Italy shall restore to Yugoslavia all objects of artistic, historical, scientific, educational or religious character … which, as the result of the Italian occupation, were removed between 4 November 1918 and 2 March 1924 from the territories ceded to Yugoslavia under the treaties signed in Rapallo on 12 November 1920 and in Rome on 27 January 1924.
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Italy on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 12.
Under Article 37 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Italy was obliged to “restore all works of art, religious objects, archives and objects of historical value belonging to Ethiopia or its nationals and removed from Ethiopia to Italy since 3 October 1935”.
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Italy on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 37.
Upon the entry into force of the present Convention, the Federal Republic [of Germany] shall establish, staff and equip an administrative agency which shall … search for, recover, and restitute jewellery, silverware and antique furniture … and cultural property, if such articles or cultural property were, during the occupation of any territory, removed therefrom by the forces or authorities of Germany or its Allies or their individual members (whether or not pursuant to orders) after acquisition by duress (with or without violence), by larceny, by requisitioning or by other forms of dispossession by force.
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation (with Annex), Bonn, 26 May 1952, also known as the Transference Treaty, as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Régime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, 23 October 1954, Chapter 5, Article 1, para. 1.
4. The High Contracting Party whose obligation was to prevent the exportation of cultural property from the territory occupied by it, shall pay an indemnity to the holders in good faith of any cultural property which has to be returned in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Articles 3 and 4.
The States Parties undertake to oppose [the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property] with the means at their disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a stop to current practices, and by helping to make the necessary reparations.
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted by the 16th Session of the UNESCO General Conference, Paris, 14 November 1970, Article 2(2).
Each party to the conflict shall be bound to prevent the exportation of cultural property from a territory occupied by it during an international armed conflict. If, in spite of this prohibition, cultural property should nevertheless be transferred from the occupied territory into the territory of another party, the latter shall be bound to place such property under its protection. This shall be effected either immediately upon the importation of the property or, failing this, at a later date, at the request of the authorities of the occupied territory concerned.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 67.c.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 68(c), p. 268.
2. the authorities of the Contracting State address a request for return to the Federal Foreign Office through the diplomatic channel.
(2) Deposited cultural property in the sense of Paragraph II No. 5 of the Protocol to the Convention of 14 May 1954 (Federal Law Gazette 1967, Part II, p. 1233, 1300) shall be returned after the close of hostilities, without the further conditions of paragraph 1 needing to be fulfilled.
(3) The costs of the return are borne by the requesting State.
(4) A person who, for himself or for someone else, exercises actual physical control of cultural property (person under the obligation to return), is obligated to return the cultural property only in reciprocal and simultaneous exchange for adequate compensation. The obligation to compensate is not applicable if the requesting State proves that the person under the obligation to return knew or as a result of gross negligence did not know when acquiring the cultural property that the property was moved from occupied territory or was deposited for the purpose of protection.
(5) If the person under the obligation to return acquired the cultural property through donation, inheritance or legacy, he assumes responsibility for the duties of care of the donor or the deceased.
Germany, Law Implementing the 1954 Cultural Property Convention, 2007, Section 1.
In the event of an armed conflict, restitution and/or recovery of cultural property shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention [for the Protection of Cultural Property] and its two protocols of 1954 and 1999. In such a case, competent authorities shall reciprocally facilitate the process of restitution and/or recovery of cultural property belonging to the cultural heritage of another State (obtained in violation of international law in the context of an armed conflict) if the property is located on Peruvian territory.
all cultural values located in the territory of the Russian Federation that were brought [as a result of the Second World War] into the USSR by way of exercise of its right to compensatory restitution … pursuant to orders of the Soviet Army Military Command, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany or instructions of other competent bodies in the USSR.
Russian Federation, Law on Removed Cultural Property, 1997, Article 6.
By the term “cultural values” is meant “any property of a religious or secular nature which has historic, artistic, scientific or any other cultural importance”, either owned by the State or privately.
Russian Federation, Law on Removed Cultural Property, 1997, Article 4.
However, the following types of properties may be claimed under the law: a) the cultural values plundered by Germany or its allies that were the national property of the former Soviet republics; b) the property of religious organizations or private charities which, being used exclusively for religious or charitable aims, did not serve the interest of militarism and/or Fascism; c) the cultural values previously owned by victims of Nazi/Fascist persecutions; d) all other removed cultural values located in Russia and originating from territories of States, other than the former Soviet republics, that were occupied during the war by Germany or its allies; and e) family relics.
Russian Federation, Law on Removed Cultural Property, 1997, Articles 7–12.
France, Paris Administrative Court, Kaplan case, Judgment, 25 June 2010, p. 1.
[A]ccording to article 1 of the Decree [No. 99-778] of 10 September 1999: “ … a commission is established before the prime minister with the mandate of reviewing individual claims submitted by victims or their legal heirs or assignees in order to receive reparation for damages following the despoliation of their property resulting from anti-Semitic legislation adopted during the Occupation by either the occupying power or the Vichy government”.
France, Paris Administrative Court, Kaplan case, Judgment, 25 June 2010, p. 2.
Russian Federation, Constitutional Court, Law on Removed Cultural Property case, 20 July 1999.
In 1991, the Government of Germany declared that it “fully accepts the fact that cultural property has to be returned after the end of hostilities”. Germany has returned cultural property in all cases in which the cultural goods were found and could be identified. In other cases, Germany has paid compensation to the original owner countries.
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Statement by a Member of Parliament, Dr. Werner Schuster, 21 June 1991, Plenarprotokoll 12/35, p. 2966.
In 1997, the Government of Germany reiterated the principles contained in a general declaration made in 1984, whereby “thefts and destruction of cultural property by the Nazi regime as well as the removal of cultural property by the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War were breaches of international law”. Furthermore, it pointed out that the basic principles of the protection of cultural property are not only binding upon the vanquished but also upon the victor.
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Answer by the government to a question in Parliament, BT-Drucksache 13/8111, 27 June 1997, p. 7.
The theft of cultural property committed by the German Nationalist-Socialist regime during the Second World War, as well as the transporting of cultural objects from Germany to Russia by the Soviet Union after the Second World War, represent violations of international law.
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Statement by the Government, Plenarprotokoll 13/221, 4 March 1998.
It was reported that during the Gulf War, large amounts of cultural property, including almost the entire contents of the Kuwait National Museum, were removed to Baghdad but later returned.
Iraq, Identical letters dated 5 March 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the UN Security Council, annexed to Identical letters dated 5 March 1991 to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22330, 5 March 1991, p. 2.
Mr. J. Richard Foran, Assistant Secretary-General and official responsible for coordinating the return of [Kuwaiti] property, visited Iraq twice during the month of May 1991. The competent Iraqi authorities expressed their readiness to hand over the Kuwaiti property of which Iraq had already notified the Secretariat of the United Nations … Mr. Foran also undertook a wide-ranging field visit and saw for himself the … museum antiquities and books that will be returned to Kuwait immediately [after] an agreement is reached establishing a location for the handing over, it being understood that it is this property whose handing over Mr. Foran has determined should have priority at the present stage. The same procedures will doubtless be applied to other Kuwaiti property.
Iraq, Letter dated 8 June 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to a number of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States members of the UN Security Council, annexed to Letter dated 16 August 1991 addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22957, 16 August 1991, Annex II, § 4.
In a letter to the UN Secretary-General in September 1994, Iraq claimed that it had returned all the Kuwaiti property in its possession, “having nothing else whatsoever to return”.
Iraq, Letter dated 26 September 1994 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1994/1099, 27 September 1994, p. 1.
In 1997, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Iraq declared, in response to allegations by Kuwait that Iraqi soldiers had robbed and looted Kuwaiti cultural property during the Gulf War, that all the cultural property taken out of Kuwait by Iraq had either been returned or would be in the future.
Iraq, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/52/PV.55, 25 November 1997, p. 20.
In execution of UN [S]ecurity [C]ouncil related resolutions, and within the efforts of the Iraqi [M]inistry of [F]oreign [A]ffairs to close down the file of Kuwaiti property seized by the previous regime in 1990, the Kuwaiti side was handed over 27 boxes containing the archives of Kuwait Radio and two books belonging to Kuwait [U]niversity on June 27, 2012 at the HQ [headquarters] of the Kuwaiti [M]inistry of [F]oreign [A]ffairs.
Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Handing Over of Kuwaiti Property”, Press Release, 8 July 2012.
Iraq has informed the UN [of] its intention to return national Kuwait[i] archives found in Iraqi territories. This was stated in a letter addressed by Hamid Al-Bayati, Iraq’s ambassador to the UN, to the head of [the] UN [S]ecurity [C]ouncil[,] stating that Iraq has formed a ministerial committee to coordinate with the [S]tate of Kuwait regarding the return of its national archives. He added that the [G]overnment of Iraq had officially informed the Kuwaiti embassy in Baghdad of [the] finding of 136 microfilm tapes containing official archives of Kuwait, adding that such tapes were handed over to the Iraqi [F]oreign [M]inister by an Iraqi citizen.
Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Iraq informs the UN [of] its intent to return found Kuwaiti archives”, Press Release, 23 December 2012.
In 1997, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Kuwait reiterated the allegation that Iraqi soldiers had robbed and looted Kuwaiti cultural property during the Gulf War, including manuscripts and historical documents, adding that many treasures which had been returned had been damaged. He then appealed to the international community to urge the return of Kuwait’s cultural property.
Kuwait, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/52/PV.55, 25 November 1997, p. 15.
the utmost importance to the return by Iraq of all the official documents looted by Iraqi forces from the Office of the Amir, the Office of the Crown Prince, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No price can compensate for such documents.
Kuwait, Letter dated 6 March 1995 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/1995/184, 7 March 1995, p. 2; see also UN Secretary-General, Report on the return of Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, UN Doc. S/1996/1042, 16 December 1996, p. 1 and Second report pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), UN Doc. S/2000/575, 14 June 2000, § 17(a).
During the diplomatic conference which led to the adoption of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Norway proposed that “restitution cannot, however, be required later than twenty years after the object has got into the hands of the present holder, this holder having acted in good faith in acquiring it”. The proposal was not adopted by the conference.
Jirí Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Dartmouth and UNESCO Publishing, Hants and Paris, 1996, p. 345.
Upon ratification of the 1954 Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property, Norway entered a reservation whereby “restitution of cultural property in accordance with the provisions of Sections I and II of the Protocol could not be required more than twenty years from the date on which the property in question had come into the possession of a holder acting in good faith”. In 1979, Norway withdrew this reservation.
In March 2001, the Russian Federation and Belgium reached an agreement on the return to Belgium of the military archives stolen by the Nazis during the Second World War and then taken to Moscow by Soviet forces. The Russian authorities accepted to return the archives to Belgium, provided that they be compensated for the cost of having maintained them.
Ch. Laporte, “Les archives belges quittent Moscou”, Le Soir, 24 March 2001.
In 1999, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, the United Arab Emirates called on Iraq to return Kuwaiti cultural property.
United Arab Emirates, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/54/PV.7, 21 September 1999, p. 36.
In 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 686, in which, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it demanded that Iraq “immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, the return to be completed in the shortest possible period”.
UN Security Council, Res. 686, 2 March 1991, § 2(d), voting record: 11-1-3.
The same demand was implicitly reiterated the same year in Resolution 687, in which the Security Council requested that the UN Secretary-General report on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq.
UN Security Council, Res. 687, 3 April 1991, § 15, voting record: 12-1-2.
In a resolution adopted in 1999 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the UN Security Council, recalling Resolutions 686 and 687 of 1991, noted “with regret” that Iraq had still not complied fully with its obligation to return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property it had seized, and requested that the UN Secretary-General “report every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq”.
UN Security Council, Res. 1284, 17 December 1999, preamble and § 14, voting record: 11-0-4.
Decides that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, including by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with respect to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed, and calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the implementation of this paragraph.
UN Security Council, Res. 1483, 22 May 2003, § 7, voting record: 14-0-0-1.
26. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, return immediately all documents and papers that were taken away from the Sharia Islamic Court in occupied Jerusalem, to the officials of the said Court.
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/47, 9 December 1991, Part A, §§ 8(h) and 25–26, voting record: 96-5-52-13.
6. Welcomes the most recent efforts made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the protection of the cultural heritage of countries in conflict, including the safe return to those countries of cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific and religious importance that have been illegally removed, and calls upon the international community to contribute to these efforts.
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/17, 3 December 2003, preamble and §§ 4–6, adopted without a vote.
9. Welcomes the most recent efforts made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the protection of the cultural heritage of countries in conflict, including the safe return to those countries of cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific and religious importance that have been illegally removed, and calls upon the international community to contribute to these efforts.
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/52, 4 December 2006, preamble and §§ 7–9, adopted without a vote.
Aware of the urgent need to establish standards for the restitution and return of movable property forming part of the cultural heritage of peoples after it has been stolen or illicitly exported, and for its protection and preservation.
The return of the property has commenced and, to date, properties of the Central Bank of Kuwait, the Central Library of Kuwait, the National Museum of Kuwait, the Kuwait News Agency … have been returned. A number of additional items are ready for return and the process is continuing. In addition, Kuwait has submitted lists of properties from other ministries, corporations and individuals that are being pursued. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials involved with the return of property have extended maximum cooperation to the United Nations to facilitate the return.
UN Secretary-General, Further report on the status of compliance by Iraq with the obligations placed upon it under certain of the Security-Council resolutions relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc. S/23687, 7 March 1992; see also “Kuwait’s Art Comes Home”, The Washington Post, 17 February 1992.
In 2000, in a report on the return of Kuwaiti property from Iraq, the UN Secretary-General confirmed that, although Iraq had returned a substantial quantity of property since the end of the Gulf War, there remained “many items which Iraq is under obligation to return to Kuwait”. In this respect, he stressed that “priority should be given to the return by Iraq of the Kuwaiti archives … and museum items”.
UN Secretary-General, Second report pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), UN Doc. S/2000/575, 14 June 2000, §§ 17(a) and 20.
In a resolution adopted in 2000 on the destruction and desecration of the Islamic historical and cultural relics and shrines in the occupied Azeri territories resulting from the Republic of Armenia’s aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Islamic Summit Conference recalled that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property “prohibits the confiscation of cultural assets moved to the territories of other countries”.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 259.


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For the expounding of this psalm we may borrow a great deal of light from the apostle's discourse, Heb. 3 and 4, where it appears both to have been penned by David and to have been calculated for the days of the Messiah; for it is there said expressly (Heb. 4:7) that the day here spoken of (v. 7) is to be understood of the gospel day, in which God speaks to us by his Son in a voice which we are concerned to hear, and proposes to us a rest besides that of Canaan. In singing psalms it is intended, I. That we should "make melody unto the Lord;'' this we are here excited to do, and assisted in doing, being called upon to praise God (v. 1, 2) as a great God (v. 3-5) and as our gracious benefactor (v. 6, 7). II. That we should teach and admonish ourselves and one another; and we are here taught and warned to hear God's voice (v. 7), and not to harden our hearts, as the Israelites in the wilderness did (v. 8, 9), lest we fall under God's wrath and fall short of his rest, as they did (v. 10, 11). This psalm must be sung with a holy reverence of God's majesty and a dread of his justice, with a desire to please him and a fear to offend him.
I. How God is to be praised. 1. With holy joy and delight in him. The praising song must be a joyful noise, v. 1 and again v. 2. Spiritual joy is the heart and soul of thankful praise. It is the will of God (such is the condescension of his grace) that when we give glory to him as a being infinitely perfect and blessed we should, at the same time, rejoice in him as our Father and King, and a God in covenant with us. 2. With humble reverence, and a holy awe of him (v. 6): "Let us worship, and bow down, and kneel before him, as becomes those who know what an infinite distance there is between us and God, how much we are in danger of his wrath and in need of his mercy.'' Though bodily exercise, alone, profits little, yet certainly it is our duty to glorify God with our bodies by the outward expressions of reverence, seriousness, and humility, in the duties of religious worship. 3. We must praise God with our voice; we must speak forth, sing forth, his praises out of the abundance of a heart filled with love, and joy, and thankfulness—Sing to the Lord; make a noise, a joyful noise to him, with psalms—as those who are ourselves much affected with his greatness and goodness, are forward to own ourselves so, are desirous to be more and more affected therewith, and would willingly be instrumental to kindle and inflame the same pious and devout affection in others also. 4. We must praise God in concert, in the solemn assemblies: "Come, let us sing; let us join in singing to the Lord; not others without me, nor I alone, but others with me. Let us come together before his presence, in the courts of his house, where his people are wont to attend him and to expect his manifestations of himself.'' Whenever we come into God's presence we must come with thanksgiving that we are admitted to such a favour; and, whenever we have thanks to give, we must come before God's presence, set ourselves before him, and present ourselves to him in the ordinances which he has appointed.
1. Because he is a great God, and sovereign Lord of all, v. 3. He is great, and therefore greatly to be praised. He is infinite and immense, and has all perfection in himself. (1.) He has great power: He is a great King above all gods, above all deputed deities, all magistrates, to whom he said, You are gods (he manages them all, and serves his own purposes by them, and to him they are all accountable), above all counterfeit deities, all pretenders, all usurpers; he can do that which none of them can do; he can, and will, famish and vanquish them all. (2.) He has great possessions. This lower world is here particularly specified. We reckon those great men who have large territories, which they call their own against all the world, which yet are a very inconsiderable part of the universe: how great then is that God whose the whole earth is, and the fulness thereof, not only under whose feet it is, as he has an incontestable dominion over all the creatures and a propriety in them, but in whose hand it is, as he has the actual directing and disposing of all (v. 4); even the deep places of the earth, which are out of our sight, subterraneous springs and mines, are in his hand; and the height of the hills which are out of our reach, whatever grows or feeds upon them, is his also. This may be taken figuratively: the meanest of the children of men, who are as the low places of the earth, are not beneath his cognizance; and the greatest, who are as the strength of the hills, are not above his control. Whatever strength is in any creature it is derived from God and employed for him (v. 5): The sea is his, and all that is in it (the waves fulfil his word); it is his, for he made it, gathered its waters and fixed its shores; the dry land, though given to the children of men, is his too, for he still reserved the property to himself; it is his, for his hands formed it, when his word made the dry land appear. His being the Creator of all makes him, without dispute, the owner of all. This being a gospel psalm, we may very well suppose that it is the Lord Jesus whom we are here taught to praise. He is a great God; the mighty God is one of his titles, and God over all, blessed for evermore. As Mediator, he is a great King above all gods; by him kings reign; and angels, principalities, and powers, are subject to him; by him, as the eternal Word, all things were made (Jn. 1:3), and it was fit he should be the restorer and reconciler of all who was the Creator of all, Col. 1:16, 20. To him all power is given both in heaven and in earth, and into his hand all things are delivered. It is he that sets one foot on the sea and the other on the earth, as sovereign Lord of both (Rev. 10:2), and therefore to him we must sing our songs of praise, and before him we must worship and bow down.
2. Because he is our God, not only has a dominion over us, as he has over all the creatures, but stands in special relation to us (v. 7): He is our God, and therefore it is expected we should praise him; who will, if we do not? What else did he make us for but that we should be to him for a name and a praise? (1.) He is our Creator, and the author of our being; we must kneel before the Lord our Maker, v. 6. Idolaters kneel before gods which they themselves made; we kneel before a God who made us and all the world and who is therefore our rightful proprietor; for his we are, and not our own. (2.) He is our Saviour, and the author of our blessedness. He is here called the rock of our salvation (v. 1), not only the founder, but the very foundation, of that work of wonder, on whom it is built. That rock is Christ; to him therefore we must sing our songs of praises, to him that sits upon the throne and to the Lamb. (3.) We are therefore his, under all possible obligations: We are the people of his pasture and the sheep of his hand. All the children of men are so; they are fed and led by his Providence, which cares for them, and conducts them, as the shepherd the sheep. We must praise him, not only because he made us, but because he preserves and maintains us, and our breath and ways are in his hand. All the church's children are in a special manner so; Israel are the people of his pasture and the sheep of his hand; and therefore he demands their homage in a special manner. The gospel church is his flock. Christ is the great and good Shepherd of it. We, as Christians, are led by his hand into the green pastures, by him we are protected and well provided for, to his honour and service we are entirely devoted as a peculiar people, and therefore to him must be glory in the churches (whether it be in the world or no) throughout all ages, Eph. 3:21.
I. The duty required of all those that are the people of Christ's pasture and the sheep of his hand. He expects that they hear his voice, for he has said, My sheep hear my voice, Jn. 10:27. We are his people, say they. Are you so? Then hear his voice. If you call him Master, or Lord, then do the things which he says, and be his willing obedient people. Hear the voice of his doctrine, of his law, and, in both, of his Spirit; hear and heed; hear and yield. Hear his voice, and not the voice of a stranger. If you will hear his voice; some take it as a wish, O that you would hear his voice! that you would be so wise, and do so well for yourselves; like that, If thou hadst known (Lu. 19:42), that is, O that thou hadst known! Christ's voice must be heard to-day; this the apostle lays much stress upon, applying it to the gospel day. While he is speaking to you see that you attend to him, for this day of your opportunities will not last always; improve it, therefore, while it is called to-day, Heb. 3:13, 15. Hearing the voice of Christ is the same with believing. To-day, if by faith you accept the gospel offer, well and good, but to-morrow it may be too late. In a matter of such vast importance nothing is more dangerous than delay.
II. The sin they are warned against, as inconsistent with the believing obedient ear required, and that is hardness of heart. If you will hear his voice, and profit by what you hear, then do not harden your hearts; for the seed sown on the rock never brought any fruit to perfection. The Jews therefore believed not the gospel of Christ because their hearts were hardened; they were not convinced of the evil of sin, and of their danger by reason of sin, and therefore they regarded not the offer of salvation; they would not bend to the yoke of Christ, nor yield to his demands; and, if the sinner's heart be hardened, it is his own act and deed (he hardening it himself) and he alone shall bear the blame for ever.
III. The example they are warned by, which is that of the Israelites in the wilderness.
1. "Take heed of sinning as they did, lest you be shut out of the everlasting rest as they were out of Canaan.'' Be not, as your fathers, a stubborn and rebellious generation, Ps. 78:8. Thus here, Harden not your heart as you did (that is, your ancestors) in the provocation, or in Meribah, the place where they quarrelled with God and Moses (Ex. 17:2-7), and in the day of temptation in the wilderness, v. 8. So often did they provoke God by their distrusts and murmurings that the whole time of their continuance in the wilderness might be called a day of temptation, or Massah, the other name given to that place (Ex. 17:7), because they tempted the Lord, saying, Is the Lord among us or is he not? This was in the wilderness, where they could not help themselves, but lay at God's mercy, and where God wonderfully helped them and gave them such sensible proofs of his power and tokens of his favour as never any people had before or since. Note, (1.) Days of temptation are days of provocation. Nothing is more offensive to God than disbelief of his promise and despair of the performance of it because of some difficulties that seem to lie in the way. (2.) The more experience we have had of the power and goodness of God the greater is our sin if we distrust him. What, to tempt him in the wilderness, where we live upon him! This is as ungrateful as it is absurd and unreasonable. (3.) Hardness of heart is at the bottom of all our distrusts of God and quarrels with him. That is a hard heart which receives not the impressions of divine discoveries and conforms not to the intentions of the divine will, which will not melt, which will not bend. (4.) The sins of others ought to be warnings to us not to tread in their steps. The murmurings of Israel were written for our admonition, 1 Co. 10:11.
(1.) The charge drawn up, in God's name, against the unbelieving Israelites, v. 9, 10. God here, many ages after, complains of their ill conduct towards him, with the expressions of high resentment. [1.] Their sin was unbelief: they tempted God and proved him; they questioned whether they might take his word, and insisted upon further security before they would go forward to Canaan, by sending spies; and, when those discouraged them, they protested against the sufficiency of the divine power and promise, and would make a captain and return into Egypt, Num. 14:3, 4. This is called rebellion, Deu. 1:26, 32. [2.] The aggravation of this sin was that they saw God's work; they saw what he had done for them in bringing them out of Egypt, nay, what he was now doing for them every day, this day, in the bread he rained from heaven for them and the water out of the rock that followed them, than which they could not have more unquestionable evidences of God's presence with them. With them even seeing was not believing, because they hardened their hearts, though they had seen what Pharaoh got by hardening his heart. [3.] The causes of their sin. See what God imputed it to: It is a people that do err in their hearts, and they have not known my ways. Men's unbelief and distrust of God, their murmurings and quarrels with him, are the effect of their ignorance and mistake. First, Of their ignorance: They have not known my ways. They saw his work (v. 9) and he made known his acts to them (Ps. 103:7); and yet they did not know his ways, the ways of his providence, in which he walked towards them, or the ways of his commandments, in which he would have them to walk towards him: they did not know, they did not rightly understand and therefore did not approve of these. Note, The reason why people slight and forsake the ways of God is because they do not know them. Secondly, Of their mistake: They do err in their heart; they wander out of the way; in heart they turn back. Note, Sins are errors, practical errors, errors in heart; such there are, and as fatal as errors in the head. When the corrupt affections pervert the judgment, and so lead the soul out of the ways of duty and obedience, there is an error of the heart. [4.] God's resentment of their sin: Forty years long was I grieved with this generation. Not, The sins of God's professing people do not only anger him, but grieve him, especially their distrust of him; and God keeps an account how often (Num. 14:22) and how long they grieve him. See the patience of God towards provoking sinners; he was grieved with them forty years, and yet those years ended in a triumphant entrance into Canaan made by the next generation. If our sins have grieved God, surely they should grieve us, and nothing in sin should grieve us so much as that.
(2.) The sentence passed upon them for their sin (v. 11): "Unto whom I swore in my wrath, If they shall enter into my rest, then say I am changeable and untrue:'' see the sentence at large, Num. 14:21, etc. Observe, [1.] Whence this sentence came—from the wrath of God. He swore solemnly in his wrath, his just and holy wrath; but let not men therefore swear profanely in their wrath, their sinful brutish wrath. God is not subject to such passions as we are; but he is said to be angry, very angry, at sin and sinners, to show the malignity of sin and the justice of God's government. That is certainly an evil thing which deserves such a recompence of revenge as may be expected from a provoked Deity. [2.] What it was: That they should not enter into his rest, the rest which he had prepared and designed for them, a settlement for them and theirs, that none of those who were enrolled when they came out of Egypt should be found written in the roll of the living at their entering into Canaan, but Caleb and Joshua. [3.] How it was ratified: I swore it. It was not only a purpose, but a decree; the oath showed the immutability of his counsel; the Lord swore, and will not repent. It cut off the thought of any reserve of mercy. God's threatenings are as sure as his promises.
Now this case of Israel may be applied to those of their posterity that lived in David's time, when this psalm was penned; let them hear God's voice, and not harden their hearts as their fathers did, lest, if they were stiffnecked like them, God should be provoked to forbid them the privileges of his temple at Jerusalem, of which he had said, This is my rest. But it must be applied to us Christians, because so the apostle applies it. There is a spiritual and eternal rest set before us, and promised to us, of which Canaan was a type; we are all (in profession, at least) bound for this rest; yet many that seem to be so come short and shall never enter into it. And what is it that puts a bar in their door? It is sin; it is unbelief, that sin against the remedy, against our appeal. Those that, like Israel, distrust God, and his power and goodness, and prefer the garlick and onions of Egypt before the milk and honey of Canaan, will justly be shut out from his rest: so shall their doom be; they themselves have decided it. Let us therefore fear, Heb. 4:1.

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[b]An elegantly designed, superbly composed quantity of non-public letters from well-known American women and men that celebrates the yank event and illuminates the wealthy heritage of a few of America’s so much storied families.
Posterity is without delay an epistolary chronicle of the United States and a desirable glimpse into the hearts and minds of a few of history’s so much popular figures. Spanning greater than 3 centuries, those letters include enduring classes in existence and love, personality and compassion that would shock and enlighten.
incorporated listed here are letters from Thomas Jefferson to his daughter, caution her of the evils of debt; normal Patton on D-Day to his son, a cadet at West element, approximately what it capacity to be an outstanding soldier; W. E. B. DuBois to his daughter approximately personality underneath the colour of dermis; Oscar Hammerstein approximately why, in spite of everything his good fortune, he doesn’t cease operating; Woody Guthrie from a brand new Jersey asylum to nine-year-old Arlo approximately common human frailty; sixty-five-year-old Laura Ingalls Wilder’s educate of considered her pioneer formative years; Eleanor Roosevelt chastising her grown son for his Christmas plans; and Groucho Marx as a puppy to his twenty-five-year-old son.
With letters that span greater than 3 centuries of yank background, Posterity is an interesting glimpse into the options, knowledge, and relatives lives of these whose public accomplishments have touched us all. listed below are popular americans of their personal phrases and of their personal instances, noticeable as they have been noticeable by means of their little ones. listed here are our nice americans as moms and fathers.
From the alternate Paperback version.
Child Bop has collected all of her musical tools and is prepared for playtime by means of herself. As Barney understands, it may be much more enjoyable should you proportion.
After Franklin Pig wins first prize in an paintings contest, his very messy kin ultimately starts to place their soiled, messy domestic so as.
131-180. 20. M. Reid, "Young person's guide to canonical singularities," Proc. Syrup. , 46:1,345-414 (1987). 21. M. Reid, Birational Geometry of 3-Fotds According to Sarkiso~, preprint (1991). 22. V. G. Sarkisov, Birational Maps of Standard Q-Fano Fiberings, I. V. Kurchatov Institute Atomic Energy preprint (1989). 23. V. V. Shokurov, "A nonvanishing theorem," Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR. Set. , 49,635-651 (1985). 2698 24. V. V. Shokurov, "Problems about Fano varieties," In: Birational Geomet~ of Algebraic Varieties: Open problema.
Math. (2), 127, 93-163 (1988). 7. Y. Kawamata, "On the length of an extremal rational curve," Invent. , 105, No. 3, 609-611 (1991). 8. Y. Kawamata, "The minimal discrepancy coefficients of terminal singularities of dimension 3," Appendix to , Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR. Set. , 56, No. 1,201-203 (1992). Y. Kawamata, "Abundance theorem for minimal threefolds," Inv. , 108, 229-246 (1992). 10. Y. Kawamata, "Termination of log flips for algebraic 3-folds," Int. J. , 3, No. 5, 653-659 (1992). 11. Y. Kawamata, K.
V. V. Shokurov, "A nonvanishing theorem," Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR. Set. , 49,635-651 (1985). 2698 24. V. V. Shokurov, "Problems about Fano varieties," In: Birational Geomet~ of Algebraic Varieties: Open problema. The XXIIIrd International Symposium, Division of Mathematica, The Taniguehi Foundation. Aug. ~-27, 1988, pp. 30-32. 25. V. V. Shokurov, Special 3-Dimensional Flips, preprint, MPI/89-22. 26. V. V. Shokurov, "3-Fold log flips," Izv. Akad. IVauk SSSR. Ser. , 56, No. 1,105-201 (1992). 27. V.

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This is the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court announced in 1954 that segregated schools were inherently unequal, and in 1955 required school districts to desegregate "with all deliberate speed." It is the most famous civil rights case in American history. But it also had a specific set of plaintiffs -- schoolchildren in Topeka, Kansas -- and a specific history in its own community. This summary focuses on that history, rather than the broader setting and the Supreme Court jurisprudence.
On February 28, 1951, a group of black parents and children residing in the Topeka, Kansas, school district filed, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, a complaint naming as defendants the district's school board and certain school administrators. The plaintiffs were represented by local NAACP cooperating attorney Charles Bledsoe and sought class action status for their case, which they filed citing what was then 8 U.S.C. § 43, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Their complaint alleged that the defendants, acting pursuant to state statute, denied the plaintiff's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by operating separate public schools for white and black children, denying black children the right to enroll in and attend the schools attended by similarly-situated white children. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' conduct denied, solely on the basis of "race and color," to the child plaintiffs educational advantages, opportunities and facilities equal to those provided to white children, and that the black children forced by state law to attend racially-segregated schools "do not and cannot" enjoy the educational benefits afforded to whites. The plaintiffs alleged that some black students had to travel two miles farther to attend an all-black school than if allowed to attend the nearest all-white school. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees, and asked that the court convene a three judge panel, then required by 28 U.S.C. § 2281, to consider the constitutionality of the state statute.
On March 22, 1951, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint making the same basic allegations and seeking the same relief. It named as an intervening defendant the State of Kansas. The amended complaint was itself amended on May 29, 1951, when plaintiffs' counsel amended a paragraph to specify that the education opportunities provided by the defendants to the plaintiff children were inferior to those provided to white children in numerous respects, including "physical facilities, curricula, teaching, resources, student personnel services, access, and all other educational factors, tangible and intangible...." Moreover, the amended paragraph alleged that, apart from all other factors, the racial segregation practiced by the defendants "in and of itself" constituted an inferiority in educational opportunity offered to blacks, when compared to that offered to whites.
The school board's June 7, 1951, answer denied the claimed violations of constitutional rights. It also sought to correct or clarify certain claims made in the complaint, asserting that the operation of separate schools only occurred in the district's elementary-level facilities, that the city had but a single district with multiple attendance territories, that it provided free transportation for black children to any of the four black elementary schools operated for them in the district while providing no transportation for white elementary school students, and that, on average, the distances traveled to schools by black and by white children were the same. The state's answer, filed on June 15, 1951, generally denied the plaintiffs' allegations, specifically denying that the state statute was unconstitutional (and added, as had the other defendants' answer, that the plaintiffs' complaint had mis-cited the state statute of which they complained, by citing one applicable to cities of the second class, whereas Topeka was a city of the first class). The state also asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. That claim must have been rejected in an unpublished ruling, for the case was tried that summer.
After a trial of approximately ten days, on August 3, 1951, the three-judge panel sitting as the district court issued its opinion upholding the state statute and denying the plaintiffs' claims for relief. The court briefly reviewed the issues of facilities, curricula, instruction, and travel, finding that comparable educational facilities and services were provided to students of both races. It concluded that in the maintenance and operation of the separate schools "there is no willful, intentional or material discrimination." Recognizing that prior Supreme Court precedent (including Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)) allowing segregation in state-provided services seemed, to some degree, undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions, the district court adjudged that the prior cases, not having been overruled, controlled. Brown v. Board of Education, 96 F. Supp. 797 (D. Ks. 1951) (Circuit Judge Walter August Huxman). The plaintiffs appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, as then permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
At the Supreme Court, the Kansas case was heard along with three other cases (from South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware) challenging segregation in public education. These other cases, two of which had elementary and high school age plaintiffs and one with only high school age plaintiffs, all involved state constitutions and statutes that required segregation in public education. In contrast, the Kansas statute permitted, but did not require, cities above a certain population to maintain racially-separate school facilities. (Topeka's school board had elected to maintain segregated elementary schools.) In the South Carolina and Virginia cases, the lower federal courts found the black students' schools to have been inferior and the states were directed to equalize the facilities and services; however, the states' segregation laws were upheld and the plaintiffs were not provided access to the white students' schools during the mandated equalization programs. In the Delaware case, a state trial court awarded the plaintiffs an order requiring their immediate admission to the white students' schools. The trial court cited the inferiority of the schools the state had provided to black students and accepted the view that segregation itself results in an inferior education. Delaware's Supreme Court affirmed but intimated that, once equalization of the two sets of schools had been accomplished, the state might be able to obtain a modification of the decree.
On May 17, 1954, after twice having the parties and the United States, as amicus curiae, argue the case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion declaring that racially segregated schools were inherently unequal, and therefore deprived the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Earl Warren, Chief Justice). In the four cases at issue, the lower courts had found the separate schools' "tangible" factors equal (or satisfactorily becoming so); accordingly, the Supreme Court focused on the "effect" of segregation itself on public education. In view of the importance of education as a state-provided function, the Court stated that once a state has undertaken to provide educational opportunity it must make the right available to all on equal terms. Chief Justice Warren quoted the Kansas district court's observation that public school segregation has a detrimental effect which is greater when sanctioned by law, denoting black inferiority and affecting motivation to learn. He found this observation amply supported by modern psychological authority, citing several recent studies and reports. Recognizing the wide applicability of its decision and the variety of local conditions to which it must be applied, the Court requested the parties and the United States to again argue the case, specifically to address the formulation of remedial decrees. In addition to restoring the case to the docket for further argument, the Court also invited amicus curiae briefs from those states requiring or permitting segregation in public education.
The Supreme Court's next decision in the case occurred on May 31, 1955. In another unanimous opinion, again written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court remanded the cases to the trial courts for the crafting of appropriate decrees. The opinion observed that these courts were best suited to assess local conditions and the good faith efforts of local school officials to implement governing constitutional principles. The lower courts were reminded to consider the plaintiffs' personal interests in admission to public schools "as soon as practicable" on a nondiscriminatory basis, as well as the public interest in eliminating obstacles to such relief in an "orderly and systematic" manner. The courts were directed to require the defendants to make a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance" with the earlier ruling. This imprecise timeframe for action was not appreciably honed by the Court's directive that the lower courts, on remand, should "take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases." (The Delaware case, having been the sole affirmance of the four appealed cases, was remanded to that state's Supreme Court for proceedings it deemed necessary.) Brown v. Board of Education, 399 U.S. 294 (1955).
On remand in the Brown case, in Topeka, on August 2, 1955, the Kansas plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court for a hearing on the formulation of a decree. The hearing occurred on August 24, 1955, followed by issuance of a per curiam opinion by the three judge court on October 28, 1955. The court approved the plan the school board put in force for that school year. The plan's central principle was that children would be required to attend school within the district of their residence, with rare exceptions, and that race or color would not be any part of any exception to the general rule. Although the court viewed as insufficient one aspect of the plan, allowing (for that year only) kindergarten children to opt to attend schools inside or out of their residence district, the court decided that the plan sufficiently reflected the good faith of school authorities in attempting to adhere to the Supreme Court's rulings. The court also noted that at least one all-black school would, because of residence demographics, remain all-black. This result was acceptable, reasoned the court, because desegregation did not require intermingling but, instead, that children not be prevented from going to school together because of race or color. (This conceptualization of the desegregation obligation was later disapproved by the Supreme Court in Green v. School Board of New Kent County and Swann w. Charlotte/Mecklenberg.) The court retained jurisdiction over the case and regarded acceptance of the school board's plan as an interim measure.
The docket is devoid of any subsequent activity of importance until 1979. At that point, represented by private counsel, a group of black parents and schoolchildren filed a motion in the case to intervene as plaintiffs. They also filed a motion asking the court to command compliance with the earlier ruling to desegregate Topeka's schools. District Judge Richard Dean Rogers granted the motion to intervene. Brown v. Board of Education, 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979). He noted that four separate cases had been filed during that decade seeking to eliminate alleged racial discrimination in Topeka's schools and that, in at least two of them, the state and the school board's successful positions had been that the plaintiffs in those cases should not be permitted to proceed and, instead, should file motions seeking relief in Brown v. Board of Education, since the court had expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the Constitution. The intervening plaintiffs alleged (1) the school board had created attendance zones that perpetuate racial discrimination, (2) schools with predominately black enrollment had facilities, equipment, curricula, and instruction substantially inferior to that provided in schools with predominately white enrollment, (3) racial disparity existed in school personnel assignments, (4) the school board had adopted an open enrollment policy perpetuating school segregation, and (5) the board adopted a long range facilities plan which also perpetuated school segregation. Without resolving any of these claims, Judge Rogers made the procedural ruling that the movants could appropriately intervene as plaintiffs. He found it unpersuasive that passage of time had mooted the original plaintiffs' interest in the case, because the case was a class action (even though modern procedures for certifying a class action did not exist when the case had begun) and the intervenors had appropriate interests in seeking compliance with the Supreme Court's earlier orders.
Discovery and motion proceedings followed, as did a trial, which resulted in the district court's order of April 9, 1987. Brown v. Board of Education, 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987). Reviewing the case's history as well as other desegregation rulings, Judge Rogers observed that, in determining whether a unitary school system existed, he would assess whether characteristics of the dual system existing in 1954 either do not exist or, if they exist, whether they are not the result of past or present intentional segregative conduct of the defendants or their predecessors. He then reviewed the history of desegregation efforts in the Topeka schools, noting that some desegregation, at the high school level, preceded the 1951 filing of this case. The trial evidence included statistics which, according to the plaintiffs, demonstrated a lack of racial balance in the district's schools, in the sense that many schools' racial mix did not reflect the racial mix of the district. The judge, however, saw the statistics as a result of residential patterns, not as remnants of past discrimination nor of present intentionally discriminatory conduct. He added that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence for him to find that the residential patterns were the product of discriminatory conduct. Likewise, school transfer policies, attendance zone decisions, school space and site decisions, school closings and openings, school boundary locations, facilities quality, activities and curriculum, transportation, faculty and staff assignments, test scores, opportunities to take desegregative action, and other factors were reviewed and found racially neutral. Judge Rogers stated that the existence of some schools having a statistical predominance of one race was not the product of overt or covert intentionally segregative conduct. Thus, the new plaintiffs also could not prevail on their claim that the defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since that act prohibits only intentional discrimination in operation of schools receiving federal funds and the act's implementing regulations prohibiting racially discriminatory effects had not been shown to have been violated. Judge Rogers also ruled that the Kansas governor was dismissed as a defendant and that no evidence established liability of the state's school board. The public school system in Topeka was adjudged a unitary one. The plaintiffs' claims for relief were denied and they were ordered to pay the defendants' costs.
With assistance from ACLU attorneys, plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court upheld, 2-1, limited aspects of the district court's ruling but reversed the lower court's main conclusions. Brown v. Board of Education, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989) (Circuit Judge Stephanie Kulp Seymour). In sum, Judge Seymour faulted the district court's placing the burden of proving intentional discrimination on the plaintiffs, rather than according plaintiffs the presumption that existing racial disparities in the school system were causally related to past discriminatory conduct. Reviewing the evidence with the burden of proof properly assigned, the appellate court concluded that the defendants had failed in meeting their burden of proving that the effects of past intentional discrimination had dissipated. The lower court's ruling on the alleged Title VI violation also was error, according to Judge Seymour, who affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state's governor from the case and the finding that the state's recently-created school board had no liability.
The defendants sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court. In a brief order, Brown v. Board of Education, 503 U.S. 978 (1992), that court granted certiorari, vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), and Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), each of which suggested that district courts should aim in school desegregation cases to relinquish jurisdiction when possible.
On remand, the appellate court reinstated its prior opinion in full, again citing the local school board's failure of proof and its' inaction rather than taking sufficient affirmative steps in the area of student and faculty/staff assignments to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination. Judge Seymour, again writing for a 2-1 court, was of the view that the recent Supreme Court decisions changed nothing in the analysis. Brown v. Board of Education, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court declined review, so the case returned to the district court.
There, in a December 3, 1993, unpublished order, Judge Rogers stated that the issue before him was limited to the crafting of a remedial plan to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation in student and faculty/staff assignments. In his view, other aspects of the school system, such as educational performance, disciplinary outcomes, or classroom assignments were not part of the direct mandate from the Tenth Circuit. Discovery on remand was to be limited accordingly.
Also addressed on remand were the plaintiffs' motions for recovery of their attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The district court ruled that the fees would be calculated using local standards, rather than the higher rates prevailing in New York, where the ACLU attorneys were housed. Judge Rogers also ruled that volunteer paralegals' time spent on the case would not result in reimbursement, nor would counsel's travel time or secretarial and word processing costs. He decided, however, not to reduce the amount of recovery based on the fact that the plaintiffs were not fully successful. Brown v. Unified School District No. 501, 878 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Kan. 1995).
In 1999, the district court made its final ruling in the case. The ruling resulted from the motion of the defendant for a declaration of unitary status and order of dismissal. The plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. In ruling on the motion, Judge Rogers considered that the school board, after the most recent remand from the appellate court, had adopted and implemented a remedial plan with guidelines which prevented any school from being identified as a majority or minority school on the basis of the race of its faculty and staff. Likewise, the plan addressed student assignments at individual elementary, middle, and high schools in a way that, in recent years, kept minority and majority student populations within 15% of the minority and majority student figures for the district at large. The court also noted the defendant's on-going multi-cultural education programs for students, faculty, and staff, and an announced commitment to diversity and intolerance of discrimination. Granting the motion for a declaration of unitary status for the school district, Judge Rogers ruled that the vestiges of past discrimination in the school district had been eliminated to the extent practicable; and defendant had demonstrated a good faith commitment to the law and the Constitution which presaged no future need for judicial intervention. He dismissed the case on July 27, 1999. Brown v. Unified School District No. 501, 56 F. Supp.2d 1212 (D. Kan. 1999).
Plaintiff Description Current and future African-American students in Topeka public schools.
Citation: 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23 (1996).
Henry Hampton Collection: Harry Briggs, Jr.
Henry Hampton Collection: Interview of Eliza Briggs and Harry Briggs, Sr.