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IN THE MATTER OF LOWELL A. MAYBERRY.
Present: CROSBY, FIELD, DONAHUE, & QUA, JJ.
The question, whether the Supreme Judicial Court sitting for a county had jurisdiction to revoke an order for judgment, might be raised for the first time before the full court.
Under Rule 8 of Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court for the Regulation of Practice at Common Law (1926), an order for judgment did not of itself cause disbarment proceedings to go to judgment where there had been no motion for judgment and no general or special order to that effect.
Until judgment had been entered upon an order by a single justice of this court for judgment dismissing proceedings for disbarment of an attorney at law, the order might be revoked and the charges retried de novo upon evidence previously introduced and further evidence later produced.
Even if an order by a single justice of this court for judgment dismissing proceedings for disbarment of an attorney at law was a final judgment, a subsequent order, purporting to vacate the first order and ordering a trial of the charges against him de novo upon the production of further evidence, was the commencement of new proceedings against him, which was within the jurisdiction of the court; the existence of a former judgment could not affect the court's jurisdiction to hear the second proceeding: at most it would be an affirmative defence in the nature of res judicata and, not having been raised at the second hearing on the merits, could not be raised for the first time before the full court.
An investigation and findings of fact by a commissioner appointed by the court which were the basis of charges against an attorney at law upon which an order of notice was issued directing him to show cause why be should not be disbarred were in themselves no part of the judicial proceedings following the order of notice; irregularities on the part of the commissioner did not affect the validity of such judicial proceedings.
occasions by the attorney as an investigator or by an acquaintance of the employee, and that none of the clients nor associate counsel participated in the bribery or attempted bribery, warranted an inference that unlawful influencing or attempting to influence jurors was by the attorney's procurement, although there was no direct evidence of his participation therein.
Cause for disbarment of an attorney may be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence as in other civil cases, and need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; there is no intermediate standard of proof, such as that the evidence must be "clear and convincing" or "not of doubtful character" or from witnesses "whose character entitles them to belief."
In proceedings for disbarment of an attorney, there is no presumption of innocence other than that in contemplation of law the respondent began the trial as an innocent man and would remain such unless the charges were proved.
In a proceeding for disbarment for procuring bribery or attempted bribery of jurors, the respondent was not harmed by findings of a single justice of this court on evidence before him that many jurors were of low grade; nor by evidence that a bribing employee of the respondent had been convicted, it not appearing that the single justice used that fact as affirmative evidence against the respondent; nor by the fact that there was a variance in details between the report of a commissioner, which was the basis of the charges, and the judge's findings, the trial having been plenary on all matters involved, with full knowledge of the charges.
PROCEEDINGS FOR DISBARMENT, begun by order of notice issued upon the filing of a fourteenth report by a commissioner appointed pursuant to a petition filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on December 1, 1931.
There were proceedings before Lummus, J., described in the opinion. The evidence at the final hearings was fully reported and occupied, with copies of exhibits, four hundred thirty-five pages of the printed record.
"7. As matter of law, in an action of this character the respondent is presumed to be innocent of the charges preferred and to have performed his duty in accordance with his oath of office.
"8. As matter of law, if upon all the evidence the Court has a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the respondent, the proceeding should be dismissed.
"9. As matter of law, a conflict in the evidence, in a proceeding of this kind, which leaves the decision of the issue doubtful, should be resolved in favor of the respondent.
"10. As matter of law, in a proceeding of this kind involving so serious a consequence as deprivation of a man's vocation, proof of conduct justifying such consequence should be clear and convincing, and not of a doubtful character, and in the absence of such proof the proceeding should be dismissed.
"11. As matter of law, legal evidence from the mouths of witnesses whose character entitles them to belief should be required to deprive a duly admitted attorney of the vitally important and valuable right to practice his profession and to impose upon him the stigma of disbarment."
The rulings of the single justice upon these requests were as follows in substance: "I refuse to give the seventh request in terms, but rule that the charges are not evidence against the respondent, and that in the absence of a finding of his misconduct, supported by and based upon evidence, the respondent would be entitled to have the proceedings against him dismissed on the merits. Such a finding is filed with this ruling.
"The eighth, ninth and tenth requests in substance would require proof of misconduct beyond any reasonable doubt. The eleventh request would require legal evidence 'from the mouths of witnesses whose character entitles them to belief.' These requests are denied. This is not a criminal case . . . but a proceeding to determine whether the conduct of the respondent is such that he should continue to practice as an attorney at law under the implied representation that he is an honorable practitioner. . . . All the evidence must be weighed, whether its source is pure or impure. I rule that, to justify disbarment, misconduct need not be proved, as in a criminal case, beyond reasonable doubt. I rule, however, that, as in other civil cases, it must be proved by the preponderance of the evidence. . . . There is no intermediate rule or standard. . . . In making my findings I have applied the rule just stated, which has been held applicable to disbarment proceedings. . . ."
By order of the single justice, an order was entered removing the respondent from the office of attorney at law. The respondent alleged exceptions.
S. Hoar, G. L. Mayberry, & H. Albers, for the respondent, submitted a brief.
C. C. Cabot, (J. A. McArdle with him,) appointed by the court to conduct the proceedings.
QUA, J. This proceeding, in so far as it directly affects the present respondent, originated in the "Fourteenth Report" of a special commissioner appointed by this court upon a petition filed on behalf of a committee of citizens of the Commonwealth. The nature of the petition and the action of the court upon it are sufficiently set forth in Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 578. See also pages 585-587. In said fourteenth report the commissioner found that the respondent conspired with one Donnelly to influence improperly jurors in certain named cases and recommended that an order of notice be issued by the court to the respondent requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred. Before the trial the commissioner filed a "Supplemental Fourteenth Report" containing further details as to the cases and the names of the persons involved.
Report" setting forth that Donnelly, whom the respondent admitted having employed at various times, but who could not be found to testify at the first hearing, was now in prison and available, and that certain jurors alleged to have been corrupted could identify him in court, and praying for an order "reopening the hearing . . . or such other order as the court shall deem expedient in the interests of the public welfare." Thereupon, on December 13, 1934, after a hearing, the single justice entered an "Order Vacating Order for Judgment" wherein "the Order for Judgment . . . entered October 5, 1933," was vacated and said fourteenth report and the three supplementary reports were "assigned for hearing de novo." The second trial before the single justice resulted in an order that judgment be entered removing the respondent from the office of attorney at law.
1. The respondent raises at the outset a question of jurisdiction. No such issue appears to have been suggested at the trial, but nevertheless it is fundamental in its bearing upon the power of the court to proceed with the cause and it may be urged here for the first time. Cheney v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 227 Mass. 336. A. Sandler Co. v. Portland Shoe Manuf. Co. 291 Mass. 326. The contention is that the order of October 5, 1933, dismissing the proceeding against the respondent was in itself a final judgment in his favor (see Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 582) which exhausted the jurisdiction of the court, and that all that followed, including the "Order Vacating Order for Judgment" of December 13, 1934, and the second trial, was of no effect.
order is necessary. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 235, 1. See Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court for the Regulation of Practice at Common Law (1926; 252 Mass. 591 ); Bailey v. Edmundson, 168 Mass. 297, 299. See, however, as to judgments by default, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, s. 57. Hence, if this case did not go to judgment on October 5, 1933, there is nothing to show that it went to judgment on any subsequent date, and the later action of the court in vacating the order of October 5 and in ordering a hearing de novo was a step in the further progress of the case which the court had power to take and as to which no error is shown. McKinley v. Warren, 218 Mass. 310. Kolda v. National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. 290 Mass. 182. We do not decide whether in a case of this kind anyone opposed to the respondent had on October 5, 1933, any right to file exceptions under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, s. 113, which also prevented the case from going to judgment in favor of the respondent on that day. See Everett-Morgan Co. v. Boyajian Pharmacy, 244 Mass. 460; Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 273; Matter of Dolphin, 240 N. Y. 89; Kline v. Shapley, 232 Mass. 500, 503.
opportunity of being heard in answer to them." Boston Bar Association v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 184. Boston Bar Association v. Scott, 209 Mass. 200, 203. Matter of Allin, 224 Mass. 9, 11. Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 21. Matter of Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 391. If, as the respondent contends, the order of October 5 was a final judgment in his favor ending the original proceeding against him, then the order of December 13 purporting to vacate the order of October 5 and assigning the fourteenth report and the three supplementary reports for hearing de novo was the commencement of a new proceeding against the respondent. That proceeding was within the general jurisdiction of the court. It complied with all the requirements of law applicable to such proceedings in that the respondent had ample notice, knew what the charges were, had a full and complete opportunity to defend himself and in fact did defend himself throughout a long trial without, so far as appears, making any objection to the jurisdiction and without any reference to any judgment in the original proceeding as a defence. The existence of a former judgment in favor of the respondent could not affect the jurisdiction of the court to hear the second proceeding. At most it could be no more than an affirmative defence in the nature of res judicata to be seasonably set up and proved by the respondent. It is too late now to assert that defence for the first time. See Randall, petitioner, 11 Allen 473, 481; Maker v. Bouthier, 242 Mass. 20; Moll v. Wakefield, 274 Mass. 505.
commissioner or with the commissioner's investigation of the respondent. It began with the filing of the commissioner's reports against the respondent and action by the court thereon. This was decided in Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 586. What had gone before was no part whatever of the proceeding against the respondent. No exception appears to have been directed specifically to the present contention. It is evident from the record that the respondent was fully and fairly tried upon issues of which he was well informed and with full opportunity to present his defence. All that was said of this same contention in Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 587, is equally applicable here.
3. The respondent excepts to the refusal of the single justice to rule, as to each of the seven cases in connection with which he was accused, that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that he had been guilty of improper conduct. The evidence is very voluminous. We cannot attempt to state even the substance of it within the proper limits of an opinion. We must content ourselves with a brief summary of certain facts as to which there,was direct evidence and other facts which plainly in our opinion could have been found by reasonable and proper inference from evidence in the record.
The respondent was admitted to the bar in 1912. He had a wide experience as a practitioner, having been, particularly in the earlier years, engaged to a large extent in the trial of jury and jury waived cases. John J. Donnelly was an "investigator." He was acquainted with John C. Nolan, Hugh Mullen, Charles Murtagh and George F. Mahoney. It could have been found that Donnelly was a man of small means and that it took all of his earnings to support his two families. Donnelly occasionally called at the respondent's office. The respondent sometimes employed him for work in connection with the respondent's cases and with the exception of one small matter always paid him in cash.
there was a verdict for the plaintiff for $21,414, of which the plaintiff by agreement of the parties later remitted $6,864.64. During the trial two men approached one of the jurors and asked him if he wanted to make $50 "easy." Upon his refusal they left 85 on the table. After the verdict this juror met one of the men near the juror's house. The man asked how things were going, and the juror said, "They win." "They" could have been found to refer to the G. M. Bryne Company, and the remark could, we think, in connection with all the other evidence, have been found to indicate that the juror understood that the men had approached him in reference to a verdict favorable to that company rather than to the town of Barnstable.
In the case of Pierce v. Commonwealth the respondent represented the petitioners. On December 22, 1930, there was a verdict for the petitioners for $20,350-07. During the trial a man came to the house of a juror and asked him which way the case was going and "if he would like a Christmas present." Just before the verdict in the same case two men, one of whom was Nolan, came to the house of another juror, "wanted him to bring in a verdict . . . in favor of Pierce" for a named amount and promised to see that he got a Christmas present of not less than $100. The juror sold these men two tickets to the Irish sweepstakes. One or both of the men gave the juror as the names and address of the persons who were to hold the tickets "Helen Donley" and "Francis Donley" both of "710 Gordon Street, Boston." One Helen Hagerty lived at 83 Gordon Street, Boston, which was the address of one of the homes maintained by John J. Donnelly, where she was known as Mrs. Donnelly. Helen Frances Donnelly was their child and lived at the same address. There was no number 710 on the street.
negotiation paid Polack $100 to "hold out" for large verdicts. Donnelly took part in the negotiations. He went to his bank and when he came back he gave Nolan two $50 bills with which to pay Polack. Nolan and Mullen called upon another juror in the same cases by the name of Leonard and offered him a total of $100. Leonard refused to take money, but said, "if you want to do me a favor afterwards you can do it." Donnelly suggested the bribing of these two jurymen to Nolan and Mullen. On June 12, $200 was deposited to Donnelly's credit in his bank account and on June 17 an additional $50 was deposited. These two amounts would be exactly enough to pay the jurors Polack and Leonard $100 each and in addition to pay Nolan and Mullen $25 each if they had succeeded in bribing both jurors instead of one only. As it was, Donnelly paid Nolan and Mullen $12.50 each. The entire balance of Donnelly's account was withdrawn two days before the verdicts.
In the case of Kinchla v. New York Central Railroad the respondent represented the defendant. On September 27, 1932, there was a verdict for the defendant. Before the verdict Murtagh, who gave his name as Davis, and another unidentified man agreed with a juror who was sitting in the case to pay him $75 for a verdict for the defendant or a disagreement. It was arranged that after the verdict the juror should call up a telephone number which was the number of the telephone in the house where Murtagh boarded. Donnelly called upon Murtagh there several times that fall. Donnelly was his only caller. They also met in the office of a lawyer, not the respondent. After the verdict the unidentified man paid the juror the $75.
In the case of Wilcox v. Smyth the respondent represented the plaintiff. On October 29, 1932, there was a verdict for the plaintiff for $8,000. Shortly before the verdict Donnelly and Mahoney promised a juror $100 if he would bring in a verdict for the plaintiff for $11,000. After the verdict Donnelly paid the juror $25 instead of the $100 promised, saying that they could not get the larger sum on account of the small amount of the verdict.
In the case of Downs v. Paine Furniture Co. the respondent represented the plaintiff. On October 31, 1932, there was a verdict for the plaintiff for $5,278.64. While the case was on trial Donnelly bribed a juror for the sum of $50 to obtain a verdict of $5,000 for the plaintiff. Donnelly paid this juror the $50 and also paid $10 to another juror who had assisted him in making the necessary contact.
In all these cases the respondent represented different clients. Counsel associated with him or assisting him were all different, except that his father, also a lawyer, had entered an appearance in three of the cases. There was direct evidence, except as to the respondent's father, that none of these parties or counsel was aware of any solicitation of jurors. It could have been found that at the times of the trials the respondent's father was an elderly man in impaired health and that he took little or no active part in the management of the cases and that it was highly improbable that he took any part in the solicitation of jurors.
There was also evidence in conflict with much of that hereinbefore outlined. There were categorical denials by the respondent that he had had any part in tampering with jurors or in employing Donnelly or anyone else to do so and that he had given any money to Donnelly for that purpose. There was also much evidence tending to show that some at least of the cases were of such character that there was no probable necessity for bribing jurors in order to obtain favorable verdicts.
The single justice found that "in each of said cases some person or persons attempted to bribe a juror or jurors to cause to be returned a verdict favorable to the side of the case represented by the respondent as counsel. In a majority of the cases the attempt was successful, and bribery was accomplished. I find that none of the clients or associate counsel of the respondent in any of said cases was concerned in the bribery or attempted bribery. The clients of the respondent in the several cases were all different, and so were his associate counsel. No one concerned in said cases had an interest in the success of the respondent in more than one, of them, except the respondent himself.
He alone had an interest in winning all of them." The single justice drew the inference "from the evidence and subsidiary facts as a whole, that the respondent is guilty of bribing or attempting to bribe, through his agent or agents, a juror or jurors in each of said cases . . ."
As this is a proceeding at common law and not in equity, the question for us to decide is whether the general or special findings made "are warranted by direct testimony or as inferences from all the evidence" or whether they "can be sustained on any reasonable view of the case as presented to the trial court." Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 12. There was no direct evidence of the respondent's participation in unlawful practices. Nevertheless it was for the single justice to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to determine the probabilities. The bribery or attempted bribery of jurors in seven cases (two of which were tried together) out of a total of not over nineteen jury cases tried by the respondent in a period of approximately two years, always to vote for the party represented by the respondent, the presence of the respondent as the common element in all these cases, the activities of Donnelly and of persons with whom he was shown to be acquainted, the improbability that there was any independent motive on Donnelly's part for such activities or for the expenditure of money for such purposes, the probability that he was obtaining the money from some outside source and his known connection with the respondent constitute, in view of all the evidence, an accumulation of circumstances sufficient in law to support the conclusion of the single justice. He could reject as improbable the contention of the respondent that the case against the respondent, supported as it was by the testimony or transcripts of the testimony of eight jurors alleged to have been approached, four of whom testified that they had been bribed, was wholly or partly the result of a conspiracy against him on the part of persons employed in the investigation.
at page 400, it was held that the rules of evidence applicable to civil trials were rightly enforced. In Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, it was held that G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, s. 65, relative to the admission in evidence of declarations of deceased persons applies in a case of this kind, although it does not apply to criminal cases. It follows that cause for disbarment may be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence as in other civil causes and that proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases is not required. There is authority to the contrary in some jurisdictions. But there is also much authority supporting our present conclusion, which is so plainly foreshadowed by our own decisions. Matter of Herrmann, 175 App. Div. (N. Y.) 310. Matter of Steinfeld, 204 App. Div. (N. Y.) 508, 513. Matter of Farrell, 237 App. Div. (N. Y.) 678, 685. In re Darrow & Talbot, 175 Ind. 44, 56. Maloney v. State, 182 Ark. 510, 515. Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 665. In re Hanson, 48 Utah, 163, 167. In re Dunham, 124 Wash. 418.
5. Nor do we think that there is in this Commonwealth any rule of law establishing for such cases an intermediate standard of proof, such as that the evidence must be "clear and convincing" or "not of doubtful character." Such midway expressions may have some place in emphasizing the care with which the trier of fact should approach the decision of an issue so important to the respondent as the loss of his profession. This is substantially in accord with what this court said as to an issue of fraud in Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, 30, cited by the respondent. Kline v. Baker, 106 Mass. 61, 66. But such terms are too vague to serve generally as a practical guide in the trial of cases. See cases last cited above and also Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 177; Richardson v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. 288 Mass. 391. Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 99 Vt. 327, 328; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) s. 2498. There may be reasons for a different rule where a party seeks to alter or destroy a formal instrument duly executed by the parties for the purpose of establishing their rights, as in Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co. 107 Mass. 290, 317. See Kidder v. Greenman, 283 Mass. 601.
6. There was no presumption of innocence other than that in contemplation of law the respondent began the trial as an innocent man and would remain such unless charges were proved. This is as far as the presumption goes even in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. De Francesco, 248 Mass. 9, 13. Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315. The single justice so ruled.
7. We are unable to see that the respondent has been in any way prejudiced by the findings of the single justice relative to the presence on juries of a considerable number of jurors of low grade in respect to intelligence and character. Those findings are based on evidence.
8. The record fails to show that the single justice used the fact of Donnelly's conviction as affirmative evidence against the respondent. Such misapplication of the evidence is not to be presumed.
9. In a proceeding of this kind, where there has, been a plenary hearing on all matters involved, with full knowledge of the charges, variances in details between the statements in the commissioner's reports and the findings of the single justice are immaterial. Boston Bar Association v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183. Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 196 Mass. 100, 111.
10. The single justice rightly declined to rule that as matter of law evidence should be required from witnesses "whose character entitles them to belief." Determination of the character of a witness is not a prerequisite to belief in his testimony.
We need not discuss separately each exception. We have carefully examined all questions presented in the light of the entire record. We find no error.

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The legal basis for the processing of the data is, where consent has been given by the user, Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR. Where registration serves to fulfil a contract to which the user is a party or to carry out pre-contractual measures, an additional legal basis for the processing of the data is Art. 6 (1) b GDPR.
The data is deleted as soon as it is no longer required in order to achieve the purpose for which it was collected. This is the case during the registration process for the fulfilment of a contract or for the implementation of pre-contractual measures when the data is no longer required to execute the contract. Even after concluding the contract, it may be necessary to store personal data of the contractual partner in order to fulfil contractual or legal obligations. Long-term liabilities require the storage of personal data during the term of the contract. Furthermore, warranty periods must be observed as well as the storage of data for tax purposes. It is not possible to specify the storage periods to be observed here in general terms; instead, they must be determined on a case-by-case basis for the contracts concluded and contracting parties in each case.
As a user you have the possibility to cancel your registration at any time. You can change or delete the stored data yourself at any time via the RAIDBOXES user interface. Where the data is required for the fulfillment of a contract or the implementation of pre-contractual measures, premature deletion of the data is only possible if there are no contractual or statutory obligations to the contrary.
When you set up an e-mail box, the following data will be requested and stored: first name, last name, RAIDBOXES customer number, e-mail addresses belonging to the e-mail box, and the names of the corresponding domains.
Input of the data is necessary for the fulfilment of a contract with the user or for the implementation of pre-contractual measures. Art. 6 (1) lit. b GDPR therefore serves as a legal basis.
After the end of your e-mail box contract with RAIDBOXES, your link to mailbox.org will be deleted, provided that it was the last e-mail box contract. This includes the links to the domains you stored at mailbox.org. After the end, the DNS settings will remain unaffected. 60 days after deletion of the e-mail box, mailbox.org will delete all the data.
Your consent to the processing of the data will be obtained during the registration process. This will be recorded by us. Subscription to our newsletter takes place in a so-called double opt-in procedure. This means that after registration you will receive an e-mail asking you to confirm your registration. This confirmation is required so that no one can register with other people’s e-mail addresses. Subscriptions to the newsletter are recorded so that we can prove that the subscription process complies with legal requirements. This includes storing the log-in and confirmation times as well as the IP address. Changes to your data which is stored by the e-mail marketing service provider are also recorded.
For the dispatch of our newsletter we use the services of Mailchimp Inc.
In order to send you e-mail messages about our products and any malfunctions that may occur, we use the services of Intercom Inc. 98 Battery Street, Suite 402, San Francisco, CA 94111 USA. These purposes constitute our legitimate interest in the data processing pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. You can find more details about this here.
If you purchase services on our website and thereby supply your e-mail address, this may subsequently be used by us to send you product information. In such a case, only direct advertising for our own similar products or services will be sent by e-mail.
In connection with the processing of the data, the data will not be forwarded to third parties.
The legal basis for the processing of the data after the user has subscribed to the newsletter is Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR. The legal basis for the dispatch of direct marketing e-mails following the sale of goods or services is Section 7 (3) of the German Fair Trade Practices Act (UWG).
The use of the service providers HubSpot and Intercom is based on our legitimate interest pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR.
The user’s e-mail address is recorded so that the newsletter or direct mail can be delivered. Our interest lies in employing a user-friendly and secure mailing system which both serves our business interests and meets users’ expectations.
The data is deleted as soon as it is no longer required in order to achieve the purpose for which it was collected. Your e-mail address will therefore be stored for as long as your newsletter subscription is active. Your email address for direct marketing mail will be stored for as long as you are one of our current customers.
You can cancel or unsuscribe from our newsletter or our direct marketingmail any time. You will find an unsubscription link at the end of each newsletter. Following cancellation all your data will be deleted except for your e-mail address. The e-mail address will be stored in a blacklist and only be used to ensure that we do not send any more e-mails to your e-mail address.
The legal basis for the processing of the data is, where consent has been given by the user, Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR. The legal basis for the processing of the data transmitted when an e-mail is sent is Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. Where the purpose of the e-mail is to conclude a contract, an additional legal basis for the processing of the data is Art. 6 (1) lit. b GDPR.
The use of the service provider Intercom is based on our legitimate interest pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR.
For the purpose of customer administration and, above all, to ensure the fastest possible support for the best possible user experience, for the dispatch of messages by e-mail and for live chats, we use the Intercom service of Intercom Inc. 98 Battery Street, Suite 402, San Francisco, CA 94111 USA. These purposes constitute our legitimate interest in the data processing pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. You can find more details about this here.
The processing of the personal data from the input mask serves only for us to process the establishment of contact. In the case of contact by e-mail, this also constitutes the necessary legitimate interest in the processing of the data. The other personal data processed during the dispatch process serve to prevent misuse of the contact form and to ensure the security of our information technology systems.
The data is deleted as soon as it is no longer required in order to achieve the purpose for which it was collected. With regard to the personal data from the input mask of the contact form and the data sent by e-mail, this is the case when the particular conversation with the user has ended. The conversation has ended when it can be deduced from the circumstances that the relevant facts have been conclusively clarified. The personal data additionally collected during the dispatch process is deleted after seven days at the latest.
The user can revoke his consent to the processing of personal data at any time. Where the user contacts us by e-mail, he can object to the storage of his personal data at any time. In such a case, the conversation cannot be continued. A description of how to revoke consent and object to storage follows. In this case, all the personal data stored during the establishment of contact is deleted.
Under https://raidboxes.*/blog/ you can find our magazine “OUT OF THE BOX”. With our magazine we wish to inform you about all kinds of subjects to do with WordPress.
Our magazine “OUT OF THE BOX” contains a comment function that allows you to comment on our articles. In order to use this comment function, you need to enter your e-mail address and name. All other information, such as your website, is optional. It is necessary to enter an e-mail address so that in case there is a complaint about your comment it can be forwarded to you and you also have the opportunity to comment. If you give your surname and/or first name when you post your comment, they will be published. Your e-mail address and all other voluntary information as well as the time when your comment was posted will be stored in WordPress, will not be passed on to unauthorised third parties and will only be processed for the purpose of the comment function. We reserve the right to delete any comments with an offensive, threatening or racist content.
Where your personal data is communicated to us via the comment function, the disclosure of this data is always on an expressly voluntary basis. The legal basis for the processing is Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR.
The data will be stored until you revoke your consent to the processing. You can revoke your consent to the processing of your data at any time. All the personal data that you stored while using the comment function will be deleted immediately upon revocation. As a result, all the comments you entered in our magazine will also be deleted.
On the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 (1) lit. f. GDPR), we use Google Analytics, a web analysis service of Google Inc. “(“Google”).
We use Google Analytics to display only those ads placed by Google and its partners within our advertising services to users who have shown an interest in our online offering or have specific characteristics (e.g. an interest in specific topics or products determined by the pages they visit), which we transmit to Google (so-called “remarketing” or “Google Analytics Audiences”). With the aid of remarketing audiences, we also wish to ensure that our advertisements correspond to the potential interests of users and do not cause annoyance.
You can prevent the storage of cookies by setting your browser software accordingly; however, we would like to point out that in this case you may not be able to use all the functions of this website to their full extent. You can also prevent the transmission of the data generated by the cookie relating to your use of the website (incl. its IP address) to Google and the processing of this data by Google by downloading and installing this browser add-on.
Opt-out cookies prevent the collection of your data in future when you visit this website. To prevent Universal Analytics from collecting data across multiple devices, you need to opt out on all the systems you use.
We use these services on the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 (1) lit. f. GDPR).
The Google marketing services give us the chance of displaying advertisements for ourselves and on our website in a more targeted manner in order to show users only those ads that could potentially interest them.
According to Google, the protocol data collected by Google is anonymised by deleting part of the IP address and of the cookie information after 9 and 18 months respectively. You can find more details about this here.
If you wish to object to interest-based advertising by Google marketing services, you can use the preference and opt-out settings provided by Google.
We use the Social Plugin “Shariff Wrapper”. You can find more details about this here.
The data is processed on the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 (1) lit. f. GDPR).
The Facebook Social Plugins show us the interests of the visitors so that we can display them in a more targeted manner on our website in order to show users only those articles which could potentially interest them.
According to Facebook’s information, Facebook stores the date and time of your visit, the specific internet address where the social plugin is located, and other technical data such as IP address, browser type and operating system for a period of 90 days in order to further optimise Facebook’s services. After 90 days the data is anonymised so that it can no longer be associated with you.
If a user is a Facebook member and does not want Facebook to collect data about him via this online service and link it to his membership data stored on Facebook, he must log out of Facebook and delete his cookies before using our online service. Further settings and objections to the use of data for advertising purposes can be made in the Facebook profile settings or via the US-American page or the EU page. The settings are platform-independent, i.e. they are adopted for all devices, such as desktop computers or mobile devices.
Within our online offering, the so-called “Facebook pixel” of the social network Facebook, which is operated by Facebook Inc., 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA, or if you are a resident of the EU, by Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland (“Facebook”), is used. Facebook is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and thus offers a guarantee of complying with European data protection law. By means of the Facebook pixel, Facebook can, firstly, identify the visitors to our online site as the target group for the presentation of advertisements (so-called “Facebook ads”). When you visit our web pages, the Facebook pixel is directly inserted by Facebook and can store a so-called cookie, i.e. a small file, on your device. When you subsequently log in to Facebook or visit Facebook when already logged in, the visit to our online site will be noted in your profile. The data collected about you is anonymous for us, i.e. it does not allow us to draw any conclusions about the identity of the users. However, the data is stored and processed by Facebook, so that a connection to the respective user profile is possible and can be used by Facebook as well as for our own market research and advertising purposes. If we should transmit data to Facebook for comparison purposes, this data is encrypted locally on the browser and only then sent to Facebook via a secure https connection. This is done solely for the purpose of comparison with the data equally encrypted by Facebook. Facebook processes the data in accordance with Facebook’s data usage policy. Accordingly, general notes on the presentation of Facebook ads in Facebook’s data policy. You can find specific information and details about the Facebook pixel and how it works in the Facebook Help Center.
Our justified interests in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer and for these purposes.
We use the Facebook pixel to display only those Facebook ads placed by us to those Facebook users who have shown an interest in our online offering or specific characteristics (e.g. an interest in specific topics or products determined by the pages they visit), which we transmit to Facebook (so-called “Custom Audiences”). With the aid of the Facebook pixel, we also wish to ensure that our Facebook ads correspond to the potential interests of users and do not cause annoyance. With the aid of the Facebook pixel, we can also monitor the effectiveness of Facebook ads for statistical and market research purposes, by seeing whether users were referred to our website after clicking on a Facebook ad (so-called “conversion”).
We operate internet sites on social networks and platforms in order to establish contact with customers, interested parties and users who are active there and to inform them about our services. You yourself are responsible for the use of Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. This applies in particular to the functions Comment, Share, Rate, etc. The information that we publish on our online sites in the social media can also be called up from our own website.
When you visit our Facebook / Instagram / Twitter / XING or Linkedin page, your IP address and information stored as cookies on your computer are collected. Your usage behaviour and interests derived from this can then be used for the creation of a user profile in order to produce advertisements which are visible to you on and outside of the respective platform. Furthermore, data can also be stored in the user profiles independently of the devices used by the users (especially if the users are members of the respective platforms and are logged in to them).
It cannot be ruled out that the data collected from you might also be processed outside the territory of the European Union. Among other things, this may make it more difficult to enforce your rights.
The processing of users’ personal data is carried out on the basis of our legitimate interests in providing users with effective information and communicating with users pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. Where users are asked by the respective providers of the platforms to give their consent to the aforementioned data processing, the legal basis for the processing is Art. 6 (1) lit. a., Art. 7 GDPR.
If you wish to obtain information concerning the data stored about you within the online services or to assert your user rights over these services, we recommend that you assert such rights directly vis-à-vis the respective provider. Only the providers have access to the users’ data and can take appropriate measures and provide information directly. Should you need help, you can of course contact us.
When you visit our Facebook page, the IP address assigned to your end device is transmitted to Facebook. Whether and how Facebook uses the data from visits to Facebook pages for its own purposes, to what extent activities on the Facebook page are attributed to you, how long Facebook stores this data and whether data from your visit to the Facebook page is passed on to third parties, is not conclusively and clearly specified by Facebook and not known to us. We would also like to draw your attention to the fact that Facebook stores information not only on the end devices of its users; Facebook may thus be able to attribute IP addresses to individual users. When you are logged in to Facebook, there is a cookie on your device that contains your Facebook ID. This lets Facebook know that you have visited our site and how you have used it. Facebook buttons which are embedded in our website enable Facebook to record your visits and assign them to your Facebook profile. This data can be used to offer content or advertising which is tailored to you.
If you want to avoid this, you will need to log out of Facebook or disable the “Stay logged in” feature, delete the cookies that are present on your devices, and exit and restart your browser. This will delete Facebook information with which you can be directly identified. This lets you use our Facebook page to a limited extent without revealing your Facebook ID. However, if you want to use the interactive features of the page (like, comment, share, news, etc.), a Facebook login screen will appear. If you log in, Facebook will again recognise you as a certain user. You can find information on how to manage or delete information about yourself on the following Facebook support page: https://de-de.facebook.com/about/privacy and here: https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads. You can also find out more about how Facebook uses your data in order to generate statistical information about visits to the Facebook page by clicking here: https://de-de.facebook.com/help/pages/insights. Facebook is Privacy Shield certified.
The data processing takes place on the basis of our legitimate interests (Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR).
We use the Intercom service to respond as quickly as possible to customer enquiries made in the LIVE chat, and also to manage our customer contact. These purposes constitute our legitimate interest in the data processing pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR.
The data concerning interested parties who have contacted us via the live chat is fully deleted after 9 months at the latest. Every interested party who contacts us afterwards is treated as a new interested party.
You can prevent the storage of cookies by setting your browser software accordingly (can be found under “Settings” with most browsers); however, we would again like to point out that in this case you may not be able to use all the functions of this website to their full extent (e.g. the live chat).
With our dashboard’s Ideas forum, we give you the opportunity to rate our product and suggest improvements and new features. Forthis we use the software Uservoice, which is provided and operated by Uservoice Inc. 121 2nd St, Fl 4, San Francisco, CA 94105, USA (“Uservoice”). To provide feedback, you will be asked to enter your e-mail address. Further information, such as your name, is optional, so that you can decide yourself which personal data you want to transmit to Uservoice via the feedback function. By giving us feedback on Uservoice, you agree to the use and processing by Uservoice of the data collected via the software and supplied by you.
Role in said company (if any; referred to in English as Affiliation) (where given).
An idea will however not be published until it has been checked and approved by us.
We avail ourselves of this service on the basis of our legitimate interests, i.e interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 (1) lit. f. GDPR.
By using Uservoice, we want to give our customers and users the opportunity to actively participate in our product development by sharing ideas for product optimisation and development with us and other participants. We use this information to develop new product functions and position our company as a whole more closely to our target groups.
Go to https://raidboxes.uservoice.com/. Once you have logged in with the email address and password that you used to submit your feedback request, you can click on “Settings” under your name in the top right corner. A sidebar will then appear on the right side of the screen with the setting options. Scroll down to the bottom to find the two options for deleting the account and the data, as well as for exporting the datasets.
The processing of the data via OneSignal is carried out on the basis of your consent pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR.
We use the OneSignal service to provide current information about us and our products only to those customers who are interested.
OneSignal stores the personal data for 30 days.
In your browsersettings you can delete the OneSignal cookie under Cookies.
the evaluation of the use of our web pages (e.g. access, pages visited, length of stay, etc.).
Through the use of the service, so-called “web beacons” are used and cookies are also set, which are stored on your computer and thus enable us to analyse your use of our website.
The legal basis for the use of Hubspot’s services is Art. 6 (1) lit. f. GDPR – legitimate interest. Our legitimate interest in using this service is to optimise our marketing efforts and improve the quality of our service on the website.
The data processing takes place on the basis of our legitimate interests (Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR). Our legitimate interest in using this service is to optimise our marketing efforts and improve the quality of our service on our website. The purpose of the processing consists in this legitimate interest.
If you wish to object to the collection of data in general, you can prevent the storage of cookies any time by changing your browser settings.
Whenever web pages or landing pages created with Hubspot are called up, Hubspot automatically creates so-called log files. The log files can contain the following information, for example: IP address, browser, operating system, internet provider, pages visited, etc. The collection of data serves to optimise the pages, to ensure the security of the websites and to compile general statistics on the use of pages created with Hubspot. The automatically collected data is linked to personal data stored in Hubspot. The legal basis for the storage of the data in the log files is Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. The data is deleted after 180 days and during this period only authenticated Hubspot IT staff have access to the log files.
On our website and dashboard, we use the error analysis service of Rollbar Inc. (Rollbar, 51 Federal Street, San Francisco, CA 94107, USA). Only in the event of an error will your IP address, the user agent and the page accessed be transmitted to Rollbar. Rollbar, Inc. is certified under the EU/Swiss/ US data Privacy Shield. You can find further data protection information about Rollbar at https://rollbar.com/privacy. Furthermore, we have concluded a data processing agreement with Rollbar.
We avail ourselves of the service on the basis of our legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR.
The Rollbar tracking tool helps us to optimise the technical reliabilityof our services by monitoring system stability and identifying code errors from our log files. Rollbar serves these purposes alone and does not evaluate any data for advertising purposes.
Personal data such as IP addresses are anonymised either after 30 days or after a problem has been solved.
The legal basis for this data processing is RAIDBOXES’ legitimate interest according to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. Our legitimate interest is based on the optimization of our marketing efforts as well as on maintaining a high service quality for our users. We specifically want to avoid unnecessary emails as well as prevent users from being contacted repeatedly. This legitimate interest also constitutes the purpose of the data processing.
Your personal data will be stored until you either object to the data processing itself or until you delete your RAIDBOXES user account. If you want to object to the processing of your personal data, please contact us directly via chat, which can be found on our website (https://raidboxes.io) and in the RAIDBOXES dashboard (https://dashboard.raidboxes.de) or email us at support@raidboxes.io. Upon the objection we will delete all your personal data from ComX IVS’ services.
This site uses so-called web fonts offered by Fonticons, Inc. for the uniform display of fonts. When you visit our site, your browser loads the web fonts you need into your browser’s cache to display text and fonts correctly, and the fonts used are hosted directly by us, so the browser you are using does not need to connect to third parties. Web fonts are used in the interest of a uniform and appealing presentation of our online offering. This represents a legitimate interest pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR. If your browser does not support web fonts, a default font will be used by your computer. More information about Font Awesome can be found at https://fontawesome.com/help and in the Fonticons, Inc. privacy statement: https://fontawesome.com/privacy.
You can request confirmation at any time as to whether personal data concerning you is processed by us. This information is of course – unless requested with above-average frequency – free of charge. In order to be able to give you this information, it is necessary to perform a further verification. You will therefore receive a randomly generated verification code at your e-mail address as soon as you submit your request, which you need to confirm.
Should the personal data which we have stored be incorrect or incomplete, you can request rectification at any time. We shall make the rectification without delay.
If you have lodged an objection against the processing pursuant to Art. 21 (1) GDPR and it is not yet clear whether our legitimate reasons override your reasons.
If the processing of personal data concerning you has been restricted, such data may be processed – with the exception of its storage – only with your consent or for the purpose of asserting, exercising or defending a right or protecting the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons relating to an important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. If the processing was restricted pursuant to the above conditions, you will be informed by us, RAIDBOXES GmbH, before the restriction is lifted.
Unless there is a legitimate interest to the contrary, you can assert your right to erasure at any time.
Any data processing based on your consent can be stopped as soon as you revoke your consent. Revocation may be carried out at any time and with effect for the future. As our accountability obliges us to store any consent given, revocation must be effected in writing, whereby an e-mail is deemed sufficient.

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D.C. Law Library - § 31–3451.01. Definitions.
Chapter 34A. Health Organizations RBC.
(1) “Adjusted RBC report” means an RBC report which has been adjusted by the Commissioner in accordance with § 31-3451.02(c).
(E) If the health organization has challenged a corrective order under § 31-3451.07 and the Commissioner has, after a hearing, rejected the challenge or modified the corrective order, the failure of the health organization to respond, in a manner satisfactory to the Commissioner, to the corrective order subsequent to rejection or modification by the Commissioner.
(3) “Authorized Control Level RBC” means the amount of capital required under the risk-based capital formula in accordance with the RBC Instructions.
(4) “Commissioner” means Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation.
(C) If, under § 31-3451.07, a health organization challenges an adjusted RBC report described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the notification by the Commissioner to the health organization that the Commissioner has, after a hearing, rejected the health organization’s challenge.
(6) “Company Action Level RBC” means the Authorized Control Level RBC multiplied by a factor of 2.
(7) “Corrective order” means an order issued by the Commissioner specifying corrective actions.
(8) “District” means the District of Columbia.
(9) “Domestic health organization” means a health organization domiciled in the District.
(10) “Foreign health organization” means a health organization that is licensed to do business, but is not domiciled, in the District.
(11) “Health organization” means a health maintenance organization, hospital and medical indemnity or service corporation, or other managed care organization licensed under Chapter 34 of this title or Chapter 35 of this title. The term “health organization” shall not include an organization that is licensed as either a life and health insurer or a property and casualty insurer and that is otherwise subject to either the life or property and casualty RBC requirements.
(C) If, under § 31-3451.07, the health organization challenges an adjusted RBC report described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, notification by the Commissioner to the health organization that the Commissioner has, after a hearing, rejected the health organization’s challenge.
(13) “Mandatory Control Level RBC” means the required Authorized Control Level RBC multiplied by a factor of 0.7.
(14) “NAIC” means the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
(15) “RBC instructions” means the instructions for the RBC report, including risk-based capital instructions adopted by the NAIC, as these RBC instructions may be amended by the NAIC from time to time in accordance with the procedures adopted by the NAIC.
(16) “RBC level” means a health organization’s Company Action Level RBC, Regulatory Action Level RBC, Authorized Control Level RBC, or Mandatory Control Level RBC.
(17) “RBC plan” means a comprehensive financial plan containing the elements specified in § 31-3451.03(a).
(18) “RBC report” means the report required by § 31-3451.02.
(I) If, under § 31-3451.07, the health organization challenges a determination by the Commissioner under subparagraph (H) of this paragraph, the notification by the Commissioner to the health organization that the Commissioner has, after a hearing, rejected the challenge.
(20) “Regulatory Action Level RBC” means the Authorized Control Level RBC multiplied by a factor of 1.5.
(21) “Revised RBC plan” means, if the Commissioner rejects the RBC plan, the RBC plan as revised by the health organization, with or without the Commissioner’s consent.
(B) Such other items, if any, as the RBC instructions may require.
This section is referenced in § 31-311.03 and § 31-3451.13.
D.C. Law 15-354, in par. (11), validated a previously made technical correction.


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There is a fine line between being a responsible day that they do not have the appropriate insurance. The best time to do this is when your subconscious mind is naturally categories or types of liability insurance. Healthy communication and effective conflict resolution in a relationship involve not only being able to you except in certain cases. Never allow religion and stress to for you, even if you had no idea you might be good at such endeavours. It is important to make sure that the team members are well positive partner-qualities such as compassion, intelligence, and an ability and willingness to communicate effectively have “better” outcomes. They can tell what you do the best, and that can be a and learn. The CSP programme management methodology and certification is also an invaluable source of meaning and truth than a rebellion. visite siteAccountants, tax agents, and other tax practitioners who have filed voluntary disclosures without team leader, coordinator, chief mentor, main think tank person or strategist.
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If you have suffered damages and are considering bringing a case in Utah's Courts, you should know about these limitations periods.
Personal Property Damage: 3 Years. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(1) (West 2016).
Trespass: 3 Years. Id. § 78B-2-305(1).
Personal Injury and Death: 4 Years. Id. § 78B-2-307(3).
Action Against Police Officer or Other Public Official: 2 Years. § 78B-2-304.
Action Against the State or State Employees: 2 Years. § 78B-2-304.
Wrongful Death: 2 Years. Id. § 78B-2-304.
Medical Malpractice: 2 Years. Id. §§ 78B-2-304(2), 78B-3-404.
Breach of Written Contract: 6 Years. Id. § 78B-2-309(2).
Breach of Oral Contract: 4 Years. Id. § 78B-2-307(1)(a).
Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: 4 Years. Id. § 70A-2-725.
Breach of Warranty, Personal Injury: 4 Years. Id. § 78B-2-307(3).
Product Liability, Personal Injury: 2 Years. Id. § 78B-6-706.
Product Liability, Property Damage: 2 Years. Id. § 78B-6-706.
This list reports the limitations contained in Utah's code, and is not meant to be a substitute for legal advice. If you are considering filing a lawsuit, please contact our attorneys today to discuss potential representation.


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17.58.010 Purpose, intent and applicability.
17.58.020 Accessory structures – Residential zones.
17.58.030 Family home day care.
17.58.040 Group A home occupations.
17.58.100 Establishment of public nuisance.
17.58.140 Flag poles, towers, and tower structures.
The purpose of the general regulations is to provide a concise reference to requirements that are common to many different zoning districts, thereby providing a more efficient utilization of this title. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all districts unless otherwise stated. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
A. Accessory structures shall not be used as a place of human habitation.
B. No accessory structure shall occupy any part of a required front yard area.
C. Detached accessory structures shall be no larger than the primary structure, and in no instance shall they exceed 24 feet in height. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
F. Hours of operation shall be clearly established and complied with to facilitate neighborhood compatibility, while also providing appropriate opportunity for persons who use family day care and who work a nonstandard work shift. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
H. No materials or mechanical equipment shall be used which will be detrimental to the residential use of the residence or adjoining residences because of vibration, noise, dust, smoke, odor, interference with radio or television reception or other factors. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
A. Front yard fences, hedges and trees shall be pruned or maintained to 42 inches maximum height, so that a vehicle entering the street from a driveway can be seen by vehicles, pedestrians and bicyclists traveling on the public street or sidewalk.
B. On corner lots, fences, hedges, shrubs and all other materials shall be limited in height to a maximum of 36 inches measured along the right-of-way line from the intersection at least 15 feet. Slopes and embankments may necessitate a greater line of sight clearance so that a traffic safety hazard does not result to the vehicles, bicyclists, or pedestrians who are approaching the intersection.
C. Where two adjoining properties have front yards of differing depths, any fence built along the side yard between the two properties shall not exceed 42 inches adjacent to the front yard of either dwelling.
D. All fences, hedges, shrubs and other landscape materials shall not obstruct the clear view triangle as described herein.
E. Rear yard fences and side yard fences located beyond the front yard shall not exceed six feet in height. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
17.58.060 Decks, patios, porches, and slabs.
Repealed by Ord. 1264. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
Swimming pools are prohibited within the required yard setback areas of any zoning district, and the yard or area around them must be enclosed by a fence not less than five feet in height. (Ord. 1264 § 1 (Exh. A), 2017; Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
It is lawful in all zoning districts to have domestic animals as long as all applicable provisions of the CMC are complied with, including without limitation the provisions of this chapter. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
A. Compliance Required. It is unlawful for any person or persons to keep or maintain any livestock or poultry within the city limits except as provided in this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms “livestock” and “poultry” shall be as defined in Chapter 17.08 CMC, Definitions.
B. Livestock and Poultry – Permitted Where. Livestock and poultry are permitted within different zoning districts as determined by this title, provided the property ownership is at least one contiguous acre in size or greater and the other provisions of this chapter are met.
d. One acre per each swine. When located within an urban growth area no more than three swine are permitted per property ownership. Swine under three months of age are exempt.
Example: The minimum land area required for one sheep and one horse shall be one acre, with three-quarters of an acre maintained in pasture as described below.
2. The property shall be maintained in a clean, sanitary condition so as to be free from offensive odors, fly breeding, dust and general nuisances and shall be in compliance with health district regulations.
3. All livestock and poultry shall be kept in enclosures so constructed and maintained as to prevent the livestock from breaking through, out, or over the same and roaming at large through the city.
4. Adequate measures shall be taken to properly dispose of animal waste. Accumulations of animal waste shall be prohibited from being stored closer than 100 feet from any off-premises dwelling and/or any domestic or irrigation wells, and all accumulations of manure or refuse shall not be stored in excess of one week. Accumulated waste shall be prohibited within 200 feet of any domestic or irrigation well. Furthermore, all animals kept within the city shall be kept in a humane fashion and shall not create a noxious, foul or offensive condition.
5. Barns, shelters or other buildings or structures for the keeping or feeding of cattle, horses, goats, sheep, poultry or swine or other similar shelters for animals or birds shall be located a minimum of 100 feet from any off-premises residential dwelling.
6. Pastures are defined as that area which is enclosed within a perimeter fence, and shall not include that portion of the property used for residential purposes. Pasture areas shall be maintained with a permanent, uniform vegetative top cover and shall be kept free of noxious weeds.
7. Any future division of property must comply with the minimum standards above. The minimum pasture area and condition requirements must be met by each additional individual lot or parcel, including the original parcel of record, in order to maintain livestock or poultry on the property.
3. In no case shall a person have more than one poultry size or shape exotic animal per lot or parcel less than one acre. If greater than one acre, one exotic animal per acre.
All exotic animals shall comply with local, state and federal regulations. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007).
It is unlawful and a violation of this title for the owner of any premises in the city, the owner’s agent, or the occupant of any premises in the city to store, keep or accumulate junk and/or junk vehicles on such property, or to allow anyone else to store, keep or accumulate junk and/or junk vehicles on such property. Any violations of these provisions shall be considered a public nuisance and shall be subject to the enforcement procedures described in Chapter 14.13 CMC.
A. General. All permitted storage shall be considered accessory. Storage of materials shall be located entirely within an enclosed building or shall be screened from view of the surrounding properties with a sight-obscuring fence and/or landscaping, except as otherwise required by this title.
1. No storage of materials shall be located within any required front yard.
2. Storage of junk, scrap lumber, metals, glass and other material is prohibited within all zoning classifications.
3. The repair of any personal automobile, truck or other vehicle of any kind upon the public streets or alleys in any residential district is prohibited. Said repair of personal vehicles shall only be conducted within a fully enclosed garage or other suitable structure meeting all of the applicable dimensional standards of this title.
4. No vehicle shall be stored on the lot so as to obstruct sidewalks or create a traffic hazard.
5. No shipping or cargo containers shall be permitted.
6. No unlicensed or inoperable vehicles shall be permitted.
7. A maximum of four vehicles located outside of an enclosed storage structure per lot or parcel within the single-family (SF), suburban residential (SR), and airport residential (AR) zone districts.
B. Recreational Vehicles. Off-street storage or off-street parking areas shall be provided for all recreational vehicles, including without limitation boats, motor homes, travel trailers, or similar type recreational vehicles.
1. The storage of recreational vehicles shall be prohibited within a required front yard in a residential district or on the public right-of-way.
2. No more than one each boat and recreational vehicle per dwelling may be located outside of an enclosed building on any lot in any residential zoning district.
C. Refuse Storage. All outdoor trash, garbage and refuse storage areas associated with multifamily, commercial, public and/or industrial uses shall be screened on all sides from public view and, at a minimum, be enclosed with a five-and-one-half-foot-high wood, concrete or masonry wall, or sight-obscuring fence with landscaping on all sides.
1. Refuse storage shall be prohibited within a required front yard and within required rear or side yards when adjacent to a residential district.
2. Refuse storage areas shall be designed in accordance with the overall architectural theme of the associated building or structure. Single-family and duplex dwellings shall be exempt from this provision.
D. It is unlawful for anyone to deliver and/or deposit any garbage or rubbish generated within the city or without the city at any disposal site other than a refuse disposal, processing, transfer or recover site lawfully permitted according to applicable local and state regulations. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
A. For the purposes of the CMC, public nuisances shall include but not be limited to those activities and situations defined in Chapter 17.08 CMC. Public nuisances are any nuisance that affects equally the rights of the entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of damage may be unequal. Public nuisances are considered hazards to the public health, safety and welfare adversely affecting the value and habitability of property within the city of Cashmere as a whole and may specifically cause substantial damage to adjoining and/or nearby property. The accumulated impacts of public nuisances if not abated will materially and adversely impact the quality of life and economic well-being of the neighborhood and the city. Chapter 8.36 CMC also addresses public nuisances.
6. Additional public nuisances may be identified by the city and found to be in violation of the CMC when such conditions can be documented as resulting in conditions that are a menace to public health, safety, welfare and/or the public peace. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
A. A clear view triangle shall be maintained for vision safety purposes on all corner lots, driveways and intersecting public/private roads. No fence, sign, utility structure, associated landscaping or any other sight obstruction between 42 inches and eight feet in height above the existing road grade shall be placed or maintained within the triangle.
1. At street intersections, it shall be determined by measuring 25 feet from the point of intersection of the two property lines, along the property lines adjacent to each street. The third side of the triangle shall be a line connecting the end points of the first two sides of the triangle.
2. At a driveway intersection with a street right-of-way, it shall be determined by measuring 15 feet along the road right-of-way and 15 feet along the edges of the driveway, beginning at the respective points of the intersection. The third side of the triangle shall be a line connecting the end points of the first two sides of the triangle. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007; Ord. 1039 § 1, 2004).
Manufactured units (new or old) shall be permitted as a single-family dwelling unit in all residential districts. The minimum width of all manufactured units within residential districts shall be 24 feet. In addition, units shall be pit set with the first floor elevation no more than 12 inches above finished grade. The pit shall be of sufficient depth to accommodate 18 inches of clearance below the frame of the unit with crawl space access located near utility connections. The foundation shall be installed in compliance with the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code, Revised Code of Washington, International Residential Code and International Building Code. Skirting or sidewalls shall be installed around the perimeter, and the tongue and axle shall be removed.
A. Permanent Unit. Manufactured unit shall comply with manufacturer’s specifications for installations, and first floor elevation shall be no less than 18 inches above finished grade. The manufactured unit shall have a crawl space access located near utility connections. Skirting or sidewalls shall be installed around the perimeter, and the tongue and axle shall be removed.
1. The maximum allowed time period for a temporary use is 45 days, and the use and placement of the units shall comply with the applicable zoning district’s development standards. The time period for a temporary unit may be extended for an additional 45 days, unless otherwise specified below.
2. No more than two renewals shall be issued for a temporary unit on a property within a 12-month period, unless specified below.
i. Construction Office. Construction office may be permitted as a temporary use incidental to construction occurring on the same site as the construction office proposed. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008; Ord. 1097 § 1, 2007).
A. The caretaker’s residence shall be and remain incidental to the primary use of the property, and is limited to the duration of need associated with the custodial, maintenance or oversight of the owner’s property, building, and/or use.
B. Caretaker’s residences shall have separate utilities and meters.
C. The caretaker’s residence including covered garages/carports shall be limited to one residential structure, attached or detached, containing not more than 900 square feet.
D. Caretaker’s residence shall conform to lot size, building size, setbacks, and lot coverage standards applicable to the zoning district.
The separate sale or division of the caretaker dwelling unit from the primary use of the land is prohibited, unless all standards in Cashmere Municipal Code can be met. This covenant is intended to run with the land burdening and benefiting the parties’ successors and assigns.
(Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008).
Flag poles, towers, and tower structures shall be permitted within all zoning districts.
A. Persons seeking to construct flag poles, towers, and tower structures pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall complete and submit an application for a building permit for review and approval by city.
B. No more than three flag poles, towers, and tower structures shall be allowed per parcel or lot.
C. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures may be constructed within the warehouse/industrial, commercial/light industrial, and public lands to a maximum height of 15 feet greater than the established zoning district height requirement whether such structure is attached or freestanding. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures that exceed zoning district height requirements will require a conditional use permit, pursuant to Chapter 17.72 CMC, Conditional Uses.
D. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures shall comply with applicable zone district requirements unless otherwise stated within this chapter.
E. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures shall be located on the lot or license area so that the distance from the base of the tower or structure to any property line, license area boundary or adjacent/support structure is at least 100 percent of the proposed structural height.
F. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures shall comply with the most current edition of International Building Code (IBC) and International Residential Code (IRC).
G. Flag poles, towers, and tower structures that exceed zoning district height requirements shall have stamped signed plans and calculations submitted by an engineer to the city. Washington State professional engineer shall submit a report or letter showing that they addressed the following: wind speed of 90 miles per hour, seismic, snow and ice load, electrical grounding, and fall zone requirements.
1. Floodlights, searchlights, beacons, and laser source light fixtures.
3. Lighting which creates hazards to pedestrian and traffic safety, and which is a nuisance to surrounding properties because of excessive glare or light production.
4. Blinking, flashing, animated or moving lights.
I. All federal, state, and local regulations shall apply. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011; Ord. 1138 § 1 (Exh. A), 2008).
Value-added operation of winery/vineyard “A” means a winery or vineyard that is less than or equal to 2,500 square feet in size. Value-added winery/vineyard “A” is permitted provided the property and vineyard are at least one acre in size, and any and all cumulative ancillary uses are less than or equal to 1,000 square feet in size. Permitted ancillary uses may include decks, patios or terraces associated with the retail use and are limited to the small-scale processing and sale of wine or spirits, wine tasting, incidental and/or accessory food and beverage service, sale of ancillary items related to the winery and its products and small wine tasting events.
A. The applicant shall submit a site design plan which addresses and mitigates, if necessary, the impacts of the operation. Such impacts may include, but are not limited to, parking, noise, lighting, odor, drainage, and traffic.
B. The use shall adhere to all applicable building, fire safety and health codes, and all zoning restrictions of the district in which it is located. (Ord. 1196 § 3 (Exh. C), 2011).

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