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Supreme Court rulings are binding precedent across the United States; Circuit Court rulings are binding within a certain portion of it (the circuit in question); District Court rulings are not binding precedent, but may still be referred to by other courts.
Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 S. Ct. 1834 There is no such thing as common law copyright and one must observe the formalities to secure a copyright.
Baker v. Selden 101 U.S. 99 S. Ct. 1879 Idea-expression divide.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 111 U.S. 53 S. Ct. 1884 Extended copyright protection to photography.
Banks v. Manchester 128 U.S. 244 S. Ct. 1888 Expressions of law cannot be copyrighted.
Bobbs-Merrill Co v. Straus 210 U.S. 339 S. Ct. 1908 No license to use copyrighted material. License cannot extend holder’s rights beyond statute defined by Congress.
Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell 229 U.S. 1 S. Ct. 1913 Differences between patent and copyright defined also prohibits a license from extending holder’s rights beyond statute.
Macmillan Co. v. King 223 F. 862 D. Mass. 1914 Limits of fair use with respect to an educational context and to summaries.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. 45 F.2d 119 2d Cir. 1930 No copyright for “stock characters”.
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948–9 No moral rights in public domain works.
National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications 191 F.2d 594 (1951), clarified 198 F.2d 927 (1952) 2d Cir. 1951–2 Derivative works; an author does not forfeit his copyright to a piece of intellectual property if his work is contracted to another who fails to properly copyright works which incorporate the original property (obsoleted by Copyright Act of 1976).
Irving Berlin et al. v. E.C. Publications, Inc. 329 F. 2d 541 2d Cir. 1964 Parody.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d 1345 Ct. Cl. 1973 Libraries’ photocopying for research was fair use.
Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman 669 F.2d 852 2d Cir. 1982 Copyright on computer programs includes images and sounds as well as the computer code.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 3rd Cir. 1983 Computer software is protected by copyright (affirmed and obsoleted by subsequent legislation).
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (the "Betamax case") 464 U.S. 417 S. Ct. 1984 Products with substantial non-infringing uses (e.g. video recorders) may be sold even if they can be used to infringe.
Dowling v. United States 473 U.S. 207 S. Ct. 1985 Copyright infringement is not theft, conversion, or fraud; illegally made copies are not stolen goods.
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 471 U.S. 539 S. Ct. 1985 The interest served by republication of a public figure's account of an event is not sufficient to permit nontransformative fair use.
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 663 F. Supp. 706 S.D.N.Y. 1987 Derivative works.
Anderson v. Stallone 11 USPQ2D 1161 C.D. Cal 1989 Derivative works.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 490 U.S. 730 S. Ct. 1989 Works made for hire.
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corporation 758 F. Supp. 1522 S.D.N.Y. 1991 Articles copied for educational use are not necessarily fair use.
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp 925 F.2d 670 3d Cir. 1991 The sale of software is the sale of a good within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp 929 F.2d 1147, 1150 6th Cir. 1991 The sale of software is the sale of a good within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service 499 U.S. 340 S. Ct. 1991 "Sweat of the brow" alone is not sufficient to bestow copyright.
Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 780 F. Supp. 182 S.D.N.Y. 1991 Music sampling is generally copyright infringement.
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology 939 F.2d 91 3rd Cir. 1991 The need to characterize the transaction as a license to use software is “largely anachronistic”.
Computer Associates Int. Inc. v. Altai Inc. 982 F.2d 693 2d Cir. 1992 “Substantial similarity” is required for copyright infringement to occur.
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 780 F. Supp. 1283 9th Cir. 1992 Consumers may modify purchased computer games for their own use.
Rogers v. Koons 960 F.2d 301 2d Cir. 1992 Fair use and parody.
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 9th Cir. 1993 RAM ("working memory") copies of computer programs are governed by copyright.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 35 F.3d 1435 9th Cir. 1994 Certain components of computer programs' graphical user interfaces are not copyrightable.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 S. Ct. 1994 Commercial parody can be fair use.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear Inc. 861 F. Supp. 303 S.D.N.Y. 1994 Interpreting moral rights provisions of U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act (overturned for other reasons: 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996)).
Lotus v. Borland 49 F.3d 807 1st Cir. 1995 Software interfaces per se are "methods of operation" and are not covered by copyright.
Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church 59 F.3d 902, 910 9th Cir. 1995 Renewal rights are not assignable.
Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc, v. Icart 976 Supp. 149, 155 E.D.N.Y. 1997 The sale of software is the sale of a good. Case was dropped.
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc. 153 F.3d 82 2d Cir. 1998 Jurisdiction with closest association to putative owner applies to determine copyright ownership.
Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corporation 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 S.D.N.Y. 1999 "Slavish copying" is inherently uncreative and cannot confer copyright.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 194 F.3d 1211 11th Cir. 1999 Giving a public speech is not public-domain publication under the Copyright Act of 1909.
Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distrib., Inc. 2000 US Dist. Lexis. 9975 SD Tex. 2000 The first-sale doctrine applies to computer software.
UMG v. MP3.com 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5761 S.D.N.Y. 2000 Distribution of copyrighted music without permission of the copyright holders is infringement even if the downloader already owns a copy of the music.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 9th Cir. 2001 Knowingly failing to take steps to prevent infringement, while benefiting from said infringement, is grounds for contributory infringement. Also, users of file-sharing services infringe by both uploading and downloading works without permission.
New York Times Company v. Tasini 533 U.S. 483 S. Ct. 2001 Freelance journalists did not grant electronic republication rights for collective work.
SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc. CV 00-04161 DDP (AJWx) C.D. Cal. 2001 The first-sale doctrine applies to computer software and cannot be waived or taken away through an end-user license agreement.
Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin 252 F. 3d 1165 11th Cir. 2001 Parody and fair use.
Universal v. Reimerdes 273 F.3d 429 2d Cir. 2001 Affirmed the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l 241 F.3d 398, 416 5th Cir. 2001 A private organization cannot assert copyright protection for its model codes, after the models have been adopted by a legislative body and become the law.
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation 280 F.3d 934 3d Cir. 2002 Thumbnails and inline linking can be fair use.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23 S. Ct. 2003 Trademark cannot preserve rights to a public domain work.
Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 S. Ct. 2003 Congress may retroactively extend the duration of works still under copyright, as long as the extension is limited.
CoStar Group v. LoopNet 373 F.3d 544 4th Cir. 2004 Internet service provider was found liable for copyright infringement of photographs of commercial real estate by allowing subscribers to post the photographs on the provider's website.
Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Association Inc. v. Lexmark International Inc. 03-16987 D.C. No. CV-01-04626SBA/JL OPINION 9th Cir. 2005 End User License Agreements on a physical box can be binding on consumers who signal their acceptance of the license agreement by opening the box.
(in progress) No. 01-B-1854, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800 D.Co. 2005.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S., 125 S. Ct. 2764 S. Ct. 2005 Distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software can be liable for copyright infringement if there are "affirmative steps taken to foster infringement".

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No more waiting! Orders on child custody and visitation rights are immediately appealable.
Bifurcation is commonly used in dissolution proceedings, but it has been complicated by the fact that decisions in one part of the case weren’t automatically appealable due to the “one final judgment rule” in CCP §904.1. That’s about to change: A final order or judgment in a bifurcated proceeding on child custody or visitation rights will soon be immediately appealable without the need for certification from the trial court. See CCP §904.1(a)(14)(amended by Stats 2017, ch 41, effective January 1, 2018). Appeals in family law cases are discussed in CEB’s Practice Under the California Family Code: Dissolution, Legal Separation, Nullity, chap 19.
Domestic violence victims have one less hurdle to obtaining evidence.
California law has permitted the recording of a confidential communication to obtain evidence reasonably believed to relate to the commission of certain crimes, including a felony involving violence against the person making the recording. This limit created problems for domestic violence victims, because domestic violence is frequently charged as a misdemeanor. To address this issue, the law was amended to state that recording a communication to get evidence reasonably believed to relate to domestic violence is lawful and not rendered inadmissible in a prosecution against the perpetrator for domestic violence. This law will also allow victims seeking a domestic violence restraining order to record communications by the perpetrator to provide evidence to the court. See Pen C §633.5 (amended by Stats 2017, ch 191, effective January 1, 2018). Get guidance on obtaining temporary orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act in CEB’s Practice Under the California Family Code: Dissolution, Legal Separation, Nullity, chap 11.
Yes, judges may be paid for solemnizing marriages on the side.
A change in the law last year created confusion about whether an active judge could be compensated for solemnizing a marriage. It’s now cleared up: Active judicial officers may accept reasonable payment and reimbursement of expenses for solemnizing marriages. See Fam C §400 (Stats 2017, ch 42, effective July 10, 2017).
More privacy protection for minors who are victims of domestic violence.
The laws on restraining orders against harassment or abuse and protective orders to prevent domestic violence have been amended to permit a minor (or the guardian) to petition the court to keep confidential all information on the minor that was obtained when issuing the order. The new law sets out the findings the court must make before granting the petition, including that the minor’s privacy overcomes the right of public access to the information. See CCP §527.6 and Fam C §6301.5 (amended by Stats 2017, ch 384, effective January 1, 2018). Applying for temporary orders to address extraordinary circumstances is discussed in CEB’s California Child Custody Litigation and Practice §6.7.
Parents get an earlier shot at working out custody and visitation issues in mediation.
To help resolve or narrow child custody disputes before the parties ever get to court, family courts must provide mediation services for parents. For the next two years, parents will be able to attend mediation even earlier in the process, i.e., before the filing of a petition, application, or other pleading to obtain or modify a custody or visitation order. The hope is that parents will be able to resolve the issues and avoid a court hearing entirely. See Fam C §3170 (amended by Stats 2017, ch 330, effective January 1, 2018, and set to repeal on January 1, 2020). For guidance on custody mediation, turn to CEB’s California Child Custody Litigation and Practice, chap 8.
Domestic violence protection orders cross the border from Canada.
Canada already recognizes domestic violence restraining orders issued by California courts, and now, with enactment of the Uniform Recognition and Enforcement of Canadian Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act, California will be able to reciprocate. The Act specifies the requirements for a Canadian domestic violence protection order to be enforceable and requires law enforcement officers to enforce it as if the terms were in an order of a California court. See Fam C §§6450-6460 (added by Stats 2017, ch 98, effective January 1, 2018). Temporary orders are covered in CEB’s California Child Custody Litigation and Practice, chap 6.
Definition of domestic violence counselor is expanded to include those who work at higher education institutions.
The domestic violence counselor-victim privilege protects against disclosure of confidential communications between the victim and a domestic violence counselor. A “domestic violence counselor” is a person employed at a “domestic violence victim service organization.” These organizations were defined as a nongovernmental organization or entity that provides shelter, programs, or services to victims of domestic violence and their children. That definition has been expanded to include public or private institutions of higher education. See Evid C §1037.1 (amended by Stats 2017, ch 178, effective January 1, 2018). The domestic violence counselor-victim privilege is discussed in detail in CEB’s California Trial Objections, chap 39.
New law streamlines the process under surrogacy agreements.
Surrogacy situations are getting easier, from a legal perspective anyway. Under a new law, a surrogate who’s a party to a properly executed assisted reproduction agreement doesn’t establish a parent-child relationship by giving birth to the child. This means that there’s no parent-child relationship to terminate in an action to establish the parentage rights of the intended parents. See Fam C §7962 (amended by Stats 2017, ch 326, effective January 1, 2018). On parentage concepts and the legal effects, turn to CEB’s Practice Under the California Family Code: Dissolution, Legal Separation, Nullity, chap 8A.


NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued September 12, 2017 Decided October 5, 2017 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge No. 15-3368 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. THOMAS D. PHILIPSBORN IRREVOCABLE INSURANCE TRUST, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, No. 11 C 3274 Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. v. AVON CAPITAL, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Order This appeal arises from a complex dispute about the sale of three life insurance policies. We simplify the dispute, and indeed we have simplified the caption so that it fits on one page. But we discuss all of the parties and issues, if only briefly. More detail is not required in a nonprecedential disposition. Using approximately $3 million borrowed from Coventry Capital, the Thomas D. Philipsborn Irrevocable Insurance Trust purchased three policies on Philipsborn’s life. The Trust’s plan was to hold these policies for two years and then sell them into the life- No. 15-3368 Page 2 settlement market. When the time arrived, Avon Capital offered about $4.5 million for the policies, which the Trust agreed to sell without a written contract. Avon directed the Trust to transfer two of the policies to Financial Life Services, which insurance companies deem an appropriate buyer in the life-settlement market. The Trust and Financial Life acted pursuant to written contracts that entitled the Trust to repurchase each policy for a 10% premium. Avon asserts that it had an understanding with Financial Life to acquire the two policies at this purchase-plus-10% price. Things went awry with respect to one of these, a $5 million policy issued by AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company. Avon promised to pay the Trust approximately $1.5 million for this policy, but the contract between Financial Life and the Trust called for its transfer to Financial Life at a price of $600,000. Avon planned to acquire this policy from Financial Life for $660,000, resell it into the life-settlement market at a much higher price, and clear a profit after paying the Trust the balance remaining on the $4.5 million. (That balance was approximately $820,000, after other transactions that we do not recount.) But Financial Life resold the AXA policy to Life Trading, one of its subsidiaries, rather than to Avon. This litigation ensued. It rests on the diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a). Having reviewed the supplemental jurisdictional statements filed after oral argument, we are satisfied that complete diversity of citizenship exists. The initial claim, by the Trust and its trustee, demanded about $820,000 in damages for breach of contract. The complaint named Avon, Donald Trudeau, and Benistar Admin Services as defendants. Avon named Financial Life as a third-party defendant, contending that Financial Life’s failure to resell the AXA policy to Avon is responsible for Avon’s failure to pay the Trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Financial Life. The court observed that Financial Life’s only contractual agreement is with the Trust, and that as the Trust did not want to repurchase the policy Financial Life was free to resell it to anyone of its choice. The judge observed that Avon itself had instructed the Trust to transfer the policy to Financial Life for $600,000, and if that was too little (in light of Avon’s commitment to pay $4.5 million for the three policies together) the problem was attributable to Avon, not to Financial Life. Avon does not contend that it had an enforceable contract that required Financial Life to resell the AXA policy to it for $660,000. Instead it invokes the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Illinois (whose law applies) does not use that doctrine to contradict a written contract. Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 51 N.E.3d 753, 779 (Ill. 2016). Financial Life drafted a contract between itself and the Trust, and it sent that document to Avon for review. This contract specifies that it supersedes all prior agreements and un- No. 15-3368 Page 3 derstandings. Instead of insisting that Financial Life revise the document to provide for a resale to itself, Avon relayed the document to the Trust without change. It is in no position to complain just because Financial Life stood on its contractual rights. The Trust’s claim against Avon produced summary judgment in the Trust’s favor. Avon has not appealed from that judgment. The Trust’s claims against Trudeau and Benistar went to a jury, which found in Benistar’s favor but returned a verdict of $818,512.17 against Trudeau. We need not mention Benistar again—but now we must describe Trudeau’s role in the transactions. Trudeau negotiated with the Trust as Avon’s declared agent. Trudeau also told Financial Life that he was the Trust’s agent, but the Trust did not seek damages from Trudeau because of that misrepresentation. Nor did the Trust seek damages for fraud, although it contends that Trudeau misrepresented several matters, such as his role with Avon. (It is not clear in this record whether he was a member of Avon, a manager of it, an investor in it, or some combination of these things; nor is it clear just which of these roles he told the Trust he played.) Instead the Trust’s theory of relief against Trudeau is that he was a party to the contract of sale and not just an agent for Avon. Thomas Philipsborn testified that Trudeau told him that he and Avon would acquire the policies jointly, as principals. If the jury credited that statement, then the verdict against Trudeau is secure. But the Trust had two other theories of liability, and the jury returned a general verdict. So if either of those additional theories is deficient, the Trust’s claim against Trudeau must be retried. One of the Trust’s additional theories is that Trudeau became a party to the contract by providing the Trust with some personal information, such as a character reference. The Trust was worried about Avon’s reliability, and when pressed on this point Trudeau told the Trust that he was reliable and furnished information in an effort to convince the Trust. According to the Trust, this made Trudeau a party to the contract. Yet the Trust does not identify any rule of Illinois law, either statutory or judicial, that provision of personal information turns a declared agent into a principal. The Trust’s second additional theory is that Trudeau is responsible for Avon’s breach of contract and therefore owes damages as if he were a principal. The district court instructed the jury that if Trudeau “took an active part in violating some duty Avon Capital owed to the Trust”, then Trudeau is personally liable. The district court lifted this language from a 1953 treatise, 1 Ill. L. & Practice, Agency §130 (1953), which declared: “It is considered a well settled principle of law in Illinois that an agent is not liable for the acts of a disclosed principal unless he takes an active part in violating No. 15-3368 Page 4 some duty the principal owes to a third person.” That sentence was quoted with approval in Merrill Tenant Council v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th Cir. 1981), and the district court deemed it the law of the circuit. One problem is that Merrill did not hold what the second half of the quoted sentence says. It held, among other things, that some of the defendants could be liable for violating their own statutory duties; that they were agents did not relieve them of those duties. That’s different from holding that an agent can be liable for a violation of the principal’s duties. A further problem is that the second half of the treatise’s statement cannot be taken literally. A company’s CEO who directs the business not to keep one of its promises, and instead to pay damages, does not become personally liable for those damages—at least we could not find any case in Illinois so holding. Corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies can act only through agents, and if the second half of the sentence from the 1953 treatise were taken as gospel, then in every suit for breach of contract the right defendants would be the organization plus at least one agent, to be held personally liable. That would be a revolution in the law of agency. Merrill cited Landau v. Landau, 409 Ill. 556, 564 (1951), in addition to the 1953 treatise. Landau in turn cited the Restatement of Agency §320 (1933). Landau did not hold anything one way or the other about the “active part” issue; it ruled on other grounds. And at least one intermediate appellate court has held that taking an “active part” in a breach of contract does not make an agent personally liable in Illinois. Gateway Erectors v. Lutheran General Hospital, 102 Ill. App. 3d 300 (1981). The Restatement suggests that an agent is liable for his own torts but not for a principal’s breach of contract in which the agent played a role. (The current provisions on this subject are Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 6.01 and 7.01 (2006).) The Trust does not contend that Trudeau committed a tort against it; its claim is contractual in nature. We do not see in Illinois law any general principle that declared agents for declared principals become personally liable if they take an “active part” in the principal’s breach of contract. Two of the three theories before the jury were legally defective. Because the verdict is general, we cannot tell which theory of liability the jury accepted. Trudeau therefore is entitled to a new trial. The judgment with respect to Financial Life is affirmed. The judgment with respect to Trudeau is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this order.


Recodified as RCW 11.98.009 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 66, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.020 Power of trustor — Trust provisions control chapter provisions.
Recodified as RCW 11.97.010 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 63, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.030 Exercise of powers by co-trustees.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.016 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 66, effective January 1, 1985.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.029 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 70, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.050 Filling vacancy in office of trustee.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.039 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 71, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.060 Power of successor trustee.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.060 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 77, effective January 1, 1985.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.070 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 79, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.080 Nonliability of third persons without knowledge of breach.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.090 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 82, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.090 Nonliability for action or inaction based on lack of knowledge of events.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.100 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 82, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.100 Contract and tort liability.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.110 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 82, effective January 1, 1985.
30.99.110 Tax reform act of 1969, state implementation — Application to certain trusts.
Cross-reference section, decodified January 1985.
30.99.900 Severability — 1959 c 124.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.910 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 94, effective January 1, 1985.
Recodified as RCW 11.98.920 pursuant to 1984 c 149 § 94, effective January 1, 1985.


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1. RICHARD1 SNOW He married MARGARET BROWN June 29, 1803, daughter of LAWRENCE BROWN and JEAN JAMIESON.
2. i. WILLIAM F.2 SNOW, b. 1806, Tryon, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. July 08, 1874, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
ii. JANE SNOW, b. November 17, 1807, PEI, Canada.
3. iii. ROBERT A. SNOW, b. September 01, 1810, Stanley, York County, New Brunswick, Canada.
iv. HANNAH SNOW, b. Bet. 1816 - 1818, PEI, Canada.
4. v. JAMES SNOW, b. 1821, Victoria-Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
2. WILLIAM F.2 SNOW (RICHARD1) was born 1806 in Tryon, Prince Edward Island, Canada, and died July 08, 1874 in Prince Edward Island, Canada. He married SUSANNAH BYNON, daughter of GEORGE BYNON and JANE PICKEN. She was born November 13, 1814 in Plymouth, Dock, England, and died March 28, 1880 in Prince Edward Island, Canada.
ii. JANE SNOW, m. UNKNOWN MCLEOD.
iii. LUCY SNOW, m. DONALD COLE, September 11, 1883.
iv. MARY SNOW, d. December 1894, Tryon, PEI, Canada.
5. v. EDWARD KENT SNOW, b. December 21, 1835; d. June 06, 1902.
6. vi. SAMUEL SNOW, b. December 27, 1835, Tryon, PEI, Canada; d. May 23, 1903, Louisbourg, C. B., Nova Scotia, Canada.
vii. KENT SNOW, b. Bef. May 09, 1837, Tryon, PEI, Canada.
7. viii. REBECCAH CAROLINE SNOW, b. August 18, 1838, Tryon, PEI, Canada.
8. ix. JAMES SNOW, b. June 08, 1840.
x. ELIZABETH SNOW, b. 1846, Tryon, PEI, Canada; m. WILLIAM HENRY REEVES, April 06, 1867, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada; b. 1842, Waverly, Nova Scotia, Canada.
9. xi. EMILY ELLA SNOW, b. March 23, 1853, Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. June 25, 1928, Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. ROBERT A.2 SNOW (RICHARD1) was born September 01, 1810 in Stanley, York County, New Brunswick, Canada. He married OLIVIA SPENCER Bef. 1859.
i. RICHARD WILLIAM3 SNOW, b. July 03, 1859, Boiestown, New Brunswick, Canada; d. May 04, 1941, Dover, Strafford County, New Hampshire, USA.
ii. MARGARET E. SNOW, b. Abt. 1863; m. J. A. DESAUINIERS.
10. iii. JOHN GORDON SNOW, b. September 23, 1864, Stanley, York County, New Brunswick, Canada; d. April 12, 1958, Dover, Strafford County, New Hampshire, USA.
iv. ROBERT A. SNOW, b. Abt. 1868, Stanley, York County, New Brunswick, Canada; d. Aft. 1958.
4. JAMES2 SNOW (RICHARD1) was born 1821 in Victoria-Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada. He married HARRIETT FRANCIS, daughter of JOHN FRANCIS.
11. i. ELIZABETH3 SNOW, b. March 09, 1843, Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. November 04, 1915.
ii. JOHN FRANCIS SNOW, b. May 09, 1844.
iii. MARY SNOW, b. May 12, 1845, Lot 28, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
12. iv. WILLIAM WESTY SNOW, SR., b. May 22, 1848, Lot 28, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
v. ELMIRA SNOW, b. December 28, 1865.
5. EDWARD KENT3 SNOW (WILLIAM F.2, RICHARD1) was born December 21, 1835, and died June 06, 1902. He married ELIZABETH SNOW September 30, 1862 in Prince Edward Island, Canada, daughter of JAMES SNOW and HARRIETT FRANCIS. She was born March 09, 1843 in Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada, and died November 04, 1915.
i. URIAH4 SNOW, b. 1864; d. August 10, 1865.
ii. LEVI SNOW, b. June 28, 1865; d. July 05, 1886.
iii. SAMUEL JOHNSON SNOW, b. April 11, 1867; d. November 30, 1881.
iv. EMALINE SNOW, b. August 12, 1869; d. July 1870.
v. BERTRUM SNOW, b. September 13, 1871; d. September 1873.
vi. CLARA SNOW, b. August 1874; d. October 1874, at two months of age.
vii. GERTRUDE SNOW, b. Bef. April 12, 1876; d. August 1876.
viii. RUSSELL SNOW, b. June 22, 1877.
ix. BERNICE SNOW, b. June 13, 1879; d. November 23, 1881.
x. ROY SNOW, b. October 14, 1881; d. December 10, 1881.
xi. SEYMOUR SNOW, b. December 14, 1882; d. Victoria, PEI, Canada; m. (1) UNKNOWN BYNON; m. (2) EVALINA CARR, April 04, 1906; b. October 28, 1867, Tryon, PEI, Canada; d. September 04, 1945, Crapaud, PEI, Canada.
6. SAMUEL3 SNOW (WILLIAM F.2, RICHARD1) was born December 27, 1835 in Tryon, PEI, Canada, and died May 23, 1903 in Louisbourg, C. B., Nova Scotia, Canada. He married JESSIE JANE FERGUSON April 1868 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada.
i. MARY4 SNOW, b. 1870.
ii. JOHN ANGUS SNOW, b. 1872; m. ANNIE DE FRIEZE.
iii. WILLIAM EDWARD SNOW, b. 1876.
iv. NORMAN SNOW, b. 1879.
v. JESSIE A. SNOW, b. September 01, 1880; d. Bet. 1905 - 1906.
vi. BESSIE SNOW, b. August 01, 1882, Louisbourg, C. B., Nova Scotia, Canada; d. 1938, Louisbourg, C. B., Nova Scotia, Canada; m. JAMES NORMAN MACDONALD.
7. REBECCAH CAROLINE3 SNOW (WILLIAM F.2, RICHARD1) was born August 18, 1838 in Tryon, PEI, Canada. She married JAMES A. HOWATT.
ii. GEORGE HOWATT, m. ISABELLA GREENE.
iii. JAMES W. HOWATT, m. LOUISE BAILEY.
8. JAMES3 SNOW (WILLIAM F.2, RICHARD1) was born June 08, 1840. He married SUSAN UNKNOWN.
i. IRENA4 SNOW, b. October 03, 1867, Crapaud-Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
ii. BESSIE JANE SNOW, b. November 18, 1869.
iii. CINNETTA SNOW, b. January 25, 1874.
9. EMILY ELLA3 SNOW (WILLIAM F.2, RICHARD1) was born March 23, 1853 in Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada, and died June 25, 1928 in Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada. She married (2) PAUL HAMILTON CURTIS June 13, 1877, son of THEOPHILUS CURTIS and MARIA MABEY. He was born February 07, 1854 in Lot 29, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, and died July 18, 1918 in Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
i. CLARA LAURA4 CURTIS, b. April 10, 1874, Prince Eward Island, Canada; d. November 27, 1952, Leverett, Massachusetts, USA; m. (1) BALFOUR DENSMORE NICKERSON, 1894, Somerville, Massechusetts; b. October 12, 1876, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada; d. January 12, 1945, Oakland, Alameda County, California; m. (2) EDWARD FAIRFIELD STONE, April 19, 1923, Sommerville, Massachusetts, USA; b. 1858, Corinna, Maine, USA; d. 1936, Somerville, Massashusetts, USA.
ii. ALETHA4 CURTIS, b. Unknown infant death before 1 yr old; d. Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
iii. ARTHUR WINBERG CURTIS, SR., b. August 16, 1878, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. July 04, 1970, Milford, Worcester County, Massachusetts, USA; m. ANNIE W. DE VENNE, May 22, 1913, 94 Prospect Street, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA; b. October 11, 1878, Massachusetts, USA; d. April 1967, Somerville, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, USA.
iv. OWEN ALVIN CURTIS, b. November 16, 1879, Unknown infant death before 1 yr old; d. Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
v. ALMA A. CURTIS, b. March 1881.
vi. EMILY ALENA CURTIS, b. March 12, 1881, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. December 31, 1968, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; m. WILLIAM H. VILLETT, Unknown, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada; b. Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. March 07, 1963, Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada.
vii. RUBY EVA CURTIS, b. September 17, 1883, Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. August 07, 1977, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
viii. ALDEBERTE CURTIS, b. January 22, 1885, Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. November 09, 1967, 181 Spring Street, Summerside, PEI, Canada; m. CHARLES BRADEN JELLY, August 1914; b. 1890; d. May 20, 1974, Summerside, Prince Edward Island, Canada.
ix. HERBERT HOWATT CURTIS, b. April 26, 1887, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. 1961; m. (1) UNKNOWN HOGAN; m. (2) ADA DAWSON; b. England.
x. HAROLD ALMORE CURTIS, b. August 31, 1890, Victoria, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. December 08, 1961, Miami, Florida, USA; m. (1) UNKNOWN HOGAN; m. (2) AUDEST SYRETHA ALLEN, Abt. 1910, Tauton, Massachusetts, USA; b. March 31, 1895, S. Easton, Bristol County, Massachusetts, USA; d. October 21, 1966, Brockton, Plymouth County, Massachusetts, USA.
xi. MAE ELLEN CURTIS, b. September 02, 1895, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. WFT Est. 1929-1990; m. HAROLD JACOB FARROW, June 24, 1924, Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada; b. December 10, 1897, Tryon, Prince Edward Island, Canada; d. November 29, 1979, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
10. JOHN GORDON3 SNOW (ROBERT A.2, RICHARD1) was born September 23, 1864 in Stanley, York County, New Brunswick, Canada, and died April 12, 1958 in Dover, Strafford County, New Hampshire, USA. He married ELSIE A. MUNN June 26, 1900, daughter of BENJAMIN MUNN and HANNAH CLOUWATER. She was born Abt. 1881 in Boiestown, New Brunswick, Canada, and died October 29, 1949 in Dover, Strafford County, New Hampshire, USA.
vii. FORREST SNOW, d. Died in infancy.
viii. DONALD ADRIAN SNOW, b. February 26, 1924, Boiestown, New Brunswick, Canada; m. PHYLLIS JOAN DRAKE, October 30, 1948, Dover, New Hampshire.
11. ELIZABETH3 SNOW (JAMES2, RICHARD1) was born March 09, 1843 in Crapaud, Prince Edward Island, Canada, and died November 04, 1915. She married EDWARD KENT SNOW September 30, 1862 in Prince Edward Island, Canada, son of WILLIAM SNOW and SUSANNAH BYNON. He was born December 21, 1835, and died June 06, 1902.
Children are listed above under (5) Edward Kent Snow.
12. WILLIAM WESTY3 SNOW, SR. (JAMES2, RICHARD1) was born May 22, 1848 in Lot 28, Prince Edward Island, Canada. He married SARAH JANE UNKNOWN.
ii. CHARLES WELLINGTON SNOW, b. October 02, 1873.
iii. JANE LOUISA SNOW, b. December 20, 1875, Hampton, PEI, Canada.
iv. WILLIAM WESTY SNOW, JR., b. February 12, 1877.
v. ALVA LORNE SNOW, b. March 25, 1880.
vi. LILLIE MYRTLE SNOW, b. August 28, 1882, Hampton, PEI, Canada.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Under the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, an author's right to obtain a renewal and extension of his copyright is assignable by him by an agreement made before the expiration of the original copyright term. P. 318 U. S. 656.
Certiorari, 317 U.S. 611, to review the affirmance of a decree of the District Court, 38 F.Supp. 72, granting an interlocutory injunction in a case of alleged copyright infringement.
"may be assigned . . . by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright. . . ." Concededly, the author can assign the original copyright, and, after he has secured it, the renewal copyright as well. The question is -- does the Act prevent the author from assigning his interest in the renewal copyright before he has secured it?
"all copyrights and renewals of copyrights and the right to secure all copyrights and renewals of copyrights in the [songs], and any and all rights therein that I [Graff] or my heirs, executors, administrators or next of kin may at any time be entitled to."
"necessary to secure to [Witmark] the renewals and extensions of the copyrights in said compositions and all rights therein for the terms of such renewals and extensions."
"all papers necessary in order to secure to it the renewals and extensions of all copyrights in said compositions and all rights therein for the terms of such renewals and extensions."
This agreement was duly recorded in the Copyright Office.
"sole question is whether . . . an agreement to assign his renewal, made by an author in advance of the twenty-eighth year of the original term of copyright, is valid and enforceable."
Because of the obvious importance of this question of the proper construction of the Copyright Act, we brought the case here. 317 U.S. 611.
Plainly, there is only one question before us -- does the Copyright Act nullify an agreement by an author, made during the original copyright term, to assign his renewal? The explicit words of the statute give the author an unqualified right to renew the copyright. No limitations are placed upon the assignability of his interest in the renewal. If we look only to what the Act says, there can be no doubt as to the answer. But each of the parties finds support for its conclusion in the historical background of copyright legislation, and to that we must turn to discover whether Congress meant more than it said.
English courts held that the author's right of renewal, although contingent upon his surviving the original fourteen-year period, could be assigned, and that, if he did survive the original term, he was bound by the assignment. Carnan v. Bowles, 2 Bro.C.C. 80; Rundell v. Murray, Jac. 311; see Maugham, Law of Literary Property (1828) 73; Curtis on Copyright (1847) 235. Subsequent English legislation eliminated the problem by providing for one continuous term of copyright. In 1814, the statute was amended to provide that the author and his assigns should have the copyright for twenty-eight years, "and also, if the author shall be living at the end of that period, for the residue of his natural life." 54 Geo. III, c. 156. In 1842, the copyright term was extended to forty-two years or the life of the author and seven years, whichever should prove longer. 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45; see Macgillivray, Law of Copyright (1902) 56-57. The English law today, with minor qualifications not relevant here, gives the author and his assigns the exclusive copyright for the life of the author and fifty years after his death. Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 34; see Oldfield, Law of Copyright (1912) 60-66; Robertson, Law of Copyright (1912) 44-50; Copinger, Law of Copyright (7th Ed.1936) 78-86.
"for a certain time, not less than fourteen years from the first publication, and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned, and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years."
the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (1922), vol. XXIV, pp. 326-27. When the resolution was adopted, laws governing copyrights were on the statute books of at least three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland. The Connecticut and Maryland statutes substantially followed the Statute of Anne: in both states, copyright was granted for a term of fourteen years, renewable for another term of the same length if the author survived the original term. Connecticut, Acts & Laws (Green, 1783) 617-19; Maryland, Laws (Green, 1783) c. 34. The Maryland statute employed the phraseology of the Statute of Anne, providing simply that the privilege of renewal belonged to the author. The Connecticut statute, however, explicitly incorporated the construction made by the English courts, and conferred the right of renewal upon the author and "his heirs and assigns." The Massachusetts statute created a single copyright term of twenty-one years. Massachusetts, Acts & Laws (Edes, 1783) 236.
Laws (Melcher, 1789) 161-62; Rhode Island, Acts and Resolves (Carter, 1783) 6-7; Virginia, Acts (Dunlap & Hayes, 1785) 8-9; North Carolina, Laws 1785, c. 24.
"if, at the expiration of the said term, the author or authors, or any of them, be living, and a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein, the same exclusive right shall be continued to him or them, his or their executors, administrators or assigns, for the further term of fourteen years."
1 Stat. 124. In view of the language and history of this provision, there can be no doubt that, if the present case had arisen under the Act of 1790, there would be no statutory restriction upon the assignability of the author's renewal interest. The petitioners contend, however, that such a limitation was introduced by subsequent legislation, particularly the Copyright Acts of 1831 and 1909.
authors in other countries. . . . In the United States, by the existing laws, a copyright is secured to the author, in the first instance, for fourteen years, and if, at the end of that period, he be living, then for fourteen years more; but, if he be not then living, the copyright is determined, although, by the very event of the death of the author, his family stand in more need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them."
Register of Debates, vol. 7, appendix CXIX.
Plainly, therefore, the Copyright Act of 1831 merely enlarged the benefits of the copyright; it extended the length of the original term and gave the author's widow and children that which theretofore they did not possess -- namely, the right of renewal to which the author would have been entitled if he had survived the original term. The petitioners attach much significance to a sentence appearing in the report of the committee: "The question is, whether the author or the bookseller should receive the reward." Ibid. The meaning of this sentence, read in its context is quite clear. By providing that, if the author should not survive the original term, his renewal interest should, instead of falling into the public domain, pass to his widow and children, Congress was, of course, preferring the author to the bookseller. But neither expressly nor impliedly did the Act of 1831 impose any restraints upon the right of the author himself to assign his contingent interest in the renewal. That the Act contained no such limitation was accepted without question both by the courts, see Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 Fed.Cas. 652, and Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608, with which compare White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250-253, and by commentators, see Curtis on Copyright (1847) 235; 2 Morgan, Law of Literature (1875) 229-30; Spalding, Law of Copyright (1878) 111; Drone on Copyright (1879) 326-32; Bowker on Copyright (1886) 20, 34; 2 Kent's Commentaries (12th ed.
1873) 510; Solberg, Copyright Protection and Statutory Formalities (1904) 24. Representative Ellsworth, [Footnote 4] who submitted the committee report on the bill that became the Copyright Act of 1831, himself stated unequivocally that an agreement to assign the renewal was binding upon the author. See Ellsworth, Copyright Manual (1862) 29.
any of the bills previously introduced. Your committee believes that, in all its essential features, it fairly meets and solves the difficult problems with which the committee had to deal. . . ."
"Mr. Clemens told me that he sold the copyright for Innocents Abroad for a very small sum, and he got very little out of the Innocents Abroad until the twenty-eight year period expired, and then his contract did not cover the renewal period, and, in the fourteen years of the renewal period, he was able to get out of it all of the profits."
"Section 23 deals with the term of the copyright. Under existing law, the copyright term is twenty-eight years, with the right of renewal by the author, or by the author's widow or children if he be dead, for a further term of fourteen years. The act of 1790 provided for an original term of fourteen years, with the right of renewal for fourteen years. The act of 1831 extended the term to its present length. It was urged before the committee that it would be better to have a single term without any right of renewal, and a term of life and fifty years was suggested. Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed, as is the existing law [italics ours], so that he could not be deprived of that right."
needs it the most. A very small percentage of the copyrights are ever renewed. All use of them ceases in most cases long before the expiration of twenty-eight years. In the comparatively few cases where the work survives the original term, the author ought to be given an adequate renewal term. In the exceptional case of a brilliant work of literature, art, or musical composition, it continues to have a value for a long period, but this value is dependent upon the merit of the composition. Just in proportion as the composition is meritorious and deserving will it continue to be profitable, provided the copyright is extended so long, and it is believed that, in all such cases where the merit is very high, this term is certainly not too long."
"Your committee do not favor, and the bill does not provide for, any extension of the original term of twenty-eight years, but it does provide for an extension of the renewal term from fourteen years to twenty-eight years, and it makes some change in existing law as to those who may apply for the renewal. Instead of confining the right of renewal to the author, if still living, or to the widow or children of the author, if he be dead, we provide that the author of such work, if still living, may apply for the renewal, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or, in the absence of a will, his next of kin. It was not the intention to permit the administrator to apply for the renewal, but to permit the author who had no wife or children to bequeath by will the right to apply for the renewal."
H.Rep. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 14, 15.
Congress, speaking through its responsible members, had any intention of altering what theretofore had not been questioned -- namely, that there were no statutory restraints upon the assignment by authors of their renewal rights -- it is almost certain that such purpose would have been manifested. The legislative materials reveal no such intention.
of an agreement where the author was under such coercion of circumstances that enforcement would be unconscionable. Cf. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U. S. 67, 248 U. S. 70; Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581, 148 U. S. 589-591; Snyder v. Rosenbaum, 215 U. S. 261, 215 U. S. 265-266; Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 60 U. S. 160. The Elfrida, 172 U. S. 186, 172 U. S. 193-194. It is quite another matter to hold, as we are asked in this case, that, regardless of the circumstances surrounding a particular assignment, no agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests are binding.
It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie upon one side of this question rather than the other. If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author for something he cannot sell. We cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of garret poverty of some men of literary genius. Even if we could do so, we cannot say that such men would regard with favor a rule of law preventing them from realizing on their assets when they are most in need of funds. Nor can we be unmindful of the fact that authors have themselves devised means of safeguarding their interests. We do not have such assured knowledge about authorship, and particularly about song writing, or the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to dispose of their property possessed by others. While authors may have habits making for intermittent want, they may have no less a spirit of independence which would resent treatment of them as wards under guardianship of the law.
reference to the actual practices of authors and publishers with respect to assignments of renewals, as disclosed by the records of the Copyright Office. Since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 213, assignments of copyrights must be recorded in the office of the Register of Copyrights. The records of the Copyright Office, we are advised, show that, during the period from July, 1870, to July, 1871, the first period in which assignments were recorded in the Office, 223 assignments were registered. Of these, 14 were assignments of renewal interests. Similarly, during the first six months of 1909, immediately preceding the enactment of the Copyright Act of that year, 304 assignments were recorded, and, of these, 62 were assignments of renewal interests. In the six-month period following the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, there was no significant change: 404 assignments, of which 68 were transfers of renewals. And, to round out the picture, in the most recent complete volume of records (covering the period from January 27, 1943, to February 12, 1943), 135 assignments were recorded, and, of these, 29 were assignments of renewals. Many assignments have thus been entered into a good faith upon the assumption that they were valid and enforceable.
The available evidence indicates, therefore, that renewal interests of authors have been regarded as assignable both before and after the Copyright Act of 1909. To hold at this late date that, as a matter of law, such interests are not assignable would be to reject all relevant aids to construction.
the renewal privilege for the personal benefit of authors and their families. They believe the judgment below should be reversed.
"SEC. 23. That the copyright secured by this Act shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication, whether the copyrighted work bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name: Provided, That in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further, That in the case of any copyrighted work, including a contribution by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall determine at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first publication."
"SEC. 42. That copyright secured under this or previous Acts of the United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will."
Ball and Olcott were no longer living at the time, and, under § 23 of the Act, their interests in the renewal passed to their widows. Witmark is also the assignee of Mrs. Olcott's interest in the renewal copyright, and Mrs. Ball has assigned her interest to another music publisher. The validity of neither assignment is involved in this suit.
In opposing the motion for a preliminary injunction, Graff submitted an affidavit stating he "was in desperate financial straits" when he entered into the agreement of May 19, 1917. The district court made no findings upon, and did not otherwise deal with, the issue that this allegation may raise.
William Wolcott Ellsworth, the son of Oliver Ellsworth, third Chief Justice of the United States. See Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927 (1928) 943.
Curtis on Copyright (1847) 235; Drone on Copyright (1879) 326, 332; Howell, Copyright Law (1942) 108; 2 Morgan, Law of Literature (1875) 229, 230; Spalding, Law of Copyright (1878) 111; Macgillivray, Law of Copyright (1902) 266, 267; Wittenberg, Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (1937) 45; Ladas, International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (1938) 772, 773.
DeWolf, Outline of Copyright Law (1925) 65, 66; Weil, American Copyright Law (1917) 365, 366.
Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 540, 541; Frohlich and Schwartz, Law of Motion Pictures (1918) 548, 549; Marchetti, Law of Stage, Screen, and Radio (1936) 67; Bowker, Copyright -- Its History and Its Law (1912) 117, 438; Bump, Law of Patents, Trademarks, Labels, and Copyrights (2d ed. 1884); Elfreth, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks (1913); Graham, Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights (2d ed.1921); Law, Copyright and Patent Laws of the United States, 1790-1870 (3d ed. 1870); Copinger, Law of Copyright (7th ed.1936); Shafter, Musical Copyright (2d ed.1939) 174.
Wittenberg, Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (1937) 195, 261; Shafter, Musical Copyright (2d ed.1939) 577; Gordon, Annotated Forms of Agreement (1923) 32; 6 Winslow, Forms of Pleading and Practice (3d ed.1934) § 8267, pp. 501-02; Birdseye, Encyclopedia of General Business and Legal Forms (1924) 280, 281; Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 836; Church, Legal and Business Forms (2d ed.1925) 344.


text:
A method and system for detecting a search intent of a user. The method includes tokenizing the search query into at least one tokenized query; sending, to a plurality of engines, the at least one tokenized query, wherein each engine is configured with at least one entity, wherein each entity represents a topic of interest; receiving, from each engine, the at least one entity of the engine and at least one certainty score, wherein each certainty score indicates a probability that a tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine; and determining, based on the received entities and certainty scores, the search intent of the user.
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/103,536 filed on Dec. 11, 2013, now allowed, which claims the benefit of U.S. provisional application No. 61/822,376 filed on May 12, 2013. The Ser. No. 14/103,536 application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/712,563 filed on Dec. 12, 2012, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,141,702. The Ser. No. 13/712,563 application claims the benefit of U.S. provisional patent application No. 61/653,562 filed on May 31, 2012, and is a continuation-in-part application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/156,999 filed on Jun. 9, 2011, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,323,844. The Ser. No. 13/156,999 application claims the benefit of U.S. provisional patent application No. 61/468,095 filed on Mar. 28, 2011, and of U.S. provisional application No. 61/354,022 filed on Jun. 11, 2010. The Ser. No. 13/712,563 application is also a continuation-in-part application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/296,619 filed on Nov. 15, 2011, now pending.
The contents of the above-referenced applications are incorporated herein by reference.
The disclosure generally relates to search engines for providing one or more search results respective of a query received from a user, and more specifically to a system and methods for detecting user intent with respect to a query.
Search engines are used to search for information over the World Wide Web. A web search query refers to a query that a user enters into a web search engine in order to receive search results.
A query received from a user device may be explicit or implicit in different levels. An implicit query makes it complicated to provide appropriate search results to the user because the user intent behind such queries is unclear. As an example, if the input query is “Madonna clips” it is unclear whether the user is interested in listening to the entertainer Madonna's music clips, viewing Madonna's video clips, or downloading Madonna's music or video clips to the user's device.
It would therefore be advantageous to provide a solution that overcomes the limitations of the prior art.
Certain embodiments disclosed herein include a method for detecting a search intent of a user. The method comprises tokenizing the search query into at least one tokenized query; sending, to a plurality of engines, the at least one tokenized query, wherein each engine is configured with at least one entity, wherein each entity represents a topic of interest; receiving, from each engine, the at least one entity of the engine and at least one certainty score, wherein each certainty score indicates a probability that a tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine; and determining, based on the received entities and certainty scores, the search intent of the user.
Certain embodiments disclosed herein also include a non-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions for causing a processing circuitry to perform a process, the process comprising: tokenizing the search query into at least one tokenized query; sending, to a plurality of engines, the at least one tokenized query, wherein each engine is configured with at least one entity, wherein each entity represents a topic of interest; receiving, from each engine, the at least one entity of the engine and at least one certainty score, wherein each certainty score indicates a probability that a tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine; and determining, based on the received entities and certainty scores, the search intent of the user.
Certain exemplary embodiments also include an intent detector for detecting a search intent of a user. The intent detector comprises a network interface, wherein the network interface is configured to at least receive the search query; a processing circuitry; and a memory connected to the processing circuitry and configured to contain a plurality of instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, configure the intent detector to: tokenize the search query into at least one tokenized query; send, to a plurality of engines, the at least one tokenized query, wherein each engine is configured with at least one entity, wherein each entity represents a topic of interest; receive, from each engine, the at least one entity of the engine and at least one certainty score, wherein each certainty score indicates a probability that a tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine; and determine, based on the received entities and certainty scores, the search intent of the user.
The subject matter that is disclosed herein is particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed in the claims at the conclusion of the specification. The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the disclosed embodiments will be apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
FIG. 3 is a flowchart describing the operation of detecting a search intent of a user according to an embodiment.
The embodiments disclosed herein are only examples of the many possible advantageous uses and implementations of the innovative teachings presented herein. In general, statements made in the specification of the present application do not necessarily limit any of the various claimed embodiments. Moreover, some statements may apply to some inventive features but not to others. In general, unless otherwise indicated, singular elements may be in plural and vice versa with no loss of generality. In the drawings, like numerals refer to like parts through several views.
According to exemplary embodiments disclosed herein, a system and method for detecting the search intent of users based on queries entered by the users are provided. An input query is received from a user device. The input query is tokenized into at least one tokenized query that is then processed by a plurality of engines. Each engine of the plurality of engines computes the probability that a tokenized query is mapped to an entity. An entity defines a topic of interest. Each of the plurality of engines provides an entity together with a certainty score. The intent is then determined based on the certainty score received from each of the plurality of engines.
FIG. 1 depicts an exemplary and non-limiting schematic diagram of a system 100 utilized for describing certain embodiments disclosed herein. A user device 110 is connected to a network 120. The network 120 may be, but is not limited to, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a metro area network (MAN), the world wide web (WWW), the Internet, a wired network, a wireless network, etc., as well as any combination thereof.
The user device 110 is configured to submit queries to a search server 130 which is also connected to the network 120. The search server 130 is configured to send and receive queries to and from an intent detection unit (IDU) 140. The IDU 140 is configured to determine the search intent of a user of the user device 110 respective of an input query or part of the input query.
The search intent represents the type of content, the content, and/or actions that may be of interest to the user during a current time period. For example, the search intent may represent the user's desire to view a clip, download the clip, or listen to the clip. Further, the search intent provides which song or performer the intent is directed to. In an embodiment, the IDU 140 is further configured to send the determined search intent to the search server 130. In one embodiment, the IDU 140 may be integrated in the search server 130 or communicatively connected to the server 130.
With this aim, according to one embodiment, the IDU 140 tokenizes a received query and analyzes the tokens via use of a plurality of engines. Each engine is configured to handle a certain topic of interest so that each engine of the plurality of engines handles different one or more topics. Upon determination of the search intent, the search server 130 can provide one or more search results respective of the query and the user intent. To this end, the search server 130 uses the search intent to query one or more resources from a plurality of resources that are the most appropriate to fulfill the search intent of the user. The resources may include, but are not limited to, a plurality of web search engines, servers of content providers, vertical comparison engines, servers of content publishers, native content installed on the user device, and so on. The query provided by the search server 130 is generated, in part, respective of the determined intent, or variations thereof, to a resource in a communication format that is proper for that specific resource, thereby enabling search of such resources that require a customized interface to perform any kind of successful processing.
The system 100 may further include a database 150 for storing information such as prior user intents, prior queries received from users, semantic and statistic data for enhancing the search experience, and so on. The system 100 may further include an agent 115 installed locally on the user device 110. The agent 115 is configured to facilitate the communication with the search server 130. In an embodiment, the agent 115 is realized as an application (mobile app), where instructions of such an application are saved in a memory and executed by a processor of the user device 110. It should be noted that the one user device 110 is illustrated in FIG. 1 only for the sake of simplicity and without limitation on the generality of the disclosed embodiments.
FIG. 2 depicts an exemplary and non-limiting schematic diagram 200 of the IDU 140 according to an embodiment. The IDU 140 includes a network interface 142, a tokenizer 144, a plurality of engines 146-1 through 146-N, an analyzer 148, and a memory 149. The network interface 142 provides connectivity to the network 120 and is configured to receive queries from the search server 130 or directly from a user device 110. The network interface 142 may further be used to communicate with the database 150 to retrieve information therefrom. The elements of the IDU 140 are communicatively coupled using a communication bus 143.
The tokenizer 144 is configured to tokenize an input query to units of information (tokens). The tokenizer 144 arranges the tokens in tokenized paths to enable efficient processing by the engine 146. Each token may be, but is not limited to, a word or a series of words, or a number or a series of numbers. According to one embodiment, the tokenizer 144 may also include a filtering unit (not shown) for filtering the input query. The input queries can be classified into three different types of queries: definitive, fuzzy, and noisy. A definitive query is short and mapped to known entities or keywords. A fuzzy query contains a combination of known entities and keywords that are not correlated to the known entities. Noisy queries cannot be mapped to known entities, or are long and complex. According to the disclosed embodiments, an entity is an “object” in the world that can be defined with known types and attributes. Entities may be, for example, products, people, locations, companies, music bands, popular keywords, applications, zip codes, and query components. Each entity can be associated with one or more classifications describing its essence. For example, an entity ‘Madonna’ can be associated with the classifications singer, actor, and celebrity.
The filtering process is designed to simplify at least fuzzy and noisy queries. The filtering process may include removing one or more unnecessary tokens (such as preposition words) from the query. As an example, if the received query is “where there in Tolsa”, the word “in” may be removed from the query if the token is determined to be unnecessary. A list of unnecessary tokens is defined in a semantic dictionary maintained in the database 150 or the memory 149.
The tokenized paths created by the tokenizer 144 are based on the fact that the coherent query typically includes a set of tokens (map to entities as defined above) that represent similar intents. According to one embodiment, any ambiguity between paths is resolved by using the most coherent and probable path among all possible tokenized paths. In one embodiment, a graph of connections between entities (e.g., singers connected to their songs) is utilized to evaluate the likelihood of a certain tokenized paths yielding the user's intended search result based on the connection of tokens (mapped to entities) in the same query. For example, the input query “madonna vogue” includes two tokens: “madonna” and “vogue”, where the tokenized path is that the entire query deals with music, rather than a Vogue magazine article (“Vogue” is both the name of a Madonna song and the title of a magazine).
Each engine of the plurality of engines 146 is configured to handle different one or more topics of interest. In one embodiment, a set of engines 146 are configured to map input tokenized paths or tokens (hereinafter tokenized queries) to entities. As noted above, entities are objects that can be defined using a set of attributes such as consumer goods, locations, keywords, mobile applications (apps), person names, questions, URLs, and so on.
As a non-limiting example, an engine 146 that is configured to handle locations, search for place names (cities, states, countries) in the tokenized query, and compute the probability that the user added a location to his or her input query. As another non-limiting example, an engine 146 that handles the names of people computes the probability that a given n-gram in the tokenized query is the name of an unknown person. Such an engine uses a frequency dictionary for common names versus common words, and common last name suffixes. In the fields of computational linguistics and probability, an n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n items from a given sequence of text or speech.
As another non-limiting example, an engine 146 that handles URLs is configured to include a list of URLs, domain names, and websites, and to compute the probability that the tokenized query includes a website name. As another non-limiting example, an engine 146 computes the probability that the tokenized query includes a question word, thereby determining the probability that the entire input query is a question. This is performed using pattern matching.
According to one embodiment, the probability may be computed based on at least one of: the frequency of appearance of the tokenized query within the entities by the engines, the correlation of the tokenized query to the entities, the matching between each of the tokens to the entities, the matching of the tokenized query to a plurality of search results received from an external search engine, the correlation to trend reports, and combinations thereof. As noted above, entities represent topics of interests.
The engines 146 are periodically updated with relevant content and are therefore consistent with the trends related to the respective topics. As a non-limiting example, the entities are updated by periodically downloading an index of entities from external sources (e.g., freebase.org) and names related mobile apps that can be periodically downloaded from central repositories of such applications, e.g., AppStore®.
In one embodiment, trends or popularity reports of certain keywords or queries are retrieved from external sources. Such reports can be input to engines 146 and can be utilized in part to compute the probability of a certain entity. For example, a trend report shows that a keyword “JFK airport” is currently trendy, so the probability computed for the location JFK airport would be higher than the probability computed for the person President John F. Kennedy.
Each engine of the plurality of engines 146 then provides an output respective of the tokenized query. Such output includes the mapped entity from the engine 146 and a certainty score for the tokenized query based on the probability computed for the entity handled by a respective engine. That is, each certainty score reflects the matching of the tokenized query to the topic which the corresponding engine handles. In an exemplary embodiment, the certainty score is an integer number between 0 and 10. In one embodiment, a certainty score that does not exceed a predefined threshold is not output by the engine 146.
The outputs of the engines 146 are then analyzed by an analyzer 148 and the search intent is determined respective to the analysis. The analysis of the analyzer 148 may include: a statistical analysis, a semantic analysis, analysis of the user experience, and combinations thereof. The statistical analysis determines the co-occurrence of the tokens within the topics of interest of the engine. The semantic analysis determines at least one of: the type of each of the one or more tokens, the correlation between each of the tokens and the topic of interest of the engine, and a combination thereof.
The statistical analysis is performed to determine, based on the certainty scores, which entities would best describe the search intent of an input query. This may include statistically combining the outputs from engines 146. In another embodiment, the statistical analysis including computing an average over the received certainty scores and considering entities with certainty scores over the computed average. The semantic analysis determines which of the combination of tokens mapped to entities describes a coherent query (or phrase).
The user intent is then sent to the search server 130 in order to provide the user with appropriate search results. It should be noted that each of the units may include a processor coupled to a memory (both are not shown).
As a non-limiting example, the words “March madness” are received as a query by the network interface 142. The query is tokenized by the tokenizer 144 to the tokenized queries “March”, “madness” and “March madness”. The tokenized queries are then sent to a plurality of engines 146. An engine (e.g., engine 146-1) that handles dates will provide a high certainty score (e.g., 10) for the word “March” and the certainty of this word as the 3rd Month of the year, but this engine 146-1 will not provide an output for the tokenized queries “madness” and “March Madness” (or otherwise provide a certainty score below a predefined threshold). An engine (e.g., engine 146-2) that handles a music entity will provide a high certainty score (e.g., 7) for the word “madness” and the certainty of this word as the name of a Music band, but engine 146-2 will not provide an output for the tokenized queries “March” and “March Madness.” An engine (e.g., engine 146-3) that handles basketball will output a high certainty score (e.g., 10) for the tokenized query “March Madness” and the certainty of this combination of words as a basketball related phrase. Respective thereto the search intent is determined to be basketball, as a coherent query is comprised of entities that best represent the intent.
FIG. 3 depicts an exemplary and non-limiting flowchart 300 of a method for detecting a search intent of a user submitting a search query according to one embodiment. In S310, a query, or a portion thereof, is received from a user device, for example the user device 110. The input query can be a text query or a voice query, wherein a text query would include a free text query and a structured query. In an embodiment, the user device is a hand held device. Therefore, in that embodiment, the user tends to type shorter queries as it is often inconvenient to type long phrases using hand held devices.
In S320, the received query is tokenized to one or more tokenized queries. A tokenized query may be any combination of tokens broken from the input query. A token may be a word or phrase that appears in the input query. In an embodiment, S320 is performed by the tokenizer 146. In S330, the tokenized queries are input to the plurality of engines 146-1 through 146-N. In S335, each engine computes the probability that a tokenized query is mapped to at least entity that the engine is configured with. An entity represents a topic of interest. Various examples of engines and their entities are discussed above. The probability computation is realized by a certainty score. In S340, each of the engines 146-1 through 146-N provides at least one entity together with a certainty score. As an example, the tokenized query ‘madonna’ can be mapped to the entities: ‘musician’ and ‘religious figure.’ As noted above, in an embodiment, certainty scores below a predefined threshold are not output by the engines. In S350, at least a statistical analysis, a semantic analysis, or both is performed on at least the certainty scores and entities received from the engines to determine the search intent of the user. In S360, the determined search intent is returned to a search server. In an embodiment, the tokenized queries and the search intent are saved in the memory 149. In S370, it is checked whether a new query is received, and if so execution continues with S310; otherwise, execution terminates.
It should be understood that any reference to an element herein using a designation such as “first,” “second,” and so forth does not generally limit the quantity or order of those elements. Rather, these designations are generally used herein as a convenient method of distinguishing between two or more elements or instances of an element. Thus, a reference to first and second elements does not mean that only two elements may be employed there or that the first element must precede the second element in some manner. Also, unless stated otherwise, a set of elements comprises one or more elements.
As used herein, the phrase “at least one of” followed by a listing of items means that any of the listed items can be utilized individually, or any combination of two or more of the listed items can be utilized. For example, if a system is described as including “at least one of A, B, and C,” the system can include A alone; B alone; C alone; A and B in combination; B and C in combination; A and C in combination; or A, B, and C in combination.
The various embodiments may be implemented as hardware, firmware, software, or any combination thereof. Moreover, the software is preferably implemented as an application program tangibly embodied on a program storage unit or tangible computer readable medium consisting of parts, or of certain devices and/or a combination of devices. The application program may be uploaded to, and executed by, a machine comprising any suitable architecture. Preferably, the machine is implemented on a computer platform having hardware such as one or more central processing units (“CPUs”), a memory, and input/output interfaces. The computer platform may also include an operating system and microinstruction code. The various processes and functions described herein may be either part of the microinstruction code or part of the application program, or any combination thereof, which may be executed by a CPU, whether or not such computer or processor is explicitly shown. In addition, various other peripheral units may be connected to the computer platform such as an additional data storage unit and a printing unit. All or some of the servers maybe combined into one or more integrated servers. Furthermore, a non-transitory computer readable medium is any computer readable medium except for a transitory propagating signal.
All examples and conditional language recited herein are intended for pedagogical purposes to aid the reader in understanding the principles and the concepts contributed by the inventor to furthering the art, and are to be construed as being without limitation to such specifically recited examples and conditions. Moreover, all statements herein reciting principles, aspects, and embodiments, as well as specific examples thereof, are intended to encompass both structural and functional equivalents thereof. Additionally, it is intended that such equivalents include both currently known equivalents as well as equivalents developed in the future, i.e., any elements developed that perform the same function, regardless of structure.
supplying the determined search intent of the user to a search server for use in developing search results for the user submitted search query.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein each received certainty score is above a predetermined threshold.
statistically analyzing the received entities and certainty scores, wherein the statistical analysis includes determining a co-occurrence of the at least one tokenized query within the at least one entity of each engine, wherein the search intent of the user is determined further based on the determined co-occurrences.
semantically analyzing the at least one tokenized query, wherein the semantic analysis includes determining a combination of the at least one tokenized query that describes a coherent query.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the search query is any of: a definitive query, a fuzzy query, and a noisy query.
filtering, based on a list of unnecessary tokens, at least one unnecessary token from the search query, when the search query is a fuzzy query or a noisy query.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the tokenizing is based on a graph of connections between entities of the plurality of engines.
deriving, based on the correlation, at least a category of interest, wherein the search intent is determined based further on the category of interest.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein each engine is configured to compute the probability that each tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine.
supply the determined search intent of the user to a search server for use in developing search results for the user submitted search query.
12. The intent detector of claim 11, wherein each received certainty score is above a predetermined threshold.
statistically analyze the received entities and certainty scores, wherein the statistical analysis includes determining a co-occurrence of the at least one tokenized query within the at least one entity of each engine, wherein the search intent of the user is determined further based on the determined co-occurrences.
semantically analyze the at least one tokenized query, wherein the semantic analysis includes determining a combination of the at least one tokenized query that describes a coherent query.
15. The intent detector of claim 11, wherein the search query is any of: a definitive query, a fuzzy query, and a noisy query.
filter, based on a list of unnecessary tokens, at least one unnecessary token from the search query, when the search query is a fuzzy query or a noisy query.
17. The intent detector of claim 11, wherein the tokenizing is based on a graph of connections between entities of the plurality of engines.
derive, based on the correlation, at least a category of interest, wherein the search intent is determined based further on the category of interest.
19. The intent detector of claim 11, wherein each engine is configured to compute the probability that each tokenized query of the at least one tokenized query is mapped to the at least one entity of the engine.
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Application No. 201280004300
Application No. 201280004300
Application No. 201280004301