text:
My last post discussed the important new Sedona Conference guidance, The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production. The revised principles are compelling, providing important direction to lawyers and eDiscovery practitioners alike. The Sedona Principles often make their way into court opinions and thus inform eDiscovery case law. In my view, the most interesting component of the updated Sedona Principles is its stance against full disk imaging for routine eDiscovery preservation, labeling the practice as unnecessary and unduly burdensome. Full disk imaging is still very widely used (some attorneys would say abused) for eDiscovery collection, which is an issue I highlighted at length last year on this blog.
The Sedona commentary brings into focus the judges’ rationale when issuing sanctions for failure to properly preserve ESI. Specifically, what types of conduct resulting in the destruction of ESI do the courts actually impose penalties for? I have been monitoring the caselaw involving failure to preserve ESI sanctions for over 15 years, and such cases fall under three general categories.
The first and most obvious category involves intentional conduct to delete or otherwise destroy potentially relevant ESI. There are many examples of such cases, including Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart, 2013 WL 4116322 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013), and Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
The second category involves situations where there is no process in place and the organization asserts little or no effort to preserve ESI. In a recent example, a magistrate judge imposed spoliation sanctions where the Plaintiff made no effort to preserve their emails — even after it sent a letter to the defendant threatening litigation. (Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2016 WL 2957133 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016). The court, finding that the defendant suffered substantial prejudice by the loss of potentially relevant ESI, imposed severe evidentiary sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1), including allowing the defense to use the fact of spoliation to rebut testimony from the plaintiff’s witnesses. The court also awarded reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the defendant in bringing the motion. See also, Internmatch v. Nxtbigthing, LLC, 2016 WL 491483 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016), where a U.S. District Court imposed similar sanctions based upon the corporate defendant’s suspect preservation efforts.
The final category involves situations where an organization does have a palpable ESI preservation process, but one that perilously relies on custodian self-collection. In a recent illustrative case, a company found themselves on the wrong end of a $3 million sanctions penalty for spoliation of evidence. The case illustrates that establishing a litigation hold and notifying the custodians is just the first step. Effective monitoring and diligent compliance with the litigation hold is essential to avoid punitive sanctions. GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. 12-1318-LPS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93299 (D. Del. July 12, 2016). Even with effective monitoring, severe defensibility concerns plague custodian self-collection, with several courts disapproving of the practice due to poor compliance, metadata alteration, and inconsistency of results. See Geen v. Blitz, 2011 WL 806011, (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011), Nat’l Day Laborer Org. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, 2012 WL 2878130 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012).
So those are the three general categories for ESI preservation sanctions. But here is the question that the new Sedona commentary indirectly raises: Are there any cases out there where a court sanctions a party who; one, had a sound and reasonable ESI preservation process in place, and two, reasonably followed and executed that process in good faith, but were sanctioned anyway because that one document or email slipped through the cracks, which theoretically could have been prevented by employing full disk imaging as a routine practice? I believe this is an important question because some organizations and/or their outside counsel cite this concern as justification for full disk imaging across multitudes of custodians as a routine (but very expensive and burdensome) eDiscovery preservation practice. This still occurs even with the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically FRCP 26(b)(1), which requires the application of proportionality to all aspects of eDiscovery, including collection and preservation.
I am unaware of any such case described in the previous paragraph. But if anyone is, please let me know in the comments below!

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Published by Hodder and Stoughton Limited, London First paperback edition 1989. 1989.
First paperback edition new and updated in publisher's original laminated card covers. Folio 11" x 8½" 238 pages. ISBN 0340505206. Colour and archive monochrome photographic illustrations. In near Fine condition, no dust wrapper as issued. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Rutgers University Press, New Jersey.
Publisher's original colour illustrated laminated card covers. 8vo 9½'' x 6¼'' ISBN 0813526698. Illustrations throughout. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened and unused new book still in the publisher's original shrink-wrap polythene. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex First Penguin Edition 1999. 1999.
Publisher's original colour illustrated laminated card covers. 8vo 8½'' x 5¼'' 364 pages. ISBN 014118082X. Monochrome illustrations throughout. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened and unused new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Newmarket Press, New York First Edition 1998. New York 1998.
Publisher's original colour illustrated laminated card covers. 8vo 9'' x 6'' 234 pages. ISBN 1557043655. Colour illustrations to the centre. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened and unused new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Ian Allan Publishing Ltd., First Edition 2002. 2002.
First edition hard back binding in publisher's original burgundy cloth covers, gilt lettering to the spine. Quarto 10½'' x 8¼'' 128 pages. ISBN 0711028966. Colour and monochrome illustrations throughout. Fine condition book, in Fine condition dust wrapper, not price clipped, unopened and unused new book. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Magna Books, Wigston, Leicester First Edition 1992. 1992.
First edition hard back binding in publisher's original colour illustrated glazed boards. Folio 11½'' x 8¼'' 80 pages. ISBN 1854222783. Colour and monochrome illustrations throughout. Fine condition book, in Fine condition dust wrapper, unopened and unused new book. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London / Madison Press Book 1988. London 1988.
Hard back binding in publisher's original navy cloth covers, gilt lettering to the spine, White Star Line end papers. Folio 11½'' x 8¼'' 230, ii [pages.] ISBN 0340412658. Colour and monochrome illustrations throughout. Fine condition book, in very near Fine condition price clipped dust wrapper. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Pyramid Books Ltd., Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London First Edition 1988. London 1988.
First edition hard back binding in publisher's original colour illustrated glazed boards, White Star Line end papers. Folio 11½'' x 8¼'' 64 pages. ISBN 1871307007. Colour and monochrome illustrations throughout, special Titanic wall poster to the reverse of the dust wrapper. Fine condition book, in Fine condition dust wrapper, not price clipped, unopened and unused new book. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., First Edition 1996. New York 1996.
First edition hard back binding in publisher's original jade paper covers, silver lettering to black cloth spine. 8vo 9'' x 6'' 300 pages. ISBN 039303965X. Monochrome illustrations throughout. Fine condition book, in Fine condition dust wrapper, not price clipped, unopened and unused new book. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Chelsea House Publishers Philadelphia First Edition 2001. Philadelphia 2001.
First edition hard back binding in publisher's original colour illustrated glazed boards. 8vo 9½'' x 7¼'' 120 pages. ISBN 0791052656. Monochrome illustrations throughout. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published, unopened and unused new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Publisher's original stapled pink card covers. 8vo 8'' x 5¼'' 40 pp. Monochrome illustrations to the rear. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Kingfisher Railway Productions 65A The Avenue, Southampton 1988. 1988.
Publisher's original illustrated laminated card covers. Folio 11'' x 9'' 48 pages. ISBN 0946184291. Double page colour illustration to the centre, monochrome illustrations throughout. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London First Edition 2000. London 2000.
Publisher's original illustrated laminated card covers, French Flaps. Folio 12'' x 8¼'' 48 pages. ISBN 0948065362. Monochrome illustrations throughout. In Fine condition, no dust wrapper as published. Unopened new book. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London / Madison Press Book 1987. London 1987.
Hard back binding in publisher's original navy cloth covers, gilt lettering to the spine, White Star Line end papers. Folio 11½'' x 8¼'' 230, ii [pages.] ISBN 0340412658. Colour and monochrome illustrations throughout. Fine condition book, in Fine condition dust wrapper, not price clipped. Dust wrapper supplied in archive acetate film protection, this is not adhered to the book or to the dust wrapper and can easily be removed should you so wish. Member of the P.B.F.A.
Published by National Geographic Society, Washington circa 1985. 1985.
Publisher's original colour illustrated laminated card wrap covers. Landscape 9'' x 12'' 36 pp. Stunning colour illustrations throughout. In very near Fine condition with top front corner very slightly turned up, no dust wrapper as published. We currently hold in stock 31 other Titanic titles. Member of the P.B.F.A.

matches:
In Fine
In Fine
In Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
in Fine
In Fine
In Fine
In Fine
In Fine
in Fine


text:
We are very delighted that you have shown interest in our enterprise. Data protection is of a particularly high priority for the management of GoVolunteer e. V. The use of the internet pages of GoVolunteer e. V. is possible without any indication of personal data; however, if a data subject wants to use special enterprise services via our website, processing of personal data could become necessary. If the processing of personal data is necessary and there is no statutory basis for such processing, we generally obtain consent from the data subject.
The processing of personal data, such as the name, address, e-mail address, or telephone number of a data subject shall always be in line with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and in accordance with the country-specific data protection regulations applicable to GoVolunteer e. V. By means of this data protection declaration, our enterprise would like to inform the general public of the nature, scope, and purpose of the personal data we collect, use and process. Furthermore, data subjects are informed, by means of this data protection declaration, of the rights to which they are entitled.
As the controller, GoVolunteer e. V. has implemented numerous technical and organizational measures to ensure the most complete protection of personal data processed through this website. However, internet-based data transmissions may in principle have security gaps, so absolute protection may not be guaranteed. For this reason, every data subject is free to transfer personal data to us via alternative means, e.g. by telephone.
The data protection declaration of GoVolunteer e. V. is based on the terms used by the European legislator for the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Our data protection declaration should be legible and understandable for the general public, as well as our users and business partners. To ensure this, we would like to first explain the terminology used.
The website of GoVolunteer e. V. collects a series of general data and information when a data subject or automated system calls up the website. This general data and information are stored in the server log files. Collected may be (1) the browser types and versions used, (2) the operating system used by the accessing system, (3) the website from which an accessing system reaches our website (so-called referrers), (4) the sub-websites, (5) the date and time of access to the internet site, (6) an internet protocol address (IP address), (7) the internet service provider of the accessing system, and (8) any other similar data and information that may be used in the event of attacks on our information technology systems.
When using these general data and information, GoVolunteer e. V. does not draw any conclusions about the data subject. Rather, this information is needed to (1) deliver the content of our website correctly, (2) optimize the content of our website as well as its advertisement, (3) ensure the long-term viability of our information technology systems and website technology, and (4) provide law enforcement authorities with the information necessary for criminal prosecution in case of a cyber-attack. Therefore, GoVolunteer e. V. analyzes anonymously collected data and information statistically, with the aim of increasing the data protection and data security of our enterprise, and to ensure an optimal level of protection for the personal data we process. The anonymous data of the server log files are stored separately from all personal data provided by a data subject.
On the website of GoVolunteer e. V., users are given the opportunity to subscribe to our enterprise's newsletter. The input mask used for this purpose determines what personal data are transmitted, as well as when the newsletter is ordered from the controller.
GoVolunteer e. V. informs its users and business partners regularly by means of a newsletter about enterprise offers. The enterprise's newsletter may only be received by the data subject if (1) the data subject has a valid e-mail address and (2) the data subject registers for the newsletter. A confirmation e-mail will be sent to the e-mail address registered by a data subject for the first time, for legal reasons, in the double opt-in procedure. This confirmation e-mail is used to prove whether the owner of the e-mail address as the data subject is authorized to receive the newsletter.
The newsletter of GoVolunteer e. V. contains so-called tracking pixels. A tracking pixel is a miniature graphic embedded in such e-mails, which are sent in HTML format to enable log file recording and analysis. This allows a statistical analysis of the success or failure of online marketing campaigns. Based on the embedded tracking pixel, GoVolunteer e. V. may see if and when an e-mail was opened by a data subject, and which links in the e-mail were called up by data subjects.
Such personal data collected in the tracking pixels contained in the newsletters are stored and analyzed by the controller in order to optimize the newsletter, as well as to adapt the content of future newsletters even better to the interests of the data subject. These personal data will not be passed on to third parties. Data subjects are at any time entitled to revoke the respective separate declaration of consent issued by means of the double-opt-in procedure. After a revocation, these personal data will be deleted by the controller. GoVolunteer e. V. automatically regards a withdrawal from the receipt of the newsletter as a revocation.
The website of GoVolunteer e. V. contains information that enables a quick electronic contact to our enterprise, as well as direct communication with us, which also includes a general address of the so-called electronic mail (e-mail address). If a data subject contacts the controller by e-mail or via a contact form, the personal data transmitted by the data subject are automatically stored. Such personal data transmitted on a voluntary basis by a data subject to the data controller are stored for the purpose of processing or contacting the data subject. There is no transfer of this personal data to third parties.
If one of the aforementioned reasons applies, and a data subject wishes to request the erasure of personal data stored by GoVolunteer e. V., she or he may at any time contact us. The Data Protection Officer of GoVolunteer e. V. or another employee shall promptly ensure that the erasure request is complied with immediately.
Where the controller has made personal data public and is obliged pursuant to Article 17(1) to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform other controllers processing the personal data that the data subject has requested erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data, as far as processing is not required. The Data Protection Officer of GoVolunteer e. V. or another employee will arrange the necessary measures in individual cases.
If one of the aforementioned conditions is met, and a data subject wishes to request the restriction of the processing of personal data stored by GoVolunteer e. V., she or he may at any time contact us. The Data Protection Officer of GoVolunteer e. V. or another employee will arrange the restriction of the processing.
In order to assert the right to data portability, the data subject may at any time contact the Data Protection Officer designated by GoVolunteer e. V. or another employee.
GoVolunteer e. V. shall no longer process the personal data in the event of the objection, unless we can demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
If GoVolunteer e. V. processes personal data for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her for such marketing. This applies to profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing. If the data subject objects to GoVolunteer e. V. to the processing for direct marketing purposes, GoVolunteer e. V. will no longer process the personal data for these purposes.
In addition, the data subject has the right, on grounds relating to her or his particular situation, to object to processing of personal data concerning him or her by GoVolunteer e. V. for scientific or historical research purposes, or for statistical purposes pursuant to Article 89(1) of the GDPR, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest.
In order to exercise the right to object, the data subject may directly contact GoVolunteer e. V. In addition, the data subject is free in the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, to use her or his right to object by automated means using technical specifications.
If the decision (1) is necessary for entering into, or the performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller, or (2) it is based on the data subject's explicit consent, GoVolunteer e. V. shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express her or his point of view and contest the decision.
If the data subject wishes to exercise the rights concerning automated individual decision-making, she or he may at any time directly contact GoVolunteer e. V.
If the data subject wishes to exercise the right to withdraw the consent, she or he may at any time directly contact GoVolunteer e. V.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Is the Supreme Court breathtakingly dishonest or just completely clueless?
On Wednesday, March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Star Athletica LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. The case called upon the Court, in the opinion of the majority, to address the thorny issue of conceptual separability; a test for which there was absolutely no agreement among the Regional Circuit Courts of Appeal.
The question addressed by the majority was whether designs on cheerleader uniforms could be copyrighted separate from the uniform itself, which is not copyrightable because useful articles are not copyright protectable. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan, held that “an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful article.” (Slip op. at 17) The Court went on to also determine that the cheerleader uniforms satisfied this test and, therefore, affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id.
The majority opinion, although in favor of the copyright holder, was not without certain problems. First, Justice Ginsburg, who concurred in the outcome but not in the opinion, was exactly right. The Court did not need to reach the issue of conceptual separability in this case. Ginsburg wrote: “Consideration of [separability] test is unwarranted because the designs at issue are not designs of useful articles. Instead, the designs are themselves copyrightable pictorial or graphic works reproduced on useful articles.” (Ginsburg concurring at 1).
Regardless of the fact that Justice Ginsburg was alone correct, the majority has settled the law on conceptual separability, which should be positive. At least now the law won’t depend upon where the lawsuit is filed.
More difficult to swallow, however, were several passages from the majority opinion and dissent by Justice Breyer that explained the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes and how they are not searching for the best policy, but the correct statutory interpretation.
Thomas also wrote: “Petitioner next argues that we should incorporate two “objective” components… We reject this argument because neither consideration is grounded in the text of the statute.” (Slip op. at 15-16).
These statements echo what Justice Alito wrote in SCA Hygiene, about the role of the Supreme Court as interpreter and not as legislator. The problem is this is simply NOT what the Supreme Court does in patent cases. This deference to Congress is convenient, nothing more. It is patronizing lip service that insults the intelligence of patent professionals familiar with Supreme Court patent jurisprudence, particularly the recent pronouncements on patent eligibility, which ignore the statute entirely.
35 U.S.C. 101 says that claims are patent eligible if they are written to cover a machine, a process, an article of manufacture or a compound. There are not exceptions in the statute, yet the Supreme Court in their infinite wisdom have created three “judicial exceptions” to patent eligibility. These judicial exceptions are nothing more than lawless, extra-statutory requirements imposed by the Supreme Court because they think they know better. There is no support anywhere in the statute or Constitution for “judicial exceptions,” and the very label the Court uses to describe them – “judicial exceptions” – confirms that they are above and beyond the statute.
In Star Athletica Breyer laments that the majority is ignoring the statute. On Tuesday in SCA Hygiene Justice Breyer similarly lamented that the Court was reaching a decision that upended decades of well established law and settled expectations. These concerns were simply non-existent when Justice Breyer issued the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus, a decision that unceremoniously overruled Diamond v. Diehr and ignored the Patent Act itself by purposefully conflating novelty and nonobviousness with patent eligibility. Then Associate Justice Rehnquist specifically wrote such a conflation was erroneous in Diehr some 31 years earlier. Breyer was also not concerned with well-established law in AMP v. Myriad, which overruled Diamond v. Chakrabarty, or in KSR v. Teleflex, which directly and substantially rewrote generations of obviousness law and for the first time made it possible to reject claims as being obvious to try.
These seemingly innocent comments demonstrate a breathtaking dishonesty, which is hardly a newsworthy conclusion, or even much of a revelation to anyone in the patent community. Still, over the past few days the drivel that has been sprinkled into Supreme Court opinions has been particularly nauseating. The ends justify the means for the Supreme Court. When it is convenient they defer to Congress and wax poetically about the importance of stare decisis, as they actually had the gall to do in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment. When adhering to well-established rules and expectations of an entire industry is inconvenient, they create exceptions to statutes, ignore statutory schemes altogether, and overrule generations of well-established law.
Perhaps even more disturbing, in dissent in Star Athletica Justice Breyer went on explained that in 1850 Lord Macaulay referred to copyrights in books as a tax on readers. Justice Breyer did not point out how ridiculous it is to think of copyrights in such an ignorant manner, but instead cited this nonsense with approval as if it is actually true! Breyer did not explain, perhaps because he himself doesn’t understand, that the existence of copyrights allows for creators to be able to create and then if the creation is desired in the market to make more and more content.
You see, it is a simple concept. There are limited hours in the day and everyone has basic requirements (i.e., food, shelter, etc.). If you cannot get paid for creating you have to spend less time creating. So copyrights allow creators to reap rewards from their labors to the extent that their work is validated in the marketplace. Seriously, for someone who loves to pontificate and professes such great knowledge of economics and the economy, Justice Breyer seems to know very little about how the real world works, very little about intellectual property, and absolutely nothing about creators and the business of creation.
A copyright monopoly? I’ve heard many ignorant things from those who think they understand intellectual property, but this easily ranks in the top 10, and has to be a serious challenger for the most ridiculous statements ever made. Copyrights do NOT create a monopoly and they do NOT provide monopoly rights. The Court incorrectly refers to a patent as a monopoly, but it takes a special kind of bias (and/or ignorance) to refer to a copyright as a monopoly. Allow me to explain.
First, let’s start with the obvious. You cannot have a monopoly in something for which there is no market. Copyrights attach at creation, and there are many millions, if not many billions, of copyright works. The overwhelming majority of copyrighted works will never have a market, they will never be commercialized, and if commercialized no one will ever be a buyer. Without a market there cannot be a monopoly. For someone who likes to think of himself as an antitrust expert I would expect Justice Breyer to understand this fundamental truism about monopolies, markets and market power.
Next, copyrights are encumbered by very real and substantial fair use rights. These fair use rights are not subject to the permission of the copyright owner, but instead are freely available to the world.
Finally, piracy and copyright infringement has always been a problem, but in the Internet Age it is easier than ever to rip off content creators. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is largely ineffective today. Content Delivery Networks refuse to acknowledge DMCA take down notices claiming they do not host infringing content on servers despite the fact that the entire purpose of a CDN is to host content on not one, but many servers that are closer to the recipient than the original host server. Even when DMCA notices are effective infringers simply set up other websites and content creators are left to constantly chase, which could be a full-time job. And as a content creator who experiences sometimes widespread infringement perpetrated even by intellectual property professionals who wholesale copy our original content I can tell you it sure feels at times like we fight a losing battle.
A copyright monopoly? If copyrights are a monopoly it is the most bizarre monopoly I’ve ever seen. All the power is held by infringers, copyright owners must chase, be vigilant, and still fight a losing battle. Unless you are a major studio, record label or giant software company you won’t get help from the government, and Congress caved when threatened over SOPA.
None of this seems to particularly describe the type of power arrangement typically seen in a monopolistic relationship because copyrights do NOT convey monopolies, period. Frankly, I would love to have a discussion with Justice Breyer about how and why he could make such an idiotic remark.
The fact that Justice Breyer wrote the words “copyright monopoly” demonstrates a breathtaking dishonesty, or perhaps that he is just completely clueless. Whatever the case may be, having such uninformed jurists making these decisions and pontificating in grandiose ways about issues they clearly do not understand is a serious problem for the Supreme Court. They like to think they know everything about everything, and instead they continually demonstrate they are a bunch of emperors without any clothes, standing naked in the street.
Funny. I’ve been pondering the same question.
I think what we are seeing is a mixture of many factors.
It is impossible for any human being to know (to store in the biological connectome networks) everything all at once.
It is impossible for any human being to simultaneously process everything (to simultaneously energize all their biological connectome networks).
Thus, even the “Supremes” can only comprehend a few simple things at one time and focus their thoughts on that “finite” (very small set) of simple things.
That of course results in disjoint thought patterns heading off in all sorts of contradictory directions.
But then again, as the honorable Justice-to-be Gorsuch warned, don’t you dare have lack of respect and audacity to criticize the un-reproachable “interpretations” of the “laws” by the Supremes based on the “facts”.
The Constitution does not allow the little people to talk truth to power.
Let’s face it, SCOTUS is hypocritical, two-faced, and fork-tongued when it comes to patent law. What’s really a tragedy is that certain IP law professors who have no science or technical background are cheering this nonsense on, as well as indoctrinating scores of law students to do the same. It could take decades to unwind this mess.
This is what happens when you have recent law school graduates from the worst egghead schools in the country (e.g., Yale/Harvard) writing SCOTUS opinions. Most law school graduates don’t know anything about IP law, and the Justices don’t appear inclined to correct them. Until the Justices actually start taking an interest in correctly deciding IP issues, their erratic, profoundly damaging opinions will continue to the detriment of inventors and and the country.
I hear you. I don’t know what the answer is. I think a big part of the problem is the echo chamber in which the Supreme Court Justices live and operate. No one dares speak truth to them for fear of what? I’m not sure. Someone needs to tell them that they know absolutely nothing about IP and they are destroying the American intellectual property system, particularly the patent system. I might actually file an amicus brief in some case at some point saying just that. Not that it will do any good, but they need to be told that truth!
That is exactly wrong. It is one of the fundamental purposes of a Constitution… for the little people to be protected to be able to talk truth to power!
As an inventor, it is difficult to reconcile inherent respect for the position of U.S. Supreme Court Justice as a part of the Constitutional system of governance, with the conduct of those now occupying said positions.
As much as ‘everyone is human’ (and therefore fallible, of course); their frequent indulgence in such partisanship merely on account of sentiments of envy, superiority complex and issue favoritism is, for my point of view, an abrogation of their oaths of office.
When there is a problem allowing “little people” to ‘talk to power’; then, it is certain, that conduct in violation of the U.S. Constitutional is being perpetrated, in one or more branches of the U.S. government.
My understanding of the history of the formation of this nation, from the “Parson’s Cause” and the Virginia Stamp Act Resolution, the Boston Tea Party, “Common Sense” and the Declaration, through the Articles of Confederation, to the Federalist Papers and the Constitution, is; that Gene, is correct.
It’s easy to label other people as “dishonest”.
But it is relatively unlikely that everyone gets up every morning saying to themselves, “Today I will be even more dishonest than I was yesterday, nee ha ha”.
You have to understand the roots from whence these other people arose and the models they cling to in their heads about how the world is put together.
Dishonest, step back, may or may not include a factor of “purpose” so clear cut as your post indicates.
Dishonest includes the lack of inte11ectual honesty – the refusal to give objective and critical thinking that reflects an awareness of one’s own bias and tendencies and arrives at a just result sometimes in spite of those views.
Justice Breyer instead as continuously NOT used such critical thinking and acts out of apparent malice towards the concept of a person having intellectual property rights.
The level of “dishonest” here stems from the purposeful views and decisions of Justice Breyer to place his own world view and desired policies in front of those duly delegated with that authority per our Constitution.
This is just not something that attorneys – with an oath that does not place the Supreme Court above the Constitution – should merely accept. Our duty includes a duty to state when the Emperor is strutting around in the buff.
Breyer earned a B.A. in philosophy from Stanford University in 1959, a B.A. from Magdalen College at the University of Oxford as a Marshall Scholar in 1961, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1964. While at Harvard, Breyer was the article editor at the Harvard Law Review.
Consider a cotton gin: does this “organize human behavior”? Of course. It structures our entire behavior in regard to growing and processing cotton.
The cotton and the information are analogous for inventions. The information processing machines are just processing information like the cotton gin is processing cotton. So, Stevens, Ginsburg, Sotomayor’s statements about inventions not being for organizing human behavior are offensively ignorant and ridiculous.
The fact is that behavior is organized around processing the information so the machine that processing the information is going to organize our behavior just like the cotton gin organized the human behavior focused on growing and processing cotton.
In this case, I think their behavior falls under the category of gross ignorance. Unforgivable really.
It may be beyond “gross ignorance” and a purposeful (and ultra vires) policy decision by the Court to artificially limit what Congress has stated.
That the Court chooses to label with ad hominem (the reference to “scriveners”), when they themselves are acting as scriveners in re-writing the words of Congress is beyond deplorable.
Oh no. Please don’t label the SCOTeti as “deplorables”.
Lol – I used that word without drawing the “political” use of the word into mind – please feel free to use a different word in order to not draw an unintended comparison.


text:
Vibrio Pathogenicity Island-2 (VPI-2) is a 57 kb region present in choleragenic V. cholerae isolates that is required for growth on sialic acid as a sole carbon source. V. cholerae non-O1/O139 pathogenic strains also contain VPI-2, which in addition to sialic acid catabolism genes also encodes a type 3 secretion system in these strains. VPI-2 integrates into chromosome 1 at a tRNA-serine site and encodes an integrase intV2 (VC1758) that belongs to the tyrosine recombinase family. IntV2 is required for VPI-2 excision from chromosome 1, which occurs at very low levels, and formation of a non-replicative circular intermediate.
We determined the conditions and the factors that affect excision of VPI-2 in V. cholerae N16961. We demonstrate that excision from chromosome 1 is induced at low temperature and after sublethal UV-light irradiation treatment. In addition, after UV-light irradiation compared to untreated cells, cells showed increased expression of three genes, intV2 (VC1758) , and two putative recombination directionality factors (RDFs), vefA (VC1785) and vefB (VC1809) encoded within VPI-2. We demonstrate that along with IntV2, the RDF VefA is essential for excision. We constructed a knockout mutant of vefA in V. cholerae N16961, and found that no excision of VPI-2 occurred, indicating that a functional vefA gene is required for excision. Deletion of the second RDF encoded by vefB did not result in a loss of excision. Among Vibrio species in the genome database, we identified 27 putative RDFs within regions that also encoded IntV2 homologues. Within each species the RDFs and their cognate IntV2 proteins were associated with different island regions suggesting that this pairing is widespread.
We demonstrate that excision of VPI-2 is induced under some environmental stress conditions and we show for the first time that an RDF encoded within a pathogenicity island in V. cholerae is required for excision of the region.
Vibrio cholerae is the etiological agent of the severe diarrheal disease cholera. Similar to many Gram-negative enteric pathogens, horizontal gene transfer and recombination plays a significant role in the evolution and emergence of new pathogenic strain of this species [1–12]. The main cause of the explosive rice water diarrhea characteristic of cholera is the cholera toxin (CT), an AB type enterotoxin, which is encoded within the ssDNA filamentous phage CTXɸ [13, 14]. The B subunit of CT binds to the GM1 gangliosides, which are exposed when higher order gangliosides found in the intestinal mucus are cleaved by sialidase/neuraminidase (NanH). This protein is encoded within a 57 kb region named Vibrio Pathogenicity Island-2 (VPI-2) [15, 16]. In addition to encoding sialidase, VPI-2 also encodes the sialic acid catabolism (SAC) gene cluster (Figure 1A) [16–19]. The SAC cluster was shown to be present only in pathogenic isolates of V. cholerae and enables the bacterium to grow on sialic acid as a sole carbon source [18, 20]. Recently, we demonstrated that the ability to catabolize sialic acid gives V. cholerae a competitive advantage in vivo. In non-O1/O139 pathogenic isolates, in addition to the SAC cluster are the genes required for a type 3 secretion system which is important for virulence [21–25]. The toxin co-regulated pilus (TCP), an essential intestinal colonization factor for V. cholerae, is encoded within the 40 kb Vibrio Pathogenicity Island-1 (VPI-1 or TCP Island) region [26, 27].
Vibrio Pathogenicity Island-2 (VPI-2) ORFs and primers used in this study. A. Schematic representation of VPI-2. Small black vertical arrows mark ORFs VC1758 (IntV2), VC1785 (VefA), or VC1809 (VefB). Block arrows represent ORFs and direction of transcription. Black arrows represent core genome ORFs (VC1757 and VC1810) present in all V. cholerae isolates; red arrow indicates an integrase, purple arrows indicate type 1 restriction modification ORFs, green arrows represent sialic acid catabolism, transport and regulator ORFs, blue arrow indicates sialidase/neuraminidase and yellow arrows represent transposase and Mu-phage like proteins. B. Schematic of VPI-2 excision mechanism and primer pair VPI2attF and VPI2attR used to detect the VPI-2 attB locus after excision of the entire region.
VPI-1 and VPI-2 do not share any genes in common but do share some functional characteristics such as the ability to integrate into the chromosome, specifically at a tRNA site using an integrase belonging to the tyrosine recombinase family [16, 18, 23, 26, 28]. VPI-2 integrates into chromosome 1 at a tRNA-serine locus, whereas VPI-1 is located at the tmRNA locus. Both regions are flanked by direct repeats (DRs) named attL and attR[16, 18, 23, 26, 28]. These integrases, IntV1 (VC0847) and IntV2 (VC1758), are believed to mediate insertion into the host chromosome through site specific recombination between an attachment site attP, present in the pathogenicity island, and attB, present in the bacterial chromosome.
Pathogenicity islands have been shown to excise from their host genome in pathogenic Escherichia coli and Yersinia species [29–36]. In E. coli strain 536, a uropathogenic isolate, Hacker and colleagues have identified six PAIs, all of which encode a tyrosine recombinase integrase and are flanked by DRs [31, 33, 36–39]. They demonstrated that PAI-I, II, III and V can excise from the chromosome by site-specific recombination involving their respective DRs (attL and attR) [31, 33]. The PAIs were shown to excise at different frequencies depending on the growth conditions [31, 33]. Likewise, both VPI-1 and VPI-2 have been shown to excise from their host chromosome [23, 28]. Rajanna and colleagues demonstrated that VPI-1 can excise from V. cholerae N16961 at very low rates . They determined that the integrase IntV1 (VC0847) was not essential for excision since a transposase within the region appeared to compensate for an IntV1 knockout . Recently, Murphy and Boyd demonstrated that VPI-2 from V. cholerae N16961 can excise from chromosome 1, which also occurred at very low frequency under optimal growth conditions . Their study showed that IntV2 (VC1758) was essential for excision and the formation of a circular intermediate (CI) . Pathogenicity islands from both E. coli and V. cholerae are non-self mobilizable, they do not encode any proteins such as those for phage structural proteins or conjugation systems needed for cell to cell mobility [23, 28, 31, 33, 36–39]. The mechanism of transfer for most pathogenicity islands remains to be elucidated but likely involves hitchhiking with plasmids, conjugative transposons, Integrative and Conjugative Elements (ICEs), or generalized transducing phages or uptake by transformation.
It is known that for some mobile and integrative genetic elements (MIGEs) the presence of a recombination directionality factor (RDF)/excisionase is required for excision [40, 41]. For instance, Xis is required for the excision of the ICE SXT from V. cholerae, Hef from the High Pathogenicity Island of Yersinia pestis, and Rox from the Shigella Resistance Locus (SRL) of Shigella flexneri. RDFs are small basic proteins that bind and bend DNA on the recombination sites attL and attR triggering excision by coordinating the assembly of the excisive intasome [43–45]. In addition, some RDFs have been found to inhibit reintegration of the CI by converting attP into a catalytically inactive structure and are thought to stabilize the appropriate positioning of the integrase within the excisive intasome [46–48]. To date, no RDFs have been identified in E. coli or V. cholerae pathogenicity islands.
Here, we report the environmental conditions that induce excision of VPI-2. We examined the VPI-2-encoded factors that are required for VPI-2 excision, determining that V. cholerae cells subjected to stress conditions showed an increase in the excision levels of VPI-2 compared to cell grown at optimal conditions. Bioinformatic analysis of the VPI-2 region identified two open reading frames (ORFs) VC1785 and VC1809 that show homology to previously described RDFs, which we named VefA and VefB. We examined the role of these genes in VPI-2 excision.
The strains and plasmids used in this study are listed in table 1. Bacteria were grown in lysogeny broth more commonly known as Luria-Bertani broth (LB), LB agar, or LB agar 10% sucrose without NaCl (LB-Suc) . Strains harboring the pBAD33 expression vector were grown on LB supplemented with 0.02% W/V of L-Arabinose (LB-Ara). Bacteria were incubated overnight at 37°C with aeration unless otherwise indicated. When required, ampicillin (Amp, 100 μg/ml), streptomycin (Sm, 200 μg/ml), or chloramphenicol (Cm, 25 μg/ml) were added to the media.
Excised circular VPI-2 DNA containing attP is expected to be a very rare event given the predicted low excision rate under normal conditions and the inability of VPI-2 to replicate after excision . Therefore, we quantified the excision rates of VPI-2 by measuring the presence of attB, the locus present on the V. cholerae chromosome after VPI-2 excises (Figure 1B), in different strains under different conditions, and comparing it with the presence of attB in cultures of V. cholerae N16961 grown under standard optimal conditions: 12 hours in LB at 37°C with aeration. Using the O.D. values of 1 mL of a culture of V. cholerae N16961 grown for 12 hours in LB at 37°C with aeration as a reference, 750 μL to 4 mL were pelleted by centrifugation and genomic DNA was extracted using ABI PrepMan Ultra reagent from the test cultures. We took 50 μL from each DNA extraction and diluted each with 200 μL of sterile ddH2O. A 5 μL aliquot of DNA after dilution was used as template for Real-Time quantitative PCR (QPCR) reactions. The QPCR assay calculated the percentage of cells in a culture that contained an unoccupied VPI-2 attB site. We quantified attB sites present in cell grown under different growth conditions and normalized to the amount of attB present in N16961 grown for 12 hours at 37°C. The gene-specific primers were designed using Primer3 software according to the real-time PCR guidelines, and are listed in Table 2. The Applied Biosystems 7000 system was used for RT fluorescence detection of PCR products that resulted from binding of the dye SYBR Green to double stranded DNA and the results were examined with Applied Biosystems SDS software V 1.3. The reference gene mdh was assayed both separately and in the same reaction. To confirm that primer pairs only amplified target genes to assure accurate quantification of the results, non-template controls were included in each replicate. The attB and mdh PCR products were visually checked on agarose gels. The melting curves of PCR products were used to ensure the absence of primer dimers, contamination with genomic DNA and non-specific homologous sequences. PCR reactions were performed in 10 uL volumes containing 5 uL of 2X SYBR Green PCR Master Mix (Applied Biosystems), 900 nm of each primer, and 1 uL of DNA template. PCR cycling conditions were 30 sec at 95°C followed by 40 cycles of 15 sec at 95°C and 30 sec at 60°C. Serial doubling dilutions were used as templates for QPCR to generate standard curves for each PCR reaction by plotting relative DNA concentrations versus log (Ct) value (Ct is the PCR cycle at which fluorescence rises beyond background). The Ct value for mdh was 15 cycles and for attB 30 cycles. Every sample was assayed in triplicate and each experiment was performed using a minimum of three different samples. Differences in the attB ratio were extrapolated using the delta-delta Ct method as developed by Pfaffl .
Underlined sequence represents restriction enzyme sites SacI, XbaI and Pst1.
BLAST search was performed using Xis (ABA87014), an RDF from V.cholerae SXT ICE element required for excision, AlpA, a well known RDF from E. coli (AAA18418) and the Hef protein (NP_405464) from Y. pestis pathogenicity island, as seeds on the genome sequence of V. cholerae N16961 . DNA sequences from putative RDFs were downloaded from GenBank and the sequences were aligned using ClustalW . Next, the protein sequences of characterized RDFs were used as seeds to perform BLASTN and BLASTP searches against Vibrio genomes sequences in the database . The retrieved sequence must give an e-value below 10-3, relative to known RDFs.
Total RNA from V. cholerae N16961 was extracted 12 hours post-inoculation in LB broth from one group treated with sub-lethal UV-irradiation and one group untreated as follows. The cells from 5 mLs 11 hours growth cultures were pelleted and resuspended in 5 mLs of PBS. A 100 uL aliquot was taken from each sample prior to treatment to calculate colony forming units (CFUs). Each 5 mL sample was placed in a plastic Petri dishes without a cover and one set of samples was irradiated with a sublethal dose of 25 J/m2 of UV irradiation in a Fisher Scientific UV cross linker (FB-UVXL-1000) and the other 5 mL set of samples was left untreated as previously described by others . The cells from both UV treated and untreated samples were recovered, pelleted, resuspended in 5 mLs of LB broth and grown for 1 hour at 37°C. A 100 uL aliquot was taken from each sample to calculate CFUs post treatment from both sets of samples. The CFU counts pre and post treatment were identical at ~9.75 × 109/ml as expected. Every experiment was performed in triplicate. Total RNA was extracted from each culture using RNAprotect Bacteria reagent (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) and an RNeasy mini kit (Qiagen) according to the manufacturer's protocols. RNA purity and the presence of genomic DNA were assessed using an ND-1000 NanoDrop UV-Vis spectrophotometer (NanoDrop Technologies) giving values of A260/A280 > 2.0 and A260/A230 > 2.0 indicating of no protein and solvent contamination, respectively. In addition, 1 μg of each sample of RNA was run on a 1% agarose gel in 1× TBE buffer to examine quality of the samples. RNA was measured to calculate the volume of sample to be added to perform a reverse transcriptase (RT) reaction using SuperScript II Reverse Transcriptase and random hexamers following manufacturer's instructions (Invitrogen). The purity and quantity of cDNA was examined using an ND-1000 NanoDrop UV-Vis spectrophotometer as above. QPCR was performed using standard protocol using primer pairs for vc1758, vc1785, vc1809 and vc0432 (intV2, vefA, vefB and mdh, respectively) listed in Table 2 using SYBR green PCR Master Mix (Invitrogen) on an Applied Biosystems 7000 Real Time PCR System (Foster City, CA). To confirm that primer pairs only amplified target genes to assure accurate quantification of the results, non-template controls were included in each replicate. The intV2, vefA, vefB and mdh PCR products were visually checked on agarose gels. The melting curves of PCR products were used to ensure the absence of primer dimers, contamination with genomic DNA and non-specific homologous sequences. The data was analyzed using ABI PRISM 7000 SDS software (Applied Biosystems). Differences in the gene ratios were extrapolated using the delta-delta Ct method . Every sample was assayed in triplicate and each experiment was performed using a minimum of three different samples.
To construct the mutant strains, primers were designed to conduct Splice Overlap Extension (SOE) PCR followed by allelic exchange . SOE PCR primers were designed to produce non-functioning constructs of the 204-bp vefA and the 228-bp vefB genes. The size of the regions removed from vefA and vefB is 169-bp and 191-bp, respectively and were constructed in V. cholerae strain N16961 to create mutant strains V. cholerae SAM-3 and SAM-4, respectively (Table 1). Primer pairs SOEVC1785A/SOEVC1785B and SOEVC1785C/SOEVC1785 D were used to amplify PCR products from VC1785 from V. cholerae strain N16961 (Table 2). The ligated product was amplified with primer pair SOEVC1785A and SOEVC1785 D, which was restricted with enzymes, XbaI and SacI and ligated with pDS132 (New England Biolabs) resulting in pΔ1785. pΔ1785 was transformed into E. coli strain DH5αλpir, plasmid purified and then transformed into E. coli β2155 cells. E. coli β2155 transformants were conjugated with N16961. V. cholerae cells were passaged in LB-suc to cure them of the integrated pΔ1785. PCR was used to screen for V. cholerae strains in which the wild type gene was replaced by the mutant gene, which was confirmed by sequencing. The Δ1785 strain was designated V. cholerae strain SAM-3. A knockout mutant of VC1809 was constructed in N16961 as described above using primer pairs listed in Table 2. Complementation of RAM-1 and SAM-3 mutant strains were generated by creating pIntV2 and pVefA, by cloning intV2 (VC1758) and vefA (VC1785), respectively into the SacI/XbaI sites of the expression plasmid pBAD33 (New England Biolabs) using standard cloning protocol (Table 1 and 2).
It was previously shown that the four pathogenicity islands identified in V. cholerae N16961 can excise from chromosome 1 and form circular intermediates (CI) [23, 28]. The excision of VPI-1 and VPI-2 occurs at very low levels suggesting that excision is tightly controlled, although it may also suggest that the excision event is inefficient, possibly due to poor expression of the regulatory genes, an altered regulatory circuit, or mutations that might occur in these sequences as the region become evolutionarily integrated into the host chromosome [23, 28]. First, we quantified the excision levels of VPI-2 in cultures of V. cholerae N16961 grown for 12 hours in LB at 37°C (standard conditions) by measuring the presence of attB, the locus present on the chromosome after VPI-2 excises (Figure 1), and comparing it with the housekeeping gene mdh using QPCR. We used attB as a surrogate for VPI-2 excision measurements since the copy number of attP in the CI is minuscule compared to attB, which replicates along with the rest of the chromosome unlike excised VPI-2. We compared the presence of attB with mdh since all cells encode one functional copy of the latter. PCR products of attB and mdh were visually checked on an agarose gel and their melting temperature analyzed to ensure we had the correct PCR products. The reference gene was assayed both separately and in the same reaction. Both primer pairs used were tested by comparing the results obtained using previously quantified cloned copies of mdh and attB and gave comparable results. We found that attB was present in 1 in every 1.6 (±0.2) × 106V. cholerae cells under optimal growth conditions.
Next, we measured the presence of attB from V. cholerae cells cultured under different conditions compared with the presence of attB under our standard condition, growth for 12 hours at 37°C. We determined that incubation time does not affect the excision levels of VPI-2 indicating that excision does not occur in a growth phase dependent manner (Figure 2). However, V. cholerae cultures grown at 25°C showed a 2-fold increase in the presence of the attB site compared to cells grown at the optimum temperature 37°C (Figure 2). In addition, we found that nutrient limitation affected the excision level showing over a 5-fold decrease in the presence of attB when compared to the growth on LB at the same temperature (Figure 2). Furthermore, we found that sub-lethal UV-light irradiation of cell cultures compared to untreated cells, resulted in a significant increase in the level of excision of VPI-2, over 4-fold compared to untreated cells grown under the same conditions (Figure 2). Taken together, these data indicate that environmental factors can affect the induction of excision and circularization of VPI-2, which is probably the first step required for the horizontal transfer of the region. These results are consistent with what was previously shown for other mobile and integrative genetic elements as well as PAIs from E. coli, where excision occurs upon exposure to stress conditions such as sub-lethal UV-light irradiation [53, 55, 56].
Detection of VPI-2 excision by using real time quantitative PCR (QPCR) of attB levels in cell cultures grown under different conditions. The X-axis specifies culture conditions: 6 h, incubation time of 6 h; 24 h, incubation time of 24 h; 25C, incubation temperature of 25°C; 3%, the LB broth contained 3% NaCl; M9+G, cell grown on minimal media supplemented with glucose; UV-light, bacterial cultures were UV-light irradiated. The Y-axis represent the ratio of the attB presence in the cultures tested compared with cultures grown on standard conditions 12 h at 37°C in LB. Unpaired t-test was used in order to infer statistical significance for the differences in VPI-2 excision. ***, p < 0.005. **, p < 0.05. Error bars indicate standard deviation. Each experiment was performed in triplicate a minimum of three times.
Both the high pathogenicity island HPI from Y. pestis and ICE SXT from V. cholerae encode small accessory proteins called recombination directionality factors (RDFs) or excisionases (Xis) that are required for efficient excision of these elements [29, 41]. In order to identify candidate RDFs within VPI-2 from V. cholerae N16961, we performed BLAST and PSI-BLAST searches on the V. cholerae N16961 genome using RDFs, the V. cholerae Xis protein (ABA87014) from SXT, the Y. pestis Hef protein (NP_405464) from HPI and E. coli K12 AlpA protein (AAA18418) from λ phage as queries . The most significant BLAST result in these searches was ORF VC0497, which is annotated as a transcriptional regulator, and is encoded within Vibrio Seventh Pandemic island-II (VSP-II). VSP-II also encodes a tyrosine recombinase integrase at ORF VC0516 (IntV3) . ORFs VC1785 and VC1809 encoded within VPI-2 were the second and third most significant hits retrieved from these BLAST searches, which we termed VefA (for Vibrio excision factor A) and VefB, respectively (Figure 3). The VefA and VefB proteins share 46% amino acid identity/72% similarity. VefA shares 37% amino acid identities with AlpA, 46% identity with Hef and 29% with Xis from the V. cholerae SXT element as was previously shown  (Figure 3). The vefB gene is located at the 3' end of VPI-2 at ORF VC1809 marking the end of the island, and vefA (VC1785) is adjacent to neuraminidase gene, nanH (VC1784) in the middle of the island (Figure 1A).
Alignments of VPI-2 RDFs VefA and VefB with other known RDFs: AlpA (AAA18418), Hef (NP_405464), Xis (ABA87014). For both alignments black shading highlights residues shared by all the sequences and grey shading highlights residues shared by all but one sequences. The numbers on the right indicate the number of amino acids of the predicted protein.
As shown in Figure 2, UV-light irradiation increased excision of VPI-2 over 4-fold. In order to investigate this further, we determined the effect of UV-light irradiation on the expression of intV2, vefA and vefB in V. cholerae N16961 (Figure 4). We examined transcript levels of intV2, vefA and vefB in cells grown for 12 h in LB and in cells grown for 12 h in LB followed UV-light irradiation treatment. We found that all three genes showed negligible levels of transcription under standard optimum growth conditions but after UV-light treatment both intV2 and vefA show a 10-fold and vefB a 5-fold increase in expression levels (Figure 4). These results indicate that UV-light induces expression of factors potentially involved in VPI-2 excision.
Expression of intV2 (VC1758), vefA , and vefB from cultures grown in standard (black bars) or UV-light irradiated cultures (grey bars). The Y-axis represents the expression ratio of the genes relative to the expression of mdh. Unpaired t-test was used in order to infer statistical significance for the differences in gene expression between cultures of V. cholerae N16961 with or without UV-light treatment. **, p < 0.05; ***, p < 0.005. Error bars indicate standard deviation. Each experiment was performed in triplicate a minimum of three times.
To determine in more detail the role of intV2, vefA and vefB in VPI-2 excision, we created deletion mutations in each gene and measured excision levels of VPI-2 by determining attB levels in cells. In V. cholerae RAM-1, an intV2 mutant, we did not detect any VPI-2 attB products, demonstrating that intV2 is essential for excision as was previously shown (Figure 5) . We complemented RAM-1 with a functional copy of intV2 by transforming V. cholerae RAM-1 with pIntV2 creating strain SAM-1. In our SAM-1 strain, we found that excision of VPI-2 was restored in addition, attB levels were approximately four-fold higher than wild-type levels which is represented by the dotted broken horizontal line in Figure 5. These data demonstrate that over expressing intV2 ectopically induces excision of VPI-2. In our control experiments, transformation of either wild-type N16961 or RAM-1 with pBAD33 alone (strains SAM-11 and SAM-12 respectively) did not affect attB levels (data not shown).
Excision levels of VPI-2 in mutant strains and strains complemented with intV2 (VC1758), and vefA (VC1785). Excision levels of ΔintV2 mutant (RAM-1), ΔintV2 mutant complemented (SAM-1), ΔvefA mutant (SAM-3), ΔvefA mutant complemented (SAM-5), and ΔvefB mutant (SAM-4). Unpaired t-test was used in order to infer statistical significance for the differences in VPI-2 excision between V. cholerae N16961 and test strains. **, p < 0.05; ***, p < 0.005. Error bars indicate standard deviation. Each experiment was performed in triplicate a minimum of three times.
Next, we determined whether one, both, or neither of the putative RDFs uncovered by our bioinformatic analysis are required for VPI-2 excision. To do this, we constructed in-frame deletion mutations in each gene to create mutant strain SAM-3 (ΔvefA) and SAM-4 (ΔvefB). The two mutant strains and the wild-type N16961 were each inoculated into LB and all three strains grew similarly indicating that the mutant constructs did not have any general growth defect (data not shown). We determined the attB levels using QPCR in strain SAM-3 compared to the wild-type strain grown under the same conditions. We found that no VPI-2 excision occurs in SAM-3 cells when compared with the wild type, indicating that a functional copy of vefA is essential for efficient excision of VPI-2 (Figure 5). We complemented SAM-3 with a functional copy of vefA (SAM-5) and measured attB levels in these cells with the wild type levels both under standard conditions, to find that some excision occurred, but it was less than in wild-type cells (Figure 5). In our vefB mutant strain (SAM-4), we found no difference in VPI-2 excision levels compared to wild-type grown under the same conditions, which demonstrates that vefB is not essential for excision (Figure 5). From these data it appears that vefA is the cognate RDF for VPI-2 excision. In our control experiments, transformation of SAM-3 with pBAD33 alone (resulting in strain SAM-13) did not affect attB levels (data not shown).
Given that our initial search for RDFs within one V. cholerae genome (strain N16961) yielded three putative RDFs (VC0497, VC1785, and VC1809), we decided to investigate further the occurrence of RDFs among Vibrio species whose genome sequence is available in the database. We performed BLAST searches against the 20 Vibrio species in the genome database, and we uncovered a total of 27 putative RDFs (Table 3). Next, we identified putative integrases within the genomes of the RDF homologues using BLAST search analysis by using IntV2 as a seed. For each of the RDFs identified among the 27 genomes encompassing 10 different Vibrio species (V. cholerae, V. coralliilyticus, V. furnissii, V. harveyi, V. parahaemolyticus, V. splendidus, V. vulnificus, Vibrio sp. Ex25, RC341, and MED222), we identified a corresponding integrase with greater than 40% amino acid identities to IntV2 (VC1758) (Table 3). We examined the gene context of each RDF and integrase within each of the 20 strains to determine whether the RDF and integrase were located on the same region within a strain. From these analyses, we found that each of the 27 RDFs has a corresponding integrase within approximately 100 kb of each other (Table 3). It should be noted that from table 3, only three of the strains have been annotated completely and for many of the strains examined their ORF annotation numbering is not consecutive. Within V. cholerae, integrases and RDFs located in the same region of the genome in different strains had the same gene content indicating the same island is present in different strains. Among the different species, however, integrases and RDFs associated with the same insertion site did not have the same gene content indicating a novel island region in the different species (data not shown).
Locus tags for integrases and corresponding RDFs identified in this study.
From our analysis, no RDF was identified within the VPI-1 or the VSP-I regions in N16961 or within homologous regions in the other 27 sequenced strains of V. cholerae in the database. Both the VPI-1 and VSP-I regions have been shown to excise from their chromosome location, and VPI-1 encodes a tyrosine recombinase with homology to IntV2, thus they may therefore use an alternative mechanism of excision or perhaps co-opt an RDF from another region on the genome. Overall our data indicates that the presence of both an integrase and a cognate RDF pairing is a relatively conserved feature but not an essential one.
In this study, we analyzed the excision dynamics of VPI-2 encoded within V. cholerae N16961. Our results indicate that excision is controlled by at least two conserved factors within the island, an integrase encoded by intV2 and an RDF encoded by vefA, whose expression is induced by environmental stimuli similar to other MIGEs such as prophages, ICEs and integrons. We identified two putative RDFs and found that of the two we identified, only one VefA is essential for the efficient excision of VPI-2. We determined the occurrence of RDFs among the genomes of sequenced Vibrio species and found 27 putative RDFs that also had a homologue of IntV2 associated with it, which suggests that requirement for both an RDF and a corresponding integrase is a relatively common feature.
This research was supported by National Science Foundation CAREER award DEB-0844409 to E.F.B.
EFB designed the research; SA-M and MGN performed the research; SA-M, MGN and EFB analyzed data; SA-M, MGN and EFB wrote the paper.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
THIS case was brought up from Baltimore County Court by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court, to which the reader is referred.
It was argued by Mr. Campbell and Mr. Yellot, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Johnson, for the defendants in error.
1st. That the charter was a contract between the state of Maryland and the railroad company, and that the act of 1841, which varies the terms of that contract without the company's assent, is a law impairing the obligation of the contract, and therefore unconstitutional and void. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 84; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Id., 647, 663, 668, 669, 699, 710, 711, 712.
2d. That the title to the land condemned having vested by the confirmation of the inquisition, and the tender of the money anterior to the action by the Baltimore County Court, under the [51 U.S. 395, 396] act of 1841, that act is unconstitutional, because it divests vested rights, and in this way impairs the obligations of contracts.
That there is nothing of the character of a contract in the charter, that, by the Constitution of the United States, deprives the legislature of the state of the power to order a re-hearing of the case. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet., 380; Livingston's Lessee v. Moore et al., 7 Id., 469; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Id., 627; S. C., 10 Id., 294; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Id., 88; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Id., 420.
This case comes before us from the District of Maryland, upon a writ of error to the court of Baltimore County, prosecuted under the twenty- fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
The legislature of Maryland, by a law of the 18th of February, 1828, incorporated the plaintiff in error by the name and style of the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing a railroad from the city of Baltimore to some point or points on the Susquehanna River. To enable this company to acquire such land, earth, timber, or other materials as might be necessary for the construction and repairing of the road, the law above mentioned, by its fifteenth section, authorized the company to agree with the owners of the land and other materials wanted, for the purchase or use thereof; and in the event that the company could not agree with the owners, or that the owners were femes covert under age, insane, or out of the county, this section provided that a justice of the peace of the county, upon application, should thereupon issue his warrant to the sheriff to summon a jury, who, in accordance with the directions contained in the same section of the statute, should value the damages which the owner or owners would sustain, and that the inquisition, signed and sealed by the jury, should be returned by the sheriff to the clerk or prothonotary of his county, to be filed in court, and that the same should be confirmed by said court at its next session, if no sufficient cause to the contrary be shown.
It appears that, under the authority of the statute above cited, an inquisition was (upon the application of the plaintiff in error) held by the sheriff of Baltimore County, on the 13th of December, 1836, upon the lands of the defendants in error as possessed by Alexander Nesbit in the character of trustee, and by Penelope D. Goodwin as cestui que trust, and the damages assessed by the jury upon that inquisition, for the land to be appropriated to the use of the plaintiff in error, were to the said Alexander Nesbit nothing, and to the said, Penelope D. Goodwin five hundred dollars; that this inquisition having been returned to the court of Baltimore County, the following order in relation thereto was made on the 24th of April, 1837: 'Ordered, That this inquisition be ratified and confirmed, no cause to the contrary having been shown.' Subsequently to this order of confirmation, it appears that payment of the money assessed for damages to the lands of the defendants was not tendered by the plaintiff, nor any measure whatever in relation to this inquisition adopted by them, prior to the 18th day of April, 1844, on which last day the plaintiff by its agent tendered to the defendant Penelope D. Goodwin the sum of $500, the principal of the damages assessed, with $220.42 as interest for seven years four months and five days on the amount of that assessment, making an aggregate of $720.42. In the meantime, between the date of the inquisition and the tender just mentioned, viz., at their December session of 1841, the legislature of Maryland passed a statute, by which they directed, 'that the Baltimore County Court should set aside the inquisition found for the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company condemning the lands of Penelope D. Goodwin of said county, and that the said court direct an inquisition de novo to be taken, and that such proceedings be had as in cases where inquisitions in similar cases are set aside.' In obedience to the statute last cited, the court of Baltimore County, upon the petition of the defendants in error, presented to them on the 26th of April, 1844, entered a rule upon the plaintiff in error to show cause, on the 11th day of May succeeding, why the inquisition should not be set aside, and an inquisition de novo directed as prayed for, and, after hearing counsel for and against the application, did, on the 13th of May, 1847, order and adjudge, that the inquisition returned in that case be set aside, and that hereafter the [51 U.S. 395, 398] court will upon application of the petitioners provide for the taking of an inquisition de novo, according to law.
The court of Baltimore County is admitted to be the highest in the state in which a decision upon this matter could be had, there being no appeal allowed from its judgment.
1st. That, its charter being a contract between itself and the state, the act of 1841, having varied that contract without the assent of the company, was a law impairing the obligation of a contract, and therefore unconstitutional and void.
2d. That the title to the land condemned having vested by the confirmation of the inquisition, and the tender of the money anterior to the judgment of the Baltimore County Court under the act of 1841, this act of the legislature is unconstitutional, because it divests vested rights, and in this way impairs the obligation of contracts.
In considering the two propositions here laid down by the plaintiff in error, the first criticism to which they would seem to be obnoxious is this, that they assume as the ground work for the conclusions they present, that which remains to be demonstrated by a fair interpretation of the legislative action which it is sought to impugn. For instance, with respect to the first proposition, admitting the charter of the plaintiff to be a contract, the reality and character of any variation thereof by the legislature must be shown, before it can be brought within the inhibition of the Constitution. So, too, with respect to the second charge, it must certainly be shown that there was a perfect investment of property in the plaintiff in error by contract with the legislature, and a subsequent arbitrary divestiture of that property by the latter body, in order to constitute their proceeding an act impairing the obligation of a contract.
The mode of proceeding prescribed by the fifteenth section of the charter of incorporation, for the acquiring of land and other materials for constructing the road, has been already stated. Let us now inquire by what acts to be performed by the company, and at what period of time, the investiture of such land and other property in them was to become complete,- what conditions or stipulations were imposed on the plaintiff in error as necessary to the completion of their contract. This will be indispensable in order to ascertain whether any variation of these conditions, amounting to an infraction of the contract, has been made by the Maryland legislature. After declaring that the inquisition, when returned, if no objection be made, shall be recorded, the fifteenth section provides [51 U.S. 395, 399] that the payment or tender of the valuation to the owner of the land, &c., shall entitle the company to the estate and interest in the same as fully as if it had been conveyed by the owner or owners thereof. Thus it appears that it is the payment of tender of the value assessed by the inquisition which gives title to the company, and consequently, without such payment or tender, no title could, by the very terms of the law, have passed to them. Have the legislature by any subsequent arrangement abrogated or altered this condition, or the consequences which were to flow from its performance? From the period of the assessment to the 18th of April, 1844, this record discloses no evidence of any acceptance by the company of the proceedings under the inquisition, or such at least as could bind them. It can hardly be questioned, that, without acceptance by the acts and in the mode prescribed, the company were not bound; that if they had been dissatisfied with the estimate placed upon the land, or could have procured a more eligible site for the location of their road, they would have been at liberty before such acceptance wholly to renounce the inquisition. The proprietors of the land could have no authority to coerce the company into its adoption. This being the case, there could up to this point be no mutuality, and hence no contract, even in the constrained and compulsory character in which it was created and imposed upon the proprietors by the authority of the statute. This view of the matter seems to accord with the opinion of the Chancellor of Maryland in his construction of this very charter, in the case of Compton v. The Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company, where he uses this language: 'In the taking of an inquisition under this and similar statutory provisions, it must appear that the authority given has been pursued; and as under a writ of ad quod damnum there should be no unreasonable delay, much less could any fraudulent practice be allowed to pass without check or rebuke.' 3 Bland (Md.), 391. Five years after this inquisition, during all which interval this company neglects or omits the fulfilment of the essential condition on performance of which its title depended, the legislature again interposes; and it may be asked in what respects this interposition amounted to an abrogation or variation of any contract which the legislative body itself, rather than the proprietors of the land, had been instrumental in making. We think this interposition in no respect impaired or contravened the contract alleged to have been previously existing; that it is perfectly consistent with all its conditions, and leaves the parties precisely as they stood from the passage of the charter, and at full liberty to insist upon whatever rights [51 U.S. 395, 400] or interests that law had granted. It divested no rights of property, because, as we have shown, none had been vested. This intervention was simply the award of a new trial of the proceedings under the inquisition, which proceedings were of no avail as a judgment, after such new trial was allowed. This intervention, too, was the exercise of power by the legislature supposed by that body to belong legitimately to itself; whether this authority was strictly legislative or judicial, according to the distribution of power in the state government, was a question rather for that government than for this court to determine.
What exact partition of powers, legislative, executive, or judicial, the people of the several states in their domestic organization may or should apportion to the different departments of their respective governments, is an inquity into which this court would enter with very great reluctance.
It might seem advantageous to some of the states that the judicial and legislative authorities or functions of the government should be blended in the same body; and that the legislature should in all cases exercise powers similar to those now vested in one branch of the British Parliament, and as in some specified instances in one of the houses of our own national legislature. Should such an organization be adopted by a state, whatever might be thought of its wisdom, where beyond the body politic of the state would exist any power to impugn its legitimacy? But in truth no such inquiry regularly arises upon this record. The only questions presented for our consideration, the only questions we have authority to consider here, are,-1st, Whether under their charter of incorporation and the proceedings therein directed, and which have been had in pursuance of that charter, the plaintiff in error has, by contract with the state, been invested with certain perfect absolute rights of property? And 2dly, Whether such contract, if any such existed, has been impaired by subsequent legislation of the state, by a divestiture of those rights? To each of these questions we reply in the negative; because, as has already been shown, the conditions of the charter,-conditions indispensable to the vesting of a title in the plaintiff in error,-never were in due time and in good faith fulfilled; nor, until after the new trial had been ordered by the legislature, pretended to be complied with.
'The effect,' says this same judge, 'of the resolution or law of Connecticut above stated is to revise a decision of one of its inferior courts, and to direct a new hearing of the case by the same Court of Probate that passed the decree against the will of Norman Morrison. By the existing law of Connecticut, a right to recover certain property had vested in Calder and wife in consequence of a decision of a court of justice, but in virtue of a subsequent resolution or law, and the new hearing thereof, and the decision in consequence, this right to recover certain property was divested, and the right to the property declared to be in Bull and wife, the appellees.' Upon a full examination of this case, the court being of the opinion that the resolution or law of Connecticut awarding the new trial, with right of appeal, did not fall within the technical definition of an ex post facto law, and there being no contract impaired or affected by that resolution, they by a unanimous decision sustained the judgment founded upon that resolution.
That there exists a general power in the state governments to enact retrospective or retroactive laws, is a point too well settled to admit of question at this day. The only limit upon this power in the states by the Federal Constitution, and therefore the only source of cognizance or control with respect to that power existing in this court, is the provision that these retrospective laws shall not be such as are technically ex post facto, or such as impair the obligation of contracts. Thus, in the case of Watson et al. v. Mercer, 8 Pet., 110, the court say: 'It is clear, that this court has no right to pronounce an [51 U.S. 395, 402] act of the state legislature void, as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, from the mere fact that it divests antecedent vested rights of property. The Constitution of the United States does not prohibit the states from passing retrospective laws generally, but only ex post facto laws. Now it has been solemnly settled by this court, that the phrase ex post facto is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws.' For this position is cited the case of Calder v. Bull, already mentioned; of Fletcher v. Peck, 5 Cranch, 138; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 266; and Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet., 380. Now it must be apparent that the act of the Maryland legislature of December, 1841, simply ordering a new trial of the inquisition, does not fall within any definition given of an ex post facto law, and is not therefore assailable on that account. We have already shown that this law impaired the obligation of no contract, because at the time of its passage, and in virtue of any proceeding had under the charter of the company, no contract between the company on the one hand, and the state or the proprietors of the land on the other, in reality existed. We therefore adjudge the act of the legislature of Maryland of December, 1841, and the proceedings of the court of Baltimore County had in pursuance thereof, to be constitutional and valid, and order that the judgment of the said court be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Baltimore County Court, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Baltimore County Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.
[ Footnote 1 ] CITED. Beveridge v. West Chicago Park Comm'rs, 7 Bradw. (Ill.), 467.
[ Footnote 2 ] DISTINGUISHED. Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass., 566. CITED. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How., 408; Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall., 204; Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Id., 603; State ex rel. v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann., 715; Peerce v. Kitzmiller, 19 W. Va., 573.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


As to avoid burying the lede, yes, in essence a sitting President can own trademarks and trademark registrations in his individual capacity. That said, as a buffer, Presidential Campaigns often seek to register trademarks on behalf of the candidate and his or her various slogans. Through his official campaign organization, President Obama even engaged in what some legal experts phrased as an “aggressive branding strategy” during the 2012 campaign season.
The Obama campaign even sued to assert these trademark rights against unauthorized users and potential infringers. You might note, however, that “Barack H. Obama” is not the named Plaintiff. He did not sue in his individual capacity as the owner of the trademark and its affiliated registration is the non-profit entity that ran the campaign. Obama was in effect the owner of the mark but, like Trump, he often seeks trademark protection through the corporate structure.
On the flip side, you can use a President’s name in a trademark sense – even without authorization! While U.S. trademark law precludes the registration of any trademarks that bear another’s name without their permission or authorization, to the extent you seek to market your goods and services to the consuming public by using a living POTUS’ name or image, to the extent this mark is not likely to confuse with existing marks and operates to distinguish your goods or services from your competitors – congratulations, you have an enforceable trademark. Of course, Donald Trump is the most litigious President to ever take office and he is almost certain to send a cease-and-desist for any attempt to use his name in commerce without his permission. Remember, Trump has been stamping the TRUMP name on almost everything for over 30 years. He likely got there first. Though he is a businessman, make him a licensing offer and I am sure he would consider it.
Moreover, while the government is often protected through the cloak of immunity in lawsuits and legal exposure, a POTUS and his administration may actually be held accountable for potential acts of trademark infringement. Obama’s administration was on the defensive end of separate trademark infringement lawsuits in 2008 and 2014, in fact.
My expectation is that the Trump administration and his Presidency will be more focused on branding and trademark rights (both in acquisition and enforcement) than any previous campaign or administration before him. As a businessman who proudly proclaims that he is not a career politician, Donald Trump knows the value of his name and he has made a lifestyle out of using it as a trademark.
This is why Trump’s acquisition and registration of foreign trademarks is gaining so much attention at the moment. Reports suggest that Trump’s personal and business enterprises have over 150 trademark applications pending in at least 36 countries. Never before has a President entered office with such a global business reach. As a result, there are a series of ethical questions and concerns about the potential application of the emoluments clause to Trump and his Presidency. Not surprisingly, this has recently been made the subject matter of a pending lawsuit. I do not offer any personal or professional opinions on the merits or applicability of the emoluments clause herein. I just find it to be an interesting question.
Officers and employees of the Patent and Trademark Office shall be incapable, during the period of their appointments and for one year thereafter, of applying for a patent and of acquiring, directly or indirectly, except by inheritance or bequest, any patent or any right or interest in any patent, issued or to be issued by the Office. In patents applied for thereafter they shall not be entitled to any priority date earlier than one year after the termination of their appointment.
Let us assume that Donald Trump individually conceives and invents a novel and useful method for broadcasting his thoughts and reactions to his constituents. A new and useful and non-obvious version of Twitter, if such a thing may exist. If we assume that this new “invention” meets all of the standards for patentability under exiting U.S. law, can Donald Trump apply for and obtain a patent in his name? Based on the existing law, “Officers and employees” are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 3, which does not specifically identify the President as an Officer or an Employee of the USPTO. The Officers appear to include the Director of the USPTO, a Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property, a Deputy Director of the USPTO, a Commissioner for Patents, and a Commissioner for Trademarks. While each of these may report up the chain to POTUS, the President is not identified as an actual Officer or employee. Donald Trump could therefore be eligible to apply for and subsequently own a patent in his own name, if he actually is the hypothetical inventor of this Twitter 2.0.
What is to stop Donald Trump from just using someone else’s patented invention though? To put it plainly, not much. The U.S. government, including POTUS and his administration, can be sued for unlicensed use of a patented invention. Which means there is no immunity against infringement. At least on its face. What are the practical ramifications though? Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the patent owner’s only real remedy is to bring a claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims, and if infringement is proven, the patent owner can acquire what amounts to nothing more than a reasonable royalty for the use of this invention. There will be no jury of POTUS’ peers to shame him for this unauthorized use. He merely cuts a check for a reasonable royalty (which is its own question mark) and continues on his way.
Patent law favors the U.S. government in most every way, either through full sovereign immunity or through the exceedingly high standards for patentability and enforcement.
Here is where things get interesting. President Trump says a lot of things. He makes a lot of speeches. He is on television all the time. He tweets incessantly. About everything.
As we all know, “copyright” exists the moment an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. It is immediate, though registration is required to file any lawsuit for copyright infringement. But can Donald Trump be the “author” of copyrighted works as a sitting United States President?
Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 105 – “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.” This means that Donald Trump, in his status as President, cannot be the “author” of any works that would otherwise be subject to copyright protections. All of his speeches? All of his tweets? All of his images from television appearances? All of his proposed legislation or outlines? Not copyrighted. As a matter of law, it is in the public domain upon creation.
Now, Donald Trump – and any other member of his administration – can acquire or own copyrighted works that were “authored” by someone else, either through assignment or as an inheritance. The key is that anything Trump says or writes or is recorded as his speech – this is not copyrighted. You cannot be deemed an infringer for using a Trump audio recording as a snippet in a song or movie or TV show. It is essentially fair game. You do not even need to make it a parody to fall under a safe harbor. It is free to use for all.
Of course, nothing is that easy. The actual language of Section 105 states that it must be a “work of the United States Government” to fall into this no-copyright exception. What about works that President Trump might commission a third-party non-government individual to create on his behalf. Normally, that would be a “work made for hire” that would designate Trump as the legal “author” of the work, but pursuant to certain Federal Acquisitions Regulations, in these instances, the works are not necessarily deemed works made for hire and may not automatically be in the public domain. Often, these third-party works are then (by contract) assigned back to the government, whereby the U.S. Government is not technically the “author” but is now the legal “owner” of the copyrighted work. How tricky.
Trade secrets are that last nebulous, catch-all category of intellectual property. Unlike patents and copyrights, they are not subject to direct Constitutional protections. Unlike trademarks, they are not authorized by Congress through the Commerce Clause. In fact, only recently did the federal government pass the Defend Trade Secrets Act, providing federal jurisdiction for claims of misappropriation of trade secrets.
Trade secrets exist only to the extent they remain secret. This is obvious, but it means that there is no federal administrative agency that oversees any formal registration or cataloging of “trade secrets” and who owns them. Two people can simultaneously own and claim rights to the exact same trade secret. Unlike patents, trademarks, and copyrights, both hypothetical trade secret owners can also claim equal rights to assert claims for misappropriation against third-parties. Again, this is because trade secrets are just that – secret.
Therefore, yes, Donald Trump can theoretically own trade secrets as POTUS. In fact, I would be surprised if his administration did not assert some level of trade secret-type protection over proprietary and confidential information for how to run an administration or how they intend to promote and pursue its agenda. I am certain that many employees have been required to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) stating that they will not disclose this confidential information to the public.
The fact is that it is also highly unlikely that Donald Trump or anyone in the administration would ever seek to “enforce” these rights against a third party. For there is not a competing U.S. Presidential administration that would use these secrets to the competitive disadvantage of Donald Trump. This is not the casino industry. At least not officially.
In a thoroughly unsatisfying and anti-climactic conclusion – yes, Donald Trump can and likely does own trade secrets. But, legally speaking, these are not worth much and could never be effectively enforced.
Besides, there is a non-zero probability that Donald Trump is going to inadvertently disclose highly classified information through a 3am tweetstorm at some point during his term of office.
 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 5020556 (August 16, 2016).
 Obama for America v. Demstore.com and Washington Promotions & Printing, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00889, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, filed June 1, 2012.
 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 411-12.
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 90 et seq.