Imagine you own a million-dollar piece of property free and clear, but then the federal government and local law enforcement agents announce that they are going to take it from you, not compensate you one dime, and then use the money they get from selling your land to pad their budgets—all this even though you have never so much as been accused of a crime, let alone convicted of one.
That is the nightmare Russ Caswell and his family faced in Tewksbury, Mass., where the the federal government tried to take the family-operated motel they have owned for two generations.
Seeking to circumvent state law and cash in on the profits, the Tewksbury Police Department teamed up with the United States Department of Justice to take and sell the Caswell’s property because a tiny fraction of people staying there during the past 14 years were arrested for drug crimes. Keep in mind, the Caswells themselves have worked closely with law enforcement officials to prevent and report crime on their property. And during those 14 years, the government pointed to a mere fifteen arrests—out of more than 200,000 rooms rented during that time by the Caswells.
Despite all this, the Caswells could have lost literally everything they had worked for because of this effort by federal and local law enforcement officials not to pursue justice, but rather to police for profit.
The Institute for Justice, a national public interest law firm that fights civil forfeiture abuse nationwide, represented the Caswells in defense of their property and their constitutional rights. After a four-day trial, on January 24, 2013, a federal judge in Boston dismissed the forfeiture action against them ruling that the government engaged in “gross exaggeration” of the evidence and did not have authority to forfeit the property. The judge also held that the Caswells were themselves innocent owners of the property that took all reasonable actions to prevent crime on their property.
The U.S. Attorney’s office later announced that it would not appeal Judge Judith Dein’s decision so the Caswells’ victory is now final. The decision is a significant win for property rights, the rule of law, and a hard-working, law-abiding family bullied by the federal government.
Will a Trump Administration’s Support for Police Taking Citizens’ Property Trigger Needed Reforms?
Civil forfeiture—where the government can take and sell your property without ever charging you with a crime, let alone convicting you of one—is one of the greatest threats to property rights in the nation. To make matters worse, such forfeitures often fund law enforcement officials’ budgets, giving them a direct financial incentive to abuse this power. A prime example of the civil forfeiture abuse is taking place in Tewksbury, Mass., 30 minutes outside of Boston.
The Motel Caswell is a family-owned budget motel in Tewksbury. Russell and Pat Caswell have owned and operated the motel for nearly 30 years, since they took over management from Russ’s father in the 1980s. They live next door with Pat’s 91-year-old mother, their son and daughter-in-law, and granddaughter, tending to the business. Having survived for two generations as entrepreneurs, the Caswells have paid off the mortgage on the motel and they expected it to provide a nest egg for retirement.
Precisely because it is mortgage-free, the motel has now become an attractive target for taking by federal and local law enforcement officials who seek to cash in on what the Caswells have earned.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Tewksbury police department are demanding the Caswells forfeit the entire property—worth more than a million dollars— because a tiny fraction of people who have stayed at the Motel Caswell during the past 20 years have been arrested for crimes. Keep in mind, the Caswells themselves have worked closely with law enforcement officials to prevent and report crime on their property. And the arrests the government complains of represent less than .05 percent of the 125,000 rooms the Caswells have rented over that period of time. Indeed, the government’s lawsuit identifies only 19 arrests of guests staying the motel during the past 18 years as the basis of the forfeiture.
The government does not allege that the Caswells have done anything illegal. But under civil forfeiture laws, innocent people can lose their property—with no compensation whatsoever—if the government believes it was used to “facilitate a crime.” So unless the Caswells can prove in court that they did everything they could do to prevent crime on their land, the motel—everything they have worked their lives for—will become the government’s property. In short, civil forfeiture treats law abiding citizens worse than criminals, presuming them guilty until they can prove their innocence—a heavy burden for any property owner against the power and resources of the government.
Unlike criminal cases, which charge people with wrong doing, a civil forfeiture case is an in rem proceeding (which means literally “against a thing”); the property itself is said to have acted wrongly and is being sued. The idea behind forfeiture was adopted centuries ago in British law to allow customs agents to seize ships and cargo that were in violation of customs laws. Since the owners of the ships were often on another continent, and ownership of the goods and cargo was not clear, it was justified as the only way to enforce the law. Forfeiture is now wrongly used by law enforcement in modern America to take property that police merely suspect of being involved in crime.
Under federal law, the property that law enforcement agents take is, incredibly, kept by those same agencies—going straight to the bottom line of their budgets. When local law enforcement agencies team up with the U.S. Department of Justice, the federal government takes the property and pays out up to 80 percent of the money to local or state law enforcement agencies—something it calls “equitable sharing” of forfeiture proceeds.
That is what is happening in this case: If the federal government succeeds in the forfeiture of the Caswell’s property, it will send nearly one million dollars to the Tewksbury police department, keeping the rest for itself, and leaving the Caswells with nothing but the loss and destruction of their life’s work.
Civil forfeiture creates a perverse incentive for police to target innocent owners and their assets rather than aiming for justice and public safety. No one in the United States should lose their property without being convicted of or even charged with any crime. This case shows that fair and impartial law enforcement cannot exist as long as we allow this policing for profit.
That is why the Institute for Justice is joining with the Caswells to defend their rights as innocent owners, and fight the perverse, unconstitutional incentives for law enforcement created by civil forfeiture and equitable sharing agreements.
Russ Caswell was a boy when his father built the motel in 1955. For decades, it prospered as reasonably priced overnight accommodations for families on road trips and truckers traveling on the newly built interstate highway system. Annette Funicello and the Mouseketeers stayed there during an early tour. In more recent decades, however, with truckers increasingly sleeping in their rigs and changes to the freeway system, the Caswells have found themselves in a less amiable spot for vacationers. Meanwhile, the Town of Tewksbury has become increasingly subject to gang and drug activity.
The Caswells have faced these changes as entrepreneurs and found ways to hang on. Today they provide budget accommodations not only for the travelers that still come to Tewksbury, but to some locals in need of temporary housing. In prior years, the motel has housed families placed there by Catholic Charities and it served as temporary quarters for people facing the distress of eviction or foreclosure. The Caswells have also taken in families on welfare for short periods. The Motel Caswell is a simple, clean, safe place to stay for under $50 a night.
Unfortunately, the Caswells have had no better success in escaping crime than anyone else in their neighborhood. It is hard to know what people do behind closed doors, of course, and some people who have stayed at the motel have been involved in drug activity. But the Caswells have not taken this lying down, especially in light of the pride they take in their business and the fact that their family lives right next door. Whenever they become aware of illegal activity, they call the police and cooperate with them fully. The police acknowledge this.
In fact, the Caswells have gone above and beyond the law. They have installed security cameras, they photocopy customer’s identification and record their license plates, and they routinely turn that information over to police for their review. Indeed, in nearly 60 years, no one from the town or the police have told them to do more than they have done to reduce crime or that their property might be at risk for failure to do so. As far as the Caswells were aware, they enjoyed a cooperative relationship with authorities.
Yet, after years of telling the Caswells nothing, the local police and the federal government now take the position that they should have prevented more crime from occurring on their property. How much crime should the Caswells have prevented? No one knows. The governments’ position is simply that the arrests that have occurred there over the past 18 years are too much. And the penalty is the loss of the property that they have spent nearly their entirely working lives to earn.
Of course, the Motel Caswell is not the only property in Tewksbury that has had run ins with crime. According to police logs, the Motel 6, the Fairfield Inn, and even the nearby Wal-Mart and Home Depot parking lots have similar problems. But those properties are corporate-owned, which means the government would have to fight teams of lawyers to take them. And, importantly, the Caswells own their property free and clear, which makes them the perfect target for a government interested in policing for profit: the Caswells are vulnerable and their property is valuable.
Civil forfeiture is the governmental power to take property suspected of involvement in crime. Unlike criminal forfeiture, in which the ill-gotten gains of criminal activity may be seized after an individual is convicted of the crime, police and prosecutors can use civil forfeiture to take away cash, cars, homes or other property without having to convict or even charge the owner of any wrongdoing.
Although its use is widespread throughout the United States, civil forfeiture is not widely recognized or understood. Because civil forfeiture proceedings are against the property, as if the property somehow acted to assist in the commission of a crime, the government can take it despite the innocence of its owner. That is why civil forfeiture cases have unusual names such as United States v.434 Main Street, Tewskbury, Massachusetts—the case involving the Motel Caswell.
Civil forfeiture was originally adopted in America from British law. It may have had its purpose as used in the 19th century as a means for fighting piracy on the high seas or in customs law, where one might never be able to arrest the criminal but could at least take away the ill-gotten gains of criminal activity, but modern civil forfeiture is no longer tied to the practical necessities of enforcing maritime or customs law. Now the forfeiture power applies to a broad range of crimes. Nearly all states and the federal government frequently use civil forfeiture laws.
The use of civil forfeiture has expanded dramatically in the modern era since the 1980s as a part of the “war on drugs.” When civil forfeiture is stretched to seize property from people like the Caswells, who have no involvement in the crimes that have been committed by third-parties staying in their motel rooms, it is simply unnecessary and unconscionable. The Caswell’s ownership of their property has nothing whatsoever to do with “ill-gotten gains” from criminal activity. They do not bear any relationship to a pirate or smuggler, incapable of being made to answer to charges brought by the government: the Caswells live on the property and have been there for 30 years. They are eager to cooperate with police and see crime reduced in their neighborhood.
Nonetheless, using federal civil forfeiture law, enforcement agencies are able to keep all of the property and currency they take to pad their own budgets. This direct financial incentive was put into federal law in 1985. Prior 1985, federal forfeiture proceeds did not go automatically to the seizing agency but went to the general revenue fund of the United States, where Congress then decided how such revenue would be appropriated to law enforcement or to other government functions.
Before 1985, forfeiture revenue was modest. After the profit incentive was put into the law, forfeiture revenue exploded—and it has been growing ever since. In 1986, the year after the U.S. Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund was created—the fund that holds the forfeiture proceeds from properties forfeited under federal law and available to be paid out to law enforcement agencies—took in just $93.7 million. Today it holds more than $1.6 billion.1 Though so-called “equitable sharing agreements,” federal law extends this profit incentive to state and local law enforcement agencies. In equitable sharing cases, the DOJ may pay up to 80 percent of the proceeds of forfeiture to state and local law local agencies.
When law enforcement agencies grab assets in forfeiture actions, this money may be used for better equipment, nicer offices, newer vehicles, trips to law enforcement conventions and even police salaries, bonuses or overtime pay. Thus, law enforcement agencies benefit in a very direct way from every dollar in assets and currency they manage to seize and forfeit. This profit motive forms the rotten core of forfeiture abuse.
The second way civil forfeiture is hard on property owners is by establishing a lower “standard of proof” under which the government can take the property. As most people know, the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” That is, the government must demonstrate to the jury that evidence shows that the accused individual committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This high standard exists to protect the rights of innocent individuals who might be accused of a crime. But innocent property owners enjoy no such protections. In only two states (Nebraska and Wisconsin) does the civil forfeiture standard match the criminal standard—“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under Massachusetts and federal law, however, the government must only assert “probable cause” to seize property and they can keep it if there is “preponderance of the evidence” that crimes occurred using the property. That standard says nothing, however, about whether the owner is guilty of any wrong doing.
Finally, federal law and the law in many states—including Massachusetts—shift the burden of proof from the government to the owner to prove that he or she is innocent of the crime in forfeiture cases. In other words, with civil forfeiture, property owners are effectively guilty until proven innocent. The increased burden (including substantial legal costs) of proving one’s innocence can result in owners abandoning rightful claims to seized property. And if owners do not fight civil forfeiture and the government wins by default, law enforcement agencies are more likely to engage in it.
Equitable sharing has led to a massive expansion in the number of civil forfeitures in part because—by pursuing a federal forfeiture—it often allows local law enforcement agencies to receive more money than the agency would receive under state law. As state legislatures have sought to reign in abuse of forfeiture laws by increasing the burden of proof required to seize property, or by prohibiting proceeds of forfeitures from going directly to the budget of the local law enforcement agency, such agencies have increasingly sidestepped state law, entering into the more profitable equitable sharing arrangements with federal law enforcement agencies.
This is not just theoretical. As a recent study published in The Journal of Criminal Justice concluded, “When state laws make forfeiture more difficult and less rewarding, agencies are even more apt to turn to the federal government’s easier and more generous forfeiture procedures.”4 Federal equitable sharing policy thereby provides a means and incentive for state and local law enforcement officials to circumvent unfavorable state forfeiture procedures, undermining attempts at reform by citizens and state legislatures.
In Massachusetts, the state law recognizes that others might use property in ways that are unlawful and not consented to by the owner. To avoid cases just like the Caswell’s, Massachusetts state law limits the seizure of property to the narrow circumstances in which the property owner “knew or should have known” that it was “used in and for the business of unlawfully manufacturing, dispensing, or distributing controlled substances.”5 To use a motel “in and for the business of” these unlawful purposes is clearly not what has ever happened at the Motel Caswell. State law certainly did not intend for innocent property owners to have their life’s work taken because the occasional low-level drug user or dealer rented a room under false pretenses, using it secretly until such time as the owners discovered and alerted authorities to the illegal activity.
By running to the federal government, however, and taking advantage of its more lax standards of proof, equitable sharing allows the Tewksbury police to ignore the policies written into law by the Massachusetts legislature and hold on to a million dollar payout from forfeiture.
Unfortunately, in past years, 80 percent of forfeitures occur without the property owner being charged with a crime and federal courts have not yet been clear enough about what an owner is expected to do to avoid having his property seized.6 The Caswells argue they should not have their property seized because they rented a room to someone for lawful purposes only to discover later that the person brought drugs on to the property and engaged in some unlawful activity.
A March 2010 report from the Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Forfeiture, shows just how widespread police profit from civil forfeiture has become. At the federal level, civil forfeiture has exploded. As stated previously, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund—the fund that holds the forfeiture proceeds from properties forfeited under federal law and available to be paid out to law enforcement agencies—now holds more than $1.6 billion. Payments from the federal government to state law enforcement agencies under equitable sharing agreements have risen to more than $400 million per year.
Policing for Profit, as well as numerous academic studies, shows that civil forfeiture is growing in size, has created an incentive for abusing innocent owners, and has warped law enforcement priorities and state policy. In order to limit the rapacious path of this abuse, IJ launched its nationwide civil forfeiture initiative to defend property owners in state and federal court. The Caswell’s case is IJ’s first challenge to federal rather than state forfeiture laws.
Van Meter v. Turner—IJ represented Georgia citizens to hold local law enforcement agencies—the Atlanta Police Department, Fulton County Police Department and Fulton County Sheriff—accountable under Georgia’s forfeiture reporting law. Georgia law requires that law enforcement agencies publish a report each year of all forfeitures they conduct and indicate how the money they receive is used. Despite the clear legal requirement to do so, these agencies never made such information public until IJ brought them to state court.
State of Texas v. One 2004 Chevrolet Silverado—The State of Texas took the truck of an innocent owner through civil forfeiture and refused to give it back. To right this outrage, and attack various unconstitutional aspects of Texas’ civil forfeiture laws, the Institute for Justice is representing small businessman Zaher El-Ali, a man the state admits had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity that led to his truck’s seizure.
Wells v. City of Riviera Beach— The Institute for Justice successfully defeated an attempt in Riviera Beach, Fla., to abuse its power of eminent domain and displace more than 5,000 residents for a massive private development project that included a yacht marina, luxury condominiums and upscale hotels.
City of Norwood v. Horney—In a resounding repudiation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously ruled in July 2006 that the city of Norwood acted unconstitutionally in its efforts to abuse eminent domain and take the homes of the Institute for Justice’s clients for a privately owned mall.
Kelo v. City of New London—Just three years after the landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kelo v. City of New London, which allowed private property to be taken for economic development, 43 states have tightened their restrictions on eminent domain. In 2007, IJ client Susette Kelo’s little pink cottage—the home that became a national symbol of the fight against eminent domain abuse—was moved so that it would not be demolished by the government’s wrecking ball.
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin—In a classic David versus Goliath battle, the Institute for Justice scored a major victory for property rights in July 1998 when the New Jersey Superior Court ruled a state agency could not condemn widow Vera Coking’s home of 37 years through eminent domain and give it to Donald Trump for his private development.
The Caswells are defended by Institute for Justice Senior Attorney Scott Bullock, who leads the Institute’s Civil Forfeiture Initiative and litigates property rights and economic liberties cases nationwide, and Attorneys Larry Salzman and Darpana Sheth, who also litigate property rights and economic liberties cases. For a year before IJ got involved, the Caswells were defended ably by George Skogstrom and Tiffany Pawson, from the law firm of Schlossberg, LLC, in Braintree, Mass., who remain on the team as local counsel. Bullock is a co-author of the groundbreaking IJ study of civil forfeiture, Policing for Profit. He argued the landmark U.S. Supreme Court property rights case, Kelo v. City of New London, one of the most controversial and widely discussed Supreme Court decisions in decades.
The Institute for Justice is based in Arlington, Va. IJ has state chapters in Arizona, Washington, Minnesota and Texas, as well as a Clinic on Entrepreneurship at the University of Chicago Law School.
 Ma. Ann. Stat. § 47(d); 21 USC 983(c).
 J.E. Holcomb, et al., Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011), p. 282.
 Ma. Ann. Stat. 94c §47(c)(3).
 Hyde, H, Forfeiting Our Property Rights: Is Your Property Safe From Seizure? p.6, Washington, D.C. (1995): Cato Institute .


text:
It was during Paul’s first missionary journey that the light of the Gospel first broke into the darkness of pagan Thessalonica.
The apostles were beaten and jailed in Philippi. They also were forced to flee Berea. Paul’s stay in the city was brief due to the violent persecution.
Acts 17 says it lasted through three successive Sabbath days, almost a month.
Despite the brevity of his visit, he instructed these new believers in many of the great doctrines of the faith.
One of the most important themes of the Epistle is the return of the Lord. It is mentioned at least once in each chapter. Also mentioned in each Chapter is the second epistle.
The Thessalonians displayed three outstanding spiritual virtues, which gave Paul reason for constant thanksgiving.
This would primarily refer to their conversion to God.
Then it would also include their life of faith following conversion.
Their faith was not of the empty theoretical kind.
It was a living, vibrant, energetic faith that manifested itself in power and intensity, in the face of adverse conditions.
It was the driving force that energized them in their work for God.
This was the same kind of faith that urged the heroes of Heb 11 to toil and die in their service for God. See Heb 11:33.
Their faith gave substance to the unseen things of which the Scriptures speak.
1. Self-denying labors of love to each other.
2. This speaks of their service for God motivated by their love for Jesus Christ.
Theirs was a determined, self-sacrificing love. This love drove them to labor and toil to the point of weariness and fatigue. Their love for Christ never wavered despite the tremendous cost. First love.
3) Their patience of hope – endurance of hope – Persevering endurance.
This hope is given by the indwelling Spirit.
This hope is their steadfast waiting for the return of the Lord.
These new believers were enduring tremendous persecution because of their faithfulness and love for Christ.
Despite the pressures, they were unmoved from their hope of the Lord’s return. Even though the evidences of their arduous circumstances were contradictory to their hope of the return of the Lord, they remained unshaken.
They believed God. Such hope produces unshakable steadfastness. See I Corinth 15-58.
V. 4—“Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God.” See 2 Thess 2:13.
Paul knew that they were among the elect by the way they received the gospel, and by the spiritual characteristics they displayed in their life.
Many people when viewing the Biblical truth of Election, picture God as a tyrant, damning or saving men at will.
The teaching of scripture rather gives the impression that election proceeds from God’s love.
It is not a device for sentencing men to eternal torment, but rather for rescuing them from it.
Election prevents us from thinking of salvation as dependent on human effort, and roots it squarely in the grace and will of God.
Our being saved is only because God by His Spirit convicted us and then saved us by His grace.
Our election took place before the foundation of the world. Eph 1-4.
V. 5—Notice how the gospel came to the Thessalonians.
It came with power—it came in the Holy Spirit—it came with assurance.
1. Paul’s presentation of Christ in the Gospel was not merely carefully arranged rhetoric, i.e. in word only.
As he preached, God’s power swept through the company. We need this power today.
The dynamic of the Gospel worked in their lives with spiritual energy, producing conviction of sin, repentance and conversion.
Also came to them in the Holy Spirit.
There are many kinds of power in the professing church (organization, publicity, oratory, wealth, music, talents of all descriptions).
But the kind of power that was seen in Thessalonica was the Holy Spirit’s power, which breaks the stony hearts of unbelief and leads men and women to Christ for salvation. Grips the mind, disturbs the conscience, makes drunken men sober, crooked men straight, warms the heart, saves the soul, and sanctifies the life.
3. The Gospel of Christ also came in much assurance.
The full assurance of their faith in Christ was the result of the Holy Spirit’s work in their lives.
They knew whom they had believed, etc. I Tim 1:15.
They were saved and they knew it and were fully assured that all the promises of God would be fulfilled, especially with regard to the Lord’s coming.
V. 7 The Thessalonians became reproducing Christians.
The spirit-filled church reproduces, it is indigenous, recreative, procreative, and generative. Their example under adverse conditions was an inspiration to the believers throughout Greece.
No other church was singled out by Paul and set forth as an example by which other churches should measure themselves.
V. 8 From you sounded forth the Word of God.
Not only was this young church an “evangelical church” – it was also a missionary church.
The Gospel sounded forth from them like the clear piercing blast of a trumpet, and like a roll of thunder echoing throughout Greece and re-echoing in distant places.
Rivers of life-giving water should flow from every assembly to those around, and then on into the regions beyond.
Another example of an evangelical and missionary church is the young church at Antioch.
There were five characteristics seen in their activities.
1. They preached the Lord Jesus.
2. The hand of the Lord was with them.
5. They were a missionary church.
V. 9 They turned to God from idols.
Rom 12:1, 2. Present your body. Living and true God in contrast to the dead and false idols.
Rom 6:19. As you presented your members as slaves to lawlessness, now present them as slaves to righteousness. Missionary.
The truth of sanctification. See Ch 4:3 – Ch 5:23. This is a setting aside of the total man for God. This entails being broken, God can only use broken believers. The power of sin must be broken – We must be totally at the Lord’s disposal.
V. 10 Wait for God’s Son from heaven.
God’s people should be waiting for the coming of the Lord momentarily. We should be watching as well as waiting.
The one we look for is God’s Son, Jesus, who will deliver us from the wrath to come.
1. The Lord delivered us from the eternal punishment of our sins.
On the cross He endured the wrath of God against our sin.
Through faith in Him, God reckoned our debt paid.
There is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus. Rom 8:1.
2. The second aspect is that the Lord will deliver us from the coming period when the wrath of God will be poured out on a world which rejected His Son.
This period is known as the Tribulation and the Great Tribulation.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
Westdahl bibliography: all known references that deal with Westdahl.
Li, J. D., Rude, C. M., Blair, D. M., Gowanlock, M. G., Herring, T. A., and Pankratius, V., 2016, Computer aided detection of transient inflation events at Alaskan volcanoes using GPS measurements from 2005-2015: Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, v. 327, p. 634-642.
Li, J.D., Rude, C.M., Blair, D.M., Gowanlock, M.G., Herring, T.A., and Pankratius, V., 2016, Computer aided detection of transient inflation events at Alaskan volcanoes using GPS measurements from 2005-2015: Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, v. 327, p. 634-642.
Larsen, J., Izbekov, P., Rader, E., Freymueller, J., 2008. Magma storage and movement at Okmok and Westdahl volcanoes, Alaska: Comparing experimental petrology with geophysical models [abs.]: IAVCEI 2008 Abstracts, August 17-22, Reykjavik, Iceland, p. 3.
Rader, E.L., and Larsen, J., 2008, Water under-saturated phase equilibria of basaltic andesites from Westdahl Volcano, Alaska [abs.]: Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union, v. 89, n. 53, 1 p.
Lu, Zhong, 2007, InSAR imaging of volcanic deformation over cloud-prone areas - Aleutian Islands: Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, v. 73, n. 3, p. 245-257.
Smellie, J.L, 2006, The relative importance of supraglacial versus subglacial meltwater escape in basaltic subglacial tuya eruptions; an important unresolved conundrum: Earth-Science Reviews, v. 74, n. 3-4, p. 241-268, doi:10.1016/j.earscirev.2005.09.004.
Calvert, A.T., Moore, R.B., and McGimsey, R.G., 2005, Argon geochronology of Late Pleistocene to Holocene Westdahl Volcano, Unimak Island, Alaska: in Haeussler, P.J., and Galloway, J.P., eds., Studies by the U.S. Geological Survey in Alaska, 2004, U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper PP 1709-D, 16 p.
Lu, Zhong, Rykhus, Russell, Masterlark, Tim, and Dean, K. G., 2004, Mapping recent lava flows at Westdahl Volcano, Alaska, using radar and optical satellite imagery: Remote Sensing of Environment, v. 91, p. 345-353.
Lu, Z., Masterlark, Tim, Dzurisin, Daniel, Rykhus, R., and Wicks, Charles, 2003, Magma supply dynamics at Westdahl volcano, Alaska, modeled from satellite radar interferometry: Journal of Geophysical Research, v. 108, n. B7, 17 p.
Lu, Zhong, Wicks, C. J., Dzurisin, Daniel, Power, John, Thatcher, Wayne, and Masterlark, Tim, 2003, Interferometric synthetic aperture radar studies of Alaska volcanoes: Earth Observation Magazine, v. 12, n. 3, p. 8-10.
Dean, K. G., Engle, K., Groves, J., Dehn, J., and Partington, K., 2002, Analysis of surface processes using SAR data; Westdahl Volcano, Alaska: International Journal of Remote Sensing, v. 23, n. 21, p. 4529-4550.
Lu, Zhong, Wicks, Charles, Dzurisin, Daniel, Thatcher, Wayne, Freymueller, J. T., McNutt, S. R., and Mann, Dorte, 2000, Aseismic inflation of Westdahl volcano, Alaska, revealed by satellite radar interferometry: Geophysical Research Letters, v. 27, n. 11, p. 1567-1570.
Lu, Zhong, Wicks, Charles, and Dzurisin, Daniel, 2000, Watching magma from space: Geotimes, v. 45, n. 11, p. 36-37.
Dzurisin, Daniel, 2000, Volcano geodesy: challenges and opportunities for the 21st century: in Francis, Peter, Neuberg, Juergen, and Sparks, R. S. J., The causes and consequences of eruptions of andesite volcanoes: papers of a discussion meeting, Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, v. 358, n. 1770, p. 1547-1566.
Dzurisin, Daniel, Lu, Zhong, Wicks, C. W., and Thatcher, Wayne, 1999, Inflation of Westdahl Volcano, Alaska: detected by satellite radar interferometry [abs.]: Eos, v. 80, n. 46, p. 1196.
George, R. M., Turner, Simon, Hawkesworth, Chris, and Nye, C. J., 1999, Along-arc U-Th-Ra systematics in the Aleutians [abs.]: Eos, v. 80, n. 46, p. 1202.
Dean, Ken, Engle, Kevin, George, Shari, Partington, Kim, and Dehn, Jon, 1999, Analysis of surface volcanic processes using SAR data: Westdahl Volcano, Alaska [abs.]: in Severin, Barb and Anderson, P. M., (eds.), Science in the north: 50 years of change, Arctic Science Conference, 50, Program and Abstracts, Denali National Park and Preserve, AK, Sept 19-22, 1999, p. 209-210.
Fournelle, J. H., Simkin, Tom, Marsh, B. D., and Blaustein, M. K., 1997, Shishaldin Volcano, Aleutians: 1975 eruption and FeTi basalts [abs.]: Eos, v. 78, n. 46, p. 794.
Dean, K. G., Engle, K., Lu, Z., Eichelberger, J., Neal, C., and Doukas, M., 1996, Use of SAR data to study active volcanoes in Alaska: in Circumpolar symposium, 4, Proceedings, Lyngby, Denmark, Apr. 29-May 1, 1996, Remote sensing of the polar environments, v. 391, Noordwijk, European Space Agency, p.153-158.
Lander, J.F., 1996, Tsunamis affecting Alaska: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, National Geophysical Data Center, Boulder, CO, 195 p.
McGimsey, R. G., 1995, Westdahl: in Annual report of the world volcanic eruptions in 1992, Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions, v. 32, p. 92-94.
Reeder, J. W., and Doukas, M., 1994, Westdahl: in Annual report of the world volcanic eruptions in 1991, Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions, v. 31, p. 83-86.
McGimsey, Game, 1993, Volcanic activity in Alaska: September 1991-September 1992: Earthquakes and Volcanoes, v. 24, n. 2, p. 60-73.
Associated Press, 1992, False Pass residents report rumbling under Westdahl volcano re Alaska earthquakes: The Tundra Drums, v. XIX, n. 40, Bethel, AK, p. 3.
Smithsonian Institution, 1992, Westdahl: Global Volcanism Network Bulletin v. 17, n. 01, unpaged.
Unknown, 1991, Eruption reported in Aleutian islands: Eos, v. 72, n. 50, p. 562.
Smithsonian Institution, 1991, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 16, n. 11, unpaged.
Smithsonian Institution, 1991, Westdahl: Global Volcanism Network Bulletin v. 16, n. 12, unpaged.
Associated Press, 1991, Geologists observe eruption from afar: Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, v. December 4, 1991, p. A5.
Morris, J.D., Leeman, W.P., and Tera, F., 1990, The subducted component in island arc lavas: constraints from Be isotopes and B-Be systematics: Nature, v. 344, p. 31-36.
Tera, Fouad, Brown, Louis, Morris, Julie, and Sacks, I.S., 1986, Sediment incorporation in island-arc magmas: inferences from 10Be: Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta, v. 50, p. 535-550.
Neal, R. J., 1983, Petrology and geochemistry of Westdahl and Pogromni volcanoes, Unimak Island, Alaska: University of Alaska Fairbanks unpublished M.S. thesis draft unpaged.
Pamenter, F., and Kienle, J., 1981, Westdahl: in Annual report of the world volcanic eruptions in 1979, Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions, v. 19, p. 61-62.
McClelland, Lindsay, 1980, Summary of 1979 volcanic activity [abs.]: Eos, v. 61, n. 6, p. 65.
Krafft, M., Miller, T., and Kienle, J., 1980, Westdahl: in Annual report of the world volcanic eruptions in 1978, Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions, v. 18, p. 65-66.
Associated Press, 1980, Remote Alaska volcano blows its top: Anchorage Times, v. August 16, p. A3.
Smithsonian Institution, 1979, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 04, n. 02, unpaged.
Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Shishaldin: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 03, n. 02, unpaged.
Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 03, n. 01, unpaged.
Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 03, n. 02, p. 3-6.
Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 03, n. 05, unpaged.
Smithsonian Institution, 1978, Westdahl: Scientific Event Alert Network Bulletin v. 03, n. 09, p. 9-11.
Harris, G. L., 1978, Eruption of Westdahl peak: Alaska magazine, v. May 1978, .
Clark, M., Villegas, Bob, Stanley, Mike, and Standridge, Ray, 1978, Scotch Cap diary: unpublished personal account, 8 p.
Decker, R. W., 1967, Investigations at active volcanoes: Adams, L. H. and Schairer, J. F., (eds.), Eos, v. 48, n. 2, p. 639-647.
Coats, R. R., 1964, Aleutian Islands and Alaska: Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions, v. 4, p. 4.
Associated Press, 1964, Volcano erupts: The Gettysburg Times, Gettysburg, PA, Saturday, March 14, 1964, p. 6.
Jones, A. E., 1952, Aleutian volcanoes: The Volcano Letter, v. 516, p. 8-9.
Lowney, P. B., 1946, Angry Earth: Alaska Life: the Territorial Magazine, v. 9, n. 4, p. 2.
Finch, R. H., 1934, Shishaldin volcano: in Pacific Science Congress, 5, Proceedings, v. 3, Victoria and Vancouver, BC, 1933, p. 2369-2376.
Jaggar, T. A., 1908, Journal of the technology expedition to the Aleutian Islands, 1907: The Technology Review, v. 10, n. 1, p. 1-37.
Dunn, Robert, 1906, An island rises from the sea to annex itself: The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1906, p. 44.
Sauer, Martin, 1802, Expedition to the northern parts of Russia, for ascertaining the degree of latitude and longitude of the mouth of the river Kovima; of the whole coast of the Tshutski, to East Cape; and of the islands in the eastern ocean, stretching to the American coast: London, A. Strahan, 3332 p.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


(oral farm partnership formed between family members; family dispute occurs and partnership dissolved and accounting sought).
(defendants installation of gate on right-of- way located on defendant's property but used by plaintiff to access plaintiff's land permanently enjoined; gate not necessary for defendant's safe use and enjoyment of defendant's property and plaintiff had prescriptive easement).
(arrest of defendant not within curtilage of home and, therefore, not within home’s umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection; while arrest occurred within close proximity of home, area not enclosed by fence or any form of enclosure and defendant did not engage in activities in front of home in which he engaged in private areas of home; area in which arrest occurred observable from highway).
(evidence indicated that defendant had prescriptive easement over driveway at issue in case).
(estate had right of indemnification from defendant for value of property owned by decedent that was foreclosed upon and sold, and the proceeds applied against a debt for which defendant was obligated).
(I.R.C. does not impose dollar limitation on de minimis fringe benefits excludible from gross income for those fringes listed in Treas. Reg. §1.132-6(e)(1)).
(bankruptcy of qualified intermediary used to facilitate I.R.C. §1031 exchange disqualifies taxpayer from achieving tax-deferred exchange status for transaction).
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service does not have an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from Endangered Species Act protection after a five-year agency review required by ESA determined that the species does not fit into one of several types of population categories protected under the ESA).
(Court refused to decide whether fisherman who sued over the Exxon Valdez oil spill are entitled to collect interest on the punitive damages award of $507.5 million; case remanded to Ninth Circuit).
(application of passive loss limitations to partnership losses do not violate partner’s due process rights; application of the passive loss rules not impermissibly retroactive).
(tribal member mortgaged tribal fee land to bank which was subsequently deeded to bank in lieu of foreclosure; bank leased property to defendant with option to buy, but defendant could not exercise option; bank then sold land to non-tribal members; tribal members sued in tribal court and tribal court found that bank had discriminated against tribe by selling land to non-members on more favorable terms with tribe awarded damages and option to buy portion of land; Eighth Circuit affirmed and U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; U.S. Supreme Court reversed – tribal court lacked authority to adjudicate discrimination claim; bank had standing to raise jurisdictional challenge; case not within Montana exceptions to general rule that Indian tribe lacks authority to regulate activities of non-members; and tribe’s limited authority to regulate non-member activities on reservation did not permit tribe to regulate sale of non-Indian fee land).
(quiet title action; description of disputed parcel in 1816 deed was sufficient to convey title, and plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession even if it was not the record owner of the parcel).
(water pollution case against dairy operation; plaintiff not entitled to bring enforcement action under state law against dairy without first establishing that dairy was significant contributor of pollution; mere fact that dairy was a Concentrated Dairy Animal Feeding Operation insufficient, by itself, to support finding that dairy was significant contributor of pollution; however, other factors supported finding that dairy was significant contributor of pollution; penalty upheld as reasonable and plaintiff’s decision as to penalty amount not arbitrary and capricious).
(defendant's conviction and sentence for taking migratory birds by aid of bait in violation of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 703 upheld; USFWS testimony that milo field at issue had not been harvested was credible and testimony of farm employee to the contrary was not credible and court would not disturb trial court's witness testimony credibility determination; testimony that use of stripper header to harvest milo did not establish that such practice was a normal agricultural practice; defendant's testimony that he could not reasonably be expected to know field was baited because he was not a farmer was not credible - defendant failed to inspect field and unharvested milo clearly present near defendant's duck blind and decoys).
(land qualified for agricultural status and Green Acres tax benefits because land primarily devoted to agricultural use; land used for purpose of growing trees as well as weeding, mowing, spraying and overall maintenance for agricultural use).
(evidence sufficient to support elements of adverse possession; title to disputed strip quieted in plaintiffs).
(quitclaim deed of remainder interest in farm from mother to son with life estate reserved by mother; son predeceased mother and son’s interest in farm belonged to son’s estate (thereby subject to state intestacy statute) and did not revert to mother upon son’s death because deed did not contain clear and unambiguous language that remainder interest ended upon son’s death).
(decedent’s heirs entered into voluntary cleanup agreement with State to clean up site contaminated by lead bullets and other contaminants to be deposited in soil at firing range on the property, and sued estate to recover costs; decedent’s personal liability insurance policy motioned for summary judgment on basis that it had no duty to indemnify estate because any judgment against estate not indemnifiable because not a product of a “suit” nor an “award of damages”; motion granted – plaintiffs voluntarily assumed response costs and contamination tied to business pursuits of the insured which is excluded under the policy).
(county constructed outdoor shooting range for firearms training purposes for local law enforcement prohibited by local zoning and anti-noise ordinances; shooting range only ancillary to law enforcement building and building’s normal use was for firearms training and support; thus, outdoor shooting ranges not indispensible for building’s indoor training and support because indoor training could be conducted without the outdoor shooting ranges being located next to the building).
(cooperative patron may not count qualified payment received from cooperative in patron’s I.R.C. §199 computation whether or not cooperative keeps or passes through I.R.C. §199 deduction; the only way a patron can claim an I.R.C. §199 deduction for a qualified payment from a cooperative is for the cooperative to pass-through the I.R.C. §199 amount in accordance with the provisions of I.R.C. §199(d)(3); but, net proceeds distributed on patronage basis qualify as per-unit retain allocations because they were distributed with respect to products that the cooperative markets for its patrons and patrons receive payments based on quantity of product delivered to the cooperative and are not based on cooperative’s net earnings).
(grant of special exception from zoning ordinance allowing construction of horse stable and accessory facilities affirmed; neighbor’s testimony about odors, well water contamination and flies merely speculative).
(trial court judgment for parents against son (the farm tenant) upheld; son signed one-year lease for 2004 stating that the parties would not pursue any legal action against the parties or related family members for anything related to the farm, farm equipment, or the farm's operation; no partnership created; and son's claim that he signed lease under duress raised for first time on appeal).
(dissenters' rights statute invoked upon sale of seven-generation, closely-held, family farming corporation located on Potomac River; trial court properly determined fair market value of dissenting shareholders' shares of stock; 6 percent simple interest to be applied).
(defendant violated state environmental policy by approving marine biotechnology firm’s request to import GMO algae to facility on state land; no adequate environmental assessment provided, and environmental studies provided were outdated and did not discuss impact of large-scale algae production).
(proposed operation or rock mining quarry for production of gravel held to be a public nuisance because local roads inadequate to safely handle required truck traffic; case remanded to trial court to “balance the equities” in determining how to abate the anticipated nuisance).
(subdivision lot owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against successors in interest to subdivision developer for enforcement of rights they claimed they were entitled pursuant to subdivision’s restrictive covenants and plat; court held that covenants did not grant lot owners right to connect to water system developed by successor-in-interest or to central livestock facilities located in common area – covenants neither expressly or impliedly create those rights).
(class action lawsuit brought against Southern Marketing Agency (formed by Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.) for alleged conspiracy to suppress prices paid for raw milk while simultaneously raising prices to the region's retailers in violation of the Sherman Act; defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on basis that Capper Volstead Act provides immunity denied because such defense cannot be resolved through a motion to dismiss).
(no constructive trust imposed against plaintiff's daughter over farm and farmhome; plaintiff deeded farm to daughter and claimed that she would be allowed to live on the farm "until her death"; evidence showed that deed of farm intended as gift to daughter; no mistaken belief present relating to effect of execution of warranty deed).
(trial court’s award of specific performance of option contract for sale of land upheld; option contract not ambiguous and no issues of fact existed as to whether consideration given for option contract).
(plaintiffs' action for injunctive relief against defendant for nuisance per se, private nuisance, violation of state environmental law and claim that state right-to- farm law does not protect commercial composting dismissed for lack of standing; defendant had not yet engaged in any on-farm composting and no evidence presented that defendant proposed on-farm composting would violate state law).
(public use of road as shown by plaintiff insufficient to constitute implied acceptance of defendant’s statutory offer to dedicate it for public use; accordingly, plaintiff’s cutting down of trees and other vegetation on defendant’s adjacent property improper and plaintiff liable for $4,296 in damages).
(defendant cut down plaintiff’s landscape-grade trees without authorization and plaintiff sued for reckless destruction of trees under state statute authorizing treble damages; trial court’s judgment for plaintiff and denial of defendant’s motion for new trial upheld).
(defendant's impoundment of plaintiff's cattle and cancellation of federal grazing permit not a taking; but, plaintiff had vested right in surface waters flowing from federal land that could have been put to beneficial agricultural use if not for defendant's interference (construction of fences and disallowance of plaintiff to clear obstructions upstream in 1866 Act irrigation ditches); plaintiff entitled to $4,220,431.20 plus interest from date of taking (beginning in 1983) plus attorney's fees and costs).
(plaintiffs’ claim that Dupont defrauded EPA by convincing EPA to drop language from Oust warning label prohibiting its use in arid areas near cropland which resulted in Bureau of Land Management to buy and apply Oust in manner that damaged plaintiff’s crops; complaint defective because it doesn’t asset fraud against the plaintiffs; but, plaintiffs motion to amend complaint granted to add allegations of fraud and misrepresentation by Dupont to plaintiffs).
(defendant breached option agreement which allowed plaintiff to purchase defendants’ 50 percent interest in Colorado LLC containing 5,000 acres as sole asset; plaintiff entitled to $1.5 million in damages based on plaintiff’s testimony of ranchland value).
(right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) held by Land Trust in subject farm was condition precedent to purchase agreement in farm entered into between plaintiff and defendant; Land Trust’s exercise of ROFR and subsequent assignment of its interest to neighboring farmer resulted in sale contract never being formed between plaintiff and defendant).
(negotiations for sale of farm involving letters, notes, memoranda, draft agreements and conversations did not satisfy statute of frauds - no mutual agreement to essential contract terms; no equitable estoppel nor part performance).
(trespass case; no easement established or proven).
(partners of plaintiff general partnership bought land and general partnership obtained title insurance from defendant; land conveyed to limited partnership owned by same partners, but new title insurance not obtained; title defect discovered ten years later and suit brought under policy; partners held to not have insurable interest because insured (general partnership) no longer held title to land - policy lapsed when property voluntarily conveyed to separate and distinct limited partnership and limited partnership did not have standing to sue under policy).
(quiet title action brought by state of Utah against private landowner; state claims title to lakebed of Utah lake, a navigable body of freshwater, under equal footing doctrine upon admission to Union on Jan. 4, 1896; landowner traces title to 63-acre slough to patent issued by defendant in 1881; state officials failed to approve decision to agree to quiet title in private landowner).
(plaintiff's Tennessee Walking Horse died at defendant's stable; plaintiff claimed horse died due to defendant's negligence, but such claim barred by exculpatory provision in contract between the parties and plaintiff failed to make out prima facie claim of gross negligence).
(cattle rancher sued defendant on public nuisance theory for contamination of cattle ranch arising from oil spills; trial court ruling for defendant upheld - plaintiff did not meet burden of proof that defendant caused the contamination).
(judgment for plaintiff against defendant on charge of animal cruelty or neglect upheld; animal cruelty statute applicable and not unconstitutionally vague).
(divorce case involving farm assets; trial court did not err in awarding 138 acres to ex-wife; acreage not an integral part of ex-husband’s farming and ranching operation; ex-wife not entitled to “Grace” award to even-out property division because substantial marital estate existed which was divided evenly).
(“short-sale” of residence held for investment purposes resulted in cancellation of indebtedness income (CODI); taxpayer failed to prove that any exception from the general rule of recognition applied; accuracy-related penalty upheld).
(plaintiffs’ use of particular route established a prescriptive easement, but did not establish the element of adverse use with regard to the claimed easement for cattle driving – use was permissive).


§ 410.020 Compliance With Provisions.
§ 410.030 Approval of Plats Before Recording — Improvements in Unapproved Area.
§ 410.040 Variations or Modifications to Provisions.
§ 410.070 Preliminary and Final Plats Required — Approval.
§ 410.090 Streets and Alleys.
§ 410.110 Lots and Building Lines.
§ 410.120 Improvements Required — Bond.
§ 410.130 Minimum Improvements — Standards.
Section 410.020 Compliance With Provisions.
Section 410.030 Approval of Plats Before Recording — Improvements in Unapproved Area.
Section 410.040 Variations or Modifications to Provisions.
Section 410.070 Preliminary and Final Plats Required — Approval.
Section 410.090 Streets and Alleys.
Section 410.110 Lots and Building Lines.
Section 410.120 Improvements Required — Bond.
Section 410.130 Minimum Improvements — Standards.