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Since 2000, Power To The People has filed lawsuits, written letters to public officials and through its various members attempted to alert the public concerning an Article V Amendatory Convention and the blatant attempt by Congress to veto the Constitution depriving the people of their most fundamental right, the right to alter or abolish their form of government as they choose.
Using the various links to our different web pages, you can read about our legal filings, our letters to public officials and other activities of PTTP.
We suggest you begin by reading the over-length brief filed in Walker v. United States (2001). This brief extensively covers the entire subject of an Amendment Convention presenting over 200 Supreme Court Cases which support the calling of an Amendatory Convention. The brief also provides information on the various applications by the states, some 567 in all as well as examining the nuts and bolts of a convention answering many of the heretofore unanswered questions surrounding the calling of a convention, its organization and powers. The brief also contains a copy of the 1972 ABA Report on a convention along with a critical examination of its weakness. The format of the brief is in .pdf.
Then we suggest you watch our video on our current lawsuit, Walker v. Members of Congress.
Following the video, you may be interested in reading the entire history of Walker v. United States at its web page.
Then we suggest you read the letters to Congress and to the Supreme Court PTTP wrote informing them of the effect of the ruling following the ruling in Walker v United States.
PTTP then filed an Amicus Brief in the Supreme Court case, McConnell v. FEC in which a frank discussion of the effect of Walker v. United States on our constitutional form of government was presented to the Supreme Court formally.
PTTP then filed a second lawsuit Walker v. Members of Congress. You can read the district court filings, the appeals court filings and the Supreme Court filings. Also you can read a letter from a member of Congress regarding the lawsuit.
Finally you can read What The Court Decision Means.
Finally, you can read about the various subjects that will be discussed at a convention.
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This Petition for Review from the May 5, 1995 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Fifth District was heard January 10, 1997 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners James J. Metro, Angelo L. dos Santos, and Amado J. Vargas.
JAMES J. METRO, COMMISSIONER. The pro se claimant has petitioned for review from the May 5, 1995 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Fifth District. He argues on appeal that the commissioner erred by dismissing his claim for a dependency allowance. We affirm the trial commissioner’s decision.
The claimant sustained a compensable injury to his right master wrist on August 15, 1986, which was accepted by voluntary agreement. At that time, § 31-308b C.G.S. provided that a totally disabled employee shall receive weekly “a dependency allowance of ten dollars for each of such employee’s children or stepchildren who, (1) at the time of injury for which such compensation is being paid, were being wholly or mainly supported by such employee and who . . . are under eighteen years of age . . . .” The claimant did not allege that he had fathered or legally adopted minor children of his own. Rather, he claimed entitlement to a dependency allowance based on his responsibility for each of two nephews who resided in Ghana, Africa. The claimant contends that an unwritten Ghanaian tribal custom made him the caretaker of these children when his sister, their mother, died in April 1986.
The commissioner found that the claimant produced the following as evidence of guardianship: a December 27, 1989 letter from the Ghanaian embassy certifying that he was the legal guardian of his deceased sister’s nephews; a Statutory Declaration from a surviving sister made in a Ghanaian court, stating that the claimant was responsible for caring for one of his nephews; a certification from a Ghanaian Administrative Secretary authenticating the seal on the Statutory Declaration; and a January 23, 1995 letter from the Ghanaian Consulate-General in New York confirming the existence of a “matrilineal inheritance system” in the Akhan tribe, and stating that “the children of one’s sisters could be a direct responsibility.” (Emphasis added by commissioner.) He also offered into evidence a number of registered mail receipts, money transfer orders and checks that he alleged were for support for his nephews. He introduced a certificate of insurance listing one nephew as a dependent, and a February 1, 1995 notarized statement from a local college professor corroborating his claim that he was providing support to his nephews at the time of his injury.
The trier observed that most of the documents substantiating guardianship and financial support were prepared or issued after the date of the claimant’s compensable injury. Some of the traveler’s checks and wire transfers were sent to unidentified third parties in Germany and South Africa, and the claimant produced no evidence that his nephews had actually received the money, nor that his alleged support of his nephews constituted their primary support. She concluded that the claimant had not shown that his late sister’s children were his “children or stepchildren” within the meaning of § 31-308b. He had no evidence that a competent court had named him their legal guardian, nor did he show that the tribal custom allegedly creating his responsibility would make his nephews equivalent to a child or stepchild under § 31-308b. Further, he had produced inadequate evidence of actual support of his nephews. Thus, the trier held that he had failed to prove that he was entitled to a dependency allowance for his two nephews. The claimant has appealed that decision.
Part of what the claimant is arguing on appeal is that the trial commissioner should not have looked for the legal indicia of “guardianship” as a barometer of his relationship with his nephews. He contends that the term “guardianship” first became intertwined with this case when the word was selected as the closest approximation to the nature of the relationship that Ghanaian custom creates in this situation. However, he argues that attempting to determine whether he fits the American definition of a legal guardian is inappropriate in this case, because his tribal custom would not require the formal filing of documents in a Ghanaian court of law. Instead, the tribal custom automatically made him responsible for the children as soon as his sister passed away, just as if they were his own biological children. He argues that this custom makes these children akin to his “stepchildren” under § 31-308b.
This distinction may be important, but it also presents a problem for the claimant in this case. Regardless of the effect that the country of Ghana would give to Akhan tribal customs, the claimant must prove that he satisfies the conditions created by the laws of the state of Connecticut before he can collect workers’ compensation here, including dependency allowances for specified individuals. One of those conditions is that the dependent in question be a “child” or a “stepchild” of the employee. Rather than looking at the laws and customs of any other state, tribe, or country, we must interpret our own laws “according to the commonly approved usage of the language, and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law.” Crook v. Academy Drywall Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 155, 848 CRD-4-89-4 (Sept. 21, 1990).
A person’s “child” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as their “progeny; offspring of parentage.” It may include or apply to adopted, after-born, or illegitimate children, as well as stepchildren and “issue.” A “stepchild” is defined by Black’s as “the child by one of the spouses by a former marriage,” or a child “who has a parent by his natural parent’s second marriage and has not been adopted by that parent.” “Adoption,” in turn, entails “legal process pursuant to state statute in which a child’s legal rights and duties toward his natural parents are terminated and duties toward his adoptive parents are substituted.” It is emphasized that the adoptive process is completely statutory, and has no basis in the common law.
A look at these definitions shows that, absent a biological parent-child relationship with either the claimant or the claimant’s spouse, only a child adopted through statutory process could possibly fall within the term “children or stepchildren” in § 31-308b. The Ghanaian tribal custom alleged by the claimant may be a noble and long-recognized practice in his native tribe, and may be a perfectly desirable means of ensuring that children are cared for if something unfortunate happens to their parents. However, this custom is not based on a statutory adoption process, either in Ghana or in Connecticut. In the eyes of the law of this state, there is no legal obligation tying the claimant to his nephews as anything other than their uncle. Consistent with that fact, there is no language in § 31-308b that contemplates the recognition of any individual other than a “child” or a “stepchild” as a dependent for whom benefits may be claimed. Quite simply, § 31-308b was not built to take into account familial relationships such as the one adduced by the claimant in this case. We therefore need proceed no further in this matter; the claimant has not alleged sufficient facts to satisfy that statute.
Commissioners Angelo L. dos Santos and Amado J. Vargas concur.


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First published in September 1979 (this issue pictured above with Kevin Keegan in the classic red England away shirt by Admiral was No. 1) and offering a glut of colour posters in each issue, Match gradually established itself as Shoot's main weekly rival on the newsagent's shelves.
We are pleased to be able to offer a substantional collection of Match Weekly magazines, starting with the very first issue in September 1979, with the vast majority of magazines being in perfect condition.
For the first few months of publication, Match was dated to cover a full week (for instance, Issue 1 is dated 6th-12th September 1979) but for our purposes, the latter date is used (i.e, Sep 12). The last issue using this format is dated 28th February-5th March 1980 (this appears as Mar 5 in our listings for 1980), with next issue being dated for the following Saturday, in this case 8th March 1980 (therefore Mar 8). Until August 1981, magazines were stapled rather than glued, which made removal of the centre spread far easier. We can confirm that the ALL the magazines listed below are complete !
Where two or more players appear in a match action picture, the 'home' players will be listed first if the venue can be identified by stadium shots, or if the other player(s) are in away colours. Similarly, match action shots will also show the 'home' club first, if the venue can be clearly identified.
UNLESS STATED, MATCH WEEKLY MAGAZINES ARE PRICED AT £1 EACH.
Oct 24 David Cross & David Barton/Glenn Hoddle/Leeds/West Ham v. Newcastle, Paul Price, Steve MacKenzie, Alan Kennedy, Aberdeen, Tony Currie.
Oct 31 Paul Miller, Glenn Hoddle & Billy Caskey/Dave Langan/Ipswich/Kenny Dalglish & John Wile, Dave Swindlehurst, Malcolm Waldron & Chris Jones, John Matthews, Peter Shilton.
Nov 7 Sammy McIlroy & Tony Woodcock/Johan Cruyff/Scotland v. Austria/N. Ireland v. England, Andy King, Frank Kopel, Rotherham.
Jan 16 John Hollins/Match '80 Soccer Calendar, pt 2/Billy Bonds & John Brownlie/Stan Bowles, Dixie McNeill.
Apr 12 Mike Channon & Wayne Entwhistle/Arsenal/Arnold Muhren/Trevor Francis, Ray Clemence, Colin Todd.
Apr 19 Alan Devonshire & Gary Megson/Kevin Keegan/Graham Rix/F.A. Cup semi-final action, Tony Morley.
May 31 George McCluskey & Frank McGarvey/Archie Gemmill/Kevin Keegan/Dave Bennett, Dennis Mortimer, Glenn Hoddle, Paul Bradshaw.
June 21 Archie Gemmill & Steve Coppell/Scotland v England/Sandy Jardine/Bobby Smith, John Robertson, Billy Gilbert, Peter Latchford.
July 5 Man City v. Stoke/Frank Stapleton, Liam Brady, Graeme Souness & Alan Hansen ('79 Charity Shield)/Jim Cannon/Wilkins' Touch of Class (v. Belgium), Joe Gallagher, Pat Jennings.
July 26 Kenny Burns/Keith Bertschin/Paul Hart/Andy Gray, Jeff Wealands, George McCluskey.
Sep 20 Kenny Dalglish/Kevin Keegan/David Armstrong/Andy Peake, Alan Dodd.
Oct 11 Kenny Sansom/Coventry/Paul Cooper/Steve Daley, Ossie Ardiles, Gordon Strachan.
Nov 8 Bryan 'Pop' Robson/Wolves/John McGovern/Allan Evans, Orient, Alan Devonshire.
Dec 20 Steve Coppell & Glenn Hoddle/Aston V/Phil Neal/Steve Goble, Martin O'Neill.
Dec 27 Russell Osman/Billy Ashcroft/Swansea/Bobby Russell, Garth Crooks, Ray Kennedy.
Feb 7 Willie Young/Steve Coppell/A-Z "F"/Kenny Dalglish story pt 5, Alex McLeish, Kevin Reeves.
Apr 11 Mick Mills, Joe Corrigan, Steve Perryman, Geoff Palmer (FA Cup semi's preview)/Peter Withe/A-Z "M"/KD pt 14, Ivan Golac.
May 9 (F) F.A. Cup Cover/Man City/Milija Aleksic/Those (semi-final) Golden Goals/Dundee Utd, Glenn Hoddle.
KD pt 19, Derek Parlane.
May 30 Trevor Brooking/Frans Thijssen/A-Z "R"/Rangers, Mark Dennis, KD pt 20, Pat Jennings.
June 6 John Wark (with UEFA Cup)/Alan Kennedy & Phil Neal with European Cup/A-Z "S"/Colin Walsh, Steve MacKenzie, Chris Nicholl.
Best of British (Home Internationals pics).
Aug 8 John Wile/Joe Corrigan/Top Ten Quiz/David Narey, Peter Nicholas, Larry May, Gary Shaw.
Aug 22 Jimmy Case & Alan Devonshire/Steve Foster/Mastermind of Soccer ad/John Gidman, Paul Miller, Top Ten Quiz, Wayne Clarke.
Nov 7 Gerry Daly/Notts Co/Joe Jordan/Tony Godden, Ally McCoist, Jimmy Case.
Nov 28 Phil Neal, Paul Mariner & Terry McDermott/Barnsley/Kevin Reeves/England Are Back, Mike Lyons, Adrian Heath.
Dec 26 Xmas cover/Southampton/Gerry Armstrong/Terry McDermott, Joe Corrigan, Dundee Utd, David Moss.
Jan 30 Paul Miller & David Geddis/Cambridge/Billy Thomson/Dave Watson (Stoke), Graham Rix, Geoff Palmer, Kevin Reeves.
Apr 24 Garth Crooks/Dave Watson (Norwich)/Keith Cassells/Tony Currie, Sammy McIlroy, Zico.
June 5 Gary Bailey/Champions - Liverpool tribute/Zbigniew Boniek/Justin Fashanu, Luton (Div 2. Champs).
June 19 (WC) David Narey & Trevor Brooking/England/Jan Ceulemans/Mal Dongaghy, Sheff Utd (Div 4. Champs), Brian Stein.
June 26 (WC) Paul Mariner & Christian Lopez/England v. France action/Tony Woodcock/The Big (WC) Kick-off, Brazil v. Scotland.
July 24 Alan Sunderland & Everald La Ronde/Mick Mills/Alain Giresse/Willie Young, Alan Curtis, Pierre Littbarski, Paulo Rossi.
Danny Thomas, Cambridge, John Barnes.
Feb 5 Steve Archibald/Oldham/Andy Ritchie/Huddersfield, Nigel Callaghan, David O' Leary.
Bob Latchford, St Mirren, Alan Brazil.
Gary Rowell, Paul Dyson, Joey Jones.
Paul Walsh, Ian Bolton & Mark Falco, Trevor Christie, Paul Bracewell.
Apr 30 Gordon McQueen/Vladimar Petrovic, Gary Shaw & Gordon Cowans/Ian Wallace/Romeo Zondervan, Mick McCarthy, Colin Gibson, Peter Fox.
England Win 'Withe' Style, Martin O'Neill, Chris Waddle.
May 14 Tony Woodcock & Graham Roberts/Craig Johnston/Hans van Breukelen/Ross Jenkins, Arthur (Cox's) Army, Warren Neill, Ian Wilson.
June 11 Steve Lynex & Willie Donachie/Peter Withe cartoon/Terry Butcher/John Deehan, England v. Scotland action.
Gordon Smith & Mel Sterland, Alvin Martin, Mike Duxbury.
June 25 Cyrille Regis, Ray Stewart & Alvin Martin/Charlie Nicholas cartoon/Allan Evans/David Felgate, Wales v. Brazil action, John Pearson & John Pender, Wilf Rostron.
July 16 David Armstrong & Wayne Turner/John Deehan & Norman Whiteside/Ian Wallace/Gary Shaw, Gary Brooke, Gordon Smith, Martin Dobson.
Tony Morley, Kelham O'Hanlon, Billy Bonds.
Mark Lawrenson, Tony Grealish, Luther Blissett.
Aug 6 Clive Goodyear & Trevor Aylott/Brighton/Gary Lineker/Gary Bailey, Peter Hampton.
Aug 13 David O'Leary, Kenny Sanson & Norman Whiteside/Swansea/Terry Fenwick/Ian Munro, Bryan Robson, Mal Donaghy, Dave Watson (Norwich).
Sep 3 Graeme Souness/Sheff Wed/Alan Curbishley/Mark Grew, Mark Hateley & Gary Stevens (Tottenham), Arthur Graham.
Mark Chamberlain, Geoff Palmer & Michael Robinson.
Wilf Rostron, Alan Biley, Stockport.
Phil Thompson & Frank Stapleton, Kevin Keegan.
Nov 19 Eric Gates & Gary Stevens (Tottenham)/Sheff Utd/Kerry Dixon/Tony Woodcock.
England's Four-Goal Farewell (EC qualifier v. Luxembourg), Neil Orr.
Dec 10 Perry Suckling/Southampton/Jimmy Case/Mansfield trio, Keegan, Whitworth & Barrowclough, Ian Rush, Swindon.
Robbie James, Byron Stevenson, Tony Cottee.
Eric Gates, Bradford, Alvin Martin.
Jan 7 Nigel Callaghan & Brian Roberts/Norwich/Ian Stewart/Graeme Souness, Steve Foster, Dennis Mortimer & Garry Williams, Halifax.
Jan 28 Glenn Hoddle/Bournemouth/Les Phillips/Mike Duxbury, Peter Beardsley, Greg Downs, Kevin MacDonald.
Feb 4 Garry Birtles/Walsall/Paul Haylock/Kenny Dalglish, Steve Archibald, Peter Withe.
Feb 18 Noel Blake/Burnley/Gary Megson/Paul Maguire, Steve Wicks, Mark Wright, Paul Davis.
Feb 25 Steve Perryman/Notts Co/Derek Parlane/Kirk Stephens, Bruce Grobelaar, Millwall.
Mar 10 Steve Williams/Plymouth/Joe Hagan/Steve Hodge, Maurice Johnston, Mansfield.
Mar 17 Chris Hughton/Diego Maradona/Paul McStay/Perry Suckling, Mick Harford & Allan Evans, new England kit, Newcastle.
Apr 7 Kenny Dalglish/League Cup Final replay action/Mike Channon/Rangers' League Cup, Russell Osman & Alan Brazil, Grimsby.
Andy Gray & Mark Whitlock, Davie Provan.
Craig Johnston, John Deehan, Uli Stielike.
Trevor Brooking, Cyrille Regis, Jan Ceulemans.
May 19 (F) Peter Reid & Maurice Johnston/Andy Gray & George Reilly/Tommy Burns/Allan Simonsen.
May 26 Kevin Richardson & John Bailey with F.A. Cup/Sharp's Sweet Success/Costica Stefanescu/Paul Mariner, Magnificent Minster Men (York, Div 4 Champs).
June 9 Phil Neal & Alan Kennedy with European Cup/There's No Place Like Rome !/Neville Southall/Lee Chapman, Glory Boys (England U-21), Tamagnini Nene, Mick Mills.
June 23 John Barnes & Mark Hateley/Liverpool Treble winners/Darren Wood/Graham Baker, England's Samba Sensation, Nigel Spink, Chris Waddle & Robbie Cooke.
July 14 Mark Hateley/Graham Roberts & Oleg Blokhin/Gary Waddock/Paul Hart, Kenny Sansom.
July 21 Kenny Dalglish/Olympics Extra - Peter Elliott & Seb Coe/Mark Chamberlain/Tony Cottee, John Anderson, Colin Walsh & Nigel Callaghan, Alan Smith.
Aug 11 Roy Aitken & Dave Mitchell/Steve Foster/Bobby Russell/John Gregor, John Devine.
Aug 18 Adrian Heath/Celtic/Nigel Worthington/Ian Rush, John Trewick, Tony Woodcock.
Sep 1 Clive Allen/Aston V/Puma Advert/Lincoln, Charity Shield action, Andy Blair.
Sep 15 Graeme Sharp & Alan Hansen/Newcastle/Nike Advert/Tommy Caton, Preston.
Sep 22 Gordon Strachan/Sheff Wed/Uhlsport Advert/Gary Bailey, Jan Molby.
Oct 6 England & Scotland poster promo/West Brom/Alan Hansen/Peterborough, Mark Walters, Mark Falco.
Oct 13 John Barnes/Oxford/Kenny Dalglish/Mich D'Avray, Bryan Robson.
Port Vale, Gary Lineker & Wes Saunders.
Nov 3 Mark Hateley/Luton/MC Sports ad/Ray Clemence, Peter Barnes.
Nov 10 Brian Talbot/Grimsby/Book Shelf ad/Alan Brazil, Allan Evans, Rotherham.
Nov 17 Kerry Dixon/Burnley/pre-Xmas ads/Mark Hateley, Micky Gynn.
Nov 24 George Reilly & Ian Butterworth/Sheff Utd/pre-Xmas ads/Adrian Heath, Kevin Bond.
Dec 1 John Wark/Huddersfield/pre-Xmas ads/John Chiedozie, Arthur Albiston.
Dec 8 Bryan Robson/Bristol Rovers/pre-Xmas ads/Russell Osman, Graham Roberts, Tony Ford.
Dec 15 David Speedie/Norwich/Gordon Cowans/Remi Moses, Steve McCall, Lee Chapman, George Reilly.
Northampton, Nick Holmes, Stewart Robson.
Jan 12 Gary Mabbutt & Paul Canoville/Fulham/Kevin Dillon/Paul Rideout, Bruce Grobbelaar.
Feb 16 Steve Williams/Man Utd/Simon Garner/Paul Haylock, Keith Houchen, Mark Proctor.
Feb 23 Graham Roberts/Mansfield/Ray Stewart/John Barnes, Andy Gray.
Mar 23 (L) Dave Watson & Barry Venison/Sunderland/Steve Bruce/Paul Bracewell, Luther Blissett.
Apr 6 Alan Hansen/Blackburn/Garry Thompson/Frank Stapleton, Tony Galvin, Martin Hodge.
Apr 20 Paul Walsh & Jesper Olsen/F.A. Cup Semi-Final action/Tommy Williams/Stuart McCall, Kerry Dixon, Terry Butcher, Malcolm Brown.
Kevin MacDonald, Ian Andrews, David Bardsley.
June 1 (C*) Gary Stevens (Everton) with Cup Winners' Cup/Birmingham/Steve Kinsey/Steve Nicol, Charlie Nicholas, Frank McGarvey, Bradford.
June 8 Stuart McKimmie & Richard Gough/Man Utd, F.A. Cup winners/Brendon Ormsby/John O'Neill & Kenny Wharton, Mark Hateley, Peter Davenport, Joe McLaughlin.
David Phillips, Hans Segers, Wigan (Freight Rover winners).
June 22 Mark Hateley & Fulvio Collovati/England/Gary Williams/Steve Foster/Phil Neal/Ian Allinson, Paul Bracewell.
June 29 Gary Lineker & Klaus Augenthaler/(Kerry) Dixon's Dream Debut/Luther Blissett/Alan Curtis, Johnny Metgod, Alan Brazil.
trophy & Cup Winners' Cup)/Stuart Pearce/Chris Nicholl, Ronnie Whelan, Graham Rix.
July 13 Steve Bruce/Mark Hateley/Paul Futcher/Steve Hodge, Brian Marwood, Andy May.
July 27 Chris Turner & Gary Bailey/Club Fact File cover/Gary Stevens (Everton)/Graham Moseley, Andy Dibble & Joe Jordan, Paul Ramsay, Clive Wilson.
Aug 10 Alex McLeish & Maurice Johnston/Celtic/Jimmy Quinn/Sammy McIlroy, Derek Mountfield, Norman Whiteside.

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Landau, Schaller and Daly, Js.
On appeal by the respondent mother from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to two of her minor children, held:1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) did not provide a defense in proceedings to terminate parental rights; termination proceedings are not services, programs or activities from which a person with a disability can claim exclusion and any alleged violation of the act by the state could be the basis of a separate action.2. There was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the department of children and families had made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their family.3. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly determined that termination was in the children's best interests.
Petitions to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to two of their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, and transferred to the Child Protection Session at Middletown, where the matter was tried to the court, Quinn, J.; judgments terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David Brian Carr, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Donald R. Green, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (petitioner).
SCHALLER, J. The respondent mother,See footnote 1 appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights in her twin sons, A and T.See footnote 2 The respondent claims that the trial court improperly (1) held that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings, (2) found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts at reunification and (3) found that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the respondent mother's rights instead of transferring guardianship. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary to the resolution of this appeal. The respondent has suffered from psychiatric disorders since the 1980s when she was diagnosed with schizo-affective disorder. The respondent was placed on medication that, when taken as directed, improved her condition dramatically. While on the medication, the respondent was able to carry on a nearly normal lifestyle. The respondent received a bachelor of science degree at the University of Connecticut and was just two months short of receiving her nursing degree from St. Francis Hospital when she stopped taking her medication in 1991. After she stopped taking her medication, her condition deteriorated and she found herself living in shelters.
The respondent gave birth to A and T prematurely at twenty- seven weeks of gestation on December 30, 1994. During the course of her pregnancy with the twins, she did not seek prenatal care and was living with the twins' father. She moved out prior to the twins' birth, however, because the father became physically abusive toward her. The respondent moved into a room in a homeless shelter that was frequently littered with empty alcoholic beverage bottles. When the respondent gave birth to the twins, she had to be placed in four point restraints and be sedated because she was abusive and actively psychotic. Upon her discharge, the respondent was resistant to treatment and failed to take part in the services offered by the department to allow her to take the twins home with her when they were well enough to be discharged. She appeared to be apathetic towards the twins' condition and care.
The respondent, even after the twins' birth, refused offers of assistance and failed to take her medication as prescribed. The commissioner of children and families (commissioner) sought and was granted an order of temporary custody of the twins on February 10, 1995. The commissioner placed A and T with the respondent's brother and sister-in-law in Maine. The children are currently living with their aunt and uncle and have adjusted to their surroundings.
The respondent was admitted to Cedarcrest Regional Hospital, where she remained for a period of one month. She was diagnosed as having a schizo-affective disorder and that diagnosis has not changed over time. The respondent saw Elizabeth Villotas, a psychotherapist, from December, 1995, through May, 1997. Villotas stated that the respondent has a "psychotic illness of sufficient severity to require regular treatment and medication. She has delusional ideas and trouble keeping organized enough for her own care and is extremely unlikely to be able to do so for others, especially young children." Villotas further testified that the respondent was probably in a violent relationship with the father and that there were concerns of domestic violence. The respondent was confused, sometimes admitting to the violence and, other times, denying that any violence occurred.
In addition to the concerns about the respondent's volatile relationship with the father, Villotas suspected that the respondent was abusing alcohol. There were times when Villotas smelled alcohol on the respondent's breath. The consumption of alcoholic beverages while taking her prescribed medications could cause serious sedation and further disorganization in the respondent's life.
When the twins were six months old, the respondent was given strictly supervised visitation rights. At no time did the respondent participate in any medical appointments for the twins nor did she inquire as to their well-being. During her visits, the respondent had episodes where her eyes would roll back and she would appear to be completely unaware of her surroundings. When the respondent had these episodes, Kerry Bell, the social worker assigned to the case, would have to call out the respondent's name to get her to become alert again. The respondent was holding the twins during one of these episodes and dropped one of them on the floor. The commissioner suspended visitation rights until the respondent obtained a note from a physician stating that she was able to continue with visitation.
In October, 1996, the commissioner transferred the respondent's case to Daniel Huntley, a social worker. Huntley remained on this case and worked with the respondent for approximately eight months. Between October, 1996, and January, 1997, the respondent was pregnant with her third child, C. Catherine Foss, a home health nurse, assisted her with her pregnancy. Foss noticed evidence of domestic abuse during her visits. Additionally, a nurse at St. Francis Hospital noticed bruises on the respondent's chin, eyes and forearm. When questioned, the respondent admitted that the bruises were from incidents of domestic violence.
The attorney for the twins filed a petition to terminate parental rights on February 9, 1997, which the commissioner joined on March 14, 1997. The commissioner referred the respondent and the father to Catholic Family Services (agency), and in April, 1997, they began classes at the agency's reunification program under the supervision of Isabel Perez. Perez described the reunification program as follows: "Parents come. They have opportunities to do different activities. It could be feeding -- of course we have to take into consideration the age of the child. It could be feeding, holding the babies, changing them, playing with them. Using different games." Perez stated that during the course of the program, the respondent's interaction with the children was "limited to the welcome greetings. There was no . . . parent child interaction during [the visit]." Furthermore, Perez noticed no improvement in the respondent's interaction over the course of two months. In fact, there never was a time that Perez felt that she could recommend to the department that the respondent should be given unsupervised visits.
Additionally, the respondent disclosed to Perez that she was suffering from instances of self-destructive behavior. Based on observations of the respondent, the decision was made by the agency to discontinue the reunification course with the respondent because "it was not the right program for [her]." The fact that the respondent suffered from a mental illness did not affect the agency's decision to terminate her involvement with the reunification program.
The trial court appointed Robert Meier, a psychologist, to evaluate the respondent's mental condition. In a report dated May 26, 1997, Meier stated: "[P]ersonality evaluation results present a profile that is consistent with individuals who have serious emotional problems. Those with this pattern generally lack self- confidence and self-esteem. They tend to be isolated from others, are distrustful, and are seriously lacking in social skills. Their lifestyles are often characterized as schizoid. Thinking is often autistic, fragmented and tangential. There is difficulty concentrating and feelings that things that are not real may be present." Meier stated that when the respondent was on her medication, her condition was markedly improved, but that treatment was not perfect, and the respondent faced episodes where she lost concentration. According to Meier, such episodes might affect her ability to raise her children.
In June, 1997, the commissioner transferred the case to social worker Clordean Davis Mendes. During Mendes' involvement with the respondent, obtaining stable, suitable housing remained a problem for the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent was still not faithfully taking her medication. The respondent also remained in the abusive relationship with the father.
During the course of the department's involvement with the respondent, she has been offered psychiatric treatment, substance abuse counseling, housing assistance and assistance with getting out of her abusive relationship with the father. She refused most of the services offered, with the exception of the Catholic Family Services program. The respondent rejected the offers of department personnel to pick her up and drive her to specific counseling sessions. Additional facts will be set forth where necessary.
The respondent first claims that the trial court improperly held that the ADA does not apply and does not provide a defense to termination of parental rights proceedings.See footnote 3 We disagree.
Whether the ADA applies to termination of parental rights proceedings appears to be an issue of first impressionSee footnote 4 before either this court or our Supreme Court and presents a question of law, affording us plenary review. General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Powers, Bolles, Houlihan & Hartline, Inc., 38 Conn. App. 290, 298, 660 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 904, 665 A.2d 901 (1995).
Because the appellate courts of Connecticut have not addressed the issue of the applicability of the ADA to termination of parental rights proceedings, we look to our sister states for guidance.See footnote 6 The leading case is In re Torrance P., 187 Wis. 2d 10, 522 N.W.2d 243 (App. 1994). In In re Torrance P., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that "an alleged violation of the ADA is not a basis to attack [termination of parental rights] proceedings." Id., 12. Rather, the Wisconsin court held that the proper test was whether the state had made the proper efforts under the Wisconsin termination statute stating: "the County must show by clear and convincing evidence that `the agency responsible for the care of the child and the family has made a diligent effort to provide the services ordered by the court' . . . . We held in In re D.P., 170 Wis. 2d 313, 331-32, 488 N.W.2d 133, 140 (Ct. App. 1992), that `diligent effort' means `reasonable, earnest and energetic effort.'" (Citation omitted.) In re Torrance P., supra, 14. The Wisconsin court went on to discuss further Congress' intent in enacting the ADA. "Congress did not intend to change the obligation imposed by unrelated statutes. [The father] may have a separate cause of action under the ADA based on the County's actions or inactions; such a claim, however, is not a basis to attack the [termination] proceedings." Id., 16.
In In re B.S., Juvenile, 166 Vt. 345, 351-52, 693 A.2d 716 (1997),See footnote 7 the Supreme Court of Vermont held that termination proceedings are not "services, programs or activities within the meaning of Title II of the ADA . . . . Thus the anti-discrimination requirement does not directly apply to [termination] proceedings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) As in In re Torrance P., the Vermont court held that the mother whose rights had been terminated could have filed a separate ADA claim if the state had indeed violated her civil rights under the ADA. See also Stone v. Daviess County Director of Child Services, 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (state required no reunification efforts by department; therefore, ADA not defense to termination proceeding; "any alleged noncompliance with the ADA . . . would be a matter separate and distinct from the operation of our termination statute"); In re B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1997), appeal denied, 709 So. 2d 779 (La. 1998) (termination proceedings not "services programs or activities" under ADA; therefore, ADA not defense to termination proceedings).
We conclude that the reasoning applied in In re Torrance P. is sound and we follow the Wisconsin court's reasoning that the ADA neither provides a defense to nor creates special obligations in a termination proceeding. We further agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont's decision in In re B.S., Juvenile, that a termination proceeding is not a "service, program or activity" under the ADA. The Wisconsin decision is especially persuasive because the Wisconsin termination statute, much like our own,See footnote 8 sets forth the minimum efforts the state must make to reunify the children with the parent.
We note that, even if the ADA were an appropriate defense in termination proceedings, the parent's rights are not absolute. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233_34, 92 S. Ct. 1525, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1971) (parent's constitutional rights may be overcome if health or safety of child in danger). Our Supreme Court has held that a parent's rights can be terminated because of her mental condition, even if she is not at fault. "In weighing the interests of the child against the hardship imposed on the parent, the legislature may properly strike the balance at the point where the mental or physical deficiency, even though not involving fault, is so great as to render the parent incapable of measuring up to the child's needs as those are delineated in [§ 17a-112 (c)]." In re Juvenile Appeal (83-BC), 189 Conn. 66, 78-79, 454 A.2d 1262 (1983). "Termination has been consistently recognized as being in the best interest of the child when the parent has a mental deficiency or illness which renders her unable to provide the child with necessary care." In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn. App. 598, 605, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
The respondent next claims that the trial court improperly found that the department had made reasonable efforts at reunification as required by General Statutes § 17a-112 (c) (1). We disagree.
"On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial court's conclusion was legally correct and factually supported. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached . . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, on review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 48 Conn. App. 290, 309, 710 A.2d 771, cert. granted on other grounds, 245 Conn. 917, 717 A.2d 234 (1998).
"Before a termination of parental rights can be granted, the trial court must be convinced that the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the [children] with [their] family. The term reasonable efforts was recently addressed by this court: Turning to the statutory scheme encompassing the termination of the parental rights of a child committed to the department, the statute imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 600, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).
In essence, similar to her first claim, the respondent claims that because of her mental illness, the department was required to provide additional reunification efforts than those provided to mentally healthy parents. We agree with the respondent that the department is required, pursuant to § 17a-112 (c) (1), to take into consideration her mental condition when determining what "reasonable efforts" to make at reunification. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly found that the steps taken by the department met the statutory mandate.
The respondent correctly states in her brief that the question of reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the trier. The trial court found: "There is no evidence that [the respondent] ever completed an alcohol assessment or treatment program, dealt with the domestic violence issues in her life, her transient housing or income until recently, when she became eligible for social security disability income. [The department] offered an alcohol assessment with Advanced Behavioral Health, but [the respondent] denied she had a problem and did not attend. [Bell], the [department] social worker, testified that she made two appointments for [the respondent] and provided her with information and offered transportation. [The respondent] did not attend, `she was agitated and all she wanted was an attorney.' [Bell] then offered her transportation to an attorney which was also refused. [Bell] further testified that [the respondent] has been unable to maintain housing and had been intermittently homeless, living in shelters. . . . [The respondent] resisted discussing [domestic violence] issues in their therapy sessions. She has never been receptive to counseling and assistance for domestic violence.
"Visitation . . . confirmed the same behaviors. [The respondent's] behavior was variable, sometimes she was able to interact on a limited basis, and sometimes she was not. Not only was her behavior unpredictable, but she . . . [was] not attentive to [her] children, their needs and safety . . . .
"[The respondent] rejected many of the services offered to her, rejected her need to be stabilized with the help of regular medication and did very little to attempt to rehabilitate herself. . . . [The respondent] did not choose to accept services from [the department]."
Testimony from Bell, Mendes, Huntley and Meier reflect that the department made numerous attempts at assisting the respondent and, specifically, attempted to treat the problems associated with her mental condition. While the respondent, in her brief, alleges that the efforts failed to equal "reasonable efforts," she does not point to any additional efforts that the department could have made. Furthermore, the file and transcripts indicate that the respondent did not make the trial court aware that she demanded that a heightened standard should apply until after trial. The department is required only to make "reasonable efforts." It is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costello, 161 Conn. 430, 441, 288 A.2d 415 (1971). After a thorough review of the file and transcripts, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence on which the trial court reasonably found by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification considering her mental condition.
The respondent last claims that the trial court improperly found that it was in A's and T's best interests to terminate her parental rights instead of transferring guardianship. We are not persuaded.
"The state has a substantial interest in protecting minor children; Stanley v. Illinois, [405 U.S. 645, 649, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)]; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944); intervention in family matters by the state is justified, however, only when such intervention is actually in the best interests of the child, a standard long used in this state. . . . State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 165, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 661_62, 420 A.2d 875 (1979)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Our Supreme Court has further recognized the "deleterious effects of prolonged temporary placement on the child . . . ." Id., 292. Because of these effects, time is of the essence. Id.
Meier testified that a transfer of guardianship would place A and T in possibly a temporary setting. Meier was concerned over the twins' placement: "My concern about not having a permanent solution for the children is that at some point a year, two years, ten years from now the parents could change their minds, could then make a request that the children then be returned to them, could reopen the case and I think that would be very destructive to the children. My main focus in the interest of the children would be that the children have stability and consistency and permanency as soon as possible. . . . I think the long term risk of not having the children permanently placed somewhere opens the opportunity that their lives could be disrupted later in their lives." The trial court further stated that it was concerned about the possible relitigation over the respondent's parental rights in A and T if it ordered a transfer of guardianship as opposed to ordering termination of the respondent's parental rights. The trial court found: "[B]ased on the evidence, that such lack of permanency in their placement is not in the twins' best interests."
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (e)See footnote 10 provides seven findings that the trial court must consider before it issues a termination order. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court made the seven findings required by § 17a-112 (e). The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable reunification and rehabilitation efforts. The trial court found that the children have good ties to their aunt and uncle while having only "tenuous ties" to the respondent. The trial court further found that the respondent has been unable to accomplish steps at rehabilitating herself. On the basis of these findings, which are not clearly erroneous, we will not disturb the trial court's finding that termination of the respondent's parental rights is in the best interests of A and T. The judgment is affirmed.
Footnote: 1 The trial court also terminated the respondent father's parental rights, but the respondent father is not a party to this appeal. We refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as the respondent.
Footnote: 2 In the same action, the trial court committed the respondent's youngest son, C, to the custody of the commissioner of the children and families for a period of twelve months until May 21, 1999. The disposition of C's case is not at issue in this appeal.
Footnote: 3 The department claims that the respondent did not raise her ADA defense at trial. After a thorough review of the transcripts and file, we agree. The trial court, however, allowed the parties to file supplemental trial briefs, in which the respondent raised the issue for the first time. The trial court's memorandum of decision fully addresses the applicability of the ADA to the respondent's case and the respondent adequately briefed the issue. Furthermore, the commissioner does not claim that we should not review the respondent's claim as inadequately preserved. We choose, therefore, to exercise our discretion and review the respondent's ADA claim.
Footnote: 4 We have had before us two cases in which the respondents claimed that termination proceedings violated the ADA. In In re Jessica S., 51 Conn. App. 667, 674, 723 A.2d 356 (1999), we refused to review the respondent's claim based on the ADA because it was not properly preserved. In In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn. Sup. 101, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn. App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996), the mother claimed "terminating the mother's rights as a parent due to her mental disability would violate the [ADA]." The trial court did not address the question of whether the ADA specifically applied to termination of parental rights proceedings. Instead, it stated that it was applying strict scrutiny to the mother's case. Id. We affirmed the trial court's decision without further analysis, stating: "that memorandum addresses the arguments raised in this appeal . . . ." In re Karrlo K., 40 Conn App. 73, 75, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Footnote: 5 "The purpose of the Act is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing, not to give them an unfair advantage." Kornblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (11th Cir. 1996), citing In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1994).
Footnote: 6 We note that some states have held that the ADA applies to termination proceedings, but held that the state had met its burden under the ADA. See In Interest of C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa App. 1994); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995); In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash. App. 222, 230, 896 P.2d 1298, cert. denied, 127 Wash. 2d 1021, 904 P.2d 1157 (1995).
Footnote: 7 The respondent mother in In re B.S., Juvenile, was "a moderately retarded woman." In re B.S., Juvenile, supra, 166 Vt. 346. "The mother's . . . claim of error is that the court improperly terminated her parental rights without addressing her claims under Title II of the [ADA]. . . . She relies on the fact that she is mentally retarded and mental retardation is a disability with the meaning of the ADA. . . . She argues that, with help, she has the capacity to care for her child and is therefore a qualified person eligible for accommodation under the ADA. . . . She claims that [the department of social and rehabilitation services (SRS)] has failed to accommodate her disability and, as a result, has discriminated against her in the provision of the services needed to parent her child." (Citations omitted.) Id., 350-51.
The Vermont Supreme Court stated: "The issue is not, however, whether SRS properly treated the parents or treated them consistent with the requirements of the ADA. The issue instead is whether SRS's alleged violation of requirements of the ADA may be raised as a defense to a [termination] petition. The family court ruled that ADA noncompliance is not a defense. We agree." Id., 351.
Footnote: 9 Our holding in this case concerns only the applicability of the ADA to termination proceedings. As such, we do not suggest that the ADA does not apply to the reunification services and programs that the department must make to meet the parents' specialized needs. See In re B.S., Juvenile, supra, 166 Vt. 345; In re Torrance P., supra, 522 N.W.2d 243. Moreover, we note that § 17a-112 requires the department to make reasonable efforts at reunification. This includes taking the parent's mental condition into consideration. A failure to provide adequate services because of the parent's mental condition would violate not only § 17a-112, but the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Such a violation would give rise to a separate cause of action under the ADA. We emphasize, however, that the ADA does not give rise to an affirmative defense to the adjudicatory and dispositional phases of termination of parental rights proceedings. See State v. Valinski, 53 Conn. App. 23, ___ A.2d ___ (1998), cert. granted on other grounds, 249 Conn. 924, ___ A.2d ___ (1999) (authority to declare affirmative defenses rests with legislature).
Footnote: 10 General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (e) provides in relevant part: "Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."


text:
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If you access a page of the PAUL HEWITT website that contains such a plug-in, your browser establishes a direct connection to the Instagram servers. The content of the plug-in is transmitted directly to your browser by Instagram and integrated into the page. This integrated content enables Instagram to receive information that your browser has accessed the respective page of our website even if you do not have a Instagram profile or are currently not logged into Instagram. This information (including your IP address) is transmitted directly from your browser to an Instagram server in the USA and stored there.
If you are logged into Instagram, Instagram can directly link your visit to our website to your Instagram account. If you interact with plug-ins, for example, by pressing the ‘Instagram’ button, this information is also transmitted directly to an Instagram server and stored there. The information is also published on your Instagram account and is then visible to your contacts.
If you do not want Instagram to directly link the information collected on your visit to our website to your Instagram profile, you should log out of Instagram before visiting our website. You can also completely prevent Instagram plug-ins from being uploaded by installing add-ons in your browser, for example, the script blocker ‘NoScript’ (http://noscript.net/).
In order to send you special offers that are currently relevant and interesting in your particular region, we pseudonymise your title, year of birth, country, postcode, (anonymised) hash value of the email address and your IP address and transmit this information to Sovendus GmbH, Moltkestr. 11, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany (Sovendus) in encrypted form (Art. 6 (1) b) GDPR). The IP address is used by Sovendus solely for purposes of data security and is usually anonymised after seven days.
If you click on a special offer, we will forward your name, your address and your email address to Sovendus in encrypted form (Art. 6 (1) b) and f) GDPR) for the purpose of preparing the personalised request for the special offer from the product supplier.
If you are interested in a coupon offer from Sovendus GmbH, Moltkestr. 11, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany (Sovendus) and click on the coupon banner, we will forward your title, name and email address to Sovendus in encrypted form (Art. 6 (1) b) and f) GDPR) for the purpose of preparing the coupon. The IP address is transmitted first; this is used by Sovendus solely for purposes of data security and is usually anonymised after seven days. We also forward the order number, order value and currency, session ID, coupon code and timestamp to Sovendus in pseudonymised form for invoicing purposes.
Please see the online data protection information provided at www.sovendus.de/datenschutz, www.sovendus.at/datenschutz or www.sovendus.ch/datenschutzfor further information on the processing of your data by Sovendus.
The Trusted Shops Trustbadge is integrated into this website to enable the Trusted Shops trustmark, any customer reviews and the range of Trusted Shops products to be displayed to buyers following an order.
In balancing the various interests, this serves to safeguard our legitimate overriding interests in the optimal marketing of our product range. The Trustbadge and the services advertised by it are an offer of Trusted Shops GmbH, Subbelrather Str. 15C, 50823 Cologne, Germany.
When the Trustbadge is retrieved, the web server automatically stores a so-called server log file which contains, for example, your IP address, the date and time of retrieval, the transmitted data volume and the requesting provider (access data). It also documents the retrieval. This access data is not evaluated and is automatically overwritten seven days after your visit to the website.
Other personal data shall only be forwarded to Trusted Shops if you decide, after placing an order, to use Trusted Shops products or have already registered to use them. In this case, the contractual agreement concluded between you and Trusted Shops shall apply.
This website uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service provided by Google Inc. (‘Google’). Google Analytics uses so-called cookies (i.e. text files) which are stored on your computer and enable an analysis of how you use the website. The information generated by the cookie about your use of this website is normally sent to a Google server in the USA and stored there. If IP anonymisation has been enabled on this website, however, your IP address will first be truncated by Google within the member states of the European Union or in other countries that are party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be sent to a Google server in the USA and truncated there. Google will use this information on behalf of the operator of this website to evaluate your use of the website, to compile reports about website activity and to provide the website operator with other services relating to website activity and Internet usage.
The IP address transmitted by Google Analytics from your browser will not be combined with any other data held by Google.
You can prevent the storage of cookies on your computer by adjusting your browser settings accordingly; we should point out, however, that in this case you may not be able to use all of this website’s functions to their full extent.
This website uses Google Analytics with the extension ‘_anonymizeIp()’. This allows further processing of the truncated IP addresses, thereby preventing any direct connection being established to a particular individual.
This website uses the map service Google Maps by way of an API. The provider of this service is Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.
The storage of your email address is required to enable you to use the Google Maps feature. This information is usually transmitted to a Google server in the USA and stored there. The provider of this website has no influence over the data transmitted.
Google Maps is used in the interests of ensuring that our website is visually appealing to the user and that the locations specified on the website are easy to find. This constitutes a legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 (1) f) GDPR.
The PAUL HEWITT website can determine the geographic location of your device. The collection of the data serves only to provide you with information that could be interesting and relevant for you on grounds of your geographic location.

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Australia‘s federal rules on police use of force generally comply with international standards although an amended law in New South Wales allows use of firearms against suspected terrorists even where no imminent threat is perceived.
Australia's federal constitution does not protect fundamental human rights nor does it regulate the use of force by the police.
There is not yet a regional human rights treaty to which Asian nations can adhere.
The Australian Federal Police is the principal national law enforcement agency. There are also state police forces. Both federal and state police officers in Australia carry pistols, pepper spray, and batons. Many also have access to conducted energy weapons (e.g. Tasers).
(1) A person must not, in the course of arresting another person for an offence, use more force, or subject the other person to greater indignity, than is necessary and reasonable to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the other person after the arrest.
(ii) the person has, if practicable, been called on to surrender and the constable believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot be apprehended in any other manner.S. 3ZC, 1914 Crimes Act.
Use of firearms is generally only lawful where necessary and where a threat to life or limb is imminent. In 2013, the Australian Institute of Criminology reported that in 1989–2011, police fatally shot 105 people, of whom more than 40% had been identified as having some form of mental illness, with psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia being the most common.
In Victoria, firearms must not be drawn by a law enforcement official unless extreme danger is anticipated and firearms may only be discharged when he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury. Warning shots should not be fired.Victoria Police Manual Instructions 101-3 6.3.
(1) The police action that is authorised by this section when police officers respond to any incident that is declared to be a terrorist act to which this Part applies is authorising, directing or using force (including lethal force) that is reasonably necessary, in the circumstances as the police officer perceives them, to defend any persons threatened by the terrorist act or to prevent or terminate their unlawful deprivation of liberty.
(2) A police officer does not incur any criminal liability for taking any such police action for the purposes of a police action plan of the police officer in charge of the police officers responding to the terrorist act.
(3) This section applies only to action taken by a police officer in good faith.S. 24B, Terrorism (Police Powers and Parole) Act 2017.
that the close relationship between the police investigations and the coroners’ investigations may compromise the independence of the coroners’ investigations.Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Australia's sixth periodic report, UN doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6, 1 December 2017, §31.
There are also oversight bodies in the various states. In Victoria, for example, alleged excessive use of police force is investigated by the state's Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC).
that all allegations of excessive use of force by the police, including deaths in custody, are investigated in a fully independent and impartial manner.Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Australia's sixth periodic report, UN doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6, 1 December 2017, §32.
There is no regional human rights body to which alleged victims of excessive use of police force can complain.
The High Court of Australia is the ultimate court of appeal on issues of both federal and state law.
In its judgment in 2012 in this case,ACT Court of Appeal, Australian Capital Territory v. Crowley and Commonwealth of Australia and Glen Pitkethly  ACTCA 52.the ACT Court of Appeal overturned the finding at first instance that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) owed the plaintiff, Jonathan Crowley, a duty of care, and had breached that duty of care. This duty of care can be considered akin to the duty of precaution under international law.
The case concerned a call-out on 11 December 2001 to the AFP, which had received reports that Mr Crowley was walking in the streets in a highly disturbed state and behaving in a threatening manner to a number of people while carrying a kendo stick. When two AFP officers approached him, he refused to comply with their instructions and struck both officers with the stick. One of the officers shot him in the neck, shattering his spinal column and leaving him a quadriplegic. He did not argue that the shooting was unreasonable. The Court of Appeal held that the AFP could not be under an obligation to discharge a duty of care when apprehending someone to prevent apparent or possible criminal behaviour.
due to the nature and immediacy of an imminent lethal threat, it is essential that the police response is to incapacitate the threat. To achieve this police officers will shoot at the “armpit hold” – the centre of an imaginary transverse cross-sectional line between the two armpits of the human body (roughly centred on the heart/aorta and lungs).Coroners Court of Queensland, Recommendations from Inquest Into the Deaths of Anthony William Young et al (2017), §63.
The person exercising the power of arrest is entitled to use such a degree of force as in the circumstances they reasonably believe to be necessary to effect their purpose, provided that the means adopted by them are such as a reasonable person placed as they were placed would not consider to be disproportionate “to the evil to be prevented.”Supreme Court of Victoria, Slaveski v. Victoria  VSC 441 at  per Kyrou J, citing R v. Turner  VR 30 at 36.