§ 20-14-304 . Right to be accompanied by service animal--Penalty and restitution for killing or injuring a service animal or search and rescue dog.
(a) It is the policy of this state to accord individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities all rights and privileges of other persons with respect to the use of public streets, highways, sidewalks, public buildings, public facilities, public carriers, public housing accommodations, public amusement and resort areas, and other public areas to which the public is invited, subject only to the limitations and conditions established by law and applicable to all persons and subject to the special limitations and conditions prescribed in this subchapter for individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities.
(b) It is further the policy of this state that individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities shall be employed in state service, in the service of political subdivisions of this state, in the public schools, and in all other employment supported in whole or in part by public funds, on the same terms and conditions as individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities, unless it is shown that the visual, hearing, or other physical disability of a person prevents the performance of the work involved.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 1; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1.
Any person, firm, or corporation, or the agent of any person, firm, or corporation, who denies or interferes with the admittance to or enjoyment of public facilities and housing accommodations by an individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 6; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1.
(5) All other places to which the general public is invited.
(b) The rights and privileges are subject only to the limitations and conditions established by law and applicable to all persons and subject to the special limitations and conditions prescribed in this subchapter with respect to individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 2; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1.
§ 20-14-304. Right to be accompanied by service animal--Penalty and restitution for killing or injuring a service animal or search and rescue dog.
(a) Every individual with visual, hearing, or other disabilities has the right to be accompanied by a service animal especially trained to do work or to perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability in or upon any and all public ways, public places, and other public accommodations and housing accommodations prescribed in § 20-14-303 and to be accompanied by a service dog as defined in Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2017, and shall not be required to pay any extra fee or charge for the service animal.
(b) However, any individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities accompanied by a service animal in any public way, public place, public accommodation, or housing accommodation shall be liable for any damage caused to the premises or facilities by the animal.
(3) Used in conjunction with local law enforcement or emergency services organizations for the purpose of locating missing persons or evidence of arson.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 3; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1; Acts of 1995, Act 266, § 1; Acts of 1999, Act 571, § 2, eff. July 30, 1999; Acts of 2017, Act 652, § 2, eff. Aug. 1, 2017.
(a) Individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to all housing accommodations offered for rental, lease, or compensation in this state subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to other persons.
(b) The provisions of this section with respect to the rights of individuals with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities to equal access to housing accommodations shall not be deemed to include any accommodations in a facility which is designed and used primarily as a single family residence and a portion of which is rented, leased, or furnished for compensation.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require any person renting, leasing, or otherwise providing housing accommodations for compensation to modify his or her accommodations in any way or to provide a higher degree of care for an individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities than for an individual without visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 5; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1.
The driver of a vehicle approaching a visually handicapped or hearing impaired person who is carrying a cane which is predominately white or metallic in color with or without a red tip or using a guide or hearing ear dog or the driver of a vehicle approaching an otherwise handicapped person shall take all reasonable precautions to avoid injury to the pedestrian with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities.
Acts of 1973, Act 484, § 4; Acts of 1979, Act 574, § 1.
(a) State agencies which require any persons, agencies, boards, commissions, businesses, or other entities to display signs for individuals with disabilities shall require those persons, agencies, boards, commissions, businesses, or other entities to display only the blue and white international symbol of access.
(b) This section shall have no retroactive effect, applying only to signs installed subsequent to this section's taking effect.
(c) This section shall apply only if installation of a required sign can be achieved without creating a negative financial impact on any persons, agencies, boards, commissions, businesses, or other entities required to display signs for individuals with disabilities.
Acts of 2001, Act 992, § 1, eff. Aug. 13, 2001.
(9) Any other place of public accommodation, amusement, convenience, or resort to which the general public or any classification of persons from the general public is regularly, normally, or customarily invited within the State of Arkansas.
(b) The individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities, or dog trainer in the act of training a guide, signal, or service dog shall not be required to pay any additional charges for his or her guide, signal, or service dog but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by the dog.
Acts of 2003, Act 1107, § 1, eff. July 16, 2003.
(a)(1) Before filing a civil action or petition for injunctive relief based on a claim that an entity's website does not conform with applicable law, codes, guidelines, or standards regulating the functionality of an entity's website to accommodate a person with a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the aggrieved party shall notify the entity in writing of the aggrieved party's allegation that the website does not comply with applicable law, codes, guidelines, or standards regulating the functionality of an organization's website to accommodate persons with a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the specific violations that the aggrieved party asserts.
(2) The specific violations alleged in the written notice under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall include without limitation the alleged violation, alleged harm, and date of alleged harm.
(3) The notice shall be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the filing of a petition for injunctive relief.
(4) The lack of the written notice under or compliance with this subsection may be used as a basis for dismissal by a court and may be used by a court as a mitigating factor in any remedy ordered by the court.
(b)(1) An entity that corrects the website that is allegedly in violation as described in the written notice under subsection (a) of this section within one hundred twenty (120) days of receipt of the written notice under subsection (a) of this section may use that fact as an affirmative defense to a civil action or petition for injunctive relief.
(2) The affirmative defense under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and may not be rebutted.
(3) A defendant in a civil action or petition for injunctive relief that prevails in that action due to the raising and successful proving of the affirmative defense under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be entitled to all reasonable costs of litigation, including attorney's fees.
Acts of 2017, Act 784, § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 2017.
(a) A transportation network company shall adopt a policy of nondiscrimination with respect to passengers and potential passengers and notify transportation network company drivers of its policy.
(b) Transportation network company drivers shall comply with all applicable laws regarding nondiscrimination against passengers or potential passengers.
(c) Transportation network company drivers shall comply with all applicable laws to accommodate service animals.
(d) A transportation network company shall not impose additional charges for providing services to a person with a physical disability because of the disability.
(e)(1) A transportation network company shall provide a passenger an opportunity to indicate whether he or she requires a wheelchair-accessible motor vehicle.
(2) If a transportation network company cannot arrange wheelchair-accessible transportation network company service in any instance, it shall direct the passenger to an alternate provider of wheelchair-accessible service, if available.
Acts of 2015, Act 1050, § 1, eff. July 22, 2015.


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Dr. Claudine Franche is the leader of the Rhizogenesis team in the Research Institute for sustainable Development (Montpellier, France). Her carieer has been dedicated to nitrogen fixation in non-legumes (Azospirillum brasilense, Anabaena azollae and Frankia). Her research is currently dedicated to the understanding of the early stages of the symbiotic interaction between the root system of the tropical actinorhizal tree Casuarina glauca and the nitrogen fixing actinobacteria Frankia. A major objective is to isolate key plant genes involved in the perception and transduction of the still unknown symbiotic signaling molecules emitted by the actinobacteria. Claudine Franche is vice-president of the French High Council of Biotechnology and Deputy advisor of the IUFRO working group “Improvement and Culture of nitrogen-fixing trees”.
Froussart, E., Zhong, C., Jiang, Q., Bonneau, J., Franche, C., and Bogusz, D. 2016. Biotechnological strategies for studying actinorhizal symbiosis in Casuarinaceae: transgenesis and beyond. Symbiosis, DOI 10.1007/s13199-016-0400-4.
Froussart, E., Bonneau, J., Franche, C., and Bogusz , D. 2016. Recent advances in actinorhizal symbiosis signaling. Plant Mol. Biol. 90 : 613-22.
Chabaud, M., Gherbi, H., Pirolles, E., Vaissayre, V., Fournier, J., Moukouanga, D., Franche, C., Bogusz, D., Tisa, L.S., Barker, D.G., and Svistoonoff, S. 2016. Chitinase-resistant hydrophilic symbiotic factors secreted by Frankia activate both Ca(2+) spiking and NIN gene expression in the actinorhizal plant Casuarina glauca. New Phytol., 209 : 86-93.
Selkesavan RK, Dhanya NN, Thushara P, Abraham SM, Jayaraj RSC, Balasubramanian A, Deeparaj B, Sudha S, Sowmiya Rani KS, Bachpai VKW, Ganesh D, Diagne N, Laplaze L, Gherbi H, Svistoonoff S, Hocher V, Franche C, Bogusz D, Nambiar-Veetil M. 2016. Intraspecies variation in sodium partitioning, potassium and proline accumulation under salt stress in Casuarina equisetifolia Forst. Symbiosis 70 : 117-128.
Mansour SR, Abdel-lateif K, Bogusz D, Franche C. 2016. Influence of salt stress on inoculated Casuarina glauca seedlings. Symbiosis 70 : 129-138.
Clavijo, F, Diedhiou, I, Vaissayre, V, Brottier, L, Acolatse, J, Moukouanga, D, Crabos, A, Franche, C, Gherbi, H. Champion, A, Hocher, V, Bogusz, D, Tisa, LS and Svistoonoff, S. 2015. Nodule Inception recruited for actinorhizal symbiosis in Casuarina glauca. New Phytol., 208 : 887-903.
Champion, C, Lucas, M, Tromas, A, Vaissayre, V, Crabos, A, Diediou, I, Prodjinoto, H, Moukouanga, D, Pirolles, E, Cissoko, M, Bonneau, J, Gherbi, H, Franche, C, Hocher, V, Svistoonoff, S, Laplaze, L. 2015. Inhibition of auxin signaling in Frankia species-infected cells in Casuarina glauca nodules leads to increased nodulation. Plant Physiol., 167 : 1149-1157.
Jiang, Q, Ma, Y, Zhong, C., Zeng, B., Zhang, Y., Pinyopusarerk, K., Bogusz, D., Franche, C. (2014). Optimization of the conditions for Casuarina cunninghamiana Miq. genetic transformation mediated by Agrobacterium tumefaciens. Plant Cell Tiss. Organ. Cult., 121 : 195-204.
Diagne, N, Arumugam K, Ngom M, Nambiar-Veetil M, Franche C, Narayanan KK, Laplaze L. 2013. Use of Frankia and actinorhizal plants for degraded lands reclamation. Biomed Res Int. 2013:948258.
Zhong, C, Mansour S, Nambiar-Veetil M, Bogusz D, Franche C. 2013 Casuarina glauca: a model tree for basic research in actinorhizal symbiosis. J Biosci. 38(4):815-23.
Diagne, N, Diouf D, Svistoonoff S, Kane A, Noba K, Franche C, Bogusz D, Duponnois R. Casuarina in Africa: distribution, role and importance of arbuscular mycorrhizal, ectomycorrhizal fungi and Frankia on plant development. J Environ Manage. 2013 Oct 15;128:204-9.
Svistoonoff, S, Benabdoun, FM, Nambiar-Veetil, M, Imanishi, L, Vaissayre, V, Cesari, S, Diagne, N, Hocher, V, de Billy, F, Bonneau, J, Wall, L, Ykhlef, N, Rosenberg, C, Bogusz, D, Franche, C, Gherbi, H. (2013). The independent acquisition of plant root nitrogen-fixing symbiosis in Fabids recruited the same genetic pathway for nodule organogenesis. PLoS One. 8(5):e645155.
Abdel-Lateif, K, Vaissayre, V, Verries, C, Meudec, E, Gherbi, H., Perrine-Walker F, Cheynier V, Svistoonoff S, Franche C, Bogusz D and Hocher V. (2013) The silencing of the chalcone synthase (CHS) gene in Casuarina glauca highlights the important role of flavonoids during nodulation. New Phytol., 199 : 1012-1021.
Santi, C., Bogusz, D., and Franche, C. (2013). Nitrogen Fixation in non Legumes – Invited review. Ann. Bot., 111: 743-767.
Jiang, Q., Zhang, Y., Zhong, C., Zeng, B., Bogusz, D. and Franche, C. (2012). Establishment of an in vitro regeneration protocol for Casuarina cunninghamiana Miq. via indirect organogenesis. New Forests, 43: 143-154.
Imanishi, L., Vayssières, A., Franche, C., Bogusz, D., Wall, L. and Svistoonoff, S. (2011). Transformed Hairy Roots of Discaria trinervis: A valuable tool for studying actinorhizal symbiosis in the context of intercellular infection. Mol. Plant-Microbe Interact., 24: 1317-1324.
Svistoonoff, S., Sy, M-O., Diagne, N., Barker, D., Bogusz, D., and Franche, C. (2010). Infection-specific activation of the Medicago 1 truncatula Enod11 early nodulin gene during actinorhizal root nodulation. Mol. Plant-Microbe Interact., 23: 740-747.
Bonaldi, K., Gherbi, H., Franche, C., Bastien, G., Fardoux, J., Barker, D., Giraud, E., and Cartieaux, F. (2010). The Nod Factor–Independent Symbiotic Signaling Pathway: Development of Agrobacterium rhizogenes–Mediated Transformation for the Legume Aeschynomene indica. Mol. Plant-Microbe Interact., 23 (12) : 1537–1544.
Svistoonoff, S., Gherbi, H., Nambiar-Veetil, M., Zhong, C., Michalak, Z., Laplaze, L., Vaissayre, V., Auguy, F., Hocher, V., Doumas, P., Bonneau, J., Bogusz, D., and Franche, C. (2010). Contribution of transgenic Casuarinaceae to our knowledge of the actinorhizal symbioses. Symbiosis, 1: 3-11.
Zhong, C., Zhang, Y ., Chen, Y., Jiang, Q., Chen, Z., Liang, J., Pinyopusarerk, K., Franche, C. and Bogusz, D. (2010). Casuarina research in China. Symbiosis, 1: 107-114.
Franche, C., Lindström, K., and Elmerich, C. (2009). Nitrogen-fixing bacteria associated with leguminous and non-leguminous plants. Plant Soil, 321: 35-59.
Huang, G.H., Zhong, C., Su, X.H., Zhang, Y., Pinyopusarek, K., Franche, C., and Bogusz, D. (2008). Genetic varaition and structure of native and introduced Casuarina equisetifolia (L. Johnson) provenances. Silvae Genetica, 58: 79-85.
Gherbi, H., Nambiar-Veetil, M., Zhong, C., Félix, J., Autran, D., Girardin, R., Vaissayre, V., Auguy, F., Bogusz, D. and Franche, C. (2008). Post-transcriptional gene silencing in the root system of the actinorhizal tree Allocasuarina verticillata. Molecular Plant-Microbe Interact., 21: 518-524.
Gherbi, H., Markmann, K., Svistoonoff, S., Estevan, J., Autran, D., Giczey, G., Auguy, F., Péret, B., Laplaze, L., Franche, C., Parniske, M., and Bogusz, D. (2008). SymRK defines a common genetic basis for plant root endosymbioses with AM fungi, rhizobia and Frankia bacteria. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA., 105: 4928–4932.
Péret, B., Swarup, R., Jansen, L., Devos, G., Auguy, F., Collin, M., Santi, C., Hocher, V., Franche, C., Bogusz, D., Bennett, M., and Laplaze, L. (2007). Auxin influx activity is associated with Frankia infection during actinorhizal nodule formation in Casuarina glauca. Plant Physiol. 144: 1852-1862.
Obertello, M., Wall , L., Laplaze, L., Nicole, M., Auguy, F., Gherbi, H., Bogusz, D., and Franche, C. (2007). Functional analysis of the metallothionein gene cgMT1 isolated from the actinorhizal tree Casuarina glauca. Molecular Plant-Microbe Interact., 10: 1231-1240.
Sy, M-O., Hocher, V., Gherbi, H., Laplaze, L., Auguy, F., Bogusz, D., and Franche, C. (2007). The cell-cycle promoter cdc2aAt from Arabidopsis thaliana is induced in the lateral roots of the actinorhizal tree Allocasuarina verticillata during the early stages of the symbiotic interaction with Frankia. Physiol. Plant. 130: 409-417.
Sy, M.O., Constans, L., Obertello, M., Geney C., Laplaze, L., Auguy, F., Bogusz, D. and Franche, C. (2006). The PsEnod12B promoter from the early nodulin gene of Pisum sativum does not drive gene expression during the early stages of actinorhizal nodule development in transgenic Casuarinaceae. Plant Soil 281: 279-287.
Hocher, V., Auguy, F., Argout, X., Laplaze, L., Franche, C., and Bogusz, D. (2006). Expressed sequence –tag analysis in Casuarina glauca actinorhizal nodule and root. New Phytol. 169: 681-688.

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 557 › Forest Grove School Dist. v. T. A.
FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. V. T. A.
Held: IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education services when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special-education services through the public school. Pp. 6–17.
(a) This Court held in Burlington and Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, that §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) authorizes courts to reimburse parents for the cost of private-school tuition when a school district fails to provide a child a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate. That Burlington and Carter involved the deficiency of a proposed IEP does not distinguish this case, nor does the fact that the children in Burlington and Carter had previously received special-education services; the Court’s decision in those cases depended on the Act’s language and purpose rather than the particular facts involved. Thus, the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies unless the 1997 Amendments require a different result. Pp. 6–8.
(b) The 1997 Amendments do not impose a categorical bar to reimbursement. The Amendments made no change to the central purpose of IDEA or the text of §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Because Congress is presumed to be aware of, and to adopt, a judicial interpretation of a statute when it reenacts that law without change, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580, this Court will continue to read §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement absent a clear indication that Congress intended to repeal the provision or abrogate Burlington and Carter. The School District’s argument that §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) limits reimbursement to children who have previously received public special-education services is unpersuasive for several reasons: It is not supported by IDEA’s text, as the 1997 Amendments do not expressly prohibit reimbursement in this case and the School District offers no evidence that Congress intended to supersede Burlington and Carter; it is at odds with IDEA’s remedial purpose of “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special education … designed to meet their unique needs,” §1400(d)(1)(A); and it would produce a rule bordering on the irrational by providing a remedy when a school offers a child inadequate special-education services but leaving parents remediless when the school unreasonably denies access to such services altogether. Pp. 8–15.
(c) The School District’s argument that any conditions on accepting IDEA funds must be stated unambiguously is clearly satisfied here, as States have been on notice at least since Burlington that IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement. The School District’s claims that respondent’s reading will impose a heavy financial burden on public schools and encourage parents to enroll their children in private school without first trying to cooperate with public-school authorities are also unpersuasive in light of the restrictions on reimbursement awards identified in Burlington and the fact that parents unilaterally change their child’s placement at their own financial risk. See, e.g., Carter, 510 U. S., at 15. Pp. 15–16.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq., requires States receiving federal funding to make a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) available to all children with disabilities residing in the State, §1412(a)(1)(A). We have previously held that when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 370 (1985). The question presented in this case is whether the IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Amendments), 111 Stat. 37, categorically prohibit reimbursement for private-education costs if a child has not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). We hold that the Amendments impose no such categorical bar.
Respondent T. A. attended public schools in the Forest Grove School District (School District or District) from the time he was in kindergarten through the winter of his junior year of high school. From kindergarten through eighth grade, respondent’s teachers observed that he had trouble paying attention in class and completing his assignments. When respondent entered high school, his difficulties increased.
In December 2000, during respondent’s freshman year, his mother contacted the school counselor to discuss respondent’s problems with his schoolwork. At the end of the school year, respondent was evaluated by a school psychologist. After interviewing him, examining his school records, and administering cognitive ability tests, the psychologist concluded that respondent did not need further testing for any learning disabilities or other health impairments, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The psychologist and two other school officials discussed the evaluation results with respondent’s mother in June 2001, and all agreed that respondent did not qualify for special-education services. Respondent’s parents did not seek review of that decision, although the hearing examiner later found that the School District’s evaluation was legally inadequate because it failed to address all areas of suspected disability, including ADHD.
With extensive help from his family, respondent completed his sophomore year at Forest Grove High School, but his problems worsened during his junior year. In February 2003, respondent’s parents discussed with the School District the possibility of respondent completing high school through a partnership program with the local community college. They also sought private professional advice, and in March 2003 respondent was diagnosed with ADHD and a number of disabilities related to learning and memory. Advised by the private specialist that respondent would do best in a structured, residential learning environment, respondent’s parents enrolled him at a private academy that focuses on educating children with special needs.
Four days after enrolling him in private school, respondent’s parents hired a lawyer to ascertain their rights and to give the School District written notice of respondent’s private placement. A few weeks later, in April 2003, respondent’s parents requested an administrative due process hearing regarding respondent’s eligibility for special-education services. In June 2003, the District engaged a school psychologist to assist in determining whether respondent had a disability that significantly interfered with his educational performance. Respondent’s parents cooperated with the District during the evaluation process. In July 2003, a multidisciplinary team met to discuss whether respondent satisfied IDEA’s disability criteria and concluded that he did not because his ADHD did not have a sufficiently significant adverse impact on his educational performance. Because the School District maintained that respondent was not eligible for special-education services and therefore declined to provide an individualized education program (IEP),[Footnote 1] respondent’s parents left him enrolled at the private academy for his senior year.
The School District sought judicial review pursuant to §1415(i)(2), arguing that the hearing officer erred in granting reimbursement. The District Court accepted the hearing officer’s findings of fact but set aside the reimbursement award after finding that the 1997 Amendments categorically bar reimbursement of private-school tuition for students who have not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” §612(a)(10)(C)(ii), 111 Stat. 63, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The District Court further held that, “[e]ven assuming that tuition reimbursement may be ordered in an extreme case for a student not receiving special education services, under general principles of equity where the need for special education was obvious to school authorities,” the facts of this case do not support equitable relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court first noted that, prior to the 1997 Amendments, “IDEA was silent on the subject of private school reimbursement, but courts had granted such reimbursement as ‘appropriate’ relief under principles of equity pursuant to 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(2)(C).” 523 F. 3d 1078, 1085 (2008) (citing Burlington, 471 U. S., at 370). It then held that the Amendments do not impose a categorical bar to reimbursement when a parent unilaterally places in private school a child who has not previously received special-education services through the public school. Rather, such students “are eligible for reimbursement, to the same extent as before the 1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’ relief pursuant to §1415(i)(2)(C).” 523 F. 3d, at 1087–1088.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court’s analysis of the equities as resting on two legal errors. First, because it found that §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) generally bars relief in these circumstances, the District Court wrongly stated that relief was appropriate only if the equities were sufficient to “ ‘override’ ” that statutory limitation. The District Court also erred in asserting that reimbursement is limited to “ ‘extreme’ ” cases. Id., at 1088 (emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals therefore remanded with instructions to reexamine the equities, including the failure of respondent’s parents to notify the School District before removing respondent from public school. In dissent, Judge Rymer stated her view that reimbursement is not available as an equitable remedy in this case because respondent’s parents did not request an IEP before removing him from public school and respondent’s right to a FAPE was therefore not at issue.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Burlington provides the pertinent background for our analysis of the question presented. In that case, respondent challenged the appropriateness of the IEP developed for his child by public-school officials. The child had previously received special-education services through the public school. While administrative review was pending, private specialists advised respondent that the child would do best in a specialized private educational setting, and respondent enrolled the child in private school without the school district’s consent. The hearing officer concluded that the IEP was not adequate to meet the child’s educational needs and that the school district therefore failed to provide the child a FAPE. Finding also that the private-school placement was appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse respondent for the cost of the private-school tuition.
We granted certiorari in Burlington to determine whether IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private education when a parent or guardian unilaterally enrolls a child in private school because the public school has proposed an inadequate IEP and thus failed to provide a FAPE. The Act at that time made no express reference to the possibility of reimbursement, but it authorized a court to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).[Footnote 5] In determining the scope of the relief authorized, we noted that “the ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court” and that, absent any indication to the contrary, what relief is “appropriate” must be determined in light of the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through publicly funded private-school placements when necessary. 471 U. S., at 369. Accordingly, we held that the provision’s grant of authority includes “the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special-education services if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.” Ibid.
Our decision rested in part on the fact that administrative and judicial review of a parent’s complaint often takes years. We concluded that, having mandated that participating States provide a FAPE for every student, Congress could not have intended to require parents to either accept an inadequate public-school education pending adjudication of their claim or bear the cost of a private education if the court ultimately determined that the private placement was proper under the Act. Id., at 370. Eight years later, we unanimously reaffirmed the availability of reimbursement in Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7 (1993) (holding that reimbursement may be appropriate even when a child is placed in a private school that has not been approved by the State).
The dispute giving rise to the present litigation differs from those in Burlington and Carter in that it concerns not the adequacy of a proposed IEP but the School District’s failure to provide an IEP at all. And, unlike respondent, the children in those cases had previously received public special-education services. These differences are insignificant, however, because our analysis in the earlier cases depended on the language and purpose of the Act and not the particular facts involved. Moreover, when a child requires special-education services, a school district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP. It is thus clear that the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies equally to this case. The only question is whether the 1997 Amendments require a different result.
Congress enacted IDEA in 1970[Footnote 6] to ensure that all children with disabilities are provided “ ‘a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of [such] children and their parents or guardians are protected.’ ” Burlington, 471 U. S., at 367 (quoting 20 U. S. C. §1400(c) (1982 ed.), now codified as amended at §§1400(d)(1)(A), (B)). After examining the States’ progress under IDEA, Congress found in 1997 that substantial gains had been made in the area of special education but that more needed to be done to guarantee children with disabilities adequate access to appropriate services. See S. Rep. No. 105–17, p. 5 (1997). The 1997 Amendments were intended “to place greater emphasis on improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality public education.” Id., at 3.
Consistent with that goal, the Amendments preserved the Act’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all children with disabilities. And they did not change the text of the provision we considered in Burlington, §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which gives courts broad authority to grant “appropriate” relief, including reimbursement for the cost of private special education when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). Accordingly, absent a clear expression elsewhere in the Amendments of Congress’ intent to repeal some portion of that provision or to abrogate our decisions in Burlington and Carter, we will continue to read §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize the relief respondent seeks.
Looking primarily to clauses (i) and (ii), the School District argues that Congress intended §1412(a)(10)(C) to provide the exclusive source of authority for courts to order reimbursement when parents unilaterally enroll a child in private school. According to the District, clause (i) provides a safe harbor for school districts that provide a FAPE by foreclosing reimbursement in those circumstances. Clause (ii) then sets forth the circumstance in which reimbursement is appropriate—namely, when a school district fails to provide a FAPE to a child who has previously received special-education services through the public school. The District contends that because §1412(a)(10)(C) only discusses reimbursement for children who have previously received special-education services through the public school, IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance. The dissent agrees.
For several reasons, we find this argument unpersuasive. First, the School District’s reading of the Act is not supported by its text and context, as the 1997 Amendments do not expressly prohibit reimbursement under the circumstances of this case, and the District offers no evidence that Congress intended to supersede our decisions in Burlington and Carter. Clause (i)’s safe harbor explicitly bars reimbursement only when a school district makes a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs. The clause says nothing about the availability of reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. Indeed, its statement that reimbursement is not authorized when a school district provides a FAPE could be read to indicate that reimbursement is authorized when a school district does not fulfill that obligation.
The School District’s reading of §1412(a)(10)(C) is also at odds with the general remedial purpose underlying IDEA and the 1997 Amendments. The express purpose of the Act is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs,” §1400(d)(1)(A)—a factor we took into account in construing the scope of §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), see Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369. Without the remedy respondent seeks, a “child’s right to a free appropriate education … would be less than complete.” Id., at 370. The District’s position similarly conflicts with IDEA’s “child find” requirement, pursuant to which States are obligated to “identif[y], locat[e], and evaluat[e]” “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State” to ensure that they receive needed special-education services. §1412(a)(3)(A); see §1412(a)(10)(A)(ii). A reading of the Act that left parents without an adequate remedy when a school district unreasonably failed to identify a child with disabilities would not comport with Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services.
Indeed, by immunizing a school district’s refusal to find a child eligible for special-education services no matter how compelling the child’s need, the School District’s interpretation of §1412(a)(10)(C) would produce a rule bordering on the irrational. It would be particularly strange for the Act to provide a remedy, as all agree it does, when a school district offers a child inadequate special-education services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such services altogether. That IDEA affords parents substantial procedural safeguards, including the right to challenge a school district’s eligibility determination and obtain prospective relief, see post, at 11, is no answer. We roundly rejected that argument in Burlington, observing that the “review process is ponderous” and therefore inadequate to ensure that a school’s failure to provide a FAPE is remedied with the speed necessary to avoid detriment to the child’s education. 471 U. S., at 370. Like Burlington, see ibid., this case vividly demonstrates the problem of delay, as respondent’s parents first sought a due process hearing in April 2003, and the District Court issued its decision in May 2005—almost a year after respondent graduated from high school. The dissent all but ignores these shortcomings of IDEA’s procedural safeguards.
The School District advances two additional arguments for reading the Act to foreclose reimbursement in this case. First, the District contends that because IDEA was an exercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1, any conditions attached to a State’s acceptance of funds must be stated unambiguously. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Applying that principle, we held in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 304 (2006), that IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, §1415(i)(3)(B), does not authorize courts to award expert-services fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions because the Act does not put States on notice of the possibility of such awards. But Arlington is readily distinguishable from this case. In accepting IDEA funding, States expressly agree to provide a FAPE to all children with disabilities. See §1412(a)(1)(A). An order awarding reimbursement of private-education costs when a school district fails to provide a FAPE merely requires the district “to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along.” Burlington, 471 U. S., at 370–371. And States have in any event been on notice at least since our decision in Burlington that IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of private special-education services in appropriate circumstances. Pennhurst’s notice requirement is thus clearly satisfied.
Finally, the District urges that respondent’s reading of the Act will impose a substantial financial burden on public school districts and encourage parents to immediately enroll their children in private school without first endeavoring to cooperate with the school district. The dissent echoes this concern. See post, at 10. For several reasons, those fears are unfounded. Parents “are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the Act.” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15. And even then courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant—for instance, if the parents failed to give the school district adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school. In considering the equities, courts should generally presume that public-school officials are properly performing their obligations under IDEA. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 62–63 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). As a result of these criteria and the fact that parents who “ ‘unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk,’ ” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15 (quoting Burlington, 471 U. S., at 373–374), the incidence of private-school placement at public expense is quite small, see Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14.
The IDEA Amendments of 1997 did not modify the text of §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and we do not read §1412(a)(10)(C) to alter that provision’s meaning. Consistent with our decisions in Burlington and Carter, we conclude that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education or related services through the public school.
When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents and the school district’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s private education is warranted. As the Court of Appeals noted, the District Court did not properly consider the equities in this case and will need to undertake that analysis on remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
“Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility.
“If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.
An IEP is an education plan tailored to a child’s unique needs that is designed by the school district in consultation with the child’s parents after the child is identified as eligible for special-education services. See 20 U. S. C. §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d).
Although it was respondent’s parents who initially sought reimbursement, when respondent reached the age of majority in 2003 his parents’ rights under IDEA transferred to him pursuant to Ore. Admin. Rule 581–015–2325(1) (2008).
Compare Frank G. v. Board of Ed. of Hyde Park, 459 F. 3d 356, 376 (CA2 2006) (holding that §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not bar reimbursement for students who have not previously received public special-education services), and M. M. v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 437 F. 3d 1085, 1099 (CA11 2006) (per curiam) (same), with Greenland School Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F. 3d 150, 159–160 (CA1 2004) (finding reimbursement barred in those circumstances).
The legislation was enacted as the Education of the Handicapped Act, title VI of Pub. L. 91–230, 84 Stat. 175, and was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990, see §901(a)(3), Pub. L. 101–476, 104 Stat. 1142.
The dissent asserts that, under this reading of the Act, “Congress has called for reducing reimbursement only for the most deserving … but provided no mechanism to reduce reimbursement to the least deserving.” Post, at 6 (opinion of Souter, J.). In addition to making unsubstantiated generalizations about the desert of parents whose children have been denied public special-education services, the dissent grossly mischaracterizes our view of §1412(a)(10)(C). The fact that clause (iii) permits a court to reduce a reimbursement award when a parent whose child has previously received special-education services fails to give the school adequate notice of an intended private placement does not mean that it prohibits courts from similarly reducing the amount of reimbursement when a parent whose child has not previously received services fails to give such notice. Like clause (ii), clause (iii) provides guidance regarding the appropriateness of relief in a common factual scenario, and its instructions should not be understood to preclude courts and hearing officers from considering similar factors in other scenarios.
In arguing that §1412(a)(10)(C) is the exclusive source of authority for granting reimbursement awards to parents who unilaterally place a child in private school, the dissent neglects to explain that provision’s failure to limit the type of private-school placements for which parents may be reimbursed. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass. held that courts may grant reimbursement under §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) only when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate. See 471 U. S. 359, 369 (1985); see Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, 12–13 (1993). The latter requirement is essential to ensuring that reimbursement awards are granted only when such relief furthers the purposes of the Act. See Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369. That §1412(a)(10)(C) did not codify that requirement further indicates that Congress did not intend that provision to supplant §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) as the sole authority on reimbursement awards but rather meant to augment the latter provision and our decisions construing it.
As discussed above, although the children in Burlington and Carter had previously received special-education services in public school, our decisions in no way depended on their prior receipt of services. Those holdings rested instead on the breadth of the authority conferred by §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing relief consistent with the Act’s purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would produce, see Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369–370; see also Carter, 510 U. S., at 12–14—considerations that were not altered by the 1997 Amendments.
For the same reason, we reject the District’s argument that because §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) authorizes “a court or a hearing officer” to award reimbursement for private-school tuition, whereas §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) only provides a general grant of remedial authority to “court[s],” the latter section cannot be read to authorize hearing officers to award reimbursement. That argument ignores our decision in Burlington, 471 U. S., at 363, 370, which interpreted §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize hearing officers as well as courts to award reimbursement notwithstanding the provision’s silence with regard to hearing officers. When Congress amended IDEA without altering the text of §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), it implicitly adopted that construction of the statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580–581 (1978).
Looking to the Amendments’ legislative history for support, the School District cites two House and Senate Reports that essentially restate the text of §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), H. R. Rep. No. 105–95, pp. 92–93 (1997); S. Rep. No. 105–17, p. 13 (1997), and a floor statement by Representative Mike Castle, 143 Cong. Rec. 8013 (1997) (stating that the “bill makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school districts”). Those ambiguous references do not undermine the meaning that we discern from the statute’s language and context.
Notably, the agency charged with implementing IDEA has adopted respondent’s reading of the statute. In commentary to regulations implementing the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education stated that “hearing officers and courts retain their authority, recognized in Burlington … to award ‘appropriate’ relief if a public agency has failed to provide FAPE, including reimbursement … in instances in which the child has not yet received special education and related services.” 64 Fed. Reg. 12602 (1999); see 71 Fed. Reg. 46599 (2006).
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359 (1985), held that the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq., authorized a district court to order reimbursement of private school tuition and expenses to parents who took their disabled child from public school because the school’s special education services did not meet the child’s needs. We said that, for want of any specific limitation, this remedy was within the general authorization for courts to award “such relief as [they] determin[e] is appropriate.” §1415(e)(2) (1982 ed.) (now codified at §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006 ed.)). In 1997, however, Congress amended the IDEA with a number of provisions explicitly addressing the issue of “[p]ayment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.” §1412(a)(10)(C). These amendments generally prohibit reimbursement if the school district made a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) available, §1412(a)(10)(C)(i), and if they are to have any effect, there is no exception except by agreement, §1412(a)(10)(B), or for a student who previously received special education services that were inadequate, §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The majority says otherwise and holds that §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) places no limit on reimbursements for private tuition. The Court does not find the provision clear enough to affect the rule in Burlington, and it does not believe Congress meant to limit public reimbursement for unilaterally incurred private school tuition. But there is no authority for a heightened standard before Congress can alter a prior judicial interpretation of a statute, and the assessment of congressional policy aims falls short of trumping what seems to me to be the clear limitation imposed by §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
In Burlington, parents of a child with a learning disability tried for over eight years to work out a satisfactory individualized education plan (IEP) for their son. 471 U. S., at 361–362. They eventually gave up and sent the boy to a private school for disabled children, id., at 362, and we took the ensuing case to decide whether the Education of the Handicapped Act authorized courts to order reimbursement for private special education “if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act,” id., at 369. After noting various sections that “emphasiz[e] the participation of the parents in developing the child’s [public] educational program,” id., at 368, we inferred that the Act authorized reimbursement by providing that a district court shall “ ‘grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate,’ ” id., at 369 (quoting what is now §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); alteration in original). We emphasized that the Act did not speak specifically to the issue of reimbursement, and held that “[a]bsent other reference,” reimbursement for private tuition and expenses would be an “ ‘appropriate’ ” remedy in light of the purposes of the Act. Id., at 369–370. In short, we read the general provision for ordering equitable remedies in §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) as authorizing a reimbursement order, in large part because Congress had not spoken more specifically to the issue.
“. . . this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education . . . of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility.” §1412(a)(10)(C).
“If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.” §1412(a)(10)(C).
Two additional clauses spell out in some detail various facts upon which the reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be “reduced or denied.” See §§1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) and (iv).
As a purely semantic matter, these provisions are ambiguous in their silence about the case with no previous special education services and no FAPE available. As the majority suggests, ante, at 10–11, clause (i) could theoretically be understood to imply that reimbursement may be ordered whenever a school district fails to provide a FAPE, and clause (ii) could be read as merely taking care to mention one of a variety of circumstances in which such reimbursement is permitted. But this is overstretching. When permissive language covers a special case, the natural sense of it is taken to prohibit what it fails to authorize. When a mother tells a boy that he may go out and play after his homework is done, he knows what she means.
So does anyone who reads the authorization of a reimbursement order in the case of “a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).[Footnote 1] If the mother did not mean that the homework had to be done, why did she mention it at all, and if Congress did not mean to restrict reimbursement authority by reference to previous receipt of services, why did it even raise the subject? “[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . . ” Corley v. United States, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted). But not on the Court’s reading, under which clause (ii) does nothing but describe a particular subset of cases subject to remedial authority already given to courts by §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) and recognized in Burlington: a court may order reimbursement for a child who previously received special education related services, but it may do this for any other child, too.[Footnote 2] But this is just not plausible, the notion that Congress added a new provision to the IDEA entitled “Reimbursement for private school placement” that had no effect whatsoever on reimbursement for private school placement. I would read clause (i) as written on the assumption that the school authorities can be expected to honor their obligations and as stating the general rule that unilateral placement cannot be reimbursed. See §1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (“In general . . . ”). And I would read clause (ii) as imposing a receipt of prior services limit on any exceptions to that general rule when school officials fall short of providing a FAPE. See §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (“Reimbursement for private school placement . . . ”).
This reading can claim the virtue of avoiding a further anomaly. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), which limits otherwise available reimbursement, is expressly directed to “[t]he cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii).” This makes perfect sense under my reading. Since clause (ii) is now the exclusive source of authority to order reimbursement, it is natural to refer to it in the clause setting out the conditions for reducing or even denying reimbursement otherwise authorized. Yet, as T. A. and the Government concede, Brief for Respondent 22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 17, under the majority’s reading, Congress has called for reducing reimbursement only for the most deserving (parents described in clause (ii) who consult with the school district and give public special education services a try before demanding payment for private education), but provided no mechanism to reduce reimbursement to the least deserving (parents who have not given public placement a chance).
The Court responds to this point by doubling down. According to the majority, the criteria listed in clause (iii) can justify a reduction not only of “reimbursement described in clause (ii),” §1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), but can also do so for a reimbursement order authorized elsewhere as well, ante, at 11 n. 8. That is, the majority avoids ascribing perverse motives to Congress by concluding that in both clause (ii) and clause (iii), Congress meant to add nothing to the statutory scheme. This simply leads back to the question of why Congress in §1412(a)(10)(C) would have been so concerned with cases in which children had not previously received special education services when, on the majority’s reading, the prior receipt of services has no relevance whatsoever to the subject of that provision.
Neither the majority’s clear statement rule nor its policy considerations prevail over the better view of the 1997 Amendments.
The majority says that, because of our previous interpretation of the Act as authorizing reimbursement for unilateral private placement, Congress was obliged to speak with added clarity to alter the statute as so understood. Ante, at 8–12. The majority refers to two distinct principles for support: first, statutes are to be read with a presumption against implied repeals, e.g., ante, at 12–13 (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion)), and second, congressional reenactment of statutory text without change is deemed to ratify a prior judicial interpretation of it, e.g., ante, at 8–9 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978)). I think neither principle is up to the task.
Section 1412(a)(10)(C) in no way repealed the provision we considered in Burlington.[Footnote 3] The relief that “is appropriate” under §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) depends on the substantive provisions of the IDEA as surely as if the provision authorized equitable relief “consistent with the provisions of this statute.”[Footnote 4] When we applied §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) in Burlington, we expressly referred to those provisions and concluded that, in the absence of a specific rule, “appropriate” relief included the reimbursement sought. By introducing new restrictions on reimbursement, the 1997 Amendments produce a different conclusion about what relief is “appropriate.” But §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) remains in effect, just as it would remain in effect if Congress had explicitly amended the IDEA to prohibit reimbursement absent prior receipt of services.
As for the rule that reenactment incorporates prior interpretation, the Court’s reliance on it to preserve Burlington’s reading of §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) faces two hurdles. First, so far as I can tell, this maxim has never been used to impose a clear statement rule. If Congress does not suggest otherwise, reenacted statutory language retains its old meaning; but when a new enactment includes language undermining the prior reading, there is no presumption favoring the old, and the only course open is simply to read the revised statute as a whole. This is so because there is no reason to distinguish between amendments that occur in a single clause (as if Congress had placed all the changes in §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)), and those that take the form of a separate section (here, §1412(a)(10)(C)). If Congress had added a caveat within §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), or in an immediately neighboring provision, I assume the majority would not approach it with skepticism on the ground that it purported to modify a prior judicial interpretation.
Second, nothing in my reading of §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is inconsistent with the holdings of Burlington and the other prior decision on the subject, Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7 (1993). Our opinion in Burlington was expressly premised on there being no “other reference” that would govern reimbursement for private tuition, 471 U. S., at 369, and this all but invited Congress to provide one. Congress’s provision of such a reference in 1997 is, to say the very least, no reason for skepticism that Congress wished to alter the law on reimbursement. The 1997 legislation, read my way, would not, however, alter the result in either Burlington or Carter. In each case, the school district had agreed that the child was disabled, the parents had cooperated with the district and tried out an IEP, and the only question was whether parents who later resorted to a private school could be reimbursed “ ‘if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.’ ” Carter, supra, at 12 (quoting Burlington, supra, at 369). In ordering reimbursement, the Court in both Burlington and Carter emphasized that the parents took part in devising an IEP, 471 U. S., at 368; 510 U. S., at 12, and expressed concern for parents who had sought an IEP before placing their child in private school, but received one that was inadequate, 471 U. S., at 370; 510 U. S., at 12. The result in each case would have been the same under my reading of the amended Act, both sets of parents being “parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). It is therefore too much to suggest that my reading of §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) would “abrogat[e] sub silentio our decisions in Burlington and Carter,” ante, at 12.
The majority argues that the policy concerns vindicated in Burlington and Carter justify reading those cases to authorize a reimbursement authority going beyond their facts, ante, at 7–8, and would hold reimbursement possible even for parents who, like those here, unilaterally resort to a private school without first establishing at the administrative or appellate level that the child is disabled, or engaging in a collaborative process with the school officials. But how broadly one should read Burlington and Carter is beside the point, Congress having explicitly addressed the subject with statutory language that precludes the Court’s result today.
The Court also rejects the natural sense of §1412(a)(10)(C) as an interpretation that would be “at odds with the general remedial purpose underlying IDEA and the 1997 Amendments.” Ante, at 13. The majority thinks my reading would place the school authorities in total control of parents’ eligibility for reimbursement: just refuse any request for special education or services in the public school, and the prior service condition for eligibility under clause (ii) can never be satisfied. Thus, as the majority puts it, it would “borde[r] on the irrational” to “immuniz[e] a school district’s refusal to find a child eligible for special-education services no matter how compelling the child’s need.” Ibid. I agree that any such scheme would be pretty absurd, but there is no absurdity here. The majority’s suggestion overlooks the terms of the IDEA process, the substantial procedures protecting a child’s substantive rights under the IDEA, and the significant costs of its rule.
To start with the costs, special education can be immensely expensive, amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually and as much as 20% of public schools’ general operating budgets. See Brief for Council of the Great City Schools as Amicus Curiae 22–23. The more private placement there is, the higher the special education bill, a fact that lends urgency to the IDEA’s mandate of a collaborative process in which an IEP is “developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child’s teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child.” Burlington, supra, at 368.
Likewise, no one is unsure whether this Court’s Rule 18.6, which states, “Within 30 days after the case is placed on this Court’s docket, the appellee may file a motion to dismiss . . . ,” allows for a motion to dismiss after 30 days. See also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 431–32 (1996) (listing numerous examples of permissive statements, such as then Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(d)’s statement that a subpoena “may be served” by a person “who is not less than 18 years of age,” that plainly carry a restrictive meaning).
The majority says that “clause (ii) is best read as elaborating on the general rule that courts may order reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that may affect a reimbursement award in the common situation in which a school district has provided a child with some special-education services and the child’s parents believe those services are inadequate.” Ante, at 11. But this is just another way of reading the provision off the books. On the majority’s reading, clause (ii) states only that a court may award reimbursement when (1) there is a previous receipt of special education services and (2) a failure to provide a FAPE. Such a description of the most common subset of a category already described may be called elaboration, but it still has no effect on the statutory scheme.
The majority argues that we already rejected this process as inadequate in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359 (1985). Ante, at 14. That was before the enactment of §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The question in Burlington was whether the reimbursement there was an “appropriate” remedy under §1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See 471 U. S., at 370. With no statement to the contrary from Congress, the Court expressed concern over the possible length of the IDEA review process and surmised that Congress would have intended for reimbursement to be authorized. Ibid. But Congress provided a statement to the contrary in 1997; the only reading that gives effect to §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is that reimbursement is not permitted absent prior placement, and the only question for the Court now is whether Congress could have meant what it said.
See 143 Cong. Rec. 8013 (1997) (statement of Rep. Castle) (“This law . . . has had unintended and costly consequences. . . . It has resulted in school districts unnecessarily paying expensive private school tuition for children. It has resulted in cases where lawyers have gamed the system to the detriment of schools and children.” “This bill makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school districts”).