1. The Border Patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent checkpoint located on a major highway away from the Mexican border for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and the stops and questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. Pp. 428 U. S. 556-564.
(a) To require that such stops always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car necessary to identify it as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. Such a requirement also would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly. Pp. 428 U. S. 556-557.
(b) While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited, the interference with legitimate traffic being minimal and checkpoint operations involving less discretionary enforcement activity than roving patrol stops. Pp. 428 U. S. 557-560.
(c) Under the circumstances of these checkpoint stops, which do not involve searches, the Government or public interest in making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. Pp. 428 U. S. 560-562.
(d) With respect to the checkpoint involved in No 74-1560, it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection area for limited inquiry on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving patrol stop, since the intrusion is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it. Pp. 428 U. S. 563-564.
U.S. 523, distinguished. The visible manifestations of the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide assurances to motorists that the officers are acting lawfully. Moreover, the purpose of a warrant in preventing hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure is inapplicable here, since the reasonableness of checkpoint stops turns on factors such as the checkpoint's location and method of operation. These factors are not susceptible of the distortion of hindsight, and will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Nor is the purpose of a warrant in substituting a magistrate's judgment for that of the searching or seizing officer applicable, since the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the field officer and deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials in selecting the checkpoint locations. Pp. 428 U. S. 564-566.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 428 U. S. 567.
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth Amendment. In each instance, whether the Fourth Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 422 U. S. 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a Judicial warrant.
mile further north are two black on yellow signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of California weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended over the highway. These signs each state `STOP HERE -- U.S. OFFICERS.' Placed on the highway are a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with lashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent building which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation.""
United States v. Ortiz, supra at 422 U. S. 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.Supp. 398, 410-411 (SD Cal.1973).
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 3] The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury trial.
aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), four counts of inducing the illegal entry of aliens, § 1324(a)(4), and one conspiracy count, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the Government appealed the granting of the motions to suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. [Footnote 4] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three appeals, which presented the common question whether routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 5] The Court of Appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the other cases. 514 F.2d 308 (1975). We reverse and remand.
and 65-90 miles from the nearest points of the Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente, but the checkpoint is operated differently, in that the officers customarily stop all north-bound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the San Clemente checkpoint, the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant.
"[e]stimates of the number of illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests there may be a many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 422 U. S. 878 (1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater in the United States than they are in Mexico. United States v. Baca, 368 F.Supp. at 402.
.Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. Id. at 405. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the border area is uninhabited desert or thinly populated arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals to enter the United States without detection. It also is possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain in the country unlawfully. [Footnote 7] Once within the country, the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers who transport them in private vehicles. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 879.
States, 413 U. S. 266, 413 U. S. 268 (1973). [Footnote 8] In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. [Footnote 9] Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United States v. Baca, supra at 405, 407, and n. 2.
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. The Border Patrol believes that, to assure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the confluence of two or more significant roads leading away from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and (v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes," see n 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint. Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in operation only about 70% of the time. [Footnote 10] In calendar year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974 that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint during 124 1/6 hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles were referred to the secondary inspection area, where Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the Government contends that many illegal aliens pass through the checkpoint undetected. The record in No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there, it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as every motorist is questioned.
387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528 (1967). In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving patrol unit constitutionally could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized that important law enforcement interests were at stake, but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that a search could be conducted without consent only if there was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given area. Compare 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 273, with id. at 413 U. S. 283-285 (POWELL, J., concurring), and id. at 413 U. S. 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a permanent checkpoint.
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the advance judicial authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente, but none at Sarita. As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests at stake.
are located on important highways; in their absence, such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled, slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 883-885.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.'"
"[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."
422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 894-895.
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. . . . [They] could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road. . . ."
Ibid. There also was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid.
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection area, thereby "stigmatizing" those diverted and reducing the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive, because of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective referrals -- rather than questioning the occupants of every car -- tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring public.
U.S. at 392 U. S. 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 283-285 (POWELL, J., concurring); id. at 413 U. S. 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 154. In Camara, the Court required an "area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspecting private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling" was not required to enter any given residence. 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 538. In so holding, the Court examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," id. at 387 U. S. 534-535, and concluded that, under the circumstances the government interests outweighed those of the private citizen.
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization."
387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 532. A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 407 U. S. 316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 881-882. We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891 (1975). And our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other cases to the District Court for further proceedings.
* Together with No. 75-5387, Sifuentes v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a routine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without such a warrant. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (1974). Soon after the warrant issued, the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (1974). See also n 15, infra.
"[t]here may be room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial, as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized or statements overheard, is subject to suppression. . . ."
The question again is not before us.
The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were stopped. See n 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be made absent a warrant.
We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 74-1560, 423 U.S. 822, and later granted Sifuentes' petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in tandem. 423 U.S. 945. Subsequently, we granted the motion of the Solicitor General to consolidate the cases for oral argument. 425 U.S. 931.
All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1), (a)(3). Under current regulations, the authority conferred by § 1357(a)(3) may be exercised anywhere within 100 air miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1976).
"a person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official agents."
United States v. Baca, 368 F.Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution. The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smugglers, many of whom are lawfully in the United States.
The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages, weather conditions, and -- at San Clemente -- peak traffic loads.
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative, they suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols not defeated by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra this page.
The choice of checkpoint locations must be left largely to the discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. See n 15, infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operation also must be committed to the discretion of such officials. But see infra at 428 U. S. 565-566.
As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 74-1560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when authorized by warrant. Cf. n 5, supra. The Court of Appeals held, alternatively, that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514 F.2d 308, 318 (1975), and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id. at 321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens pass through the San Clemente checkpoint,"(ii) the distance of the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente.
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above, the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol, see n 13, supra; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 538 (1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra at 428 U. S. 553, and the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement are furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra at 428 U. S. 554, confirming Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was selected as the location where traffic is lightest between San Diego and Los Angeles, thereby minimizing interference with legitimate traffic.
The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-5387, p. 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 884-885. This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning, whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the population of southern California. The 1970 census figures, which may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California to be approximately 19,958,000, of whom some 3,102,000, or 16%, are Spanish-speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and 18% respectively. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, vol. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the state-wide population ratio is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in No. 74-1560, roughly 23,400 would be expected to contain persons of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to the secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion that the Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area.
Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560, roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra at 428 U. S. 554. Thus, to the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this checkpoint, see n 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 886-887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . ," although we held that apparent Mexican ancestry, by itself, could not create the reasonable suspicion required for a roving patrol stop. Different considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border.
There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five Justices. See id. at 413 U. S. 283-285 (POWELL, J., concurring); id. at 413 U. S. 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however, was that an "area" warrant could serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary to sustain roving patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-Sanchez is not an issue in these cases.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new intrusion on citizens' rights: it speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post at 428 U. S. 567, 428 U. S. 568. Since 1952, Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 233, Congress has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interrogated as to residence, and vehicles "within a reasonable distance" from the border to be searched for aliens. See n 8, supra. The San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra at 428 U. S. 565-556. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing practice justifies a constitutional violation. We do suggest, however, that, against this background and in the context of our recent decisions, the rhetoric of the dissent reflects unjustified concern.
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk. . . ."
Post at 428 U. S. 572. For the reason stated in n 16, supra, this concern is misplaced. Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican ancestry.
and opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), held that, regardless of whether opportunity exists to obtain a warrant, an arrest in a public place for a previously committed felony never requires a warrant, a result certainly not fairly supported by either history or precedent. See id. at 423 U. S. 433 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38 (1976), went further and approved the warrantless arrest for a felony of a person standing on the front porch of her residence. United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), narrowed the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy by denying the existence of a protectible interest in the compilation of checks, deposit slips, and other records pertaining to an individual's bank account. Stone v. Powell, ante p. 428 U. S. 465, precluded the assertion of Fourth Amendment claims in federal collateral relief proceedings. United States v. Janis, ante p. 428 U. S. 433, held that evidence unconstitutionally seized by a state officer is admissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United States. South Dakota v. Opperman, ante p. 428 U. S. 364, approved sweeping inventory searches of automobiles in police custody irrespective of the particular circumstances of the case. Finally, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the Court, in practical effect, weakened the Fourth Amendment prohibition against general warrants.
and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973). I dissent.
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that, at some point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And, in making that assessment, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. . . . Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction."
"This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21 n. 18. Terry thus made clear what common sense teaches: conduct, to be reasonable, must pass muster under objective standards applied to specific facts.
inspected, and then further detained without even a showing of articulable suspicion, see ante at 428 U. S. 547, let alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of reasonable suspicion, a result that permits search and seizure to rest upon "nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." This defacement of Fourth Amendment protections is arrived at by a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure. But that method is only a convenient cover for condoning arbitrary official conduct, for the governmental interests relied on as warranting intrusion here are the same as those in Almeida-Sanchez and Ortiz, which required a showing of probable cause for roving patrol and fixed checkpoint searches, and Brignoni-Ponce, which required at least a showing of reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts to justify roving patrol stops. Absent some difference in the nature of the intrusion, the same minimal requirement should be imposed for checkpoint stops.
The Court assumes, and I certainly agree, that persons stopped at fixed checkpoints, whether or not referred to a secondary detention area, are "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, since the vehicle and its occupants are subjected to a "visual inspection," the intrusion clearly exceeds mere physical restraint, for officers are able to see more in a stopped vehicle than in vehicles traveling at normal speeds down the highway. As the Court concedes, ante at 428 U. S. 558, the checkpoint stop involves essentially the same intrusions as a roving patrol stop, yet the Court provides no principled basis for distinguishing checkpoint stops.
Certainly that basis is not provided in the Court's reasoning that the subjective intrusion here is appreciably less than in the case of a stop by a roving patrol.
Brignoni-Ponce nowhere bases the requirement of reasonable suspicion upon the subjective nature of the intrusion. In any event, the subjective aspects of checkpoint stops, even if different from the subjective aspects of roving patrol stops, just as much require some principled restraint on law enforcement conduct. The motorist whose conduct has been nothing but innocent -- and this is overwhelmingly the case -- surely resents his own detention and inspection. And checkpoints, unlike roving stops, detain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citizens. Also, the delay occasioned by stopping hundreds of vehicles on a busy highway is particularly irritating.
U.S. at 422 U. S. 887. Since the objective is almost entirely the Mexican illegally in the country, checkpoint officials, uninhibited by any objective standards and therefore free to stop any or all motorists without explanation or excuse, wholly on whim, will perforce target motorists of Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that they unavoidably possess the same "suspicious" physical and grooming characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.
"A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical, because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens."
Ante at 428 U. S. 557.
exists to formulate the reasonable suspicion which, if it actually exists, would justify further detention. Indeed, though permitting roving stops based on reasonable suspicion, Brignoni-Ponce required that "any further detention or search must be based on [the greater showing of] consent or probable cause." 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 882. The Court today, however, does not impose a requirement of even reasonable suspicion for these secondary stops.
The Court's rationale is also not persuasive, because several of the factors upon which officers may rely in establishing reasonable suspicion are readily ascertainable, regardless of the flow of traffic. For example, with checkpoint stops, as with roving patrol stops, "[a]spects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion." Id. at 422 U. S. 885. Thus, it is relevant that the vehicle is a certain type of station wagon, appears to be heavily loaded, contains an extraordinary number of persons, or contains persons trying to hide. See ibid. If such factors are satisfactory to permit the imposition of a reasonable suspicion requirement in the more demanding circumstances of a roving patrol, where officers initially deal with a vehicle traveling not at a crawl, but at highway speeds, they clearly should suffice in the circumstances of a checkpoint stop.
such a requirement would make it impossible to identify a given person in a high-crime area as a possible carrier of concealed weapons.
"The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 273.
"since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving patrol stops."
"those charged with . . . investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy. . . ."
"the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials."
The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free society, is orderly procedure. The Constitution, as originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure, a procedural document. For the same reasons, the drafter of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in procedural limitations on government action. The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in erecting its buffer against the arbitrary treatment of citizens by government. But to permit, as the Court does today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system of a government, for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, "[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 324 U. S. 414 (1945).
"[Mexican ancestry] alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were aliens nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of native born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and, even in the border area, a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but, standing alone, it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens."
422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 886-887 (footnote omitted). Today we are told that secondary referrals may be based on criteria that would not sustain a roving patrol stop, and specifically that such referrals may be based largely on Mexican ancestry. Ante at 428 U. S. 563. Even if the difference between Brignoni-Ponce and this decision is only a matter of degree, we are not told what justifies the different treatment of Mexican appearance, or why greater emphasis is permitted in the less demanding circumstances of a checkpoint. That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any circumstances.
"selective referrals -- rather than questioning the occupants of every car -- tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring public,"
ante at 428 U. S. 560, stands the Fourth Amendment on its head. The starting point of this view is the unannounced assumption that intrusions are generally permissible; hence, any minimization of intrusions serves Fourth Amendment interests. Under the Fourth Amendment, however, the status quo is nonintrusion, for, as a general matter, it is unreasonable to subject the average citizen or his property to search or seizure. Thus, minimization of intrusion only lessens the aggravation to Fourth Amendment interests; it certainly does not further those interests.
"Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches others cars as well."
Id. at 422 U. S. 895.
"simple "good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, [379 U.S. 89,] 379 U. S. 97 ."
Even if good faith is assumed, the affront to the dignity of American citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully within the country is in no way diminished. The fact still remains that people of Mexican ancestry are targeted for examination at checkpoints and that the burden of checkpoint intrusions will lie heaviest on them. That, as the Court observes, ante at 428 U. S. 563 n. 16, "[l]ess than 1% of the motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning," whereas approximately 16% of the population of California is Spanish-speaking or of Spanish surname, has little bearing on this point -- or, for that matter, on the integrity of Border Patrol practices. There is no indication how many of the 16% have physical and grooming characteristics identifiable as Mexican. There is no indication what portion of the motoring public in California is of Spanish or Mexican ancestry. Given the socioeconomic status of this portion, it is likely that the figure is significantly less than 16%. Neither is there any indication that those of Mexican ancestry are not subjected to lengthier initial stops than others, even if they are not secondarily detained. Finally, there is no indication of the ancestral makeup of the 1% who are referred for secondary detention. If, as is quite likely the case, it is overwhelmingly Mexican, the sense of discrimination which will be felt is only enhanced.
As an empirical proposition, this observation is hardly self-evident. No small number of vehicles pass through a checkpoint. Indeed, better than 1,000 pass through the San Clemente checkpoint during each hour of operation. Ante at 428 U. S. 554. Thus, there is clearly abundant opportunity for abuse and harassment at checkpoints through lengthier detention and questioning of some individuals or arbitrary secondary detentions. Such practices need not be confined to those of Mexican ancestry. And given that it is easier to deal with a vehicle which has already been slowed than it is to observe and then chase and apprehend a vehicle traveling at highway speeds, if anything, there is more, not less, room for abuse or harassment at checkpoints. Indeed, in Ortiz, the Court was "not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to select cars for search." 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 895. A fortiori, discretion can be no more limited simply because the activity is detention or questioning, rather than searching.
"[checkpoints] thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed. . . ."


text:
দংশন [ daṃśana ] n act of biting or stinging; a bite or sting. দংশন করা v. to bite or sting.
দরুন [ daruna ] prep for, because of, owing to, due to, on account of; for the sake of.
দশন [ daśana ] n tooth, bite. ~পঙ্ক্তি n. a set or row of teeth.
রটন, রটনা [ raṭana, raṭanā ] n circulation of a report, rumour, etc.; publicity; announcement; a scandalous report. রটনা করা v. to circulate, to give publicity to; to announce.
2nd/3rd person respectful present simple tense of দোয়া: দোয়া1 [ dōẏā1 ] v to milk (as a cow); (fig.) to ex tort (money etc.) from (a person). ~নো v. to cause to milk; to milk.
দুশমন [ duśamana ] n an enemy, a foe, an adversary; a rogue, a scoundrel, a wicked or vile person. দুশমনি n. enmity, hostility; roguery, wickedness.
ভরন [ bharana ] n an inferior metal obtained from an alloy of coper, zinc and tin.
দর্ভ [ darbha ] n a generic name for different species of small grass. ~ময় a. grassy; made of grass. দর্ভাসন n. a grass mat for sitting upon.
দর্প [ darpa ] n vanity, conceit, pride; boast, vaunt, arrogance, haughtiness; daring, challenge. দর্প করা v. to be proud of, to take pride in; to boast, to vaunt; to dare, to challenge. দর্প চূর্ণ করা, দর্প ভাঙা v. to humble one's pride. ~নাশ n. ruin or destruction of pride; conquest or quelling of pride or vanity. ~হর, ~হারী a. one who or (rarely) that which humbles one's pride or vanity. দর্পিত, দর্পী a. vain, conceited, proud; boastful; bumptious, arrogant, haughty; daring. দর্পোক্তি n. proud or arrogant or overbearing or stiff-necked utterance.
দংশল [ daṃśala ] v (obs. & poet.) bit or stung.
দংশক [ daṃśaka ] a one who or that which bites or stings. ☐ n. a large gnat, the gadfly.
আরশ [ āraśa ] n a throne.
দুন [ duna ] n (mus.) double quick measure; act of playing a musical instrument or singing doubly quick. 2nd person respectful present imperative tense of দোয়া: দোয়া1 [ dōẏā1 ] v to milk (as a cow); (fig.) to ex tort (money etc.) from (a person). ~নো v. to cause to milk; to milk.
দরি [ dari ] n a carpet, a thick cloth used for sit ting or as laid under a bed.
দরগা [ daragā ] n (Mus.) a mausoleum of a holy saint.

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G.R. No. 170102 - Sps. Francisco & Gloria Salcedo v. Amelia Marino etc.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO and GLORIA SALCEDO, Petitioners, v. AMELIA MARINO, joined by her husband CECILIO MARINO, Respondents.
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (Special Seventeenth Division) dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87932.
On October 3, 1990, spouses Francisco and Gloria Salcedo, petitioners, obtained a loan of P98,000.00 from spouses Amelia and Cecilio Marino, respondents. To secure this loan, petitioners executed a real estate mortgage over their residential property located at No. 36-B, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. The term of the loan was one (1) year.
Petitioners failed to pay their indebtedness within the period stipulated. Hence, on December 13, 1993, the parties executed before the barangay captain of East Bajac-bajac, Olongapo City, an agreement extending the period for payment to another year; and providing that should petitioners fail to pay their obligation within the extended period, they will surrender their mortgaged property voluntarily to respondents.
Petitioners again failed to pay their loan, prompting respondents to file with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Olongapo City a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, docketed as MTCC Case No. 34-94.
On August 9, 1996, the MTCC granted respondents' motion and issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 417 of Republic Act 7160 (Revised Local Government Code)2 and ordering petitioners to surrender voluntarily their mortgaged property to respondents.
On August 23, 1996, the writ of execution was implemented and respondents were placed in possession of the property. Eventually, petitioners filed a motion to recall the writ and to be allowed to deposit P98,000.00. The MTCC denied the motion, holding that it had become moot and that the issues raised therein can be heard in a separate civil action.
On June 6, 1997, petitioners filed with the same MTCC a complaint for recovery of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 3568. But for lack of barangay conciliation, the MTCC, in its Decision dated September 2, 1997, denied the petition.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City issued an Order dated April 27, 1998 affirming the MTCC Decision.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48088.
On October 28, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing the RTC Order of April 27, 1998 and declaring that petitioners are entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged property on the ground that the agreement to extend the term of the loan contained a pactum commissarium.
Respondents then filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari . In its Decision dated November 15, 2000, this Court ordered that the case be remanded to the MTCC for further proceedings to determine whether petitioners "are entitled to possession of the mortgaged property."
After trial on the merits, the MTCC promulgated its Decision dated March 29, 2004 dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action since the mortgaged property had already been sold at public auction in favor of respondents and that the sheriff, on December 16, 1991, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 244-0-04.
On June 14, 2004, the RTC ordered petitioners to file their memorandum within fifteen (15) days from notice. Instead of complying with the Order, they filed a motion for extension of 15 days within which to file their memorandum which was granted by the RTC. Again, they failed to file the required memorandum. Subsequently, they filed anew a motion asking for another extension of fifteen (15) days. Once more, the RTC granted the motion.
However, despite the two (2) extensions, petitioners still failed to file their memorandum. Consequently, the RTC, in an Order dated November 24, 2004, dismissed their appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Attached thereto was their memorandum. They alleged that their counsel had a heavy workload and that he had difficulty getting in touch with them because they transferred their residence to Manila.
In its Order of December 1, 2004, the RTC denied petitioners' motion, stating that it had given them enough time to file their memorandum. Moreover, although they transferred to Manila, they could still communicate with their counsel regarding the case.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72 dated November 24, 2004 and December 1, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Thus, the instant petition anchored on the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders dismissing petitioners' appeal for their failure to submit their memorandum on time.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
It is clear from the above provisions that petitioners' failure to file their memorandum seasonably is a ground for the dismissal of their appeal.
Nor will the bare fact that the petitioners now live in Manila, while their counsel has office in Olongapo, justifies their failure to file their memorandum on time. In Balgami v. Court of Appeals,7 where a party resided 135 kilometers away from his counsel in Iloilo City, we held that such fact alone will not excuse the party from failing to get in touch with his counsel. Moreover, we agree with the RTC that petitioners' presence was not indispensable in the preparation of their memorandum. Also, there is no showing that they were earnestly following up their case with their counsel. It is a dogma that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.8 A party to a case is mandated to inquire from his counsel from time to time about its status and progress. Petitioners were unmindful of this mandate.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87932 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
1 Rollo, pp. 109-115. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo.
2 Section 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
3 Miwa v. Medina, A.C. No. 5854, September 30, 2002, 412 SCRA 275, 281, citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 418 (1991).
4 Boaz International Trading Corp. v. Woodward Japan, Inc., G.R. No. 147793, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 287, 295.
5 Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 418, 428.
6 See Perea v. Almadro, A.C. No. 5246, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 322.
7 G.R. No. 131287, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 591.
8 Balgami v. Court of Appeals, id.
9 Borbon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138495, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 617, 622, citing Edrial v. Quilat-Quilat, 339 SCRA 760 (2000).

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