CAROLYN ZALESKI vs. STEPHEN ZALESKI.
Court Below: Probate and Family Court Department, Essex Division.
Discussion of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124, which created four categories of alimony [233-235], and of the standard of review applicable to a judge's award of alimony under the statute [235-236].
In a divorce action, the Probate and Family Court judge did not abuse her discretion in awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony (with its presumptive five-year payment period), rather than general term alimony, where the judge's comprehensive findings of fact reflected that the judge gave consideration to all the factors identified in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a) [236-239]; and where the judge's findings concerning the wife's previous employment history, her wish to work, her employability in the area of sales, and her transferable skills supported the judge's determination that the wife could be expected to become economically self-sufficient by a predicted time [239-242].
COMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on December 20, 2010.
The case was heard by Amy Lyn Blake, J.
Paul P. Perocchi (Cynthia Grover Hastings with him) for the wife.
David E. Cherny (Catharine V. Blake with him) for the husband.
DUFFLY, J. The Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act or act), changed the legal framework under which courts may award alimony when a marriage ends in divorce. The act created four categories of alimony: "[g]eneral term alimony," "[r]ehabilitative alimony," "[r]eimbursement alimony," and "[t]ransitional alimony," and placed durational limits on the length of time alimony may be paid absent specific extenuating circumstances as found by a judge before the statutory period expires. See G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-52. We are asked to decide in this case of first impression whether a Probate and Family Court judge abused her discretion in determining that rehabilitative alimony, with its presumptive five-year payment period, was the appropriate form of alimony to be ordered, rather than general term alimony, which, based on the length of the parties' marriage, would have permitted alimony payments to continue for thirteen years.
In December, 2010, Carolyn Zaleski (wife) filed a complaint for divorce from Stephen Zaleski (husband) on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Following trial, judgment entered granting a divorce nisi on the basis of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, see G. L. c. 208, § 1B, awarding rehabilitative alimony to the wife, dividing the marital assets, and incorporating a stipulation of the parties regarding the custody and education of their two children. The wife appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.
include all of the husband's income in the calculation of the amount of alimony, and that there was no basis in the judge's findings to require the wife to maintain life insurance policies as security.
parties; income, employment and employability of both parties, including employability through reasonable diligence and additional training, if necessary; economic and noneconomic contribution of both parties to the marriage; marital lifestyle; ability of each party to maintain the marital lifestyle; lost economic opportunity as a result of the marriage; and such other factors as the court considers relevant and material."
G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a). These factors also are to be considered in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded. Id. In sum, the primary differences between rehabilitative and general alimony relate to the initial term limits set forth in the act and the standard by which the term of alimony may be extended.
foreseen events prevent the recipient spouse from being self-supporting at the end of the term with due consideration to the length of the marriage, [and] the court finds that the recipient tried to become self-supporting." G. L. c. 208, § 50 (b). [Note 11] The amount of alimony may be modified during the term "upon material change of circumstance." G. L. c. 208, § 50 (c). By contrast, general term alimony is defined as "the periodic payment of support to a recipient spouse who is economically dependent." G. L. c. 208, § 48. Payments continue, subject to durational time limits established by the act that depend upon the length of the marriage; here, general alimony would have entitled the wife to support payments of up to approximately thirteen years. [Note 12] See G. L. c. 208, § 49. General term alimony can be extended for "good cause" if there has been a material change in circumstances and the reasons are supported by "clear and convincing evidence." G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (2).
We turn to a consideration whether the judge's findings in this case reflect that she considered the mandatory factors when determining the appropriate form of alimony, and whether those findings support her conclusion that the wife should receive rehabilitative alimony. We then consider whether the findings support the judge's determination regarding the amount of the alimony award.
amount of an award of alimony, we examine a judge's findings to determine whether the judge considered all of the relevant factors under G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), and whether the judge relied on any irrelevant factors. Cf. Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787 , 790 (2001) (reviewing factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34, regarding division of marital property). "[I]t is important that the record indicate clearly that the judge considered all the mandatory statutory factors," Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398 , 401 (1977), and that the reason for her conclusion is apparent in her findings. Heins v. Ledis, supra at 481. "A judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless "plainly wrong and excessive." Id., quoting Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292 , 296 (1991).
3. Rehabilitative alimony. a. Mandatory factors. A judge has discretion in deciding whether to award rehabilitative alimony rather than general term alimony, so long as she has given appropriate consideration to the factors identified in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a). [Note 14] Where the determination is made that rehabilitative alimony, with its shorter durational limits, is the most appropriate form, findings based on those factors must support the conclusion that a recipient spouse's economic dependence is temporary, and that, at a predictable date, the dependent spouse can become self-sufficient by undertaking reasonable efforts. See G. L. c. 208, §§ 48, 53.
in this case was rehabilitative. "[W]e will not reverse findings made by the judge on the basis of oral testimony unless we are convinced they are plainly wrong." Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232 , 239 (1981). See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 52 (a). According to those findings, this was a marriage of approximately sixteen years and four months; at the time of trial the wife was forty-five years old and the husband was forty-eight years old; both parties enjoyed good health, as did their children. During most of the marriage, both parties were employed full time outside the home and contributed their earnings to the marital enterprise. The marriage was a "true partnership in every aspect," from the financial contributions that each made "to child rearing[, and] to homemaking."
The husband, who holds a bachelor of arts degree in political science, initially worked as a real estate appraiser, then as an analyst and executive in real estate investment firms. The husband's income, as reported on his Internal Revenue Service W-2 forms, was $302,442 in 2004. It increased annually until it reached $1,024,555 in 2008, and was in excess of $900,000 in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, the husband's income as reported on his W-2 forms was $741,958. [Note 15] Since 2008, the husband's income has consisted of base salary in the amount of approximately $400,000, and bonuses which are paid annually in the year after they are earned. In 2011, the husband also received $286,625 in nonrecurring deferred compensation from a prior employer. The husband's income during the marriage was always greater than that of the wife. The husband was found to be self-supporting and fully employed commensurate with his training, skills, and experience.
which she was terminated in 2007. See note 16, infra. At that time, her base salary was in the range of $127,000 to $130,000 annually, with a bonus of up to $40,000; she also had use of the company car.
The judge found that the wife, who has not been employed outside the home since 2008, is not presently self-supporting, but has the ability and the desire to work. The judge found credible the wife's testimony that she wants to work and plans to work outside the home, but found also that her job search efforts have been sporadic and superficial, and that she had not used her best efforts to secure employment. [Note 16] At the time of trial, the wife had received no interview or job offers as a result of her job search. The judge was not required to credit, or to give significant weight to, the wife's assertions as to those steps she had taken in her job search, which do not, even if credited, negate the finding that the wife had not used her best efforts. Cf. Flaherty v. Flaherty, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 289 , 291 (1996). The judge did not credit the opinion of the husband's expert that the wife was highly employable as a sales manager or marketing manager and in those jobs could earn an annual salary of $160,000 to $170,000, but did find that the wife had skills that were transferrable across many fields beyond pharmaceutical and medical device sales.
Also according to the findings, "[t]he parties lived an upper middle class lifestyle during the marriage. They dined out, vacationed, joined a yacht club," and owned boats, luxury vehicles, and a second home, which the parties sold by agreement during the litigation. The children attended private schools. The husband held membership in a fish and game club, while the wife was a member of a tennis club. The judge also found that the husband and wife "spent beyond their means" and that, despite the husband's significant income and the wife's "meaningful salary," their only assets at the time of trial consisted of the equity in their home and their retirement accounts.
alimony." The judge further found that, with reasonable effort, the wife "can be employed within five years. At such time, the parties will need to review each of their respective financial circumstances and the need for continued alimony and/or child support."
These factors reflect that the judge gave consideration to all the factors identified in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a). We turn now to the wife's claim that the findings do not support the judge's determination that the wife will become self-sufficient by a predictable date in the future.
b. Self-sufficiency by predicted date. The wife argues that the judge abused her discretion in awarding rehabilitative rather then general term alimony, because there is no specific event upon which termination was based. The wife relies on the language in G. L. c. 208, § 50 (a), which provides, in relevant part, that "[r]ehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon . . . the occurrence of a specific event in the future," to support her claim that rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where a judge has identified a "specific event in the future," such as completion of job training or a medical residency, passing a licensing examination, or graduation from a specific educational program. We agree that the examples provided by the wife can support the award of rehabilitative alimony. However, we conclude that, in some circumstances, the potential of future reemployment may provide a basis for deciding that rehabilitative, rather than general term, alimony should be awarded.
We interpret a statute according to "all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511 , 513 (1975), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360 , 364 (1975). The reference to a "specific event" is found only in G. L. c. 208, § 50 (a), which establishes the durational limits for rehabilitative alimony. The meaning of "specific event" must be considered in light of other provisions in the alimony reform act that define rehabilitative alimony and list the factors a judge must consider when determining the form of the alimony award.
limitation, reemployment; completion of job training; or receipt of a sum due from the payor spouse under a judgment." Although the wife makes no direct reference to this provision, it is implicit in her argument that she views the term "reemployment" to mean a specific, identifiable job that is expected to materialize on a date certain. But future employment is also among the factors a judge must consider in determining the form of alimony to be awarded.
As set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), a judge must consider the "employment and employability of both parties, including employability through reasonable diligence and additional training, if necessary." "Employable" has been defined as "capable of being employed," Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 408 (1991), and "able to be employed," Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 638 (2003). "Employability" in this context means that a party has the capability of being employed. As the act suggests, to become employable may require that a party undertake "reasonable diligence and additional training." Thus, although a party may not be employed or employable at the time of entry of the alimony award, that party still could have predictable prospects of future employment in a specific type of work or position. In such circumstances, if a party's employability in the near future is a realistic prospect, rehabilitative alimony might, with other considerations, be appropriate.
870 (2006). [Note 17] In accordance with these cases, the prospect of future employment, when based on a past history of commensurate employment followed by a brief hiatus, may be sufficiently predictable, even in the absence of an available, specifically identifiable job.
Rehabilitative alimony is the appropriate form of alimony if "a recipient spouse . . . is expected to become economically self-sufficient by a predicted time." G. L. c. 208, § 48. Thus, the alimony reform act permits a judge to determine that rehabilitative alimony based on expected employment is appropriate where there is sufficient evidence for a judge to find, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the recipient spouse can obtain employment through reasonable efforts, and thereby can gain economic self-sufficiency, in the near future. See G. L. c. 208, § 50 (b).
4. Amount of alimony award. The wife also challenges the amount of the alimony award, arguing that it should not have been calculated solely from the husband's base salary, but rather should have encompassed his income from all sources, including any bonuses. The husband argues that alimony based on thirty-five per cent of his base income is sufficient to meet the wife's needs; that any future bonuses are the result of his own hard work alone; that the amount of his future bonuses is speculative; and that by ordering him to pay all of the cost of the children's private school education, the judge was in essence excluding from his income an amount that the judge had already considered for setting a child support order, as provided by G. L. c. 208, § 53 (c) (2).
Included among the factors that the judge was required to consider in determining the amount of the alimony award are "marital lifestyle" and "ability of each party to maintain the marital lifestyle." G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a). In addition, an award of rehabilitative alimony is governed by the general guidelines for awards of alimony, other than reimbursement alimony, that the amount "should generally not exceed the recipient's need or [thirty] to [thirty-five] per cent of the difference between the parties' gross incomes established at the time of the order being issued." G. L. c. 208, § 53 (b). Subject to certain exclusions, [Note 19] "income shall be defined as set forth in the Massachusetts child support guidelines." G. L. c. 208, § 53 (b).
support a spouse in a manner consistent with the marital lifestyle (particularly where, as here, the parties were found to be spending beyond their means) may be found in the provision that authorizes an alimony award based on "need," or on a percentage of "the difference between the parties' gross incomes established at the time of the order being issued." G. L. c. 208, § 53 (b). Because "need" is a relative term for purposes of the act, it must be measured in light of mandatory considerations that include the parties' marital lifestyle. The judge found that the parties enjoyed "an upper middle class lifestyle" that included dining out, vacations, memberships in clubs, luxury automobiles, boats, and private schools for their children. Although the husband's income at times prior to the divorce approached or exceeded $1 million annually, the husband and wife "spent beyond their means" and acquired few assets. On these facts, the judge did not abuse her discretion in arriving at an award based on thirty-five per cent of the husband's income, rather than on a calculation of need based on historic marital spending. Cf. M.C. v. T.K., 463 Mass. 226 , 234 n.11 (2012) (noting distinction between net worth and standard of living, and that household spending is but one mode of establishing standard of living).
The question remains whether the judge was required to include the husband's bonus income in this calculation. The language of the act is clear that all of the payor spouse's income, as defined by the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (guidelines), must be included in any calculation of alimony, and bonus income is specifically included in this definition. [Note 20] Caring for dependent children is a factor to be considered in awarding child support, but is not among the factors to be considered in determining alimony. See G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a). See also Saia v. Saia, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 135 , 137-138 (2003).
Because the alimony amount was not calculated on the basis of all of the husband's income, as required by the statute, and because the finding that the wife agreed that the husband need not pay child support was erroneous, we are unable to conclude that the amount of alimony was determined after due consideration of all of the statutory factors. We therefore remand to the Probate and Family Court for recalculation of the amount of alimony, and for any additional action that the judge may deem to be warranted.
5. Life insurance as security. The judgment ordered both parties to maintain the life insurance policies in effect at the time of trial for the benefit of the other. The act authorizes a court to "require reasonable security for alimony in the event of the payor's death during the alimony period. Security may include, but shall not be limited to, maintenance of life insurance." G. L. c. 208, § 55 (a). In addition, when support for children has been ordered, "the court may require sufficient security for its payment according to the judgment." G. L. c. 208, § 36.
the husband in the amount of $1.6 million; at the same time, the husband would be relieved of his obligation to pay alimony. [Note 23] See G. L. c. 208, § 50 (a). Although the wife is responsible for one-half of the cost of the children's extracurricular and enrichment activities and one-half of their uninsured medical and dental costs, nothing in the judge's findings suggests that these costs were the basis for her order. The findings do not otherwise support an order requiring security under G. L. c. 208, § 55 (a), or under G. L. c. 208, § 36. Assuming that some security could be found to be appropriate, the amount of the death benefit the wife was ordered to maintain exceeds any financial obligation she has under the judgment and, on this basis, the order requiring that the wife maintain life insurance policies with a death benefit of $1.6 million for the benefit of the husband was an abuse of discretion.
6. Division of assets. The wife contends that the judge's assignment of marital property and allocation of responsibility for the parties' liabilities was plainly wrong and not supported by the judge's findings. She argues that, because the judge found the marriage to be a "true partnership" and ordered a payment to "equalize the division of assets," the judge intended to effect an approximately equal division of assets. The wife contends that the division was not equal, because the judge allocated to her a greater amount of debt than was allocated to the husband, failed to value certain of the husband's bank accounts, and incorrectly divided one asset based on its present value rather than ordering that she receive one-half of any future proceeds.
We review the judge's findings to determine whether she considered all the relevant factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors. See Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787 , 790 (2001). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it is 'plainly wrong and excessive.' " Id. at 793, quoting Mahoney v. Mahoney, 425 Mass. 441 , 447 (1997).
could afford; because the debts were incurred at a time when the husband "was paying all of the family's living expenses" and the wife was receiving weekly cash payments from the husband, who had taken over management of the family finances, the judge found that the debts were solely those of the wife. The judge's findings are supported by the evidence, and the allocation of liabilities was not plainly wrong or excessive.
Apart from this allocation of the parties' liabilities, the judge awarded each party assets of roughly equal value. The judge was not required to follow a precise mathematical formula in dividing the marital estate. See Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619 , 631 (2000); Denninger v. Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429 , 430 (1993). The wife claims that the judge erred in concluding that the value of the husband's bank accounts was "nominal." The husband testified at trial that the balances in these accounts had changed; he was using them to pay bills, and had recently made a mortgage payment on the former marital residence. [Note 24] The judge was entitled to, and implicitly did, credit this testimony when she allocated these accounts to the husband without an attribution of specific value. The wife also takes issue with the manner in which the judge divided the interests in a particular investment vehicle. The judge found that the present value of the husband's interest in that investment vehicle was $24,625. One-half of the value of the investment vehicle was assigned to the wife. The wife makes no claim that the finding as to the present value of this asset is erroneous. [Note 25] Rather, she argues that the asset should have been divided on an "if, as, and when basis," meaning that she should receive one-half of the value at some future date if, and when, investors receive a return on their investment.
Because the wife does not challenge the judge's finding as to the present value of this investment, and the parties have sufficient assets to permit a present payment, it was not an abuse of the judge's discretion to order present assignment of the wife's interest. See, e.g., Dewan v. Dewan, 399 Mass. 754 , 757 (1987), citing Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 340 (Ct. App.
1981) (present assignment of percentage of future pension benefits is "the preferable approach" where sufficient assets are available at time of divorce to divide present value without causing undue hardship to either spouse).
Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the order in the judgment of divorce nisi requiring the plaintiff to maintain her current policies of life insurance for the benefit of the defendant is vacated. The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for recalculation of the amount of the monthly alimony payment to be made to the plaintiff in light of this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
[Note 2] The trial took place over three nonconsecutive days from January 31, 2012, to March 6, 2012.
[Note 3] Pursuant to this "nesting arrangement," as described by the parties, when a party was not residing in the marital home with the children, that party lived in a shared apartment that was maintained by the parties for this purpose.
[Note 4] This was a marriage of approximately sixteen years and four months under the definition of "[l]ength of marriage" in G. L. c. 208, § 48 (defining "length of marriage" as "the number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint . . . for divorce").
[Note 5] Alimony was to be paid by the husband in monthly installments commencing on July 1, 2012, and terminating on the earliest of July 1, 2017, the remarriage of the wife, or the death of either party. For State and Federal income tax purposes, the alimony payments were deductible by the husband, and included as taxable income to the wife. See Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 , 655 n.2 (2014). The husband was ordered to maintain his then-current medical, dental, and vision insurance for the benefit of the children until their emancipation, and for the wife so long as she was eligible for coverage under the terms of his employer-sponsored insurance coverage. In the event of an additional cost to the husband to insure the wife, the wife was to be responsible for such cost. Each party was responsible for his or her own uninsured medical and dental expenses.
[Note 6] No provision was made for payment of the children's future college tuition and expenses. See Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52 , 54 (1998) ("as a general rule, support orders regarding the future payment of post-high school educational costs are premature and should not be made").
[Note 7] The judgment ordered that the wife transfer her interest in the marital home to the husband, and required that the husband refinance the existing mortgage and pay to the wife the sum of $161,432, an amount equal to one-half of the equity in the home. The judgment also ordered that certain bank accounts, investment accounts, and retirement accounts standing in the individual name of a party would remain that party's property. The husband's Merrill Lynch 401(k) account and Fidelity Investments individual retirement account were to be divided equally.
[Note 8] The courts' statutory authority to award alimony has existed in the Commonwealth since 1786. See St 1785, c. 69.
"the periodic or one-time payment of support to a recipient spouse after a marriage of not more than [five] years to compensate the recipient spouse for economic or noneconomic contribution to the financial resources of the payor spouse, such as enabling the payor spouse to complete an education or job training."
G. L. c. 208, § 48. Reimbursement alimony terminates on the death of the recipient or on a date certain; once ordered, modification of reimbursement alimony is prohibited and income guidelines, applicable to all other forms of alimony, do not apply. G. L. c. 208, § 51 (a)-(c).
"the periodic or one-time payment of support to a recipient spouse after a marriage of not more than [five] years to transition the recipient spouse to an adjusted lifestyle or location as a result of the divorce."
G. L. c. 208, § 48. Transitional alimony terminates on the death of the recipient or a date certain "that is not longer than [three] years from the date of the parties' divorce." G. L. c. 208, § 52. The statute prohibits modification or extension of transitional alimony, which, once ordered, may not be replaced with another form of alimony. Id.
"Rehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient, the occurrence of a specific event in the future or the death of either spouse; provided, however, that the court may require the payor to provide reasonable security for payment of sums due to the recipient in the event of the payor's death during the alimony term."
"The alimony term for rehabilitative alimony shall be not more than [five] years. Unless the recipient has remarried, the rehabilitative alimony may be extended on a complaint for modification upon a showing of compelling circumstances in the event that: (1) unforeseen events prevent the recipient spouse from being self-supporting at the end of the term with due consideration to the length of the marriage; (2) the court finds that the recipient tried to become self-supporting; and (3) the payor is able to pay without undue burden."
"If the length of the marriage is [twenty] years or less, but more than [fifteen] years, general term alimony shall continue for not longer than [eighty] per cent of the number of months of the marriage."
[Note 13] The legislative history clearly shows that the broad discretion judges historically have had in making awards of alimony was not affected by the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act). Indeed, the Legislature appears to have viewed the creation of the four categories of alimony as providing greater discretion to judges. A senator speaking in support of the bill that would become the alimony reform act stated, "Under this bill, people are provided with the ability to plan for their future. They are provided with clear guidance. We still need discretion for judges." See State House News Service (Senate Sess.), July 28, 2011 (statement by Senator Cynthia S. Creem). And in floor debates prior to adoption of the alimony reform act, a representative stated, "We create[d] several forms of alimony. . . . [The bill] gives judges the ability to do things they can't do now." See State House News Service (House Sess.), July 20, 2011 (statement by Representative John V. Fernandes prior to vote to engross 2011 Senate Doc. No. 665). See also State House News Service, Sept. 25, 2011 ("The bill lays out for the first time in state law specific guidelines on the levels and duration, amount and form of payments to former spouses. Reform advocates say the bill will give judges more discretion on when and how much alimony to award").
[Note 14] There is nothing in the statutory scheme to suggest that, even where there is evidence of conditions supporting rehabilitative alimony, a judge must in every case award rehabilitative and not general term alimony; indeed, a fine line may distinguish the two in some circumstances.
[Note 15] According to the judge's findings, the husband "received" bonuses from his present employer in the amount of $200,000 in 2008, $200,000 in 2009, and $345,000 in 2010, but the uncontested trial evidence reflects that those amounts were "earned" in the years indicated and received a year later and that the husband's income for 2011 included a bonus in the amount of $345,000, and in each of 2010, 2009, and 2008 his income included a bonus of $200,000. This evidence is consistent with the judge's findings regarding the husband's 2011 income.
[Note 16] The judge found that, immediately after being terminated from her job in 2007, the wife applied for a job with another company, but received no response. Soon thereafter, the wife and her sister-in-law started a consulting firm for early-stage pharmaceutical companies, but the business closed after six months because of what the judge described as "issues" in the sister-in-law's life.
[Note 17] See Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 366 , 371 (2004) (durational limit not warranted where "simply uncertain" that wife, sole proprietor of small business, could generate future income that would render alimony unnecessary); D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488 , 510 (2004) (durational limit not warranted where "simply uncertain" whether wife's future income from employment would render alimony unnecessary); Goldman v. Goldman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 603 , 613 (1990) ("Where future events cannot be predicted with any measure of certainty, an alimony award should be based on present conditions").
[Note 18] As to the circumstances of the wife's departure from her last position, the judge found that the wife's employer had determined after investigation that, as a sales district manager, she had approved an expense of a sales representative who had misappropriated the funds. The wife had no knowledge of this misappropriation, but was fired nonetheless. However, as the judge noted in her findings, the husband's expert was not asked what impact the involuntary departure from employment would have on the likelihood of the wife's ability to secure employment. The wife introduced no expert testimony on this issue.
"(2) gross income which the court has already considered for setting a child support order."
[Note 20] The definition of income in the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (effective Jan. 1, 2009) (guidelines) that were in effect at the time of the trial in this case is very broad and includes bonuses among twenty-seven specifically identified sources of income, as well as "any other form of income or compensation not specifically itemized above." The guidelines in effect as of August 1, 2013, do not alter this aspect of the definition of income.
[Note 22] We do not suggest that the amounts calculated by the wife are correct.
[Note 23] The parties are in agreement that the wife's annual premiums for the policies she has been ordered to maintain total approximately $15,561.
[Note 24] The husband's financial statement sets forth weekly living expenses of $7,250.61, including payments to the wife in the amount of $500.
[Note 25] The husband listed this as the value on his financial statement submitted to the court in conjunction with the divorce filing. The value reflects the cost of two subscription units of the investment vehicle made available through a private offering to employees of a certain investment firm, less an outstanding payment of $375.


§ 198-3 Duty of police officers to report excavations.
§ 198-4 Proceedings at law.
§ 198-5 Liability of owners, contractors and city.
§ 198-8 Notice of excavation or demolition.
§ 198-9 Notice of unscheduled discharging of explosives.
§ 198-10 Marking of underground facilities of utilities; test pits.
§ 198-12 Procedures at work site.
§ 198-13 Notice to public utility of damage.
§ 198-15 Construal of provisions.
§ 198-18 Violations and penalties.
§ 198-19 Nonpublic utilities; fees.
§ 198-20 Public utilities; fee.
§ 198-23 Violations and penalties.
Street excavations — See Ch. 351, Art. V.
Construction materials in streets — See Ch. 351, Art. VIII.
Utility rights-of-way — See Ch. 375.


text:
In electronics we usually deal with low voltage DC (Direct Current). Supply voltages between 5 V and 24 VDC are common. Very often electronic circuits are designed for 12 V.
Supply cable in electrical installation are called phase (P) and neutral (N). In DC the two supply cables are plus (+) (red) and minus (-) (black).
In general minus is the common connection. Often it is grounded and connected to the metal housing of the equipment.
In order to run such a circuit on mains voltage a power supply is needed. The power supply converts the high voltage (e.g. 230 V) mains AC (Alternating Current) into low voltage DC, for example: 230 VAC → 12 VDC.
AC voltages can be transformed (making a voltage smaller or bigger) by means of a transformer without much losses. A powerless transformation of a DC voltage is not that easy. An AC voltage can also easily converted into a DC voltage by a rectifier. The other way round, converting a DC voltage into an AC voltage is also not that easy.
The voltage V is measured in V (Volt). Electronic circuits usually run on DC.
A battery is a typical DC power source.
A battery is a connection of several single (battery) cells.
The voltage can be measured with a voltmeter or a multimeter which includes a voltmeter. Digital voltmeters are easier to read but not necessarily more accurate. Only a calibrated voltmeter is precise, no matter if it is analogue or digital, cheap or expensive.
Clamp and tips for measuring voltages.
The measurement current through the voltmeter is extremely small so that the measurement leads can be thin and the the tips or clamps small.
Because an existing voltage is a condition for an electric circuit, the first measurement in a defective circuit is always the checking of the operating voltage.
An electric circuit consists of a voltage source and a load. If the circuit is closed a current can flow.
Simple circuit with voltage source and a light bulb.
The battery delivers the voltage V to the bulb. A current I can flow. The current depends on the voltage and the resistance R of the bulb.
Here the equivalent circuit with a resistor.
The voltage of the resistor is measured across the resistor.
The voltage of the power supply is measured across the power supply.
In this case the voltage across the resistor and the voltage of the supply supply is the same.
The first condition for a current is an existing voltage, second the closed circuit.
The current in a closed circuit is everywhere the same and can be measured everywhere.
Is the voltage DC also the current is DC.
In a simple circuit the current is everywhere the same.
The current I is measured in A or mA (Ampere).
The current can be measured with an ammeter which is always integrated in a multimeter.
Compare to voltmeters the quality of the leads, the contacts and the clamps are import because the current of the whole circuit flows through the ammeter, the leads and connectors. The higher the current, the bigger the connectors, cable and clamps have to be.
Appropriate clamps for measuring currents.
A small voltage measurement clamp was used for current measurement. The high current destroyed the clamp.
Tips and clamps for voltage measurement must not be used for current measurement.
In electrical engineering clamp meters are common. The measurement happens contact-less through the electrical field around the conductor which depends on the current. Clamp meters are not very precise and can be only used for high currents.
In electronics the measurement of the current through a resistor is not very common. Because the current depends on the voltage and the resistor, the current can be measured indirectly by the voltage across a resistor (Ohm's law).
Every electrical or electronic device has a electrical resistance. Even cable have resistances. Those cable resistances depends on the lengths, the diameter and the material of the cable.
In electronic circuits resistors are found everywhere. They are available in different values, sizes and shapes.
The resistance R is measured in Ω, kΩ or MΩ (Ohm).
For troubleshooting electronics we are interested in the resistance of a resistor, the voltage across the resistor and the current through the resistor. The current can be determined by measuring the voltage across the resistor and the calculation with the resistance itself (I = VR / R).
The resistance R has influence on the voltage across the resistor (VR) and the current through the resistor (IR).
The resistor can be measured with an ohmmeter which is always integrated in a multimeter.
For the measurement the resistor has to be disconnected from the circuit. Otherwise the rest of the circuit with its resistances influences the measurement result.
The same applies when holding the resistor in hands. On one side the probe and the resistor connection wire can be touched but not on both sides because the body resistance will be in parallel with the resistor on test.
Typically resistors get burned. They get high-ohmic (open connection) because of excessive current. This means: When a resistor got burned, there must be a reason for the higher current somewhere. Often it is a semiconductor (transistor, FET...) which got a short and produced the abnormal high current.
If two of the three values are known, the third can be calculated.
The values for the units are V, A and Ω.
kΩ can be used if the current is rated in mA.
Imagine or draw a pyramid with the three values. The voltage V has to be up.
If you now cover with a finger the value you are looking for, the correct constellation of the formula will be shown.
Example 1: A resistor at a power supply of 12 V creates 1 A.
Example 2: What current creates a resistor of 120 Ω at the same power supply?
Example 3: Through the same 120 Ω now flows only 41.7 mA.
What has happened to the power supply?
The voltage of the power supply has changed to 6 V.
In the following circuit the resistor is bridged. The resistor now is 0 and the current is maximum. The battery will get damaged and wires and battery can burn. To prevent this dangerous situation every power supply and every equipment has a fuse.
A blown fuse has a reason. Do not only change the fuse. Find the reason for the high current first.
In an open circuit no current can flow and no current can create a voltage drop across the resistors.
The voltage across the resistor is 0.
The voltage in front of the resistor and behind is the same.
In a circuit with two or more resistors in series there is only one path for the current to flow: Through both resistors. The current through both resistors is the same.
But because the resistors might be different the same current creates different voltage drops across the resistors. The voltage drops across the resistors are different.
The voltage drops can be easily calculated by using Ohm's law.
The current through both resistors is the same. The voltage drops across the resistors can be calculated when the resistor values are known.
For the circuit above we know the overall voltage and the two resistors.
In practice the minus probe of the voltmeter is connected to ground or common and remains there. Measurement are only made by using the plus probe of the multimeter. We are measuring against ground. Because the voltage drops are part of the overall power supply voltage can be easily calculated.
The voltage V1 is the difference of the power supply voltage and V2. In other words: The voltage in front of a resistor minus the voltage behind the resistor makes the voltage drop across the resistor.
In a parallel circuit all resistors are parallel to the voltage source. The voltage drops across the resistors are the same.
But because the resistors might be different the currents through the resistors are not the same. The currents through the resistors are different.
These currents can be easily calculated by using Ohm's law.
The voltage across both resistors is the same. The currents through the resistors can be calculated when the resistor values are known.
For the previous circuit we know the overall voltage and the two resistors.
The total current is not known.
To get the total current we have to calculate the 2 partial currents and add them.
The total current is 80 mA.
We can also calculate the total resistor and then the total current.
Itotal = V / Rtotal Itotal = 12V / 150 Ω Itotal = 80 mA.
Also here: The total current is 80 mA.
A LED always needs a series resistor for limiting the current because LED do not work with an operating voltage like bulbs but with an operating current.
A series resistor is a must for every LED application.
In this example a 3mm LED with 20 mA at 2.5 V is used.
The overall voltage is 12 V.
The current is everywhere the same and should be 20 mA.
The voltage across the LED should be 2.5 V.
For calculating the value of the resistor we need the voltage drop across the resistor and the current through the resistor.
According to the E-12 series the next suitable resistor has 470 Ω.
This small circuit can be used as a voltage indicator. It can show if a voltage exists or not. This is sometimes helpful in electronics when just have to be checked rather than exactly measured. In digital electronics for example high or low signals just have to be detected and a digital multimeter is often to slow for fast voltage changes. A simple LED with the series resistor mounted in an old ball pen is a great help for detecting this voltages or signals.
The LED and the series resistor are integrated in the ball pen housing. The old ball pen tip acts as a probe and a short cable with a clamp closes the circuit and is connected to ground.
Such an indicator is also a cheap and good help in car repairs where only 12 V voltages have to be detected and traced.
A current through a resistor or a load does not only creates a voltage drop but also power loss. This power loss is heat. The higher the voltage drop or the current the bigger the heat.
A bigger resistor (in size, not in value) is able to transfer heat better to the surrounding air. It gets less hot. The power dissipation (wattage) depends on the size of the resistor.
Beside the resistor value we also have to make sure that the resistor size or the power rating of the resistor is correct.
Unfortunately these three formulas have also three variations each. That means 9 formulas have to be learned or the technique of converting a formula has to be known.
If e.g. the resistor is given but not the current, we first calculate the current with Ohm's law and then take the power formula.
Also here a pyramid can be used – with P in the top.
Example 1: Back to our LED and the series resistor.
The current was 20 mA and the voltage across the resistor was 9.5 V.
A common ¼ W resistor can be used.
Example 2: A light bulb for 230 V has 100 W.
How high is the current?
Example 3: A heating element for 230 V has 353 Ω.
What wattage has the heating element?
The power supply of a microscope is defective and can not be repaired. The alternative can be a conversion from halogen bulb technology to a white LED system.
A high power LED Luxeon Star has an integrated lens which focusses the light beam perfectly for this purpose. The LED has the following specifications: 350 mA at 3.42 V.
Problem: Can the charger be used and what series resistor has to be taken?
The charger can deliver 700 mA. The LED only needs 350 mA.
Yes, the charger can be used.
resistor and the current through the resistor.
According to the E-12 series the next suitable resistor has 6.8 Ω.
3. The resistor value is found, but will a standard ¼ W type be big enough?
multiplied by the voltage across the resistor.
A standard resistor is NOT big enough. We need a 1 W type.
For a lot of examinations with the microscope, it is necessary to reduce the brightness of the light. For reducing the light we simply can add another resistor or better we make it variable and take a potentiometer.
A pot in addition to the resistor-LED-combination reduces the brightness by reducing the current through the LED.
The question now is: What is the value of the pot?
I = 50 mA at a voltage of 3.3 V across the LED and the series resistor.
For calculating the maximum value of the pot we need the voltage across the pot and the current through the pot.
According to a catalogue the next available potentiometer has 47 Ω.
Unfortunately such a small value is not very common and we might not get such a pot. But maybe it is not necessary to limit the brightness continuously. Maybe three or four different brightness steps are enough. In this case a rotary switch with different resistors is a good solution.
If we have a position left we can even use it for switching off the light.
A rotary switch with 6 positions gives 5 brightness steps and an off position. Turning the switch to the right gives more brightness (the resistors get smaller).
To the very right no additional resistor is in use. The brightness is maximum and just limited by the 6.8 Ω resistor.
Here the result is the same but the realisation is different. The resistors are added up as far we turn to the left.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


text:
We reported previously on HB 2186, a bill that proposed to amend the Municipal, Township, Counties, and School Code regarding zoning of public schools. Just last week, the Governor signed the legislation into law.
P.A. 99-890 confirms that local governments have authority to apply and enforce their zoning regulations on schools, consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in the Crystal Lake bleachers' case.
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation goes much further than just clarifying that ruling. The law places new limits on local zoning authority that could create both administrative and procedural problems for local governments. The law requires local governments to modify and streamline their otherwise applicable zoning procedures for public schools. These procedures could require local governments to reduce their otherwise required application fees and limit the required number of copies of plans and other documents required to be submitted by the school district. Presumably, these costs will now be borne by the local zoning authority rather than the school district that is requesting zoning approval. The legislation also requires the local government to expedite the zoning process. The law only applies to public schools, which might implicate constitutional protections if a local zoning authority is statutorily required to treat public schools more favorably than private schools.
This legislation raises a lot of unanswered questions for local zoning authorities, none of which has been answered in the bill signed by the Governor.
To read our comprehensive analysis of this legislation, visit this post.
The blog is back! (we went on hiatus for a week so the moderator could attend her son's wedding!). We come back with an interesting election case out of the federal court (central district of Illinois).
A federal court has ordered the Illinois State Board of Elections to certify an independent candidate for U.S. House of Representatives to the ballot for the November general election, even though the candidate submitted petitions containing 2,161 valid signatures fewer than the amount required. Gill v. Scholz (C.D.Ill., August 25, 2016). Specifically, the court found that no reasonably diligent independent candidate could overcome the signature requirement in Illinois’ 13th Congressional District, and the 10,754 signatures required for access to the 2016 ballot unlawfully infringed upon the First Amendment free-speech and assembly rights of the candidate and the voters who signed his petitions.
The court also found that the signature requirement violated the U.S. Constitution’s equal protection clause, because there was no legitimate state interest in having such a large disparity between the number of signatures required for independent and new-party candidates, as compared to candidates of the established Democratic and Republican parties. In the same congressional district, Democratic candidates were required to obtain at least 733 signatures, and Republicans needed 739.
The candidate, David M. Gill, timely filed nominating petitions containing a total of 11,348 signatures, but after an objection was filed and the State Board conducted a records exam, it was determined that only 8,593 of those signatures were legally valid. Despite having submitted almost 12-times the number of valid signatures required of Democrats and Republicans, the State Board’s hearing officer issued a recommendation that the Board remove Gill’s name from the ballot. Gill and some voters then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois seeking an injunction to bar the State Board from enforcing the signature requirement against him.
Plaintiffs presented expert testimony from a federal election scholar showing that since the year 1888, no Illinois congressional candidate has ever overcome a signature requirement as high as 10,754, and only three candidates have ever done so in the entire country. Only one congressional candidate in Illinois has ever overcome a requirement as high as 8,593, which was the number of valid signatures on Gill’s petitions, but that was back in 1974, before Illinois limited the signature collection period to 90 days. Thus, the court found that no reasonably diligent independent candidate could overcome the signature requirement in the 13th Congressional District.
Disclaimer: Ancel Glink assisted the plaintiffs with this case.
Although it seems backwards at times, public employers generally know by now that they can’t take action against an employee who speaks critically about the agency or circumstances within the agency if they are speaking as a private citizen about a situation that is of general concern to the public. In other words, public employees lose their protection under the First Amendment when they speak about matters that are related to their job. That’s pretty clear, but sometimes it’s not so easy to discern if the speech is related to the employee’s job.
Take the case of Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills as an example. Kristofek was a part time police officer for the Village and a full time police officer for the Village of Lemont. Among his part time officer duties, he was responsible for issuing traffic violations. During the course of his duties, he stopped a driver and ultimately placed him under arrest for driving without insurance and driving with suspended plates. The driver apparently used his one phone call wisely because it wasn’t long before the mayor and the police chief started getting calls from politically influential people requesting that the citations be dismissed and the driver released from custody, which is just what happened.
A few months later Kristofek watched an online training in his capacity with the Lamont police department about instances of official misconduct, causing him to become concerned that the Orland Hills chief was guilty of such when the chief voided the tickets and released the driver involved in his Kristofek’s arrest. He first brought his concerns to one of his superiors, who shared it with another ranking officer and ultimately the issue was brought to the police chief. When no action was taken in the department, Kristofek contacted the FBI. You can probably guess what happened next – Officer Kristofek was fired.
Kristofek sued for violation of his First Amendment right to protected speech. The Village obtained a dismissal of the suit in the lower court on the argument that Kristofek was speaking on matters related to his official duties and therefore did not have First Amendment protection. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and has sent the case back for a trial. In reversing the lower court finding, the court of appeals found that while Kristofek’s statements of concern about political corruption concerned his job and certainly the information about which he spoke was acquired as a result of his work, Kristofek’s statements were not related to his official duties and therefore were made by him as a private citizen. Additionally, the court noted that the police chief failed to show that Kristofek’s statements caused disruption in the department, which may have superseded Kristofek’s rights as a private citizen had evidence of such existed.
It is truly a fine line in this case in what capacity Kristofek spoke about corruption. What is clear is the special attention the 7th circuit gave to employee statements related to agency wrongdoing. It noted that public employees are often in the best position to witness wrongdoing in a public agency and First Amendment protections should extend to those situations.
Public employers must carefully analyze the situation before taking action against an employee over what they have to say about the employer’s operations. If statements are made by an employee directly relating to their job duties, it’s probably not protected speech. Furthermore, gripes and grievances are not generally of a public concern. But public employers should tread lightly when an employee raises questions of wrongdoing that might be of concern to the public.
Recently, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling finding that penalties assessed by Metra for parking lot violations are subject to the debt collection procedures set out in the Fair Debt Collections Practice Act. Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc.
The case involved a challenge by two individuals who had parked their cars in a Metra-owned parking lot and were fined for failure to pay the daily parking fee of $1.50. The non-payment penalty was $45.00. When the individuals failed to pay the violation notices, the matter was referred for collection to Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. The individuals filed a class action against Parking Revenue, alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Parking Revenue argued that the FDCPA does not apply because the unpaid parking obligations were not "debt" as defined by that Act.
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Parking Revenue, holding that the parking penalties are debts under the FDCPA. Specifically, the court determined that the violations were obligations "arising out of" consumer transactions - in this case, the transaction was the offer by Metra for customers to park in its lot for $1.50. The court rejected Parking Revenue's argument that the violations were more in the nature of fines, like a parking meter ticket. The court noted that the crucial issue is the legal source of the obligation - in this case, there was no municipal ordinance or regulation that obligated "park-and-dashers" to pay the $45; instead, the obligation came from the contract formed when the customer parks in the lot.
Municipalities and other government entities may want to make sure that parking fines and violations are expressly established in an ordinance or other formal regulation so that the "legal source of the obligation" to pay a fine or penalty is regulatory rather than contractual.
We have written extensively in the past about the Champaign v. Madigan case. That case involved a FOIA request for text messages between City Council members sent/received on their private cell phones. The City had denied the FOIA request on the basis that these text messages were not public records because they were not in the possession of, or under the control of, a public body. The requester had challenged the City's denial, and the PAC issued a binding opinion that all communications that relate to public business, regardless of device, are public records. That opinion was appealed to the courts. Although the appellate court agreed with the PAC that the City Council members' text messages sent during a City Council meeting should be released, it disagreed with the PAC's very broad interpretation of FOIA that all communications, regardless of device, are public records.
This case recently came up in the context of the PAC's 6th binding opinion of 2016. In PAC Op. 16-006, the PAC found the Chicago Police Department in violation of FOIA when it failed to provide copies of emails sent/received by Chicago police officers on their private accounts that related to the Laquan McDonald shooting. The City had provided the requester with emails that were sent/received on the officers' official City email accounts or were found on the City server. The City did not provide any emails on the officers' personal email accounts on the basis that the emails were not public records because the City did not have any control over the officers' personal devices, and the emails were not used by, received by, in the possession of, or under the control of a public body.
The PAC ruled against the City, finding that "communications pertaining to the transaction of public business that were sent or received on the CPD employees' personal e-mail accounts are 'public records' under the definition of that term in section 2(c) of FOIA." The PAC noted that any other interpretation would be "contrary to the General Assembly's intent of ensuring public access to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government."
If the General Assembly intends for communications pertaining to city business to and from an individual city council member’s personal electronic device to be subject to FOIA in every case, it should expressly so state. It is not this court’s function to legislate. Indeed, such issues are legislative matters best left to resolution by the General Assembly.
The PAC opinion also seems to ignore the guidance contained in Champaign v. Madigan that an individual government official is not the "public body" that is subject to FOIA. Messages sent on private devices are only considered "public records" that might be subject to FOIA when the official sending/receiving the message is acting as a public body. The rationale offered by the court is that the public body is not in control or possession of messages of government officials when sent on their private devices except in certain limited circumstances. The PAC did not appear to apply this analysis to the CPD FOIA request, and instead stuck to its pre-Champaign v. Madigan position that only the content of the message is relevant for purposes of FOIA, and the device used to send that message doesn't matter.
As the appellate court acknowledged (see above quote), FOIA does not expressly provide that communications on private devices are subject to FOIA. Based on the Champaign v. Madigan ruling, we know that individual City Council members' messages on their private devices are not necessarily subject to FOIA (they are releasable only in certain, limited circumstances such as when they are sent during a public meeting or forwarded to/from the City's server). It would be helpful for government bodies to know whether the Champaign v. Madigan analysis applies to all public officials/employees (and not just aldermen) or whether the PAC is correct that public employees will be treated as "public bodies" subject to FOIA whenever they communicate on public business, regardless of device. That's certainly not what the statute says.
In June, we reported that Illinois H.B. 5684, the "The Local Government Wage Increase Transparency Act," had passed both the Illinois Senate and House, and had been sent to the Governor for signature. On July 28, 2016, Governor Rauner signed the bill into law, which is now known as P.A. 099-0646.
The new law prohibits certain wage increases or lump sum payments to a local government employee during the employee’s last 12 months of employment unless the increase or payment is disclosed and approved at a public meeting in open session of the employer governing body.
The law also amends the Open Meetings Act to require the public body to discuss compensation of individuals who fall within this category in open session – a significant change from the otherwise applicable OMA exemption that allows a public body to discuss compensation of specific employees in closed session. According to news reports about the new law, the change is an attempt by the General Assembly to prevent a “pension spike” from occurring without the public’s knowledge.
As previously reported, this new law only applies to employees who began participating in IMRF prior to January 1, 2011, and who are not part of a collective bargaining unit. The trigger for the new disclosure requirement is any increase or payment within the final 12 months of employment that makes the reportable monthly earnings 6% or more than the previous month’s reportable earnings.
the effect of the payment on the liability of the employer to the IMRF fund.
Municipalities that hire individuals who are receiving an IMRF pension may be required to pay a penalty to IMRF if the employer knowingly fails to notify IMRF to suspend that individual’s annuity during the term of employment under a new law just passed by the Illinois General Assembly.
The Illinois Pension Code requires the suspension of a retiree's IMRF pension if the retiree returns to work for an IMRF employer and works more than the government employer’s hourly standard for participation in IMRF (599 hours or 999 hours). Public Act 099-0745 (effective immediately) will now create a duty for the government employer to notify IMRF that it has hired or re-hired an IMRF retiree. If the government employer knowingly fails to notify IMRF to suspend the annuity, and the employee works more than the employer’s IMRF hourly standard, the employer and the employee will each be liable to reimburse IMRF for up to one-half of the amount of any IMRF annuity payments made to the employee after the date the annuity should have been suspended. The reimbursement provision is not applicable if the individual returned to work for less than twelve months.
IMRF employers should ask candidates if they are receiving an IMRF annuity and contact IMRF to discuss the potential ramifications of hiring an IMRF retiree prior to making an offer of employment. If the government employer decides to hire the retiree to work a number of hours in excess of the IMRF hourly standard, the employer must provide the required notice to IMRF.
Sec. 3. (a) Where the provisions of this Act are not complied with, or where there is probable cause to believe that the provisions of this Act will not be complied with, any person, including the State's Attorney of the county in which such noncompliance may occur, may bring a civil action in the circuit court for the judicial circuit in which the alleged noncompliance has occurred or is about to occur, or in which the affected public body has its principal office, prior to or within 60 days of the meeting alleged to be in violation of this Act or, if facts concerning the meeting are not discovered within the 60-day period, within 60 days of the discovery of a violation by the State's Attorney or, if the person timely files a request for review under Section 3.5, within 60 days of the decision by the Attorney General to resolve a request for review by a means other than the issuance of a binding opinion under subsection (e) of Section 3.5.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently enacted a new rule, 14 CFR Part 107, governing non-recreational operation of small drone aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds (www.faa.gov/uas/media/RIN_2120-AJ60_Clean_Signed.pdf). Local governments may now conduct public drone operations under the rule without first obtaining FAA certification. The new regulations establish standards for who may fly small drone aircraft, how drones may be operated, and how drones are to be registered and inspected to ensure safety.
In addition to understanding how to comply with the FAA regulations, local governments interested in drone operations should be aware of constitutional limitations on drone use, privacy laws, zoning and land use concerns, and the intersection between federal, state and local laws. Local government organizations should continue to stay educated on federal and state regulation of drone use and the proper procedures for conducting public drone operations.
When: August 23, 2016; 8:30 a.m - 10:30 a.m.
Transgender issues remain the emerging topic of 2016 for both individual rights as well as rights in the workplace. Be prepared for this rare intersection of rapidly changing law and social awareness. Ancel Glink attorneys will demystify the topic and give you practical advice on how to stay compliant with new laws and achieve a respectful environment for your workers as well as the people with which you do business.
How: Seating is limited. Reserve your spot at the breakfast briefing now by calling Kathy Cook at 312-604-9174 or by making a reservation by email at kcook@ancelglink.com.
This Facebook site was created to pass on information to you and to try to keep you informed as to what is occurring in our City. We will not entertain negative comments towards anyone, nor will we host arguments between individuals. We do not care who you are, we are trying to inform you. If you decide to make unpleasant comments we will delete you.
The two residents claim that the City's actions in removing their comments and blocking them from posting on both the city and police department Facebook pages violate their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The complaint also argues that the City's practice of removing public comments because of their viewpoint (i.e., "negative comments") also violates the First Amendment. The lawsuit asks the court to enjoin the City from blocking comments based on their viewpoint.
This will be an interesting case to follow, assuming it moves forward and doesn't settle like the Honolulu case involving the police department's removal of critical posts. News reports about the case suggest that the City will seek settlement with the two residents, although it won't include any agreement to "unblock" the two residents since the City has since taken its Facebook page down.
The Illinois General Assembly just approved P.A. 99-610, amending the "Freedom from Location Surveillance Act" to expand employee privacy rights in online activities. The following is a summary of the major provisions of this new law, which takes effect January 1, 2017.
join an online account established by the employer or add the employer to the employee's or applicant's list of contacts (e.g., "friends") to access the personal online account.
2. Discharge, discipline, discriminate against, retaliate against, or penalize an employee for any of the above activities or for filing a complaint alleging a violation.
3. Fail or refuse to hire an applicant for any of the above activities.
The law contains certain exemptions to these prohibitions, including the ability of employers to obtain information about an employee or applicant available in the public domain.
The law also allows employers to request that an employee share specific content that has been reported to the employer in connection with an investigation and to ensure compliance with laws and policies.
Finally, the law did not eliminate the authority of employers to adopt and enforce workplace policies regarding use of the employer's electronic equipment and to monitor employee use of employer's equipment.
Employers may need to review and modify any internal personnel policies that conflict with these new requirements before the law takes effect on January 1st of next year.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.