A California bill that has emerged from the #MeToo movement and is likely to increase employers’ costs and exposure in defending harassment claims will take effect on January 1, 2019. As briefly discussed in our October 2018 Employment Law Commentary, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law SB 1300, amending the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in a manner that impacts employers in both the workplace and the courts. This Commentary discusses in more detail SB 1300’s changes to FEHA, the likely impact it will have on California employers, and the key issues defendants should keep in mind when facing harassment and discrimination claims brought by current or former employees under FEHA.
Even before the rise of the #MeToo movement, California was one of the most employee-friendly forums—if not the most employee-friendly one—in the country for protections against harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Over the past year, the public and media outcry over high-profile examples of sexual harassment in the workplace have led numerous companies voluntarily to change their workplace policies and practices to protect alleged victims of sexual harassment.
For example, some employers require employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements requiring employees to bring any employment claims in arbitration, including claims of sexual harassment. Given the recent MeToo movement, such mandatory arbitration agreements covering sexual harassment claims have come under attack. Google and Facebook, two of the largest employers in California, recently announced that they would no longer require employees to arbitrate sexual harassment and assault claims. eBay, Airbnb, and others promptly followed suit. Still other California employers may soon face public pressure to carve out certain types of claims from their arbitration provisions. Absent an arbitration requirement, employees will be able to litigate their sexual harassment claims in a public forum, file claims on behalf of similarly situated employees based on allegedly common harassment practices in the workplace, and potentially use the media and other forms of public pressure to their advantage.
Further, last month, in response to the allegations asserted against former Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Alex Kozinski, the Ninth Circuit announced that it had created a new position of director of workplace relations to address workplace harassment issues in its courts. With the Ninth Circuit taking this unprecedented step to prevent and resolve workplace harassment within its workforce, Ninth Circuit judges may very well expect the same from private employers appearing in its courts. It also can reasonably be expected that the California federal courts will take plaintiffs’ claims of harassment and discrimination even more seriously than before.
SB 1300 is part of the California legislature’s efforts to ensure that as many California employers as possible provide more robust and expansive protections for their employees in the workplace. While many employers want to protect their employees against sexual harassment, SB 1300 greatly increases the potential liability from harassment and discrimination claims than ever before.
Although legislative findings and declarations are generally not binding on courts, the California legislature’s largely unprecedented act of adding a standalone code section to FEHA for the sole purpose of expressing its understanding of the appropriate legal standards surrounding harassment claims may have more force than usual. As we have seen over the past year, increased media, public, and legislative attention on workplace conditions arising from the #MeToo movement has time and again led to significant change. At a minimum, plaintiffs will rely heavily on Government Code § 12923 and the cases explicitly affirmed by the legislature in support of their harassment claims, especially when opposing summary judgment motions from employers. While a defendant’s likelihood of success in defending against harassment claims will, to a certain extent, still come down to the judge, arbitrator, or administrative agency official assigned to the case, it is hard to imagine how overall SB 1300 will not result in increased costs and exposure for employers facing harassment claims in California.
Before SB 1300, employers could be liable for the acts of nonemployees with respect to sexual harassment only. SB 1300, however, amends Government Code § 12940(j)(1) to now expose employers to potential liability for the actions of nonemployees for all forms of harassment.
In light of this change, employers should heed the implicit recommendations by the Legislature in Government Code § 12950.2 authorizing employers to provide bystander intervention training in order to motivate bystanders to take action when they observe problematic behaviors in the workplace. The development and provision of this type of bystander intervention training may be costly for employers in the short run, but also could result in significant savings in costs, time, and resources down the road by preventing the filing of lawsuits.
Before SB 1300, courts were authorized under FEHA and California Code of Civil Procedure § 998 to award the prevailing party in a lawsuit—whether the plaintiff or the defendant—reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees. SB 1300, however, makes the award of attorneys’ fees now one-sided. Beginning January 1, 2019, prevailing defendants are prohibited from being awarded fees and costs unless the court finds that the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Gov. Code § 12965(b). Needless to say, this is an extremely high standard for employers to meet to recover attorneys’ fees and costs, and SB 1300 therefore effectively eliminates the advantages to defendants of making Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offers to plaintiffs in FEHA cases.
Finally, the impact of SB 1300 does not just extend to the courtroom. Beginning January 1, 2019, employers will be prohibited from requiring employees to sign either releases of FEHA claims or nondisparagment agreements, in exchange for a bonus, a raise, employment, or continued employment. Gov. Code § 12964.5. This prohibition, however, does not apply to negotiated settlement agreements between an employer and employee to resolve a lawsuit, administrative agency complaint, or internal complaint. Nevertheless, employers will have to ensure that their standard agreements comply with these new prohibitions, and can no longer take certain pre-litigation actions to try to avoid the filing of lawsuits by current and former employees.
With SB 1300 taking effect on January 1, 2019, employers should think hard about how these significant changes to FEHA could impact the way they litigate harassment claims in California courts. Being less likely to prevail on summary judgment of harassment claims, employers may want to reconsider how they approach settlement with current and former employees bringing harassment claims under FEHA. Employers should keep in mind, however, that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed by Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code so that no deductions can be made for either (1) settlements or payments related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse claims if they are made subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees related to such settlements or payments.
But employers should not stop there. The best defense against harassment and other FEHA-related claims is to try to prevent as many problems from arising in the workplace as possible. With the increased costs of litigation that SB 1300 will usher in, employers should ask whether the harassment and discrimination trainings provided are sufficient, analyze whether their employee handbooks, internal complaint procedures, and other policies are sufficiently robust, and ensure that their agreements and business practices are in full compliance with SB 1300 and other recently enacted employment laws in California.
 Employers’ use of mandatory arbitration agreements also seems to be on the rise given the Supreme Court’s approval of the use of class action waivers. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); May 2018 Employment Law Commentary.
 Google, Company Announcements: A note to our employees, available at https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/note-our-employees/; Douglas MacMillan, “Facebook to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual-Harassment Claims,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, 2018, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-to-end-forced-arbitration-for-sexual-harassment-claims-1541799129.
 United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, News Release: Ninth Circuit Announces Appointment of First Director of Workplace Relations, http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/ce9/2018/05/21/R2_Judicial_Council_Workplace_Initiative.pdf.
 See, e.g., SB 820, SB 826, SB 1343, AB 2770, AB 3109.


(1) Has completed an American Dental Association accredited postgraduate general dentistry or specialty residency program which included specific training in oral conscious sedation.
(2) Has completed a minimum of 16 hours' training in oral conscious sedation in a course approved by the board.
(3) Has certification of training in oral conscious sedation by any entity or organization approved by the board.
§ 34-9-82. Requirements for treatment.
(1) Patients to be treated under oral conscious sedation must be suitably evaluated prior to the start of any sedation procedure. Using the American Society of Anesthesiologists Patient Physical Status classifications the dentist should determine that the patient is an appropriate candidate for oral conscious sedation.
(2) The patient or guardian must be advised regarding the procedure associated with the delivery of any sedative agents and the appropriate written informed consent should be obtained.
(3) Inhalation equipment used in conjunction with oral conscious sedation must be evaluated prior to use on each patient. Determination of adequate oxygen supply must be completed prior to use with each patient.
(4) Appropriate verbal or written preoperative and postoperative instructions must be given to the patient or guardian.
(5) Baseline vital signs should be obtained unless the patient's behavior prohibits such determination.
(6) Pretreatment physical evaluation should be performed as deemed appropriate.
(7) All medications and dosages used during an oral conscious sedation procedure must be recorded in the patient's record of treatment.
(8) An emergency cart or kit must be readily accessible and must be available for immediate use during any sedation procedure.
(9) The only classification of drugs for sedation to be administered enterally by a responsible adult procedurally outside the treatment facility is minor tranquilizers. Minor tranquilizers (i.e., hydroxyzine or diazepam) do not include chloral hydrate or narcotics.
(10) Direct clinical observation and monitoring of the patient by a staff member must be continuous during the recovery period. The dentist shall assess the patient's responsiveness and must determine that the patient has met discharge criteria prior to leaving the office and the patient must be discharged into the care of a responsible person.
(b) It shall be incumbent upon the operating dentist to insure that the patient is appropriately monitored. A sedated patient must be continuously kept under direct clinical observation by a trained individual. The sedated patient's oxygen saturation must be monitored by pulse oximetry. Chest excursions must be observed and the color of mucosa and skin continually evaluated. Back-up emergency services should be identified and a protocol outlining necessary procedures for their immediate employment should be developed and operational for each facility.
(c) Any dentist utilizing oral conscious sedation procedures must have a properly equipped facility staffed with a supervised team of allied dental personnel who will be appropriately trained and capable of reasonably assisting the dentist with procedures, problems, and emergencies incident thereto. When inhalation equipment is used, in combination with orally administered sedatives, it must have a failsafe system that is appropriately checked and calibrated. The inhalation equipment must have the capacity for delivering 100 percent oxygen, and never less than 25 percent oxygen. A system for delivering oxygen must be available and must have adequate full-face mask and appropriate connectors, and be capable of delivering oxygen under positive pressure to the patient. Inhalation equipment must have a scavenging system. Suction equipment must be available that allows aspiration of the oral and pharyngeal cavities. A stethoscope and a sphygmomanometer with cuffs of appropriate size shall be immediately available.
§ 34-9-83. Requirements for assistants.
Allied dental personnel who assist dentists during oral conscious sedation procedures must be currently certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation. During a sedation procedure, at least one additional person must be present in addition to the dentist. This may be a chair side dental assistant.
§ 34-9-84. Report of adverse consequences.
Any adverse consequence occurring with oral conscious sedation shall be reported to the board as required with general anesthesia and parenteral sedation.
§ 34-9-85. Limits on advertisements.
The availability of oral conscious sedation, if advertised, shall be done without reference to sleep, snooze, or any other expression indicating a total or partial loss of consciousness.
The board, prior to issuance of a permit for oral conscious sedation, may require an on-site inspection of the personnel, the facility, and the equipment to determine if the requirements of this article have been met. The inspection team shall be determined by the board and shall reflect the principles of peer review.
A dentist who holds only an oral conscious sedation permit may not use or administer general anesthesia or parenteral sedation, or both, as those terms are used in this chapter.
§ 34-9-88. Renewal of permit.
This permit must be renewed annually upon payment of a renewal fee.
§ 34-9-89. Treatment of patients under 12 years of age.
(1) The drugs, dosages, and techniques used should carry a margin of safety which is unlikely to render the patient noninteractive and nonarousable.
(2) Appropriately sized emergency equipment must be available.
§ 34-9-90. Violations and penalties.
Violation of any provision of this article shall subject the dentist to the penalties in Section 34-9-18, and no order imposing those penalties shall be made or entered except after notice and hearing by the board as provided by that section. Such order shall be subject to judicial review.
(1) DENTIST. Any person who is a dentist or dental practitioner pursuant to the definition of section 6-5-481, as amended.
(2) PHARMACIST. Any person who is a pharmacist as defined in section 34-23-1, as amended, and pharmacy externs and interns registered by the Board of Pharmacy under Rule 680-X-2.16 of the Alabama Administrative Code.
(3) BOARDS. Individually and/or jointly: the Board of Dental Examiners and the Board of Pharmacy.
(4) COMMITTEE. The Alabama Impaired Professional's Committee.
(5) HYGIENIST. Any person who is a hygienist pursuant to the provisions of sections 34-9-26 and 34-9-27.
§34-38-2. State Board of Dental Examiners; duties - State Board of Pharmacy; duties - Committee; established.
It shall be the duty and obligation of the State Board of Dental Examiners and the State Board of Pharmacy to promote the early identification, intervention, treatment and rehabilitation of individuals within the respective jurisdiction, licensed to practice in the state of Alabama, who may be impaired by reason of illness, inebriation, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, controlled substances, alcohol, chemicals or other dependent forming substances, or as a result of any physical or mental condition rendering such person unable to meet the standards of his or her profession. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "impaired" shall mean the inability of a dentist, hygienist, expanded duty dental assistant, or pharmacist to practice with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness, inebriation, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, controlled substances, alcohol, chemicals or other dependent forming substances, or as a result of any physical or mental condition rendering such person unable to meet the standards of his or her profession. In order to carry out this obligation, each Board, individually or jointly, is hereby empowered to contract with any non-profit corporation, health provider or professional association for the purpose of creating, supporting and maintaining a committee of professionals to be designated the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee. The committee shall consist of not less than three nor more than fifteen professionals licensed to practice dentistry or pharmacy in the State of Alabama, and selected in a manner prescribed by the board or boards. The authority of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee shall not supersede the authority of the board or boards to take disciplinary action against individuals subject to this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall limit the power and authority of the board or boards to discipline an impaired individual subject to its jurisdiction; provided that where an individual is impaired and currently in need of intervention, treatment or rehabilitation and such individual is currently participating in programs or rehabilitation recommended by the Committee, then in its discretion, the board or boards may refrain from taking or continuing disciplinary action against such individuals; and further provided that where the board or boards, upon reasonable cause to believe an individual subject to its jurisdiction is impaired, has referred such individual to the Committee for evaluation, then in its discretion, the board or boards may refrain from taking or continuing disciplinary action against such individual. The board, or boards, may collect or expend such funds as are available to it as deemed necessary to adequately provide for the operational expenses of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee, including, but not limited to, the actual cost of travel, office overhead and personnel expense and compensation for the members of the Committee and its staff; provided that operational expenses of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee shall not include the cost of treatment or rehabilitation programs recommended by the Committee to individuals subject to this chapter. The funds provided by the board or boards, under this section for the purposes stated herein shall not be subject to any provision of law requiring competitive bidding.
(2) periodic disclosure and joint review of such information as the board or boards may deem appropriate regarding reports received, contracts or investigations made and the disposition of each report, provided, however, that the committee shall not disclose any personally identifiable information except as provided in section 34-38-7.
§34-38-5. Nonliability of Impaired Professionals’ Committee personnel, etc., for actions within scope of function.
Any dentist licensed to practice in the state of Alabama, or pharmacist, who shall be duly appointed to serve as a member of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee and any auxiliary personnel, consultants, attorneys, or other employees of the committee shall not be liable to any person for any claim for damages as a result of any decision, opinion, investigation or action taken by the committee or any individual member of the committee made by him within the scope of his function as a member of the committee if such decision, opinion, investigation or action was taken without malice and on a reasonable belief that such action or recommendation was warranted by the facts that were then available. No nonprofit corporation, professional association, health provider or state or county association that contracts with, or received funds from board or boards for the creation, support and operation of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee shall be liable to any person for any claim for damages for any action taken or recommendation made by the Alabama Impaired Professionals' Committee, or any member thereof, or any auxiliary personnel, consultant, attorney, or employee of such committee.
§34-38-6. Confidentiality of information, records, and proceedings.
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memorandums, or other documents furnished to or produced by the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee and any findings, conclusions, recommendations or reports resulting from the investigations, interventions, treatment or rehabilitation, or other related proceedings of such committee are declared to be privileged and confidential. All records and proceedings of such committee shall be confidential and shall be used by such committee, the members thereof and the boards, only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee and the boards, and shall not be public records nor available for court subpoena or for discovery proceedings. Nothing contained herein shall apply to records made in the regular course of business of an individual; documents or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any civil proceedings merely because they were presented or considered during the proceedings of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee.
It shall be the duty of the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee to render an annual report to each board or boards, concerning the operations and proceedings of the committee for the preceding year. In addition, the committee shall promptly report to the respective boards any individual within their jurisdiction who, in the opinion of the committee is unable to practice the standards of his or her profession with reasonable skill and safety to patients, by reason of illness, inebriation, excessive use of drugs, controlled substances, narcotics, alcohol, chemicals or other dependent forming substances, or as a result of any physical or mental condition rendering such person unable to meet the standards of his or her profession and appears that such individual is currently in need of intervention, treatment or rehabilitation. A report to the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee shall be deemed to be a report to the board or boards for the purpose of any mandated reporting of professional impairment otherwise provided for by the statutes of this state.
§34-38-8. Evaluations of professional who is believed to be impaired; report of findings.
If the board or boards has reasonable cause to believe that a professional is impaired, such board may cause an evaluation of such professional to be conducted by the Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee, for the purpose of determining if there is an impairment. The Alabama Impaired Professionals Committee shall report the findings of its evaluation to the respective board or boards.


text:
Artamonova E. V., Galiakhmetova A. T., Andreeva E. A.
This article covers the questions of monitioring the quality of students’ knowledge results in Russian professional education in a context of reforming of the whole system of higher education in Russia. We show some problems connected with the control and evaluation practice and present some ways to solve the allocated problems, such as studying the questions of the control of students’ knowledge results in professional education in the context of his historical formation and development.
1. Larionov M. V., Shadrikov V. D., Jelesov B. V., Gorbunova E. M. The European Higher Education. Problem for Russian higher education. Moscow, GU-VShE Publ., 2004. 524 p. (in Russian).
2. Baydenko V. I. Competence approach to the design of the state educational standards of higher professional education (methodological and methodical questions): methodical manual. Century I. Moscow, ITsPKPS Publ., 2005. 114 p. (in Russian).
3. Putin V. V. Russian development strategy until 2020. The Russian newspaper, 2008, 9 February, р. 2 (in Russian).
5. Artamonova E. V. Exam monitoring of educational achievements of the students of professional schools in the conditions of modernization of education. Tomsk State Pedagogical University Bulletin, 2011, no. 4, рр. 67–72 (in Russian).
6. The concept of the all-Russian system of education quality assessment. Edited by A. N. Lejbovich. Moscow, The Federal service for supervision in education and science, 2006 (in Russian).
7. Bolotov V. A. The evaluation of the quality of education should be independent. URL: http://ria.ru/ratings_analytics/20120202 (in Russian).
8. Bolotov V. A., Efremova N. F. Quality Assessment of Education: Textbook forstudents of pedagogical university. Moscow, Logos Publ., 2007. 190 p. (in Russian).

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -X HASSAN FORD, ORDER Plaintiff, 18-CV-2202(NGG) (RLM) -against- XTRA LEASE LLC,etal., Defendants. -X NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge. On April 13, 2018, Defendant XTRA Lease LLC("XTRA")removed this personal- injury action from New York Supreme Court, Kings County, on the grounds that diversity of citizenship existed among all parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(a). (Notice of Removal(Dkt. 1).) XTRA answered the complaint on April 24,2018. (Answer(Dkt. 5).) On May 1,2018, Magistrate Judge Roaime L. Mann directed XTRA to show cause "why the case should not be remanded to state court" given that "[njothing in the Notice of Removal... or the pleadings furnishes any support for defendant's conclusory assertion that the amount in controversy satisfies the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction." (Order to Show Cause (the "OTSC")(Dkt. 7).) In response, XTRA asserted that Plaintiff had set forth a claim with a sufiQcient amount in controversy, and accordingly requested that the court "deem [that] the removal ofthis matter to federal court was proper within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332." (Resp. to OTSC (Dkt. 8).) On May 11,2018, Judge Mann issued a sua sponte report and recommendation("R&R") that the undersigned remand this action to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (R&R(Dkt. 10) at 4.) Judge Maim found that XTRA had not proven, either in its notice of 1 removal or response to the OTSC,"by a preponderance ofthe evidence, that the jurisdictional threshold has been met." (Id. at 2-3.) She also rejected XTRA's assertion that subject-matter jurisdiction was proper because Plaintiff had not yet objected to removal, as "parties may not waive a lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' (Id at 3.) No party has objected to the R&R and the time in which to do so has elapsed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The court therefore reviews the R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment; s^ Colvin v. Berrvhill. — F. App'x —,2018 WL 2277791, at *1 (2d Cir. May 18, 2018)(summary order); Wider v. Colviru 245 F. Supp. 3d 381, 385(E.D.N.Y. 2017). Finding no clear error, the court ADOPTS the R&R in fiill.^ This action is remanded to the New York Supreme Court, Kings County (Index No. 503157/2018),for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. s/Nicholas G. Garaufis Dated; BrooWyn,New York May J ,2018 NICHOLAS G. GARAIOTS United States District Judge ^ In any event, after Judge Mann issued the R&R,Plaintiff moved the court to remand this action to state court. (Mot. to Remand (Dkt. 11); ^PI. May 24, 2018, Letter Requesting Remand(Dkt. 13).) ^ The court received two motions after Judge Mann issued the R&R. Plaintiffs motion to remand is declared moot by operation ofthis order remanding the case. The court declines to rule on the stipulation of dismissal with prejudice between Plaintiff and XTRA (Stipulation of Dismissal(Dkt. 12)). This stipulation is not self-executing because it was filed after XTRA served its answer and is not signed by all parties who have entered an appearance. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). Thus,the "action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). In remanding this matter to state court, the court acknowledges that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Because the court is on notice as to its lack ofjurisdiction, it has no power to issue an order that would foreclose Plaintiff and XTRA fi reasserting any ;om oftheir claims or cross-claims fi^om this action in future litigation. Steiner v. Atochem. S.A.. 70 F. App'x 599, 599-600(2d Cir. 2003)(summary order)(citing Nemaizer v. Baker. 793 F.2d 58,65(2d Cir. 1986))(finding that a stipulation of dismissal is not void ifthe district court has a "reasonable basis" for assuming jurisdiction); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.. 526 U.S. 574, 584(1999)("[SJubject-matter jurisdiction necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits."); Carter v. Lncoroorated Village of Ocean Beach. 759 F.3d 159, 165(2d Cir. 2014)(stating that a voluntary dismissal ofan action with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits). If Plaintiff and XTRA wish to stipulate to the dismissal ofthis case with prejudice, they may do so in state court.


There is no clear legal definition of “corruption” in Greek Criminal Law; corruption is not only a legal term but also a social phenomenon. A criminal approach to the term, according to the Greek legal theory, includes all improper or unlawful transactions or trading relations, characterised by lack of transparency, and aiming at an inappropriate economic interest. Corruption is therefore terminologically connected with criminal law and specifically with bribery crimes, which incorporate all the aforementioned characteristics. Bribery crimes are described mainly in the Greek Criminal Code (GCC) and, in some cases, in special criminal laws.
The anti-corruption legislation covers an extensive scope of active and passive bribery in the public and private sector such as: active and passive bribery of public servants (Art. 235, 236 GCC) and judges (Art. 237 GCC); trading in influence (Art. 237A GCC); active and passive bribery in the private sector (Art. 237B GCC); several aspects of active and passive bribery of voters and political officials in national and local government elections (Art. 159, 159A, 165 GCC); active and passive bribery of foreign officials according to the OECD anti-bribery convention; active and passive bribery in sports (Art. 132 Law No 2725/1999); and active and passive bribery of national or EU officials against the financial interests of the European Union (Law 2803/2000).
According to Art. 235 GCC, a public servant who requests or receives for themselves or another person any kind of undue advantage, or a promise of such an advantage, in exchange for an action or omission in the future or in the past, within the exercise of their duties, is punished with imprisonment of between one and five years and pecuniary punishment of €5,000–€50,000. If the advantage is of high value or the act is committed habitually or professionally, the foreseen sentence is incarceration of between five and ten years and pecuniary punishment of €10,000–€100,000. If the actions are contrary to the public servant’s duties, they shall be punished with incarceration of between five and ten years and pecuniary punishment of €15,000–€150,000 and, if the advantage is of high value or the act is committed habitually or professionally, with incarceration of between five and fifteen years and pecuniary punishment of €15,000–€150,000. The same punishments are foreseen in Art. 236 GCC for the perpetrator in the active bribery of a public servant.
Furthermore, persons with decision-making or supervisory powers within an enterprise, who fail through negligence and by breaching a specific service duty to prevent a person under their command accepting bribes as a public servant or offering bribes to a public servant in favour of the enterprise, are punished with imprisonment of between ten days and five years. This can be challenging for the compliance and legal departments of an enterprise and may trigger further civil liability thereof.
In bribery crimes, the public sector is defined through the “employee” legal term, which is broader than the one of “public servant” and is described in Art. 263A GCC. For the purposes of Art. 235, 236 GCC (among others) an employee is, next to public servants, any person who serves: in a legal person of private law owned by the Greek State; in bodies or organisations of the EU; or in legal entities of private law which are subsidised by the Greek state or by legal persons of public law. This means that requesting or receiving bribery as an employee of a private company, which is subsidised by the Greek State, is considered to be “public sector bribery”. As a result of this broad definition of “employee”, Greek Criminal Courts have extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of “public sector active bribery” (Art. 236 GCC), when the latter takes place abroad.
Passive bribery is also punishable when it takes place in the private sector, during the employee’s exercise of a business activity in breach of their duties as defined by law, employment contract or internal regulation. The foreseen punishment is imprisonment of between one and five years. The employee requests or receives the undue advantage for themselves or a third person in exchange for an action or omission against his duties. The same punishment applies to anyone who, during the exercise of a business activity, provides or promises an undue advantage to an employee in the private sector in exchange for an action or omission, in breach of the employee’s duties as defined by law, contract or internal regulation (active bribery). The scope of Art. 237B GCC underlines the importance of internal business regulation of an enterprise in identifying and prosecuting the employee’s breach of trust.
The passive and active forms of political bribery are described and punished in Arts. 159 and 159A GCC respectively. This covers the Prime Minister, Minister, Heads of the Region and other officials requesting or receiving an undue advantage in exchange for a future or already completed action related to the exercise of their duties (passive bribery). The foreseen punishment is incarceration of between 5 and 20 years. The same punishment applies to whomever promises or gives an undue advantage to these political persons in exchange for an action or omission related to their duties (active bribery). Not taking part in an election or poll, supporting a specific resolution, or voting in a particular manner in exchange for an undue advantage are further explicitly punished as forms of political bribery in their active and passive form, as hereinabove. Persons with decision-making or supervisory powers within an enterprise, who fail through negligence or by breaching a specific service duty to prevent active political bribery, are punished with imprisonment of between ten days and five years.
Passive and active bribery of judicial officials are described in Art 237 GCC, and cover the officials’ future or already completed actions or omissions, related to the exercise of their duties, in exchange for receiving an undue advantage or the promise of this advantage (passive judicial bribery). The foreseen punishment is incarceration of between 5 and 20 years and pecuniary punishment of between €15,000 and €1.5 million. The same punishment applies to any person who offers or promises this undue advantage to a judicial official for the aforementioned purpose (active bribery). Once again, persons with decision-making or supervisory powers within an enterprise, who fail through negligence or by breaching a specific service duty to prevent judicial bribery in favour of the enterprise, are punished with imprisonment of between ten days and five years.
Trading in influence is punishable according to Art. 237A GCC as follows: Whoever requests or receives, directly or via a third party, any kind of advantage for themselves or for another person, or accepts a promise of such an advantage in exchange for undue influence, that he asserts or confirms falsely or truly, that he is able to exert over political or judicial officials or public employees, so that they commit an act or an omission in the exercise of their duties, is punished with imprisonment of between one and five years (passive trading in influence) and a pecuniary punishment of between €5,000 and €50,000. The same punishment applies to whomever promises, offers or gives directly or indirectly an undue advantage to a person asserting or confirming, falsely or truly, that they possess the aforementioned ability, with the aforementioned purpose (active trading in influence).
Finally, bribery in sports is punishable under Art. 132 par. 2 of Law 2725/1999. It is prohibited to request or receive an advantage in order to influence the result of a sport (passive bribery in sports), as well as to provide or give such an advantage to players, coaches or referees in order to influence the result of a sport (active bribery). The foreseen punishment is imprisonment of between two and five years and pecuniary punishment from €200,000 to €2 million. Were the match to be indeed influenced, this would be construed as an aggravating factor and the act would become a felony (incarceration of between five and ten years).
If the damage caused to the Greek State exceeds €150,000 as a result of the bribery, the punishability of the act is aggravated. The foreseen sentence is lifetime incarceration. This severe legislation applies in most public sector bribery cases due to the low limit of €150,000, and the inflexibility of the Greek prosecuting authorities when estimating said damage.
Crimes which are punished with imprisonment are considered as misdemeanours and crimes which are punished with incarceration, felonies. According to the Greek Arts. 99–104 GCC, the punishment for misdemeanours (imprisonment) is most often suspended or converted to pecuniary penalties. An incarceration may also be transformed to an imprisonment upon acceptance of mitigating factors, and therefore further suspended or (more likely) converted to a pecuniary penalty. Otherwise, an incarceration sentence imposed by the second instance court must be served in prison, but a conditional release of the convict is possible after having served 2/5 or 3/5 of the imposed sentence. In cases of lifetime incarceration, a conditional release of the convict is possible after a 15- or 19-year prison sentence.
In Greece there is no special agency for combating corruption crimes like the British SFO. There are, however, special departments in the Public Prosecution Offices seated in the second (“Efeteio”) and first instance courts (“Protodikeio”) in Athens and Thessaloniki with the competence to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes, primarily in the public sector, according to the provisions of Law 4022/2011. The “Anti-Corruption Prosecutors” of the second instance supervise those of the first instance. They are all supervised and coordinated by a specially designated Prosecutor of the Supreme Court in Athens (“Areios Pagos”). The “Anti-Corruption Prosecutors” may also investigate and prosecute further cases specially characterised by the Supreme Court Prosecutor as “important for the public interest”. Next to the “Anti-Corruption Prosecutors”, the “Financial Crime Prosecutors” are competent to investigate and prosecute mainly tax and customs crimes. It is important to note that in Greece, the Prosecution Office is part of the judicial authority and Prosecutors enjoy a judicial status.
According to the Greek Criminal Procedure Code (GCPC), primary investigation in the pre-trial stage is generally conducted by an Investigating Judge. Law 4022/2011 further regulates that primary investigation in corruption crimes must be conducted by a specially designated, experienced judge (“Investigating Judge of Law 4022/2011”).
Bribery crimes are, by definition, basic crimes to money laundering. This triggers further liability for legal entities that have gained an illicit advantage due to the bribery, according to Art. 51 of Law 3691/2008 (in the current version of Art. 6 of Law 4506/2017), as repeated in Art. 45 of Law 4557/2018. Although legal entities cannot be subjects of criminal liability according to the Greek Criminal Law, the administrative liability described in this provision includes the imposition of an administrative penalty of between €50,000 and €10 million. Further administrative sanctions that may be imposed separately or jointly on the legal entity are: the closing of the enterprise or some sectors thereof from between one month to two years; the prohibition of capital-raising in the enterprise for the same period; the prohibition of opening affiliate stores for the same period; the exclusion of the enterprise from public tenders and contracts with the Greek State or other legal entities of the public sector for the same period.
Money laundering is, in most cases, a felony (Art. 39 of Law 4557/2018) and remains, according to the Greek jurisprudence, a continuous offence. Therefore, it is very difficult for the criminal action to lapse. Furthermore, according to Art. 39 of Law 4557/2018 (in accordance with the previous Art. 45 of Law 3691/2008), money laundering remains a criminal offence, even when the “basic offence”, from which the laundered proceedings derive, is barred by the statute of limitation.
During the last year, Greece has implemented the new Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. The new Law 4557/2018 repeats the provisions of the Directive.
In 2017, Greece further implemented Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union in Greek Law 4478/2017. According to Art. 5 of the Law (equivalent to Art. 10 of the Directive), the Greek State had stated its willingness to establish national institutions allowing confiscated property to be used for public interest or social purposes.
A special Secretariat for the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE) was established in 2018, by virtue of Ministerial Decision No. 242/2018; its mission is to ensure the adequate management of property frozen with a view to possible subsequent confiscation.
According to Greek law, facilitation payments are considered to be bribery and hence not permitted. Greek law and policy regarding “hospitality” is not clear. According to the Greek anti-corruption legislation, there is no specific boundary to distinguish “permitted” from non-permitted illicit advantages. In that sense, any kind of advantage to which the recipient is not legally entitled, can theoretically be a bribe. An exception can be made, however, when the advantage is socially adequate and justified according to the special characteristics of each occasion. For example, it is acceptable for pharmaceutical companies to provide short-term accommodation to doctors, but not to the doctors’ families, when sponsoring a medical conference.
Prosecution in Greece operates under a very strict principle of legality. This means that Prosecutors do not have the ability to choose whether to prosecute or not, when they have adequate evidence regarding the defendant’s guilt.
There is no plea bargaining in Greece and once the prosecution is initiated, a judicial decision must be issued, either in the pre-trial stage or in a court hearing. This rather inflexible system leads to a great number of prosecutions and, consequently, a great number of court hearings. It is, on the other hand, not unusual for a court hearing to end with an acquittal.
There are some special provisions regarding the (Greek equivalent of) crown witnesses and whistleblowers in bribery crimes in the Greek Criminal Procedure Code and the Greek Criminal Code. Specifically, Art. 263B GCC provides some leniency measures for crown witnesses as following: active bribery in the public and private sector remains unpunished if the person, of their own volition and before being examined in any way regarding their act, reports it to the Prosecutor. Furthermore, if the person responsible for an act of bribery contributes substantially to the disclosure of the participation of an employee, they will receive a mitigated punishment and, in some cases, the prosecution may be suspended. The main purpose of these provisions is to punish employees who are, in most cases, public servants, and combat bribery efficiently.
Art. 45B GCPC concerns whistleblowers regarding bribery crimes. This new institution in Greek law, which was created in 2014, refers to persons who, unlike crown witnesses, have not participated in the illicit bribery act and wish to report it. Art. 45B GCPC provides them with the necessary protection, both legal and actual, from the actions of the persons accused for bribery crimes. The whistleblower status is granted by the Prosecutor of the Court of First Instance and confirmed by the specially designated “anti-corruption” Prosecutor of the Supreme Court in Athens.
Finally, in order to achieve efficiency in anti-corruption policy, Greek Law 4312/2014 offers a mitigated sentence, inter alia, in cases of bribery against the Greek State, should the defendant fully compensate the Greek State in the loss it has suffered due to their actions. This law is very important in practice because, if the damage caused to the Greek State exceeds €150,000 (which applies to most cases), the foreseen sentence is lifetime incarceration (Law 1608/1950). A mitigating sentence can therefore ensure the suspension of the sentence until the end of the procedure before the Court of Appeal and in the end, the release of the convict after a shorter period of time in prison.
In recent years, Greek justice has dealt with several serious, cross-border bribery cases, including the pharmaceutical and arms industries. As Greek prosecution and investigating officials had to cooperate with other prosecution officials in the EU and the United States, several cross-border issues arose within the procedure of mutual assistance in criminal matters.
Greek prosecutorial and investigating officials are not familiar with the principle of specialty in mutual assistance in criminal matters. They therefore tend to use the material received by the foreign prosecution office as they wish – and sometimes against the will of the foreign prosecution office. This judicial malpractice (due to a lack of understanding on behalf of the Greek authorities) has been confirmed, both in cases of direct translational mutual assistance between Greek prosecution and investigating offices and foreign prosecution officials (specifically between the Greek Investigating Judge and the Prosecution Office of Bremen, in an arms industry bribery case), as well as in Eurojust-governed mutual assistance between several prosecution officials (specifically in a bribery case in the pharmaceutical sector).
In both cases, the Greek authorities used the mutual assistance material in order to prosecute several persons, without the prior consent of the foreign authorities. In one case, this resulted in the prosecution in Greece of a British citizen for bribery, fraud and money laundering, who had already been convicted in the UK after having pleaded guilty and provided crucial material to the SFO, which was then sent to the Greek prosecution authorities for further investigation. The Greek Prosecutor and Investigating Judge used this very material in order to prosecute the British citizen in Greece, against the expressed will of the SFO!
Defence lawyers and foreign prosecution officials should therefore explicitly provide detailed instructions to the Greek prosecution and investigating authorities about the extent of usage of the material in respect of specific defendants.
According to Greek criminal law, legal entities cannot be held criminally liable. Although the so-called “administrative liability” does have a punitive nature, it is governed by administrative law and the law of administrative procedure. This means that imposed administrative penalties and sanctions can be challenged before administrative, rather than criminal courts.
On the other hand, legal entities can be held as “victims” of a crime according to Greek criminal law. This is very important because in the Greek Criminal Procedure Code, every “victim” of a criminal act (“everyone directly damaged by the crime”) has the right to actively participate in the criminal proceedings and be represented by a lawyer as a civil plaintiff. This is possible through the raising of a symbolic part of the civil claim against the defendant for moral damages in the criminal court. The rest of the claim is raised before the civil courts.
Recently, in several bribery cases in the public sector and the pharmaceutical industry, the Greek State raised such claims as a “victim of the crime”. These claims were accepted by the courts and the Greek State participated in the criminal procedure as “victim”, next to the Prosecutor through the lawyers of the Greek State.
In a recent bribery case against Greek and German officials in the arms industry, who had been employees of two German companies, the Greek State (participating in the procedure as “victim”), invited the German companies to participate in the trial as “civilly liable parties” for the actions of the defendants. This means that corporate entities can be named as quasi-“defendants” in the criminal procedure but within a civil action, raised before the criminal court. A “civilly liable party” is therefore not a criminal defendant stricto sensu, but they have all the rights of a participant in the criminal procedure, aiming to prove the innocence of the defendant, in order to avoid further corporate civil liability resulting from the actions of the defendant. This is a new trend in Greek criminal procedure.
In the next months, Greece will be evaluated by the FATF. Some amendments to the AML legislation are expected to occur.


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1. The practice of substituting for the evidence a stipulation of facts not shown to have received the approval of the court below, is disapproved. P. 358.
2. Upon appeal from a judgment of a state supreme court sustaining a conviction, this Court in this case takes the indictment as construed by the court below. P. 360.
3. Criminal punishment under a state statute for participation in the conduct of a public meeting, otherwise lawful, merely because the meeting was held under the auspices of an organization which teaches or advocates the use of violence, or other unlawful acts  or methods to effect industrial or political change or revolution, though no such teaching or advocacy attended the meeting in question, violates the constitutional principles of free speech and assembly. P. 362.
4. The rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are fundamental rights which are safeguarded against state interference by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 364.
5. The fact that these rights are guaranteed specifically by the First Amendment against abridgment by Congress, does not argue their exclusion from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Appellant, Dirk De Jonge, was indicted in Multnomah County, Oregon, for violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Law of that State. [note 1] The Act, which we set forth in  the margin, defines "criminal syndicalism" as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." With this preliminary definition the Act proceeds to describe a number of offenses, embracing the teaching of criminal syndicalism, the printing or distribution of books, pamphlets, etc., advocating that doctrine, the organization of a society or assemblage which advocates it, and presiding at or assisting in conducting a meeting of such an organization, society or group. The prohibited acts are made felonies, punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.
We are concerned with but one of the described offenses and with the validity of the statute in this particular application. The charge is that appellant assisted in the conduct of a meeting which was called under the auspices of the Communist Party, an organization advocating criminal syndicalism. The defense was that the meeting was public and orderly and was held for a lawful purpose; that while it was held under the auspices of the Communist Party, neither criminal syndicalism nor any unlawful conduct was taught or advocated at the meeting either by appellant or by others. Appellant moved for a direction of acquittal, contending that the statute as applied to him, for merely assisting at a meeting called by the Communist Party at which nothing unlawful was done or advocated, violated the due process clause of the  Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
This contention was overruled. Appellant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to imprisonment for seven years. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, which considered the constitutional question and sustained the statute as thus applied. 152 Ore. 315; 51 P.2d 674. The case comes here on appeal.
The stipulation, after setting forth the charging part of the indictment, recites in substance the following: That on July 27, 1934, there was held in Portland, a meeting which had been advertised by handbills issued by the Portland section of the Communist Party; that the number of persons in attendance was variously estimated at from 150 to 300; that some of those present, who were members of the Communist Party, estimated that not to exceed ten to fifteen per cent. of those in attendance were such members; that the meeting was open to the public without charge and no questions were asked of those entering, with respect to their relation to the Communist Party; that the notice of the meeting advertised it as a  protest against illegal raids on workers' halls and homes and against the shooting of striking longshoremen by Portland police; that the chairman stated that it was a meeting held by the Communist Party; that the first speaker dwelt on the activities of the Young Communist League; that the defendant De Jonge, the second speaker, was a member of the Communist Party and went to the meeting to speak in its name; that in his talk he protested against conditions in the county jail, the action of city police in relation to the maritime strike then in progress in Portland and numerous other matters; that he discussed the reason for the raids on the Communist headquarters and workers' halls and offices; that he told the workers that these attacks were due to efforts on the part of the steamship companies and stevedoring companies to break the maritime longshoremen's and seamen's strike; that they hoped to break the strike by pitting the longshoremen and seamen against the Communist movement; that there was also testimony to the effect that defendant asked those present to do more work in obtaining members for the Communist Party and requested all to be at the meeting of the party to be held in Portland on the following evening and to bring their friends to show their defiance to local police authority and to assist them in their revolutionary tactics; that there was also testimony that defendant urged the purchase of certain communist literature which was sold at the meeting; that while the meeting was still in progress it was raided by the police; that the meeting was conducted in an orderly manner; that defendant and several others who were actively conducting the meeting were arrested by the police and that on searching the hall the police found a quantity of communist literature.
The stipulation then set forth various extracts from the literature of the Communist Party to show its advocacy of criminal syndicalism. The stipulation does not disclose  any activity by the defendant as a basis for his prosecution other than his participation in the meeting in question. Nor does the stipulation show that the communist literature distributed at the meeting contained any advocacy of criminal syndicalism or of any unlawful conduct. It was admitted by the Attorney General of the State in his argument at the bar of this Court that the literature distributed in the meeting was not of that sort and that the extracts contained in the stipulation were taken from communist literature found elsewhere. Its introduction in evidence was for the purpose of showing that the Communist Party as such did advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, a fact which is not disputed on this appeal.
"The said Dirk De Jonge, Don Cluster, Edward R. Denny and Earl Stewart on the 27th day of July, A. D., 1934, in the county of Multnomah and State of Oregon, then and there being, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously preside at, conduct and assist in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group, to-wit: The Communist Party, a more particular description of which said assemblage of persons, organization, society and group is to this grand jury unknown, which said assemblage of persons, organization, society and group did then and there unlawfully and feloniously teach and advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon."
"Turning now to the grounds for a directed verdict set forth in defendant's motion therefor, we note that he asserts and argues that the indictment charges the assemblage at which he spoke with unlawfully and feloniously teaching and advocating the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage, and elsewhere in the same motion he contends that the indictment charges the defendant with unlawfully and feloniously teaching and advocating said doctrine at said meeting. The indictment does not, however, charge the defendant, nor the assemblage at which he spoke, with teaching or advocating at said meeting at 68 Southwest Alder street, in the city of Portland, the doctrine of criminal syndicalism or sabotage. What the indictment does charge, in plain and concise language, is that the defendant presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group, to-wit, the Communist party, which said assemblage of persons, organization, society and group was unlawfully teaching and advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage."
In this view, lack of sufficient evidence as to illegal advocacy or action at the meeting became immaterial.  Having limited the charge to defendant's participation in a meeting called by the Communist Party, the state court sustained the conviction upon that basis regardless of what was said or done at the meeting.
The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who "assisted in the conduct" of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. This manifest result was brought out sharply at this bar by the concessions which the Attorney General made, and could not avoid, in the light of the decision of the state court.  Thus if the Communist Party had called a public meeting in Portland to discuss the tariff, or the foreign policy of the Government, or taxation, or relief, or candidacies for the offices of President, members of Congress, Governor, or state legislators, every speaker who assisted in the conduct of the meeting would be equally guilty with the defendant in this case, upon the charge as here defined and sustained. The list of illustrations might be indefinitely extended to every variety of meetings under the auspices of the Communist Party although held for the discussion of political issues or to adopt protests and pass resolutions of an entirely innocent and proper character.
While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions go to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a "manifesto" advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id., pp. 656, 662, 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of wilfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods. The defendant was convicted of participation in what amounted to a conspiracy to commit serious crimes. Id., pp. 363, 364, 367, 379. The case of Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, involved a similar ruling under the California statute as  extended to the Yosemite National Park. Id., pp. 330, 331. On the other hand, in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, the criminal syndicalism act of that State was held to have been applied unconstitutionally and the judgment of conviction was reversed, where it was not shown that unlawful methods had been advocated. Id., p. 387. See, also, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359.
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243, 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552: "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions, -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra.
These rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the  abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.
It follows from these considerations that, consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
We are not called upon to review the findings of the state court as to the objectives of the Communist Party. Notwithstanding those objectives, the defendant still enjoyed his personal right of free speech and to take part in a peaceable assembly having a lawful purpose, although  called by that Party. The defendant was none the less entitled to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek redress of alleged grievances. That was of the essence of his guaranteed personal liberty.
We hold that the Oregon statute as applied to the particular charge as defined by the state court is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
"Section 14-3110. Criminal syndicalism hereby is defined to be the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution.
"Section 14-3111. Sabotage hereby is defined to be intentional and unlawful damage, injury or destruction of real or personal property.
"Section 14-3112. Any person who, by word of mouth or writing, advocates or teaches the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, or sabotage, or who prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly displays any books, pamphlets, paper, hand-bill, poster, document or written or printed matter in any form whatsoever, containing matter advocating criminal syndicalism, or sabotage, or who shall organize or help to organize, or solicit or accept any person to become a member of any society or assemblage of persons which teaches or advocates the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, or sabotage, or any person who shall orally or by writing or by printed matter call together or who shall distribute or circulate written or printed matter calling together or who shall preside at or conduct or assist in conducting any assemblage of persons, or any organization, or any society, or any group which teaches or advocates the doctrine of criminal syndicalism or sabotage is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than $ 1,000, or by both such imprisonment and fine."

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