This chapter confronts the issue of Kinyras’ extra-musical qualities, which he regularly assumed on Cyprus, and which already seem to inform the Kinyras(es) of Pylos and the Kourion stands, both in the thirteenth century. I refine and develop the position, taken by J. P. Brown and others, that Kinyras was productively implicated in a syncretic relationship with the WS craftsman god Kothar.  I argue that on some parts of the mainland, the Divine Knr was sometimes absorbed by Kothar. On Cyprus, however, Kothar was himself absorbed by Kinyras. I reserve for separate discussion in Chapter 19 the traditions allying both Kinyras and ‘Kauthar’ to Byblos.
RS 24.252 is the one Ugaritic text that seems to attest a significant connection between Kothar and music.  Yet the kinnāru’s divinization in that city surely means that Kothar was not the only or primary musical god there, despite the lack of unambiguous evidence for a personified treatment of Kinnaru.
The sympathies of Khousor and Kinyras, already undeniable, become quite remarkable when one considers Philo’s attribution of lógoi, epōidaí, and manteîai to Khousor. Although these powers can be paralleled to some extent for Kothar in the Ugaritian texts,  they accord much better with what one expects of a Divine Lyre, both on the basis of Mesopotamian and Hurro-Hittite parallels for divinized instruments, and the performance contexts known for the kinnāru itself.
Thus, the overlap between Khousor’s powers and what is attested for Kothar at Ugarit is only very partial. Yet all three abilities would suit a Divine Lyre very well.
Despite the sporadic illumination provided by the Ugaritian texts, there is no particular reason to suppose that Philo’s musicalized Khousor is a direct diachronic development of Ugarit’s Kothar. We know enough about first-millennium Phoenician cults to be sure that there was considerable diversity from city to city in the LBA too.  I have already argued, on the basis of the Kinyras(es) of Pylos and the thirteenth-century Cypriot stands, that a metamusical Kinyras had emerged by this time on the island. Whether this development was original to Cyprus, or had earlier roots in a mainland city other than Ugarit—for instance Byblos—will be considered in Chapter 19.
While Khousor’s absorption of a musical brother is understandable, the reverse, as one has with Kinyras, is more surprising. And it is quite remarkable how the two processes mirror each from island to mainland. It is of a piece with this that, while ‘Kinyras’ persisted as a Grecophone PN,  the element knr is not certainly attested in Canaanite or Phoenician/Punic PNs, nor at Ugarit  —although we did see a fifteenth-century example from nearby Alalakh.  Kothar/Khousor exhibits the opposite distribution. Absent from inscriptions and texts not stemming from Syria and the Levant, Khousor’s longevity and popular appeal is clear from Amorite and Ugaritian PNs going back to the MBA and LBA, respectively,  and Neo-Punic and Aramaean PNs enduring to the third century CE.  The early names especially suggest that Kothar was regarded as a kind of king and/or patron of kings.  Here is another parallel with Kinyras.
Once again, no extant Classical source mentions a brother for Kinyras.  Fraternal pairs, we have seen, were a traditional mythological construction in the region; but they are not otherwise prominent in Lusignan’s account. The historian will hardly have invented an anonymous non-entity who plays no role in the ancient Cypriot dynastic sequence in which his ‘Cinaras’ looms large, and is otherwise so artificially contrived.  We are very fortunate indeed that Lusignan bothered to include this point, which must be a vestige of something significant. That he himself felt this way is shown by the later Description, which, though containing rather less ancient material, still troubles to mention Paffo/Paphos and his two sons before again discussing only Cinaras.  Unless one supposes that Lusignan’s source for this ‘retiring twin’ was some ancient source now lost, he must have drawn on the island’s conservative oral traditions. In either case, I conclude that he attests a Cypriot version of the same process that informs Philo—the fusion of Kinyras and Kothar, with a record kept ‘in the family’ through an anonymous twin.
Here the metalworking Tubal-Cain has been bifurcated and endowed with a twin. Bar Koni then reverts to the Biblical account by quoting the ‘original’ verse about Jubal; but note that Jubal is not called the brother of Tubal-Cain, who after all already has Cainan. Since this second metalworking sibling is apparently a local innovation, it is perfectly possible in principle that the family’s musical contributions were equally reworked, and yet are masked here by the Biblical quotation.
There is a telling ‘error’ here. The Book of the Bee first follows Bar Koni in naming the brothers Cainan and Tubal-Cain. But in its musical sequel quoted above—which contains several deviations from Bar Koni, including the relocation of “evil spirits” from the patients into the pipes themselves—the brothers reappear as Tubal and Tubal-Cain. There is no way to decide the ‘correct’ reading. One might suggest that ‘Tubal’ is a mistake for ‘Jubal’, but this would still leave Tubal-Cain partaking in both metals and music; and given the novel pairing of Cainan and Tubal-Cain, an error of Tubal for Jubal would itself be symptomatic of the mutability of the brothers’ names and relationships.
These texts present striking parallels with Philo’s Khousor and Lusignan’s Cinaras, and strongly suggest that the reception of Tubal and Jubal was shaped by a wider mythological pattern—the craftsman-musician mytheme—with pagan mythology leaving its imprint as in a palimpsest.
The last issue bearing upon Kinyras and Kothar is potentially the most crucial, since it concerns a comparable crossover in lyre terminology and morphology, apparently at the Greek and Syro-Levantine linguistic and cultural interface.
When one considers that Kothar and Kinyras were variously confounded in Phoenicia and Cyprus; that Syro-Levantine and Cypro-Aegean lyre-types coexisted on Cyprus probably from the time of Aegean immigration in the twelfth century, and certainly by the ninth (Chapter 11); and that it is precisely on Cyprus, the eastern rim of the early Greek linguistic continuum, that Kinyras most conspicuously survived in an expanded form that incorporated Kothar-like powers—under these very particular circumstances, it would be remarkable indeed if the mirror-image lyre-terminology were accidental.
[ back ] 1. For Kothar generally, Albright 1940:296–297; Gaster 1961:161–163; YGC:135–137; Gese et al. 1970:147–148 et passim; Xella 1976; KwH; Morris 1992:79–100 et passim; Morris 1998; DDD col. 913–915 (Pardee).
[ back ] 2. ‘Kothar’ will refer both to the god as a wider Syro-Levantine figure and to his specific manifestation at Ugarit (context should make the difference clear); for the form, see n12. I reserve ‘Khousor’ (Gk. Χουσώρ) for the complex Phoenician culture-hero presented by Philo of Byblos (see p445–452), probably with special Byblian associations. ‘Kauthar’ will apply to the cognate figure in ps.-Meliton (Chapter 19). Note that the vocalization of Ug. kṯr as Kôtharu (/kōθaru/), which entails taking Arabic *kawṯar as cognate (KwH:51–80), is not always accepted; Huehnergard 2008:141 considers it “by no means certain,” noting that otherwise the Ugarit-Akkadian ku-šar-ru (RS 20.123+ = Nougayrol 1968:248 (no. 137 IVa.19) will equally permit /kūθaru/ or /kŭθaru/. Yet the latter form is in any case ruled out by Philo’s Χουσώρ (see n12 below), which establishes the long quantity of the first syllable. And the Greek spelling ΧΑΥΘΑΡ in a third-century CE tombstone from Hama, Syria (Lassus 1935:33 no. 14), an Aramaean area, definitely favors the Arabic form’s relevance to the reconstruction (as realized already by Albright 1938:593; cf. Brown 1965:199; KwH:77; S. Weninger, communication, May 2012); for the old diphthongal value is clearly indicated by Greek αυ, itself still diphthongal at this time (Allen 1987:79–80). It may still be, however, that at Ugarit ku-šar-ru does reflect something closer to /kūθaru/ than /kōθaru/ (cf. p273–274).
[ back ] 3. For this interpretive issue, see p135n140.
[ back ] 4. See p135, with text and comments.
[ back ] 5. Good 1991:156–157; Clemens 1993:73.
[ back ] 6. For those who interpret line three as referring not to another instrument but to cult-dancers (see p135n140), the “goodly companions of Kothar” will follow suit by parallelism: cf. Clemens 1993:73n57: “pair of instruments (x2); personal participant (x2).” Yet even this line of thinking is not incompatible with a musical Kothar, since both instruments and ‘Kothar-dancers’ would obviously comprise an integrated performance.
[ back ] 8. Cf. p6–7, 25–33, 103, 122–123.
[ back ] 9. See p122.
[ back ] 10. See p23–25.
[ back ] 11. Support for a musical Kothar has also been sought from the Kotharat, the seven ‘skillful’ goddesses who preside over marriage and conception rituals, arguably as songstresses (Margalit 1972). But this still would not guarantee a musical sense for Kothar himself, as one can suppose independent semantic developments of √kṯr. Dahood 1963 argued well for an allusion to Kothar in Ezekiel 33:32, so that “you are like a singer of love-songs” becomes “skillful with reed-pipes” (“a Kothar on the pipes”?); cf. Cooper 1981:386.
[ back ] 12. The ‘Greek’ orthography (Χουσώρ) reflects normal Phoenician phonetic developments. The long ô of Kothar resulted from the monophthongization of P-S aw (see n2), and then underwent further development to û, whence it is represented by Gk. ου (since υ/ῡ, having narrowed to /ü/ or /ǖ/ by the later fifth century, was no longer appropriate: see p196). As to the final syllable, after the loss of final short vowels in Phoenician, accented a was lengthened to ā and then to ō (by the same process which had produced the Canaanite Shift of ā > ō in the second millennium, still exerting its influence: Harris 1936:25 §8, 34–35 §11; Harris 1939:59–60; SL §21.13, 25.6). The stages of development are thus *Kawṯaru > *Kôṯaru > *Kû/ôšár > *Kû/ôšā ́ r > *Kûšṓr > ‘Gk.’ Χουσώρ (cf. KwH:79–80). Initial k- can be represented by Greek χ from the Hellenistic period.
[ back ] 13. Mokhos of Sidon (Tyre? cf. Baumgarten 1981:148n33) FGH 784 F 4, preserved by Damaskios, a Syrian Neo-Platonist of the fifth–sixth century: Χουσωρὸν ἀνοιγέα πρῶτον … τὴν νοητὴν δύναμιν ἅτε πρώτην διακρίνασαν τὴν ἀδιάκριτον φύσιν, On First Principles 125c (1.323 Ruelle); also in Attridge and Oden 1981:102–103. See generally Barr 1974:47–49 (undermining the equation of Khousor-‘Opener’ and Ptah advanced by Hoffman 1896:253–254 and YGC:193–196).
[ back ] 14. Οὐλωμὸς ὁ νοητὸς θεός. See Cross 1973:18; Attridge and Oden 1981:104n7; Barr 1974:48–49).
[ back ] 15. For the character of Philo’s work and sources, see p123.
[ back ] 16. See Philo of Byblos FGH 790 F 1 (21); cf. Lokkegaard 1954:53.
[ back ] 17. But see p472. Note that Philo’s later treatment of Sydyk and Misor and their children appears to double some of his Khousor material: see p510–511.
[ back ] 18. We must follow Clemen 1939:50 (so tacitly Brown 1965:203; Baumgarten 1981:169) in emending to the singular (τοὺς ἀδελφούς > τὸν ἀδελφόν: see text in next note). The phrase θάτερον τὸν Χουσώρ clearly implies a pair of brothers and that a second will indeed be discussed, as is the case throughout the larger narrative; the traditional plural reading would require us to suppose three (or more) brothers, of whom only Khousor is named. The corruption may have arisen from the following accusative plural τοίχους, with the glossing of Khousor as both Hephaistos and Zeus Meilikhios in the relatively long intervening stretch making a careless scribe lose track of brotherly pairs (A’s reading αὐτῶν, “their brothers,” will have followed suit). Just possibly Khousor’s brother was in fact named, but has fallen from the text, through cavalier abstraction by Eusebios or in transmission; but the text reads smoothly. Some would connect Khousor’s anonymous brother with the ‘Craftsman’ (Τεχνίτης) who comes soon afterwards (Clapham 1969:108); but this figure has a named brother of his own (Γήïνος Ἀυτόχθων). Τεχνίτης may however be a doublet of Kothar deriving from Philo’s conflation of regional Phoenician variants (Attridge and Oden 1981:84n70).
[ back ] 19. Philo of Byblos FGH 790 F 2 (11) = Eusebios Preparation for the Gospel 1.10.11–12: Ἀγρέα καὶ Ἁλιέα … ἐξ ὧν γενέσθαι δύο ἀδελφοὺς σιδήρου εὑρετὰς καὶ τῆς τούτου ἐργασίας, ὧν θάτερον τὸν Χουσὼρ λόγους ἀσκῆσαι καὶ ἐπωιδὰς καὶ μαντείας. εἶναι δὲ τοῦτον τὸν Ἥφαιστον, εὑρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄγκιστρον καὶ δέλεαρ καὶ ὁρμιὰν καὶ σχεδίαν, πρῶτόν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῦσαι. διὸ καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν μετὰ θάνατον ἐσεβάσθησαν. καλεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Δία Μειλίχιον· οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀδελφὸν [Clemen, see n18: τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς MSS] αὐτοῦ [A: αὐτῶν] τοίχους φασὶν ἐπινοῆσαι ἐκ πλίνθων.
[ back ] 20. Hoffman 1896:256–258.
[ back ] 21. Brown 1965. But his unawareness of Kinnaru led him to endorse the comparison of Kinyras with el-ku-ni-ir-ša (El, Creator of the Earth), now obsolete (cf. p5n27), and to reject the etymology of Kinyras < κινύρα (cf. p4, 189).
[ back ] 22. RS 2. + 5.155 = KTU/CAT 1.6 vi.51–53. Kothar’s conjunction with the sea is clear in this text, although the exact interpretation is debated: see RTU:145 and n126 with further references.
[ back ] 23. Kothar’s homes in Crete (Caphtor) and Egypt: RS 3.361 (KTU/CAT 1.1 iii.1, 18–19); RS 3.346? (1.2 iii.2–3); RS 2.+ (1.3 vi.14–16). For further evidence connecting Kothar and the sea, KwH:105–118; cf. Brown 1965:204; DDUPP:109. Kothar as a totalizing figure of second-millennium trade with the Aegean and Egypt: Morris 1992:93 et passim; Morris 1998; note especially the startling discovery of Minoan frescoes at Avaris and elsewhere: Bietak 2005, etc. The interpretation of Kothar as ‘fisherman of Athirat/Asherah’ (see Baumgarten 1981:167, 200), and so a close connection with the ‘Lady of the Sea’ (DDUPP:72; OSG:14 with references in n25), has been abandoned: see Smith and Pitard 2009:377.
[ back ] 24. Kothar as palace-builder: RS 3.361? (KTU/CAT 1.1 iii.27–28); RS 3.346 (1.2 iii.7–11); RS 2.+ (1.4 v.41–vi.38). See generally Gaster 1961:161nXIV; Gordon 1966:22–23, 48–49, 58–60, 63–64 (somewhat out-of-date); Gese et al. 1970:148; Baumgarten 1981:169–170; KwH:218–250, 310–350; Morris 1992:83–84.
[ back ] 25. Kinyras and Agamemnon’s breastplate: Homer Iliad 11.24–28; see p1, 322–323. Kothar’s gift for Athirat: RS 2.+ (KTU/CAT 1.4 i.23–43).
[ back ] 26. Baal’s weapons: RS 3.367 (KTU/CAT 1.2 iv.11–15); Aqhat’s bow: RS 2. (KTU/CAT 1.17 v.10–28, vi.20–25).
[ back ] 27. Σ Pindar Pythian 2.30g (Abel 1891): see p226.
[ back ] 28. See especially KwH:51–80, convincingly upholding the relevance of Arabic cognates, including kawṯar, ‘abundant goodness’; so too SL §29.9.
[ back ] 29. For Kothar as Zeus Meilikhios, see Baumgarten 1981:168–169; contrast KwH:113–114.
[ back ] 30. For scenes in which Kothar appears to be prophetic, see Smith 1994:336. For incantations, see below.
[ back ] 31. See p97.
[ back ] 32. The Greek does not support the idea that λόγους ἀσκῆσαι here is defined by καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ μαντείας (KwH:443: “the ‘verbal arts’ of Khousor … do not include music, but ‘spells and prophecies’”). Λόγοι are a separate category—various forms of poetry that (as typically in the ancient world) will have had a musical aspect.
[ back ] 33. KwH:442–445 rightly emphasized the tenuous basis for supposing a musical Kothar; cf. Brown 1965:206; Good 1991:157 (“it remains puzzling that the Ugaritic texts do not place Kothar in a musical context apart from [RS 24.252]”).
[ back ] 34. See p394n127. Cf. Obermann 1947:208; Gaster 1961:161–163; KwH:119.
[ back ] 35. Kothar as Ea: RS 20.024, 15; RS 20.123+, IVa.19, etc.: Nougayrol 1968:44–45 (no. 18), cf. 51; 240–249 (no. 137). Cf. Clapham 1969:107; Gese et al. 1970:98–99, 147; Lichtenstein 1972:104n57, 110; Baumgarten 1981:166; SURS:861 and n1116 with further references. Ea is invoked in various incantations from Ugarit, but is not unique in this: SURS:1020–1021.
[ back ] 36. See p444–445.
[ back ] 37. Caquot 1976:300 rightly understood ἐπῳδαί broadly—“chants (ou des incantations)”—but anachronistically retrojects this to Kothar himself.
[ back ] 38. The ‘Getty hexameters’ contain much relevant language: text in Faraone and Obbink 2013, 10–11 (note especially lines 1, 6, 23–24).
[ back ] 39. Herodotos 1.132.3 (μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεὼς ἐπαείδει θεογονίην, οἵην δὴ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι εἶναι τὴν ἐπαοιδήν); Derveni Papyrus col. 6.1–11 (ἐπ̣[ωιδὴ δ]ὲ̣ μάγων δύν[α]ται δ̣αίμονας ἐμπο[δὼν] γι[̣νομένο]υ̣ς μεθιστάν̣αι, 2–3, ed. Kouremenos et al. 2006). I assume that the papyrus speaks of Persian Magi specifically (for the issue, Lightfoot 2004:103; Kouremenos et al. 2006:166–168 with references), although apotropaic and cathartic incantations were of course more widely spread in the ANE.
[ back ] 40. Plato Republic 364b; cf. Symposium 202e. Plato exploits the overlap between singing and incantation in the Laws, when his Athenian, after a discussion of the positive psychagogic effects of a proper musical education for children, realizes that “what we call songs (ᾠδάς) now appear in fact to have been incantations (ἐπῳδαί) for the soul” (Plato Laws 659d–e, following Bury’s text in the Loeb edition).
[ back ] 41. Sources in AGM:32 (beginning with Homer).
[ back ] 42. Sophokles Ajax 582: θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδάς; Bion Lament for Adonis 91, 94–95: αἱ Χάριτες κλαίοντι τὸν υἱέα τῶ Κινύραο … χαἰ Μοῖραι τὸν Ἄδωνιν ἀνακλείοισιν, Ἄδωνιν, / καί νιν ἐπαείδουσιν (“The Graces beweep the son of Kinyras … the Moirai too invoke ‘Adonis, Adonis’, / and sing incantations over him”).
[ back ] 43. Tacitus Histories 2.3–4; Clement of Alexandria Miscellanies 1.21. See Chapter 16. Cf. Hoffman 1896:256; Brown 1965:204. Extispicy in the hands of a Divine Lyre may conjure a rather grotesque image. But recall that the slaughtering of a bull for making the divinized lilissu-drum was governed by a highly elaborate series of ritual actions and incantations (see p23–26). Hermes’ invention of his divine-voiced (see p6n32, 411n68) lyre involved eviscerating a turtle, flaying a cow, and disemboweling a sheep: Homeric Hymn to Hermes 39–51 (handwashing is not mentioned).
[ back ] 44. See p26–33, 161–165.
[ back ] 45. Pliny Natural History 7.56.195; Chorograffia p. 13a, 14a, 87 (§28, 37, 590); Description pp. 27a, 30a, 224a. See p325.
[ back ] 46. So Clapham 1969:108; KwH:83–84, 170. I retain for convenience the conventional vocalization of ḫss; but note the further considerations in van Selms 1979:741; KwH:85–90.
[ back ] 47. It may well be, however, that Kothar’s dual name invited conflation with another god, better-defined than ‘Hasis’, as a means of better differentiating the two ‘brothers’. And doubtless a Divine Knr would be considered ‘wise’.
[ back ] 48. For the following points, see de Moor 1970:227–228.
[ back ] 49. Smith 2015:49–5, 57, 64–65.
[ back ] 50. De Moor 1970:228 and n75.
[ back ] 51. For ‘the Castors’, Pliny Natural History 10.121 (noted by Brown 1965:206).
[ back ] 52. KwH:51 collected forty-five instances.
[ back ] 53. SURS:1105–1112.
[ back ] 54. But see p121–122.
[ back ] 56. See p59, 97.
[ back ] 57. One may note here the application of carpentry metaphors for the tuning process in both Akkadian (pitnu) and Greek (harmonía, the phonology of which reveals its Mycenaean pedigree): Franklin 2002b:2, 9, 15; Franklin 2002a:677 (with n26 for Akkadian pitnu); elaborated in Franklin 2006a:55n42.
[ back ] 58. DDUPP passim.
[ back ] 59. See p334–335.
[ back ] 60. See Pardee 1988a:139n87 for gods in the Ugaritian pantheon texts who are absent from PNs. In the Punic sphere, a KNRSN, son of B‘LŠLK may be attested as a member of a marzeaḥ, dedicating a temple at Maktar, Tunisia (first century CE): KAI 145.40, with the reading going back to Févrer 1956 (who considered it “douteux” , but compared “libyque KNRSN” in Chabot 1940–1941 no. 232). A KNRD‘T appears in KAI 139.1 (gravestone inscription, Chemtou, Tunisia, n.d.); the certainty of this reading is affirmed by Chabot 1918:296–301, but the name, vocalized as “Kanradât,” is taken as Libyan/Numidian.
[ back ] 61. For Alalakh, see p98.
[ back ] 62. Amorite royal name Kwšr in the Execration Texts of MK Egypt (ca. 1900): Sethe 1926:46–47; Albright 1940:297 and n47; Goetze 1958:28; YGC:136n65. Amorite PNs at Mari: Gelb 1980:131; KwH:58. Ugaritian names: Gröndahl 1967:152; KwH:62–63.
[ back ] 63. Phoenician/Punic: Hoffman 1896:254–255; Benz 1972:131, 336; Brown 1965:201; KwH:74, 77; DDD col. 914 (Pardee); Krahmalkov 2000:244; DDUPP:109–111. For ‘Χαυθαρ’ at Hama, Syria, see p443n2.
[ back ] 64. Besides the Amorite king Kwšr of the Execration Texts (see n62), there is the Ugaritian theophoric PN kṯrmlk, ‘Kothar-is-King’ (see p167n100 above); and King Kushan-rishathaim of Aram-naharaim (Judges 3:8, 10), rendered as Khousarsathom or Khousarsathaim in LXX, and Khousarsathos in Josephus Antiquities of the Jews 5.180.3, 183.2 (Hoffman 1896:256–258; but see Pardee, DDD col. 914–915).
[ back ] 65. See p325.
[ back ] 67. Our Lusignan passage answers Baurain 1980a:9, who criticized Brown 1965 for failing to produce a sibling for Kinyras to parallel Khousor and his brother.
[ back ] 68. See Appendix G.
[ back ] 71. The phrase quoted is that of Knapp, PPC.
[ back ] 72. Brown 1965:206; Baumgarten 1981:141. Ugarit: de Moor 1970:227–228; KwH:81–84; del Olmo Lete 1999:82. Lokkegaard 1954:60–61 proposed that Philo represents a trend “for dividing or specializing the gods according to the splitting up of society in new trades and guilds following the demands of advancing culture and more refined art.” But his numerous pairs are probably due more to combining regional variants into a master scheme.
[ back ] 73. Genesis 4:22. See p43–46.
[ back ] 74. See p44–45.
[ back ] 75. For possible associations between qayin (‘smith’), qīnā (‘composition, dirge’), and kinnōr, see p44n5. D’Angour 2011:64–84 now proposes connecting the Greek myth of Kaineus with √qyn (‘forge’), interpreting him as ‘Spear-Man’ and parallel to Kinyras as embodying a Levantine cultural practice.
[ back ] 76. For Syriac, Persian, and Arabic sources, see Budge 1886:29 and n5 (see below); Farmer 1929:6–7; Robson and Farmer 1938:9 and n4; MgB 3/2:24; SOM 1:10–11, 153; also Jacobson 1996:303 vis-à-vis Tubal-Cain in Philo Judaeus. In the Armenian commentary on Genesis attributed to St. Ephraim, Jubal is connected exclusively with the lyre tradition; pipes are traced rather to the wife of Tubal; Horace’s ambubaiae and their relations (Satires 1.2.1: see Appendix C) make this more interesting than “an inner Armenian corruption or misunderstanding of the Syriac” (Mathews 1998:55 and n111). Similarly, Michael the Syrian (twelfth century), crediting Jubal with both kinnōr and kithára, eliminates pipes (Chronicle 1.6: Chabot 1899–1924 1:10).
[ back ] 77. See p312.
[ back ] 78. Theodore Bar Koni Liber scholiorum, Mimrā 2.97: the first part of my translation comes from Budge 1886, since the passage was taken over verbatim into the Book of the Bee 19; the second part is after Hespel and Draguet 1981–1982 1:116.
[ back ] 79. Book of the Bee 18: translation from Budge 1886; cf. Budge 1927:79–80.
[ back ] 80. Κίθαρις < kṯr: Ginsberg 1938:13; Nougayrol 1968:51. The potential parallel of Kinyras/kinýra and ‘Kauthar’/kithára was first noted, so far as I have found, by Lenormant 1871–1872:255n1 in connection with the dual tradition at Aphaka (for which see Chapter 19).
[ back ] 81. The proposal of Good 1991:156–157 to see such an instrument in RS 24.252, 5 (KTU/CAT 1.108), rather than the god Kothar, was refuted by Clemens 1993:73–74 (cf. p135n141). There remains the kissar, applied to some traditional lyres of East Africa (Plumley 1976). But this word probably derives from Greek κιθάρα under Hellenistic-Egyptian influence (versus krar < *kenar: see p58n65). Lyres per se, however, are probably older in the region: cf. Athenaios 633f on the harplike instrument played among the ‘Troglodytes’ (reported by the Hellenistic explorer Pythagoras: AGM:76n126). The begena, a last surviving ‘giant lyre’, is attributed to the Israelite tradition and associated with David (p58n65, 167). See further Kebede 1977:380; MGG 5:1042–1043 (G. Kubik); K. Wachsmann and U. Wegner in GMO s.v. Lyres, §3 Modern Africa, with bibliography.
[ back ] 82. Brown 1965:207.
[ back ] 83. So apparently Morris 1992:79–80n26. And beware Braun’s confusing statement in MAIP:146 (punctuation and capitalization preserved): “The root of the word itself, knr, appears frequently [sic!] in divine names such as kinýras, [[kinnaraas [sic!], kuthar]].” The same hodgepodge appears in MGG 1:1516.
[ back ] 84. Jan 1882:5, 35n142; Lewy 1895:164 (whence Rosól 2013:181). The idea is perpetuated by Hoch 1994:324 and in n45; but his further argument, that the modification of kinnāru to κίθαρις (sic) must have preceded the Canaanite Shift (whence no *κίθορις or *κίθωρις), does not follow in any case since the hypothetical borrowing could have been at any point from an ‘unshifted’ dialect in North Syria. See further below.
[ back ] 86. Heubeck 1959:24–27; Heubeck 1961:19–21.
[ back ] 87. I have found no exact parallels in Melchert 1994, although the simplification of geminates in Lydian (e.g. /nn/ > /n/: p340, cf. 372 §9) would be relevant.
[ back ] 88. Athenaios 256b–c.
[ back ] 89. HC:86n2.
[ back ] 90. Note the Trojan context of Homer Iliad 3.54.
[ back ] 91. Franklin 2010:20–22; Franklin 2012:745–746.
[ back ] 92. See p198–199.
[ back ] 93. See p262.


§ 200-105 Community development objectives.
§ 200-301 Zoning District Map.
§ 200-302 Zoning districts and purposes.
§ 200-304 General district regulations.
§ 200-305 Authorized land uses.
§ 200-306 Area and bulk regulations.
§ 200-402 Applicability and relationship to other ordinances.
§ 200-404 Site area, use and density requirements.
§ 200-405 Setbacks and lot areas.
§ 200-406 Access and availability of public services.
§ 200-407 Administration and procedure.
§ 200-408 Criteria for tentative approval.
§ 200-409 Application for final approval.
§ 200-410 Common open space.
§ 200-502 Procedure for approval.
§ 200-504 Standards for specific uses.
§ 200-513 Comparable uses not specifically listed.
§ 200-517 Day-care centers and day-care centers, institutional.
§ 200-519 Family day-care homes.
§ 200-520 Group care facilities; group day-care home; personal care boarding homes, transitional dwellings; pub dwellings.
§ 200-521 Hospitals, clinics or nursing homes.
§ 200-525 Medical marijuana dispensary.
§ 200-526 Medical marijuana growing/processing facility.
§ 200-527 Mine portals, ventilating shafts, bore holes, tipples, cleaning plants and mine waste disposal areas.
§ 200-529 Mini-warehouse or self-storage facility.
§ 200-530 Mobile home parks.
§ 200-531 Noncommercial recreation, public recreation.
§ 200-531.1 Oil and gas compressor stations.
§ 200-531.1 Oil and gas processing facilities.
§ 200-531.3 Oil and gas wells.
§ 200-532 Place of assembly; schools, private or public.
§ 200-533 Public parking garages or public parking lots.
§ 200-537 Temporary uses or structures, other than a construction trailers, model homes or sales offices.
§ 200-539 Wind energy systems, small.
§ 200-602 Granting and evaluation of special exception uses.
§ 200-603 Requests for reasonable accommodations.
§ 200-703 Screening and landscaping.
§ 200-704 Special yard requirements.
§ 200-705 Permitted projections into required yards.
§ 200-708 Temporary construction trailers, model homes or sales offices.
§ 200-711 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance.
§ 200-712 Mobile homes on individual lots.
§ 200-713 On-site sales accessory to farm and greenhouses.
§ 200-714 No-impact home-based business.
§ 200-802 Off-street parking design.
§ 200-803 Off-street parking requirements.
§ 200-902 Types and classes.
§ 200-904 Signs authorized in all zoning districts.
§ 200-905 Signs authorized in agricultural and residential zoning districts.
§ 200-906 Signs authorized in business districts.
§ 200-1005 Registration of nonconformity.
§ 200-1105 Notice and conduct of hearings.
§ 200-1106 Failure to render a decision.
§ 200-1108 Fees and expenditures.
§ 200-1110 Stay of proceedings.
§ 200-1201 Zoning Officer powers and duties.
§ 200-1202 Enforcement; violations and penalties.
§ 200-1203 Zoning certificate required.
§ 200-1204 Application requirements for zoning certificate.
§ 200-1205 Certificate of occupancy required.
§ 200-1207 Procedure for amendments.
§ 200-1209 Landowner curative amendments.
Floodplain management — See Ch. 97.
Gas and oil wells — See Ch. 104.
Subdivision and land development — See Ch. 178.


text:
This document describes specifications for four normalized forms of Unicode text. With these forms, equivalent text (canonical or compatibility) will have identical binary representations. When implementations keep strings in a normalized form, they can be assured that equivalent strings have a unique binary representation.
Note: Unicode 3.1 introduces a change that may affect backwards compatibility for some implementations; for details see Annex 12: Unicode 3.1 Normalization Corrigendum.
This document has been reviewed by Unicode members and other interested parties, and has been approved by the Unicode Technical Committee as a Unicode Standard Annex. It is a stable document and may be used as reference material or cited as a normative reference from another document.
A Unicode Standard Annex (UAX) forms an integral part of the Unicode Standard, carrying the same version number, but is published as a separate document. Note that conformance to a version of the Unicode Standard includes conformance to its Unicode Standard Annexes.
A list of current Unicode Technical Reports is found on http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/. For more information about versions of the Unicode Standard, see http://www.unicode.org/unicode/standard/versions/.
The References provide related information that is useful in understanding this document. Please mail corrigenda and other comments to the author(s).
Both canonical and compatibility equivalences are explained in more detail in The Unicode Standard, Chapters 2 and 3. In addition, the Unicode Standard describes several forms of normalization in Section 5.7 (Section 5.9 in Version 2.0). These normalization forms are designed to produce a unique normalized form for any given string. Two of these forms are precisely specified in Section 3.6. In particular, the standard defines a canonical decomposition format, which can be used as a normalization for interchanging text. This format allows for binary comparison while maintaining canonical equivalence with the original unnormalized text.
The standard also defines a compatibility decomposition format, which allows for binary comparison while maintaining compatibility equivalence with the original unnormalized text. The latter can also be useful in many circumstances, since it levels the differences between characters which are inappropriate in those circumstances. For example, the half-width and full-width katakana characters will have the same compatibility decomposition and are thus compatibility equivalents; however, they are not canonical equivalents.
Both of these formats are normalizations to decomposed characters. While Section 3.6 also discusses normalization to composite characters (also known as decomposible or precomposed characters), it does not precisely specify a format. Because of the nature of the precomposed forms in the Unicode Standard, there is more than one possible specification for a normalized form with composite characters. This document provides a unique specification for normalization, and a label for each normalized form.
The four normalization forms are labeled as follows.
As with decomposition, there are two forms of normalization to composite characters, Normalization Form C and Normalization Form KC. The difference between these depends on whether the resulting text is to be a canonical equivalent to the original unnormalized text, or is to be a compatibility equivalent to the original unnormalized text. (In NFKC and NFKD, a K is used to stand for compatibility to avoid confusion with the C standing for canonical.) Both types of normalization can be useful in different circumstances.
The following diagram illustrates the effect of applying different normalization forms to denormalized text. In the diagram, glyphs are colored according to the characters they represent (this will not be visible in black & white printouts).
With all normalization forms, singleton characters (those with singleton canonical mappings) are replaced. With NFD and NFC, compatibility composites (characters with compatibility decompositions) are retained; with NFKD and NFKC they are replaced. Notice that this is sometimes loses significant information, unless supplemented by markup or styling.
With NFD and NFKD, composite characters are mapped to their canonical decompositions. With NFC and NFKC, combining character sequences are mapped to composites, if possible. Notice that since there is no composite for e-ring, so it is left decomposed in NFC and NFKC.
All of the definitions in this document depend on the rules for equivalence and decomposition found in Chapter 3 of The Unicode Standard and the decomposition mappings in the Unicode Character Database.
Note: Text containing only ASCII characters (U+0000 to U+007F) is left unaffected by all of the normalization forms. This is particularly important for programming languages (see Annex 7: Programming Language Identifiers).
The W3C Character Model for the World Wide Web [CharMod] uses Normalization Form C for XML and related standards (this document is not yet final, but this requirement is not expected to change). See the W3C Requirements for String Identity, Matching, and String Indexing [CharReq] for more background.
Normalization Form KC additionally levels the differences between compatibility-equivalent characters which are inappropriately distinguished in many circumstances. For example, the half-width and full-width katakana characters will normalize to the same strings, as will Roman Numerals and their letter equivalents. More complete examples are provided in Annex 1: Examples and Charts.
Normalization forms KC and KD must not be blindly applied to arbitrary text. Since they erase many formatting distinctions, they will prevent round-trip conversion to and from many legacy character sets, and unless supplanted by formatting markup, may remove distinctions that are important to the semantics of the text. The best way to think of these normalization forms is like uppercase or lowercase mappings: useful in certain contexts for identifying core meanings, but also performing modifications to the text that may not always be appropriate. They can be applied more freely to domains with restricted character sets, such as in Annex 7: Programming Language Identifiers.
Both NFD and NFC maintain compatibility composites.
Neither NFKD nor NFKC maintain compatibility composites.
None of the forms generate compatibility composites that were not in the source text.
Note: Normalization Form KC does not attempt to map character sequences to compatibility composites. For example, a compatibility composition of "office" does not produce "o\uFB03ce", even though "\uFB03" is a character that is the compatibility equivalent of the sequence of three characters 'ffi'.
NFC "a" "^" "a"+"^" "â"
NFD "a"+"^" "." (dot under) "a"+"^" + "." "a" + "." +"^"
Without limiting the repertoire, there is no way to produce a normalized form that is closed under simple string concatenation. If desired, however, a specialized function could be constructed that produced a normalized concatenation. However, all of the normalization forms are closed under substringing.
All of the definitions in this document depend on the rules for equivalence and decomposition found in Chapter 3 of The Unicode Standard and the Character Decomposition Mapping and Canonical Combining Class property in the Unicode Character Database. Decomposition must be done in accordance with these rules. In particular, the decomposition mappings found in the Unicode Character Database must be applied recursively, and then the string put into canonical order based on the characters' combining classes.
The combining class of a character X may be written as combiningClass(X).
A sequence of characters may be represented by using plus signs between the character names, or by using string notation.
"...\uXXXX..." represents the Unicode character U+XXXX embedded within a string.
A single character which is equivalent to the sequence of characters B + C may be written as B-C.
The normalization forms for a string S can be abbreviated as NFD(S), NFKD(S), NFC(S) and NFKC(S), respectively. NFX(S) stands for any normalization form.
Conjoining jamo of various types (initial, medial, final) are represented by subscripts, such as ki, am, and kf.
Spacing accents (without a dotted circle) may be used to represent non-spacing accents, such as "c¸" for c followed by a non-spacing cedilla.
To see what difference the composition version makes, suppose that Unicode 4.0 adds the composite Q-caron. For an implementation that uses Unicode 4.0, strings in Normalization Forms C or KC will continue to contain the sequence Q + caron, and not the new character Q-caron, since a canonical composition for Q-caron was not defined in the composition version. See §6 Composition Exclusion Table for more information.
Note: It would be possible to add more compositions in a future version of Unicode, as long as the backward compatibility requirement is met. That requires that for any new composition XY => Z, at most one of X or Y was defined in a previous version of Unicode. That is, Z must be a new character, and either X or Y must be a new character. However, the Unicode Consortium strongly discourages new compositions, even in such restricted cases.
In addition to fixing the composition version, future versions of Unicode must be restricted in terms of the kinds of changes that can be made to character properties. Because of this, the Unicode Consortium has a clear policy to guarantee the stability of normalization forms: for more information, see Unicode Policies.
Note: One exception to this policy was made in Unicode 3.1: see Annex 12: Unicode 3.1 Normalization Corrigendum below.
C1. A process that produces Unicode text that purports to be in a Normalization Form shall do so in accordance with the specifications in this document.
C2. A process that tests Unicode text to determine whether it is in a Normalization Form shall do so in accordance with the specifications in this document.
C3. A process that purports to transform text into a Normalization Form, must be able to pass the conformance test described in Annex 9: Conformance Testing.
Note: The specifications for Normalization Forms are written in terms of a process for producing a decomposition or composition from an arbitrary Unicode string. This is a logical description — particular implementations can have more efficient mechanisms as long as they produce the same result. Similarly, testing for a particular Normalization Form does not require applying the process of normalization, so long as the result of the test is equivalent to applying normalization and then testing for binary identity.
This section specifies the format for Normalization Forms C and KC. It uses the following four definitions D1, D2, D3, D4, and two rules R1 and R2.
D1. A character S is a starter if it has a combining class of zero in the Unicode Character Database.
Because of the definition of canonical equivalence, the order of combining characters with the same combining class makes a difference. For example, a-macron-breve is not the same as a-breve-macron. Characters can not be composed if that would change the canonical order of the combining characters.
D2. In any character sequence beginning with a starter S, a character C is blocked from S if and only if there is some character B between S and C, and either B is a starter or it has the same combining class as C.
Note: When B blocks C, changing the order of B and C would result in a character sequence that is not canonically equivalent to the original. See Section 3.9 Canonical Ordering Behavior in the Unicode Standard.
Note: If a combining character sequence is in canonical order, then testing whether a character is blocked only requires looking at the immediately preceding character.
composing the resulting string according to the canonical mappings of the composition version of the Unicode Character Database by successively composing each unblocked character with the last starter.
Figure 1 shows a sample of how this works. The dark green cubes represent starters, and the light gray cubes represent non-starters. In the first step, the string is fully decomposed, and reordered. In the second step, each character is checked against the last non-starter, and combined if all the conditions are met. Examples are provided in Annex 1: Examples and Charts, and a code sample is provided in Annex 5: Code Sample.
A precise notion is required for when an unblocked character can be composed with a starter. This uses the following two definitions.
D3. A primary composite is a character that has a canonical decomposition mapping in the Unicode Character Database (or has a canonical Hangul decomposition) but is not in the §6 Composition Exclusion Table.
Note: Hangul syllable decomposition is considered a canonical decomposition. See The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0. Also see Annex 10: Hangul.
D4. A character X can be primary combined with a character Y if and only if there is a primary composite Z which is canonically equivalent to the sequence <X, Y>.
Based upon these definitions, the following rules specify the Normalization Forms C and KC.
Generate the canonical decomposition for the source string S according to the decomposition mappings in the latest supported version of the Unicode Character Database.
Iterate through each character C in that decomposition, from first to last. If C is not blocked from the last starter L, and it can be primary combined with L, then replace L by the composite L-C, and remove C.
The result of this process is a new string S' which is in Normalization Form C.
Generate the compatibility decomposition for the source string S according to the decomposition mappings in the latest supported version of the Unicode Character Database.
The result of this process is a new string S' which is in Normalization Form KC.
There are four classes of characters that are excluded from composition.
Script-specifics: precomposed characters that are generally not the preferred form for particular scripts.
These cannot be computed from information in the Unicode Character Database.
Post Composition Version: precomposed characters that are added after Unicode 3.0. This set will be updated with each subsequent version of Unicode. For more information, see §3 Versioning and Stability.
Singletons: characters having decompositions that consist of single characters (as described below).
These are computed from information in the Unicode Character Database.
Non-starter decompositions: precomposed characters whose decompositions start with a non-starter.
The Unicode Character Database will first decompose one of the characters to the other, and then decompose from there. That is, one of the characters (in this case ANGSTROM SIGN) will have a singleton decomposition. Characters with singleton decompositions are included in Unicode essentially for compatibility with certain pre-existing standards. These singleton decompositions are excluded from primary composition.
A machine-readable form data file for Unicode 3.1 is found in Composition Exclusion Table [Exclusions]. Note that this corrects the omission of YOD WITH HIRIQ, as described in Annex 12: Unicode 3.1 Normalization Corrigendum.
All four classes of characters are included in this file, although the singletons and non-starter decompositions are commented out.
A derived property containing the complete list of exclusions is in Unicode 3.1. This property, Comp_Ex, is described in DerivedProperties.html [DerivedProps]. Implementations can avoid computing the singleton and non-starter decompositions from the Unicode Character Database by using the Comp_Ex property instead.
This annex provides some detailed examples of the results of applying each of the normalization forms. The Normalization Charts [Charts] provide also charts of all the characters in Unicode that differ from at least one of their normalization forms (NFC, NFD, NFKC, NFKD).
The following examples are cases where the NFD and NFKD are identical, and NFC and NFKC are identical.
D-dot_above D + dot_above D-dot_above Both decomposed and precomposed canonical sequences produce the same result.
By the time we have gotten to dot_above, it cannot be combined with the base character.
There may be intervening combining marks (see f), so long as the result of the combination is canonically equivalent.
E-macron-grave E + macron + grave E-macron-grave Multiple combining characters are combined with the base character.
E-grave + macron E + grave + macron E-grave + macron Characters will not be combined if they would not be canonical equivalents because of their ordering.
angstrom_sign A + ring A-ring Since Å (A-ring) is the preferred composite, it is the form produced for both characters.
The following are examples of NFD and NFC that illustrate how they differ from NFKD and NFKC, respectively.
"Henry IV" "Henry IV" "Henry IV" Similarly, the ROMAN NUMERAL IV (U+2163) is not decomposed.
"Henry \u2163" "Henry \u2163" "Henry \u2163"
ga ka + ten ga Different compatibility equivalents of a single Japanese character will not result in the same string in NFC.
Hangul syllables are maintained under normalization.
The following are examples of NFKD and NFKC that illustrate how they differ from NF D and NFC, respectively.
"Äffin" "A\u0308ffin" "Äffin" The ffi_ligature (U+FB03) is decomposed in NFKC (where it is not in NFC).
"Henry IV" "Henry IV" "Henry IV" Similarly, the resulting strings here are identical in NFKC.
"Henry \u2163" "Henry IV" "Henry IV"
ga ka + ten ga Different compatibility equivalents of a single Japanese character will result in the same string in NFKC.
The following are the design goals for the specification of the normalization forms, and are presented here for reference.
The second major design goal for the normalization forms is stability of characters that are not involved in the composition or decomposition process.
If X contains a character with a compatibility decomposition, then NFD(X) and NFC(X) still contain that character.
As much as possible, if there are no combining characters in X, then NFC(X) = X.
Irrelevant combining marks should not affect the results of composition. See example f in Annex 1: Examples and Charts, where the horn character does not affect the results of composition.
Note: The only characters for which Goal 2.2 is not true are those in the §6 Composition Exclusion Table.
The third major design goal for the normalization forms is that it allow for efficient implementations.
It is possible to implement efficient code for producing the Normalization Forms. In particular, it should be possible to produce Normalization Form C very quickly from strings that are already in Normalization Form C or are in Normalization Form D.
Composition Forms do not have to produce the shortest possible results, because that can be computationally expensive.
Then a pair of these small integers are simply mapped through a two-dimensional array to get a resulting value. This yields much better performance than a general-purpose string lookup in a hash table.
Since the Hangul compositions and decompositions are algorithmic, memory storage can be significantly reduced if the corresponding operations are done in code. See Annex 10: Hangul for more information.
Note: Any such optimizations must be carefully check to ensure that they still produce conformant results. In particular, the code must still be able to pass the test described in Annex 9: Conformance Testing.
For those reading this document without access to the Unicode Standard, the following summarizes the canonical decomposition process. For a complete discussion, see Sections 3.6 and 3.10 of the Unicode Standard.
Canonical decomposition is the process of taking a string, recursively replacing composite characters using the Unicode canonical decomposition mappings (including the algorithmic Hangul canonical decomposition mappings, see Annex 10: Hangul), and putting the result in canonical order.
Compatibility decomposition is the process of taking a string, replacing composite characters using both the Unicode canonical decomposition mappings and the Unicode compatibility decomposition mappings, and putting the result in canonical order.
A string is put into canonical order by repeatedly replacing any exchangeable pair by the pair in reversed order. When there are no remaining exchangeable pairs, then the string is in canonical order. Note that the replacements can be done in any order.
A sequence of two adjacent characters in a string is an exchangeable pair if the combining class (from the Unicode Character Database) for the first character is greater than the combining class for the second, and the second is not a starter; that is, if combiningClass(first) > combiningClass(second) > 0.
<acute, a> 230, 0 not exchangeable, since the second class is zero.
code; name; ... combining class; ... decomposition.
Applying the canonical decomposition mappings, we get "a´c´¸" (a, acute, c, acute, cedilla).
Applying the canonical ordering, we get "a´c¸´" (a, acute, c, cedilla, acute).
This is because cedilla has a lower combining class (202) than acute (230) does. The positions of 'a' and 'c' are not affected, since they are starters.
A code sample is available for the four different normalization forms. For clarity, this sample is not optimized. The implementations for NFKC and NFC transform a string in two passes: pass 1 decomposes, while pass 2 composes by successively composing each unblocked character with the last starter.
In some implementations, people may be working with streaming interfaces that read and write small amounts at a time. In those implementations, the text back to the last starter needs to be buffered. Whenever a second starter would be added to that buffer, the buffer can be flushed.
The sample is written in Java, though for accessibility it avoids the use of object-oriented techniques. For access to the code, and for a live demonstration, see Normalizer.html [Sample]. Equivalent Perl code is available on the W3C site [CharLint].
While the Normalization Forms are specified for Unicode text, they can also be extended to non-Unicode (legacy) character encodings. This is based on mapping the legacy character set strings to and from Unicode using definitions D5 and D6.
D5. An invertible transcoding T for a legacy character set L is a one-to-one mapping from characters encoded in L to characters in Unicode with an associated mapping T-1 such that for any string S in L, T-1(T(S)) = S.
Note: Typically there is a single accepted invertible transcoding for a given legacy character set. In in a few cases there may be multiple invertible transcodings: for example, Shift-JIS may have two different mappings used in different circumstances: one to preserve the '/' semantics of 2F16, and one to preserve the '¥' semantics.
Note: The character indexes in the legacy character set string may be very different than character indexes in the Unicode equivalent. For example, if a legacy string uses visual encoding for Hebrew, then its first character might be the last character in the Unicode string.
If you implement transcoders for legacy character sets, it is recommended that you ensure that the result is in Normalization Form C where possible. See UTR #22: Character Mapping Tables for more information.
D6. Given a string S encoded in L and an invertible transcoding T for L, the Normalization Form X of S under T is defined to be the result of mapping to Unicode, normalizing to Unicode Normalization Form X, and mapping back to the legacy character encoding, e.g., T-1(NFX(T(S))). Where there is a single accepted invertible transcoding for that character set, we can simply speak of the Normalization Form X of S.
Legacy character sets fall into three categories based on their normalization behavior with accepted transcoders.
Prenormalized. Any string in the character set is already in Normalization Form X.
For example, ISO 8859-1 is prenormalized in NFC.
Normalizable. Although the set is not prenormalized, any string in the set can be normalized to Form X.
For example, ISO 2022 (with a mixture of ISO 5426 and ISO 8859-1) is normalizable.
Unnormalizable. Some strings in the character set cannot be normalized into Form X.
For example, ISO 5426 is unnormalizable in NFC under common transcoders, since it contains combining marks but not composites.
That is, the first character of an identifier can be an uppercase letter, lowercase letter, titlecase letter, modifier letter, other letter, or letter number. The subsequent characters of an identifier can be any of those, plus non-spacing marks, spacing combining marks, decimal numbers, connector punctuations, and formatting codes (such as right-left-mark). Normally the formatting codes should be filtered out before storing or comparing identifiers.
Normalization as described in this report can be used to avoid problems where apparently identical identifiers are not treated equivalently. Such problems can appear both during compilation and during linking, in particular also across different programming languages. To avoid such problems, programming languages can normalize identifiers before storing or comparing them. Generally if the programming language has case-sensitive identifiers then Normalization Form C may be used, while if the programming language has case-insensitive identifiers then Normalization Form KC may be more appropriate.
Irregularly decomposing characters. U+037A GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI and certain Arabic presentation forms have irregular compatibility decompositions, and need to be excluded from both <identifier_start> and <identifier_extend>. It is recommended that all Arabic presentation forms be excluded from identifiers in any event, although only a few of them are required to be excluded for normalization to guarantee identifier closure.
The one exception is U+0345 COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI. In the very unusual case that U+0345 is at the start of S, U+0345 is not in <identifier_start>, but its uppercase and case-folder version are. In practice this is not a problem, because of the way normalization is used with identifiers.
Note: Those programming languages with case-insensitive identifiers should use the case foldings described in UTR #21 Case Mappings to produce a case-insensitive normalized form.
When source text (such as program source) is parsed for identifiers, the identifiers must be parsed before folding distinctions using case mapping or NFKC.
When source text (such as program source) is parsed for identifiers, the folding of distinctions (using case mapping or NFKC) must be delayed until after parsing has located the identifiers. Thus such folding of distinctions should not be applied to string literals or to comments in program source text.
Note: Unicode 3.1 provides derived properties that can be used by implementations for parsing identifiers, both normalized and unnormalized. These are the properties ID_Start, ID_Continue, XID_Start, and XID_Continue. Unicode 3.1 also provides support for handling case folding with normalization: the property FNC can be used in case folding, so that a case folding of an NFKC string is itself normalized. These properties, and the files containing them, are described in DerivedProperties.html [DerivedProps].
The codepoint cannot occur in that normalization form.
The codepoint can occur, subject to canonical ordering, but without any other constraints.
The codepoint can occur, subject to canonical ordering, but with constraints. In particular, the text may not be in the specified normalization form if this codepoint is preceded by certain other characters.
Code that uses this property can do a very fast first pass over a string to determine the normalization form. The result is also either NO, YES, or MAYBE. For NO or YES, the answer is definite. In the MAYBE case, a more thorough check must be made, typically by putting a copy of the string into the normalization form, and checking for equality with the original.
This check is much faster than simply running the normalization algorithm, since it avoids any memory allocation and copying. The vast majority of strings will return a definitive YES or NO answer, leaving only a small percentage that require more work. The sample below is written in Java, though for accessibility it avoids the use of object-oriented techniques.
These lines assign the value NFC_MAYBE to the code point U+0338, and the value NFC_NO to the codepoints in the range U+F900 .. U+FA0D. Note that there are no MAYBE values for NFD and NFKD: the quickCheck function will always produce a precise result for these normalization forms. All characters that are not specifically mentioned in the file have the values YES.
The data for the implementation of the isAllowed() call can be accessed in memory with a hashtable or a trie (see Annex 3: Implementation Notes); the latter will be the fastest.
Implementations must be thoroughly tested for conformance to the normalization specification. In Unicode 3.0.1, the Normalization Conformance Test [Test] file was added for use in testing conformance. This file consists of a series of fields. When normalization forms are applied to the different fields, the results shall be as specified in the header of that file.
Since the Hangul compositions and decompositions are algorithmic, memory storage can be significantly reduced if the corresponding operations are done in code rather than by simply storing the data in the general purpose tables. Here is sample code illustrating algorithmic Hangul canonical decomposition and composition done according to the specification in Section 3.11 Combining Jamo Behavior. Although coded in Java, the same structure can be used in other programming languages.
Notice an important feature of Hangul composition: whenever the source string is not in Normalization Form D, you can not just detect character sequences of the form <L, V> and <L, V, T>. You also must catch the sequences of the form <LV, T>. To guarantee uniqueness, these sequences must also be composed. This is illustrated in Step 2 below.
Additional transformations can be performed on sequences of Hangul jamo for various purposes. For example, to regularize sequences of Hangul jamo into standard syllables, the choseong and jungseong fillers can be inserted, as described in Chapter 3. (In the text of the 2.0 version of the Unicode Standard, these standard syllables were called canonical syllables, but this has nothing to do with canonical composition or decomposition.) For keyboard input, additional compositions may be performed. For example, the trailing consonants kf + sf may be combined into ksf. In addition, some Hangul input methods do not require a distinction on input between initial and final consonants, and change between them on the basis of context. For example, in the keyboard sequence mi + em + ni + si + am, the consonant ni would be reinterpreted as nf, since there is no possible syllable nsa. This results in the two syllables men and sa.
However, none of these additional transformations are considered part of the Unicode Normalization Formats.
Hangul decomposition is also used to form the character names for the Hangul syllables. While the sample code that illustrates this process is not directly related to normalization, it is worth including because it is so similar to the decomposition code.
"S", "SS", "", "J", "JJ", "C", "K", "T", "P", "H"
"S", "SS", "NG", "J", "C", "K", "T", "P", "H"
The attached document entitled "Unicode Normalization Forms" does not require IBM technology, but may be implemented using IBM technology that has been filed for US Patent. However, IBM believes that the technology could be beneficial to the software community at large, especially with respect to usage on the Internet, allowing the community to derive the enormous benefits provided by Unicode.
This letter is to inform you that IBM is pleased to make the Unicode normalization technology that has been filed for patent freely available to anyone using them in implementing to the Unicode standard.
In the production of the normalization tables for Unicode 3.0, the character U+FB1D HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ was mistakenly omitted from Composition Exclusions [Exclusions]. During the public review period, this mistake was reported, but the report was misinterpreted and thus overlooked. In Unicode 3.1 [U3.1], this character is now included in Composition Exclusions.
This particular change does affect backwards compatibility of Normalization forms NFKC and NFC for strings containing this character. It is recommended that all implementations for these Normalization forms upgrade to the Unicode 3.1 data tables.
The omission had been reported during the public review period for Unicode 3.0.
There were no normative references to Unicode 3.0 Normalization from our liaison organizations (particularly IETF and W3C), although normative references are expected soon after Unicode 3.1.
YOD WITH HIRIQ is one of a class of characters ("marked" Hebrew presentation forms within the range U+FB1D .. U+FB4E) that were to be handled all in the same way, during all review and discussion of Normalization in the UTC. The other characters in this class were uniformly included in Composition Exclusions.
YOD WITH HIRIQ is a very rare character. The amount of existing data containing it is infinitesimal as a proportion of all computerized text. Even if it takes some time for implementations to upgrade, this change should pose no significant backwards-compatibility issue in practice.
No future changes will be made to normalization that would affect backwards compatibility; no other characters could satisfy these criteria in the future.
The following summarizes modifications from the previous version of this document.
Note: the character U+FB1D HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ has been added to the Composition Exclusions Table in Unicode 3.1.
Added Annex 12: Unicode 3.1 Normalization Corrigendum.
Modified §3 Versioning and Stability appropriately.
Pointed to the new Unicode 3.1 Comp_Ex property in §6 Composition Exclusion Table.
Edited Annex 7: Programming Language Identifiers to reflect the Unicode 3.1 properties ID_Start, ID_Continue, XID_Start, XID_Continue, and FNC.
Edited Annex 8: Detecting Normalization Forms to reflect the Unicode 3.1 properties NF*_NO and NF*_MAYBE.
Updated some instances of Unicode 3.0 to 3.1.
Fixed typos that had "canonical class" and "canonical ordering value" instead of "combining class". Used the formal names Character Decomposition Mapping and Canonical Combining Class at the point of first usage (§2 Notation).
In the quickCheck() function (Annex 8), the variable lastCanonicalClass was never updated.
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matches: §6 §6 §3 §6 §3 §6


UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brian Keith BISHOP, Defendant–Appellant.
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. ARGUED:Joseph Michael Hannon, Jr., Hannon Law Group, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, Office of the United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:William Coffield, Coffield Law Group, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Ronald L. Walutes, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778, regulates the export of “defense articles” such as ammunition, and subjects to criminal liability anyone who “willfully” violates its requirements. Brian Keith Bishop was convicted under the law for attempting to export small-arms ammunition to Jordan without a license. He appeals his conviction on two grounds: first, that he did not willfully violate the AECA because he did not know that it applied to the ammunition he attempted to export, and second, that there was insufficient evidence that he even knew that exporting the ammunition was generally illegal rather than merely a violation of administrative policy. We reject Bishop's contentions and affirm his conviction.
The day before the movers arrived, Paxton's subcontractor dispatched one of its employees, Brian Davis, to survey the shipment. Davis testified that Bishop informed him that Bishop was moving “weights” and neglected to mention ammunition. When workers loaded Bishop's shipment the next day, some of the ammunition remained in the Cabela's boxes, while the rest had been transferred to unlatched hard-shell pelican cases. Bishop's father testified that, when the shippers asked Bishop what was inside the cases, Bishop replied “bullets.” The inventory of shipped items signed by Bishop, however, did not reference the 366 pounds of ammunition included in his household effects, instead listing them as weights. Bishop also signed a statement certifying that his belongings did not include “any unauthorized explosives, destructive devices or hazardous materials.” An internal email between Paxton employees suggested that Bishop “did not like [the movers] questioning him on what he was shipping,” and that he had organized his possessions so as to discourage the movers from inspecting them.
The movers transferred Bishop's items to a Paxton warehouse in Springfield, Virginia. At the warehouse, Paxton employees determined that certain items required repackaging, and Bishop's ammunition was discovered during the repacking process. According to one employee, the ammunition was removed from boxes labeled “weights” on the inventory, but that one of the boxes did in fact contain a single small weight. Two days later, Paxton alerted the State Department, and special agents with the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) ultimately took custody of the ammunition. The Paxton employee in charge of Bishop's shipment testified that, when she called Bishop and told him that ammunition had been discovered, he asked her whether the State Department knew how much ammunition he had attempted to ship. She also testified that Bishop told her that the ammunition was a gift for a government official for which he would be repaid, and that she should not speak with any of the Jordanian nationals at the embassy about the shipment.
A little over a year later, DSS agents interviewed Bishop and informed him that an arrest warrant had been issued for violations stemming from his attempted shipment of the ammunition. Bishop waived his Miranda rights and, according to the agent who interviewed him, admitted to the attempted shipment. The agent testified that Bishop claimed the ammunition had been intended for his recreational use at firing ranges and for shooting with “veteran tribesmen in the desert,” and that he attempted to ship the ammunition because it would have been prohibitively expensive to purchase it in Jordan. The agent also testified that Bishop admitted that he had known that the embassy prohibited FSOs from having firearms, that he had a shotgun in his residence without his wife's knowledge, and that he had lied the previous year when he told a DSS agent that he did not have any firearms in his residence.
In September 2012, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Bishop relating to his attempted transportation of the ammunition. As amended, Count I of the indictment charged Bishop with a violation of the AECA and its implementing regulations. Specifically, the indictment alleged that Bishop “knowingly and willfully attempt[ed] to export from the United States to Jordan, without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export, or written authorization for such export, defense articles, to-wit: approximately 7,496 rounds of 9mm and 7.62 x 39mm ammunition, which are designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, Category III.” Count II charged Bishop with delivering ammunition to a common and contract carrier, Paxton, without notice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). Count II covered not only the ammunition identified in Count I, but also the nearly 2,000 rounds of .45–caliber and 12–gauge shotgun ammunition included in the shipment.
The government also called Mette Beecroft, a State Department official responsible for educating State Department employees on the rules and regulations governing travel. Beecroft testified that the State Department maintains a Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), a collection of regulations for FSOs, including those governing travel and transportation. The FAM prohibits the shipment of ammunition in household effects in three separate sections. One section identifies 27 C.F.R. § 478 as authority for the FAM's ammunition provisions. This regulation, in turn, states that ammunition exports are subject to the AECA. Another FAM section puts employees on notice that shipping ammunition may require special accommodations. It notes, for instance, that household effects may not include ammunition and further states that federal law may “prohibit commercial shipment of certain articles in” this section. 14 U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 611.5. The third section informs employees that “[a]mmunition, a hazardous cargo, requires special handling and labeling,” and that it is the responsibility of each FSO to check with their post “to determine the restrictions and limitations, if any, that are placed upon the shipment of personally owned firearms or ammunition into the country of assignment.” Id. § 611.6–2.
According to Beecroft, all State Department employees are required to participate in an orientation program that introduces them to the rules contained in the FAM, including those pertaining to the transport of ammunition. Beecroft testified that, in every training class, she stresses that shipping ammunition is not permitted. Beecroft also described a manual entitled “It's Your Move,” which is mentioned during training and is available to all State Department employees both in print and online. The manual repeatedly prohibits the shipment of ammunition as a household effect, and notes that the penalties for improper shipment of hazardous items include imprisonment. On cross-examination, Beecroft admitted, “I can't tell you what the State Department's reasoning is” for prohibiting the shipment of ammunition.
In response, Bishop called Luis Roque, former branch chief for the State Department's transportation-management bureau and the individual who initially dealt with the ammunition when Paxton contacted the State Department. Roque testified that, despite overseeing the shipment of all household effects for the State Department, he was “desperate” for advice on how to proceed upon being alerted of the discovery of the ammunition. He initially instructed Paxton to dispose of the ammunition with the assistance of the fire marshal. He subsequently contacted diplomatic security experts, who countermanded his prior instruction.
Bishop also called the Regional Security Officer at the embassy in Jordan, who explained that, under the Mission Firearms Policy, which governs FSOs stationed there, Bishop was permitted to possess ammunition in his residence. He also stated that the disciplinary action prescribed by the policy for any violation is purely administrative.
Another one of Bishop's witnesses testified to Bishop's general law-abidingness, emphasizing his diligence and skill at understanding and following complex regulations. The witness, an attorney, recounted an incident in which Bishop had conducted independent research on a legal issue confronting an embassy and reached a conclusion nearly identical to the guidance ultimately provided by State Department headquarters.
Bishop subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, alleging that the government had introduced insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bishop had the requisite intent to violate the law. The district court denied this motion and sentenced Bishop to two-years probation and six-months home confinement subject to work release, in addition to a $25,000 fine. Bishop now appeals his conviction.
Count I of the indictment charged Bishop with attempting to export 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition without a license in willful violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The AECA regulates the export of arms, ammunition, and other military and defense technology. It delegates to the President the tasks of creating the United States Munitions List (USML), which designates certain items as “defense articles and defense services,” and of promulgating “regulations for the import and export of such articles and services.” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The President has delegated this authority to the State Department, see Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed.Reg. 4311 (Jan. 24, 1977), which publicly maintains the USML, see 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. With limited exception, anyone seeking to export items on the USML must first apply for and receive an export license from the State Department. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a). A defendant who “willfully violates any provision” of the AECA may be punished with a fine of up to a million dollars, a prison term of up to 20 years, or both. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c).
Bishop raises two challenges to his conviction. First, he argues that, for his conduct to have been willful, he needed to have known not only that exporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition was generally unlawful, but that the ammunition was specifically covered by the AECA. Second, Bishop argues in the alternative that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his conduct was illegal, rather than merely prohibited by State Department policy. We address each argument in turn.
Bishop and the government disagree over what constitutes a “willful” violation of the AECA. Bishop contends that the government must show not only that he knew that his conduct was illegal, but also that he knew why: because 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition were listed on the USML. The government, by contrast, argues that it was enough that Bishop knew exporting the ammunition was illegal as a general matter. On this point, we agree with the government.
Bishop frames the issue as whether a conviction under the AECA requires specific intent. See Appellant's Br. at 17. Courts regularly use the language of specific versus general intent in discussing the AECA's willfulness requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.2012). Unfortunately, the terms are often left ill-defined and used inconsistently, and as the Supreme Court has observed, the “venerable distinction” between general and specific intent “has been the source of a good deal of confusion.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2 (2d ed. 2013) (“The meaning of the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has always been rather obscure ․”). Other courts have characterized the willfulness provision as imposing some sort of scienter requirement. See United States v. Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.2013); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir.1999). Although courts often use the language of general and specific intent, scienter, and the related concept of mens rea interchangeably, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952), none of these terms by itself adequately defines willfulness under the AECA.
Rather than struggle with such confusing terminology, we may simply ask where, on the spectrum of culpability, the AECA's willfulness requirement falls. Both Bishop and the government agree that knowledge of an export's illegality is necessary to satisfy the AECA's willfulness requirement; they disagree over how precise that knowledge must be. This question is ultimately one of statutory interpretation, since “determining the mental state required for commission of a federal crime requires ․ inference of the intent of Congress.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our interpretation of the AECA is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). The Bryan Court interpreted the Firearm Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), Pub.L. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–929), which established a willfulness requirement for certain violations of prohibitions against dealing in firearms without a license under 18 U.S.C. § 922. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D). Bryan held that, “to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191–92 (internal quotation marks omitted). It rejected the defendant's argument that the government also had to prove that he knew of the federal licensing requirement, holding that, to establish willfulness, “knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.” Id. at 196.
In interpreting FOPA, Bryan distinguished statutes where the Court had read “willfulness” as requiring knowledge of the specific criminal prohibition at issue. The Court observed that these cases—Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)—addressed “highly technical statutes” involving taxes and currency transactions that “presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194. By contrast, the statutory scheme amended by FOPA to “protect law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes,” id. at 187–88, did not present comparable risks of criminalizing otherwise-innocent behavior. Furthermore, this danger was plainly absent on the facts of the case because, as here, the factfinder “found that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195.
Bryan is highly relevant to our task here. As with FOPA, the AECA's language and structure make clear that Congress struck a balance between punishing those who intentionally violate the law and ensnaring individuals who make honest mistakes. As this court has previously emphasized, the willfulness requirement ensures that “the government must prove that a defendant intended to violate the law to obtain a conviction, thereby eliminating any genuine risk of holding a person ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ “ United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir.2002)).
At the same time, the AECA's legislative history, while “sparse,” United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 420 (2d Cir.1987), makes clear that Congress was especially concerned that arms exports not become an “automatic, unregulated process,” H.R.Rep. No. 94–1144, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1378, 1388. To read the willfulness requirement as narrowly as Bishop proposes would be a step toward such an unregulated system and undermine congressional intent. The AECA does not include such highly technical requirements as might inadvertently criminalize good-faith attempts at compliance. Unlike the complicated tax and arcane currency prohibitions discussed in Cheek and Ratzlaf, the export of 9mm and AK–47 ammunition to Jordan would quickly strike someone of ordinary intelligence as potentially unlawful. Bishop's narrow reading would thus undermine Congress's purpose in passing the AECA and deprive it of its rightful authority to define the elements of federal offenses. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute .”). For it would be unwarranted for courts to draw from the word “willful” a desire on the part of Congress to require not simply general knowledge of an export's illegality, but specific knowledge of the particulars of a certain list.
Bishop argues that the rule of lenity requires us to view the AECA's willfulness requirement in the light most favorable to him. See Appellant's Br. at 22. But “the rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Barber v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). That there is no such “grievous ambiguity” in this case is underscored by the fact that Bishop's construction would move the AECA, even further than the willfulness requirement already does, from “the fundamental canon of criminal law that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 392 (2d Cir.2004) (Sotomayor, J.). Exceptions to such a venerable rule should be construed narrowly in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary. We discern nothing in the language or purpose of the statute to suggest that Congress wished to jettison altogether the bedrock presumption that each of us knows the standards applicable to our personal conduct.
Given that both the AECA's text and purpose support the government's position, it is no surprise that this court's precedent lends no support to Bishop's stance. In United States v. Hsu, we upheld convictions for AECA export violations against an as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge. We rejected in passing a defendant's argument that “the government presented insufficient evidence ․ that [the defendant] acted ‘willfully’ because of the asserted lack of evidence that [he] knew the [exported items] were on the [USML] or military items.” Hsu, 364 F.3d at 198 n. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted that “[w]hatever specificity on ‘willfulness' is required, it is clear that this extremely particularized definition finds no support in the case law .” Id.
We draw further support from decisions of other circuits that have squarely considered the issue. See United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 835 (6th Cir.2011) (“[S]ection 2778(c) does not require a defendant to know that the items being exported are on the Munitions List. Rather, it only requires knowledge that the underlying action is unlawful.”); United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1992) (“If the defendant knew that the export was in violation of the law, we are hard pressed to say that it matters what the basis of that knowledge was.”); United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1988) (upholding a jury instruction that “made clear that conviction [under the AECA] would not require evidence that defendants knew of the licensing requirement or were aware of the munitions list”).
Bishop argues, unconvincingly, that the weight of circuit authority cuts in his favor. Many of the opinions Bishop cites in his defense are inapposite, as they merely indicated that jury instructions as to the defendant's knowledge of the USML were sufficient without indicating that the specific instructions were required. See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1032, 1037–38 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437 n. 14 (8th Cir.1987); see also Murphy, 852 F.2d at 7 n. 6 (reading Gregg as not requiring knowledge of the contents of the USML to sustain a conviction under the AECA). Moreover, the great bulk of the authority on which Bishop relies either fails to support his position or, to the extent that it does, antedates the Supreme Court's analysis of willfulness requirements in Bryan.
Bishop appears to recognize that the law is against him when he argues that, even if defendants do not generally need to know whether a particular item is on the USML for criminal liability under the AECA, such knowledge is necessary on the “narrow facts of this case.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 4. Bishop grounds this contention in the fact that his shipment contained a mix of ammunition, some of which was on the USML (and thus covered by the AECA) and some of which was not. Thus, he argues, the only way he could have known that his conduct was illegal was if he knew that 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition were on the USML. If, as the district court found, Bishop believed that the “ammunition couldn't be shipped” and “he knew what he was doing was unlawful,” he would necessarily have believed that exporting each type of ammunition—9mm and 7.62X39mm included—was illegal as well. Under the standard of willfulness described above, his true belief as to the illegality of transporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition is sufficient to establish culpability under the AECA even if unaccompanied by knowledge of the contents of the USML.
Having established that willfulness under the AECA requires only general knowledge of illegality, we now turn to Bishop's argument that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he knew his actions were illegal rather than merely violations of State Department policy. “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 760–61 (4th Cir.2003). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc).
In reviewing the district court's judgment, we are mindful that, as the trier of fact, that court was in a better position than we are to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, take into account circumstances, and make reasonable inferences. Thus we reverse on sufficiency grounds only where “the prosecution's failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). Bishop consequently carries a “heavy burden” on his appeal of this issue. United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir.1995).
Bishop argues that the government's evidence fails to satisfy even its own interpretation of the willfulness requirement. He contends that neither the email sent by the shipping company Paxton to Bishop's wife, nor the training and notifications he received as a State Department employee, explicitly stated that transporting ammunition was illegal, rather than merely against State Department policy. Bishop also cites evidence that the legal prohibition on exporting certain ammunition was not well known: Mette Beecroft's apparent lack of knowledge as to why the State Department prohibited shipping ammunition; a State Department official's testimony that a typical law-enforcement officer would likely not know about the prohibition; Luis Roque's need for legal guidance after he discovered that Bishop had attempted to transport ammunition; and the embassy's policy of permitting FSOs to keep ammunition in their homes.
While admittedly probative of Bishop's knowledge (or lack thereof) of the legality of his actions, this evidence is substantially outweighed by that presented by the government, which we must view on appeal in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
First, Bishop was thoroughly trained in the rules and regulations surrounding the State Department's transportation policies. He was required to attend training that warned him against transporting ammunition and was provided with numerous documents that not only informed him that transporting ammunition was prohibited but also referenced the AECA and explained that violations could be punished by imprisonment. These documents included the FAM and the “It's Your Move” manual, and specifically referenced criminal, rather than merely administrative, prohibitions and penalties. Bishop also received an email from Paxton reiterating that he could not transport ammunition, and was told explicitly by a DSS agent prior to his trip to Alabama that he could not keep firearms in Jordan. Moreover, as befits an FSO charged with the financial management of a U.S. embassy abroad, Bishop's own witness characterized him as skilled at following complex legal rules and performing sophisticated independent legal research. Even without the substantial evidence of Bishop's deception, discussed below, the gravity of the penalties he was repeatedly warned about make it highly unlikely that Bishop believed that shipping ammunition was a simple breach of State Department policy, rather than a violation of federal law and regulation.
Moreover, Bishop engaged in numerous acts of deception that clearly indicated his awareness of wrongdoing. Although he claims to have told the Paxton packers that some of the boxes contained “bullets,” he falsely described the boxes as generally containing weights and actively deceived by failing to include ammunition on inventory lists that he signed. Bishop quibbles that the packers, rather than he, listed weights on the inventory, Appellant's Reply Br. at 1, but this assertion ignores the fact that Bishop packed many of the boxes himself and knowingly signed an inaccurate inventory as well as a declaration that he was not transporting hazardous or explosive items. When Paxton informed him that it had found ammunition in his shipment, his first instinct was to ask if the State Department knew how much ammunition he had tried to ship. He changed his story about why he attempted to ship the ammunition, first asserting that it was intended as a gift and later that it was meant for his own recreational use. Finally, when interviewed by DSS agents, he admitted to deception the year before about not having a firearm in Jordan in violation of mission policy.
The district court concluded that Bishop “knew from the time he was employed at the State Department that this ammunition couldn't be shipped. He'd been reminded continually over the years. I think it's clear. I find the evidence is clear that he knew what he was doing was unlawful and simply went ahead and did it.” We agree. But even if we disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Bishop violated a known legal duty in attempting to export the ammunition, we would not be, on this record, in a position to disturb it. As we have explained, “The relevant question is not whether the appellate court is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.1982). That standard is plainly satisfied here.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Bishop willfully violated the AECA. We therefore affirm his conviction.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge DIAZ and Judge THACKER joined.


Present DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges. Zheng Xuan Xu, Pro Se, Flushing, New York, for Petitioner. Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Katharine E. Clark, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jacob A. Bashyrov, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Petitioner Zheng Xuan Xu, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a June 24, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a September 19, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Xu's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zheng Xuan Xu, No. A200 733 452 (B.I.A. June 24, 2014), aff'g No. A200 733 452 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 19, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ's decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).
To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant like Xu, who does not allege past persecution, must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir.2006). To do so, he must show that he subjectively fears persecution and that his fear is objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F .3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 162 (2d Cir.2008). There are two ways for an applicant to show objective fear: (1) offering evidence that he would be singled out for persecution; or (2) proving that a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated persons exists in his home country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir.2007).
The agency reasonably found that Xu did not establish that he would be targeted individually for persecution in China. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). Although Xu testified that if he returned to China he would attend a house church, there is no evidence that Chinese authorities have threatened him or are either aware or likely to become aware of his religious activities in the United States. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008). Moreover, the country conditions evidence shows that Chinese authorities are more likely to target religious leaders than individual church members, and Xu never asserted that he would be a religious leader if he returned to China. Accordingly, Xu has presented no evidence to establish that Chinese authorities are likely to become aware of his Christian faith and practice.
Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that Xu did not show a pattern or practice of persecution against similarly situated Christians in China. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. To establish a pattern or practice of persecution of a particular group, an applicant must demonstrate that the harm to that group constitutes persecution, is perpetrated or tolerated by state actors, and is “so systemic or pervasive as to amount to a pattern or practice of persecution.” In re A–M–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see Mufied v.. Mukasey, 508 F.3d at 92. If the agency “explicitly discussed the pattern or practice claim and the record includes substantial documentary evidence regarding the conditions in petitioner's homeland,” we can “reach the conclusion that the agency's decision was not erroneous.” Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 n. 1 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam).
Here, the BIA explicitly addressed Xu's claim and found that the evidence did not show a “systemic, pervasive, or organized” threat of harm because treatment varied by region. C.A.R. 4; see Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 149–50, 159–60, 163–65. The agency's finding is supported by substantial evidence, as the 2011 U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom report discusses destruction of underground churches and arrests of parishioners, but not any incidents in Xu's home province of Liao Ning. Other than a general statement that the country conditions evidence in the record shows a “crackdown on unauthorized religions and religious practices,” Xu points to no specific evidence showing a pattern of persecution of Christians throughout China. And although he argued in his counseled brief to the BIA that religions in China are subject to strict government control, he does not locate in the record any evidence demonstrating either a pattern of persecution or persecution of Christians in Liao Ning province.
Finally, Xu did not present any particularized evidence showing that he would be subject to torture in China and as a result he is ineligible for CAT relief. Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159–60 (2d Cir.2005).