Purchases made as a result of a federal grant award are subject to Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Procurement Standards, as can be found in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR) - Procurement Standards Sections 200.317 through 200.326. Such purchases are also subject to all University policies as listed in policies 2.1 through 2.8. Whenever there is potential conflict between bid limits, the lower of the 2 policies will apply. This policy outlines the competitive bid requirements as found in eCFR.
This Policy applies to all WSU employees and external contractors involved in the procurement of goods and services for the University resulting from a federal award, regardless of whether the University is the prime contractor or is serving as a subcontractor to another federal grant recipient. The policy applies regardless of whether the employee is serving as an administrator within a Department or Unit, or the final end user of such goods and services. The policy applies to National Science Foundation (NSF) awards or funding amendments commencing as of March 01, 2018, and all other federal awards or amendments commencing with the University's fiscal year 2019, or October 1, 2018. This policy includes acquisition both by the requisitioning / purchase order (PO) process and by Procard.
The Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (e-CFR) is a regularly updated, unofficial editorial compilation of CFR material and Federal Register amendments produced by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of the Federal Register (OFR) and the Government Printing Office.
Small purchase procedures are those relatively simple and informal procurement methods for securing services, supplies, or other property that do not cost more than the Simplified Acquisition Threshold. If small purchase procedures are used, price or rate quotations must be obtained from an adequate number of qualified sources.
eCFR Sealed Bids (formal advertising).
Bids are publicly solicited and a firm fixed price contract (lump sum or unit price) is awarded to the responsible bidder whose bid, conforming with all the material terms and conditions of the invitation for bids, is the lowest in price. The sealed bid method is the preferred method for procuring construction, if the conditions in paragraph (c)(1) of this section apply.
(iii) The procurement lends itself to a firm fixed price contract and the selection of the successful bidder can be made principally on the basis of price.
(v) Any or all bids may be rejected if there is a sound documented reason.
The non-Federal entity may use competitive proposal procedures for qualifications-based procurement of architectural/engineering (A/E) professional services whereby competitors' qualifications are evaluated and the most qualified competitor is selected, subject to negotiation of fair and reasonable compensation. The method, where price is not used as a selection factor, can only be used in procurement of A/E professional services. It cannot be used to purchase other types of services though A/E firms are a potential source to perform the proposed effort.
(4) After solicitation of a number of sources, competition is determined inadequate.
Descriptions of each item are listed in the definition section above. The complete policy can be found at U.S Government Publishing Office's site by clicking on this link. Appendix 1 below contains the complete text of the policy as of 6-18-2018. The current policy on the eCFR site will always prevail over Appendix 1. Such purchases are also subject to all University policies as listed in APPM Policies 2.1 through 2.8.
Determine if a purchase request on a federal award will be for $25,000 or more. If greater than $25,000, a competitive bid or Request for Proposal process is required. For all contracts that are to be signed by the PASS Director, Associate Vice President and/or CFO, the bid or Request for Proposal process is to be conducted by Procurement & Strategic Sourcing. The responsible department, college or division must provide all supporting documents.
The requestor must document the necessity for an exception to bid in a "request for bid waiver" form to the Associate Vice President of PASS. A bid waiver request form is available on the Procurement website.
Determine if the Purchase is being made with federal funds, based on the fund found in the FOAPAL. A Special Approval Queue is set up for this purpose as shown in APPM 2.1 – Special Approvals under Federal Grant Related Purchases.
When procuring property and services under a Federal award, a state must follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The state will comply with §200.322 Procurement of recovered materials and ensure that every purchase order or other contract includes any clauses required by section §200.326 Contract provisions. All other non-Federal entities, including subrecipients of a state, will follow §§200.318 General procurement standards through 200.326 Contract provisions.
(a) The non-Federal entity must use its own documented procurement procedures which reflect applicable State, local, and tribal laws and regulations, provided that the procurements conform to applicable Federal law and the standards identified in this part.
(b) Non-Federal entities must maintain oversight to ensure that contractors perform in accordance with the terms, conditions, and specifications of their contracts or purchase orders.
(c)(1) The non-Federal entity must maintain written standards of conduct covering conflicts of interest and governing the actions of its employees engaged in the selection, award and administration of contracts. No employee, officer, or agent may participate in the selection, award, or administration of a contract supported by a Federal award if he or she has a real or apparent conflict of interest. Such a conflict of interest would arise when the employee, officer, or agent, any member of his or her immediate family, his or her partner, or an organization which employs or is about to employ any of the parties indicated herein, has a financial or other interest in or a tangible personal benefit from a firm considered for a contract. The officers, employees, and agents of the non-Federal entity may neither solicit nor accept gratuities, favors, or anything of monetary value from contractors or parties to subcontracts. However, non-Federal entities may set standards for situations in which the financial interest is not substantial or the gift is an unsolicited item of nominal value. The standards of conduct must provide for disciplinary actions to be applied for violations of such standards by officers, employees, or agents of the non-Federal entity.
(2) If the non-Federal entity has a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary organization that is not a state, local government, or Indian tribe, the non-Federal entity must also maintain written standards of conduct covering organizational conflicts of interest. Organizational conflicts of interest means that because of relationships with a parent company, affiliate, or subsidiary organization, the non-Federal entity is unable or appears to be unable to be impartial in conducting a procurement action involving a related organization.
(d) The non-Federal entity's procedures must avoid acquisition of unnecessary or duplicative items. Consideration should be given to consolidating or breaking out procurements to obtain a more economical purchase. Where appropriate, an analysis will be made of lease versus purchase alternatives, and any other appropriate analysis to determine the most economical approach.
(e) To foster greater economy and efficiency, and in accordance with efforts to promote cost-effective use of shared services across the Federal Government, the non-Federal entity is encouraged to enter into state and local intergovernmental agreements or inter-entity agreements where appropriate for procurement or use of common or shared goods and services.
(f) The non-Federal entity is encouraged to use Federal excess and surplus property in lieu of purchasing new equipment and property whenever such use is feasible and reduces project costs.
(g) The non-Federal entity is encouraged to use value engineering clauses in contracts for construction projects of sufficient size to offer reasonable opportunities for cost reductions. Value engineering is a systematic and creative analysis of each contract item or task to ensure that its essential function is provided at the overall lower cost.
(h) The non-Federal entity must award contracts only to responsible contractors possessing the ability to perform successfully under the terms and conditions of a proposed procurement. Consideration will be given to such matters as contractor integrity, compliance with public policy, record of past performance, and financial and technical resources. See also §200.213 Suspension and debarment.
(i) The non-Federal entity must maintain records sufficient to detail the history of procurement. These records will include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: rationale for the method of procurement, selection of contract type, contractor selection or rejection, and the basis for the contract price.
(ii) Direct labor hours charged at fixed hourly rates that reflect wages, general and administrative expenses, and profit.
(2) Since this formula generates an open-ended contract price, a time-and-materials contract provides no positive profit incentive to the contractor for cost control or labor efficiency. Therefore, each contract must set a ceiling price that the contractor exceeds at its own risk. Further, the non-Federal entity awarding such a contract must assert a high degree of oversight in order to obtain reasonable assurance that the contractor is using efficient methods and effective cost controls.
(k) The non-Federal entity alone must be responsible, in accordance with good administrative practice and sound business judgment, for the settlement of all contractual and administrative issues arising out of procurements. These issues include, but are not limited to, source evaluation, protests, disputes, and claims. These standards do not relieve the non-Federal entity of any contractual responsibilities under its contracts. The Federal awarding agency will not substitute its judgment for that of the non-Federal entity unless the matter is primarily a Federal concern. Violations of law will be referred to the local, state, or Federal authority having proper jurisdiction.
(7) Any arbitrary action in the procurement process.
(b) The non-Federal entity must conduct procurements in a manner that prohibits the use of statutorily or administratively imposed state, local, or tribal geographical preferences in the evaluation of bids or proposals, except in those cases where applicable Federal statutes expressly mandate or encourage geographic preference. Nothing in this section preempts state licensing laws. When contracting for architectural and engineering (A/E) services, geographic location may be a selection criterion provided its application leaves an appropriate number of qualified firms, given the nature and size of the project, to compete for the contract.
(2) Identify all requirements which the offerors must fulfill and all other factors to be used in evaluating bids or proposals.
(d) The non-Federal entity must ensure that all prequalified lists of persons, firms, or products which are used in acquiring goods and services are current and include enough qualified sources to ensure maximum open and free competition. Also, the non-Federal entity must not preclude potential bidders from qualifying during the solicitation period.
§200.320 Methods of procurement to be followed.
The non-Federal entity must use one of the following methods of procurement.
(a) Procurement by micro-purchases. Procurement by micro-purchase is the acquisition of supplies or services, the aggregate dollar amount of which does not exceed the micro-purchase threshold (§200.67 Micro-purchase). To the extent practicable, the non-Federal entity must distribute micro-purchases equitably among qualified suppliers. Micro-purchases may be awarded without soliciting competitive quotations if the non-Federal entity considers the price to be reasonable.
(b) Procurement by small purchase procedures. Small purchase procedures are those relatively simple and informal procurement methods for securing services, supplies, or other property that do not cost more than the Simplified Acquisition Threshold. If small purchase procedures are used, price or rate quotations must be obtained from an adequate number of qualified sources.
(c) Procurement by sealed bids (formal advertising). Bids are publicly solicited and a firm fixed price contract (lump sum or unit price) is awarded to the responsible bidder whose bid, conforming with all the material terms and conditions of the invitation for bids, is the lowest in price. The sealed bid method is the preferred method for procuring construction, if the conditions in paragraph (c)(1) of this section apply.
(5) The non-Federal entity may use competitive proposal procedures for qualifications-based procurement of architectural/engineering (A/E) professional services whereby competitors' qualifications are evaluated and the most qualified competitor is selected, subject to negotiation of fair and reasonable compensation. The method, where price is not used as a selection factor, can only be used in procurement of A/E professional services. It cannot be used to purchase other types of services though A/E firms are a potential source to perform the proposed effort.
§200.321 Contracting with small and minority businesses, women's business enterprises, and labor surplus area firms.
(a) The non-Federal entity must take all necessary affirmative steps to assure that minority businesses, women's business enterprises, and labor surplus area firms are used when possible.
(6) Requiring the prime contractor, if subcontracts are to be let, to take the affirmative steps listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) of this section.
§200.322 Procurement of recovered materials.
§200.323 Contract cost and price.
(a) The non-Federal entity must perform a cost or price analysis in connection with every procurement action in excess of the Simplified Acquisition Threshold including contract modifications. The method and degree of analysis is dependent on the facts surrounding the particular procurement situation, but as a starting point, the non-Federal entity must make independent estimates before receiving bids or proposals.
(b) The non-Federal entity must negotiate profit as a separate element of the price for each contract in which there is no price competition and in all cases where cost analysis is performed. To establish a fair and reasonable profit, consideration must be given to the complexity of the work to be performed, the risk borne by the contractor, the contractor's investment, the amount of subcontracting, the quality of its record of past performance, and industry profit rates in the surrounding geographical area for similar work.
(c) Costs or prices based on estimated costs for contracts under the Federal award are allowable only to the extent that costs incurred or cost estimates included in negotiated prices would be allowable for the non-Federal entity under Subpart E—Cost Principles of this part. The non-Federal entity may reference its own cost principles that comply with the Federal cost principles.
(d) The cost plus a percentage of cost and percentage of construction cost methods of contracting must not be used.
§200.324 Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity review.
(a) The non-Federal entity must make available, upon request of the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity, technical specifications on proposed procurements where the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity believes such review is needed to ensure that the item or service specified is the one being proposed for acquisition. This review generally will take place prior to the time the specification is incorporated into a solicitation document. However, if the non-Federal entity desires to have the review accomplished after a solicitation has been developed, the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity may still review the specifications, with such review usually limited to the technical aspects of the proposed purchase.
(5) A proposed contract modification changes the scope of a contract or increases the contract amount by more than the Simplified Acquisition Threshold.
(c) The non-Federal entity is exempt from the pre-procurement review in paragraph (b) of this section if the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity determines that its procurement systems comply with the standards of this part.
(2) The non-Federal entity may self-certify its procurement system. Such self-certification must not limit the Federal awarding agency's right to survey the system. Under a self-certification procedure, the Federal awarding agency may rely on written assurances from the non-Federal entity that it is complying with these standards. The non-Federal entity must cite specific policies, procedures, regulations, or standards as being in compliance with these requirements and have its system available for review.
(a) A bid guarantee from each bidder equivalent to five percent of the bid price. The "bid guarantee" must consist of a firm commitment such as a bid bond, certified check, or other negotiable instrument accompanying a bid as assurance that the bidder will, upon acceptance of the bid, execute such contractual documents as may be required within the time specified.
(b) A performance bond on the part of the contractor for 100 percent of the contract price. A "performance bond" is one executed in connection with a contract to secure fulfillment of all the contractor's obligations under such contract.
(c) A payment bond on the part of the contractor for 100 percent of the contract price. A "payment bond" is one executed in connection with a contract to assure payment as required by law of all persons supplying labor and material in the execution of the work provided for in the contract.
The non-Federal entity's contracts must contain the applicable provisions described in Appendix II to Part 200—Contract Provisions for non-Federal Entity Contracts Under Federal Awards.


2-2507. Inspection fee; stamps; quarterly payment; reports and records; disposition of moneys received; egg fee fund. (a) For the purpose of financing the administration and enforcement of this act, there is hereby levied an inspection fee on all graded eggs sold, offered or exposed for sale or distributed to food purveyors or retailers at the rate of 3.5 mills for each dozen eggs. Such fee shall be paid by the last handler. The inspection fee shall be paid only once on the same quantity of eggs so long as such eggs remain in the eggs' original container.
(b) The secretary shall provide inspection fee stamps for sale to persons requesting such stamps. The price of such inspection fee stamps shall include the printing and mailing costs thereof. Such inspection fee stamps shall also serve as a label indicating size and quality in boldface type letters not less than 3/8 inch in height.
(c) Persons desiring to report and pay the inspection fee quarterly, in lieu of using such inspection fee stamps, may make application to the secretary for a permit to pay the inspection fee quarterly, except that in no event shall the inspection fee for any quarter be less than $15. The secretary may grant the permit if the applicant agrees to keep such records and make such report as may be necessary to indicate accurately the quantity of eggs sold on which the inspection fee is due, and if the applicant agrees to grant the secretary permission to verify the statement of quantity of eggs sold. The report shall be filed in the office of the secretary, and shall be due and payable on the first day of October, January, April and July for the previous three months. If the report is not filed and the inspection fee is not paid within 30 days after the due date, or if the report of quantity is false, the secretary may revoke the permit. In addition to the inspection fee there may be assessed against the permit holder a penalty of $5 per day for each day the inspection fee remains unpaid after the 30-day period has expired. Such records of quantity sold shall be held for a period of three years.
(d) If the department finds that the fees specified in this section are providing more funds than necessary for the administration of this act, the department may reduce the above-mentioned fee pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the secretary. The secretary may increase such fee when necessary, pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the secretary, except that such fee shall not exceed the rate specified in subsection (a). The secretary shall remit all moneys received by or for the secretary under article 25 of chapter 2 of [the] Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, to the state treasurer in accordance with the provision of K.S.A. 75-4215, and amendments thereto. Upon receipt of each such remittance, the state treasurer shall deposit the entire amount in the state treasury to the credit of the egg fee fund. All expenditures from such fund shall be made in accordance with appropriation acts upon warrants of the director of accounts and reports issued pursuant to vouchers approved by the secretary of agriculture or by a person or persons designated by the secretary.
History: L. 1955, ch. 9, § 7; L. 1971, ch. 7, § 2; L. 1973, ch. 2, § 10; L. 1979, ch. 10, § 1; L. 2000, ch. 57, § 7; L. 2001, ch. 5, § 19; L. 2006, ch. 90, § 5; July 1.


text:
A person for whose delivery a demand has been made by executive authority of one state upon the executive authority of another state under clause 2 of section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution, and who shows conclusively, and upon conceded facts, that he was not within the demanding state at the time stated in the indictment, nor at any time when the acts were, if ever, committed, is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of Rev.Stat. sec. 6278, and the federal statute upon the subject of interstate extradition and rendition.
If the governor of the state upon whom the demand is made issues a warrant for the apprehension and delivery of such a person, the warrant is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused, and it is open to him, on habeas corpus proceedings, to show that the charge upon which his delivery is demanded assumes that he was absent from the demanding state at the time the crime alleged was, if ever, committed.
This proceeding by habeas corpus was commenced by the relator, defendant in error, to obtain his discharge from imprisonment by the plaintiff in error, the Chief of Police in the City of Albany, State of New York, who held the relator by means of a warrant issued in extradition proceedings by the governor of New York. The justice of the supreme court of New York to whom the petition for the writ was addressed, and also, upon appeal, the appellate division of the supreme court of New York, refused to grant the relator's discharge, but the Court of Appeals reversed their orders and discharged him. 172 N.Y. 176. A writ of error has been taken from this Court to review the latter judgment.
The relator stated in his petition for the writ that he was arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant by the Governor of New York, granted on a requisition from the Governor of Tennessee, reciting that relator had been indicted in that state for the crime of grand larceny and false pretenses, and that he was a fugitive from the justice of that state; that the warrant under which he was held showed that the crimes with which he was charged were committed in Tennessee, and the relator stated that nowhere did it appear in the papers that he was personally present within the State of Tennessee at the time the alleged crimes were stated to have been committed; that the Governor had no jurisdiction to issue his warrant, in that it did not appear before him that the relator was a fugitive from the justice of the State of Tennessee, or had fled therefrom; that it did not appear that there was any evidence that relator was personally or continuously present in Tennessee when the crimes were alleged to have been committed; that it appeared on the face of the indictments accompanying the requisition that no crime under the laws of Tennessee was charged or had been committed. Upon this petition, the writ was issued and served.
The return of the plaintiff in error, the chief of police, was to the effect that the relator was held by virtue of a warrant of the Governor of New York, and a copy of it was annexed.
"The Governor of the State of New York to the Chief of Police, Albany, N.Y. and the sheriffs, undersheriffs and other officers of and in the several cities and counties of this state authorized by subdivision 1 of section 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to execute this warrant:"
and taken refuge in the State of New York, and the said Governor of the State of Tennessee having, pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, demanded of me that I cause the said Charles E. Corkran to be arrested and delivered to Vernon Sharpe, who is duly authorized to receive him into his custody and convey him back to the said State of Tennessee; which said demand is accompanied by copies of indictment and other documents duly certified by the said Governor of the State of Tennessee to be authentic and duly authenticated and charging the said Charles E. Corkran with having committed the said crimes and fled from the said state and taken refuge in the State of New York;"
"You are hereby required to arrest and secure the said Charles E. Corkran wherever he may be found within this state and thereafter and after compliance with the requirements of section 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to deliver him into the custody of the said Vernon Sharpe, to be taken back to the said state from which he fled, pursuant to the said requisition, and also to return this warrant and make return to the executive chamber within thirty days from the date hereof of all your proceedings had thereunder, and of the facts and circumstances relating thereto."
"Given under my seal and the privy seal of the state at the capitol in the City of Albany, this 13th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two."
"[L. S.] B. B. Odell, Jr."
"By the Governor: James G. Graham,"
the warrant of arrest was issued, and that they charged him with the commission of the crime of larceny and false pretenses on the 20th and 30th days of April, the 8th day of May, and the 17th and the 24th days of June, 1901. The relator in his affidavit also asserted that he was not in the State of Tennessee at any time in the months of March, April, May, or June, 1901, or at any time for more than a year prior to the month of March, 1901, and he denied that he had fled from the State of Tennessee, or that he was a fugitive from the justice of that state. He further therein stated that he had heard read the papers accompanying the requisition of the Governor of Tennessee to the Governor of New York, and that those papers did not contain any evidence or proof that he had been in the State of Tennessee at any stated time since the 26th and 27th days of May, 1899, and they contained no evidence or proof that he was in the State of Tennessee on any day in any of the months set forth in the indictments when the crime or crimes were alleged to have been committed.
"It is conceded that the relator was not within the State of Tennessee between the first day of May, 1899, and the first day of July, 1901. It is also conceded that the relator was in the State of Tennessee on the 2d day of July, 1901."
"The following additional facts are hereby conceded, and the same shall be incorporated in the appeal record herein, as a part thereof, and shall constitute a part of the record upon which the appellate division may hear and determine the appeal herein, i.e. --"
have been committed on the first day of May, 1901, on the 8th day of May, 1901, and on the 24th day of June, 1901, respectively."
Upon the hearing before the judge on March 17, 1902, the relator was sworn without out objection, and testified that he had been living in the State of New York for the past fourteen months; that his residence when at home was in Lutherville, Maryland; that he was in the City of Nashville, in the State of Tennessee, on July 2, 1901, and (under objection as immaterial) had gone there on business connected with a lumber company in which he was a heavy stockholder; that he arrived in the city on July 2, in the morning, and left about half-past seven in the evening of the same day, and while there he notified the Union Bank & Trust Company (the subsequent prosecutor herein) that the resignation of the president of the lumber company had been demanded, and would probably be accepted that day. After such notification, and on the same day, the resignation was obtained, and the Union Bank & Trust Company was notified thereof by the relator before leaving the city on the evening of that day; that he passed through the City of Nashville on the 16th or 17th of July thereafter on his way to Chattanooga, but did not stop at Nashville at that time, and had not been in the State of Tennessee since the 16th day of July, 1901 at the time he went to Chattanooga; that he had never lived in the State of Tennessee, and had not been in that state between the 26th or 27th of May, 1899, and the second day of July, 1901.
Upon this state of facts, the judge before whom the hearing was had dismissed the writ and remanded the relator to the custody of the defendant Hyatt, as chief of police. This order was affirmed without any opinion by the appellate division of the supreme court, but, as stated, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals and the relator discharged.
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
"SEC. 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the state or territory making such demand shall be paid by such state or territory."
"It is conceded that the determination of the fact by the executive of the state in issuing his warrant of arrest, upon a demand made on that ground, whether the writ contains a recital of an express finding to that effect or not, must be regarded as sufficient to justify the removal until the presumption in its favor is overthrown by contrary proof"
In People v. Brady, 56 N.Y. 182, it was held that the courts have jurisdiction to interfere by writ of habeas corpus, and to examine the grounds upon which an executive warrant for the apprehension of an alleged fugitive from justice from another state is issued, and, in case the papers are defective and insufficient, to discharge the prisoner.
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime was sufficient to authorize the demand for his surrender.
We are of opinion that the warrant of the Governor is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused, and that it is open to him to show by admissions, such as are herein produced, or by other conclusive evidence, that the charge upon which extradition is demanded assumes the absence of the accused person from the state at the time the crime was, if ever, committed. This is in accordance with the authorities in the states cited in the opinion of Judge Cullen in the New York Court of Appeals, and is, as we think, founded upon correct principles. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, recognizing authority of states to act by habeas corpus in extradition proceedings.
If upon a question of fact, made before the Governor, which he ought to decide, there were evidence pro and con, the courts might not be justified in reviewing the decision of the Governor upon such question. In a case like that, where there was some evidence sustaining the finding, the courts might regard the decision of the Governor as conclusive. But here, as we have the testimony of the relator (uncontradicted) and the stipulation of counsel as to what the facts were, we have the right, and it is our duty on such proof and concession, to say whether a case was made out within the federal statute, justifying the action of the Governor. It is upon the statute that the inquiry must rest.
state at the times named in the indictments, and when those facts are proved so that there is no dispute in regard to them, and there is no claim of any error in the dates named in the indictments, the facts so proved are sufficient to show that the person was not in the state when the crimes were, if ever, committed.
The New York Court of Appeals has construed the stipulation as conceding these facts, and we think that its construction of the stipulation is the correct one.
It is, however, contended that a person may be guilty of a larceny or false pretense within a state without being personally present in the state at the time. Therefore, the indictments found were sufficient justification for the requisition and for the action of the Governor of New York thereon. This raises the question whether the relator could have been a fugitive from justice when it is conceded he was not in the State of Tennessee at the time of the commission of those acts for which he had been indicted, assuming that he committed them outside of the state.
The exercise of Jurisdiction by a state to make an act committed outside its borders a crime against the state is one thing, but to assert that the party committing such act comes under the federal statute, and is to be delivered up as a fugitive from the justice of that state, is quite a different proposition.
The language of section 5278, Rev.Stat., provides, as we think, that the act shall have been committed by an individual who was at the time of its commission personally present within the state which demands his surrender. It speaks of a demand by the executive authority of a state for the surrender of a person as a fugitive from justice, by the executive authority of a state to which such person has fled, and it provides that a copy of the indictment found, or affidavit made before a magistrate of any state, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, etc., certified as authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, shall be produced, and it makes it the duty of the executive authority of the state to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured.
Thus, the person who is sought must be one who has fled from the demanding state, and he must have fled (not necessarily directly) to the state where he is found. It is difficult to see how a person can be said to have fled from the state in which he is charged to have committed some act amounting to a crime against that state when in fact he was not within the state at the time the act is said to have been committed. How can a person flee from a place that he was not in? He could avoid a place that he had not been in; he could omit to go to it; but how can it be said with accuracy that he has fled from a place in which he had not been present? This is neither a narrow nor, as we think, an incorrect interpretation of the statute. It has been in existence since 1793, and we have found no case decided by this Court wherein it has been held that the statute covered a case where the party was not in the state at the time when the act is alleged to have been committed. We think the plain meaning of the act requires such presence, and that it was not intended to include, as a fugitive from the justice of a state, one who had not been in the state at the time when, if ever, the offense was committed, and who had not therefore in fact fled therefrom.
by the act of Congress, to cause the arrest of appellant and his delivery to the agent appointed by the Governor of Pennsylvania without proof of the fact that he was a fugitive from justice is, in our judgment, clear from the language of that act. Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the mere requisition by the executive of the demanding state, accompanied by the copy of an indictment, or an affidavit before a magistrate, certified by him to be authentic, charging the accused with crime committed within her limits, imposes upon the executive of the state or territory where the accused is found the duty of surrendering him, although he may be satisfied, from incontestible proof, that the accused had, in fact never been in the demanding state, and therefore could not be said to have fled from its justice. Upon the executive of the state in which the accused is found rests the responsibility of determining in some legal mode whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. He does not fail in duty if he makes it a condition precedent to the surrender of the accused that it be shown to him by competent proof that the accused is in fact a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state."
"The appellant, in his affidavit, does not deny that he was in the State of New York about the date of the day laid in the indictment, when the offense is alleged to have been committed, and states, by way of inference only, that he was not in that state on that very day, and the fact that he has not been within the state since the finding of the indictment is irrelevant and immaterial."
in the affidavit or indictment, and that it was a fact jurisdictional in its nature, without which he could not be proceeded against under the federal statute.
the highest state court where a decision could be had, instead of determining the question summarily on habeas corpus.
It is contended, however, that there are cases in this Court which sustain the proposition maintained by the plaintiff in error herein, and Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, supra, is referred to as authority. It is therein held that the words "treason, felony, or other crime," spoken of in the Constitution, included every offense forbidden and made punishable by the laws of the state where the offense is committed, and it is therefore argued that, as an act committed outside its borders may, under certain circumstances, become a crime against the state, a person thus committing such an act comes within the meaning of the Constitution, and should be surrendered upon demand of the Governor of the state whose law he is alleged to have violated.
felony. 4 Bl.Com. 5, 6, and note 3, Wendell's edition. But as the word 'crime' would have included treason and felony, without specially mentioning those offenses, it seems to be supposed that the natural and legal import of the word, by associating it with those offenses, must be restricted and confined to offenses already known to the common law and to the usage of nations, and regarded as offenses in every civilized community, and that they do not extend to acts made offenses by local statute, growing out of local circumstances, nor to offenses against ordinary police regulations. This is one of the grounds upon which the Governor of Ohio refused to deliver Lago, under the advice of the attorney general of that state."
"But this inference is founded upon an obvious mistake as to the purposes for which the words 'treason and felony' were introduced. They were introduced for the purpose of guarding against any restriction of the word 'crime,' and to prevent this provision from being construed by the rules and usages of independent nations in compacts for delivering up fugitives from justice."
"This compact, ingrafted in the Constitution, included, and was intended to include, every offense made punishable by the law of the state in which it was committed, and that it gives the right to the executive authority of the state to demand the fugitive from the executive authority of the state in which he is found; that the right given to 'demand' implies that it is an absolute right, and it follows that there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the state to which the fugitive has fled."
and that the courts could not coerce the state executive or other state officer as such to perform any duty by act of Congress. On that ground, the motion for a mandamus to compel the Governor of Ohio to issue his warrant was refused. Nothing in that case can be regarded as any authority for the proposition contended for here. The case assumed the presence of the party in the state at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. The question was whether, upon such assumption, the executive of the state upon whom the demand was made could examine as to the character of the crime and refuse to deliver up, in his discretion.
To the same effect is Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642. In that case, the objection was made in the court of original jurisdiction that there could be no valid requisition based upon an indictment for an offense less than a felony. It was held that such view was erroneous, and Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, was cited in support of that proposition, yet it was in this very case of Reggel that the remarks already quoted were made, that the person demanded was entitled to insist upon proof that he was within the demanding state at the time that he is charged to have committed the crime, and subsequently withdrew therefrom to another jurisdiction, so that he could not be reached by the criminal process of the state where the act was committed.
In the case of In re White, 55 F. 54, 58, in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it was said by Lacombe, Circuit Judge, that it was proper to inquire upon habeas corpus whether the prisoner was in fact within the demanding state when the alleged crime was committed, for if he were not, it could not be properly held that he had fled from it.
The subsequent presence for one day (under the circumstances stated above) of the relator in the State of Tennessee, eight days after the alleged commission of the act, did not, when he left the state, render him a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the statute. There is no evidence or claim that he then committed any act which brought him within the criminal law of the State of Tennessee, or that he was indicted for any act then committed. The proof is uncontradicted that he went there on business, transacted it, and came away. The complaint was not made, nor the indictments found, until months after that time. His departure from the state after the conclusion of his business cannot be regarded as a fleeing from justice within the meaning of the statute. He must have been there when the crime was committed, as alleged, and if not, a subsequent going there and coming away is not a flight.
We are of opinion that, as the relator showed without contradiction and upon conceded facts that he was not within the State of Tennessee at the times stated in the indictments found in the Tennessee court, nor at any time when the acts were, if ever, committed, he was not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the federal statute upon that subject, and upon these facts the warrant of the Governor of the State of New York was improperly issued, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York discharging the relator from imprisonment by reason of such warrant must be affirmed.
* Wilcox v. Nolze, (1878) 34 Ohio St. 520, 324; Jones v. Leonard, (1878) 50 Ia. 106; In re Mohr, (1883) 73 Ala. 503, 514; In re Fetter, (1852) 23 N.J.L. 311; Hartman v. Aveline, (1878) 63 Ind. 345; Ex Parte Knowles, (1894) 16 Ky. Law Rep. 263; Kingsbury's Case, (1870) 106 Mass. 223, 227; State v. Hall, (1894) 115 N.C. 811; 2 Moore on Extradition secs. 579, 581, 584; Spear on Extradition 310 et seq.; Cooley, Const.Lim., 4th ed., 21, note 1; 3 Crim.Law Rep. 806 et seq., published 1882.

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Q. In its February 2001 Garrett decision, the Supreme Court chose not to decide whether Congress had the authority to abrogate states? Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits brought under Title II of the ADA. How have the circuit courts dealt with the Title II abrogation issue post-Garrett?
A. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states? Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits brought under Title I of the ADA. In order to enact valid Section 5 legislation that goes beyond the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the Court ruled, Congress must act pursuant to a record of unconstitutional conduct, and the legislation must exhibit ?congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.? See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
In Garrett, the Court opted not to decide whether Congress validly abrogated states? Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits brought under Title II of the ADA. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. Thus, at least for now, it has been left to the circuit courts to determine this important question. Since Garrett, six of the 12 appellate courts have issued decisions squarely deciding the Title II abrogation question, but no consensus has emerged from these courts on the issue. Instead, as discussed in more detail below, to date the appellate courts have provided three different answers to the question of whether Title II validly abrogates a state?s immunity: Yes, No, and Sometimes.
A. YES ? Congress validly abrogated states? EleventhAmendment immunity to suits brought under Title II.
The only post-Garrett appellate court case holding unequivocally that Congress validly abrogated states? immunity when it enacted Title II is the Ninth Circuit?s decision in Hason v. Medical Board of California. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Ninth Circuit did not engage in any analysis of the abrogation issue in light of the Supreme Court?s discussion in Garrett. Instead, the court said only that 1) the Ninth Circuit had twice decided pre-Garrett that states? immunity had been abrogated by the enactment of Title II; see Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999), and Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997); 2) the Supreme Court made clear in Garrett that it was not deciding the Title II abrogation question; and 3) ?[w]e therefore conclude that Garrett does not overrule either Clark or Dare and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Dr. Hason?s Title II claims.? Hason, 279 F.3d at 1170-71. Given this cursory handling of the abrogation question, the persuasive value of Hason outside of the Ninth Circuit is questionable.
Amendment immunity to suits brought under Title II.
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have held that Congress did not validly abrogate states? immunity when it enacted Title II of the ADA.
In Reickenbacker, the Fifth Circuit ? in contrast to the Ninth Circuit ? re-analyzed the abrogation issue despite a prior decision holding that Title II did validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity (Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998)). The court noted that Garrett and Kimel represented a tightening of the law related to abrogation and held that, in light of those more recent decisions Coolbaugh was no longer good law.
According to the Fifth Circuit, Title II fails both parts of the Boerne/Kimel/Garrett abrogation test. First, the court held that Congress failed to make ?the requisite findings of state discrimination? against persons with disabilities. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 982. The court stated that most of the Title II legislative history referred to discrimination by local entities rather than state government and that, in any event, ?many of the findings to which we are referred by the plaintiffs describe facially neutral state policies that are unlikely to represent unconstitutional discrimination.? Id. Interestingly, the court argued that the appendix to Justice Breyer?s dissent in Garrett, which was offered to show an extensive record of discrimination by the states, is more helpful to states that to plaintiffs with disabilities.
The word ?inaccessible,? without more, in this context, is synonymous with ?constitutional? as it implies a facially neutral state policy without evidence of discriminatory intent. ?Inaccessible? appears over 250 times in Justice Breyer?s list of ?roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments.? The plaintiffs cite to this list as providing life to their claim that there are sufficient Congressional findings of discrimination in public accommodation. In fact, this list is fatal to the plaintiffs? case, because it catalogs presumptively constitutional state action.
Id. at 982 n.62 (citation omitted).
Second, the Fifth Circuit held that Title II fails the ?proportional and congruent? test imposed by the Supreme Court. ?Title II indisputably embodies more than merely a prohibition on unconstitutional conduct against the disabled? and instead ?create[s] an affirmative accommodation obligation on the part of public entities that far exceeds the constitutional boundaries.? Id. at 983.

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G.R. No. 154481 - Dolores Granada v. Bormaheco Inc etc.
DOLORES GRANADA, Petitioner, v. BORMAHECO, INC., Represented by its Branch Manager, Hernane Lozanes, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to set aside a Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 12 April 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46502 declaring that the petitioner, Dolores Granada, is not an agricultural lessee of the subject land and may be ejected therefrom. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, reversed the Decision2 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated 11 July 1997 in DARAB Case No. 0564.
3. That the LESSEE hereby undertakes to take care of the leased premises or coconuts with the deligence (sic) of a good father of the family, to fertilize the same if and when necessary, to apply proper insecticides or fungicides for proper pest and disease control and to replace old or worn out trees with new plantings of coconuts.
During the proceedings before the PARAD, petitioner formally offered evidence consisting of several receipts from 1965 to 1989 issued by respondent indicating that the payments were for "lot rentals." Only two receipts show that the payment was made for the lease of coconuts.8 Petitioner also presented before the DARAB a Certification9 by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, dated 17 January 1992, stating that the subject land was classified as "cocoland," and, therefore, agricultural in nature.
Respondent sent the petitioner a letter, dated 20 October 1989,10 terminating the lease and demanding that the latter vacate the leased premises as of 30 October 1989, and pay the outstanding rental balance of P2,500.00.
2. Ordering petitioner to pay respondent the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
THE FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) THAT THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DID NOT REFLECT THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES ARE SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND EVIDENCE.
The main issue in the present case is whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure.
Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined. Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.
Respondent alleges that several requisites of agricultural tenancy are absent in this case. It denies that the petitioner was an agricultural lessee. Moreover, it avers that the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984, clearly provides that the subject of the lease is not agricultural land, but rather the 300 coconut trees that are growing thereon. Lastly, it insists that there was no cultivation of the subject property nor any sharing of harvests therefrom.
(2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Based on the aforequoted definition for the petitioner to qualify as an agricultural lessee, it is required that she should cultivate the land with the consent of the landowner. In Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) v. Court of Appeals,24 citing Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court specified the activities which are considered as "cultivation" of coconut lands.
The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing or plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. x x x.
Respondent admits that the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984, which covered the period from 1983 to 1984, was orally renewed until 1989, which means that for no less than six years, petitioner had cultivated the subject property.
In addition, it cannot be denied that there was a sharing of the harvest between the petitioner and the respondent. Section 4 of the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984 provided for a total rental of P4,000.00.27 Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199 confirms that sharing of harvest in an agricultural leasehold tenancy may consist of a price certain to be paid by the person cultivating the land to the lessor.
Section 4. Systems of Agricultural Tenancy. - x x x.
Evidently, the law does not stipulate that the sharing of harvest be limited to a sharing of the crops, or that the amount be set based on the abundance of the harvest. A fixed amount of money, such as the P4,000.00 agreed to by the parties in their lease contract, can be considered as a share in the harvest.
1. That this lease shall cover only the growing coconut trees in the abovementioned parcel of land.
Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section Four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
In stipulating that such relation may exist by implied agreement, the law seeks to prevent the invalidation by unscrupulous landowners of the right of security of tenure granted to agricultural lessees. If agrarian relations were determined only by the explicit provisions of written agreement, poor and unlettered farmers, who have toiled over the land, could easily be misled or pressured into signing away their rights, which have long been guaranteed by law.
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
As in this case, the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984 required the petitioner to perform the grueling duties required of an agricultural lessee, but refused to grant her the consequent right to security of tenure. This Court shall not tolerate this unjust, unlawful, and most certainly undeserved double standard against agricultural tenants.
The charade that the lease contract of 21 August 1984 covered only the coconut trees and not the subject property wore thin after the petitioner presented before the PARAD receipts issued by the respondent from 1965 to 1989, which state that the payments were for "lot rental." In fact, only two receipts issued within this period indicated that the payments were made in connection with the rent for the coconut trees.
7. That the LESSEE admits having allowed, without permission from the LESSOR, her relatives (namely, spouses Romeo and Betty Sobigon and spouses Juan and Nora Recodo, Jr.) to construct their houses on Lot No. 614-A, Bacolod Cadestre, and binds and obliges herself on her coconut (sic) to cause their ejectment upon demand at any time by the LESSOR; and the LESSEE further binds and obliges herself not to allow any other person or persons to construct any structure or house in any portion of the lease premises and to report immediately to the LESSOR any attempt or attempts of construction.
While the aforequoted provision states that the petitioner's relatives occupied the subject land without the permission of the respondent, it also obliged the petitioner to cause their ejectment upon the respondent's demand. This means that before the respondent's demand to vacate, petitioner's relatives were permitted to stay. Had the petitioner been leasing the coconut trees only, there was no reason for the respondent, a stranger to the petitioner's relatives, to tolerate their occupancy of the subject property. Respondent could have easily initiated proceedings for the ejectment of petitioner's relatives. Conversely, respondent's implicit consent to let the petitioner's relatives stay on the subject property supports the petitioner's assertion that she and her relatives had cultivated the land with the permission of the respondent, which in turn, received its share of the agricultural produce through the rent paid by petitioner.
Lastly, it should be noted that petitioner's father, Alfredo Granada, had been an agricultural lessee on the subject land even before the same was transferred to the respondent in 1965. There is nothing in the records which show that Alfredo Granada voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the land or he was divested thereof after a proper hearing was conducted. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 384428 provides that even as it is the respondent's prerogative as landowner to choose the successor of its deceased tenant, such prerogative is considered waived if it is not asserted within a reasonable time. Neither is there any showing that petitioner's mother or siblings had ever contested the petitioner's claim over her father's tenancy rights. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the petitioner's claim that she succeeded her father's tenancy rights upon his death in 1981.
There is no question that the subject property is agricultural land. The Certification of the Local Assessment Operations Officer, dated 17 January 1992, states that subject property is "cocoland." The existence of no less than 300 coconut trees on a 2.5 hectare land would confirm that the subject property is devoted to the raising of agricultural products thereon. Respondent's allegation before the PARAD that the subject property is industrial or residential is not supported by evidence and, thus, cannot be credited.
The said parcel of land was formerly owned by Augusto Villarosa, who leased the same to Alfredo Granada, father of the petitioner, under an oral contract as far back as 1950, on a yearly basis with the rentals, in terms of money. To make use of the property and to be able to pay the rentals, the lessee planted the landholding to coconuts and some fruit trees. The same was then purchased by respondent, BORMAHECO, present owner, but remained leased to the lessee until his death, sometime in 1982. Thereafter, the petitioner entered into a contract of lease with the respondent, covering only the growing coconut trees in the aforesaid parcel of land for the duration of one (1) year, beginning October 1, 1983 to October 1, 1984, x x x.
The aforequoted portion of the PARAD Decision rendered in favor of the respondent clearly states that before the death of Alfredo Granada, the lease agreement was between respondent and Alfredo Granada, not the petitioner. Moreover, there was no mention of the lease contract of 29 September 1965 during the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB.
Even assuming that the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965 was authentic, it would still not negate the existence of a leasehold tenancy relation between the parties. The said lease contract, likewise, obligated the petitioner to perform the same acts of cultivation and imposed an annual rent of P600.00. More importantly, the receipts issued by the respondent for "lot rentals" from 1965 to 1989 patently show that the lease contract covered the subject land and not just the 300 coconut trees growing thereon. Like the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984, the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965 does not fully reflect the true intent of the parties and thus cannot invalidate the petitioner's status as an agricultural lessee.
It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements of agricultural leasehold tenancy are met in this case.chanrobles virtual law library The Contracts of Lease, dated 29 September 1965 and 21 August 1984, presented by the respondent to disprove the existence of an agricultural leasehold relation, stipulate that the petitioner perform acts of cultivation of the subject property. The respondent provided the agricultural land, classified as "cocoland"; and the petitioner took care of the coconut trees, replanted new ones when necessary, harvested the coconut fruits and produced tuba or coconut wine therefrom. Respondent received a fixed sum of P4,000.00 each year as its share of the harvest. Without any question, respondent was very much aware that petitioner had been cultivating the land and paying the "lot rentals" as early as 1983, or even earlier, and continued to do so until 1989. Petitioner is unquestionably an agricultural lessee of the respondent's land, and is, thus, entitled to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court GRANTS this petition and REVERSES the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46502, dated 12 April 2002 and REINSTATES the Decision of the DARAB dated 11 July 1997 in DARAB Case No. 0564. This Court declares the petitioner an agricultural tenant of the subject property owned by the respondent; and orders both parties to reduce their agricultural leasehold relation into writing before the Municipal Agrarian Reform, in accordance with law. No costs.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-42.
2 CA rollo, pp. 70-82.
13 CA rollo, p. 46.
15 Id. at p. 38.
17 CA rollo, pp. 81-82.
22 Ludo & Luym Development Corporation v. Barreto, G.R. No. 147266, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 391, 403.
23 Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, 23 June 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106; Mon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118292, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 165, 175; Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 434 Phil. 626, 638-639 (2002).
24 G.R. NOS. L-46281-83, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 568, 580.
25 226 Phil. 62, 71 (1986).
26 CA rollo, p. 18.
27 That in consideration of the said coconuts and of the faithful performance of all the stipulations of this agreement, the yearly rental of the lease is Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00), Philippine Currency, x x x.
28 Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. - In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
29 CA rollo, p. 34.