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The Data Controller processes your personal identifying non-sensitive data (in particular, name, surname, tax code, vat number, email, phone number, your images – hereinafter “personal data” or “data”) notified by you when registering on the Data Controller’s website and/or when subscribing to the newsletter offered by the Data Controller and/or when signing consultancy proposals for acceptance.
- to exercise the Data Controller’s rights, for example the right to legal defence.
In addition to the already specified right of access according to art. 15 GDPR in order to know the existence of the processing, its purposes, the categories of processed data, the recipients to whom the data have or will be communicated, in particular where these consist of third countries or international organisations, the storage period or the criteria employed to determine this, the data subject may ask for the rectification or cancellation of the personal data or the restriction of the processing and may oppose their processing; he/she may also lodge a complaint to a supervisory authority, obtain information regarding the origin of the data, where not personally supplied, the existence of an automated decision process, including profiling according to art. 22, § 1 and 4 (and in such case, significant information concerning the logic employed), the guarantee of adequate safeguards in case of transmission to third countries, obtain a copy of the data held by the Data Controller, revoke consent and the portability of the data.
- to send you newsletters, commercial notices and/or publicity material by email concerning products or services offered by the Data Controller.
Please note that if you are already our customer, we could send you commercial information concerning products or services of the Data Controller similar to those you have already enjoyed, until your consent is revoked or you request cancellation.
C) The Data Controller will process the data for the time necessary to fulfil the above quoted purposes and in case for no longer than 10 years from the end of the relationship for Service Purposes and for no longer than 2 years for Marketing Purposes, without prejudice to the right to cancellation or of revoking consent.
Your data may be transmitted for the purposes outlined in art. 2.A) and 2.B): - to employees or collaborators of the Data Controller, in their capacity of processors and/or internal processing officers and/or system administrators; - to third parties (for example, providers for the management and maintenance of the website, suppliers, credit institutions, professional studios etc.) who carry out outsourcing activities on behalf of the Data Controller, in their capacity of external data processors.
Without your express consent, (ex art. 24 let. a), b), d) of the Privacy Code and art. 6 let. b) and c) of the GDPR), the Data Controller may notify your data for the purposes laid down in art. 2.A) to Supervisory Bodies, Judicial Authorities as well as to all other subjects to whom the communication is legally mandatory in order to fulfil the purposes described. Your data will not be disseminated.
Personal data will be managed and stored on servers located within the European Union where the Data Controller and/or third party companies appointed and duly nominated as data processors are located. These servers are currently located in ITALY. Data will not be transmitted outside the European Union. In any case, it is understood that where necessary, the Data Controller will have the right to move the servers’ location in Italy and/or the European Union and/or countries outside the EU. In such a case, the Data Controller guarantees as of now that the transfer of data outside the EU will occur in accordance with the applicable legislation, by concluding agreements where necessary which guarantee an adequate level of protection and/or by adopting the standard contractual clauses laid down by the European Commission.
The Website and the Services offered by the Data Controller are not aimed at persons under 18 years of age and the Data Controller does not intentionally collect personal information concerning underage persons. Should data concerning underage persons be collected unintentionally, the Data Controller will erase these immediately, on the user’s request.
The Data Controller is ASCO FILTRI SPA.
The updated list of the processing officers and processors is kept at the Data Controller’s registered office.
The data controller declares no data are processed for which a data protection officer (DPO) is mandatory.
The Data Controller also declares to have adopted technical and organisational measures suitable to guarantee the safety of the processing carried out.
© Copyright 2017 by ASCO Filtri Spa. All Rights Reserved.

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art. 15
art. 22
§ 1
art. 2
art. 24
art. 6
art. 2


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Notice: The following page is a copy of the current law as of February 18, 2018 that was posted on the Department of Educations's Website. . Sometimes changes to the law are made. We do our best to make sure information on our website is current, however, this is site is not used for any legal advice. Please visit the official Hawaii State Legislature page for Chapter 12 law for the most current version.
"Alternative educational program" means an educational program, in a non-school setting other than home schooling, which addresses the standards identified in the Hawaii Content and Performance Standards.
"Department" means the department of education.
"Employment" means suitable, lawful full-time employment of a minimum of forty hours per week.
"Home schooling" means a viable educational option where a parent instructs the parent's own child.
"Local public school" means the school the child would be enrolled in if the child was not excepted from compulsory school attendance.
"Parent" means the natural or legal parent, guardian or other legal custodian of child.
"School age child" means a child who will have arrived at the age of at least six years, and who will not have arrived at the age of eighteen years on or before December 31 of any school year.
§8-12-5 Procedures for exceptions due to disabilities. (a) A parent whose child is physically or mentally unable to attend school, deafness and blindness excepted, shall complete and submit Form 4140, Exceptions to Compulsory Education, to the local public school.
(b) A parent whose child is physically or mentally unable to attend school, deafness and blindness excepted, shall also submit sufficient evidence of the identified disabilities to the local public school. A certificate from a duly licensed physician shall be sufficient evidence.
(c) The district superintendent may approve withdrawal from school for exceptions due to identified disabilities.
4140, Exceptions to Compulsory Education, to the local public school for the principal's recommendation as to whether the exception should be granted. The form shall then be submitted to the district superintendent for approval.
(b) A family court judge may also approve an exception due to employment.
(c) The student to be exempted from attendance shall be employed full-time for a minimum of forty hours per week.
§8-12-7 Procedures for exceptions due to family court order. (a) Approval for exceptions due to family court order shall be authorized by a family court judge.
(b) The approval of the family court judge shall be obtained on Form 4140, Exceptions to Compulsory Education, and submitted to the local public school.
§8-12-8 Procedures for exceptions for alternative educational programs, other than home schooling.
(a) The parent of a child requesting a compulsory attendance exception for an alternative educational program other than home schooling shall complete and submit Form 4140, Exceptions to Compulsory Education, to the local public school.
to be offered at the appropriate development stage of the child.
(B) A secondary school curriculum may include the subject areas of social studies, English, mathematics, science, health, physical education and guidance.
(5) A list of textbooks or other instructional materials which will be used. The list shall be in standard bibliographical format. For books, the author, title, publisher and date of publication shall be indicated. For magazines the author, article title, magazine, date, volume number and pages shall be indicated.
(d) The superintendent or the superintendent's designee may approve withdrawal from school where an appropriate educational program other than home schooling is developed for the child in accordance with the plans and policies of the department.
(e) A request for an exception for an alternative educational program other than home schooling shall be renewed annually.
(b) A narrative progress report and report card from the professional staff or tutor of a child's alternative educational program shall be submitted by the family to the local public school principal at the end of each school year. More frequent progress reports may be requested by the principal.
(c) The narrative report shall include statements of progress in each of the subject areas as well as development in social awareness and understanding of self, understanding of the problems of the society and the culture, and independence in learning. Copies of tests or assignments, if available, shall be attached to the narrative report. Grades for courses shall be submitted. The principal shall judge the adequacy of progress of a child. If progress is not satisfactory, the principal shall meet with the parent to discuss the problems and establish a plan for improvement.
(d) If progress is not satisfactory, the principal may recommend to the district superintendent that the exception be rescinded.
§8-12-10 Instructional personnel of alternative educational programs, other than home schooling.
(a) Instructional personnel in the alternative educational program shall be qualified to provide appropriate education to the child served.
(3) Official transcripts verifying educational background.
§8-12-11 High school diploma, alternative education programs, other than home schooling.
(a) A child in an alternative educational program other than home schooling who wants a high school diploma shall comply with the requirements outlined in Department of Education Regulation No. 4540.2, High School Graduation Through the Adult Schools.
(3) Signature of the parent.
protect families from unfounded accusations of educational neglect or truancy.
(c) If a child's annual progress report has been submitted as stated in §8-12-18(b), notification of intent to home school need not be resubmitted annually, except in cases where the child is transferring from one local public school to another, for example, transition from sixth grade to an intermediate school. Then the parents shall notify the principal of the child's new local public school.
§8-12-18 Testing and progress reports of home-schooled children. (a) Test scores shall be required for grades identified in the Statewide Testing Program, grades three, five, eight, and ten. A child is eligible to participate in the Statewide Testing Program at the local public school. The parent is responsible for securing necessary details from the principal of the local public school. The parent may elect to arrange for private testing at the parent's own expense. The tests used shall be comparable to the appropriate criterion or norm-referenced tests used by the department in the grades concerned. The parent may request and the principal may approve other means of evaluation to meet the Statewide Testing Program requirements.
(C) Representative tests and assignments including grades for courses if grades are given.
(c) When tests are administered under the Statewide Testing Program for grades three, five, eight, and ten, the parent may choose to have the child participate in the school's testing program and have the results serve as a means of assessing annual progress for that year.
Satisfactory performance on the Hawaii State Test of Essential Competencies (HSTEC) is also required.
(3) Take and achieve a satisfactory score on the General Educational Development (GED) test.

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Oliver W. Hill, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Richmond, Va., Robert L. Carter, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Hunton, Williams, Gay Moore Powell, Archibald G. Robertson, Richmond, Va., for defendants.
This case comes before me again pursuant to a mandate from the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, by per curiam opinion which is reported in 249 F.2d 462. For a somewhat comprehensive history of the litigation, reference is made to my opinion reported in Davis v. County School Board, D.C., 149 F. Supp. 431. As will be seen from an examination of those opinions, when the case was last before me I heard evidence and reached the conclusion that in the exercise of discretion vested in the District Courts by the Supreme Court in the cases reported as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, and 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (see also 345 U.S. 972, 73 S.Ct. 1114, 97 L.Ed. 1388), the interests of the litigants and of the public would not be best served by fixing a definite date upon which the defendants should comply with the order prohibiting segregation of children in the schools of Prince Edward County solely on account of race. An appeal was taken and in accordance with the opinion mentioned, the Court of Appeals reversed my decision and remanded the case to me with certain directions.
The case as now before the Court has the following issues presented for determination.
1. A motion to intervene filed by J.B. Minnick, argued on June 6, 1958, and renewed on July 21, 1958.
2. A controversy concerning taxable costs.
3. A motion filed by the plaintiffs, seeking the entry of an order directing the defendants to comply with the injunction heretofore entered at the beginning of the school term in September 1958, and a counter motion filed by the defendants for a general continuance pending a survey of the school problems in the County by an independent agency. These will be dealt with jointly.
These several matters will be considered in the order stated.
The petitioner, J.B. Minnick, a practicing attorney of Arlington, Virginia, seeks to intervene in his own right as a citizen and in behalf of others similarly affected and to have this Court re-examine certain constitutional issues. He contends that when this case, along with others known as the School Segregation Cases, and reported as Brown v. Board of Education, supra, was decided, the Supreme Court overlooked certain basic legal principles, particularly the statutes pertaining to land grant colleges and the provisions of the several acts admitting new states to the Union, with provision concerning operation of the schools of the state. I find it unnecessary to discuss the merits of his contentions. Whether these matters were called to the attention of the Supreme Court in these cases or were overlooked by that Court is beside the point. So far as this particular case the law has been settled and it is too late for a review to be had in this proceeding. It follows that the petition to intervene must be denied.
The defendants question several items of costs which will be dealt with separately.
a. The plaintiffs seek the recovery of the sum of $215, expended for photographs showing the condition of the respective school buildings, which were filed as exhibits at the original hearing. They also claim an item of $500 paid to Dr. Thomas H. Henderson, an expert witness called by the plaintiffs, who testified with respect to the inequality of the educational facilities, and the sum of $725 as expert witness fees for Mrs. Evelyn W. Shaed, a statistician employed in the office of counsel for the plaintiffs. It appears clearly that under the rule followed by the Fourth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Parker in Specialty Equipment and Machinery Corporation v. Zell Motor Car Company, 193 F.2d 515, at page 520, and cases cited, these items of cost should not be allowed. See also Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. O.R. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 52 S.Ct. 223, 76 L.Ed. 386, and National Labor Relations Board v. School-Timer Frocks, Inc., 4 Cir., 248 F.2d 831.
b. The item of $446.40, witness fees allowed by the Clerk, is approved.
c. The defendants have withdrawn their objection to an item of $148.75, representing one-half of the cost of copies of certain records. It follows that this should be allowed.
d. Prior to the trial the defendants arranged with the court reporter to obtain daily transcripts of the proceedings. In accordance with the usual practice this was under a special arrangement with the reporter and he is permitted to make additional charges necessitated by the personnel required to furnish such service. Counsel for the plaintiffs with the approval of counsel for the defendant, arranged with the reporter to obtain a copy of the transcript, which, together with one-half of the per diem, amounted to $770.25. Plaintiffs contend that this item should be taxed as costs. While it is proper to tax as costs on appeal a copy of the transcript obtained by the prevailing party, this should be limited to the regular charges of the reporter for such transcript furnished in ordinary course and should not include the additional charge incident to the special service provided. It is therefore my conclusion that the plaintiffs should receive as a part of the taxable costs that portion of the item of $770.25 representing one copy of the transcript furnished in ordinary course.
When the motion of the plaintiffs was filed on June 6, 1958, counsel for the defendants indicated their desire to be heard and July 14 was fixed as the time. At the hearing defendants offered affidavits, but upon suggestion of counsel for plaintiffs that they desired an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the defendants called the following residents of Prince Edward County: James T. Clark, Sheriff of Prince Edward County since March 1944, and prior to that time from February 1936 Deputy Sheriff, the successor in that office of his father, who had been Sheriff since the present Sheriff was five years of age; D.C. Womack, Commissioner of the Revenue of the County since January 1940, and prior to that time engaged in the wholesale grocery business in the County; Lester E. Andrews, a member of the School Board for four years and chairman during the last three, who is a retail lumber dealer; and B. Calvin Bass, now engaged in dairy farming at Rice, deputy chairman and former chairman of the School Board. Mr. Bass has had experience in teaching in the schools of the County and Hampden-Sydney College. He had teaching experience in Tennessee, including the position of School Principal and Assistant Superintendent. T.J. McIlwaine, who has been Superintendent of the schools for approximately forty years, was offered for cross-examination, with the statement that his testimony would be corroborative of that already heard. He was then called by the plaintiffs under Rule 41 and cross-examined.
These witnesses were unanimous in expressing the opinion that racial relations in the County have deteriorated to a marked degree since 1954. They believe that the effectiveness of the entire educational system in the County is suffering as a result of the atmosphere in which the schools are being operated. They express apprehension with respect to both violence and closing of the schools if the motion of the plaintiffs should be granted. The Sheriff pointed to the necessity of maintaining order in the County having an area of 354 square miles, bisected by highways over which school buses travel. It is his opinion that the local enforcement officers, reinforced by the entire state constabulary or highway patrol, would not be sufficient to maintain order if violence should erupt.
The conditions shown are to be deplored and those responsible may be the proper objects of censure if proper responsibility could be fixed. Considering the complexities of the entire problem this would present an impossible task, involving honest, sincere emotions felt by those on both sides of the controversy. However, we are faced with a situation rather than a theory and, being invested with a discretion in determining how this situation best may be met, it is necessary to seek a course to follow which appears in the best interest of all concerned at this time.
The defendants filed a copy of a recent resolution of the School Board authorizing the employment of expert professional assistance in conducting a survey and counselling the Board in connection with the entire school problem in the County. Superintendent McIlwaine has been charged with taking steps in this direction and testified that it is the next order of business with him. The plaintiffs offered no evidence.
At the conclusion of the testimony counsel for the defendants filed a motion that further action be deferred pending a survey, as referred to, and the consequent formulation of plans by the School Board. The matter was then ably argued by counsel, the plaintiffs insisting that an order be entered directing a start toward compliance with the decree beginning in September 1958, and the defendants urging additional time within which to effect a plan of operation.
In approaching the problem it is well to bear in mind that this is not a lawsuit nor is it a cause in equity in the conventional sense. In the first, the Court lays down legal principles to guide the parties. In a proceeding in equity the chancellor formulates the rules to be applied. In this case the District Judge must be guided by broad, flexible principles of equity while acting as arbiter of policies to be formulated and carried out by the local school authorities.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, compliance with the order may be brought about in ways other than by mixing schools. However, this is a matter for determination by the local authorities subject to approval or disapproval of the Court. Supposing that the Court was apprised of a solution, it would not be within its province to direct its adoption since the Court has only the authority to approve or disapprove the acts of the defendants.
That Court pointed to voluntary continuation of the present system as one method of meeting the requirement. 249 F.2d 462, at page 465.
As authority for this conclusion the Court quoted from an opinion by the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93, 96, to the effect that the plaintiffs there were entitled to have the defendants "* * * acting promptly, and completely uninfluenced by private and public opinion as to the desirability of desegregation in the community, proceed with deliberate speed consistent with administration * * *".
"Had the court made such a declaration (of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs) and retained the cause for further orders necessary to implement it, deferment to a later time of action on the prayer for injunctive relief, if necessary, may well have been within his discretion."
In my initial study of the Brown cases, I considered Jackson v. Rawdon, and was influenced, in part, by that opinion in reaching my conclusions stated in January 1957, supra. Finally, the opinion of the Fourth Circuit concludes with directions that this Court enter an order directing the defendants to "make a prompt and reasonable start toward complying with the Court's order enjoining discrimination on the ground of race or color in admitting children to the schools under their supervision."
So, as is seen, the Court of Appeals has said in broad and general terms that I was in error in not fixing a time limit for compliance, that I should say plainly the defendants must comply without further delay and a prompt and reasonable start must be made. It is to be observed that the Court refrained from indicating what would be a proper time to fix, what act of compliance must be without further delay, and they have failed to define a prompt and reasonable start. It is clear that the Court recognizes what the Supreme Court announced, namely, that the responsibility is upon the District Court to pass upon the details. Working out the details is not an assignment of a minor nature and if I am to use that discretion called for by the Supreme Court, recognized by the Court of Appeals and which should motivate a chancellor in applying equitable principles, the difficulties must be recognized.
In this state of affairs I feel that it is proper that I further discuss the problem and give my reasons for the conclusions to be stated. The Court of Appeals says correctly that the enforcement of a right may not be denied because of action taken or threatened in defiance of such right. But the Supreme Court has announced in an epochal opinion that the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States may be deferred until necessary local adjustments in the public interest may be effected. It is clear that Court did not anticipate hurried, ill-considered action. Judging from the experience of other localities it may be observed that violence may be within the realm of probability if precipitate action is taken. While this consideration of itself is secondary the psychological effect of such conditions upon immature children is of primary importance. It must be ever borne in mind that the children are those for whom the entire educational system was devised and their interests are not to be lost sight of in the conflicts of the adult world in which they live.
"The Tragic Era — The Revolution after Lincoln" 1929, The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass.
"If we, in whose hands responsibility for leadership and judgment is placed, open our eyes to the teachings of history and perform our duties with patience, with sympathy and with common sense, we shall make a contribution toward averting a repetition of an epoch from which nobody derived any benefit and in which everybody suffered."
To this might be added the warning that if we make mistakes by impatience and failure to consider and to endeavor to understand, however good our intentions may be, we are responsible for the consequences because that responsibility has been placed upon us by the Supreme Court. For my part, I believe much harm can be caused by ill-considered action. The conditions which have arisen in other places constitute a warning which should not be ignored.
We hear such terms as "the jet age", "a new day" and "crash programs" used as excuses for speedy action. These catch phrases are not consistent with the "deliberate speed", the "unhurrying chase" and the "unperturbed pace" ascribed by Thompson to his Hound of Heaven. Furthermore, they are not applicable to the situation with which we are dealing. In the case cited in the footnote the Supreme Court recognized the difference between action by an individual and action by a State. The distinction appears to be in point. Despite the great advances made in scientific and technical knowledge we have no evidence upon which to base a belief that in accepting new theories of social or moral reform the modern human mind is any more adaptable than that of the Athenian of 500 B.C. The knowledge of preceding generations can be preserved in writings but wisdom cannot be transmitted by inheritance. It must be acquired by experience.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 1911, 222 U.S. 17, at pages 19-20, 32 S.Ct. 4, at page 6, 56 L.Ed. 71: "But a state cannot be expected to move with the celerity of a private business man; it is enough if it proceeds, in the language of the English Chancery, with all deliberate speed".
In dealing with problems accompanying such reforms we must look to the teachings of history if we are to avoid treacherous shoals. History affords many lessons we would do well to heed.
We find that following the adoption of his code of laws, which he described, not as the best that could be given the people but, as "the best they could receive". Solon, in order to afford a period for its acceptance by the people and to avoid importunities for interpretation, modification, etc., absented himself for ten years during which he visited foreign countries. Upon his return there yet remained much to be done.
Plutarch relates that: "And, therefore, when he (Solon) was afterwards asked if he had left the Athenians the best laws that could be given, he replied, `The best they could receive'." Plutarch's Lives — New York. McKinlay, Stone and Mac-Kenzie — 1924.
Later we find the admonition of The Great Teacher that morality cannot be enforced by Pharisaic legalism. He pointed to the truth that the application of external force will not "cleanse * * * that which is within the cup and platter," the essential first step in reform.
Innumerable illustrations might be used. Among more modern ones, reference has already been made to the period in the history of our country known as "The Tragic Era", which has also been called "The Age of Hate".
"The Age of Hate; Andrew Johnson and the Radicals" — George Fort Milton. New York. Coward-McCann, Inc. — 1930.
Within the memory of many of us, this Nation embarked upon a sudden and determined effort to enforce upon the people a code of morality adopted as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was designed to reform the customs of the Nation in the use of intoxicating liquors and it was called "The Noble Experiment". To assist the Government in its enforcement a nationwide moral crusade was waged by private enterprise and religious organizations. The failure of the experiment is too well known to require discussion. That action was too precipitate. There had not been a sufficient preparatory cleansing of the inside "of the cup and of the platter". Contrary to the situation before us, there was no provision for flexibility of enforcement. The history of civilization is a story of trial and error. We have here a more reasonable rule to follow than that which prevailed under the 18th Amendment and the statutes enacted under that Amendment. Within the bounds of this rule latitude is allowed for meeting conditions in a practical manner in the search for the correct solution.
It should be pointed out that in none of the episodes referred to was the emotional appeal more deeply seated or based upon more honest convictions of right on both sides to the controversy than in the situation before us nor was the impact more far-reaching.
It has been demonstrated that the hearts and the minds of men cannot be controlled by legislation nor by force. It has been demonstrated that violence can be quelled by force, such as the use of troops, but unless proper preliminary preparation has been had, when the force is removed festering scars remain requiring treatment of the type administered by Judge Harry J. Lemley of the Eastern District of Arkansas in his recent opinion in Aaron v. Cooper, D.C., 163 F. Supp. 13, known as the Little Rock Case. It is realized that these observations may appear trite, but in periods of stress we often need to recall to mind and to be guided by simple truths, which we are prone to overlook at times.
It is belaboring the point to again call attention to the obvious fact that the Supreme Court recognized all this as disclosed by its language in the Brown cases. A reading of those opinions clearly reveals that the Court should not confuse delay with defiance of or non-compliance with the law. The law must be observed and the questions here to be determined relate only to the method and time of such observance. Over-hasty action necessitating a backward step is less conducive to proper law enforcement than action taken after carefully considered delay, even though the Court may be criticised for delay by those impatiently urging speedy action.
The defendants should proceed promptly with the formulation of a plan which will comply with the order heretofore entered enjoining them from discriminating against the plaintiffs in admission to the schools in the County solely on account of race. They have indicated their purpose to so proceed.
The proposal of the defendants that a comprehensive survey of the entire problem be made by experts trained in the subjects involved is, so far as I am informed, an approach which has not been tried elsewhere. Considering the weight and importance which have been given psychological and sociological factors, such an approach would appear to have merit and to contain the possibility of a worth-while recommendation dealing with the problems peculiar to the particular community with which we are concerned.
I do not conceive it to be within the province of the Court to specify what steps the defendants should take but deem it not inappropriate to make this comment concerning their proposal. As declared by the Supreme Court in the Brown cases and by the Fifth Circuit in Rippy v. Borders, the primary responsibility is theirs and the function of this Court is to either approve or disapprove their actions.
The Court of Appeals has directed that a date be fixed for compliance with the mandate.
In determining what would be a proper time to fix for compliance, a number of factors and some precedents have been considered. Obviously, it is not in the best interest of those concerned to comply with the suggestion of the plaintiffs that compliance be had with the beginning of the school year in September 1958. Such a course would be unrealistic. It is equally obvious that at this time there is no evidence before the Court upon which to base an opinion as to what would be a proper time. It is anticipated that progress reports to be made by the defendants in the future will throw light upon this phase of the problem. Turning again to precedent available in somewhat comparable situations, it is recalled that Solon considered ten years an appropriate interval to allow for adjustments to far-reaching changes in the customs of a people. The period of greatest turmoil following the death of President Lincoln, is regarded as about twelve years. The efforts to enforce the 18th Amendment were concentrated over a period of some twelve or fourteen years. Concededly, these yardsticks are of limited aid but they do reflect some past experiences with human behavior. No better measure has been suggested nor has one occurred to me. As I have pointed out previously, it is not possible for a Court to forecast conditions which will exist in the future. It can only find facts which exist at a stated time, past or present. In full realization of this limitation but faced with directions from the Court of Appeals to fix a date and believing that some assurance of stability of conditions in the immediate future may be beneficial to the people of the County, in their efforts to meet the changed conditions, I fix ten years following the 1955 decision in the Brown cases as the time for such compliance. However, because of the uncertainty of conditions during the interval and the absence at this time of a sound basis for this conclusion, the power to change this date by either reducing or extending the time will be expressly reserved and action under such reservation will be in accord with what may develop in the future.
149 F. Supp. 431, at page 439.
An order will be entered directing an immediate start in the necessary preliminary steps looking to the formulation of a plan, with directions that on or before January 1, 1959, the defendants inform the Court concerning progress to that date. The report should reflect the scope and purpose of the survey and general information regarding the qualifications of such consultant or consultants as have then been engaged. The order will direct compliance with the terms of the injunction heretofore entered at the beginning of the school year for 1965, unless such order should be modified during the interval. The order will expressly reserve to the Court the power to modify it by accelerating or extending the date of compliance and in such other respects as the best interest of the parties and of the public may appear proper including the power to direct additional reports from time to time as may be deemed appropriate.

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THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, under the Acts of 1824 and 1844 so often referred to in cases previously reported.
The facts of the case are recited in the opinion of the Court.
It was argued by Mr. Cushing (Attorney-General) on the part of the United States, and by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Johnson, with whom was Mr. Coxe, on behalf of the appellees.
I. That the court below had no jurisdiction, and that the decrees are therefore nullities.
These grants were complete titles, requiring nothing more to be done to perfect them; and the cases are full of proof, offered by the claimants, to show that the grants were perfect grants. But the act of 1824 applies only to cases of incomplete titles, to cases protected by the treaty of 1803, 'and which might have been perfected into a complete title, under, and in conformity to, the laws, usages, and customs of the governments under which the same originated, had not the sovereignty of the country been transferred to the United States.' 1 Land Laws, 385. The point, it is conceived, is decided in the case of the United States v. Reynes, 9 Howard, 144, bottom of page, and 145.
II. That there is no sufficient evidence of the execution of the grants by Fernandez and Gaudiana.
III. That, even if their execution is proved, then they are void; because Fernandez and Gaudiana had no authority to make such large grants. Laws for the sale and distribution of lands. 2 White's Rec. p. 48 to 55; Royal Ordinance of 13th October, 1749, Ibid. 67; Royal Ordinance of 1754, Ibid. 62; O'Reilly's and Gayoso's Regulations, Ibid. 229, 231.
IV. That even if their execution is proved, then the grants are void, because no lands were severed from the public domain by surveys, giving a certain location previous to the treaty of 1800 or even 1803, and the descriptions in the grants are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain, that no location of the lands embraced in them can be given. United States v. Miranda, 16 Peters, 156 to 160; 15 Peters, 184, 215, 275, 319; 10 Peters, 331; 3 Howard, 787; 5 Howard, 26; United States v. Boisdore's heirs, 11 Howard, 63; Lecompte v. United States, Ibid. 115.
V. That the claimants are not within the provisions of the act of 1824, and there are not the proper averments in their petitions to show that they are entitled to its benefits.
1. The territory within which both of these grants were situate was, at their respective dates, within the boundaries of Texas, (the Arroyo Hondo being the eastern boundary,) and subject to the dominion and control of the commandancy at Nacogdoches, so far as related to the granting of lands.
2. The civil and military commandants at that post were, ex officio, lieutenant-governors, and had authority to grant lands within their province or department.
3. These grants were made by them in manner stated in the petitions, and were in conformity with the laws, usages, and customs of Spain, which then existed in the province of Texas and at the post of Nacogdoches.
4. These grants gave to the grantees therein named, and to their legal representatives, a good title to the premises in them respectively described.
5. The plaintiffs, in these suits, have shown themselves, by a regular deduction of title, the owners of the William Burr and Samuel Davenport interests in both tracts; and are, therefore, entitled to recover.
Mr. Johnson, in his argument, said that the United States had not denied the existence of the original grants. As to the allegation that the lands were not severed from the royal domain, if the grant was capable of being located, it need not be actually severed. Glenn v. United States, 13 Howard, 250. This grant can be located. A centre being given, a line must be run from it two leagues to the north and two to the south; then from each end, two east and two west; then close the survey. The record shows that the centre tree existed. The other grant can be surveyed also.
But it has been said that if these titles are good for any thing, they are complete titles, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the court under the acts of 1824 and 1844.
'It appears to be a historial fact, that the strip of country called the neutral territory was early disputed by the ancient governments of Texas and Louisiana, both alternately assuming and repelling jurisdiction over it; and even after both provinces were united under the dominion of Spain the dispute did not subside, but was kept alive and perpetuated by the local commandants, & c.' These commissioners, in their several reports, after classing these in the first class of claims, recommend them for confirmation; a language which would not have been used in reference to perfect titles, and which, coming from them, is to be regarded as the language of the government itself. 9 Pet.R. 468.
These were the grounds on which the District Attorney, in the court below, insisted that the grants were inchoate and not perfect and absolute; and we with great confidence submit to the court, therefore, whether these combined considerations do not clearly distinguish these cases from that of the United States v. Reynes, before referred to; and if so, whether they are not embraced by the act under which the suits are brought; and in view of the whole case in all its aspects, we, with like confidence, submit whether we are not entitled to recover.
1 Howard, 24; 7 Pet. R. 51; 10 Pet. R. 303; Civil Code, title Prescription, 3421, 3437, 3438, 3465, and 3466; 2 White's Recop. 191; Duff Green's American State Papers, vol. 2, p. 72 to 83; Ib. vol. 4, p. 34-36, 60, 61, 75; Executive Document, 33, 2d session, 27th Congress, p. 81. Doe v. Eslava et al. 9 Pet. R. 449; Doe v. The City of Mobile, Ib. 468.

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To resolve a dispute over the ownership of certain lands, California seeks to invoke this Court's original jurisdiction in an action to quiet title against Arizona and the United States, both of which contend that the United States has not consents to be a defendant and that therefore California's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint must be denied. Title 28 U.S.C. § 209a(a) permits the United States to be named as a defendant in an action to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest other than a security interest or water rights; and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) gives the federal district courts "exclusive original jurisdiction" of actions under § 2409a to quiet title to real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States.
Held: Under § 2409a(a), the United States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit in this case, and hence there is no bar to the suit. The legislative history of § 1346(f) shows no intent by Congress to divest this Court of jurisdiction over such actions in cases otherwise within its original jurisdiction, an attempt that would raise grave constitutional questions. The section did no more than assure that such jurisdiction was not conferred upon the courts of any State. Pp. 440 U. S. 65-68.
Since the admission of California to the Union in 1850, the southeastern boundary of the State has been the middle of the channel of the Colorado River. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat 452. Neither the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 nor the admission of Arizona to statehood in 1912 changed the location of this 22-mile border. The location of the river did change, however, from causes both natural and artificial. These shifts created confusion about the location of the political boundary between California and Arizona. This problem was resolved through an interstate compact, ratified by the Congress in 1966. [Footnote 1] The Compact fixed the boundary by stations of longitude and latitude, divorced from the continuing shifts of the Colorado River.
property interests. California has presented the determinations of its Lands Commission to both Arizona and the United States; neither has acquiesced in the Commission's conclusions.
California seeks to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction in this suit to quiet title to the lands it claims, and thus resolve its dispute with Arizona and the United States. [Footnote 2] To sue Arizona, it relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), which confers on this Court "original and exclusive jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll controversies between two or more States." To sue the United States, it relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b), which confers on this Court "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll controversies between the United States and a State." Both these heads of original jurisdiction find their source in Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution: "In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."
It is undisputed that both Arizona and the United States are indispensable parties to this litigation, and it is California's need to sue both Arizona and the United States that creates the problem before us. Specifically, Arizona and the United States contend that the United States has not agreed to be a defendant in a quiet title action in this Court. Yet this is the only federal court in which California can sue Arizona, because Congress has conferred upon it "original and exclusive jurisdiction" (emphasis added) over controversies between States. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
United States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public policy forbids that conclusion."
Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 204 U. S. 342. See Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 185 U. S. 387 (dicta). But cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621. Yet the Court has recognized that an action in equity cannot be maintained without the joinder of indispensable parties. [Footnote 3] Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193. Thus, if the United States has not consented to be sued in an action such as this, California's motion for leave to file a complaint must be denied. "A bill of complaint will not be entertained which, if filed, could only be dismissed because of the absence of the United States as a party." Arizona v. California, 298 U.S.
558, 298 U. S. 572. See Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991; but see 58 U. S. Georgia, 17 How. 478, 58 U. S. 491-496 (Taney, C.J.).
The suit, then, could not be maintained in any court. This Court could not hear the claims against the United States because it has not waived its sovereign immunity, and a district court could not hear the claims against Arizona, because this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. To resolve this asserted dilemma, the Solicitor General has made an undertaking on behalf of the United States. He has agreed that, if California is granted leave to file its complaint in this Court against Arizona, the United States will intervene with respect to the controversy over part of the area in question. [Footnote 4] Because, however, we have concluded that the United States has already waived its sovereign immunity to suit in this case, we need not assess the wisdom or validity of the Solicitor General's suggestion.
in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. . . ."
of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States."
It is thus clear that the United States has waived its immunity to suit in actions brought against it to quiet title to land. The question is whether suits brought under that waiver may be heard in this Court. The Solicitor General argues that they may not, that § 1346(f) operates both to confer original jurisdiction over such a case on the federal district courts and simultaneously to withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court. If this contention were accepted, a grave constitutional question would immediately arise. That question, quite simply, is whether Congress can deprive this Court of original jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution.
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative implementation. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 65 U. S. 96; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. at 58 U. S. 492; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 332. It is clear, of course, that Congress could refuse to waive the Nation's sovereign immunity in all cases or only in some cases but in all courts. Either action would bind this Court even in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. It is similarly clear that the original jurisdiction of this Court is not constitutionally exclusive -- that other courts can be awarded concurrent jurisdiction by statute. Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252; Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U. S. 449. But once Congress has waived the Nation's sovereign immunity, it is far from clear that it can withdraw the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court over such suits.
"The evident purpose [of the grant of original jurisdiction] was to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in the first instance, of suits involving a State or a diplomatic or commercial representative of a foreign government. So much was due to the rank and dignity of those for whom the provision was made. . . ."
Id. at 111 U. S. 464. See The Federalist No. 81, pp. 507-509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). Elimination of this Court's original jurisdiction would require those sovereign parties to go to another court, in derogation of this constitutional purpose. Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of the federal courts and over the sovereign immunity of the United States, but it is extremely doubtful that they include the power to limit in this manner the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution.
Happily, we need not decide this constitutional question, for the statute in question can readily be construed in such a way as to obviate it. In so construing the statute, we no more than follow the long practice of the Court to forgo the resolution of constitutional issues except when absolutely necessary.
"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 62.
that § 1346(f), by vesting "exclusive original jurisdiction" of quiet title actions against the United States in the federal district courts, did no more than assure that such jurisdiction was not conferred upon the courts of any State.
For these reasons, we conclude that there is no bar to this original suit in the Supreme Court between California as plaintiff, and Arizona and the United States as defendants. [Footnote 8] Accordingly, the motion of California for leave to file its complaint is granted, and the defendants are allowed 45 days in which to answer or otherwise respond.
Interstate Compact Defining the Boundary Between the States of Arizona and California, 80 Stat. 340.
California points out that other title questions may arise along the entire stretch of the California-Arizona border. It urges the Court to retain jurisdiction of this case for adjudication of these potential additional controversies. We leave that suggestion for a later date.
"(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."
"the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable."
"The form of pleadings and motions in original actions shall be governed, so far as may be, by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in other respects those rules, where their application is appropriate, may be taken as a guide to procedure in original actions in this court."
This Court has dismissed cases in its original jurisdiction for want of an indispensable party, Arizona v. California, 298 U. S. 558, 298 U. S. 572; California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U. S. 229, 157 U. S. 256. Here, all three parties have agreed that their interests in the land in question are inextricably linked.
The Solicitor General maintains that the Government has a valid statute of limitations defense as to that part of this controversy that concerns the northern 2.7 miles of the 11.3-mile stretch of original riverbed in controversy. He has undertaken to intervene, therefore, only with respect to the reminder of the tract.
The Act also included a venue provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1402(d).
"(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which may be or could have been brought under sections 1346, 1347, 1491, or 2410 of this title, sections 7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended . . . or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952. . . . "
"(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judgment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or control."
"(c) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States."
"(d) If the United States disclaims an interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority conferred by section 1346(f) of this title."
"(e) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried by the court without a jury."
"(f) Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States."
"(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession."
"The United States may be named a party in any civil action brought by any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United States."
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 216, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1971).
"Since we believe it is the better policy to litigate questions of the Government's title in the Federal courts, the draft bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of suits under the statute in the U.S. district courts."
S.Rep. No. 92-575, supra, at 7.
The administration's suggestions were, for the most part, accepted. There was no discussion of the jurisdictional section in the Report of either the House Committee, H.R.Rep. No. 92-1559 (1972), or the Senate Committee, supra. Nor was that provision the subject of any debate on the floor of either House. 117 Cong.Rec. 46380-46381 (1971) (passage by the Senate); 118 Cong.Rec. 35530-35531 (1972) (passage by the House of Representatives); id. at 35993 (concurrence by the Senate in the amendments made by the House).
Arizona argues that this is not an appropriate case for this Court's original jurisdiction, both because of its factual complexity and because it involves only title to land, rather than the location of a political boundary. Such considerations are hardly relevant to the exercise of this Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction, and the fact is that several cases decided by the Court under its original jurisdiction have involved complicated questions of title to land. In Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65, for example, the Court decided that Massachusetts did not have title to lands within New York along and within Lake Ontario. In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, and Wisconsin v. Lane, 245 U. S. 427, the Court decided bills brought by States to quiet title against the United States. The Congress had expressly waived sovereign immunity for those suits. Cases in which the Court has entertained actions by the United States to quiet title to lands claimed by the States include United States v. Utah, 279 U. S. 816; United States v. Oregon, 282 U.S. 804; United States v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 274; United States v. Wyoming, 333 U.S. 834; United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19; United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699; and United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707.


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California currently does not have an imputation rule comparable to Model Rule 1.10, nor does California have rules that address screening in the case of former government lawyers, (Model Rule 1.11), former judges and third party neutrals (Model Rule 1.12) or in dealing with prospective clients (Model Rule 1.18). Instead, imputation of conflicts of interest is a matter of common law. See, California Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (Thomson West (Rutter Group) 2007) ¶ 4:32 ff.
California cases were among the first to apply the imputed knowledge rule relying in part on DR 5-105(D). Chadwick v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 (1980), superseded by statute on other grounds in People v. Conner, 34 Cal. 3d 141 (1983); Chambers v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893, 898 (1981). The established rule in California is that where an attorney is disqualified that attorney’s entire firm is disqualified as well regardless of efforts to erect an ethical wall. Klein v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 894, 912-914 (1998); Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 117 (1992).
The California Supreme Court has not expressly changed the presumption of shared confidences in successive representation cases. City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 38 Cal. 4th 839 (2006). However, based on a statement in People ex. rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc, 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1151-1152 (1999) (that the record lacked an evidentiary basis for considering whether an ethical screen could be used to avoid disqualification of the law firm based on the firm’s disqualified “of counsel”), the Ninth Circuit expressed the belief in In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th. Cir. 2000) that the Court is “sending a signal that [it] may well adopt a more flexible approach to vicarious disqualification” in certain cases. Yet, the basic rule remains intact. Hitachi, Ltd. v. Tatung Company, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1158,1161 (N.D. CA. 2006).
Several courts have relaxed the imputation standard in specific situations. Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 4th 752 (2005) (where the disqualified attorney leaves the firm and the prior firm shows it did not receive confidential information); Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1324 (2001) (where the new firm shows that the lateral attorney had no exposure to confidential information relevant to the current action). Thus, California follows the rule in most jurisdictions that “double imputation” will not support disqualification. Frazier v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 23, 27 (2002); Derivi Construction & Architecture, Inc v. Wong, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1268, 1274-1276 (2004).
Courts will also permit screening in certain contexts. For example, a law firm will not be vicariously disqualified because a former judicial officer who heard a portion of the case subsequently joins a firm of one of the parties so long as no confidences were revealed to the judicial officer by the opposing side and appropriate screening procedures are established. Higdon v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1667 (1991); In re County of Los Angeles, supra,223 F. 3d 990. However, screening will not avoid disqualification if the former judicial officer participated in settlement conferences in the case. Cho v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 113 (1995).
Screening procedures may also protect against the presumption of shared confidences when hiring former government lawyers (Chambers v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893 (1981)) as well as private lawyers joining a government office. City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17 (2004). However, a public office may not avoid vicarious disqualification by using screening procedures to shield a conflicted lawyer that becomes the head of the office. Cobra Solutions, supra,38 Cal. 4th at 850. Screening procedures can also be effective in overcoming the presumption of shared confidences when hiring an opposing counsel’s former paralegal or secretary (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation,232 Cal. App. 3d 572 (1991)) or employing an expert previously consulted by the other side. Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1067, 1087 (1994); Western Digital Corp. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1471 (1998).

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View of a farm-based anaerobic digester in Iowa.
Anaerobic food web. Adapted from Gujer and Zehnder ( 1983 ) and McCarty and Smith ( 1986 ).
Schematic of biological butanol production from waste slurries.
Schematic of a microbial fuel cell for hydrogen generation in the cathode (left panel) and electrical power generation (right panel). The surface of the anodic electrode is positive, and the surface of the cathodic electrode is negative. Electron current is from the anode to the cathode.
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