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The creation of the contents of this website was done with the utmost care. However, we can not guarantee the completeness of the content provided, its timeliness and accuracy. Pursuant to §§ 8 - 10 TMG, we, as service providers, have no obligation to monitor third-party information that has been transmitted or stored, or to search for clues and circumstances that indicate the illegality of activities and information. An obligation on our part to block the use of content within the framework of general laws remains unaffected. However, this liability is only in the moment of notice of a specific violation of rights in question. If we are aware of any violations, the relevant content must be removed by us immediately. Our liability for our own content, as a service provider, is governed by the general laws.
On the content published by the provider on this page, the German copyright and ancillary copyright law applies. If the copying, processing, distribution or any other form of exploitation outside the German copyright and ancillary copyright, it requires the written consent of the respective creator. Unauthorized copying or downloading of these pages is only permitted for private use, but not for commercial use.Unless we act as the operator and creator of the content, the copyrights of third parties are respected. We always endeavor to mark such content as third-party content. In the event that despite careful work on our part, you notice copyright infringement, we kindly ask you to inform us accordingly, so that the removal of this content can be arranged immediately.
The protection of your privacy when processing personal data is an important concern for SMARTY Hotels | Hostels | Boardinghouses, which we take into account in our business processes. Below we inform you about the handling of your data according to Art. 13 EU-GDPR.
(2) Responsible acc. Art. 4 para. 7 EU Data Protection Regulation (DS-GMO) is Géraldine Reumkens, Graf-Gessler Street 13-15, office@rheinland-hotels.de (see our imprint). Our data protection officer can be reached under office@rheinland-hotels.de or our mailing address with the suffix "The Information Commissioner".
d) You can configure your browser setting according to your wishes. B. decline the acceptance of third-party cookies or all cookies. Please be aware that this may not enable you to use all features of this site.
f) The Flash cookies used are not detected by your browser, but by your Flash plug-in. Furthermore, we use HTML5 storage objects that are stored on your device. These objects store the required data regardless of your browser and do not have an automatic expiration date. If you do not want to process the Flash cookies, you must install a corresponding add-on, eg. Eg " Better Privacy" for Mozilla Firefox (https://addons.mozilla.org/en/firefox/addon/betterprivacy/) or the Adobe Flash killer cookie for Google Chrome. The use of HTML5 storage You can prevent objects by using private mode in your browser.In addition, we recommend that you regularly delete your cookies and the browser history manually.
(3) You can prevent the storage of cookies by setting your browser software accordingly; however, please note that if you do this, you may not be able to use all the features of this website to the fullest extent possible. You may also prevent the collection by Google of the data generated by the cookie and related to your use of the website (including your IP address) as well as the processing of this data by Google by using the browser plug-in available under the following link. in download and install: https://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de.
(4) This website uses Google Analytics with the extension "_ anonymizeIp ( )". As a result, IP addresses are processed shortened, a person-relatedness can be excluded. Insofar as the data collected about you is assigned a personal reference, it will be immediately excluded and the personal data will be deleted immediately.
(5) We use Google Analytics to analyze and regularly improve the use of our website. With the statistics we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. For the exceptional cases in which Personal Information is transferred to the US, Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework. Legal basis for the use of Google Analytics is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(1) This website uses technologies from etracker GmbH (https://www.etracker.com/) to collect and store data for marketing and optimization purposes . From this data, usage profiles can be created under a pseudonym. Cookies can be used for this purpose (see § 3 for details). Cookies are small text files stored locally in the cache of the site visitor's Internet browser. Cookies enable recognition of the Internet browser. The data collected with the eTracker technologies will not be used to personally identify the visitor to this website and will not be merged with personal data about the bearer of the pseudonym without the specific consent of the data subject. The data collection and storage can be contradicted at any time with effect for the future.
(2) We use eTracker to analyze and regularly improve the use of our website. With the statistics we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. The collected data are stored permanently and analyzed pseudonymously. Legal basis for the use of eTracker is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(3) Information from the third-party provider : etracker GmbH, Erste Brunnenstraße 1, 20459 Hamburg; https://www.etracker.com/de/datenschutz.html . Legal basis for the use of eTracker is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(1) This website uses the web analytics service Jetpack (formerly: WordPress.com- Stats ) to analyze and regularly improve the use of our website. With the statistics we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. Furthermore, we use the system for measures to protect the security of the website, eg. As the detection of attacks or viruses. For the exceptional cases in which personal data is transferred to the US, Automattic Inc. has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov . Legal basis for the use of Jetpack is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(2) For this evaluation, cookies (more detailed in § 3) are stored on your computer. The information collected in this way is stored on a server in the USA. If you prevent the storage of cookies, we point out that you may not be able to use this website to the full extent. The prevention of the storage of cookies is possible by setting in your browser or by clicking the button "Click here to Opt- out "athttps://www.quantcast.com/opt-out/ .
(4) Third Party Information: Automattic Inc., 60 29th Street, # 343, San Francisco, CA 94110-4929, USA, https://automattic.com/privacy , and the third party tracking technology company: Quantcast Inc., 201 3rd St , Floor 2, San Francisco, CA 94103-3153, USA, https://www.quantcast.com/privacy .
(1) This website uses the web analytics service Adobe Analytics ( Omniture ) to analyze and regularly improve the use of our website. With the statistics we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. For the exceptional cases in which personal information is transferred to the US, Adobe is subject to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework .Legal basis for the use of Adobe Analytics is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(2) For this evaluation, cookies (more detailed in § 3) are stored on your computer. The information collected in this way is stored on servers, including in the USA. If you prevent the storage of cookies, we point out that you may not be able to use this website in full. The prevention of the storage of cookies is possible by setting in your browser or by clicking the buttons "Logout" athttps://www.adobe.com/de/privacy/opt-out.html .
(3) This website uses Adobe Analytics ( Omniture ) with the settings " Before Geo-Lookup: Replace visitor's last IP octet with 0 "and" Obfuscate IP- Removed ", which replaces your IP address with the last octet and replaces it with a generic IP address, ie an unassignable one. A person-related ability is to be excluded thereby.
(1) Our website uses the measuring method (" SZMnG ") of INFOnline GmbH ( https://www.infonline.de ) to determine statistical parameters for the use of our offers. The aim of the range measurement is to determine the intensity of use, the number of users of a website and the surfing behavior statistically - based on a uniform standard procedure - and thus obtain comparable values across the market.
For web offers that are members of the information community to determine the distribution of advertising e. V. (IVW - http://www.ivw.eu ) or in the studies of Arbeitsgemeinschaft Online-Forschung e. V. (AGOF - https://www.agof.de/ ), the usage statistics are regularly updated by the AGOF and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyze e. V. ( agma - https://www.agma-mmc.de/ ) and the IVW are published and can be viewed on the respective websites.
The Infoline GmbH collects and processes data according to German data protection law. Technical and organizational measures ensure that individual users can not be identified at any time. Data that may be related to a particular, identifiable person will be anonymized as soon as possible.
On the Internet, each device for transmitting data requires a unique address, the so-called IP address. The at least temporary storage of the IP address is technically necessary due to the functioning of the Internet. The IP addresses are shortened before any processing and processed only anonymously. There is no storage or processing of the unabridged IP addresses.
A so-called geo-localization, ie the assignment of a website call to the place of the call, takes place exclusively on the basis of the anonymized IP address and only up to the geographical level of the federal states / regions. In no case can a conclusion be drawn on the specific place of residence of a user from the geographic information obtained in this way.
The range measurement uses to recognize computer systems alternatively either a cookie with the identifier "ioam.de", a " Local Storage Object " or an anonymous signature, which is created from various automatically transmitted information from your browser. The validity of the cookie is limited to a maximum of 1 year.
For the measurement of distributed use (use of a service of different devices), the user ID can be transmitted to INFOnline on login, if available, as an anonymous check sum .
Further information on data protection in the measurement process can be found on the website of INFOnline GmbH ( https://www.infonline.de ), which operates the measurement process, the data protection website of AGOF ( http://www.agof.de/datenschutz-allgemein/) ) and the privacy website of the IVW ( http://www.ivw.eu ).
(2) We use the SZM process to analyze and regularly improve the use of our website. With the statistics we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. The legal basis for the use of the SZM procedure is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(1) We currently use the following social media plug-ins: Facebook , Instagram , Google+ , YouTube , Twitter, Xing, LinkedIn.
1 . We use the so-called two-click solution.
2 . In other words, when you visit our site, no personal data is initially passed on to the providers of the plug-ins. The provider of the plug-in can be identified by the marking on the box above its initial letter or logo. We give you the opportunity to communicate directly with the provider of the plug-in via the button. Only if you click on the marked field and activate it, the plug-in provider receives the information that you have accessed the corresponding website of our online service. In addition, the data mentioned under § 3 of this declaration will be transmitted. In the case of Facebook and Xing, according to the respective providers in Germany, the IP address is anonymized immediately after collection. By activating the plug-in, personal data will be transmitted by you to the respective plug-in provider and stored there (with US providers in the USA). Since the plug-in provider carries out the data collection, in particular via cookies, we recommend that you delete all cookies before clicking on the greyed box via the security settings of your browser.
(3) The plug-in provider saves the data collected about you as usage profiles and uses these for purposes of advertising, market research and / or tailor-made website design. Such an evaluation is carried out in particular (also for non-logged-in users) for the presentation of needs-based advertising and to inform other users of the social network about your activities on our website. You have the right to object to the formation of these user profiles, whereby you must contact the respective plug-in provider to exercise it. Through the plug-ins we offer you the opportunity to interact with the social networks and other users, so that we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. The legal basis for the use of the plug-ins is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(4) The data transfer takes place regardless of whether you have an account with the plug-in provider and are logged in there. If you are logged into the plug-in provider, your data collected from us will be assigned directly to your existing account with the plug-in provider. If you press the activated button and z. For example, if you link the page, the plug-in provider also stores this information in your user account and shares it publicly with your contacts. We recommend logging out regularly after using a social network , but especially before activating the button, as this will prevent you from being assigned to your profile with the plug-in provider.
(5) For more information on the purpose and scope of the data collection and its processing by the plug-in provider, please refer to the privacy statements of these providers, which are provided below.There you will also find further information about your rights and settings options for the protection of your privacy.
a) Facebook Inc., 1601 S California Ave, Palo Alto, California 94304, USA; https://www.facebook.com/policy.php ; Further information to Data collection : https://www.facebook.com/help/186325668085084, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-other#applications as https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#everyoneinfo . Facebook / Instagram has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework .
b) Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountainview, California 94043, USA; https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/partners/?hl=en . Google / YouTube has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield,https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework .
c) Twitter, Inc., 1355 Market St., Suite 900, San Francisco, California 94103, USA; https://twitter.com/privacy . Twitter has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-USFramework .
d) Xing AG, Gänsemarkt 43, 20354 Hamburg, DE; https://www.xing.com/privacy .
e ) LinkedIn Corporation, 2029 Stierlin Court, Mountain View, California 94043, USA; https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy . LinkedIn has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield,https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework .
(1) Our websites also contain AddThis plug-ins. These plug-ins allow you to set bookmarks or share interesting content with other users. The plug-ins allow us to interact with social networks and other users so that we can improve our offer and make it more interesting for you as a user. The legal basis for the use of the plug-ins is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO.
(2) Through these plug-ins, your Internet browser establishes a direct connection to the AddThis servers and, where appropriate, the selected social network or bookmarking service. The recipients receive the information that you have accessed the corresponding website of our online service and the data mentioned in § 3 of this statement. This information is processed on AddThis servers in the United States. If you send content on our website to social networks or bookmarking services, a link can be made between visiting our website and your user profile on the relevant network. We have no influence on the collected data and data processing operations, nor are we aware of the full extent of data collection, the purpose of the processing, the retention periods. We also have no information to delete the data collected by the plug-in provider.
(4) If you do not wish to participate in this process, you may object to data collection and storage at any time by setting an opt -out cookie with future effect: http://www.addthis.com/privacy/opt-out ,Alternatively, you can set your browser to prevent a cookie from being set.
(5) Further information on the purpose and scope of the data collection and its processing by the plug-in provider, as well as further information on your rights and options for privacy can be found atAddThis LLC, 1595 Spring Hill Road, Sweet 300, Vienna , VA 22182, USA, www.addthis.com/privacy .
(1) We have included YouTube videos in our online offering, which are stored at https://www.youtube.com/ and are directly playable from our website. These are all integrated in the "extended privacy mode", d. H. that you do not transfer data about you as a user to YouTube if you are not playing the videos. Only when you play the videos, the data mentioned in paragraph 2 will be transmitted. We have no influence on this data transfer.
(2) By visiting the website, Google receives the information that you have accessed the corresponding subpage of our website. In addition, the under § 3 of this declaration. This is done regardless of whether Google provides a user account that you are logged in to, or if there is no user account. When you're logged in to Google, your data will be assigned directly to your account. If you do not wish to be associated with your profile on Google, you must log out before activating the button. Google stores your data as usage profiles and uses them for purposes of advertising, market research and / or tailor-made website design. Such an evaluation is done in particular (even for users who are not logged in) to provide appropriate advertising and to inform other users of the social network about their activities on our website. You have a right of objection to the formation of these user profiles, and you must comply with this to Google.
(1) This website uses the online advertising service Google AdSense, which allows you to present advertising tailored to your interests. 2 We are interested in showing you advertisements that may be of interest to you in order to make our website more interesting to you. It collects statistical information about you, which is processed by our advertising partners. These ads can be seen by the "Google ads" reference in the ad.
(2) By visiting our website Google receives the information that you have accessed our website. Google uses a web beacon to set a cookie on your computer. The data mentioned in § 3 of this declaration will be transmitted. We have no influence on the collected data, nor are we aware of the full extent of the data collection and the duration of storage. Your data will be transmitted to the USA and evaluated there. If you are logged in with your Google account, your data can be assigned directly to it. If you do not want to associate with your Google profile, you'll need to log out. It is possible that these data may be shared with Google's contractors to third parties and government agencies. The legal basis for the processing of your data is Art. 6 para. 1 p. 1 lit. f DS-GMO. This site has also enabled Google AdSense third-party ads. The above data may be transferred to these third parties (named at https://support.google.com/dfp_sb/answer/94149 ).
(3) You can prevent the installation of Google AdSense cookies in various ways: a) by setting your browser software accordingly, in particular, the suppression of third-party cookies will prevent you from receiving any third party advertisements; b) by disabling the interest-based ads on Google using the link https://adssettings.google.com/anonymous?hl=de&sig=ACi0TCj6LdrR5-7lmiLSsKXJubLUq17O8gxKFGjWZ1zxsE2XqFcCrK2MzChXTWzNbCHj8bEztr9FccFbZBoPQAq1R15ADTODrqLx__GhJRTpkBAY3Qm0Zoo , this setting is deleted when you delete your cookies; c) by deactivating the interest-based advertisements of the providers that are part of the "About Ads" self-regulation campaign via the link http://www.aboutads.info/choices , this setting being deleted when you delete your cookies; d) by permanent deactivation in your browsers Firefox, Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome under the link https://support.google.com/ads/answer/7395996 .5 We point out that you in this case if necessary can not fully use all features of this offer.
(1) We use the offer of Google Adwords to draw attention to our attractive offers with the help of advertising materials (so-called Google Adwords ) on external websites. In relation to the data of the advertising campaigns, we can determine how successful the individual advertising measures are. We are interested in showing you advertisements that are of interest to you, to make our website more interesting to you and to achieve a fair calculation of advertising costs.
(2) These advertising materials are supplied by Google via so-called "ad servers". To do this, we use ad server cookies, which measure certain performance metrics such as ads or user clicks. If you access our website through a Google ad, Google Adwords will store a cookie on your PC. These cookies usually lose after 30 Days are valid and should not serve to identify you personally. As a rule, this cookie will be analyzed as unique cookie ID, number of ad impressions per placement ( Frequency ), last impression (relevant to post-view conversions ) and opt -out information (mark that the user is not more would like to be addressed) saved.
(3) These cookies allow Google to recognize your Internet browser. If a user visits certain pages of the website of an Adwords customer and the cookie stored on their computer has not yet expired, Google and the customer can recognize that the user has clicked on the ad and has been redirected to this page. Each Adwords customer is assigned a different cookie. Cookies can not be tracked via the websites of Adwords customers. We ourselves do not collect and process any personal data in the aforementioned advertising measures. We receive only statistical evaluations provided by Google. On the basis of these evaluations, we can identify which of the advertising measures used are particularly effective. We do not receive any further data from the use of the advertising material, in particular we can not identify the users on the basis of this information.
(5) You can prevent participation in this tracking process in several ways: a) by adjusting your browser software accordingly, in particular, the suppression of third-party cookies will prevent you from receiving any third party advertisements; b) By deactivating the cookies for conversion tracking by setting your browser to block cookies from the domain www.googleadservices.com, https://www.google.com/settings/ads , whereby this setting will be deleted if you delete your cookies; c) by deactivating the interest-based ads of the providers that are part of the self-regulation "About Ads" campaign via the link http://www.aboutads.info/choices This setting will be deleted if you delete your cookies; d) by permanent deactivation in your browsers Firefox, Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome under the link https://support.google.com/ads/answer/7395996 . We point out that in this case you may not be able to use all the features of this offer in full.
(6) The legal basis for the processing of your data is Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 lit . f DS-GMO. For more information on Google's privacy, please visit https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en and https://services.google.com/sitestats.html . Alternatively, you can visit the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) website at https://www.networkadvertising.org/ . Google has submitted to the EU-US Privacy Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/EU-US Framework .
In addition to Adwords Conversion , we use the Google Remarketing application. This is a process by which we would like to address you again. This application allows you to see our ads after visiting our website as you continue to use the Internet. This is done by means of cookies stored in your browser, through which your usage behavior when visiting various websites is recorded and evaluated by Google. This is how Google determines your previous visit to our website. A merge of the as part of the remarketing According to your own statements, Google does not collect collected data with your personal data that may be stored by Google. In particular, according to Google, pseudonymization is used in remarketing.
(2) Due to the marketing tools used, your browser automatically establishes a direct connection to the Google server. We have no control over the extent and further use of the data collected by the use of this tool by Google and therefore inform you to the best of our knowledge: By including DoubleClick , Google receives the information that you access the corresponding part of our website or clicked an ad from us. If you are registered with a service provided by Google, Google may associate the visit with your account. Even if you are not registered with Google or have not logged in, there is a chance that the provider will find and store your IP address.
(3) You can prevent participation in this tracking process in several ways: a) by adjusting your browser software accordingly, in particular, the suppression of third-party cookies will prevent you from receiving any third party advertisements; b) By deactivating the cookies for conversion tracking by setting your browser to block cookies from the domain www.googleadservices.com, https://www.google.com/settings/ads , this setting will be deleted if you delete your cookies; c) by deactivating the interest-based ads of the providers that are part of the self-regulation "About Ads" campaign via the link http://www.aboutads.info/choices This setting will be deleted if you delete your cookies; d) by permanent deactivation in your browsers Firefox, Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome under the link https://support.google.com/ads/answer/7395996 . We point out that in this case you may not be able to use all the features of this offer in full.
(1) The website also uses the remarketing function "Custom Audiences " of Facebook Inc. ("Facebook"). This allows users of the website to be shown interest-based advertisements ("Facebook Ads") as part of their visit to the social network Facebook or other websites that also use the process. We are interested in showing you advertisements that are of interest to you in order to make our website more interesting to you.
(2) Due to the marketing tools used, your browser automatically establishes a direct connection to the Facebook server. We have no control over the extent and the further use of the data, which are raised by the use of this tool by Facebook and inform you therefore according to our knowledge level: Through the integration of Facebook Custom Audiences Facebook receives the information that you have accessed the corresponding website of our website, or have clicked on an advertisement from us. If you are registered with a service of Facebook, Facebook can assign the visit to your account. Even if you are not registered with Facebook or have not logged in, there is a chance that the provider will find out and store your IP address and other identifying features.
(3) The deactivation of the function "Facebook Custom Audiences " is possible for logged in users at https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=ads#_ .
(4) The legal basis for the processing of your data is Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 lit . f DS-GMO. For more information about data processing through Facebook, please visit https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ .
This page uses so-called web fonts to represent the font . These are provided by Google (http://www.google.com/webfonts/). To do this, when you visit our page, your browser loads the required web font into your browser cache. This is necessary so that your browser can display a visually improved presentation of our texts. If your browser does not support this feature, a default font will be used by your computer for viewing.
The personal data collected by SMARTY Hotels | Hostels | Boardinghouses are used for the purpose of establishing an employment relationship (recruiting) acc. Article 6 EU GDPR. No personal data will be transmitted to a third country outside the EU.
Of course, we only use your data, which you submit to us in the online application form, to process your application. For the online transmission, we use an encryption method, so that your information is protected against unauthorized access. Please note that applications that you send us by e-mail will be transmitted unencrypted. We therefore recommend the use of the online application tool.
Unless otherwise agreed or contradicted, data will only be stored for as long as necessary to fulfill the purpose of the processing. Stored online applications will be deleted 6 months after the occupation or the project ends of the advertised vacancy, provided that no consent is given that the application data may remain in our candidate pool for later recruitment and may be used in a later placement process.
We take appropriate measures to technically and organizationally implement the protection of your data. Our employees are committed to complying with data protection, our data-processing service providers are carefully selected and also committed to data protection. In sensitive areas of our website, we have made SSL encryption.
If you have any further questions, please contact our certified privacy officer.
The data processing takes place for the purpose of contract execution.
The processing of your data is required under Art. 6 para. 1 letter f of the GDPR for the protection of our legitimate interests or that of a third party. Our legitimate interests are the execution of the contract.
We process the following categories of data: master data, communication data, contract data, claim data, if necessary payment information. Data from the above data categories has been provided to us by TravelClick, Inc.
We do not share your personal information with third parties. This does not apply to our service partners, if this is necessary for the fulfillment of the contract, such as parcel and letter carriers, banks for the collection of direct debits, tax authorities.
The data stored on your person will be deleted after the fulfillment of the contract and the expiry of warranty periods after two years, provided that no further statutory storage requirements preclude. Such are about commercial and financial data. These are deleted in accordance with the legal provisions after ten years, as long as no longer retention periods are prescribed or justified for legitimate reasons. If you revoke your consent to the use of your data, these will be deleted immediately, unless the above reasons do not prevent it.
At any time, you may request information about your data stored on us or correction, blocking (restriction of processing) and deletion of your stored data and their processing. If deletion conflicts with statutory, contractual or commercial or tax-related retention periods or other statutory reasons, your data will not be deleted but provided with a block.
You can object to the use of your data at any time. Please direct the objection to our data protection officer: Géraldine Reumkens, Graf-Gessler Strasse 13-15, 50679 Cologne – Germany.
According to Art. 77 DS-BER, you have the right to complain to the supervisory authority if you believe that the processing of your personal data is not lawful. The address of the supervisory authority responsible for our company is: State Representative for Data Protection and Freedom of Information North Rhine-Westphalia, Kavalleriestraße 2-4, 40213 Düsseldorf.
The provision of personal data is contractually required or required for a contract, as we can not guarantee a successful completion of the contract without this data. Failure to provide the required personal information would result in no contract being made.
Automated decisions in individual cases including profiling do not take place.

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§ 416.300 Basis and scope of subpart.
§ 416.305 Participation and withdrawal requirements under the ASCQR Program.
§ 416.310 Data collection and submission requirements under the ASCQR Program.
§ 416.315 Public reporting of data under the ASCQR Program.
§ 416.320 Retention and removal of quality measures under the ASCQR Program.
§ 416.325 Measure maintenance under the ASCQR Program.
§ 416.330 Reconsiderations under the ASCQR Program.
80 FR 70604, Nov. 13, 2015, unless otherwise noted.


Everyone who uses the roads in New York State – whether on four wheels, two wheels or two feet – would be safer understanding the rules for bicyclists.
Bicyclists must ride on the right shoulder or edge of the roadway, or in a bike lane whenever there is one available.
While bicyclists are allowed to ride two abreast, they must go single file if a vehicle is attempting to pass.
Clinging to a vehicle in any way is prohibited.
Bicyclists are only allowed to have one earphone while riding.
Helmets are required for bicyclists under the age of 14, and recommended for all riders because they can reduce injuries in the unfortunate event of an accident.
At night, New York requires a front light to be visible for 500 feet, and a rear light be visible from 300 feet. Less commonly known, one of the lights must be visible from the sides for two hundred feet.
While this quick guide provides some of the most important rules for bicyclists for their safety, the rules provided are not exhaustive. Bicycle riders should be acquainted with and follow the same rules as automobile drivers, whenever possible. This includes yielding to pedestrians when they have the right of way and keeping to the right side of the road.
Sharing the roadways – as well as understanding everyone’s respective rights and responsibilities – are essential factors in ensuring all travelers safely arrive at their destination.
For more information, take a look at our Question and Answer section.
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1231 (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1231 (McKinney) and N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 110 (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1234(a) (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1234(b) (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1233 (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 375 24-a (McKinney). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1236 (McKinney).


On October 5, 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018 (the “2018 Act”) was signed into law. One of the more notable aspects of the 2018 Act is its change to 49 U.S.C. § 44112, the section of the Federal Aviation Act that concerns the liability of aircraft owners and lessors and persons with a financial interest in aircraft. By making two small changes to the language of 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b), section 514 of the 2018 Act expands the protections afforded to aircraft owners and lessors against liability for personal injury, death, and property damage caused by accidents.
Previously, 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) provided that “[a] lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because of (1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or (2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.” Although this provision limits the liability of out-of-possession aircraft owners and lessors,1 some U.S. courts applying this provision relied on the phrases “on land or water” and “control” to conclude that out-of-possession aircraft owners and lessors with no operational control over the aircraft could still potentially be held liable under state tort law for damages caused by the aircraft.
For example, in Vreeland v. Ferrer, 2 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that 49 U.S.C. § 44112 did not preempt Florida’s “dangerous instrumentality” law, pursuant to which an out-of-possession aircraft owner or lessor is liable for the negligence of the pilot operating the aircraft. The defendant in Vreeland was an aircraft owner that had leased the aircraft to another person for a one-year lease period. During the lease period, the aircraft crashed, killing the pilot operating the aircraft with the lessee’s permission and the other individual on board. The estate of the deceased passenger sued the aircraft owner, among others, and argued that the owner was strictly liable under Florida law as the owner of a dangerous instrumentality. The aircraft owner argued, successfully in the lower courts, that federal law governing the liability of aircraft owners preempted Florida’s dangerous instrumentality statute and precluded out-of-possession aircraft owners from being held liable for death caused by the aircraft. However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ preemption holding.
Section 514 of the 2018 Act eliminates the phrase “on land or water” from section 44112. By removing this language, Congress effectively overturned the Vreeland court’s holding that federal law does not preempt state dangerous instrumentality laws. Accordingly, aircraft owners and lessors now have stronger grounds to argue that federal law precludes them from being held liable for damages caused by aircraft while not in their possession or control.
In addition to removing the geographical component of section 44112, section 514 of the 2018 Act qualifies that “control” means “operational control.” Thus, as amended by section 514, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 provides that “[a] aircraft owner, lessor, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in [their] actual possession or operational control . . . .” This change also is significant because, unlike the word “control,” which some courts have construed broadly to include any legal rights or obligations with respect to the aircraft,5 the words “operational control” are specifically defined in the Federal Aviation Regulations. Specifically, 14 CFR § 1 defines “operational control” with respect to any flight as “the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, or terminating a flight.” This modification suggests that to establish that an aircraft owner or lessor is liable for an accident, there must be evidence that the aircraft owner or lessor exercised authority over the flight and evidence of indirect control may not be sufficient.
While it remains to be seen how courts will construe the new language of 49 U.S.C. § 44112, section 514 of the 2018 Act reflects Congress’ efforts to provide greater protection from liability to out-of-possession aircraft owners and lessors.
1 The predecessor of section 44112(b), section 1404, was enacted in 1948 to shield security holders in aircraft from the vicarious liability they might otherwise incur under state law. At that time, several states had enacted the Uniform Aeronautics Act (“UAA”), which altered the common law rule that a bailor could not be held liable for the negligence of a bailee and provided that aircraft owners and lessors were absolutely liable for injuries to people and property on the ground caused by their aircraft while in flight. In addition to states that adopted the UAA, some states had laws governing “dangerous instrumentalities,” which made non-operating owners vicariously liable for operator negligence.
2 71 So.3d 70 (Fla. 2011). The Vreeland case has been the subject of previous newsletters, including one that can be found on our website at: https://condonlaw.com/2011/09/lessor-liability-florida-supreme-court-limits-pre-emptive-effect-federal-ownerlessor-liability-statute-vreeland-v-ferrer-special-edition-fall-2011/.
5 See, e.g., Scollard v. Duncan Aviation, Case No. CI 02-2621, Order (Neb. Dist. Ct. Lancaster Cty. Oct. 10, 2003).


In 1945, when the Railway Labor Act prohibited union shop agreements between railroads and labor unions, nonunion employees of a railroad brought a suit against the railroad and certain unions of its employees which resulted in a consent decree forbidding the defendants to discriminate against nonunion employees because of their refusal to join unions. After the Act was amended in 1951 so as to permit union shop agreements between railroads and labor unions, the petitioner unions moved that the decree be modified so as not to prohibit the defendants from entering into such agreements. The District Court, which had retained jurisdiction of the suit, denied the motion.
Held: it erred in doing so. Pp. 364 U. S. 643-653.
(a) It would have been an abuse of discretion to deny modification of the injunction had it not resulted from a consent decree, since a change in the law had expressly made lawful what had theretofore been forbidden. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421. Pp. 364 U. S. 646-650.
(b) A different conclusion is not required by the fact that the injunction was incorporated in a consent decree, since the decree was a judicial act, and not a mere contract between the parties. Pp. 364 U. S. 650-651.
(c) It was the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties, that the District Court served in entering the consent decree; and that Court must be free to continue to further the objectives of the Act after its provisions have been amended. Pp. 364 U. S. 651-653.
"unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization . . ."
and which forbid any carrier from requiring "any person seeking employment to sign any contract or agreement promising to join . . . a labor organization. . . ." Also relied upon was the duty of the exclusive bargaining agent to represent fairly and without discrimination all members of the class represented. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. The factual allegations set forth a pattern of discriminations effected by the railroad and the defendant unions against nonunion employees.
"in consideration of the sum of $5,000.00 this day paid to the undersigned . . . and the consent of said defendants to the entry of a decree in said action, a copy of which is attached hereto. . . ."
"are further enjoined, in the application of the provisions of the regularly adopted bargaining agreements in effect between the defendant Railroad and the defendant Unions, or that may be hereafter in effect between the defendant Railroad and the defendant Unions in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, from discriminating against the plaintiffs and the classes represented by them in this action by reason of or on account of the refusal of said employes to join or retain their membership in any of defendant labor organizations, or any labor organization. . . ."
The District Court, 165 F.Supp. 443, 445, retained jurisdiction over the matter "for the purpose of entering such further orders as may be deemed necessary or proper."
"shall have no prospective application to prohibit defendants, or any of them, from negotiating, entering into, or applying and enforcing, any agreement or agreements authorized by Section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, as amended January 10, 1951."
to agree, as they did, that the non-union members should not then be required to join or maintain membership in any of their craft unions as a condition precedent to employment. The law so prohibited, Section 152, Fourth and Fifth, Title 45, United States Code Annotated, Railway Labor Act. The railroad and unions went further to provide by their agreement that no such requirement of union membership should thereafter be in effect in any bargaining agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The 1951 amendment to the Act did no more than make negotiations for a union shop permissive, Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, supra. The amendment did not nullify the agreement or the injunction. It did not prohibit an agreement between the railroad and the unions that a union shop should not exist. Hence, the Court leaves the parties as they agreed to be and to remain."
165 F.Supp. 443, 449. Though making it clear that evidence of continued union hostility against nonunion employees was not decisive, the District Court gave some weight to the administrative difficulty of preventing unlawful discriminations against nonunion employees that might be facilitated if there were a union shop. The Sixth Circuit affirmed "for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Chief Judge Shelbourne" in the District Court. 272 F.2d 56, 58. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues involved. 362 U.S. 948.
"We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent. . . . Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so, from the beginning, went hand in hand with its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, power there still would be by force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need. Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 494, 495."
of the court to apply modified measures to changed circumstances.
Where there is such a balance of imponderables, there must be wide discretion in the District Court. But discretion is never without limits, and these limits are often far clearer to the reviewing court when the new circumstances involve a change in law, rather than facts. When the decree in this case was originally made, union shop agreements were prohibited by the Railway Labor Act, and thus constituted in themselves a form of statutorily forbidden discrimination. Congress has since, in the clearest terms, legislated that bargaining for and the existence of a union shop contract, satisfying the conditions provided in § 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, are not forbidden discriminations by union or employer. Congress has therefore determined that whatever ways such a union shop arrangement facilitates other, unauthorized discriminations must be borne as inescapable incidents of a legislatively approved contract term.
by the union shop clause have been legislatively determined to be an expense more than offset by the benefits of such a provision.
be enforced. There is no longer any interference with the enjoyment of the public right inconsistent with law, no more than there would be where the plaintiff himself had consented to it, after the rendition of the decree. Suppose the decree had been executed, and after that the passage of the law in question, can it be doubted but that the defendants would have had a right to reconstruct it? And is it not equally clear that the right to maintain it, if not abated, existed from the moment of the enactment?"
The principles of the Wheeling Bridge case have repeatedly been followed by lower federal and state courts. [Footnote 6] We find no reason to recede from them.
event, a court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong. We reject the argument for the interveners that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act. . . . But, in truth, what was then adjudged was not a contract as to anyone. The consent is to be read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in the future if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be."
This Court has never departed from that general rule. [Footnote 7] We continue to adhere to it because of the policy it expresses. The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a court of equity a continuing injunction. In a case like this, the District Court's authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce. Frequently, of course, the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted without change by the adopting court. But, just as the adopting court is free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives. In short, it was the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties, that the District Court served in entering the consent decree now before us. The court must be free to continue to further the objectives of that Act when its provisions are amended.
The parties have no power to require of the court continuing enforcement of rights the statute no longer gives.
of the equity court and decide for it once and for all what was equitable and what was not, because the court was not acting to enforce a promise, but to enforce a statute.
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh. See Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225.
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
In the view we take of the case, we need not consider whether such a commitment of indefinite duration is valid.
In McGrath v. Potash, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 199 F.2d 166, after Congress passed a statute excluding from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act deportation proceedings, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated an injunction against the Government requiring compliance with that Act. There are many cases where a mere change in decisional law has been held to justify modification of an outstanding injunction. E.g., Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (whether a garage in a residential district is a nuisance); Santa Rita Oil & Gas Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, 116 P.2d 1012 (what federal instrumentalities are exempt from state taxation); Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788 (whether the use of the word "cola" infringed Coca-Cola's trademark); and see Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Brotherhood, 133 F.2d 955 (whether ordinary strikes are forbidden by the Sherman Act and what picketing can constitutionally be enjoined).
"We know of no case which holds that a consent decree imposing a continuing injunction deprives the court of its supervisory jurisdiction in the matter."
We consider unpersuasive the argument of the railroad that, in 1945, there was already on foot a movement to amend the Railway Labor Act so as to permit union shop agreements.
This controversy commenced in 1945 prior to the time when so-called union shop agreements were authorized by Congress. Act of Jan. 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh. Since the date of that law, which we upheld in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, employees and carriers may negotiate that type of agreement, though they are not required to do so. Id., p. 351 U. S. 231. Prior to that date, however, a union shop was barred by law in this industry, and a union that discriminated against nonunion members was accountable to them. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 323 U. S. 207.
Twenty-eight nonunion members sued petitioners, in 1945, claiming damages in the amount of $140,000. The complaint purported to state a class action. But the case never came to trial. A settlement was reached which provided for (a) the payment of $5,000 in cash; (b) the waiver and release by the 28 plaintiffs of all their claims; and (c) a consent decree which would protect "the undersigned" against future acts of discrimination by petitioners.
The consent decree did not purport to protect future employees. By its terms, it protected only "the plaintiffs in this action and all other employes of the defendant Railroad employed in" designated crafts or classes and not members of the union. The petitioners agreed to refrain from discriminating "against the plaintiffs and the classes represented by them."
I do not think the consent decree, read in light of the settlement, did more than settle claims of then-existing employees. Employees hired in the future were, by its terms, not included. Yet apparently a host of them have intervened, seeking the protection of the status quo created by that decree. I use the word "apparently" because the record does not show which intervenors were on the payroll of the carrier in 1945. Those who became employed after that date plainly are not entitled to the protection of the decree. Of those who were employed at that time, we know that some are still employed. Of the latter group, at least seven of the original 28 employees are still on the payroll. These seven released valuable claims for settling their disputes. It is harsh and unjust to deprive them of those fruits of the settlement. Whether there are others employed in 1945 who have a like claim to fair dealing is impossible to tell from the record.
terms and gave nothing up in exchange for it. To construe it to include them would as a result of changing circumstances turn the consent decree "into an instrument of wrong." United States v. Swift & Co., supra, 286 U. S. 115. But when we set aside the decree as respects those who gave up something of value to get it, we do an injustice. I think the applicable principle is stated in United States v. Swift & Co., supra, 286 U. S. 119: "The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making."


Who Gets to Challenge Constitutionality?
In the divorce judgment entered between Michael and Joesie Gerty, the chancellor sua sponte declared MCA § 93-5-2 (divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences) unconstitutional.
Michael, Joesie, and the State of Mississippi all filed R59 motions asking the court to set aside that part of her ruling because no party had pled, argued, or offered evidence on the issue. The chancellor did not change her ruling, and all three movants appealed.
¶34. Few subjects in our jurisprudence are so settled as the maxim that a statute’s constitutionality will not be considered unless it has been specifically pleaded. See Martin [v. Lowery], 912 So. 2d  at 464-65; Lawrence Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Bowden, 912 So. 2d 898, 900 (Miss. 2005); City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 688 So. 2d 742, 749 (Miss. 1996) (citing State ex rel. Carr v. Cabana Terrace, Inc., 247 Miss. 26, 153 So. 2d 257, 260 (1963)); see also Colburn v. State, 431 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Miss. 1983); Witt v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 63, 66 (Miss. 1983).“[I]issues are framed, formed and bounded by the pleadings of the litigants. The Court is limited to the issues raised in the pleadings and proof contained in the record.” Lakeland Lounge, 688 So. 2d at 750 (emphasis removed) (internal citation omitted). A trial court may not raise a constitutional issue sua sponte. In re Estate of Miller v. Miller, 409 So. 2d 715, 718 (Miss. 1982).
¶35. The chancellor fully acknowledges that the litigants did not raise the constitutionality of Section 93-5-2 in their pleadings or proof. The chancellor’s ruling, that the statutory scheme presented by Section 93-5-2 is unconstitutional, exceeded her authority. The rule of law requires that we reverse and vacate the chancellor’s judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and granting an irreconcilable-differences divorce.
The court reversed and remanded on other issues raised by the parties.
At ¶5, this enigmatic statement appears: “Today’s case … is unique but not unprecedented … ” It seems to me that something unique is by its nature unprecedented.
This case, involving a sua sponte unconstitutionality ruling, is not a scenario you are likely to encounter, but, as the precedent shows, it is in the realm of possibility.
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