text:
Complainant is Formula One Licensing B.V. of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, represented by Wild Schnyder AG, Switzerland.
Respondent is Holding Theunisse of Berghem, the Netherlands, represented by Advocaat Van Tongeren, the Netherlands.
The disputed domain name <f1racingdrinks.com> is registered with DomainPeople, Inc.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 10, 2009. On June 10, 2009, the Center transmitted by email to DomainPeople, Inc. a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name <f1racingdrinks.com> (the “Domain Name”). On June 22, 2009, DomainPeople, Inc. transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on June 23, 2009. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was July 13, 2009. The Response was filed with the Center on July 8, 2009.
On July 15, 2009, Complainant filed a Statement to Respondent's response, and on July 16, 2009, the Center acknowledge receipt thereof and referred to the Rules, paragraph 10(d) which provide that it is to the Panel's discretion to consider it.
The Center appointed Alfred Meijboom as the sole panelist in this matter on July 17, 2009. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
Complainant is owner of the trademark portfolio that comprises the F1 brand. An affiliate company of Complainant, Formula One Administration Limited (“FOA”) is the commercial rights holder and commercial organizer of the FORMULA 1 F1 motor races known as the Fia Formula One World Championship, which is regulated by the Federation Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) who established the Championship in 1950.
- International word mark registration no. 732134 F1 with priority of December 20, 1999.
These trademarks shall jointly be referred to as the “F1 Trademarks”.
Furthermore, Complainant or related companies own a number of domain names with the element F1, above all <f1.com>.
Respondent is holder of the Domain Name which was registered on November 6, 2008. Through its subsidiary Respondent distributes energy drinks.
Complainant claims that the F1 Trademarks are internationally very well-known if not famous. The F1 motor racing draws a large television audience in the world for an annual sporting event – with the race, broadcast live, attracting hundreds of millions of viewers in almost 200 countries. Each race attracts an average of approximately 50 million unique television viewers, with a race-only cumulative, annual audience of unique viewers of almost 600 million people.
The F1 Trademarks are used extensively to promote the event and are shown throughout the racing venue, on and off the track and in connection with the television broadcasting.
With reference to the F1 Marks, Complainant claims that particularly in the Benelux, Respondent's residence, Complainant has extensive protection for F1 Trademarks.
Complainant is using its trademark F1 actively in licensing and sponsoring deals, allowing use of the famous mark on goods or services of third parties against compensation and under strict rules to safeguard the brands integrity.
With reference to the decision of the OHIM of May 11, 2007, in opposition case no. B894727, which was based on Community device trademark registration no. 631531 F1 and directed against a third party's device mark F1 EASY OHIM found that the said Community trademark enjoys a high degree of reputation for all services it covers in class 41 in the European Union so that the mark F1 EASY would take unfair advantage of and be detrimental to the distinctive character of the opposition mark since both were dominated by the element “F1”. Furthermore OHIM held that “F1” is a known abbreviation for Formula One races so the public will associate the marks with the races.
According to Complainant the F1 Trademarks are basically identical with the Domain Name. The only difference is that after element “F1” of the Domain Name, a purely descriptive and non-distinctive element “racingdrinks” is added. To combine the F1 Trademarks with the descriptor does not change the element “F1” at all. Quite to the contrary, it highlights the brand F1 standing alone and indicates that the website offers in some way drinks connected to Complainant's activity and protected under the F1 Trademarks. Complaint refers to other cases under the Rules that it found to clearly held that such amendment of mark does not destroy identity of high similarity (Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG v. Vasiliy Terkin, WIPO Case No. D2003-0888; Diageo Brands B.V., Diageo North America, Inc. and United Distillers Manufacturing, Inc. v. iVodka.com a.k.a. Alec Bargman, WIPO Case No. D2004-0627; Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Holding Theunisse., WIPO Case No. D2008-1631; Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Louis Theunisse., WIPO Case No. D2008-1633).
According to Complainant it is obvious that Respondent's only reason in registering and using the Domain Name is to benefit from the reputation of the famous F1 Trademarks and to trade on the fame of the F1 Trademarks for commercial profit. With reference to Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. Ivan Razin, WIPO Case No. D2005-0341, Complainant claims that such abuse of intellectual property right cannot constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services (see) and it is clear that Respondent has chosen the contested domain name simply to profit from its fame and generate initial expectation of users to whom they offer their goods.
Further, Complainant pointed out that the Domain Name has been registered by Respondent on November 6, 2008. This was after registration of the F1 Trademarks and long after the F1 Trademarks became famous.
According to Complainant there is no evidence that Respondent is or was commonly known by the trademark F1 RACINGDRINKS nor is there any evidence that Respondent is making legitimate commercial or non-commercial use of the Domain Name. Complainant never gave consent to such use and it is clear that Respondent must have known complainants trademark at the time of registering the domain name, as Respondent makes very aggressive reference to the F1 motor sport themes on the website itself.
Complainant further stated that for anybody who is just a little interested in the sport of motor racing, it is common knowledge that energy drink brands are important sponsors. The racing series organized under the F1 Trademarks, for example, lists one team RED BULL and another SCUDERIA TORRO ROSSO. One of the most prominent companies to have sponsored a team is Red Bull, the company owning the high energy drink of the same name, whose involvement as a sponsor began in 1995. Furthermore, a number of the teams and drivers have been sponsored by other companies which manufacture drinks at various times in the last 15 years. Moreover, since as early as 1980, champagne has featured in the prize giving ceremony at the end of each race. The victory celebration invariably involves the drivers drenching one another, the winning team boss and nearby crowd with spray from recently shaken bottles of champagne.
According to Complainant there can be no doubt that these facts were and are well-known to Respondent who makes clear reference to motor racing sport on the website. Respondent's website shows that in addition to the graphic elements, the sound and motion clearly connected with the F1 racing events are abused as well. As a consequence Respondent did not only misappropriate the F1 Trademarks, but in addition takes active steps to increase consumer confusion by playing the F1 motor sports sounds and pictures on the website.
In conclusion, Complainant quotes from Volvo Trademark Holding AB v. Unasi, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0556 and considers it well applicable to this case: “In this regard, it has been deemed by numerous WIPO panels that attracting Internet traffic and diverting it to website(s) selling products of complainant's competitors by using a domain name identical or confusingly similar is evidence of bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy”.
Respondent manufactures, sells and distributes energy drinks under the name “F1 Racing energy drink” through a subsidiary. He acknowledges that F1 as element of the Domain Name attracts attention, as does every alphabetic letter and every cipher of its own, but asserts that concerning the aforementioned product name, the attention of the public at large will be attracted and the image/imagination will be most vivid by the element “Racing energy drink”. When the public at large hears of the domain names <f1.nl> or <f1.com> it will probably think that it has to do with auto races. In contrast, no one shall think that Respondent's aforementioned product has anything to do with (the company that organizes) Formula 1 auto races or that such product is produced, sold or distributed by Complainant or its affiliates companies.
Respondent further claims that proof of any confusion or misunderstanding by the buying public is lacking.
Moreover, Complainant's web store does not sell energy drinks.
Respondent finds, when it considers the F1 Trademarks, that Complaint has monopolized thousands of things, but not energy drinks which cannot be considered non-alcoholic drinks because it is something special.
Respondent claims that it has right and legitimate interest in the Domain Name because it is a means to promote and market its energy drink.
In this connection Respondent pointed out that to it had not given enough attention to maintenance of the domain names <f1drinks.nl> and <f1energydrinks.com>1. Respondent is sure that it would have preserved these domain names if it had put up a defense.
Respondent has furthermore brought forward that when assessing the three elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy (as the Panel understands), the Domain Name should be distinguished from the contents of the website under the Domain Name. If (the text of) the website under the Domain Name is possibly in conflict with third-party rights – which, according to Respondent, is not the case in this matter – this does not mean that the Domain Name affects the rights of others who are entitled to the Domain Name.
The images of a motor or a car on Respondent's website only want to create the impression that energy drinks give strength, power and energy to the body. According to Respondent, its use of the Domain Name is therefore made in good faith.
Finally, Respondent is of the view that Red Bull is materially the claimant who has asked Complainant by means of procedures under the Policy to push Respondent off the market as a small competitor.
On July 15, 2009, Complainant filed a Statement to Respondent's response. The Panel observes that it must be mindful of the need for procedural efficiency, but that it has discretion to accept an unsolicited supplemental filing (WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, question 4.2). The Panel believes that supplemental filings should ordinarily not be taken into account, except in exceptional circumstances. Those circumstances would include Complainant's objective inability to anticipate and deal with arguments made in the Response (PAA Laboratories GmbH v. Printing Arts America, WIPO Case No. D2004-0338). It is also helpful if the party submitting its filing can show its relevance to the case and why it was unable to provide that information in the Complaint or Response.
In this case, Complainant did not explain the need to file a Statement to Respondent's response. As Complainant was reasonably able to anticipate the Response, the Panel declines to take into account Complainant's Statement to Respondent's response.
C. the Domain Name has been registered and was being used in bad faith.
First, the Panelist agrees with Respondent's observation in conformity with the panelists' majority view that the contents of the website under the Domain Name do not play a role in the assessment of the question whether the Domain Name is identically or confusingly similar to the F1 Trademarks (see WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions). Therefore, the Domain Name as such is hereinafter compared with the F1 Trademarks, whereby the top level domain label “.com” – as being a necessary part of a domain name – is not taken into account.
The F1 Trademarks are reflected entirely in the Domain Name. In the Domain Name the term “racing drinks” is added to “F1”. This term in itself has (little) distinctive character, but in combination with the F1 Trademarks of which the Panel is of the view that (just like the other “F1” trademarks, of which Complainant has submitted registration evidence) they are well-known, the Panel rules that “racing” and “F1” are conceptually similar, whereas the remaining word (a plural of “drink”) for a drink is purely descriptive.
The term “racing drinks” therefore plays a subordinate role in the comparison between the F1 Trademarks and the Domain Name. In the opinion of the Panel the Domain Name is therefore similar to the Trademarks in such a way that as a result there may be a likelihood of confusion.
Complainant submitted prima facie evidence that Respondent has no right to or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name. Respondent must therefore prove that it is entitled to the Domain Name or has a legitimate interest therein.
In this respect Respondent brought forward that it has a great interest in the Domain Name because it uses it to promote and market its energy drink product. In that connection the Panel is satisfied that Respondent does indeed appear (in part) to be using the domain name to promote an energy drink with the name “F1 Racing” or “F1 Racing Energy Drink” via its website, as stated by Respondent and confirmed by the screen prints submitted by Complainant as Exhibit 8. The website is clearly of a commercial nature, and the products promoted on it would appear to compete (at least in part) to those offered by Complainant under its well-known F1 Trademarks.
The Panel cannot rule out that Respondent's product name infringes the F1 Trademarks and/or other trademarks of Complainant, but neither can it rule out that the product name is valid and non-infringing. Respondent submitted third-party (F1 Racing Establishment, Smart Drinks & Food and Infra metal Establishment GesmbH) trademark registrations for the word mark/device mark F1 RACING (International Registration no. 669526 and Community Trademark registration no. 451419) for, inter alia, non-alcoholic beverages, which trademarks were apparently placed on Respondent's products, and various decisions in trademark oppositions, which may or may not be relevant to deciding that question. Respondent, however, did not provide any explanation at all with respect to said third party trademarks and decisions and has not, for instance, argued that on the basis of a license under said trademarks it was authorized to use the sign F1 RACING. The onus of making a case for rights or legitimate interests falls on Respondent. In the absence of a sound defense in this regard, it is not up to the Panel to form an opinion on this matter. The Panel has therefore no other option than to decide that Respondent failed to rebut Complainant's prima facie evidence of lack of rights or legitimate interests.
Consequently, the Panel finds that Respondent has failed to demonstrate rights of legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Regarding this third element the Panel agrees with the decision of the panel in Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Holding Theunisse., WIPO Case No. D2008-1631 and Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Louis Theunisse, WIPO Case No. D2008-1633, which cases were decided in default proceedings between Complainant and Respondent and Respondent's managing director, respectively, regarding the domain names <f1energydrinks.com> and <f1drinks.com>.
The Panel finds that Respondent in the present case has registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith.
The Panel finds it inconceivable that Respondent could not have been aware of Complainant and the F1 Trademarks, since the F1 Trademarks are well-known and were registered many years prior to the registration of the Domain Names. Moreover, Respondent's website under the Domain Name refers to F1 motor racing by, amongst others, the representation of an F1 racing car, racing tracks, a checkered flag, various “F1” events and news about same. The question in this case turns on the issue of whether or not Respondent has a demonstrated right or legitimate interest in using Complainant's well-known trademark for the purpose claimed, or if in so doing, Respondent was merely intending to trade and cash-in on its fame.
The Panel finds that, by using the Domain Name for a website where an “F1 energy drink” is promoted under reference to F1 motor racing, Respondent intentionally attempts to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website or another online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of its website or location or of a product or service on its website or location, and has therefore registered and used the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of the third element of the Policy.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name <f1racingdrinks.com> be transferred to Complainant.
1 These domain names were awarded to Complainant in Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Holding Theunisse., WIPO Case No. D2008-1631 and Formula One Licensing B.V. v. Louis Theunisse, WIPO Case No. D2008-1633. The respective Respondents in this case did not put up a defense.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Background: The following long-form post is based, in part, on the seminar sponsored by the New York Technology Council / UX Design Track titled: “Apple vs. Samsung: What the case means to software development and UX design”2 . The session was held in New York on October 23, 2012. The session featured presentations by Christopher V. Carani Esq.3 , Robert S. Katz Esq.4 and Charles L. Mauro CHFP5 . The seminar was created and moderated by Charles L. Mauro.
No other U.S. patent case in recent history has consumed as much media bandwidth and generated more discussion than the recent Apple v. Samsung case in the Northern District of California6. That case resulted in the largest jury award for patent infringement in history (1.05 billion dollars). However, this is by no means the first patent case with potentially massive implications for the technology we have come to rely on to improve our daily lives. Other cases have had similar impact including the famous Wright Brothers7 patent litigation involving fundamental aircraft design and the battle between Alexander Graham Bell and Western Union over misuse of Bell’s telephone patent8. Over the past 100 years there have been a handful of patent cases that have fundamentally impacted how products in major commercial sectors are designed and commercialized in the U.S. market. While it is too early to place the Apple vs. Samsung case at the same level of impact as the Wright Brothers litigation, it is likely that the case has altered how smart companies going forward will create and protect innovations in the mobile platform space.
Lawyers see this case as simply a series of patents and related protections litigated brilliantly to the financial benefit of Apple. Surprisingly, the legal position is not the most important fall-out from the verdict. The case will certainly have an impact on Product Design, User Interface (UX) Design and Software Development. This fact will remain valid whether or not aspects of the case are overturned on appeal. Specifically, when one peels back the veneer of the case and views the judgment from the perspective of Product Design, User Interface (UX) Design and Software Development, surprising insights emerge which a legal analysis fails entirely to frame. There is far more to the case than simple financial or legal precedent.
What Was Apple Really Trying to Protect?
The answer to this question is found in detailed examination of the patents that Apple chose to assert against Samsung. Below is a list of the patents that the parties asserted against each other in this matter9.
When one decomposes the patents asserted by Apple against Samsung it is clear that Apple was intensely focused on protecting more than individual patents taken at random from its portfolio of about 1,300 patents10 related to mobile devices. The palette of patents asserted against Samsung is a clear and convincing example of the concept that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Based on a detailed analysis of these patents and their relatedness, it is clear that when combined the Apple patents create, as closely as possible given the complexity of the litigation, the “Total User Experience (TUX)“11 of the iPhone and related Apple iOS devices.
The asserted Apple patents covered the look of the iPhone, the style of the screen-based interface, design of the icons and related screens, and some of the essential gesture-based interaction behaviors of the iPhone product. The sum of these patents covered essentially the iPhone you may or may not have in your hand from the standpoint of what you cognitively experience when you use the device. In retrospect this was a brilliant strategy because it gave Apple the opportunity to secure (conceptually) protections well beyond those that accrue to any single patent related to iPhone technology.
This was likely an essential legal strategy of Apple since it is the Total User Experience (TUX) of the iPhone that drives commercial success, not any individual feature or function as presented in a single patent asserted. It is interesting to note that Samsung asserted against Apple a series of garden-variety utility patents, which the jury found Apple had not infringed. The Samsung patents did not appear to have any specific rationale for selection other than they might have been broadly applicable to cellphone infrastructure. In this regard Samsung’s legal team seemed clueless with respect to the larger strategy by Apple to fence in the TUX of the iPhone through careful selection of key patents that combined to create a far broader protective screen around the iPhone product offering.
This approach of conceptualizing the iPhone as comprised of many highly engaging features which combine to create an experience which is greater that the sum of its parts fits exactly with advanced research12 in UX design which posits the view that a company’s most valuable corporate asset in the future will be the total user experience of its products, not a subset of features covered by discrete, individual patents or related IP. The cognitive science behind this approach is well understood by those who develop such products but ignored entirely by the current legal IP system. The human mind does not approach the world as a series of disconnected features but assembles experiences from the world we inhabit to form a mental model that is robust and determines what we find engaging and meaningful.
Smart companies going forward will work with their IP counsel to frame patent applications and related litigation toward protecting the total user experience of their products. But the road to an IP strategy like Apple’s that focuses on the total user experience may not be an easy one. The current legal system works in exactly the opposite direction by requiring inventors to slice up their products into many features that can be described in patent claims or in other forms of narrowly defined legal descriptions. Trade dress13 protection is a notable exception but is understood to be, in its current state, both unwieldy and difficult to assert.
Some of have said this “divide and define” legal framework is a fundamental conceptual and structural problem with the current patent system and its ability to protect these new massively interconnected, screen-based, software-driven, globally distributed, high-technology products and services. Furthermore, patent litigation currently requires attorneys, working with the aid of economic experts, to place a dollar value on features that have been infringed. One can see immediately the friction between the value of individual features and the value of the combined total user experience where a given feature or features may reside. This is not a new concern and has recently become a source of considerable debate and rancor within the legal system and the larger software development community.
In the future, it may be conceptually impossible, from a business perspective, to decouple individual features from a highly successful product, like the iPhone, in a manner that allows the courts to assign a meaningful dollar value to infringement of piecemeal features. This is a heated topic of debate in the legal community that has surprisingly brought out opinions ranging from lawyers to federal court judges. Nowhere has this issue been made more obvious than in the recent Federal Circuit rulings and writings of Judge Richard Posner14 in the case of Apple vs. Motorola15. In his recent rulings in the Apple v. Motorola case, Judge Posner was so upset by the testimony of the economic experts of both sides when establishing the value of features found infringing that he called the experts in formal legal opinions “Dummy” and “Dummkopf”16.
When viewed in the context of the new forms of technology that allow companies to create highly engaging and successful total user experiences like those found in the iPhone, Judge Posner had it exactly right. In the context of business impact Judge Posner’s frustration with piece-meal valuations of asserted and infringing features is both deeply insightful and functionally correct. Assigning an asset value to individual features of an overall user experience like that of the iPhone makes little practical sense in the context of how such features actually contribute to the overall user experience of the product. All truly successful products are carefully conceived combinations of features, which, as we have said, can create engagement at a level that makes customers the world over stand in line to purchase an iPhone.
The difficult problem is determining how one assigns the proper value to a given feature or set of features in a manner that is objectively related to the commercial success of a product like the iPhone.
The marketing sciences have been dealing with this question for over a decade as marketing experts are constantly testing the marketplace to identify clusters of features that will produce enhanced purchase decision behaviors. The current patent litigation system has no such sophistication either conceptually or technically, hence Judge Posner’s frustration. As previously noted, in the Apple v. Samsung case, Apple focused on protecting the total user experience by asserting a cluster of patents that combine to drive high levels of user engagement. This raises the profoundly interesting question of exactly how many features and functions protected by patents does one have to remove before the iPhone user experience is also removed. This is probably a conversation Samsung bet the farm on but somehow failed to understand completely. The finding of infringement based on this palette of IP protections is a massive win for Apple both tactically and strategically. In fact, in terms of long-term business impact, this aspect of the win is vastly more important than a billion dollars in cash. It is also a strategy that others can learn from in a big way.
Ultimately what Apple has to be reaching for in the future is a way to protect the iPhone TUX under the legal concept of a comprehensive trade dress20 judgment. Under that legal framework, Apple will have virtually no time limit on protection and will be able to objectively tie the iPhone TUX to core consumer purchase decision behaviors and product recognition. It is important to note that some measure of trade dress protection was achieved in this litigation but when taken in the larger context Apple can objectively claim a much larger field of user engagement or customer touch points when defining its overall user experience. Such trade dress claims can easily be conceptualized as including all primary and secondary consumer touch points such as retail, Genius Bar, web site, etc., all integrated into a truly Total TUX.
While there do not appear to have been patents claiming the total user experience design as patentable subject matter it is only a matter of time before companies with highly engaging and successful TUX solutions file for such patents. In a critical way this is the future of product and service design protective strategies as it allows companies to protect the combined “whole” of their user experience solutions across all relevant customer touch points.
Judge Koh21 was, by most measures, an outspoken jurist with her own clearly stated opinions accompanied by a well defined strategy for keeping the case on track and both sides within bounds. This was no simple task. Her formal statements from the bench resulted in surprisingly strong opinions on the merits of the case along with decisions that allowed for a case of such profound impact. Specifically, Judge Koh allowed a wide range of legal IP protection forms to be litigated in the same case at the same time. She allowed Apple to assert infringement based on several major forms of IP protection (utility patents, design patents and trade dress)22 in the same trial, a fact that some have said was a dramatic benefit to Apple in implementing its ultimate legal objective of producing a “walled garden” of IP protection which combined design patents, utility patents, and trade dress.
By allowing consideration of such a wide palette of IP protection in this single matter Judge Koh may have established a critical precedent that will impact both legal strategy and product development. The legal teams and product development staff of companies large and small involved in UX design and software development should clearly benefit in a big way by making use of the widest range of IP protections possible and UX design should be conceptualized as an effort which optimizes against the total UX experience, not just individual features and functions and related infrastructure.
It is important to note that much of the coverage of the case in the mass media focused on the look of the iPhone or its “overall shape, style and appearance” as compared to that of the Samsung products. Even though Apple successfully executed a broader strategy of protecting the overall UX design of the iPhone, the design patent aspects of the case did generate by far the largest portion of the total financial award of 1.05 billion dollars23. The design patent aspects of the case were of special interest to Judge Koh as she expressed her opinion related to the similarity of the Apple and Samsung products during various pre-trial hearings. To say that she believed the products to be similar is an understatement. In one exchange with the two legal teams present she essentially held up the two products and challenged the Samsung team to tell the difference.
This exchange24 apparently left the Samsung lawyers speechless if not totally flummoxed. The surprising aspect of this exchange and the judge’s expression of likeness between the competing products was that Samsung lawyers gave the Judge a complete free pass on her opinion and never offered up expert analysis or testimony for the judge or jury on the cognitive science of shape perception. It turns out that such science reveals surprising insights on the question of shape equivalence. There was a great deal of expertise and science available to Samsung related to shape perception that could have helped educate the judge and jury on the realities of the ordinary observer test25. Surprisingly, throughout the entire trial, Samsung did not use expert testimony to educate the judge and jury on the science of shape perception.
Certainly such lack of insight and expertise on the part of Samsung’s legal team gave Apple a free ride on the design patent infringement. Would such testimony have altered the findings of the jury? One will never know, but clearly Samsung could have provided the judge and jury with a far more reasoned and research-based understanding for reaching the finding of infringement on the design patent issues.
While the media frenzy surrounding this case created surprising awareness and discussion ranging from skits on Saturday Night Live26 to Conan O’Brien27, the fact is that this case was not only about the current products in question but more specifically about future products to be created by Apple, Samsung and many other corporations that will populate our world in the next 10-15 years. In this regard the case is more about what is not on the table than what is.
There are a number of important trends in technology that are critically important when determining the impact that this case will have on product and software development over the longer term. Of the several important trends, the “connectedness” of devices is the most compelling in the context of this case. This trend estimates the number of products across eight major product categories that will be connected by some form of interactive network over the next 10-15 years. Research from numerous sources suggests that the so-called “Internet of Things” is going to take place on a massive scale, unlike anything we can imagine today. When one examines this data, for example shown in the chart below, it can be seen that the largest number of devices that will likely be networked are not computer clients but consumer products, followed by pallets and cases, appliances, machinery, vehicles, and hand held devices28.
While the impact of this trend is beyond the scope and purpose of this discussion, it is clear that companies like Apple, Samsung and thousands of other entities large and small will soon create products under their own brands which will be connected to a common universal network. Each of these products, devices or even entire processes will require a user experience that informs the customer of that specific product’s status and features.
In this new world of connectedness between all manner of devices, one key factor, more than any other, will drive success, and that is the delivery of a common, highly engaging and easy-to-learn user experience that resides cognitively in the same form across many customer touch-points. The future goes to those who have the greatest control over the most productive user experience design running on the greatest number of devices.
This is a fundamental structural concept for a world of connected things. When companies have a compelling and easy-to-learn user experience running across many devices they provide the customer/user with one huge benefit: positive transfer-of-learning from device to device. This dramatically reduces the cognitive workload of customers and reduces friction at the point of sale. One can see this principle in action when walking into an Apple retail store where the iPhone behaves much like the iPad which in turn behaves like the iPod…and so on.
Samsung and other large corporations are peering into a future of connectedness without a TUX interaction model that will allow them to control the mind, wallet and learning profile of the consumer across many, many product categories. In fact, the chart above, which shows the number of products to be connected by product category, reads like the global product catalog of Samsung.
The sheer number of devices, products and entire systems that Samsung produces and the fact that many will be connected in coming iterations places far more demand on Samsung’s management than Apple’s in terms of creating a unified UX design framework that will map across not a dozen or two dozen devices like Apple but across thousands of SKUs ranging from smartphones to vacuum cleaners29. It is therefore somewhat of a mystery as to why Samsung played this case so badly on several levels given the strategic impact of the verdict.
Does Anyone Have All the Pieces?
This specific matter of Apple v. Samsung is only one of hundreds of cases being litigated in the smartphone/tablet space at this time. The chart below shows some of the recent activity in terms of litigation, patent purchases, and licensing agreements taking place between parties in this technology space.
The most interesting point is that there are many other parties including non-practicing entities (NPEs), private inventors and other corporations that may hold key patents related to smartphone product design, UI design and infrastructure. Neither Apple, Samsung nor any other entity has the ultimate treasure trove of patents necessary to control this space.
Where Is the Prior Art?
Many of the patents that may be relevant in terms of prior art31 references flow from the mid to late 1990s. Searching this older body of prior art is not only time consuming, complex and costly but it leaves even the best, most recent intellectual property protection vulnerable to questions of both obviousness and invalidity. In fact, prior art accumulated by Samsung in this case, which was not allowed due to an error on the part of Samsung’s counsel32, is a case in point.
It is interesting to think about how that prior art found by Samsung might have or have not influenced the outcome of the trial had it been properly dealt with and allowed into evidence. In the end what this means is a landscape of scorched earth litigation that is not only complex, time-consuming and costly but highly unpredictable given that there are many patents and other forms of viable prior art still valid and relevant but that have not surfaced in the process of this litigation or other matters of strategic importance. This is a major problem for legal and development teams striving to create and protect innovative user experience design solutions like those at the center of this litigation.
The question of who owns the necessary IP to control the smartphone market is a point of considerable interest to lawyers and corporate executives, not to mention UX design and software development teams. The technical term for the underlying technology required to produce a successful (or even unsuccessful) smartphone system in known as “the stack”. The stack is divided into 4 primary layers, which together create technology to do what smartphones do. In his broadly read and widely quoted article in ArsTechnica titled Owning the stack: The legal war to control the smartphone platform33, Law Professor James Grimmelmann divides the stack into essentially 4 layers: the UI/application layer, operating system layer, the device layer and the cellular network layer.
He goes on to describe how the current wave of litigation is focused on two factors: 1) owning or controlling the entire stack (not possible, but every player’s fantasy) and 2) owning a critical portion of the stack that other layers touch or pass through, so that a patentee can hold others participating in the smartphone market hostage by way of licensing fees.
Professor Grimmelmann goes on to say essentially that the current litigation is bi-directional (within a layer or between layers). For example, Oracle vs. Google in operating systems as in this litigation where Apple is trying to control two critical layers of the stack: the UI/Application and the Product layers. Currently no single company has anything like control of the entire stack, although Apple has the greatest proprietary control of any smartphone player through control of three levels of the stack: the UI/Application layer (iOS interface design), Operating System layer (iOS) and Device layer (iPhone). The only factor keeping Apple from owning a complete stack is control of the cellular network layer held by the likes of Verizon, AT&T and other telecommunications companies. However, were Apple to use its massive cash balance (70+ billion dollars at last count) to purchase one of these cellular networks, Apple would then have the only complete smartphone stack.
Ultimately the lower layers of the stack will become commoditized and less valuable than what the customer ultimately interacts with: the overall user experience design (UX + Device). It is the combination at the center of this case that makes possible actual user engagement with the new, massively connected world around us. The most advanced thinking related to UX design suggests that operating systems are in most ways irrelevant when considering whether or not a given UX design is infringed.
It is a technical reality that most modern operating systems (iOS, Android, Java, etc. have a robust GUI layer that can be employed in the implementation of advanced UX design solutions. Against this conceptual backdrop the measure of infringement is a cognitive science problem, not a computer science problem.
In this regard there is going to be a shift in the value of IP toward UX design and device design and away from deep-level smartphone infrastructure. Ultimately, several billion users couldn’t care less about anything going on behind the glass. All they care about, and what they employ in making purchase decisions, is what happens at the glass, hence at the UX Design and Product Design layers. In this regard this case may be a precursor to a new process for determining core asset value from IP going forward.
While the legal issues of this case are interesting, the more important question for those who create technological innovations and seek protection is: what is the business rationale for this litigation? One might assume that the case is simply about two corporations who have a strong dislike for each other. That is not the real story. Apple and Samsung share massive production commitments outside of this litigation. A look into the underlying business environment of smartphones shows instantly that this case is about two companies that together totally dominate the smartphone market and more specifically capture between them a staggering level of profitability from this product category. This is shown in stark relief by the chart below, which shows that Apple and Samsung combined capture over 95% of the profit from the sale of smartphones.
In this competitive landscape Apple’s market share combined with Samsung’s market share makes up essentially the entire market. All other manufactures combined realize a negative percentage of the profitability of this market, when taking into account the current negative operating profit value of once prolific companies like Motorola, RIM, and Nokia. One can see the staggering impact that failing to create a compelling user experience can have on a previous world leader in smartphones by tracing the path of Nokia in the chart above as they went from essentially owning the profitability of the smartphone market to almost zero. There is one key player not at the table in this litigation but one whose products go to the heart of the case. That is, of course, Google34.
Over the past two years there has been considerable discussion about the trend toward consumers engaging on an increasing level with their mobile devices for tasks previously undertaken on desktop devices. This migration to mobile for more complex tasks by the consumer has been driven to some extent by the success of the iPhone User Experience and other devices of similar inherent ease of use. However, this trend known as “Mobile-Migration” has not been well documented in objective terms that could be mapped to reliable business implications. However, all that changed when Google recently released an important study titled The New Multi-screen World35.
In that study one can discern both the structure and extent of mobile-migration and the importance of protecting and optimizing the user experience for mobile devices like that of the iPhone. Based on the Google study one can see in stark relief the staggering shift in user behavior toward engaging with smartphones first as their primary entry point for a wide range of tasks that have critical business impact. Nowhere in the study data is this behavioral change more apparent than in basic search, where now 65% of all tasks involving “Searching for Info” start on the smartphone. As can be seen from the summary chart below, other critical tasks are also being started on mobile smartphones and then continued on the computer and to a much smaller percentage on a tablet.
This data suggests (although we have not seen the raw data) that those who own a smartphone have made a fundamental transition to the mobile user experience for critical tasks. This removes, for the most part, the question of whether or not consumers will adopt mobile user experiences for tasks that are known to fundamentally impact business performance for companies that rely on connected user behaviors. Therefore, when taken from a strategic point of view one can see that the design and protection of a robust mobile user experience like the iPhone’s may actually determine the success or failure of a given business entity, even one as large as Apple.
In this regard the case happens to have surfaced at exactly the same time that mobile user experience design has transitioned to a critically important interaction framework for users of such technology. One can also glean from this data the apparent connection between mobile and desktop user experience design and the related human performance requirement to minimize negative transfer between these two hardware platforms. This awareness is likely at the heart of recent developments by Apple and Microsoft related to common interaction frameworks for the PC desktop/laptop, tablet and smartphone.
At the highest level the case has been framed in the media based on the narrative of “The Good” (Apple: market leader and innovator) versus “The Bad” (Samsung: market follower and copier). The creation and propagation of this narrative was a primary and well executed legal strategy of the Apple litigation team37. This simple narrative abounds in Apple trial material including filings, trial testimony, visual aids and summation arguments.
There is nothing especially new or insightful about this approach since creating such a narrative is a basic litigation technique. However what is unusual in this case is the extent to which Apple was able to structure and control this narrative in the courtroom in a manner consistent with Apple’s brand strategy. The surprising fact is that this ability to control the highest-level narrative of the case was simply a reflection of how Apple has aggressively, and one can say brilliantly, controlled its brand narrative in the actual consumer marketplace. This clarity related to brand positioning in the marketplace, some have said, is responsible for premium pricing of Apple products.
However, in this litigation, it is clear that Apple’s control of the trial narrative was simply a extension of its branding strategy which has focused on delivering attributes of innovation and leadership to the market place through its brand delivery channels and the actual design of its overall user experience.
Mapping this same brand positioning narrative into such a complex litigation is no simple matter and was likely a key factor in Apple’s success as the jury received a trial narrative consistent with Apple’s advertising and brand positioning strategy in the actual marketplace. This is not a trivial matter as jury members, no matter how media averse, had easily encountered the Apple brand messaging thousands of times prior to the case in various passive forms through the mainstream media including TV ads, billboards in the Valley, magazine advertisements, Apple retail store experiences or mall/store walk-bys. It is safe to assume that the jury had ample exposure to the global brand messaging of Apple for years prior to the case. It is well known from brand research studies that Apple has one of the top 5 simplest brands in the world, and that this simplicity is a desirable brand trait for which consumers are willing to pay a premium28. The psychology behind delivery of a consistent brand image is well known and when extended to trial-based communications reduces the jury’s likelihood of confusion during deliberation by removing a question of conflict between market brand positioning and the way a party is presented in litigation.
Conversely, Samsung’s legal team39 failed to either alter the trial narrative or call into question Apple’s positioning of the “good” versus “bad” structure. Samsung had ample opportunity to provide an alternate narrative or to weaken Apple’s high-level structural messaging but seemed unable or even unaware of the importance of this aspect of the case. It is safe to say that this case demonstrates that in order to prevail in the protection of critical user experience IP, brand positioning needs to extend to trial strategy at the highest level.
What this means to those who develop software and UX Design innovations is that ultimately your brand will be on trial along with your products. Therefore, having a clearly defined and well articulated brand strategy in the consumer or commercial marketplace is likely to be very helpful when defending against issues of infringement or when asserting your IP against possible infringers. To be clear this means that those developing UX Design software-based solutions should not overlook the importance of developing a simple, clear and meaningful brand strategy based on a simple messaging structure.
All of this assumes your legal team can carry the narrative to the jury as Apple did in this case and that you have a positive narrative that is supported by brand positioning that actually delivers attributes that consumers find aligned with the functionality of your total user experience. In other words the best brand strategy possible will not replace a dysfunctional user experience either in the marketplace or at trial.
The Persistent Question: Did the Case Damage Innovation?
In the final analysis we are left with the question that has consumed more blog bytes than any other issue related to this case: “will the verdict have a negative impact on innovation?” The answer is almost certainly no. There is one important reason.
From this case a new strategy for product development and IP protection has emerged. The change dictates a shift to innovation to total user experience design. This is a fundamental change that has now been shown to provide companies with a massive core asset in a world that is rapidly becoming an interconnected lattice of billions of devices where product design, usability and ease of learning are the most important factors in achieving business success.
This case marks the beginning of a very different future for teams tasked with product and software development for this category of devices. Below is a partial list of key legal and development strategies flowing from this case.
It is important to note that this litigation surfaced in parallel with several important trends that together are setting in place a perfect storm of new technology and massive consumer demand for the next generation of mobile devices and related systems. In the end this case is simply a mileage marker on a new and exciting road to a world of massively connected mobile devices where the user experience is all that ultimately matters. Protecting such innovations, in light of the available protections, will require as much innovation as the design of the devices themselves.
Develop products and services in this space that focus on the total user experience (TUX): The future of robust IP protection for products in this category is going be determined by how well your total user experience is protected. In this regard, focus innovations on ALL critical customer touch points covering hardware and software interactions.
Create clusters of IP protection that capture the total user experience (TUX): IP practitioners should make use of all available forms of IP protection including design patents, utility patents, copyright, trademark and in litigation, trade dress, to create an interlocking set of protections that cover the look, feel and function of your products and services.
Develop a robust interactive brand that supports your overall TUX strategy: Consider carefully protecting core brand positioning elements and messaging as part of the overall IP protection strategy. In the best user experience design solutions in the future your brand will be delivered by (and be indistinguishable from) your total user experience.
Practice tighter integration between legal and development teams: Waiting until an innovative new user experience is complete before developing a legal strategy for protection will no longer be productive given the large body of prior art, rapid release schedules and litigious nature of the marketplace.
Focus on “mobile-first” design strategy: The larger trends which are surfacing in parallel with this litigation strongly suggest that business-critical user interface and product design solutions should implement a “design-for-mobile-first” strategy that is then migrated across the other 3-4 screen types known to capture user behaviors.
Do not rely on specific software operating systems or platforms for user experience design IP innovations: This is more complex than it sounds since good IP strategy may well include utility patent filings. However, it is critical to think of TUX design innovations as platform agnostic.
To the extent possible secure trade dress rights through litigation: This is an issue for the legal team. If you are going to go for litigation consider doing so based on trade dress as this form of legal protection is likely the most robust option. Be aware of the complexity of such cases before proceeding.
Use design patents to secure visual design protection on UX design solutions: Consider the visual (non-functional) aspects of your solutions absolutely worth protecting and make sure that your IP counsel understands design patent filings and related methods. There are many ways to employ design patents beyond those adopted by Apple in this litigation.
To comment on this post, go to the comment link at the end of the references.
1 In the context of this article, “UX” refers to the user’s experience with a product, process, or system. UX is differentiated from product design and user interface design in that UX refers to the combined experience of these and other aspects of the product or service, such as utility, ease of use and efficiency.
4 Robert Katz Esq. Partner at Banner & Witcoff in Washington, DC. Mr. Katz is a leading attorney with extensive experience in complex UX and product design patent prosecution and enforcement. He works with leading corporate clients on a wide range of UX design and product design IP matters on a worldwide basis. Mr. Katz was previously a patent examiner at the USPTO and holds undergraduate degree in Mechanical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University and a JD from George Washington University. http://www.bannerwitcoff.com/rkatz/5 Charles L Mauro CHFP, Moderator: Mr. Mauro is President of MauroNewMedia founded in 1975 specializing in UX and Product Design, usability engineering and new media strategy. He holds numerous US and international patents covering UX and product design. He has been responsible for complex UX design solutions currently running on major world markets. Charles is the Chairman of the Design Protection Section of the Industrial Designers Society of America and is the IDSA liaison to the USPTO for Design Day 2011-12. He has received awards and citations from the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Association of Computing Machines and, NASA. He has been quoted in Science, New York Times, BusinessWeek, Wall Street Journal. He served as expert witness in over 50 cases covering GUI design and product design. Mr. Mauro recently represented leading corporate clients in related mobile UX cases. Mr. Mauro is NYTECH UX Design Track founder and session moderator.
8 Anton A. Huurdeman (31 July 2003). The Worldwide History of Telecommuncations, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 176-177. ISBN 978-0-471-20505-0. Retrieved 7 August 2012.
11 Total User Experience (TUX) in the context of this discussion refers to the combined look, feel and function of a product comprised of the physical product design, screen design, interaction design/related behaviors and the graphic look of the screens of the device. In the larger context TUX refers to the customer’s total experience with a product or service as defined by comprehensive task analysis covering all critical touch points that impact the user’s perception, use and maintenance of the device.
up the good get the job done.
the feeds additionally? I’m satisfied to find numerous useful info here in the publish, we want work out more strategies on this regard, thank you for sharing. . . . . .

matches: V. v. v. v. v. art31


text:
MOSEY CAFE, INC. vs. LICENSING BOARD FOR THE CITY OF BOSTON & another.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on September 20, 1957.
The suit was reported by Morton, J.
Hirsh Freed, (Arthur Sherman & Herbert Baer with him,) for the plaintiff.
William H. Kerr, for the defendants Licensing Board for the City of Boston and another.
WILKINS, C.J. This bill in equity for a declaratory decree under G. L. c. 231A is reserved and reported without decision upon the pleadings and an agreement as to all the material facts. G. L. c. 214, Section 31. The broad questions to be determined are whether G. L. c. 140, Section 183A, and Revised Ordinances of Boston (1947) c. 40A, Section 1, cl. 92, are inapplicable or void as to the plaintiff in so far as they purport to impose licensing requirements and the payment of license fees for furnishing public entertainment on weekdays solely through "music provided by mechanical or electrical means" by the use of "juke boxes," television, or radio. The defendants are the city and the licensing board.
The plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, has a place of business known as "Ball and Bat Cafe" at 565 Tremont Street, Boston. It has been licensed by the board as a common victualler under G. L. c. 140, Section 2, and as a common victualler it has been further licensed by the board under G. L. c. 138, Section 12, as amended, to sell, on all days of the week, all alcoholic beverages for consumption on its premises. The licenses for 1958 are evidenced by a combination license issued on December 31, 1957, upon payment of a fee of $45 under the Revised Ordinances of Boston (1947) c. 40A, Section 1, cl. 68, for the common victualler's license and a fee of $1,400 under G. L. c. 138, Section 12, for the alcoholic beverages license.
and drink are sold for cash to members of the general public without admission fee, cover charge, or minimum charge.
The plaintiff maintains two television sets and a radio set by which on weekdays it makes regularly broadcasted programs available to customers without any payment or deposit of money over and above their payment for food, drink, or other refreshment sold to them for cash. It also maintains a coin-operated "juke box," which is a phonograph, with a capacity for one hundred "two play" records. This is an automatic electrical device which furnishes recorded music, and through its use on lawful hours on weekdays the plaintiff makes available to customers "musical entertainment provided by mechanical or electrical means" on a voluntary basis according to their own selection upon deposit of a coin, but without other payment or deposit of money over and above their payment for food, drink, or other refreshment sold to them for cash.
The plaintiff contends that it has the right to furnish to customers, at lawful times and in a proper manner and in compliance with all other pertinent laws, public entertainment on weekdays through the use of television, radio, and "music provided by mechanical or electrical means" without obtaining any license pursuant to G. L. c. 140, Section 183A, or paying any license fee under cl. 92 of the ordinance.
on week days only, has been issued by the licensing authorities . . .. Such licenses, unless sooner revoked, shall expire on December thirty-first of each year."
Chapter 40A, [Note p202-1] Section 1, provides in part: "Fees and charges are hereby fixed under chapter 222 of the acts of 1949 as follows: . . . (92) Entertainment License. The fee for a license granted by the licensing board under section 183A of chapter 140 of the General Laws (including a license so granted to an innholder or common victualler) shall be $100.00; provided, that in cases where the entertainment is solely through the use of television, radio, and music provided by mechanical or electrical means, the fee shall be $50.00; and provided also, that in cases where the entertainment is solely provided by not exceeding four instrumentalists, the fee shall be $75.00."
On December 30, 1957, the board issued to the plaintiff upon the payment of $50 a weekday entertainment license under cl. 92 for radio, phonograph, and television for the year 1958.
television might have been unknown when Section 183A was drafted, the very broad language, "public show of any description," must be taken to comprehend new modes of entertainment. See Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 403. We, therefore, do not accept the plaintiff's argument that Section 183A does not include a "juke box" because of the omission of the specific, but narrower, phrase found in Section 181, "amusement . . . furnished upon a deposit of money in a coin controlled apparatus." The greater phrase used includes the lesser. Further detailed discussion of the arguments respecting this aspect of statutory interpretation would profit our jurisprudence nothing.
2. Another question of construction is presented by the last sentence of Section 183A, which provides that "no fee shall be chargeable" for the license thereby required "to a person who, for the period covered by such license, is also licensed under section two." General Laws c. 140, Section 2, reads in part: "Licensing authorities may grant licenses to persons to be innholders or common victuallers." The plaintiff argues that because it is already licensed as a common victualler under c. 40A, Section 1, cl. 68, it cannot be made to acquire an entertainment license under cl. 92, which expressly refers to Section 183A.
in whole or in part or to affect in any way any fee or charge theretofore or thereafter fixed by ordinance under this act."
The Legislature in c. 222 showed an intent to empower the city to fix certain license fees, such as the one before us, and to make c. 222 the sole source of power unless express mention of the act should be made in later legislation. The language of Section 3 must be taken to wipe the slate clean of prior limitations even though expressed in the formally prohibitory words, "no fee shall be chargeable."
3. The plaintiff raises constitutional questions. In so doing it asserts that Section 183A "is clearly a censorship statute," and that "Section 183A and cl. 92 do not regulate, in any respect or to any extent, the place or time or manner of, nor the machine or device employed in, such `entertainment,' but directly and immediately and exclusively apply their force to the actual content of the entertainment furnished." With these assertions we are not in accord. Section 183A is not a censorship statute. We are of opinion that the purpose of Section 183A and of the ordinance is the preservation of public order at public entertainments. We fail to perceive any prior restraint or any attempt to impinge upon the constitutional guaranties of free speech and freedom of the press. We regard such cases as Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, and Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 58, as inapplicable to the statute and ordinance rightly construed. In Jaffarian v. Building Commr. of Somerville, 275 Mass. 267, 271, this court said in an opinion by Chief Justice Rugg, "The right to require licenses is based on the conception that places of public amusement may require supervision by public authorities to the end that they may not degenerate and become obnoxious to the public welfare." See Opinion of the Justices, 247 Mass. 589, 594-595.
that the board ever attempted to use the licensing requirement as a cloak for exercising as to even one day's program a censorship power which the statute does not confer.
We are mindful of the plaintiff's argument that Section 183A establishes no standards for the granting or denial of licenses, and is, therefore, void under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. But the purpose being the preservation of public order at public entertainments, greater particularity was not required. Instead of attempting to make an advance delineation of all possible circumstances in which applications might be made or licenses granted, Section 183A confers upon the licensing authorities a "quasi judicial authority to determine the facts and to pass upon the application in each instance under the serious sense of responsibility imposed upon them by their official positions and the delicate character of the duty entrusted to them." Butler v. East Bridgewater, 330 Mass. 33, 37. They cannot act in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Commonwealth v. McGann, 213 Mass. 213, 215. General Outdoor Advertising Co. Inc. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 192. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 144, affd. sub nom. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576. See Hannan v. Haverhill, 120 F. 2d 87, 89 (1st Cir.). They cannot function as a board of censors. Each individual application must be determined on its own set of facts. The licensing procedure is appropriate to afford notice to the municipal authorities of locations where large numbers of people might gather at one time under a single roof. See Opinion of the Justices, 247 Mass. 589, 594-595. It is likewise proper that the operation of radios, television sets, and "juke boxes" in restaurants, bars, taverns, and other eating or drinking places not be allowed to become a public nuisance due to noise. That the plaintiff's premises have never become a nuisance is not decisive. Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415, 419. Jaffarian v. Building Commr. of Somerville, 275 Mass. 267, 271. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 629. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 594.
legislated [Note p206-1] that the States have been excluded from dealing with television and radio as a matter of local public order. The statements in Allen B. Dumont Labs. Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F. 2d 153, 156 (3d Cir.), must be read in the light of the question before the court, which was one of attempted State censorship. As the court said, also at page 156, "Program control was entrusted to the Federal Commission and it is an effective one."
Another case relied upon by the plaintiff which must be read within the scope of the question presented is Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 58. We were there dealing with a statute, G. L. c. 136, Section 4, which required advance approval by public officials of a motion picture film intended for public entertainment on the Lord's day "as being in keeping with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due observance." The holding (page 62) was that the statute "as applied to the plaintiff in the circumstances set forth in the bill of complaint is unconstitutional and void." In a companion case brought by a motion picture distributor, Times Film Corp. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 62, which raised a similar question under the same statute, we dismissed the petition without prejudice, saying (page 63), "It is not to be assumed that the respondent, who is a public officer and a defendant in the Brattle Films case, will not carry out his duty under the law."
4. A final decree is to be entered declaring that the plaintiff's activities as set forth in its bill fall within G. L. c. 140, Section 183A, and Revised Ordinances of Boston (1947) c. 40A, Section 1, cl. 92, the provisions of which are not unconstitutional or void as applied to the plaintiff.
[Note p202-1] Effective December 1, 1956. -- REPORTER.
[Note p206-1] Communications act of 1934, Sections 2 (a), 3 (b, d), 303 (g), 48 Stat. 1064, 1065, 1082, as amended, 47 U. S. C. Sections 152 (a), 153 (b, d), 303 (g) (1952). Communications act of 1934, Section 326, 48 Stat. 1091, as amended, 47 U. S. C. Section 326 (1952).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


42 WATKINS v. ROBERTSON, 105 Va. 269, 54 S. E. 33, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194, 115 Am. St Rep. 8S0, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 43; Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 1, at page 83, 7 L. Ed. 761; Jackson v. Parkhurst, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 209; Smith v. Burnham, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 306; Cutler v. Dickinson, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 386; Dobbins v. Cruger, 108 111. 188; City of Ottawa v. Bank, 105 U. S. 342, 26 L. Ed. 1127; Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Me. 186; Thompson v. Smith, 96 Mich. 258, 55 N. W. 886; Carson v. Cochran, 52 Minn. 67, 53 N. W. 1130; Moore v. Earl, 91 Cal. 632, 27 Pac. 1087; Chapman v. Persinger's Ex'x, 87 Va. 581, 13 S. E. 549; Billingsley v. Harris, 79 Wis. 103, 48 N. W. 108; Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Bender, 124 N. Y. 47, 26 N. E. 345, 11 L. R. A. 708; Rogers v. Bollinger, 59 Ark. 12, 26 S. W. 12; Balue v. Taylor, 136 Ind. 368, 36 N. E. 269; Johnston v. Oliver, 51 Ohio St. 6, 36 N. E. 458; Willis v. Terry (Ky.) 24 S. W. 621. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 82; Cent. Dig. §§ 225-280; "Estoppel," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 14; Cent. Dig. §§ 18-25.
43 Bowman v. Taylor, 2 Adol. & E. 278. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 82; Cent. Dig. §§ 225-230; "Estoppel," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 14; Cent. Dig. §§ 18-25.
44 Wallace's Lessee v. Miner, 6 Ohio, 367; Zimmler v. Water Co., 57 Cal. 221 See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 82; Cent. Dig. §§ 225-230; "Estoppel," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 14; Cent. Dig. §§ 18-25.


text:
This privacy notice applies to any StarTiger website, application, service or tool (collectively "Services") where this privacy notice is referenced, regardless of how you access or use them, including through mobile devices.
This privacy notice also applies to the provision of StarTiger services through any StarTiger partner's website, application, service or tool where it is referenced and where your content is published or advertised in accordance with the terms of this privacy notice.
We may amend this privacy notice at any time by posting the amended version on this site including the effective date of the amended version. We will announce any material changes to this privacy notice through the StarTiger message service and/or via email.
We collect personal information from you and any devices (including mobile devices) you use when you: use our Services, register for an account with us, provide us information on a web form, update or add information to your account, participate in a community board discussion or chat, or when you otherwise correspond with us.
Some of this personal information, such as a way to identify you, is necessary to enter into our Subscription Agreement. The provision of all other personal information is voluntary, but may be necessary in order to use our Services, such as address requests, address and response submissions and information needed to conclude a trade.
Identifying information such as your name, addresses or email addresses when you register for an account with us.
Other content that you generate, or that is connected to your account (such as adding celebrities to your favorites list, creating MyLists or MyCollection pages, and following other collectors and members).
Postage, billing and other information you provide through one of our Services, as well as Tax ID or other identification numbers and relevant postage information (such as tracking numbers and tracking updates).
You may also provide us other information through a web form, by updating or adding information to your account, through your participation in community discussions, member-to-member communications, chats, or when you otherwise communicate with us regarding our Services.
Social Media. We allow you to share information with social media sites, or use social media sites to create your account or to connect your account with the respective social media site. Those social media sites may give us automatic access to certain personal information retained by them about you (e.g., content viewed by you, content liked by you and information about the advertisements you have been shown or have clicked on, etc.). You control the personal information you allow us to have access to through the privacy settings on the applicable social media site and the permissions you give us when you grant us access to the personal information retained by the respective social media site about you. By associating an account managed by a social media site with your account and authorising us to have access to this information, you agree that we can collect, use and retain the information provided by these social media sites in accordance with this privacy notice. We may also use plug-ins or other technologies from various social media sites. If you click on a link provided via a social media plug in, you are voluntarily establishing a connection with that respective social media site.
To contact you regarding your account, to troubleshoot problems with your account, to collect fees or monies owed or as otherwise necessary to provide you customer service.
When contacting you for such purposes as outlined above, we may contact you via email or postal mail.
We use general location information to provide you with location based services (such as search results and other personalised content).
To enforce our Subscription Agreement, this privacy notice, or other policies, and to monitor member-to-member communications for violations of our policies or applicable laws.
Personalise, measure and improve our pages based on your customisation preferences.
Monitor and improve the information security of our site.
Provide you with marketing via email, text.
Provide you with marketing from other MicroTide corporate family members.
You can control your email communication preferences in the Profile section within StarTiger as well as the Profile section within the StarTiger forum. There, you can also control your member-to-member communications preferences setting and choose which newsletters and promotions you want to receive.
If you do not wish to receive marketing communications from us, you can unsubscribe via the link in an email you received, change your Communication Preferences within your StarTiger Profile, or contact us as described in the Contact section. Keep in mind, we do not sell, rent or otherwise disclose your personal information to third parties for their marketing purposes without your consent.
Members of our MicroTide corporate family will use your personal information to send you marketing communications only if you have consented to receive such communications from them or if otherwise permitted by the law.
Third party service providers who help us to provide our Services, payment processing services, assist us in providing customised advertising, to assist us with the prevention, detection, mitigation, and investigation of potentially illegal acts, violations of our Subscription Agreement, fraud and/or security breaches, bill collection, affiliate and rewards programs and other business operations.
Third party financial institutions with whom we partner to offer financial products to you, for them to provide joint content and services (such as, registration, trade and customer support). These third party financial institution partners will use your personal information to send you marketing communications only if you have requested their services.
Third party delivery providers (e.g., DHL, UPS, USPS, etc.) with whom we share delivery address, contact information and shipment tracking information for the purposes of facilitating the delivery of items won and other delivery related communications.
Third party providers of websites, applications, services and tools that we cooperate with so that they can publish or advertise your submissions and their content on their websites or in their applications, services and tools. If we transfer personal information along with the content of your submissions to third party providers, this will be solely on the basis of an agreement limiting use by the third party provider of such personal information to processing necessary to fulfil their contract with us and obligating the third party provider to take security measures with regard to such data. Third party providers are not permitted to sell, lease or in any other way transfer the personal information included in your submissions to third parties.
To comply with our legal requirements, enforce our Subscription Agreement, respond to claims that a submission or other content violates the rights of others, or protect anyone's rights, property or safety.
To law enforcement or governmental agencies, or authorised third-parties, in response to a verified request or legal process relating to a criminal investigation or alleged or suspected illegal activity or any other activity that exposes us, you, or any other of our users to legal liability. We will only disclose information we deem relevant to the investigation or inquiry, such as name, city, state, postcode, telephone number, email address, User ID history, IP address and fraud complaints.
Contacting users with unwanted or threatening messages is a violation of our Subscription Agreement.
To facilitate the processing of payment cards when you pay within our Services with a payment card and we use PayPal or WorldPay to process your payment.
Change of Ownership If we are subject to a merger or acquisition with/by another company, we may share information with them in accordance with our global privacy standards. Should such an event occur, we will require that the new combined entity follow this privacy notice with respect to your personal information. If we intend to handle your personal information for any purposes not covered in this privacy notice, you will receive prior notification of the processing of your personal information for the new purposes.
Other users have access to the information you share on StarTiger. For example, other users can see your address requests, trades, pendings and responses, MyCollection, members you follow, feedback, ratings and associated comments. Other users can also see any information you chose to share in your profile or your pages.
Your Username and User ID is displayed throughout StarTiger and is available to the public. It is connected to all of your StarTiger activity. Notices sent to other users about suspicious activity and notice violations on our sites refer to Usernames, User IDs and specific submissions. So if you associate your name with your Username or User ID, the people to whom you have revealed your name will be able to personally identify your StarTiger activities.
To help protect your privacy, we allow only limited access to other users' contact information as necessary to facilitate your transactions. However, when users are involved in a transaction, they have access to each other's name, Username, User ID, email address and other contact and shipping information.
Our Services are meant for the general public and not for children. We do not knowingly collect personal data of persons who are children according to local juristictions.
We cannot guarantee the privacy or security of your information once you provide it to a third party.
Many data processing operations are only possible with your express consent. You may revoke your consent at any time with future effect. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
As permitted by law, you have the right to be provided at any time with information about any of your personal data that is stored as well as its origin, the recipient and the purpose for which it has been processed. You also have the right to have this data corrected, blocked or deleted. You can contact us at any time using the address given in our legal notice if you have further questions on the topic of personal data.
We will, therefore, process any data you enter onto the contact form only with your consent per Art. 6 (1)(a) DSGVO. You may revoke your consent at any time. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
You can register on our website in order to access additional functions offered here. The mandatory information requested during registration must be provided in full. Otherwise, we will reject your registration.
The comments are stored based on your consent per Art. 6 (1) (a) DSGVO. You may revoke your consent at any time with future effect. The data processed before we receive your request may still be legally processed.
Our website accepts payments via WorldPay. The provider of this service is Worldpay (UK) Limited Registered in England No. 07316500. Registered Office: The Walbrook Building, 25 Walbrook, London EC4N 8AF, United Kingdom.
If you select payment via WorldPay, the payment data you provide will be supplied to WorldPay based on Art. 6 (1) (a) (Consent) and Art. 6 (1) (b) DSGVO (Processing for contract purposes). You have the option to revoke your consent at any time with future effect. It does not affect the processing of data previously collected.
Diese Übersetzung dient ausschließlich zu Informationszwecken und ist kein rechtsverbindliches Dokument. Die ursprünglichen Bestimmungen sind in der englischen Originalfassung dargelegt.
Diese Datenschutzerklärung wurde am 10. Mai veröffentlicht. Sie tritt für Nutzer, die sich ab 10. Mai 2018 bei StarTiger angemeldet haben, zu diesem Zeitpunkt in Kraft. Für alle anderen Nutzer tritt sie ab 25. Mai 2018 in Kraft.
Diese Datenschutzerklärung gilt für alle Websites, Anwendungen, Services oder Tools von StarTiger (zusammenfassend „Services“), in denen auf diese Datenschutzerklärung Bezug genommen wird, unabhängig davon, wie Sie diese Services aufrufen oder verwenden, einschließlich des Zugriffs über Mobilgeräte.
Diese Datenschutzerklärung gilt auch für die Bereitstellung von Services über alle Partner-Websites, Anwendungen, Services oder Tools von MicroTide, in denen auf diese Datenschutzerklärung Bezug genommen wird und in denen Ihre übermittelten Daten und deren Inhalte gemäß dieser Datenschutzerklärung veröffentlicht oder beworben werden.
Diese Datenschutzerklärung kann von uns jederzeit geändert werden, indem wir die geänderte Fassung auf dieser Website veröffentlichen und gleichzeitig den Zeitpunkt des Inkrafttretens der geänderten Fassung angeben. Alle wesentlichen Änderungen dieser Datenschutzerklärung werden Ihnen über die Nachrichtenfunktion in StarTiger und/oder per E-Mail mitgeteilt.
Wir erheben personenbezogene Daten von Ihnen und den von Ihnen verwendeten Geräten (auch Mobilgeräten), wenn Sie: unsere Services nutzen, ein neues StarTiger-Benutzerkonto anlegen, uns Informationen über ein Webformular mitteilen, Informationen zu Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto hinzufügen oder diese aktualisieren, sich an Community-Diskussionen beteiligen oder auf andere Art und Weise mit uns in Kontakt treten.
Einige dieser personenbezogenen Daten, z.B. solche, über die wir Sie identifizieren können, sind erforderlich um den Nutzungsvertrag abschließen und durchführen zu können. Die Überlassung aller anderen personenbezogenen Daten ist freiwillig, kann aber zur Nutzung notwendig sein, wie z.B. Daten zu Adressanfragen, eingetragenen Antworten und Tauschgeschäften.
Daten, die Sie identifizieren, wie Name, Anschrift oder E-Mail-Adressen, die Sie bei der Einrichtung Ihres StarTiger-Benutzerkontos angeben.
Daten zu Adressanfragen (Address Requests), Tauschgeschäften (Trades), eingetragenen Sendungen und Antworten (Pendings/Responses), die Sie bei der Benutzung von StarTiger angeben, oder weitere Inhalte, die Sie generieren oder die aufgrund einer Anfrage oder Einreichung, an der Sie beteiligt sind, mit Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto verbunden sind.
Sonstige Inhalte, die Sie generieren oder die mit Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto verbunden sind (wenn Sie z.B. Stars auf ihre Beobachtungsliste setzen, Sammlungen erstellen, anderen Sammlungen oder Mitgliedern folgen).
Versand-, Rechnungs- und andere Daten, die Sie für eine StarTiger Mitgliedschaft angeben, sowie etwaige Steuernummern oder sonstige Identifizierungsnummern) und relevante Versandinformationen (z.B. Sendungsnummern und Sendungsverfolgung), sofern ein Versand über unsere Plattform erfolgt.
Sie können uns weitere Informationen über ein Webformular zur Verfügung stellen oder durch Aktualisieren oder Hinzufügen von Daten zu Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto, durch Beteiligung an Community-Diskussionen, Chats, oder wenn Sie aus anderen Gründen mit uns bezüglich unserer Services Kontakt aufnehmen.
Computer- und Verbindungsinformationen, wie Statistiken über Ihr Aufrufen von StarTiger-Services, Informationen zum Datenverkehr zu und von Websites, Referral-URL, Informationen zu Werbeanzeigen, Ihre IP-Adresse, Ihre Browser-Verlaufsdaten und Ihre Weblog-Informationen.
Wir ergänzen die personenbezogenen Daten, die wir direkt erheben, mit Daten, die wir von Dritten einholen, und fügen diese Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto hinzu. Beispielsweise erheben und nutzen wir im Rahmen der gesetzlichen Vorschriften demografische und andere Daten, die öffentlich verfügbar sind.
Soziale Netzwerke. Wir ermöglichen es Ihnen, Daten mit sozialen Netzwerken zu teilen oder soziale Netzwerke zu nutzen, um ein StarTiger-Benutzerkonto anzulegen oder Ihr StarTiger-Benutzerkonto mit dem jeweiligen sozialen Netzwerk zu verknüpfen. Diese sozialen Netzwerke können uns automatisch Zugang zu bestimmten personenbezogenen Daten einräumen, die dort über Sie gespeichert sind (z.B. Inhalte, die Sie sich angesehen haben oder die Ihnen gefallen, Informationen zu den Werbeanzeigen, die Ihnen angezeigt wurden oder die Sie angeklickt haben, usw.). Auf welche personenbezogenen Daten wir zugreifen können, legen Sie über die Datenschutzeinstellungen des jeweiligen sozialen Netzwerks fest und über die Berechtigungen, die Sie uns bei der Gewährung von Zugriff auf Ihre bei dem jeweiligen sozialen Netzwerk gespeicherten personenbezogenen Daten geben. Wenn Sie ein von einem sozialen Netzwerk verwaltetes Konto mit Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto verknüpfen und uns den Zugriff auf diese Informationen gestatten, verarbeiten wir die Informationen von den betreffenden sozialen Netzwerken in Übereinstimmung mit dieser Datenschutzerklärung. Wir können auch Plug-Ins oder andere Technologien diverser sozialer Netzwerke nutzen. Wenn Sie einen Link anklicken, der über ein Plug-In eines sozialen Netzwerks angezeigt wird, stellen Sie freiwillig eine Verbindung zu dem jeweiligen sozialen Netzwerk her.
Die Bereitstellung von Zahlungsabwicklung und Kontoverwaltung, den Betrieb, die Beurteilung und Verbesserung unserer Services, die Absicherung und Funktionsfähigkeit unserer Services sowie die Anpassung von Seiteninhalten, um anhand der von Ihnen vorgenommenen Handlungen die Einträge und Services anzuzeigen, die Ihnen gefallen könnten.
Die Kontaktaufnahme mit Ihnen bezüglich Ihres StarTiger-Benutzerkontos, um Probleme mit Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto zu klären, um Gebührenforderungen durchzusetzen oder sonstige Maßnahmen im Rahmen des Kundenservice.
Falls wir Sie aus diesen Gründen kontaktieren, können wir Sie per E-Mail oder Post kontaktieren.
Wir verwenden allgemeine Standortdaten, um Ihnen standortbasierte Services (wie Suchergebnisse und andere personalisierte Inhalte) zur Verfügung zu stellen.
Die Durchsetzung unserer Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, dieser Datenschutzerklärung und anderer Grundsätze sowie zur Überwachung der Kommunikation der Mitglieder untereinander in Verbindung mit Verstößen gegen unsere Grundsätze und das geltende Recht.
Personalisierung, Messung und Verbesserung unserer Seiten gemäß Ihrer Anpassungseinstellungen.
Beurteilung des Servicestatus sowie Überwachung und Verbesserung der Informationssicherheit unserer Services.
Zurverfügungstellen von Werbung über E-Mail oder in Textform.
Zurverfügungstellen von Werbung anderer Mitglieder der MicroTide Unternehmensgruppe.
In den Einstellungen Ihres StarTiger Profiles sowie in den Einstellungen unseres Forums können Sie Ihre E-Mail-Benachrichtigungseinstellungen festlegen. Dort können Sie auch Einstellungen für die Kommunikation mit anderen Nutzern festlegen und auswählen, welche Newsletter und Sonderaktionen Sie erhalten möchten.
Wenn Sie keine Marketingmitteilungen von uns erhalten möchten, können Sie diese über den Link in der von Ihnen empfangenen E-Mail abbestellen, Ihre Benachrichtigungseinstellungen in ihrem StarTiger Profile ändern, oder uns diese unter dem angegebenen Kontakt mitteilen. Bitte beachten Sie, dass wir Ihre personenbezogenen Daten ohne Ihre Zustimmung nicht an Dritte für deren Marketingzwecke verkaufen, überlassen oder in anderer Weise weitergeben.
Wenn Sie sich mit Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto im Rahmen unserer Services anmelden, bieten wir Ihnen die Möglichkeit, für eine bestimmte Zeit in Ihrem StarTiger-Benutzerkonto eingeloggt zu bleiben. Wenn Sie einen öffentlichen Computer verwenden oder Ihren Computer mit anderen Personen teilen, raten wir davon ab, die Funktion „Eingeloggt bleiben“ zu verwenden. Sie und jeder andere Nutzer des Computers/Browsers, über den Sie sich eingeloggt haben, können während des Zeitraums, in dem Sie eingeloggt sind, ohne weitere Autorisierung die meisten Bereiche Ihres StarTiger-Benutzerkontos einsehen und darauf zugreifen, um bestimmte Aktionen durchzuführen.
Sie beenden die Sitzung, für die Sie eingeloggt sind, normalerweise, indem Sie sich ausloggen und/oder Ihre Cookies löschen. Wenn Sie bestimmte Datenschutzeinstellungen im Browser aktiviert haben, können Sie die Sitzung, für die Sie eingeloggt sind, auch durch einfaches Schließen des Browsers beenden. Wenn Sie einen öffentlichen Computer benutzen oder Ihren Computer mit anderen Personen teilen, sollten Sie sich ausloggen und/oder Ihre Cookies löschen, sobald Sie unsere Services nicht mehr nutzen, um Ihr StarTiger-Benutzerkonto und Ihre personenbezogenen Daten zu schützen.
Mitglieder der MicroTide-Unternehmensgruppe dürfen Ihre personenbezogenen Daten allerdings nur dann für die Übermittlung von Marketingmitteilungen an Sie verwenden, wenn Sie eingewilligt haben, solche Mitteilungen zu erhalten oder dies anderweitig gesetzlich zulässig ist.
An externe Serviceanbieter, die uns in unserem Geschäftsbetrieb unterstützen, Zahlungsdienste für uns erbringen, uns bei der Bereitstellung personalisierter Werbung behilflich sind sowie uns bei der Verhinderung, Erkennung, Eindämmung und Untersuchung von möglicherweise rechtswidrigen Handlungen, Verstößen gegen unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, Betrug und/oder Sicherheitsverletzungen, in Zusammenhang mit Rechnungsinkasso, Partner- und Prämienprogrammen und anderen Geschäftsvorgängen unterstützen.
An Versandunternehmen (z.B. DHL, UPS, USPS usw.), an die wir Ihre Lieferadresse, Kontaktdaten und die Angaben zur Sendungsverfolgung weitergeben, um die Lieferung gewonnener Artikel und andere mit der Lieferung zusammenhängende Mitteilungen zu ermöglichen.
An Strafverfolgungsbehörden, staatliche Stellen oder autorisierte Dritte aufgrund eines Auskunftsersuchens oder im Zusammenhang mit einem Ermittlungsverfahren oder dem Verdacht auf eine Straftat, eine rechtswidrige Handlung oder eine andere Handlung, aus der sich für uns, Sie oder einen anderen Nutzer eine rechtliche Haftung ergeben kann. In solchen Fällen werden wir nur die für die Untersuchung oder das Auskunftsersuchen nach unserer Einschätzung relevanten Daten offenlegen, wie z.B. Name, Ort, Postleitzahl, Telefonnummer, E-Mail-Adresse, bisherige Nutzernamen, IP-Adresse, Betrugsbeschwerden.
Wenn Sie eine Transaktion mit einem anderen Nutzer durchführen, kann der andere Nutzer bei uns Informationen über Sie anfordern, die für den Abschluss der Transaktion notwendig sind, z.B. Ihren Namen, Ihre Mitgliedsnummer, Ihre E-Mail-Adresse, Ihre Kontakt-, Versand- und Rechnungsinformationen oder andere Ihrer Informationen, die erforderlich sind, um die Zuverlässigkeit und Sicherheit der Transaktion zu fördern.
Um möglicherweise rechtswidrige Handlungen, Betrug und/oder Sicherheitsverletzungen zu verhindern, zu erkennen, einzudämmen und zu untersuchen sowie zu Zwecken der Risikobewertung und des Risikomanagements, insbesondere um Sie zu warnen, wenn betrügerische Aktivitäten auf Ihrem StarTiger Mitgliedskonto entdeckt wurden.
Um Leistungen des Kundenservice zu erbringen.
Um Kreditkartenzahlungen abzuwickeln, wenn Sie im Rahmen unserer Services mit einer Kreditkarte bezahlen und wir PayPal bzw. WorldPay für die Zahlungsabwicklung verwenden.
Hierzu sowie zu weiteren Fragen zum Thema Datenschutz können Sie sich jederzeit unter der im Impressum angegebenen Adresse an uns wenden. Des Weiteren steht Ihnen ein Beschwerderecht bei der zuständigen Aufsichtsbehörde zu, falls Sie der Auffassung sind, dass die Verarbeitung ihrer personenbezogenen Daten rechtswidrig erfolgt.
Andere Nutzer haben Zugang zu den Informationen, die Sie bei StarTiger offenlegen oder an andere Nutzer weitergeben. Andere Nutzer können beispielsweise Ihre Addressanfragen (Address Requests), Tauschgeschäfte (Trades), eingetragenen Sendungen und Antworten (Pendings/Responses), MyCollection und die Mitglieder, denen Sie folgen, Rückmeldungen, Bewertungen und Bewertungskommentare einsehen. Andere Nutzer können auch sämtliche Informationen über Sie sehen, die Sie in Ihrem Profil oder auf StarTiger Seiten öffentlich gemacht haben.
Wenn Sie unsere Services nutzen, wird Ihr öffentlicher Nutzername angezeigt und ist somit für die Öffentlichkeit einsehbar. Er ist mit allen Ihren öffentlichen StarTiger-Aktivitäten verknüpft. Hinweise auf verdächtige Aktivitäten und Verstöße gegen die Grundsätze auf unseren Websites, die an andere StarTiger-Nutzer gesendet werden, enthalten möglicherweise Ihren öffentlichen Nutzernamen und konkrete Angaben zu Adresseinträgen. Wenn Sie also Ihren Namen mit Ihrem Nutzernamen verknüpfen, können Personen, denen Sie Ihren Namen mitgeteilt haben, Ihre StarTiger-Aktivitäten mit Ihrer Person in Verbindung bringen.
Um den Schutz Ihrer personenbezogenen Daten zu gewährleisten, erlauben wir anderen Nutzern nur einen eingeschränkten Zugriff auf Ihre Kontaktinformationen, das heißt, nur insoweit, als die betreffenden Daten für die Abwicklung von Tauschgeschäften und zur Kommunikation erforderlich sind. Die an einer Transaktion beteiligten Nutzer erhalten jedoch unter Umständen Zugriff auf Namen, Nutzernamen, E-Mail-Adresse und andere Kontaktdaten und Versandinformationen ihres jeweiligen Handelspartners.
Wir dulden keinen Missbrauch unserer Services. Es ist Ihnen nicht erlaubt, andere Nutzer zu Ihren Verteilerlisten (E-Mail oder postalisch) hinzuzufügen oder an diese Nachrichten für gewerbliche Zwecke zu senden, sofern der betreffende Nutzer nicht seine ausdrückliche Einwilligung dazu gegeben hat. Dies gilt auch für Nutzer, mit denen Sie bereits Kontakt hatten. Das Senden unerwünschter, bedrohender oder betrügerischer E-Mail- oder Nachrichten stellt einen Verstoß gegen unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen dar. Bitte melden Sie Spam- oder betrügerische E-Mail- oder Nachrichten im Zusammenhang mit StarTiger und leiten Sie sie an microtide@startiger.com weiter.
Sie können sich auf unserer Website registrieren, um zusätzliche Funktionen auf der Seite zu nutzen. Die bei der Registrierung abgefragten Pflichtangaben müssen vollständig angegeben werden. Anderenfalls werden wir die Registrierung ablehnen.
Die Speicherung der Kommentare erfolgt auf Grundlage Ihrer Einwilligung (Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a DSGVO). Sie können eine von Ihnen erteilte Einwilligung jederzeit widerrufen. Die Rechtmäßigkeit der bereits erfolgten Datenverarbeitungsvorgänge bleibt vom Widerruf unberührt.
Auf unserer Website bieten wir u.a. die Bezahlung via WorldPay an. Anbieter dieses Zahlungsdienstes ist die Worldpay (UK) Limited Registered in England No. 07316500. Registered Office: The Walbrook Building, 25 Walbrook, London EC4N 8AF, United Kingdom (im Folgenden “WorldPay”).
Wenn Sie die Bezahlung via WorldPay auswählen, werden die von Ihnen eingegebenen Zahlungsdaten an WorldPay übermittelt.
Die Übermittlung Ihrer Daten an WorldPay erfolgt auf Grundlage von Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a DSGVO (Einwilligung) und Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. b DSGVO (Verarbeitung zur Erfüllung eines Vertrags). Sie haben die Möglichkeit, Ihre Einwilligung zur Datenverarbeitung jederzeit zu widerrufen. Ein Widerruf wirkt sich auf die Wirksamkeit von in der Vergangenheit liegenden Datenverarbeitungsvorgängen nicht aus.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6