Philip Sokolich, Plaintiff, v. Bernadette Sokolich; Bozemanlawfirm.com, Associate Leticia Arzu; New York State Attorney General, Then Andrew Cuomo; Westchester County, Probate and Surrogate Court in New York State; USPS, Ogdensburg, NY; USPS OIG; USPS Consumer Affairs; USPS Inspections Services; USPS Postal Regulatory Commission, Annie Kennedy; USPS Inspectors in North Carolina and Albany, NY; Dave Derosier; South Carolina Solicitor's Office; Aiken County Sheriff's Department, SC; Aiken SC Local Police Department; Burnettown, SC Police Department; Westchester County DA, Janet Difiore, Defendants.
The Plaintiff, Philip Sokolich ("Plaintiff"), is proceeding pro se in this matter which is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) DSC. Plaintiff indicates that he gave legal consent for his sister, Defendant Bernadette Sokolich, to act as executrix of their father-in-law's estate "worth an estimated $750,000 to $1 Million." (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Defendant Sokolich has allegedly withheld from Plaintiff a fifty percent (50%) share of the estate. (Id.) Plaintiff accuses his sister of fraud and also indicates that she has violated federal mail and wire fraud statutes. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant Bozeman Law firm is named for having been paid legal fees by Defendant Sokolich. (Id. at 4.) The Complaint indicates that Defendant Derosier, USPS Inspector, confirmed for Plaintiff an address change by Defendant Sokolich. (Id.) The remaining defendants are apparently named for failing to "do their duties." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks an order directing Defendant Sokolich to pay Plaintiff fifty percent of the estate. (Id.) Plaintiff also asks the court to direct other defendants to provide court documents and bank statements relating to the case. (Id.) Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
A court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation in order to hear and decide a case. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, Md., 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) "federal question," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) "diversity of citizenship," 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In the present case, Plaintiff is a resident of the state of New York. Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 & nn.13-16 (1978). The court has no diversity jurisdiction over this case because, according to the Plaintiff's Complaint, several of the defendants are also residents of the state of New York. In absence of diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy is irrelevant.
The pleadings also fail to provide any clear basis for federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. However, Plaintiff does ask the court, "if necessary [to] prosecute Bernadette Sokolich, et al. for U.S. mail fraud and wire fraud against Philip Sokolich." (ECF No. 1 at 5); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. While district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States, "[n]o citizen has an enforceable right to institute a criminal prosecution." Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 494 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Linda R. v. Richard V., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("In American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.")). Further, prosecutorial discretion does not reside in the judicial branch; the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring, generally rests within the prosecutor's discretion. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799, 825 (4th Cir. 1998) ("A judge in our system does not have the authority to tell prosecutors which crimes to prosecute or when to prosecute them") (quoting United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992)). Thus, Plaintiff lacks the right to institute, and the court lacks authority to initiate, criminal charges against any of the defendants.
Liberally construed, the Complaint may also attempt to assert a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights by the defendants. A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Alleged constitutional claims against federal entities or employees are evaluated under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), which established a direct cause of action under the United States Constitution against federal officials for the violation of federal constitutional rights. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 2006). A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore, caselaw involving § 1983 claims is applicable in Bivens actions. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20, n.30 (1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2000); Campbell v. Civil Air Patrol, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310, n.8 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("[T]he court shall refer interchangeably to cases decided under both § 1983 and Bivens.").
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a violation of his constitutional rights by the defendants, such a claim must fail. The Complaint identifies Defendant Sokolich as Plaintiff's sister, and Defendant Bozeman Law Firm as a private company which provided legal services thereto. However, purely private conduct such as that alleged in this case, no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961). As Plaintiff provides no facts to demonstrate that Defendants Sokolich and Bozeman Law Firm acted under color of state law, these two defendants are not amenable to suit under § 1983.
As Plaintiff does not meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction and any possible federal question claims Plaintiff may be asserting are subject to summary dismissal, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law fraud claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Next, Plaintiff names numerous state and federal offices, agencies and employees as defendants. While these remaining defendants would qualify as state or federal actors, Plaintiff provides insufficient facts to state a § 1983/Bivens claim against any of them. Instead, Plaintiff indicates that "the lower jurisdictions and USPS did not do their duties for" him. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) At best, Plaintiff alleges a claim of negligence, which is not generally cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983/Bivens. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n.3 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir.1995) ("The district court properly held that Daniels bars an action under § 1983 for negligent conduct[.]"). Thus, Plaintiff's claims regarding the allegedly negligent job performance of the state and federal defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Complaint in the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.


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Fixing maximum rates of interest on money loaned within the state by persons subject to its jurisdiction is clearly within the police power of the state, and the details are within legislative discretion if not unreasonably and arbitrarily exercised.
is within legislative discretion and a reasonable selection which is not merely arbitrary and without real difference does not deny equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute of Connecticut of 1907, limiting interest on loans is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the laws because it excepts loans made by national and state banks and trust companies and bona fide mortgages on real and personal property: the classification is a reasonable one.
The contract clause of the federal Constitution does not give validity to contracts that are properly prohibited by statute.
If the validity of the particular subject of classification assailed has not been so foreclosed by prior decisions as to render discussion frivolous, the motion to dismiss will be denied, but if, as in this case, it is manifest that the contention is, in view of prior decisions, without merit, the motion to affirm will prevail.
Upon a prosecution originating in the Police Court of the City of Hartford, in Hartford County, Connecticut, the plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the superior court of the county upon an information alleging, in six counts, the commission of offenses against chapter 238 of the Public Acts of Connecticut of 1907. The offenses charged were the exacting on certain loans of money a rate of interest greater than fifteen percent per annum, contrary to the provisions of the first section of the act, and in accepting notes for an amount greater than that actually loaned with intent to evade the provisions of said first section, contrary to the provisions of the second section of the act. During the course of the trial, the accused, in various forms, assailed the validity of the statute referred to because of repugnancy to the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States and to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. From a judgment imposing a fine as to the conviction upon each count, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Errors. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed (83 Conn. 1), and the case was then brought here.
Since the filing of the record of the State of Connecticut has moved that the writ of error be dismissed, or, in the alternative, that the judgment be affirmed.
of 1905, shall, directly or indirectly, loan money to any person, and directly or indirectly charge, demand, accept, or make an agreement to receive therefor interest at a greater rate than fifteen percentum per annum. The provisions of this section shall not apply to loans made to any national bank, or any bank or trust company duly incorporated under the laws of this state, or to any bona fide mortgage of real or personal property."
"SEC. 2. No person, firm, or corporation, with intent to evade section one hereof, shall accept a note for a greater amount than that actually loaned."
"It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that the statute in question is an arbitrary, unjust, and unreasonable selection, favoring a class; is detrimental to the public, stifles competition, and that no good reason exists for the granting of the privilege of loaning money at any rate of interest without taking a mortgage on real or personal property to the favored class, to the exclusion of all others."
"It is not a police regulation; there is no care imposed or restriction in the loan of money by the favored few -- simply an arbitrary, unreasonable limitation upon all except those privileged under the statute."
in effect a special statute permitting only certain favored individuals or corporations to do an act or conduct a business."
"There is 'no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others it leaves untouched.'"
"unless such regulations are so unreasonable and extravagant as to interfere with property and personal rights of citizens unnecessarily and arbitrarily, they are within the power of the state, and that the classification of the subjects of such legislation, so long as such classification has a reasonable basis, and is not merely arbitrary selection without real difference between the subjects included and those omitted from the law, does not deny to the citizen the equal protection of the laws."
Watson v. Maryland, ante, p. 218 U. S. 173 , and cases cited. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Errors ruled that the statute was not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, following a prior ruling to that effect made in State v. Hurlburt, 82 Conn. 232.
make such contracts. The further exception in favor of loans by trust companies chartered by this state was fully justified by the peculiar character of these institutions, each created by a special act of legislation, and subject to the inspection of the bank commissioners. Gen.Stat. 1902, ch. 199, 202. There was also reasonable cause for the exception as to pawnbrokers. Their business can only be carried on by those found by public authority to be suitable persons to engage in it, and its character is such as to make it not improper to allow a charge of interest beyond the limit of 15 percent a year. Pub. Acts 1905, c. 235, p. 438. There was also sufficient reason for restricting the statute so that it should not apply to loans made to any bank or to any trust company chartered by this state. Such institutions, managed by those accustomed to financial operations and familiar with the worth of money in the market from day to day, might well be deemed to require no statutory protection against being forced by their financial necessities to pay excessive interest for moneys borrowed. Nor is the act invalidated by the exception of mortgages."
in the same manner. Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338 , 207 U. S. 354 ; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 , 211 U. S. 281 . The enactment of the statute now in question fell within this right. Norwich Gas & Electric Co. v. Norwich, 76 Conn. 565, 573."
In the argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error, no attempt is made to meet the force of the foregoing statements of the court below; and, clearly, in the light of such declarations, it is impossible to conclude otherwise than that the classification complained of has a reasonable basis, and that the exemption of national banks, etc., was not a mere arbitrary selection.
In the argument for plaintiff in error, no reference is made to the claim urged below of the protection of the contract clause of the Constitution. The claim appears to have had reference to a provision contained in § 5 of the Act of 1907, forbidding the enforcement of contracts made in violation of the act, thereby operating to deny validity to such contracts when made by those not within the exempted classes. There was power to enact the provision ( Missouri, Kansas &c.; Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 351 , 172 U. S. 358 -359), and, as said by the court below, the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States "does not give validity to contracts which are properly prohibited by statute."
gone before, the contentions now advanced against the correctness of the judgment are so wholly without merit as not to require further argument. The motion to affirm must therefore prevail.

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LOS LUNAS CENTER FOR PERSONS with DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, et al., Defendants, and ARC of NEW MEXICO, Intervenors, and MARY TERRAZAS, et al., Intervenors pro se.
In 1990, the Honorable James A. Parker expressly found that "Defendants' failure to accommodate the severely handicapped in existing community programs while serving less severely handicapped peers is unreasonable and discriminatory." Jackson by Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F.Supp. 1243, 1299 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992). This finding came in his conclusions of law section regarding statutory discrimination claims brought pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 296-99. Judge Parker further found that "where reasonable accommodations in community programs can be made, defendants' failure to integrate severely handicapped residents into community programs which presently serve less severely handicapped residents violates § 504." Id. at 1299. He additionally concluded that Defendants were violating class members' substantive due process rights. Id. at 1306-07, 1312.
At his direction, the parties worked in good faith and finally agreed to the entry of a consent decree to correct the deficiencies he had identified. That decree, with numerous additions and modifications to it, has been in existence for almost three decades with continuing oversight by the federal district.
In June 2016, Judge Parker rejected Defendants' contention that changed circumstances made continuing federal court involvement inequitable such that all remedial orders should be vacated and federal court oversight discontinued. Jackson v. Los Lunas Ctr., 2016 WL 9777237 (D.N.M. June 14, 2016). He disagreed with Defendants' assertion that he had found no ongoing violations of federal law in his 206-page October 12, 2012 decision, Doc. 1930, following a trial on Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Further Remedial Relief to Remedy Noncompliance. Rather, he stated that the court "is not in a position to assess, and, therefore, cannot conclude that Defendants are no longer violating constitutional or federal law." Jackson v. Los Lunas Ctr. for Persons with Developmental Disabilities ("Jackson III"), 2012 WL 13076262, at *76 (D.N.M. Oct. 12, 2012). Instead, Judge Parker noted "so many obligations" of the consent decrees were not yet fulfilled and "conclude[d] that Defendants have not demonstrated that a durable remedy is in place sufficient to justify vacatur of all the Court's orders." Id. at *18.
the district court's analysis on this point was too narrow, focusing almost entirely on whether defendants had fulfilled the numerous, detailed obligations provided in the consent decrees. But because Defendants move on the ground that continued enforcement of the consent decrees is no longer equitable, the district court should have "ascertained] whether ongoing enforcement of the [decrees] was supported by an ongoing violation of federal law," see Home, 557 U.S. at 454 - here, whether Defendants are violating class members' rights under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Rehabilitation Act.
Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176, 1206 (10th Cir. 2018). The Tenth Circuit therefore remanded the case back to Judge Parker with instructions that "the court should consider the broader question of whether the State is meeting the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Rehabilitation Act by means other than those stated in the consent decrees." Id. at 1206. In doing so, the court is to "make up-to-date findings" and if no violations of federal or constitutional law are found, "assess the durability of that compliance." Id. at 1207.
It is against the above backdrop that this Court now addresses the discovery dispute at hand in preparation for the trial on the remanded issues that Judge Parker will hold next Spring. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek production of certain information and data about non-Jackson class members to which Defendants have objected.
Plaintiffs contend that they require information about non-class members to demonstrate a continuing violation of Section 504 under the theory that the State's policies and practices discriminate against the more severely disabled while accommodating the needs of the less severely disabled. In other words, they put forth a "disparate impact" argument for relevance of the requested data. Defendants counter that a showing of "disparate impact" is not the applicable standard for a Section 504 claim; rather, Defendants argue that "meaningful access" to services forms the proper inquiry for such a claim by class members. Thus, Defendants maintain, information regarding services provided to non-class members is simply irrelevant.
Defendants posit that the "Supreme Court has specifically held that disparate impact, by itself, does not state a prima facie case under § 504." Walz Letter of July 20, 2018 (Attachment A) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)). In his 2012 decision, Judge Parker acknowledged that the Alexander case stood for the proposition "that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers." Jackson III, 2012 WL 13076262, at *76 (D.N.M. Oct. 12, 2012). He further recognized that "the Rehabilitation Act and ADA do not guarantee 'equal results' for disabled individuals." Id. (citing Cohort ex rel. Bass v. New Mexico Dept. of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 729 (10* Cir. 2100). Nevertheless, Judge Parker found that the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 n.10 (1999), "provides a more than adequate ground for concluding that Plaintiffs can sue under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA for discrimination claims based on severely disabled persons being treated differently than less severely disabled persons." Jackson III, at *77.
Moreover, Judge Parker indicated that "[u]nlawful differential treatment claims can be brought under two legal theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact" and that a disparate impact claim "does not require proof of an intent to discriminate, but, instead, mandates a showing that a policy caused a disparate effect." Id. Although Judge Parker went on to find that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an intent to discriminate on Plaintiffs' Section 503 disparate treatment claims, he did not address any potential Section 503 disparate impact claims, which do not implicate an intent to discriminate. This Court notes that disparate impact claims, usually seen in the context of employment discrimination, require statistical analysis of accumulated data and expert testimony as to the significance of the statistical information.
Given all these observations, this Court finds that some of the information requested by Plaintiffs as to non-class members is intended to lead to admissible evidence showing that the State's system currently violates Section 504 by providing lesser disabled individual with more meaningful access to services than those more severely disabled. But the Court must question whether non-class member data can be truly said to represent a group lesser disabled than the Jackson class members. Such an inference seems supportable because the Jackson class members were institutionalized based upon the severity of their developmental disabilities. Presumably, only a portion of the non-class members would be at the same end of that spectrum such that the non-class group on average could be considered lesser disabled. Again, the Court questions how the numerous variables will influence the data and the validity of conclusions drawn, but that is the job of the experts at trial - not the undersigned referred magistrate judge.
As to each of the categories of information sought as to non-class members, the Court will balance the relevance asserted by Plaintiffs (as to alleged disparate impacts in the delivery of services and/or the showing of a durable remedy after court oversight is terminated) against the asserted burdens of production cited by Defendants.


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field at the end of the current cycle, and assimilated parameter of magnetic strength spots of cycle is an integral component for future forecasts of solar activity based on the dynamo models.
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Joseph H. Mercer, Albuquerque, N. M., for appellant.
John Quinn, U. S. Atty., and John A. Babington, Asst. U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., for appellee.
Before WARREN L. JONES,* Senior Circuit Judge, and BREITENSTEIN and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction and a sentence for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312. The indictment charged interstate transportation by appellant in November, 1967, of a Lincoln Continental automobile from Washington, D.C., to Albuquerque, New Mexico, with knowledge that the car had been stolen. Prosecution evidence showed appellant's use at Washingon of a stolen driver's license and Hertz credit card and his forgery of their owner's signature on a rental contract to obtain use of the car, and driving of the car by appellant to New Mexico where he was apprehended.
Appellant urges three contentions for reversal: (1) that the instruction defining a stolen vehicle under the Act was in error; (2) that the charge erred in saying that it was not necessary to intend to deprive the owner permanently of his rights and benefits in the vehicle for it to be "stolen;" and (3) that proof was insufficient that the car was stolen within the meaning of the Act, so that denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was error. From the evidence which the jury could believe and the instructions given, we conclude that no ground for reversal is shown.
Proof by the prosecution tended to establish these facts. In November, 1967, the wallet of one Hoffman, containing several credit cards and his driver's license, disappeared. Appellant admitted paying $100 for the wallet and these contents. He used Hoffman's Hertz credit card at the Newark Airport to rent a Cadillac which he drove to Washington, D. C. He appeared at Washington National Airport, complaining that the Cadillac used excessive oil, and exchanged it for a Lincoln Continental. The Hertz attendant from Washington identified appellant as the person who got the Continental. Appellant told her he would drive the car back to New York and turn it in that day. He produced Hoffman's Hertz credit card and driver's license and the rental agreement from New York, all of which were used by the attendant in preparing the agreement on the Continental. The attendant testified that the car would not have been rented to appellant if she had known that the signature on the agreement was forged, that the Hertz credit card and driver's license did not belong to appellant, and that he was not authorized to use them.
The Continental was released to appellant on November 14. The agreement stated that the car would be turned in on November 15. There was no restriction in the contract as to the area in which the vehicle would be used. Appellant appeared at the Columbus, Ohio, Hertz office and there obtained a notation on the agreement that it was extended to November 19. This Hertz representative testified that appellant said he would make it back to Washington in three or four days, and made no mention of going to New Mexico. She said that she relied on the rental contract which appellant produced in making the extension. Appellant was also identified as having appeared at the Hertz St. Louis office, where he attempted to rent another car with the use of Hoffman's Hertz credit card and driver's license. The discrepancy between appellant's appearance (he is 37) and the 60 year age stated on Hoffman's driver's license was noticed. When a call to the police was mentioned, appellant left and the license and card were retained by the attendant.
Appellant was stopped while driving the Continental on November 18 by the New Mexico State Police. He was near Albuquerque and heading west, and said he was going to California. He produced Hoffman's other credit cards and the rental agreement. During a subsequent interview with a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, appellant admitted he had known that the Hertz card and other credit cards were stolen. He traced his route as having been from Columbus, Ohio, to Memphis, and stated he was en route to California. There was no report known to the New Mexico State Police or to the Special Agent that the Continental had been reported stolen. By telegraph the Agent learned that the credit cards involved had been stolen. This indictment followed, and the jury found appellant guilty of the Dyer Act offense.
"Whenever a motor vehicle, which is the property of one person, is acquired or thereafter possessed as a result of some wrongful or dishonest act, such as fraud or forgery, whereby another person either willfully obtains or thereafter willfully retains possession of such property without or beyond the permission or beyond any permission given and with the intent to deprive the owner of the benefits of the ownership, such motor vehicle is a stolen motor vehicle as that term is used in these instructions.
"To establish the crime of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle it is essential to prove that at the time the stolen vehicle was transported across state lines by the defendant, he had knowledge that it was stolen and that he had the specific intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. It is not necessary that defendant have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of such rights and benefits.
"In determining whether defendant had the requisite intent, the jury should consider all the facts and circumstances in the case. In other words, it is up to the jury to determine whether or not the vehicle was stolen and whether or not it was transported across the state line with a specific intent that I mentioned." We conclude that the instruction properly followed the substance of the definition of "stolen" as including all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common law larceny. United States v. Turley, supra, at 417, 77 S. Ct. 397; Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S. Ct. 2038, 20 L. Ed. 2d 880 (1968); Smith v. United States, 385 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Dillinger, 341 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1965); Lake v. United States, 338 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1964). By the use of the phrase "wrongful or dishonest act," appellant contends that the instruction improperly departed from the definition in Turley referring to "felonious takings." We find, however, that the charge rightly dealt with the meaning of the term "stolen" as applied to the facts before the jury by referring to a wrongful or dishonest act, such as fraud or forgery. The reference to a wrongful or dishonest act, without use of the term "felonious," did not depart from the substance of the meaning of the statute. Without use of the term "felonious," the meaning of "stolen" in the Act has been defined as encompassing any taking with intent to convert the vehicle to the taker's use and wrongfully depriving the owner of his possessory rights and benefits of ownership. United States v. Dillinger, supra, at 697. Similarly, in Lake, supra, this Court defined the term with reference to the specific facts there present as including "* * * any taking by trick or other artifice with an intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership." 338 F.2d at 789. We conclude that the instruction afforded appellant the substance of the proper definition of the statutory term.
Second, appellant attacks the instructions for saying that it is not necessary that it was intended to permanently deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership for the car to have been "stolen" within the meaning of the Act. This Court did approve an instruction referring to "* * * the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership * * *." in Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d at 715, as not prejudicial to a defendant. However, the point raised here by appellant was not involved. As have other courts, we conclude that a vehicle may be "stolen" within the meaning of the Act, whether the intent was to deprive the owner of his rights and benefits in the vehicle permanently, or only so long as it suited the purposes of the taker. Smith v. United States, 385 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Dillinger, 341 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1965); Schwab v. United States, 327 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1964); Berard v. United States, 309 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1962). The charge properly defined the term "stolen" as intended by the statute.
Appellant lastly argues that the prosecution evidence as a whole made out no case that the Continental was "stolen." The fact that appellant was apprehended on November 18, one day before expiration of the purported contract, is stressed. But there was more than ample proof that car and contract were obtained by fraud and forgery at the outset, so that the jury could find that the car was "stolen," all the while. Evidence of obtaining vehicles by such devices is a sufficient basis for finding them to have been "stolen" within the meaning of the Act, see Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S. Ct. 2038, 20 L. Ed. 2d 880 (1968), and Lake v. United States, 338 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1964), even if the rental term has not expired. See United States v. Dillinger, 341 F.2d 696, 698 (4th Cir. 1965). These and the remaining contentions of appellant we find insufficient as grounds for disturbing the conviction.


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Descriptive inventory for the Chicago White Sox and 1919 World Series baseball scandal collection, 1917-1929, bulk 1920-1924.
Prepared by Peter T. Alter and Kristy Noga, 2008; ed. by Julie Wroblewski, 2015.
The Chicago History Museum purchased this collection on December 13, 2007, in an on-line auction conducted by Mastro Auctions of Burr Ridge, Illinois. The seller's name and identity are unknown, and the manner in which the seller acquired the materials is also unknown (accession #: 2008.0020.1).
Copyright may be retained by the creators of items or their descendants as stipulated by United States copyright law, unless otherwise noted.
Photocopies are available for research use. Originals are closed to researchers.
Chicago White Sox and 1919 World Series baseball scandal collection (Chicago History Museum) plus a detailed description date, and box/folder.
Related materials at Chicago History Museum Research Center include the Chicago White Sox collection; Clarence Rowland papers, Joe Jackson collection; Joseph Benz papers; Kenesaw Mountain Landis papers, and many Chicago White Sox related photographs.
Primarily legal documents and correspondence between lawyers, Chicago White Sox representatives, other baseball club owners, American League officials, various baseball players, and other people; reports by private detectives; press releases; player paychecks; and handwritten notes related to various trials. Legal files include partial trial transcripts, affidavits, and depositions. Many items relate directly to the 1919 World Series scandal, but some materials deal with other disputes. The private detective reports (1919-1920, 1924) include surveillance of players Frederick McMullin (known as Fred McMullin), Arnold Gandil (known as Chick Gandil), Charles Risberg (known as Swede Risberg), Oscar Felsch (known as Happy Felsch); gamblers Carl Zork and Joe Pesch; and Marie Purcell among others.
Grand jury material (1920) includes copies of waivers of immunity, correspondence, and transcripts. These files include affidavits by gambler Carl Zork and St. Louis sportswriter Sid Keener regarding Saint Louis Browns' player Elmer Joseph Gedeon's knowledge of the scandal. (He is called Joe Gedeon in some documents). Files related to the case in Cook County Criminal Court, People v. Cicotte, et al., contain a partial trial transcript, including testimony by Joe Jackson.
Other topics in the collection include the legal strategies, filings, affidavits, depositions, correspondence, and testimony related to Jackson's (1922-1924) and Weaver's (1921-1923) back pay cases. Materials include White Sox paychecks (1919) signed by Comiskey and endorsed by players Cicotte and Williams and a travel expense report (no date) written by Jackson's wife Katie, who signed her husband's name to it. Other files (1918-1920) include the minutes, proclamations, press releases, and correspondence of the American League board of directors while Charles Comiskey, Henry Frazee, and Jacob Ruppert controlled it; and affidavits and depositions related to the Yankees' case against Ban Johnson (Baseball Club of New York, Inc. v. Byron B. Johnson, et al., 1919-1920).
In 1919, some Chicago White Sox players intentionally lost the World Series to the Cincinnati Reds. As compensation, some of the players received cash payments from gamblers. Rumors of a conspiracy circulated immediately following Cincinnati's victory, but the scandal broke publicly in September 1920. This series of events and later developments became known as the Black Sox Scandal.
In 1919, Chicago White Sox owner Charles A. Comiskey hired private detectives to gather information about players and other individuals who may have been involved in the fixing of the World Series. Agents from Hunter's Secret Service, owned and managed by John R. Hunter and J.C. Pallin, befriended several Chicago White Sox players and gamblers across the United States in an effort to garner intelligence. Comiskey also put his legal team at the Chicago law firm Mayer, Meyer, Austrian, and Platt (MMAP) to work exploring the scandal. His lead counsel was Alfred S. Austrian, an influential attorney and Comiskey's close personal friend. MMAP lawyers Frederic Burnham, Paul M. Godehn, and J.E. Northrup also were involved in litigation related to the scandal.
In September 1920, a Cook County grand jury convened to investigate accusations of dishonesty in a game between the Chicago and the Philadelphia National League baseball clubs. Ultimately, this grand jury focused on the 1919 World Series and heard testimony from Chicago White Sox players, Edward V. Cicotte (Eddie Cicotte), Claude Williams (Lefty Williams), and Joseph Jackson (Shoeless Joe Jackson) among many others. This grand jury investigation resulted in the 1921 criminal trial (People vs. Cicotte, et al.) in Judge Hugo Friend's Cook County courtroom, where a jury found the players not guilty.
Meanwhile, the need to resolve conflicts among team owners and league officials as well as the 1919 World Series scandal resulted in the appointment of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of Major League Baseball.
Despite the court verdict in the case of People vs. Cicotte, et al., Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis permanently banned eight Chicago White Sox players implicated in the scandal from playing in Major League Baseball. Jackson and players Oscar Felsch (Happy Felsch) and Charles Risberg (Swede Risberg) later initiated legal proceedings against the Chicago White Sox for back pay and damages. Jackson's case came to trial in a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, court in 1924. Jackson lost this case when Judge John J. Gregory set aside the jury's verdict that had been in Jackson's favor. The Milwaukee law firm of Bottum, Hudnall, Lecher, and McNamara represented the Chicago White Sox, and George B. Hudnall served as the lead counsel while Milwaukee attorney Raymond Cannon litigated on Jackson's behalf. George Weaver (Buck Weaver) also brought a similar suit against the club, which was eventually adjudicated in a Chicago federal court.
While the country watched the trials unfold, another drama developed in Major League Baseball. Comiskey had a long-standing dispute with the president of the American League, Byron Bancroft Johnson (known as Ban Johnson). Ban Johnson became alienated from many club owners, especially Charles A. Comiskey; Boston Red Sox owner Henry Frazee (Harry Frazee); and New York Yankees owners Jacob Ruppert and Tillinghast L. Huston, who were calling for Johnson's removal as American League president.
The dispute came about when Frazee sold pitcher Carl Mays to the Yankees in 1919. Mays, because of an injury and personal problems, left the Boston Red Sox during the 1919 season. However, Frazee still owned Mays' contract and hoped to profit from it. Ban Johnson attempted to block the sale of Mays. Comiskey, Ruppert, and Frazee took control of the American League board of directors in an effort to diminish Johnson's power. They investigated his handling of league finances and contracts, and accused him of public intoxication at a 1918 World Series game in Boston.
At the same time, the Yankees also brought suit against Johnson in a New York court alleging, among other things, that Johnson blocked the team's attempts to build a new stadium. Austrian and other lawyers from MMAP also were involved in this controversy. Amidst these disputes, Comiskey, Frazee, and Ruppert all viewed the hiring of Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of Major League Baseball as a direct challenge to Johnson's power. Landis became commissioner in November 1920 and held that post until 1944. Johnson remained president of the American League of Professional Baseball until 1924.
Baseball team owners--United States--20th century.
Series 1 consists primarily of correspondence between and among attorneys for the Chicago White Sox and various players, reports by private detectives, trial transcripts, procedural documents, affidavits, depositions, press releases, and handwritten notes related to various trials. This series sheds light on the grand jury and criminal trial testimony given by key members of the White Sox team. The private investigation reports chronicle the actions, whereabouts, and conversations between detectives and several of the ball players directly following the World Series of 1919. The State of Illinois vs. Eddie Cicotte et al. contains the court transcripts charging the players with defrauding the public and conspiring to injure the American League, among other charges. Other items of interest include paychecks signed by Comiskey and endorsed by the players, newspaper comics, and multiple telegrams. The majority of the folders in the series are arranged chronologically.
Series 2 contains minutes, proclamations, press releases, and correspondence of the American League board of directors during the turbulent struggle between president of the American League Ban Johnson and club owners Charles A. Comiskey, Henry Frazee, and Jacob Ruppert. This series reveals the stated rules and regulations that the national commission agreed upon to govern baseball. These rules then relate to later materials that accuse Ban Johnson of breaking rules, inept leadership, and public intoxication. Materials in this series illuminate the tangled relationship between Johnson and Comiskey and the distrust and confusion during the 1919-1921 scandal, which contributed to the hiring of Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of Major League Baseball. The majority of the folders in the series are arranged chronologically.
Title Descriptive inventory for the Chicago White Sox and 1919 World Series baseball scandal collection, 1917-1929, bulk 1920-1924.
Biographical History Biographical/historical note; In 1919, some Chicago White Sox players intentionally lost the World Series to the Cincinnati Reds. As compensation, some of the players received cash payments from gamblers. Rumors of a conspiracy circulated immediately following Cincinnati's victory, but the scandal broke publicly in September 1920. This series of events and later developments became known as the Black Sox Scandal.; In 1919, Chicago White Sox owner Charles A. Comiskey hired private detectives to gather information about players and other individuals who may have been involved in the fixing of the World Series. Agents from Hunter's Secret Service, owned and managed by John R. Hunter and J.C. Pallin, befriended several Chicago White Sox players and gamblers across the United States in an effort to garner intelligence. Comiskey also put his legal team at the Chicago law firm Mayer, Meyer, Austrian, and Platt (MMAP) to work exploring the scandal. His lead counsel was Alfred S. Austrian, an influential attorney and Comiskey's close personal friend. MMAP lawyers Frederic Burnham, Paul M. Godehn, and J.E. Northrup also were involved in litigation related to the scandal.; In September 1920, a Cook County grand jury convened to investigate accusations of dishonesty in a game between the Chicago and the Philadelphia National League baseball clubs. Ultimately, this grand jury focused on the 1919 World Series and heard testimony from Chicago White Sox players, Edward V. Cicotte (Eddie Cicotte), Claude Williams (Lefty Williams), and Joseph Jackson (Shoeless Joe Jackson) among many others. This grand jury investigation resulted in the 1921 criminal trial (People vs. Cicotte, et al.) in Judge Hugo Friend's Cook County courtroom, where a jury found the players not guilty.; Meanwhile, the need to resolve conflicts among team owners and league officials as well as the 1919 World Series scandal resulted in the appointment of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of Major League Baseball.; Despite the court verdict in the case of People vs. Cicotte, et al., Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis permanently banned eight Chicago White Sox players implicated in the scandal from playing in Major League Baseball. Jackson and players Oscar Felsch (Happy Felsch) and Charles Risberg (Swede Risberg) later initiated legal proceedings against the Chicago White Sox for back pay and damages. Jackson's case came to trial in a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, court in 1924. Jackson lost this case when Judge John J. Gregory set aside the jury's verdict that had been in Jackson's favor. The Milwaukee law firm of Bottum, Hudnall, Lecher, and McNamara represented the Chicago White Sox, and George B. Hudnall served as the lead counsel while Milwaukee attorney Raymond Cannon litigated on Jackson's behalf. George Weaver (Buck Weaver) also brought a similar suit against the club, which was eventually adjudicated in a Chicago federal court.; While the country watched the trials unfold, another drama developed in Major League Baseball. Comiskey had a long-standing dispute with the president of the American League, Byron Bancroft Johnson (known as Ban Johnson). Ban Johnson became alienated from many club owners, especially Charles A. Comiskey; Boston Red Sox owner Henry Frazee (Harry Frazee); and New York Yankees owners Jacob Ruppert and Tillinghast L. Huston, who were calling for Johnson's removal as American League president.; The dispute came about when Frazee sold pitcher Carl Mays to the Yankees in 1919. Mays, because of an injury and personal problems, left the Boston Red Sox during the 1919 season. However, Frazee still owned Mays' contract and hoped to profit from it. Ban Johnson attempted to block the sale of Mays. Comiskey, Ruppert, and Frazee took control of the American League board of directors in an effort to diminish Johnson's power. They investigated his handling of league finances and contracts, and accused him of public intoxication at a 1918 World Series game in Boston.; At the same time, the Yankees also brought suit against Johnson in a New York court alleging, among other things, that Johnson blocked the team's attempts to build a new stadium. Austrian and other lawyers from MMAP also were involved in this controversy. Amidst these disputes, Comiskey, Frazee, and Ruppert all viewed the hiring of Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of Major League Baseball as a direct challenge to Johnson's power. Landis became commissioner in November 1920 and held that post until 1944. Johnson remained president of the American League of Professional Baseball until 1924.
Scope and Contents Primarily legal documents and correspondence between lawyers, Chicago White Sox representatives, other baseball club owners, American League officials, various baseball players, and other people; reports by private detectives; press releases; player paychecks; and handwritten notes related to various trials. Legal files include partial trial transcripts, affidavits, and depositions. Many items relate directly to the 1919 World Series scandal, but some materials deal with other disputes. The private detective reports (1919-1920, 1924) include surveillance of players Frederick McMullin (known as Fred McMullin), Arnold Gandil (known as Chick Gandil), Charles Risberg (known as Swede Risberg), Oscar Felsch (known as Happy Felsch); gamblers Carl Zork and Joe Pesch; and Marie Purcell among others.; Grand jury material (1920) includes copies of waivers of immunity, correspondence, and transcripts. These files include affidavits by gambler Carl Zork and St. Louis sportswriter Sid Keener regarding Saint Louis Browns' player Elmer Joseph Gedeon's knowledge of the scandal. (He is called Joe Gedeon in some documents). Files related to the case in Cook County Criminal Court, People v. Cicotte, et al., contain a partial trial transcript, including testimony by Joe Jackson.; Other topics in the collection include the legal strategies, filings, affidavits, depositions, correspondence, and testimony related to Jackson's (1922-1924) and Weaver's (1921-1923) back pay cases. Materials include White Sox paychecks (1919) signed by Comiskey and endorsed by players Cicotte and Williams and a travel expense report (no date) written by Jackson's wife Katie, who signed her husband's name to it. Other files (1918-1920) include the minutes, proclamations, press releases, and correspondence of the American League board of directors while Charles Comiskey, Henry Frazee, and Jacob Ruppert controlled it; and affidavits and depositions related to the Yankees' case against Ban Johnson (Baseball Club of New York, Inc. v. Byron B. Johnson, et al., 1919-1920).

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CHARLES INGRAM vs. CITY PLANNER OF LYNN & another.
A judge of the Superior Court of his own motion entered a decree dismissing this bill for declaratory relief. He assigned as his reason for refusing such relief (see G. L. c. 231A, Section 3) that "there is no basis in law for granting any relief to [the] plaintiff" We agree.
LORLY I. GOLDSTEIN vs. EDWARD M. GOLDSTEIN.
The husband appeals from a decree adjudging him in contempt for failure to comply with a decree of the probate judge directing him to pay $25 a week for his wife's support. The latter decree modified the decree nisi which incorporated by reference until further order of the court a stipulation by the husband and wife giving to the wife custody of the children, an allowance for their support and a lump sum for alimony and providing for mutual release of all demands. Jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties is not disputed and noncompliance with the decree for payment is admitted. The case thus being properly before us on the merits of the contempt decree, Irving & Casson - A. H. Davenport Co. v. Howlett, 229 Mass. 560, 562, the case is resolved adversely to the husband by what was said in Fabrizio v. Fabrizio, 316 Mass. 343, 346. We add that, although appeal is a proper method for review of a decree adjudging contempt, Nickerson v. Dowd, 342 Mass. 462, it does not reach back to the decree which was the subject of the contempt and from which no appeal was taken. State Realty Co. of Boston, Inc. v. MacNeil, 341 Mass. 123, 124.
EDWARD H. MCGRATH vs. MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY.
1963 to accept a new assignment as Superintendent of Laurence G. Hanscom Field. The petitioner had been Commissioner of Airport Management from 1952 to February, 1959, but in 1959 the respondent authority, created by St. 1956, c. 465, as amended by St. 1958, c. 599, assumed control, operation and maintenance of the two State owned airports and supplanted him. He alleges that in February of 1959 he was "transferred to the authority," being designated "Director of Airports." He claims that because he was a veteran and had been employed by the Commonwealth for more than three years as Commissioner of Airport Management, the authority was required by G. L. c. 30, Section 9A, to employ certain procedures under G. L. c. 31, Section 43, in reassigning him in 1963. The demurrer was properly sustained. As commissioner, he had been subject to appointment and removal by the State Airport Management Board under G. L. c. 6, Section 59B (St. 1948, c. 637, Section 2, since repealed), and with broad supervisory powers was plainly an "officer" not an "employee." Attorney Gen. v. Tillinghast, 203 Mass. 539, 543-545. See Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives, 331 Mass. 135, 137-140; Simonian v. Boston Redevelopment Authy. 342 Mass. 573, 582; Cieri v. Commissioner of Ins. 343 Mass. 181, 185-186. The position of commissioner was abolished by St. 1956, c. 465, as amended, and the petitioner was, in effect, replaced by the authority which assumed his duties. He thus could not lay claim to those benefits which Section 22 of St. 1956, c. 465, provided for "employees" of the airport properties who had previously been under control of the State Airport Management Board. Thus, G. L. c. 30, Section 9A, granted no rights to the petitioner in 1959 and it is not contended that it became applicable to him later. Therefore the petitioner in 1963 could not insist that the respondent follow certain procedures in regard to his reassignment.

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The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recently published its annual top 10 most frequently cited standards list.
1. Fall protection – General Requirements for Construction Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501. OSHA cited employers for 7,270 violations of this standard in 2018.
2. Hazard Communication – General Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200. OSHA cited employers for 4,552 violations of this standard in 2018.
3. Scaffolds – Construction Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451. OSHA cited employers for 3,336 violations for this standard in 2018.
4. Respiratory Protection – General Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134. OSHA cited employers for 3,118 violations for this standard in 2018.
5. Lockout/Tagout – General Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147. OSHA cited employers for 2,944 violations for this standard in 2018.
6. Ladders – Construction Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1053. OSHA cited employers for 2,812 violations for this standard in 2018.
7. Powered Industrial Trucks – General Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178. OSHA cited employers for 2,294 violations of this standard in 2018.
8. Fall Protection – Training Requirements for Construction Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.503. OSHA cited employers for 1,982 violations for this standard in 2018.
9. Machine Guarding – General Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212. OSHA cited employers for 1,972 violations for this standard in 2018.
10. Personal Protective and Lifesaving Equipment – Eye and Face Protection – Construction Industry. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.102. OSHA cited employers for 1,536 violations for this standard in 2018.
Take advantage of this information to reinforce your compliance efforts. Employers should review this list and resolve recognized hazards in their facilities before OSHA shows up. KPA’s Environmental Health & Safety consultants can also help you with on-site audits and compliance guidance.