Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 451 › H. A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Assn.
Respondent union, which represents most of the stage actors and actresses in the United States, has entered into collective bargaining agreements with virtually all major theatrical producers throughout the country, fixing minimum (scale) wages and other conditions of employment for those represented by the union. Because of abuses by theatrical agents who, as independent contractors, negotiated employment contracts for actors and actresses with producers, particularly abuses as to the extraction of high commissions tending to undermine collectively bargained rates of compensation, the union, in 1928, unilaterally established a licensing system for the regulation of agents, prohibiting union members from using an agent who has not obtained a license from the union. The essential elements of the licensing system have remained unchanged. To obtain a license, an agent must agree to comply with union regulations which, inter alia, prohibit agent commissions on scale portions of wages received by an actor or an actress from a producer, limit commissions on wages in excess of scale pay, and require payment to the union of franchise fees. Petitioners, agents who refused to obtain union licenses, instituted this action, contending that the union's regulations violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. After trial, the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the union's agency franchise system was protected from liability by the antitrust exemptions of unions and their members arising under the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that the central feature of the union's franchising system -- the exaction of an agreement by agents as to their commissions -- was immune from antitrust challenge. The court suggested that, if the exactions of franchise fees exceeded the union's costs in administering its license system, they could not legally be collected; but despite the lack of any cost evidence at trial, the court concluded that the fees were sufficiently low that a remand on the point would not serve any useful purpose.
"job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors."
Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99, 391 U. S. 106. Because of the peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where it is customary, if not essential, for union members to secure employment through agents whose fees are calculated as a percentage of the member's wage -- thus making it impossible for the union to defend even the integrity of the minimum wages it has negotiated with producers without regulation of agency fees -- the union's regulations are within the labor exemption. Agents must, therefore, be considered a "labor group," and their controversy with the union is plainly a "labor dispute" as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The union's regulations are also clearly designed to promote its legitimate self-interest. Pp. 451 U. S. 713-722.
2. However, the union's justification for the franchise fees -- based only on the suggestion in the most general terms that they are related to the basic purposes of its regulations -- is inadequate to warrant the conclusion that the fees are a permissible component of the exempt regulatory system. P. 451 U. S. 722.
622 F.2d 647, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE; BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-D of which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 451 U. S. 723.
The respondent Actors' Equity Association (Equity) is a union representing the vast majority of stage actors and actresses in the United States. It enters into collective bargaining agreements with theatrical producers that specify minimum wages and other terms and conditions of employment for those whom it represents. The petitioners are independent theatrical agents who place actors and actresses in jobs with producers. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the respondents' [Footnote 1] system of regulation of theatrical agents is immune from antitrust liability by reason of the statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, 622 F.2d 647. [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari to consider the availability of that exemption in the circumstances presented by this case. 449 U.S. 991.
and with most other theatrical producers throughout the United States. The terms negotiated with producers are the minimum conditions of employment (called "scale"); an actor or actress is free to negotiate wages or terms more favorable than the collectively bargained minima.
Theatrical agents are independent contractors who negotiate contracts and solicit employment for their clients. The agents do not participate in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements between Equity and the theatrical producers. If an agent succeeds in obtaining employment for a client, he receives a commission based on a percentage of the client's earnings. Agents who operate in New York City must be licensed as employment agencies, and are regulated by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs pursuant to New York law, which provides that the maximum commission a theatrical agent may charge his client is 10% of the client's compensation.
In 1928, concerned with the high unemployment rates in the legitimate theater and the vulnerability of actors and actresses to abuses by theatrical agents, [Footnote 3] including the extraction of high commissions that tended to undermine collectively bargained rates of compensation, Equity unilaterally established a licensing system for the regulation of agents. The regulations permitted Equity members to deal only with those agents who obtained Equity licenses and thereby agreed to meet the conditions of representation prescribed by Equity. Those members who dealt with nonlicensed agents were subject to union discipline.
"The evils of unregulated employment agencies (using this term broadly to include also the personal representative) are set forth in the defendants' affidavits and are corroborated by common knowledge. . . . Hence the requirement that, as a condition to writing new business with Equity's members, old contracts with its members must be made to conform to the new standards, does not seem to us to justify an inference that the primary purpose of the requirement is infliction of injury upon plaintiff, and other personal representatives in a similar situation, rather than the protection of the supposed interests of Equity's members. The terms they insist upon are calculated to secure from personal representatives better and more impartial service, at uniform and cheaper rates, and to improve conditions of employment of actors by theater managers. Undoubtedly the defendants intend to compel the plaintiff to give up rights under existing contracts which do not conform to the new standards set up by Equity, but, as already indicated, their motive in so doing is to benefit themselves and their fellow actors in the economic struggle. The financial loss to plaintiff is incidental to this purpose."
The essential elements of Equity's regulation of theatrical agents have remained unchanged since 1928. [Footnote 7] A member of Equity is prohibited, on pain of union discipline, from using an agent who has not, through the mechanism of obtaining an Equity license (called a "franchise"), agreed to comply with the regulations. The most important of the regulations requires that a licensed agent must renounce any right to take a commission on an employment contract under which an actor or actress receives scale wages. [Footnote 8] To the extent a contract includes provisions under which an actor or actress will sometimes receive scale pay -- for rehearsals or "chorus"
employment, for example -- and sometimes more, the regulations deny the agent any commission on the scale portions of the contract. Licensed agents are also precluded from taking commissions on out-of-town expense money paid to their clients. Moreover, commissions are limited on wages within 10% of scale pay, [Footnote 9] and an agent must allow his client to terminate a representation contract if the agent is not successful in procuring employment within a specified period. [Footnote 10] Finally, agents are required to pay franchise fees to Equity. The fee is $200 for the initial franchise, $60 a year thereafter for each agent, and $40 for any subagent working in the office of another. These fees are deposited by Equity in its general treasury, and are not segregated from other union funds.
In 1977, after a dispute between Equity and Theatrical Artists Representatives Associates (TARA) -- a trade association representing theatrical agents, see n 7, supra -- a group of agents, including the petitioners, resigned from TARA because of TARA's decision to abide by Equity's regulations. These agents also informed Equity that they would not accept Equity's regulations, or apply for franchises. The petitioners instituted this lawsuit in May, 1978, contending that Equity's regulations of theatrical agents violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.
"As a matter of general industry practice, producers seek actors and actresses for their productions through agents. Testimony in this case convincingly established that an actor without an agent does not have the same access to producers or the same opportunity to be seriously considered for a part as does an actor who has an agent. Even principal interviews, in which producers are required to interview all actors who want to be considered for principal roles, do not eliminate the need for an agent, who may have a greater chance of gaining an audition for his client."
"Testimony confirmed that agents play an integral role in the industry; without an agent, an actor would have significantly lesser chances of gaining employment."
"no evidence to suggest the existence of any conspiracy or illegal combination between Actors' Equity and TARA or between Actors' Equity and producers,"
"[t]he Actors Equity franchising system was employed by Actors' Equity for the purpose of protecting the wages and working conditions of its members."
between Equity and any "non-labor groups" or persons who are not "parties to a labor dispute." 622 F.2d at 648-649. If it did, the court reasoned, the protection of the statutory labor exemption would not apply.
costs, they could not legally be collected, as such exactions would be unconnected with any of the goals of national labor policy that justify the labor antitrust exemption. Despite the lack of any cost evidence at trial, however, the appellate court reasoned that the fees were sufficiently low that a remand to the District Court on this point "would not serve any useful purpose." Id. at 651.
Labor unions are lawful combinations that serve the collective interests of workers, but they also possess the power to control the character of competition in an industry. Accordingly, there is an inherent tension between national antitrust policy, which seeks to maximize competition, and national labor policy, which encourages cooperation among workers to improve the conditions of employment. [Footnote 12] In the years immediately following passage of the Sherman Act, courts enjoined strikes as unlawful restraints of trade when a union's conduct or objectives were deemed "socially or economically harmful." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 254 U. S. 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). [Footnote 13] In response to these practices, Congress acted, first in the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, and later in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, to immunize labor unions and labor disputes from challenge under the Sherman Act.
"[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means."
"§ 20 [of the Clayton Act] removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of being a 'violation of any law of the United States,' including the Sherman [Act]."
"intended to outlaw business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act."
The Court of Appeals properly recognized that the threshold issue was to determine whether or not Equity's franchising of agents involved any combination between Equity and any "non-labor groups," or persons who are not "parties to a labor dispute." 622 F.2d at 649 (quoting Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 232). [Footnote 20] And the court's conclusion that the trial court had not been clearly erroneous in its finding that there was no combination between Equity and the theatrical producers [Footnote 21] to create or maintain the franchise system is amply supported by the record.
closed shop; required orchestra leaders to engage a minimum number of "sidemen," or instrumentalists; prescribed minimum prices for local engagements; [Footnote 22] prescribed higher minimum prices for traveling orchestras; and permitted leaders to deal only with booking agents licensed by the union.
Id. at 391 U. S. 106.
regulation of agents developed in response to abuses by employment agents who occupy a critical role in the relevant labor market. [Footnote 26] The agent stands directly between union members and jobs, and is in a powerful position to evade the union's negotiated wage structure.
The peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work is intermittent, where it is customary, if not essential, for union members to secure employment through agents, and where agents' fees are calculated as a percentage of a member's wage, makes it impossible for the union to defend even the integrity of the minimum wages it has negotiated without regulation of agency fees. [Footnote 27] The regulations are "brought within the labor exemption [because they are] necessary to assure that scale wages will be paid. . . ." Carroll, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 112. They "embody . . . a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure." Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
"representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
presence of a nonlabor group -- whether there is "some . . . economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests . . . ,'" 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 106 (quoting District Court opinion) -- necessarily resolves this issue.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The respondent Donald Grody is the executive secretary of Equity.
The basic sources of organized labor's exemption from federal antitrust laws are §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 and 738, 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52, and §§ 4, 5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, and 73, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113.
Such vulnerability was, and still remains, particularly acute for actors and actresses without established professional reputations, who have always constituted the overwhelming majority of Equity's members.
The challenge was grounded on allegations of common law tortious interference with business relationships.
Judge Manton dissented without opinion.
For contemporary descriptions of agent abuses of actors and actresses, see generally A. Harding, The Revolt of the Actors (1929). See also New Rules for Actors, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1928, p. 20, col. 3; The New Republic, Oct. 24, 1928, p. 263. Cf. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 277 U. S. 359-375 (Stone, J., joined by Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (general abuses by employment agencies, particularly at times of widespread unemployment). The Court's decision in Ribnik v. McBride was overruled unanimously in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236.
The petitioners do not dispute this. The regulations have undergone revision in some details, largely as a result of negotiations between Equity and Theatrical Artists Representatives Associates (TARA), which, until shortly before this litigation began, was the only association voicing the concerns of agents with regard to their representation of Equity members. Until their voluntary resignation in late 1977, most of the petitioners were members of TARA. The petitioners are now members of the National Association of Talent Representatives (NATR). Unlike TARA, which functions only in the legitimate theater field, NATR also functions in the fields of motion pictures and television. In those fields, agents operate under closely analogous agent regulations maintained by the Screen Actors' Guild and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists.
The history of the negotiations and disputes between Equity and TARA are described in the opinion of the District Court in the present case. 478 F.Supp. 496, 498 (SDNY).
The minimum, or "scale," wage varies. In August, 1977, for example, the minimum weekly salary was $335 for Broadway performances, and $175 for performances off Broadway. Scale wages are set by a collective bargaining agreement between Equity and the producers, to which the agents are not parties. When an agent represents an actor or actress whose professional reputation is not sufficient to demand a salary higher than scale, the agent hopes to develop a relationship that will become continually more remunerative as the performer's professional reputation grows, and with it the power to demand an ever higher salary. No agent is required to represent an actor or actress whom he does not wish to represent .
It is Equity's view that commissions in the industry are not necessarily related to efforts by the agents, and that an agent often functions as little more than an "order taker," who is able to collect a percentage of a client's wages for the duration of a show for doing little more than answering a producer's telephone call. Indeed, an agent may collect a commission on the salary of an actor or actress he represents even if the client obtains the job without the agent.
Equity argues that this restriction is necessary because there is an incentive for agents to represent as many actors and actresses as possible -- and not necessarily to serve them all well -- because an agent receives a commission whenever his client is employed at a salary higher than scale, regardless of the extent of his involvement in obtaining employment for the client.
The Court of Appeals recognized that, even if there had been an agreement between Equity and a "non-labor group," the agreement might still have been protected from the antitrust laws under the "non-statutory" exemption. 622 F.2d at 649, n. 1. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U. S. 616, 421 U. S. 622. See n19, infra.
See generally Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14 (1963). See also Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va.L.Rev. 1183 (1980).
See Winter, supra, n 12, at 30-38.
"For us to hold, in the face of [the Norris-LaGuardia Act], that the federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act are involved would run counter to the plain mandate of the Act, and would reverse the declared purpose of Congress."
See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469. There, in the Term preceding that in which the Hutcheson case was decided, the Court reasoned that the Sherman Act prohibits only restraints on "commercial competition," 310 U.S. at 310 U. S. 497, 310 U. S. 499, 310 U. S. 510-511 -- or those market restraints designed to monopolize supply, control prices, or allocate product distribution -- and that unions are not liable where they merely further their own goals in the labor market.
In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U. S. 821, decided the same day as Allen Bradley, the Court ruled that the labor exemption protected a union's boycott of a truck hauler through successful secondary pressure on purchasers of the hauler's services with whom the union had contracts, because of the absence of union participation in a conspiracy with the hauler's competitors. See 325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 824; Meltzer, supra, n 12, at 677, and n. 74.
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, also dealt with a union combination with employers, but the grounds of decision were unrelated to the antitrust exemption.
"The Court has recognized . . . that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. . . ."
"The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and working conditions. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals in this case decided whether the nonstatutory exemption would independently shield the respondents from the petitioners' antitrust claims. See n 11, supra."
of course, a party seeking refuge in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent contractor or entrepreneur. See Meat Drivers v. United States, 371 U. S. 94; Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143. See generally 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 229c, pp. 195-198 (1978). There is no dispute about Equity's status as a bona fide labor organization.
As the employers of Equity's members, producers are plainly a "nonlabor group." Employers almost always will be a "nonlabor group," although an exception has been recognized, for example, when the employer himself is in job competition with his employees. See Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (orchestra leaders who both lead an orchestra and play an instrument).
These consisted of a minimum scale for sidemen, a "leader's fee," which was twice the sidemen's scale in orchestras of at least four, and an additional 8% for social security, unemployment insurance, and other expenses. In addition, if a leader did not appear, but designated a subleader, and four or more musicians performed, the leader was required to pay from his leader's fee 1.5 times the sidemen's scale to the subleader.
The Court did not explicitly determine whether the second prong of the Hutcheson test for the statutory exemption had been met, i.e., whether the union had acted in its "self-interest." But, given its various findings that the challenged restrictions were designed to cope with job competition and to protect wage scales and working conditions, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 108, 391 U. S. 109, 391 U. S. 110, 391 U. S. 113, it clearly did so sub silentio.
"[t]he regulations embod[ied] . . . a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the collective bargaining contract."
358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 294. See also Oliver II, supra at 362 U. S. 66 (after remand to the state court).
Indeed, the District Court in Carroll, whose judgment was affirmed by this Court "in its entirety," 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 114, drew parallels with the restrictions at issue in the present case. The court noted that "[a]pparently, similar abuses by booking agents existed in other fields too. Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir.1929) (actors)." Carroll v. AFM, 241 F.Supp. 865, 892 (SDNY).
The petitioners argue that theatrical agents are indistinguishable from "numerous [other] groups of persons who merely supply products and services to union members," such as landlords, grocers, accountants, and lawyers. But it is clear that agents differ from these groups in two critical respects: the agents control access to jobs and negotiation of the terms of employment. For the actor or actress, therefore, agent commissions are not merely a discretionary expenditure of disposable income, but a virtually inevitable concomitant of obtaining employment.
See Carroll v. AFM, 241 F.Supp. at 881-882; Harding, supra, n 6, at 319-325.
The Court of Appeals found that "the union cannot eliminate wage competition among its members without regulation of the fees of the agents." 622 F.2d at 651 (emphasis added). Wage competition is prevented not only by the rule precluding commissions on scale jobs. Actors and actresses could also compete over the percentage of their wages they were willing to cede to an agent, subject only to the restrictions imposed by state law.
"The employer should be able to make a contract with the union as an employment agency. The union frequently is the best employment agency. The employer should be able to give notice of vacancies, and, in the normal course of events, to accept men sent to him by the hiring hall."
S.Rep. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1947), quoted in Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 365 U. S. 673-674.
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have ruled that union demands for hiring halls are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and that strikes to obtain such provisions are protected activity. See, e.g., Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, enf'd, 349 F.2d 449 (CA5); NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768, 771 (CA9). Cf. Teamsters v. NLRB, supra, at 365 U. S. 672-673, 365 U. S. 676.
See Carroll, 241 F.Supp. at 881. We have, in fact, found no case holding that a union may extract such fees from independent agents who represent union members.
As already indicated, the franchise fees are not segregated in any manner, but merely deposited in the union's general fund.
The respondents offer union hiring hall fees as an analogy in support of Equity's collection of franchise fees. In that context, the respondents argue, without citation, that a union may impose reasonable fees upon employers to meet the costs of maintaining a union-run hiring hall. But even if the respondents' statement of labor law is correct, the analogy would not be persuasive. Assuming that hiring hall fees are so imposed, the fees are borne by parties who directly benefit from the employment services of the hiring halls and are collected by the entities that provide them. That is not true in the present case.
The view expressed in the separate opinion filed today as to who are the beneficiaries of the franchising system will undoubtedly surprise the agents who brought this lawsuit. Post at 451 U. S. 724.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all but 451 U. S. That part holds that respondents' exaction of a franchise fee is not a "permissible component of the exempt regulatory system." Ante at 451 U. S. 722. Rather, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the approximately $12,000 collected annually in fees is not "incommensurate with Equity's expenses in maintaining a full-time employee to administer the system," 622 F.2d 647, 651 (CA2 1980), and thus is not "unconnected with any of the goals of national labor policy which justify the antitrust exemption for labor," ibid.
The Court justifies its conclusion by suggesting that, since the union could increase its dues to offset the revenue lost from invalidation of the fee system, "there is no reason to believe that any of [the union's] legitimate interests would be affected," if the fee system were found to violate the antitrust laws. Ante at 451 U. S. 722. The union could, of course, raise its dues, but the issue here is whether the conceded antitrust immunity of the franchising system includes the franchise fee.
"Equity's franchise system operates as a substitute for maintaining a hiring hall as the representative of its members seeking employment."
Ante at 451 U. S. 721. The Court disregards this similarity in concluding that the franchising system does not "directly benefit" the agents who are required to pay the fees. Ante at 451 U. S. 722, n. 31. It reaches this conclusion by incorrectly assuming that the only parties who directly benefit from the hiring hall and the franchising system are employers and employees and producers and actors, as the case may be. But surely the agents also benefit from the franchising system, which provides an orderly and protective mechanism for pairing actors who seek jobs with producers who seek actors. The system is thus the means by which the agents ultimately receive their commissions; it is as much the source of their livelihood as it is that of the actors.
Because the fee is an incident of a legitimate scheme of regulation, and because it is commensurate in amount with the purpose for which it is sought, I would also affirm this holding of the Court of Appeals.
H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc.


was attached"as mortgagees, and moved theconrt. to dischargE. · the order of attachment, arid the levy made thereunder. The issues arising on this interplea and the issues in the 'attachment suit were tried together before the court, which found generally in favor of the plaintiffs in the attachment suit,and rendered judgment accordingly. In this court there is but one record in both cases, and, as they have been argued as one cause, they will be decided together. The only error assigned on behalf of the interpleader is · that, "upon and under the evidence heard upon the hearing of said motion," the court ought to have discharged the attachment. It appears that the interveners executed to the marshal a redelivery bond for the property attached. Under the statutes of Kansas this bond had the effect ,to estop them from denying that the property belonged to the defendant in the attachment, or that it was not subject to the attachment. Code, Ran.§ 199; Sponenbarger v. Lemert, 23 Kan. 55, 62; Haxtun v. Sizer, Id.310; Wolf v. Hahn, 28 Kan. 588; Case, Bishop & Co; v. & Hosea, 31 Ran. 96,99, 1 Pac. 269; Peterson v. Woollen, 48 Kan. 770, 30 Pac. 128. To avoid the legal effect of the execution of the redelivery bond, · the interveners claimed they were induced to execute it by the false and fraUdulent representations of the plaintiffs' agent or attorneyas to its legal effect, and there is a good deal of testimony in the recor-d relating to this issue. But the finding of the lower court upon this, as upon all other. issues of fact in the case, was general; and, as we have seen, where a case is tried by the court without a jury, and its finding upon the facts is general, such finding cannot be reviewed in this court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
CITY OF LINCOLN v. SUN VAPOR STREET-LIGHT CO. OF CANTON.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
The provisions of the twenty-fourth rule of court. (47 Fed. xl.,) prescribing the contents and manner of statement of briefs for plaIntiff in error. particularly In respect to assignments and specifications of error, and the presentation of the questions to be dIscussed, will be enforced by the court, to the end that the vital issues in the case may be clearly presented. and immaterial and frivolous matters excluded from consideration.
A contract for lighting streets by gasoline lamps. requiring no plant but the posts and lamps, which are to'remain the property of the contractors. ,may be made by simple resolution of cOuncil, under the general charter power to make contracts necessary to the exercise of the corporate powers, and further provisions recognizing the power to contract by resolution or order concurred in by a majority of the members elected; and provisions requiring formal ordinances in making contracts for "gas works, electric or other light works.... etc., do not apply.
CITY OF LINCOLN V, SUN VAPOR STREET-LIGHT CO.
Contracts formally executed by the proper officers of the city by an· thority of its counCil, and not necessarily beyond the scope of its powers, will, in the absence of, proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been made by lawful authority.
REVIEW ON ERROR-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
On a writ of error the court cannot consider a proposition that the jury Violated tneir instructions, in that, being instructed that there could be no recovery unless the claim sued on was presented to the city clerk within three months of its accrual, they awarded a recovery, although the uIlcontradicted evidence was that the claim was not so presented; for this is simply a contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, which question cannot be considered in a federal appellate court, in the. absence of a request for a peremptory instruction to the jury.
SAME-MOTION FOR NEW TlUAL-NoT REVIEWABLE.
"(4) When there Is no assignment of errors, .as reqUired by section 997 of tbe Rev!sedStatutes, counsel w111 not be heard, excePt at the request of the court;. and errors not specified according to this rule will be disregarded; .but the court, at,lts option, may notice a plain error not assigned or specified." 47 Fed. xl.
The eIl,tire rule is a copy of the twenty-first rule of the supreme court. 13 Sup. Ct. xii. Only the pprt;ion of it material in this case is quoted h.ere. In our opinion, the strict and careful observance of this rule directs the attention of counsel and the court to the merits of the ..case presented, to'the vital questions at issue, and excludes from their consideration frivolous and immaterial questions. If the rule is observed, the arguments of counsel and the consideration of the court are concentrated upon the important questions in c()lltroversy, instead of being scattered and dissipated by the argument and consideration of numerous side issues, that, if at all material,' are generally governed by the decision of the main questions,apd. in this way a just result is more speedily and certainly attained. It often occurs that, through abundance of cauerrors, when they obtain their writ of tion, counsel assign error, which they find it entirely unnecessary to refer to, and themselves abandon upon reflection, and after an examination of the authorities upon which they intend to rely in the presentation of their case to this court. Every of the bar understands and appreciates the necessity of concmtrating and confining his own attention and investigation, as well as the attention and consideration of the court, to the crucial questions in his case. This rule enables him to accomplish. this result after he has carefully examined the 'authorities and considered the reasons which support his positions, Ilnd when: he is best prepared to select the errors he deems of importance. The rule should be carefully observed. The brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error contains 23 printed pages. The record: contains pleading-s, evidence, instructions given and instructions refused,the verdict, judgment, assignment of errOrs, and writ of' error, and covers 62 printed pages. No specification of the errors :relied on which sets out separately or particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged in a separate subdivision of the brief is found. After the statement of the case, and before the argument, the following statement appears, which is the nearest apprQach to such a specification found in this brief: ..
CITY OF LINCOLN V. SUN VAPOR .STREET-LIGHT CO.
city, the plaintiff must have first filed with the city clerk a statement of his claim, giving his full naine, the time, place, nature, circumstance, and cause of injury or damage complained of, and that such statement must have been filed within threE:' months of the time when his cause of action accrued. "(4) That the verdict is contrary to, and in direct violation of, the instructions of the court as given to the jury."
works, -electric or other light works, in said city, and give such persons, compan,. or' association the privilege of furnishing light 'for the streets, lanes and alleys ofsatd city, for any length of time not exceeding five years." Id. § 67.
12 Wheat. 64, 70; The Omaha Bridge Cases, 10 U. S. App. 98, 189, 2 C. C. A. 174, 240, 51 Fed. 309, and cases cited; Union Water Co. v. Murphy's Flat Fluming Co., 22 Cal. 620, 629. 3. The third point urged is that the company must have filed a statement of its claim with the city clerk within three months after it accrued, in order to maintain its action. The court so instructed the jurY, and a careful perusal of the 21 supposed errors assis-ned when the writ was issued discloses none which challenges any ruling .ofthe court upon this question. 4. The fourth point urged is that the verdict was in direct violation of the instructions given by the court to the jury. The contention of the counsel for the city here rests upon the proposition that the court instructed the jury that the company could not reo cover unless it proved that it had filed the statement of its claim with the city clerk within three months of its accrual, and that the uncontradicted evidence was that it had not done so; in other words, the point is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. If the city wished to test, by writ of error in this court, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict for the company, it should. have requested the court below, at the close of the evi· dence, to peremptorily instruct the jury to return a verdict in de· fendant's favor. Village of Alexandria v. Stabler, 4 U. S. App. 324, 1 C. C. A. 616, 50 Fed. 689; :Railroad Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202, 12 Sup. Ct. 591. It did not do this, and the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be considered here. In an action at law brought here by writ of error for review, this is a court for the correction of the errors of the court below solely ; it is not a court for the correction of the mistakes of the jury,or for the retrial of issues of fa.ct which they have determined with the consent of the litigants. In order to obtain a review of any question by writ of error in this court it must appear that the court below decided that very question, for there cltn be no. review of that which has never beenpassed upon. In this case the city consented to the submission of the eyi· dence to the jury, and requested· the general instruction on this subject which was given by the court. The court below was not requested to decide, and did not determine, whether or not there was sufficient evidence to warrant a verdict before it was rendered, and hence it could not have committed any error in this regard, and there is nothing here for us to consider. It is true that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence was subsequently submitted to the court below on a motion for a new trial; but the action of the court upon that motion was discretionary, and is not reviewable in this court. McClellan v. Pyeatt, 4 U. S. App. 319, 323, 1 O. O. A. 613, 50 Fed. 686; Village of Alexan· dria v. Stabler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 4 U. S. App. 202, 1 C. O. A. 229, 49 Fed. 206; Mining Co. v. Fullerton, 58 Fed. 521. The result is that there was no substantial error in the/trial of this case, and no error whatever has been specified according to the rules of this court. The judgment of the circuit court is accord· mgly affirmed, with costs.
Wh8fe, ,wlqdow, glaBsls brokeuin transit, so tbat partot ,It Is useless for remanufacture, the broken part Is not admissible, un4er paragraph '590 of the tree list, as broken 'glass, but the whole is dutiable as window glass, unless there is an abandonment to the government, under section 23 of theaot otJune 10, 1890. MFed. 371,reversed.
"-<1) Tbe merchandise consists of window, .cyllnder,and other kinds of glass, of the particular des'cription named in the severalinvoices and entries, contained In cases or packages, marked and numbered as shown· by the accompanying papers in the appended list of clises. "(2)· A part ot said merchandise was ill\ported under the new tariff act, and since October 6, 1890, and a part of it under the tariff act of March 3, 1883, prior to the time when the present tariff law went into effect. But all of the merchlW'lise was imported after AUgust I, 1890, when the act of June 10, 1890. kr wn as the 'Customs Administrative Act,' went Into effect.


It is an undisputed point of law that employees of the Federal Government are protected by discriminatory practices under the Civil Rights Act at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Full stop, blog over, nothing new to report here. However, let’s not be premature, we may still have questions. What happens if an individual amends his charge subsequent to the initial filing, must he wait an additional 180 days to file his complaint for civil action from the date of the amendment or from the date of the initial charge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)? This is just the question that Fourth Circuit, Judge Wynn, answered on January 8th. Stewart v. Iancu, No. 17-1815, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 524 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2019).
In Stewart, the Plaintiff worked as a patent examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and suffered from bulging disk in his lower back, radiculopathy from compression of his sciatic nerve, as well as post and continuous traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 2. Subsequently, the Plaintiff made his reasonable accommodations request in April 2014, which was partially granted on September 19, 2014. Id. On July 14 2015, the Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the PTOs Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity office (EEO Office), which challenged the denial of his request for accommodations, asserted a hostile work environment and discrimination, and alleged various claims of retaliation. Id. at 3. Ultimately the Plaintiff amended his administrative complaint eight times. Id. Each amendment was followed by a notice from the EEO office informing the Plaintiff: (1) the he could amend his formal complaint at any time before the investigation is complete and any new claims “must be like or related to the claims raised” in the original complaint; and (2) he may “file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court at any time after 180 days have passed from the date [he] filed [his] original complaint.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b). Ultimately, the Plaintiff filed a pro se civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on February 29, 2016, more than 180 days after the filing of the original administrative complaint, alleging numerous violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Id. at 4.
Subsequent to the Plaintiff filing his lawsuit, the PTO filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Plaintiff was premature due to failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407. Id. The PTO believed that the Plaintiff was required to wait to file a civil action until the conclusion of the agency’s investigation period, which is extended when employees amend their administrative complaint to the earlier of 180 days after the last amendment or 360 days after the filing of the initial complaint. Id.; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.106(e)(2); 1614.108(f).On March 17, 2017, the district court held that the Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because under Section 1614.407(b), he was required to wait until July 8, 2016, the earlier of 180 days after Stewart’s last amendment or 360 days after the filing of his initial complaint, to file a civil action in federal court. Id. at 5. The Plaintiff timely appealed the decision alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. Id. Rehabilitation Act Claims must comply with the same administrative procedures that cover federal employees Title VII claims. Id. at 5. As such, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, amended Title VII regarding federal employees to state that Federal employees may file a civil action based upon their administrative complaint (1) within 90 days of receipt of notice of final agency action or (2) after 180 days of filing of the initial charge with the agency, if there has been no final agency action. Id. at 5.
The Court first determined that Title VII’s 180-day waiting period found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)2000e-16(c) is not a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 6. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that “’only if the statutory text “plainly show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences’ should a court treat a rule as jurisdictional.” Id. at 10; United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015). Congress has done nothing in the statutory language to tag Section 2000e-16(c) as jurisdictional; therefore, dismissal under 12(b)(1) was inappropriate. Id. at 13. Upon conducting a de novo review for dismissal under 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim, the Court held that the statute’s use of the modifier “initial” demonstrates the possibility of subsequent amendments. Id. at 15. Furthermore, allowing agencies to repeatedly delay individuals’ ability to go to court, simply because they have amended their administrative complaints, would frustrate a “congressional policy to make the courts the final tribunal for the resolution of controversies over charges of discrimination after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.” Id. at 17 (quoting Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1974)). Furthermore, Title VII is a remedial scheme where laypersons are expected to initiate the actions. Id. at 18. The PTO repeatedly informed the Plaintiff that he may amend his action any time after 180 days had passed from the filing of his initial complaint; therefore allowing the agency to confuse litigants would further frustrate the purpose of Title VII. Id.
Subsequently, the court dismissed the PTO’s arguments that the statutory text is ambiguous, that the EEOC’s regulations support tethering the 180-day waiting period to the extended investigation period for amended complaints; and that reversal would incentivize gamesmanship. Id. at 18. Ultimately, the PTO was not entitled to Chevron deference in the interpretation of terms, it has long been held that courts may adjudicate claims not raised before the agency as long as they are like or related and grow out of the allegations, and there are already procedural guardrails to gamesmanship. Id. at 19-29. As such, Section 2000e-16(c)’s 180-day waiting period for filing a civil action, absent agency final action, commences with the filing of the initial administrative complaint, regardless of subsequent amendments to that complaint.
 The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s Claim under Rule 12(b)(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Stewart v. Iancu, No. 17-1815, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 524, at 7.
 The Court stated that it does not hold that all exhaustion requirements in Title VII are non-jurisdictional because this will turn on the statutory language of the provision at issue. Id. at 13.


text:
I'm interested in cerebrovascular disease, critical care illnesses and obstructive sleep apnea, epilepsy, narcolepsy, obstructive sleep apnea, parasomnias, persistent sleepiness in OSA patients successfully treated with CPAP, restless legs syndrome, sleep, EEG patterns associated with rhythmic movement disorders of sleep, the association of obstructive sleep apnea in Downs syndrome, and the EEG patterns in the auxiliary symptoms of narcolepsy.
Dyken, M. E., Tippen, J. (In Press). Fitness for driving and safety in sleep neurology. Continuum.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B., Richerson, G. B. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (In Press). Sleep and Stroke. In Sleep Disorders. pp. Chapter 32. Oxford Textbooks in Clinical Neurology.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2015). The Evaluation of Pediatric Sleep Disorders. In Clinical Neurophysiology in Pediatrics : A Practical Approach to Neurodiagnostic Testing and Management. pp. 77-95. Demos Medical.
Eric Dyken, M., Bin Im, K. & B. Richerson, G. (2015). Sleep and Stroke. In Sleep Medicine. pp. 255-269. Springer New York. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4939-2089-1_31.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Clemmons, E. (In Press). Impact of Neurological Diseases. In C. A. Kushida (Eds.) Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology.
Dyken, M. E., et al, (In Press). Impact of Neurological Diseases. In C. A. Kushida (Eds.) Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology.
Bajpai, S., Im, K., Dyken, M. E., Sodhi, S. & Fiedorowicz, J. (2014). Obstructive sleep apnea and risk for late-life depression. Annals of Clinical Psychiatry, 26(3), 163–170.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Boyle, J. (2014). Sleep terrors [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of sleep medicine. pp. 386-387. Saunders/Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Nivedita, J. (2014). Hypnagogic hallucinations [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of sleep medicine. pp. 382-385. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders/Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Bajpai, S. (2014). Sleepwalking [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of sleep medicine. pp. 380-381. Saunders/Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Jerath, N. (2014). Confusional arousals [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of sleep medicine. pp. 378-388. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders, an imprint of Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Richerson, G. B. & Glenn, C. L. (2014). Obstructive Sleep Apnea Associated With Cerebral Hypoxemia [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. J. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of Sleep Medicine. (2nd edition), pp. 367-370. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders an imprint of Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Maxfield, J. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2014). Narcolepsy—Unequivocal Diagnosis After Split-Screen, Video-Polysomnographic Analysis of a Prolonged Cataplectic Attack [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. J. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of Sleep Medicine. (2nd edition), pp. 363-366. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders an imprint of Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Glenn, C. L. (2014). The Rapid Eye Movement Sleep Behavior Disorder Leading to a Subdural Hemorrhage [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. J. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of Sleep Medicine. (2nd edition), pp. 371-374. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders an imprint of Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Glenn, C. L. & Jerath, N. (2014). Isolated Sleep Paralysis: An REM-“Sleep” Polysomnographic Phenomenon as Documented With Simultaneous Clinical and Electrophysiological Assessment [with video vignette]. In S. Chokroverty , R. J. Thomas (Eds.) Atlas of Sleep Medicine. (2nd edition), pp. 375-377. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders an imprint of Elsevier.
Dyken, M. E., Rodnitzky, R. L. (2013). Sleep Disorders in Other Hyperkinetic Syndromes. In Sleep and Movement Disorders. pp. 696-709. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/med/9780199795161.003.0053.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Linton, C. M. (2013). Impact of Neurological Diseases. In Encyclopedia of Sleep. pp. 548–552. Waltham: Academic Press.
Nahra, K., Dyken, M. E. (2013). The History of Narcolepsy. In Encyclopedia of Sleep. pp. 362–366. Waltham: Academic Press.
Nahra, K., Dyken, M. (2013). The History of Narcolepsy. In Encyclopedia of Sleep. pp. 362-366. Elsevier. DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-378610-4.00213-8.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Im, K. B. (2012). The relationship of obstructive sleep apnea with obesity and stroke. International Journal of Respiratory Care, 17-20.
Dyken, M. E. (2012). Approach to the Patient with Sleep Disorders. In J. Biller (Eds.) Practical Neurology. (4), pp. 81-93. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Dyken, M., Afifi, A. K. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2012). Sleep-related problems in neurologic diseases. Chest, 141(2), 528-44. PMID: 22315121.
Dyken, M. E., Richerson, G. B. & Im, K. B. (2012). Sleep apnea, stroke risk factors, and the arousal response. In Sleep, Stroke and Cardiovascular Disease. pp. 64-79. Cambridge University Press.
Shirani, A., Paradiso, S. & Dyken, M. E. (2011). The impact of atypical antipsychotic use on obstructive sleep apnea: A pilot study and literature review. Sleep Medicine, 12(6), 591-597. DOI: 10.1016/j.sleep.2010.12.013.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2011). Parasomnias. In Practical Guide for Clinical Neurophysiologic Testing: EP, LTM, IOM, PSG, and NCS.. pp. 260–277. Wolters Kluwer/Lippincott Williams & Wilkens.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B. (2011). Stroke in sleep. In S. Chokroverty , P. Sahota (Eds.) Acute and emergent events in sleep disorders. pp. 328-348. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dyken, M. E., Afifi, A. K. & Im, K. B. (2011). Sleep studies: introduction and sleep physiology/pathology. In T. Yamada , E. Meng (Eds.) Practical guide for clinical neurophysiologic testing : EP, LTM, IOM, PSG, and NCS. pp. 202-219. Philadelphia, PA: Wolters Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Im, K. B., Dyken, M. E. (2011). Idiopathic insomnia. (2011) San Diego, CA: Medlink Neurology.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B. (2011). Sleep disorders associated with dementia. (2011) San Diego, CA: Medlink Neurology.
Im, K. B., Strader, S. & Dyken, M. (2010). Management of sleep disorders in stroke. Current treatment options in neurology, 12(5), 379-95. PMID: 20842596.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B. & Afifi, A. K. (2010). Violent sleep related behavior resulting in subdural presentations. In A. Culebras (Eds.) Case Studies in Sleep Neurology: Common and Uncommon Presentations.. pp. 92-100. Leiden: Cambridge University Press.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2010). Sleepwalking or seizing?. In Case Studies in Sleep Neurology. pp. 185-192. Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511902505.029.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2010). A child with behavioral problems and violent sleep behavior leading to trauma. In Case Studies in Sleep Neurology. pp. 234-241. Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511902505.035.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2010). Seizure, parasomnia or behavioral disorder?. In Case Studies in Sleep Neurology. pp. 193-199. Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511902505.030.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. (2010). The clinical diagnostic pitfalls of polysomnography. Clinical Neurophysiology, 121((Dyken M.E.; Yamada T.) University of Iowa Carver College of Medicine, Iowa City, United States), S40–S41. DOI: 10.1016/S1388-2457(10)60169-1.
Im, K. B., Dyken, M. E. (2010). Idiopathic insomnia. (2010) San Diego, CA: Medlink Neurology.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B. (2010). Sleep disorders associated with dementia. (2010) San Diego, CA: Medlink Neurology.
Dyken, M., Im, K. B. (2009). Obstructive sleep apnea and stroke. Chest, 136(6), 1668-77. PMID: 19995768.
Brown, T., Dow, B., Trask, D., Dyken, M., Salisbury, S. & Salisbury, S. (2009). Driving Performance and Obstructive Sleep Apnea: A Preliminary Look at Manifestations of Impairment. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2096, 33-40. DOI: 10.3141/2096-05.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. & Ali, M. (2009). Treatment of hypersomnias. In Handbook of Sleep Disorders. (2nd), pp. 299–319. New York, NY: Informa Healthcare.
Dyken, M. E. (2009). Approach to the patient with sleep abnormalities. In J. Biller (Eds.) Practical neurology. (3rd edition), pp. 99-115. Philadelphia, PA: Wolters Kluwer/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B. (2008). Sleep-Disordered Breathing and Stroke. (3), pp. 361-376. Sleep Medicine Clinics. DOI: 10.1016/j.jsmc.2008.04.013.
JIANG, F., SHEN, X., YAN, C., WU, S., JIN, X., DYKEN, M. & LIN-DYKEN, D. (2007). Epidemiological study of sleep characteristics in Chinese children 1–23 months of age. Pediatrics International, 49(6), 811-816. DOI: 10.1111/j.1442-200x.2007.02449.x.
Dyken, M. E., Ali, M., Raman, S. & Eppen, K. E. (2007). Obesity. In Obstructive Sleep Apnea: Pathophysiology, Comorbidities and Consequences. pp. 355-376. Informa Healthcare USA.
Winkelman, J. W., Sethi, K. D., Kushida, C. A., Becker, P. M., Koester, J., Cappola, J. J., Reess, J. (2006). Efficacy and safety of pramipexole in restless legs syndrome. Neurology, 67(6), 1034-1039. DOI: 10.1212/01.wnl.0000231513.23919.a1.
Dyken, M., Wenger, E. J. & Yamada, T. (2006). REM alpha rhythm: diagnostic for narcolepsy?. Journal of clinical neurophysiology : official publication of the American Electroencephalographic Society, 23(3), 254-7. PMID: 16751726.
Harsh, J. R., Hayduk, R., Rosenberg, R., Wesnes, K. A., Walsh, J. K., Arora, S., Niebler, G. E., Roth, T. (2006). The efficacy and safety of armodafinil as treatment for adults with excessive sleepiness associated with narcolepsy. Current Medical Research and Opinion, 22(4), 761-774. DOI: 10.1185/030079906x100050.
Dyken, M., Yamada, T. (2005). Narcolepsy and disorders of excessive somnolence. Primary care, 32(2), 389-413. PMID: 15935192.
Yamada, T., Dyken, M. E. (2005). Abnormal movements and behaviors in sleep: video EEG/PSG analysis. Japanese Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 33(5), 347.
Dyken, M. E. (2004). One-year treatment with standard and sustained-release levodopa: appropriate long-term treatment of restless legs syndrome?. CME Digest, 2(22), 1826.
Dyken, M., Yamada, T., Glenn, C. L. & Berger, H. A. (2004). Obstructive sleep apnea associated with cerebral hypoxemia and death. Neurology, 62(3), 491-3. PMID: 14872041.
Dyken, M. E., Berger, H. A., Yamada, T. & Glenn, C. L. (2004). Obstructive sleep apnea associated with cerebral hypoxemia and death. (Vols. 62). (3), pp. 491-493. Neurology.
Dyken, M. E. (2004). Association between obstructive sleep apnea and stroke?. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Virtual Hospital.
Dyken, M. E. (2004). Association between obstructive sleep apnea and stroke?. University of Iowa, Currents in Medicine and Health Care, 5(3), 17-22.
Dyken, M. E. (2003). Clinical practice. Restless Legs Syndrome. CME Digest, 2(17), 1689.
Dyken, M., Lin-Dyken, D. C., Poulton, S., Zimmerman, M. B. & Sedars, E. (2003). Prospective polysomnographic analysis of obstructive sleep apnea in down syndrome. Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine, 157(7), 655-60. PMID: 12860786.
Dyken, M., Yamada, T. & Berger, H. A. (2003). Transient obstructive sleep apnea and asystole in association with presumed viral encephalopathy. Neurology, 60(10), 1692-4. PMID: 12771270.
Dyken, M. E. (2003). The neurobiology, diagnosis, and treatment of narcolepsy. CME Digest, 1613.
Dyken, M. E., Rodnitzky, R. (2003). Sleep disorders in other hyperkinetic syndromes. In S. Chokroverty , W. A. Hening , A. S. Walters (Eds.) Sleep and movement disorders. Philadelphia, PA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Dyken, M. E. (2003). Sleep apnea, hypertension and stroke. (Vols. 13). pp. 1. Stroke, Clinical Update.
Dyken, M. E., Im, K. B., Richerson, G. B. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2003). Sleep and Stroke. In S. Chokroverty , L. Ferini-Strambi (Eds.) Oxford textbook of sleep disorders. pp. Chapter 32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lin-Dyken, D. C., Dyken, M. E. (2002). Use of Melatonin in Young Children for Sleep Disorders. Infants & Young Children, 15(2), 20-37. DOI: 10.1097/00001163-200210000-00005.
Dyken, M. E. (2002). Sleep deprivation followed by polysomnography may facilitate the diagnosis of patients with suspected somnambulism. CME Digest, 1404.
Dyken, M. E. (2002). Cardiac pacing, to increase the heart rate in patients with sleep apnea may be of benefit. CME Digest, 1373.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. (2002). Approach to the patient with sleep abnormalities. In J. Biller (Eds.) Practical neurology. (2nd edition), pp. 99-118. New York: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Dyken, M. E. (2002). Viewpoint: history and structure of The University of Iowa Sleep Disorders Center. AASM Bulletin.
Dyken, M. E. (2001). Body Position, Sleep Stage, and Upper-Airway Collapsibility in Sleep Apnea [reviewing Penzel T et al. Sleep 2001 Feb 1]. Journal Watch Neurology.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2001). Abnormal behaviors in sleep. Acta Neurologica Taiwanica, 10(4), 241–247.
Yamada, T., Dyken, M. E. (2001). Narcolepsy update. Acta Neurologica Taiwanica, 10(4), 233–240.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. & Lin-Dyken, D. C. (2001). Polysomnographic assessment of spells in sleep: Nocturnal seizures versus parasomnias. Seminars in Neurology, 21(4), 377–390. DOI: 10.1055/s-2001-19409.
Dyken, M. E., Lyn-Dyken, D. C. (2001). Building Shanhai's first pediatric sleep disorder center. International Accents, 1(2), 8-9.
Dyken, M. E. (2001). An uneasy relationship: investigators study obstructive sleep apenea's association with stroke. Advance for Managers of Respiratory Care, 11, 54-71.
Dyken, M. E. (2001). Cerebrovascular Disease and Sleep Apnea [From Exploring the relationship between sleep-disordered breathing and stroke: 1997-2000]. Res Med.
Dyken, M. E. (2000). Cerebrovascular Disease and Sleep Apnea [presentation from the North American Stroke Meeting Symposium: Sleep Disordered Breathing-Stroke's Missing Link?]. Res Med.
Dyken, M. (2000). Cerebrovascular Disease and Sleep Apnea. In Sleep Apnea. pp. 285-306. CRC Press. DOI: 10.1201/b15277-14.
Dyken, M. E. (2000). Stroke and sleep apnea: OSA has the potential to contribute to or exacerbate a cerebrovascular accident. Sleep Review, 1(1), 37-39.
Teramoto, S., Matsuse, T. & Ouchi, Y. (1999). Does the Altered Cardiovascular Variability Associated With Obstructive Sleep Apnea Contribute to Development of Cardiovascular Disease in Patients With Obstructive Sleep Apnea Syndrome?. (Vols. 100). (25), pp. e136–e137. Circulation. PMID: 10604904.
Phillips, B. G., Hisel, T. M., Kato, M., Pesek, C. A., Dyken, M. E., Narkiewicz, K. & Somers, V. K. (1999). Recent weight gain in patients with newly diagnosed obstructive sleep apnea. Journal of hypertension, 17(9), 1297-300. PMID: 10489107.
Narkiewicz, K., van de Borne, P. J., Pesek, C. A., Dyken, M. E., Montano, N. & Somers, V. K. (1999). Selective potentiation of peripheral chemoreflex sensitivity in obstructive sleep apnea. Circulation, 99(9), 1183-9. PMID: 10069786.
Pesek, C. A., Cooley, R., Narkiewicz, K., Dyken, M., Weintraub, N. L. & Somers, V. K. (1999). Theophylline therapy for near-fatal Cheyne-Stokes respiration. A case report. Annals of internal medicine, 130(5), 427-30. PMID: 10068417.
Phillips, B. G., Narkiewicz, K., Pesek, C. A., Haynes, W. G., Dyken, M. E. & Somers, V. K. (1999). Effects of obstructive sleep apnea on endothelin-1 and blood pressure. Journal of hypertension, 17(1), 61-6. PMID: 10100095.
Narkiewicz, K., Montano, N., Cogliati, C., van de Borne, P. J., Dyken, M. E. & Somers, V. K. (1998). Altered cardiovascular variability in obstructive sleep apnea. Circulation, 98(11), 1071-7. PMID: 9736593.
Narkiewicz, K., van de Borne, P. J., Cooley, R. L., Dyken, M. E. & Somers, V. K. (1998). Sympathetic activity in obese subjects with and without obstructive sleep apnea. Circulation, 98(8), 772-6. PMID: 9727547.
Narkiewicz, K., van de Borne, P. J., Montano, N., Dyken, M. E., Phillips, B. G. & Somers, V. K. (1998). Contribution of tonic chemoreflex activation to sympathetic activity and blood pressure in patients with obstructive sleep apnea. Circulation, 97(10), 943-5. PMID: 9529260.
Van Dyke, D. C., Harper, D. C. & Dyken, M. E. (1998). Alzheimer’s disease and Down syndrome. Down Syndrome Quarterly, 3(2), 1–11.
Mock, D. M., Dyken, M. E. (1997). Biotin catabolism is accelerated in adults receiving long-term therapy with anticonvulsants. Neurology, 49(5), 1444-7. PMID: 9371938.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Yamada, T. (1997). Diagnosing rhythmic movement disorder with video-polysomnography. Pediatric neurology, 16(1), 37-41. PMID: 9044399.
Dyken, M. E. (1997). The relationship between stroke and obstructive sleep apnea. Arteres et veines, 16, 226-239.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T. (1997). Approach to the patient with sleep abnormalities. In J. Biller (Eds.) Practical neurology. pp. 83-96. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott-Raven.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T., Ren, Z. & Zimmerman, M. B. (1997). Investigating the relationship between stroke and obstructive sleep apnea. Neurology Network Commentary, 1(5), 269-275.
Van Dyke, D. C., Bonthitis, N. E., Bonthius, D. J., McBrien, D. M. & Dyken, M. E. (1996). Alcohol and Anticonvulsant Medication Use During Pregnancy: Effects on the Growth and Development of Infants and Children. Infants & Young Children, 9(2), 43-50. DOI: 10.1097/00001163-199610000-00007.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T., Lin-Dyken, D. C., Seaba, P. & Yeh, M. (1996). Diagnosing narcolepsy through the simultaneous clinical and electrophysiologic analysis of cataplexy. Archives of neurology, 53(5), 456-60. PMID: 8624222.
Davis, P. H., Bendixen, B., Adams, H., Woolson, R. F., Culebras, A. (1996). Silent cerebral infarction in patients enrolled in the TOAST study. Neurology, 46(4), 942-948. DOI: 10.1212/wnl.46.4.942.
Dyken, M. E., Somers, V. K., Yamada, T., Ren, Z. Y. & Zimmerman, M. B. (1996). Investigating the relationship between stroke and obstructive sleep apnea. Stroke; a journal of cerebral circulation, 27(3), 401-7. PMID: 8610303.
Lin-Dyken, D. C., Dyken, M. E. (1996). Sleep in infancy, childhood, and youth. In Clinical Handbook of Sleep Disorders.. pp. 345-375. Butterworth-Heinemann.
Yamada, T., Dyken, M. E. & Granner, M. A. (1996). Split-screen video and polysomnographic/EEG analysis. In Recent advances in clinical neurophysiology : proceedings of the Xth International Congress of EMG and Clinical Neurophysiology, Kyoto, Japan, 15-19 October, 1995. pp. 904-907. Amersterdam: Elsevier.
Somers, V. K., Dyken, M. E., Clary, M. P. & Abboud, F. M. (1995). Sympathetic neural mechanisms in obstructive sleep apnea. The Journal of clinical investigation, 96(4), 1897-904. PMID: 7560081.
Dyken, M. E., Lin-Dyken, D. C., Seaba, P. & Yamada, T. (1995). Violent sleep-related behavior leading to subdural hemorrhage. Archives of neurology, 52(3), 318-21. PMID: 7872888.
Albanese, M. A., Clarke, W. R., Adams, H. P., Woolson, R. F. (1994). Ensuring reliability of outcome measures in multicenter clinical trials of treatments for acute ischemic stroke. The program developed for the Trial of Org 10172 in Acute Stroke Treatment (TOAST). Stroke, 25(9), 1746-1751. DOI: 10.1161/01.str.25.9.1746.
Dyken, M. E., Yamada, T., Lin-Dyken, D. C. & Seaba, P. (1994). Narcolepsy: unequivocal diagnosis after split-screen, video-polysomnographic analysis of a prolonged cataplectic attack. Neurology, 44(4), 760-1. PMID: 8164841.
Dyken, M. E., Biller, J. (1994). Peripartum Cardiomyopathy and Stroke. Cerebrovascular Diseases, 4(4), 325-328. DOI: 10.1159/000108502.
Somers, V. K., Dyken, M. E. & Abboud, F. M. (1993). Sympathetic-Nerve Activity during Sleep. (Vols. 328). (25), pp. 1850–1851. New England Journal of Medicine. PMID: 8347217.
Somers, V. K., Dyken, M. E., Mark, A. L. & Abboud, F. M. (1993). Sympathetic-nerve activity during sleep in normal subjects. The New England journal of medicine, 328(5), 303-7. PMID: 8419815.
Somers, V. K., Dyken, M. & Skinner, J. L. (1993). Autonomic and hemodynamic responses and interactions during the Mueller maneuver in humans. Journal of the autonomic nervous system, 44(2-3), 253-9. PMID: 8227959.
Dyken, M. E., Somers, V. K. & Yamada, T. (1993). Stroke, Sleep Apnea and Autonomic Instability. In Sleep Apnea and Rhonchopathy. pp. 166-168. S. Karger AG. DOI: 10.1159/000421851.
Dyken, M. E., Rodnitzky, R. L. (1992). Periodic, aperiodic, and rhythmic motor disorders of sleep. Neurology, 42(7 Suppl 6), 68-74. PMID: 1630642.
Somers, V. K., Dyken, M. E., Mark, A. L. & Abboud, F. M. (1992). Parasympathetic hyperresponsiveness and bradyarrhythmias during apnoea in hypertension. Clinical autonomic research : official journal of the Clinical Autonomic Research Society, 2(3), 171-6. PMID: 1498563.
Yasuhara, A., Yoshida, H., Hatanaka, T., Sugimoto, T., Kobayashi, Y. & Dyken, E. (1991). Epilepsy with continuous spike-waves during slow sleep and its treatment. Epilepsia, 32(1), 59-62. PMID: 1985831.
Dyken, M. E., Biller, J., Yuh, W. T., Fincham, R., Moore, S. A. & Justin, E. (1990). Carotid-cavernous sinus thrombosis caused by Aspergillus fumigatus: magnetic resonance imaging with pathologic correlation--a case report. Angiology, 41(8), 652-7. PMID: 2202234.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Warren Building, 350 McAllister Street, Fourth Floor, San Francisco, California, on October 2 and 3, 2017.
#16-199 T.H., a Minor, et al. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898. (D067839; 245 Cal.App.4th 589; Superior Court of San Diego County; 37-2013-00070440-CU-MM-CTL.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed an order in a civil action. The court limited review to the following issue: May the brand name manufacturer of a pharmaceutical drug that divested all ownership interest in the drug be held liable for injuries caused years later by another manufacturer’s generic version of that drug?
#16-269 Kurwa (Badrudin) v. Kislinger (Mark B.), et al., S234617. (B264641; nonpublished opinion; Superior Court of Los Angeles County; KC045216.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal in a civil action. This case presents the following issue: Can plaintiff take an appeal in the current posture of this litigation?
#16-295 Jackson (Patrick Lowell) v. Superior Court of Riverside County (People, Real Party in Interest), S235549. (E064010; 247 Cal.App.4th 767; Superior Court of Riverside County; INF1500950.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of peremptory mandate or prohibition. This case presents the following issue: After an incompetent defendant has reached the maximum three-year commitment provided for by law, can the prosecution initiate a new competency proceeding by obtaining dismissal of the original complaint and proceeding on a new charging document?
#16-38 People v. Gallardo (Sulma Marilyn), S231260. (B257357; nonpublished opinion; Superior Court of Los Angeles County; VA126705.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. The court limited review to the following issue: Was the trial court’s decision that defendant’s prior conviction constituted a strike incompatible with Descamps v. U.S. (2013) 570 U.S. __ (133 S.Ct. 2276) because the trial court relied on judicial fact-finding beyond the elements of the actual prior conviction?
#15-46 People v. Contreras (Leonel), et al., S224564. (D063428; nonpublished opinion; Superior Court of San Diego County; SCD236438.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing and otherwise affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. This case presents the following issue: Is a total sentence of 50 years to life or 58 years to life the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?
This matter is an automatic appeal from a judgment of death.
#16-362 People v. Frierson (James Belton), S236728. (B260774; 1 Cal.App.5th 788; Superior Court of Los Angeles County; GA043389.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed an order denying a petition to recall sentence. The court limited review to the following issue: What is the standard of proof for a finding of ineligibility for resentencing under Proposition 36? (See People v. Arevalo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 836; cf. People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020)?

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


17.11. Licenses of employers or representative contractors.
17.16. Responsibility of employer, representative contractor or contractor.
The provisions of this Chapter 17 issued under act of May 18, 1937 (P. L. 665, No. 176) (43 P. S. §§ 491-1 - 491-24), unless otherwise noted.
The provisions of this Chapter 17 adopted December 10, 1937; amended through July 1, 1968, unless otherwise noted.
Contractor - A person who for the account or benefit of an employer, representative contractor or other person, distributes to a homeworker, or any other person, not recruited or engaged by the employer, representative contractor or other person, articles or materials to be manufactured in a home, and returned to him or disposed of in accordance with his directions.
(i) Delivers, or causes to be delivered to another person, articles or materials to be manufactured in a home and returned to him, not for the personal use of himself or a member of his family, or disposed of in accordance with his directions.
(ii) Sells to another person, materials or articles for the purpose of having the articles or materials manufactured in a home and then rebuying the materials or articles after the manufacture, either by himself, or by someone designated by him.
Home - A room, house, apartment or other premises, which is most extensively used, in whole or in part, as a place of dwelling, and including outbuildings upon premises that are primarily used as a place of dwelling, where the outbuildings are under the control of the person dwelling on the premises.
Homework - The manufacture in a home of articles, or materials for an employer, a representative contractor or a contractor.
Homeworker - A person engaged in manufacturing in a home, articles or materials for an employer, a representative contractor or a contractor.
Manufacture - The preparing, altering, repairing, finishing or processing, in whole or in part, or handling in any way connected with the production, wrapping, packaging or preparation for display of an article or materials.
Person - An individual, partnership, firm, association, domestic or foreign corporation, the legal representatives of a deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee or successor of an individual, partnership, association or corporation.
Representative contractor - A person who receives from an employer, or contractor not within this Commonwealth, articles or materials to be distributed by him to a homeworker, or other person, not recruited or engaged by the employer or contractor, to be manufactured in a home, and returned to him, or disposed of, in accordance with his directions.
This chapter sets forth rules to safeguard the lives, limbs and health of workers who engage in industrial homework and places the responsibility of compliance with the rules upon both employer, the representative contractor or the contractor and employe.
A person who violates this chapter or regulations of the Department or who interferes with the Department or its authorized representative in the enforcement of the regulations will be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in accordance with section 7, 9 or 21 of act of May 18, 1937 (P. L. 665, No. 176) (43 P. S. § 491-7, § 491-9 or § 491-21).
§ 17.11. Licenses of employers or representative contractors.
An employer or representative contractor may not furnish material to a contractor or homeworker until the employer or representative contractor has first secured a permit from the Department. A contractor may not furnish material to homeworkers until the contractor has first secured a permit from the Department. A permit of contractor shall entitle the contractor to accept materials to be given to homeworkers only from those employers or representative contractors who have been issued permits by the Department as employers or representative contractors to distribute homework. If the employer is a resident of a jurisdiction other than this Commonwealth, he shall cause his authorized agent in this Commonwealth to secure a permit as a representative contractor. When a person furnishes, or causes to be furnished, material to a contractor for the purpose of manufacture in whole or in part by homeworkers this person shall be considered an employer, and shall be licensed as such. Permits may be revoked if, after a hearing, it is determined that this chapter or the act of May 18, 1937 (P. L. 665, No. 176) (43 P. S. §§ 491-1 - 491-24) or act of May 13, 1915 (P. L. 286, No. 177) (43 P. S. §§ 41 - 71), have been violated.
This section cited in 34 Pa. Code § 17.13 (relating to label).
§ 17.12. Report of homeworkers.
Each employer, representative contractor or contractor, whichever one distributes materials direct to homeworkers, shall forward to the Department between the first and 15th day of March, June, September and December, a complete list of homeworkers employed by him. The lists shall give the name, address and age of each homeworker, and the wages received. There shall also be submitted a statement of the materials furnished and articles manufactured by each homeworker. A list of contractors to whom materials have been furnished shall likewise be submitted by each employer or representative contractor furnishing materials to a contractor. Each contractor shall also submit a list of employers or representative contractors from whom he has received materials, and indicate whether or not the materials furnished were in turn given out to homeworkers.
The employer or representative contractor shall place upon each unit of delivery or shipment to a homeworker a label of a design which has been registered with the Department at the time of securing the license specified in § 17.11 (relating to licenses of employers or representative contractors). When material to homeworkers is distributed by a contractor, the label shall bear the name of the contractor in addition to the name of the employer or representative contractor. The labels may not be removed from the wrapper or container in which the homework is delivered until the work has been completed and returned to the employer.
The employer, representative contractor or contractor may not distribute directly or indirectly to a homeworker materials to be manufactured, finished, repaired, altered or handled in any manner until he has assured himself that the home in which the work is to be done is in a clean and sanitary condition and free from an infectious, contagious or communicable disease. The recommended Health and Sanitation Housing Standards of the Department of Health may be used as a guide for determining the sanitary condition of the home.
The employer, representative contractor or contractor upon being notified by a representative of the Department or local or the Department of Health of the existence of an infectious, contagious or communicable disease in a home where industrial homework is being done, shall, if permitted by the local or Department of Health, remove the articles or materials from the home. The articles or materials shall be immediately sterilized in a manner approved by the Department. The employer, representative contractor or contractor may not again furnish materials to a homeworker living in the home until he has been notified by one of the agents mentioned in this section that the home is free from the infectious, contagious or communicable disease.
§ 17.16. Responsibility of employer, representative contractor or contractor.
The employer, representative contractor or contractor, distributing materials directly to homeworkers, shall designate some person over 21 years of age, such as a parent, a guardian or homeworkers, in each home where homework is done as his authorized representative in that home, who, together with the employer, representative contractor or contractor is jointly responsible for the carrying out of the act of May 18, 1937 (P. L. 665, No. 176) (43 P. S. §§ 491-1 - 491-24) or the act of May 13, 1915 (P. L. 286, No. 177) (43 P. S. §§ 41 - 71) and this chapter. An employer or representative contractor who furnishes materials to a contractor to be distributed to homeworkers when that contractor is violating the provision of the laws or regulations applicable to industrial homework, shall be held jointly responsible with the contractor.
(a) A female may not be employed more than 10 hours per day, nor more than 48 hours per week nor more than 6 days per week.
(b) A female 17 years of age or younger may not be employed before 6 a.m. or after 9 p.m.
(c) A female may not be employed for more than 5 hours continuously without a rest or meal period of at least 30 minutes.
(a) Minors 15 years of age or under may not be employed in industrial homework. A minor between 16 and 18 may be employed in this work if it does not interfere with school attendance. The hours spent in school shall be considered as part of the working day or week. A minor 17 years of age or younger may not be employed for more than 44 hours a week, nor more than 8 hours per day.
(b) A minor 17 years of age or younger may not be employed without an employment certificate which shall be kept on file by the employer.
(c) General employment certificates are required when children between 16 and 18 are employed all the time.
(d) Vacation employment certificates are required when minors 16 to 18 work at any time except when they are required to attend school.
(e) Employment certificates may be issued only by the district superintendent, supervising principal or secretary of the board of school directors or other school official, deputized in writing by any of the other school officials authorized by law to issue certificates.
(f) Before an employment certificate is issued the prospective employer shall make a statement in writing that he expects to give employment to a minor applying for the certificate.
(g) Employers shall acknowledge in writing, to the issuing officer, receipt of an employment certificate within 3 days after the minor has begun working.
(h) Upon termination of employment, the employer shall return the employment certificate by mail to the issuing school official.


In all seven actions, an enrollee was involved in an accident resulting in injuries arising from the use, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. Ultimately, Plaintiff paid the medical expenses when the defendant auto insurer was supposed to pay and failed to do so. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged in its pleadings that the facts and law supported its authority to bring its state law claims and, particularly in Allstate II, a private cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).
Plaintiff filed its state law claims in Florida state court, but the defendant auto insurers removed the action. Although removal was timely, they ineffectively argued that Plaintiff’s state law claims were masking a private cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) due to the complaints’ references to federal law. However, Plaintiff’s arguments prevailed, since although its standing is based on federal law, it presented no federal law claims.
The federal courts addressed the following, whether: (1) a substantial question of federal law was present in the complaint; (2) the claims were completely preempted by federal law; and (3) there was diversity jurisdiction.
Further, only the Liberty Mutual court addressed diversity jurisdiction, whereby the auto insurer conceded that it was lacking. In pertinent part, it stated that “if the attorney’s fees are attributed pro rata among all potential class members . . . the amount in controversy likely would not be met.” Hence, MSP Recovery victoriously established that although Plaintiff references federal law, its state law claims belong in state court.
In these cases, the defendant auto insurers argued that the “revival exception” created a basis to remove Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The auto insurers “attempt[ed] to circumvent the removal statute by relying on the narrow judicially created exception of revival.” However, the federal courts held, even for a second time in IDS II, that the removal was untimely. The Eleventh Circuit had yet to endorse the “revival exception”; and assuming it did apply, it was inapplicable in Plaintiff’s cases. Therefore, MSP Recovery prevented auto insurers from using the “revival exception” as a second-opportunity to avoid an untimely removal, and solidified seven victories.
 MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., Case No. 16-CV-20271-DPG (S.D. Fla. 2016) (ordering a remand to state court on July 14, 2016); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV- 20328-RNS (S.D. Fla. 2016) (same on June 30, 2016); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-20443-RNS (S.D. Fla. 2016) (same on June 29, 2016) (“Allstate I”); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-21148-RNS (S.D. Fla. 2016) (same for a different enrollee on July 6, 2016) (“Allstate II”); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-20901-DPG (S.D. Fla. 2016) (same on July 14, 2016); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-20223-JLK (S.D. Fla. 2016) (ordering the first remand to state court on March 3, 2016) (“IDS I”); MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-21040-JLK (S.D. Fla. 2016) (ordering the second Remand to state court on March 29, 2016) (“IDS II”).
 In Allstate I, IDS I, Liberty Mutual, Security National, and Direct General (hereinafter collectively “State Law Actions”), Plaintiff’s complaint only addressed state law claims.
 The “revival exception” allows a defendant, that failed to remove an action to federal court within thirty days of the first available basis, a second opportunity to remove the action “based on the occurrence of certain later events.” Doe v. Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2006). After Plaintiff amended its complaint, the defendant auto insurers sought to remove the action in IDS II and Allstate II under the “revival exception” (hereinafter collectively “Amended State Law Actions”).
 Diversity Jurisdiction requires an amount-in-controversy in excess of $75,000 and for the parties to be citizens of different states pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
 Liberty Mut. Ins., Case No. 16-CV-20271-DPG.
 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
 Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Reale, 180 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Reale”).
 Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-20443-RNS.
 Bolden v. Healthspring of Ala. Inc., 2007 WL 4403588, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2007).
 Allstate Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV-21148-RNS.
 Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., Case No. 16-CV- 20328-RNS (emphasis added).
 Liberty Mut. Ins., Case No. 16-CV-20271-DPG (emphasis added).