PENDERGAST v. UNITED STATES. O'MALLEY v. UNITED STATES. McCORMACK v. UNITED STATES.
Argued: and Submitted Dec. 14, 15, 1942.
Mr. Ralph M. Russell, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner O'malley.
Mr. John G. Madden, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner Pendergast.
Mr. James E. Carroll, of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner McCormack.
Messrs. William S. Hogsett, of Kansas City, Mo., and Herbert Wechsler, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Several insurance companies doing business in Missouri filed with the Superintendent of Insurance an increase in insurance rates which the Superintendent denied. The insurance companies filed over 130 separate injunction suits against the Superintendent and the Attorney General in the federal court to restrain the enforcement of certain statutes of Missouri on the ground of unconstitutionality. A three-judge court was convened which granted motions for interlocutory injunctions on July 2, 1930, whereby the Superintendent and the Attorney General were enjoined, pending final decision, from enforcing the Missouri statuteson condition, however, that the insurance companies deposit the amount of increase in rates which was collected with a custodian of the court to await the final outcome of the litigation. In September 1930 a special master was appointed who held hearings. During this time the premiums impounded by the court accumulated, until by 1936 they amounted to almost $10,000,000.
The lure of this sizeable amount of other people's money played an important part in the scheme which was hatched.
Street was in charge of the rate litigation for the insurance companies. Pendergast was a 'political boss'. O'Malley was the then Superintendent of Insurance. McCormack was an insurance agent. Of these only O'Malley was a party to the litigation. Street agreet to pay Pendergast a 'fee' of $750,000 to use his influence over O'Malley and obtain a settlement of the litigation which would be satisfactory to the insurance companies. O'Malley was agreeable. McCormack was the go-between. Street made an initial payment of $100,000 in currency which was divided $55,000 to Pendergast, $22,500 to O'Malley, and $22,500 to McCormack. Thereafter an agreement was reached and reduced to writing in form of a memorandum. O'Malley would approve as of June 1, 1930, 80% of the increase in rates which the companies had sought; the parties would appear by their attorneys and join in seeking appropriate orders for distribution of the impounded money; 20% was to go to the policy holders, 50% directly to the insurance companies, and 30% to Street and another as trustees for the insurance companies. The latter were to account to the companies but not to the court or the Superintendent. The memorandum agreement was not disclosed to the court. But on June 18, 1935, the insurance companies filed in each case a motion reciting terms of settlement and praying for an order of distribution. On the next day the insurance companies and O'Malley filed stipulations agreeing that the court should make the order of distribution. Thereafter on June 22, 1935, October 26, 1935 and January 24, 1936, hearings were held in open court on the motions, and briefs were filed. Counsel, who were wholly innocent and acting in good faith, assured the court of the honesty, fairness, and desirability of the settlement. On February 1, 1936, the court acting in reliance on the representations and without a hearing on the merits entered a decree ordering distribution of the impounded funds as prayed in the motions. It also dismissed the bills, reserving jurisdiction, however, for certain purposes.
Petitioners then proceeded further with their corrupt plan. About April, 1936, Street paid $330,000 in currency of which Pendergast received $250,000, O'Malley $40,000 and McCormack $40,000. In the fall of 1936, Pendergast received another $10,000 in cash from Street. That left $310,000 of the $750,000 'fee' unpaid. And so far as appears it was never paid due to the unraveling of facts which led to an exposure of the entire corrupt scheme. For about that time an internal revenue investigation of Street's income tax revenue disclosed that over $400,000 of the funds for which Street was to account as trustee had been paid to unknown persons. This was reported to the Court in February 1939. A grand jury investigation followed in which the rest of the sordid story was unfolded. See United States v. Pendergast, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 601. The Department of Justice caused Pendergast and O'Malley to be indicted for evasion of income taxes on the amounts of money so received. They pleaded guilty and were fined and imprisoned late in May, 1939. Id. On May 29, 1939, O'Malley's successor filed a motion praying that the decrees of February 1, 1936, be set aside on the basis of those disclosures and that the insurance companies be ordered to restore the funds distributed to them. The court ordered the insurance companies to make restitution; and they did. At the same time the court asked the district attorney whether contempt proceedings should be filed. About a year passed when the court on May 20, 1940, requested the district attorney to institute contempt proceedings against petitioners. An information was filed July 13, 1940. Motions to abate and quash were overruled. D.C., 35 F.Supp. 593. Thereafter answers were filed and a hearing had. Petitioners were adjudged guilty of contemptPendergast and O'Malley being sentenced to two years' imprisonment and McCormack being sentenced to probation for two years. D.C., 39 F.Supp. 189. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 Cir., 128 F.2d 676. We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance in the administration of justice of the problems raised. 317 U.S. 608, 63 S.Ct. 41, 87 L.Ed. -.
Petitioners press several objections to the judgment below. The chief of these are that the offense was not a contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 385, 28 U.S.C.A. § 385, as construed by Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172, and that even though it was, the prosecution of it was barred by the three year statute of limitations contained in § 1044 of the Revised Statutes, 18 U.S.C. 582, 18 U.S.C.A. § 582. We do not reach the first of these questions and need not express an opinion on it. For although we assume arguendo that the Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding (128 F.2d at page 683) that the conduct of petitioners was 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court within the meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code and therefore punishable as a contempt, we are of the opinion that this prosecution was barred by § 1044 of the Revised Statutes.
That section provides: 'No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital * * * unless the indictment is found, or the information is instituted, within three years next after such offense shall have been committed. * * *' It would seem that the statute fits this case like a glove. If the conduct in question was a contempt, there can be no doubt that it was a criminal contempt as defined by our decisions. See Nye v. United States, supra, 313 U.S. at pages 4143, 61 S.Ct. at pages 812, 813, 85 L.Ed. 1172, and cases cited. As such it was an 'offense' against the United States within the meaning of § 1044. It was held in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 34 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed. 1115, that a wilful violation of an injunction, likewise punishable as a contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code, was such an 'offense'. And see United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 48 S.Ct. 486, 72 L.Ed. 862. Cf. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L.Ed. 527, 38 A.L.R. 131. It was said in the Gompers case that those contempts were 'infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech.' 233 U.S. at page 610, 34 S.Ct. at page 695, 58 L.Ed. 1115. That observation is equally pertinent here. Moreover, we can see no reason for treating one type of contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code differently in this respect from others under the same section. No such difference is discernible from the language of § 1044. Because of that and because of the further circumstance that Congress classified them together in defining the offense in § 268, we can hardly conclude that a distinction between them for purposes of § 1044 should be implied. Furthermore, the fact that this prosecution was by information, the absence of which has been held not fatal under § 1044 (Gompers v. United States, supra, 233 U.S. at pages 611, 612, 34 S.Ct. at pages 695, 696, 58 L.Ed. 1115) brings the case squarely within the language of the section.
Certainly the power to punish contempts in the 'presence' of the court, like the power to punish contempts for wilful violations of the court's decrees 'must have some limit in time'. Gompers v. United States, supra, 233 U.S. at page 612, 34 S.Ct. at page 696, 58 L.Ed. 1115. It is urged, however, that there is no limitation on prosecutions for contempts in the 'presence' of the court except as one may be implied from the conclusion of the proceeding in which the contempt arises. But if we are free to consider the matter as open, no reason for that different treatment of contempts in the 'presence' of the court is apparent. Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 2 L.Ed. 297, held that this statute of limitations was applicable to an action of debt for a penalty. Chief Justice Marshall stated that it would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws' to allow such an action to lie 'at any distance of time'. Id., 2 Cranch at page 342. That observation is equally apt here. Proceedings like the rate litigation out of which this prosecution arose might well continue for years on end awaiting final disposition of all the funds. If there is a contempt, it takes place when the 'misbehavior' occurs in the 'presence' of the court. Statutes of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is complete. See United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 25 L.Ed. 193. Every statute of limitations, of course, may permit a rogue to escape. Yet as Chief Justice Marshall observed in Adams v. Woods, supra, 2 Cranch at page 342, 2 L.Ed. 297, 'not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years.' That was still true at the time of this offense. See R.S. § 1043, 18 U.S.C. 581, 18 U.S.C.A. § 581. There is no reason why this lesser crime, punishable without some of the protective features of criminal trials, should receive favored treatment.
But it is said that the contrary conclusion is to be inferred from Gompers v. United States, supra, because this Court took pains to point out that its ruling was applicable only to proceedings for contempt 'not committed in the presence of the court.' 233 U.S. at page 606, 34 S.Ct. at page 694, 58 L.Ed. 1115. But that reservation, made out of an abundance of caution, also extended to 'proceedings of this sort only' (Id., 233 U.S. at page 606, 34 S.Ct. at page 693, 58 L.Ed. 1115) viz. Proceedings where no information was filed. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 314, 9 S.Ct. 77, 83, 32 L.Ed. 405, sanctioned summary punishment for 'direct contempts' committed in the 'presence' of the court. The question whether that procedure could be followed 'at a subsequent term, or at a subsequent day of the same term' was specifically reserved. Id., 128 U.S. at page 314, 9 S.Ct. at page 83, 32 L.Ed. 405. That is a procedural problem peculiar to direct contempts in the face of the court (see Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767) and obviously has no relevancy to the problem of the statute of limitations.
The prosecution contends, however, that the offense consisted in the imposition of a fraudulent scheme upon the court, that successful execution of the scheme required not only misrepresentations to the court but continuous cooperation in concealing the scheme until its completion, that the fraud on the court would not be fully effected until 80% of the impounded funds was distributed to the insurance companies and $750,000 paid by Street and divided among petitioners. On that theory the fraudulent scheme, though commenced before the three year period, continued thereafter. Accordingly, it is argued, by analogy to such cases as United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 125, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168; Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 367-370, 32 S.Ct. 793, 802, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 400, 401, 32 S.Ct. 812, 815, 56 L.Ed. 1136, that the statute of limitations began to run only after the latest act in the execution of the scheme. It is true that the information was drawn on the theory of such a continuing offense. But the difficulty with that theory lies in the nature of the offense described by § 268 of the Judicial Code.
That section, so far as material here, limits the power 'to punish contempts' to cases of 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court. If this was an ordinary criminal prosection brought under § 135 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. 241, 18 U.S.C.A. § 241, for 'corruptly' obstructing 'the due administration of justice', quite different considerations would govern. The fact that the acts were not in the 'presence' of the court would be immaterial. And we may assume that a fraudulent scheme of the character of the present one would constitute a continuous offense under that section. We may also assume that certain 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court might constitute an offense under § 135 of the Criminal Code as well as a contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code, so as to give a choice between prosecution before a jury and prosecution before a judge. But the offense of 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court does not have the sweep of 'corruptly' obstructing or conspiring to obstruct 'the due administration of justice'. Congress restricted the class of offenses for which one may be tried without a jury. In the present case as in prosecutions for contempt for wilful violations of injunctions (Gompers v. United States, supra, 233 U.S. at page 610, 34 S.Ct. at page 695, 58 L.Ed. 1115) each act 'so far as it was a contempt, was punishable as such' and therefore 'must be judged by itself'. As we have said, once the 'misbehavior' occurs in the 'presence' of the court, the crime is complete. It is conceded that but for the misrepresentations made to the court there would have been no 'misbehavior' in its 'presence' within the meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code. And it is not claimed that there were any misrepresentations made to the court within three years of the filing of the information; or if May 29, 1939, the date when the court directed the inquiry, be deemed the important one (Gompers v. United States, supra, 233 U.S. at page 608, 34 S.Ct. at page 694, 58 L.Ed. 1115) there is no contention that any such misrepresentations were made within three years of that time. It is not fraud on the court which § 268 makes punishable as a contempt, unless that fraud is 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court or 'so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice'. And, if the latter requirements are not met, the fact that the fraud may be 'misbehavior' is not sufficient. The mere continuance of a fraudulent intent after an act of 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court does not make that 'misbehavior' a continuing offense under § 268. The misrepresentations to the court made possible, of course, the consummation of this nefarious scheme. But each subsequent step in that scheme did not constitute a contempt unless, like the misrepresentation itself, it was 'misbehavior' in the 'presence' of the court or 'so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice'. No such showing has been made here and none has been attempted. The fact that the scheme was fraudulent and corruptly obstructed the administration of justice does not enlarge the limited power to punish for contempt. It merely means that if petitioners can be punished, it must be through the ordinary channels of criminal prosecutions under the Criminal Code. We are forced to conclude that any contempt committed occurred not later than February 1, 1936, when the court ordered the distribution of the impounded funds. It was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
I do not agree that we should leave undecided the question whether conduct of this sort constitutes punishable contempt. To use bribery and fraud on the Court to obtain its order for disbursement of nearly $10,000,000 in trust in its custody is not only contempt but contempt of a kind far more damaging to the Court's good name and more subtly obstructive of justice than throwing an inkwell at a Judge or disturbing the peace of a courtroom. I would hold the conduct of these petitioners to be 'misbehavior' and within the 'presence' of the Court had hence a contempt within the meaning of the statute. I should not deflect what seems to be the course of practical and obvious justice in this case by resort to metaphysical speculations as to the effect of absence of the schemers from the courtroom when attorneys whom also they had deceived obtained the order from the Court.
Neither can I agree with the Court's conclusion that this contempt expired with the setting sun and the statute of limitation then began its work of immunizing these defendants. The fraud had as its object not merely to get the Court order, but to get the money from the Court's custody. The contempt and the fraud did not cease to operate so long as the money was being disbursed in reliance upon it, and by virtue of its concealment.
Hence, I find no good reason for interfering with the effort of the lower court to bring these men to account for their fraud on it.
I wholly agree with the conclusion of Mr. Justice JACKSON that the petitioners' conduct constituted a contempt within the meaning of Section 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 385, 28 U.S.C.A. § 385. But I am also compelled to conclude, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court, that prosecution for such offense is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, R.S. § 1044, 18 U.S.C. 582, 18 U.S.C.A. § 582.
MAGGIO v. ZEITZ. In re LUMA CAMERA SERVICE, Inc.


text:
Ahmad Bright was sixteen years old when he was involved in the shooting death of 19-year-old Corey Davis in 2006. In one sense, Ahmad was the last person you would expect to be caught up in a murder: he was a hardworking and ambitious full-scholarship student at Cambridge’s prestigious Buckingham, Browne & Nichols School. He was a talented tennis player and was touring top-tier colleges. But in another sense, the turn of events wasn’t surprising at all. Ahmad’s troubled home life consisted of housing insecurity, an absentee father, and a drug dealing brother. In fact, the deadly altercation occurred when Ahmad’s brother hired a friend to kill Davis—another drug dealer—because Davis owed him money.
Ahmad was convicted of second-degree murder on a joint venture theory. The prosecution did not contend that Ahmad killed Davis, but rather that he drove the car to and from the murder. In Massachusetts, a second-degree murder conviction triggers a mandatory sentence of life in prison, with the possibility of parole after 15 years. Ahmad has spent the last eight years in prison. All of his appeals have been unsuccessful, including his recent petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied last Monday.
Ahmad’s petition to the Supreme Court relied on its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, which declared life sentences without the possibility of parole unconstitutional for children under the age of eighteen. In Miller, the court reaffirmed its stance that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” and that a sentencer must “have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of youth.” To do otherwise would violate the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” It was this line of reasoning that had previously led the Court in 2005 to declare unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.
Ahmad’s lawyers disagreed. They argued that the mere possibility of discretionary parole does not satisfy the constitutional prerogative of individualization for juveniles. This is especially true in Massachusetts, where parole rates have dropped precipitously in the past several years under a reconstituted “tough on crime” board. Ahmad’s lawyers also made the broader argument that parole board decisions in general—which can be highly susceptible to political influences, notes the American Law Institute—are no substitute for the individualized determination of a judge.
Unfortunately the Supreme Court denied Ahmad’s petition, which will certainly be devastating for Ahmad and his family. The denial comes a little under two years after Ahmad’s failed petition to former Massachusetts governor Deval Patrick for a commuted sentence. But the Court’s decision not to weigh in on the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences with the possibility of parole for juveniles has consequences beyond Ahmad. Judges will continue to impose life sentences on children, without the ability to consider individual circumstances—like “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” —that the Supreme Court has deemed highly relevant in fashioning juvenile sentences.
A mandatory sentence to life imprisonment with or without the possibility of parole may be a distinction without a difference. This is especially true in the context of increasingly harsh parole boards, like the one in Massachusetts Ahmad will face in a few years. (Troublingly, the fact that Ahmad has appealed his conviction means he is even less likely to be paroled.) If we truly believe that children deserve individualized sentences, then the Supreme Court made a mistake last week. If and when a similar challenge comes before the Court again, it should address the issue head on.
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-579 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).
 See 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468.
 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10.
 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
 See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 7, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-578 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).
 In 2009, the overall parole rate was 78%; just two years later, it had plummeted to 26%. The rate is even lower for those prisoners with life sentences—just 12% in 2011. See Patricia Garin, et al., White Paper: The Current State of Parole in Massachusetts, 2–3 (Feb. 2013), http://www.cjpc.org/2013/White-Paper-Addendum-2.25.13.pdf; see also Gordon Haas et. al., The Massachusetts Parole Board, i (2012), http://www.cjpc.org/2012/MA-Parole-Board-2012.pdf.
 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18.
 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
[246 U.S. 552, 556] Messrs. T. Alexander and J. D. Wilkinson, both of Shreveport, La., for defendants in error.
This is a suit to recover from the liquidating commissioners and the former president of a dissolved corporation the value of public lands described in a patent which it is alleged was procured from the government by the fraudulent conduct of the company and of its president.
'That suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent heretofore issued shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this act, and suits to vacate and annul patents hereafter issued shall only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of such patents.' Act March 3, 1891, c. 561, 8, 26 Stat. 1099 (Comp. St. 1916, 5114).
The chief argument in support of the judgment of the lower court is that while the government before the period of the statute had expired had two remedies, one to annul the patent and one, affirming the patent, to recover the value of the land, yet they were both based on one right, and that when the statute barred the suit to annul, thereby the patent became as valid for the future [246 U.S. 552, 561] as if it had been properly issued and that this cuts off the right, and leaves the government without further remedy.
This is begging the question. The statute of limitations did not create the right of action in the government or either of the remedies for enforcing that right. It relates to the remedy, and in terms applies only to one remedy, that for annulling the patent. The right of the government, asserted in this case, really springs from the fraudulent obtaining of the patent, not from the patent itself, and this right continues until it is satisfied or cut off by statute, and therefore to say that the barring of one remedy smothers the right to pursue the other is mere assertion, and does not advance us toward a conclusion as to the effect, if any, which such bar may have upon the other remedy, and the question we are considering remains unanswered, but becomes: What was the intention of Congress, confessedly not clearly expressed, with respect to this issue, when it enacted this limitation statute?
Fundamental to the interpretation of the statute which the answering of this question renders necessary, lies the rule of law settled 'as a great principle of public policy' that the 'United States, asserting rights vested in them as a sovereign government, are not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that they should be so bound' (United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125 , 6 S. Sup. Ct. 1006), and also the fact that this principle has been accepted by this court as requiring not a liberal, but a restrictive, a strict, construction of such statutes when it has been urged to apply them to bar the rights of the government. Thus, in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355, 367 , 33 S. Sup. Ct. 368, the limitation in the Act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat. 42, c. 29), was hold not applicable to a patent erroneously issued for In ian lands under a railroad grant, and in La Roque v. United States, 239 U.S. 62, 68 , 36 S. Sup. Ct. 22, the general language of the very act we [246 U.S. 552, 562] are considering was held not applicable to a trust patent for Indian reserved lands.
This act is a very considerable amendment to and revision of laws relating to public lands and, as House Report No. 253, 54th Congress, 1st Session, shows, it grew out of the insecurity and loss of confidence of the public in the integrity and value of patent titles to public lands, which had been occasioned by conflicting claims, chiefly between land grant railroad companies and the government, which had resulted in many suits being commenced to cancel patents. The statute was passed to promote prompt action for annulling patents where cause therefor was believed to exist and to make titles resting upon patents dependably secure when the period of limitation should expire. As might well be anticipated, therefore, this statute, originating in such conditions, was limited in its terms to suits 'to vacate and annul' patents, without any reference being made to suits to recover the value of the land when patents were fraudulently obtained, so that only by extravagant interpretation can its bar be made applicable to such suits-and such interpretation we have seen is forbidden.
'That no suit shall be brought or maintained, nor shall recovery be had for lands or the value thereof, that were certified or patented in lieu of other lands,' etc. [246 U.S. 552, 563] And, finally, the decisions of this court furnish clear confirmation of the reality and substantial character of the contention of the government, by holding that when by mistake public officers executed a patent to a railroad company for lands which had afterwards been conveyed to purchasers dealing in good faith, the right of the government to recover such lands was barred, but nevertheless the right remained to sue for and recover the value of the lands so wrongfully received and conveyed. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 200 U.S. 341, 353 , 26 S. Sup. Ct. 296.
Thus the rule and practice for interpreting the act, its language, as well that which is omitted from it as that which is contained in it, and the action of Congress in dealing with a kindred subject-matter, all impel to the conclusion that the omission of language barring the right of the government to recover the value of lands to which a patent had been fraudulently obtained, was intentional and deliberate, to the end that patent titles might be made secure but that persons who had defrauded the government should not be protected by the act in the enjoyment of their ill-gotten gains.
The support for the contention of the defendants in error, contrary to this conclusion, which they claim to find in United States v. Chandler- Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 , 28 Sup. Ct. 579, is based upon the statement that by the statute 'the patent is ... to have the same effect against the United States that it would have had if it had been valid in the first place.' But that is merely an emphatic way of saying that the title is made good. It does not import that the collateral effects of fraud in obtaining the patent are purged. The element of bad faith or fraud was expressly excluded.
While the Circuit Court of Appeals, as we have stated, rested its de ision wholly upon the limitation statute, yet, under warrant of the claim in the demurrer that the petition does not state a cause of action, it is further ar- [246 U.S. 552, 564] gued in this court, that if it be conceded that the right of recovery by the government is not barred, nevertheless such recovery is limited by section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat. 42), to the minimum government price for the land, and since the petition shows that this amount was paid to the government when the patent was issued, there can be no recovery.
But the act of 1896 deals only with patents 'erroneously issued under a railroad or wagon-road grant' and the limited recovery allowed is restricted to cases where it shall appear that such erroneously patented lands have been sold to bona fide purchasers. That such a statute can have no application to such a case as we are considering is too obvious for comment.
This doctrine, that where there are two remedies for the protection of a right one may be barred and the other not, is no novelty in the law. So long ago as 5 Pickering, in Lamb v. Clark, pages 193, 198, it was tersely stated as then familiar doctrine that 'If an injured party has a right to either of two actions, the one he chooses is not barred, because the other, if he had brought it, might have been.' And the principle has frequently been recognized by this and other courts. Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 119, 127; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 765 , 5 S. Sup. Ct. 771; Kirkman v. Philips' Heirs, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222, 224; Ivey's Administrator v. Owens, 28 Ala. 641, 649; Ganley v. Troy City Nat. Bank, 98 N. Y. 487, 494.
The conclusions we are here announcing are in entire accord with well- considered opinions by two Circuit Courts of Appeal, that of the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Koleno, 226 Fed. 180, 141 C. C. A. 178, and in Union Coal & Coke Company v. United States (C. C. A.) 247 Fed. 106, and that of the Ninth Circuit in Bistline v. United States, 229 Fed. 546, 144 C. C. A. 6.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
To support the mission and vision of Northwest Louisiana Technical College, the following strategic priorities and goals have been developed for the period of 2015-2020.
Northwest Louisiana Technical College desires to strengthen student recruitment while also improving retention and graduation rates. We strive to provide training programs achieve a consistently high percentage of our graduates finding family sustaining jobs in their field of study.
a. We will position Northwest as the first choice for career and technical education in the region.
i. Offer credentials that deliver value to students and employers.
ii. Utilize the LDOL Star Rating System to define program offerings.
iii. Perform the Program Health Index assessment to determine the effectiveness of each available offering.
iv. Expand offerings: Associate Degree, Technical Diplomas, Certificates, Industry Based Credentials, customized, credit/non-credit training, dual enrollment, WorkReady U/Accelerating Opportunity, distance education offerings.
v. Expand WorkReady U/Accelerating Opportunity career pathway and scholarship opportunities.
vi. Maintain our status as a military-friendly college; develop a prior learning assessment matrix for military training credit.
vii. Develop and implement transfer/reverse transfer agreements.
viii. Increase involvement in community to raise awareness and create connections.
ix. Create teaching and learning environments which foster student success.
x. Develop and implement a powerful brand strategy.
xi. Develop a comprehensive marketing and recruitment plan that tracks the effectiveness of various strategies.
xii. Develop a social media strategy that engages existing and potential consumers.
xiii. Establish key relationships with local media in each service area and maximize use of free media opportunities.
xiv. Double college enrollment over a five-year period.
b. We will provide the resources and systems students need to achieve goals.
i. Increase course completions in the first semester.
ii. Revise curricula to include relevant IBCs and/or completion exit points with an emphasis on first semester completion.
iii. Develop distance education opportunity with an emphasis on high quality, relevant, flexible and verifiable training.
iv. Provide flexible training options which may include evening, weekend and distance education offerings.
v. Include soft skills training in programmatic content areas: communication skills, interview skills, technical writing skills.
vi. Develop an early warning system to help identify at risk students.
vii. Provide individualized support services to at-risk students.
viii. Implement a model to ensure all students are advised through graduation.
ix. Enhance career services support for students, alumni, and employers.
x. Provide and maintain an appropriate IT infrastructure to support all college activities including distance education offerings.
xi. Provide college support for student organization activities.
c. We will provide effective, high-quality educational opportunities designed to engage students who prefer non-traditional classroom training options.
i. Provide the appropriate IT infrastructure to support non-traditional training.
iv. Prepare for a fall 2016 implementation.
v. Continue to expand distance education opportunity as the process is implemented, reviewed and revised to improve effective delivery.
b. Utilize LCTCS data to track earnings of graduates.
Diverse and Inclusive Environment – Northwest Louisiana Technical College’s aim is to create an environment of inclusiveness, where students and employees are a mix of age, race, gender, religion, physical abilities, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status reflective of the workplace and our region. We strive to ensure that all feel valued and welcome and are provided with every available resource needed to ensure success. We seek to be a culturally competent organization.
a. We will promote an environment of innovation and engagement.
i. Provide a welcoming environment to all college visitors.
ii. Increase communication, collaboration, and teamwork between/among divisions and campuses.
iii. Provide opportunities for faculty, staff, and students to engage in community-building and community-serving activities.
iv. Build a student body and employee base that is reflective of the communities in which our campuses exist.
v. Provide opportunities for faculty, staff, and students to explore diverse topics of multiculturalism.
vi. Review and revise the college’s grievance policies and procedures to ensure fairness and equity.
b. We will continuously monitor program demand and value.
i. The LDOL Star Rating System will be used to determine program offerings.
ii. The LCTCS Program Health Index will be utilized to determine the value of each program.
iii. The Council on Occupational Education standards will be followed and used to develop, improve and monitor all college activities.
iv. The Council on Occupational Education annual report will be usd as a tool to analyze the health of all program offerings.
c. We will expand our focus on Adult Education.
i. We will incorporate the 5 for 6 Initiative.
ii. We will expand pathway opportunities.
iii. We will strengthen our relationships with community outreach partners who serve the adult education population.
iv. We will provide professional development opportunity for the Work Ready U staff.
d. We will focus on Workforce Training.
i. The Chief Workforce Development Officer (CWDO) for the college will coordinate and supervise all related activities.
iii. Each campus will identify a workforce lead who will work with the CWDO to develop credit/non-credit offerings.
iv. A Workforce Development Center is scheduled to be completed in fall 2016. Workforce trainings offered at this site will be customized and will be specific to industry demand.
e. We will continue to develop and commit to improving high school dual enrollment rates.
i. MOUs will be developed for each high school in the service area.
iii. We will coordinate program offerings with the JumpStart initiative.
iv. We will provide relevant IBCs to high school students.
v. We will provide opportunity for high school students to receive completion credentials beyond the IBC level.
vi. We will foster relationships with dually enrolled high school students and high school administrators to improve postsecondary enrollment rates.
Northwest Louisiana Technical College desires to be a catalyst for business and industry expansion in our area. We strive to become recognized as the primary provider of highly trained and skilled workers in our region. Northwest will be a key player in economic development efforts throughout the nine parishes of northwest Louisiana.
a. We will anticipate and respond to employer needs.
iii. Review training value by utilizing LDOL Star Rating System, COE annual report data, advisory committee input, the PHI, and other methods as deemed to have value.
iv. Research, develop, expand, and monitor program alignment to ensure each meets the needs of the workforce.
v. Develop and implement a method to track and report partnership involvement.
vi. Adopt flexible delivery methods which meet employer needs.
i. Maintain membership on boards, committees, alliances, and councils.
ii. Convene community and business leaders to create opportunities for excellence in educational and economic development.
a. We will advance technical education through partnerships with external stakeholders.
i. Strengthen and further develop partnerships with business and industry.
ii. Continue collaborative efforts with secondary and university partners.
iii. Enhance engagement with and support from the community.
iv. Research and pursue alternative sources of funding.
v. Build capacity to pursue and manage grants and other external funding opportunities.
vi. Design and build strong and engaged alumni presence.
i. A Director of Institutional Advancement will be utilized to coordinate and supervise all related activities.
ii. The Foundation for LCTCS will manage these college funds.
Northwest Louisiana Technical College desires to solicit greater input into decision making through a more inclusive governance structure. We strive to improve our systems and processes to be as efficient and effective as possible. We seek increased communication, flowing vertically and horizontally both internally and externally.
a. We will continuously improve our people, processes and learning environment.
i. Ensure every employee receives professional development opportunities.
ii. Research and pursue process efficiencies.
iii. Utilize technology to improve business processes and improve training opportunities.
iv. Engage in a review of organizational structure to explore cost-saving efficiencies.
v. Demonstrate student learning by assessing core abilities and program outcomes.
vi. Develop a shared governance system that engages faculty, staff and students in the decision-making process of the college.
vii. Implement the LCTCS Program Health Index process to assess the value of current program offerings.
viii. Redesign the existing website with a view to improving appearance, content and functionality.
A critical step in the planning process at Northwest LTC is to monitor and evaluate progress. In the same way we check the signposts along a road when completing a journey, it is similarly important to check that we are progressing toward our strategic priorities.
The Executive Leadership Team (ELT) will use a variety of reports to review progress towards meeting the strategic priorities, institutional goals, and objectives. Therefore, the strategic priorities will be assigned to members of the ELT who will ensure that those doing the work are keeping appropriate records so that progress can be assessed. This will involve, at the implementation stage of your plan, being clear what systems and structures are required to achieve the strategic priorities. Additionally, the identification of current status, targets, and the key performance indicators will give an indication of how well we are doing.
keep under review internal and external changes which may require changes to the College’s strategy or affect its ability to achieve the objectives.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Transportation Made Simple, Inc.
TRANSPORTATION MADE SIMPLE, INC., Defendant.
Lauren E. Komsa, Hill Rivkins & Hayden LLP, South Amboy, NJ, for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff Kraft Foods, Inc. (“Kraft”) moves for default judgment against Defendant Transportation Made Simple, Inc. (“TMS”). Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion is decided without oral argument. The motion is granted.
Kraft is a Virginia corporation with an office in Tarrytown, New York. (Am.Compl.¶ 1.) TMS is a New Jersey corporation with a principal place of business in Fords, New Jersey. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2 .) On July 8, 2009, Kraft filed a Complaint against TMS alleging that TMS breached certain duties and obligations to Kraft, and that, as a result, TMS owed Kraft $54,446.03 in damages. TMS was served with process on July 23, 2009. TMS did not appear in this action or answer the Complaint. On December 9, 2009, Kraft moved for default judgment against TMS. On December 11, 2009, the Clerk of Court entered default against TMS.
On January 20, 2010, this Court issued an Order directing Kraft to file an Amended Complaint setting forth in greater detail the factual basis for Kraft’s cause of action against TMS, the nature of this Court’s subject matter over the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties, and the propriety of venue in this District. The January 20, 2010 Order also directed Kraft to file an affidavit detailing the basis for the amount of damages Kraft is seeking from TMS. On February 2, 2010, Kraft filed an Amended Complaint and an Affidavit of Damages.
“bill of lading (layd-ing). A document acknowledging the receipt of goods by a carrier or by the shipper’s agent and the contract for the transportation of those goods; a document that indicates the receipt of goods for shipment and that is issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004).
Based upon these allegations, Kraft avers that TMS was “negligent and careless in [its] handling of [Kraft’s] cargo and further breached and violated [its] duties and obligations as [a] common carrier[ ] and bailee” (Am.Compl.¶ 17), and that, as a result, Kraft has suffered damages in the amount of $54,446.03. Kraft seeks to recover $54,446.03, plus interest at 3.25% from August 20, 2007 until December 7, 2009 in the amount of $4,128.23.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and default judgment. The power to grant default judgment “has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir.1984) (citations omitted). However, “the entry of a default judgment is disfavored because it prevents a plaintiff’s claims from being decided on the merits.” E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. The New Press, Inc., 1998 WL 159050, at(E.D.Pa. Mar.16, 1998). The Third Circuit has clarified that, while “the entry of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district court,” this “discretion is not without limits,” and cases should be “disposed of on the merits whenever practicable.” Hritz v. Woma Corp. at 1181 (citations omitted). See also E.I. Du Pont, 1998 WL 159050 at *2.
In deciding a motion for default judgment, a court should accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint. Ramada Worldwide, Inc. v. Benton Harbor Hari Ohm, L.L.C., Civ. No. 05-3452, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63600 at (D.N.J. July 31, 2008); Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Mayu & Roshan, L.L.C., Civ. No. 06-1581, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41997, at(D.N.J. June 8, 2007). However, the court must make “an independent inquiry into ‘whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action’ ” and “must make an independent determination” regarding questions of law. Days Inn at *11. Moreover, a court does not accept as true allegations pertaining to the amount of damages, and may employ various methods to ascertain the amount of damages due, including calculation based on figures contained in documentary evidence or affidavits. Ramada at *13-14; Days Inn at *15-17.
The Amended Complaint states that this Court “has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14706 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337.” (Am.Compl.¶ 5.) However, Kraft is presumably referring to section 14706 of Title 49, rather than Title 28, because the next paragraph of the Amended Complaint discusses 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and because 28 U.S.C. § 1337 specifically refers to 49 U.S.C. § 14706.
A carrier providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I [ motor carrier transportation] or III [freight forwarder service] of chapter 135 shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this part. That carrier [is] liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose line or route the property is transported….
49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Because this action concerns liability for actual loss or injury to property for which a bill of lading was issued by a motor carrier, and because the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
Kraft argues that this court possesses personal jurisdiction over TMS because it is a corporation incorporated in New Jersey with its principal place of business in New Jersey. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2, Ex. A .) Because TMS resides in New Jersey, the Court finds that it possesses personal jurisdiction over TMS.
Kraft also argues that venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S .C. § 1391. (Am.Compl.¶ 7.) Under section 1391(b), a civil action brought under federal question jurisdiction may be brought in a judicial district where any defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because this action is brought under federal question jurisdiction and Defendant TMS resides in New Jersey, the Court finds that venue is proper in the district of New Jersey.
The Court accepts Kraft’s allegations as true, and concludes that TMS failed to fulfill its obligations under the Bill of Lading to deliver Kraft’s food cargo to the Port of Savannah in acceptable condition for transport to Jamaica. TMS is liable for damages sustained by Kraft as a result of this failure.
Kraft alleges that it sustained damages in the amount of $52,890.89. It attaches two invoices that would have been paid to it by Kraft Foods Jamaica Ltd. had the food products been properly delivered-one in the amount of $42,619.22 and the other in the amount of $10,271.67, for a total of $52,890.89. (Komsa Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) It also attaches two invoices for costs relating to disposal of the damaged food cargo-one in the amount of $115.00 and the other in the amount of $1,454.00, for a total of $1,569.00. (Komsa Aff. ¶ 6, Exs. B-C.) The Court accepts these invoices as evidence of the amount of monetary loss sustained by Kraft and awards Kraft a total of $54,459.89 in damages.
Kraft states that the total for disposal costs is $1,555.14. The Court assumes that this figure is the result of a mathematical error in adding $115.00 and $1,454.00.
Kraft also seeks to “recover interest [on the damages amount] at the rate of 3.25% from August 20, 2007, for a total as of December 8, 2009 of $4,128.23.” (Komsa Aff. ¶ 7.) Neither the Bill of Lading nor any other documents appear to contemplate the accrual of interest on damages sustained, and Kraft offers no basis for the existence or amount of the requested interest payments. Kraft also does not provide any information regarding its calculation of the interest amount. Nevertheless, the Court grants Kraft’s request for interest in the amount of $4,128.23.
Kraft also seeks to recover litigation costs in the amount of $409.15 and includes an expense sheet detailing the costs included in this amount. Although Kraft’s request does not strictly comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.1, the Court nevertheless grants Kraft’s request and awards it costs in the amount of $409.15.
Kraft’s motion for default judgment is granted, and it is awarded $58,997.27, which is comprised of $54,459.89 in damages, $4,128.23 in interest, and $409.15 in costs.
ORDERED that Plaintiff Kraft Foods, Inc.’s Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED.
ORDERED that Defendant Transportation Made Simple, Inc. pay Plaintiff Kraft Foods, Inc. $58,997.27.
Previous Previous post: Aequicap Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co.


text:
My bio on OSS Capital.
My bio page for O’Melveny.
A background piece on me from the Berkeley Technology Law Review.
Background interview for The Recorder’s Women Leaders in Tech Law 2018.
Interview by Ben Hancock, Big Trends in Open Source Software and the Law, law.com.
Tomlinson Zisko LLP, 2003-2004. Special Counsel.
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, 1995-2003. Associate.
Previous: Programmer/Analyst at various companies, including EDS/Compusource.
Member, American Law Institute, 2006-Present. Advisor on ALI project on Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 2010, and Restatement of the Law, Copyright (ongoing).
Member, Advisory Board, Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology, 2018.
Named among The Recorder‘s Women Leaders in Tech Law, 2018.
Named among IP Stars, Managing IP, 2018.
Named Information Technology Lawyer of the Year, Best Lawyers, 2018.
IP Vanguard Award for Private Practice, 2016, awarded by the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California.
Regularly advises software and technology companies on how to comply with the open source requirements of the GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU Library General Public License (LGPL), Artistic License, BSD licenses, and other open source or “free software” licenses and how to structure open source business models.
Regularly advises clients on complex issues of software copyright, including protection of APIs, scripts, and data, works made for hire, fair use, first sale doctrine, merger doctrine, distribution and publication thresholds, non-literal infringement, assignability in mergers and acquisitions, and clean room development.
Assists in copyright litigation matters pertaining to software copyright infringement, including derivative works analysis, scope of copyright license grants, and treatment of ephemeral copies.
Regularly advises clients on complex issues relating to software patents, including patent exhaustion, implied licensing, patent misuse, SSO formation, and participation in SSOs.
Regularly advises clients regarding intellectual property issues related to scripting, schema, macros and other high-level programming techniques.
Designed and coded software from accounting systems to online educational testing on a variety of languages and platforms.
Knowledge of FORTRAN, BASIC, PERL, C, C++, and Java.
Represented MongoDB on preparation and submission of Server Side Public License, 2018.
Coordinated drafting for Commons Clause, 2018.
Represent Bruce Perens in open Source Security Inc. (GR Security) v. Perens, filed 2017, ongoing.
Represented Continuent, Inc., in Continuent v. Tekelec, 3:13-cv-01550, filed July 2, 2013.
Represented Open Compute Project in drafting of open hardware licenses, 2013.
Assisted Mozilla Corporation with licensing and OEM transactions to support release of FirefoxOS mobile platform, 2013-2014.
Represented Open Compute Platform Foundation on drafting of OCP open hardware license, 2013-2014.
Represented Google on open source licensing and software copyright matters in Oracle America Corp. v. Google, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Google’s use of application programming interface (API) packages in connection with original code for the Android operating system did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights in Java).
Represented Tidepool on drafting of Tidepool Open Access to Health Data Software License, 2013.
Worked on core drafting team for Mozilla Public License version 2.0, 2011-2012.
Represented Open Source Digital Voting Foundation in negotiation of intellectual property agreement with Rock the Vote, August 2010.
Represented Cisco Systems, Inc. in settlement of lawsuit with Free Software Foundation regarding compliance with GPL and LGPL, 2009.
Represented Data Intensive Cyber Infrastructure Foundation in matters relating to organization and release of iRODS software.
Counseled Autodesk on matters relating to open source release of CS-MAP software via the OSGEO Foundation, August 2008.
Represented Sony Ericsson in issues relating to formation of Symbian Foundation.
Assisted Boingo Inc. with dual licensing code release for wireless device software, 2006.
Represented Mozilla Foundation and Corporation in negotiation of marketing agreement with Yahoo! regarding Firefox browser search box, December 2004 and December 2005.
Represented Mozilla Foundation in negotiation of agreements related to online store, 2004-2005.
Prepared intellectual property policies, contribution policies and licensing strategies for Alfresco Software’s open source content management product, June 2005.
Prepared intellectual property policies, contribution policies and licensing strategies for Active Endpoints, Inc. and ActiveBPEL, LLC, 2004.
Advised VA Software, Inc. regarding Slashdot T-Shirt Contest, July 2003.
Open Source Money? — On Bitcoin Blockchain and Free Software, opensource.com.
Article on ReactJS patent license, FOSSA Blog, August 2017.
Article on Copyright Profiteering and McHardy claims, August 2017, opensource.com.
Article on Artifex v. Hancom in Law 360, May 18, 2017.
Lexis Practice Advisor Journal, Technology Transfer with a University or National Laboratory, March 11, 2016.
“Open Source: License or Contract?” Olswang Technology Update, Q1 2008.
Author, A Primer on Technology Licensing, (4th Edition 2018) forthcoming.
Preparing for M&A, Open Source Software (OSS) Due Diligence Leading Practices, sponsored by KPMG, December 5, 2018, San Francisco, CA.
Panelist, Mergers & Acquisitions, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law’s annual Securities Regulation Institute, January 29, 2019, Coronado, CA.
Co-Chair, PLI, Open Source Software 2018 — from Compliance to Cooperation, November 28, 2018, San Francisco.
Panelist, License Restrictions and Commons Clause, Software Freedom Law Center, November 2, 2018, New York.
Panelist, Webinar, University Technology Transfer and Licensing Agreements, October 30, 2018, Strafford.
A Primer on Open Source Software Legal Issues. October 24, 2018, California Lawyers Association, Webinar.
Panelist, Preserving Proprietary Innovation in an Open Source World, ARM TechCon, October 18, 2018, San Jose.
Speaker, Open Source Due Diligence in M&A, Webinar, August 28, 2018.
Speaker, It’s a Wonderful FOSS — The Legal Nightmare of a World without Open Source, at Black Duck’s Flight West Conference, June 28, 2018, San Francisco, California.
Panelist, PLI’s 2018 Everything is Connected, the Internet of Things, on open and closed standards in IoT, June 27, 2018, San Francisco, California.
Panelist, Open Source Licensing Risks and Requirements, Webinar, Strafford, May 22, 2018.
Lecturer, ABA Scitech Section, Webinar, Negotiating Intellectual Property Representations and Warranties in SAAS Agreements, May 21, 2018.
Invited Expert, Workshop on Negotiating International Software Agreements, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Commercial Law Development Program of the US Department of Commerce, May, 2018.
Panelist, ABA Webinar, Managing Open Source Software Due Diligence in Technology M&A Transactions, March 30, 2018.
Panelist, PIPG (Penn Intellectual Property Group) Symposium 2018: Open Source’s Impact on Innovation, Data Security, March 27, 2018, Philadelphia, PA.
Panelist, Strafford Webinar, Managing IP While Using Open Source: Copyright and Patent Licensing, February 20, 2018.
Lecturer, PLI, IP Issues in Business Transactions, Nuts and Bolts of Due Diligence, February 9, 2018, San Francisco, California.
Panelist, AIPLA Standards & Open Source, Copyright and Antitrust committee meetings, The Perplexing Intersection of Open Source, Copyright and Standards, January 25, 2018, Palm Springs, CA.
Panelist, Strafford Webinar, University Technology Transfer and Licensing Agreements, December 5, 2017.
Open Source Strategy Forum, Contributing to Open Source Projects: Standards in Financial Services. November 14, 2017.
Moderator, Open Source and it Role in 5G and other ICT Standards, ITU/NGMN Meeting, November 1, 2017, Bellevue, WA.
Panelist, Open Source Software: Challenges and Opportunities, ABA IP West Meeting, October 11, 2017, Long Beach, CA.
Workshop: Open Source Compliance, Strange Loop Conference, September 28, 2017, St. Louis.
Open Source and the Family Business, Linaro Connect, September 27, 2017, San Francisco.
Open Source and the Age of Enforcement, Black Duck Open Source Conference Korea, June 22, 2017, Seoul.
Negotiating in the Open: IP Warranties for Open Source Software in Commercial Agreement, University of Texas Technology Law Conference, May 25, 2017, Austin, TX.
Panelist, What In-House Counsel Need to Know about Open Source, Lot Bridge 1st Annual Meeting, May 11, 2017, San Francisco, CA.
Stand up for your Product: Negotiating Warranties and Indemnities for Open Source Software, IP Section of Calif. State Bar, Licensing Interest Group, May 12, 2017, webinar.
Pokemon-Go Was Just a Beginning- Future of Augmented Reality, ItechLaw, India Meeting, February 2, 2017, Delhi.
Co-Chair, PLI, Open Source Software 2016—from Compliance to Cooperation, San Francisco, CA, December 21, 2016.
Panelist, Your Guide to Penguin Super Heroes—Open Source Software Advantages, Compliance, and Enforcement, IP Institute 2016, Santa Barbara, CA, November 11, 2016.
Panelist, IP Strategy for Online Businesses, Stanford E-Commerce Best Practices Conference, June 6, 2016.
Presenter, Open Source Update, University of Texas Technology Law Conference, Austin, TX, May 26-27, 2016.
Panelist, OSCON, Aligning Patents and Open Source, Austin, TX, May 18, 2016.
Issues in Legacy License Agreements, IBSMA Compliance Manager Summit 2016, San Francisco, CA, March 8, 2016.
Presenter on open source licensing, SCALE, Pasadena, CA, January 22,2016.
Co-Chair, PLI, Open Source Software 2017, San Francisco, CA, December 9, 2017.
IBSMA Software Asset Manager Summit, presentations on open source licensing, and negotiating enterprise software agreements, Chicago, IL, June 9-10, 2015.
Presenter, All Things Open, Raleigh, NC, October 20, 2015.
Moderator, Sticky Issues in Negotiating Enterprise License Agreements, Stanford E-Commerce Best Practices Conference, June 8, 2015.
University of Texas Technology Law Conference, Co-Chair and presenter on open source developments, Austin, TX, May 21-22, 2015.
Webinar, Prepping for the M&A Exit, May 12, 2015, sponsored by Palamida.
Panelist, Best Practices in Open Source, LAIPLA, Irvine, CA, February 3, 2015.
Speaker, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal conference on Patent Rights and Open Source Licensing, Santa Clara, CA, January 23, 2015.
Speaker, panel on License-on-Transfer, 2014 LES 2014 Annual Meeting, prospective, San Francisco, CA, October 5-8, 2014.
Invited expert, Seminar on Technology Valuation and Commercialization in Iraq, Commercial Law Development Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce, in U.S., August 27, 2014.
Invited expert, Seminar on the Management of Technology Transfer Offices in Tunisia, Commercial Law Development Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce, in Istanbul, Turkey, December 3-6, 2013.
Panelist, PLI, Open Source and Free Software 2013: Benefits, Risks and Challenges, Hot topics panel, New York and San Francisco Presentations, November-December, 2013.
Panelist, Altai @ 21: Software Copyrights Revisited, Berkeley Center for law & Technology Roundtable Seminar, Berkeley, CA, October 25, 2013.
Speaker, University Sponsored Research: Moving Technology from Gown to Town, Webinar, September 3, 2013.
Speaker, Managing Open Source Software Supply Chains: Development and Trends, GT Conference and Webinar on Open Source Development, East Palo Alto, CA, July 24, 2013.
Moderator, “Best Practices for Automating Open Source Software Compliance,” Stanford eCommerce Best Practices Conference, Stanford Law School, Menlo Park, CA, June 28, 2013.
Speaker, “Hot Issues in Online Gaming,” ACC Privacy, Data Security & E-Commerce Committee CLE Program, San Francisco, CA, June 18, 2013 and East Palo Alto, CA, June 20, 2013.
Invited expert, Commercial Law Development Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce, a Middle East Regional Forum on Establishment of Technology Transfer Offices and Technology Incubators in Istanbul, Turkey, April 8-11, 2013.
Speaker, “I-Win Committee Meeting,” ITechLaw 2013 World Technology Law Conference & Annual Meeting, Scottsdale, AZ, May 1- 3, 2013.
Panelist, “Marriage of Science & Industry Part 2: Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer,” ESCoNS2 Conference, Los Angeles, CA, March 16, 2013.
Speaker, “Art of the Deal 2.0 – Web 2.0 Issues in Technology Acquisitions,” PLI Teleconference on Technology Acquisitions, January 23, 2013.
Speaker, “Managing Open Source Requirements,” GT Conference/Webinar on Open Source Development, East Palo Alto, CA, December 6, 2012.
Lecturer, “Open Source in the Cloud,” 9th Annual E-Commerce Best Practices Conference, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, June 18, 2012.
Speaker, “Controlling and Complying with Open Source License Requirements,” Cloud Computing Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 6, 2012.
Lecturer, “Open Source Issues Involving M&A Transactions: Lessons Learned after 21 Years of GPL,” University of Texas 2012 Technology Law Conference, Austin, TX, May 24, 2012.
Panelist, “Copyright on the Move,” Legal Frontiers in Digital Media, Stanford, CA, May 21, 2012.
Lecturer, “E-commerce Agreement Workshop: Planning and Executing your Negotiation,” Association of Corporate Counsel Bay Area Chapter, Greenberg Traurig offices, Silicon Valley, CA, April 24, 2012; San Francisco, CA, April 26, 2012.
Webinar Presenter, “Understanding Derivative Works in Open Source Software: The “Border Dispute” of GPL version 2,” OpenLogic, May 23, 2011.
Webinar Presenter, “The Instant Impact of MDY Industries LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment Inc. On the Power of Software Licensing Agreements to Prevent Unauthorized Use of Content,” ExecSense, March 10, 2011.
Moderator, “Open Source: Protecting the Integrity of the Licensed Software by Controlling the Use and Manipulation of Open Source in Your License Agreement,” American Conference Institute’s 16th Annual Software Licensing Agreements, September 21, 2010.
Webinar Presenter, “How to Create an Enterprise Open Source License Compliance Program,” Open Logic, June 23, 2010.
Lecturer, “Open Source Disputes — How to Defend, Settle and Avoid Them,” Open Source Business Conference, March 17, 2010.
Teleseminar Presenter, “ALI’s Software Contract Principals: Concept, Clauses and Controversy,” Computer Law Committee of the State Bar of California, October 28, 2009.
Lecturer, “Master Class on Open Source Software Licenses,” American Conference Institute, The Practical and Tactical Art of the Deal in Software Licensing Agreements, San Francisco, CA, October 8, 2009.
Advisor, Commercial Law Development Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Software Development and Intellectual Property Workshop in Prishtina, Kosovo on September 22-24, 2009.
Lecturer, “Integration of Open Source and Commercial Software in Products,” Law Seminar International, Open Source Software, San Francisco, CA, June 8, 2009.
Lecturer, “Anatomy of OSS Licenses,” Open Source — Nothing But the Law, Olswang, May 14, 2009.
Lecturer, Second National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Technology Commercialization, The Peninsula Manila, Philippines, April, 21-23, 2009.
Lecturer, “The Elimination of Operational Risk and Management of Operational Efficiency in the Enterprise: The Audacity of Open Source Hope,” Open Source Business Conference, San Francisco, CA, March 24, 2009.
Lecturer, “Cost Control: Open Source Software and Video Games,” Law Seminars International, Gamer Technology Law, Beverly Hills, CA, March 10, 2009.
Lecturer, AUTM Software and Digital Media Course, Austin, TX, June 20-21, 2008.
Lecturer, “Integration of Open Source and Commercial Software in Products,” Law Seminars International, San Francisco, CA, June 9, 2008.
Lecturer, The University of Texas School of Law 2008 Technology Law Conference, Austin, TX, May 22-23, 2008.
Lecturer, “Open Source Issues, Handling Intellectual Property Issues in Business Transactions,” Practising Law Institute, San Francisco, CA, April 28, 2008.
Lecturer, “Open Source Track: Licensing Best Practices,” AUTM Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, February 29, 2008.
Lecturer, “Leveraging Dual Licensing and Open Source Business Initiatives,” ITechlaw 4th International Asian Conference, Mumbai, February 8, 2008.
Lecturer, Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal Symposium, Implications of Free Software/Open Source Licensing Free and Open Source Licensing, Mountain View, CA, February 1, 2008.
Lecturer, “The Basics of Open Source,” Olswang Open Source Summit, Seattle, WA, November 9, 2007.
Lecturer, “Ensuring the Agreement Allows for the Use, Manipulation, and Control of Open Source Code,” American Conference Institute’s “The Practical and Technical Art of the Deal in Software Licensing Agreements,” San Francisco, CA, October 17, 2007.
Webinar Presenter, “Trends in Technology Licensing—the Impact of Leegin vs. PSKS on Vertical Price Restrictions,” Managing Intellectual Property, September 26, 2007.
Lecturer, “Technology Acquisitions and Transactions Involving Open Source Software: Principal Approaches and Solutions to the Pervasive Use of Open Source Software in IT Development Projects,” LSI Conference on Current Issues in Complex IP Licensing, Seattle, WA, August 23, 2007.
Lecturer, “Dual Licensing Models in 2007 — What Has Worked,” Linux World Conference Expo, August, 9, 2007.
Lecturer, “Will Open Source Survive?” The Fourth Annual Stanford E-Commerce Best Practices Conference: How to Deal with the Uncertainties of Online Business, Stanford Law School, June 18, 2007.
Lecturer, “Adopting Open Source Software: Legal Compliance and Risks,” University of Colorado School of Law, March 5, 2007.
Lecturer, “Creative Copyright-Based Commercialization of Code and Components,” Software IP Summit, Palo Alto, CA, February 20-21, 2007.
Lecturer, “The New Era in Technology M&A,” Law Seminars International, Menlo Park, CA, September 11, 2006.
Lecturer, “Open Source: Due Diligence and Drafting—A Practical Guide to Working with Open Source,” University of Texas Computer and Technology Law Conference, Austin, TX, June 9, 2005.
Lecturer, “Open Source: Risk Management and Use,” Stanford Ecommerce Best Practices Conference, Palo Alto, CA, June 03, 2005.
Lecturer, “A Review of IBM’s Common Public License,” Tysons Corner, VA, May 11, 2005.
Lecturer, “War Stories and Happy Endings: A Lawyer’s Perspective on Open Source Compliance,” LinuxWorld, Toronto, Canada, April 20, 2005.
Panel Moderator, “Open Standards—The Coming Storm In Information Technology and Bioinformatics,” ABA Intellectual Property Law Conference, Reston, VA, April 14, 2005.
Lecturer, “Dual Licensing: Untangling the Intellectual Property Knot,” Open Source Business Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2005.
Lecturer, “SCO v. IBM and the World,” Licensing Executives Society Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, October 20, 2004.
Lecturer, “Patent Pooling in Linux and Open Source,” Open Source Risk Management Advanced Seminar at LinuxWorld, August 1, 2004.
Lecturer, “What Software Lawyers Need to Know about Software,” Cisco Systems, July 29, 2004.
Lecturer, “Understanding Free and Open Source Software: Strategy, Tactics and Risk Avoidance in Working with the Penguin,” University of Texas School of Law Computer and Technology Law Institute, May 20, 2004.
Panelist, “Open Source – From Software to Genetics,” ABA 19th Annual Intellectual Property Law Conference, April 1, 2004.
Lecturer, “How to Ride the Penguin without Hitting Icebergs,” Open Source Business Conference, March 16, 2004.
Panelist, “New Open Source Software: Myths, Risks and Management of Open Source Software,” Glasser LegalWorks Copyright Law, 2004.
Lecturer, “Business Basics” (in Spanish, with Vicente Reyes), East Palo Alto StartUp, April 2003.
Lecturer, Trade Secret Licensing, Computer Law Conference, Seattle, WA, December 12, 2002.
Lecturer, “Open Source Software, the Legal Wrangling,” Legal Incite, CNET Radio, October 13, 2001.
Lecturer, “The Application Service Provider Model in Software Licensing,” Salt Lake City, UT February, 2001.
Lecturer, “Anatomy of a Shrink Wrap Agreement,” Legal Incite, CNET Radio, February 3, 2001.
Lecturer, “Intellectual Property,” Stanford BASES, E-Challenge Workshop, November 20, 2000.
Lecturer, “A License to Kill?: Copyright Ownership and Fair Use in an Age of Licensing,” Boalt Hall, May 1, 1997.