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In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), we held that the warrantless monitoring of an electronic tracking device ("beeper") inside a container of chemicals did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it revealed no information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance. In this case, we are called upon to address two questions left unresolved in Knotts: (1) whether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper, and (2) whether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.
Because the beeper equipment was not sensitive enough to allow agents to learn precisely which locker the ether was in, agents obtained a subpoena for the records of the storage company and learned that locker 143 had been rented by Horton. Using the beeper, agents confirmed that the ether was indeed in one of the lockers in the row containing locker 143, and using their noses they detected the odor of ether emanating from locker 143. On October 8 agents obtained an order authorizing installation of an entry tone alarm into the door jamb of the locker so they would be able to tell when the door was opened. While installing the alarm, agents observed that the cans containing ether were still inside. Agents ceased visual and beeper surveillance, relying instead on the entry tone alarm. However, on October 16 Horton retrieved the contents from the locker without sounding the alarm. Agents did not learn of the entry until the manager of the storage facility notified them that Horton had been there.
At about 6 p. m. on February 6, the car and the pickup left the driveway and traveled along public highways to Taos. During the trip, the two vehicles were under both physical and electronic surveillance. When the vehicles arrived at a house in Taos rented by Horton, Harley, and Michael Steele, the agents did not maintain tight surveillance for fear of detection. When the vehicles left the Taos residence, agents determined, using the beeper monitor, that the beeper can was still inside the house. Again on February 7, the beeper revealed that the ether can was still on the premises. At one point, agents noticed that the windows of the house were wide open on a cold windy day, leading them to suspect that the ether was being used. On February 8, the agents applied for and obtained a warrant to search the Taos residence based in part on information derived through use of the beeper. The warrant was executed on February 10, 1981, and Horton, Harley, Steele, and Evan Roth were arrested, and cocaine and laboratory equipment were seized.
Respondents Karo, Horton, Harley, Steele, and Roth were indicted for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it and with the underlying offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Respondent Rhodes was indicted only for conspiracy to possess. The District Court granted respondents' pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the Taos residence on the grounds that the initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid and that the Taos seizure was the tainted fruit of an unauthorized installation and monitoring of that beeper. The United States appealed but did not challenge the invalidation of the initial warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, except with respect to Rhodes, holding that a warrant was required to install the beeper in one of the 10 cans of ether and to monitor it in private dwellings and storage lockers. 710 F.2d 1433 (CA10 1983). The warrant for the search in Taos and the resulting seizure were tainted by the prior illegal conduct of the Government. The evidence was therefore properly suppressed with respect to respondents Horton, Harley, Steele, and Roth, who were held to have protectible interests in the privacy of the Taos dwelling, and with respect to respondent Karo because the beeper had been installed without a warrant and had been monitored while its ether-can host was in his house. We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 464 U.S. 1068 (1984), which raised the question whether a warrant was required to authorize either the installation of the beeper or its subsequent monitoring. We deal with each contention in turn.
We likewise do not believe that the transfer of the container constituted a seizure. A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Ibid. Although the can may have contained an unknown and unwanted foreign object, it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful way. At most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper. The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (no trespass, but Fourth Amendment violation), with Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (trespass, but no Fourth Amendment violation). Of course, if the presence of a beeper in the can constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would follow that the presence of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate the Fourth Amendment.
We conclude that no Fourth Amendment interest of Karo or of any other respondent was infringed by the installation of the beeper. Rather, any impairment of their privacy interests that may have occurred was occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper.
In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), law enforcement officials, with the consent of the seller, installed a beeper in a 5-gallon can of chloroform and monitored the beeper after delivery of the can to the buyer in Minneapolis, Minn. Although there was partial visual surveillance as the automobile containing the can moved along the public highways, the beeper enabled the officers to locate the can in the area of a cabin near Shell Lake, Wis., and it was this information that provided the basis for the issuance of a search warrant. As the case came to us, the installation of the beeper was not challenged; only the monitoring was at issue. The Court held that since the movements of the automobile and the arrival of the can containing the beeper in the area of the cabin could have been observed by the naked eye, no Fourth Amendment violation was committed by monitoring the beeper during the trip to the cabin. In Knotts, the record did not show that the beeper was monitored while the can containing it was inside the cabin, and we therefore had no occasion to consider whether a constitutional violation would have occurred had the fact been otherwise.
"For fear of detection, we did not maintain tight surveillance of the residence.... Using the 'beeper' locator, I positively determined that the 'beeper' can (5-gallon can of ether, described earlier in this affidavit) was now inside the above-described premises to be searched because the 'beeper' locator (direction finder) pinpointed the beeper signal as emanating from the above-described premises.... Again, later on Saturday (now in the daytime), 7 February 1981, my 'beeper' locator still shows a strong 'beeper' signal emanating from inside the above-described residence." App. 57-58.
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-749 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). In this case, had a DEA agent thought it useful to enter the Taos residence to verify that the ether was actually in the house and had he done so surreptitiously and without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would have engaged in an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of the Amendment, the result is the same where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house. The beeper tells the agent that a particular article is actually located at a particular time in the private residence and is in the possession of the person or persons whose residence is being watched. Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies the officers' observations but also establishes that the article remains on the premises. Here, for example, the beeper was monitored for a significant period after the arrival of the ether in Taos and before the application for a warrant to search.
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant. The case is thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts' cabin. The information obtained in Knotts was "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look...," 460 U.S., at 281; here, as we have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified.
We cannot accept the Government's contention that it should be completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular article--or a person, for that matter--is in an individual's home at a particular time. Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.
We also reject the Government's contention that it should be able to monitor beepers in private residences without a warrant if there is the requisite justification in the facts for believing that a crime is being or will be committed and that monitoring the beeper wherever it goes is likely to produce evidence of criminal activity. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobiles); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances). The Government's contention that warrantless beeper searches should be deemed reasonable is based upon its deprecation of the benefits and exaggeration of the difficulties associated with procurement of a warrant. The Government argues that the traditional justifications for the warrant requirement are inapplicable in beeper cases, but to a large extent that argument is based upon the contention, rejected above, that the beeper constitutes only a minuscule intrusion on protected privacy interests. The primary reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a "neutral and detached magistrate" between the citizen and "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Those suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to that protection than those suspected of nondrug offenses. Requiring a warrant will have the salutary effect of ensuring that use of beepers is not abused, by imposing upon agents the requirement that they demonstrate in advance their justification for the desired search. This is not to say that there are no exceptions to the warrant rule, because if truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth Amendment principles.
In sum, we discern no reason for deviating from the general rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
As we have said, by maintaining the beeper the agents verified that the ether was actually located in the Taos house and that it remained there while the warrant was sought. This information was obtained without a warrant and would therefore be inadmissible at trial against those with privacy interests in the house--Horton, Harley, Steele, and Roth. That information, which was included in the warrant affidavit, would also invalidate the warrant for the search of the house if it proved to be critical to establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. However, if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978).
That leaves the question whether any part of this additional information contained in the warrant affidavit was itself the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation to which any of the occupants of the house could object. As far as the present record reveals, two of the four respondents who had standing to object to the search of the residence--Steele and Roth-—had no interest in any of the arguably private places in which the beeper was monitored prior to its arrival in Taos. The evidence seized in the house would be admissible against them.
Assuming for present purposes that prior to its arrival at the second warehouse the beeper was illegally used to locate the ether in a house or other place in which Horton or Harley had a justifiable claim to privacy, we are confident that such use of the beeper does not taint its later use in locating the ether and tracking it to Taos. The movement of the ether from the first warehouse was undetected, but by monitoring the beeper the agents discovered that it had been moved to the second storage facility. No prior monitoring of the beeper contributed to this discovery; using the beeper for this purpose was thus untainted by any possible prior illegality. Furthermore, the beeper informed the agents only that the ether was somewhere in the warehouse; it did not identify the specific locker in which the ether was located. Monitoring the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of the locker that Horton and Harley had rented and hence was not a search of that locker. The locker was identified only when agents traversing the public parts of the facility found that the smell of ether was coming from a specific locker.
The agents set up visual surveillance of that locker, and on September 6, they observed Rhodes and a female remove the ether and load it into Horton's pickup truck. The truck moved over the public streets and was tracked by beeper to Rhodes' house, where it was temporarily parked. At about 6 p. m. the truck was observed departing and was tracked visually and by beeper to the vicinity of the house in Taos. Because locating the ether in the warehouse was not an illegal search--and because the ether was seen being loaded into Horton's truck, which then traveled the public highways--it is evident that under Knotts there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment as to anyone with or without standing to complain about monitoring the beeper while it was located in Horton's truck. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the warrant affidavit, after striking the facts about monitoring the beeper while it was in the Taos residence, contained sufficient untainted information to furnish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The evidence seized in the house should not have been suppressed with respect to any of the respondents.
^ . "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S., at 277.
^ . The Court of Appeals reversed as to Rhodes since he had not shown that the beeper had been located in any place in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor had he shown any possessory interest in the ether itself that would have been invaded by the installation of the beeper.
^ . Despite this holding, warrants for the installation and monitoring of a beeper will obviously be desirable since it may be useful, even critical, to monitor the beeper to determine that it is actually located in a place not open to visual surveillance. As will be evident below, such monitoring without a warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment.
^ . Justice O'Connor observes that a homeowner has no reasonable expectation that a person invited into his home will not be wired with a microphone that transmits conversations in which he engages, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), and from this proposition she concludes that a homeowner has no reasonable expectation that an invitee will not bring an object containing a beeper into his home. Post, at 722-724. While that observation would be relevant if one of the conspirators in this case had consented to the placement of the beeper in the can, it has no relevance to the case at hand. Surely if the Government surreptitiously plants a listening device on an unsuspecting household guest or family member and then monitors conversations with the homeowner, the homeowner could challenge the monitoring of the conversations regardless of the fact that he did not have power "to give effective consent to the search" of the visitor. Post, at 724. As the plurality recognized in United States v. White, supra, at 749, there is a substantial distinction between "revelation[s] to the Government by a party to conversations with the defendant" and eavesdropping on conversations without the knowledge or consent of either party to it. A homeowner takes the risk that his guest will cooperate with the Government but not the risk that a trustworthy friend has been bugged by the Government without his knowledge or consent. Under Justice O'Connor's view it could easily be said that in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Katz had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation because the person to whom he was speaking might have divulged the contents of the conversation. There would be nothing left of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy if anything that a hypothetical government informant might reveal is stripped of constitutional protection.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), is simply inapposite, since it was not Rawlings' home in which the challenged search occurred. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (homeowner has standing to challenge illegal search of house even if he has no interest in the property seized). Justice O'Connor seems to recognize as much, noting in the discussion of Katz, post, at 725, that "a third person, who never used a particular telephone line" would have no standing to challenge illegal eavesdropping. If the phone line is that of the third person, however, a different analysis is involved.
^ . The United States insists that if beeper monitoring is deemed a search, a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause should suffice for its execution. That issue, however, is not before us. The initial warrant was not invalidated for want of probable cause, which plainly existed, but for misleading statements in the affidavit. The Government did not appeal the invalidation of the warrant and as the case has turned out, the Government prevails without a warrant authorizing installation. It will be time enough to resolve the probable cause-reasonable suspicion issue in a case that requires it.
^ . Had the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container within a particular locker the result would be otherwise, for surely Horton and Harley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own storage locker.
^ . Although the unwarranted monitoring of the beeper in Karo's house would foreclose using that evidence against him, it did not taint the discovery of the ether in the second warehouse and the ensuing surveillance of the trip to Taos.

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Annals of Burns and Fire Disasters - vol. XXI - n.
1 - March 2008 TREATMENT OF POST-BURN SCAR DEFORMATIONS USING TISSUE EXPANSION AND ENDOSCOPY Sharobaro V.I.1, Moroz V.Y.1, Starkov Y.G.2, Yudenich A.A.1 A.V. Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery, Moscow, Russia 1 Division of Reconstructive and Plastic Surgery 2 Division of Endoscopic Surgery SUMMARY. Background. The essential drawbacks of conventional tissue expansion, a technique widely used in reconstructive surgery, are its significant duration and the high complications rate. The experience of our clinic covers 329 patients treated with this method from 1987 to 2006. The mean time of expansion was previously 72 ± 2 days (± SD) and the rate of local complications was 38.6%. We applied effective new approaches to this method in order to reduce its drawbacks, i.e. the endoscopic implantation of expanders, intensive expansion, and a modified technique of elevation of an expanded flap. Methods. Twenty-seven patients treated in the A.V. Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery between 2001 and 2006 for post-burn scar deformities underwent endoscopic implantations of 46 silicone expanders in various anatomical areas. High-grade tissue expansion was initiated immediately after implantation. The elevation of the reconstructed flap was performed, including defective tissues in the flap, after which the expander was removed and the expanded tissues were transposed. Results. With the help of the techniques developed, it was possible to reduce the mean expansion time from 72 days to 34 (less than half) and to reduce the complications rate from 38.6% to 6.5%. Conclusions. Endoscopic expander implantation, the accelerated technique of tissue expansion, and modified elevation of the expanded flap enabled us to considerably improve results in the treatment of post-burn scar deformities, using the tissue expansion method. Introduction In the last decade there has been a marked and steady growth in the number of patients suffering from post-burn and post-traumatic soft tissue deformities and scar contractures causing functional and cosmetic defects. Such “defects” of appearance promote alterations in the patients’ psychoemotional conditions, generate feelings of hopelessness, inferiority, and uncertainty, and reduce a person’s mental and working capacity, frequently leading to the development of concomitant diseases of psychosomatic origin such as neurosis, angina pectoris, and hypertension. Surgical treatment is frequently limited by the scarcity of adequate soft tissues available for reconstruction. Over the last 25 years tissue expansion has become a technique for overcoming such soft-tissue limitations.1-4 This method possesses the unique ability of generating skin with an almost perfect match of colour, texture, and sensation required for reconstruction in a specific area. Compared with other methods of plastic surgery, tissue expansion facilitates the closing of extensive soft-tissue defects without additional scars in donor areas. In the period from 1987 to 2006 tissue expansion was used in the treatment of 329 patients with postburn and post-traumatic cicatricial deformations in the A.V. Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery. A total of 780 expanders were implanted in various anatomical areas. However, the method presented some essential drawbacks, i.e. its significant duration (72 ± 2 days (± SD) and the high complications rate (up to 38.6%). Our data are consistent with those in the literature, according to which the expansion lasts 23 months and the complications rate ranges from 5% to 70%.4, 6-12 This considerably limits the possibilities of wide clinical usage of tissue expansion.
Fig. Patients and methods We used an endoscopic implantation of 46 expanders in 27 patients with post-burn scar deformities between December 2001 and December 2006. Moscow) in hemispherical. and the incision line for the creation of a pocket were selected and marked on the skin. the expander sizes. The incision was made within the defect area that it was planned to excise. abdominal wall.Scheme of orientation of tension vectors in relation to post-operative wounds in traditional and tissue expander implantation. We used an endoscopic expander implantation. 2). making use of expanded tissues.Plastis-M silicone expander. face. Fig. and its direction was parallel to that of the tissue expansion tension vectors (Fig. intensive expansion. 1). scapular. Expanders Silicone expanders (Plastis-M. sites for tissue expansion. Endoscopic technique of expander implantation In the early days. Expanders were implanted in the head. it was 10 mm long (in relation to the size of the endoscopic instrument). oblong.6) (± SE). and a modified technique for elevation of the expanded flap. and forearm and calf areas. 18 patients were female and 9 male. 25. . or cylindrical form were used (Fig. Their base size ranged from 80 õ 35 to 130 õ 50 mm and their volume from 50 to 500 ml. neck.1 yr ± 0. 1 .The above considerations led us to seek effective new approaches to this method that would enable us to considerably reduce the duration of treatment and the complications rate. chest. The patients’ ages varied from 15 to 44 yr (mean. The incision was as remote as possible from the expander pocket. 2 . shoulder.
Germany) (Fig. a dissector. 4 .The second stage was the dissection of the expander pocket in the required anatomical stratum. The expanders were placed under a galea aponeurotica on the head and. tissue dissection. with meticulous haemostasis (Fig. and coagulation. since it was fitted with a camera. providing the opportunity of cutting tissues in conditions of haemostasis. 4).Endoscopic dissection of expander pocket via distant small incision with good visualization and precise haemostasis. A primary tunnel (approximate length. A coagulation hook. Fig. if possible. 15-17 mm Hg) was insufflated through the ESDO channel in order to maintain an optical cavity in the soft tissues and to simplify the endoscopic manipulations. Wolf. Fig. . This provided uniform tissue expansion and prevented pressure sores and excessive thinning of subdermal fat. 2 cm) was created bluntly from the incision to the planned expander site. This instrument made it possible to implant the expander through one remote incision. Wolf. a gas insufflator. making it easy to lift the dissected tissues mechanically and to create sufficient space for the dissection optical cavity. gas infusion. Carbonic gas (pressure. 3 . under a superficial fascia in all other areas.Endoscopic videosystem (R. and a channel for a working instrument. 3) was then inserted with a working tool. The instrument’s L-shaped form was very convenient. Germany) permitting simultaneous visualization. An ESDP endoscopic videosystem (R. The working tool was always in front of the camera at the centre of the field of vision. or scissors were used as a working tool. The expander pocket was created on the basis of the pre-operative markings.
filling the expanders in 3-4 weeks using expansion with a conventional implantation technique (up to 350 ml). with post-burn scar sequelae on left cheek and neck. straightened inside. depending on the diameter of the connecting tube). Filling was done daily or every other day with normal saline solution and was suspended on the appearance of signs of altered blood circulation in the expanded tissues (hyperaemia. pallor). Tissue expansion was performed until sufficient tissue gain for reconstruction had been achieved (Figs. ranging from 15 to 60 ml in one tissue expansion session. 17 years old. 5 .6). Ports were placed subdermally or externally through the small apertures (2 mm. The operative wound was closed in two layers with two single sutures. without taking any notice of post-operative wound dehiscence. 6 . Drainage was not used. Measuring oxygen pressure in the expanded tissues with a TCM 400 gas analyser (Radiometer. Fig.Patient N. Expanders were filled in such a way as not to interrupt the blood supply to the expanded tissues.Two endoscopically implanted expanders and sufficient tissue gain achieved by intensive expansion in 27 days. It was enough to change the antiseptic dressings once every two days to prevent infection. During filling the pressure should not go below 10 mm Hg (TcÐÎ2 of healthy intact skin is 55-60 mm Hg). Denmark) was an expedient method of objective control. . in view of the adequate haemostasis and the absence of free cavities in the tissues. 5. This eliminated any possible “dead spaces” between an expander and the surrounding tissues and thus made it possible to prevent seromas.. Intensive technique of tissue expansion High-grade tissue expansion was initiated at once on the operating table. haematomas and infection of the pocket. and filled with normal saline solution.An empty expander was implanted in the cavity created. Fig. Analgesic drugs were not used. The volume of the infusions depended on the anatomical area and the volume of the expander.
is the surface area of the defect. 7A . . with coagulation of bleeding vessels.. Twenty per cent of the gain achieved by expanded tissues was thus lost using this technique. fibroblasts. Fig. Planning of the defect area to be excised was done before . An endoscopic expander implantation enabled us to apply a new technique of elevation for expanded flap that permitted a more effective utilization of the flaps’ resources without any retraction. In the conventional technique. during which time retraction occurred. and myofibroblasts of derma and capsule. The implant was then taken out and the size of the expanded tissues was calculated.base is the surface area of the expander base. To avoid this deficit of expanded tissue on reconstruction. expanded tissues retracted by approximately 20% or 2-4 cm.14 The duration of tissue expansion was therefore prolonged.base = 1. = Sexp. Sexp. An expander pocket was opened with an incision on the edge of the pathological and expanded tissues that was practically an incision from the previous implantation (Fig. A traditional reconstruction by expanded tissues was performed as we shall now describe. on the basis of which defective tissues were excised. It was performed to prevent tissue deficit after reconstruction because. 7A).2 õ Sdef. the following formula was used: Snes. Sexp. after removal of the implant. is the surface area of tissues necessary for plastic surgery.Modified elevation of expanded tissues The anatomical blood supply of the expanded flaps was taken into the account during the planning and performance of reconstruction by expanded tissues. expansion was continued until the area of expanded tissues was 20% greater than the defective area. depending on expander size.Sexp. is the surface area of expanded skin above an expander.13. This procedure usually took from 30 to 60 min. and Sdef.Scheme of incisions for dissection and mobilization of expanded flap with conventional reconstruction. The modified technique became possible after study of endoscopic expander implantation allowed maximum use of expanded tissue resources. This retraction was caused by elastic and collagenic fibres. where Snes. The period of tissue expansion was therefore prolonged as it was necessary to reach Snes.
In view of the possibility of tissue deficit due to complete excision of all extensive defects. Incisions were made on the basis of this plan (Fig. the superficial fascia were included in the flap in order to save the blood supply in distal parts (Fig. . 7B . The wound was closed with two layers of sutures. Fig.the operation on the basis of the tissue gain due to the expansion. Fig.Mobilization of cutaneous or fasciocutaneous layer (under defect) towards expander pocket with subsequent haemostasis. with subsequent haemostasis. arrow shows direction of mobilization). Fig. 9). The expanded flap was placed on the defect. 8). and tissues scheduled for removal excised from flap. and tissues scheduled for removal were cut from the flap (Fig. if possible. Using this technique. there was no time for the retraction of expanded tissues.Expanded flap transferred to defect. final fitting was done. the defective tissues had already been cut from subjacent tissues and haemostasis had been achieved on the wound surface. 8 . final fitting performed. was left in the distal part of the flap. 9 . Subdermal fat and if possible the superficial fascia is included in the flap in order to maintain blood supply to distal parts. the strip of pathologic tissues. The subdermal fat and. When during mobilization an expander pocket was reached. 7B). After that the expander pocket was opened and the implant was removed. where the blood supply was not interrupted by the incision for implantation of the expander. after which mobilization of a cutaneous or fasciocutaneous layer (under the defect!) towards an expander pocket was carried out.Scheme of incisions for dissection and mobilization of expanded flap with modified reconstruction and inclusion of defective tissue in flap (wide continuous lines show incisions.
The complications had a negative influence on tissue expansion. haematomas (6.0 was used for statistical analysis.5 * p < 0.6 ± 2.3%).0%).2 Infection 14. Statistical analysis The licensed program Statistica 6.The advantage of this modified technique of reconstruction was thus the reduction in expansion time. Wound dehiscence and pressure sores were associated with seromas.6 0 Total* 38. and the results of treatment: in 24 cases (5. This testified to the important role of these in the development of trophic alterations in expanded tissues. the hypothesis of equality of average (frequencies) in two groups was rejected at a significance value of p < 0.0 0 Pressure sore 15.05 Table I .5%). haematomas. and Student’s t-test. tissue expansion failed because of complications such as infection (2.Comparison of techniques of implantation and tissue expansion .7 (± SE) 33. The most frequent complications with the conventional technique were seromas (11.6% of cases. pressure sores (1. using the following parameters: mean value (M). Criteria of comparison Conventional implantation and expansion Endoscopic implantation and intensive expansion Mean expansion time (days) 71. dehiscence of post-operative wounds (8.6%). or infections of the expander pocket in respectively 63. without losing up to 20% of the gain because of retraction and without the risk of tissue deficit for plastic surgery. Results For the comparison of techniques we considered the results. average standard deviation.8 3. and pressure sores (15. the terms of treatment. and wound dehiscence (1.6 6. its duration. infections (14. and the complications rates.3 (± SE) Complications (percentage of expansions) Seroma 11.8 ± 1.6% and 47.8%).6 0 Wound dehiscence 8.4%) using the conventional technique. due to maximum use of expanded tissues.05 for quantitative attributes and the c2 criterion for qualitative attributes.4%).4 0 Haematoma 6.6%).3%) (Table I).2 Failure of expansion due to complications 5.3 3.
The wounds healed uneventfully by primary intention. With the traditional technique a surgeon has to balance between insufficient filling (seroma and infection) and overfilling (post-operative wound dehiscence) in the first two weeks after an implantation. The mean duration of tissue expansion using an endoscopic expander implantation. and modified reconstruction was less than half than using the conventional technique. Discussion Tissue expansion is an effective method of reconstructive and plastic surgery.Same patient three months after reconstruction with expanded tissues. a haematoma was observed in one case (3. and all the transferred expanded flaps survived after reconstruction (Fig.5%.e. i. Conventional post-operative implantation wounds did not allow tissue expansion within 10-14 days before healing.6 ± 1.e.1% (p < 0. by 32.05) and to decrease expansion time by 38 days. The new techniques therefore enabled us to considerably reduce the complications rate from 38. intensive expansion. This fortnight’s delay promotes the development of a thicker capsule around the expanders that complicated tissue expansion16 and increased the retraction of expanded tissues.8 ± 2.14 .7 days (± SE) compared to 71.6% to 6. 10). as reported above. and to develop a reconstruction technique without retraction of the expanded tissues and therefore without the need to waste time on overexpansion up to 20%. Thus the commencement of tissue expansion immediately after implantation and the intensive filling technique did not increase the trophic alteration rate in the expanded tissues.15 However.3 days (± SE) (p < 0. Reduction of the length of the incision was limited by the need of good visual control and of adequate operative space for maintenance of haemostasis. its essential drawbacks of significant duration and a high local complications rate considerably limit its wide clinical application. A reliable technique was necessary to reduce the risk of complications to a minimum. Fig.2%) and a pressure sore (due to an accidental trauma in the expansion site) also in one patient (3. This time was completely inadequate for tissue expansion.05). We analysed factors that might consent a reduction of these limits of expansion: it was necessary “to exclude” the time required for healing of an implantation wound. thus reducing patient discomfort. 33. i. There were no failed expansions. 10 . This period was even longer in the event of complications.2%).With the new techniques. to prevent complications.
Even if an expansion process has no complications. served to prevent haematomas. Endoscopic techniques and instruments made it possible to create the required cavity for an expander in the selected anatomical layer of tissues. Patients should not therefore suppose they are going to be “switched off” from their usual lives for 3-4 months (2-3 months for expansion plus of 2-4 weeks after the reconstructive operation). High-grade tissue expansion is started immediately after expander implantation and is maintained until sufficient tissue gain for reconstruction has been achieved. wound dehiscence). plus precise haemostasis. with subsequent haemostasis that includes defective tissues on the flap.5 months). The new techniques effectively prevent complications. All patients want to get rid of their defect with minimal discomfort and within the shortest terms.). It should be emphasized that a surgeon cannot guarantee the final outcome. antibiotic therapy. especially if the expanders are located on exposed body sites. it considerably limits normal life and physical activity. In reconstruction by means of expanded tissues adjacent to the defect. such as the face or head. especially from the patient’s point of view. The new techniques have made it possible to reduce the risk of complications and to considerably reduce expansion time (from 2-3 to 1-1. daily bandagings. surgeons have to make several parallel incisions for capsular release that can impair damage the flap’s blood supply. Conclusions Tissue expansion is an effective method in the treatment of various extensive post-burn scar deformities that makes it possible to increase the area of normal tissues available for reconstruction having a colour and texture similar to those of the defect area. haematoma. If such complications occur (i. The commencement of tissue expansion immediately after implantation and the intensive filling technique did not cause any trophic alterations in the expanded tissues. in their turn. and minimize patient discomfort. A careful check of all the areas of a newly formed pocket. because of the elevated risk of complications. reduced the infections and pressure sore rates above the expanders. Some minor incisions (5-10 mm). In plastic surgery psychosocial aspects play an important role and should not be underestimated. reaching its maximum after approximately two months of expansion. To overcome this. Defects of appearance are not life-threatening.23 Endoscopic implantation of expanders appeared to effectively prevent complications. Endoscopic expander implantation is preferable because of the reduction of expansion time and in-patient stay. thus significantly diminishing patient discomfort.e. Some moments during tissue expansion are disappointing.22. repeated wound suturing. The prevention of seromas and haematomas. the thick capsule. reduce expansion time by over a half.Capsular thickness is proportional to expander pressure. . made parallel to tension forces. with conventional techniques.18-21 A high-grade expansion process was therefore immediately initiated immediately after implantation of the expander. limited the expanded tissues’ mobility. the expansion process lasts even longer and causes more discomfort (pain. infection. etc. after two or three months of expansion. enabled us to initiate a high-grade tissue expansion just after the expander implantation without taking care of a wound dehiscence that also prevented seromas. Pathological tissues are excised after removal of the expander and transposition of the expanded tissues on the defect. and the prevention of complications.17 Thus. seroma. with good haemostasis control through remote 5-10 mm incision(s) made parallel to the tension vectors.16. an incision is made on the opposite side and mobilization is effected towards an expander.
Select..R. Kerem H. Vadodaria S.. Magalon G. 1995. Plast. Antonyshyn O. 1989. le temps moyen de l’expansion était de 72 ± 2 jours (± DS) et le taux de complications locales était de 38. 2000. L’expansion tissulaire à niveau élevé a été commencée immédiatement après l’implantation. Read.. Surg.P.. Gibstein L. Bilkay U.S. a été effectuée et ensuite l’expanseur a été enlevé et les tissus expansés ont été transposés. Surg. Grishkevich V. Kayser M. Conclusions.. Moroz V.: A method of expansion of soft tissues in plastic and reconstruction surgery (review of the literature).S.. Plast. Plast. il a été possible de réduire le temps moyen de l’expansion de 72 jours jusqu’à 34 (moins que la moitié) et de réduire le taux de complications de 38. Plast. In: Georgiade G. 57: 93-7.. Br. Fac.. Herson M. avec l’emploi de la méthode de l’expansion tissulaire. J.. Ann. J.C. 42: 396-401. Surg. Hosp. Faes J. Vishnevsky entre 2001 et 2006 pour des séquelles cicatricielles post-brûlures ont reçu l’implantation endoscopique de 46 expanseurs de silicone dans diverses zones anatomiques du corps. Coleman D.. c’est-à-dire l’implantation endoscopique des expanseurs. 1999.C. Karp N. y compris les tissus déficients du lambeau. Songur E.: Tissue expansion in the limbs: A comparative analysis of limb and non-limb sites. 2004.ont permis aux Auteurs d’améliorer notamment les résultats du traitement des séquelles cicatricielles post-brûlure. Legre R. Clin. la technique accélérée de l’expansion tissulaire et l’élévation modifiée du lambeau expansé . Ann.R. une technique fréquemment utilisée dans la chirurgie reconstructive. Ozek C. Plast. 41: 239-50. Trois techniques l’implantation endoscopique de l’expanseur. Surg. Rev.L. 2002. Mackinnon S. Med. Ferreira M.C.RÉSUMÉ. J. J. 114: 98-106... Plast. Bartlett R. 15: 758-65. Sao Paulo.. Surg. 54: 310-6. sont la durée significative et le taux élevé des complications.. Ganzha P. Méthodes.. (eds): “Plastic. Mulliken J.. 8: 7-58...: Tissue expander complications in plastic surgery: A 10-year experience. Hodges P.M. Sharobaro V. 6: 42-6. l’expansion intensive et une technique modifiée pour l’élévation d’un lambeau expansé..V. Les désavantages de l’expansion tissulaire conventionnelle. Maxillofacial and Reconstructive Surgery”.: Complications of soft tissue expansion. Plast..S.. Cunha M.5%..Y.S.. 38: 358-64. Bardot J.. Levin L. Khirurgiia (Mosk. Craniofac... Riefkohl R. Williams & Wilkins.. Résultats. Les Auteurs décrivent leur expérience du traitement en clinique de 329 patients traités avec cette méthode pendant la période 1987-2006...: Tissue expansion. Margulis A. Youm T.: Tissue expansion of the lower limb: Complications in a cohort of 103 cases. 2001. L’élévation du lambeau reconstruit.A.: Tissue expansion in children: A retrospective study of complications. Erdem O. Madazimov M. 1997. Br. Br. Vingt-sept patients traités à l’Institut de Chirurgie A. Orgill D. Utilisant ces techniques qui ont été perfectionnées. 1988. 55: 302-6..: Alopecia treatment with scalp expansion: Some surgical fine points and a simple modification to improve the results. Bauer B.F. Nakamoto H.A. Gruss J. Surg. Khirurgii. Surg...S. Pandya A.B.C. 8: 140-3. Bibliography Argenta L.. Kasabian A.A. Reconstr. Ann.I.M.. Données générales. Baltimore. 87-98. Gemperli R. Abramson D. Surg.: Principles of flaps (overview).E.6%. Moroz V. 2004. Bali D.: Complications of tissue expansion in a public hospital.L.J.6% à 6. Avec la méthode ancienne. 2002... Upton J. Les Auteurs ont appliqué une nouvelle approche à cette méthode afin de réduire ses désavantages. Margiotta M.Y.N.....). .. Casanova D.: The expanded transposition flap: Shifting paradigms based on experience gained from two decades of pediatric tissue expansion. 1997.: Prevention of complications of tissue expansion.
: Experiment research on the mechanism of skin contracture after expansion. Division of Reconstructive and Plastic Surgery.. Sharobaro V. 1995. Ph. Guo S. Argenta L..: First experience of endoscopic implantation of tissue expanders in plastic and reconstructive surgery....A. Zhonghua Zheng King Wai Ke Za Zhi. Arnaund E. Springer Verlag New York Inc. Surg. Liu K. Microsurg.G... Surg. Surg.. Paul. Guo J..: Tissue expansion in pediatric patients. Rehnke R. 16: 143-5.K. Eubanks S.: Free flap expansion using balloon-assisted endoscopic technique. Anger J. Cohen S. Lo Giudice J...K. Reconstr. Tel. Rev. Hand Clin..H. Rivera R.. Daniel R.. Ann.: Investigation on contraction mechanism of expanded tissue. M. Russia... 113811 Moscow. 2004. 11: 59-70. Plast..A. In: Ramirez O. (eds): “Endoscopic Plastic Surgery”..D.V.P.D.: Quantitative analysis of the thickness of human skin and subcutaneous tissue following controlled expansion with a silicone implant.: Use of videoscopy as an aid in the placement of tissue expanders.ru . Lu K. 1988.: Endoscopic surgery of the upper extremity.. 18: 173-4. Serra J.: +7916 1257548.Y.D. fax: +7495 2370814. 27 Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street. Plast.. Levin L. Saltz R. 1996.. Sims C. 17: 330-6... Plast. Pasyk K..: Reconstruction of pharyngostomes with a modified deltopectoral flap combining endoscopy and tissue expansion. 283-92. 2002. 111: 363-6. Al Y. Strekalovsky V... Surg.S. 18: 513-7. Clin..: Applications of endoscopic surgery in pediatric patients. 2005..: Endoscopic expansion surgery. Lin C....... Zhonghua Zheng King Wai Ke Za Zhi. 102: 1446-51. Endosc. Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery.H. 1996. Burstein F. Manzano M. Starkov Y. Moroz V. Gosain A..Fan Z. Sharobaro. Hassett C. Paloma V. 81: 516-23. Associate Professor. 1998. Med. Cui L. 1993. Castro V. Monner J. Surg. Szego T.R. Plast.. A. e-mail: sharobarovi@mail. 2000.S...I.M. Levin L. Reconstr.C. Li J. This paper was received on 19 October 2007.. Address correspondence to: Valentin I. Huang M.R.M. 1998. Benito J. Anger J. 32: 35-44. 41: 283-8.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


248 La. 1097, 184 So.2d 23, certiorari dismissed.
I wish to state in a few words my reasons for joining in the dismissal of this writ as improvidently granted. For reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS, I agree that the dispositive federal issue in this case is whether the petitioner used an unreasonable amount of force in resisting what, on this record, must be regarded as an illegal attempt by the police to search his person. I find this record too opaque to permit any satisfactory adjudication of that question. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 331 U. S. 568-575.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring.
constitutional issues in this case are not adequately presented by the record before us. It is also entirely clear that they cannot now be developed on remand with any verisimilitude.
The central issue that this case appeared to present for decision when certiorari was granted is of great importance. It is whether the police, seeing a pedestrian who fits the description of a person suspected of murder, may accost the pedestrian and stop him, and when and to what extent is the accosted person justified in refusing to cooperate with efforts of the police to establish that he is or is not the person whom they seek.
I am not prepared to say that, regardless of the presence or absence of adequate cause for police action, the arrest or the attempt by the officers to search is unlawful, as my Brother HARLAN's opinion suggests, where the accosted person produces no identification, attempts three times to walk away, and refuses to dispel any doubt by showing that his forearm is not tattooed. I should want to know whether, in fact, there was constitutionally adequate cause for the police to suspect that the pedestrian was the man sought for murder.
If the Court should, on an adequate record, determine that the police action in stopping and arresting petitioner violated his constitutional rights, there would remain, among other issues the question of culpability for the scuffle that ensued. My Brethren who have written in this case seem agreed that the record is too sketchy to permit decision of this issue.
believe to be a suspect in a murder case. I do not believe that this Court would or should, without careful analysis, endorse the right of a pedestrian, accosted by the police because he fits the description of a person wanted for murder, to resist the officers so vigorously that they are "bounced from wall to wall physically" or to react "like a football player going through a line." Our jurisprudence teaches that we should decide issues on the basis of facts of record. This is especially important in the difficult, dangerous, and subtle field where the essential office of the policeman impinges upon the basic freedom of the citizen.
jacket, though he did not communicate this to the police. The police arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering, and frisked him.
During this incident, petitioner attempted three times peacefully to walk away from the officers. The first two attempts came after petitioner had given what he regarded as sufficient identification. The third, although the officers were not certain about this, apparently occurred after petitioner was informed he was under arrest. Evidently on the basis of this last attempt, petitioner was subsequently charged with resisting an officer. Petitioner used no force in any of his attempts to walk away, and each time stopped when so directed by the police.
After petitioner was inside the police car, he called the officers "stupid cops," whereupon they told him he would also be charged with reviling the police. When the car arrived at the police station, petitioner offered to produce identification if they would take him home, but this offer was rejected. In the stationhouse, petitioner was interrogated for about 10 minutes concerning a "possible murder suspect." Thereafter, he was booked for vagrancy by loitering, resisting an officer, and reviling the police.
"got hold of each of his arms . . . [and] tried to pry his arms apart, and . . . were bounced from wall to wall and bench to bench and back again."
officers sustained no bruises, marks, or torn clothing as a result of this incident, and succeeded in removing petitioner's jacket and discovering he had no tattoo.
Petitioner's trial for the three charges based on the episode in the street -- vagrancy by loitering, resisting an officer and reviling the police -- commenced on December 4, 1964. After partial testimony, the trial was adjourned, and not resumed until May 7, 1965, when the court heard further partial testimony and adjourned over petitioner's objection. The trial was again resumed on May 14, and, at the close of the State's case on that day, petitioner's motion for dismissal was taken under advisement, and three new charges based on events inside the police station were lodged against him. Respondent, before this Court, characterizes the original charges which were prosecuted against petitioner intermittently over a six-month period as "long-abandoned." Why the police waited six months before bringing charges based on events occurring within the police station is nowhere explained.
"[t]he defendant was in police custody pursuant to a legal arrest . . . the officers had the right and the obligation to search the defendant. . . ."
Petitioner sought writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Louisiana Supreme Court, again arguing that, because the arrest and search were unlawful, he had a right to resist, and also that the "evidence merely shows that the defendant acted in self-defense and resisted the removal of his clothing." The court denied his application, holding: "The ruling of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans is correct."
Petitioner argues before this Court that his arrest and subsequent search in the stationhouse were unlawful, and that he had a right under the Fourth Amendment reasonably to resist the unlawful search. In my view, there can be no doubt on this record that the arrest and subsequent search of petitioner were illegal. I believe that the illegality of the search alone requires reversal of the judgment below, which rejected possibly meritorious state law claims on the erroneous premise that the search was lawful. Therefore, in accordance with this Court's well established practice "not to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts presented in the record," Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 368 U. S. 163 (1961), I would reverse and remand this case without reaching the question whether petitioner had, and acted within, a Fourth Amendment right to resist.
The officers had neither a warrant nor probable cause to arrest petitioner for vagrancy by loitering. [Footnote 2] The loitering charge was based on the inconsequential circumstance that petitioner had been standing still for 5 to 10 seconds before the police approached him. That petitioner had no identification papers on his person and had very little funds obviously add nothing which could constitutionally make his conduct criminal. Cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960).
cause to arrest him for murder. I agree that the record does not permit a determination of whether the officers could lawfully have arrested petitioner for murder. With due respect, however, I suggest that this is an irrelevant inadequacy in the record. The record does establish that petitioner was not arrested for murder. The record does establish that the police interrogated petitioner for about 10 minutes concerning the murder before it was decided that he would not be booked for murder. The record does establish that petitioner was booked only for vagrancy by loitering, resisting an officer, and reviling the police.
was the murder suspect, and that the vagrancy charge here was used as a pretext for holding petitioner for further questioning concerning the murder. This technique, using a minor and imaginary charge to hold an individual, in my judgment, deserves unqualified condemnation. [Footnote 8] It is a technique which makes personal liberty and dignity contingent upon the whims of a police officer, and can serve only to engender fear, resentment, and disrespect of the police in the populace which they serve.
Since the arrest was unlawful, the subsequent search of petitioner in the stationhouse was also unlawful. See Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948). Because the opinion of the court below was predicated upon the assumption that this search was lawful, I think that the judgment below must be reversed. If the Louisiana courts had reached the correct conclusion that the police officers had no authority to search petitioner, they might well have concluded that petitioner was within his rights under local law in resisting this unlawful search.
"The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable, when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person . . . ; provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense. . . . [Footnote 10]"
whether the record in the instant case establishes such a defense are questions of Louisiana law.
"The right of personal liberty is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen, and any unlawful interference with it may be resisted. Every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest; and, in preventing such illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary. [Footnote 12]"
Petitioner vigorously argued in the state courts that he had a right to resist the stationhouse search, which he contended was unlawful, but the state courts never came to grips with this issue, because they held he was then in "lawful police custody" pursuant to "a legal arrest." By virtue of the City of Monroe case, supra, it appears with unmistakable clarity that an individual in Louisiana has a right under state law reasonably to resist an unlawful arrest. Whether this state right encompasses the right to resist an unlawful search and whether the amount of resistance here was reasonable are questions of state law.
arrest someone on a trumped-up minor charge pending investigation of other crimes warrants this Court's condemnation, and because, unlike my Brethren, I do not find this record too opaque for what I consider a proper disposition, I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
The ordinance under which petitioner was convicted provides: "No person shall disturb the public peace by assaulting or beating another or by threatening to do bodily harm to another." § 42-24 Code of the City of New Orleans, Louisiana.
The "reviling the police" charge arose from an incident subsequent to the unlawful arrest. While it is not entirely clear from the testimony whether the charge of resisting an officer was based on petitioner's pre- or post-arrest attempt to walk away, the decision of the Criminal District Court reversing petitioner's conviction for resisting an officer based on events inside the police station makes clear that, to constitute a crime under the relevant New Orleans ordinance, the resistance must occur in the process of an arrest. Therefore, petitioner's pre-arrest attempts to walk away are irrelevant. His post-arrest attempt, just as his post-arrest alleged reviling of the police, cannot justify the initial arrest for vagrancy. Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 332 U. S. 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 273 U. S. 29 (1927). In any event, it is evident that these two charges are as baseless as the vagrancy charge. A peaceful attempt to walk away from a police officer, where the accused has identified himself, has committed no crime in the presence of the officer, and stops as soon as the officer directs him to cannot be regarded as the crime of resisting an officer, and, it is fairly clear, would not be so regarded in Louisiana. See State v. Dunnington, 157 La. 363, 102 So. 47 (1924); State v. Scott, 123 La. 105, 49 So. 715 (1909). And with due regard for the sensitivity of police officers, it is simply inconceivable that it can be made criminal to speak the words "stupid cop," without more, in the privacy of a police car. It seems likely that the abandonment of the prosecution on these charges after the State had presented its case indicates that the prosecuting officials were well aware of the groundlessness of all three charges.
See W. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody 379-382 (1965). Cf. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 8 (1967).
See, e.g., New York City Charter and Administrative Code § 435-12.0 (1963); District of Columbia Code § 4-134 (1967).
"It is the duty of every peace officer making an arrest, or having an arrested person in his custody, promptly to conduct the person arrested to the nearest jail or police station and cause him to be booked. A person is booked by an entry, in a book kept for that purpose, showing his name and address, the offense charged against him, by whom he was arrested, a list of any property taken from him, and the date and time of booking. Every jail and police station shall keep a book for the listing of the above information as to each prisoner received. The book shall always be open for public inspection. The person booked shall be imprisoned unless he is released on bail."
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that a defendant arrested and booked for one crime cannot later be charged with other crimes. The point is simply that, when a controversy arises over the legality of the arrest, the police should be held to the booked offense.
For example, one officer might have followed petitioner while the other secured more detailed information about the murder suspect from headquarters, and/or checked petitioner's identification by looking at a phone book or going to the address he gave them. They might also have checked with someone connected with petitioner's law school. Another alternative would have been to suggest that petitioner voluntarily return to his apartment, which the officers knew was only four blocks away from the scene of the arrest, to secure identification -- an offer which petitioner made upon arrival at the police station and the officers rejected.
Cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36, 342 U. S. 46 (1951); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 367 U. S. 631-632 (1961). Respondent, the City of New Orleans, urges that, in 1958, it abandoned the practice of arresting for vagrancy pending investigation of other offenses. If this is so, the city is deserving of commendation. Irrespective of the general policy of the city, however, the instant case clearly demonstrates that the practice continues.
State v. Chandler, 5 La.Ann. 489 (1850); State v. Scossoni, 48 La.Ann. 1464, 21 So. 32 (1896); State v. Baptiste, 105 La. 661, 30 So. 147 (1901); State v. Bolden, 107 La. 116, 31 So. 393 (1902); State v. Short, 120 La. 187, 45 So. 98 (1907); State v. Robinson, 143 La. 543, 78 So. 933 (1918); State v. Van Duff, 146 La. 713, 84 So. 29 (1920). See generally Comment, Self-Defense in Louisiana -- The Criminal Law and the Tort Law Compared, 16 Tulane L.Rev. 609 (1942).
La.Rev.Stat. § 14:19. This statute has been broadly interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Rowland, 246 La. 729, 167 So.2d 346 (1964). See also La.Rev.Stat. §§ 14:18, 14:20, 14:21, 14:22.
State v. Teleton, 243 La. 1031, 150 So.2d 4 (1963). However, the assault in the Teleton case was found to have been committed before any attempted arrest.
City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 979, 14 So.2d 781, 784 (1943). See also Lyons v. Carroll, 107 L. 471, 31 So. 760 (1902).
If this case is to be decided by the traditional Fourth Amendment standards applicable prior to Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 1, the question is whether a person who is unconstitutionally arrested must submit to a search of his person, or whether he may offer at least token resistance.
He was booked on three charges -- vagrancy, resisting an officer, and reviling the police.
this second case was had, and petitioner fined $25 on each charge or given 30 days in jail on each charge, the sentences being suspended. On appeal, the conviction of resisting an officer was reversed, but his conviction on two charges of disturbing the peace was affirmed by the Criminal District Court and later by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the complaint in the first case apparently being abandoned. While petitioner tried to get the appellate courts to incorporate the record in the first case into the record in the second, that was not done. But that defect has been remedied here, the transcripts of all the hearings now being before the Court.
by the factor of loitering, but petitioner was seen standing still for only five to 10 seconds. To be sure, he did not have identification papers on him, and "very little funds." But those factors obviously could not be ingredients of a crime under our present system of government. Cf. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199.
It is plain that the officers "seized" petitioner to question him further concerning a murder. It is apparently on that ground that the Criminal District Court concluded that petitioner's arrest was "legal." But he was not arrested for murder or for any related offense, hut only for vagrancy. The circumstances of this case show that the arrest was no more than arrest on suspicion, [Footnote 2/2] which, of course, was unconstitutional -- at least prior to Terry v. Ohio -- and robs the search of any color of legality. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98.
Under our authorities (cf. Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529, 177 U. S. 534-535, and see United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 332 U. S. 594), at least prior to the ill-starred case of Terry v. Ohio, a citizen had the right to offer some resistance to an unconstitutional "seizure" or "search." Must he now stand quietly and supinely while officers "pat him down " whirl him around, and throw him in the wagon?
The present episode may be an insignificant one, and the hurt to petitioner nominal. But the principle that a citizen can defy an unconstitutional act is deep in our system. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 323 U. S. 532-537.
"Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution."
We should not let those fences of the law be broken down.
This case points up vividly the dangers which emanate from the Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, the so-called "stop-and-frisk" case. If this case is to be decided by the new test of "searches" and "seizures" announced in that case, startling problems are presented. The officers here had no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that petitioner was a murder suspect, a suspicion based only on a superficial resemblance between petitioner and the wanted man. Thus, they had no right to "seize" petitioner. Is the case dismissed as improvidently granted because the officers had "reasonable suspicion" justifying the seizure, or reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous? These questions are not answered by the Court, and leaving them unanswered gives a new impetus to Terry v. Ohio. If this "seizure" was constitutional, then the sleepless professor who walks in the night to find the relaxation for sleep is easy prey to the police, as are thousands of other innocent Americans raised in the sturdy environment where no policeman can lay a hand on the citizen without "probable cause" that a crime has been or is about to be committed. That was the philosophy of Walt Whitman, Vachel Lindsay, and Carl Sandburg, and it was faithfully reflected in our law.
an officer's "seizure" of a person on the street, even though not made upon "probable cause," means that, if the suspect resists the "seizure," he may then be taken to the police station for further inquisition. That is a terrifying spectacle -- a person is plucked off the street and whisked to the police station for questioning and identification merely because he resembles the suspected perpetrator of a crime. I fear that, with Terry and with Wainwright, we have forsaken the Western tradition and taken a long step toward the oppressive police practices not only of Communist regimes, but of modern Iran, "democratic" Formosa, and Franco Spain, with which we are now even more closely allied.
I do not, as my Brothers HARLAN and FORTAS suggest, consider the record too sketchy for determining the degree of force employed by petitioner in resisting the officers. The record discloses that no violence and little force were used by petitioner.
"Mr. Wainwright refused to take his jacket off . . . , so I instructed him I would have the jacket removed by the doorman."
"He again refused. He walked into a corner, grabbed his jacket by his hands, folding his arms, and he said, 'If you want this jacket off, take it off.'"
"Officer O'Rourke and Officer Gilford asked him to take the jacket off and he didn't respond, so they physically took the jacket off of him. He done everything in his power to keep them from removing the jacket. In this operation, the officers were bounced from wall to wall physically, and, with the assistance of a couple of other police officers, they put handcuffs on one of his arms, and they removed his jacket."
"Q. You testified that Mr. Wainwright crouched in a corner, held his jacket to him, now what did he do when Officers O'Rourke and Gilford tried to remove it?"
"A. He tried to keep it on by holding it."
"A. By folding his arms (demonstrates)."
"Q. He didn't do anything else?"
"A. No, not to my knowledge."
"Q. If Officer O'Rourke and Officer Gilford got thrown around the room, it was through their own effort?"
"A. No, it was the combined effort of Mr. Wainwright in his refusal to remove the jacket. Force was necessary to remove the jacket by the officers."
"Q. He didn't do anything but try to hold the jacket on?"
"A. They tried to take it off, and he was trying to keep the jacket on."
"Q. He held very still?"
"A. No, it was a struggle."
"Q. Did he strike out at the officers?"
"Q. Did he kick the officers?"
"A. I didn't see him. He could have. I didn't see him. It wasn't visible to me."
Later, in answer to a question posed by the court, Martello stated that none of the four officers who removed petitioner's jacket suffered any "marks, bruises, or torn clothing."
"Q. How was he [petitioner] pushing you around? Did he strike out at someone?"
"A. No. Like a football player going through a line."
"Q. Did he try to run?"
"A. No, dancing from wall to wall."
What transpired after the arrest for vagrancy demonstrates that the officers merely suspected petitioner was involved in the murder because of a superficial resemblance to the wanted man. Officers testified that the reason they wished to remove petitioner's jacket after he was in custody was to see if his arm was tattooed -- that is, to ascertain if petitioner's resemblance to the murder suspect was more than superficial.