§ 4971 Counting absentee votes; penalty for disclosure.
§ 4972 Rules regarding what constitutes a legal vote.
(a) Votes cast on a direct recording electronic voting machine shall be considered legal votes once the voter has taken the necessary action or actions to cast a ballot. A voter who has cast a ballot on a direct recording electronic voting machine shall not be permitted to cast a second ballot under any circumstances.
(9) Writing in the name of either candidate for President or Vice-President shall constitute a valid vote for the slate.
§§ 4973 , 4974. Disqualified ballots; notation and preservation of disqualified or disputed ballots and envelopes.
§ 4975 Removing the results from the voting machine or machines and dispatching the memory cartridge or cartridges to the zone reporting station.
(a) After the polls have closed and the last voter has finished voting and exited the polling place, the inspector shall verify that each voting machine has been deactivated. The election officers shall then copy the protective counter number from each voting machine assigned to the election district onto section 3 of each of the voting machine certificate or certificates.
(b) After the polls have been closed on a voting machine, the officers shall remove the paper tape containing the results and the memory cartridge from the voting machine.
(c) After the memory cartridge or cartridges have been removed from each voting machine assigned to the election district, the inspector shall place said memory cartridge or cartridges into the envelope designated for the memory cartridge or cartridges and seal the envelope. The inspector shall give the envelope to the election officer assigned to deliver the memory cartridge or cartridges to the zone reporting station. The inspector shall then enter the date and time in section 2 of each of the voting machine certificates and direct the said election officer to sign section 2 of each of the voting machine certificates. The inspector shall then dispatch the said election officer with the envelope containing the memory cartridge or cartridges to the zone reporting station listed on the envelope containing the memory cartridge or cartridges. The election officer assigned to take the memory cartridge or cartridges to the zone reporting station shall depart the polling place immediately and go directly to the zone reporting station listed on the envelope containing the memory cartridge or cartridges. Upon arriving at the said zone reporting station, the said election officer shall give the envelope to a designated representative of the State Election Commissioner.
(d) After the election officer assigned to deliver the memory cartridge or cartridges to the zone reporting station has departed the polling place, each remaining election officer shall sign each copy of every paper tape removed from a voting machine assigned to the election district.
(e) After every copy of every paper tape has been signed, the inspector will separate the copies of each tape by cutting at the "cut here" line. The first copy of each paper tape (the copy with the zero count certification) shall be placed into the Prothonotary envelope and the first extra copy of each tape shall be placed into the Department of Elections envelope.
§ 4976 Counting of write-in votes.
(a) After the paper tapes have been separated and placed in envelopes, the inspector shall remove the 1st copy paper tape or tapes (with zero count certification) from the Prothonotary envelope.
(b) The inspector shall then proceed to read distinctly each office voted for, starting from the top of each paper tape, and the names of the persons for whom votes were cast. If the name of the person voted for is not clear, the inspector and 2 judges shall examine the paper roll and determine, by majority vote, if necessary, the name to be entered on the write-in vote tally sheet. The judge of the opposite political party shall stand or sit with the inspector while the inspector reads off the write-in votes to verify the votes cast.
(c) Two clerks shall account on separate Write-in Vote Tally Sheets for each write-in vote for an office for a candidate on the ballot for that office, a declared write-in candidate for the office or for all other write-in votes for the office as "Other Write-in Candidates."
(d) After the counting is completed, the clerks shall compare their tallies and add up the number of votes cast for each person in the presence of the inspector and judges. They shall then announce the names of the persons voted for and the total number of votes cast for each person. The first copy paper tape (with zero count certification) from each voting machine assigned to the election district shall be placed in the envelope and shall be delivered to the Prothonotary.
§ 4977 Persons authorized to be present during the count and tabulation.
Any candidate and any duly accredited challenger may be admitted to the voting room after the closing of the polls to observe the counting and tabulation of votes. Such persons shall be afforded the full opportunity to examine the ballot, results tapes from each voting machine, voting machine certificates and the tally sheets.
§ 4978 Securing the voting machine, voting machine certificates and tally sheets.
(a) After the write-in votes have been tallied, the inspector shall close the printer door and apply a seal to the printer door for each voting machine assigned to the election district. The inspector shall record the seal number on each of the voting machine certificates.
(b) After placing the curtain, absentee entry device and any other materials designated by the Department in the base of the voting machine, the inspector shall fold up the voting machine and apply a seal to the voting machine case. The inspector shall record the seal number on each of the voting machine certificates. The inspector shall repeat this procedure for each voting machine assigned to the election district.
(c) The election officers present shall sign all copies of the write-in vote tally sheets and section 3 of the voting machine certificates.
(d) The inspector shall place 1 copy of the voting machine certificate and write-in vote tally sheet in the envelope to be delivered to the Prothonotary and 1 copy of each of the said documents in the envelope to be delivered to the Department of Elections immediately following the closing of the polling place.
§ 4979 Delivery of certificates, election records and supplies, voting machines and absentee ballot boxes.
(a) After the close of the election, the inspector shall deliver an envelope containing the first copy of the paper tape (with "zero count" certification) from each voting machine in the election district, 1 copy of the voting machine certificate, 1 copy of the write-in vote tally sheet, if any, to the Prothonotary of the Superior Court for that inspector's county. The Prothonotary shall, on the second day following the election at 10 a.m. present said envelope to the Court. If the inspector of any election district dies or is prevented by sickness or accident from delivering the above-mentioned items to the Prothonotary the night of election day, the Prothonotary and/or the Department shall obtain the envelope from that inspector as soon as practical. The same shall apply to all envelopes, documents, poll lists, election records and supplies that the inspector is obligated to return to the Department following the close of the polls.
(7) All other supplies provided by the department, including the flag of the United States of America and the polling place flag.
(c) All certificates, poll lists, oaths (or affirmations), voter signature cards, tally sheets and other records of the election shall be filed in the department of elections for not less than 1 year following the election and shall be public records and, as such, admissible in evidence.
§ 4980 Return and custody of voting machines and keys.
(a) Immediately after the election, and within the 2 days immediately following the day of election, the voting machines and absentee ballot boxes shall be stored in some safe and secure place provided by the department of elections. While the board of canvass is conducting its canvass of the vote, the machines and ballot boxes shall be in the custody of the Prothonotary. While in the Prothonotary's custody, the voting machines and the absentee ballot boxes may be opened and examined by order of the board of canvass or any other court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) After the board of canvass has completed its canvass of the vote, the Prothonotary shall turn custody of the voting machine and absentee ballot boxes over to the department of elections. The department shall leave the ballot boxes undisturbed and locked until the following February 1. During this period, the ballot boxes may be opened for inspection by any duly authorized member or agent of the General Assembly or the Attorney General. After February 1 the department shall be free to unlock, clean out, inspect and repair any absentee ballot box.
§ 4981 Duties of department of elections and Election Commissioner following an election.
(a) Immediately following an election, the State Election Commissioner shall take each voter signature card and through electronic means, note that the voter participated in the election on the election district record.
(b) Voter signature cards and all other forms and records not of a permanent nature, which are used in the conduct of an election, shall be retained by the department for not less than 1 year following the election. The Commissioner may require that the department send the voter signature cards used in the election to the Commissioner to carry out the Commissioner's own duties under this section. In such event, the Commissioner shall return the voter signature cards to the department not more than 6 months following their delivery to the Commissioner.


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Posted on March 16, 2018 by Michael Lowe.
Crimes that can get you arrested in the Dallas – Fort Worth Metroplex, as well as the rest of the Lone Star State, are defined by the Texas Penal Code as well as federal statute. Every single day, arrests are made here for serious felony violations under both these systems of law.
Pursuant to the state and federal criminal codes, felonies can cost someone many years of freedom, if not the rest of their days – or even their life itself. However, how the process works and what can happen to the accused is not the same for Texas arrests as they are for federal busts.
It’s vital for anyone whose freedom is threatened to understand the distinctions between federal and state. It’s also imperative that they know that it is in the early part of these felony cases that people need a criminal defense lawyer the most.
When you are arrested in Texas, the state peace officer usually has an arrest warrant authorizing taking you into custody (there are exceptions to needing a warrant). See, e.g., Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 14.03. Here in Dallas, you most likely taken down to Lew Sterrett, the big Dallas County Jail down on West Commerce.
If you are arrested on federal charges, it may be based upon a criminal complaint or an arrest warrant. Federal agents take you into custody. It’s likely that you’ll end up at Seagoville, the big federal detention center here in Dallas County.
Legal rights and constitutional protections exist for the accused immediately upon questioning (even before you are taken into custody). Were you given your Miranda Rights? When? Miranda Rights are required in both state and federal arrests and must be given by the arresting officer.
Things are different once you are arrested. Texas criminal procedure is not the same as federal procedure, but the accused’s need for a criminal defense lawyer as soon as possible is unchanged.
Once the defendant is arrested and brought to jail, he will stay there until his Initial Appearance at the Arraignment. The accused must be brought before the court within 48 hours of being arrested.
Arraignment. This is a short hearing before a Texas magistrate, where bond is set after formal charges are filed against you by the prosecutor and you enter a plea (usually not guilty). You have a right to have an attorney represent you at the arraignment. You have a right to reasonable time and opportunity to consult with your lawyer before the arraignment begins.
the person arrested is not required to make a statement and any statement made may be used against the person arrested.
Most importantly for the accused, now is when the bail bond amount is set. Bail gives the defendant his freedom to return home while the charges against him are pending.
If the bond amount set is too high, the defense lawyer can file a motion for a writ of habeas corpus to get the bond amount reduced.
Before a defendant is indicted on a felony charge under Texas law, he has the right to ask for an “examining trial.” The Magistrate must inform the accused of this right at the Arraignment.
In Texas, you are usually arrested based upon an arrest warrant. However, the prosecutor cannot proceed on a felony charge without doing more than relying on that arrest warrant. All felonies in Texas must be prosecuted pursuant to an Indictment.
An Indictment is a grand jury’s determination that there is probable cause and sufficient evidence to believe that the accused committed the felony crime. The prosecutor brings evidence before the grand jurors, and if at least 9 of the 12 members of the grand jury agree on the charges, then the Indictment is issued.
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 16.01, every defendant is entitled to have an examining trial prior to the grand jury hearing.
At the examining trial, the defense lawyer has an opportunity to cross examine the state’s probable cause witnesses. This is usually done in front of a magistrate with a court reporter present.
A skilled defense attorney can usually get an unprepared witness to make admissions which will be very damaging to the Government’s case. The admissions will be recorded on the record. They will be evidence that can be used later in front of the Grand Jury or even at trial.
It is important to hire a defense lawyer early in a case because the defense lawyer can request an examining trial and conduct a probable cause hearing prior to the grand jury becoming involved. This can sometimes yield helpful testimony in preparation for Grand Jury or even trial. It can end up with the charges being dismissed, as well.
In the federal system, the defendant is arrested and brought directly to a U.S. Magistrate Judge for an Initial Appearance.
The Initial Appearance in federal court legally must take place within 48 hours of the arrest. At the Initial Appearance, the accused will get a copy of the federal charges filed against him.
The indictment or complaint is read to the defendant, and the Magistrate Judge will appoint defense counsel if the accused has not retained a defense lawyer and cannot afford one.
It is at the Initial Appearance that the Magistrate Judge will make a decision on whether or not the accused can be freed or must remain in federal custody and behind bars. This is considered a bail hearing that takes place during the Initial Appearance. It is the decision of the magistrate whether or not to grant bail to the accused facing federal felony charges.
However, the defense lawyer may think a brief delay on the bail hearing will allow the defendant to be better prepared to demonstrate why bail should be granted. If so, the lawyer can request that bail not be decided at the Initial Appearance but deferred for a time.
Having an experienced defense lawyer for the Initial Appearance may increase the likelihood of getting freed on bail.
The prosecutor in federal court is from the United States Attorney General’s Office. If the federal prosecutor does not want the accused to be freed, he or she files a Motion to Detain the Defendant which is not heard by the Magistrate Judge at the Initial Arraignment.
Some offenses brought against the accused create a Presumption of Detention. If the defense cannot refute the presumption, then the defendant cannot be granted bail of any amount and bonded out. He or she must remain in custody through trial.
The prosecution may not have to do a thing here because the language of the indictment may establish the presumption. Under federal law, there are certain charges in an indictment that raise a rebuttable presumption that the accused should be detained. See, United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412 (1st Cir.1991); Suppa, 799 F.2d at 119; United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n. 7 (7th Cir.1986); Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1477-79; United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Mosuro, 648 F.Supp. 316, 318 (D.D.C.1986).
(2) “reasonably assure” the appearance of the defendant as required and “reasonably assure” the safety of any other person and the community if the defendant is released.
a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction, or the release of the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, whichever is later.
It is possible for the accused to get bail even if there is a presumption of detention in his case. If the defense lawyer can overcome the presumption with direct testimonial evidence at the detention hearing, the Magistrate can rule in favor of the defendant being released on bail.
Key here is having an experienced federal criminal defense lawyer prepared and ready within the short time from arrest to the detention hearing (i.e., in a few days) to have live witnesses ready to take the stand and testify on behalf of the defendant before the magistrate. The goal will be to demonstrate to the Magistrate that the defendant is not a danger to the community or a flight risk, and that bail should be granted.
Not every defendant in federal court is charged based upon an indictment. Federal charges also originate in a sworn complaint filed by the Attorney General’s Office.
If the defendant is arrested strictly on a sworn complaint, then that defendant is legally entitled to challenge the probable cause for his arrest at the same time that as the detention hearing before the Magistrate.
Indictments are issued by the federal grand jury. The federal prosecutor must present evidence to the grand jury, and they must make a decision on whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a federal crime. Sworn complaints do not have the preliminary determination by a grand jury about probable cause.
Accordingly, the defendant has the right to challenge whether or not there was sufficient legal basis to arrest him in the first place when the arrest is based upon a sworn complaint.
In these situations, having an experienced federal criminal defense lawyer at this early stage of the federal proceeding may mean the end of it. The defense may be able to gut the government’s case by showing insufficient probable cause existed to support the arrest in the first place.
Key here is having a defense lawyer who is ready and prepared to cross examine the U.S. Government’s witnesses about probable cause.
In federal proceedings, it is possible to be released pre-trial, subject to the supervision of a United States Probation Officer. Here, the accused is freed on his or her personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond, as decided by the Magistrate Judge.
The defendant may be released and freed subject to one or more conditions. These are set by the Magistrate in the order granting pre-trial release.
It is considered favorable to release defendants pending trial because “… deprivation of liberty pending trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects defendants to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances, deprives their families of support.” ABA Standard 10-1.1 Pretrial Release.
For example, in an earlier post, we referenced how neurologist Dr. Eugene Gosy was able to negotiate his ability to continue practicing medicine while facing trial on an 166-count indictment for health care fraud.
Before making the decision to grant pre-trial release to the defendant, the Magistrate will seek and review a United States Pre-Trial Release Report. These contain the findings of the investigation performed by officers of the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Division.
It is imperative that the accused and his or her family understand the perception and approach that will be taken by those who are compiling the Pre-Trial report.
The most important thing to know is what is expected of you to succeed, and the most important thing to do is communicate openly and honestly with your probation and pretrial services officer. The officer’s greatest responsibility is protection of the public. That means we will assist you in acquiring assistance and resources, but we will also monitor your condition and activities to ensure that you are in compliance with the Court’s order or expectations, while treating you with respect and dignity as outlined in our Role and Authority of the Officer document.
From a criminal defense perspective, it is important for defendants and their families to cooperate as much as possible with probation. Pre-trial release is a good thing and being uncooperative with the Pre-Trial Release process will not help matters.
Having an experienced criminal defense lawyer involved at this stage can be invaluable to those facing federal felony charges. That defense lawyer will explain how this process works, and how it can be complicated and sometimes, even self-sabotaging.
For instance, it is not wise for any defendant to discuss their criminal history with probation officers. Why? Anything they say now can be used against them later on, in their criminal history category calculation for sentencing purposes.
The early stages of a criminal case in either the state or federal systems can be tremendously slanted in favor of the government, even if the defendant is a highly-educated professional or someone with great wealth and backing.
This is because the process in each system of justice is complicated and both the arresting officers and the prosecutors are well-versed in getting their jobs done and building their cases. They are in it to win it, and delaying efforts on your part to level the playing field by getting your own lawyer cannot serve to help you.
There are no guarantees that having an aggressive and experienced defense lawyer will get your case dismissed or your son free on bail – but failing to get a defense lawyer advocating on your behalf at the earliest possible moment does guarantee that the state will be operating at a tremendous advantage.

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So in my series on Defamation law so far, I’ve focused on the elements of the defamation case.
But what if you’re accused of defamation? How do you defend yourself against a defamation suit?
Truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim. This is simply the flip side of the requirement that plaintiff prove the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.
…or at least not completely false.
And when there’s some public interest to the subject – say, the target/plaintiff is some sort of public figure, or the story relates to some important public issue? Then it gets a little more complicated.
The Supremes have spoken on this issue directly, although if you’re not a lawyer, not especially clearly.
1. Public Officials/Public Figures: Actual Malice must be proven.
The First Amendment requires that a defamation plaintiff prove actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This is a much higher burden of proof for a public figure plaintiff. Instead of showing objectively that a “reasonable person” knew or should have known the defamatory statement was false, a public figure plaintiff must prove the intent of the defendant was malicious, or that they acted with reckless disregard for the truth. This allows the defendant to prove its good faith intent and efforts as a defense.
This is a tricky bit – the kind of thing that keeps lawyers in Lexuses.
Here’s how it works: If I claimed that Brad Carlson (of the Brad Carlson blog – a public figure, to be sure,and the Northern Alliance’s “The Closer” show), was”convicted of drunk driving” [*], and Brad shows it was false, he’d also have to prove that I was being malicious, or acting in reckless disregard of the truth.
Would it be considered “malicious” if I had spent months tweeting about my anger toward and hatred of Brad [**}?
Or, perhaps, if it were pointed out to me that the “source” I’d used was bogus – like in the example we showed yesterday – and I not only refused to apologize and retract, but indeed doubled own on my story?
Well, again, that’s the kind of thing that makes some lawyers happy, wealthy people.
2. Matter of Public Concern: Actual Malice must be proven.
In cases where the media defendant is treating an issue of public concern, the First Amendment also requires proof of actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth, even if the plaintiff is not a public figure. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). See also Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775 (In non-public concern, non-public plaintiff defamation case, First Amendment does not bar application of mere negligence standard for defamation); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
In other words, if my quip about Brad’s (hypothetical) DUI were part of a larger story – say, Brad had uncovered a massive corruption scam at the Ramsey City Hall, and the defamation was part of the larger discussion? Well, then Brad would have to prove that I acted maliciously, and the courts might well err on the side of protecting my right to free speech.
But for purposes of this discussion, let’s just say there’s no larger issue; I just wanted to bag on Brad. Then – if you read this the quote above at face value – the fact that I’d not gotten my facts straight would be considered, on its own, as malicious.
3. Matter of Public Concern: Plaintiff Must Prove Statement is False.
Proof of falsity required when media defendant addresses topic of public concern; regardless of public/private status of plaintiff. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775-76.
Where the plaintiff is a public official, he must prove actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth with “clear and convincing proof”. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Hepps, 475 U.S. at 773.
That means the burden of proof would be on Brad. And he’d pass that burden with panache, since the only place where Brad shows up as a drunk driver is here.
Public figure plaintiffs may have to prove falsity by “clear and convincing evidence” as protected under New York Times v. Sullivan. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Firestone v. Time Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 722 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 875 (Bell, J., specially concurring).
In other words, gray areas are bad.
But there is no gray area there. Brad never had a DUI, and there is no larger, compelling public interest in the story.
Smells like malice to me.
…well, we have not a few lawyers tuned in here. Do you think Brad’d have a case?
More in two weeks or so.
[*] Which he was not. I mean, seriously. Not at all. This is just an example.
[**] Which, to be sure, I have not. I have nothing but respect for my broadcast colleague. Indeed, he’s one of the godfathers of conservative political satire in this state, via his tenure as as Protest Warrior.
This entry was posted in Geekery, Slander Files and tagged Defamation Law by Mitch Berg. Bookmark the permalink.
You may have to buy Brad a drink after all that….
As I noted in an earlier chapter of the series – nope. It does not!
What happened to the Protest Warrior guys? They were doing some great stuff, then they disappeared.
I would like to see someone pick up their banner again.

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Colleen R. LaRose is an American citizen and a convicted Islamic extremist. Between 2008 and 2009, LaRose served as an online recruiter and fundraiser for an Ireland-based al-Qaeda cell from her home in Pennsylvania.“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Easter District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 4. In August of 2009, she traveled to Ireland to live with the cell members and to plan the assassination of Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, LaRose agreed to kill Vilks—who had previously depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad as a dog—in such a way that would frighten “the whole Kufar [nonbeliever] world.”“Pennsylvania Woman Indicted in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder Overseas,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 9, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pennsylvania-woman-indicted-plot-recruit-violent-jihadist-fighters-and-commit-murder-overseas. LaRose lived in Ireland for approximately six weeks before she “grew frustrated” with the slow pace of her fellow cell members and returned to the United States, according to the Assistant U.S. Attorney. She was arrested by the FBI in October 2009.“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, December 30, 2013, 5. LaRose pled guilty to four terrorism-related charges in February 2011,“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, December 30, 2013, 6. and authorities sentenced her to 10 years in prison in January 2014.John Shiffman, “U.S. woman known as Jihad Jane sentenced to 10 years in plot,” Reuters, January 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jihadjane-idUSBREA050PC20140106.
“Anwar al-Awlaki, Counter Extremism Project, January 2016, http://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/themes/bricktheme/stylesheets/images/disruption/CEP_Report_Anwar_al-Awlaki.pdf. LaRose was allegedly listed as a “friend” on a YouTube channel of Awlaki’s sermons.Steve Emerson, “Web Weaves Evidence Against ‘Jihad Jane’,” Newsmax, March 10, 2010, http://www.newsmax.com/t/finance/article/352269.
John Burns, “Irish Town Puzzled by Role in Investigation,” New York Times, March 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/world/europe/20ireland.html?ref=topics&_r=0. Her co-conspirators reportedly viewed LaRose as an asset because of her physical attributes as well as her gender and American citizenship.“Pennsylvania Woman Indicted in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder Overseas,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 9, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pennsylvania-woman-indicted-plot-recruit-violent-jihadist-fighters-and-commit-murder-overseas. Upon her departure to Ireland in August 2009, LaRose brought with her a stolen American passport to “facilitate an act of international terrorism,” according to her guilty plea. She reportedly intended to provide a co-conspirator with the passport in order to help him enter Europe.“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, December 30, 2013, 6; “United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 6. LaRose also sought to gain residency status in a European country, and to then marry a fellow extremist in order to ease his path to EU citizenship.“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, March 4, 2010, 4.
“US woman who plotted to kill Swedish cartoonist sentenced to 10 years,” AlJazeera America, January 6, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/6/us-woman-who-plottedtokillswedishcartoonistsentencedto10years.html. Her assistance to authorities provided Irish officials with enough evidence to arrest Damache and the five other co-conspirators in March of 2010.John Burns, “Irish Town Puzzled by Role in Investigation,” New York Times, March 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/world/europe/20ireland.html?ref=topics&_r=0. Because of her assistance, LaRose was sentenced to 10 years in prison rather than a life sentence.John Shiffman, “U.S. woman known as Jihad Jane sentenced to 10 years in plot,” Reuters, January 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jihadjane-idUSBREA050PC20140106.
ExtremeSister4Life“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane,’” United States District Court for the Easter District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 4.
Fatima LaRose“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Easter District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 4.
Jihad Jane“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Easter District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 4.
SisterOfTerror“United States of America v. Colleen R. LaRose a/k/a ‘Fatima LaRose’ a/k/a ‘JihadJane’,” United States District Court for the Easter District of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2011, 4.
Place of Birth Michigan, U.S.
Colleen R. LaRose is an American citizen and a convicted Islamic extremist.
10/16/2009: material support et al.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Note: James Joyce began II.1, the opening episode of Book II — the “children's games” according to his 1926 plan (see Letters, I, 7 June 1926) — in late 1930 when he returned to Paris from Étretat. It was a difficult time for him and he found creative work hard going. He started with the longer section 2. By the 5th of November (Guy Fawkes day) he had managed a little over 1000 words. By late January 1931 the first draft was finished, and typed. He next dashed off early drafts of the briefer sections 3 and 4 before stopping, concentrating instead on taking notes that, although intended for the episode, were never used: see N40 (VI.B.28B).
He left Paris in April 1931 for London, where he lived for six months. His concentration continued to be sporadic and remained so for several years. While in London, he signed the contracts for Work in Progress (see Letters, Beach, 13 July and 19 July, 1931) and began the process of assembling copy to send to his publishers. For Joyce, assembling meant gathering together what he had already written (mainly copies of the episodes as published in transition and elsewhere) and further revising it. For Book I at least, the gathering part was accomplished fairly quickly (see Letters, III 27 October 1931), but the revising had to wait.
His work during the early 1930s consisted of disjoint periods of intense work, first on II.1, then on II.2, long stretches of rest, recuperation and illness, re-organising his notes, and revising his gathering of Book I, and later Book III, for Faber and Faber. He came to rely increasingly on a new friend, Paul Léon. His working relationship, and correspondence, with Sylvia Beach came to an end in or around 1932. For these reasons, it is often difficult to be precise regarding the dates of individual draft stages.
Book II plan; May-June 1926 (see Letters, I, 21 May, 7 June, and 15 July 1926).
First draft (pencil and ink) of this short introduction (a dramatis personae): added in 1932.
Carbons of above with two new additions and with some (though not all) of the overlay on §1.2 copied in: it is not clear whether the omissions were intended or not; 1932.
Second typescript: the recto of fol. 23 (fol.23v carries additions for both fols. 48r and 49r) is a typescript of a fragment of text that, though clearly intended for it, was never used in II.1. Instead, it, or a carbon of it, was later used as the source of material for II.2§5.0; 1932.
Fair copy, written on the versos of carbons of III§4.4, probably first draft from fol. 10r on (ink). Joyce began work on 19 October 1930 and by mid-November had about half done (see Letters, III, 22 October, Beach ca. November, BLHW, 5 November, Stuart Gilbert diary 14 November, and I, 22 November [for an image see NLPL], 1930).
A small number of revisions, including one long addition (‘The Fomor's in his Fin, the Momor's her und hin. A paaralone! A paaralone! And Dublin's all adin.’), missing, for fols 20r and 21r above; 1930 or early 1931.
First typescript (carbon); probably November 1930-Spring 1931. Included under the letter A is a lost three-paragraph addition to fol. 30r, typed on the verso of fol. 29r, intended to follow the ‘youthful poem’ (1939 FW 231): ‘Byfall? Amaidst those pinnifores? Here, here there hilarities! / Lame get duck and drake your lives and fake your lie and rake your lice! Tame, get luck and take your likes while madsomer nighs into dawning! / And him, unwinged ones!’ (fol.29v). The recto of fol. 23 (its verso carries additions for both fols. 48r and 49r) is a typescript of a fragment of text that, though in itself unused, later served as a source of material for II.2§5.0.
Retyped pages of 2.1; probably late 1931 or early 1932 (see Letters, BLHW, 8 October 1931 and 4 January 1932). The following lost addition was designed to follow ‘Fled.’ (1939 FW 224.34): ‘The hopes they felt so elpliss, every waiting for her one that all left for Dolorado and now there was none.’ (fol. 54r); 1930 or early 1931.
Retype of fol. 57r; 1930 or early 1931.
First draft (pencil) written on the versos of carbons of III§4.4; probably late 1930 or early 1931.
Fair copy (ink) written on the versos of carbons of III§4.4; late 1930 or early 1931.
Typescript; probably late 1931 or early 1932.
Retyped pages of §3.2; late 1931 or early 1932.
Retyped version of part of fols. 69r-70r; late 1931 or early 1932.
First draft (pencil) written on the versos of carbons of III§4.4; probably Spring 1931.
Missing draft, possibly a fair copy; 1931.
Missing draft, carbon of §4.2 or new TS, with minor revision; 1931 or 1932.
First draft (ink); probably early 1932.
Missing draft, minor revision; probably early 1932.
Note: Joyce stopped working at the beginning of May 1932 (see, Letters, BLHW, 7 May and 23 July, 1932) and did not resume work until the end of August (see Letters, NLPL, 28 August, 1932).
Extradraft material; probably August or September 1932.
Retyped pages of §4.4/5.2 (missing); probably August or September 1932.
Retyped pages of §4.4+/5.2+; probably August or September 1932.
Setting typescript (missing) for first part of the episode; probably September 1932.
Extradraft material (part of Sheets I) for the above draft stage. See also §6D.0, §6CE.0 and §6B.3χ; -; §4.6, and III§3A.8; §4.6 and §6CB.1χ; probably September 1932.
Typescript versions (part of Sheets I) of extradraft material. See also §6CA.2/§6CE.2, §6B.3χ, §6CB.3χ, §6D.2, §6D.0χ, §6CC.2; probably September 1932.
Note: In an unusual development, negotiations for the separate, fine-press publication of II.1 began in advance of its publication in transition (see Letters, BLHW, 10 October 1932). This came about because the Servire Press of The Hague, Holland, the printers hired by transition for this issue, were also publishers. The following, first proofs for transition look very different from the version ultimately published in the magazine. They look more like sample proofs for a fine-press edition.
Unmarked copy of proofs of first five sections of II.1 (incomplete, missing pages 1-16); September 1932 (see Letters, I, 6 Sep 1932 and BLHW, 17 October 1932). The type-font is different from that later used in transition 22.
Note: The revision of the first five and the composition of the final two sections of II.1 appear to have been done in a hurry in late 1932 in the midst of confusion. MSS were mislaid or lost, and a new apartment had to be found (see Letters, BLHW 18 October, 21 October, I, 11 November, 1932). Section Seven might even have been drafted before Section Six (see Letters, I, 25 November). The latter is made up of a number of discrete Subsections (outlined in below) written and revised in a complex manner. The autograph of the first drafts of these was made in pencil; some scribal copies and retypes of these fragments remain, although many intermediate draft stages are missing.
First draft (see also §4.5χ and §4.6χ for material on verso); late 1932.
First draft of passage (see also §1.4χ, §4.5χ, §2.2χ and §6B.3χ); late 1932.
First draft/fair copy, prepared in several stages in October-November 1932 (for fols. 128-131, see Letters, HRCRC, 25 November 1932: for the extra paragraph promised in the letter see fols. 132-133, and for the insertions supplied, see fol. 134).
First draft of this segment, written on a sheet of TS (after it had been copied) of §6CF.2+; late 1932.
Extradraft material used to construct §6B.0; late 1932.
Extradraft material (see also §1.4χ and §6D.0χ); late 1932.
Extradraft material for the first draft (see also §1.4χ, §2.2χ, and §4.5χ); late 1932.
Copy sent to Stuart Gilbert for typing (see Letters, HRCRC, 25 November 1932); §6D.0 may be part of it; late 1932.
Fair copy. Written in blue-black ink on the rectos of two leaves of plain wove paper (269x210mm), a small “x” in green pencil or crayon at the top left corner of the first leaf. Part of the Gilvarry Collection sold at aution. The first page is reproduced in the catalogue; late 1932.
Extradraft material (see also §4.5χ); late 1932.
Extradraft material (see also §2.3χ, §3.4χ); late 1932.
Retyped versions of portion of §6A.2/6CF.2 (see also §6E.0); late 1932.
Typescript with hologaph insertion. (See also §5.4χ); late 1932.
Typed version of insertion to §6B.2; late 1932.
Typescript (see also §2.2χ'); late 1932.
Typescript (see also §6CC.2); late 1932.
Typescript versions of §6CC.0 and §6CC.0χ above; and a holograph draft of a passage to be added. See also §4.5χ, §2.2χ' and §6CB.2; late 1932.
Typescript, incomplete; followed by typescript of some insertions (see also §4.5χ, and §5.4χ); late 1932.
Missing draft, probably typescript; late 1932.
Setting typescript (missing) for transition 22; late 1932.
Extradraft material (see also §4.5χ, §6CE.0, §6D.3χ); late 1932.
Typed version of extradraft material (see also §2.2χ', §6CA.2, §6CE.2); late 1932.
Draft of one revision (see also §2.2χ', §6CA.2, §6CE.2); late 1932.
Fair copy of passages to be added; late 1932.
Extradraft material. November 1932; see also §6CE.0 and §6B.3χ.
Note: the reset proofs finally arrived late December 1932 and, with Paul Léon's help, were revised and sent off within days (see Letters, NLPK, 27 December 1932, 3 January and NLFF, 3 January, 1933). It would appear that most of the new material was ready and waiting for the arrival of the proofs (see Letters, I, 12 December 1932). There were at least two marked-up copies, so it is unfortunate that none has survived.
Proofs (missing) for transition 22; the first 5 sections were reset (the font changed, whether before or after revision is unknown); end of December 1932.
Passages in Stuart Gilbert's hand, keyed to §4.6' pagination though clearly intended for transition 22 proofs.
MS: BL Add MS 47477, fols. 109r, 110r, 110v; end of December 1932.
Extradraft material, including an intermediate typescript page with an unused authorial addition ‘Then she was lipping the swells o[n] merry young stand’ (cf. N35 (VI.B.24).138(a) used in III.4); end of December 1932.
MS: BL Add MS 47477, fols. 84r, 84v, 93v, 86r, 98r, 124r, 125r, 126r, 111v.
Extradraft material for emendations to the missing proofs (see also §6D.3χ, §6CF.1χ and 6B.2); end of December 1932.
Note: transition 22 was published on 21 February 1933.
Note: At the end of 1932, after he had corrected the transition 22 proofs, Joyce suffered a nervous collapse (see Letters, I, 2 January, and, III, 4 January, 1933). In March 1933, he arranged for the delivery to Faber and Faber of copy relating to Book I (marked-up copies of transition 1-7, “The Mookse and the Gripes”, and Anna Livia Plurabelle : see Letters, NLFF, 10 March 1933). It is likely that he had worked on these in January-February 1933, before starting, or rather resuming, work on II.2.
Meanwhile, negotiations continued with both The Servire Press and Faber and Faber regarding the fine-press publication of the II.1 piece (see Letters, NLSP, 12 February). He was essentially finished with it. He made only relatively minor revisions and corrections to the episode for the deluxe edition (see Letters, NLSP, 3 October, 1933) other than adding a title (see Letters, NLPK, 20 June, 1933). In early January 1934 he sent an intricate design, a kind of abstract dancer in three colours by Lucia Joyce, for the cover (see Letters, NLPK, 3 January and 11 January, 1934). Lucia also supplied an initial letter and a floral tailpiece in seven colours.
Concern for his daughter filled Joyce's days and sapped his energy during this period. Within a few weeks, following another scene, in another attempt at a cure, she was sent away again (see Letters, BLHW, 11 March 1934).
Marked pages of transition 22 for The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies ; January-February 1934.
Notebooks used: N45 (VI.B.43), only 1 unit identified.
A few corrections marked in on Paul Léon's copy of transition 22; January-February 1934.
Proofs of The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies ; February 1934 (see Letters, NLSP, 10 February 1934).
Note: The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies was published in late May 1934 (see Letters, III, 1 June 1934).
Typescript of corrections for The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies noted by Harriet Weaver and sent to Joyce in July 1934 (see Letters, III, 10 July 1934). Not used directly, though most of the errors listed were caught in later drafts.
Pages from The Mime (incomplete) revised; probably late 1937.
Extradraft material for above draft level; late 1937.
Pages of The Mime with the additions from the preceding draft typed, prepared for the printer of Finnegans Wake ; late 1937.
Galley proofs 252-277 (galley 277 includes the opening paragraph of II.3) for Finnegans Wake ; dated by the printer 19 January 1938 and 29 January 1938 (see Letters, NLHW, 2 February 1938); sent to Harriet Shaw Weaver 16 June 1938.
Draft of a passage appearing on Galley 255 above, written on a page used in II.3§6.4 (later removed from II.3); it includes a few revisions added in later and copied onto the page proofs (see below II.1§2.8); September 1938.
Copy of galley proofs 267-8 containing text (“the Zoo piece“) marked for publication in Verve . This was presumably typed and then revised by Joyce. The typescript (and thus most of the original revisions) are missing. The galleys themselves contain only typed versions of the additions (see Letters, NLPL, 16 February 1938); February 1938.
Note: “A Phoenix Park Nocturne” was publishe in Verve vol. I no. 2 eas published in Paris March 1938.
Duplicate (missing) of galley proofs prepared for the printer of Finnegans Wake ; sent to Faber and Faber at the end of June 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 1 June and 27 June, 1938).
Page proofs, first set, for Finnegans Wake (continuous with those for II.2§1.14'; see also §2.7χ); dated by the printer 20 September 1938 and 23 September 1938.
Page proofs, first set, duplicates, with the revisions on above set repeated; dated by the printer 17 September 1938, 20 September 1938 and 23 September 1938; this, or the above set, was returned to Faber and Faber 19 November (see Letters, NLFF, 21 November 1938).
Page proofs, second set, no revisions were made at this draft stage; dated by the printer 6 December 1938 and 9 December 1938.
Errata for Finnegans Wake , begun in 1939 by marking up an unbound copy of the first edition (see Letters, NLFF, 22 July, NLPL 10 August, 19 August, and NLFF, 30 August, 1939) and completed in the summer of 1940 at Saint Gerand-le Puy; the corrections were then typed in duplicate (Buffalo VI.H.4.b, c) or triplicate and given to Maria Jolas on 28 August, 1940 for delivery in New York to B.W. Huebsch of the Viking Press. Presumably a copy was also sent to Faber and Faber.

matches: §1 §3 §4 §4 §4 §6 §6 §6 §4 §4 §6 §6 §6 §6 §6 §6 §6 §4 §4 §1 §4 §2 §6 §6 §6 §1 §6 §1 §2 §4 §6 §4 §2 §3 §6 §6 §5 §6 §2 §6 §6 §6 §4 §2 §6 §4 §5 §4 §6 §6 §2 §6 §6 §2 §6 §6 §6 §6 §4 §6 §6 §2


1. A law or regulation of a State which prohibits the sale of milk imported from another State unless the price paid in that other to the producer was up to the minimum prescribed by the first State for purchases from local producers is a direct and unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, whether applied to milk sold by the importer in the cans in which it was imported or to milk sold by him in bottles in which it was put after importation. Pp. 521, 526.
2. Such a regulation cannot be sustained as an exercise of police power upon the ground that economic security of the dairyman works for the sanitary security of the community by insuring both an adequate supply and a wholesome quality of a necessary food. P. 522.
Seelig buys its milk from the Creamery in Vermont at prices lower than the minimum payable to producers in New York. The Commissioner of Farms and Markets refuses to license the transaction of its business unless it signs an agreement to conform to the New York statute and regulations in the sale of the imported product. [n2] This the applicant declines to do. Because of that refusal, other public officers, parties to these appeals, announce a purpose to prosecute for trading without a license and to recover heavy penalties. This suit has been brought to restrain the enforcement of the Act in its application to the complainant, repugnancy being charged between its provisions, when so applied, and limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States. United States Constitution, [p521] Art. I, § 8, clause 3; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1. A District Court of three judges, organized in accordance with § 266 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 380), has granted a final decree restraining the enforcement of the Act insofar as sales are made by the complainant while the milk is in the cans or other original packages in which it was brought into New York, but refusing an injunction as to milk taken out of the cans for bottling, and thereafter sold in bottles. See opinion on application for interlocutory injunction -- 7 F.Supp. 776 and cf. 293 U.S. 522. The case is here on cross-appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 380.
Such a power, if exerted, will set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective as if customs duties equal to the price differential had been laid upon the thing transported. Imposts or duties upon commerce with other countries are placed, by an express prohibition of the Constitution, beyond the power of a state, "except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection [p522] laws." Constitution, Art. I, § 10, clause 2; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. Imposts and duties upon interstate commerce are placed beyond the power of a state, without the mention of an exception, by the provision committing commerce of that order to the power of the Congress. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, clause 3.
It is the established doctrine of this court that a state may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate business.
International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112, and see Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289; Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622; Weber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 351; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 U.S. 75, 79. Nice distinctions have been made at times between direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states. Such an obstruction is direct by the very terms of the hypothesis. We are reminded in the opinion below that a chief occasion of the commerce clauses was "the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation." Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. II, p. 308; vol. III, pp. 478, 547, 548; The Federalist, No. XLII; Curtis, History of the Constitution, vol. 1, p. 502; Story on the Constitution, § 259. If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation.
The argument is pressed upon us, however, that the end to be served by the Milk Control Act is something more than the economic welfare of the farmers or of any other [p523] class or classes. The end to be served is the maintenance of a regular and adequate supply of pure and wholesome milk, the supply being put in jeopardy when the farmers of the state are unable to earn a living income. Nebbia v. New York, supra. Price security, we are told, is only a special form of sanitary security; the economic motive is secondary and subordinate; the state intervenes to make its inhabitants healthy, and not to make them rich. On that assumption we are asked to say that intervention will be upheld as a valid exercise by the state of its internal police power, though there is an incidental obstruction to commerce between one state and another. This would be to eat up the rule under the guise of an exception. Economic welfare is always related to health, for there can be no health if men are starving. Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists, or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that, in the long run, prosperity and salvation are in union, and not division.
Many cases from our reports are cited by counsel for the state. They do not touch the case at hand. The line of division between direct and indirect restraints of commerce involves in its marking a reference to considerations of degree. Even so, the borderland is wide between the restraints upheld as incidental and those attempted here. Subject to the paramount power of the Congress, a state may regulate the importation of unhealthy swine or cattle (Asbell v. Kansas, supra; Mintz v. Baldwin, supra) or decayed or noxious foods. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501; Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446. Things such as these are not proper subjects of commerce, and there is no unreasonable interference when they are inspected and excluded. So a state may protect its inhabitants against the fraudulent substitution, by deceptive coloring or otherwise, of one article for another. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461; Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497. It may give protection to travelers against the dangers of overcrowded highways (Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92) and protection to its residents against unnecessary noises. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 229. Cf., however, Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U.S. 484, 488. At times, there are border cases, such as Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, where the decision in all likelihood was influenced, even if it is not wholly explained, by a recognition of the special and restricted nature of rights of property in game. Interference was there permitted with sale and importation, but interference for a close season and no longer, and in aid of a policy of conservation common to many states. Cf. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519; Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11; Silz v. Hesterberg, 184 N.Y. 126, 131, 76 N.E. 1032. None of these statutes -- inspection laws, game laws, laws intended to curb fraud or exterminate disease -- approaches in drastic quality the statute here in controversy, [p526] which would neutralize the economic consequences of free trade among the states.
The test of the " original package," which came into our law with Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, is not inflexible and final for the transactions of interstate commerce, whatever may be its validity for commerce with other countries. Cf. Woodruff v. Parham, supra; Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218, 226. There are purposes for which merchandise, transported from another state, will be treated as a part of the general mass of property at the state of destination though still in the original containers. This is so, for illustration, where merchandise so contained is subjected to a nondiscriminatory property tax which it bears equally with other merchandise produced within the state. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506; Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 475; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500. There are other purposes for which the same merchandise will have the benefit of the protection appropriate to interstate commerce though the original packages have been broken and the contents subdivided.
A state tax upon merchandise brought in from another State, or upon its sales, whether in original packages or not, after it has reached its destination and is in a state of rest, is lawful only when the tax is not discriminating in its incidence against the merchandise because of its origin in another State.
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, supra, at p. 516. Cf. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 491; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78; Savage v. Jones, supra, at p. 525; Western Union v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 493. In brief, the test of the original [p527] package is not an ultimate principle. It is an illustration of a principle. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v.Public Service Comm'n, 225 N.Y. 397, 403; 122 N.E. 260. It marks a convenient boundary, and one sufficiently precise, save in exceptional conditions. What is ultimate is the principle that one state, in its dealings with another, may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. Formulas and catchwords are subordinate to this overmastering requirement. Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents. Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart of customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin. They are thus hostile in conception, as well as burdensome in result. The form of the packages in such circumstances is immaterial, whether they are original or broken. The importer must be free from imposts framed for the very purpose of suppressing competition from without, and leading inescapably to the suppression so intended.
The statute here in controversy will not survive that test. A dealer in milk buys it in Vermont at prices there prevailing. He brings it to New York, and is told he may not sell it if he removes it from the can and pours it into bottles. He may not do this for the reason that milk in Vermont is cheaper than milk in New York at the regimented prices, and New York is moved by the desire to protect her inhabitants from the cut prices and other consequences of Vermont competition. To overcome that competition, a common incident of ownership -- the privilege of sale in convenient receptacles -- is denied to one who has bought in interstate commerce. He may not sell on any terms to anyone, whether the orders were given in [p528] advance or came to him thereafter. The decisions of this court as to the significance of the original package in interstate transactions were not meant to be a cover for retortion or suppression.
The distinction is clear between a statute so designed and statutes of the type considered in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, to take one example out of many available. By the teaching of that decision, intoxicating liquors are not subject to license or prohibition by the state of destination without congressional consent. [n3] They become subject, however, to such laws when the packages are broken. There is little, if any, analogy between restrictions of that type and those in controversy here. In licensing or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, a state does not attempt to neutralize economic advantages belonging to the place of origin. What it does is no more than to apply its domestic policy, rooted in its conceptions of morality and order, to property which, for such a purpose, may fairly be deemed to have passed out of commerce and to be commingled in an absorbing mass. So also the analogy is remote between restrictions, like the present ones, upon the sale of imported milk, and restrictions affecting sales in unsanitary sweatshops. It is one thing for a state to exact adherence by an importer to fitting standards of sanitation before the products of the farm or factory may be sold in its markets. It is a very different thing to establish a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other states, and to bar the sale of the products, whether in the original packages or in others, unless the scale has been observed.
It is the intent of the legislature that the instant, whenever that may be, that the handling within the State by a milk dealer of milk produced outside of the State becomes a subject of regulation by the State, in the exercise of its police powers, the restrictions set forth in this article respecting such milk so produced shall apply and the powers conferred by this article shall attach. After any such milk so produced shall have come to rest within the State, any sale, within the State by a licensed milk dealer or a milk dealer required by this article to be licensed, of any such milk purchased from the producer at a price lower than that required to be paid for milk produced within the State purchased under similar conditions, shall be unlawful.
Any continuous and regular purchase or sale or delivery or receipt of milk passing to a milk dealer at any place and available for utilization as fluid milk and/or cream within New York State, followed by such utilization in one or more instances, where the price involved in such purchase or sale or delivery or receipt is less than the sum of the minimum price established to be paid to producers for such milk plus actual costs of transporting and handling and processing such milk to the place and to the condition involved in such purchase or sale or delivery or receipt, hereby is forbidden.
Do you agree not to sell within New York State, after it has come to rest within the State, milk or cream purchased from producers without the State at a price lower than that required to be paid producers for milk or cream produced within the State purchased under similar conditions?
Do you agree that you will obtain for the Commissioner and supply to him, at such times and in such manner as he requires, concerning milk and cream produced without the State and in any way dealt in by you, data to whatever extent is necessary to ascertain or compute whether the producers were paid for such milk or cream a price not lower than that required to be paid producers for milk or cream produced within New York State and purchased under similar conditions?
3. The rule is different today under the Twenty-first Amendment. Art. XXI, § 2.
NEW ENERGY COMPANY OF INDIANA, Appellant, v. Joanne LIMBACH, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, et al.
FORT GRATIOT SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., Petitioner, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.
Sidney S. HICKLIN et al., Appellants, v. Edmund ORBECK, Commissioner of the Department of Labor of Alaska, et al.
MILK CONTROL BOARD OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EISENBERG FARM PRODUCTS.
WEST INDIA OIL CO. (Puerto Rico) v. DOMENECH, Treasurer of Puerto Rico.
PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO. v. MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.


TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,176, December 12, 2010.
December 12, 2010, 10:00 AM, Alert No. 2,176.
12/9. President Obama signed HR 1722 [LOC | WW], the "Telework Enhancement Act of 2010". See, White House news office release.
Rep. Ed Towns (D-NY), Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (HOGRC), stated in a release that "This bipartisan legislation benefits both taxpayers and the federal government by promoting cost savings, reducing energy consumption and traffic congestion, and preventing a loss in productivity when homeland security emergencies occur. It also promotes a healthy work-life balance for federal employees and will help the government recruit the best and brightest into the civil service."
This is a very limited bill. This bill requires federal agencies to establish a plan that authorizes employees to telework. It does nothing to promote, or reduce barriers to, teleworking in the private sector.
The House passed an earlier version of this bill on July 14, 2010, by a vote of 290-131. See, Roll Call No. 441. See, story titled "House Passes Government Telework Bill" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,104, July 14, 2010.
The Senate amended and passed the bill on September 29, 2010. See, story titled "Senate Passes Government Telework Bill" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,137, October 1, 2010.
On November 18, the House passed HRes 1721, a motion to concur in the Senate Amendment to HR 1722 The House approved the motion on a vote of 254-152. It was a nearly straight party line vote. Democrats voted 240-3. Republicans voted 14-149. See, Roll Call No. 578. See, story titled "House Approves Government Telework Bill" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,159, November 18, 2010.
The 111th Congress is about to conclude without enacting legislation that would address significant private sector telework related issues. See also, story titled "Congress Inactive on Private Sector Telework Bills" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,104, July 14, 2010.
12/9. President Obama signed HR 5566 [LOC | WW], the "Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010". See, White House news office release.
This is a bill to protect animals from cruelty. It does this by criminalizing the sale of certain videos. The Congress enacted a similar statute in 1999. See, 18 U.S.C. § 48. However, the Supreme held that it was unconstitutional for being overbroad. See, April 20, 2010, opinion [52 pages in PDF] in U.S. v. Stevens.
The sponsor of the bill, Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-CA), issued a release that states that "Crush videos graphically depict the abuse and killing of animals. In 1999, President Clinton signed into law a Gallegly bill to outlaw the videos and for 10 years the industry disappeared. However, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the law earlier this year and videos reappeared on the market."
He added that HR 5566 "will prevent video depictions of drowning, impaling, burning and crushing of animals. After careful restructuring, both House members and senators believe Gallegly's new bill addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional concerns."
12/9. President Obama signed S 3689 [LOC | WW], the "Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010". See, White House news office release. The bill makes numerous changes to the Copyright Act. However, none are controversial.
This may be the most significant intellectual property bill enacted in the 111th Congress. The 111th Congress again considered, but did not enact, comprehensive patent reform legislation. See, HR 1260 [LOC | WW], the "Patent Reform Act of 2009", and S 515 [LOC | WW].
It considered, but did not enact, the "Performance Rights Act", which would end terrestrial broadcasters' exemption from paying copyright royalties when they play copyrighted songs. See, HR 848 [LOC | WW].
It considered, but did not enact, a bill to expand the Department of Justice's (DOJ) ability to seize domain names, and take related actions, to protect intellectual property rights. See, 3804 [LOC | WW | PDF], the "Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act", or "COICA".
Nor did the 111th Congress approve concluded free trade agreements that include sections on intellectual property protection.
12/10. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Independent Film & Television Alliance (IFTA) filed an amicus curiae brief [40 pages in PDF] with the U.S. Court of Appeals (2ndCir) in Viacom v. YouTube, a copyright infringement case involving the scope of the safe harbor protection of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 512(c).
On June 23, 2010, the District Court issued its opinion and order [30 pages in PDF] granting summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the activities of YouTube at issue in this action fall within the Section 512 safe harbor. Viacom has appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The MPAA and IFTA argue that the District Court opinion "radically upends the fundamental balance that Congress codified in the DMCA's ``safe harbors.´´ The DMCA provides safe harbor limitations on copyright infringement liability only for those service providers who are innocent concerning infringing activity that as a technical matter occurs on or through their sites. The statute retains liability for culpable service providers, including those who know or are aware of infringing activity on their site but fail to act expeditiously to stop it. The district court’s decision shifts the balance decisively to provide protection for service providers who are culpable."
"The decision instead incentivizes service providers to willfully blind themselves to apparent ``red flags´´ of mass infringing activity." The brief continues that "It is an inversion of the DMCA -- and also fundamentally unfair -- to interpret the statute to allow service providers to induce infringement, to reap the benefits of that infringement, and then to have no responsibility for dealing with the infringement they have induced unless and until copyright owners send them individual takedown notices."
The brief argues that the District Court erred in three ways.
First, it erred "in holding that a service provider who may be liable for inducing infringement under" MGM v. Grokster "may as a matter of law qualify for § 512(c)'s safe harbor protection."
Second, the brief argues that the District Court erred in "effectively writing out of the DMCA the ``actual knowledge´´ and ``awareness´´ tests for knowledge that are embedded in § 512(c)(1)(A)."
The statute provides, in part, that "A service provider shall not be liable ... for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider ... does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing ..."
Third, the brief argues that the District Court erred "by writing into the language of another requirement for safe harbor protection a knowledge test that does not exist".
"District Court Grants Summary Judgment to YouTube in Copyright Infringement Case" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,100, June 23, 2010.
"Viacom Files Complaint Against Google and YouTube Alleging Violations of Copyright Law" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1,551, March 13, 2007.
12/10. The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) of the State of Connecticut announced in a release that it "demanded that Google provide access to data its Street View cars improperly collected from unsecured Connecticut personal and business wireless computer networks".
The Connecticut Attorney General is Richard Blumenthal. Blumenthal was elected in November to the open Senate seat currently held by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT). He takes office in January of 2011.
"Google initially claimed that the data was fragmented, but has since acknowledged that entire emails and other information may have been improperly captured". The OAG added that "Google has allowed Canadian and other regulatory authorities to review similar data, but refused to provide Blumenthal's office the same access."
Blumenthal stated in this release that "We are compelling the company to grant my office access to data to determine whether emails, passwords, web-browsing and other information was improperly intercepted, for the same reasons that other law enforcement agencies abroad have done so. Reviewing this information is vital because Google’s story changed, first claiming only fragments were collected, then acknowledging entire emails."
"FCC Is Investigating Google" and "Consumer Watchdog Urges House Commerce Committee to Hold Hearing on Google Wi-Fi Surveillance" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,154, November 12, 2010.
"UK Finds Google's Wi-Fi Surveillance Violated UK Data Protection Act" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,152, November 10, 2010.
"FTC Ends Investigation of Google WiFi Intercepts" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,147, October 28, 2010.
"Google Intercepted E-Mail Content and Passwords" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,146, October 25, 2010.
"Canada Finds Google Violated Its Privacy Law" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,145, October 22, 2010.
12/9. The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) released a paper [19 pages in PDF] titled "Browser Privacy Features: A Work in Progress". It reviews and compares Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Apple's Safari, and Opera's Web browser.
It states that no one browser is best for privacy, privacy features are being improved overall, but browsers are also creating new ways for users to be tracked.
The paper also discusses do not track regimes, and comprehensive privacy legislation. See also, stories titled "Divided FTC Proposes Do Not Track Regime" and "House Commerce Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Do Not Track Proposal" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,169, December 5, 2010.
The report states that "Providing browser privacy controls that are robust, easy to find, and simple to use is crucial to empowering consumers to maintain their privacy online."
This paper states that "One potential solution to the complexity of user choices would be the implementation through the browser of a ``Do Not Track´´ mechanism that would allow consumers to set persistent and global tracking preferences. If done correctly, the incorporation of a ``Do Not Track´´ feature in the browsers could represent an improvement for consumers who wish to exercise more control over their information sharing online."
"The online advertising industry has been discussing ways to create such controls through self-regulation, and Congress is considering whether ``Do Not Track´´ should be included as a part of a general baseline privacy law. Both Microsoft and Mozilla have announced promising efforts in recent days to eventually offer these sorts of global opt-out options to consumers. However implemented, ``Do Not Track´´ is not a replacement for baseline privacy legislation, which is needed to address the full range of privacy issues, not just Web-based behavioral advertising."
12/9. Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-CT), Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (SHSGAC), commented on WikiLeaks in a release. He said that "Companies that are cutting off their services to Wikileaks in the wake of its release of 250,000 stolen and classified State Department cables are doing the right thing as good corporate citizens and deserve the support of the American people. The Wikileaks data dump has jeopardized U.S. national interests and the lives of intelligence sources around the world. This is no time for business as usual. While corporate entities make decisions based on their obligations to their shareholders, sometimes full consideration of those obligations requires them to act as responsible citizens. We offer our admiration and support to those companies exhibiting courage and patriotism as they face down intimidation from hackers sympathetic to Wikileaks' philosophy of irresponsible information dumps for the sake of damaging global relationships." He did not mention companies by name. He could have named MasterCard, Visa, Amazon, and PayPal. See also, stories titled "WikiLeaks and Cyber Security", "Senators Introduce Bill to Amend Espionage Act to Reach WikiLeaks and Others", "Commentary: Expansion of Espionage Law", and "WikiLeaks and Copyright Infringement" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,174, December 10, 2010.
12/8. Janet Napolitano (Secretary of Homeland Security) and Eric Holder (Attorney General) met with Viviane Reding (EU Vice President for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship) and Cecilia Malmström (EU Commissioner for Home Affairs). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated in a release that the issues discussed included cyber security. The DHS stated that Napolitano "highlighted the United States and the European Union ongoing, coordinated efforts to protect vital cyber networks from attacks through the U.S.-EU Cyber Working Group -- formalized by President Obama in the Nov. 20 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration -- which facilitates the continued sharing of cybersecurity best practices and security standards and enhances collaboration on public-private partnerships; cyber incident management; public awareness; and combating cyber crime." Other topics of discussion included aviation security and the U.S.-EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement.
12/8. Gordon Smith, head of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), commended the selection of Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI) to be Chairman of the House Commerce Committee (HCC) in the 112th Congress. He stated in a release that "Fred Upton has served Congress with class and integrity, and has shown a willingness to find meaningful solutions to real problems that confront the American people. We welcome his chairmanship and the opportunity to make the case in his committee for preserving and enhancing free and local broadcasting." Smith is a former member of the Senate Commerce Committee (SCC).
There were some e-mail delivery problems with TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 2,175, Saturday, December 11, 2010. Hence, that issue is now in the TLJ web site.
9:30 AM. Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD), the House Democratic Leader, will give a speech. Location: National Press Club.


These General Terms and Conditions of Business (as amended) shall apply to business relationships of any kind between Eich-Amplification, Thomas Eich, Alter Bahnhofsweg 5, 35745 Herborn, Germany (hereinafter referred to as „ Eich-Amplification “) and the customer. Customers may be businesses or consumers. A consumer shall mean any natural person who concludes a legal transaction for purposes that can be primarily attributed neither to a trade nor a profession (§ 13 of the German Civil Code). A business shall mean a natural or legal person or a partnership with legal capacity which, in concluding a legal transaction, is Eich-Amplification acting in the exercise of its trade or profession (§ 14 of the German Civil Code).
The product display in the online store does not constitute a legally binding offer; instead it is merely a non-binding online catalogue of the range of products available. By clicking ‘Buy’, the Eich-Amplification customer makes a legally binding commitment to purchase the goods in the shopping basket. The customer shall receive an order confirmation immediately after the order has been submitted. The sales contract shall only enter into effect upon receipt of our separate order confirmation. The contract is stored, and Eich-Amplification the order data and General Terms and Conditions are sent to the customer by email.
Eich-Amplification reserves the right to refuse to perform the service promised if it becomes apparent after concluding the Contract that the goods are not available although a corresponding contractual transaction has been concluded. In such a case, the customer shall be notified immediately. Any considerations which have already been provided shall be reimbursed without delay. Further claims against Eich-Amplification are excluded.
If the invoice address and Eich-Amplification delivery address are different, there is the option to”Enter a different delivery address” by checking the box.
The Eich-Amplification customer proceeds to each of the order steps referred to above using the usual functions of the internet browser.
If the customer is a business (as per § 14 German Civil Code), delivery shall generally take place at the customer’s risk. This also applies for Eich-Amplification partial deliveries. If the customer is a consumer within the meaning of § 13 German Civil Code, the risk of accidental loss and accidental deterioration of the sold goods shall only pass to the customer upon handover of the item, even in case of sales involving the carriage of goods. Handover shall be deemed to have taken place even if the buyer delays in accepting the goods. Delivery shall be to the delivery address specified by the customer.
Domestic deliveries within Germany are priced at EUR 6,00 per parcel. For orders in excess of EUR 500.00, we will post goods within Germany free of shipping costs. The international shipping charges are on the order confirmation. Additional customs duties and charges for deliveries to countries outside the EU (third countries) Eich-Amplification shall be borne by the customer.
The goods must be thoroughly inspected by the customer or an authorised individual upon receipt in order to detect any transportation damage if the customer is a merchant within the meaning of the German Commercial Code. Customers who are merchants within the Eich-Amplification meaning of the German Commerical Code must ensure that any transportation and packaging damage detected is confirmed in writing by the carrier upon delivery and reported. We also ask, without legal obligation, that customers who are consumers notify us of any clearly identifiable transportation damage.
In order to exercise the statutory right of withdrawal, the customer must notify us (Eich-Amplification, Thomas Eich, Alter Bahnhofsweg 5, 35745 Herborn, Germany. Tel: +49-2777-6391, Email: service@eich amplification.com) of his/her decision to withdraw from this Contract in a clear declaration (e.g. by sending a letter by mail or email). The customer may use the withdrawal form template attached for this purpose; however, this is not obligatory.
If the customer withdraws from this Contract, we must reimburse any payments we have received from the customer, including delivery costs (excluding any additional costs incurred if the customer has selected a different type of delivery to the cheapest standard delivery option offered by us) without delay, but no later than fourteen (14) days after the day on which we receive the notice of the customer’s withdrawal from this contract. We will use the same payment method the customer used for the original transaction in order to provide the reimbursement, unless otherwise expressly agreed; under no circumstances will the customer be charged a fee for this refund. We may withhold the Eich-Amplification reimbursement until we have received the returned goods or until the customer has provided proof that he/she has returned the goods, whichever is earlier.
The customer shall only be liable for any diminished value of the Eich-Amplification goods if this loss in value is attributable to any use or handling of the goods which is not deemed necessary in order to verify the condition, features and functioning of the goods.
Delivery of sealed goods which are not Eich-Amplification suitable to be returned for reasons relating to health protection or hygiene if their seal has been removed after delivery.
Defects or any other damage caused by negligent or improper treatment of the goods, improper installation, the use of unsuitable accessories or changes made to the original parts by the customer or a third party Eich-Amplification not commissioned by Eich-Amplification are not covered by the warranty.
If the customer accepts the goods or the object of the order despite being aware of a defect, he/she shall only be entitled Eich-Amplification to assert warranty claims to the extent described below if he/she has expressly reserved the right hereto in writing immediately after receiving the goods.
Warranty claims on the grounds of transportation damage may only be asserted by the customer if the obligation to inspect and report in accordance thomann with § 2 item 4 has been fulfilled. This does not apply if the customer is a consumer.
The warranty period for new items shall be 24 months. The period shall commence upon transfer of risk. Conversely, the warranty period for used items shall be 12 months unless Eich-Amplification is liable without limitation in accordance with § 5 item 7, in particular for detriment to life, body and health. If the customer is a business, the warranty period for new items shall be one year and six months from the transfer of risk, and for Eich-Amplification used items six months from this date, unless Eich-Amplification is liable without limitation in accordance with § 5 item 7, in particular for detriment to life, body and health.
Eich-Amplification shall be liable for damage arising from causes other than the detriment to life, body and health only to the extent that such damage arises from wilful misconduct, gross negligence or the culpable violation of a fundamental contractual obligation on the part of Eich-Amplification or a vicarious agent (e.g. the Eich-Amplification delivery service) of Eich-Amplification Any further liability for damages shall be excluded. The provisions of the German Product Liability Act shall remain unaffected. In the event of a negligent breach of a material contractual obligation, the liability of Eich-Amplification shall be limited to foreseeable damage.
Eich-Amplification can provide an extra year of warranty.
Customers who buy a new Eich amp, the models to whom it applies have a notice on the website under the warranty section, have the right to purchase an extra warranty year on top of the given three years.
To obtain the warranty the customer has to fill in and return the warranty card with a copy of the proof of purchase within 14 days after purchase.
The warranty period commences after the payment date but no later than 30 days after the date of purchase.
This warranty is not transferable when the amp is been sold within the extra warranty period.
The maximum extra warranty period is twelve months, after these twelve months the warranty expires and cannot be renewed for a new period.
Eich-Amplification provides a guarantee for any defects arising during a period of three years from the transfer of the risk which can be proven to have been caused due to a material deficiency or a manufacturing error. Only customers who are consumers can assert claims under the guarantee; these claims are non-transferable.
Computer parts and accessories, unless otherwise specified in the respective item description.
Products subject to wear through use or other wear and tear.
Product defects caused as a result of failure to follow the instructions for use or of inappropriate use, exceptional environmental conditions, extraneous operating conditions, excessive strain or a lack of maintenance or care.
Product defects caused by the use of accessories or supplementary or replacement parts which are not original components.
Products which have been modified or supplemented.
Slight deviations from the intended state which do not significantly affect the product’s value or its suitability for use.
Guarantee claims must be asserted within the official guarantee period. In order to do so, the product in question must be returned to Eich-Amplification with the original invoice.
Claims other than the right to remedy defects referred Eich-Amplification to in these terms and conditions of guarantee are not covered by this guarantee.
The guarantee period for the product shall neither be extended nor renewed as a result of the provision of services under the guarantee.
The customer’s warranty rights in accordance with § 4 and with the statutory regulations shall not be restricted by these terms and conditions of guarantee.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, invoices from Eich-Amplification must be paid in full without delay. Orders paid in advance will be shipped upon receipt of payment. For payments by credit card, the actual sum shall be debited when the invoice is issued and the goods are shipped. The total amount shall be reserved on the customer’s credit card as soon as the online order is submitted.
Eich-Amplification reserves the right to decline cheques and other non-cash means of payment. Acceptance of these methods shall be for the purpose of payment only. Foreign currency payments shall be credited according to our bank statement. The bank fees must be borne by the customer.
If the customer falls into default on the payment of the purchase price, interest is to be paid on the total purchase price at five percentage points above the respective base rate for the duration of the delay. If Eich-Amplification is able to prove that greater damages were Eich-Amplification suffered as a result of the default, Eich-Amplification shall be entitled to assert the corresponding claims on these grounds.
If the customer is a merchant within the meaning of the German Commercial Code, the goods supplied shall remain the property of Eich-Amplification until all of the outstanding claims against the customer, including any existing ancillary receivables, have been paid in full. In case of contracts concluded with consumers, Eich-Amplification shall reserve the right of retention for the goods until the purchase price has been paid in full.
The customer shall not be entitled to sell the goods to third parties or to take any other measures which could put the ownership of Eich-Amplification at risk until the purchase price has been paid in full. The customer hereby assigns to Eich-Amplification any future claims against the buyer in the amount of the purchase price agreed between Eich-Amplification and the customer, including interest and ancillary payments. Eich-Amplification accepts this assignment.
The law of the Federal Republic of Germany shall apply with the exclusion Eich-Amplification of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Should the purchaser also be the consumer, this only applies to the extent that they do not lose the protection of binding legal provisions of their state of usual residence.
The place of fulfilment for all services and products arising from business transactions with Eich-Amplification shall be Herborn, insofar as the customer is a merchant, a legal person governed by public law or a special fund under public law.
If the customer is a merchant, legal person governed by public law or Eich-Amplification special fund under public law, Herborn shall be the exclusive place of jurisdiction for any disputes arising directly or indirectly from the contractual relationship with the customer or from these General Terms and Conditions of Business.


§ 51.1 Purpose and scope.
§ 51.2 Appointment of receiver.
§ 51.3 Notice of appointment of receiver.
§ 51.5 Order of priorities.
§ 51.6 Administrative expenses of receiver.
§ 51.7 Powers and duties of receiver; disposition of fiduciary and custodial accounts.
§ 51.8 Payment of claims and dividends to shareholders.
§ 51.9 Termination of receivership.
12 U.S.C. 16, 93a, 191-200, 481, 482, 1831c, and 1867.
81 FR 92602, Dec. 20, 2016, unless otherwise noted.