Relief from joint and several liability for spouses.
The list is substantially similar to the list from the prior year, except for a marked decrease in gross income cases.
The top 10 list is made up of 923 cases.
Bad news for tax litigators - 71% of these cases involved pro se taxpayers who represented themselves.
Generally, taxpayers have a higher chance of prevailing in litigation if they were represented by counsel. However, pro se taxpayers experienced a substantially higher rate of success than represented taxpayers in litigation over frivolous issue penalties and family status issues.
Taxpayers prevailed in whole or in part in 14.3% of the cases.
In In re Bilski, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a process is not a patentable subject matter unless it is either (1) tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms an article into a different state or thing.
In RadioShack Corp. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the taxpayer’s statute of limitations period for filing a telephone excise tax refund claim began to run when the taxpayer’s telephone service provider filed a return.
In Keller v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a taxpayer was not liable for the 40 percent gross valuation misstatement penalty because his understatement of tax was attributable to improperly claiming a deduction rather than overvaluing a deductible item.
In the Estate of Rosen, the Tax Court held that the IRS could not reverse its erroneous application of the decedent’s income tax payment to his estate tax liability after the three-year statute of limitations on assessment had expired with respect to the income tax return, and thus, the income tax overpayment offset the decedent’s estate tax liability.
In Countryside L.P. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that the exception to the tax practitioner privilege applicable to written communications promoting a corporate tax shelter did not apply to handwritten notes or meeting minutes because (1) they were not a “written communication” and (2) the routine advice provided by the practitioner did not “promote” a shelter.
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court by holding that (1)a hospital’s medical residents were not eligible for the student exemption from Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes because they were full-time employees, and (2) the applicable Treasury Regulations were valid.
In Williams v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to redetermine the taxpayer’s liability for the foreign bank account report penalties(FBAR).
In Morrison v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a taxpayer can recover fees from the government under IRC § 7430 even if a third party pays the fees, provided the taxpayer agrees to repay to the third party any fees reimbursed by the government.
In United States v. McFerrin, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended the “Cohan rule” to hold that a taxpayer who establishes the existence of qualified expenses for purposes of the IRC § 41 research credit, is entitled to rely on rough estimates, rather than contemporaneous documentation, to determine the amount of those expenditures.
In Bakersfield Energy, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an overstatement of basis was not an omission of gross income for purposes of extending the statute of limitations on assessment under IRC § 6501(e).
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74-5611a. Central registry; purpose; required reports; immunity from liability. (a) The commission shall establish and maintain a central registry of all Kansas police officers or law enforcement officers. The purpose of the registry is to be a resource for all agencies who appoint or elect police or law enforcement officers to use when reviewing employment applications of such officers. The registry shall be made available only to those agencies who appoint or elect police or law enforcement officers.
(b) The director shall provide forms for registration and shall refuse any registration not submitted on such form in full detail.
(c) Within 30 days of appointment, election or termination, every city, county and state agency, every school district and every community college shall submit the name of any person appointed or elected to or terminated from the position of police officer or law enforcement officer within its jurisdiction.
(d) Upon termination, the agency head shall include a report explaining the circumstances under which the officer resigned or was terminated. Such termination report shall be available to the terminated officer and any law enforcement agency to which the terminated officer later applies for a position as a police officer or law enforcement officer. The terminated officer may submit a written statement in response to the termination and any such statement shall be included in the registry file concerning such officer. The director shall adopt a format for the termination report.
(2) when responding in writing to a written request concerning a current or former officer from a prospective law enforcement agency of that officer for the report made in accordance with subsection (d) and for the disclosure of such report.
History: L. 1982, ch. 322, § 7; L. 1987, ch. 277, § 6; L. 1992, ch. 157, § 1; L. 1995, ch. 180, § 13; L. 2004, ch. 149, § 3; L. 2006, ch. 170, § 16; July 1.


ABA: U.S. Supreme Court Updates. May 27, 2009.
Mr. Montejo was arrested on September 6th, 2002, in connection with the robbery and murder of Mr. Lewis Ferrari. During police questioning of Mr. Montejo, which lasted from late afternoon on the 6th to early morning on the 7th, Mr. Montejo repeatedly changed the account of the crime, ultimately confessing to having shot and killed Mr. Ferrari during a failed burglary. Later, after being read his Miranda rights for a second time, Mr. Montejo agreed to accompany police in retrieving the alleged murder weapon. During this excursion, Mr. Montejo wrote a letter of apology to Mr. Ferrari’s widow. Mr. Montejo did not have access to his court-appointed attorney until his return to jail, who was upset that his client had been interrogated in his absence and subsequently objected to the apology letter’s admission as evidence at trial.
The jury convicted Mr. Montejo, who was sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, relying on Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279 (1992), explanation of the rule in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), reasoning that the prophylactic protection of Jackson is not triggered unless and until the defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. At a hearing where a judge ordered the appointment of counsel, Mr. Montejo did not explicitly request a meeting with his counsel, but rather, remained mute.
The USSC held, in deciding whether courts must presume that a waiver of an accused’s Miranda rights is invalid under certain circumstances, that when a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary. The USSC explains that the rule laid out in Jackson was designed to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their mind about their rights, but a defendant who has never asked for counsel, such as Mr. Montejo, has not yet made up his or her mind.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, J.J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined, except for n. 5. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
After tapping the phone of suspected drug dealer Mohammed Said, FBI agents recorded six calls between Said and petitioner Salman Khade Abuelhawa, during which Abuelhawa arranged to buy cocaine in two separate transactions, each time for a single gram. Under §844 of the Controlled Substances Act, Abuelhawa’s purchases were misdemeanors, and Said’s two sales were felonies. However, the government charged Abuelhawa with six felonies on the theory that each phone call violated §843(b), which makes it a felony “to use any communication facility in… facilitating” felony drug sales.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that using a telephone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase does not “facilitate” felony drug sales in violation of §843(b). Where a transaction like a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be “odd” to speak of one party as facilitating the other’s conduct. The Court relied on holdings in similar cases in which adding to the penalty of the party on one side for facilitating the actions by the other would upend the “legislature’s punishment calibration.” See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119.
Furthermore, since the word “facilitate” is generally synonymous with “aid,” “abet,” or “assist,” it is likely that Congress had an equivalent meaning in mind when it enacted §843(b). Any broader reading would for practical purposes destroy the distinction between the possession of drugs and the distribution of drugs. Finally, the fact that Congress had previously downgraded possession from a felony to a misdemeanor shows that Congress meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than felony distribution, and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a felony. Therefore, Abuelhawa’s actions could not be considered “facilitation” of Said’s felonies.


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We process personal data collected when you visit our website only for the purpose of providing a functioning website and its content and services. Principally we process personal data of our users only after their consent. An exception applies to cases, where it is not possible to obtain consent before, but the processing of the data is permitted by law. The transfer of personal data to third parties only takes place within contractually secured order data processing with our internal companies of the GLEICH group as well as our IT service providers. Principally the GLEICH Aluminium GmbH will be responsible for this data.
Insofar as we obtain the consent of the affected people, that consent is the legal basis for the processing ( Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR).
Art. 6 para 1 lit. b GDPR serves as the legal basis for the processing of personal data that is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party. This also applies to processing operations required to carry out pre-contractual actions.
To the extent that processing of personal data is required to fulfill a legal obligation serves Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c GDPR as legal basis.
In the event that vital interests of the data subject or any other natural person require the processing of personal data serves Art. 6 para. 1 lit. d GDPR as legal basis.
If processing is necessary to preserve the legitimate interests of our company or a third party, the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned do not outweigh the former interest. In this case serves Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR as legal basis for processing.
The personal data of the data subject will be deleted or blocked as soon as the purpose of storage ceases to apply.In addition the personal data will be stored if it is prescribed by the european or national legislator in EU regulations, laws or other regulations to which the controller is subject . If a storage period prescribed by the legal standards expires, the personal data will be blocked or deleted unless there is a need for further storage for a conclusion or a performance of a contract.
Use of our website is generally possible without any specification of personal or business data. The IP address and general access data will be stored without any personal reference. This includes data such as page impressions (number of clicks on our site), date and time of access, type of protocol, status of access, sizes and names of retrieved files, name of your internet service provider and details of the page through which you have reached our website.
Under certain circumstances, we will ask you to give us information about yourself and /or your company, par example for concluding contracts or creating a user account. Personal data may be also required if you wish to receive our newsletter. Depending on the offer, this information may be your e-mail address and /or the name of your company and /or your first and last name, your street, your place of residence, your postcode, your telephone number, information about your job. For payment transactions you have to give us the necessary bank data for the payment processing. We always collect and process such personal information in accordance with the legal requirements and the following explanations.
4.1.1 How do we process and use your personal information ?
Your personal information is stored in a contact database by the GLEICH Aluminium GmbH. Principally GLEICH Aluminum GmbH uses this information only within its own company and only for the purpose for which it is intended, eg. for the execution of contracts or delivery of goods. The data will only be transmitted to the service provider in order to carry out the contract that you have concluded with us. For example, we pass your data on to the shipper responsible for the delivery or for the processing of payments (credit card, direct debit) to the designated banking institution, where you have declared expressively that you consent to it.
In order to protect the security of your data during transmission, we use the current state of the art encryption methods (e.g. SSL) over HTTPS.
Forwarding to third party companies or organizations is not possible without your permission. A possible transmission of the data takes place exclusively in the context of an order processing, i.e. if the responsibility for processing remains with the GLEICH Aluminium GmbH.
In accordance with your explicit consent, we will regularly send you our newsletter or comparable information by e-mail to the e-mail address you provided.
To receive the newsletter, your e-mail address is sufficient. When you register to our newsletter, the information you provide will be used exclusively for this purpose. Subscribers may be informed by e-mail about changes to the offers of the newsletter or its technical circumstances.
For an effective registration we need a valid e-mail address. In order to verify that an registration is actually made by the owner of an e-mail address, we use the “double opt-in” procedure. For this purpose we log the order of the newsletter, the sending of a confirmation mail and the receipt of the requested answer. No further data will be collected. The data will be used exclusively for the newsletter and will not be passed on to third parties.
If you contact us via e-mail or contact form, you grant us the voluntary consent to use your data for the purposes concerned. This requires the information of a valid e-mail address, the name of your company, your first name and surname, your street, your place of residence, your postal code and your telephone number. These are used to assign the request and the subsequent reply to the same. Specifying additional data is optional. The information you provide is stored for the purpose of processing the request and for possible connection questions. After completing the request, personal data will be automatically deleted.
Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR serves as the legal basis for the temporary storage of data and log files.
The object of the website of the GLEICH Aluminium GmbH is the target group specific presentation of the company and its services on the internet with the aim to offer additional opportunities for contact, to win you customers, to manage offers and orders and to inform our customers by newsletter.
4.5 How can you revoke your consent ?
You can revoke your consent for data processing, storage and/or use at any time against the GLEICH Aluminium GmbH with effect for the future.
5. How cookies are used on this website ?
Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR serves as the legal basis for processing of personal data using cookies.
5.4 How can you correct or delete your data ?
You can correct and/or delete your own data at any time free of charge. Further storage takes place only to the extent required and only to fulfil legal retention obligations and to enforce any own claims.
Google will use this information on our behalf to evaluate the use of our online offer by users, to compile reports of the activities within this online offer and to provide us with further services related to the use of this online offer and the internet usage. In this case, pseudonyms of user profiles can be created from the processed data.
We use Google Analytics only with IP anonymization enabled. This means that the IP address of the users is reduced by Google within Member States of the European Union or in other contracting States of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be sent to a Google server in the US and shortened there.
The IP address submitted by the user’s browser will not be merged with other data provided by Google. Users can prevent the storage of cookies by setting their browser software accordingly; users may also prevent the collection of the data generated by the cookie relating to the use of the online offer and the processing of such data by Google by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available under the following link: http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de.
As an alternative to the browser add-on or within browsers on mobile devices, please click this link to prevent Google Analytics from entering this website in the future: Exclude from tracking by Google Analytics. An opt-out cookie is stored on your device. If you delete your cookies, you must click this link again.
URL of the previously visited website, amount of data sent, first name, last name and email address.
Furthermore, Userlike stores the chat record. This shall not only spare you the inconvenience of recalling the whole chat history of past chats when you ask for our assistance via live chat but shall also ensure an continuous quality control regarding our live chat. If you do not want to have your chat record stored please contact us and we will delete it immediately. You may find our contact details at the beginning of this privacy statement.
11. How do you get information about your data stored at GLEICH Aluminium GmbH ?
You have the right to receive information free of charge at any time as to whether and which personal data about you or your company has been stored at GLEICH Aluminum GmbH and for what purpose they are used. If you have any questions, please contact the GLEICH Aluminum GmbH at the address given above or send an email to datenschutz@gleich.de.
to object the processing of your personal data, provided that your personal data are based on legitimate interests in accordance with Article 1 para 1. (f) GDPR are processed and the opposition to direct advertising is addressed or there are reasons for the opposition arising from their particular situation. If you wish to make use of your right of revocation or objection, an e-mail is sufficient to datenschutz@gleich.de.

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Note: Each chapter in this Audit Techniques Guide (ATG) can be printed individually. Please follow the links at the beginning or end of this chapter to return to either the previous chapter or the Table of Contents or to proceed to the next chapter.
In addition to the legal framework presented earlier in Chapter 2, the court cases listed below provide further guidance as to whether a particular asset constitutes § 1245 property or § 1250 property. Although the issue in many of the cases below relates to whether property is eligible for the now-expired investment tax credit (ITC), the precedent that was developed to ascertain whether property constituted eligible property for purposes of ITC is equally applicable to ascertain whether property constitutes as § 1245 property for purposes of ACRS/MACRS.
Unfortunately, there are no bright-line tests for distinguishing § 1245 property from § 1250 property. Each of the cases below is factually intensive. Additionally, opinions by different courts sometimes conflict; therefore, an ultimate determination of the categorization of an asset generally cannot be based upon reading merely one case. In addition to reading all of the cases on point, one must also consider whether the Service has acquiesced to a particular position or case. Advice should be sought where the asset at issue is not specifically discussed in any of the below opinions, if one is not sure of how to categorize a specific asset, or if the opinions are vague or conflicting.
NOTE: Cost Segregation studies are often organized following the Construction Specifications Institute (CSI) MasterFormat Division system. The CSI MasterFormat system is a master list of numbers and titles classified by construction trades (concrete, electrical, plumbing, mechanical, carpentry, masonry, steel, etc.) that was developed to simplify and facilitate communication within the construction industry. The inclusion of the CSI MasterFormat Divisions in these tables is for informational purposes only and is not an endorsement of either the Construction Specifications Institute or the MasterFormat system.
Enumerates three categories of §1245 property: 1) accessory to a business; 2) non-permanence; and 3) is ornamental or decorative.
7/28/2010 PPL Corporation & Subs. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 176 (2010) Street Lights Street light assets did not fall with asset class 49.14 Utility Transmission and Distribution Plant, nor within asset class 00.3 Land Improvements. They fall within the residual asset class to which a 7-year recovery period.
Landmark case setting precedent that criteria developed to ascertain whether property constituted eligible property for purposes of ITC is equally applicable to ascertain whether property constitutes § 1245 property for purposes of ACRS/MACRS. In AOD 1999-008, the IRS acquiesced in part regarding definition of tangible personal property and non-acquiesced in part regarding determination of individual assets in dispute.
This is a Fourth Circuit case that follows the precedent in A.C. Monk and does not represent the predominant view of the issue.
The court determined that any items expressly listed as a building or structural component in the regulations are excluded from being tangible personal property. This approach is precedent only for the Federal Claims Court and has not been followed by other courts.
In AOD 1991-19, the IRS acquiesced to the functional allocation approach based, in part, on the Morrison case.
11/13/1986 Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1986), aff’g 84 T.C. 739 (1985) HVAC units (§1245) In AOD 1988-22, the IRS non-acquiesced to the court not using the sole justification test for HVAC systems.
4/28/1986 Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1986), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1983-469, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986) Electrical distribution system (§1245/§1250) (95%/5%) In AOD 1988-20, the IRS non-acquiesced to the use of the functional allocation approach for electrical systems. In AOD 1991-19, the IRS acquiesced to the functional allocation approach.
8/6/1984 Shoney’s South, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-413 Chandeliers and lanterns (§1245) In AOD 1986-48 the IRS non-acquiesced that certain lighting was decorative and thus eligible for the ITC.
Court used adaptability test for electrical systems (not functional allocation method). Opinion should be followed only in cases appealable to the Fourth Circuit.
Landmark case setting forth functional allocation method for allocating components of an electrical distribution system into §§ 1245/1250 property.
2/13/1978 Westroads, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 682 (1978) Elec. generating equip. (§1245) In AOD 1979-173, the IRS acquiesced to the result.
12/31/1975 Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975) Outdoor signs (billboards) (§1245) Landmark case putting forth factors for determining whether property is inherently permanent. In AOD 1977-142, the Service acquiesced to the criteria set forth for determining whether property is inherently permanent.
12/3/1973 Everhart v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 328 (1973) Sewage disposal system (§1250) Property is structural component even though not directly attached to the building.
In AOD 1972 WL 33204, the IRS recommended appeal of the Tax Court case. In AOD 1975-580, the IRS acquiesced to the Circuit Court case.
Partitions: movable sys. (§1245) Determination of structural component based on permanency test, not functional use test.
Landmark case that held that a building could be allocated into portions for purposes of the ITC. In AOD 1968 WL 16712, the IRS acquiesced in result only (not to the court’s rationale). In AOD 1972 WL 33051, the IRS acquiesced to the rationale of the court.
Div. 06 – Wood, Plastics, & Comp.
Div. 07 – Thermal & Moisture Prot.
261000 16400 Primary & secondary elec. dist. sys.
261000 16400 Secondary electric distribution sys.


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Dr. Mohan’s Diabetes Specialities Centre & Madras Diabetes Research Foundation, Chennai.
Mohan V, Shanthirani CS, Deepa M, Deepa R, Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Datta M. Mortality rates due to diabetes in a selected urban south Indian population--the Chennai Urban Population Study [CUPS--16]. J Assoc Physicians India. 2006;54:113 – 117.
Mohan V. Gokulakrishnan K. Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Deepa R. Epidemiology of hypertension in India: Lessons from the Chennai Urban Population Study (CUPS). In: Type 2 Diabetes in South Asians : Epidemiology, Risk Factors and Prevention. Mohan V, Gundu HR Rao (Eds), Under the Aegis of SASAT. Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers. 2006;317-330.
Mohan V, Gokulakrishnan K. Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Deepa R. Epidemiology of hypertension in India: Lessons from the Chennai Urban Population Study (CUPS). In: Type 2 Diabetes in South Asians : Epidemiology, Risk Factors and Prevention. Mohan V, Gundu HR Rao (Eds), Under the Aegis of SASAT. Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers. 2006; 317-330.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus : Beyond Glycaemic Control. The National Medical Journal of India. 2007;20:304-306.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Diabetic Nephropathy and its Prevention in India. Journal of International Medical Sciences Academy. 2007;20:301-305.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V.. Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus : Beyond Glycaemic Control. National Medical Journal of India. 2007;20:304-306.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Rema M, Pradeep R, Deepa M, Shanthirani, CS, Deepa R, Mohan V. Prevalence and risk factor of diabetic nephropathy in an urban south Indian population; The Chennai Urban Rural Epidemiology study (CURES-45). Diabetes Care. 2007;30:2019-2024.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Das R, Jaydip R, Sudhakaran C, Mohan V. Unexpected and Abnormally Low HDL Cholesterol Levels on Combination Hypolipidemic Therapy. J Assoc Physicians India. 2009; 57; 180 – 81.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Diabetes Mellitus. In: Diabetic Retinopathy for the Clinician, Chandran Abraham & Annie Mathai (Eds), Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers. 2009; p.1 -14.
Kavitha Rao CVN, Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Reducing cardiometabolic risk in impaired glucose tolerance. In : Cardiometabolic Risk in India, Prasanna Kumar KM (Ed), ECAB Clinical Update : Diabetology, Elsevier, a division of Reed Elsevier India Private Limited, Haryana. 2009; pp 46 – 73.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Protocols of SMBG in various insulin regimens - A practical guide for titration and control. In : Postgraduate Medicine Update (Frontiers in Medicine). Das AK (Ed), The Association of Physicans of India, 2009;XXIII:pp. 39 – 41.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Sitagliptin in therapy for type 2 diabetes. . In : Medicine Update. Agarwal AK, Jain DG & Yadav P (Eds), The Association of Physicians of India, Part I: 2009; pp. 399 – 402.
Chandramohan P, Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Mohan V. Antibiotics in diabetic foot infection. In : ECAB Clinical Update: Diabetology. Bal A (Ed), Elsevier, a division of Reed Elsevier India Private Limited, Noida. 2008; Vol. 1, Issue; pp 100 – 124.
Chidambaram S, Anjana RM, Kavitha Rao CVN, Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Suresh T, Mohan V. Role of CSII in patients with Recalcitrant Diabetes in South India. Diabetes Science & Technology, 2009 (in press).
Participated in the Third MDRF-UAB (University of Alabama, Birmingham) “National Seminar on Epidemiology of Non-Communicable diseases (NCDs)” supported by National Institutes of Health, USA held between March 11 -13, 2005 at Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India.
Indo-Swedish Symposium on “Genomics and Proteomics of Diabetes” held between April 1 – 2, 2006 at Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India.
Project Presentation on “Prevalence Of Diabetic Nephropathy And Microalbuminuria In Urban Indians –The Chennai Urban Rural Epidemiology Study [CURES]” at MDRF – UAB one day intensive interactive training programme on clinical research methods held on March 10, 2005 at Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India.
Ranjit Unnikrishnan I, Rema M, Pradeepa R, Deepa M, Shanthirani CS, Deepa R, Mohan V. Prevalence Of Diabetic Nephropathy And Microalbuminuria In Urban Indians –The Chennai Urban Rural Epidemiology Study [CURES]. Poster presentation at American Diabetes Association 65th Scientific Sessions held between June 10 – 14, 2005 at San Diego, California, USA.

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Sometimes a traffic crash involving a fatality is just a tragic accident. Traffic homicide detectives in Utah investigate these cases to determine whether any criminal charges for automobile homicide should occur. If you were involved in the crash, then you need an advocate for your during the investigation.
After a traffic homicide investigation begins, contact an experienced criminal defense attorney at Brown, Bradshaw & Moffat, LLP in Salt Lake City, UT, to find out what you need to do right now to protect yourself against these serious charges.
had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation (often called the "per se" driving under the influence [DUI]).
If more than one person suffered bodily injury, serious bodily injury or death as a result of the crash, a separate charge could be brought for each victim even when the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
Under § 76-5-207(4), the standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.
Additionally, the calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(1).
Both the Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury Statute apply to individuals under the influence of “any drug.” See Utah Code Ann. § 41–6a–502(1)(b); id. § 76–5–207(2)(a)(ii).
Both statutes include controlled substances within the definition of “drug.” For instance, § 41–6a–501(1)(c)(i) defines “drug” for purposes of the DUI With Serious Injury Statute to include controlled substances.
In § 76–5–207(1)(a)(i), the term “drug” is defined for purposes of the Automobile Homicide Statute to include controlled substances. Under § 58–37–2(1)(f), the term “controlled substance” is defined to include substances listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Utah Controlled Substances Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act).
Neither the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI with Serious Bodily Injury statute distinguishes between drugs used in accordance with a valid prescription and drugs used illegally. Thus, by their plain language, these statutes apply to the use of both prescription and nonprescription controlled substances.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–207(2)(b), (3), the crime of automobile homicide is charged as a third-degree felony. Alternatively, the crime of automobile homicide may be charged as a second-degree felony if the defendant was criminally negligent or had a previous DUI-related conviction.
Additionally, when action is taken against a driving privilege for the alcohol-related offense of automobile homicide, a lifetime alcohol-restricted status will result after a conviction.
Statutes or ordinances previously in effect in this state or in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815.
expungement under Title 77, Chapter 40, Utah Expungement Act.
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the time of operation.
With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken into the human body, can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a motor vehicle.
The statute also provides several definitions. The term “motor vehicle" is defined as “any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
Homicide Automobile Statute in Utah - Visit the website of the Utah State Legislature to learn more about Utah’s criminal code for offenses against the person involving homicide including automobile homicide.
Under the Automobile Homicide Statute, a person who, while “under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle,” “operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another” commits a third-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–207(2)(a). Penalties for a second-degree felony can be imposed if the defendant had a prior DUI-related conviction or if the defendant acted with criminal negligence.
Under § 76-5-207(6), the fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense.
If you were charged with Automobile Homicide Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–207 as either a third-degree felony or a second-degree felony, then contact an experienced attorney for traffic crimes in Salt Lake City and the surrounding areas in Utah. Our attorneys represent clients on a variety of DUI-related offenses and other serious driving offenses in Utah.
Call us at (801) 532-5297 for a free consultation to discuss the facts of your case.


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We thank you for your interest in our website and are happy about your visit.
The protection and security of your data are also crucial to us, which is why we would like to hereby explain to you in detail the way in which we handle your information. This will inform you which data is collected by us during your visit to our online presence (e.g. as part of purchasing processes via our webshop) and what use is made of this data in detail.
We employ various techniques on our website to improve user friendliness, effectiveness and security. In this regard we, or authorised third parties, may retrieve information.
Personal data within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR are all data that are personally identifiable to you, e.g. name, address, e-mail addresses, details of your use of the internet.
With regard to the processing of personal data, a distinction must be made as to whether the data is only collected during a mere visit to our online presence, whether you contact us or subscribe to the newsletter or whether you carry out business transactions - in particular the purchase of products or services offered by us in general.
When you contact us by e-mail or via a contact form, the data you have provided will be transmitted to us and stored by us in order to answer your questions.
We process the data arising in this context for the purpose of communication with you and delete them after storage is no longer necessary, or restrict processing if statutory retention obligations exist.
If you contact us the legal basis is first of all Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR.
The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 lit. f GDPR. The corresponding legitimate interest follows from the purposes for data collection listed above. Under no circumstances do we use the data collected for the purpose of drawing conclusions about you personally from them. We do not create user profiles of our website visitors.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer necessary to achieve the purpose for which they were collected. With regard to the collection of data for the provision of the website this is done when the session is over.
These are small files that your browser automatically creates and that are stored on your device (laptop, tablet, smartphone, etc.) when you visit our website.
Cookies do no damage to your end device, do not contain viruses, Trojans or other malware.
Information is stored in the cookie that is connected to the specific device used. However, this does not mean that we immediately become aware of your identity.
The data processed by cookies is required for the above-mentioned purposes in order to ensure our legitimate interests in accordance with Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 f GDPR.
All personal data will be deleted or blocked as soon as the storage is no longer necessary.
are transferred to a Google server in the USA and stored there. The information is used to evaluate the use of the website, to compile reports on the website activities and to provide further services associated with the use of the website and the Internet for the purposes of market research and demand-oriented design of these Internet pages. This information may also be transferred to third parties if this is required by law or if third parties process this data on behalf of the company.
Under no circumstances your IP address will be combined with other Google data. The IP addresses are anonymized so that an attribution is not possible (IP masking).
As an alternative to the browser add-on, especially for browsers on mobile devices, you can also prevent Google Analytics from collecting data by clicking on https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout. An opt-out cookie is set to prevent future collection of your data when you visit this website. The opt-out cookie is only valid in this browser and only for our website and is stored on your device. If you delete the cookies in this browser, you must set the opt-out cookie again.
However, if you do not wish to use Google's remarketing feature, you can always deactivate it by making the appropriate settings at https://www.google.com/settings/ads.
We are of course interested in informing you regularly about our latest offers and products. Among other things, we use electronic newsletters for this purpose. If you would like to receive a newsletter from us and sign up for it, we need your e-mail address and your consent to receive a newsletter. If you wish, you can also submit your salutation, first name and surname via the registration form so that we can contact you personally. After registration you will also receive an e-mail with a confirmation link, which you must click on. This identifies you as the owner of the e-mail address (so-called double opt-in procedure). If this confirmation does not take place without significant delay, the registration process is aborted and the previously entered data will be deleted from our servers.
You can either request the newsletter directly under the reference "Newsletter" or, in the case of ordering processes, also within the scope of the declaration of consent or, in the latter case, explicitly refuse to receive it.
The legal basis for processing your e-mail address is your consent (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR).
In any case, related data will only be collected in order to be able to send you the newsletter. The e-mail address in particular will not be passed on to third parties. You can revoke your consent to the processing of your e-mail address for the purpose of receiving the newsletter at any time. An e-mail to datenschutz@pco-group.com or using the unsubscribe link at the end of each newsletter makes this possible without any problems.
With revocation of the consent the data stored until then are immediately deleted. This means that the data is only stored for as long as the subscription to the newsletter continues.
For our commercial customers we offer a webshop. If you would like to place an order, you need to register first.
During the registration process, during which you receive personal and password-protected access, we store your data for the purpose of subsequent performance of the contract. When you create an account under "My account", the data you have provided will be stored revocably. You can have your customer account deleted at any time by sending an e-mail to info@pco-group.com, although we must comply with any statutory storage obligations.
You must enter the above data in order to create an account. All other information can be provided voluntarily by using your customer account. You can always view and manage the total data you have stored in this respect via your customer account.
The legal basis for this results from Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a, b and f GDPR.
When using the customer account to order our products in the webshop, we use the data provided by you to process your order. The data collected is forwarded to external third parties as your address data is forwarded to a commissioned shipping company to carry out the dispatch of the ordered goods and, if necessary, your payment data is transmitted to our house bank.
The legal basis for the conclusion and execution of the contract with regard to data protection law is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b and c GDPR. The data is stored for the duration of the contract and for the period of statutory storage obligations.
Your processed personal data will otherwise neither be published nor passed on to third parties without authorization, in particular without your consent.
However, contract processors (cf. Art. 28 GDPR) support us in the provision of our services as IT service providers and in the context of hosting services. They have their registered offices in the European Union. Our contractors may have access to your data in the course of their work. We have concluded written contracts with our processors.
In all other respects we refer to the above explanations (if necessary passing on to house bank and suppliers).
e.g. by email to datenschutz@pco-group.com.
According to Art. 21 para. 1 GDPR, you have the right to object at any time to the processing of personal data concerning you, which is based on Art. 6 para. 1 e GDPR (data processing in the public interest) or Article 6 para. 1 f GDPR (data processing to protect a legitimate interest), for reasons arising from your particular situation; this also applies to profiling based on this regulation. In the event of your objection, we will no longer process your personal data unless we can prove compelling grounds for processing that outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or the processing serves to assert, exercise or defend legal claims.

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Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
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Art. 28
Art. 21
Art. 6


We operate exclusively in accordance with the latest version of the Allgemeinen Deutschen Spediteurbedingungen – ADSp – (German Freight Forwarders’ General Terms and Conditions). These limit in clause 23 ADSp the legal liability for damage to goods in case of damage to goods whilst in the care of a forwarder to € 5/kg, in accordance with Art. 431 of the German Commercial Code (HGB); in case of multimodal transports including sea transport to 2 SDR/kg. In addition the liability is limited to € 1 Million per damage respectively to € 2 Million per event or 2 SDR/kg whichever is the greater. The parties agree subsidiary, that (1) clause 27 ADSp does neither extend the liability nor the responsibility of the forwarder for agents, servants, employees or crewmembers beyond legal regulations as Art. 507 HGB, Art. 25 MC, Art. 36 CIM, Art. 20, 21 CMNI for the benefit of the principal, (2) the freight forwarder as a sea carrier is only liable for fault of his own part in case of risks provided in Art. 512 paragraph 2 no. 1 HGB such as default in navigation of the ship or fire on board and the freight forwarder as a carrier defined in CMNI is relieved of liability in compliance with the requirements provided in Art. 25 paragraph 2 CMNI such as default in navigation of the ship, fire on board or defects of vessel.
In keeping with the motto “YOU KNOW HOW TO DO - WE KNOW HOW TO SHIP” we see ourselves as a trusted partner when it comes to delivering effective transport solutions tailored to your specific requirements.


37 C.F.R. 1.132 Affidavits or declarations traversing rejections or objections.
When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section.
It is the responsibility of the primary examiner to personally review and decide whether affidavits or declarations submitted under 37 CFR 1.132 for the purpose of traversing grounds of rejection are responsive to the rejection and present sufficient facts to overcome the rejection.
This rule sets forth the general policy of the Office consistently followed for a long period of time of receiving affidavit evidence traversing rejections or objections. All affidavits or declarations presented which do not fall within or under other specific rules are to be treated or considered as falling under this rule.
Form paragraph 7.65 or 7.66 and any of form paragraphs 7.66.01 through 7.66.05, as appropriate, should be used to comment on a 37 CFR 1.132 affidavit or declaration.
The  under 37 CFR 1.132 filed  is sufficient to overcome the rejection of claim  based upon .
3. In bracket 3, insert the affected claim or claims.
4. In bracket 4, indicate the rejection that has been overcome, including the statutory grounds, e.g.: insufficiency of disclosure under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph; lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. 101; inoperativeness under 35 U.S.C. 101; a specific reference applied under 35 U.S.C. 103; etc. See MPEP § 716.
3. In bracket 3, insert the claim or claims affected.
4. In bracket 4, indicate the rejection that has not been overcome, including the statutory grounds, i.e.: insufficiency of disclosure under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph; lack of utility and/or inoperativeness under 35 U.S.C. 101; a specific reference applied under 35 U.S.C. 103; etc. See MPEP § 716.
5. Following this form paragraph, set forth the reasons for the insufficiency; e.g., categories include: --untimely--; --fails to set forth facts--; --facts presented are not germane to the rejection at issue--;--showing is not commensurate in scope with the claims--; etc. See MPEP § 716. Also include a detailed explanation of the reasons why the affidavit or declaration is insufficient. Any of form paragraphs 7.66.01 - 7.66.05 may be used, as appropriate.
It includes statements which amount to an affirmation that the affiant has never seen the claimed subject matter before. This is not relevant to the issue of nonobviousness of the claimed subject matter and provides no objective evidence thereof. See MPEP § 716.
1. This form paragraph must be preceded by form paragraph 7.66.
2. A full explanation must be provided, if appropriate.
It includes statements which amount to an affirmation that the claimed subject matter functions as it was intended to function. This is not relevant to the issue of nonobviousness of the claimed subject matter and provides no objective evidence thereof. See MPEP § 716.
It refers only to the system described in the above referenced application and not to the individual claims of the application. As such the declaration does not show that the objective evidence of nonobviousness is commensurate in scope with the claims. See MPEP § 716.
It states that the claimed subject matter solved a problem that was long standing in the art. However, there is no showing that others of ordinary skill in the art were working on the problem and if so, for how long. In addition, there is no evidence that if persons skilled in the art who were presumably working on the problem knew of the teachings of the above cited references, they would still be unable to solve the problem. See MPEP § 716.04.
In view of the foregoing, when all of the evidence is considered, the totality of the rebuttal evidence of nonobviousness fails to outweigh the evidence of obviousness.
This form paragraph should be presented as a conclusion to your explanation of why the affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132 is insufficient, and it must be preceded by form paragraph 7.66.


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Moulin Rouge S.A. and Bal du Moulin Rouge S.A. v. Owgab Ltd.
The Complainant is Moulin Rouge S.A. and Bal du Moulin Rouge S.A., both located in Paris, France. The Complainant is represented by Deborah A. Nilson of Rozan & Nilson, LLP, New York, New York, United States of America.
The Respondent is Owgab Ltd., a company located at Milburne House, St. John�s, Antigua.
The disputed domain name is <moulinrouge.com>.
The registrar for the disputed domain name is Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI).
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center ("the Center") on September 16, 2003. Afterwards, on September 17, 2003, the Center transmitted by email to NSI a request for registrar verification of the disputed domain name. On September 22, 2003, NSI transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the administrative, billing and technical contact. NSI also stated that the registration agreement was in English: per paragraph 11(a) of the Rules, English thus also becomes the language of this proceeding.
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Complaint to the Respondent and this proceeding began on September 23, 2003. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was set at October 13, 2003. The Respondent did not file a response with the Center by this deadline, and, on October 14, 2003, the Center notified the Respondent of its default.
In view of the Respondent�s default, under paragraph 5(e) of the Rules, the Panel will conduct this proceeding based on the Complaint alone.
The Center appointed Messrs. Peter D. Siemsen, Francois Dessemontet, and Dennis A. Foster as panelists in this matter on October 31, 2003. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Panel finds that the Center has adhered to the Policy and the Rules in administering this proceeding.
The Complainant is a famous cabaret establishment in Paris, France that has been operating for more than 100 years. The Complainant owns numerous trademark registrations for its MOULIN ROUGE trademark. The Respondent registered the disputed domain name, <moulinrouge.com>, on May 15, 1998. There was some sporadic email contact between the parties before this proceeding.
The Respondent uses the domain name <moulinrouge.com>, which is identical to the Complainant�s Moulin Rouge trademark and to its identity as a famous cabaret.
The Complainant Moulin Rouge S.A. is the owner of the world-famous French trademark MOULIN ROUGE, which has been in use continuously in France in connection with its famous cabaret since 1889. The MOULIN ROUGE cabaret was immortalized by the painter Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec. Also, many international stars have performed on stage at the Moulin Rouge: Ella Fitzgerald, Liza Minelli, Frank Sinatra, Elton John. They have followed in the footsteps of French celebrities such as Maurice Chevalier, Jean Gabin, Edith Piaf and Yves Montand.
Millions of spectators have seen the Moulin Rouge show. The Moulin Rouge cabaret continues to be a very popular Parisian attraction known worldwide. (A recent program of the Moulin Rouge is attached as Complaint Annex 4).
In addition to use of the trademark in connection with cabaret and theatrical services, the Complainant uses its Moulin Rouge trademark on an extensive line of products sold at the boutique at the Moulin Rouge cabaret, including clothing, posters, compact discs, books, plates, porcelain cups and saucers, jewelry and many other articles.
The Complainant has many trademark registrations for MOULIN ROUGE in a number of countries, including France, Canada and the United States of America.
The Respondent has admitted that it knew the Moulin Rouge name was a "historical and geographical reference" when it registered the disputed domain name (Complaint Annex 2). The Respondent was undoubtedly familiar with the famous Moulin Rouge cabaret when it selected the disputed domain name, <moulinrouge.com>, as the cabaret has been famous for more than 100 years---long before the existence of the Internet and the Respondent�s domain name.
Even if the Respondent now claims that it did not know of the famous Moulin Rouge cabaret at the time it registered the disputed domain name, the Respondent should have known of this trademark, given its international fame.
As held in Expedia v. European Travel Network, WIPO Case No. D2000-0137, April 18, 2000 "in the absence of contrary evidence, the Panel finds that the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant�s trademark and services at the time it registered the domain name <xpediatravel.com>, given the widespread use of the Complainant�s Expedia website."
It is important to note that the Complainant first notified the Respondent of this issue in 1999. Complainants� counsel sent a cease and desist letter (certified mail, return receipt) to the Respondent in November, 1999 which went unanswered (Complaint Annex 16).
Since 1999, the Respondent has continued to renew its registration for the <moulinrouge.com> domain name, knowing full well that it was violating the Complainant�s rights to this name.
The Complainant�s counsel recently contacted the Respondent by e-mail asserting the Complainant�s rights to the disputed domain name and demanding that the Respondent transfer the name to the Complainant. Through its attorney, the Respondent initially proposed that it would sell the disputed domain name to the Complainant for a price of U.S.$2,500. However, then the Respondent later changed counsel and decided not to sell the domain name to the Complainants.
The Respondent is not a licensee of the Complainant and indeed has no association whatsoever with Complainant.
The Respondent is not making any legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name.
We have no evidence of Respondent�s use of the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
The Respondent is using the disputed domain name simply to attract viewers to its casino web site by using the Complainants� world famous mark.
The Respondent simply wishes to use a famous trademark associated with a famous cabaret to attract potential gamblers to its web site. The Respondent has been on notice for several years that its use of the domain name is in contravention of the rights of the Complainant, yet the Respondent continues to renew its domain name registration in continuing bad faith.
With a famous mark such as MOULIN ROUGE, the very use of the mark in the form of a domain name by a third party suggests "bad faith." (Parfums Christian Dior v. Javier Garcia Quintas and Christiandior.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-0226, May 17, 2000; and Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondee en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163, May 1, 2000).
The Respondent may attempt to assert that the Complainants� claims are precluded by laches, since the Respondent first registered the disputed domain name in 1999, or because the Complainant first contacted the Respondent at the end of 1999.
Given that the remedy requested in this proceeding is simply the transfer of the domain name back to its rightful owner, and that the Complainant is not seeking money damages, it does not seem inequitable that the defense of laches would not apply, which perhaps was the thought of the drafters of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.
The disputed domain name should be transferred to the Complainant Moulin Rouge S.A.
The Respondent is in default in this proceeding and thus did not submit any contentions.
The Complainant has exhibited a number of its MOULIN ROUGE trade and service mark registrations in various countries including France, no. 1,311,105 in international class 42 (Annex 9) with a priority date of May 3, 1983, for education and entertainment services; the European Union trademark registration no. 110,437 dated November 5, 1998, in international classes 3, 14, 18, 25, 32, 33, and 41 in countries including France, Germany, the Benelux, Spain and Great Britain (Complaint Annex 12); in the United States, federal service mark registration no. 2,667,568 dated December 31, 2002, in international class 41 for entertainment services.
The Panel finds the disputed domain name, <moulinrouge.com>, is identical to the Complainant�s MOULIN ROUGE registered trade and service marks. The Panel notes that lack of a space between the two words "Moulin" and "rouge"--for technical reasons no space is permissible in domain names-- and the addition of the gTLD ".com" do not affect this finding of identity. It has long since been established that these minor changes in the context of Internet domain names do not affect identity or confusing similarity (see, e.g. Guinness UDV North America, Inc. v. UKJENT, WIPO Case No. D2001-0684, August 9, 2001 where the Panel found the gTLD,".com" was "incapable of distinguishing" between a trademark and a domain name).
The Panel finds the Complainant has shown the disputed domain name is identical to the trademark MOULIN ROUGE in which the Complainant has rights.
The Complainant contends it has not licensed the Respondent to use its MOULIN ROUGE trademark and, indeed, has no business relationship whatever with the Respondent.
At paragraphs 4(c)(i-iii), the Policy allows the Respondent to come forward and show that it does have rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. However, as the Respondent has defaulted in this proceeding, the Panel has nothing from the Respondent to go on. In addition, based on the record before us, the Panel does not see any legitimate rights and interests on behalf of the Respondent. Certainly, using the Complainant�s strong trademark to run an Internet gambling casino is not a right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name.
The Panel finds the Complainant has shown that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
The Complainant alleges one principal ground for bad faith with which the Panel is in complete agreement. This is paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy which states: "by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant�s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location."
The Respondent operates an on-line gambling site or casino at the disputed domain name web site. It takes little imagination to see why the Respondent thought that the Complainant�s famous trademark MOULIN ROUGE would bring the type of Internet public the Respondent seeks as potential clients, i.e., cabaret aficionados are people who might like to gamble. The Respondent registered the disputed domain name to exploit this synergy.
Secondarily, the Panel also agrees with the Complainant that its trademark, MOULIN ROUGE, is in that select class of strong, famous trademarks such that registration under the facts of this Case amounts to "opportunistic bad faith." This is not one of the bad faith grounds enumerated in the Policy at paragraphs 4(b)(i-iv), but those grounds are non-exhaustive. Paragraph 15 of the Rules gives the Panel the authority to find additional grounds of bad faith where appropriate. The Panel finds it is appropriate in this Case. (see Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondee en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163, May 1, 2000, involving the famous French champagne trademark VEUVE CLICQUOT; and also Parfums Christian Dior v. Javier Garcia Quintas and Christiandior.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-0226, May 17, 2000, where the Panel found the Respondent "knew or should have known" of the Complainant�s famous trademark given the "widespread use and fame of the Complainant�s CHRISTIAN DIOR trademark").
The Panel finds the Complainant has registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name, <moulinrouge.com>, be transferred to the Complainant, Moulin Rouge S.A.

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Upon review of (1) Defendant-Appellant Teri W. Pedro's (Appellant Pedro) August 19, 2017 motion to dismiss her own appeal in appellate court case number CAAP-17-0000522 for lack of appellate jurisdiction, (2) the lack of any response by Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai‘i to Appellant Pedro's August 19, 2017 motion to dismiss, (3) Appellant Pedro's attorney, Deputy Public Defender James A. Tabe's declaration stating his unsuccessful effort to contact Appellant Pedro by telephone or letter explaining why he was unable to obtain an affidavit or declaration that reflects a knowing and intelligent understanding of the consequences of the dismissal of the appeal and that the withdrawal is made voluntarily, pursuant to Rule 42(c) of the Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP), and (4) the record, it appears that we lack appellate jurisdiction over Appellant Pedro's appeal from the Honorable Margaret K. Masunaga's May 25, 2017 interlocutory order in district court Criminal No. 3DTA-17-00495 acknowledging Appellant Pedro's plea of not guilty to the charge of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of HRS § 291E-61 (Supp. 2016) and scheduling a pretrial conference for June 19, 2017, because the district court has not yet entered a final judgment.
“The right to an appeal is strictly statutory.” State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai‘i 446, 449, 923 P.2d 388, 391 (1996) (citation omitted). The Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals has jurisdiction “[t]o hear and determine appeals from any court or agency when appeals are allowed by law[.]” Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-57(1) (2016). HRS § 641-12 (2016) provides that “[a]ppeals upon the record shall be allowed from all final decisions and final judgments of district courts in all criminal matters.” Appellant Pedro is not appealing from a final decision or judgment of the district court because the district court has not yet held a trial, much less entered any final decision or judgment. Absent an appealable final decision or judgment in a district court criminal case, we lack appellate jurisdiction under HRS § 641-12.
“An appellate court has ․ an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction over each case and to dismiss the appeal sua sponte if a jurisdictional defect exists.” State v. Graybeard, 93 Hawai‘i 513, 516, 6 P.3d 385, 388 (App. 2000) (citation omitted). “A jurisdictional defect in an appeal cannot be waived by the parties or disregarded by us. We must dismiss an appeal on our own motion if we lack jurisdiction.” State v. Johnston, 63 Haw. 9, 10, 619 P.2d 1076, 1077 (1980) (citations omitted). Therefore, in the absence of appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss Appellant Pedro's appeal from the May 25, 2017 interlocutory order for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant Pedro's August 19, 2017 motion to dismiss appellate court case number CAAP-17-0000522 for lack of appellate jurisdiction is granted.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that all pending motions in appellate court case number CAAP-17-0000522 are dismissed as moot.


When Does An Employer Have To Pay Your Cell Phone Bill?
Do you use your personal cell phone to take work-related calls or send work-related emails? Do you sometimes work remotely using your personal computer and/or internet access from your home? If your employer knows that you have incurred these costs then California law likely requires that you be reimbursed for them.
Section 2802 of the California Labor Code requires an employer to indemnify its employees for “all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by that employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” The purpose of the statute is “to prevent employers from passing their operating expenses onto their employees.” Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal.4th 554, 562 (2007).
Previous litigation applied Section 2802 to require that employers provide reimbursements for the cost of uniforms, travel expenses and legal fees for employees who were sued as a result of their employment. But it is now clear that 2802 applies to a much broader universe of items.
In August, a court wrote that the employer’s duty under 2802 extends to any employee-paid expenses that “were a foreseeable and clearly anticipated cost of doing business.” Aguilar v. Zep, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-00563 WHO (N.D. Cal. August 27, 2014). Another court stated that all an employee is required to do to establish liability is to demonstrate “expenses, in any amount and to any degree, are reasonable and necessary to conducting [the employer’s] business.” Lindell v. Synthes USA, Case No. 11-cv-02053-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. March 4, 2014). Indeed, the leading recent case on 2802 confirmed that an employee must be reimbursed even if the costs at issue were fixed and the employee would have incurred them irrespective of the needs of her employer. Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Divisions Two, Case No. B247160 (August 12, 2014).
To see the importance of the ruling in Cochran, consider an employee who purchases a smart phone or a computer or pays monthly fees for a minute plan, a data plan, or home internet access. Under Cochran, an employer cannot defend a 2802 action related to use of a cell phone on the basis that the employee would have bought a cell phone even if she was not required to use it for work. Instead the employer must pay some reasonable percentage of the employee’s bill even if the fact that she used it for work did not cause any marginal increase in the amount of the bill.
So any 2802 claim will now be analyzed under the following simple framework. First, were the claimed expenses reasonable and necessary to conducting the employer’s business? If they were, then “liability attaches” and “it does not matter if the telephone was used for [the employer’s] business 99% or 1% of the time.” Some reimbursement is required and the issue is just how much of the cost the employer should bear.
Use a computer to edit a document or similar material.
To satisfy these expectations, an employee needs to own a smart phone and pay for monthly minute and data plans. The employee also must own a computer and pay for internet access so she can manipulate word documents, excel files and so forth. The cases cited above make clear that the employee must be reimbursed for some percentage of the costs she incurred to provide her own internet access, computer, smart phone, etc. To hold otherwise would allow the employer to pass its operating costs onto the employee. The amount of the reimbursement will vary and requires a fact finder to allocate some percentage of the cost to the employer’s business and some percentage to the employee’s personal use.
A 2802 action is based on an employer’s statutory violation and therefore a three-year statute of limitations applies. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a). But the employee may enlarge this period to four years by seeking restitution under California’s unfair competition law—namely return of the operating expenses the employer passed on by failing to provide reimbursement. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518, 528-30 (2000).
Thus, employees are entitled to recover reimbursement for four prior years of expenses. They are also entitled to interest at the legal rate of 10% and attorneys’ fees and costs. Labor Code § 2802(b)-(c). Thus, an employee who was regularly required to work remotely on short notice, take calls from a cell phone and respond to emails using a personal smart phone could recover a significant amount of money in a 2802 action seeking reimbursement for a data plan, a minute plan and home internet access. For example, a fact-finder could conclude that the employer were required to bear half of these costs, which were $200/month, the employee could recover $4,800 over a four-year period and, with interest, that amount could increase by 50% by the time of a judgment.
Furthermore, employees may recover significant additional sums under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) which provides for cumulative civil penalties each time an employer violates a section of the Labor Code. Unless another amount is stated, the civil penalty for each violation of the Labor Code is $200 per pay period. Labor Code § 2699(f)(2). The statute of limitations for a PAGA claim is one year and attorneys’ fees are recoverable. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a). 25% of the PAGA penalty is paid to the employee and 75% to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency. Thus, PAGA could increase an employee’s recover by $1,300 (25% of 5,200).
The employer discharged its 2802 obligations by paying increased salary or incentive compensation.
The first defense will almost never be a complete one. Rather, an argument against the “reasonableness” of expenses will generally seek to decrease the denominator of the equation not eliminate it altogether. For example, an employer might argue that spending $1,000 on a cell phone was not reasonable. But the remedy will not be to deny reimbursement, just to decrease the amount to, say, $250.
The second defense is stronger. An employer might assert it did not expect or require employees to work remotely or respond to emails or calls while they were outside the office. This will generally present a factual question and is the sort of argument an employer will attempt to offer to defeat class certification. An employer might also assert that it expected employees to return to the office to perform all of their work and, therefore, home office and other remote-work expenses were not “necessary” but rather for the employee’s convenience. In most instances, this argument will fail since it could effectively require the employee to live in their office. This claim is not credible since it is unlikely to appear in any written policy, given that few employees would agree to employment on those terms.
The third defense can, in some instances, be a complete one but it is also laden with risk. In Gattuso, the California Supreme Court held that an employer can satisfy its 2802 obligation by providing enhanced compensation to employees. But, “the employer must provide some method or formula to identify the amount of the combined employee compensation payment that is intended to provide expense reimbursement.” Id. at 482. Thus, if the employer has not communicated this method to employees ahead of time and stated it is intended to satisfy the 2802 obligation, the employer has little chance of proving the defense.
In addition, making the argument that enhanced pay was provided exposes the employer to additional damages of $100 per pay period under Labor Code § 226. Id. at 483. Damages under section 226 are set at $100 per pay period, up to a maximum of $4,000. If the employer violates section 226, then the employee may assert a separate claim under PAGA as well. Accordingly, asserting “enhanced compensation” as a defense could backfire and result in increased liability and, therefore, many employers will hesitate to pursue it.
If you have not been reimbursed for expenses your employer required you to incur, please contact Sebastian Miller Law.