§ 97-2 Appointment; membership; term; vacancy.
§ 97-3 Officers; rules for conduct.
§ 97-5 Authority to order rent reductions.
§ 97-6 Effective date of rent reduction.
§ 97-7 Penalties for offenses.
§ 97-9 Retaliatory action by landlord.
§ 97-10 Effect of amendments to state law.
Pursuant to Section 7-148b through 7-148f of the General Statutes of Connecticut, there is hereby created a Fair Rent Commission in the City of West Haven with full powers and authority as set forth in said statute.
The Mayor shall appoint a Fair Rent Commission, which shall be comprised of seven members and two alternates, who shall be electors of the City of West Haven for at least one year. The membership of said Commission shall include two landlords and two tenants. The alternates shall be either one landlord and one tenant or two electors who are neither landlords nor tenants. Of the members first appointed, four shall serve for terms of two years, and three shall serve for terms of one year. The alternates shall serve for terms of two years. Thereafter, members shall be appointed for terms of two years each to replace those whose terms expire. Of its regular membership of seven, there shall be no more than four members of the same political party. Vacancies shall be filled in the manner of original appointment for the unexpired portion of the term. Any member may be reappointed for an additional term in the manner of original appointment.
Members of the Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Secretary for a period of one year. The Commission shall have the power to adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of business within its jurisdiction and shall keep a record of all its proceedings. The Commission may, in its discretion, appoint an Executive Director.
The Commission may attempt, through the process of informal conciliation and negotiation between a complaining tenant and landlord, to arrive at a rental agreement which is mutually acceptable to said tenant and landlord before initiating the formal hearing process. No formal or informal hearing shall be held less than 10 days from the mailing date of a notice of such hearing to the landlord or an agent of such landlord, at which he may be represented by counsel.
The designated members of the Commission shall have the power to meet with the parties, if the parties consent, on an informal basis in a session closed to the public to attempt to reconcile the differences between the parties but shall receive no formal evidence nor make any decision thereon. Any agreement between the parties as a result of said informal conference must be in writing and fully enforceable by the Commission. The informal meeting shall be conducted by two members of the Commission appointed by the Chairman. The Commission members so assigned shall take no part at a formal hearing, if any, thereafter held on the case.
If the Commission determines, after a hearing, that rent charges for any housing accommodations are so excessive, based on the standards and criteria set forth in Subsection B of this section, as to be harsh and unconscionable, it may order a reduction in rent to such amount as it determines to be fair and equitable. If the Commission determines, after a hearing, that the housing accommodations in question fail to comply with any municipal ordinance or state statute or regulations relating to health and safety, it may order the suspension of further payment of rent by the tenant until such time as the landlord makes the necessary changes, repairs or installations so as to bring such housing accommodation into compliance with such ordinance, statute or regulation. The rent during said period shall be paid to the Commission to be held in escrow.
Rent charged for the same number of rooms in other housing accommodations in the same and in other areas in the city.
The sanitary conditions existing in the housing accommodations in question.
The income of the tenant and the availability of other accommodations.
The services, furniture, furnishings and equipment supplied within said housing accommodations by the landlord.
The size and number of bedrooms and whole bathrooms contained therein.
Repairs necessary to make such accommodations reasonably livable for the occupants therein.
The amount of taxes and overhead expenses to the landlord.
Annual return and profits of the landlord's investments.
Damages done to the premises by the tenant, caused by other than ordinary wear and tear.
Whether the accommodations are in compliance with the ordinances of the municipality and the Connecticut General Statutes relating to health and safety.
The Commission shall not have the power to make any rent reduction retroactive. Any rent reduction shall become effective on the next due date of the rent following the Commission decision.
Any person who violates any order of rent reduction or rent suspension by demanding, accepting or receiving an amount in excess thereof while such other remains in effect and no appeal pursuant to § 97-8 is pending or who violates any other provision of this chapter and Section 47a-20 of the Connecticut General Statutes or who refuses to obey any subpoena, order or decision of the Commission pursuant thereto may be fined not less than $25 nor more than $100 for each offense. If such offense continues for more than five days, it shall constitute a new offense for each day it continues to exist thereafter. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and enforce all matters relating to violations under said sections.
Any person aggrieved by any order of the Commission may appeal to the Housing Court for the Judicial District of New Haven. As provided by the Connecticut General Statutes, such appeal shall be considered as a privileged matter with respect to the order of trial. Such appeal shall be limited to the question of whether the Commission acted arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Unless otherwise directed by the Commission or the Court, the filing of an appeal shall not stay any order issued by the Commission.
No landlord shall maintain an action or proceeding against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit, demand an increase in rent from the tenant or decrease the services to which the tenant has been entitled within six months after the tenant has in good faith filed a complaint with the West Haven Fair Rent Commission. The tenant shall continue to pay the amount of rent in effect of the claim of retaliatory action.
Any additions to the state law referring to Fair Rent Commissions will be automatically incorporated into this chapter.


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Fishfighter, LLC. et al. v. Goodloe Marine, Inc. (allision with a partially submerged dredge pipe)(M.D.Fla. 2017).
Fuenmayor et al. v. Sweetwater Yachting (collision)(S.D.Fla. 2017).
Miami Beach Marina Associates, Ltd. v. Everglades 350, LLC (breach of contract and indemnity)(S.D.Fla. 2017).
In re Petition of Alejandro Carro (Limitation of Liability Proceeding)(S.D.Fla. 2017).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Scarano Marine (improperly repaired marine engine)(S.D. Fla 2016).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Restore Const. Group, Inc. & Vue Condominium Assoc. Inc. (damage to yacht paint from overspray)(S.D. Fla 2015).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Hurricane Cove & Atlas Marine Partners, LLC. (S.D. Fla 2015).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Yacht Management Group II and Harbour Town Marina (S.D. Fla 2014).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Weeks Marine, Inc (allision with unmarked dredge pipe)(S.D. Fla 2013).
Quorum Management. Corp., et. al. v. Francks Pharmacy, Inc., et. al. (death by poison of 21 polo ponies)(Circuit Court of Palm Beach County 2012).
PCS Sales (USA), Inc. v. Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P. “C” & Electrical Engineering Enterprises, Inc. (contaminated animal feed)(Circuit Court of Hillsborough County 2012).
Jones Boat Yard, Inc. v. M/Y Samar, in rem (failure to pay for paint job)(S.D. Fla 2010).
American Home Assurance Co. v. RAP Trucking, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2010).
American National Fire Ins. Co., et al, v. M/V Seaboard Victory, etc., et al. (S.D. Fla. 2009).
South Dade Automotive, Inc., v. American Container Lines, L.C. (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Construction Services, Inc., v. Hydroxyl System, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2007).
A.I.G. Uruguay Compania de Seguros, S.A., v. Landair Transport (Fla. 3 DCA 2005).
Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg, jointly doing business as Maersk Line (S.D. Fla. 2003).
Kanner v. Pan American Assistance, Inc. (Fla. 3 DCA 2001).
Royal Insurance Company v. Latin American Aviation Services, Inc., Millon Air Cargo, Inc. (11 Cir. 2000).
Associated Metals v. M/V Star Skarven, et al. (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Avirex, Ltd., v. Hialeah Industries, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Seguros la Metropolitana, S.A., v. Naviera Lavinel, C.A., in personam, Nigerian National Shipping Line, Ltd., and Corvus Maritime, Ltd. (D. Oregon 1989).
C.A. la Seguridad as subrogee v. Delta Steamship Lines (11 Cir. 1983).
Vegas v. Compania Anonima de Navegacion (11 Cir. 1983).

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Is a Restrictive Covenant With a Limitation on "Stories" Enforceable? - Ward and Smith, P.A.
Is a Restrictive Covenant With a Limitation on "Stories" Enforceable?
Consider the following scenario: Your client, a builder of residential homes, purchases six vacant lots in a partially developed subdivision consisting of 100 lots. The subdivision (including your client's lots) is governed by restrictive covenants recorded by the developer which state that "no structure shall be erected, placed, altered or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." (Emphasis added). The term "stories" is not defined in the covenants.
The covenants require that construction plans must be submitted to and approved by the developer until the developer passes the responsibility for architectural review over to the homeowner's association. Your client submits plans to the developer for a "two-story residence with a walk-up attic." The walk-up attic is less than 50 percent of the square footage of the floor below, but it will be heated and cooled and have two rooms, an open space, and a full bathroom. From the street, the house appears to have only two stories, it is similar in overall appearance to existing homes in the subdivision, and it is below the height limitation set forth in the local zoning ordinance. The developer approves the plan and your client builds the residence and begins marketing it for sale.
Owners of lots next to your client's lot complain to the association Board that the new home violates the "two-story" restriction contained in the covenants. The Board sends your client a notice of violation and, following a hearing, finds that the home violates the covenants. The Board then gives your client thirty days to bring the home into compliance with the covenants. Your client wants to build similar homes on the other lots he has purchased and asks for your advice as to how he should proceed. As the late, great Karl Malden used to say in American Express Traveler's Checks commercials, "What will you do? What will you do?"
The issue here is the meaning of the phrase "one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." Is the term "stories" dispositive, or does the phrase "in height" control? While there is no specific North Carolina case on point, appellate courts in several other jurisdictions have considered the issue. In those cases, some courts focus more on the use of the space, and others focus on the lack of concrete dimensions or numerical measurements in the restrictions. In the former, the courts have generally found that such restrictions are clear and unambiguous, while the courts in the latter have found that they are vague and ambiguous.
For example, in Kamphaus v. Burns, Case No. 279962 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2009), the defendant's deed contained a provision that "no structure shall be erected on any lot in said subdivision except one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." (Emphasis added). The defendant constructed a house which had an unfinished space between the second floor ceiling and the roof. The space was accessible by stairs, but covered only a small portion of the second floor. After a 13-day bench trial, the trial court found that the deed restriction was valid and enforceable against the defendant and that the defendant did not violate the height restriction because the house had two stories and some unfinished attic space, not a third story. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals focused on the term "stories" and held that the term, as used in the defendant's deed, referred to habitable living space, not merely any space above a second story. Because the term "stories" was not defined in the deed, the Michigan Court applied the ordinary, generally understood, and popular meaning of the term "story" as a set of rooms on the same floor of a building. The court found that the term "story," as it pertains to homes, means a level of useable living space, and means something more than just space between the ceiling of a lower floor and the roof of a house. Based on this interpretation, the Michigan Court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the deed restriction did not prohibit the existence of the unfinished space even though it could be accessed by stairs and the house towered over others in the neighborhood.
In Holmesley v. Walk, 72 Ark. App. 433 (2001), the Arkansas Court of Appeals enforced a restrictive covenant that prohibited the construction of a two-story home on a lakefront lot. Both parties agreed the restriction was unambiguous, and the court found that the intent of the restriction was to prevent any blockage of the view of the lake. The court also found that the defendant's partially constructed house was a two-story structure and that injunctive relief, which required the defendant to remove two bedrooms, a bathroom, and closet space from the second floor of the home, was required.
In a similar action in California, the California District Court of Appeal enforced a restrictive covenant limiting single family dwellings to not more than "one story in height" when it enjoined the defendant from constructing a garage with a room overhead. King v. Kugler, 197 Cal. App. 2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Dist. Ct. App.1961).
In each of these cases, the courts defined the term "story" as a habitable living space, found the restriction on "stories" to be clear and unambiguous, and held that the restriction could be enforced through injunctive relief. However, several other jurisdictions have found similar restrictions to be vague and ambiguous and, ultimately, unenforceable.
For instance, in Hiner v. Hoffman, 90 Haw. 188, 977 P.2d 878 (1999), the Supreme Court of Hawai'i addressed the validity of a restrictive covenant which stated, "No dwelling shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot . . . which exceeds two stories in height." The Supreme Court of Hawai'i found that the undisputed purpose and intent of the covenant was to restrict the height of the home, as opposed to the number of stories, in order to protect view planes. The court further found that, despite this clear purpose, the drafter of the covenant failed to prescribe in feet or by some other numerical measure the maximum height which homes could not exceed. Based on these findings, the court held that the failure to provide a definition or concrete dimension for the term "story" rendered the restrictive covenant ambiguous and unenforceable.
Similarly, in Metius v. Julio, 27 Md. App. 491, 342 A.2d 348 (1975), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a covenant that used the expression "three stories in height" was ambiguous; in Allen v. Reed, 155 P.3d 443 (Colo. App. Ct. 2006), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a height limitation based on stories could be interpreted more than one way because the drafter failed to provide a numerical measurement for the maximum height of a story; and, in Johnson v. Linton, 491 S.W.2d 189 (Texas Civ. App. 1973), the Texas Court of Appeals concluded that the phrase "one and one-half stories in height" is ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple meanings.
The cases mentioned in this article are just a few of the decisions from other jurisdictions where courts have considered the enforceability of restrictive covenants with height limitations based on the number of "stories." Although some of the courts have found that such restrictions are tainted with ambiguity, others have enforced them. Those courts that have struck down the restrictions appear to focus on the lack of concrete measurements in the restrictions, while those that have enforced them appear to focus on the use of the space. In any event, the results appear to be significantly influenced by the specific facts presented and, in some cases, may have been decided by borrowing a definition for the word "story" from local building codes or ordinances. So, what advice should you give your client in the scenario? Since there are no North Carolina appellate cases on point, the best advice may be, "Proceed with Caution."

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Customers’ satisfaction at the ensured organizations has a strong reliance on the specific execution of appropriated registering from the perspectives of benefit bit and undertaking booking. Disregarding the way that this sort of organizations don’t require customers’ need of information about the particular detail of advantages (e.g., a machine), in light of the way that authority communities (e.g., specialists or server ranches) have arranged, virtualized and interfaced the benefits with the objective that the customers are awed that an earth-shattering machine has just relegated them. Everything considered, fulfilling the assurances determinedly depends upon the specific execution of circulated figuring, especially on the ideal approach to passing on an obliged measure of cloud resources for an enormous variety of or even unlimited errands requested by customers that much of the time ask for speedy organization yet minimal effort. For a reason for depiction in the field of appropriated registering, an errand is as often as possible named a Cloud or isolated into more diminutive Clouds   , and an advantage is frequently conveyed as a VM. This paper is, thusly, induced to enhance the procedures of benefit assignment and errand booking by altogether considering the collections and capabilities of the characteristics and features of Clouds and machines. Midway as a result of different potential attractions of circulated registering, confident promoters defeat to ensure customers in a huge variety of organizations in a large and often, and the ensures as often as possible stable more than adequate.
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Agada, S., Chen, F., Geiger, S., Toigulova, G., Agar, S., Shekhar, R.; Benson, G., Hehmeyer, O., Amour, F., Mutti, M., Christ, N. and Immenhauser, A., (2014) Numerical simulation of fluid-flow processes in a 3D high-resolution carbonate reservoir analogue. Petroleum Geoscience, v. 20, p. 125-142.
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Mutti, M., Eberli, G.P. , Bernoulli, D. and Vecsei, A. , 1996, Depositional geometries and facies associations in an Upper Cretaceous prograding platform margin (Orfento supersequence, Maiella, Italy). Journal of Sedimentary Research, v. B66, n. 3, p. 749-765.
Mutti, M. and Weissert, H., 1995, Climate cyclicity and monsoons in the Triassic Pangea: the sedimentological and isotopic record from Ladinian-Carnian carbonate platforms (Southern Alps, Italy). Journal of Sedimentary Research, v. B65, n. 3, p. 357-367.

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Reab was a citizen of Connecticut, and Barrow of Louisiana.
The facts in the case appeared by the record to be these.
On the 5th of February, 1845, Reab purchased, at New Orleans, from J. R. Conner, alleged to be the lawfully authorized agent of Barrow, 35,000 gallons of molasses, at the rate of twelve and a half cents per gallon, to be delivered at Field's Mills on the Bayou Lafourche; said molasses being represented as the crops of two plantations owned by Barrow, one being called the Myrtle Grove Plantation, and the other being called the Home Plantation, or Home Place. At the time of purchase, Reab paid to Conner for Barrow five hundred dollars.
On the 20th of March, 1845, Reab brought an action in the Circuit Court against Barrow, claiming, for expenses of sending a vessel, &c., and for the rise in the price of molasses, the sum of $3,755.07.
On the 22d of April, 1845, Barrow answered the petition by a general denial, and by denying specially that Conner was his agent.
In March, 1847, the cause came up for trial, when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $3,000, with interest. Whereupon the court entered judgment against Barrow for the sum of three thousand dollars, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent. per annum from judicial demand, the 29th day of March, 1845, till paid; and the costs of suit.
In the course of the trial, the following bill of exceptions was taken.
"Mr. R. R. Barrow, or manager, will deliver to Mr. Josiah Reab, or order, the molasses on Myrtle Grove, as well as the production of the Home Place, or Residence, said molasses to be delivered in casks, to be furnished by the purchaser at Field's mills, and oblige, &c.
"Deliver to Mr. William Patton.
"The molasses has all been shipped from Myrtle Grove and the Residence.
'And after the evidence had been given to the jury by both parties, the defendant, through his counsel, requested the court to charge the jury, that, in order to recover damages for the alleged failure of the defendant to deliver the article sold by his alleged agent, as set forth in the plaintiff's petition, it would be necessary for him to show that a demand in writing, or in one of the other modes prescribed by article 1905 of the Louisiana Code, had been made upon him for the delivery of the article sold, by the vendee, or some person authorized, and that he had been put in default according to the terms of the said article 1905. Whereupon the court charged the jury, that, if they should be satisfied that there had been a sale, and that the instrument aforesaid was a memorandum of the sale, with the indorsement of the vendee for the delivery of the thing sold, and that the same had been presented to the defendant or his authorized agent, such would be a demand in writing under the terms of the article 1905 of the Louisiana Code.
'To which opinion and charge of the court the defendant, through his counsel, excepted, and prayed leave of the court that said exception be made of record, and that he have his bill of exception thereto; which leave was granted by the honorable court, and this, the bill of exceptions of the defendant to the said charge of the court, was then and there signed and sealed by the honorable court.
The defendant, Barrow, sued out a writ of error, and brought the case up to this court.
It was submitted on printed argument by Mr. Downs, for the plaintiff in error, and argued orally by Mr. Baldwin, for the defendant in error.
Mr. Downs, for the plaintiff in error, contended that the judge erred in his charge to the jury, in this: that in stating what was requisite to make the demand in writing a good one, under the 1905th article of the Louisiana Code, he ought to have informed the jury, among other things, that they must be satisfied that, when the demand was made, a proper tender of the price was also made; for this is a necessary and an essential part of a legal demand, so as to put a party in default or delay, to entitle the plaintiff to recover. This the judge did not do, as the bill of exceptions shows. The Louisiana Code requires this formality, as has been frequently decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. La. Code, art. 1905 et seq.; 11 La. Rep. 77, 101.
II. The court also erred (and this question is submitted as an error apparent on the face of the record) in giving judgment for interest on a demand for damages. Interest can be allowed by the laws of Louisiana only on a liquidated demand, and not on a claim for damages. 4 Martin, 620; 2 La. Rep. 580; 4 La. Rep. 129-140; 8 La. Rep. 572.
Mr. Baldwin, for the defendant in error.
1. The only question which can be raised under the bill of exceptions is, whether the presentment of the written order, with the indorsement of Reab thereon, to the defendant below, or his authorized agent, was a demand in writing. As no particular form of demand is required, it is difficult to conceive how this can be denied. See Wilbor v. McGillicuddy, 3 La. Rep. 383; Kelly v. Caldwell, 4 La. Rep. 40.
Conner, who signed the order to deliver, being the agent of the defendant, the order is itself proof that the plaintiff had done every thing necessary to entitle him to receive the merchandise. Consequently, there is no question as to the tender of performance by the plaintiff. If any question of that kind had arisen below, there was abundant proof in the case that the plaintiff had done every thing required of him, and was ready to receive the property; but the exception is taken only to the direction of the judge, that the presentation of this order, with the indorsement of the plaintiff thereon, was a demand in writing.
It was not only a demand in writing, but there was a refusal in writing, which, of course, from its very nature, relieved the plaintiff of the necessity of any further offer or act. If there was no molasses there, it would have been idle to have made any further tender or demand.
The judge did not refuse to charge that a demand must be made and a default proved. His charge is in effect a compliance with the request of the defendant's counsel,-that, admitting the necessity of a demand, it had been proved by the production of the order.
The debtor is put in default by a tender to perform (art. 1907, Louisiana Code) and by a demand of performance (art. 1905). The bill of exceptions alludes only to article 1905, and says nothing about the former. Hence, the instruction only had reference to the demand, and the tender must be implied to have been regularly made.
2. The allowance of interest was proper. The decisions relied on by the counsel for the plaintiff in error were made while an article of the Code of Practice was in force which has since been repealed. That article was as follows (No. 553):-'No interest shall be allowed on accounts or unliquidated demands.' It was repealed by the fifteenth section of the act of 20th March, 1839. Louisiana Acts, p. 168.
Since the repeal of that article, the law of interest applicable to the case is found in art. 1932 of the Civil Code, as follows:-'In contracts which do not stipulate for the payment of interest, it is due from the time the debtor is put in default for the payment of the principal, and is to be calculated on whatever sum shall be found by the judgment to have been due at the time of the default.' One of the modes of putting in default is by suit, another by demand, &c. (art. 1905.) Interest might, therefore, have been allowed from the demand, but, as that preceded the suit only a few days, the date of citation was taken.
No question appears to have arisen at the trial in relation to the interest.
In Porter v. Barrow, 3 La. Ann. Rep. 140, it was decided, on breach of a similar contract to that which is the subject of the present suit, that the court may, in its discretion, allow interest from judicial demand. 3 Robinson, 361.
In Petrie v. Woford, 3 La. Ann. Rep. 562, the court say,-'We have hitherto held that sums due on contracts bear interest from judicial demand, though unliquidated.' And see also 2 Ann. Rep. 878.
In Ryder v. Thayer, 3 La. Ann. Rep. 149, where the suit was brought for breach of contract to ship goods, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to recover the value of the goods at the port of destination, with interest from the time of judicial demand.
See also Enders v. Board of Public Works, 1 Grattan, (Va.) 389, where the court say that, 'as a general rule, the value of the articles to be delivered, at the time when they should have been delivered, with interest from such time of delivery, forms the proper measure of damages in actions for the breach of executory contracts for the sale and delivery of personal property.' 2 Comstock, 135.


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An Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division Investigator made an affidavit stating his belief, on the basis of his own observations and the observations and investigation of other Investigators, that there was an illegal distillery operation in respondent's house. The affidavit described different occasions when a car was driven to the rear of respondent's house with loads of sugar or empty tins; the loading at the house of apparently full five-gallon cans; the smelling by Investigators as they walked in front of the house of fermenting mash; and their hearing the sound of a motor pump and metallic noises from the direction of the house. A Commissioner issued a search warrant on the basis of the affidavit, pursuant to which a still was found for the illegal possession and operation of which respondent was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the warrant insufficient to establish probable cause. Held: The affidavit amply showed facts to establish probable cause to support the Commissioner's issuance of the search warrant. Pp. 105-111.
(a) In a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. Pp. 106-107.
(b) An affidavit for a search warrant may be based on hearsay information so long as the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant involved, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or his information reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , followed. P. 108.
(c) Though in order for a magistrate to perform his detached function of determining probable cause an affidavit must recite the underlying circumstances and not mere conclusions as to probable cause, the affidavit must be tested in a commonsense way. Pp. 108-109.
(d) Since a fair reading of the whole affidavit, which is detailed and specific, setting forth many of the underlying circumstances, reveals that its conclusions are substantially based upon observations [380 U.S. 102, 103] of government officers, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant was shown. Pp. 110-111.
Frank I. Goodman argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer.
Matthew R. McCann argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward C. Maher.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, Ventresca, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts of possessing and operating an illegal distillery. The conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals (one judge dissenting) on the ground that the affidavit for a search warrant pursuant to which the still was found was insufficient to establish probable cause. 324 F.2d 864.
"Based upon observations made by me, and based upon information received officially from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division assigned to this investigation, and reports orally made to me describing the results of their [380 U.S. 102, 104] observations and investigation, this request for the issuance of a search warrant is made."
The affidavit then described seven different occasions between July 28 and August 30, 1961, when a Pontiac car was driven into the yard to the rear of Ventresca's house. On four occasions the car carried loads of sugar in 60-pound bags; it made two trips loaded with empty tin cans; and once it was merely observed as being heavily laden. Garry, the car's owner, and Incardone, a passenger, were seen on several occasions loading the car at Ventresca's house and later unloading apparently full five-gallon cans at Garry's house late in the evening. On August 28, after a delivery of empty tin cans to Ventresca's house, Garry and Incardone were observed carrying from the house cans which appeared to be filled and placing them in the trunk of Garry's car. The affidavit went on to state that at about 4 a. m. on August 18, and at about 4 a. m. on August 30, "Investigators" smelled the odor of fermenting mash as they walked along the sidewalk in front of Ventresca's house. On August 18 they heard, "[a]t or about the same time, . . . certain metallic noises." On August 30, the day before the warrant was applied for, they heard (as they smelled the mash) "sounds similar to that of a motor or a pump coming from the direction of" Ventresca's house. The affidavit concluded: "The foregoing information is based upon personal knowledge and information which has been obtained from Investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, who have been assigned to this investigation."
The District Court upheld the validity of the warrant on a motion to suppress. The divided Court of Appeals held the warrant insufficient because it read the affidavit as not specifically stating in so many words that the information it contained was based upon the personal knowledge of Mazaka or other reliable investigators. The [380 U.S. 102, 105] Court of Appeals reasoned that all of the information recited in the affidavit might conceivably have been obtained by investigators other than Mazaka, and it could not be certain that the information of these other investigators was not in turn based upon hearsay received from unreliable informants rather than their own personal observations. For this reason the court found that probable cause had not been established. 324 F.2d, at 868-870. We granted certiorari to consider the standards by which a reviewing court should approach the interpretation of affidavits supporting warrants which have been duly issued by examining magistrates. 377 U.S. 989 . For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
"An evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that `the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be preferred [380 U.S. 102, 106] over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.' United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 . The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth Amendment." 378 U.S., at 110 -111.
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers." Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14.
The fact that exceptions to the requirement that searches and seizures be undertaken only after obtaining a warrant [380 U.S. 102, 107] are limited 2 underscores the preference accorded police action taken under a warrant as against searches and seizures without one.
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held that "the term `probable cause' . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation," Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 . [380 U.S. 102, 108] As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 , "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [guilt and probable cause], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." Thus hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant "so long as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United States, supra, at 272. And, in Aguilar we recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed . . . was `credible' or his information `reliable.'" Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 114.
These decisions reflect the recognition that the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.
This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the "underlying circumstances" [380 U.S. 102, 109] upon which that belief is based. See Aguilar v. Texas, supra. Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. Jones v. United States, supra, at 270.
The application of the principles stated above leads us to reverse the Court of Appeals. The affidavit in this case, if read in a commonsense way rather than technically, shows ample facts to establish probable cause and allow the Commissioner to issue the search warrant. The affidavit at issue here, unlike the affidavit held insufficient in Aguilar, is detailed and specific. It sets forth not merely "some of the underlying circumstances" supporting the officer's belief, but a good many of them. This is apparent from the summary of the affidavit already recited and from its text which is reproduced in the Appendix.
The Court of Appeals did not question the specificity of the affidavit. It rested its holding that the affidavit was insufficient on the ground that "[t]he affidavit failed to clearly indicate which of the facts alleged therein were hearsay or which were within the affiant's own knowledge," and therefore "[t]he Commissioner could only conclude that the entire affidavit was based on hearsay." [380 U.S. 102, 110] 324 F.2d, at 868. While the Court of Appeals recognized that an affidavit based on hearsay will be sufficient, "so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented," Jones v. United States, supra, at 269, it felt that no such basis existed here because the hearsay consisted of reports by "Investigators," and the affidavit did not recite how the Investigators obtained their information. The Court of Appeals conceded that the affidavit stated that the Investigators themselves smelled the odor of fermenting mash, but argued that the rest of their information might itself have been based upon hearsay thus raising "the distinct possibility of hearsay-upon-hearsay." 324 F.2d, at 869. For this reason, it held that the affidavit did not establish probable cause.
We disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. Its determination that the affidavit might have been based wholly upon hearsay cannot be supported in light of the fact that Mazaka, a Government Investigator, swore under oath that the relevant information was in part based "upon observations made by me" and "upon personal knowledge" as well as upon "information which has been obtained from Investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, who have been assigned to this investigation." It also seems to us that the assumption of the Court of Appeals that all of the information in Mazaka's affidavit may in fact have come from unreliable anonymous informers, passed on to Government Investigators, who in turn related this information to Mazaka is without foundation. Mazaka swore that, insofar as the affidavit was not based upon his own observations, it was "based upon information received officially from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division assigned to this investigation, and reports orally made to me describing the results of their observations and investigation." (Emphasis [380 U.S. 102, 111] added.) The Court of Appeals itself recognized that the affidavit stated that "`Investigators' [employees of the Service] smelled the odor of fermenting mash in the vicinity of the suspected dwelling." 324 F.2d, at 869. A qualified officer's detection of the smell of mash has often been held a very strong factor in determining that probable cause exists so as to allow issuance of a warrant. 3 Moreover, upon reading the affidavit as a whole, it becomes clear that the detailed observations recounted in the affidavit cannot fairly be regarded as having been made in any significant part by persons other than full-time Investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service. Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. 4 We conclude that the affidavit showed probable cause and that the Court of Appeals misapprehended its judicial function in reviewing this affidavit by giving it an unduly technical and restrictive reading.
This Court is alert to invalidate unconstitutional searches and seizures whether with or without a warrant. See Aguilar v. Texas, supra; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 . By doing so, it vindicates individual liberties and strengthens the administration of justice by promoting respect for law and order. This Court is equally concerned to uphold the actions of law [380 U.S. 102, 112] enforcement officers consistently following the proper constitutional course. This is no less important to the administration of justice than the invalidation of convictions because of disregard of individual rights or official overreaching. In our view the officers in this case did what the Constitution requires. They obtained a warrant from a judicial officer "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized." It is vital that having done so their actions should be sustained under a system of justice responsive both to the needs of individual liberty and to the rights of the community.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Based upon observations made by me, and based upon information received officially from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division assigned to this investigation, and reports orally made to me describing the results of their observations and investigation, this request for the issuance of a search warrant is made.
On August 2, 1961 a Pontiac car owned by Garry, and driven by Garry with Incardone as a passenger, was followed from Boston to Worcester. The car appeared heavily laden. The car was again driven into the driveway at 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue to the rear of the yard and between the above-numbered houses.
On August 7, 1961 at least six sixty-pound bags of Domino Sugar were loaded into the Pontiac owned by Garry. The loading was done by Garry and Incardone. The car traveled from Boston to Worcester, then to Holden, and returned with its contents and entered the driveway at 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, where the car was parked at the rear between the two houses.
On August 11, 1961 new empty metal or tin cans were transferred from a car owned by Incardone to the Pontiac owned by Garry on Highland Street in Hyde Park. The Pontiac was driven by Garry with Incardone as a passenger to Worcester, and into the yard at 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue to the rear and between the two numbered premises.
On August 16, 1961 the Pontiac was observed. In the back seat bags of sugar were observed covered with a cloth or tarpaulin. A sixty-pound bag of sugar was on the front seat. Garry was observed after loading the above-described sugar into the car placing a carton with various five-pound bags of sugar on the top of the tarpaulin. The car was then driven by Garry with Incardone as a passenger to Worcester together with its contents into the yard at 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue to the rear of and between the two houses. About Midnight on the same night, the Pontiac driven by Garry with Incardone as a passenger was seen pulling up to the premises at 59 Highland Street, Hyde Park, where Garry lives. Garry opened the trunk of his car, and removed ten five-gallon cans therefrom, and placed them on the sidewalk. He then entered the house, and opened a door on the side. [380 U.S. 102, 115] Incardone made five trips from the sidewalk to the side of the house carrying two five-gallon cans on each such trip. It appeared that the cans were filled. On each of these trips, Incardone passed the two cans to someone standing in the doorway. Immediately after the fifth such trip, Garry came out of the door and joined Incardone. They walked to the sidewalk, and talked for a few moments. Incardone then drove away, and Garry went into his home.
On August 18, 1961 Investigators smelled an odor of fermenting mash on two occasions between 4:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. The first such odor was detected as they walked along the sidewalk in front of 148 Coburn Avenue, and the second such odor was detected from the side of 148 Coburn Avenue. At or about the same time, the Investigators heard certain metallic noises which cannot be further identified by source or sound.
On August 24, 1961 the Pontiac was observed parked at a bowling alley and coffee shop off Route 9. The back of the car contained what appeared to be boxes covered by a cloth or tarpaulin, but which cannot be more specifically identified. On the front seat of the car was observed a sixty-pound bag of Revere Sugar. Garry and Incardone were observed in the restaurant or coffee shop eating. Later the car was seen driven to the rear of 148 between 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, Worcester.
About Midnight the Pontiac was observed pulling up in front of Garry's house at 59 Highland Street, Hyde Park. Garry was driving, and Incardone was a passenger. They both got out of the car. Garry opened the trunk, and then entered his house. From the trunk of the car there was removed eleven five-gallon cans which appeared to be filled. Incardone made six trips to a door on the side of the house. He carried two five-gallon cans on each trip, except the sixth trip. On that trip he carried one can, having passed the others to somebody in the door-way, [380 U.S. 102, 116] and on the last trip he entered the house. He remained there at least forty-five minutes, and was not observed to leave.
On August 28, 1961 Garry drove Incardone in his car to Worcester. On Lake Ave. they met Giacomo Ventresca, who lives at 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, Worcester. Ventresca entered the car driven by Garry. The car was then driven into the yard to the rear of 148 and between 148 and 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue. An observation was made that empty metal cans, five-gallon size, were being taken from the car owned by Garry, and brought into the premises at 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, which was occupied by Ventresca. Later, new cans similar in size, shape and appearance were observed being placed into the trunk of Garry's car while parked at the rear of 148 and in front of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue. The manner in which the cans were handled, and the sound[s] which were heard during the handling of these cans, were consistent with that of cans containing liquid.
On August 30, 1961, at about 4:00 A.M., an odor of fermenting mash was detected while Investigators were walking on the sidewalk in front of 148 Coburn Avenue. At the same time, they heard sounds similar to that of a motor or a pump coming from the direction of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue.
The foregoing information is based upon personal knowledge and information which has been obtained from Investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, who have been assigned to this investigation.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Fourth Amendment's policy against unreasonable searches and seizures finds expression in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[ Footnote 2 ] The exceptions are illustrated by cases in which "seizure is impossible except without warrant," Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 , such as a search of a moving object where "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought," Carroll v. United States, supra, at 153, and those in which search is incident to a lawful arrest. This latter exception is itself a limited one. We stated in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 : "Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused's immediate control, Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S., at 158 , and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested, Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U.S., at 30 ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 -62 (1950). The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime - things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." 376 U.S., at 367 .
[ Footnote 3 ] See, e. g., Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847, 850 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Cf. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 ; Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615, 616, 618 (C. A. 10th Cir.); United States v. Kaplan, 89 F.2d 869 (C. A. 2d Cir.).
[ Footnote 4 ] See, e. g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 ; Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 320 (C. A. 9th Cir.); United States v. McCormick, 309 F.2d 367, 372 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Weise v. United States, 251 F.2d 867, 868 (C. A. 9th Cir.).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs, dissenting.
With all deference, the present affidavit seems hopelessly inadequate to me as a basis for a magistrate's [380 U.S. 102, 117] informed determination that a search warrant should issue.
We deal with the constitutional right of privacy that can be invaded only on a showing of "probable cause" as provided by the Fourth Amendment. That is a strict standard; what the police say does not necessarily carry the day; "probable cause" is in the keeping of the magistrate. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 -487; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 . Yet anything he says does not necessarily go either. He too is bound by the Constitution. His discretion is reviewable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 . But unless the constitutional standard of "probable cause" is defined in meticulous ways, the discretion of police and of magistrates alike will become absolute. The present case, illustrates how the mere weight of lengthy and vague recitals takes the place of reasonably probative evidence of the existence of crime.
Investigator Mazaka sought a warrant for the purpose of searching the premises at 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, occupied by respondent and his family, because, he averred, he had reason to believe that there was concealed on the premises an illegal still and other material connected with the manufacture of nontax-paid liquors. The grounds for this belief were recited in 12 paragraphs on an attached sheet, as reproduced in the Appendix to the Court's opinion, ante, p. 112.
The factual recitals comprise 10 paragraphs, each paragraph setting forth the alleged events of a single day, except that August 24, 1961, is dealt with in two paragraphs. Of these factual recitals more will be said in a moment. The first and last paragraphs of the 12 describe the sources from which the affiant has gained the information set forth in the factual paragraphs. These sources are, according to the first paragraph, three in [380 U.S. 102, 118] number: (1) "observations made by me"; (2) "information received officially from other Investigators"; and (3) "reports orally made to me [by other investigators] describing the results of their observations and investigation." In the last paragraph the affiant describes the sources of his information slightly differently: "The foregoing information is based upon personal knowledge and information which has been obtained from Investigators . . . ."
Of the 10 factual paragraphs eight describe trips said to have been made to and from the vicinity of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue by one Garry and one Incardone. On these trips, it is said, there were delivered to the vicinity of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue large quantities of sugar (four deliveries) and empty metal cans (two deliveries, on one of which respondent himself is said to have been a passenger in the car); on one occasion it was observed only that the car was "heavily laden." It is said that on two occasions Garry and Incardone were seen taking apparently filled cans into Garry's house, 59 Highland Street, from the Pontiac; on one such occasion the Pontiac, it is said, had been at Coburn Avenue earlier in the day, apparently making a sugar delivery. And, finally, it is averred that on one occasion seemingly filled cans were loaded into the Pontiac near 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue, shortly after a delivery of empties to that address.
The "facts" recited in these eight paragraphs, it is said, permit the inference that a still was being operated on respondent's premises. But are these "facts" really facts? A statement of "fact" is only as credible as its source. Investigator Mazaka evidently believes these statements to be correct; but the magistrate must, of course, know something of the basis of that belief. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 . Is the belief of this affiant based on personal observation, or on hearsay, or on hearsay on hearsay? Nowhere in the affidavit is the source [380 U.S. 102, 119] of these eight paragraphs of information revealed. In each paragraph the alleged events are simply described directly, or else it is said that certain events "were observed." Scarcely a clue is given as to who the observer might have been. It might have been the affiant, though one would not expect that he would so studiously refrain from revealing that he himself witnessed these events. The observers might have been some other investigators, though the affiant does not say so; yet in the two paragraphs next to be discussed the observers are prominently identified as investigators. Perhaps the ultimate source of most of these statements was one or more private citizens, who were interviewed by investigators, whose reports on these interviews came in due course to Investigator Mazaka, who then composed the affidavit. Perhaps many of the "facts" recited in the affidavit were supplied by an unknown informant over the telephone.
In most instances the language of the affidavit suggests that some investigator witnessed the alleged events. For example, the second paragraph begins: "On or about July 28, 1961, about 6:45 P. M., an observation was made covering a Pontiac automobile owned by one Joseph Garry." But the presumed investigator who may have been "covering" this automobile is in no way identified. There is no way of knowing whether the report of this alleged observation was made directly to the affiant or whether it went through one or more intermediaries.
Turning now to the remaining two "factual" paragraphs, we find it averred that "Investigators" smelled fermenting mash and heard metallic and other noises in the vicinity of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue. On August 18, it is said, investigators twice smelled mash between 4 and 5 a. m. as they walked on the sidewalk in front of and beside the house at 148 Coburn Avenue, which is apparently the house next to respondent's. The "Investigators" are not further identified. On August 30 at about 4 a. m., it [380 U.S. 102, 120] is averred, unidentified investigators detected the odor of fermenting mash while they were "walking on the sidewalk in front of 148 Coburn Avenue." The source of the odor is again not specified; but sounds heard at the same time, similar to the sounds made by "a motor or a pump," are stated to have come "from the direction of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue."
Such is the substance of the affidavit. No particular item of information is identified as within the first-hand knowledge of the affiant. Certain smells and sounds are explicitly described as having been directly perceived by unnamed investigators. The sources of all the other information are left to speculation.
The Court's unconcern over the failure of the affidavit to identify the sources of the information recited seems based in part on the detailed, lengthy nature of the factual recitals. The Court seems to say that even if we assume that only some small part of the information is trustworthy, still enough remains to establish probable cause. But I would direct attention to the fact that only one of the 12 paragraphs in this affidavit definitely points the finger of suspicion at 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue: that is the paragraph describing the alleged events of August 28, 1961. In every other paragraph the recitals point no more to 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue than they do to 148 Coburn Avenue. The August 28 paragraph is critical to the finding of the existence of probable cause for the search of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue. Yet the source of the information contained in that paragraph is in no way identified and it is therefore impossible to determine the trust-worthiness of that crucial information.
A discussion of the legal principles governing the sufficiency of this affidavit must, unhappily, begin with Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 . There an officer [380 U.S. 102, 121] had been told by an informer, known to the officer to be reliable, that a man of a certain description would get off a certain train with heroin in his possession. The officer met the train, observed a man of that description getting off, and arrested him. The Court held that there was probable cause for the arrest. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , the Court applied the holding in Draper to find an affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, even though the facts stated in the affidavit did not rest on the affiant's personal observations but rather on the observations of another. The Court held that an affidavit could rest on hearsay, "so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." Id., at 269. (Emphasis supplied.) In Jones the basis for crediting the informant's hearsay was: (1) the affiant swore that the informant had previously given information to him which was correct; (2) the affiant had been given corroborating information by other informants; and (3) the affiant was independently familiar with the persons claimed by the informants to be concealing narcotics in their apartment, and he knew them to have admitted to the use of narcotics.
I dissented from the decisions of the Court in these two cases, for the reasons which I set forth most fully in Draper, supra, at 314 et seq. But though I regard these decisions * as taking a view destructive of the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, they are in any event clearly not dispositive of the present case. As I have already shown, the affidavit here does not set forth a single corroborating [380 U.S. 102, 122] fact that is sworn to be within the personal knowledge of the affiant. Moreover, there is not a single statement in the affidavit that could not well be hearsay on hearsay or some other multiple form of hearsay.
We are told, however, that it is at least clear that "Investigators" detected the smell of mash in the vicinity of 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue. And the Court says: "Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number," ante, p. 111. But I would make Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 , my starting point, where the Court stated: "Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the owner of a building of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search." In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 , the Court explained what the decision in Taylor meant: "That decision held only that odors alone do not authorize a search without warrant. If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant." (Emphasis supplied.) It is hardly necessary to point out that a magistrate cannot begin to assess the odor-identifying qualifications of persons whose identity is unknown to him. Nor is it necessary to belabor the point that these odors of mash are not ever stated in the affidavit to have emanated from 148 1/2 Coburn Avenue.
The Court of Appeals was surely correct when it observed that "the affidavit leaves as a complete mystery the manner in which the Investigators discovered their information." 324 F.2d 864, 869. Such being the case, [380 U.S. 102, 123] I see no way to avoid the conclusion of the majority below: "If hearsay evidence is to be relied upon in the preparation of an affidavit for a search warrant, the officer or attorney preparing such an affidavit should keep in mind that hearsay statements are only as credible as their source and only as strong as their corroboration. And where the source of the information is in doubt and the corroboration by the affiant is unclear, the affidavit is insufficient." Id., at 869-870. That conclusion states a relatively clear standard of probable cause and is in sharp contrast to the amorphous one upon which today's decision rests.
In Jones v. United States, supra, this Court forgot, as it forgets again today, that the duty of the magistrate is not delegable to the police. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 . It is for the magistrate, not the police, to decide whether there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. That function cannot be discharged by the magistrate unless the police first discharge their own, different responsibility: "to evidence what is reliable and why, and not to introduce a hodge-podge under some general formalistic coverall." 324 F.2d, at 870. And see Masiello v. United States, 304 F.2d 399, 401-402. That is the duty of the police - the rest is not for them.
I would affirm the decision below.

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