text:
Forgetful witnesses, spotting liars, difficult opposing counsel, and more.
Just what are “the usual stipulations”? The answer is that it depends. The usual stipulations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and might even vary within jurisdictions according to the local practice.
The usual stipulations might include agreements based on the jurisdiction’s procedural rules—for example, that all objections except those as to form are waived. The usual stipulations might also include agreements based on years of local practice—for example, that depositions, despite a rule to the contrary, need not ever be filed with the court.
Since the phrase “the usual stipulations” is always ambiguous, you should never agree that the usual stipulations will apply to your deposition.
With this said, it is okay to make agreements about the rules that will govern your deposition. Just make sure you understand exactly what you are agreeing to. If the opposing lawyer asks for a stipulation, make him or her spell out exactly what he or she is proposing on the record. Only then should you make your decision about whether or not you can agree to it.
The court reporter is responsible for “swearing the witness”—that is, administering an oath to the witness to tell the truth. Once the deposition begins, the court reporter transcribes the proceedings and, if asked, attaches exhibit stickers to your exhibits.
Do not allow witnesses to answer before you have finished your question. It is difficult for the court reporter to transcribe the proceedings if the participants are talking over one another.
If you read from an exhibit, do not read so fast that the court reporter has difficulty taking down what you say.
During breaks, provide the court reporter with the spellings of any difficult names.
If you do not want something on the record, remember to say, “Off the record.” Don’t begin talking until the court reporter stops typing. This way, if you get into a dispute with the opposing lawyer about what is on or off the record, you do not have to worry about the court reporter taking down something you did not want recorded.
Q: Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
Q: You understand you are under oath?
Q: And that means sworn to tell the truth?
Q: And even though we are in an informal setting here in this office, your answers have the same force and effect as if we were in a courtroom with a judge and a jury?
Q: There’s nothing that will prevent you from giving me your full attention?
Q: You aren’t taking any medications or suffering from any illness that will prevent you from understanding my questions or answering them fully?
Q: If you don’t understand one of my questions, will you let me know?
Q: If you need to take a break at any time, tell me, and we’ll take a break. Is that okay?
You will find standard preliminary questions like these at the beginning of this book’s sample outlines. One reason for using the standard preliminary questions is to put the deponent at ease right from the start. But more importantly, they will help you later if you need to impeach the witness with his or her prior testimony.
For more on this point, see §1:101.
While the standard preliminary questions do not have to come at the very beginning of a deposition, you should not skip them altogether. The importance of the preliminary questions becomes evident if you view them from the point of view of the lawyer trying to impeach the witness at a later date.
The form and style of impeachment varies from lawyer to lawyer, but the general idea is the same. Do not skip the preliminary questions.
The preliminary questions do not necessarily have to come right at the beginning of a deposition. Since both the lawyer and the witness will expect you to begin with easy topics, you can often gain a tactical advantage by heading straight into an important issue.
Try mixing up your deposition outline by beginning with “Can you tell us your name please for the record,” then jump to a topic that would normally happen much later in the deposition. Later, you can circle back to complete the preliminary questions at your leisure.
If you are trying to get information, ask open-ended questions.
If you are trying to pin a witness down, ask leading questions.
Whether open-ended or leading, keep your questions short.
If you mess up after you have started a question, simply say “strike that” and start over. Another method of starting over is to say to the witness, “I’m going to start over. Okay?” This way, after the witness answers “yes,” your corrected question will start on a new line of the deposition transcript.
The sample depositions in these books contains thousands of examples of appropriately-phrased deposition questions. You can also learn about basic questioning technique simply by reviewing deposition transcripts, both your own and those taken by other lawyers.
For other tips about questioning technique, see V.B. Situations You Might Encounter (§§1:140 et seq.).
Q: It was 2:10 p.m., is that not correct?
Q: That was a true statement?
Q: It was 2:10 p.m.?
The last example is often the best alternative. It’s simple, direct, and unambiguous.
After you have finished questioning the witness, your opposing counsel will have an opportunity to ask questions. If any of these questions are objectionable, it is up to you to object at the appropriate time—that is, after the question but before the answer. See generally VI. Objections at Depositions (§§1:160 et seq.).
In some jurisdictions, the scope of additional questions will be limited to the matters that came up in the preceding round of questions.
When do you know when to end a deposition? You end a deposition when you have asked all the questions you want to ask.
Do not let your opposing lawyer pressure you into ending the deposition before you’re ready to end it. When you think you are finished, ask to take a break. Look over your deposition outline to make sure you have not skipped anything you want to ask. Look over your notes to make sure you have properly followed up on all the witness’s answers.
When you are conducting this review, be methodical. Take your time. It is probably the only opportunity you will have to question the witness, so do not end the deposition until you’re ready to end it.
When you know you are ready to complete the deposition, say, “No further questions.” If the other lawyer does not have any questions either, the deposition is complete. For more information, see §1:104 Questions by Opposing Counsel.
The questions and answers today will be typed up by the court reporter into a deposition transcript. You have the right to read the deposition and review the answers. In the alternative, you can also rely on the accuracy of the court reporter to have taken down everything you said, in which case you can waive the requirement of signature.
§1:111 Practice Tip: Can You “Wing It” at a Deposition?
Can you wing it at a deposition? Undoubtedly, you can. When depositions don’t give you butterflies anymore, it can give you some pleasure to know that you can step into a conference room and conduct a complete deposition barely giving a thought to preparation.
What are the dangers of winging it? While style over substance can get lots of lawyers through depositions, “winging it” is never a good idea. If you are merely going through the motions, which is the whole point of winging it, you are not adding value to the case. It’s not a good way to lay the foundation for trial or settlement.
What are the goals of the deposition? Are you merely gathering information or can you also get helpful admissions from the witness? How do you plan to achieve your goals?
Do you plan to exhaust the witness’ memory on certain issues? Which ones? Why these issues and not others? When you are finished, will the witness really be pinned down, or have you left some doors open for him to wiggle through later?
Have you reviewed the pleadings? If not, why not? Have you looked at the discovery responses and documents? Which ones do you plan to use at the deposition, and why?
How is the witness going to fit into your plan for trial? Have you even thought about trial? How will the witness support or detract from your legal claims or defenses?
How can use the deposition in motions before trial? Have you thought about the ways you’ll use the deposition in other depositions? Have you thought about the ways you’ll use the deposition at trial?
No matter how memorable your deposition style, there’s simply no substitute for thoughtful preparation.
Following the deposition, the court reporter prepares the transcript. In most cases, the original is mailed to the lawyer who noticed the deposition. The other lawyers get copies.
It is always a useful exercise to ask yourself after each deposition how you could have improved your performance. When depositions become not only a means of preparing your case for trial, but also an opportunity for learning, you will hone your deposition skills much more rapidly than the average lawyer.
Some lawyers keep a running tally of their own self-criticisms, which they review when preparing for the next deposition. It’s a great way to stay focused on your goal of getting beyond the basics.
Another useful exercise is to critique the performance of your opposing lawyer. You will find yourself picking up tricks and techniques that you can easily add to your own deposition repertoire.
A motion in limine is a motion asking the trial court for a pretrial ruling that certain evidence is not admissible. The same motion can also be used to obtain a pretrial ruling that certain evidence can be used.
Typically, a motion in limine is presented just before the trial begins. It might consist of a long list of facts that you think the defense should not be allowed to bring into evidence—facts or argument about third-party insurance, for example, or facts about a preexisting injury to another part of the body that you think is irrelevant to issues in the trial.
You can make your motions in limine better—and save time preparing them—by keeping a list of points to include at the conclusion of every deposition. This idea works well because it is during depositions that you get a preview of the facts that the defendant wants to present at trial. Keeping a running tally of the points for your motion in limine as discovery proceeds is far more efficient than trying to review the entire file in the week before trial.
Can a witness “outsmart” the lawyer who is asking questions at a deposition?
It can certainly happen during a trial, especially during cross-examination. But a deposition is different than cross-examination.
Assuming the goal of your deposition is one of the common ones—finding out what the witness knows, learning about the other side’s defenses, obtaining admissions, and so on—then you are not cross-examining, but just trying to get information. This usually means there won’t be any opportunity for the witness to “outsmart” you. Instead, there will only be opportunities to evade, mislead, or lie, which isn’t outsmarting you at all—it’s getting the witness in deeper if he’s caught.
If the witness lies, he’s likely to be caught. Once the deposition ends, the discovery phase of your case continues. Unlike cross-examination, which comes at the end of the case, you’ll have plenty of opportunity to test the truthfulness of a witness’ deposition answers as the case continues.
When you are ready to use a document, hand it to the court reporter to be marked with a deposition exhibit. Remember not to say anything when the court reporter is placing the exhibit sticker on the document: with only one set of hands, the court reporter will not be able to record what you are saying.
Q: I’m handing you what’s been marked Exhibit X. Can you identify that document for the record?
Q: I’m handing you what’s been marked Exhibit X. Can you tell me what it is?
Q: I’m handing you what’s been marked Exhibit X. Is that a letter from John Smith to Sally Jones dated March 13, 2006?
After the witness answers, you can ask further questions about the document. Remember to refer to it by its exhibit number so that the record is clear.
If you ask a witness about a document, your opposing counsel may say, “Objection, the documents speaks for itself.” In most jurisdictions, this is an objection without substance, so you can carry on by asking the witness to answer over the objection.
Q: Mr. Witness, I’m going to read the second sentence on page 2 of Exhibit 1. Do you see that sentence?
Q: “The corporate management team thinks that five copy machines will be sufficient for our purposes.” Did I read that correctly?
Q: Do you agree with that statement?
Every so often, you will encounter a witness who is not intimidated in the slightest by the deposition process and who wants to demonstrate this fact by being rude or flippant. Initially, you should ignore this behavior—refuse to take the bait, as it were—and see whether the witness becomes more cooperative on realizing that these antics will not become a shortcut to having to answer the questions.
If this does not work, there are other approaches. If the witness is represented by counsel, you can call a break and have a quick conference with the opposing lawyer. Ask if he or she could step in and control the witness. Often, the other lawyer is embarrassed by the conduct, and will welcome the opportunity to remind his or her client to answer appropriately. If the other lawyer does not want to do this, you can do it yourself: Tell the witness on the record that since his or her conduct would not be appropriate in a courtroom, it is also not appropriate in a deposition. Tell the witness that if he or she does not show the lawyers and court reporter sufficient courtesy—if the witness refuses to respect the process—you will have to stop the deposition to get the judge involved. When you return, it might be at the witness’s own cost.
Some witnesses—doctors, for example—are very aware of the time the deposition is taking. Sometimes it helps to remind the uncooperative witness that the deposition will take much longer if he or she fails to give you straight answers to your questions.
Here’s a final tip: if you suspect ahead of time that the witness will be uncooperative, conduct a video deposition. The presence of a video camera often keeps even the most demanding witnesses in line.
As a last resort, you can seek court involvement. See §1:164 Seeking Judicial Intervention.
Q: The light was green, correct?
If you think in terms of impeachment nuggets as you are taking a deposition, it will help you maintain a clean transcript whenever you are doing the important work of pinning the witness down about key facts. You will remember, for example, to confine your question to a single, simple fact.
When the witness responds “yes,” then stops, you have an impeachment nugget for trial.
You will be able to spot the forgetful witness by the number of times he or she answers “I don’t remember” to your questions. If true, this is an appropriate response. But when the witness does remember, it’s not; then the witness is telling you a lie.
Based on the witness’s answers to your other questions, you will be able to sense whether the witness is telling you the truth about his or her inability to remember. If you think the witness is credible, you can try to refresh his or her recollection with documents or by telling the witness how other witnesses have testified.
Another way to refresh a witness’s recollection is by moving on to other questions concerning the same issue, then circling back to the topics that the witness was having trouble remembering. You can also ask the witness directly if there is anything you could show him or her that would refresh his or her recollection about the event.
What if the witness is lying to you? While you cannot force a witness to give you the answer that you want, you can use the witness’s claims of forgetfulness to call the witness’s credibility into question—not only on the questions that he or she does not remember, but on the rest of the testimony as well.
Demonstrate that even though the witness claims he or she cannot remember details about the event that are important to issues in the case, the witness can recall insignificant details about the same event.
Demonstrate that even though the witness claims he or she cannot remember details about the event at issue, the witness has a clear recollection of other events that happened long before.
Establish a pattern of “I don’t remember” answers clustered only around the event that is most critical to the issues in the case.
Keep in mind that if the witness claims he or she cannot remember, you can use this answer to take the witness out completely as a witness in the case on the particular issue. If done properly, the witness’s “forgetfulness” will allow you to present your own uncontradicted testimony on the issue. In order to do this, however, you have to pin down the forgetful witness by asking questions that would make it difficult for the witness to claim later that he or she suddenly remembered the answer.
For example, to preclude the possibility that the witness will claim later that he or she remembered the answer after reviewing documents about the issue, ask the witness during the deposition whether there are any documents you can show him or her that would refresh his or her recollection. When the witness answers no, this will close the door on this route to a newly-refreshed recollection.
The witness can knowingly make a false statement. “The light was green,” he might say, when he knows it was red.
The witness can state he doesn’t know the answer to your question when, in fact, he knows very well.
The witness can say “I don’t remember,” when, in fact, he does remember.
The witness can give one of the words in your question a meaning he knows is false, so that he can answer your question in a way that seems to be accurate, though it really isn’t. “It depends on what the meaning of the word is is,” said one famous deponent.
For some more tips about recognizing lies by witnesses see §1:252 Make Sure You Get the Real Answer. If you think the witness is trying to fool you, don’t be bashful about circling around and starting the line of questions from a new angle. Just because the witness is sworn to tell the truth, it doesn’t mean he’s really going to do it.
The witness might be refusing to answer your leading questions with a yes or no answer.
The witness might be adding information not called for by the question because he or she thinks it is damaging to your case.
The witness might be rambling on about issues that are not relevant to the case in an attempt to stall you.
There are two tools you can use to address these situations. One of them is to simply ask the question again—over and over, if necessary. Say something like, “Thank you, but that’s not what I asked you. Let me ask the question again. At the time of the collision, were your headlights on?” Continue to repeat the question until the witness answers the question succinctly, giving you an “impeachment nugget” as described above in §1:141 Practice Tip: Impeachment Nuggets.
In most jurisdictions, you can also move to strike non-responsive answers by saying, “I move to strike that answer as non-responsive. Here’s the question again . . . .” Since many witnesses think there might be some personal penalty attached to having their answers stricken, this can be quite an effective tool for controlling witnesses.
Creating an outline is the most efficient way of formalizing your preparation for a deposition. But be careful: deposition outlines can pose a hazard if you become too fixated on following them word for word. There are countless stories of inexperienced lawyers who are so timid about straying from their outlines that they fail to follow up on a witness’s answers when something helpful is volunteered.
The solution is simple: consider your outline merely a starting point or a checklist, and then be flexible enough to respond to the witness’s answers with appropriate follow-up questions.
Once you have enough experience forming succinct deposition questions on the fly, you can change your deposition outlines so that they only contain a list of topics. This way, the process of asking good follow-up questions will happen naturally.
Witnesses who have been told by their lawyers “don’t volunteer” sometimes become unwilling to answer any question at all. You will recognize this type of witness by the way they seem to cut off their answers in mid-phrase, saying something like “and then we,” and then stopping.
Handling the witness who talks too little is really a process of retraining the witness to forget his or her lawyer’s warnings not to volunteer information. It usually takes only a few minutes of prodding with simple follow-up questions before the witness starts acting like a normal person again.
There are a number of things your opposing counsel might do to rattle your concentration: improper objections, loud sighs, rattling of a newspaper, etc. The best way to respond to this type of behavior is to ignore it. Focus on the deponent and your game plan and refuse the opposing lawyer’s invitation to be drawn into an argument. In fact, you should simply pretend he or she is not there, unless opposing counsel makes an objection to one of your questions that is worthy of your consideration.
As for objections, use the advice in the next section, V. Objections at Depositions, in deciding how to respond. If objections are interposed merely to slow you down and become so intrusive that they are obstructing your ability to finish the deposition, consider seeking court involvement. This is covered in §1:164 Seeking Judicial Intervention.
You might also have to seek judicial intervention if your opponent is making speaking objections—that is, making an objection in such a way that it signals an answer to the witness. Though court rules generally prohibit this behavior, it still goes on. If your opponent makes a speaking objection, you should warn him or her right away that you will not tolerate it, as in the following example.
Q: Before the collision occurred, did you see the brake lights on the car you collided with?
Opposing Counsel: Objection, form. That question is confusing. The witness has already testified that the accident happened so quickly that he doesn’t remember everything that happened. Your question assumes that he remembered everything. That’s my objection, but Mr. Witness, subject to that, you can answer.
You: Wait, Mr. Witness. Counsel, that’s a speaking objection. It’s improper. Please don’t do it again. If you do, I’m going to stop this deposition and file a motion.
You should not have to tolerate speaking objections. Most lawyers will stop once they know you are on to them. If they do not, you have no choice but to assert your rights by seeking judicial intervention.
Psychologists at the University of Portsmouth in Great Britain devised a useful method for police detectives to spot liars: ask the witness to repeat the story in reverse.
The idea is that a made-up story is difficult enough to remember in the right order. If asked to remember the story in reverse, the witness is bound to make mistakes.
Will the technique work in depositions? Maybe so. Try it out in a case that involves both a central, key narrative, like a car accident or a work injury, and a witness who has a strong motive to lie.
T. Evan Schaeffer began his career as a defense lawyer, but since 1996 has worked primarily on the plaintiffs’ side. Schaeffer’s areas of practice include complex commercial and tort litigation, including mass torts and class actions, as well as general civil litigation. Mr. Schaeffer’s publications include articles and essays in many newspapers and magazines, including the Chicago Tribune, the Houston Chronicle, theSt. Louis Post-Dispatch, and theIllinois Bar Journal. Mr. Schaeffer also publishes two weblogs, The Illinois Trial Practice Weblog and Evan Schaeffer’s Legal Underground. Mr. Schaeffer is the author of Deposition Checklists and Strategies, from which this article is excerpted.

matches: §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 V. §1


EMINENT DOMAIN - PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE PROPERTY - REVIEW - APPEAL. Under appropriate circumstances, the trial court may grant a new trial in condemnation proceedings; however, in such proceedings neither side may appeal until a final judgment for damages has been entered, and the only matters then reviewable are errors respecting the propriety and justness of the award.
 SAME - GRANT OF NEW TRIAL - REVIEW - CERTIORARI. Certiorari lies to review an order granting a new trial in condemnation proceedings.
 SAME - PLEADING - AMENDMENT OF PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. In a condemnation proceeding, it was not error for the trial court to allow an amendment of the property description in the cause which eliminated nine tenths of an acre, and to permit the petitioner to take less property than originally contemplated.
 SAME - ADJUDICATION OF PUBLIC USE - SPECIFICATIONS OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION - NECESSITY. It is not necessary that an order adjudicating public use be accompanied by specifications or plans showing the exact nature of the proposed construction in order to render them admissible in the subsequent trial to determine the damages.
 SAME - NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER - PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS. In condemnation cases, property may be taken subject to certain easements of the landowner so as to minimize his damages.
 ATTORNEY GENERAL - POWERS AND DUTIES COMMITMENTS BINDING UPON STATE. Under RCW 43.10.030, 43.10.060, the commitments of the attorney general and his assistants are binding upon the state.
 STIPULATIONS - STIPULATIONS IN OPEN COURT - BINDING EFFECT. A party to an action is bound by the stipulations and agreements which are entered into by his counsel in open court as a part of the proceedings in the cause.
 ATTORNEY GENERAL - POWERS AND DUTIES - PRESUMPTIONS. It will be presumed that, when the attorney general appears for the state and makes representations in a condemnation proceeding, he acts within the scope of his authority.
«1» Reported in 294 P. (2d) 418.
 See 6l A. L. R. 94; 18 Am. Jur. § 366.
 EMINENT DOMAIN - PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE PROPERTY - EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES - EASEMENTS MINIMIZING DAMAGES. In a proceeding to condemn property for highway purposes, it was proper for the state to introduce evidence that a cattle guard, or underpass, would be constructed in one of three possible locations, depending upon the option of the landowner, for the purpose of minimizing his damages.
Certiorari to review an order of the superior court for Snohomish county, No. 57006, Stiger, J., entered May 6, 1955, granting a new trial in a condemnation proceeding. Reversed.
The Attorney General, Don Miles, Edward E. Level, and Newell Smith, Assistants, for relator.
The basic question in this case is whether certain eminent domain proceedings (initiated by the state highway department to acquire property for highway purposes) are valid.
The background of the matter and the questions involved are as follows: The state highway department sought and obtained an order of public use and necessity respecting certain property. Neither the department nor the property owner sought a review of the order within the period as allowed by statute.
Subsequently, just prior to the trial which was for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of damages to be awarded to the property owner, the state highway department determined that it would not be necessary to take all of the property as originally contemplated and as embraced in the order of public use and necessity theretofore obtained. The department filed an amended property description in the cause, which eliminated approximately nine tenths of an acre. Thereupon, at the commencement of the trial on the question of damages, counsel for the property owner objected to the efforts of the department to amend the property description and to take nine tenths of an acre less than the amount of property originally contemplated and as embraced in the order of public use and necessity.
The trial judge offered to continue the matter for the convenience of the attorney for the property owner and for the protection of the interests of the property owner; but when counsel for the property owner declined the offer, the trial judge permitted the lawsuit to proceed. In effect, the trial judge permitted amendment of the property description or the pleadings whereby the state would acquire nine tenths of an acre less than originally contemplated.
Both sides presented evidence regarding the lesser amount of property to be taken by the highway department. The department offered evidence that the damages suffered would be lessened by the construction of a cattle guard, or underpass, in any one of three locations, depending upon the choice or option of the property owner. The jury rendered a verdict and awarded damages to the property owner.
Thereafter, on motion of the property owner, the trial judge, by order, granted a new trial. The reasons given for so doing were (a) that he had erred in permitting the amendment to the property description or the pleadings whereby the state would acquire nine tenths of an acre less than originally contemplated and embraced in the order of public use and necessity, as originally obtained by the department; (b) that he had erred in permitting the introduction of evidence regarding the offer of the department to construct a cattle guard, or underpass, at one of three locations, depending upon the option of the property owner.
The department petitioned for a review by writ of certiorari, and the matter is now before us. The questions are: (1) whether the order granting the new trial is reviewable by certiorari; (2) whether the amendment of the property description or the pleadings was properly and validly permitted by the trial court; (3) whether it was proper for the state to introduce evidence that a cattle guard, or underpass, would be constructed in one of three possible locations, depending upon the option or choice of the landowner.
valuable rights, and that the state will be without a remedy unless review can be obtained by certiorari.
 We held in State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior Court, 45 Wn. (2d) 48, 272 P. (2d) 624, that, under appropriate circumstances, the trial court may grant a new trial in condemnation proceedings. However, it is well settled that in such proceedings neither side may appeal until a final judgment for damages has been entered. Longview, Portland & Northern R. Co. v. Seattle, 128 Wash. 642, 223 Pac. 1058; State v. Prindle, 169 Wash. 311, 13 P. (2d) 425. Furthermore, the only matters then reviewable are errors respecting the propriety and justness of the award. RCW 8.04.150; Coats-Fordney Logging Co. v. Grays Harbor Logging Co., 100 Wash. 491, 171 Pac. 241; State ex rel. Northwestern Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 27 Wn. (2d) 694, 179 P. (2d) 510.
 If certiorari is denied in the case at bar, the case is likely to be retried. The alleged errors in granting the new trial would not be reviewable in an appeal arising out of the second trial. The state would be without an adequate remedy. We hold that certiorari lies. The motion to quash the writ is denied.
Department v. Bobotes, 180 S. C. 183, 185 S. E. 165, 121 A. L. R. 1; Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 955; 121 A. L. R. 12.
"The contention that petitioner may not abandon condemnation proceedings as against any one parcel of property without abandoning the entire project is without substance. If, after the institution of a condemnation action, a plaintiff should determine that a certain parcel of land is not necessary in the operations contemplated, there is no law to prevent an abandonment of proceedings against the land in question."
"The condemning agency is accorded the right to dismiss as to a portion of the land when it decides that its purpose may be accomplished with less land than was initially sought."
 We hold that it was not error in the instant case for the trial court to allow the amendment of the property description and to permit the department to take less property than originally contemplated.
"That no specifications accompany the decree is no objection. The decree determines only the legal right; it does not attempt to indicate the facts to be determined before that right can be exercised. That inquiry and ascertainment may be left to the trial, and the jury can there determine the damages to be paid under a particular and designated use, to be shown by plats, designs, or other appropriate specifications, which become part of the record, and may be appropriately referred to in the final decree or judgment."
take water therefrom. We held the proffered stipulation inadmissible on the grounds that the condemner must take the rights which he seeks to appropriate unconditionally, and must make full compensation in money for what he takes.
Clearly, the Polson and the Smith cases are not controlling in the case at bar. We are not concerned here with a conditional promise to do something in the future or an offer to pay something in lieu of money. Nor are we concerned with an attempt on the part of the condemner to reduce the damages to the landowner by tendering an interest in property apart from the property sought to be condemned. The landowners are being compensated in money for all rights which they are losing. The effect of constructing the cattle guard in one of the three locations is to reserve in the landowner a proprietary right in the land.
 The right to take property in condemnation cases subject to certain easements of the landowner, so as to minimize his damages, is in accordance with the weight of authority. See 26 L. R. A. 751; 7 A. L. R. (2d) 392, § 6, Distinctions between promissory statements and binding stipulations, reservations, or limited condemnation. It is also in harmony with the fundamental principle that no greater estate or interest should be taken than reasonably necessary for contemplated public necessity or use.
"The law does not favor the taking or damaging of property for a public use beyond the necessities of the case, and if damages may be avoided by a waiver or stipulation definite and certain in its terms, which will fully protect the rights of all parties concerned, there is no reason why such a stipulation should not be received and acted upon." Tacoma Eastern R. Co. v. Smithgall, 58 Wash. 445, 108 Pac. 1091.
Finally, the respondents question the authority of the district engineer or the attorneys for the petitioner to bind the state as to the construction of the cattle guards. The district engineer is an employee and official of the state highway department. He is competent to testify relative to the construction plans. RCW 43.27.020 (4).
 The commitments of the attorney general and his assistants are binding upon the state. RCW 43.10.030; RCW 43.10.060.
[7, 8] Clearly, a party to an action is bound by the stipulations and agreements which are entered into by his counsel in open court as a part of the proceedings in the cause. It must be presumed that, when the attorney general appears for the state and makes representations in a condemnation proceeding, he acts within the scope of his authority.
Respondents contend that the result, suggested by the foregoing, is inconsistent with our holding in Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn. (2d) 747, 284 P. (2d) 1099, where we held that the mayor of a municipal corporation of the fourth class is clothed with no authority to speak for or to bind the town or the town council in a condemnation proceeding, unless specifically authorized to do so by ordinance. We do not agree with respondents' contention. Our decision in the Othello case involved an interpretation of particular statutory provisions which are not involved in the case at bar.
 For the reasons stated, the third question is answered in the affirmative.
We find no merit in the contentions of respondents. It is our best judgment that the action of the trial court in granting the new trial should be reversed, and that the case should be remanded for further necessary proceedings involving the entry of judgment by the trial court on the verdict of damages as rendered by the jury. It is so ordered.
SCHWELLENBACH, DONWORTH, ROSELLINI, and OTT, JJ., concur.
March 21, 1956. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
Smith, Curt. Storied Stadiums. Baseball's History through Its Ballparks. Photo available. New York. Carroll and Graf. 2002. Octavo. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, David L. The Gods of Golf. A Novel. New York. Pocket. 1997. 369 pps. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Very good copy. Light wear (owner inscription).
Smith, Guy. Ferreting and Trapping for Amateur Gamekeepers. Hindhead. Spur Pub. 1979. Octavo. Hard cover. Second edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, Lissa (ed). Nike is a Goddess. The History of Women in Sports. Photo available. New York. Atlantic Monthly. 1998. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, Richard. Animal Tracks and Signs of North America. Photo available. Harrisburg. Stackpole Books. 1982. 271 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, Robert W. Hsing-I. Chinese Mind-Body Boxing. Berkeley. North Atlantic Books. 2003. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Smith, Robert. Illustrated History of Baseball. Photo available. New York. Grosset & Dunlap. 1978. 4to. Hard cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, Ron. Pro Football's Heroes of the Hall. Deluxe binding. Photo available. St. Louis. Sporting News. 2003. 399 pps. 4to. Gilt decorated leather, Gilt hard cover. Gilt edges. Satin end papers. Ribbon book mark. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Smith, W.H.B. The W.H.B. Smith Classic Book of Pistols & Revolvers. Handguns of the World - Their Identification and Operation, Illustrations and Descriptions... Photo available. Secaucus. Castle Books. 1979. 816 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Smith, W.H.B. Walther Pistols and Mauser Rifles ad Pistols. Photo available. Birmingham. Palladium Press. The Firearms Classic Library. 1999. 236 pps. Octavo. Gilt decorated hard cover. Gilt edges. Satin end papers. First edition thus. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Smith, Walter H.B. Rifles. Photo available. Birmingham. Palladium Press. The Firearms Classic Library. 1997. 546 pps. Octavo. Gilt decorated hard cover. Gilt edges. Satin end papers. First edition thus. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Smythe, Frank. Mountains in Color. London. Readers Union. 1951. 155 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Color plates of mountains of the world. Near fine copy.
Smythe, Pat. Jumping Round the World. Horses. Photo available. New York. Arco. 1964. 211 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy (owner name on end papers) in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Smythe, R.H. The Mind of the Horse. Brattleboro. Stephen Greene Press. 1983. 123 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Snead, Sam. Golf Begins at Forty. How to Use Your Age Advantage. New York. Dial. 1978. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Snead, Sam. Natural Golf. New York. A.S. Barnes Publishing. 1953. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in lightly edge worn, slight spine fading dust jacket (in mylar).
Snead, Sam. Pigeons, Marks, Hustlers and Other Golf Bettors You Can Beat. Photo available. Trumbull. Golf Digest. 1986. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition? Number one missing. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Snead, Sam. Sam Snead Teaches You His Simple "Key" Approach to Golf. Photo available. New York. Atheneum. 1975. 180 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Stated first edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Snead, Sam. Slamming Sam. How to Hit a Golf Ball from Any Sort of Lie. Photo available. Garden City. Doubleday. 1950. Octavo. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Solomon, Larry (ed). The Complete Book of Modern Fly Fishing. Photo available. Chicago. Follett. 1979. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Solomon, Larry. The Caddis and the Angler. Cassis Entomology and Behavior. Fly Fishing Techniques... Harrisburg. Stackpole. 1977. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Sorenstam, Annika. Golf Annika's Way. Photo available. New York. Gotham Books. 2004. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).

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text:
B.(1) Whenever a husband has left his wife or a wife has left her husband in destitute or necessitous circumstances and has not provided means of support within thirty days thereafter, his or her failure to so provide shall be only presumptive evidence for the purpose of determining the substantive elements of this offense that at the time of leaving he or she intended desertion and nonsupport. The receipt of assistance from the Family Independence Temporary Assistance Program (FITAP) shall constitute only presumptive evidence of necessitous circumstances for purposes of proving the substantive elements of this offense. Physical incapacity which prevents a person from seeking any type of employment constitutes a defense to the charge of criminal neglect of family.
D.(1) Whoever commits the offense of criminal neglect of family shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more than six months, or both, and may be placed on probation pursuant to R.S. 15:305.
Amended by Acts 1950, No. 164, §1; Acts 1952, No. 368, §1; Acts 1968, No. 233, §1; Acts 1968, No. 647, §1; Acts 1968, Ex.Sess., No. 14, §1; Acts 1975, No. 116, §1, eff. July 1, 1975; Acts 1976, No. 559, §1; Acts 1978, No. 443, §1; Acts 1979, No. 614, §1; Acts 1980, No. 764, §§4, 5; Acts 1981, No. 812, §3, eff. Aug. 2, 1981; Acts 1981, Ex.Sess., No. 36, §3, eff. Nov. 19, 1981; Acts 1984, No. 453, §§1 and 2; Acts 1997, No. 1402, §1.

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034 Pa. Code § 131.67. Expenses of taking depositions.
§ 131.67. Expenses of taking depositions.
(a) If a deposition is to be taken more than 100 miles from where the hearing is or would be scheduled, the judge may order the payment of reasonable expenses of attorneys, not including counsel fees, to attend the deposition.
(b) Subsection (a) supersedes 1 Pa. Code § § 35.148 and 35.152 (relating to officer before whom deposition is taken; and fees of officers and deponents).
The provisions of this § 131.67 amended under sections 401.1 and 435(a) and (c) of the Workers Compensation Act (77 P. S. § § 710 and 991(a) and (c)); section 2205 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (71 P. S. § 565); and section 414 of The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act (77 P. S. § 1514).
The provisions of this § 131.67 adopted November 6, 1981, effective November 7, 1981, 11 Pa.B. 4015; amended March 29, 1991, effective March 30, 1991, 21 Pa.B. 1401; amended December 6, 2002, effective December 7, 2002, 32 Pa.B. 6043. Immediately preceding text appears at serial page (261801).


Companies that import and export goods to and from the United States can face internal and external risks for criminal prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other statutes. Our federal defense lawyers are available to represent organizations, executives, and personnel facing corruption charges nationwide.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) gives federal prosecutors broad authority to target individuals and corporate organizations under a wide range of circumstances. While most litigation under the FCPA involves allegations of corrupt practices related to contracts with foreign governments and state-owned enterprises, companies can also face corruption charges related to their import and export operations. Bribes and other attempts to obtain improper influence directed toward U.S. officials can lead to criminal prosecution as well, and companies and their executives can face prosecution as a result of their relationships with foreign entities even if they do not directly engage in bribery or other corrupt practices.
In other words, any conduct involving interstate commerce (including virtually all import and export activities) which also involves a bribe or other attempt to unduly influence a foreign official has the potential to lead to a criminal inquiry under the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. If the inquiry leads to charges, those targeted in the government’s prosecution can face penalties including up to $5 million in fines per violation for individuals, up to $25 million in fines per violation for businesses, and up to 20 years of federal imprisonment. In FCPA cases, individuals and businesses can also face forfeitures, disgorgements, injunctions, and suspension or debarment from doing business with government entities.
The first set of risks relates to interactions between company personnel and foreign officials. With import and export operations, it is possible for various individuals to interact with foreign officials in differing capacities, and each one of these interactions presents a potential risk for a “corrupt” practice. While this includes intentionally-corrupt practices such as knowingly offering an illegal bribe, it can also include unintentional FCPA violations – particularly in cases where companies do not have comprehensive anti-corruption policies and training programs in place.
This risk is exacerbated by the fact that many foreign officials are not well paid, particularly in the context of the salaries paid to the company personnel with whom they interact. This factor may make some foreign officials particularly susceptible to influence, and may even cause them to request improper payments and other benefits which company personnel do not realize are unlawful under U.S. federal law.
In cases where a company relies on one of these third parties to interact with a foreign official on its behalf or in direct or indirect relation to import or export operations, it is possible that these third parties’ practices could trigger an investigation or even directly result in criminal charges. This applies to both domestic and foreign third parties. While companies can use contractual language to mitigate their civil liability for third-party action, these types of contractual protections will generally be insufficient to ward off government prosecution in criminal cases.
While the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is the primary federal statute used to prosecute individuals and entities suspected of offering bribes and engaging in other corrupt practices in relation to foreign commerce, importers and exporters can face criminal prosecution under a variety of other federal statutes as well. In relation to interactions with domestic customs and border officials, two of the statutes that present the greatest risks for U.S. companies and individuals are 18 U.S.C. § 201 and 18 U.S.C. § 371.
18 U.S.C. § 201 is a criminal statute, with potential penalties including statutory fines or three times the value of the improper benefit (whichever is greater), and federal imprisonment for a term of up to 15 years.
The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, imposes criminal penalties in circumstances where no bribe has been paid and no other form of improper influence has been asserted. It applies in situations where a “successful” corrupt act would result in prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or 18 U.S.C. § 201.
In many respects, 18 U.S.C. § 371 contains some of the broadest provisions of the entire federal criminal code. In order to face prosecution in relation to import or export-related operations, it is not necessary for an individual or organization to be directly involved in alleged corrupt activity, nor it is necessary for the alleged corrupt activity to actually take place. If there is evidence of an agreement (express or implied) and an “overt act” toward the commission of a corrupt practice, this alone is enough to trigger criminal enforcement proceedings. Learn more about federal conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Foreign Law Compliance – It is a defense to criminal culpability under the FCPA that a payment was lawful under the laws or regulations of the recipient official’s country of citizenship.
Learn more about the defense strategies we use to protect our clients in federal corruption cases.
Oberheiden, P.C. is a federal criminal defense law firm with a national presence and headquarters in Dallas, Texas. The firm was founded by Dr. Nick Oberheiden, a federal defense lawyer who has more than a decade of experience in private practice and who received his training and education at top institutions in the United States and abroad. The firm’s team of defense attorneys also includes several former federal prosecutors, many of whom worked for the DOJ for decades before entering private practice.
The firm provides strategic legal representation for individual and corporate clients facing federal investigations and criminal charges under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other federal statutes. By taking an aggressive and proactive approach, the firm’s attorneys have been successful in resolving many clients’ cases without charges being filed or between the stages of indictment and trial. By taking a team approach, the firm offers all clients the benefit of centuries of combined legal experience, and clients have full access to their defense team 24/7 through the final resolution of their case.
To discuss your federal corruption case with a member of Oberheiden, P.C.’s federal defense team, please call 888-519-4897 or contact us online. We will schedule your initial consultation as soon as possible.


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Just two weeks after holding oral argument, the South Dakota Supreme Court issued its decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, et al., striking down South Dakota’s “kill-Quill” law. South Dakota’s law would have imposed sales tax collection and remittance obligations on out-of-state retailers. The state is expected to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
Today, the South Dakota Supreme Court published its opinion in South Dakota v. Wayfair¸ holding that SB 106—imposing sales tax collection and remittance obligations on out-of-state retailers—violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.1 The court held that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in National Bellas Hess v. Illinois2 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota3 commanded such a result. Those decisions, issued in 1967 and 1992, respectively, require retailers to be “physically present” in a state in order to have an obligation to collect and remit sales and use tax on sales to in-state customers.
What’s Next? The court’s decision is unsurprising, given that SB 106 directly conflicted with the United States Supreme Court precedent. The state has until December 12, 2017, to file its anticipated cert petition (although an extension to file may be granted). We expect numerous amicus curiae briefs to be filed on behalf of both the state and the out-of-state retailers.
State of South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., Overstock.com Inc. & Newegg, Inc., 2017 S.D. 56 (2017) (hereinafter “South Dakota v. Wayfair”).
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 2017 S.D. 56 at ¶ 18 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).

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Rudy is one of the country’s premier intellectual property litigators.
With only one exception, Rudy has not lost a trial, arbitration or other case-dispositive motion in well over a decade. The exception involved a case in which the jury verdict obtained was ten times lower than the amount sought by plaintiff in closing argument.
During this time, and for each case not settled following decision, Rudy has been affirmed on appeal. At the same time, he is well-known for shaping litigation solutions that make economic sense for businesses.
For more than 25 years, Rudy has litigated and tried disputes over patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret, internet and First Amendment matters in district and appellate courts throughout the United States, including notable jurisdictions such as the Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Central and Northern Districts of California. Additionally, Rudy handled argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case that altered the balance of power in patent litigation.
Prior to entering law school, Rudy worked as an engineer for a leading defense contractor, applying his skills in the areas of avionics systems engineering and software development.
Managing Intellectual Property, Case of the Year, Editor’s Choice: Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.
From a pure legal standpoint, the issue was whether the use of player statistics to play fantasy sports violated player rights of publicity and, even if it did, whether the First Amendment trumped any such state rights of publicity. At the time of the suit, the fantasy industry was valued at $1.5 billion annually.
A deeper dive into the facts revealed a much more compelling story for the fantasy industry and against Major League Baseball than that signaled by the pure legal issue. As it turns out, Major League Baseball played no part in developing fantasy sports. An editor for The New York Times thought of it. In the 1980s, devoted fans created and managed their own statistical games with an estimation of 500,000 fans playing annually.
In the 1990s and moving forward, software companies like CBC developed state-of-the-art software to manage the statistic interface and to create many forms of interesting fantasy games. The software made it far easier for the average fan to play and track the games, dramatically increasing the popularity of fantasy sports.
At the time of the suit, an estimated 15 million fans played fantasy sports annually. CBC brought in many witnesses to explain in detail how fantasy sports had actually made Major League Baseball far more money by causing devoted fans to watch many more games than just those of their home town team and encouraging them to buy more merchandise, satellite television packages and fantasy sports media, to name just some of the benefits. Indeed, the fantasy industry helped Major League Baseball and its players; it had not damaged them in the least.
This compelling version transcended the mere legal issues. CBC prevailed at the District Court level and was affirmed on appeal.
Provided lead counsel representation of Octane Fitness LLC (Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Sports) before U.S. Supreme Court in appeal of denial of attorneys' fees in patent infringement case. Obtained summary judgment on infringement claims against Octane Fitness and District Court denied fees. Merits and reply briefs to U.S. Supreme Court were authored by team and joined by numerous amici, including U.S. Solicitor General. In Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Fitness and Health Inc., Supreme Court reversed Federal Circuit and set totality of circumstances standard for finding exceptionality to award fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Case garnered significant national media attention and altered balance of power in patent litigation. On remand, District Court finally found original claims against Octane Fitness exceptional, and team secured fee award of $1.4 million for client. Rudy handled oral argument before Supreme Court.
Represented CDM Fantasy Sports against Major League Baseball, making new law in turning back Major League Baseball’s attempts to monopolize $1.5 billion per year fantasy sports industry. Case ended with Supreme Court denying certiorari. (CBC Distribution v. Major League Baseball) Filed amicus brief on behalf of Fantasy Sports Trade Association in Indiana Supreme Court case Akeem Daniels, Cameron Stingily and Nicholas Stoner v. FanDuel, Inc., and DraftKings, Inc. Court issued unanimous ruling in favor of FanDuel and DraftKings.
Rudy loves spending time with his children.
His daughter is the captain of her high school golf team, so he spends a lot of time on the course playing with her and watching her play. Rudy likes to ski with his son in Vail, Colorado. As a family, they enjoy traveling to big cities like New York City and Washington, D.C.
Rudy enjoys exercising and staying in shape. He likes to walk, jog and lift weights. Rudy also likes to fish.
Rudy and his daughter, Natalie, following his U.S. Supreme Court argument.
Rudy and his son, Jacob, skiing in Colorado.


Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 376 › United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.
The Federal Government filed suit under § 7 of the Clayton Act charging that the acquisition by a natural gas company, then the sole out of state supplier to California, of the stock and assets of another gas company, one of the two major interstate pipelines serving the trans-Rocky Mountain States, which had made some efforts to enter the California market, "may be substantially to lessen competition." The District Court, without a written opinion, dismissed the complaint after trial, adopting verbatim the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by counsel for appellees.
1. A trial judge's findings will stand if supported by evidence even where they are not his own work product, United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, but such findings are less helpful on judicial review than those prepared by the trial judge himself. Pp. 376 U. S. 656-657.
2. A review of the record, composed mainly of undisputed evidence, clearly shows that the "effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition" in California under § 7 of the Act. Pp. 376 U. S. 657-662.
(a) The production, transportation and sale of natural gas is a "line of commerce," and California is a "section of the country," as used in § 7. P. 376 U. S. 657.
(b) The words "may be substantially to lessen competition" in § 7 manifest Congress' concern with probabilities, and not with either certainties or ephemeral possibilities. P. 376 U. S. 658.
(c) Although the acquired company had not gained entry into California for its gas, its effect as a potential supplier made it a substantial competitive factor in that continuously expanding market. Pp. 376 U. S. 658-659.
3. Since appellees have been on notice of the antitrust charge almost from the inception of the merger plans, the District Court is directed to order divestiture without delay. P. 376 U. S. 662.
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR. JUSTICE CLARK.
This is a civil suit charging a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, [Footnote 1] by reason of the acquisition of the stock and assets of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. (Pacific Northwest) by El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El Paso). The District Court dismissed the complaint after trial, making findings of fact and conclusions of law, but not writing an opinion. The case is here on direct appeal. 15 U.S.C. § 29. We noted probable jurisdiction, 373 U.S. 930.
In 1954, Pacific Northwest received the approval of the Federal Power Commission to construct and operate a pipeline from the San Juan Basin, New Mexico, to the State of Washington, to supply gas to the then unserved Pacific Northwest area. Later it was authorized to receive large quantities of Canadian gas, and to enlarge its system for that purpose. In addition, Pacific Northwest acquired Rocky Mountain reservoirs along its route. At the end of 1957, it had an estimated 3.51 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves owned outright in the San Juan Basin; 1.04 trillion under contract in the San Juan Basin; 1.59 trillion under contract in the Rocky Mountain area; and 2.33 trillion under contract in Canada -- 8.47 trillion in all. By 1958, one-half of its natural gas sales were of gas from Canada.
In 1954, Pacific Northwest entered into two gas exchange contracts with El Paso -- one to deliver 250 million cubic feet per day to El Paso in Idaho for transportation to California via Nevada, the other to gather gas jointly in the San Juan Basin for a five-year period. Under the latter agreement, El Paso loaned gas to Pacific Northwest from its wells in the San Juan Basin; to avoid duplication of facilities, Pacific Northwest agreed to gather gas with its own facilities from El Paso's wells in the eastern portion of the basin, and El Paso agreed to perform the same service for Pacific Northwest in the western portion. At the same time, Pacific Northwest undertook to purchase 300 million cubic feet per day from West-coast Transmission Co., Ltd., a Canadian pipeline.
its facilities, be a larger company, will protect its market from future competition by a Canadian pipeline, and it caused the dismissal of the law suit of Westcoast against Pacific's present certificate. It means that El Paso's California market will be protected against future competition, and, further, it results in all parties' now working together for a common end, rather than fighting each other."
El Paso, however, could not get Commission approval to build the pipeline necessary to deliver the 250 million cubic feet of gas to California. Consequently, a new agreement on that aspect was negotiated in 1955 whereby El Paso undertook to purchase 50 million cubic feet a day to be delivered on an exchange basis in Colorado. Pacific Northwest, still obligated to take 300 million cubic feet per day from Westcoast, disposed of the balance in its own market areas.
and, upon being advised that it was El Paso's policy to sell only to distributors, started negotiations with Pacific Northwest in May, 1956. The idea was for Pacific Northwest to deliver to Edison at a point on the California-Oregon border 300 million cubic feet of Canadian gas a day. In July, 1956, they reached a tentative agreement. Edison thereupon tried to develop within California an integrated system for distributing Canadian gas supplied by Pacific Northwest to itself and others. El Paso decided to fight the plan to the last ditch, and succeeded in getting (through a distributor) a contract for Edison's needs. Edison's tentative agreement with Pacific Northwest was terminated. Before Edison terminated that agreement with Pacific Northwest, Edison had reached an agreement with El Paso for firm deliveries of gas; and while the original El Paso offer was 40¢ per Mcf, the price dropped to 38¢ per Mcf, then to 34¢, and finally to 30¢. Thereafter, and while the merger negotiations were pending, Pacific Northwest renewed its efforts to get its gas into California.
it should not have acted until the District Court had passed on the Clayton Act issues. California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U. S. 482. Meanwhile (in October, 1960), the United States amended its complaint so as to include the asset acquisition in the charged violation of the Clayton Act.
and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright ed. 1961), § 1124. Moreover, these detailed findings were "mechanically adopted," to use the phrase of the late Judge Frank in United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942, and do not reveal the discerning line for decision of the basic issue in the case. On review of the record -- which is composed largely of undisputed evidence -- we conclude that "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition" within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
could not have received the gas supplies or financing for a pipeline project to California, or could not have put together a project acceptable to the regulatory agencies. Those findings are irrelevant.
See also United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 374 U. S. 362.
was the only other important interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains. Though young, it was prospering, and appeared strong enough to warrant a "treaty" with El Paso that protected El Paso's California markets.
"to arrest the trend toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger. . . ."
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 367.
compete for, enter into, and then obtain Commission approval of sale contracts in advance of constructing the pipeline facilities. In the natural gas industry, pipelines are very expensive, and, to be justified, they need long-term contracts for sale of the gas that will travel them. Those transactions with distributors are few in number. For example, in California, there are only two significant wholesale purchasers -- Pacific Gas & Electric in the north and the Southern Companies in the south. Once the Commission grants authorization to construct facilities or to transport gas in interstate commerce, once the distributing contracts are made, a particular market is withdrawn from competition. The competition then is for the new increments of demand that may emerge with an expanding population and with an expanding industrial or household use of gas.
"I do not think, for the present moment, we should confuse the sale of gas from our system to California with El Paso's taking part of the gas through their present system to California. Reason for this: should the El Paso-Pacific deal collapse, we would have nothing of substance with California."
Pacific Northwest had proximity to the California market -- 550 miles distant in Wyoming, even nearer in Idaho, only 250 miles away in Oregon. Moreover, it had enormous reserves in the San Juan Basin, the Rocky Mountains, and Western Canada. Had Pacific Northwest remained independent, there can be no doubt it would have sought to exploit its formidable geographical position vis-a-vis California. No one knows what success it would have had. We do know, however, that two interstate pipelines in addition to El Paso now serve California -- one of the newcomers being Pacific Gas Transmission Co., bringing down Canadian gas. So we know that opportunities would have existed for Pacific Northwest had it remained independent.
Paso. If El Paso can absorb Pacific Northwest without violating § 7 of the Clayton Act, that section has no meaning in the natural gas field. For normally there is no competition -- once the lines are built and the long-term contracts negotiated -- except as respects the incremental needs.
In 1956, El Paso supplied more than 50% of all gas consumed in the State, the remainder coming from intrastate sources.
"The Court. Judgment will be for the defendant in this case. Prepare the findings and conclusions and judgment."
"How much time do you want within which to submit it?"
"Mr. Harrison. Does the court have a rule, your Honor?"
"The Court. No, I have no rule about that."
"Mr. Harrison. Could we have twenty days, your Honor?"
"The Court. Twenty days to prepare the findings and conclusions and judgment. I shan't write an opinion in this case."
"Mr. Harrison. I didn't hear you."
"The Court. I don't intend to write an opinion in this case. I think it is a factual matter. I think we have taken a full, fair look at the evidence and the factual issues, and I am not satisfied that the Government has discharged its burden."
"Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52 says the court shall prepare the findings. 'The court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law.' We all know what has happened. Many courts simply decide the case in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, have him prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and sign them. This has been denounced by every court of appeals save one. This is an abandonment of the duty and the trust that has been placed in the judge by these rules. It is a noncompliance with Rule 52 specifically, and it betrays the primary purpose of Rule 52 -- the primary purpose being that the preparation of these findings by the judge shall assist in the adjudication of the lawsuit."
"I suggest to you strongly that you avoid as far as you possibly can simply signing what some lawyer puts under your nose. These lawyers, and properly so, in their zeal and advocacy and their enthusiasm, are going to state the case for their side in these findings as strongly as they possibly can. When these findings get to the courts of appeals, they won't be worth the paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining why the judge decided the case."
Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges (1963), p. 166.
"The dependence of California upon natural gas as a fuel is unique among the states. California does not possess coal deposits sufficient for energy requirements. It is dependent upon natural gas for its energy needs, and approximately three quarters of the natural gas utilized in California comes from out-of-state sources. Ninety per cent of all homes in California are heated by natural gas, and California industry depends upon natural gas as a fuel. In California, the percentage of total energy provided by natural gas is substantially greater than for the nation as a whole."
"During 1962, California Gas distributing utilities purchased over 745,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas at a cost somewhat in excess of $266,850,000. California takes in excess of ten per cent of all of the natural gas moving in interstate commerce throughout the United States, and exceeds the volume of gas imported by any other state."
"The interest of California in this proceeding is evident. More than 80 percent of the customers of El Paso before merger resided in the State of California, and California ratepayers bear most of the costs of service of El Paso."
"California, alone, consumes more natural gas than the Middle Atlantic states combined, more than half as much as the highly industrialized, thickly populated East North-Central states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin, and as much as the seven states that make up the West North-Central area. Out-of-state deliveries to California averaged three billion cubic feet per day in 1961. At a price of slightly more than thirty cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf), this business was worth then about $1,000,000 per day."
Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U. S. 291.
Cf. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U. S. 179, 281 U. S. 197.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Contrary to what I had first thought, the Government is not asking in this case, as it did in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338, that we "in effect . . . try the case de novo," id. at 338 U. S. 340. Rather, it contends that on the undisputed facts of record the ultimate determination below was clearly erroneous. See id., at 338 U. S. 341-342. For reasons given in the Court's opinion, I agree that a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act has been established, and that the District Court erred in deciding otherwise . On this score, I shall comment only on two matters.
here, has accepted in toto the findings proposed by one side or the other. The real lack in this case is that the District Court wrote no opinion setting forth the reasoning underlying any of the subsidiary findings on disputed issues of fact or connecting the subsidiary findings with its ultimate determination that the Clayton Act had not been violated by this merger.
Both as a practitioner and as a judge, I have more than once felt that a closely contested government antitrust case, decided below in favor of the defendant, has foundered in this Court for lack of an illuminating opinion by the District Court. District Courts should not forget that such cases, the trials of which usually result in long and complex factual records, come here without the benefit of any sifting by the Courts of Appeals. The absence of an opinion by the District Court has been a handicap in this instance.
the effect of placing the Department of Justice in the driver's seat even though Congress has lodged primary regulatory authority elsewhere.
It does seem to me that the time has come when this duplicative, and, I venture to say, anachronistic system of dual regulation should be re-examined. Had the subtle and necessarily speculative questions involved in assessing the short-term and long-term effects of this merger been subject to appraisal by a single agency, under congressionally established standards marking the relationship between the different and often competing objectives of the antitrust laws and those governing the regulation of "interstate" natural gas, who can say that this case might not have called for a different outcome?
While I agree with the Court's decision on the merits, I dissent from its peremptory ordering of divestiture. "The framing of" appropriate relief "should take place in the District, rather than in Appellate, Courts." International Salt Co., Inc., v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 332 U. S. 400 (footnote omitted). United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U. S. 316, is not to the contrary; that case had already been here before on the merits ( 353 U. S. 353 U.S. 586), and, when it came here again at the relief stage, the Court observed that "the District Courts [have] the responsibility initially to fashion the remedy. . . ." 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 323. I know of no case where this Court has in the first instance itself directed divestiture or any other particular kind of relief. The fact that these appellees have been "on notice," ante, p. 376 U. S. 662, of the charges against them affords no justification for this departure from normal practice. See the cases cited in the second du Pont case, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 322.
I would remand the case to the District Court for the fashioning of appropriate relief.
* This Court has not had the benefit of an amicus brief from the Federal Power Commission.


text:
In 1999, OKS Partners, a consortium comprised of, among others, the American businessman William Koch, returned to Turkey nearly 1700 ancient coins. The coins were part of the Elmali Hoard, a precious and rare collection of ancient coins, also called the “Hoard of the Century,” that had been illegally excavated and smuggled out of Turkey in 1984.
Citation: Ece Velioglu, Alessandro Chechi, Marc-André Renold, “Case Elmali Hoard – Turkey and OKS Partners,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva.
In 1999, OKS Partners, a consortium comprised of, among others, the American businessman William Koch, returned nearly 1700 ancient coins to Turkey. The coins were part of the Elmali Hoard, a precious and rare collection of ancient coins, also called the “Hoard of the Century,” that had been illegally excavated and smuggled out of Turkey in 1984. The return resulted from an amicable settlement that followed a decade of litigation in the United States.
In or around April 1984: A collection of nearly two thousand ancient Greek and Lycian silver coins were unearthed in Elmali, a town near Antalya, Turkey, and soon after smuggled out of the country (hereafter Elmali Hoard). Turkish authorities contacted Interpol seeking international assistance to find and arrest the traffickers.
1984: The consortium OKS Partners (hereafter OKS) purchased almost 1,700 of these coins (hereafter the Coins) for about $3.2 million. OKS was made up of an American businessman, William Koch, a New York investment banker, Jonathan H. Kagan, and an academic, Jeffrey Spier, who lived in London.
1987: OKS began to sell the Coins.
July 1988: Özgen Acar, a Turkish journalist known for “chasing” smuggled antiquities from Turkey, published an article in the Connoisseur magazine with another Turkish journalist, Melik Kayla. The article revealed that Koch and his partners had bought the Elmali Hoard.
1989: Following this new information, Turkey filed a suit against OKS for the recovery of the Coins.
1999: After a decade of litigation, the parties settled out of court and OKS returned the Coins to Turkey.
Soon after identifying the possessors of the Elmali Hoard, Turkey filed a court action for its recovery. The facts suggest that the parties did not engage in any kind of negotiation before the commencement of the lawsuit. In 1998, after nine years of litigation, Mr. Koch criticized Turkey in an interview for never having tried to meet him halfway.
Yet several months later, the parties decided to settle. It is important to note that in U.S. law, a civil case usually begins with a pre-trial phase where the parties may file motions contesting an issue before the court and disclose documents. The trial can begin only after these steps are completed. Here, the parties settled at the pre-trial stage and therefore the case did not proceed further. During the pre-trial stage, the District Court of Massachusetts (hereafter the Court) decided several motions brought by both parties. In particular, OKS asserted that Turkey had no evidence that the Coins were in fact the Elmali Hoard”. According to Lawrence Kaye, the attorney who represented Turkey in this case, the question of the Coins’ identity was a critical factor. He explained that Turkey succeeded in representing various types of evidence to the Court that could link the Coins’ origin to Turkey displaying similar characteristics with the Elmali Hoard. As a result, the Court denied OKS’ motion, which allowed Turkey to make full use of this evidence against OKS. This outcome, among other things, put pressure on OKS. To avoid the risk of losing at trial, OKS opted to settle the dispute with Turkey. However, the conditions of the negotiation were clearly different compared to the time when Turkey learned about OKS in the first place. Turkey was, at that point, in a very advantageous position and could negotiate for the actual return of the Coins instead of meeting Mr. Koch “halfway”.
Since Turkey sought the recovery of the illegally excavated objects, the Court faced two important legal issues: interpreting foreign law and determining the date of accrual for the statute of limitation.
Under Turkish patrimony legislation, undiscovered cultural objects, such as archeological artifacts, belong to the State. Turkey claimed the recovery of the Coins relying on the ownership right provided by this legislation. In response, OKS argued that Turkish law was not clear on this issue.
U.S. federal law characterizes the determination of foreign law as a question of law. Therefore, foreign law is relevant to a court’s analysis, but not binding. In the present case, the Court was required to interpret the meaning of Turkish patrimony laws to decide whether Turkey had an ownership interest in the Coins. To do so, the Court examined expert testimonies with extracts from Turkish legal material. After considering this, the Court decided that Turkey had “an immediate, unconditional right of possession” of the Coins (as provided by Turkish law) that constituted a sufficient interest to support a replevin (recovery) action.
With regard to the statute of limitation, Massachusetts law required tort and replevin actions to be filed within 3 years of the cause of action (generally the time of the injury). Massachusetts law also recognized the “discovery rule” doctrine, which prevented the statute of limitation from running until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known who possessed the property in question. Under this doctrine, Turkey argued that the facts of the case had been “inherently unknowable” until shortly before it filed the suit. It alleged that OKS and the smugglers agreed to keep the sale as a secret, and that OKS then forged the customs documents by indicating a false country origin.
The Court held that the facts giving rise to the cause of action might indeed have been “inherently unknowable” to Turkey and thus did not dismiss Turkey’s claims on the statute of limitation ground. In the well-known Goldberg case concerning mosaics stolen from a church in Cyprus and acquired by the American dealer Goldberg, the Illinois Court had adopted the same solution.
Moreover, evidence submitted in the course of the proceedings showed that Mr. Koch and his associates had been informed, prior to the purchase, about the existence of a very precious hoard smuggled from Turkey around that time. Therefore, one can also assume that the statute of limitation could not have run because Mr. Koch and his associates did not qualify as good faith purchasers.
OKS claimed that Turkey had no evidence that the disputed Coins were, in fact, the Elmali Hoard. However, several facts undermined this claim. First, Mr. Spier had published academic papers stating the origin of the Coins as modern Turkey. Second, the Coins included several Decadrachms, which are extremely rare (only 12 or 13 existing Decadrachms were known before the Elmali Hoard) and are the highest denomination of ancient Greek currency. It was very unlikely that two hoards containing these rare Decadrachms appeared in two different parts of the world around the same time.
The recognition of Turkey’s proprietary interest by the Court and the evidence presented to the Court supporting the Coins’ Turkish origin compelled OKS to return the Coins. On 4 March 1999, a ceremony was held at the Turkish Embassy in Washington for the Coins’ return.
In the Elmali Hoard case, the Court recognized Turkey’s proprietary interest in undiscovered cultural objects by examining Turkish patrimony legislation. This recognition was essential since, in the absence of such an interest, Turkey would not have standing to bring the claim. However, in a Swiss case concerning Turkey, the Court of Appeals of Basel-City concluded that Turkey did not have any immediate ownership right on undiscovered cultural objects, based on the same Turkish patrimony legislation. This shows that the different interpretation of patrimony laws by foreign courts may create an obstacle for the recovery of cultural property. In 2011, UNESCO and UNIDROIT looked into this issue and adopted a set of model provisions as an example for states wishing to adopt similar laws or to improve the existing ones in order to succeed in the recovery of their undiscovered cultural property.
It is interesting to note that Turkey considerably changed its attitude concerning cultural property disputes in recent years. It now favors alternative dispute resolution methods over long-standing litigation to recover illegally excavated and exported cultural property, similar to other source nations such as Italy. States’ experience of litigation in foreign courts over the last decades showed that ensuring the return of cultural property was expensive and time consuming, which could be hindered by courts’ reluctance in applying foreign public law, their unfamiliarity with foreign nations’ patrimony legislation or other legal technicalities (such as the statute of limitation).
Brodie, Neil. “The investment potential of antiquities.” Work in progress, Stanford University Archaeology Center. August 2009. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.stanford.edu/group/chr/cgi-bin/drupal/files/investments.pdf.
Kaye, Lawrence M. “Litigation in Cultural Property: A General Overview.” In Resolving Disputes in Cultural Property, edited by Marc-André Renold, Alessandro Chechi and Anne Laure, 3-20. Vol. 23 of Studies in Art Law. Genève: Schulthess, 2012.
Kleeberg, John M. “The Law and Practice Regarding Coins Finds: United States Laws Concerning the Trade in Cultural Property.” Compte Rendu 57 (2010): 11-32. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.muenzgeschichte.ch/downloads/01_kleeberg.pdf.
Merryman, John H. Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts. London: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
Spiegler, Howard, and Yael Weitz. “The Ancient World Meets the Modern World: A Primer on the Restitution of Looted Antiquities.” The Art Law Newsletter of Herrick, Feinstein LLP 6 (2010): 1-4. Accessed September 3, 2013. http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/Publications/1BE07C63637309D84EC011D4DC8E3293.pdf.
The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64. (D. Mass. 1992), motion to dismiss denied.
The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 F.R.D 24 (D. Mass. 1993), discovery motion granted in part and denied in part.
The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. 1994), summary judgment denied.
The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23526 (D. Mass. 1998), summary judgment and partial summary judgment denied, motion to strike denied.
Law no. 2863 on the Protection of Cultural and Natural Property. Published in the Official Gazette dated 23 July 1983 and numbered 18113.
Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. “Elmalı Sikkeleri.” Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.kulturvarliklari.gov.tr/TR,44948/elmali-sikkeleri.html.
 The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64. (D. Mass. 1992). John H. Merryman, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 190-194; Neil Brodie, “The investment potential of antiquities,” work in progress, Stanford University Archaeology Center, August 2009, accessed September 2, 2013, http://www.stanford.edu/group/chr/cgi-bin/drupal/files/investments.pdf.
 John M. Kleeberg, “The Law and Practice Regarding Coins Finds: United States Laws Concerning the Trade in Cultural Property,” Compte Rendu 57 (2010): 27, accessed September 2, 2013, http://www.muenzgeschichte.ch/downloads/01_kleeberg.pdf; Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Elmalı Sikkeleri,” accessed September 2, 2013, http://www.kulturvarliklari.gov.tr/TR,44948/elmali-sikkeleri.html.
 OKS Partners purchased the Coins as an investment, with a view of selling them for $7.5 to $10 million. Brodie, “The investment potential of antiquities;” Barry Meier, “The Case of the Contested Coins; A Modern-Day Battle over Ancient Objects,” New York Times, September 24, 1998, accessed September 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/24/business/the-case-of-the-contested-coins-a-modern-day-battle-over-ancient-objects.html.
 See “litigation” in Wex Legal Dictionary, Legal Information Institute, the Cornell Law School, accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/litigation.
 Lawrence M. Kaye, “Litigation in Cultural Property: A General Overview,” in Resolving Disputes in Cultural Property, ed. Marc-André Renold et al., vol. 23 of Studies in Art Law (Genève: Schulthess, 2012), 13.
 The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23526 (D. Mass. 1998).
 Kaye, “Litigation in Cultural Property,” 12.
 See Article 5 of Law no. 2863 on the Protection of Cultural and Natural Property. Published in the Official Gazette No. 18113 of 23 July 1983.
 The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64. (D. Mass. 1992).
 Ibid. The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 F.R.D 24 (D. Mass. 1993).
 The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 F.R.D 24 (D. Mass. 1993). The Court further explained that “discovery (…) to determine foreign law is limited to those materials which the courts of the foreign country would examine if called upon to make the determination, absent a showing, supported by expert testimony, of the necessity of obtaining additional materials.” For example, the Court found that the OKS partners failed to demonstrate the necessity of seeking materials other than the published and publicly available legislative history of Law no. 2863 to determine how such law was administered. Therefore according to the Court, their request for additional material was not appropriate.
 The Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. 1994); Howard Spiegler and Yael Weitz, “The Ancient World Meets the Modern World: A Primer on the Restitution of Looted Antiquities,” The Art Law Newsletter of Herrick, Feinstein LLP 6 (Spring/Summer 2010): 2, accessed September 3, 2013, http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/Publications/1BE07C63637309D84EC011D4DC8E3293.pdf.
 Ibid. See also Raphael Contel, Alessandro Chechi, Marc-André Renold, “Case Kanakaria Mosaics – Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and Cyprus v. Goldberg,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva.
 Kleeberg, “United States Laws Concerning the Trade in Cultural Property,” 27.
 Ibid; Kaye, “Litigation in Cultural Property,” 12-13.
 Ibid; Kaye, “Litigation in Cultural Property,” 12.
 See also Alessandro Chechi, Anne Laure Bandle, Marc-André Renold, “Case Lydian Hoard – Turkey and Metropolitan Museum of Art,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva.
 The Republic of Turkey v. the Canton of the City of Basel. Basler Juritiche Mitteilung (BJM 1997 17 ss).
 Spiegler and Weitz, “A Primer on the Restitution of Looted Antiquities,” 2.
 For example see, Ece Velioglu, Alessandro Chechi, Marc-André Renold, “Case Orpheus Mosaic – Turkey and Dallas Museum of Art,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva; Ece Velioglu, Anne Laure Bandle, Marc-André Renold, “Case Troy Gold – Turkey and the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva; and Alessandro Chechi, Anne Laure Bandle, Marc-André Renold, “Case Boğazköy Sphinx – Turkey and Germany,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva.
 For example see, Raphael Contel, Giulia Soldan, Alessandro Chechi, “Case Euphronios Krater and Other Archaeological Objects – Italy and Metropolitan Museum of Art,” Platform ArThemis (http://unige.ch/art-adr), Art-Law Centre, University of Geneva.

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