text:
Applied Materials wins at PTAB in Ex parte CUVALCI; PTAB mentions "the epitome of hindsight"
Appellants’ Appeal and Reply Briefs.
We add the following for emphasis.
for substantially the reasons provided by Appellants in their Brief and Reply Brief.
together form a sintered monolithic component”. Ans. 4–5.
to make the proposed modification.
March 18, 2015. Attorneys involved were Fish & Richardson.
The third party requester in the 95/000,569 case concerning US Patent 6,703,403 was Pubpat .
An issue seemed to be "new arguments" presented in the reply brief.
One infers patent challenges were passed along as well. One of these was against Microsoft with Patent Owner, Microsoft Corporation (“Owner”), unsuccessful in its appeal to PTAB under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315(a) from various adopted rejections.
Of Ex parte Frye, from LawUpdates: In a recent and rare precedential decision, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has clarified that examiner findings are given no deference when specifically challenged on appeal. However, the Board will neither review nor disturb examiner findings that are not specifically challenged on appeal. The opinion in Ex Parte Nancy C. Frye, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 2010 WL 889747 (BPAI 2010) is particularly notable because both U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director David J. Kappos and Deputy Director Sharon R. Barner joined the Board in issuing the opinion.
The Frye decision appears designed to emphasize the importance of challenging on appeal the specific factual findings made by the examiner, rather than merely the general basis for the examiner’s rejection. The Board will defer to examiner findings that are not specifically challenged.
struction of the contested claim term.
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes through legislation, see, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671, and n. 14 (1974), we have never applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes. See, e. g., Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 n. 1 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Nor is this a case where we should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
the patentee. 35 U.S.C. §154(b)(1)(A).
the actual filing date of the application.
In response to a patent challenge filed by the hedge-fund manager, Celgene recently won permission from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to file a motion seeking sanctions against a Bass entity for allegedly abusing the process for reviewing patents.
Although Celgene has not yet filed a motion, the development is being closely watched because it raises the possibility that patent officials may put an end to a tactic Bass has used to challenge valuable patents held by drug makers and biotechs.
Changes in case law didn't stop Prism Technologies from winning big.
A Nebraska jury has ordered Sprint to pay $30 million to Prism Technologies, a patent-holding company that has sued the five largest cell phone carriers.
The problem for the US is that the US cannot compete with single-digit tax rates some companies can now achieve abroad, so there is some thought in Congress for a "tax break" related to intellectual property.
The idea — known as a patent box or innovation box — would grant a lower tax rate on income generated from patents and other intellectual property housed in the U.S. This would aid technology and pharmaceutical companies trying to maintain low tax rates that they've achieved by booking income in overseas tax havens.
0003] A particularly advantageous approach to fingerprint sensing is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,963,679 to Setlak and assigned to the assignee of the present invention. The fingerprint sensor is an integrated circuit sensor that drives the user's finger with an electric field signal and senses the electric field with an array of electric field sensing pixels on the integrated circuit substrate. Such sensors are used to control access for many different types of electronic devices such as computers, cell phones, personal digital assistants (PDA's), and the like. In particular, fingerprint sensors are used because they may have a small footprint, are relatively easy for a user to use and they provide reasonable authentication capabilities.
 In some recent applications, the sensor may desirably capture images of fingerprint patterns from fingers that are farther away from the sensor array than is typical with today's technologies. Unfortunately, as the finger gets farther away from the sensor array (for example when a relatively thick dielectric lies between the sensor array and the finger), the spatial field strength variations that represent the fingerprint pattern become weaker. One way to compensate for this loss of spatial pattern strength is to increase the voltage of the signals that generate the field between the finger and the sensor array, also known as the drive signal. The fingerprint spatial pattern strength increases proportionately.
 However, the detected signals generated from the sensor array and based upon placement of the user's finger adjacent the sensor array are relatively small compared to the drive signal. Thus, these relatively small detected signals may be increasingly difficult to process along with the relatively high drive signal, limiting measurement resolution of the detected signals, for example. Amplifier and processing stages that read and process the detected signals may add additional noise. Another source of noise may be fixed pattern noise from the sensor array, which also may make it increasingly difficult to measure the detected signals.
A finger biometric sensor comprising: an array of finger biometric sensing pixels; and processing circuitry coupled to the array of finger biometric sensing pixels and capable of acquiring initial data from the array of finger biometric sensing pixels based upon an initial drive signal level and with a finger positioned adjacent the array of finger biometric sensing pixels, determining an updated drive signal level based upon the initial data, and acquiring finger biometric data from the array of finger biometric sensing pixels based upon the updated drive signal level and with the finger positioned adjacent the array of finger biometric sensing pixels.
A reflective article comprising: a reflecting material configured to diffusely reflect at least 80% of incident sunlight that is photosynthetically active; and a retro-reflecting material configured to retro-reflect at least 80% of incident sunlight that is non-photosynthetically active; wherein: sunlight that is photosynthetically active corresponds to wavelengths from 400 nm to 750 nm; and the article is configured for placement under, around, or in the proximity of a plant.
The application is assigned to Elwha.
Marc E. Davis, Matthew G. Dyor, William Gates, Xuedong Huang, Roderick A. Hyde, Edward K.Y. Jung, Jordin T. Kare, Royce A. Levien, Richard T. Lord, Robert W. Lord, Qi Lu, Mark A. Malamud, Nathan P. Myhrvold, Satya Nadella, Danny Allen Reed, Harry Shum, Clarence T. Tegreene, Lowell L. Wood, JR.
1. A method to produce a carbon-based product of interest, comprising culturing an engineered cyanobacterial cell in a cell culture in the presence of CO.sub.2 and light under conditions suitable to produce a carbon-based product of interest, wherein said engineered cyanobacterial cell comprises a recombinant nucleic acid encoding an enzyme classified under an Enzyme Commission number selected from EC 1.11.1.6, EC 1.11.1.7, and EC 1.11.1.21.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein said enzyme has catalase activity.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein said enzyme has peroxidase activity.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein said enzyme is selected from KatG and KatE.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein said enzyme comprises an amino acid sequence at least 90% identical to SEQ ID NO: 3.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein said enzyme comprises an amino acid sequence at least 90% identical to SEQ ID NO: 4.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein said cell culture further comprises hydrogen peroxide.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein said hydrogen peroxide is at a concentration of 0.1 to 50 mM in said cell culture.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein said cell culture comprises a reagent to mitigate contamination of said cell culture.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein said cell culture is exposed to diurnal light conditions.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein said engineered cyanobacterial cell has the same or a higher rate of ethanol production in said cell culture than an otherwise identical cyanobacterial cell lacking said recombinant nucleic acid.
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the production rate of ethanol of a culture of said engineered cyanobacterial cells is greater than a rate selected from: 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, and 400 mg*L.sup.-1*day.sup.-1, or wherein the production rate of ethanol of a culture of said engineered byanobacterial cells is greater than a rate selected from: 13, 14, 15, and 16 mg*L.sup.-1*h.sup.-1, or wherein the mass of ethanol produced by a culture of said engineered cyanobacterial cells per volume of said culture is greater than an amount selected from: 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 7.5, and 8 g/L, or wherein said ethanol is produced during up to 30 days of culture.
The US case is related to PCT/US2012/071250, for which the written opinion of May 2013 was unfavorable.
Yahoo.sports has a piece on the axe bat now used by Dustin Pedroia.
In 2006, a New Yorker named Steve Leinert obtained a patent on the axe handle for a baseball bat, a concept Ted Williams hit on decades earlier in his book "The Science of Hitting," in which he compared a baseball swing to that of an axe. "Try it for yourself," Williams wrote. "Get a bat and swing it against a telephone pole. I do this with doubting young Washington players. Where is the wrist position at point of impact? Square and unbroken, that's where, just as when you hit a tree with an ax."
The axe handle felt more comfortable to Leinert, and he shopped it around to manufacturers. He met rejection after rejection, companies frightened off by something so novel, until Baden, whose main products to that point were balls, fell in love with the Axe Bat and agreed to license it for 20 years starting in 2009.
It took five years for MLB to climb onboard, and even now Baden isn't making the bats for Pedroia because it doesn't have a license from the league. Victus Sports, a small New Jersey-based company, produces the axe-handle bats for major league players, something Pedroia learned by happy accident.
. A bat comprising: a body, comprising a first material, the body defining an exterior surface with a top end and a bottom end; a barrel portion having a barrel cross-section with a substantially circular perimeter that defines a center point; the barrel cross-section defining a longitudinal axis substantially perpendicular to the barrel cross-section, the longitudinal axis intersecting the barrel cross-section at approximately the center point, the longitudinal axis intersecting and extending through the exterior surface, near the top and bottom ends, at respective upper and lower intersection points, and otherwise within the exterior surface; a handle portion that includes the bottom end, the handle portion having a separately formed handle component comprising a second material; the handle portion defining a maximum forward distance, measured along a first line perpendicular to the longitudinal axis, from a first point on the longitudinal axis to a first location on the exterior surface of the handle portion that is farthest forward of the longitudinal axis; the handle portion defining a maximum rearward distance, measured along a second line perpendicular to the longitudinal axis, from a second point on the longitudinal axis to a second location on the exterior surface of the handle portion that is farthest rearward of the longitudinal axis; the handle portion also having an asymmetrically flared region extending from an upper boundary to a lower boundary, the upper boundary being more proximate the top end and the lower boundary being more proximate the bottom end; the asymmetrically flared region defining a non-circular cross-section perpendicular to the longitudinal axis, the non-circular cross-section having a major axis, wherein the major axis increases continuously throughout the asymmetrically flared region, from the upper boundary to the lower boundary; and portions of the exterior surface, in the asymmetrically flared region, defining a front edge and a rear edge, wherein the distance from the longitudinal axis to the front edge, measured along respective lines perpendicular to the longitudinal axis, is greater than the distance from the longitudinal axis to the rear edge, for each point of the longitudinal axis throughout the asymmetrically flared region.
He met rejection after rejection, companies frightened off by something so novel, until Baden, whose main products to that point were balls, fell in love with the Axe Bat and agreed to license it for 20 years starting in 2009.
sounds in "Chester Carlson" and is highly relevant to the patent reform discussion. Yes, there still are individual inventors who may have a big impact.
The Supreme Court's decision not to grant certiorari leaves intact a March 2014 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [CAFC], which threw out a district judge’s finding that Google had not infringed on four different patents of Vederi LLC. The case will now return to lower courts for further proceedings.
intrinsic evidence in this case.
So things don’t look very promising for Vederi, but we’ll see.
In November 2011, U.S. Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, who sat by designation in district court, adopted a claim construction for the patents proposed by Google, ruling that Vederi’s patents cover “vertical flat” images rather than curved images like those used in Google Street View.
Largely as a result of that claim construction, the judge ruled in September 2012 that Google had not infringed Vederi’s patents, which he said covered stitched-together flat images rather than spherical ones.
The Federal Circuit held in March that Judge Kozinski had been too strict in his construction of a patent claim that defined Vederi’s images as “substantially elevations,” which is an architectural term for a flat, typically illustrated image of a building.
The Federal Circuit found that the inclusion of the word “substantially” meant that Vederi’s patent claims were not exclusively limited to flat images, and that the trial court had erred by ignoring the word.
Does a former employee have to "forget" past information to avoid trade secret litigation?
You are not required to “forget” what you learned. Go over your nondisclosure agreement. Chances are it prohibits certain use and disclosure by you of an actual trade secret.
Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., H038555 (Apr. 28, 2015). Cypress sued Maxim for trade secret misappropriation, alleging Maxim was attempting to hire its employees in violation of California law. Cypress pled two theories: (1) the names of its employees were trade secrets and Maxim wrongly obtained and exploited a list of its employees, and (2) Cypress was seeking to hire its employees to misappropriate their knowledge of Cypress’ touchscreen technology. The trial court denied Cypress’ requests for preliminary relief, finding Cypress had no evidence to support its claims. One piece of telling evidence the court noted was a declaration submitted by Maxim’s attorney demonstrating she learned the name of nearly every Cypress employee who worked on touchscreen technology by spending an afternoon perusing LinkedIn. Facing an upcoming hearing on Maxim’s demurrer to its first amended complaint, Cypress voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit without prejudice. Maxim thereafter sought and was awarded $180,817.50 in sanctions on the ground Cypress had brought its suit in bad faith, which under California law has two prongs: (1) objective speciousness of the claim, and (2) subjective bad faith in bringing or maintaining the action, i.e., for an improper purpose.
Plagiarism hidden because of collusive ties between literary critics and major publishers?
Over the past week, Ms. Shin has come under increasing pressure to respond to the plagiarism accusation, which was made by the novelist Lee Eung-jun in an online commentary. Mr. Lee and others have argued that instances of plagiarism by best-selling authors such as Ms. Shin go largely unnoticed because of collusive ties between literary critics and major publishers.
UT is going to have to take a look at its peer review process and try to figure out how this one got through.
In the post --The PATENT Act: Be Careful What You Wish For --, one has the following "prediction"
Most Congressional observers believe that the change in control of the United States Senate presages approval of the PATENT Act, the Innovation Act or some form of those bills in the 114th Congress. To that end, the House continues to amend the Innovation Act, recently adding new venue provisions that would make it more difficult for non-practicing entities to bring their suits in the Eastern District of Texas. Moreover, the White House previously has signaled its intention to support and sign patent reform legislation. On the other hand, opposition to these bills is mounting from small businesses and individual inventors who sincerely believe that these changes will make it harder for them to protect their patent rights, thereby enabling larger companies to infringe their patents with impunity, as well as from those who benefit from the current system. In the end, it appears likely that Congress will amend the Patent Act during this session.
One notes that pharma and university interests have strongly opposed the Innovation Act. Among other things, "loser pays" is opposed by many.
Now, Congress is on the verge of passing major revisions to the Patent Act, which, if enacted, would be a blunder of historical proportions and would pose a threat to American innovation. Large corporations have been able to convince Congress and the public, through a well-funded, organized and misleading PR campaign, that innovation is being threatened by patent trolls, entities that abuse the system by extorting settlements and by bringing frivolous lawsuits.
Both of the bills also would alter the “American rule” that attorney’s fees should be borne by the respective parties absent exceptional circumstances and ignore the recent Supreme Court decisions giving district courts greater discretion to award attorney’s fees. Indeed, courts have recently begun to grant more motions seeking attorney’s fees. Fee shifting will likely deter legitimate owners of enforcing their patent rights by making the risk of enforcement prohibitively high.
Smaller companies also will be less able to enforce their patent rights by making it harder to obtain litigation funding.
What is the "conservative" IP position?
In the Spider-Man case with a Supreme Court vote of 6-3, Justice Scalia (and Justice Kennedy) aligned with the "liberal" judges. Justices Thomas, Alito, and CJ Roberts made up the dissent of three justices.
In the Cisco case at the Supreme Court, Justice Alito aligned with the "liberals," and Justice Thomas partially so. CJ Roberts and Scalia were in the dissent.
If hypothetically the conservatives Thomas and Alito had aligned with Scalia, the vote would have been 4 to 4, and the decision of the CAFC would have stood.
One notes that Scalia and Alito voted in opposite ways on both cases, basically the same for Scalia and Thomas.
Scalia voted with Roberts in one case (Cisco); against in the other.
In terms of "big guy" vs. "little guy," the little guy/patentee Kimble was the loser of the Spider-Man case.
In Cisco, the decision made life a bit tougher for accused infringers who believe the asserted patents are invalid, so arguably that decision was pro-little guy-patentee.
So, using only this one lens, Alito/Thomas/Roberts favored the position of the little guy in Spider-Man.
Supreme Court decides Spider-Man case; Brulotte still lives.
By a 6-3 vote, with the four court "liberals" joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court decided to maintain the rule of Brulotte v. Thys. Marvel wins. Kimble loses.
A comic book fanatic colleague of mine—who insisted I not use his name in this piece—lauds Kagan for correctly citing to Amazing Fantasy, the name of the issue that introduced Spider-Man. However, he notes that she did make one error: The story in that issue introduced a character named Spider-Man!, with an exclamation mark which Kagan omits. The authors of the Bluebook would be disappointed.
Justice Kagan said that if the Supreme Court’s earlier interpretation of patent law was problematic, Congress was the branch of government best suited to change patent policy. She also said parties have other ways to craft business arrangements that allow for deferred payments after a patent expires.
Charles Osgood introduced the stories for Father's Day, June 21, 2015. Lee Cowan does the cover story on family leave.
Second, Tracy Smith interviews Pat Boone. Third, Barry Petersen on small businesses in Viet Nam. Fourth, Anthony Mason on"Little Big Town." Fifth, Bill Geist; Steve Hartman; Jim Gaffigan. Headlines: Sunday services at Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, SC. Manhunt in New Orleans. NY State police look for escapees in Allegheny County. June 21 is longest day of year. Yogathon. Weather: cool in northeast; rainstorms.
Martha Teichner mentions Denmark Vesey. [Wikipedia: in 1818 he was among the founders of an AME Church in the city, which later became Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church. The first independent black denomination in the nation, it had recently been organized in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.] Poll says 61% of people think race relations are bad.
Lee Cowan on parental leave. Example of six week leave for father to be with adopted child. Price Waterhouse has policy of six weeks leave. The US has no law on paid leave. FMLA has 12 weeks of unpaid leave. A study shows dads take an average of two weeks. National Partnership for Women and Families. Poll : 80% favor paid leave for parents.
"Family Act" offers three months at 66% salary. Videoclip of Dan Rather on Cal. paid leave law in 2002.
Pulse: In 1960, 70% of households, only dad works.
Almanac. June 21, 1921. Jane Russell born. Movie: "The Outlaw." Adoption group: WAIF. Died in 2011. Publicity can be terrible, but only if you don't have any.
Anthony Mason on "Little Big Town"'s Girl Crush. We are a walking breathing country song.
Bill Geist on cat circus. Samantha Msrtin's Acro-cats. 17 cats.
Barry Petersen's postcard from Vietnam. "The floating market."
Speed the tortoise died at San Diego Zoo.
Ringing church bells in Charleston.
Steve Hartman on 1053 Malcolm Road in Toledo. Built in 1955. Selling of the family home.
Contract to sell Beatles pictures. In 1997: heavy metal album. Shirley Foley. I'd like to be loved by everybody, but nobody is.
Brannigan on Father's Day. Dads are the human equivalent of cargo shorts. Without the comparison to dads, moms would look horrible.
Week ahead. Monday: 5th annual, sings for pride. Tuesday: Shatner journey Wed. sentencing in Boston Thurs. Grammy museum on Supremes. Friday: take your dog to work Sat.: Grateful Dead.
Video from Charleston. Church bell ringing.
Next week. "Heart and soul" Capture love in a photograph?
Moment of nature, Spiriva. Elks in Rocky Mountain National Park.
The claim refers to "molecular weight" and does not refer to "average molecular weight." That might suggest that the term "copolymer-1" refers to an individual molecule, not a collection of polymers, each individual one of which might have a different molecular weight.
Copolymer-1 is a synthetic polypeptide analog of myelin basic protein (MBP), which is a natural component of the myelin sheath. It has been suggested as a potential therapeutic agent for multiple sclerosis (Eur. J. Immunol.  1:242; and J. Neurol. Sci.  31:433). All references cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety. Interest in copolymer-1 as an immunotherapy for multiple sclerosis stems from observations first made in the 1950's that myelin components such as MBP prevent or arrest experimental autoimmune encephalomyelitis (EAE). EAE is a disease resembling multiple sclerosis that can be induced in susceptible animals.
Copolymer-1 was developed by Drs. Sela, Arnon, and their co-workers at the Weizmann Institute (Rehovot, Israel). It was shown to suppress EAE (Eur. J. Immunol.  1:242; U.S. Pat. No. 3,849,550). More recently, copolymer-1 was shown to be beneficial for patients with the exacerbating-remitting form of multiple sclerosis (N. Engl. J. Med.  317:408). Patients treated with daily injections of copolymer-1 had fewer exacerbations and smaller increases in their disability status than the control patients.
Copolymer-1 is a mixture of polypeptides composed of alanine, glutamic acid, lysine, and tyrosine in a molar ratio of approximately 6:2:5:1, respectively. It is synthesized by chemically polymerizing the four amino acids forming products with average molecular weights of 23,000 daltons (U.S. Pat. No. 3,849,550).
It is an object of the present invention to provide an improved composition of copolymer-1.
The present invention relates to a composition of copolymer-1 substantially free of species of copolymer-1 having a molecular weight of over 40 kilodaltons (KDa).
The invention further relates to a copolymer-1 having over 75% of its molar fraction within the molecular weight range from about 2 KDa to about 20 KDa.
In addition, the invention relates to a copolymer-1 having an average molecular weight of about 4 to about 8.6 KDa.
As the courts have noted, the patent does not discuss "how" average molecular weight is to be measured; claim 1 does not use the term "average molecular weight."
Protected copolymer-1 is prepared as described by Teitelbaum et al. Eur. J. Immun. Vol. 1 p. 242 (1971) from the N-carboxyanhydrides of tyrosine (18 g), alanine (50 g), y-benzyl glutamate (35 g) and trifluoroacetyllysine (83 g) dissolved in 3.5 liters of dioxane.
The polymerization process is initiated by the addition of 0.01-0.02% diethylamine. The reaction mixture is stirred at room temperature for 24 hours and then poured into 10 liters water. The product (protected copolymer-1) is filtered, washed with water and dried. The removal of the gamma-benzyl blocking groups from the glutamate residue is carried out by treating the protected copolymer-1 with 33% hydrobromic acid in glacial acetic acid at room temperature for 6-12 hours with stirring. The product is poured into excess water, filtered, washed and dried, yielding the trifluoroacetyl-copolymer-1.
Protected copolymer-1 is prepared as described by Teitelbaum et al. Eur. J. Immun. Vol. 1 p. 242 (1971) from the N-carboxyanhydrides of tyrosine (18 g), alanine (50 g), .tau.-benzyl glutamate (35 g) and trifluoroacetyllysine (83 g) dissolved in 3.5 liters of dioxane.
The polymerization process is initiated by the addition of 0.01-0.02% diethylamine. The reaction mixture is stirred at room temperature for 24 hours and then poured into 10 liters water. The product (protected copolymer-1) is filtered, washed with water and dried.
Protected copolymer-1 is treated with 33% HBr in acetic acid which removes the omega benzyl protecting group from the 5-carboxylate of the glutamate residue and cleaves the polymer to smaller polypeptides. The time needed for obtaining copolymer-1 of molecular weight 7,000.+-.2,000 Da depends on the reaction temperature and the size of protected copolymer-1. At temperatures of between 20.degree.-28.degree. C. a test reaction is performed on every batch at different time periods for example, from 10-50 hours.
The results concerning the molecular weights of these small scale reactions are calculated and a curve of molecular weight against time is drawn. The time needed for obtaining molecular weight 7,000.+-.2,000 Da is calculated from the curve and performed on larger scale reaction. On average, working at 26.degree. C. the time period is 17 hours. The product is poured into excess water, filtered, washed and dried, yielding the trifluoroacetyl-copolymer-1.
20 g of trifluoroacetyl-copolymer-1 are dispersed in 1 liter of water to which 100 g piperidine are added. The mixture is stirred for 24 hours at room temperature and filtered. The solution of crude copolymer-1 is distributed into dialysis bags and dialyzed at 10.degree.-20.degree. C. against water until a pH=8 is attained. It is then dialyzed against about 0.3% acetic acid and again water until a pH=5.5-6.0 is obtained. This solution is then concentrated and lyophilized to dryness.
The application leading to the '808 patent was filed May 22, 1995.
Tech media’s patent coverage typically centers on two rather unseemly arenas: patent trolls, who profit from frivolous copyright lawsuits against larger companies, and tech titans slugging it out in court over minor device similarities.
For the first time in its 200-year history, the USPTO is expanding beyond Washington, D.C. to staff four satellite offices as regional resource centers.
To educate the next generation about the importance of intellectual property, the patent office sponsors a summer program for elementary school kids, during which they build simple devices and write patents for them.
Modernizing the USPTO's internal data systems is a priority, starting with establishing an integrated system to track patent progress from the minute an application is submitted. Revamping the internal system will also allow the USPTO to track distinct parts of a patent: Currently, the USPTO simply scans in patent forms and uploads them as PDFs. Updating the network will allow staff to search for patent data from within forms.
***Separately, the sitemeter icon has disappeared.
In a discussion of Intuitive Surgical, Forbes gets into issues of --patent trolling-- in the robotic surgery space.
One suit against Intuitive Surgical was brought by Alisanos LLC after Medicanica – a company that retained surgical robotics patents – transferred its patent portfolio to Alisanos in a “licensing arrangement.” That agreement ensured Medcanica received a portion of any licensing fees Alisanos could extract from other companies. Alisanos itself is owned by the Medici Portfolio, a company that offers patent “monetization” services. Medici states that its “fee for advisory services is contingent on making money for the client.” In short, Medici and Alisanos make money when they propound demands on other companies for alleged patent infringement.
Undoubtedly, there are inherent benefits to having companies that aid inventors seeking compensation when their intellectual property has been infringed upon. When, however, neither the company suing nor the company for whose benefit a suit is being brought are actually producing products or services, innovative companies are harmed without benefits being provided to the public. This practice of so-called patent privateering levies tangible costs for innovators globally. Just like pirates taxing commerce with unfair attacks on the high seas, innovative companies can be sapped of their capital and their vitality by patent litigation boutiques for hire. Often, the targets do not even know which company is launching an attack and who will ultimately benefit financially.
Freedom for companies to innovate without fear of frivolous patent lawsuits helps promote healthy competition and healthy patients. Competition in this marketplace benefits consumers by driving down costs of care, and a competitive marketplace is a healthy marketplace.
Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir.
an initial map database, not that it does not contain one.
his invention from Saito. See Appellee’s Br. 31.
that the system does not require an initial map database.
Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed.
review that construction de novo.’”) (quoting Teva, 135 S.
district court’s construction is therefore reversed.
device as described in claim 1.
Surfs up for Glatopa ( glatiramer acetate injection for relapsing MS )?
itself a question of fact, it is wrong. See Teva, 135 S. Ct.
patent simply by having an expert offer an opinion on it.
prosecution history is also part of the legal analysis.
Example 1 (Size Exclusion Chromatography or SEC). Id.
manipulation and calculations not disclosed in the specification.
Example 1 implies the use of Mp.
One notes that Mp is not an average.
About GlatopaTMOnce daily Glatopa (glatiramer acetate injection), developed in collaboration with Sandoz, is the first FDA-approved generic version of daily COPAXONE® 20 mg for patients with relapsing forms of multiple sclerosis. Produced entirely in the United States, once daily Glatopa has been determined by the FDA to be therapeutically equivalent to daily COPAXONE 20 mg, and is an "AP" rated, fully-substitutable product. As a therapeutically equivalent generic product, once daily Glatopa contains the same active ingredients, route of administration, strength, and dosage form, and can be substituted with the full expectation that Glatopa will produce the same clinical effect and safety profile as daily COPAXONE 20 mg. Daily COPAXONE 20 mg is one of the leading products marketed to treat multiple sclerosis, and is frequently prescribed as a first-line therapy in newly diagnosed patients.
On remand, CAFC holds that Teva's Group I claims are invalid for indefiniteness; Teva loses.
the Supreme Court’s Teva decision.
Group I claims are invalid for indefiniteness.
Thus, claim 1 of the ’808 patent is the sole unexpired Group I claim.
in the art in general or in the context of this patent.
itself a question of fact, it is wrong.
reasonable certainty, are questions of law.
prosecution history is a question of law.
defer to the district court on this legal question.
does not have a plain meaning to one of skill in the art.
lost the substantive patent case on remand.
Keep that in mind for Gevo/Butamax.
Wrong as to "government-granted monopoly" ! !
A patent is a right to exclude others from practicing the claims of the patent.
A monopoly pertains to exclusive control by one group of the means of producing or selling a commodity or service. In the classic case of diodes and triodes, the patent right to exclude meant that NEITHER patentee had exclusive control of producing triodes. This is a significant conceptual misunderstanding by Khanna.
Wrong as to "can't do" !! A patent right gives the inventor the ability to negotiate. That is "free markets and free competition." And patent owners have discretion. The Wright Brothers never sued any amateur or hobbyist for infringing their patent. They were concerned with those who profited by the invention of the Wright Brothers, as manifested by the patent claims. So, the government is not saying these are the things you can't do; the government is saying we are giving property rights, for a limited time, to the inventor, in return for the knowledge the inventor has made available. If you want to do these things, negotiate with the inventor.
Since the solution to many public health problems depends on research, it is critical for the progress and well-being for the patients that we can trust the scientific literature. Misconduct and poor laboratory practice in science threatens the scientific progress, leads to loss of productivity and increased healthcare costs, and endangers lives of patients. Data duplication may represent one of challenges related to these problems. In order to estimate the frequency of data duplication in life science literature, a systematic screen through 120 original scientific articles published in three different cancer related journals [journal impact factor (IF) <5, 5–10 and >20] was completed. The study revealed a surprisingly high proportion of articles containing data duplication. For the IF < 5 and IF > 20 journals, 25 % of the articles were found to contain data duplications. The IF 5–10 journal showed a comparable proportion (22.5 %). The proportion of articles containing duplicated data was comparable between the three journals and no significant correlation to journal IF was found. The editorial offices representing the journals included in this study and the individual authors of the detected articles were contacted to clarify the individual cases. The editorial offices did not reply and only 1 out of 29 cases were apparently clarified by the authors, although no supporting data was supplied. This study questions the reliability of life science literature, it illustrates that data duplications are widespread and independent of journal impact factor and call for a reform of the current peer review and retraction process of scientific publishing.
LBE served on the "Ethics Task Force" of the American Chemical Society from 2000-2002. At the time, there was no procedure for third party correction of mistakes that appeared in the Journal of the American Chemical Society.
LBE was victimized by this procedural failing, by a paper published in JACS, which made a false statement about LBE's work on (poly(carbon monofluoride)), also published in JACS. Of patent relevance was an inaccurate paper in JACS which played a significant role in the litigation of SKB's US '639 on nabumetone (Relafen).
contains a fast-dissolving form of paclitaxel.
see Cephalon, Inc. v. Celgene Corp.
985 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
usage.” Appellants’ Br.18 (quoting Cephalon, 985 F.
term . .. [is] plainly a question of fact.’” Teva, 135 S. Ct.
at 838 (quoting Harries v. Air King Prods., Co.
question of fact reviewable for clear error.
Jawbone is suing Fitbit for infringing on its patented wearable technology. It’s bad news for Fitbit, the biggest activity-tracker maker in the world — but if Jawbone wins, it will also mean trouble for Apple, Samsung, and basically any other wearable company that attempts to track movement and equate it to health.
If Jawbone’s patents hold up, they would be ammunition against the Apple Watch — which, with Apple’s clout and capital, threatens to swallow both Jawbone and Fitbit’s market share.
If that happens, it wouldn’t be the first time a company successfully went after a target and then took on a bigger rival. In 2001, NTP, a Virginia patent holding company, sued Research in Motion, the company behind BlackBerry, for allegedly infringing on its wireless email patents. After NTP won a $612.5 million settlement, it went on from 2007 to 2010 to sue more than a dozen other tech giants, including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile, for infringing on those patents, too.
**IPBiz notes that it is "standard operating procedure" to seek licenses from smaller entities (and sue such companies if licensing talks break down).
Fitbit says it has more than 200 granted and pending patents. (A search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office turns up about 100 patents granted from 2012 onward.) Meanwhile, Jawbone, including BodyMedia, claims to have “hundreds” of granted and pending patents (about 150 granted patents going back to 2001 show up online).
IPBiz found 96 issued US patents with assignee Fitbit.
g) cause the at least one user interface element to output a first goal celebration indicator associated with the first biometric performance goal after c) and responsive to f) when the input signal is received at a second time after the first time.
A portable monitoring device, adapted to couple to a body of a user, to calculate a number of stairs or flights of stairs traversed by the user, the portable monitoring device comprising: a housing having a physical size and shape that is adapted to couple to the body of the user; a motion sensor, disposed in the housing, to detect motion of the user and, in response thereto, to generate data which is representative of motion of the user; an altitude sensor, disposed in the housing, to sample an altitude of the user in response to a sample signal, wherein, in response to sampling the altitude of the user, the altitude sensor generates data which is representative of a change in altitude of the user; and processing circuitry, disposed in the housing and coupled to the motion sensor and the altitude sensor, to: generate the sample signal using the data which is representative of motion of the user, and calculate a number of stairs or flights of stairs traversed by the user using the data which is representative of motion of the user and the data which is representative of a change in altitude of the user.
An article in ManagingIP [An Unfit Lawsuit ] states that Jawbone has 97 granted US patents.
The criminal complaint alleges that Rukavina retired from PPG in July of 2012. As early as June 2014, Rukavina passed proprietary and confidential information to J.T.M.G. Co., a glass company based in Jiangsu, China, that specializes in automotive and other specialty glass. The trade secret information he passed included PPG’s manufacturing specifications for windows, which are made of synthetic plastics and used for high-speed transportation, including airplanes.
Rukavina went on to write that he was “forced out,” and that had he not agreed to leave PPG, he would have received only $18,000 in severance pay instead of $100,000.
PPG says it’s cooperating with authorities, but won’t comment because the investigation is ongoing.
Fifteen Chinese nationals — almost all in their 20s — have been indicted by a Pittsburgh grand jury for using fake Chinese passports and hired test-takers to take SATs and other standardized exams in order to gain admission to American universities.
U.S. Attorney David Hickton outlined the first-of-its-kind conspiracy to KDKA money editor Jon Delano on Thursday.
***Separately, as to a matter of timing, the law firm Orick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP had posted an article on the Rukavina matter, titled Fighting Back: Identifying Risks Posed by an Angry Current or Former Employee on 2 June 2015, five days before Rukavina's suicide.
PPG appears to have learned of Rukavina’s work with the Chinese manufacturer after J.T.M.G. contacted one of PPG’s subcontractors about purchasing molds based on PPG’s designs and specifications.
Joule, the pioneer of liquid fuels from recycled CO2, today announced the issuance of an additional patent on the direct, continuous production of hydrocarbon fuels – extending its ability to target the highest-value molecules of the petroleum distillation process and generate them on demand from sunlight and CO2.
U.S. Patent #9,034,629, issued on May 19, covers both the cyanobacterium and the process for directly converting CO2 into medium-chain alkanes, which are the molecular basis of diesel, jet fuel and gasoline.
wherein the engineered cyanobacterium comprises recombinant genes encoding an alkane deformylative monooxygenase having EC number 4.1.99.5, a thioesterase having EC number 3.1.2.14, and a carboxylic acid reductase having EC number 1.2.99.6, wherein the alkane deformylative monooxygenase is encoded by adm, the thioesterase is encoded by fatB or fatB2, and the carboxylic acid reductase is encoded by carB, wherein the thioesterase converts C(.sub.8-12) acyl-ACP to C(.sub.8-12) fatty acid, wherein the carboxylic acid reductase converts C(.sub.8-12) fatty acid to C(.sub.8-12) aldehyde, wherein the alkane deformylative monooxygenase converts C(.sub.8-12) aldehyde to C(.sub.7-11) alkane, and wherein the engineered cyanobacterium produces at least one of heptane, nonane, and undecane in an amount greater than an otherwise identical cyanobacterium, cultured under identical conditions, but lacking recombinant genes encoding alkane deformylative monooxygenase, thioesterase, and carboxylic acid reductase.
One or more recombinant genes encoding one or more enzymes having enzyme activities which catalyze the production of medium chain-length alkanes are identified and selected. The enzyme activities include: an alkane deformylative monooxygenase activity, a thioesterase activity, a carboxylic acid reductase activity, and a phosphopanthetheinyl transferase activity, a long-chain fatty acid CoA-ligase activity, and/or a long-chain acyl-CoA reductase activity. Such genes and enzymes can be those described in Tables 1 and 2.
The selected genes are cloned into an expression vector. For example, adm-carB-entD-fatB or adm-acrM-fadD-fatB (or combinations of homologs thereof) are cloned into one or more vectors. See FIG. 6. The genes can be under inducible control (such as the urea-repressible nir07 promoter or the cumate-inducible cum02 promoter). The genes may or may not be expressed operonically; and one or more of the genes can be placed under constitutive control such that when the other gene(s) are induced, the genes under constitutive control are already expressed. For example, one might express adm, carB, and entD constitutively while placing fatty-acid-generating fatB under inducible control; thus when fatty acids are made by fatB after induction, the remainder of the pathway is already present.
One or more vectors are selected and transformed into a microorganism (e.g., cyanobacteria). The cells are grown to a suitable optical density. In some instances cells are grown to a suitable optical density in an uninduced state, and then an induction signal is applied to commence alkane production.
Alkanes are produced by the transformed cells. The alkanes generally have 7, 8, 9, 10, or 11 carbon atoms. In some instances, alkanes are detected. In some instances, alkanes are quantified. In some instances, alkanes are collected.
The claim to priority: This application is related to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/756,973, filed Jan. 25,2013.
There was a final rejection in the case on 9 October 2014. Among other items, there were rejections over Roessler, including US 8,633,002. Joule Unlimited, in papers and in an interview on 13 January 2015, pointed to the lack of working examples in the cited prior art of Roessler.
“It’s a broad-spectrum weed killer, but it’s killing plants, too,” said Rep. Thomas Massie, a Kentucky Republican and MIT graduate who said he holds 29 patents.
Mr. Massie is leading the fight alongside Reps. Dana Rohrabacher, California Republican, and Marcy Kaptur, Ohio Democrat.
Mr. Massie said larger companies are not dissuaded from ripping off ideas, because the law weakens a judge’s ability to freeze the company’s ability to ship products once they are caught.
12 of the ’840 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 1122, para. 2.
from the written description into the claims.”).
graphical display to those examples and embodiments.
examples in the specification.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N.
virtual classroom is required by claim 8 of the ‘840 patent.
I dissent from that portion of this opinion.
§ 112, para. 6 merits attention.
judicially-created § 112, para. 6 presumptions.
Order in this case issued this date.
court en banc changes the law and practice of 35 U.S.C.
the strictures set forth in the statute.

matches:
v.
v.
v.
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§154
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Application No. 61
§ 1122
v.
§ 112
§ 112


In Re the Marriage of: Douglas Wayne Starnes, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Sharon Gulledge Starnes, Respondent. C4-97-1712, Court of Appeals Unpublished, February 17, 1998.
Appellant Douglas Starnes alleges that the district court abused its discretion when it modified the parties' visitation schedule. Respondent Sharon Gulledge Starnes filed a notice of review claiming the district court abused its discretion when it failed to award her all of her claimed costs and fees. We affirm.
The parties were divorced in 1992, and have one minor child. Respondent was awarded sole physical custody of the child with appellant granted visitation. The visitation schedule sought to accommodate appellant's irregular work schedule as an airline pilot by requiring the parties to cooperate in coordinating visitation with appellant's days off work. The visitation schedule was unsuccessful and resulted in numerous difficulties between the parties. The child suffered because of the parties' inability to make the visitation schedule work. Ultimately, respondent moved the district court for a modification of visitation and prevailed. Appellant seeks review of the district court's change to the visitation schedule and respondent seeks review of the district court's award of costs and fees.
The district court's discretion in deciding visitation questions is "extensive" and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Al-Zouhayli v. Al-Zouhayli, 486 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. App. 1992) (quoting Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45-56 (Minn. 1978)).
Under the statute governing modification of visitation, the "court shall modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child." Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (1996). On the other hand, the court may not restrict visitation rights without a finding of endangerment or the noncustodial parent's chronic and unreasonable failure to comply with court-ordered visitation. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subds. 5 (1), (2) (1996); see also Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993) (defining restriction as "[a] substantial alteration of visitation rights").
Appellant's time with his child has been modified and not restricted. Appellant's speculation that he will have only five days of visitation per month under the new schedule is unsupported by the record. The record reveals that under the previous visitation schedule, appellant was able to see the child on weekends; some months he saw the child every weekend. It was not an abuse of the district court's discretion, therefore, to assume that appellant will continue to be able to see the child every other weekend. In fact, under the new visitation schedule, appellant will be with his child one or two weeknights and every other Friday through Sunday. During months with three weekends, appellant could have as many as 17 visitation days per month, eight more than under the previous schedule. The change in the visitation schedule did not substantially alter appellant's visitation rights and, therefore, cannot be categorized as a restriction. See Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 4 (restriction is substantial alteration of visitation rights). We affirm the district court's discretion in modifying the visitation schedule.
Having determined that the district court modified appellant's visitation rights, we next address whether the change was in the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5. A district court has broad discretion in this area. We hold that the district court properly acted in the child's best interest because the previous schedule was unworkable and negatively affected the child. The new schedule will provide stability because the dates of appellant's visitation will be known in advance. Appellant was unable or unwilling to make the previous flexible schedule work and the child suffered. By enacting a schedule aimed at reducing the parties' conflict and providing stability for the child, the district court's modification was in the child's best interests.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by adopting verbatim respondent's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The verbatim adoption of a party's proposed findings, however, is not reversible error per se; rather, the "clearly erroneous" standard applies. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 408 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 1987). After a review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not adopt respondent's proposed findings and conclusions verbatim but rather accepted some, modified some, and omitted others. The district court's findings and conclusions were "detailed, specific and sufficient enough to enable meaningful" appellate review. Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). Accordingly, its findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous.
Finally, respondent argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded her only $2,000 of the approximately $7,000 she sought in costs and fees. The allowance of attorney fees rests almost entirely in the discretion of the trial court. Solon v. Solon, 255 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn. 1977). "[O]nly rarely will a trial court's decision regarding attorney fees be overturned on appeal." Burns v. Burns, 466 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. App. 1991). The record provides no basis to support that the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm its award of costs and fees.


FIRE > Freedom of Speech & Expression > Public Forum and Private Property > UNITED STATES et al. v. GRACE et al.
Whether a federal statutewhich bans picketing and the distribution of leaflets on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Courtviolates the 1st Amendment.
Affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part. Petitioning party did not receive a favorable disposition.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT*172 Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Marc Richman.
Robert L. Gnaizda and Sidney M. Wolinsky filed a brief for the League of United Latin American Citizens as amicus curiae.
In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the “display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public *173 notice any party, organization, or movement” in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds, violates the First Amendment.
In May 1978 appellee Thaddeus Zywicki, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building, distributed leaflets to passerby. The leaflets were reprints of a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from a United States Senator concerning the removal of unfit judges from the bench. A Supreme Court police officer approached Zywicki and told him, accurately, that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the Supreme Court grounds, which includes the sidewalk. Zywicki left.
In January 1980 Zywicki again visited the sidewalk in front of the Court to distribute pamphlets containing information about forthcoming meetings and events concerning “the oppressed peoples of Central America.” Zywicki again was approached by a Court police officer and was informed that the distribution of leaflets on the Court grounds was prohibited by law. The officer indicated that Zywicki would be arrested if the leafletting continued. Zywicki left.
Zywicki reappeared in February 1980 on the sidewalk in front of the Court and distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala. Zywicki had consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities and had been informed that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of *174 justice. Zywicki again was told by a Court police officer that he would be subject to arrest if he persisted in his leafletting. Zywicki complained that he was being denied a right that others were granted, referring to the newspaper vending machines located on the sidewalk. Nonetheless, Zywicki left the grounds.
Around noon on March 17, 1980, appellee Mary Grace entered upon the sidewalk in front of the Court and began to display a four foot by two and a half foot sign on which was inscribed the verbatim text of the First Amendment. A Court police officer approached Grace and informed her that she would have to go across the street if she wished to display the sign. Grace was informed that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited her conduct and that if she did not cease she would be arrested. Grace left the grounds.
On May 13, 1980, Zywicki and Grace filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought an injunction against continued enforcement of 40 U. S. C. § 13k and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. On August 7, 1980, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellees took an appeal, arguing that the District Court’s action was improper and that the Court of Appeals should grant the relief requested in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous and went on to strike down § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights in a *175 public place.Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 665 F. 2d 1193 (1981).
The Government appealed from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982).
Section 13k prohibits two distinct activities: it is unlawful either “to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds,” or “to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” Each appellee appeared individually on the public sidewalks to engage in expressive activity, and it goes without saying that the threat of arrest to which each appellee was subjected was for violating the prohibition against the display of a “banner or device.” Accordingly, our review is limited to the latter portion of the statute. Likewise, the controversy presented by appellees concerned their right to use the public sidewalks surrounding the Court building for the communicative activities they sought to carry out, and we shall address only whether the proscriptions of § 13k are constitutional as applied to the public sidewalks.
Our normal course is first to “ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] *176 question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Appellees did not make a statutory construction argument before the lower courts, but at oral argument, the question was raised whether § 13k reached the types of conduct in which appellees engaged, and we should answer it. We agree with the United States that the statute covers the particular conduct of Zywicki or Grace and that it is therefore proper to reach the constitutional question involved in this case.
The statutory ban is on the display of a “flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 40 U. S. C. § 13k. It is undisputed that Grace’s picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment falls within the description of a “flag, banner, or device.” Although it is less obvious, it is equally uncontested that Zywicki’s leaflets fall within the proscription as well.
We also accept the Government’s contention, not contested by appellees, that almost any sign or leaflet carrying a communication, including Grace’s picket sign and Zywicki’s leaflets, would be “designed or adapted to bring into public notice [a] party, organization or movement.” Such a construction brings some certainty to the reach of the statute and hence avoids what might be other challenges to its validity.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. E. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 *177 U. S. 455, 460 (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
It is also true that “public places” historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be “public forums.” See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, supra, at 460; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 515 (1976); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939). In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Perry Education Assn., supra, at 45. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647, 654 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Perry Education Assn., supra, at 46; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981).
Publicly owned or operated property does not become a “public forum” simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976). Although whether the property has been “generally opened to the public” is a factor to consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is not determinative of the question. We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish “to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever *178 and however and wherever they please.” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966). See, e. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555 (1965) (Cox I); Cox II, supra, at 563-564. There is little doubt that in some circumstances the government may ban the entry on to public property that is not a “public forum” of all persons except those who have legitimate business on the premises. The government, “no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderley v. Florida, supra, at 47. See Cox II, supra, at 563-564.
It is argued that the Supreme Court building and grounds fit neatly within the description of nonpublic forum property. Although the property is publicly owned, it has not been traditionally held open for the use of the public for expressive activities. As Greer v. Spock, supra, teaches, the property is not transformed into “public forum” property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and the public is admitted to the building during specified hours. Under this view it would be necessary only to determine that the restrictions imposed by § 13k are reasonable in light of the use to which the building and grounds are dedicated and that there is no discrimination on the basis of content. We need not make that judgment at this time, however, because § 13k covers the public sidewalks as well as the building and grounds inside *179 the sidewalks. As will become evident, we hold that § 13k may not be applied to the public sidewalks.
The prohibitions imposed by § 13k technically cover the entire grounds of the Supreme Court as defined in 40 U. S. C. § 13p. That section describes the Court grounds as extending to the curb of each of the four streets enclosing the block on which the building is located. Included within this small geographical area, therefore, are not only the building, the plaza and surrounding promenade, lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D. C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently. Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property. In this respect, the present case differs from Greer v. Spock, supra. In Greer, the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within an enclosed military reservation, Fort Dix, N. J., and were thus separated from the streets and sidewalks of any municipality. That is not true of the sidewalks surrounding *180 the Court. There is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave. In United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 133 (1981), we stated that “Congress . . . may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the `public forum’ status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums. . . .” The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of § 13k’s prohibition, however, results in the destruction of public forum status that is at least presumptively impermissible. Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property. The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes.
The Government submits that § 13k qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which may be imposed to restrict communicative activities on public forum property such as sidewalks. The argument is that the inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court grounds but should focus on “the vicinity of the Supreme Court” or “the public places of Washington, D. C.” Brief for Appellants 16, n. 5. Viewed in this light, the Government contends that there are sufficient alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as the streets around the Court or the sidewalks across those streets to permit § 13k to be considered a reasonable “place” restriction having only a minimal *181 impact on expressive activity. We are convinced, however, that the section, which totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction primarily because it has an insufficient nexus with any of the public interests that may be thought to undergird § 13k. Our reasons for this conclusion will become apparent below, where we decide that § 13k, insofar as its prohibitions reach to the public sidewalks, is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justification.
Section 13k was part of an 11-section statute, enacted in 1949, “[r]elating to the policing of the building and grounds of the Supreme Court of the United States.” 63 Stat. 616, 40 U. S. C. §§ 13f-13p. The occasion for its passage was the termination of the practice by District of Columbia authorities of appointing Supreme Court guards as special policemen for the District. This action left the Supreme Court police force without authority to make arrests and enforce the law in the building and on the grounds of the Court. The Act, which was soon forthcoming, was modeled on the legislation relating to the Capitol grounds, 60 Stat. 718, 40 U. S. C. §§ 193a-193m. It authorizes the appointment by the Marshal of special officers “for duty in connection with the policing of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and adjacent streets.” Sections 2-6 of the Act prohibit certain kinds of *182 conduct in the building or grounds. Section 6, codified as 40 U. S. C. § 13k, is at issue here. Other sections authorize the Marshal to issue regulations, provide penalties for violations of the Act or regulations, and authorize the Court’s special police to make arrests for violation of the Act’s prohibitions or of any law of the United States occurring within the building and grounds and on the adjacent streets. Section 11 of the Act, 13 U. S. C. § 13p, defines the limits of the Court’s grounds as including the sidewalks surrounding the building.
Based on its provisions and legislative history, it is fair to say that the purpose of the Act was to provide for the protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum. Section 6, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, was one of the provisions apparently designed for these purposes. At least, no special reason was stated for its enactment.
We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question whether a total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes. There is no suggestion, for example, that appellees’ activities in any way obstructed the sidewalks or access to the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way interfered with the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds. As we have said, the building’s perimeter sidewalks are indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in the city that are normally open to the conduct that is at issue here and that § 13k forbids. A total ban on that conduct is no more necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the public sidewalks surrounding the building than on any other sidewalks in the city. Accordingly, § 13k cannot be justified on this basis.
The United States offers another justification for § 13k that deserves our attention. It is said that the federal courts represent an independent branch of the Government and that *183 their decisionmaking processes are different from those of the other branches. Court decisions are made on the record before them and in accordance with the applicable law. The views of the parties and of others are to be presented by briefs and oral argument. Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing, or pressure groups. Neither, the Government urges, should it appear to the public that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence or that picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or proper way of appealing to or influencing the Supreme Court. Hence, we are asked to hold that Congress was quite justified in preventing the conduct in dispute here from occurring on the sidewalks at the edge of the Court grounds.
As was the case with the maintenance of law and order on the Court grounds, we do not discount the importance of this proffered purpose for § 13k. But, again, we are unconvinced that the prohibitions of § 13k that are at issue here sufficiently serve that purpose to sustain its validity insofar as the public sidewalks on the perimeter of the grounds are concerned. Those sidewalks are used by the public like other public sidewalks. There is nothing to indicate to the public that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds or are in any way different from other public sidewalks in the city. We seriously doubt that the public would draw a different inference from a lone picketer carrying a sign on the sidewalks around the building than it would from a similar picket on the sidewalks across the street.
We thus perceive insufficient justification for § 13k’s prohibition of carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building. We hold that under the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable *184 time, place, and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13l.
The judgment below is accordingly affirmed to the extent indicated by this opinion and is otherwise vacated.
I would hold 40 U. S. C. § 13k unconstitutional on its face. The statute in no way distinguishes the sidewalks from the rest of the premises, and excising the sidewalks from its purview does not bring it into conformity with the First Amendment. Visitors to this Court do not lose their First Amendment rights at the edge of the sidewalks any more than “students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Since the continuing existence of the statute will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, there is no virtue in deciding its constitutionality on a piecemeal basis.
When a citizen is “in a place where [he] has every right to be,” Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966) (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J.), he cannot be denied the opportunity to express his views simply because the Government has not chosen to designate the area as a forum for public discussion. While the right to conduct expressive activities in such areas as streets, parks, and sidewalks is reinforced by their traditional use for purposes of assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.), that right ultimately rests on the principle that “one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943) (emphasis added). Every citizen lawfully present in a *185 public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in question, whether that place is a school, a library, a private lunch counter, the grounds of a statehouse, the grounds of the United States Capitol, a bus terminal, an airport, or a welfare center. As we stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972), “[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” “[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939).
Viewed in this light, 40 U. S. C. § 13k is plainly unconstitutional on its face. The statute is not a reasonable regulation *186 of time, place, and manner, cf., e. g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87-89 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941), for it applies at all times, covers the entire premises, and, as interpreted by the Court, proscribes even the handing out of a leaflet and, presumably, the wearing of a campaign button as well.
Nor does the statute merely forbid conduct that is incompatible with the primary activity being carried out in this Court. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 843 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). In contrast to 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), 40 U. S. C. § 13k is not limited to expressive activities that are intended to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice. In Cox the Court stressed that a prohibition of expression “unrelated to any judicial proceedings” would raise “entirely different considerations.” 379 U. S., at 567. The statute at issue here is a far cry from *187 both 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox, for it imposes a blanket prohibition on the “display” of “any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” (Emphasis added.) The application of the statute does not depend upon whether the flag, banner, or device in any way concerns a case before this Court. So sweeping a prohibition is scarcely necessary to protect the operations of this Court, and in my view cannot constitutionally be applied either to the Court grounds or to the areas inside the Court building that are open to the public.
I would therefore hold the prohibition unconstitutional on its face. We have repeatedly recognized that a statute which sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment should be struck down on its face. “The existence of such a statute . . . results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion *188 that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (footnote omitted). As JUSTICE BRENNAN stated in his opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963), First Amendment freedoms “are delicate and vulnerable,” and “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.” I would not leave visitors to this Court subject to the continuing threat of imprisonment if they dare to exercise their First Amendment rights once inside the sidewalks.
On three occasions Zywicki distributed leaflets and handbills. I would not construe that activity as the “display” of any “flag, banner, or device.” A typical passerby would not have learned Zywicki’s message from the “display” of his literature. Only after the material left Zywicki’s possession would his message have become intelligible.
I see no reason to stretch the language of the statute to encompass the activities of either Zywicki or Grace. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we should not infer that *189 Congress intended to abridge free expression in circumstances not plainly covered by the language of the statute. As a matter of judicial restraint, we should avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions.
Because neither of the appellees has violated the statute, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it requires that appellants be restrained from causing appellees’ arrest for engaging in the activities disclosed by this record.
[*] A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Arthur B. Spitzer, and Charles S. Sims filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
“It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 63 Stat. 617.
 The case Zywicki’s counsel referred to is United States v. Ebner, No. M-12487-79 (D. C. Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1980). The case is currently on appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; that court has postponed decision pending the outcome of the present appeal.
 Grace v. Burger, 524 F. Supp. 815 (1980).
 The court justified its action in this regard by relying primarily on the fact that the case presented a pure question of law that had been fully briefed and argued by the parties both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals. Because the appellants do not take issue with the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ action in addressing the merits rather than remanding to the District Court, we will assume that such action was proper without deciding that question. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976).
 Although the Court of Appeals opinion purports to hold § 13k unconstitutional on its face without any indication that the holding is limited to that portion of the statute that deals with the display of a “flag, banner, or device,” the decision must be read as limited to that prohibition.
 Because the prohibitions of § 13k are expressly made applicable to the entire grounds under § 13p, the statute cannot be construed to exclude the sidewalks. Thus we must consider Congress’ extension of § 13k’s prohibitions to the sidewalks to be a reasoned choice.
 Section 13k does not prohibit all expressive conduct: it does not, for example, purport to prohibit any oral expression, on any subject. It is unnecessary, however, to determine what conduct other than the picketing and leafletting at issue here may be fairly within the terms of the statute because the statute at least prohibits the conduct at issue here. We do note that the current Marshal of the Court has interpreted and applied the statute to prohibit picketing and leafletting, but not other expressive conduct. See Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 378, n. 7, 665 F. 2d 1193, 1196, n. 7 (1981). Interpreted and applied as an absolute ban on these two types of expressive conduct, it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral.
 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 512-513 (1969).
 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966); id., at 146, and n. 5 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment).
 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 201-202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
 Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (DC), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 972 (1972).
 Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F. 2d 83 (CA2), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 940 (1968).
 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973).
 Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F. 2d 1319 (CA2), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 838 (1974).
 Separate provisions of the United States Code also make it a crime to solicit contributions or give a speech on the premises. 40 U. S. C. §§ 13h and 13j.
“Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana . . . shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” La. Rev. Stat. § 14:401 (Supp. 1962).
 I agree with the Court that the clause of 40 U. S. C. § 13k prohibiting processions or assemblages is not before us, since neither of the appellees engaged in a procession or assemblage.
 E. g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 604, 609-610 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 19 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938).
Indeed, to protect third parties not before the Court, we have held that even “a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.” Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 634 (1980) (emphasis added). E. g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432-433 (1963). If such a showing is made, the statute will be struck down on its face.
 A person who violates the statute is subject to imprisonment for 60 days or a $100 fine, or both. 40 U. S. C. § 13m.
[*] “A course or series of actions and endeavours on the part of a body of persons, moving or tending more or less continuously towards some special end.” 6 Oxford English Dictionary 729 (1933) (“movement,” definition 6). See also Webster’s International Dictionary 1604 (2d ed. 1934) (“movement,” definition 4).


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