text:
COMMONWEALTH vs. I. CHARLES BAKER (and a companion case).
Bail bonds are not instruments which may be described as "money" or "obligations or other securities for money" as referred to in G. L. c. 277, Section 23, and at the trial of indictments charging that bond agents did steal "money" of surety companies on the bonds, where there was no evidence that the defendants received any premiums thereon, it was error not to allow their motions for directed verdicts at the close of the Commonwealth's case [64-71]; a verdict of not guilty should have been ordered with respect to such an indictment where there was evidence that the principal's mother paid a premium but the jury in finding the defendants guilty of larceny of the bond implicitly found that they did not steal the premium [71-72].
At a criminal trial, the judge cannot be required to grant a motion "that the Court direct a verdict of not guilty on the Commonwealth's opening." [80-81] Evidence warranted findings that, when initially receiving premiums on certain bail bonds from principals, two bond agents intended to keep the premiums and to deprive the surety companies of their share thereof, pursuant to a scheme to exclude the bonds from the agents' monthly reports, and that the agents were guilty of larceny under G. L. c. 266, Section 30 ; G. L. c. 175, Section 176, had no bearing on the propriety of the trial judge's denial of motions for directed verdicts [81-83].
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court on October 4, 1971.
The cases were tried before Collins, J.
John P. White, Jr., for Nathan A. Baker.
Monroe L. Inker (Charlotte Anne Perretta with him) for I. Charles Baker.
Terence A. Troyer, Assistant District Attorney (Bonnie H. MacLeod-Griffin, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.
The two indictments were tried before a jury in a single trial under the provisions of G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G.
The defendants were found guilty and sentenced on all counts. They appealed to the Appeals Court and the cases were then ordered transferred to this court. See G. L. c. 211A, Section 10 (A), inserted by St. 1972, c. 740, Section 1.
The defendants filed a consolidated assignment alleging a total of twenty-seven errors, but in their joint brief they have not argued all of them. We therefore limit our consideration to the issues argued and treat the rest as waived. S.J.C. Rule 1:13, 351 Mass. 738 (1967). Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 13-14 (1958). Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282, 290 (1970). Gelinas v. New England Power Co. 359 Mass. 119, 127 (1971). The defendants argue that the trial judge committed errors in (1) denying their motions for particulars, (2) refusing to read the minutes of the grand jury who had returned the indictments, (3) allowing the Commonwealth's petition under G. L. c. 277, Section 57A, concerning venue, (4) denying their motions for directed verdicts of not guilty made at the close of the Commonwealth's opening statement and repeated at the close of the Commonwealth's case, (5) making various rulings relating to the examination of witnesses and the admissibility of evidence, and (6) refusing to give the jury certain instructions requested by the defendants and giving the jury certain instructions claimed to have been incorrect. Before discussing these alleged errors it may be helpful to summarize briefly some of the evidence showing the setting in which these cases arise.
one-half of the outstanding shares of stock of the agency. Between 1959 and 1971 the defendant Nathan A. Baker was the president, and the defendant I. Charles Baker was the treasurer of the agency. In addition, they and one other person were the directors of the agency. The agency was duly licensed to issue bail bonds as agent for either Continental or American or both in this Commonwealth in the years in question.
The contracts between the agency and the surety companies required the agency to file with each company a monthly list of all bail bonds issued by the agency on behalf of the company, and to pay the premiums due to the company, less the commissions to which the agency was entitled. A typical monthly report listed several hundred bail bonds issued by the agency for the company, listing each bond by the name of the principal, the amount thereof, the gross and net premiums, and the date of issuance.
On various dates, the earliest being November 20, 1967, and the latest being June 18, 1971, the agency issued twenty-two bail bonds, the first four of these on behalf of Continental and the eighteen thereafter on behalf of American. None of these twenty-two bonds was included in any of the agency's monthly reports to either company, nor did the agency pay the company any part of the premium for any of these bonds issued in its name. The Commonwealth contends that each defendant committed larceny as to each of these twenty-two bonds, that each of the twenty-two counts in the indictment against one defendant alleges the crime of larceny with respect to a different one of the twenty-two bonds, and that the twenty-two count indictment against the other defendant alleges the same crimes with respect to the same bonds.
the property of the named owner (Continental in four counts and of American in eighteen counts of each indictment). The counts are thus in substantially the statutory form authorized by G. L. c. 277, Section 79, [Note 2] with the addition of the date and place of the offense charged.
Each of the twenty-two bail bonds in question was signed either by one of the defendants or by an employee (subagent) of the agency, all of which persons were authorized to sign such bonds in behalf of the agency.
As to the bonds involved in the five counts numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22 of each indictment, there was testimony that a premium was paid therefor, the premium for one having been paid directly to the defendant Nathan Baker and the premiums for the other four having been paid to one of the subagents, and there was further evidence permitting an inference that the subagents paid the premiums over to one of the defendants or to an employee of the agency.
As to the bonds involved in the remaining seventeen counts of each indictment the situation is as follows. As to count numbered 7 there was testimony by a witness that a premium was paid therefor to one of the subagents, and testimony by the latter that he had no memory of the transaction. As to the remaining sixteen counts numbered 1 through 6, 8, 9, 11 through 15, and 19 through 21, there was either (a) no testimony whether any premium was paid, (b) testimony that no premium was paid, or (c) testimony by a witness who had no memory whether a premium was paid.
named therein not guilty, guilty of larceny of the bond involved, or guilty of larceny of the premium paid for the bond, and that if they found a defendant guilty on any count they must state whether he was found guilty of larceny of the bond or of the premium. The jury returned verdicts finding each defendant guilty on all counts against him. In the five counts numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22, they found the defendants guilty of larceny of the premiums, and in the remaining seventeen counts numbered 1 through 9, 11 through 15, and 19 through 21, they found the defendants guilty of larceny of the bonds.
The judge imposed on each defendant a sentence on each count of one year in a house of correction and a fine of $100, the sentences to be served concurrently; and he stayed execution of the sentences and payment of the fines pending the outcome of the present appeals. There is no indication whether, in sentencing the defendants, the judge considered the applicability of G. L. c. 266, Section 40, relating to the punishment of "a common and notorious thief."
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgments on the five counts numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22 on which both defendants were found guilty of larceny of premiums, and we reverse the judgments on the seventeen counts numbered 1 through 9, 11 through 15, and 19 through 21 on which both defendants were found guilty of larceny of bonds.
would prove that the defendants had received premiums on the twenty-two bail bonds in question and that they had stolen the surety companies' shares of those premiums.
On the fifth day of the trial the Commonwealth offered one of these bonds as an exhibit without first having offered any evidence that the defendants had received a premium therefor. This precipitated a long bench conference in which the prosecutor contended (a) that by issuing the bond without receiving a premium the defendants stole from the surety company its right to receive a premium, and, either additionally or alternatively, (b) that the defendants, by filing with the surety companies a series of false monthly statements from which they had intentionally omitted many bonds issued, had, by that false pretense, been enabled to continue to pledge the credit or obligations of the companies as to bonds issued thereafter.
On the fifteenth day of the trial there was another bench conference on the same general subject. At the start of that conference the Commonwealth's position seemed to be that although the indictments charged larceny of "money," it was entitled to prove the defendants' guilt by showing that by means of some false pretense they had induced the surety companies "to part with property of any kind." The Commonwealth's position at the end of the conference seemed to be that by virtue of G. L. c. 277, Section 23, the defendants could be found guilty of larceny of bail bonds on each of those sixteen counts where there was no proof that they had received any premiums for the bonds.
The Commonwealth rested its case late on the fifteenth day of trial. The next day was devoted almost entirely to arguments on the defendants' motions for directed verdicts of not guilty. A large part of the argument again revolved around the question whether the defendants could be found guilty of larceny of the bonds on those sixteen counts mentioned above.
Section 23 provides: "If an allegation relative to any bullion, money, notes, bank notes, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, obligations or other securities for money of any country, state, county, city, town, bank, corporation, partnership or person is necessary, it may describe it as money, without specifying any particulars thereof; and such descriptive allegation shall be sustained by proof of any amount of bullion, money, notes or other securities for money as aforesaid, although the particular nature thereof shall not be proved."
We hold that the judge's interpretation and application of G. L. c. 277, Section 23, was incorrect. We do not believe that the language of the statute permits the word "money," as used in the indictments to describe the property allegedly stolen, to be construed to include bail bonds. We hasten to add that this is not a holding that printed bail bond forms, whether in blank or executed, cannot be the objects of the crime of larceny. It is a holding, however, that the language used in the indictments in these cases is not adequate to permit a jury to convict the defendants of the larceny of bail bonds.
they may be described as such in a criminal complaint or indictment. The statute groups "bullion, money, notes, bank notes, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, obligations or other securities for money of any country, state, county, city, town, bank, corporation, partnership or person" as the articles which may come under the umbrella of the word "money." Clearly, bail bonds are not bullion, and apart from the statute they are not money. Neither are they notes, bank notes, checks, drafts or bills of exchange. The only statutory category which it is argued includes bail bonds is that of "obligations or other securities for money of any . . . corporation . . . or person." In some sense, of course, a bail bond is a combination of a personal and corporate obligation for money, although the obligation is conditional. On the other hand, a bail bond is obviously not a "security" as that term is commonly applied to the ordinary bond received by an investor as evidence of his investment. Is a bail bond nevertheless a "security" within the meaning of Section 23? The parties have cited no judicial precedents on the interpretation of this particular portion of this particular statute, and our research has disclosed none.
are intended to pass, and do pass, as money . . .." Ibid. Checks, drafts, and bills of exchange serve commercial functions similar to those served by notes, and are primarily distinguished from notes in that they involve an order to pay, usually on a third party, while notes involve a promise to pay. Id. Sections 14, 18, 22. Plainly, a bail bond, which merely assures that a penalty will be forfeited if an individual fails to appear in court as required, serves no commercial function similar to those outlined above.
Merchs. Natl. Bank v. Old Colony Trust Co. 356 Mass. 612, 615 (1970). The word "security" denotes an investment in some private or public business enterprise. See G. L. c. 63, Section 38B, as amended through St. 1973, c. 752, Section 8. Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Commn. 367 Mass. 360, 365-367 (1975).
instrument commonly known as a security.'" Ibid. Bail bonds do not begin to meet these criteria. Although it is not always easy to distinguish securities from their close relatives, compare Olpin v. Ideal Natl. Ins. Co. 419 F. 2d 1250, 1259-1263 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 1074 (1970), with Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F. 2d 1124, 1126-1128 (4th Cir. 1970), we do not consider bail bonds to be even close relatives of securities. Bail bonds accordingly are not among the "obligations or other securities for money" referred to in G. L. c. 277, Section 23.
We conclude, therefore, that it was error to submit to the jury for verdicts the sixteen counts numbered 1 through 6, 8, 9, 11 through 15, and 19 through 21, because (a) there was no evidence that the defendants received any premiums on the bail bonds involved in these counts, and (b) the defendants could not be found guilty of larceny of bail bonds on counts charging larceny of "money." The motions of both defendants for directed verdicts of not guilty on these sixteen counts at the close of the Commonwealth's case should have been allowed.
each count numbered 7 must be vacated, and a verdict of not guilty must be entered thereon as to each defendant.
The remainder of this opinion is limited to the five counts numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22 on which the defendants were found guilty of larceny of premiums. We shall consider, as to these five counts only, various other issues raised by the defendants which have not been disposed of above.
1. Denial of Motions for Particulars. The indictments were returned by the grand jury on October 4, 1971. One defendant was arraigned on October 6 and the other on October 27, 1971. On November 16, 1971, each defendant filed five preliminary motions, including a motion to dismiss the larceny indictment for the reasons that it "is duplicitous, charges . . . more than one offense in a single count, charges . . . the same offense in different counts, has fragmented a single offense into many offenses, and is so vague and uncertain that it cannot be cured by a Bill of Particulars, and confounds the defendant in his defense." Neither defendant then filed a motion for particulars. All of the motions were heard on March 2, 1972, with the following result: on that date the motions to inspect documents were allowed and the ones to suppress evidence were deferred to the trial judge, and on April 3, 1972, the three other motions, including the motions to dismiss quoted above, were denied.
on the indictments charging them with larceny. [Note 4] When these motions were heard on November 6, 1972, the Commonwealth objected to their allowance for the reasons that (a) the defendants had already received considerable discovery, including inspection of all the documents which the Commonwealth intended to offer in evidence against them, and (b) the defendants had delayed filing their motions for particulars until "this late date before trial." The defendants agreed that they had been allowed to see or obtain copies of documents on "what underlies the theory of the twenty-two counts" against them and that they were ready for trial and argued in justification of their delay in moving for particulars that they had been pursuing other motions which they hoped might have resulted in the dismissal of the indictments.
stolen and the total value thereof. The motions were denied in their entirety. The defendants contend that the denial violated their constitutional right to due process of law and also their statutory rights under G. L. c. 277, Section 40, dealing with particulars in criminal cases. For the reasons discussed below, we believe that they were entitled to some of the particulars which they requested, whether as matter of constitutional right or otherwise, but that the denial of their motions was harmless error.
The matters of the form and content of criminal complaints and indictments, and of requests for and allowance of particulars on such complaints and indictments, first became the subjects of general statutory regulation in this Commonwealth on the enactment of St. 1899, c. 409, entitled "An Act to provide for the simplification of criminal pleadings." These regulatory provisions now appear principally in G. L. c. 277.
General Laws c. 277, Section 79, provides in part that "the forms hereto annexed, shall apply as well to complaints as to indictments, and . . . shall be sufficient in cases to which they are applicable." Included in the forms annexed to Section 79 is one applicable to the crime of larceny. Each of the counts charging the defendant with the crime of larceny does so in the language of the statutory form, alleging that between two stated dates the defendant, in the county of Middlesex, did steal money of the amount of more than $100 of the property of the named owner (Continental in four counts and American in the other eighteen counts). The statutory form does not include any allegation of the date or place of the crime charged.
request of the defendant if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out" (emphasis supplied). We thus see that a court must allow certain motions for particulars "if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out," and that in all other situations it may, in its discretion, order particulars. In commenting on G. L. c. 218, Section 39, now G. L. c. 277, Section 40, this court said in Commonwealth v. King, 202 Mass. 379, 384 (1909): "The first sentence of that section does give him [the defendant] an absolute right to require `a statement of such particulars as may be necessary' to give him `reasonable knowledge of the nature and grounds of the crime charged,' if that charge would not be otherwise `fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out.' . . . Except as modified by this provision it still is, as it formerly was, in the discretion of the court to say whether any and what bill of particulars shall be furnished to him. . . . The change from `shall' to `may' in the statute cannot be treated as without significance, however either word might be construed if it stood alone." Commonwealth v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 581, 584-585 (1905). Commonwealth v. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 19 (1905). Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 266-267 (1911). Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky, 238 Mass. 379, 383 (1921). Commonwealth v. Hayes, 311 Mass. 21, 24-25 (1942). The same rule was again stated in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 395-396 (1944).
The discussion above brings us to the question whether the allegations in the indictments before us are such that the defendants were entitled to particulars as matter of right, or whether it was a matter of discretion whether the court would order or deny particulars.
302 Mass. 349, 355 (1939), we said: "Indictments . . . in the form prescribed by the statute, are expressly deemed to be sufficient. . . . It is within the competency of the General Court to establish forms of criminal pleading and to provide that they shall be conceded sufficient and valid." In Commonwealth v. Norton, 339 Mass. 592, 593 (1959), where the defendant alleged error from the denial of his motion for particulars of the time, place and manner and means of the alleged offense, we said: "There was no error in the denial of this motion. The indictment was in the form stated to be sufficient by G. L. c. 277, Section 79. . . . It was adequate to afford the defendant reasonable knowledge of the nature and grounds of the offence charged, and the furnishing of further information in the form of particulars was within the discretion of the judge." To the same effect, see Commonwealth v. Baron, 356 Mass. 362, 364 (1969), and Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass. 356, 400 (1970), judgments vacated as to death penalty sub nom. Limone v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 936 (1972). It is arguable whether the cases cited and statements quoted above are holdings that if a complaint or indictment is in a form permitted by G. L. c. 277, Section 79, the allowance of a motion for particulars rests solely in the discretion of the court. In any event, we do not rest our decision on this theory and we therefore intimate no opinion thereon.
We hold that even if each count of the indictments considered alone satisfied the requirement of art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution that "[n]o subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him," in the circumstances of these cases, particularly the fact that a number of counts allege the crime of larceny to have been committed in the same time span, or in a time span overlapping time spans in other counts (fn. 1, supra), the defendants were entitled to some portions of the particulars requested and that the denial thereof was error.
Unlike the situation in the group of sixteen counts disposed of earlier in this opinion, however, the Commonwealth informed the defendants that on these five counts (numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22) its basis of prosecution was that of larceny of premiums and it never changed that position. There had been considerable pre-trial discovery. The defendants knew at all times the essential basic facts, to be distinguished from evidence, which they might have obtained if the particulars had been ordered. The defendants were in no way prejudiced in their defence against these five counts by reason of the denial of their motions for particulars. Considering all the circumstances of these cases, we conclude that the judge's error in denying the motions, even if viewed as having constitutional dimensions, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-26 (1967). Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). Subilosky v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 390, 397 (1970). Commonwealth v. Gilday, 367 Mass. 474, 499 (1975).
We take this occasion to make the following observations. The fact that a complaint or indictment is framed in the form permitted by G. L. c. 277, Section 79, and will therefore withstand an attack as to its sufficiency (formerly by a motion to quash, now by a motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 277, Section 47A, inserted by St. 1965, c. 617, Section 1) is not decisive on the question whether the court should exercise its discretionary power to order particulars. A more liberal exercise of that discretion seems to be indicated when considering a conventional request for particulars of the time, place, nature and grounds of the crime charged when a felony is charged in an indictment framed in the limited language permitted by Section 79. These observations are not to be construed as an invitation to defendants to request, or as a suggestion to judges that they order, particulars which, in their requirement for detail or otherwise, amount to the imposition of a straitjacket on the prosecution.
2. Judge's Refusal to Read Grand Jury Minutes. We have noted above that much of the argument on the motions for directed verdicts focused on the sixteen counts involving bail bonds as to which there had been no evidence that any premiums had been paid therefor. Because the prosecutor argued that, by virtue of G. L. c. 277, Section 23, the word "money" could be construed to include bail bonds and that the jury could find the defendants guilty of larceny of bail bonds on these sixteen counts, the defendants requested that the judge read the minutes of the grand jury "to determine whether or not the defendants were, in fact, indicted for larceny of the premium . . . rather than larceny . . . of the bonds." The judge refused to do so, and the defendants argue that the refusal was error. Since we are reversing the judgments on these sixteen counts, we need not consider this issue further.
3. Question of Venue. The indictments in these cases were returned by a grand jury in Middlesex County. All of the bail bonds involved in the crimes charged in the indictments were issued by the agency in that county, and whatever premiums were paid by the purchasers for the bonds were paid in that county. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments on the ground of improper venue. Attached to the motions was an affidavit to the effect that: the agency's place of business was in Boston, Suffolk County; all of the agency's contracts with, and accountings to, American and Continental on bail bond premiums were made in Suffolk County; all business transacted by the agency and the companies was transacted in Suffolk County; and all payments by the agency to the companies were transmitted to Boston or to places outside of the Commonwealth. The motions were heard on March 2, 1972, and denied on April 3, 1972. Their denial was not made the subject of any assignment of error and is not before us for review.
County. There is sufficient nexus with Middlesex County to support the Motion."
The judge's analysis of the situation in regard to venue was correct. The statements made by the prosecutor in the affidavit filed with the petition and those made at the hearing on the petition were sufficient to permit the judge to find the facts necessary to support his action in allowing the petition. Commonwealth v. Mannos, 311 Mass. 94, 104 (1942). Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 53-54 (1965).
4. Denial of Motions for Directed Verdicts. Each defendant argues that the judge committed error in denying his motion "that the Court direct a verdict of not guilty on the Commonwealth's opening," and also in denying his motion, filed at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, "that the Court direct a verdict of not guilty on each and every count."
It was formerly the law that "[u]ntil all the evidence has been closed on both sides, a defendant in a civil or criminal case cannot require the judge to rule upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence already introduced to support a verdict against him." Commonwealth v. Bader, 285 Mass. 574, 575 (1934). Commonwealth v. Carter, 306 Mass. 141, 142 (1940). However, as to criminal cases, that law was changed by St. 1963, c. 569, and also by St. 1964, c. 108, Section 1, which resulted in the following language now appearing in G. L. c. 278, Section 11: "The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall direct a verdict or enter a finding of not guilty of any offense charged in an indictment after the evidence on either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense" (emphasis supplied).
be required to direct a verdict on an opening." Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482, 489 (1963). Commonwealth v. Binnette, 351 Mass. 704 (1966). Commonwealth v. van Kooiman, 353 Mass. 759 (1967). Commonwealth v. Sloane, 361 Mass. 872 (1972). Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 454, 463 (1975). We therefore do not deal with the alleged error in the denial of the motions for directed verdicts after the Commonwealth's opening.
We turn now to the motions for directed verdicts at the close of the Commonwealth's case. The sole question raised by these motions is "whether there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt to warrant the submission of the cases to a jury." Commonwealth v. Altenhaus, 317 Mass. 270, 271 (1944). Commonwealth v. Baron, 356 Mass. 362, 365 (1969). We hold that there was. The evidence in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendants, by concerted action extending over a period of years, stole bail bond premiums from both Continental and American by causing the agency to issue bonds with one of the companies as surety, then intentionally excluding a large number of those bonds (about 176 including the twenty-two involved in this case) from the agency's monthly reports to the companies, and personally keeping whatever premiums were received on these excluded bonds. The evidence also permitted the inference that by virtue of the scheme the larcenies in such cases occurred on the initial receipt of the premium with the concurrent intent to deprive the companies of their share thereof, rather than by reason of any subsequent embezzlement of premiums originally lawfully received. It would add nothing to our jurisprudence to describe the evidence in further detail.
was under G. L. c. 175, Section 176," but that in any event the Commonwealth cannot prevail under that statute because it did not allege a crime thereunder and further it failed to show that Continental or American ever made a written demand for the premiums due them. [Note 6] There is no merit to this argument.
to support a conviction of larceny. It eliminates the necessity for proving what the accused agent or broker did with the money which he should have turned over to the company. However, it does not mean that even without such a demand on the agent or broker he cannot be convicted of larceny of premiums on proof of actual misappropriation. The statute has no bearing on the propriety of the judge's denial of the defendants' motions for directed verdicts.
Numerous additional arguments advanced on the issue of the motions for directed verdicts have been examined and found either not applicable or without merit.
5. Evidentiary Rulings. The defendants argue that the judge erred in several instances in admitting evidence over their objections and exceptions. We hold that he did not err, and we describe these instances briefly.
a. In attempting to prove that the defendants or their agency received premiums for the bail bonds involved in the sixteen counts on which we have ordered the entry of directed verdicts of not guilty, the Commonwealth called as witnesses three of the persons for whom the bonds were issued. It is obvious that they were not testifying voluntarily, or being cooperative when questioned about whether they had paid for their bonds. It was also obvious that they had done business with the defendants in connection with bail bonds on other occasions. The judge properly allowed the prosecutor reasonable leeway in the examination of these witnesses and did not exceed the bounds of permissible discretion. In any event, the testimony of the witnesses bore only on counts included in the group of sixteen mentioned above and no harm has come to the defendants.
which we are affirming the judgments and we therefore need not discuss it.
c. The judge admitted in evidence certain business records which are admissible under G. L. c. 233, Section 78, if the court makes the preliminary findings required thereby. The action of the judge in admitting the records in evidence imports a preliminary finding that the conditions imposed by Section 78 had been satisfied. Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 578-579 (1959). Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139, 170 (1965). Commonwealth v. Leonard, 352 Mass. 636, 644 (1967). The defendants claim that there was inadequate evidence to establish the statutory conditions precedent to the admission of the records, but their argument seems directed more to the weight and credibility of the evidence on which the preliminary finding was based rather than to its adequacy under the statute. We hold there was adequate evidence to support the preliminary finding. The decision on the weight and credibility of this evidence was a matter for the trial judge and his decision thereon is not reviewable on appeal.
d. The business records admitted in evidence included 176 bail bonds (including the twenty-two involved in the indictments) and ninety-four monthly reports by the agency to Continental and American purporting to list all bail bonds issued by the agency during each month covered. The judge allowed witnesses called by the Commonwealth to testify that they had examined all of the monthly reports and did not find the 176 bonds listed thereon. The defendants argue that this in some manner invaded or usurped the jury function as fact finders. We hold that it did not. Each monthly report listed several hundred bonds. In view of the complexities of the evidence in this area, the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, properly admitted the clarifying testimony in question. The jury were still free to examine the monthly reports themselves to see whether the bonds in question were included thereon. Boston & Worcester R.R.
v. Dana, 1 Gray 83, 104 (1854). Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 581-582 (1959). The claim by the defendants that the judge allowed the witnesses to state opinions is not correct. They were permitted to state, as a fact, whether the lists included the 176 bonds.
e. The indictments in these cases charged the defendants with larceny of money in connection with twenty-two bail bonds written by the agency for Continental and American. As noted above, at the trial the judge admitted in evidence not only those twenty-two bonds, but also 154 more, all of which were omitted from the monthly reports of the agency to the companies. The defendants argue that it was error to admit the 154 bonds which were not directly involved in the crimes charged by the indictments. In offering the 154 bonds the prosecutor said that he was doing it on the basis that as to the bail bonds involved in the indictments the evidence of these additional bonds "would negate any mistake of a bookkeeping error on behalf of either the company or the defendants . . . [and] to show as part of the case of the Commonwealth of the intent of the parties, the defendants, to defraud the companies and to show a common scheme on behalf of the defendants to defraud the insurance companies. It is for that sole purpose that they are being offered." We hold that these additional bonds were properly admitted for the purpose offered.
is admissible, provided it is reasonably near in time and so connected with the crime charged in the indictment as to show unity of plot and design and that it was part of a common plan or scheme to defraud." For cases applying this quoted exception see Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen 548, 566-567 (1863); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 118 Mass. 443, 452-453 (1875); Commonwealth v. Lubinsky, 182 Mass. 142, 143 (1902); Commonwealth v. Stuart, 207 Mass. 563, 568-569 (1911); Commonwealth v. Dow, 217 Mass. 473, 480 (1914); Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 512-513 (1914); and Commonwealth v. Abbott Engr. Inc. 351 Mass. 568, 573-574 (1967). For general discussions of the rule and its exceptions and applications, see Wigmore, Evidence, Sections 192-194, 300-302, 304 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence, Section 190 (2d ed. 1972). Rule 404 (b) of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1975) (as enacted by P. L. 93-595, January 2, 1975, effective July 1, 1975), provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
that statute had no application to these cases it was not error for the judge to refuse to charge thereon.
The defendants claim errors in the charge in several other respects. We hold that, except with respect to the instruction permitting verdicts of guilty of larceny of bail bonds which we have discussed above, the charge when read and considered in its entirety was accurate and adequate.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered as follows: (a) the judgments on counts numbered 10, 16, 17, 18 and 22 against each defendant are affirmed; and (b) the judgments on counts numbered 1 through 9, 11 through 15, and 19 through 21 against each defendant are reversed, the verdicts thereon are set aside, and verdicts of not guilty are to be entered thereon.
[Note 2] Section 79 provides in part that the following forms "shall be sufficient" for complaints or indictments charging the crime of larceny under G. L. c. 266, Section 30: "(1) That A. B. did steal one horse of the value of more (or less, as the case may be) than one hundred dollars, of the property of C. D. (2) That A. B. did steal six cows, each of the value of twenty dollars, of the property of C. D."
[Note 3] "Therefore, if in respect to a particular count in the indictment the jury finds that it wasn't proved by the Commonwealth that the Agent collected a premium in respect of the bond in question, the only possibility of a guilty verdict on that count would be a conclusion by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that at the time the bond was issued or approximately at that time . . . the defendant never intended to report that bond to the company, and intended to convert that bond to his own use, or to the agency's own use, or to the use of both defendants, either by giving it away or by keeping any premium, if one was later collected. Thus there would be larceny of the bond which by the statutory definition of money in General Laws, Chapter 277, Section 23 pertaining to the use of that word in indictments would be referred to in the indictment as money, because it was `a security for money' as that word is used in Section 23 of Chapter 277."
Later in his instructions, the judge stated: "[I]f the jury concludes that the Commonwealth has failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a verdict of stealing of a premium, then is there any other theory upon which the jury could return a verdict of guilty on such counts? Well, the answer to that question depends, of course, on whether the . . . defendants are found by the jury to have had the criminal intent at or about the time the bond was issued to convert the bond, itself, to his or their or the agency's own use to the exclusion of the insurance companies' rights to know the bond's existence and to enjoy the right to receive or collect a premium. Such a conversion would constitute larceny of a bond itself, where there is such a conversion. Where criminal intent was found then the bond, itself, may be considered as money for the purposes of these indictments." He then cited and read in part the language of Section 23, and continued: "I instruct you that a bail bond is `security for money.' It is the security for the prisoner's appearance in court. But in the other aspects it is a security for money, for the payment of money on condition that he doesn't appear in court as required."
[Note 4] Contemporaneously with the return of these indictments charging larceny, the grand jury also returned indictments charging the defendants with the crime of conspiracy in relation to the same alleged larcenies. The defendants had filed motions for particulars of the alleged conspiracy shortly after the return of the indictments charging that crime but did not then file such motions on the indictments charging larceny.
[Note 5] Section 57A reads: "A defendant shall not be discharged for want of jurisdiction if the evidence discloses that the crime with which he is charged was actually committed without the county or the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which he is being tried; provided, that the attorney general or the district attorney petitions to the court before proceeding with the trial for leave to proceed, stating that he is in doubt from the state of the evidence then in his possession as to whether or not the crime was committed within the county or the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the court after hearing said petition orders the trial to proceed."
[Note 6] Section 176 provides as follows: "An insurance agent or broker who acts in negotiating or renewing or continuing a policy of insurance or an annuity or pure endowment contract issued by a company lawfully doing business in the commonwealth, and who receives any money or substitute for money as a premium for such a policy or contract from the insured or holder thereof, shall be deemed to hold such premium in trust for the company. If he fails to pay the same over to the company after written demand made upon him therefor, less his commission and any deductions to which, by the written consent of the company, he may be entitled, such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has used or applied the said premium for a purpose other than paying the same over to the company, and upon conviction thereof he shall be guilty of larceny."

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§ 160-74 Menand Road and Lyons Avenue.
§ 160-75 Menand Road and Villa Road.
§ 160-76 Menand Road and Railroad Avenue.
§ 160-77 Sage Hill Lane and Pateman Circle.
§ 160-78 Pateman Circle and Graffunder Drive.
§ 160-79 MacAffer Drive and Newell Court.
§ 160-80 MacAffer Drive and Morrow Court.
§ 160-81 Brookside Avenue and Lyons Avenue.
§ 160-82 Stop signs to be erected.
§ 160-83 Simmons Lane and Canal Road.
§ 160-84 Simmons Lane and entrance to 40 Simmons Lane.
§ 160-85 Jones Court and Menand Road.
§ 160-86 Sky Hollow Drive and MacAffer Drive.
§ 160-87 Newell Court and Folmsbee Drive.
§ 160-88 Norwood Drive and Newell Court.
§ 160-89 Norwood Drive and Folmsbee Drive.
§ 160-90 Dennin Drive and Folmsbee Drive.
§ 160-91 Momrow Court and Newell Court.
§ 160-92 Momrow Court, Momrow Terrace and Folmsbee Drive.
§ 160-93 Scott Drive and Wards Lane.
§ 160-94 Highland Street and Hendrick Avenue.
§ 160-95 Hampton Street and Hendrick Avenue.
§ 160-96 Pawling Street and Hendrick Avenue.
§ 160-97 Kingston Street and Hendrick Avenue.
§ 160-98 Canal Road and Irving Place.
§ 160-99 Canal Road and East Elmwood Road.
§ 160-100 Harts Lane and Elmwood Road.
§ 160-101 Harts Lane and Louis Avenue.
§ 160-102 Myton Lane at Pateman Circle.
§ 160-103 Ruso Drive at Pateman Circle.
§ 160-104 Lower Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane.
§ 160-105 Numbers 23 through 27 Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane.
§ 160-106 Numbers 11 through 17 Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane.
§ 160-107 Intersecting Streets with Broadway.
§ 160-108 North Sage Hill Lane and Sage Hill Lane.
§ 160-109 Ward Lane and Park Drive.
§ 160-110 Penalties for Offenses.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Menand Road and North Lyons Avenue from North Lyons Avenue must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Menand Road and Villa Road, traveling in an easterly direction on Menand Road, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Menand Road and Railroad Avenue, traveling in a westerly direction on Menand Road and in either direction on Railroad Avenue, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Sage Hill Lane and Pateman Circle from northerly Pateman Circle must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Pateman Circle and Graffunder Drive, traveling in a southerly direction on Graffunder Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of MacAffer Drive and Newell Court must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of MacAffer Drive and Momrow Court traveling in a westerly direction on MacAffer Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Brookside Avenue and Lyons Avenue must come to a full stop prior to entering Lyons Avenue unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
A sign bearing the word "stop" shall be erected and maintained in the appropriate locations at the intersections described in this article in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Simmons Lane and Canal Road must come to a full stop prior to entering Simmons Lane from Canal Road unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
Editor's Note: This local law also provided for the redesignation of former § 160-83 as § 160-86.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Simmons Lane and the entrance to 40 Simmons Lane must come to all full stop at 40 Simmons Lane prior to entering Simmons Lane unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Jones Court and Menand Road must come to a full stop at Jones Court prior to entering Menand Road unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Sky Hollow Drive and MacAffer Drive, traveling in a southerly direction on Sky Hollow Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Newell Court and Folmsbee Drive, traveling in a northerly direction on Folmsbee Drive, and an easterly direction on Newell Court, most come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Norwood Drive and Newell Court, traveling in a northerly direction on Norwood Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Norwood Drive and Folmsbee Drive, traveling in an easterly direction on Norwood Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Dennin Drive and Folmsbee Drive, traveling in an easterly direction on Dennin Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Momrow Court and Newell Court, traveling in a northerly direction on Momrow Court, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Momrow Court, Momrow Terrace and Folmsbee Drive, traveling in an easterly direction on Folmsbee Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Scott Drive and Wards Lane, traveling in a northerly direction on Scott Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Highland Street and Hendrick Avenue, traveling in a southerly direction on Highland Street, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Hampton Street and Hendrick Avenue, traveling in a southerly direction on Hampton Street, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Pawling Street and Hendrick Avenue, traveling in a southerly direction on Pawling Street, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Kingston Street and Hendrick Avenue, traveling in a southerly direction on Kingston Street, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Canal Road and Irving Place, traveling in a southerly direction on Canal Road, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Canal Road and East Elmwood Road, traveling in a northerly direction on Canal Road, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Harts Lane and Elmwood Road must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Harts Lane and Louis Avenue, traveling in a southerly direction on Louis Avenue, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Myton Lane at Pateman Circle must come to a full stop on the southbound Myton Lane approach prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Ruso Drive at Pateman Circle must come to a full stop on the eastbound Ruso Drive approach prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Lower Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane must come to a full stop on the eastbound Lower Sage Hill Lane approach prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Nos. 23 through 27 Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane must come to a full stop on the westbound Nos. 23 through 27 Sage Hill Lane approach prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Nos. 11 through 17 Sage Hill Lane at Sage Hill Lane must come to a full stop on the westbound Nos. 11 through 17 Sage Hill Lane approach prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
Intersecting streets with Broadway, assumed to be installed and maintained by New York State Department of Transportation: Simmons Lane, Clifford Road, Tillinghast Avenue, Glenwood Road, Oakland Avenue, MacDonald Circle, MacDonald Circle Ext., and Harts Lane.
All traffic approaching the intersection of North Sage Hill Lane and Sage Hill Lane must come to a full stop on the northbound Sage Hill Lane and westbound North Sage Hill Lane approaches prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
All traffic approaching the intersection of Ward Lane and Park Drive, traveling in a southerly direction on Park Drive, must come to a full stop prior to entering such intersection unless otherwise directed by a peace officer or traffic signal. Such intersection is hereby designated as a stop intersection.
Any person violating any provision of this article may, upon conviction, be punished for the first offense by a fine not exceeding $10 and for the second offense by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $25 or by imprisonment for not less than two nor more than 15 days. The third or any subsequent offense within one year shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment.


77-2106.01. Tax; refunds; interest; claim.
When any amount of transfer tax in excess of that legally due has been paid to the State Treasurer, the party making such overpayment or his or her successors or assigns shall be entitled to refund of such overpayment plus interest at the rate specified in section 45-104.02, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted. All claims for refund on account of the overpayment of transfer taxes shall be filed with the Tax Commissioner within four years after the date of such overpayment or within one year of a change in the amount of federal tax due, whichever is later. If any overpayment of transfer tax is refunded within ninety days after the last day prescribed for filing the original return of such tax or ninety days after the date on which the original return was filed, if later, no interest shall be allowed under this section on the overpayment. If the Tax Commissioner rejects or disallows any such claim in whole or in part, action in the district courts shall be permitted in accordance with sections 25-21,201 to 25-21,218.
Source:Laws 1949, c. 243, § 1, p. 659; Laws 1985, LB 273, § 39; Laws 1991, LB 9, § 1; Laws 1992, LB 1004, § 11; Laws 1992, Fourth Spec. Sess., LB 1, § 20; Laws 1993, LB 345, § 13.
The plain, direct, and unambiguous meaning of the words "has been paid" in this section does not limit interest on overpayments of estate tax to those overpayments made after the effective date of the statute. Given its plain and ordinary meaning, the term "has been paid" includes overpayments of estate tax made prior to the effective date of LB1004, July 15, 1992. Vervaecke v. State, 247 Neb. 707, 529 N.W.2d 779 (1995).


text:
Reina Mebius completed a Ph.D. at Vrije Universiteit (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), where she studied the process of lymphocyte migration. During postdoctoral training, she continued to work in this field, in the laboratory of Irv Weissman, at Stanford University (Stanford, California, USA). In 1995, she returned to the Department of Molecular Cell Biology and Immunology at Vrije Universiteit. Her research focuses on the cellular and molecular aspects of lymphoid-organ development, the cell–cell interactions that are required for proper organization of lymphoid organs, the cellular interactions that occur in immune responses, and the early onset of inflammatory lesions.
Georg Kraal also works in the Department of Molecular Cell Biology and Immunology, where he studies the structure of lymphoid organs in relation to their function, in various immunological processes. He has developed several antibodies that are specific for pattern-recognition receptors expressed by myeloid cell types, and these antibodies have helped to identify these cells and their function in the spleen and the lymph nodes. At present, his research focuses on mucosal immunology and the role of lymph-node structure in immunological tolerance.
The structure of the spleen is such that two compartments can be distinguished: the blood-containing red pulp; and the white pulp, which is full of lymphoid cells.
In the red pulp, pathogens and cellular debris, as well as ageing erythrocytes, are efficiently removed from the blood by macrophages, which are abundant in this compartment. These macrophages are then well equipped to recycle iron from the erythrocytes.
The white pulp is a highly organized lymphoid region where adaptive immune responses can be initiated. It is composed of separate areas for B cells and T cells, which are surrounded by the marginal zone — a region that contains discrete subsets of macrophages and B cells. Whereas blood flows freely through the marginal zone, the white pulp is excluded from the bloodstream, and specific signals are required for entry.
Entry of leukocytes to the white pulp requires activation of G-protein-coupled receptors, a process which is reminiscent of the multistep extravasation process that has been described for leukocytes leaving the bloodstream and entering the lymph nodes or sites of inflammation.
The marginal zone forms a bridge between the innate and adaptive immune response, because the macrophages in this region, which express specific pattern-recognition receptors, can efficiently take up blood-borne pathogens. The specific subset of B cells in this region, the marginal-zone B cells, can be activated by these macrophages or can directly respond to blood-borne pathogens, after which they become antigen-presenting cells or IgM-producing plasma cells.
Entry of activated dendritic cells or marginal-zone B cells to the white pulp can initiate an adaptive immune response through activation of T cells, which then migrate to the edge of the B-cell follicles and provide help to B cells.
The organization of the white pulp into distinct areas, which promotes efficient interaction of cells of the immune system, is coordinated by the expression of chemokines, which attract the specific lymphoid subsets to the appropriate microdomains.
In addition, the organization of both the white pulp and the marginal zone is under strict control of lipid mediators and adhesion molecules, as well as chemokines, all of which help the specific cellular subsets to be retained within their compartments. Expression of these factors is, in turn, controlled by activation of the lymphotoxin-β receptor and tumour-necrosis-factor receptor 1, but it might also involve additional signalling receptors.
Through this unique organization of its compartments, the spleen can mount complex adaptive immune responses, as well as effectively clear pathogens from the blood.
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We thank all of our collaborators, particularly B. Steiniger, for helpful discussions.
Department of Molecular Cell Biology and Immunology, Vrije Universiteit Medical Center, v.d. Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Correspondence to Reina E. Mebius.
Blood sinuses in which the blood is collected from the cords in the splenic red pulp and transported to the efferent vein of the spleen (the vena lienalis). The structure of the wall of the sinuses allows the removal of ageing erythrocytes from the circulation.
A bar of connective tissue that protrudes from the capsule into the splenic tissue. Together, the capsule and the trabeculae form a supporting, three-dimensional framework that provides some rigidity to the spleen.
A receptor that recognizes unique structures that are present at the surface of microorganisms. Signalling through these receptors leads to the production of pro-inflammatory cytokines and chemokines and to the expression of co-stimulatory molecules by antigen-presenting cells. The expression of co-stimulatory molecules, together with the presentation of antigenic peptides, by antigen-presenting cells couples innate immune recognition of pathogens with the activation of adaptive immune responses.
The efferent vein of the spleen.
An intracellular vesicle that results from the fusion of phagosomes, which enclose extracellular material that has been ingested, and lysosomes, which contain lytic enzymes.
A plasma protein that can bind free haemoglobin in the bloodstream.
A compound that is secreted by microorganisms that efficiently bind iron.
A type of pattern-recognition receptor that is expressed by macrophages and dendritic cells. These receptors recognize unique structures that are present at the surface of microorganisms.
An activated B cell at an intermediate stage of differentiation. Plasmablasts leave germinal centres and migrate through the lymph and the blood to distant sites, such as the skin and the lamina propria of the intestines, to become antibody-producing plasma cells.
A terminally differentiated cell of the B-cell lineage that secretes large amounts of antibodies.
An animal that contains cell populations of different genotypes as a result of the transfer of haematopoietic stem cells from fetal liver or bone marrow to a recipient in which haematopoietic-cell populations (and other actively dividing cell populations) have been fully or partially destroyed by lethal or sub-lethal ionizing radiation.
A stromal cell that is crucial for the development of germinal centres in B-cell follicles. The interaction between FDCs and B cells is thought to be essential for isotype switching and somatic hypermutation.
A large macrophage in the splenic marginal zone that is characterized by the expression of a unique set of pattern-recognition receptors.
A macrophage that is located at the border of the white pulp and the marginal zone of the spleen. The precise function of these cells at this site is not known.
A cell that is present in developing lymph nodes, Peyer's patches and nasopharynx-associated lymphoid tissue (NALT). Lymphoid-tissue inducer cells are required for the development of these lymphoid organs. The inductive capacity of these cells for the generation of Peyer's patches and NALT has been shown by adoptive transfer, and it is generally assumed that they have a similar function in the formation of lymph nodes.
A specialized venule that occurs in secondary lymphoid organs, except the spleen. HEVs allow continuous transmigration of lymphocytes as a consequence of the constitutive expression of adhesion molecules and chemokines at their luminal surface.

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"He is particularly strong on age discrimination, is an excellent cross-examiner and he prepares his cases in a meticulous way." "He is razor sharp and willing to assist at all times."
"He is an excellent advocate, well liked by clients and very responsive."
"He is an excellent advocate, who can change his line of questioning swiftly as and when required." "He knows his stuff and can handle difficult judges with ease."
He is instructed by a large range of solicitors from city firms to regional firms and his clients range from the largest companies to trade unions and local authorities to the entire breadth of claimants, from multi-claimant representative actions to individual claimants.
He writes and previously edited Westlaw’s Insight pages on Age discrimination.
Deshpal is Chair of the Employment Law Bar Association, and a member of both the Industrial Law Society and the ELA.
A supremely effective advocate both in the employment tribunal and appeal courts in all aspects of employment and discrimination law. He is consistently praised for his sure handling of clients, his firm grasp on a case and above all his ability to achieve excellent results in court. He works closely as a team with solicitors and lay clients, bringing exceptional commitment and experience to each case.
He has a particular special interest in age discrimination, having appeared in some of the first successful age discrimination cases including Woodcock v Cumbria PCT, Court v Dennis Publishing and advising in Selden v Clarkson Wright and Jakes. He is further well known for disability discrimination and appears in doctors disciplinary cases.
Deshpal studied law at the London School of Economics. Having grown up in Northern Ireland, his interest and in employment and discrimination law started when he co-annotated the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 for Sweet and Maxwell some of the earliest legislation outlawing religious discrimination. After being called to the bar he was a member of 13 Kings Bench Walk building a thriving employment practice before being invited to join Old Square Chambers in January 2006.
Deshpal lectures widely on employment and discrimination law.
Woodcock v. Cumbria PCT  EWCA Civ 330;  I.C.R. 1126;  I.R.L.R. 491;  Eq. L.R. 463; Times, June 21, 2012; on when age discrimination can is justified.
Court v. Dennis Publishing (IDS Brief 840, November 2007) Age discrimination in redundancy.
Selden v. Clarkson Wright and Jakes  I.C.R. 716 on age discrimination, compulsory retirement and justification, in which case he provided the first advice.
George v. Ministry of Justice  EWCA Civ 324 on the principles of construction of collective agreements generally.
Qantas Cabin Crew (UK) Ltd v. Lopez and Hooper  I.R.L.R. 4, on airline staff contracts of employment and the doctrine of mistake.
Kelly and Others v. Unison  I.R.L.R. 442 on trade union discipline, and religion and belief discrimination.
Deshpal's experience in employment and discrimination law is of considerable assistance in his professional discipline practice. He has particular experience in cases involving professionals in the healthcare industry and has extensive experience of acting on behalf of a wide range of NHS Trusts as well as professionals.
Deshpal has appeared on professional disciplinary matters in Employment Tribunals, the Employment Appeal Tribunal, The Health Professions Council, the GMC and has had the benefit of being junior to John Hendy Q.C. in respect of numerous doctors' disciplinary matters in the Queen's Bench Division. Most notably in Lakshmi v. Mid Cheshire Hospitals NHS Trust  IRLR 956 (QB) - Contract of employment, duty of mutual trust and confidence, doctor - breaches of procedure including internal appeal.
An excellent advocate, whose cross examination always yields results; he is someone you can always rely on (Legal 500 2017).
Prepares his cases in a meticulous way. He is Razor sharp and willing to assist at all times (Chambers and Partners 2016).
Exceptionally well prepared (Legal 500 2014).
Deshpal regularly advises companies and institutions from the smallest to multinational ones. He acts for both employers and employees. He has an in-depth knowledge of disciplinary proceedings and extensive experience acting for commercial organisations, healthcare institutions and educational institutions including universities.
He specializes in taking complex legal and factual situations and providing a clear analysis and strategy for the best possible outcome.
He accepts direct access instructions.

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Bradley W. Matthiesen | Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C.Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer S.C.
Bradley W. Matthiesen is a trial lawyer, mediator, and founding partner of Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. (“MWL”). Brad has 40 years of legal experience and is licensed to practice law in Wisconsin and Arizona. He is also admitted to practice in the Eastern and Western Districts of the State of Wisconsin and the United States Supreme Court. Brad has litigated many construction defect, personal injury, insurance coverage, toxic tort, lemon-law, and Magnuson-Moss warranty cases for individuals and insurance companies throughout Wisconsin.
Brad obtained his undergraduate degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1975. In 1978, Brad obtained his law degree from the University of Puget-Sound School of Law (now Seattle University School of Law). Upon gradation from law school, Brad was engaged in the private practice of law for Levy & Levy, S.C. in Cedarburg, Wisconsin. In 1981, Brad became an Assistant District Attorney for Ozaukee County, Wisconsin, where he tried numerous misdemeanor and felony cases. In 1984, Brad became in-house counsel at Milwaukee Insurance Group, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he continued trying hundreds of civil cases both to the court and before juries. In 1994, Brad joined Mohr & Anderson, S.C., in Hartford, Wisconsin, as a partner, and, in 2001, Brad co-founded the law firm of Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. in Hartford, Wisconsin. Brad has tried numerous civil cases throughout the State of Wisconsin and has tried hundreds of cases to a jury and many more to the court in the form of bench trials. Over Brad’s 38 years of practicing law, he has been instrumental in helping to settle thousands of disputed claims and insurance litigation matters. Brad has also litigated many cases that were resolved through the mediation process.
Brad is an AV-rated attorney and a member of the Wisconsin Association of Mediators (“WAM”) and Resolute Systems, Inc. Aside from his law practice, Brad also serves as a mediator throughout the State of Wisconsin. As a mediator, Brad’s extensive history in practicing insurance law makes him adept at breaking through the thorny issues of insurance litigation that lurk in the background, and so often prevent cases from settling. As a practicing attorney with decades of practical experience, he understands the challenges and is sensitive to the difficult issues attorneys face during settlement negotiations when they engage with opposing parties and, sometimes, even their own clients. Throughout his legal career, Brad has maintained the demeanor, character, interpersonal skills, and a mature legal judgment to effectively assist parties in resolving simple or complex disputes. Brad is available to mediate a wide range of civil matters including business disputes, professional liability, personal injury, subrogation, insurance coverage, construction, landlord/tenant, and bad faith disputes.
Milwaukee City Center, LLC, et al. v. Tub Doctors, Inc., et al., Milwaukee County Case No. 2015CV000007 (4 Parties; Defective Installation).
Jacobson Farmers Supply, Inc. v. Jeff Fahney, Ozaukee County Case No. 2015CV000026 (2 Parties; Farm Supply).
Kelsey Goodmanson, et al. v. John B. Stangler, et al., Waukesha County Case No. 2015CV000555 (2 Parties; MVA/BI).
In the Estate of Arthur Oscar Lucht, Ozaukee County Case No. 2014PR000081 (2 Parties; Estate).
In The Estate of Ronald Heidelbach, Ozaukee County Case No. 2013PR000007 (2 Parties; Estate).
When Brad isn’t practicing law or mediating, he enjoys spending time with his wife and six daughters. He is also an avid Milwaukee Brewer and Green Bay Packer fan.
Marjala v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 13-C-631, 2014 WL 1922788 (E.D. Wis. May 13, 2014) (remand order); 2013 WL 4017078 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2013) (sealed documents).
Wiedenbeck v. Cinergy Health, Inc., No. 12-CV-508-WMC, 2013 WL 5308206 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 20, 2013), leave to appeal denied (Nov. 27, 2013) (defense of purported class action alleging deceptive practices over purchase of comprehensive medical benefit plan).
Diocese of Superior v. Swan & Associates, Inc., 2010 WI App 100, ¶ 1, 327 Wis.2d 798, 788 N.W.2d 383 (upheld Georgia choice-of-law provision in a commercial insurance policy).
Young v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 147, 314 Wis.2d 246, 758 N.W.2d 196 (UIM coverage case involving exclusions based upon ownership of motorcycle).
Hunter v. AES Consultants, Ltd., 2007 WI App 42, 300 Wis.2d 213, 730 N.W.2d 184 (procedural challenge to local rules based on conflict with statutory summary judgment procedures).
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Besse Forest Products Grp. Co., No. 05-C-0079, 2006 WL 1544146 (E.D. Wis. May 26, 2006) (coordination of benefits dispute involving competing primary insurers).
Perra v. Menomonee Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 215, 239 Wis. 2d 26, 619 N.W.2d 123 (holding that employment classifications of child labor regulation establishing minimum age for hazardous employment were exclusive and exhaustive, affirming dismissal of action).
Handling Injury Claims From The Defense Perspective, April 23, 2013, webinar presented to National Business Institute (NBI).

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