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STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking to set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution dated September 22, 2005 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders - General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) - National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same was denied for having been filed out of time.
On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices. Said election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete with irregularities. On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the conduct of the election with "NAFLU" and "NO UNION" as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.
On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS," respondent and "NO UNION" as choices. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999. Unsatisfied, petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.
On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner; hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision which annulled and set aside the August 27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further directed the holding of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices, to the exclusion of respondent.
On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS' election protest but deferred the request of respondent to be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA. Not satisfied with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary. It further filed a Manifestation before the CA pointing out that in the April 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged as winner, and thus, the election should be considered as an intervening event sufficient to bar another certification election. The CA, however, dismissed said manifestation on December 28, 2000.
Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner's employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration.
Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latter's refusal to bargain with it.
On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA decision. On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.
On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01. Again, on April 2, 2001, another Notice of Strike was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated with the certified case.
On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders. The decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct certification election in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002.
Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the officers of the union. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the resolution praying that additional employees be dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner's refusal to bargain and union busting. The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.
On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting. Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. The second certified case was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of seniority rights and diminution of salary. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated January 26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.
Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision dated February 12, 2003 opted to resolve the parties' respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRC modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered terminated, which in effect denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003. These decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIRECTING PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF THIS COURT DIRECTING THE HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the directives of this Tribunal in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioner's claims are based on pure allegations and not supported by any substantial evidence.
In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be noted that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA added that since it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as the duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim and it has no right to demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated September 22, 2005.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE STRIKE HELD BY THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INVALIDATE THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DIRECTING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE LABOR SECRETARY.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE NLRC HAS RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION MAY RECONSIDER IN THE SECOND CERTIFIED CASE ITS DECISION ON THE FIRST CERTIFIED CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitioner argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent as the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-strike, it is illegal.
Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264, which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration between the parties. Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by express provision of the law.
Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRC's decision in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res judicata in the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.
Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost their employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination from employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the union officers was warranted.
Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision ordering the reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike. It argues that since the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the decision.
Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.
Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.
In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.
The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality, petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds - petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their action.
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from filling up their positions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, rollo, pp. 52-70.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated August 27, 1999 and the resolution dated October 10, 1999, both of the respondent DOLE Undersecretary are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Conformably herewith, the Department of Labor and Employment or its appropriate bureau or office shall conduct a certification election with Steel Corporation of the Philippines Workers' Union FUEL-GAS and No Union as choices, subject to such rules and regulations prescribed under the Labor Code and/or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 55-70.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 19-20.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 35-52.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 21-22.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 355-380.
 ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. -- (a) x x x.
 CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 49-61.
 Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines (AIUP), et al. v. NLRC, 354 Phil. 697, 707.
 In CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
 Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications and Philcom Corporation, G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 214, 232.
 Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 776, 794.
 Supra note 63 at 243.
 Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Corporation, G.R. No. 154591, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 349, 363.
 Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 437, 455; Grand Boulevard Hotel v. GLOWHRAIN, 454 Phil. 463, 491; Lapanday Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95, 104-105.
 Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. supra at 458-459; See also: Stamford Marketing Corp. v. Julian, G.R. No. 145496, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 633, 649.


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This is a follow-up to this morning’s post on United States v. Robertson, the Fourth Circuit’s decision yesterday on the voluntariness of a consent search under the Fourth Amendment. In the comment threads, a lot of thoughtful comments raised the issue of whether voluntariness is really just a question of fact reviewed for clear error. As I noted in the original post, there were two layers of facts: The facts of what happened, and then the “fact” of whether the consent was voluntary. But as some commenters noted, it’s a little weird to think of voluntariness as just a fact. Whether consent is voluntary is a conclusion based on a legal sense of what voluntariness means. It must have at least some legal elements in it. So that raised the question, is voluntariness really just reviewed for clear error as a fact, or is it a mixed judgment of law and fact, with the “what happened” part reviewed for clear error and the “so does that amount to consent” part reviewed de novo?
In the Fourth Circuit, I found, the answer is actually somewhat mixed. If you follow what most of the cases say, it looks like the standard is just clear error all around. That is, when Fourth Circuit opinions discuss the voluntariness standard, they usually just say it is a factual issue and say clear error applies. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The voluntariness of consent to search is a factual question, and as a reviewing court, we must affirm the determination of the district court unless its finding is clearly erroneous.”); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (“In reviewing a district court’s determination on consent, an appellate court must uphold the lower court’s finding unless it is “clearly erroneous.””); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d at 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1990). (“The voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to a search is a factual question determined in light of the totality of the circumstances and should be upheld unless clearly erroneous.”).
The Robertson opinion recited that standard, and if you take that standard seriously, then I think the majority was wrong and the dissent was right for the reason I explained in my post.
When the government justifies a warrantless search under the “voluntary consent” exception to the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement, the district court’s factual determination as to whether consent to the search was actually given is reviewed for clear error. . .
A related, but analytically distinct, issue is whether Ms. McRae’s factual consent to the search was also “voluntary,” as a matter of law. The defendant argues that the police coerced Ms. McRae’s consent by saying: “We want to search your car to make sure Mr. McRae didn’t leave anything in the interior that might get you in trouble.” The defendant argues that, by inducing fear in Ms. McRae, the police effectively intimidated her into consenting to the search.
Because the “voluntariness” of a search is a matter of law, it is reviewed de novo.
Unfortunately, this part of Carter doesn’t cite any caselaw on the latter point, or try to reconcile it with the contrary statements in other decisions. But Carter clearly treats voluntariness as a mixed question of law and fact. (In case you’re wondering, Carter is a per curiam decision with Widener and Hall by designation; Murnaghan was on the original panel but died before the opinion was published.) If you accept Carter‘s standard, then I think the majority in Robertson may very well be correct, and at the very least isn’t guilty of clear judicial overreach.
Anyway, I’m not sure of the lessons to be drawn here. Maybe it’s just that Robertson should have cited Carter and made clear that it was reviewing the ultimate issue de novo, as it seemed to be. Maybe it’s that the Fourth Circuit needs to go en banc and figure out just what standards apply to appellate review of voluntariness determinations of consent searches. Maybe it’s that lawyers litigating consent issues should be aware of the mixed caselaw, and they should use it to their advantage.
Or maybe this is an issue for the Supreme Court to clarify. The Court’s decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte leaves the precise nature of voluntariness inquiries somewhat murky, and that has led to considerable uncertainty in the federal court of appeals. I looked quickly through the caselaw of the Seventh Circuit, for example, and I also found Seventh Circuit cases taking both sides of the law/fact issue. Compare United States v. Jones, 614 F.3d 423, 435 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We will reverse a district court’s finding of voluntary consent only if it is clearly erroneous.”) with United States v. Wade, 400 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Questions of law—that is, the legal conclusion of whether Wade’s consent was voluntary and whether he was illegally seized—are reviewed de novo.”) So it may be a source of widespread confusion in the circuit courts generally, and therefore is an issue that the Supreme Court would be best situated to clarify.
Finally, this is a great student note topic for any law student readers out there. A note that combed through the law of each of the circuits and figured out the law of each, as well as inconsistencies in the law of each, would be really helpful.
3B. Would Granting an Exemption from the Employer Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause?
Good Non-Fiction Audiobooks, Preferably About History?

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Repeated violation of behavior policies may result in an official suspension of library privileges, based on an established schedule of offenses and consequences established by the library.


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John Riley, Sr. - Descendants of John Riley, Jr.
1. JOHN6 RILEY, JR. (JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1)1 was born 1795 in Orange County North Carolina1. He married WINIFRED Abt. 1820 in Darlington District, South Carolina. She was born Abt. 1800.
The 1820 Darlington County South Carolina Federal Census, roll 118, page 070, list John Riley,Jr, age 16-26 with one female age 16-26. I believe John Junior was the first child born to John Senior and Mary Riley and was born in 1795.
The 1830 Darlington County South Carolina Census, lists John Riley, Jr. age 30-40, with 2 females age 20-30, (his wife Winifred and perhaps a sister Joanna) 2 females age 5-10, and 1 male age 0-4.
The 1840 Henry County Alabama Census, page 168, list John Riley, Jr. age 40-50 with 1 female age 40-50, 1 female age 16-20, 1 female age 10-15, and 1 male age 10-15.
John Jr. has not been found on other Census and no record exists on him after 1840.
i. WINIFRED 'WINNIE'7 RILEY, b. 12 Sep 1820, Darlington District, South Carolina; d. 10 Feb 1840, Henry County Alabama.
Direct proof that Winnie is the Child of John Riley, Jr has not been found. John Junior is the only child of John Senior that had a female child old enough to be Winnie. The 1830 Darlington County South Carolina Census list 2 females age 5-10. The Henry County Alabama 1840 Census list 1 female age 16-20 which I believe to be Winnie. Her Grave Stone simply says " In Memory of Winnie Riley " with birth and death dates. Also, her sister Mary Riley ward named her first child "Winifred".
2. ii. MARY RILEY, b. 17 Apr 1822, Darlington District, South Carolina; d. 28 Aug 1861, Dale County Alabama.
iii. SON RILEY, b. Abt. 1828, Darlington District, South Carolina.
2. MARY7 RILEY (JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 17 Apr 1822 in Darlington District, South Carolina, and died 28 Aug 1861 in Dale County Alabama. She married JOHNATHAN WARD Abt. 1839 in Dale County Alabama. He was born 23 Apr 1811 in Darlington District, South Carolina, and died 13 Oct 1868 in Henry County Alabama.
3. i. WINIFRED8 WARD, b. 26 Jan 1840, Dale County Alabama; d. 22 Apr 1924.
4. ii. JOHN JACKSON WARD, b. 19 May 1842, Dale County Alabama; d. 03 Apr 1890.
iii. MARY WARD, b. 24 Jan 1844, Dale County Alabama; d. 08 Jun 1854, Dale County Alabama.
5. iv. THOMAS WARD, b. 08 Jan 1845, Dale County Alabama; d. 14 Jun 1920, Dale County Alabama.
6. v. WILEY F. WARD, b. 09 Jul 1857, Dale County Alabama; d. 10 Jul 1925, Dale County Alabama.
3. WINIFRED8 WARD (MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 26 Jan 1840 in Dale County Alabama, and died 22 Apr 1924. She married AMOS GILMORE CHANCEY, JR 31 Jan 1862 in Dale County Alabama, son of THOMAS CHANCY and POLLY. He was born 11 Dec 1842 in Alabama, and died 01 Mar 1924.
i. MARY ANN9 CHANCEY, b. 19 Jan 1863, Dale County Alabama; d. Abt. 1865, Dale County Alabama.
ii. ANNER CHANCEY, b. 17 Aug 1865, Dale County Alabama; d. 13 Jul 1887, Dale County Alabama.
iii. HARRISON T. CHANCEY, b. 18 May 1867, Dale County Alabama.
7. iv. JONATHAN BRINKLEY CHANCEY, b. 03 Jan 1869, Dale County Alabama; d. 13 Jun 1953, Dale County Alabama.
8. v. IDEN CAMELLA CHANCEY, b. 14 Oct 1870, Dale County Alabama; d. 25 Sep 1933, Dale County Alabama.
vi. A .L. CHANCEY, b. 15 Dec 1872, Dale County Alabama; d. 16 Dec 1872.
vii. L. L. CHANCEY, b. 15 Sep 1872, Dale County Alabama; d. 17 Sep 1872.
9. viii. JOHN C. CHANCEY, b. 14 Sep 1873, Dale County Alabama; d. 26 May 1916, Henry County Alabama.
ix. MARTHA D. CHANCEY, b. 20 May 1876, Dale County Alabama.
10. x. DELLA CHANCEY, b. 20 May 1878, Dale County Alabama.
11. xi. LUCINDA ISABELLE CHANCEY, b. 25 Mar 1880, Echo, Dale County Alabama; d. 21 Aug 1972, Headland, Henry County Alabama.
xii. SOLOMON W. CHANCEY, b. 05 Feb 1880, Dale County Alabama; d. 24 May 1884.
xiii. LULEY CHANCEY, b. 18 Mar 1882, Dale County Alabama; d. 17 Jun 1885.
12. xiv. ARNIE ETHEL CHANCEY, b. 24 Nov 1884, Barbour County Alabama; d. 15 Aug 1960, Dale County Alabama.
xv. ESTHER CHANCEY, b. 24 Nov 1884, Barbour County Alabama.
4. JOHN JACKSON8 WARD (MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 19 May 1842 in Dale County Alabama, and died 03 Apr 1890. He married MARY CHANCEY. She was born 1848, and died 02 Oct 1902.
i. CHARLES9 WARD, b. 17 Jul 1868.
13. ii. HENRY J. WARD, b. 12 Jan 1871, Alabama.
iii. SON WARD, b. 1873; d. 24 Aug 1902.
5. THOMAS8 WARD (MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 08 Jan 1845 in Dale County Alabama, and died 14 Jun 1920 in Dale County Alabama. He married ANZILLA GALLOWAY 15 Nov 1869 in Henry County Alabama, daughter of EDWARD GALLOWAY and ELIZABETH WOODHAM. She was born 18 May 1850 in Dale County Alabama, and died 13 Jun 1930 in Dale County Alabama.
Thomas served in Company D, 57th Alabama Infantry Regiment, CSA. He was parolled at Greensboro North Carolina at the end of the War.
14. i. JAMES HARDEE9 WARD, b. 17 Sep 1871, Dale County Alabama; d. 29 Dec 1948.
15. ii. MONROE WARD, b. 05 Aug 1873, Dale County Alabama; d. 1929.
16. iii. MARY EUDORA WARD, b. 12 Mar 1877, Dale County Alabama; d. 01 Jan 1949.
17. iv. CHELLIE ANNIE WARD, b. 05 Jan 1880, Dale County Alabama; d. 12 Aug 1937.
v. OLLIE WARD, b. 25 Apr 1886, Dale County Alabama; d. 28 Apr 1890, Dale County Alabama.
vi. MOULTON E. WARD, b. 10 Sep 1888, Dale County Alabama; d. 29 Sep 1890.
vii. ALVAH S. WARD, b. 23 Dec 1891, Dale County Alabama; d. 01 Mar 1897.
6. WILEY F.8 WARD (MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 09 Jul 1857 in Dale County Alabama, and died 10 Jul 1925 in Dale County Alabama. He married (1) OCTAVIA TAVIE BOOTH 25 Dec 1887 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of J.M. BOOTH. She was born 24 Jul 1865 in Dale County Alabama, and died 05 Sep 1897 in Dale County Alabama. He married (2) MARY JANE CLARK 29 Mar 1905 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of WILLIAM CLARK and MARY LISENBY. She was born 16 Dec 1878 in Dale County Alabama, and died 29 Oct 1947 in Dale County Alabama.
18. i. DAISY D.9 WARD, b. 24 Sep 1885, Echo, Dale County Alabama; d. 01 Sep 1940, Echo, Dale County Alabama.
19. ii. LILLIE DALE WARD, b. 10 Jul 1890, Echo, Dale County Alabama; d. 1969, Echo, Dale County Alabama.
iii. PASTORIE WARD, b. 19 Sep 1892.
iv. SAMSON9 WARD, b. 22 May 1906, Dale County Alabama; d. 1907, Dale County Alabama.
20. v. JESSE TITUS WARD, b. 18 Oct 1907, Dale County Alabama; d. 05 Aug 1978.
vi. JOHNATHAN W. WARD, b. 21 Jul 1910, Dale County Alabama; d. 04 Jul 1989.
vii. THOMAS WARD, b. 30 Mar 1913, Dale County Alabama; d. 07 Oct 1931, Dale County Alabama.
21. viii. JOSHUA WARD, b. 16 Feb 1915, Dale County Alabama; d. 30 Nov 1990, Dale County Alabama.
ix. JAMES WARD, b. 25 Jan 1917, Dale County Alabama; d. 16 Jan 2002, Ozark, Dale County Alabama.
x. RUTH WARD, b. 1921, Dale County Alabama.
7. JONATHAN BRINKLEY9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 03 Jan 1869 in Dale County Alabama, and died 13 Jun 1953 in Dale County Alabama. He married ARGENT MALISSIA RILEY 29 Nov 1891 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of WILLIAM RILEY and MARY ROGERS. She was born 10 Sep 1874 in Henry County Alabama, and died 27 Aug 1936 in Dale County Alabama.
22. i. MELISSA MALLIE10 CHANCEY, b. 06 Apr 1893, Dade City, Pasco County Florida; d. 30 Aug 1960.
23. ii. HURLEY B. CHANCEY, SR, b. 10 Feb 1895, Henry County Alabama; d. 14 Nov 1978, Memphis, Shelby County Tennessee.
24. iii. LESSIE BELL CHANCEY, b. 29 Jul 1901, Dale County Alabama; d. 23 Sep 1989, Dale County Alabama.
25. iv. LUTHER WILLIAM CHANCEY, b. 28 Oct 1907, Dale County Alabama; d. 07 Mar 1976.
26. v. OSSIE ELIZABETH CHANCEY, b. 23 Oct 1910, Henry County Alabama; d. 1979.
27. vi. AMOS ESTO CHANCEY, b. 16 Aug 1913, Dale County Alabama; d. 31 Dec 1981.
8. IDEN CAMELLA9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 14 Oct 1870 in Dale County Alabama, and died 25 Sep 1933 in Dale County Alabama. She married ROBERT IVEY RILEY 21 Aug 1889 in Henry County Alabama, son of WILLIAM RILEY and MARY ROGERS. He was born 03 Mar 1870 in Dale County Alabama, and died 01 Apr 1942 in Dale County Alabama.
28. i. CLEONE CLENNIE10 RILEY, b. 05 Jun 1890, Henry County Alabama; d. 10 Dec 1978, Dade City, Pasco County Florida.
29. ii. SUSAN CLAIRE RILEY, b. Apr 1893, Henry County Alabama.
30. iii. AZZIE PATE RILEY, b. 04 Jan 1897, Dale County Alabama; d. 14 Feb 1966, Donalsonville, Seminole County Georgia.
iv. PARKIE C. RILEY, b. 1904, Henry County Alabama.
9. JOHN C.9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 14 Sep 1873 in Dale County Alabama, and died 26 May 1916 in Henry County Alabama. He married TEMPERANCE V. RILEY 24 Feb 1895 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of JAMES RILEY and EMILY MELVIN. She was born 13 Jun 1875 in Dale County Alabama, and died 11 Feb 1950 in Henry County Alabama.
31. i. VERA L.10 CHANCEY, b. 03 Dec 1895; d. 13 Jun 1983.
32. ii. VINNIE CHANCEY, b. 12 Apr 1899, Newville, Henry County Alabama; d. 13 Apr 1989.
33. iii. ERRY B. CHANCEY, b. 15 Dec 1901; d. Dec 1929, Coffee County Alabama.
iv. STERLING STURLY CHANCEY, b. 02 May 1907; d. 16 Aug 1916, Henry County Alabama.
34. v. HARZEY C. CHANCEY, b. 04 Sep 1912; d. 23 Sep 2001.
10. DELLA9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 20 May 1878 in Dale County Alabama. She married JAMES KELLUM 24 Dec 1898, son of ELIJAH KELLUM and ELIZA. He was born 30 May 1869.
i. UNA10 KELLUM, b. 10 Jul 1901.
ii. BRUNER KELLUM, b. Aug 1903.
iii. OLLIE KELLUM, b. 16 Dec 1906.
11. LUCINDA ISABELLE9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 25 Mar 1880 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 21 Aug 1972 in Headland, Henry County Alabama. She married JOSEPH HENRY WOODHAM 23 Dec 1897 in Dale County Alabama, son of NEEDHAM WOODHAM and ELIZA DEAL. He was born 21 Oct 1874 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 22 Jan 1955 in Echo, Dale County Alabama.
i. PILLIE10 WOODHAM, b. 11 Oct 1898.
ii. LILLIE WOODHAM, b. 28 Feb 1906.
12. ARNIE ETHEL9 CHANCEY (WINIFRED8 WARD, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 24 Nov 1884 in Barbour County Alabama, and died 15 Aug 1960 in Dale County Alabama. She married WILLIAM EDWARD (BUD) RILEY 07 Sep 1902 in Dale County Alabama, son of JAMES RILEY and EMILY MELVIN. He was born 14 Feb 1879 in Dale County Alabama, and died 04 Feb 1964 in Newville, Henry County Alabama.
i. BARNARD V.10 RILEY, b. 09 Aug 1903, Houston County Alabama; d. 09 Jul 1965; m. LENA MAE SIMMONS, 27 Aug 1927, Clayton, Barbour County Alabama; b. 21 Nov 1905; d. 13 Feb 2003.
35. ii. VERNON RILEY, b. 05 Apr 1906, Dale County Alabama; d. 04 Jun 1977, Dothan, Houston County Alabama.
iii. FRANCES RILEY, b. 15 Oct 1913, Dale County Alabama; d. 14 Sep 1916, Dale County Alabama.
36. iv. LOLA RUTH RILEY, b. 14 Sep 1916, Dale County Alabama; d. 06 Dec 1977, Dothan, Houston County Alabama.
13. HENRY J.9 WARD (JOHN JACKSON8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 12 Jan 1871 in Alabama. He married ELIZA A. RILEY 28 Mar 1895 in Henry County Alabama, daughter of ABRAHAM RILEY and DILLIE GALLOWAY. She was born 20 Jun 1875 in Dale County Alabama.
i. MINNIE IODA10 WARD, b. 28 Jan 1897, Dale County Alabama.
ii. CONSIE E. WARD, b. 26 Oct 1898, Dale County Alabama.
iii. FOY WARD, b. 28 Jun 1900, Dale County Alabama.
iv. DENNIS DONISE WARD, b. 17 May 1902, Dale County Alabama; m. MATTIE BIVINS, 1922; b. 1904.
v. ESAU WARD, b. 28 Feb 1905, Dale County Alabama; d. 1907.
vi. MITTIE WARD, b. 01 Apr 1907, Dale County Alabama; d. 08 Mar 1908.
vii. INFANT WARD, b. 1909, Dale County Alabama; d. 1909.
14. JAMES HARDEE9 WARD (THOMAS8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 17 Sep 1871 in Dale County Alabama, and died 29 Dec 1948. He married (1) IDA LILLIE MIMS, daughter of ROBERT MIMS and SARAH BRANNON. She was born 19 Aug 1905. He married (2) ERMA HAY 10 May 1907.
i. PATRICIA 'PATSY'10 WARD, b. 08 Dec 1931; m. JAMES JOSEPH CONNERS, 19 Mar 1971.
15. MONROE9 WARD (THOMAS8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 05 Aug 1873 in Dale County Alabama, and died 1929. He married FRANCES D. RILEY 11 Feb 1897 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of JOSEPH RILEY and SARA JOHNSON. She was born 14 Nov 1878 in Dale County Alabama, and died 1961.
i. TALBOT10 WARD, b. 02 Dec 1897; d. 21 Dec 1897.
ii. BIRMA LEON WARD, b. 12 May 1899; m. DAISY.
iii. J. BEE WARD, b. 26 Dec 1902; m. JOYCE MORGAN.
iv. INFANT WARD, b. 21 Jul 1904, Dale County Alabama; d. 21 Jul 1904, Dale County Alabama.
v. ERMA WARD, b. 01 Jul 1908.
vi. ANNIE WARD, b. 1911; m. HARRY GRUBB.
16. MARY EUDORA9 WARD (THOMAS8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 12 Mar 1877 in Dale County Alabama, and died 01 Jan 1949. She married WILLIAM ROBERT WIGGINS. He was born 13 May 1865, and died 28 Jun 1945.
37. i. OLLIE10 WIGGINS, b. 20 Sep 1912, Dale County Alabama.
ii. WILLIAM FREEMONT WIGGINS, b. 21 Nov 1913, Dale County Alabama; d. 19 Apr 1945, KIA, WW-II Okinawa.
38. iii. LLOYD THOMAS WIGGINS, b. 1915, Dale County Alabama.
39. iv. MARY ELIZABETH WIGGINS, b. 1917, Dale County Alabama.
17. CHELLIE ANNIE9 WARD (THOMAS8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 05 Jan 1880 in Dale County Alabama, and died 12 Aug 1937. She married HENRY MORGAN HUNT 19 Feb 1903 in Dale County Alabama, son of DANIEL HUNT and MARY WARD. He was born 28 Mar 1878 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 26 Oct 1971 in Echo, Dale County Alabama.
40. i. DORA LEE10 HUNT, b. 28 Jan 1907, Dale County Alabama.
ii. GERALD HUNT, b. 1907, Dale County Alabama; d. 1907, Dale County Alabama.
iii. JAMES M. HUNT, b. 26 Dec 1908, Dale County Alabama; d. 19 Jul 1918, Dale County Alabama.
41. iv. NELLIE MAE HUNT, b. 18 Sep 1912.
42. v. MARY ANZILLA HUNT, b. 25 Mar 1915, Dale County Alabama; d. 25 Jun 1989, Echo, Dale County Alabama.
18. DAISY D.9 WARD (WILEY F.8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 24 Sep 1885 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 01 Sep 1940 in Echo, Dale County Alabama. She married ZINNAMON SOLLY WOODHAM 17 Nov 1904 in Dale County Alabama, son of NEEDHAM WOODHAM and ELIZA DEAL. He was born 20 May 1884 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 17 Nov 1957 in Echo, Dale County Alabama.
i. BELL10 WOODHAM, b. 07 Mar 1912, Dale County Alabama; d. 02 Jul 1999; m. FLETCHER SEWELL, 05 Nov 1932; b. 11 Nov 1910; d. 19 Jan 1995.
ii. SIMMIE M. WOODHAM, b. 15 May 1917, Dale County Alabama; d. 22 Aug 1997; m. RAY R. MILLER, 16 Dec 1939; b. 23 Dec 1912; d. 07 Apr 1981.
19. LILLIE DALE9 WARD (WILEY F.8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 10 Jul 1890 in Echo, Dale County Alabama, and died 1969 in Echo, Dale County Alabama. She married AARON THOMAS LINDSAY 10 Mar 1916 in Dale County Alabama, son of AMBROSE LINDSAY and SALLY ARD. He was born 09 Dec 1862 in Henry County Alabama, and died 17 Apr 1944 in Bonifay, Holmes County Florida.
i. MARVIN DEE10 LINDSAY, b. 27 Aug 1914, Dale County Alabama; d. Feb 1972, Crestview, Okaloosa County Florida.
ii. JANE M. LINDSAY, b. 1918, Dale County Alabama.
iii. THADY B. LINDSAY, b. 09 Mar 1921, Dale County Alabama; d. Dec 1983, Ozark, Dale County Alabama.
iv. RAYMOND L. LINDSAY, b. 12 Apr 1922, Dale County Alabama; d. 30 Dec 1995, Ozark, Dale County Alabama.
v. WILEY LINDSAY, b. 05 Sep 1924, Dale County Alabama; d. 13 Apr 1953, Marianna, Jackson County Florida.
vi. OCTAVIA L. LINDSAY, b. 1929, Dale County Alabama.
20. JESSE TITUS9 WARD (WILEY F.8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 18 Oct 1907 in Dale County Alabama, and died 05 Aug 1978. He married TERA SEWELL 1928. She was born 1911 in Dale County Alabama.
i. EUGENE10 WARD, b. 1928, Dale County Alabama.
21. JOSHUA9 WARD (WILEY F.8, MARY7 RILEY, JOHN6, JOHN5, EDWARD4, WILLIAM3, EDWARD2, EDWARD1) was born 16 Feb 1915 in Dale County Alabama, and died 30 Nov 1990 in Dale County Alabama. He married MATTIE LEE PEACOCK 10 Dec 1938 in Dale County Alabama, daughter of FITZHUGH PEACOCK and ROBERTA NEWTON. She was born 10 Jan 1917 in Dale County Alabama, and died 09 Oct 1993 in Dale County Alabama.

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The Management Board of LC Corp SA, with its registered office in Wrocław, at ul. Powstańców Śląskich 2-4, entered on March 15th 2006 into the National Court Register kept by the District Court for Wrocław - Fabryczna 6th Commercial Division of the National Court Register under number KRS 0000253077 ("Issuer"), acting pursuant to Art. 398, Art. 399, Art. 400 § 1 and § 2, Art. 4021 and 4022 of the Polish Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies in relation to a request to convene an an Extraordinary General Meeting of LC Corp SA from Powszechne Towarzystwo Emerytalne PZU S.A. in Warszawa acting from behalf of a shareholder od the Company: Otwarty Fundusz Emerytalny PZU „Złota Jesień”, hereby convenes the Extraordinary General Meeting of LC Corp SA, to be held at the Company's registered office in Wrocław, at ul. Powstanców Śląskich 2-4, at 10:00 AM on October 15, 2018.
Election of the Chairperson of the Meeting.
(in words: four hundred and forty seven million five hundred and fifty eight thousand three hundred eleven) shares.
All Company's shares are ordinary bearer shares.
3. Auditor’s review report of LC Corp S.A.
The Management Board of LC Corp SA, with its registered office in Wrocław, at ul. Powstańców Śląskich 2-4, entered on March 15th 2006 into the National Court Register kept by the District Court for Wrocław - Fabryczna 6th Commercial Division of the National Court Register under number KRS 0000253077 ("Issuer"), acting pursuant to Art. 395, Art. 399.1, Art. 4021 and 4022 of the Polish Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies convenes an Ordinary General Meeting of LC Corp SA, to be held at the Company's registered office in Wrocław, at ul. Powstanców Śląskich 2-4, at 10:00 on June 27, 2018.
Statement of the validity of the convocation of the Ordinary General Meeting and its capacity to adopt resolutions.
Adoption of the agenda of the Meeting.