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In a post-Dynamex world, hiring entities are finding it increasingly difficult to determine whether or not to classify a worker as an independent contractor or an employee.
The applicability of this seemingly strict ABC test was clarified in Garcia v. Border Tranportation LLC (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 558. On October 22, 2018, the Court of Appeal released its opinion on Garcia v. Border Transportation Group, LLC. In Border Transportation, Plaintiff Garcia, a taxi driver, filed a complaint against Border Transportation Group, LLC for wrongful termination, overtime, waiting time penalties, unfair competition and various wage order claims based on his alleged misclassification as an independent contractor. Border Transportation filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that under the Borello test, which largely focuses on control, Garcia was properly classified as an independent contractor. The trial court agreed with Border Transportation. Garcia appealed the ruling granting the motion for summary judgment, and while the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court released its opinion on Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court.
The Court of Appeal ultimately decided that in determining a worker’s status as an independent contractor, Dynamex only applies to wage order claims. As to all non-wage order claims, Borello remains the proper standard. (Garcia v. Border Transportation LLC (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 558, 570-71). Therefore, summary adjudication should not have been granted as to Garcia’s wage order claims but was proper as to his non-wage order claims.
Overall, although the Supreme Court has not ruled at this time, the Court of Appeal in Garcia v. Border Transportation LLC has provided an important exception to the strict Dynamex ABC test as it pertains to non-wage order claims. We will be paying close attention to further developments in the interpretation of this important exception.
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Ariel Brotman at [email protected]glaw.com.
In late 2017, the “Me Too” movement ignited after actress Ashley Judd publicly accused media mogul Harvey Weinstein of sexual harassment. Since then, the movement has led to vast changes in the workplace. Numerous industry leaders have fallen from grace. States are quickly passing legislation to attempt to curb sexual harassment and abuse in the workplace, and allegations of sexual harassment continue to rise. However, as Google employees proved last month, compliance with the law cannot be an employer’s only consideration.
When Andy Rubin stepped down from his executive role at Google in October of 2014, it appeared to be an amicable parting of ways. But three years later, a New York Times article revealed that Andy Rubin was forced to resign following a “credible” allegation of sexual harassment. The NYT also disclosed that Google gave Rubin an exit package worth approximately $90 million dollars, which was not required under his contract. Within days of learning this information, hundreds of Google employees staged a walk-out to protest their employer’s handling of alleged sexual misconduct.
In response to employee demands, Google CEO Sundar Pichai agreed not to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements with regard to claims of sexual harassment and assault. However, following their victory, Google employees began pushing for the arbitration clauses to be nixed entirely. On February 21, Google announced the end of its policy of forced arbitration and class action waivers for its employees.
There are many lessons we can learn from Google’s experience. First, never assume that resolution of a dispute will remain confidential. One of the most embarrassing aspects of this situation for Google—and what appears to have been the source of much employee infuriation—was the fact that Google could have terminated Rubin without paying him $90 million for allegations an internal investigation concluded to be credible.
Second, employers must weigh all costs and benefits of their policies regarding employees. While employers typically can require employees who have signed arbitration agreements to pursue their claims within the arbitration context, employers should also assess other factors in deciding how they handle the use of arbitration agreements with their workforce.
Third, sexual harassment continues to be a front-page issue. From giant tech companies to family-owned restaurants, allegations of sexual harassment are likely to make it into the news. So it is now more important than ever to ensure that employers get ahead of these issues by holding consistent harassment training, updating employee policies and manuals, and quickly and appropriately handling employee complaints.
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Hassan Aburish at [email protected].
A California Court of Appeal upheld a $50,000 sanction against an attorney based on conduct at a deposition.
On February 4, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in the case Anna Anka v. Louis Yeager. This case involved a child custody dispute between Paul Anka’s ex-wife, Anna Anka, and her first husband, Louis Yeager. As part of this dispute, the trial court had ordered that a confidential child custody and evaluation report be performed. Mrs. Anka was then subsequently involved in a second child custody dispute with her second husband/now ex-husband, Paul Anka.
Mrs. Anka was represented by the same attorney in both custody disputes. Mrs. Anka’s attorney took Mr. Yeager’s deposition as part of Mrs. Anka’s second custody dispute. During the deposition, Mrs. Anka’s attorney asked Mr. Yeager a series of questions to attempt to elicit confidential information regarding the contents of the evaluation and report from the first child custody dispute. Mr. Yeager testified that he could not recall the information. However, the trial court still sanctioned Mrs. Anka and her attorney $50,000 jointly and severally for her attorney’s reckless and malicious line of questioning that was orchestrated to elicit confidential child custody information.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the $50,000 sanctions against the attorney, but reversed the sanctions award as to Mrs. Anka. The Court found that the disclosure of confidential information was due solely to the attorney’s reckless and malicious conduct during the deposition. The Court opined that “besides being an advocate to advance the interest of the client, the attorney is also an officer of the court” and further that “counsel’s zeal to protect and advance the interest of the client must be tempered by the professional and ethical constraints the legal profession demands.” The Court held that the attorney’s conduct in eliciting confidential information during the deposition was not only reckless, but was intentional and willful.
The takeaway from this case is that in both California and across all states, there are real ethical limitations to zealous representation during depositions. Attorneys must remember to balance their duty to zealously represent their client’s interests with their duty as officers of the court to conduct themselves with integrity, courtesy, and professionalism.
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Jenny Jin at (415) 352-6451 or [email protected].

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CITY OF HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA, DefendantAppellee.
Amended by Order Filed July 12, 1993.
Michael W. Carey, U.S. Atty., Charleston, WV, on brief), for plaintiffappellant.
in the City. 1 Civil penalties are available for delinquent accounts.
were immune from the fees.
the injunction against the collection of penalties and interest.
service fee is a tax, then immunity is clear.
the tax and its effect upon the federal right asserted." United States v.
(quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367-68, 50 S.Ct. 121, 123, 74 L.Ed.
Fire and flood protection and street maintenance are core government services.
See Mullen Benev. Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89, 54 S.Ct. 38, 78 L.Ed.
reassessments for sewers and sidewalks."); see also Federal Reserve Bank v.
User fees are payments given in return for a government-provided benefit.
City service.6 See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287, 96 S.Ct.
among the beneficiaries according to their respective wealth ...").
disguised tax, and, as such, the USPS and GSA are immune from liability for it.
to enter judgment for the United States.
limitations on ad valorem taxation. See Hare v. City of Wheeling, 171 W.Va.
172 W.Va. 505, 308 S.E.2d 527 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958, 104 S.Ct.
immunity from state taxation, and is based on a different constitutional source,"
we are of the opinion that the United States v. Maine test is inapplicable here.
Lessons Learned Promoting Physical Activity at the Community Level.

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In general, our website can be used without providing personal data. If personal data are collected on our websites (name, address or email addresses, for example), this always takes place on a voluntary basis where possible.
Please note that transmission of data over the internet (during communication via email, for example) may have security vulnerabilities. The complete protection of data against access by third parties is not possible.
This information serves the purpose of transparency as well as the exercising of your rights in connection with the processing of personal data. Personal data means all information relating to you as an identified or identifiable natural person. The processing of personal data takes place according to the statutory provisions on data protection of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Our Managing Director will be pleased to respond to all of your questions regarding data projection.
For the fulfilment of contractual obligations (point (b) of Art. 6(1) GDPR): We process personal data for the fulfilment of contracts. The fulfilment of contracts includes, for example, the conclusion, implementation and reversal of the contract. We also process personal data which is required for the completion of pre-contractual measures, such as the initiation of a contract, for example, and which take place upon your request.
The fulfilment of statutory obligations (point (c) of Art. 6(1) GDPR): We also process personal data if it is necessary for the fulfilment of a statutory obligation to which we are subject. That includes the fulfilment of statutory retention requirements, for example..
Processing on the basis of consent (point (a) of Art 6(1) GDPR): We shall also process personal data for one or several specific purposes if you have provided us with your consent to do so.
In the scope of the safeguarding of our legitimate interests, on the basis of point (f) of Art. 6(1) GDPR, we process personal data for internal administrative purposes.
We only disclose personal data for the purposes referred to in clause 3. The recipients of the data include public authorities or social insurance agencies.
We also disclose personal data to service providers. When commissioning services, we take the data protection provisions into account, especially those concerning order processing.
We will not transfer your data to a third country or to an international organisation.
Duration of storage and criteria for the determination of the storage period (point (a) of Art. 13/14(2) GDPR).
We shall store your personal data for the purposes referred to in clause 3, especially for the fulfilment of contracts. If the contract is completely implemented or reversed together with you, as a rule, your data will no longer be used. The exception is the use for statistical assessments. Your data will also be stored for the fulfilment of the statutory retention obligations.
automated individual decision-making, including profiling Art. 22 GDPR): You have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing – including profiling – which has a legal impact on your person or otherwise places you at a considerable disadvantage. This shall not apply if the decision concerning the conclusion or fulfilment of a contract between your person and us is necessary, is permitted on the basis of statutory provisions, and such provisions contain reasonable measures for the safeguarding of your rights and freedoms and your legitimate interests, or takes place with your express consent.
Withdrawal of consent (point (c) of Art 13(2) GDPR) / Point (d) of Art. 14(2) GDPR).
If the processing of data is based on your consent, you have the right to withdraw such consent at any time.
The provision of personal data is generally required for the initiation, conclusion, implementation and reversal of a contract. Should you fail to provide the necessary personal data, it is not possible for us to conclude or fulfil a contract with you.
Automated decision-making and profiling to not occur.
We do not collect personal data through third parties.

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In Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit reviewed the final written decisions in CBM reviews of three related patents owned by Ameranth, Inc., directed to computerized systems for generating and displaying menus for use in the restaurant industry. The court determined that the PTAB properly construed all disputed claim terms, determined that the patents are CBM patents, and determined that most challenged claims were unpatentable under § 101, but that the PTAB erred in concluding that some dependent claims were not unpatentable under § 101.
More specifically, the claims in the disputed Ameranth patents are directed to a “first menu that has categories and items, and software that can generate a second menu from the first menu by allowing categories and items to be selected.” In its decisions, the PTAB had canceled claims in all three patents for patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and upheld some dependent claims that had been challenged on the same basis. The PTAB found that the Apple petitioners had not met their burden of showing that certain dependent claims in the ’733 patent were unpatentable under § 101.
On appeal, Ameranth argued that the Board’s CBM patent and § 101 determinations were “based on a misapprehension of the actually claimed subject matter.” A CBM patent, as defined in the AIA, means “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” Ameranth did not appeal the Board’s “financial product or service” determination, but argued that the patents fall within the exception for technological inventions because they recite technological features, including specific software which was distinctive over the prior art, and because the petitioners made no showing that these features were known or conventional. The court was not persuaded by Ameranth’s arguments that theirs was a technological invention. The court found that there was substantial evidence in support of the PTAB’s determination that the challenged claims “do not solve technical problems using technical solutions,” and that all challenged patents met the statutory definition of CBM patents.
The court did not address the Board’s “financial product or service” determination, because that issue had not been raised by Ameranth; however, the challenged claims do not appear to recite a method or apparatus “used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” as required by the statute, which was recently construed by the court in Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., and discussed here.
The court also reversed the PTAB’s decision that some of Ameranth’s challenged dependent claims were patentable. In making that determination, the court found no disclosure of how the linking of orders with customers would be technologically implemented. In its § 101 analysis, the court determined that the challenged claims are directed to the abstract idea of a restaurant server taking an order from a customer and keeping track of what customer placed that order, using a computer. The court further determined that the elements of the challenged claims did not transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Instead, the claims simply add conventional computer components to well-known business practices, which is not sufficient for patent eligibility under Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The court also noted that Ameranth, in its patent specification, expressly recited that the hardware needed was typical and that the programming steps were commonly known. As a result the court found no inventive method. The court cited Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015), in concluding that a claim that merely describes an “effect or result dissociated from any method by which [it] is accomplished” is not patent-eligible. In view of the outcome here, patent practitioners should be careful about using words like “typical” and “commonly known” in describing various aspects of an invention in a patent application.


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Recent developments in molecular technology have led to significant improvements in detection and control of many pathogens. The use of those techniques for pathogen detection in quarantine and certification programs has not yet been universally accepted. This is primarily because of the need to validate these techniques and determine their limitations. We are proposing to supply the data for that validation for the case of grapevine registration and certification. We will make a side-by-side comparison of 1) the classical, currently used technique for the analysis of viral pathogens of grapevine, with 2) the more recently developed technology of Next Generation. Sequencing (NGS). In both cases, we will test the same set of fifty selected grapevine accessions infected with one or multiple viruses of importance to the grape industry. In the first case, viral pathogens will be analyzed using biological assays on a standard herbaceous and woody index panel of host plants, as is required by APHIS and CDFA for certification. We will compare the results from that bioassay with a second analysis based on NGS of the total grapevine viruses in each of the selected accessions. The two tests will run concurrently. We expect to show that, for the evaluation of the disease status of grapevine stocks, NGS is superior to biological assay, as well as to ELISA, RT-PCR and real time RT-qPCR in sensitivity, reliability, speed and labor intensity, and cost. We will make the case for the replacement of biological assays with NGS for the certification of novel grapevine accessions. Our data will be useful to federal and state regulatory agencies as evidence supporting the revision of the existing mandated protocols for the testing and release of novel grapevine accessions from quarantine. The improvements brought with the up-date to NGS technology for this application will be of significant benefit to the grape growing industry.
The first year objectives of this project have been met. We have identified the first batch of 20 grapevine accessions that carry infections of agronomic importance, for use in the comparative demonstration of the effectiveness of the two techniques evaluated in this project. We have chipbud grafted material from each of those to the standard four bioassay index hosts, and begun their two year incubation period toward symptom scoring. We have also made total RNA extractions from those infected plants and begun NGS analysis, using BLAST sequence comparisons to subtract the host coded sequences from those of the pathogens of interest. This progress will generate the data for the comparisons between the techniques, which will meet the subsequent objectives of this proposal.
The 2013 crosses focused on developing rootstocks with deeper root systems, the genetics of root architecture traits, and introgressing the excellent soil pest resistance from rotundifolia into rootstocks using semi-fertile vinifera x rotundifolia (VR) hybrids (see Table 1). This may also be a way to incorporate fanleaf tolerance and allow improvement of O39-16. VR hybrids are normally sterile but a few were selected by Olmo to have some fertility. Unfortunately they are also crosses with vinifera so we must be assured of their phylloxera resistance (studies underway).
GRN Field Trials – This was the first year data was gathered from GRN rootstock trials; most of which are being overseen by farm advisers and Constellation. We took crop yields at a trial in Dunnigan with Franzia and another in Lodi with Gallo. This data will be combined with pruning weights (not yet taken) and presented with the next report and as a bulletin to nurseries and cooperators.
Nematode testing – We work closely with Howard Ferris and his technician to evaluate the nematode resistance of rootstock breeding populations. Nin Romero (my chief greenhouse and field technician) propagated and assisted with the nematode resistance screening of hundreds of seedlings this year. Nina and I first examined the populations and evaluated them for brushy growth, internode length, and vigor. Most were also evaluated for their ability to root from dormant cuttings. They were tested for resistance to the Harmony/Freedom aggressive root-knot strains (HarmA and HarmC) and Xiphinema index, and many were also screened for ring nematode resistance. The best 21 are shown in Table 2 and will be advanced to field testing on the UC Davis campus with 101-14 and 1103P comparison controls.
Fanleaf – We continue to make progress on identifying and verifying the function of the Xiphinema index resistance gene from V. arizonica b42-26, and it resistance locus XiR1. Two gene candidates are members of the NB-LRR (nucleotide binding-leucine rich repeat) resistance gene family that control recognition of pests and diseases and the triggering of a defense reaction. These two candidates were transformed into St. George and Thompson Seedless and they reduced susceptibility to X. index resistance, but the transformed plants were still susceptible. There are more lines to test and we are examining gene expression with qPCR and will pursue native promoters to determine if they can increase resistance.
The USDA Agricultural Research Service grape rootstock improvement program, based at the Grape Genetics Research Unit, is breeding rootstocks resistant to aggressive root-knot nematodes. We define aggressive root-knot nematodes as those which feed on and damage the rootstocks Freedom and Harmony. We screened 5212 candidate grape rootstock seedlings (representing 34 different populations) for resistance to aggressive root-knot nematodes. We select only those seedlings which completely suppress nematode reproduction and show zero nematode egg masses. The nematode resistance evaluation total includes 494 seedlings of a genetic study population that also are qualified for consideration as rootstocks. Selected seedlings are propagated and then planted into the vineyard. We tested the propagation ability of 123 selections (already tested once for nematode resistance). We evaluated 22 selections, grafted to Syrah, in replicated rootstock trials at the University of California Kearney Agricultural Research and Extension center. We pollinated 412 clusters of crosses in 48 unique combinations specifically aimed at the breeding of improved rootstocks with resistance to aggressive root-knot nematodes and collected 33,530 rootstock cross seeds. Matador, Minotaur, and Kingfisher rootstocks, released by this USDA ARS grape rootstock breeding program in 2010, are being distributed by Foundation Plant Services and planted by California nurseries.
We made more crosses to increase the number of Muscadinia rotundifolia-based progeny by crossing 101-14 Mgt, 161-49C (V. berlandieri x V. riparia) and 5BB with M. rotundifolia Trayshed pollen to create populations with broad pest resistance and the ability to induce fanleaf tolerance in scions. We have over 200 progeny in the 101-14 x Trayshed population and many are undergoing rooting and horticultural screening this Winter. We have screened subsets of the population for resistance to dagger, root-knot and ring nematodes; they segregate for dagger and root-knot resistance and all resist ring nematodes. To further our study of fanleaf tolerance, we also collected xylem sap from stronger progeny in the 101-14 x Trashed population. We will screen these saps with targeted metabolites from our fanleaf tolerance investigations. We also made crosses to produce PD resistant rootstocks with good nematode resistance and good rooting; better drought and salt tolerance; and crosses to make virus tolerant rootstocks. Cecilia Agüero successfully made constructs of two of the XiR1, Xiphinema index resistance genes we characterized from V. arizonica/girdiana b42-26 (Hwang et al. 2010. Theoretical and Applied Genetics 121:780-799). She has transformed them into St. George and Thompson Seedless, and into tomato (a host of X. index and very easy to transform and study). We should be able to inoculate these plants with X. index later this year to test the function of these gene candidates. This project is primarily funded by the American Vineyard Foundation, and it also supports our efforts to determine which metabolites are responsible for O39-16?s fanleaf tolerance. We will be testing for presence and levels of five metabolites and two cytokinins in saps from O39-16 and about 20 individuals from the 101-14 x Trayshed population. Kevin Fort?s excellent work on the mechanisms of, and screening for, salt tolerance are coming to fruition and four publications are ready for submission. He is now working as a post-doc on generous funding from E&J Gallo who funded a joint project between Andrew McElrone and myself. Kevin is studying interactions between drought and salinity, and working out experiments to accurately screen drought tolerance and to better understand root architecture. He is helping to supervise Claire Heinitz who is studying the eco-genetics of salt tolerance in southwestern Vitis, and Cecilia Osorio who is studying the anatomical basis of drought tolerance. Jean Dodson is also working on drought adaptation by studying the influence of rootstocks on phenological events such as root senescence, leaf drop and harvest dates, which will greatly impact vine water use. Karl Lund is analyzing the feeding behavior of eight phylloxera strains on the root tips of 11 rootstocks and Vitis species. He has also initiated the screening of a V. vinifera x V. berlandieri 9031 mapping population. This V. berlandieri accession has excellent phylloxera resistance and the progeny segregates for resistance, which allows the development of a genetic map for this source of resistance.
The USDA grape rootstock improvement program, based at the Grape Genetics Research Unit, is breeding grape rootstocks resistant to aggressive root-knot nematodes. We define aggressive root-knot nematodes as those which feed on and damage the rootstocks Freedom and Harmony. In 2009 we screened 5126 candidate grape rootstock seedlings (representing 69 different populations) for resistance to aggressive root-knot nematodes. We select only those seedlings which completely suppress nematode reproduction and show zero nematode egg masses. Selected seedlings are propagated and then planted into the vineyard. We screened an additional 420 seedlings for nematode resistance genetics studies. We tested the propagation ability of 190 selections (already tested once for nematode resistance) and of these retested 80 selections to confirm nematode resistance in replicated trials. We planted eleven selections, grafted to Syrah, into a new rootstock trial at the University of California Kearney Ag Center and identified eleven more selections to be grafted to Syrah for a rootstock trial to be planted in 2010. We pollinated 317 clusters of crosses in 55 unique combinations specifically aimed at the breeding of improved rootstocks with resistance to aggressive root-knot nematodes. Virus testing is complete for our most elite selections and several of these are candidates for possible variety release.

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Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG is pleased to welcome you on this website and to note your interest in our products and services. Your data will be treated as confidential according to the valid German Data Protection Act. All personal details collected on this website will be stored, processed and possibly transmitted to the partners of Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG only with the aim to provide you with individual support or to send you product information and service offers.
The protection of your personal data has the highest priority for us and is considered in all our business processes. With the introduction of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (DS-GVO) new and more extensive data protection regulations apply. With regard to the new legal situation, we would like to inform you with the following information about the processing of your personal data by the company and the rights to which you are entitled under data protection law.
Personal data refers to all information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. With these data protection notices, we inform you about the type, scope and purpose of the collection of personal data by our company and how we handle this data. You will also be informed about your rights with regard to the processing of your personal data.
The following information applies to all natural persons whose personal data is stored and who are associated with the supplier business relationship (e.g. authorised representatives).
process as responsible bodies your personal data in compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (DS-GVO), the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) and all other relevant legal provisions.
d.) for the evaluation of accesses.
Data processing is carried out for the purpose of maintaining the customer relationship.
Data processing is carried out for the purpose of maintaining the supplier relationship.
Data processing is carried out for the purpose of employee administration.
Data processing is carried out for the purpose of recruiting employees.
The data provided by you will be stored and processed for the aforementioned purposes on the basis of Art. 6 Para. 1 S 1 Letter b) General Data Protection Regulation (DS-GVO) and Art. 6 Para. 1 S 1 Letter a) DS-GVO in conjunction with Art. 7 DS-GVO.
All our employees who process personal data are trained in accordance with the DS-GVO and, in accordance with the principles of the DS-GVO for the processing of personal data, are obliged to comply with the data protection requirements as laid down in Art. 5 para. 1 DS-GVO.
A transfer of personal data to third parties does not take place in principle with the only exception: A transfer takes place when there is a legal obligation to public bodies, such as law enforcement authorities or tax consultants. In addition, a transfer to third parties will only take place if this is necessary for the above-mentioned purposes and legally permitted or if you have given your prior consent. Furthermore, we are obliged to transmit data to official recipients in accordance with Art. 6 para. 1 c DS-GVO in the event of prescribed reliability checks. In the case of employment of applicants from third countries, data is transferred to the central foreign and specialist placement service.
The storage period of your personal data depends on the legal retention periods or the existence of the consent you may have given.
Right to information: You have the right to information about the data stored with us, in particular, for what purpose the processing takes place and how long the data are stored (Article 15 DS-GVO).
Right to rectify inaccurate data: You have the right to demand that we rectify any personal data concerning you without delay if it is inaccurate (Article 16 DS-GVO).
Right of deletion: You have the right to request that we delete your personal data. These conditions stipulate that you can request the deletion of your data if, for example, we no longer need the personal data for the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed, if we should process the data unlawfully or if you have legitimately objected to them or if there is a statutory obligation to delete them (Article 17 DS-GVO).
Right to limitation of processing: You have the right to request a limitation of the processing of your data. This right exists in particular for the duration of the examination if you have disputed the accuracy of the data concerning you and in the event that you wish limited processing instead of deletion in the case of an existing right to deletion. Furthermore, the processing will be restricted if the data is no longer required for the purposes pursued by us, but you need the data to assert, exercise or defend legal claims, or if the successful exercise of an objection between us and you is disputed (Article 18 DS-GVO).
Right to data transfer: You have the right to receive from us the personal data concerning you which you have provided to us in a structured, common, machine-readable format (Article 20 DS-GVO), insofar as these have not already been deleted.
Right of objection: You have the right to object to the processing of your personal data at any time for reasons arising from your particular situation (Article 21 DS-GVO). We will stop processing your personal data unless we can prove compelling reasons for processing worthy of protection which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or if the processing serves the assertion, exercise or defence of legal claims.
If you are of the opinion that the processing of your personal data violates the General Data Protection Regulation, please contact the Data Protection Officer mentioned above or the competent data protection supervisory authority.
You can also prevent Google from collecting the data generated by the cookie and related to your use of the website (including your IP address) and from processing this data by Google by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available at the following link (http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en).
On the basis of our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimisation and economic operation of our online offer in the sense of Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO), we make use of social plugins ("plugins") of the social network facebook.com, which is operated by Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin 2, Ireland ("Facebook").
When a user calls up a function of this online service that contains such a plugin, his device establishes a direct connection with Facebook's servers. The content of the plugin is transmitted directly from Facebook to the user's device and integrated into the online service. User profiles can be created from the processed data. We therefore have no influence on the extent of the data that Facebook collects with the help of this plugin and therefore inform the user according to our state of knowledge.
The purpose and scope of the data collection and the further processing and use of the data by Facebook as well as the relevant rights and setting options to protect the privacy of users can be found in Facebook's data protection information: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/.
This website has been compiled with the greatest possible care. Nevertheless, Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG, Leonberg, cannot guarantee the correctness and accuracy of the information provided. We therefore exclude any liability for damages arising directly or indirectly from the use of this website, unless otherwise provided by law. We reserve the right to change the information on this server without prior notice. All texts, graphics and offers are subject to change and non-binding. The use of this website does not create any contractual relationship between the user and the publisher.
Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG reserves all rights to the contents of this website. Texts, pictures, graphics, sound, animations and videos as well as their arrangement on this website are protected by copyright and other protective laws. The contents of this website may not be copied, distributed, changed or made accessible to third parties without express permission. The website may also contain content that is subject to the copyright of third parties.
The intellectual property contained in the website, such as patents, brands, trademarks and copyrights, is protected. This website does not grant any license to use the intellectual property of Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG or third parties.
Despite careful control of the content, Brückner Trockentechnik GmbH & Co. KG assumes no liability for the content of external links. The operators of the linked pages are solely responsible for their content. The links are regularly checked for illegal content and are removed immediately in the event of a violation.

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When a dispute arose between parties to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana, respondent franchisee sued petitioners, franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Lombardi, in a Montana state court. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." Mont. Code Ann. 27-5-114(4). DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that 27-5-114(4) was preempted by 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." In arguing for preemption, DAI and Lombardi dominantly relied on Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 , and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 , in which this Court established that "state law . . . is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally," but not if the state-law principle "takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue." Id., at 493, n. 9 (emphasis added). The Montana Supreme Court, however, thought Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 , limited 2's preemptive force and correspondingly qualified Southland and Perry; the proper inquiry, the Montana Supreme Court said, should focus not on the bare words of 2 but on the question: Would the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements Page II altogether. On remand from this Court for reconsideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. ___, the Montana court adhered to its original ruling.
Montana's first-page notice requirement, which governs not "any contract," but specifically and solely contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. Generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening 2, see, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S., at ___, but courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions, see, e.g., id., at ___. By enacting 2, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed upon the same footing as other contracts. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 . Montana's 27-5-114(4) directly conflicts with 2 because the State's law conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally. The Montana Supreme Court misread Volt in reaching a contrary conclusion. The state rule examined in Volt determined only the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself. Applying 27-5-114(4) here, in contrast, would invalidate the arbitration clause. Pp. 5-8.
___ Mont. ___, 901 P.2d 596, reversed and remanded.
This case concerns a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana. When a dispute arose between parties to the agreement, franchisee Paul Casarotto sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and DAI's Montana development agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court. DAI and Lombardi sought to stop the litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out on page nine of the franchise agreement.
Petitioner DAI is the national franchisor of Subway sandwich shops. In April 1988, DAI entered a franchise agreement with respondent Paul Casarotto, which permitted Casarotto to open a Subway shop in Great Falls, Montana. The franchise agreement stated, on page nine and in ordinary type: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof shall be settled by Arbitration . . . ." App. 75.
In October 1992, Casarotto sued DAI and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in Montana state court, alleging state-law contract and tort claims relating to the franchise agreement. DAI demanded arbitration of those claims, and successfully moved in the Montana trial court to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration. Id., at 10-11.
"Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration . . . shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."
Notice of the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement did not appear on the first page of the contract. Nor was anything relating to the clause typed in underlined capital letters. Because the State's statutory notice requirement had not been met, the Montana Supreme Court declared the parties' dispute "not subject to arbitration." 268 Mont., at 382, 886 P.2d, at 939.
DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued before the Montana Supreme Court that 27-5-114(4) was preempted by [ DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CASAROTTO, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) , 3] 2 of the FAA. 1 DAI and Lombardi dominantly relied on our decisions in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). In Southland, we held that 2 of the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts, see 465 U.S., at 12 , and "withdr[aws] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration," id., at 10. We noted in the pathmarking Southland decision that the FAA established a "broad principle of enforceability," id., at 11, and that 2 of the federal Act provided for revocation of arbitration agreements only upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." In Perry, we reiterated: "[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of 2]." 482 U.S., at 493 , n. 9.
The Montana Supreme Court, however, read our decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), as limiting the preemptive force of 2 and correspondingly qualifying Southland and Perry. 268 Mont., at 378-381, 886 [ DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CASAROTTO, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) , 4] P.2d, at 937-939. As the Montana Supreme Court comprehended Volt, the proper inquiry here should focus not on the bare words of 2, but on this question: Would the application of Montana's notice requirement, contained in 27-5-114(4), "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA." 268 Mont., at 381, 886 P.2d, at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 27-5-114(4), in the Montana court's judgment, did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA, for the notice requirement did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether; it simply prescribed "that before arbitration agreements are enforceable, they be entered knowingly." Id., at 381, 886 P.2d, at 939.
"States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause `upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' 9 U.S.C. 2 (emphasis added). What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal `footing,' directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress's intent." 513 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15-16).
On remand, without inviting or permitting further briefing or oral argument, 2 the Montana Supreme Court adhered to its original ruling. The court stated: "After careful review, we can find nothing in the [Allied-Bruce] decision which relates [ DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CASAROTTO, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) , 5] to the issues presented to this Court in this case." Casarotto v. Lombardi, ___ Mont. ___, ___, 901 P.2d 596, 598 (1995). Elaborating, the Montana court said it found "no suggestion in [Allied-Bruce] that the principles from Volt on which we relied [to uphold 27-5-114(4)] have been modified in any way." Id., at ___-___, 901 P.2d, at 598-599. We again granted certiorari, 516 U.S. ___ (1996), and now reverse.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. 2 (emphasis added). Repeating our observation in Perry, the text of 2 declares that state law may be applied "if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." 482 U.S., at 493 , n. 9. Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening 2. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 -484 (1989); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
The Montana Supreme Court misread our Volt decision and therefore reached a conclusion in this case at odds with our rulings. Volt involved an arbitration agreement that incorporated state procedural rules, one of which, on the facts of that case, called for arbitration to be stayed pending the resolution of a related judicial proceeding. The state rule examined in Volt determined only the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself. We held that applying the state rule would not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA," 489 U.S., at 478 , because the very purpose of the Act was to "ensur[e] that private [ DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CASAROTTO, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) , 7] agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms," id., at 479.
Applying 27-5-114(4) here, in contrast, would not enforce the arbitration clause in the contract between DAI and Casarotto; instead, Montana's first-page notice requirement would invalidate the clause. The "goals and policies" of the FAA, this Court's precedent indicates, are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions. Section 2 "mandate[s] the enforcement of arbitration agreements," Southland, 465 U.S., at 10 , "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," 9 U.S.C. 2. Section 27-5-114(4) of Montana's law places arbitration agreements in a class apart from "any contract," and singularly limits their validity. The State's prescription is thus inconsonant with, and is therefore preempted by, the federal law.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
"A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. 2.
[ Footnote 2 ] Dissenting Justice Gray thought it "cavalier" of her colleagues to ignore the defendants' request for an "opportunity to brief the issues raised by the . . . remand and to present oral argument." Casarotto v. Lombardi, ___, Mont. ___, ___-___, 901 P.2d 596, 599-600 (1995).

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