text:
Basic data (e.g. name, address).
Contact data (e.g. Email, Telephone number).
User data (e.g. visited websites, interest in content, access time).
Meta-/data communication (e.g. device information, IP-address).
Visitors and users of the online offers (“users“).
Providing online offer, its features and content.
Answering any contact requests and communicate with users.
„personal data“ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person („data subject“); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier (e.g. cookie) or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person (“data”).
„processing“ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, which personal data includes but is not limited to any and all handling of data.
„controller“ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.
We inform you about the legal basis of our data processing in accordance with Art. 13 GDPR, whereby the following applies: Processing shall be lawful in accordance with Art. 6.1(a) GDPR and Art. 7 GDPR, when the data subject has given consent, when processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party to (Art. 6.1(b) GDPR), for processing in order to fulfil our legal obligations (Art. 6.1 (c) GDPR) and for the processing in order to safeguard our legitimate interests (Art. 6.1 (f) GDPR).
In accordance with Art. 32 GDPR we take into account the state of the art technology, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor and implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services.
Measures include but are not limited to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data by controlling physical access to the personal data as well as their access, input, disclosure, availability of data and its separation. In addition, we have established procedures that ensure the enjoyment of data subject rights, data erasure and data vulnerability. Furthermore, we consider the protection of personal data already in the development or selection of hardware, software and procedures, according to the principle of data protection by technology design and by privacy-friendly default settings taken into account (Art. 25 GDPR).
If in the context of our processing we disclose personal data to other persons and companies (processors or third parties), transmit that personal data to them or otherwise grant access to the personal data, this will only be done on the basis of a legal permission (e.g. if a transmission of personal data to third parties, as required by payment service providers, pursuant to Art. 6.1. (b) GDPR to fulfil the contract), you have consented to a legal obligation or based on our legitimate interests (e.g. the use of agents, webhosts, etc.).
If we commission third parties to process personal data on the basis of a so-called „order processing contract“, this is done based on Art. 28 GDPR.
If we process data in a third country (i.e. outside the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA)) or in the content of the use of third party services or disclosure or transmission of personal data to third parties, this will only be done to fulfil our (pre-)contractual obligations on the basis of your consent, a legal obligation or of our legitimate interests. Subject to legal or contractual permission, we process or have personal data processed in a third country only based on the special condition of Art. 44 ff. GDPR, e.g. based on specific guarantees, such as the officially recognised level of data protection (e.g. in the US through the privacy shield) or compliance with officially recognised special contractual obligations (so-called “standard contractual clauses”).
You have the right to ask for confirmation as to whether the personal data in question is being processed, which personal data is being held and do obtain a copy of the personal data pursuant to Art. 15 GDPR.
Based on Art. 16 GDPR, you have the right to demand the completion or correction of your personal data.
In accordance with Art. 17 GDPR, you have the right to demand deletion of your personal data without delay or, alternatively, to require a restriction of the processing of personal data in accordance with Art. 18 GDPR.
You have the right to demand the personal data we hold on you is provided to you in accordance with Art. 20 GDPR and you can demand that it be transferred to another controller.
In accordance with Art. 77 GDPR you have the right to file a complaint with a regulatory authority.
If the processing of personal data is based on consent, you have the right to withdrawal such consent granted in accordance with Art. 7.3. GDPR with effect for the future. The revocation of consent does not affect the legality of the processing of such personal data carried out based on the given consent until the date of revocation. Please address your withdrawal request to the controller.
You can object at any time to the future processing of your personal data in accordance with Art. 21 GDPR. The objection may be made against the processing of personal data regarding any direct marketing. Please direct your objection to the controller.
„Cookies“ are small files that are stored on a user‘s computer, whereby different information can be stored within a cookie. A cookie is primarily used to store the information about a user (or the device on which the cookie is stored) during or after his visit to our online offer. Temporary cookies, or “session cookies“ or “transient cookies“ are cookies that are deleted after a user leaves our online service and closes the browser. Such a cookie can for example store the contents of a shopping cart in an online store or login details. The term “permanent” or “persistent” refers to cookies that remain stored even after the browser has been closed. This way, for example, login details will be saved and when a user visits the online offer after several days. In addition, such cookies can store the user’s interests, which are used for audience measurement or marketing purposes. A “third-party cookie” refers to cookies that are offered by providers other than the controller, who manages the online offer (otherwise, if it is only their cookies, this is called “first-party cookies”). We can use temporary and permanent cookies and inform you of this in this Policy.
If users do not want cookies to be stored on their computer, the user will be asked to disable the option in their own browser’s system settings. Saved cookies can be deleted in the system settings of the browser. The exclusion of cookies can lead to functional restrictions of the online offer.
Any personal data processed by us are either deleted or restricted in accordance with Art. 17 and Art. 18 GDPR. Unless explicitly stated in this Policy, personal data stored by us is deleted as soon as it is no longer required for its purpose and its deletion does not conflict with any statutory storage requirements. Where personal data is not deleted because of any legal statutory requirements, its processing will be restricted. This means that such personal data is being blocked and not processed for any other purposes, e.g. data that must be kept for commercial or tax reasons.
According to German legal requirements, the storage takes place for 10 years according to §§ 147.1 AO, §§ 257.1(1) and (4) HGB and §§ 257.4 HGB (books, records, management reports, accounting documents, trading books, relevant for taxation documents, etc.) and 6 years in accordance with § 257 (1) Nr. 2 and 3, Abs. 4 HGB (commercial letters).
from our customers, prospective customers and business partners for the purpose of providing contractual services, customer care, marketing, advertising and market research.
The hosting services we use to operate our online services are for the purpose of providing the following services: infrastructural- and platform services, computing capacity, storage and database services, security and technical maintenance.
We or our hosting provider process inventory data, contact data, content data, contract data, usage data, meta and communication data of customers, interested parties and visitors to this online offer based on our legitimate interests in an efficient and secure provision of this online offer (Art. 6.1(f) GDPR (conclusion of order-processing contract)).
We or our hosting provider, collect personal data on every access to the server on which the service is located (so-called server log files) based on our legitimate interests within the meaning of Art. 6.1(f) GDPR. The access data includes name of the accessed webpage, file name, date and time of access, amount of data transferred, message of successful retrieval, type of browser and version, the user’s operating system, referrer URL (the previously visited page), IP address and the requesting provider.
For security purposes (e.g. to investigate abusive or fraudulent activities), such logfile information is stored for a maximum of 7 days and is then deleted. Where retention of such data is required for a longer period due to evidential purposes, such data shall be exempted from the cancellation until final clarification of the incident.
We process personal data in relation to administrative tasks and by way of organising our business, accounting department and compliance with any legal obligations, such as, for example, archiving. In doing this, we process the same data that we process in the course of rendering our contractual services. The processing principles are Art. 6.1(c) GDPR, Art. 6.1(f) GDPR. The process affects customers, prospective customers, business partners and website visitors. The purpose and our interest in processing the data lies in administration, accounting, office organisation, data archiving, i.e. tasks that serve to maintain our business, perform our duties and provide our services. The deletion of data with regard to contractual services and contractual communication takes place according to the legal retention periods. Please refer to the part „Deletion of personal data“.
We disclose or transmit data to the financial administration, consultants such as lawyers, accountants or auditors, and other fee agents and payment service providers.
Furthermore, based on our business interests, we store information about suppliers, promoters and other business partners, e.g. for contacting them at a later stage. We generally store this kind of company-related data permanently.
Applicants can send us their applications by way of email. However, we’d like to point out that emails are generally not sent encrypted so that applicants themselves must provide encryption. Therefore, we cannot take any responsibility for the application’s transmission between the sender and receipt on our server. We process the applicant’s data only for the purpose and in the context of the application process in accordance with the legal requirements. The processing of the applicant’s data takes place in order to establish an employment relationship in accordance with Art. 6.a (b) GDPR, Art. 88 GDPR, § 26 BDSG and Art. 6.1(f) GDPR subject to such processing of data becomes legally necessary.
The application process requires applicants to provide us with the applicant’s data. We receive such necessary applicant’s data by way of email. Otherwise, data is derived from the job description, which include personal details, postal details and contact details and any application documents, such as cover letter, CV and certificates or references. Any additional information provided by the applicant is done on a voluntary basis. By submitting such additional information, the applicant agrees to its processing.
Insofar as special categories of personal data regarding the application process are requested from an applicant in accordance with Art. 9.1 GDPR, the processing is carried out on the basis of Art. 9.2(b) GDPR (e.g. health data, if this is necessary for this professional application). Insofar as special categories of personal data within the meaning of Art. 9.1 GDPR are voluntarily communicated within the application procedure, such processing is additionally carried out in accordance within Art. 9.2(a) GDPR (e.g. health data such as disability or ethnic origin). By submitting this additional information, the applicant agrees to its processing.
On a successful application, the applicant’s data provided may further be processed by us for employment purposes. Where the job application is unsuccessful, the applicant’s data will be deleted. Applicant’s data will also be deleted if an application is withdrawn, which an applicant is entitled to at any time.
Any such deletion, subject to a legitimate revocation by the applicant, will take place after a six months period, in order to answer any follow-up questions by the applicant and to meet our obligations under the General Equal Treatment Act. Invoices for any reimbursement of travel expenses are archived in accordance with the tax regulations.
When contacting us (e.g. by contact form, email, telephone or via social media), the user’s information is processed in accordance with Art. 6.1. (b) GDPR to deal with the contact request. User information can be stored in a customer relationship management system (“CRM system") or any comparable system.
We will delete the request, if it is no longer required. We check this requirement every two years, subject to any legal archiving obligations, which may apply.
We use the analysis service “etracker” of etracker GmbH, Erste Brunnenstraße 1 20459 Hamburg, based on our legitimate interest (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6.a(f) GDPR). The data collected is analysed on a pseudonymised basis only, stored solely on servers in Germany and such data is not combined with other data or passed on to any third parties.
You can object to the collection and storage of data at any time with effect for the future. In order to do so, you can obtain an opt-out cookie from etracker under the following link, which ensures that no visitor data from your browse will be collected and stored by etracker in the future: http://www.etracker.de/privacy?et=CbgxEg.
The opt-out sets an opt-out cookie with the name "cntcookie" by etracker. Please do not delete this cookie as long as you want to object to the collection and storage of such data.
Based on our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of Art. 6.a(f) GDPR), we make use of content or services offered by third-party providers in order to provide their content and services, like including videos and fonts (collectively referred to as “Content”).
This always presupposes that third-party providers of this content uses the IP address of the users, as such content without the use of this IP address can otherwise not be send to the user’s browser. Due to this the IP address is therefore required for such presentation of this content. We endeavour to use only such content, where respective providers only use the IP address for the delivery of the content. Third parties may also use so-called pixel tags (invisible graphics, also referred to as “web beacons") for statistical or marketing purposes. Such "pixel-tags" can be used to evaluate information such as visitor traffic on the pages of this website. The pseudonymous information may also be stored as cookies on the user’s device and may include but is not limited to technical information about the browser and operating system, referring webpages, time of visit and other information regarding the use of our online offer.

matches:
Art. 13
Art. 6
Art. 7
Art. 32
Art. 6
Art. 28
Art. 44
Art. 15
Art. 16
Art. 17
Art. 18
Art. 20
Art. 77
Art. 7
Art. 21
Art. 17
Art. 18
§ 257
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 88
§ 26
Art. 6
Art. 9
Art. 9
Art. 9
Art. 9
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 188 › Boston & Montana Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Co.
To give the Circuit Court jurisdiction under section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888, federal questions must appear necessarily in the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action, and not as mere allegations in the plaintiff's bill of the defense which the defendants intend to set up or which they rely upon. And if it further appear from defendant's answer that no such defense is set up, no jurisdiction exists to try questions not of the kind coming within the statute, and the Circuit Court should dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction.
In order for a party in possession to maintain a bill of peace for the purpose of quieting his title to land against a single adverse claimant ineffectually seeking to establish a legal title by repeated actions of ejectment, it is necessary for the bill to aver that complainant's title has been established by at least one successful trial at law, and where it appears from the bill that an action at law involving the same questions has been commenced, but has not been tried, it is a fatal defect.
To maintain a bill of peace in the federal courts, there must be an allegation that the complainant is in possession or that both parties are out of possession.
The appellant in this case (being the complainant below) has brought it to this Court by an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana dismissing its complaint and ordering judgment for the defendants on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the action. A decree having been entered in accordance with the direction of the court dismissing the bill, the circuit court has certified to this Court the question of jurisdiction, and whether or not a federal question is presented in complainant's amended bill and the answer of the defendant corporation.
The cause of action relates to the ownership of a certain quantity of copper ore taken and converted by the defendants from the mining ground alleged to be owned by the complainant. For the purpose of presenting the question of jurisdiction, the court below has certified to this Court the amended bill and the answer of the defendants. The complainant in the bill alleges that it is the owner and entitled to possession of certain property therein described, known as and called the Pennsylvania lode mining claim, lot No. 172, situated in Summit Valley Mining District, County of Silver Bow, Montana. A full description of the land is given in the bill. The complainant's title is next set out with much particularity and detail, from which it appears that the original source of its title is a United States patent covering the claim, dated April 9, 1886, issued to persons named therein, from whom the complainant deraigns title. It is then averred that, on April 1, 1895, defendants wrongfully and unlawfully entered upon complainant's premises, and from that time on extracted from the mine large quantities of valuable ores, of the reasonable value of $500,000, and that they have continued to extract and mine ores from the premises belonging to the complainant, and are now mining and extracting ores therefrom and threatening to continue to do so unless enjoined by the court.
of the damages it has from time to time sustained by reason of such trespasses, which are continuing on the part of the defendants. Therefore the complainant brings this suit in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits in the premises, and by reason of the trespasses of the defendants and their threatened continuance the complainant has suffered and will suffer great and irreparable injury and damage unless the defendants are enjoined from further trespass, as prayed for.
The complainant then further averred in the bill, for the purpose, as therein stated, of showing the jurisdiction of the court to determine the matters set forth in such bill, that the determination of the controversy between the parties involved the construction of the mining laws of the United States; that the property of the complainant is a mining claim and has been patented as such under the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to mines and mineral lands; that the defendants owned a portion of certain properties called the Rarus lode claim, lot No. 179; the Johnstown lode claim, lot No. 173, and the Little Ida lode claim, lot No. 126, which claims lie north of and partially adjoining and near to the Pennsylvania lode claim, owned by the complainant.
Johnstown patent, and not under or by virtue of the Rarus patent."
"that the said defendants contend and claim that the complainant cannot under any circumstances obtain any relief for ores extracted within that portion of the premises owned by it, without first showing that the apices of the veins from which the ores were extracted are within the surface lines of the ground owned and claimed by the complainant, whereas your orator claims that prima facie it is the owner of all ores found within its boundaries extended downward into the earth, until it has been shown that some other person or company has some right thereto by reason of ownership of the apex of the vein within some other claim."
The complainant further stated its right to enjoin defendant from mining ore beneath the ground of complainant, because no vein having its apex in the defendant's claim passes in its strike through the end lines thereof so as to confer extralateral rights.
"Wherefore, your orator shows to your honors that there is involved in the matters in controversy, between your orator and the said defendants, the numerous questions aforesaid, involving the construction of the statutes of the United States relative to locating, purchasing, and patenting of mineral lands and the construction of the statutes relative to the right of one claimant to follow veins down to and into the premises of another, under the circumstances and situation of the parties as hereinbefore set out, and also the construction of the said statutes in relation to patenting of claims and whether the vein can be patented to one person and the surface to another, and to the right of the Land Department to segregate the surface from the mineral in the ground, granting one to one person and the other to another, and as to whether said action is authorized under and by virtue of said statutes, and also as to whether, when an apex of a vein is divided upon the surface, part being within the premises granted in one patent and a part within another, as to what, if any, extralateral rights are granted under such circumstances to either party."
from a perpendicular as to depart from said Rarus lode claim, and to enter the premises claimed by the complainant, and deny that they assert or claim the right to enter the premises of the complainant by reason of the fact that any veins owned or claimed by the defendants have their top or apices in said lode claim or any part thereof, but alleges that the defendants claim the right to enter the premises of the claimant by reason of the fact that certain veins have their top or apices within that portion of the Johnstown lode claim owned by the defendant, or that they assert the right to follow such veins on their downward course or dip, although the same so far depart from a perpendicular as to depart from the Johnstown lode claim and from the portions thereof owned by the defendants, and enter the premises of the complainant.
"that in this action it makes no claim of any right under the Rarus patent to enter upon the veins within the ground claimed or owned by the complainant, but that it asserts its right to do so by reason of its ownership of a portion of the Johnstown lode claim, and the fact that the top or apices of the veins or lode in question are within said portion of the Johnstown lode claim."
"denies that in this action it contends or claims that only the surface ground of the Johnstown claim was patented to the patentees named therein, or that all or any veins lying within the original location lines of the Rarus claim were patented to the claimant under the Rarus claim; . . . but defendant alleges that it contends and claims in this action, and insofar as this controversy between complainant and defendant is concerned, that its extralateral rights to the veins in question should be determined by its ownership of that parcel of ground now included within the Johnstown claim, and not by the Rarus, for the reason that said veins or lodes have their tops or apices within the said parcel of ground owned by defendant."
Various other denials were made, from which it appears that the only claim made by the defendants in this action is by virtue of their ownership of the Johnstown lode claim. The defendants by this answer therefore admit the averments in the bill that their rights must be governed and regulated in this action by reason of their ownership of the Johnstown patent, and not by virtue of the Rarus patent, and as to those rights the complainant claims that the course of the vein cannot be followed because of the nature of the ground.
action, to go into any matters of defense which the defendants might possibly set up, and then attempt to reply to such defense, and thus, if possible, to show that a federal question might or probably would arise in the course of the trial of the case. To allege such defense and then make an answer to it before the defendant has the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own defense is inconsistent with any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.
or a law or treaty of the United States, or under statutes of the United States or of a state, in conflict with the Constitution."
See also Blackburn v. Portland &c. Co., 175 U. S. 571; Shoshone &c. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505.
The test of the right of removal is that the case must be one over which the circuit court might have exercised original jurisdiction under section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888, 24 Stat. 552; 25 Stat. 433. The cases hold that to give the circuit court original jurisdiction the federal question must appear necessarily in the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action, and not as mere allegations of the defense which the defendants intend to set out, or which they rely upon. Third Street Railway Company v. Lewis, 173 U. S. 457.
It is urged, however, on the part of the complainant that its averments in regard to the jurisdiction of the court are necessary to be set forth as a part of its cause of action, and that they show that the appellees are questioning complainant's title and interfering with its enjoyment of its property right by asserting ownership to a portion of such claim of complainant based upon two government patents issued for the Rarus and Johnstown claims, respectively, and although such assertion of ownership of the appellees is, as complainant avers, without legal foundation, yet, for reasons stated in the bill, the consideration of which necessitates an examination of federal questions, the case is in effect one to quiet complainant's title or to prevent an interference with its rights and property, and complainant avers that the allegations of jurisdiction relate to its cause of action; that they state the controversy existing between the parties as to its subject matter not as anticipatory of the defense, but as establishing the complainant's right to have its title quieted.
court, not over an equitable cause of action in the nature of a bill to quiet title, but over a cause of action arising out of the laws of the United States, and the various mining laws of the United States are cited to show the truth of the assertion. It is also clear that jurisdiction in a federal court cannot be predicated in this case upon an assertion that it is brought to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Even then, the complainant's proof in the first instance would remain the same as already stated. The frequent trespasses, as alleged, of the defendants, by reason of which an equitable remedy by injunction is sought, might exist, and still it would not necessarily appear from the complainant's proof that the defendant's justification arose by reason of an alleged right under the Constitution or laws of the United States. That might appear in the defense, but would constitute no cause of action by complainant.
If, however, the bill is to be looked upon as one in the nature of a bill of peace or to quiet title, it is fatally defective in that aspect. There are two distinct kinds or classes of bills of peace, or bills to quiet title, the one brought for the purpose of establishing a general right between a single party and numerous persons claiming distinct and individual interests, the other for the purpose of quieting complainant's title to land against a single adverse claimant. In the second class, the suit can be maintained by a party in possession against a single defendant ineffectually seeking to establish a legal title by repeated actions of ejectment, and in such case it is necessary to aver that the title of complainant has been established by at least one successful trial at law before equity will entertain jurisdiction. 3 Pom.Eq. Jur.2d ed. § 1394, note 3, and 1 Pom.Eq. Jur. § 246.
possession, an action of ejectment would lie. The contention that, under the Code of Montana, a person not in possession may maintain an action to quiet title cannot prevail in a federal court. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146.
The complainant fails on both these grounds to show that its bill is sufficient as one to quiet its title, and it therefore fails to show that the case is not covered by the Union & Planters' Bank and other cases above cited. If the bill do not contain facts sufficient to constitute it a bill to quiet title, all the averments as to defendants' claims as defenses, and complainant's answers thereto, are only material for the purpose of showing that the defense may disclose facts which will show a case arising out of the mining laws of the United States. But this would not constitute complainant's cause of action.
apices in defendants' claim, do not pass in their strike through the end lines of defendants' claim. This alleged inability to follow the veins, assuming that they apex in the defendants' Johnstown patent, and the allegation as to the veins not passing through end lines, are mere questions of fact, depending upon the proof as to the truth of those averments. This does not constitute a question arising out of the Constitution or laws of the United States. The answer, by its denials and disclaimers as to what it sets up by way of defense, takes away a defense which might show the case as arising under such Constitution or laws.
"Even if the complaint, standing by itself, made out a cause of jurisdiction, which we do not decide, it was taken away as soon as the answers were in, because if there was jurisdiction at all, it was by reason of the averments in the complaint as to what the defenses against the title of the plaintiffs would be, and these were of no avail as soon as the answers were filed and it was made to appear that no such defenses were relied on."
See also Crystal Springs &c. Co. v. Los Angeles, 82 F. 114, aff'd, 177 U. S. 177 U.S. 169.
come in it is seen that no such defense in fact is set up or insisted upon, it is then seen that no such case exists as stated in the complaint, and no jurisdiction therefor exists to try questions which are not of a kind coming within the statute, and the court should then dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
rights under the Rarus patent as would be a decree upon any other form of answer."


text:
This notice (“Notice”) will provide you with information on our data processing activities with respect to certain personal data about you when accessing and using the Sivantos Recruiting System (“the Portal”) to (i) create an account in the Portal inter alia used to store your application data and/or (ii) to apply for a specific job offering of an entity belonging to the Sivantos Group (“Sivantos” or “we”). The Notice considers the rights and obligations set forth in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, “GDPR”).
Scope of applicability: This Summary Notice applies to you if you want to use Sivantos’ career portal.
Processing of your personal data and processing purposes: We process certain personal data about you when you access and use the Portal such as: Your name, contact details, account settings, education details (“Personal Data”), etc. for the following purposes: Creation of account and profile, applications, etc. For more details see I. of the Full Notice.
Recipients of your data: We transfer your Personal Data to other Sivantos group companies and third parties such as governmental agencies and regulators (e.g., tax authorities), social insurance carriers, courts, and government authorities, all in accordance with applicable law some of the recipients located in jurisdictions outside the EU. For more details see III. of the Full Notice.
Managing your account: You have different option to manage your account. For more details see IV. of the Full Notice.
Retention periods for and deletion of your Personal Data: Your Personal Data will be deleted once they aren’t any longer needed for the purposes motivating their original collection or as required by applicable law. For more details see V. of the Full Notice.
Your statutory rights: As set forth by applicable law, you have several rights regarding the Processing or your Personal Data, each as per the conditions defined in applicable law, such as the right to get access to your data, to get them corrected, erased or handed over. Please refer any of your questions to dpo@sivantos.com. For more details see VI. of the Full Notice.
Changes: Both this summary and the Full Notice are subject to change. You will be notified adequately of any such changes, see VII of the Full Notice.
How to contact us: If you wish to exercise your data subject rights or if you have any other questions concerning this Summary or the Full Notice, please address your request to the data protection officer, who can be contacted at dpo@sivantos.com.
Account settings regarding accessibility (recipients) of your profile, your willingness to receive new job posting notifications and information about career opportunities.
Furthermore, each time you use your account we store date and time of your login to allow you to verify when you were last logged into your account and to enable us to notify you about a pending deletion of your account due to long-time inactivity (see IV. blow).
Mandatory information: First name, last name, email, primary phone, address, city, country, state/province/region, travel preference, highest education level, region for school of study, country of school for study, name of school for study, employment visa sponsorship needed, resume.
IP address and information regarding your use of the Portal.
You may use Personal Data about you stored at third parties to create a profile on the Portal, such as s from LinkedIn, Xing and Facebook. With respect to the handling of your Personal Data by such third parties in this context please refer to the privacy policies of such third parties.
Once registered on the Portal you may provide within and/or upload further information about you into your profile, such as your resume, a cover letter, attachments (both general attachments and application specific attachments) as well as further profile information (how did you hear about this position, detail of source, whether one of our recruiters may contact you on job offerings that may be of interest for you), information on your work experience and education as well as professional certifications, language skills, geographic mobility.
You also have the possibility to apply solely for a specific job opportunity on the Portal. You may in such case – in addition to the information described under section I.2. – submit further job specific information such as whether you are authorized to work in the country of the job for which you are applying and other information. We will use the Personal Data described herein and under section I.2. only for the application process, which includes reviewing your application and conducting job interviews via phone, and in person.
We may from time to time conduct surveys to improve our process. In case permitted by law or based on your specific consent we may ask you to participate in such surveys occasionally. These surveys will either be conducted by Sivantos itself or by a specialized external processor on behalf of Sivantos. For this purpose, any external processor will only get your Personal Data as required to conduct the survey and, in any case, solely to the extent permitted by law or based on your consent. The participation in such a survey is voluntary and not participating in such a survey will have no negative impact on any current or future applications submitted by you.
You may communicate with us via the Portal (e.g., by asking questions regarding an application or about a position or your profile on the Portal). In this context, we will process your Personal Data (including such that you disclose to us in connection with such a query) to the extent required to respond to your query. We will not use such information for another purpose. The processing is insofar necessary to take steps at the request of you prior to potentially entering into a contract and based on Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b) GDPR.
Based on preferences you indicated in your account settings you made on creating your account within the Portal or at a later stage within the preference section of your profile (consent, Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a) GDPR) we shall send you new job posting notifications and/or information about career opportunities. You may revoke your consent by changing your account settings in a way as not to receive new job posting notifications and/or information about career opportunities.
In addition to sections 1. to 5. above, your Personal Data may also be processed where Sivantos reasonably considers it necessary for complying with legal or regulatory obligations (pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit c) GDPR), or for the following legitimate interests (pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f) GDPR), for example establishing, exercising or defending legal rights of members of the Sivantos group. Your Personal Data will also be processed in the operation and management of Sivantos group IT systems being hosted either internally or externally.
The provision of Personal Data is necessary for the conclusion and/or performance of a contract with you. The provision of Personal Data is voluntary. However, if you do not provide Personal Data, the affected application processes or provision of the Portal might be delayed or impossible.
The following recipients or categories of recipients will receive access to some of your Personal Data.
We transfer your Personal Data to other Sivantos group companies as permitted under applicable data privacy law pursuant to Art. 6 (1)(f) GDPR for the legitimate interests of Sivantos to administer applications and candidate information at a group wide level and enable candidates to manage their own Personal Data in some cases.
Only authorized employees with a need to know have access to your Personal Data; this includes sharing of your Personal Data on a “need-to-know” basis between our employees in the recruiting department. Certain executives, managers and employees at other companies of the Sivantos Group may also have access to certain Personal Data, however, on a “need-to-know” basis if there are legitimate business purposes (e.g., enabling employees in our shared service centers to arrange an interview or as required during an application process).
We may also transfer your Personal Data to governmental agencies and regulators (e.g., tax authorities), social insurance carriers, courts, and government authorities, all in accordance with applicable law based on Art. 6 (1) (c) GDPR and to external advisors acting as controllers (e.g., lawyers, accountants, auditors etc.) based on Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR.
Sivantos contracts with third party service providers or other Sivantos group companies as part of its normal business operations to carry out certain human resources-related or IT-related tasks. When required by local law to process Sensitive Employee Data, then this information will only be transferred outside of your country if permitted by applicable law.
We transfer your Personal Data outside of the country you are located. Some recipients of your Personal Data are in another country for which the European Commission has not issued a decision that this country ensures an adequate level of data protection, namely: The U.S. or some of the locations of non-European Sivantos group companies.
Some recipients located outside of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) are certified under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield and others are in countries for which the European Commission has issued adequacy decisions. In each case, the transfer is thereby recognized as providing an adequate level of data protection from a European data protection law perspective (Art. 45 GDPR).
By way of entering into appropriate data transfer agreements based on Standard Contractual Clauses (2010/87/EU and/or 2004/915/EC) as referred to in Art. 46 (5) GDPR or other adequate means we have established that all other recipients located outside the EEA will provide an adequate level of data protection for the Personal Data and that appropriate technical and organizational security measures are in place to protect Personal Data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, and against all other unlawful forms of processing. Any onward transfer (including Our affiliates outside the EEA) is subject to appropriate onward transfer requirements as required by applicable law.
You have a variety of options to manage kind and volume of data we store about you.
You can delete your entire account at any time.
You can delete all or selected information in your profile.
You can withdraw an application.
Data collected for the purposes hereunder will be stored only if necessary for (i) a specific application and/or (ii) your registration on the Portal, as well as during a transition period (e.g., the compliance of Sivantos’ obligations regarding data retention as established in the applicable laws or as long as retaining the data is permitted by applicable law).
We shall delete your account if you have not logged into your account for more than 180 days. In such case, you will receive a separate notification informing you about the upcoming deletion.
Your Personal Data will not be kept in a form that allows you to be identified for any longer than is reasonably considered necessary by Sivantos for achieving the purposes for which it was collected or processed or as it is established in the applicable laws related to data retention periods or as permitted by applicable laws.
Right of access: You have the right to obtain from us confirmation as to whether Personal Data concerning you is being processed, and, where that is the case, to request access to the Personal Data. The access information includes – inter alia – the purposes of the processing, the categories of Personal Data concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the Personal Data have been or will be disclosed. You have the right to obtain a copy of the Personal Data undergoing processing. For additional copies requested by you, we may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs.
Right to erasure (right to be forgotten): You have the right to ask us to erase your Personal Data.
Right to restriction of processing: You have the right to request the restriction of processing your Personal Data. In this case, the respective data will be marked and may only be processed by Us for certain purposes.
Right to data portability: You have the right to receive the Personal Data concerning you which you have provided to us in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and you have the right to transmit those Personal Data to another entity without hindrance from us.
Right to object: You have the right to object, on grounds relating to your situation, at any time to the processing of your Personal Data by us and we can be required to no longer process your Personal Data. If you have a right to object and you exercise this right, your Personal Data will no longer be processed for such purposes by us. Exercising this right will not incur any costs.
Please note that the rights might be limited under the applicable national data protection law.
If you wish to exercise your data subject rights please address your request to the data protection officer, who can be contact at dpo@sivantos.com.
In case of complaints you also have the right to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority in the Member State of your residence or alleged infringement of the GDPR.
This notice is subject to change. You will be notified adequately of substantial changes.

matches:
V.
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 46


text:
After respondent Stokes was convicted and sentenced to death in Missouri, he filed three unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts. A few days before his scheduled execution, he filed an application for stay of execution pending consideration of a fourth habeas petition. The District Court found that the imposition of a stay was warranted by the issues raised in his claim that the state courts had selectively applied the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases in violation of his right to equal protection. The Court of Appeals denied the State's motion to vacate the stay.
The District Court abused its discretion in granting the stay. A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition can be granted only when there are substantial grounds upon which relief can be granted. Here, there are no such grounds, because Stokes' fourth petition clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ. His claim could have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas, and the principles he asserts are not novel and could have been developed long before this application.
The State of Missouri has issued a warrant for the execution of Winford Stokes, which expires at 11:59 p.m. CDT on May 11, 1990. Stokes was convicted of capital murder in 1979 and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Stokes, 638 S. W. 2d 715 (1982) (en banc). Stokes has since filed three separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts, each of which was denied. See Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085 (CA8 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152 (CA8 1989), stay of execution denied, post, p. 926; Stokes v. Armontrout, No. 89-0133C(6) (ED Mo., Mar. 16, 1990). On [495 U.S. 320, 321] May 10, 1990, this Court denied a stay of execution pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari relating to one of Stokes' first three habeas petitions. Post, p. 926.
While his application for stay of execution was pending in this Court, and within a matter of days before the scheduled execution, Stokes filed in the District Court a new application for stay of execution pending consideration of a fourth federal habeas petition. On the afternoon of May 9, the District Court granted a stay of execution, stating that "the issues raised by petitioner's claim that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated by the Missouri state courts' selective application of the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases warrant the imposition of a stay of execution. See Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated upon grant of rehearing en banc (February 7, 1990)." No. 90-0505C(6) (ED Mo.). On the morning of May 11, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the State's motion to vacate the stay, one judge dissenting. The State then asked the en banc Court of Appeals to vacate the stay. That motion was also denied. The State has now filed with this Court an application to vacate the stay of execution.
A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition should be granted only when there are "substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There are no "substantial grounds" present in this case, because respondent's fourth federal habeas petition clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ. See 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b); 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). Stokes' claim that he was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction, and that the Missouri Supreme Court has selectively applied its rules relating to that claim, could have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas corpus. The equal protection principles asserted by respondent are not novel and could have been developed [495 U.S. 320, 322] long before this last minute application for stay of execution. Indeed, Stokes himself cites dissenting opinions filed in the Missouri Supreme Court in 1983 to support his contention. See, e. g., State v. Holland, 653 S. W. 2d 670, 679 (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
The fourth federal habeas petition now pending in the District Court "is another example of abuse of the writ." Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 378 -380 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by four other Justices) (vacating stay of execution where claims in a successive petition could, and should, have been raised in a first petition for federal habeas corpus). The District Court abused its discretion in granting a stay of execution. The application to vacate the stay is granted.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court. The more than 24-hour delay in the Court of Appeals' ruling on the State's motion to vacate the stay granted on this fourth successive petition, one which discloses no substantial ground for relief, makes appropriate some additional comments.
If the court of appeals fails to act in a manner sufficiently prompt to preserve the jurisdiction of the court and to protect the parties from the consequences of a stay entered without an adequate basis, an injured party may seek relief in this Court pursuant to our jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 385 U.S. 650 (1967) (common-law petition for writ of certiorari granted where shortness of time available before a scheduled execution made ordinary appeal procedure unavailable).
Delay or default by courts in the federal system must not be allowed to deprive parties, including States, of the lawful process to which they are entitled. It is the duty of the courts of appeals to adopt and follow procedures which ensure all parties expeditious determinations with respect to any request for a stay. Prompt review and determination is necessary to enable criminal processes to operate without undue interference from the federal courts, and to assure the proper functioning of the federal habeas procedure.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins and JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting.
Today the Court vacates a stay of execution entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and found to be within that court's discretion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc. Contrary to the majority's intimations, this case does not involve a last minute stay application by a defendant on the eve of his execution. Rather, Winford Stokes raised an equal protection claim in an amendment to a petition for writ of habeas corpus pending in the District Court on April 5, 1990, before the current execution date had been set. * The rush to judgment is instigated here by the [495 U.S. 320, 324] State's insistence on vacating the District Court's grant of a stay to consider Mr. Stokes' claim.
"Upon thorough consideration of the record before it, the Court concludes that the issues raised by petitioner's claim that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated by the Missouri state courts' selective application of the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases warrant the imposition of a stay of execution."
This Court has said repeatedly that the principles governing the disposition of successive writs "are addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges. Theirs is the major responsibility for the just and sound administration of the federal collateral remedies. . . . We are confident that [495 U.S. 320, 325] this power will be soundly applied." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 -19 (1963). See also Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 938 (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("[T]he lower court's decision is `deserving of great weight'"). Judge Gunn is particularly well situated to exercise the discretion Congress has entrusted to him. He has heard three of Mr. Stokes' habeas applications, attending to the complex issues and detailed facts of Mr. Stokes' conviction over several years.
The Eighth Circuit, also closer to this case than we could hope to be in the few hours we have had to consider the matter, found the District Court's order sound and responsible. The Court of Appeals similarly is due considerable deference. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) ("A stay of execution should first be sought from the court of appeals, and this Court generally places considerable weight on the decision reached by the courts of appeals in these circumstances"); O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1980) (STEVENS, J., in chambers) ("A Court of Appeals' decision to enter a stay is entitled to great deference"). Nonetheless, this Court has decided that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have committed such gross abuses of discretion that this Court must intervene. Nothing in the Court's opinion explains adequately why the lower courts have been adjudged so harshly.
To determine whether the claim is novel, we must begin by defining what it is. The lower courts have not ruled on the merits of Mr. Stokes' claim. Rather, they in effect have held his case in abeyance pending resolution of Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656 (1989); in this case, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, is reviewing a panel decision that the selective application by Missouri courts of the decision in State v. Baker, 636 S. W. 2d 902, 904-905 (1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983), "denies similarly situated defendants in capital murder cases equal protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution." 891 F.2d, at 659. Given that the Eighth Circuit has not determined definitively the contours of the equal protection claim, it is impossible to say at this time whether the claim constitutes a "novel" one.
Even if we could ascertain the precise character of the claim, in order to decide whether it could have been raised in a previous habeas petition we also would have to engage in a comprehensive review of Missouri state cases over the past decade. The Court today does not even purport to do this. In other contexts, the Court has noted that whether a legal claim is a "novel" one depends on an inquiry into existing precedents. Cf. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (that claim is "within the `logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is `controlled' by a prior decision" does not prevent it from being a "new rule" for purposes of retroactivity). Thus, the mere fact that the Court today can point to an opinion of a dissenting Missouri Supreme Court Justice in 1983 hardly establishes that Mr. Stokes' claim is not "novel."
When a person's life is at stake we cannot tolerate such facile judgments. I would rather rely on the considered wisdom of the courts below, aided by their familiarity with Missouri law, that Mr. Stokes' claim cannot be decided until Williams is resolved. Given the dire consequences of error, [495 U.S. 320, 327] the Court's rush to judgment is unseemly and indefensible. See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 382 -383 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 384 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). There is no call to deny a district court the time it needs to consider properly a petitioner's claim. "It is . . . important that before we allow human lives to be snuffed out we be sure - emphatically sure - that we act within the law." Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 321 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would deny the application to vacate the stay entered by the District Court.
[ Footnote * ] At that time, a stay of execution was in effect pending review by the Eighth Circuit of the District Court's denial of a previous habeas petition. [495 U.S. 320, 324] This stay was dissolved by the Court of Appeals on April 24. On April 27, the Missouri Supreme Court set Stokes' execution date for May 11.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


In a recent decision, Mark Crawford et al. v. United States Department of the Treasury, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled against a motion for preliminary injunction by Senator Rand Paul and six other plaintiffs. These individuals requested that the district court enjoin the U.S. Treasury Department from enforcing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”), the intergovernmental agreements (or “IGAs”) negotiated by the Treasury to implement FATCA and the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (“FBAR”) administered by the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement network (“FinCEN”). The decision is significant because if a preliminary injunction were granted, the extensive global network created over the last several years to implement FATCA would have been brought to a standstill. The decision also is of interest because it is a rare challenge to a tax law based on U.S. constitutional law.
In 2010, Congress enacted FATCA with the purpose of ensuring that U.S. taxpayers having accounts with foreign financial institutions (“FFI’s”) reported the income from those accounts on their U.S. tax returns. The law requires, inter alia, that a U.S. withholding agent making a payment of certain U.S.-source income to an FFI, withhold U.S. tax from that payment unless the FFI satisfies certain reporting requirements with respect to the U.S. holder of the associated account. In general, an FFI will provide the required information rather than suffer the U.S. withholding tax. The regulations implementing FATCA are lengthy, far reaching and impose a significant compliance burden on foreign banks and brokers (as well as many other foreign taxpayers). Some banks and brokers have reacted to FATCA by refusing to allow U.S. taxpayers to maintain accounts with their institution.
Because FACTA is premised on reporting by FFIs of taxpayer information to the IRS, it is necessary to enable those institutions to provide that information in a manner compatible with the law of their governing jurisdiction. To that end, the U.S. Treasury has negotiated more than 70 Intergovernmental Agreements (“IGAs”) with other countries. Under the terms of a Model 1 IGA, an FFI provides information to its foreign government which then provides the information to the IRS under the terms of an income tax treaty or a tax information exchange agreement. Under the terms of a Model 2 IGA, the FFI provides information directly to the IRS.
U.S. persons with assets exceeding $10,000 in a foreign financial account must file an annual report, the FBAR, with the U.S. Treasury by June 30 of the following year. The FBAR is intended to help root out tax evasion, money laundering and terrorism. In general, the penalty for failure to file the FBAR is $10,000. If the failure is intentional, however, the penalty may be as large as the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the value of the account that is not reported.
There are seven plaintiffs in the case. The most notable plaintiff is Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, currently a candidate to be the Republican Party’s nominee for President, who seeks relief in his capacity as a member of the U.S. Senate. The other plaintiffs are U.S. citizens (or individuals who at one time were U.S. citizens but have renounced their citizenship) who are resident outside the United States and who claim to have been harmed by FATCA or FBAR reporting.
Eight counts comprise the complaint. The first count is that the IGA’s are in violation of the U.S. Constitution because they exceed the Executive Branch’s independent constitutional powers. The second count is that the IGA’s are in violation of the U.S. Constitution because they override FATCA. The third count is that, as to U.S. citizens living abroad, FATCA and the FBAR violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The fourth, fifth and six counts challenge various penalties as unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The seventh and eighth counts challenge FATCA and the IGAs under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
The plaintiffs in the case seek a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of FATCA, IGAs and the FBAR.
The court begins its analysis by setting out the legal standard for review of a motion for a preliminary injunction. For a plaintiff to succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff needs to demonstrate that (i) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the case, (ii) the injunctive relief will save the plaintiff from irreparable injury, (iii) the injunctive relief will not harm others, and (iv) the public interest will be served by the injunction.
In opposing the motion for preliminary injunction, the Treasury Department argues that the plaintiffs lacked “standing” to bring their lawsuit. Thus, if the plaintiffs lack standing they would be unable to succeed on the merits and the motion would be denied.
The district court notes that in order to prove standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) that he has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., the injury must be concrete and particularized and it must be actual or imminent, (ii) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of by the plaintiff, and (iii) it must be likely, rather than merely speculative, that plaintiff’s injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court.
In arriving at its decision, the district court considered whether each of the seven plaintiffs satisfies the requirements for standing. The court first considers Senator Paul.
Senator Paul contends that the Executive Branch lacks the power to enter into the IGA’s by itself and that the IGA should have been submitted to the Senate for its consent. Thus, Senator Paul was harmed as he was denied an opportunity to consider and vote on whether to approve the IGA’s.
In considering Senator Paul’s standing, the District Court cited the Supreme Court decision of Raines v. Byrd in which several members of Congress challenge the constitutionality of The Line Item Veto Act of 1996. In that case, the Supreme Court distinguished a loss of political power by an elected representative from a loss of a private right, and found that standing could not be based on a loss of political power. Other courts have stated that the federal courts (Article III Courts under the U.S. Constitution) could not consider disputes between the Congress and the Executive Branch when the complaint is based on an injury to an official’s authority or power.
None of the other Plaintiffs has alleged that he or she has suffered or is about to suffer injury under the FATCA withholding tax: none is an FFI to which the tax under §1471(a) applies, and none has been assessed, or informed that IRS intends to assess, the recalcitrant account holder withholding tax imposed by § 1471(b). Moreover, all plaintiffs but Crawford live in jurisdictions where FFIs are not currently subject to the § 1471(b) withholding tax. No plaintiff has alleged that he or she is subject to § 6038D reporting due to an aggregate asset value exceeding $50,000 or FBAR reporting due to a bank account exceeding $10,000 in value.
Under Constitutional jurisprudence, Equal Protection claims are considered under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The gist of Count Six is that the only information reported to the IRS about domestic accounts is the amount of interest paid on that account during the calendar year. By contrast, under the FATCA regulations and the IGAs at issue in the case, more extensive information is required with respect to foreign accounts: the balance in the account, whether the account was opened or closed during the year, the amount of any income, gain, loss deduction or credit recognized during the year, etc. This difference in reporting requirements, the plaintiffs argue, is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Count Six alleges that the FBAR willfulness penalty is unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The “willfulness penalty” is imposed by section 5321 of the U.S. Code. The penalty for willingly failing to file an FBAR is the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the balance of the account at the time of the violation. Plaintiffs argue that the fine is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
The court concludes that Keuttel’s claim is not “ripe” for adjudication and therefore cannot be heard by the court. The doctrine of ripeness is designed to prevent courts from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. The District Court referred to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kentucky Press Assn v. Kentucky for a definition of the doctrine of ripeness. Courts consider three factors in deciding whether a claim is ripe for adjudication: (i) the likelihood that the harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass, (ii) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claim; and (iii) the hardship of the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage of the proceeding.
The court found that the Keuttel’s and the other plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims are not ripe under the Kentucky Press doctrine for multiple reasons, including (i) no withholding or FBAR penalty has been imposed against any of them, (ii) the 30 percent FFI withholding tax under §1471(a) will never be imposed against any of them because they are individuals, not FFIs, (iii) plaintiffs’ “cannot show that the FATCA taxes and the willful FBAR penalties are grossly disproportionate to the gravity of their (as yet unspecified) conduct,” (iv) the factual record is not sufficiently developed, and (v) plaintiffs will not suffer appreciable hardship from the court declining to hear their Eighth Amendment claims.
There are at least five income tax treaties or protocols awaiting consideration by the full U.S. Senate at this time. As we have noted, Senator Paul has written that he will object to any unanimous consent request, motion or waiver of any rule in relation to these treaties or any related measure. Senator Paul’s opposition to the treaties makes it difficult for these treaties to be approved by the full Senate because most Senate business is conducted by unanimous consent of the members. Senator Paul’s opposition to these treaties rests, at least in part, on the grounds that these treaties facilitate the exchange of information between the United States and foreign countries in order to implement FATCA.
The plaintiffs in this case likely will appeal the District Court’s decision. Thus, it will be some time before this issue is finally resolved. Until this case concludes, Senator Paul is unlikely to cease his opposition to the group of pending U.S. income tax treaties and protocols. Moreover, Senator Paul has not indicated whether, should he not prevail in this case, he will cease his opposition to the Senate’s consideration of the pending treaties and protocols.
 Case No. 3:15-cv-250 (September 29, 2015).
 The Bank Secrecy Act (31 USC §5314) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require citizens or residents of the United States, and certain other persons, to maintain records and file reports related to certain transactions with a foreign agency. Pursuant to this authority, the Treasury has promulgated regulations that require each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (except a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. person) having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, any bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country to report such relationship to the IRS and to provide the information specified in a form prescribed by Treasury.
 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
 Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995).
 454 F3d. 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2006).


01/04/2009. CN are candidates for licensure and END are endorsement applicants.
Percentage of Disconnects - 7%.
§217.16. Reporting of Minor Incidents.
(a) Purpose. The Board believes protection of the public is not enhanced by the reporting of every minor incident that may be a violation of the Texas Nursing Practice Act or a board rule. This is particularly true when there are mechanisms in place in the nurse's practice setting to identify nursing errors, detect patterns of practice, and take corrective action to remediate deficits in a nurse's judgment, knowledge, training, or skill. This rule is intended to provide guidance to nurses, nursing peer review committees and others in determining whether a nurse has engaged in conduct that indicates the nurse's continued practice would pose a risk of harm to patients or others and should [clarify what constitutes a minor incident and when a minor incident need not] be reported to the board.
(c) Factors to be Considered in Evaluating if Conduct Must Be Reported to the Board.
(D) indicates the nurse has engaged in a pattern of multiple minor incidents that demonstrate the nurse's continued practice would pose a risk of harm to patients or others.
(2) Evaluation of Multiple Incidents.
(A) Evaluation of Conduct. In evaluating whether multiple incidents constitute grounds for reporting it is the responsibility of the nurse manager or supervisor or peer review committee to determine if the minor incidents indicate a pattern of practice that demonstrates the nurse's continued practice poses a risk and should be reported.
(B) Evaluation of Multiple Incidents. In practice settings with nursing peer review, the nurse must be reported to peer review if a nurse commits five minor incidents within a 12-month period. In practice settings with no nursing peer review, the nurse who commits five minor incidents within a 12 month period must be reported to the Board.
(C) Nurse Manager and Nurse Supervisor Responsibilities. Regardless of the time frame or number of minor incidents, if a nurse manager or supervisor believes the minor incidents indicate a pattern of practice that poses a risk of harm that cannot be remediated, the nurse should be reported to the Board or Peer Review Committee.
(B) the presence of contributing or mitigating circumstances, including systems issues or factors beyond the nurse's control, in relation to the nurse's conduct.
(d) Conduct Required to be Reported.
(A) An error that contributed to a patient's death or serious harm.
(B) Criminal Conduct defined in Texas Occupations Code §301.4535.
(C) A serious violation of the board's Unprofessional Conduct rule §217.12 of this title (relating to Unprofessional Conduct) involving intentional or unethical conduct including but not limited to fraud, theft, patient abuse or patient exploitation.
(D) A practice-related violation involving impairment or suspected impairment by reason of chemical dependency, intemperate use, misuse or abuse of drugs or alcohol, mental illness, or diminished mental capacity required to be reported in accordance with §301.410(b) of the Nursing Practice Act and §217.19(g) of this title (relating to Incident Based Nursing Peer Review and Whistle Blower Protections).
(2) If a nursing peer review committee determines that a nurse engaged in the conduct listed in subsection (c)(1)(A) - (D) of this section the committee must report the nurse to the board. For errors involving the death or serious injury of a patient, if a nursing peer review committee makes a determination that a nurse has not engaged in conduct subject to reporting to the board, the committee must maintain documentation of the rationale for their belief that the nurse's conduct failed to meet each of the factors in paragraph (1)(A) - (D) of this subsection.
(e) Conduct Normally Not Required to Be Reported to the Board [ Special Considerations in Evaluating Incidents].
(B) [(2)] the incident was [ Multiple factors may contribute to medication errors. For the purposes of this rule,] a medication error caused primarily by factors beyond the nurse's control rather than [should be evaluated to determine whether the error resulted from] failure of the nurse to exercise proper clinical judgment [or if there were other extraneous factors that were the primary cause of the error]. Board Position Statement 15.17 Texas Board of Nursing/Board of Pharmacy Joint Position Statement/Medication Error provides guidelines for evaluating medication errors found at http://www.bon.state.tx.us/practice/position.html#15.17.
(2) If either of the conditions listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection are present, a presumption should exist that the nurse's conduct does not indicate the nurse's continued practice poses a risk of harm to a patient or another person and does not need to be reported to the board.
(1) A report must [shall] be prepared and maintained for a minimum of 12 months that contains a complete description of the incident, patient record number, witnesses, nurse involved and the action taken to correct or remedy the problem.
(2) If a medication error is attributable or assigned to the nurse as a minor incident, the record of that incident should indicate why the error is being attributed or assigned to the nurse.
(g) Nursing Peer Review Committee.
(1) If a report is made to the peer review committee, the committee must investigate and conduct incident-based nursing peer review in compliance with Nursing Peer Review Law in Texas Occupations Code §303 and §217.19 of this title.
(2) Review of a nurse's conduct or practice may be accomplished by either an informal work group of the nursing peer review committee as provided under §217.19(e) of this title or the full nursing peer review committee prior to a report being made to the board.
(3) [(1)] A nursing peer review committee receiving a report involving a minor incident or incidents must [shall] review the incident(s) and other conduct of the nurse during the previous 12 months to determine if the nurse's continuing to practice poses a risk of harm to patients [clients] or other persons and whether remediation would be reasonably expected to adequately mitigate such risk if it exists. The committee must [shall] consider the special considerations set out in subsection (c) [(d) ] of this section.
(B) [provided any] remediation could reasonably be expected to adequately mitigate any such risk and the nurse [is] successfully completes the remediation [completed].
(C) re-evaluate the nurse's current conduct to determine if the nurse did complete sufficient remediation and is deemed safe to practice.
(h) A Right to Report. Nurses and other persons are encouraged not to report minor incidents to the Board unless required to do so by this rule, but nothing in this rule is intended to prevent reporting of a potential violation directly to the Board or to a nursing peer review committee.
(i) Mis-classifying to Avoid Reporting. [Bad Faith Determination.] Intentionally mis-classifying an incident [in bad faith] to avoid reporting may result in violation of the mandatory reporting statute.
(j) Chief Nursing Officer or Nurse Administrator [ Officer's] Responsibility. The Chief Nursing Officer, Nurse Administrator or registered nurse by any title who is responsible for nursing services [chief nursing officer] shall be responsible for taking reasonable steps to assure that minor incidents are handled in compliance with this rule and any other applicable law.
(k) Nurses Reported to the Board. If a nurse is reported to the board, the board shall review the nurse's conduct to determine if it indicates the nurse's continued practice poses a risk of harm to a patient or another person. If it does not the board may elect not to proceed with filing formal charges.
Now the part I think is inconsistent: The Board rule is cited in italics and then the Nurse Practice Act Chapter 301.401 and 301.403 in bold, followed by my comments.
(c) Factors to be Considered in Evaluating if Conduct Must Be Reported to the Board.Sec. 301.403. Duty of Peer Review Committee to Report and Conduct Subject to Reporting.
So, it appears to me that the Board rule is much more broad than the statute. The Board rule allows for reporting if a nurse ignored a risk that either harmed or could have harmed a patient. This means that a nurse is subject to reporting for just the potential of a problem. The statute states that there must be a violation of a board rule AND the conduct must have contributed to the DEATH or SERIOUS INJURY of a patient. I do not understand the change from the statute requirements especially when the Board's preamble to the proposed rule states, "the board does not believe the protection of the public is enhanced by the reporting of every minor incident that may be a violation of the Texas Nursing Practice Act."


The Constitution of the United States of America guarantees the citizens of this great country freedom from overreaching and abusive conduct by our federal, state and local governments and those who work for them. Unfortunately, too often we learn of instances where private citizens have been the victims of police brutality, unlawful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or the unlawful taking of property. The attorneys at Mashel Law are ready to fight to vindicate and obtain damages for economic loss and personal injury caused by the unconstitutional deprivation of your rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2004).
A local city or municipality may also be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of a person’s civil rights. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), the United States Supreme Court established that local governing bodies can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief when the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.
A prevailing plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to fair and reasonable compensatory damages for economic loss and personal injuries. Punitive damages are available under the statute against individual defendants. A prevailing party is also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs.
New Jersey has its own civil rights act aptly called The New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“CRA”). CRA prohibits all persons “acting under color of law” from depriving any other person of “any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion.” N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). The purpose of the private CRA cause of action is “assuring a state law cause of action for violations of state and federal constitutional rights and to fill any gaps in state statutory anti-discrimination protection.” Tumpson v. Farina, 431 N.J. Super. 164, 181 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 611 (2008) (holding tort claims notice does not apply to CRA claims)). There are two types of claims under the CRA: (1) a claim where one is “deprived of a right”; and (2), a claim where one's “rights are interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion or force”. Id. at 181-82.
If you believe your civil rights have been violated by a public entity or an agent, representative or employee thereof call the lawyers at Mashel Law (732) 536-6161 for help or fill out the contact form on this page.


text:
Schroeder, Joseph J (ed). The Wonderful World of Toys, Games & Dolls. 1860 - 1930. Northfield. Digest Books. 1977. 256 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Schroeder, Joseph J. (ed). The Wonderful World of Toys, Games & Dolls. 1860 - 1930. Photo available. Chicago. Follett. 1977. 256 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Schroeder, Kathy. Pier Pressure. California Piers from San Diego to San Francisco. Photo available. Atglen. Schiffer. 2013. 197 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schuber, Trixie-Ann and Patty Gardenseed. A Bell in the Heart. The Autobiography of Patty Gardenseed, America's Ambassador of Good Will. Los Angeles. Western Publishers. 1963. 285 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy.
Schumach, Murray. The Face on the Cutting Room Floor. The Story of Movie and Television Censorship. New York. William Morrow. 1964. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in very good (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Schumacher, Geoff. Sun, Sin & Suburbia. Inscribed by the author. An Essential History of Modern Las Vegas. Las Vegas. Stephens Press. 2005. Octavo. Hard cover. Second edition. Illustrated. Inscribed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schumann-Bacia, Eva. John Soane and The Bank of England. Photo available. New York. Princeton Architectural Press. 1991. 204 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York. Harper. 1975. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Schuster, Hal. The Trek Encyclopedia. A Unique Reference to Every Actor, Director and Writer to Work on the Series. Plus Complete Details on Each of the Characters, Alien Races, Planets and Ships. Photo available. Las Vegas. Pioneer Books. 1992. 4to. Soft cover. Revised edition. Illustrated. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Schutz, Susan Polis. The Language of Love. Boulder. Blue Mountain Press. 2000. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. Reprint. Fine copy in glassine wrapper.
Schwantes, Carlos Arnaldo. Hard Traveling. A Portrait of Work Life in the New Northwest. Photo available. Lincoln. University of Nebraska Press. 1994. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schwartz, Charles. Gershwin. His Life and Music. Indianapolis. Bobbs-Merrill. 1973. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in very good (cigarette mark in front panel) dust jacket (in mylar).
Schwartz, Ellen. Northern California Art Exhibition Catalogs (1875-1915). A Descriptive Checklist & Index. La Jolla. Laurence McGilvery. 1990. 132 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Schwartz, Ellen. San Francisco Art Exhibition Catalogues. A Descriptive Checklist & Index. Davis. Davis University Press. 1981. 181 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Schwartz, Marvin. Collectors' Guide to Antique American Clocks. Garden City. Doubleday. 1975. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. iIlustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schwartz, Stephen. The Two Faces of Islam. Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism. New York. Anchor. 2003. Octavo. Soft cover. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Schwarz, Joel. A Water Odyssey. The Story of Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Commemorating 50 Years of Water Delivery to Southern California. Photo available. np. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. 1991. 212 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Schwarz, Joel. A Water Odyssey. The Story of Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Commemorating 50 Years of Water Delivery to Southern California. Photo available. np. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. 1991. 212 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Schwiebert, E.G., Ph. D. Luther and His Times. The Reformation from a New Perspective. Photo available. Saint Louis. Concordia Publishing House. 1950. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Scicolone, Michele. A Fresh Taste of Italy. 250 Authentic Recipes, Undiscovered Dishes, and New Flavors for Every Day. New York. Broadway. 1997. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Scigliano, Eric. Michelangelo's Mountain. The Quest for Perfection in the Marble Quarries of Carrara. New York. Free Press. 2005. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Sciolone, Michele. A Fresh Taste of Italy. 250 Authentic Recipes, Undiscovered Dishes and New Flavors. New York. Broadway. 1997. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Scofield, W. Fleming. Modern Timber Engineering. Photo available. New Orleans. Southern Pine Assoc. 1954. Octavo. Hard cover. Fourth edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Scott, Clark, Catherine. The Amber Room. The Fate of the World's Greatest Lost Treasure. New York. Walker. 2004. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Scott, David. Wall Street Words. An Essential A to Z for Today's Investor. Boston. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1988. Octavo. Soft cover. Fine copy.

matches:
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine
in fine