On May 20, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that an administrative agency’s construction of a statute related to its own jurisdiction is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“Chevron”). City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission, 569 U.S. ___ (2013) (“Arlington”).This holding, if replicated in California appellate courts, has the potential to affect the fashion in which state courts review decisions of the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) under the judicial review provisions of the California Public Utilities Code.
Chevron arose out of the promulgation by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) of a permitting requirement under the Clean Air Act that allowed states to adopt a plant-wide definition of the term “stationary source.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The question before the high court was whether the EPA’s requirement, which allowed stated to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as part of a single “bubble,” was based on a reasonable construction of the term “stationary source.” Id. In holding the EPA’s construction was reasonable and entitled to deference, the court articulated the two-question Chevron test: “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter…. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-843.
Arlington held that courts must defer, elevating the importance of the first step of Chevron (“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”) by holding that even where the agency’s jurisdiction turns on the construction of a statute, the reviewing court must defer to the agency’s construction of the statute. The holding, at least in the view of the dissent, posits a regime of heightened agency power in government since an agency’s statutory interpretation stands little chance of being overturned in court.
Arlington involved a Declaratory Ruling issued by the FCC that defined the term “reasonable period of time” contained in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996), within which state and local zoning authorities must act on siting applications for wireless facilities; the FCC deemed a “reasonable period of time” to mean 90 for collocation applications and 150 days for other applications. Arlington, 569 U.S. __ (slip op., 2-3).2 State and local governments objected to the FCC’s Ruling on the grounds the FCC lacked jurisdiction to interpret ambiguous provisions of Section 332(c)(7). The purported lack of jurisdiction was based on the saving clause in Section 332(c)(7)(A), which provides nothing in the Act shall limit the authority of state and local governments over siting decisions except the limitations of §332(c)(7)(B), and Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which authorizes a person who believes a siting decision violates the limitations of §332(c)(7)(B) to commence an action in court. (Slip op., 2). These provisions, the state and local governments argued, showed Congressional intent to withhold from the FCC the authority to interpret the limitations in subsection (B). (Id. at 3).
The Fifth Circuit applied Chevron to the threshold question of whether the FCC had authority to adopt the timeframes in its Ruling, and found the FCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority was reasonable and entitled to deference. 668 F. 3d 229, 248, 254-256 (CA5 2012). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of whether a court should apply Chevron to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction. (Slip op., 4).
The majority opinion, authored in a noticeably frisky tone by Justice Scalia,3 upheld the Fifth Circuit. The distinction between “jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” ambiguities in an agency’s statutory framework, the majority explained, is false. “No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.” (Slip op., 5) (emphasis original). In stark contrast to the courts, which separately conclude they have jurisdiction over a matter before turning to the substantive decisions, Congress has “authoritatively prescribed” administrative agencies’ power to act and the manner in which they may act; any improper agency decision, “whether framed as an incorrect application of agency authority or an assertion of authority not conferred,” is a violation of the limits imposed by Congress and may not be parsed into jurisdictional and substantive errors. (Slip op., 6). The only relevant question before a reviewing court, the majority held, is whether the statutory text forecloses an agency’s exercise of authority. (Slip op., 9).
The majority and dissent agree on one point: an agency must receive Congressional authority to “determine the particular matter at issue in the particular manner adopted.” (Slip op., 15). With regard to what constitutes Congressional authority, the majority holds that a general grant of adjudicative or rulemaking authority will validate agency determinations on all matters within the agency’s substantive field. (Id.) Subjecting agency decisions to closer, case-by-case judicial inspection would lead to “[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test [that] would render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron.” (Id. at 16). This sweeping authority does not quite amount to a jurisdictional blank check for the agency, but the majority, having acknowledged Congress can (and does) purposely leave ambiguities in a statute, does not clearly define where the line delimiting an agency’s power under a grant of general authority might lie.
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, presents its fundamental disagreement with the majority in clear terms: “A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference.” (Dissent slip op. at 1). This judicial oversight is necessary to check the rapidly burgeoning power of the administrative state; the dissent is wary of expanding agencies’ authority to include not only the broad power to answer questions left to them by Congress, but also the power to decide if Congress has given the agency that power. (See id. at 2-5). In addition to providing a necessary check on the power of administrative agencies, whether an agency has jurisdiction is a question of law that must be decided by the courts. (Id. at 6). The dissent notes the duty of the judiciary “to say what the law is,” handed down in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), has not been altered by the rise of the administrative state. (Dissent slip op. at 6).
These crucial checks and balances were not disturbed in Chevron itself, the dissent argues. There, the challenge to the administrative agency’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act focused on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, as opposed to whether the agency reasonably filled a legislative gap left by Congress. (Dissent slip op. at 7). Judicial deference to agencies on policy matters and areas in which the court has no expert knowledge is appropriate. Such deference must, however, be exercised within the limits of authority granted the agency by Congress. (Id. at 7-8). A general grant of adjudicatory or rulemaking authority will not suffice; the court must determine if the “specific provision” or “particular question” at issue were encompassed in the delegation of authority. (Id. at 12). The dissent would hold the Fifth Circuit erred in granting Chevron deference to the FCC’s determination it had authority to issue the Declaratory Ruling, and would remand for a proper inquiry into the agency’s jurisdiction, one presumably premised on an independent review of whether the statutory scheme enacted by Congress permitted the agency to act as it had. (Id. at 18).
California law currently distinguishes between the level of judicial deference a court must afford to an administrative agency’s determination of its jurisdiction and that required with respect to matters plainly within the agency’s area of expertise. PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission held “the general rule of deference to interpretations of statutes subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of agencies does not apply when the issue is the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.” 118 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1194 (2004) (quoting Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Zingale, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1028 (2002)). (The PG&E court even blurs the distinction by observing in dicta that even where the agency’s jurisdiction is not at issue, “the interpretation of statues is a question of law subject to independent judicial review.” Id. at 1194-1195 (citing Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1 (1998)); see also Sara M. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 998, 1011 (2005).) At present, courts adhere to these limitations on deference to the CPUC’s construction of statutes notwithstanding the fact that, as each decision acknowledges, the CPUC is not an ordinary administrative agency, but is a constitutional body with broad legislative and judicial powers. PG&E Corp., supra, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 1194, fn. 17. The rule that an agency is entitled to limited, if any, deference when it decides its own jurisdiction has been affirmed in Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718, 729 (2006), and Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority v. Public Utilities Commission, 124 Cal. App. 4th 346 (2004).
The question is particularly critical because when courts determine that deference to the CPUC is required, the deference is quite broad. The counterpart to Chevron under California law is Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 68 Cal.2d 406 (1968). In Greyhound, the California Supreme Court held that “the Commission’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code should not be disturbed unless it fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language.” What has become known as Greyhound deference reached a high-water mark in Southern California Edison v. Public Utilities Commission , 117 Cal.App.4th 1039 (2004), in which the Court of Appeal, applying Greyhound, agreed with the Commission that the term “obtaining judicial review” in Section 1802 of the Public Utilities Code (governing the compensation of intervenors in Commission proceedings) included actions by The Utility Reform Network (”TURN”) as an intervenor in a federal court proceeding on behalf of the defendant therein (the Commission).
California appellate courts have limited authority to determine whether the policy or substance of a CPUC action is proper, which is consistent with general judicial deference to agency determinations where the court lacks expertise with the subject matter. Under California law, however, deference to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction is not required. To the contrary, that decision rests firmly with the courts.
Were our fictional advocate to make this argument, it is unclear what effect Arlington would have on the jurisdiction-specific judicial review provision of Section 1757. A broad reading of Arlington, which would rely on the general grant of authority given the CPUC by the State Legislature, would either confine judicial review to instances where the Public Utilities Code explicitly says “the commission has/does not have jurisdiction over XYZ,” or would render judicial review moot. Arlington’s explanation as to why there is no meaningful distinction between jurisdictional and substantive agency determinations is problematic because there is no clear mechanism for deciding where judicial deference is appropriate, and because it ignores the possibility that administrative statutes might distinguish between jurisdictional and substantive decisions made by the agency.
Southern California Edison v. Peevey, 31 Cal.4th 781 (2003) (“Edison”), is illustrative of this problem. Edison involved a challenge to the CPUC’s interpretation of Public Utilities Code sections 330 through 398.5, under which the CPUC proposed a stipulated judgment as part of an action initiated by Edison alleging the CPUC’s regulation of electricity violated federal law. TURN intervened and opposed the stipulated judgment as a violation of California law. The question whether the CPUC had authority to propose the judgment under Section 330 et seq. was certified by the Ninth Circuit to the California Supreme Court.4 Had the question been presented to the court under the judicial review provisions of Section 1757, instead of being certified, it could have been framed two ways: (1) Did the CPUC act without, or in excess of, its powers or jurisdiction under Section 1757(a)(1)? Or (2) did the CPUC fail to proceed in the manner required by law under Section 1757(a)(2)? The former is a threshold jurisdictional question, akin to the personal jurisdiction analysis courts must perform before engaging in substantive analysis. The latter is a question of statutory interpretation, but contains no jurisdictional analysis–the CPUC’s authority to interpret the statute at issue is assumed. Arlington holds these questions are indistinguishable. The plain language of Section 1757, and the line of cases following PG&E Corp., indicate otherwise. Arlington provides no reasoning or mechanism to reconcile this conflict.
The dissent’s view reflects the checks and balances currently in place between the CPUC and courts, which are codified in the judicial review provisions of Section 1757. The CPUC has broad authority to regulate public utilities, and the courts are empowered to check the CPUC when it overreaches. If Arlington is adopted by California authority, it is unclear to what extent this balance will be disturbed, or how courts and the CPUC will reconcile Arlington’s holding with established state precedent. It is certain, however, introducing Arlington into California law will result in a period of confusion and conflict.
1.Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion does not bear on the subject matter of this post, and is therefore not discussed.
2.All further citations to Arlington are to the Slip Opinion.
3.Practitioners familiar with the telecommunications industry will notice footnote 1 of the majority opinion, appending the first mention of CTIA-The Wireless Association: “This is not a typographical error. CTIA-The Wireless Association was the name of the petitioner. CTIA is presumably an (unpronounceable) acronym, but even the organization’s website does not say what it stands for. That secret, known only to wireless-service-provider insiders, we will not disclose here.” (Slip op., 3, fn. 1).
4.The court was also asked to decide whether the stipulated judgment violated the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Gov. Code §§ 11120-11132.5) or Public Utilities Code § 454.


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Twenty-five years after it was decided, a legal scholar can still use McCleskey v. Kemp as shorthand for a Supreme Court decision that failed to protect the Constitution’s most basic values. This Article uses Justice Powell’s papers to gain new insight into how an opinion came to be written that engendered so much criticism. What emerges is a sense of how Justice Powell’s belief in the legal system, when coupled with his distrust of “statistical jurisprudence,” led him to place his faith in legal procedures despite statistical evidence that racial bias was infecting the death penalty. McCleskey is thus an important lesson that procedure, despite its many benefits, can have a dark side if it becomes a veneer obscuring injustice.
Justice Powell’s opinion, especially the final section of the decision, also provides important lessons about how a judicial opinion communicates messages that reach beyond the holding itself. Indeed, the Article compares Powell’s opinion to the concurrence that Justice Scalia proposed but never wrote – a concurrence that would have acknowledged that “irrational sympathies and antipathies including racial” inevitably enter a capital jury’s decision, but then would have found no constitutional violation. The Article ultimately asks: although Scalia’s position might have provoked outrage, might not its candor in the long run have produced a more constructive response than Powell’s opinion which appeared to adopt a position of willful blindness towards the existence of racial bias?
International constitutionalism comes in many different forms. A distinction may be made between those claiming that we today have an international constitution and others arguing that what is of importance is to apply constitutional thinking to the international legal system. The article discusses whether we have an international constitution and concludes with a negative answer. This means that we still must operate with different international legal regimes and with the distinction between the international and national legal systems, i.e. aspects of pluralism. However, the challenge is how to secure constitutional guarantees in a pluralist legal order.
This article provides a concise analysis of lawmaking, inspired by what I perceive to be the realist conception of law. Legal realism, as I reconstruct it, stands for the proposition that law is a going institution (or set of institutions) distinguished by the difficult accommodation of three constitutive, yet irresolvable, tensions between power and reason, science and craft, and tradition and progress. Unlike some caricatures of legal realism, this understanding of legal realism explains why the original legal realists invested time and energy in various arenas of lawmaking, shaping and reshaping the various rules and standards that are to govern society. This sustained effort reflects a mature position regarding the rule of law whereby, notwithstanding the malleability of legal doctrine as such, the social practice of law implies stable expectations as to the content of the law at any given time and place. Redrawing the line between promulgation and application along these conventionalist lines paves the way for a realist account of lawmaking. This account is likely to rely on contextual and pragmatic analyses of the pertinent issues at hand. Thus, it implies that, rather than opting for either bright-line rules or vague standards, legal realists would recommend using both precise rules and informative standards founded on the regulative principles of the doctrines at hand, enabling people to predict the consequences of future contingencies and to plan and structure their lives accordingly. Legal realists would likewise avoid binary institutional choices and, in many contexts, appreciate the comparative advantages of both legislatures and courts — in terms of both expected performance and legitimacy — as potential contributors to the development of the law.
In 2000, some scholars predicted the Supreme Court’s controversial equal protection holding in Bush v. Gore that the state could not arbitrarily value one person’s vote over that of another might be used to force states to improve their election processes through litigation. In the ensuing years, Bush v. Gore had not fulfilled that promise. Scholars debated when, if ever, the case could apply beyond the narrow facts of a statewide recount with inconsistent counting standards, but the courts seemed uninterested: the Supreme Court has failed to cite the case for any proposition, and the few lower courts which relied upon the case as precedent to create better and fairer voting conditions were overturned or limited. By 2007 I lamented the “untimely death” of Bush v. Gore.
In Ohio, one of the twin epicenters (along with Florida) of the 2012 voting wars, two important cases relied in part on Bush v. Gore to expand voting rights. In one case, a conservative panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit—a court which had shown itself bitterly divided along party and ideological lines on election issues in 2008—unanimously held that Ohio’s disenfranchisement of voters for voting in the wrong polling location because of poll worker error violated the equal protection clause. In the other case, another Sixth Circuit panel held that Ohio’s contraction of the early voting period to exclude the weekend before the election, for all voters except certain military voters, violated the equal protection clause under Bush v. Gore. The court so held despite the fact that Ohio provided 23 days of early voting and for the first time sent all Ohio voters a no-excuse absentee ballot application. This latter ruling was at best a major stretch of Bush v. Gore and existing precedent.
The story of the 2012 voting wars is a story of Republican legislative and to some extent administrative overreach to contract voting rights, followed by a judicial and public backlash. The public backlash was somewhat expected—Democrats predictably made “voter suppression” a key talking point of the campaign. The judicial backlash, and the resurrection of Bush v. Gore in the Sixth Circuit, was not. The judicial reaction, from liberal and conservative judges and often on a unanimous basis, suggests that courts may now be more willing to act as backstops to prevent egregious cutbacks in voting rights and perhaps to do even more to assure greater equality and fairness in voting. However, it is possible that this trend will reverse in future elections.
The jurisprudential dimensions of treating custom as law have been puzzling at least since the time of Bentham and Austin. If law emanates from the sovereign, and consists of commands backed by threats from the sovereign, then customary law seems scarcely law at all. Or so Bentham and Austin, each in his own way, believed. But if, in a post-Hart jurisprudential world, we can recognize that norms can be internalized by judges and other officials even if they arise from the bottom up rather than from the top down, then a new puzzle emerges. In this modern jurisprudential world, the lawness of custom can easily be explained, but custom then appears simply to be one of many forms of law, occupying no distinct juridical space. The question whether and when to treat custom as law, therefore, is no different from the question whether and when one jurisdiction treats another jurisdiction’s norms as law, and whether and when to treat some particular source as law. These are important and sometimes difficult issues, but they are more continuous with the routine questions of legal sources and legal authority than the traditional treatments of custom have assumed.
Lasser’s study Judicial Deliberations offers an interesting analysis of judicial discourse and legal argumentation. For theorists of legal argumentation Judicial Deliberations is an interesting project, because of its theoretical perspective, its methods and its results. In the past thirty years the study of legal argumentation has increasingly become an important field of interest. In this paper I discuss some of Lasser’s conceptual and empirical contributions to this theory of legal interpretation and argumentation. I will do this by exploring Lasser’s analysis of the difference between interpretative justification in Common Law and Civil Law countries, focusing on the difference between formal and substantial interpretative argumentation in legal decisions. In short, I will discuss Lasser’s lack of conceptualization of the distinction between formal and substantial interpretative argumentation, his methodological choices and the generalization of his empirical findings.
Underregulation kills. When a sensible and effective rule is proposed but then not implemented, society loses whatever benefits the regulation would have provided. When those benefits take the form of saved lives — if, for example, the rule would have kept a carcinogen out of the workplace — failing to enact and enforce a regulation means people die. Unfortunately, federal agencies in the United States systematically undercount the benefits of rulemaking, causing regulators to forsake the implementation of lifesaving measures that would have been enacted were benefits estimated more accurately. The result is American lives lost, every year.
This article presents two arguments against the “discounting” of future human lives as part of cost benefit analysis, or CBA. Our first argument is that because CBA has thus far ignored evidence of rising health care expenditures, it underestimates the “willingness to pay” for health and safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing their lives. Our second argument is that until recently CBA has ignored the trend of improved material conditions in developed countries, and most agencies continue to ignore it entirely. As time advances, residents of rich countries tend to live better and spend more, meaning that a strict economic evaluation of future lives would discount the relatively impoverished lives of present citizens compared to the projected luxurious and healthy existence of our expected descendents, just the opposite of what happens in agency practice.
The article discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, which held that the Westboro Baptist Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed in Iraq.
In the article, I criticize the Court’s view that the government generally may not regulate public discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury. I then present an alternative theory of the First Amendment which aims to protect the freedom and dignity not only of speakers but also of those who are affected by the speech. Drawing extensively on the record in Snyder, I argue that the picketing in that case should not have received First Amendment protection, because it was intended to condemn the deceased and to inflict severe distress on the mourners. Finally, I show that Snyder may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for Westboro, because the Court also suggested that the government may protect mourners through carefully drawn buffer-zone laws, such as the new federal law that Congress passed this summer.
Constitutional pragmatism is under-theorized and frequently misconceived. Most constitutional interpretation discussions focus on originalism or some form of “living constitutionalism.” The irony is that the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to adopt any single foundational constitutional theory makes pragmatism the best descriptive characterization of the Court, as Mark Tushnet has suggested. Yet, Judge Posner, Daniel Farber, and Justice Breyer certainly do not agree on what pragmatism means. This symposium paper illuminates this poor step-child in constitutional theory by providing a typology of a dozen strands of constitutional pragmatism. The paper looks at U.S. Supreme Court cases and some historical events to support this framework. For example, certain types of constitutional pragmatism do not rule out the use of fundamental moral principles in constitutional interpretation, nor are these approaches all about consequences. The paper also shows how the U.S. Revolution, and some other successful constitutional revolutions, required surprisingly pragmatic influences.
Matthew Adler's book, Well-being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, is an extraordinary feat, providing a philosophical defense of social welfare functions as a framework for governmental policy analysis. The defense and design of his welfare consequentialist framework involves several theoretical and practical issues, a first set dealing with well-being: What determines an individual's well-being? Are there criteria for ranking well-being among different persons? How might policy analysts construct utility functions to represent individuals' welfare across a population? A second set of issues concerns how the social welfare function should rank potential outcomes using information about individuals' well-being. Adler defends a prioritarian social welfare function, which gives greater weight to changes in well-being for the worst-off. In so arguing, he claims that welfare consequentialism is compatible with a concern for fairness. Throughout this remarkable book, Adler draws upon welfare economics, social choice theory, philosophy, and other related fields. Four speakers will present commentary on different aspects of the book, to which Adler will respond.

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19-918. Additions; subdivision; plat of streets; duty of owner to obtain approval. No owner of real estate within the corporate limits of such municipality shall be permitted to subdivide, plat, or lay out said real estate into blocks, lots, streets, or other portions of the same intended to be dedicated for public use, or for the use of the purchasers or owners of lots fronting thereon or adjacent thereto, without first having obtained the approval thereof of the governing body of such municipality or its agent designated pursuant to section 19-916. Any and all additions to be made to the municipality shall be made, so far as the same relate to the avenues, streets, and alleys therein, under and in accordance with the provisions of sections 19-916 to 19-918.
Source: Laws 1901, c. 18, § 51, p. 269; R.S. 1913, § 4813; C.S. 1922, § 3981; C.S. 1929, § 16-110; R.S. 1943, § 16-114; Laws 1967, c. 66, § 2, p. 217; R.R.S. 1943, § 16-114; Laws 1975, LB 410, § 4; Laws 1983, LB 71, § 11.


The PTAB has interpreted the statutes and rules as giving it broad discretion as to whether to institute inter partes review. Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the PTAB may reject a petition because “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.”10 In September 2014, the PTAB published seven opinions in which it denied a petition for inter partes review under § 325(d).
In some of those cases, the Board seems to be concerned about the Petitioner taking a “second bite at the apple.” For example, the PTAB has denied a second petition challenging claims which were unsuccessfully challenged in a first petition, where the Petitioner relied on the same primary references used in the first petition, and added new evidence or prior art to specifically address the failings in the first petition.11 In denying these second petitions, the Board said that it did not want parties to file inadequate petitions and use the institution decision as a road map because “a decision to institute review on some claims should not act as an entry ticket, and a how-to guide, for the same Petitioner.”12 Thus, it is important that the Petitioner carefully consider the strength of its case before filing a petition because it may not be able to correct deficiencies in a second petition. The Patent Owner, on the other hand, should evaluate and raise any § 325(d) issue in its preliminary response, especially if it seems that the second petition is addressing failures identified in an earlier denied petition.
The Board also seems keen to avoid duplicative or prejudicial proceedings. The PTAB has denied a second petition in which the Petitioner swapped out the primary reference in a first petition without explaining how the new reference differed from the original primary reference,13 and in which two of the three references in a second petition were the same as in the first petition, and were simply used in different combinations.14 The Board also denied a petition that impacted the timing of several related cases in which the Petitioner failed to address potential prejudice and all of the challenged claims were already the subject of instituted proceedings on the same grounds.15 Thus a Petitioner filing a second petition should consider discussing the reasons necessitating a second petition, the lack of burden, and the prejudice, if it is denied. Conversely, a Patent Owner raising § 325(d) under these circumstance should note the lack of prejudice to the Petitioner if the petition is denied.
At least one case indicates that the Board may also be reluctant to revisit arguments made in prosecution.16 Although this case may be an outlier, the Petitioner must remember that grounds that raise similar issues to those addressed during prosecution carry more risk of outright denial. A Patent Owner, on the other hand, can point out arguments that are similar to what was in the original prosecution or reexamination.
The Board, under § 325(d), will likely continue to frown on petitions that repeat earlier arguments or duplicate the proceedings. Petitioners should be mindful of these considerations when filing an IPR, particularly when trying to remedy the deficiency of a previously denied petition by using the same art or arguments. This area of practice should continue to evolve as the PTAB considers a wider range of facts under § 325(d).


A few weeks back I pointed out that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) had changed its position on whether or not a new RPI designation requires a resetting of the petition filing date. It has now made that determination precedential, along with two other decisions on the topic.
First, in Adello Biologics LLC v. Amgen Inc., Case PGR2019-00001 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019) (Paper 11) the Board granted Petitioners’ Motion to Update its Mandatory Notices before the institution of trial and denied Patent Owner’s request for permission to file a Motion for Discovery of facts surrounding a real party-in-interest (RPI) issue. The Board determined that Petitioners’ update to the Mandatory Notices was permissible under 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(2) without assigning a new filing date to the Petition because Petitioners did not act in bad faith or engage in gamesmanship in omitting the RPI from the Mandatory Notices in the Petition and Petitioners’ delay did not result in any undue prejudice to Patent Owner.
In the case I previously discussed, Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLC, Case IPR2017-01917 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2019) (Paper 86) the Board denied Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate. The Board determined that the Petition was not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) in view of the Federal Circuit’s guidance in Applications in Internet Time (AIT) because the RPI that Petitioner added in an update to its mandatory notices would not have been time-barred if named at the time the Petition originally was filed. The Board further determined that the addition was permissible without assigning a new filing date to the Petition. This order also sets forth a number of factors that the Board previously has considered when allowing a new RPI to be named without assigning a new filing date to a petition, including: (1) avoiding 315(b) bar or estoppel rules; (2) prejudice to patent owner as a result of the delay; (3) bad faith; and (4) gamesmanship.
Finally, in Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc., Case IPR2017-00651 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Paper 152), in a redacted Order dismissing the petition, the Board vacated the Decision instituting inter partes review, and terminated the proceeding. The Board determined that the Petition was time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) in view of the Federal Circuit’s guidance in AIT because Petitioner failed to name an RPI and privy that would have been time-barred if named at the time the Petition originally was filed.
While these decisions will halt panel dependency on the issue, I don’t see how the Board can decide that statutory requirements can somehow be excused as a matter of discretion. This issue will reach the Federal Circuit in due course.


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Review "Is a Probate Necessary?"
Are All Claims Subject to the Creditor's Claim Procedure?
Why Follow the Creditor's Claims Procedure?
Why Publish a Probate Notice to Creditors?
Why Send Actual Notice to Known Creditors?
Why Insist on a Creditor's Claim for Payment?
What Can "Go Wrong" Even Though You're Doing Everything "Right"?
What is a Preliminary Distribution?
Re-title all probate asset securities accounts from Decedent’s name to your name as Personal Representative.
Estate of George Washington, Martha Washington, Personal Representative.
You will need to check with each institution as to its preference. You should make all payments on behalf of the estate by check from the estate’s checking account and make sure that you keep an adequate record of the checks that you have written, most easily done by saving the monthly statements from the checking institution so long as those statements show not only the check number and amount of the check but also its payee. You may have advanced funds on behalf of the estate, such as the $200 Court filing fee and possibly $100 or more for publishing the Probate Notice to Creditors. An appropriate first check on the estate’s new checking account would be to reimburse yourself for those funds advanced upon your delivery to yourself of the receipts for those advancements. You should not, however, pay any Creditor’s Claims that you may have against the estate — only reimbursement of funds advanced on behalf of the estate. Payment of any of your Creditor’s Claims will be dealt with later.
Determine the net value of each item, as of Decedent’s date of death, after deducting the encumbrances, liens, and other secured charges against the item.
Note: Although the statute says the Personal Representative “shall” prepare an Inventory, practically speaking, preparing one is solely for your own benefit, as WA law no longer requires an Inventory to be filed with the Court. RCW 11.44.015(2) Exception: If a person interested in the estate requests one.
Print a Inventory & Appraisementform.
Discover all the assets Decedent owned at death. See: Assets That Slip Through the Cracks.
Take control over them, among other reasons to protect them for Decedent’s Heirs and Beneficiaries.
Inventory them, at least informally.
If Decedent was married at death: Characterize them as either separate, community, or quasi-community property, revealing the extent to which Decedent’s surviving spouse has any marital interest in the asset. See: Determining Decedent’s Surviving Spouse’s Marital Interest.
To categorize each (ie, as a probate or a nonprobate asset).
To set aside for the time being the nonprobate assets.
To focus exclusively on the probate assets.
If Decedent was married at death, to characterize each probate asset (ie, as community, quasi-community, or separate).
To inventory Decedent’s interest in the probate assets (ie, one-half of community & quasi-community and all of separate).
To inventory all of Decedent’s debts and other liabilities, whether a “straight,” unsecured debt (eg, charge accounts, utility bills, salary or wages to hired help, etc.) or a security interest in a probate asset (eg, a lien or pledge on personal property, such as a vehicle or securities; or a mortgage or note + deed of trust on real property, such as a home).
In his/her Will, Decedent identified and gave one or more items of TPP specifically to one or more persons (ie, they are specifically bequeathed to legatees; eg, “I give my diamond ring to my daughter, Susan, if she survives me”). 2003 King County Probate Policy & Procedure Manual, § 5.3.6.
Omit Partnership PropertyAny interest Decedent had in any partnership should be described in terms of his or her respective partnership share, but no inventory of partnership property is required. 2003 King County Probate Policy & Procedure Manual, § 5.3.6.
Inventory of Real PropertyThe description of any interest Decedent had in any real property should include its legal description, and its appraisement should include, in addition to its gross and net values, its current assessed value for property tax purposes.
Out-of-State Real Property — The Possibility of an Ancillary ProbateIf Decedent’s estate includes real property located outside Washington (examples: residential, commercial, investment, vacation, etc. property; oil & gas interests, other mineral interests, water interests, etc.; acreage, farmland, etc.), it will not be included in the Inventory of Decedent’s Washington probate estate, and its transfer will be subject to the jurisdiction of its actual location, not Washington. What will likely be required is a parallel probate proceeding in the out-of-state county were the real property is located. This probate, in what is known as the “foreign” jurisdiction, is known as an “Ancillary” Probate, as opposed to the “domiciliary” probate in Washington (the Decedent’s state of domicile, ie, residence).
With each spouses’ interest shown in terms of each spouses’ (or just the Decedent’s) one-half community interest.
Gross Value: $250,000, subject to a Note payable to The Washington Bank, whose principal balance at Decedent’s date of death was $75,286, secured by a Deed of Trust in favor of The Washington Bank.
Make Sure to Inventory Any Claim Against YouAny claim (eg, for money or other property owed to Decedent, even if forgiven in Decedent’s Will) that Decedent had against his or her Personal Representative (ie, you) should expressly be included.
As of Decedent’s date of death. RCW 11.44.015. Estate of Toomey, 75 Wn.2d 915 (1969).
Example of Attachment to Inventory for a Single Decedent.
Example of Attachment to Inventory for a Married Decedent.
requests in writing a copy of the Inventory & Appraisement after three months following your appointment, you are required to send him/her a copy of it within 10 days of your receipt of the request. RCW 11.44.015(2). If a person making such a request fails to timely receive the copy, he/she may complain to the Court (RCW 11.44.050), although the Court may grant an extension of time for up to six months to provide the copy for good cause shown. 2003 King County Probate Policy & Procedure Manual, § 5.2.
Timing: Complete the Inventory & Appraisement within 3 months after your appointment.
ENTIRELY OPTIONAL, UP TO YOU, & NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
$100 or more to publish the Probate Notice to Creditors ($105 in King County).
What this means is that by following this procedure, when you distribute Decedent’s assets to his/her Heirs and Beneficiaries following the expiration of the 4-month period, they take those assets with virtually clear title, free of almost all potential claims — otherwise, the assets remain subject to potential claims for 2 years after Decedent’s death.
WASHINGTON PROBATE believes that the advantages of following the Washington Probate Creditor’s Claim Procedure in the great majority of cases far outweigh its effort and cost and urges you to follow it. All it takes is one dilatory creditor to make the $100 or so cost of publication a remarkably cheap investment.
Side-bar: Example of a typical published Probate Notice to Creditors.
Are All Claims Subject to the Creditor’s Claim Procedure?
Why Follow the Creditor’s Claim Procedure?
What Can “Go Wrong” Even Though You’re Doing Everything “Right”?What can “go wrong” is that the estate can run out of money before paying all the allowed Creditor’s Claims. If other assets remain in the estate, they will need to be sold (or used as security for a loan) to produce sufficient money to pay the Claims. If the estate is now or ever becomes unable to pay all of its debts, taxes, and other expenses, it is insolvent. For information on the legal consequences of an estate being or becoming insolvent, see: An Insolvent Estate.
Any creditor of Decedent has four months to present his/her/its claim against the estate or be barred.
Download and complete a Probate Notice to Creditors form.
Ignore for the moment the line stating “Decedent’s Social Security Number.” After your Probate Notice to Creditors is published, you will add Decedent’s SSN to a copy of your Probate Notice to Creditors and send a copy of that document to WDSHS.
File the original of the Probate Notice to Creditors with the Court (with a copy for conformation and return to you).Note: This is most easily done when you attend Court for your appointment, immediately following your hearing in Court and upon obtaining a copy of your Letters from the Clerk’s office.
Send a copy of the Probate Notice to Creditors to your chosen legal newspaper for publication and request that your Notice be published once each week for three successive weeks, beginning on the date of first publication stated in the Notice.Timing: Within 30 days after appointment.
Promptly following the third publication of the Probate Notice to Creditors, obtain and File an Affidavit of Publication.
The Issue: Putting the State on notice that if any Medicare reimbursement is due, the State (just like any other creditor) has four months to present its claim or be barred.
Caution: The Notice sent to WDSHS (ie, Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services) is required to contain Decedent’s Social Security Number (“SSN”), but GR31 prohibits filing Social Security Numbers with the Court. Consequently, make sure that you place Decedent’s Social Security Number on the copy of any form you send to WDSHS but not on any form that you file with the Court.
Download a Declaration of Mailing of Probate Notice Creditors to WDSHS form.
Complete and sign theform and make two copies of it.
Make three copies of your filed Probate Notice to Creditors.
To the original and the two copies of your Declaration, attach a copy of your Probate Notice to Creditors.
To the two copies to your Probate Notice to Creditors that are attached to the two copies (but not the original) of your Declaration, add Decedent’s Social Security Number.
File the original of your Declaration (with the copy of the Probate Notice to Creditors not having Decedent’s SSN) with the Court (with one of the copies of the Declaration + Probate Notice to Creditors) for conformation and return to you).
Mail the other copy of your Declaration + Probate Notice to Creditors to the WDSHS at the address shown on the form.
The Issue: Identifying possible creditors of Decedent — so that you can send them actual notice of the same information as in the Probate Notice to Creditors.
Make a list of each possible creditor found in your review.
The Issue: Sending to the possible creditors of Decedent identified in your review actual notice of the same information as in the Probate Notice to Creditors, effectively “inviting” them to make their claim or be barred.
Complete the Header (top half of first page of pleading) on the Creditor’s Claim form.
A Header-completed Creditor’s Claim form.
Do so at no sacrifice to the estate (eg, by extending the time that a Creditor has to timely submit a Creditor’s Claim past the statutory four month period).
Side-bar: How to ensure that you have made a reasonable review and sent actual notice to the possible creditors found in your review — see: Evidencing Your Reasonable Review.
The Issue: Has each creditor given notice of his/her/its claim according to law?
The creditor’s name and address.
If made by the creditor’s agent, the agent’s name and address and the nature of the agent’s authority as regards the creditor.
A statement of facts or circumstances surrounding the claim.
If the Claim is secured, the nature of the security; if not yet due, the date when it will become due; and if contingent, the nature of the uncertainty.
The Claim must be presented within the Statute of Limitations period.
The original of the claimant’s Creditor’s Claim must be filed with the Court.
A copy of the claimant’s Creditor’s Claim must be served or mailed (by first-class mail) to you.
The Issue: How do you lawfully respond to any creditor who has lawfully given notice of his/her/its Creditor’s Claim.
Rejected (in whole or in part) by notifying the claimant of the rejection.
2 months from the date of your receipt of the Claim.
30 days from the date of your receipt of the Claim.
The Issue: Can you lawfully pay a creditor who has not lawfully given notice of his/her/its Claim?
Your payment is made in good faith (eg, you believe the Claim to be valid — the other criterion for allowing a Creditor’s Claim). See Villegas v. McBride, 112, Wn.App. 689 (2002).
Bottom-line: If you receive a modest bill, have no qualms about paying it, and believe that it would not be cost effective to return it and insist on the submission of a proper Creditor’s Claim, then you may waive the defects and pay it without subjecting yourself to personal liability.
Caution: You may not lawfully pay any Creditor’s Claim that was presented after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations period. RCW 11.40.090(4); Bank of Montreal v. Buchanan, 32 Wash. 480 (1903). Furthermore, a Personal Representative may not waive the defect of a Creditor’s Claim being presented after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Osborn v. Old Nat’l Bank, 10 Wn. App. 169 (1973); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660 (1969) By paying a Creditor’s Claim unlawfully (eg, one that was presented after the expiration of the limitations period), you are subjecting yourself to personal liability to the estate for the amount of your payment.
Declaration re Reasonable Review to Ascertain Decedent’s Creditors form.
Timing: Soon after 4 months after first publication of your Probate Notice to Creditors (ie, promptly after the expiration of the four-month statutory period).
Determining and paying the estate’s fiduciary income tax during its administration.
Notice Requirements: See Section 14.D.Federal of Opening the Probate Estate.
IRS Publication 559: Survivors, Executors, and Administrators, which details the issues at the Federal tax level.
As Decedent’s Personal Representative, you are responsible for filing Decedent’s final Income Tax Return (Form 1040) for the year of death, as well as any Returns not filed for prior years.
Example: Personal Returns are due on April 15 of the following year. If Decedent died on March 1, 2002, chances are that Decedent would not yet have filed his/her 2001 Income Tax Return (due 4/15/02) and surely would not have filed his/her 2002 Income Tax Return (due 4/15/03). The Personal Representative would be responsible for timely filing both the 2001 and the 2002 Returns.
If Decedent was married at death, the Personal Representative and the surviving spouse may file joint Returns for preceding and final years, except that the surviving spouse may not file a joint Return for the final year if he or she remarries before the end of the year of Decedent’s death.
Payments representing a distributive share or guaranteed payment in liquidation of the Decedent partner’s interest in a partnership.
The Decedent is a US citizen, no heir or beneficiary is a nonresident alien individual, and the estate has gross income of at least $600 during the tax year.
The Decedent is a US citizen and any heir or beneficiary is a nonresident alien individual, regardless of the estate’s gross income.
You may report the estate’s income on either a calendar (ie, due April 15 of the following year) or a fiscal year basis. If you choose the latter, the estate’s tax year may end on the last day of the month of any of month following Decedent’s date of death so long as it does not exceed 12 months.
Schedule K-1 (of Form 1041) . As part of filing your annual Form 1041, you are also required to file with it a separate Schedule K-1 for each heir or beneficiary together with his or her Tax Identification Number (SSN for individuals; EIN for entities) and send a copy of each Schedule K-1 to its respective heir or beneficiary. The income tax liability of the estate attaches to its assets, so as estate income is either required to be distributed or is actually distributed to an heir or beneficiary, the burden for reporting and paying income tax on such income shifts from the estate to the recipient heir or beneficiary.
Example: Decedent’s Will provides that all estate income is to be distributed when received to Decedent’s surviving spouse. On the Schedule K-1 of your annual Form 1041 for the year of distribution, you would report the surviving spouse as the recipient of that income, and he/she would be required to report the income on his/her individual income tax return (his/her Form 1040) as income in the year in which he/she received it to the extent of the estate’s taxable income, what is known as the estate’s “Distributable Net Income” — for you, your receipt and concurrent distribution of such income would effectively amount to a wash transaction, for which you would pay no income tax.
After any federal income tax return (either for Decedent or the estate) is filed, the Personal Representative, by filing a Form 4810, may request prompt assessment of any tax remaining due. By doing so, he/she reduces the time that the IRS has to make the assessment from its usual 3 years from the date of filing the return to 18 months from date of filing for the Request.
Request for Discharge from Personal LiabilityAfter filing any federal income or gift tax return for the Decedent, the Personal Representative (by letter, as there is no Form for it) may request to be discharged from Personal Responsibility for any remaining tax due. The IRS has 9 months after receipt of the Request to notify the Personal Representative of the amount of any remaining tax due or be barred from its collection.
WashingtonNotice Requirements: See Section III.C.Washington of Opening the Probate Estate.
Closing Department of Revenue Account: The Personal Representative should also close Decedent’s account with the Department of Revenue. See Close Your DOR Account.
For a Decedent dying between May 17 and December 31, 2005, if the sum of the value of Decedent’s estate plus his/her lifetime taxable gifts is less than $1,500,000, then no estate tax return nor estate tax should be required to be filed or paid, and you should be able to skip this section.
For a Decedent dying in 2006 or 2007, that amount increases to $2.000,000.
The estate tax is a tax levied on any property or interest in property held by a Decedent at death (plus the value of taxable gifts made by the Decedent during his/her lifetime). The estate tax is irrelevant to the great majority of estates, due to their having less than the minimum amount of property (including interests in property and lifetime taxable gifts) requiring the filing of an estate tax return, as stated above. For those few, larger estates requiring the filing of an estate tax return, the majority of them will likely avoid paying any estate tax, generally as a result of their qualifying for the estate tax marital or charitable deduction.
Is the estate large enough so that an estate tax return must be filed?
How much estate tax will be owed?
Timing: By 9 months after date of death.
Is governed by the property law of the State of Washington.
Is governed by the tax law primarily of the U.S. (the IRS code) and secondarily of Washington.
Summary: “Gross Estate” = Value of all of Decedent’s property & property interests, including the above.
The value of property passing to Decedent’s surviving spouse (the “marital deduction”) and to qualified charities (the “charitable deduction”).
Filing Requirement: If Decedent’s Gross Estate (plus lifetime taxable gifts) exceeds the pertinent Applicable Exclusion Amount, a federal estate tax return (Form 706) will almost certainly be required to be filed.
Paying Requirement: If Decedent’s Taxable Estate exceeds the pertinent Applicable Exclusion Amount, an estate tax will likely be required to be paid. Many estates are required to file a Form 706 although no actual estate tax is due, usually as a result of sufficient property passing to Decedent’s surviving spouse or qualified charities.
The federal estate tax sounds simple but is remarkably obtuse and arcane — and making sonorous music out of both of the income and the estate tax laws is just that more delicate. If you make a mistake regarding either tax, you may find yourself, knowingly or unknowingly, liable for substantially more tax, and possibly interest and penalties, than were necessary — or paying substantially more tax than was otherwise due.
If you, as Decedent’s Personal Representative, will likely be required to file a federal estate tax return (whether or not any estate tax is actually due), WASHINGTON PROBATE urges you to obtain legal assistance, preferably from someone having a specialty practice that includes estate tax planning and reporting. Substantial liability — or savings — may be involved.
Example: If Decedent died in 2002 or 2003 and “held” property worth $1 million or more at his/her date of death, you as his/her Personal Representative will almost certainly be required to file a federal estate tax return (Form 706) and may or may not be required to pay an estate tax, depending on the nature of Decedent’s beneficiaries.
In general: IRS Publication: Estate and Gift Taxes.
For the instructions for the federal estate tax return (Form 706): IRS Publication: Instructions for Form 706.
For the federal estate tax return (Form 706) itself: U.S. Estate Tax Return (Form 706).
On February 3, 2005, the Washington Supreme Court abolished the Washington estate tax. See: The decision.
Thereafter, the Washington Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation imposing a Washington estate tax for Decedents dying after May 16, 2005, having a taxable estate of more than $1.5 million in 2005 or $2 million in 2006 or later. The Washington estate tax rates begin at 10% and increase to 19% for taxable estates greater than $9 million.
For purposes of this website, a “Preliminary Distribution” is a distribution of estate assets to one or more of its heirs or beneficiaries made before the expiration of the four-month Creditor’s Claim Statute of Limitations period (the “four month period”). Technically, a “Preliminary Distribution” is any distribution made before the Final Distribution, upon the closing of the estate.
To benefit the heirs or beneficiaries, by giving them prompt access to the property to which they are entitled.
The inherent problem in making a Preliminary Distribution is unknown creditors, specifically one who presents a substantial and legitimate Creditor’s Claim after the making of any Preliminary Distribution but before the expiration of the four-month period. Upon the receipt of such an unexpected Creditor’s Claim, the estate may no longer contain sufficient assets to satisfy the claim. In that case, the Personal Representative will need to re-acquire some or all of the assets that have been distributed in order to pay the claim.
Will be promptly returned, without the Personal Representative having to obtain a Court Order.
Therefore, in deciding what property may appropriately be the subject of a Preliminary Distribution, all property subject to specific gifts (eg, I give all my shares of Microsoft stock to the United Way”) should be distributed first, followed by all property subject to general gifts (eg, I give 100 shares of Microsoft stock to the United Way”), and so forth.
Probably the most likely case for a significant Preliminary Distribution to be made is following the death of a spouse where the surviving spouse is the Personal Representative and major heir or beneficiary. The surviving spouse will likely be aware of Decedent’s debts, and the commonality of the Personal Representative and the major heir or beneficiary makes the “un-needy” and “cooperative” heirs or beneficiaries requirement moot. Another likely case is following the death of a parent where one of the parent’s adult children is the Personal Representative and he/she together with his/her siblings are the major heirs or beneficiaries.
The estate has an estate tax filing or paying obligation to the IRS, and the Personal Representative desires not to close the estate before receiving the IRS closing letter, indicating the acceptance by the IRS that the estate’s obligations have been met.
The estate has an asset, typically a parcel of real property, that is subject to an option to purchase held by a third party, and the Personal Representative desires not to close the estate before the option is either exercised or expires.
Decedent’s estate includes a parcel of real property located out of state, necessitating an ancillary probate of that property in the foreign jurisdiction, and the Personal Representative desires not to close the domiciliary probate before the ancillary probate is closed.
The most bizarre example in your author’s experience was a Washington probate with a large number of beneficiaries and whose major asset was a portfolio of numerous viatical contracts on the lives of AIDS victims in Florida; viatical contracts are life insurance policies on the lives of unrelated parties that are bought solely for investment. Here, the problem was two-fold. First, dealing with the ancillary Florida probate. But more importantly, the Decedent had purchased the viatical contracts early in the AIDS epidemic, when no effective remedy for AIDS was known and the insureds had life expectancies of only a few years. Time had past, AIDS remedies were discovered, and the insureds were not dying as expected, allowing the Decedent’s investment to “pay off.” The Personal Representative and the beneficiaries were stuck with waiting far longer than the Decedent had anticipated. Other assets could be preliminarily distributed, but the domiciliary probate was put on hold for years.
The property received by the heirs or beneficiaries will become immune from (almost) all Creditor’s Claims presented after only four months following first publication of the Notice instead of after 24 months following Decedent’s date of death.
Wanting the probate process over and the assets transferred quickly after death may largely be had by making Preliminary Distributions, while also receiving the benefits of using the Washington Probate Creditor’s Claim Procedure.

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 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2012, ACT 50/011/2013, Apr. 10, 2013. Larry Roberts, Trinidad executes nine in four days, Intl. Committee of the Fourth Intl., http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/cari-j17.shtml , Jun. 17, 1999.
 Trinidad and Tobago Treason Act, art. 2, Act No. 16 of 1842, amended by Act No. 45 of 1979, 1979, as updated to Dec. 31, 2011. Larry Roberts, Trinidad executes nine in four days, Intl. Committee of the Fourth Intl., http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/cari-j17.shtml , Jun. 17, 1999.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 16, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 BBC, Country Profiles: Trinidad and Tobago Profile, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12650940, Sep. 14, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2017, p. 13, ACT 50/7955/2018, Apr. 12, 2018.
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 Amnesty Intl., Trinidad and Tobago: First execution in ten years threatened, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=18358, Jul. 31, 2009.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 17, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
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 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 15, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Trinidad and Tobago Criminal Law Act, sec. 2(A), Act 20 of 1936, as amended by Act 16 of 1997 and Act 90 of 2000, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Anti-Terrorism Act, art. 19(2)(b), Act 26 of 2005, Sept. 13, 2005, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Treason Act, art. 2, Act 16 of 1842, Jul. 22, 1844, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Treason Act, art. 3, Act 16 of 1842, Jul. 22, 1844, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Genocide Act, art. 3(1)(a), Act 1 of 1977, Jan. 31, 1977, updated to Dec. 31, 2011 & Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Act, Act No. 90 of 2000, Nov. 2, 2000.
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 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, arts. 4D, 4E, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4H, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, arts. 4I, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, Appendix: Act 90 of 2000, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Parliament : Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Bills : First Session of the 10th Parliament : The Constitution (Amendment)(Capital Offences) Bill, 2011, last accessed Sep. 22, 2013. Trinidad and Tobago, The Constitution (Amendment) (Capital Offences) Bill, 2011, Bill No. 2 of 2011, First Session of Tenth Parliament.
 Matthew v. The State, No. 12 of 2004,  UKPC 33, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Jul. 7, 2004.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, pp. 14-15, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 4, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Trinidad and Tobago Genocide Act, art. 3(1)(a), Act 1 of 1977, Jan. 31, 1977 and Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, combined.
 Trinidad and Tobago Treason Act, art. 2, Act 16 of 1842, amended by Act 45 of 1979, 1979, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Anti-Terrorism Act, art. 19(2)(b), Act 26 of 2005, Sep. 13, 2005, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Sophia Chote, affiliated with the Criminal Bar of Trinidad and Tobago, and Leela M. Ramdeen, affiliated with the Catholic Commission for Social Justice, e-mail to DPW, DPW Doc. Trinidad E-1, Sep. 21, 2013.
 Trinidad and Tobago Criminal Law Act, sec. 2(A), Act 20 of 1936, as amended by Act 16 of 1997 and Act 90 of 2000, updated to Dec. 31, 2011. Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 4, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Nimrod Miguel v. The State, No. 37 of 2010,  UKPC 14, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Jun. 15, 2011. Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 15, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Trinidad and Tobago Children Act, s. 79, Act 4 of 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, Second periodic Reports of States parties due in 1999, Trinidad and Tobago, para. 257, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.12, Nov. 15, 2004.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4〈=en, Jun. 8, 2013.
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989.
 Amnesty Intl., Executions of Juveniles Since 1990, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/executions-of-child-offenders-since-1990, last accessed Aug. 2, 2013.
 Criminal Procedure Act, art. 62, Act 22 of 1925, Jun. 2, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4A, Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 2013, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 See, e.g., Pitman v. The State (Trinidad And Tobago), No. 89 of 2005,  UKPC 16, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Mar. 3, 2008. Nigel Brown v. The State, No. 107 of 2010,  UKPC 2, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Feb. 7, 2012.
 Criminal Procedure Act, arts. 64-66, Act 22 of 1925, Jun. 2, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, p. 208, Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2008.
 Offences Against the Person Act, art. 4A(1), Act 10 of 1925, Apr. 3, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4〈=en, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4〈=en, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Dec. 31, 1999.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4〈=en , last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Second Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, Dec. 15, 1989, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-12&chapter=4〈=en , last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Second Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, Dec. 15, 1989, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-12&chapter=4〈=en, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 13, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Status, Declarations, Reservations, Denunciations, Withdrawals, B-32: Amer. Conv. on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, http://cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic4.amer.conv.ratif.htm, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Status, Declarations, Reservations, Denunciations, Withdrawals A-53: Prot. to the Amer. Conv. on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, Jun. 8, 1990, http://cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic8.death%20penalty%20ratif.htm, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 U.N.G.A., 63rd Session, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty: Resolution, 70th Plenary Meeting, pp. 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.70, Dec. 18, 2008.
While Trinidad has not carried out any executions since 1999, its abolitionist de facto status is the particular result of the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council based in the United Kingdom, which as a result of Trinidad’s colonial past remains its highest appellate court. Without the Privy Council’s restrictive constitutional interpretations, Trinidad and Tobago would in all probability continue to carry out executions.
Capital punishment in Trinidad has been the subject of several recent in-depth studies.
All of the Privy Council’s judgments issued after July 2009 can be found on its website at http://www.jcpc.gov.uk/decided-cases/index.html. Earlier Privy Council judgments can be found on BAILII at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC. The Privy Council Papers website provides detailed case records for all appeals considered by the JCPC between 1792 and 1998: http://www.privycouncilpapers.org.
Further selected Court of Appeal decisions from 1996 to 2006 are available on CommonLII at http://www.commonlii.org/tt/cases/TTCA/recent.html.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, art. 4(a), Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, art. 5(2)(b), Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, art. 6, Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003. Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 14, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, art. 13, Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003. Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 14, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, arts. 87-89, Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, arts. 42(1)(e), 48(1)(d), Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, art. 94 & Third Schedule (art. 5), Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 10, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Annual Report 2013: Trinidad and Tobago, p. 271, Index: POL 10/001/2013, May 23, 2013.
 Amnesty Intl., Trinidad and Tobago : Further Information : Execution Bill Defeated, Index: AMR 49/003/2011, Mar. 2, 2011.
 U.N.G.A., 67th Session, 60th Plenary Meeting, pp. 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/67/PV.60, Dec. 20, 2012. U.N.G.A., 65th Session, 71st Plenary Meeting, pp. 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.71, Dec. 21, 2010. U.N.G.A., 63rd Session, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty: Resolution, 70th Plenary Meeting, pp. 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.70, Dec. 18, 2008. U.N.G.A., 62nd Session, 76th Plenary Meeting, pp. 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.76, Dec. 18, 2007.
 Mark James, Major steps to abolish death penalty in CARICOM, Catholic Commission for Social Justice, rcsocialjusticett.org/2.0/2010/10/28/major-steps-to-abolish-death-penalty-in-caricom, Oct. 28, 2010.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 7, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Annual Report 2012 : Trinidad and Tobago, http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2012, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 14, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 Darren Bahaw : DPP : Milestone ruling to revolutionise death penalty, www.trinidadexpress.com/news/DPP__Milestone_ruling_to_revolutionise_death_penalty_-124051164.html, Jun. 17, 2011.
 Gail Alexander, Abolitionists to hold conference in Spain, www.guardian.co.tt/news/2013-06-11/abolitionists-hold-conference-spain, Trinidad Guardian, Jun. 11, 2013.
 Trinidad Guardian, Ramlogan wants Opposition support for death penalty, guardian.co.tt/news/2013-03-03/ramlogan-wants-opposition-support-death-penalty, Mar. 3, 2013.
 Status, Declarations, Reservations, Denunciations, Withdrawals, B-32: Amer. Conv. on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, http://cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic4.amer.conv.ratif.htm, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013. Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4〈=en, last accessed Jul. 31, 2013.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012. Amnesty Intl., Urgent Action, First Execution in Ten Years Threatened, AMR 49/001/2009, Jul. 24, 2009.
 Dr. Hamid Ghany, The CCJ and the Death Penalty, Trinidad Guardian, www.guardian.co.tt/columnist/2013-05-19/ccj-and-death-penalty, May 19, 2013. Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, Death Penalty Cases for Final Court, www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,159111.html, Apr. 26, 2012. Andre Bagoo, Hangings Could Resume, Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,159106.html, Apr. 26, 2012.
 David F. Greenberg and Biko Agozino, Executions, imprisonment and crime in Trinidad and Tobago, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 52, p. 113, 2012.
 Roger Hood and Florence Seemungal, A rare and arbitrary fate: Conviction for Murder, the Mandatory Death Penalty and the Reality of Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago: A Report to the Death Penalty Project, http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/documents/rep-2006-rare-and-arbitrary-en.pdf, University of the West Indies Faculty of Law and University of Oxford Centre for Criminology, 2006.
 Roger Hood, Florence Seemungal, Douglas Mendes, & Jeffrey Fagan, A Penalty Without Legitimacy The Mandatory Death Penalty In Trinidad and Tobogo, Death Penalty Project, http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/assets/7/original/09.08.10_Trinidad_Publication.pdf?1259080068, Mar. 7, 2009.
 Roger Hood and Florence Seemungal, Public Opinion on the Mandatory Death Penalty in Trinidad : A Summary of the Main Findings of a Survey : A Report for the Death Penalty Project and the Rights Advocacy Project of the University of the West Indies Faculty of Law, http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/fulltexts/49/original/11.02.23_SUMMARY_EDITED_PO_REPORT_REVISED_23_FEB1.pdf?1298482044, Feb. 23, 2011.
 U.N.G.A. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review : Trinidad and Tobago, para. 89, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/7, Dec. 14, 2011.
 Matthew v. State, No. 12 of 2004, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2004. Roodal v. State, No. 18 of 2003, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 2003.
 Dana Seetahal, The Privy Council Has Done It Again, Trinidad Express, www.trinidadexpress.com/commentaries/The_Privy_Council_has_done_it_again-124120214.html, Jun. 18, 2011.
 Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, No. 10 of 1993, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1993.
 Darcus Howe, The Privy Council halts Caribbean hangings, New Statesman, http://www.newstatesman.com/node/138775, Oct. 16, 2000. Amnesty Intl., Urgent Action, First Execution in Ten Years Threatened, AMR 49/001/2009, Jul. 24, 2009. Attorney General v. Boyce, paras. 15, 47, 117, 126, 131, 138-139, Appeal No. CV 2 of 2005, Caribbean Court of Justice, Jun. 21, 2006 (discussing the effect of the 5-year limit imposed by Pratt).
 Pitman v. The State (Trinidad And Tobago), No. 89 of 2005,  UKPC 16, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Mar. 3, 2008.
 Nigel Brown v. The State, No. 107 of 2010,  UKPC 2, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Feb. 7, 2012. Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, pp. 19-20, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 20, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Criminal Procedure Act, art. 70, Act 22 of 1925, Jun. 2, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 108, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 109-113, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Trinidad and Tobago Criminal Procedure Act, art. 6, Act 22 of 1925, Jun. 2, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 24, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, para. 25, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Trinidad and Tobago Criminal Procedure Act, art. 46(1), Act 22 of 1925, Jun. 2, 1925, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Catherine A. Deane and Vincent Moyer, Trinidad and Tobago Law and Legal Research, GlobaLex, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Trinidad_Tobago1.htm#judicialbranch, Apr. 2013.
 The Constitution of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, arts. 108-109, Act 4 of 1976, last amended by Act 89 of 2000, 2003.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 91-92, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 95-96, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 Trinidad and Tobago Supreme Court of Judicature Act, art. 43, Act 12 of 1962, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Trinidad and Tobago Supreme Court of Judicature Act, art. 51, Act 12 of 1962, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
We found no reports of individuals sentenced to death for a crime committed while under the age of 18.
 Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty, The Caribbean: Trinidad/Tobago, http://www.ccadp.org/islands.htm, Feb. 16, 2006.
 Francis Joseph, 86 killers escape hangman, Trinidad and Tobago’s Newsday, http://newsday.co.tt/news/0,19782.html, Jul. 8, 2004.
 U.S. State Department, 2012 Human Rights Reports : Trinidad and Tobago, Prison and Detention Center Conditions, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/wha/204482.htm, Apr. 19, 2013.
 Trinidad Guardian, New prisons’ inspector : Don’t expect magic wand, www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/01/22/don-t-expect-magic-wand, Jan. 22, 2011.
 Clevon Raphael, Prison reform will reduce crime – Khan, Trinidad Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2013-04-06/prison-reform-will-reduce-crime-khan, Apr. 7, 2013.
 Yvonne Baboolal, One day at a time, Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, Mar. 15, 2009.
 Gail Alexander, Abolitionists hold conference in Spain, Trinidad Guardian, www.guardian.co.tt/news/2013-06-11/abolitionists-hold-conference-spain, Jun. 11, 2013.
 Trinidad and Tobago Legal Aid and Advice Act, art. 17, Act 25 of 1976, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 17, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Trinidad and Tobago Legal Aid and Advice Act, art. 18(1), Act 25 of 1976, updated to Dec. 31, 2011.
 Lendore v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 9, Report No. 21/05, Inter-Amer. Commn. on Human Rights, 2005.
 Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 91-94, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
 U.S. Dept. of State, 2012 Human Rights Report: Trinidad and Tobago, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/wha/204482.htm, Apr. 19, 2013.
 Trinidad Guardian, Certain practices can create room for flaws, http://guardian.co.tt/2012-01-24/certain-practices-can-create-room-flaws, Jan. 24, 2012. Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 18, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the American Convention on Human Rights largely to deny death row prisoners the ability to submit petitions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  The Inter-American human rights system therefore currently has no jurisdiction over the implementation of the death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Human Rights Issue, p. 18, Index AMR 05/001/2012, Nov. 30, 2012.
 Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Dec. 31, 1999. Amnesty Intl., Trinidad and Tobago: Human rights concerns in Trinidad and Tobago: Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review October 2011, Index AMR 49/006/2011, Jul. 31, 2011.
 Status, Declarations, and Reservations, Optional Prot. to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4〈=en, last accessed Aug. 6, 2013.
 U.N. ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, para. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/TTO, Nov. 3, 2000.
 U.N.G.A. Human Rights Council, Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, paras. 63-64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/12/TTO/2, Jul. 25, 2011.
 Sahadath v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 684/1996, Human Rights Committee, Apr. 2, 2002. See, also, Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 98/2000, Human Rights Committee, Apr. 4, 2003; Siewpersaud v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 938/2000, Human Rights Committee, Jul. 29, 2004; others available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/LACRegion/Pages/TTIndex.aspx.
 Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 580/1994, Human Rights Committee, Mar. 21, 2002.
 Amnesty Intl., Death Sentences and Executions in 2011, p. 15, ACT 50/001/2012, Mar. 27, 2012.
 U.N.G.A. Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1*: Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 48-53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/12/TTO/1, Jul. 19, 2011.
 U.N.G.A. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review : Trinidad and Tobago, paras. 17-19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/7, Dec. 14, 2011.
Desmond Allum & Gregory Delzin, Report on the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago, Bar Human Rights Committee, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/content/report-criminal-justice-system-trinidad-and-tobago, 2003.
David F. Greenberg and Biko Agozino, Executions, imprisonment and crime in Trinidad and Tobago, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 52, p. 113, 2012. Roger Hood and Florence Seemungal, A rare and arbitrary fate: Conviction for Murder, the Mandatory Death Penalty and the Reality of Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago: A Report to the Death Penalty Project, http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/documents/rep-2006-rare-and-arbitrary-en.pdf, University of the West Indies Faculty of Law and University of Oxford Centre for Criminology, 2006.

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§ 107-1 Authorization to adopt collection and disposal rules and regulations.
§ 107-3 Source separation; exemption from source-separation requirements.
§ 107-4 Preparation for collection; prohibited locations.
§ 107-6 Hours for collection.
§ 107-7 Metal appliances; charge for removal.
§ 107-8 Fees for collection.
§ 107-11 Residential dwelling compliance requirements.
§ 107-12 Nonresidential establishment compliance requirements.
§ 107-13 New developments of multifamily residential units or commercial, institutional, or industrial properties (pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:1E-99.13a and 99.16c).
§ 107-14 Collection of solid waste mixed with recyclable materials prohibited.
§ 107-15 Enforcement; random inspections.
§ 107-16 Violations and penalties.
§ 107-19 Disposal of recyclable materials.
§ 107-21 Unauthorized collection prohibited.
§ 107-22 Sale or donation of recyclable materials permitted.
§ 107-25 Distribution of public information.
§ 107-26 Separation of medical waste required; applicability.
§ 107-27 Collection of nonmedical solid waste from medical facilities.
§ 107-28 Liability for Borough costs.
Littering; handbills; brush and trash — See Ch. 120.
Sewage disposal — See Ch. 226.
Editor's Note: This chapter also repealed former Ch. 107, Garbage, Municipal Solid Waste and Recyclables, as amended.


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be-werigend, -wergend a protector. Add :-- Hé sceal been be-wergend wydewena, O. E. Hml. i. 302, 34. Paulus wæs bewerigend þæ-acute;re ealdan æ-acute;, Hml. Th. i. 388, 32: Hml. S. 7, 127. Ðæt gé sýn beweriendras Crtstes landáre, C. D. iii. 350, 27.
be-werung. Substitute: Defence, protection :-- Freónd getreówe bewerung (protectio) strang, Scint. 194, 11 : manitio, 35, 20. For mynstres bewerunge (defensione), Angl. xiii. 373, 114. Under rihtum dóme and bewerunge sub jurisdictione atgue tuitions, C. D. B. i. 155, 20. Wæ-acute;pnu on swæþnum beran bewerunge hit getácnað, Lch. iii. 198, 11: 206, 4.
be-westan-norþan, -westan-súþan. v. westan-norþan, -súþan in Dict.
be-willan; p. de To boil away :-- Dó on wylisc ealu, bewyl oþ þrid-dan dæl, Lch. ii. 120, 15. Genim betonican, wyl in wætere, bewyll þriddan dæ-acute;l, iii. 43, 22. Wylle oþ sié twæ-acute;de bewylled þæs wóses, ii. 38, 11. Wylle on cetele oþ þ-bar; se wæ-acute;. a sié twæ-acute;de on bewylled, 332, 17: 966, 31. Gewyrce gemilscade drincan, þ-bar; is micel dæ-acute;l bewylledes wæ-acute;teres on huniges gódum dæ-acute;le, 202, 27.
be-willan, -wellan ; p. de To roll about, mix with ingredients :-- Be-welledne (-weledne, v. l. ) hláf and mid áttre gemengedne infectum veneno panem, Gr. D. 118, 6. Confectos, i. compositos, mixtos vel be-welde, Wrt. Voc. ii. 133, 22. [Cf. O. Frs. bi-willa to pollute : O. L. Ger. be-uuillid inficit; beuuollan pollutus; O. H. Ger. wellan volvere; pi-wellan polluere.] v. next word.
be-wilw(i)an. I. to roll down :-- þenne he byþ þurh fyllas be-wylewud cumfuerit per precipitia deuolutus, Scint. 107, 14. II. to roll about, mix. v. preceding word :-- Geæ-acute;tredum, bewyledum, befýle&dash-uncertain;dum infectis, Wrt. Voc. ii. 43, 62.
be-witan. Add: I. in a general sense, to take charge of, watch over :-- Wén is þ-bar; hé wille bewitan á his menn ge on lífe ge on deá ðe, Hml. S. 17, 187, II. of official or professional action, to have charge or direction of, (1) persons :-- Se mágister þe þá cild bewát the schoolmaster, Tech. ii. 118, 12. þ á hyndenmenn and þá þe teóðunge bewitan, Ll. Th. i. 236, 4. Ic wæs dæges and nihtes mid hyre and hí bewiste, and heó hlyste mínre láre, Wlfst. 140, 18. Se yldesta bewiste þá þe nigene teó Sélcum geláste, Ll. Th. ii. 30, 22. part werod þe hé (Lucifer) bewiste, Hml. Th. i. 10, 17. Oðer bewiste his byrlas, óðer his bæcestran alter pincernis praeerat, alter pistoribus, Gen. 40, 2. þ ára geréfena þe þá men bewiston æt þám temple, Angl. xi. 9, 24. Hundredes ealdras þe ðá burhware bewiston, Hml. Th. ii. 418, 34. Se læ-acute;ce tilað ðæs gewundedan ðe hé bewitan sceal (cui medicamentum adhibet). Past. 457, 16. Se cyng sende Ælfún mid þám æþelingum, þ-bar; hé hí bewitan sceolde, Chr. 1013; P. 144, 15. Hé hié (his sons) betáhte twæ-acute;m ealdormonnum tó bewitanne singulis potissimis infantum cura commissa erat, Ors. 6, 37; S. 296, 2. (2) places, institutions, &c. :-- Se ealdor þe þæt mynster bewát qui monasterio praeest, Cht. Th. 333, 37- Hæ-acute;ðen mundbora þe þá burh bewiste, Hml. S. 22, 99: 3, 61. pá góde mæn þe þis land bewiston, Chr. 1091; P. 226, 27. (3) property :-- þá (the senators) wæron simbel binnan Rómebyrg wuniende, tó þon þ-bar; hié bewisten eal þ-bar; licgende feoh, Ors. 2, 4; S. 72, 4. Hé betæ-acute;hte hit Eardulfe tó bewitenne commisit manerium Eardulfo ad custodiendum, Cht. Th. 271, 25. Ic an ðæs landes Æffan tó bewitanne, 496, 14, (4) implements, affairs, offices, &c. :-- Ælfríc þá sócne mínre móder tó handa bewiste, C. D. iv. 222, 20. Hé ealle his gemót bewiste, Chr. 1099; P 235,1 Þegn þe his ælmyssan bewiste his almoner, Hml. S. 26, 91. Se munuc þe þæs mynstres geat bewiste, 23 b, 66. Hé ungeorne bewiste hwæt he dyde he managed his business carelessly. Bl. H. 183, 23. Hí gesettan him x consulas, tó þon þ-bar; hié hiera æ-acute; bewisten (constituendarum legum gratia), Ors. 2, 6; S. 88, 19. Swilce þú micel bewytan wills as if you wish to see after much business (?), Tech. ii. 121, 8. Ð á ðing tó bewitanne ðe tó scipene belimpað, Angl. ix. 260, 4. Mynstres æ-acute;hta on tólum oþþe on reáfum sýn betæ-acute;hte tó bewitenne þám gebróþrum, R. Ben. 56, 4.
be-witian. Add: I. to watch, observe :-- Sé sceal þ æ-acute;re sunnan síð behealdan, . . . georne bewitigan, hwonne up cyme æðclost tungla, Ph. 92. II. to have charge or direction of, see about or after, (1) living things :-- Be ð ám (te beon bewitað concerning the beekeeper, Ll. Th. i. 434, 35. (2) places :-- þæs mægenbrymmes nán þe ricebewitigað, þeódnes þrýlgesteald, Cri. 353. (3) affairs, proceedings, matters :-- Hí þá þeg-nunge beweotigað, El. 745. Hé ealle beweotede þegnes þearfe, B. 1796. Hé þý geornlícar hire þearfa begá and bewiotige, Cht. Th. 470, 13. þæs behðfaí hie. eþa æ-acute;ghwylc, þ he his sáwle s!ð sylfa bewitige (geþence, MS. Vercel. ) that he see after the course of his soul, Exon. Th. 367, 4. þæt hé (the star) þæ-acute;re sunnan síð bewitige, hé sceal beforan féran, Met. 4, 16. Ealle gesceafta mótan heora gewunan bewitigan bútan me ánum all creatures may direct their customs except me only, Bt. 7, 3; F. 20, 24 : Gú. 170. v. precuding word.
be-wlátian. Add :-- Hé bewlátode ofor ealle respexit super omnes, Ps. L. 32, 14.
be-wrítan. Add: To score round :-- Bewrít þú hý (the mandragora) wel hraþe mid íserne, þý læ-acute;s heó þé ætfleó . . . þ ú hý bewrít mid íserne, and swá þú scealt onbútan hý delfan swá ðú hyre mid þám íserne ná æthríne make a score in the ground round it at once with iron, lest it escape thee . . . score round it with iron, and so must you dig round it as not to touch it with the iron, Lch. i. 244, 17-23. v. Grmm. D. M. 1153 sqq., and cf. ymb-wrítan.
be-wuna; odj. indecl. Wont, accustomed :-- Swá hié æ-acute;r bewuna wæ-acute;ron, þonne hié wælstówe geweald áhton, Ors. 3, 7 ; S. 116, 32. Hí dydon eall swá hí bewuna wæ-acute;ron, Chr. 1001; P. 133, 20. Cf. ge&dash-uncertain;wuna ; adj.
be-wyrded defatu. l. be wyrde de fatu, Wrt. Voc. ii. 27, 60: be-yrnan. v. be-irnan.
biblioþéce, bibliþéca. Add: I. a library :-- Heora bibliþéca (bibliotheoco, v. l.. ) wærð onbærned . . . on heora bibliþécan forburnon IIII hund M bóca, Ors. 6, 14; Bos. 122, 19-23. Nime heora æ-acute;lc sume bóc of þ æ-acute;re bibliothécan, R. Ben. 74, 13. II. the bible :-- þis spel (Judith) nis on ð æ-acute;re bibliothécan, Hml. A. 114, 405. Gyf þú biblio-ðécan habban wille, Tech. ii. 120, 26.
bicce.. Add: -- Bicce cunicula, Wrt. Voc. ii. 23, 8. Andlang eá on biccan pól, C. D. iii. 456, 26.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.