The proposed regulations eliminate the no-aggregation rule in determining the 250-return threshold for filing certain information returns electronically. These proposed regulations also require corrected returns be filed electronically if original returns were required to be filed electronically, regardless of the number of corrected returns being filed.
This Revenue Ruling clarifies that federal income tax withholding under § 3405 and Form 1099–R reporting under § 408(i) generally apply for the year a payment is made, as required by State law, from an individual retirement arrangement (IRA) to a State unclaimed property fund.
(1) Under the facts presented, is the payment by Trustee Y of Individual C’s interest in IRA O to the State J unclaimed property fund, as required by State J law, subject to federal income tax withholding under § 3405 of the Internal Revenue Code?
(2) Is the payment by Trustee Y subject to reporting under § 408(i)?
Individual C has an interest in IRA O, a traditional IRA trusteed by Trustee Y. Individual C, a U.S. person under § 7701(a)(30)(A) with a calendar year taxable year, has not made a withholding election with respect to her interest in IRA O. State J law requires Trustee Y to pay Individual C’s interest in IRA O to the State J unclaimed property fund under which a claim for property may be made by the owner. In 2018, Trustee Y pays Individual C’s interest in IRA O, which has a value of $1,000, to the State J unclaimed property fund.
For purposes of this revenue ruling, an “IRA” is an individual retirement plan under § 7701(a)(37) (that is, an individual retirement account as defined in § 408(a) or individual retirement annuity as defined in § 408(b)), and a “traditional IRA” is an IRA that is not a Roth IRA under § 408A, a simplified employee pension under § 408(k), a SIMPLE IRA under § 408(p), or a deemed IRA under § 408(q).
Section 3405 provides federal income tax withholding rules with respect to designated distributions. Under § 3405(e)(1)(A), a designated distribution means, except as provided in § 3405(e)(1)(B), any distribution or payment from or under an employer deferred compensation plan, an IRA, or a commercial annuity. As relevant here, under § 3405(e)(1)(B)(ii), a designated distribution does not include the portion of a distribution or payment that it is reasonable to believe is not includible in gross income. For this purpose, the flush language under § 3405(e)(1)(B) provides that any distribution or payment from or under an IRA (other than a Roth IRA as defined in § 408A) is treated as includible in gross income.
Section 3405 requires federal income tax to be withheld from two types of designated distributions from IRAs, each with its own withholding rules: periodic payments under § 3405(a), and nonperiodic distributions under § 3405(b). Under § 3405(e)(3), a nonperiodic distribution is a designated distribution that is not an annuity or similar periodic payment. In the case of a nonperiodic distribution under § 3405(e)(3), § 3405(b)(1) provides that the payor shall withhold from such distribution an amount equal to 10 percent of the distribution. Section 3405(b)(2) provides that an individual may elect not to have § 3405(b)(1) withholding apply with respect to any nonperiodic distribution.
Section 35.3405–1T provides rules regarding § 3405, including general rules on withholding requirements and specific rules addressing withholding on periodic and nonperiodic distributions, notice and election procedures, and reporting and recordkeeping. Section 35.3405–1 provides rules regarding the medium through which notices required under § 3405 may be provided.
The payment of Individual C’s interest in IRA O, a traditional IRA, to the State J unclaimed property fund, as required by State J law, is a payment from an IRA that is treated as includible in gross income (pursuant to the flush language of § 3405(e)(1)(B)) for purposes of § 3405(e)(1)(B)(ii). Thus, the payment is a designated distribution for purposes of § 3405. The payment from IRA O is not an annuity or similar periodic payment under § 3405(e)(2). Thus, it is a nonperiodic distribution as defined in § 3405(e)(3). Because Individual C has not made a withholding election with respect to the payment, a 10 percent withholding rate applies to the payment pursuant to § 3405(b)(1), and Trustee Y must withhold federal income tax of $100 (10% of Individual C’s $1,000 interest in IRA O).
Section 408(i) provides that the trustee of an individual retirement account and the issuer of an endowment contract described in § 408(b) or an individual retirement annuity must make such reports regarding such account, contract, or annuity to the Secretary and to the individuals for whom the account, contract, or annuity is, or is to be, maintained with respect to contributions (and the years to which they relate), distributions aggregating $10 or more in any calendar year, and such other matters as the Secretary may require.
Section 1.408–7(a) provides that the trustee of an individual retirement account or the issuer of an individual retirement annuity who makes a distribution during any calendar year shall make a report of the distribution for such year. Form 1099–R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., is used to satisfy this reporting obligation.
Pursuant to § 408(i), Trustee Y must report the $1,000 distribution from IRA O ($900 of which is paid to the State J unclaimed property fund and $100 of which is remitted as federal income tax withholding) on a 2018 Form 1099–R identifying Individual C as the recipient.
(1) Under the facts presented, the payment by Trustee Y of Individual C’s interest in IRA O to the State J unclaimed property fund, as required by State J law, is subject to federal income tax withholding under § 3405.
(2) The payment by Trustee Y is subject to reporting under § 408(i).
A person will not be treated as failing to comply with the withholding and reporting requirements described in this revenue ruling with respect to payments made before the earlier of January 1, 2019, or the date it becomes reasonably practicable for the person to comply with those requirements.
The principal author of this revenue ruling is Cynthia Van Bogaert of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Government Entities). Ms. Van Bogaert may be reached at (202) 317-4102 (not a toll-free number).
 This revenue ruling does not address whether the payment to the State unclaimed property fund otherwise complies with applicable law (for example, it does not address compliance with any applicable search requirements under State law).
 Under § 3405(e)(1)(B)(iii), a designated distribution also does not include a payment that is subject to withholding under the withholding rules applicable to payments to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. See § 1441 (Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens), § 1442 (Withholding of Tax on Foreign Corporations), and § 1.1441–4(b)(1)(ii) (Exemptions from Withholding for Certain Effectively Connected Income and Other Amounts).
This document contains proposed regulations amending the rules for determining whether information returns must be filed using magnetic media (electronically). The proposed regulations would require that all information returns, regardless of type, be taken into account to determine whether a person meets the 250-return threshold and, therefore, must file the information returns electronically. The proposed regulations also would require any person required to file information returns electronically to file corrected information returns electronically, regardless of the number of corrected information returns being filed. The proposed regulations will affect persons required to file information returns.
Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by July 30, 2018.
Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–102951–16), room 5205, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–102951–16), Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20224. Alternatively, persons may submit comments electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov (IRS REG–102951–16).
Concerning the proposed regulations, Michael Hara, (202) 317-6845; concerning the submission of comments and requests for a public hearing, Regina L. Johnson, (202) 317-5177 (not toll-free numbers).
This document contains proposed amendments to the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 CFR part 301) under section 6011(e) relating to the filing of information returns on magnetic media. Section 6011(e) authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations regarding the filing of returns on magnetic media. Section 6011(e)(2)(A) prohibits the Secretary from requiring persons to file returns on magnetic media unless the person is required to file at least 250 returns during the calendar year. Section 6011(e)(2)(B) provides that, in prescribing regulations, the Secretary shall consider the taxpayer’s ability to comply at reasonable cost with the regulations’ requirements. Section 301.6011–2(a)(1) provides that magnetic media includes any magnetic media permitted under the applicable regulations, revenue procedures, or publications, or, in the case of returns filed with the Social Security Administration, any magnetic media permitted under Social Security Administration publications, including electronic filing.
Section 301.6011–2 provides rules for when information returns described in § 301.6011–2(b), such as Form 1042–S, “Foreign Person’s U.S. Source Income Subject to Withholding;” forms in the 1099 series; and Form W–2, “Wage and Tax Statement,” must be filed electronically. Under § 301.6011–2(c), a person is not required to file a type of information return covered by § 301.6011–2(b) electronically unless the person is required to file 250 or more such returns during the calendar year. Sections 301.6011–2(c)(1)(i) and (iii) and the Examples in § 301.6011–2(c)(1)(iv) describe that the 250-return threshold applies separately to each type of information return and each type of corrected information return filed, and, therefore, the forms are not aggregated for purposes of determining whether the 250-return threshold is satisfied. Section 301.6011–2(c)(2) allows the Commissioner to waive the requirement to file electronically if the request for waiver demonstrates hardship and provides that the principal factor in determining hardship will be the extent, if any, to which the cost of electronic filing exceeds the cost of filing on other media.
When the rules for determining the 250-return threshold, including the rule providing that each type of information return is counted separately and not aggregated, were originally published, electronic filing was in the early stages of development and was not as commonly used as it is today. The non-aggregation rule helped to reduce cost and ease burden on taxpayers, given the existing limits on technology and accessibility to such technology. Since then, significant advances in technology have made electronic filing more prevalent and accessible. As a result, electronic filing is less costly and most often easier than paper filing. In fact, most information returns are filed electronically. In tax year 2015, approximately 98 percent of information returns were filed electronically. In tax year 2016, the percentage of information returns filed electronically rose to 98.5 percent. Advances in tax return preparation software, as well as the prevalence of tax return preparers and third-party service providers who offer information return preparation and electronic filing, have also contributed to the increase in electronic filing.
The concerns regarding taxpayer burden and cost associated with electronic filing have been significantly mitigated since the non-aggregation rule in § 301.6011–2(c)(1)(i) and (iii) of the regulations was first published. Therefore, determining the 250-return threshold on a form-by-form basis without aggregation is no longer necessary to relieve taxpayer burden and cost. Accordingly, these regulations simplify the rules for determining the 250-return threshold by requiring aggregation of all information returns covered by § 301.6011–2(b) for purposes of determining the 250-return threshold. In addition, these regulations provide that corrected information returns must be filed electronically if the original information returns were filed electronically. These rule changes will help facilitate efficient and effective tax administration.
These proposed regulations remove the non-aggregation rule in § 301.6011–2(c)(1)(iii) that counts the number of information returns required to be filed on a form-by-form basis. The proposed regulations add a new paragraph (4) to § 301.6011–2(b) to provide that if during a calendar year a person is required to file a total of 250 or more information returns of any type covered by § 301.6011–2(b), the person is required to file those information returns electronically. For example, under these proposed regulations, if a person is required to file 200 Forms 1099–INT, “Interest Income,” and 200 Forms 1099–DIV, that person must file all Forms 1099–INT and Forms 1099–DIV electronically because that person is required to file, in the aggregate, at least 250 information returns covered by § 301.6011–2(b). Corrected information returns are not taken into account in determining whether the 250-return threshold is met under proposed § 301.6011–2(b)(4) for purposes of determining whether information returns covered by § 301.6011–2(b) must be filed electronically. Examples in proposed § 301.6011–2(c)(1)(iv) illustrate this rule.
The proposed regulations also provide that corrected information returns covered by § 301.6011–2(b) must be filed electronically if the information returns originally filed for the calendar year are required to be filed electronically. If fewer than 250 returns covered by § 301.6011–2(b) are required to be filed for the calendar year, the original returns for the calendar year, as well as the corrected returns for the calendar year, are not required to be filed electronically. See proposed § 301.6011–2(b)(4), Example 4.
The proposed regulations also amend § 301.6721–1(a)(2)(ii) regarding the penalty for failure to file correct information returns to remove references to the prior rule for determining the number of returns on a form-by-form basis and the prior corrected return rule.
The proposed regulations do not amend the existing regulations allowing persons who are required to file returns electronically to request a waiver of the electronic-filing requirement. See § 301.6011–2(c)(2). This waiver authority will be exercised so as not to unduly burden taxpayers lacking the necessary data-processing capabilities or access to return preparers and third-party service providers at a reasonable cost.
These proposed regulations will be effective on the date of the publication of the Treasury Decision adopting these rules as final in the Federal Register. However, to give information-return filers sufficient time to comply with these regulations, these proposed regulations will not apply to information returns required to be filed before January 1, 2019. Accordingly, these proposed regulations provide that § § 301.6011–2(b)(4) and 301.6721–1(a)(2)(ii), as amended, will be effective for information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2018. Section 301.6011–2(b)(5), as amended, will be effective for corrected information returns filed after December 31, 2018.
This regulation is not subject to review under section 6(b) of Executive Order 12866 pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (April 11, 2018) between the Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget regarding review of tax regulations.
When the Internal Revenue Service issues a proposed rulemaking imposing a collection of information requirement on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires the agency to “prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis,” which will “describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.” 5 U.S.C. 603(a). Section 605(b) of the RFA allows an agency to certify a rule, in lieu of preparing an analysis, if the proposed rulemaking is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This proposed rule directly affects information-return filers that file more than 250 returns of any type covered by § 301.6011–2(b), which includes a substantial number of small entities. However, the IRS has determined that the economic impact on small entities affected by the proposed rule would not be significant. Under sections 6011(e) and § 301.6011–2(c)(1), information-return filers already must file information returns electronically if during a calendar year a person is required to file a total of 250 or more information returns of any type covered by § 301.6011–2(b). The proposed rule merely amends the method of counting those 250 returns to determine if the 250-return threshold is met. Information filers may request a waiver of the electronic-filing requirement if they lack the necessary data-processing capabilities or access to return preparers and third-party service providers at a reasonable cost, and the IRS routinely grants meritorious hardship waiver requests. Accordingly, the burden on the limited number of small entities that are not currently filing electronically will be slight, and small entities that would experience a hardship because of this proposed rule may seek a waiver. The Commissioner of the IRS hereby certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The IRS invites comment from members of the public who believe there will be a significant impact on small information return filers. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.
The principal author of these proposed regulations is Michael Hara of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration).
Income taxes, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Section 301.6721–1 is also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6011(e).
a. Paragraphs (b)(4) through (6) are added.
b. Paragraphs (c)(1)(iii) and (iv) are removed.
c. Paragraph (g)(2) is revised.
§ 301.6011–2 Required use of magnetic media.
(4) Aggregation of returns. For purposes of determining whether the number of returns a person is required to file meets the 250-return threshold under paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, all types of returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section required to be filed during the calendar year are aggregated. Corrected returns are not taken into account in determining whether the 250-return threshold is met.
(5) Corrected returns. Any person required to file returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section on magnetic media for a calendar year must file corrected returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section for such calendar year on magnetic media.
Example 1. For the 2018 calendar year, Company W is required to file 200 Forms 1099–INT, “Interest Income,” and 200 Forms 1099–DIV, “Dividends and Distributions,” for a total of 400 returns. Because Company W is required to file 250 or more returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section for the calendar year, Company W must file all Forms 1099–INT and Forms 1099–DIV electronically.
Example 2. During the 2018 calendar year, Company X has 200 employees in Puerto Rico and 75 employees in American Samoa, for a total of 275 returns. Because Company X is required to file 250 or more returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section for the calendar year, Company X must file Forms 499R–2/W–2PR, “Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Withholding Statement,” and Forms W–2AS, “American Samoa Wage and Tax Statement,” electronically.
Example 3. For the 2018 calendar year, Company Y files 300 original Forms 1099–MISC, “Miscellaneous Income.” Later, Company Y files 70 corrected Forms 1099–MISC for the 2018 calendar year. Because Company Y is required to file 250 or more returns covered by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section for the calendar year, Company Y must file its original 300 Forms 1099–MISC, as well as its 70 corrected Forms 1099–MISC for the 2018 calendar year, electronically.
(2) Paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(1) and (2), (c)(1)(i), (c)(2), (d), (e), and (f) of this section are effective for information returns required to be filed after December 31, 1996. For information returns required to be filed after December 31, 1989, and before January 1, 1997, see section 6011(e) [26 USC 6011(e)]. Paragraph (b)(4) of this section is effective for information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2018. Paragraph (b)(5) of this section is effective for corrected information returns filed after December 31, 2018.
a. By removing the fifth through seventh sentences in paragraph (a)(2)(ii).
§ 301.6721–1 Failure to file correct information returns.
(h) Effective dates. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section is effective for information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2018.


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If this is true, then nothing can be more evident than this: The law is the organization of the natural right of lawful defense. C. has been an essential component of our nation’s civil rights progress. This includes their Rights inherent in their Allodial Land Titles and to be Merchants and/or Traders at Law on the cash basis, and their Rights to access to Courts of Law and to a jurisdiction where their Rights are protected.
By contrast, he wrote, the majority’s decision in Christie II “does not leave a state ‘much room’ at all. Following Christie II, states “must maintain an anti-sports wagering scheme” by “leav[ing] sports gambling prohibitions on the books to regulate their citizens.” Judge Vanaskie opined that this really “leaves the States with no choice,” adding that “[t]he anti-commandeering doctrine, essential to protect State sovereignty, prohibits Congress from compelling States to prohibit such private activity.” Judge Vanaskie was unpersuaded by the majority’s assertion that some partial repeal options “may pass muster” (such as the example involving small wagers between friends and family), noting that the majority “does not explain why all partial repeals are not created equal or explain what distinguishes the 2014 Law from those partial repeals that pass muster.” As Judge Vanaskie explained, “[t]he bedrock principle of federalism that Congress may not compel the States to require or prohibit certain activities cannot be evaded by the false assertion that PASPA affords the States some undefined options when it comes to sports wagering.” Contending that the majority opinion “excised” the distinction between a “repeal” and an “authorization,” Judge Vanaskie declared that it is “clear” that no repeal of any kind will evade PASPA’s command that no State “shall. .. authorize by law sports gambling.” Such commands, Judge Vanaskie concluded, “are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.” Judge Vanaskie’s commandeering analysis—and his thesis that PASPA requires states to maintain and enforce existing state-law gambling prohibitions—will likely be the centerpiece of New Jersey’s petition to the Supreme Court Bryan M. Hansen, Appellant, v. Minnesota State Board of Bar Examiners et al. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings download Bryan M. Hansen, Appellant, v. Minnesota State Board of Bar Examiners et al. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings. Ronald Dworkin (1982), "'Natural' Law Revisited," University of Florida Law Review vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 165-188. Ronald Dworkin (1986), Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Joel Feinberg (1985), Offense to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Joel Feinberg (1979), "Civil Disobedience in the Modern World," Humanities in Review, vol. 2, pp. 37-60 Ronald W. Keiser, Petitioner, v. Richard Hartman et al. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings Ronald W. Keiser, Petitioner, v. Richard Hartman et al. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf, azw (kindle), epub, doc, mobi.
He left this practice shortly after qualifying and set up on his own as Birchall & Co in the early 1950s. His first office was a small room above an accountant’s firm on Cannon Street in Preston Becker S S Co v. Snyder U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings online. Divergences in detail are very numerous, but even here attempts were made to secure some sort of uniformity. There was a movement from local law towards a cosmopolitan law, and this process was not completed until after the close of the middle ages Sylvester Jones, Petitioner, v. United States. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings Sylvester Jones, Petitioner, v. United States. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings online. Recent work on this period has shown how largely it was concerned with legal problems, and to lawyers there are two especial reasons for studying the baronial revolt with care. First, it was the age of Bracton, 1 who ceased to revise his great treatise just as the crisis approached; and secondly, it was the one occasion in English history when the laity carried out vi et armis an important and complicated programme of law reform ref.: Guthrie v. U S U.S. Supreme read epub Guthrie v. U S U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf, azw (kindle). Brown consisted of six separate cases in five jurisdictions; Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, the District of Columbia and Delaware. These cases are remembered as “Brown” because Oliver Brown was one of several plaintiffs in the Kansas case whose name appeared first in the court filings The American Constitution and read epub read The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism pdf.
The next body of testimony -- remember all of this took a total of two hours -- uh . ref.: The Law of Evidence in read for free read The Law of Evidence in Victorian England (Cambridge Studies in English Legal History). But although this the Conqueror might do, yet a Change of the Laws of the conquered Country was rarely universally made, especially by the Romans: Who, though in their own particular Colonies planted in conquered Countries, they observed the Roman Law, which possibly might by Degrees, without any rigorous Imposition, gain and insinuate themselves into the conquered People, and so gradually obtain, and insensibly conform them, at least so many of them as were conterminous to the Colonies and Garrisons to the Roman Laws; yet they rarely made a rigorous and universal Change of the Laws of the conquered Country, unless they were such as were foreign and barbarous, or altogether inconsistent with the Victor's Government: But in other Things, they commonly indulged unto the conquered, the Laws and Religion of their Country upon a double Account, viz download Becker S S Co v. Snyder U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings epub. There's a wide range of courses to choose from and three awards to aim for: you decide the level you want to achieve and the areas you want to cover. And because you can study when you choose, you can plan your studying to fit in with your work and home commitments The History of Lawyers, Ancient and Modern The History of Lawyers, Ancient and Modern online. In every specialty, you'll be challenged by the CUA Law vision that promotes the practice of law as a way of serving others. More Small classes, professors who take a personal interest in you, students who treat each other like family, an active alumni network, an ideal location in Washington, D , e.g. Anglo: Murray Legal History (3rd Edition) (Paperback) download Anglo: Murray Legal History (3rd Edition) (Paperback) pdf, azw (kindle), epub. The lesser Charter, or De Foresta, was to reform the Excesses and Encroachments which were made, especially in the Time of Rich. I and Hen. 2 who had made New Afforestations, and much extended the Rigour of the Forest Laws: And both these Charters do in Substance agree with that Magna Charta, & de Foresta, granted and confirm'd 9 Hen. 3 ref.: Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court (Chicago Series in Law and Society) click Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court (Chicago Series in Law and Society) book. Having originated early in the reign of Edward I, by the time we come to his son and successor, Edward II, the Year Books have already taken another aspect Quinti Horatii Flacci opera omnia: the works of Horace (Volume 2) Quinti Horatii Flacci opera omnia: the works of Horace (Volume 2) book.
The sheriff court was originally held at the castle. Head courts were held 3 times per year, with lesser courts meeting more infrequently. The sheriff presided over the court and administered both civil and criminal justice , source: Helvering v. Le Gierse U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings download Helvering v. Le Gierse U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings. Under the common law system, everything ought to have a history, and so a singularly obscure case came to be conventionally regarded as the historical foundation for common recoveries Bank of Hendersonville, read pdf read online Bank of Hendersonville, Petitioner, v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings. But in one respect—new stationary sources—the Act adopted a technology-based approach , cited: An Act for enlarging and read online download online An Act for enlarging and improving the harbour of Leith; for making a new bason, quays, wharfs, or docks; for building warehouses; for making new ... others, leading to and from the said harbour. Please ensure that you include the start and end dates for all positions/scholarships/study periods/funding etc held. Reminder: Candidates should not submit publications or written work with their application. Those who are shortlisted will be contacted in late January 2017 and will be invited to send material at that stage U.S. Supreme Court Transcript read epub download online U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record Moulor v. American Life Ins Co. It is such a pleasure to be back here at the ASIL. I am embarrassed to confess that I have been a member of ASIL for more than 30 years, since my first year of law school, and coming to the annual meeting has always been a highlight of my year The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis download The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis online. If a man, after having promised, either verbally or in writing, a certain dowry to his daughter, loses part of his property, he can give his daughter a dowry in accordance with the property as it is now, and neither father-in-law nor son-in-law shall go to law on that account. 11 Guthrie v. U S U.S. Supreme read for free download Guthrie v. U S U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf. So, for example, is coherence the sole desideratum which should guide judges in interpreting the law, or is it merely one feature of a successful such interpretation, and, moreover, is it a necessary feature, or one which, although desirable, may be overridden by competing values which judges should also try to realise in interpreting the law Melvin L. Roberts, Appellant, v. Jesse C. Johnson, Fire Marshal of the State of South Carolina. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings download Melvin L. Roberts, Appellant, v. Jesse C. Johnson, Fire Marshal of the State of South Carolina. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf, azw (kindle)? He merely points out how different it is from the typical Western approach, leaving readers to conclude that foreigners ignore or disregard Chinese negotiating tactics at their own peril. This is certainly consistent with our view that one should not rush to blame the Chinese when things go wrong read Becker S S Co v. Snyder U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf, azw (kindle), epub. Unsurprisingly, many law graduates go on to pursue careers within the legal sector Harry P. Locklin and Elmer J. download online click Harry P. Locklin and Elmer J. Brant, Etc., Petitioners, v. Switzer Brothers, Inc. U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings. Under Houston’s “equalization strategy,” lawsuits were filed demanding that the facilities provided for black students be made equal to those available to white students, carefully stopping short of a direct challenge to Plessy download Becker S S Co v. Snyder U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf. Since the Christie line of cases are only the federal court decisions addressing the constitutionality of PASPA, the all-important “circuit split” is lacking here. (Note: New Jersey could potentially focus the “circuit split’ on the broader commandeering issue by pointing to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), where Judge Kozinski reasoned in a concurring opinion that “preventing [a] state from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one,” and, therefore, “runs afoul of the commandeering doctrine.” That language is arguably at odds with Christie II) , source: E W Buschman Co v. N L R B read epub E W Buschman Co v. N L R B U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings pdf, azw (kindle), epub, doc, mobi.

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The 15th Annual Insurance Symposium will be held on Friday, March 28, 2008 at Cityplace Conference Center in Dallas, Texas. The course will educate the attendant on developments during the past year regarding the insurer-insured relationship, duties owed to the consumer, “bad faith” and insurance code claims, and ethical obligations in the insurance context. Additionally, the course will give an up date on case law decided within the past year with respect to both personal and commercial policies.
This course has been certified for insurance licensee continuing education by the Texas Department of Insurance in the amount of 5.0 general credit hours and 1.0 Ethics/Consumer Protection credit hours. Cooper & Scully, P.C. is a Texas Department of Insurance registered CE provider (#1107).
This course has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of Texas Committee on MCLE in the amount of 6.0 hours.
Ms. Gartner’s presentation will focus on litigation stemming from the rescission of health insurance coverage due to material misrepresentations made on an insurance application. Upon rescission, the insured frequently brings claims against their insurer for, inter alia, breach of contract, bad faith, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. She will analyze various aspects of litigating such claims, including the scope and application of the misrepresentation defense, ERISA preemption, and the potential for fraudulent joinder.
The Right to Reimbursement after Frank's Casing: What did it come from; why is it here; and where might it be going.
Mr. Wright’s presentation will address the Texas Supreme Court's recent opinion in Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, et al v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. and its effect on the insurer's right to reimbursement for claims later determined to be not covered. A short historical perspective will be provided as well as a discussion of the present state of the law and where the law might go in the future. Possible implications for the settlement of cases and for the application of the Stowers doctrine will be discussed.
Mr. Huddleston will address the breadth of appraisal clauses in policies and whether or not they extend to issues involving coverage. He will discuss the case of State Farm v. Johnson currently pending before the Texas Supreme Court.
Mr. Fischer and Ms. Sheffield will be taking about whether pay and case is still viable among co-insurers; how the decision affects the discharge of the duty to defend; and how the Texas Supreme Court’s decision affects Stowers demands where co-insurers are present.
Ms. Robberson will address the recent decision in Nation Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Crocker and what duties Texas courts will impose on insurers to notify additional insureds of coverage that may be available to them. She will examine the breadth of the decision and how far the holding can be extended.
Ms. Faust will address the recent decision in Fairfield Ins Co v. Stephens Martin Paving. LP and whether or not Texas public policy prevents coverage for punitive damages. She will address the specific issues presented in this case and how far the holding can be extended.
Mr. Johnson will present an analysis and overview of liability, bad faith, and claims handling considerations regarding Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance Code and the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Statute, (formerly known as Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code) in light of the recent Texas Supreme Court ruling in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.
Mr. Cooper will focus on the lack of direction from Texas courts on what must be done to perfect a Stowers demand in multi-insurer situations. Suggestions and ideas will be presented on what solutions may exist.
Ms. McClelland will give a review and update on the latest Texas cases involving general liability and auto coverage. Additionally, she will give an update on regulatory requirements for Texas auto insurers.
Mr. Dortch will present an analysis into the differing State, Federal, and Appellate venues and jurisdictions in the State of Texas including an in depth look into the socioeconomic, political, and demographic changes experienced across the state over the past five years.
Mr. Shattuck will discuss the scope of Section 451 of the Texas Insurance Code. Then analyze recent cases and issues that have arisen with regard to application of the statute.
Mr. Cooper's topic will address the recent decision in Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals and the breadth of coverage afforded to additional insureds under most additional insured endorsements. He will focus on how far the decision may be extended and the implications for those depending upon coverage under additional insured endorsements.

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text: The retirement health benefits at issue in this case are identical to other public employment and retirement benefits that North Carolina Courts have held be to be contractual in nature and not subject to unilateral change once the employee/retiree vests in said benefits. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130 (1998)(Tax Exemptions for Post-Retirement Benefits); Simpson v. North Carolina Local Gov’t Employees’ Retirement System, 88 N.C. App. 218 (1987) aff’d per curiam 323 N.C. 362 (1988)(Retirement Disability); Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System of North Carolina, 345 N.C. 683 (1997)(Retirement Disability); Wells v. Consolidated Judicial Retirement System of North Carolina, 136 N.C. App. 671 (2000)(Retirement Pension); Bolick v. County of Caldwell, 182 N.C. App. 95 (2007)(Severance); Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543 (1986)(Vacation Pay); Wiggs v. Edgecombe County, 361 N.C. 318 (2007)(Special Separation Allowance for Law Enforcement Officers). These retiree health benefits can only be classified as deferred compensation and are governed by the previously cited cases on the same basis. Because the Plaintiffs had all vested in the retiree health benefits prior to the unilateral reduction/termination of these benefits in 2009 and 2011, the Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement of the vested benefits and payment of back damages. Evidence of the contractual and vested nature of these benefits is acknowledged in the statutes that enable the state health plan(s), in employee handbooks, in retirement benefit pamphlets, in the legislative history of the health plan statutes, and in the State’s financial reports.

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Bisphenol A (BPA) is an environmental estrogen that can affect development and health by disrupting normal hormonal signaling. Estrogen, working at very low blood concentrations, triggers responses in cells and tissues and is critical during fetal development and in normal health and reproduction. BPA binds to the same cellular receptors as estrogen and may lead to detrimental health effects.
In June of this year, the American Medical Association formally recognized BPA as an endocrine-disrupting agent. Physicians can play an important role in educating their patients about this pervasive environmental contaminant. The first steps are to understand the potential health risks of BPA and how to limit those risks through simple lifestyle changes.
BPA is used in the production of polycarbonate plastics and epoxy resins. Many consumer products, such as some reusable water bottles, baby bottles, toys, cell phones, and DVDs, contain BPA. BPA is also found in the inner linings of metal food cans.1 The epoxy lining protects the metal can from rust and corrosion which may taint the food. It is present in various medical devices as well, including incubators, blood oxygenators, and dialysis machines. Given its wide uses, BPA ranks among the highest volume chemicals manufactured worldwide.
Although present in countless products, none of which is intended for consumption, the primary route of exposure is through ingestion. BPA has been shown to leach from products that contain it, such as food cans, into the foodstuffs stored in the container.1,2 When the food is then consumed, BPA enters the body through the digestive tract.
A 2007 survey by the Centers for Disease Control found that approximately 92% of Americans have detectable levels of BPA in their bodies.3 The survey is considered representative of the United States population even though it included only people older than six years old. It is notable, however, that the children (ages 6-11 years) in this study displayed the highest levels of BPA of all populations investigated. BPA has been found in placental tissue and fetal blood as well, indicating that fetuses are being exposed as a result of maternal exposure.4 An additional study looked at the levels of BPA in infants – specifically in premature infants housed in Neonatal Intensive Care Units.5 It was found that these infants displayed the highest level of BPA in their bodies of all populations.
While hundreds of studies, most focusing on animal models, point to the harmful health effects of BPA, there has been controversy over the past decade and a half regarding safety of the compound in humans. Nevertheless, scientific review panels have determined that some detrimental health effects may occur in humans.14-16 Likely human health effects that have been vetted through these review panels include advanced puberty in females14, 15 , effects on the brain and behavior15, 16, mammary gland and prostate abnormalities, and reproductive effects in males and females.
Humans are typically exposed to about 0.001 milligrams of BPA per kilogram of body weight per day. This is 50 times lower than the ‘safe’ limit set by the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration. Unfortunately, this level of exposure is still significantly higher than the low doses that have been shown to cause adverse health effects.
The concern of exposure is highest when fetuses, infants, and children are considered because of the adverse effects of BPA on normal developmental processes early in life.
It is clear that infants and children are burdened with the highest levels of BPA. This is likely due to several factors. First, the ability infants and children to metabolically detoxify contaminants such as BPA is not yet mature. While BPA will ultimately be removed from the blood through a liver-mediated process, BPA stays in the system of infants and children longer than in adults.16 Second, when compared to adults, infants and children consume proportionately more food when their overall body size is taken into account and therefore bodily concentrations are higher. The milk, formula, or food that is the main staple of an infant may be stored in containers (baby bottles, sippy cups) that are made with BPA.3, 22, 23 Infants and young children are also more likely to mouth plastic products, such as toys, that are not necessarily meant to be put in the mouth.
BPA can also pass from the mother to the fetus.5 In addition, breast milk can transmit BPA to an infant.24 Given this, it is not only the child, but the pregnant or nursing mother, that need to be protected from BPA exposure. Since the children cannot be responsible for making choices regarding BPA, clear information must be provided to parents (and potential parents) so that they can made the educated choices needed to protect themselves and their children.
Fortunately, BPA is metabolized and cleared from the body so decreasing daily exposure to BPA can make a difference in overall body levels.25, 26 In Japan, industries voluntarily reduced BPA use in their products between 1998 and 2003 and studies showed a dramatic decline in body levels of BPA in the population.27, 28 Educating your patients about a few simple lifestyle changes can make a difference in their overall BPA exposure and potentially reduce their risk for adverse health effects.
Second, minimizing the use of polycarbonate plastics food and beverage containers will also help. Polycarbonate plastics are usually hard, clear, and shatter-resistant. They may be labeled with recycle number 7, although not all number 7 products contain BPA.
Children are also more likely to mouth plastic products, such as toys or the hard plastic portion of a pacifier. Caregivers should be mindful of products aimed at children that may contain BPA, such as sippy cups, tableware, and toys.3, 22, 26 Thankfully, manufacturers are increasingly labeling products as “BPA-free”. The American Medical Association adopted a new policy in 2011 supporting continued industry efforts to produce BPA-free baby products as well as a total ban on the sale of such products.
As of 2011, ten states have passed legislation limiting the use of BPA in products aimed at children. Pennsylvania has similar legislation, spearheaded by Representative Lawrence Curry, that is currently in the House Health Committee. In New Jersey, Senator Linda Greenstein introduced a related bill in 2010 that has been referred to the Senate Commerce Committee.
While the current BPA legislation is an important step, the direct education of patients about BPA and the simple steps that can be taken to minimize their BPA exposure may lead to health improvements within the community.
Rebecca Roberts, Ph. D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Biology and Coordinator of the Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Program at Ursinus College in Collegeville, PA, where she studies the effect of hormonal regulation of the immune system, with a focus on the roles of estrogen and bisphenol A in Systemic Lupus Erythematosus. She has been active in educating the public about bisphenol A and recently presented expert testimony to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Democratic Policy Committee regarding toxin-free toddler and baby products.
1. Goodson, A., H. Robin, W. Summerfield, and I. Cooper, 2004. Migration of bisphenol A from can coatings – effects of damage, storage conditions and heating. Food Addit Contam, v. 21(10), pp. 1015-26.
2. Brede, C., P. Fjeldal, I. Skjevrak, and H. Herikstad. 2003 Increased migration levels of bisphenol A from polycarbonate baby bottles after dishwashing, boiling and brushing. Food Addit Contam, v. 20(7), pp. 684-9.
4. Calafat A.M., J. Weuve, X. Ye, L.T. Jia, H. Hu, S. Ringer, K. Huttner, and R. Hauser, 2009. Exposure to bisphenol A and other phenols in neonatal intensive care unit premature infants. Environ Health Perspect, v. 117, pp. 639-644.
5. Schonfelder, G., W. Wittfoht, H. Hopp, C.E. Talsness, M. Paul, and I. Chahoud, 2002. Parent bisphenol A accumulation in the human maternal-fetal-placental unit. Environ Health Perspect, v. 110(11), pp. A703-7.
6. Takeuchi, T., O. Tsutsumi, Y. Ikezuki, Y. Takai, and Y. Taketani, 2004. Positive relationship between androgen and the endocrine disruptor, bisphenol A, in normal women and women with ovarian dysfunction. Endocr J., v. 51, pp. 165-169.
7. Sugiura-Ogasawara, M., Y. Ozaki, S. Sonta, T. Makino, and K. Suzumori, 2005. Exposure to bisphenol A is associated with recurrent miscarriage. Hum Reprod, v. 20, pp.2325-2329.
8. Melzer, D., Rice, N.E., Lewis, C., Henley, W.E., Galloway, T.S. (2010). Association of urinary bisphenol a concentration with heart disease: evidence from NHANES 1003/06. PLoS One, v. 5(1), pp8673.
9. Singleton, D.W., Y. Feng, Y. Chen, S.J. Busch, A.V. Lee, A. Puga, and S.A. Khan, 2004.Bisphenol-A and estradiol exert novel gene regulation in human MCF-7 derived breast cancer cells. Mol Cell Endocrinol, v. 221(1-2), pp. 47-55.
10. Lee, C.K., S.H. Kim, D.H. Moon, J.H. Kim, B.C. Son, D.H. Kim, C.H. Lee, H.D. Kim, J.W. Kim, J.E. Kim, and C.U. Lee, 2005. Effects of bisphenol A on the placental function and reproduction in rats. J Prev Med Pub Health. v. 38(3), pp. 330-336.
11. Markey, C.M., P.R. Wadia, B.S. Rubin, C. Sonnenscheine, and A.M. Soto, 2005. Long Term Effects of Fetal Exposure to Low Doses of the Xenoestrogen Bisphenol-A in the Female Mouse Genital Tract. Biol Reprod, v. 72(6), pp. 1344-51.
12. Nikaido, Y., K. Yoshizawa, N. Danbara, M. Tsujita-Kyutoku, T. uri, N. Uehara, and A.Tsubura, 2004. Effects of maternal xenoestrogen exposure on development of the reproductive tract and mammary gland in female CD-1 mouse offspring. Reprod Toxicol, v. 18(6), pp. 803-811.
13. Rubin, B.S., J.R. Lenkowski, C.M. Schaeberle, L.N. Vandenberg, P.M. Ronsheim, and A.M. Soto, 2006. Evidence of altered brain sexual differentiation in mice exposed perinatally to low, environmentally relevant levels of bisphenol A. Endocrinology, v.147(8), pp. 3681-3691.
14. National Toxicology Program’s Report of the Endocrine Disruptors Low Dose Peer Review (2001).
15. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Toxicology Program, Center for the Evaluation of Risks to Human Reproduction. NTP-CERHR monograph on the potential human reproductive and developmental effects of bisphenol A (NIH Publication No. 08-5994).
16. Vom Saal, F.S. et al., 2007. Chapel Hill bisphenol A expert panel consensus statement: Integration of mechanisms, effects in animals and potential to impact human health at current levels of exposure. Reproductive Toxicology, v. 24, pp. 131-138.
17. Kudakovic, M. and F.A. Champagne, 2011. Epigenetic perspective on the developmental effects of bisphenol A. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity. V. 25(6), pp. 1084-93.
18. Dolinoy, D.C., D. Huang, and R.L. Jirtle, 2007. Maternal nutrient supplementation counteracts bisphenol A-induced DNA hypomethylation in early development. PNAS, v. 104(32), pp. 13056-13061.
19. Walker, D.M. and A.C. Gore, 2011. Transgenerational neuroendocrine disruption of reproduction. Nat Rev Endocrinol. v. 7(4), pp197-207.
20. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010. Bisphenol A (BPA) action plan summary.
21. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010. Bisphenol A (BPA) information for parents.
22. Vandenberg, L.N., R. Hauser, M. Marcus, N. Olea, and W.V. Welshons, 2007. Human exposure to bisphenol A (BPA). Reproductive Toxicology, v. 24, pp. 139-177.
23. Kuo, H.W. and W.H. Ding, 2004. Trace determination of bisphenol A and phytoestrogens in infant formula powders by gas chromatography-mass spectrometery. J. Chromatogr A, v. 1027, pp. 67-74.
24. Houlihan, J., 2007. Toxic plastics chemical in infant formula. Environmental Working Group.
25. Carwile JL, Luu HT, Bassett LS, Driscoll DA, Yuan C, Chang JY, Ye X, Calafat AM, Michels KB, 2009. Polycarbonate bottle use and urinary bisphenol A concentrations. Environ Health Perspect, v. 117(9), pp. 1368-1372.
26. Vökel, Wl, Kiraoglu, M., Fromme, H., 2011. Determination of free and total bisphenol A in urine of infants. Environ Res, v. 111(1), pp.143-148.
27. Matsumoto A KN, Kitagawa K, Isse T, Oyama T, Foureman GL, Morita M, Kawamoto T. 2003. Bisphenol A levels in human urine. Environ Health Perspect 111(1): 101-4.
28. Research Center for Chemical Risk Management (2005). Bisphenol A Risk Assessment Document. AIST Risk Assessment Document Comprehensive Chemical Substance Assessment and Management Program. Japan.
30. Breast Cancer Fund (2011). BPA in Kids’ Canned Food.
Well, I can not compete with the highly scientific studies quoted above. But what I can offer is this: meet my 13 year old daughter, who has markedly low estradiol, elevated (although blessedly not *too* elevated) androgens, and body hair in keeping with those androgens – possibly PCOS, although she does not have most of the other symptoms outside the Labwork.
What she *did* have was a definitive reaction when we abruptly eliminated BPA from our diet. After over two years of stable periods (beyond the erratic first six months) she skipped a cycle, then began bleeding every 16-18 days for the next four months. Our very limited, gluten/corn/casein free diet did not alter, either before, during or after this event, nor were there any other changes that could be considered remotely likely to affect the menses. Our only change was to rid the house and diet of all plastics, cans, non stick coatings and even TP made from recycled paper.
She has apparently stabilized, however, labs indicate that her last two cycles may have been anovulatory.
I hope the relevance of this real-world example is obvious, and thank those who research and publish what history will write: filling our bodies with endocrine disruptors will not be seen as a Very Bright Idea in the future.
You wrote: “Likely human health effects that have been vetted through these review panels include advanced puberty in females14, 15 , effects on the brain and behavior15, 16, mammary gland and prostate abnormalities, and reproductive effects in males and females.
Regarding Rebecca Roberts’s recent article, BPA has an active and an inactive form in the human body. It is well known that when ingested, almost all BPA is converted into the inactive form and excreted. In fact, the amount of BPA that CDC measured in urine is encouraging, as it is evidence that the amount of BPA to which people, including children, are exposed is extremely small. Also, FDA studies have shown that ingested BPA does not reach the fetus, even at levels well above typical human exposures.
Drs. Ronald Lorentzen and David Hattan, FDA toxicologists, recently discussed how some scientists opining on the human health risks of BPA do not have the appropriate experience in applying results of laboratory studies to assess these risks. They suggested that these scientists have not considered that not all laboratory studies are equally informative regarding human health risks. For example, rats metabolize BPA much less efficiently than humans, and many studies in animals use exposure routes that are not informative for human risk assessment (e.g., injection).
With respect to the human studies, Dr. Mary Wolff, a prominent epidemiologist, noted that certain epidemiology methods are not appropriate for assessing BPA health effects, and that few (if any) took precautions to prevent sample contamination or deal with statistical noise, complicating the interpretation of results.
The only appropriate scientific way to assess BPA toxicity and epidemiology studies is to consider each one in the context of all other relevant studies that have been conducted. Those who claim that BPA could cause harm do not conduct such analyses. When one analyzes these studies in the appropriate manner, the weight of evidence does not indicate harm from human exposures to BPA among fetuses, newborns, infants, children, or adults. Doctors and other health professionals should take this information into account as they consider how to counsel their patients.
Excellent! A Beautiful article! I have been waiting for this for years! BPA in coated, thermally activated papers should have been mentioned though, do not underestimate that route of exposure. Also the mechanism of anovulatory cycles raising testosterone producing ovarian cysts which deprive females of much needed progesterone because of the absence of a corpus luteum, and instead drench her body with excess androgens. A woman with obvious belly fat, facial and torso hair, and shoulders that are much wider than the hips is a sure tip off that she has pcos caused by bpa exposure.
Also manufacturers did not willingly remove bpa from their products, consumers removed it from the list of products they are willing to buy. Government and industry have played catch up to public opinion and have banned bpa products only after no one would buy them anymore. Also there has been excellent progress by corporations who DON’T manufacture bpa like BASF who recently discovered phenol free coatings for receipt paper, and a recent advance in developing a bpa free epoxy coating for use in rail cars that carry food products.
The massive disinformation war that occurs around the world in every regulatory jurisdiction is outside the scope of this article but I’m not complaining. The human race has a wonderful ally in the form of Dr. Rebecca Roberts, bravo again on your excellent work!

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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Federal Circuit decision dealing with patent damages for lost sales in foreign jurisdictions. WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 586 U.S. ____ (June 22, 2018), Case No. 16-1011 (Thomas J). The Court concluded that U.S. patent owners can get damages from overseas sales lost through infringement.
WesternGeco owns four patents related to systems and methods for surveying the ocean floor to locate hydrocarbon deposits. ION developed and began selling a competing system indistinguishable from the systems disclosed in WesternGeco’s patents. ION manufactured the components for its competing system in the United States and then shipped them to companies in foreign jurisdictions where the components were assembled to form the competing system.
Under the Patent Act, a company can be liable for patent infringement if it ships components of a patented invention overseas to be assembled there, and a patent owner who proves infringement under this provision can then be then entitled to recover damages. See 35 U.S.C §271(f)(2) and 284.
WesternGeco sued for patent infringement and the jury in the District Court proceeding found ION liable and awarded WesternGeco damages in royalties and lost profits. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the award of lost-profits damages concluding that patent owners cannot recover damages for lost foreign sales. After granting a petition for review, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded for further consideration in view of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics. On remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated its decision regarding extraterritoriality of §271(f).
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. In its decision, the Court utilized a two-step framework for assessing the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, a doctrine known as the presumption against extraterritoriality. In determining whether this presumption applies, a court determines if the law in question “focuses” on a domestic activity. The Court concluded that the focus of §284 involving infringement under §271(f)(2) is the exportation of components of a patented invention from the United States. Since it was ION’s domestic act of supplying the components that infringed WesternGeco’s patents, damages arising from foreign activity using the infringing system were thus permitted in this case.
This case now returns to the Federal Circuit for further proceedings. Of note, the Federal Circuit recently upheld a Patent Trial and Appeal Board ruling that three of the four patents owned by WesternGeco were invalid, which may reduce the damages available to WesternGeco.
This ruling may affect pending and future infringement lawsuits by helping ensure that patent owners receive adequate damages compensation caused by U.S. patent infringement regardless of where the infringement occurs. Under this ruling, U.S. patent owners are able to obtain damages from overseas sales lost through infringement if the conduct relevant to the statutory focus occurs in the U.S.


The www.patine.shoes Online Store cares for the rights of consumers. The consumer cannot waiver the rights granted based on the Consumer Rights Act. Any agreement provisions less favorable to the consumer, than those in the Consumer Rights Act are void and in their place corresponding provisions of the Consumer Rights Act shall be applied. For that reason, the provisions of these Terms and Conditions are not meant to exclude or limit any rights of consumers granted based on the strictly binding legal regulations, and all possible doubts should be interpreted to the benefit of the consumer. In the case of any possible nonconformity between the provisions of these Terms and Conditions with the above regulations, the above regulations take priority and shall be applied.
1.1. The Online Store available at the address patine.shoes is operated by the partners operating business activity based on the contract of civil law partnership under the business name of DANBIS SPÓŁKA CYWILNA DANIEL GŁOWACKI, DANIEL ZIĘTEK (address of the place of business and address for service: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa), NIP 8542346029, REGON 320595592, e-mail address: shop@patine.shoes, telephone number: 884043003, i.e. DANIEL GŁOWACKI who operates a business enterprise under the business name: DANIEL GŁOWACKI DANBIS S.C. (address of business operation: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa) entered in the Central Electronic Register and Information on Economic Activity of the Republic of Poland kept by the minister responsible for the economy, NIP: 8541707815, REGON: 321282501 and DANIEL ZIĘTEK who operates a business enterprise under the business name: DANIEL ZIĘTEK DANBIS S.C. (address of business operation: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa) entered in the Central Electronic Register and Information on Economic Activity of the Republic of Poland kept by the minister responsible for the economy, NIP: 8541685746, REGON: 321281996.
1.2. These Terms and Conditions are intended for consumers, as well as entrepreneurs who use the Online Store, unless a section is intended solely for consumers or entrepreneurs.
1.4.10. ONLINE STORE – the Service Provider’s store available at the Internet address: www. patine.shoes.
1.4.11. SELLER; SERVICE PROVIDER – the partners operating business activity based on the contract of civil law partnership under the business name of DANBIS SPÓŁKA CYWILNA DANIEL GŁOWACKI, DANIEL ZIĘTEK (address of the place of business and address for service: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa), NIP 8542346029, REGON 320595592, e-mail address: shop@patine.shoes, telephone number: 884043003, i.e. DANIEL GŁOWACKI who operates a business enterprise under the business name: DANIEL GŁOWACKI DANBIS S.C. (address of business operation: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa) entered in the Central Electronic Register and Information on Economic Activity of the Republic of Poland kept by the minister responsible for the economy, NIP: 8541707815, REGON: 321282501 and DANIEL ZIĘTEK who operates a business enterprise under the business name: DANIEL ZIĘTEK DANBIS S.C. (address of business operation: Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa) entered in the Central Electronic Register and Information on Economic Activity of the Republic of Poland kept by the minister responsible for the economy, NIP: 8541685746, REGON: 321281996.
2.1.1. 2.1.1. Account – use of the Account is possible after performing a total of three subsequent steps by the Service User – (1) filling out the Registration Form, (2) clicking the „Create account” and (3) confirming account’s registration by clicking the confirmation link sent automatically to the provided e-mail address. The Registration Form requires the Service User to provide the following data: e-mail address and password.
2.1.1.1. The Account Electronic Service is provided free of charge for an indefinite time. The Service User has the option, at any time and without stating a reason, to delete their Account (resignation from Account) by sending a corresponding request to the Service Provider, in particular via e-mail at the address: shop@patine.shoes or in writing at the address: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa.
2.1.2. Order Form – use of the Order Form begins upon addition by the Customer of the first Product to the electronic shopping cart in the Online Store. Placement of an Order is effected after the Customer performs a total of two subsequent steps – (1) fills out the Order Form and (2) clicks the “Order with payment obligation” button on the Online Store’s Website after filling out the Order Form – from that point on there is a possibility of individual modification of the entered data (to do that, follow the instructions displayed onscreen and information available at the Online Service’s website). In the Order Form it is essential for the Customer to provide the following data: name and surname/company name, address (street, house/flat number, postal code, town/city, country), e-mail address, contact telephone number and information regarding the Sales Agreement: Product/s, quantity of Products, place and method of Product delivery, method of payment. In the case of non-consumer Customers it is also necessary to provide the company name and Tax ID number.
2.1.3. Newsletter – forwarding Newsletter occurs after signing in to the “Newsletter” bookmark after providing e-mail address and clicking the “Sign in” button and confirming Newsletter registration by clicking the confirmation link sent automatically to the provided e-mail address It is possible to sign in to the Newsletter whilst placing the Order by clicking the right checkbox – the e-mail address is kept to Newsletter at the moment Order is placed.
2.1.3.1. The Newsletter Online Service is provided free of charge for an indefinite time. The Service User as the option, at any time and without stating the cause, to unsubscribe from the Newsletter (resign from the Newsletter) by sending a corresponding request to the Service Provider, in particular via e-mail at the address: shop@patine.shoes or in writing at the address: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa.
2.4.1.2 electronically via e-mail at the following address: shop@patine.shoes.
2.4.2. In the complaint description it is recommended for the Service User to provide: (1) information and circumstances regarding the subject of complaint, especially the type and occurrence date of the irregularity; (2) the Service User’s claim/request; and (3) contact data of the claimant – this will facilitate and expedite investigation of the complaint by the Service Provider. The requirements stated in the preceding sentence should be interpreted as recommendations and do not influence the effectiveness of complaints filed with omission of the recommended complaint description.
2.4.3. The Service Provider shall address the complaint without delay, no later than within 14 calendar days from the date of submission.
3.2. The Product price visible on the Online Service’s website is given in currency corresponding to language version of the page and includes VAT tax. In case of Sales Agreements with delivery service outside the Republic of Poland, Customer is obliged to pay for additional taxes (including import duty) if it is necessary. The Customer is informed of the total value of the Product included in the Order, as well as of the delivery costs (including fees for transport, delivery and postal services) and other costs, or the obligation to pay those costs, if the value of those fees cannot be determined, on the Online Store’s website during placement of the Order, as well as at the moment of the Customer’s expression of will to enter into the Sale’s Agreement.
4.1.4. Online payment and payment by credit or debit card is possible by service PayPal.com and PayU.pl – the list of possible payment methods can be seen in the information bookmart on the website as well as on the Internet page: https://www.paypal.com/pl and http://payu.pl.
4.1.4.1.1. PayU.pl – PayU S.A. company with a registered office in Poznań (registration address: ul. Grunwaldzka 182, 60-166 Poznań), entered into the Entrepreneurs Registry of the National Court Register under the number 0000274399, registry documents kept by the District Court of Poznań – Nowe Miasto and Wilda in Poznań, share capital: 4.000.000 PLN fully paid, Tax ID: 779-23-08-495.
4.1.4.1.2. 4.1.4.1.2. PayPal.com – company PayPal (Europe) S.a r.l. & Cie, S.C.A., 5. 22–24 Boulevard Royal, L-2449, Luxembourg.
4.2.1. If the Customer selects payment via bank transfer, electronic or pay card payment, the Customer is obliged to issue the payment within 7 days from the Sales Agreement conclusion date.
5.3.1. Postal service, postal cash on delivery service.
5.3.2. Courier service, courier cash on delivery service.
5.3.3. Personal collection available at: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa – in Business Days, between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m, after previous telephone contact with the Seller.
5.4.2. If the Customer selects the cash on delivery payment - from the date of conclusion of the Contract of Sale.
5.5. The term of readiness of a Product to be collected by the Customer – if the Customer chooses personal collection of a Product, the Product will be ready for collection for up to 2 Business Days, unless otherwise provided in the description of a given Product or if, during the Order placement, a shorter term is specified. In the case of Products with different terms of readiness for collection, the term of readiness for collection is the longest term provided which, however, cannot exceed 2 Business Days. The Seller shall additionally notify the Customer of the readiness for pick-up of the Product. The date on which the term of readiness for collection of the Product by the Customer starts to run shall be determined in the following manner.
5.5.2. If the Customer selects the cash on collection payment - from the date of conclusion of the Contract of Sale.
6.1. The basis and extent of Seller's liability towards the Customer, if the Product sold has a physical or legal defect (warranty), are specified by the generally applicable laws, especially the Civil Code (including art. 556-576 of the Civil Code).
6.3.2. in electronic form via e-mail to the following address: shop@patine.shoes.
6.5. In the case of the Products described as being used, the Seller is obliged to deliver the Product to the Customer in accordance with the description on the Online Store, in particular, the Product free from defects other as indicated in the Product description, about which the Customer was informed before the purchase.
6.6. In the case of Products marked on the online store pages, as used, at which there is a detailed description of the Products with a description of the defects of these Products, the Seller is released from liability under the warranty, if the buyer knew about the defect at the time of conclusion of the contract, in accordance with art. 557 § 1 of the Civil Code.
6.7. In the case of Products marked on the online store pages, as used, the Seller's liability is limited to a period of one year from the date of delivery of the goods to the Buyer, in accordance with art. 568 § 1 of the Civil Code.
6.8. The Seller shall address the complaint without delay, no later than within 14 calendar days from the date of submission. If a consumer requests an exchange of a Product or a removal of defects or submits a statement of a price reduction, stating the amount of which the price is to be reduced and the Seller does not respond to the complaint within the abovementioned period, it means that the Seller has deemed the complaint as justified.
6.9. The Customer who exercises the rights under the warranty shall be obliged to deliver the defective Product to the following address: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa. In a case of a consumer, the Seller bears a cost of delivery of the Product. If, due to the nature of the Product or the way it is mounted, the delivery of the Product by Customer would be extremely difficult, the Customer is obliged to make the Product available to the Seller in the place where the Product is located.
8.1.2. electronically via e-mail at the address: shop@patine.shoes.
8.2. An example agreement withdrawal form template is included as appendix no. 2 to the Consumer Rights Act and additionally available at the Online Store’s website in the bookmark about possibility of withdrawal of the agreement and also in clause 12. of the Terms and Conditions. The Consumer may use the template form, however it is not obligatory.
8.6. The Consumer shall without delay, no later than within 14 calendar days from the agreement withdrawal date, return the Product to the Seller or hand it over to a person authorized by the Seller, unless the Seller has offered to personally reclaim the Product. In order to meet the above deadline, it is sufficient to send the Product back before the deadline expires. A consumer may return the Product at the address: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa.
9.1. This section of the Term and Conditions does not affect the rights of the Customer who is a consumer to submit a complaint in accordance to clause 6. of the Terms and Conditions and to withdraw from an agreement in accordance to clause 8. of the Term and Conditions. The contractual right to exchange the Product is additional, voluntary.
9.2. In the absence of other regulations resulting from this clause, the provisions of clause. 8 of the Terms and Conditions should be applied.
9.3. A Customer who is a consumer who entered into an agreement remotely may after the deadline specified in point 8.1. within the next 14 calendar days, without incurring costs, except for the costs specified in point 9.4. replace the Product purchased in the Online Store for a different size within the same model, available in the Online Store. The contractual right to exchange the Product applies only to shoes available in the Online Store.
9.4. Customer who is a consumer who exchanges the Product under the contractual right to exchange the Product does not bear the Costs of the first return of the Product to the Seller. The costs of the first return of the Product to the Seller are borne by the Seller. The costs of subsequent returns of the Product to the Seller are borne by the Buyer.
9.5. The Product returned by the Customer can not be damaged.
9.6. A replacement for a more expensive Product is possible after covering the difference between the price of the replaced and the new Product by the Costumer.
9.7. In the case of replacement of the Product to a cheaper one, the returned difference between the price of the replaced and the new Product cannot be more than 50% of the price of the exchanged Product.
9.8.2. in electronic form via e-mail to the following address: shop@patine.shoes.
9.9. The Consumer shall without delay, no later than within 7 calendar days from the agreement exchange date, return the Product to the Seller or hand it over to a person authorized by the Seller. In order to meet the above deadline, it is sufficient to send the Product back before the deadline expires. A consumer may return the Product at the address: DANBIS S.C. Kicko 2E/A, 73-112 Stara Dąbrowa.
9.10. The Consumer bears responsibility for degradation of a Product’s value as a result of its use beyond the scope necessary to determine the Product’s nature, features and functioning.
9.11. The Customer is asked to attach a confirmation of purchase preferably in the form of a receipt or a VAT invoice.
10.1. This section of the Terms and Conditions and provisions contained herein relate exclusively to Customers and Service users who are not consumers.
10.2. The Seller is entitled to withdraw from a Sales Agreement concluded with a Customer who is not a consumer within 14 calendar days from its conclusion. Withdrawal from a Sales Agreement in such an instance may take place without stating a cause and does not entitle the Customer who is not a consumer to any claims towards the Seller.
10.3. In the case of Customers who are not consumers, the Seller has the right to limit the available methods of payment, as well as require the issue of a prepayment in full or in part, regardless of the method of payment selected by the Customer and the fact of concluding a Sales Agreement.
10.4. Upon the Seller’s release of a Product to the carrier, the benefits and burdens associated with the goods and risk of any loss or damage to the Products as a result of accidents are transferred to the Customer who is not a consumer. In such a case the Seller is not responsible for the full or partial loss, or damage to a Product which may occur between the Product’s release for transport and delivery to the Customer, nor for any delays in transport.
10.5. In the case of a Product being delivered to a Customer via a carrier, the Customer who is not a consumer is obliged to inspect the parcel within a time and in a manner generally accepted for such deliveries. If it is determined that loss or damage of the Product occurred during transport, the Customer is obliged to perform all actions necessary to determine the responsibility of the carrier.
10.6. Pursuant to Art. 558 § 1 of the Civil Code, the Seller's liability under the warranty for the Product to the Customer who is not a consumer shall be excluded.
10.7. In the case of Service Users who are not consumers, the Service Provider may terminate an Electronic Service Provision agreement with immediate effect and without stating the cause by way of sending a corresponding statement to the Service User.
10.8. The Service Provider’s/Seller’s liability towards the Service Recipient/Customer who is not a consumer, regardless of its legal basis, shall be limited - both within a single claim, as well as for any claims in total - to the amount of the price paid and the cost of delivery in respect of the Contract for Sale, but not more than the amount of one thousand Polish Zlotys. The Service Provider/Seller shall be accountable to the Service Recipient/Customer who is not a consumer only for typical damage foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract and shall not be held accountable for lost profits to the Service Recipient/Customer who is not a consumer.
10.9. Any disputes arising between the Service Provider/Seller and the non-consumer Service User/Client shall be settled by a court of competent jurisdiction over the Service Provider’s/Seller’s seat.
11.1. Agreements concluded through the Online Store are drawn up in Polish.
11.2.1. The Service Provider reserves the right to amend the Terms and Conditions due to significant reasons, i.e. change in legal regulations; change in methods of payment and delivery – in a scope, in which such changes influence the execution of provisions of these Terms and Conditions.
11.2.2. In the event of the conclusion of perpetual agreements based on these Terms and Conditions (e.g. for the provision of the Account – Electronic Service), the amended Terms and Conditions are binding for the Service User, provided that the requirements of art. 384 and 384 of the Civil Code are met, i.e. the Service User has been properly notified of the amendments and has not terminated the agreement within 14 calendar days from the notification date. In cases, where an amendment of Terms and Conditions results in the introduction of any new charges or increase of current ones, the Service User who is a consumer is entitled to withdraw from the agreement.
11.2.3. In case of conclusion of agreements other than perpetual ones based on these Terms and Conditions (e.g. Sales Agreements), amendments to the Terms and Conditions shall in no way affect the rights acquired by consumer Service Users/Customers before the effective date of the amended Terms and Conditions; in particular the amendments to the Terms and Conditions will not affect pending or already placed Orders and concluded, in progress or performed Sales Agreements.
11.3. These Terms and Conditions shall not exclude the laws of the country of habitual residence of the consumer concluding the contract with the Seller/Service Provider, which cannot be excluded by agreement. Seller/Service Provider warrants in this case, the consumer protection afforded to him by provisions which cannot be excluded by agreement.


Rehearing Denied June 12, 1951.
Paul B. Rodden, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Willis H. McQueary, Asst. Atty. Gen. of the State of Kansas (Harold R. Fatzer, Atty. Gen. of the State of Kansas, on the brief), for appellee.
On October 3, 1946, appellant, Lawson Odell, was convicted in the District Court of Barber County, Kansas, of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Kansas State Penitentiary. No appeal was taken and the judgment and sentence became final. Habeas corpus proceedings were thereafter instituted and denied in the State Court of Kansas and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied in the United States Supreme Court, 334 U.S. 851, 68 S.Ct. 1504, 92 L.Ed. 1773. Appellant then filed this proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas contending that his detention was unlawful because his conviction had been obtained in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The District Court entertained the petition and after full hearing denied the relief on the grounds that the evidence failed to sustain the allegations of lack of due process. This appeal followed.
Federal courts will entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus and discharge persons detained under a state court judgment and sentence only when that custody is in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, and then only when all remedies afforded by appeal have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241; Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572; Hudspeth v. McDonald, 10 Cir., 120 F.2d 962. To authorize relief to a state prisoner under section 2241, the deprivation of constitutional rights must be such as to render the judgment void. Mere errors in proceedings by a state court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over a case properly before it, however serious, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. Habeas corpus proceedings may not be employed as a substitute for appeal. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969; Maxwell v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 175 F.2d 318, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 834, 70 S.Ct. 39; Garrison v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 149 F.2d 844; Rosenhoover v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 112 F.2d 667. Federal courts will intervene only when the fundamental rights of the prisoner have been denied and taken from him arbitrarily and a trial in accordance with the established law of the state in a court of competent jurisdiction has not been afforded. The court in the Mangum case, in speaking of due process in state courts, aptly said: 'It is perfectly well settled that a criminal prosecution in the courts of a state, based upon a law not in itself repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and conducted according to the settled course of judicial proceedings as established by the law of the state, so long as it includes notice and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, before a court of competent jurisdiction, according to established modes of procedure, is 'due process' in the constitutional sense.' (237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 586.) To establish a different doctrine would impair the power of the states to prevent and punish crime.
In the case at bar petitioner sets up numerous assignments of error which he contends deprived him of due process of law. Those which merit discussion are: that a number of armed guards were stationed about the courtroom; that the defendant was handcuffed during the trial, except while testifying; that the jury was not kept together during trial; that the witnesses were not separated; and that the sheriff, a witness for the prosecution, acted as bailiff and custodian of the jury during the trial. It is admitted by the appellee that these conditions complained of did exist during the trial.
Generally the use of guards in the courtroom during trial and the necessity of the use of manacles on a defendant are within the sound discretion of the trial court. An abuse of this discretion, coupled with an unusual display of hostility toward a defendant, might well reach a point where the trial is a farce and a fair trial impossible. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543. We shall therefore consider whether the use of guards and manacles, together with the claim of unusual hostility toward the defendant, was sufficient to deprive the defendant of a constitutional trial and render the judgment and sentence void. The burden of proof was upon the petitioner to sustain these allegations. Eagles v. U.S. ex rel. Samuels,329 U.S. 304, 67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. 308; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116, 90 L.Ed. 61; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830. We think the petitioner failed to sustain the required burden of proof. The essence of the Sheriff's testimony was that armed guards were present, and manacles used, because he had reason to fear that relatives of the murdered person might cause trouble during the trial, and, in addition, the defendant was a known criminal having been convicted of burglary, robbery with firearms, and theft of an automobile. He believed it a necessary precaution to protect the petitioner and preserve order during the trial. The trial court agreed. This was within its discretion. The contention of extreme public hostility toward the defendant is also without merit. The evidence of such hostility was very meager. Throughout the trial the defendant was represented by eminent attorneys of his own choice, one of whom testified that he did not believe that the hostility toward the petitioner warranted the number of armed guards present. There was no gathering of a mob, no public demonstration, and no threatened violence toward the defendant by the public. There is no indication that there was any publicity in newspapers or otherwise which was unusually hostile to the defendant. It appears that except for the use of armed guards and the manacles the trial proceeded about as any other in that community. The record does not disclose any attempt to control or influence the jury or anything unusual about its deliberation. It returned a verdict carrying with it life imprisonment when it could have taken the life of the defendant. So far as the record shows the case caused no more public concern than any other case of a like nature. Apparently the claimed hostility did not reach such an extent as to cause the defendant or his attorneys to request a change of venue. The denial of a change of venue is discretionary and would not of itself void a judgment and sentence.
Freedom from shackling and manacling of a defendant during the trial of a criminal case has long been recognized as an important component of a fair and impartial trial. 14 Am.Jur.,Criminal Law, 132. Ordinarily such procedure should be permitted only to prevent the escape of the prisoner or to prevent him from injuring bystanders and officers of the court or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial. Blaine v. United States, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 136 F.2d 284; McDonald v. United States, 8 Cir., 89 F.2d 128, certiorari denied 301 U.S. 697, 57 S.Ct. 925, 81 L.Ed. 1352; State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389, 167 P.2d 476; People v. Kimball, 5 Cal.2d 608, 55 P.2d 483; Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark. 914, 141 S.W.2d 532; Gray v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 305, 268 S.W. 941, 949; State v. Bryan, 69 Ohio App. 306, 43 N.E.2d 625. The question of whether the manacling was an abuse of discretion should have been tested on appeal. Federal courts interfere with the administration of justice in state courts only in rare cases where circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398; Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 18 S.Ct. 805, 43 L.Ed. 91; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 16 S.Ct. 304, 40 L.Ed. 432; In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 738, 35 L.Ed. 505; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 13 S.Ct. 40, 36 L.Ed. 934; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 12 S.Ct. 156, 35 L.Ed. 971; Schechtman v. Foster, 2 Cir., 172 F.2d 339, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 924, 70 S.Ct. 613. We do not say that a remedy is not available in federal courts where it is clear that the trial in a criminal case was a farce, dominated by a mob, or the conduct of the citizens of the community and its officers prevented a fair and impartial trial such as in the case of Moore v. Dempsey, supra, or a situation recited by Mr. Justice Jackson in Shepherd v. Florida, 71 S.Ct. 549. We have no such case here.
As to the remaining contentions, it is the better practice not to permit a jury to separate during the trial of capital cases but for the court to allow such separation does not void the judgment. In Kansas it is not such misconduct as to constitute prejudicial error on appeal unless it is established that it tended to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case. State v. Howland, 157 Kan. 11, 138 P.2d 424; State v. Haines, 128 Kan. 475, 278 P. 767; State v. McNeil, 59 Kan. 599, 53 P. 876; see also Baker v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 129 F.2d 779, 782, certiorari denied Baker v. Hunter, 317 U.S. 681, 63 S.Ct. 201, 87 L.Ed. 546. There is no showing that the separation was without order or permission of the court or that it was not properly instructed prior to separation. It is not shown that a request was made by defendant or his counsel that the jury be kept together. The contention that the sheriff, a witness for the prosecution, acting as bailiff and custodian of the jury during the trial would void the judgment, is also without merit. There is no evidence that the sheriff did anything irregular in performing this function. The evidence was to the contrary. Williams v. Barnes, 181 Ga. 514, 182 S.E. 897; 53 Am.Jur.,Trial, 858, p. 625. So too, the refusal to exclude the witnesses from the courtroom during the trial is within the discretion of the court. Oliver v. United States, 10 Cir., 121 F.2d 245, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 666, 62 S.Ct. 124, 86 L.Ed. 533; State v. Sweet, 101 Kan. 746, 168 P. 1112; State v. Davis, 48 Kan. 1, 9, 28 P. 1092.


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1. Those against whom the Postmaster General has issued a postal fraud order may sue the local postmaster to enjoin him from carrying out the order, and the Postmaster General is not an indispensable party. Pp. 332 U. S. 492-494.
2. The superior officer is an indispensable party if a decree granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise it for him. Pp. 332 U. S. 492-493.
3. The superior officer is not an indispensable party if the decree which is entered would effectively grant the relief desired by expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the court. Pp. 332 U. S. 493-494.
The District Court dismissed a suit to enjoin a postmaster from carrying out a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158 F.2d 95. This Court granted certiorari. 3 31 U.S. 797. Reversed, p. 332 U. S. 494.
This case, here on certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits, [Footnote 1] presents the question whether those against whom the Postmaster General has issued a postal fraud order may sue the local postmaster to enjoin him from carrying out the order or whether the Postmaster General is an indispensable party.
Petitioners thereupon brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of California to enjoin respondent from carrying out the order, [Footnote 2] claiming that they had been deprived of the hearing to which they were entitled and that the fraud order was without the support of substantial evidence. On motion of respondent, the District Court dismissed the complaint, holding in accord with the view of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [Footnote 3] that the Postmaster General was an indispensable party. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158 F.2d 95.
enforcing a restriction embodied in a permit issued under the National Prohibition Act. The subordinate official, acting for the Commissioner, had refused to give plaintiffs the more liberal permit which they desired, and he had no power to grant the desired permit without revision of his delegated authority. The Commissioner was held to be an indispensable party. Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, followed. That was a suit brought by an Osage Indian to require payment to him of funds under an act of Congress. The power and responsibility of making the payments being in the Secretary of the Interior, he was held to be an indispensable party.
That principle was brought into clearer relief by Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228. There, the director of national parks had issued regulations forbidding operation in the Rocky Mountain National Park of automobiles for hire. Toll was the superintendent of the park who was enforcing the regulation. A suit to enjoin him was allowed to be maintained without joining his superior, the director, who had promulgated the regulation. That result followed, 268 U.S. p. 268 U. S. 230, by analogy to those cases which permit suit against a public official who invades a private right either by exceeding his authority or by carrying out a mandate of his superior. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 223 U. S. 619-620. In those situations, relief against the offending officer could be granted without risk that the judgment awarded would "expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration." Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 330 U. S. 738.
But the distinction we have noted between these two lines of cases apparently was not as clear to others as it seems to us. For a conflict among the circuits developed in these postal fraud cases. [Footnote 5] National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F.2d 66, which held that the Postmaster General must be made a party, suggested that, if he were not, the local postmaster would be left under a command of his superior to do what the court has forbidden. But that seems to us immaterial if the decree which is entered will effectively grant the relief desired by expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the court. It seems plain in the present case that that will be the result even though the local postmaster alone is sued. It is he who refuses to pay money orders, who places the stamp "fraudulent" on the mail, who returns the mail to the senders. If he desists in those acts, the matter is at an end. That is all the relief which petitioners seek. The decree, in order to be effective, need not require the Postmaster General to do a single thing -- he need not be required to take new action either directly, as in the Smith and Fall cases, or indirectly, through his subordinate, as in the Rutter case. No concurrence on his part is necessary to make lawful the payment of the money orders and the release of the mail unstamped. Yet that is all the court is asked to command.
And see Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497; Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138.

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