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The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is located in a geopolitically unstable region along the Indus River in South Asia. Pakistani laws and customs heavily follow Islamic standards and are paired with a government that is harsh on criticism. Reporters Without Borders ranks Pakistan 139 out the 179 countries in the World Press Freedom Index, putting Pakistan in the bottom quartile of countries, indicating little freedom of expression. The country has been subject to militarized regimes since its independence was established in 1947, normalizing a culture to an oppressive silence which has only worsened in recent years.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was established in 1947. However, the story of Pakistan begins in roughly 3,000 BCE with one of the worlds’ first settlements—the Indus Valley Civilization. This Bronze Age civilization blossomed due to its proximity to the Indus River and Mesopotamia. Though archeologists are unsure why the civilization fell, historians know that the region saw constantly power struggles over the next few thousand years. Many tribal kingdoms fought for control in the vacuum that was left by the Indus Valley Civilization’s absence and they eventually fell to numerous Arabic and Indian empires. Next were the Persians, who were conquered by Alexander the Great and his Macedonians, the Turks, the Mongols, the Sikh Empire, before finally succumbing to the British Empire until the 20th Century. The historic precedent of instability would not be lost in modern times, nor would it be during the Pakistani independence movement. It took numerous attempts over 90 years, with most credit due to the All-India Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, before Britain finally left the Indian subcontinent and surrounding regions shortly following World War II.
Evident through Jinnah’s words, “Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature…. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction,” at a Muslim League Conference in 1940, there was an imminent concern by failing to recognize the tension and violence sprouting between Hindu and Islamic groups. Thus, Britain granted independence to Pakistan and India separately after congressional elections demonstrated a nearly 90 percent loyalty to religiously similar representatives. The British exit left a considerable amount of territory for Pakistan and India to divide independently, simultaneously instigating a mass exodus of up to 14 million refugees seeking heaven in Pakistan or India, what Harold Isaac’s book Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change calls history’s largest mass migration. Kidnappings, riots, and rapes ravaged the evacuees as the first of four major Indo-Pakistani wars waged in pursuit of land and resources, with some sources reporting up to two million victims. Relations between India and Pakistan have remained tense since both of their inceptions.
Pakistan was established as a parliamentary democracy in 1947, dedicated to upholding the teachings of Allah. By 1956, Pakistan had undergone its first military coup d’état and plummeted into martial law. The subsequent actions – ousting of a president, another Indo-Pakistani war and political oppression – led to a civil war and a third war with India before 1972. Soon after, the political control switched parties and the 1973 Constitution, based on British common law, was ratified. This constitution is still in place today and establishes three branches of government consisting of an executive led by a prime minister, bicameral legislature, and a federal judicial system lead by a supreme court as well as a president to act as a head of state. The military overthrew the Pakistani government again four years later, with the commanding General Zia-ul-Haq implementing Sharia law and sanctioning limitation of free expression. Following Zia-ul-Haq’s death in 1988, power has shifted between parties representing the left and right, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League respectively. Pakistan was again overthrown by its own military in 1999 through 2008, making the third successful coup d’état in its history.
Throughout this post-independence era, journalists have been censored, imprisoned, and killed. This is likely because of Pakistan constantly finding itself in a corrupt, politically unstable environment; in addition to the success military coups, there are three known failed attempts to overthrow the government. More so, since Pakistan achieved independence 71 years ago, it has spent roughly 33 years under control of an extreme military government. These circumstances grant few liberties to those who seek to express themselves freely.
The most apparent evidence of lack of support for the freedom of speech in Pakistan is the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s repetitive legitimization of martial law. Pakistan’s use of martial law seems to have been manipulative in order to systematically suppressed political opposition, limited personal expression, and enable a system of government that is routinely prone to catastrophic instability.
Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 explicitly defines and protects freedom of speech. However, it does include terminology which may allow exceptions that could almost nullify the right entirely.
The caveat that most clearly exposes the flaw within Article 19 is the phrase ‘subject to any reasonable restrictions.’ It does name exemptions, such as uses which violate state security, incite offenses, and jeopardize foreign relations. However, what it does not do is restrain its own power; by including ‘decency, or morality,’ without clearly stating or elaborating within further amendments what those bounds may be, this statute appears too easily subjective to the will of the government.
Another potentially compromising statement is the “interest of the glory of Islam,” specifically. As a nation that is guided by the Quran and Sunnah, it is not surprising to find this addition within its constitution; however, it would be a misstep to omit a criticism of this particular inclusion—especially in a country governed by Sharia law. As a nation with an established religion, it may inherently limit the freedoms of those who practice other religions or do not practice any. Blasphemy is still a crime in Pakistan, punishable by death. Pakistan: Eye of the storm includes an except that notes of the roughly 650 people charged with blasphemy between 1986 and 2007, over half belong to the minority group of non-Muslims which make up only three percent of the total population. The narrative of an atheist in Pakistan is explored in BBC’s article Pakistan’s Secret Atheist, which follows a Pakistani atheist who fears for his life due to his personal beliefs. This appears to be more reflective of an oppressive regime.
Exemplifying the lack of true freedom of expression is a 2015 issue involving a man burning Pakistan’s flag, according to Dawn News. Desecration of a flag is a form of protest, demonstrating a discontentment with the body that the flag represents. Though it does not violate any of the expressed points Article 19, Pakistani authorities still arrested Qamarul Zaman for his actions. The comments on the story range from demanding punishment to legitimately questioning the mental health of someone who would commit such an uncommon action. He was charged with burning the flag under Pakistani Penal Code and no other updates have been published.
The Taliban’s success has been, in no small part, due to support by many sovereign governments – including Pakistan. While the Taliban remains an independent entity, there are undoubtedly ties between them and Pakistan, with the Taliban routinely executing the will of the Pakistani government. The book I am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban explores this relationship, but it also tells the story of Malala Yousafzai, a teenager who was a vocal supporter of women’s rights. The book recounts her experience when an armed Taliban militant walked onto her school bus and asked, “Who is Malala?” Though she was shot, Malala survived and became an international icon. She also became a chilling reminder to all of Pakistan and the world of the harshly nonconformant nature of Pakistan. Now a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Yousafzai returned to her home country in a visit for the first time since the attack in nearly six years, on March 29, 2018. Much to Pakistan’s credit, she was met with applause and is expected to meet with numerous officials including the prime minister.
Through these examples, it appears that the Pakistani administration has not protected the freedom of speech that its constitution ought to protect. Voices that are in opposition to the government regime report being silenced by force or by fear. The lack of historic cases combating this regime and evidence of domestic Pakistani dissidents before the rise of the internet reflects of a lack of transparency, which may enable corrupt officials.
There is also an explicit protection of press within Article 19 as well, but there is an additional implicit protection through an interpretation of the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, written in 2002.
Again, the inclusion of the phrase “subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions,” serves only the government. This not only limits the freedom of news organizations to the discretion of the government, it violates the concept of transparency and trust for that governing entity.
Forty years before that excerpt was inserted next to the Article 19, the first military leader to overthrow the standing government issued the Press and Publication Ordinance. The PPO gave power to the government to censor agencies and retract stories that it deemed unhealthy for the development of the Pakistani government. It also restricted who could publish a newspaper to people who had “reasonable educational qualifications,” and “adequate training or experience in journalism,” which was left to the discretion of the government. This eventually lead to the government taking over the largest news outlets and crippling others. Under the military successor Zia-ul-Haq, more severe additions were made which made the publisher legally liable for stories that shed a negative light on the government, regardless of its factuality. It was not until Zia-ul-Haq’s death that any revisions were made that help loosen control on the press.
In 2002, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PERMA) was established to “[i]mprove the standards of information, education, and entertainment,” according to its mission statement. It does so through censorship and closing publications that appear to defy the interests of the Pakistani people. Interestingly, PERMA is granted the power to do so through Article 19 and 19A of the constitution, the same articles establish to protect the rights of speech and access to information. It has used this power to silence critical voices both domestically and internationally, blocking BBC broadcast signals while they aired the documentary “Secret Pakistan.” Though Britannica reports that the censorship is widespread, they also claim many Pakistanis are able to obtain nonbiased and uncensored media through the internet and satellite television.
The most toxic effect that these repetitive military administrations have had on the free press has been self-censorship. Many journalists have reported being intimidated during the decades of government arrests and executions, and have not felt comfortable freely expressing and investigating substantive issues. These concerns were not amiss: in 2015 the Committee to Protect Journalists reported three different media officials were all slain within 24 hours. As of April 2018, no arrests have been made in response to the attack. Kim Barker acknowledges this mentality in her book, “The Taliban Struggle: Strange Days in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” describing how citizens and journalists have been reluctant to criticize the government because of the extreme lengths state-supported militant groups would go to silence them. Allowing this disables a freely operated press seems to perpetuate the dangerous system that currently stands.
Today’s biggest concern for the press in Pakistan is the Prevention of Electronic Crime Act of 2016, which bans criticism of the military, judiciary, and Islam. Unanimously adopted by the senate, the act’s broad terminology allows a nearly limitless scope for categorizing content as illegal. It also comes with harsh penalties, Reuters reports, such as a prison sentence of up to seven years. Campaigned as an anti-terrorism security measure, it suggests it will be used to block content that depicts the government and its officials in a negative light and silence unfavorable political ideas.
As of January 2017, Pakistan’s largest satirical publication, Khabaristan Times, was blocked from access by all Pakistani IP addresses. IFEX, formerly known as the Freedom of International Expression Exchange, reported that this ban came without any warning or any evidence cited by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority. Banning a satirical entity may be especially troublesome because it is not intended to be regarded as ‘real’ news, which demonstrates the lack of ability for the Pakistani government to process and accept criticism of any sort. Though it did reporting of typically nonfactual, humorous stories, there is a general merit to satire and its ability to humanize the events going on in the world. By blocking the Khabaristan Times, Pakistan seems to be setting a dark precedent for criticism in the modern era.
Reporters Without Borders has published claims by Taha Siddiqui, a prominent Pakistani reporter, of being ambushed and attacked by multiple gunmen and narrowly escaping death in early 2018. There is evidence to support his claims, such as previous threats from government agencies and additional information from reporters who have experienced similar encounters. Speculation is that it was a military endeavor. If this is true, it may explain the lack of investigation on the issue by the Pakistani government, Siddiqui is still free, but no updates from government officials have been given in response to the incident.
The United States is ranked 43 out of 179 countries in quality of freedom of speech and press, some 96 spots higher than Pakistan by Reporters Without Borders. Thought it is not ranked in an exceedingly high spot, the United States prides itself on its constituents’ ability to voice their opinion, concerns, and criticisms. Though there have been recent issues facing the First Amendment, namely the ‘fake news’ crisis and subsequent response to it, it appears that the United States promotes a society that protects freedoms of expression have more clearly defined regulations than Pakistan.
First and foremost is the terminology used in the First Amendment, which covers the unalienable individual liberties of every U.S. citizen.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” – “The Constitution of the United States,” First Amendment.
The First Amendment grants freedom of expression to citizens and has laws clearly defining the range which speech may be used, curtailing the things which could infringe on other’s rights to wellbeing such as the usage of fighting words and the incitement of imminent lawless action.
This immediately contrasts Articles 19 and 19 on issues of free speech specifically, the United States has adopted a far more robust protection of individual expression. Whereas the Supreme Court of Pakistan has a consistent track record of justifying martial law, the United States Supreme Court declared President Lincoln’s use of martial law to manipulate the Confederacy unconstitutional. This established a precedent in American jurisprudence of erring to the side of caution with a very conservative usage of martial law in Ex Parte Milligan in 1866. The United States also allows its constituents to practice, or refuse to practice, whatever religion they believe and distinctly prohibits the government from establishing an official religion; Pakistan is firmly rooted in Islam and criminalizes blasphemy, something that is inherently restrictive for those practicing other religions in the country. Though not explicitly outlawed, a Pakistani man was arrested for burning the nation’s flag in 2015, a stark contrast to the expression deemed legal in Texas v. Johnson, a 1989 United States Supreme Court case which invalidated laws prohibiting desecration of the U.S. flag. It would be unfair to ignore the dark past of the United States, which has funded and armed numerous foreign militant groups throughout history. Still, it would be careless to compare that to directly associating with a domestic guerilla entity that is internationally renowned for their terroristic practices as the Taliban like Pakistan did. Since Schenck v. United States famously set the precedent for free speech as anything short of falsely yelling fire in a movie theater. This stood until the imminent lawless action standard was overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969 and refined in Hess v. Indiana in 1973, establishing a more progressive statute than Pakistan’s in 2018.
Free press is recognized as the cornerstone of an effective democracy. The Bill of Rights distinctly included free press in its First Amendment in 1789, whereas Pakistan did not have both freedom of press and right to information in the Constitution of 1973 until the Eighteenth Amendment in 2002, 29 years after the constitution was ratified. Near v. Minnesota is another example of a differentiation between the U.S. and Pakistan; though PERMA granted Pakistan the authority to censor anything it deemed unfavorable, Near v. Minnesota saw the United States Supreme Court uphold that, except for rare cases, censorship is unconstitutional. The United States protects the press publishing their stories, including satire—as seen in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. This distinguishes America from Pakistan yet again, as FERPA recently blocked the Khabaristan Times without any evidence presented. To claim that the United States would attempt to kidnap a journalist or ban criticism of the government would be outlandish, and especially in modern day, would more likely be the subject of conspiracy theorists than journalists and scholars. The freedom of press in the United States appears far more robust and developed than Pakistan’s thanks to strict adherence to the First Amendment. However, the United States did not begin defining the First Amendment with greater clarity until the early 1900s. Much like the attempted abduction of Taha Siddiqui in Early 2018, there is also a historic record of the United States acting against public figures. Namely, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover utilized the bureau to send an intimidating letter to Martin Luther King Jr., urging him to surrender advocating civil rights and commit suicide in 1964. There are still issues with freedom of expression in the U.S., but unlike Pakistan, there is a consistent trend by the judiciary to interpret and define freedoms of those given by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. Perhaps with time to grow and develop, Pakistan will grow to adopt such an expressively progressive system.
The United States appears to be far better at allowing its constituents to exercise freedoms than Pakistan. There are numerous reasons for this, including the wording and later deliberation those same words of the U.S. Constitution, a more stable government and longer history to establish precedents. Pakistan is too undeveloped to have a solid protection of freedoms, especially with most of its history being dominated by militant forces. Despite sharing much of its government structure with the United States, corruption and lack of tolerance for political dissent disqualify Pakistan from being globally recognized as a country that values freedom of expression.
Barker, Kim. The Taliban Shuffle: Strange Days in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Anchor Books, 2012. Print.
Isaacs, Harold Robert (1975). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-44315-0. Print.
Jones, Owen Bennett. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2009. eBook.
Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. American constitutional law. (49-53, 51) Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013. Print.
Yousafzai, Malala, I Am Malala: the Girl Who Stood up for Education and Was Shot by the Taliban. New York, NY :Little, Brown, & Company, 2013. Print.

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With the following information we would like to give you as "data subject" an overview of the processing of your personal data by us and your rights under data protection law. The use of our internet pages is basically possible without entering personal data. However, if you wish to make use of special services of our company via our website, it may be necessary to process personal data. If the processing of personal data is necessary and there is no legal basis for such processing, we will generally obtain your consent.
The processing of personal data, for example your name, address or e-mail address, always takes place in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and in accordance with the country-specific data protection regulations applicable to "Animals Angels e.V.". By means of this data protection declaration, we would like to inform you about the scope and purpose of the personal data collected, used and processed by us.
As the data controller, we have implemented numerous technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data processed via this website is protected as fully as possible. Nevertheless, Internet-based data transmissions can in principle have security gaps, so that absolute protection cannot be guaranteed. For this reason, you are also free to transmit personal data to us by alternative means, for example by telephone or mail.
Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR serves our company as legal basis for processing operations in which we obtain consent for a specific processing purpose.
If the processing of personal data is necessary for the fulfilment of a contract to which you are a party, as is the case, for example, with processing operations which are necessary for the delivery of goods or the provision of other services or consideration, the processing is based on Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR. The same applies to such processing operations which are necessary for the execution of pre-contractual measures, e.g. in cases of inquiries regarding our products or services.
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In rare cases, the processing of personal data may become necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the person concerned or another natural person. This would be the case, for example, if a visitor to our business were injured and his name, age, health insurance data or other vital information would have to be passed on to a doctor, hospital or other third party. Then the processing would be based on Art. 6 para. 1 lit. d GDPR.
Ultimately, processing operations could be based on Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR. Processing operations that are not covered by any of the aforementioned legal bases are based on this legal basis if the processing is necessary to safeguard a legitimate interest of our company or a third party, provided that the interests, fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms of the data subject do not predominate. Such processing operations are permitted to us in particular because they have been specifically mentioned by the European legislator. In this respect, he was of the opinion that a legitimate interest could be assumed if you are a customer of our company (recital 47 sentence 2 GDPR).
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This collected data and information is therefore evaluated by us both statistically and with the aim of increasing data protection and data security in our company in order to ultimately ensure an optimum level of protection for the personal data processed by us. The data in the server log files are stored separately from all personal data provided by the person concerned.
The legal basis for data processing is Art. 6 Para. 1 S. 1 lit. f GDPR. Our legitimate interest follows from the purposes listed above for the collection of data.
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Our newsletters sent with CleverReach enable us to analyse the behaviour of newsletter recipients. Among other things, it can be analyzed how many recipients have opened the newsletter message and how often which link was clicked in the newsletter. With the help of so-called conversion tracking, it can also be analysed whether a predefined action (e.g. purchase of a product on our website) has taken place after clicking on the link in the newsletter. Further information on data analysis through the CleverReach newsletter can be found at: www.cleverreach.com/de/funktionen/reporting-und-tracking/.
Data processing is based on your consent (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR). You can revoke this consent at any time by unsubscribing from the newsletter. The legality of the data processing operations that have already taken place remains unaffected by the revocation.
If you do not wish CleverReach to carry out an analysis, you must unsubscribe from the newsletter. For this purpose, we provide a corresponding link in every newsletter message. You can also unsubscribe directly on the website.
The data you provide us with for the purpose of subscribing to the newsletter will be stored by us until you unsubscribe from the newsletter and deleted from our servers as well as from CleverReach's servers after you cancel the newsletter. This does not affect data stored by us for other purposes (e.g. e-mail addresses for the member area).
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The purpose of the Matomo component is to analyse the flow of visitors to our website. We use the data and information obtained, among other things, to evaluate the use of this website in order to compile reports showing the activities on our website.
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The transmission of the data is intended for payment processing and fraud prevention. We will transmit personal data to PayPal in particular if there is a legitimate interest in the transmission. The personal data exchanged between PayPal and us may be transferred by PayPal to credit agencies. The purpose of this transfer is to check identity and creditworthiness.
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When selecting the payment methods "direct debit via ipayment" or "credit card via ipayment", we pass on your personal data to 1&1 Ionos SE, Elgendorfer Str. 57, 56410 Montabaur (hereinafter referred to as "1&1") for payment processing purposes, insofar as this is necessary for payment processing.
Within the framework of transaction processing, we work together with Concardis GmbH (Concardis), Helfmann Park 7, D-65760 Eschborn. All payment data as well as data on possible chargebacks will only be stored for as long as they are required for payment processing (including the processing of possible chargebacks and the collection of receivables) and for combating misuse.
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You have the right to receive the personal data concerning you that you have provided to us in a structured, common and machine-readable format. You also have the right to transfer this data to another data controller to whom the personal data have been provided, without any hindrance on our part, provided that the processing is based on consent pursuant to Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. a GDPR or Art. 9 Para. 2 lit. a GDPR or on a contract pursuant to Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. b GDPR and that the processing is carried out using automated procedures, provided that the processing is not necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority assigned to us.
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You have the right, for reasons arising from your particular situation, to object at any time to the processing of personal data concerning you on the basis of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. e (data processing in the public interest) or f (data processing on the basis of a weighing of interests) GDRP.
If you file an objection, we will no longer process your personal data unless we can prove compelling legitimate reasons for the processing that outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or the processing serves the assertion, exercise or defense of legal claims.
In individual cases, we process personal data in order to conduct direct advertising. You may object to the processing of personal data for the purpose of such advertising at any time. This also applies to profiling as far as it is connected with such direct advertising. If you object to our processing for direct marketing purposes, we will no longer process your personal data for these purposes.
You also have the right to object to the processing of your personal data for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes in accordance with Art. 89 Para. 1 GDPR for reasons arising from your particular situation, unless such processing is necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest.
You are free to exercise your right of objection in connection with the use of Information Society services, notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, by means of automated procedures using technical specifications.
This data protection declaration is currently valid and has the status [[April 2019]].
Due to the further development of our websites and offers or due to changed legal or official requirements, it may become necessary to amend this data protection declaration. You can call up and print out the current data protection declaration at any time on the website under the following link.

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Law amending the law on the Central Dna-profile-directory, the code of civil procedure and the law on registration of vehicles (Exchange of information on dna-profiles, fingerprints and vehicle with States outside the European Union) WE, MARGRETHE the SECOND, by the grace of God Queen of Denmark, do indeed: the Danish Parliament has adopted and we know Our consent confirmed the following law: § 1 of lov nr. 434 of 31. May 2000 on the Central Dna-profile-directory, as amended, inter alia, by § 1 of lov nr. 479 of 17. June 2008 and at the latest by the law No. 405 of 21. April 2010, is amended as follows: 1. Pursuant to section 5 shall be inserted: ' article 5 (a). The Minister of Justice may, on the basis of an agreement to that effect with a State outside the European Union provide that article 5, paragraph 2, shall apply in the relationship between Denmark and this State. ' § 2 of the law on the Court of Justice, without prejudice. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1053 of 29. October 2009, as amended most recently by § 2 of the law No. 551 of 26. May 2010, is amended as follows: 1. Pursuant to section 116 (a) shall be inserted: ' section 116 (b). The Minister of Justice may, on the basis of an agreement to that effect with a State outside the European Union provide that section 116 (a) shall apply in the relationship between Denmark and this State. ' § 3 of the law No. 309 of 19. April 2006 for the registration of vehicles, as amended most recently by § 2 of the law No. 545 of 26. May 2010, is amended as follows: 1. Under section 18 shall be inserted: ' article 18 (a). The Minister of Justice may, on the basis of an agreement to that effect with a State outside the European Union provide that section 18 (3) shall apply in the relationship between Denmark and this State. ' § 4 the Minister shall pay compensation for the injury caused by the Danish State, and due to the use of false information received from another country by virtue of an agreement concluded in accordance with the rules laid down in this law. Compensation may be reduced or denied if the person seeking compensation itself has given rise to the damage.
§ 5 the Minister shall determine the time of the entry into force of the law and can establish that § including § 1-4 shall enter into force at different times.
§ 6 paragraph 1. The law does not apply to the Faroe Islands and Greenland.
(2). sections 1 and 4 may, by Royal Decree in whole or in part be put into force for Greenland and the Faroe Islands with the derogations which the Faroese and Greenlandic conditions warrant.

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Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California was notified on the morning of Friday, September 21, via a personal call from Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that he will be the recipient of the prestigious 34th Annual Devitt Award, our nation's highest honor bestowed upon a Article III federal judge. The ceremony and celebration will take place on November 7, 2018 at the Supreme Court of the United States in the presence of the Supreme Court Justices and 100 invited guests. As brother of Justice Stephen Breyer, this is the first time that a relation of any Justice of the Supreme Court will receive the Devitt.
⇒ View the news release issued by the Devitt Award sponsor, the Dwight D. Opperman Foundation (www.prnewswire.com...).
⇒ View the news release on the United States Courts website.
I and the other judges of the Northern District are delighted that Judge Breyer's amazing body of work as a federal judge has been recognized by the Devitt Award selection committee this year. Judge Breyer's remarkable judicial achievements, combined with his tireless efforts on behalf of the United States Courts and the Northern District, have earned the boundless admiration of the Court and the community; we are so pleased that he will now receive this prestigious national honor. Our Court, and indeed the Northern District as a whole, is a better place because of Judge Breyer.
The Northern District is pleased to highlight the following selected accomplishments from Judge Breyer's two-plus decades of service to the federal judicial system and to the Northern District since taking the bench in 1997.
Judge Breyer was appointed as a district judge in the Northern District of California in 1997. Soon after taking the bench, he began to serve not just his district but the federal judiciary as a whole. He regularly taught courses at a program sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center for the education of newly-appointed federal judges. In 2005, following a vote by all district and circuit judges in the Ninth Circuit, he was appointed to be the circuit's District Judge Representative on the United States Judicial Conference. Chief Justice Roberts then selected him to serve on the Executive Committee of the Conference.
Judge Breyer played a key role in several important initiatives during his five years of service on the Executive Committee. For example, in response to press reports that federal judges were occasionally deciding cases without realizing they had a financial interest in the outcome, Judge Breyer and his colleagues obtained agreement from judicial districts across the country to install conflict-checking software that would prevent these inadvertent lapses.
From his post on the Executive Committee, Judge Breyer became the Chair of the Advisory Committee on Long Range Planning for the Judiciary. In this capacity he assembled a diverse group of people (judges, court clerks, circuit executives) to create a Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary. The plan set long-term goals designed to advance the rule of law, judicial independence, accountability, and public confidence in the courts.
Judge Breyer's tenure with the Judicial Conference ended in 2010. The following year, Chief Justice Roberts appointed him to the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, where he continues to serve today. The MDL Panel consists of seven federal judges who meet every two months around the country to hear oral argument and decide whether cases filed in different districts should be assigned for pretrial purposes to one federal judge. The work performed by Judge Breyer and the other Panel members ensures that the federal judiciary responds fairly and efficiently to some of our nation's most complicated and widespread legal disputes.
One reason Judge Breyer has served so ably on the MDL Panel is his vast experience with MDL matters, having agreed to handle so many of them himself. Most recently, the MDL Panel entrusted Judge Breyer with pretrial proceedings in the cases arising out of Volkswagen's installation of an emissions control defeat device in thousands of its diesel vehicles. Due to his active management, including his admonishments about the importance of removing the polluting cars from the road as soon as possible, Volkswagen, the EPA, the FCC, and the consumers who purchased these vehicles reached a settlement just a few months after the MDL's creation. Judge Breyer's final approval of the settlement was recently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. This settlement is the largest of its kind; that it came together so quickly, despite involving a foreign defendant, consumer class actions, and federal and state regulators, is a testament to Judge Breyer's case management skills and dedication.
In 2013, President Obama appointed Judge Breyer to be a member of the United States Sentencing Commission. As with the MDL Panel, Judge Breyer has brought his considerable practical experience to bear – experience he developed both as a district judge and as a long-time criminal law practitioner. Judge Breyer has brought valuable perspective, helping ensure that the Commission's policy decisions are informed by the practical realities and current practices in sentencing throughout the country. Judge Breyer served as Vice-Chair during his first term on the Commission; he was recently renominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate for his second term.
These many responsibilities do not tell the whole story of Judge Breyer's service to the national judicial system. Time and again, when judges from other districts put out the call for help, Judge Breyer has responded. When the Southern District of California sought assistance after being inundated with immigration matters, Judge Breyer sat by designation and handled a number of criminal cases there. He volunteered to handle trials in the District of Idaho when it was experiencing a judge shortage, as well as a trial in the District of Hawaii when all the local judges were conflicted from the case. He volunteered to be assigned numerous prisoner cases from the Eastern District of California, which is one of the most overworked federal judicial districts in the country. He regularly sits by designation on the Ninth Circuit. And now he serves on the newly-formed Ninth Circuit Workplace Environment Committee.
Judge Breyer's service to the Northern District has mirrored his service to the national judiciary, beginning shortly after he took the bench. His initial focus in our district (and one that has persisted throughout his tenure) was improving the courthouse experience for attorneys, witnesses, litigants, jurors, and the media. Judge Breyer knew from his time in practice that our courthouses were relatively inhospitable to attorneys, so he led a project to create attorney lounges in our three primary locations (San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose). Knowing too that most people in a courthouse are not particularly happy to be there, Judge Breyer installed educational photography displays that highlight the history of our judicial district. Upon learning that members of the media were having logistical difficulties conducting interviews on site, he took the lead in establishing a media room where members of the press can watch proceedings on closed-circuit television and conduct interviews with attorneys and litigants. More recently, when our previous courthouse in Eureka was condemned, Judge Breyer took the lead on getting a new one built. He worked closely with the Clerk's Office and the General Services Administration during the developmental stage of the project, and ensured the preservation of five historic murals that went into the courtroom. As chair of our Committee on Space and Facilities, Judge Breyer's constant focus is on making our court more hospitable to the public.
He recently presided over the biggest public corruption case San Francisco has seen in decades. United States v. Chow, et al., No. 14-cr-196. The case, which involved 29 defendants, resulted in numerous guilty pleas, including that of a former California State Senator. It also involved a lengthy jury trial of purported Chinatown gang leader Raymond "Shrimp Boy" Chow. During the trial, Judge Breyer was confronted with the question of how to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial while at the same time protecting the identity of an undercover agent. He balanced the defendant’s rights with the safety of the witness by having the witness testify in a sealed courtroom. The jury was able to observe the witness and evaluate his credibility, while the press and public were able to hear the testimony through a video feed that hid the witness.
In United States v. FedEx Corp., No. 14-cr-380, after just a few days of trial, the U.S. Attorney dismissed novel criminal charges against Federal Express after Judge Breyer ordered the presentation of the government’s evidence in a sequence that focused first on the elements of the crime that were most in dispute, which ultimately caused the government to conclude it did not have the evidence to prove its case. Judge Breyer also presided over a jury trial involving two San Francisco police officers who were convicted in 2015 of charges related to a scheme to steal money and property during police searches and arrests. United States v. Furminger, No. 14-cr-102. In another recent criminal matter, in a hearing on a motion to suppress, an officer’s testimony was contradicted by videotape of the incident. Newspaper articles quoted Judge Breyer as declaring in open court upon granting the motion: "The worst thing in the world is the prosecution and conviction of an innocent person, or a conviction based on perjured testimony." These cases are examples of the way Judge Breyer manages his courtroom with moral clarity and fairness to all parties.
His opinion allowing the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks to collect on their unsatisfied money judgments from a bank that is an instrumentality of Iran. Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 927 F. Supp. 2d 833 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 817 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended, 2016 WL 3257780 (9th Cir. June 14, 2016).
His ruling that an airline was responsible for the death of a passenger under the Warsaw Convention due to the crew's refusal to honor a passenger’s request to move to an open seat for medical reasons. Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2000). His opinion was ultimately affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2003).
An order enjoining the federal government from using mismatched Social Security data to investigate undocumented immigrants and punish their employers, on the ground that the government’s policy was causing irreparable harm to innocent workers and employers. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Rather than appeal, the government issued new regulations to address Judge Breyer’s concerns.
A decision that the National Park Service was likely violating the National Environmental Policy Act in connection with a major construction project in Yosemite National Park. Sierra Club v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1998). The Park Service made major substantive and procedural changes to the project in response to the legal concerns identified in his opinion.
A decision granting the habeas petition of a 17-year-old mentally challenged youth convicted of murder, finding that the admission of the teenager's confession violated Miranda. Holguin v. Harrison, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
In 2014, the Northern District received more than 200 asbestos product liability cases on remand following pretrial MDL proceedings in Pennsylvania. They were assigned to judges throughout the Northern District. Knowing that these aging cases would resolve more quickly if they were in front of one judge, Judge Breyer volunteered to take them all. He, with the assistance of several magistrate judge colleagues, systematically managed the cases and issued prompt pretrial rulings. The result is that every one of the cases was resolved by early 2016.

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There is a Judge Advocate General in the Air Force, who is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from officers of the Air Force. The term of office is four years.
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force shall be appointed from those officers who at the time of appointment are members of the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, and who have had at least eight years of experience in legal duties as commissioned officers.
shall receive, revise, and have recorded the proceedings of courts of inquiry and military commissions.
There is a Deputy Judge Advocate General in the Air Force, who is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from officers of the Air Force who have the qualifications prescribed in subsection (b) for the Judge Advocate General. The term of office of the Deputy Judge Advocate General is four years.
When paragraph (2) cannot be complied with because of the absence or disability of the Deputy Judge Advocate General, the heads of the major divisions of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, in the order directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, shall perform the duties of the Judge Advocate General, unless otherwise directed by the President.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, in selecting an officer for recommendation to the President under subsection (a) for appointment as the Judge Advocate General or under subsection (d) for appointment as the Deputy Judge Advocate General, shall ensure that the officer selected is recommended by a board of officers that, insofar as practicable, is subject to the procedures applicable to selection boards convened under chapter 36 of this title.
waive section 619(a)(2) of this title if the Secretary determines that the needs of the Air Force require the waiver.
the ability of officers of the Air Force who are designated as judge advocates who are assigned or attached to, or performing duty with, military units to give independent legal advice to commanders.
Sept. 19, 1951, ch. 407, § 310(a), (b) (less 1st sentence), 65 Stat. 332.
May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 13 (as applicable to Air Force), 64 Stat. 147.
June 23, 1874, ch. 458, § 2, 18 Stat. 244.
In subsection (a), the words “subject to the provisions of section 741 of Title 50” are omitted as surplusage. The words “but may be sooner terminated, or extended, by the President” are substituted for 10:1840(a) (last 11 words of 1st sentence, and 2d sentence). 10:1840(a) (1st 46 words of 3d sentence) is omitted as surplusage. 10:1840(a) (last sentence) is omitted as executed. The words “by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”, as they relate to the appointment as a major general in the Regular Air Force, are omitted as covered by section 8284 of this title.
In subsection (b), the words “Hereafter” and “exclusive of the present incumbents” are omitted as surplusage. The words “at least” are substituted for the words “not less than a total”.
In subsection (c), the Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 458, § 2 (words before semicolon of 1st sentence, and last sentence), 18 Stat. 244, are not contained in 10:62. They are also omitted from the revised section, since the Air Force does not have organic corps created by statute.
2018—Pub. L. 115–232 renumbered section 8037 of this title as this section.
2017—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 115–91 designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 109–163, § 1057(a)(2), struck out “or Territory” after “a State”.
2004—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 108–375, § 574(c)(1), struck out “, but may be sooner terminated or extended by the President” after “four years”.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 108–375, § 574(c)(2)(A), struck out “shall” after “General” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 108–375, § 574(c)(3), struck out “, but may be sooner terminated or extended by the President” after “four years”.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 108–375, § 574(c)(4), added subsec. (f).
1994—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103–337 added subsec. (e).
1980—Pub. L. 96–343, § 12(b)(1), substituted “General, Deputy Judge Advocate General:” for “General:” in section catchline.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 96–343, § 12(a), added subsec. (d).


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From "The History of JoDaviess County Illinois"
Beals, John - laborer; Loran.
Bechler, Calvin - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Bishop, Peter - merchant; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Bowman, Josiah - laborer; Willow.
Brininger, Benj. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Brininger, Henry - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Brininger, John - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in Ohio July 31, 1843; came west in an early day with his parents; served in army in the 39th I. V. I., and remained until the close of the war; was in front of Richmond and Petersburg; was honorably discharged at Norfolk, Va.; married Catherine Oberheim March 6, 1864; she was born in Centre Co., Pa., Oct. 24, 1847, and came to this Co. when a child; have three children living: Lewis T., Manie E., Ervie M.; three dead: John E., Orin S., George A.; owns 40 acres of land, house and lot, valued at $2,000.
Brushous, Jackson - farmer; Sec. 17; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; was born in Pa. Sept. 24, 1827; his father died in 1831, but his mother married again, and in 1844 the family moved to this Co.; married Mary A. Bishop in 1853; she died May 28, 1875; married Mrs. Brumgard Aug. 15, 1875; her maiden name was Catherine Brean; she was born in Clinton Co., Pa., April 11, 1844; she married Mr. Brumgard, by which marriage she had three children living: Newton, Harrison, Valentine; lost one, Ida Jane. Mr. Brushous has ten children living by his first marriage: George, Peter, Josiah, Mary Catherine, Parmelia, Barbara E., Julia A., Emma F., Wallace, Jackson; lost one, William; one child by second marriage, Sylvester; owns 280 acres of land.
Bucher, Adam - farmer; Sec. 30; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Bucher, John - farmer; Sec. 31; P. O. Pleasant Valley; born in Nederweingen, Switzerland, March 8, 1812; married Esther Huber in 1836; came to the U. S. in 1854; she was born in Dulsdorf, Switzerland, March 1, 1814; they came direct to this Co.; have four children living: Jacob S. Bucher, Mrs. Dorothea White, Mrs. Anna Kaufman, and John J. Bucher. Jacob S. Bucher was born Jan. 18, 1837, in Switzerland; married Elesta McIntyre Aug 30, 1860; she died in 1875; served in Union army during the war, in the 45th I. V. I.; was in battles of Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, Jackson, siege of Vicksburg, and Champion Hill; was honorably discharged after serving three years and three months.
Bucher, Johannes - farmer; Sec. 13; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Calhoun, Noah W. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; was born in Bedford Co., Pa., April 18, 1838; when quite young his parents moved to Maryland, where they lived until 1857; then came to Ogle Co., Ill.; lived there one year, and in Stephenson Co. three years; in 1861 came into Jo Daviess Co.; enlisted in 57th Regt. I. V. I., and served until the close of the war; joined Sheridan�s army at Savannah, and came up through the Carolinas to Washington, and was honorably discharged at Chicago; married Julia A. Parkinson Jan. 10, 1861; she was born in this Co. March 11, 1843; have seven children living: Roberta, Crissie, Manly J., Russell W., John S., Hattie, Josephine; owns 213 acres of land; was Assessor two years, Supervisor two years, School Director three years, and Highway Commissioner.
Church, Martin - laborer; Sec. 7; P. O. Willow.
Chambers, M. R. - teacher; P. O. Willow.
Clay, Daniel - farmer; Sec. 9; P. O. Willow.
Claywell, Geo. E. - farmer; Sec. 22; P. O. Loran.
Clay, Jeremiah - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; was born in Summit Co., Ohio, Feb. 22, 1830; his mother with her family came to this Co. in 1849, and this has been his home since that time; Sept. 20, 1855, married Martha Stahly, who was born in Summit Co., Ohio, Nov. 12, 1837; have eight children living: Mary C., Lovina J., William H., Mollie A., Samuel F., Charles S., Fannie A., Elliot R.; was a member of the 153d I. V. I., and was honorably discharged at Springfield at the close of the war. Mrs. Clay�s mother (Mrs. Catherine Stahly) lives with them; she was born in Wurtemburg, Germany, April 16, 1806, and came to America in 1831; owns 198 acres of land; was Postmaster two years and School Director six years; member of M. E. Church and A. F. and A. M.
Clevidence, Daniel - farmer; Sec. 9; P. O. Loran.
Cormony, Henry - farmer; Sec. 31; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Cullens, Geo. E. - farmer; Sec. 32; P. O. Loran.
Cullens, James - farmer; Sec. 33; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born in Pa. Dec. 8, 1817; came to Stork Co., Ohio, and married Miss Esther Zerbe Oct. 2, 1842; she was born in Stark Co., Ohio, April 25, 1825; came to this Co. in 1856; was Commissioner of Highways six years, Justice of Peace four years (commissioned by Gov. John B. Palmer); was School Director many years; have ten children living: William H., George E., Sarah C., Margaret A., Julius F. J., Esther A., James Wesley, Josephine, Emma A., and Ward H.; lost five; owns 280 acres of land; his mother, Mrs. Mary Cullens, resides with them; she was born in Huntington Co., Pa, in 1795.
Cullens, Wm. H. - farmer; Sec. 32; P. O. Loran.
Darr, John C. - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Pleasant Valley; born in Westmoreland Co., Pa., Jan. 24, 1835; came to this Co. in 1856; was married May 13, 1860, to Ann Harkness, who was born in Canada June 27, 1837; one child living, Oscar E.; have lost five children; Sept. 1862, enlisted in 96th I. V. I., and served until the close of the war; was at Atlanta, Buzzard Roost Gap, Resaca, Dalla, Kenesaw Mountain, Peach Tree Creek, Lovejoy Station, Franklin, Nashville; owns 200 acres of land.
Davis, John - farmer; P. O. Willow.
Dawson, John - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in Lincolnshire, England, Aug. 7, 1831; came to U. S. in 1842; suffered shipwreck on the voyage off banks of Newfoundland; all survived but one; lived in Freeport two years, and returned to England; came to America again in 1845; married Miss Phoebe J. Baker may 5, 1868; she was born in Canada Aug. 22, 2850; came to the U. S. with her parents in 1860; have three children: Julia Ann, Henrietta A., Jennie Maud; lost one child, Franklin Eugene; Mr. D. owns 60 acres of land.
Ditsworth, Samuel - farmer; Sec. 28; P. O. Loran.
Ditsworth, Wm. - farmer; P. O. Loran.
Dixon, Alvin - farmer; Sec. 28; P. O. Loran.
Flickinger, Jacob - farmer; Sec. 21; P. O. Loran.
Fickes, John - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Willow.
Fike, David - laborer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Fox, Anthony - farmer; Sec. 33; P. O. Loran.
Frederick, A. S. P. - laborer; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Garke, Augustus - farmer; Sec. 16; P. O. Loran.
Garke, Wm. - farmer; Sec. 16; P. O. Loran.
Gates, Samuel R. - farmer; Sec. 6; P. O. Willow; born in Wayne Co., N. Y., June 4, 1822, on shore of Lake Ontario; his father emigrated to this Co. in 1837; were first permanent residents in Berreman Twp.; his mother, whose maiden name was Phoebe G. Crane, born in New HAMPSHIRE April 21, 1797, still lives with him; she was the only woman in this section for eighteen months after they came to the country; she is the only one of nineteen brothers and sisters now living; his father died Aug. 18, 1847; he was born in N. Y. Oct. 26, 1779; married Miss Mary E. Mahoney Sept. 15, 1851; she was born in Indiana Nov. 8, 1827; have six children living: William W., now in Washington Territory; Mrs. Clara Davis, John W., Alice A., Rosilla M., Thomas M.; a little nephew lives with them, Ellis A. Evans; have lost four children. Mr. G. served 57th regt. I. V. I.; joined Sherman�s command at Savannah, Ga.; passed in review with the army in Washington; was honorably discharged in 1865; owns 320 acres of land.
Glassner, Nicholas - farmer; Sec. 8; P. O. Willow.
Gray, George W. - farmer and stock dealer; Sec. 29; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born in Owen Co., Ind., March 19, 1844; served in Union army during War of the Rebellion, in 97th Regt. Ind. V. I.; participated in battles of Vicksburg, Jackson, Missionary Ridge,, Dalton, Resaca, Atlanta, Savannah, Bentonville, N. C., and a number of others; was honorably discharged at Indianapolis at close of the war; went to Pittsburgh, Pa., in 1866; came to Jo Daviess Co. in 1868; married Cordelia Mitchell Oct. 14, 1875; she was born in Stephenson Co. July 1, 1854; have one child, Bessie Irena, born Oct. 7, 1876; works 200 acres of land.
Harmon, David - farmer; Sec. 31; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Hoy, Henry C. - farmer; Sec. 9; P. O. Willow.
Keltner, Henry - farmer and stock dealer; Sec. 21; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co., Ill.; was born at Dayton, O., Dec. 25, 1817; in 1834 his father moved to Elkhart Co., Ind, where they lived 18 years; married Welthy A. Cook in 1847; she died in 1850; had two children, one of whom, Julia A. Benner, is living; married Catherine Eisenbise March 13, 1851; she was born in Miami Co., O., Sept. 8, 1833; came to Ill. to Carroll Co. in 1853, and to Jo Daviess Co. in 1872; have nine children living: Peter R., who has been a teacher six years; Jophn H., Henry, William, Cora E., James A., Lewis E., Effa M. and Malinda; lost four children; owns 177 acres of land.
Klump, C. A. - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Willow.
Klump, Jacob B. - farmer and Justice of the Peace; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in Wurtemburg, Ge3rmany, Dec. 24, 1834; came to the U. S. with two sisters in 1853, to Lake Co. and to Elgin; to this Co. in 1854; went to Galena; declared his intention to become a citizen; traveled in Iowa and Minnesota; returned in 1860; went to Peoria to see sisters; there enlisted in 39th I. V. I.; served 4 � years during rebellion; never was off duty; had close calls from bullets; passed through his clothes, drew some blood; was in the severest engagements - 16 battles - Winchester, Black Water, Morris Island, Petersburg, charge and capture of Ft. Gregg, and others equally severe; pursuit and capture of gen. Lee; while at home on veteran furlough married Miss Jane Parkinson Feb. 29, 1864; she was born near where they now live; was the first white child born in Ward�s Grove precinct; have six children living: Sophie E., Herman R., Julia M., William F., Mary and Rubie; lost two children, Helen and Joseph. Mr. K. was honorably discharged from army at Springfield Dec. 16, 1865; has been commissioned by three governors of Illinois as Justice of the Peace, John M. Palmer, John L. Beveridge, and Shelly M. Cullom; owns 323 acres of land.
Kock, Henry - farmer; Sec. 17; P. O. Loran.
Koehler, Frederick - farmer; Sec. 32; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Lopshire, Wm. H. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Lyde, N. Allen - carpenter; Sec. 8; P. O. Willow.
McGinnis, Enoch - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born near Indianapolis, Ind., June 23, 1828; father emigrated to McLean Co., Ill., in 1841; came to this Co. in 1842; lived eight years in Stephenson Co.; went to Wis. In 1859; remained there until 1867; moved to this Co.; married Beulah Buckley in 1850; she was born in Lycoming Co., Pa., Sept. 28, 1828; have ten children living: James B., John F., Samuel A., Thomas D., Mary J., Ida A., Joseph S., Clunson B., George A., Orpha E.; lost two children: William F. and Sarah E; owns 320 acres of land; Commissioner of Highways three years.
McGinnis, Francis - farmer; Sec. 21; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; was born near Pittsburgh, Pa., March 8, 1801; at the age of 15 moved to Ky., and remained there six years; married Jane Coffar in 1822; she died June 9, 1849; they had twelve children, five of whom are living: Enoch, Mary, Sarah, Margaret, Nancy; emigrated to Indiana when it was a new country and remained until 1841, when he moved to McLean, Co., Ill., and in 1842 came to this Co.; two of his sons, James and Joseph, died in the army; James was the owner of the famous Wisconsin eagle; he was color-bearer in the regiment to which it was attached, and cared for it until he died at Jacksonville, Tenn., 1862; had they both lived, James intended to present this eagle to his father, but it became the common property of the Regt. After his death, and at the close of the war was presented to the Governor of Wisconsin; the bird was taken to the Centennial, and while there attracted a great deal of attention; Mr. McGinnis married Eleanor Bartlow Oct. 10, 1851; she died Oct. 17, 1870; owns 61 acres of land; member of Church of Brethren of the Abrahamic Faith.
McGinnis, James - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Loran.
McPeek, Robert - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Pleasant Valley; born in Guernsey Co., Ohio, March 18, 1831; came directly to this Co. from Ohio in 1856; married Nancy Aduddell in Oct., 1854; she was born in Ohio Dec. 11, 1829; have nine children living: Sarah M., Mary I., Amanda J., Benjamin A., Perry O., Orpha A., Margaret A., James G., Josephine B.; lost one child, Nancy; owns 195 acres of land; has been school director four years; they have been active and influential members of the M. E. Church twenty-four years.
Machamer, Thomas J. - farmer; Sec. 4; P. O. Willow; born in Union Co., Pa., March 28, 1839; parents emigrated to this Co. in 1845, when the subject of this sketch was quite young; served in the Union army in the 45th Regt. I. V. I.; enlisted Sept. 14, 1861; was in battles at fort Henry and Donelson; was wounded at Shiloh; honorably discharged on account of wounds received July 17, 1862; married Mary E. Solt Sept. 24, 1864; she was born in this Co. March 10, 1848; have four children : Daniel Lafayette, John Wilbert, Russel C. and Lottie B.; owns 40 acres of land.
Mader, Wm. H. - Sec. 30; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Mitchell, Martin M. - farmer; Sec. 33; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born in Vermillion Co., Ind., April 21, 1827; his father emigrated to Stephenson Co., Ill., in 1842; married Therza Herrington April 18, 1853; she was born in Upper Canada July 14, 1830; came to Carroll, Ill., in 1839; they have five children living: Mrs. Cordelia A. May, Anna M., teacher; Almeda A., Phoebe R. and Stephen M.; owns 433 acres of land; was School Director fifteen years; lost three children: Wm. H., Isaac A., and an infant not named.
Mowry, Wm. - laborer; P. O. Loran.
Mowery, Wm. - farmer; Sec. 16; P. O. Loran.
Muper, Henry - farmer; Sec. 29; P. O. Loran.
Neff, Henry - farmer; Sec. 4; P. O. Willow.
Noble, Arthur - farmer and stock raiser; Sec. 29; p. O. Loran, Stephenson Co., Ill.; born in Co. Tyrone, Ireland, in 1825; came to this country in 1850, and settled at Pittsburgh, Pa., where he lived ten years; was married March 8, 1860, to Jane Conn, who was born in Co. Down, near Belfast, Ireland, in 1843, and came to America with her parents when 5 years old; came to Jo Daviess Co. in 1867; seven children: Alice E., Margaret W., William J., Mary A., Joseph R., Sarah J., Emma R.; owns 310 acres of land; is School Director of the Union School District.
Obley, Christian - farmer; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born in Germany, and came to U. S. when young; settled in Westmoreland Co., Pa.; married there Miss Catherine Darr, in 1844; she was also born in Germany, and came to this country when a child; came to Galena in 1854. Mr. O. served in the army, in 96th Regt. I. V. I.; participated in all the severe engagements through which his regiment passed; was honorably discharged at close of war; have eight children: Catherine married Mr. Wm. H. Mader; both born in this Co.; they have one child, Leonora.
Parkinson, Mrs. Christine - farming; Sec. 8; P. O. Willow; her maiden name was Miss C. Hoy; she was born in Centre Co., Pa., Aug. 31, 1812; married Mr. James Parkinson in 1832; he was born in Centre Co., Pa., April 29, 1806; they emigrated to this Co. in the Spring of 1839; second family in this section; Mr. P.�s brother, Isaac W., who is now P. M. at Willow, came with them; they were educated and enterprising men, and were valuable to the society in a new and sparsely settled country; James was the first Justice of the Peace in this precinct, and served as the first Supervisor of Berreman Twp.; eight children living: Jane (now the wife of J. B. Klump, Eng.), Mrs. Julia A. Calhoun, Isaac W., Mrs. Fannie Lopshire, Cressie E., George W., Silas D., Josiah B., now at Rock River Seminary; lost three sons in army: John died of disease, William killed at Pittsburgh Landing, James died of disease; lost one daughter, Rebecca.
Parkinson, Geo. W. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in this Co. may 8, 1850; married Miss Julia A. Wise Dec. 7, 1873; she was born in Ward�s Grove, Dec. 7, 1852. Mr. P. is the leader of the Willow Helicon Band; he is teacher of instrumental and vocal music; owns 41 acres of land; they have one child, W. Bliss Parkinson.
Parkinson, Isaac W. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in Berreman, this Co., Jan. 23, 1845; has since resided here; served in the Union Army, as Sergeant Co. B, 142d Regt. I. V. I.; served his time in that Regt. And enlisted in the 39th Regt. I. V. I.; joined this regiment the next day after Lee�s surrender at Appomatox; was honorably discharged Dec., 1865; married Miss Maggie C. McLenahen, Sept. 16, 1866; she was born in Mifflin Co., Pa., Nov. 2, 1848; came to Freeport with her parents in 1850; have five children living: Minnie A., Warden W., Fannie B., James W., Benjamin F.. Mr. P. is now serving as Supervisor for the second term, a position he is worthy and well qualified to fill; has been Assessor one term; owns 135 acres of land.
Parkinson, Isaac W., Sr. - postmaster; Willow.
Parkinson, J. B. - Willow.
Parkinson, N. - farmer; Sec. 6; P. O. Willow.
Parkinson, Silas G. - farmer; Sec. 8; P. O. Willow; born Aug. 27, 1852 in this Co.; married Miss Francis A. Chambers in Sept. 1877; she was born in Winona, Minn., June 4, 1859. Mr. P. owns 140 acres of land.
Ray, G. W. - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Loran.
Reiss, John M. - farmer; P. O. Loran.
Renner, David - farmer; Sec. 31; P. O. Pleasant Valley.
Rinebarger, Josiah - farmer; Sec. 18; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; born in Dolphin Co., Pa., Oct. 14, 1829; his father emigrated to Ohio in early times; was principally reared in Wayne Co., Ohio; came to this Co. in 1854; married Elizabeth Mader Nov. 12, 1857; she was born in Union Co., Pa., Sept. 7, 1829; came here with her parents when quite young; they were early settlers; have four children living: Susan J., Eveline R., Mary E. and Carrie Bell; Dolly Ray, niece of Mrs. R., also resides with them; owns 220 acres of land. Mr. R. was School Director 3 and Commissioner of Highways 9 years.
Robinson, Chas. - farmer and Twp. Collector; Sec. 7; P. O. Willow.
Rumsey, G. W., Sr. - farmer; Sec. 32; P. O. Loran.
Rumsey, G. W., Jr. - farmer; Sec. 32; P. O. Loran.
Rumsey, S. - farmer; Sec. 33; P. O. Loran.
Schlafer, Geo. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow.
Schmeck, G. W. - farmer; Sec. 6; P. O. Willow.
Schmeck, Levi F. - farmer; Sec. 5; P. O. Willow; born in Mountour Co. Pa., July 26, 1834; came to this Co. in 1854; served in the Union Army, 3d regt. Mo. V. C., as Commissary Sergeant; was under fire of the enemy most of the time from Balls Bluff to Little rock; was honorably discharged Dec. 31, 1864; married Miss Rebecca A . Ruble, 1866; she died in 1867; married Miss Julia A. Lyle, Jan. 20, 1869; she was born in Jefferson Co., Pa., Sept. 4, 1845; came to this Co. in 1863; has two children: Susan M. and Luella. Mr. S. has been Collector one term, and School Director three years; belongs to the M. E. Church.
Shaffer, P. - farmer; Sec. 16; P. O. Loran.
Sharron, H. - laborer; Sec. 31; P. O. Loran.
Solt, D. - farmer; Sec. 31; P. O. Loran.
Solt, Israel - merchant; P. O. Willow; born in Clinton Co., Pa., April 7, 1840; came to this Co. in 1848; served in the army during the Rebellion in the 34th Regt. I. V. I.; was promoted to 1st Lieutenant Co. I; was in the severe engagements of Shiloh, Stone river, Murfeesbora and Chattanooga; re-enlisted in 1864; returned home on veteran furlough and married Miss Kate Bishop in Feb. 1864; she was born in Centre Co., Pa., Dec. 7, 1842; have three children: Cora E., Theophilus A. and Hettie. Mr. S. was wounded at Jonesboro, Ga., Sept 1, 1864, through the left thigh; was honorably discharged at the close of the war; has been engaged in merchandising 5 years at his present stand where he is doing a thriving business.
Spurgeon, Joseph - farmer; Sec. 19; P. O. Loran.
Staley, Frederick - farmer; Sec. 4; P. O. Willow.
Taylor, John, Jr. - laborer; Sec. 9; P. O. Loran.
Taylor, John, Sr. - farmer; Sec. 9; P. O. Loran.
Tiffany, C. J. - farmer; Sec. 6; P. O. Willow.
Tiffany, Delzon - farmer; Sec. 6; P. O. Plum River; born in Wayne Co., Pa., Feb. 24, 1820; lived in N. Y. two years; came to this Co. in 1839; settled on farm where he now resides; among first settlers; married Miss Betsy Lyon Dec. 31, 1847; she was born in Wayne Co., N. Y., June 7, 1825; have eight children living: Albinus, Columbus J., Mary E., Charles H., Palmer, Douglas, Orlena, Reuben; have lost three children; lost his wife June 28, 2871; has been Supervisor five years; owns 476 acres of land; he and his son, C. J., both members of A. F. and A. M.
Wagner, Lafayette - farmer and teacher; Sec. 32; P. O. Mt. Carroll; was born in Stark Co., Ohio, Jan. 15, 1828; when quite young his father moved to Wayne Co.; in 1850 he left home and crossed the plains to California, and was in the gold mines ten years, then returned to Ohio, and in 1860 came to this Cp.; Aug. 26, 1877, married Mrs. Keyser, whose maiden name was Nancy McGinnis; she had six children by her first marriage, four of whom are living: Mary J., William E., Elizabeth R. and Rosanna. Mr. Wagner has taught school for 20 years; has been Supervisor and Justice of the Peace; owns 207 acres of land.
Williams, Z. Taylor - farmer and teacher; Sec. 29; P. O. Loran, Stephenson Co.; was born in this Co. Sept. 4, 1848, and has made his home here ever since; traveled through Iowa and Central Illinois; attended Mt. Hope school, Pleasant Valley, and union school, Mt. Carroll; married Lucinda Mader April 14, 1870; she was born in this Co. May 5, 1852; one son, Wilber; owns 120 acres of land; he is now engaged in teaching the Union School in Berreman Twp.
Wise, Mrs. Esther - farming; Sec. 4; P. O. Willow; maiden name was Esther Wolfley; she was born in Union Co., Pa., Dec. 15, 1822, and moved with her parents to Centre Co.; was married Dec. 8, 1845, to Frederick Wise, who was born in Germany near the French line, Feb. 14, 1820; came to the U. S. in 1823, and in 1849 to Jo Daviess Co. Mr. Wise died march 2, 1873; has seven children living: George, Henry, Mrs. Julia A. Parkinson, Mrs. Mary C. Calhoun, William, Randolph G. and Jacob; William and Jacob are at the Rock River Seminary; owns 265 acres of land.
Wise, George - farmer; Sec. 4; P. O. Willow.
Wise, Henry - carpenter and joiner; P. O. Willow; born in Ward�s Grove, this Co., April 25, 1850; went to Nebraska in 1871; was there three years; came back to this Co.; served an apprenticeship at his trade in Stephenson Co.; married Miss Mary J. Troxell Nov. 9, 1875; she was born in Pleasant valley, this Co., Nov. 9, 1856; they have one child, Orus M., born Sept. 11, 1876. Mr. W. has lately erected a mill, in which he has a steam engine for grinding feed, and is already doing a good business.
Womer, John - blacksmith; Willow.
Yeomans, John - laborer; Willow.
Yeomans, Wm. - laborer; Willow.

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(1) Whenever any person is found guilty of a violation of section 28-303 and the information contains a notice of aggravation as provided in section 29-1603, the district court shall, as soon as practicable, fix a date for an aggravation hearing to determine the alleged aggravating circumstances. If no notice of aggravation has been filed, the district court shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment.
(ii) The jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged.
A jury required by subdivision (2)(b) of this section shall be impaneled in the manner provided in sections 29-2004 to 29-2010.
(3) The defendant may waive his or her right to a jury determination of the alleged aggravating circumstances. The court shall accept the waiver after determining that it is made freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. If the defendant waives his or her right to a jury determination of the alleged aggravating circumstances, such determination shall be made by a panel of judges as a part of the sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521.
(4)(a) At an aggravation hearing before a jury for the determination of the alleged aggravating circumstances, the state may present evidence as to the existence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. The Nebraska Evidence Rules shall apply at the aggravation hearing.
(b) Alternate jurors who would otherwise be discharged upon final submission of the cause to the jury shall be retained during the deliberation of the defendant's guilt but shall not participate in such deliberations. Such alternate jurors shall serve during the aggravation hearing as provided in section 29-2004 but shall not participate in the jury's deliberations under this subsection.
(c) If the jury serving at the aggravation hearing is the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, the jury may consider evidence received at the trial of guilt for purposes of reaching its verdict as to the existence or nonexistence of aggravating circumstances in addition to the evidence received at the aggravation hearing.
(d) After the presentation and receipt of evidence at the aggravation hearing, the state and the defendant or his or her counsel may present arguments before the jury as to the existence or nonexistence of the alleged aggravating circumstances.
(e) The court shall instruct the members of the jury as to their duty as jurors, the definitions of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, and the state's burden to prove the existence of each aggravating circumstance alleged in the information beyond a reasonable doubt.
(f) The jury at the aggravation hearing shall deliberate and return a verdict as to the existence or nonexistence of each alleged aggravating circumstance. Each aggravating circumstance shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Each verdict with respect to each alleged aggravating circumstance shall be unanimous. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to an aggravating circumstance, such aggravating circumstance shall not be weighed in the sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-2521.
(g) Upon rendering its verdict as to the determination of the aggravating circumstances, the jury shall be discharged.
(h) If no aggravating circumstance is found to exist, the court shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment. If one or more aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the court shall convene a panel of three judges to hold a hearing to receive evidence of mitigation and sentence excessiveness or disproportionality as provided in subsection (3) of section 29-2521.
Note: The repeal of section 29-2520 by Laws 2015, LB 268, section 35, is not effective because of the vote on the referendum at the November 2016 general election.
Resentencing necessitated by a new rule of procedure requiring the jury to find the existence of aggravating circumstances in death penalty cases did not expose the defendant to greater punishment and/or violate the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008).
The requirement that a notice of aggravators be filed prior to trial is not applicable to cases in which the pretrial and trial litigation steps have already been completed. State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003).
A three-judge panel designated under subsection (3) of this section must vote unanimously for a sentence of death before the death penalty can be properly imposed. State v. Hochstein and Anderson, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001).
This section grants the trial judge discretion to conduct the sentencing with or without the assistance of two additional judges, and a defendant's request for a three-judge panel does not make such a panel mandatory. The sentencing procedure provided by this section provides appropriate standards for impaneling a three-judge panel. State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000).
This section does not violate the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution, and the decision whether to convene a three-judge panel under the statute is left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989).
In Nebraska, the judge rather than the jury is responsible for sentencing upon conviction in a capital case. State v. Burchett, 224 Neb. 444, 399 N.W.2d 258 (1986).
District court's failure to set hearing date on sentencing within statutory limit is not a ground for reversal where the error does not result in some demonstrative prejudice. State v. Benzel, 220 Neb. 466, 370 N.W.2d 501 (1985).
District court shall set date for hearing on determination of sentence within seven days of defendant's conviction of murder. State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).


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Three cases raised similar issues concerning procedures relating to decisions to move prisoners or detainees into cellular confinement or segregation.
King was serving a seven year sentence in a young offender institute for death by dangerous driving. He was subjected to cellular confinement between 11 and 13 April 2009 for failure to comply with a lawful order.
Bourgass is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for murdering a police officer and 17 years in prison for conspiracy to commit public nuisance by the use of poisons and / or explosives. He was segregated for a period of several months for reasons of good order and discipline. Issues included accusations that he had been involved in bullying and intimidation and accusations that he had been considered to have influence over other prisoners.
Hussain is serving a long sentence for terrorism-related offences. While in prison, he seriously assaulted another prisoner and was placed in segregation for several months for reasons of good order and discipline.
Did the prisoners have an ECHR, art 6 right to associate with other prisoners, derived from provision of domestic law, that was “determined” by the proceedings in question?
In the alternative, did the proceedings determine their art 6 civil rights on the basis that cellular confinement or segregation interfered with their other ECHR rights, namely art 3 and art 8?
If the answer to points 1 or 2 is yes, was the overall process by which the appellants’ civil rights were determined compliant with art 6, in particular given the availability of judicial review to challenge the decisions of the prison governors and the Segregation Review Boards?
In relation to the first question, the CA noted that the three men’s case is that domestic law, either in itself or in conjunction with recent ECtHR decisions, acknowledges that serving prisoners have a right to enjoy association with their fellow inmates; that that right is a “civil right” within the meaning of the ECHR, art 6; and that decisions of a governor or SRB to interfere with it by authorising or continuing cellular confinement or segregation are “determinations” of it.
According to the CA, the burden was to establish the engagement of the ECHR, art 6 at the time of the decisions of the governor or SRBs, however there was nothing in the relevant Strasbourg authorities or domestic authority which requires compliance with art 6 at the stage of the administrative decision to segregate or continue segregation. The CA stated that the question is therefore whether there is an implied right of association with other prisoners which amounts to a “civil right”?
The CA thought it significant that the Young Offender Institution Rules 2000 and the Prison Rules 1999 stop short of conferring a right to associate with other prisoners. It held that the correct analysis is to see association with other prisoners as a normal privilege rather than a right, one that is subject to withdrawal in accordance with the Rules, which invest discretionary powers in governors. The CA stressed that the exercise of these powers and the SRB review process are amenable to judicial review which will secure rights such as those under the ECHR, art 3 and art 8. The CA concluded that this amenability to judicial review is appropriate protection and therefore the ECHR, art 6 was not engaged at the point at which the governors or SRBs made their decisions.
In relation to the second question, the court noted that the present case is concerned with administrative decision-making in a specific context which may lead to a later challenge in judicial proceedings in the Administrative Court. While the governor and the SRBs were obliged, under the Human Rights Act 1998, s 7, to ensure these decisions did not breach the prisoners’ rights under the ECHR, that did not transform the processes with which they were concerned into determinations of disputes about the prisoners’ rights under the ECHR.
In relation to the third question, the CA noted that if the decisions of the governors and the SRB did not engage the ECHR, art 6 at that stage, then the issue does not arise and the decisions would be susceptible to judicial review on conventional grounds. However, if art 6 is engaged, the CA considered that, notwithstanding the absence of the elements of independence and impartiality in the ECHR, art 6 sense within the prison, the procedure as a whole is art 6 compliant on a “full jurisdiction” basis.
The CA went on to reject the submission, particularly by Bourgass, that he should be able to invoke common law procedural fairness in support of his case that he was not provided with sufficient disclosure or reasons to permit a meaningful opportunity to challenge his segregation. In particular, the CA noted that facts relating to Bourgass did not favour this submission. The CA also rejected Hussain’s claim that he was denied his right of access to legal advice due to additional restrictions on his telephone access while in segregation.
The CA concluded that the appeals should be dismissed.
The case was heard by the Supreme Court on 16 and 17 February 2015, which had to decide if the decisions were unlawful under the ECHR, art 6, and common law rules of procedural fairness.
According to this article from The Guardian and Press Association, the arguments advanced on behalf of Bourgass and Hussain at the hearing included that fairness means that (i) prisoners should be provided with sufficient information relating to the decision to segregate them to put them in a position to defend themselves in a meaningful way, and (ii) they should also have the opportunity to challenge a decision to segregate them on a long-term basis before an independent body.
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