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The plaintiff was the absolute owner of the property bearing No. F-18 Geetanjali Enclave, New Delhi pursuant to a perpetual sub-lease dated 16.12.1970. The present suit for was filed by the plaintiff seeking a permanent and mandatory injunction against the defendants to restrain them from entering the suit property and to direct defendant No. 1 to permanently quit the suit property.
2. Defendant No. 2 is the son of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 is her daughter in law and the present suit is a result of souring of relations between the plaintiff and her daughter in law. The dispute is really one between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1.
3. Issues in the suit were framed on 6.3.2007 and the matter was set down for trial. Defendant No. 1 was restrained from entering the suit property by an ad interim order dated 5.12.2006 and the application for setting aside the same was dismissed on 10.1.2007. An appeal was filed against the said order which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 19.3.2007 with the direction to appear before this Court to pursue the suit in accordance with law as the Counsel for respondent No. 1 (plaintiff herein) stated that the suit property had been sold and the appeal had thus become infructuous. The suit property is stated to have been sold vide a sale deed executed and registered in favour of the purchaser on 11.3.2007.
4. On 16.4.2007, learned Counsel for the plaintiff stated that he has obtained instructions to unconditionally withdraw the present suit. Learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 however had objections to the same. I heard learned Counsel for the parties on 20.4.2007 and 3.5.2007.
5. The basic plea of the plaintiff is that a plaintiff has an unconditional right to withdraw a suit under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the said Code) and cannot be compelled at the instance of the defendant to continue with the suit. Defendant No. 1 on the other hand has taken the stand that she has a right of possession by virtue of the factum of possession as well as by reason of her right of possession being implicit in the right to maintenance and thus the plaintiff cannot be considered wholly dominus litis and permitted to withdraw the suit.
6. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that well prior to the commencement of the litigation, the plaintiff had definite plans to sell the property in question and purchase smaller residential accommodation. This fact was brought to the notice of the Court at the very outset. In this regard, learned Counsel drew the attention of the Court to para 17 of the plaint wherein it has been stated that the plaintiff has definite plans to sell the property and take a smaller apartment and keep the proceeds for meeting her old age needs and security.
7. Learned Senior Counsel averred that defendant No. 1 had forcibly entered the house and occupied one room therein and thereafter filed a suit seeking an injunction against the plaintiff claiming protection of her right to residence in the matrimonial home under inter alia the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short the ‘PWDV Act’). It is submitted that no interim relief was obtained in that suit and the suit itself has been dismissed in default.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff contended that under the provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the said Code, a plaintiff has an absolute right of withdrawal or abandonment and cannot be compelled to proceed with the suit at the instance of defendant No. 1 who contends that she may be able to establish a personal right arising out of her status as a wife particularly because she has abandoned her independent suit to claim the rights asserted.
9. In support of his plea learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Wig Brothers (Builders and Engineers) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank and Anr., 100 (2002) DLT 187, wherein the Court has drawn a distinction between a plaintiff’s right to unconditionally withdraw a suit and granting of permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. Order 23 Rule 1(1) confers an absolute right of withdrawal or abandonment which is not the same as withdrawal with the liberty to file afresh on the same cause of action, as provided under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the said Code. If the suit is sought to be withdrawn under Rule 1(1), the plaintiff cannot be compelled to proceed with the suit except when there is a counter claim, etc. In this case, the Court had referred to the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Hulas Rail Baij Nath v. Firm K.B. Bass and Co., AIR 1968 SC 111. In this case, it was observed that the language of Order 23 Rule (1) Sub-rule (1) of the said Code gives an unqualified right to the plaintiff to withdraw from a suit and if no permission to file a fresh suit is sought under Sub-rule (2) of that rule, the plaintiff becomes liable for such costs as the Court may award and becomes precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of that subject matter under Sub-rule 3 of that rule. There is no provision in the said code which requires the Court to refuse permission to withdraw the suit in such circumstances and to compel the plaintiff to proceed with it. Different considerations may arise where a set off may have been claimed or a counter claim may have been filed if permissible by the procedural law applicable to the proceedings governing the suit.
10. A reference was also made to the judgment of the Apex Court in K.S. Bhoopathy v. Kokila, IV (2000) SLT 727=II (2000) CLT 289 (SC)=(2000) 5 SCC 458, wherein at para 13 it has been observed that on principle an application by a plaintiff under Sub-rule (3) cannot be treated on a par with an application by him in exercise of the absolute liberty given to him under Sub-rule (1). In the former it is actually a prayer for concession from the Court after satisfying the Court regarding existence of the circumstances justifying the grant of such concession. No doubt, the grant of leave envisaged in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 is at the discretion of the Court but such discretion is to be exercised by the Court with caution and circumspection.
1(1) and withdrawal of a suit with the permission of the Court with liberty to file a fresh suit as provided for under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the said Code to contend that what is being sought is unconditional withdrawal and not withdrawal with leave to file a fresh suit.
12. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 submitted that the said Code in permitting abandonment of a claim applies the principle invito beneficium non datur which means law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire.
The principle underlying Order 23 Rule 1, is that the law confers no right which a person does not desire. Though based on public policy, it is distinct from res judicata.
The principle underlying the provision for withdrawal and abandonment is, that law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire — invitio beneficium non datur. The second suit after the withdrawal of the first suit without seeking permission to file a fresh suit) is barred, not because of the principle of res judicata (because there has been no adjudication), but because, whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. However, where the second suit is instituted before the withdrawal of the first suit, permission obtained in the first suit with regard to institution of the second suit is not hit by res judicata”.
13. It was submitted that Order 23 Rule 1 merely permits one to abandon a benefit and cannot be enlarged to defeat a right in another and envisages a situation where a right exits without there being a competing right. In this behalf, learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of a division bench of the Madras High Court in Seethai Achi v. Meyappa Chettiar and Ors., AIR 1934 Mad. 337, wherein it has been observed that while ordinarily the Court finds no impediment to the dismissal of a suit on the announcement of withdrawal of the claim and may dismiss the same as withdrawn, several exceptions have been recognized to this rule. The exceptions discussed in the said judgment include partition suits where a preliminary decree has been passed declaring and defining the shares of the parties as in such a case the rights declared in favour of the defendants would be rendered nugatory. Another example is of in partnership suits where the defendants may also be entitled to some reliefs in their favour as a result of the settlement of accounts. In suits for specific performance and administration, withdrawal may not necessarily lead to dismissal of the suit. In a representative suit, withdrawal by the plaintiff may not lead to dismissal of the suit but to the substitution of the plaintiff or transposing of a defendant as a plaintiff.
14. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Ramamurthi Iyer v. Raja V. Rajeshwara Rao, (1972) 2 SCC 721, wherein the Court was dealing with the right of a shareholder who had requested the Court to exercise its power under Section 2 of the Partition Act. The question was whether a suit can be withdrawn after acquiring a privilege under the partition Act. It was observed that the true position under Sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act so far as Order 23 Rule 1 is concerned must be determined in the light of the rule that in partition suit a defendant seeking a share is in the position of a plaintiff and a plaintiff cannot withdraw without the permission of the defendant.
15. A reference was also made to the judgment of learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Registrar, Manomaniam Sundaranar University v. Suhura Beevi Educational Trust and Ors., AIR 1995 Mad. 42, in support of the proposition that while liberty may lie with the plaintiff in a suit to withdraw or abandon at any time after the institution of the suit, the whole of the suit or part of his claim, yet it cannot be considered to be so absolute as to permit, encourage or ratify an abuse of the process of the Court or a fraud to be played upon the parties as well as the Court. The abandonment ought not to be a ruse to get rid of a party but yet get the same relief as prayed for earlier.
16. The decisions in Wig Bros (Builders and Engineers) and M/s. Hulas Rail Baij Nath cases (supra) show that Order 23 Rule 1 allows withdrawal/ abandonment of a suit or part of a claim by a plaintiff and ordinarily the Court cannot refuse permission for withdrawal and compel the plaintiff to proceed. However, the same is not without exceptions; some of which are suits for partition where all parties can be plaintiffs or defendants alike or in cases of partnership where defendants may be entitled to some reliefs in their favour. Thus, what would have to be seen in the present matter is whether defendant No. 1, as contended, has some rights in respect of the suit property which would be defeated by withdrawal of the suit.
“18. Maintenance of wife.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life-time.
20. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that defendant No. 1 can claim to have a right of residence only against her husband and in property which belongs to her husband, is taken on rent by her husband or is a joint family property in which her husband is a co-sharer. Learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in S.R. Batra and Anr. v. Smt. Taruna Batra, I (2007) DMC 1 (SC)=I (2007) SLT 1=(2006) 13 SCALE 652, wherein it was observed that there is no such law in India like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father in law or mother in law. In that case, the house belonged to the mother in law. The respondent in that case relied upon the provisions of the PWDV Act to contend that in view of the provisions of that Act, the respondent cannot be disposed from the second floor of the property. It was found that Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the house in question and also that the house in question could not be said to be a shared household under the provisions of the PWDV Act. The contention of the respondent that ‘shared household’ includes a household where the aggrieved person lives or may have lived at any stage in a domestic relationship was not accepted. It was held that the wife is only entitled to claim a right of residence in a shared household and a shared household would mean only a house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.
21. In support of his contentions learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Indian Airlines v. Union of India and Ors., 128 (2006) DLT 505 (DB). The Court observed in this case that the Court cannot declare law laid down by the Supreme Court as per incuriam or take a contrary view on the ground that the Supreme Court has failed to deal with certain aspects or some relevant provisions of law were not brought to its notice.
22. The decision in S.R. Batra and Anr’s. case (supra) shows that under the provisions of the PWDV Act, a woman on account of her status as wife is entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household which would mean a house which belongs to her husband or which is taken on rent by her husband or a house which belongs to a joint family of which her husband is a member. Under the PWDV Act, in case of a finding of domestic violence, a residence order can be passed inter alia, restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the shared household or securing the same level of alternative accommodation enjoyed by the aggrieved person in a shared household. Such order is also in respect of a shared household. Also even the claim for alternative accommodation can be made only against the husband and not against the in laws or other relatives. Learned senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 sought to distinguish the judgment in S.R. Batra and Anr’s. case supra by contending that in the present case defendant No. 1 was residing in the suit property and was occupying a portion of the suit property being a room while in S.R. Batra and Anr’s. case the respondent daughter in law was admittedly not residing in the suit property. In this behalf, learned Senior Counsel referred to the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 wherein at para xxxvii it has been averred that both the defendants resided at the suit property since their marriage.
23. It cannot be lost sight of that in the present case; the property in question is stated to be owned by the plaintiff. This is not really disputed by defendant No. 1 who, in her written statement has taken the stand that the property was owned by the parents of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 was not residing in the suit property on a permanent/regular basis. A perusal of the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 shows that the said defendant was residing and working in the United Kingdom and visited India periodically for short periods of time. In fact defendant No. 1 is a British Citizen. Thus, the contention of learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1in this behalf cannot be accepted as such.
24. As noticed in the order dated 10.1.2007, defendant No. 1 even in India was working and had a salary of Rs. 15 lacs per annum. Although a claim of termination of employment was made, nothing in support of the same was placed on record.
25. Defendant No. 2, the husband of defendant No. 1, as noticed in the orders dated 5.12.2006 and 10.1.2007 is not residing in the suit property. In view of the decision in S.R. Batra and Anr’s case (supra), defendant No. 1 can claim a right of residence with respect to a shared household which would mean only a house belonging to or taken on rent by her husband or belonging to a joint family of which her husband is a member. This is not the case insofar as the suit property is concerned as defendant No. 2 was not living in the suit property and is not the owner of the suit property. The suit property thus cannot be said to fall within the meaning of the expression ‘shared household’. The provisions of the PWDV Act show that even an order restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of or disturbing possession can be made only in respect of a shared household and as observed in S.R. Batra and Anr’s case (supra), even a claim for alternative accommodation can be made only against the husband and not against the in laws or other relatives.
26. It may also be noticed that the suit filed by defendant No. 1 inter alia against defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff for permanent and mandatory injunction is stated to have been dismissed in default.
27. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, relied on by learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 provides right to a Hindu wife to claim maintenance from her husband during her lifetime and also entitles her to live separately from her husband in certain circumstances without forfeiting her right to maintenance. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 does not entitle a wife to claim maintenance from her in laws or other relatives of the husband during the lifetime of the husband. The provisions relied on by defendant No. 1 thus entitle her to claim maintenance from her husband even if residing separately from him. However, the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 do not support the claim of defendant No. 1 against her in laws.
28. Thus, defendant No. 1 really cannot claim a right of residence in the suit property as the same is not a ‘shared household’ as defined by the PWDV Act and is owned by the plaintiff who is her mother in law. Any claims for residence or maintenance by the said defendant can only be made against her husband.
29. Learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 submitted that the withdrawal is liable to be opposed on the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as the withdrawal sought is intended to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Court and to remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the Courts power and frustrate its decree. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705. The Court observed in this case that the whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property, which are the subject matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as to prevent the object of the pending action from being defeated.
“It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the Court often so describes its operation. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending litigation, rights to a property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party. Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the Court in the suit shall be binding not only on the litigant parties but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end. A mortgage or sale made before the final decree to a person who had no notice of the pending proceedings would always render a new suit necessary and so interminable litigation might be the consequence”.
This observation has been referred to in the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab in Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Firm Luddar Mal Khushi Ram and Ors., AIR 1959 Punj. 490.
31. Learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 contended that if transfer pendente lite is subject to the outcome of the proceedings, abandonment of a claim cannot be permitted as it would amount to doing indirectly what cannot be done directly. The abandonment would take the transferee outside the jurisdiction of the Court. This would amount to misusing the Courts process which is contempt of Court.
32. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff however contended that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies and operates only where any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question in a suit or a decree or order is ultimately passed. It was contended that defendant No. 1 is not claiming any right to immovable property but is claiming only a personal right arising out of the incidence of matrimony and her status as wife which personal right cannot survive and be enforceable against the transferee. In support of this contention, reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand v. Om Chand and Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 715, wherein it has been observed that transfer of the interest does not stop the progress of the suit and the only exception is when the transfer of property forming the subject matter of the suit, pendente lite, results in wiping out the cause of action itself or deprives the transferee of the right to decree, such as where the cause of action was personal to the plaintiff. Otherwise the transferee steps in the shoes of his predecessor in interest and remains bound by the result of the suit.
33. It was further contended that Section 52 does not place any fetter on the right of the plaintiff to unconditionally withdraw the suit.
34. It is not disputed that ordinarily, the transfer of the interest does not stop the progress of the suit. Where a litigation is pending as regards rights in any immovable property and the same is transferred pendente lite, the decision is binding on the transferee. However, as observed by the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand’s case (supra) an exception to this is when the transfer of property forming the subject matter of the suit, pendente lite, results in wiping out the cause of action itself or deprives the transferee of the right to decree, such as where the cause of action was personal to the plaintiff.
35. In the present case, what is being claimed by defendant No. 1 is the right to residence in the suit property by reason of being the wife of defendant No. 2 and not any interest in the suit property as such. This plea has been raised by defendant No. 1 only as a defence to the suit filed by the plaintiff and as noticed hereinabove, defendant No. 1 has allowed the suit filed by her inter alia against the plaintiff to be dismissed in default.
36. The relief claimed by the plaintiff in the present suit is inter alia for a permanent and mandatory injunction to restrain the defendants from entering the suit property. As the property in itself question has been sold, the plaintiff cannot really claim the said relief with regard to the suit property. Also, defendant No. 1 is not claiming any interest in the suit property itself and cannot claim any relief against the purchasers. There is thus, no merit in the plea of defendant No. 1.
37. Learned Senior Counsel for defendant No. 1 contended that fraud and collusion have been alleged in the written statement and the abandonment of the suit is a ploy to avoid the case being decided.
38. It was submitted that active proceedings are not necessary for rescission on the ground of fraud or collusion and the same can be avoided even in defence to an action on the decision. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh, VII (2000) SLT 320=(2000) 7 SCC 543.
39. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, in this regard submitted that there is no fraud or collusion in the present matter. The property in question is the Stridhan of the plaintiff and neither defendant No. 2 nor defendant No. 1 can claim any right in the same.
40. The contention of learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 that there is fraud and collusion on the part of the plaintiff cannot be accepted as such. The plaintiff had declared her intention to sell the suit property in the plaint itself and there has been no concealment in this behalf on the part of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 has taken the stand in the written statement itself that the property belongs to the parents of defendant No. 2. No case of fraud is thus really made out against the plaintiff.
41. The aforesaid shows that defendant No. 1 cannot claim a right of residence against the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff is the owner of the property and defendant No. 1 is not claiming any interest in the property as such besides a right of residence. The plaintiff had declared her intention to sell the property in question at the stage of filing the plaint itself. The property in question has been sold and thus nothing really survives for the suit to proceed.
42. Order 23 Rule 1(1) of the said Code entitles a plaintiff to unconditionally withdraw or abandon a suit and ordinarily there is nothing in the said Code which requires the Court to refuse permission for the same. The exceptions that have to be taken into consideration are where there is a set- off or counter claim or in certain kinds to suits such as for partition, or in partnership suits where the defendants may be entitled to settlement of accounts, etc. In the present suit there is no such competing right of defendant No. 1 and the rights being claimed by the said defendant can really be claimed only against her husband and not against the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 failed to prosecute the suit filed by her which was dismissed in default.
43. I thus see no reason for preventing the plaintiff from withdrawing and compelling her to proceed with the present suit.
44. The suit is dismissed as withdrawn leaving parties to bear their own costs.

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A proverb is a pithy statement expressing some truth in a striking and memorable way. This book is mostly instructions given by a scholar (or father) to a student (or son) on how to lead a moral life, with proper respect for God. Life involves choices; it is important that one be informed, trained and persuaded to make the right ones. The objective of life is attainment of wisdom, i.e. integrity in God’s eyes. V. 4 says: “The reward for humility and fear of the Lord is riches and honour and life”.
ill-treating a “poor wretch in court” (REB).
(The law courts were at the city gates.) Why? Because, in an ultimate sense, God is on the side of the underdog: he will “rob of life those who rob them” (REB), either by making the oppressors’ lives miserable or by shortening their lives.
The superscription is A Song of Ascents: this psalm was probably sung by pilgrims travelling up to Jerusalem. The solidity of “Mount Zion” is seen as symbolic of the certitude enjoyed by God’s people of his continuing care for them. The promised “land” (v. 3) was “allotted to the righteous” (those living in God’s ways) when they entered it after the exodus. Ungodly rulers of Israel (“sceptre”) – either Israelite or foreign – will no longer rule the land (or “wickedness” will disappear), removing the temptation for the godly to succumb to evil. V. 4 is a prayer: may God give goodness to the faithful. V. 5a warns: those who deviate from God’s ways will be treated as “evildoers”: their fate will be horrible. Hopefully, this will not affect Israel; she will have “peace”.
Although James opens like a letter, it is an exhortation to ethical conduct. Christians find themselves in an alien world, full of immorality and evil; they are called to a faith that is not merely theoretical or abstract, but acted upon, in every aspect of their lives. In a situation where trials and tribulations abound, and where the poor suffer at the hands of the rich, the author exhorts them to joy, endurance, wisdom, confident prayer and faithful response to the liberating word of God, as they await the second coming of the Lord. The recipients appear to be a group of Jewish-Christian communities outside Palestine. Traditionally, the Church has seen the author of this book as James, the brother of our Lord; however, its excellent Greek style, late acceptance into the canon, and absence of concerns about ritual purity suggest another author. The author seems to have written in the name of James, thus giving the book authority.
The author has exhorted his readers to “be doers of the word, and not merely hearers” ( 1:22) of the gospel. He has taken caring for widows and orphans as an example. Now he expands on the responsibility of Christians to the disadvantaged. He challenges his audience: is your “favouritism”, your partiality, consistent with belief in Christ, who in his glory makes nonsense of distinctions based on status? He gives an example (vv. 2-3): if a stranger “comes into” your worship “assembly” don’t you offer him a better seat if he is well dressed? You judge by appearances; you discriminate. But, he says (v. 5): remember Jesus’ preference for the poor; they will have faith and inherit “the kingdom”. Your conduct is the opposite of God’s! (v. 6a) Perhaps he addresses the poor in vv. 6b-7. We are baptised into Jesus’ name in baptism; his name is “invoked” over us. To discriminate against the baptised, God’s people, is to “blaspheme” Christ’s character and “name”.
Then v. 8: the readers will fully comply with God’s law, “the royal law” revealed by Christ, if they keep the commandment Jesus called the “greatest and first” (Matthew 22:38): to “love one’s neighbour as yourself”. You break the law if you show “partiality” (v. 9), discriminate. Failing to love in any way makes one totally “accountable” (v. 10, literally: guilty). V. 11 is an example from the Ten Commandments.
Make the commandment of love, that gives freedom, your guide to conduct (v. 12). The person who fails to show compassion in life will be shown “no mercy” (v. 13) at Judgement Day, but one who is kindly will be treated compassionately. Then v. 14: what sense is there to claiming to “have faith” (freely accepting God’s saving revelation) if you don’t do God’s will? Claiming such will not save you! For example (vv. 15-16), words alone do not suffice when material help is needed. V. 17 summarizes: faith must be living, accompanied by actions, else it is useless.
In Galilee, Jesus has challenged official Judaism over the authority of non-biblical traditions and has taught that ritual purity is irrelevant. He now travels to the coast (“Tyre”), a largely Gentile area. The “woman” (v. 26) is Gentile by birth and of non-Jewish origin; she seeks healing for her daughter who (at least in contemporary understanding) is possessed by evil. In Jesus’ statement (v. 27), the “children” are presumably Jews; Jewish writers sometimes referred to Gentiles as “dogs”. Jesus says that he comes principally to Jews, but note that both Jews and Gentiles are at or near the table. The woman’s witty retort (v. 28) shows that she has faith in him: there is a place for non-Jews in God’s plan. Jesus accepts her claim (v. 29). The daughter is completely cured (v. 30).
show that the Kingdom of God has begun: v. 37c is a quotation from a section of Isaiah on Israel’s glorious future.
The kingdom of God has already begun!

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1 of 1 Loveland Children's Picture Book - Paperback London, J.
c1992. 1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 21 x 27 cm.
c1992. 1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 18 x 23 cm.
1992. 1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 21 x 27 cm.
McDonough, John., Remkiewicz, Frank,, Remkiewicz, Frank.
McDonough, John.|Narrator, Recorded Books, Inc., Remkiewicz, Frank,illustrator., Remkiewicz, Frank.
OneClick digital (Loveland):rbdZ09801|eAudiobook|Audio Books|Unabridged.|English|Recorded Books, Inc. ;|2014, p1998.|1 online resource., ils:.b11409228|Book|Books||English|Viking,|c1992.|1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 21 x 27 cm., ils:.b13249228|Book|Books||English|Viking,|c1992.|1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 18 x 23 cm., ils:.b21748731|Audio|Audio Books||English|Puffin Books,|, c1992.|1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 19 x 23 cm. + 1 sound disc (4 3/4 in.)., ils:.b23459013|Book|Books||English|Viking,|1992.|1 v. (unpaged) : col. ill. ; 21 x 27 cm.

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In re JAMES MITCHELL on Habeas Corpus.
James Mitchell, in pro. per., and Frank C. Wood, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, Roger E. Venturi and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
James Mitchell, presently an inmate of the California State Prison at Folsom, was convicted of second degree burglary in 1961. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on November 7, 1962 (People v. Mitchell (1962) 209 Cal. App. 2d 312 [26 Cal.Rptr. 89]), a petition for hearing was denied by this court, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court (Mitchell v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 845 [10 L. Ed. 2d 1065, 83 S.Ct. 1902]). On [68 Cal. 2d 260] March 15, 1967, Mitchell filed in this court the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel on appeal (see Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814]). fn. 1 We issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel for petitioner. In his return to the order to show cause, respondent Walter Dunbar, Director of the Department of Corrections, denied the basic claim of the petition and alleged in substance that petitioner had waived his right to counsel on appeal, that his request for counsel on appeal had been equivocal and untimely, and that his delay in making application for collateral relief was not justified.
After an initial hearing on pertinent legal issues, it became apparent that the determination of certain factual issues was necessary to our decision, and we appointed the Honorable Lewis Drucker, retired Judge of the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, as referee of this court. Our order of reference instructed that evidence be taken and a determination made as to the following questions: (1) What, if any, advice or information did petitioner receive from any source either before or after sentence with respect to his right to have counsel appointed to represent him on appeal? (2) What, if any, request or requests did petitioner make for the appointment of counsel on appeal? (3) Did petitioner knowingly and intelligently [68 Cal. 2d 261] waive his right to be represented by counsel on appeal and, if so, what is the factual basis of any such waiver?
At the hearing before the referee both oral and documentary evidence was presented, and the following facts emerged: At petitioner's trial in 1961 he was represented by Joseph Mazziotta, an attorney appointed by the court. After the verdict of guilty had been returned, Mr. Mazziotta argued a motion for new trial on petitioner's behalf, and upon denial of this motion petitioner was sentenced to state prison. Thereupon Mr. Mazziotta asked to be relieved as attorney of record, and upon the granting of that motion he stated for the record "that I now advise Mr. Mitchell, the defendant herein, that since he desires to take an appeal from these proceedings, or the judgment, the order denying the motion for a new trial, he must do so within 10 days from today." Mr. Mazziotta also testified before the referee that at the time of sentencing he advised petitioner privately as to what procedures the latter would have to undertake in order to have an attorney appointed to represent him on appeal. Mr. Mazziotta further testified, however, that petitioner was in "a withdrawn state" when this advice was given because "he wrote some copious notes about the trial, and I am certain that he didn't hear half of what I told him on occasions because of his preoccupation with the written matter that he had before him."petitioner testified before the referee that Mr. Mazziotta did not speak to him after advising him for the record of the 10-day appeal period, and that Mr. Mazziotta at no time advised him of the procedures to be undertaken by him in order to have counsel appointed for his appeal.
On September 25, 1961, petitioner in propria persona filed timely notice of appeal from the judgment convicting him of second degree burglary. fn. 2 Thereafter, and prior to filing his opening brief, he undertook extensive efforts to augment the record on appeal. These efforts included letters, motions, and even a petition for a writ of mandate, fn. 3 but were largely unsuccessful. It was in the course of this attempt to secure additional records that petitioner received a letter from the clerk of the trial court which, after informing petitioner that his request for records had been denied, went on to state: "When an attorney has been appointed by the Appellate Court to act in [68 Cal. 2d 262] your behalf, these matters may then be presented to that Court, ..." It was petitioner's testimony before the referee that this letter led him to believe an attorney would be appointed by the Court of Appeal, and that he proceeded to wait for such appointment to occur.
On May 17, 1962, petitioner filed his handwritten opening brief in propria persona. Thereafter he made application to be present and address the court at oral argument; this application was denied on July 5, 1962. On July 25, 1962, respondent's brief was filed and on August 21, 1962, petitioner filed his closing brief. The appeal was calendared for October 9, 1962, for oral argument. On October 8, one day prior to the scheduled hearing, petitioner for the first time made application for appointment of counsel on appeal; the application also requested that he be allowed to appear "in propria persona with Counsel at the said hearing of this case and Cause." The application was denied on the date of filing. fn. 4 Judgment was affirmed on November 7, 1962.
After consideration of the above evidence the referee filed in this court his findings and report, making the following findings on the questions submitted to him: As to question number (1) "that the petitioner did not receive any advice or information from any source either before or after sentence with respect to his right to have counsel appointed to represent him on appeal"; as to question number (2) "that the petitioner made a request for appointment of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal in which his case was then pending, on October 8, 1962"; and as to question number (3) "that the petitioner did not waive his right to be represented by counsel." The People have excepted to each of these findings.
 The findings of the referee, although not binding upon this court, are entitled to great weight. (In re Poe (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 25, 27 [51 Cal. Rptr. 896, 415 P.2d 784]; In re Jones (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 860, 864 [22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310]; In re Riddle (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 848, 853 [22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304].) After an independent review of the record we have concluded that the findings are fully supported by the [68 Cal. 2d 263] evidence, that they are a correct appraisal of the evidence, and that they should be adopted by us. Accordingly, we adopt them as the findings of this court.
 It is now settled that the right to counsel on appeal first enunciated in Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. 353, is to be given fully retrospective application. (Smith v. Crouse (1964) 378 U.S. 584 [12 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 84 S. Ct. 1929] (per curiam); Ruark v. Colorado (1964) 378 U.S. 585 [12 L. Ed. 2d 1042, 84 S. Ct. 1935] (per curiam); People v. Campbell (1966) 239 Cal. App. 2d 252, 253-255 [48 Cal. Rptr. 693]; see In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 368, 376 [42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].)  In the light of the facts found by the referee and adopted by this court, we have no hesitancy in concluding that petitioner has been denied that right.
We reject without extensive comment respondent's contentions (a) that petitioner's request for counsel on appeal was equivocal and untimely, and (b) that there was no adequate justification for petitioner's delay in seeking collateral relief until two years after the Douglas decision (see fn. 1, ante).
The writ is granted and the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District is ordered to recall its remittitur in People v. Mitchell, 4 Crim. 1710 (209 Cal. App. 2d 312 [26 Cal.Rptr. 89]), to reinstate the appeal therein, and to appoint counsel to represent petitioner on such reinstated appeal.
The Douglas decision clearly establishes that an application for counsel to present the appeal of an indigent must not be denied if such action will result in an "invidious discrimination" between rich and poor. Further, the denial of an application is tainted by such discrimination when its sole basis is that of an investigation on the part of the appellate court of the nature contemplated in People v. Hyde, supra, 51 Cal. 2d 152. However, the fact that such an investigation was undertaken in the instant case, as is reflected in the order of the [68 Cal. 2d 265] Court of Appeal (see fn. 4 of the majority opinion), does not compel us to withhold from our consideration other circumstances surrounding the application which might cause us to conclude that its denial did not result in "invidious discrimination" against defendant.
In the instant case, defendant, through his filing of substantial briefs, his initiation of proceedings to require augmentation of the record on appeal, and his request to appear personally at oral argument, manifested an intention to proceed with his appeal in propria persona. Apparently, defendant sought to modify his position in this regard, and to make application for appointment of counsel, only after his request to be personally present at the time of oral argument had been denied. This modification was not even then complete, for defendant persisted in his request that he be allowed a personal appearance. Finally, and most importantly, the application was made on the day immediately preceding that scheduled for oral argument. There was no request that the cause be continued for oral argument so that counsel could adequately review the record and prepare for the argument. In sum, it appears that defendant's application for appointment of counsel on appeal was little more than a request that counsel be appointed at the eleventh hour in order to make an oral presentation of the arguments presented by defendant's pro se briefs.
Applying to the instant case the rationale of Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. 353, I am of the view that the denial of defendant's belated application for appointment of counsel did not violate any right secured to him by the equal protection clause. A comparison of the position of the indigent with that of the "rich" man does, of course, reveal differences. The defendant who can afford legal assistance but nevertheless proceeds in propria persona prior to oral argument, then seeks to be represented by retained counsel, will in all probability be allowed such representation, for the state certainly has no cognizable interest to be protected in such an instance. However, "as the United States Supreme Court pointed out in the Douglas case, absolute equality is not required; only 'invidious discrimination' denies equal protection." (People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 226, 232 [42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993].) The rich defendant seeking to substitute counsel on appeal at the last moment places no burden thereby upon the People or the courts--assuming, of course, that the motion for such substitution is not accompanied by a request for continuance of oral argument. Further, it is to be presumed that counsel [68 Cal. 2d 266] sought to be substituted in such circumstances is prepared in the premises. In the situation of the instant case, on the other hand, the granting of the request for appointment of counsel would produce one of two equally unsatisfactory results. Either the case would be argued at the scheduled date by counsel unprepared to make a presentation of the quality expected by his profession, or a continuance would have to be granted in order to allow adequate preparation. The first alternative is unthinkable; the second is clearly improper in view of the fact that the necessity for continuance derives wholly from the tardiness of defendant's application for legal assistance.
The initiative for the procurement of counsel on appeal rests equally upon the rich man and the poor man. The defendant able to afford counsel must affirmatively contact such counsel and arrange for representation; the defendant unable to afford counsel must affirmatively contact the appellate court so that counsel may be assigned. Similarly, a defendant wishing to have counsel speak for him on appeal--whether or not that defendant can afford to retain such counsel--has the responsibility of exercising his initiative in a timely way so that counsel can be prepared to make argument at the time set therefor. The defendant, rich or poor, who fails to discharge that responsibility, pays the price in terms of the quality with which his case is presented for appellate review.
From the foregoing, it appears that, applying the rationale of the Douglas case to the problem at hand, the Court of Appeal's denial of defendant's application for counsel on appeal did not result in a denial of equal protection of the laws.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the order to show cause should be discharged and the writ denied.
FN 2. Written in the margin of the notice was the following: "As you know--I represent myself."
FN 3. It appears that petitioner requested and was denied counsel in the mandate proceeding.

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On Aug. 7, 2013, 16 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. The amended complaint, filed on behalf of 21 individuals, asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), the Ku Kux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by the Equal Justice Center and the Transnational Worker Rights Clinic.
Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International. Signal was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. One plaintiff worked in Pascagoula; the remaining plaintiffs worked at Signal's Orange, Texas site. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, Plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor.
In July 2014, U.S. Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Magistrate Judge Hawthorn found the similarity in issues in the cases not substantial enough to warrant transfer because the current venue was otherwise proper.
In June 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Trial was set for December 2015. However, in July 2015, the Court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015.
In this case, the parties were to update the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties' most recent report (July 5, 2018) noted that 20 of the 21 plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett (immigration attorney) defendants, and the remaining one plaintiff could not be located. Plaintiffs requested the stay remain in effect as to the Signal defendants and Dewan (recruiter) defendants.
On August 24, 2018, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn issued a report and recommendation to dismiss without prejudice the one remaining plaintiff who did not respond to the court’s order. District Judge Ron Judge Clark adopted the report and recommendation on September 12, 2018 and dismissed this plaintiff without prejudice.
The case is ongoing as to the Signal defendants and Dewan defendants.
Plaintiff Description 21 Indian guestworkers fraudulently recruited to work in the U.S.


text:
The Pioche Formation has a large Trilobite fauna, including lower Cambrian Ollenelids.
This faunal list is restricted to the Pioche Shale exposed in Lincoln County, Nevada, and was compiled by Linda B. McCollum, Geology Department, Eastern Washington University, from both published and unpublished sources. For more information and a complete faunal list of all taxa, please visit Dr. Linda B. McCollum: Lower-Middle Cambrian Boundary Research, southern Great Basin and south China. Dr. McCollum's extensive Pioche Shale faunal list.
Eddy, J.D., and McCollum, L.B., 1998, Early Middle Cambrian Albertella Biozone trilobites of the Pioche Shale, southeastern Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 72, p. 864-887.
Fritz, W. H. 1968. Lower and early Middle Cambrian trilobites from the Pioche Shale, east-central Nevada, U.S.A. Palaeontology 11: 183-235.
Lieberman, B.S., 2003, A new soft-bodied fauna: The Pioche Formation of Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 77, no. 4, p. 674-690.
Merriam, C.W., 1964, Cambrian rocks of the Pioche mining district, Nevada. U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 469, 59 p.
Palmer, A.R., 1998, Terminal Early Cambrian extinction of the Olenellina: Documentation from the Pioche Formation, Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 72, p. 650-672.
Rowell, A.J., 1980, Inarticulate brachiopods of the Lower and Middle Cambrian Pioche Shale of the Pioche District, Nevada. University of Kansas Paleontological Contribution, Paper 98, 26 p.
Sundberg, F.A., and McCollum, L.B., 1997, Oryctocephalids (Corynexochida: Trilobita) of the Lower-Middle Cambrian boundary interval from California and Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 71, p. 1065-1090.
Sundberg, F.A., and McCollum, L.B., 2000, Ptychopariid trilobites from the Lower-Middle Cambrian boundary interval, Pioche Shale, southeastern Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 74, p. 604-630.
Sundberg, F.A., and McCollum, L.B., 2002, Kochiella Poulsen, 1927, and Hadrocephalites new (Ptychopariida, Trilobita) from the early Middle Cambrian of western Laurentia. Journal of Paleontology, v. 76, p. 76-94.
Sundberg, F.A., and McCollum, L.B., 2003a, Trilobites of the lower Middle Cambrian Poliella denticulata Biozone (new) of southeastern Nevada. Journal of Paleontology, v. 77, p. 333-361.
Sundberg, F.A., and McCollum, L.B., 2003b, Early and Mid Cambrian trilobites from the outer-shelf deposits of Nevada and California, USA. Palaeontology, v. 46, part 5, p. 945-986.

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text:
Reap ( v. ) - A bundle of grain; a handful of grain laid down by the reaper as it is cut.
Reap ( v. i. ) - To perform the act or operation of reaping; to gather a harvest.
Reap ( v. t. ) - To clear of a crop by reaping; as, to reap a field.
Reap ( v. t. ) - To cut with a sickle, scythe, or reaping machine, as grain; to gather, as a harvest, by cutting.
Reap ( v. t. ) - To deprive of the beard; to shave.
Reap ( v. t. ) - To gather; to obtain; to receive as a reward or harvest, or as the fruit of labor or of works; -- in a good or a bad sense; as, to reap a benefit from exertions.

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In 1927, the US Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell set a legal precedent that states may sterilize inmates of public institutions. The court argued that imbecility, epilepsy, and feeblemindedness are hereditary, and that inmates should be prevented from passing these defects to the next generation. On 2 May 1927, in an eight to one decision, the US Supreme Court ordered that Carrie Buck, whom it called a feebleminded daughter of a feebleminded mother and herself the mother of a feebleminded child, be sterilized under the 1924 Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act. Buck v. Bell determined that compulsory sterilization laws did not violate due process awarded by the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. It also bolstered the American eugenics movement and established legal authority for sterilizing more than 60,000 US citizens in more than thirty states, until most of the practices ended in the 1970s.
The US compulsory sterilization movement gained momentum in the 1890s, when eugenics became increasingly influential in politics and sterilization operations began to replace castration and other forms of mutilation. Vasectomies could sever a man’s vasa deferentia, while salpingectomies could sever a woman’s Fallopian tubes, although surgical procedures posed their own problems. The eugenics movement held that hereditary defects weaken society and should be eliminated from the population. Positive eugenics encouraged reproduction among individuals with hereditary advantages, whereas negative eugenics sought to prevent people deemed disabled or socially inferior from reproducing by restricting immigration, banning interracial marriages, and sterilization.
By 1914, twelve states had passed compulsory sterilization legislation, but these laws were often challenged and weakly enforced. Several more states attempted to pass sterilization laws, but one was overturned and state governors vetoed two more. Determined to craft legislation that could withstand judicial scrutiny, Harry Hamilton Laughlin, superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, published Eugenical Sterilization in the United States in 1922. Laughlin’s book included a copy of his Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, which he designed to serve a prototype of constitutional state sterilization laws. Laughlin’s Model Law claimed that, if enacted, the genes from “the most worthless one-tenth of our present population” would be eliminated within two generations.
In Virginia, Albert Priddy, superintendent of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded in Lynchburg, Virginia, recruited legislator Aubrey Strode in order to draft a state sterilization law. In 1917, Priddy was sued for sterilizing Willie Mallory, on the grounds that Mallory was held and operated on against her will. Though Priddy won the case, the experience taught him that future legislation should be carefully worded to ensure its constitutionality. Ultimately, Strode’s sterilization law relied on Laughlin’s Model Law.
On 20 March 1924, the Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act was signed into law. It stated that in certain cases, inmates of any state institution could be sterilized if the institution's board found that the patient was idiotic, insane, feebleminded, epileptic, or an imbecile. On Strode’s advice, Priddy sought to validate the Act by subjecting it to judicial review. Priddy would arrange a test case, to be appealed and taken to the Supreme Court, in order to test the constitutionality of the sterilization legislation. A patient would be selected for sterilization and Priddy would arrange for a lawsuit on the patient’s behalf to challenge the decision to sterilize him or her. The lawsuit would sue Priddy in an attempt to challenge the legality of the Sterilization Act.
In August, Priddy presented to the Virginia Colony’s Board a list of eighteen patients eligible for sterilization. All eighteen were women. The board approved the use of salpingectomy on fourteen of the women, and left decisions about the remaining four pending. Among the women approved for sterilization was Carrie Buck, who would become the first person sterilized under the Virginia Sterilization Act.
In the previous fall, Buck’s foster mother, Alice Dobbs, had noticed that her seventeen-year-old foster child was pregnant. By the time Buck’s pregnancy could no longer be hidden, Alice and her husband John had decided to institutionalize Carrie for being an unwed teenage mother. Buck was institutionalized on the grounds that she was a moral delinquent whom her foster parents could neither control nor afford. Priddy had ceased to allow expectant mothers to enter to the Virginia Colony, so Buck had gone briefly to a home in Charlottesville until she delivered her baby.
On 28 March 1924, Carrie’s daughter, Vivian Buck was born. Consigned to the Virginia Colony, Carrie was forced to relinquish her child. Already dubbed feebleminded, Vivian was to be sent to a poorhouse until the Dobbses agreed to adopt her, on the condition that Vivian go to the Virginia Colony if she continued to be feebleminded. Two months after giving birth, Carrie was forced to leave her daughter and join her mother, Emma Buck at the Virginia Colony.
Carrie’s biological mother, Emma Adeline Harlowe Buck, had been admitted to the Colony four years earlier. Emma was in poor health, having suffered from rheumatism, pneumonia, and syphilis. Her record indicated that she was arrested for prostitution and giving birth to illegitimate children, while scars on her arms hinted at previous drug use. Despite these claims, Emma Buck was married to Carrie’s father, Frank Buck, and every time she entered a hospital to deliver a child, she was designated as married. Like her daughter, Emma Buck was admitted to the Colony on the basis that she was “feebleminded” within the meaning of the law.
With three generations of Bucks available for his argument, Albert Priddy felt confident that he could prove that the Buck women were feebleminded and that their low intelligence was a hereditary defect. Emma Buck’s record stated that she lacked moral sense and responsibility; it labeled her a moron; and she had supposedly given birth to illegitimate children. Proving Vivian Buck’s feeblemindedness was more challenging. Priddy had the trial delayed in his attempt to gather additional evidence that Vivian had inherited her mother and grandmother’s feeblemindedness. Caroline Wilhelm, a social worker for the Red Cross, asserted several times that she could find no defect in Vivian. Two weeks before the trial, however, Wilhelm again visited the Dobbses, and decided that the Alice Dobbs’s grandbaby, born three days earlier than Vivian, was somehow different. Unable to qualify this statement, Wilhelm merely asserted that Vivian was “not quite a normal baby.” Wilhem based these assertions on Vivian’s responsiveness and how she crawled.
In order to proceed to trial, the Board of the Virginia Colony had to appoint an attorney for Carrie Buck. The board chose Irving Whitehead, founding member of the Colony and a primary supporter of Priddy’s sterilization campaign. The case began as Buck v. Priddy, but Priddy died of cancer before the case could be tried, and John Bell replaced him. Aubrey Strode, the author for the 1924 Virginia Sterilization Act and a childhood friend of Whitehead’s, represented the Virginia Colony.
Buck v. Bell was tried on 18 November 1924 in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia; the proceedings lasted five hours. Strode presented his evidence and Whitehead offered no rebuttal. Carrie Buck’s lawyer called no witnesses to counter the experts in medicine and eugenic science that Strode presented. Eugenics expert Arthur Estabrook, who had visited the Virginia Colony to examine the Buck women, testified that they met the Virginia Sterilization Act’s definition of feeblemindedness. Harry Laughlin presented his brief on inheritance of degenerate qualities. He had used the newly designed Stanford-Binet IQ test to score Carrie and Emma Buck, and he explained that Carrie’s mental age was nine years old, while Emma’s mental age was seven years, eleven months. Anyone who scored an age of six through nine years was deemed an imbecile; morons scored higher, while idiots scored lower. These results qualified Carrie and Emma as imbeciles, and Laughlin argued that this trait of imbecility was genetic, not environmental. Caroline Wilhelm testified that Vivian Buck was an abnormal baby, listless and unresponsive. The court found in favor of Bell.
The case reached the US Supreme Court in April 1927. Whitehead argued that sterilization procedures violate the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees certain rights and liberties known as due process; he further stated that there were as of yet no standards on compulsory sterilization to which the Court could compare the Virginia Sterilization Act. Strode countered that the Act did afford due process rights and that sterilization was not cruel and unusual punishment. He likened the procedure to compulsory vaccination laws, and further argued that the Act was designed for the protection of society—and the individual.
Holmes further stated that if public welfare may demand the lives of its best citizens, then surely the lowest members of society should be prevented from propagating their kind at the expense of everyone else. Justice Pierce Butler dissented, but authored no opinion.
In his book, Three Generations, No Imbecile, historian of science Paul Lombardo concluded that there was little to suggest mental deficiencies in Carrie or Vivian Buck. During his research, Lombardo located some of Carrie’s and Vivian’s report cards: both girls had received adequate marks in school, and Vivian had made the Honor Roll one term. Lombardo also reveals that Carrie’s pregnancy was not an act of promiscuity—she was raped by her foster mother’s nephew.
Lombardo interviewed Carrie in 1983, shortly before her death. He confirmed that she had been raped, inquired about her grades, and discussed her successful progression through school. He also asked about Carrie’s sister, Doris Buck, who was sterilized without her consent or knowledge under the Virginia Sterilization Act. Doris was told her operation was for appendicitis, and she did not learn about the sterilization for years. Carrie Buck died on 28 January 1983, and was buried a few steps away from her daughter, who had died when she was only eight-years-old of enteric colitis, a broad term that could have meant any number of diseases. Alice and John Dobbs, who had adopted Vivian, reported on her death certificate that they did not know the name of her birth mother.
Buck v. Bell was a landmark decision for the American eugenics movement. Although Carrie Buck was the first person sterilized under Virginia’s Sterilization law, another 8,300 Virginians underwent involuntary sterilization until the practice was finally ended nationwide in the 1970s. The Virginia Sterilization Act was repealed in 1974. As of 2012, however, the justification of sterilizing “feebleminded” individuals set by the Buck v. Bell precedent had not been overturned.
Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=Buck+v.+Bell.+274+U.S.+200+(1927).&hl=en&as_sdt=806&case=1700304772805702914&scilh=0 (Accessed January 9, 2014).
Gould, Stephen Jay. “Carrie Buck’s Daughter.” Natural History 93 (1984): 14–18.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=Jacobson+v.+Massachusetts.+197+U.S.+11+(1905).&hl=en&as_sdt=806&case=16169198038706839183&scilh=0 (Accessed January 9, 2014).
Laughlin, Harry Hamilton. Eugenical Sterilization in the United States. Chicago: Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922. http://books.google.com/books?id=tdYeAQAAMAAJ&dq=Eugenical%20Sterilization%20in%20the%20United%20States&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false (Accessed February 12, 2012).
Lombardo, Paul. Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
Mallory v. Priddy. Va Cir. Ct. Richmond (Feb 16, 1918).
Pitzer, Andrea. “U.S. Eugenics Legacy: Ruling on Buck Sterilization Still Stands.” USA Today, June 24, 2009, Health & Behavior section.
Antonios, Nathalie,, Raup, Christina, "Buck v. Bell (1927)". Embryo Project Encyclopedia (2012-01-01). ISSN: 1940-5030 http://embryo.asu.edu/handle/10776/2092.


The Kentucky Department of Revenue recently amended a variety of corporate income tax regulations.1 Some apportionment regulations are revised to reflect the major state tax reform legislation enacted last year, including the adoption of single sales factor apportionment.2 A regulation also is amended to provide taxpayers with procedures to request the use of alternative apportionment. Regulations that address topics such as apportionment of income reported under the completed contract method, related-party transactions and the nexus standard applicable to corporations and pass-through entities also have been amended.
Determination of apportionable income For taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2018, Kentucky is requiring most taxpayers to use a single sales factor apportionment formula.3 In line with model regulations adopted by the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), the regulation updates the statutory terminology by replacing “business income” with “apportionable income” and “nonbusiness income” with “non-apportionable income.” Under the amended statute, apportionable income means income that is apportionable under the U.S. Constitution and is not allocated to Kentucky, including income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business.4 Apportionable income also includes income arising from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, employment, development or disposition of the property is or was related to the operation of the taxpayer’s trade or business.
Nexus standard The regulation that addresses the nexus standard for corporations and pass-through entities is amended to provide that P.L. 86-272 does not afford immunity from the Kentucky limited liability entity tax.21 The existing regulation explains that under P.L. 86-272, Kentucky will not impose tax if the entity’s sole activity in the state is through representatives soliciting orders for the sale of tangible personal property and the orders are: (i) sent outside Kentucky for approval or rejection; and (ii) filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside Kentucky. The amendment clarifies that this provision applies regardless of the method of shipment or delivery.
Commentary Kentucky substantially amended the apportionment income classification regulation to reflect the major legislation enacted last year and provide further clarity to taxpayers. The state has adopted the terminology used by the MTC and distinguishes between apportionable and non-apportionable income. Many of the revisions to the regulation are drawn from the MTC’s Model General Allocation and Apportionment Regulations. In fact, the Kentucky regulation directly adopts the MTC’s functional test examples. The Kentucky regulation provides further guidance by adding multiple examples of apportionable and non-apportionable income. These amendments should assist taxpayers in determining the correct treatment of income. Furthermore, the new alternative apportionment provisions clarify the procedures that taxpayers should follow when requesting the use of an alternative apportionment methodology. As explained in the regulation, taxpayers must file a petition seeking the use of alternative apportionment prior to filing a return that employs this methodology. Kentucky is expected to amend additional regulations to address the major tax reform legislation enacted last year, including the implementation of rules governing mandatory unitary combined reporting, market-based sourcing for items other than tangible personal property, and the treatment of net operating losses.
1 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:060; 16:090; 16:230; 16:240; 16:290; 16:330; 16:340. The amendments are effective February 1, 2019, but some of the apportionment regulation amendments retroactively apply to tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2018.
2 Ch. 207 (H.B. 487), Laws 2018. For further information, see GT SALT Alert: Kentucky Enacts Tax Reform Including Mandatory Unitary Combined Reporting, Single Sales Factor Apportionment and Remote Seller Nexus. The legislation also adopted market-based sourcing for sales other than sales of tangible personal property but the amended regulations do not address this topic.
3 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(9). Previously, business income was apportioned to Kentucky using a three-factor formula consisting of a property, payroll and double-weighted sales factor. Former KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(8).
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(1)(a).
5 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:060.
6 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:060.1(8). “Trade or business” as used in the definition of apportionable income means the taxpayer’s unitary business, part of which is conducted within Kentucky.
10 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:060.5. The examples include the following: (i) rental income from real and tangible personal property; (ii) gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other disposition of real, tangible or intangible property; (iii) interest income; and (iv) patent and copyright royalties.
11 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:090; 16:290.
12 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.121(1)(e), (3).
13 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.120(12). If the statutory allocation and apportionment provisions do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in Kentucky, a taxpayer may petition for, or the Department may require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer’s business activity, if reasonable: (i) separate accounting; (ii) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent the taxpayer’s business activity in the state; or (iii) the use of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer’s income. The party petitioning for or the Department requiring the use of alternative apportionment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (i) the statutory allocation and apportionment provisions do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in Kentucky; and (ii) the alternative to the provisions is reasonable.
14 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:330.
15 Id. If a taxpayer disagrees with the denial of the petition, the taxpayer can: (i) pay the tax that is due under the Department’s interpretation and seek a refund which, if denied, can be protested; or (ii) file a return with the denied alternative apportionment method, which will result in an assessment being issued that the taxpayer can protest.
17 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:340.
18 Id. “Gross contract price” means the percentage of the entire contract that has been completed, from the commencement of the contract to the date of withdrawal, dissolution or cessation of the business.
19 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.205.
20 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:230. Specifically, the regulation adopts the definition as provided in 26 C.F.R. 1.482-1.
21 103 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:240.


601.2. Termination of tuition accounts, refunds and settlement.
The provisions of this Chapter 601 issued under the Tuition Account Program and College Savings Bond Act (24 P. S. § § 6901.1016901.509), unless otherwise noted.
The provisions of this Chapter 601 adopted August 20, 1993, effective September 1, 1993, 23 Pa.B. 3936, unless otherwise noted.
ActThe Tuition Account Program and College Savings Bond Act (24 P. S. § § 6901.1016901.509).
BeneficiaryA person who meets the eligibility criteria in the act, and on whose behalf a purchaser enters into a tuition account payment contract.
DepartmentThe Treasury Department of the Commonwealth.
FundThe Tuition Payment Fund established by the act.
Material misrepresentationA false statement made with the intent to deceive by the purchaser or beneficiary, either in the application or in written correspondence with the Department regarding the tuition account payment contract, relating to a substantial fact, including the age of the purchaser, the residency of the purchaser or beneficiary or the reason for termination of the tuition account payment contract.
Net earnings rate of the FundThe percentage return of the investment of Fund assets after adjusting for taxes and operating expenses.
(i) Community colleges operating under Article XIX-A of the Public School Code of 1949 (24 P. S. § § 19-901-A19-1913-A).
(ii) Universities comprising the State System of Higher Education.
(E) An institution which is designated as State-related by the Commonwealth.
ProgramThe Tuition Account Program established by the act.
PurchaserA person of legal age, including a natural person, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity, who meets the eligibility requirements in the act and who enters into a tuition account payment contract.
(i) The Commonwealths community colleges.
(ii) Universities in the State System of Higher Education.
Termination of the tuition account payment contractThe voluntary or involuntary discontinuation of a purchaser from the Program and the voluntary or involuntary discontinuation of the beneficiarys right to receive benefits under a tuition account payment contract.
(i) Activities or functions unrelated to course or program workthat is, student activity fees.
(ii) Specific course or program fees, charged by an institution of higher education, which are in addition to the other fees and charges for attendancethat is, laboratory fees, computer fees and book costs.
Tuition accountThe account established by a tuition account payment contract for a beneficiary.
Tuition account payment contractThe contract entered into by a purchaser and the Department to provide for the advance purchase of tuition credits for a beneficiary attending a participating institution, which contract consists of a master agreement, application, acceptance package, annual price schedule for tuition credits as periodically amended and other related documents.
(i) If a participating institution calculates tuition on a semester basis, as opposed to a credit hour basis, the term is defined as 1/24 of the tuition for an academic year at that participating institution. In that case, 12 tuition credits equal 1 semester, and 24 tuition credits equal 1 academic year of tuition at that participating institution.
(ii) If a participating institution calculates tuition on the basis of cost per credit hour only, as opposed to a semester basis, a tuition credit is defined as 1 academic credit hour. For example, if a participating institution charges by the credit hour and requires 15 credit hours, 15 tuition credits per semester will be needed to pay for the credit hours. In that case, 30 tuition credits equal 1 academic year of tuition at that participating institution.
(iii) This definition is based on section 309(c) of the act (24 P. S. § 6901.309(c)).
Tuition unitFive percent of a tuition credit. For example, 20 tuition units equal 1 tuition credit.
Value of the accountThe sum of payments made under a tuition account payment contract for the purchase of tuition credits or tuition units plus, in the case of each payment, a pro rata share of the net earnings rate of the Fund from the date of payment to the time of valuation, compounded annually.
§ 601.2. Termination of tuition account payment contracts, refunds and settlement.
(a) In addition to circumstances in section 313 of the act (24 P. S. § 6901.313), a tuition account may be terminated for the other reasons specified in this section.
(1) Termination at the will of the purchaser. A tuition account payment contract may be terminated at the will of the purchaser. The Department will settle the tuition account and pay to the purchaser a refund in an amount as specified under subsection (c).
(2) Termination for material misrepresentation. The Department may terminate a tuition account payment contract if it determines that the purchaser or beneficiary has made a material misrepresentation regarding information required to be submitted to the Department in writing. On termination of the tuition account payment contract under this subsection, the Department will settle the tuition account and pay to the purchaser a refund in an amount as specified under subsection (c).
(b) Procedure for termination of a tuition account payment contract and request for refund.
(1) The Department will terminate a tuition account payment contract under subsection (a)(1) only upon written request of the purchaser.
(iii) The tuition account payment contract number.
(iv) The reason for termination.
(v) Supporting documentation as required by the Department.
(3) The Department will terminate a tuition account payment contract under subsection (a)(1) only after the purchaser pays to the Department a reasonable fee to be determined by the Department and specified in the tuition account payment contract.
(1) Ninety percent of the tuition for the number of tuition credits purchased at the standard tuition level or at the tuition level for a specific participating institution, as designated in the tuition account payment contract, as periodically amended.
(2) Ninety percent of the value of the account.
(3) The sum of payments made by the purchaser, or on behalf of the purchaser, for the purchase of tuition credits or tuition units.