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"The ability to simplify means to eliminate the unnecessary so that the necessary may speak." Hans Hoffmann.
B.S. in Statistics, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil, 2006.
de Desenvolvimento e o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, 2017.
Federal de Minas Gerais, 2017.
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Disclaimer: Use of any code from this package is at own risk!
for the hyperparameters in state space models.
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of life: a longitudinal evaluation of treated and untreated individuals.
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previsão da incidência de Dengue em Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais.
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PELES, P. R. H. ; PEREIRA, F. H. ; SANTOS, T. R. ; ASSINI, A. G. ; RIBEIRO, V. V. ; MORAES, E. N. ; CARAMELLI, P.
and the CYP2D6 and APOE genetic polymorphisms. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease, v. 55, p. 539-549, 2017.
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disease and mixed dementia: a one-year naturalistic study.
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- A New Proposal of Stochastic Volatility.
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classical and Bayesian perspectives: a comparison study.
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United States v. Celestine, ante, p. 215 U. S. 278, followed, as to continuance of jurisdiction of United States over offenses committed within the limits of an Indian reservation.
The Indians, as wards of the government, are the beneficiaries of the prohibition against the introduction of liquor into Indian country, and, under the Washington Enabling Act, jurisdiction and control over Indian lands remains in the United States, and Congress has power to prohibit and punish the introduction of liquor therein.
The limit of an Indian reservation are not changed by allotments in severalty during the trust period, and, where the land allotted are subject to restriction against alienation and to defeasance, the prohibition against liquor continues to be effective.
"To-wit, into and upon a certain Indian allotment No. 670, within the limits of the boundary of the Yakima Indian Reservation, in the Eastern District of Washington, which said allotment had theretofore been allotted to a certain Indian, a member of the Yakima Tribe of Indians, named George Wesslike, under and by virtue of the provision of the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, entitled, 'An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations, and to Extend the Protection of the Laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for Other Purposes' (24 Stat. 388, c. 119), said allotment being then and now one held in trust by the government for said allottee, and being inalienable by the said allottee without the consent of the United States."
"1. That the Yakima Indian Reservation, in the Eastern District of Washington, is inhabited by the Yakima and other Indians, under the general charge and control of an Indian agent and superintendent of the United States."
"2. That, prior to September 3, 1908, a very large number of allotments of land within said reservation had been made to Indians entitled thereto, which said allotments had been made and allotted under and by virtue of the provision of the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, known as the General Allotment Act."
Reservation, and the same had been made and allotted, and the usual trust patent thereto issued to the allottee named in the indictment under the provision of the Act of February 8, 1887, prior to September, 1908."
"4. That the trust limitation has not yet expired, and the title to said allotment is still being held in trust by the government; that the title to said allotment is not alienable by the allottee without the consent of the United States."
"5. That on or about September 3, 1908, the defendants did go on and upon said allotment described in the indictment, taking and carrying with them certain ardent spirits and intoxicating liquor, to-wit, alcohol, in a demijohn and flasks."
"That . . . any person who shall introduce or attempt to introduce any malt, spirituous, or vinous liquor, including beer, ale, and wine, or any ardent or intoxicating liquor of any kind whatsoever into the Indian country, which term shall include any Indian allotment while the title to the same shall be held in trust by the government, or while the same shall remain inalienable by the allottee without the consent of the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than sixty days, and by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars for the first offense, and not less than two hundred dollars for each offense thereafter."
"All which tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out, for the exclusive use and benefit of said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as an Indian reservation; nor shall any white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian Department, be permitted to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe and the superintendent and agent."
"ARTICLE VI. The President may, from time to time at his discretion, cause the whole or such portions of such reservation as he may think proper to be surveyed into lots, and assign the same to such individuals or families of the said confederated tribes and bands of Indians as are willing to avail themselves of the privilege, and will locate on the same as a permanent home, on the same terms and subject to the same regulations as are provided in the sixth article of the treaty with the Omahas, so far as the same may be applicable."
The demurrer was sustained, and thereupon the government brought the case here on writ of error under the Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1246, c. 2564.
The question whether the indictment charges any offense against the laws of the United States involves the validity of the Act of January 30, 1897, as applied to the facts stated, and therefore the case is one properly before us under the act providing for writs of error in certain instances in criminal cases. 34 Stat. 1246, c. 2564; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 211 U. S. 397.
"to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that, until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States."
section withdrawing any other jurisdiction than that named in Draper v. United States, undoubtedly Congress has the right to forbid the introduction of liquor and to provide punishment for any violation thereof. Couture v. United States, 207 U.S. 581. It is true that only a per curiam opinion was filed in that case, and the judgment was affirmed on the authority of United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, but an examination of the record shows that its facts are similar to those in the present case. See also an opinion by Shiras, District Judge, in United States v. Mullin, 71 F. 682, and one by Circuit Judge Van Devanter, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835.

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By: Sheryl J. Seiden, Esq.
In determining how to equitably distribute executive compensation, first, the type of executive compensation must be identified. Then, it must be determined whether the executive compensation was awarded for the party's past efforts or in anticipation of the party's future efforts. Executive compensation awarded prior to the termination of the marriage will be subject to equitable distribution whereas executive compensation awarded after the termination of the marriage will not be subject to equitable distribution. As executive compensation is often awarded for both past efforts and in anticipation of future services, a portion, but not all, of executive compensation is often part of the marital estate for purposes of equitable distribution.
Stock options ("SOs") are rights to purchase shares of stock for a certain price in the future. The rights are granted to an employee in conjunction with his or her employment. If the stock is trading at a higher price than the grant price of the stock options than the stock options have value but if the stock is trading at a lower price than the grant price, then the stock options have no value at that time and are referred to as "underwater." It is important to note that just because stock options have no value at the time of the division of the assets, they may have value at a later date if the value of the stock increases in the future.
such individual, at the time the option is granted, does not own stock possessing more than 10 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of the employer corporation or of its parent or subsidiary corporation.
Restricted Stock Units, commonly known as RSUs, are compensation offered by employer to an employee in the form of company stock which vests overtime pursuant to a vesting schedule. The RSUs are considered income to the employee upon vesting and the employee can either sell the stock or hold the shares upon vesting.
How Are SOs and RSUs Divided?
Although Incentive Stock Options and Restricted Stock Units are not transferable and are rights granted to employees, they are distributable in a divorce. The titled spouse can either buyout the non-titled spouse from his/her share by valuing the asset using the current market value and deducting the applicable taxes or the titled spouse can "hold" the non-titled spouse's share of these assets pursuant to a "Callahan Trust" established in the case of Callahan v Callahan, 142 N.J. Super 325 (Sup. Ct. of N.J. Chan. Div. 1976).
The issues that practitioners face is determining what portion of the stock options are marital and what portion should be awarded to the non-titled spouse. The answer to this question focuses on whether the stock options were awarded for past efforts which occurred during the marriage or future efforts which will occur after the termination of the marital partnership.
In Pascale v Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 609 (1995), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Plaintiff's stock options awarded ten (10) days after the Complaint was filed, which were the result of efforts expended during the marriage, were subject to equitable distribution. Although the stock options were part of the marital estate, the Court must next decide how to allocate this asset between the parties.
Although that argument may be to an extent factually correct, we do not find it useful in the context of an equitable distribution determination, since its acceptance would permit a supportive spouse to claim assets accruing throughout the work life of the divorced partner, regardless of when the divorce occurred. Such a result would be clearly inequitable, and thus contrary to the principles of equitable distribution.
The Appellate Division held that the four year vesting period was designed to ensure the Husband's continued employment with the company. Therefore, the Court held that the stock options were not awarded for the couples joint marital endeavors, and held them entirely immune from equitable distribution.
In a situation where stock options are granted during the marriage but vested after the marriage termination, a coverture fraction can be applied to determine the marital portion. This coverture fraction is recognized in Skoloff & Cutler, III, New Jersey Family Law Practice, (12th Ed. 2006). The coverture fraction was developed by the highest court in the State of New York case of DeJesus v DeJesus, 90 N.Y.2d 643 (1997). DeJesus references the case of In Re Marriage of Hug, 154 CalApp. 3d 780 – the case referenced in Skoloff & Cutler. DeJesus addresses precisely this issue – to what extent an interest in restricted stock and stock option benefits provided during the marriage but which vested after the marriage are subject to equitable distribution. By using the DeJesus formula, the marital portion of the stock options will be distributed to a party while the non-marital portion remains the separate property of the titled spouse.
The coverture portion was also implemented by the formula established in Marx v. Marx, 265 N.J.Super. 418 (Ch.Div.1993), whereby the non-titled spouse receives fifty (50%) percent of the benefit payable to the participant multiplied by the coverture fraction. The numerator of the coverture fraction is the number of during the marital period from the date of grant of SOs or RSUs to date of complaint and the denominator is the number of months from the date that SOs or RSUs were granted to date that they vest. For example, if SOs were granted on January 1, 2012, and the divorce complaint was filed January 1, 2014 and the SOs vest January 1, 2016, the coverture fraction would be as follows: 24 months (from date of grant to date of complaint)/48 months (from date of grant to date of vesting). In this example, 24/48, or 50% of the SOs would be marital, which presumably would entitle the non-titled spouse to 25% of the value. Such a formula takes into consideration that a portion of the SOs vests during the marital period as well as after the marital period.
A Forgivable Loan is a form of executive compensation used much like a sign-on bonus or performance bonus to give key employees a motivation to "sign-on" with a new employer and deepen their commitment to remain in their new position. The terms of the loan agreement can establish that the loan will be forgiven over the life of the agreement as long as the employee remains employed by the company. The loan amount is taxable as income to the employee, but the tax is spread out over the life of the loan. If the employee leaves before the loan is fully forgiven, then it is repayable in full, with interest. So for the employee, the forgivable loan is a tax-deferred up-front payment for future service with a fairly big club if the employee leaves the company before fulfilling the terms.
The Internal Revenue Service and case law have established that the forgivable loan will not be treated as compensation for tax purposes as long as the loan represents a bona fide debt agreement. If it were compensation, it would be taxable the day it is paid. But as a loan, it is taxable only as it is repaid or forgiven over time, making it the hook that helps retain people in key positions.
Generally, property qualifies for equitable distribution "when it is 'attributable to the expenditure of effort by either spouse' during marriage." Pascale v. Pascale, supra, 140 N.J. at 609, 660 A.2d at 498 (quotingPainter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974). For the purpose of equitable distribution of marital assets, a marriage is deemed to end on the day a valid Complaint for Divorce is filed that commences a proceeding culminating in a Final Judgment of Divorce. Portner v. Portner, 93 N.J. 215, 225, 460 A.2d 115, 120 (1983). When a forgivable loan is issued to an employee, the purpose of the loan is critical in the determination of whether it should be deemed an asset for equitable distribution or income for alimony purposes. If the forgivable loan is to reward an employee or potential employee for his or her goodwill or past accomplishments, the forgivable loan should be classified as an asset. However, if the purpose of the forgivable loan is used as an incentive to entice a potential employee for future contributions not attributable to efforts of either spouse during the marriage or to compensate future work effort, it should be deemed not available to equitable distribution since marital contribution is lacking. In fairness it can only be used as part of the support calculation.
In New Jersey, case law determining whether a forgivable loan should be categorized as income for alimony purposes or an asset for equitable distribution is scarce. However, other jurisdictions provide guidance to determine the classification of such a loan in the divorce context. In O'neal v. O'neal, 55 Ark. App. 57, 58 (1996), the appellant appealed a final divorce decree, which provided that a $35,000 forgivable loan that appellee received from his employer be characterized as deferred compensation and not marital in character. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to categorize it as non-marital property because although appellee acquired the right to earn the $35,000 during the marriage, he did not earn it during the marriage. Id. at 59. The court concluded that the forgivable loan was compensation for future performance; therefore, it was not earned during the marriage and is not marital property. Id. In Mosteller v. Brooks, 2008 WL 5330525 (Va.App), at *3, the court found that the unvested portion of the husband's forgivable loan was not marital property because he alone remained liable for the balance of the loan post-divorce.
In O'Keefe v. O'Keefe, 1998 WL 170117 (Minnesota, April 14, 1998), the husband received two bonuses from his employer, one of which was acknowledged as a signing bonus. Both bonuses were structured as forgivable loans. During the two years following the commencement of the husband's employment, preceding trial of the divorce action, his employer cancelled portions of his debt and reported those amounts as taxable income to the husband. Under Minnesota law, a bonus is included in the calculation of future income for support purposes only if it constitutes a "dependable source of income." The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the husband "earned" the cancellation of the debt, and the resulting income, with every year of continued service for his employer. Accordingly, the forgivable loans constituted income from which husband was required to pay support and was not designated as an asset subject to equitable distribution.
If Not An Asset, Then Maybe Income?
If the executive compensation is not subject to equitable distribution, then it may be subject to inclusion in a party's income for purposes of determining support. Actual income of the paying spouse is the lodestar for determining the extent of that party's alimony obligation. Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 293 (N.J. 2005). In Bonanno v. Bonanno, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it looks to a person's income to determine support. 4 N.J. 268 (1950). This is consistent with the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, et. seq. Income is traditionally defined as "the return in money from one's business, labor, or capital invested." Black's Law Dictionary, 763 (6th ed. 1998). The Internal Revenue Code includes in its definition of "gross income" any "income from discharge of indebtedness." 26 I.R.C. §61(a). It also specifically defines items which are excluded from gross income. 26 U.S.C.A. §108(a). In the taxation context, the United States Supreme Court has defined income as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, (1920) (quotingDoyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918). Under that definition, only gains that are actually realized are considered income for taxation purposes. Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 421 (N.J. 1999). Accordingly, a forgivable loan or signing bonus may not be an asset but may be deemed income.
The decision of whether to include executive compensation as part of the marital estate subject to equitable distribution will be based on whether it was granted for past services during the marriage or for future services after the termination of the marital partnership.If it is not part of the marital estate subject to equitable distribution, then consider whether it should be part of the title spouse's income for purposes of support.
Sheryl J. Seiden is an attorney admitted to practice law in the States of New Jersey and New York. She is the founding partner of Seiden Family Law, LLC in Cranford, NJ. She is an officer of the Family Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers – New Jersey Chapter. She is a frequent lecturer on topics affecting the practice of family law.


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It is extraordinary how we are seeing the prophesies of Isaiah come to pass here in South Africa.
You experienced the Twin Towers destruction that was within seconds. First you see it now you don't.
I find here in South Africa too a breach is ready to fall and the swelling out in a high wall whose breaking is coming upon us suddenly, is also occurring.
What does it mean, swelling out in a high wall for South Africa. Well look at this. The part of our economy that is high up in affluence, is experiencing a breach in its wall of prosperity. Our electricity is being switched off for hours on end at periodical times throughout the day. This is happening across South Africa. Whole cities are switched off at a time! Can you imagine? Lifts stop. Malls are plunged into darkness. Security systems go off line. Mines cave into darkness, bakeries loose their production, petrol stations stop pumping fuel and robots switch off. Yes! It is happening here! Our leaders fiddle with the figures of by how much increase to load up the cost for electricity. Electricity is going to be rationed here. Oh I am not complaining. I see exactly the Twin Tower effect happening in this Nation. Our breaking coming suddenly and in an instant!
Why? Because the whole head is sick, the whole heart is faint and there is no soundness in it.
Before I leave for work to begin a double shift, thought I'd share a response to your post, it brings to mind Ecclesiastes. 1:9,10; 9:1-3; 8:11-14. It seems that in all areas of Knowledge and subject matter that those taking the lead deliberately and unknowingly misleed and disceive others. Experts in all fields load statistics and always seem to prefer being Politically correct instead of just plainly telling the truth. I see this in the Food Industry, Sports, Exercise, Science and Of course we both know in Religion, worst of all. We have to dig deep and do much research in those areas that are important to each one of us to find the best information, Seek, Knock and you will find. Man dominates Man to his own injury, the so-called Shepperds are leading the poor misguided and misled sheep(masses) into a ditch, thankfully in His due time, Our Heavenly Father is going to correct all of this.
May the peace of God that excels all thought guard your heart and mental faculties.
You are so right about what you say about the food industry. I learnt years ago that the qualifications on the boxes of fruit juices that claim there are no preservatives in the juice is true. The industry simply sprayed the insides of the containers which do not have to pass through the food and health regulations that the juice has to!
Also if you take a look at the side effects of our chemical medicines, the illness by contrast appears to be much more desirable! This is not to knock medicine and medical advantages of our century. I am grateful for pain killers!
Your post touched my heart and I empathize with you. I too witness in my own country the frivolous and trivial pursuits of our leaders at all levels.
2Ti 3:13 Yet wicked men and swindlers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived."
In my current studies of the scripture I am seeing more clearly how that what hurts people the most... that injures them is deception. That destruction or to be "destroyed" is good, we know... but this deception is the worst of hurts.
The deceivers are also deceived... these that so many men & women put their faith in.
2Ti 3:4 traitors, rash, conceited, fond of their own gratification rather than fond of God;"
2Ti 3:5 having a form of devoutness, yet denying its power."
2Ti 3:7 always learning and yet not at any time able to come into a realization of the truth.
"…for when Thy judgments are in the earth, the inhabitants of the world will learn RIGHTEOUSNESS"
Thank you Bobby for posting that responce of Hope.
What is interesting is the reactions I come into contact with regarding the impact of this situation. We have only just entered into the circumstances of cut off electricity supplies. The imact is still to be felt and it is coming.
Time to move to America Arc?
We are bogged down in the war with Iraq, with a presidential election this year who knows where this will all lead.
There is a recession looming, I believe because of the lax lending of recent years, which have lead to us being too deep in debt to pay it back. Our financial institutions are made of a house of card ready to come tumbling down.
These are just a couple of our nations wooes.
As you have noted the crisis in your country, are we all heading for the swelling out in a high wall whose breaking is coming upon us suddenly.
Here too I find, Because the whole head is sick, the whole heart is faint and there is no soundness in it.
This has been the state of the world in this age ever since God created man in it.
Mat 24:3 Now as He sat on the Mount of Olives, the disciples came to Him privately, saying, "Tell us, when will these things be? And what will be the sign of Your coming, and of the end of the age?"
v. 4 And Jesus answered and said to them: "Take heed that no one deceives you.
v. 5 For many will come in My name, saying, "I am the Christ,' and will deceive many.
v. 6 And you will hear of wars and rumors of wars. See that you are not troubled; for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet.
v. 7 For nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. And there will be famines, pestilences, and earthquakes in various places.
v. 8 All these are the beginning of sorrows.
v. 9 "Then they will deliver you up to tribulation and kill you, and you will be hated by all nations for My name's sake.
v. 10 And then many will be offended, will betray one another, and will hate one another.
v. 11 Then many false prophets will rise up and deceive many.
v. 12 And because lawlessness will abound, the love of many will grow cold.
v. 13 But he who endures to the end shall be saved.
v. 14 And this gospel of the kingdom will be preached in all the world as a witness to all the nations, and then the end will come.
By means of the internet through the voice of Ray Smith "this gospel of the kingdom will be preached in all the world as a witness to all the nations" is being accomplished. Preach on Ray, preach on.
LOL Randy good one but no I am not going to run! I am exactly where God has put me and if I move it has to be Him moving me!
Kat you are so right and what I see in this links up with what Bobby observed. Jesus said "these things must come to pass" so yes the trials and tribulations, price increases, inflation, electricity cut offs, fuel hikes, unemployment, retrenchments, escalating crime, legalised murders of abortion, incurable diseases etc, have to come...they will pass..."All these are the beginning of sorrows."
I agree that THIS Gospel that Jesus Christ talks about which will be preached in all the world, is not the one in Babylon but certainly IS the ONE HERE in BT. That we have the Truth and the Gospel is what is so very precious midst all the lawlessness. I believe that endurance and patience by way of repentance in humility, is so necessary to the fulfilment in those whose love will not grow cold and who will overcome.
Not only do nations do this but do not individuals also look to their wealth for protection from their enemies? Is this not the correction as wealth dissolves under the expence of inflation, ill health, injustice or unemployment? Individuals and nations have turned away from God. They make alliances with the enemy to protect themselves and they do this with their wealth. Look at insurance companies who accumulate billions of Dollars off fear of people who pay heavy premiums for life insurance or physical or property protection. Anyone been back to New Orleans lately?
Experts in all fields load statistics and always seem to prefer being Politically correct instead of just plainly telling the truth.
I find this to be very true, even in the military.
The leaders, many times, are not at fault (though they must accept responsibility). They are often given misinformation from trusted staff and "experts", usually due to ignorance and/or pride (I always tell my people that ignorance is not a bad word, just a statement of fact). It really helps more when people just admit they do not know something, rather than passing bad info.
In my line of work, once something is briefed to the "big cheese", it is reality and we have to deal with it, no matter how wrong or ridiculous it is (unless of course safety is an issue).
That idiocy and stupidity doesn't just happen to the leaders. It trickles down even to the neighborhood.
The moral vacuum of our leaders is unbelievable!!! I cannot believe that of all the great people in this country, we have to pick from this latest batch??? good grief. Who cares if our president is a woman or ethnic but why not upright, honest, moral, SMART, common sense people!!! Ah well, God's in control so best not to worry about it!
I live about 70 miles from Detroit. The mayor has lied under oath, used public funds for "spring vacation-type" trysts w/ someone other than wife, etc etc. Embarrasing. But why are these type our leaders!!!
This is an interesting thread. And it is comforting to know this is all a means to an end.
The electricity problem can only be solved with nucleur power plants which are already operating 20% of the U.S. and all of France. We need more quickly. But we know it will fall apart anyway. The dollar is crashing. The gold it used to be based on is reputed to have been stolen by our own government. Ft. Knox is empty but don't tell the government I told you that please. They like to keep it a secret.
Whichever comes first, the lights going out or the dollar completely crashing, America will be chaos. There will be people jumping out of buildings. Have any of you seen the show "Jericho" where two small U.S. towns start a war with each other after the U.S. gets attacked by nucleur weapons. That will be a reality. Your neighbors today will be desperately attacking you tomorrow.
I'm in trading, so I occasionally get bent out of shape about the decisions of the Alan Greenspan's of the world who have set up this entire subprime mess, encouraged indebtedness instead of savings and allowed the banks to write their own laws. Don't get me started on the crooks at Goldman Sachs...but then I push away from the news, take a breath and go read the only "news" that matters.
Our faith in Christ and belief in every word of scripture is what will get us through. I truly feel blessed that I no longer have to worry about this stuff or worry for my kids. Praise God that I came to Ray's site all those years ago and found out I didn't have to worry about eternal torment for my kids either.
There is still enough flesh in me to worry a little about this stuff but not much.
Just remember that your money is well spent. We gotta get those terrorists in Iraq.
Do I detect a note of sarcasm, Musicman? or did you pull an Amadeus? (tooo many notes) Some of you mentioned a candidate you love, I betcha I'm for the same guy, but I won't mention his name, because I don't want to taint this forum w/politics!
But that's not where I hope lies anyway!
You betcher life! I'll change it from time to time with anther Groucho!
I liked those pics you posted. Where do you live exactly?
By the way, how is your daughter doing?
I think you hit the nail on the head. We have no leaders just greedy power hungry people. I look at the virtual idiots running for our highest office and wonder what the next years will bring for my children and grandchildren.
I think we will just continue to sit back and let our economic system crumble from greed, radical Islamic terrorism and corruption at all levels. Jerico will look like a tea party once our economic system crashes.
GOD has given HIS warning of the tough times ahead and we can only trust in HIM.
It is good to see someone on the inside who recognizes the problem. Thanks for you input.

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SCOTT GODDARD vs. RICHARD E. GOUCHER, trustee, & another.
Plymouth. December 1, 2015. – February 2, 2016.
Present: Kafker, C.J., Milkey, & Sullivan, JJ.
Real Property, Purchase and sale agreement. Contract, Sale of real estate, What constitutes. Practice, Civil, Stipulation, Findings by judge. Evidence, Credibility of witness, Best and secondary. Witness, Credibility.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 25, 2011.
Isaac H. Peres (Richard W. Bland, II, with him) for the plaintiff.
John D. Finnegan for town of Dover.
KAFKER, C.J. The plaintiff, Scott Goddard, appeals from a judgment entered against him following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court on his complaint seeking enforcement of a 2007 purchase and sale agreement. The two issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial judge erred in concluding that Goddard and the defendant Richard Goucher failed to enter into a valid and enforceable purchase and sale agreement despite a pretrial stipulation regarding the contractual negotiations and their legal consequences, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in declining to admit secondary evidence of the purchase and sale agreement, in violation of the best evidence rule. We conclude that the judge correctly distinguished the factual elements from the legal elements in the stipulation. We further discern no error in his additional findings of fact and legal analysis regarding the validity of the purchase and sale agreement or in his weighing of the secondary evidence pursuant to the best evidence rule. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Background. The trial judge made extensive findings of fact, which we summarize below. Richard Goucher’s mother, Barbara B. Goucher, owned property located on Wilsondale Street (property) in Dover (town). In 2004, Barbara conveyed the property to herself as trustee of the Salt Marsh Farm Trust and executed a durable power of attorney naming Richard as her agent and attorney-in-fact. Barbara and Richard attempted to sell the property, and in January, 2007, an interested party made an offer. Because of various wetlands on the property, Richard assembled a team, including Goddard, an environmental engineer, and Attorney Vincent O’Brien, to develop a proposal for potential permitting. After the interested party withdrew his offer, Richard offered Goddard the property for one dollar plus the payment of back real estate taxes.
Goddard was interested in Richard’s offer and in May, 2007, asked O’Brien to draft a purchase and sale agreement for the property (the agreement). Paragraph 7 of the agreement contained a provision setting forth the purchase price of one dollar. Paragraph 8 provided for delivery of the deed at 10:00 A.M. on an unspecified date in June, 2007, and contained a declaration that “time is of the essence of this agreement.” The agreement provided that the closing date could be extended for a period of not more than thirty days. Goddard signed the agreement and, through O’Brien, sent the draft to Richard. June and July passed without a closing. During that time, Richard sent the agreement to Attorney Lawrence Hale for his review. Hale, an experienced real estate attorney, made a number of handwritten amendments to the draft agreement, including adding language in multiple provisions making clear that Goddard, as the buyer, agreed to assume “any [and] all encumbrances of record or otherwise” as well as “[a]ny and all past, present, and future taxes” without adjustment. Richard, as attorney-in-fact for Barbara, signed the amended agreement and it was sent back to Goddard. O’Brien conducted a title search on the property on Goddard’s behalf.
In the meantime, the real estate taxes on the property went unpaid, and on January 29, 2008, the town, through its tax collector, sent notice to Barbara, as trustee of Salt Marsh Farm Trust, that $ 8,107.96 was due and owing. On March 11, 2008, the town recorded a tax taking of the property in the Norfolk County registry of deeds. The town subsequently filed an action in the Land Court, and on February 4, 2009, judgment entered foreclosing and barring all rights of redemption as to the property.
On January 29, 2010, Goddard filed with the Land Court a petition to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, asserting that he had standing as buyer under the agreement. On June 4, 2010, the Land Court denied the petition, finding that Goddard held no interest in the property and therefore did not have standing to petition the Land Court under G. L. c. 60, § 69A. Goddard appealed, and this court vacated the order and remanded the case to the Land Court to determine the validity of and rights conferred by the agreement. See Dover v. Goddard, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2011). On November 15, 2011, the Land Court granted Goddard’s petition to stay proceedings pending the outcome of the action Goddard had filed in Superior Court.
Goddard’s Superior Court complaint named Richard and Barbara as defendants and alleged breach of contract against them (Count I), sought a declaration that the agreement was a valid and enforceable contract (Count II), and requested specific performance of the agreement through an order that Barbara and Richard obtain valid title from the town and convey the property to Goddard (Count III). The town filed a motion to intervene in order to protect its interests as the owner of the property. The motion was allowed, and the town filed an answer containing cross claims and counterclaims. Goddard, Richard, and the town entered into a pretrial stipulation that stated: ”The purchase and sale Agreement . . . dated May 2007, signed by Scott Goddard and Richard Goucher as attorney-in-fact for Barbara B. Goucher, trustee of the Salt Marsh Farm Trust was a valid and enforceable contract at the time it was entered into by the parties.” The trial judge concluded otherwise, expressly determining that the “revised purchase and sale agreement . . . never progressed from imperfect negotiations into an enforceable contract.” He also found no waiver of the “time is of the essence” provision. Judgment entered against Goddard on his complaint, and he filed a timely appeal.
Standard of review. It is well established that on appeal, we are bound by the trial judge’s findings of fact, including all reasonable inferences, that are supported by the evidence. Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 420 (2005). T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Natl. Bank, 456 Mass 562, 569 (2010). Such findings will only be set aside if clearly erroneous. Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). ”The judge’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.” Anastos v. Sable, 443 Mass. 146, 149 (2004).
Discussion. 1. The purchase and sale agreement. Goddard argues that the trial judge’s finding that “the parties failed to establish a valid and enforceable agreement to convey the . . . property” was clearly erroneous because it directly contradicted the parties’ pretrial stipulation to the contrary. He contends that the trial judge “simply ignored” the stipulation. We disagree.
The stipulation at issue is one of both fact and law. The judge properly distinguished the factual components from the legal components of the stipulation and addressed each accordingly. He acknowledged and adopted undisputed stipulated facts. He also addressed and resolved factual disputes and gaps glossed over by the stipulation. Finally, he disregarded the legal aspects of the stipulation, particularly the incorrect and self-serving legal analysis proposed by the parties.
There is, of course, a significant difference between factual and legal stipulations. ”Nothing is more common in practice or more useful in dispatching the business of the courts than for counsel to admit undisputed facts.” Brocklesby v. Newton, 294 Mass. 41, 43 (1936). Generally, such stipulations are binding on the parties, see Kalika v. Munro, 323 Mass. 542, 543 (1948), and respected by the courts, unless a court determines that to do so would be “improvident or not conducive to justice.” Loring v. Mercier, 318 Mass. 599, 601 (1945). See Huard v. Forest St. Hous., Inc., 366 Mass. 203, 208-209 (1974) (stipulation that omitted “seemingly significant information” set aside and matter remanded to trial court); Stuart v. Brookline, 412 Mass. 251, 254-255 (1992) (statement of agreed facts was binding where party failed to show that facts were “omitted, misstated or inadvertently included”). See generally Mass. G. Evid. § 611(g)(1) (2015).
In contrast, stipulations regarding “the legal effect of admitted facts” require a different consideration “since the court cannot be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law.” Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917). ”Parties may not stipulate to the legal conclusions to be reached by the court.” Texas Instruments Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir. 1995), quoting from Saviano v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 765 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1985). ”Issues of law are the province of courts, not of parties to a lawsuit, individuals whose legal conclusions may be tainted by self-interest.” Ibid. We therefore do not hold ourselves “bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to questions of law.” Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939).
With these distinctions in mind, we turn to the particular stipulation at issue and the judge’s findings of fact and legal analysis related thereto. As previously noted, the stipulation provided: ”The purchase and sale Agreement dated May, 2007, signed by Scott Goddard and Richard Goucher as attorney-in-fact for Barbara Goucher was a valid and enforceable contract at the time it was entered into by the parties.” As formulated, the stipulation contains undisputed facts, substantial gaps requiring further factual findings, and legal conclusions. The trial judge dealt with each appropriately. The undisputed stipulated facts are that both parties signed the agreement, as Goddard undisputedly signed the original version prepared by O’Brien and Goucher signed the version containing the handwritten amendments made by Hale, which made significant changes to the agreement. The trial judge correctly understood that the stipulation did not state that the parties both signed the same version of the agreement. The judge recognized that these facts remained unaddressed and unresolved in the stipulation and were necessary to determine whether the parties had entered into a valid and enforceable contract.
The trial judge properly concluded that he was not bound by the remainder of the stipulation providing that the agreement “was a valid and enforceable contract at that time it was entered into by the parties.” This was a stipulation of law seeking to bind the court regarding the legal effect of the admitted facts. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. at 289. The judge was not, nor are we, bound to accept as controlling stipulations on questions of law, particularly where they are based on incomplete and misleading facts and an incorrect application of legal principles. See ibid. Those stipulations were also self-serving. See Texas Instruments Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d at 928. This becomes particularly clear when the second pretrial stipulation regarding damages is considered. The additional stipulation indemnified Richard and any of his beneficiaries, successors, assigns, or heirs from any monetary damages in the event that the court found Richard breached the terms of the agreement.
Having properly rejected the legal stipulation, the judge undertook his own fact finding and analysis of the agreement. We discern no error in either. “It is axiomatic that to create an enforceable contract, there must be agreement between the parties on the material terms of that contract, and the parties must have a present intention to be bound by that agreement.” Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 Mass. 875, 878 (2000). In the instant case, there were numerous additional questions to be resolved by the trial judge to determine if an agreement had been reached, including whether Goddard agreed to the amendments sent back by Goucher, and whether Goddard communicated any such assent to Goucher. The judge found that he did not.
Rather, on the basis of witness credibility determinations, the judge found that the handwritten amendments Hale made to the agreement “caused Goddard, after consultation with O’Brien, to forego signing the amended Purchase and Sale Agreement.” The judge expressly rejected testimony to the effect that a clean version of the agreement incorporating Hale’s amendments, along with a check for the one dollar consideration, and a deed and trust were sent, and he concluded that the transaction was never completed.
It is not for us to decide who we might find more credible but rather who the trial judge, with the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, found to be more credible. See Goddard v. Dupree, 322 Mass. 247, 248 (1948) (“The value of the testimony of the witnesses depended in great measure upon their appearance and their manner of testifying on the stand”). In finding that Goddard refused to accept the amended agreement, the judge concluded that the proposed agreement “never progressed from imperfect negotiations into an enforceable contract.” See Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass. 210, 217 (1935). Because the judge’s findings are supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, and the rational inferences drawn therefrom, we discern no error in his finding that there was no valid and enforceable agreement for the property. See Goddard v. Dupree, supra; Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. Richman, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 519 (1985); Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
2. Best evidence rule. At the start of trial, the judge heard arguments on the town’s motion in limine to exclude, based on the best evidence rule, the following documents: (1) an unsigned computer print-out of a letter dated September 4, 2007, on plain paper, allegedly sent by O’Brien, to Hale, referencing two copies of an amended agreement “with the incorporated suggestions from your redraft and our telephone conversation,” a proposed deed, a copy of a proposed realty trust, and a check made payable to Barbara, and (2) a check notation indicating a one dollar check dated September 5, 2007, referencing O’Brien and Barbara, as trustee. The judge admitted this evidence de bene during trial and reserved his ruling for his decision.
Goddard argues that the trial judge erroneously excluded the unsigned letter from O’Brien to Hale based on the best evidence rule. The best evidence rule requires, “as a threshold matter,” that the proponent “offer evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that the original [writing] once existed.” Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6 (2001). “If the evidence warrants such a finding, the judge must assume its existence, and then determine if the ‘original had become unavailable, otherwise than through the serious fault of the proponent . . . and that reasonable search had been made for it.’” Id. at 7, quoting from Fauci v. Mulready, 337 Mass. 532, 540 (1958). See Mass. G. Evid. § 1004. If the judge finds in favor of the proponent on the sufficiency and fault questions, then the judge must allow the secondary evidence to be admitted to establish the contents of the writing at issue. Fauci, supra at 540. It is then up to the fact finder to determine what, if any, weight to give to the secondary evidence. See Buker v. Melanson, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 331 (1979). In the instant jury-waived case, the judge was therefore responsible for determining both the admissibility of the unsigned letter and check evidence and the weight to give them in his findings of fact.
As an initial matter, we presume that the judge correctly instructed himself on the admissibility of evidence. See Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 284 Mass. 563, 568 (1933). Although the judge did not expressly so state, he appears to have found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the original letter, revised agreement, and check existed at some point in time and that they were unavailable through no fault of Goddard. See Commonwealth v. Ocasio, supra. He then “reject[ed] [Goddard’s] evidence that the letter, redrafted purchase and sale agreement, and check were mailed to Attorney Hale.” This determination was based on the judge’s credibility findings, particularly his findings that Hale was credible on the question and O’Brien was not. See Mass. G. Evid. § 104. The judge wrote: ”Though, the court possesses authority to determine that a mailing occurred on the basis of habit evidence, this court declines in the instant case to find persuasive proof that a habit was followed.” In his weighing of the evidence, he also noted gaps and discrepancies between this evidence and other evidence presented at trial. Finally, as previously explained, it was well within the province of the judge’s role as fact finder in this jury-waived trial to determine the ultimate credibility to assign to the secondary evidence presented. See Buker v. Melanson, supra. It was for the judge to weigh the evidence and assess credibility.
 Of Salt Marsh Farm Trust. Richard Goucher did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal.
 Because Richard Goucher and his mother, Barbara Goucher, share a surname, we will refer to them hereafter by their first names to avoid confusion.
 By the time of the offer, Barbara was incapacitated and Richard was acting on her behalf. Barbara died in 2010. After the complaint and answer were filed in this case, Richard filed a suggestion of death as to Barbara, and his motion to be substituted as the defendant trustee of Salt Marsh Farm Trust was allowed.
 The judge did not make a finding regarding the date on which the agreement was signed by Richard and sent back to Goddard. Goddard testified that the agreement was received in early August, 2007.
 Goddard’s complaint also alleged inducement to enter into a contract by false pretenses (Count IV) and unfair and deceptive practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A (Count V), but these counts were voluntarily dismissed prior to trial.
 The Superior Court judgment dismissed the town’s counterclaims and cross claims, and the town has not appealed.
 See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939) (court not bound by legal stipulation that corporate reorganization plan was “fair and equitable”); Estate of Sanford, supra at 50-51 (court not bound by stipulated definition of administrative practice involving conclusions of law); Texas Instruments Fed. Credit Union, supra (stipulation that Federal credit unions were government units was an issue of law to which the court was not bound); Warner v. Mayor of Taunton, 253 Mass. 116, 118 (1925) (court not bound by parties’ stipulation regarding jurisdiction over case); Clifford v. School Comm. of Lynn, 275 Mass. 258, 259 (1931) (court not bound by parties’ stipulation that writ of mandamus should issue). See also Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 13-32 (2014) (discussing stipulations and how courts generally retain discretion to disregard or override party choice).
 Even Goddard testified that the clean version incorporating Hale’s amendments that O’Brien allegedly sent to Hale was unsigned.
 We also note that the phrase “at the time it was entered into” is left unclear. It could mean May, 2007, when the original agreement was drafted, or August, 2007, when Hale purportedly mailed Goddard the amended agreement, or yet another date.
 It would have been preferable for the judge to have expressly notified the parties at trial that he was considering disregarding the stipulation. Compare White v. Peabody Constr. Co., 386 Mass. 121, 127 (1982) (notice of judge’s decision to convert party’s 12[b] motion into rule 56 motion for summary judgment prevents party surprise). However, the gaps, contradictions, and questionable legal conclusions reflected therein should have put the parties on notice that the stipulation would not be dispositive. Moreover, Goddard has not articulated how the proof he offered at trial would have been any different. In our view, the judge was well within his authority to reject this highly problematic stipulation of law.
 We also note that the version with Hale’s handwritten amendments does not appear to have been sent back until after the May agreement had expired by its own terms. The judge expressly found that the sale did not close in June or July, and the “time is of the essence” clause was not waived by either of the parties. The alleged preparation of the clean version and any subsequent negotiations therefore occurred even further after the sixty-day deadline provided in the May, 2007, agreement. Nonetheless, because we discern no error in the trial judge’s findings and ultimate conclusion that negotiations never progressed into a valid and enforceable agreement, we need not rely on the alternative theory of expiration and discharge.
 Hale testified that, upon careful review of his records, he could not find, nor did he remember receiving, a signed, amended agreement or any closing documents. Hale also denied having any conversations with O’Brien about a pending closing for sale of the property. In addition to Hale’s testimony, there was extensive testimony from Richard indicating that he did not receive any communication from Hale regarding a closing or any correspondence from Goddard related to the deed.


text:
Hold the presses! The Good News is being declared! What is the Good News? It’s Jesus Christ! The Lord has come to save us from Sin and no longer must anyone be condemned to the pits of Hell. Jesus came to take the punishment for our sins because God so loves us that He didn’t even spare is one and only begotten Son, Jesus Christ!
“For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son,[a] that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.
I. The Good News Is Cosmic in Scope.
A. Consider the use of “everyone” ( v. 15) and “whoever” ( v. 16).
B. Consider that “world” appears four times in verses 16-17.
1. A religious leader ( chapter 3).
2. A morally-wounded woman ( chapter 4).
3. A Roman official ( chapter 4).
4. A lame man ( chapter 5).
5. A host of hungry people ( chapter 6).
6. An array of enemies ( chapters 7, 8, and 10).
7. A blind man ( chapter 9).
8. A family in grieving ( chapter 11).
II. The Good News Is Warm in Appeal.
A. The warmth is seen in God’s love ( v. 16) and God’s heart ( v. 17). He doesn’t want to condemn the world.
B. But the warmth is not sticky and mere sentiment. The verses that surround the golden text of Scripture deal with the wrath of God ( v. 18-20). Maybe this is the only way to appreciate the love of God—i.e. see it against the backdrop of His justice.
III. The Good News Is Available Through Belief.
A. Belief is a key term in John’s Gospel (cf. 20:30-31). It is used numerous times and always—with one exception—as a verb. From John’s perspective, belief is something one does.
B. Belief is simple and profound at the same time. It astounds the scholar, but the little children can understand.
C. Belief, in the final understanding, is the commitment of one’s life to Christ in unconditional loyalty.
IV. The Good News Is Eternal in life.
A. Life is also a key term in John’s Gospel (cf. 20:30-31).
1. In terms of quality ( 10:10b). This is life lived at the highest level.
2. In terms of duration ( 5:24). God’s glorious future has invaded our present through the Christ-event.
C. Life is not the accumulation of stuff nor the storing up of things. That which was forfeited in the garden is regained through Christ.
No doubt this all sounded astounding to Nicodemus (cf. v. 4, 10).
But he would later appreciate its truthfulness ( 19:39).
Perhaps that’s how it sounds to post-modern man. The only objection might be that it is too good to be true.

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text:
Trademark rights holders are keeping close watch on the ongoing litigation between world-famous jeweler Tiffany[i] and the online auction site eBay, Inc. (“eBay”). This litigation arose as a result of the large volume of sales of counterfeit Tiffany goods on eBay’s website. The market for counterfeit merchandise has seen rapid growth over recent years, due in part to the increased availability of inexpensive goods from foreign manufacturers as well as the ease with which such goods can be sold and distributed over the Internet through sites such as eBay, which is the market leader in online auctions. Just as copyright-based industries such as music and film are struggling to adapt and protect their business while the marketplace continues to be shaped by technology, so too are holders of valuable trademarks seeking ways to staunch the swelling tide of counterfeit goods being sold online. Tiffany is one business which has struggled over recent years with the sale of counterfeit goods, especially the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods through online marketplaces.
In 2003 and 2004, after working with eBay for many months to try to reduce the volume of counterfeit Tiffany goods being sold on eBay’s website, Tiffany grew frustrated with eBay’s refusal to comply with all of Tiffany’s demands and brought a suit for trademark infringement against eBay in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Tiffany raised several state and federal claims against eBay, including counts for direct and contributory trademark infringement, unfair competition, false advertising, and direct and contributory trademark dilution relating to the sale of counterfeit goods bearing Tiffany’s marks through the eBay website.
The District Court’s decision in Tiffany (NJ), Inc., et al v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) is significant because of its treatment of the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement. The Court declined to hold website operators such as eBay liable under the contributory infringement doctrine where the operators do not have actual, specific knowledge of infringement. In doing so, the Court gave electronic commerce sites a significant defense against liability for sales of counterfeit goods by third parties through those sites. The decision also leaves trademark holders with an apparent increased obligation to police the use of their marks and play by the rules of each website operator, creating a potentially burdensome and unsatisfactory situation.
(3) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of defendant with plaintiff, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the defendant’s goods, services, or commercial activities by the plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. 1114(1); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2nd Cir. 2005). Thus, a court’s focus in a direct trademark infringement action should be whether the plaintiff has a valid, protectable mark, and whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods.
If a manufacturer of distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially [sic] responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.
Id. at 502. The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement became the issue of primary significance in the Tiffany decision.
Tiffany is the exclusive licensee and user[ii] of the TIFFANY, TIFFANY & CO., and T & CO. trademarks, including several trademarks registered with the United States Patent & Trademark Office for use on jewelry, watches, and decorative arts objects. Tiffany at 472. Tiffany makes significant efforts, and spends considerable money, to control the sale and distribution of genuine Tiffany-branded goods, and sells its new jewelry only through its retail stores. Id. at 472-73, 484. Tiffany does not sell, or authorize the sale of, Tiffany merchandise on eBay or any other online marketplaces. Id. at 473. In addition, Tiffany has a general policy of refusing to sell more than five of the same new items to a single purchaser without the approval of a retail store manager. Id.
eBay is a global online marketplace most commonly used by businesses or individuals to sell goods through eBay’s online auction system. Id. at 474. eBay does not itself sell any items, and items sold on eBay are never in eBay’s physical possession. Id. at 475. eBay merely provides a marketplace for sales, and support and services for sales transactions, which are then consummated directly between eBay members. Id.
eBay has implemented a variety of anti-fraud measures as it confronts the problem of the sale of counterfeit goods through its website. Id. at 476. These anti-fraud measures include the creation of a “Trust and Safety Department” with a workforce of approximately 4,000 individuals, the development of “fraud engine” technology to automatically search for counterfeit goods, and the implementation of the Verified Rights Owner Program (“VeRO”). VeRO is a program developed by eBay in which eBay works directly with rights holders to address concerns relating to potentially infringing items posted for sale on eBay’s website. Id. at 476-79. VeRO consists of a procedure by which rights holders such as Tiffany can submit a Notice of Claimed Infringement (“NOCI”) to eBay if they see a potentially infringing item for sale on eBay’s website. Id. at 478. Upon receipt of a NOCI, eBay will then promptly remove the report listing from the website and refunded all fees associated with the listing. Id.
Tiffany discovered that a significant volume of counterfeit goods bearing Tiffany marks were sold through eBay’s website. Id. at 481, 485-86. Prior to 2003, Tiffany attempted to stop the counterfeiters through direct action. Id. at 481. Tiffany brought individual lawsuits against counterfeiters, pursued customs actions, worked with law enforcement agencies, and contacted individual eBay sellers to demand that they cease and desist from selling counterfeit Tiffany items. Id. Apparently, these efforts did not eliminate the existence of counterfeit Tiffany goods on eBay, though their actual impact is unclear. In any event, beginning in 2003, Tiffany decided that it would try to address the problem directly with eBay. Id.
In May 2003, Tiffany wrote to eBay to complain about the problem of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry being sold through eBay’s website. Id. Tiffany made several demands on eBay in its May 2003 letter, including that eBay remove all counterfeit listings and take measures to eliminate the sale through eBay of counterfeit merchandise. Id. eBay responded by encouraging Tiffany to take advantage of VeRO, and indicating that eBay did monitor for counterfeit listings and would work together with Tiffany to help protect the Tiffany marks. Id. at 482. However, eBay rejected Tiffany’s demands to prospectively ban listings without any further action from Tiffany. Id.
Between 2003 and 2004, Tiffany used VeRo to give eBay notice of listings by submitted NOCIs for what Tiffany believed to be counterfeit Tiffany merchandise. Id. Tiffany also conducted a “buying program,” whereby Tiffany purchased and inspected items listed on eBay as Tiffany merchandise, in an attempt to document the number of listings which it believed to be counterfeit. Id.
In June 2004, Tiffany sent another letter to eBay stating that it had used VeRO to no avail and that its buying program had indicated that 73% of sterling silver Tiffany merchandise being sold through eBay’s website was counterfeit. Id. Tiffany’s June 2004 letter also demanded that eBay (i) ban any eBay seller from listing five (5) or more Tiffany jewelry items at any given time, (ii) ban the sale of silver Tiffany jewelry, (iii) ban the sale of any Tiffany item that is advertised as being counterfeit or being “inspired by Tiffany,” (iv) not advertise the sale of Tiffany merchandise, and (v) remove sponsored links to Tiffany on any search engine. Id. eBay declined to comply with any of Tiffany’s requests, and litigation ensued soon after.
The principal issues before the Court related to whether eBay could be held liable for direct and/or contributory trademark infringement.
With respect to direct infringement, Tiffany’s arguments are three-pronged. First, Tiffany argued that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s marks in advertising and other promotional materials, use which resulted in revenue for eBay from the subsequent sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods through eBay’s website, constituted direct infringement. Second, Tiffany argued that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s marks in purchasing sponsored links through sites like Google and Yahoo! also constituted direct infringement. Third, Tiffany argued that, under principles of joint and several liability, eBay was liable for direct infringement of Tiffany’s marks as the result of its participation in the sales of counterfeit goods through its website. Id. at 494-495.
With respect to contributory infringement, Tiffany argued that eBay was liable for contributory trademark infringement because eBay “continue[d] to provide its platform despite its knowledge, or reason to know, that counterfeit merchandise is being sold [through that platform]” id. at 502, even though eBay did not itself assist or otherwise actively participate in the infringing activity.
In his opinion, Judge Richard J. Sullivan considered each of Tiffany’s factual allegations to determine whether Tiffany had established that “(1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that (2) [eBay] use[d] the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) ‘in connection with the sale … or advertising of goods or services,’ (5) without the plaintiff’s consent,” and also whether Tiffany had shown that eBay’s use of its marks was “likely to cause confusion … as to the affililation, connection, or association of [eBay] with [Tiffany], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [eBay’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by [Tiffany.]” Id. at 495 (citing 1-800-Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 406-407). In short, Tiffany had to establish that it had valid, protectible marks, and that eBay’s use of those marks was likely to cause confusion as to the origin of goods.
There was no dispute as to whether Tiffany’s marks were valid and protectible, and eBay stipulated to Tiffany’s registration of its marks. The bulk of the Court’s analysis therefore turned on the second prong of the test, whether eBay’s use of Tiffany’s marks constituted direct infringement, and its consideration of eBay’s defense of nominative fair use.
eBay’s defense to Tiffany’s claim of direct infringement relied on the doctrine of nominative fair use. Id. Nominative fair use is a principle which permits the use of trademarks in a descriptive manner. Trademark law “‘generally does not prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by its brand name, so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the owner of the product.'” Id. at 496 (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Intl’ Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006)). Nominative fair use permits use of a trademark “where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service.” Id. (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)). Under principles of nominative fair use, trademark owners cannot “use trademark law to prevent the resale of authentic, trademarked goods.” Id. (citing Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimranm 975 F.2d 58 (2d. Cir. 1992)).
With respect to eBay’s use of the Tiffany marks on the eBay homepage and in marketing materials, the Court found that goods bearing the Tiffany brand were not readily identifiable without use of the Tiffany marks, particularly since “the Tiffany name is what gives the jewelry the cachet it enjoys.” Id. at 497. If it could not use the Tiffany marks, “eBay would be forced into absurd circumlocutions.” Id. Further, the Court found that eBay only used as much of the Tiffany marks as necessary to identify the goods sold. Id. And lastly, the Court found that eBay did not do anything which would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the actual trademark holder, Tiffany, and therefore its use did not create a likelihood of confusion as to Tiffany’s affiliation with eBay, stating that “the mere use of a trademarked term to describe something is not enough to suggest sponsorship or endorsement.” Id. The Court concluded that eBay’s use of the Tiffany marks was protected under the doctrine of nominative fair use.
The Court also relied on the doctrine of nominative fair use in considering Tiffany’s argument that eBay’s purchase of sponsored links using the Tiffany marks constituted direct infringement. eBay’s purchase of sponsored links “communicated the availability of Tiffany goods on eBay to the public,” essentially a practice of causing advertisements to be triggered by Internet searches for terms such as “Tiffany.” Those advertisements then communicated to the searching party that Tiffany goods were sold through the eBay website. Id. at 500-501. Finding that eBay’s use of the Tiffany marks in sponsored links was “effectively identical to its use of the Tiffany name on the eBay website,” the Court held that such use was protected under the doctrine of nominative fair use. Id. at 501. The Court rejected Tiffany’s claim that eBay was liable for direct trademark infringement under the theory of joint and several liability as being “misplaced,” and “more properly addressed under the theory of contributory infringement.” Id.
As noted above, liability for trademark infringement may arise in certain circumstances even when a defendant is not the direct infringer of a plaintiff’s trademark. In this case, Tiffany argued that eBay was liable for contributory trademark infringement because eBay “continue[d] to provide its platform despite its knowledge, or reason to know, that counterfeit merchandise is being sold [through that platform]” id. at 502, even though eBay did not itself assist or otherwise actively participate in the infringing activity.
Id. at 502. In applying the Inwood standard to eBay’s conduct, the Court made two critical holdings with respect to the knowledge required before contributory infringement will lie. First, the Court concluded that the Inwood test should be applied in determining whether there is a basis for liability for contributory infringement, and that application of the more expansive “reasonable anticipation” standard was not supported by precedent or policy. Second, the Court found that generalized knowledge is not sufficient to satisfy Inwood’s “knows or has reason to know” test and that, instead, specific knowledge of infringing activity is required.
As an alternative to the Inwood test, Tiffany had urged the Court to apply the “reasonable anticipation” standard as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. Tiffany at 502. Under the Restatement, a party may be liable for contributory trademark infringement where “the actor fails to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the third person’s infringing conduct in circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 27 (1995) (emphasis added). Tiffany argued that the Court’s inquiry should consider whether the offer for sale of counterfeit Tiffany merchandise could be reasonably anticipated by eBay. Id. Tiffany’s position was rejected by the Court, based largely on the plain language of Inwood itself. Id. at 503. Pointing to a footnote in the Inwood opinion, the Court concluded that the Supreme Court in Inwood had “explicitly rejected” the “reasonable anticipation” standard and had described it as a “watered down and incorrect” standard. Id. (citing Inwood at 854). The Court went on to buttress its conclusion that the Inwood test applied by citing to a number of district court cases which had also rejected the “reasonable anticipation” standard. Id.
The most significant piece of the District Court’s decision in Tiffany concerned its conclusion as to how much or what type of knowledge a defendant must have to satisfy the “know or have reason to know” standard set forth in Inwood. The Court found that generalized knowledge of infringement, which eBay clearly had, was not sufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the infringement, a breach of which duty would give rise to liability for contributory infringement. Id. at 508. Instead, specific knowledge of actual infringing activities was required. Id. at 510.
The Court found that “neither precedent nor policy” supported Tiffany’s position that generalized allegations of infringement provided eBay with knowledge or a reason to know of the infringement which would be sufficient to give rise to liability. The Court found initial support in the language of the Inwood decision, which stated that a defendant may be liable for contributory infringement if it “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Id. at 508 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court’s focus on individual infringers through its singular language is consistent with a requirement of specific, rather than general, knowledge.” Id.
The Court also concluded that prior court decisions demonstrated that generalized knowledge of infringement was not sufficient to find liability for contributory infringement. Id. at 509. Instead, plaintiffs face a high burden of establishing actual knowledge of infringing activity when alleging liability for contributory infringement. Id. at 508-09.
After considering many prior cases, the Court found that, rather than mere generalized knowledge, courts have required a much higher showing that defendant knew or had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement. Id. at 510. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the Court reasoned that, “were Tiffany to prevail on its argument that generalized statements of infringement were sufficient to impute knowledge to eBay of any and all infringing acts, Tiffany’s rights in its mark would dramatically expand, potentially stifling legitimate sales of Tiffany goods on eBay.” Id.
Based on the Inwood standard, the Court analyzed Tiffany’s arguments and evidence that eBay knew or had reason to know that infringing activity was taking place through its website. First, Tiffany argued that its demand letters provided detailed notice to eBay that there were no authorized third-party vendors for Tiffany merchandise and that anyone selling lots of more than five items was almost certainly offering counterfeit merchandise. Tiffany at 511. Second, Tiffany argued that the results of the buying program which it had conducted provided eBay with knowledge of any and all instances of counterfeiting on eBay. Finally, Tiffany contended that the large number of NOCIs that Tiffany submitted to eBay between 2003 and 2006, along with complaints from other rights holders, should have put eBay on notice of actual, ongoing counterfeiting which was occurring on its website. Id. at 513.
The Court was not persuaded by any of Tiffany’s arguments. The Court found that Tiffany failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that a seller offering five or more items of Tiffany jewelry was presumptively dealing in counterfeit merchandise. Id. This conclusion was based on the fact that the five-item limit was not regularly enforced by Tiffany itself; that lots of more than five identical Tiffany items were available through Tiffany’s corporate and international sales accounts; and, most importantly, that lots of five or more pieces of authentic new Tiffany items had been made available on eBay. Id. Therefore, the Court declined to impute knowledge or a reason to know of counterfeiting based on Tiffany’s demand letters and the proposed five-or-more rule. Id. at 512.
As to Tiffany’s buying program, the Court found that it suffered from serious methodological problems and that, at most, the results of the program gave eBay generalized notice that some level of infringement was occurring on its website. Id. at 512-13. Finally, the Court found that eBay had responded reasonably to all notices of specific infringing activities resulting from NOCIs, and that any generalized knowledge that the NOCIs provided was insufficient to impute the requisite specific level of knowledge to eBay to hold it liable. Id. at 513.
The Court’s analysis regarding the final two aspects of Inwood’s contributory infringement test–whether eBay was willfully blind to infringement and whether it “continued to supply” services to infringers–followed similar reasoning. As to willful blindness, the Court stated that eBay was not willfully blind to counterfeiting occurring on its website because “without specific knowledge or reason to know, eBay is under no affirmative duty to ferret out potential infringement.” Id. at 515. The Court warned that such an expansion of the “reason to know” standard was explicitly precluded by prior case law. Id. (citing Hard Rock Caf at 1149).
Finally, the Court concluded that even for those infringing listings of which eBay was notified through submission of NOCIs, eBay did not “continue to supply” its services because eBay acted reasonably and promptly to remove such listings upon receiving each NOCI. Tiffany at 516-17. The Court found that eBay’s administration of the VeRO program represented reasonable conduct by eBay to address specific acts of infringement of which it became aware. Id.
Based on this analysis, the Court found that eBay was not liable to Tiffany for contributory trademark infringement.
Tiffany brought four other claims against eBay in this action in addition to its claims for direct and contributory trademark infringement: unfair competition, false advertising, dilution, and contributory dilution. Id. at 519-26. These claims were considered and dismissed by the Court in a fairly summary fashion. Id.
The Court found that Tiffany’s federal and common law unfair competition claims were subject to the same analytical framework as its federal infringement claims, and that therefore both failed because Tiffany had failed to prove its federal infringement claims. Id. at 519.
Next, as to Tiffany’s false advertising claims, the Court found that eBay’s practice of advertising listings featuring Tiffany items were not literally false since authentic Tiffany merchandise is sold on eBay. Id. at 520. The second possible basis for Tiffany’s false advertising claim–that eBay’s advertising, though not literally false, was likely to mislead or confuse–was subjected to a similar analysis as were Tiffany’s direct and contributory infringement claims. The Court found that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s marks in advertising constituted nominative fair use; that eBay’s generalized knowledge of counterfeit sales did not support the claim that eBay was misleading consumers; and that any falsity was the responsibility of third party sellers, not eBay. Id. at 521. The Court also reiterated that eBay’s diligence in removing listings for counterfeit goods showed that eBay was not misleading consumers. Id.
Finally, with respect to Tiffany’s claims for trademark dilution, the Court concluded that Tiffany’s direct dilution claimed failed both on its merits and due to eBay’s nominative fair use defense, and that its contributory trademark dilution claim failed for the same reasons as its contributory infringement claim. Id. 525-26.
Although currently pending in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the District Court’s decision in Tiffany v. eBay, if upheld, could have a significant impact on businesses who rely on branding and brand awareness to sell their goods, and who already devote a large portion of their operating expenses to trademark protection and enforcement. Based on Tiffany, these companies may be compelled to step their own policing and enforcement efforts, at added expense, in order to protect against rampant counterfeit goods being sold online under their brands. On the other hand, the decision is good news for online merchants, who can now feel more insulated from liability for the sale of counterfeit goods on their websites, as long as they take reasonable steps to prevent such counterfeiting and take prompt steps remove infringing items upon notification from rights owners.
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In all the years this writer served on the Rules of Civil Procedure Committee of the Florida Bar, the one rule that never seemed to make sense was Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) which provided for dismissal of a suit based on lack of prosecution. All of the many cases interpreting that rule involved actions where the prosecuting party clearly wanted the case to go forward. Were that not the case, an appeal would not have followed the order of dismissal. Dismissing a case a party wants to pursue after the statute of limitations has passed simply created new causes of action for legal malpractice and did nothing to clear dockets.
Prior to January 1, 2006, rule 1.420(e) provided that if there was no record activity during the preceding 12 months the suit would be dismissed absent a stay order in place or a finding of good cause. Numerous cases interpreted what the term “record activity” meant and a whole line of cases tried to separate active and passive record activity under the theory that only actions designed to move the case forward would constitute sufficient record activity within the meaning of the rule.
That issue came to rest in Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So. 2d 363, 368 (Fla. 2005) when the Supreme Court created a bright-line test for record activity concluding that any document filed in the record was sufficient. After January 1, 2006, the amendment to rule 1.420(e) shortened the period for lack of record activity to ten months but created a sixty day grace period during which the prosecuting party could avoid dismissal. The Second and Third Districts in Pagan v. Facilicorp, Inc., 989 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Edwards v. City of St. Petersburg, 961 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) and Padron v. Alonso, 970 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2007) concluded that the Supreme Court’s edict in Wilson, supra, applied to the type of record activity necessary to avoid dismissal within the sixty day grace period. The First District in Chemrock Corporation v. Tampa Electric Co., 23 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) disagreed reverting to the question of whether the actions of the nonmoving party during the grace period were an attempt to move the case forward to and, if not, that such actions were insufficient to avoid dismissal.
The conflict between these cases was decided by the Supreme Court in Chemrock Corporation v. Tampa Electric Co., 36 Fla. L. Weekly S318 (Fla. June 30, 2011).
It is interesting to note that the underlying facts of Chemrock are that the case was initially set for trial and then continued on joint motion. During the next three and a half years while no one moved to reset the case for trial, discovery was ongoing and trial preparation was being undertaken and there were numerous disagreements concerning discovery which did not result in any motions before the Court. This scenario is a perfect example of why the rule itself makes no sense. While record activity may not have occurred during this period of time, nonrecord activity was ample and the case was clearly moving towards conclusion despite the fact that the parties had not required the Court to intervene in their discovery disputes. Dismissing a case on that basis seems to make no sense.
At 320, the Supreme Court makes clear that the bright-line edict enunciated in Wilson, supra, with regard to the period of nonrecord activity also applies to the sixty day grace period in the revised rule.
Wilson remains applicable to the current rule.
prosecution. See In re Amendments, 917 So.
periods set forth in the amended rule.


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Joseph Smith's leg was operated on by Dr. Nathan Smith of Dartmouth Medical School. In convalescence Joseph traveled with his uncle Jesse Smith to Salem, Massachusetts.
Jesse Smith files his protest objecting to changes in the organization of his local congregation.
Joseph Smith moved with his mother and siblings to Palmyra, New York, from Norwich, Vermont. Joseph Smith Sr. had gone to Palmyra earlier in the year to investigate the move.
Joseph Smith Sr. v. Hurlbut: Joseph Smith Sr. and Alvin Smith executed a promissory note to pay Jeremiah Hurlbut $65.00 in grain for the purchase of two horses.
Joseph Smith Sr. v. Hurlbut: Joseph Smith Sr. created a list of damages sustained by "fraud or ducet" when he and Alvin Smith had purchased two deficient horses from Jeremiah Hurlbut.
Joseph Smith Sr. v. Hurlbut: Joseph Smith Sr. and Alvin Smith transferred $53.00 in "crops on the ground" to Hurlbut.
Joseph Smith Sr. v. Hurlbut: Joseph Smith Sr. and Alvin Smith filed suit against Hurlbut in the Justice Court seeking damages for deficient horses they had bought from Hurlbut.
Joseph Smith Sr. v. Hurlbut: Constable D. Uandee served the summons to Jeremiah Hurlbut.
Joseph Smith Jr. appeared as a credible witness in the case of Joseph Smith Sr. v. Jeremiah Hurlbut. The jury awarded the Smiths $40.78.


§ 212-26 Commercial vehicles in residential districts.
§ 212-27 Required off-street spaces.
§ 212-28 Parking spaces in front yards.
§ 212-29 Size of spaces.
§ 212-30 Surfacing of spaces; adequate access to spaces.
§ 212-31 Spaces to be on same lot in zone.
§ 212-32 Maintenance of spaces.
§ 212-33 Dedication of lots to Village.
§ 212-34 Certificate of occupancy contingent upon spaces.
Editor's Note: For related provisions, see Ch. 135, Off-Street Parking Fields, Municipal.
No commercial vehicles exceeding one ton's capacity shall be parked or stored overnight in any residence district.
No vehicle bearing transporter or commercial plates or bearing plates of any similar nature of any jurisdiction shall be parked or stored overnight in any residence district.
Editor's Note: For related provisions, see Ch. 200, Vehicles and Traffic.
In the case of a multiple dwelling, at least 1 1/4 parking spaces must be provided on site for each dwelling unit.
In the case of an auditorium or place of assembly and in the case of a church or other place of worship, club, community center or school, other than a public school, there shall be at least one parking space for each five persons for which the building has occupancy or capacity. Such occupancy or capacity shall be determined in the same manner as is provided in the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code for determining the number of persons for which exits are to be provided; that is, using the following table, divide the gross floor area within the inside perimeter of the space by the applicable floor space.
* NOTE: For floor area actually occupied by seats. If the entire floor is considered, or if the seats exceed 21 inches in width, and the distance back-to-back of the seats is 36 inches or more, use 10 square feet.
In the case of a one-family or two-family dwelling on a lot of 20,000 square feet or less, an enclosed garage (attached, semi-attached or detached) shall be provided containing at least one parking space for each family housed or intended to be housed in said dwelling. In the case of a one-family or two-family dwelling on a lot larger than 20,000 square feet, an enclosed garage (attached, semi-attached or detached) shall be provided containing at least two parking spaces.
For the purposes of this subsection, an attached garage must share a common wall with the dwelling, and a semi-attached garage is any garage connected to the dwelling via a breezeway or any other similar structure.
In the case of a semiattached or detached garage, said building cannot exceed one story nor a vertical distance of 12 feet measured from the grade plane to the average height of the roof surface.
Each one-car garage shall have a clear inside dimension of not less than 10 feet in width and 20 feet in depth, and each two-car garage shall have clear inside dimensions of not less than 20 feet in width and 20 feet in depth.
Each front-facing garage located within 35 feet of the street line shall be served by a driveway of not less than 10 feet in width for a one-car garage and 20 feet in width for a two-car garage. For all other garages, a driveway area shall be provided of sufficient dimension to allow a vehicle to enter each garage space in a single driving maneuver and to exit each garage space with a single backing maneuver that will then allow the vehicle to enter upon the street in a forward direction. The driveway dimension normally required for such a maneuver shall be 30 feet perpendicular to the garage door, unless site-specific conditions require a different distance, as determined by the Village Building Department.
Residential garages may be reduced in size or relocated in compliance with § 212-27C. Notwithstanding the foregoing, all existing nonconforming residential garages in the Village must be maintained at not less than their current size as legally existing.
If a building is increased in the number of dwelling units or in its occupancy or capacity, as defined in subsection B of this section, there shall be additional parking spaces to the same extent as if such building were then first erected or first used for the purposes mentioned.
In the case of a multiple dwelling situated in a residence district or adjoining a residence district, such parking space must be provided underneath the building or in one or more private garages located and constructed in accordance with this chapter and in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 70, Building Construction and Fire Prevention.
Motor vehicles may be parked or stored in the open upon the premises, but no vehicle may be parked or stored nearer than 10 feet to any combustible wall of a building or any unprotected opening in a noncombustible wall.
Garages shall be arranged and constructed so that flammable or toxic gases or vapors cannot spread to fixed sources of ignition. Floors or decks shall be constructed of noncombustible materials that will not absorb flammable liquids. Each floor or roof deck upon which vehicles are stored shall be pitched for drainage.
If ramps are used for vehicle travel from street to garage floor or from floor to floor, the slope shall not exceed 15%. Ramps leading to a street shall terminate not less than 20 feet from such street.
Each parking space must be at least nine feet in width and 20 feet in depth and must be readily accessible without interfering with the use of other parking spaces. Accordingly, at least 300 square feet of parking area shall be provided for each required parking space. Parking spaces provided in access lanes shall not be counted.
All parking spaces shall be paved, oiled or covered with gravel, shall be suitably drained, shall be maintained in good condition and shall have adequate means of ingress and egress.
All parking spaces shall be situated on the same lot and in the same building zone in which the building or premises requiring such parking spaces is located.
Parking spaces required by §§ 212-27 through 212-34 shall be maintained in accordance with the provisions of §§ 212-27 through 212-34, as long as such buildings or premises are used for the purposes requiring such parking spaces to be furnished.
In case the owner of any lot should dedicate part of such lot to the Village of Lawrence for the purpose of a parking area and the Village of Lawrence should accept such dedication, the number of parking spaces upon the land so dedicated shall be credited against the number of parking spaces which the owner would be required to provide under §§ 212-27 through 212-34, in respect to any building or structure erected on the remaining part of the lot within five years after the date of such dedication.
Particulars of such parking spaces shall be shown in the application for a building permit, and proof shall be submitted that the owner or occupant of the building owns or controls the land on which such parking spaces are provided.
The certificate of occupancy shall be contingent upon the continuance of such parking spaces, and, if they should, for any reason, cease to be used and maintained for such purposes, or if the owner for the time being of the building for which such certificate of occupancy was issued should cease to own or control such parking area, the Board of Trustees may, upon notice to the applicant or the owner or occupant for the time being of such building, and after giving him an opportunity to be heard, cancel and revoke such certificate of occupancy.


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This collection contains issues from Volume 48 (1892-1893) of the New York Ledger.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 25, Saturday, July 2, 1892.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 35, Saturday, September 10, 1892.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 42, Saturday, October 29, 1892.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 46, Saturday, November 26, 1892.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 47, Saturday, December 3, 1892.
The New York Ledger, v. 48, no. 50, Saturday, December 24, 1892.
1 Connelly, J. H. 1 Hoke, Howard M.