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**Secretary-General of the Pan-African Movement, based in Kampala, Uganda in an article entitled 'An idea whose time has come' BBC Focus on Africa Magazine July-September 01 48.
The end of the Cold War was a turning point for Africa. It generated hopes for greater prospects of peace, development and integration in the world economy. It also marked the start of a new epoch, in which Africa lost the strategic value it had to the world superpowers and thus became increasingly marginalised both politically and economically. The post-Cold War era also marked the beginning of globalisation, 'a complex set of developments often operating in contradictory, oppositional or even conflictual manner'.  Globalisation was ushered in with promises of progress and prosperity for all.  But globalisation also poses serious threats to the sovereignty, cultural and historical identities of the people of Africa and it gravely undermines Africa's development prospects.  It is becoming clearer that African countries cannot effectively face the challenges of globalisation as single political entities. Globalisation can only be met through a politically and economically unified Africa.
At the same time, it is also becoming widely recognised that economic and social development cannot be achieved without peace and stability. Peace and stability can only thrive in an environment where human rights are respected. Thus the connection between human rights and development and its linkage to regional integration in the context of globalisation are increasingly acknowledged.
Despite the creation of the OAU, some African leaders, particularly Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, felt that Africa needed a stronger union than the one that had been realised in the OAU.  Therefore he advocated for an even stronger union of African states. Nkrumah made his last efforts to influence his fellow leaders to establish a union government for the whole of independent Africa during the OAU summit held in Accra, Ghana in 1965. The idea evoked suspicion and animosity from a substantial number of African heads of state.  These leaders were not about to give up their hard-fought independence and recently acquired presidential status for the sake of a continental union. The removal of Kwame Nkrumah from power through a military coup d'etat in 1966 seemed to have ended the discussion about one government for African states for a while.
In the period between 1966 and 1999 efforts were made to realise African unity through the means of economic integration. This was expressed theoretically in a number of OAU declarations, resolutions and plans of actions that were adopted between 1968 and 1980, and in concrete terms in the formation of several sub-regional economic blocs.
This was also a period when African states were making efforts to achieve economic integration by establishing organisations and institutions in various sub-regions in Africa. A large number of these organisations and institutions, also known as Regional Economic Communities (REC), have been created, some with overlapping mandates.  Some of the key RECs include Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) in East and Southern Africa; East African Community (EAC) in East Africa; Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in North Africa.
The entry into force of the Abuja Treaty created a situation whereby the OAU co-existed with the AEC. In a way the OAU started operating on the basis of both the OAU Charter and Abuja Treaty. This eventually created a need for an institution that would combine the OAU's political nature and the AEC's economic nature. At the same time, the end of the millennium led to a sense of urgency among African leadership to reposition the OAU in order to set the African continent as a whole on a firm path to development and peace in the new millennium.  It was in this context that the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi called a meeting to discuss the formation of a 'United States of Africa'.
The OAU legal unit then drafted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the Act). The draft Act was debated in a meeting of legal experts and parliamentarians and later at a ministerial conference held in Tripoli from 31 May to 2 June 2000.  The involvement of the African parliamentarians was intended to ensure that the Union becomes more closely connected with the people.  The Act was adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé in July 2000.  All members of the OAU had signed the Act by March 2001,  and therefore the OAU Assembly at its 5th extraordinary summit held in Sirte, Libya from 1 to 2 March 2001 declared the establishment of the AU.  However, to fulfil the legal requirements for the Union, the Constitutive Act had to be ratified by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU.  This was achieved on 26 April 2001 when Nigeria became the thirty-sixth OAU member state to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Constitutive Act of the AU with the OAU Secretary-General.  The AU became a legal and political reality a month thereafter, on 26 May 2001, when the Constitutive Act entered into force.  The Constitutive Act of the AU is annexed to this article.
The process towards the establishment of the AU ran concurrently with efforts to develop a blueprint for African development in the 21st century. The blueprint in place is known as the New African Initiative  and it is a result of a merger between the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) developed by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and the Omega Plan developed by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. The AU provides a structural framework supporting the implementation of the New African Initiative. The New African Initiative could be seen as the fuel that fires the engine of the AU.
The AU is loosely modelled on the European Union. It is intended to become a pan-African body with strong political and economic ties that would replace the OAU. But is the AU a new organisation or just the same old OAU with a new name? An analysis of the salient features of the Union will now be conducted by comparing the provisions of the Act with those of the OAU Charter in order to establish the extent to which the AU is in fact a new organisation.
The Union is to be guided by 16 principles,  again nine more than those of the OAU. However, only four of the seven guiding principles of the OAU found their way into the Act. These are sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes and condemnation of political assassination and subversive activities.  Among the new principles, the prohibition of the use (or threat of the use of force) is a recent addition copied from the UN Charter.  Others, for instance the principle of sacrosanctity of the colonial borders, reflect the developments in the OAU in the 38 years of its existence.  Still others, for example the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, reflect developments in international law in general.  Additional novel principles in the Act include gender equality, participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union, a common defence policy for the African continent, self-reliance, social justice, peaceful co-existence of member states and respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.
Article 5(a) of the Act enumerates the organs of the Union. They are the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Specialised Technical Committee, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and financial institutions. The Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Commission and the Specialised Technical Committees are equivalent to the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, General Secretariat and Specialised Commissions in the OAU institutional structure. The OAU's Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration is left out in the African Union. The Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Economic Social and Cultural Council have equivalent structures in the African Economic Community. The Union's Permanent Representative Committee and Financial Institutions are new institutions.
Articles 6 to 9 deal with the Assembly. They describe issues such as its composition, its meetings, decision making within the Assembly, quorum for meetings and the powers and functions of the Assembly. The Assembly is composed of the Heads of State and Government and meets at least once a year. As the supreme organ of the Union, the Assembly determines the common policies of the Union; monitors the implementation thereof; establishes any organ of the Union; and receives, considers and takes decisions on reports and recommendations of other organs of the Union.
The Commission of the Union is composed of the Chairperson, his or her deputies and the commissioners and assisted by the necessary staff.  The Commission of the Union is the Secretariat of the Union. The Union will also have a Permanent Representatives Committee composed of the permanent representative to the Union and mandated to prepare the work of the Executive Council. Finally, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an advisory body composed of different social and professional groups of member states, shall be established.  The functions, powers, composition and organisation of the three institutions stated above shall be determined by the Assembly.
It has been argued that the successful enforcement of human rights in Africa will depend, in part, on the development of economic integration among states on the continent.  This alone could justify the welcoming of the establishment of the AU, which is the highest level of economic integration that African states could aspire to, by members of the human rights community. The Act itself, however, also contains provisions that put human rights on the agenda of the AU.
The provisions of the Preamble and those that set out the objectives and principles of the Act include human rights in very clear terms. The Preamble of the Act states that African leaders are 'determined to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law'.  Two of the objectives of the AU, as defined in the text, incorporate human rights issues in very explicit manner. Article 3(g) provides that the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter or Charter) and other relevant human rights instruments is an objective of the Union.  Similarly, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance are also some of the objectives of the Union.
Article 30 states in very precise terms that a government that shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union. This provision embodies the Algiers Summit decision on unconstitutional changes in Africa.
The African human rights system is centred on the African Charter and is designed to operate within the OAU institutional framework.  Its enforcement mechanism comprises the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission or Commission) and to be established African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court). Given the role of the two institutions in the African human rights scene, it is important to establish their status within the AU.
The African Court has not yet been established. Yet, given the likelihood that it would be established in the near future, it is appropriate to take up the issue regarding its status in the African Union too. The Lusaka summit again has not given any guidance on this issue and the matter is open for debate and speculation. Particularly important in this regard is the question as to which institution takes over the role of the Council of Ministers in enforcing judgments of the African Court of Human Rights. This issue has been clarified in neither the Constitutive Act nor by the recent OAU summit in Lusaka.
The other issue that may be of interest is the role that the African Court of Justice could play in the enforcement of human rights obligations. The European equivalent of the African Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, has played a significant role in the development of human rights in Europe.  If the European model of political and economic integration is any guide on this matter, the African Court of Justice could, in a similar way, play a significant role in advancing human rights in the continent in conjunction with the African Court.  The Protocol on the African Court of Justice is yet to be drafted. However, it would be interesting to see how the African Court of Justice will relate to the African Court in the Protocol and in practice.
The AU cannot be said to be radically different in qualitative and quantitative terms from the OAU/AEC.  The Union, however, has a more explicit human rights focus than the OAU/AEC.  In a sense it could be argued that the AU is an attempt to unite the ideals of African unity and human rights on the continent. The progressive nature of the AU regarding human rights is clear in the Preamble of the Constitutive Act and in its objectives and guiding principles. Furthermore, the provision on the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council offers hopes of more involvement of African people in the activities of the Union than was the case in the OAU.  But in order for these provisions to have the desired impact there is a need to equip the organs, structures and mechanisms of the AU to effectively implement these provisions so as to realise the goal of fully integrating the human rights framework in the activities of the AU.
The retention in the Constitutive Act of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states which, on the main, accounts for the failure on the part of the OAU to address human rights violations in the continent, is a cause for concern. One could argue that the principle of non-interference has been watered down so much in recent years as to pose no threat to human rights protection efforts. In any event, there are other principles such as the right of the Union to intervene and the respect of human rights that would balance it out. However, the principle of Union intervention is restricted to situations of genocide and crimes against humanity. Yet most of the violations of human rights in Africa do not reach those grievous levels and thus they are outside the purview of intervention.
Experience has shown that treaties and regional institutions by themselves do not necessarily translate into better protection of human rights unless accompanied by political will. In the final analysis, while the Constitutive Act contains elaborate human rights provisions, the extent to which the Union will be more protective of human rights will depend on the political will of the states to give effect to those ideals, the progressive interpretation of the Act by the African Court of Justice and the leadership by the African Commission and Union organs in championing the human rights cause on the continent.
 J Oloka-Onyango 'Globalisation in the context of increased incidents of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia' Working Paper of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 22 June 1999 (E/CN4/Sub2/1999/8) para 2.
 Algiers Declaration adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government during the 35th ordinary session held on 12—14 July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria. AHG/Decl1 (XXXV). The Declaration is reprinted in (1999) 11 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 788.
 The African Union was established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the Act) which entered into force on 26 May 2001. The Act is reprinted in (2000) 12 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 629 and in the Annexure at the end of this article.
 The two bodies, the OAU and AEC, are dealt with together in this paper because since the establishment of the AEC by the Abuja Treaty in 1994, the two have been existing side by side although the OAU overshadowed the AEC. In practice this was reflected by the holding of parallel summits of the OAU and the AEC. For example the recent summit held in Lusaka was the 37th ordinary session of the OAU and at the same time the 5th ordinary session of the AEC.
 A prominent African historian and political scientist, Ali Mazrui, defines Pan-Africanism as a system of values and attitudes that favour the unity and solidarity of Africans and of people of African ancestry. See O Agyeman Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations (1992) 11. On Pan-Africanism see C Legum Pan Africanism: A short political guide (1962); K Nkrumah Africa must unite (1963); R Cox Pan-Africanism in practice: PAFMECSA, 1958-1964 (1964); J Nyerere Freedom and unity: Uhuru na umoja; A selection from writings and speeches, 1952—1965 (1968); A Jacques-Garvey Philosophy and opinions of Marcus Garvey (1968); V Thompson Africa and unity: The evolution of Pan-Africanism (1969); G Padmore Pan-Africanism or Communism (1972); and C Amate Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in practice (1986).
 A Chanda 'The Organization of African Unity: An appraisal' (1989-92) 21-24 Zambia Law Journal 1.
 Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, who would later lead Kenya and Ghana to independence, were some of the key organizers of the historic 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester which brought together Africans, Black Americans and West Indians of African descent. See Agyeman (n 6 above) 12.
 Chanda (n 7 above) 4.
 GJ Naldi The Organisation of African Unity (1999) 2.
 At about the same time the former colonial masters in Africa, the European states, were in process of establishing their own union through the Treaty of Rome — signed in 1958 — which established the European Economic Community. The idea proposed by Nkrumah was more progressive than that of Europe in that it advocated for even stronger political and economic union. On account of the benefits — such as peace, security and prosperity — that have accrued to the European states one imagines tremendous strides that Africa could have made by now if it had already then embraced wholeheartedly the idea of a United Government of Africa.
 The OAU was established by the OAU Charter which was adopted by a conference of heads of state and government in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963. The OAU Charter is reprinted in 3 International Legal Materials 1116 and in I Brownlie (ed) Basic documents in international law (1983) 76.
 M Munya 'The Organisation of African Unity and its role in regional conflict resolution and dispute settlement: A critical evaluation' (1999) Boston College Third World Law Journal 537 582.
 It should be recalled that on the eve of the founding of the OAU, Nkrumah made an impassioned speech in which he argued for the formation of a union government of African states with a common market, currency, monetary zone, central bank, system of defence, citizenship, foreign policy and continental communication system. The speech is reprinted in New African January 2000 381 18—25.
 After a failure to establish a union government at the Accra summit of 1965, Nyerere said he had heard one head of state expressing relief that he was happy to be returning home to his country while still the head of state. See New African January 2000 381 28—31.
 See the Preamble to the Abuja Treaty cited below.
 Subregional economic integration is a special theme of two consecutive volumes of the African Yearbook of International Law. See (1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law 3—81 particularly the articles by Ndulo (on SADC), Kessie (on ECOWAS) and Kaahwa (on EAC). See also (1998) 6 African Yearbook of International Law 3-150 especially the article by Gondwe (on COMESA). For an examination of the potential role of the subregional economic institutions in promotion and protection of human rights, see F Viljoen 'The realisation of human rights in Africa through subregional institutions' (1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law 185.
 Reprinted in (1993) 1 African Yearbook of International Law 227; (1991) 3 International Legal Materials 1241; (1991) 3 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 792.
 OAU 'The African Economic Community' http://www.oau-oua.org/document/documents/AEC.htm (accessed 31 July 01). As at 31 July 01 all OAU member states with the exception of Eritrea had signed the Abuja Treaty and 45 OAU member states had ratified the treaty. OAU CAB/LEG/28.1.
 Art 6(1) Constitutive Act. For a thorough analysis of the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, see B Thompson 'Economic integration in Africa: A milestone — The Abuja Treaty' (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 743.
 While criticising the various attempts to achieve regional economic integration in Africa as having failed to achieve continental fusion, Mistry argues that the Abuja Treaty is useful in that it provides mechanisms to assure a measure of consistency across subregions in their integration measures. P Mistry 'Africa's record of regional cooperation and integration' (2000) 99 African Affairs 553 570.
 'The adoption of the Sirte Declaration and subsequently the Constitutive Act of the AU must be viewed as part and parcel of the endeavour which has the ultimate objective of enhancing unity, strengthening cooperation and coordination as well as equipping the African continent with a legal and institutional framework which would enable Africa to gain its rightful place in the community of nations.' Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Sirte Decision on the African Union (EAHG/Dec1 (V)) Council of Ministers 74th ordinary session/9th ordinary session of the AEC 2—7 July 01 Lusaka, Zambia CM/2210 (LXXIV) para 5.
 (1999) 36 Africa Research Bulletin 13677.
 OAU Doc EAHG/Dec1 (IV) Rev 1, reprinted in (1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law 411.
 (1999) 36 Africa Research Bulletin 13678.
 Para 247, OAU Secretary-General report http://www.oau-oua.org/LOMÉ2000/ ENGLISH% INTRO%Note%20SG.htm (accessed 31 July 01). According to this report the most important aspect of the debate was the nature and form of the African Union. On this issue the Ministerial Conference underscored the need to establish the African Union in keeping with the Pan-African vision of the OAU founding fathers.
 That notwithstanding, criticism has been voiced on the lack of direct involvement of civil society and the masses in the debates regarding the formation of the Union. The criticism was voiced by a number of participants during a public lecture on the African Union given by Prof Tiyanjana Maluwa, the Legal Counsel of the OAU, and attended by this writer in November 00 at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.
 36th ordinary session of the Assembly held in Lomé, Togo 10—11 July 2000.
 OAU 'Decision on the Africa Union' 5th OAU extraordinary session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 1-2 March 01 Sirte, Libya EAHG/Dec1—4 (V).
 The Constitutive Act of the Africa Union entered into force 30 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the members of the OAU. See art 28 Constitutive Act.
 OAU 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union attains the legal requirement for entering into force' Press release No 52/2001 at http://www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/pressrelease/PRESS%20RELEASE%20NO%2052-%202001.htm (accessed 31 July 2001).
 As at 31 July 2001, 44 OAU member states have ratified and deposited the instruments of the ratification in accordance with art 27(2) of the Act and seven countries have informed the OAU secretariat that they have ratified the Act and that the instruments of ratification will be deposited with the General Secretariat in due course. Only two member states, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar, are yet to ratify the Act. See OAU CAB/LEG/23.15/Vol.IX paras 1—3.
 The New African Initiative is available on the Internet at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/misc/mapomega.html (accessed 31 July 01).
 Arts 2(a), 2(c), 2(e) & 2(b) OAU Charter and arts 3(a), 3(b), 3(e) & 3(k) Constitutive Act.
 The OAU principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, emancipation of dependent African territories and non-alignment are left out.
 This principle was developed in the Cairo Declaration of 1964. The same could be said of other Union guiding principles such as condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, which was stated in the OAU summit in Algiers, Algeria in 1999.
 These two principles are based on a new and controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention. For further details on this doctrine see FK Abiew The evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention (1999).
 Arts 12—15 OAU Charter and 11—13 Abuja Treaty.
 While the OAU Charter provided for neither the Pan-African Parliament nor the Pan-African Court of Justice, the Abuja Treaty envisages the establishment of both institutions. See the Abuja Treaty; arts 14 & 18. However, neither of the two treaties provided for the establishment of the African continental financial institutions.
 These developments are due to the fact that the process was already underway to establish the Pan-African Parliament within the AEC. The OAU General Secretariat drafted the protocol on the Pan-African parliament. The draft was referred to experts from member states that met in April 2000. This was followed by the discussion at both parliamentary and ministerial levels in May 2000. The ministerial conference requested the OAU Secretariat to make some amendments. The amended draft was discussed at the first meeting of the African parliamentarians on the establishment of the African parliament held in Pretoria in November 2000. Then it was considered by the preparatory meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in February 2001, see OAU 'Report of 73rd ordinary session of the Council of Ministers' 22—26 February 2001 Tripoli, Libya OAU Doc CM/Rpt (LXXIII) para 103. The amended draft protocol was finally adopted by the OAU Assembly in March 2001. See OAU 'Decision on the Draft Protocol on the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament', 5th extraordinary session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 1—2 March 01 Sirte, Libya EAHG/3 (V) para 2.
 Art 20 Constitutive Act. This organ is equivalent to the General Secretariat in the OAU Charter (arts 16-18) and the Abuja Treaty (arts 21—23).
 Art 21 Constitutive Act. The OAU Charter did not provide for such a body, but the Abuja Treaty provided for an equivalent organ named the Economic and Social Commission. See arts 15—17 Abuja Treaty. The OAU Assembly has decided that in view of the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the Economic and Social Commission provided for in the Abuja Treaty would cease to exist at the end of transitional period between OAU/AEC to the AU. The transitional period from the OAU/AEC to the AU is one year from July 2001. See OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' 37th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government July 2001 Lusaka, Zambia AHG/Dec1 (XXXVII) para 7(b).
 To that end the OAU Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structure, procedures and the working methods of the Central Organ including the possibility of changing its name. See OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' (n 51 above) para 8. The Central Organ had been established as a constituent part of the OAU mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Cairo, Egypt in 1993. See Declaration of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, reprinted in (1994) 6 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 158.
 OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' (n 51 above) para 4.
 In this respect, the OAU Assembly mandated the Secretary-General in consultation with member states to submit proposals regarding the structure, functions and powers of the Commission (n 51 above para 5).
 This provision was informed by the desire to ensure that the Union does not inherit the OAU's negative legacy of resource deprivation arising from the failure of member states to meet their financial obligations.
 C Heyns & F Viljoen 'An overview of international protection of human rights in Africa' (1999) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 425 433. These authors argue that as a general rule the international enforcement of human rights depends for its success on the existence of, among other factors, a web of trade relations between the respective states because only where these exist can their potential severance in cases where human rights violations come to light constitute a real threat to coerce the states to adhere to human rights principles.
 Para 10 Preamble to the Act.
 There is a similar provision in art 3(g) of the Abuja Treaty, although as a principle and not an objective as is the case in the Act.
 The establishment of the Pan-African Parliament is said to be geared towards ensuring the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration. See art 17 Constitutive Act.
 Arts 4(l), 4(n) & 4(p) Constitutive Act.
 See T Abdul-Raheem 'An idea whose time has come' BBC Focus on Africa Magazine July—September 2001 48.
 Art 22 Constitutive Act. At the recently held Lusaka OAU summit, the OAU Assembly emphasised the importance of involving African NGOs, socio-economic organisations, professional associations and civil society in general in Africa's integration process as well as in the formulation and implementation of programmes of the African Union. See OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' (n 51 above) para 7.
 See Abdul-Raheem (n 62 above) 48.
 The African Charter was adopted by the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in Nairobi on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. The text of the Charter is reprinted in (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 58.
 Final Communiqué of the 29th ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 23 April—7 May 2001, para 10. The Commission adopted a resolution on the African Charter and the AU.
 Incidentally in the same summit, the OAU Assembly did adopt a decision in which it recognised the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as an organ of the AU. See OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' (n 51 above) paras 8(a) & (b).
 For more information on the role of the European Court of Justice in human rights protection see L Woods 'The European Union and human rights' in R Hanski & M Sukksi (eds) An introduction to the international protection of human rights (1999) 351—367.
 The potential human rights mandate of this court is explored in CM Peter 'The proposed African Court of Justice — jurisprudential, procedural, enforcement problems and beyond (1993) 1 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 117.
 The AU evolves from the combination of OAU and AEC. The institutions that the Union establishes are to a large extent similar to those that the OAU/AEC had set out to establish albeit in a more gradual process. Therefore what the Union actually sets out to achieve is to fast-track the process of economic integration that had been set in motion by the OAU/AEC. This view finds support in para 7 of the Preamble to the Act which states that the African leaders are 'convinced of the need to accelerate the process of implementing the African Economic Community in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more effectively the challenges posed by globalisation' (my emphasis).
 This is not surprising given the fact that the OAU was established at the time when human rights were considered to be internal matters and outside the purview of an intergovernmental body. Although the AEC was established in a period when human rights were on international agenda, its objectives were more restrictive than those of the Union as they were principally economic in nature. The Union however has been established at the time when human rights are foremost concepts in inter- national relations.
 The intention to bring the Union closer to the African people is reaffirmed by the Lusaka summit of the OAU Heads of State and Government which acknowledges the member states' primary responsibility of popularising the African Union and urges the member states to take the necessary steps to ensure that the Union is truly a community of peoples. The summit further requested the OAU General Secretariat and regional communities to undertake complementary actions to popularise the Union. See OAU 'Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the African Union' (n 51 above) para 6.

matches:
Art 6
art 28
art 27
Art 20
Art 21
art 3
art 17
Art 22


Douglas E. Whitney, Dist. Counsel, Dept. of H & R Serv., James A. Edwards, Orlando, Fla., Gerald B. Curington, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., Brian R. Toung, Delia Doyle Rose, Daytona Beach, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
We have taken this case en banc to examine the scope of judicial immunity in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982).1 A panel of this court in Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.1984), held that, where a judge performs a judicial act affecting the rights of a party over whom he knows the court has no personal jurisdiction, the judge may be liable to such party for money damages. We find this result both contrary to precedent and policy and reassert the common law doctrine that a judge enjoys absolute immunity where he or she had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter forming the basis for such liability.
This case grew out of a domestic dispute. The judicial act in question is a juvenile court order declaring a child dependent and temporarily awarding custody of the child to the father.
Diana Dykes and Roger Francis "Buzzy" Dykes, Jr. began experiencing marital difficulties in 1977. In November of that year, Buzzy took their only child, Aaron, from their home in Pennsylvania to his parents' house in Florida. It is alleged that Buzzy and his father, Roger F. Dykes, a Brevard County, Florida Circuit Court judge, formulated a plan to obtain a colorable court order awarding custody of Aaron to Buzzy. Judge Dykes telephoned Judge Anthony Hosemann, Jr., a member of his court then assigned to the court's juvenile division2 for advice. Judge Hosemann counseled that Buzzy come before him with a "dependency" petition and referred Judge Dykes to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS).
Diana and her son7 subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985 (1982)8 alleging that Buzzy, Buzzy's father, Judge Hosemann, and Thomas Weinberg, the HRS supervisor who assisted in the preparation of the dependency petition,9 conspired to deprive them of their constitutional rights.10 We today focus only on the plaintiffs' claims made against Judge Hosemann and determine whether under the facts of the case he is immune from suit.
Since the seventeenth century, common law has immunized judges from suit for judicial acts within the jurisdiction of the court.11 This doctrine of judicial immunity was embraced by the Supreme Court as early as 1872 when the Court noted that it was "a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).12 More recently, the Court held that Congress, in enacting section 1983, did not intend to abolish the doctrine of judicial immunity in cases alleging state deprivation of federal constitutional rights. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), the Court established a two-part test for determining whether a judge enjoys absolute immunity from money damages under section 1983. First, did the judge deal with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity? Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107. If he did not, then judicial immunity does not lie. If he did act in such a capacity, then the focus is on whether the judge acted in the " 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' "13 Id. at 357, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). In this case, then, we must determine whether Judge Hosemann acted in his judicial capacity in finding dependency and awarding temporary custody of Aaron to Buzzy and, if so, whether he acted in the absence of all jurisdiction.
(1) the precise act complained of ... is a normal judicial function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.
Appellants allege that Judge Hosemann acted in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction" because he lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dependency proceeding and jurisdiction over their persons; therefore, he cannot claim immunity. Section 39.02(1) of the 1977 Florida Statutes provided that "[t]he circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to be dependent." There is no question that Judge Hosemann was a circuit court judge and that the petition presented to him on November 22, 1977 alleged that Aaron was a "dependent" child. Thus it is clear that Judge Hosemann had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. That he may have incorrectly concluded that Aaron actually was dependent does not affect the fact that it was within his power to make that determination. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1105.
Judge Hosemann, however, did lack personal jurisdiction over one of the parties to the dispute. He signed the order finding Aaron a dependent child and awarded custody to Buzzy even though no summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was ever directed to Diana as required by statute.16 The issue we must resolve is whether a judge who acts within his or her subject matter jurisdiction before acquiring personal jurisdiction over a party to the suit can be made to answer in money damages.
435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). Although the Court referred to jurisdiction in general terms, the context of the statement indicates that the Court was referring to a complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The passage itself cited to a footnote in which the Court presented an example of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.17 More importantly, the language in Bradley from which Stump quotes, more fully reads "clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351 (emphasis added).
The Court in Bradley v. Fisher, identified five policy reasons for judicial immunity: First, and foremost, a judge must be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences; second, the controversiality and importance of the competing interests in a case before a court make it likely that the losing party may be overly willing to ascribe malevolent motives to the judge; third, judges faced with the prospect of defending damages actions and, perhaps, satisfying money judgments would be driven to wasteful and destructive self-protection devices and, moreover, may be less inclined to administer justice; fourth, alternative remedies such as appeal and impeachment reduce the need for private rights of action against judges; and fifth, the ease of alleging bad faith would make a qualified "good faith" immunity virtually worthless because judges would constantly be forced to defend their motivations in court. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-54. These factors are still important today. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-09, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2912, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).
Withdrawing judicial immunity where a judge has subject matter but not personal jurisdiction over a party affected by his ruling conflicts with all of these policies. Unlike questions of subject matter jurisdiction, which generally require only statutory intrepretation, personal jurisdiction depends upon facts that a judge is not likely to be able to verify first hand. A judge, for example, would be particularly vulnerable in issuing ex parte restraining orders, see, e.g., Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.610, where time constraints often dictate that he rely on the representations of the party before him in determining whether personal jurisdiction has been or can be obtained over the absent party. Frequently, the question of whether a nonresident can be reached by the court's process cannot be decided until the litigation is well underway;20 sometimes the decision is made in a collateral proceeding, after judgment is entered, when, for example, the judgment creditor seeks to levy on the nonresident party's assets. In sum, to require a judge to defend a charge that he knowingly entered an order adversely affecting a party over whom the court had not acquired personal jurisdiction would be to ignore the still valid policy considerations articulated by the Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher. We accordingly uphold the district court's ruling that Judge Hosemann need not appear and defend appellants' claims against him.
Having disposed of the issue we concluded to be en banc-worthy, we remand this case to the panel that initially considered it for such further consideration as the panel deems appropriate.
AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED to the panel.
I join in the majority's affirmance of the district judge's dismissal of Judge Hosemann from this case because I find that, in addition to being immune from a section 1983 suit, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), mandates that the suit against him be dismissed. I dissent, however, from the majority's remand of the case as to the other appellees because I also read Parratt as requiring that the claims against the remaining appellees be dismissed, as well.
I view this case as an ordinary abuse of process claim. Diana complains that Buzzy, with the aid of the other appellees, deliberately used a dependency proceeding for a purpose for which it was not designed, i.e., to deprive her of her parental right to the shared custody of her child and to deprive the child of the benefit of such custody. Since Aaron was not a dependent child,1 Buzzy could not properly invoke Florida's child dependency law to obtain his custody. Buzzy's appropriate recourse under Florida law, if he wanted to obtain sole custody of Aaron, was to sue Diana for divorce and request the court to award him temporary (pending the litigation) and permanent custody of the child. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 61.13 (1977).
If Diana's factual allegations are true, Buzzy and those who conspired with him are liable to her, in her individual and representative capacities, in money damages for the injuries she and Aaron sustained. Diana has not sued them for abusing Florida's dependency procedure, however. Rather, invoking section 1983 she seeks compensation for such injuries under the theory that the State of Florida denied her and Aaron the due process of law guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment.3 Her theory is foreclosed by Parratt.
In Parratt, Nebraska prison officials failed to follow normal procedures for receipt of packages mailed to prisoners and lost a prisoner's hobby kit. The prisoner sued the officials under section 1983 to recover the value of the lost hobby kit, alleging that the officials, acting for the state, had deprived him of his property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.4 The district court entered summary judgment for the prisoner, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, noting that the fourteenth amendment protects only against deprivations without due process of law, focused on the question of what process was due the prisoner. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1914. The Court first observed that the prison officials' action was random and not sanctioned by the state. Because the state could not have anticipated such random activity, it would have been impossible for the state to have provided the prisoner any process, such as a hearing, prior to the deprivation. Nebraska law, however, did provide the prisoner a make-whole damages remedy. Finding that the damages remedy was all the process the state could have provided him under the circumstances, the Court concluded that the prisoner had not been deprived of his property without due process of law. Id. at 541-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1916-17.
Parratt thus stands for the proposition that, where state law provides a make-whole damages remedy to a person whose property has been taken or destroyed by the random tortious conduct of a state agent, the state has accorded that person all the process he is due under the fourteenth amendment due process clause simpliciter. In other words, Parratt treats the claimant as if he had already been compensated in full by the state for his loss and therefore accorded due process.
Parratt has been extended by the better reasoned opinions to apply to deprivations of liberty as well as property interests. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 337-38 (5th Cir.1984); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 794-96 (4th Cir.1983); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069, 103 S.Ct. 488, 74 L.Ed.2d 631 (1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). But see Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir.1982). Certainly Parratt's reasoning is unaffected by which fourteenth amendment interest is deprived. A state's inability to provide predeprivation process, because the action of the state employee was unauthorized and random, exists regardless of which due process interest is involved. Furthermore, adequate damages remedies may be available not only for property interests but also for liberty and life interests. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2004, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ("[h]istorically damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty"); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d at 338. Finally, the Court in Parratt implicitly acknowledged the applicability of its rationale to deprivations of liberty interests by its discussion of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Ingraham was a section 1983 class action brought on behalf of school children who alleged a deprivation of liberty without due process of law when their public school teachers paddled them for disciplinary reasons without providing them a prior hearing. The Court acknowledged the children's liberty interest but noted that an adequate damages remedy, in the form of a suit for the tort of assault and battery, existed in state law. Recognizing that a hearing prior to each school paddling was impractical, the Court concluded that the state remedy was the only process required. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674-82, 97 S.Ct. at 1414-18. By drawing on Ingraham, the Court indicated that Parratt was designed to apply to liberty interests such as those involved in this case.
In my view, Parratt requires the dismissal of this section 1983 suit. This case tracks Parratt in all its essential elements: (1) appellants seek money damages;5 (2) only violations of fourteenth amendment due process simpliciter rights are alleged;6 and (3) the act of which appellants complain, the appellees' misuse of Florida's dependency law,7 was, to the extent of the state's involvement through Judge Hosemann, random conduct not sanctioned by the state. Quite to the contrary, the state condemned such conduct by subjecting appellees Buzzy Dykes, Judge Dykes, Thomas Weinberg, and Kenneth McIntosh to possible tort liability in the form of a damages action for abuse of process and Judge Hosemann to possible criminal liability, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 839.25 (1983),8 discipline (including removal from office), see Fla.Const. art. V, Sec. 12, or impeachment, see Fla.Const. art. 111, Sec. 17. In addition, Judge Hosemann's dependency order was subject to modification or vacation (if, for example, Diana, after learning of the order's entry appeared to contest it), see Fla.Stat. Sec. 39.11(3) (1977), or reversal on appeal, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 39.14(1) (1977).
Appellants might argue that Parratt does not foreclose their suit against Judge Hosemann because the state, in applying its doctrine of judicial immunity,9 failed to provide them a make-whole damages remedy against him. In short, the state has not accorded the process appellants are due. The rationale of Parratt is based upon an inquiry into what process is due. With respect to Judge Hosemann, then, the question is whether Florida's immunization of judges from suit and the corresponding absence of a tort remedy for judicial wrongs provides an injured party less process than he is due. I find that it does not.
Courts have consistently upheld the use of judicial immunity in section 1983 suits. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734-35, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1976, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), the Court found no indication that Congress, in enacting section 1983, intended to eliminate the doctrine of judicial immunity. These cases clearly imply that judicial immunity is constitutionally permissible and that the resulting absence of an action for money damages to remedy a judge's tortious conduct does not violate the injured party's due process rights. See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-83, 100 S.Ct. 553, 557-58, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (state does not deny due process simply by granting reasonable tort immunity to state entities and officials). This being so, a state accords an injured party all of the process he is due even though it immunizes its judges from suit. See Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1456-58 (11th Cir.1985) (involving statutorily created municipal immunity). Because Florida's immunization of Judge Hosemann from tort damages did not violate appellants' due process rights, Parratt requires that the section 1983 suit against him be dismissed.
In summary, Parratt mandates this section 1983 suit be dismissed as to all of the appellees. This should not be surprising for, when a state provides all the process possible, it is difficult to interpret the fourteenth amendment as requiring more.
On the difficult issue presented in this case, the scope of judicial immunity in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is now made clear. The en banc court holds that judicial immunity is complete, unqualified, and without exception. According to the majority, judicial immunity even protects a judge who acts without subject matter jurisdiction, without personal jurisdiction, and who unlawfully conspires with a party to violate another party's federal constitutional rights. As the majority concedes, no precedent, Supreme Court or otherwise, requires such a broad definition and application of the judicial immunity doctrine. Contrary to the majority's view, no policy considerations justify such a result.
If the judicial action inflicts the intended damage by killing the demonstrators' political momentum, making injunctive relief useless, the victims will lack any remedy for the violation of their rights. In a state with a political climate which is hostile to freedom of association, a judge could repeatedly interfere with constitutional rights without being held accountable. This hypothetical may seem far fetched, but it is not; this is the exact fact pattern that section 1983 was enacted to address and which it has addressed since its enactment.
It is difficult to understand how every person in the United States may be held accountable in damages for conspiring to violate another person's federal constitutional rights, except those persons trained in constitutional guarantees, charged with interpreting the constitution, and oath bound to deal fairly with parties to litigation.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
In 1978, the Florida State Legislature revised Chapter 39, and it became known as the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, with new sections effective October 1, 1978.
(2) Upon the filing of a petition containing allegations of facts which, if true, would constitute the child therein named a dependent child ..., and upon the request of the petitioner, the clerk or deputy clerk shall issue a summons.
(3) The summons shall require the person on whom it is served to appear for a hearing at a time and place specified. The time shall not be less than 24 hours after service of the summons. If the child is not detained by an order of the court, the summons shall require the custodian to produce the child at the said time and place. A copy of the petition shall be attached to the summons.
(c) The legal custodians, actual custodians, and guardians ad litem [of the child], if there be any other than the parents.
Diana sued in behalf of her son, a minor, in a representative capacity, as his "mother and next friend."
In Bradley, the Court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. Id., [80 U.S. (13 Wall.) ], at 352.
Three possible meanings may be gleaned from the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" requirement; judicial immunity is lost (1) only if both subject matter and personal jurisdiction are absent; (2) if subject matter jurisdiction exists but personal jurisdiction is lacking; or (3) if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. The first two possibilities seem foreclosed by the language in the footnote. In stating that, if subject matter jurisdiction exists, the judge is immune, the Court implies that the presence of personal jurisdiction is irrelevant in determining whether immunity exists. Therefore, the Court seems to adopt the third possibility and requires the absence of subject matter jurisdiction to defeat a claim of immunity.
[Judge] Martin's action in convicting O'Neil of contempt, an offense within his court's jurisdiction, although without the requisite papers to confer jurisdiction over this particular commission of the offense, is more analogous to a criminal court convicting for a nonexistent offense than to a probate court hearing a criminal case. It is the sort of "grave procedural error" that does not pierce the cloak of immunity.
O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369 (9th Cir.1981); see also Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1973); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1972); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S.Ct. 529, 34 L.Ed.2d 492 (1972).
Appellants cite Farish v. Smoot, 58 So.2d 534 (Fla.1952), for the proposition that a lack of personal jurisdiction over a party divests a judge of his immunity from suit. In Farish, the defendant, a West Palm Beach municipal judge, had allegedly ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's release from prison on a habeas corpus writ issued by the circuit court. In an action for false imprisonment the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed entry of a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the defendant judge had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction and was therefore not entitled to any immunity for his actions. Id. at 537. Farish, however, does not hold that absence of personal jurisdiction over a party alone subjects a judge to liability, because the judge in that case acted without subject matter jurisdiction as well. Indeed, the case is cited by Florida courts for the rule that absence of subject matter jurisdiction is required to divest a judge's immunity from suit. See Rivello, 322 So.2d at 607.
Although it may be argued that once Green was sentenced the trial judge no longer had personal jurisdiction over Green and the case, Judge Ingrassia did possess subject matter jurisdiction. As demonstrated in Bradley, and by the Supreme Court's approving citation of Bradley in Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 n. 7, it is apparent that a judge who possesses subject matter jurisdiction is not within the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" posture which would deprive him of the use of the defense of judicial immunity. Judge Ingrassia--assuming, of course, for purposes of this appeal that all the allegations of the complaint are true--was not bereft of all jurisdiction, although such acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction. As explained in Bradley, and its progeny, a judge who acts in excess of his jurisdiction is still entitled to rely on the defense of judicial immunity.
Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d at 1017 (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, even subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have severely limited the holding in Rankin. See O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir.1981) (failure to comply with procedural requirements of a statute conferring jurisdiction does not result in a loss of immunity); see also supra note 15.
The fact that a judge commits "grave procedural errors" is not sufficient to deprive a judge of absolute immunity. Stump 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Thus, even if Beard's allegations that Judge Greer failed to adhere to the procedural rules established by the Arizona statutes are true, judicial immunity precludes Beard from recovering for this alleged wrongful act.
The present case is essentially identical to Beard. Diana did not receive notice or a hearing prior to the entry of the November 22, 1977 dependency and temporary custody order, as required by statute. Thus, even in the circuit in which Rankin is binding precedent, Judge Hosemann would have immunity.
In an action for abuse of process it is not essential to show a termination of the proceeding in favor of the person against whom the process was issued and used, or to show want of probable cause or malice. The cause of action consists of the willful or intentional misuse of process; a willful and intentional misuse of it for some wrongful and unlawful object, or ulterior purpose not intended by the law to effect.
The fourteenth amendment due process clause provides that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Appellants allege no substantive constitutional claims. As the panel stressed, "appellants only argue that their rights to procedural due process were violated by the appellees individually and as a part of a conspiracy, and have apparently abandoned their equal protection and substantive due process claims."
In each of these cases [involving immunity from section 1983 liability], our finding of Sec. 1983 immunity "was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it." ... Where the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the time Sec. 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity.
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421, 96 S.Ct. 984, 990, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). As the Court had previously noted: " 'A construction of [Sec. 1983] which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic [constitutional] guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.... The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.' " Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974)).
The Court's decision in Pierson v. Ray is not to the contrary. That case held that Congress did not intend to abolish the judicial immunity of state judges in enacting section 1983. 386 U.S. at 554-55, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. This does not suggest that Congress could abolish the judicial immunity of federal judges, as section 1983 does not apply to such judges and the protection accorded federal judges under article III does not extend to state judges.


text:
1. JOHN(1)7 CAMPBELL (DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born November16, 1674 in Londonderry, Ireland, and died Abt. 1765. He married GRIZEL(GRACE)HAY Abt. 1710. She was born 1678 in Antrim, Ireland.
John(1)Campbell was ourimmigrant ancestor from County Down, Ireland in 1726. He settled in Virginiain 1730. John had nine (11) children with wife Grizel(Grace). Robert, Patrickand David accompanied their parents to St Mark’s Parish, Orange Co. Virginia1732-1741. Patrick was grandfather of BG William Campbell, Commander atthe Battle of Kings Mountain, October 1780. John(1) Campbell’s sister wasMary(2) Campbell and accompanied him from Ireland in 1726.
1. Robert Campbell, Campbell.FTW, July 1999.
2. [email protected], Ancestry.Com file 2533, August 1999.
2. Bill Brink, Ancestry.Com file F2533.
2. i. PATRICK8 CAMPBELL,b. 1696, Antrim, Ireland.
ii. JOHN(2) CAMPBELL, b.1702, Antrim, Ireland.
2. [email protected], Ancestry.com file F2533.
iii. WILLIAM CAMPBELL,b. 1704, Antrim, Ireland; m. SARAH GAY.
2. [email protected], Ancestry.Com file 2533, August 8,1999.
2. [email protected], Ancestry.Com file F2533, August 1999.
3. v. DAVID CAMPBELL, b.March 08, 1705/06, Drumboden, Londonderry, Ireland.
vi. MARGARET CAMPBELL,b. 1707, Antrim, Ireland; d. March 1764, Amsterdam, Boutetourt Co., Virginia.
vii. JAMES CAMPBELL,b. 1708, Antrim, Ireland.
viii. MARTHA CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1709, <Ireland>.
1. [email protected], Ancestry.com file 2533, August 1999.
ix. MARY ANN CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1710, Antrim, Ireland; m. JOHN(3) PATRICK CAMPBELL.
1. RobertCampbell, Campbell.FTW, July 1999.
4. x. CAPTAIN ROBERT(1) CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1727, Antrim, Ireland; d. Abt. 1790.
xi. ELIZABETH CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1713.
2. PATRICK8 CAMPBELL(JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born1696 in Antrim, Ireland. He married DELILAH THOMPSON. She was born Abt.1696.
5. i. CHARLES9 CAMPBELL,b. 1715; d. 1767.
3. DAVID8 CAMPBELL(JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornMarch 08, 1705/06 in Drumboden, Londonderry, Ireland. He married MARY(5)HAMILTON. She was born Abt. 1710.
6. i. COL. ARTHUR9 CAMPBELL.
7. ii. COL. ROBERT(2) CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1755.
4. CAPTAIN ROBERT(1)8CAMPBELL (JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1)was born Abt. 1727 in Antrim, Ireland, and died Abt. 1790. He married MARGARETOR SARAH UNKNOWN Abt. 1750.
8. i. JOHN(4)9 CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1756; d. Abt. 1806.
5. CHARLES9 CAMPBELL(PATRICK8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1)was born 1715, and died 1767. He married MARGARET BUCHANAN, daughter ofJOHN BUCHANAN.
9. i. B. G. WILLIAM10 CAMPBELL,b. 1744; d. 1781.
6. COL. ARTHUR9 CAMPBELL(DAVID8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1)He married MARGARET CAMPBELL.
i. COL. JOHN(6) B.10CAMPBELL, m. POLLY LATHAM.
7. COL. ROBERT(2)9CAMPBELL (DAVID8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2,DUGAL1) was born Abt. 1755. He married REBECCA MCDONALD.
8. JOHN(4)9 CAMPBELL(ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1)was born Abt. 1756, and died Abt. 1806. He married SARAH FORRESTERAbt. 1783. She was born Abt. 1763, and died Abt. 1828.
10. i. JOHN(5) G.10 CAMPBELL,b. April 13, 1778.
11. ii. WILLIAM F. CAMPBELL,b. March 19, 1780; d. November 02, 1833, Logan Co., Kentucky.
iii. ARCHIBALD M.CAMPBELL, b. March 06, 1784; m. ELIZABETH.
John G. Campbell, WilliamCampbell, and Archibald Campbell are buried in the cemetery of the OldRed River Church, which is located on State Road 663 about one mile westof Schochoh, Kentucky.
12. iv. OWENS F. CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1786, Orange Co., North Carolina; d. Abt. 1814, Robertson Co. Tennessee(Logan Co. KY).
v. THOMAS CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1790; m. POLLY SHELTON.
9. B. G. WILLIAM10CAMPBELL (CHARLES9, PATRICK8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3,DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born 1744, and died 1781. He married ELIZABETH HENRY.She was born 1749, and died 1825.
13. i. SARAH11 CAMPBELL,b. 1778.
10. JOHN(5) G.10 CAMPBELL(JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2,DUGAL1) was born April 13, 1778.
14. i. HIRAM11 CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1807; d. September 1845.
ii. SUSAN CAMPBELL,b. December 26, 1806; d. February 13, 1858; m. JOHN OATS.
iv. ELIZABETH CAMPBELL,b. March 30, 1816; d. April 28, 1885; m. JAMES H. OATS.
11. WILLIAM F.10 CAMPBELL(JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2,DUGAL1) was born March 19, 1780, and died November 02, 1833 in Logan Co.,Kentucky. He married CATHERINE. She died December 04, 1857in Logan Co., Kentucky.
i. THOMAS L.11 CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1839; m. MARTHA.
15. iii. ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1800, Logan Co. Kentucky; d. September 08, 1829.
vi. MONTFONT S. CAMPBELL,m. JANE MONDALE.
12. OWENS F.10 CAMPBELL(JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2,DUGAL1) was born Abt. 1786 in Orange Co., North Carolina, and died Abt.1814 in Robertson Co. Tennessee (Logan Co. KY). He married MARY(6)CLARK 1808, daughter of WILLIAM(2) CLARK and SARAH BRIEN. She wasborn Abt. 1785, and died April 30, 1866.
Owens Campbell wasa soldier in the War of 1812-1814 with England. He was killed in an argumentabout the war.
His three sons were rearedin Logan Co., Kentucky. All of them, along with Thomas Clark’s family,moved to Brown County, Illinois, and may have travelled there togther.Thomas Clark was the son of Thomas and Susannah Clark, Susannah, who was born abt 1754, was the daughter of William Clark who immigratedabt. 1728, and sister of Lt. Col. George Rogers Clark.
i. SILAS11 CAMPBELL,b. October 04, 1811.
16. ii. MAJOR ALEXANDER J.CAMPBELL, b. June 27, 1813, Adairsville, Kentucky; d. May 25, 1912, BrownCounty, Illinois.
17. iii. WILLIAM O. F. CAMPBELL,b. November 18, 1816; d. March 11, 1891, Logan Co. Kentucky.
13. SARAH11 CAMPBELL(WILLIAM10, CHARLES9, PATRICK8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3,DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born 1778. She married FRANCES PRESTON. He was born 1765 in 1836.
14. HIRAM11 CAMPBELL(JOHN(5) G.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4,PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born Abt. 1807, and died September 1845.He married MARY SWAN Abt. 1826. She was born Abt. 1807.
18. i. JAMES SWAN12 CAMPBELL,b. September 15, 1826.
ii. NANCY CAMPBELL,b. 1828; m. EZEKIEL MILLER, July 04, 1844.
iii. WILLIAM GEORGECAMPBELL, b. 1830.
19. iv. MARY G. CAMPBELL,b. Abt. 1831.
15. ARCHIBALD11 CAMPBELL(WILLIAM F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4,PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born Abt. 1800 in Logan Co. Kentucky, anddied September 08, 1829. He married ELIZABETH. She was born August 25,1784, and died July 25, 1858.
The dates given as marriage dates for the children of Archibald and Elizabethmust be birthdates. If James was married in 1826 then he would have beenborn when Archibald was only about 5.
i. JAMES12 CAMPBELL,m. ELIZABETH BAKER, December 15, 1826.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as December 15, 1826. But this is more likely thebirth date. Otherwise, James would have to have been born when Archibaldwas about 6 years old.
ii. SUSAN CAMPBELL,m. JOHN CATA, November 17, 1831.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as November 17, 1831. But this is more likely thebirth date. Otherwise, assuming Archibald was born abt. 1800, Susan wouldhave to have been born when Archibald was about 10 years old.
Campbell.FTW lists the marriage date as November 17, 1831. But this ismore likely Susan’s birth date. Otherwise, assuming Archibald was bornabt. 1800, Susan would have had to been born when Archibald was about 15years old.
iii. SARAH CAMPBELL,m. AMOS HALL, April 29, 1830.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as April 29, 1830. But this is more likely thebirth date. Otherwise, Sarah would have to have been born when Archibaldwas about 6 years old.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as April 29, 1830. But this is more likely Sarah’sbirth date. Otherwise, Sarah would have to have been born when Archibaldwas about 6 years old.
iv. CATHARINE CAMPBELL,m. HIRAM MODALE, February 10, 1835.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as February 10, 1835. But this is more likely Catharine’sbirth date. Otherwise, Catharine would have had to been born when Archibaldwas about 10 years old.
Campbell.FTWlists the marriage date as February 10, 1835. But this is more likelyCatharine’s birth date. Otherwise, Catharine would have had to beenborn when Archibald was about 15 years old.
16. MAJOR ALEXANDERJ.11 CAMPBELL (OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5,HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born June 27, 1813 in Adairsville,Kentucky, and died May 25, 1912 in Brown County, Illinois. He married MARY(9)CLARK August 27, 1838, daughter of THOMAS(2) CLARK and MARY ANTHONY. Shewas born April 21, 1819, and died February 02, 1895.
Alexander J. Campbell wasreared in Logan Co., Kentucky. He and his brothers, along with Thomas(2)Clark’s family, moved to Brown County, Illinois.
Alexander married Mary(9)Clark, daughter of Thomas(2) Clark and his second wife Mary(4) Anthony. Mary(9) was a half sister of Hannah and Lucinda Clark, who successivelyhad been wives of Alexander’s brother William O. F. Campbell. Mary(9)is also buried in the Rigg Cemetery.
Mary(9) Clark, daughterof Thomas(2) Clark and his second wife Mary(4) Anthony, married Major AlexanderJ. Campbell. Mary(9) was a half sister of Hannah and Lucinda Clark,who successively had been wives of Alexander’s brother William O. F. Campbell.
i. SARAH ANN12 CAMPBELL,b. September 08, 1839; d. February 22, 1864.
ii. WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL,b. April 24, 1841; d. October 09, 1876.
20. iii. ALCIBEDES W. CAMPBELL,b. March 24, 1843; d. December 14, 1915.
iv. MARY(10) SUSANCAMPBELL, b. November 03, 1844; d. February 14, 1910.
21. v. ALEXANDER JAMES CAMPBELL,b. October 07, 1849, Brown County, Illinois; d. January 27, 1944, BrownCounty, Illinois.
vi. PRICILLA CAMPBELL,b. March 05, 1852; d. September 28, 1867.
22. vii. JOHN(8) CAMPBELL,b. October 21, 1854; d. October 10, 1940.
17. WILLIAM O. F.11CAMPBELL (OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5,HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born November 18, 1816, and diedMarch 11, 1891 in Logan Co. Kentucky. He married (1) HANNAH CLARK, daughterof THOMAS(2) CLARK and 1ST CLARK. She was born May 16, 1809, and died November23, 1840. He married (2) LUCINDA CLARK February 15, 1842, daughter of THOMAS(2)CLARK and 1ST CLARK. She was born February 06, 1808, and died October 19,1852.
i. JAMES A.12 CAMPBELL,b. October 10, 1845; d. September 23, 1916.
18. JAMES SWAN12 CAMPBELL(HIRAM11, JOHN(5) G.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5,HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born September 15, 1826. Hemarried MARY KNUPP September 17, 1848.
19. MARY G.12 CAMPBELL(HIRAM11, JOHN(5) G.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5,HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born Abt. 1831. She married GEORGEDAVIS March 21, 1850.
20. ALCIBEDES W.12CAMPBELL (ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6,ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born March 24, 1843, anddied December 14, 1915.
ii. DR. DR A. J. CAMPBELL.
21. ALEXANDER JAMES12CAMPBELL (ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6,ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born October 07, 1849 inBrown County, Illinois, and died January 27, 1944 in Brown County, Illinois.He married MARY CATHERINE THOROMAN February 01, 1876 in Brown County, Illinois,daughter of JOHN THOROMAN and CATHERINE MCGOWAN. She was born January 03,1854 in Manchester, Ohio, and died July 30, 1922 in Mt. Sterling, Illinois.
i. ROSCOE HOMER13CAMPBELL, b. November 01, 1876, Brown County, IL; d. October 11, 1949,Santa Barbara, California; m. (1) LILIA BELL; d. 1923, Brown County, Illinois;m. (2) MILLICENT ERNESTINE HANSEN; b. August 16, 1888, Portland, Oregon;d. August 07, 1971, Ojai, California.
2. The Campbell Cousins, August 1996.
23. ii. CORLIS(1) EUGENECAMPBELL, b. August 06, 1880, Mt. Sterling, Brown County, Illinois; d.February 25, 1985, Beardstown, Illinois.
24. iii. JOHN ALEXANDERCAMPBELL, b. June 27, 1885, Brown County, Il; d. December 28, 1972, Indiana.
25. iv. MARY EDNA CAMPBELL,b. June 19, 1892, Brown County, IL; d. September 11, 1989, Salem, Oregon.
26. v. ROBERT NEWTON CAMPBELL,b. May 30, 1894, Brown County, Illinois; d. January 27, 1990, Quincy, Illinois.
22. JOHN(8)12 CAMPBELL(ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5,HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born October 21, 1854, and died October10, 1940. He married FANNIE FRANCES MCGOVERN, daughter of MICHAELMCGOVERN and FRANCES BUTLER. She was born April 17, 1856, and diedMarch 23, 1930.
i. WALLACE MELVIN13CAMPBELL, b. August 11, 1877; d. July 11, 1943; m. MARY ORR, August 27,1916; b. June 06, 1883; d. January 26, 1939.
27. ii. CORA FRANCES CAMPBELL,b. July 01, 1879.
28. iii. CLARENCE HENRYCAMPBELL, b. December 23, 1881.
29. iv. MARY LOUISE CAMPBELL,b. September 15, 1884.
v. JULIA LORENA CAMPBELL,b. February 22, 1887; d. March 03, 1911; m. CHESTER K. HARPER, December19, 1907; b. June 24, 1886; d. January 27, 1936.
30. vi. JOHN WILLIAM CAMPBELL,b. March 25, 1889.
31. vii. FANNIE RUTH CAMPBELL,b. April 20, 1892.
32. viii. HAROLD LORENZOCAMPBELL, b. January 27, 1896.
33. ix. JAMES LEROY CAMPBELL,b. May 16, 1899.
23. CORLIS(1) EUGENE13CAMPBELL (ALEXANDER JAMES12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornAugust 06, 1880 in Mt. Sterling, Brown County, Illinois, and died February25, 1985 in Beardstown, Illinois. He married LYDIA AMNEY PECK December24, 1905 in Mt. Sterling, Illinois, daughter of ALFRED PECK and CORA SHANK. She was born February 25, 1887 in Schuyler Co., Illinois, and diedOctober 14, 1985 in Beardstown, Illinois.
and Edna Mary Seaman, 7/1999.
36. iv. CAPT. ROBERT RUSSELLCAMPBELL, b. August 22, 1918, Mt. Sterling, Brown Co., Illinois.
37. v. STERLING ALEXANDERCAMPBELL, b. November 23, 1923, Grants Pass, Oregon.
38. vi. RICHARD ALDEN CAMPBELL,b. July 31, 1926, Bend, Oregon.
24. JOHN ALEXANDER13CAMPBELL (ALEXANDER JAMES12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornJune 27, 1885 in Brown County, Il, and died December 28, 1972 in Indiana.He married MYRTLE SUSAN STEWART October 07, 1913, daughter of CHARLES STEWARTand EMILY HANLEY. She was born February 07, 1882 in Pike County, Illinois,and died February 21, 1964 in Indiana.
25. MARY EDNA13 CAMPBELL(ALEXANDER JAMES12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7,DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born June 19, 1892in Brown County, IL, and died September 11, 1989 in Salem, Oregon. Shemarried ANTONE FOSSEN June 19, 1923 in The Dalles, Oregon, son of ANDREASFOSSEN and MARINE OLESON. He was born June 28, 1890 in Modum Parish, Norway,and died October 27, 1975 in Bend, Oregon.
26. ROBERT NEWTON13CAMPBELL (ALEXANDER JAMES12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornMay 30, 1894 in Brown County, Illinois, and died January 27, 1990 in Quincy,Illinois. He married EUTROPHIA CURRY November 26, 1932, daughter of ALLENCURRY and IDA GRIMES. She was born December 14, 1903 in Brown County, Illinois,and died October 20, 1976.
27. CORA FRANCES13CAMPBELL (JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornJuly 01, 1879. She married EDWIN CLARK March 06, 1902, son of WILLIAMCLARK and MINERVA PETTIGREW. He was born December 29, 1870, and diedMarch 03, 1932.
28. CLARENCE HENRY13CAMPBELL (JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornDecember 23, 1881. He married MAY MCPHAIL January 20, 1904, daughter ofJAMES MCPHAIL and MARY RABB. She was born January 21, 1883.
29. MARY LOUISE13 CAMPBELL(JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7,DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born September15, 1884. She married CHARLES WILLIAM SAXEN November 30, 1905, son of JOHNT. SAXEN. He was born May 01, 1875, and died August 15, 1913.
30. JOHN WILLIAM13CAMPBELL (JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornMarch 25, 1889. He married SOPHIA WARD June 1911, daughter of CHARLES WARDand JAN INNES. She was born June 05, 1891.
31. FANNIE RUTH13 CAMPBELL(JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7,DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born April 20,1892. She married RAY CLINARD, son of JOHN CLINARD and DORA BROWN. He wasborn July 03, 1890.
32. HAROLD LORENZO13CAMPBELL (JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8,JOHN(1)7, DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was bornJanuary 27, 1896. He married KATHERYN SABRA KINSEY November 27, 1924, daughterof KINSEY and GRACE SAPP. She was born April 18, 1904.
33. JAMES LEROY13 CAMPBELL(JOHN(8)12, ALEXANDER J.11, OWENS F.10, JOHN(4)9, ROBERT(1)8, JOHN(1)7,DUNCAN6, ANDREW5, HUGH4, PATRICK3, DUNCAN2, DUGAL1) was born May 16, 1899. He married LUCILLA GADDES May 18, 1923, daughter of CARLES GADDES and ROSELAPPIN. She was born October 19, 1901.
prohibited without priorpermission. If copied, this copyright must appear with the information.

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