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Behavioral Locus of Drug Action V. The chapters, written by authorities in their respective research areas, provide up-to-date examination and analysis of dominant evolving research areas. Monaghan, Contributions of the Matching Law to the Analysis of the Behavioral Effects of Drugs. Schaal, Roles and Characteristics of Theory in Behavioral Pharmacology. The book presents papers about some quantitative behavioral pharmacology in the mouse; about interrelations among prior experience; and current conditions in the determination of behavior and the effects of drugs. This is the latest volume in a series that continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral pharmacology, psychopharmacology, and the neurosciences. Behavioral Topography of Agonistic Behavior V.
The chapters, written by authorities in their respective research areas, provide up-to-date examination and analysis of dominant evolving research areas. Lucki, Behavioral Responses Associated With Serotonin Receptors. This volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. This seventh volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. Kantak, Nutritional Aspects of Drug Action on Behavior. This seventh volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. Summary and Conclusions References A Biobehavioral Approach to Treatment of Amphetamine Addiction: A Four-Way Integration I.
Kantak, Nutritional Aspects of Drug Action on Behavior. The text then describes rate-dependence and the effects of phenothiazine antipsychotics in pigeons; the rate-convergent effects of drugs; and the rate-dependent effects of extra sti. Marr, Behavioral Pharmacology: Issues of Reductionism and Causality. For researchers and graduate students in psychopharmacology, behavioral pharmacology, toxicology, and the neurosciences. A Biobehavioral Approach to Treatment of Amphetamine Addiction: A Four-Way Integration; I. The chapters, written by authorities in their respective research areas, provide up-to-date examination and analysis of dominant evolving research areas. Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology : Volume 3.
Table of Contents Contents: M. Concluding Comments References Subject Index Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology, Volume 2 covers papers on the evidence of the broadening scope and the practical implications of behavioral pharmacology. Effects of Reinforcement Schedule on Drug Intake V. Contributors Erratum Contents of Previous Volumes Behavioral Mechanisms of Drug Dependence I. Volume 3 Author: Travis I Thompson; Peter B Dews; William A McKim; James E Barrett; Canadian Psychological Association Publisher: Burlington : Elsevier Science : Academic Press, ©2013. This is the latest volume in a series that continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral pharmacology, psychopharmacology, and the neurosciences.
Schedule-Controlled Behavior in the Mouse V. Implications for the Future of Drug Dependence Treatment References Behavioral Effects of Nicotine I. The book discusses the behavioral actions of benzodiazepines and considers the extent to which these actions are consistent with the proposition that these effects are partially or entirely determined by control rates of responding. Distributions of Rate-Dependency Slopes; V. List of Contributors Preface Some Quantitative Behavioral Pharmacology in the Mouse I. The text also describes the behavioral effects of nicotine in human and infrahuman studies; the behavioral pharmacology of cigarette smoking; the problems and perspectives in the behavioral toxicity of l.
This volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. Assessment of the Relationship between Reinforcing Effects and Therapeutic Effects of Drugs: Implications for Abuse Liability V. Witkin, Behavioral Pharmacology of Compounds Affecting Muscarinic Cholinergic Receptors. Summary References Index Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology, Volume 4 covers papers about the advances in behavioral pharmacology. The text then describes rate-dependence and the effects of phenothiazine antipsychotics in pigeons; the rate-convergent effects of drugs; and the rate-dependent effects of extra sti. Rate-Convergent Effects of Drugs; I. Effects of Phenothiazines on the Stimulus Control of Responding; V.
For researchers and graduate students in psychopharmacology, behavioral pharmacology, toxicology, and the neurosciences. Summary of the Effects of Some Prototype Drugs on Agonistic Behavior References Predicting the Abuse Liability of Drugs with Animal Drug Self-Administration Procedures: Psychomotor Stimulants and Hallucinogens I. Abstract: Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology, Volume 3 covers papers dealing with various aspects of the ways in which drug effects are related to and perhaps modified by the rate of responding. Designed as a resource text for professionals, as well as a supplementary text for upper level undergraduate and graduate students of behavioral pharmacology, psychopharmacology, psychobiology, and related fields, this book, like the others in the Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology Series,provides comprehensive coverage unavailable elsewhere. The Behavioral Toxicity of Lead: Problems and Perspectives; I.
How Does Behavior Differ from Other Indicators of Toxicity? Behavioral pharmacologists, psychiatrists, pharmacologists, psychologists, physicians, and students taking these courses will find the book invaluable. Witkin, Behavioral Pharmacology of Compounds Affecting Muscarinic Cholinergic Receptors. Marr, Behavioral Pharmacology: Issues of Reductionism and Causality. Exploring Mechanisms of the Food Deprivation Effect V. Contents: Front Cover; Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Contributors; Erratum; Contents of Previous Volumes; Chapter 1. .
A Hypothesis of Cigarette Smoking References The Behavioral Toxicity of Lead: Problems and Perspectives I. For researchers and graduate students in psychopharmacology, behavioral pharmacology, toxicology, and the neurosciences. For researchers and graduate students in psychopharmacology, behavioral pharmacology, toxicology, and the neurosciences. This seventh volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. Includes papers from meetings of the Canadian Psychological Association, June, 1978, organized by W. Description: 1 online resource 235 pages Contents: Front Cover; Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology; Copyright Page ; Table of Contents; List of Contributors; Preface; Preface to the Ottawa Conference on the Rate-Dependent Effects of Drugs; Contents of Previous Volumes; Chapter 1.
Factors Influencing Amphetamine-Produced Taste Aversions. The text also describes the effects of drugs on male sexual function; agonistic behavior and repeated acquisition; as well as the procedures and results of drug self-administration research in laboratory animals that provide information about the abuse liability of drugs in man. For researchers and graduate students in psychopharmacology, behavioral pharmacology, toxicology, and the neurosciences. This volume continues to document and summarize developments, trends, and emergent interdisciplinary research in behavioral psychopharmacology. Designed as a resource text for professionals, as well as a supplementary text for upper level undergraduate and graduate students of behavioral pharmacology, psychopharmacology, psychobiology, and related fields, this book, like the others in the Advances in Behavioral Pharmacology Series, provides comprehensive coverage unavailable elsewhere. Concluding Remarks References Increased Drug-Reinforced Behavior due to Food Deprivation I. The book presents papers on the behavioral mechanisms of drug dependence; the effects of food deprivation on drug-reinforced behavior across most types of drugs abused by humans, routes of self-administration and species; and a biobehavioral approach to treatment of amphetamine addiction.

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Step-by-step techniques for expanding your practice, reducing your hours, or both. Provides dozens of techniques potentially worth six figures of new revenue.
More clients, fewer hours. Think you can’t have both? Read these two success stories from David V. Lorenzo’s ground-breaking book.
“Pat is an intellectual property attorney who came to me complaining about the number of hours he worked. His biggest complaint was that he was working on too many small matters. Since there are no small matters, only small fees, I delved into his client list and we made some adjustments.
“It seems Pat was filing about 5 trademark applications per month for his clients and charging $1,500 each. His justification for this fee was: This is what everyone else charges.
“The first adjustment we made was to Pat’s mindset. When a business owner owns a trademark he owns an asset. This is a thing of value to his business. It helps build equity. This means filing a trademark application and having it approved is making a sound investment.
“But that is not all Pat’s clients are investing in. They are also investing in a relationship WITH HIM. This was a new philosophy for Pat. This investment in the relationship means that all the work done on this matter would be covered by one fee (less the government filing charges). If it took 20 revisions to get the mark approved, Pat would resubmit the paperwork 20 times. Once the client invested in Pat, he would not need to spend another penny on this matter.
“Second, we added the glue that cemented the relationship between Pat and his clients. We offered three years of monitoring to protect the trademark from infringement and we offered LIFETIME consultations on this trademark INCLUDED in the fee.
“This means ten years from now, if someone has a question about this particular trademark, they can call Pat and he will answer their question for free.
“Joe came to me complaining that people would not pay more than $500 for him to draft their will. He said this was all he could charge since everyone else in town was charging that fee.
“After interviewing Joe I learned there were 3 other documents that were critical to setting up a sound estate plan. I also learned that Joe’s average client revises these documents at least once during their lifetime. Finally, Joe told me that most of his clients only learned of advantageous changes in the law when he brought them up.
“Under my guidance, Joe immediately stopped offering the drafting of a will as a standalone service. Instead, he began offering his clients a long-term relationship that included the drafting of all estate planning documents, the review of 12 different kinds of legal contracts (including mortgage documents, auto financing agreements, leases, and more — basically any document that bound his client to an investment of $1,000 or more) and two estate planning meetings per year.
“Overnight Joe went from being the guy who writes the will to becoming a trusted family advisor. How did this affect his income? Well, remember how Joe was charging $500 for the drafting of a will? Now he charges $2,400 per year for his Concierge Legal Service. And oh, by the way, he went back to his clients who previously paid $500 for their wills and he was able to sign up more than half of them to the new relationship.
“First: You may think this approach is not applicable to you and your law firm. If you do, you are DEAD WRONG. This is applicable to every attorney in every law practice. We have even used it for litigation. I have given you two examples – one in a business-to-business setting and one in a consumer setting. There is absolutely no value in thinking that you cannot use this model in your law firm. You absolutely can.
1. Match your message to your target audience: Stop talking about yourself. Talk about the issues that keep your clients awake at night.
2. Become a thought leader: You cannot be everything to everyone. Pick one area and master it. Make sure everyone knows you own that area of law.
“2. Everyone else is part of the problem. If I had a dollar for every time I saw a lawyer receive bad business advice from another lawyer, I would have a pile of money the size of Mount Everest. Lawyers are the worst people to ask about strategy or marketing. The majority of lawyers believe you can ignore these business disciplines and live happily ever after. A select few lawyers believe marketing and business success can be found exclusively online or in social media.
“Remember this: Most lawyers in private practice struggle with their finances, their work/life balance or both. Ignore advice from other lawyers, even those you believe to be successful. If you want to know how to improve the quality of your service or your marketing message, ask your clients.
“When I work with an attorney one-on-one, I interview current clients and past clients. I then develop the business strategy based upon the real world research. Having done this over 100 times in the past 3 years, I have developed a good understanding for the perspective of the client.
Job number one in every law firm is to attract and retain more clients. But how do you go about that challenging task? How do you know the marketing work in which you are investing scarce hours and dollars will actually pay off?
David V. Lorenzo’s Client Attraction Secrets provides a practice-proven roadmap to increasing law firm revenue without increasing your hours. His techniques might even allow you to shorten your workweek.
Your results will depend on how enthusiastically and creatively you implement Mr. Lorenzo’s suggestions, but know beforehand that the techniques detailed have worked for a wide variety of lawyers, in all types of practices, in good economic times and bad.
Mr. Lorenzo has helped attorneys in ambitious solo practices, mid-sized firms, and multi-national behemoths. But what he most enjoys is helping lawyers build lifestyle-friendly niche practices that generate a comfortable income while permitting a healthy working/living balance.
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§2. Does Your Pride Get In the Way?
§3. What Are Your Unshakable Beliefs?
§5. How Did This Happen?
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§30. Are You Worth the Risk?
§35. Do You Look Like an Expert?
§41. Want to Wake Up Tomorrow Smart, Rich and Thin?
§42. Can You Take It?
David V. Lorenzo has helped hundreds of lawyers build lifestyle-friendly niche practices. “Make a great living and live a great life®” is his motto.
He relies on practice-tested techniques, focuses on implementation of those proven methods, and obtains client feedback to guide further improvements.
Prior to assisting attorneys, David worked with The Gallup Organization to develop innovative solutions for the firm’s clients. During his time with Gallup, David’s consulting teams added over $250 million in value to dozens of large multi-national firms. This value came from true organic growth – actual changes in business strategy that led to rapid revenue and profit improvement.
More may be learned about David and his consulting work for lawyers at www.RainmakerLawyer.com.


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Anashin V. V., Aulchenko V. M., Baldin E. M., Barladyan A. K., Barnyakov A. Yu, Barnyakov M. Yu, Baru S. E., Basok I. Yu, Bedny I. V., Beloborodova O. L., Blinov A. E., Blinov V. E., Bobrov A. V., Bobrovnikov V. S., Bondar A. E., Buzykaev A. R., Vorobiov A. I., Gulevich V. V., Dneprovsky L. V., Zhilich V. N., Zhulanov V. V., Karpov G. V., Karpov S. V., Kononov S. A., Kotov K. Yu, Kravchenko E. A., Kudryavtsev V. N., Kuzmin A. S., Kulikov V. F., Kuper E. A., Levichev E. B., Maksimov D. A., Malyshev V. M., Maslennikov A. L., Medvedko A. S., Muchnoi N. Yu, Nikitin S. A., Nikolaev I. B., Onuchin A. P., Oreshkin S. B., Orlov I. O., Osipov A. A., Peleganchuk S. V., Pivovarov S. G., Poluektov A. O., Pospelov G. E., Prisekin V. G., Rodyakin V. A., Ruban A. A., Savinov G. A., Skovpen Yu I., Skrinsky A. N., Smalyuk V. V., Snopkov R. G., Sokolov A. V., Sukharev A. M., Talyshev A. A., Tayursky V. A., Telnov V. I., Tikhonov Yu A., Todyshev K. Yu, Usov Yu V., Kharlamova T. A., Shamov A. G., Shwartz B. A., Shekhtman L. I., Shusharo A. I., Yushkov A. N.
The KEDR detector is a universal magnetic detector designed for studying the c- and b-quarks and two-photon physics, and is employed at the VEPP-4M e+ e- collider. A specific feature of the experiment is the measurement of absolute beam energy using two methods: the resonant depolarization and the faster but less precise Compton backscattering of laser photons. This allowed a large series of measurements to be performed, in which the accuracy of determination of such fundamental parameters of particles as mass and total and leptonic widths was improved. © 2013 Pleiades Publishing, Ltd.

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You are currently browsing the The GAP Attorneys Blog blog archives for December, 2011.
Lexington County School District One v. D.T., 57 IDELR 190 (D.S.C. 2011): The parents of a student diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder, Disorder of Written Expression, and Learning Disorder were awarded reimbursement for the student’s placement at a private residential school for the 2007-2008 school year. The school district had denied the student a FAPE where the IEP failed to address the student’s truancy from school. The evidence demonstrated that the student’s truancy was related to his disability and the school district failed to provide the student with counseling or with a psychological evaluation to address the causes of the student’s resistance to attend school. The court also concluded that the residential school was appropriate since it was essential for the student to make educational progress.
However, the court denied the parents’ claim for reimbursement at a different private school in subsequent school years where the student’s condition improved significantly and the school district’s IEP offered the student a FAPE. Although the proposed IEPs in the subsequent school years did not include counseling, the school district was willing to provide counseling upon the recommendation from a psychologist or outside agency. However, the parents placed the student in the private school before this evaluation could take place.
Alabama District Judge rules that the IDEA does authorize independent educational evaluations at public expense (overruling magistrate judge).
Phillip and Angie C. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 57 IDELR 97 (N.D. Ala. 2011): A U.S. District Judge overruled a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the IDEA does not authorize IEEs at public expense. Given the circumstances surrounding the regulation (e.g., that it has been in place since 1977 and Alabama has a similar state regulation), the District Judge determined that the IDEA statute’s omission of “at public expense” did not render the regulation void since the agency (here the Department of Education) is delegated authority to fill any gap Congress leaves in a statute. The regulation providing for IEEs at public expense fills that gap.
The District Judge upheld the magistrate’s other recommendation, however, that the hearing officer did not have authority to order production of copies of the student’s records under the circumstances in this case. Specifically, the hearing officer determined that, once the parents filed a due process complaint, they were entitled to copies of the student’s records and not simply an opportunity to inspect and review them. However, since the hearing officer reached this determination after the hearing had concluded, the determination was untimely since the reasons supporting the hearing officer’s conclusion (that parents should have copies of student records in order to ably prepare for a hearing) were rendered moot by the fact that the hearing had concluded.
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School district’s discontinuation of student’s 1:1 aide appropriate where student would be instructed by a special education teacher in small group.
E.D. v. Bedford Central School District, 57 IDELR 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2011): A U.S. District Court upheld the New York State Review Officer’s (SRO’s) decision that the school district offered an appropriate program to a student with specific learning disabilities and ADHD. As a result, the student’s parents’ claim for tuition reimbursement was denied.
The student previously received the services of a 1:1 aide while in elementary school to address his attention issues due to the student’s placement in a general education classroom. As the student moved to middle school, the district discontinued the 1:1 aide and instead placed the student in integrated co-teaching classrooms for math and ELA, and also assigned a consultant teacher for his other core academic classes. In each of these classes, a special education teacher would be modifying the general instruction for a group of students, with a maximum of six students in each group.
In addition to the specialized instruction, the student was also to receive instruction in a building level support class to allow his special education teacher the opportunity to reinforce concepts and preview materials. Also, the student’s IEP provided for speech services and counseling to address language deficiencies and social/emotional issues. In light of all the services offered, the SRO determined (and the Court agreed) that the student’s varied needs would have been met and the district therefore offered an appropriate program. Accordingly, the parents’ request for tuition reimbursement for their unilateral placement was denied.
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Student not eligible for special education where her reading fluency deficiency did not prevent her from reading at, or near, grade level.
H.M. v. Haddon Heights Board of Education, 57 IDELR 186 (D.N.J. 2011): A U.S. District Court determined that a school district’s declassification of a student with a specific learning disability was proper where the student’s identified deficiency in reading fluency did not prevent her from reading at, or at least near, grade level. Therefore, she did not require special education and was ineligible for classification.
The student’s evaluations indicated reading fluency skills below grade level. However, the Court noted that when “viewed in conjunction with the other tests, as well as observations of her teachers” the student was operating at, or near, grade level in overall reading fluency. The tests and observations also showed the student exhibited little, if any, difficulty with reading comprehension. Thus, since the student’s reading fluency deficiency was not adversely impacting her educational performance she did not require special education services. Therefore, the district’s declassification was proper.
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District’s inclusion of parents in IEP process and student’s overall progress showed she received FAPE.
K.C. v. Nazareth Area School District, 57 IDELR 92 (E.D. Pa. 2011): A U.S. District Court ruled that a school district’s willingness to work with parents of a student with disabilities, and the progress the student demonstrated under the IEPs contested by the parents, resulted in a free appropriate public education for the student.
The student was twenty years old, and attended a private school at the District’s expense due to her diagnosis of Prader-Willi Syndrome (a genetic disorder), which was considered the underlying cause of most of the student’s academic and functional skill issues. The student also had brain damage due to an in-utero stroke. Throughout her education at her private school (beginning in 2006) her parents only agreed to one IEP. That IEP was finalized in May of 2007. Since that IEP, the parents requested numerous IEP Team meetings and insisted on specific language to be included in the IEP. As a result, the last IEP the district offered the student was more than seventy-five (75) pages long.
Despite the length of the IEP, the parents still disagreed with the nature of the services provided. The Court, affirming the impartial hearing officer, determined that the student’s demonstrated progress showed that the services the district provided were appropriate. More specifically, the parents argued that the transition plan was deficient due to a failure to provide travel training and the student failed to meet certain transition goals. However, the Court found that the student made adequate progress. Additionally, the Court concluded that the parents’ failed to consent to specific transition programs the district wished to provide. Such programs likely would have been beneficial to the student, and enhanced her transition plan. Therefore, the Court held the district offered a FAPE, and the student was not entitled to compensatory education.
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School district may violate IDEA by not providing notice of procedural safeguards and by requiring parent to transport student.
Doe v. Attleboro Public Schools, 57 IDELR 132 (D. Mass. 2011): Parents of a student with pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified (on the autism spectrum) appealed an administrative hearing officer’s dismissal of their claim for reimbursement for transportation of their son to a different school within the school district. The Court determined the dismissal was in error, and remanded the matter back to the hearing officer.
The parents wanted their son to attend a specific elementary school so that he would have an enclosed classroom (in which the walls go from floor to ceiling) as opposed to open classrooms (in which the classrooms are not divided by traditional walls). Based on the student’s needs, his parents argued that he required an enclosed classroom. As a condition of the student attending school in an enclosed classroom, the district required the parents to sign an agreement requiring them to transport the student. In doing so, the district also did not provide the parents with notice of their procedural safeguards. Based on the failure to provide such notice, the parents may not have been aware of their ability to challenge the decision to place the student in an open classroom. Therefore, the Court remanded the matter back to the hearing officer for further proceedings to address those issues.
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Child’s residency, not his or her formal enrollment in public schools, obligates school district to re-evaluate.
Moorestown Township Board of Education v. M.D., 57 IDELR 158 (D.N.J. 2011): A U.S. District Court held that the location of a child’s residence determines whether or not the school district has an obligation to re-evaluate the child. The Court rejected the District’s argument that, in order for there to be an affirmative obligation to re-evaluate a student with a disability, that student needs to be enrolled in the school district.
The parents unilaterally enrolled the student in a private school that, at the time of the student’s enrollment, was within the school district where the student resided. After the student had spent more than a year at such private school, the parents requested the district re-evaluate him for potential placement back in a public school setting. The district refused to evaluate the student, despite the fact that the student resided within the district, unless he first re-enrolled in the public schools. The parents did not want to re-enroll the student in the district, out of fear of potentially losing his spot in the private school should the district not create an acceptable program.
After the parents filed a due process complaint, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined the district denied the student a free appropriate public education by not conducting evaluations and convening an IEP Team meeting. The district appealed the decision, arguing that its duty to evaluate a student with a disability only applies if the student is enrolled in the district. The Court, noting that the district could produce only marginal support for its argument that it does not have to evaluate a student residing within its boundaries, rejected the district’s argument and held that the district’s responsibility to evaluate students with disabilities depends on their residence and does not also require that such students be enrolled in the district’s schools.
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FindACase | Koropey v. Penn Virginia Corp.
Koropey v. Penn Virginia Corp.
The pro se appellant, Roman Koropey, owned stock in the Penn Virginia Corporation prior to the company filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and restructuring its stock ownership. In the bankruptcy proceeding below, appellant Roman Koropey filed an adversary complaint in which he claimed that Penn Virginia defrauded its investors and asked the Bankruptcy Court to revoke its approval of the proposed Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Koropey's adversary proceeding, and Koropey has appealed. The Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court and dismisses the appeal because Koropey's adversary complaint fails to allege that Penn Virginia engaged in any fraud that warranting revocation of the Bankruptcy Court's approval order.
On May 12, 2016, Penn Virginia and each of its debtor affiliates (collectively, "Penn Virginia") filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. (Case No. 16-32390.) The Bankruptcy Court eventually confirmed a reorganization plan (the "Plan").
Under the Plan, Penn Virginia generated $50 million in cash, in part from a stock offering (the "Rights Offering"). Under the Plan, new "Backstop Parties" could purchase new common stock at a set price of $3.18 per share. To encourage investment in the surviving entity, the Plan gave the Backstop Parties a "Commitment Premium" of additional shares. The Plan authorized an aggregate Commitment Premium of $3, 000, 000 to be paid to the Backstop Parties as new common stock based on the initial offering price. The stock purchase turned into a very profitable investment because when the Backstop Parties' shares began trading on the open market, the value of the new common stock skyrocketed to $42-$50 per share.
On February 7, 2017, Koropey filed an adversary complaint in the Bankruptcy Court (Case No. 17-03030, Appendix 000010A) to revoke the Confirmation Order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1144. Penn Virginia moved to dismiss Koropey's complaint, which the Bankruptcy Court granted. In dismissing Koropey's complaint, the Bankruptcy Court found that Koropey failed to "identify any particular statement or act" constituting fraud by Penn Virginia, and therefore failed to sufficiently plead fraud under the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9 and Bankruptcy Rule 7009. (Appendix 000144A.) The Bankruptcy Court also found Koropey's complaint time barred.
On appeal, Koropey argues that Penn Virginia fraudulently misrepresented (1) the value of the common stock issued to the Backstop Parties and (2) the value of the Commitment Premium paid to the Backstop Parties. In essence, Koropey says Penn Virginia undervalued the stock in the Rights Offering. In support of his claims, Koropey points to the initial purchase price of $3.18 for stock that later traded on the open market for $42-$50 per share. He also says that the Backstop Parties should have received no more than $3, 000, 000 as a premium but received more because of the increase in the shares' value.
District courts have appellate jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (granting the district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals "from final judgments, orders, and decrees ... of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title."). "On appeal from the bankruptcy court, the district court acts as an appellate court and reviews the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo." In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017).
As noted above, the Bankruptcy Court decided this case by granting Penn Virginia's motion to dismiss. The Bankruptcy Court's procedures adopt the pleading standard from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Bank. P. 7012. A motion to dismiss gauges the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving any factual discrepancies or testing the merits of the claims. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle that a court must accept all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state facts that, when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
The Court liberally construes pro se plaintiffs' complaints. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 115 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). This principle of liberal construction, however, has its limits. Id. at 1276; see Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) ("In interpreting a pro se complaint, the court's task is not to discern the unexpressed intent of a plaintiff, but what the words in the complaint mean.").
Pursuant to 11 U.S. Code § 1144, an interested party can move to revoke a bankruptcy court's prior order confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization if the debtor procured the order by fraud. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Bankruptcy Rule 7009, a party alleging fraud must "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud...." At a minimum, these "circumstances" must include "the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby." United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen'l Trading & Contracting Co., 612 F.3d 724, 731 (4th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff may plead fraudulent intent generally. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999).


text:
against Benaroya, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the agreement.
confirm the award only as to Benaroya.
of the contract by Willis.
question for the trial court alone.
had not produced financial documents in response to a subpoena.
again in their post-hearing closing brief.
Benaroya’s alter ego) were liable.
usurped the authority of the court and was legally unsupportable.
question resides, by law, solely with the trial court.
question of law subject to de novo review. [Citation.]” (Daniels v.
arbitrate and which no statute has made arbitrable.”]; Goldman v.
not examine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award.
written construction contract that contained an arbitration clause.
moved to stay the proceedings to obtain judicial review of the order.
arbitration clause was sufficient to bind the plaintiff to arbitration.
arbitrator rather than by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Id. at p.
make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.” (Id. at p.
contract to which he was not a party.
and, if that was unsuccessful, commence arbitration proceedings.
defendants were jointly and severally liable.
intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p.
compelled to arbitrate. (See Greenspan, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p.
grievances fall outside the clause’s scope”]; Dream Theater, Inc. v.
nonsignatory should be bound by an arbitration agreement]; Boucher v.
to compel nonsignatory to arbitration made by court]; cf. Mormile v.
agreement, did not agree to delegate any issues to the arbitrator.
them.” (First Options, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 946; see Ikerd v. Warren T.
failure to do so was mere harmless error.
as to Benaroya. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
On July 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Lee, decided Daniel T. Lee’s Sixth Amendment claim under Faretta v. California, a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a criminal defendant’s right to represent herself. In Lee, the defendant, after filing a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence (through an attorney), moved to be allowed to discharge his attorney, waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and proceed pro se (i.e., representing himself). The magistrate judge who ultimately conducted the suppression hearing ordered that the hearing proceed with the defendant represented by counsel. At the conclusion of that hearing, the magistrate judge recommended to the district judge that the motion to suppress be denied and that the defendant be permitted to represent himself at trial, and the district judge accepted both recommendations.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Lee suffered a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at his suppression motion and ruled that it would be inappropriate to apply harmless error analysis to the violation. In this column, I will consider the Seventh Circuit’s decision and examine more broadly why it might be valuable to have a right to self-representation (a right the exercise of which generally hinders, rather than helps, a criminal defendant’s case).
In Faretta, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that competent defendants have a Sixth Amendment entitlement to discharge counsel and represent themselves during criminal proceedings. This right was controversial, as Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun each filed dissents (both of which the other and Justice Rehnquist joined). But the contrary view prevailed.
We began this discussion with Lee’s case, which considered the defendant’s claims that he was entitled to represent himself at his suppression hearing and that the denial of that right should not be subject to harmless error analysis. Harmless error is a conclusion that courts are authorized to draw about many of the (inevitable) errors that judges make in presiding over criminal matters, where the error can often be said to have had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding. When there has been harmless error, the verdict or other outcome remains in place, while a finding of reversible error yields a reversal and perhaps the opportunity to repeat the trial or other proceeding without the error in question.
A finding of harmless error in a case involving a constitutional violation requires that the prosecutor prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the outcome. Once the prosecutor meets that burden, even an egregious constitutional violation may not lead to a reversal and retrial. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court said in Arizona v. Fulminante that when a judge, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, admits a defendant’s coerced confession into evidence at his trial, that error could, in theory, be harmless if the prosecutor were able to satisfy the burden of proving that the outcome would have been the same had the confession been properly excluded.
Some errors, however, are always reversible and not subject to harmless error analysis at all. One example occurs when the judge gives a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction in a criminal case. Such an error, under Sullivan v. Louisiana, is not subject to harmless error analysis. Another example is the denial of counsel. Such errors are structural and call into question the fairness and legitimacy of the entire proceeding in a way that cannot be readily severed from the rest of the process to determine their particular impact.
A denial of the right to self-representation is similar to these other errors in that having an (unwanted) attorney representing the defendant fundamentally alters the entire proceeding rather than constituting a discrete error subject to conceptual severance from the rest of the (legitimately conducted) process. In one respect, however, a denial of the right to self-representation is quite different from the other types of automatically reversible error: being represented by counsel almost always reduces the odds of conviction relative to self-representation. That is, unlike other structural errors, it would be most accurate to describe the denial of Faretta rights as likely to be harmless (in the sense of posing no increased risk of conviction) and perhaps best characterized as “helpful error.” As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in McKaskle v. Wiggins, then, “[s]ince the right of self-representation is a right that, when exercised, usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis,” an explanation aptly quoted by the Seventh Circuit in Lee.
Does This Right Make Sense?
The court of appeals’ analysis is sound. Lee was denied his right of self-representation at the suppression motion, and the proper remedy for this type of error is to allow Lee to redo the motion on his own. But a perhaps more basic question may arise out of this Faretta case, namely, should a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to act in a way that increases the odds of his being found guilty?
An arrested suspect has an autonomy interest in confessing her crimes to the police and may waive the Miranda right to remain silent in custody, but that interest in confessing to the police is not protected by a constitutional right. The suspect may waive her right to remain silent, and a knowing and voluntary waiver will stand as a bar against her subsequent claims of constitutional right, but there is no right to confess. If police refuse to listen to her confession, she is simply out of luck (at least along this rather narrow autonomy dimension) and cannot later be heard to complain in court that her rights were violated.
So what makes the right to self-representation different, if it is different? Many criminal defendants do not have the benefit of representation by their first choice of attorney. If they are poor (or simply lack the means to hire the particular person they want), then then they will have to “settle” for someone with whom they might not see eye to eye and who does not appear to the defendants to authentically speak on their behalf.
My earlier reference to silencing the defendant is no accident, because the defendant enjoys another right the exercise of which can prove (at least some of the time) to be very damaging to her case: the right to testify on her own behalf. In Rock v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of Due Process, Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process, and a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, a criminal defendant has the right to testify on her own behalf. If the defendant wishes to take the witness stand, even against the firm advice of her attorney, she is entitled to do so.
It may be clear in some cases that the defendant can only hurt herself by testifying (because prior convictions will make a horrible impression on the jury, or because she is a terrible witness who will wilt under cross-examination). Yet she may nonetheless insist on taking the stand and speaking to the jury about what happened.
The Faretta right takes this logic one step further. As a matter of autonomy, a person who stands accused of a crime is entitled to be heard. One way in which she may be heard is by testifying, if she so chooses, and she may do so no matter how dire the likely consequences. Another way in which a defendant may be heard is by presenting her case in court. Indeed, when courts and attorneys refer to arguments made by a lawyer during trial, they usually say that “the defendant/appellant/petitioner” made an argument instead of saying that “the lawyer” made an argument. This is because the lawyer, in an important sense, merges with her client, and what the lawyer says or decides is generally binding on the client.
One way of thinking about the autonomy right here is to analogize it to the right to refuse medical treatment. Doctors might deem a medical treatment to be beneficial, and society might consider the right to receive that treatment, if it is desired, to be of paramount importance. Yet the person who chooses not to receive the treatment, if he is competent to understand the choice that he is making, is entitled to make that choice. This is true no matter how “foolish” the election, when viewed exclusively through a cost/benefit lens. In some cases, of course, the patient may turn out to have been wiser than his doctors.
Regardless of its wisdom, the purest expression of autonomy may be manifest precisely when its exercise defies a cost/benefit analysis. If so, then—like the right to refuse life-saving treatment—the right to speak on one’s own behalf, whether as a witness or as one’s own counsel, may rightfully belong with the individual whose life or liberty is actually at stake, and that individual is the criminal defendant herself.


The application was not submitted with an authenticated copy of the business entity’s organizational documents.
Does my company need to register with the Commission before transacting business in Virginia?
What is the difference between registering and domesticating a foreign business entity?
How do I register a foreign business entity to transact business in Virginia?
What is an authenticated copy?
If a business entity does not have a business office in Virginia, is a registered office required?
What are a business entity’s obligations to the Commission after registration?
Does my company need to register with any other Virginia governmental agencies?
A foreign corporation, limited liability company, business trust, limited partnership or registered limited liability partnership (i.e., organized or existing under the laws of a state or jurisdiction other than Virginia) may not transact business in Virginia until it obtains a certificate of authority or certificate of registration from the State Corporation Commission.
Certain limited business activities, however, are specifically excluded from the definition of "transacting business."
For foreign stock corporations, see § 13.1-757 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign nonstock corporations, see § 13.1-919 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign limited liability companies, see § 13.1-1059 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign business trusts, see § 13.1-1249 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign limited partnerships, see § 50-73.61 of the Code of Virginia.
The Clerk’s Office will not be able to help you determine whether a particular business activity or situation falls within one of the exceptions to the definition of “transacting business.” This question calls for a legal opinion, which the staff is not authorized to issue. Accordingly, we suggest that you contact an attorney licensed to practice law in Virginia if you believe a business entity may be exempt from the filing requirement.
For foreign stock corporations, see § 13.1-758 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign nonstock corporations, see § 13.1-920 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign limited liability companies, see § 13.1-1057 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign business trusts, see § 13.1-1247 of the Code of Virginia.
For foreign limited partnerships, see § 50-73.59 of the Code of Virginia.
When a foreign business entity “registers” with the Commission, it obtains a certificate of authority or registration to transact business in Virginia. It remains incorporated, organized or formed, however, under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction after registering in Virginia.
Domestication is the process by which a foreign corporation, limited liability company or business trust becomes a Virginia corporation, limited liability company or business trust. That is, the business entity ceases to be incorporated, organized or formed under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction and instead becomes incorporated, organized or formed under the laws of Virginia.
A foreign corporation, limited liability company or business trust can domesticate in Virginia if, and only if, the laws of the foreign jurisdiction specifically authorize such “re-domestications.” This process will usually entail the filing of an “exiting” document in the foreign jurisdiction.
Under Virginia law, only a foreign corporation, limited liability company or business trust can domesticate as a Virginia business entity, and it cannot change its entity type incident to the domestication process. In other words, a foreign corporation can only become a Virginia corporation, etc.
The laws of some foreign jurisdictions classify a domestication as a “conversion” because the business entity is allowed to change its entity type incident to the process of domesticating. The Clerk’s Office will recognize such enabling statutes, but not allow a business entity to change its entity type when it domesticates as a Virginia business entity.
Step 1: Obtain an application for a certificate to transact business in Virginia, read the instructions, and fully complete the application.
For foreign stock corporations, use form SCC759/921.
For foreign nonstock corporations, use form SCC759/921.
For foreign limited liability companies, use form LLC-1052.
For foreign business trusts, use form BTA1242.
For foreign limited partnerships, use form LPA-73.54.
For foreign registered limited liability partnerships, use form UPA-138.
Step 2: From the secretary of state or other custodian of business entity records in the state or other jurisdiction in which the business entity is formed or existing, obtain an authenticated (i.e., certified) copy of the business entity’s organizational documents, including all amendments. Exception: a registered limited liability partnership will need to provide a certificate of status instead of its organizational documents.
Step 3: Determine the correct amount of fees that are needed with your application.
For foreign stock corporations, see Corporation Entrance Fee Schedule. Note: the entrance fee is based on the number of authorized shares set forth in the corporation's articles of incorporation, not on the number of shares that are issued and outstanding.
For foreign nonstock corporations, the fees total $75.
The fee is $100 for foreign limited liability companies, business trusts, limited partnerships, and registered limited liability partnerships.
Step 4: Forward the application, documents and fees to the Office of the Clerk as directed on the back of the application.
Upon request and, usually, the payment of a fee, the secretary of state or other official custodian of business entity records in a jurisdiction will make a copy of a document on file in his or her office and attach a certificate to the copy stating that it is a “true and correct copy,” or words to that effect. A copy of a document so certified is referred to as an authenticated copy.
The authenticated copy of the organizational documents that are to be submitted by a foreign business entity with its application for a certificate to transact business in Virginia must be the original authenticated copy. We cannot accept a copy of the authenticated copy.
The custodian’s certificate will indicate the date the custodian authenticated the copy, and this date must be within 12 months of the time the document is submitted and filed in the Office of the Clerk. If a copy of a document was authenticated more than 12 months prior to submission to the Clerk's Office, you will need to obtain a new authenticated copy.
After an organizational document is filed, some jurisdictions will return the original instrument to the filer after it has been placed to record. Although this document may have been stamped "Filed," it will not suffice for an authenticated copy because there will be no certification by the official custodian of governmental records that it is a true and correct copy of the document on file.
We cannot accept a certificate of existence in lieu of an authenticated copy of the business entity’s organizational documents.
Yes. The registered office is defined as a business office of the registered agent, which must be located in Virginia. If a foreign business entity’s proposed registered agent does not maintain a business office in Virginia, the person is not qualified to serve as its registered agent in Virginia. Please refer to FAQs regarding Registered Agents for more information.
Beginning in the calendar year after obtaining authority to transact business in Virginia, a foreign business entity is required to pay an annual registration fee. If the entity is a foreign corporation, it will also be required to file an annual report, which is generated by the Commission and mailed to the registered agent about 3 months before it is due.
In addition, the business entity is required to file an authenticated copy of all instruments of amendment or merger within 30 days of the effective date of the instrument’s filing in the business entity’s home state.
Additional information is available at Notice to Foreign Corporations and Notice to Foreign Limited Liability Companies.
Yes. The business entity will need to register with the Virginia Department of Taxation. and, if it has employees in Virginia, the Virginia Employment Commission.
In addition, there are certain regulated business activities in Virginia that require a separate license or registration. Some common examples include contractors, realtors, insurance agents and providers of professional services.


§ 8.02 Systems of Weights and Measures.
§ 8.03 Field Standards and Equipment; Specifications and Tolerances; Adoption of Code.
§ 8.04 City Sealers and Assistant Sealers.
§ 8.08 Advertising Commodities for Sale.
§ 8.09 Misrepresentation of Price.
§ 8.14 Suspension, Revocation, and Nonrenewal of Permit.
8.02 Systems of Weights and Measures.
8.03 Field Standards and Equipment; Specifications and Tolerances; Adoption of Code.
8.04 City Sealers and Assistant Sealers.
8.08 Advertising Commodities for Sale.
8.14 Suspension, Revocation, and Nonrenewal of Permit.
The word "person" shall include individuals, partnerships, corporations, companies, societies and associations.
"Department" means the West Allis Health Department.
"Weights and measures" means weights and measures of every kind, instruments and devices for weighing and measuring, and any appliances and accessories used with any or all such instruments and devices, except meters for the measurement of electricity, gas (natural or manufactured) or water, when the same are operated in a public utility system.
"Sell," "sale" and "sold" includes barter or exchange and any offering or exposing for sale or possession with intent to sell.
"Sealer" and "Assistant Sealer" means a Sealer of Weights and Measures and Assistant Sealer of Weights and Measures of the City of West Allis.
"Weight" means net weight when used in reference to a commodity.
"Incorrect," as applied to weights and measures and commodities, includes any failure to comply with the requirements of this ordinance.
"Commodity" means any movable or tangible thing that is produced or used as a subject or barter of sale.
"Pricing System" means a system that utilizes a scanning device such as a handheld gun or wand, or counter-mounted scanner unit at retail checkouts which read universal product code symbols or other bar code labels and the like.
The system of weights and measures in customary use in the United States or the metric system of weights and measures shall be the only systems used for commercial purposes in this City. The definitions of basic units of weights and measure, the tables of weights and measures and weights and measures equivalents, published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, shall govern weighing and measuring equipment and transactions in this City.
There shall be supplied by the City such field standards and such equipment as may be found necessary to carry out the provisions of this ordinance. The field standards shall be verified by the Wisconsin Weights and Measures Laboratory upon their initial receipt and thereafter as the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection may require.
The specifications, tolerances, and regulations for commercial weighing and measuring devices issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall apply in this City, except as modified by rules issued by the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection.
The provisions of Chapter 98 of the Wisconsin Statutes, entitled "Weights and Measures," ATCP Chapters 90, 91, and 92 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology Handbook, as applicable to weights and measures, are adopted by reference and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Violation of any applicable provisions thereof shall constitute a violation of this ordinance.
Pursuant to Section 2.17(1) of this Code, the City Health Commissioner is hereby designated as the Sealer of Weights and Measures. The Health Commissioner may appoint public health sanitarians or environmentalists as Assistant Sealers.
Complete records of all weights and measures work shall be kept. A written report shall be submitted to the Mayor every third month and filed with the City Clerk showing the number and kind of measure or measures inspected, tested and sealed, the names of persons arrested under this act, the property seized and the fines imposed.
There is hereby conferred upon the Sealer and Assistant Sealers of Weights and Measures, police power; such Sealer and Assistant Sealers shall be provided with suitable badges or insignia of authority and, in the exercise of their functions, shall exhibit the same, upon demand, to any person questioning their powers and they are hereby empowered and authorized to make arrests, with or without formal warrant, of any person violating any ordinance or statute relating to weights and measures.
The Sealer or Assistant Sealers may enter and go into or upon any structure or premises, and may stop any person or vehicle for the purpose of enforcing this ordinance. They shall inspect and test any weights and measures or commodities which are sold or used commercially as often as necessary to secure compliance with this ordinance, and may seize as evidence, or reject and mark or tag as "rejected," those which are incorrect. A representative sample may be used as the basis to determine whether any lot is incorrect.
Weights and measures and commodities that have been rejected may be confiscated and destroyed by the Sealer or an Assistant Sealer if not corrected within thirty (30) days or such longer period as the Health Commissioner may authorize, or if used or disposed of without his or her written authorization.
The Sealer or Assistant Sealers may seal or mark with appropriate devices such weights and measures as are found upon inspection and test to be in conformance with this ordinance.
The Sealer or Assistant Sealers shall investigate complaints made concerning violations of the provisions of this ordinance and shall, upon their own initiative, conduct such investigations as they deem appropriate and advisable to develop information on possible prevailing practices in commercial quantity determination and on possible violations of the provisions of this ordinance and to promote the general objective of accuracy in the determination and representation of quantity in commercial transactions.
If the Sealer or Assistant Sealer reinspects a weight and measure because he or she has found a violation of this chapter, the permittee shall pay a reinspection fee for each reinspection. The reinspection fee shall be the same as the annual permit fee of the weight or measure being reinspected. Such fee shall be due immediately after the reinspection upon written demand from the Health Department. No permittee may renew a permit issued under this chapter unless the permittee has paid all reinspection fees in full.
Editor's Note: Former Subsection (6), as amended 5/4/1999 by Ord. 6432 which immediately followed this subsection and set forth requirements for the acquisition of an annual permit and annual permit fees was repealed 4/7/2015 by Ord. O-2015-0021. For current provisions, see Section 8.13.
Editor’s Note: Former Section 8.06, Method of Sale of Commodities, and former Section 8.07, Declaration of Quantity, were repealed 4/7/2015 by Ord. O-2015-0021.
No person shall himself, or by his servant or agent, or as the servant or agent of any other person, advertise for sale any commodity when the retail price is mentioned in such advertisement, unless the actual weight or volume or count of such commodity shall be plainly and conspicuously set forth in such advertisement in not less than five (5) point type.
Whenever any commodity or service is sold or is offered, exposed or advertised for sale by weight, measure or count, the price shall not be misrepresented, nor shall the price be represented in any manner calculated or tending to mislead or deceive an actual or prospective purchaser. Whenever an advertised, posted or labeled price per unit of weight, measure or count includes a fraction of a cent, all elements of the fraction shall be prominently displayed and the numeral or numerals expressing the fraction shall be immediately adjacent to, of the same general design and style and at least one half (1/2) the height and width of the numerals representing the whole cents.
Editor's Note: Former Section 8.10, Standard Containers, and former Section 8.11, Bulk Deliveries Sold in Terms of Weight and Delivered by Vehicle, were repealed 4/7/2015 by Ord. O-2015-0021.
Hinder, obstruct, or impersonate a Sealer or Assistant Sealer.
Use or have in possession an incorrect weight or measure for use in buying or selling any commodity or service, sell any incorrect weight or measure, or cause a weight or measure to be incorrect.
Represent in any manner a false quantity or price in connection with the purchase or sale, or any advertising thereof, of any commodity, thing, or service.
Use or dispose of any rejected weight or measure or commodity or remove therefrom any official tag, seal, stamp, or mark without written authority from a Sealer or Assistant Sealer.
Violate any other provision of this ordinance for which no specific penalty is prescribed.
Permit Required. No person shall operate or utilize a weight and measuring device or system, including a pricing system and timing device, or any accessories relating thereto, which are used commercially within the City in determining the weight, measure, or count of commodities or items sold or purchased or offered or exposed for sale on the basis of weight, measure, or count without first obtaining a Weighing/Measuring Equipment Operation Permit from the West Allis Health Commissioner. Each device requires its own permit. Only a person who complies with the requirements of this section shall be entitled to receive and retain a permit. Permits shall be issued only in the name of the operator of the weight and measuring devices and shall not be transferable.
Permit Application. A written application for the permit(s) required by this section shall be filed with the Health Commissioner upon forms provided by the Health Commissioner. Initial permit fees shall be paid at the time the application is filed. Renewal permit fees shall be paid prior to the expiration of a permit, and no person shall operate any weights and measuring device until all renewal fees have been paid. Any renewal permit fee paid on July 1 or later shall be subject to a late fee of fifteen dollars ($15.). A permittee or applicant shall notify the Health Commissioner in writing if any information listed in the application form has changed within ten (10) days of such change.
All matters submitted in writing to the City by any applicant or permittee pertaining to any permit issued under this section shall be true.
Permit Expiration. All permits shall expire on June 30.
If any weights and measuring device requires a reinspection due to the Health Department finding a violation of this chapter or state statute or state regulation relating to weights and measuring devices, the permittee shall pay, at the time of reinspection, the applicable reinspection fee per each device requiring reinspection.
The cost for a duplicate permit shall be fifteen dollars ($15.).
Every applicant procuring a permit thereby consents to the entry of the Health Department, police or other duly authorized representatives of the City at all reasonable hours for the purpose of inspection and search, and consents to the removal from said premises of all things and articles there had in violation of City ordinances or state laws.
The permittee and/or employees and agents of the permittee shall cooperate with the Health Department and police investigations. "Cooperate," as used in this subsection, shall mean calling the police when a disturbance of the peace or other violation occurs on the permitted premises and providing complete and truthful responses to police and Health Department inquires. A permittee shall also appear before the License and Health Committee when requested to do so and shall otherwise follow the lawful directives of the License and Health Committee.
The permittee shall comply with all other provisions of this section and all other ordinances of the City of West Allis and the laws of the State of Wisconsin.
The making of any material false statement in any application for a permit.
The violation of any of the applicable provisions of Chapter 8 of the West Allis Revised Municipal Code.
The violation of any of the applicable provisions of Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 98, ATCP Chapters 90, 91, and 92 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, or the National Institute of Standards and Technology Handbook, as related to weights and measures.
The failure to pay any of the items listed in Section 1.08(9)(a) and (b) of this Code.
Commencement of Proceedings. Suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal proceedings may be instituted by the License and Health Committee of the Common Council upon its own motion or upon sworn written charges made and filed with the City Clerk by the Health Commissioner.
Upon receipt of a sworn complaint, either from the Health Commissioner or upon directive of the Committee, the License and Health Committee shall direct the City Attorney to prepare a summons and have the summons and complaint served upon the permittee pursuant to § 801.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The summons and complaint shall contain the date and time for appearance by the permittee; a statement of the Common Council's intention to suspend, revoke, or not renew the permit in the event any of the allegations are found to be true; a statement of the reasons for suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal; notification to the permittee of an opportunity to be heard, respond to and challenge the reasons for suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal and to present and cross examine witnesses under oath; and notification to the permittee of the right to be represented by counsel of the permittee's choice and at the permittee's expense.
If the permittee fails to appear on the date and time designated in the summons, the License and Health Committee may enter a default judgment and take the allegations of the complaint to be true. The License and Health Committee shall then deliberate on what sanction, if any, to impose.
If the permittee appears before the License and Health Committee at the date and time designated in the summons and denies the material charges contained in the complaint, an evidentiary hearing shall be scheduled. If the permittee does not appear or appears but does not deny the material charges contained in the complaint, the complaint may be taken as true and the Committee shall hear the arguments of the complainant and, if applicable, the permittee in connection with whether to nonrenew, revoke, or suspend the permit and the length of the suspension.
The complainant shall first present evidence in support of the complaint.
After the complainant rests, the permittee may present evidence in opposition to the charges.
The complainant and permittee may subpoena and present witnesses. All witnesses shall testify under oath or affirmation and shall be subject to cross examination.
The complainant and permittee shall each be limited to one (1) hour for testimony unless the Chair, subject to approval of the Committee, extends the time to assure a full and fair presentation.
Questions by Committee members or the advising City Attorney, and answers to such questions, shall not be counted against the time limitations.
At the close of testimony, the complainant and permittee shall be given a reasonable time to make arguments upon the evidence produced at hearing.
At all stages of the proceedings, the permittee shall be entitled to appear in person or by an attorney at his or her own expense.
If the complaint is in the name of the Committee or is brought by a City official in his/her official capacity, the complainant shall be represented by a prosecuting City Attorney.
The Committee shall be, when required, advised by an advisory City Attorney who shall not be the same individual as the prosecuting City Attorney.
The Chair of the License and Health Committee shall be the presiding officer. The Chair shall direct that oaths and affirmations be administered and subpoenas issued upon request of either side. The Chair shall ensure that an orderly hearing is conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section. The Chair shall rule on objections to the admissibility of evidence. Any ruling of the Chair shall be final unless appealed to the Committee and a majority vote of those members present and voting reverses such ruling.
An audio recording or stenographic record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing. Any interested party may obtain a copy of the recording or transcript at his or her own expense.
After the close of the hearing, the Committee shall deliberate and reach a decision. The Committee shall prepare findings on factual matters, conclusions of law, and a recommendation on what action, if any, should be taken with regard to the permit(s) at issue. The report shall be filed with the City Clerk, with a copy to the permittee and complainant. The findings and recommendations shall be distributed to each member of the Common Council.
The permittee and complainant may file a written statement or response to the findings and recommendations, including objections, exceptions, and arguments of fact and law. A written statement must be filed with the City Clerk before the close of business on a day that is at least three (3) working days prior to the date set for determination by the Common Council. Copies of written statements shall be provided to each member of the Common Council at least twenty-four (24) hours before any vote on the matter is scheduled before the Common Council.
Not less than five (5) working days prior to the matter being scheduled before the Common Council, the City Clerk shall notify the permittee and complainant by United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, sent to the last known address, that the Common Council will convene to determine the matter.
Unless an Alderperson states that he/she has not read the findings and recommendations and written statements, if any, the matter shall proceed to debate amongst members of the Common Council. Neither the complainant nor the permittee shall be permitted to make oral arguments.
The Common Council shall determine by a majority vote of those in attendance and voting whether to adopt the recommendation of the Committee or make such modification as is deemed appropriate. Such vote shall be a roll call vote. Upon an affirmative vote suspending, revoking, or not renewing the permit(s), the Clerk shall give notice to the person whose permit is affected. If the Common Council finds the complaint to be untrue or unsupported by sufficient evidence, the proceedings shall be dismissed without cost to the accused.
A permittee may, at any time during the permit year, surrender a permit to the Health Department, along with a statement, in writing, that the permittee no longer wishes to conduct permitted activity at the permitted premises.
Except as set forth in Subsection (g)(3) below, the surrender shall operate to extinguish any right the permittee had to the permit or to conduct permitted activity at the premises listed in the permit.
If a summons and complaint has been issued against the permittee seeking suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal of the permit, the surrender of the permit shall be deemed a request and the matter shall be referred to the License and Health Committee. The Committee may approve the request or deny the request and proceed to hearing.
Any request to have a surrendered permit returned shall be treated as a new permit application and the requestor must fill out the required applications and pay the required fees. The request shall thereafter be treated as all other new permit applications.
Prohibition on Future Issuance. If a permit is revoked or not renewed due to action by the License and Health Committee, at least two (2) years shall elapse before another permit may be given to the same permittee.
Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance shall forfeit the sum of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) upon the first offense. For a second or subsequent offense, the person shall forfeit the sum of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). For all violations, the person shall be required to pay the costs of prosecution. In default of payment thereof, the person shall be imprisoned in the Milwaukee County House of Correction until such forfeiture and costs are paid, but not more than the number of days set forth in Section 800.095(1)(b)1 of the Wisconsin Statutes, or by suspension of the person's operating privilege, pursuant to Section 800.095(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes. Each and every day a violation continues constitutes a separate offense.


28. Osborn, supra note 22, at 309.
29. Id. at 310; see also Allison D. Burroughs, et al., Off-Label Promotion: Government Theories of Prosecution and Facts that Drive Them, 65 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 555, 563 (setting forth an untested but clear argument regarding why drugs should be exempt from the “adequate directions for use” provision of the misbranding statute).
30. E.g., United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of 47 Bottles, More or Less, Jenesol RJ Formula ‘60’, 320 F.2d 564, 571 (3d Cir. 1963); Colusa Remedy Co. v. United States, 176 F.2d 554, 561 (8th Cir. 1949).
31. United States v. Sene X Eleemosynary Corp., 479 F. Supp. 970, 980 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
32. 21 U.S. C. § 331 (2012).
33. United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1351 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D. Mass. 2001).


The review of the final judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico by this Court is not restricted to cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it is denied. There may be cases, certainly civil cases, which, if determined in a Supreme Court of one of the territories of the United States could be reviewed although not involving any right of a distinctly federal nature.
But a criminal case like this arising under § 3082 Rev.Stat., could not be reviewed by this Court in virtue of the words, in § 35 of the Porto Rico Act of April 12, 1900, "in the same cases as from the Supreme Courts of the Territories of the United States."
"in all cases where the Constitution of the United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied,"
indictment did not charge "an offense under the statutes of the United States." Such an objection was too indefinite.
Unless a judgment in the United States District Court for Porto Rico can be reviewed here, then it is final, for no case determined in that court can be carried to a circuit court of appeals.
"if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any merchandise, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of, such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such merchandise shall be forfeited, and the offender shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both."
"the same tariffs, customs, and duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported into Porto Rico from ports other than those of the United States which are required by law to be collected upon articles imported into the United States from foreign countries;"
"the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States, except the internal revenue laws, which, in view of the provisions of section three, shall not have force and effect in Porto Rico."
31 Stat. 77, 80, c. 191, §§ 2, 14.
These statutes being in force, the plaintiff in error, Amado, was indicted in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, upon the charge of having, on May 28, 1901, unlawfully received, concealed, and facilitated the transportation, concealment, and sale of certain specified quantities of Holland gin, vermouth, brandy, and Danish beer, theretofore, as the accused well knew, fraudulently imported into Porto Rico, contrary to law, without the payment to the United States of the duties imposed upon such articles.
The accused was duly arraigned, and found guilty by a jury. A motion in arrest of judgment having been overruled, he was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary of Porto Rico for one year and one day, and to pay a fine of $500. A new trial was denied, and the accused sued out the present writ of error.
In allowing the writ, the judge of the district court expressed some doubt whether error would lie, but he resolved the doubt in favor of the defendant.
The government insists that the writ of error should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this Court to review the judgment below; otherwise, that the judgment should be affirmed.
"shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court."
31 Stat. 77, 84, c. 191, § 34.
the Constitution of the United States, or treaty thereof, or an act of Congress, is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied. . . ."
The review of the final judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico is not restricted to those cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it denied. This construction is too narrow and technical. There may be cases -- certainly civil cases -- in the United States District Court for Porto Rico that do not involve any question arising under the Constitution or a treaty or an act of Congress, and yet if the case be one which, if determined in a supreme court of one of the territories of the United States, could be brought here for reexamination, the final judgment could be reviewed by this Court although no right of a distinctly federal nature was involved. Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149, 192 U. S. 160; Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 194 U. S. 320. See Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461. But even this test, if applied here, will not avail the accused, for the statutes regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this Court do not authorize a review of the final judgment in a supreme court of one of the territories of the United States in a criminal case like this one.
"in all cases where the Constitution of the United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress, is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied?"
"Congress did not intend that any connection should exist between the United States court for Porto Rico and any circuit court of appeals established under the act of 1891."