Last week, in United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., District Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado issued an order denying a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendant Pure Hemp Collective Inc., finding that Pure Hemp was not entitled to summary judgment on the record. Pure Hemp had filed an Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, arguing that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,730,911, which is owned by United Cannabis Corp. ("UCANN"), were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (claims 10, 12, 14, 20–22, 25, 27, 28, 31, and 33 of the '911 patent) or 35 U.S.C. § 112(e) (claim 31).
UCANN had initiated the dispute between the parties by filing a complaint against Pure Hemp for infringement of claims 10, 12, 14, 20–22, 25, 27, 28, 31, and 33 of the '911 patent. Pure Hemp responded by filing its motion for partial summary judgment, contending that all of the asserted claims were invalid.
10. A liquid cannabinoid formulation, wherein at least 95% of the total cannabinoids is cannabidiol (CBD).
20. A liquid cannabinoid formulation, wherein at least 95% of the total cannabinoids are THC [tetrahydrocannabinol] and CBD.
25. A liquid cannabinoid formulation, wherein at least 95% of the total cannabinoids are CBD, cannabinol (CBN) and THC.
31. The formulation of any one of the proceeding claims, wherein the formulation is infused in a medium chain triglyceride (MCT).
"[D]istinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts" first requires a court to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. at 217. If the answer is no, the inquiry ends; but if the answer is yes, a court must then determine whether the claims in question nonetheless offer "an inventive concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself." Id. at 217–18 (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations incorporated).
[T]he proper application of the Supreme Court's Alice standard is an evolving and sometimes hazy area of law. Deciding whether a patent claim is "directed to" a law of nature is not as straightforward as the Supreme Court makes it sound in Alice itself. Moreover, the Federal Circuit itself has remarked on the difficulty, at times, of distinguishing the first Alice inquiry from the second, see, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); or distinguishing the two Alice inquiries (comprising a patentability analysis rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 101) from other common inquiries such as anticipation and obviousness (which are rooted in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03), see, e.g., Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
However, after applying the Alice test to the asserted claims, Judge Martinez determined that "[d]espite the potential ambiguities [of the Alice test], the Court is convinced under the current state of the case law that the challenged claims of the 911 Patent are not directed at unpatentable subject matter." With respect to the first Alice inquiry, Pure Hemp had argued that the asserted claims are "directed to" the patent ineligible natural phenomenon of the specified chemical compounds (cannabinoids, terpenes, and flavonoids). UCANN had countered that "the claims are not directed to laws of nature or natural phenomena because they claim human-modified liquid formulations that require converting solid cannabinoids into a different state with markedly different physiological characteristics" (citation omitted).
Pure Hemp has failed to establish beyond genuine dispute that a liquefied version of cannabinoids and related chemicals at the concentrations specified in the 911 Patent is anything like a natural phenomenon. It may be true, as Pure Hemp insists, that cannabinoids in nature can take the form of a resin; that a resin can be highly viscous; that a highly viscous substance may at times be considered a liquid; and therefore it is logically possible that cannabinoids in nature might appear in a form that could, in some sense, be deemed a "liquid." . . . Even accepting as much, the 911 Patent specifies threshold concentrations of cannabinoids and related chemicals. Pure Hemp nowhere claims that these precise concentrations, or anything close to them, occur in liquid form in nature. Accordingly, UCANN's claims are not restatements of "the handiwork of nature," Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 131, "but [UCANN's] own [handiwork]," Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
While noting that "the Court sees reason to question whether the 911 Patent claims anything novel, useful, or nonobvious," with respect to the Alice inquiry, the Court determined that "the 911 Patent is not 'directed to' an unpatentable law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea," but "is instead 'directed to' a non-naturally occurring delivery method of naturally occurring chemicals in (as far as the record reveals) non-naturally occurring proportions and concentrations." Finding that the asserted claims did not fail at step one of the Alice inquiry, the Court determined that it did not need to address step two.
As for claim 31, Pure Hemp argued that this claim was invalid for depending from a multiple dependent claim when claim 31 is itself a multiple dependent claim (i.e., claim 31 depends from "any preceding claim" -- following UCANN's correction of the claim -- and claim 9 depends from claim 1 or 5, and claim 24 depends from claim 16 or 20). Judge Martinez noted, however, that UCANN had disclaimed claim 9 and 24, and cited Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996), for the proposition that "[a] statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent." While noting that "[o]ne would expect that this would end the argument as to Claim 31," the Order points out that Pure Hemp insisted in its reply brief that the Court could still declare claim 31 to be invalid for depending from multiple dependent claims, even though those multiple dependent claims are now deemed to be nonexistent. To support its argument, Pure Hemp relied on Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co., 853 F.3d 1370 (sFed. Cir. 2017), in which the patentee had disclaimed one of two claims in order to seek damages that would have been otherwise prohibited by a failure to mark its products. Pure Hemp argued that the same public notice concerns raised in Rembrandt Wireless undergird the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(e) with respect to multiple dependencies, and therefore contended that there must be "clear public notice" of invalidity. Judge Martinez, however, noted that Pure Hemp's argument was circular, since "Claim 31 is not invalid anymore, at least not on account of the multiple dependency problem that existed before UCANN's disclaimer," finding that "there is neither a good reason nor a statutory basis to declare Claim 31 invalid, even though it previously depended on multiple dependent claims."
Rejecting both of Pure Hemp's invalidity arguments, the District Court denied Pure Hemp's Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
A great deal of faith has recently been given to Congress by the patent community, spurred by efforts to solve the conundrums in patent law created by several recent Supreme Court decisions (and aided and abetted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, district courts, and the Federal Circuit). Last week, Congress provided ample evidence that a degree of caution (if not a grain of salt) should arise regarding anything Congress does with the introduction by Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) (along with several "co-conspirators") of three bills ostensibly aimed at "solving" the problem of "excessively high" prescription drug prices. A gastroenterologist before standing for elective office, Senator Cassidy's sympathies (if not prejudices) are both evident and understandable. But as policies, they are ill conceived and unlikely to have anything more than a cosmetic effect.
If the applicant made a certification described in clause (iv) of subsection (b)(2)(A) [colloquially known as a "Paragraph IV Certification"], the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, in the case of a certification with respect to a patent that claims a drug substance (and not in the case of a certification with respect to a patent that claims a drug product or method of use for a drug, except that, in the case of a patent that claims a drug substance and a drug product or method of use, this subparagraph shall apply, but only to the extent the patent claims a drug substance), before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice described in subsection (b)(3) is received, an action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which information was submitted to the Secretary under paragraph (2) or subsection (b)(1) before the date on which the application (excluding an amendment or supplement to the application) was submitted.
(iii) If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii), the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, in the case of a certification with respect to a patent that claims a drug substance (and not in the case of a certification with respect to a patent that claims a drug product or method of use for a drug, except that, in the case of a patent that claims a drug substance and a drug product or method of use, this clause shall apply, but only to the extent the patent claims a drug substance), before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice described in paragraph (2)(B) is received, an action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which information was submitted to the Secretary under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) before the date on which the application (excluding an amendment or supplement to the application), which the Secretary later determines to be substantially complete, was submitted.
If enacted into law, a patent-holding, branded drug maker would only be able to have the benefit of the 30-month stay enshrined in these provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act for patents claiming a drug substance itself, but not formulations or methods of treatment using a patented, branded drug under an NDA. An ANDA applicant could have FDA approve its generic drug and to enter the marketplace with no further ado.
Of course, this is the classic "launch at risk" scenario, and the generic drug maker would risk not only an injunction preventing marketing of its generic drug until any patent to formulation or method of treatment has expired, but also treble damages for willful infringement. This scenario may be much less attractive to actual generic drug companies than Senator Cassidy and his co-sponsors believe it will be.
(iv) In the case of a listed drug for which the list under clause (i) includes a patent that claims the drug or a use for such drug, and where the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office has cancelled any claim of the patent relating to such drug or such use pursuant to a determination by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes review conducted under chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code, or a post-grant review conducted under chapter 32 of that title, and any such cancellation, if appealed, has been upheld upon appeal, the holder of the applicable approved application shall notify the Secretary of such cancellation, and the revisions required under clause (iii) shall include striking the patent from the list with respect to such drug.
This subclause shall apply even if a patent is stricken from the list under paragraph (7)(A), pursuant to the second sentence of clause (iii) of such paragraph, provided that, at the time that the first applicant submitted an application under this subsection containing a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV), the patent that was the subject of such certification was included in such list with respect to the listed drug.
These revisions are cosmetic insofar as they merely bring the statute into conformity with the changes proposed for Sections 505(c)(3)(C) and 505(j)(5)(B)(iii) and thus bear little further discussion.
(i) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary determines that a petition or a supplement to the petition was submitted with the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an application and the petition does not on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues, the Secretary may deny the petition at any point based on such determination. The Secretary may issue guidance to describe the factors that will be used to determine under this subparagraph whether a petition is submitted with the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an application.
(iii) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary shall publish on the internet website of the Food and Drug Administration a list of any petitions that the Secretary determines were submitted for the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an application.
(J) TIMELINE FOR SUBMITTING PETITIONS.—The Secretary may establish a time period after the relevant information relied upon in a petition became known to the petitioner (or reasonably should have been known to a petitioner), as certified by the petitioner in accordance with subparagraph (H), and any petition that is submitted after such time period has passed shall be summarily denied.
The bill tracks a draft Guidance released by FDA last year representing the agency's attempt to address the perceived problem with frivolous citizen petitions. The significance and effect of such changes may depend on how much one considers branded drug makers are filing frivolous citizen petitions (or that they are having substantive effects) and whether the changes would pass constitutional muster on free speech and right to petition the Federal government for redress of grievances grounds.
(i) NO ADDITIONAL EXCLUSIVITY THROUGH DEEMING.—An approved application that is deemed to be a license for a biological product under this section pursuant to section 7002(e)(4) of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 shall not be treated as having been first licensed under subsection (a) for purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(II) the approved application for such product was deemed to be a license for a biological product as described in clause (i).
Paradoxically this bill has the highest chance of passage, according to Ryan Davis at IP Law 360 (subscription required) as being directed to insulin, which has been licensed under the FDCA since the 1930's but is slated to come under the auspices of the BPCIA in 2020. According to Mr. Davis, this bill is intended to prevent this change from bestowing on a biologic drug-classified insulins a 12-year exclusivity under the BPCIA. As with the Timely Act, the effect enactment of this bill into law would have depends on the magnitude of the problem that prompted its introduction.
As has been said in other contexts, political posturing is in vogue and particularly posturing regarding prescription drug prices. It is unclear whether any of these proposed changes in the law will remedy any real problems that underlie high drug prices. Bills like these only address part of those problems but at the cost of addressing systemic issues with drug pricing not as amenable to quick or simple changes in existing law.
April 25, 2019 - "IPR Estoppel One Year After SAS" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) - 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).
Those wishing to attend the meeting can register here. The USPTO notes that registrations will be honored on a first-come, first-served basis according to the time and date of receipt of each request, but that in order to ensure a broad cross-section of attendees, the USPTO reserves the right to limit the number of attendees from any single organization or law firm, and therefore, organizations and law firms must designate their official representatives. Additional information regarding the customer partnership meeting can be found here.
• The pending Federal Circuit appeal in BTG International Ltd. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC and whether the America Invents Act stops patent challengers who won at the PTAB from pursuing their winning arguments in court.
D Young & Co will be offering its next European biotech patent law update on April 30, 2019. The webinar will be offered at three times: 4:00 am, 7:00 am, and 12:00 pm (EDT). D Young & Co European Patent Attorneys Simon O'Brien and Matthew Caines will provide an essential update and live Q&A on EPO biotechnology case law.
• What key information does counsel need to determine inventorship?
• What are the steps for counsel when inventorship must be corrected?
• What is the AIA's impact on an inventorship determination?
• What guidance can be drawn from recent court decisions for claim construction?
• What pitfalls to avoid do the cases identify?
• What best practices can practitioners use for claim construction of varying scope as applied now under the same standard in the district courts and PTAB post-grant proceedings?


In December we examined many aspects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the “Act”), and in particular those portions of the Act that we expected many of our clients, colleagues and friends to be most interested in. One aspect of the legislation that garnered a lot of attention then and now concerns a new business deduction available to individuals with “qualified business income” from partnerships, limited liability companies, S corporations, and sole proprietorships. In our December summary of the Act, prepared just before the President actually signed the new legislation, we provided only an overview of this new and particularly complicated deduction. We promised a more thorough analysis of this deduction after having additional time to examine its particulars and are happy to provide this analysis now.
First – a warning. Qualification for this deduction, in whole or part, is extremely complicated.
The new deduction (IRC § 199A) provides that a noncorporate taxpayer is generally allowed a deduction equal to 20% of qualified business income from a partnership, limited liability company, S corporation, or sole proprietorship. “Qualified business income” is defined as the net amount of items of income, gain, deduction, and loss. Certain investment related items are excluded from this definition including capital gains and losses, dividends and interest income that is not allocable to the business. Compensation received by employees and guaranteed payments received by partners are also excluded from the calculation of qualified business income.
Specified service trade or businesses such as law, accounting or medical practices are generally not entitled to the Section 199A deduction; however, the deduction is available if the taxable income of an owner of one of these types of businesses is less than $207,500 ($415,000 in the case of a joint return).
When taxable income exceeds $157,500 ($315,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly) the taxpayer’s deduction is limited based on the amount of W-2 wages paid by the business and the business’s unadjusted basis in acquired qualified property.
The deduction is available to taxpayers who do not itemize their expenses, and it is a below the line deduction, meaning it is a deduction that reduces adjusted gross income in arriving at taxable income. It is available for tax years beginning after December 31, 2017, and as with much of the Act pertaining to noncorporate taxpayers, before January 1, 2026.
The amount of the deduction is (1) the lesser of (a) the taxpayer’s combined “qualified business income” (defined below), or (b) 20% of the excess of taxable income (determined without regard to the deduction) over the sum of the taxpayer’s net capital gain and qualified cooperative dividends, plus (2) the lesser of (a) 20% of the qualified cooperative dividends, or (b) the taxpayer’s taxable income (minus net capital gain). The total deduction is limited to the taxpayer’s taxable income for the year.
“Qualified business income” is the net amount of qualified items of income, gain, deduction and loss relating to any qualified trade or business (defined below) of the taxpayer. It does not include REIT dividends, qualified cooperative dividends, or income from qualified publicly traded partnerships. “Qualified items of income, gain, deduction and loss” are those such items that are effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the U.S.
If the net amount of qualified items of income, gain, deduction and loss relating to a qualified trade or business is less than zero, the amount is carried over as a loss from the trade or business in the following tax year.
As stated above, there are exceptions to what constitutes qualified items of income, gain, deduction and loss. These include, but are not limited to investment income items that are, (i) short-term capital gain and loss; (ii) long-term capital gain and loss; (iii) any dividend; (iv) interest income except interest income properly allocable to the trade or business, and (v) commodity transaction or foreign currency gain or loss.
Qualified business income also doesn’t include reasonable compensation paid to the taxpayer by any qualified trade or business for services rendered for the trade or business, guaranteed payments made to a partner (IRC § 707(c) payments), and IRC § 707(a) payments to a partner outside his capacity as partner for services rendered for the trade or business.
A “qualified trade or business” is a trade or business other than a specified service trade or business, or the performance of services as an employee. The term “specified service trade or business” refers to a trade or business involving the performance of services described in IRC § 1202(e)(3)(A) (e.g., health, law, accounting, athletics, or a business where the principal asset of the business is the skill or reputation of one or more employees or owners, but not engineering and architecture), or any trade or business which involves the performance of services that consist of investing and investment management, trading or dealing in securities, partnership interests, or commodities.
However, a special exception allows for a deduction with respect to specified service trades or businesses based upon the taxpayer’s income. If the taxable income of a taxpayer is less than the sum of $157,500 ($315,000 in the case of a joint return), plus $50,000 ($100,000 in the case of a joint return) (all amounts are indexed for inflation), a deduction is allowed. A phaseout rule reduces the 20% deduction available to such specified service trade or business by 1% for each $2,500 ($5,000 in the case of a joint return) of taxable income in excess of $157,500 ($315,000 in the case of a joint return). As a result, in 2018 no deduction is allowed for a specified service trade or business under IRC § 199A if the taxpayer’s taxable income equals or exceeds $207,500 ($415,000 in the case of a joint return). This exception allowing a deduction for specified service trades or businesses based upon a taxpayer’s income is one of the more complicated aspects of IRC § 199A.
A factor in calculating the Section 199A deduction is “combined qualified business income.” This refers to the sum of the deductible amounts determined for each qualified trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, plus 20% of taxpayer’s qualified REIT dividends and qualified publicly traded partnership income. A qualified REIT dividend is a dividend received from a real estate investment trust that is not a capital gain dividend or qualified dividend income. Qualified publicly traded partnership income is generally defined as certain items of income derived from a publicly traded partnership (that is not treated as a corporation) and gain from the sale of an interests in a publicly traded partnership.
The Section 199A deduction is limited. This limitation provides another complication in the application and computation of the deduction. The limitation on the deduction is the lesser of (1) 20% of the taxpayer’s qualified business income from a qualified trade or business, or (2) the greater of (i) 50% of the W-2 wages relating to the qualified trade or business, or (ii) the sum of 25% of the W-2 wages relating to the qualified trade or business and 2.5% of the unadjusted basis immediately after acquisition of all qualified property.
“W-2 wages” refers not just to wages paid, but also elective deferrals (to retirement plans) as well, so long as these amounts are all allocable to the qualified business income. “Qualified property” is tangible property subject to depreciation that his (A) held by and available for use in the qualified trade or business, (B) used during the year in the production of qualified business income, and (C) the depreciable period for which has not ended before the close of the tax year. The depreciable period for these purposes begins when the property is placed in service and ends the latter of 10 years after the property is placed in service, or the asset’s applicable depreciable (MACRS) life.
So the deduction is more readily available to pass-through businesses (partnerships, limited liability companies, S corporations, and sole proprietorships) that either employ a lot of people or simply pay a lot in wages, and/or have significant capital expenditures. However, a further complication to Section 199A provides that the wage and property limitations actually don’t apply at all for taxpayers below a threshold amount of $157,500 ($315,000 in the case of a joint return) of taxable income.
If the taxable income of a taxpayer exceeds the threshold amount by less than $50,000 ($100,000 in the case of a joint return), and the wage and property limitation is less than 20% of the taxpayer’s qualified business income from the qualified trade or business (determined without regard to the rule addressed by this paragraph), then the wage and property limitation will not apply at all. Instead the 199A deduction is reduced by (1) 20% of the qualified business income from the qualified trade or business (determined without regard to this rule), minus (2) the wage and property limitation (also determined without regard to this rule), multiplied by (I) the amount by which the taxpayer’s taxable income exceeds the threshold amount, divided by $50,000 ($100,000 in the case of a joint return). All of this means that the deduction for a taxpayer whose income exceeds the threshold amount by less than $50,000 ($100,000 in the case of a joint return), and 20% of the qualified business income from the qualified trade or business exceeds the wage or property limitation, will take an actual deduction amount somewhere between 20% of the qualified business income from the qualified trade or business and the wage or property limitation.
Each partner in a partnership, member of a limited liability company, or shareholder in an S corporation, separately computes and claims his or her own 199A deduction. Therefore, each person takes into account his or her allocable share of the business’s qualified items of income, gain, deduction, and loss, as well as an allocable share of W-2 wages and unadjusted bases of qualified property. Wages are allocated on the same basis that wage expense is allocated among the business owners, and the basis of qualified property is allocated on the same basis that depreciation expenses is allocated.
Because the 199A limitations are also computed by each partner, member or shareholder, it’s possible for some persons to claim the deduction while others may not. This might encourage some partnership or limited liability companies to amend their partnership or operating agreements in an attempt to specially allocate W-2 wages and depreciation expense in a fashion designed to allow partners or members to maximize their Section 199A deductions.
Generally, taxpayers are subject to a 20% accuracy related penalty for an underpayment of tax that is attributable to a substantial understatement of income. An understatement is “substantial” if it exceeds the lesser of 10% of the tax required to be shown on a return or $5,000. However, for taxpayers claiming the 199A deduction the first threshold for determining if an understatement is substantial is reduced from 10% to 5%.
In passing IRC § 199A, Congress has directed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue regulations that the IRS determines is necessary to carry out the purposes of the deduction.


text:
A full analysis coming tomorrow; for now, here is my translation of the Estonian security police's statement regarding the mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, and his campaign financing from a Russian state company.
On February 9th 2010, the president of JSC Russian Railroads, Vladimir Yakunin, took part in the Railroad Forum that took place in Estonia. During a dinner on the same night, which was attended by Tallinn mayor Edgar Savisaar, Tallinn deputy mayor Denis Boroditch, Vladimir Yakunin, and chief of staff of the president of Russian Railroads Vladimir Bushuyev, E. Savisaar asked V. Yakunin for financial support for the construction of an orthodox church in Lasnamäe, Tallinn. V. Yakunin expressed an agreement to make the investments, asking first for a more exact calculation of the money needed for the construction. E. Savisaar presented a preliminary calculation, according to which the requirement was for 13,5 million kroons, which would be enough to finish the church’s façade. During the same visit V. Yakunin met with Metropolitan Kornelius of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereafter EOCMP). During the visit they agreed that on the Moscow side, the issues of the church shall be handled by V. Bushuyev, who will need to determine the person who will deal with construction issues on the Russian side and notify D. Boroditch of this. The person in question turned out to be businessman Sergei Petrov, who was engaged in the coal business in Estonia through AS Petromaks Spediitor.
The decision to provide support in the amount of 1,5 million euro for the construction of the Lasnamäe orthodox church was made public during the visit of Russian Railroads president Vladimir Jakunin on February 9th, 2010.
Between February and October of 2010, approximately 13,5 million kroons were transferred from accounts of Sergei Petrov’s companies to the accounts of EOCMP, for the specific purpose of constructing the church.
Only on November 26th, 2010 a tripartite contract for the financing of the Lasnamäe orthodox church was signed by the St. Andrew Foundation, EOCMP and the Tallinn City Government.
On May 10-11, 2010, E. Savisaar and Center Party MP Vladimir Velman visited Moscow, where they arranged for V. Yakunin’s visit to Estonia in June.
On June 23-24, 2010, V. Yakunin visited Estonia. V. Bushuyev arrived in Estonia as early as June 22nd, 2010. On June 23rd, 2010, V. Bushuyev, S. Petrov, Jevgeni Tomberg and D. Boroditch visited the construction site of the Lasnamäe church. On the evening of the same day, V. Yakunin arrived in Estonia, to take part in the midsummer bonfire at Edgar Savisaar’s Hundisilma farm.
On the morning of June 24th, the guests participated in a motorboat pleasure cruise in Tallinn Bay. During the pleasure cruise, V. Yakunin notified D. Boroditch of the fact that “you won’t get the 3 you asked for, but you will get 1,5”.
Next on the itinerary was a visit to the Kiltsi manor compound in Lääne-Virumaa county. At the manor compound, E. Savisaar, D. Boroditch, V. Bushuyev, S. Petrov and V. Yakunin stepped aside, on the suggestion of the latter, for a private covert conversation. During the conversation, V. Yakunin announced that the Center Party would receive support for the Estonian parliamentary elections in the amount of 1,5 million euro. 1/3 of that would be delivered in cash, the other 2/3 by wire transfer, based on invoices. At the same time V. Yakunin stressed to all participants that the deal must not be discussed anywhere by anyone. During the conversation, S. Petrov on one side and D. Boroditch on the other side were assigned as persons responsible for the delivery and legalization of the money.
On September 13th, 2010, E. Savisaar and D. Boroditch visited Moscow and attended a dinner at the Russian Railroads residence, which included V. Yakunin, V. Bushuyev, D. Boroditch and E. Savisaar. Several topics were discussed during the dinner. Among these were: the financing of the Lasnamäe church, the progress of the church’s construction, the timing of the various stages of construction in conjunction with the upcoming parliamentary elections, their tie-in with the elections; the importance and significance of the Dialogue of Civilizations conference on Rhodos; how Russia can officially, by sending its delegates, support the execution of the Rural People’s Congress that was being organized in Estonia by the Center Party. In addition to the above, the Center Party financing scheme was also discussed during the dinner.
E. Savisaar confirmed the agreement from Kiltsi manor in July: 1/3 in cash and 2/3 in wire transfers, mentioning that paying the entire sum in cash could also be resolved. After that, V. Yakunin demanded that all further dealings proceed with absolute covertness, referencing his extensive experience in operational work. The demand involved a complete ban on using phones to discuss issues of the money delivery, arranging meetings, and other sensitive issues.
On October 27th, 2010, S. Petrov arrived in Estonia and actively sought contact with D. Boroditch. As the latter was not present in Estonia, the contact attempt failed. On the next day S. Petrov left Estonia, notifying V. Bushuyev immediately upon arrival in Moscow that the planned meeting with D. Boroditch was not successful.
Based on the above, the Department of Security Police had sufficient basis to believe that the Russian side is actively seeking contact to deliver the money to the Center Party. Considering also the circumstance that the anniversary event of the Estonian Railroad on November 4th, 2010, was due to include a visit by V. Yakunin and V. Bushuyev, a decision was made on November 3rd 2010 to conduct conversations with Edgar Savisaar and S. Petrov, who was arriving in Tallinn on the same day.
During the conversation that took place on November 3rd, 2010, E. Savisaar’s attention was called to the opportunity for his person and party to be compromised, inherent in asking a foreign state for money for the party, and the associated security threats.
On November 4th, officers of the Security Police conducted a similar conversation with D. Boroditch, who had previously been on vacation.
On November 6th, 2010, a conversation took place between E. Savisaar and V. Yakunin, discussing the need to sign a tripartite contract to legalize the money provided to support the Lasnamäe church and avoid a possible scandal.
On November 26th, 2010, the Lasnamäe church financing contract was signed. V. Bushuyev arrived in Tallinn from Moscow for this, carrying a contract signed in Moscow by Sergei Scheblygin, president of the St. Andrew Foundation. The signatures of representatives from the Tallinn City Government and the EOCMP were gathered on the contract by Jevgeni Tomberg. On the next day, mayor Edgar Savisaar presented the contract at the Tallinn City Government.
Name withheld to protect the blonde.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


§ 441-1 Purpose and intent.
§ 441-3 Definitions; word usage.
§ 441-4 Garbage from outside of Village.
§ 441-5 Enforcement; violations and penalties.
§ 441-6 Ownership of recyclable material and refuse.
§ 441-8 Placement of recyclables and solid waste for collection.
§ 441-9 Right to reject materials.
§ 441-10 Dumping, discharge and disposal.
§ 441-17 Abrogation and greater restrictions.
§ 441-20 Separation of recyclable material.
§ 441-21 Separation requirements exempted.
§ 441-22 Care of separated recyclable material.
§ 441-23 Preparation and collection for recyclable materials.
§ 441-24 Responsibilities of owners of multiple-family dwellings and mobile home parks.
§ 441-25 Responsibilities of owners of nonresidential facilities and properties.
§ 441-26 Prohibitions on disposal of recyclable materials separated for recycling.
§ 441-29 Set by Board.
Open burning — See Ch. 227.
Property maintenance — See Ch. 409.


On August 17, a US District Court handed down a fascinating piece of statutory interpretation that apparently means that unless a Somali pirate succeeds in stealing something, he cannot be charged with piracy under US law.
There have been a number of national piracy trials taking place in Western States, notably in the US and the Netherlands. (I have written on piracy trials in Kenya elsewhere.) In the Netherlands a group of Somali pirates was sentenced to five years in prison. I have not seen either the judgement in Dutch or a summary of it in any other language yet. (If you have it, do let me know). In New York, the young Somali suspect pirate Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, sole survivor of the gang that attempted to hijack the Maersk Alabama, entered a guilty plea in a deal that removed piracy from the charges against him.
This leaves US v Said et al, the trial of 11 suspects before the US District Court in Norfolk, Virginia who were alleged to have (rather foolishly) attacked the naval vessel the USS Ashland, an amphibious landing craft transport, in April this year. The New York Times has helpful posted a copy of the interlocutory decision in this case which Justice Jackson struck out the charges of piracy against them. The decision finds that the alleged facts, which involve drawing alongside another vessel and starting a fire-fight with it, do not fall within the US statutory concept of “piracy as defined by the law of nations” (18 USC §1651). The reason for this is that the classic case, US v Smith 18 US 153 (1820), remains the governing authority and it held piracy to be “robbery at sea”. The alleged facts disclose no robbery, ergo no piracy.
Who is Party to the Geneva Convention but not a Member of the UN?
Last week (Aug 12) was the 61st anniversary of the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions are the most widely ratified treaties with 194 parties to each of the four conventions. The next most widely ratified treaty is the Convention on the Rights of the Child with 193 States parties and then comes the UN Charter with 192 parties. This summer I taught a course on “International Law and Armed Conflict” as part of the Oxford Masters in International Human Rights Law. I mentioned the statistics above in class and one student asked who are the two States that are parties to the Geneva Convention but not members of the UN. I thought long and hard (not too long though as the class had to go on) but couldn’t come up with an answer. The next day one student came up with one of the States but I still wasn’t able to think of the other State. So I’m now throwing the question out to readers: Which States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 but not members of the UN?
Sahib Singh is a member of the international litigation and arbitration group at Skadden and a visiting lecturer at the University of Vienna. This note was prepared before the Enron v. Argentina annulment decision became available at the beginning of August. A note on that case is forthcoming on EJIL: Talk!
On 29 June 2010, the ad hoc ICSID Annulment Committee annulled the initial award in Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, finding that the initial tribunal had exercised a manifest excess of powers. The decision is central to our understanding of necessity in international investment law, and particularly the relationship between necessity under Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT of 1991 and under customary international law. Unfortunately, the committee’s decision leaves much to be desired in terms of its interpretive methodology. The central critique of this post, is the degree of relevance the committee’s decision gives to necessity under customary international law when interpreting Article XI. It also questions the presumptive relevance of necessity under custom as an interpretive tool, when the latter can only apply if the investor does not hold substantive or procedural rights under the BIT.
Did the United Kingdom leave anything out of its declaration? What about Diego Garcia, which is part of the Chagos Archipelago in the British Indian Ocean Territory. After expelling the inhabitants of the islands, the British then essentially handed over the base to the United States, which uses it as a kind of a fixed aircraft carrier. Is the Diego Garcia military base subject to the Rome Statute because it forms part of the ‘territory’ of the United Kingdom? Or does the recent declaration attempt to confirm that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, because the United Kingdom has not made a declaration to that effect?
Aside from jurisdiction over territory, there is also the issue of responsibility for arrest and other cooperation obligations under the Rome Statute. By its declaration, was the United Kingdom suggesting that it was not previously responsible for cooperation with the Court with respect to the territories listed in the declaration?
The formulation of the UK’s declaration certainly indicated that hitherto it considered itself bound by the Rome Statute only with respect to its metropolitan territory. But was this indeed the case? Or did the UK have all of the Rome Statute obligations conditioned by territory with regard to, say, Bermuda, from the moment of ratification? And what of the territorial jurisdiction of the ICC?
Up until the end of its empire after the Second World War the UK had a rather stringent policy of including so-called colonial clauses in the multilateral treaties to which it was a party. Thus, for example, it had the negotiating power to have such clauses included in the ECHR and the Genocide Convention. The UK was motivated in this partially by a policy desire to avoid assuming burdensome obligations for territories in which it did not want to apply them, and partially by a constitutional convention that it needed the assent of its dependencies for the extension of treaties to them. The UK’s efforts were resisted, however, in respect of other treaties, such as the ICCPR. With regard to those treaties, the UK employed the practice of filing a declaration that would specify the territories to which the the treaty would apply – as with the ICCPR, and now the Rome Statute.
As explained by the ILC in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the ‘entire territory’ bit encompasses all territories over which a state has title, and not just its metropolitan territory. Art. 29 thus creates a rebuttable presumption that a treaty applies to all of the territories that belong to a state party.
One Government [I imagine the UK, but I haven’t checked] proposed that a second paragraph should be added to the article providing specifically that a State, which is composed of distinct autonomous parts, should have the right to declare to which of the constituent parts of the State a treaty is to apply. Under this proposal the declaration was not to be considered a reservation but a limitation of the consent to certain parts only of the State. The Commission was of the opinion that such a provision, however formulated, might raise as many problems as it would solve. It further considered that the words “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established” in the text now proposed give the necessary flexibility to the rule to cover all legitimate requirements in regard to the application of treaties to territory.
So what are then we to do with the UK’s declarations? First, it does not regard them as reservations, but as ‘limitations on its consent’ only to parts of its territory. But isn’t a reservation precisely a limitation on state consent? A mere interpretative declaration cannot as such have direct effect on state obligations, as this territorial declaration purports to. Second, Art. 120 of the Rome Statute explicitly forbids any reservations. Third, whatever their nature, they might reflect the UK’s intention, but they certainly do not reflect that of the other parties, which is the Art. 29 VCLT criterion. Finally, and quite oddly, unless I am mistaken from my quick skim of the UN treaty collection, the UK made the ICC declaration only some 12 years after it ratified the Statute. How can this affect the consent that it had already given? It is only if a general rule existed to the effect that states can vary the territorial scope of their obligations via declarations – but as we have seen the ILC was quite explicitly opposed to such a rule, and the instability it potentially brings seems very much undesirable, and unsupported by state practice.
Then again, Denmark also made a similar declaration with respect to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which it later withdrew, as did the Netherlands. No state objected to such declarations in principle, which might be taken as a inference that they are permissible, and would thus serve to rebut the Art. 29 VCLT presumption. This is, in short, quite a vexing little problem – and one that I doubt the Court will ever have the opportunity to resolve.
I was asked by the organizers of the 2010 ILA Conference in the Hague to put up this notice, and do so with pleasure. The Conference starts in a couple of days, and I’m sure it’ll be a wonderful event.
The 15th – 20th of August 2010 marks a historic moment for the Netherlands Society of International Law as it brings together over 600 lawyers from all over the world to discuss how international law and institutions can and should contribute to solving global problems.
The event – the 74th Biennial Conference of the International Law Association – is being hosted in the Hague by the Netherlands Society of International Law as part of the events marking the 100th year of its existence. The wide range of topics to be discussed at the panels of the conference include the international accountability of government lawyers for advice that leads their governments to violate international law, the tensions between peace/reconciliation and justice before the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion in the Kosovo Case, current international law on piracy and the argument that Somali pirates are freedom fighters, the role of international law in global economic governance and financial supervision after the financial crisis, the ICC as either a court of last resort or simply a means for guaranteeing domestic proceedings are exactly like the ICC’s, the enforceability or otherwise of the Millennium Development Goals and the role of international law in realizing those goals, the interplay between international human rights and national law in domestic litigation (plaintiffs’ and defendant’s perspectives), access to justice at the domestic level and the tension between local/national and international ideas of justice, the necessity or otherwise of an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW), the Sudan Abyei Arbitration as an example of international law arbitration as conflict prevention, Islamic finance and in general the role of religion in the making and practicing of law, forum based limitations to parties’ freedom of choice of applicable law in arbitration and a-national or transnational law as a possible solution thereto, and the relationship between the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the use or non-use of force in international law.
Alongside the panel discussions, there will be Open Working Sessions of the Committees and Study Groups of the ILA at which the various Committees and Study Groups will discuss the reports of their research on a variety of contemporary issues of international law. Committees which will be discussing their work include the Committees on Feminism and International Law, Islamic Law and International Law, Space Law, Non State Actors, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, International Securities Regulation, International Law on Sustainable Development, Rights of Indigenous People, Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, the Teaching of International Law, International Civil Litigation and the interests of the public, Cultural Heritage Law, International Commercial Arbitration, International Criminal Court, International Family Law, International Human Rights Law, International Law on Biotechnology, International Protection of Consumers, International Securities Regulation, International Trade Law, Outer Continental Shelf, Recognition/Non-recognition in International Law and Responsibility of International Organizations. Most of the Committee and Study Group reports are already available on the ILA website and can be downloaded via http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/draft-committee-reports-the-hague-2010.cfm.
Updates on the conference will be available on the conference blog which can be accessed from the website of the conference (http://www.ila2010.org). Reports and resolutions adopted at the conference will be available later.
Formal Opening: Monday, 16th August at 9 a.m.
So far, the blogging concerning The Constitutionalization of International Law The has been fairly sedate. Of course, it is summertime; of course, there was a soccer tournament to focus on; of course, the ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo occupies the international legal community; and perhaps there is a certain idleness and lethargy to be associated with constitutionalism these days, as Jeff Dunoff and Joel Trachtman merrily suggest. But it may also be the case that the approach we espouse gives rise to some unease on the part of readers and therewith elicits few responses, for our approach is difficult to pigeonhole. The kind and generous comments published on EJIL: Talk! suggest as much: they display a certain puzzlement at what it is we aim to do, and some seem to have difficulties in identifying the genre we work in.
Comments Off on The Genre of Constitutionalization?
Ruth Wedgwood is Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law and Diplomacy; and Director of the International Law and Organizations Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington DC. She is also a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of the UN Human Rights Committee.
If you’re a betting person, here’s a safe bet: On August 9, the balloting in the east African state of Rwanda will give world-famous military leader Paul Kagame yet another seven-year term as president. The astonishing margin of victory will impress even the modern grand viziers of Central Asia. The outcome is quite easy to predict, when no other candidates are allowed to campaign.
Given this and much else besides, it’s time Washington began to create some distance from a man who has earned his reputation as a de facto despot who terrorizes critics and does not shrink from political violence.
For the last 15 years, Kagame has at every turn invoked these memories to shoehorn the West into a nearly reflexive support for his government. Even Bill Clinton came back to apologize. Kagame has become a fixture at the United Nations in New York, regaling delegations in the Indonesian Lounge, extolling his vision of benevolent autocracy, claiming to admire Singapore as his model for economic growth and insisting that he and only he can keep Rwanda’s torn society knitted together.
Christian J. Tams is Professor of International Law at the Univeristy of Glasgow. His publications include Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
The International Court of Justice’s Kosovo opinion of 22 July had been much expected. It was one of the not so frequent instances which the world (as opposed to State parties, or a small group of international lawyers) was waiting for the world court to speak. Great expectations can lead to great disappointment. And judging from the first round of reactions and responses on this blog and in other fora, there is indeed a feeling of disappointment: of course among those who expected a different outcome, but also among those who would have hoped for a fuller discussion of the legal issues raised by the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.
I share many of the points made in the posts by Dapo and Zoran in their posts on this blog, notably their surprise at the Court’s strained conclusion on the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence – a readjustment of the request that is rightly criticised by Vice-President Tomka in his declaration. Instead of reiterating my agreement with other criticisms, I will use this comment to make two broader points on the scope of the opinion. The first comes back to the “minimalist” focus of the opinion, and essentially is an attempt to shift some of the blame away from the Court. The second is a reflection on what seems to be the crucial substantive statement of the opinion – namely that general international law does not prohibit declarations of independence.


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USA, Guantánamo, End of “Active Hostilities” in Afghanistan?
Home > USA, Guantánamo, End of “Active Hostilities” in Afghanistan?
INTRODUCTORY TEXT: Two individuals detained by the US at Guantánamo Bay Detention Center challenged the legality of continued detention on the basis that “active hostilities” in Afghanistan had ended. The Courts in both cases ruled against them, finding that “active hostilities” in Afghanistan had not come to an end. This case is particularly conducive to a discussion on the temporal scope of armed conflict and its impact on detention.
Case prepared by Julie Black, esq., LL.M. student at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, under the supervision of Professor Marco Sassòli and Ms. Yvette Issar, research assistant, both at the University of Geneva.
 Petitioner Haji Hamdullah has been detained as a prisoner of war by the United States since his capture in 2003. Mr. Hamdullah argues that active hostilities in Afghanistan have ceased and that the United States is therefore obligated under the Third Geneva Convention to release him immediately. Respondents counter that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force [AUMF] continues to authorize Mr. Hamdullah’s detention because the United States remains engaged in active hostilities in Afghanistan.
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion to Grant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus […] [F]or the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Motion shall be denied.
 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). […] In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that “Congress’s “grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’” in the AUMF “include[s] the authority to detain (prisoners of war) [sic; this term does not appear in the Supreme Court decision quoted] for the duration of the relevant conflict.” […]; see also Aamer v. Obama […] (“[T]his court has repeatedly held that under the [AUMF], individuals may be detained at Guantanamo so long as they are determined to have been part of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, and so long as hostilities are ongoing.”).
 While entitled to some deference, the President's position is not dispositive. Our Court of Appeals has stated that, under separation of powers principles, “[t]he determination of when hostilities have ceased is a political decision, and we defer to the Executive's opinion on that matter, at least in the absence of an authoritative congressional declaration purporting to terminate the war.” […] But, the Hamdi plurality recognized that deference to the Executive must have limits. […] (“history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present [an immediate threat to national security]”).
 The crux of the Parties' disagreement is whether detention is authorized for the duration of “active combat” or “active hostilities.” Compare Hamdi[…] (“If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of 'necessary and appropriate force' ...”) with Hamdi […] (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”); see also Third Geneva Convention, Art. 118 (prisoners of war must be released “after the cessation of active hostilities”).
 Petitioner also looks to Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that application of the Fourth Geneva Convention “shall cease on the close of military operations.” […] The phrase “close of military operations” was understood to mean “the final end of all fighting between all those concerned.” [Footnote 3 - The main purpose of this statement was to clarify that if more than two nations are involved in a conflict, the Fourth Convention only ceases to apply after the fighting stops between all parties, not just some of the parties. Fourth Convention Commentary at 62.] […] The Court agrees with Petitioner that “cessation of active hostilities” is distinct from “close of military operations,” and that active hostilities can cease prior to the close of military operations.
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the appropriate standard is cessation of active hostilities and that active hostilities can continue after combat operations have ceased. But, cessation of active hostilities is not so demanding a standard that it requires total peace, signed peace agreements, or an end to all fighting.
 Next, the Court looks to whether active hostilities have, in fact, ceased. Petitioner relies heavily on the Bilateral Security Agreement and the President's speeches regarding the end of the combat mission and war in Afghanistan in support of his argument that active hostilities have ceased.
 Petitioner cites to speeches by the President, including his 2015 State of the Union Address and his May 2014 Statement on Afghanistan, but notably, none of these statements discuss the end of “active hostilities.” […]The end of the combat mission is not synonymous with the end of active hostilities. […]Indeed, the President has expressly stated that active hostilities continue. […] [The Court cites President Obama] (“The United States currently remains in an armed conflict against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, and active hostilities against those groups remain ongoing”).
 Petitioners point to greatly reduced troop numbers in Afghanistan as evidence of cessation of active hostilities. Respondents counter that the continued presence of nearly 10,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan is actually evidence of ongoing active hostilities. […] While troop numbers alone are not sufficient to determine whether active hostilities persist[…] a United States presence of nearly 10,000 troops certainly supports the conclusion that ongoing active hostilities exist.
 “The Geneva Conventions require release and repatriation only at the 'cessation of active hostilities.' ” […] As this Court has noted, “The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have repeatedly held that detention under the AUMF is lawful for the duration of active hostilities.” […] While what constitutes “active hostilities” has never been clearly defined, Respondents have provided convincing examples of ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. Given this evidence, combined with the deference accorded the Executive's determination of when hostilities have ceased, the Court concludes that active hostilities continue in Afghanistan. Mr. Hamdullah's continued detention, therefore, is both authorized under the AUMF and does not violate the Third Geneva Convention.
 Petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi (“Al-Alwi” or “petitioner”) challenges his continued detention at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he has been held since January 2002. Although this Court, […] and our Court of Appeals, […] previously determined that Al-Alwi could lawfully be detained as an enemy combatant under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), […] Al-Alwi now argues that the relevant conflict in Afghanistan that justified his detention has now ended, thereby extinguishing the United States’ authority to detain him any longer.
 Al–Alwi filed his second and current petition for a writ of habeas corpus in May 2015. […] In his petition, Al–Alwi does not challenge the Court's prior determination that he is an enemy combatant. […] Instead, he alleges that the relevant conflict in Afghanistan that originally justified his detention has concluded and his detention is no longer authorized by the AUMF (and violates the Geneva Convention and the Convention Against Torture). […] In the alternative, Al–Alwi argues that his detention has gone on for so long that it can no longer be reconciled with traditional law of war principles, and he must therefore be released whether or not the conflict is still ongoing. […] For the following reasons, I disagree as to both positions.
[T]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
[…] The AUMF gives the President authority to detain enemy combatants—i.e., individuals who were “part of” or provided support to al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. […] This Court has already determined that Al–Alwi is an enemy combatant who can be lawfully detained under the AUMF. […] As a result, the issue presented by this petition is not whether the government had the initial authority to detain him, but whether that authority has lapsed in the fifteen years since.
 In 2004, a plurality of the Supreme Court observed in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that it was a “clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” […] Informed by the principles of the law of war, the Court held that the AUMF's grant of authority to use “necessary and appropriate force” included within it the “authority to detain (combatants) [sic; this term does not appear in the Supreme Court decision quoted] for the duration of the relevant conflict.” […] In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”), Congress explicitly clarified that the AUMF gives the President authority to detain combatants “under the law of war without trial until the end of hostilities ....” […] Thus, the Court must determine whether “active hostilities” have ceased, such that Al–Alwi's detention is no longer permitted.
 However, when viewed in their proper context, these statements cannot reasonably be construed as a presidential declaration that active hostilities have ended in Afghanistan. Instead, President Obama's statements reflect a transition from Operation Enduring Freedom, which was the military's active combat mission, to Operation Freedom's Sentinel, a support and counterterrorism operation that nonetheless entails active hostilities in Afghanistan. […] Although the President announced a change in the military's focus going forward, he made clear that the United States would continue to engage in active counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. In fact, in the December 28, 2014 remarks referred to in Al–Alwi's petition, President Obama explicitly clarified that the United States would maintain a military presence in Afghanistan to “train, advise, and assist Afghan forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda.” […] As such, his comments cannot be construed as a definitive declaration that active hostilities have concluded, particularly when juxtaposed with the other numerous statements from the executive branch expressly stating that active hostilities persist in Afghanistan.
 With respect to the legislative branch, Congress passed the AUMF in 2001, which gave the President the authority to use “necessary and appropriate force” in Afghanistan, which remains in effect today. […] Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Congress passed the NDAA in 2012, which affirmed the President's authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the [AUMF].” […] Both indicate that Congress believes that active hostilities are ongoing and has certainly not passed an “authoritative congressional declaration purporting to terminate the war.” […] As a result, his detention under the AUMF remains lawful. [Footnote 3 reads: Al–Alwi also argues that his continued detention is prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 1, 13 […] Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions […] art. 75 (3) […]. Specifically, he argues that the conflict in Afghanistan has ended, requiring his release under the Geneva Convention, and asserts that his continued and indefinite detention has gone on for so long that it constitutes torture, violating the Convention Against Torture. […] As an initial matter, these arguments seem exceedingly likely to fail on the merits—active hostilities remain ongoing in Afghanistan, and the mere length of his detention cannot be characterized as torture. More importantly, Al–Alwi has no judicially enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions or the Convention Against Torture, whether he invokes them directly or indirectly, and his claims under them must therefore be rejected. […]].
[W]e agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.
[…] Al–Alwi argues that the “scenario Justice O'Connor describes has come to pass” and that the unusual nature and length of the conflict in Afghanistan have caused conventional understandings of the law of war to unravel completely. […] Therefore, the Court should order his release whether or not the conflict in Afghanistan continues. I disagree.
 Simply put, this case does not present a situation in which petitioner's detention would be inconsistent with the “clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities” or the rationale underlying that principle. […] After all, 8,400 United States service members are currently stationed in Afghanistan and engage in the use of force, against al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces, consistent with the laws of war and in a context similar to that presented to the Supreme Court in Hamdi. To say the least, the duration of a conflict does not somehow excuse it from longstanding law of war principles.
 Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus […].
d. What evidence did the courts consider when determining whether the conflict had ended? What evidence did the courts find most persuasive? How does this analysis compare with your analysis in (c)?
e. In your opinion, had the conflict ended in either case? Why or why not? Which evidence did you find most persuasive?
a. What was the status, under IHL, of Haji Hamdullah, in your opinion? Is there any additional information you would need to determine his status? What was the U.S. Government’s determination of his status? What rules of IHL governed whether or not he could be detained, on what grounds, and according to what procedures? (GC I-IV, Common Art. 3 ; GC III, Arts. 4 , 5 ; GC IV, Art. 4 ; CIHL, Rule 99 .
4. (Document A, para. , --; Document B, para. ) In your opinion, is the AUMF consistent with IHL? Why/Why not?
a. Must a State repatriate POWs when its participation in an IAC ends even if the conflict goes on?
b. Did the participation of the United States in hostilities in Afghanistan ended at the end of 2014?
c. May a State continue to hold prisoners of war if it terminates its participation in hostilities, but continues to support a party to the conflict?
9. (Document A, paras. , -, in particular para. ) What is the essence of Haji Hamdullah’s argument concerning the legality of his detention? Please enumerate the specific elements of his argument. Does the Court agree with his assessment? Why/Why not? What does the Court conclude?
10. (Document B, paras. , -) What is the essence of Al-Alwi’s argument concerning the legality of his detention? Please enumerate the specific elements of his argument. Does the Court agree with his assessment? Why/Why not? What does the Court conclude?
11. (Document B, paras -) Al-Alwi makes two alternative arguments concerning the legality of his prolonged detention.

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I am a social scientist with a background in psychology working across disciplinary boundaries. My research combines arts, science and public engagement to investigate health, well-being, creativity and resilience in later life. I critically explore how, and the extent to which, older people can manage to meet policy aspirations to ‘live well’ despite health problems and cognitive impairment, and research the impact of creative approaches to improving quality of life. I am involved in Welsh policy development, having co-authoring a number of literature reviews to inform the development of the Strategy for Older People in Wales and the Healthy Ageing Action Plan (Welsh Assembly Government 2005). I was seconded to the Older People’s Strategy Unit at the Welsh Assembly Government during the 2006/07 interim review period of the Strategy, and was a member of the Strategy Advisory Group. More recently I have been a member of the Wales Dementia Strategy task and finish group.
The Imagination Café. Arts and Humanities Research Council Follow on Fund for Impact and Engagement. £100,000. 1st January 2018-31st December 2018. (GW co-investigator).
Co-creating a resilience building framework for people living with dementia and their carers. Health and Care Research Wales Social Care PhD studentship. £59,972. 1st January 2018. (Lead applicant and supervisor).
Centre for Ageing and Dementia Research. NISCHR Centres programme grant £1.2m. April 2018-March 2020). (Associate Director).
‘Created out of Mind’: Shaping perceptions of dementia through art and science. The Wellcome Trust Residency Hub, £1,087,059.00, October 2016 for 22 months (Co-director).
Enhancing resilience and quality of life through arts and science research. Knowledge exchange fellowship from Alzheimer’s Society UK and Alzheimer Nederland, £12,500, May 2016 for 12 months.
Centre for Ageing and Dementia Research. NISCHR Centres programme grant, £1.8m, April 2015-March 2018 (co-applicant and work-theme lead).
What do older people living with dementia and their carers think of ‘Try Something New?' Alzheimer’s Society, £9,000, March 2015 (lead investigator).
Evidence based policy making on ageing in Wales: What pushes the older population into, or protects them from poverty, isolation and exclusion? Economic and Social Research Council, £387,500, 2013 (lead investigator).
Lost in Art Too. An evaluation of a 10 week programme of art sessions provided by Denbigh County Council for people with dementia and their carers. Denbighshire County Council, £5,500, 2013 (lead investigator).
Five year evaluation of the Cadwyn Môn befriending programme. Age Cymru Gwynedd a Môn, £12,000, 2012 (lead investigator).
Improving well-being and community connectivity for people with dementia through community based arts interventions. Arts and Humanities Research Council, £14,496, 2011 (lead investigator).
Lifestyle Matters for maintenance of health and well-being. MRC/LLHWB, £1,131,314, 2011 (co-applicant/site PI).
Can an arts programme increase quality of life and well-being of care home residents with dementia? An exploratory study. NISCHR PhD studentship, £59,947, 2010 (co-supervisor).
Maintaining Function and Well-Being: A Longitudinal Cohort Study. Economic and Social Research Council Large Grant/HEFCfW, £3.2m, 2010 (co-applicant/project manager).
Older People & Ageing Research and Development Network (OPAN). National Institute of Social Care and Health Research, Registered Research Group Grant, £1,342,988.40, 2010 (co-applicant/North Wales lead).
Challenges and Healthy Ageing: The Role of Resilience across the Life Course. Medical Research Council Collaborative Network Grant, £49,753, 2009 (lead applicant).
Constructing a model to guide investment in older people’s mental capital, mental health and well-being. Medical Research Council Collaborative Network Grant, £49,964, 2009 (co-applicant; led by Mima Cattan, Leeds Metropolitan University).
Promoting Excellence in Care Homes. Department of Health, £472,257, 2009 (co-applicant with Bob Woods, Diane Seddon, Win Tadd and Tony Bayer).
Social care, housing and dementia research development group. NEURODEM & WORD, £2,500, 2008 (lead applicant and Chair of group).
Systematic reviews on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of interventions to promote mental well-being in older age. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, £114,766, 2007 (lead applicant).
Rural North Wales Initiative for the Development of Support for Older People (RuralWIDe). Community Fund, £194,995, 2004 –2006 (co-applicant - with Age Concern Gwynedd a Môn and Vanessa Burholt).
Health promotion for older people: A literature review. National Assembly For Wales, £9000, 2001 (lead applicant).
Kanvin, K., MacLeod, C., Windle, G., Sacker, A. (In Press). Seeking assistance in later life: How do older people evaluate their need for assistance? Age and Ageing.
Sacker A, Ross A, MacLeod CA, Windle, G. (2017). Health and social exclusion in older age: evidence from Understanding Society, the UK household longitudinal study J Epidemiology Community Health, 71:681-690.
Windle, G., Howson-Griffiths, T., Gregory, S., O’Brien, D., Newman, A., Goulding, A. Exploring the theoretical foundations of visual art programmes for people living with dementia. (2017). Dementia: the international journal of social research and practice).
Joling, K. J., Windle, G., Droes, R.M., Huisman, M., Hertogh, C. Woods, B. "What are the essential features of resilience for informal caregivers of people living with dementia? A Delphi consensus examination. (2015). Aging & Mental Health. 2015 Dec 21:1-9. [Epub ahead of print] IF=2.70.
Karlijn J. Joling, Gill Windle, Rose-Marie Dröes, Franka Meiland, Hein P.J. van Hout, Janet MacNeil Vroomen, Peter M. van de Ven, Esmé Moniz-Cook, Bob Woods. (2016). Factors of resilience in informal caregivers of people with dementia from integrative international data-analysis. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders 42:198-214 (DOI:10.1159/000449131). IF=3.40.
Windle, G., Newman, A., Burholt, V. Woods, B., O’Brien, D., Hounsome, B., Parkinson, C. Tischler, V. (2016). Dementia and Imagination: A mixed-methods protocol for arts and science research. BMJ Open. 6(11):e011634. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011634.
Bennett, K. M., Windle, G. (2015). Commentary on "A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience". Behavioural and Brain Sciences.
Joling, K. J., Windle, G., Droes, R.M., Huisman, M., Hertogh, C. Woods, B. "What are the essential features of resilience for informal caregivers of people living with dementia? A Delphi consensus examination. Aging & Mental Health (in press).
Algar, K., Woods, B., & Windle, G. (2014). Measuring the quality of life and well-being of people with dementia: A review of observational measures. Dementia: the international journal of social research and practice. doi: 10.1177/1471301214540163.
Bennett, K. M., Windle, G. (In press). Commentary on "A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience". Behavioural and Brain Sciences (IF=14.96).
Bowling, A., Hankins, M., Windle, G., Bilotta, C. & Grant, R. (2013). Grounded development and psychometric testing of the short-form of the Older People’s Quality of Life questionnaire: OPQOL-brief. Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 56 (1),181-187. (IF=1.496).
Burholt, V., Nash, P., Naylor, D. & Windle, G. (2010). Training Older Volunteers in Gerontological Research in the United Kingdom: Moving Towards an Andragogical and Emancipatory Agenda. Educational Gerontology, 36 (9), 753-780.
Burholt, V., Windle, G., Balducci, C., Ferring, D., Weber, G., Thissen, F. & Hallberg, I. R. (2007). Reliability and validity of the older Americans resources and services (OARS) social resources scale in six European countries. Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences. 62B, (6),S371-S379.
Burholt, V. & Windle, G. (2007). Retaining independence and autonomy: older people’s preferences for specialised housing. Research, Policy and Planning.25(1), 13- 26.
Burholt, V. and Windle, G. (2006). Keeping warm? Self-reported housing, and home energy efficiency factors impacting on older People heating homes in North Wales. Energy Policy, 34, p.1198-1208.
Burholt, V. & Windle, G. (2006) The material resources and well-being of older people. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Dumitrache, C.G, Windle, G. & Herrera, R. R (2014). Do Social Resources Explain the Relationship between Optimism and Life Satisfaction in Community-Dwelling Older People? Testing a Multiple Mediation Model. Journal of Happiness Studies. DOI 10.1007/s10902-014-9526-3.
Sprange Kirsty, Mountain A Gail, Brazier John, Cook P Sarah, Craig Claire, Hind Daniel, Walters J Stephen, Windle Gill, Woods Robert, Keetharuth D Anju, Chater Tim, Horner Kath, (2013). Lifestyle Matters for maintenance of health and wellbeing in people aged 65 years and over: study protocol for a randomised controlled trial. Trials, 14:302.
Windle, G., Gregory, S., Newman, A., Goulding, A., O’Brien, D., Parkinson, C. (2014). Understanding the impact of visual arts interventions for people living with dementia: a realist review protocol. BMC Systematic Reviews, 3:91 doi:10.1186/2046-4053-3-91.
Windle, G. (2014). Exercise, Physical Activity and Mental Well-being in Later Life. Reviews in Clinical Gerontology, 4 (4) 319-325.
Windle, G. The contribution of resilience to healthy ageing. Perspectives in Public Health, 132 (4), 159-160 (IF=1.089).
Note: this paper is tagged as ‘highly accessed’ by the journal.
Windle, G. (2010). Do we know enough about the contribution of telecare to the quality of life of people with dementia? Journal of Dementia Care, 18 (5), 33-36.
Windle G., Hughes, D., Linck, P., Russell, I. & Woods, R. (2010). Is exercise effective in promoting mental well-being in later life? A systematic review. Aging & Mental Health, 14 (6), 652-669.
Windle, G., Woods, B., & Markland, D.A. (2010). Living with ill-health in older age: the role of a resilient personality. Journal of Happiness Studies, 11,763–777.
Windle, G. (2009) Variations in well-being: Psychological resilience in older Age. Germany: VDM Publishing Ltd.
Windle, G., Woods, B., & Markland, D.A. (2009). Living with ill-health in older age: the role of a resilient personality. Journal of Happiness Studies, online first, DOI 10.1007/s10902-009-9172-3.
Windle, G., Markland, D. A., & Woods, B. (2008). Examination of a theoretical model of psychological resilience in older age. Aging & Mental Health 12(3), 285-292.
Windle, G., Burholt, V., & Edwards, R. T, (2006). Housing related difficulties, housing tenure and variations in health status: Evidence from older people in Wales. Health & Place, 12, 267-278.
Windle, G., Edwards, R. T., & Burholt, V. (2004). A concise alternative for researching health related quality of life in older people. Quality in Ageing – Policy, practice and research, 5(3), 13-24.
Windle, G. & Woods, B. (2004). Variations in well-being: the mediating role of a psychological resource. Ageing and Society, 24, 583-602.
Windle, G. & Burholt, V. (2003). Older People in Wales, their transport and mobility. A Literature Review. Quality in Ageing – Policy, practice and research, 4(2), p. 28-35.
Williams, J. M. G., Healy, H., Eade, J. E., Windle, G., Cowen, P. J., Green, M. & Durlach, P. (2002). Mood, eating behaviour and attention. Psychological Medicine. 32(3), 469-481.
Windle, G. (2009). Variations in Well-Being: Psychological Resilience in Older Age. Germany: VDM Publishing Ltd.
Windle, G. & Bennett, K.M. (2012). Resilience and Caring Relationships. In Ungar, M. (ed). The Social Ecologies of Resilience. A Handbook of Theory and Practice. p. 219-231. New York: Springer.
Woods, B., Clare, L. & Windle, G. (In Press). Dementia and other cognitive disorders. In The Handbook of Evidence-Based Practice in Clinical Psychology.
Windle, G. What is mental health and mental well-being? (2009). In Cattan, M. & Forte, D. Mental Health and Well-being in Later Life. England: Open University Press.
Windle, G., & Woods, B. (2008). The Effects of Ageing on Personality. In Jacoby, R., Oppenheimer, C., Dening, T., & Thomas, A. (eds.,) The Oxford Textbook of Old Age Psychiatry. p. 591-603. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Windle, G., & Porter, A. (2008). Policy for Older People in Wales. In Maltby, T., Kennett, P., & Rummery, K., (eds.). Social Policy Review (20). pp. 93-110. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Burholt, V. & Windle, G. (2006). The Material Resources and Well-Being of Older People. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Jones C, Edwards RT & Windle G, on behalf of the Dementia and Imagination research team. Social return on investment analysis of an art group for people with dementia. The Lancet - 19 November 2014 (Vol. 384, Page S43) doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(14)62169-3.
Windle, G. (2014). Exploring life experiences, use of resources and their relation resilience in older people with ill-health and mobility restrictions. 67th Annual Scientific Meeting “Making Connections: From Cells to Societies” The Gerontologist (2014) 54 (Suppl 2), p.394: NP doi:10.1093/geront/gnu106.
Windle, G. (2011). Psychological resilience as a resource for later life. 64th Annual Scientific Meeting “Lifestyle→Lifespan” The Gerontologist (2011) 51 (suppl 2) P.331: 1-633 doi:10.1093/geront/gns068.
Windle, G. (2010). A Mixed-Methods Approach to Synthesising Resilience Research: Definition, Measurement and Gaps in the Evidence. 63rd Annual Scientific Meeting “Transitions of Care Across the Aging Continuum” The Gerontologist (2010) 50 (suppl 1), p.15: 1-550 doi:10.1093/geront/gnq115.
Windle, G. (2007). Variations in well-being: the role of psychological resilience in older age. Generations Review, 17, (1).
Burholt, V., & Windle, G. (2003). A matter of preference. Professional Social Work, Dec.2003, p18-19.
Gregory, S. A. and Windle, G. (2013). Lost in Art Too….Challenging perceptions of dementia. The Journal of Dementia Care, 21(5), 23-25.
Windle G. (2004). Transport in Rural Wales. Working with Older People, 8 (2), 32-35.
Windle, G. (2004). Subjective well-being in older age: Maintaining mental wellness. Signpost, 9 (2), 25-27.
Burholt, V., & Windle, G. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people in Wales: Housing services for older people. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Burholt, V., & Windle, G. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people in Wales: Social Inclusion for older people. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Burholt, V., & Windle, G. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people in Wales: Lifelong learning and employment for older people. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Burholt, V., & Windle, G. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people: Health and Social care. Centre for Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Windle, G., & Burholt, V. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people in Wales: Transport, Access, Mobility and Rural Living. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Windle, G., & Burholt, V. (2001). Literature review for the strategy for older people in Wales: Examples of Good Practice. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Gregory, S., & Windle, G. (2013). Lost Lost in Art Too. An evaluation of a 10 week programme of art sessions provided by Denbigh County Council for people with dementia and their carers. Denbighshire County Council.
Burholt, V., Windle, G., Naylor, D., Jones, B., Riley, B., Oades, J., Oades, R., Humphries, C., Kennedy, D., & Clifford Jones, J. (2007). Looking to the future: Ageing in Rural Communities. Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, Bangor University.
Burholt, V. & Windle, G. (2003). Housing for An Ageing Population: Planning Implications. Centre for Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Hill, J., Windle, G., Williams, L.& Parsonage, R. (2002). Promoting the health and well-being of disadvantaged groups in Wales. A review of the published literature. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Windle, G., & Burholt, V. (2005). Promoting the sexual health of older people. Report to the Welsh Assembly Government. The Centre for Social Policy Research and Development, The Institute of Medical and Social Care Research, University of Wales, Bangor.
Windle, G. Can I experience resilience despite dementia? Poster presented at the Alzheimer’s Society Annual Conference, The Oval, London, May 2018.
Windle, G. Is a Visual arts programme beneficial for the quality of life and well-being of people iving with dementia? Findings from Dementia and Imagination. Presented at Alzheimer’s Disease International Conference, Kyoto, Japan, 27th - 29th April 2017.
Windle, G. (2016). Is a Visual Arts Programme Beneficial for the Quality of Life of People Living With Dementia? Presented as art of a symposium ‘International Perspectives on arts and dementia research’ (convenor and chair). Gerontological Society of America annual scientific meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, 16th - 21st November 2016.
Windle, G, (2016). Mental health resilience and cognitive impairment. Presented as part of a symposium ‘Resilience in older age’. Gerontological Society of America annual scientific meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, 16th-21st November 2016.
Windle, G. (2015). Understanding resilience in later life: Some conceptual and methodological challenges. Part of symposium ‘The Role of Life Course Experiences and Generational Change in Theorizing Resilience, Loneliness and Support: Results From The CFAS-Wales Study, at the International Association of Gerontology and Geriatrics European Region Congress, 23rd - 26th April 2015, Dublin, Ireland.
Windle, G. Exploring life experiences, use of resources and their relation resilience in older people with ill-health and mobility restrictions. Paper presents as part of a symposium ‘Qualitative Insights on Health Literacy, Nutrition, Social Relationships and Resilience from the Cognitive Function and Ageing Studies Wales (CFAS-Wales), at the 67th Annual Scientific Meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, 5th - 9th November 2014. Washington DC, USA.
Windle, G. ‘Developing a visual arts intervention’. Paper presented as part of a symposium ‘Inter-disciplinary methodologies for understanding the impact of creative activities’ at the British Society of Gerontology Annual Conference, Southampton, 1st - 3rd September 2014.
Windle, G. How do earlier life experiences impact on the development of resilience in later life? Preliminary findings from CFAS Wales. Paper presented at the the 20th IAGG World Congress of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 23rd - 27th June 2013, Seoul, Korea.
Windle, G. Participation in community arts for health and well-being of people with dementia, their carers, and the communities in which they live – implications for research, policy and practice. Presented at the British Society of Gerontology Annual Conference, Keele, 11th - 13th July 2012.
Windle, G. Psychological resilience in later life. Paper presented at the 64th Annual Scientific Meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, 18th - 22nd November, 2011, Boston, USA.
Windle, G. Is it worth taking the trouble to study resilience? (Invited paper). The Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, University of Liverpool, 9th November, 2011.
Windle, G. The Older People and Ageing Research and Development Network Cymru. Poster presented at Ageing Globally-Ageing Locally 2011, the Centre for Ageing Research & Development in Ireland, Dublin, 2 - 3 November, 2011.
Windle, G. Resilience research: consolidating 20 years of evidence. Paper presented at Resilience – why bother? International Conference, University of Brighton, 6th - 8th April, 2011.
Windle, G. A Mixed-Methods Approach to Synthesising Resilience Research: Definition, Measurement and Gaps in the Evidence. Paper presented at the Gerontological Society of America 63rd Annual Scientific Meeting, 19th - 23rd November 2010 New Orleans, USA.
Windle, G. Resilience research: consolidating 20 years of evidence. Paper presented at the British Society of Gerontology 39th Annual Conference, 6th - 8th July 2010 Brunel University.
Windle, G. The resilience and healthy ageing research network: An overview. Poster presentation at Pathways to Resilience II: Social Ecology of Resilience, Halifax, Nova, Scotia, Canada, 7th - 10th June 2010.
Windle, G,. Bennett, K and Noyes, J. A methodological review of resilience measurement scales. Paper presentation at the Pathways to Resilience II: Social Ecology of Resilience, Halifax, Nova, Scotia, Canada, 7th - 10th June 2010.
Windle, G. (2009). Dignity in Care Homes. Paper presented at the Annual Care Conference, Millenium Stadium, Cardiff, 15th October 2009.
Windle, G. Is exercise effective in promoting mental well-being at 65+? Presentation at the International Congress of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Paris, 5th - 9th July 2009.
Windle, G. Promoting mental well-being at 65+. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Older People and Ageing Research Network, Swansea, 24th July 2008.
Windle, G. NEURODEM Cymru: The Welsh Portfolio of Research. Poster presented at the British Society of Gerontology Annual Conference, Bristol, 4th – 6th July 2008.
Windle G. Life activities and well-being. Poster presented at the VI European Congress of Gerontology, St. Petersburg, Russia, July 5th - 8th 2007.
Windle, G. How might loss of independence in activities of daily living affect subjective well-being? Paper presented at the 35th Annual Scientific Meeting of the British Society of Gerontology, University of Wales, Bangor, September 7th - 9th 2006.
Windle, G. A profile of the prevalence of depressive type symptoms and use of psychotropic medication in Europe. Poster presented at The 18th Congress of the International Association of Gerontology, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 26th - 30th 2005.
Windle, G. The self and Ageing: the role of psychological resources. Paper presented at The 18th Congress of the International Association of Gerontology, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 26th - 30th 2005.
Windle, G. The effects of psychological resources on the relationship between chronic illness and subjective well-being. Paper presented at the 34th Annual Scientific Meeting of the British Society of Gerontology, Keele, 14th - 16th July 2005.
Windle, G. Mental health and growing older: a cross-national study. Paper presented at the International Sociological Association Inter-Congress Conference, Ageing Societies and Ageing Sociology: Diversity and Change in a Global World. 7th - 9th September 2004.
Windle G, Edwards R.T, & Burholt , V. Health Related Quality of Life in Rural Community Dwelling Elders: Validating the EuroQol-5D Instrument. Global Health Economics: Bridging Research and Reforms. Abstracts from 4th International Health Economics Association World Congress on Health Economics, San Francisco, USA, June 2003. Page 187.
Windle G. Resilience in Older Age. Paper presented at The International Conference of Anthropological and Ethnographic Sciences, Florence, 5 - 9th July 2003.
Windle, G., Edwards, R. T., & Burholt, V. Poster presentation: Housing, Health and Service Use: Evidence from Wales. British Society for Gerontology Conference, 14 - 16th September 2003.
Windle, G. Predictors of subjective well-being in community dwelling older people: The role of environmental mastery. Poster presentation: British Society for Gerontology Conference, 14th September 2002.
Considering dementia in the future of care. Presented at the 6th International Longevity Forum, Rio de Jeneiro, Brazil, 22 - 23rd November, 2018.
Reducing loneliness in later life. The role of resilience. Presented at Public Health Wales event ‘Old and Alone: Not just an isolated incident. 11th October 2018.
Researching the arts in health and social care settings. Presented at the launch of the North Wales Concordant – an agreement between Arts Council Wales and the NHS for the arts in healthcare. 27th September 2018.
Dementia in the Asylum. Workshop with the Wellcome Collection, 1st February 2018.
Windle, G. Dementia and imagination: the role of the arts in dementia care. Presented at Ageing Well in Wales Celebrating Communities Conference, Wrexham, 16th January 2018.
Dementia and Imagination: A mixed-methods longitudinal investigation of the impact of a visual arts programme on quality of life. Presented in a symposium Art and Dementia’ organised by the INTERDEM Taskforce Social Health in Dementia, Alzheimer Europe Annual Conference, Berlin 2 - 4th October 2017.
Windle, G. The role of the arts in dementia care. Presented at the Alzheimer’s Society Annual Conference, London, 18th - 19th May, 2017.
Windle, G, and Algar, K. Measuring well-being in arts and dementia research. Invited workshop as part of the first International Arts and Dementia Conference, the Royal Society of Public Health, London, 9th-10th March 2017.
Windle, G. Dementia and Imagination. Presented to the meeting of the Wales Arts for Health and Wellbeing network, 17th March, 2017.
Windle, G. Dementia and Imagination: Highlights and Achievements. Presented at ‘Sharing Dementia and Imagination’, The Wellcome Trust, London, 31st January 2017.
Windle, G. Dementia and Imagination. Part of a showcase event ‘Celebrating the arts in dementia care’ UK Dementia Care Congress, Telford, 4 - 5th November 2015.
Windle, G. Psychological resilience: an important resource in later life? Part of an invited international symposium ‘Resilience and Ageing’. The 2015 International Psychogeriatrics Association Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany, 13 - 16 October 2015.
Windle, G. Workshop on resilience and ageing, to be held as part of ‘Pathways to Resilience III: Beyond Nature v Nurture’. Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 15 - 19th 2015.
Windle, G. The role of aesthetics in improving the quality of health-care. Health Improvement Foundation conference on co-production, Bangor University, 11th March 2015.
Windle, G. Lifestyle Matters for Depression: A feasibility Study. Presented to the Division of Occupational Science and Occupational Therapy, University of Southern California, 6th May 2014.
Windle, G. Dementia and Imagination. Presented at Creative Dementia Arts Network (CDAN) conference, 8th April 2014.
Windle, G. Is it worth taking the trouble to study resilience? Presented at a meeting of Creativity for connectivity and resilience, Newcastle University, 1st April 2014.

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