text:
S. L. Gilmore and H. J. Leovy, for appellee.
This suit was determined in the court below upon demurrer to the bill. The question presented is whether the bill set forth a cause of action entitling the appellant, who was the plaintiff below, to the relief asked.
The case made by the bill is substantially as follows: By the fifth section of the act of the general assembly of Louisiana commonly known as 'Act No. 33, Extra Session of 1877,' it was provided that the New Orleans Water Works Company, in its corporate capacity, should own and possess the privileges acquired by the city of New Orleans from the Commercial Bank; that it should have, for 50 years from the passage of the act, the exclusive privilege of supplying the city of New Orleans and its inhabitants with water from the Mississippi river, or any other stream or river, by means of pipes and conduits, and for erecting or constructing any necessary works or engines or machines for that purpose; that it might contract for, purchase, or lease any land or lots of ground, or the right to pass over and enter the same from time to time, as occasion required, through which it might be necessary to convey the water into said city, or to distribute the same to the inhabitants of said city, and construct, dig, or cause to be opened any canals or trenches whatsoever for the conducting of the water of the rivers from any place or places it deemed fit, and raise and construct such dykes, mounds, reservoirs as might be required for securing and carrying a fully supply of pure water to the city and its inhabitants; enter upon and survey such lands as it might think proper, in order to ascertain [164 U.S. 471, 473] the best mode of furnishing a supply of water; and lay and place any number of conduits or pipes or aqueducts, and cleanse and repair the same, through or over any of the lands or streets of the city, provided the same should not be an obstruction to commerce or free circulation.
After this constitutional provision took effect the city council of New Orleans passed, November 15, 1882, an ordinance allowing Robert E. Rivers, the lessee of the St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans, 'the right of way and privilege to lay a water pipe from the Mississippi river, at any point opposite the head of Common or Gravier streets, through either of these streets to said hotel, its front and side streets, with all needed attachments and appurtenances, and to distribute said water through said hotel as said Rivers, or lessee, may desire from said pipes,' etc.
Rivers being about to take the benefit of this ordinance, the waterworks company commenced suit against him in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Louisiana, in which it sought a decree perpetually restraining him from laying pipes, conduits, or mains in the public streets of New Orleans for the purpose of conveying water from the Mississippi river to his hotel. The company proceeded in [164 U.S. 471, 474] that suit upon the ground that it had a valid contract with the state and city for an exclusive right for the full term of 50 years from March 31, 1877, of supplying the city of New Orleans and its inhabitants, other than those contiguous to the Mississippi river, with water from that stream by means of pipes and conduits placed in the streets of that city, and that the obligation of that contract was protected by the constitution of the United States against impairment by any act of the state. Rivers claimed the right to proceed with the construction of pipes, mains, and conduits under the authority of the ordinance above referred to, which rested for its validity, as he claimed, upon the constitution and laws of Louisiana.
The bill filed by the waterworks company against Rivers was dismissed in the circuit court, and upon appeal to this court the judgment of dismissal was reversed, with the direction to enter a decree perpetually restraining Rivers, as prayed for in the bill filed by the waterworks compny. The opinion in Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 , 6 Sup. Ct. 273, states fully the grounds upon which this court proceeded.
In 1882 the St. Tammany Waterworks Company was organized under the general laws of Louisiana for the purpose of furnishing and supplying the inhabitants of the city of New Orleans and other localities contiguous to the line of its works with an ample supply of clear and wholesome water from such rivers, streams, and other fountain sources as might be found most available for such purpose, by means of pipes and conduits. The company being about to take steps to obtain authority for bringing into New Orleans the waters of the Bogue Falaya river, in the parish of St. Tammany, and distributing the same by means of pipes, mains, and conduits placed in the streets of the city parallel with those constructed by the New Orleans Waterworks Company, the latter corporation instituted, in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Louisiana, a suit for an injunction to restrain the other company from carrying out its scheme. On appeal from the decree of the circuit court granting the [164 U.S. 471, 475] injunction, this court reaffirmed the principles announced in the Rivers Case, saying: 'As the exclusive right of the appellee to supply the city of New Orleans and its inhabitants with water was not restricted to water drawn from the Mississippi river, but embraced water from any other stream, it is impossible to distinguish this case in principle from that of Waterworks Co. v. Rivers. Upon the authority of the latter case it must be held that the carrying out by the appellant of its scheme for a system of waterworks in New Orleans would be in violation of the rights of the appellee, and that the state constitution of 1879, so far as it assumes to withdraw the exclusive privileges granted to the appellee, is inconsistent with the clause of the national constitution forbidding a state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Waterworks, 120 U.S. 64, 67 , 7 S. Sup. Ct. 405, 407.
The present suit was brought February 8, 1894, by the New Orleans Water Works Company against the city of New Orleans. The bill sets out the foregoing facts, and gives the history of the two cases to which reference has been made.
It further alleged that after the above adjudications the defendant continued to make and promulgate ordinances conferring upon individuals and corporations the right to lay pipes and mains through the streets and public ways of New Orleans to premises not contiguous to the rivers and waters with which said pipes and mains connected, from which the water supply is drawn and consumed within the city of New Orleans, such premises not being included in the proviso in the plaintiff's charter relating to the owners of property contiguous to said waters; that the defendant has continued to pass and promulgate such ordinances, and threatens to continue to do so in the future; that the ordinances set forth by copy, and contained in Exhibit C2, filed with and made a part of the bill, had been adopted and promulgated by the defendant in open defiance and disregard of the plaintiff's rights; that the plaintiff is advised and believes that the said ordinances set forth in said Exhibit C constitute but a portion of those of like character adopted and promulgated by the defendant; [164 U.S. 471, 476] that in nearly all instances where said ordinances have been adopted and promulgated the parties named as the beneficiaries or grantees therein have availed themselves of the said act of the city to lay pipes and mains through the streets and public ways of the city, and established pumping machinery to draw water through said mains for a water supply; that in the instances where they have not already availed themselves of this supposed warrant to establish waterworks of their own they are intending to so establish pipes and mains, and will do so unless restrained therefrom by the courts; and that none of the premises referred to in said ordinances are contiguous to the Mississippi river, or within the proviso contained in the plaintiff's charter and contract with the state relating to or affecting the owners of property contiguous to the river.
The bill also alleged that most of the persons and corporations named as grantees in said ordinances are large consumers of water, and, but for said wrongful act of the city, would be customers of and consumers of the water provided as public water supply by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff has pipes and mains so located that it could supply all of said premises with water, and should receive recompense and profit thereby; that its franchises, and the income that should accrue to it from public water supply, have been lessened, and its revenues diminished, by a sum exceeding $30,000 in the past, and that such loss of income and revenue is continuing, and, if continued during the lifetime or corporate existence of the plaintiff, would amount to many thousand dollars more; that many of the said ordinances of the city of New Orleans complained of contain on the face thereof a condition that said license or grant of the right to lay pipes and mains and pump water from the river shall continue only during the will of the defendant; than in the cases where that provision is not contained in the text of the ordinances the city has full and complete power to revoke and recall such fraudulent and wrongful grants and permissions at its will, and thereby cease to countenance said wrongdoers, or furnish them with any colorable right to continue and maintain said pipes and mains [164 U.S. 471, 477] so wrongfully established, and in good conscience should recall, revoke, and expunge all of said pretended ordinances and regulations of its own motion, without compulsion; that by reason of the said wrongful acts of the defendant, and the large number of grants and privileges made by the city, it is practically impossible for the plaintiff to obtain full and adequate relief through proceedings instituted against the said several persons and corporations receiving said supposed grants and authority to establish pipes and pumping machinery for the purpose of drawing water from the Mississippi river by reason of the great delays and the enormous expense of litigating with so many several defendants, and the multiplicity of suits and actions necessary to restrain said wrongful acts by proceeding against the several supposed grantees.
It was further alleged that the defendant and other persons proposing to assail the plaintiff's rights contend that there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the eighteenth section of plaintiff's charter; that at the time of the acceptance of its charter and grant the plaintiff was advised, and, it believes, correctly, that said section 18 could only lawfully be construed as conferring upon the city the right to grant to privilege of laying pipes to such person or persons or corporations as may, at the time of such grant, be the owner of, or in the lawful possession of, real estate or property extending down to the river front, and touching the said river, and having riparian rights on the banks of said river, subject only to such public servitude or right of way as may be impressed upon said property by the operation of the general statutes of Louisiana bearing upon servitudes attaching to public waters, relating to the right of the public to moor and unload vessels at such banks, and a right of way for travel or public roads on or along the banks of such waters, and the servitude or right the public may have to occupy the banks of rivers, and to establish levees or embankments to prevent overflow, where such public waters are subject or liable to overflow from any cause; that the defendant and others allege and insist that such construction does not express the intent of the legislature of the state in granting said franchises, and insist upon a construction and range [164 U.S. 471, 478] for section 18, which, if correct, would destroy the plaintiff's rights and privileges conferred under and by its charter in so far as the same relate to the territory and limit within which the plaintiff has the exclusive right to furnish public water supply through pipes and mains; that this alleged ambiguity has given rise to serious contention, has already caused, and, if continued, will in the future cause, the plaintiff much contention, litigation, expense, loss, and damage; that it is important that the true, actual, and proper construction of said section 18, and the proviso therein contained, should be judicially ascertained and decreed; that the court should adjudge, decree, and declare, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the true and actual meaning and construction of said section and proviso, in order that all future disputes and contentions in relation thereto may be at an end, and the plaintiff have knowledge of its actual rights in the premises; that the plaintiff is remediless in a court of law, and therefore applies and appeals to the court sitting in equity, having peculiar and full power and jurisdiction in the premises by virtue of the constitution and laws of the United States; and that all of said actings and doings of the defendant are contrary to equity and good conscience, and tend to the manifest wrong, injury, and oppression of the plaintiff.
The relief sought by the bill is a decree determining to what class the property, ownership, or possession of the property specified contained in that section 18 applies, and establishing and defining the limit beyond which the defendant has no power under said state legislation to authorize any person or corporation to invade the plaintiff's exclusive rights by laying pipes and drawing water from the Mississippi river or other public waters; that it be also adjudged and decreed that the rights conferred upon the plaintiff are those declared in Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, and in the case of St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Waterworks; that the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to have for and during the period named in said act of incorporation all of the exclusive rights and privileges named and set forth therein; that all the said acts, reso- [164 U.S. 471, 479] lutions, and grants sought to be made by the defendant to persons or corporations, not being possessors or owners of property not touching the banks of the Mississippi river within the parish of Orleans, are null, void, and of no effect; that defendant be ordered, adjudged, and decreed, within a time certain to be named in the decree, to recall, expunge, repeal, and cancel each and all of said alleged ordinances, resolutions, grants, or licenses so made by it since the date the plaintiff became invested with said exclusive rights, save only such grants, permits, ordinances, or resolutions as relate to or are confined to property and premises contiguous to the Mississippi river; and that, in the event defendant shall neglect or refuse in some public way to declare the same recalled, canceled, annulled, and avoided within a time specified in such decree, the court will declare, adjudge, and decree the same, and each and all of them, to be absolutely null and void, and of no effect, and as conferring no rights or authority whatsoever, nor lawful reason for the invasion of the plaintiff's said exclusive rights.
The plaintiff asked that a writ of injunction be issued, inhibiting and forbidding the city of New Orleans, its council, officers, agents, or departments, from granting or allowing to any person, persons, or corporation any further or other like grants, licenses, privileges, or warrants in any form on the face thereof assuming to grant unto any person, persons, or corporation any right or privilege to lay or maintain any pipes, mains, or conduits from the Mississippi river across, along, or through any public place or territory within the limits of New Orleans where said premises are not contiguous to the Mississippi river; also, that it be adjudged and decreed that, in so far as the matters were in issue and litigated in said cause of the said St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Waterworks, the judgment and decree therein determined the rights of the plaintiff as between it and the city of New Orleans beyond further contention and dispute, and that the defendant 'be compelled to abide by, observe, and enforce the same'; and that such decree be carried into full force and effect by such proper order, judgment, [164 U.S. 471, 480] or decree therein as might be necessary to accomplish that end, and compel obedience to its provisions.
The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the bill, and dismissed the suit, with costs to the city.
It appears from the bill of complaint-the facts therein set forth being admitted by demurrer-that the city of New Orleans has by ordinances granted to a large number of corporations, associations, and individuals the privilege of laying pipes in its streets for the purpose of conveying water to their respective premises from the Mississippi. These ordinances, the plaintiff contends, are in derogation of its rights and privileges as heretofore declared and adjudged by this court in the Rivers and St. Tammany Cases. None of the parties for whose benefit the ordinances above referred to were passed were brought before the court, or given an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless the plaintiff seeks a decree not only declaring those ordinances to be null and void, but requiring the city, within a named time, to recall, expunge, repeal, and cancel each ordinance that does not relate to premises contiguous to the Mississippi river, and if the city does not, within such time, and in some public way, cancel and annul those ordinances, then that the court in this suit shall adjudge and decree them to be null and void, as illegally interfering with the rights of the plaintiff.
Ought the court to have proceeded to a decree, or held the bill to be sufficient for relief, as between the plaintiff and the [164 U.S. 471, 481] city? In effect, a decree is asked against the city reasserting, for its guidance in the future, the principles announced in the Rivers and St. Tammany Cases, and informing it that, in passing the ordinances complained of, it had done violence to those principles. But of what avail would such a decree be, if the city council, the members of which are not before the court, were left free to enact ordinances granting to other parties, in violation of the plaintiff's rights, the privilege of placing pipes in the streets of the city through which to convey water from the Mississippi river to their respective premises? If it be said that a final decree against the city, enjoining it from making such grants in the future, will control the future action of the city council of New Orleans, and will, therefore, tend to protect the plaintiff in its rights, our answer is that a court of equity cannot properly interfere with, or in advance restrain, the discretion of a municipal body while it is in the exercise of powers that are legislative in their character. It ought not to attempt to do indirectly what it could not do directly. In view of the adjudged cases, it cannot be doubted that the legislature may delegate to municipal assemblies the power of enacting ordinances that relate to local matters, and that such ordinances, if legally enacted, have the force of laws passed by the legislature of the state, and are to be respected by all. But the courts will pass the line that separates judicial from legislative authority if by any order, or in any mode, they assume to control the discretion with which municipal assemblies are invested when deliberating upon the adoption or rejection of ordinances proposed for their adoption. The passage of ordinances by such bodies are legislative acts, which a court of equity will not enjoin. City of Chicago v. Evans, 24 Ill. 52, 57; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 504; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp . 308, and notes; 2 High, Inj. 1246. If an ordinance be passed, and is invalid, the jurisdiction of the courts may then be invoked for the protection of private rights that may be violated by its enforcement. Page's Case, 34 Md. 558, 564; Mayor, etc., v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 231.
As no decree can be properly rendered that will affect the [164 U.S. 471, 482] rights of the beneficiaries named in the ordinances enacted before this suit was commenced,-such beneficiaries not being before the court,-a court of equity ought not, by any form of proceeding, to interfere with the course of proceedings in the city council of New Orleans, and enjoin that branch of its municipal government from hereafter passing ordinances similar to those heretofore enacted, and which are alleged to be obnoxious to the plaintiff's rights. The mischievous consequences that may result from the attempt of courts of equity to control the proceedings of municipal bodies when engaged in the consideration of matters entirely legislative in their character, are too apparent to permit such judicial action as this suit contemplates. We repeat that when the city council shall pass an ordinance that infringes the rights of the plaintiff, and is unconstitutional and void as impairing the obligation of its contract with the state, it will be time enough for equity to interfere, and by injunction prevent the execution of such ordinance. If the ordinances already passed are in derogation of the plaintiff's contract rights, their enforcement can be prevented by appropriate proceedings instituted directly against the parties who seek to have the benefit of them. This may involve the plaintiff in a multiplicity of actions. But that circumstance cannot justify any such decree as it asks.
Upon the grounds we have indicated, and without considering the merits of the case, the decree below must be affirmed.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


What may appear to be a minor mistake in the notary acknowledgement of a mortgage can expose the mortgage to avoidance by a bankruptcy trustee. In Massachusetts, an improperly notarized mortgage is treated as an unrecorded document which is not effective against third-parties who lack knowledge of the document’s existence. McOuatt v. McOuatt, 320 Mass. 410 (1946). This article will reflect on the lessons learned from various cases dealing with defective acknowledgments.
I. What is an Acknowledgment?
Arising from customary law in England, acknowledgments have been required by law since 1640. See Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218, 220 n. 1 (1812). Massachusetts law requires that a validly executed acknowledgment be attached to a mortgage as a prerequisite to recording the mortgage in the registry of deeds. In re Bower, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3641, at *11 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 13, 2010). An acknowledgment of the signature of at least one of the grantors, made before the officer certifying the acknowledgment, must appear on the mortgage. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 183, § 30.
An "acknowledgment" is the act of witnessing a signatory’s indication that he or she signed a document voluntarily for its intended purpose, or as his or her free act and deed. "Standards of Conduct for Notaries Public," Revised Executive Order 455 (04-04), Section 5(d). An acknowledgment is more than a confirmation that a specific person signed a document; rather, it must also confirm that the person intended to act by virtue of his or her signature. Without a proper acknowledgement, the mortgage may not be recorded. Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 183, § 29. If a mortgage without a proper acknowledgement is recorded, the mortgage cannot provide constructive notice to junior lienholders. In re Giroux, 2009 WL 3834002 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2009); In re Nistad, 2012 WL 272750 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2012); In re Bower, 462 B.R. 347 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012).
The consequences of a defective notarization on a mortgage are significant. Under the "strong-arm powers" established in Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), a trustee can avoid any transfer of property of a debtor, or obligation incurred by a debtor, if that transfer or obligation would be avoidable by a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor. A bona fide purchaser is one who purchases without knowledge of defects in the mortgage. In other words, a defect in the notarization of a mortgage could mean that a creditor holding a fully secured claim could have its claim converted to a general unsecured claim.
Section 554(a)(3) of the Code states in relevant part that: "[t]he trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case…the rights and powers [to]…avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by— . . . (3) a bona fide purchaser of real property… against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case…." Pursuant to § 544(a)(3), the trustee holds, as of the commencement of the case, the status of a bona fide purchaser of real property. See In re Coletta Bros. of North Quincy, Inc., 172 B.R. 159, 164 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). Section 554(a)(3) also allows the trustee to invalidate unperfected security interests. In re Sullivan, 387 B.R. 353, 357 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). Thus, the trustee is empowered to avoid a mortgage — which is materially defective under Massachusetts state law — by virtue of his status as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser.
"It is well established law in Massachusetts that a defectively acknowledged mortgage cannot be legally recorded, and if recorded the mortgage does not, as a matter of law, provide constructive notice to future purchasers." In re Bower, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3641, at *18. In situations where a mortgage contains a material defect, it is incapable of giving notice of its existence to a trustee as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). As such, the trustee can avoid the mortgage through the "strong-arm powers" vested in him or her pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
Section 551 of the Code automatically preserves for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate any transfer avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 544. As the court in In re Carvell explained, preservation "simply puts the estate in the shoes of the creditor whose lien is avoided. It does nothing to enhance (or detract from) the rights of that creditor viz-a-viz other creditors." In re Carvell, 222 B.R. 178, 180 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998). The purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 551 is to allow a trustee to preserve the avoided interest for the bankruptcy estate so that junior interest holders do not benefit from the avoidance to the detriment of the bankruptcy estate and its creditors. In re Nistad, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 367, at *20.
Defective acknowledgments can occur as a result of the failure to identify the signatory. This is true even where the acknowledgment is located directly below the signature lines of the mortgage itself. In the case of In re Giroux, for instance, the acknowledgement at issue omitted the debtor’s name. 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3429 (Bank. D. Mass. May 21, 2009). As a result, the bankruptcy court found that "the acknowledgement attached to the mortgage executed by the Debtor … cannot be construed to satisfy the requirements of Massachusetts law. Although the notary witnessed the Debtor’s signature, that alone is not enough." Id. at *31. Since the notary acknowledgment in Giroux was defective because it omitted the debtor’s name, the court concluded that it did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser for value. Id. at *34.
Similarly, in the case of In re Bower, the bankruptcy court found that the absence of the debtor’s identity from a certificate of acknowledgement was a material defect that rendered it impossible to infer that the notary had ascertained that it was the debtor who appeared before her. 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3641 (Bank. D. Mass. Oct. 13, 2010). The court in Bower cited Giroux and held that the omission of the debtor’s name constituted a material defect. Id. at *19. As a result, the mortgage was incapable of giving constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser for value. Id.
Lastly, in the case of In re Nistad, the acknowledgment at issue mistakenly contained the name of third-parties instead of the debtors’ names. 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 367 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2012). The bankruptcy court in Nistad adopted the court’s holding in Bower and held that although the inclusion of third-party names in the identification clause of an acknowledgement was distinguishable from Bower, where the acknowledgment at issue omitted the debtor’s name entirely, the "very purpose of the Acknowledgment has been similarly undermined." Id. at *12-13. As such, the court in Nistad held that the inclusion of third-party names in the acknowledgment constituted a material defect, thereby rendering the mortgage incapable of providing constructive notice. Id.
2. Failure to Include Language that Acknowledgment was Signed "Voluntarily" or as One’s "Free Act and Deed"
Under Massachusetts law, a notary acknowledgement that cannot permit an inference that the notary "obtain[ed] satisfactory evidence of the Debtor’s identity" and "ascertain[ed] that his [or her] signature on the mortgage was voluntarily affixed" is patently defective and renders the instrument ineligible for recording and ineffective for constructive notice purposes. In re Giroux, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3429 at *31 (Bankr. D. Mass. May, 21, 2009) (emphasis added), aff’d, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106872 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2009); see also In re Nistad, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 367 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2012); In re Bower, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3641. "[T]he Supreme Judicial Court [has] signaled its adherence to a stringent requirement, namely that a grantor or mortgagor expressly state to the notary that the execution of the instrument was his or her free act and deed." In re Giroux, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3429 at *28.
Without the language "voluntarily for its intended purpose" or "signed as his/her free act and deed," or similar language to that effect, the notarization does not confirm that the signatory acknowledged the document before the notary, and the mortgage is unrecordable. For instance, in the case of In re Shubert, the Bankruptcy Court held that the notarization at end of a mortgage, which provided merely that the debtor/mortgagor had appeared before the notary public and proven her identity by means of a Massachusetts driver’s license, but with no indication that she was executing the mortgage as her free and voluntary act, was not proper notarization under Massachusetts law. 535 B.R. 488 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015); But see In re Greater Love Tabernacle Church of Boston, Massachusetts, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2784 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2015) (finding notary certificate unambiguous and not defective under Massachusetts law where certificate stated that the signer personally appeared before the notary and "acknowledged the foregoing instrument to be his free act and deed").
Nonetheless, even if the notarization does contain the language "voluntarily for its intended purpose" or "signed as his/her free act and deed," or similar language to that effect, there may still be a problem if the mortgage is signed by a person who acted in a representative capacity. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel case of In re Kelley, for instance, dealt with a mortgage that was executed and acknowledged by an attorney-in-fact, rather than the individuals for whom he was acting. 498 B.R. 392 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013). In Kelley, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel determined that "a review of the language of this acknowledgement does not justify a conclusion that [the attorney-in-fact] ever said anything to the one who made out the certificate of acknowledgement to indicate that the Mortgage was the voluntary act of the Debtors." Id. The fatal flaw identified by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Kelley was that the language of the acknowledgement "fail[ed] to unequivocally express that the execution of the Mortgage was the free act and deed of the [grantors]." Id. at 400 (emphasis supplied).
It is important to note, however, that not every error in a notarization renders a mortgage unrecordable. For instance, when an acknowledgment fails to disclose the method used to identify the signatory to the notary, the mortgage can still be recorded. Other failures, such as a failure to maintain a record of the acknowledgment in a separate ledger, or a failure to make a copy of the signatory’s identification, should not affect recordation.
A bankruptcy trustee’s job is to liquidate assets for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. While the avoidance and preservation of an improperly notarized mortgage are steps toward liquidation, the trustee must still liquidate the mortgage. In most cases, the holder of the mortgage will agree to make a cash settlement to retain its secured position. But what if the former mortgage holder is satisfied with being an unsecured creditor? What can the trustee do to maximize the value of the mortgage he now holds?
In 2014, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued its decision in In re Traverse, 753 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 459 (2014), limiting a Chapter 7 trustee’s ability to sell a debtor’s home that is subject to an avoided mortgage. In Traverse, the trustee avoided an unrecorded mortgage and preserved the mortgage for the benefit of the estate. The trustee then sought to sell the real estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). The trustee planned to use the sale proceeds to first pay the bankruptcy estate the amount due on the avoided and preserved mortgage and then pay any remaining amount to the debtor pursuant to her valid homestead.
pursuant to her homestead exemption. The Court stated that the trustee’s avoidance powers only preserved the value of the avoided mortgage for the bankruptcy estate’s benefit. It did not give the trustee any right to sell the real estate. The Court determined that since the debtor was making her payments under the note that was secured by the mortgage, the trustee, in his new role as mortgagee, had no right to foreclose on the mortgage.
The Traverse Court also held that although preservation of a mortgage can promise a bankruptcy estate a benefit from the sale of a home, it does not follow that "the preserved mortgage creates ‘equity’ for the estate." In re Traverse, 753 F.3d at 29-30. The Court stated that bankruptcy courts have defined "equity" for purposes of justifying a sale as "the value remaining for unsecured creditors above any secured claims and the debtor’s exemption." Id. at *29. The Court noted that the debtor’s claimed homestead exemption leaves no residual equity for her unsecured creditors and, as such, concluded that the trustee may either claim the first proceeds of a voluntary sale or wait to exercise the rights of a mortgage holder in the event of a default.
Monica P. Snyder is an associate in the Litigation Department of Murtha Cullina and a member of the Firm’s Bankruptcy & Creditors’ Rights Practice Group. Ms. Snyder can be contacted at 617.457.4157 or msnyder@murthalaw.com.


The pro se plaintiff, Steven Margetta (“Plaintiff” or “Margetta”), a state inmate housed at the Benner Township State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Benner”), in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Defendants removed him from his prison job as a library worker in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. (Doc. 9, Am. Compl.) Plaintiff names the following Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees assigned to SCI-Benner: Mr. Ramirez, Director of Education; Mr. Garmen, Director of Inmate Employment; Mr. Hamor, C-Block Unit Manager; and Mr. Gummo, Inmate Counselor. (Id.) Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint due to Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. (Doc. 21, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint will be granted with prejudice.
On a motion to dismiss, “[w]e ‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'” Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoted case omitted). In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court can consider the allegations of the complaint as well as any “documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, . . . any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (brackets in original).
Among other requirements, a sound complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 -03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). “Fair notice” in Rule 8(a)(2) “depends on the type of case-some complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965; accord, e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (The court is not “compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
Additionally, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003). Pro se litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint “even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, ” unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). However, a complaint that sets forth facts, which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover, is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
On April 27, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint due to Plaintiff's failure to state an equal protection claim. (Doc. 21, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss). Defendants filed a brief in support of their motion. (Doc. 22, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Br.) Margetta failed to file an opposition brief or seek an enlargement of time to do so.
Since August 2015 Margetta was employed as a library worker at SCI-Benner with positive progress reports. (Doc. 9, ¶ 12). On July 25, 2016, Plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with the four named Defendants. (Id., ¶ 13). Defendants reported irregularities concerning the use of the library's photocopy machine. Apparently, inmates were using without paying for copies. (Id., ¶¶ 15 - 16). Although Margetta was not specifically accused of wrongdoing or issued a misconduct, Defendants removed him from his library job. (Id., ¶ 18).
Margetta asserts eight other inmates worked in SCI-Benner's library at the relevant period in question. “[T]hus [they] were similarly situated to Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 21). “At least two of the other similarly situated inmates did not have their job assignments within the library terminated by defendants.” (Id., ¶ 22). Margetta alleges that Defendants had “no rational basis for the difference in the[ir] treatment of Plaintiff and the two similarly situated inmates wh[o] did not have their job assignment within the library terminated.” (Id., ¶ 23).


text:
Mark L. Rienzi is a professor of law at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
The First Amendment’s protections for minority speakers are most needed — and most in jeopardy — when the speech relates to deeply important and deeply controversial issues. When the speech in question matters most, the temptation toward government control is greatest. This is true both for the political branches the First Amendment is designed to restrain and, more dangerously, for the judges charged with its enforcement.
Thus it is no surprise that abortion-related speech cases like National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra arrive on the Supreme Court’s docket from time to time. Too often, courts in such cases are either tempted or overwhelmed by the abortion-related aspects of a case and fail to apply straightforward First Amendment principles. That pattern is a danger to all speakers, as abortion-related First Amendment errors can distort the doctrine more broadly.
Recent history suggests that, unlike the lower courts, the justices in this case will see the First Amendment issues clearly, even though those issues relate to abortion. The Supreme Court is thus likely to reach the obvious conclusion that California cannot force pro-life pregnancy counselors to direct women to abortion providers. In the process, the court can and should continue its project of repairing First Amendment doctrine that has, over time, been warped by abortion-related speech cases.
The justices are, of course, well aware that a sensitive issue like abortion can sometimes distort other areas of the law, including the First Amendment. This case arrives as both sides of the abortion debate have tried to control the speech of their opponents. A Florida law seeks to require counselors and even clergy members who might advise a woman to have an abortion to obtain a special license from the government — a license that would not be required if the same advisor were to counsel against abortion.
A San Francisco law, on the other hand, creates special advertising restrictions that apply to speakers who counsel against abortion, but not to those who counsel for abortion. A Baltimore law forces pro-life pregnancy counselors — even when operating on church property — to post signs with the government’s chosen message about abortion; no similar requirement applies to counselors who are willing to refer for abortions.
As a matter of standard First Amendment doctrine, these should be easy cases. Such laws are classic examples of content and viewpoint discrimination, and they would only be sustainable if the relevant government body could satisfy strict scrutiny and prove that it has no less restrictive way to serve a compelling government interest.
But at times courts have warped First Amendment doctrine to allow a favored side of the abortion debate to control the speech of its adversaries. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in the San Francisco case (First Resort v. Herrera), for example, actually claimed that nonprofit pregnancy counselors — who do not charge their clients a penny — were somehow engaged in commercial speech, because the nonprofit separately engages in fund-raising. This standard would turn every nonprofit in the country into a commercial speaker and give the government enormous power to regulate the speech of every nonprofit, from the Sierra Club to the Catholic Church. The panel also found that singling out pro-life counselors was viewpoint-neutral, because speakers might have reasons for refusing to refer for abortion other than being pro-life.
Perhaps the most infamous example of a court allowing the abortion context to trump standard First Amendment analysis is the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Hill v. Colorado. There, the court badly distorted the content-neutrality inquiry by holding that a law that restricted “counseling, education, or protest” near the entrance to a health-care facility was content-neutral. Even though such a law is obviously content-based — its application depends directly on the content of someone’s speech — the court found it content-neutral because it was allegedly enacted, not because of disagreement with speech, but to protect “the right to be let alone” or a “right to privacy” on public sidewalks.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas accused the majority of applying special rules because the case involved abortion, using an approach that is “in stark contradiction of the constitutional principles we apply in all other contexts.” The outrage was not limited to opponents of Roe v. Wade and Casey. Professor Laurence Tribe called Hill “slam-dunk simple and slam-dunk wrong.” Justice Anthony Kennedy (a member of the Casey plurality) said the analysis “contradict[ed] more than a half century of well-established First Amendment principles.” Hill became a widely cited precedent for nearly 15 years, used by many lower courts as the standard for content analysis.
Recently, the Supreme Court has begun taking steps to clean up the damage done to First Amendment doctrine by these types of cases. First, in 2014, the court decided McCullen v. Coakley, which involved a Massachusetts abortion-clinic buffer-zone law. For 13 years, the lower federal courts in McCullen and its predecessor cases had found the buffer-zone law constitutional because of Hill. But the justices unanimously reversed, finding that the state’s attempt to criminalize even peaceful speech on public sidewalks outside abortion clinics violated the First Amendment.
The McCullen court did not expressly overrule Hill, but it did restate the content-neutrality analysis in a way that was utterly irreconcilable with Hill: A law is content-based if enforcement authorities need to “examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has occurred.” Further, concern about a listener’s reaction to speech — even if it “caused offense or made listeners uncomfortable” — is not neutral. Under that analysis, the law at issue in Hill is plainly content-based.
The day after deciding McCullen, the Supreme Court granted review in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Although Reed did not directly concern abortion, it involved the 9th Circuit’s heavy reliance on Hill to find a restriction on the size and placement of signs to be content-neutral, even though application of the law depended entirely on the words placed on the sign. Reversing, and repeatedly relying on the dissenting opinions from Hill, the court made clear that a law is content-based if its application depends on the words spoken, and a benign purpose cannot save an otherwise content-based statute. And Reed emphasized that content-based laws must pass strict scrutiny to survive. Again, under this analysis, the law at issue in Hill is plainly content-based and unconstitutional.
NIFLA appears to be part of a similar doctrinal housecleaning for cases involving abortion-related speech restrictions. In this case, the 9th Circuit acknowledged that California’s regulation of pregnancy-related speech was content-based, but chose not to apply strict scrutiny, because the law regulated the speakers’ “professional speech.” Indeed, the appeals court openly acknowledged that it was deviating from Reed in applying only intermediate scrutiny. The court reasoned that strict scrutiny was only required if the law engaged in viewpoint discrimination and found that, although the law requires pro-life providers to provide information about where to obtain abortions, it was viewpoint-neutral.
That reasoning makes no sense, either on its face or in light of Reed and McCullen. California’s law is designed to target speakers who oppose abortion, and it forces them to provide messages that convey the government’s viewpoint, including directing clients where to call to get an abortion. If the law did not concern abortion, no court would have difficulty knowing that strict scrutiny applies.
NIFLA presents the court with intriguing possibilities for how broadly to approach cleaning up First Amendment doctrine. A narrow ruling would dispose of this case but provide little guidance for pregnancy-counseling-regulation cases pending in the lower courts. For example, the court could hold that because the 9th Circuit found the law is content-based, strict scrutiny is necessary, and could remand the case for that analysis.
Alternatively, the court may want to rule more broadly so as to standardize First Amendment doctrine in the pregnancy-center cases throughout the circuits. Such a ruling would require two additional components. First, the court would need to announce (yet again) its clear standard for determining whether a law is viewpoint-based. Some of the lower courts — chiefly the 9th Circuit in First Resort and the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in an earlier round of litigation in Greater Baltimore Pregnancy Center v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore — have deviated from proper viewpoint analysis by allowing speculation about a speaker’s particular motives for speech to lead them to treat an obviously viewpoint-based government policy as viewpoint-neutral. Reed and McCullen corrected the lower courts’ Hill-inspired overemphasis on government motive; surely the court did not intend that new clarity to be replaced with judicial guesswork about a speaker’s individual motive for having spoken from a certain viewpoint.
Second, the court could clearly announce that the speech of nonprofit pregnancy counselors is not commercial speech. Again, the 9th and 4th Circuits have suggested otherwise. That approach cannot be reconciled with the court’s own commercial-speech cases. Because California has argued that the regulations in this case regulate commercial speech, the court would certainly have grounds to reach this issue.
Whether the justices will use this case quite so broadly is difficult to predict. If they choose not to, they should have one ready vehicle waiting for them by June (the certiorari petition in First Resort is due on February 1) and possibly others soon after. A narrower ruling in this case, followed closely by an additional correction in one of the other cases, would match the cleanup pattern set by McCullen and Reed.
However the court approaches the task, NIFLA is likely to be part of the court’s effort to ensure that the First Amendment protects speakers on all sides of important debates, and continues to apply even on the most sensitive and controversial issue of our time.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Irrigation Districts — Claims Against — Revocation of Warrant — Mandamus — Judgment on Pleadings — When Improper. Irrigation Districts — Claims Against — Disallowance — Remedy Open to Claimant. 1. An irrigation district is a public corporation the governing body of which is its board of directors, which board in allowing or disallowing a claim against the district does not act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, and upon disallowance of a claim the claimant's only remedy lies in the ordinary judicial proceeding. Judgment on Pleadings — When Improper. 2. Rendition of judgment on the pleadings is improper where the answer of defendant raises a question of fact upon a material issue. Irrigation Districts — Board Revoking Payment of Warrant — Mandamus — Erroneous Judgment on Pleadings. 3. Under the above rule (par. 2) held, that where the board of directors of an irrigation district under its general authority to manage and control the affairs of the district, notified the county treasurer, the custodian ex-officio of the funds of the district, as it properly could do, not to pay a warrant issued by it in payment of construction work, and the treasurer, in answer to the complaint in mandamus proceedings to compel him to do so, alleged that he had been instructed not to pay it, which allegation was denied by the reply, an issue of fact was raised, and the court erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Appeal from District Court, Carbon County; O.F. Goddard, Judge.
MANDAMUS by the State, on the relation of J.S. Haley, to compel Charlotte Dilworth, County Treasurer, to pay warrant issued to relator by the Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District. From a judgment on the pleadings directing issuance of the writ, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Mr. John C. Skinner and Mr. Sterling M. Wood, for Appellant, submitted a brief; Mr. Wood argued the cause orally.
Mr. George W. Pierson, for Respondent, submitted a brief, and argued the cause orally.
MR. JUSTICE STARK delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, rendered and entered on relator's motion directing a peremptory writ of mandate to issue commanding the respondent to pay certain warrants issued to relator by the Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District.
The facts leading up to the issuance of the alternative writ of mandate herein as alleged in this petition therefor, are fully set forth in the opinion in State ex rel. Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District v. District Court, 75 Mont. 132, 242 P. 431, and need not be here repeated.
The respondent filed an answer in response to the alternative writ, in which she undertook to give numerous reasons why judgment should not be rendered directing a peremptory writ to issue against her, among them being (1) that on July 14, 1925, before the presentation of said warrants, she was instructed and ordered by the directors of the Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District not to pay any warrants drawn on the construction fund of said district (the warrants in question being drawn on that fund); and (2) that she had been directed and instructed by the directors of said Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District not to pay said warrants or either of them, and that payment of said warrants and both of them had been stopped by the district and its directors and officers. All the defensive matters set out in the answer were denied by relator's reply thereto, and on this condition of the pleadings the relator's motion for judgment was sustained.
The determination of this appeal does not require a consideration of any of the matters set out in the answer except those above mentioned.
We shall confine our discussion to a very narrow range, [1, 2] keeping in view that the only question presented is whether the court erred in granting relator's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
An irrigation district is a public corporation ( Crow Creek Irr. Dist. v. Crittenden, 71 Mont. 66, 227 P. 63), and is governed by a board of directors which constitutes its corporate authority, and is charged with the duty of managing and conducting its business affairs (sec. 3964, Rev. Codes 1921). So far as its ordinary business transactions are concerned, they stand upon the same footing as a private individual or the directors of a business corporation similarly situated.
In allowing or disallowing a claim against the district, the board of directors does not act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. If a claim should be disallowed, the claimant has but one remedy to establish it, and that is by the ordinary judicial proceeding. If a claim is allowed, it is paid by an order upon the county treasurer as custodian of the district funds. This order, sometimes designated a warrant, is merely a direction to the custodian to pay the specified sum, and in effect amounts to nothing more than would a bank check upon the district's depositary, if its funds were handled in that manner; it is merely a device for properly drawing money from the custodian or depositary. There is no statute conferring any special characteristics upon these orders or warrants. So long as the money of the district remains in the possession of the county treasurer as its custodian, the directors have complete control of it. It is subject to their order, with the exception above noted. The treasurer is a mere disbursing officer. The money being subject to the order of the board of directors, and the warrant issued against it not having any of the characteristics of an adjudication of the rights of the parties to the same, we can perceive no reason that would preclude the directors from revoking or rescinding the same under their general authority to manage and control the business and affairs of the district.
In the case before us, the respondent's answer to the  alternative writ expressly stated that she had been directed not to pay the two warrants held by the relator, and that payment of them had been stopped by the district. If this were true, if the power which had ordered her to pay the money had rescinded the order, her right to pay it ceased, and this would be a complete defense to relator's application for a writ of mandate to compel her to pay.
We direct attention to the fact that the order and direction of the district stopping payment of the warrants in question, set forth in the respondent's answer, and to which reference is now being made, is not the one contained in a certain resolution by the board of directors of the district, dated October 5, 1925, and which is referred to in State ex rel. Red Lodge-Rosebud Irrigation District v. District Court, supra.
Since the respondent's answer raised a question of fact upon a material point, the court erred in sustaining the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The conclusion above announced finds support in the following cases: State ex rel. First National Bank of York v. Cook, Treas., 43 Neb. 318, 61 N.W. 693; Murphy v. Reeder, Township Treasurer, 56 Mich. 505, 23 N.W. 197; Harrison County v. Ogden, 165 Iowa, 325, 145 N.W. 681; Tucker v. Justices, 35 N.C. 434; People v. Klokke, 92 Ill. 134; Abernathy v. Phifer, 84 N.C. 711; People v. Supervisors, 33 Mich. 497; Van Akin v. Dunn, 117 Mich. 421, 75 N.W. 938; Fletcher v. Renfro, 56 Ga. 674.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CALLAWAY and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HOLLOWAY, GALEN and MATTHEWS concur.
Rehearing denied, May 12, 1926.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Overview (table of contents) Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Grants individual pools Chapter 3 Chapter 4 decision on Application and payment of the subsidy Chapter 5 reporting and accounting Review Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Public default-entry into force of The full text of the Executive order on supplements to promote debate and awareness in Denmark about Europe by virtue of text annotation nr. 126 (3) ad budget 2009 § 20.71.41 for grants to promote debate and awareness in Denmark about Europe, including the development of participatory democracy, fixed: Chapter 1 Grants section 1. Within the appropriation, by virtue of text annotation nr. 126 (3) ad budget 2009 section 20.71.41 is devoted to the promotion of debate and information in Denmark about Europe, including the development of participatory democracy, the Committee for the promotion of Debate and information on Europe (the Board) after application grants for initiatives that promote debate and awareness in Denmark about Europe, including the development of participatory democracy.
Chapter 2 section 2 of the individual pools. Grants from Pool A, see. text annotation nr. 126, paragraph 3, subparagraph (a), ad budget 2009 § 20.71.41, may be granted to legal nationwide organizations that have discussion and information on Europe as the main purpose, and that is not a party or a movement was elected to the Folketing or Parliament or a youth organization to such a party or such a movement.
(2). Subsidies in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be granted to implement a comprehensive programme of activities for a period of three years corresponding to three calendar years.
(3). It is a condition of grants in accordance with paragraph 1, that the Organization 1) have at least 350 registered and individually documented quota paying members, 2) has an annual quota rate of minimum 150 DKK for ordinary membership, 3) is represented and has operations in various parts of the country, and 4) have a democratic structure, which ensures its members ' influence on the Organization's work, which must be reflected in the Organization's bylaws or assigned description.
§ 3. Grants from Pool B, see. text annotation nr. 126, paragraph 3, point (b) of the ad budget 2009 § 20.71.41, may be granted to legal nationwide organizations that have discussion and information on Europe as a part of their activities, but where the main objective is another, however, not greater labour market and vocational organizations, parties and movements was elected to the Folketing, or Parliament, as well as youth organisations to such a party or such a movement.
(3). It is a condition of grants in accordance with paragraph 1, that the Organization 1) have at least 350 registered and individually documented quota paying members or is an Association of national organisations or of regional or local organizations, so that the Organization activity and both have a nationwide character, 2) is represented and has operations in various parts of the country, and 3) have a democratic structure, which ensures its members ' influence on the Organization's work , which must be reflected in the Organization's bylaws or assigned description.
§ 4. Grants from Pool C, see. text annotation nr. 126, paragraph 3, point (c), ad budget 2009 § 20.71.41, may be granted for legitimate organizations, however, not parties and movements was elected to the Folketing or Parliament, certain legal persons, certain public institutions and to adult individuals who are registered in Denmark.
(2). Subsidies in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be granted for the implementation of individual local activities or greater cross-regional or nationwide activities.
(3). Subsidies in accordance with paragraph 1 may be granted to, among other things: 1) Meetings and conferences, including fees and transport to external presenters, with the exception of fees and transportation to members of Parliament or members of the European Parliament.
2) preparation of information material.
3) production of television and radio programmes, as well as applications for the Web.
5) financial reporting and auditing in the context of activities.
(4). Subsidies in accordance with paragraph 1 shall not be granted for study tours and research trips.
Chapter 3 Application section 5. Application for grants from the Pool (A), (B) and (C) of the basic regulation. sections 2-4, may be made on the basis of an announced application round. Board appointment by application rounds on his website, URwww.europa-naevnet.dk, and indicate a time limit for the submission of the application.
(2). Application must be submitted to the Committee in the form of an application form, which is available on the Board's website, filled in electronically on the website, printed, signed by the responsible person of the initiative and sent to the Committee's mailing address, see. However, paragraph 4. An activity plan and a budget for the initiative must be attached to the application form.
(3). Applications must reach the Board within the Board announced the date for submission of application, see. (1). Applications which are received in the Committee after the closing date for the submission of application, shall not be taken into consideration.
(4). Applicants who do not have access to the Internet, you can request an application form by contacting the Board's secretariat.
(5). Organizations submitting applications for reimbursement, to enclose a copy of the Organization's statutes or application a description of the Organization's purposes.
Chapter 4 decision and payment of grants section 6. The Committee shall, in accordance with the decision of the application for reimbursement in accordance with §§ 2-4.
(2). By decision on commitments for grants will be given to that initiative 1) in content and form caters to a broad or new segment in Denmark, 2) have high impact in the target group or the public, 3) is publicly and advertised widely in public, and 4) are significant financial or substantially financed from other sources.
§ 7. The Committee can make a commitment to provide all the requested reimbursement or part of the product applied for grants.
§ 8. Commitments for grants pursuant to section § 2-4 shall be subject to the condition that the initiative be carried out 1) as far as possible, as described in the activity plan for the initiative, see. However, paragraph 3, 2) to the costs of the initiative as far as possible take place as specified in the budget for the initiative, see. However, paragraphs 3, 3) the applicant shall report on the completed initiative, as the Board may approve, without prejudice. section 13, and 4) the applicant shall submit accounts for the completed initiative, as the Board may approve, without prejudice. § 14.
(2). The Committee may, in connection with the announcement of a call for proposals, establish additional conditions for commitments for grants pursuant to section § 2-4.
(3). The Committee may in exceptional cases authorise the activity plan and budget for a change initiative. If the activity plan and budget for an initiative changes with the Committee's approval, it is a condition of the undertaking for reimbursement that the initiative be carried out in accordance with the revised activity plan and the amended budget.
(4). A commitment to grant will lapse, if the conditions set out in paragraphs 1-3 are not met.
§ 9. Applicants who are granted the commitment of grant from the Pool (A) or (B) of the basic regulation. sections 2 and 3, are given in the first calendar year of the three-year period paid 75 percent of the annual amount of the grant, when undertaking grant is announced, and the remaining 25 per cent of the annual amount of the grant, when the report and accounts for the calendar year's activities are approved by the Committee's secretariat, in accordance with article 3. sections 13 and 14. In the second and third calendar years in the three-year period will be paid the annual grant amounts so that 75 percent of the amount be paid simultaneously with payment of the balance for the previous calendar year, and the remaining 25 per cent of the amount paid when report and accounts for the calendar year's activities are approved by the Committee's secretariat, in accordance with article 3. sections 13 and 14.
(2). Unused funds in one calendar year can be used in the remaining activity period. If an applicant has not used its total subsidies by the end of the three-year period, the candidate must repay the unused amounts to the Board.
§ 10. Applicants who are granted the commitment of grant from Pool C, see. § 4, get the subsidy paid, when the initiative is implemented, and the report and accounts for the initiative is approved by the Committee's secretariat, in accordance with article 3. sections 13 and 14. Displays the cost of the completed initiative itself lower than indicated in the budget for the initiative, paid only a grant equivalent to the costs actually incurred for the initiative.
§ 11. The Board's decisions on commitments for grants and rebates on subsidies is final and cannot be brought before another administrative authority.
§ 12. By the commitment of the grants for the participation of external organisations or individuals, including presenters, is the responsibility of the employer's obligation of applicant, including fulfilment of the requirements in accordance with tax legislation.
Chapter 5, reporting and accounting section 13. Applicants who have received commitments for grants from the Pool (A) or (B) of the basic regulation. sections 2 and 3, shall for each calendar year during the three year period give a report on the completed initiatives, which the Committee has given grants to. The report must be presented to the Committee by 15 June. March of the year following the calendar year that is reported on. Six copies of any manufactured material must be attached to the report.
(2). Applicants who have received commitments for aid from Pool C, see. section 4, shall submit a report on the initiative, which the Committee has given grants to. The report must be presented to the Board within one month after the date of completion of the initiative, as stated in the grant application. Six copies of any manufactured material must be attached to the report.
(3). Applicants must be in possession of documentation for the activities described in those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 reports, as well as its outcome.
§ 14. Applicants must be accountable for the implemented initiatives which the Committee has agreed to give grants to, see. sections 15 and 16.
§ 15. Applicants who have received commitments for grants from the Pool (A) or (B) of the basic regulation. sections 2 and 3, for each calendar year of the three year reporting period of activity a company for completed activities, which the Committee has given grants to. Records shall be to the Committee not later than 15 July. March of the year following the calendar year, conducting accounts for.
(2). The company's content and presentation must follow the principles of the Danish financial statements Act and rules issued under this Act.
(3). Grants from other page must be specified in the accounts.
(4). Accounting entries can be assigned to individual notes with additional information on the accounting record content.
(5). Offsetting in accounting (NET transaction) may take place only if offsetting is helping to increase the company's information value. Offset entries shall be disclosed in the notes to the accounting entries.
(6). Records shall contain information about the accounting practices. Be carried out changes in accounting principles in relation to previous accounts, the accounts contain a cast-off justification and a description of the impact thereof.
(7). Records shall be signed by the applicant's competent leadership. In addition, the financial statements be audited and provided with an audit report, see. the rules set out in Chapter 6.
(8). Applicants must be in possession of proof that the conditions for the grant have been met, without prejudice to the Board. sections 2, 3 and 8, as well as to the expense recognised in the financial statements relating to activities to promote debate and awareness in Denmark about Europe.
(9). Applicants must keep records for a period of five years from the end of the fiscal year, on request, transmit them to the Committee.
§ 16. Applicants who have received commitments for aid from Pool C, see. § 4, are accountable to the Board not later than one month after the date of completion of the initiative, as stated in the grant application.
(2). Accounts shall be drawn up in the same way as the budget for the initiative, so that accounting entries and budget entries are directly comparable.
(3). Accountability for grant of DKK 50000 or more must follow the principles of the Danish financial statements Act and rules issued under this Act. The second way of accounting may be used. If the other way for financial reporting is used, it must be recorded in the financial statements, which principles are used. The rules in § 15 (3) to (6) shall furthermore apply mutatis mutandis.
(4). Accounts for subsidy under 50000 DKK presented by filling out one from the Committee received accounting schema attached to the relevant documentation for the costs incurred.
(5). Records shall be signed by the individual responsible for the initiative, or, if an organization, legal person or public institution is responsible for the initiative, the Organization, the legal person or the public institution competent leadership. In addition, the financial statements be audited and provided with an audit report, see. the rules set out in Chapter 6.
(6). Applicants must be in possession of proof that the conditions for the grant have been met, without prejudice to the Board. sections 4 and 8, as well as to the expense recognised in the financial statements relating to activities to promote debate and awareness in Denmark about Europe.
(7). Applicants must keep records for a period of five years from the end of the fiscal year, on request, transmit them to the Committee.
Chapter 6 Review § 17. Review of an applicant's accounts, see. section 15, paragraph 7, and section 16, paragraph 5, shall be carried out by a State auto rice dish or certified accountant or after an audit system in accordance with the law on local government agency or in accordance with the law on regions, etc., see. However, paragraph 3.
(2). By auditor change to candidate as soon as possible, inform the Board of the names and addresses of the incoming auditor and inform about the reason for the shift.
(3). Accounts for subsidy under 50000 DKK can be reviewed by an expert person, which does not need to be a trained accountant.
§ 18. The review shall be carried out in accordance with good public audit practice, as that term is defined in section 3 of the Act on the audit of State accounts, etc. and specified in this chapter.
(2). By the audit verified whether the accounts are true, and whether the transactions are subject to the reporting, are in accordance with the announced commitments for grants, laws and other regulations as well as with the agreements concluded and usual practice. In addition, an assessment is made of whether or not they have been taken into account in the management of the economic owed funds covered by the financial statements.
§ 19. The scope of the audit depends on the applicant's administrative structure and business processes, including the internal control, and other issues of importance to financial reporting. In addition, the amount of importance for the scope of the audit.
§ 20. The review should the auditor verify 1) on the financial statements of activity/initiative is true, IE. without significant errors and deficiencies, 2) on conditions for the Committee's contribution to the activity/initiative are met, 3) for the grant is used for this purpose, 4) about the candidate has demonstrated a thrift, and 5) on the information which the applicant has informed the Committee on the implementation and results of the activity/initiative are documented.
(2). The review shall be carried out at random show studies.
§ 21. The applicant must give the auditor the information that must be considered of importance for the assessment of the financial statement as well as for the auditor's assessment of the management, including the objectives and results achieved. The applicant must provide the auditor with access to carry out the studies that consider necessary, and shall ensure that the auditor will have the information and the assistance that the Auditor considers necessary for the performance of his duties.
§ 22. Becomes auditor aware of offences or breaches of regulations of major importance in connection with the funds management is the responsibility of the auditor immediately to give the applicant notice of withdrawal, as well as to ensure that the applicant within 3 weeks then gives the Board thereof. Otherwise, it is the auditor's duty to inform the Board. Auditor's comments are submitted together with the notice.
(2). The same applies if the Auditor during his audit or otherwise becomes aware that the initiative's implementation is uncertain for economic or other reasons.
§ 23. The audited financial statement shall bear an endorsement stating that the accounts have been revised in accordance with the rules set out in this notice.
(2). Auditor, in accordance with article 3. section 17, paragraph 1, shall provide the audited financial statement with a statement of endorsement for it at any time in force declaring the paradigm of the independent auditor's endorsement, shall be provided at the National Audit Office's website, www.rigsrevisionen.dk/paategning.hmtl.
(3). The auditor must provide an audit report with the auditor's assessment and conclusion on the performed audit, see. § 20. The report can be made in addition to the audit report, see. paragraph 1, or in an audit Protocol. The audit report must be submitted by the applicant to the Board together with the endorsed accounts, see. section 15 (1), and section 16, paragraph 1.
Chapter 7 Breach § 24. If a commitment to grant will lapse, without prejudice. § 8, paragraph 4, shall be paid by the Committee did not grant, just as the Committee has the right to require repayment of amounts already paid. Furthermore, the Tribunal is entitled to withhold the payment of a grant or require paid refunded if the candidate has achieved the pledge grants by fraud or otherwise have made false information during the proceedings.
Chapter 8 Public § 25. Information about the application rounds and announced commitments for grants will be published on the Committee's website, URwww.europa-naevnet.dk. Furthermore, the applicant's published reports, see. section 13, on the Board's website.
Chapter 9 entry into force section 26. The notice shall enter into force on 16 September. November 2009.
(2). Executive Order No. 1094 of 18. November 2008 for grants to organizations and individuals for the promotion of debate and information in Denmark about Europe are hereby repealed, without prejudice. However, paragraph 3.
(3). The notice referred to in paragraph 2 shall continue to apply for applicants who are granted commitment grants under this Ordinance.


text:
We are pleased to present to you the list of the largest – in their respective practice areas – plaintiff and cross-claimant jury verdicts obtained in the State of Florida in the year 2017. The list is comprised of various case types that were tried either in state or federal courts.
Attorneys: Nicholas I. Gerson, David L. Markel of Gerson & Schwartz, P.A.
Attorneys: Juan P. Bauta, II, and Marc P. Kunen of The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A.
Case: Beale v. Lal, et al.
Attorneys: Charles H. Baumberger, Jarrett L. DeLuca, Manuel A. Reboso of Rossman, Baumberger, Reboso & Spier, P.A.
Case: Belcher v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Case: Haley v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, et al.
Case: Marquez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Case: Machado v. R.G. Rancho Grande Corp., et al.
Attorneys: Michael Fayard, Adam Brum of Morgan & Morgan, PA.
Case: Craig v. C-Scape Construction Inc., et al.
Case: Marks v. Brian Coleman M.D., et al.
Attorneys: Edward R. Shohat, Monique Garcia, Jon May of Jones Walker L.L.P.; Otto C. de Cordoba, Jr. of De La Pena Group, P.A.
Case: Duran v. Mario A. Lamar, P.A., et al.
Attorneys: R. Timothy Vannatta, Sean J. Greene, Alfred R. Bell, Jr. of Steinger, Iscoe & Greene P.A.
Case: Bonacci v. Fresh Start BSC, Inc.
Case: Schopp v. American Airlines, Inc.
Case: Soffin v. Clean Coal Technologies Inc., et al.
Case: Rodriguez v. Aqua Life Corp.
Case: Wallick v. Red Coach, Inc., et al.
Case: Samayoa v. Waste Pro of Fla.
Case: Chea v. Ripa, D.D.S.
Case: Nuro v. Rumpf, et al.
Attorneys: Nelson A. Rodriguez-Varela of Nelson A. Rodriguez-Varela, P.A.
Attorneys: Steven E. Earle, Ashley B. Winstead of Morgan & Morgan, PA.
Case: Mogavero v. Starbucks Corp.
Case: Pier 1 Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Takeaway: Because there is copyright protection for the photographs taken of the products by the brand owner, if the online sellers for their counterfeit products use those images, the brand owner can request the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to take down the post.
Some well-known tactics for combating the selling of counterfeits online include using domain name dispute procedures, takedown notices, and automated monitoring software in terms of trademarks, trade dress, and copyright policing.
Another way brand owners may prevent counterfeit sales online relates to the copyright protection of the images that the brand owners own that show the products they are selling online.
If the counterfeiters use the brand owners’ own photos of their products to sell the counterfeit goods, the brand owners can rely on copyright law to request the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to take down the post under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) because the brand owner owns the copyright to the image.
For example, one can also utilize Google’s Trusted Copyright Removal Program by submitting the DMCA notices regarding the copyrighted images to request that the post for selling the counterfeit be removed from Google’s search results.
Because copyright protection is automatic and the brand owner does not need to register the rights to the image in order to submit a DMCA takedown notice, this is an efficient and cost-effective way to combat counterfeiters.
Takeaway: In the recent case Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that for a 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) liability, which is based on exporting parts of a patented invention, more than one component is required to constitute a “substantial portion” of the patented invention for there to be liability.
I’m not sure I agree with your understanding of the extraterritorial principle. I don’t – I mean, do you really take that down into the minutiae of every little clause? It seems to me it’s once the law applies, then you apply normal principles of statutory interpretation. I think we have cases about that in other – in other areas, which is sort of what is the reach, I think, may be the presumption against infringement in sovereign immunity, is – a case I can’t recall right away that said, well, once you get over it, you know, it’s over, and then you apply normal principles. The case clarifies that “substantial portion” means to comprise more than one component of the patented invention.
“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.” [35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)].
In interpreting the phrase “substantial portion of the components of a patented invention,” the Court adopted a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach in terms of the importance of each component. The Court asked, “How are courts—or, for that matter, market participants attempting to avoid liability—to determine the relative importance of the components of an invention?” The Court factored in how its holding would be difficult for those trying to interpret what would be considered liability when the importance of a component would require much more analysis and would be somewhat subjective.
Ultimately, the holding of the case is rather straightforward and interprets “substantial portion” to require more than one component of a patented invention in terms of being liable as an infringer for supplying a component of a patented invention from the United States.
Takeaway: In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews Inc. and Livewire Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that, for direct copyright infringement, proximate causation is a requirement, and a mere operation of a service or system like Giganews is not sufficient proximate causation.
The well-known copyright troll Perfect 10, Inc. sued Giganews for billions of dollars of alleged damages for copyright infringement and the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed Giganews in a 3-0 decision. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews Inc. and Livewire Services, Inc., No. 15-55500 (9th Cir. 2017).
Prior to this lawsuit, Perfect 10 had sued numerous other companies such as Google, Amazon, Tumblr, Microsoft, and Visa, lost in all of them, and consequently set a handful of useful and landmark precedents relating to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and this case is no different.
Giganews works with copyright holders to remove claimed infringing messages from its servers and the only way for Giganews to process the millions of notifications every year is to rely on copyright holders to provide machine-readable message-IDs. Perfect 10 refused to comply with providing the message-IDs and demanded that Giganews search the messages using certain search terms. However, that would impose burdensome processing power and would also introduce risk of error during the process. When Giganews refused to comply, Perfect 10 sued for billions of dollars of statutory damages for copyright infringement.
Giganews was not contributorily infringing because Giganews’ provision of service did not constitute a “material contribution” to infringement.
Giganews was not contributorily infringing because Giganews did not fail to take simple measures to curb infringement; rather, they were actively working with copyright holders to remove claimed infringement.
Perfect 10 failed to show that Giganews obtained any direct financial benefit from the infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrights and therefore is not able to prove vicarious liability.
Awarding attorneys’ fees was appropriate because victory for Giganews would likely advance the purposes and policies of the Copyright Act.
Takeaway: Starting February 17, 2017, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) will be implementing a random trademark audit program that would require trademark owners to show proof of the use of the trademark for the listed goods and services.
The USPTO randomly selected 500 trademark registrations and required the owners to submit proof of use of those marks in the additional goods or services per class.
In this 2-year pilot program, 51 percent of the registrations failed to supply proof of use, 35 percent selected to have the unused additional goods or services deleted, and 16 percent failed to respond, which resulted in the cancellation of the entire registration.
In an effort to clear “deadwood” from the Register, which currently has more than 5 million active trademarks, the USPTO will now select 10 percent of the trademarks that have been renewed to be selected for audit.
If selected for audit, trademark owners will have up to six months to respond and will be given the option either to submit the required proof of use or to delete those goods and services for which the mark is not being used. If the trademark owner fails to respond, the entire registration will be cancelled.
In order to avoid cancellation of your trademarks, we recommend that you take the proactive approach and choose to file a Post-Registration Amendment now, and delete any unused goods or services you have previously selected during registration. This will save you time and money in the case that your trademark does get chosen for audit.
Takeaway: The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) denied instituting an inter partes review based on the patent owner’s challenge that the prior art used for asserting obviousness could not afford the provisional filing date because there was insufficient written description support and therefore should not qualify as prior art.
Takeaway: Under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), a trademark owner can bring a federal suit against cybersquatters and if applicable, submit a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-resolution Policy (“UDRP”) for a proceeding established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) for the resolution of disputes regarding the registration of internet domain names.
Cybersquatting is a term used for a bad faith registration of another’s trademark in a domain name with the intent either to sell the domain back to the owner for a profit or to divert consumers to a competing or different website/company.
Typosquatting is a specific form of cybersquatting that exploits human typing errors wherein the bad faith registration is for domains very similar to well-known marks/domains. See, e.g., Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Sys., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“The ACPA has also been interpreted as prohibiting ‘typosquatting’—that is, registering intentional misspellings of famous trademarks or names”).
In terms of determining “bad faith intent,” courts look at a person’s “intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark . . . for commercial gain . . . by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site.” 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). The court can also find bad faith when the registrant acquired “multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
If there were actual damages and profits, the owner of the mark can recover those but may alternatively choose to pursue statutory damages of up to $100,000 per domain.
In addition, a trademark owner can also file for a Domain-Name Dispute-resolution Policy (“UDRP”) proceeding which would require a cybersquatter to transfer the domain if the trademark owner can show that (1) the domain in question is identical or confusing similar to its mark, (2) the registrant does not have a legitimate interest in the domain, and (3) obtained it and is using it in bad faith.
For example, in January 2017, FIFA, the international association for soccer, won the rights to FIFA.net with a UDRP proceeding.
It is recommended that trademark owners enforce their online brands by using the ACPA and UDRP legal processes to combat cybersquatters and typosquatters.
Takeaway: The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) must explain where an element is taught in the prior art and adequately explain the motivation to combine multiple prior art references. To merely state that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood to combine” is insufficient.
In Personal Web Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017), the Federal Circuit held that, once again, the PTAB failed to adequately explain the reasoning for an obviousness rejection based on the combination of multiple prior art references. This is not the first time the Federal Circuit remanded a PTAB decision based on this issue.
This is not the first time that the Federal Circuit has reversed and remanded a PTAB decision for the same reason. See Cutsforth, Inc. v. Motivepower, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, after Cutsforth was remanded, the PTAB issued a new final decision after additional briefing by both parties. The PTAB still found that all claims except two were still unpatentable for obviousness in the subsequent final written decision, allowing two claims that were previously found as unpatentable for obviousness.


Chapter 74 - Mines and Quarries.
Article 1 - Operation of Mines and Quarries.
§§ 74-1 through 74-14. Repealed by Session Laws 1975, c. 206, s. 21.
Article 2 - Inspection of Mines and Quarries.
§§ 74-15 through 74-24. Repealed by Session Laws 1975, c. 206, s. 21.
Article 2A - Mine Safety and Health Act.
§ 74-24.1. Short title and legislative purpose.
§ 74-24.4. Safety and health standards.
§ 74-24.5. Modification of safety and health standards.
§ 74-24.7. Inspections and investigations.
§ 74-24.8. Findings, notices, and orders.
§ 74-24.9. Issuance and delivery of notices, orders, and decisions.
§ 74-24.10. Administrative and judicial review of decisions on mine safety.
§ 74-24.11. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 827, s. 260.
§ 74-24.15. Rights and duties of miners.
§ 74-24.16. Education, training, technical assistance, and research.
§ 74-24.20. Construction of Article and severability.
Article 3 - Waterways Obtained.
§ 74-25. Water and drainage rights obtained.
§ 74-26. The petition, what to contain.
§ 74-27. Appraisers; appointment and duties.
§ 74-28. Confirmation of report; payment of damages; rights of petitioner.
§ 74-29. Registration of report.
§ 74-30. Obstructing mining drains.
§ 74-31. Disposition of waste.
Article 4 - Adjustment of Conflicting Claims.
§ 74-32. Liability for damage for trespass.
§ 74-33. Persons entitled to bring suit.
§ 74-34. Application and order for survey.
§ 74-35. Free access to mine for survey.
§ 74-36. Costs of the survey.
Article 5 - Interstate Mining Compact.
§ 74-37. Compact enacted into law.
§ 74-38. Commission to file copies of bylaws with Department of Environmental Quality.
Article 6 - Mining Registration.
§§ 74-39, 74-40: Repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 712, s. 2.
§ 74-41. Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 1262, s. 33.
§§ 74-42 through 74-45: Repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 712, s. 2.
Article 7 - The Mining Act of 1971.
§ 74-50. Permits – General.
§ 74-51. Permits – Application, granting, conditions.
§ 74-56. Inspection and approval of reclamation; bond release or forfeiture.
§ 74-57. Departmental modification of permit or reclamation plan.
§ 74-58. Suspension or revocation of permit.
§ 74-59. Bond forfeiture proceedings.
§ 74-61. Administrative and judicial review of decisions.
§ 74-62. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 827, s. 83.
§ 74-64. Penalties for violations.
§ 74-65. Effect on local zoning regulations.
§ 74-66. Private relief against nuisance or hazard.
§ 74-68. Cooperation with other agencies; contracts and grants.
§§ 74-69 through 74-74. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 8 - Control of Exploration for Uranium in North Carolina.
§ 74-75. Legislative findings; declaration of policy.
§ 74-78. Permits; application; granting; terms; duration; renewal.
§ 74-82. Suspension, revocation or modification of permit.
§ 74-85. Administrative and judicial review of decisions.
§ 74-87. Penalty for violations.
§ 74-88. Confidentiality of logs, surveys, and reports.
§ 74-89. Delay before mining permits issued.