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PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
Mr. Samuel Slaff, of New York City, for appellant.
Mr. John H. Tolan, of Oakland, Cal., for the Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, appointed pursuant to House Resolution No. 63, April 22, 1940, to investigate Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, as amicus curiae by special leave of Court.
Mr. W. T. Sweigert, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
The facts of this case are simple and are not disputed. Appellant is a citizen of the United States and a resident of California. In December, 1939, he left his home in Marysville, California, for Spur, Texas, with the intention of bringing back to Marysville, his wife's brother, Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas. When he arrived in Texas, appellant learned that Duncan had last been employed by the Works Progress Administration. Appellant thus became aware of the fact that Duncan was an indigent person and he continued to be aware of it throughout the period involved in this case. The two men agreed that appellant should transport Duncan from Texas to Marysville in appellant's automobile. Accordingly, they left Spur on January 1, 1940, entered California by way of Arizona on January 3, and reached Marysville on January 5. When he left Texas, Duncan had about $20. It had all been spent by the time he reached Marysville. He lived with appellant for about ten days until he obtained financial assistance from the Farm Security Administration. During the ten day interval, he had no employment.
In Justice Court a complaint was filed against appellant under Section 2615 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California, St.1937, p. 1406, which provides: 'Every person, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.' On demurrer to the complaint, appellant urged that the Section violated several provisions of the Federal Constitution. The demurrer was overruled, the cause was tried, appellant was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment in the county jail, and sentence was suspended.
On appeal to the Superior Court of Yuba County, the facts as stated above were stipulated. The Superior Court, although regarding as 'close' the question of the validity of the Section, felt 'constrained to uphold the statute as a valid exercise of the police power of the State of California'. Consequently, the conviction was affirmed. No appeal to a higher state court was open to appellant. We noted probable jurisdiction early last term, and later ordered reargument (313 U.S. 545, 61 S.Ct. 956, 85 L.Ed. 1511) which has been held.
At the threshold of our inquiry a question arises with respect to the interpretation of Section 2615. On reargument, the Attorney General of California has submitted an exposition of the history of the Section, which reveals that statutes similar, though not identical to it have been in effect in California since 1860, see Cal.Stat. 1860, p. 213; Cal.Stat. 1901, p. 636; Cal.Stat.1933, p. 2005. Neither under these forerunners nor under Section 2615 itself does the term 'indigent person' seem to have been accorded an authoritative interpretation by the California courts. The appellee claims for the Section a very limited scope. It urges that the term 'indigent person' must be taken to include only persons who are presently destitute of property and without resources to obtain the necessities of life, and who have no relatives or friends able and willing to support them. It is conceded, however, that the term is not confined to those who are physically or mentally incapacitated. While the generality of the language of the Section contains no hint of these limitations, we are content to assign to the term this narrow meaning.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. And it is settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is 'commerce', within the meaning of that provision.1 It is nevertheless true that the States are not wholly precluded from exercising their police power in matters of local concern even though they may thereby affect interstate commerce. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113, 61 S.Ct. 930, 932, 85 L.Ed. 1219. The issue presented in this case, therefore, is whether the prohibition embodied in Section 2615 against the 'bringing' or transportation of indigent persons into California is within the police power of that State. We think that it is not, and hold that it is an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce.
The grave and perplexing social and economic dislocation which this statute reflects is a matter of common knowledge and concern. We are not unmindful of it. We appreciate that the spectacle of large segments of our population constantly on the move has given rise to urgent demands upon the ingenuity of government. Both the brief of the Attorney General of California and that of the Chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States as amicus curiae have sharpened this appreciation. The State asserts that the huge influx of migrants into California in recent years has resulted in problems of health, morals, and especially finance, the proportions of which are staggering. It is not for us to say that this is not true. We have repeatedly and recently affirmed, and we now reaffirm, that we do not conceive it our function to pass upon 'the wisdom, need, or appropriateness' of the legislative efforts of the States to solve such difficulties. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246, 61 S.Ct. 862, 865, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500.
But this does not mean that there are no boundaries to the permissible area of State legislative activity. There are. And none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its borders. It is frequently the case that a State might gain a momentary respite from the pressure of events by the simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outside world. But, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: 'The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.' Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523, 55 S.Ct. 497, 500, 79 L.Ed. 1032, 101 A.L.R. 55.
It is difficult to conceive of a statute more squarely in conflict with this theory than the Section challenged here. Its express purpose and inevitable effect is to prohibit the transportation of indigent persons across the California border. The burden upon interstate commerce is intended and immediate; it is the plain and sole function of the statute. Moreover, the indigent non-residents who are the real victims of the statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy. South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185, note 2, 58 S.Ct. 510, 513, 82 L.Ed. 734. We think this statute must fail under any known test of the validity of State interference with interstate commerce.
It is urged, however, that the concept which underlies Section 2615 enjoys a firm basis in English and American history.2 This is the notion that each community should care for its own indigent, that relief is solely the responsibility of local government. Of this it must first be said that we are not now called upon to determine anything other than the propriety of an attempt by a State to prohibit the transportation of indigent non-residents into its territory. The nature and extent of its obligation to afford relief to newcomers is not here involved. We do, however, suggest that the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts. Recent years, and particularly the past decade, have been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized not only by State governments, but by the Federal government as well. The changed attitude is reflected in the Social Security laws under which the Federal and State governments cooperate for the care of the aged, the blind and dependent children. U.S.C., Title 42, §§ 301—1307, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301—1307, esp. §§ 301, 501, 601, 701, 721, 801, 1201. It is reflected in the works programs under which work is furnished the unemployed, with the States supplying approximately 25% and the Federal government approximately 75% of the cost. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of June 26, 1940, c. 432, § 1(d), 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 54 Stat. 611, 613, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 721—728. It is further reflected in the Farm Security laws, under which the entire cost of the relief provisions is borne by the Federal government. Id., at §§ 2(a), 2(b), 2(d).
Indeed the record in this very case illustrates the inadequate basis in fact for the theory that relief is presently a local matter. Before leaving Texas, Duncan had received assistance from the Works Progress Administration. After arriving in California he was aided by the Farm Security Administration, which, as we have said, is wholly financed by the Federal government. This is not to say that our judgment would be different if Duncan had received relief from local agencies in Texas and California. Nor is it to suggest that the financial burden of assistance to indigent persons does not continue to fall heavily upon local and State governments. It is only to illustrate that in not inconsiderable measure the relief of the needy has become the common responsibility and concern of the whole nation.
What has been said with respect to financing relief is not without its bearing upon the regulation of the transportation of indigent persons. For the social phenomenon of large-scale interstate migration is as certainly a matter of national concern as the provision of assistance to those who have found a permanent or temporary abode. Moreover, and unlike the relief problem, this phenomenon does not admit of diverse treatment by the several States. The prohibition against transporting indigent non-residents into one State is an open invitation to retaliatory measures, and the burdens upon the transportation of such persons become cumulative. Moreover, it would be a virtual impossibility for migrants and those who transport them to acquaint themselves with the peculiar rules of admission of many states. 'This court has repeatedly declared that the grant (the commerce clause) established the immunity of interstate commerce from the control of the states respecting all those subjects embraced within the grant which are of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation must be prescribed by a single authority.' Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 351, 59 S.Ct. 528, 530, 83 L.Ed. 752. We are of the opinion that the transportation of indigent persons from State to State clearly falls within this class of subjects. The scope of Congressional power to deal with this problem we are not now called upon to decide.
There remains to be noticed only the contention that the limitation upon State power to interfere with the interstate transportation of persons is subject to an exception in the case of 'paupers'. It is true that support for this contention may be found in early decisions of this Court. In City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 103, at page 143, 9 L.Ed. 648, it was said that it is 'as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported * * *.' This language has been casually repeated in numerous later cases up to the turn of the century. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 426 and 466, 467, 12 L.Ed. 702; Hannibal & St. J. Railway Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471, 24 L.Ed. 527; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 478, 15 S.Ct. 154, 160, 39 L.Ed. 223; Missouri, Kansas & Topeka Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 629, 18 S.Ct. 488, 494, 42 L.Ed. 878. In none of these cases, however, was the power of a State to exclude 'paupers' actually involved.
Whether an able-bodied but unemployed person like Duncan is a 'pauper' within the historical meaning of the term is open to considerable doubt. See 53 Harvard L.Rev. 1031, 1032. But assuming that the term is applicable to him and to persons similarly situated, we do not consider ourselves bound by the language referred to. City of New York v. Miln was decided in 1836. Whatever may have been the notion then prevailing, we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence'. Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.
We are of the opinion that Section 2615 is not a valid exercise of the police power of California, that it imposes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, and that the conviction under it cannot be sustained. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to decide whether the Section is repugnant to other provisions of the Constitution.
I express no view on whether or not the statute here in question runs afoul of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution granting to Congress the power 'to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.' But I am of the opinion that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines. While the opinion of the Court expresses no view on that issue, the right involved is so fundamental that I deem it appropriate to indicate the reach of the constitutional question which is present.
The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S.Ct. 14, 18, 53 L.Ed. 97, stated, 'Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States * * * are only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of the national government, or are specifically granted or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States.' And he went on to state that one of those rights of national citizenship was 'the right to pass freely from state to state'. Id., 211 U.S. page 97, 29 S.Ct. pages 18, 19, 53 L.Ed. 97. Now it is apparent that this right is not specifically granted by the Constitution. Yet before the Fourteenth Amendment it was recognized as a right fundamental to the national character of our Federal government. It was so decided in 1867 by Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 39, 18 L.Ed. 745. In that case this Court struck down a Nevada tax 'upon every person leaving the State' by common carrier. Mr. Justice Miller writing for the Court held that the right to move freely throughout the nation was a right of national citizenship. That the right was implied did not make it any the less 'guaranteed' by the Constitution. Id., 6 Wall. page 47, 18 L.Ed. 745. To be sure, he emphasized that the Nevada statute would obstruct the right of a citizen to travel to the seat of his national government or its offices throughout the country. And see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 299, 41 S.Ct. 133, 136, 65 L.Ed. 270. But there is not a shred of evidence in the record of the Crandall case that the persons there involved were en route on any such mission any more than it appears in this case that Duncan entered California to interview some federal agency. The point which Mr. Justice Miller made was merely in illustration of the damage and havoc which would ensue if the States had the power to prevent the free movement of citizens from one State to another. This is emphasized by his quotation from Chief Justice Taney's dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702: 'We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.' Hence the dictum in United States v. Wheeler, supra, 254 U.S. page 299, 41 S.Ct. page 136, 65 L.Ed. 270, which attempts to limit the Crandall case to a holding that the statute in question directly burdened 'the performance by the United States of its governmental functions' and limited the 'rights of the citizens growing out of such functions,' does not bear analysis.
In the face of this history I cannot accede to the suggestion (Helson v. Com. of Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251, 49 S.Ct. 279, 281, 73 L.Ed. 683; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 444, 56 S.Ct. 252, 265, 80 L.Ed. 299, 102 A.L.R. 54) that the commerce clause is the appropriate explanation of Crandall v. Nevada, supra. Two of the Justices in that case expressly put the decision on the commerce clause; the others put it on the broader ground of rights of national citizenship, Mr. Justice Miller stating that 'we do not concede that the question before us is to be determined' by the commerce clause. Id., 6 Wall. page 43, 18 L.Ed. 745. On that broader ground it should continue to rest.
To be sure, there are expressions in the cases that this right of free movement of persons is an incident of state citizenship protected against discriminatory state action by Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. Corfield v. Coryell, Fed.Cas.No.3,230, 4 Wash. C.C. 371, 381; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall, 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430, 20 L.Ed. 449; United States v. Wheeler, supra, 254 U.S. pages 298, 299, 41 S.Ct. pages 135, 136, 65 L.Ed. 270. Under the dicta of those cases the statute in the instant case would not survive, since California is curtailing only the free movement of indigents who are non-residents of that State. But the thrust of the Crandall case is deeper. Mr. Justice Miller adverted to Corfield v. Coryell, Paul v. Virginia, and Ward v. Maryland, when he stated in the Slaughter-House Cases that the right protected by the Crandall case was a right of national citizenship arising from the 'implied guarantees' of the Constitution. 16 Wall. at pages 75-79, 21 L.Ed. 394. But his failure to classify that right as one of state citizenship protected solely by Art. IV, sec. 2, underscores his view that the free movement of persons throughout this nation was a right of national citizenship. It likewise emphasizes that Art. IV, Sec. 2, whatever its reach, is primarily concerned with the incidents of residence (the matter involved in United States v. Wheeler, supra) and the exercise of rights within a State, so that a citizen of one State is not in a 'condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another state.' Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256, 19 S.Ct. 165, 172, 43 L.Ed. 432. Furthermore, Art. IV, Sec. 2, cannot explain the Crandall decision. The statute in that case applied to citizens of Nevada as well as to citizens of other States. That is to say Nevada was not 'discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its own.' Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 511, 59 S.Ct. 954, 962, 83 L.Ed. 1423, and cases cited. Thus it is plain that the right of free ingress and egress rises to a higher constitutional dignity than that afforded by state citizenship.
The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national citizenship stands on firm historical ground. If a state tax on that movement, as in the Crandall case, is invalid, a fortiori a state statute which obstructs or in substance prevents that movement must fall. That result necessarily follows unless perchance a State can curtail the right of free movement of those who are poor or destitute. But to allow such an exception to be engrafted on the rights of national citizenship would be to contravene every conception of national unity. It would also introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government. It would permit those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom of opportunity. The result would be a substantial dilution of the rights of national citizenship, a serious impairment of the principles of equality. Since the state statute here challenged involves such consequences, it runs afoul of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I concur in the result reached by the Court, and I agree that the grounds of its decision are permissible ones under applicable authorities. But the migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he possesses nothing that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights. I turn, therefore, away from principles by which commerce is regulated to that clause of the Constitution by virtue of which Duncan is a citizen of the United States and which forbids any state to abridge his privileges or immunities as such.
While instances of valid 'privileges or immunities' must be but few, I am convinced that this is one. I do not ignore or belittle the difficulties of what has been characterized by this Court as an 'almost forgotten' clause. But the difficulty of the task does not excuse us from giving these general and abstract words whatever of specific content and concreteness they will bear as we mark out their application, case by case. That is the method of the common law, and it has been the method of this Court with other no less general statements in our fundamental law. This Court has not been timorous about giving concrete meaning to such obscure and vagrant phrases as 'due process,' 'general welfare,' 'equal protection,' or even 'commerce among the several States.' But it has always hesitated to give any real meaning to the privileges and immunities clause lest it improvidently give too much.
This Court should, however, hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring two kinds of citizenship is discriminating. It is: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' While it thus establishes national citizenship from the mere circumstance of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, birth within a state does not establish citizenship thereof. State citizenship is ephemeral. It results only from residence and is gained or lost therewith. That choice of residence was subject to local approval is contrary to the inescapable implications of the westward movement of our civilization.
Even as to an alien who had 'been admitted to the United States under the Federal law,' this Court, through Mr. Justice Hughes, declared that 'He was thus admitted with the privilege of entering and abiding in the United States, and hence of entering and abiding in any state in the Union.' Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 7, 9, 60 L.Ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann.Cas.1917B, 283. Why we should hesitate to hold that federal citizenship implies rights to enter and abide in any state of the Union at least equal to those possessed by aliens passes my understanding. The world is even more upside down than I had supposed it to be, if California must accept aliens in deference to their federal privileges but is free to turn back citizens of the United States unless we treat them as subjects of commerce.
The right of the citizen to migrate from state to state which, I agree with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, is shown by our precedents to be one of national citizenship, is not, however, an unlimited one. In addition to being subject to all constitutional limitations imposed by the federal government, such citizen is subject to some control by state governments. He may not, if a fugitive from justice, claim freedom to migrate unmolested, nor may he endanger others by carrying contagion about. These causes, and perhaps others that do not occur to me now, warrant any public authority in stopping a man where it finds him and arresting his progress across a state line quite as much as from place to place within the state.
It is here that we meet the real crux of this case. Does 'indigence' as defined by the application of the California statute constitute a basis for restricting the freedom of a citizen, as crime or contagion warrants its restriction' We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. 'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color. I agree with what I understand to be the holding of the Court that cases which may indicate the contrary are overruled.
Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of property into one class free to move from state to state and another class that is poverty-bound to the place where it has suffered misfortune is not only at war with the habit and custom by which our country has expanded, but is also a short-sighted blow at the security of property itself. Property can have no more dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its possession a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where those rights are derived from national citizenship no state may impose such a test, and whether the Congress could do so we are not called upon to inquire.
I think California had no right to make the condition of Duncan's purse, with no evidence of violation by him of any law or social policy which caused it, the basis of excluding him or of punishing one who extended him aid.
If I doubted whether his federal citizenship alone were enough to open the gates of California to Duncan, my doubt would disappear on consideration of the obligations of such citizenship. Duncan owes a duty to render military service, and this Court has said that this duty is the result of his citizenship. Mr. Chief Justice White declared in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378, 38 S.Ct. 159, 161, 62 L.Ed. 349, L.R.A.1918C, 361, Ann.Cas.1918B, 856: 'It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to compel it.' A contention that a citizen's duty to render military service is suspended by 'indigence' would meet with little favor. Rich or penniless, Duncan's citizenship under the Constitution pledges his strength to the defense of California as a part of the United States, and his right to migrate to any part of the land he must defend is something she must respect under the same instrument. Unless this Court is willing to say that citizenship of the United States means at least this much to the citizen, then our heritage of constitutional privileges and immunities is only a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203, 5 S.Ct. 826, 827, 29 L.Ed. 158; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 112, 10 S.Ct. 681, 685, 34 L.Ed. 128; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 218, 14 S.Ct. 1087, 1092, 38 L.Ed. 962; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320, 33 S.Ct. 281, 283, 57 L.Ed. 523, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 906, Ann.Cas.1913E, 905; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 37 S.Ct. 192, 196, 61 L.Ed. 442, L.R.A.1917F, 502, Ann.Cas.1917B, 1168; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423, 39 S.Ct. 143, 144, 63 L.Ed. 337; Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873, 85 L.Ed. 1201. Cf. The Federal Kidnaping Act of 1932, U.S.C., Title 18, §§ 408a—408c, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 408a—408c. It is immaterial whether or not the transportation is commercial in character. See Caminetti v. United States, supra.
See Hirsch, H.M., Our Settlement Laws (N.Y Dept. of Social Welfare, 1933), passim.
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436, et seq., 56 S.Ct. 252, 262, 80 L.Ed. 299, 102 A.L.R. 54.

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Autor MAURICIO, J.C. MORENO, J. ORTEGA, J.M.
Autor LOPEZ, F. AMOROS, S. PUJOLA, M. CARBO, R.
Autor MORATA, A. GOMEZ CORDOBES, M.C. CALDERON, F. COLOMO, B. GONZALEZ, M.C. SUAREZ LEPE, J.A.
Autor MORALES, M.L. BENITEZ, B. TRONCOSO, A.M.
Autor SANCHEZ PALOMO, E. DIAZ MAROTO, M.C. PEREZ COELLO,M.S. CABEZUDO, M.D.
Autor CLIMENT, M.D. ESTEVE, M.D. GARCERAN, C. CORTELL, A.
Autor SAENZ LOPEZ, R. FERNANDEZ ZURBANO, P. TENA, T.
Autor PEREZ OLIVERO, S.J. CABRERA VALIDO, H.M. RODRIGUEZ BENCOMO, J.J. CONDE GONZALEZ, J.E. PEREZ TRUJILLO, J.P.
Autor GOMEZ, M.J. JORRIN, J. SANCHO, E.
Autor PEREZ JUAN, P.M. GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, J. LUQUE DE CASTRO, M.D.
Autor ZAMORA, F. CANALS, R. LLAUDY, C. ROZES, N. AROLA, L. CANALS, J.M.
Autor SALINAS, M.R. GARIJO, J. PARDO, F. ZALACAIN, A. ALONSO,G.L.
Autor MARTINEZ DE TODA, F. MARTINEZ, T. MARTINEZ, J, SANCHA, J.C. GARCIA ESCUDERO, E.
Autor PEREZ JUAN, P.M. GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, J.M. DELGADO, J.A. MAESO, B. RODERO, M?.J.
Autor LOPEZ, F. TESFAYE, W. GUELL, C. GARCIA PARRILLA, M.C. TRONCOSO, A.M.
Autor MARTINEZ SORIA, M.T. ECHEVARRIA EGUIGUREN, G. FERNANDEZ ZURBANO, P. LOPEZ ALONSO, M. DIAZ YUBERO, F. SANZ ASENSIO, J.
Autor BERLANGA, T.M. MILLAN, C. ORTEGA, J.M.
Autor PEREZ PRIETO, L.J. BAUTISTA ORTIN, A.B. MARTINEZ CUTILLAS, A. LOPEZ ROCA, J.M. GOMEZ PLAZA, E.
Autor FERNANDEZ SIMON, B. CADAHIA, E.
Autor AYESTARAN, B. LEON, D. GUADALUPE, Z.
Autor ORTIN, N. FERREIRA, V. CACHO, J.
Autor LOPEZ, F. MORALES, L. MEDINA, F. GUELL, C. TRONCOSO, A.M.
Autor RODRIGUEZ, M.C. GUILLEN, D.A. BARROSO, C.G.
Autor NAVASCUES, E. RASINES, G. CALDERON, F.
Autor ROJO, B. CALVO DE LA BANDA, M.T. TORRES, C. RUIZ LARREA, F.
Autor RIU, M. MESTRES, M. BUSTO, O. GUASCH, J.
Autor MARTI, M.P. BOQUE, R. BUSTO, O. GUASCH, J.
Autor ARROYO, T. CABELLOS, J.M. GIL, M.
Autor NATERA, R. CASTRO, R. MORENO, M.V.G. HERNADEZ, J. BARROSO, G.
Autor GONZALEZ, A. HIERRO, N. CHIVA, R. POBLET, M. ROZES, N. MAS, A. GUILLAMON, J.M.
Autor LUIS DEL RIO, S. VILA CRESPO, J. SAN MARTIN FERNANDEZ, R.
Autor HERNANDEZ ORTE, P. IBARZ, M.J. CACHO, J. PELLERIN, P. SOTO, F. FERREIRA, V.
Autor RAMIREZ, M. ALVAREZ, M.L. ZAMORA, E. COTILLA, P.
Autor SANTAMARIA AQUILUE, P. LOPEZ MARTIN, R. GARIJO JIMENEZ, P. EPIFANIO FERNANDEZ, S.I. GUTIERREZ VIGUERA, A.R.
Autor LAPE?A, A.C. SANCHEZ, J. ASTRAIN, J. CACHO, J. FERREIRA, V.
Autor AYESTARAN, B. GUADALUPE, Z. LEON, D. PALACIOS, A. ECHAVARRI, F.
Autor MARIN, M?.J. DE MIGUEL, C. ARGUETA, M?.S. RODRIGUEZ, A.M.
Autor SUBERVIOLA, J. CELAYETA, G. GARCAINDIA, J. RECIO, E. SANTIAGO, L. PALACIOS, A.
Autor GARCIA ESCUDER, E. MARTINEZ, H. ZABALLA, O. GONZALEZ, G. VILLAR, M?.T.
Autor DE LA ERA ORTS, M.L. MARTINEZ CUTILLAS, A. PEREZ PIETRO, L.J. LOPEZ ROCA, J.M. GOMEZ PLAZA, E.
Autor GOMEZ, M. HEREDIA, F.J.
Autor VALDES SANCHEZ, M.E. HERNADEZ MENDEZ, M.T. CABO DOMINGUEZ, C.
Autor ESCUDERO, A. ORTIN, N. CACHO, J. FERREIRA, V.
Autor GARCIA, M.J. ALIEXANDRE, J.L. VALLES, S. GENOVES, S. TORRALBA, T. ALVAREZ, I. SURIA, A.
Autor BELTRAN, G. BAIGES, I. NOVO, M.T. CHIVA, R. GUILLAMON, J.M. MAS, A. ROZES, N.
Autor POZO BAYON, M.A. GOMEZ CORDOVES, M.C. POLO, M.C.
Autor MARTI, M.P. MESTRES, M. BUSTO, O. GUASCH, J.
Autor ARAQUE, I. GIL, J. CARRETE, R. REGUANT, C. BORDONS, A.
Autor REMCAMALES,A.F. SAYAGO, A. VIOLANTE, M.D. HERNANZ, D.
Autor LANDETE, J.M. POLO, L. FERRER, S. PARDO, I.
Autor GONZALEZ SANJOSE, L. ORTEGA HERAS, M.
Autor DURAN, D. VIRSEDA, P. MARIN, R.
Autor SIMON, B. PUEYO, E. FAJARDO, M.C. LUNA, N. MARTIN ALVAREZ, P.J. HIDALGO, P.
Autor JARAUTA GURRIA, I. ESCUDERO, A. FERREIRA, V. CACHO, J.
Autor JIMENEZ MORENO, N. GARDE CERDAN, T. ANCIN AZPILLICUETA, C.
Autor ALAMO SANZA, M. CASADO FERNANDEZ, L. MERINO GARCIA, S. NEVARES DOMINGUEZ, I. CARCEL CARCEL , L. NAVAS GRACIA, L.M.
Autor GOMEZ, M.J. GONZALEZ MIRET, M.L. HERNANZ, D. FERNANDEZ RECAMALES, M.A. VICARIO, I.M. HEREDIA, F.J.
Autor SAEZ HERNAEZ, A. MARTINEZ SORIA, M.T. LOPEZ ALONSO, M. SANZ ASENSIO, J. PONS JUBERA, B. FERNADEZ ZURBANO, P.
Autor RIU AUMATELL, M. BOSCH FUSTE, J. TORRENS, J. LOPEZ TAMAMES, E. BUXADERAS, S.
Autor NOVO, M. BELTRAN, G. TORIJA, M?.J. POBLET, M. GUILLAMON, J.M. ROZES, N. MAS, A.
Autor GIL, J. ARAQUE, I. CARRETE, R. BORDONS, A. REGUANT, C.
Autor ALAMO SANZA, M. GARCIA CARRANZA, J. VILLAMUZA MANSO, B. NEVARES DOMINGUEZ, I. CARCEL CARCEL, L. NAVAS GRACIA, M.
Autor ARENA, M.E. MANCA DE NADRA, M.C.
Autor GARCIA ESCUDERO, E. VILLAR, M. ZABALLA, O. GONZALEZ, G. OLIVERAS, C.G. IBA?EZ, S. ROMERO, I. LOPEZ, D.
Autor ALVAREZ, I. GARCIA, M.A. MARTIN, P. GONZALEZ, R. GARCIA, M.J. ALEIXANDRE, J.L.
Autor PUERTAS, B. SERRANO, M.J. VALCARCEL, M.C. PEREZ MAGRI?O, S. JIMENEZ, M.J. GARCIA DE LUJAN, A.
Autor BENITEZ, P. CASTRO, R. GARCIA BARROSO, C.
Autor VAQUERO FERNANDEZ, L. MARTINEZ SORIA, M.T. FERNANDEZ ZURBANO, P. PONS JUBERA, B. LOPEZ ALONSO, M. SANZ ASENSIO, J.
Autor NEGUERUELA, A.I. AYALA, F. ECHAVARRI, J.F.
Autor GARDE CERDAN, T. JIMENEZ MORENO, N. ANCIN AZPILICUETA, C.
Autor LOPEZ MARTIN, R. SANTAMARIA AQUILUE, P. GUTIERREZ VIGUERA, A.R. TENORIO RODRIGUEZ, C. GARIJO, O SOTA EGUIZABAL, C OCON, E. PALACIOS, A.
Títol Isomerizacion cis-trans de antocianos p-cumarilicos en vinos y uvas de Vitis Vinifera L.
Autor NU?EZ, V. MONAGAS, M. SUBERVIOLA, J. BARTOLOME, B. GOMEZ CORDOBES, C.
Autor GARCIA VALLEJO, M.C. GONZALEZ ADRADOS, J.R. GONZALEZ HERNADEZ, F. VEGA GARCIA, R. GARCIA DE CECA, J.L.
Autor FORT, F. RABASCALL, G. MORENO, S. VALLS, J. BAIGES, I. CARRETE, R. AROLA, LL.
Autor HIERRO, N. GONZALEZ, A. ROZES, N. MAS, A. GUILLAMON, J.M.
Autor FAJARDO, M.C. HIDALGO, P.
Autor MARTINEZ CUTILLAS, A. LOPEZ ROCA, M.L. DE LA HERA ORTS, M.L. FERNANDEZ, J.I. GOMEZ PLAZA, E.
Autor PE?A, A. DE MIGUEL, C. ARGUETA, M?.S. RODRIGUEZ, A.M.
Autor RAMIREZ, M. PEREZ NEVADO, F. REGODON, J.A.
Autor ZAMORA, F. VANRELL, G. GERLAND, C. POINSAUT, P. LEBOEUF, D. CANALS, R. ESTERUELAS, M. AROLA, LL. CANALS, J.M.
Autor MONTES, C. ESCUDERO, M?.L. HEREDIA, F.J.
Autor MORATA, A. CALDERON, F. COLOMO, B. GONZALEZ, M.C. UTHURRY, C. SUAREZ LEPE, J.A.
Autor GONZALEZ SANJOSE, M.L. PEREZ MAGARI?O, S.

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Mr. James Mercer Davis, Jr., argued the cause for appellants.
Mr. Franklin H. Berry, Jr., argued the cause for respondent ( Mr. Franklin H. Berry, Jr., of counsel; Messrs. Berry, Whitson Berry, attorneys).
The opinion of the court was delivered by HANEMAN, J.
Judgments were entered in the Superior Court, Law Division, in two separate cases, holding, inter alia, that two ordinances as amended (which, for convenience, we shall hereafter refer to as (1) "fence ordinance" and (2) "dune ordinance") and adopted by defendant were constitutional. The separate appeals, limited to the constitutional issues, which were taken to the Appellate Division, were consolidated. Before argument in the Appellate Division, this Court certified the appeals on its own motion, R.R. 1:10-1.
Plaintiffs are the owners of four ocean front tracts of land in the Borough of Beach Haven. The tracts are subdivided into building lots. The first tract is bounded on the northerly and southerly sides by Jefferis and Kentford Avenues respectively and is unimproved. The second tract is bounded by Kentford and Leeward Avenues and upon this tract plaintiffs have erected a residence. The third tract is bounded on the north by Leeward Avenue and on the south by Merivale Avenue. Upon this tract plaintiffs have erected a small two-story frame apartment house. The fourth tract is bounded by Merivale and Nelson Avenue and is unimproved.
"SECTION 1. Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect, to cause to be erected or to maintain on any privately owned beach in the Borough of Beach Haven, east of the dune line as established by the Borough's engineers, any fence, wall, post, piling, stake, or structures of any sort or which will in any way interfere with or impede any public official, public employee or contractor employed by any public body in the performance of work on any such beach to repair or prevent storm damage, without first obtaining a permit therefor from the Board of Commissioners of the Borough of Beach Haven.
SECTION 2. The permit referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be issued only after public hearing at a regular meeting of said governing body held at least seven days after publication of notice of such hearing in the Beach Haven Times."
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking recovery of damages for the demolition of the fence and challenging the constitutionality of the fence ordinance. Judgment was entered after trial, awarding plaintiffs $300 damages for the fence removal and upholding the constitutionality of the fence ordinance.
At the oral argument before this Court, defendant admitted that plaintiffs had a right under the several ordinances to a permit to erect a fence on their lands from the mean high water mark landward, subject, however, to the condition that the fence be not so designed as to impede or prevent beach protection work, including the passage of vehicles for such purposes. So construed, we conclude that the provision is a lawful and reasonable exercise of police power for the protection of public health and safety. This is especially so in light of N.J.S.A. 40:92-9 which grants the governing body power to protect its ocean and beach front. Cf. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952); Rohrs v. Zabriskie, 102 N.J.L. 473 ( Sup. Ct. 1926); Caldwell v. Saul, 5 N.J. Misc. 165, 135 A. 691 ( Sup. Ct. 1927); Myers v. State, 4 N.J. Misc. 251, 132 A. 335 ( Sup. Ct. 1926); Manning v. Hague, 3 N.J. Misc. 329, 128 A. 375 ( Sup. Ct. 1925); Annotation "Zoning regulation prohibiting or limiting fences, hedges or the like," 66 A.L.R.2d 1294 (1959). No cross-appeal is taken from the judgment of $300.
The fence ordinance thus disposed of, we come to a consideration of the dune ordinance which constitutes the balance of this appeal.
On April 23, 1963 defendant adopted Ordinance No. 63-4 (dune ordinance) which was amended by Ordinance No. 63-5 and Ordinance No. 64-17. By amendment of the above referred to fence ordinance complaint, plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the dune ordinance. The court below upheld its constitutionality. Summary judgment was also entered against plaintiffs in a separate suit challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 64-17 which amended the dune ordinance.
An ordinance to Define and Delineate the Beach and Dune Areas of the Borough of Beach Haven, and Establish Regulations for the Use and Protection Thereof, and Providing Penalties for the Violation Thereof.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE: This ordinance shall be known as the Borough of Beach Haven Beach Protection Ordinance.
(a) It has been clearly demonstrated that well established and protected sand dunes, together with berms, beaches and underwater slopes of suitable configuration and of proper grade and height, are a durable and effective protection against high tides and flooding, and against damage by the ocean under storm conditions, and are the natural protections of the coastal areas adjacent thereto, and the State and its subdivisions and their inhabitants have an interest in the continued protection thereof, and in the right to restore them in the event of damage or destruction.
(b) Said dunes are vulnerable to erosion by both wind and water, but primarily by wind, since its attacks against the dunes are sustained for substantial and frequently recurring periods of time whereas, if protected by typical berms, beaches and underwater slopes, the dunes are attacked by water only at infrequent intervals. The best available means of protecting said dunes against wind erosion is by preventing indiscriminate trespassing, construction or other acts which might destroy or damage said dunes, and through the use of native plantings, supplemented by sand fencing and other devices designated to prevent the free blowing of sand and the maintenance of the surface tensions, root accumulations, normal contours and other features found in typical natural dunes.
(c) The immediate dune and beach area is not capable of rigid definition or delineation, or of completely firm stabilization, so that particular sites, at one time free of dunes, may, as a result of natural forces, become part of the dune area necessary for the continuation of the protection above outlined, and persons purchasing or owning such property do so subject to the public interest therein.
(d) It is the purpose of this Ordinance to define the areas so affected and to establish regulations to assure their continued effectiveness. This Ordinance is declared to be an exercise of the police power in the interest of safety and welfare and for the protection of persons and property.
(e) The erosion of the beachfront during the storm of March 6th and 7th, 1962, has created an immediate and imminent threat and danger to life of persons and property in the Borough of Beach Haven by reason of the destruction of the sand barriers which protect the Borough's oceanfront to the end that it has become necessary to the health, safety and welfare of the Borough to repair, restore, replace or construct protective barriers on both public and private property within the Borough of Beach Haven.
(f) The interference with or the depletion of the beach and sand dunes tends to permit encroachment by the sea and the conditions above recited make it imperative that the governing body regulate and control the removal of sand from the beach or dunes or any other interference with or depletion of the protective barrier on the oceanfront of the Borough of Beach Haven.
Backshore: That zone of the shore or beach lying between the foreshore and dune area, and normally acted upon by waves only during severe storms, especially when combined with exceptionally high water.
Beach: The zone of unconsolidated material that extends landward from the low water line to the place where there is marked change in the material of physiographic form, i.e. dune or bulkhead. Includes Foreshore and Backshore.
Strand: The same area included within the definition of Beach.
Beach-Dune Area: The district set off by this Ordinance, to include the dunes, beaches, strand, backshore and foreshore, and the areas where, according to a normal beach profile, the same would or should exist. The Beach-Dune area, as defined therein has been established by Taylor, Wiseman, Taylor and Sleeper, Consulting Engineers, and constitutes all that area lying eastwardly of the Building Line as hereafter defined.
Boardwalk: This shall include the term `walkway' and shall mean a walk or promenade of planking built across the dune line or berm(s) to connect the street ends or other property with the open beach. These shall be perpendicular to the western boundary of the dune zone, and in no case shall a wooden promenade parallel to or along the beach be permitted. The height, width, length and type of construction of these must be approved by the Borough Engineer.
Dunes: A hill of sand accumulated along the beach front, usually by natural means. It shall extend from the backshore to the line where the normal leeward slope intersects the established grade of the hinterland. Dune Area: The area actually or normally occupied by dunes. For purposes of this Ordinance it shall be construed to include its actual dimensions or according to a computed profile with a height of 14' above mean sea level, a crest of 20' and a leeward slope of 1:5, whichever shall be greater, but not greater than 50' from the average seaward side of the dune crest as computed by the Borough Engineer and provided further that the leeward slope shall in no case be made steeper than 1:5.
Dune Line: This shall mean a row of dunes, which may blend in with a berm, or berms, which blend in with each other, are roughly parallel to the ocean, and serve as a protective barrier against the elements.
Foreshore: The part of the shore, lying between the crest of the seaward berm and the ordinary low water mark, that is ordinarily traversed by the uprush and backrush of the waves.
Mean Sea Level: This shall include the term `sea level' and shall refer to the 1929 Sea Level Datum established by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, or, such other datum as may be established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or other properly authorized agencies.
Natural Dune: A dune created by natural forces, or one that has developed the contours, vegetation, root systems, etc., characteristic of dunes so created.
Natural Vegetation: This shall include the terms `native vegetation' or `indigenous vegetation.' Specifically it shall mean such plants as beachgrass (Ammophila breviligulata), dusty miller (Artiemisia stelleriana), hudsonia (Hudsonia tomentosa), sea rocket (Cakile endentula), seaside goldenrod (Solidago sempervirens), bayberry (Myrica Pennsylvanica), or beach plum (Prunus maritima) which normally grow, or may be planted on the slopes of dunes or behind them; no distinction is made as to how such plants are introduced into their locations.
Sand Fence: This shall include the term `snow fence' and may mean either of two types of barricade established in a line or a pattern to accumulate sand and aid in the formation of a dune.
(a) brush type — This consists of dead bushes, trees, reeds or similar debris collected in bundles and fixed by stakes or similar means.
(b) picket type — This shall be the commercial variety of light wooden fence, held together by wire and secured by posts.
Slope, leeward: This shall be the face or surface of the dune or berm going from its crest or plateau away from the ocean.
Bulkhead Line and Building Line: The lines so designated on maps entitled Bulkhead and Building Line at Atlantic Ocean, Chatsworth Avenue to North Borough Line, Borough of Beach Haven, Ocean County, New Jersey, and Bulkhead and Building Line at Atlantic Ocean, Chatsworth Avenue to South Borough Line, Borough of Beach Haven, Ocean County, New Jersey, both prepared by Taylor, Wiseman, Taylor and Sleeper, Consulting Engineers, dated June 1964 and on file in the office of the Borough Clerk.
SECTION 4. A. This Ordinance shall be applicable to the beach-dune area as hereinbefore defined.
B. No construction of any sort shall be allowed in the foreshore or backshore areas thereof excepting protective works undertaken by the Borough with the approval of the Bureau of Navigation of the State of New Jersey and/or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as applicable.
1. Any use mentioned in paragraph B above.
2. Boardwalks and steps to permit access across the dunes or berms to the open beach, without damage to the dunes themselves.
3. Sand fences to encourage the accumulation of sand.
(a) unreasonably disturb the existing dunes.
(b) be likely to create wind currents detrimental to the existing dunes.
(c) be likely to create, increase, or prolong any other hazard.
The design and construction of any such pavilion or platform shall include any feature, device or provision required by the Borough Engineer to carry out the intent of this Ordinance.
(a) In every respect provide as much protection as the dunes intended to be in such area, in optimum condition, would provide.
(b) Create, increase, or prolong no condition likely to be detrimental to the maintenance of an adequate dune line.
(c) Conform adequately with the overall beach protection plans of the Borough, the Bureau of Navigation, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
(d) No bulkhead shall be constructed eastwardly of the bulkhead line as defined in Section 3 hereof.
The Governing Body shall conduct or require such hearings, and the production of such proofs as it shall reasonably consider necessary to establish the foregoing.
D. Access to the open beach in this zone shall be obtained only across street ends or along properly constructed and authorized boardwalks and steps. Where boardwalks and steps are constructed in street end extensions, access shall be across such boardwalks and steps only.
E. The Borough may erect or require the construction of fencing along the western limits of the backshore and dune areas and provide or require suitable markings to identify the same. Persons may enter such areas only to carry out the purposes of this Ordinance. Where walkways or boardwalks exist, the same shall be suitably bordered with fences to prevent damage to the dunes or berms which they cross.
F. No individual, firm or corporation shall authorize or participate in any manner in the moving or displacement of sand within the beach-dune area unless a permit therefor shall have been issued pursuant to an application in writing to the Board of Commissioners. Said application shall contain the following information.
1. Name and address of the applicant.
2. Location of sand to be moved or displaced.
3. The nature and purpose of the proposed moving or displacement.
4. Proposed method by which the applicant desires to move or displace the same, including a description of the equipment, machinery or other apparatus to be used.
5. Estimate in terms of cubic yards as to the quantity of sand to be moved or displaced.
6. Such other information as may be required by the Board of Commissioners.
1. Adversely affect the littoral drift on the beach-dune area.
3. Interfere with the general configuration of the beach-dune area of the subject property or neighboring properties.
1. The removal of sand from the beach-dune area or from any street end.
2. The removal or destruction of natural vegetation within the beach-dune area.
H. Where by the action of high winds and/or tides, sand is blown or washed upon the lands, including street ends, lying westwardly from the dune line, such sand shall not be removed from said lands unless a permit therefor shall have been issued pursuant to and in full compliance with the requirements set out in Paragraph F above."
Under the amended dune ordinance there is created a Foreshore Area encompassing the lands between the mean low and high water lines. Landward of the Foreshore lies a Backshore Area which extends from the mean high water line to a Bulkhead Line. The Bulkhead Line was established by and is shown on a map prepared by Wiseman, Taylor and Sleeper, consulting engineers, which map is incorporated into the ordinance by reference. Landward and 20 feet distant from the Bulkhead Line lies a Building Line also established by said engineers and shown on said map. The stretch of land lying between the Bulkhead and Building Lines is designated as a Dune Area.
From the mean low water line to the Building Line, no construction is permitted except for fences, sand fences, boardwalks and steps to permit access to the beach over the Dune Area, pavilions or similar small platforms of less than 300 square feet, and bulkheads. Plaintiffs' first tract is almost entirely oceanward of the Building Line. Although the second tract lies on both sides of the Building Line the residence constructed on said tract lies wholly landward. The Building Line cuts through the third tract in such a way as to diagonally bisect the apartment house from its southeast to its northwest corner. The fourth tract of land is completely oceanward of the Building Line. In brief, plaintiffs own property on both sides of the Building Line.
Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance, as applied to them, constitutes a taking of their property for public purposes without just compensation. They rationalize that the regulations are so onerous that the uses to which their lands may now be put are minimal. They conclude that this barring of any real beneficial use constitutes a taking under the police power and is unconstitutional. They argue as well that the ordinance is unreasonable, vague and indefinite both in purpose and standards and hence unconstitutional.
Generally, it must be recognized that private property cannot be taken for public use without compensation. N.J. Const., Art. 1, par. 20; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
Ordinarily the question arises in eminent domain cases where the property has been taken directly. However, the right to compensation has been held as viable where the property has been indirectly taken through excessive regulation under the police power.
"* * * The measures here adopted to accomplish public benefits do not amount to a direct or outright taking, as were those struck down in Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn Township, 137 N.J.L. 630 ( Sup. Ct. 1948), where use of the plaintiff's property was precluded by placing the lot in the bed of a proposed street on the official map; in Hager v. Louisville Jefferson County Planning Zoning Commission, 261 S.W.2d 619 ( Ky. Ct. App. 1953), where the plaintiff's land was rendered useless by zoning it as ponding areas for temporary storage basins in accordance with a flood control plant; and in Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 ( Sup. Ct. 1951), where private utilization of the tract was inhibited for a period of years, pursuant to a statute, by its inclusion in a territory encompassed by an ordinance adopting a general plan for present and future parks.
`The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. * * * We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.'"
The problem of how far a governmental agency may restrict the use of lands without breaching the constitutional mandates against taking without compensation is a most confused and troublesome one. It is unclear from the cases when the economic loss suffered by a private citizen ceases to be regarded as a mere incident of the lawful exercise of police power and becomes an unconstitutional deprivation of property. No plain and catholic formula exists to ascertain the outside limits to which a regulation upon the use of land under the police power without compensation may extend. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 , 163 (1952); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962); Sax, "Taking and the Police Power," 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964); Dunham, "Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective; Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law," 1962 Supreme Court Review 63. We, however, do not reach this problem in the case sub judice.
Here, plaintiffs assert that the ordinance is unconstitutional because if the regulations were enforced against their particularly described land they would be deprived of its use. No objection is grounded on an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of police power because of the lack of necessity for action or erroneous means adopted to accomplish that result. They do not contest either the municipal finding that a condition exists which constitutes a present public danger or that the means set forth in the ordinance for alleviating or remedying that condition are suitable for the accomplishment of that purpose, nor do they suggest any other effective or less burdensome means capable of counteracting the danger. Rather, the contest of the constitutionality is based solely on the impact that the regulations have upon the useability of plaintiffs' lands.
To sustain such an attack, the burden is cast upon a plaintiff to prove that the ordinance unduly burdens his beneficial use of the land. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). It follows that an essential element of plaintiff's proof is the existence of some present or potential beneficial use of which he has been deprived.
Plaintiffs failed to adduce proof of any economic use to which the property could be put. The borough, on the other hand, adduced unrebutted proof that it would be unsafe to construct houses oceanward of the building line (apparently the only use to which lands similarly located in defendant municipality have been put), because of the possibility that they would be destroyed during a severe storm — a result which occurred during the storm of March 1962. Additionally, defendant submitted proof that there was great peril to life and health arising through the likely destruction of streets, sewer, water and gas mains, and electric power lines in the proscribed area in an ordinary storm. The gist of this testimony was that such regulation prescribed only such conduct as good husbandry would dictate that plaintiffs should themselves impose on the use of their own lands. Consequently, we find that plaintiffs did not sustain the burden of proving that the ordinance resulted in a taking of any beneficial economic use of their lands.
Plaintiffs additionally argue that the denial of the right of promiscuous pedestrian crossing of the dunes and the obligation to construct boardwalks or steps for access to the beach are an unlawful taking. The answer to that contention is that the restriction is sustained by the proof as necessary to maintain a dune line and the curtailment of plaintiffs use of their land in that respect is also de minimis, and must be suffered in the interest of public good. Fred v. Mayor and Council, Old Tappan Borough, 10 N.J. 515 (1952).
Plaintiffs also assert that the ordinance prevents the use of so much of their apartment house as lies within the Dune Area. The ordinance was not intended to nor does it apply to the use and occupancy of buildings existing on its effective date and lying within the Dune Area. It is prospective only and relates to construction thereafter undertaken.
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the ordinances result in a taking and hence are unconstitutional.
We have not mentioned Lorio v. Sea Isle City, 88 N.J. Super. 506 ( Law Div. 1965), where a trial court held there was a taking requiring condemnation by reason of governmental construction of a protective sand dune on the plaintiffs' property. Beyond the conclusory statement that the dune denied all use of the land, no facts are given in the opinion as to the nature or location of the property, the extent of the dune thereon or what beneficial use the property was or could be put to previously which is now prevented. We therefore express no view on the result there reached or the relation of the decision to what we have said in the instant case.
We come to plaintiffs' final argument that the ordinances are unreasonable and void because they are indefinite both in standards and purposes.
They point first to the definitions as not setting forth tests with mathematical certainty. Plaintiffs seem to object to the ordinance because the various zones are not described by metes and bounds. The very nature of the subject matter of the definitions prevents more specific language than that employed. The shifting and unstable high water line and Dune Area are not susceptible of more particular description. The definitions are sufficiently clear and definite to furnish adequate information as to what was intended and to act as a restraint against arbitrary enforcement.
The standards furnished by the ordinance for the guidance of the borough engineer in passing upon an application for leave to erect one of the permitted types of construction which plaintiffs secondly argue are vague and uncertain, although in general terms, are also as precise as the situation permits. The ordinances furnish an adequate standard against which to measure official action and to prevent the exercise of unbridled and arbitrary power in the enforcement thereof by the municipal government. See Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117 , 123 (1952); Bechler v. Parsekian, 36 N.J. 242 , 255 (1961); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566 , 581 (1962).
Affirmed without prejudice, however, to any further proceedings based upon a claim and showing of an actual taking of a beneficial use.
HALL, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN — 7.

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The United States is a juristic person in the sense that it has capacity to sue upon contracts made with it or in vindication of its property rights. The Sherman Act, however, created new rights and remedies which are available only to those on whom they are conferred by the Act. 4 The precise question for decision, therefore, is whether, by the use of the phrase 'any person', Congress intended to confer upon the United States the right to maintain an action for treble damages against a violator of the Act.
Decision is not to be reached by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other available aids to construction. But it is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made. 7 [312 U.S. 600, 606] The recent expressions of this court in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 , 149 S., 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 883, 130 A.L.R. 1321, warn that it is not for the courts to indulge in the business of policy making in the field of antitrust legislation. Congress has not left us at large to devise every feasible means for protecting the Government as a purchaser. It is the function of Congress to fashion means to that end, and Congress has discharged this duty from time to time according to its own wisdom. Our function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of Congress.
1. Without going beyond the words of the section, the use of the phrase 'any person' is insufficient to authorize an action by the Government. This conclusion is supported by the fact that if the purpose was to include the United States, 'the ordinary dignities of speech would have led' to its mention by name. 8 It is supported also by the collocation of the phrase in the section. The provision is that 'any person' injured by violation of the Act 'by any other person or corporation' may maintain an action for treble damages against the latter. It is hardly credible that Congress used the term 'person' in different senses in the same sentence. Yet, unless it did, the United States would not only be entitled to sue but would be liable to suit for treble damages. The more natural inference, we think, is that the meaning of the word was in both uses limited to what are usually known as natural and artificial persons, that is, individuals and corporations. In addition, the concluding words of the section give the injured party, as part of his costs, a reasonable attorney's fee,-a provision more appropriate for a private litigant than for the United States.
2. The connotation of a term in one portion of an Act may often be clarified by reference to its use in others. [312 U.S. 600, 607] The word 'person' is used in several sections other than 7. In 1, 2, and 3, 15 U.S.C.A. 1-3, the phrase designating those liable criminally is 'every person who shall' etc. In each instance it is obvious that while the term 'person' may well in clude a corporation it cannot embrace the United States. In 8, 15 U.S.C.A. 7, Congress attempted to make clear that the term 'person' is to include a corporation. The provision is 'that the word 'person,' or 'persons,' wherever used in this act (section 1, 2, 3, or 15 of this chapter) shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.' The very fact, however, that this sweeping inclusion of various entities was thought important to preclude any narrow interpretation emphasizes the fact that if the United States was intended to be included Congress would have so provided We may say in passing that the argument that the United States may be treated as a corporation organized under its own laws, that is, under the Constitution as the fundamental law, seems so strained as not to merit serious consideration. It is fair to assume that the term 'person', in the absence of an indication to the contrary, was employed by the Congress throughout the Act in the same, and not in different, senses.
3. The scheme and structure of the legislation is likewise important to a proper ascertainment of its purpose and intent. Sections 1, 2, and 3 impose criminal sanctions for violations of the acts denounced in those sections respectively. Section 4, 15 U.S.C.A. 4, gives jurisdiction to the federal courts of proceedings by the Government to restrain violations of the Act and imposes upon United States Attorneys the duty to institute equity proceedings to that end. Section 5, 15 U.S.C.A. 5, regulates service in such suits. Section 6, 15 U.S.C.A. 6, authorizes seizure, in the course of interstate transportation, of goods owned under any contract or pursuant to any conspiracy made illegal by the statute. [312 U.S. 600, 608] Thus far the Act deals in detail with the criminal and civil remedies of the Government in vindication of the policy of the legislation. There follows 7, the only other substantive section, giving a civil action for an injury to property rights.
It seems evident that the Act envisaged two classes of actions,-those made available only to the Government, which are first provided in detail, and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages granted to redress private injury. If this be the fair construction of the Act, the Court's task is finished when it gives effect to the purposes of the law, evidenced by the various remedies it affords for different situations. Though the law gave a remedy by way of injunction at the suit of the United States, we were pressed to say that a private person should have the same remedy. We were compelled to answer that Congress had not seen fit so to provide. 9 For the like reasons we cannot hold that since a private purchaser is given a remedy for his losses in treble damages, the United States should be awarded the same remedy.
4. Supplemental legislation lends support to the view that Congress had in mind the distinction between public and private remedies and did not intend to confer a right of action on the United States by the use of the phrase 'any person' in 7. The antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act10 follow the same pattern as the Sherman Act. Section 7311 denounces combinations and agreements between parties importing articles from a foreign country and declares that every person guilty of [312 U.S. 600, 609] violation of its terms shall be punished. Section 74 confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts and authorizes proceedings in equity by the United States to restrain such acts. Section 76 provides for seizure and forfeiture of property imported into the United States contrary to law and 77 gives an action for treble damages to any person against any other person or corporation in the exact words of 7 of the Sherman Act.
It should be noted that 1 of the Clayton Act again defined the term 'person' exactly as it was defined by 8 of the Sherman Act, and 4 again enacted that any person injured by a violation might recover treble damages together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
5. There has been a considerable body of judicial expression to the effect that 7 authorizes an action for damages only by private suitors and not by the Government. 14 While none of the cases presented the exact ques- [312 U.S. 600, 611] tion here involved, the statements bearing on the subject exhibit a uniform opinion contrary to the Government's present contention.
As is well known, after Senator Sherman's bill had been amended, Senator Hoar rewrote most of the bill. In so doing he eliminated 1 with its provision for civil suits by the United States and substituted 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, specifying the remedies, civil, criminal, and by way of forfeiture, available to the United States. In that revision he retained, with slight change, 2 of the bill, increasing the recoverable damages to treble instead of double, and renumbered the section as 7. In this form the bill was adopted.
7. It is significant that, in the light of the expressions by the courts, the supplemental legislation, and the legislative history, no action has ever been brought by the United States under 7 in the fifty years during which [312 U.S. 600, 614] the statute has been in force until the present action was instituted. Down to the close of the year 1937, 428 criminal prosecutions and suits in equity had been instituted by the Government. 20 Down to December, 1939, 103 civil suits had been instituted by private persons, including corporations. 21 In the meantime the World War intervened with the Government a purchaser of enormous quantities of material and supplies. Then, as now, the complaint was prevalent that agreements and conspiracies existed to fix and maintain prices of materials needed by the Government. And throughout the life of the legislation able and vigilant officials devoted to enforcement of the policy of the Sherman Act have not been wanting.
The judgment is affirmed. [312 U.S. 600, 615] Mr. Justice MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In order to give purchasers of goods an opportunity to buy them at prices fixed by competitive trade, the Sherman Act made it illegal to fix prices by combination or conspiracy. It is difficult for me to believe that Congress did not intend to give equal protection to all purchasers similarly injured. In my judgment, no language of that Act, nothing in its history, and no argument now presented for our consideration makes necessary the conclusion that Congress intended to discriminate in favor of some purchasers and against others. It would require clear and unequivocal statutory language to persuade me that Congress intended to grant a remedy to all except one of those who were injured by trust prices- the 'all' including every natural and artificial person, every corporation and association,1 foreign and domestic, and the single exception [312 U.S. 600, 616] being the United States, which buys more goods and services than any other single purchaser. 2 No such clear and unequivocal statutory language exists. And no plausible reason has been hazarded to prove that the government as a purchaser of goods needs less protection from unlawful combinations than do other buyers. 3 Many deplorable instances in our history, in fact, indicate the contrary. Congress, no doubt stimulated to action by these historical occurrences, has by numerous enactments recognized the urgent necessity for safeguarding governmental purchases of goods and services against unfair and collusive price-fixing. To that end, competitive bidding as a prerequisite to government contracts has been the general statutory rule over a long period of years, and combinations to deprive the government of the advantages of such competition have been made criminal. It is therefore strange indeed that the Sherman Act, the greatest of all legislative efforts to make competition, not combination, the law of trade, should now be found to afford a greater protection against collusive price-fixing to every other buyer in the United States than is afforded to the United States itself.
So much for what seems to me to be the logical approach to the problem, and the one that should cause us to say that the government can sue for damages. If, however, we apply familiar canons of construction, I think we are led to the same result. For it is a primary principle that a law should be construed so as to carry [312 U.S. 600, 617] out its purpose, in the light of the evil aimed at and the protection intended to be afforded. Here, among the evils legislated against was price-fixing by combination, and among the remedies afforded was the giving of a right of action to purchasers injured by prices so fixed. The result of this case-denying to the largest single purchaser of all goods manufactured and sold in the nation the protection afforded by this legislation-is to restrict the remedy in such way that the evil aimed at is less likely to be suppressed. For the construction given the Sherman Act, insofar as sales to the government and civil damages are concerned, enables those guilty of violating it to elude its provisions, escape its consequences, and defeat its objects.
These particular cases are but facets of a general rule that has long been accepted-the United States can exercise all of the legal remedies which other persons, bodies or associations can exercise, both at common law and under statutes,7 unless there is something in a statute or in its history to indicate an intent to deprive the United States of that right. 8 In this case, nothing in the Sherman Act itself and nothing in its legislative history makes necessary the conclusion that Congress intended to withhold from the United States a remedy given to all other purchasers. 9 Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the judgment below should be reversed.
[ Footnote 1 ] Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 210, 15 U.S.C.A. 15 note.
[ Footnote 2 ] D.C., 31 F.Supp. 848.
[ Footnote 3 ] 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 413.
[ Footnote 4 ] Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174 , 35 S.Ct. 398, 401, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 118; Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 , 36 S.Ct. 233, 234; Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 593 , 41 S.Ct. 209, 210.
[ Footnote 5 ] In re Fox, 52 N.Y. 530, 11 Am.Rep. 751; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 , 321.
[ Footnote 6 ] See Levy v. M'Cartee, 6 Pet. 102, 110; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 565; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 , 54 S.Ct. 725, 727; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 , 58 S.Ct. 275.
[ Footnote 7 ] The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354, 364 , 20 S.Ct. 138, 141; Dewey v. United States, 178 U.S. 510, 519 , 520 S., 20 S.Ct. 981, 984; Pirie v. Chicago T. & T. Co., 182 U.S. 438, 451 , 21 S.Ct. 906, 911; White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551 , 552 S., 24 S.Ct. 171, 172; Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 , 45 S.Ct. 188, 190; Helvering v. Oregon L.I.Co., 311 U.S. 267, 272 , 61 S.Ct. 207, 209.
[ Footnote 8 ] Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318 , 45 S.Ct. 549, 550.
[ Footnote 9 ] Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 71 , 24 S.Ct. 598, 604; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 , 37 S.Ct. 718. The Act was amended to authorize suits for injunctions by private litigants. See the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737, 15 U.S.C. 26, 15 U.S.C.A. 26.
[ Footnote 10 ] Act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, 28 Stat. 509, as amended by Act of Feb. 12, 1913, c. 40, 37 Stat. 667, 15 U.S.C. 8, 15 U.S.C.A. 8.
[ Footnote 11 ] 28 Stat. 570, 37 Stat. 667.
[ Footnote 12 ] Act of September 8, 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 798, 15 U.S.C. 72, 15 U.S.C.A. 72.
[ Footnote 13 ] Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730.
[ Footnote 14 ] Pidcock v. Harrington, C.C., 64 F. 821, 822; Lowenstein v. Evans, C.C., 69 F. 908, 911; Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, C.C., 77 F. 1, 3; City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry, C.C., 101 F. 900, 904; Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 , 33 S.Ct. 9, 16; United States v. Patterson, D.C., 201 F. 697, 714; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan So. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286 , 43 S.Ct. 106, 116; Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 4 Cir., 72 F.2d 885, 889; Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, D.C ., 35 F.Supp. 949, 950; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 , 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 130 A.L.R. 1321.
[ Footnote 16 ] 21 Cong.Rec. 2563, 2564.
[ Footnote 17 ] 51 Cong.Rec. 13898. Statements by members of the House Judiciary Committee indicate a similar view: 51 Cong.Rec. 9079, 9490. Representative Webb the chairman of that Committee mentioned the civil remedies available under the bill as treble damage actions by persons, suits by the Federal Trade Commission, suits by the United States for injunctions, and similar suits by persons. He then said 'Certainly the remedies are cumulative. The remedies pile up, and all of the remedies are open to the individual and to the government in a suit.' 51 Cong.Rec. 16276. But obviously he meant that the remedies given the public and the individual respectively were cumulative, as they clearly are; for it is plain the remedy given the Federal Trade Commission is not afforded to the individual.
[ Footnote 18 ] Sen.Doc.No. 79, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
[ Footnote 19 ] 84 Cong.Rec. 8192.
[ Footnote 20 ] 'Federal Antitrust Laws', published by the Department of Justice January 1938.
[ Footnote 21 ] 49 Yale Law Journal 296.
[ Footnote 1 ] A 1940 report to the Senate, made by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to a Senate Resolution, revealed that the federal government was transacting part of its business through the medium of at least 1469 government corporations. Senate Document No. 172, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Part 1, p. 4. The judgment here does not foreclose such corporations from suing for damages under section 7, or so I assume. If I am correct in my assumption, the result is that as to those purchases made by its corporate agencies, the Government is protected by the Sherman Act, while as to those purchases made by its non-corporate agencies, it is not so protected. A process of statutory construction which results in giving to government corporations a right denied to constitutionally authorized government departments seems to me to conflict with the frequently declared rule that a statute should not be interpreted in such way as to produce an unreasonable or unjust result. See United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 542 , 543 S., 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 214, 86 A.L.R. 249.
[ Footnote 2 ] For a recent study, see 'Government Purchasing-An Economic Commentary', Monograph No. 19 of the Temporary National Economic Committee ( 1940).
[ Footnote 3 ] An argument is offered to the effect that the government has no need of a right to damages, because it has the power to bring criminal and injunctive proceedings. But the right to bring those proceedings is given to the government for the protection of the public, rather than for its self protection as a purchaser. Further, criminal and injunctive proceedings, whatever their efficacy, do not achieve the object of section 7, which is to indemnify all injured purchasers.
[ Footnote 4 ] Though the Act is all-inclusive in naming those who may sue for damages, it is not equally all-inclusive in describing those acts which may be regarded as unlawful combinations. This is true both because of the original language and objects of the Sherman Act itself, and because of subsequent legislation. The most notable example of such subsequent legislation is that portion of the Clayton Act which provides: 'The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.' 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. 17, 15 U.S.C.A. 17. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 , 60 S.Ct. 982, 128 A.L.R. 1044.
[ Footnote 5 ] It is argued that if the government can sue for damages it may also be sued for damages. That question is not before us and need not be decided. Other principles will be material if such a question ever should be presented. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 , 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. --, this day decided; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 , 384 S., 58 S.Ct. 275, 277; United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315. Among these principles the most important is that of sovereign immunity. 'The sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption against its suability, unless it is clearly shown; nor should a court enlarge its liability to suit conferred beyond what the language ( of the statute in question) requires.' Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 , 47 S.Ct. 289, 291; Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375 , 376 S., 19 S.Ct. 765, 766; United States v. Sherwood, supra.
[ Footnote 6 ] To this statement the Court added: 'If to carry out the purposes of a statute it be admissible to construe the word 'person' as including the United States (cases to that effect having previously been cited), it is hard to see why, in like circumstances, it is inadmissible to construe the word 'resident' as likewise including the United States.' Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 , 371 S., 54 S.Ct. 725, 727; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 , 13 S.Ct. 418, 421.
[ Footnote 7 ] See Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; United States v. Gear, 3 How, 120, 800, Appendix, 838; Cotton v. United States, supra. Cf. Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250 , 31 S.Ct. 155.
[ Footnote 8 ] Cf. Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 , 45 S.Ct. 549.
[ Footnote 9 ] The legislative history of the Sherman Act is not enlightening on the question now before us. At best, all that can be said of the very few and scattered statements that were made on the subject during the debates on the Clayton Act is that they look both ways.

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