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On December 7, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania granted en banc reargument for Murray v. Am. LaFrance, LLC, No. 2105 EDA 2016, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1064. In September, a 2-1 majority ruled in Murray that registering as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania equals consent to the state court’s general personal jurisdiction. In granting reargument, the court has withdrawn its previous decision, affecting all of the consolidated cases that were considered in the appeal. The court ordered the case listed for the next available en banc panel.
The Murray case has no factual connection to Pennsylvania: The plaintiffs alleged fire engine sirens caused them hearing loss while working in New York. They sued Federal Signal Corporation, a Delaware company whose principal place of business is in Illinois.
The original Murray opinion followed two other Pennsylvania state court decisions on the same issue. The Murray court aligned itself with another Superior Court decision in Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. International Rug Group, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 742, in which the Superior Court accepted at face value that registering to do business in the state equals consent to general jurisdiction. But the Murray opinion contradicted the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., No. 1961 802 EDA 2018. In Mallory, Judge New found that a Pennsylvania court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a company merely because it registered to do business there. Mallory is on appeal, but it is likely to be overturned if the Webb-Benjamin and Murray decisions are any guide.
The original Murray majority opinion, which has now been withdrawn, runs counter to recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent limiting states’ general jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The Murray majority opinion distinguished the consolidated cases on appeal from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), because Daimler did not concern consent to a state court’s general jurisdiction based on business registration. Daimler held that a foreign corporation must ordinarily be “at home” in a state for the state court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over it. A corporation is “at home” in its place of incorporation and its principal place of business, as well as in “exceptional” circumstances when a corporation’s operations in a state are “so substantial . . . as to render [it] at home” there. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117).
Instead, the September Murray majority, relying on a 2016 federal district court decision, found that “consent remains a valid form of establishing personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania registration statute after Daimler.” Murray, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1064 (citing Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016)). The September Murray court reasoned that a foreign corporation that has registered to do business in Pennsylvania does not have to be “at home” for the state’s courts to have power over it.
The Superior Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions have already had an impact on trial court dockets. On October 1, Judge Fox of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas explicitly relied on Webb-Benjamin and Bors to hold that the court had general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the claims involved events occurring entirely outside the Commonwealth. See Kleiner v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 2505 (Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Oct. 1, 2018).
Questions remain as to the soundness of the Murray majority’s reasoning in its September opinion. Judge Bowes acknowledged in her dissent that the U.S. Supreme Court cases allow for personal jurisdiction by consent. But Judge Bowes contended that mandatory business registration is not voluntary, and, without voluntariness, registration cannot amount to consent. In particular, mandatory business registration is not consent for general personal jurisdiction, which gives Pennsylvania courts power over a defendant for cases having nothing to do with its business in the state. Judge Bowes instead argued that a corporation’s decision to register to do business in Pennsylvania should only be consent for Pennsylvania courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.
Judge Bowes’s line of reasoning (and the reasoning of Judge New in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas) seems to be consistent with the recent trend of U.S. Supreme Court cases limiting state courts’ exercise of general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). These cases emphasize that a state court cannot have general personal jurisdiction over every corporation doing business within its borders, relying on Fourteenth Amendment due process constraints.
The implications of the court’s decision upon hearing reargument could be widespread. The en banc panel could come to a different conclusion on the jurisdictional issue. Similarly, the panel could overrule the Webb-Benjamin decision, which also found that foreign corporations consent to general jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute by registering to do business in the Commonwealth. Until the court does so, however, Webb-Benjamin remains good law.
While there exists a threshold legal issue of whether the Murray plaintiffs waived their right to argue on appeal that registration equals consent to jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that the court would address that argument en banc. Even if the court decided on the waiver issue alone, the general personal jurisdiction question remains ripe for final resolution by the state’s highest court, either on appeal in Murray or in other personal jurisdiction cases winding their way through the Pennsylvania appellate system. No matter the vehicle, the justices are likely to finally resolve whether registration to do business in Pennsylvania is enough of a voluntary act to constitute consent to the general personal jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts.
A. Christopher Young is a partner in the Philadelphia office of Pepper Hamilton LLP and chairman of the Franchise, Distribution, and Marketing Section of the Trial and Dispute Resolution Practice Group. His trial practice, in federal and state courts, involves many substantive areas, including antitrust, admiralty, franchise disputes, commercial disputes, insurance, and products liability.
Rosemary T. Cochrane is an associate in the Trial and Dispute Resolution Practice Group of Pepper Hamilton LLP, resident in the Philadelphia office.
Posted in Alumni Comments, Legal Developments and tagged Analysis, Appeals, BNSF Ry. Co. v Tyrrell, Bowes, Consent, Corporations, Daimpler AG v Bauman, En Banc, Federal SIgnal Coporation, Hearing Loss, Incorporation, Jurisdiction, Mallory v Norfolk Souther Railway Co, Murray v. Am. LaFrance LLC, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, SCPA, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Webb-Benjamin LLC v International Rug Group. Bookmark the permalink.

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EVELYN VENTROMILE & another vs. MALDEN ELECTRIC COMPANY (and a companion case [Note 1]).
without objection, that, to one as to whose duties there was no evidence except that he was an employee of the corporation which was not responsible for janitor service, she had stated, as she was being helped to a chair that "there was wax on the floor," though incompetent, was entitled to its probative value, and findings would have been warranted that wax had been applied to the floor by the corporation responsible for janitor service and that the plaintiff's fall was caused by negligence of that corporation in the application of the wax or in inviting her to walk on the floor before it became dry.
A defendant jointly occupying an office with another defendant who was solely responsible for the janitor service, could not be found liable for personal injuries sustained by a business visitor of both of them in a fall caused by negligence in applying wax to the floor or in inviting the visitor to walk on the floor before it was dry, where there was no evidence from which it could be inferred that the first defendant should have discovered the condition of the floor before the plaintiff fell.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Superior Court dated January 11, 1943.
The cases were tried before Walsh, J. Besides the evidence stated in the opinion, the record recited that, when the plaintiff Evelyn fell, Buckley, the employee of the defendant Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company, "came over with another man and both of them helped her to her feet"; that after she "talked with the cashier and paid her bill," she was "assisted by Buckley to a chair, but as she walked to the chair she stopped to examine the place where she fell"; that she "then turned to Buckley and told him that there was wax on the floor." There was no evidence that Buckley made any reply to her.
D. Gorfinkle, for the plaintiffs, submitted a brief.
G. S. Lowden, for the defendants.
WILKINS, J. The female plaintiff, a business visitor, by these actions of tort seeks to recover for personal injuries sustained by slipping on the floor of premises occupied by both defendants. The male plaintiff, her husband, sues for consequential damages. These cases are here upon exceptions to a directed verdict for each defendant. The only testimony was by the female plaintiff, hereinafter called the plaintiff. On October 11, 1940, a clear, dry day, about 9:30 A.M. she entered the premises, which consisted of a large well-lighted room on the street floor used in part for display purposes, in order "to pay a bill to both defendants."
She had been there frequently. From the front door there was a clear space about ten feet wide forming an aisle leading to the cashier's cage about thirty-five feet toward the rear. The floor was covered with what looked like an inlaid linoleum. There was no one in the aisle. At the further end of the aisle, to the right, about eight or ten feet from the cashier's cage, stood one Buckley, an employee of the defendant Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company, who was facing away from her. In the cage one of the cashiers was looking in her general direction. When the plaintiff reached a point eight or ten feet from the cage her left heel slipped and she fell. In an effort to get up quickly she fell again in a sitting position. She saw "a shiny substance on the floor" where she fell, "a sticky, oily, shiny substance about half the size of her hand. It was wet." She saw a skid mark about the length of her hand. She told Buckley that there was wax on the floor. The plaintiff further testified "that the floor always looked awfully slippery; it looked shiny as though it had been waxed and had a high polish on it; it had looked that way on the other occasions when she had been there." She also testified that in answer to interrogatories "she had stated that the foreign substance which she described as being shiny, oily and sticky covered that portion of the floor on which she fell and that was the fact and was true."
As to the responsibility for the premises of the respective defendants the record merely states: "It was agreed at the trial that the defendant, Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company, occupied the street floor jointly with the defendant, Malden Electric Company, under an arrangement by which the Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company paid a fixed monthly rental and the Malden Electric Company furnished the light, heat and janitor service." From this it could have been inferred that the defendant Malden Electric Company, and not the defendant Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company, was in charge of waxing the floor, if this was in fact done. Compare Teall v. Harlow, 275 Mass. 448; Fagan v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of New York, 84 N. Y. 348, 352.
The plaintiff was on the premises by invitation of both defendants, each of whom owed to her the duty of care owed to a business visitor. Blease v. Webber, 232 Mass. 165, 167. Hillis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 284 Mass. 320, 321. Heina v. Broadway Fruit Market, Inc. 304 Mass. 608, 610. Parker v. Jordan Marsh Co. 310 Mass. 227, 229.
jury could have inferred from it and the other evidence that wax had been applied to the floor, and that the plaintiff had fallen because of negligence in its application or in inviting the plaintiff to walk on the floor before it was dry. If the plaintiff's testimony be interpreted as inconsistent with her answer to interrogatories, it was nevertheless for the jury to say to what it amounted. Keenan v. E. M. Loew's, Inc. 302 Mass. 309, 311, and cases cited. Fitzgerald v. McClymont, 314 Mass. 497, 499. Cases of mere slipperiness are distinguishable. See, for example, Crone v. Jordan Marsh Co. 269 Mass. 289; McGuire v. Valley Arena Inc. 299 Mass. 351; Kay v. Audet, 306 Mass. 337.
Since the waxing of the floor could have been found to have been done by the defendant Malden Electric Company, it follows that its motion for a directed verdict should not have been allowed. The motion of the defendant Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company, however, was rightly allowed, as it could not have been inferred that this defendant should have discovered the condition of the floor before the plaintiff fell. O'Leary v. Smith, 255 Mass. 121, 123. White v. Mugar, 280 Mass. 73, 75. Not enough appears in the meager record to bring the action against this defendant within Rouillard v. Canadian Klondike Club, Inc. 316 Mass. 11, or within Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co. 303 Mass. 540, and Barron v. McLellan Stores Co. 310 Mass. 778.
In the action against the Malden Electric Company the exceptions are sustained. In the action against the Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company the exceptions are overruled.
[Note 1] The companion case is by the same plaintiffs against Malden and Melrose Gas Light Company.

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D.C. Law Library - § 47–858.01. Tax abatements for homeowners in enterprise zones — Definitions.
↪ § 47–858.01. Tax abatements for homeowners in enterprise zones — Definitions.
(2) “Eligible owner” means the owner of a residential property who resides in a household consisting of one or more individuals with a household income of 120% or less of the area median income.
(3) “Enterprise zone” means the area of the District designated as the District of Columbia Enterprise Zone under section 1400 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, approved August 5, 1997 (111 Stat. 863; 26 U.S.C. § 1400).
(4) “Single family residential property” shall have the same meaning as in § 47-803(6).
(5) “Substantially rehabilitates” means rehabilitation of a single family residential property for which the rehabilitation expenditures, during the 24-month period selected by the taxpayer, exceed $20,000. In the case of a rehabilitation that may reasonably be expected to be completed in phases set forth in architectural plans and specifications drawn by an architect licensed by the District of Columbia before the rehabilitation begins, a 60-month period may be substituted for the 24-month period.
This section is referenced in § 47-858.03, § 47-858.05, and § 47-4701.