text:
Mr. Rufus W. Peckham and Mr. Wheeler H. Peckham for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. George F. Edmunds and Mr. Matthew Hale for the defendant in error.
Stanley recovered a judgment against the Board of Supervisors of the County of Albany, for taxes exacted and paid under legal process on shares of the stock of the National Albany Exchange Bank. A large number of the shareholders of the bank who had paid this tax made an assignment of their claims to him, and the judgment was for the sum of $61,991.20, with interest and costs.
The ground of this recovery was that the statute of New York, under which the shares were assessed, was void, because it did not permit the shareholder to make deduction of the amount of his debts from the valuation of his shares of stock, in ascertaining the amount for which they should be taxed.
The pleadings in the case set out the sums paid by the stockholders and their names, and their assignment to Stanley, the payment under compulsion of legal process, and a demand for the repayment on the Albany County authorities.
'First, That the allegations of the complaint in regard to the citizenship of the plaintiff, the citizenship and powers and liabilities of the defendant, the organization and capital of the National Albany Exchange Bank, the ownership of the shares of capital stock of the National Albany Exchange Bank, the assessment of the stockholders in said bank, named in said complaint, by the board of assessors of the city of Albany, the names and residences of said stockholders, the collection of taxes from said stockholders, and the payment of the same to the county treasurer of the county of Albany, and the demand made by Chauncey P. Williams, before the commencement of this action of the treasurer of the county of Albany, are true as therein set forth.
'Third, That the sums above named were not paid voluntarily by said stockholders, but were forcibly collected by the marshal of the city of Albany, under a warrant issued to such marshal by the receiver of taxes of said city, pursuant to a warrant issued to said receiver of taxes by the board of supervisors of the county of Albany, by levying upon the property of the said stockholders respectively, as alleged in said complaint.
'Fourth, That the said assessments were made and said amounts collected and received by the treasurer of the county of Albany, as above stated, under color of an act of the legislature of the State of New York, entitled 'An Act authorizing the taxation of stockholders of banks, and surplus funds of savings banks,' passed April 23, 1866, being chapter 761 of the laws of 1866, and not otherwise.
'Fifth, That the allegations of the complaint with reference to the assignments by the respective stockholders of said bank of their claims against the county of Albany, by reason of the matters alleged in the said complaint, are true as set forth in said complaint, and that the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of this action, was the holder and owner of all claims against the county of Albany, or against the defendant, arising out of the matters alleged and set forth in said complaint.
'Sixth, That the said act of the legislature of the State of New York, chapter 761 of the laws of 1866, did not permit the deduction of debts owing by the owners of stock in banks or banking associations, in the assessment thereof for taxation, although such deduction of debts of the owner was, at the time of the assessments alleged in the said complaint, permitted and required by the laws of the State of New York to be made from the value of every kind of personal property and moneyed capital, other than bank stock, in assessing the same for the purpose of taxation.
It does not appear by this finding of the court that any shareholder, for whose payment of taxes this suit is brought, made affidavit or other application in regard to his indebtedness, that it might be deducted from his assessment, or that he owed anything to be deducted from the assessed value of his shares, except the seventh finding of facts in regard to C. P. Williams.
Unless, therefore, the other shareholders who paid the tax on the shares of their stock were entitled to recover back the sum paid without any evidence that they had made affidavit of the amount which they would be entitled to deduct from the assessment of their shares, if the same rule had been applied to assessment of bank shares as to other personal property, and without any evidence that they owed anything whatever to be deducted from any assessment of their personal property, including bank shares, the judgment in this case cannot be supported.
The judge who decided the case on the circuit found as a conclusion of law that the assessment of all shares of national banks was void, because the statute of New York, under which the assessments were necessarily made, was void, as being in conflict with the act of Congress on that subject, and he declares, in an opinion delivered in the case of The National Albany Exchange Bank v. Hills, Receiver of Taxes, in a chancery suit, that the assessments in this class of cases are absolutely void, the assessors having acted without any jurisdiction.
If this view of the subject be sound,if the officers who assessed and collected this tax were utterly without authority to collect any tax whatever, or, if there was no law by which in any case they could assess and collect a tax on shares of national banks,then it is of no consequence to inquire of anything beyond the fact that plaintiff's assignors did pay such a tax under legal compulsion.
On the other hand, if the law is for any porpose a valid law, and if it can be held to furnish the rule of taxation as to any class of owners of national bank shares, then the onus is on plaintiff to show that his assignors are not of that class.
The question here to be decided arises under two statutes of the State of New York in regard to taxation.
The first of these is the act of 1850, relating to the assessment and collection of taxes in the city of Albany. The sixth section of the act requires the board of assessors to prepare an assessment-roll, in which there shall be set opposite the name of each taxpayer, (1) All his real estate liable to taxation and its value; (2) The full value of all his personal property after deducting the just debts owing by him.
In the case of People v. Dolan (36 N. Y. 59), the question was whether, taking these two statutes together, an owner of shares of stock in a national bank was entitled to deduct from the assessed value of his shares the just debts owing by him. It was argued that into this act of 1866 for the taxation of bank shares there should enter, as part of it, the provision of the act of 1850 which allowed this deduction as to all personal property, and that nothing in the act of 1866 forbade this or was inconsistent with it. It was also insisted that unless the act of 1866 was so construed it would violate the act of Congress which only permitted the shares of national banks to be taxed at the same rate as other money capital of the citizens of the State.
But the Court of Appeals overruled both propositions, and held that the true meaning of the act of 1866 was that no such deduction should be made, and that as thus construed it was not in conflict with the act of Congress on that subject.
In a subsequent case, Williams, a shareholder in the National Albany Exchange Bank, made the affidavit required by sect. 9 of the act of 1850, and presenting it to the board of assessors of the county, demanded a reduction in accordance with it, from the valuation of his bank shares. On the refusal of the assessors to comply with this request, a proceeding was commenced in the courts of the State, in which the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principles of the case of People v. Dolan. That case coming into this court by writ of error, it was here held that while we were bound to accept the decision of the highest court of the State in construction of its own statute the act of 1866 as thus construed was in that particular in conflict with the act of Congress, because it did tax shares of the national banks at a higher rate than other moneyed capital in the State. It is reported in 100 U. S. 539, and there are no words which declare the act of 1866 to be void, but the careful language of the decision is, that 'in refusing to plaintiff the same deduction for debts due by him from his shares of national bank stock that it allows to others who have moneyed capital otherwise invested, it is in conflict with the act of Congress.' p. 546.
Accepting, therefore, as we must, the act of 1866, as construed by the Court of Appeals of New York, as not authorizing any deduction for debts by a shareholder of a national bank, is it for that reason absolutely void? This cannot be true in its full sense, for there is no reason why it should not remain the law as to banks or banking associations organized under the laws of the State, or as to private bankers, of which there no doubt exists a large number of both classes.
What is there to render it void as to a shareholder in a national bank, who owes no debts which he can deduct from the assessed value of his shares? The denial of this right does not affect him. He pays the same amount of tax that he would if the law gave him the right of deduction. He would be in no better condition if the law expressly authorized him to make the deduction. What legal interest has he in a question which only affects others? Why should he invoke the protection of the act of Congress in a case where he has no rights to protect? Is a court to sit and decide abstract questions of law in which the parties before it show no interest, and which, if decided either way, affect no right of theirs?
It would seem that if the act remains a valid rule of assessment for shares of State banks, and for individual bankers, it should also remain the rule for shareholders of national banks who have no debts to deduct, and who could not, therefore, deduct anything if the statute conformed to the requirements of the act of Congress.
It is very difficult to conceive why the act of the legislature should be held void any further than when it affects some right conferred by the act of Congress. If no such right exists, the delicate duty of declaring by this court that an act of State legislation is void, is an assumption of authority uncalled for by the merits of the case, and unnecessary to the assertion of the rights of any party to the suit.
The general proposition must be conceded, that in a statute which contains invalid or unconstitutional provisions, that which is unaffected by these provisions, or which can stand without them, must remain. If the valid and invalid are capable of separation, only the latter are to be disregarded.
In Railroad Companies v. Schutte (103 U. S. 118), decided at the last term, this point was pressed upon us with much earnestness, and its decision was necessary to the judgment of the court. 'It is contended,' said the court, 'that as the provision of the act in respect to the execution and exchange of the State bonds is unconstitutional, the one in relation to the statutory lien on the property of the company is also void and must fall. We do not so understand the law.' And yet this was a case in which the scheme of exchanging the bonds of the State for the bonds of the company, in order that the company might get the benefit of the better credit of the State, was accompanied by a mortgage created alone by the statute in favor of the State as her security; and the court, while holding that the exchange of bonds was void, as being in conflict with the Constitution of the State of Florida, held that the mortagage which secured the bonds of the company, and which was only a mortgage by operation of the same statute, was valid.
This court, in the two cases cited in the brief, United States v. Reese (92 id. 214) and Trade-Mark Cases (100 id. 82), concedes the general principle that the whole of a statute is not necessarily void because a part of it may be so. Said the court in the latter case: 'While it may be true that when one part of the statute is valid and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and void, the court may enforce the valid part where they are distinctly separable, so that each may stand alone, it is not within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear.' The first case also implies that there may be unconstitutional provisions which do not vitiate the whole statute or even a single section, because the argument is to show that in that case there could be no separation of the good from the bad. It is also to be observed that in both these cases it was a statute creating and punishing offences criminally which was to be construed in regard to the limited constitutional power of Congress in criminal matters.
Case of the State Freight Tax (15 Wall. 232) arose out of a statute of Pennsylvania which attempted to impose a tax on commerce forbidden by the Constitution of the United States. The act imposed a tax upon every ton of freight carried by every railroad company, steamboat company, and canal company doing business within the State. The railroad companies, who contested the tax, presented a statement which separated the freight transported by them between points solely within the State and limited to such destination, and that which was received from or carried beyond those limits. This court held the latter to be void as a tax on inter-state commerce, and did not declare the whole tax or the whole statute void. It said: 'It is not the purpose of the law, but its effect, which we are now considering. Nor is it at all material that the tax is levied upon all freight, as well that which is wholly internal as that embarked in inter-state commerce. . . . The conclusion of the whole is that, in our opinion, the act of the legislature of Pennsylvania of Aug. 25, 1864, so far as it applies to articles carried through the State, or articles taken up in the State and carried out of it, or articles taken up without the State and brought into it, is unconstitutional and void.' The same language is repeated in Erie Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania (id. 282), decided at the same time. Both cases were remanded to the State court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion, which could only mean to enforce the tax on transportation limited to the State and not on inter-state commerce.
This is a clear case of distinguishing between the articles protected by the Constitution of the United States and those which were not, though nothing in the language of the statute authorized any such distinction.
But in a review of the cases in this court on this subject, Austin v. The Aldermen (7 Wall. 694) will be found most nearly to resemble the one before us. It related to the same matter of the invalidity of a statute of a State taxing shares of the national banks as being in conflict with the act of Congress. That act said that such taxes might be assessed at the place where said bank was located, and not elsewhere.
The statute directed the assessment and taxation of the shares at the place where the owner resided. Austin, having contested the tax on his shares in the courts of the State unsuccessfully, brought the case here by writ of error. This court declined to enter upon the question of the validity of the statute, because the case did not show that he was taxed on his shares in any other place than that where he bank was located.
The argument of counsel in the case before us is that any tax, or a tax on any person on account of his bank shares, is void because the whole of the New York statute is void. If the argument is sound, it was equally applicable to Austin's case, in which the statute, which made no limitation of taxation to the place where he bank was located, must have been held void under any principle which would wholly invalidate the statute of New York, because the latter did not allow the deduction of the owner's indebtedness from his shares. And if in that case the Massachusetts statute was utterly void as to national bank shares, then the tax on Austin's shares in Boston was void, and he had a right to be protected against the unconstitutional statute. The court evidently went upon the principle that the statute was only void as against the act of Congress, in cases where some one was injured by the particular matter in which there was such conflict. The case seems to us directly in point.
To the same effect are the cases of People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46; Gordon v. Cornes, 47 id. 608; In the Matter, &c., Village of Middleton, 82 id. 196.
If we examine the statute before us on principle, we shall find but little reason to hold it to be wholly void as regards bank shares. If the statute stood alone, there is nothing in it in conflict with the act of Congress. It is only when we look to the other statute, which permits the deduction of debts from the entire value of personal property, that we discern the discrimination against bank shares. The act declares that bank shares shall be taxed according to their value, after deducting the real estate and other property on which the bank itself pays tax. This is eminently just. It provides for a mode of ascertaining their value, the officers who shall do it, and how the tax shall be collected. In all this the law is valid, except that it does not authorize a deduction for debts of the shareholder. This is a distinct and separable principle. When the shareholder has no debts to deduct, the law provides a mode of assessment for him, which is not in conflict with the act of Congress, and the law in that case can be held valid. Under the decision in Austin v. The Aldermen, it is valid as to him.
If he has debts to be deducted, the case of People v. Weaver (100 U. S. 539) shows that in taking the steps which this court has held he may take, he can secure that deduction, and when secured the rest of the law remains valid. In other words, in such a case, so much of the law as conflicts with the act of Congress in the given case is held invalid, and that part of the State law which is in accord with the act of Congress is held to be the measure of his liability. There is no difficulty here in drawing the line between those cases to which the statute does not apply and to those to which it does, between the cases in which it violates the act of Congress and those in which it does not. There is, therefore, no necessity of holding the statute void as to all taxation of national bank shares, when the cases in which it is invalid can be readily ascertained on presentation of the facts.
It follows that the assessors were not without authority to assess national bank shares; that where no debts of the owners existed to be deducted the assessment was valid, and the tax paid under it a valid tax. That in cases where there did exist such indebtedness, which ought to be deducted, the assessment was voidable but not void. The assessing officers acted within their authority in such cases until they were notified in some proper manner that the shareholder owed just debts which he was entitled to have deducted.
If they then proceeded in disregard of the act of Congress, the assessment was erroneous, and the case of People v. Weaver (supra) shows how that error could be corrected.
The case before us shows no error in any case but that of Williams, and in that case he has obtained the judicial decision of this court, that the tax he paid was illegally exacted from him. Nor do the facts of his case raise the question whether in a case where the debts of the shareholder do not equal the assessors' value of his shares, the tax is wholly erroneous, or only so much as represent the assessment of his indebtedness that should have been deducted, for his affidavit was that his debts equalled the value of his bank shares. Nor do the findings of fact raise the question whether, without making affidavit and demand on the assessors, a suit can be maintained to recover, when such indebtedness actually existed; for he did make affidavit and demand, and no other taxpayer has shown any such notice or demand, or that he had any indebtedness to be deducted. There is neither finding of fact nor averment in the pleadings on either point as to any other assignors of plaintiff than Williams. It results from these considerations that the judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and that on the finding of facts judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff on the fourth count for the amount of the tax paid by Williams, with interest, and on all the other counts for defendants.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered, at a subsequent day of the term, the further opinion of the court.
Since the opinion in this case was delivered a suggestion has been made to modify the order of the court for judgment so far as to permit a trial in the Circuit Court on issues not decided by that court in the former trial.
The conclusions of law found by the Circuit Court, if sound, disposed of the whole case, and the facts found were sufficient to meet that view. As our opinion differed in one important point from that on which the Circuit Court acted, it became a question whether the facts found were still sufficient to dispose of the whole case.
In a bill of exceptions, signed by the judge and found in the record, it is said: 'There was evidence given in the case upon the subject of other allegations contained in the complaint, but the court did not pass upon such allegations, as the following admission and the decision of the court herein duly show.' Then follows a stipulation, signed by counsel or each party, that the case was decided solely upon the invalidity of the New York statute, and that other allegations contained in the complaint had not been passed on.
Under these circumstances we should have little difficulty in directing the court below to grant a new hearing as to such issues, if we could find in the record any material issue in regard to which the court made no finding.
If this is a sufficient allegation of a distinct ground of recovery, it seems just that the plaintiff should have a hearing on it, as the defendant took issue on it and it has not been disposed of.
We have, however, much difficulty in finding a solid ground of recovery in this statement. It is divisible into two parts: 1. That the shares of the national bank were assessed at a greater rate than was assessed on shares of a bank organized under the laws of the State of New York, located in said sixth ward.
We are quite clear that the shares of the plaintiff are not relieved from taxation because a single bank of the State has been favored by mistake or by intention.
For errors of this kind the statutes of New York provide the correction, which should be taken in time, and we should be very reluctant to hold that, when it has been shown that a single bank or a single individual has been taxed less than he should be, all other taxes, however just, are thereby invalidated.
If by this it is supposed that a few individual instances may be shown of partial assessments favoring citizens as compared with the national banks, we think it is erroneous. But if it is intended to allege that apart from the question of the right of the shareholder to deduct for his debtsa question which, in this case, was disposed of and was in issueit can be proved that the assessors habitually and intentionally, or by some rule prescribed by themselves, or by some one whom they were bound to obey, assessed the shares of the national banks higher in proportion to their actual value than other moneyed capital generally, then there is ground for recovery, and a hearing as to that should be granted.
As we have said, it may be well doubted if plaintiff intended to allege this, or to rely on proving it.
AETNA INS. CO. et al. v. HYDE, Superintendent of Insurance Department of Missouri.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF SHREVEPORT et al. v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION et al.
STANLEY EX'x, etc., v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF THE COUNTY OF ALBANY.
PEOPLE'S NATIONAL BANK OF LYNCHBURG, v. MORTON MARYE, Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Virginia.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. EDWARD P. BARKER, Theodore Sutro, and James L. Wells, Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City and County of New York.
JOHN E. HAMPTON et al., Appts., v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN, & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. AMOSKEAG SAVINGS BANK OF MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Plff. in Err., v. LAWSON PURDY and Others, Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York.
WILLIAM MARVIN, v. BELLE B. TROUT.
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK et al., Plffs. in Err., in Err., v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF BOYLE COUNTY, et al.

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Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. These records may include medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his or her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). According to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003).


According to opened case with CAK, the following step was token. Letter from Thearchy with rejection of imposed against will of the Gods Raixe&Airis fine of 402,24 EUR was sent to the top of Ministry of Justice (Ferdinand Grapperhaus).
We, the God and Goddess Raixe&Airis did send a “rejection letter” to ministry of health of the Netherlands (paul blokhuis) – copy of letter attached. cak institution did informed Us, that Our objection will be considered and that We will receive so-called “decision” about Our objection. It also informed Us, that “We must” pay fine for so-called “too late reaction on it letter”.
FIRST OF ALL, IT IS NOT UP TO ANYTHING TO DECIDE ABOUT OUR LOVE, HEALTH AND FREEDOM. WE ARE THE GOD AND GODDESS RAIXE&AIRIS AND WE ARE AUTONOMOUS/SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITIES, AND ONLY WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIGHER MENTORED; OUR PURE TRUE LOVE TO EACH OTHER, OUR INFINITE HEALTH, ABSOLUTE FREEDOM AND WELL BEING OF ALL OUR CREATIONS/CHILDREN IN VAST INFINITE SPACE – INNOCENT NATURE – THIS IS OUR LAW, THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF IMMORTAL CREATORS OF ALL LIFE.
Second of all, explanation of “too late” meaning: WE ARE THE GODS, the true Creators of all innocent Life. We do not exist in systematic counting of time. For Us, as example, 1 second can take 1 million years and one million years can take one second. Therefore, We reacting WHEN WE WANT – NOT WHEN SOME THING IS DICTATING TO US, BECAUSE WE ARE IMMORTAL SUPREME BEINGS, WHO DID CREATE TIME AS OUR CHILD, BUT WE OURSELVES EXIST OUT OF TIME.
Therefore We officially informing you, that ACCORDING TO OUR LAW (extraction from Supreme Constitution of Thearchy: “Article 7: Fundamental International/Worldwide/Universewide Rights and Freedoms of Supreme Deities Raixe&Airis” – Art.7§4 “Right on Infinite Health”, Art.7§5 “Right on Absolute Freedom”, Art.7§8.“Right on Supreme Sovereignty and Supreme Sovereign International Immunity”; Art.7§11 “Right on Endless Happiness, Joy, Peace and Euphoria”; Art.7§15 “Right on Absolute Justice”; Art.7§19 “International Protection from discrimination in accordance with all Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Gods Raixe&Airis”, – We are NOT ALLOWED to pay for any form of fines, insurances, donations, pharmaceutical drugs or any charges connected to taking away responsibility for OUR HEALTH.
OUR HEALTH BELONG TO US, AND ONLY WE HAVE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH THIS.
We sending to you this fine back and officially informing, that We will not agree to pay for this – NEVER, because for Us this is a form of violation on Our HEALTHY STATE OF MIND by enforcement of evil weapon called “stress”, and it is OUR DUTY TO PROTECT OUR MIND from it, as well as OUR SOURCE OF SOULS and OUR BODIES.
you have been officially informed.
This letter is worldwide published on official website of Thearchy – Government of the Gods Raixe&Airis.
In attachment is a copy of letter to ministry of health (paul blokhuis).
Second letter in respond on the fine of CAK was sent from Universal Court of the Gods Raixe&Airis UCO THE G-RA with criminal fine applied according to broken law of Supreme Constitution of the Gods Raixe&Airis.
Higher mentored institution DID VIOLATE ON LAW OF THEARCHY BY BREAKING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE GODS RAIXE&AIRIS which was established to PROTECT THEIR PURE LOVE to Each Other and to all Innocent Life.
IN DAY 28 March Year 4 (2019 – by time of satanism), Fundamental LAW OF Supreme Constitution of Thearchy, Article 7: “Fundamental International/Worldwide/Universewide Rights and Freedoms of Supreme Deities Raixe&Airis”, HAS BEEN BROKEN by sending letter with frightening to pay fine in amount € 402,24, after receiving warning in form of letter about rejection of health insurance by the God and Goddess Raixe&Airis.
In case of continue bothering Us by letters with frightening’s by fines or enforcing to register by health insurance company – the bothering side will take a consequences in form of financial penalty: 20.000 EUR, for treat on Our Health and consequences on energy/spiritual levels: “What goes around – comes around: nothing cannot avoid the destiny” – unavoidable FORCE OF OUR CHILD – NATURE will be applied.” – end of quote.
Thearchy has been imposed a criminal fine to dutch governmental institution called CAK, based on decision of Authorities of Thearchy – the God and Goddess Raixe&Airis for violation on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Gods Raixe&Airis (Supreme Constitution of Thearchy, Article 7: “Fundamental International/Worldwide/Universewide Rights and Freedoms of Supreme Deities Raixe&Airis”). The Universal Court of Rights “UCO The G-RA” collects this criminal fine on behalf of Thearchy. That is why CAK did receive this letter with a payment penalty instructions mentored lower.
Option nr.1: splits the total amount in 4 monthly transfers of € 5.000.
Option nr.2: splits the total amount in 20 monthly transfers of € 1.000.
with IBAN/International Bank Account Number: NL59BUNQ2205722549.
Payment can be established on any day of the month and since this day all forwards transfers must be credited at the same date as previous one.
In case, if fine will be not payed, and CAK will try to induce stress/violation on HEALTH of the Gods Raixe&Airis again, then CAK will receive second fine € 10.000 extra, so summary amount will rise up to € 30.000.
In case, if CAK will write an official letter to THEARCHY (official corresponding address: Lunenburg 17, 4385ER, Vlissingen, the Netherlands) with submission, that it will no longer try to harm/ bother The Gods Raixe&Airis and will dissolve enforcement of health insurance and any fines connected to this case, then UCO THE G-RA will cancel higher mentored APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL FINE.
In case if bothering the Gods will not stop (CAK will behave not peacefully), then case will be forwarded to the authority: Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands.
And, if this will not help to close the case peacefully, then; DESTINY and ELEMENTS OF NATURE/WEATHER – Creations/Children and Guardians of the Gods Raixe&Airis will TAKE OVER THE CASE, and consequences will be very heavy, as They already was in many cases of violence on the Gods Raixe&Airis IN THE RECENT PAST.
CAK HAVE BEEN CLEARLY INFORMED.


COOK BORDEN & COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMONWEALTH & others. SAME vs. SAME.
Commonwealth, Security for public work. Oath. Jurat. Contract, Construction. Sale, Construction of contract of sale.
A statement of claim with an unsigned form of jurat annexed, though actually sworn to before a notary public, was not a "sworn statement" under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 30, § 39.
Under a contract to sell exterior finish to a building contractor, which contract imported by reference specifications defining exterior finish as including siding, siding furnished by the seller was covered by the contract and was not an extra.
TWO PETITIONS, filed in the Superior Court on May 10, 1932.
The cases were referred to a master, whose reports were confirmed. By order of Hanify, J., the final decrees described in the opinion were entered. The petitioner appealed from both decrees.
residence at Westfield "according to [certain] plans and specifications." Subsequently "a contract was made on . . . [such] terms" and the petitioner furnished the materials called for. The petitioner "claimed to have furnished . . . as extras " siding in the sum of $595.08 and mirrors in the sum of $25.20. The respondents contended that these items came under the contract and that "siding was included under 'exterior wood finish.'" There were in evidence the "specifications for the general contract on the building," listing "Siding" under the heading "Exterior Wood Finish." The Testa and Scurto Engineering Company was indebted to the petitioner for "Contract price $1900," siding in the sum of $595.08, and mirrors in the sum of $25.20, "a total of $2520.28 less cash credits of $1800.00 leaving a balance due of $720.28 for which the Bonding Company is also responsible if, as a matter of law, the . . . [petitioner] filed a sufficient statement of its claim. If as a matter of law because of the terms of the contract between the . . . [petitioner and the Testa and Scurto Engineering Company, the petitioner] was bound thereunder to furnish siding, the last figure should be reduced by $595.08, leaving a balance of $125.20 due."
W. E. Crowther, for the petitioner, submitted a brief.
brought in, filed his report in the Superior Court. In each case an interlocutory decree was entered confirming the report.
In the first case the report discloses that the respondent Testa and Scurto Engineering Company (hereinafter called the respondent) made a contract with the Commonwealth through the department of public health for the construction of a superintendent's residence at Lakeville State Sanatorium, and furnished a bond with the respondent Consolidated Indemnity and Insurance Company (hereinafter called the insurance company) as surety, "conditioned upon the faithful performance by the general contractor of all the agreements, terms and conditions of said contract on its part to be kept and performed and also for the payment 'for all labor performed or furnished, and for all materials used in the carrying out of said contract.'" The respondent completed the work required by the contract and it was accepted by the department of public health on April 23, 1931. The Commonwealth has in its possession the sum of $12.63 due under the contract to the respondent. The petitioner furnished the respondent "materials which were actually used or consumed in the construction of said building." The amount chargeable for these materials was in dispute. The master found that the amount due was $1,085.72 or $938.81, depending on the question whether or not the petitioner under its contract with the respondent was required to furnish "siding" under its agreement that there should be "delivered at the job" all "Exterior Wood Finish."
or furnish labor or materials, and shall, within one year after the filing of such claim, file a petition in the superior court for the proper county to enforce his claim or intervene in a petition already filed; and the provisions of chapter two hundred and fifty-eight shall apply to such petitions."
The last delivery on the Lakeville job was made March 20, 1931. Within sixty days thereafter, on May 15, 1931, the petitioner filed with the Commonwealth, through the department of public health, on a form provided by said department, a statement of its claim for materials furnished. This statement was executed by the petitioner and was complete in every detail except that the certificate of oath thereto, although filled out in form, was not signed by any officer qualified to take oaths. This statement purported to cover materials furnished on both the Lakeville job and the Westfield job, which was the subject involved in the second case as will hereafter appear. Attached to the statement was a schedule of the alleged charges and credits on account of both the Lakeville and Westfield jobs. On May 23, 1931, the petitioner filed with the department of public health a statement, on the form provided by the department and duly sworn to, making claim for materials furnished on the Lakeville job for $1,098.92. No schedule accompanied this statement. The Commonwealth in its answer admitted the receipt of the sworn statement from the petitioner on May 15, 1931, and of a supplemental sworn statement on May 23, 1931. Evidence was received by the master to the effect that one Smith, treasurer of the petitioner, swore to the statement of May 15 before a notary public, and testimony was received from the notary public "that she took Mr. Smith's oath to the statement." On this evidence the master found "as a fact that Smith did swear to the statement in behalf of the petitioner and that she took his oath but did not sign the certificate through inadvertence."
for the construction of a superintendent's residence at Westfield State Sanatorium, and furnished a bond with the insurance company as surety in the sum of $17,000, instead of $17,325. The respondent's contract was completed, and the work accepted by the department of public health on June 10, 1931. The last delivery of materials on the Westfield job was made on April 6, 1931. The same evidence was received and the master found the same facts as in the first case; and, as there, the amount chargeable was in dispute between the parties. As in the first case, the master found a balance due of $720.28 if the petitioner was not bound to furnish "siding" under the contract to deliver all "Exterior Wood Finish," and that, if it was so bound, the figures should be reduced by $595.08 leaving a balance of $125.20 due.
its bond is indebted to the petitioner for said sums, and it is ordered that said Consolidated Indemnity and Insurance Company pay to the petitioner said sums of $125.20 and $11.92, together with costs in the sum of $32.70. 3. That the bill be dismissed as against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." In each case the petitioner appealed from the final decree to the Supreme Judicial Court.
In each case the petitioner filed with the department of public health a statement of its claim within sixty days of the last delivery of materials which were actually used in the construction of the residences at Lakeville and at Westfield. When the statement was filed on May 15, 1931, it had no certificate evidencing that the affidavit was properly made before an officer qualified to administer oaths. When a sworn statement was again filed by the petitioner covering both jobs on May 23, 1931, the statement had a proper and legal jurat attached to the affidavits or affidavit. In the first case more than sixty days had passed when the jurat was attached to the second sworn statement of claim. In the second case the last delivery of materials consumed in the erection of the Westfield residence was on April 6, 1931. It follows that the second sworn statement with the attached jurat was filed within sixty days and was a compliance with G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 30, § 39.
shall have a jurat attached." That sentence was expressive of the Common Understanding and general practice as to the meaning of the statute. Although G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 30, § 39, which governs the present proceeding, is not specified as a mechanics' lien statute, it is in substance the same in its mandate as the mechanics' lien statute and should be construed according to the same principles. Nash v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 335, 336. The mechanics' lien statute has always been construed somewhat strictly. Ellinwood v. Worcester, 154 Mass. 590. The sentence quoted from Jackman v. Gloucester, 143 Mass. 380, has undoubtedly been accepted in practice as the law of this Commonwealth by the profession and public. There are practical considerations of importance supporting that view. The sworn statement is designed in part to be the basis of action by others who are entitled to like relief and by public officers. To hold that there need be no jurat attached would open the door to fraud difficult to detect. There is nothing in the decision of Commonwealth v. Keefe, 7 Gray 332, adverse to this conclusion. The authorities in other jurisdictions are in conflict. A considerable number of decisions support the result here reached. [Note p180-1] There are numerous cases to the contrary. [Note p180-2] It would serve no useful purpose to review any of these decisions.
the claimant ceases to perform labor or furnish materials for the construction or repair of public buildings or other public works; and that said statute further requires that the sworn statement, when filed, shall have attached to it a certificate of the officer who administered the oath to the claimant. See Jackman v. Gloucester, 143 Mass. 380, 381. It follows that paragraph 1 of the final decree in the first case should be amended by striking out the words "to the date hereof, amounting to $89.86," and substituting in place thereof the following: to the date of the entry of the final decree after rescript. The decree as so modified is to be affirmed with costs.
The second case is free from any legal question arising from the fact that the first sworn statement of claim had no signed jurat when filed on May 15, 1931, because the second statement of claim filed on May 23, 1931, was signed by the notary within sixty days from April 6, 1931, the day of the last delivery on the Westfield job. The only question for decision remaining in the second case is whether or not the "siding" was within the contract of the petitioner to furnish all "Exterior Wood Finish." The petitioner's contention is that the agreement or terms of the contract were changed by mutual consent upon sufficient consideration. We think the reported facts found by the master do not sustain the contention of the petitioner in this regard, and that the ruling of the trial judge embodied in the final decree was warranted. The final decree is to be amended in paragraph 1 by striking out the words "to the date hereof, amounting to $11.92," and substituting therefor the words: to the date of the entry of the final decree after rescript; and in paragraph 2 by striking out the figures "$11.92," and substituting therefor the amount found due as interest in accordance with paragraph 1 of the decree as amended. As so modified the final decree is affirmed with costs.
[Note p180-1] In re Coleman & Titus Corp. 286 Fed. Rep. 303. Benedict v. Peters, 58 Ohio St. 527. Holmes v. Crooks, 56 Neb. 466. Hitsman v. Garrard, 1 Harr. 124. Hill v. Gilman, 39 N. H. 88. Reynolds v. Fitzpatrick 23 Mont. 52, 60. Bill v. Bament, 9 Dowl. Pr. Cas. 810. Inman v. Rae, 10 Manitoba, 411. Compare Clement v. Bullens, 159 Mass. 193; Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. 81 Fed. Rep. 439, 452; Meldrum v. United States, 151 Fed. Rep. 177, 182; Ladow v. Groom, 1 Denio, 429, 431; Sage v. Stafford, 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 449, 453.
[Note p180-2] People v. Block, 281 Ill. 227, 229. Cox v. Stern, 170 M. 442, 446. Doty & Co. v. Boyd, 46 S. C. 39. Capner v. Flemington Mining Co. 2 Green Ch. 467. Sage v. Stafford, 42 App. Div. (N.Y.) 449. Turner v. St. John, 8 N. D. 245, 260-261. James v. Logan, 82 Kans. 285. Farrow v. J. A. Hayes & Co. 51 Md. 498, 507. Beach v. Averett, 106 Ga. 73. Hyde v. Adams, 80 Ala 111, 113. Bittick v. State, 67 Ark. 131. Cusick's Election, 136 Penn. St. 459.


Can an unsuccessful qui tam False Claim Act (FCA) relator intervene in lawsuit later filed by the United States if the claims in the United States’ lawsuit mirror the allegations first made by the relator? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue and said no, rejecting a relator’s attempt to salvage an FCA recovery after the district court had previously dismissed his qui tam claims. See U.S. v. Sprint Comm. (Prather), --- F.3d ---, 2017 WL 1526316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017).
In 2009, relator John Prather filed a qui tam FCA lawsuit alleging that Sprint (and others) overcharged the United States for wiretapping services. United States ex rel. Prather v. ATT, et al., Case No. 09-cv-02457 (N.D. Ca.), ECF No. 1. The Government declined to intervene (Id. at ECF No. 15), and the district court ultimately dismissed relator’s claim, finding that he based his lawsuit on publicly disclosed information and did not qualify as an original source. Id. at ECF No. 159.
Relator appealed and in 2014, while that appeal was pending, the United States filed its own FCA lawsuit against Sprint. United States v. Sprint Comm., Case No. 14-cv-02457 (N.D. Ca.), ECF No. 1. Like the relator, the United States alleged that Sprint had overcharged the United States for wiretapping services. To his chagrin, the relator learned that the Assistant U.S. Attorney that filed the claim on behalf of the United States was actively involved in the investigation of his underlying action and the United States’ decision not to intervene in his qui tam case. Id. at ECF No. 191.
Relator then moved to intervene in the United States’ new FCA lawsuit, arguing that it amounted to an “alternate remedy” that the United States sought in lieu of intervening in his own lawsuit. Under this theory, relator argued that he should recover between 15% - 25% of the United States’ recovery—the same amount he could have recovered had the United States intervened in his qui tam. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (granting a relator the right to share in the recovery if the United States elects to pursue its claim through any “alternate remedy”). The district court denied relator’s motion to intervene because his own FCA lawsuit had already been dismissed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit zeroed in on whether the relator had the “significantly protectable interest” required to intervene under Rule 26. U.S. v. Sprint Comm. (Prather), --- F.3d ---, 2017 WL 1526316 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017). To make this call, the Court set out to determine whether the relator could have recovered had the United States intervened in his qui tam lawsuit. Id. at **4-5. If he could have recovered, then he had a protectable interest warranting intervention. Id. If he could not have recovered, the district court’s decision to deny intervention was correct. Id.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the relator could not have recovered in his qui tam lawsuit even if the United States had intervened. Id. at *7. Relying in large part on Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007), the court held that the pre-2010 public disclosure bar jurisdictionally barred by the relator's claim. Id. at *6. Under Rockwell, even if the United States had intervened in relator's lawsuit, that would not have cured the jurisdictional defect, and relator’s lawsuit “would have become an action brought by the Attorney General.” Id. Because the Ninth Circuit held that the relator could not have recovered even if the United States had intervened, he had no protectable financial interest in the United States’ subsequent suit that would warrant intervention.
In any future case where the defense can plausibly raise the public disclosure bar, Prather will empower the Government to wait and see how the public disclosure defense plays out before intervening. If the public disclosure bar applies, the Government can simply await dismissal and then file a new lawsuit with the same allegations. And the Government can do so safe in the knowledge that the new lawsuit will not be deemed an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, potentially entitling the relator to a portion of the recovery. Although Prather ultimately may have little impact to the FCA defense bar, it will certainly create issues for relators and the Government to consider when the Government weighs its intervention options.


Maurice D. L. Fuller, Jr., San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
C. A. Muecke, U. S. Atty., Tom Karas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before BARNES, MERRILL and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1291) from a sentence for bank robbery imposed on appellant after he was found guilty of such crime (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) by jury verdict.
We adopt, with slight additions, the statement of fact set forth by appellee.
"On January 26, 1960, a lone gunman entered the Valley National Bank located at 19th Street and E. McDowell Road, City of Phoenix, State of Arizona. This bank was a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the above mentioned date. The gunman, upon entering the bank went to the window of teller Maxine Todd, brandished a gun, and gave to her a green bag ordering her to place money in it. The teller being frightened, placed $4260 in the bag and relinquished the bag to the gunman. Maxine Todd gave a detailed description of the gunman following the robbery, and subsequently identified photographs of the gunman as being appellant. She picked appellant out of a lineup, and identified appellant as the gunman at time of trial.
As the gunman was leaving the bank, the teller pointed out the gunman to Robert E. Schmidt, the Assistant Manager, who was previously alerted by the alarm set off by Miss Todd. Mr. Schmidt followed the gunman and observed him entering a compact car, red in color. Mr. Schmidt immediately left the bank, hailed a passing automobile and requested that the automobile carrying the gunman be followed. This was done, and approximately six blocks from the bank the compact automobile turned into a market parking lot, followed by Mr. Schmidt. Mr. Schmidt observed the gunman, carrying a green bag, get out of the compact automobile, and saw him enter a 1959 or 1960 Pontiac or Oldsmobile which had three aerials. Mr. Schmidt gave a description of the gunman to investigators, identified him by photograph, picked the gunman (appellant) from a lineup, and identified appellant at the time of trial as being the gunman.
Investigation subsequent to the offense revealed that the compact automobile used by the gunman was stolen on the morning of July 26, 1960. This was the same automobile recovered at the market parking lot on the afternoon of the same day.
The initial lead identifying the gunman as appellant developed when investigators having knowledge of the three aerials on the 1959 or 1960 Pontiac or Oldsmobile vehicle, and a description of the gunman, examined records at the Motor Vehicle Division as to automobiles equipped with special radio equipment. Appellant had installed, prior to the offense, amateur radio equipment and aerials on his 1960 Pontiac.
Investigation further revealed that appellant was registered and stayed at a Phoenix Motel on the date of the offense, and was then in possession of his 1960 Pontiac. Immediately following the offense, appellant returned to Tucson where his home was situated, and there removed the radio equipment and aerials from his automobile. Appellant's assigned license plates were removed from his automobile and replaced with others. Five hundred dollars was given to his mother at this time.
On the morning of July 28, 1960, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was alerted at Las Vegas, Nevada concerning the whereabouts of appellant. A stake-out was made and the appellant was observed leaving a restaurant. At the sight of the agents, appellant broke into a run, and was ordered to stop. Appellant entered his 1960 Pontiac and left his parking space at a high rate of speed. Agent John T. Reilly, Jr. was in the street, and the automobile was driven straight at him. A shot was fired by Agent Reilly which entered the front windshield of appellant's automobile, causing appellant to stop the vehicle.
Examination and search of the vehicle produced, among other things, a blackjack, a gun and $2975 in cash. The holes which housed the antennae were masked over and painted to match the color of the automobile.
Following his arrest, appellant attempted to escape from the Las Vegas, Nevada city jail. The appellant denied the robbery at one time, denied that he had robbed any bank; and later stated that he would not admit or deny the robbery. At one point appellant admitted that the money in the trunk was part of the bank robbery. Appellant stated that eye witnesses can be mistaken, and further stated that the woman teller could also be mistaken. He was asked how he knew a woman teller had been robbed and he declined to answer."
On this statement of facts, undisputed by appellant, he urges upon us that the government's case is weak, particularly as to the identification of the defendant. We find no weakness in such evidence, either with respect to its proof of guilt, or with respect to the identification of appellant as the wrong-doer.
Because of this alleged "weakness," urges appellant, the other "error" complained of attains a higher status and is "more prejudicial" to the appellant.
This "other error" is that the trial judge impugned the motive and conduct of appellant's trial counsel1 "in the hearing of the jury."
The simple answer is that what the trial court said, to which appellant objects, was said outside the presence of the jury, while respective counsel, the court clerk and the appellant were "at the bench." (Tr. p. 847, line 14, et seq.) The trial judge specifically asked the questions and made the statements objected to after ruling in appellant's favor and asking appellant's counsel not to leave the bench. (Tr. p. 848, line 25.) After a further discussion, the record shows "the following proceedings were resumed in open court." (Tr. p. 849, line 17.) The question asked by appellant's counsel on cross-examination of the witness,2 to which objection had originally been made, and to which the court permitted an answer, was then asked by the court of the witness. It was a question which ordinarily would not be permitted.3 It was, in the court's discretion exercised in favor of appellant, permitted upon the theory of establishing the motive and credibility of the witness.
While appellant's counsel agrees that the record clearly shows all the so-called objectionable statements took place outside the hearing of the jury, it is urged that this may not be true, because defense counsel in moving for a mistrial stated (and in so doing misstated the record) that the court made the remark "upon counsel returning to counsel table," and that it was "heard by the jury," (Tr. p. 889) and that the court did not deny the factual situation described by appellant's trial counsel. Therefore, urges appellant, the jury might have heard. And might have thought his counsel's question improper. But not only did the court permit such question to be asked; he asked it of the witness himself. How this could "tarnish" counsel for appellant in the eyes of the jury is difficult to understand — we think it more likely it would enhance his stature in their eyes.
Even were we to assume (which we cannot) that the jury did hear the remarks made by the court and the questions asked, (and that any "error" which occurred was not dissipated by the trial court's instructions to disregard his comments or anything the jury might regard as an expression of his own attitude toward the case, the appellant, or counsel) we find no merit in defense counsel's attempt to compare and correlate what here occurred with the statements made by the trial judges in the four cases relied upon by appellant — Kraft v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 794; Lau Lee v. United States, 9 Cir., 1933, 67 F.2d 156; Withrow v. United States, 4 Cir., 1924, 1 F.2d 858; Allen v. United States, 9 Cir., 1902, 115 F. 3.
In Kraft, supra, counsel was admonished to "refrain from any such petifoggery."
In Lau Lee, supra, counsel was told by the trial judge: "* * * you are not to make statements that are untrue, and which should be known to be absolutely untrue by you. * * * [Y]ou concealed [from the jury] * * *." Of such language this court stated: "[I]n accusing the defendant's attorney of a deliberate and dishonest attempt to deceive the jury the trial judge went too far."
In Withrow, supra, the trial court said to counsel: "You had him [the witness] swear to a lie, or stuff that you knew was not true, when he swore to it."
In Allen, supra, the trial court in the presence of all jurors, before the jury was impaneled, corroborated, as a matter of personal knowledge, the statement of the district attorney that the wife of a witness had said that the defendant's attorney had tried to get her husband to give false testimony.
By no stretch of our imagination can we compare the facts presently before us with those outlined in the four cases cited above.
"General language may be found in a few cases seemingly holding that any punishment or severe rebuke of counsel in the presence of the jury is presumed to be prejudicial to his client. We are unable to take that view. * * *" (Emphasis added.) See also Billeci v. United States, 9 Cir., 1961, 290 F.2d 628, 629; Bush v. United States, 9 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 483, 487.
"* * * that the conduct complained of was intended or calculated to disparage the defendant in the eyes of the jury and to prevent the jury from exercising an impartial judgment upon the merits." Goldstein v. United States, 8 Cir., 1933, 63 F.2d 609, 613.
But even had the remarks made been prejudicial to appellant or his counsel (and we hold they were not), they were not heard by the jury, and thus could not be prejudicial. Cf.: Callahan v. United States, 10 Cir., 1929, 35 F.2d 633, distinguishing Allen v. United States, supra, and Grock v. United States, 1923, 53 App.D.C. 146, 289 F. 544.
We have carefully read the rather long trial transcript in this case. The trial judge gave appellant a fair trial. A jury found him guilty. He has been ably represented by appointed counsel on appeal.
Finding no error, we affirm the conviction.
The question: "Helen you have a boy, don't you, in federal prison?"
As the trial court later stated: "I think I would have been fully justified in sustaining the objection on the ground that you can't ask the witness an incriminating question, or one that would humiliate or degrade them. The question was entirely immaterial, but out of an abundance of caution I overruled the government's objection, and permitted her to answer the question."


§ 128-1 Certain connections prohibited.
§ 128-2 Notice to discontinue illegal connection.
§ 128-3 Violations and penalties.
§ 128-8 Responsibility for administration.
§ 128-12 Emergency suspension of storm drainage system access.
§ 128-13 Industrial or construction activity discharges.
§ 128-15 Notification of spills.
Editor's Note: This Article also superseded former Art. I, Connection of Runoff Sources to System, adopted 6-13-2001 STM by Art. 14.
No property owner shall allow roof downspouts, foundation drains, sump pumps, areaway drains, or any other sources of surface runoff or groundwater to be connected to a building sewer or other pipe which discharges to the municipal sewer system.
Any property owner found to be in violation of this article shall be given written notice by the Board of Sewer Commissioners requiring said property owner to provide proof of discontinuance of said illegal connection within 30 days thereafter, unless further extended by vote of the Board of Sewer Commissioners.
Failure to discontinue said illegal connection pursuant to said notice shall cause said property owner to be assessed a fine of $50 per day until the violation is shown to be removed and proven to be remedied. Said fine shall be added to the property owner's sewer usage bill and shall be subject to the interest and lien penalties of the usage bill.
Regulation of illicit connections and discharges to the municipal separate storm sewer system is necessary for the protection of the Town of Abington's natural resources, municipal facilities, and to safeguard the public health, safety, welfare and the environment.
Unless a different definition is indicated in other sections of this Bylaw, the following definitions and provisions shall apply throughout this Article, also referred to in this Article as this Bylaw.
An activity, procedure, restraint, or structural improvement that helps to reduce the quantity or improve the quality of storm water runoff.
The addition from any source of any pollutant or combination of pollutants into the municipal storm drain system or into the Wetland Resource Areas from any source.
A person or persons who discharge any pollutant or combination of pollutants into the municipal storm drain system or into the Wetland Resource Areas from any source.
The Town Manager, and Town employees and/or agents designated by the Town Manager to enforce this Bylaw.
Water beneath the surface of the ground.
A surface or subsurface drain or conveyance, which allows an illicit discharge into the municipal storm drain system, including without limitation sewage, process wastewater, or wash water and any connections from indoor drains, sinks, or toilets, regardless of whether said connection was previously allowed or approved before the effective date of this Bylaw.
Direct or indirect discharge to the municipal storm drain system that is not composed entirely of stormwater, except as exempted herein.
One of six Minimum Control Measures regulated under the Town's NPDES Phase II MS4 Permit. The federal regulation governing implementation of the IDDE program under this Permit is Section (b)(3) of 40 CFR 122.34, "Storm Water Phase II Regulations."
Any material or structure on or above the ground that prevents water infiltrating the underlying soil. Impervious surface includes without limitation roads, paved parking lots, sidewalks, and roof tops.
The system of conveyances designed or used for collecting or conveying stormwater, including any road with a drainage system, street, gutter, curb, inlet, piped storm drain, pumping facility, retention or detention basin, natural or man-made or altered drainage channel, reservoir, and other drainage structure that together comprise the storm drainage system owned or operated by the Town of Abington.
A permit issued by United States Environmental Protection Agency or jointly with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that authorizes and regulates the discharge of pollutants to waters of the United States.
A written notice given to a person by the Enforcement Authority that states that said person has violated this Bylaw on any specified occasion.
The process by which groundwater is replenished by precipitation through the percolation of runoff and surface water through the soil.
Any material, which because of its quantity, concentration, chemical, corrosive, flammable, reactive, toxic, infectious or radioactive characteristics, either separately or in combination with any substance or substances, constitutes a present or potential threat to human health, safety, welfare, or to the environment as defined under MGL Ch. 21C and Ch. 21E, and the regulations at 310 CMR 30.000 and 310 CMR 40.0000. Toxic or hazardous materials include any synthetic organic chemical, petroleum product, heavy metal, radioactive or infectious waste, acid and alkali, and any substance defined as Toxic or Hazardous under these laws and regulations.
A natural or man-made channel through which water flows or a stream of water, including a river, brook or underground stream.
All wetlands and watercourses protected under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act and the Abington Wetlands Protection Bylaw.
This Bylaw shall apply to flows entering the municipally owned storm drainage system, a watercourse, and any Wetland Resource Areas located within the boundaries of the Town of Abington.
This Bylaw is adopted under authority granted by the Home Rule Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution, the Home Rule statutes, and the regulations of the federal Clean Water Act found at 40 CFR 122.34.
The Enforcement Authority shall administer, implement and enforce this Bylaw. Any powers granted to or duties imposed upon the Enforcement Authority may be delegated in writing by the Enforcement Authority to employees or agents of the Enforcement Authority, including other Town officials and employees.
The Enforcement Authority may promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of this Bylaw. Failure by the Enforcement Authority to promulgate such rules and regulations shall not have the effect of suspending or invalidating this Bylaw.
Illicit discharges. No person shall dump, discharge, cause or allow to be discharged any pollutant or non-stormwater discharge into the municipal separate storm sewer system (MS4), into a watercourse, or into the Wetland Resource Areas.
Illicit connections. No person shall construct, use, allow, maintain or continue any illicit connection to the municipal storm drain system, regardless of whether the connection was permissible under applicable law, regulation or custom at the time of connection.
Obstruction of municipal storm drain system (MS4). No Person shall obstruct or interfere with the normal flow of stormwater into or out of the MS4 without prior consent from the Enforcement Authority. No person shall dump or dispose of yard waste (leaves, grass clippings, etc.) into the MS4, or into open watercourses (swales, brooks and streams).
Drains. No one shall tie any pump, cellar, yard, roof or area drain directly into the storm water drainage system without approval from the Enforcement Authority.
Catch basins. No Person shall directly or indirectly dump, discharge or cause or allow to be discharged into any catchbasin, any solid waste, construction debris, paint or paint product, antifreeze, hazardous waste, oil, gasoline, grease and all other automotive and petroleum products, solvents and degreasers, drain cleaners, commercial and household cleaners, soap, detergent, ammonia, food and food waste, grease or yard waste, animal feces, dirt, sand, gravel or other pollutant. Any Person determined by the Applicable Authority to be responsible for the discharge of any of the above substances to a catchbasin may be held responsible for cleaning the catchbasin and any other portions of the storm water system impacted according to Town standards and requirements or paying the cost for such cleaning. In addition, the Person shall be responsible for paying any penalties assessed by the Town pursuant to this Bylaw.
Septage. No Person shall discharge or cause or allow to be discharged any septage, or septage tank or cesspool overflow into the Town's storm water drainage system.
Storage and disposal of hazardous material. No one shall dispose of anything other than clear water into the Town's storm drainage system. The disposal of waste, gasoline or any other hazardous material into the storm drainage system is strictly prohibited and is in violation of state and federal pollution laws.
Private drainage systems. It is prohibited for anyone with a private drainage system from tying into the municipal storm drainage system without written approval from the Enforcement Authority. The maintenance of any and all private drainage systems shall be the responsibility of the owners.
Discharges or flows resulting from fire fighting activities or other authorized hydrant use are exempt.
Discharge for which advanced written approval is received from the Enforcement Authority as necessary to protect the public interest.
The Enforcement Authority may suspend municipal storm drain system access to any person or property without prior written notice when such suspension is necessary to stop an actual or threatened discharge of pollutants that presents imminent risk of harm to the public health, safety, welfare or the environment. In the event any person fails to comply with an emergency suspension order, the Enforcement Authority may take all reasonable steps to prevent or minimize harm to the public health, safety, welfare or the environment.
A person commits an offense if the person reinstates MS4 access to premises terminated pursuant to this Bylaw, without the prior written approval of the Enforcement Authority.
NPDES stormwater permit. Any person subject to an industrial or construction activity NPDES storm water discharge permit shall comply with all provisions of such permit. Proof of compliance with said permit may be required in a form acceptable to the Enforcement Authority prior to the allowing of discharges to the MS4.
Monitoring of discharges. Upon notice of an alleged illicit discharge or connection, the Enforcement Authority have the right to investigate any facility that has storm water discharges associated with industrial activity, including construction activity. The exercise of this right does not constitute a replacement or substitution for enforcement by federal or state agencies for facilities that are adequately regulated either under a NPDES permit or, if a violation is determined to have occurred, under 310 CMR 40.00, the Massachusetts Contingency Plan.
Every person owning property through which a watercourse passes, or such person's lessee, shall keep and maintain that part of the watercourse within the property free of trash, debris, and other obstacles that would pollute, contaminate, or significantly retard the flow of water through the watercourse. In addition, the owner or lessee shall maintain existing privately owned structures within or adjacent to a watercourse so that such structures will not become a hazard to the use, function, or physical integrity of the watercourse.
Failure by the property owner to maintain the watercourse does not constitute an obligation on the part of the Town to assume this responsibility.
Notwithstanding other requirements of local, state or federal law, as soon as a person responsible for a facility or operation, or responsible for emergency response for a facility or operation has information of or suspects a release of materials at that facility or operation resulting in or which may result in discharge of pollutants to the municipal drainage system or Wetland Resource Areas, the person shall take all necessary steps to ensure containment, and cleanup of the release. In the event of a release of oil or hazardous materials, the person shall immediately notify the municipal fire and police departments. In the event of a release of non-hazardous material, the reporting person shall notify the Enforcement Authority no later than the next business day. The reporting person shall provide to the Enforcement Authority written confirmation of all telephone, facsimile or in-person notifications within three business days thereafter. If the discharge of prohibited materials is from a commercial or industrial facility, the facility owner or operator of the facility shall retain on-site a written record of the discharge and the actions taken to prevent its recurrence. Such records shall be retained for at least three years.
The Enforcement Authority or an authorized agent of the Enforcement Authority shall enforce this Bylaw, regulations, orders, violation notices, and enforcement orders, and may pursue all civil and criminal remedies for such violations.
Entry to perform duties. To the extent permitted by state law, or if authorized by the owner or other party in control of the property, the Enforcement Authority may enter upon privately owned property for the purpose of performing their duties under these regulations and may make or cause to be made such examinations, surveys or sampling as the Enforcement Authority deems reasonably necessary.
Civil relief. If a person violates the provisions of this Bylaw, regulations, written approval, notice, or order issued thereunder, the Enforcement Authority may seek injunctive relief in a court of competent jurisdiction restraining the person from activities which would create further violations or compelling the person to perform abatement or remediation of the violation.
Implementation of source control or treatment BMPs.
If the enforcing person determines that abatement or remediation of contamination is required, the order shall set forth a deadline by which such abatement or remediation must be completed. Said order shall further advise that, should the violator or property owner fail to abate or perform remediation within the specified deadline, the Town may, at its option, undertake such work, and expenses thereof shall be charged to the violator.
Within 30 days after completing all measures necessary to abate the violation or to perform remediation, the violator and the property owner will be notified, in writing, of the costs incurred by the Town, including administrative costs, for which payment is due to the Town. The violator or property owner may file a written protest objecting to the amount or basis of costs with the Enforcement Authority within 30 days of the Town's issuance of the notification of the costs incurred. Payment of the Town's costs is due within 30 days of the issuance of the notification, or if a protest is filed, within 30 days following a decision of the Enforcement Authority affirming or reducing the costs, whichever is later. Pursuant to MGL Ch. 40, § 58, the Town is hereby authorized to impose and record a municipal charges lien on the property for any costs that have not been paid to the Town by the applicable due date, and unpaid charges shall be added to the tax on the property, in the manner provided in said statute.
Criminal penalty. Any person who violates any provision of this Bylaw, regulation, order or written approval issued thereunder, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $300 per violation. Each day or part thereof that such violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.
Non-criminal disposition. As an alternative to criminal prosecution or civil action, the Town may elect to utilize the non-criminal disposition procedure set forth in MGL Ch. 40, § 21D in which case the Enforcement Authority shall be the enforcing person. For non-criminal disposition, the penalty for the first violation shall be $100, the penalty for the second violation shall be $200, and the penalty for the third and subsequent violations shall be $300. Each day or part thereof that such violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.
Appeals. The decisions or orders of the Enforcement Authority shall be final. Further relief shall be to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Property owners shall have 90 days from the effective date of the Bylaw to comply with its provisions provided good cause is shown for the failure to comply with the Bylaw during that period.


In the Matter of 1976 PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE NEW MEXICO LICENSE NO. BNE-532 VIN: 4762900200 The STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott JACOBSEN, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CIV 4936.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Pima County, Cause No. 202511, William E. Druke, J.
Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty. by Michael P. Callahan, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for plaintiff/appellee.
Scott Jacobsen, in pro. per.
This appeal is from a February 11, 1983, judgment to retain a 1976 Porsche automobile as a result of forfeiture proceedings filed under A.R.S. § 13-3409(A)(3).
The facts show that appellant was allegedly involved in two drug transactions in Pima County in May 1982. The Porsche automobile was allegedly used by appellant to transport the narcotics in Tucson on those dates. Appellant was not arrested following the transactions, but rather he returned to New Mexico while negotiations for larger transactions ensued. Tucson police officers and appellant arranged a sale of $1,000 worth of methamphetamines, the sale being consummated on May 25, 1982, in Albuquerque. At this point, a laboratory for the manufacture of narcotics was seized, appellant and others were arrested and federal narcotics prosecutions were instituted. The vehicle in question was seized on June 14, 1982, in Albuquerque by the Albuquerque Police Department at the request of the Tucson Police Department, and was delivered to the Tucson Police Department. Forfeiture proceedings were instituted two days later when an order was issued by Pima County Superior Court Judge William Sherrill authorizing the retention of the automobile. Pleadings were thereafter filed by the state and eventually responsive pleadings were filed by appellant, which were stricken as untimely. A default judgment was eventually entered along with the judgment to retain the vehicle.
Preliminarily, the state has argued that appellant was correctly denied relief below since he failed to timely raise his challenge to the proceedings, citing In the Matter of 1969 Ford Truck I.D. No. E14AHD34733, License No. 2 CB-870, 122 Ariz. 442, 595 P.2d 674 (App. 1979). However, in that case, the appellant was advancing an illegal search and seizure argument in the motion to suppress and was therefore bound by the 20-day requirement of Rule 16.1(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Here, appellant has challenged the jurisdiction of the court to conduct the forfeiture proceeding. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and is not subject to the 20-day limitation of Rule 16.1(b).
(1st Cir. 1931). However, courts are divided as to whether an illegal or unauthorized seizure precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction.
(W.D.Pa. 1938); cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S.Ct. 305, 77 L.Ed. 641 (1933) (recognizing this principle, but finding it inapplicable where beyond the territorial limits placed upon the government’s authority by treaty).
the National Prohibition Act. The state officers were not authorized by the act to make the seizure. The court held that where the seizure was made by one having no authority to do so, the government could nevertheless adopt the seizure with the same effect as if it had been originally made by one duly authorized, reasoning that “the jurisdiction of the court was secured by the fact that the res was in the possession of the [party authorized to seize] when the libel was filed.” 272 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 192.
It has been pointed out that both Mr. Justice Holmes in Dodge v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Brandeis in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, supra, were apparently paraphrasing Mr. Justice Story’s opinion in The Caledonian, 4 Wheat (17 U.S.) 100, 103, 4 L.Ed. 523 (1819), for the proposition that a forfeiture proceeding “quite basically involves the in rem jurisdiction of a court of the United States and that it makes very little difference to any one how initial possession of the res was obtained, so long as the proceeding to enforce the forfeiture accords with due process.” United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two-Door, 250 F. Supp. 183, 186 (W.D.Mo. 1966). In the present case, appellant received notice of the proceedings and did eventually appear, and no due process argument is made.
(1924), and Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). See also People v. One 1951 Chevrolet 2-Door, 157 Cal.App.2d 301, 320 P.2d 881 (1958).
“If there was no legal seizure, then there could be no judgment of forfeiture. `The very foundation of forfeiture is a legal seizure; until this is had, no further proceedings are authorized.’ [Citations omitted]” 85 A. at 1061.
The cases are compiled in the annotation of 8 A.L.R.3d 473, under the lead case of Berkowitz v. U.S., 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965), which held that the government could not enforce a forfeiture of money and checks on the ground that the items had been used in violation of internal revenue laws, where the government had seized the property by an invasion of the constitutional rights of the person from whom the property had been seized incident to an unlawful arrest. The court, refusing to allow “the Governmental violators of the Constitution” to “enrich the Treasury by their defiance of fundamental liberties,” applied exclusionary rule reasoning referred to, but not followed, by Mr. Justice Holmes in Dodge v. United States, supra.
1. The seizure is incident to any arrest or any lawful search or seizure or an inspection under the administrative inspection warrant.
2. The seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of this state and the seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the property will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction of the state before a warrant can be obtained.
3. A peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety and that harm may occur before a warrant can be obtained.
It is clear that the property can only be seized pursuant to a court order, unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies, which is not the case here. Indeed, § 13-106(B)(1) contemplates a seizure pursuant to a lawful search or seizure. Since Arizona has aligned itself with those jurisdictions which authorize forfeiture proceedings only where the res is properly brought before the court, we also follow the cases which void the proceeding when the seizing authority has disregarded the statutory requirements for forfeiture. Therefore, the forfeiture order is vacated as having been entered without jurisdiction.
BIRDSALL, C.J., and HOWARD, J., concur.


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• In 1995, Ms. Chaitman was named one of the nation’s top ten litigators by the National Law Journal for a jury verdict she obtained in an accountants’ malpractice case.
• Ms. Chaitman is the author of The Law of Lender Liability (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1990) which has been updated annually since 1990.
• Since 1987, Ms. Chaitman has authored the monthly newsletter, The Lender Liability Law Report, which is subscribed to by law firms and financial institutions through the United States.
• Since early 2009, Ms. Chaitman has been an outspoken advocate for investors in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. She has lobbied in Congress, on a pro bono basis, for statutory changes to assure Madoff customers of the protections of the Securities Investor Protection Act. And she has testified twice before Congressional committees on issues affecting securities investors. See Ms. Chaitman’s testimony here.
Ms. Chaitman practices regularly in New York and New Jersey and has been admitted to practice pro haec vice in numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Ms. Chaitman represents approximately 1,600 Madoff customers. On December 9, 2009, Ms. Chaitman testified concerning the plight of Madoff customers before the House Financial Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises. She is litigating against Irving H. Picard, Trustee, on several different issues and filed over 250 claims against the Securities and Exchange Commission related to her clients’ Madoff losses.
Ms. Chaitman has handled all kinds of debtor/creditor litigation. She has asserted and defended RICO claims; she has defended banks in various lender liability actions; she has represented borrowers and guarantors in litigation against financial institutions.
Ms. Chaitman is not only the author of the leading treatise on lender liability, she coined the term “lender liability.” She has been involved in some of the seminal decisions defining the obligations of financial institutions, particularly in the area of good faith and fair dealing. She has written the monthly newsletter “The Lender Liability Law Report” since 1987, has advised numerous financial institutions concerning lender liability issues, and she has spoken at professional conferences on lender liability since the 1980s.
Ms. Chaitman has represented several corporate debtors in chapter 11 cases that were successfully reorganized. She has represented creditors in defending preference and fraudulent conveyance claims, including the defendants in 112 cases brought by the Madoff Trustee against victims of Madoff’s crimes. She has had extensive experience representing lenders and corporate borrowers in debt restructurings and workouts.
Ms. Chaitman has litigated malpractice cases against both accountants and lawyers. Indeed, the National Law Journal named her one of the nation’s top ten litigators in 1995 based upon a jury verdict she won in New York Supreme Court against an accounting firm on behalf of a client whose accountant embezzled funds. She also successfully litigated a legal malpractice case against Rogers & Wells.
Ms. Chaitman has extensive experience litigating RICO cases on behalf of creditors. She won a RICO judgment in the Eastern District of New York in a bench trial before the Honorable Jack Weinstein, which was affirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit. She successfully defended Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A. in a RICO action in the Southern District of New York.
Ms. Chaitman has done substantial litigation involving trusts and estates both in New York and New Jersey. In one instance, she was asked to try a case in New Jersey one week before the trial was scheduled to begin. The case was a suit by an executor to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash gifts given to the defendant in the last two years of the decedent’s life. During the course of the trial, the judge urged Ms. Chaitman to settle because he was convinced that the jury was against Ms. Chaitman’s client. The executor refused the generous settlement proposal offered by Ms. Chaitman’s client and she had no alternative but to proceed with the trial. The result: The verdict was in favor of Ms. Chaitman’s client. The jury found that the inter vivos gifts were not the result of undue influence. The jury verdict was affirmed on appeal.
• In Re In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, 773 F.3d 411, 422-23 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Ida Fishman Revocable Trust, 135 S. Ct. 2858 (June 22, 2015).
• Lawrence B. Seidman v. Spencer Savings Bank, S.L.A., No. A-3836-12T2 (App. Div. April 30, 2015.
• Norwood-JEB, L.L.C. v. North River Mews Associates, L.L.C., A. 1259, N.J. Super. A.D. 2013).
• Picard v. Greiff (In re Madoff Secs.), No. 12 MC 115 (JSR), 2012 WL 1505349 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012).
• Norwood-JEB, L.L.C. v. North River Mews Associates, L.L.C., 2009 WL 1010963 (N.J. Super. A.D.).
• McAninch v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 478 F. 3d 882, 2007 WL 655454 (8th Cir. 2007).
• Hunts Point Terminal Produce Cooperative Association v. New York City Economic Development Corporation, 36 A.D. 3d 234, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 59, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 08073 (2006).
• Levchuk v. Jovich, 2005 WL 2364826 (N.J. App. Div.).
• Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (SDNY 2002) Sinclair v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 274 (2001); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1438 (S.D.N.Y.).
• Logan & Kanawha Coal Company, Inc. v. Banque Francaise du Commerce, 1996 WL 551718 (SDNY).
• Sterling National Bank v. Longa, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13306 (S.D.N.Y.).
• Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 995 F. 2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1993.
• Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F. 2d 780 (2d Cir. 1991).
• Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 714 A. 2d 271 (N.J. 1998).
• Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer S&L Assn., 878 F. 2d 742 (3d Cir. 1989).
• International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc., 736 F. Supp 587 (D.N.J. 1990).
• In re Wedgewood Realty Group, Ltd., 878 F. 2d 693 (3d Cir. 1989).
• Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. 388, 565 A. 2d 1133 (N.J. App. Div. 1989).
• John Doe v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Ms. Chaitman is a member of the Character & Fitness Committee of the New York State Appellate Division - First Department. She served as the chair of the Commercial Financial Services Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association from 1994 to 1997. She is a member of the American Law Institute and served as an adviser on the Restatement (Third) of Restitution.
Contributing author of "Commercial Damages,” Matthew Bender, 1985.
Editor of "Emerging Theories of Lender Liability," Volumes I, II, III and IV, published by the American Bar Association, 1985-1987.
Ms. Chaitman has lectured frequently for the Practicing Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the Banking Law Institute, the Uniform Commercial Code Institute, and various State bar associations on lender liability and commercial litigation.
• Founder and Chairman of the Lender Liability Subcommittee of the Commercial Financial Services Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, 1986-90.
• Chairman of the Commercial Financial Services Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, 1994-97.
• Member of the Editorial Board, The Business Lawyer, Vol. 51, 1995-96.
• Member of the Character & Fitness Committee of the Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York Supreme Court.
• Life Member of the National Registry of Who's Who.
• Member of the American Law Institute and member of the Members Consultative Group for the Restatement of the Law Third: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.
• Former articles editor of the Rutgers Law Review in 1975-76.
• Selected as a "Super Lawyer" in 2007 in Business Litigation in the Metro New York area.
• Selected as a New York "Super Lawyer" in the 2008 Corporate Counsel edition.
• Selected as a "Super Lawyer" in 2008 and thereafter in Business Litigation, Bankruptcy & Creditor/Debtor Rights, Intellectual Property Litigation in the Metro New York area.
• Participant in the Justice and Society Seminar of the Aspen Institute, July 2009.
Ms. Chaitman is a Board member of the New Jersey Audubon Society and a supporter of the Society’s conservation efforts.

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