The term "legislative body" of a municipality, as used in this chapter, shall mean the mayor and board of aldermen of a city, the selectboard of a town, and the president and trustees of an incorporated village. The term "selectboard," as used in this chapter, shall include the mayor and board of aldermen of a city and the president and trustees of an incorporated village. The term "town" shall mean village or city.
The right of a legislative branch of a municipality to make such regulations shall not take effect until they have been approved and accepted by a majority of the voters of the municipality attending a duly warned regular or special meeting called for that purpose, nor shall such regulations take effect until they are published once a week on the same day for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in such municipality or, in the absence thereof, in a newspaper circulating within the county.
§§ 2061-2066. Repealed. 1961, No. 261, § 17, eff. July 31, 1961.
§§ 2067-2081. Repealed. 1969, No. 98, § 2.
Upon complaint to the legislative body that some person, firm, or corporation, having authority to transact business in this State, is unreasonably and unnecessarily disturbing or interfering with the reception of radio or television waves used for radio or television transmission, the legislative body, after notice to such person, firm, or corporation, may investigate or cause to be investigated such complaint under such rules and regulations as the legislative body may prescribe as to service of such notice and as to the date of hearing thereon.
If, upon such investigation, the source and cause of such alleged disturbance or interference is determined, after due notice as provided in section 2091 of this title, the legislative body shall give due notice in writing to the person, firm, or corporation found by such legislative body to be responsible therefor to correct or eliminate the cause of such unnecessary or unreasonable disturbance or interference, within a reasonable time thereafter to be stated in such notice. Such notice may be sent to the person, firm, or corporation affected, by registered mail addressed to the residence or place of business in this State.
The selectboard of a town in the name and behalf of such town or the town school district therein, as the case may be, and the trustees of an incorporated village, in the name and behalf of such village, may prefer complaint for relief by injunction for the abatement of public nuisances. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of such actions.
A municipality may make regulations respecting children under 16 years of age who are allowed to loiter in the streets or other public places. Such regulations shall be conducive to their welfare and to the public good. Such municipality may fix a penalty of not more than $5.00 for each violation of such regulations to be recovered against the person having the custody of such child in a civil action on this statute.
Owners and renters of land shall have the right to vend or sell all products of such land at wholesale or retail, in person or by agent, in towns without obtaining licenses therefor from such towns.
(a)(1) Prohibition. Every person shall be responsible for proper disposal of his or her own solid waste. A person shall not throw, dump, deposit, or cause or permit to be thrown, dumped, or deposited any solid waste as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6602, refuse of whatever nature, or any noxious thing in or on lands or waters of the State outside a solid waste management facility certified by the Agency of Natural Resources.
(2) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person who is identifiable from an examination of illegally disposed solid waste is the person who violated a provision of this section.
(B) complying with all relevant State and local regulations and ordinances.
(b) Prosecution of violations. A person who violates a provision of this section commits a civil violation and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $800.00.
(1) This violation shall be enforceable in the Judicial Bureau pursuant to the provisions of 4 V.S.A. chapter 29 in an action that may be brought by a municipal attorney, a solid waste management district attorney, an environmental enforcement officer employed by the Agency of Natural Resources, a designee of the legislative body of the municipality, or any duly authorized law enforcement officer.
(2) If the throwing, placing, or depositing was done from a snowmobile, vessel, or motor vehicle, except a motor bus, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the throwing, placing, or depositing was done by the operator of the snowmobile, vessel, or motor vehicle.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the operation of an automobile graveyard or salvage yard as defined in section 2241 of this title, nor shall anything in this section be construed as prohibiting the installation and use of appropriate receptacles for solid waste provided by the State or towns.
(c) Roadside cleanup. A person found in violation of this section may be assigned to spend up to 80 hours collecting trash or litter from a specified segment of roadside or from a specified area of public property.
(e) Revocation of hunting, fishing, or trapping license. The Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife shall revoke the privilege of a person found in violation of this section from holding a hunting, fishing, or trapping license for a period of one year from the date of the conviction, if the person fails to pay the penalty set forth in subsection (b) of this section. The Bureau shall immediately notify the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife of the entry of judgment.
(g) Amendment of complaint. A person authorized to enforce this section may amend or dismiss a complaint issued by that person by marking the complaint and returning it to the Judicial Bureau. At the hearing, a person authorized to enforce this section may amend or dismiss a complaint issued by that person, subject to the approval of the hearing judge.
(i) Applicability. Enforcement actions taken under this section shall in no way preclude the Agency of Natural Resources, the Attorney General, or an appropriate State prosecutor from initiating other or further enforcement actions under the civil, administrative, or criminal enforcement provisions of 10 V.S.A. chapter 23, 47, 159, 201, or 211. To the extent that enforcement under this section is by an environmental enforcement officer employed by the Agency of Natural Resources, enforcement under this section shall preclude other enforcement by the Agency for the same offence.
(1) "Motor vehicle" shall have the same meaning as in 23 V.S.A. § 4(21).
(2) "Snowmobile" shall have the same meaning as in 23 V.S.A. § 3801.
(3) "Vessel" means motor boats, boats, kayaks, canoes, sailboats, and all other types of watercraft.
(a) A person shall not use trash containers which are provided for travel trash at State parks, public picnic and rest areas, and roadside turnouts as dumping places for household garbage, household trash, farm waste, or commercial waste materials or deposit such garbage, trash, or waste material on or near any spot commonly used for picnic purposes.
§ 2202. Repealed. 1977, No. 106, § 4.
(a) Municipalities are responsible for the management and regulation of the storage, collection, processing, and disposal of solid wastes within their jurisdiction in conformance with the State Solid Waste Management Plan authorized under 10 V.S.A. chapter 159. Municipalities may issue exclusive local franchises and may make, amend, or repeal rules necessary to manage the storage, collection, processing, and disposal of solid waste materials within their limits and impose penalties for violations thereof, provided that the rules are consistent with the State Plan and rules adopted by the Secretary of Natural Resources under 10 V.S.A. chapter 159. A fine may not exceed $1,000.00 for each violation. This section shall not be construed to permit the existence of a nuisance.
(b) Municipalities may satisfy the requirements of the State Solid Waste Management Plan and the rules of the Secretary of Natural Resources through agreement between any other unit of government or any operator having a permit from the Secretary, as the case may be.
(c)(1) On or before July 1, 1988, each municipality, as defined in subdivision 4303(12) of this title, shall join or participate in a solid waste management district organized pursuant to chapter 121 of this title on or before January 1, 1988 or participate in a regional planning commission's planning effort for purposes of solid waste implementation planning, as implementation planning is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6602.
(2) On or before July 1, 1990, each regional planning commission shall work on a cooperative basis with municipalities within the region to prepare a solid waste implementation plan for adoption by all of the municipalities within the region that are not members of a solid waste district, that conforms to the State Waste Management Plan and describes in detail how the region will achieve the priorities established by 10 V.S.A. § 6604(a)(1). A solid waste implementation plan adopted by a municipality that is not a member of a district shall not in any way require the approval of a district. On or before July 1, 1990, each solid waste district shall adopt a solid waste implementation plan that conforms to the State Waste Management Plan, describes in detail how the district will achieve the priorities established by 10 V.S.A. § 6604(a), and is in conformance with any regional plan adopted pursuant to chapter 117 of this title. Municipalities or solid waste management districts that have contracts in existence as of January 1, 1987, which contracts are inconsistent with the State Solid Waste Plan and the priorities established in 10 V.S.A. § 6604(a), shall not be required to breach those contracts, provided they make good faith efforts to renegotiate those contracts in order to comply. The Secretary may extend the deadline for completion of a plan upon finding that despite good faith efforts to comply, a regional planning commission or solid waste management district has been unable to comply, due to delays in completion of a landfill evaluation under 10 V.S.A. § 6605a.
(3) A municipality that does not join or participate as provided in this subsection shall not be eligible for State funds to plan and construct solid waste facilities, nor can it use facilities certified for use by the region or by the solid waste management district.
(4) A regional plan or a solid waste implementation plan shall include a component for the management of nonregulated hazardous wastes.
(A) At the outset of the planning process for the management of nonregulated hazardous wastes and throughout the process, solid waste management districts or regional planning commissions, with respect to areas not served by solid waste management districts, shall solicit the participation of owners of solid waste management facilities that receive mixed solid wastes, local citizens, businesses, and organizations by holding informal working sessions that suit the needs of local people. At a minimum, an advisory committee composed of citizens and business persons shall be established to provide guidance on both the development and implementation of the nonregulated hazardous waste management plan component.
(B) The regional planning commission or solid waste management district shall hold at least two public hearings within the region or district after public notice on the proposed plan component or amendment.
(iv) reduction in the toxicity of the solid waste stream, to the maximum extent feasible in accordance with the priorities of 10 V.S.A. § 6604(a)(1).
(vii) a waste management system established for all the waste streams banned from landfills under 10 V.S.A. § 6621a.
(E) For the purposes of this subsection, nonregulated hazardous wastes include hazardous wastes generated by households and exempt small quantity generators as defined in the hazardous waste management regulations adopted under 10 V.S.A. chapter 159.
(d) By no later than July 1, 2015, a municipality shall implement a variable rate pricing system that charges for the collection of municipal solid waste from a residential customer for disposal based on the volume or weight of the waste collected.
§ 2203. Repealed. 1977, No. 106, § 4.
(a) Whether or not a municipality provides for the operation and maintenance of a recycling center or intermediate processing facility pursuant to section 2203a of this title, the municipality may establish requirements for the management of such a center or facility.
(c) For the purposes of Titles 10, 24, and 32, recycling means the process of utilizing waste for the production of raw materials or products, but shall not include processing solid waste to produce energy or fuel products.
§ 2204. Repealed. 1979, No. 47, § 1(1), eff. April 25, 1979.
§ 2205. Repealed. 1979, No. 47, § 1(2), eff. April 25, 1979.
(a) The Secretary of Natural Resources shall develop a State plan for the establishment and operation of solid waste recycling centers sufficient to meet the need for solid waste recycling throughout the State. In developing a State plan, the Secretary may establish pilot or demonstration projects for the purpose of determining equitable regions or methods for solid waste recycling. Pursuant to such plan, the Secretary shall establish and operate or contract for the establishment and operation of a solid waste recycling center within each town, or within each administrative district created pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 4001, or within such other regions as he or she deems reasonable to efficiently utilize solid waste recycling facilities at locations determined by him or her with the approval of the legislative body of the town in which the facility is to be located. Each recycling center shall be used for the storage, processing, and sale or disposal of solid waste. The Secretary may purchase, lease, or rent land or designate land owned by the State or any agency or department thereof for use as recycling centers.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to contract in the name of the State for the service of independent contractors under bond or with an agency or department of the State or a town to operate the recycling centers or to collect solid waste and deliver it to a recycling center.
(c) The Secretary shall adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 to implement the provisions of this section.
§§ 2231-2233. Repealed. 2007, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 1(a).
(1) "Abandoned" means a motor vehicle as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 2151.
(2) "Board" means the State Transportation Board or its duly delegated representative.
(3) "Highway" means any highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1.
(4) "Interstate or primary highway" means any highway, including access roads, ramps, and connecting links, which have been designated by the State with the approval of the Federal Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, as part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, or as a part of the National System of Primary Highways.
(5) "Junk" means old or scrap copper, brass, iron, steel, and other old or scrap or nonferrous material, including rope, rags, batteries, glass, rubber debris, waste, trash, or any discarded, dismantled, wrecked, scrapped, or ruined motor vehicles or parts thereof.
(6) "Junk motor vehicle" means a discarded, dismantled, wrecked, scrapped, or ruined motor vehicle or parts thereof, or a motor vehicle, other than an on-premise utility vehicle, which is allowed to remain unregistered or uninspected for a period of 90 days from the date of discovery.
(7) "Salvage yard" means any place of outdoor storage or deposit for storing, keeping, processing, buying, or selling junk or as a scrap metal processing facility. "Salvage yard" also means any outdoor area used for operation of an automobile graveyard. It does not mean a garage where wrecked or disabled motor vehicles are stored for less than 90 days for inspection or repairs.
(8) "Legislative body" means the city council of a city, the selectboard of a town, or the board of trustees of a village.
(9) "Main traveled way" means the portion of a highway designed for the movement of motor vehicles, shoulders, auxiliary lanes, and roadside picnic, parking, rest, and observation areas and other areas immediately adjacent and contiguous to the traveled portion of the highway and designated by the Transportation Board as a roadside area for the use of highway users and generally but not necessarily located within the highway right-of-way.
(10) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power, including trailers.
(11) "Notice" means by certified mail with return receipt requested.
(12) "Scrap metal processing facility" means a manufacturing business which purchases sundry types of scrap metal from various sources including the following: industrial plants, fabricators, manufacturing companies, railroads, junkyards, auto wreckers, salvage dealers, building wreckers, and plant dismantlers and sells the scrap metal in wholesale shipments directly to foundries, ductile foundries, and steel foundries where the scrap metal is melted down and utilized in their manufacturing process.
(13) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Natural Resources or the Secretary's designee.
(B) accepting, storing, or dismantling junk motor vehicles.
(2) holds a certificate of registration issued by the Secretary to operate, establish, or maintain a salvage yard.
(b) The issuance of a certificate of registration under subsection (a) of this section shall not relieve a salvage yard from the obligation to comply with existing State and federal environmental laws and to obtain all permits required under State or federal environmental law.
(1) The Agency of Transportation or the Secretary of Natural Resources may make such reasonable rules as it, he, or she deems necessary, provided such rules do not conflict with any federal laws, rules, and regulations, or the provisions of this subchapter.
(2) The Agency of Transportation shall enter into agreements with the U.S. Secretary of Transportation or his or her representatives in order to designate those areas of the State that are properly zoned or used for industrial activities, and to arrange for federal cost participation.
(3) The Secretary shall adopt and enforce requirements for adequate fencing and screening of salvage yards.
(4) The Agency of Transportation may seek an injunction against a salvage yard that is in violation of the relevant provisions of this subchapter. The Secretary may enforce the relevant provisions of this chapter under 10 V.S.A. chapter 201.
§ 2244. Repealed. 1993, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 67(5).
(1) The siting of salvage yards, including setbacks from surface waters, wetlands, and potable water supplies. Siting requirements under this subdivision may include site-specific conditions for salvage yards operating under a valid certificate of registration under section 2242 of this title, provided that such site-specific conditions are designed to prevent releases to groundwater, discharges to surface waters, or other risks to public health and the environment. A site-specific condition under this subdivision may include the requirement that the owner or operator of a salvage yard obtain an individual certificate of registration under section 2242 of this title instead of operating under a general permit adopted by the Secretary under subsection (c) of this section.
(2) Exemptions from the requirement to obtain a certificate of registration under section 2242 of this title.
(B) assure proper management of salvage materials upon closure of the salvage yard.
(4) Removal of solid waste or tires from the salvage yard for proper disposal.
(5) Establishment and maintenance of screening or fencing of salvage yards from public view.
(6) Assuring proper closure of a salvage yard facility.
(7) Postclosure environmental monitoring of a salvage yard.
(8) Classes or categories of salvage yards, including those handling total loss vehicles from insurance.
(9) Additional measures that the Secretary determines necessary for the protection of public health, safety, and the environment.
(c)(1) The Secretary may issue a general permit for a certificate of registration issued to salvage yards under section 2242 of this title. The general permit may include a provision allowing a holder of a valid certificate of registration issued under this subchapter to self-certify compliance with the applicable standards of this subchapter and rules adopted under this subchapter. A general permit issued under this section shall be adopted by rule and may be incorporated into the rule required under subsection (b) of this section.
(E) the salvage yard presents a potential risk to public health or the environment.
(d) No person may deliver salvage vehicles to or operate a mobile salvage vehicle crusher at a salvage yard that does not hold a certificate of registration under this subchapter. A salvage yard holding a certificate of registration under this subchapter shall post a copy of its current certificate in a clearly visible location in the proximity of each entrance to the salvage yard.
(3) whether or not the proposed location can be reasonably protected from affecting the public health, safety, environment, or from a nuisance condition.
(b)(1) A person shall not establish, operate, or maintain a salvage yard which is within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of the interstate or primary highway systems and visible from the main traveled way thereof at any season of the year.
(2) On or after July 1, 2009, no person shall establish or initiate operation of a new salvage yard within 100 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a State or town road or within 100 feet of a navigable water, as that term is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 1422.
(a) After the hearing the legislative body shall, within 30 days, make a finding as to whether or not the application should be granted, giving notice of their finding to the applicant by mail, postage prepaid, to the address given on the application.
(5) a condition requiring a salvage yard established or initiated prior to July 1, 2009 to be setback 100-feet from the nearest edge of a right-of-way of a State or town road or from a navigable water as that term is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 1422, provided that if a salvage yard cannot demonstrate during the application process that it meets the 100-foot setback requirement of this subdivision, a municipality may regulate the salvage yard as a nonconforming use, nonconforming structure, or nonconforming lot under a municipal nonconformity bylaw adopted under section 4412 of this title, provided that no enlargement or further encroachment within a setback required under this subdivision shall be allowed.
(c) Certificates of approval shall be renewed thereafter for successive periods of not more than five years upon payment of the renewal fee without hearing, provided all provisions of this subchapter are complied with during the preceding period, and the salvage yard does not become a public nuisance under the common law.
(a) A salvage yard shall be screened by a fence or vegetation which effectively screens it from public view and which complies with the rules of the Secretary relative to the screening and fencing of salvage yards, and shall have a gate which shall be closed after business hours.
(b) Fences and artificial means used for screening purposes as hereafter provided shall be maintained neatly and in good repair. They shall not be used for advertising signs or other displays which are visible from the main traveled way of a highway or State or town road.
(c) All junk stored or deposited in a salvage yard shall be kept within the enclosure, except while being transported to or from the salvage yard. All wrecking or other work on the junk shall be accomplished within the enclosure.
(1) The applicant is able to comply with the provisions of this subchapter.
(2) The applicant has filed a currently valid certificate of approval of location with the Secretary.
§ 2263. Repealed. 2009, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 32(c).
§ 2264. Repealed. 2009, No. 56, § 17.
(a) A junk motor vehicle discovered in violation of section 2271 of this title shall be removed from view of the main traveled way of the highway by the owner of the land upon which it is discovered, upon receiving written notice from the Agency of Transportation to do so, if such owner holds title to the motor vehicle.
(b) If the owner of the land upon which a junk motor vehicle is discovered in violation of section 2271 of this title does not hold or disclaims title and the true owner of the motor vehicle is known or can be ascertained, the motor vehicle owner shall dispose of such motor vehicle in such a manner that it is no longer visible from the main traveled way of the highway upon receiving written notice from the Agency of Transportation to do so.
(c) The owner of land upon which a motor vehicle is left in violation of this section or section 2271 of this title may, without incurring any civil liability or criminal penalty to the owner or lienholders of such vehicle, cause the vehicle to be removed from the place where it is discovered to any other place on any property owned by him or her, or from the property, in accordance with 23 V.S.A. § 2152. The provisions of 23 V.S.A. chapter 21, subchapter 7 (abandoned motor vehicles) shall govern the identification, reclamation, and disposal of such vehicles.
(a) In addition to the penalty in section 2282 of this title, the legislative body may seek a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction against the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a salvage yard which is in violation of the relevant municipal requirements of this subchapter and may obtain compliance with the relevant municipal requirements of this subchapter and the terms of a certificate of approved location issued under this subchapter by complaint to the Environmental Division for the county in which the salvage yard is located.
(1) To set off portions of public highways of the municipality for sidewalks and bicycle paths and to regulate their use.
(2) To provide for the removal of snow and ice from sidewalks by the owner, occupant, or person having charge of abutting property.
(3) To provide for the location, protection, maintenance, and removal of trees, plants, and shrubs and buildings or other structures on or above public highways, sidewalks, or other property of the municipality.
(4) To regulate the operation and use of vehicles of every kind including the power: to erect traffic signs and signals; to regulate the speed of vehicles subject to 23 V.S.A. chapter 13, subchapter 12; to regulate or exclude the parking of all vehicles; and to provide for waiver of the right of appearance and arraignment in court by persons charged with parking violations by payment of specified fines within a stated period of time.
(5) To establish rules for pedestrian traffic on public highways and to establish crosswalks.
(6) To regulate the location, installation, maintenance, repair, and removal of utility poles, wires and conduits, water pipes or mains, or gas mains and sewers, upon, under, or above public highways or public property of the municipality.
(7) To regulate or prohibit the erection, size, structure, contents, and location of signs, posters, or displays on or above any public highway, sidewalk, lane, or alleyway of the municipality and to regulate the use, size, structure, contents, and location of signs on private buildings or structures.
(8) To regulate or prohibit the use or discharge, but not possession of, firearms within the municipality or specified portions thereof, provided that an ordinance adopted under this subdivision shall be consistent with section 2295 of this title and shall not prohibit, reduce, or limit discharge at any existing sport shooting range, as that term is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 5227.
(9) To license or regulate itinerant vendors, peddlers, door-to-door salesmen, and those selling goods, wares, merchandise, or services who engage in a transient or temporary business, or who sell from an automobile, truck, wagon, or other conveyance, excepting persons selling fruits, vegetables, or other farm produce.
(10) To regulate the keeping of dogs, and to provide for their licensing, leashing, muzzling, restraint, impoundment, and destruction.
(11) To regulate, license, tax, or prohibit circuses, carnivals, and menageries and all plays, concerts, entertainments, or exhibitions of any kind for which money is received.
(12) To regulate or prohibit the storage or dumping of solid waste, as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6602. These regulations may require the separation of specified components of the waste stream.
(13) To compel the cleaning or repair of any premises that in the judgment of the legislative body is dangerous to the health or safety of the public.
(14) To define what constitutes a public nuisance, and to provide procedures and take action for its abatement or removal as the public health, safety, or welfare may require.
(15) To provide for penalties for violation of any ordinance or rule adopted under the authority of this section.
(16) To name and rename streets and to number and renumber lots pursuant to section 4463 of this title, and to require the owner of a house or other building to which a number has been assigned to affix the number, including the assigned 911 address, to the structure, sign, or number post so that it is clearly visible from the road.
(17) To regulate or prohibit possession of open or unsealed containers of alcoholic beverages in public places.
(18) To regulate or prohibit consumption of alcoholic beverages in public places.
(19) To regulate the construction, alteration, development, and decommissioning or dismantling of wireless telecommunications facilities and ancillary improvements where the city, town, or village has not adopted zoning or where those activities are not regulated pursuant to a duly adopted zoning bylaw. Regulations regarding the decommissioning or dismantling of telecommunications facilities and ancillary structures may include requirements that bond be posted, or other security acceptable to the legislative body, in order to finance facility decommissioning or dismantling activities. These regulations are not intended to prohibit seamless coverage of wireless telecommunications services. With respect to the construction or alteration of wireless telecommunications facilities subject to regulation granted in this section, the town, city, or incorporated village shall vest in its local regulatory authority the power to determine whether the installation of a wireless telecommunications facility, whatever its size, will impose no impact or merely a de minimis impact on the surrounding area and the overall pattern of land development, and if the local regulatory authority, originally or on appeal, determines that the facility will impose no impact or a de minimis impact, it shall issue a permit. No ordinance authorized by this section, except to the extent structured to protect historic landmarks and structures listed on the State or National Register of Historic Places, may have the purpose or effect of limiting or prohibiting a property owner's ability to place or allow placement of antennae used to transmit, receive, or transmit and receive communications signals on that property owner's premises if the aggregate area of the largest faces of the antennae is not more than eight square feet, and if the antennae and the mast to which they are attached do not extend more than 12 feet above the roof of that portion of the building to which they are attached.
(20) To establish a conflict-of-interest policy to apply to all elected and appointed officials of the town, city, or incorporated village or ethical conduct policies to apply to all elected and appointed officials and employees of the municipality, or both.
(21) To regulate, by means of a civil ordinance adopted pursuant to chapter 59 of this title, subject to the limitations of 13 V.S.A. § 351b and the requirement of 13 V.S.A. § 354(a), and consistent with the rules adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture, Food and Markets, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 352b(a), the welfare of animals in the municipality. Such ordinance may be enforced by humane officers as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 351, if authorized to do so by the municipality.
(22) To regulate the sale and conveyance of sewage capacity to users, including phasing provisions and other conditions based on the impact of residential, commercial, or industrial growth within a town, in accord with principles in a duly adopted town plan.
(23) Acting individually or in concert with other towns, cities, or incorporated villages and pursuant to chapter 87, subchapter 2 of this title, to incur indebtedness for or otherwise finance by any means permitted under chapter 53 of this title projects relating to renewable energy, as defined in 30 V.S.A. § 8002(17), or to eligible energy efficiency projects undertaken by owners of real property within the boundaries of the town, city, or incorporated village. Energy efficiency projects shall be those that are eligible under section 3267 of this title.
(24) Upon the determination by a municipal building inspector, health officer, or fire marshal that a building within the boundaries of the town, city, or incorporated village is uninhabitable, to recover all expenses incident to the maintenance of the uninhabitable building with the expenses to constitute a lien on the property in the same manner and to the same extent as taxes assessed on the grand list, and all procedures and remedies for the collection of taxes shall apply to the collection of those expenses; provided, however, that the town, city, or incorporated village has adopted rules to determine the habitability of a building, including provisions for notice in accordance with 32 V.S.A. § 5252(3) to the building's owner prior to incurring expenses and including provisions for an administrative appeals process.
(25) To regulate by means of an ordinance or bylaw development in a flood hazard area, river corridor protection area, or other hazard area consistent with the requirements of section 4424 of this title and the National Flood Insurance Program. Such an ordinance or bylaw may regulate accessory dwelling units in flood hazard and fluvial erosion areas. However, such an ordinance or bylaw shall not require the filing of an application or the issuance of a permit or other approval by the municipality for a planting project considered to have a permit by operation of subsection 4424(c) of this title.
(26) To regulate parking lots and parking meters on public property or public highways of the municipality, including the power to set parking fees and use parking revenues for any municipal purpose. Projects relating to parking lots and parking meters under this subdivision shall constitute an improvement under chapter 53 of this title, and a municipality shall have the right of eminent domain to condemn land necessary for such projects subject to the restrictions set forth in section 2805 of this title and 18 V.S.A. § 5318.
(27) When a disaster or emergency has been declared by the Governor, a municipal building inspector, health officer, fire marshal, or zoning administrator may declare condemned to be destroyed a property that has been damaged in the disaster or emergency and is dangerous to life, health, or safety due to the disaster-related damage. The local legislative body may require that an official receive training on disaster-related condemnation before he or she may condemn property under this subdivision. The owner of property condemned under this subdivision may appeal the condemnation according to the condemnation appeals procedure of chapter 83 of this title, provided that any appeal to the Superior Court shall be to the Civil Division.
(28) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of sections 2291a and 4413 of this title or 30 V.S.A. chapter 5 or 89, a municipality may adopt an ordinance to establish screening requirements that shall apply to a ground-mounted plant that generates electricity from solar energy. In a proceeding under 30 V.S.A. § 248, the municipality may make recommendations to the Public Utility Commission applying the ordinance to such a plant. The ordinance may designate the municipal body to make this recommendation. Screening requirements and recommendations adopted under this subdivision shall be a condition of a certificate of public good issued for the plant under 30 V.S.A. § 248, provided that they do not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the installation of such a plant and do not have the effect of interfering with its intended functional use.
(A) Screening requirements under this subdivision shall not be more restrictive than screening requirements applied to commercial development in the municipality under chapter 117 of this title or, if the municipality does not have other bylaws except flood hazard, 10 V.S.A. chapter 151.
(B) In this subdivision (28), "plant" shall have the same meaning as in 30 V.S.A. § 8002 and "screening" means reasonable aesthetic mitigation measures to harmonize a facility with its surroundings and includes landscaping, vegetation, fencing, and topographic features.
(1) "Amateur radio" means the use of amateur radio and amateur satellite radio frequencies and services by qualified and federally authorized persons of any age who are interested in radio technique without pecuniary interest.
(2) "Antenna" means an array of wires, tubing, or the like used for the transmission and reception of radio waves.
(3) "Antenna support structure" means a structure or framework that is designed to elevate an antenna above the ground for the purpose of increasing the effective communications range and reliability of an amateur radio station. Amateur radio antenna support structures are removable by design and therefore are a removable structure for assessment purposes.
(1) "Solid waste ordinance" means an ordinance adopted pursuant to subdivision 2291(12) of this title.
(2) "Legislative body" means the legislative body of a town, city, or incorporated village.
(9) the length of time the violation has existed.
(3) a statement that the respondent has a right to a preliminary hearing before the legislative body and a description of the procedures for requesting a preliminary hearing.
(c) Preliminary hearing. A person who receives a notice of violation shall be offered an opportunity for a preliminary hearing before the legislative body for the purpose of determining whether a violation exists and reviewing the legislative body's probable course of action. The request for hearing shall be made in writing to the clerk of the town, city, or incorporated village no later than ten days after the date the notice of violation is received. The legislative body shall hold a hearing within 14 days of receipt of the request for a hearing.
(d) Proposed order. After a preliminary hearing, the legislative body may issue a proposed order. If no hearing is requested within ten days after the date of receipt of the notice of violation, the legislative body may issue a proposed order at once. A proposed order shall be delivered to the respondent in person or mailed to the respondent by first class mail or by certified mail, return receipt requested. If mailed by first class mail, the order is deemed received three days after the date of mailing.
(5) if applicable, a civil penalty of not more than $800.00 for each violation and in the case of a continuing violation, not more than $100.00 for each succeeding day.
(f) Hearing on proposed order. A person who receives a proposed order shall be offered an opportunity for a hearing before the legislative body, provided that the request for hearing is made in writing to the clerk of the town, city, or incorporated village no later than 15 days after the date of receipt of the order. If the respondent does not request a hearing, the order shall be deemed a final order, and shall be effective on the date of receipt or a later date stated in the order. If the respondent does request a hearing subsequent to receipt of the order, the legislative body shall hold a hearing within 14 days of receipt of the request. After the hearing, the legislative body may withdraw or amend the order and may issue a final order, which shall be delivered or mailed to the respondent in the same manner as proposed orders and which shall be effective on the date of receipt or a later date stated in the order.
(g) Continuing violations. Each day that a violation continues from the effective date of a final order shall constitute a separate violation. However, the filing of a request for hearing with the Environmental Division shall stop penalties from accruing in the case of a continuing violation until the Environmental Division has issued its order.
(h) Effect of imposition of penalty. Imposition of a penalty under this subchapter precludes imposition by the town, city, or incorporated village of any other administrative or civil penalty under any other provision of law for the same violation.
(i) Payment to town, city, or incorporated village. All penalties collected under this subchapter shall be paid to the town, city, or incorporated village whose ordinance is the subject of the violation.
(a) A respondent may request a hearing on a final order under this subchapter before the Environmental Division established under 4 V.S.A. chapter 27, which shall consider the matter de novo. Notice of a request for hearing shall be filed with the Environmental Division and the municipal clerk within ten days of receipt of the final order.
(b) Notice of a request for hearing before the Environmental Division shall stay the order and payment of the penalty, if imposed, pending the hearing.
(c) If the Environmental Division determines that a violation has not occurred, it shall reverse the order.
(d) The Environmental Division may affirm a directive in an order or, if it finds that the violation exists but the remedies contained in the order are not likely to achieve the intended result, it may modify or vacate and remand the directive.
(e) In determining whether to affirm, modify, or reverse an order for a civil penalty, the Environmental Division shall consider the factors set forth in subsection 2297a(a) of this title.
(a) A solid waste management district organized pursuant to chapter 121 of this title or by charter, may acquire property, or some easement or other rights in property, in order to construct and operate a sanitary landfill including suitable buffer areas and transfer stations and other solid waste facilities located on the landfill site, by condemnation as provided in this subchapter.
(b) A solid waste management district may condemn only property, easements or rights in property lying within the boundary of the district at any time after June 28, 1991. However, withdrawal of a municipality from membership in the district before November 1, 1991 shall terminate condemnation proceedings with respect to property, easements, and interests in property lying within that municipality.
(1) "Necessity" means a reasonable need which considers the greatest public good and the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and to the property owner. Necessity shall not be measured merely by expense or convenience to the condemning party. Due consideration shall be given to the adequacy of other property and locations and to the quantity, kind, and extent of cultivated and agricultural land which may be taken or rendered unfit for use by the proposed taking. In this matter, the court shall view the problem from both a long-range agricultural land use viewpoint as well as from the immediate taking of agricultural lands which may be involved. The court shall also consider and give effect to the policy of protecting earth resources, as set forth in 10 V.S.A. § 6086. Consideration also shall be given to the effect upon home and homestead rights and the convenience of the owner of the land, to the effect of the facility upon scenic and recreational values, and to the effect upon town grand lists and revenues.
(2) Damages resulting from the taking or use of property under the provisions of this subchapter shall be the value for the most reasonable use of the property or right in the property, and of the business on the property, and the direct and proximate decrease in the value of the remaining property or right in the property and the business on the property. The added value, if any, to the remaining property or right in the property, which accrues directly to the owner of the property as a result of the taking or use, as distinguished from the general public benefit, shall be considered in the determination of damages.
(3) "Interested person" or "person interested in lands" means a person who has a legal interest of record in the property affected.
(a) No solid waste management district shall exercise the authority conferred on it by this subchapter until after the legislative body of the district has voted at a regular or special meeting warned for that purpose to adopt a resolution setting forth the necessity for the taking and the compensation to be paid.
(b) A public hearing shall be held for the purpose of receiving suggestions and recommendations from the public prior to the legislative body's reaching the judgment required in subsection (a) of this section. The hearing shall be conducted by the legislative body. Public notice shall be given by printing the official notice not less than 30 days prior to the hearing in a newspaper having general circulation in the area affected. A copy of the notice shall be mailed to the legislative body of the municipalities affected and a copy sent by certified mail to known owners of lands and rights in land proposed to be condemned. The notice shall set forth the purpose for which the land or rights are desired. At the hearing the legislative body shall hear and consider all objections, suggestions for changes, and recommendations made by any person interested.
(a) After completion of the survey, the solid waste management district intending to acquire property or property rights shall present a petition to the Superior Court of the county in which the property lies, describing the property or rights, and stating why it is unable to acquire it without condemnation, and why its acquisition is necessary. The Superior Court shall set a time and place for hearing such petitions, which shall not be more than 60 nor less than 40 days from the date its order is signed, and shall issue a citation.
(a) At the time and place appointed for the hearing, the court shall hear all persons interested and wishing to be heard. If any person owning or having an interest in the property to be taken or affected objects to the necessity of the proposed taking, the court shall require the petitioner to proceed with the introduction of evidence as to the necessity of the taking. The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner to establish necessity by a fair preponderance of the evidence. No presumptions shall attend the petitioner's determination of necessity.
(a) If any person with an interest in the property or right is dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the legislative body of the solid waste management district, the person may, within 30 days after any court order regarding necessity has become final, apply by petition in writing to the Superior Court of the county within which such property or right or part thereof is situated to have the amount of compensation reassessed and the time and manner of payment redetermined. Such petition shall be served and returned like a summons.
(b) Either party may request and have a trial by jury on the issue of compensation only.


2-1907. Supervisors; qualifications; terms; meetings; vacancies; chairperson; quorum; expenses; employees; powers and duties; bonds for employees; records; removal of supervisor. The governing body of the district shall consist of five supervisors who are qualified electors residing within the district. The supervisors who are first elected shall serve for terms of one, two and three years according to the following plan: The two persons receiving the highest number of votes in the election shall hold office for three years; the two persons receiving the next highest number of votes shall hold such office for a term of two years and the remaining supervisor shall hold office for a term of one year. In the event of a tie vote, such terms shall be decided by lot. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the length of the term of supervisors holding office on January 1, 1995. Successors to such persons shall be elected for terms of three years. An annual meeting of all qualified electors of the district shall be held in the month of January or February. Notice of the time and place of such meeting shall be given by such supervisors by publishing a notice in the official county paper once each week for two consecutive weeks prior to the week in which such meeting is to be held. At such meeting the supervisors shall make full and due report of their activities and financial affairs since the last annual meeting and shall conduct an election by secret ballot of all of the qualified electors of the district there present for the election of supervisors whose terms have expired. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership of the governing body the remaining supervisors of the district shall appoint a qualified elector of the district to fill the office for the unexpired term. The supervisors shall designate a chairperson and may from time to time change such designation. A supervisor shall hold office until a successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified. A majority of the supervisors shall constitute a quorum and the concurrence of a majority of the supervisors in any matter within their duties shall be required for its determination. A supervisor shall receive no compensation for services, but may be entitled to expenses, including traveling expenses, necessarily incurred in the discharge of duties. The supervisors may employ a secretary, technical experts, and such other officers, agents, and employees, permanent and temporary, as they may require, and shall determine their qualifications, duties and compensation. The supervisors may call upon the county attorney of the county in which a major portion of the district lies, or the attorney general for such legal services as they may require. The supervisors may delegate to their chairperson, to one or more supervisors, or to one or more agents, or employees such powers and duties as they may deem proper. The supervisors shall furnish to the Kansas department of agriculture division of conservation, upon request, copies of such rules, regulations, orders, contracts, forms, and other documents as they shall adopt or employ, and such other information concerning their activities as it may require in the performance of its duties under this act. The supervisors shall provide for the execution of surety bonds for all employees and officers who shall be entrusted with funds or property; shall provide for the keeping of a full and accurate record of all proceedings and of all resolutions, regulations, and orders issued or adopted; and shall provide for an annual audit of the accounts and receipts and disbursements. Any supervisor may be removed by the state conservation commission upon notice and hearing in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other reason. The supervisors may invite the legislative body of any municipality or county located near the territory comprised within the district to designate a representative to advise and consult with the supervisors of the district on all questions of program and policy which may affect the property, water supply, or other interests of such municipality or county.
History: L. 1937, ch. 5, § 7; L. 1949, ch. 5, § 1; L. 1951, ch. 11, § 3; L. 1972, ch. 5, § 4; L. 1976, ch. 7, § 3; L. 1988, ch. 356, § 29; L. 1989, ch. 5, § 2; L. 1994, ch. 45, § 4; L. 2012, ch. 140, § 125; July 1.


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There we have it folks! Real Madrid has done it again in a 3-1 victory over Liverpool and crowned, for the 3rd straight finals in a row, the ultimate champions of the league. Congratulations Real Madrid! We’ll see you folks back here again next year for the 2019 UEFA Champions League Finals.
The UEFA Champions League is an annual continental club football competition and is considered one of the most prestigious tournaments in the world. The 63rd season of the tournament will culminate in spectacular fashion on 26 May 2018 with Real Madrid and Liverpool battling it out for the ultimate club bragging rights.
This year at NSC Olimpiyskiy Stadium, Kiev – Real Madrid will be looking to defend their title to solidify their 3rd straight finals win. Whereas for Liverpool, this will be their 8th finals since 2007 and will be looking forward to prove themselves as a formidable force.
Live stream starting on 26 May (Saturday) at 1845GMT.
UEFA Champions League Final All You Need To Know.
UEFA Champions League Final Programme Page.
UEFA Champions League Final Broadcast Partners.
BT Sport Champions League Final Programme Page.
BT Sport Champions League Final News.
BT Sport Champions League Final Fixtures.
Fox Sports Champions League Final Schedule.
ESPN Champions League Final Programme Page.
ESPN Champions League Final Schedule.
Fox Sports Champions League Final Programme Page.
beIN Sports Champions League Final Schedule.
ESPN Champions League Final Fixtures.
If you’re not currently in the U.K, U.S, India, MENA, South America, or South Africa then you’ll need to connect to our VPN first before streaming the finale from your usual providers.
2) Install our VPN on any device that you’ll be using to watch the 2018 UEFA Champions League Final.
3) Connect to our U.K (GBR) servers for BT Sport, U.S (USA) for Fox Sports and ESPN, India (IND) for SonyLIV, Egypt (EGY) for beIN Sports, Argentina/Mexico (ARG/MEX) for ESPN, or South Africa (ZAF) for SuperSport.
Watch the live Real Madrid v. Liverpool UEFA Champions League Final from BT Sport. Fortunately, BT Sport is offering the live stream completely for free via their website, app and Youtube channel. Availability: UK only – Connect to our U.K (GBR) servers first before starting the stream!
1) Head to the BT Sport website or BT Sport Youtube Channel.
Tip: UEFA Champions League Final will be airing live on 26 May 2018 on BT Sport 2, BT Sport 4K, and BT Sport’s Youtube Channel.
Watch the live Real Madrid v. Liverpool UEFA Champions League Final from Fox Sports. You’ll need a paid subscription with Fox Sports to access their content. Availability: USA only – Connect to our U.S (USA) servers first before starting the stream!
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1) Sign in to your ESPN International or ESPN USA account.
Tip: UEFA Champions League Final will be airing live from 26 May 2018 on ESPN Player.
Watch the live Real Madrid v. Liverpool UEFA Champions League Final from SonyLIV for free. Availability: India only – Connect to our India (IND) servers first before starting the stream!
Tip: UEFA Champions League Final will be airing live from 26 May 2018 on SonyLIV. Live matches will only be displayed accordingly when the live match starts.
Watch the live Real Madrid v. Liverpool UEFA Champions League Final from beIN Sports. However, you’ll need a paid subscription with them to access their content. Availability: Middle East and North Africa – Connect to our Egypt (EGY), Israel (ISR) or Saudi Arabia (SAU) servers first before starting the stream!
Watch the live Real Madrid v. Liverpool UEFA Champions League Final from SuperSport. However, you’ll need a paid subscription with them to access their content. Availability: South Africa including Sub-Saharan Africa only – Connect to our South Africa (ZAF) servers first before starting the stream!
Tip: UEFA Champions League Final will be airing live from 26 May 2018 on SuperSport.
We hope you found this article informative and useful. Please feel free to share it with your friends or family that want to watch the Champions League Finals too!

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1.) The following internal procedures will be utilized to the extent practicable by the Georgia Attorney General’s Office in implementing the provision of O.C.G.A. § 23-3-122(b)(1) requiring the written approval of the Attorney General in order for a private person to bring a civil action under § 23-3-122 of the Georgia Taxpayer Protection False Claims Act. These procedures are adopted at the sole discretion of the Attorney General, are subject to change and modification without notice, and do not create or confer any rights on any person, entity, or party, whether public or private.
The Attorney General’s Office shall provide the Relator’s counsel with an Acknowledgement of Receipt date and time stamped (“Receipt Time”) as of the time the requested filing is received. Proposed cases shall be assigned a Receipt Time in the order they are actually received regardless of the method of delivery.
a.) A copy of the “Proposed Qui Tam Complaint” the Relator seeks Attorney General approval to file.
a.) Review the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint and accompanying materials and determine if additional information is required in order to make a recommendation to the Attorney General.
b.) Request additional information or materials from Relator and Relator’s Counsel as deemed appropriate.
c.) Conduct such legal research and other inquiries as deemed appropriate.
d.) In the event the designee determines that the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint does not seek relief provided by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-122 or is not accompanied by a completed Disclosure Statement and the required letter from Relator’s Counsel, the designee may communicate to the Relator’s Counsel a provisional denial of approval to file proposed qui tam complaint, which shall identify the deficiencies resulting in the Provisional Denial.
e.) In the event the designee determines that the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint does seek relief under §23-3-122 and is accompanied by a completed Disclosure Statement and the required letter from Relator’s Counsel, the designee shall make a recommendation to the Attorney General regarding the proper action with respect to the filing.
a.) Review and consider the staff recommendation and in his sole discretion request such additional review, analysis, and inquiry by the designee, and may in his sole discretion directly communicate with Relator and Relator’s Counsel as appropriate.
c.) The Attorney General may require that the Relator’s Counsel make such amendments to the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint and accompanying documents as a condition to an Approval to File Proposed Qui Tam Complaint.
d.) The Attorney General may in his sole discretion state in the Denial of Approval to File Proposed Qui Tam Complaint the reasons for the denial.
e.) The Attorney General may in his sole discretion include with a Denial of Approval to File Proposed Qui Tam Complaint a suggestion that the Relator take further action and resubmit a Proposed Qui Tam Complaint for approval.
6.) Upon receipt of a Provisional Denial of Approval to File Proposed Qui Tam Complaint or Denial of Approval to File Proposed Qui Tam Complaint, the Relator may augment or otherwise modify the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint and accompanying documents and resubmit them pursuant to the above procedure, in which event each such resubmission shall result in a new Receipt Time.
a.) Within 30 days, or such additional time as may be specified by the Attorney General, file the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint, after complying with any amendment requirements or other conditions imposed by the Attorney General.
b.) Resubmit a modified Proposed Qui Tam Complaint and accompanying documents pursuant to the above procedure.
c.) Decide to take no action with respect to the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint, without prejudice to the submission of any Proposed Qui Tam Complaint in the future pursuant to the above procedures, in which case Relator Counsel’s shall notify the Attorney General’s Office in writing of such decision.
9.) The Attorney General may in his sole discretion, at any time, waive the requirement of compliance with these internal procedures if he deems such waiver to be in the interests of the State or local government .
10.) In the event that a Relator desires to join a qui tam action pursuant to O.C.G.A. §23-3-122 together with a qui tam action on behalf of the United States pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §3730 and to bring such an action in a United States District Court, the Relator shall so notify the Attorney General’s Office at the time the Relator seeks Attorney General approval under § 23-3-122(b)(1). The Relator may not file any Qui Tam action containing claims brought under the Georgia Taxpayer Protection False Claims Act without first obtaining a written Notice of Approval from the Attorney General, regardless of whether such claims are filed in state or federal court.
a.) The specificity, clarity and comprehensiveness of the allegations in the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint and the information in the Disclosure Statement.
b.) Whether the factual allegations made and legal theories advanced by the Relator appear supportable and likely to state a claim.
c.) Whether available information, such as the filing of other law suits, indicates that the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint will be filed for vexatious, harassing or other improper purposes.
d.) Whether the Relator advances a theory of or claim for damages and/or civil penalties that is reasonably related to the misconduct and harm alleged.
e.) Whether the Relator advances a theory of or claim for damages and/or civil penalties that seeks an excessive recovery in light of the misconduct and harm alleged.
f.) Whether, and to what extent, the Relator’s Counsel has experience in False Claims Act litigation, federal or state, such that it is likely that counsel will be able to effectively pursue the case.
g.) Whether the available information indicates that the Relator and the Relator’s Counsel have the ability and willingness to devote adequate resources such that it would be in the interest of the State or local government for the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint to be filed.
h.) Whether available information indicates that it would be in the interest of the State or local government for another relator’s proposed or pending qui tam action to proceed and for the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint to not be filed or to be filed after the filing of another proposed qui tam action.
i.) Whether the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint is likely to be subject to dismissal on the basis of public disclosure and the Attorney General is unlikely to object to such dismissal.
j.) Whether the allegations in the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint are related to pending or potential criminal investigations or prosecutions, and, if so, whether proceeding with the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint could prejudice or otherwise interfere with the pending or potential criminal proceeding.
k.) Whether, in the sole discretion of the Attorney General, proceeding with the Proposed Qui Tam Complaint would be in the interest of the State or local government.


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In an investigation conducted under the New York Security Risk Law, appellant, a subway conductor employed by the New York City Transit Authority, was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City and asked whether he was then a member of the Communist Party. He refused to answer, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and he persisted in this refusal after being warned that it might lead to his dismissal and after being given time to reconsider and to obtain counsel. Based upon this refusal, appellees found that "reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of his doubtful trust and reliability," appellant's continued employment would endanger national and state security, and they suspended him and later discharged him after he failed to avail himself of an opportunity to submit statements or affidavits showing why he should be reinstated. Without pursuing his administrative remedies before the State Civil Service Commission, he sued in a state court for reinstatement; that court dismissed the suit; its decision was sustained by the State's highest court; and he appealed to this Court. Held: Appellant's discharge did not violate his rights under the Federal Constitution. Pp. 470-479.
1. Since the constitutional questions before this Court relate primarily to the propriety of the findings made by appellees, rather than to the validity of the provisions of the state law, the appeal is dismissed; but certiorari is granted. P. 473.
2. Appellant is in no position to claim that the state law deprives him of procedural due process by providing for dismissal of employees without a hearing, opportunity for cross-examination or disclosure of the evidence upon which dismissal is based, since his own refusal to answer blocked such proceedings and in any event he failed to pursue his administrative remedy. P. 473.
3. Since the highest state court considered that appellant was not discharged on the ground that he was a member of the Communist Party, he cannot claim that the statute offends due process by making it possible to base dismissal of an employee on mere [357 U.S. 468, 469] present membership in the Communist Party without regard to the character of such membership. Pp. 474-475.
4. The manner in which the Security Risk Law was applied to appellant did not violate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 475-479.
(a) The highest state court held that appellant's discharge was not based upon any inference of Communist Party membership drawn from the exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege nor upon the assertion of that constitutional protection, but rather upon a finding of "doubtful trust and reliability" based upon his lack of candor in refusing to answer questions relevant to his employment put to him by his employer. Pp. 475-476.
(b) Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , distinguished. Pp. 476-477.
(c) New York's classification of employees found to be of doubtful trust and reliability as "security risks" is not so arbitrary as to be constitutionally impermissible when applied to one in appellant's position. P. 478.
(d) Appellant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege in these state proceedings did not preclude the State from concluding that his failure to answer questions relevant to his employment engendered reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability. Pp. 478-479.
2 N. Y. 2d 355, 141 N. E. 2d 553, affirmed.
Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Victor Rabinowitz.
Daniel T. Scannell argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Helen R. Cassidy and Edward L. Cox, Jr.
Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Paxton Blair, Solicitor General.
This case raises questions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States concerning the validity of appellant's dismissal from his position as a subway conductor in the New York City Transit System. The dismissal was pursuant to the Security Risk Law of the State of New York, N. Y. Laws 1951, c. 233, as amended, N. Y. Laws 1954, c. 105.
The Security Risk Law, enacted by New York in 1951, 1 provides in pertinent part as follows: The State Civil Service Commission is authorized to classify any bureau or agency within the State as a "security agency" ( 3), defined as any unit of government ". . . wherein functions are performed which are necessary to the security or defense of the nation and the state . . . ." ( 2.) The appointing authority in each such agency is given powers of suspension and dismissal as to any employee if, after investigation, it is found that, ". . . upon all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of doubtful trust and reliability, the employment of such person . . . [in a security agency] would endanger the security or defense of the nation and the state" ( 5). Such evidence is not to be restricted by normal rules prevailing in the courts, and the required finding may be based upon an employee's past conduct ". . . which may include, . . . but shall not be limited to evidence of . . . (d) membership in any organization or group found by the state civil service commission to be subversive" ( 7). 2 [357 U.S. 468, 471] A discharged employee has a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, which may take further evidence ( 6).
In November 1953 the Commission determined the New York City Transit Authority, which the appellees in this case constitute, to be a "security agency," 3 and in March 1954 it listed the Communist Party of the United States as a "subversive group," adopting, as contemplated by the Security Risk Law, the similar listing of the State Board of Regents made under the provisions of the Feinberg Law, N. Y. Laws 1949, c. 360, after hearings at which the Party appeared by counsel. In September 1954 appellant was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Investigation of the City of New York in the course of an investigation being conducted under the Security Risk Law. 4 Appellant, who had been sworn, was asked whether he was then a member of the Communist Party, but he refused to answer and claimed his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 5 After he had [357 U.S. 468, 472] been advised of the provisions of the Security Risk Law and given time to reconsider his refusal and to engage counsel, appellant, accompanied by counsel, made two further appearances in September and October before the Department of Investigation, on each of which he adhered to his initial position.
Appellees, informed of these events, thereupon adopted a resolution suspending appellant without pay and sent him a copy of the resolution with a covering letter. This letter notified appellant that his suspension followed a finding under 5 of the Security Risk Law ". . . that upon all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of doubtful trust and reliability . . .," appellant's continued employment would endanger national and state security. This finding was based on appellant's refusal ". . . to answer questions as to whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party and [invocation of] the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . ." Appellant was also advised, pursuant to 5 of the Security Risk Law, that he had thirty days within which to submit statements or affidavits showing why he should be reinstated. At the expiration of this period appellees, having heard nothing further from appellant, dismissed him from his position by a resolution which confirmed the previous "suspension" findings.
Appellant did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission, as was his statutory right, but brought this proceeding in the state courts for reinstatement. He attacked appellees' actions on various grounds, including the constitutional grounds asserted here. The State Supreme Court, assuming jurisdiction despite appellant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, upheld the Security Risk Law and its application to appellant as constitutional, ruled adversely to appellant's state law contentions, and dismissed the proceeding. 138 N. Y. S. [357 U.S. 468, 473] 2d 777. The Appellate Division, 2 App. Div. 2d 1, 154 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (2d Dept.), and the Court of Appeals, 2 N. Y. 2d 355, 141 N. E. 2d 533, both affirmed, each by a divided court. An appeal to this Court was brought under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2), and we postponed to the hearing on the merits the question of our jurisdiction. 355 U.S. 803 . As will appear from this opinion, we consider that the constitutional questions before us relate primarily, and more substantially, to the propriety of the findings made by appellees rather than to the validity of the provisions of the Security Risk Law. Accordingly, we think it the better course to dismiss the appeal, and to treat the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, which is hereby granted. 6 28 U.S.C. 2103. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 .
Finally, the claim that the statute offends due process because dismissal of an employee may be based on mere present membership in the Communist Party, without regard to the character of such membership, cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 , must also fail. Apart from the fact that the statute simply makes membership in an organization found to be subversive one of the elements which may enter into the ultimate determination as to "doubtful trust and reliability," appellant, as the Court [357 U.S. 468, 475] of Appeals viewed the administrative proceedings and as we accordingly treat them here, was not discharged on grounds that he was a party member.
We come then to what we consider appellant's major constitutional claim, which goes to the manner in which the Security Risk Law was applied to him. It is contended that the administrative finding of reasonable grounds for belief that he was "of doubtful trust and reliability," and therefore a security risk, offends due process. The contention is (1) that the finding rests on an inference, that appellant was a member of the Communist Party, which was drawn from appellant's invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and that this inference lacked any rational connection with appellant's refusal to answer based on the exercise of this constitutional privilege; and (2) that the drawing of such an inference was in any event in derogation of the policy behind the Fifth Amendment privilege and contrary to the teaching of this Court's decision in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 . We think this contention both misconceives the basis on which the Court of Appeals sustained appellant's dismissal and assumes incorrectly the availability of the Fifth Amendment to appellant in these proceedings. Consequently it must be rejected in both its aspects.
"[N]o inference of membership in [the Communist] party was drawn from [appellant's] refusal to reply to the question asked . . . . [Appellant] was not discharged for invoking the Fifth Amendment; he was discharged for creating a doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability by refusing to answer the question as to Communist party membership." 2 N. Y. 2d, at 372, 141 N. E. 2d, at 542.
In other words, we read the court's opinion as meaning that a finding of doubtful trust and reliability could justifiably be based on appellant's lack of frankness, cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 ; Beilan v. Board of Public Education, ante, p. 399, decided today, just as if he had refused to give any other information about himself which might be relevant to his employment. It was this lack of candor which provided the evidence of appellant's doubtful trust and reliability which under the New York statutory scheme constituted him a security risk. The Court of Appeals went on to reason that had appellant refused, without more, to answer the question, the finding of "doubtful trust and reliability" would have undoubtedly been permissible, and that the basis for such a finding, in appellant's refusal to answer, was not destroyed by the claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege because the Commissioner was not required to accept that claim as an adequate explanation of the refusal.
Accepting, as we do, these premises of the state court's opinion, we find no constitutional block to its decision sustaining appellant's dismissal from employment. Postponing for the moment the question whether appellant was entitled to rely in this local investigation on the federal privilege, it seems clear that the discharge here [357 U.S. 468, 477] in any event was unlike that in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, supra, in that, as definitively interpreted by the Court of Appeals, it was not based on the fact that the employee had asserted Fifth Amendment rights. Further, in Slochower such a claim had been asserted in a federal inquiry having nothing to do with the qualifications of persons for state employment, and the Court in its opinion carefully distinguished that situation from one where, as here, a State is conducting an inquiry into fitness of its employees. Nor, as the Court of Appeals stressed, was the claim of possible self-incrimination made the basis for an inference that appellant was a Communist and therefore unreliable. Hence we are not faced here with the question whether party membership may rationally be inferred from a refusal to answer a question directed to present membership where the refusal rests on the belief that an answer might incriminate, cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 , or with the question whether membership in the Communist Party which might be "innocent" can be relied upon as a ground for denial of state employment. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, supra; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 .
We think it scarcely debatable that had there been no claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, New York would have been constitutionally entitled to conclude from appellant's refusal to answer what must be conceded to have been a question relevant to the purposes of the statute and his employment, cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra, that he was of doubtful trust and reliability. Such a conclusion is not "so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them." Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 . This Court pointed out in Garner that a government employee can be required upon pain of dismissal to respond [357 U.S. 468, 478] to inquiry probing into matters relevant to his employment, and that present membership in the Communist Party is such a matter. See also Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra. Certainly it is not a controlling constitutional distinction that New York, rather than impose on employees, as in Garner and Beilan, an absolute duty to respond to permissible inquiry upon threat of dismissal for refusal, has in these proceedings held that an employee lacking in candor to his governmental employer evidences doubt as to his trust and reliability. Finally, unlike the situation involved in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra, there is here no problem of inadequate notice as to the consequences of refusal to answer, for appellant was specifically notified that continued refusal might lead to his dismissal.
The fact that New York has chosen to base its dismissal of employees whom it finds to be of doubtful trust and reliability on the ground that they are in effect "security risks" hardly requires a different determination. The classification is not so arbitrary that we would be justified in saying that it is constitutionally impermissible in its application to one in appellant's position. Neither the New York statute nor courts purported to equate this ground for dismissal with "disloyalty." That term, which carries a distinct connotation, was never relied upon by New York as justification for appellant's dismissal.
The issue then reduces to the narrow question whether the conclusion which could otherwise be reached from appellant's refusal to answer is constitutionally barred because his refusal was accompanied by the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege. We think it does not. The federal privilege against self-incrimination was not available to appellant through the Fourteenth Amendment in this state investigation. Knapp v. Schweitzer, ante, p. 371, decided today; Adamson v. California, [357 U.S. 468, 479] supra. And we see no merit in appellant's suggestion that, despite the teachings of these cases, the plea was available to him in this instance because the State was acting as agent for, or in collaboration with, the Federal Government. This contention finds no support in the record. Hence we are not here concerned with the protection, as a matter of policy or constitutional requirement, to be accorded persons who under similar circumstances, in a federal inquiry, validly invoke the federal privilege. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 3481; Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 ; Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, supra; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 . Under these circumstances, we cannot say that appellant's explanation for his silence precluded New York from concluding that his failure to respond to relevant inquiry engendered reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness and reliability.
[ Footnote 1 ] The state statute was originally passed as an emergency measure and thereafter extended from year to year. The present terminal date is June 30, 1958.
[ Footnote 2 ] A subversive organization is defined in 8 as one which is found ". . . to advocate, advise, teach or embrace the doctrine that the government of the United States or of any state or of any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown or overturned by force, violence [357 U.S. 468, 471] or any unlawful means, or to advocate, advise, teach or embrace the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting any such doctrine . . . ."
[ Footnote 3 ] The New York Court of Appeals held that the Transit Authority was a state body corporate subject to classification under the Security Risk Law and sustained the Commission's determination that it was a "security agency." 2 N. Y. 2d 355, 365-367, 141 N. E. 2d 533, 538-539. We consider ourselves bound by these holdings.
[ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals held that the Commissioner of Investigation, although a city official, was authorized to act with respect to these matters arising under the Security Risk Law and to conduct these investigations.
[ Footnote 5 ] Appellant did not specifically state that his refusal to answer was based on his belief that an answer might incriminate him but simply explained his silence by reference to the "Fifth Amendment." We consider this reference, without regard to the availability of the Fifth Amendment to appellant in this state investigation (see p. 477, infra), to be equivalent to an assertion of a claim of possible self-incrimination. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 -163; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 .
[ Footnote 6 ] For convenience, we shall continue to refer to the parties as appellant and appellees.

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