text:
The Gospel writer provides no further words until Jesus’ third (final) return, when he wakes the disciples and gives the climactic declaration in vv. 41-42. The reference to the “hour” (w%ra) is parallel to that in verse 35b and marks the scene as the beginning of Jesus Passion—which will continue with his arrest, interrogation/trial, mistreatment, and death.
This doubling generally fits what Mark describes in 14:39, but creates a more dramatic moment.
The three-fold cycle of prayer is replaced with a single time of prayer, followed by Jesus’ return to the disciples.
This idiom of drinking the cup is a way of expressing the acceptance of one’s destiny, as it has been determined by God. For something of the Old Testament background, cf. Psalm 11:6; 75:9; Isa 51:17, 22; Jer 25:15; 49:12; Lam 4:21. Sometimes the image carries the sense of accepting one’s death, as in the expression “cup of death” in the Jerusalem II Targum on Gen 40:23 (cf. Fitzmyer, p. 1442).
The general location—a place on the slope of the Mount of Olives, though indicated by different designations. John is unique in describing it as a garden spot across the “winter-flowing Kidron” riverbed (v. 1). There may be an allusion here to 2 Sam 15:23.
The arrival of Judas (the betrayal) with a crowd of police/soldiers and attendants of the religious authorities (Chief Priests, etc). The tradition that Judas was familiar with the place (v. 2) may have confirmation from the notice in Lk 22:39.
The central scene is very much unique to John, both in the way Judas is presented, and, even more so, by the depiction of the crowd’s encounter with Jesus (vv. 4-8). The detail in vv. 2-3 reminds the reader of Judas’ former inclusion as one of Jesus’ Twelve closest disciples, and of the betrayal as he arrives with a crowd of attendants (acting as police) from the Chief Priests, along with (Roman) soldiers (a detail found only in John). After verse 5, Judas essentially disappears from the scene; there is nothing corresponding to Mk 14:44-45 par. His role (as betrayer) was to set Jesus’ Passion and death in motion.
By contrast, the encounter in vv. 4-8 between Jesus and the crowd is striking, with nothing like it in the Synoptics (cp. Mk 14:48-49, for the nearest parallel). Jesus has a commanding presence, and speaks with such authority, so as to cause the crowd to shrink back and fall to the ground. His double declaration of e)gw\ ei)mi (“I am [he]”, vv. 6, 8) is certainly to be related to the earlier I AM statements of Jesus in John, and intended here as a declaration of his identity as the eternal Son of God. As such it carries definite Christological weight, and is a far cry from the portrait of Jesus in the Synoptic version of the Garden episode. In this same spirit is the emphasis on Jesus’ control over the disciples—those given to him by God the Father and left in his care (vv. 8-9). His authority protects them from harm in the moment of his arrest.
The latter is a natural development of the tradition; the second would appear (on objective grounds) to be authentic historical information. Only the identification of the disciple with Peter is problematic—how and/or why would the other Gospels have left out this key bit of information if it were part of the original tradition? However one judges the historical-critical question, the identification with Peter is important within the Johannine narrative, as it serves as a parallel to Peter’s role (his denial) in the next episode. His rash act with the sword is, in some ways, an extension of his failure in the denial scene. Often in the Gospel tradition, Peter effectively represents all the disciples, and so perhaps we should understand it here.
John’s account also differs slightly in that he separates the actual arrest of Jesus (v. 12) from the main Garden scene, making it part of the next episode—the interrogation of Jesus before the Jewish Council (Sanhedrin)—which will be discussed in the next daily note.
References above marked “Fitzmyer” are to J. A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke, Anchor Bible [AB] Vol. 28, 28A (1985).
40geno/meno$ de e)pi tou= to/pou ei‚pen au)toi=$: proseu/xesqe mh ei)selqei=n ei)$ peirasmo/n. 41kai au)to$ a)pespa/sqh a)p’ au)tw=n w(sei li/qou bolh/n kai qei$ ta go/nata proshu/xeto 42le/gwn: pa/ter, ei) bou/lei pare/negke tou=to to poth/rion a)p’ e)mou=: plhn mh to qe/lhma/ mou a)lla to son gine/sqw. [[43w&fqh de au)tw=| a&ggelo$ a)p’ ou)ranou= e)nisxu/wn au)to/n. 44kai geno/meno$ e)n a)gwni/a| e)ktene/steron proshu/xeto: kai e)ge/neto o( i(drw$ au)tou= w(sei qro/mboi ai%mato$ katabai/nonto$ e)pi thn gh=n.]] 45kai a)nasta$ a)po th=$ proseuxh=$ e)lqwn pro$ tou$ maqhta$ eu!ren koimwme/nou$ au)tou$ a)po th=$ lu/ph$, 46kai ei‚pen au)toi=$: ti/ kaqeu/dete; a)nasta/nte$ proseu/xesqe, i%na mh ei)se/lqhte ei)$ peirasmo/n.
Manuscripts Ë69 (apparently), Ë75, aa, A, B, N, R, T, W, 579, family 13 mss, etc., as well as a number of key early translations (Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, etc.) and a number of Church Fathers (such as Origen and Clement of Alexandria), do not include vv. 43-44. A number of additional manuscripts include the verses but mark them with asterisks as suspect.
Manuscripts a*, D, K, L, X, G, D, 565, family 1 mss, etc., along with key translations (Syriac, Coptic, Latin, etc.), and a number of Church fathers, do include the verses.
To judge by some of the best/earliest Alexandrian manuscripts, a slight edge would be given to the shorter text, as well as on the basis of lectio brevior potior (“the shorter reading is [generally] to be preferred”). However, it is hard to say which is the more difficult reading. Did scribes add the verses, perhaps to help combat “docetic” Christologies by emphasizing the suffering of Jesus? Or, did scribes delete the verses, because they seemed to give too much emphasis on the human suffering of Christ? It is always easier to explain how such variants were preserved in the manuscripts, than to explain how they first came about.
In any event, the change, whichever direction it occurred (add or omit), must have taken place before the end of the second-century, since late-second- and early-third-century witnesses attest both forms of the text. Vv. 43-44 clearly represent an ancient tradition — early Church Fathers like Justin Martyr (see the Dialogue with Trypho c. 103) cite it, though not specifically as coming from the Gospel of Luke.
On the whole, the text-critical evidence appears to be slightly in favor of the shorter reading. So cherished and familiar are vv. 43-44, however—and such a powerful ancient tradition—that even scholars who reject them as original still feel compelled to include them (bracketed, as in the Nestle-Aland text above) and to comment upon them.
The next (third) episode of the Passion Narrative is the scene in Gethsemane, so identified as the location in the Synoptic tradition (Mark/Matthew). In this episode, Jesus’ suffering (his Passion) truly begins, climaxing in his arrest. For the basic outline and treatment of the Synoptic tradition, we begin with the Gospel of Mark.
With the aorist form of h@lqen (“came”) Jesus may be telling his disciples “the hour came i.e. while you were sleeping” (cf. verses 37, 40-41a).
When we turn to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, we can see that, while the basic Synoptic (Markan) outline is followed, there are certain signs of development in the Tradition.
The prediction of Peter’s denial (vv. 31-34) is made part of the Last Supper scene, so the reference to their journey to the Mount of Olives (v. 39) becomes part of the Gethsemane/Garden episode (Luke does not mention the place name “Gethsemane”).
The Prayer scene is greatly abridged, especially if one omits the disputed verses 43-44 for which there is considerable uncertainty in the textual tradition (addressed in a supplemental note).
Luke, like Matthew, has developed the arrest scene, further expanding and emphasizing the role of Judas and eliminating any mention of the disciples’ flight.
Before the actual seizure of Jesus, some of the disciples ask him: “Lord, shall we strike (them) in [i.e. with] (the) sword?” (v. 49). This refers to one of the two swords mentioned earlier in v. 38—a violent and improper application of Jesus’ teaching, to be sure!
Luke records (a) Jesus’ response to his disciples, and (b) his act of healing the ear that was severed (v. 51), identified specifically as the man’s right ear. Jesus’ words of rebuke are difficult to interpret and translate precisely. It may be understood as a sharp rebuke (i.e. “No more of this!”), or in terms of an explanation as to why they must not act—”Let (things) be (even) until this [i.e. my arrest]!” The tenor of the tradition overall would favor the latter, but the specific teaching in vv. 24-27ff may indicate that Luke has something like the former in mind.
The word “hour” (w%ra) refers to the time of Jesus’ Passion and links back to the start of the Last Supper scene in Luke (v. 14). This time of darkness also reflects the opening of the Passion narrative, in which Luke records that Satan entered Judas (v. 3). For similar associations with the Devil and darkness, cf. John 13:2, 30b. The Gospel of John also uses the word “hour” in a similar way, to introduction the Passion narrative (13:1).
In the next daily note, I will examine the differences in the Prayer scene between the Synoptic versions, and also look briefly at the unique tradition presented in John’s Gospel.
A different order/arrangement of the institution of the “Lord’s Supper”; in particular, the majority text of vv. 17-20 represents an expanded form of the institution, compared with that in Mark/Matthew.
Luke has reversed the order of the Lord’s Supper and the identification of the betrayer (including the Son of Man saying)—the latter occurs after the Lord’s Supper, rather than before.
This statement intensifies the scene, in several respects. First, is the personal element, whereby Jesus declares that he has “set his heart” upon eating this particular Passover meal with his disciples. The expression e)piqumi/a| e)pequ/mhsa reflects a Semitic idiom that is extremely difficult to translate. The doubling of the verb—the principal verb form preceded by a verbal noun—is an intensifying construction. The literal syntax here would be something like “I desired (with a great) desire…”, which in conventional English might be rendered “I (have) eagerly desired…”. This longing should very much be considered here in terms of Jesus’ Passion. In this regard, there is also a kind of play of words in v. 15 between pa/sxa (páscha, Pesaµ, Passover) and pa/sxw (páschœ, “suffer”), just as in English we might make between “Passover” and “Passion”. Indeed, there is here a greater emphasis on Jesus’ suffering and death, than we see in Mark/Matthew. Note, for example, how Luke has modified the narrative introduction in v. 14 (cp. Mk 14:17), with the use of the word “hour” (w%ra), which often relates symbolically (and dramatically) to the time, or moment, when Jesus’ Passion begins (v. 53; Mk 14:41 par; Jn 7:30 etc, and see below). There may also be an association with the Passover lamb; Luke preserves the Markan detail (v. 7; Mk 14:12) regarding the sacrifice of the Passover lamb.
The Lukan version of the institution of the “Lord’s Supper” involves a difficult (and famous) text-critical question, regarding which of the two main forms of the text—the shorter or longer version—is original. I have discussed this in some detail in an earlier study, which you should consult. The “long” version (vv. 17-20) is the majority reading, and is accepted by most scholars and commentators today. However, there are also good arguments to be made in favor of the “short” version (vv. 17-19a), which is attested primarily by “Western” witnesses (D a ff2 i l).
In either case, we should note, Luke gives greater emphasis to the association with Passover than do the other Gospels. For more on this, cf. especially J. Jeremias, The Eucharistic Words of Jesus (Fortress Press: 1977), and note the discussion in Fitzmyer, Luke, pp. 1386-95.
Eschatological promise to the disciples (the Twelve [Eleven]) who remain faithful (vv. 28-30)—note the parallel to v. 30 in vv. 16, 18.
It is worth noting that the sayings in vv. 25-26, 28-30 have Synoptic parallels in Mark 10:42-45 (Matt 20:25-28) and Matt 19:28, though these occur at quite different points in the narrative. This has caused critical commentators to question their location here in Luke. However, vv. 25-27 have a general parallel with Jesus’ action (and teaching) in John 13:12-17, which would seem to confirm a basic historical tradition, even if sayings corresponding to vv. 25-26 appear in a different setting in the Synoptic tradition. The ‘omission’ of Mk 10:45 is curious, considering its appropriateness in the context of the Last Supper scene (vv. 19b-20). The eschatological orientation of vv. 28-30 does seem to fit thematically (compare the context of Jesus’ words in vv. 16, 18), perhaps moreso that the setting of Matt 19:28, where it is added/included within the Synoptic tradition.
Before proceeding to the Last Supper (Passover meal) scene in the Gospel of John, it will be important to examine the basic tradition regarding Jesus’ words of institution as they have been preserved in the Synoptic Gospels (and by Paul in 1 Corinthians). This we will do in the next daily note.
References above marked “Fitzmyer, Luke” are to J. A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV, Anchor Bible [AB] Vol. 28A (1985).
The second episode of the Passion Narrative in the Synoptics is the Passover meal which Jesus shared with his disciples the night of his arrest. In the Synoptic tradition, this “Last Supper” was unquestionably part of the Passover celebration. This setting was established in the narrative introduction (Mk 14:1 par), and is affirmed again at the start of this episode (vv. 12ff). The Passover setting of the Passion narrative is just as clear in the Gospel of John (12:1; 13:1, etc); however, as you may be aware (and as we shall see), there are significant chronological differences between John and the Synoptics on this point.
This thematic structure was probably inherited by the Gospel writer from the early tradition, though it is possible that he played a significant role in emphasizing it within the narrative. Each of the parts will be discussed in turn, beginning with Mark and then examining the parallels in Matthew and Luke to see how the tradition(s) may have been modified or developed.
There are two basic elements to the tradition in vv. 12-16 which, we may assume, caused it to be included in the core narrative: (1) the significance and importance of the Passover, and (2) an early historical tradition regarding the specific location (the “upper room”) in which the meal took place. With regard to the first point, the importance of Passover is indicated by the careful preparations that are made for it. Jesus gives specific instructions to his disciples (vv. 13-15), though it is not entirely clear whether this reflects arrangements which had already been made or, in particualar, special foreknowledge by Jesus as to how things would come about. The parallel with the preparations for his “triumphal entry” (11:2-6 par) suggest that the Gospel writer(s) understood it in the latter sense.
The two disciples are identified as Peter and John; this detail most likely represents a development of the tradition, according to the early Christian tendency toward identifying otherwise unnamed figures.
The initial directive by Jesus in Luke’s version also serves to give added emphasis to the Passover theme.
As in the earlier scene, Matthew (26:20-25) follows Mark closely, but again narrates in simpler fashion. He includes one detail which would seem to reflect a development of the tradition: in verse 25, Judas (identified by the author as “the one giving him [i.e. Jesus] along”) asks “Is (it) I, Rabbi?”, to which Jesus responds “You (have) said (it)”. It is rather an odd detail; its inclusion may be meant, in part, as a foreshadowing of Judas’ greeting at the moment of the arrest, where he also uses the honorific title “Rabbi” (v. 49).
Luke’s Gospel shows far more extensive development of the tradition here. The main differences are: (1) the identification of Judas and Son of Man saying occur after the institution of the Lord’s Supper (22:21-23), and (2) two blocks of teaching are included (vv. 24-30, 35-38)—one after the Lord’s Supper and the other after the prediction of Peter’s denial (vv. 31-34). These differences will be discussed in the upcoming note on Luke 22:14-38.
This saying, with its “Amen, I say to you” (a)mh\n le/gw u(mi=n) formula (a well-attested mark of Jesus’ own style), is parallel to the declaration in v. 18.
Generally these details (along with a couple of other small modifications) appear to reflect a degree of development, an expanding of the core tradition with added information or emphasis. This will be discussed further, along with Luke’s unique presentation of this material, and the parallel tradition recorded by Paul (in 1 Cor 11:23-26), over the next two daily notes.
This is the only such Anointing scene in Luke; he does not include anything similar at a point corresponding to Mk 14:3-9 par. This might suggest that Luke felt that the episode properly belonged at a different point in the narrative. John’s version provides confirmation for an earlier setting of the episode, prior to Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem.
(a) The name of the host (Simon)—Mk 14:3 par; Lk 7:40.
(c) As we shall see, the description of the woman’s action (v. 38) is nearly identical with that in John’s version (12:3), which otherwise is quite close overall to the Markan episode.
They simply record entirely separate (historical) events, and the similarities between them are coincidental. This would probably be the normal traditional-conservative view, yet the points noted above seem to speak against it.
(1) that involving a “sinful” woman who wets Jesus’ feet with her tears and dries them with her hair; the episode is set earlier in Jesus’ ministry, at the house of a Pharisee.
(2) that of the woman who anoints Jesus at Bethany; i.e. the Synoptic tradition, set close to the time of Jesus’ Passion in Jerusalem.
This would tend to be the more common critical view—that Luke has added details from the Synoptic version (which he has otherwise omitted) to the other scene.
They record the same underlying historical tradition (and event), but that Luke has brought out very different details and points of emphasis, through the specific tradition he has inherited.
Unfortunately, each of these three views has its own problems, and none is entirely satisfactory as an explanation of both the differences and similarities between the versions. The situation is complicated still further when one compares these two versions of the Anointing scene with the third (in John). Insofar as Luke has developed the core (Synoptic) tradition, we must consider this from several different perspectives.
1. If Luke has otherwise made use of Mark (or a similar Synoptic narrative), why did he omit the Bethany Anointing scene of Mk 14:3-9? Different possibilities have been suggested, but, in my view, the most convincing is that his purpose was to emphasize more clearly two primary thematic elements of the narrative—(1) the Passover setting, and (2) the Betrayal by Judas. Eliminating the Anointing episode at this point serves to join immediately the narrative introduction (22:1-6) with the Last Supper scene (vv. 7ff), in which both of these elements are prominent. Luke has further enhanced the narrative introduction by weaving into it the tradition of Judas’ betrayal (compare vv. 3-6 with Mk 14:1b-2).
2. The author (trad. Luke) may also have wished to give greater prominence to the earlier Anointing scene, set in Galilee. Whether or not he has included details, otherwise found in the Bethany scene, within this episode (cf. above), there is tremendous power and beauty to the narrative in 7:36-50. The Anointing episode outline (on this, cf. the previous note) is essentially represented by vv. 36-40, the first part of the narrative. The second part (vv. 41-50) involves a parable (vv. 41-47) similar to others found in Luke’s Gospel (see esp. 10:25-37, of the “Good Samaritan”). The three-fold emphasis on repentance, forgiveness, and love, reflects important Lukan themes, such as we see, for example, in the parable of the Prodigal (15:11-24ff). All of these elements, of course, are unique to Luke’s tradition, and are not found in the Synoptic Anointing episode. Yet, as noted above, there is some indication that the author may have seen the two traditions as reflecting the same episode. In particular, the reference to the host Pharisee as “Simon” (v. 40) could suggest a conscious harmonization with Mk 14:3ff.
3. The similarity between Lk 7:38 and Jn 12:3 raises the possibility that Luke inherited a form of the (Bethany) Anointing tradition closer to Jn 12:1-8 than Mk 14:3-9. This should be seriously considered, especially since there is some evidence that, in the Passion and Resurrection narratives, Luke and John are drawing from a common tradition separate from the Synoptic (i.e. not found in Mark/Matthew). John’s account of the Anointing will be discussed in the next daily note.
Having examined the Son of Man sayings in the core Synoptic (Triple) Tradition, it will be useful here to survey the additional sayings and references found in Matthew and Luke (but not in Mark). While these most likely derive from separate lines of tradition, they all relate fundamentally to the sayings already discussed. I begin with the so-called “Q” material—sayings and traditions found in Matthew and Luke.
There are between 7 and 9 distinct sayings from the “Q” material. The first three (as they occur in Luke) tend to focus on the earthly life and suffering of Jesus, while the remainder have an eschatological (Judgment) emphasis.
Luke 7:34 / Matt 11:19—Here we seem to have a simple self-reference by Jesus, dealing with his behavior/lifestyle during his ministry on earth. However, the expression “the Son of Man has come…” may allude to a certain eschatological and/or Messianic expectation (cf. below). In both Luke and Matthew, this saying is part of a (fixed) block of material dealing with the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist (Lk 7:18-35 par).
This also is part of a (fixed) sequence of sayings on the theme of discipleship. A motif of self-sacrifice is tied to the suffering and hardship of Jesus—i.e., his identification with the human condition.
Luke 11:30 / Matt 12:40—In this saying, Jesus draws upon the Old Testament story of Jonah, as a type or figure of his upcoming death. The saying is formulated quite differently in Luke and Matthew, but it clearly derives from a common tradition. It combines the idea of suffering (his death) with the scene of Judgment in Lk 11:29-32 par—two important aspects of the Son of Man sayings in the Gospels.
Luke 12:8-9 / Matt 10:32-33—This saying presents a vivid scene of the Judgment and the heavenly tribunal, or courtroom, with the Son of Man playing a central role in the proceedings. It was discussed briefly in the previous note, in relation to the corresponding saying in Mk 8:38 par.
Luke 12:10 / Matt 12:32—Another Son of Man saying follows immediately in Luke (by way of “catchword” bonding), while in Matthew it is found in a different location, joined to the Synoptic parallel in v. 31 (Mk 3:28-29). As I noted previously, the Synoptic saying in Mark raises the possibility that “Son of Man” could have originally been intended (by Jesus) in the general sense of “human being(s)”. However, in the context of the “Q” version in Matthew and Luke, it is almost certainly understood as a (self-)title of Jesus. Luke has more clearly preserved the eschatological/Judgment setting of the saying.
Luke has included it as part of the eschatological material in chapter 12, while Matthew has set it in the eschatological “discourse” (chaps. 24-25 = Lk 21:5-36) during the final period in Jerusalem.
The Son of Man’s appearance will be both sudden and all-encompassing, like a flash of lightning which fills the sky from one end to the other. The Scriptural allusions in Lk 17:26-30 par—Noah and Lot [Matthew only refers to Noah]—involve Judgment by God upon humankind, expressed through natural disaster and destruction. Such natural phenomena were typically seen as accompanying the end-time Judgment (the “Day of YHWH”) in the Scriptural prophecies, such as those cited by Jesus in Mk 13:24-25 par (Isa 13:10; 34:4). It essentially reflects the idea of theophany—the presence of God breaking through into the natural world.
The expression “days of the Son of Man” probably is meant to fit the pattern of the sayings which follow—”days of Noah”, “days of Lot” (vv. 27-28). It refers to the time of the Son of Man’s appearing. More curious is the formulation “one of the days of…”, the precise meaning of which remains uncertain. Perhaps it serves to intensify the dramatic tension of the illustration—i.e., people will not be able to see anything, not even a glimpse, of the Son of Man’s appearance, no matter how much they long for it. As the following sayings make clear, this will be due to the death and destruction which will come upon human beings at the time of the Judgment. Only the elect/chosen ones (i.e., believers in Jesus) will be saved from this fate. Here seeing the Son of Man is synonymous with experiencing the salvation/deliverance which he brings (cf. Lk 21:28, etc).
Lk 6:22—This is the Lukan Beatitude corresponding to Matt 5:11; while in Matthew Jesus uses the expression “on account of me“, the Lukan form is “on account of the Son of Man“. It is a clear example of “Son of Man” as a self-reference by Jesus, being readily understood as such in the early Tradition. It also draws upon the motif of suffering and persecution which is central to a number of the Son of Man sayings. The Judgment setting of the Beatitude form (on this, cf. my earlier series on the Beatitudes) comes across more clearly in Luke’s version (6:20-26).
The coming of the Son of Man, in the context of the Lukan narrative, must be understood in light of the earlier eschatological material in chap. 17 (cf. above).
Lk 19:10—This saying appears to be a “floating” tradition, which is found in different locations (i.e., Lk 9:55; Matt 18:11) in the various manuscripts. Its inclusion at the end of the Zaccheus episode (19:1-9) may be a Lukan adaptation of the tradition. The saying itself refers to the earthly ministry of Jesus, with a possible allusion to his (sacrificial) suffering and death (cf. Mk 10:45). The emphasis on salvation—the Son of Man’s role in saving sinners—is unique here among these sayings in the Synoptics, being more prominent in the Son of Man sayings in John (to be discussed in the next note).
Lk 21:36—The end-time Judgment and the heavenly tribunal are certainly in view in this saying (cf. 12:40 par), with the Son of Man even more clearly in the position of Judge—”…to stand in front of the Son of Man”.
Lk 22:48—On this addition to the Son of Man references in the Passion narrative, cf. the earlier note.
Lk 24:7—The words of the Angel in the Lukan resurrection scene refer back directly to the Passion predictions by Jesus (Mk 8:31; 9:31; 10:33 par).
Matt 10:23—In Matthew’s narrative, this saying is part of Jesus’ instruction to the Twelve prior to being sent out on their mission (vv. 5ff). It includes sayings and teaching which are found in different locations in the other Gospels. While it all fits thematically, portions such as vv. 17-23 seem decidedly out of place. Indeed the instruction/exhortation in verses 17-23 is much more appropriate to a setting closer to Jesus’ Passion and Resurrection (cf. Mk 13:9-13 and the Last Supper Discourses [chs. 13-17] in John). In its original context, v. 23 almost certainly was eschatological, referring to the end-time coming of the Son of Man, as in many of the passages discussed above. However, the narrative setting here in Matthew creates an obvious chronological difficulty.
Matt 13:37, 41—There are two Son of Man references in the parable of the Weeds (i.e., Jesus’ explanation in vv. 36-43, cf. vv. 24-30). Verse 37 is unique in the Synoptic Gospels with its apparent allusion to the divine pre-existence of the Son of Man (otherwise found only in the Gospel of John). It no doubt also refers to the earthly ministry of Jesus. Verse 41 draws upon the image of the Son of Man as God’s representative overseeing the end-time Judgment (cf. the passages discussed above, and in the prior note).
Matt 16:13—In the episode of Peter’s confession, Jesus (in Matthew’s version) asks, “Who do men count [i.e. consider] the Son of Man to be?”. In Mk 8:27 par it is: “Who do men count me to be?”. Cf. on Lk 6:22 above, for the interchangeability with “Son of Man” as a self-reference of Jesus.
The result is a saying with a more pronounced Christological emphasis (cf. Lk 23:42, etc).
Matt 19:28—This saying has been discussed in an earlier note. It may properly belong to the “Q” material (cp. Lk 22:29-30), but the reference to the Son of Man is unique to Matthew’s version. It draws upon the image of Jesus’ exaltation, which is otherwise found in the Son of Man sayings only in Mk 14:62 par, though it may also be inferred from the very idea of the Son of Man coming to earth (from Heaven) at the time of Judgment.
Matt 25:31—The eschatological image of the Son of Man, at the beginning of the parable (vv. 31-46), very much follows the Synoptic sayings in Mk 8:38; 13:26 par, etc. This is the clearest Judgment scene involving the Son of Man in the Gospels.
Matt 26:2—This saying by Jesus, echoing the earlier Passion predictions, has been utilized by Matthew in his introduction of the Passion narrative.
The next daily note will survey the dozen or so Son of Man sayings and references in the Gospel of John.
In the previous daily note, I examined the two Miraculous Feeding episodes in the Gospel of Mark (6:30-44; 8:1-10), noting the similarities (and differences) between them, as well as their place within the Markan narrative (6:14-8:30). Today, I will look at how this tradition has been utilized and developed in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke.
The structure of Mk 6:14-8:30, with its rather careful symmetry (cf. the prior note), I would attribute, on the whole, to the author of the Gospel (trad. Mark), rather than to an earlier stage in the Gospel Tradition. If so, then the presence of the same outline in Matthew would provide strong confirmation, at this point, of the critical hypothesis that Matthew made use of Mark’s Gospel. The author (trad. Matthew) has certainly included episodes corresponding to Mark 6:30-44ff and 8:1-10ff (Matt 14:13-21ff; 15:32-39ff), at more or less the same positions in the narrative. Notably, the basic information from Mk 8:11-21 is repeated in 16:5-12—i.e., Jesus’ own reference to both of the Feeding Miracles.
Matthew’s introduction (v. 13a) also makes a smoother transition with the Baptist episode immediately prior; Mark, by contrast, refers back to the mission of the Twelve.
The beginning of the narrative proper (vv. 15-16) is also simpler than in Mark. The author omits, or otherwise does not include, the disciples’ question (Mk 6:37) and Jesus’ question to them in response (6:38a, “How many loaves…?”); however, he also adds the words of Jesus in v. 16a: “They have no business going [i.e. there is no need for them to go] away…”.
There is no reference to the crowd sitting down in groups (Mk 6:39-40).
Verses 19-21 are very close to Mk, with a small addition in v. 21b.
Overall, Matthew’s narrative is simpler and smoother, with some of the dramatic and local detail of Mark’s account absent.
Matthew’s version is framed by specific geographical references, in relation to the sea of Galilee (vv. 29, 39; cp. Mark 7:31).
The references to healing miracles (vv. 30-31) have been integrated more closely into the narrative of the miraculous feeding (cp. Mk 7:32-37).
The basic narrative of vv. 32-38 is quite close to Mk 8:1-9, with minor differences in wording.
There is a small difference in the geographical location at the close of the episode (v. 39; Mk 8:10).
Again, Matthew’s narrative is a bit simpler and more streamlined, by comparison with Mark. In both miracle episodes, the author adapts the tradition to set it more clearly within the context of Jesus’ ministry—especially the healing miracles of Jesus (cf. 14:13-14; 15:29-31). The second half of the Galilean Period in Matthew covers 10:1-16:20, and has a clearly defined theme of the disciples’ participation in Jesus’ ministry, along with the theme of discipleship. Matthew includes much more traditional material between the mission of the Twelve (10:1-5ff) and the confession of Peter (16:13-20) than do the other Gospels. The author retains the Synoptic (Markan) structure in 14:1-16:20, including the two Feeding Miracles, but sets them within a more developed and expansive narrative outline.
Luke retains the Markan connection with the mission of the Twelve (v. 10; Mk 6:30); the importance of this will be indicated below.
Luke uniquely records the geographical reference which locates the miracle in the area around Bethsaida (cp. Mark 6:45).
Like Matthew (cf. above), Luke has a simpler narrative introduction (vv. 10-11) than does Mark. Verse 11 would seem to be simplified version of Mk 6:33.
As in Matthew, there is incorporated into the narrative a summary reference to Jesus healing the sick in the crowd (v. 11b; Matt 14:14).
Luke adds the specific detail that Jesus spoke to the people “about the Kingdom of God” (v. 11); this definitely would seem to be an (editorial) addition by the author (on this theme, and wording, cf. Acts 1:3, also Lk 4:43; 8:1; 9:2; 17:20; 19:11).
Verses 12-17 generally follows Mk 6:35-44, but with simpler narration; with Matthew, the two questions in Mk 6:37-38 are omitted. There are a number of other (minor) agreements in wording between Matthew and Luke (cf. vv. 11-14, 17 par).
Luke has set the mention of the crowd’s estimated size earlier in the narrative (v. 14); instead, his version of the episode closes with the gathering of the twelve baskets of leftovers (v. 17).
The central section in bold represents the Feeding Miracle. Luke’s streamlined account, more than the other Gospels, uses the Feeding Miracle here to represent and summarize the ministry of Jesus. The connection with Jesus’ disciples (the Twelve) is more prominent as well. This is almost certainly the reason why mention of the estimated size of the crowd was moved back to verse 14—so that the feeding miracle would conclude with a reference to the twelve baskets gathered by the disciples (i.e. symbolic of the Twelve). Indeed, the Greek of verse 17 specifically ends with the word dw/deka (“twelve”).
For another comparison of the Feeding Miracle episode(s) in the Synoptic Gospels cf. my earlier note on this topic.
Having compared the versions of the Synoptic tradition(s), it now remains to turn to the account of the Feeding Miracle in the Gospel of John. In so doing, we will return to the critical question (i.e. originally one or two miracles?), as well as examine the unique way that the tradition has been adapted in the Fourth Gospel, through its connection with the great “Bread of Life” discourse in chapter 6. This will be the topic of the next daily note.
In yesterday’s note, I presented the Synoptic narrative outline, as represented by the Gospel of Mark, along with a more detailed breakdown of the traditions in Mk 3:13-8:30, the second half of the Galilean period (1:14-8:30). Today, I want to look at how this material was developed by Luke and Matthew. In particular, I will focus on Luke’s treatment of the Synoptic/Markan traditions.
The dark red portions above indicate the Markan traditions which Luke has omitted, or otherwise does not include—Mk 3:20-30; 4:26-34.
7:11-17: a healing miracle story—the raising of the dead son of the widow at Nain.
7:36-50: an encounter story (with a parable), involving the traditional motif of conflict/debate between Jesus and the Pharisees—the anointing of Jesus by the “sinful” woman. This tradition is quite similar to, but not identical with, Mk 14:3-19, and will be discussed in an upcoming note.
8:1-3: a narrative summary, probably of Lukan composition, but containing traditional/historical information.
The traditions in 7:11-17 and 36-50 are very much in keeping with the episodes of the core Synoptic Tradition (cf. the previous note), though 7:36-50 shows definite signs of literary development. The “Q” material is rather different, and indicates that it has been derived from a separate (and early) line of tradition.
Luke and Matthew have each arranged several distinct units of “Q” material (sayings and parables, etc) to form a sermon or discourse. Notably, each Gospel writer (independently) has set this in the context of Jesus gathering his disciples together and instructing them (Matt 4:18ff; 5:1-2; Luke 6:12-16, 17)—though in each Gospel it occurs at a slightly different point in the narrative.
Interestingly, while this Q-material in Luke follows generally after Jesus’ calling the Twelve (6:12-16) and the “Sermon” (6:20-49), in Matthew it occurs at a different (though similar) point in the narrative. The calling and subsequent mission of the Twelve is narrated together (Matt 10:1-5f), followed by an entirely separate collection of instruction (or “sermon”) for the disciples (10:5-42).
This brief, though detailed, analysis demonstrates the creative work of each Gospel writer in selecting, adapting, and arranging traditional material. Many of the themes and contours of the narrative are the same in each Gospel, but the overall presentation and thematic structure differs considerably. This is all the more true when we consider how the (historical) traditions have been developed and arranged in the Gospel of John. I will be examining this in the next daily note.
In the last several daily notes, I have been looking at the main Gospel traditions involving the family and relatives of Jesus. These early traditions occasionally put Jesus’ relatives in something of a negative light—suggesting a certain misunderstanding of who he is and the nature of his mission, and, at times, even reflecting opposition toward him. Such traditions soon would disappear; we can actually see this process at work, by noting that there is nothing corresponding to Mark 3:20-21 in either Matthew or Luke—the episode described briefly in those verses has ‘dropped out’ of the Gospel Tradition. At the same time, Jesus’ family came to achieve a revered position and status in the early Church. While we know virtually nothing of Jesus’ sisters (mentioned in Mk 6:3), his mother (Mary) and at least some of his brothers began to feature prominently in early Christian tradition by the end of the first century. Something of this is reflected already in the New Testament, and must, on objective grounds, go back to authentic (historical) tradition. Here I will briefly examine the New Testament references (1) to Mary, (2) to James, and finally (3) the important Lukan description in Acts 1:14.
It is scarcely necessary to mention the revered position of Mary, as Jesus’ mother, well-established (with traditions full of fabulous details), by the early 2nd century A.D. It has always been somewhat surprising to Christians that the New Testament, on the whole, has so little to say about her. If we separate out the Infancy Narratives of Matthew 1-2 and Luke 1-2, she is mentioned by name in just one passage—Mark 6:3 (par Matt 13:55). In several other places she is referred to as “his mother”, or otherwise indirectly (Mark 3:31-32ff par; John 2:3ff; 19:25-27; Gal 4:4). Given the importance of the virgin birth for Christians past and present, it is worth pointing out that even the birth of Jesus is scarcely mentioned in the New Testament, apart from the Infancy narratives.
At the Angel’s initial appearance and greeting (1:28-29), Mary is thoroughly disturbed (vb. diatara/ssw) but also “gathers things through” (dialogi/zomai), i.e. in her mind. This use of dialogi/zomai is significant.
Elizabeth’s blessing of Mary contains the declaration: “and happy [i.e. blessed] (is she) the one trusting that there will be a completion [i.e. fulfillment] to the (thing)s spoken to her (from) alongside the Lord” (v. 45). Again, this indicates Mary’s faith/trust in God.
In 2:21-24, along with v. 39 and 41ff, Mary and Joseph are depicted as faithful in observing the religious requirements and regulations set down in the Old Testament/Jewish Law.
The statement by Simeon, in his oracle, addressed directly to Mary (in v. 35a): “and a sword also will come/go through your heart”. As I discussed in an earlier note, this declaration may possibly allude to Ezekiel 14:17, and the sword of God’s Judgment that will pass through the land. If Mary represents the people of Israel, at the transition point between the Old and New Covenants, then the sword that separates and divides (cf. the context of vv. 34-35) will also pass through Mary (her own heart). She, too, will have to come to terms with Jesus’ identity.
In the following episode (the child Jesus in the Temple, vv. 41-50), it is illustrated that Mary still does not fully understand who Jesus is—his true identity (as God’s Son) and the nature of his mission (to be in/among “the things of God”), cf. verses 48-49.
In the Gospel of John, Jesus’ mother (not mentioned by name) appears in two episodes. The first is the miracle at Cana (2:1-12), in which she requests Jesus to perform a miracle for the wedding party. This narrative, on objective grounds, has all the earmarks of an early (authentic) tradition, though one which is unique to John. There are also certain similarities between this episode and that of Luke 2:41-50. Each includes a question/request by Mary, and a response by Jesus, illustrating that his mother does not truly understand the nature and purpose of his mission. The second scene occurs at the crucifixion (19:25-27). Critical scholars are more likely to question the historicity of this tradition, since it would seem to have the (apologetic) purpose of giving prominence to the “disciple whom (Jesus) loved”, and is otherwise absent from the well-established Gospel traditions surrounding the crucifixion of Jesus. It is sometimes thought to have symbolic significance—e.g., Mary as the “mother” of the disciples (i.e. the Church, represented by the beloved Disciple). However, I find it much more likely that the significance is literary, in terms of the overall structure of the Fourth Gospel. The two episodes involving Jesus’ mother are set at the very beginning and end of his ministry on earth, respectively—his first public miracle (in Galilee) and his death (in Jerusalem). In view of the portrait of Jesus in this Gospel—as the eternal Son of God who was sent to earth (as a human being)—Mary was only his mother during the short time of his incarnation and earthly ministry. At the time of Jesus’ death, it was necessary to transfer that (human) sonship to another—the one closest to him, the beloved Disciple.
In Mark 6:3 (and the parallel in Matthew), four of Jesus’ brothers are named, including Ya’aqob (Heb. bq)u&y~), transliterated into Greek as Ia/kwbo$, and into English as “Jacob” (the corresponding James comes into English through the Latinized form Iacomus). This is the only mention of James in the Gospels. It is not certain if he is to be counted among the brothers of Jesus in Mk 3:31ff par, or the ‘relatives’ in 3:21 (cf. the earlier note on these traditions). Jesus’ brothers are also part of the tradition recorded in Jn 7:1-9 (also discussed in an earlier note). If James was among the brothers mentioned in these passages, it would indicate that he did not understand or believe in Jesus, at least during the Galilean period of ministry.
The earliest New Testament tradition regarding James would appear to be Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 15:7, of a resurrection appearance by Jesus to James. Paul cites this as a well-established tradition, passed down to him (vv. 1-3ff), and the way he phrases vv. 3-7 would indicate a relatively fixed (traditional) formula, in place by at least 50 A.D. (if not earlier). In Galatians, Paul does not cite traditions but (his own) memory of recent events in Jerusalem and Antioch. The date of the letter, and the events recorded in chapters 1-2, have varied somewhat among commentators. Style and subject matter suggests a date (for the letter) around the same time as Romans and 2 Corinthians (i.e. early-to-mid-50s). At around 50 A.D., James was an important leader in the Jerusalem Church (1:19; 2:9), whom Paul associates with his Jewish(-Christian) opponents at Antioch and elsewhere (2:12). This generally relates to the controversy addressed at the so-called Jerusalem Council (in Acts 15). In Gal 1:19, Paul refers to James specifically as “the brother of the Lord”.
In the book of Acts, probably written around 70 A.D., but certainly containing many older (historical) traditions, James is mentioned as a leader of the Jerusalem Christians in 12:17. He is also featured in the Jerusalem Council episode (15:13-21), and is associated directly with the letter sent to believers in the region around Antioch (vv. 22-29). What is noteworthy for the author of Acts (trad. Luke) is that Peter and James both speak out in favor of allowing Gentile coverts to be considered part of the Church without requiring their observance of the Old Testament Law (with the exception of the points made in vv. 20-21 and 29). James thus plays a central role in the central episode of the book. After chapter 15, the Jerusalem Church gives way in the narrative to Paul’s missionary work. James does appear in one more episode (21:17-25), which confirms the validity of Paul’s work, but yet still declares the validity of the Law for Jews (and, by extension, Jewish believers). I have dealt with this topic extensively in my earlier series “The Law and the New Testament” (cf. the articles on Paul’s view of the Law, and the Law in Luke-Acts).
Later Christian writers preserve additional traditions regarding James, who was surnamed “the Righteous/Just”. Eusebius (Church History 2.1, 23) cites a (lost) writing by Hegesippus which recorded several such traditions, including (a) the great virtue of James, (b) that he was a Nazirite, (c) spent time in the Holy Place of the Temple (dressed in priestly clothing), (d) that Jesus gave special instruction to him following the resurrection appearance (cf. 1 Cor 15:7), and (e) that he was clubbed to death on the parapet of the Temple sanctuary. James’ death is also reported by Josephus in his Antiquities 20.200. Both Eusebius and Jerome (Lives of Illustrious Men 2) consider James to have been Jesus’ half-brother (cf. Mk 15:40 par), and regard him as the first bishop of Jerusalem. James the brother of Jesus is also thought, by most commentators to be the “James” of the New Testament letter, whether such attribution is considered genuine (the traditional-conservative view) or pseudonymous (most critical scholars). Similarly, the “Jude” of the New Testament letter, called “brother of James”, is thought to refer to another of Jesus’ brothers (Mk 6:3 par).

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VERNON PHILLIP MACKNIC, Defendant and Appellant.
Albert I. Kaufman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Gerald H. Genard, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant was found guilty of driving a vehicle while under the influence of narcotics (§ 23105, Veh. Code). Motion for a new trial was denied and the court ordered a petition to be filed in department 95 under section 3051, Welfare and Institutions Code. Upon his return for further criminal proceedings, defendant was sentenced to the state prison, the term to run concurrently with any prior incompleted sentence. He appeals from the judgment.
Officer Key, a narcotics officer, had information from Officer Marinelli, Glendale Police Department that a person named Macknic would be around 5th and Burlington in Los Angeles between 10:30 and 10:45 a.m.; possibly a narcotic buy could be made from him; Macknic would be driving a 1954 two- tone white over blue Chevrolet; and he was wanted for parole violation on a narcotics offense. Officer Key and other law enforcement officers, and State Narcotic Agent Feldman in a separate vehicle, watched the location and around 10:45 a.m. saw defendant driving the Chevrolet. When he stopped for a red signal, Agent Feldman got out of his car and approached defendant on the driver's side; as he neared the Chevrolet defendant started up the car, turned it to the left in the direction of the agent, forcing him to jump out of the way, and drove away. In his car Officer Key overtook defendant, pulled alongside of him, identified himself and ordered him to stop; defendant complied and upon being told to do so, got out of the car. Officer Key asked him for his identification; he said his name was Vernon Macknic. Asked if he was on parole defendant said he was, was in violation and "had been running for about nine months." It was stipulated that Officer Key is an expert in determining whether a person is under the influence of narcotics. The officer "observed that defendant [257 Cal. App. 2d 372] was perspiring profusely, that his eyes were pinpoint, and that he lacked coordination in that he was slow to move and staggered," and since defendant was wearing a short-sleeved shirt "also observed numerous marking on his arms, which appeared to be needle marks"; he then formed the opinion that defendant was under the influence of narcotics and arrested him for parole violation and for driving a vehicle while under the influence of narcotics. After his arrest defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and transported to the station where a further examination of the inner portion of his left forearm revealed several tracks with scabs and marks indicating hypodermic injections, and on the back portion, an area with approximately fifteen scabs and marks varying in age from one to twenty-one days, one scab appearing to be recent or fresh. An examination of his eyes in the light accommodation test showed that they "went from a maximum of 3.5 millimeters to 3 millimeters, with a very sluggish reaction to the light." As a result of these observations he formed the opinion that defendant was under the influence of narcotics.
Defendant testified that at the time of his arrest he was not under the influence of narcotics, had no trouble controlling his vehicle, had not used narcotics that day, was not addicted to heroin at that time and had his last "fix" a day and a half before arrest.
On his own testimony and that of Officer Key that he was driving at a normal speed and did not appear to be violating any vehicle laws before stopping at the red signal, appellant asserts that there was no probable cause either for Agent Feldman to approach him or for Officer Key to arrest him.  There is nothing improper about an officer stopping a motorist or a pedestrian on the streets for questioning when to a reasonable person such a course of conduct appears necessary to the discharge of his duty (People v. McGlory, 226 Cal. App. 2d 762, 765 [38 Cal. Rptr. 373]; People v. Alcala, 204 Cal. App. 2d 15, 20 [22 Cal. Rptr. 31]; People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 108 [293 P.2d 52]; People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 117 [293 P.2d 57]; People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852]); and circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify such action. (People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450 [30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) Officer Key had received detailed information concerning defendant, his activities, his car and where he would be, from Officer Marinelli.  It is well established that police officers may rely on [257 Cal. App. 2d 373] information coming to them through official channels. (People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 70 [60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606]; People v. Davis, 205 Cal. App. 2d 517, 521 [23 Cal. Rptr. 152]; People v. Melchor, 237 Cal. App. 2d 685, 690 [47 Cal. Rptr. 235].) fn. 1 When, according to the information received from Officer Marinelli, defendant appeared at the location driving the described vehicle and at the time specified, they had a right to approach him to question him when he stopped at the red signal.  While anonymous information in and of itself is not sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest, such information corroborated by additional facts may be considered as a factor going to probable cause. (Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 [294 P.2d 36]; People v. Davis, 205 Cal. App. 2d 517, 521 [23 Cal. Rptr. 152].)  Here those additional facts constitute Officer Key's observation of defendant's erratic use of his vehicle, physical condition, lack of coordination, "pinpoint" pupils and needle marks on his arm. When Agent Feldman approached the left side of defendant's car, defendant started up his vehicle and swerved to the left in the direction of Agent Feldman, forcing him to jump out of the way, turned right and drove away. Under these circumstances Officer Key was justified in stopping defendant. Thus when he ascertained that defendant was a parole violator and formed the opinion from defendant's appearance and conduct that he was under the influence of narcotics, it was his duty to arrest him for both violations.
 Equating his "right" to a Nalline test when arrested with his rights "under the Miranda [384 U.S. 436 (16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974)] doctrine," appellant asserts that he was denied due process of law because he was neither informed that he had a right to demand a Nalline test [257 Cal. App. 2d 374] nor given the test which could establish his innocence.people v. Zavala, 239 Cal. App. 2d 732 [49 Cal. Rptr. 129], relied upon by appellant, does not support his contention for therein the court concluded that while a person has no constitutional right to refuse to take a Nalline test, provided it is administered in a medically approved manner and not in a fashion that shocks the conscience or offends one's sense of justice, "he may refuse to take the test in California by reason of the enactment of section 11723, which requires written consent for the administration of the Nalline test." (P. 739.) This case recognizes neither a right to have a Nalline test nor the right upon arrest to be informed that he could have such a test. While the court in In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 508, at p. 513 [11 Cal. Rptr. 551, 360 P.2d 47], said, "The denial of an opportunity to procure a blood test on a charge of intoxication prevents the accused from obtaining evidence necessary to his defense and is a denial of due process of law entitling him to his discharge," it is clear that there is no duty or obligation upon law enforcement agencies to cause the sample to be made. (McCormick v. Municipal Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 819, 821 [16 Cal. Rptr. 211].) McCormick relied upon In re Koehne, 54 Cal. 2d 757 [8 Cal. Rptr. 435, 356 P.2d 179]; therein the court said at page 759: "It is significant, however, that the law does not impose upon law enforcement agencies the requirement that they take the initiative, or even any affirmative action, in procuring the evidence deemed necessary to the defense of an accused. Rather it is the accused who must act to protect his interests, and it is only when he is denied an opportunity, reasonable under the circumstances, to procure a timely sample of his blood that he can properly claim a denial of due process. (In re Newbern, supra, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 866 [1 Cal. Rptr. 80].)" These cases say that an accused has been denied due process when the police refuse his request to procure a chemical test at his own expense preventing him from procuring evidence. It appears to us that there is no more duty on the police to take the initiative, or any affirmative action, in procuring evidence deemed necessary to the defense of one accused of being under the influence of a narcotic drug, than there is in the case of one accused of being under the influence of alcohol. If he wants to take a Nalline test he must act to protect his own interest by requesting such a test.
FN 1. At the preliminary hearing on voir dire examination defense counsel sought to examine Officer Key relative to the reliability of Officer Marinelli. Upon objection the judge said: "The Court will, at least at this stage, permit the mere fact that the informant was a police officer from another jurisdiction to be sufficient reliability upon which this officer could act further." While the cause was submitted on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing, at the trial there was ample opportunity to explore the subject. Officer Key was further examined and defendant took the stand. At no time on the trial level did defense counsel raise the issue by objection or otherwise, make mention of the point, seek to examine Officer Key on the subject of Officer Marinelli's "reliability" or argue the matter to the trial judge. The court's ruling on the preliminary hearing was proper. In light of the record we deem to be unnecessary further discussion of appellant's present claim that his inquiry in the area of the reliability of Officer Marinelli as an informer was curtailed.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


AARON SLOAN, Plaintiff, v. MELISSA HAINSWORTH, et al, Defendants.
Plaintiff Aaron Sloan ("Plaintiff") initiated this pro se prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 14, 2014, setting forth claims against fifteen Defendants, and alleging that each violated his civil rights during his incarceration at SCI Somerset from September 2013 through November 12, 2014. ECF No. 1. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with and denied him access to his stored legal property in violation of the Access to Courts and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; conspired to retaliate against him for filing lawsuits and grievances in violation of the First Amendment; and wrongfully destroyed personal property in violation of Pennsylvania law. ECF No. 4.
In response to the complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead an access to courts claim, a negligence claim, a conspiracy claim, and a retaliation claim, and failed to allege the necessary personal involvement of Defendants Rozum, Gerhlmann, Wingard, and Sroka.
Upon review of Plaintiff's complaint and Defendants' motion, the Court recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied as to Plaintiff's retaliation and federal conspiracy claims, but that Plaintiff's state and common law tort claims be dismissed as barred by doctrine of sovereign immunity. It was further recommended that Plaintiff's due process property loss claims be dismissed due to the availability of a post-deprivation remedy. ECF No. 30. Finally, the Court recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's access to courts claim because Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim. In particular, Plaintiff did not allege facts which would permit the Court to determine whether Plaintiff suffered an actual injury to any underlying claim, and failed to allege the personal involvement of each named Defendant in the purported denial of access. It was recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to file an amended complaint to rectify the deficiencies in his access to courts claim but, due to futility, it was recommended that no amendment be permitted to his property-related due process and state law claims. Id. The District Court adopted each of these recommendations by Order dated February 10, 2016.
After repeated direction, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on July 27, 2016. ECF Nos. 32, 33, 36, 43, 45, 46. Defendants were granted an extension of time to respond, and on December 12, 2016, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 48, 54. Plaintiff has filed his response to the motion to strike [ECF No. 55] and the motion is now ripe for review by this Court.
Defendants have filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), contending that much of the 42-page document contains irrelevant allegations of fact, attempts to assert new claims, and otherwise fails to remedy the deficiencies of Plaintiff's access to courts claim, as required by the Court's prior Recommendation and Order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes courts to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Although courts possess 'considerable discretion in disposing of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), such motions are not favored and usually will be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issue in the case.'" Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Connellsville Area School District, 2013 WL 869663, at * (W.D. Pa. Mar.7, 2013) quoting Thornton v. UL Enterprises, LLC, 2010 WL 1005021, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar.16, 2010). "Striking some or all of a pleading is therefore considered a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice." Id.
Defendants contend the amended complaint, in its entirety, should be stricken as containing immaterial and impertinent matter to the extent that the document fails to cure deficiencies as previously articulated by the Court. "Immaterial" matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief. Del. Health Care Inc. v. MCD Holding Co., 893 F. Supp. 1279 (D.Del. 1995). "Impertinent" matter "consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Zaloga v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of America, 671 F.Supp. 2d 623, 633 (M.D. Pa. Nov.24, 2009) quoting Donnelly v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., 2008 WL 762085, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar.20, 2008).
Motions to strike must be decided on the pleadings alone. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 619 F.Supp.2d 127, 132 (E.D.Pa. 2007). Because such motions are disfavored, they typically are not granted unless the material to be stricken bears no possible relationship to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties. Zaloga, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 633, citing Hanover Ins., 619 F.Supp.2d at 133 and Miller v. Group Voyagers, Inc., 912 F.Supp. 164, 168 (E.D.Pa.1996).
Here, such is not the case. While Plaintiff's amended complaint is prolix and difficult to follow, it is neither impertinent nor immaterial to the access to courts claims.
As this Court has previously determined, Plaintiff's retaliation and federal conspiracy claims are sufficiently pled. This Court expresses no opinion as to whether Plaintiff's access to courts claim is sufficiently pled, only that the allegations of the amended complaint are not immaterial or impertinent as those terms are defined by case law.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants' motion to strike [ECF No. 54] is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants file an answer or dispositive motion to the retaliation, federal conspiracy, and access to courts claims of the amended complaint only by September 15, 2017.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery shall end October 20, 2017.


text:
Today in class we discussed reapportionment, redistricting, gerrymandering, Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims. If you were absent, make sure you are confident re: LT 26 and 27. Additionally watch the video "Drawing District Lines" and get the notes (Jobs of Members of Congress) from a friend.
The homework is to complete the Congressional Committee worksheet by Monday.
1. Complete the individual assignment (blue paper in the Wednesday folder) and turn it in for a grade.
2. Get a copy of the learning targets and vocabulary for the legislative branch from the Wednesday folder.
1. Study for tomorrow's test over Chapter 4.
2. Complete the following reading assignment by Friday.
Today in class we discussed LTs 17-22.
The Chapter 4 Test is Thursday.
1. Be sure you are comfortable with LT14.
3. Identify pros and cons of federalism. Identify how federalism benefits democracy.
1. Get the notes (Evolution of Federalism) from a friend.
2. Complete the States Rights v. Nationalists assignment (in the Friday folder).
3. Read "The Clean Air Act Case Study" (in the Friday folder).
Tuesday, January 15th and Wednesday, January 16th - No school due to weather.
If you were absent today, get the notes from a friend (including the notes from the video (binder pages 72 and 73). There is no homework. Chapter 4 Test will be next week.
1. Get the following notes from a friend: Significance of McCulloch v. Maryland, Supremacy Clause, Obligations of national government, Obligations of states.
2. Read Chapter 4, Section 2.
3. Identify the Constitutional provisions for cooperation between the states.
The homework is to read pages 106-107.
1. Get a copy of the Chapter 4 Learning Targets from the Friday folder.
3. Read the McCulloch v. Maryland case study (also in the Friday folder).
If you were absent today, please make arrangements to make up the Chapter 2.4 and Chapter 3 Test.
There is no homework .

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
On March 1, 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) ruled that the six (6) year statute of repose set forth in G.L. c. 260, § 2b is “unequivocal” even where its application bars personal injury and wrongful death asbestos claims with known extended latency periods.
Faced with whether G.L. c. 260, § 2b barred decedent’s estate from bringing a claim against General Electric (“GE”) alleging that, 25 years prior, GE negligently exposed decedent to asbestos during the construction of power plants, causing him to contract mesothelioma, Judge Zobel of the United States District Court for the District Court for Massachusetts certified the question to the SJC. Specifically, the SJC considered whether G.L. c. 260, § 2b bars tort claims arising from diseases with extended latency periods, such as those associated with asbestos exposure.
Citing its precedent, the SJC held that in writing G.L. c. 260, § 2b, the Massachusetts Legislature fashioned an “ironclad rule” that places an “absolute time limit on the liability of those within its protection” even if the plaintiff’s injury does not occur, or is not discovered, until after the statute’s time limit has expired. While acknowledging that the application of G.L. c. 260, § 2b to asbestos claims renders a “harsh reality,” the SJC noted that the primary objective in enacting G.L. c. 260, § 2b was to limit the liability of architects, engineers, contractors, and others involved in the design, planning, construction, or general administration of an improvement to real property.
The SJC noted that the Legislature had, in other circumstances, crafted exceptions to specific statutes of repose (see G. L. c. 260, § 4 (statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions excludes actions arising from foreign object left in body)). By contrast, the SJC held that G.L. c. 260, § 2b had no exceptions and is “unequivocal.” Accordingly, the SJC refused to concoct an exception to G.L. c. 260, § 2b’s six year limitation for asbestos related cases, where it determined it was clearly the Legislature’s exclusive prerogative to do so.
Sugarman Rogers has a long history of successfully defending companies which have been sued by those alleging that they contracted illnesses from asbestos present in a wide-variety of products. Please contact Tony Agudelo if you would like additional information.

matches:
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 2
§ 4
§ 2
§ 2


text:
In July 2012 the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) were amended to include additional requirements for non-EEA (European Economic Area) family members to join their relatives in the UK. Appendix FM to the Rules included the MIR. This required the UK spouse or civil partner (“the sponsor”) to demonstrate that they had a gross annual income of £18,600 in order for their spouse or civil partner to be allowed entry to the UK. This figure was increased depending on the number of children. Only the sponsor’s current income was taken into account in assessing whether the MIR was met.
Prior to this amendment, the Rules only required that parties were able to “maintain and accommodate themselves and any dependants ‘adequately in the UK without resource to public funds’” [para. 4]. This procedure was difficult to administer and so the Home Office proceeded to devise an alternative policy that included a minimum income threshold for sponsors. After prolonged consideration of alternatives by the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee, the Government published the “Statement of Intent: Family Migration” in June 2012 that included the MIR proposal in the form that was ultimately adopted. This was fleshed out by the Home Office’s statements in “Grounds of Compatibility with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. This paper stated that the purpose of the amendments to the Rules was to ensure that “those who choose to establish their family life in the UK…should have the financial wherewithal to be able to support themselves and their partner without being a burden on the taxpayer” [Grounds of Compatibility, para. 52]. There was a presumption that, apart from exceptional cases, any decision taken in accordance with the Rules would be compatible with Article 8 [Grounds of Compatibility, para. 20]. Consideration of “exceptional circumstances” must also include consideration of any factors relevant to the best interests of a child in the UK. However, the relevant Instructions state that there is a need to consider “any factors involving the child in the UK that can only be alleviated by the presence of the applicant in the UK”.
Within the amended Rules, which received unanimous approval from the House of Commons, there is an exception to the MIR. This exception covers individuals seeking entry who have a “genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child under 18 in the UK” or “with a partner in the UK” and would face “insurmountable obstacles” in continuing family life with that child or partner outside the UK.
Finally, there is the potential to grant entry to the UK even if the MIR or the specific exception is not met in the event that a refusal to grant entry would result in a breach of Article 8 rights [Immigration Directorate Instruction: Family Migration: Appendix FM Section 1.0a: Family Life (as a Partner or Parent): 5-year Routes and Appendix FM Section 1.0b: Family Life (as a Partner or Parent) 10-Year Routes]. If an Entry Clearance Officer believes that “exceptional circumstances” exist which would result in a violation of Article 8 rights if entry is refused, then they must refer the case to the Referred Casework Unit. The individual Officer has no personal power to grant entry on grounds beyond those contained within the Rules. The Officers are told to consider a number of factors, including the best interests of a child in the UK. This requirement stems from the Secretary of State’s duty under s.55, Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when making decisions with affect them. Generally, it is stated that requiring compliance with the Rules, including the MIR, will lead to a disproportionate effect on the child’s interests “only rarely” [para. 24].
Five cases were laid before the Supreme Court illustrating the problems that the MIR could cause for partners wishing to live together in the UK. Only one of theses cases, SS, was an appeal against findings of facts in legal proceedings.
SS, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), married another DRC citizen, NT, in September 2012. NT was initially granted refugee status in the UK but later became a naturalised British citizen. Shortly after the marriage, SS applied for entry clearance under Appendix FM. Permission was refused due to a failure to meet the MIR. SS then successfully appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Whilst the Tribunal found that NT’s earnings did not satisfy the MIR (his gross annual earnings were £17,000, below the £18,600 threshold), the appeal was allowed on Article 8 grounds. The Tribunal considered that the couple would be unable to live together in the DRC. Additionally, NT was earning an income that would allow the couple to live in the UK without placing additional strain on the public purse. Finally, SS had suffered a miscarriage following the refusal of her application. NT had been unable to visit her for fear of losing his employment and so she “needed” to be admitted to the UK “so that she [could] take solace with her husband and begin to form family life with him here”. As a result of these factors, the Tribunal held that the interference with the Article 8 rights of SS was disproportionate.
The Upper Tribunal refused the appeal of the Entry Clearance Officer. Whilst the Tribunal were wrong in considering events following the refusal, there were “insurmountable obstacles” to the gamily life continuing in the DRC. This decision was successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. The First-tier Tribunal had failed to give adequate weight to the MIR as part of the Article 8 balancing exercise and placed too much weight on the fact that NT had nearly satisfied the MIR. Additionally, no valid compelling circumstances requiring the granting of permission to enter had been identified.
The Supreme Court began by considering the legality of the Rules themselves as opposed to consideration of their application to an individual case. In order to assess whether the Rules were compatible with Article 8, the Supreme Court applied the familiar four-stage test that was adopted in both R (on the application of Quila and another) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department,  UKSC 45 and R (on the application of Bibi) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department,  UKSC 68. The fourth aspect of this test, whether the measures strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community, is often focussed upon. When assessing the legality of the Rules, the Supreme Court highlighted that they “would not be entitled to strike down the [Rules] unless satisfied that [they were] incapable of being operated in a proportionate way and so [were] inherently unjustified in all or nearly all cases” [Lord Hodge, Bibi, para. 69]. Despite the existence of factors in the Rules that made compliance difficult, the Rules would only be incompatible with Article 8 if they were “couched in terms which made non-compliance in individual cases practically inevitable’. However, as outlined above, there is the need to consider whether any request that resulted in refusal according to the Rules should actually be granted if the refusal would be incompatible with Article 8. Additionally, any decision can be appealed on the grounds that the decision is unlawful under s.6, Human Rights Act 1998 due to incompatibility with a Convention Right (s.84(1)(c), Nationality. Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). Even if the request should be refused under the Rules, both the Secretary of State and any Tribunal, will consider whether the refusal is compliant with Convention Rights. Accordingly, the argument that the Rules themselves were incompatible with Article 8 was bound to fail.
The Supreme Court moved on to consider the remaining substantive issues before them.
In considering whether the MIR was compatible with the Convention, firstly, the Supreme Court addressed which Convention Rights were engaged. The Supreme Court held that the MIR creates an obstacle to couples enjoying family life together as protected under Article 8. However, it does not prevent a couple marrying and, therefore, no issue arose under Article 12. As the MIR can interfere with the rights of individuals protected under Article 8 the Supreme Court then considered whether this interference could be justified.
The introduction of the MIR was part of an overall push to reduce net migration. The Supreme Court accepted that such an aim is legitimate. Further, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that a rational connection existed between this aim and the decision to implement the MIR. The Migration Advisory Committee had undertaken a thorough consideration of economical issues in order to arrive at a figure that, if set, would mean that individuals would not have recourse to welfare benefits. It was not possible to say that a less intrusive measure could have been taken i.e. the adoption of a lesser figure. The Supreme Court found that the work of the Migration Advisory Committee was “a model of economic rationality”. As a result, the MIR appeared a proportionate measure to achieve the accepted legitimate aim of reducing net migration to the UK.
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also previously considered the existence of MIR within the Dutch immigration system. In Konstatinov v. the Netherlands, Application no. 16351/03, 26 April 2007 the ECtHR stated that it “did not consider unreasonable a requirement” for an individual to “demonstrate that he/she has sufficient independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the basic costs of subsistence o his or her family member with whom reunion is sought” [Konstantinov, para. 50].
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that, in principle, the MIR was justified and compatible with Article 8.
The Supreme Court then went on to consider the general position of children under the Rules. Appendix FM of the Rules, which includes the MIR, states that it “takes into account” the Secretary of State’s duty under s.55, Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when making decisions with affect them. Despite this statement in Appendix FM, and the general statutory duty on Entry Clearance Officers to consider the welfare of children under s.55, Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, this did nothing to support the assertion that the relevant consideration were sufficiently taken into account in Appendix FM itself.
The instructions to Entry Clearance Officers, discussed above, states that there needs to be factors “that can only be alleviated by the presence of the applicant in the UK”, such as support during a major medical procedure or in order to prevent abandonment. Such a highly prescriptive approach was, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, inconsistent with the approach advocated by the ECtHR in Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], Application no. 12738/10, 3 October 2014. In Jeunesse the ECtHR considered the approach that should be adopted when considering the impact of a decision to remove a parent on the welfare of a child. Such considerations were equally applicable to decisions surround the reunification of a parent with a child. The ECtHR stated that there was a need to assess all evidence in terms of “practicality, feasibility and proportionality”. The approach set out in the instructions to Entry Clearance Officers set a much higher bar which was inconsistent with Jeunesse. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated that there was the need for amendment of the instructions in order to bring them in line with the approach of the ECtHR in Jeaunesse. The Rules and Instructions, as they stand, failed to adequately promote the welfare of children as required by s.55, Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, As a result, the Supreme Court issued a declaration that both were unlawful.
When considering the form of the MIR to be included within the amended Rules, the Migration Advisory Committee excluded consideration of potential future earnings of the spouse seeking entry for reasons of practicality. In certain circumstances, this lead to the refusal of entry even if granting such entry would be consistent with the general objectives of the Rules – to prevent entry of individuals that are likely to be a burden on the State.
The Supreme Court proceeded to consider the legality of this approach under common law principles and the HRA. The rationality of this aspect of the Rules under common law principles was quickly dispensed with. The restriction may appear harsh, however it had received careful consideration by the Migration Advisory Committee and the Secretary of State. The Supreme Court concluded that it was not irrational in the common law sense to give priority to “simplicity of operation and ease of verification” by imposing this restriction.
Under the HRA, the Supreme Court had to consider whether this restriction was compatible with the general balancing approach required by Article 8. Avoiding a financial burden is a legitimate concern that can be considered in the Article 8 balancing process, but restricting this with a prohibition on taking into account future earnings was undue. The Supreme Court concluded that the Rules were too restrictive and a broader approach with regards to consideration of relevant issues, including potential future earnings, was necessary in order to ensure that the decisions of Entry Clearance Officers were consistent with their obligations under the HRA to comply with Article 8. This did not impact the legality of the Rules, but the Supreme Court highlighted that the Secretary of State should consider whether to amend the rules, or merely the guidance, to include circumstances in which alternative sources of funding may be taken into account.
Finally, the Supreme Court considered the only substantive appeal presented to them. The circumstances surrounding the appeal of SS have been highlighted above. The crucial finding was that there were “insurmountable obstacles” to the couple living in the DRC. When considering the factors contained within the ECtHR judgment in Jeunesse, family life would be seriously ruptured as they would only be able to spend short periods of time together in the DRC. Additionally, the sponsor had been resident in the UK for a number of years, he had two children, both British citizens, in the UK and also other extensive ties to the UK. There were also no factors of immigration control of public order that would point towards refusing the request for entry. Despite the fact that the relationship was developed when there was no guarantee that the sponsor’s spouse would be admitted, this was merely a factor weighing in favour of refusal.
As a result of this consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that the decision of the Upper Tribunal should be restored.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court with regards to the compatibility of the Immigration Rules with the ECHR is, generally, unsurprising. Considering the fact that the Rules explicitly require any refusal to be subsequently assessed in light of Article 8, it is clear that on the face of it there appears no compatibility issues.
However, the Secretary of State will be busy in assessing the best way to revise the Rules, or Guidance, in order to ensure that both the best interests of the child are appropriately addressed and that the proportionality assessment required by Article 8 is not unduly restricted by a prohibition on consideration of any alternative sources of funding.

matches:
v.
UKSC
v.
UKSC
v.
Application no. 16351
v.
Application no. 12738