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STAMFORD, Conn. – February 7, 2019 – NBC Sports’ live Premier League coverage this week is highlighted by 1st-place Manchester City v. 4th-place Chelsea in a meeting of the last two Premier League champions on Sunday, Feb. 10 at 11 a.m. ET on NBCSN and Telemundo. Sergio Aguero and defending champions Manchester City enter the weekend above Liverpool on goal difference, while Chelsea continue their push to finish in this season’s top-4. Arlo White, Lee Dixon and Graeme Le Saux, who will call the match from a three-man booth, will also provide commentary from a pitch-side desk at Etihad Stadium.
This weekend’s match coverage begins on Saturday, Feb. 9, with a tripleheader on NBCSN, starting at 7:30 a.m. ET with Fulham v. 5th-place Manchester United, followed by 2nd– place Liverpool v. Bournemouth at 10 a.m. ET and Brighton & Hove Albion v. Burnley at 12:30 p.m. ET.
Also at 10 a.m. ET, CNBC will present Huddersfield Town v. Arsenal and NBC Sports Gold will present exclusive coverage of three matches: Crystal Palace v. West Ham, Southampton v. Cardiff City and Watford v. Everton.
Live coverage on Sunday, Feb. 10 begins at 8 a.m. ET with Premier League Mornings, followed by 3rd-place Tottenham v. Leicester City on NBCSN and Telemundo. Only five points behind Manchester City and Liverpool, Tottenham look to stay within touching distance of the top of the table, while Leicester City aim for their first win since New Year’s Day.
Wrapping up this week’s Premier League coverage on Monday, Feb. 11 is Wolverhampton Wanderers v. Newcastle at 3 p.m. ET on NBCSN. Newly promoted Wolves are sitting comfortable in 7th place, while Newcastle enter the weekend just two points above the relegation zone.
Rebecca Lowe hosts Goal Zone, Premier League Mornings, and Premier League Live this weekend, joined by former Jamaica National Team player Robbie Earle and former U.S. Men’s National Team midfielder Kyle Martino.
Manchester City midfielder Kevin De Bruyne joins Arlo White for this week’s episode of “Inside the Mind,” exclusively on NBC Sports’ YouTube channel (available Saturday, Feb. 9). The two discuss De Bruyne’s success at Manchester City, what it’s like to play for manager Pep Guardiola, and his goals before retiring from the sport.
NBC Sports Gold – NBC Sports Digital’s direct-to-consumer live streaming product – “Premier League Pass” features 150 exclusive Premier League matches live and on-demand, an extensive suite of daily and weekly news shows, plus classic archive programming never available before in the U.S. “Premier League Pass” features more than 1,000 hours of additional non-match content throughout the season. Fans can purchase by visiting NBCSportsGold.com for the 2018-19 season of “Premier League Pass,” available for the rest of the season at a reduced price of $24.99. Click here for more information.

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Claude Arthur Cary Askew was born in Holland Park, Kensington, on 27 November 1865, the second son of Reverend John Askew, M.A. Educated at Eton and on the continent, Askew married Alice Jane de Courcey Leake (born St. Pancras, London, on 18 June 1874, the daughter of Colonel Henry Leake) in Paddington on 10 July 1900 and the pair became industrious writers of stories and serials.
"It was because our tastes were so identical that we decided to take up literary work together," said Mrs. Askew, "and the idea came to us about a year after our marriage. Our first venture was a serial in The Evening News and this was so successful that we were soon writing serials for other papers.
"Later on we wrote our first book -- The Shulamite. Its genesis was curious. One Sunday morning, quite unexpectedly, we began talking over the plot. We got so enthusiastic about it that we determined to begin it at once and by nightfall we had completed several chapters. The beginning of this novel is a fair example of the way in which we work. If we feel keen about a story we do it very quickly and we find that the work we do at fever heat is always our best." The Shulamite was dramatised in 1906 by Claude Askew and Edward Knoblauch for production by Lena Ashwell at the Savoy Theatre. Between them, they produced 89 novels and one non-fiction book in the space of twelve years.
"A curious fact in connection with our work is that people sometimes assume that we are brother and sister," recalled Alice Askew. "I remember on one occasion our secretary overheard in a railway carriage a man telling a fellow passenger that he knew 'the Askews' quite well. 'Brother and sister, you know,' he said, 'and most passionately fond of each other, and neither of them ever intend to marry!'"
During the war with Germany, the Askews were in Serbia where Major Askew was attached to the Serbian Army – the experience used as background for their book The Stricken Land (1916) – and were involved the retreat of the Serbians from Prishtina to Alessio. On October 5, 1917, they were aboard a ship in the Mediterranean which was attacked by an enemy submarine. Both were recorded as having drowned at sea.
The couple were survived by a son and a daughter. In more peaceful times they had lived in Wivelsfield Green, near Burgess Hill in Sussex.
The Shulamite. London, Chapman & Hall, 1904.
Eve – and the Law. London, Chapman & Hall, 1905.
The Premier’s Daughter. London, F. V. White & Co., 1905.
Anna of the Plains. London, F. V. White & Co., 1906 .
The Etonian. London, F. V. White & Co., 1906.
Jennifer Pontefract. London, Hurst & Blackett, 1906.
The Baxter Family. London, F. V. White & Co., 1907 .
The Love-Stone. London, Sisley’s, 1907.
Lucy Gort. A study in temperament. London, F. V. White & Co., 1907.
Out of the Running. London, Everett & Co., 1907.
The Plains of Silence. London, Cassell & Co., 1907.
The Sword of Peace. The story of a secret society. London, Everett & Co., 1907.
Not Proven. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1908.
The Orchard Close. London, Hurst & Blackett, 1908.
The Path of Lies. London, F. V. White & Co., 1908.
The Tempting of Paul Chester. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1908.
The Blue Diamond. London, C. H. White, 1909.
The Devil and the Crusader. London, F. V. White, 1909.
Felix Stone. London, Everett & Co., 1909.
John Heriot’s Wife. London, F. V. White & Co., 1909.
Testimony. London, Chapman & Hall, 1909; abridged, London, George Newnes (Sevenpenny Novels 24), 1921.
Behind Shuttered Windows. London. C. H. White, 1910.
Fate – and Drusilla. London, Everett & Co., 1910.
The Quest of El Dorado. London, Cassell & Co., 1910.
The Rod of Justice. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1910.
Scarlet Town. London, C. H. White, 1910.
The Sporting Chance. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1910.
Destiny. London, Hurst & Blackett, 1911.
Helen of the Moor. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1911.
The House Next Door. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1911.
Kitty Shafton – Swindler. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1911.
The Pearl of Great Price. London, F. V. White & Co., 1911.
A Society Marriage. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1911.
The Stolen Lady. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1911.
The Woman Deborah. London, Eveleigh Nash, 1911.
The Apache. London, Everett & Co., 1912.
Barbara. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1912.
Bess of Bentley’s. A true shop-girl story. London, F. V. White & Co., 1912.
The Dream Daughter. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1912.
The Englishwoman. London, Cassell & Co., 1912.
In Lovers’ Lane. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1912.
The King’s Signature. London, Chapman & Hall, 1912.
The Lily and the Devil. London, Everett & Co., 1912.
Outlaw Jess. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1912.
The Actor Manager. London, George Newnes, 1913.
God’s Clay. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1913.
The Golden Girl. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1913.
Milly the Actress. London, Aldine Publishing Co. (Mascot Novels 2), 1913.
The Mystery of Helmsley Grange. London, C. A. Pearson, 1913.
Poison. London, Everleigh Nash, 1913.
A Preacher of the Lord. London, Cassell & Co., 1913.
A Scarlet Sin. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1913.
Souls Adrift. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1913.
Araby’s Husband. London, Hurst & Blackett, 1914.
By Order of the King. London, Aldine Publishing Co. (Goodship Sixpennies), 1914.
Freedom. London, Hurst & Blackett, 1914.
Gilded London. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1914.
In Strange Shoes. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1914.
The Legacy. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1914.
Love the Jester. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1914.
Through Folly’s Mill. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1914.
The Golden Quest. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915; abridged, London, Aldine (Novels 8), 1924.
Her Mother’s Child. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915.
The Lurking Shadow. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915.
The Missing Million. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915.
The Tocsin. A romance of the Great War. London, John Long, 1915.
Trespass. London, Chapman & Hall, 1915.
The Weavers. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915.
Wild Sheba. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1915.
The Footlight Glare. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1916.
Her Father’s Daughter. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1916.
Nurse. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1916.
The Garment of Immortality. London, John Long, 1917.
The Inscrutable Miss Stone. London, John Long, 1917.
The Lost Idol. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1917.
The Paignton Honour. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1917.
Salvation. London, Chapman & Hall, 1917.
The Bride in Black. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1918.
Lady Borradale’s Ordeal. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1918.
The Ordeal of Ann Curtis. London, Jarrolds, 1918.
The Telephone Girl. London, Ward, Lock & Co., 1918.
The Work of Herr Hands. London, Chapman & Hall, 1918.
The Secret Pathway. London & Glasgow, Collins, 1919.
The Yellow Yoke. London, Aldine Publishing Co. (Goodship Sixpennies), 1919.
The Grip of Sin. London, Lloyds, 1920.
Lavender’s Inheritance. London, United Press, 1922.
Evelyn. London, John Long, 1923.
Her Empty Triumph. London, J. Leng & Co. (People’s Friend Library 162), 1926.
A Woman’s World. London, J. Leng & Co. (People’s Friend Library 170), 1926.
A Deadly Revenge. London & Dublin, Mellifont Press, 1934.
The Stricken Land. Serbia as we saw it. London, Everleigh Nash Co., 1916.
my name is Erik Schreiber and I am from germany. i like herabooks and titania medien published in this time Alice and Claude Askew - Aylmer Vance Abenteuer eines Geistersehers. I dont know the rigth titel in englich. my questin is, because I found your blog, if you can help me for one projekt. I am the publisher of one young publishinghouse calles Saphir im Stahl (www.saphir-im-stahl.de) And I think it was a good idea, to publisch some phantastik storys , translated in german. I see the list of the Askews and would ask you, if you can help me and send the storys to me?
This is simply a list of stories compiled from information available in various library listings. I don't actually have the books themselves.
I was looking for the exact birth dates for the Askew's and ran across a family genealogy page, http://www.halhed.com/t4r/familygroup.php?familyID=F1368&tree=tree1. Dates differ a bit from your article, and strangely enough Claude's death is given exactly, while Alice's is listed with a day's uncertainty.
Thanks for the link. The mismatch with dates is that Claude's birth was registered in 1866 (legally you had - and maybe still have - six weeks to register a birth). I've now made a correction.

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state habeas proceedings warranted tolling. The filing of the skeletal petition had stayed the statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but left only 13 days remaining in Hill's one-year grace period. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying rule announced in United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998), to petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and thus allowing prisoners whose convictions were final before AEDPA's effective date until April 24, 1997 to file petitions in federal court). The court denied the benefits of equitable tolling, but construed Hill's motion as one for an extension under 28 U.S.C. § 2263. The court granted an extension until March 31, 1999.
Hill filed his petition seeking federal habeas relief on March 30, 1999. He filed motions under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) seeking the assistance of a forensic expert (on June 7, 1999), and of an investigator for discovery purposes (on June 11, 1999), and under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases seeking additional discovery (on June 11, 1999). Each of these motions was denied the same day it was filed. The district court held on June 11 a hearing regarding Respondent Gary L. Johnson's ("Respondent") June 10 motion for summary judgment, and on July 1, issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, granted Respondent's motion, and entered a judgment dismissing Hill's petition with prejudice.
Hill's petition for federal habeas relief was filed on March 30, 1999, and therefore his case is governed by the provisions of the AEDPA. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), Hill must first obtain a COA before he may obtain appellate review of the district court's denial of habeas relief. A COA can issue only if Hill makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. § 2253(c)(2). Such a showing "requires the applicant to 'demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues (in a different manner); or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). We resolve doubts about whether to grant a COA in Hill's favor, and we may consider the severity of his penalty in determining whether he has met his "substantial showing" burden. See Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
deference scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 22 (1999). Under that scheme, we review pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact under § 2254(d)(1), and review questions of fact under § 2254(d)(2), provided that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court, and denied relief. This qualifies as an "adjudication on the merits." See Trevino, 168 F.3d at 181; Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1474 (1999).


The Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal have issued unanimous opinions rejecting state governments? claims of sovereign immunity from suits by private individuals to enforce the Medicaid Act. Since February of last year, Medicaid beneficiaries and their advocates have been dealing with a radical decision by Judge Robert Cleland, Westside Mothers v. Haveman. In his ruling, Judge Cleland said the Medicaid Act can never be enforced by beneficiaries. Since the opinion was issued, similar arguments have been made to federal judges by a number of state governments. Four of the federal circuit courts of appeal are currently looking at this issue, affecting people living in 16 states.
On May 15th, 2002, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Westside Mothers decision. One week earlier, the Fourth Circuit had rejected the arguments in a case called, Antrican v. Odom, also a Medicaid case. The issue is still before the Fifth and First Circuit courts.
If it had been accepted by the Sixth Circuit, Judge Cleland?s decision would have caused radical changes in the enforcement of Medicaid and other federal legislation enacted pursuant to Congress? spending clause authority. Under the spending clause, Congress ties federal funding to participating states? agreements to adhere to the conditions placed on the funding by Congress. According to Judge Cleland, only the federal government could enforce the terms of the spending clause enactments.
To reach this conclusion, Judge Cleland took a quite literal reading of two previous Supreme Court decisions. Citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (describing spending power legislation as ?much in the nature of a contract?) and Justice Scalia?s concurring opinion in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (describing the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between the state and federal governments as a ?third party beneficiary?), Judge Cleland had decided that Medicaid was merely a contract to pay money, not a federal law. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
The Sixth Circuit rejected this holding: ?[T]he [Supreme] Court ? is using the term ?contract? metaphorically, to illuminate certain aspects of the relationship formed between a state and the federal government?. It does not say that Medicaid is only a contract?. The Supreme Court has held that the conditions imposed by the federal government pursuant to statute upon states participating in Medicaid and similar programs are not merely contract provisions; they are federal laws.? Indeed, the Circuit Court ?reaffirmed well-established precedent holding that laws validly passed by Congress under its spending powers are supreme law of the land? under the United States Constitution.
The Sixth Circuit went on to hold that private individuals can enforce the Medicaid Act against states by using the ?Ex parte Young exception? to sovereign immunity, which ?gives life to the Supremacy Clause? by allowing private individuals to bring actions against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to halt ongoing violations of federal law.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit found that the Medicaid beneficiaries and provider organizations who filed Westside Mothers could enforce the specific Medicaid Act EPSDT provisions that form the basis for the suit. The court found these provisions were enforceable through a civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On May 9th, 2002, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to decide this novel set of sovereign immunity issues. The case, Antrican v. Odom, was a unanimous decision written by Judge Niemeyer.
Antrican involves Medicaid-eligible children in North Carolina who have been unable to obtain dental care as the Medicaid Act requires, due in large part to a lack of Medicaid-participating dentists. The children also claim that the Medicaid provisions for Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) are being violated.
After District Judge Malcolm Howard rejected the state=s motion to dismiss, the State Attorney General appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit. There, the State Attorney General cited Judge Cleland?s Westside Mothers decision to raise a number of state sovereign immunity claims. Significantly, they argued that private individuals can never enforce the Medicaid Act or any other spending clause enactment. As the Attorney General?s office noted during the oral argument, it was not federal enforcement the state minded, it was suits by private Medicaid beneficiaries.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected a number of other sovereign immunity claims. Under the Ex parte Young exception, noted above, the plaintiffs in the case can seek prospective injunctive relief, but not retroactive relief or damages. Because the suit would require expenditure of funds from the state fisc, the state argued that the relief sought, at its core, was not truly prospective.
The state also argued that there was no ongoing violation (also a requisite of the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity) because the plaintiffs were presently receiving dental treatment.
The Court found this argument ?misreads the substance of the plaintiffs= complaint,? which did not rest on the notion that children could obtain no dental services but rather alleged that the state was failing to provide a Medicaid program under which beneficiaries could obtain prompt and adequate dental services on an ongoing basis as would be available to the general public.
The Attorney General next argued that the state has a special sovereignty interest in determining how its limited Medicaid funds will be spent and that this should insulate the state from suit in federal court.
The Court rejected this argument, saying: ?North Carolina elected to participate in the federal Medicaid program and, therefore to be bound by the requirements of the Medicaid Act. If the State did not want to face this federal involvement, it was free to decline federal funds and operate a State program for medical assistance using its own standards or to decline to operate such a program at all.?
The National Health Law Program is co-counsel in the Antrican (4th Circuit) case, along with the North Carolina Justice Center, and Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice. In the Westside Mothers (6th Circuit) case, NHeLP is co-counsel with Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Michigan Legal Services, and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia.


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Philip S. Anderson was a founding partner of Williams & Anderson and is now senior counsel to the firm. He received his B.A. and LL.B. degrees from the University of Arkansas. He served as Editor-in-Chief of the Arkansas Law Review. He has broad experience in trial and appellate practice as well as in acquisitions, mergers and general corporate matters. He was president of the American Bar Association in 1998-1999. He continues to maintain an active practice.
Mr. Anderson was selected by the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation to receive the 2013 Outstanding Service Award, which is presented to "a fellow who has , in his professional career, adhered for more than thirty years to the highest principles and traditions of the legal profession and to the service to the public."
Mr. Anderson represents the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, a newspaper of statewide circulation. He also serves on the board of directors of the newspaper and its parent company. He represents media clients on First Amendment issues, including access and defamation. He was lead counsel for ABC, CBS, CNN and NBC in access litigation arising out of the Whitewater trials in Arkansas in 1996. He has represented The New York Times, the Associated Press and HBO on media issues arising in Arkansas. He was also lead counsel in trying two landmark newspaper antitrust cases to successful conclusions. Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, affirmed, Community Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998); Arkansas Gazette Company v. Camden News Publishing Company, U.S.D.C. No. LR-C-84-1020 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
He was retained as appellate counsel in Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 2011 Ark. 183, in which the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the discovery order of the lower court and issued a Writ of Certiorari to protect the manufacturer's valuable formulas and other trade secrets from disclosure.
He was lead appellate counsel in the appeal of the largest personal-injury verdict in the history of the state, which resulted in a substantial remittitur of the award, Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346 (2003), and in the appeal of a judgment in the amount of $8.2 million against a bank on a lender-liability claim, which resulted in the reversal of the judgment and the dismissal of the claim, First Commercial Bank v. Walker, 333 Ark. 100, 969 S.W. 2nd 146 (1998).
He tries cases in federal and state courts throughout Arkansas, and appears before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Arkansas Supreme Court.
For several years, Mr. Anderson was outside general counsel for the largest bank holding company in Arkansas at the time, and he represented the client in the acquisition of banks throughout the state. He continues to represent clients in major acquisitions and mergers. In 2008, he represented WEHCO Newspapers, Inc., in the acquisition of three newspapers in central Missouri. In 1998 and 1999, he represented the same client in the acquisition of the Chattanooga Free Press and The Chattanooga Times, which papers were merged into the Chattanooga Times Free Press in 1999.
Mr. Anderson’s service to the American Bar Association, in addition to his term as president, includes two terms on the Association’s Board of Governors and more than thirty years in its House of Delegates, in which he continues to serve. He is a member of the American Law Institute, which promulgates the Restatements of the Law, and he is an emeritus member of its governing Council. He served as an adviser in the preparation of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and the Restatement of Trusts-Prudent Investor Rule. Mr. Anderson is listed in Best Lawyers in America under Antitrust Law, Appellate Practice, Corporate Law, First Amendment Law, Commercial Litigation, Bet-the-Company Litigation, Litigation - Antitrust, Litigation - Banking & Finance, and Litigation - First Amendment; in Chambers USA as a “Leader” in the field of General Commercial Litigation; and in Mid-South Super Lawyers in the areas of Business Litigation, First Amendment/Media/Advertising Law and Business/Corporate Law.
Mr. Anderson is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.

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23-1908. Corners; establishment and restoration; rules governing. The boundaries of the public lands established by the duly appointed government surveyors, when approved by the Surveyor General and accepted by the government, are unchangeable, and the corners established thereon by them shall be held and considered as the true corners which they were intended to represent, and the restoration of lines and corners of said surveys and the division of sections into their legal subdivisions shall be in accordance with the laws of the United States, the circular of instructions of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on the restoration of lost and obliterated section corners and quarter corners, and the circular of instructions to the county surveyors by the State Surveyor under authority of the Board of Educational Lands and Funds. The county surveyor is hereby authorized to restore lost and obliterated corners of original surveys and to establish the subdivisional corners of sections in accordance with the provisions of this section and section 23-1907. Any registered land surveyor registered under the provisions of sections 81-8,108 to 81-8,127 is hereby authorized to establish any corner not monumented in the original government surveys in accordance with the provisions of this section 23-1907. Subdivision shall be executed according to the plan indicated by the original field notes and plats of surveys and governed by the original and legally restored corners. The survey of the subdivisional lines of sections in violation of this section shall be absolutely void.
Source: Laws 1913, c. 43, § 6, p. 143; R.S. 1913, § 5692; Laws 1915, c. 102, § 1, p. 245; Laws 1917, c. 109, § 1, p. 280; Laws 1921, c. 161, § 1, p. 654; C.S. 1922, § 5022; C.S. 1929, § 26-1608; R.S. 1943, § 23-1908; Laws 1969, c. 171, § 1, p. 748; Laws 1982, LB 127, § 5.


D.C. Law Library - § 47–1812.05. Determination of deficiency; protest by taxpayer; hearing; determination of taxable income; effect thereof.
↪ § 47–1812.05. Determination of deficiency; protest by taxpayer; hearing; determination of taxable income; effect thereof.
§ 47–1812.04. Duty of Mayor to make return.
§ 47–1812.05. Determination of deficiency; protest by taxpayer; hearing; determination of taxable income; effect thereof.
Assessments of any deficiencies in the tax due under this chapter, or any interest and penalties thereon, shall be governed by § 47-4312. The Mayor may determine the gross income, adjusted gross income, and any itemized deductions necessary to arrive at the taxpayer’s proper taxable income. Any assessment made or proposed on the basis of such determinations shall be deemed prima facie correct. Any assessment, compromise, closing agreement, settlement, adjustment, ruling, or other determination of the individual’s, estate’s, or trust’s income or status for federal income tax purposes made or proposed by the Internal Revenue Service, or other competent federal authority, shall not be binding or deemed controlling on the Mayor, the courts, or such taxpayers in determining their taxable income for District income and franchise tax purposes.
This section is referenced in § 47-1806.06, § 47-1806.09c, § 47-1812.07, and § 47-1815.01.
Documentary evidence, certified mail return receipts, see § 14-506.
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3(b) of Office of Administrative Hearings Establishment Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-513, August 2, 2004, 51 DCR 8976).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 3(b) of Office of Administrative Hearings Establishment Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-553, October 26, 2004, 51 DCR 10359).
Notice of deficiency is different from an assessment: This section obviously contemplates that an assessment is to be made after the notice of deficiency has been issued, after the taxpayer has filed a protest, and after any hearing has been held.


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Texas cities and other government entities like to wrap themselves with the legal trappings of "sovereign" immunity, and thus defeat law suits against them on jurisdictional grounds that they might otherwise lose on the merits. Here the City of Houston fails in this scheme as the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice John Anderson, holds that it was collecting an illegal fee, which the plaintiff had paid under duress. New civil county court at law judge Jacqueline Lucci-Smith , formerly with the Harris County Attorney's Office, gets reversed for the first in her new career as a county court judge over the immunity issue.
Appellant, Saturn Capital Corporation ("Saturn"), appeals the trial court’s granting of the City of Houston’s (the "City") Plea to the Jurisdiction. Finding the trial court erred when it granted the City’s Plea, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In 1992, the City demolished buildings on the property located at 8526 Pitner Road. The City assessed a fee for the cost of the demolition against the Pitner Road property which was owned by L.A. Investments, Inc. When L.A. Investments did not pay the demolition fee, the City filed a demolition lien on the Pitner Road property. On February 15, 2000, the City, Spring Branch Independent School District ("SBISD"), and other taxing authorities, obtained a judgment against L.A. Investments for delinquent taxes on the Pitner Road property. On May 15, 2000, an Order of Sale in Tax Suit was obtained and on June 22, 2000, the constable gave notice that the property would be sold at a public tax sale. With the approval of L.A. Investments, Saturn purchased the tax lien from SBISD and later foreclosed on the tax lien at a public tax foreclosure sale. Saturn purchased the Pitner Road property at the tax sale. The City did not bid at the tax sale. At the time Saturn purchased the Pitner Road property, Saturn, taking the position that the tax sale extinguished all inferior liens, did not pay off the City’s demolition lien.
In 2003, Saturn agreed to sell the Pitner Road property to Pitner Road Affordable Housing, Ltd. However, the title company would not issue title insurance and close the sale unless the City released its demolition lien on the property. In addition, the purchaser was unwilling to go forward with the deal as long as the City refused to release its lien. Saturn, arguing the demolition lien was invalid because it had been extinguished by the tax sale, made demand on the City that it release the lien. The City refused to release the demolition lien until the lien had been paid in full.
Faced with the loss of the sale of the Pitner Road property, Saturn paid the City the full amount of the demolition lien, $88,500.32, under protest and with full reservation of rights to litigate and recover the funds paid. Saturn then filed suit against the City seeking to recover its payment of the demolition lien. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing it was immune from Saturn’s suit, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.
In a single issue on appeal, Saturn contends the trial court erred when it granted the City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. at 228. In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not consider the merits of the case, but only the pleadings and the evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Moore v. University of Houston-Clear Lake, 165 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the pleader’s intent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 228. In addition, the question of whether undisputed evidence, which is the situation we are presented with here, establishes a trial court’s jurisdiction, is a question of law. Id. at 226.
B. Is the City Immune From Saturn’s Suit?
Texas has long recognized, and the City conceded during oral argument, that sovereign immunity does not prevent a party who paid illegal government taxes and fees under duress from filing a lawsuit to seek their repayment. Dallas County Community College District v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 877 (Tex. 2005). Thus, to resolve the issue of whether or not the City is immune from Saturn’s suit, two questions must be answered: (1) does Saturn’s payment of the demolition lien constitute the payment of an illegal tax or fee; and (2) if so, did Saturn pay off the demolition lien under duress?
In Texas, a demolition lien is subordinate to a tax lien. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. ' 214.001(o) (Vernon 1999). Therefore, a tax foreclosure sale extinguishes a demolition lien on the subject property. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. ' 33.95 (Vernon 2001) ("A purchaser for value at or subsequent to the tax sale may conclusively presume the validity of the sale and takes free of any claim of a party with a prior interest in the property. . ."); see also Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. J & J Mobile Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 878, 881B82 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (stating that a junior lien does not survive the foreclosure of a superior tax lien). Here, because Saturn purchased the Pitner Road property at a properly conducted tax sale, the City’s inferior demolition lien was extinguished and Saturn took the Pitner Road property free from that lien.
A fee is defined as a fixed charge or a charge for a service. The Merriam-webster Dictionary (New Edition, 2004). The City’s demolition lien imposed on the Pitner Road property was to cover the cost incurred by the City when it performed a service: demolishing dangerous buildings on the property. Therefore, the costs of the demolition constitute a fee. As discussed above, the demolition lien was extinguished as a result of the tax sale. Therefore, when the City sent, after the tax sale, a letter to the title company handling Saturn’s sale of the Pitner Road property stating "[The City] will issue releases for the Notice and the Order of Building Official (Clerk’s File Nos. T118848 and N576628, respectively), once the lien(s) have been paid in full," we hold this constitutes an effort to collect an illegal fee.
Saturn argues that it paid the City’s demolition lien under duress because it faced (1) the loss of the pending sale of the Pitner Road property if the City’s demolition lien was not paid off; and (2) the ultimate loss of the property because if the sale did not go through, it would be unable to continue paying the taxes on the property. In response, the City contends Saturn voluntarily paid the lien as the loss of a pending sale of the property is insufficient to constitute duress. We agree with Saturn.
The Texas Supreme Court has consistently recognized that business compulsion arising from the payment of illegal or improper government fees and taxes coerced by financial penalties, loss of livelihood, or substantial damage to a business can constitute duress and allow for the recovery of an illegal tax or fee. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d at 878. The duress necessary to authorize the recovery of an illegal tax or fee is established when the unauthorized tax or fee is required, necessary, or shall be paid to avoid the government’s ability to charge penalties or halt a person from earning a living or operating a business. Id. at 879. Because the record demonstrates that (1) Saturn faced substantial damage to its business if the Pitner Road property sale did not go through; (2) the sale could not be completed unless the City released its extinguished demolition lien; and (3) Saturn paid off the extinguished demolition lien only after the City demanded payment in full before it would release the lien, the payment was not voluntary but made under duress. Accordingly, sovereign immunity is not at issue and does not preclude Saturn from pursuing its suit against the City. We sustain Saturn’s only issue on appeal.
Having sustained Saturn’s only issue on appeal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Seymore.
 "Business compulsion" has also been referred to as "economic duress" or "implied duress." Dallas County Community College District v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 877-78 (Tex. 2005).
 In its brief, the City emphasizes the role of Alfred Antonini, the president of Saturn, and alleges that the transfer of the SBISD tax lien to Saturn violates the Fraudulent Transfer Act. These issues constitute affirmative defenses to Saturn’s suit and are not relevant to this appeal, which addresses only the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and does not reach the merits of the case. Moore v. University of Houston-Clear Lake, 165 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] no pet.).


Texas Penal Code § 25.11 was created to enhance the penalties to a third-degree felony when it is alleged that a person assaults one or more of his/her family members, household members, or a person with whom he/she has a dating relationship, two or more times within a 12 month period.
If you are charged with any act of domestic violence you should understand that the penalties can be enhanced. The charges are serious. Contact Matt Horak, experienced criminal defense attorney to discuss the best ways to mount an aggressive defense to the charges of continuous family violence in the greater Houston area, Harris County, and the surrounding areas including The Woodlands in Montgomery County, Texas.
A person commits an offense if, during a period that is 12 months or less in duration, the person two or more times engages in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 22.01(a)(1) against another person or persons whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code.
Section 22.01(a)(1) of the Penal Code, Assault, provides that “[a] person commits an offense if the person ... intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 22.01(a)(1).
The relationships covered by the statute include a husband and wife, boyfriend and girlfriend, parents of children, blood relatives, and even individuals in a dating relationship.
Under section 71.0021(b) of the Family Code, a “dating relationship” as “a relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 71.0021(b) (West 2008 & Supp.2013).
the frequency and type of interaction between the persons involved in the relationship.
A charge of continuous violence against the family is a felony of the third degree. A felony of the third degree is punishable by incarceration for two to ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and a fine of no more than $10.000.
A defendant may not be charged with more than one count under Subsection (a) if all of the specific conduct that is alleged to have been engaged in is alleged to have been committed against a single victim or members of the same household, as defined by Section 71.005, Family Code.Tex. Penal Code § 25.11(d).
Thus the court concluded that under section 25.11 the allowable unit of prosecution for double jeopardy purposes is a series of at least two bodily-injury assaults committed within a certain 12–months–or–less period against a single victim in a dating relationship with appellant. See id. § 25.11(d). Id.
Additionally, under the statutory scheme of section 25.11, only one punishment is intended “in cases of continuous family violence where the specific underlying acts of bodily injury assault upon which the defendant was convicted occurred against the same victim and within the same period the continuous family violence occurred.” Id. (citing § 25.11(c)).
Matt Horak represents clients charged with domestic assault, domestic violence and family violence crimes throughout the Houston Texas area, including Harris, Montgomery, Fort Bend, Brazoria, Galveston, Liberty, and Waller counties. With offices in Houston and The Woodlands, call Horak Law today at (713) 225-8000 or toll-free at (800) 225-8009 to set up a consultation and discuss the specific facts of your case.
Although any allegation of assault in a domestic violence case is serious, the possible penalties and punishments are even more serious after repeated allegations have been made. An experienced Houston criminal defense lawyer can fight to have criminal charges reduced or dismissed.


C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Thomas L. Johnson, Vernon F. Pergstrom, Chief, Appellate Section, Lisa A. Berg, Assistant County Attorney, for Respondent.
Willie Bias, Jr., appeals his conviction for first degree murder while committing or attempting aggravated robbery, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) (1986). Appellant contends (a) the evidence, entirely circumstantial, does not support the jury’s verdict; (b) the indictment was constitutionally flawed; and (c) the trial court erroneously allowed him to be impeached with evidence of a prior felony conviction. We affirm on all three grounds.
Appellant’s main claim of insufficient evidence requires a detailed review of the facts. On Saturday, October 18, 1986, at 11:43 p.m., the Minneapolis Fire Department received a call reporting a fire at 32 Spruce Place. The call was placed by Charles Swenson, who lived on the third floor of an adjoining building and could see into a window of Apartment 301 at 32 Spruce Place. Swenson heard a noise at his window and when he looked out noticed a bright orange flash, followed by smoke, in the window across the courtyard. He called 911, then hurried to the burning apartment and opened the unlocked door. Swenson tried to crawl in, but cut himself on broken glass and became overwhelmed by smoke. Before leaving, he saw what he thought was a person’s leg.
Fire department officials arrived shortly thereafter and, while subduing the fire, found a body slumped over the arm of a sofa in the living room. The body, charred beyond recognition, was later identified by dental records as Robert Churchill, the apartment’s tenant. An October 19 autopsy revealed a stab wound to the heart, as well as fractured cartilage and bleeding in the neck, consistent with strangulation. Low carbon monoxide levels in the body and normal lungs showed Churchill died before the fire began. The medical examiner opined the stab wound was the cause of death. Fire investigators found no trace of accelerants, but believed the fire was probably intentional, given the evidence of homicide. They also believed the fire originated on the sofa at the end where the body was found, as that area showed the greatest charring. A knife was found in the ashes near the sofa, but was burned so badly no blood could be recovered. There was no evidence of forced entry.
Minneapolis Police Detective Charles Miles initiated the homicide investigation. On Monday, October 20, he and another officer went to the Speakeasy Bar on Hennepin Avenue, looking for people who knew Robert Churchill. The officers approached a woman crying on the sidewalk outside the bar, who told them she was a good friend of Churchill’s and had been with him at a party Saturday night. She had just learned of the death from the Speakeasy’s bartender. The woman, Bonnie Bender, identified three other people who had been at the party: a black man named Eric, a man she knew only as Willie, and another she referred to as “the Mexican.” She also described a submachine gun Churchill owned and passed around at the party, but which was not recovered in the apartment after the fire.
Within a few days, police located Erasmo (Eric) Diaz Delaluz and Jerry Wittner (“the Mexican”), who confirmed Bender’s report. Bender and Delaluz identified Bias from a photo lineup as the “Willie” who had also been present, but police could not find him. Sgt. Miles contacted Bias’ sister, Lenore Stukel, telling her Bias was wanted in connection with a burglary. Bias called Stukel twice in October and asked if anyone was looking for him, but refused to tell her precisely where he was. When Bias called Stukel once more, he told her he was in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, after she said she might need to contact him if something happened to their ailing grandfather. Stukel relayed that information to Miles and Bias was arrested by Baton Rouge authorities under a Minnesota second degree murder warrant. Bias waived extradition and Miranda rights, and on November 17, 1986, submitted to questioning in Baton Rouge by Sgts. Miles and DeConcini of the Minneapolis Police Department. A grand jury indicted Bias on one count of premeditated murder and one count of murder while committing aggravated robbery, both constituting murder in the first degree.
At trial, the four guests at Churchill’s party related the events of October 18, 1986. Around 11:00 a.m. that day Bias went to the Speakeasy Bar on Hennepin Avenue. There he approached Bonnie Bender, whom he did not know, and invited her to play pool. Two or three hours later, Robert Churchill came in and greeted them. Bender had known Churchill for several years and considered him “like my brother.” Bias also knew Churchill, who housed Bias for a short time in 1985 after Bias was released from prison. After a few drinks, Churchill suggested they all go to his apartment along with two others in the bar, Jerry Wittner and Bender’s friend Eric Delaluz. Delaluz had other business, but agreed to join them later.
Late that afternoon, Churchill, Bender, Wittner and Bias left the Speakeasy to go to Churchill’s apartment at 32 Spruce Place, where they drank and talked into the evening. At one point, Churchill asked Bender if she wanted to see his “baby.” Bender said, “Sure,” and Churchill retrieved from the bedroom a large case apparently carrying a musical instrument. The case actually contained a semi-automatic submachine gun which Churchill passed around the group, then put back in the case. When Delaluz arrived, Churchill again brought out the gun and passed it around the room. Appellant put the gun away in the bedroom.
Witnesses testified appellant later approached Delaluz and said something about selling the gun and that “he had to have it.” Delaluz, a Cuban national with poor English, did not fully understand appellant, but Bender overheard the conversation and thought appellant wanted to steal the gun and have Delaluz help “get rid of it.” Bender angrily confronted appellant and informed Churchill, but appellant denied the accusation, saying he wanted only to buy the gun for resale at a profit. Appellant testified Delaluz was a potential buyer. According to Bender, Churchill said he would kill appellant if he tried to steal the gun.
Sometime after the argument, Delaluz said he needed to buy cigarettes and wanted to leave. Bender asked Churchill to accompany them to the Speakeasy, but Churchill said he was drunk and wanted to stay home. Bender told Bias he had to leave too, but Bias wanted to stay and talk with Churchill. Bender asked Churchill which he preferred, and Churchill said he wanted everyone to go.
Evidence of subsequent events is conflicting. According to Bender, she picked up the phone and threatened to call the police, whereupon Bias “disappeared.” Everyone else was still in the living room and heard a door click. Bender, Delaluz and Wittner then left, though Bender stood outside the door until she was sure Churchill locked it. She and the others hurried down the steps to confront Bias again, but could not find him. Wittner left on his bicycle and Bender and Delaluz left for the Speakeasy about 10:30 p.m.
Bias testified he agreed to leave but went first to the bathroom, then to the kitchen to get beer. According to Bias, Bender followed him around the apartment and stood at the door until he was on his way down the steps. He was afraid the group would “gang up” on him, and hurried to nearby Loring Park. Bias said he sat near the fountain to drink his beer and was joined by a man he recognized from Personal Contractors, Inc. (PCI), an agency through which he had obtained temporary work in previous weeks. Bias gave the man a beer and confessed he had slashed the tires on PCI vans recently. After one or two hours, Bias testified, he headed home to Portland Avenue and Ninth Street, walking down Yale Place and through the parking lot of the MacPhail Music Center.
Bias’ testimony at this point agrees with that of Minneapolis Police Officer Paul Peterson, who encountered Bias in the MacPhail lot. Peterson was in the area investigating a call he received around 11:25 p.m., about a man shooting a gun near Hennepin Avenue and 13th Street. He stationed his car at the dead end of 13th Street just east of Yale Place, and saw a person cross 13th Street a block away on Harmon Place. The person was carrying what Peterson thought might be a gun case, but Peterson did not believe this person was the subject of his 11:25 p.m. call. He then slowly drove up 13th Street to Harmon and turned right, continuing to follow the person nearly a block ahead of him. The person turned right onto 12th Street, but when Peterson turned, after stopping for a red light, the person was nowhere in sight. Thinking the person might have stepped into a building on 12th Street, Peterson pulled into the MacPhail Center lot to turn around and continue his search. As he did so, he saw a man at the end of the parking lot. Peterson pulled the car toward the man, Bias, who also approached Peterson. Bias was wearing a baseball cap and dark blue windbreaker with the words “Rainbow Bowl” on the back that he testified he wore to the Speakeasy earlier. Peterson could only describe the gun-carrier’s clothing as dark.
Peterson asked Bias if he had seen anyone meeting the description given in the earlier call. Bias testified he lied and said yes, because he was drunk and was afraid of arrest. Bias then asked where he could buy cigarettes, and Peterson pointed him toward the nearby Luxeford Hotel or JR’s bar. Bias testified he went to the Luxeford, bought cigarettes, and walked directly home.
After Bias left, Peterson logged the earlier call, then glanced out his window and noticed a hard-sided gun case leaning against the MacPhail Center Annex. Peterson opened the case and found a submachine gun, which witnesses later identified as Robert Churchill’s. Peterson put the gun in his trunk and tried to find Bias, the man he had just encountered. After about five minutes of searching, he met some other officers and overheard a 12:02 a.m. call to their squad car about a fire at 32 Spruce Place.
Bias’ testimony about Loring Park and the MacPhail Center encounter conflicts with his November 17 statements to Sgt. Miles. Asked then about the party, Bias said there had been no argument and he left before the others. He said he walked to Hennepin Avenue to go drinking, but changed his mind and walked home straight down 9th Street. Bias denied talking to a policeman in the MacPhail Center area, saying he talked to no one on his way home. At trial, Bias testified the earlier statements were wrong because he was confused and “just kind of flipped out” upon hearing the murder charge.
The day after the party, Sunday, Bias left Minneapolis and hitchhiked to Texas although three days earlier he had rented an apartment in Minneapolis on a monthly basis. Bias testified he was planning to leave in a few days and had looked for weekly accommodations, but could not find any with laundry facilities and individual mailboxes; he rejected flop houses because he “can’t handle them.” Using money from the sale of his truck, Bias rented an efficiency he thought more desirable and paid through November 16, 1986. According to the building manager, Bias asked if he could carpet and paint the apartment. Bias bought dishes, silverware, and canned food and retrieved a small black and white TV set from storage at the bus station.
After moving in, Bias discovered the building lacked mailboxes, and laundry facilities had to be reserved several days in advance. Unhappy with the situation, he decided to leave. At about 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, he went to the building manager and asked for his $ 25.00 deposit, saying he had an emergency. She told him the main office would mail it to him, but Bias had no forwarding address. Bias then went to the Francis Drake Hotel, looking for someone to sublet the apartment. He met several transients with whom he exchanged the keys and rent receipt for $ 5.00 and a half-ounce of marijuana. Two of the transients testified Bias told them he was “hot,” meaning wanted by the law. Bias testified he told them he wanted to leave for someplace hotter because it was getting cold in Minneapolis. He left them the dishes, food and some old clothes.
At around 11:00 a.m., Bias began hitchhiking on Interstate 35W. Chester Eddins picked him up at around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. and drove him all the way to Texas, where he stayed in Eddins’ home and did maintenance work for four days. He then hitchhiked to another Texas town, and two days later to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where he got a lawn maintenance job. He was arrested on the murder charge there in November.
Bias contends his conviction rests on pure speculation and circumstantial evidence and thus cannot stand. We recently summarized the general standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case. State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1986). We must determine whether, under the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences that can be drawn from them, a jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. Id. at 661. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. Id.; State v. Flores, 418 N.W. 2d 150 (Minn. 1988).
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny. The evidence is entitled to the same weight as any evidence so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Race, 383 N.W.2d at 661. The conviction may stand only where the circumstances form “a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn. 1980). This stricter standard, though, “still recognizes a jury is in the best position to evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime.” Race, 383 N.W.2d at 662. As in all cases, the jury determines the credibility and weight given to the testimony of individual witnesses. State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1985); State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 1980).
Bias claims the record fails to show he intended to harm or steal from Churchill. The party guests’ testimony, he asserts, demonstrates nothing more than his desire to acquire the gun by lawful means. While the party testimony alone is not conclusive, it certainly demonstrates Bias’ intense interest in the gun. The jury was in a position to assess Bender’s credibility, and could reasonably have believed her account, which was generally corroborated by other witnesses (e.g., Wittner’s testimony that Bias treated the gun “like a little kid after a bag of candy”). The jury likewise could have believed Bender’s testimony that guests were in the living room and heard the door click as Bias apparently left the apartment. This evidence, and evidence of no forced entry, is consistent with the state’s theory that Bias swung the door shut from the inside, then proceeded down a short hallway to the bathroom where he hid until the others left. Though Bias testified Bender accompanied him to the door, his vested interest in having a witness to his departure provides substantial grounds to doubt his story. See State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Minn. 1984).
Bias also dismisses his encounter with Officer Peterson in the MacPhail Music Center parking lot as an unfortunate coincidence with no probative value, considering Peterson’s inability to describe the person he saw carrying the gun case. However, the location of the gun in relation to Bias and the timing of events that night allowed the jury to infer that Bias saw the squad car following him, cut through the alley, and dropped the gun shortly before Peterson entered the parking lot. More importantly, inconsistencies in the evidence cast doubt on any alternative hypothesis. Bias testified he walked from Loring Park down Yale Place to arrive in the MacPhail lot at the same time as Peterson. Peterson, however, was parked just off Yale Place several minutes earlier and would almost certainly have seen Bias somewhere along that street. Peterson apparently saw no one else that night other than a crowd leaving a bus at the nearby Luxeford Hotel, and Bias himself saw no one in the alley or parking lot near where the gun was found. Peterson spotted appellant just moments after he last saw the gun-carrier, who must have been near the parking lot at roughly the same time.
Bias’ credibility is further undermined by the conflicting story he gave Sgt. Miles in Baton Rouge, at a time when he was not aware that Officer Peterson had confirmed Bias’ presence in the MacPhail lot. When Miles asked Bias to show him on a map how he walked home, Bias described a path that avoided the MacPhail Music Center and denied talking to a police officer. Bias attributes those “omissions” to fright and confusion, but such “significant inconsistencies in appellant’s statements to authorities substantially diminished the credibility” of his story. State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. 1986). Assessment of credibility is left to the jury, which was fully apprised of discrepancies in the evidence. See State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 827 (Minn. 1985).
Bias further claims “there is absolutely nothing suspicious” about his departure from Minneapolis the day after the party, as he was a drifter with no permanent home and had been planning to leave for warmer weather. Nevertheless, evidence of flight suggests consciousness of guilt. State v. Meany, 262 Minn. 491, 502, 115 N.W.2d 247, 255 (1962); State v. French, 400 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn. App. 1987). The jury could and apparently did find the circumstances surrounding his abrupt departure to be incriminating. Bias had only three days earlier rented an apartment and exhausted his money on rent and furnishings. He explained his actions partly through dissatisfaction with mail facilities at the apartment, but admitted he hadn’t received mail in a long time, then equivocated about whether or not he was expecting mail. Transients who sublet appellant’s apartment claimed he told them he was “hot”; appellant disputes their testimony, but the jury apparently believed them and could reasonably have done so. See State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172, 180 (Minn. 1983). The jury could also reasonably dismiss the relatively minor PCI tire-slashing incident as the explanation for appellant’s evasive telephone calls to his sister. Moreover, appellant’s behavior after the offense cannot be isolated from the rest of the evidence, the cumulative effect of which negates any rational hypothesis other than guilty flight.
Similarly, lack of physical evidence connecting appellant to the crime does not undermine the verdict. Evidentiary gaps are largely products of the fire, a result obviously intended by the offender. Any gaps, moreover, fail to support a reasonable inference other than guilt, given the implausibility of an alternative offender who somehow gained access to the apartment after 10:30 p.m.; murdered Churchill and started the fire; stole the gun but ignored other valuable items in plain sight; and escaped notice when abandoning the gun in the MacPhail Center parking lot within moments of appellant and Officer Peterson’s meeting there.
To successfully challenge a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, a convicted criminal must show his claim is consistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. Race, 383 N.W.2d at 662. After reviewing the evidence as a whole, and assuming the jury believed the state’s witnesses, we hold appellant did not meet that test.
Appellant next argues his conviction must be overturned because the indictment was constitutionally inadequate. The trial court denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, which he claimed insufficiently informed him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require that indictments contain “a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.02, subd. 2. Under Minn. Stat. § 628.18(6) (1986), an indictment is sufficient if it meets the requirements of Rule 17.02 and “the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.” An indictment offers two major protections and is ultimately tested on that basis: whether it apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and whether the record shows with accuracy that subsequent prosecution on the offense is barred. State v. Oman, 265 Minn. 277, 281, 121 N.W.2d 616, 620 (1963), citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240, 82 S. Ct. 1038 (1962). However, we have also stressed that a conviction after a fair trial will stand unless there is actual proof that defendant has in fact been misled as to the charge brought against him, to his prejudice. State v. Clark, 270 Minn. 538, 552, 134 N.W.2d 857, 867 (1965); see also State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. 1984); Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.02, subd. 3. We may reverse if the charge was so vague as to make it impossible for the defendant to defend himself. Id.; State v. Waukazo, 269 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Minn. 1978).
Appellant’s indictment charged “that on or about the 18th day of October, 1986, in Hennepin County, Minnesota, Willie Roger Bias caused the death of Robert Churchill, a human being,” under Count One “with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of that person, or another,” and under Count Two “with intent to effect the death of that person, or another, while committing or attempting to commit the felony of aggravated Robbery.” He claims the indictment fails because it merely repeats the statutory language without telling him exactly how the state claimed he committed the alleged crimes.
The indictment touches the essential elements of both crimes charged. See Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1), (3) (1986). Its language offers little beyond the words of the statute, but no greater particularity is needed if all that is essential to constitute the offense is stated fully and directly. Oman, 121 N.W.2d at 620. Even if the indictment lacks detail, appellant demonstrates no prejudice to his defense. The charge presents none of the problems posed by an indictment we recently found defective because it simply alleged the defendant exceeded his statutory authority. State v. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d 514, 518-19 (Minn. 1987). In that case, neither the indictment nor any pretrial records told defendant what authority he had exceeded; he had no way to prepare a defense. Id. Bias, though, knew the essential facts of his charge: the death of a named person on a specific date, caused by him, with intent and with premeditation or while committing or attempting aggravated robbery. Other facts beyond the material elements of the offense were available through discovery procedures. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d at 519; State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. 1984). Moreover, Bias earlier had been served a second-degree murder complaint providing detailed notice of the facts underlying the state’s case. We can only conclude that appellant knew precisely what was the charge against him. See Clark, 134 N.W.2d at 865.
We also find no merit in appellant’s claim that the indictment exposes him to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. He points to State v. LaValla, 278 Minn. 63, 153 N.W.2d 135 (1967), where an indictment threatened double jeopardy when it failed to specify which of several kinds of burglary had been committed, even leaving questions about whether the charge alleged a felony or a gross misdemeanor. Bias’ indictment allows no such confusion; it clearly identifies two specific types of murder recognized by statute and enough facts to bring the alleged offense within the statute. The indictment reflects the charge against Bias with sufficient accuracy to bar his subsequent prosecution for the same crime.
The trial court admitted for impeachment purposes evidence of appellant’s 1981 conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. Bias testified despite that ruling and his counsel drew out the prior conviction on direct examination. On appeal, he claims the evidence was unduly prejudicial and warrants a new trial.
Evidence of a prior conviction within the last ten years is admissible to impeach a witness’ credibility if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, or if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment exceeding one year and the court finds the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609. For crimes in the latter category, weighing probative value and potential prejudice is left to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1985). The court’s decision will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 209; State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979).
Bias’ prior felony did not involve dishonesty or false statement, so the only question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the conviction to impeach Bias. Five factors should guide the trial court’s decision: (a) the impeachment value of the prior conviction; (b) the date of the conviction and defendant’s subsequent history; (c) the similarity of the prior conviction with the charged crime; (d) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (e) the centrality of the credibility issue. State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978).
While sexual crimes have less bearing on veracity than do many other crimes, Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546, impeachment is not improper simply because the prior crime is not directly related to truth or falsity. State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 1984); Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d at 707. Such evidence allows the jury to view the “whole person” and thus judge better the truth of his or her testimony. Id. Bias was released from prison on the 1981 offense just two years before the offense here, so the prior conviction’s relevance has not substantially diminished. See Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546. Nor is criminal sexual conduct so similar to premeditated or felony murder that the jury inevitably made an improper inference about his propensity to commit the latter crimes. Even closer similarity between the prior and charged crimes does not preclude impeachment, though that factor weighs against admissibility. See Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546; Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d at 707-08.
Appellant seems to concede his credibility is at issue, but charges undue prejudice from the prior crime because his word stands against nothing but circumstantial evidence. That argument implies circumstantial evidence is somehow not enough and appellant’s testimony deserves greater deference as a matter of law, a notion we reject. Further, key facts in this case depended on whether the jury believed witness Bonnie Bender or Willie Bias, and particularly whether the jury believed Bias’ portrayal of his actions at the end of and after the party. Bias’ credibility, then, was central to the case, which weighs in favor of admitting impeachment evidence. We find no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.