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1. The first respondent was served with a Memorandum of Charges on 16th September, 1996, which was unequivocally refuted by him. The Disciplinary Authority considering the denial of charges, on 12th November, 1996, appointed an Inquiry Officer, who after conducting the enquiry, submitted a report to the Disciplinary Authority which contained a finding that the employee had misappropriated a sum of Rs.2,68,317.00. After the report was submitted, the Disciplinary Authority issued a show cause notice on 4th June, 1999, whereby it had proposed to terminate the services of the employee.
2. The first respondent submitted the reply and the Disciplinary Authority considering the explanation passed an order of dismissal on 6th September, 1999 and he stood dismissed from that day. The order passed by the State Government dismissing the employee read as follows:- "Whereas the commissioner of Inquiries has submitted his report to the Government and has found him guilty of having embezzled Government money to the tune of Rs.2,68,317.00 (Rupees two lacs, sixty eight thousand, three hundred and seventeen only) besides being responsible for financial mis- conduct and complete lack of devotion to duties. Whereas, after considering the report of the inquiry officer the involvement of Shri R.K. Zalpur, Senior Assistant, has been established in the embezzlement of Government money as indicated above in the office of Resident Commissioner, J & K, New Delhi.
Whereas after accepting the report of the inquiry officer and after establishing his involvement, the Government has decided to take action against Shri R.K. Zalpuri, Sr. Assistant in terms of clause (viii) of rule 30 of the J & K (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 which provides dismissal from service. Whereas, Shri R.K. Zalpuri was informed about the decision of the Government vide communication No. GAD (Admn.) TA 3391-IV dated 04.06.1999 and was called upon under rules to show cause as to why the proposed action is not taken against him. Whereas Shri R.K. Zalpuri has furnished his reply to the notice served upon him, which has been considered by the Government and no merit was found in he same; Now, therefore, Shri R.K. Zalpur, Senior Assistant, in the office of the Resident Commissioner, J & K, New Delhi is hereby dismissed from Government service with immediate effect in terms of clause VIII of Rule 30 of J & K Civil Service (CCA) Rules, 1956."
3. After the said order was passed, the first respondent did not prefer any departmental appeal nor did he approach any superior authority for redressal of his grievance. However, on 18th February, 2006, he filed a writ petition (S.W.P. No.352 of 2006) before the High Court challenging his dismissal from service. Various assertions were made in the writ petition with regard to the defects in conducting of the inquiry including the one that there had been violation of Rule 34 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1956, for he had not been afforded an opportunity of hearing in the manner provided in the said Rules. In the writ petition nothing was stated what he had done from 1999 to 2006.
4. The State Government filed a counter affidavit wherein it had raised a preliminary objection relating to delay and laches. The stand taken by the State Government in the counter affidavit as regards the delay and laches is as follows:- "That, the writ petition instituted by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed at its threshold, inasmuch as the same is suffering from inordinate and unexplainable delay and latches. By virtue of the writ petition instituted in the year 2006, the petitioner has come to the court to challenge an order passed by the answering respondents way back on 06.09.1999. It is submitted that pursuant to the issuance of order impugned, the petitioner chose to sleep over the matter and acquiesced whatever rights assumed to be available to him."
5. After putting forth the submission with regard to the delay and laches, the State Government defended its action by asseverating many an aspect, which need not be adverted to.
6. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 14th May, 2010, opined that the show cause notice issued to the employee was not accompanied with the copies of the proceedings as envisaged under Rule 34 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1956 and that did tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to the delinquent official, as has been held by the Constitution Bench in E.C.I.L. vs. B. Karunakar. On that singular ground, he allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of dismissal.
7. Being grieved by the aforesaid decision, the State Government preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.102 of 2012. In the grounds of the Letters Patent Appeal, the State had clearly asserted:- "That the learned Single Judge, with great respects, has not appreciated the specific and important averment made by the appellants that the respondent had slept over the matter for quite seven years and has knocked the door of the Hon'ble Court after a gap of seven years, thus there was clear unexplained huge delay and laches in filing the writ petition, the same was liable to be dismissed, however, the learned Single Judge without returning any finding on this vital issue has allowed the writ petition, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside on this ground along."
"Learned Single Judge has quashed Respondent's dismissal from Government service on the ground that copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 33 was not supplied to the Respondent before passing final orders on the provisional conclusion reached at on the basis of the inquiry to show cause as to why the proposed penalty be not imposed on him. Although the Appellants' dismissal was set aside by the Court finding non- compliance of the provisions of the Rule 34 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956, yet it cannot be said that the Appellants have been left without any remedy to proceed against the delinquent employee on complying with the requirement of Rule 34.
The Learned State counsel's contention that the Appellants have been left without any remedy to proceed against the respondent may not, therefore, be a correct proposition of law. However, to set the records straight and allay, the State Government's apprehension that they were without any remedy, we dispose of this appeal by providing that quashing of Respondent's dismissal will not operate as impediment for the Appellants to proceed against the Respondent for his misconduct after complying with the requirement of Rule 34 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956."
9. It is apt to note here that an application for review being Review (LPA) No.03 of 2012 was filed wherein a stand was taken pertaining to delay which we think should be reproduced. It reads as under:- "The appellants filed detailed reply to the maintainability of the said writ petition. In the objection, it was specifically pleaded before the writ court that the Respondent had slept over the matter and the writ petition is suffering from inordinate and unexplained delay and laches, therefore, the writ petition filed in the year 2006 against the order passed way back in 1999 is liable to be dismissed."
10. The Division Bench considered the application for review and ultimately dismissed the same on the ground that there was no palpable error warranting review of the order. The principal order and the order passed in the review are the subject matters of assail in the present appeals.
11. We have heard Mr. Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel for the appellant- State and Mr. Gagan Gupta, learned counsel for the first respondent.
12. On a perusal of the factual exposition, it is quite vivid that the first respondent was dismissed from service on 6th September, 1999, and he preferred the writ petition on 18th February, 2006, after a lapse of almost five and a half years. The plea relating to delay was specifically taken in the counter affidavit as a preliminary objection, but the learned Single Judge chose not to address the same. The appellate-Bench has noted the submission and modified the order and an application for review was filed with the stand that the plea pertaining to delay and laches had not been considered, but the review application, as we find from the record, was dismissed on the ground that the review could not be treated like an appeal in disguise.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant-State would contend that when a categorical stand was taken in the counter affidavit and a specific stance had been put forth in the intra-Court appeal as is manifest from the record, the High Court should have taken into consideration the same and not recorded a finding on a ground which was not taken in the grounds of appeal.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent-employee, per contra, would contend that the delay and laches cannot alone defeat the cause of justice and in any case, when substantial justice has been done this Court should not interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
15. We have noted that the High Court has rejected the application for review on the ground that it cannot sit in appeal and the parameters of review are not attracted. In this context, we may refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Shivdeo Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, wherein it has been observed that nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution precludes a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave palpable errors committed by it.
16. In this regard, reference to Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others, would also be apt. In the said case, it has been held thus:- "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review.
The power of review may be exercised to the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner or errors committed by the subordinate Court."
17. In M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, this Court while discussing about the concept of review, has ruled that:- "a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out".
18. Almost fifty-five years back, in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, it was laid down that:- "an error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments and such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ".
19. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities as we are of the convinced opinion that in the present case, there was a manifest error by the High Court, for it had really not taken note of the stand and stance that was eloquently put by the State as regards the delay and laches. The averments in the writ petition were absolutely silent and nothing had been spelt out why the delay had occurred. The Single Judge, as stated earlier had chosen not to address the said issue. The Division Bench in appeal addressed the submission, totally being oblivious of the ground pertaining to delay and laches clearly stated in the memorandum of appeal, and modified the order passed by the Learned Single Judge as if that was the sole submission.
It needs no special emphasis to state that in the obtaining factual matrix, the application for review did not require delving deep into the factual matrix to find out the error. It was not an exercise of an appellate jurisdiction as is understood in law. It can be stated with certitude that it was a palpable error, for the principal stand of the State was not addressed to and definitely it had immense significance and hence, the same deserved to be addressed to. Therefore, we are compelled to think that the order required review for the purpose of consideration of the impact of delay and laches in preferring the writ petition. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to deal with the repercussions of delay and laches, as we are of the considered opinion that the same deserves to be addressed to in the present case.
20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from City and Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and Others, wherein this Court while dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has expressed thus:- "The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty- bound to consider whether: adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; the petition reveals all material facts; the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors."
21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd Through its Chairman & Managing Director & Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr would be apposite:- "Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party". After so stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandalal Jaiswal restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is to the following effect:- "the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.
If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction".
22. In State of Maharashtra V Digambar a three-judge bench laid down that:- "19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct."
23. Recently in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, it has been ruled thus: "Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.
In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis".
24. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the question of delay and laches in all kinds of cases would not curb or curtail the power of writ court to exercise the discretion. In Tukaram Kana Joshi And Ors. Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors it has been ruled that:- "Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved.
Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience". And again:- "No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned.
In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Collector (LA) v. Katiji, Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, Dayal Singh v. Union of India and Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar.)"
25. Be it stated, in the said case the appellants were deprived of the legitimate dues for decades and the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation had handed over the possession of the property belonging to the appellant to the City Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra without any kind of acquisition and grant of compensation. This court granted relief reversing the decision of the High Court which had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and non-availability of certain documents. Therefore, it is clear that the principle of delay and laches would not affect the grant of relief in all types of cases.
26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court.
27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" - 'thanks to God'.
28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.
29. In view of our aforesaid analysis the appeals are allowed and the judgment and orders passed by the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

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Watch Todd Merolla argue before the Georgia Supreme Court on April 6, 2011.
Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 2016).
Successfully overturned 16-year precedential rule in the Second Circuit regarding the circumstances under which district courts can hear arbitration appeals.
Doscher v. Sobel & Co., LLC, et.al., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29063; USDC SDNY Case No. 14 CV 646 (RMB).
Successfully prevented non-party from intervening in civil suit and sealing judicial documents in contravention of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Barber, et.al. v. Arkin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90130; D. Ariz. Case No. CV08-1896-PHX-DGC.
Successfully defended and defeated motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction to stay pending arbitration case against a publicly traded company. The arbitration then resulted in a favorable settlement in the middle of the final hearing.
Sun Micro Medical Technologies Corp. v. Passport Health Communications, Inc., et.al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56686; USDC SDNY Case No. 06 CV 2083 (RWS).
Successfully defended motion to dismiss copyright infringement cause of action. The case then resulted in a favorable settlement after discovery.
Smith v. Saulsbury, 286 Ga. App. 322 (2007).
Obtained favorable judgment after a jury trial, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal, involving federal copyright counterfeiting issues.
Young’s Trading Company, et.al. v. Fancy Import, Inc., et.al., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46042; USDC WD Tenn. Case No. 03-CV-2637.
Successfully excluded Plaintiff’s desired expert through a Daubert motion pursuant to Federal Rule 702. Thereafter, obtained a judgment of dismissal for an internet-based business and its principals against 21 counts of alleged intentional interference and consumer protection act violations after a week-long jury trial in federal court.
Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129 (2005).
Successfully overturned a trial court decision to disqualify where serving as lead counsel, in the first case interpreting Rule 3.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct – Lawyer as Witness. Subsequently received a jury verdict against the defendant attorney for breach of fiduciary duty against his former client, which resulted in a favorable settlement.
MK Systems, Inc. v. Lifewave Products, LLC, et.al., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3877; USDC SDNY Case No. 04 CV 8106 (RWS).
Successfully transferred venue of civil action from New York to Georgia, in case involving claims concerning the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FCDA). After transfer to Georgia, obtained successful result through summary judgment.

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At 10 a.m. on Wednesday, a constitutional issue returns to the Supreme Court after a three-decade absence: the role that prayer may play in government meetings. Arguing for the local government in Town of Greece v. Galloway will be Thomas G. Hungar of the Washington office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, with twenty minutes of time. Supporting the town, at least in part, for the U.S. government as an amicus will be Deputy Solicitor General Ian H. Gershengorn, with ten minutes. Arguing for the town residents who challenged the prayer practice will be Douglas Laycock of Charlottesville, Virginia, a University of Virginia law professor, with thirty minutes.
That was not all of what the Court had said in the Marsh v. Chambers decision in July 1983, but it turned out to be enough to allow such prayers. If that history still justifies the practice, then the Supreme Court will have no difficulty deciding Town of Greece v. Galloway. But the constitutional law governing church-government relations has grown much more complex since then, and it is one of the most divisive constitutional fields for the Court.
Some of the Court’s members want to start all over in defining the limits, if any, on those relations, and some believe the precedents that have built up are adequate to the task. Some are content just to take the cases one at a time. It is no exaggeration to say, then, that the constitutional meaning of church-state separation is very much in flux, and it is tempting to think that the Court has taken on a case from a town in New York to reach for some new clarity.
At its core, the Town of Greece case is about the constitutional test to review government involvement in practices that have or can have religious meaning. Should such involvement be judged by its potential effect in endorsing or promoting one religious faith over others? Or should it be judged by its capacity to coerce what one believes about faith principles?
That is basically the either/or choice that now is before the Justices. But even making that choice is not at all simple when either alternative test is applied to prayer at the opening of a government meeting.
Does it matter who is reciting the prayer? Does it matter what the prayer’s words say? Does it count whether people are asked to join in by some gesture of participation? If the people are asked to be a part of it, what is the meaning if some don’t do so? Is the mere process of choosing someone to utter a prayer a key factor? Is having a prayer always a form of worship, or might it have a more neutral function? Does it make a difference who is in the audience at the time, and does it matter what effect the prayer does, or might, have on the crowd? What significance, if any, can be read into how long the practice has continued? And if a prayer practice’s constitutionality is challenged, does what happens after that influence the constitutionality issue?
It is a fair supposition that the five-member town board of supervisors in Greece, New York, a town of about 100,000 located just outside of Rochester in the upstate region, did not have all the answers to those questions when they decided in 1999 to start opening their monthly public meetings with a prayer. It is not even certain that they asked those questions.
Up to that time, the board had most often opened its sessions with a moment of silence. For a time at the outset of praying in 1999, the town supervisor led the prayer himself. Soon, however, the board decided to have someone from within the community offer such prayers, and they promptly began calling members of the clergy in town, working from a list provided by the local chamber of commerce. A list was drawn up of clergy willing to lead the prayers, and the staff worked its way down that list, from one meeting to the next. From time to time, the list was updated.
Those who agreed to lead a prayer were not told what to say or not to say, and were not asked to submit their prayer for advance review by the town board.
Those are the basic outlines. As a lawsuit over the practice moved forward, considerable disagreement has emerged about just how the practice has worked, and what significance to attach to differing developments and competing interpretations. Those disputes were the fodder for a lawsuit that was begun after the practice had continued for about nine years.
Two longtime area residents who had gone to board meetings, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, were offended by what they heard in the prayers — uniformly Christian in content, and worshipful in tone, in their view. It was not until after they objected, they would later say, that the board began bringing in some non-Christian prayer-givers, but that remained a distinct minority. They first protested to the town board, and then decided to hire a lawyer — first, to question the board about the practice, and then to file a lawsuit.
The lawsuit claimed that the procedure for selecting those who led prayer preferred Christianity over other faiths, and that the prayer as it actually happened was religious in character. A federal district judge ruled for the town board, first finding no evidence that it had intentionally excluded a prayer leader from any given faith. Second, while finding that many of the prayers clearly were religious in content and identified with the Christian faith, the judge — relying upon the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers — said that the Constitution “does not require that legislative prayer be non-sectarian.” The Marsh decision, according to the judge’s reading of it, had carved out an exception, based on the history of legislative prayers, to the usual limits on government involvement in religious practices.
Appealing the case to the Second Circuit, Galloway and Stephens dropped their challenge to the method of choosing the prayer-givers. They focused on the claim that the practice, as it actually existed, had the unconstitutional effect of establishing a religion — the Christian religion — as the town government’s own.
When the Second Circuit ruled, it noted that it was not deciding whether a local government could open public meetings with prayer or a religious invocation, and stressed that it would not lay down a flat rule that would only allow prayer in theory but that would, in reality, forbid it from actually going ahead.
In essence, the Second Circuit had relied upon the so-called “endorsement test,” derived from a series of Supreme Court rulings going back to 1971, but most often associated with the judicial writings for the Court of former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
Here is the way the Circuit Court summed up its use of that test: “Where the overwhelming predominance of prayers offered are associated, often in an explicitly sectarian way, with a particular creed, and where the town takes no steps to avoid the identification, but rather conveys the impression that town officials themselves identify with the sectarian prayers and that residents in attendance are expected to participate in them, a reasonable objective observer would perceive such an affiliation.” In short, the Circuit Court had concluded that Greece was mainly a Christian town, and that its local governing officials set up a prayer practice showing that they embraced that faith.
The town then took the case on to the Supreme Court.
In December of last year, the town’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to rule that, in “the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers or forbidden exploitation of the prayer opportunity,” a legislative prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause. The recitation of that question was preceded by a preamble stressing the significance to this case of the Court’s ruling in Marsh v. Chambers.
The petition argued that the federal appeals courts “are hopelessly divided” over whether they should judge legislative prayers by the historical framework that the Marsh decision had used, or by the “endorsement test.” Legislative bodies, from Congress down to the most local level, “lack sufficient guidance as to which prayer practices are permissible.” The town explicitly asked the Court to clarify that the historical test was the controlling one.
The Second Circuit, the town argued, was wrong to abandon that test and apply, instead, an “endorsement” analysis.
The brief in opposition noted that the Supreme Court had, just one year earlier, denied review of a case involving a county in North Carolina, with the local officials there making the same kind of arguments that the Greece officials were making here. If there is a difference between decisions of the appeals courts on legislative prayer, the local residents’ filing contended, it is mainly because the facts are different from one case to the next.
The string of decisions by the Supreme Court on church-state issues, this brief asserted, are complementary, and do not conflict with each other.
Finally, the challengers argued that this case had reached the Court prematurely, because the Second Circuit had sent the case back to the trial judge to work out a remedy for the Establishment Clause violation. While the town may ultimately be ordered to modify its practice, this brief stressed, the Second Circuit had already made clear that it still could fashion a valid prayer practice.
The town board’s brief on the merits opened with a simple proposition: “This case can begin and end with Marsh v. Chambers.” That decision, it stressed, put only “two modest limitations” on legislative prayer: choosing prayer-givers out of an “impermissible motive” or using the prayer experience to promote or degrade a faith. There is simply no evidence that this town board did either, the petition asserted.
Not surprisingly, the brief again emphasized the facts in the Marsh case, and suggested that those facts made this case an easier one because of the differences. Here, the town board argued, prayers were open to anyone, no one got paid for offering a prayer, and different faith traditions were represented.
In a short section of the new brief, the town board suggested that the Court might uphold the town’s prayer practice by allowing governments to treat the citizen prayer sessions as a limited kind of public forum, in which the prayer-givers who do take part are permitted to express their own privately held and uncensored religious views, instead of a more generic kind of divine guidance for the government decision-makers. Much of the brief, though, is an energetic challenge to the “endorsement test” for enforcing the Establishment Clause.
What that test does, the town contended, turned the Marsh decision upside down: Marsh made legislative prayer constitutional on the basis of a presumption and barred government officials from probing into the religious content of prayers, while the Second Circuit here started with an inquiry into the content of the prayers, and found them unconstitutional because of their Christian content.
The endorsement approach, the town brief said, “threatens to impose a ‘state-created orthodoxy,’ in which judges reviewing invocations for hints of impermissible endorsement would put at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed” (quoting from a prior Supreme Court opinion).
The town’s lawyers do not explicitly urge the Court to drop the “endorsement test” altogether, but only to declare that it has no place in analyzing prayer at government meetings. The brief’s preferred outcome, it is clear, would be to apply Marsh‘s historical analysis as if that were a perfect fit.
But between the petition and merits stages of this case, the town’s lawyers appeared to have developed a sense that the Court might not use the Marsh approach, and thus might turn to some more customary approach to Establishment Clause analysis. One part in the brief, for example, contended that the town board’s prayer practice could survive any Establishment Clause test that the Court chose to apply.
In the merits brief, the lawyers’ first task appeared to be to steer the Court clearly away from any use of the “endorsement test,” because that is the analysis that cost them the case in the Second Circuit.
But, as an alternative to that test or to the historical test, this brief put a notably heavier emphasis on the complaint that the Second Circuit’s use of the endorsement test would amount to “state-created orthodoxy” and “imposition” of a preferred faith on the citizenry. That kind of reference is coercion rhetoric, and the town’s brief clearly intended it to be read that way, because it talked of the need for the Court to rule in this case in a way that protects “religious liberty” from government compulsion.
While this is not an explicit embrace of the “coercion” mode of analysis, it does serve as an appeal to the jurisprudence of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who is closely associated with the “coercion” test and whose comments about it are quoted with some frequency in the brief.
As matters have turned out, it may have been clairvoyant for the town board’s lawyers to try to turn a form of “coercion” analysis their way. That is because the two town residents, in their brief on the merits, turned fully toward arguing that the town of Greece’s prayer practices are a form of unconstitutional coercion to get the community to join in a shared Christian faith.
That is an argument explicitly drawn from Justice Kennedy’s declaration that officially sponsored prayer at public school graduation ceremonies is coercive because students have no real option but to attend, even if they would be offended by the prayers.
The federal government has entered the Greece case, obviously interested in protecting the long tradition of prayer recitations to open congressional sessions, and it made arguments largely on the side of the town board. Its amicus brief on the merits urged the Court to allow prayers to open government meetings, even if most if not all of the recitals are from one religion. But it also asked the Court to prevent citizens who take part in such opening opportunities from turning it into a forum for expressing their own private prayers.
The Constitution, the Justice Department filing contended, does not allow the creation by government of a public forum for the expression of private prayer, but only in a form that assists the government body in making the occasion more solemn with the aid of divine guidance.
The town board’s reply brief sought to exploit the challengers’ switch to a coercion argument instead of fully defending the Circuit Court’s use of an ‘endorsement’ analysis. In doing so, however, the town’s filing was careful not to disparage a “coercion” analysis if it were properly used — as in the graduation prayer context. The “coercion” test does not work when taken out of the adolescent realm and used to judge prayers uttered when the audience is composed mainly if not entirely of adults, the town’s lawyers asserted.
But the reply brief did not take away from the strong hints in the merits brief that courts could engage in coercion if they sought to impose orthodoxy on prayer-givers by undertaking to censor the content of their utterances.
If numbers of amici filings are in any sense a measure of one side’s strength in a Supreme Court case, the town board gets something of an advantage with twice as many of these briefs as were filed in support of the challengers to the prayer practice. The majority of those briefs are from conservative and libertarian legal advocacy groups, and from religious liberty advocates such as the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. About half of the states have lined up on that side of the case, as have thirty-five members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The Rev. Palmer from the Marsh case renewed his support at this stage.
Backing the two town residents are liberal and progressive advocacy organizations, several groups of professors of law, political science and history, organizations that strongly advocate separation of church and state, and mainstream religious denominations.
Over the past three decades, since the Marsh ruling, the Court passed up opportunities to return to the issue of prayers at government meetings. Thus, the choice to step back into the controversy at this belated point probably should be taken as an indication that this generation of Justices is at least tempted to make a strong new statement on the issue.
Even if the Court did no more than unqualifiedly reaffirm the Marsh decision, that would amount to such a historic new declaration, particularly in the wake of several decisions voicing concern about prayers that appear to have government sponsorship, at least in some settings. Those rulings, though, were mainly in settings involving vulnerable adolescents, and the Court majority may have no inclination at this point to move their rationale into the mostly adult setting of government meetings.
The federal government’s participation in the case, however, could turn out to be a complicating factor. It has given a strong push for upholding legislative prayers, even when they have undeniable religious content. If the government’s usual prestige before the Court holds sway in that analysis, then Marsh may be put on sturdy new constitutional ground.
But the fact that Justice Department lawyers have cautioned the Court that the actual content of prayers in government settings may stray into privately expressed religious preferences would seem to line it up at least partly on the side of the prayer challengers: those two town residents want the Court to require governments to take explicit steps to ensure that citizen or clergy prayers in those meetings are not turned into proselytizing for specific faiths, at least hinting at coercion.
And that has prompted the lawyers for the town board in Greece to mount an energetic challenge to any such official intervention into what prayer-givers actually say. At a minimum, the exchanges over this point — seen as government censorship by the town, but as orthodoxy-promotion by the challengers — make a simple reaffirmation of Marsh somewhat out of easy reach.
This case, at its most significant potential level, could put the “endorsement test” into significant jeopardy. It no longer enjoys real favor with a majority of the Court, and the sustained denunciation of it by the town board’s lawyers here could further energize that skepticism. It is far from clear, however, what would be left of modern church-state precedents if the Court were to opt to abandon that test altogether.
That, perhaps, is why the town board’s attorneys have not suggested the total demise of that test, instead recommending only that it be walled off from use in the context of legislative prayers.

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§ 78-3 Hours of operation.
§ 78-4 Granting of license.
§ 78-5 License fee; duration of license.
§ 78-6 Penalties for offenses.
§ 78-10 License application; issuance of license.
§ 78-12 Expiration of license.
§ 78-14 Maintenance of records by auctioneers.
§ 78-15 Records to be open to inspection by Town Clerk.
§ 78-16 Denial or revocation of license.
§ 78-19 Maintenance of records by Town Clerk.
§ 78-20 Penalties for offenses.
No person, firm or corporation whether setting as principal or as agent for another shall conduct a public auction of any goods, wares or merchandise or any other personal property except in an auction conducted under process of law or in any legal proceeding in the Town of Rotterdam without first obtaining a license thereof as provided herein.
Any such person, firm or corporation applying for a license to conduct any such public auction in the Town of Rotterdam shall apply for such license by verified petition to the Town Clerk of the Town of Rotterdam stating his or its name, residence or place of business and the location where the proposed auction is to take place. There shall accompany such petition and be made a part thereof an inventory in detail of the goods which are to be sold and what facts are to be represented upon said sale as to such goods.
The applicant shall also furnish to accompany said petition such other and further information as shall be necessary to establish the truth of the facts stated in said petition.
No license shall be granted under this article which shall permit such auction sale to be conducted between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., nor shall any license be granted to permit such auction sale on Sundays.
The granting of a license under this article shall rest in the discretion of the Town Clerk of the Town of Rotterdam.
Before the issuing of said license, there shall be paid to the Town Clerk of the Town of Rotterdam a license fee per day as set forth in Ch. 126, Fees. No license shall be granted for a period of longer than 15 days.
Any person, firm or corporation failing to obey any of the provisions of this article shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $250 and by imprisonment not to exceed 15 days, or both.
Includes any person selling or offering for sale for another or for himself at public auction any goods, wares, merchandise, real or personal property of any description, except as hereinafter provided.
It shall be unlawful for any person to conduct, or to represent or circulate or place before the public any announcement that he conducts the business of a public auctioneer without first having obtained and paid for and having in full force and effect a license therefor as herein provided.
Nothing herein contained shall apply to the judicial sales or sales by executors or administrators, by trustees under deed of assignment, by lienors or by public officers in the manner prescribed by law.
Such other information as the Town Board may from time to time require.
If satisfied that the applicant possesses the required qualifications, he is a fit and desirable person, and is capable of properly conducting public auctions, the Town Clerk shall, upon receipt of a license fee, issue a license to the applicant authorizing him to act as an auctioneer in the Town of Rotterdam.
The yearly license fee for a public auctioneer shall be as set forth in Ch. 126, Fees, payable at the time the license is issued.
All licenses issued hereunder shall automatically expire on the first day of January of the year following their issuance.
Falsely or fraudulently misrepresent the quantity, character or quality of any article offered for sale; or offer for sale any unwholesome, tainted or diseased provisions or merchandise.
Blow a horn, ring a bell or use any other noise or device to attract public attention to his articles for sale.
Create or maintain any booth or stand or place any barrels, boxes, crates or other obstructions upon any street or public place for the purpose of selling or exposing for sale any goods, wares or merchandise.
Every public auctioneer shall, upon the receipt of acceptance by him of any goods for the purpose of sale at auction, and before offering the same or any part thereof for sale at auction, write or cause to be written in a book to be kept by him for the purpose, the name and address of the person who employed him to sell such goods at auction; the name and address of the person from whom such public auctioneer received or accepted such goods; the name and address of the person who was the owner, the authorized agent of the owner or the consignor of such goods immediately prior to the receipt or acceptance for the purpose of sale at auction of the same by such public auctioneer; the locations, with street and number, if any, of such goods immediately prior to the receipt or acceptance of the same by such public auctioneer for the purpose of sale at the auction; the date of the receipt or acceptance by such public auctioneer of such goods for the purpose of sale at auction; the place, with street and number, if any, in which such goods are to be held, kept or stored until sold or offered for sale at auction; the place, with street and number, if any, in which such goods are to be sold or offered for sale at auction; a description of such goods, the quantity thereof and the distinctive marks thereon, if any; the terms and conditions upon which such public auctioneer receives or accepts such goods for sale at auction. The expression "goods," as used in this section, signifies any goods, wares, work of art, commodity, compound or thing, chattels, merchandise or personal property which may be lawfully kept or offered for sale, but shall not include goods damaged at sea or by fire and sold or to be sold for the benefit of the owners, insurers or for the account for whom it may concern or goods sold by virtue of judicial degree. Nothing in this section shall apply to the sale of real property at auction.
Such books and the entries therein, made as provided in the preceding section, shall at all reasonable times be open to the inspection of the Town Clerk of the Town of Rotterdam to inspect the same.
The Town Clerk may deny the issuance or renewal of a license or may revoke any outstanding license if he/she deems that there is good and sufficient reason for the denial or revocation thereof. Any person aggrieved by the action of the Town Clerk in denying the issuance, renewal or revoking of any license shall have the right to appeal pursuant to § 78-17 hereof.
An appeal may be taken pursuant to §§ 78-17 and 78-18 within 20 days of the receipt of written notice of the denial or revocation, mailed to the appellant's last known address, by filing with the Town Clerk a written notice of appeal and a statement setting forth fully the grounds of the appeal.
An application for such review shall be in writing, signed and acknowledged by the applicant, and shall state the ground or grounds on which the applicant claims that the determination of the Town Clerk was erroneous.
Such application shall be filed with the Town Clerk by the applicant within 20 days after notice of denial of his application by the Town Clerk has been mailed to him or delivered to him in person.
Upon the filing of such application, a hearing shall be held thereon pursuant to the provisions of § 78-18.
At such hearing, the Review Board shall consider the record upon which the Town Clerk based his/her determination and, in its discretion, may receive new or additional evidence in support thereof or in opposition thereto.
The Review Board, after such hearing, may affirm the action of the Town Clerk or direct the Town Clerk to issue a proper license pursuant to this chapter.
If an application or licensee requests a hearing, the Supervisor shall designate two or more members of the Town Board to conduct said hearing as a Review Board.
Such hearing shall be held on a date at a place and hour designated by the Chairman thereof.
The Town Clerk shall give notice thereof, stating the name and address of the applicant or licensee concerned, the subject matter of the hearing and the date, place and hour thereof designated therefor, by mailing a copy thereof to the applicant or licensee concerned, at the address shown upon the most recent application of such applicant or licensee at least 10 days prior to such hearing.
The applicant or licensee involved shall be entitled to be represented by legal counsel and to present such competent and material testimony or other evidence in his own behalf as may be relevant to the subject matter of the hearing.
All witnesses shall be sworn and examined under oath.
It shall be the duty of the Town Clerk to keep a record of all applications and of all licenses granted under the provisions of this article, giving the number and date of each license, the name and residence of the person licensed, the amount of the license fee paid and also the date of revocation of all licenses revoked.
Any person, who shall act as a public auctioneer as herein defined without a license or shall violate any of the provisions of this article, or who, having had his license revoked, shall continue to act as a public auctioneer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and be punished by fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment not to exceed three months, or both; and each day on which such violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.


text:
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§ 96
Art. 6
Art. 45
Art. 46
Art. 21
Art. 6


D.C. Law Library - § 31–3514.01. Tax and related payments.
↪ § 31–3514.01. Tax and related payments.
§ 31–3514.02. Establishment of Healthy DC and Health Care Expansion Fund.
§ 31–3514.01. Tax and related payments.
A corporation shall be subject to § 47-2608.
This section is referenced in § 31-3514.02.


text:
The grades of genealogy relationship of bulls with the head of bloodlines are not equivalent in each genealogical formation and are stipulated by the number of animals (branching) in bloodline, their diversity, distance from the head of bloodlines and system of selection. Thus, the coefficients of kinship of bulls, descendants of which have 5 and more ranks in genealogy: 1427381 Chief (n = 79), 1650414 Valiant (n = 10) and Elevation 1491007 (n = 64) with the ancestors of these bloodlines were 5,67; 8,81 and 8,37% respectively.
Slight higher coefficients of genealogical kinship of bulls with successors of Chief bloodlines – Blackstar 1929410 – by 2,28 (7,35%) and Belwood 2103297– by 1,67% (6,37%), due to the use of the last ones in the pedigrees of these bulls on the maternal side.
Significantly higher coefficientsof genealogical kinship of bulls of Starbuck 352790 bloodlines (n = 112) were with the ancestor and successors of this bloodline. Thus, the coefficient of kinship of bulls of Starbuck bloodline with their ancestor was 13,4% and with successors Aerostar 383622 – 16,9%, Mtoto 6001001962 – 9,0%, Storm 6820564– 10,9% and Shottle 598172 – 9,8%.
It was found that the highest coefficient of genealogical kinship was at the bulls of new lines and related groups Marshal 2290977 – 30,5; Toystory 60372887 – 18,5; Buckeye 130588960 – 14,8; Goldwyn 10705608 – 19,1; Shottle 598172 – 25,1%. This is because the offspring were at 1-2 generations from their founders.
The high interline genealogical kinship of bulls was revealed. Thus, the coefficient of genealogical kinship of bulls of all the bloodlines with progenitor of Starbuck 352790 bloodlines was 0,96-13,4 and with his son Aerostar 383622 – 2,9-16,9%.
Average degrees of kinship of bulls of all the population with these leaders of the breed were also quite high (8,16 and 11,42% respectively). This shows the great saturation of pedigree of all the Holstein bulls bygenes of Starbuck 352790, Aerostar 383622 and Elevation 1491007, which complicates scheduling the breeding selection even at crossing bloodlines because ancestors of the same bulls of several lines are in pedigree of animals of each bloodline. This explains increasing inbred cows in the latest generation of Ukrainian Black-and-White Dairy cattle to 71,3-91,3%.
Perhaps for restraining growth of the number of inbred cows, US experts prolong duration of hereditary qualities transmissionof a founder in generations by creating so-called "inbred" lines. To do this, for carefully selected mothers of bulls with high levels of economic useful traits (yield, fat and protein contents) of some line are selected bull-leaders of the same line with similar breeding values (homogeneous selection). Using inbreeding of different degrees from remote (V-V) and moderate degrees (III-IV, IV-IV) to close one (II-II, II-III, III-III), inbred animals are obtained and bred "in itself" again (integrated inbreeding). Probability of obtaining larger number of animals with hereditary traits of ancestor’s performance increases. So, 30 (8,77%) of 342 bulls used in Ukraine, are obtained in this way and bulls of only this line used as fathers in 4 ranks of their pedigree.
Use of moderate and remote levels of inbreeding on ancestorsof lines maintains high genealogical kinship of animals at their distance in generation and accumulation of valuable traits in populations which are inherent for ancestorsof lines.
Share of inbred bulls in all the lines is quite high – 80,7%. On average, 15 bulls were obtained as a result of the close degree of inbreeding in the population (II-II, II-III). The number of moderate levels of inbreeding (II-IV, III-IV, IV-IV and IV-V) at obtaining these bulls was 244 and remote one (V-V and above) – 195.
In addition, 116 fathers and 59 mothers received as a result of various degrees of inbreedingwere foundin the pedigrees of the bulls. Among them 15 animals (8,57%) were as a result of close degree of inbreeding, 127 (72,6%) – moderate and 33 (18,8%) – remote; it also forms the genealogical relationship between bulls of various lines.
Thus, the rate of genealogical kinship characterizes the intensity of using bull-leaders, ancestors of bloodlines and their successors for breeding stock, from both paternal and maternal sides of genealogy and genealogical relations between some bloodlines, it is important to consider while forming further genealogical structure of the breed and breeding selection as at breeding herds, so at production ones of domestic dairy cattle.
Kravchenko, N. A. 1973. Razvedenie sel'skokhozyaystvennykh zhivotnykh – Breeding of farm animals. Moskow, Kolos. 239–395 (in Russian).
Zubets M. V., V. P. Burkat, and Yu. F. Mel'nik. 1997. Genetika, selektsiya i biotekhnologiya v skotovodstve – Genetics, Breeding and Biotechnology in cattle breeding. Kyiv, BIT. 722 (in Russian).
Sirats'kyy, Y. Z., Ye. Fedorovych, M. Kuziv, T. Dorda, and O. Lyubyns'kyy. 2005. Problemy pytannya rozvedennya tvaryn za liniyamy – Problems of breeding lines for. Tvarynnytstvo Ukrayiny – Ukraine Animal Breeding. 9:16–17 (in Ukraine).
Naydenko, K. A. 2009. Henealohichna odnoridnist' buhayiv holshtyns'koyi porody v Ukrayini – Genealogical uniformity Holstein breed bulls in Ukraine. Naukovyy visnyk Natsional'noho universytetu bioresursiv i pryrodokorystuvannya Ukrayiny – Scientific Bulletin of National University of Life and Environmental Scienses of Ukraine. Kyiv, 138:170–174 (in Ukraine).
Oleshko, V. P. 2014. Riven' henealohichnoyi odnoridnosti stad molochnoyi khudoby – Level genealogical uniformity herds of dairy cattle. Materialy ХІІ Vseukrayins'koyi naukovoyi konferentsiyi molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv – Materials XII Ukrainian scientific conference of young scientists and graduate students. Chubyns'ke. 49–50 (in Ukraine).
Kozyr, V. S., T. V. Movchan, A. D. Hekkiyev, and M. V. Kozlovs'ka. 2005. Systematyzatsiya henealohichnykh uhrupuvan' za stupenem yikhn'oyi sporidnenosti – Systematics genealogical groups in the degree of their relationship. Visnyk ahrarnoyi nauky – Bulletin of Agricultural Science. 5:30–34 (in Ukraine).
2012. Kataloh buhayiv molochnykh porid ta molochno-m"yasnykh porid dlya vidtvorennya matochnoho poholiv"ya v 2012 rotsi – Catalog bull breeds and dairy cattle breeds for reproduction of breeding stock in 2012. Kyiv, 11–97.
Burkat, V. P. 1985. O metodakh polucheniya i otbora vydayushchikhsya zhivotnykh – On the methods of preparation and selection of outstanding animals. Zhivotnovodstvo – Animal breeding. 4: 37–38.
Zubets', M. V., and A. P. Kruhlyak. 2010. Ukrayins'ka chervono-ryaba molochna poroda: metody vyvedennya, stan, perspektyvy udoskonalennya – Ukrainian Red-and-Whaite ripple dairy breed: Methods output condition, prospects improving. Rozvedennya i henetyka tvaryn – Animal Breeding and Genetics. 44:14–17 (in Ukraine).
Efimenko, M. Ya. 2010. Ukrainskaya cherno-pestraya molochnaya poroda: genezis, sostoyanie i perspektivy selektsii – Ukrainian Black-and-White dairy breed: Genesis, state and prospects of breeding. Rozvedennya i henetyka tvaryn – Animal Breeding and Genetics. 44:17–20 (in Ukraine).

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original “this Act”, meaning Pub. L. 93–638, Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2203, as amended, known as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which is classified principally to this subchapter (§450 et seq.). For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 450 of this title and Tables.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, referred to in subsec. (e), is Pub. L. 92–203, Dec. 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 688, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 33 (§1601 et seq.) of Title 43, Public Lands. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of Title 43, and Tables.
Part A of this subchapter, referred to in subsec. (j), was in the original “title I of this act”, meaning title I of Pub. L. 93–638, known as the Indian Self-Determination Act, which is classified principally to part A (§450f et seq.) of this subchapter. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 450 of this title and Tables.
Section 450j(a) of this title, referred to in subsec. (j), was repealed and a new subsec. (a) of section 450j was added by Pub. L. 103–413, title I, §102(10), Oct. 25, 1994, 108 Stat. 4253, which does not contain provisos.
1994—Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 103–413, §102(1)(A), substituted “indirect cost rate” for “indirect costs rate”.
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 103–413, §102(1)(B)–(D), added subsec. (m).
1990—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101–301, §2(a)(1), inserted a comma before “which is recognized”.
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101–644, §202(1), struck out “in existence on October 5, 1988,” before “which meets this definition”.
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 101–644, §202(2), substituted “contract (or grant or cooperative agreement utilized under section 450e–1 of this title) entered” for “contract entered” in two places.
Pub. L. 101–301, §2(a)(2), (3), substituted “under this subchapter” for “pursuant to this Act” in two places and struck out “the” before “Secretary”.
1988—Pub. L. 100–472 amended section generally, substituting subsecs. (a) to (l) for former subsecs. (a) to (d) and (f) which defined “Indian”, “Indian tribe”, “Tribal organization”, “Secretary”, and “State education agency”.
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 100–581, §208(a)(1), substituted “by a tribal organization” for “by tribal organization”.
Pub. L. 100–581, §208(a)(2), which directed the amendment of subsec. (h) by substituting “a tribal organization or the tribal organization's Indian tribe for purposes of section 450f(a) of this title” for “a tribal organization or a tribal governing body” was executed by substituting the new language for “a tribal organization or tribal governing body” to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 100–581, §208(b), substituted “the Secretary for the planning” for “Secretary the planning” and “except as provided the last proviso in section 450j(a) of this title, no contract” for “no contract”.
1 So in original. Probably should be “provided in”.


text:
Ilapak Interantional SA (hereinafter “Ilapak” or the “Company”), is informing you pursuant to Art. 13 of the GDPR that personal data you have provided through the website www.ilapak.cz (hereinafter the “Website”) can be processed according to the rules set forth by the existing laws.
The Data Controller, that is who takes the relevant decisions on the data processing purposes , is Ilapak International SA , VAT CHE-103.918.515, P.O. Box 756 CH-6916 Grancia, Switzerland.
The processing of your personal data will be based on principles of correctness, lawfulness, transparency and protection of your privacy and your rights, in accordance with the principles expressed by the GDPR.
c) carry out the internal operational and management needs of the Companies and related to the services and / or products offered to you.
e) Profiling: collection of information about behavior and commercial preferences related to your company field in order to improve services provided to our customers, and more specifically in order to analyze information relative to your choices preferences by the Company and/or IMA Group companies, interests and habits acquired by you in the context of the offered services.
Your personal data will be treated, therefore, only for the purposes listed above. The data will be processed using appropriate tools in order to guarantee security and confidentiality and can be carried out by hard copy and/or automated tools to store, manage and transmit the data.
The Company guarantees the logical and physical security of the data and, in general, the confidentiality of the processed personal data, putting in place all the necessary technical and organizational measures to prevent the loss of personal data, illicit use or, in any case, incorrect of the same, as well as unauthorized access by third parties.
personal data (by way of example: your name and family name, tax code, VAT number, residence, email, certified email address, employers company, business role and/or position etc.).
At any time you can verify that your Personal Data processed for the purposes set forth in the present notice are correct and, if violated, you can ask their update at the following address: privacy@ilapak.com.
For the purposes under letters a), b) and c) of Art. 2 set above, the collection of your personal data is necessary in order to access the services available on our web site (e.g.
the downloading of technical documentations and/or brochures).
For the purposes under Art. 2 letters d) and e) above, the collection of your personal data is made on voluntary basis; consequently, you may decide not to provide us with any express consent, or to waive it in any moment. The lack of any express consent to process such data may cause the impossibility for the Company and/or the IMA Group companies to perform the above-mentioned activities.
Therefore, the lack of express consent under Art. 2, letter d), will cause the impossibility for the Companiy and/or the IMA Group companies to perform marketing and commercial activities.
5. Storage of data .
Your personal data will be stored for the period of time strictly necessary for the purposes of the data processing as indicated in Art. 2 above.
If you are interested in receiving further information on the retention periods of your personal data, we invite you to contact us using the methods indicated in the art. 8 set below of this notice.
to judicial or supervisory authorities, public administrations, public (national and foreign) bodies, in compliance with the provisions of the law and conforming with a previous formal request from such subjects.
The business structure of the Company implies, necessarily, a cross-border circulation of data that under the law is seen as transfer of data abroad, even outside the territory of the European Union.
Your data, if transferred to countries outside the European Union, will always be processed in accordance with the principles set out in Art. 45 and 46 of the GDPR regarding the existence of an adequacy decision by the European Commission.
Right of Access to Personal Data Art. 15 – Obtain confirmation whether your data are processed or not and, in such a case, obtain information related, in particular, to: the purposes of such processing, the categories of the processed Personal Data, the storage period, the recipients to whom such data can be transferred, the right to send a complaint to the supervisory authority, the right to request the correction or cancellation or limitation of the processing or to file an opposition to the processing itself as well as the existence of an automated decision-making process.
Right of Rectification Art. 16– Obtain, without undue delay, the rectification of inaccurate Personal Data and to have incomplete Personal Data duly completed.
Right of Erasure Art. 17 – Obtain, without undue delay, the erasure of your Personal Data, in the cases provided for by the GPDR.
Right to Restriction Art. 18 – "limitation" means the marking of the data stored with the aim of limiting the processing in the future. This will imply the burden on the part of the Company and IMA Group companies to suspend the processing of your Personal Data.
Right to Data Portability Art. 20 – in case of automated processing carried out on the basis of consent or in execution of a contract, to receive your data in a structured format, commonly used and readable by automatic device.
Right to object Art. 21– Object to the processing of your personal data, unless there are reasons of legitimate interest for the Data Controller to continue processing such data. You also have the right to object to processing where your personal information are used for direct marketing purposes.
Oppose the automated decision-making process, including profiling Art. 22 – your Personal Data must not be subject to any automatic decision-making process by the Company through the use of personal information or through the Customer profiling, unless you have expressed your consent.
Withdrawal of consent – in the event that you have given consent to the collection, processing and transfer of your Personal Data, you have the right to revoke it for such specific processing at any time. Once we receive the notice of withdrawal of consent, we will no longer process your Personal Data, unless these are not based upon other legitimate interest-basis.
You may exercise your above listed rights by means of a request to be sent by e-mail to privacy@ilapak.com or by mail to the Company headquarter.
Requests relating to the exercise of your rights will be processed without undue delay and, in any case, within 30 (thirty) days of receipt of the request.
Finally, the Company reserves the right to modify or update this information also in order to comply with new obligations imposed by laws or for technical reasons.

matches:
Art. 13
Art. 2
Art. 2
Art. 2
Art. 2
art. 8
Art. 45
Art. 15
Art. 16
Art. 17
Art. 18
Art. 20
Art. 21
Art. 22


The recently passed California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (the "CCPA") is set to create significant compliance burdens for most businesses that collect personal information about California residents ("consumers").
respect new rights for consumers, including rights to request access to and deletion of their personal information and to opt out of having their personal information sold to third parties.
Liability for failure to comply could easily reach millions of dollars in some circumstances: businesses may be subject to civil liability in the event of a data breach caused by a failure to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices; and knowing violations of other provisions may subject a business to civil penalties up to $7,500 per violation.
The new requirements are likely to necessitate significant updates to covered businesses' external and internal privacy policies and operational compliance procedures, in particular, to enable them to respond to consumers who exercise their rights under the CCPA.
Certain provisions of the CCPA bear some similarities to the European Union's new General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") and businesses that have put in place a GDPR compliance framework may, to a certain extent, be able to leverage their existing processes to comply with the CCPA. However, even where there are similarities between the two laws, the requirements also have subtle differences, requiring a careful analysis and application for businesses subject to both laws.
The CCPA takes effect on January 1, 2020, and the California Attorney General (the "AG") is anticipated to promulgate related regulations and guidance in the interim. However, the California legislature recently passed a bill ("S.B. 1121") that, as well as clarifying potential ambiguities in the CCPA, would also extend the deadline for the AG to issue regulations, and delay enforcement of the CCPA until July 1, 2020 or later. The bill is currently awaiting the governor’s signature. Businesses may participate in the public review and comment period for future regulations, once the open comment period has started, by contacting the AG.
The CCPA builds on existing data privacy legislation in California including the "Shine the Light" law, the California Online Privacy Protection Act, and California's data breach notification law. The CCPA was passed amid concerns that consumers cannot "properly protect and safeguard their privacy." Its passage comes at a time when many US companies with international operations are still dealing with the significant compliance burden associated with the GDPR and, despite some similarities, the CCPA will place additional burdens on businesses that are subject to both laws.
Scope: Covered Entities, "Personal Information" and "Consumers"
derive 50 percent or more of their annual revenue from selling the personal information of consumers.
Personal information is broadly defined as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." The CCPA provides several examples of personal information, including real name, alias, IP address, biometric information, network activity information (e.g., browsing and search history), and geolocation data.
The CCPA applies to "consumers" which it defines as natural persons who are California residents. Although the CCPA references and appears designed to protect consumers in the commonly understood sense (i.e., recipients of a good or service), its broad definition may cover data obtained in other circumstances, such as data related to a business's employees who are California residents. The CCPA specifically identifies "employment-related data" as a category of personal information covered by the CCPA and the legislative findings mention "apply[ing] for a job" as one of the activities that is "almost impossible to do ... without sharing personal information." Additionally, the CCPA never states that it applies only to personal information collected in the course of a consumer transaction or expressly excludes personal information collected by an employer about its employees for employment purposes. The scope of the CCPA will likely be clarified through legislative amendment, regulation, or guidance from the AG.
Despite its potentially broad reach, the CCPA is not all encompassing. The CCPA does not apply to "commercial conduct" which takes place entirely outside of California. In addition, the CCPA is not intended to replace or supersede federal and state laws, nor does it apply to personal information collected pursuant to certain laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. The CCPA also excludes "personal information" transferred as part of a merger, acquisition or other corporate transaction, subject to certain conditions including requiring notice to a consumer if the acquirer of the information plans to use it in a way that is inconsistent with the conditions under which it was originally collected. Notably, as explained in more detail below, the CCPA excludes certain types of requests that businesses rely on to lower their compliance burden.
The CCPA imposes substantial obligations on covered businesses.
a description of consumers' specific rights under the CCPA and the methods provided by the business for consumers to submit corresponding requests (including if the business sells personal information, a link to a "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" webpage).
the categories of personal information disclosed (for a business purpose) or sold (or a statement that the business has not engaged in such sale or disclosure, if applicable).
Access: disclose the following, in relation to personal information it has collected about the consumer in the preceding twelve months: (a) the specific pieces of information collected; (b) the categories of information collected; (c) the categories of sources from which that information was collected; (c) the business or commercial purpose for collecting that information; and (d) the categories of third parties with whom that information has been shared, including information sold to third parties. The disclosure should be made in writing and delivered: through the consumer's account with the business, if they have one (if not they should not be asked to create one); by mail; or electronically, at the consumer's option if they do not have an account (in which case the information must be provided in a readily useable format that allows the consumer to easily transmit the information to another entity). Such requests are limited to two per twelve-month period.
The business must provide at least two designated methods for consumers to submit requests, including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number and a web page (if the business maintains a web site).
Deletion: delete the personal information the business has collected from the consumer, subject to certain exceptions, including if the consumer's personal information is necessary for the business or service provider to: (a) provide a good or service requested by the consumer; (b) complete the transaction for which personal information was collected; or (c) perform a contract between the business and consumer.
Opt out: if they sell personal information to third parties, refrain from selling a consumer's personal information (and not request that the consumer authorize the sale of their personal information for at least twelve months from the opt out). The business must provide a clear and conspicuous link entitled "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" on its website that directs consumers to a webpage where they can opt-out.
Prohibited Discrimination: A business must not discriminate against a consumer who chooses to exercise his or her rights under the CCPA, e.g., by increasing prices, or reducing the level or quality of goods or services for those consumers. This does not prevent a business from varying prices, or the level or quality of goods or services if the difference equates to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer's data. Businesses may (1) offer financial incentives such as payments to a consumer as compensation, for the collection, sale, and deletion of personal information, and/or (2) offer a different price, rate, level, or quality of goods and services to consumers "if the difference is related to the value of having a consumer's personal information."
Educate Personnel: A business is under an obligation to ensure that individuals responsible for handling consumer inquiries about the business's privacy practices or the business's compliance with the CCPA are informed of all requirements, and how to direct consumers to exercise their rights.
State Enforcement: The CCPA contains significant tools for enforcement. Violation of the CCPA would expose businesses to civil penalties of up to $7,500 per intentional violation in suits brought by the AG (or any other public entity with the authority to sue on the behalf of the people of California). Civil penalties for non-intentional violations will be limited to $2,500 or less per violation. Businesses will have 30 days to cure any alleged violations after being notified of non-compliance.
Consumer Actions: The CCPA grants a right for consumers to bring a civil action for statutory damages. However, this applies only in relation to data security breaches which arise out of a failure by a business to comply with its duty (under a separate law) to maintain reasonable data security measures. This right extends to consumers whose unencrypted or non-redacted personal information (defined by that separate law, and more narrowly than in the remainder of the CCPA) has been stolen or disclosed as a result of a business's violation of its duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information. Statutory damages are the greater of $100-$750 per consumer per incident, and actual damages. As such, an applicable data breach, involving as little as 10,000 records, could subject a business to a million dollar plus damages claim.
Compliance in Practice: To be prepared in practice to comply with these obligations under the CCPA, businesses are likely to need to implement operational changes, for example so that, for a given California resident, they are able to identify all relevant personal information they hold, are able to provide a copy and/or delete it on request, and, to the extent they sell personal information, to refrain from selling that particular California resident's personal information.
What does it mean to "do business in the State of California"?
What is a "household" in the context of "personal information" as defined by the CCPA and does the scope of information covered by "households" include other individuals within a household or simply information relating to a physical location?
Do consumer rights extend to consumers who do not have a direct relationship with the business, but whose data the business has collected (from other consumers for example)?
Do consumers' rights regarding their personal information extend beyond the business that collected the personal information to any vendors or other third parties that maintain the personal information?
Who is liable for the subsequent sale of a consumer's personal information by a third party who purchased the personal information from a business?
Are the rights and obligations created under the CCPA intended to apply to collection of personal information by employers about their employees?
Latest Developments: Before it takes effect on January 1, 2020, the CCPA calls for the AG to solicit public input in developing regulations and procedures for certain key provisions of the law. It is also likely to be revised by the California legislature.
For example, the California legislature recently passed S.B. 1121, which would make several changes to the CCPA. Along with technical corrections, S.B. 1121 would amend the CCPA to make clear that the private right of action only applies to data breaches. It would also extend the deadline for the AG to issue regulations under the CCPA from January 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020. Should S.B. 1121 become law, the CCPA would not be enforceable until the earlier of July 1, 2020 or six months after the AG publishes final CCPA regulations. The bill is currently awaiting the governor’s signature.
Therefore, there are opportunities for businesses that are concerned about particular measures or uncertainty in the CCPA to influence its final form and related requirements and procedures. To participate in the AG's proposed rulemaking process, participants will generally have 45 days from the date of announcement of the proposed rulemaking to submit their comments, either via email, fax, postal address, or at a public hearing. To date, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking has not been announced by the AG.
Businesses may also seek the advice of the AG on how to comply with the law, although (as of the date of this article), the AG has not provided a means by which businesses may solicit such advice.
Other data privacy regimes, including the GDPR: For a global business, the CCPA will add an additional regulatory burden on top of the significant compliance overhead from other data privacy regimes, in particular the GDPR. Although certain provisions of the CCPA resemble certain provisions of the GDPR, even those similar provisions also include subtle differences. Therefore, while businesses may find that existing compliance frameworks developed under the GDPR are useful for preparing for compliance under the CCPA, this will not avoid the need for a review of and updates to these frameworks. For businesses that have already been dealing with the compliance demands of the GDPR, this news is unlikely to be welcomed.
 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100-195.
 Regulation 2016/679, O.J. L 119/1 (2016). For more information on the GDPR, please see White & Case's GDPR Handbook and related publications.
 S.B. 1121, 2017-18 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
 Regulatory proposals in the State of California must typically undergo a public comment period of at least 45 days. Any notice of proposed rulemaking will be published in the California Regulatory Notice Register.
 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.
 Cal. Bus. and Professions Code §§ 22575-22579.
 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82.
 A.B. 275, 2017-18 Leg. § 2(c) (Cal. 2018).
 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
 See "Honor Consumer Requests" below.
 Subject to extension in limited circumstances.
 In relation to minors, businesses are prohibited from selling their personal information without having received consent (i.e., opt-in) and, in relation to consumers that the business has actual knowledge are under the age of 16, without having affirmative authorization for the sale: in the case of minors between the ages of 13 and 16, from the minor; and, in the case of minors under the age of 13, from the minor's parent or guardian.
 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 ("Privacy: personal information").?
 "Personal information" under Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 includes only: an individual's first name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted or redacted: Social security number; driver's license number or California identification card number; account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account; any individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, regarding the individual's medical history or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care professional; an individual's insurance policy number or subscriber identification number, any unique identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual, or any information in an individual's application and claims history, including any appeals records; or a username or email address in combination with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to an online account. Personal information does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records.
 The CCPA applies only to "sole proprietorship[s], partnership[s], limited liability company[ies], corporation[s], association[s], or other legal entit[ies] that [are] organized or operated for the profit or financial benefit of [their] shareholders or other owners . . . that do business in the State of California." Cal. Civ. Code §1798.40(c)(1).
 See "Scope: Covered Businesses; 'Personal Information'; 'Consumers'" above. The CCPA does not define what a "household" is. Personal information includes "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly with a particular consumer or household." Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1).
 See "Scope: Covered Businesses; 'Personal Information'; 'Consumers'" above.
 For a comparison of areas of overlap between the GDPR and the CCPA, see here.
Mark Williams, Law Clerk at White & Case, and Charles Miller and Kyle Levenberg, summer associates at White & Case, also assisted in the development of this publication.