text:
2012: March 22; 2012: November 9.
Human rights — Discrimination — Prohibited grounds — Mental or physical disability — Education — Student with dyslexia attending public school — School district cancelling special education program requiring student to enrol in specialized private school — Whether school district discriminating against student by failing to provide necessary remediation — Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 8.
Education law — School regulation and administration — Curriculum and education programs — Obligations of school authorities — What constitutes meaningful access to education for students with learning disabilities — School Act, S.B.C. 1989, c. 61.
J suffered from severe dyslexia for which he received special education at his public school. In Grade 2, a psychologist employed by the school district recommended that since he could not get the remedial help he needed at his school, he should attend the local Diagnostic Centre to receive the necessary remediation. When the Diagnostic Centre was closed by the school district, J transferred to a private school to get the instruction he needed. His father filed a complaint with the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal on J’s behalf against the school district and the Province on the grounds that J had been denied a “service . . . customarily available to the public” under s. 8 of the B.C. Human Rights Code. The Tribunal concluded that there was discrimination against J by the District and the Province and ordered a wide range of sweeping systemic remedies against both. It also ordered that the family be reimbursed for the tuition costs of J’s private school. The reviewing judge set aside the Tribunal’s decision, finding that there was no discrimination. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Held: The appeal is substantially allowed.
The purpose of the School Act in British Columbia is to ensure that “all learners . . . develop their individual potential and . . . acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to contribute to a healthy, democratic and pluralistic society and a prosperous and sustainable economy”. This is an acknowledgment by the government that the reason children are entitled to an education is that a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution. Adequate special education, therefore, is not a dispensable luxury. For those with severe learning disabilities, it is the ramp that provides access to the statutory commitment to education made to all children in British Columbia.
The “service” to which J is entitled under s. 8 of the B.C. Human Rights Code is education generally. To define special education as the service at issue risks descending into a kind of “separate but equal” approach. Comparing J only with other special needs students would mean that the District could cut all special needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination. If J is compared only to other special needs students, full consideration cannot be given to whether he had meaningful access to the education to which all students in British Columbia are entitled. This risks perpetuating the very disadvantage and exclusion the Code is intended to remedy.
To demonstrate prima facie discrimination under s. 8, complainants must show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination; that they have experienced an adverse impact with respect to a service customarily available to the public; and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify the conduct or practice. If it cannot be justified, discrimination will be found to occur.
There is no dispute that J’s dyslexia is a disability. There is equally no question that any adverse impact he suffered is related to his disability. The question then is whether J has, without reasonable justification, been denied meaningful access to the general education available to all children in British Columbia based on his disability.
Prima facie discrimination was made out based on the insufficiently intensive remediation provided by the District for J’s learning disability in order for him to get access to the education he was entitled to. J received some special education assistance until Grade 3, but the Tribunal’s conclusion that the remediation was far from adequate to give J the education to which he was entitled, was fully supported by the evidence. The Tribunal found that the family was told by District employees that J required intensive remediation. As a result of the closing of the Diagnostic Centre, a private school was the only alternative that would provide the intense remediation that J required.
The Tribunal found that when the decision to close the Diagnostic Centre was made, the District did so without knowing how the needs of students like J would be addressed, and without undertaking a needs‑based analysis to consider what might replace the Diagnostic Centre, or assessing the effect of the closure on Severe Learning Disabilities students. It was the combination of the clear recognition by the District, its employees and the experts that J required intensive remediation in order to have meaningful access to education, the closing of the Diagnostic Centre, and the fact that the family was told that these services could not otherwise be provided by the District, that justified the Tribunal’s conclusion that the failure of the District to meet J’s educational needs constituted prima facie discrimination.
The next question is whether the District’s conduct was justified. The District’s justification centred on the budgetary crisis it faced during the relevant period, which led to the closure of the Diagnostic Centre and other related cuts. The Tribunal’s findings that the District had other options available for addressing its budgetary crisis should not be disturbed. The Tribunal accepted that the District faced financial difficulties during the relevant period. Yet it also found that cuts were disproportionably made to special needs programs. Despite their similar cost, the District retained some discretionary programs, such as the Outdoor School — an outdoor campus where students learned about community and the environment — while eliminating the Diagnostic Centre.
More significantly, the Tribunal found that the District undertook no assessment, financial or otherwise, of what alternatives were or could be reasonably available to accommodate special needs students if the Diagnostic Centre were closed. The failure to consider financial alternatives completely undermined the District’s argument that it was justified in providing no meaningful access to an education for J because it had no choice. In order to decide that it had no other choice, it had at least to consider what those other choices were.
The finding of discrimination against the District is therefore restored.
Referred to: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12,  1 S.C.R. 396; Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,  1 S.C.R. 1219; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),  3 S.C.R. 624; University of British Columbia v. Berg,  2 S.C.R. 353; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27,  1 S.C.R. 665; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15,  1 S.C.R. 650; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU,  3 S.C.R. 3; Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke,  1 S.C.R. 202; Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud,  2 S.C.R. 970; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission),  2 S.C.R. 489; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),  1 S.C.R. 1114; British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights),  3 S.C.R. 868.
Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, s. 59.
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 8.
School Act, S.B.C. 1989, c. 61, preamble.
School Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1993, c. 6.
British Columbia. Ministry of Education. Mandate for the School System. Vancouver: The Ministry, 1989.
British Columbia. Ministry of Education. Special Programs: A Manual of Policies, Procedures and Guidelines. Vancouver: The Ministry, 1985.
Brodsky, Gwen, Shelagh Day and Yvonne Peters. Accommodation in the 21st Century. Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2012 (online: http://www.chrc‑ccdp.ca/pdf/accommodation_eng.pdf).
MacKay, A. Wayne. “Connecting Care and Challenge: Tapping Our Human Potential” (2008), 17 E.L.J. 37.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Rowles, Saunders and Low JJ.A.), 2010 BCCA 478, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 246, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 77, 294 B.C.A.C. 185, 498 W.A.C. 185, 71 C.H.R.R. D/238,  3 W.W.R. 383,  B.C.J. No. 2097 (QL), 2010 CarswellBC 3446, affirming a decision of Dillon J., 2008 BCSC 264, 81 B.C.L.R. (4th) 107, 62 C.H.R.R. D/289,  10 W.W.R. 518,  B.C.J. No. 348 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 388, reversing a decision of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, 2005 BCHRT 580, 54 C.H.R.R. D/245,  B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580 (QL), 2005 CarswellBC 3573. Appeal substantially allowed.
Frances M. Kelly and Devyn Cousineau, for the appellant.
Leah Greathead and E. W. (Heidi) Hughes, for the respondent Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, as represented by the Ministry of Education.
Laura N. Bakan, Q.C., David J. Bell and Kristal M. Low, for the respondent the Board of Education of School District No. 44 (North Vancouver), formerly known as The Board of School Trustees of School District No. 44 (North Vancouver).
Robert E. Charney and Sarah Kraicer, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Andrea Luey, for the intervener Justice for Children and Youth.
Diane MacDonald and Robyn Trask, for the intervener the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation.
Written submissions only by Gwen Brodsky, Yvonne Peters and Melina Buckley, for the intervener the Council of Canadians with Disabilities.
Anthony D. Griffin, for the interveners the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and the Alberta Human Rights Commission.
Rahool P. Agarwal, Christopher W. Cummins and Rowan E. Weaver, for the intervener the International Dyslexia Association, Ontario Branch.
Brian Smith and Philippe Dufresne, for the intervener the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
Yude M. Henteleff, Q.C., and Darla L. Rettie, for the intervener the Learning Disabilities Association of Canada.
Ranjan K. Agarwal and Daniel Holden, for the intervener the Canadian Constitution Foundation.
Written submissions only by Isha Khan, for the intervener the Manitoba Human Rights Commission.
Alison Dewar, for the intervener the West Coast Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund.
Roberto Lattanzio and Laurie Letheren, for the intervener the Canadian Association for Community Living.
Athanassia Bitzakidis, for the intervener Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse.
Denise E. Paluck, for the intervener the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal.
Nicholas McHaffie and Sarah Clarke, for the intervener the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada.
 Abella J. — This case is about the education of Jeffrey Moore, a child with a severe learning disability who claims that he was discriminated against because the intense remedial instruction he needed in his early school years for his dyslexia was not available in the public school system. Based on the recommendation of a school psychologist, Jeffrey’s parents enrolled him in specialized private schools in Grade 4 and paid the necessary tuition. The remedial instruction he received was successful and his reading ability improved significantly.
 Jeffrey’s father, Frederick Moore, filed a human rights complaint against the School District and the British Columbia Ministry of Education alleging that Jeffrey had been discriminated against because of his disability and had been denied a “service . . . customarily available to the public”, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (“Code”).
 The Human Rights Tribunal held 43 days of hearings, receiving evidence about the funding and administration of special education in the District and Province, the District’s budgetary constraints at the relevant time, dyslexia generally, and Jeffrey’s circumstances in particular.
 The Tribunal concluded that the failure of the public school system to give Jeffrey the support he needed to have meaningful access to the educational opportunities offered by the Board, amounted to discrimination under the Code. I agree.
 The preamble to the School Act, the operative legislation when Jeffrey was in school, stated that “the purpose of the British Columbia school system is to enable all learners to develop their individual potential and to acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to contribute to a healthy, democratic and pluralistic society and a prosperous and sustainable economy”. This declaration of purpose is an acknowledgment by the government that the reason all children are entitled to an education, is because a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution. Adequate special education, therefore, is not a dispensable luxury. For those with severe learning disabilities, it is the ramp that provides access to the statutory commitment to education made to all children in British Columbia.
 At the relevant time, public school funding in British Columbia was approved annually by the Province but administered by districts under the School Act. As of the 1990/91 school year, the Province instituted a block funding system, whereby an overall amount of money was made available for education and then allocated among the various districts by the Minister. The block amount, as determined in the base year, was adjusted annually to allow for changes in enrolment, mandated services, and economic indicators such as changes in the cost of resources. For a short period, the Province provided equalization grants to ease the transition for districts which had historically earned significant supplementary funds through local taxation.
 For the purposes of funding special education, the Province classified students into various groups, including what it referred to as “high incidence/low cost” and “low incidence/high cost” programs. Severe learning disabilities like dyslexia were always treated as a high incidence/low cost disability. From 1987/88, the Province capped the specific funding that was available for high incidence/low cost students to a percentage of a district’s student population in order to control the increasing number of students qualifying for this supplementary funding. Notably, as of 1991, the School Act set out minimum spending levels for high incidence/low cost and low incidence/high cost students. That meant that once a child was identified as having a severe learning disability, additional support was mandatory. As a result, districts were required to draw on the general provincial allocation to fund any high incidence/low cost students above the high incidence/low cost cap.
 When Jeffrey entered kindergarten in 1991, students with special needs in the District were supported in several ways: they received assistance in and out of the classroom from special education Aides; they were referred to the school-based Learning Assistance Centre where they would work with learning assistance teachers or tutors; and a small number of them were placed in the Diagnostic Centre for more intensive assistance.
 Following the implementation of the block funding model, there were significant financial pressures on Jeffrey’s home district, School District No. 44. From 1991/92 to 1994/95, the District consistently faced budgetary shortfalls. It had relied on supplementary funds in the past and received declining equalization grants until 1992/93. Despite requests, it did not get additional funding from the Province but got permission to run temporary deficits. Consistent deficits during this period led to wide-scale budget cuts in the District between 1991/92 and 1994/95, including a reduction of almost $1.5 million in spending for high incidence/low cost students with learning disabilities.
 In the 1994/95 budgetary process, possible solutions to the financial difficulties included restricting the availability of Aides or closing the District Diagnostic Centre, a program which provided intensive services and individualized assistance to students with severe learning disabilities. The District limited its cuts to Aide allocation because of the terms of its Collective Agreement with the teachers’ association, which required a minimum of two hours a week of Aide time once a student was designated as being in a high incidence/low cost category. Other proposed cuts were implemented, including the closing of the Diagnostic Centre in 1994. In February 1996, the Province fired the Board of the District and replaced it with an Official Trustee.
 Jeffrey Moore started kindergarten in September 1991 at Braemar Elementary School, his North Vancouver neighbourhood school in the District. While he was happy and energetic in nursery school, it quickly became apparent in kindergarten that Jeffrey needed extra support to learn to read. After scoring low on a screening test, Jeffrey was referred to the Elementary Learning Resource Team, a group of specialists who provided support and assistance to students in the District who had severe learning disabilities, including dyslexia.
 After his first assessment in kindergarten, Jeffrey was observed in the classroom and given 15 minutes of individual help from an Aide three times a week. He was assessed twice by the Elementary Learning Resource Team in Grade 1 because he continued to fall behind in literacy skills. He started attending the Learning Assistance Centre three times a week, for half-hour individual sessions with Barbara Waigh, a learning assistance teacher. He also had two 40-minute sessions in the Learning Assistance Centre with a volunteer tutor. Because he still made poor progress, Jeffrey’s parents, at the school’s recommendation, hired a private tutor to work with Jeffrey.
 In January 1994, while Jeffrey was in Grade 2, his parents, concerned about his worsening headaches, took him to a neurologist. They were told that Jeffrey was under significant stress which could be improved by addressing his learning difficulties. The next month, Jeffrey was again referred to the Elementary Learning Resource Team, with his teachers reporting slow academic progress and immature behaviour. He received a full psycho-educational assessment on April 1, 1994, a prerequisite to his designation as a Severe Learning Disabilities student. Following the assessment, Mary Tennant, a psychologist employed by the District, concluded that Jeffrey needed more intensive remediation than he had been receiving and suggested that he attend the Diagnostic Centre.
 Ms. Tennant, Ms. Waigh, and Bryn Roberts, Braemar’s principal, met with the Moores soon after this assessment. Ms. Tennant and Ms. Waigh told the Moores that because the Diagnostic Centre was being closed, Jeffrey could not obtain the intensive remediation he needed in the District’s public schools. The necessary instruction was available only at Kenneth Gordon School, a private school specializing in teaching children who had learning disabilities.
 Jeffrey could not enrol in Kenneth Gordon School until Grade 4. His pre-referral form to that school confirmed a serious lack of progress in reading and spelling as well as his poor self-esteem. Every week during Grade 3 at Braemar, he received two 30-minute sessions of individual assistance in the Learning Assistance Centre, two 40-minute periods of individual assistance with a tutor in the Learning Assistance Centre, and four 40-minute sessions with an Aide, primarily in the classroom.
 Jeffrey attended Kenneth Gordon School from Grade 4 to Grade 7. When he left, he was reading at a Grade 5 level and was at Grade 7 level in math. He began Grade 8 in September 1999 at Fraser Academy, another private school specializing in children with learning disabilities. He remained there until the time of the hearing and eventually completed high school there.
 The Tribunal chair, Heather MacNaughton, found that there was general agreement among the experts about the significant, negative long-term consequences for students with unremediated learning disabilities. The experts also agreed that children with reading disabilities should be identified early and provided with intensive supports.
 Based on this evidence, the Tribunal concluded that a range of services was necessary for these students, from a modified program within the classroom to full-time placement in a special program for Severe Learning Disabilities students.
 The Tribunal accepted the evidence of experts and of District employees like Ms. Tennant that Jeffrey could not get sufficient services within the District after the closure of the Diagnostic Centre in 1994. Only one expert, who was called by the District, said that Jeffrey had received the services he needed at his public school and that the interventions had been of appropriate intensity.
 The Tribunal concluded that there was both individual discrimination against Jeffrey and systemic discrimination against Severe Learning Disabilities students in general. It grounded its finding of discrimination against Jeffrey in the District’s failure to assess Jeffrey’s learning disability early, and to provide appropriately intensive instruction following the closing of the Diagnostic Centre. It ordered that the Moores be reimbursed for the costs related to Jeffrey’s attendance at private schools, as well as $10,000 in damages for pain and suffering.
 The finding of systemic discrimination against the District was based on the underfunding of Severe Learning Disabilities programs and the closing of the Diagnostic Centre. While accepting that the District’s financial circumstances were compelling, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence that the District had considered any reasonable alternatives for meeting the needs of Severe Learning Disabilities students before cutting available services such as the Diagnostic Centre.
 The Tribunal’s finding of systemic discrimination against the Province was based on what it identified as four problems in the provincial administration of special education: the high incidence/low cost cap; the underfunding of the District; the failure to ensure that necessary services, including early intervention, were mandatory; and the failure to monitor the activities of the districts. It ordered a wide range of sweeping systemic remedies against both the District and the Province.
 In the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Dillon J. allowed the application for judicial review ( 10 W.W.R. 518). She found that Jeffrey’s situation should be compared to other special needs students, not to the general student population as the Tribunal had done. There was no evidence about this comparison, nor was there evidence about how students with special needs were affected by funding mechanisms such as the high incidence/low cost cap or the closing of the Diagnostic Centre. The failure to identify and compare Jeffrey with the appropriate comparator group tainted the entire discrimination analysis. As a result, she set aside the Tribunal’s decision.
 A majority in the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Jeffrey ought to be compared to other special needs students ( 3 W.W.R. 383). To compare him with the general student population was to invite an inquiry into general education policy and its application, which it concluded could not be the purpose of a human rights complaint.
 In dissent, Rowles J.A. would have allowed the appeal. In her view, special education was the means by which “meaningful access” to educational services was achievable by students with learning disabilities. She found that a comparator analysis was both unnecessary and inappropriate. The Tribunal’s detailed evidentiary analysis showing that Jeffrey had not received sufficiently intensive remediation after the closing of the Diagnostic Centre, justified the findings of discrimination.
 Section 8 of British Columbia’s Human Rights Code states that it is discriminatory if “[a] person . . . without a bona fide and reasonable justification, . . . den[ies] to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public” on the basis of a prohibited ground. That means that if a service is ordinarily provided to the public, it must be available in a way that does not arbitrarily — or unjustifiably — exclude individuals by virtue of their membership in a protected group.
 A central issue throughout these proceedings was what the relevant “service . . . customarily available to the public” was. While the Tribunal and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal defined it as “general” education, the reviewing judge and the majority defined it as “special” education.
 The answer, to me, is that the ‘service’ is education generally. Defining the service only as ‘special education’ would relieve the Province and District of their duty to ensure that no student is excluded from the benefit of the education system by virtue of their disability.
 To define ‘special education’ as the service at issue also risks descending into the kind of “separate but equal” approach which was majestically discarded in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Comparing Jeffrey only with other special needs students would mean that the District could cut all special needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination. It is not a question of who else is or is not experiencing similar barriers. This formalism was one of the potential dangers of comparator groups identified in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 396.
 If Jeffrey is compared only to other special needs students, full consideration cannot be given to whether he had genuine access to the education that all students in British Columbia are entitled to. This, as Rowles J.A. noted, “risks perpetuating the very disadvantage and exclusion from mainstream society the Code is intended to remedy” (see Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,  1 S.C.R. 1219, at p. 1237; Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day and Yvonne Peters, Accommodation in the 21st Century (2012) (online), at p. 41).
 A majority of students do not require intensive remediation in order to learn to read. Jeffrey does. He was unable to get it in the public school. Was that an unjustified denial of meaningful access to the general education to which students in British Columbia are entitled and, as a result, discrimination?
 As the Tribunal properly recognized, to demonstrate prima facie discrimination, complainants are required to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of the exemptions available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be justified, discrimination will be found to occur.
 The answer is informed by the mandate and objectives of public education in British Columbia during the relevant period. As with many public services, educational policies often contemplate that students will achieve certain results. But the fact that a particular student has not achieved a given result does not end the inquiry. In some cases, the government may well have done what was necessary to give the student access to the service, yet the hoped-for results did not follow. Moreover, policy documents tend to be aspirational in nature, and may not reflect realistic objectives. A margin of deference is, as a result, owed to governments and administrators in implementing these broad, aspirational policies.
 But if the evidence demonstrates that the government failed to deliver the mandate and objectives of public education such that a given student was denied meaningful access to the service based on a protected ground, this will justify a finding of prima facie discrimination.
 As previously noted, the mandate and objectives for public education during the relevant period were set out in the School Act, which stated in its preamble that “the purpose of the British Columbia school system is to enable all learners to develop their individual potential and to acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to contribute to a healthy, democratic and pluralistic society and a prosperous and sustainable economy”. A related policy document, the 1989 Mandate for the School System, O.I.C. 1280/89, said that the government was “responsible for ensuring that all of our youth have the opportunity to obtain high quality schooling that will assist in the development of an educated society” (p. D-96). The Mandate said that schools should develop students who are, among other things, “thoughtful, able to learn and to think critically . . . can communicate information from a broad knowledge base . . . [are] creative, flexible, self-motivated . . . have a positive self image . . . [are] capable of making independent decisions . . . [are] skilled and . . . can contribute to society generally, including the world of work” (p. D-96).
 There were divergent views when Jeffrey was in school about how “special needs” students could best be educated. The Province’s “Special Programs: A Manual of Policies, Procedures and Guidelines” (“1985 Manual”) contemplated a “cascade” model of service delivery, where a “range” of placements would be available, including a “very highly specialized” education environment for a small number of students (ss. 4.1 and 4.2). The predominant policy in the 1985 Manual, however, was the integration of special needs students into the general classroom whenever possible.
 Notably, however, the 1985 Manual said that “[s]pecial education shares the basic purpose of all education: the optimal development of individuals as skillful, free, and purposeful persons, able to plan and manage life and to realize highest potential as individuals and as members of society” (s. 3.1 (emphasis added)). It added that “[a]ll children should be afforded opportunities to develop their full potential” (s. 3.1 (emphasis in original)).
 These education goals in British Columbia informed the Tribunal’s conclusion that the District did not take the necessary steps to give Jeffrey the education to which he was entitled. Prima facie discrimination was made out based, in essence, on two factors: the failure by the District to assess Jeffrey at an earlier stage; and the insufficiently intensive remediation provided by the District for Jeffrey’s learning disability in order for him to get access to the education he was entitled to. Only the second is in issue before us, since the conclusions about early assessment which were quashed by the reviewing court, were not appealed to this Court. That leaves only the issue of the sufficiency of the services given to Jeffrey by the District.
 There is no doubt that Jeffrey received some special education assistance until Grade 3, but in my view the Tribunal’s conclusion that the remediation was far from adequate to give Jeffrey the education to which he was entitled, was fully supported by the evidence. To start, the Tribunal found that the Moores were told by District employees that Jeffrey required intensive remediation which, as a result of the closing of the Diagnostic Centre, would only be available outside of the public school system. After Jeffrey’s psycho-educational assessment in April 1994, Ms. Tennant concluded that he “needed more intensive remediation than he had been receiving”, and recommended that he be considered for the Diagnostic Centre program. The Tribunal accepted the Moores’ evidence that at a meeting with Ms. Tennant after this assessment, they were advised that since the Diagnostic Centre was not an option as a result of its pending closing, Kenneth Gordon School “was the only alternative that would provide the intense remediation that Jeffrey required”.
Ms. Tennant described Jeffrey’s case as one of the worst she had ever seen in her many years of experience. According to her, Jeffrey needed a high degree of intensive one-on-one instruction in a setting designed to minimize distractions. Her opinion was that Jeffrey needed intensive remediation which, in the District, was only offered by the [Diagnostic Centre].
 The Tribunal found that when the decision to close the Diagnostic Centre was made, the District did so without knowing how the needs of students like Jeffrey would be addressed, and without “undertak[ing] a needs-based analysis, consider[ing] what might replace [Diagnostic Centre], or assess[ing] the effect of the closure on [Severe Learning Disabilities] students”. The Tribunal noted that at the Board meeting on April 26, 1994, when the budget closing the Diagnostic Centre was approved, the Minutes stated that “[a]ll Trustees indicated in this discussion that they were adopting the bylaw as it was required by legislation and not because they believed it met the needs of the students.” It concluded that Dr. Robin Brayne, the District’s Superintendent of Schools, and the District in general “did not know how many students would be affected” by the closure. In fact, on the day of the Board vote, the District’s Assistant Superintendent and the Coordinator of Student Services informed Dr. Brayne that it was “too early to know precisely how the needs of high incidence students will be addressed in the absence of the Diagnostic Centre”.
 Nor did the District consult Ms. Waigh or Ms. Tennant, despite their role in providing services to Severe Learning Disabilities students and their opposition to the closure. It was only at the end of June 1994, more than two months after the decision to close the Diagnostic Centre, that Dr. Brayne requested the development of a policy document to set out the District’s plan for addressing the needs of Severe Learning Disabilities students in the absence of the Diagnostic Centre. The policy document was to be discussed in August, with training planned for the fall and winter of 1994/95. As a result, the Tribunal concluded that “nothing was in place in September when schools opened, other than what the schools already provided”.
 Moreover, the Tribunal rejected the District’s argument that the educational philosophy of integration was “a consideration” in the closure of the Diagnostic Centre, since “[i]t was clear from the evidence of all of the District’s witnesses that they thought the [Diagnostic Centre] provided a useful service.” It noted that Dr. Brayne admitted in cross-examination that the closure was not motivated by educational policy, and acknowledged that “without [the Diagnostic Centre], the range of options available to [Severe Learning Disabilities] students was reduced [and] according to the 1985 Manual, [the remaining resources] were not intended for [Severe Learning Disabilities] students”. As a result, based on “the evidence, the concurrent memoranda, and the speed at which the decision was made”, the Tribunal concluded that “the sole reason for the closure was financial” (emphasis added).
 The Tribunal was cognizant of the deference it owed to the District in delivering educational services, and the fact that Jeffrey’s needs could have been met by means other than the Diagnostic Centre. In brief, the Tribunal found that when the decision to close the Diagnostic Centre was made, the District’s motivations were exclusively financial, and it had failed to consider the consequences or plan for alternate accommodations.
 This failure was crucial in light of the expert evidence that intensive supports were needed generally to remedy Jeffrey’s learning disability, and that he had not received the support he needed in the public school system. The Tribunal acknowledged that it was impossible to compare Jeffrey’s current abilities to what he might have achieved if he had received earlier and more intensive services. But while the failure to obtain a given result did not in itself constitute adverse treatment, the Tribunal accepted the evidence of two experts who, after examining Jeffrey, found that he “would have benefited from more intensive remediation earlier and from attending at the [Diagnostic Centre]”.
 It was therefore the combination of the clear recognition by the District, its employees and the experts that Jeffrey required intensive remediation in order to have meaningful access to education, the closing of the Diagnostic Centre, and the fact that the Moores were told that these services could not otherwise be provided by the District, that justified the Tribunal’s conclusion that the failure of the District to meet Jeffrey’s educational needs constituted prima facie discrimination. In my view, this conclusion is amply supported by the record.
 The next question is whether the District’s conduct was justified. At this stage in the analysis, it must be shown that alternative approaches were investigated (British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU,  3 S.C.R. 3 (“Meiorin”), at para. 65). The prima facie discriminatory conduct must also be “reasonably necessary” in order to accomplish a broader goal (Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke,  1 S.C.R. 202, at p. 208; Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud,  2 S.C.R. 970, at p. 984). In other words, an employer or service provider must show “that it could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact on the individual” (Meiorin, at para. 38; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission),  2 S.C.R. 489, at pp. 518-19; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., at para. 130).
 The District’s justification centred on the budgetary crisis it faced during the relevant period, which led to the closure of the Diagnostic Centre and other related cuts. There is no doubt that the District was facing serious financial constraints. Nor is there any doubt that this is a relevant consideration. It is undoubtedly difficult for administrators to implement education policy in the face of severe fiscal limitations, but accommodation is not a question of “mere efficiency”, since “[i]t will always seem demonstrably cheaper to maintain the status quo and not eliminate a discriminatory barrier” (VIA Rail, at para. 225).
 In Jeffrey’s case, the Tribunal accepted that the District faced financial difficulties during the relevant period. Yet it also found that cuts were disproportionably made to special needs programs. Despite their similar cost, the District retained some discretionary programs, such as the Outdoor School — an outdoor campus where students learned about community and the environment — while eliminating the Diagnostic Centre. As Rowles J.A. noted, “without undermining the educational value of the Outdoor School, such specialized and discretionary initiatives cannot be compared with the accommodations necessary in order to make the core curriculum accessible to severely learning disabled students” (para. 154).
The failure to consider financial alternatives completely undermines what is, in essence, the District’s argument, namely that it was justified in providing no meaningful access to an education for Jeffrey because it had no economic choice. In order to decide that it had no other choice, it had at least to consider what those other choices were.
 Given the Tribunal’s findings that the District had other options for addressing its budgetary crisis, its conclusion that the District’s conduct was not justified should not be disturbed. The finding of discrimination is thereby confirmed.
 This brings us to the Province’s role. The District’s budgetary crisis was created, at least in part, by the Province’s funding shortfalls. But in light of the Tribunal’s finding that it was the District which failed to properly consider the consequences of closing the Diagnostic Centre or how to accommodate the affected students, it seems to me that the conclusion that the Province was liable for the District’s discriminatory conduct towards Jeffrey cannot be sustained.
 This leads to considering the remedies imposed by the Tribunal which have been appealed to this Court. A remedial decision by the Tribunal is subject to a standard of patent unreasonableness according to s. 59 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45.
 The Tribunal awarded the Moores the amount of tuition paid for Jeffrey to attend Kenneth Gordon School and Fraser Academy, up to and including Grade 12, half of the costs incurred for his transportation to and from those schools, and $10,000 for “the injury to [Jeffrey’s] dignity, feelings and self-respect”. This order, it seems to me, is sustainable given the actual scope of the complaint.
• That the Province allocate funding on the basis of actual incidence levels, establish mechanisms ensuring that accommodations for Severe Learning Disabilities students are appropriate and meet the stated goals in legislation and policies, and ensure that districts have a range of services to meet the needs of Severe Learning Disabilities students.
• That the District establish mechanisms to ensure that its delivery of services to Severe Learning Disabilities students meet the stated goals in legislation and policies, and ensure that it had a range of services to meet the needs of Severe Learning Disabilities students.
• The Tribunal remained seized of the matter to oversee the implementation of its remedial orders.
 Having first found that Jeffrey had suffered discrimination at the hands of the District, the Tribunal then considered whether the broader policies of the District and the Province constituted systemic discrimination. I think this flows from the fact that it approached discrimination in a binary way: individual and systemic. It was, however, neither necessary nor conceptually helpful to divide discrimination into these two discrete categories. A practice is discriminatory whether it has an unjustifiably adverse impact on a single individual or systemically on several: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The only difference is quantitative, that is, the number of people disadvantaged by the practice.
 In Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),  1 S.C.R. 1114, this Court first identified ‘systemic discrimination’ by name. It defined it as “practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics” (p. 1138). Notably, however, the designation did not change the analysis. The considerations and evidence at play in a group complaint may undoubtedly differ from those in an individual complaint, but the focus is always on whether the complainant has suffered arbitrary adverse effects based on a prohibited ground.
 The inquiry is into whether there is discrimination, period. The question in every case is the same: does the practice result in the claimant suffering arbitrary — or unjustified — barriers on the basis of his or her membership in a protected group. Where it does, discrimination will be established.
 It is true that before Meiorin and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights),  3 S.C.R. 868 (“Grismer”), different remedial approaches had been applied for direct versus adverse impact discrimination. But in Meiorin, McLachlin J. observed that since few rules are framed in directly discriminatory terms, the human rights issue will generally be whether the claimant has suffered adverse effects. Insightfully, she commented that upholding a remedial distinction between direct and adverse effect discrimination “may, in practice, serve to legitimize systemic discrimination” (para. 39). The Meiorin/Grismer approach imposed a unified remedial theory with two aspects: the removal of arbitrary barriers to participation by a group, and the requirement to take positive steps to remedy the adverse impact of neutral practices.
 Meiorin and Grismer also directed that practices that are neutral on their face but have an unjustifiable adverse impact based on prohibited grounds will be subject to a requirement to “accommodate the characteristics of affected groups within their standards, rather than maintaining discriminatory standards supplemented by accommodation for those who cannot meet them” (Grismer, at para. 19).
 In that sense, it is certainly true that a remedy for an individual claimant can have a ‘systemic’ impact. In Grismer, for example, the issue was a rule that excluded individuals with a medical condition affecting peripheral vision — homonymous hemianopia — from obtaining a drivers’ licence. The Court concluded that this rule had a discriminatory impact on Mr. Grismer and upheld the Tribunal’s order that the Superintendent test Mr. Grismer individually. Although the remedy was individual to Mr. Grismer, it clearly had remedial consequences for others in his circumstances. Similarly, a finding that Jeffrey suffered discrimination and was entitled to a consequential personal remedy, has clear broad remedial repercussions for how other students with severe learning disabilities are educated.
 But the remedy must flow from the claim. In this case, the claim was made on behalf of Jeffrey, and the evidence giving concrete support to the claim all centred on him. While the Tribunal was certainly entitled to consider systemic evidence in order to determine whether Jeffrey had suffered discrimination, it was unnecessary for it to hold an extensive inquiry into the precise format of the provincial funding mechanism or the entire provincial administration of special education in order to determine whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The Tribunal, with great respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is before it, not a Royal Commission.
 The connection between the high incidence/low cost cap and the closure of the Diagnostic Centre is remote, given the range of factors that led to the District’s budgetary crisis. There is no particular reason to think that these funding mechanisms could not be retained in some form while still ensuring that Severe Learning Disabilities students receive adequate support. It is entirely legitimate for the Province to choose a block funding mechanism in order to ensure that districts do not have an incentive to over-report Severe Learning Disabilities students, so long as it also complies with its human rights obligations. In other words, while systemic evidence can be instrumental in establishing a human rights complaint, the evidence about the provincial funding regime, and the high incidence/low cost cap in particular, was too remote to demonstrate discrimination against Jeffrey. And the Tribunal’s orders that the District establish mechanisms to ensure that accommodations for Severe Learning Disabilities students meet the stated goals in legislation and policies, and provide a range of services to meet their needs, in any event, essentially direct the District to comply with the Human Rights Code. They are, to that extent, redundant.
 Moreover, the Tribunal’s order that it remain seized of the matter to oversee implementation is hardly suited to a claim brought on behalf of an individual student who has finished his high school education and will not re-enter the public school system. It goes without saying that if the District is to avoid similar claims such as those Jeffrey brought, it will have to ensure that it provides a range of services for special needs students in accordance with the School Act and its related policies. There is no remaining need for the Tribunal to remain seized of the matter in order to satisfy Jeffrey’s claim.
 In fairness to the Tribunal, I think the fact that the scope of the inquiry and the resulting remedial orders were expanded beyond Jeffrey’s actual complaints can be traced to the unusual procedural history of this case. Frederick Moore’s initial complaints under s. 8 alleged that the District and the Province had failed to identify Jeffrey’s disability early enough and failed to provide him with sufficient support to enable him to access public education. He also complained that the District and the Province had failed to properly fund, support and monitor special education throughout the Province.
 In a preliminary decision on the scope of the complaint and the required disclosure, a Tribunal member allowed the Moores to lead systemic evidence establishing the complaint. However, she properly noted that “[a]lthough systemic discrimination does not have to be specifically pleaded, it must relate to the complaint as framed by the Complainant” (emphasis added). This, I think, was a clear direction to the Tribunal hearing the merits of the case that while systemic evidence could be helpful, the claim should remain centred on Jeffrey.
 But the issue was complicated on judicial review where, in upholding this preliminary decision, Shaw J. said that the complaint “includes allegations of province-wide systemic discrimination by the Ministry against dyslexic students” ((2001), 88 B.C.L.R. (3d) 343 (emphasis added)). This does not appear to have been challenged before the Tribunal, and I think it was on this basis that the Tribunal appears to have departed from the actual focus of the complaint — Jeffrey — and imposed systemic remedies based on its systemic conclusions.
 This does not in any way detract, however, from the cogency of the Tribunal’s core analysis. Its finding of discrimination against Jeffrey Moore by the District should be upheld, as should the individual orders, which reimburse the Moores for the cost of private schooling and award them damages. These orders properly seek to compensate them for the harm that Jeffrey suffered and were well within the Tribunal’s broad remedial authority. Given my earlier comments on the liability of the Province, however, the order for reimbursement and damages should apply only against the District. I would, however, set aside the remaining orders.
 The appeal is therefore substantially allowed as discussed, with costs to the Moores throughout since they were successful in upholding the central finding that there was discrimination.
Appeal substantially allowed with costs throughout.
Solicitor for the appellant: Community Legal Assistance Society, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the respondent Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, as represented by the Ministry of Education: Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.
Solicitors for the respondent the Board of Education of School District No. 44 (North Vancouver), formerly known as The Board of School Trustees of School District No. 44 (North Vancouver): Guild Yule, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener Justice for Children and Youth: Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation: British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, Vancouver.
Solicitors for the intervener the Council of Canadians with Disabilities: Camp Fiorante Matthews, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the interveners the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and the Alberta Human Rights Commission: Ontario Human Rights Commission, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the International Dyslexia Association, Ontario Branch: Norton Rose Canada, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Canadian Human Rights Commission: Canadian Human Rights Commission, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener the Learning Disabilities Association of Canada: Pitblado, Winnipeg.
Solicitors for the intervener the Canadian Constitution Foundation: Bennett Jones, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the intervener the Manitoba Human Rights Commission: Manitoba Human Rights Commission, Winnipeg.
Solicitor for the intervener the West Coast Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund: West Coast Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener the Canadian Association for Community Living: ARCH Disability Law Centre, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse: Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Montréal.
Solicitor for the intervener the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, Vancouver.
Solicitors for the intervener the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada: Stikeman Elliott, Ottawa.
 S.B.C. 1989, c. 61, as amended in 1993 (School Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1993, c. 6).

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The Professional Standards Board, acting in consultation and cooperation with the Delaware Department of Education ("Department"), developed amendments to 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit. The regulation applies to the issuance of a paraeducator permit pursuant to 14 Del.C. §1205(b). On August 1, 2018, the Professional Standards Board published proposed changes. The Professional Standards Board did not receive any written submittals concerning the changes that were published on August 1, 2018. However, the Professional Standards Board, in consultation and cooperation with the Department, made additional substantive changes, including adding definitions of the terms "DEEDS" and "PDMS" to Section 2.0; adding subsections 3.1.3.1, 4.1.3.1, and 5.1.3.1 concerning the requirements for paraeducators whose permits have expired more than one time; clarifying the requirements for renewal in Section 7.0; and clarifying the language concerning professional development transcripts in subsection 8.2. This regulation includes the changes that were published on August 1, 2018 and the additional changes.
Notice of the proposed regulation was published in the Register of Regulations on October 1, 2018. The Professional Standards Board received written submittals from Ann C. Fisher, the Chairperson of the Governor's Advisory Council for Exceptional Citizens ("GACEC"), and Nicholas J. Fina, Ed.D., the Chairperson of the State Council for Persons with Disabilities ("SCPD").
GACEC commented that the last sentence in subsection 3.2.1.2 "seems to imply that the standards are fluid and may be different from one applicant to the next." Both GACEC and SCPD commented that the language "engaged in misconduct" in subsections 3.1.1, 4.1.1, and 5.1.1 is not defined. SCPD commented that the proposed regulation "may prevent people with petty criminal backgrounds[, such as marijuana possession,] from obtaining permits." GACEC and SCPD each commented that the proposed regulation eliminates when permit applications will be denied or revoked and the hearing rights for an individual whose permit application has been denied or whose permit has been revoked.
On November 1, 2018, the Professional Standards Board considered GACEC's and SCPD's written submittals. The Professional Standards Board found that the language in subsection 3.2.1.2, which is existing language, is in place to help ensure that an applicant's ParaPro Assessment score is sent from a legitimate source, i.e., the test provider, ETS, and that the language provides that the Department with the discretion to accept documentation of an applicant's score if it is in an unopened, unaltered envelope. In addition, the Professional Standards Board found that misconduct is defined in a statute (14 Del.C. §1218), it includes pleading guilty or nolo contendere with respect to, or being convicted of, a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance classified as such in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of 16 Del.C. Ch. 47, and marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance under Title 16. The Professional Standards Board is charged with working in conjunction with the Department to develop a system of professional development, professional standards, licensure, and certification that serves to continually improve the quality of instruction for Delaware's children. The Professional Standards Board also found that denial of an application; suspension, limitation, and revocation of a permit; and hearings are addressed in other regulations in 14 DE Admin. Code Ch. 1500 Professional Standards Board.
On November 1, 2018, the Professional Standards Board found that further changes in response to the written submittals were not necessary and voted to propose 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit, in the form that was published, for adoption by the Department subject to the State Board of Education's approval.
The Department finds that the language in subsection 3.2.1.2 is existing language that provides the Department with the discretion to accept documentation of an applicant's ParaPro Assessment score if it is in an unopened, unaltered envelope. Additionally, the Department finds that misconduct is defined in 14 Del.C. §1218, it includes pleading guilty or nolo contendere with respect to, or being convicted of, a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance classified as such in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of 16 Del.C. Ch. 47, and marijuana is classified as a Title 16 Schedule I controlled substance. Also, the Department finds that denial of an application; suspension, limitation, and revocation of a permit; and hearings are addressed in other regulations in 14 DE Admin. Code Ch. 1500 Professional Standards Board.
The Department finds that further changes in response to the written submittals are not necessary. Additionally, the Department finds that the proposed regulation is necessary to implement 14 Del.C. Ch. 12 and is designed to improve the quality of the Delaware paraeducator workforce and to improve student performance. Accordingly, the Department finds that it is appropriate to amend 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit.
For the foregoing reasons, the Department concludes that it is appropriate to amend 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit subject to the State Board of Education's approval. Therefore, pursuant to 14 Del.C. §§1203 and 1205(b), 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is hereby amended.
The text of 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit adopted hereby shall be in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and said regulation shall be cited as 14 DE Admin. Code 1517 Paraeducator Permit in the Administrative Code of Regulations for the Department of Education.
The actions hereinabove referred to were taken by the Department pursuant to 14 Del.C. §§1203 and 1205(b) on December 20, 2018. The effective date of this Order shall be ten (10) days from the date this Order is published in the Register of Regulations.
IT IS SO ORDERED the 20th day of December, 2018.
Approved this 20th day of December, 2018.
This regulation shall apply to the issuance of a Paraeducator Permit, paraprofessional qualifications and training pursuant to 14 Del.C. §1205(a)(b). This Permit is required of Title I Paraeducators, Instructional Paraeducators, and Service Paraeducators who are employed, either full time or part time, in support positions in public schools. This Permit is required of all Paraeducators, regardless of their employment date.
"Action Research" means a process by which educational issues and problems are identified and researched at either the school or the classroom level. By integrating current research into these settings and engaging the relevant educators in research activities, the findings can be applied immediately to solve the targeted problems more quickly.
"Activity Documentation Form" means the official form approved by the Department that includes specific details about the activity to be used for Permit renewal and the signature of an instructional leader within a school, district or charter school the applicant is responsible to.
"A Product Shall Be Made Available for Verification" means that the culminating, tangible result of the Professional Development activity is accessible by the individual signing the certificate of participation or the Activity Documentation Form. Examples of a product include, but are not limited to, standards-based assessments or curriculum, copies of a presentation or other substantial work as a result of Action Research.
"Associate's Degree" means an academic degree awarded for the successful completion of a program of studies that usually requires at least 2 years or the equivalent thereof of full-time college-level study.
“Associate's or Higher Degree” means that the degree is conferred by a regionally accredited institution of higher education or by a distance education institution that is regionally accredited, or any other accrediting agency the Delaware Secretary of Education deems within his or her discretion, to be reliable or equivalent to a regional accrediting agency.
"Clock Hour" means actual time spent in Professional Development, not credit hours.
“Completed at Least 2 Years of Study at an Institution of Higher Education” means the satisfactory completion of a minimum of sixty (60) semester hours of instruction at a regionally accredited institution of higher education or by a distance education institution that is regionally accredited, or any other accrediting agency the Delaware Secretary of Education deems within his or her discretion, to be reliable or equivalent to a regional accrediting agency, in general or educational studies, including reading, writing, and mathematics content and pedagogy, unless the institution of higher education defines two (2) years of full time study as the successful completion of a minimum of forty-eight (48) semester hours, and provides documentation of such definition.
“DEEDS” means the Delaware Educator Data System.
"Educational Project" means an individual professional growth project of 15 or more Clock Hours, including a research project not related to a course for which credit is claimed, completed to enhance the individual's professional practice, with the development of a final product or report.
“Immorality” means conduct which is inconsistent with the rules and principles of morality expected of an educator or paraeducator and may reasonably be found to impair an educator’s or paraeducator’s effectiveness by reason of his or her unfitness or otherwise.
“Instructional Paraeducator” means a public school employee who provides one-on-one or small group instruction; assists with classroom management or individual student behavior; provides assistance in a computer laboratory; provides support in a library or media center; assists in training and support with functional skill activities, such as personal care or assistive technology; or provides instructional services to students under the direct supervision of a teacher. Instructional Paraeducators are those working with regular education students and students with disabilities in schools other than Title I schoolwide schools or with students not receiving Title I services in Title I targeted assistance schools.
“Paraeducator”, as used herein, means a paraprofessional, as it is defined in 14 Del.C. §1202(10) and as it is used in 14 Del.C. §1205(b). Paraeducators are not "educators" within the meaning of 14 Del.C. §1202(4)(6).
“PDMS” means Professional Development Management System.
“Permit” means a document issued by the Department that verifies an individual's qualifications and training to serve as a Title I, Instructional, or Service Paraeducator.
"Planned Professional Development Program" means a structured program within a building, district or charter school that has been specifically identified through a success plan. Such programs shall be designed to enhance knowledge and skills that promote continuous professional growth and improve student performance.
"Presentation" means preparation and presentation as a workshop or conference presenter or course instructor on a topic related to the individual's professional responsibilities.
"Professional Committee, Conference, Workshop, Institute, or Academy" means a program offered either within, or outside, the state that contributes to the participant's professional knowledge or skills in effectively conducting his/her work in education.
"Professional Development" means a combination of focused, in-depth learning, practice, feedback, reflection, and expert support experiences designed to change participants' attitudes, insights, and perspectives and ultimately results in improved professional practice. Effective professional development programs include ample opportunities for knowledge acquisition, skill mastery, descriptive feedback, and refinement of practice in the work setting as per 14 DE Admin. Code 1598 Delaware Professional Development Standards.
“Service Paraeducator” means a public school employee who provides support services other than instructional assistance to students, but does not include bus aides (See 14 DE Admin. Code 1105).
“Standards Board” means the Professional Standards Board of the State of Delaware as established in response pursuant to 14 Del.C. §1205 Ch. 12.
“State Board” means the State Board of Education of the State of Delaware established in response pursuant to 14 Del.C. §104.
“Title I Paraeducator” means a public school employee who provides one on one or small group instruction; assists with classroom management; provides assistance in a computer laboratory; provides support in a library or media center; or provides instructional services to students under the direct supervision of a teacher. Additionally, Title I Paraeducators are all Instructional Paraeducators who work with regular students and children with disabilities in Title I schoolwide schools and all Title I Paraeducators who work with children receiving Title I services in Title I targeted assistance schools, except those whose duties are limited to acting as a translator or as a home school liaison.
3.1	A Title I Paraeducator must hold a Title I Paraeducator Permit. An Instructional Paraeducator must hold an Instructional Paraeducator Permit.
3.1.1.23.1.1.3	Receipt of The applicant holds an associate's or higher degree; or Associate’s Degree or higher conferred by a regionally accredited institution of higher education or an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting agency that the Secretary, in his or her discretion, deems to be equivalent to a regional accrediting agency.
3.1.1.3	Completion of a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent, and a passing score on a rigorous assessment of knowledge of, and the ability to assist in, the instruction in reading, writing, and mathematics.
3.1.1.3.1.1	Para Pro assessment with a qualifying score of 459 or higher.
3.1.1.4	Submission of sufficient verifiable evidence of qualifications to the Department which meets all the requirements.
3.1.2.3	Completion of a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent, and a passing score on a rigorous assessment of knowledge of, and the ability to assist in, the instruction in reading, writing, and mathematics.
3.1.2.3.1.1	Para Pro assessment with a qualifying score of 459 or higher.
3.1.2.4	Submission of sufficient verifiable evidence of qualifications to the Department which meets all the requirements.
3.1.2	An applicant who holds a current permit or the equivalent from another jurisdiction shall meet the requirements herein for the Department to issue him or her a Title I Paraeducator Permit.
3.1.3	An applicant who previously held a Delaware Title I Paraeducator Permit shall be treated as a new applicant and shall meet all requirements of this regulation.
3.1.3.1	If an applicant's Delaware Title I Paraeducator Permit has expired more than one time, the applicant shall have completed fifteen (15) clock hours of Department-approved professional development during the five (5) years prior to the date of the renewal application and shall meet all of the requirements for the issuance of a Title I Paraeducator Permit in effect at the time of application.
3.2	Application Requirements and Procedures.
3.2.1	The An applicant must for a Title I Paraeducator Permit shall submit a Department approved application, his or her official transcript, and, if applicable, his or her official score on the ParaPro Assessment to the Department. The applicant must include official transcripts and when required official scores on an approved assessment of knowledge of, and the ability to assist in, the instruction in reading, writing, and mathematics. The applicant shall certify that answers on the application are true and accurate.
3.2.1.1	Official transcripts shall be forwarded directly from the issuing institution or by the applicant in an unopened, unaltered envelope. Official electronic transcripts forwarded directly to the Department from the issuing institution shall be accepted by the Department. Copies of diplomas and degrees shall not be accepted by the Department.
3.2.1.2	Test ParaPro Assessment scores shall be official and sent directly from Educational Testing Service or other test vendor (ETS). Unopened, unaltered envelopes containing test scores sent to an individual the applicant may be accepted as official. The Department shall determine whether the scores, as presented, are acceptable.
4.1	An Instructional Paraeducator must hold an Instructional Paraeducator Permit.
4.1.1.3	The applicant holds an Associate's Degree or higher conferred by a regionally accredited institution of higher education or an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting agency that the Secretary, in his or her discretion, deems to be equivalent to a regional accrediting agency.
4.1.2	An applicant who holds a permit or the equivalent from another jurisdiction shall meet the requirements herein for the Department to issue him or her an Instructional Paraeducator Permit.
4.1.3	An applicant who previously held a Delaware Instructional Paraeducator Permit shall be treated as a new applicant and shall meet all requirements of this regulation.
4.1.3.1	If an applicant's Delaware Instructional Paraeducator Permit has expired more than one time, the applicant shall have completed fifteen (15) clock hours of Department-approved professional development during the five (5) years prior to the date of the renewal application and shall meet all of the requirements for the issuance of an Instructional Paraeducator Permit in effect at the time of application.
4.2.1	An applicant for an Instructional Paraeducator Permit shall submit a Department approved application, his or her official transcript, and, if applicable, his or her official score on the ParaPro Assessment to the Department. The applicant shall certify that answers on the application are true and accurate.
4.2.1.1	Official transcripts shall be forwarded directly from the issuing institution or by the applicant in an unopened, unaltered envelope. Official electronic transcripts forwarded directly to the Department from the issuing institution shall be accepted by the Department. Copies of diplomas and degrees shall not be accepted by the Department.
4.2.1.2	ParaPro Assessment scores shall be official and sent directly from Educational Testing Service (ETS). Unopened, unaltered envelopes containing test scores sent to the applicant may be accepted as official. The Department shall determine whether the scores, as presented, are acceptable.
4.15.1	All Service Paraeducators Must Hold the Appropriate Permit in accordance with 14 Del.C. §1205(a) A Service Paraeducator must hold a Service Paraeducator Permit.
5.1.1	In accordance with 14 Del.C. §1205(b), the Department shall issue a Service Paraeducator Permit to an otherwise qualified applicant who has not engaged in misconduct in violation of 14 Del.C. §1218 and holds a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent.
4.2	The Department shall issue a Service Paraeducator Permit to an otherwise qualified applicant who has submitted a Department approved application form and who provides evidence of a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent.
5.1.2	An applicant who holds a permit or the equivalent from another jurisdiction shall meet the requirements herein for the Department to issue him or her a Service Paraeducator Permit.
5.1.3	An applicant who previously held a Delaware Service Paraeducator Permit shall be treated as a new applicant and shall meet all requirements of this regulation.
5.1.3.1	If an applicant's Delaware Service Paraeducator Permit has expired more than one time, the applicant shall have completed fifteen (15) clock hours of Department-approved professional development during the five (5) years prior to the date of the renewal application and shall meet all of the requirements for the issuance of a Service Paraeducator Permit in effect at the time of application.
5.2.1	An applicant for a Service Paraeducator Permit shall submit a Department approved application and his or her official transcript to the Department. The applicant shall certify that answers on the application are true and accurate.
5.2.1.1	Official transcripts shall be forwarded directly from the issuing institution or by the applicant in an unopened, unaltered envelope. Official electronic transcripts forwarded directly to the Department from the issuing institution shall be accepted by the Department. Copies of diplomas and degrees shall not be accepted by the Department.
5.1	Unless stated otherwise herein, a Title I, Instructional, or Service Paraeducator Permit shall be valid for five (5) years from the Date of Issuance unless revoked.
5.2	The Department shall renew a Paraeducator Permit, valid for an additional five (5) years, to a Paraeducator who provides evidence of successful completion of a minimum of fifteen (15) clock hours of approved professional development.
5.3	The paraeducator is required to complete fifteen (15) clock hours of approved professional development during the term of validity of the Paraeducator Permit.
7.1	The Department may renew a Paraeducator Permit, valid for an additional five (5) years, to a Paraeducator who provides evidence of successful completion of a minimum of fifteen (15) clock hours of Department-approved professional development.
7.2	Paraeducators are required to complete fifteen (15) clock hours of Department-approved professional development during the term of validity of the Paraeducator Permit.
7.2.1	Delaware employing authorities shall verify clock hours for applicants who are currently employed by a Delaware employing authority.
7.2.2	The Department shall verify clock hours for applicants who are not currently employed by a Delaware employing authority or who are employed in another jurisdiction and wish to renew their Paraeducator Permit(s). The applicant shall be required to submit verifying documentation to the Department with the renewal application.
6.2	Options listed in Section 6.2 shall be valid for paraeducators holding a Permit whose expiration date does not exceed December 10, 2015.
6.2.1	College credit completed at a regionally accredited college or university with a grade of "C" or better or a "P" in a pass or fail course (One  semester hour equals fifteen (15) clock hours).
6.2.2	Planned school professional development day (maximum six (6) clock hours per day).
6.2.3	Professional conference, workshop, institute, or academy that contributes to the participant's knowledge, competence, performance, or effectiveness as a paraeducator (verified clock hours actively involved in workshop or conference sessions).
6.2.4	Participation on a school, district, or state sponsored committee which has as its focus curriculum, instruction, or school or district improvement (verified clock hours of service or experience).
6.3	Educators holding a Paraeducator Permit whose expiration date does not exceed December 10, 2015 may also use the Paraeducator Permit renewal options listed in Section 6.3.
6.3.2	Professional development programs targeting curriculum, instruction, assessment, school climate, or other identified need.
6.3.3	A Committee, Professional Learning Community (PLC), Conference, Workshop, Institute or Academy that contribute to the participant's knowledge and skills, competence, performance or effectiveness in education that are directly connected to the school, district or charter school’s Success Plan or State initiative. This option includes workshops offered by districts or other employing authorities either as part of a professional development day or during after school hours.
6.4	Options listed in Section 6.2 for the renewal of a Paraeducator Permit shall expire on December 10, 2015.
6.5	Educators either receiving their original Paraeducator Permit after December 11, 2010 or upon renewing their Paraeducator Permit on or after December 11, 2010 shall use the options listed in Section 6.3.
Verified Clock Hours completing Action Research or other Educational Project. Maximum of 15 Clock Hours.
The verified Clock Hours shall be accrued during the Action Research or other Educational Project. The documented goal for the participant(s) shall be a product and a new set of educator Knowledge and Skills. These shall complement the school, district, or charter school’s success plan or State’s initiative and shall be focused on student learning. A Product Shall Be Made Available for Verification.
If an educator does not complete NBPTS or Similar National Certification, the educator may use the verified Clock Hours as an other Educational Project.
A certificate of participation; a professional development transcript from PDMS (that did not electronically transfer to DEEDS) or a comparable professional development program; or the completed Activity Documentation Form as well as the final product which documents the goals and results of the Action Research or other Educational Project shall be presented to the Department.
Verified Clock Hours involved in recertification activities.
The certification to maintain a State professional license as required in the applicable regulation.
A certificate of attendance and the original certificate of completion for Continuing Education Units (CEUs) shall be presented to the Department.
Clock Hours may be accrued where 1 semester hour equals 15 hours and 1 quarter semester hour or Continuing Education Unit (CEU) equals 10 hours.
The course shall be completed within a matriculated Masters program, Doctoral program or a graduate level course of study at or through a regionally accredited college or university or other Department-approved provider. The course may also be an undergraduate course as seen by the educator as necessary to acquire new Knowledge and Skills related to the educator’s position. The course shall be taken at a regionally accredited college or university for credit. The educator shall attain a grade of "C" or better (or a "P" in Pass / Fail course).
Official transcripts or an original certificate of completion for Continuing Education Units (CEUs) shall be presented to the Department.
Verified Clock Hours of service. Minimum of 3 Clock Hours. Maximum of 15 Clock Hours over the course of 5 years.
The documented goal is a curricular component and/or an encompassing assessment. A Product Shall Be Made Available for Verification.
Verified Clock Hours of service or experience.
The Planned Professional Development Program shall focus on the school, district or charter school’s success plan which may be targeting curriculum, instruction, assessment, school climate, or other identified need or shall be related to the educator’s work with students or staff.
Verified Clock Hours of presentation and preparation. The ratio of preparation to presentation is 3:1. Each presentation topic may be submitted one time. Maximum of 15 Clock Hours.
The Presentation shall contribute to the education profession or add to the body of knowledge in the educator’s specific field. The Presentation shall be made at a local, state, regional or national conference.
The completed Activity Documentation Form and conference agenda listing the Presentation shall be presented to the Department.
The educator may include time spent in those portions of the Professional Committee, Conference, Workshop, Institute or Academy that contribute to the educator’s Knowledge and Skills, competence, performance or effectiveness in education that are directly connected to the school, district or charter school’s success plan or State initiative. This option includes workshops offered by districts or other employing authorities either as part of a professional development day or during after school hours. Examples of expected student or educator outcomes are anticipated.
The completed Activity Documentation Form and the original certificate of attendance or completion or a letter from the Professional Committee, Conference, Workshop, Institute or Academy staff shall be presented to the Department.
7.19.1	An applicant shall disclose his or her criminal conviction history upon application for any Paraeducator Permit.
7.29.2	Failure to disclose a criminal conviction history is grounds for denial or revocation of a Paraeducator Permit as specified in 14 Del.C. §1219.
8.1	An applicant may be denied a paraeducator permit upon a finding that the applicant has failed to meet the requirements set forth herein or is unfit to be issued a permit in the State.
8.2	A Paraeducator Permit may be revoked upon the dismissal of the permit holder for immorality, misconduct in office, incompetence, willful neglect of duty or disloyalty, and must be revoked upon a finding that the permit holder made a materially false or misleading statement in his or her permit application.
8.3	A Paraeducator whose Permit has been denied or revoked may file a request for a hearing with the Secretary within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice of denial or revocation.
8.3.1	The Secretary’s decision shall be final.


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NAF v. David Daleiden and CMP (Calif.)—NAF sued David Daleiden to prevent release of the recordings and information he obtained at NAF meetings on the grounds that he is a “racketeer” who “committed fraud,” “snuck into” their completely secure, private meetings, “stole” NAF information, and repelled them with his constant questions about buying fetal tissue. Life Legal leads the defense of David and CMP. (See p. 1).
Stem Express v. CMP and David Daleiden (Calif.)—StemExpress, the biotech firm buying baby body parts from Planned Parenthood in earlier undercover videos, filed a lawsuit against the Center for Medical Progress to prevent the release of video material obtained by CMP. Life Legal continues to successfully defend David Daleiden and CMP.
Respect Life South San Francisco v. City of South San Francisco and Planned Parenthood (Calif.)—Petition for writ of mandate to overturn grant of use permit for Planned Parenthood clinic. Petitioners assert that the city wrongfully exempted the permit from compliance with applicable state environmental impact law and regulations. While Planned Parenthood has been prevented from opening for two years, an adverse decision was handed down Summer 2015. An appeal is pending.
Diss v. Portland Public Schools (Ore.)—Civil complaint for unlawful termination and religious discrimination. Bill Diss, a teacher at a Portland, Oregon high school, had his teaching contract terminated following his request for a religious exemption to excuse his participation in a school program administered by Planned Parenthood. Following his request for accommodation, Diss was subjected to harassment and retaliation by school administrators throughout the school year, which culminated in the termination of his employment. Life Legal filed employment discrimination complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In September 2014, Life Legal also filed a civil action on Diss’ behalf, seeking monetary damages as well as reinstatement in his teaching position. The civil case is in discovery.
Pro-Life Mississippi et al., v. Vance, et al., No. 3:14cv568. (Miss.)—Life Legal Defense Foundation, in conjunction with local attorney Steve Thornton, filed suit on behalf of pro-life sidewalk counselors in Jackson, Mississippi. Life Legal has appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. After oral argument in January, the Fifth Circuit issued a one-paragraph order affirming the trial court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The case now returns to the lower court.
People v. Garza/Garza v. Jackson Public School District (Jackson, Miss.)—Two young pro-life activists were arrested for distributing leaflets on a sidewalk in front of a high school and were charged with trespass, disturbing the peace, and interference with school buses. After criminal trial in which the court excluded video evidence exonerating them, they were found guilty on two of the three charges. Their request for a new trial has been pending for almost two years. Federal civil rights suit filed seeking damages and injunctive relief. The case is in discovery.
Planned Parenthood v. MMB Properties (Kissimmee, Fla.)—Planned Parenthood purchased and occupied the property in Kissimmee in April of 2014. When it became clear that the office was going to become an abortion mill, a cardiologist who also had an office at Oak Commons sued to enforce the restrictive covenant that forbade “outpatient surgical centers” at the site. Victory! The Fifth District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida upheld a trial court preliminary ruling that prohibited Planned Parenthood from performing abortions at its office in Kissimmee. The case now goes to trial.
Jackson State University v. White (Miss.)—Pro-life activist arrested for protesting on public sidewalk adjacent to public university. Others in the group left the sidewalk under threat of arrest. Criminal case pending.
Huntsville Zoning Battle (Ala.)—Variance only permits medical clinic to operate 8-5. Sidewalk counselors routinely observe more than 15-20 cars in the parking lot past 7:30 at night and see patients leaving the clinic well past 5:00 P.M. Life Legal is working with local pro-lifers to collect further evidence of zoning violations to be reported to city zoning enforcement officials.
Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey (Tex.)—Abortion providers challenged Texas statutes requiring that abortion providers have admitting privileges at local hospitals and imposing building and safety requirements on abortion facilities. Life Legal joined Alliance Defending Freedom in filing an amicus brief in the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the law’s requirements are reasonable and constitutional. The brief points out that the alleged shortage of eligible abortion providers under the law is caused not by the strictures of the law but by the unwillingness of most doctors to provide abortions. The Fifth Circuit Court upheld the ambulatory surgical center standards and the admitting privileges requirement as to all but one clinic in Texas. The court found that the requirements advance Texas’ interests in safeguarding maternal health and protecting women from substandard abortion facilities and practices. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which will hear argument on March 2, 2016.
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell (Wash., D.C.)—Life Legal filed U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of the Breast Cancer Prevention Institute opposing the government’s mandate that requires employers to offer health insurance policies that include contraceptive drug coverage. The mandate applies even to organizations that have a religious objection to artificial contraception. Employers who fail to offer approved coverage are subject to huge penalties. The Little Sisters of the Poor have been threatened with millions of dollars in fines for refusing to purchase contraceptive coverage—yet they have stood firm and will not violate their religious beliefs by making available drugs and devices that cause early abortion and compromise women’s health.
In re Kline (Kan.)—Former Kansas Attorney General was accused by Planned Parenthood and pro-abortion public officials of violating state ethics rules while investigating Kansas abortion providers, resulting in the suspension of his license to practice law. On February 25, 2014, Kline’s attorneys filed a motion to dismiss what they are calling a “void” judgment on the basis that the Kansas Constitution explicitly requires at least four justices to concur for every decision. With only two justices left on the Court for Kline’s case after several justices recused themselves because of conflicts, Kline asserts that the composition of the post-recusal Court was unlawful and in explicit violation of the Kansas Constitution. It is unclear when the Court will decide that motion. Kline’s license is currently indefinitely suspended and will be reviewed by the Kansas Supreme Court in three years. October 2015 Kline filed “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” in the matter of Kline v. Biles seeks principally a ruling that the “discipline” meted out to Kline is void because of the unlawful composition of the court that ruled against him.
People v. Miller, et al. (Nashville, Tenn.)—Three members of a pro-life youth ministry group were arrested for trespass while handing out leaflets and holding signs on a public sidewalk outside a public high school. Victory! Charges dismissed. Civil action pending.
Last Abortion Clinic in Selma Alabama CLOSED. Life Legal has been working with local pro-lifers to close Selma’s last abortion clinic since 2014—and we have a victory! The Central Alabama Women’s Clinic, an unlicensed abortion clinic in Selma, Alabama, has finally stopped performing illegal abortions as of December 30, 2015! The facility is now a weight loss clinic. Life Legal provided overwhelming evidence of the clinic’s illegal practices to the Alabama Department of Public Health and the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners.
England v. County of Sacramento (Calif.)—Employer refused to accommodate County employee who voiced a sincere religious objection to referring clients for family planning and other abortion-related services. Victory! Case settled to the satisfaction of England. In addition to monetary settlement, County of Sacramento will implement a new policy on religious accommodation.
Rivera v. UCSB et al. (Calif.)—Civil suit filed against U.C. Santa Barbara and professor of feminist studies Mireille Miller-Young for battery and civil rights violations. Professor Miller-Young started an altercation with pro-life activists engaging in free speech activity on the UCSB campus, which culminated in her stealing and destroying a sign and assaulting one of the pro-lifers, a sixteen-year-old girl. Victory! Case settled to the satisfaction of the pro-life students.
Gebreyes vs. Prime Health Care Services DBA Saint Mary’s Regional Medical Center (Reno, Nev.)—Twenty-year-old college student Aden Hailu went to the emergency room at St. Mary’s Regional Hospital in Reno, Nevada complaining of stomach pain. Doctors insisted on performing exploratory surgery and Aden went into cardiac arrest during the operation. She never fully regained consciousness and was declared brain dead by the hospital. Life Legal assisted Aden’s family’s eight-month fight to prevent the hospital from discontinuing life-sustaining care. Aden died on January 4, 2016, while the case was pending.
Planned Parenthood vs. Daleiden et al. (Calif.)—January 2016 PP filed a lawsuit that seeks to prevent Daleiden from ever launching another undercover investigation into PP’s activities. Planned Parenthood is also seeking treble damages for alleged “racketeering” as well as punitive damages and attorney fees, all of which could add up to millions of dollars. The abortion giant is represented by one of the largest law firms in the United States.

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The article examines the views of populist A. Prugavin on the sectarianism as a part of the society in the Russian Empire in the last third of the XIX century. The research works of the author on these problems are analyzed. Classification of religious organizations in the Russian Empire is represented in these research works. The author considers that A. Prugavin came to a conclusion that the adherents of different sects could not be considered the alien elements in the Russian society. He believed that religious movements did not represent danger to the state in the Russian Empire.
1. Bulgakov S. V. Spravochnik po eresyam, sektam i raskolam [Reference book on heresies, sects and schisms]. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1994. 225 p. (in Russian).
2. Prugavin A. S. Raskol i sektantstvo v russkoy narodnoy zhizni [The schism and sectarianism in the Russian national life]. Moscow, Tipografi ya I. D. Sytina Publ., 1905. p. 9. (in Russian).
3. Prugavin A. S. Religioznye otshchepentsy. Ocherki sovremennogo sektantstva [Religious renegades. Studies of modern sectarianism]. Moscow, Tipo-litogr. T-va I. N. Kushnerev i K° Publ., 1906. 266 p. (in Russian).
4. Prugavin A. S. Raskol vverkhu. Ocherki religioznykh iskaniy v privilegirovannoy srede [The schism at the top. Essays religious quest in a privileged environment]. St. Petersburg, Tovarishchestvo “Obshchestvennaya pol'za” Publ., 1909. 267 p. (in Russian).
5. Prugavin A. S. Staroobryadchestvo vo vtoroy polovine XIX veka. Ocherki iz noveyshey istorii raskola [Old Believers in the second half of the XIX century. Sketches from the recent history of the schism]. Moscow, Otd. tip. t-va I. D. Sytina Publ., 1904. 282 p. (in Russian).
6. Prugavin A. S. Raskol i sektantstvo v russkoy narodnoy zhizni [The schism and sectarianism in the Russian national life]. Moscow, Tipografi ya I. D. Sytina Publ., 1905. p. 7. (in Russian).
7. Prugavin A. S. Stat'i, zametki, skhemy o raskole [Articles, notes, diagrams of the schism]. Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy istoricheskiy arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (RGALI) [Russian State Historical Archive of Literature and Arts (RSHLA)]. F. 2167. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 67. L. 98. L. 99. L. 100. L. 105. L. 112. L. 113 ob. – 114. L. 117 ob. –118. (in Russian).
8. Prugavin A. S. Stat'i, zametki, skhemy o raskole [Articles, notes, diagrams of the schism]. Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy istoricheskiy arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (RGALI) [Russian State Historical Archive of Literature and Arts (RSHLA)]. F. 2167. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 67. L. 99. L. 113 ob. – 114. L. 117 ob. – 118. (in Russian).
9. Prugavin A. S. Stat'i, zametki, skhemy o raskole [Articles, notes, diagrams of the schism]. Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy istoricheskiy arkhiv literatury i iskusstv (RGALI) [Russian State Historical Archive of Literature and Arts (RSHLA)]. F. 2167. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 67. L. 112. (in Russian).
10. Khlysty [Whips]. Bulgakov S. V. Spravochnik po eresyam, sektam i raskolam [Reference heresies, sects and schisms]. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1994. pp. 86–90 (in Russian).
11. Shaloputy. Bulgakov S. V. Spravochnik po eresyam, sektam i raskolam [Reference heresies, sects and schisms]. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1994. pp. 93–94 (in Russian).
12. Skoptsy [Spadones]. Bulgakov S. V. Spravochnik po eresyam, sektam i raskolam [Reference heresies, sects and schisms]. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1994. pp. 73–75 (in Russian).
13. Vozdykhantsy. Bulgakov S. V. Spravochnik po eresyam, sektam i raskolam [Reference heresies, sects and schisms]. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1994. pp. 20–21 (in Russian).
14. Prugavin A. S. Raskol i sektantstvo v russkoy narodnoy zhizni [The schism and sectarianism in the Russian national life]. Moscow, Tipografi ya I. D. Sytina Publ., 1905. p. 77 (in Russian).
15. Prugavin A. S. Znacheniye sektantstva v russkoy narodnoy zhizni [The value of sectarianism in Russian national life]. Russkaya mysl' – Russian Thought, 1881, no. 1. p. 347 (in Russian).
16. Ulozheniye o nakazaniyakh ugolovnykh i ispravitel'nykh [The Code of criminal and correctional penalties]. Svod zakonov Rossiiskoy imperii. T. 15 [The code of laws the Russian Empire. Vol. 15]. St. Petersburg, 1886. pp. 196–199 (in Russian).
17. Pchelintsev A. V. K voprosu o terminakh “traditsionnaya religiya” i “sekta” [To the question of the terms “traditional religion” and “sect”]. Religiya i pravo – Religion and Law, 1999, no. 2. pp. 23 (in Russian).

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