CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ, Petitioners, v. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Decision dated April 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2006, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, dated February 14, 2000, holding petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for damages incurred due to a vehicular accident, which resulted in the death of Arnulfo Ramos.
On June 27, 1995, respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children, namely, John Arnel Ramos and Khristine Camille Ramos, filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint2 for damages under Article 21763 of the Civil Code against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995 at the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep with Plate No. DKK-995, which was involved in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator and as the administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the Spouses Achevara.
In their Complaint,4 respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway in Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. Respondents sought to recover actual damages for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in the sum of P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In their Answer,5 petitioners denied respondents' allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.
During trial on the merits, respondents presented three witnesses: Alfredo Gamera, Dr. Emilio Joven and Elvira Ramos.
Petitioners presented six witnesses, namely, PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, Special Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Marvin Valdez, Herminigildo Pagaduan, Benigno Valdez, Emilia Achevara and Alfredo Achevara.
PO3 Baltazar de Peralta stated that he was assigned to Santiago, Ilocos Sur. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m. of April 22, 1995, he was on board his motorcycle at the waiting shed erected on the eastern side of the national highway in Tablac, Ilocos Sur. He was about to go southward, but waited a while to let a southbound passenger jeep pass by. Then he followed behind the passenger jeep.
Alfredo Achevara declared that before they employed Benigno Valdez to drive the passenger jeep, the former exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting, training and supervising the latter.27 They required Valdez to show them his professional driver's license, and investigated his personal background and training/experience as a driver. For his apprenticeship, they required him to drive from Metro Manila to Tagaytay City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day.
On February 14, 2000, the RTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 22, rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 1431-N in favor of respondents.
The trial court found that the testimony of respondents' witness, Alfredo Gamera, was controverted by the testimony of PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and the finding of police investigator SPO2 Marvin Valdez. Gamera testified that the vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Gamera's testimony was, however, refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep. Hence, the trial court concluded that the passenger jeep did not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep on the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the motorcycle.
Moreover, Gamera testified that the collision occurred on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of the wheels of the owner-type jeep was detached, so that it stayed immobile at the place of collision, about two meters east from the center line of the national highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the incident, found both vehicles on the western lane of the national highway. Thus, the trial court stated that it was undeniable that the collision took place on the western lane of the national highway, which was the passenger jeep's lane.
The trial court held that, as contended by respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable to this case. It cited Picart v. Smith,29 which applied the said doctrine, thus, where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clear chance, as applied to this case, implied a contributory negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of the mechanical defect of his vehicle.
The Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez appealed the trial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals.
The motion for reconsideration of the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution34 dated October 23, 2006.
Hence, the Spouses Achevara and Benigno Valdez filed this petition.
The main issue is whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the vehicular accident.
Petitioners contend that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to this case, because the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the late Arnulfo Ramos in knowingly driving the defective owner-type jeep. When the front wheel of the owner-type jeep was removed, the said jeep suddenly encroached on the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Considering that the interval between the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Pantranco North Express Inc. v. Besa35 held that the doctrine of last clear chance "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered."
Petitioners assert that Arnulfo Ramos' negligence in driving the owner-type jeep âˆ’ despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, and his failure to have it repaired first before driving, to prevent damage to life and property âˆ’ did not only constitute contributory negligence. Ramos' negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the accident, which resulted in his untimely demise. Benigno Valdez should not be made to suffer the unlawful and negligent acts of Ramos. Since forseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence, Valdez could not have foreseen that an accident might happen due to the mechanical defect in the vehicle of Ramos. It was Ramos alone who fully knew and could foresee that an accident was likely to occur if he drove his defective jeep, which indeed happened. Hence, the proximate cause of the vehicular accident was the negligence of Ramos in driving a mechanically defective vehicle.
In short, petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos' own negligence in knowingly driving a mechanically defective vehicle was the immediate and proximate cause of his death, and that the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
The Court notes that respondents' version of the vehicular accident was rebutted by petitioners. The testimony of respondents' witness, Alfredo Gamera, that the vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep, which resulted in the collision, was refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep. Hence, the trial court correctly concluded that the passenger jeep did not encroach on the lane of the owner-type jeep on the left side of the road to allegedly overtake the motorcycle.
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels was detached and stayed immobile at the place of collision, about two meters east the center line of the national highway. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the incident, found both vehicles on the western lane of the national highway. The owner-type jeep was diagonally positioned on the right, western lane; while the passenger jeep was on the western shoulder of the road, diagonally facing southwest. The trial court, therefore, correctly held that it was undeniable that the collision took place on the western lane of the national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
It must be pointed out that Herminigildo Pagaduan testified that in the early morning of April 22, 1995, he and Barangay Captain Gacusan, along with Arnulfo Ramos, aborted their trip to Tamorong, Candon, Ilocos Sur, using the same owner-type jeep because it was wiggling. Ramos was advised to have the mechanical defect repaired. Yet, later in the morning, Ramos was driving the owner-type jeep on the national highway in Candon. Benigno Valdez testified that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner when its right front wheel got detached, and the owner-type jeep suddenly bumped the passenger jeep he was driving, hitting the left side of the passenger jeep opposite his seat. Although Valdez swerved the passenger jeep to the western edge of the road, it was still hit by the owner-type jeep.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the records are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been near enough, because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67027, dated April 25, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2006, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
2 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1431-N.
3 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
6 TSN, March 22, 1996, pp. 2-5.
7 Id. at 2; TSN, July 19, 1996, p. 16.
8 TSN, July 19, 1996, pp. 2, 4-5, 8-9.
9 TSN, August 23, 1996, pp. 4-10.
10 Death Certificate, records, p. 140.
11 TSN, June 7, 1996, pp. 5-8.
12 Exhibit "M," records, p. 145.
13 TSN, June 7, 1996, p. 17.
14 TSN, June 20, 1997, pp. 2-6.
15 Id. at 3-4, 9, 10, 14.
18 TSN, July 28, 1997, pp. 2-3.
20 TSN, August 18, 1997, pp. 2-5.
23 TSN, September 5, 1997, pp. 2-6, 8; TSN, September 19, 1997, p. 20.
24 TSN, September 5, 1997, pp. 6-7.
25 TSN, September 5, 1997, pp. 9-10; TSN, September 19, 1997, p. 12.
26 TSN, April 16, 1999, pp. 2-4.
29 37 Phil. 809 (1918).
35 G.R. NOS. 79050-51, November 14, 1989, 179 SCRA 384.
36 Jarencio, Jarencio on Torts and Damages, p. 138.
37 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008.
39 Pantranco v. North Express, Inc., G.R. NOS. 79050-51, November 14, 1989, 179 SCRA 384.
40 Id., citing Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958).


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CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 15, 1990.
The case was heard by Catherine A. White, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a question of law was reported by Margot Botsford, J., to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct review.
John C. Lankenau, of New York (Jonathan M. Albano & Rosanna Sattler with him) for the defendants.
Jonathan M. Albano & Kathryn E. Loebs, for the Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
publisher of a travel guide, made defamatory statements about him in their guide, commenced a libel action. After conducting extensive discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge denied the motion, primarily relying on G. L. c. 231, s. 92. The report raises the question whether s. 92 unconstitutionally infringes on the defendants' freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the F*st Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that it does and reverse the judge's decision and order the entry of judgment for the defendants.
The defendant Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., prepares, and the codefendant St. Martin's Press, Inc., publishes annually a budget travel guide known as "Let's Go: Egypt & Israel." The 1989 edition stated, in reference to the plaintiff's youth hostel: "Women should not stay here, nor should men who don't want to encourage harassment. The manager, Itzik, was being sued on sexual harassment charges by 3 different women during the summer of 1988." Similarly, the defendants' 1990 edition opined, "Let's Go strongly recommends that travelers DO NOT stay here. Don't let the beautiful neighborhood and calm exterior fool you. If management changes, this could be a great hostel; check at the tourist office."
These two statements were the basis of the plaintiff's libel action. A judge subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's claim as to the 1989 statement on the ground that a New York court had already deemed it as time barred. [Note 3] After the parties conducted extensive discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the 1990 statement. Their primary claim was that the truthfulness of their statement regarding the sexual harassment allegations against the plaintiff precluded any valid libel claim. [Note 4] Another judge denied the motion, concluding that, although the Attorney General received notice of the defendants challenge to the constitutionality of G. L. c. 231, s. 92, but declined to intervene.
statement was substantially true, G. L. c. 231, s. 92, dictates that the truthfulness of a defamatory statement is not necessarily a defense to a private plaintiff's libel claim.
General Laws c. 231, s. 92, provides: "The defendant in an action for writing or for publishing a libel may introduce in evidence the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as libellous; and the truth shall be a justification unless actual malice is proved" (emphasis added). Thus, under the statute, if a plaintiff shows that the defendant acted with malice in making a defamatory statement, the plaintiff may recover -- even if the statement is true.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held in defamation cases that, in order to avoid offending a publisher or broadcaster's First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a "defamatory falsehood." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). Where the plaintiff is deemed a "public figure," the Court has expressly concluded that the First Amendment "absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful criticism." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964), citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. If an individual "has published the truth, and no more [about a public person], there is no sound principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by express malice." [Note 5] Garrison v. Louisiana, supra at 73, quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42-43 (1837). Moreover, "only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity . . . may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." Garrison v. Louisiana, supra at 74.
and Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, we noted that "a judge cannot constitutionally apply G. L. c. 231, s. 92, to a public figure or public official." Materia v. Huff, supra at 333 n.6. At the same time, however, we decided to "leave open consideration of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to private [figures]." Id.
Although the Supreme Court has instructed that private figure plaintiffs may recover "on a less demanding showing than that required" in cases of public figure plaintiffs, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 348, the falsity of the defendant's defamatory statement regarding matters of public concern remains a prerequisite to recovery. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-769 (1986), the Court held that, where "a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." There, a private individual filed a libel suit against a newspaper for its articles linking this individual to organized crime and influence peddling. Id. at 769. These articles, the Court determined, were "of public concern." Id. at 776. Acknowledging the deterrent effect of placing the burden of proving truth on defendants who publish speech of public concern, the Court fashioned "a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages." Id. More recently, the Court, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990), concluded that Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, supra, stands for the proposition that "a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved." See Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 402 Mass. 376 , 381 (1988) ("These were statements about a matter of public concern, and therefore . . . in order for them to be the basis of a recovery from this media defendant, the plaintiffs must prove not only that the statements were defamatory, but also that they were false").
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-705 (1972). We feel compelled, therefore, by the Supreme Court's view of the First Amendment to require that this plaintiff's recovery be predicated, in part, on proof that the defamatory statements were untrue.
General Laws c. 231, s. 92, offers a plaintiff the opportunity to recover for a defendant's truthful defamatory statement made with malice. To apply this statute to the defendants' truthful defamatory statement concerning a matter of public concern, even if the statement is malicious, violates the First Amendment.
We reverse the order denying summary judgment and order the entry of summary judgment for the defendants.
[Note 1] St. Martin's Press, Inc.
[Note 3] The judge ruled that, under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, Massachusetts courts must honor the judgment of a New York court, despite the fact that New York's statute of limitations differs from that of Massachusetts. see Roche v. McDonald, 275 u.s. 449, 452 (1927). That ruling is not before us on appeal.
[Note 4] The defendants also maintained that their 1990 statement was not actionable because (1) it was merely an expression of opinion, and therefore protected by the First Amendment; (2) the plaintiff could not show the requisite degree of fault to warrant relief; and (3) the statement was protected under the common interest privilege. The judge rejected each of these claims.
[Note 5] In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986), the Court acknowledged that "[o]ur opinions to date have chiefly treated the necessary showings of fault rather than of falsity. Nonetheless, as one might expect given the language of the Court in New York Times [Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)] . . ., a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation."
[Note 6] Where the relevant facts are not disputed, it is for the judge to determine whether a plaintiff is a public or private figure. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849 , 862 (1975). "We look 'to the nature and extent of [the plaintiffs] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.' " Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328 , 331 (1985), quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). When "an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy[, he] thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 351. See Bowman v. Heller, 420 Mass. 517 , 523, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 682 (1995).
[Note 7] "Whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985), quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983).
[Note 8] The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the standards to be applied to nonmedia defendants. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, supra at 779 n.4.

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FROM 04 TO 11 MAY, 2018 IN BURUNDI.
Art 1: FESTICAB is open to all African content movies with a good technical and artistic quality and illustrating a remarkable creativity.
Art 2: The registered movies will be subjected to selection.
Art 3: The official competition is exclusively reserved for movies whose production does not beyond the last two years, from January 1st, 2016.
Art 5: The "National Competition" category is composed of movies shot in Burundi or elsewhere, with Burundian content, by filmmakers of Burundian nationality, filmmakers of the Burundian diaspora or foreign filmmakers with permanent residence in Burundi.
Art 7: The "East African Competition" category comprises of movies shot in the East African community or outside the region, but with African content, by filmmakers from the EAC, or the Diaspora.
Art 8: The accepted formats for all the movies in competition must be on DVD or sent by an active link then a download link after the announcement of the selection.
The director, producer or broadcaster sending the film must ensure the quality of the media.
Art 11: Selected movies in the national category may be in their original version in Kirundi, in French, English or Swahili.
Art 12: Selected movies in the international category may be in any language provided it is subtitled or dubbed in French or English.
Art 13: Selected movies in the East African category may be in either the national or vernacular language of the East African Community, provided that it is subtitled or dubbed in Swahili or English.
Art 14: The shipment of DVD copies of selected movies is the responsibility of the director or producer one month before the date of the FESTIVAL, 1th April 2018.
Art 15: FESTICAB is responsible for neither shipment errors of the movies to the sender nor the damages resulting from the bad packing or shipment. In addition, they cannot be held responsible for any damage resulting from the poor condition of the copies.
Art 16: Any movie kept in the selection cannot be removed during the festival.
Art 17: Any film taking part in FESTICAB can be the subject of more than 3 public screenings. However, with the agreement of the director or producer, other projections may be considered.
Art 18: Any movie selected during competition will never be used for business purposes.
Art 19: FESTICAB is responsible for the selection of movies. It sets up a committee for this purpose.
Art 20: The official jury for movies in the "national competition" category is made of one (1) chairperson and two (2) members.
Art 21: The official jury for movies in the "International Competition" category consists of three juries, each made of one (1) chairperson and two (2) members.
Art 22: The official jury for movies in the "East African Competition" category consists of three juries, each made of one (1) chairperson and two (2) members.
Art 23: Members of juries are appointed by FESTICAB. The official juries are sovereign. No Juror must have taken part in the production, production or broadcasting of a film in competition.
Trophy for the "Best Short Movie"
Trophy for the "Best Documentary"
Certificate for the "Best Image"
Certificate for "Best Actor ".
Trophy for the " Best Full-length movie "
Trophy for "Best Short Movie"
Trophy for the " Best Full-length movie"
Art 25: An NGO or a National / International Institution may award a Special Prize to a film performed within its field of action provided that it has signed a prior agreement with FESTICAB.
Art 26: There can be no tie in the awarding of the 2018 prize list.
However, a Jury is allowed to make a Special Mention.
Art 27: All cases not provided for in the regulation fall within the competence of FESTICAB.

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§ 38-2 Source separation; exemption from source-separation requirements.
§ 38-4 Collection and preparation rules.
§ 38-5 Residential dwelling compliance requirements.
§ 38-6 Nonresidential establishment compliance requirements.
§ 38-7 New developments of multifamily residential units or commercial, institutional, or industrial properties.
§ 38-8 Prohibition of collection of solid waste mixed with recyclable materials.
§ 38-9 Construction, renovation and demolition debris recovery plan.
§ 38-10 Review of debris recovery plan.
§ 38-11 Diversion requirement adjustment.
§ 38-12 Debris recovery plan reporting requirements.
§ 38-13 Compliance with diversion requirement.
§ 38-16 Violations and penalties.
§ 38-17 Severability; when effective.
Burning regulations — See Ch. 21.
Littering — See Ch. 40B.
Property maintenance — See Ch. 54.
Editor's Note: This ordinance also repealed former Ch. 38, Garbage and Rubbish, comprised of Art. I, Disposal Methods, adopted 7-1-1958 by Ord. No. 401, as amended; Art. II, Collection Schedule and Rules, adopted 10-6-1953 by Ord. No. 347, amended in its entirety 2-20-2001 by Ord. No. 0.06.01; Art. IIA, Yard Waste Collection Program, adopted 11-14-2005 by Ord. No. 16.05; Art. III, Recycling and Collection Program, adopted 12-18-1984 as Part III of Ord. No. 0.12.84, as amended; and Art. IV, Violations and Penalties; Repealer, adopted 12-18-1984 as Parts IV and V of Ord. No. 0.12.84, as amended.
All products made of aluminum, commonly known as "aluminum cans."
All such products commonly known as "metal cans," "tin cans," "bimetal cans" or "ferrous cans." "Bimetal cans" does not include paint, aerosol, oil, lighter fluid or other such types of cans.
Large items such as washers, dryers refrigerators, freezers, dishwashers, ovens, ranges, hot-water heaters, cold-water tanks, air conditioners, gas/oil/electric heaters, metal storage cabinets/shelves, swing sets, bicycles, large auto parts, metal lawn-care equipment and/or any other large appliance commonly referred to as a "white good," whose size precludes or complicates normal handling.
Large items of solid waste, such as furniture, chemically treated woods, carpets and other oversize items whose size precludes or complicates handling by normal collection.
All trash, garbage, bulk trash, bulk appliances/metal, yard/wood waste and recyclable materials.
A combining of nonputrescible, source-separated recyclable materials for the purpose of recycling.
The placement of yard waste in a trash can, bucket, bag or other vessel, such as to prevent the waste from spilling or blowing into the street and coming into contact with stormwater.
All uncontaminated double-layered brown cardboard.
A construction, renovation, or demolition project for which a building permit or a demolition permit is required, and for which a dumpster or roll-off container shall be placed on premises for the purpose of placement of solid waste materials.
Stones, dirt, demolition material, construction material, broken concrete and other like material.
Those materials designated within the Gloucester County District Solid Waste Management Plan to be source separated for the purpose of recycling.
A computer central processing unit and associated hardware, including keyboards, modems, printers, scanners and fax machines; a cathode ray tube, a cathode ray tube device, a flat panel display or similar video display device with a screen that is greater than four inches measured diagonally and that contains one or more circuit boards, including a television, and cell phones.
Any violation of any of the rules or regulation set forth in this chapter, provided that no violation of any rule or regulation of this chapter occurred and was attributed to the same violator for a period of at least 60 days immediately preceding the violation.
Putrescible animal or vegetable waste incident to and resulting from the use, preparation, cooking and consumption of food.
All products made from silica or sand, soda ash and limestone, the product being transparent or translucent and being used for packaging or bottling of various matter and all other material commonly known as "clear (flint)," "green" or "brown (amber)." "Glass" shall not include crystal, ceramics, light bulbs and/or plate window, laminated, wired or mirrored glass.
Clippings resulting from the mowing of grass.
All waste which is deemed chemical waste, hazardous waste, or infectious waste as defined by N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.4, and which is flammable, corrosive, explosive or which by itself or in combination with other waste could be hazardous to life or property.
Any solid waste that is generated in the diagnosis, treatment or immunization of human beings or animals, including but not limited to syringes and discarded pharmaceutical products.
Any building or structure, or complex of buildings in which three or more dwelling units are owner-occupied or rented or leased, or offered for rental or lease, for residential purposes (see N.J.S.A. 13:1E-99.13a) and shall include hotels, motels, or other guest houses serving transient or seasonal guests as those terms are defined under Subsection (j) of Section 3 of the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law, P.L. 1967, c. 76 (N.J.S.A. 55:13A-1 et seq.).
The person or persons appointed by the municipal governing body and who shall be authorized to, among other things, enforce the provisions of this chapter, and any rules and regulations which may be promulgated hereunder.
All solid waste generated at residential, commercial, and institutional establishments within the boundaries of the Borough of Paulsboro.
All uncontaminated paper material, such as newspapers magazines, books, wrapping paper, bags, discarded letters and envelopes, coated magazines, catalogues, and similar printed material, soft-covered books and junk mail.
Any individual, entity, association, corporation, company, partnership, firm, or political subdivision of this state subject to municipal jurisdiction.
Plastic bottles, such as those for milk, soda, water and detergent. These items are identified with a number "1" or a number "2" within the recycling triangle symbol located on the bottom of the product.
All solid wastes, both combustible and noncombustible, such as paper, wrappings, cardboard, tin, cans, yard clippings, leaves, glass, rags, waste food or cardboard, and other combustible solids of a nonvolatile or explosive nature, bedding, crockery and similar materials, ashes, street cleaning waste and dead animals, except bulky and industrial waste and hazardous waste, as defined in this chapter.
Any violation of any of the rules or regulations set forth in this chapter that occurs within 60 days of the first offense of any of the rules or regulations of this chapter by the same violator.
That the following recyclables may be placed into one container: plastics #1 through #5; green, clear and brown glass; aluminum beverage containers; steel food cans; newsprints; corrugated cardboard; single-ply cardboard and brown paper bags.
Any street, avenue, boulevard, road, parkway, viaduct, drive or other way which is an existing state, county or municipal roadway and includes the land between the street lines, whether improved or unimproved, and may comprise pavement, shoulders, gutters, curbs, sidewalks, parking areas and/or other areas within the street lines.
Any violation of any of the rules or regulations set forth in this chapter that occurs subsequent to a second offense and within 120 days of the first offense by the same violator.
Includes but shall not be limited to ashes, rubbish, refuse, yard waste and wood waste, waste materials, rags, crockery, ordinary household refuse, waste food, bulk trash and/or bulk appliances deposited by residents along the curbline in containers and/or bundles. It shall not include recyclable material designated herein.
Trees, branches, stumps, bushes, hedge trimmings, weeds, pallets and/or untreated lumber.
It shall be mandatory for all persons who are owners, tenants, or occupants of residential and/or nonresidential premises, which shall include but not be limited to retail and other commercial locations, as well as government, schools and other institutional locations within the Borough of Paulsboro, to separate designated recyclable materials from all solid waste.
Designated recyclable materials shall be deposited separate and apart from other solid waste generated by the owners, tenants, or occupants of such premises and shall be placed separately at the curb in a manner as established by the Borough of Paulsboro or in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40:66-1.3 and on such days and times as may be established by regulations promulgated by the Borough of Paulsboro.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1E-99.16d, the governing body of a municipality may exempt persons occupying commercial or institutional premises within its municipal boundaries from the source-separation requirements of the ordinance which requires persons generating municipal solid waste within its municipal boundaries to source separate from the municipal solid waste stream the specified recyclable materials if those persons have otherwise provided for the recycling of all designated recyclable materials.
A certification that the designated recyclable materials will be recycled, and that, at least on an annual basis, said recycling service provider or commercial/institutional generator shall provide written documentation to the Municipal Recycling Coordinator of the total number of tons collected and recycled for each designated material.
The Council of the Borough of Paulsboro shall establish by resolution the days, hours and areas for the collection of all items encompassed within this chapter. The schedule shall be available at the Borough Hall or on the Borough website: http://www.paulsboronj.org/.
Keep the collection items in rear of premises until the night before the scheduled collection day in suitable containers or bundles not exceeding 35 gallons' capacity and 50 pounds in weight when filled.
No collections will be made of barrels, manure or refuse from contractor's building operations, such as earth, plaster, cement, brick, lumber, etc.
Property owners must provide sufficient containers for the needs of collection.
All garbage shall be drained and securely wrapped and tied in suitable material such as plastic bags and placed in or alongside trash containers.
All persons placing or causing to be placed any items for collection shall securely bundle the items to prevent any portion thereof from being separated from the remainder. Items may not be placed for collection in paper bags or cardboard boxes.
Only Borough employees in the performance of their employment duties or persons specifically authorized by Borough Council may collect items encompassed within this chapter after it has been placed at the curbline for collection.
No person, except for those provided herein, shall take, remove, tamper with, search for and/or remove any item that has been placed at curbline for collection by the authorized collector.
All items encompassed within this chapter shall be placed between the curb and sidewalk, or in the absence of a curb or sidewalk, as near to the street as to not constitute a danger, where such items shall be readily accessible to the authorized collector without providing obstruction to pedestrians or traffic.
All persons placing or causing to be placed any items for collection shall maintain the receptacle or other items to be disposed of in a clean and safe condition for handling and for purposes of collection.
After collection all empty receptacles shall be removed from the curbside by no later than 7:00 p.m. of the day collection took place.
The collection of bulk trash shall be limited to two items per week.
All wood waste generated by a private contractor shall be disposed of by the contractor or the property owner by private means.
All bulk appliances/metals shall be placed curbside the day before the scheduled collection. All doors shall be removed and/or otherwise dismantled from the item(s). All wheels and/or rubber goods shall be removed and/or otherwise dismantled from the item(s).
Each day that this subsection is violated shall constitute a separate offense.
Public litter receptacles located in the Borough downtown area, Borough parks or Borough recreational areas are for pedestrian-generated litter and may not be used for persons disposing of household items or for commercially generated items.
A violation of this subsection shall also be deemed a violation of § 40B-4.
Discarded items with concrete attached, such as pipes and posts, shall have the concrete removed prior to placement at curbside.
Items generated from minor home repairs and cleanups that do not require a permit may be placed at curbside for collection. Loose boards, wood products and other similar materials are to be securely in bundles not to exceed four feet in length and not to exceed 50 pounds in weight.
Rolled bulk trash items, such as carpets, carpet padding, pool liners, fencing, etc., must be rolled into bundles, securely tied, not exceed four feet in length and not exceed 50 pounds in weight.
Wood waste shall be containerized and shall not be placed within 10 feet of any storm drain inlet. Collection shall be limited to no more than three receptacles per week.
Grass clippings shall be containerized and shall not be placed within 10 feet of any storm drain inlet. Collection shall be limited to no more than three receptacles per week.
Sweeping, raking, blowing or otherwise placing yard waste that is not containerized at the curbside is allowed during the seven days prior to a scheduled and announced yard waste collection.
During an announced yard waste collection, the yard waste shall not be placed closer than 10 feet to any storm drain inlet.
Placement of uncontainerized yard waste at curbside at any other time or in any other manner is a violation of this chapter.
All glass components of doors or windows shall be broken from their frame and shall be containerized for collection. This form of glass is not to be recycled.
Only two tires per week may be placed for collection. Rims must be removed from the tires prior to being placed for collection. Businesses that generate used tires through business operations shall dispose of them through a licensed recycling service.
Construction debris generated by a contractor or property owner will not be removed by the Borough. Disposal shall be the responsibility of the property owner or contractor.
Medical waste shall be not be placed for collection. All regulated medical waste shall be disposed of in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:26-3A et seq. All unregulated medical waste shall be disposed of through a certified medical disposal site and/or facility.
The owner of any property shall be responsible for compliance with this chapter. For multifamily units, the management or owner is responsible for setting up and maintaining the recycling system, including collection of recyclable materials, in accordance with guidelines or regulations established by the Borough.
Violations and/or penalty notices shall be directed to the owner or management.
The management shall issue notification and collection rules to new tenants when they arrive and every six months during their occupancy.
All commercial and institutional generators of solid waste shall be required to comply with the provisions of this chapter.
The arrangement for collection of designated recyclables hereunder shall be the responsibility of the commercial, institutional or industrial property owner or their designee, unless the Borough of Paulsboro specifically provides for the collection of designated recyclable materials.
All commercial, institutional or industrial properties which provide outdoor litter receptacles and disposal service for their contents shall also provide receptacles for designated recyclable materials, for those materials commonly deposited, in the location of the litter receptacle, and shall provide for separate recycling service for their contents.
Every business, institution, or industrial facility shall report on an annual basis to the Borough Recycling Coordinator, on such forms as may be prescribed by the Borough, on recycling activities at their premises, including the amount of recycled material, by material type, collected and recycled and the vendor or vendors providing recycling service.
All food-service establishments, as defined in the Borough or County Health Code, shall, in addition to compliance with all other recycling requirements, be required to recycle grease and/or cooking oil created in the processing of food or food products, and maintain such records as may be prescribed, for inspection by any code enforcement officer.
Locations documented on the application's site plan that provide for convenient recycling opportunities for all owners, tenants, and occupants. The recycling area shall be of sufficient size, convenient location and contain other attributes (signage, lighting, fencing, etc.) as may be determined by the Borough Recycling Coordinator.
Prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy by the Borough, the owner of any new multifamily housing or commercial, institutional, or industrial development must supply a copy of a duly executed contract with a hauling company for the purposes of collection and recycling of source-separated recyclable materials, in those instances where the municipality does not otherwise provide this service.
Provision shall be made for the indoor, or enclosed outdoor, storage and pickup of solid waste, to be approved by the Municipal Engineer.
It shall be the responsibility of the resident or occupant to properly segregate the uncollected solid waste for proper disposal or recycling. Allowing such unseparated solid waste and recyclables to accumulate will be considered a violation of this chapter and the local sanitary code.
Once placed in the location identified by this chapter, or any rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to this chapter, no person, other than those authorized by the Borough, shall tamper with, collect, remove, or otherwise handle designated recyclable materials.
A debris recovery plan shall be filed with the Borough Recycling Coordinator prior to the commencement of any activity for which municipal approval is required as further identified above. The debris recovery plan shall identify the types and estimated quantities of construction and demolition ("C & D") debris to be generated from the project, how each material will be managed, and the name of each facility or service provider that the entity will use to manage each material. The plan shall further detail how the applicant shall ensure that a minimum of 50% of the materials to be generated will be separated and recycled.
Approval. A debris recovery plan shall be reviewed by the Borough Recycling Coordinator, and approved if it provides for all of the information required by this chapter. An approved debris recovery plan shall be marked "Approved" and returned to the owner of the entity which submitted the plan.
Denial. A debris recovery plan shall not be approved if it does not provide all of the information required by this chapter. If a debris recovery plan is not approved, the owner of the entity which submitted the plan shall be notified in writing that the plan has been rejected, including the reasons for the rejection. In order to obtain the building or demolition permit sought, the owner of the entity which will carry out the construction, renovation, or demolition project shall make the required changes and resubmit the debris recovery plan to the Municipal Recycling Coordinator.
Application. If the owner of an entity carrying out a covered project experiences circumstances that makes it infeasible to comply with the diversion requirement cited in this chapter, the owner of the entity may apply for an adjustment. The owner shall indicate in writing why it is infeasible to divert 50% of the materials being generated from the covered project and specify what percentage of diversion could be achieved. Increased costs to the owner of the entity carrying out the covered project will not be an acceptable justification for an adjustment.
Review. The Municipal Recycling Coordinator shall review the information supplied by the owner. If warranted the Borough Recycling Coordinator shall attempt to contact the owner to discuss possible ways of meeting the diversion requirement.
Granting of an adjustment. If the Municipal Recycling Coordinator determines that it is infeasible for the entity carrying out a covered project to divert 50% of the generated C&D debris from the covered project, the percentage of diversion required shall be adjusted. The owner shall be notified in writing of the adjusted diversion requirement. The owner of the entity carrying out the covered project shall be required to divert the percentage of C&D debris required by the adjustment.
Denial of adjustment. If the Borough Recycling Coordinator determines that it is feasible for the owner of an entity carrying out a covered project to meet the diversion requirement cited in this chapter, the owner shall be notified in writing of the denial of the diversion requirement adjustment.
Any additional information that the owner of the entity carrying out the covered project believes is relevant to determining compliance with the diversion requirement.
The Borough Recycling Coordinator shall review the information submitted pursuant to this chapter and determine whether the owner of the entity carrying out the covered project has complied or failed to comply with the diversion requirement. The determination regarding compliance will be provided in writing to the owner of the entity carrying out the covered project.
An owner of the entity carrying out the covered project may appeal a determination of failure to comply under this chapter to the Borough within 30 days of the decision or determination. The appeal shall be in writing and shall state the facts and basis for the appeal. A decision by the Borough governing body shall be final.
The Code Enforcement Official, the Borough Police Department, the County Department of Health, the Borough Foreman, the Borough Recycling Coordinator, the Property Maintenance Official, and the Housing Officer are hereby individually and severally empowered to enforce the provisions of this chapter. The respective enforcing official may, in his or her discretion, post warning stickers for a first offense. An inspection may consist of dumping and opening of solid waste bags of containers to detect, by sound or sight, the presence of any recyclable material.
Any person, corporation, occupant, or entity that violates or fails to comply with any provision of this chapter or any of the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, on first offense, be punishable by a fine of $20.
Any person, corporation, occupant, or entity that violates or fails to comply with any provision of this chapter or any of the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, on second offense, be punishable by a fine of $35.
Any person, corporation, occupant, or entity that violates or fails to comply with any provision of this chapter or any of the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, on third offense, be punishable by a fine of no less than $50 and no more than $2,000.
Each day for which a violation of this chapter occurs shall be considered a separate offence.
Any person, firm or corporation cited for a first or second violation of any provision of this chapter may pay to the Clerk of the Municipal Court the fine designated herein before the court date in lieu of appearing on that date.
If it is determined, by a Court of competent jurisdiction, that any provision or section of this chapter is unconstitutional, all other sections and provisions shall remain in effect. This chapter shall take effect immediately.


§ 1599.1 - Purpose and applicability.
§ 1599.3 - Eligibility and conflicts of interest.
§ 1599.4 - Application process.
§ 1599.7 - Transportation of donated commodities.
§ 1599.8 - Entry, handling, and labeling of donated commodities and notification requirements.
§ 1599.9 - Damage to or loss of donated commodities.
§ 1599.10 - Claims for damage to or loss of donated commodities.
§ 1599.11 - Use of donated commodities, sale proceeds, FAS-provided funds, and program income.
§ 1599.12 - Monitoring and evaluation requirements.
§ 1599.13 - Reporting and record keeping requirements.
§ 1599.15 - Noncompliance with an agreement.
§ 1599.16 - Suspension and termination of agreements.
§ 1599.17 - Opportunities to object and appeals.
§ 1599.18 - Audit requirements.
§ 1599.19 - Paperwork Reduction Act.


text:
Forbes, Malcolm & Thomas D'Arcy Brophy. Nation's Heritage. Volume I, Number I. Photo available. New York. B.C. Forbes Publising. 1949. Folio. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Rare. Fine copy (book plate).
Ford, Edward R. The Details of Modern Architecture. Photo available. Cambridge. MIT Press. 1994. 371 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Ford, P.R.J. The Oriental Carpet. A History and Guide to Traditional Motifs, Patterns, and Symbols. Photo available. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 1981. 352 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Ford, Richard & Birney Imes. Juke Joint. Photographs. Photo available. Jackson. University Press of Mississippi. 1995. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Fordin, Hugh. Jerome Kern Collection. Photo available. Santa Monica. T.B. Harms Company. 1988. 239 pps. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Forney, Darrell. Darrell Forney's Mechanical Garden. A 30 Year Survey. Photo available. Sacramento. Center for Contemporary Art. 1993. 48 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Forrest, Tim. The Bulfinch Anatomy of Antique China & Silver. An Illustrated Guide to Tableware, Identifying Period, Detail, and Design. Boston. Little, Brown and Company. 1998. 160 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (mylar).
Forseth, Kevin. Graphics for Architecture. Photo available. New York. Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1980. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Forseth, Kevin. Graphics for Architecture. Photo available. New York. Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1980. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Forster, Fred et al. Fred Forster. Getting Carried Away. Inscribed by the author. Photo available. San Francisco. Glyph Publishing. 2002. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Number 128. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Inscribed by the author "To Jeanne and Carl Hop you get many smiles from looking at these drawings. best wishes (Fearless) Fred Forster February 2nd 2003". Number 128. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Forsythe, Max. Drive by Shooting. Photo available. London. Booth-Clibborn. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket.
Fort, Alice Buchnan. Minute History of the Drama. From Its Earliest Beginnings to the Present Day. New York. Grosset & Dunlap. 1935. 143 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Fort, Ilene & Arnold Skolnick (ed). Paintings of California. Photo available. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1997. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Full number line. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Fort, Ilene. The Flag Paintings of Childe Hassam. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 1988. 128 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Fort, Ilene. The Flag Paintings of Childe Hassam. Photo available. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 1988. 128 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Foster, Michael (ed). The Principles of Architecture. Style, Structure, Design. New York. Mallard. 1982. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Foster, Viv. Drawing Companion. Everything You Need to Know to Draw Like a Professional, Featuring 30 Step-by-Step Projects. London. Oceana. 2006. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Foster, Walter. Modern Cartoon. Tustin. Walter Foster. nd. 30 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy.

matches:
in fine
in fine
Art. 1993
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine


OLD ISLAND FUMIGATION, INC., Appellant, vs. KATHLEEN BARBEE, etc., et al., Appellees.
Released for Publication September 24, 1992.
PRIOR HISTORY: An Appeal from a nonfinal order of the Circuit Court for Monroe County, J. Jefferson Overby, Judge.
COUNSEL: Kenney Burd Knutson & Markowitz and Madelyn Simon Lozano, for appellant.
Leesfield and Blackburn and Ira H. Leesfield and Mycki L. Kirn, for appellees.
JUDGES: Before NESBITT, JORGENSON, and GODERICH, JJ.
Old Island Fumigation, Inc., appeals from an order of summary judgment holding it strictly liable for damages to occupants of a building adjacent to the building fumigated. We affirm.
Old Island fumigated buildings A and B of a condominium complex. Buildings A and B, together with building C, form a U-shape; buildings B and C have between them an atrium and were thought to be separated by an impenetrable fire wall. Although Old Island evacuated occupants of buildings A and B before the fumigation, the company advised the occupants of building C that they could remain in their dwellings while the other buildings were treated.
n1 The record is uncontroverted that the plaintiffs were poisoned by the Vikane gas used by the fumigator.
Several months after this incident, an architect hired by the fumigation company discovered that the fire wall between buildings B and C was defective and contained a four-foot-by-eighteen-inch open space through which the gas had entered building C. The defect was only visible from a vantage point within the crawl space and had been missed by various building inspectors and by the fumigation company itself during an earlier inspection.
The occupants of building C who had been felled by the Vikane fumes sued the fumigator for damages, alleging that they had suffered damages that resulted from the fumigator's acts. The fumigator defended on the ground that third parties--the architect and contractors--had actually caused plaintiffs' injuries by failing to construct properly the [**3] fire wall between buildings B and C. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the fumigator was strictly liable for damages caused by its performance of an ultrahazardous activity. The trial court granted the motion; the fumigator appeals.
Old Island Fumigation, Inc., is strictly liable for damages caused to the plaintiffs by its fumigation of the condominium complex. Fumigation is an ultrahazardous activity as it "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land, or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and is not a matter of common usage." Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d [*1248] DCA 1975) (applying Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964) (factors to be considered in determining whether activity is ultrahazardous activity are: whether activity involves high degree of risk of harm to property of others; whether potential harm is likely to be great; whether risk can be eliminated by exercise of reasonable care; whether activity is matter of common usage; whether activity is appropriate to [**4] place where conducted; whether activity has substantial value to community); Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460 So. 2d 510 (1984) (same); see also Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation is ultrahazardous activity). Old Island Fumigation is thus liable regardless of the level of care exercised in carrying out this activity.
Any alleged negligence by a third party does not free the fumigation company from liability. In a case involving blasting, an ultrahazardous activity, this court held that "under Florida law, a defendant is still liable for the consequences of his conduct even though some other cause contributed to the same damage." Poole v. Lowell Dunn Co., 573 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 (Tent. Draft 1968) ("One carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person . . .").
"The reason for imposing strict liability upon those who carry on abnormally [**5] dangerous activities is that they have for their own purposes created a risk that is not a usual incident of the ordinary life of a community. If the risk ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the harm occurs through the unexpectable action of a human being. . . . This is true irrespective of whether the action of the human being which makes the abnormally dangerous activity harmful is innocent, negligent or even reckless."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 cmt.a (Tentative Draft No. 10 1968).
In sum, the trial court properly entered summary judgment against Old Island Fumigation on the issue of liability.


text:
With this document the law firm lawyers Tamola Nicholas T&R and Russo Daniela discloses how to manage the website, owned by the avv. Russian Daniela (P.IVA 08231700967), and in particular, the objectives and the way in which personal data of users who consult are collected, recorded and used.
The current document refers exclusively to the website www.studiolegaletr.com, (hereinafter “law firm T&R site”) and not to other web sites accessed via links on the pages of the site.
The law firm T&R site is controlled and operated by lawyers Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela who, under art. 26 of Reg. EC 2016/679, are joint holders of the treatment of the personal data collected there. Interested parties may exercise their rights under EU Reg. 2016/679 against and against each controller.
The internal agreement between the Controllers of the processing, which regulates the respective responsibilities regarding the obligations and the exercise of rights deriving from EU Reg. 2016/679, may be made available to interested parties who make a written request to the following address: via Sant’Antonio Maria Zaccaria n.1 – 20122 Milan (Italy) – or via pec: nicola.tamola@milano.pecavvocati.it or daniela.russo@milano.pecavvocati.it.
The lawyers Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, as data controllers of personal data, pursuant to and for the effects of the EU Reg. 2016/679, hereinafter also ‘GDPR’, inform the users of the site that the aforementioned legislation provides the protection of data subjects regarding the processing of personal data and that such data shall be processed in accordance with laws and privacy obligations provided therein.
Lawyers Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, co-owners of the processing of personal data, elect domicile in via Sant’Antonio Maria Zaccaria n.1, 20122- Milan.
The treatments take place electronically and will be made available to third parties (external processors) within the European Union, regularly under contract by the owners and that offer adequate security necessary for the provision of essential services to meet the needs of users.
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The Data Controllers, pursuant to art. 26 Reg. UE 2016/679 are the lawyers Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela – Via Sant’Antonio Maria Zaccaria n.1, 20122 – Milan (MI) Tel. +39 02 39438698. Pec: nicola.tamola@milano.pecavvocati.it and daniela.russo@milano.pecavvocati.it; e-mail: info@studiolegaletr.com.
The interested parties have the right to obtain from the Owners the cancellation (right to be forgotten), the limitation, the updating, the correction, the portability, the opposition to the processing of personal data concerning them, and in general can exercise all the rights provided for by the articles 15-23 of the EU Reg. 2016/679 (GDPR).
d) any corrections or cancellations or limitations of the processing carried out at the request of the interested party – unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort – will be communicated by the Data Controllers to each of the recipients to whom the personal data have been transmitted.
The exercise of rights is not subject to any form constraint and is free. Only in case of request for further copies of the data requested by the data subject, the Data Controllers will be able to charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. If the interested party submits the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise indicated by the interested party, the information will be provided in a commonly used electronic format.
The specific address of the Data Controllers to transmit istances to exercise rights as recognized by the Regulations is as follows: info@studiolegaletr.com. No other formalities are required. The response will be given in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 3 of EU Reg. 2016/679 (“The data controller shall provide the data subject with regard to the action taken regarding a request pursuant to Articles 15 to 22 without undue delay and, in any case, no later than one month after receipt of the request, this deadline may be extended by two months if necessary, taking into account the complexity and the number of requests. this extension, and the reasons for the delay, within one month from receipt of the request If the interested party submits the request by electronic means, the information is provided, where possible, by electronic means, unless otherwise indicated by the interested party “).
Specific information on the right to the portability of personal data.
The Data Controllers inform the data subject about the specific right to portability. Article 20 of EU Reg. 2016/679 introduces the new right to data portability. This right allows the data subject to receive the personal data provided to the Data Controllers in a structured format, commonly used and readable by automatic device, and – under certain conditions – to transmit them to another data controller without impediments.
Are portable, the only personal information that (a) concern the interested party, and (b) have been provided by the data subject to the Data Controllers; (c) are processed electronically in connection with the stipulation of a contract.
Data portability includes the right of the data subject to receive a subset of personal data concerning him / her processed by the Data Controllers and to keep them for further use for personal purposes. This conservation can take place on a personal support or on a private cloud, without necessarily involving the transmission of data to another owner. Portability is a sort of integration and strengthening of the different right of access to personal data, also provided for by art. 15 of the EU Reg. 2016/679.
In the case the interested party asks for the portability together with the direct transmission of his data to another data controller, please note that this right is subject to the condition of technical feasibility: the art. 20, co. 2, Reg. UE 2016/679 provides that data can be transmitted directly from one owner to another at the request of the party concerned, and where this is technically possible. The technical feasibility of transmission from one holder to another must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Recital 68 of EU Reg. 2016/679 clarifies the limits of what is “technically feasible“, specifying that “it should not imply the obligation for the owners to adopt or maintain technically compatible processing systems“. Therefore, the direct transmission of data from the law firm T & R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, to another holder can take place if it is possible to establish a communication between the systems of the two owners (transferer and receiver) and in a secure way, and if the receiving system is technically capable of receiving incoming data. If technical impediments preclude direct transmission, the law firm T & R – Avv. Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, will give complete information and detailed explanation to the interested party. With regard to the interoperability of formats to ensure portability, the law firm T & R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela will comply with the provisions of paragraph 1021, letter (b) of Law 205/2017 (“presence of adequate infrastructure for the interoperability of the formats with which the data are made available to the interested parties“) if effective after May 25, 2018 and in any case within the limits set by the Guidelines on the portability of data WP242 issued by the Group of European guarantors (“The expectation is that the owner transmits personal data in an interoperable format, but this does not impose any obligation on the other holders to support this format“).
In accordance with the WP242 Data Portability Guidelines, holders who comply with a portability request have no specific obligation to verify the quality of the data before transmitting them. Moreover, portability does not require T & R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela Law Firm to maintain data for a period longer than necessary or further than specified. Above all, it does not impose any further obligation to retain personal data for the sole purpose of fulfilling a potential request for portability.
The exercise of the right to data portability (or any other right under the Regulation) does not affect any of the other rights. The party can continue to enjoy and benefit from the service provided by the law firm T&R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russio Daniela even after both carried out an operation of portability. Portability does not delete data automatically stored on systems T&R – law firm Messrs Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, and does not affect the retention period originally expected for data transmission. The interested party can exercise the rights as long as the treatment carried out by the law firm T & R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela continues.
The law firm T&R – Avv.ti Tamola Nicola and Russo Daniela, undertakes to fulfil user requests for portability within 30 days of receipt of the request and, pursuant to art. 12, paragraph 3 of Reg. EU 2016/679, the right to encounter the request within a period longer than three months in cases of increased complexity. The demand for portability must be addressed to the following, specific e-mail address: info@studiolegaletr.com.
Summary information on other rights.
Right of access (only personal data): the right to obtain by the data controller confirmation whether or not an ongoing processing of personal data concerning the data subject and if so, to obtain access to personal information and be informed about the purpose of the processing; on the categories of personal data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, in particular if recipients in third countries or international organisations; whenever possible, the period of storage of personal data or, if not possible, on the criteria used to determine that period; If the data has not been collected from the data subject, entitled to receive all available information about their origin; right to receive information on the existence of an automated decision-making process, including the profiling and significant information on the logic used, as well as the importance and expected consequences of such treatment for the person concerned.
Right of rectification and integration: the person concerned is entitled to obtain from the holder of the treatment correction of inaccurate personal data concerning him without undue delay. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to obtain personal data incomplete integration, even providing a supplementary statement. The holder communicates to each of the recipients to whom personal data have been transmitted any adjustments, unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort. The holder shall inform the interested recipients if the party concerned so requests.
Right to cancellation: the data subject has the right to obtain from the data controller the deletion of personal data concerning him without undue delay (and where the specific reasons of Article 17 paragraph 3 of the Regulations do not exist, on the contrary they raise the holder from the obligation of cancellation) if personal data are no longer necessary with respect to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; or if the interested party revokes the consent and there is no other legal basis for the treatment; or if the interested party opposes the treatment for marketing or profiling purposes, also by revoking the consent; if the personal data have been processed unlawfully or concern information collected from minors, in violation of art. 8 of EU Reg. 2016/679. The data controller shall inform each of the recipients to whom the personal data have been transmitted of any cancellations, unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort. The data controller informs the recipient of these recipients if the party concerned so requests.
Right to limit the processing: the data subject has the right to obtain from the data controller the processing limitation (i.e., according to the definition of “treatment limitation” provided by article 4 of EU Reg. 2016/679: “the marking of personal data retained with the aim of limiting the processing in the future“) when one of the following hypotheses occurs: the data subject disputes the accuracy of personal data, for the period necessary for the data controller to verify the accuracy of such data personal data; the processing is illegal and the interested party opposes the cancellation of personal data and asks instead that its use is limited; although the data controller no longer needs it for processing purposes, personal data are necessary for the data subject to ascertain, exercise or defend a right in court; the interested party opposed the marketing treatment, pending verification of the possible prevalence of the legitimate reasons of the data controller with respect to those of the interested party. If the processing is limited, such personal data shall be processed, except for storage, only with the consent of the interested party or for the assessment, exercise or defense of a right in court or to protect the rights of an other natural or legal person or for reasons of significant public interest The party who has obtained the limitation of processing is informed by the data controller before such limitation is revoked. The data controller shall inform each of the recipients to whom the personal data have been transmitted of any limitations, unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort. The data controller informs the recipient of these recipients if the data subject requests it.
Opposition right: the interested party has the right to oppose at any time, for reasons connected with his particular situation, to the processing of personal data concerning him / her carried out by the owner or for the performance of a task in the public interest or connected to the exercise of public authority for which the data controller is invested or carried out for the pursuit of the legitimate interests of the data controller or third parties (including profiling). Furthermore, if the personal data are processed for direct marketing or commercial profiling purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to the processing of personal data concerning him / her for such purposes.
Right not to be subjected to automated decisions, including profiling: the data subject has the right not to be subjected to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects that affect it or which significantly impacts significantly on his person, except in cases where the automated decision is necessary for the conclusion or execution of a contract between the data subject and a data controller; is required by law, in compliance with measures and precautions; is based on the explicit consent of the person concerned.

matches:
art. 26
art. 26
art. 15
art. 20
art. 12
art. 8


text:
New York Appellate Criminal Cases Originating from the New York Supreme Court NY County- LexisNexis. June 23, 2009.
1. People v. Perez, 843, 5734/05, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4972; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4899, June 18, 2009, Decided, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
2. People v. Pereyra, 850, 579/08, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4975; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4891, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
3. People v. Fields, 852, 4782/02, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4977; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4894, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (John Cataldo, J.
4. People v. Dom, 858, 6509/07, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4982; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4881, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
5. People v. Parker, 411, 5117/06, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4967; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4889, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
6. People v. Wright, 854, 6795/06, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4979; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4897, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
7. People v. Nieves, 839, 5912/06, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4970; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4882, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
8. People v. Dunnell, 3529, 613/06, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4965; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4888, June 18, 2009, Decided, June 18, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
9. People v. Hogans, 654, 1437/07, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4118; 878 N.Y.S.2d 890; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3988, May 26, 2009, Decided, May 26, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
10. People v. Nevarez, 630, 630A, 3633/06, 6046/06, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4104; 878 N.Y.S.2d 888; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3992, May 26, 2009, Decided, May 26, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
11. People v. Veneziano, 635, 2283/05, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4107; 878 N.Y.S.2d 888; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3997, May 26, 2009, Decided, May 26, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
12. People v. Jones, 659, 6099/03, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 2009 NY Slip Op 4123; 878 N.Y.S.2d 891; 2009 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4004, May 26, 2009, Decided, May 26, 2009, Entered, THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION., THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

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