also only issued a declaratory judgment, not injunctive relief. The ruling is thus quite narrow and recognizes that the issue will be resolved finally in the higher courts.
We most recently posted on health reform lawsuits here, in Liberty University v. Geithner. In that case, the federal district judge dismissed a similar constitutional challenge to reform. Check out the ACA Litigation Blog for litigation documents in all these cases.
The Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, voted last week to convict U.S. District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. (E.D. La.), on all four articles of impeachment passed by the House. Porteous is only the eighth federal judge removed from the bench by Congress.
Impeachment Article I (alleging corruption in the Lifemark case, in which Porteous had a financial relationship with the law firm representing the defendant, and declined to recuse himself) draws upon an "honest services" theory. But the Supreme Court confined the federal honest services act to kickbacks and bribery last term in Skilling v. United States to avoid vagueness problems--after the House passed its Articles. Turley argues that Congress, like the Court, should reject an honest services theory.
Aggregation is a method by which House Members, when drafting Articles of Impeachment, can circumvent the high vote required in the Constitution. They can essentially remove a Federal judge even though less than two-thirds of [Senators] agree on any specific allegation. This is accomplished by combining different claims in one article so that no single act is subject to a stand-alone vote. By lumping together or aggregating issues, you can secure total votes even if only 5 or 10 Senators might agree that any given act is sufficient to remove a Federal judge. That negates article I, section 3, which says "no person shall be convicted without Concurrence of two-thirds of the members present."
There has been a resurgence of "hippies" in political and constitutional discourse. Yet another example is Paul Krugman's post today at the NYT. Krugman criticizes a column in WaPo by Dana Millbank for praising President Obama for "punching the hippies" and rewriting recent health care reform history "as a story of how those DF hippies got in the way, until the centrists saved the day." Although Millbank does not use the word "hippies" in his column, the "hippie" motif - - - including the twinned adjectives acronymized as "DF" - - - has been percolating with more and more energy of late.
The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent so-called "hippies" and "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970) (Sen. Holland). The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, "[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment.
Moreno paved the way for the "animus" exception to a legitimate government interest that decisive in Romer v. Evans and is being argued in the Proposition 8 appeal now under consideration by the Ninth Circuit.
Justin Levitt and Erika Wood of the Brennan Center recently released A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting, a plain-spoken, but quite thorough, examination of political, policy, and constitutional issues related to legislative redistricting--just in time for the spate of activity next year.
According to Wood's Foreword, "[t]he Guide will provide engaged citizens with the knowledge and tools that they need to get involved with this round of redistricting, and to work towards continuing reform to open up the redistricting process in decades to come." It's also a terrific introduction for law students studying voting rights.
As the New York Times reports Florida's clemency board has unamiously voted to pardon Jim Morrison posthumously. Our discussion last month of the possibility of pardon for the indecent exposure and profanity trial and possible First Amendment problems is here.
Mr. Morrison appealed his judgment and sentence; however, he died before the appeal was heard. His death prevented him from exercising his right to a direct appeal, a right given to every American by the United States Constitution. If his appeal had been heard, a reviewing court could have resolved the controversies surrounding his conviction.
Closed book: no use of notes, databases, internet or other sources.
The Court heard oral argument this morning in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, a constitutional challenge on Supremacy Clause/preemption grounds to the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-211 et seq., that sanctions employers for knowingly or intentionally employing "unauthorized aliens." The law was signed by then-governor of Arizona Janet Napolitano, who is now Secretary of Homeland Security and tasked with enforcing federal immigration law, an "irony" noted by Nina Totenberg of NPR.
The Court granted certiorari in late June to review a Ninth Circuit opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Arizona statute. [The case was formerly known as Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria]. While the statute at issue is not the notorious Arizona SB1070, the attention that SB1070 has garnered is not irrelevant and may have contributed to the Court's grant of certiorari.
Justice Kagan has recused herself and did not participate in today's argument. As Solicitor General, she filed a brief on the petition for writ of certiorari; the Solicitor General's brief advocated that the writ be granted, limited to the first question presented," that question being one of express preemption of the Legal Arizona Workers Act by 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2)—which preempts "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” That is precisely the issue before the Court. Acting Solictor General Neal Katyal argued on behalf of the United States, supporting the Chamber of Commerce.
Arguing for the Chamber of Commerce Carter Phillips quickly articulated the notion that the Arizona statute provides for a “death penalty to the business” in that it might completely “eliminate the business's right to exist.” This "right to exist" occurs because Arizona's statute relies upon a provision in the 1986 federal statute, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), regarding state authority to impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws.
"Licensing" turns out to be an ambiguous term, although in today's oral argument Kennedy admits he initially thought, "Oh, well, licensing, that is a defined term; I will look in Corpus Juris Secundum or ALR or something," a sentiment echoed throughout the arguments. Roberts and Alito seemed more certain than Kennedy that "licensing" was a clear and rather broad term that granted the state wide latitude.
Sotomayor, however, had a different point: "how they define "license" or not is irrelevant to me." She asked Carter Phillips to explain the preemption of the state's ability to adjudicate, which for her is the central question.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. Are you conceding that any variation from the Federal standards for -- for criminal and civil liability is automatically precluded?
I mean, as I read the exception, it's an exception for State licensing and similar laws. And it doesn't say, "So long as those licensing and similar laws go no further than what the Federal government has done." I mean, we often allow States to impose regulatory requirements that go beyond the regulatory requirements that the Federal government has imposed, and that is not automatically considered to be preempted. So why -- why are you conceding that Arizona cannot go a whit beyond what the Federal government says?
MS. O'GRADY: Because I think what Congress preserved for us was our ability to impose sanctions, including the suspension and revocation of State laws. But I do think they established a uniform national standard. I don't think we could, for example, establish a strict liability offense in Arizona. We would have to have a scienter requirement as they have in Federal law.
JUSTICE BREYER: Congress has passed a statute that gives the employer just as much incentive to verify, so there is no discrimination, as to dismiss, so there is no illegal hiring. It's absolutely balanced. A $1,000 fine for the one, a $1,000 fine for the other.
So Arizona comes along and says: I'll tell you what, if you discriminate, you know what happens to you, nothing? But if you hire an illegal immigrant, your business is dead. That's just one thing they do. Now, how can you reconcile that intent to prevent discrimination against people because of their appearance or accent -- how do you reconcile that with Arizona's law?
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you are taking the mechanism [E-VERIFY] that Congress said will be a pilot program that is optional and you are making it mandatory. It seems to me that's almost a classic example of a State doing something that is inconsistent with a Federal requirement.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just so you know, I interpret your answer as confirming the implication of Justice Breyer's questions that there is a very substantial difference in Federal and State law on this point. I mean, you told about -- you know what lawsuits are about. If you are home free, a driver's license and Social Security inspection under Federal law and you're not under State law, that is a difference.
[image: Max Liebermann, Women in a canning factory, 1879 via].


(1) Our sales conditions apply exclusively to all of our deliveries – including future ones; conflicting conditions or conditions of the buyer which deviate from our sales conditions are not recognized unless their validity has been explicitly approved in writing. Our sales conditions also apply if we deliver the merchandise to the buyer without reservation in the knowledge of conflicting conditions or conditions of the buyer deviating from our sales conditions.
(2) All agreements made between us and the buyer to facilitate fulfillment of this contract are stipulated in writing in this contract.
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(1) Our offers are subject to change, provided that nothing else arises from the order confirmation.
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If the purchaser acts otherwise after sampling or graphic work by us, he is obligated to pay us a lumpsum compensation amounting to 20% of the order value if he does not prove that the damage is lower. Further claims for compensation for damages or other claims are not affected.
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(3) apply, the risk of an accidental loss or an accidental deterioration of the object of sale goes over to the buyer as soon as the buyer is in default of acceptance or in default of payment.
(5) We are not responsible in the case of force majeure (unforeseen facts and incidents which occur through no fault of our own, which also could not have been avoided with the diligence of a prudent businessman, in particular labour disputes, also with suppliers, war, fire, transport obstructions, lack of material, official measures, natural disasters, delivery from the supplier which is not on time and incorrect in spite of a congruent hedging transaction having been concluded), also in the case of bindingly agreed periods and deadlines. This also applies if they occur to our suppliers and their suppliers. They entitle us to postpone the delivery or performance for the duration of the obstruction, plus a suitable period or to rescind from the contract in full or in part because of the part not yet performed. An advance concession already made is to be taken into consideration when processing the contract.
(6) We are liable according to the statutory provisions insofar as the underlying purchase contract is a fixed transaction in the sense of § 286 Para. 2 No. 4 BGB (German Civil Code) or § 376 HGB (German Commercial Code). We are also liable according to the statutory provisions, provided that the purchaser is entitled to claim that his interest in the further fulfilment of the contract ceases to apply as a result of a delay in delivery which we are responsible for.
(7) We are further liable according to the statutory provisions, provided that the delay in delivery is related to an intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract which we are responsible for; fault by our representatives or persons assisting in the performance of obligations is attributed to us. If the delay in delivery is related to an intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract which we are responsible for, our liability to pay compensation for damages is limited to foreseeable, typically occurring damages.
(8) We are also liable according to the statutory provisions insofar as the delay in delivery which we are responsible for is related to the culpable breach of a material contract duty; in this case, the liability to pay compensation for damages is limited to foreseeable, typically occurring damages.
(9) We are moreover liable in the case of delay in delivery to a maximum amount of 5% of the value of the order.
(1) Warranty claims of the buyer presuppose that the buyer has fulfilled his investigative requirements and his requirements to give notice of defects correctly in accordance with § 377 HGB (German Commercial Code).
(2) The merchandise of the seller can be perishable. Fresh products shall be delivered unless other terms have been agreed upon. The customer must consult us about the shelf life of the individual products. The minimum shelf life we state applies only if the goods are properly stored.
(3) Insofar as there is a defect in the thing purchased, the purchaser is entitled to subsequent performance in the form of a removal of the defect or to delivery of a new thing free from defects, as he chooses. In the case of removal of defects or replacement delivery we are obligated to carry all expenses necessary for the subsequent performance, in particular transport, call-out, work and material costs, insofar as these are not increased by the thing purchased being delivered to a place other than the place of performance.
(4) If this subsequent fulfillment of the contract is not successful, the buyer is entitled to choose whether to withdraw from the agreement or demand a reduction of the purchase price.
(5) We are liable according to the statutory provisions if the purchaser claims compensation for damages which are related to intent or gross negligence, including the intent or gross negligence of our representatives or persons assisting in the performance of obligations. Insofar as we are not at fault for any intentional breach of contract, the liability to pay compensation for damages is limited to foreseeable, typically occurring damages.
(6) We are liable according to the statutory provisions if we culpably breach a material contract duty. There is a material contract duty if the breach is of a duty, the fulfilment of which the purchaser relied upon and may also have relied upon. Also in this case the liability to pay compensation for damages is limited to foreseeable, typically occurring damages.
(7) Liability due to negligent injury to life, physical injury or injury to health remains unaffected; this also applies to the mandatory liability in accordance with the product liability law.
(8) Unless stipulated otherwise above, liability is excluded.
(9) The period of limitation on warranty claims is 12 months, calculated from the transfer of risk.
(10) The period of limitation in the case of a delivery regress in accordance with §§ 478, 479 BGB (German Civil Code) remains unaffected; it is five years, calculated from delivery of the defective goods.
(11) Only the purchaser is entitled to claims for defects against us and cannot be assigned to third parties.
(1) Liability to pay compensation for damages further than that envisaged in Clause 7 is – without taking the legal nature of the damages claimed for into consideration – excluded. This particularly applies to claims for damages resulting from negligence in contracting, other breaches of duty or claims for damages based on tort in accordance with § 823 BGB (German Civil Code).
(2) The limitation according to Paragraph 1 also applies insofar as the purchaser demands compensation for useless expenditure instead of compensation for damages.
(3) Providing our liability for damages has been excluded or limited, this also applies with regard to the personal liability for damages of our employees, workers, staff, representatives and other agents.
(1) The object of sale remains the property of the seller until complete payment is made as specified in the delivery agreement. In the case of a breach of contract by the buyer, particularly default of payment, we are entitled to take back the object of sale. By taking back the object of sale, the seller does not withdraw from the contract unless he has specified this explicitly in writing. The seizure of the object of sale by the seller always constitutes a withdrawal from the contract. After taking back the object of sale, the seller is entitled to utilize it, the realization proceeds are to be set off against the liabilities of the buyer – minus suitable realization costs.
(2) The buyer is obliged to treat the object of sale carefully; he is particularly obliged to insure it at his own expense against damages resulting from fire, water and theft with a new-for-old in surance.
(3) In the case of seizures or any other intervention of a third party, the buyer is obliged to inform us of this immediately in writing so that we can institute legal proceedings in accordance with § 771 ZPO. If the third party is not capable of reimbursing us the costs of legal proceedings, in or out of court, in accordance with § 771 ZPO, the buyer is liable for the losses we have incurred.
(4) The buyer is entitled to resell the merchandise in the course of ordinary business; as soon as the buyer resells the merchandise he transfers to the seller his claim arising from the resale to the total of the invoiced amount (including VAT) against his customer or any other third party regardless of whether the object of sale is resold as it is or after further processing. The buyer is entitled to examine the relinquished claim. Our entitlement to collect the claim ourselves remains unaffected by this. We undertake, however, not to collect the claim as long as the buyer meets his financial obligations resulting from collected profits, does not suspend any payments, particularly does not open bankruptcy proceedings, of composition or insolvency proceedings and is not already bankrupt. If, however, this is the case, we can demand that the buyer specify the relinquished claims and their debtors, and specify all information necessary for collection, hand over the appropriate papers, and notify the debtor (third party) of the transfer.
(5) The processing or treatment of the object of sale by the buyer is always executed for us. If the object of sale is processed with other objects which do not belong to us, we are entitled to joint ownership of the new object in the relation of the value of the object of sale (total invoiced amount, including VAT) to the other processed objects at the time of processing. The same applies to the object created by processing as to the object of sale delivered with reservation.
(6) If the object of sale is mixed inseparably with other objects which do not belong to us, we are entitled to joint ownership of the new object in the relation of the value of the object of sale (total invoiced amount, including VAT) to the other mixed objects at the time of mixing. If the mixing takes place in such a way that the buyer’s object is seen as the main component, it is hereby agreed that the buyer transfers joint ownership to us proportionally. The buyer holds the exclusive ownership or joint ownership thus created for the seller.
(7) We undertake to release collateral if so requested by the buyer if the realizable value of the seller’s claim exceeds the total of the collateral by more than 10%; we are entitled to select the collateral to be released.
(1) If the buyer is a body corporate, a common fund under public law, or a businessman, the place of execution and jurisdiction shall be our seat of business; we do, however, also have the right to sue the buyer in his local court. This also applies when the customer has no general place of jurisdiction in Germany or when place of residence or usual abode are not known on the institution of legal proceedings.
(2) The legal relationship is regulated exclusively according to the legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Application of the United Nations agreement pertaining to the international sales of goods (CISG) is excluded.
(3) Unless otherwise stipulated in the order confirmation, the place of execution and jurisdiction shall be our seat of business.
(4) Should any provision of these terms of business, including the standard terms and conditions, prove to be or become invalid either in entirety or in part, this shall not affect the validity of the other provisions. The provision which has become invalid either in entirety or in part should be replaced by a provision the economic success of which comes closest to the now ineffective provision.
The products in the catalogue and on this website are not shown true to the original and differ in size, shape and colour from the original.Misprints and errors excepted, Subject to alterations.


D.C. Law Library - § 22–1341. Unlawful entry of a motor vehicle.
↪ Chapter 13A. Entry into a Motor Vehicle, Unlawful.
↪ § 22–1341. Unlawful entry of a motor vehicle.
§ 22–1341. Unlawful entry of a motor vehicle.
(a) It is unlawful to enter or be inside of the motor vehicle of another person without the permission of the owner or person lawfully in charge of the motor vehicle. A person who violates this subsection shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01, imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both.
(3) A person with a security interest in the motor vehicle who is legally authorized to seize the motor vehicle.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the term “enter the motor vehicle” means to insert any part of one’s body into any part of the motor vehicle, including the passenger compartment, the trunk or cargo area, or the engine compartment.
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-317 substituted “not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01” for “not more than $500” in (a).
For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 102 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-181, August 6, 2009, 56 DCR 6903).
For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 102 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-227, October 21, 2009, 56 DCR 8668).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 213(b) of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-45, April 1, 2013, 60 DCR 5400, 20 DCSTAT 1300).


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The responsible body for data collection, data processing and data usage in connection with the use of our website is Cyrrus Gallery – Contemporary Art, owner: Houmam Alsaleim, Ravenestraße 3, 13347 Berlin, Germany.
We use your personal data (title, first and last name, postal address, email address, telephone number, and payment information) in compliance with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to fulfil and process your order and to send messages by email in order, for example, to inform your of the status of orders. We will also store the wording of the contract and will send your order data via email. You can see our GTCS here at any time.
Your personal data, which you enter during the order, is only used for processing the contract. Some of your data (title, first and last name, address data, telephone number) will be made available to our logistics partners to facilitate delivery of your order. This forwarding is only ever performed in compliance with the strict requirements of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). There shall be no further forwarding of your information for purposes other than to fulfil, realise and terminate the contractual relationship between you and us, unless there is some statutory or official order to do so. The same shall apply to personal data you may have provided when contacting us in electronic or printed form.
In accordance with European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), you are entitled to request information regarding the data stored about you free of charge, and have the right to correct, block or delete this data. To do this, you can contact our customer service team at the email address cyrrusgallery@outlook.com.
When you access a page, information of a general nature is saved. This includes, inter alia, the type and version of the web browser used, the website from which our site was linked, our websites visited and the date of the visit. All this is information, which does not allow the person to be identified. This anonymous data is only used by Cyrrus Gallery for statistical purposes. This information is not made available to third parties.
Automattic is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation: https://www.privacyshield.gov/.
Automattic and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): https://automattic.com/automattic-and-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/.
“Cookies” are small files that are stored on users’ computers. Different information can be stored within the cookies. A cookie is primarily used to store the information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his visit to an online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies” or “transient cookies”, are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves an online service and closes his browser. In such a cookie, e.g. the contents of a shopping cart are stored in an online store or a login jam. The term “permanent” or “persistent” refers to cookies that remain stored even after the browser has been closed. Thus, e.g. the login status will be saved if users visit it after several days. Likewise, in such a cookie the interests of the users can be stored, which are used for range measurement or marketing purposes. As a “third-party cookie”, cookies will be offered by providers other than the person responsible for the online offer (otherwise, if only the cookies are called “first-party cookies”).
If users do not want cookies stored on their computer, they will be asked to disable the option in their browser’s system settings. Saved cookies can be deleted in the system settings of the browser. The exclusion of cookies can lead to functional restrictions of our online offer.
Our Website uses the “Akismet” service offered by Automattic, Inc. 132 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 94107, USA. The use is based on our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6 § 1 lit. of GDPR. With the help of this service, comments of real people are distinguished from spam comments. All comment information is sent to a server in the USA, where it is analyzed and stored for four days for comparison. If a comment has been classified as spam, the data will be stored beyond that time. This information includes the name entered, the email address, the IP address, the comment content, the referrer, details of the browser used, the computer system and the time of the entry.
Automattic is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation https://www.privacyshield.gov/.
On our Website we use the service Gravatar, Automattic, Inc. 132 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 94107, USA.
Gravatar is a service that allows users to log in and lodge profile pictures and their email addresses. If users with the respective email address on other online sites (especially in blogs) leave posts or comments, so their profile pictures can be displayed next to the posts or comments. For this purpose, the email address communicated by the users to Gravatar is transmitted encrypted in order to check whether a profile is stored for it. This is the sole purpose of sending the email address and it will not be used for other purposes, but will be deleted afterwards.
The use of Gravatar is based on our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f, DSGVO, because with the help of Gravatar we allow contributors and commentators to personalize their posts with a profile photo.
By displaying the images, Gravatar takes notice of the users’ IP addresses, as this is necessary for communication between a browser and an online service. For more information about Gravatar’s collection and use of data, see the Automattic Privacy Notice: https://automattic.com/privacy/ .
If users do not want a user picture linked to their email address on Gravatar to appear in the comments, they should use a non-Gravatar email address to comment. We also point out that it is also possible to use an anonymous or even no email address if the users do not want their own email address to be sent to Gravatar. Users can completely prevent the transfer of data by not using our commenting system.
Google is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation: https://www.privacyshield.gov/.
We only use Google Analytics with activated IP anonymization. This means that the users’ IP address will be shortened by Google within the Member States of the European Union or in other contracting states of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be sent to a Google server in the USA and shortened there.
The IP address submitted by the user’s browser will not be merged with other data provided by Google. Users can prevent the storage of cookies by setting their browser software accordingly; Users may also prevent the collection by Google of the data generated by the cookie and related to its use of the online offer and the processing of such data by Google by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available at the following link: http://tools.google.com.
For more information about Google’s data usage, adjustment and opposition options, please visit Google’s Websites: https://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/partners (“Google’s use of your data when you use websites or apps our partners “), http://www.google.com/policies/technologies/ads (“Use of data for promotional purposes”), http://www.google.de/settings/ads (“Managing information that Google uses, to show you advertising”).
We maintain online presence within social networks and platforms in order to communicate with artists, professionals of the art sector, partners, members, donators, customers, interested persons and users active there and to inform them about the services of our association. When calling the respective networks and platforms, the terms and conditions and the data processing guidelines apply to their respective operators.
When you visit our YouTube plug-in-enabled Website, you will be connected to the servers of YouTube. It tells the YouTube server which of our pages you’ve visited.
The use of YouTube is in the interest of an attractive presentation of our online offer. This constitutes a legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 § 1 of GDPR.
Based on our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6 (1) of GDPR) we use social plugins (“plugins”) of the social network facebook.com, which is operated by Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbor, Dublin 2, Ireland (“Facebook”). The plugins can represent interaction elements or content (e.g. videos, graphics or text contributions) and can be recognized by one of the Facebook logos (white “f” on blue tile, the terms “Like”, “Like” or a “thumbs up” sign) or are marked with the addition “Facebook Social Plugin”. The list and appearance of Facebook Social Plugins can be viewed here: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
Facebook is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement, which provides a guarantee to comply with European privacy legislation: https://www.privacyshield.gov/.
When a user invokes a feature of this Website that includes such a plugin, their device establishes a direct connection to the Facebook servers. The content of the plugin is transmitted by Facebook directly to the device of the user and incorporated by him into the online offer. In the process, user profiles can be created from the processed data. We therefore have no influence on the amount of data that Facebook collects with the help of this plugin and therefore informs the users according to our knowledge.
By integrating the plugins, Facebook receives the information that a user has accessed the corresponding page of the online offer. If the user is logged in to Facebook, Facebook can assign the visit to his Facebook account. If users interact with the plugins, for example, press the “Like” button or leave a comment, the information is transmitted from your device directly to Facebook and stored there. If a user is not a member of Facebook, there is still the possibility that Facebook will find out and save their IP address.

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