§815. Entry of messages in the Journal and Record.
1. Messages received from the Senate, or from the President, shall be entered on the Journal and published in the Congressional Record of the proceedings of that day.
This provision was adopted in 1867 and amended in 1880 (V, 6593). It was renumbered January 3, 1953 (p. 24). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former rule XXXIX (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
The House may receive a message from the Senate when the Senate is not in session (VIII, 3338).
2. (a)The Speaker shall refer each bill, resolution, or other matter that relates to a subject listed under a standing committee named in clause 1 of rule X in accordance with the provisions of this clause.
(b)The Speaker shall refer matters under paragraph (a) in such manner as to ensure to the maximum extent feasible that each committee that has jurisdiction under clause 1 of rule X over the subject matter of a provision thereof may consider such provision and report to the House thereon. Precedents, rulings, or procedures in effect before the Ninety-Fourth Congress shall be applied to referrals under this clause only to the extent that they will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this clause.
(6) may make such other provision as may be considered appropriate.
This provision became effective as part of the rules on January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470). Before that time a bill or resolution could not be divided for reference among two or more committees, although it contained matter properly within the jurisdiction of several committees (IV, 4361). Paragraph (c) was amended on January 4, 1977 (H. Res. 5, pp. 53–70) to authorize the Speaker to place an appropriate time limit for consideration by the first committee or committees to which referred. In the 104th Congress paragraph (c) was again amended to require the Speaker to initially designate a committee of primary jurisdiction in each referral of a measure to more than one committee (sec. 205, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 467). In the 108th Congress the parenthetical exception in paragraph (c)(1) was added (sec. 2(i), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). A paragraph (e) was added to the clause on January 4, 1977 (H. Res. 5, pp. 53–70) to abolish the legislative jurisdiction in the House of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The legislative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee was divided among the Committees on Armed Services (military applications of nuclear energy), Interior and Insular Affairs (now Natural Resources) (regulation of the domestic nuclear energy industry, since transferred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the 104th Congress), Foreign Affairs (nonproliferation of nuclear energy and international nuclear export agreements), Interstate and Foreign Commerce (now Energy and Commerce) (the same jurisdiction over nuclear energy as exercised over other energy), and Science, Space, and Technology (nondefense nuclear research and development). In addition, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (now Energy and Commerce) was given oversight jurisdiction over all laws, programs, and government activities affecting nuclear energy. Paragraph (e) was deleted entirely in the 97th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 1981, p. 98). At the same time the House deleted former paragraph (d), which required the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress to prepare factual descriptions of each bill or resolution introduced in the House to be published in the Congressional Record. A gender-based reference was eliminated in the 111th Congress (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 7). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5 of rule X (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
An order of the House precluding or limiting the potential for organizational or legislative business on certain days was considered not to deprive Members of the privilege of introducing bills and resolutions during pro forma sessions on those days, such measures being numbered on the day introduced but not noted in the Record or referred to committee until the day on which business was resumed (H. Con. Res. 260, Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840, extended by unanimous consent on Jan. 22, 1992, p. 149, and Jan. 28, 1992, p. 745; H. Res. 619, Dec. 16, 2005, p. 29054, amended by H. Res. 640, Dec. 18, 2005, p. 30378; H. Res. 877, Dec. 18, 2007, p. 35825).
Under clause 2(c), the Speaker may (1) refer a bill to more than one committee for their respective consideration of such provisions of the bill as fall within their jurisdiction (Speaker Albert, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 4315), (2) divide a matter for initial reference to committees (Speaker Albert, Feb. 4, 1975, p. 2253; Speaker Hastert, Apr. 26, 1999, p. 7354), or (3) refer designated portions of a bill to one committee while referring the entire bill to another committee (Speaker O’Neill, Mar. 3, 1982, p. 3155). The Speaker also may set appropriate time limitations on the initial reference to each committee (Speaker O’Neill, Feb. 16, 1977, p. 4532; Speaker O’Neill, May 2, 1977, p. 13184). For example, the Speaker may refer a bill to two committees, with a time limit on one of the committees ending within a certain period after the other committee reports to the House (Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 27, 1983, p. 937; Speaker O’Neill, Feb. 2, 1983, p. 1492; Speaker Wright, Apr. 9, 1987, p. 8665) or with a time limit on one committee ending with a date certain (Speaker O’Neill, July 31, 1985, p. 21936; Speaker Hastert, Mar. 13, 2001, p. 3448; Speaker Hastert, July 26, 2002, p. 15146). The Speaker may discharge a committee from further consideration of a bill not reported by it within the time for which the bill was referred and place the bill on the appropriate calendar (Speaker O’Neill, May 8, 1978, p. 12924).
Before paragraph (c) was amended in the 104th Congress to require the Speaker to designate a committee of primary jurisdiction, the Speaker announced at the convening of the 98th Congress that he would exercise his authority, in situations that warranted it, to designate a primary committee among those to which a bill was jointly referred, and to impose time limits on committees having a secondary interest following the report of the primary committee under a joint referral (Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 54; reiterated by Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105). The Speaker may refer a bill primarily to one committee while also referring it initially to additional committees for time periods to be subsequently determined when the primary committee reports, in each case for consideration of matters within their respective jurisdictions (Speaker Gingrich, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 123).
Pursuant to clause 2 of rule XIV (formerly clause 2 of rule XXIV), relating to messages from the Senate, the Speaker has discretionary authority to refer from the Speaker’s table to standing committees, Senate amendments to House-passed bills, under any conditions permitted under this provision for introduced bills. The Speaker may for example impose a time limitation for consideration only of a portion of the Senate amendment, not germane to the original House bill, by the standing committee with subject-matter jurisdiction, without referring the remainder of the Senate amendment to the House committee with jurisdiction over the original House bill (Speaker O’Neill, H.R. 31, Mar. 26, 1981, p. 5397). Beginning with the 98th Congress, the Speaker announced a policy of referring nongermane Senate amendments under certain conditions (Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 54; Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105).
Under clause 2(c), the Speaker has authority to sequentially refer a bill reported from a committee to other committees for a time certain for consideration of such portions of the bill as fall within their respective jurisdictions (Speaker Albert, Apr. 9, 1976, p. 10265; Speaker Albert, May 17, 1976, p. 14093). Under that authority, the Speaker may limit a sequential referral to matters having a direct effect on subjects within the committee’s jurisdiction (Speaker O’Neill, Apr. 5, 1982, p. 6580; Speaker O’Neill, June 7, 1983, p. 14699; Speaker Wright, Sept. 9, 1987, p. 23648). For example, the Speaker sequentially referred a bill reported by the Committee on Energy and Commerce to the Committee on the Judiciary for a specified time for consideration of “such provisions of the bill and amendment recommended by the Committee on Energy and Commerce as propose to narrow the purview of the Attorney General under section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934” (Speaker Hastert, May 24, 2001, p. 9384). The Speaker exercised authority under this clause to sequentially refer a joint resolution making continuing appropriations, reported as privileged by the Committee on Appropriations, to the committee having legislative jurisdiction over a legislative provision in the resolution, without a time limitation on the sequential referral (Speaker O’Neill, Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25523).
The Speaker has sometimes announced the application of the authority on sequential referrals at the outset of a Congress. For example, in the 97th Congress, the Speaker announced that the sequential referral of a measure would be based on the subject matter of any amendment recommended by the reporting committee, as well as upon the original text of the measure (Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 5, 1981, pp. 115, 116). In the 100th Congress, the Speaker announced that, in certain cases, a sequential referral would be based only upon the text of a reported substitute amendment in lieu of original text (Speaker Wright, Jan. 6, 1987, p. 22). The Speaker has sequentially referred (1) a bill for consideration of the bill and amendment of the previous committee (Speaker O’Neill, Oct. 13, 1977, p. 33716); (2) a bill to two committees for different periods of time, solely for consideration of designated sections of the first committee’s recommended amendment (Speaker O’Neill, May 18, 1982, p. 10418; Speaker O’Neill, Aug. 1, 1985, p. 22681); (3) a bill for consideration by a third committee of a portion of an amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by one of the committees to which the bill had been initially referred (Speaker O’Neill, May 22, 1985, p. 13126); (4) a bill back to the first-reporting committee when it was reported from the second-reporting committee with a nongermane amendment within the jurisdiction of the first committee and not within the bounds of the initial referral (Speaker Wright, Oct. 4, 1988, p. 28242). The Speaker also may base a sequential referral only on the text of the bill as introduced, even if a bill is reported by the primary committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (Speaker Gingrich, Sept. 12, 1995, p. 24791). For example, the Speaker sequentially referred a bill where the amendment recommended by the primary committee would delete portions of the bill within the jurisdiction of the sequential committee (Speaker Hastert, May 10, 1999, p. 8690).
In the 96th Congress, the Speaker followed a more restrictive policy, permitting a sequential committee to review (1) those portions of introduced text within its jurisdiction and (2) those portions of an amendment within its jurisdiction when the introduced version also warranted a sequential referral to the committee (Speaker O’Neill, Apr. 15, 1980, p. 7760). The Speaker first exercised the authority to base referrals on committee amendments by sequentially referring a bill reported from the Committee on Public Works and Transportation (now Transportation and Infrastructure), relating only to Corps of Engineers’ water projects as introduced but amended in committee to address general water resource policy affecting irrigation and reclamation projects and soil conservation programs, to the Committees on Agriculture and Interior and Insular Affairs (now Natural Resources) for consideration of provisions of the committee amendment within their jurisdiction (Speaker O’Neill, May 20, 1981, p. 10361).
The Speaker may (1) discharge a measure from the Union Calendar and sequentially refer it to another committee (Speaker O’Neill, Apr. 27, 1978, p. 11742; Speaker O’Neill, May 21, 1982, p. 11169; Speaker O’Neill, June 19, 1986, p. 14741; Speaker Foley, June 12, 1990, p. 13670; Speaker Hastert, Nov. 30, 2001, p. 23681); (2) sequentially refer a bill that has been initially referred to several committees but reported only by one, for consideration of the reporting committee’s amendment (Speaker O’Neill, June 17, 1982, p. 14069; Speaker Foley, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 23477); and (3) sequentially refer a bill referred to more than one committee when the first committee reports, for a period ending a number of days after the next committee reports (Speaker O’Neill, Aug. 1, 1985, p. 22681), or after all committees report (Speaker Wright, June 10, 1988, p. 14079).
The Speaker may (1) extend the time of a sequentially referred bill and may refer the bill to yet another committee under the same sequential referral conditions (Speaker Albert, June 1, 1976, p. 16588); (2) delimit the period for sequential consideration of a bill in terms of legislative days (Speaker Wright, June 30, 1988, p. 16597); or (3) sequentially refer a bill without day (Speaker Wright, Sept. 27, 1988, p. 25827). On the last day of an expiring sequential referral, a committee has until midnight to file its report with the Clerk (Oct. 9, 1991, p. 26045).
§816b. Referral procedures to an ad hoc select committee.
Resolutions authorizing the Speaker to establish an ad hoc committee for the consideration of a particular bill under paragraph (c) of this clause, and extending the reporting date for such a committee, are privileged when offered from the floor at the Speaker’s request (Speaker Albert, Apr. 22, 1975, p. 11261; Speaker Albert, Jan. 26, 1976, p. 876; Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 11, 1977, pp. 894–98; Speaker O’Neill, Apr. 21, 1977, pp. 11550–56).
Pursuant to the authority under paragraph (c)(4), the Speaker may refer a bill to a special ad hoc committee appointed by the Speaker with the approval of the House (from the members of the committees with legislative jurisdiction) for consideration and report on that particular bill (Speaker Albert, Apr. 22, 1975, p. 11261) or may jointly refer a report of a select committee filed with the Clerk to standing committees of the House for their study (Speaker Albert, Feb. 16, 1976, p. 3158).
The Speaker may refer to an ad hoc committee, established with the approval of the House, bills, resolutions, and other matters (including messages and communications) for the purpose of considering such matters and reporting to the House thereon, and the resolution creating such a committee may specify whether referrals to such a committee shall be by initial or sequential reference or by any of the other methods provided by this clause (H. Res. 508, Apr. 21, 1977, pp. 11550–56; Speaker O’Neill, July 11, 1977, p. 22183; Speaker O’Neill, July 20, 1977, p. 24167). For a discussion of Speaker’s referrals to the former Select Committees on Homeland Security, see §723b, supra.
Clause 7 provides the mechanism for changes of referrals erroneously made.
§816c. As to division of bills for reference.
The parliamentary law provides that the House may commit a portion of a bill, or a part thereof to one committee and another part thereof to another (V, 5558), yet under the practice of the House until January 3, 1975, a bill or joint resolution could not be divided for reference even if it contained matters properly within the jurisdiction of several committees (IV, 4372, 4376). On that date, the Speaker was given authority over referral of bills as prescribed in clause 2 of this rule (formerly clause 5 of rule X). In the 106th Congress the Speaker referred a bill by title to two committees (H.R. 1554, Apr. 26, 1999, p. 7355).
§817. Restriction on the reference of claims.
(d) A bill for the payment or adjudication of a private claim against the Government may not be referred to a committee other than the Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Committee on the Judiciary, except by unanimous consent.
The present form of this paragraph was made effective January 2, 1947, as a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812). It was amended several times to conform references to renamed committees (H. Res. 163, Mar. 19, 1975, p. 7343; H. Res. 89, Feb. 5, 1979, p. 1848; sec. 202(b), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 467; sec. 213(d), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 19). The old rule, adopted in 1885 and amended May 29, 1936, provided that private claims bills be referred to a Committee on Invalid Pensions, Claims, War Claims, Public Lands, and Accounts, in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary. Certain private bills, resolutions and amendments are barred (see §822, infra). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 4 of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
Under this paragraph unanimous consent is required for the reference of a bill for the payment of a private claim to a committee other than the Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 4, 1978, p. 12615). The Committee on the Judiciary, and not the Committee on Ways and Means, has jurisdiction over a private bill specifying that a certain annuity fund is exempt from taxation under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Deschler, ch. 17, §43.22).
§818. Introduction and reference of petitions, memorials, and private bills.
3. If a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner has a petition, memorial, or private bill to present, the Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner shall sign it, deliver it to the Clerk, and may specify the reference or disposition to be made thereof. Such petition, memorial, or private bill (except when judged by the Speaker to be obscene or insulting) shall be entered on the Journal with the name of the Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner presenting it and shall be printed in the Congressional Record.
At the first organization of the House in 1789 the rules then adopted provided for the presentation of petitions to the House by the Speaker and Members, and for the introduction of bills by motion for leave. In 1842 it was found necessary, in order to save time, to provide that petitions and memorials should be filed with the Clerk. In 1870, 1879, and 1887 the practice as to petitions was extended to private bills, at first as to certain classes and later so that all should be filed with the Clerk (IV, 3312, 3365; VII, 1024). A gender-based reference was eliminated in the 111th Congress (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 7). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 1 of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
§819. Duties of Speaker and Members in presenting petitions.
Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House may be presented by the Speaker as well as by a Member (IV, 3312). Petitions from the country at large are presented by the Speaker in the manner prescribed by the rule (III, 2030; IV, 3318; VII, 1025). A Member may present a petition from the people of another State (IV, 3315, 3316). The House itself may refer one portion of a petition to one committee and another portion to another committee (IV, 3359, 3360), but ordinarily the reference of a petition does not come before the House itself. A committee may receive a petition only through the House (IV, 4557).
§822. Certain private bills prohibited.
(c) the correction of a military or naval record.
This paragraph derives from section 131 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) and was made a part of the standing rules January 3, 1953 (p. 24). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 2(a) of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). The prohibition relating to correction of a military record does not apply to a private bill that changes the computation of retired pay for a former member of the armed services (after exhaustion of administrative remedies) but does not directly correct the military record (Sept. 18, 1984, p. 25824).
5. (a) A bill or resolution, or an amendment thereto, may not be introduced or considered in the House if it establishes or expresses a commemoration.
(b) In this clause the term “commemoration” means a remembrance, celebration, or recognition for any purpose through the designation of a specified period of time.
The 104th Congress added the prohibition against commemorative legislation and directed the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (now Oversight and Government Reform) to consider alternative means for establishing commemorations, including the creation of an independent or executive branch commission for such purpose, and to report to the House any recommendations thereon (sec. 216, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). No recommendations were reported. Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 2(b) of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). The House by unanimous consent waived the prohibition against introduction of a certain joint resolution specified by sponsor and title proposing a commemoration (which was contained in the resolving clause and not merely in the preamble) (Oct. 24, 2001, p. 20545).
§824. Correction of errors in reference; and relation to jurisdiction.
6. A petition, memorial, bill, or resolution excluded under this rule shall be returned to the Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner from whom it was received. A petition or private bill that has been inappropriately referred may, by direction of the committee having possession of it, be properly referred in the manner originally presented. An erroneous reference of a petition or private bill under this clause does not confer jurisdiction on a committee to consider or report it.
This clause of the rule was first adopted in 1880, although the portion relating to the return of certain petitions and bills was adapted from an older rule of 1842 (IV, 3312, 3365). In the 104th Congress it was amended to conform to the new prohibition against commemorative legislation (sec. 216, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 3 of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
Errors in reference of petitions, memorials, or private bills are corrected at the Clerk’s table, without action by the House, at the suggestion of the committee holding possession (IV, 4379). As provided in the rule, the erroneous reference of a private House bill does not confer jurisdiction, and a point of order is good when the bill comes up for consideration either in the House or in the Committee of the Whole (IV, 4382–4389). But in cases where the House itself refers a private House or Senate bill a point of order may not be raised as to jurisdiction (IV, 4390, 4391; VII, 2131). The Speaker may correct the erroneous referral of a bill as private by referring it to the appropriate (Union) calendar as a public bill when reported (June 1, 1988, p. 13184).
§825. Introduction, reference, and change of reference of public bills, memorials, and resolutions.
7. (a) Bills, memorials, petitions, and resolutions, endorsed with the names of Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner introducing them, may be delivered to the Speaker to be referred. The titles and references of all bills, memorials, petitions, resolutions, and other documents referred under this rule shall be entered on the Journal and printed in the Congressional Record. An erroneous reference may be corrected by the House in accordance with rule X on any day immediately after the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag by unanimous consent or motion. Such a motion shall be privileged if offered by direction of a committee to which the bill has been erroneously referred or by direction of a committee claiming jurisdiction and shall be decided without debate.
(b)(1) The sponsor of a public bill or public resolution may name cosponsors. The name of a cosponsor added after the initial printing of a bill or resolution shall appear in the next printing of the bill or resolution on the written request of the sponsor. Such a request may be submitted to the Speaker at any time until the last committee authorized to consider and report the bill or resolution reports it to the House or is discharged from its consideration.
(2) The name of a cosponsor of a bill or resolution may be deleted by unanimous consent. The Speaker may entertain such a request only by the Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner whose name is to be deleted or by the sponsor of the bill or resolution, and only until the last committee authorized to consider and report the bill or resolution reports it to the House or is discharged from its consideration. The Speaker may not entertain a request to delete the name of the sponsor of a bill or resolution. A deletion shall be indicated by date in the next printing of the bill or resolution.
(3) The addition or deletion of the name of a cosponsor of a bill or resolution shall be entered on the Journal and printed in the Congressional Record of that day.
(4) A bill or resolution shall be reprinted on the written request of the sponsor. Such a request may be submitted to the Speaker only when 20 or more cosponsors have been added since the last printing of the bill or resolution.
The rule of 1789 provided that all bills should be introduced on report of a committee or by motion for leave. By various modifications it was first provided that all classes of private bills should be introduced by filing them with the Clerk, and in 1890 this system was by this rule extended to all public bills (IV, 3365). In the 105th and 107th Congresses paragraph (a) was amended, and in the 112th Congress paragraph (b) was amended, to effect technical corrections (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121; sec. 2(x), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. 26; sec. 2(f), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 4 of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).
At its organization for the 106th Congress the House adopted an order of the House that the first 10 bill numbers be reserved for assignment by the Speaker during a specified period (sec. 2(g), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). In the 107th and 108th Congresses the House adopted the same order, but extended the applicable time to the entire first session (sec. 3(d), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. 24; sec. 3(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). In the 108th Congress, the House by unanimous consent extended such authority through the remainder of the Congress (Oct. 4, 2004, p. 20566). In the 109th through 111th Congresses the House adopted the same initial order but for the entire Congress (sec. 3(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 44; sec. 217, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 19; sec. 3(d), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 9) and the House in the 112th through 114th Congresses expanded it to reserve the second 10 bill numbers for assignment by the Minority Leader (sec. 3(m), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80; sec. 3(h), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2013, p. __; sec. 3(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. __).
The motion for a change of reference and subsidiary motions take precedence over motions to go into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of appropriation bills and the consideration of conference reports (VII, 2124), and may not be debated (VII, 2126–2128). But the motion is not in order on Calendar Wednesday (VII, 2117), and is not privileged under the rule if the original reference was not erroneous (VII, 2125). The motion may be amended, but the amendment, like the original motion, is subject to the requirement that it be authorized by the committee (VII, 2127). The motion must apply to a single bill and not to a class of bills (VII, 2125).
According to the later practice the erroneous reference of a public bill, if it remain uncorrected, in effect gives jurisdiction to the committee receiving it (IV, 4365–4371; VII, 1489, 2108–2113; VIII, 2312). It is too late to move a change of reference after such committee has reported the bill (VII, 2110; VIII, 2312), but the Speaker may, pursuant to authority granted by clause 2 (formerly clause 5 of rule X) effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470), refer a bill sequentially to other committees. All bills and resolutions must be signed by the sponsor thereof (Speaker Albert, Feb. 3, 1972, p. 2521).
Joint sponsorship of public bills by not more than 25 Members was authorized in the 90th Congress (H. Res. 42, Apr. 25, 1967, p. 10712). Prior thereto a special committee had reported against this practice and the report had been adopted by the House (VII, 1029). Effective January 3, 1979 (H. Res. 86, 95th Cong., Oct. 10, 1978, p. 34929), paragraph (b) was added to allow unlimited cosponsorship and to provide a mechanism for Members to add their names as cosponsors to bills or resolutions that have already been introduced, up until the bill is finally reported from committee, and on January 15, 1979, the Speaker announced his directive for the processing of lists of cosponsors pursuant to the new clause (Speaker O’Neill, Jan. 15, 1979, p. 19).
Although paragraph (b)(2), before the 106th Congress, permitted only a cosponsoring Member to request unanimous consent to be deleted as a cosponsor, the sponsor of a measure was permitted to request unanimous consent to remove a cosponsor inadvertently or erroneously listed (Feb. 9, 1982). In the 106th Congress, paragraph (b)(2) codified that such requests could be made by either the sponsor or the cosponsor (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). Unanimous-consent requests to delete Members’ names as cosponsors are not entertained after the last committee of referral has reported to the House (or has been discharged from further consideration) (Oct. 8, 1985, p. 26668; Feb. 10, 2000, p. 982), and the Speaker has vacated unanimous-consent orders of the House to delete cosponsors when advised that the bill had already been reported (Aug. 5, 1987, p. 22458; June 17, 2013, p. __). A Member may request unanimous consent to be deleted as a cosponsor of an unreported bill during its consideration under suspension of the rules and before a final vote thereon (June 9, 1986, p. 12979).
By unanimous consent a Member may be added as a cosponsor of an unreported bill if the sponsor is no longer a Member of the House (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23188; Oct. 3, 2008, p. 24009), and a designated Member may be authorized to sign and submit lists of additional cosponsors if the actual sponsor is no longer a Member (e.g., June 23, 1989, p. 13271; Apr. 5, 2000, p. 4487; June 20, 2001, p. 11196; Sept. 21, 2004, p. 18827), but the Chair will not otherwise entertain a request to add cosponsors by a Member other than the sponsor (Mar. 5, 1991, p. 5026). In fact, the Chair will not entertain any unanimous-consent request to add a cosponsor (July 24, 2000, p. 15878), whether such request includes only the Member making the request (Oct. 25, 1995, p. 29352), includes all Members (Dec. 18, 1985, p. 37765), or includes a specified additional sponsor (Jan. 28, 1985, p. 1141; May 23, 1985, p. 13421). Such requests must be made by the sponsor through the hopper not later than the last day on which any committee is authorized to consider and report the measure to the House (Nov. 4, 1997, p. 24413).
The Chair does not entertain a unanimous-consent request to add a co-offeror of an amendment (May 20, 2004, p. 10631; Sept. 14, 2004, p. 18429; Apr. 29, 2015, p. __) or to change the offeror of a pending amendment (Apr. 29, 2015, p. __).
At its organization for the 104th Congress the House resolved that each of the first 20 bills and each of the first two joint resolutions introduced in the House in that Congress could have more than one Member reflected as a sponsor (sec. 223(g), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 469); and the Speaker stated that all signatures of such “primary” sponsors would be required on the bills (Speaker Gingrich, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 551). A Member was subsequently added as such a “primary” sponsor by unanimous consent (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1447).
§825a. Fraudulent introduction of a bill.
The fraudulent introduction of a measure involves a question of privilege, and a measure so introduced has been ordered stricken from the files (IV, 3388). As the result of the unauthorized introduction of several bills without the knowledge of the Members listed as sponsors, the Speaker directed that all bills and resolutions must be signed by the sponsor thereof in order to be accepted for introduction (Speaker Albert, Feb. 3, 1972, p. 2521).
§826. Introduction of bills, resolutions, or memorials by request.
(5) When a bill or resolution is introduced “by request,” those words shall be entered on the Journal and printed in the Congressional Record.
This provision was adopted in 1888 (IV, 3366). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, it was found in former clause 6 of rule XXII (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). It has never been the practice of the House to permit the names of the persons requesting the introduction of the bill to be printed in the Record.
§826a. Constitutional authority statement upon introduction.
(c)(1) A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution. The statement shall appear in a portion of the Record designated for that purpose and be made publicly available in electronic form by the Clerk.
(2) Before consideration of a Senate bill or joint resolution, the chair of a committee of jurisdiction may submit the statement required under subparagraph (1) as though the chair were the sponsor of the Senate bill or joint resolution.
Paragraph (c) was added in the 112th Congress (sec. 2(a)(1), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80). A point of order under this paragraph is not timely when the relevant measure is not pending (May 16, 2013, p. __).
§826b. United States Code citations.
The House in the 113th and 114th Congresses required, to the extent practicable, an applicable United States Code citation in the case of an amendatory instruction in a bill or joint resolution proposing to repeal or amend a law not codified (sec. 3(i), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2013, p. __; sec. 3(m), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. __).
§827. Reception and reference of executive communications, including estimates.
8. Estimates of appropriations and all other communications from the executive departments intended for the consideration of any committees of the House shall be addressed to the Speaker for referral as provided in clause 2 of rule XIV.
This rule was adopted in 1867 and amended in 1880 (V, 6593). It was renumbered January 3, 1953 (p. 24). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former rule XL (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). Formerly estimates of appropriations were transmitted through the Secretary of the Treasury (IV, 3573–3576, 4045), but under 31 U.S.C. 1105 they are now included in the budget submitted by the President.


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THOMAS W. HICKEY & another [Note 1] vs. GLADYS M. GREEN.
Present: PERRETTA, CUTTER, & KASS, JJ.
In an action seeking specific performance of an oral promise to convey a residential vacant lot, the seller was estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds, where she knew that the buyers were planning to sell their home and build on the lot in question and where the buyers, in reliance upon the oral promise and within ten days thereafter, had accepted and endorsed a deposit check in a manner which probably bound them to sell their home [673-677]; however, the judge, in her discretion, was to reopen the proceeding on remand to receive a stipulation or evidence concerning the buyers' present obligation to sell their home and to reconsider the judgment in light of any changed circumstances .
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 29, 1980.
The case was heard by Dolan, J.
Peter J. McCue for the defendant.
Steven Greenzang for the plaintiffs.
Mrs. Gladys Green owns a lot (Lot S) in the Manomet section of Plymouth. In July, 1980, she advertised it for sale. On July 11 and 12, Hickey and his wife discussed with Mrs. Green purchasing Lot S and "orally agreed to a sale" for $15,000. Mrs. Green on July 12 accepted a deposit check of $500, marked by Hickey on the back, "Deposit on Lot . . . Massasoit Ave. Manomet . . . Subject to Variance from Town of Plymouth." Mrs. Green's brother and agent "was under the impression that a zoning variance was needed and [had] advised . . . Hickey to write" the quoted language on the deposit check. It turned out, however, by July 16 that no variance would be required. Hickey had left the payee line of the deposit check blank, because of uncertainty whether Mrs. Green or her brother was to receive the check and asked "Mrs. Green to fill in the appropriate name." Mrs. Green held the check, did not fill in the payee's name, and neither cashed nor endorsed it. Hickey "stated to Mrs. Green that his intention was to sell his home and build on Mrs. Green's lot."
"Relying upon the arrangements . . . with Mrs. Green," the Hickeys advertised their house on Sachem Road in newspapers on three days in July, 1980, and agreed with a purchaser for its sale and took from him a deposit check for $500 which they deposited in their own account. [Note 3] On July 24, Mrs. Green told Hickey that she "no longer intended to sell her property to him" but had decided to sell to another for $16,000. Hickey told Mrs. Green that he had already sold his house and offered her $16,000 for Lot S. Mrs. Green refused this offer.
The Hickeys filed this complaint seeking specific performance. Mrs. Green asserts that relief is barred by the Statute of Frauds contained in G. L. c. 259, Section 1. The trial judge granted specific performance. [Note 4] Mrs. Green has appealed.
of "the effect of all the facts in combination"; Winstanley v. Chapman, 325 Mass. 130, 133 (1949); Park, Real Estate Law Section 883 (1981). See also Curran v. Magee, 244 Mass. 1, 4-6 (1923); Chase v. Aetna Rubber Co., 321 Mass. 721, 724 (1947). Compare Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 167-168 (1931); Nichols v. Sanborn, 320 Mass. 436, 438-439 (1946). Frequently there has been an actual change of possession and improvement of the transferred property, as well as full payment of the full purchase price, or one or more of these elements.
It is stated in Park, Real Estate Law Section 883, at 334, that the "more recent decisions . . . indicate a trend on the part of the [Supreme Judicial C]ourt to find that the circumstances warrant specific performance." This appears to be a correct perception. See Fisher v. MacDonald, 332 Mass. 727, 729 (1955), where specific performance was granted upon a showing that the purchaser "was put into possession and . . . [had] furnished part of the consideration in money and services"; [Note 7] Orlando v. Ottaviani, 337 Mass. 157, 161-162 (1958), where specific performance was granted to the former holder of an option to buy a strip of land fifteen feet wide, important to the option holder, and the option had been surrendered in reliance upon an oral promise to convey the strip made by the purchaser of a larger parcel of which the fifteen-foot strip was a part; [Note 8] Cellucci v. sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 727-728 (1974), S. C., 368 Mass. 811 (1975). Compare Young v. Reed, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 20-21 (1978), where the questions arose on the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the summary judgment granted was reversed, so that the full facts could be developed at trial; Fitzsimmons v. Kerrigan, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 928 (1980). Compare also D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 926 (1981).
The present facts reveal a simple case of a proposed purchase of a residential vacant lot, where the vendor, Mrs. Green, Knew that the Hickeys were planning to sell their former home (possibly to obtain funds to pay her) and build on Lot S. The Hickeys, relying on Mrs. Green's oral promise, moved rapidly to make their sale without obtaining any adequate memorandum of the terms of what appears to have been intended to be a quick cash sale of Lot S. So rapid was action by the Hickeys that, by July 21, less than ten days after giving their deposit to Mrs. Green, they had accepted a deposit check for the sale of their house, endorsed the check, and placed it in their bank account. Above their signatures endorsing the check was a memorandum probably sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds under A.B.C. Auto Parts, Inc. v. Moran, 359 Mass. 327, 329-331 (1971). Cf. Guarino v. Zyfers, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 874 (1980). At the very least, the Hickeys had bound themselves in a manner in which, to avoid a transfer of their own house, they might have had to engage in expensive litigation. No attorney has been shown to have been used either in the transaction between Mrs. Green and the Hickeys or in that between the Hickeys and their purchaser.
opportunity. The stipulated facts require the conclusion that in equity Mrs. Green's conduct cannot be condoned. This is not a case where either party is shown to have contemplated the negotiation of a purchase and sale agreement. If a written agreement had been expected, even by only one party, or would have been natural (because of the participation by lawyers or otherwise), a different situation might have existed. It is a permissible inference from the agreed facts that the rapid sale of the Hickeys' house was both appropriate and expected. These are not circumstances where negotiations fairly can be seen as inchoate. Compare Tull v. Mister Donut Development Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 630-632 (1979).
We recognize that specific enforcement of Mrs. Green's promise to convey Lot S may well go somewhat beyond the circumstances considered in the Fisher case, 332 Mass. 727 (1955), and in the Orlando case, 337 Mass. 157 (1958), where specific performance was granted. It may seem (perhaps because the present facts are less complicated) to extend the principles stated in the Cellucci case (see esp. 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 728). We recognize also the cautionary language about granting specific performance in comment a to Section 129 of the Restatement (see note 6, supra). No public interest behind G. L. c. 259, Section 1, however, in the simple circumstances before us, will be violated if Mrs. Green fairly is held to her precise bargain by principles of equitable estoppel, subject to the considerations mentioned below.
been carried out, the conveyance of Lot S by Mrs. Green should be required now.
The case, in any event, must be remanded to the trial judge for the purpose of amending the judgment to require conveyance of Lot S by Mrs. Green only upon payment to her in cash within a stated period of the balance of the agreed price of $15,000. The trial judge, however, in her discretion and upon proper offers of proof by counsel, may reopen the record to receive, in addition to the presently stipulated facts, a stipulation or evidence concerning the present status of the Hickeys' apparent obligation to sell their house. If the circumstances have changed, it will be open to the trial judge to require of Mrs. Green instead of specific performance, only full restitution to the Hickeys of all costs reasonably caused to them in respect of these transactions (including advertising costs, deposits, and their reasonable costs for this litigation) with interest. The case is remanded to the Superior Court Department for further action consistent with this opinion. The Hickeys are to have costs of this appeal.
[Note 1] His wife Patricia E. Hickey.
[Note 2] This record presents what, at least under our prior practice, would have been regarded as a "case stated." See Quinton Vespa Co. v. Construction Serv. Co., 343 Mass. 547, 551-552 (1962); Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328 (1969). Compare Mass.R.A.P. 8(d), as appearing in 378 Mass. 934 (1979).
[Note 3] On the back of the check was noted above the Hickeys' signatures endorsing the check "Deposit on Purchase of property at Sachem Rd. and First St., Manomet, Ma. Sale price, $44,000."
[Note 4] The judgment ordered Mrs. Green to convey Lot S to the Hickeys but, probably by inadvertence, it failed to include an order that it be conveyed only upon payment by the grantees of the admittedly agreed price of $15,000.
[Note 5] The late Justice Braucher, prior to his appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court, was the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts when the language of what is now Section 129 was drafted; See Tent. Draft No. 4, Section 197 (1968). The section appears to be consistent with Massachusetts law.
[Note 6] Comments a and b to Section 129, read (in part): "a . . . This section restates what is widely known as the `part performance doctrine.' Part performance is not an accurate designation of such acts as taking possession and making improvements when the contract does not provide for such acts, but such acts regularly bring the doctrine into play. The doctrine is contrary to the words of the Statute of Frauds, but it was established by English courts of equity soon after the enactment of the Statute. Payment of purchase-money, without more, was once thought sufficient to justify specific enforcement, but a contrary view now prevails, since in such cases restitution is an adequate remedy. . . . Enforcement has . . . been justified on the ground that repudiation after `part performance' amounts to a `virtual fraud.' A more accurate statement is that courts with equitable powers are vested by tradition with what in substance is a dispensing power based on the promisee's reliance, a discretion to be exercised with caution in the light of all the circumstances . . . [emphasis supplied].
"b. . . Two distinct elements enter into the application of the rule of this Section: first, the extent to which the evidentiary function of the statutory formalities is fulfilled by the conduct of the parties; second, the reliance of the promisee, providing a compelling substantive basis for relief in addition to the expectations created by the promise."
[Note 7] See comment on this case in 1955 Ann. Survey Mass. Law Section 1.4, at 9-10, by Professor (later Judge) Cornelius J. Moynihan.
[Note 8] The Orlando case was the basis of illustration 9 to Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 129 at 324-325 (1981). It was also discussed in 1958 Ann. Survey Mass. Law Section 1.2, at 6-7, by Professor Moynihan.
[Note 9] Comment d of Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 129, reads "d . . . . Where specific enforcement is rested on a transfer of possession plus either part payment of the price or the making of improvements, it is commonly said that the action taken by the purchaser must be unequivocally referable to the oral agreement. But this requirement is not insisted on if the making of the promise is admitted on is clearly proved. The promisee must act in reasonable reliance on the promise, before the promisor has repudiated it, and the action must be such that the remedy of restitution is inadequate. If these requirements are met, neither taking of possession nor payment of money nor the making of improvements is essential . . ." (emphasis supplied).

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THIS subject is of vital importance to each one of us, for all of us have ancestors, relatives and friends who for some reason died without being saved. (1) They may never have heard of Jesus, "the only name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved" (Acts 4:12); or (2) they may not have had sufficient knowledge and understanding of Jesus and faith in Him as their personal Savior for God to put them on trial for eternal life during this Age—the Gospel Age, the faith Age.
God in His mercy hides the Truth "from the [worldly] wise and prudent" (Luke 10:21) and those who because of their fallen condition, by heredity, environment and circumstances, cannot exercise the necessary faith—"all men have not faith" (2 Thes. 3:2). During this faith Age, God chooses chiefly "the poor of this world, rich in faith" (James 2:5; 1 Cor. 1:26-29). He in mercy hides the Truth from the worldly wise and prudent and from the faithless and unbelieving so as not to increase their responsibility, their culpability, before Him.
Is there any hope for these and for the billions of other unsaved dead, whom God has not chosen to be "partakers of the heavenly calling" (Heb. 3:1), however virtuous or noble they may or may not have been, but who died without gaining a saving knowledge of Jesus, without accepting and holding to Him as their personal Savior and without denying self, taking up their cross and loyally following Him (Mark 8:34, 35; 10:17-27)?
Many Christians and others have been taught that all opportunity for attaining salvation, eternal life, is limited strictly to the present life. But we can get the truth on this important subject only as we lay aside the teachings of men and go with open, unprejudiced minds and hearts to the Word of God, from Genesis to Revelation, for the wisdom that comes from above (James 1:5) and that truly answers our questions in harmony with reason and facts.
At the outset, we state emphatically that the Bible does not teach a second chance, or opportunity, for salvation for any of Adam's race. It teaches for each of them only one chance, or opportunity — no more and no less.
Some—comparatively few—get their one chance for salvation in this life. They are those who receive sufficient enlightenment from the Gospel message, who are justified through faith in Jesus' great Ransom-sacrifice, who consecrate, or dedicate, their lives to God and who receive the begettal of the holy Spirit. They get all the blessings mentioned in Heb. 6:4, 5; and after receiving these, they must be faithful and win out in this life or be lost forever — they will have no other chance, for the reason that, having exhausted their share in the merit of Christ, and Christ dying no more, there is no more sacrifice to atone for their sins (Heb. 6:4-6; 10:26-29). Therefore we do not ask in the question that is the subject of this treatise if there is any hope for such persons. There is no hope for them (1 John 5:16).
But how about those who did not in this life hear about Christ and others who did not by faith receive the benefit of the atoning merit of Christ? Has Christ's death no benefit, no blessing, for them? There are admittedly many who died, not in this life having heard about Christ, and/or not having received the cancellation of their sins through His death. Among them we might instance the heathen, the Mohammedans, the Jews who are not Christians, those dying in infancy, the mentally incompetent, those who died before Jesus gave His life for them, and those who were completely blinded (2 Cor. 4:4) by Satan, the great Adversary, deceived by sectarianism, etc., and thus could not understand God's Word, without an understanding of which it is impossible to be saved (Rom. 10:13, 14). Are these hopelessly lost forever, or does the Bible hold out hope for them?
Some will ask, May it not be possible that the unsaved dead will be saved by their ignorance? We believe not; for there is no power or anything else good in ignorance to save anyone. Instead of ignorance being a ground for salvation, it is Scripturally set forth as a reason for alienation from God and for perdition (Eph. 4:18; Hosea 4:6; 6:6; Rom. 2:12). Furthermore, the Scriptures show that knowledge is essential to faith in Christ and salvation (Rom. 10:14-17; Acts 4:12). This is likewise implied in the fact that obtaining salvation presupposes personal acts by the intellect, sensibilities and will, i.e., a matter pertaining to the domain of character, requiring on our part the steps of repentance, faith in Christ, and consecration. It is for this reason that the Church was commanded to teach. i.e., make others know, that those taught might know how to gain salvation (Matt. 28:18-20; 2 Pet. 1:2, 3; 2:20, 21).
Indeed, the theory that the heathen and others are saved by their ignorance is a patent absurdity. Why send them missionaries to teach them how to obtain salvation, if they are saved by ignorance? According to this theory, to teach them about salvation would cause most of them—those who will not believe—to be lost who otherwise would have been saved by their ignorance. So through all the generations of the Gospel Age, to preach to them would have been the cause of perdition to almost all who heard the message. Does one say that we must preach to the heathen because God commands it? We agree this is true; but it is evidently that thereby they might gain what they would never gain through ignorance—namely, salvation.
The above theory makes God defeat His own wishes—His desire to bless everyone. Are we to believe that God, who desires that the people may gain life (Ezek. 18:32), is so lacking in common sense and practicability as to institute the office of teaching the Bible—God's Word—as the means of saving people—through which at most a comparatively few are saved now—when leaving them in ignorance would have resulted in the salvation of all of them? Why institute the office of preaching and teaching at all, if ignorance will save all? Manifestly the idea that the unsaved dead are saved by ignorance is unbiblical, unreasonable and unfactual. For many reasons we believe the Bible holds out hope for these—not a second chance, but their first chance, since they had no chance in this life; for there is no chance for salvation without a saving knowledge of Christ (Acts 4:12), which of course such did not have.
We will now discuss some of the more important reasons that prove a Biblical hope for such of the unsaved dead as did not have a chance in this life.
(1) First of all, we set forth God's promise (bound with an oath) as a proof that there is such a chance for those who died without it. This promise was first made to Abraham, in the great Abrahamic Covenant, "In thee shall all the families and nations of the earth be blessed" (Gen. 12:3; 18:18). St. Paul calls this promise the Gospel (Gal. 3:8). Manifestly all the families and nations of the earth have not been blessed in this life. Consequently, those who were not blessed by the Gospel in this life will have to be blessed after this life, or the Gospel, as expressed in the Abrahamic Covenant, would be untrue.
Later, God added to the original promise the statement, binding it by an oath, that in the Seed of Abraham all the nations and kindreds of the earth shall be blessed (Gen. 22:16-18). Who is this Seed of Abraham that is to bless all the families, kindreds and nations of the earth? By Divine inspiration St. Paul assures us that the Seed consists of Jesus and all who faithfully follow Him in this life (Gal. 3:16, 29).
So then the Oath-bound Promise is to this effect, that sometime through Jesus and His loyal followers, all the families, kindreds and nations of the earth will be blessed. Since the only ones so far blessed are those who have become followers of Christ (some of whom, however, have made shipwreck of all by committing the sin unto death), the others, having died unblessed, must get their blessing at the hands of Jesus and His followers after this life, in the resurrection; therefore there is hope for those of the unsaved dead who did not receive the Oath-promised blessings in this life.
Many Scriptures elaborate this promise, showing that the opportunity of obtaining salvation will yet come to those who died without having had such an opportunity.
Isa. 29:18, 24 assures us that those whose eyes and ears of understanding Satan has closed in this life will, in the Millennium, be caused to understand God's Word, by which an opportunity of being saved will be given them.
Isa. 35:5, 6 gives the same line of thought; while v. 10 tells us that they will return, i.e., from the tomb, and come to Zion (Christ and the Church, their Blessers as the Seed) and be greatly blessed.
Isa. 60:14, 15 assures us that all of those whom Satan so blinded as to move them to hate and persecute the true people of God (Zion) would acknowledge them during the Millennium and be greatly gladdened, blessed, by them.
Luke 2:10 assures us that the good tidings of great joy—the Gospel—shall be to all people; but we know that as yet all people have not obtained these good tidings of great joy; in fact the great majority died without that joy, so these must get it after this life.
Therefore, God's giving the great Oath-bound Promise, which He elaborated by numerous other promises, proves that there is hope for those of the unsaved dead who did not have their opportunity for salvation in this life. This Oath-bound Promise is the strongest Biblical proof of hope for such of the unsaved dead.
(2) The second reason for hope for the unsaved dead is the Ransom-sacrifice of Jesus, laid down for every human being. That Jesus died for the sins of the whole human family is very apparent from the following passages: John 1:29, 36; 3:14-17; 11:51, 52; Rom. 5:6-8, 18, 19; 1 Cor. 15:3; 2 Cor. 5:14, 15, 19; Gal. 4:4; Col. 1:20; 1 Tim. 2:6; Heb. 2:9; 1 John 2:2. The Bible speaks of His death as His giving Himself a Ransom for all men (Matt. 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6).
The word ransom is the translation of the Greek word antilutron, which is compounded of the two words lutron, price, and anti, instead. It means a price instead of, i.e., a corresponding price. The figure is that of a business transaction. In the figure God is the Creditor, Adam and the race in his loins the debtor, and Jesus the Purchaser. The Creditor requires the payment of the full debt, no more and no less. The debt is the human all of the perfect man Adam. The purchase price to redeem the debtor must be the exact equivalent. Jesus became a man and laid down this exactly equivalent price by His death, when in offset of Adam's debt He gave the all of His perfect humanity.
Thus as the perfect Adam's human all involved his right to life, as well as all his perfect human life-rights, which when he sinned had to be surrendered in death in payment of his debt, so Jesus as the corresponding price had to lay down His human life and all His perfect human life-rights. Both being perfect humans, of exactly equivalent rights, the life and life-rights of Jesus are a corresponding price for those of Adam. Therefore as the Ransom they are an offset before the Creditor to the complete debt of Adam, which by heredity involved Adam's entire race, yet in his loins at the time of his sin.
The Ransom, therefore, implies that in God's "due time" (1 Tim. 2:5, 6) there will be the complete deliverance of the entire human race from the Adamic sentence. Now, by an imputation, this corresponding price cancels the sins of Jesus' followers (Rom. 8:1; Heb. 7:25; 9:24; 10:14; 1 John 4:10), and thus gives them an opportunity to gain everlasting life. By and by, through an application, as a gift, it will cancel the sins of the whole world (John 1:29; 1 John 2:2).
Therefore the world, then free from the Adamic sentence, will be given an opportunity to gain salvation from all the effects of that sentence; for if it was just, or right, that through the forfeiture of the human life and life-rights of Adam they by heredity became involved in his ruin, it is just that through the substitution of the equivalent of Adam's debt they be freed from the sentence, in order to gain deliverance from every vestige of the ruin. Accordingly, the Ransom guarantees an opportunity for everyone to be saved. Therefore those who did not enjoy that opportunity in this life will have it in the future life. Thus we see there is hope for the unsaved dead who did not have such an opportunity in this life.
This is exactly the way the Scriptures set forth the matter. In John 12:32, our Lord Jesus declares: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." Thus He shows that His Ransom-sacrifice, which was completed when He was lifted up on the cross and died, will result in all men being drawn to Him, i.e., in being delivered from the death sentence and in being favorably influenced toward Him. But the vast majority have not been so delivered and influenced toward Him in this life. Therefore this will occur with them in the next life.
In Rom. 5:12-19, St. Paul reasons to the same effect. In vs. 12-14 he shows how Adam's sin brought the death sentence (not an eternal torment sentence) upon the entire human family. Then by comparisons and contrasts he shows Adam's sin and its effect for the whole race, and the contrasted righteousness of Jesus unto death and its effects for the whole race. And whereas the one brought sin, wrath and death upon all, so the other brings righteousness and release from wrath and death to all, to the end that all may through Christ, if they fulfill the conditions, obtain the right to life, "justification of life." We are witnesses to the fact that "the free gift" "unto justification of life" has come only to the minority in this life; therefore its coming to most of the all must be future.
Note, the second italicized (inserted) word "came" in v. 18 should have been made to read "shall come." Two facts prove this: (a) the fact that the free gift, which v. 16 shows is the forgiveness of sins, did not in this life come to all men, and therefore must refer to a future event; and (b) the fact that v. 19 gives the reason and explanation for the statement in v. 18 ("the free gift shall come upon all men unto justification of life") by using the future tense, "shall be made righteous," in respect to the Adamic sin. Thus Rom. 5:12-19 very strongly proves that the Ransom guarantees an opportunity for life to every son and daughter of Adam, and therefore proves that those who did not receive the opportunity in this life will have it in the next life.
Note also 2 Cor. 5:14, 15: "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead." This likewise supports the teaching that all must learn, now or hereafter, of Christ's Ransom-sacrificial death on their behalf.
1 Tim. 2:4-6 is another passage to the point. In v. 4 two glorious promises are made as an outflow of the Divine good will:  that all men will be saved, not eternally, but from the Adamic sentence; and  that all men will come into an exact knowledge of the Truth. Three reasons are given in vs. 5 and 6 for these two blessings: (a) the unity of God, which implies that He has all the Wisdom, Power, Justice and Love to effect these two blessings; (b) the Ransom-sacrifice and consequent Mediatorial office of Christ Jesus on behalf of all men; and (c) the due seasons of God's Plan, when the blessings of the Ransom will be savingly testified—now for the Church as followers of Jesus, and in the Millennium for the entire world. Thus this passage gives, among other things, the Ransom as the reason for an opportunity for all.
Note also 1 Tim. 4:10: "We trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men [not unto giving all eternal life, but from the Adamic death sentence; after it is removed from each one—which God here guarantees, and which therefore must come to all, now or hereafter—each is given an individual trial for life, and only those who prove worthy in their trial are given everlasting life], specially [the Savior to the uttermost] of those [only] that believe [who accept and faithfully hold to Jesus as Savior and Lord in this life—the elect—or after the resurrection awakening—the non-elect]."
Titus 2:11 testifies similarly: "The grace [love] of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men" (ASV), in His gift of Jesus for mankind's salvation.
Jesus' death for all is clearly taught in Heb. 2:9, which states that Jesus was made a perfect human being like perfect Adam "that by the grace of God he should taste death for every man."
In 1 John 2:2, Jesus is expressly called "the propitiation [satisfaction] for our [the Church's] sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world [therefore they also must all benefit from it]."
Accordingly, there will be an opportunity for salvation in the next life, in the resurrection awakening, for all who did not have such an opportunity in this life.
Two questions which may come up to many earnest, thinking students are: (a) If Christ died for the benefit of all mankind, why have the benefits of His death been so long delayed in coming to all mankind? (b) Why did they not flow out to all as soon as He died and was resurrected or at the latest at Pentecost?
We will answer these questions from the standpoint of their implications in the reverse order of their presentation. Christ's death-benefits could not flow out to all as soon as He died and was resurrected, because the merit of His death was not yet appropriated on behalf of anyone. This was not done until after His ascension, i.e., until Pentecost. Although at Calvary our Lord completed the laying down of His human life-rights and His human right to life—His Ransom merit—for us, He thereby did not impute them to us; He thereby merely made them available for such an imputation, which was later to be made. In other words, Justice was not yet satisfied for our sins at Calvary; for there only the right to life with its corresponding life-rights was separated from Himself in so far as His use of them for Himself was concerned; and thus they were put into a condition in which He could use them for others.
Nor by Jesus' resurrection did He impute this right and its life-rights to us; for from the standpoint of God's justice, Christ's resurrection was not the rendering of satisfaction to it, but was the evidence that He had faithfully done the Father's will unto death, and that His righteousness was available for making atonement, which as a matter of fact He had not yet made. In other words, by His death He had set aside a ransom-price sufficient to purchase the world, and by His resurrection the proof of this fact was given; but by neither act did He actually purchase the world.
Christ was by these two acts in the position of a man who has made the purchase price of a certain property available for buying that property, but who has not yet bought it, though he is fully intending to buy it. What must a person do who has the money to buy a house that is for sale, in order to acquire it for himself? He must pay for it, and obtain the necessary papers, before he is the purchaser and owner of the property in question. And when he does these things the property is his purchased possession. So Christ, making the purchase price available by His death, and by His resurrection being assured that the purchase price was acceptable for the redemption of the race, had to use it for purchasing the possession. And this He did after His ascension only for the Church, not for the world, even as we read in Heb. 9:24 (compare 1 John 2:2) "Christ hath now appeared in the presence of God for us," i.e., as the Church's Advocate at the bar of justice He appeared with the price that satisfies justice for the debt of the Church—those of the culprits for whom He now acts as Advocate before the bar of Divine justice. It is for this reason that the holy Spirit could not be given until Pentecost — after He appeared in the presence of God for them.
St. Paul in Heb. 9:24 traces the matter from the standpoint of type and antitype, thus: As Aaron had first to offer the sacrifice in the Tabernacle Court so as to make the blood available for sprinkling on the Mercy Seat for atonement, and thereafter made the atonement by such sprinkling (Lev. 16:11-17) in the Holy of Holies; so Christ, by His death in the justified condition (the antitypical Court) had to make His Ransom merit available for atonement, and thereafter, at Pentecost, in heaven (the antitypical Holy of Holies) actually did make the atonement for the Church only. Therefore the blessing of His death could not operate on anyone's behalf until Pentecost, fifty days after His resurrection. Thus we have answered part of the implications in the first question.
Now for the answer to the rest of the implications in the first and the whole of the second question: Why have the benefits of Christ's death been so long delayed in coming to all mankind? and why did they not come to all at Pentecost? It undoubtedly is a fact that the vast majority of mankind have died without getting the benefits of Christ's death, yes, without even having an opportunity of obtaining them, having never heard of them. It is a further fact that comparatively few have as yet obtained these benefits, and these facts raise in the sincere, thinking student's mind the queries that we are considering.
(a) The main reason is that God for the wisest and most benevolent purposes has not willed that during the Gospel Age these benefits should come to everyone, but rather that they be restricted to the faith class—the elect; for they are the only ones who could be saved under the strenuous conditions of a faith Age, since they are the only ones capable of exercising the necessary faith required by the conditions of such an Age. Therefore God mercifully leaves the others shut up in their unbelief until He has completed the elect class, who need the schooling of present faith-testing conditions for their proper training for the office of blessing the non-elect with favorable opportunities of obtaining the restitution salvation of the Millennial Age (Rom. 11:30-32).
(b) If the benefits of Christ's death were in this faith Age applied for the unbelief class, every one of them would be eternally lost, because they lack the faith essential to overcoming amid the strenuous conditions of the faith Age (2 Thes. 3:2; Heb. 11:6).
(c) Jehovah benevolently designs permitting the unbelief class now to undergo an experience with evil, which when contrasted with the experience with good, designed by Him for them in the next Age, will better than anything else that we can think of turn them into hating and forsaking sin and loving and adhering to righteousness, because experience is the best of all teachers to such characters as the unbelief class.
(d) The nearly 2,000 years since Calvary have been needed in order that there be enough human beings propagated to fill the earth in the Millennium.
(e) And finally, Jehovah has set aside the Millennial Age for the very purpose of instituting a fit time and proper conditions for extending the benefits of Christ's death with best results to the whole non-elect world—conditions which will not require a sightless faith, now required of the elect. It is for this reason that Christ during the Gospel Age imputes His merit only on behalf of the elect (Heb. 9:24; 10:14), and reserves the application of His merit on behalf of the world for the Millennial Age, even as Aaron made the first atonement for the Priesthood and Levites only, and then made the second atonement "for the people" (Lev. 16:6, 11, 14, 9, 15, 17; Heb. 7:27).
(3) A third Scriptural line of thought proves the proposition that all who had no opportunity for salvation in this life will be given their chance in the next life: Jesus says that all sins except the sin against the holy Spirit (all other sins are Adamic sins) will be forgiven the children of men. Mark 3:28, 29 is to the point: "All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme; but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness." This passage very clearly teaches that every sin except the sin against the holy Spirit will be forgiven the human family. But all experience proves that the vast majority of the human family have not sinned against the holy Spirit (sinned willfully against clear light) but nevertheless died without the forgiveness of their sins. Therefore the sins of such persons will be forgiven in the next life. So there is hope for such of the unsaved dead.
In the parallel passage of Matt. 12:31, 32, which we will quote from the ASV, because it translates the passage better than the KJV, Jesus shows that there are two periods of time for forgiveness of sin: (a) in this world (Age) and (b) in that which is to come; but in neither of them will the sin against the holy Spirit be forgiven. Therefore this passage implies that those sins that are not against the holy Spirit, and that were not forgiven in this world, will be forgiven in the next "Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come."
(4) The character of God, combined with the fact that most unsaved people die with characters reformable under easier conditions than those now prevailing, proves that in the next life, under the easier conditions of the Millennium, an opportunity for reformation will be given to those whose characters are reformable under those easier conditions. Experience and the Scriptures teach that only those who can trust God where they cannot trace Him can under the present evil conditions develop characters fitted for everlasting life (Heb. 11:6; Gal. 3:7, 9). Experience and the Scriptures teach that the unbelieving class, unable to exercise such faith, cannot under present evil conditions develop characters fitted for everlasting life, because through their ignorance and weaknesses Satan blinds and misleads them (2 Cor. 4:4); and that therefore God gives them up to their unbelieving condition, that later, under easier conditions, He may show them mercy through which they can reform (Rom. 11:30-32).
Thus we see that some pass out of this life with characters which can be reformed, if they are given a chance for reformation amid conditions conducive to their reformation such as the Bible assures us the Millennial conditions will be. Death does not fix character either in good or in evil any more than natural sleep fixes character in good or evil. Therefore there is nothing about death that can estop the Almighty's willingness to help people to reform; for the only thing that estops Him from reformatory efforts is irreformability in the willfully wicked.
The Bible shows us that God delights to use His Wisdom, Power, Justice and Love (the chief qualities of His character) in ways to help people to reform (Rev. 15:3, 4). These qualities moved Him to send His Son to be a Ransom for all. To have given His Son unto death for all was the greatest sacrifice that He could make to save man. And if His almighty Wisdom, Power, Justice and Love were displayed in giving His Son to die for all mankind's blessing, with an opportunity of recovery from the curse and of gaining eternal life, would His Wisdom, Power, Justice and Love stop short of doing easier things—such as putting the race under conditions that would be conducive to the reformation of even the weakest of the race for whom He did the hardest thing—gave His Son unto death for them (Rom. 8:32)? Verily His holy character, being strong enough to do the hardest thing for them, will not stop short of doing the easier thing, i.e., giving them a chance for recovery amid conditions in which they could reform, as the unbelieving class cannot now reform. This therefore implies that later on God will arrange to help those to reformation whom in this life He did not so help.
(5) The Bible gives a fifth fact that proves an opportunity for those of the unsaved dead who in this life were denied the opportunity of gaining salvation: God's object in selecting the Church now from among mankind is that in the next life He may use this elect Church as His Agent to bless with opportunities of salvation all the non-elect, i.e., those passed by during the present life, in which only the elect, the faith class, are dealt with. The Bible teaches that the human family consists of two classes: (a) a faith class (Gal. 3:7-9; 2 Cor. 5:7), and (b) an unbelieving class (2 Thes. 3:2; Rom. 11:30-32). God, foreknowing that under conditions that require a strong faith in order for one to overcome, the faith class could, but the unbelieving class could not gain salvation, predetermined to give only the faith class the opportunity to gain salvation while those conditions would prevail.
This procedure is wise, just and loving, and is in the interests of all concerned. In other words, the loving heart of God desires ardently to help all His fallen creatures, and therefore He arranged His Plan in such a way as will be to the best interests of all concerned. If He would put the unbelieving class on trial for life amid present conditions, in which it would be impossible for any of them to be saved, since these conditions require faith, which they do not have, He would be acting against His Wisdom, Justice and Love, a thing that He will not do. How much more like the good God that He is, to defer the trial of the unbelieving class until conditions prevail amid which they can overcome, and now give only those a trial who amid conditions that make the exercise of faith necessary can exercise the required faith and thus win out! How much more like Him to select this very faith class for the purpose of preparing them to help the unbelieving class to reformation when their trial time comes! And because of the faith class being faithful under the harder conditions He, of course, gives them a greater reward.
It is even so according to the Scriptures. St. James teaches (Acts 15:14-17) that during the Gospel Age, God has been visiting the nations to take, select, out of them a people for His name, the elect. He likewise shows that after this is done, the Lord will return and establish the Kingdom, in order that the residue (Webster defines the word residue to mean that which is left after a part is taken from it) of men might seek after the Lord, i.e., seek salvation. The elect are the part taken out and the non-elect are the residue of men, those that are left after the elect are taken out from among men. (See also "out of" in Rev. 5:9, 10.) Therefore we see that God first, in this Age, deals with the elect for salvation; then, in the next Age, He will deal with the non-elect for their salvation.
In Rom. 9, 10 and 11, St. Paul shows that because of unbelief Israel as a nation failed to gain a place among the elect, and that God has gathered the faith class from among both Jews and Gentiles, making them the elect. In chapter 11 he shows God's loving design in this matter. Particularly in vs. 25-33 he shows that God permitted Israel to stumble and wander about in their unbelief, while He during the Gospel Age would gather the elect out of all nations, in order to use them after the Gospel Age, i.e., during the Millennium, to show mercy toward the unbelieving class in Israel.
V. 25 shows that they would have to remain in their blindness until the full number of the Elect from among the Gentiles, "the fulness of the Gentiles," would come unto their trial period. Vs. 26 and 27 show that after this, God would recover them from their blindness, forgive them and make the New Covenant with them. Vs. 28, 29 show that it was to effect the operation of the elective features of the Gospel that God permitted Israel to fall in their unbelief into enmity with Him and His elect people; yet because of their relations to the promises given to the fathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, God still loves them, and will not change His purpose to bless them and make them a blessing in the Millennium.
Vs. 30, 31 show that while Israel because of unbelief during the Gospel Age has not had the kindness that the Gospel Church because of faith has had, i.e., the privilege of trial for the elective salvation, yet the Gospel Church is having this trial for the very purpose of showing during the Millennium the kindness of granting a trial for life to the unbelieving class in Israel, i.e., that class that throughout the Gospel Age has been dying in unbelief. V. 32 shows that this has been all along the loving design of God in leaving the unbelieving class in Israel in their unbelieving condition in one generation after another throughout this Age.
How clear this makes the language of the aged Simeon (Luke 2:34), who said of the child Jesus: "This child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel"! The unbelieving class in Israel throughout the Age stumbled and fell over Jesus and died in that condition; but thanks be to God, the very ones who fell will "rise again." And as they did not "rise again" in this life, it must be that they will "rise again" in the next, "that through your mercy," the mercy that the elect in the Millennium will show them, "they also may obtain mercy; for God hath concluded them all [left them all unhelped] in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable [to the natural man, but understood by the spiritual man (1 Cor. 2:7-16)] are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"
Let us praise our God for the understanding of this glorious mystery! It surely reveals a future opportunity for those who had none in this life. How beautifully clear, harmonious and lovable is the teaching of the Bible as just shown on the subject of the elect and the non-elect! Surely we may well love and worship a God who has arranged so benevolent and practical a plan!
(6) The Bible teaches a twofold experience for the non-elect, those who in this life were not given the opportunity of gaining the elective salvation. It teaches that in this life they will have an experience with evil, amid which, with experience as a teacher, they will learn just what sin is and just what its effects are. It further teaches that to those who in this life have undergone the experience with evil there will in the next life be given an experience with good amid which, with experience as a teacher, they will learn what righteousness is and what are its effects.
The Bible teaches also that the experience with evil, which has come to all by Father Adam's sin, is given to the race while the curse prevails. And it teaches that the experience with good, effected for all by Christ's Ransom-sacrifice laid down in righteousness, will come after the Adamic sentence is lifted from the race, i.e., during the Millennium, the thousand years of Christ's Reign on the earth.
The Bible further teaches that exactly opposite conditions accompany the two experiences; and thus God will most effectively teach the race to hate sin, from a knowledge by experience of its nature and effects, and all the more thoroughly, because of the contrast, to love righteousness, from a knowledge by experience of its nature and effects.
The human family's experience with evil is accompanied by the following bad things: sin, error, Satan's controllership in human affairs, the earth under the curse (having earthquakes, volcanoes, tidal waves, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, droughts and extremes of climate), mankind having pain, sickness, sorrow, disappointments, losses, hardships, necessities, enmities, calamities, hard labor, accidents, false religions, oppressive governments, predatory aristocracies, wars, revolutions, lawlessness, famines, pestilences, persecution of the righteous, exaltation of the wicked, selfishness, cruelty, dying and death.
The experience with good will be accompanied by the following good things (which are the reverse of the present evils): righteousness, truth, Christ's controllership in human affairs, a Paradisaic earth, pleasure, joy, prosperity, gains, comforts, abundance, friendships, equable climate, a reasonable amount of work with no labor, no accidents, no calamities, the true religion, a fostering government, a benevolent equality and fraternity, peace, lawful conduct, plenty, public weal, reward of the righteous, correction of wrongdoers, brotherly and disinterested love, kindness, convalescence, health and life. The Bible clearly teaches that the non-elect will have both of these experiences. If this can be proven, it would of course follow that there will be an opportunity for all the non-elect dead in the next life.
Rom. 8:19-22 is a passage that shows these two experiences. V. 19 shows that the human race, the creature (literally, as the same word is translated in v. 22, the [human] creation—see ASV) is now, while under the curse (v. 22), earnestly longing for and is kept waiting for a better time, a time when the Sons of God, Jesus and His faithful followers, will be manifested in the glories of the Kingdom (Col. 3:4; Dan. 7:13, 14, 18, 22, 27; Rom. 8:17; Jude 14).
V. 20 shows that the human family, without fault of its own, but through Adam's sin, was subject to the curse, "vanity" but is not to be left hopeless under the curse; for v. 21 shows that it is to be delivered from the curse, in order that it may obtain the liberty that will be the portion of all who become sons of God, a liberty that Jesus and the Church will minister to the obedient in the Kingdom. Then v. 22 shows the experience of evil to be universal in the human family. Thus vs. 19, 20 and 22 show the experience of evil, and v. 21 shows the deliverance from the curse of evil, i.e., the experience of righteousness, for all who were all their lifetime subject to the curse ("vanity"), and this in order that they may gain life through Christ on condition of obedience (Acts 3:23).
Rom. 11:30-32 contains the same thought, an experience of woe meted out to Israel as a nation throughout the Gospel Age, in which they were excluded from mercy, the special favor of God, to be followed by an experience of bliss, in which the very ones who experienced the woe throughout this life will experience the mercy, the special favor, of God through the glorious blessings that the Gospel Church, glorified with Jesus, will in mercy minister to them.
Psalm 90 contains the same thought. In vs. 1 and 2 Jehovah in His eternity is set forth. V. 3 in its first clause refers to the experience of evil as a turning of man into destruction; while the experiences of good are referred to in its last clause as a returning from destruction. V. 4 refers to a thousand-year period (the Millennium) as the time of the return from destruction, and the turning to the experience with good.
Vs. 5-10 describe various features (fifteen in all) of the curse, amid which the experience with evil is had; while v. 11 asks as to the power (meaning) of the experience of evil, and answers that it is designed to work reverence for God, which v. 12 teaches will be accomplished, if its lessons are taken to heart. V. 13 prays for the return from the experience of evil, i.e., for a change of procedure ("Let it repent thee") from the experiences of evil so far undergone. V. 14 shows that the very ones who suffered sorrows (the experiences of evil) all their days (v. 9), therefore until the time of their death, are praying that in another set of all their days, in the next life, the time of the experience with good, they may be full of joy and happiness.
V. 15 contains the prayer that, as in all the days of the first life they were afflicted and saw (experienced) evil, they may in the second life be glad, and thus realize the purpose that God had in permitting evil to fill their first life. V. 16 contains a prayer that Jesus and the Church as God's servants may carry forward the work of blessing mankind, i.e., giving them the experience with good, and that the world of mankind, the children of Jesus and the Church, who are the Second Adam and Eve, may carry forward God's glory; while v. 17 prays for the renewal of God's image (the beauty of the Lord) and His likeness (the work of ruling the earth, as God has the work of ruling the universe) to be given to those who in the "all days" of this life experienced evil, and who will in the "all days" of the next life experience good.
Thus this Psalm and the other Scriptures previously quoted prove from the standpoint of the two experiences (one with evil, the other with good) that there is hope for those of the unsaved dead who in this life did not experience the mercy, the favor, of Jehovah.
(7) A seventh proof that the Bible holds out hope for the unsaved dead who did not have the opportunity for salvation in this life is, that the facts that it sets forth demonstrate it. The Bible teaches that the people who were destroyed by fire and brimstone in Sodom, Gomorrah and the other cities of the plains, together with the Jews of the northern ten-tribed kingdom and the Jews of the southern two-tribed kingdom, in spite of their wickedness in this life (Ezek. 16:44-52), will come back to this earth and live here again (Ezek. 16:53); that the Jews will repent of their sins (Ezek. 16:54, 57-59, 61, 63); that God will make a New Covenant with them (Ezek. 16:60, 62); and that He will give the people of Sodom, etc., and the people of Samaria, etc., to the Jews for daughters, i.e., such as they will convert to the Lord; for those who are converted by others are Scripturally spoken of as their children (Gal. 4:19; 1 Cor. 4:15; Isa. 60:4). In Ezek. 16:55 the work of restoring Sodom and her daughters (people subject to her), Samaria and her daughters, and Jerusalem and her daughters, is called their return to their former estate, Restitution (Acts 3:21), a return to the original condition of perfection in which the race was in Adam, before sin entered the world, i.e., a return to God's image and likeness.
Our Lord Jesus corroborates this thought with respect to the people subject to Sodom (Matt. 11:23, 24), and adds hope for the Phoenicians, the people of Tyre and Sidon (Matt. 11:21, 22), showing that they were all less guilty than were the Israelites, who the Scriptures declare will have this opportunity, and that these will have an easier time than will the unbelieving Jews of His day, when He shall reign over the earth in the Day of Judgment (Luke 22:29, 30). Surely if these will have an opportunity, all the rest of the unsaved dead who in this life were excluded from the opportunity of salvation will have it, "in that Day." Thus the declarations of the Bible prove a hope for many of the unsaved dead.

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