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With the continuously increasing number of datasets published in the Web of Data and form part of the Linked Open Data Cloud, it becomes more and more essential to identify resources that correspond to the same real world object in order to interlink web resources and set the basis for large-scale data integration. This requirement becomes apparent in a multitude of domains ranging from science (marine research, biology, astronomy, pharmacology) to semantic publishing and cultural domains. In this context, instance matching (also referred to as record linkage , duplicate detection  entity resolution , and object identification in the context of databases ) is of crucial importance.
It is though essential at this point to develop, along with instance and entity matching systems, benchmarks to determine the weak and strong points of those systems, as well as their overall quality in order to support users in deciding the system to use for their needs. Hence, well defined, and good quality benchmarks are important for comparing the performance of the developed instance matching systems.
presenting the research directions that should be exploited for the creation of novel benchmarks to answer the needs of the Linked Data paradigm.
In this tutorial we will present the instance matching benchmarks that have been developed for Semantic Web data. A benchmark is, generally speaking, a set of tests against which the performance of a system is measured. Benchmarks are used not only to inform users of the strengths and weaknesses of systems, but also to encourage the technology vendors to deal with the drawbacks of their systems and to ameliorate their performance and functionality.
In this tutorial we will discuss the principles a benchmark should adhere to which have been introduced in the literature; based on the existing ones we will elaborate, in the concluding remarks of our tutorial, on an extended set of principles that can be used for designing new instance matching benchmarks. We will present the principles that Jim Gray proposed in his book The Benchmark Handbook for Database and Transaction Systems  and those presented by Euzenat and Shvaiko in their book Ontology Matching .
In order to have a comprehensive instance matching benchmark analysis, we define a set of dimensions along which we are going to provide the overview of the instance matching benchmarks. The dimensions we consider are the constituents of an instance matching benchmark: the dataset(s), gold standards, test cases/workloads and performance metrics.
We will distinguish the benchmarks between those that consider real datasets and workloads and those that produce synthetic datasets and corresponding workloads. For both kinds of benchmarks we will discuss the ontologies employed, their characteristics, the interconnections between schemas and their instances. In the case of synthetic benchmarks we will in particular focus on the data generators defined by such benchmarks. We will discuss the data distributions that are followed by the generators and how these are obtained, i.e., if they are randomly generated or if reference datasets are used.
Gold standards are used to judge the completeness and soundness of the instance matching approach. We will discuss how these are created and the form in which they are published (sets of matched instances or mapping files). In both cases, the quality (in terms of completeness and correctness) of the gold standards will be discussed thoroughly in our tutorial.
For each benchmark we will present which of the aforementioned heterogeneities it covers; specifically, in the case of synthetic ones, we will discuss the transformation logic employed to obtain datasets that address (parts of) the aforementioned heterogeneities. Last but not least, we will give an overview of the performance metrics that the existing benchmarks employ to quantify the performance of the instance matching systems.
We will discuss and compare existing instance matching benchmarks according to the aforementioned directions in order to derive a full and complete assessment thereof.
We will analyze the well-known Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative OAEI that, at this point is the most popular framework for testing ontology, and specifically instance matching systems. Since 2005, OAEI organizes an annual campaign aiming at evaluating ontology matching solutions and technologies using a fixed set of benchmarks. In 2009, OAEI introduced the Instance Matching (IM) Track that focuses on the evaluation of different instance matching techniques and tools for Linked Data. We will discuss the benchmarks proposed by the OAEI Instance Matching Tracks of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013, and we will present the performance of the systems that were evaluated with those benchmarks , , , , .
Apart from the OAEI benchmarks, other instance matching benchmarks have also been introduced; ONTOBI  is organized in 16 different test cases that take into account simple and complex transformations that are applied on the reference ontology. The application oriented benchmark that we will discuss in our tutorial is the Koninklijke Bibliotheek benchmark  that was proposed by the National Library of Netherlands and the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision. In addition to these benchmarks, we will describe instance matching benchmark generator SWING  that has been used in a number of OAEI IIMB benchmarks. Last but not least, other indivuadualy created benchmarks, like the Cora dataset  and others  will be discussed.
This tutorial is aimed at a broad range of attendants, ranging from senior undergraduate and graduate students to more experienced researchers who are unfamiliar with the existing instance matching benchmarks, to scientists, data producers and consumers, in general, whose applications require instance matching. We assume the audience will have a basic knowledge of the RDF , RDFS  and OWL  standard W3C languages and the SPARQL query language  along with their semantics.
 J. L. Aguirre, K. Eckert, A. F. J. Euzenat, W. R. van Hage, L. Hollink, C. Meilicke, A. N. D. Ritze, F. Scharffe, P. Shvaiko, O. Svab-Zamazal, C. Trojahn, E. Jimenez-Ruiz, B. C. Grau, and B. Zapilko. Results of the ontology alignment evaluation initiative 2012. In OM, 2012.
 I. Bhattacharya and L. Getoor. Entity resolution in graphs. Mining Graph Data. Wiley and Sons, 2006.
 A. K. Elmagarmid, P. Ipeirotis, and V. Verykios. Duplicate Record Detection: A Survey. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 19(1), 2007.
 J. Euzenat, A. Ferrara, L. Hollink, A. Isaac, C. Joslyn, V. Malaise, C. Meilicken, A. Nikolov, J. Pane, M. Sabou, F. Scharffe, P. Shvaiko, V. S. H., Stuckenschmidt, O. Svab-Zamazal, V. Svatek, , C. Trojahn, G. Vouros, and S. Wang. Results of the Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative 2009. In OM, 2009.
e, P. Shvaiko, H. Stuckenschmidt, O. Svab- Zamazal, V. Svatek, and C. Trojahn. Results of the Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative 2010. In OM, 2010.
 B. M. F. Manola, E. Miller. RDF Primer. www.w3.org/TR/rdf-primer, February 2004.
 A. Ferrara, D. Lorusso, S. Montanelli, and G. Varese. Towards a Benchmark for Instance Matching. In OM, 2008.
 [ A. Ferrara, S. Montanelli, J. Noessner, and H. Stuckenschmidt. Benchmarking Matching Applications on the Semantic Web. In ESWC, 2011.
e, P. Shvaiko, C. Trojahn, and O. Zamazal. Results of the ontology alignment evaluation initiative 2013. In OM, 2013.
 J. Gray, editor. The Benchmark Handbook for Database and Transaction Systems. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.
 P. Hayes. RDF Semantics. www.w3.org/TR/rdf-mt, February 2004.
 A. Isaac, L. van der Meij, S. Schlobach, and S. Wang. An Empirical Study of Instance-Based Ontology Matching. In ISWC/ASWC, 2007.
 A. F. J. Euzenat, W. R. van Hage, L. Hollink, C. Meilicke, A. N. D. Ritze, F. Scharffe, P. Shvaiko, H. Stuckenschmidt, O. Svab-Zamazal, and C. Trojahn. Results of the Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative 2011. In OM, 2011.
 J.Euzenat and P. Shvaiko, editors. Ontology Matching. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
 C. Li, L. Jin, and S. Mehrotra. Supporting ecient record linkage for large data sets using mapping techniques. In WWW, 2006.
 D. L. McGuinness and F. van Harmelen. OWL Web Ontology Language. http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/, 2004.
 J. Noessner, M. Niepert, C. Meilicke, and H. Stuckenschmidt. Leveraging Terminological Structure for Object Reconciliation. In ESWC, 2010.
 E. Prud'hommeaux and A. Seaborne. SPARQL Query Language for RDF. www.w3.org/TR/rdfsparql- query, January 2008.
 R. Isele and C. Bizer. Learning linkage rules using genetic programming. In OM, 2011.
 A. Nikolov, V. Uren, E. Motta, and A. de Roeck. Refining instance coreferencing results using belief propagation. In ASWC, 2008.
 A. Jentzsch, J. Zhao, O. Hassanzadeh, K.-H. Cheung, M. Samwald, and B. Andersson. Linking open drug data. In Linking Open Data Triplification Challenge, I-SEMANTICS, 2009.
Our Survey has been puplished in Journal of Web Semantics . You can download our paper from here .
Our tutorial will be presented at the 13th Extended Semantic Web School to be held in Crete, May 29th - June 2nd, 2016.
The slides presented at ISWC 2014 have been uploaded in the ISWC 2014 Slides page of our site.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


The case involved a Sport Federation and a press conference. While the Federal Tribunal, in accordance with its practice, made it impossible to identify the parties from the opinion as published on its website, a little bit of sleuthing on Google quickly shows that the case involved the press conference held by Mr. Rudel Obreja, a Romanian technical delegate, at the 2008 Beijing Olympics in connection with some alleged misdeeds within the International Boxing Association. Those of you interested in the details can find the Agence France Presse (AFP) wire of August 28 on Google.
Obreja was sanctioned as a consequence of his outburst at the press conference. He was fined CHF 2,000 and suspended for three and a half years.
He appealed to the IBA Appeal Authority and then to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The CAS panel consisted of François Klein as chairman, with Paule Gauthier and Ulrich Haas as arbitrators. The CAS granted the appeal in part, revoking the fine and reducing Mr. Obreja’s suspension to two years.
The Federal Tribunal reiterated that an award which rejects “any other or further submissions” or uses similar language is to be considered as implicitly rejecting even those arguments it does not specifically address and therefore cannot constitute a violation of Art. 190 (2) (c) PILA, which sanctions the award infra petita (See sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the opinion in this respect).
From the point of view of due process (“right to be heard” in Swiss parlance), it is possible to “cure” an award which would completely disregard certain elements apparently important to the dispute by demonstrating that the elements omitted were not relevant or were implicitly rejected by the arbitrators. Though this was clearly not the case here, the language used by the Federal Tribunal, not for the first time, puts international arbitrators sitting in Switzerland on comfortable ground should they omit something (See section 4.1 of the opinion in this respect).
Finally, an argument of public policy led the Federal Tribunal to repeat its often-made assertion that substantive public policy is not violated simply by a wrong assessment of the facts or by improper application of the law. Again, this was not the case in the award under appeal, but the Federal Tribunal reiterated the points made in numerous previous cases (See section 5.1 of the opinion in this respect).
X.________, domiciled in ..., is the President of the V._________ Federation. He is also the Vice President of the Y.________ International Association (hereafter: Y.________), an association governed by Swiss law with its headquarters in Lausanne, and a member of its Executive Committee.
During the Beijing Olympic Games, which took place from August 8 through August 24, 2008, X.________, in his capacity as Y.___________’s technical delegate, was responsible for supervising the conduct of the competitions and verifying the implementation of this association’s rules.
On August 22, 2008, two days before the end of the competitions, X._________ held a press conference without notifying Y.__________, the organizers of the Olympic Games, or the International Olympic Committee. At that time, X.________ declared that B.________, Y.________’s Executive Director, had illegally corrected the results of the random draws of the judges and referees for 60 to 70% of the competitions at the Olympic Games. More specifically, the speaker accused him of manually modifying the lists of referees and judges that were prepared for each competition using computer software. He also complained that A.________, Y. __________’s President, had won his election to head the association by buying votes. B.________ also intervened during the press conference to accuse X.________ of trying to bribe him. The participants then insulted each other and the press conference ended in chaos.
Following these events that same day, Y. _________’s President announced X._________’s immediate suspension from all functions within the association. Still on August 22, 2008, the Bureau of Y._________”s Executive Committee filed a complaint against him with that association’s Disciplinary Commission for violating the Disciplinary Code and the Code of Conduct for technical delegates. After filing its complaint, Y. ________ sent written statements to the Disciplinary Commission from three of its official members, including B. __________, in which X.________ was accused of trying to bribe them in order to manipulate the results of the random draws of the judges and referees so that the athletes from V._________ and from two other countries would obtain medals.
On September 22, 2008, X.________ appealed the suspension on the grounds that Y.________’s President did not have jurisdiction to make such a decision.
In a decision of January 13, 2009, Y.________’s Disciplinary Commission imposed a fine of CHF 2,000 on X.________ and suspended him from all activity in the sport governed by this association for a period of three and a half years starting on August 22, 2008.
On January 21, 2009, X.________ filed a notice of appeal against this decision. He asked for an extension of the time limit to appeal because his counsel at the time was unable to work, as established by a medical certificate, thereby impeding him from filing the notice timely.
In a decision of February 9, 2009, Y.________’s Appeal Authority, holding that the alleged impediment was incomplete, refused to extend the time limit to appeal and, consequently, dismissed the appeal.
On March 2, 2009, X.________ filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). As a preliminary matter, the Appellant submitted that the decision issued on January 13, 2009, by Y.________’s Disciplinary Commission was capable of appeal. On the merits, he submitted that the CAS should annul the decision, reject the complaint filed on August 22, 2008, against him, find that he did not violate Y.________’s rules, release him from all sanctions, and open an investigation by Y._________’s Disciplinary Commission with regard to the violation of this association’s by-laws and regulations by its officials and of Y.________’s Disciplinary Code by B.________.
Y.________ submitted that the CAS should reject the Appellant’s submissions.
In an award of September 25, 2009, partially granting the appeal to the extent that the matter was capable of appeal, the CAS overturned the decision made on January 13, 2009, by Y.________’s Disciplinary Commission in the sense that it eliminated the fine imposed on the Appellant and reduced the suspension to 24 months. In addition, it held that each party would pay its own costs and half of the arbitration costs.
In the first part of the award, the CAS considered the preliminary issue of extending the timeframe to file an appeal before Y._________’s Appeal Authority, against the decision made by the Disciplinary Commission of the aforesaid association. That issue is no longer under dispute at this stage of the proceedings.
With regard to the merits, the CAS first examined the Appellant’s arguments aimed at demonstrating Y._______’s violation of his procedural rights. It concluded that the proceedings conducted by the Commission complied with the statutory and regulatory prescriptions of the association. Moreover, the Appellant did not produce any evidence of the violation that he alleged and had not complained of any such violation in the first instance.
The CAS then considered the arguments developed by the Appellant with regard to the violations of Y.________’s Disciplinary Code held by the Disciplinary Commission. With regard to the disputed press conference, it held, contrary to the opinion of the Appellant, that he was perfectly aware of its irregularity and that he had knowingly accepted the consequences. In this context, the CAS refuted the Appellant’s argument that he allegedly had no other choice than to hold the press conference in order to denounce the violation of Y._______’s regulations relating to the designation of the judges and referees. According to the CAS, the Appellant’s behavior blatantly violated Art. 3 of Y.________’s Disciplinary Code and was, consequently, a “serious violation of the by-laws and/or regulations” subject to the sanctions provided in Art. 45 of the aforesaid Code. As for the utterances made by the Appellant during the press conference, the CAS deemed them prejudicial to the reputation of the two individuals specified (Mr. A.________ and Mr. B.________) and to the reputation and interests of Y.________ to the extent that, by accusing them of falsifying the results of the computerized draws in order to influence the conduct of the competitions at the Olympic Games, without providing any objective and justifiable evidence to substantiate his accusations, the Appellant seriously damaged their credibility within the international athletic community and discredited Y.___________ at the same time. According to the arbitrators, such behavior was foreseen in articles 47 and 49 of Y._______’s Disciplinary Code.
Exercising full review, the CAS also examined the scope of the disciplinary sanction imposed on the Appellant. It held against him that the statutory violations established were serious, that he was fully aware of committing them, and that he intended to give maximum publicity to his accusations of corruption. In his favour, however, it took into account the fact that the accusations were triggered by those B. _______ made against the Appellant for an alleged and unsubstantiated attempt at bribery. The CAS also took into account the circumstances in which Y. _______ had changed the regulation, and in particular, the lack of transparency and communication surrounding such change. All things considered, it found it necessary to revoke the fine and to reduce the suspension.
Lastly, the CAS ruled on the costs and expenses of the appeal proceedings. In view of the fact that the Appellant only partially won his case, but on an essential point, the CAS decided that, equitably, each of the parties would pay its own costs and half the arbitration costs.
On October 26, 2009, X._______ filed a civil law appeal with the Federal Tribunal seeking the annulment of the CAS award.
In its answer of January 8, 2010, Y.________ submitted that the appeal should be rejected. The CAS made the same submission in its answer of January 18, 2010.
On January 22, 2010, the Appellant filed a reply in which he refuted the arguments advanced by the Respondents.
In the field of international arbitration, the decisions of arbitral tribunals are capable of civil law appeal under the requirements of articles 190 to 192 PILA1 (Art. 77 (1) LTF).2 Whether with regard to the subject of the appeal, standing to appeal, the time limit to appeal, the submissions made by the Appellant or even the grounds invoked in the appeal brief, none of these requirements poses a problem in this case. Moreover, there is no need to review here the disputed issue as to whether or not a civil law appeal is subject to the condition of a minimum amount in dispute when it involves an international arbitral award. Assuming this to be the case, this condition would indeed be met, since the Appellant alleges, without being contradicted by the Respondents, that his suspension caused damage of CHF 30,000 at a minimum. Therefore, the matter is capable of appeal.
The Federal Tribunal rules on the basis of the facts established by the CAS (see Art. 105 (1) LTF). It may not rectify or supplement the factual findings of the arbitrators of its own motion, even when the facts were established in a clearly inaccurate manner or in violation of the law (see Art. 77 (2) LTF which rules out the applicability of Art. 105 (2) LTF). However, as was already the case under the Federal Law organizing the Federal Courts (see ATF 129 III 727 at 5.2.2; 128 III 50 at 2a and the decisions quoted), the Federal Tribunal retains the right to review the facts on which the award under appeal is based if one of the grievances mentioned in Art. 190 (2) PILA is raised against them or, exceptionally, when new facts or new evidence are taken into consideration in the framework of the civil law appeal (judgment 4A_128/2008 of August 19, 2008, at 2.4, not published in ATF 134 III 565).
In a first argument, the Appellant criticizes the CAS for failing to rule on all the submissions that he brought before it.
3.1 According to Art. 190 (2) (c), second case, PILA, the award may be challenged when the arbitral tribunal failed to rule on one of the submissions. The failure to decide is a formal denial of justice. “Submissions” are understood to mean the claims or submissions of the parties. What is meant here is the incomplete award, or the case in which the arbitral tribunal did not rule on one of the submissions of the parties. When the award rejects any other or further submissions, this grievance is excluded. Neither does it allow the argument that the arbitral tribunal failed to settle an issue important to the resolution of the dispute (ATF 128 III 234 at 4a and references).
3.2 The Appellant complains that the CAS did not issue a decision with regard to submissions VIII and XIX of his appeal brief, in which he requested that Y. _________’s Disciplinary Commission be invited to open an investigation on the violation of this association’s by-laws and regulations by its officials and on the violation of its Disciplinary Code by B.________.
In this case, the CAS ruled in the framework of an appeal arbitration procedure defined in articles R47 ff of the Code of Sports Arbitration (hereafter: the Code). Under (I.) of the holding in its award, it “partially allows X.________’s appeal to the extent that there is no ground for dismissal.” Then, under (II.) of the same holding, it “overturns the decision” under appeal by reducing the Appellant’s suspension from three and a half years to two years.
It is stating the obvious to say that when an appeal is partially admitted, it is rejected for the portion that is not admitted. Certainly, as the CAS itself concedes in its answer to the appeal (at 3), it would have been clearer to indicate that the Appellant’s other submissions were rejected. The fact remains that the wording of (I.) in the holding of the award necessarily implies that the other submissions are rejected, including the aforementioned submissions VIII and XIX, and that alone matters from the perspective of the grievance under consideration. Moreover, the explanations provided by the CAS under (4) and (5) of its answer to the appeal, with reference to the relevant passages of the award, show that the questions relating to these two submissions – the first being the violation of statutory and regulatory prescriptions by some of Y._______’s bodies during the designation of the judges and referees who were supposed to officiate at the Beijing Olympic Games, and the second being B._________’s alleged violation of Y.________’s Disciplinary Code – were dealt with in the award under appeal, with the result that they are covered by the implicit partial rejection of the appeal resulting from (I.) of the holding of the award. As for the manner in which these questions were dealt with, whether they are findings made by the arbitrators or reasons set out by them in that context, it does not fall under Art. 190 (2) (c), second case, PILA.
The argument that this provision was violated is thus unfounded.
In a second group of arguments, the Appellant criticizes the CAS for not having dealt at all with several issues essential to the outcome of the dispute that he had submitted to it, thereby violating his right to be heard.
4.1 The right to be heard, as guaranteed by articles 182 (3) and 190 (2) (d) PILA, does not differ in principle from the contents of the right recognized in constitutional law (ATF 127 III 576 at 2c; 119 II 386 at 1b; 117 II 346 at 1a p. 347). Thus, it was held in the field of arbitration that each party had the right to state its case on the facts that are essential for judgment, to present its legal arguments, to submit evidence on pertinent facts, and to take part in the hearings of the arbitral tribunal (ATF 127 III 576 at 2c; 116 II 639 at 4c p. 643).
Case law also deduced from the right to be heard a minimum duty for the authority to examine and to deal with pertinent issues. This duty, which was extended to international arbitration, is violated when, inadvertently or due to a misunderstanding, the arbitral tribunal does not take into consideration certain statements, arguments, evidence, or offers to produce evidence presented by one of the parties and important for the decision to be issued. It behooves the party allegedly harmed to establish that the arbitral tribunal did not examine certain facts, evidence, or legal arguments duly advanced to substantiate its submissions and that such elements could have influenced the outcome of the dispute. If the award completely disregards elements apparently important for the resolution of the dispute, it will be the responsibility of the arbitrators or the Respondent to justify such omission in their observations on the appeal. They may do so by demonstrating that, contrary to the Appellant’s assertions, the elements omitted were not relevant to resolve the specific case, or, if they were, that they were implicitly rejected by the arbitral tribunal. It must be reiterated in this context that there is a violation of the right to be heard, even in the broader sense given to this guarantee by Swiss Constitutional Law, only if the authority did not fulfill its minimum duty to examine pertinent issues. The arbitrators therefore do not have the obligation to discuss all the arguments relied upon by the parties and they cannot be blamed for a violation of the right to be heard in adversarial proceedings if they failed to refute, even implicitly, an argument objectively lacking any relevance (ATF 133 III 235 at 5.2 and the decisions quoted).
4.2.1.1 The first part of the argument relates to the conditions under which the judges and referees to officiate during the Beijing Olympic Games were designated.
4.2.1.2 This line of argument is largely incapable of appeal and is for the rest unfounded.
In order to substantiate the criticisms he makes against the CAS, the Appellant maintains that the latter “should have examined the arguments set out in detail, over five full pages (and which are deemed quoted here in their entirety) by [him] in his appeal brief…” (appeal at 11, p. 6). Such arguments are not admissible. Indeed, in accordance with case law relating to Art. 42 (1) LTF, the reasons must be contained in the appeal. Therefore, when the Appellant limits himself to referring to his previous written submissions, as is the case here, his appeal must be dismissed (judgment 4A_25/2009 of February 16, 2009, at 3.1 and references).
Furthermore, the very passages from the award quoted by the Appellant under (11) of his brief show that the issues relating to the disputed modification of the rules governing the designation of the judges and referees were dealt with by the CAS, which considers that these questions “are at the center of the issue” (award at 99, in fine). The fact that they were not dealt with to the Appellant’s satisfaction is another issue, which this Court cannot review.
In reality, the Appellant appears to argue a violation of his right to evidence in relation to these issues. Undoubtedly, this right also stems from the right to be heard. However, it is not this essential element of such a right that the Appellant invokes in this case, as is clear from nr. (8) of his brief. In matters of international arbitration, the Federal Tribunal examines only grievances that have been submitted and only to the extent that they are reasoned (Art. 77 (3) LTF). Therefore, there is no reason to analyze this aspect of the issue any further.
4.2.2.1 In a second part of the same argument, the Appellant criticizes the CAS for not responding at all to the argument according to which a person may not be sanctioned for slander unless the victim has complained. According to him, this argument was nevertheless essential since the facts of the case do not show that the alleged victims (Mr. A.________ and Mr. B.________) complained that he slandered them.
The Appellant notes that the summary of the arguments, made in (40) of the award under appeal, is erroneous insofar as the CAS, in writing that none of the interested parties had filed a criminal complaint against the Appellant, disregards that it had not conditioned an action for slander to a criminal complaint, but to a complaint filed before any competent authority whatsoever, in particular the Disciplinary Commission.
4.2.2.2 It must be noted at first that the argument does not apply to the act, attributed to the Appellant, of attacking the reputation and interests of Y._______ itself during the press conference on August 22, 2008.
That being the case, it appears from the reasons in the award, in particular under (103) and (104), that the CAS implicitly rejected the argument – which it was familiar with (see award at 40) – by which the Appellant denied that he could be sanctioned for slandering Mr. A.________ and Mr. B.________ even though they had not shown, by filing a criminal complaint or in any other manner, that they intended to see him punished. Indeed, the CAS referred to Art. 49 of Y._________’s Disciplinary Code, a provision which does not make the sanction for slander subject to a complaint from the victim.
The violation of the right to be heard alleged by the Appellant therefore does not exist.
4.2.3.1 In the last part of the argument in question, the Appellant argues that the CAS did not respond at all to his argument that defamation of a legal entity is punishable only if directed against this legal entity as such and not merely against individuals acting for it. The Appellant also claims that the CAS did not consider the argument that he was actually trying to protect the Respondent and not harm it, by denouncing the misconduct committed to its detriment by two of its bodies.
4.2.3.2 This line of argument is no better founded than the previous ones. The CAS relied here on a provision of Y.__________’s Disciplinary Code – Art. 47 – that specifically sanctions any attack on the reputation and interests of the association. In addition, it indicated why the Appellant’s behavior was such an attack, particularly in that it was liable to discredit Y.________ itself, in addition to the two individual victims. Furthermore, it clearly appears from the reasons of the award that the CAS implicitly rejected the argument that the Appellant allegedly acted for an altruistic purpose, in other words to help Y._________.
In the last argument, based on Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA, the Appellant criticizes the CAS for issuing an award inconsistent with public policy.
5.1 The judicial review by the Federal Tribunal of the substance of an international arbitral award is limited to the issue of the consistency of the award with public policy (ATF 121 III 331 at 3a). An award is inconsistent with public policy if it disregards the essential and broadly recognized values which, according to Swiss concepts, should be the basis of any legal order (ATF 132 III 389 at 2.2.3). It is contrary to substantive public policy when it violates some fundamental principles of substantive law to such an extent that it is no longer consistent with the determining legal order and value system; among such principles are, in particular, fidelity to contracts and compliance with the rules of good faith. In order to find inconsistency with substantive public policy, a more narrow concept than that of arbitrariness, it is not sufficient for a factual finding to be obviously false (ATF 121 III 331 at 3a) or for a rule of law to be clearly violated (judgment 4P.71/2002 of October 22, 2002, at 3.2 and the decisions quoted).
5.2 Generally speaking, the Appellant’s argument as to the violation of public policy are only repeating, in another form, those in the grievances examined above. Furthermore, they are clearly appellate in character and rely in part on facts that deviate from the findings of the CAS. To this extent, it is doubtful that they are capable of appeal. Moreover, these arguments can only be rejected for the following reasons.
5.2.1 First, the Appellant argues, in substance, that the CAS violated the cardinal principle of nulla poena sine lege by sanctioning him for a press conference when it is not established that this fell under the prohibition of a rule of law. According to the Appellant, to deduce the existence of such a prohibition from his own statements made during the press conference, according to which “this initiative would cause him to be sanctioned,” would be equivalent to an obviously false finding of facts contrary to the record (appeal at 16).
In arguing so, the Appellant challenges the facts found by the CAS, which is not admissible. What is more, the arbitrators invoked Art. 3. of Y.________’s Disciplinary Code to hold that the Appellant was not authorized to hold the press conference as he did (award at 96 s.). Therefore, they could not be blamed for sanctioning behavior not prohibited by a rule of law.
5.2.2 To the extent that the same argument—that is, the absence of a “legal” basis to support the prohibition of the press conference— is used to claim the violation of various provisions of the ECHR (appeal at 17), it is equally unfounded.
5.2.3 At nr. 102 of its award, the CAS finds that the Appellant “also fails to provide proof of his claim that he became aware of this change in the rules [that of the random draw procedure for judges and referees called to officiate during the Olympic Games] only during the Olympic Games.” Citing this passage, the Appellant argues that the burden of proof was wrongly allocated, resulting in a deplorable outcome contrary to public policy (appeal at 18).
However, as the Appellant himself emphasizes, an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof is not within the scope of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA. Moreover, the argument is purely appellate in nature.
5.2.4 The CAS is also criticized for a violation of public policy for not enjoining the Respondent to open an investigation against B. _________. According to the Appellant, the award under appeal would lead to a shocking result in that it sanctions him for a violation while allowing the other person to escape sanction for the same violation. The Appellant claims that this result is even more deplorable as, in contrast to Mr. A.________ and Mr. B.________, he expressly filed a complaint with Y._________’s Disciplinary Commission for the slander he suffered from B.________, while the proceedings proved that the accusation of corruption made by the latter against him was false (appeal at 19).
Such arguments have nothing to do with the grievance of a violation of public policy. The CAS was asked to consider the case of the Appellant, and not that of B.______. It examined the violations attributed to the first and weighed their seriousness by taking into account several circumstances, in particular the questionable behavior adopted by Mr. B._______ during the press conference, as such behavior creates mitigating circumstances in its opinion (award at 110). There is nothing there to support the grievance. As for the possible violations committed by B.________, the Disciplinary Commission indicated on page 18 of its decision of January 13, 2009 (at 3 § 2e), that the proceedings conducted before it did not concern them. Accordingly, it is in no way established that a final decision had been issued regarding them.
5.2.5 As for the first instance proceedings, the Appellant essentially repeats, from the perspective of the violation of public policy, the arguments that he had already advanced in support of his argument of a violation of Art. 190 (2) (c), second case, PILA (see reason 3.2 above) (appeal (20)). It is appropriate to treat them in the same manner.
In the argument, the Appellant returns to the claim that the Disciplinary Commission did not rule, despite his repeated request, on the appeal of September 22, 2008, against the decision of Y.________’s president of August 22, 2008, announcing his immediate suspension. Yet, what is disregarded is that the Commission indicated on page 26 of its decision (at 11) the reason why it considered it unnecessary to decide the appeal. Certainly, it did so in part implicitly, as it referred to the “outcome of the case.” It is nonetheless understandable that it considered, insofar as the suspension took effect retroactively to the same date as that issued by Y.________’s president for the same facts, that the Appellant no longer had an interest in seeking review of the legality of Chairman A._______’s decision.
5.2.6.1 Next, the Appellant challenges the manner in which the CAS allocated the expenses. He claims that the offset of the costs decided by the arbitrators is objectionable in its result, since he won an essential point of his case (appeal at 21).
The decision issued on this subject by the CAS was on grounds of equity. It took into account the fact that the Appellant won only part of his case, as he would still be sanctioned with a two-year suspension. In theory, it is not inconceivable that the decision made by an arbitral tribunal on the allocation of costs may violate substantive public policy (see judgment 4P.280/2005 of January 9, 2006, at 2.2.2 on the subject of the amount of costs). However, in an area (expenses and costs) where the Federal Tribunal intervenes only with the greatest restraint when arbitrariness is argued, it must do so with even greater restraint in matters of international arbitration and even more so if the arbitrators ruled based on equitable principles. Such is the case here. It does not appear that the allocation by the CAS violates any essential and broadly recognized values which, according to Swiss concepts, should be the basis of any legal order. Consequently, the grievance relating is unfounded.
5.2.6.2 Lastly, the Appellant criticizes the CAS for not dealing with the issue of the validity of Art. 56 of the Respondent’s rules of procedure, as it excludes the allocation of costs. He sees this as a violation of his right to be heard (appeal at 21). In itself, the grievance is founded, because it appears from the award that the CAS ruled only on the issue of expenses and costs of its own proceedings. However, the Appellant may not claim a present interest in the admission of the grievance under consideration. Indeed, in the most favorable case for him, that is, if the CAS, ruling again, had to admit that the costs may be allocated in the first proceedings notwithstanding the aforementioned regulatory provision, he cannot hope to obtain costs in view of the outcome of the case on the merits. In practical terms, as the disciplinary sanction issued against him remains, even though it was reduced by the CAS, it is hardly conceivable that he could obtain anything other than, in the best case scenario, an offset of the costs of the first proceedings.
The Appellant shall pay the costs of the federal proceedings (Art. 66 (1) LTF) and pay the Respondent’s costs (Art. 68 (1) and (2) LTF).
The judicial costs, set at CHF 5,000, shall be paid by the Appellant.
The Appellant shall pay to the Respondent an amount of CHF 6,000 as costs.
1. Translator’s note: PILA is the most frequently used English abbreviation for the Federal Statute of December 18, 1987, on Private International Law, RS 291.


text:
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court on January 5, 1978.
The case was heard by Sullivan, J., on a motion for summary judgment.
Richard Cole for the plaintiff.
Dennis A. Lalli for the defendants.
recovery should be opened but narrowly and with due caution." [Note 3] Should the present case be allowed to pass through the portal?
The plaintiff Robert Richey, a former employee of the American Automobile Association, Inc., Massachusetts Division, sued that company and Robert Lundblad, a personnel manager, on a number of theories set out in separate counts, of which the only one remaining for consideration is that for the asserted emotional distress. [Note 4] After answer, the plaintiff put interrogatories to the defendants, to which they furnished replies, and he then examined on oral deposition the defendant Lundblad and a number of other supervisory employees of the defendant company. [Note 5] On the pleadings, the answers to interrogatories, the depositions, and certain affidavits, the corporate defendant moved for summary judgment in its favor. [Note 6] No additional material was offered on the part of the plaintiff. A judge of the Superior Court, treating the motion as made by both defendants, allowed it, and judgment entered for the defendants dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.
calls from motorists requiring service, relaying the information to a "spotter," acting as spotter in locating the appropriate stations to send aid to the particular motorists and relaying to a "dispatcher," and acting as dispatcher in communicating with the stations by telephone or radio.
There was a six-month probationary period for new employees, with a preliminary evaluation at the end of the third month. About November 14, 1974, the plaintiff's performance was reviewed and evidently considered adequate. Sometime in November, the plaintiff was absent from work for a period of four days as a result of his physical collapse while he was on the way to work. Also that month the plaintiff absented himself from the job for several days because of the death of a parent. He did not notify the employer that he would not appear.
Again the plaintiff was absent on December 4 and thereafter, again without notification. The defendant Lundblad wrote to the plaintiff on December 9, stating that it would be assumed he was quitting voluntarily if he did not get in touch with the office by December 12. As it happened, this letter bears the same date as a formal letter from the general manager of the Division informing the plaintiff that his salary had been raised to $5,252, roughly a 5 1/2% increase (for "standard performance," which warranted an increase of 7-9%, and "outstanding performance," 10-12%).
was voluntary) the blood condition and "nerves" or anxiety reaction. There was some discussion whether an arrangement could be made to have the plaintiff work part time. Lundblad pointed out the difficulties. He told the plaintiff (confirmed by letter) that he would want information from the doctor at the hospital. On January 2, 1975, the plaintiff hand delivered to Lundblad a doctor's letter dated December 31, and Lundblad spoke with the plaintiff and asked him to get another note with more medical information. On January 10 the plaintiff appeared with a further letter. The substance of the doctor's communication apparently was that the plaintiff could return to full-time work.
About January 10 -- more than a month having now elapsed since the plaintiff was last at work -- McLaughlin consulted with Lundblad and probably an assistant manager of the emergency road service department, and a decision was reached to terminate the plaintiff's probationary employment. Lundblad telephoned the plaintiff on January 13 and reported the decision. The plaintiff expressed disappointment.
The answers of the supervisory employees to questions about their reasons for terminating the plaintiff summed up as a judgment by them that the plaintiff was not a good risk for long-term employment because of his lapses in attendance and failures to notify the office, and also (at least in Lundblad's mind) because of a doubt about his ability to withstand the strain of a job in the emergency road service department.
(1965). See Agis, supra at 145; Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592 , 594-595 (1979). [Note 8] A trier would be entitled to put as harsh a face on the actions of the supervisors as the basic facts would reasonably allow. A trier could infer, despite the supervisors' attempts at self-justification, that in dismissing the plaintiff they made a bad, unjust, and unkind decision, and one that fell with particular force on the plaintiff because he believed his continued employment to be assured if he brought in the doctor's letters pronouncing him fit to work full time. Further, a trier could suppose (despite the letters) that the plaintiff was tightly strung at the time, and would therefore be disturbed by a disappointment, and that the supervisors were conscious of the likelihood.
But even if the record could reasonably bear all these implications (which, to be frank, we doubt), we think the plaintiff still failed to make out a plausible case of "outrage." The case did not approach the abuse of ordinary decencies to be found in George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (extreme dunning tactics), Agis (public humiliation), or Wenk (persistent misbehavior by investigator). Comparison is invited with the cases collected in Annot., Liability of Employer, Supervisor, or Manager for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Employee Emotional Distress, 86 A.L.R. 3d 454 (1978). There may, indeed, be room for the observation that if the present facts should be held to qualify a discharged employee for relief, then a new practical definition might have to be given to employments theoretically terminable at will. See Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. Rev. 457, 472 & n.77 (1979). The considerations which led to a qualification of that relationship in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 (1977), are not pressed, nor would they be remotely applicable in the circumstances of the discharge of this probationary employee. Cf. Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816 (1980).
[Note 2] The cause of action is described thus in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46 (1) (1965): "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." In George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244 (1971), we had already approved the formula in the somewhat easier case for liability where bodily harm could be shown.
[Note 3] Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 , 144 (1976), quoting from Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312 (1932).
[Note 4] There were three counts purporting to be based on statute, but they were without merit and are no longer relied on.
[Note 5] The manager of the emergency road service department, the manager of the accounting and data processing department, and the general manager of the Division.
[Note 6] The motion was for judgment on the pleadings but, as the interrogatories and depositions and other material were received and considered, it was treated as a motion for summary judgment. Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).
[Note 7] Such a problem was noted when the plaintiff applied originally for the job.
[Note 8] It is a further condition of the tort that the defendant shall have acted intentionally or recklessly. See note 2 above and Restatement Section 46, Comment i.

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individual and official capacities, Appellees.
Timothy M. Gebhart, Sioux Falls, S.D., for appellant.
Janine Kern, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, S.D., for appellees.
Troy Dace appeals from the district court's dismissal of his complaint as frivolous. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Dace, a prisoner at the South Dakota State Penitentiary (Penitentiary), brought this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Dace was also granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. He named as defendants the warden and three associate wardens of the Penitentiary, as well as the prison physician and prison psychologist (defendants).
Dace's complaint contains four claims. In claim one, Dace asserts that he was scheduled for surgery to repair a nasal defect before his incarceration and was denied this surgery after he was imprisoned. This denial of surgery, Dace argues, constitutes a denial of necessary medical treatment in violation of his eighth amendment rights.
In claim two, Dace asserts that on April 8, 1986, another inmate struck him on the side of his head with a pipe. He claims that he suffers from a variety of ailments as a result, that he was initially denied adequate treatment, and that the medication eventually prescribed by the prison physician was ineffective. He also asserts that he was given drugs without being told of their possible side effects and that those medications were abruptly terminated.
Dace asserts in claim three that, because he refused to testify against his assailant in state court assault proceedings, he has been verbally abused, threatened, and intimidated by the warden and associate wardens on numerous occasions, and that he has been denied trusty status by the prison classification board. Claim three also alleges that by allowing Dace to be attacked in the shop area of the prison, the defendants failed to provide a properly staffed shop area, and failed to properly train, control and supervise those persons responsible for inmates' safety in the shop area.
Dace asserts in claim four that the warden and associate wardens conspired to retaliate against him because of his involvement in lawsuits against prison personnel. Dace argues that his medium custody classification was revoked without any reason or prior hearing.
The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), before any of the defendants were served. Counsel appointed for Dace on appeal argues that under the liberal standards governing pro se prisoner complaints, his complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that could entitle him to relief. He asserts that the district court thus abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint. The defendants respond that the district court properly dismissed Dace's complaint because it was factually and legally insufficient.
To ensure that indigents have access to the courts, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915 which established a system for in forma pauperis litigation. Congress recognized, however, the danger that without the monetary disincentives to filing suit, the federal courts could be opened to a flood of spurious litigation. To address these competing concerns, Congress gave district courts the authority to dismiss frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis complaints. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d); * * *. A frivolous complaint is one in which "the petitioner can make no rational argument in law or facts to support his [or her] claim for relief."
Williams, 837 F.2d at 306 (citations and footnote omitted).
Reviewing the factual allegations in Dace's complaint, which we must accept as true, Cline v. Herman, 601 F.2d 374, 375-76 (8th Cir.1979) (per curiam), we conclude that the face of his complaint does not show an "insuperable bar to relief" as required before we may dismiss. Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir.1985). Nor, stated another way, is Dace's complaint irreparably defective. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam). This is so because, as to each of his claims, Dace has set forth a legally and factually rational argument.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner who alleges acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Dace alleges not only that his nasal condition causes pain, but that he was scheduled for surgery to treat the condition before being imprisoned and that penitentiary officials, despite being aware of his condition, have refused to provide him with necessary medical treatment. Because Dace's complaint was dismissed before discovery was had, there is no way to assess the seriousness of Dace's condition or the necessity of treatment.
The Second Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a similar claim in Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir.1972), a case which was quoted and cited with approval in Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1973) (per curiam). As Dace points out, this court has reversed and remanded dismissals of prisoners' claims that were less serious than refusal to allow surgery scheduled before imprisonment. See, e.g., Mullen v. Smith, 738 F.2d 317, 318 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (head injury untreated for four hours, then Valium given to prisoner); Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (8th Cir.1980) (back injury untreated for three days). We therefore conclude that Dace should be given a "chance to develop his case to the point at which the courts can determine whether it has merit." East v. Lemons, 768 F.2d 1000, 1001 (8th Cir.1985).
Similarly, with regard to Dace's head injury, we think he should be entitled to further develop his claim. Although the district court was correct in concluding that disagreement over medical treatment does not constitute a medical violation, see Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir.1985), we think Dace's claim on this issue can be read to allege more than mere disagreement. Dace argues that penitentiary officials were dilatory in giving him medication after the attack, and that the medication he received was either inappropriate or improperly administered. We think that Dace is at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
After Dace was attacked by another inmate, that inmate was charged with aggravated assault. Dace alleges that penitentiary officials threatened him with various reprisals if he testified about the attack, including leaving him at the mercy of the inmate population as a "snitch." In claim three, Dace asserts that prison officials failed to protect him from inmate attack while in custody. It is well established that the constitution requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from inmate attack while in custody. Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841, 105 S.Ct. 145, 83 L.Ed.2d 84 (1984); Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam). Accordingly, Dace's arguments on this ground are not frivolous.
Finally, Dace argues that his medium custody classification was adversely affected due to his involvement in prison-related litigation. Dace argues that under Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d 1277, 1279 (8th Cir.1987), a genuine issue exists whether the custody classification regulations used to demote him contain "mandatory language" sufficient to create a liberty interest, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871-72, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), and thus whether Dace is entitled to due process procedural protections before having his classification changed. Although expressing no opinion on the validity of Dace's argument, we think that, in view of the liberal construction given pro se prisoner complaints, Dace's argument cannot be called so frivolous as to justify summary dismissal. There is no question that state officials may not retaliate against a prison inmate for exercising his legal right of access to the courts. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-87, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748-50, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). It is conceivable that Dace can prove facts in support of his claim that prison officials retaliated against him because of his previous use of the courts. Accordingly, Dace should be given an opportunity to further develop this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order dismissing Dace's complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

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Properties of the Zagreb indices of pseudo-regular graphs are established, with emphasis on the Zagreb indices inequality. The relevance of the results obtained for the theory of nanomolecules is pointed out.
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S. Ediz, The augmented eccentric connectivity index of an infinite class of nanostar dendrimers, Optoelectron. Adv. Mater.-Rapid Comm., 4(12) (2010), 2216-2217.
S. Iijima, Helical microtubules of graphitic carbon. Nature, 354 (1991), 56-58.
M. V. Diudea and A. Graovac, Generation and graph-theoretical properties of C4-tori, MATCH Commun. Math. Comput. Chem., 44 (2001), 93-102.
M. V. Diudea and I. Silaghi-Dumitrescu, B. Parv, Toranes versus torenes, MATCH Commun. Math. Comput. Chem., 44 (2001), 117-133.
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M. V. Diudea, M. Stefu, B. Parv and P.E. John, Wiener index of armchair polyhex nanotubes, Croat. Chem. Acta, 77 (2004), 111-115.
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1. EVAN DUNHAM1 JOYNT was born Abt. 1800, and died 1847. He married MARY ANN KILLICK. She died December 23, 1885.
According to notes, Evan Dunham Joynt's family was of Wales and then London and finally to Illinois in about 1850. May have had brothers who may have been Edwin Augustus Joynt, Henry Joynt and another brother or two, one of whom returned to England.
Frederick Joynt Son U 20 Gentleman b.
Emma Hurst Serv Unm 24 domestic servant b.
3. ii. FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE JOYNT, b. November 09, 1830, London, England; d. May 03, 1919, Jacksonville, Morgan Co., Illinois.
4. iii. EDWIN AUGUSTUS JOYNT, b. April 04, 1832, London, England; d. July 10, 1916, Decatur, Illinois.
5. iv. AUGUSTUS HENRY JOYNT, b. December 02, 1836, London, England; d. February 01, 1918, Patoka, Illinois.
2. EVAN2 JOYNT (EVAN DUNHAM1) He married (1) MARY LOUISA RUBARD. She died October 26, 1856. He married (2) ANNETTE KILLICK.
Note: Mary Louisa Rubard Joynt died on October 26, 1856 probably from childbirth. Evan returned to England, probably taking Mary Louisa with him. Charles Evan remained in Illinois with his uncle Frederick (Charles is shown on the 1860 census with Frederick.) A few years later Charles was retrieved by his father, taken to London and educated at Eton. He returned to Illinois in the late 1870's.
i. MARY LOUISA3 JOYNT, b. 1854, Illinois.
6. ii. CHARLES EVAN JOYNT, b. October 22, 1856, Jerseyville, Illinois; d. August 25, 1936, Decatur, Illinois.
iii. EVA ROSE3 JOYNT, b. Abt. 1859; m. ALFRED ELGAR.
iv. ANNETTE AUGUST JOYNT, b. December 03, 1861, England.
v. BOY JOYNT, b. Abt. 1863, England.
3. FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE2 JOYNT (EVAN DUNHAM1) was born November 09, 1830 in London, England, and died May 03, 1919 in Jacksonville, Morgan Co., Illinois. He married MARGARET ADELINE PARRISH February 19, 1853 in Jerseyville, Jersey Co., Illinois. She was born August 11, 1835 in Northern Kentucky, and died March 08, 1884 in near Elkhart, Illinois.
Latham, May 5 -- The body of Frederick William George Joynt, one of the oldest residents of Latham, for 40 years preacher of the Latham Methodist Church, who died Saturday in a hospital in Jacksonville, arrived here Monday.
Mr. Joynt, who was 88 years old was born in London, England, Nov. 9, 1830, and came to America when he was 21 years of age. He and Miss Margaret A., Parrish were married in 1852. Mrs. Joynt died March 8, 1884.
Mr. Joynt was a member of several Masonic orders and was prominent in church work during his life. He was a member of the Methodist Church and devoted much of his time to church work. He was a charter _____(corner torn) church in Latham and acted as pastor for 40 years.
He leaves seven children, F.S.Joynt of Roseland, Neb.; S.E.Joynt of Hendrix, Minn.;W.E.Joynt of St. Paul, Neb.;Mrs. S. M.Lillick, Florence, Wis.;Mrs. Clara Boyd of Roseland, Neb.;Mrs.Sadie Hull of Latham; and D.J.Joynt also of Latham.
Funeral services wil eb conducted Wednesday, at 10 o'clock in the Methodist church of Latham, by Rev. S. R. Reno, assisted by Rev. Mr. Milford. Furial will be inthe Williamsville cemetery. Friends may call at the residence of W. H. Hull, near Latham, until the hour of the funeral.
>If you still do lookups on 1850 census for Jersey Co., IL I would appreciate >a lookup for Joynt, specifically family of Frederick William George Joynt >who was married in Jersey Co. in 1853 to Margaret Adeline Parrish. I believe >Frederick had brothers Augustus and Henry.
Sorry, I see no Joynt (or similar spellings) entries at all for the 1850 Jersey Co.IL Census, as transcribed & purblished by the jersey Co.IL Gen.Soc.
I am a descendant of William Edward Joynt b.1865 d.1944. Susie Nita Richards was his first wife's name. After she passed he remarried. Millie Ann Ratcliff was the second wife's name.She was my maternal grandmother.
Our family history tells that Fredrick William George Joynt was the clerk of the court when Abraham Lincoln first practiced there.
Your list had the name as Edward, while my mother said he was known as Ed Joynt. After he married Millie Ann he bought an operated a hardware store in St. Paul, Ne.
i. INFANT DAUGHTER3 JOYNT, b. 1853, Latham, Illinois; d. 1853, Latham, Illinois.
ii. HENRY KILLICK JOYNT, b. 1855, Latham, Illinois; d. 1872, Latham, Illinois.
7. iii. FREDERICK SYDNEY JOYNT, b. July 02, 1857, Latham, Illinois; d. December 18, 1958, Juniata, Adams County, Nebraska.
iv. SAMUEL EMMET JOYNT, b. December 06, 1859, Latham, Illinois; d. August 28, 1941; m. TALMA EWING, March 12, 1884, Logan County, Illinois (Source: Illinois Marriage Search Site, Vol 1 pg. 104.).
v. JOHN VINCENT JOYNT, b. September 27, 1862, Latham, Illinois; d. November 27, 1918.
8. vi. WILLIAM EDWIN JOYNT, b. August 02, 1865, Williamsville, Logan Co, Illinois; d. March 05, 1944, St Paul, Nebraska.
vii. MARGARET ADELINE JOYNT, b. January 07, 1868, Latham, Illinois; d. April 17, 1924, Eau Claire, Wisconsin; m. FERDINAND N LILLICK.
viii. DAVID JAMES JOYNT, b. October 01, 1870; d. August 02, 1972, Decatur, Illinois; m. FLORA BESSAMER, September 22, 1897, Logan County, Illinois (Source: Illinois Marriage Search Site, License number 9568.).
ix. CLARA JOYNT, b. January 10, 1874, Latham, Illinois; d. August 18, 1962, Denver, Colorado; m. FRED BOYD, December 24, 1901.
x. SARA ELIZABETH JOYNT, b. October 11, 1878, Latham, Illinois; d. May 16, 1943, Decatur, Illinois; m. WALTER HALL.
4. EDWIN AUGUSTUS2 JOYNT (EVAN DUNHAM1) was born April 04, 1832 in London, England (Source: Obit of Edwin Augustus Joynt.), and died July 10, 1916 in Decatur, Illinois. He married CLARISSA SOPHIE ALDRIDGE October 31, 1854 in England (Source: Obit of Edwin Augustus Joynt.). She died March 24, 1902 in Logan County, Illinois (Source: Obit of Edwin Augustus Joynt.).
Edwin Augustus Joynt died at 6:30 o'clock Monday morning at the residence of his daughter, Mrs. L. W.Benson, 1017 West Main Street. His age was eighty-four years, three months and six days. Mr. Joynt had been in failing health for the past five years, but had been confined to his bed for only five weeks. His death was due to the infirimities of age.
Mr. Joynt was born in London, Eng., April 4, 1832. His childhood was spent in London, but at the age of fifteen he went to sea as an apprentice. He followed the sea for four years and then located in America, following different occupations, mostly in Jersey county, Ill. He and Clarissa Sophie Aldridge were married Oct. 31,1854, and they honeymoon was spent in England. Returning to America that winter, they settled in Logan county, remaining there until the death of Mrs. Joynt, March 24, 1902. Mr. Joynt then came to Harristown, Macon County and has since made his home principally with his daughter Mrs. L.W.Benson. The family moved to Decatur last March and he came with them.
Mr. Joynt is survived by two sons and two daughters, Stephen A. Joynt of Harristown; Fred E. Joynt of Decatur;Mrs. Clara Brown of Mowequa, and Mrs. L.W.Benson of Decatur. He also leaves two brothers, F.W.G Joynt of Latham, Ill, and A.H.Joynt of Portland, Ore.
The following town histories are taken from the 1878 History of Logan County, Illinois.
Edwin made at least 20 trips across the ocean back to his native London, England. On one of these trips he married Sophia who appears to have been raised in London by a spinster sister of Edwin's mother named Clarissa Killik.
Latham. The cemetery is under township management today.
9. i. STEPHEN AUGUSTUS3 JOYNT, b. August 1860, Macon Co, Illinois.
iii. CLARA JOYNT, m. MR BROWN.
iv. ALICE JOYNT, m. LESLIE WALLACE BENSON, May 09, 1882, Logan County, Illinois (Source: Illinois Marriage Search Site, Vol 1 p.15.).
5. AUGUSTUS HENRY2 JOYNT (EVAN DUNHAM1) was born December 02, 1836 in London, England (Source: 1870 census, A.H. age 36 born in England.), and died February 01, 1918 in Patoka, Illinois. He married EMILY DRAPER August 15, 1854 in Jerseyville, Jersey Co., Illinois (Source: (1) Obit of Augustus Henry Joynt., (2) IGI.), daughter of JOHN DRAPER and MARGARET GRIFFIN. She was born April 27, 1839 in Greenville, Bond, Illinois, and died June 29, 1907 in Myrtle Creek, Oregon.
1880 Census (Joint) Living in LaSalle County, LaSalle Township, LaSalle Illinois.
He was a forman in coal "shops".
1852 Came to America in 1852 and settled near Jerseyville then moved to Mt. Pulaski.
? Was the circuit clerk of Logan County for many years.
1860-1874 Was a Station Agent for the Illinois Central Railroad from about 1860-1874.
1875 Moved from Patoka, IL.
1876 Lived in Forsyth, Macon Co., Illinois.
? Lived in Lostant, LaSalle Co., Illinois prior to March 1880.
1880 Lived in Oglesby, LaSalle Co., Illinois.
Nov. 2, 1882 Received a letter of reference indicating he had been a "weighman" and "tap boss" at the Oglesby Coal Company.
March 1882 Lived in Wenona, Marshall Co., Illinois.
Jan. 1883 Lived in Decatur, Macon Co., Illinois.
1886 Moved to San Jose, California.
1909 January, was on a visit to his children and wrote letter about Lincoln.
Occupation: 1851, "Scholar at home"
A.H. Joynt, aged 81 years, died at 9 o'clock, Friday night at the home of his daughter, Mrs. Wm. F. Gebhart, 869 Pine St., following an attack of apoplexy which came upon him at 8 o'clock. Mr. Joynt was a member of the Patoka Masonic lodge, at Patoka Ill. for 60 years and was one of the oldest members of the order in the state.
He was born in London, England Dec. 2, 1836 and came to America in 1852 settling near Jerseyville. He later moved to Mt. Pulaski and he held the office of circut clerk of Logan County for many years.
He was well known and liked in Mt. Pulaski and handled his official duties with a marked degree of efficiency. He was married to Miss Emily Draper of Greenville Ill in Aug. 1854. Mrs. Joynt died in 1907 and since her death, Mr. Joynt lived with his daughters.
Mr. Joynt will be remember by all of our older citizens, was agent Ill. Cent. R. R. here for a number of years. The funeral took place Monday afternoon Feb. 4 in Decatur conducted by Ionic Lodge 312 A.F. & A. Masons, body was shipped to Myrtle Creek, Org. to its final resting place beside that of his wife. Besides 7 children, he leaves 11 grandchildren and 1 great grandchild.
1886 Went to California with husband. Lived in San Jose. 1906 went to Myrtle Creek, Oregon (after earthquake!) in July 1906.
i. MARY ELIZA3 JOYNT, b. November 10, 1855, Illinois; d. January 17, 1861, Illinois.
10. ii. CHARLES WALTER JOYNT, b. June 22, 1857, Illinois; d. March 09, 1937, Portland, Multnomah, Oregon.
11. iii. IDA LILLIAN JOYNT, b. October 23, 1859, Illinois; d. March 03, 1935.
iv. ARTHUR HENRY JOYNT, b. September 27, 1861, Illinois; d. November 02, 1866.
12. v. JOHN FARNEY JOYNT, b. December 11, 1862, Patoka, Illinois; d. December 25, 1923, Chicago, Illinois.
vi. MARGARET MYRTIE JOYNT, b. September 08, 1864, Illinois; d. October 08, 1866, Illinois.
13. vii. ALICE TERMINA JOYNT, b. April 18, 1866, Alma, Illinois; d. February 27, 1935, Decatur, Illinois.
viii. ZADOC JOYNT, b. September 08, 1867, Illinois; d. October 08, 1867, Illinois.
ix. LIZZIE SYBIL JOYNT, b. December 30, 1868, Illinois; d. February 17, 1965, Multnomah Co, Oregon; m. (1) ALFRED ALLEN, Bef. 1911; m. (2) AUGUST G MARKER, Bef. 1922; d. December 11, 1953, Multnomah Co, Oregon.
x. CLYDE JOYNT, b. June 06, 1870, Illinois; d. July 25, 1870, Illinois.
xi. OLIVE JOYNT, b. September 20, 1871, Illinois; d. October 11, 1871, Illinois.
xii. FRANCIS MARION JOYNT, b. February 23, 1873, Patoka, Illinois; d. May 13, 1885, Decatur, Illinois.
xiii. CARROLL FLOYD JOYNT, b. July 15, 1874, Illinois; d. November 20, 1874, Illinois.
14. xiv. WILLIAM LEWIS JOYNT, b. April 09, 1876, near Forsyth,Illinois; d. December 14, 1922, Portland, Multnomah, Oregon.
xv. EVA ROSE JOYNT, b. December 03, 1880, Illinois; d. August 09, 1942, Portland, Oregon; m. (1) UNKNOWN BOCKS; m. (2) CHARLES WOLFGANG, Bef. 1915; d. Aft. 1935.
6. CHARLES EVAN3 JOYNT (EVAN2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born October 22, 1856 in Jerseyville, Illinois, and died August 25, 1936 in Decatur, Illinois. He married ORA M UNKNOWN.
of the Millikin National bank.
& Wikoff funeral home. Burial will be in Fairlawn cemetery.
15. i. EVERETT E4 JOYNT, d. February 15, 1982, Decatur, Illinois.
7. FREDERICK SYDNEY3 JOYNT (FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born July 02, 1857 in Latham, Illinois, and died December 18, 1958 in Juniata, Adams County, Nebraska. He married LAURA WHITEHURST July 10, 1884 in Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska. She was born December 19, 1866 in Circleville, Pickway County, Ohio, and died June 01, 1939 in Holstein, Adams County, Nebraska.
i. NELLIE IDELLA4 JOYNT, b. June 27, 1885, Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska; d. April 15, 1970, Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska; m. MELVIN SAILOR, February 14, 1907.
16. ii. LLOYD ALLEN JOYNT, b. April 23, 1887, Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska; d. May 11, 1973, Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska.
iii. CLARA HAZEL JOYNT, b. June 11, 1891, Otis, Washington County, Colorado; d. January 02, 1951, Grafton, Nebraska; m. CHARLES STUTZMAN, August 06, 1913, Geneva, Nebraska.
iv. VERNA LEO JOYNT, b. January 16, 1893, Otis, Washington County, Colorado; d. May 14, 1972, Kearney, Nebraska; m. MILTON BLANKENBILLER, December 12, 1918, Roseland, Nebraska.
v. EMMET SYDNEY JOYNT, b. October 23, 1894, Otis, Washington County, Colorado; d. March 14, 1896, Holstein, Nebraska.
17. vi. ORVILLE WHITEHURST JOYNT, b. January 11, 1898, Holstein, Nebraska; d. November 19, 1957, Redcloud, Nebraska.
vii. CLEVE VINCENT JOYNT, b. September 19, 1899, Holstein, Nebraska; d. November 29, 1969, Colorado Springs, Colorado; m. ESTHER HENDRICKSON, March 14, 1928, Holstein, Nebraska.
viii. FREDERICK LYNN JOYNT, b. August 11, 1903, Holstein, Nebraska; d. June 26, 1976, Kearney, Nebraska; m. LENA REICHART, September 27, 1927, Norman, Nebraska.
8. WILLIAM EDWIN3 JOYNT (FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born August 02, 1865 in Williamsville, Logan Co, Illinois, and died March 05, 1944 in St Paul, Nebraska. He married (1) MILLIE ANNE RATCLIFF. He married (2) SUSIE NITA RICHARDS May 28, 1890 in Roseland, Nebraska.
W.E. Joynt who has been a resident of St. Paul for the last thirty three years past away at St. Paul at 12:25 p.m. after an illness of only two days following a heart attack suffered the Friday previous. Mr. Joynt was formerly a merchant of St. Paul, coming from Adams county in 1911 and operating a general merchandise store. He operated a ranch near Burwell for two years and again entered business as a hardware store merchant here, retiring from active business about fifteen years ago.
William Edwin Joynt was born August 2 , 1865 at Williamsville, Logan county, Illionis and died March 5, 1944 at the age of 78 years 8 months and 2 days. In the year 1886 he came to Nebraska and lived in Adams county for a number of years, after he came to St. Paul in 1911. He was of a quiet retiring nature,a good husband and father, an will be missed by his family and friends.
C. Lee Joynt, St. Paul: J. Russell Joynt , Ingelwood, Calif.: Pvt. Donald Joynt , Camp Maxie, Texas: Mrs. Eleanor Mae Becker and Mrs. Clara Graus, St. Paul. One son William Edwin, died a number of years ago.
He also leaves two sisters, Mrs. Walter Hall of Latham, Ill. and Mrs. F. A. Boyd of Denver,XColo. and two brothers, F.S. Joynt, Holstein, Nebr. and J.D. Joynt, Decatur, Ill., also five grandsons and three granddaughters.
Funeral services will be held on wednesday afternoon, under the direction of McIntyre's Funeral Home, at the funeral home at 2:30, with Rev. V. R. Bell in charge. Burial will be in Elmwood cemetery.
The Phonograph extends condolences and sympathy to the bereaved realatives.
i. ANITA4 JOYNT, m. CHRIS U BITNER, August 25, 1915; d. Bef. 1940.
BITNER, MRS ANITA J: Home Economics Teacher; b Roseland, Neb; d of William Edwin JOYNT-Susie Richards; ed Hastings HS; Hastings Coll, BSc 1921; U of N, MSc 1931; Palladian; m Chris U Bitner Aug 25, 1915 St Paul (dec); s Chris U; 1921-22 tchr, 3rd grade, Hastings; 1922-27 tchr home economics, Stromsburg HS; 1927-30 tchr home economics, Columbus HS; 1930- tchr home economics, Jackson HS, Lincoln; supvr of student tchrs of home economics, U of N Coll of Agr; Neb Home Economics Assn, past state secy, past dist pres; Amer Home Economics Assn; Lincoln Tchrs Assn; NSTA; NEA; Neb Women's Ednl Assn; Neb St Vocational Edn Assn; OES, Loup City; Presby Ch; Rep; hobby, music; off Jackson High School; res 4925 Greenwood, Lincoln.
iii. AMELIA JOYNT, m. UNKNOWN COMBS.
vii. ELEANOR MAY JOYNT, m. UNKNOWN BECKER.
viii. CLARA JOYNT, m. UNKNOWN GRAUS.
ix. WILLIAM EDWIN JOYNT, d. Bef. 1944.
9. STEPHEN AUGUSTUS3 JOYNT (EDWIN AUGUSTUS2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born August 1860 in Macon Co, Illinois. He married SARAH CAROLINE HERRIOD.
i. HAZEL D4 JOYNT, b. December 1887.
ii. CHESTER W JOYNT, b. August 1889.
iii. MABEL D JOYNT, b. January 1891.
iv. RUSSELL D JOYNT, b. July 1895.
v. VIRGEL R JOYNT, b. November 1896.
vi. MARSHALL JOYNT, b. August 1898.
18. vii. RUTH LUCILLE JOYNT, b. June 11, 1900; d. June 17, 1970, Decatur, Macon, Illinois.
10. CHARLES WALTER3 JOYNT (AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born June 22, 1857 in Illinois, and died March 09, 1937 in Portland, Multnomah, Oregon. He married LUCETTE UNKNOWN Bef. January 27, 1920. She was born Abt. 1899 in Oregon, and died Aft. 1937.
Living in a hotel (which burned) Had been very ill and in the Hospital.
i. EMILY4 JOYNT, b. Aft. 1920.
11. IDA LILLIAN3 JOYNT (AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born October 23, 1859 in Illinois, and died March 03, 1935. She married (1) TAYLOR RHODES February 21, 1878 in McLean Co, Illinois. She married (2) J J STANTLEY Bef. 1906 in Illinois.
1892 & 1909 lived in Indianapolis, Indiana.
1915 & 1922 lived in Salt Lake City, Utah.
1935 lived in San Jose, California.
i. BABY4 RHODES, b. Bef. March 1880.
12. JOHN FARNEY3 JOYNT (AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born December 11, 1862 in Patoka, Illinois, and died December 25, 1923 in Chicago, Illinois. He married RUTH ROBINSON May 17, 1888 in Rock Island Co, Illinois, daughter of JOHN ROBERTSON and BARBARA BIRELEY. She was born December 02, 1871 in Castleton, Stark, Illinois, and died October 16, 1957 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois.
: The John F. Joint/John Joint listed in the Rock Island directory is my : great-grandfather John Farney Joynt (1862 Patoka, IL - 1923 Chicago, IL). : My great-grandparents, John F. Joynt and Ruth Robinson/Robertson met : while John lived at the 229 16th street address in Rock Island, IL. : This was a boarding house run by my gr-gr grandparents.
Worked in Alaska (Klondike) before marrying Ruth.
Lived at the boarding house run by Ruth's mother, Barbara.
Left home at an early age (father was very strict).
Named after his grandfather Draper who died just 5 days before he was born.
Cause of Death: railroad accident-thrown from running board and dragged 60 feet.
Lived in Chicago, in 1917.
Attended Essex Community Church at 7?th and Blackstone.
March 1910 lived at 501 E. 88th St.
For the 1883-1884 school year, Ruth attended 29 out of 177 school days and was promoted from 5th to 6th grade.
19. i. EVA MAY4 JOYNT, b. September 07, 1888, Rock Island, Illinois; d. November 30, 1986, Denver, Colorado.
ii. ALMA MOREE JOYNT, b. August 22, 1890, Beardstown, Illinois; d. March 17, 1983, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; m. HAROLD GRIFFIN ELDER; b. February 15, 1887, Sioux Falls, South Dakota; d. April 15, 1974, Chicago, Cook, Illinois.
20. iii. RUIL RUTH JOYNT, b. April 29, 1892, Beardstown, Illinois; d. September 04, 1969.
iv. GENEVIEVE VIOLA JOYNT, b. May 08, 1895, Beardstown, Illinois; d. 1978, Dunedin, Florida; m. THEODORE SYLVESTER SCHMILLEN, June 24, 1960, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; b. December 14, 1891; d. May 16, 1970, New Port Richey, Florida.
21. v. BARBARA HENRIETTA MURIEL JOYNT, b. March 31, 1906; d. August 28, 1971, Essex Fells, New Jersey.
22. vi. JOHN ROBERT JOYNT, b. January 03, 1912; d. December 13, 1988, Chicago, Cook, Illinois.
13. ALICE TERMINA3 JOYNT (AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born April 18, 1866 in Alma, Illinois, and died February 27, 1935 in Decatur, Illinois. She married WILLIAM GEBHART November 12, 1885 in Macon County, Illinois (Source: Illinois Marriage Search Site.).
Living at home in 1880.
Funeral services conducted at Westminster Presbyterian Church.
Lived in Decatur since 1881.
Left money to Miliken University in her will.
Also left money to Eva M. and Alma A. Joynt, daughters of John Farney Joynt.
Lived in Champaign, Illinois in 1935. In 1967 lived at 1109 W. Washington, Champaign, Illinois..
14. WILLIAM LEWIS3 JOYNT (AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born April 09, 1876 in near Forsyth,Illinois, and died December 14, 1922 in Portland, Multnomah, Oregon. He married (1) CORA ETTA CLOGSTON. She was born August 31, 1879 in Kansas City, Missouri, and died October 01, 1916 in Aberdeem, Washington. He married (2) MAUDE M GODARD Bet. 1916 - 1922. She was born August 27, 1877 in Lincoln, Nebraska, and died July 02, 1948 in Portland, Multnomah, Oregon.
Living at home in 1880 -- age 4.
i. WILLIAM KEITH4 JOYNT, b. March 11, 1901, Washington; d. October 27, 1981, Lake Co, California.
ii. CECIL DALE JOYNT, b. March 08, 1905, Washington; d. June 03, 1948, Yolo Co, California.
1924-1930 Worked in Spring on a Wheat Ranch in Montana, summer worked on Railroad, Fall worked at the wheat ranch, winter went to Washington.
January 17, 1935 Staying at Stockton, California homeless shelter.
In 1934 worked 20 days for a farmer at $1/day and 1 1/2 months on railroad for $.25 per hour.
15. EVERETT E4 JOYNT (CHARLES EVAN3, EVAN2, EVAN DUNHAM1) died February 15, 1982 in Decatur, Illinois.
Everett E. Joynt, 90, of 165 S. Dennis Ave., former president and chairman of the board of Millikin National Bank, died 10 a.m. Monday (Feb. 15, 1982), in Decatur Memorial Hospital.
Funeral arrangements are incomplete at Dawson & Wikoff Funeral Home.
Mr. Joynt was born in Decatur, son of Charles Evan and Ora M. Joynt. He was president of Millikin National Bank from 1953 to 1966, chariman of the bank's board of directors from 1966 to 1971 and a former dierctor of Millikin Trust Co., He was former group president of the Illinois Bankers Association and two-time president of the Decatur Association of Commerce.
He was a member of First Baptist Church of Decatur, where he was treasurer for 50 years; Macon Lodge No. 8 AF&AM; Decatur Club; Macon Chapter RAM No. 21, and Kinghts Templar Beaumanoir No. 9. He married Maude C. Patterson in 1919. She died in 1975.
Surviving are his son, William E. of Cerro Gordo; daughter, Mrs Arnold (Helen Louise) DeWitt of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla; two grandchildren; one great-grand-child.
16. LLOYD ALLEN4 JOYNT (FREDERICK SYDNEY3, FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born April 23, 1887 in Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska, and died May 11, 1973 in Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska. He married JEANETTE ALWILDA BOONE November 13, 1913. She was born November 12, 1893.
i. FAYE AWILLAMINA5 JOYNT, b. 1915, Roseland, Roseland, Nebraska; m. (1) JAMES W HILL; b. 1923; d. 1944; m. (2) WALTER J HAYLMAN, 1937.
17. ORVILLE WHITEHURST4 JOYNT (FREDERICK SYDNEY3, FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born January 11, 1898 in Holstein, Nebraska, and died November 19, 1957 in Redcloud, Nebraska. He married FLORENCE HELEN SPICKNALL January 26, 1921 in Hastings, Adams County, Nebraska. She was born November 06, 1899 in Rural Bladen, Nebraska.
i. ORVILLE DALE5 JOYNT, b. February 02, 1922.
ii. DARRELL RUSSELL JOYNT, b. May 28, 1926.
iii. IVAN EUGENE JOYNT, b. March 25, 1933.
18. RUTH LUCILLE4 JOYNT (STEPHEN AUGUSTUS3, EDWIN AUGUSTUS2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born June 11, 1900, and died June 17, 1970 in Decatur, Macon, Illinois. She married EMERY HILL WARD August 22, 1918 in Decatur, Macon Co, Illinois. He died 1967.
i. VIRGIL EMERY5 WARD, b. April 27, 1921.
19. EVA MAY4 JOYNT (JOHN FARNEY3, AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born September 07, 1888 in Rock Island, Illinois, and died November 30, 1986 in Denver, Colorado. She married (1) ROLAND ROUSE March 23, 1910 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois. He died in Chicago, Cook, Illinois. She married (2) OSMER LOUIS WATERMAN January 06, 1923 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois, son of OSMER WATERMAN and LOUISA JOLISSAINT. He was born June 07, 1884 in Little Rock, Arkansas, and died September 18, 1954 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois.
Attended St. Albies when lived at 89th and Harper.
i. EVA MAY5 WATERMAN, b. October 04, 1926, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; m. REX F GREGORY, November 10, 1956, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; b. January 13, 1929, Memphis, Tennessee.
Attended Gustavus Adolphus Lutheran Church 7426 Drexel.
20. RUIL RUTH4 JOYNT (JOHN FARNEY3, AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born April 29, 1892 in Beardstown, Illinois, and died September 04, 1969. She married NICHOLAS J MILLER August 18, 1914 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois. He was born July 09, 1891, and died September 12, 1984 in Palatine, Illinois.
i. RUTH EVELYN5 MILLER, b. August 29, 1917, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; d. May 29, 1992, Newbury Park, California; m. (1) FRED LLOYD MINIFIE, May 18, 1937, Crown Point, Indiana; b. August 06, 1915, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; d. January 28, 1958, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; m. (2) FRANK GRIFFIN, July 18, 1959, Fords, New Jersey; b. February 22, 1915, Chicago, Cook, Illinois; d. September 16, 1962, Palatine, Illinois.
21. BARBARA HENRIETTA MURIEL4 JOYNT (JOHN FARNEY3, AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born March 31, 1906, and died August 28, 1971 in Essex Fells, New Jersey. She married JAMES MOLDEN BOLLINGER November 15, 1924. He was born February 18, 1903, and died June 25, 1971 in Essex Fells, New Jersey.
i. MURIEL ELAINE5 BOLLINGER, b. October 02, 1937, Indianapolis, Indiana; Adopted child; m. JACK WINDOLF; b. September 24, 1937.
22. JOHN ROBERT4 JOYNT (JOHN FARNEY3, AUGUSTUS HENRY2, EVAN DUNHAM1) was born January 03, 1912, and died December 13, 1988 in Chicago, Cook, Illinois. He married (1) ELSIE WATSON. She was born May 25, 1911. He married (2) MARJORIE MORLEY November 14, 1942.
i. JOHN ROBERT5 JOYNT,JR, b. January 04, 1932; m. JOE ANN GAY, January 25, 1952, Harvey, Illinois; b. January 15, 1934.
ii. HAROLD ALBERT JOYNT, b. February 28, 1935; d. April 30, 1949.

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