1. One does not acquire a domicile in the District of Columbia, within the meaning of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act, merely by coming to the District to live for an indefinite period while in the Government service. P. 314 U. S. 453.
2. The Act does not intend that one living in the District of Columbia indefinitely, while in the Government service, shall be held domiciled there simply because he does not maintain a domestic establishment at the place from which he came. P. 314 U. S. 454.
3. Persons are domiciled in the District of Columbia, within the meaning of the Act, who live there and have no fixed and definite intent to return to their former domiciles and make their homes there. P. 314 U. S. 454.
4. The place where a man lives is, prima facie, his domicile. P. 314 U. S. 455.
5. The taxing authority is warranted in treating as prima facie taxable any person quartered in the District of Columbia on tax day whose status it deems doubtful. P. 314 U. S. 455.
6. In applying this Act, the taxing authority need not find the exact time when the attitude and relationship of person to place which constitute domicile were formed. It is enough that they were formed before the tax day. P. 314 U. S. 455.
7. If one has at any time become domiciled in the District of Columbia, it is his burden to establish any change of status upon which he relies to escape the tax. P. 314 U. S. 456.
8. In order to retain his former domicile, one who comes to the District to perform Government service must always have a fixed and definite intent to return and to take up his home there when separated from the service. A mere sentimental attachment will not hold the old domicile. P. 314 U. S. 456.
9. Whether or not one votes where he claims domicile is highly relevant, but not controlling. P. 314 U. S. 456.
10. Of great significance to the question of domicile in the District of Columbia is the nature of the position which brings one to or keeps him in the service of the Government. P. 314 U. S. 457.
11. Manner of living in the District and many other considerations touching relationships, soc;al connections, and activities of the person concerned are suggested in the opinion as among the considerations which are relevant to a determination of the question of domicile. P. 314 U. S. 457.
73 App.D.C. 345, 347, 119 F.2d 449, 451, reversed.
Certiorari, 313 U.S. 556, to review judgments sustaining, on petitions for review, decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia holding that collections of income taxes from two individuals by the District of Columbia were erroneous.
be a registered voter and has voted in the elections and primaries in Wayne County, Michigan. He was born in New London, Connecticut, in 1905, and when five years old moved with his parents to Los Angeles, California, where he resided until 1926, when he removed to Berkeley, California. His parents live in California. In 1929, he completed his studies at Brown University, and immediately thereafter accepted employment in a trust company in Detroit, Michigan, of which one of his former professors at Brown was vice-president. While in Detroit, respondent lived first in a rooming house and later in an apartment. He owns no property there. In the District of Columbia, he lives in an apartment which he has furnished himself. His present employment pays him $6,500 a year, while that which he left in Detroit paid but $6,000. He testified before the Board of Tax Appeals that he does not think he would improve his condition by returning to Detroit, but that "[i]t is the place to which I will return if I ever become disemployed by the Government, which I hope will not happen. . . ." Although he has no present connection with the trust company, he believes that he could go back with it if he should return to Detroit. If a better position than he now has should be offered in a city other than Detroit, he "very likely would" accept it, despite a "preference for Detroit" based on a belief that he "would fit in more easily" there.
"had an intention to remain and make his home in the District of Columbia for an indefinite period of time, and that such intention has ever since and still does remain with him, and that, if he has any intention to return and make his home in Detroit, it is a floating intention."
matter of law," that, on December 31, 1939, the last day of the taxable year, petitioner was not domiciled in the District of Columbia, believing that it was compelled to do so by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Sweeney v. District of Columbia, 72 App.D.C. 30, 113 F.2d 25, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631.
The respondent in No. 59 lived in the District of Columbia for twenty-six years after coming here from Pennsylvania in 1914 to accept a clerical position of indefinite tenure under Civil Service in the Patent Office. He was then on a year's leave of absence from a railroad by which he was employed, but continued in the Civil Service to the time of hearing, becoming Chief Clerk of the Personnel and Organization Division of the National Guard Bureau, War Department, with offices in Washington. Single when he came, in 1917 he married a native of Washington, who died in 1935 without children. Shortly after their marriage, the couple purchased as a home, premises at 1426 Massachusetts Avenue, S.E., in the District of Columbia, in which respondent still lives. In about 1925, he purchased a lot at "Selby on the Bay" in nearby Maryland, and, before his wife's death, he bought a building lot in the District of Columbia, acting on his wife's pleas for a summer place and a better residence. He agreed with his wife that, on his retirement, six months would be spent at Selby. He testified that he never desired to purchase the lot in the District of Columbia, but did so at the insistence of his wife. He put a "For Sale" sign on it when she died, and both lots, which he still owns, are up for sale. He has deposits in three Washington financial institutions, and owns first trust notes on property located in Maryland and Virginia.
Endeavor Society. He is a contributor to Washington charities, a member of the Motor Club of Washington, and of the Washington units of "Tall Cedars of Lebanon" and the "Mystic Shrine," both identified with freemasonry. He has filed his federal income tax returns with the Collector of Internal Revenue at Baltimore, and always paid to the District of Columbia an intangible property tax while that tax was in effect.
Respondent had resided in Pennsylvania from birth until he left for Washington. He claimed as his "legal residence" the residence of his parents in Harrisburg, where they still keep intact his room in which are kept some of his clothes and childhood toys. Though paying nothing as rent or for lodging, he has from time to time made presents of money to his parents. He has visited his parents' home in Harrisburg over weekends at least eight times a year, and has been there annually between Christmas and the New Year. A registered voter in Pennsylvania, he has voted in all its general elections since he became of age. He paid the Pennsylvania poll tax until it was superseded by an occupational tax, which he has also paid. Payment of such taxes was a prerequisite to voting.
In 1912, respondent became a life member of the Robert Burns Lodge No. 464, Free and Accepted Masons, and of the Harrisburg Consistory, Scottish Rite, both Masonic bodies. While he resided in Harrisburg, he was a member of the Bible Class of the Pine Street Presbyterian Church, which he still attends on visits there, and to which he made substantial contributions in 1939. He owns jointly with his father a note secured by a mortgage on Pennsylvania real estate. Respondent testified that he expected to retire from Civil Service in four years, and intended then to sell his house and "leave Washington."
intention to remain and make his home in the District of Columbia for an indefinite period of time, and that intention remained with him at least until the death of his wife."
As in No. 58, it considered itself bound by the Sweeney case, supra, and accordingly held "as a matter of law" that the petitioner was not domiciled in the District on December 31, 1939, and never had been.
The decisions in both cases were affirmed on review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 73 App.D.C. 345, 119 F.2d 449; 73 App.D.C. 347, 119 F.2d 451. The cases were brought here on writs of certiorari because of the importance of the questions involved. 313 U.S. 556.
Although the District of Columbia Income Tax Act made "domicile" the fulcrum of the income tax, the first ever imposed in the District, it set forth no definition of that word. To ascertain its meaning, we therefore consider the Congressional history of the Act, the situation with reference to which it was enacted, and the existing judicial precedents, with which Congress may be taken to have been familiar in at least a general way. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 310 U. S. 562.
on the last day of the taxable year," with no provision for credit for income taxes paid elsewhere. H.R. Rep. Nos. 1093, 1206, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3; Sen.Doc. No. 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. This was agreed to by the Senate and by the House of Representatives, and became part of the Act under consideration.
"Mr. President, I now call attention to the fact that the individual income tax is imposed only on those domiciled in the District of Columbia. It therefore necessarily excludes from its imposition all Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the President of the United States, all Cabinet officers, and Federal employees who have been brought into the District from the various States of the Union to serve their country in the National Capital, provided such employees have not, of their own volition, surrendered their domiciles in the States and have voluntarily acquired domiciles within the District of Columbia."
chosen to establish within the District of Columbia their permanent [Footnote 2] places of abode and to abandon their domiciles within the States."
"Since the question of the effect of the word 'domicile' in this act has been raised, I think the House would probably like to have the legal definition read:"
"Domicile is the place where one has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, and where he exercises his political rights. [Footnote 3] . . . There must exist in combination the fact of residence and animus manendi --"
"which means residence and his intention to return [sic], so that, under this definition, he could certainly live in the District of Columbia and have his legal domicile in any other State in the United States."
understood that in this bill there should be no triple taxation. . . ."
The unusual character of the National Capital, making the income tax a "very explosive and controversial item," [Footnote 4] was vividly before the Congress, and must also be considered in construing the statute imposing the tax.
The District of Columbia is an exceptional community. It is not a local municipal authority, but was established under the Constitution as the seat of the National Government. Those in Government service here are not engaged in local enterprise, although their service may be localized. Their work is that of the nation, and their pay comes not from local sources, but from the whole country. Because of its character as a federal city, there is no local political constituency with whose activities those living in it may identify themselves as a symbol of their acceptance of a local domicile.
Not all who flock here are birds of a feather. Some enter the Civil Service, finding tenure and pay there more secure than in private enterprise. Political ties are of no consequence in obtaining or maintaining their positions. At the other extreme are those who hold appointive office at the pleasure of the appointing officer. These latter, as well as appointive officers with definite but unprotected tenure, and all elective officers, usually owe their presence here to the intimate and influential part they have played in community life in one of the States.
many Senators and Congressmen, cited by Senator Overton as typical of those whom the limitation of the statute to persons "domiciled" here "necessarily excludes."
"It has generally been considered that persons appointed to public office under the authority of the United States, and taking up their residence in Washington for the purpose of executing the duties of such office, do not thereby, while engaged in the service of the government, lose their domicil in the place where they before resided unless they intend on removing there to make Washington their permanent [Footnote 5] residence."
that a policy against loss of domicile by sojourn in Washington is expressed in the constitutions and statutes of many states. [Footnote 7] Of course, no individual case, constitution, or statute is controlling, but the general trend of these authorities is a significant recognition that the distinctive character of Washington habitation for federal service is meaningful to those who are served as well as to those in the service.
From these various data on Congressional intent, it is apparent that the present cases are not governed by the tests usually employed in cases where the element of federal service in the Federal City is not present. [Footnote 8] We hold that a man does not acquire a domicile in the District simply by coming here to live for an indefinite period of time while in the Government service. A contrary decision would disregard the statements made on the floor of Congress as to the meaning of the statute, fail to give proper weight to the trend of judicial decisions, with which Congress should be taken to have been cognizant, and result in a wholesale finding of domicile on the part of Government servants quite obviously at variance with Congressional policy. Further, Congress did not intend that one living here indefinitely while in the Government service be held domiciled here simply because he does not maintain a domestic establishment at the place he hails from. Such a rule would result in taxing those unable to maintain two establishments, and exempting those able to meet such a burden -- thus reversing the usual philosophy of income tax as one based on ability to pay.
domiciled. [Footnote 9] A decision that the statute lays a tax only on those with an affirmative intent to remain here the rest of their days would be at odds with the prevailing concept of domicile, and would give the statute scope far narrower than the Congress must have intended.
Cases falling clearly within such broad rules aside, the question of domicile is a difficult one of fact to be settled only by a realistic and conscientious review of the many relevant (and frequently conflicting) indicia of where a man's home [Footnote 10] is and according to the established modes of proof.
The place where a man lives is properly taken to be his domicile until facts adduced establish the contrary. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 55 U. S. 423; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694, 138 U. S. 706. The taxing authority is warranted in treating as prima facie taxable any person quartered in the District on tax day whose status it deems doubtful. It is not an unreasonable burden upon the individual, who knows best whence he came, what he left behind, and his own attitudes, to require him to establish domicile elsewhere if he is to escape the tax.
formed, so long as it finds they were formed before the tax day. What was at first a firm intent to return may have withered gradually in consequence of dissolving associations elsewhere and growing interests in the District. It is common experience that this process usually is unmarked by any dramatic or even sharply defined episode. The taxing authority need not find just when the intent was finally dissipated; it is enough that it finds that this has happened before the tax day.
If one has at any time become domiciled here, it is his burden to establish any change of status upon which he relies to escape the tax. Anderson v. Watt, supra, at p. 138 U. S. 706.
In order to retain his former domicile, one who comes to the District to enter Government service must always have a fixed and definite intent to return and take up his home there when separated from the service. A mere sentimental attachment will not hold the old domicile. And residence in the District with a nearly equal readiness to go back where one came from or to any other community offering advantages upon the termination of service is not enough.
One's testimony with regard to his intention is, of course, to be given full and fair consideration, but is subject to the infirmity of any self-serving declaration, and may frequently lack persuasiveness or even be contradicted or negatived by other declarations and inconsistent acts.
state officials, and even an adjudication of the right to vote cannot preclude the levy of a tax by an arm of the Federal Government. On the other hand, failure to vote elsewhere is, of course, not conclusive that domicile is here.
Also of great significance is the nature of the position which brings one to or keeps him in the service of the Government: whether continuous or emergency, special or war-time in character; whether requiring fixed residence in the District or only intermittent stays; whether entailing monetary sacrifices or betterment, and whether political or nonpolitical. Those dependent upon the action of a local constituency on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November are, of course, loath to leave their local identifications behind when taking up Government duties in Washington.
Of course, the manner of living here, taken in connection with one's station in life, is relevant. Did he hire a furnished room or establish himself by the purchase of a house? Or did he rent a house or apartment? Has he brought his family and dependents here? Has he brought his goods? What relations has he to churches, clubs, lodges, and investments that identify him with the District?
the old community pick up threads of close association? Or has he so severed his relations that his old community is as strange as another? Did he pay taxes in the old community because of his retention of domicile which he could have avoided by giving it up? Were they nominal or substantial? In view of the legislative history showing that Congress was concerned lest there be "triple taxation" -- Federal, State and District -- the Board should consider whether taxes similar in character to those laid by this Act have been paid elsewhere. See statement of Representative Bates, quoted supra, p. 6.
Our mention of these considerations as being relevant must not be taken as an indication of the relative weights to be attached to them, as an implied negation of the relevance of others, or as an effort to suggest a formula to handle all cases that may arise, or the possibility of devising one.
In view of what we have said, it is clear that the present cases did not call for rulings of nontaxability "as a matter of law." On the other hand, we do not consider whether taxability follows as a matter of law, as petitioner contends it does, for the factual inquiries and findings of the Board, made under a view of the law not our own, are quite likely not in all respects those which the Board would have made had it proceeded with knowledge of our opinion, and are, in some respects, ambiguous for the purpose of decision in accordance with it. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and remand these cases to that Court with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, and MR. JUSTICE REED, took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 59, District of Columbia v. DeHart, also on writ of certiorari, 313 U.S. 556, to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
53 Stat. 1087; 20 D.C.Code (Supp. V, 1939) § 980a(a).
We do not understand "permanent" to have been used in a literal sense. Of course, it cannot be known without the gift of prophecy whether a given abode is "permanent" in the strictest sense. But, beyond this, it is frequently used in the authorities on domicile to describe that which is not merely "temporary," or to describe a dwelling for the time being which there is no presently existing intent to give up. And further, compare a statement by Representative Dirksen on the floor of the House, 84 Cong.Rec. 8973.
Exercise of political rights elsewhere cannot be considered as meant to be conclusive on the issue of taxability in the District. See statement by Representative Dirksen on the floor of the House. Ibid.
Walden v. Canfield, 2 Rob. (La.) 466; Lesh v. Lesh, 13 Pa.Dist.R. 537; see Woodworth v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 18 F. 282, 284; Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365, 371; cf. Newman v. United States, 43 App.D.C. 53, 70, reversed on another ground, 238 U. S. 238 U.S. 537; Deming v. United States, 59 App.D.C. 188, 37 F.2d 818; Campbell v. Ramsey, 150 Kan. 368, 388, 92 P.2d 819; Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115. But cf. Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 18 D.C. 229, 7 Mackey 229; Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S.W. 173.
"Presence for the purpose of performing the duties of a civil office will not, of itself, effect a change of domicil; there is no inference of animus manendi from the fact of the new residence, since it is explained by the fact of officeholding. It makes no difference whether the office is elective or appointive; nor is it material whether the appointment is in its nature merely temporary or has a degree of permanence, though the permanence of the appointment is an element to be considered in determining the domicil."
I Beale, Conflict of Laws § 22.6. See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws, pp. 42, 43.
1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 172, note 2.
Cf. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 232 U. S. 624; Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S. 561.
This is not inconsistent with our holding that domicile here does not follow from more indefiniteness of the period of one's stay. While the intention to return must be fixed, the date need not be; while the intention to return must be unconditional, the time may be, and in most cases of necessity, is, contingent. The intention must not waver before the uncertainties of time, but one may not be visited with unwelcome domicile for lacking the gift of prophecy.
Of course, this term does not have the magic qualities of a divining rod in locating domicile. In fact, the search for the domicile of any person capable of acquiring a domicile of choice is but a search for his "home." See Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 593, 596; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 19.1.
See statements of Representative Dirksen, 84 Cong.Rec. 8973.


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BOSTON SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY & another, [Note 1] trustees, vs. E. G. BOONE & another, [Note 2] executors.
PETITION for probate of a will filed in the Probate Court for the county of Norfolk on December 5, 1968. Proceedings relating to trustees' accounts were heard by Robert M. Ford, J.
Ronald F. Kehoe (Linda E. Meyer with him) for the defendants.
Richard W. Renehan (Charles C. Ames with him) for the plaintiffs.
KAPLAN, J. E. G. Boone and First National Bank of Venice, Florida, executors of the will of Bernice A. Pearson, objected to the seven accounts of Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company (Boston Safe) and Clifford H. Byrnes, trustees of a marital deduction trust in favor of Mrs. Pearson. The ground of objection was that Boston Safe [Note 3] delayed unduly in liquidating the trust, with the ensuing market losses falling upon Mrs. Pearson's estate, which she, under a testamentary power to appoint the remainder of the marital trust, had named as a residuary taker after satisfaction of her various bequests. The matter was tried in much detail. A judge of the Probate Court, upon findings of fact and conclusions of law, held that the trustee had committed no breach of trust. He held also that the trustee was protected against liability by certain provisions of the will of the husband, William T. Pearson, setting up the trust, notably an "exculpatory" clause. Mrs. Pearson's executors appeal.
assets, as reported by the trustee to Mrs. Pearson's executors, stood at a value of $1,026,284.
Around this time, it appeared that Brown University might claim that, by reason of her mental incapacity or of undue influence exerted upon her at the time she made the codicil, Mrs. Pearson had not effectively appointed; and on October 19, 1972, counsel to the University asked Boston Safe to withhold distribution of the trust assets pending the university's further investigation. By May 29, 1973, the university had determined to press its claim, as indicated by counsel's letter of that date to the trustee. Accordingly, the trustee on June 4, 1973, petitioned the Probate Court to adjudicate the university's claim, joining as defendants the university and the charities.
That distribution had to be postponed did not mean necessarily that liquidation should be deferred, but that was the course taken by Boston Safe. It treated the trust assets for a time according to its usual procedure or routine. Trust officers Robert C. Adams and Kenneth J. Robinson (respectively dealing with "administration" and "investment") were in primary charge of the account. They consulted with investment review groups at intervals of about six months. The list of securities, largely common stocks, appeared very sound ("blue chips," according to one witness). The group decisions taken on August 22, 1972, March 20, 1973, September 18, 1973, and March 13, 1974, were to make "no change." During this period, the trust assets, with one minor decline around December, 1973, remained at or near the million dollar mark. [Note 5] From April through July, 1974, however, the stock market trended downward, and there was a severe fall in August (the oil embargo, among other things, was at work). About March 1, the trust assets had a value of $997,500; by August 12, they were worth around $799,000; on August 28, $711,500 (for the first time a figure below the aggregate of the cash legacies); on September 27, $675,000.
Boston Safe was not insensitive to what was happening, nor were those advising the beneficiaries. Until about August, 1974, neither the charities nor the executors had expressed any wish for liquidation of the trust. On August 15, however, Boston Safe was responding to a troubled inquiry from an attorney for the executors and for certain of the charities and mentioning a value at August 14 of $780,000. The trust officer Robinson evidently undertook to have the account reviewed completely with advice of counsel as to whether it would be prudent to liquidate. On September 4 the question was renewed with counsel, without decision. At a meeting on September 18, concerned chiefly with the possible settlement of Brown University's claim, an attorney representing beneficiaries spoke of seeking at some stage to surcharge the trustee for failing to liquidate at the death of Mrs. Pearson. On September 30 the investment review group discussed the "potential" sale of the securities or the "possibility" of distributing in kind, but decided to take no action, that is, decided to continue to hold. About this date, the trustee improved upon its customary surveillance of the portfolio by making daily valuations.
In the next few months the stock market rebounded and at the same time the prospects improved for settling the university's claim. By February 5, 1975, with settlement pretty well assured, the trustee liquidated the trust assets at $797,146 (upon distribution, the figure apparently was $816,338). The settlement agreement, executed by all concerned on June 30, 1975, and court approved on July 24, 1975, provided that in release of the claim of Brown University it would be paid $91,000 from the aggregate otherwise distributable to the charities; counsel fees and expenses of some $43,000 were also charged against the charities.
After proportionate distribution to the charities, no balance was available for Mrs. Pearson's executors. Objecting to the trustee's accounts, the executors sought to surcharge the trustee in the amount they would have received if liquidation had occurred on August 14, 1972, plus the amount of certain trustee's fees (calculated by the executors as $298,290 plus $41,768).
2. Boston Safe recognized, as a general proposition, that upon the falling in of a trust (as upon the death of a life tenant like Mrs. Pearson), a trustee should consider itself -- in the words of one of the trust officers -- a "stakeholder" with some obligation to "back off to a conservative position." The law is in agreement. See Rothwell v. Rothwell, 283 Mass. 563, 570 (1933). Cf. Brine v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1984). Usually the "stakeholder" will discharge its duty by liquidating and distributing with reasonable promptness. There is, however, no iron or absolute duty to do so, and prudence may indeed suggest (or even demand) that liquidation be deferred. Compare New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 334 Mass. 324, 330 (1956), with Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262, 264 (1881). The question of timing a liquidation may become difficult where distribution must be postponed because of the pendency for an indeterminate period of litigation regarding the interpretation of the trust instrument, ascertainment of the correct beneficiaries, or the like. See Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 358 (1931). Cf. First Natl. Bank v. Truesdale Hosp., 288 Mass. 35, 46 (1934). Where distribution will necessarily be long delayed, common sense tells us that a trustee can properly consider keeping the corpus of the trust reasonably productive meanwhile. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 344 comment c (1959); 4 Scott, Trusts Section 344, at 2736 (3d ed. 1967). One can well imagine a claim of surcharge if a trustee in these circumstances liquidates precipitately, say upon an obviously depressed market. Compare New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 334 Mass. at 330, where, however, the situation was not quite so aggravated.
It will be agreed that Boston Safe in its management of the instant trust did not display the market skills of a John Maynard Keynes. Mr. Pearson, a stockbroker himself, would not be astonished to learn that Robinson was simultaneously the primary investment officer for as many as 250 accounts. In these circumstances, Keynes himself might not have been able to provide a Keynesian service. [Note 8] On the whole we agree with the judge that, although perhaps short of excellence, Boston Safe's service was not imprudent so as to call for surcharge.
What has been discussed, elaborating on the judge's findings and conclusions, answers the tenor of the executors' objections. We need to add that we find no merit in the executors' argument that the judge overlooked the brief testimony of their expert that the trustee's conduct did not comport with the practice of local fiduciaries in like situations. [Note 9] The testimony was little more than an insistence that liquidation should have come earlier. Boston Safe had no express fixed rule about liquidation but was conscious of its duty and of the factors that should enter into prudent decision. If, perchance, the local practice was a rigid one, the practice would offend the law. The executors criticize the trustee for failing to solicit the wishes of the beneficiaries about liquidation (their expert also commented on this matter). Better liaison might have been helpful. But there was some communication, and the beneficiaries were represented by attorneys who might be expected to become vocal on proper occasions; in fact some did speak up. We should not minimize the embarrassment that could arise from soliciting opinions from the fifteen interests involved, who might differ among themselves; and the trustee's duty would not in any event be defined by a majority vote.
3. Mr. Pearson's will provided: "No one of them [executors and trustees] shall be liable for any act or omission except for his or its own wilful default or bad faith." In the light of the discussion above, we are not required to deal with the effect of this "exculpatory" clause. However, we note our agreement with the judge that the trustee's behavior cannot in any view be properly characterized as involving "wilful default" or "bad faith." See Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 347 (1909), and Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 447 (1930) (wilful default); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 417 (1937) (bad faith). See also Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 609-610 (1940); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Millis Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 998, 999-1000 (1981); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees Section 542 (2d ed. 1978). The judge's evident view that the clause was effective according to its terms, and not against public policy, is supported by past decisions. See New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. at 550; Dill v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 343 Mass. 97, 100 (1961).
The executors attempt on this appeal for the first time to argue the point that one who drafts a will in which he is named as a fiduciary should not include an exculpatory clause that might apply to himself, without first advising the testator specifically of the effect of the provision. The executors assert it has not been shown that the cotrustee Byrnes was free of fault in this respect. Without attempting to delineate the scope of the rule which the executors seek to invoke, see Barnum v. Fay, 320 Mass. 177, 181 (1946), [Note 10] we say that any claimed delict of the cotrustee should have been brought forward by the executors at an earlier stage. We may pass by the question whether or in what circumstances an infraction by one trustee might deprive a fellow trustee of the protection of an exculpatory clause.
The judgments dismissing the executors' objections to the accounts and allowing the accounts are affirmed.
[Note 1] Clifford H. Byrnes.
[Note 2] First National Bank of Venice, Florida.
[Note 3] It is understood that the claim of surcharge is directed against Boston Safe, not against the cotrustee Byrnes, who died in January, 1974. For that reason, and because Boston Safe was the active trustee engaged in management, we speak hereafter of Boston Safe as the trustee.
[Note 4] A small gift of shares of stock to certain persons was refused by them.
[Note 5] On September 17, 1973, the value was $1,035,100, but it fell to $957,600 by December 3, 1973. This was the relatively minor interim decline. It was substantially overcome by March, 1974.
[Note 6] The judge pointed out in his findings that during the whole term of the marital deduction trust, from its original funding to final distribution, the assets went from $765,497 ($692,580 plus $72,917, as indicated above) to $816,338.
[Note 7] The trustee contends that certain provisions of Mr. Pearson's will themselves authorized retention of the securities, regardless of market conditions. We do not enter upon this question except to say that the trustee's interpretation of the language appears strained.
[Note 8] It is instructive that even Keynes could falter. In Spring, 1920, he was speculating on margin against the German mark. His general aim was right but his timing was off, and he suffered severe losses. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes 295-297 (1963).
[Note 9] Except in one particular, the executors did not claim that the judge's findings were clearly erroneous; they were rather claiming errors of omission. The particular claimed error relates to finding 27(b), which sets out one of the considerations that led the trustee to retain the securities. We think the finding was supported; it might have been more comprehensive.
[Note 10] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 222(3) (1959); 3 Scott, Trusts Section 222.4 (3d ed. 1967).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Big Idea: We must confess Christ as Savior from the heart. Matthew 7:21-23.
What’s something you do to relax?
If you had to give an abbreviated version of Sunday’s message what would you make sure to focus on?
What’s a way you’ve noticed people underestimate God?
How can being still before the Lord help us to overcome struggles? Any personal examples?
How can shame keep us from experiencing God’s best in our lives?
How does the reality of the Trinity affect your faith?
Who’s someone in your life who needs to hear the good news? Pray for one another, and that person.
Big Idea: In our groaning we can have hope.
What’s something for which you often pray?
Why do you think Paul included Romans 8:18-27 where he did in his letter?
What difference can it make to know that your struggles (or groanings) have ultimate meaning?
What’s something we can do to help remember God’s promises?
What’s the connection between intercession and evangelism?
What’s something you could use prayer for? Intercede for one another.
Big Idea: You’re loved in Christ.
What’s something that makes you nervous?
Why do people struggle with predestination?
How can our response to God’s sovereignty affect our relationships with others?
How does Romans 8:31-32 relate to 1 John 4:18?
What’s something God has helped (or is helping) you to conquer?
Why do you think Paul shared Romans 8:38-39 with the Roman Christians?
What’s a way you’d like to grow in faith? Pray for one another.
V. Respond A. Relax in God’s hand.
B. Be bold because God justifies.
What’s something you don’t like making decisions about?
What’s something from Sunday’s message you found meaningful, challenging, or confusing?
How can people misunderstand or misapply the reality of God’s sovereign grace?
Why do Christians sometimes react negatively toward people who engage in behavior they used to engage in?
How can looking forward to God’s future grace change the way we live now?
What’s a way a focusing on God’s sovereignty can change the way we share our faith?
What’s something you need to trust God for this week? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We either stumble over Christ, or He becomes the Rock on which we stand.
B. If we run our own race, we’ll miss the prize. Matthew 21:42; Acts 9:31-32.
What’s something you like to do to relax?
What’s something about Christianity you’ve struggled with?
How has God, perhaps with the help of others, helped you with your struggle(s)?
How has Jesus been your Rock lately?
What’s a way you’d like to pursue righteousness by faith? Pray for one another.
What was a high point of your holiday season?
Why do you think Paul included Romans 6:15-23 at this point in Romans?
How do people misunderstand or misapply God’s grace?
What’s a specific example of how God’s grace has enabled you to obey?
How is pursuing holiness tied to eternal life?
What’s an area in your life you need to apply the gospel to? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: Joining our lives to Christ means we live when we die.
What’s a way people in our culture are unknowingly religious?
Is it possible to have a fruitless saving faith? Why or why not?
How does trusting God lead to bearing fruit? Any examples?
What’s a way churches settle for legalism rather than the fullness of the gospel?
What’s a specific way you can grow in your marriage with Christ? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We’re either waging a war we can’t win, or living out a victory already achieved.
If you had the last week to do over, what would you do differently?
What was something from Sunday’s message you found meaningful, challenging, or confusing?
In what ways do people underestimate the power of sin?
Why might some people find Paul’s honesty about his struggles alarming?
How are humility and giving thanks related?
How can having hope in God’s salvation, despite our struggles, help us to witness?
What’s a struggle you could use prayer for? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We are either controlled by our flesh or lead by the Father who loves us.
What was a low point of your last week? What was a high point?
What’s something from God’s Word you’ve been learning, or relearning, lately?
Why does reading the Bible as good advice miss the mark of why God gave it to us?
What’s something that helps you focus on God’s faithfulness?
How do you know if you’re being governed by God’s Spirit instead of controlled by sin?
How has knowing God as a good Father helped you overcome your fears?
How has your commitment to Christ and others set you free?
Why do we miss seeing God’s glory?
Why do people think God is against them?
What keeps people from receiving God’s salvation/grace?
What’s the significance of Jesus being lain in a manger?
How can we know God is for us not against us?
How can we see Jesus this Christmas?
Big Idea: Justification empowers personal faith that overcomes.
What’s one of your most treasured memories?
What’s a way Christians sometimes misunderstand God’s promises?
What’s a specific way you’ve experienced Jesus keeping His promises to you?
How does our sin affect the way we experience God’s blessings?
How can our unity because of Christ’s justification bring glory to Him in our world?
What’s something you need God’s help to persevere in right now? Pray for one another.
If there was one thing you could change about yourself, what would you change?
What was something from Sunday’s message you found important, meaningful, or confusing?
Ever try to muster up peace? How does that go?
How can prayer help us face adversity? Any personal examples?
What’s a specific way your hope in Christ has changed your character?
Why is being broken a good thing?
What’s a way we can boast in God to people who don’t yet know Him?
What belief, attitude, or action do you need to change based on Romans 5:1-11? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We are either in Adam or in Christ.
What’s something you’re looking forward to during the holidays?
In what ways does original sin help us understand life as we know it?
Why do you think Paul brings up original sin at this point in Romans?
How can the reality that we reign with Christ, if we’ve trusted in Him, help us overcome our sin struggles?
How can trusting in the power of God’s Word help us to be better witnesses for Him?
What’s something going on in your life that you can’t fix without God’s help? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We can overcome what kills us by dying in Christ.
If you’ve been baptized, how has it affected your ongoing life of faith? What do you carry with you from that day?
Why is it important to dwell on our unity with Christ in His death, burial, resurrection, and ascension?
How is the truth that we can follow Christ good news?
How does dwelling on our past sin affect the way we follow Jesus today?
What’s something you’d like to be held accountable for? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: Christian is as Christian does.
A. The Law is good, but legalism is bad.
What’s something from Sunday’s message you found interesting, important, or confusing?
What’s something you’ve been legalistic about in the past? Why did you change your view?
What’s a way Christians compromise their faith?
What Christian practices or traditions have helped you grow in your faith?
How do you check or test your motives?
How have you shared in your Master’s happiness lately?
What’s something over which you’d like God to change your heart? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: Because God is true, we can truly live.
How old were you the first time someone shared the gospel with you?
When was the last time the Bible convicted you or caused you to change your thinking, attitude or actions? What happened?
How can the gospel help us to be more honest with Him and others? Any examples?
How can our honesty with God and each other bring glory to Him in the world?
How has God been challenging you to face the truth or take up your cross lately? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: Being made right with God leads to being right with each other.
What’s something you’re sometimes (or often) tempted to boast about?
If you were to give an abbreviated version of Sunday’s message on Romans 3:9-31 what would you make sure to focus on?
Why do people view fearing God as a negative thing?
How do you know if you’re living in fear of God, or not?
What comes to mind when you hear the word “justification”?
How can conviction over sin lead to disunity?
How does living for God’s glory (in light of His justification) lead to lasting satisfaction and joy? Any examples?
What’s a way God is challenging you to live by?
Big Idea: God’s gift of justification opens the doors of heaven.
Why do you think Paul spent so much time writing about justification in Romans?
Why is it important for Christians to think Biblically and carefully about doctrine?
How has the doctrine of justification shaped your life? Can you relate to Martin Luther, at all?
Is it possible to overemphasize justification? If so, how? If not, why not?
What’s something that helps you rest in God’s salvation?
If you were to share about justification with someone who is not a believer, how would you explain it to him or her? Where would you even start?
How can you respond in a specific way to Romans 4:1-12? Pray for one another.
V. 19 Who is James addressing in this passage?
V. 20 Why can’t our anger produce righteousness?
V. 21 What sort of salvation is James describing in this verse?
Vv. 22-24 How are knowledge, identity and actions tied together?
V. 25 What does it take to experience freedom and blessings?
V. 26 Why does James mention the tongue as a means of measuring religion?
V. 27 What happens if we don’t look after people in distress, or keep ourselves from being polluted by the word?
What’s something you forget to do in response to hearing God’s Word?
How has God spoken to you through this passage today?
What changes in belief, attitude, or actions do you need to make (with the help of God and others) based on what we’ve found in this passage?
Pray for an opportunity to share the truths of this passage with someone?
Big Idea: We can live for God’s glory together by experiencing His grace.
What’s one of the most memorable gifts you’ve ever received?
What was something from Sunday’s message that was meaningful to you, or that you struggled with?
Why is it hard for people to view themselves as slaves to Christ? Or to view Christ as Master?
Many churches communicate that they’re “gospel-centered,” or “Christ-centered” (as we do at First Baptist Elma). What in the world does that even mean?
Read Matthew 10:37-39. How can such teaching by Jesus be considered Good News?
How can belonging to Christ, as members of a church, shape our lives?
What’s a way you’d like to be more faithful in Christ?
What’s something going on in your life that you’d like to see Christ glorified in? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: We can live unashamed lives.
If you didn’t have to sleep what would you do with your extra time?
Why do you think Paul included the content in Romans 1:8-17 at this point in his letter?
How are prayer and faith related?
What are ways God’s love for you in Christ has helped you move out of isolation?
How can the gospel make us more gracious?
Why was Paul so driven to proclaim the gospel? Can you relate? If so, how? If not, why not?
What’s a specific way we can be gracious as a church that will bring God glory?
What’s an area in our life right now that you need to the gospel to touch? Pray for one another.
Why do you think it was necessary for Paul to include Romans 1:18-32 in his letter, especially in the place it appears?
What’s a way we can be tempted to suppress the truth?
How are “God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature” (Romans 1:20) clearly seen?
Why do people tend to look at others’ sins with a microscope and our own with a telescope?
Read 1 John 1:5-7. What’s something you’ve been struggling with lately that you need to bring into the light? Pray for one another.
Big Idea: God’s judgement is a good thing.
If you were to plan your own funeral, what would you include?
What’s something that struck you as important or stuck with from Sunday’s message?
Do you think Christians are more critical or judgmental than the rest of the population? Why or why not?
How has reading the Bible made you humbler?
Why is it good news that God is a just Judge who is aware of everything?
Read 2 Corinthians 5:6-10. How will Christ’s justification change the way we’re judged for the things we’ve done, good or bad?
What’s a specific way we can proclaim the riches of Christ?
What’s a way you can apply Romans 2:1-16? Pray for one another?

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
i. For the purpose of these conditions, the term ABL shall mean Accessory Bits Limited.
ii. The term Customer shall mean any other party, to which ABL shall offer a quotation, offer of sale or contract.
iii. Invoice shall mean the document despatched from ABL to the Customer requiring payment, which will be deemed to include these terms and conditions of sale.
iv. Pro forma Invoice shall mean the document despatched from ABL to the Customer requiring payment to ABL before shipment of Goods.
v. Order shall mean the goods requested by the Customer and transmitted to ABL in any form bearing the Customers name, address and official Order Number.
vi. Delivery note or Advice note shall mean the document accompanying the goods in their despatch and delivery from ABL to the Customer.
vii. No conditions or stipulations in or attached to any form of order to ABL by the customer which is inconsistent with these Conditions or which adds to or modifies them in any way shall have any effect.
viii. No person in the employ of ABL or acting or purporting to act as an agent of ABL has the authority to accept orders or supply goods on any conditions other than these conditions in any way whatsoever, except by written agreement between the Customer and a Director of ABL.
i. All prices listed in ABL price lists issued from time to time are correct at the time of print. ABL will make all reasonable endeavours to ensure that goods are available at these prices. ABL cannot be held responsible if supplies are unobtainable or otherwise unsaleable.
ii. All quotations are valid for a period of 30 days unless otherwise agreed in writing, subject to clause viii. in section 1 above.
iii. Pro forma invoices are valid for the period stated thereon. If no period is stated the prices quoted are valid until the end of the month in which the invoice was raised.
iv. All prices quoted are subject to the addition of Value Added Tax at the prevailing rate at the time of despatch.
i. Customers wishing to open credit facilities with ABL may do so by completing the ABL credit application form in electronic form.
ii. ABL reserves the right to decline any application for credit facilities without any reason.
iii. Credit accounts are subject to settlement by the Customer within 30 days from the end of the month of Invoice.
Cancel the contract or suspend any further deliveries to the Customer.
v. If the customer does not have a credit facility with ABL payment will be accepted by Cash, Banker’s draft, and Cleared Personal or Company cheque, or at the discretion of the Director’s Letter of Credit. In the case of customer collection, goods will only be released when cleared funds are received in ABL’s Bank account or at the Discretion of Director’s Cash on Collection.
vi. The time for payment of the price shall be the essence of the contract and ABL shall be entitled to sue for the price of the Goods, notwithstanding that delivery may not have taken place or that the property in the Goods has not passed to the Customer.
vii. Where the customer in payment of Goods offers a cheque, ABL reserve the right to delay despatch of the Goods pending the clearance of that cheque.
viii. ABL does not give any discount for prompt or early payment of invoices or monthly statements.
ix. The Customer shall not withhold payment on account of any claim the Customer may have against ABL.
i. Before entering any agreement with ABL for the purchase of Goods, the Customer expressly warrants that they are not insolvent and have not committed any act of Bankruptcy and knows of no circumstance which would entitle any debenture holder to appoint a receiver, administrative receiver, or liquidator, to petition for a winding up order or exercise any other rights over or against the company’s assets.
ii. Risk in Goods the subject of any agreement by ABL to sell, which means without limitation any order, shall pass to the customer immediately upon delivery, be this to the customer premises, upon collection from ABL or to an agreed third party address. The customer shall insure such goods against loss and damage naming ABL as loss payee and shall produce to ABL evidence of such insurance upon request.
iii. Such Goods shall remain the sole and absolute property of ABL as legal and equitable owner until such time as the Customer shall have paid ABL the agreed price together with the full price of any other Goods the subject of any other contract with ABL and ABL may reclaim such Goods as soon as the payment for them becomes overdue, without having to rescind the contract with the customer. The customer acknowledges that they are in possession of the goods solely as bailee for ABL until such time as payment is received as defined in section 3.
iv. In order to protect ABL’s interests in Goods for which payment in full has not been received, the Customer shall, if called upon to do so, register a charge in favour of ABL on such Goods or a floating charge in favour of ABL on the customers business.
v. Until such time as the customer becomes owner of the Goods, they will store them on their premises separately from all other Goods and identify them by suitable marking or labelling as the Goods of ABL and will take all steps necessary to protect the interests of ABL in the Goods.
vi. The Customer’s right to possession of the Goods for which payment in full has not been received shall cease in the event of their insolvency. ABL may, in such event, stop the Goods in transit after parting with possession of them or, for the purpose of recovery of its Goods, enter upon any premises where they are stored or where they are reasonably thought to be stored and may re-possess the same.
vii. The customer shall not cause or permit any of ABL’s Goods to be incorporated in or affixed to any building until the Customer has paid ABL in full for such Goods.
viii. Until such time as the customer becomes the owner of the Goods and subject to the terms hereof, the customer is licensed by ABL to process the said Goods in such fashion as they may wish and/or incorporate them in or with any other product or products subject to the express condition that the new product or products or any other article or item whatsoever containing any part of the said Goods shall be separately stored and marked so as to be identifiable as being made from or with the Goods which are the property of ABL.
ix. If Goods, which are the property of ABL, are admixed with Goods which are the property of the Customer or are processed with or incorporated therein, the product thereof shall become and/or shall be deemed to be the sole and exclusive property of ABL. If Goods which are the property of any other person other than the Customer are processed with or incorporated therein the product thereof shall become or shall be deemed to be owned by ABL in common with that other person.
It is a bona fide sale to an independent party affected in the normal course of its business it being agreed that in exercising such power of sale the Customer shall (as between the Customer and ABL) effect such sale as agent for ABL. If such sale by the Customer is on credit, the Customer shall inform such independent party that the Goods remain the property of ABL until such time as the price thereof has been paid in full to ABL or its assignee, and the customer shall be deemed to have assigned their claim against such independent party to ABL to the value of the price not yet paid to ABL or its assignee.
The Customer agrees to indemnify ABL for any liability incurred by ABL as principal.
The Customer shall immediately on receipt of the entire proceeds of such sale (‘the proceeds’) account to ABL or its assignee for the price payable to ABL or its assignee for such Goods of ABL and any other costs of carriage, insurance or other costs borne by ABL in respect thereof.
The Customer shall, until receipt by ABL or its assignee of the proceeds, hold the proceeds in trust for ABL or its assignee and pay the proceeds into a bank account in the name of ABL or its assignee and the Customer shall not credit any monies other than monies received on the sale of such Goods of ABL to such account or draw on such account except for the purpose of paying ABL or its assignee the price payable as described in subclause 3. above and no other funds shall be credited to such account. The interest accrued on such account shall be paid to ABL or its assignee.
i. ABL reserves the right to charge carriage on deliveries as appropriate. And in any case on all orders of less than £300.00 net value.
ii. Delivery dates are given in good faith by ABL to indicate estimated delivery times but shall not amount to any contractual obligation to deliver at the times stated in any communication by and on behalf of ABL.
iii. Where Goods are to be delivered in instalments, each delivery shall constitute a separate contract and failure by ABL to deliver any one or more of the instalments in accordance with these conditions or any claim by the Customer in respect of any one or more instalments, shall not entitle the Customer to treat the contract as a whole repudiated.
iv. No liability for direct or consequential loss or damage arising from delay in delivery of the Goods howsoever caused will be accepted.
Check all Goods delivered by or on behalf of ABL and sign the delivery note for the Goods at the time of delivery.
Mark any discrepancies between the Goods ordered and Goods delivered and inform ABL within three days of the delivery. Such discrepancy to include claims for damaged Goods.
vi. Any claims for discrepancies or damaged Goods must be submitted to ABL in accordance with subclause 1. and 2. above, each claim submitted to ABL must include full particulars of the Order, the delivery/advice note and full details of the claim. Claims will not be accepted by ABL if they are not submitted within three days of delivery. Submission of a claim within three days does not necessarily mean that ABL will accept liability in relation to such claim. A delivery note signed ‘unexamined’ is not sufficient to uphold a claim.
vii. ABL shall not be liable for any loss resulting from the Customers failure to comply with the requirements, conditions or regulations of the Post Office, or an independent carrier appointed to transport the Goods.
i. Except as provided elsewhere in these conditions, ABL provides a one-year warranty against defective workmanship and materials on all Goods supplied to the Customer.
Such defect would not have been apparent on inspection.
The Customer or end-user has not dealt with the Goods in such a way as to render their condition worse than when they were delivered.
Such warranties do not affect your statutory rights.
iii. All descriptions, weights and dimensions given by ABL are given in good faith however; no responsibility is taken by ABL for their accuracy.
iv. Variations of colour, finish, materials and other aspects of appearance may occur from time to time, however caused no liability is accepted.
v. ABL does not accept liability for failure to comply with any standards or regulations required by law (“the legal requirements”) in respect of Goods supplied by ABL or for indirect or consequential loss or damage arising from such Goods.
i. ABL trading policy is only to supply bona fide trade customers against official Customer Orders. The proper control and authorisation of official Orders is deemed to be the responsibility of the Customer. ABL cannot accept liability for either the incorrect use or abuse of Customer official Orders.
Refuse to accept an Order.
Suspend deliveries against an Order whether or not an account is in arrears.
Cancel unexecuted instalments of an Order.
iii. No variation of an Order will be recognised unless otherwise agreed by ABL in writing.
iv. Written confirmation from a Customer of any Order made by him by telephone must be received by ABL clearly marked as confirmation of such Order. No Orders will be actioned until such confirmation is received. ABL cannot be responsible for duplication of the Order.
v. ABL retains the right to levy a handling charge equal to 20% of the contract price where a customer cancels an order.
vi. Customers are responsible for checking the accuracy of all Order acknowledgements. ABL will acknowledge all Customer Orders in writing, no claims for discrepancies between the items and quantities ordered and those supplied will be accepted where Goods supplied are in keeping with those acknowledged.
i. No Goods may be returned by a Customer without the agreement of ABL. Agreement will be acknowledged by the issue of a ‘Goods Return No.
ii. Non-faulty Goods may only be returned within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the order.
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In the Matter of Arthur S. MEISNERE, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Before KERN, FERREN and TERRY, Associate Judges.
We are presented with a Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. The Board found that respondent was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and conspiracy to defraud the United States Internal Revenue Service, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Board further found that both of these offenses involved moral turpitude, requiring disbarment pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1981).
We accept the Board's findings of fact as being supported by substantial evidence of record, including a certified copy of a court record of respondent's convictions. Moreover, we agree with the Board that both of *270 the crimes of which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude, for the reasons set forth by the Board in its Report and Recommendation, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
ORDERED that respondent, ARTHUR S. MEISNERE, is permanently disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1981). See In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C. 1980) (en banc); In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.1979) (en banc). This order shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this opinion. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(3).
On August 26, 1982, Respondent pleaded guilty to an indictment returned in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1623 and to an information charging conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. On October 29, 1982, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for two years.
On November 18, 1982, the Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law in the District of Columbia and referred the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility to determine whether the offenses of which Respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude within the purview of D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1981).
The Board is of the view that both of the offenses of which Respondent was convicted involve moral turpitude on their face, and that therefore, Respondent must be disbarred under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1981).
The first statute under which Respondent was indicted, 18 U.S.C. 1623, is essentially a perjury statute. See Dunn v. United States,  422 U.S. 100, [99 S. Ct. 2190, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743] (1979), noting that the statute was designed to facilitate perjury prosecutions without the technical problems of proof engrafted into the federal perjury statute from common law. The statute required for conviction, and the indictment here at issue charged, the making of a false statement under oath before a grand jury with respect to a matter material to the grand jury's investigation. False testimony in a judicial proceeding, particularly by an attorney sworn to uphold the law, undermines the integrity of the judicial process. It therefore involves moral turpitude on its face under the standard announced by the Court in In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1982).
A violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, the conspiracy statute[,] does not necessarily constitute moral turpitude per se since the statute prohibits both conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and conspiracy to defraud the United States. In this case, however, the information to which Respondent pleaded guilty, specifically charged conspiracy knowingly to defraud the United States by obstructing the Treasury Department in its attempt to ascertain the assets of and the taxes due from one Leon Durwood Harvey. Thus the information to which Respondent pleaded guilty necessarily required proof of intent to defraud. Intent to defraud inherently involves *271 moral turpitude. In re Willcher, supra.
Apparently recognizing the inevitability of his disbarment, Respondent, on September 29, 1982, attempted to resign from the bar as of October 1, 1982. The attempted resignation, after his plea of guilty, cannot defeat disbarment. In re Phillips [452 A.2d 345] No. M-97-81 (1982).
The Board on Professional Responsibility therefore recommends that Respondent be disbarred under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (1981).
All members of the Board join in this opinion except Mr. Webb who did not participate in the case.
 The statute provides: Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.


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SIR JOSEPH ALSTON, BART., was a successful merchant businessman, created first a Knight, and then elevated to the higher rank of Baronet on 20th January, 1681. His first wife Mary Crookenberg, was one of the daughters and co-heirs of a wealthy Dutch merchant, of Bergen-op-Zoom, in the province of Brabant. Her dowry was L12000. His second wife Anne was also women of considerable personal means.
He also purchased the estate of Bradwell Abbey, co. Bucks., two miles south of Wolverton, and a quarter of a mile west of Bradwell. The Abbey was formerly the Benedictine Priory of St. Mary, and was partly rebuilt as a mansion. It had a moat and a long avenue of trees. It is now a farm house, and the estate belongs to the Mercers' Company.
Joseph was mentioned for L5 in Isaac Alston's will, 20 May 1625, he was aged under 21 years at that date.
Priory of Bradwell - passed by purchase to the Lawrence's in 1647 and from them in 1664 to Sir Joseph Alston bart then of Chelsea who made Bradwell Abbey his residence.
After his death it was successively in the families of Fuller and Owen.
Bradwell Bucks. Monument for Sir Joseph Alston of Bradwell Abbey (in the adjoining parish of Wolverton) who died 1688.
The demesne of the manor of Houghton was sold to the Alstons and by them about the year 1699 to the Hanslapes.
The residence of Sir Joseph Alston, the first Baronet of the Chelsea line and his immediate successors, is said to have been the old time residence of Sir Thomas More, the famous Chancellor of Henry VIII's reign. In this case Beaufort House would be its original name, and it would be from here that the upright Chancellor took boat to the Tower. The present Apothecaries Garden is said to have formed a part of the gardens attached to the house.
" In Alfred Beaver's Memorials of Old Chelsea is a note that during the week commencing May 30th, 1664 some Chelsea fishermen caught, it appears, off what is now known as Cheyne Walk, 172 pounds of salmon, which they sold to the Duchess of Ormond, Lord Cheyne, Squire Alston (afterwards Sir Joseph) and others at fourteen to eighteen pence per pound."
Bill, 21 May 1650, by John Hallam, citizen and draper of London, v. Joseph Alston and Mary Croukenbery.
The defendants (who are not described) were appointed executors of her will by one Clare Buck, widow of Robert Buck, citizen and draper of London, complainant's aunt, who was near one hundred years old at her death; they have possessed themselves of a considerable part of her estate, and defraud orator.
This is the bill, dated 25 November 1650, to which the answer is filed in Reynardson, 6/189 (q. v.).
Mary Brakenbergh and Joseph Alstone are executors of Clare Buck, late of London, widow.
Of the bond in dispute orator was promised an indemnity: and he has really no responsibility whatever therein.
He prays defendants may be restrained from demanding payment.
SENTLEY v. ALSTONE & others.
Answer, 31 May 1651, by Joseph Alston, one of the defendants to the complaint of Robert Sentley, esq.
Defendant is executor of one Clare Buck, widow, who died about February 1648/9;. He is satisfied the bond given her by the complainant and others was not paid during her lifetime.
Bill, 7 May 1653, by John Southwood the elder of London, merchant, v. Thomas Burton, Joseph Alston and Henry Hickford.
" One Joseph Alston " is made party to this suit, as having cognisance of certain bonds &c. given on the marriage of complainant's daughter Hannah to Thomas Burton, and now combining with said Burton to complainant's disadvantage.
In his answer Alston says he knows nothing whatever of the transactions had in connection with the said marriage. Burton was indebted to him in over L400, for divers pieces of Norwich stuffs supplied to him by this defendant. He attached the complainant's goods as a debtor of the said Burton.
Bill, 6 November 1658, by Francis Lenthall of London, merchant, v. Joseph Alston of London, merchant. Relates solely to financial transactions between the Parties, and giving no personal details whatever.
Bill, 15 December 1658, by John Wiggott of London, merchant, v. Francis Lenthall and Joseph Alston of London, merchants.
This suit relates merely to bills and bonds, and contains no personal information whatever. See as above.
Bill, 6 February 1671/2, by Richard Maryott of the parish of St. Clement Danes, Middlesex, Esq. v. Richard Chandler, Joseph Alston, and Framlingham, Bussingborne, Charles, Mary and Sir John Gawdy.
Bill 13 May 1672, by Joseph Alston the elder, of London, Esq. v. Dame Priscilla Rider and Thomas Rider.
One Wm. Courteene late of London, Esq. and afterwards Kt., borrowed a sum of money from Clare Bucke, late of London, widow, decd., who was aunt to Mary, your Orator's wife, late deed. The said Clare Bucke made complainant her executor.
30 Dec 1681 King's Warrant Book VIII, pp. 334-5. Money Book III, p. 256.
Source: The Catalogue of The National Archives From: 'Entry Book: December 1681', Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 7: 1681-1685 (1916), pp. 353. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=83825 Date accessed: 05 July 2012.
This is a much more interesting document than the usual run of Wills (see below), revealing as it does many pleasing traits of the aged merchant baronet's personality and a deep and devout faith in his religious belief.
It begins, " In the name of God Amen. I Sir Joseph Alston of the parish of Chelsea in the County of Midd. Bart. being. in good health of body and of perfect and disposing mind and memory thanks be therefore given to Almighty God and calling to mind the uncertainty of this present life that I am borne to change the same as my former deare wife hath done. And alsoe that as the change and death of this life is most certaine to every liveing creature so the time to us is most uncertaine as a signall proofe thereof the Lord hath manifested unto mee in my last most deare and well beloved consort.
Giveing thankes to God for all his benefitts bestowed upon me in this life doe make and ordaine this my last Will and Testament in manner and forme following that is to say ffirst and principally I commend my Soule into the hands of Almighty God my Creator the ffather of our Lord Jesus Christ and to Jesus Christ my onely Saviour and Redeemer by whose death and passion I faithfully beleive to bee saved and to the Holy Ghost the Comforter of his elect three persons and one invisible imortall onely wise God blessed for evermore before Whome I shall at the generall day of judgment appear with joye in the Robes of Christs Righteousness through whose meritts I beleive my sinns shall not be imputed to me and by whome I hope and believe I shall enter into that everlasting Kingdome of Heaven with the faithful members of that triumphant church whereof Jesus Christ is the head."
After this pious but lengthy confession of faith, Sir Joseph orders his body to be buried in the Parish Church of Chelsea, "in the same place where my deare beloved wife lyeth buryed, my coffin to lye upon her coffin under the pew where we alwaises satt together in the Chancell and to be buryed in the coffin which I have provided and which is now in a closset at my dwelling house at Chelsea."
Sir Joseph died possessed of a very considerable estate, out of which he made many bequests to kinsfolk and dependents. Among the more interesting are those of his great silver Bason and Ures, his two silver flaggons, one paire Silver Candlesticks the best paire, his own Watch his Seale gold ring and his Character Bible writt" 1 with his own hand to his son Joseph, also to the same son after his (testator's second) wife's decease the use of his great necklace of pearls for life, and then to Joseph Alston his grandson (Joseph's son). To Mary, wife of his son Isaac, his "greate Diamond Jewell" The rent of a certain house he orders to be distributed among his poor kindred as his executors think fit, which he says he does " In token of my thankfulness to Almighty God who did blesse extraordinarily my poore endeavours in the aforesaid parish of St. Edmond's the King where through his mercy and goodnesse I gott my estate. And I doe order and appointe that my said executors shall keepe a bagg on purpose to putt the rent of the said house in and not to make any other use of it.
Sir Joseph desires Dr. Littleton to preach his funeral sermon upon the same text he preached upon at his former wife's funeral, i.e., Acts xiii 39, with L5 for mourning and L5 for his sermon. Not more than L300 to be spent on his funeral for rings, mourning, and other charges.
He appoints his sons Joseph and Isaac executors, enjoining " them to be very carefull and faithfull in the performance of this trust which I repose in them as they will answer for it at the great day of account."
1 The "Character Bible" is an interesting relic of the old merchant baronet - a copy of the holy scriptures written entirely by him in shorthand and handsomely bound in leather with engraved silver clasps - Lionel Cresswell in 1898 discovered it in the possession of Sir Joseph's descendant, Mr Augustus J C Hare .
And I doe hereby revoke adnull and make voyd all former Wills And doe declare this to be my last Will and Testament In Witness whereof I have hereunto sett my hand and Seale this Seaventeenth Day of March in the first yeare of the Raigne of our Soveraigne Lord James the second by the grace of God of England Scotland ffrance and Ireland King Defender of the ffaith etc Anno Dni one Thousand Six Hundred Eighty foure.
Bann: Maynard, Jo Preston, Will Milman, Nath: Gifford Cl. to Mr Milman.
There is a note in the the margin of the Will recording the grant of letters of administration (with Will annexed) 14th of April 1720 to Mary widow of Isaac Alston the younger of the two sons and executors named in the will both being dead and the estate not yet wound up.
Sir Joseph Alston Knt. and 1st Bart. of Chelsea (died 1688).
Granted with will annexed 14 April 1720 to Mary widow and administratrix of Isaac Alston one of the executors and residuary legatees named in the will.
The priory of Bradwell adjoining to this parish, the site of which is now deemed extraparochial, was founded in the reign of King Stephen, for black monks, by Manfelin, Baron of Wolverton: it was dedicated to the Virgin Mary, and was originally a cell to Luffield. In 1526 it was given with other small monasteries to Cardinal Wolsey; after his attainder, the king granted it with the manor, in the year 1531, to the prior and convent of Sheen: the site was granted after the reformation, to Arthur Longueville esq. From the Longuevilles it passed by purchase to the Lawrences, in 1647; and from them, in 1664, to Sir Joseph Alston bart. then of Chelsea, who made Bradwell Abbey his residence: after his death it was successively in the families of Fuller and Owen. About the year 1730 the Bradwell Abbey estate was purchased by Sir Charles Gunter Nicholl, K.B. whose only daughter and heir married the late Earl of Dartmouth: it is now vested in their son, the present earl. The site of the abbey, of which there are no remains, is occupied as a farm-house.
. . . . . Sir John Lawrence, the purchaser of Bradwell, sold it in 1666 to Joseph Alston of Chelsea and his son Joseph. The elder Joseph was created a baronet as of Chelsea and Bradwell Abbey in 1682, and died in May 1688, his son Joseph, who had been sheriff in 1670, and who succeeded him, dying in March of the following year. His son, the third Sir Joseph Alston,who was likewise Sheriff of Buckinghamshire in 1702, made a settlement of the manor on his marriage in1690 with Penelope Evelyn, with whom he dealt with the manor in 1705, and again in 1713, when their son, the fourth Joseph Alston, was joined with them. The third baronet was succeeded in 1716 by his son, the fourth Sir Joseph, who immediately sold Bradwell to John Fuller . . . . .
From: 'Parishes : Bradwell', A History of the County of Buckingham: Volume 4 (1927), pp. 283-288. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=62585 Date accessed: 25 June 2013.
Precis of Will of Hannah Wallin alias Poulter of St. Andrew Undershaft, London, spinster.
To be buried at St. Mary at Hill where my brother John Wallin alias Poulter is buried. L10 to Thomas Poulter now in Va. or overseas, brother of Mary Poulter who is daughter of my cousin John Poulter of Hitchin, Herts. Other principal bequests to: Mr. Joseph Alstone of London, Norwich merchant, Mary his wife and their children Joseph, Edward, Isaac and Clare Alstonc; Mr. Edward Alstonc; John Baldridge; my kinsman Thomas Hunt and his children Thomas and Hannah Hunt; the son and daughter of my cousin Isaac Poulter of Hitchin, deceased, whose names I know not; the poor of Hitchin where I was born. Execs: Joseph Alstone Sr. and Mary his wife. Wits: Thomas Goodwin, scrivener, and Timothy Howford. Pr. 7 Aug 1663 by Joseph Alston. (PROB 11/312/112).
Sir Joseph & his family appear to be executors & beneficiaries of Hannah Wallin's Will of 1662.
1. Sir Joseph Alston's Bible. This "Character Bible" is an interesting relic of the old merchant baronet - a copy of the holy scriptures written entirely by him in shorthand and handsomely bound in leather with engraved silver clasps - Lionel Cresswell in 1898 discovered it in the possession of Sir Joseph's descendant, Mr Augustus J C Hare .
2. Sir Joseph Alston & Family: Boyd's Inhabitants of London.
3. Joseph Alston: Cloth Seal impressed with Alston Crest (19mm) found in Thames, c17th Century.
A good match has been found for these arms by Michael Yeti Yates, "I think it could be a merchants seal prehaps for Joseph Alston. With the link you gave me on facebook and the other one on your website found by mudlark,you can get the initials I and maybe an A from the pair either side of crescent hence James Alston. The Alston arms are the same as the seals and with the cadency of this branch you get a crescent and star above the shield. Joseph moved to Chelsea London and married the daughter and coheir of a Mr Crookenberg a Dutch merchant with whom he got the large sum of twelve grand. One link I did find says he was a successful merchant businessman."

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CHARLES H. JUSTICE vs. N. J. SODERLUND & others.
Executor and Administrator. Equity Jurisdiction, Specific performance, Laches. Deed.
Where a will gives to the executor thereof the power to sell real estate for the payment of a mortgage debt and of legacies, if it appears that the amount of the mortgage debt is about $6,000, that the amount of the legacies is $19,500, that the personal estate of the testator was appraised in the inventory at $8,193 and that the debts, funeral expenses and taxes are about $5,143, the executor on these facts has a right to sell real estate of the testator and can give a good title thereto without obtaining a license from the Probate Court.
An executor, who sells real estate under a power given him by the will of his testator for the purpose of paying a mortgage debt and legacies, performs his duty to the purchaser by giving or tendering him a quitclaim deed containing the words "remise, release, and forever quitclaim" without using the word "grant."
Where a purchaser of a parcel of land from an executor at a sale made under a power in a will objects to a deed tendered him by the executor for certain reasons which prove to be groundless, the deed tendered by the executor being good and sufficient so far as those reasons are concerned, and does not object to the deed on account of any alleged error in the description of the land conveyed, he cannot three years later, having never during that time made any tender of the balance of the purchase money, justify his refusal to accept the deed on the ground that there was an error in such description, although correct by metes and bounds, in giving a wrong number as the number of the lot conveyed upon a plan referred to, which error, if it existed, would have been corrected immediately had it been pointed out when the deed first was tendered, and such laches on the part of the purchaser combined with his refusal to accept the deed, persisted in for three years without explanation, gives the executor the right to sell the parcel of land to another person.
In the case described above it appeared that, from the time of the purchase of the land to the time of its sale by the executor to another person three years later, the purchaser occupied and improved the land, but without the knowledge of the executor. Held, that such occupation and improvement without the knowledge of the executor did not affect the rights of the parties.
the defendants be enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's possession, use and enjoyment of such parcel of land and that the defendants Weed and Robinson be ordered to execute a good and sufficient deed of said Lot 18 to the plaintiff.
"The plaintiff, as I find, entered upon the premises, cultivated the land, setting out trees and shrubs, and has ever since had the possession and enjoyment of it as an appurtenance to his own homestead. So far as appeared, he has never made any tender of the balance [of the purchase money], nor has he taken action of any kind to enforce any supposed rights, and to the demands of the executors that he accept the proffered deed, his answer through his counsel has constantly been a refusal to take it in the form in which it was tendered.
"In the latter part of the year 1915, the executors sold and conveyed the lot in question to the defendant Soderlund, who, as I find, had notice of the transactions between the plaintiff and the executors. When the plaintiff learned of this sale, he brought his bill.
"I am satisfied that if the plaintiff had any rights, he slept upon them, and, thinking himself secure from interference, took no steps until November, 1915, when, hearing of the sale to Soderlund, he brought his bill three years after the date of the first sale.
"Secondly, if the deed was not a good and sufficient one, the plaintiff did nothing for three years towards asserting his claim, but contributed by his own inaction to delaying the settlement of the estate, and was guilty of laches. For this reason, if for no other, his bill should be dismissed."
Later by order of the judge a final decree was entered dismissing the bill with costs, and the plaintiff appealed.
R. W. Bartlett, for the plaintiff.
A. W. Blakemore, (H. A. Horgan with him,) for the defendants.
CARROLL, J. Maria M. Gay, who died June 5, 1911, in the sixteenth clause of her will directed her executors to "sell such portion of my estate as may be necessary to pay off the mortgage now thereon, and then to sell such portion as may be necessary to pay the legacies herein made," and for this purpose they were authorized "to sell at their discretion the whole or any part of the said estate." The legacies amounted to $19,500. "The mortgages referred to in the will were somewhere about $5,500 or $6,000." Her personal estate was inventoried at $8,193.47. The debts, including funeral expenses and taxes, were approximately $5,143.
The testatrix owned a large tract of land in Newton, and the executors, acting under the powers in the will, without obtaining a license to sell from the Probate Court, sold at public auction, in October, 1912, some of the lots into which the tract was divided. The total amount of these sales was $18,176.60. "But four parcels were not taken . . . leaving a little over $10,000 actual money received from the auction sale which was not enough to pay the mortgages and legacies."
At this sale of October, 1912, the plaintiff purchased Lot No. 18 for $250.25, paying $100 at the time of sale. A quitclaim deed, unsigned, was prepared and sent to the attorney for the plaintiff, describing the land sold as Lot No. 27. The form of the deed was objected to on the ground that the executors had no title under the will and could not convey by quitclaim deed, and that a license from the Probate Court was necessary to make such a sale; but no objection was made to the deed because of the error in describing the number of the lot. Further correspondence passed between one of the executors and the representative of the plaintiff. The last letter was November 2, 1912, when the plaintiff was informed the executors had ready for delivery a deed of Lot 27.
of the premises. In the latter part of 1915 the executors sold Lot 18 to the defendant Soderlund. In November, 1915, the plaintiff brought this bill for the specific performance of the contract of October, 1912, praying that the executor be directed to execute and deliver to him a good and sufficient deed of the lot purchased. In the Superior Court the bill was dismissed.
By the will of the testatrix the executors were given the power to sell her real estate for the payment of the mortgage and legacies. The evidence shows the sale to have been proper, for this purpose, and no license from the Probate Court was necessary. It was said by Chief Justice Shaw in Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. 107, 113, "Whenever an executor has a power under a will to sell real estate, no license of any court is necessary to, or can give any additional validity to any sale and conveyance which he may make. And it is considered a good reason for refusing such license, that the power already exists." See McLaughlin v. Greene, 198 Mass. 153, and cases cited. Allen v. Dean, 148 Mass. 594, relied on by the plaintiff, is not in conflict with this. In that case authority was given to sell the real estate "as the proper and convenient settlement of the estate may require." The settlement of the estate meant the settlement of the probate accounts, the payment of debts, legacies, and the charges of administration; and it was held that there was nothing in the will showing the testator used the words in any other sense, and no power was given to sell the real estate for the purpose of making partition among the devisees. In Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick. 23, the administrator was licensed to sell to the amount of $640. He sold the whole estate for $953.33, and because he exceeded his authority, the sale was void. In Bremer v. Hadley, 196 Mass. 217, no power was given to sell any part of the trust property or to reinvest the fund.
The mortgage and legacies aggregated $25,000, and while real estate property appraised at $30,000 was put up for sale, only $10,000 worth was sold. It was not required that these facts should all appear of record, nor did the executors, in proceeding as they did, exceed the authority conferred upon them. McLaughlin v. Greene, supra.
In the deed the executors used the words "remise, release, and forever quitclaim." They did not use the word "grant."
Although the instrument was made before St. 1912, c. 502, it was sufficient in form. It was unnecessary to employ this particular word. Wainwright v. Sawyer, 150 Mass. 168. Ladd v. Chase, 155 Mass. 417, 422.
The deed which was offered referred to the premises as "Lot 27 as shown on a plan . . . recorded with Middlesex South District Deeds," followed by a detailed description; while the same lot on the plan used at the trial is Lot No. 18. The plaintiff did not object to the deed on the ground of any alleged mistake in the number of the lot. He based his objections on other grounds. As the judge found, "The parties seemed to agree at the hearing that the error would have been immediately rectified if the deed had been satisfactory in other respects," and the plaintiff expressly "withdrew any charge of fraud in numbering the lots." The plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain that there was a mistake in the number of the lot in the deed if, indeed, on the whole record there was any mistake.
The plaintiff was guilty of laches and the judge was clearly right in so finding. Three years lapsed after the purchase before the plaintiff made any effort to secure a deed. He made no offer to pay the remainder of the purchase price and he did not proceed within a reasonable time to protect his rights. See Mansfield v. Wiles, 221 Mass. 75, 83. His occupation of the premises, as shown by the evidence, without the knowledge of the executors, was no excuse for this delay.
Decree of the Superior Court affirmed with costs.

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