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Ed McPherson has been practicing law for over 35 years. He recently was honored in Billboard Magazine’s “50 Attorneys of Note in the Music Biz,” and named among the Daily Journal’s Top Entertainment Lawyers. He has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating from Martindale-Hubbell®, which is the highest possible rating awarded. He also has been recognized as a California Super Lawyer for 11 consecutive years.
He started his own firm in 1991, which became McPherson & Grossblatt, McPherson & Kalmansohn, and ultimately McPherson Rane LLP. In all incarnations, his firm has handled all phases of complex entertainment and business litigation. Before starting his own firm, he was with the entertainment litigation firm of Lavely & Singer in Century City, where he represented all factions of the entertainment community in many areas of litigation. Before joining Lavely & Singer in 1989, Mr. McPherson was with the Beverly Hills entertainment firm of Cooper, Epstein & Hurewitz, where he handled all phases of entertainment litigation as well as many aspects of music, film, and television transactional matters. Mr. McPherson began his career at Booth, Mitchel, Strange & Smith, specializing in complex insurance coverage matters and bad faith litigation, wrongful termination, and legal and accounting malpractice.
Mr. McPherson is a frequent author and lecturer. He has handled numerous matters involving copyright infringement, trademark infringement, management/artist disputes, rights of publicity, rights of privacy (including internet privacy and stalking), record production and distribution, music publishing, defamation, motion picture and television production and distribution, breach of implied contract (submission cases), net profits, unfair competition, WGA, DGA, SAG, and AFTRA disputes, wrongful termination and other labor-related matters, insurance coverage and bad faith, legal malpractice, and general civil litigation. In addition, Mr. McPherson has served as a consultant and expert witness in connection with the California Talent Agencies Act, about which he has written numerous articles and spoken on many panels.
During his career, Mr. McPherson has engaged in all phases of civil litigation in State and Federal courts in California and many other states. He has substantial experience representing both plaintiffs and defendants in proceedings involving temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and writs of attachment, and has participated in numerous trials, arbitrations, petitions for writs of mandate, and appeals before the California Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the Federal Court of Appeals in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. He has participated in several cases that have resulted in published opinions, including Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2003); Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d 823 (C.D.Cal. 1998); People v. Von Villas, 10 Cal. App. 4th 201 (1992), reh den, and review den, cert den Von Villas v. California, 508 U.S. 975; Selleck v. Globe, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123 (1985); and Republic Corp. v. Superior Court (Delfino), 160 Cal. App. 3d 1253 (1984).
Mr. McPherson has made numerous television and radio appearances on CNN (Larry King Live; Burden of Proof; Connie Chung; Paula Zahn), Fox News (Greta Van Susteran; Rita Cosby), Good Morning America, The Today Show, MSNBC (The Abrams Report), Celebrity Justice, ABC Network News, NBC Network News, CBS Network News, KABC Los Angeles, KTLA Los Angeles, KTTV Los Angeles, MTV News, MTV Asia, WHDH Boston, Fox 25 News Boston, WBZ Radio Boston, WHJJ Providence, WRKO Radio Boston, WPRO Radio Providence, WPRI Providence, WRNR Providence, WJAR Providence, and Fox Radio Denver.
In addition, he has been quoted in countless newspapers and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, New York Post, New York Daily News, Washington Post, Washington Times, Los Angeles Times, Billboard, Rolling Stone, Pollstar, Dallas News, Philadelphia Inquirer, Los Angeles Daily Journal, USA Today, Entertainment Weekly, People, Us, Orange County Register, Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, Boston Herald, Bangor Daily News, Albuquerque Tribune, Bloomberg News, Associated Press, Reuters, Providence Journal, Allstar Magazine, Variety, Hollywood Reporter, E! Online, Spin Magazine, KABC.com, Heavy Metal, Metal Express, NME.com, Dynamite Metal News, Top 40-Charts.com, and ROCK1023.com.

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ART 101 - Drawing I 3 hrs.
ART 111 - Design I 3 hrs.
ART 102 - Drawing II 3 hrs.
ART 112 - Design II 3 hrs.
ART 113 - Three-Dimensional Design 3 hrs.
ART 312 - Digital Page Layout 3 hrs.
ART 313 - Digital Imaging 3 hrs.
Art Studio Elective 3 hrs.
ART 311 - Digital Visualization 3 hrs.
ART 342 - Graphic Design II/Typography 3 hrs.
ART 343 - Graphic Design III/Presentation 3 hrs.
ART 344 - Illustration 3 hrs.
Art History (400 level) 3 hrs.
Art Studio Elective (2 hours minimum) 2 hrs.
ART 341 - Graphic Design I/Production 3 hrs.
ART 441 - Graphic Communication 3 hrs.
ART 442 - Interactive Design I 3 hrs.
ART 415 - Graphic Design History 3 hrs.
ART 443 - Interactive Design II 3 hrs.
ART 444 - Graphics Design Portfolio 3 hrs.
ART 448 - Graphic Communication Project 3 hrs.

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In 1982, petitioner ETSI Pipeline Project entered into a 40-year contract with petitioner Secretary of the Interior to withdraw up to a certain amount of water per year from Lake Oahe, a reservoir located on the Missouri River in South Dakota, for use in an interstate coal slurry pipeline. Respondents Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska filed suit in Federal District Court to enjoin performance of the contract, alleging that, under the Flood Control Act of 1944 (Act), the Interior Secretary lacked authority to execute a contract to provide water from the reservoir for industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Army. Pursuant to the Act, the Oahe Reservoir was built by the Corps of Engineers, now part of the Department of the Army (successor of the Department of War), which has always maintained and operated the reservoir. The Act was directed to both flood control and navigation matters that concerned the War Department and reclamation and irrigation problems that concerned the Interior Department, thus also implicating the tensions between the Upper Missouri River Basin States' interests in irrigation and reclamation and the interests of the Lower Basin States (including respondents) in flood control. The District Court ruled for respondents, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Secretary of the Interior exceeded the authority Congress delegated to him by the Act. Pp. 484 U. S. 505-517.
irrigation pursuant to the Act's terms -- the record supporting the District Court's findings that there was no such allocation or use of the reservoir's water for irrigation -- the Army Secretary has exclusive authority to contract to remove water for industrial use. Pp. 484 U. S. 505-509.
(b) There is no merit to petitioners' contention that the Act's provisions approving general comprehensive plans for projects to be operated by both the Interior and Army Departments represent congressional approval of any functional division of authority between those Departments and allows the Interior Secretary unilaterally to remove water from Army reservoirs for irrigation purposes and for other related uses. Such contention is wide of the mark in view of the Act's specific jurisdictional provisions discussed above as to the use of Army reservoirs, and is grounded on a misuse of the legislative history. There is no indication that control over individual reservoirs was to be divided among various Departments of the Federal Government. Nor is petitioners' argument supported by a provision of the Act stating that reclamation and power developments to be undertaken by the Interior Secretary shall be governed by federal reclamation laws, which authorize him to reallocate water under his control for industrial use. Such provision of the Act applies only to projects that the Interior Department itself may undertake under the Act. But as the District Court found, the reservoir project engineered by the Army at Oahe is neither a power development nor a reclamation development undertaken by the Interior Secretary. Moreover, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that, although the Interior Department must consult with the Army Department before withdrawing water for industrial use from the Oahe Reservoir, the Interior Department can proceed without the Army Department's approval as long as the latter does not object. Pp. 484 U. S. 509-515.
(c) It is unnecessary to consider petitioners' contention that deference to the Interior Secretary's interpretation of the Act is appropriate here, and their related arguments about the history of relations between the Army and Interior Departments under the Act, for even if the Interior Department's interpretation would be entitled to any deference in these circumstances, the Executive Branch is not permitted to administer the Act in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law. The Act speaks directly to the dispute, and congressional intent as expressed in the Act indicates clearly that the Interior Secretary may not enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use without the approval of the Army Department. Pp. 484 U. S. 515-517.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except KENNEDY, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
We must decide whether, in the circumstances of this case, the Secretary of the Interior has exceeded the authority Congress delegated to him by the Flood Control Act of 1944.
that the Act does not empower the Interior Secretary to furnish water from Lake Oahe for industrial use.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (CA8 1986). It upheld the District Court's conclusion that Lake Oahe is not a reclamation development undertaken by the Interior Secretary, primarily because the Army built the reservoir and controls its operation. Accordingly, the Interior Secretary cannot contract on his own to withdraw water from the reservoir for industrial use. Neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act was thought to support the claim that the Interior Secretary was ceded broad authority over water in this reservoir, even water that it claims has been designated as available for future irrigation purposes. Indeed, the language of the Act and its legislative history were found to be convincing enough on this point that the Court of Appeals refused to defer to the Interior Secretary's contrary interpretation.
The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote of the judges. We granted certiorari, 480 U.S. 905 (1987), and we now affirm.
this region is to control flooding. See generally M. Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin's Pick-Sloan Plan 47-55 (1955). In the early 1940's, Congress focused its attention on the water problems of the Missouri River Basin, prompted especially by severe floods that had devastated the lower Basin in 1943 and 1944.
"would also provide for the most efficient utilization of the waters of the Missouri River Basin for all purposes, including irrigation, navigation, power, domestic and sanitary purposes, wildlife, and recreation,"
as well as other intangible benefits. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1944) (H.R. Doc.). The report estimated the gross storage capacity of the Oahe Reservoir at about 6 million acre-feet of water.
water. The Sloan Plan also contained a section comparing its provisions to those in the Pick Plan and suggesting modifications to the Pick Plan "which appear necessary to satisfy water use requirements throughout the Missouri River Basin." S. Doc. No.191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 120 (1944) (S. Doc.). This section concluded that, though "the capacity of individual reservoirs, as well as aggregate capacities, remain to be determined in greater detail," the "Army and Reclamation plans on storage needs for all purposes can be composed." Id. at 122-123.
The Pick and Sloan Plans differed with one another not only in their primary objectives, but also in several other important respects, such as the amount of expenditures and the number of projects. The engineering features of the two plans also were dissimilar. On the main stem of the Missouri River, the two plans called for different numbers of reservoirs of divergent sizes, and thus for inconsistent amounts of total water storage. Even where the two plans agreed on the need for a particular reservoir at a particular location, which they did at Oahe and at Fort Randall, they envisioned those projects very differently; as noted above, for example, the Sloan Plan proposed that Lake Oahe would hold more than three times as much water as called for in the Pick Plan, at an additional cost of more than $20 million.
"the irrigation of 750,000 acres of land in the James River Basin, as well as to provide useful storage for flood control, navigation, the development of hydroelectric power, and other purposes."
S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1944). As had been proposed in the Sloan Plan, the irrigation of the James River Basin was to be made possible by construction of a system of long canals, including one canal approximately 125 miles long. See S. Doc., at 115-116. With a single set of projects before it at last, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 less than two months later.
"the initial stages recommended are hereby authorized and shall be prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements."
Ibid. Second, Congress appropriated funds to pay for the initial work done on those projects. Two separate allotments were authorized: $200 million "for the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said expanded plan by the Corps of Engineers," § 9(d), and another $200 million "for the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said plans by the Secretary of the Interior." § 9(e).
"recogniz[ing] the interests and rights of the States in determining the development of the watersheds within their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and control."
§ 1, as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1952 ed.). The Act also implicated the tensions between the Upper Basin States and the Lower Basin States, whose interests in the use and control of the water were markedly different. Congress addressed this problem by providing that, when the Department of War undertook additional works not authorized by the Act, it would be required to consult and share information with the affected States and the Secretary of the Interior, depending on whether the works were located west of the 97th and 98th meridians. §§ 1(a) and (b). All projects proposed by the Interior Secretary that would involve construction of "works for irrigation" were made subject to a similar requirement, without regard to geographical location. § 1(c).
operate public park and recreational facilities in reservoir areas under the control of the War Department, and to permit the construction, maintenance, and operation of such facilities. The Secretary of War is authorized to grant leases of lands, including structure or facilities thereon, in reservoir areas for such periods and upon such terms as he shall deem reasonable." § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 460d (1946 ed.).
(2) "Electric power and energy generated at reservoir projects under the control of the War Department and in the opinion of the Secretary of War not required in the operation of such projects shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall transmit and dispose of such power and energy." § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1946 ed.).
(3) "That the Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts with States, municipalities, private concerns, or individuals, at such prices and on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of the War Department." § 6, 33 U.S.C. § 708 (1946 ed.).
(4) "Hereafter, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the operation of any such project shall be in accordance with such regulations." § 7. See 33 U.S.C. § 709 (1946 ed.).
irrigation purposes only in conformity with the provisions of this section." § 8. See 43 U.S.C. § 390 (1946 ed.).
is unavoidable that, if the Interior Secretary wishes to remove water from an Army reservoir for any purpose, the approval of the Army Secretary must be secured.
"to make contracts with States, municipalities, private concerns, or individuals . . . for domestic and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir"
"is authorized to construct, operate, and maintain, under the provisions of [the Federal reclamation laws,] . . . such additional works in connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation purposes."
Congress must grant "specific authorization" for the construction of any such additional works. Water from Army reservoirs "may be utilized hereafter for irrigation purposes only in conformity with the provisions of this section."
The petitioners seek to avert this conclusion by pointing to §§ 9(a) and (c) of the Act. Section 9(a) approves the "general comprehensive plans" set out in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan, as revised and coordinated by the final Senate Document, and authorizes the initial stages of those projects to be "prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements." The petitioners contend that this statement represents congressional approval of various aspects of the functional division of authority between the Army and Interior Departments that had been suggested in those plans; in particular, the petitioners suggest that this provision allows the Interior Secretary unilaterally to remove water from Army reservoirs for irrigation purposes and for other related uses.
made further refinements in how water could be used for irrigation, and yet did not offer the slightest indication that it was doing so. In any event, there is no reason to think that § 9(a) incorporates into the Act any additional indications about the proper division of authority between Army and Interior. On the contrary, its location in § 9 of the Act indicates that this provision was not intended as anything more than authorization for the two Departments to begin working on the projects listed in the final Senate Document. The other parts of § 9 merely harmonize the Act with existing laws and set out separate appropriations for Army and Interior to begin "the partial accomplishment of the works to be undertaken under said expanded plans," §§ 9(d) and (e), which indicates that this entire section of the Act encompasses only the necessary ministerial details to allow action to begin on the specified projects.
above, § 8 now provides that Army controls the main-stem reservoir projects and Interior controls all such additional irrigation works as it may "construct, operate, and maintain" at the site of those main-stem projects. One need not draw all the inferences that may be justified by this piece of legislative history in order to make it decisive here, for, at the very least, it directly refutes the notion that the other sections of the Act were intended to effect no changes in the division of authority between Army and Interior that had been suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan.
"with primary interest in the dominant function of any feature proposed in the plan should construct and operate that feature, giving full recognition, in the design, construction, and operation, to the needs of other agencies with minor interests."
S. Doc., at 11. The Sloan Plan recognized that the "dominant function" of Lake Oahe and the other main-stem reservoir projects would be flood control and navigation, and therefore these projects would come under the jurisdiction of the Army and its Corps of Engineers. Id. at 4. [Footnote 7] Even if Congress had intended to write the jurisdictional structure suggested in the Pick Plan and the Sloan Plan directly into law, therefore, it would not have extended to Interior the unilateral authority that has been claimed in this case.
petitioners claim that the administrative structure established in the Act divides authority over Lake Oahe between Army and Interior in a novel fashion that is considerably different from what appears on the face of the Act. One possibility, which the petitioners disavow, is that Interior has the ultimate authority to use water from the reservoir for irrigation purposes and Army has the ultimate authority to use water from the reservoir for flood control and navigational purposes. This approach obviously would founder, and could give rise to endless squabbles, unless the water in the reservoir has been allocated between these uses, yet the District Court explicitly found "no evidence that separate allocations were made at Oahe," and "one wonders how the Interior Department is to control what cannot be identified." 586 F.Supp. at 1277. The position actually urged by the petitioners is even less straightforward than the foregoing: they argue that the Act requires Interior to consult with Army before withdrawing any water for industrial use from Lake Oahe, and does not allow Interior to withdraw water if Army objects, and yet the Act does not require Interior to obtain the approval of Army in order to withdraw water for industrial use. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. The Army's authority over Lake Oahe is thus to be understood as most closely analogous to an executive veto over legislation: Interior must offer its proposal to the Army, and cannot proceed on its own if the Army objects, but can proceed even without Army approval as long as Army does not object. This would be, to say the least, a most unusual approach to administrative jurisdiction, one that gains no support from the text of the Act and one that we are unwilling to read into the Act as an implicit modification of its otherwise sensible and intelligible provisions.
"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 842-843 (1984). The Flood Control Act speaks directly to the dispute in this case, and congressional intent as expressed in the Act indicates clearly that the Interior Secretary may not enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use without the approval of the Department of the Army. That is "the end of the matter." Id. at 467 U. S. 842.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
* Together with No. 86-941, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Missouri et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Although the contract states that the Interior Secretary entered into it "after consultation with the Secretary of the Army," App. 226, no party has disputed the fact that the Secretary of the Army did not expressly approve or sign the contract, which was signed on behalf of the United States by a regional director for the Interior Department's Bureau of Reclamation. Id. at 234.
This case also has involved several procedural issues, as well as ancillary issues about the validity of the contract. Those other issues are not before this Court. Neither is there any issue presented here as to the relative interests of the United States and South Dakota in Lake Oahe water.
At one time, the Army took the view that the only "surplus water" in the main-stem reservoirs was the water that neither was held in the reservoirs nor was run through the generators to produce hydroelectric power -- in other words, that no "surplus water" existed in the reservoirs themselves -- apparently because it assumed that all water contained in the reservoirs "is otherwise being used" for specified purposes. Army Memorandum, Marketing of Missouri River Water for Coal Gasification, AR900407 (Dec. 16, 1974), App. 133. More recently, however, the Army has abandoned this assumption and recognized that "this interpretation of what constitutes surplus water is unnecessarily narrow." Memorandum from Susan Crawford, General Counsel of Army, to Assistant Secretary of Army, Proposed Contracts for Municipal and Industrial Water Withdrawals from Main Stem Missouri Reservoirs 2 (March 13, 1986), App. to Brief for Respondent States 14a. Its current position is that § 6 of the Act gives the Army Secretary the same authority over "water he determines is not needed to fulfill a project purpose in Army reservoirs" that the Interior Department possesses over water contained in its own reservoir projects, namely, the authority to withdraw water for industrial use if to do so would not impair the efficiency of the project for its other stated purposes. Memorandum of Crawford 4, App. to Brief for Respondent 16a. See also Army Circular EC 1105-2-181, pp. 3-4 (Oct. 30, 1987). This view is consistent with the language of the Act, for if the term "surplus water" could never include any of the water stored in the reservoirs themselves, then the caveat Congress enacted in § 6 -- that this grant of authority shall not "adversely affect then existing lawful uses of such water" -- would have been irrelevant, because this grant of authority could never adversely affect any existing or projected uses of such water.
"in connection with the operations under the reclamation law is hereby authorized to enter into contract to supply water from any project irrigation system for other purposes than irrigation . . . : Provided . . . That no water shall be furnished for the uses aforesaid if the delivery of such water shall be detrimental to the water service for such irrigation project."
The Interior Secretary's determination that the sale of water does not impair the irrigation purpose of a project under his control has been accorded broad deference. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, 420 F.Supp. 1037 (Mont.1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (CA9 1979).
Nothing in today's decision, it should be emphasized, prevents the water in Lake Oahe from being put to beneficial use for industrial or other purposes. Of the 23 million acre-feet of water stored in this reservoir, by far the most part was projected for potential use in irrigation. As the District Court found, however, none of this water has been allotted for irrigation, no works have been constructed to make use of this water for irrigation, and none of this water has ever been used for irrigation or is likely to be used for that purpose in the foreseeable future. 586 F.Supp. at 1274, 1277. On these facts, there is considerable leeway for the Army Secretary to designate some of this water for industrial use without "adversely affect[ing]" the "existing lawful uses of such water." Act, § 6. Certainly if the Executive Branch as a whole wishes to put the water in this reservoir to beneficial use, it may do so simply by complying with the terms of the Act.
"Corps of Engineers should construct, operate, and maintain any feature in which flood control and navigation are dominant considerations, and the [Interior's] Bureau of Reclamation should construct, operate, and maintain any feature in which the functions of irrigation, restoration of surface and ground water levels, and power are dominant,"
though the two Departments would "advise and consult with" one another to the extent that these interests overlapped in features controlled by one or the other Department. H.R. Doc., at 7.
"should have the responsibility for determining main stem reservoir capacities and capacities of tributary reservoirs for flood control and navigation,"
"should have the responsibility for determining the reservoir capacities on the main stem and tributaries of the Missouri River for irrigation."
S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1944). This passage seems to be nothing more than an explanation of how the final number of projects and the amount of their storage capacities were reached by the representatives of the two Departments.
"a part of a project which, for purposes of orderly engineering or reclamation development, is designated as a development unit by order of the Secretary."
Thus, a "reclamation development" is a designated part of a "reclamation project" under the Reclamation Project Act, for administrative purposes, and the two terms are used almost synonomously in that Act. See § 485f(b).
"to eliminate the shadow of applicability of the reclamation law to Corps of Engineers projects in any case in which the intent of Congress concerning such applicability is not clearly and explicitly set forth in statutory language,"
"authority to contract with water user entities for the irrigation water deliveries from Corps of Engineers projects, and to collect appropriate charges for those deliveries, continues in effect."
Ibid. It says nothing about when and how the Interior Secretary possesses and exercises the authority to enter into such contracts, which is prescribed in § 8 of the Act. Even more to the point, § 212 does not indicate in any way that the Interior Secretary has the authority to enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use, which is the precise authority asserted in this case.
This "Memorandum of Understanding" declared that the Army Secretary "shall retain all operational and managerial control over said reservoirs." Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretary of Interior and Secretary of Army, AR900072 (Feb. 24, 1975), App. 136. Over the four years it was in effect, no contracts were executed under it, and the agreement was allowed to expire in 1978. It also appears, by all accounts, that the contract at issue in this case is the only instance of the Interior Secretary exercising unilateral authority to withdraw water for industrial uses from a reservoir project controlled by the Army.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals mentioned various reasons why the Interior Secretary's interpretation of the Act might not be entitled to deference even if it were a reasonable interpretation. But since, in the end, the District Court, like the Court of Appeals, concluded that the agency's decision was not "reasonable," 586 F.Supp. at 1280, its additional comments, like those of the Court of Appeals, were pure dictum, and there is no reason to address them here.


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In the antitrust context, a “rimless wheel” – or “hub-and-spoke” – conspiracy is not a general conspiracy but instead amounts to multiple conspiracies between the common defendant – e.g., a distributor – and each of the other defendants – e.g., multiple suppliers.
Orchard then sued the two suppliers (Makita and METCo) and Home Depot alleging, among other things, the existence of a horizontal group boycott in violation of both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act.7 The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, on the ground that Orchard had failed to establish that the suppliers had conspired with each other to boycott Orchard rather than each independently deciding that they no longer would deal with the Orchard chain of hardware stores.8 In its second amended complaint (SAC), Orchard asserted both a per se horizontal group boycott antitrust claim and, alternatively, a rule of reason vertical boycott claim.
Orchard’s Horizontal Group Boycott Claim.
Pursuant to its per se group boycott claim, Orchard alleged that METCo and Makita participated in a horizontal arrangement to jointly participate in an unlawful group boycott with Home Depot, which constituted a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. In order to plead a per se group boycott claim, however, Orchard was required to establish, inter alia, the existence of a horizontal arrangement between METCo and Makita to jointly participate in the boycott. This requirement is founded in the Supreme Court’s holding in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,9 that “antitrust law does not permit the application of the per se rule [to group boycott claims] ... in the absence of a horizontal agreement ...”10Thus, Orchard's per se claimwould rise or fall based on whether Orchard had alleged evidentiary facts establishing the existence of a horizontal agreement between METCo and Makita.
Orchard’s horizontal per se antitrust claim, in effect, alleged what is known as a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy in a horizontal arrangement constituting an unlawful boycott – in this instance with Home Depot acting as the “hub” connecting two “spokes” – i.e., METCo and Makita. Thus, in order to state a per se group boycott claim based on its alleged hub-and-spoke conspiracy, Orchard needed to allege facts sufficient to infer that the spokes – i.e., METCo and Makita – acted pursuant to a horizontal agreement – a “rim” – as opposed to acting in parallel.11 Because Orchard did not – indeed, could not – allege facts from which one could plausibly infer that METCo’s and Makita’s decisions not to sell to Orchard were the result of a horizontal agreement, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Orchard’s per se antitrust claim. That left Orchard with its rule of reason antitrust claim.
(3) which actually injures competition.
Orchard’s Rule of Reason Vertical Boycott Claim.
Pursuant to its alternative rule of reason antitrust claim, Orchard alleged that the two vertical agreements to boycott Orchard – i.e., the Home Depot-METCo agreement and the separate Home Depot-Makita agreement – constituted rule of reason violations of both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. This means that Orchard was alleging the existence of arimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy, which in reality, constituted multiple conspiracies. The question presented to the district court was whether the anticompetitive effect of each spoke must be considered separately when determining whether it violates the rule of reason. At the pleading stage, this means that the court had to decide whether Orchard was required to allege facts demonstrating the separate anticompetitive effects of each spoke in order to state a rule of reason claim.
Professional customers purchase these power tools only from a relatively small number of hardware outlets, very few of which compete with Home Depot on price, and that the combined competitive effect of the separate and distinct Home Depot-Makita and Home Depot-METCo vertical exclusive dealing agreements resulted in the complete foreclosure of those smaller hardware outlets’ ability to compete for professional customers in the relevant product market – obviously, including Orchard.
In its SAC, Orchard made no effort to plead the separate anticompetitive effects of the two exclusive supply agreements. Instead, Orchard's allegations regarding harm to competition focused entirely on the combined effect of the Home Depot-METCo and Home Depot-Makita agreements. All of Orchard’s market power-related allegations were focused on METCo’s and Makita’s combined market power within the alleged relevant market. Conversely, Orchard purposefully made no effort to establish or allege that METCo or Makita individually had market power in the alleged relevant market.
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
METCo, Makita and Home Depot each moved to dismiss Orchard’s SAC, arguing that the SAC failed to state valid causes of action against any of the defendants. METCo, Makita and Home Depot argued that, in the absence of a horizontal agreement, Orchard needed to allege facts demonstrating the separate effects on competition of each of the alleged Home Depot-Makita and Home Depot-METCo agreements in order to establish that one or both of the separate vertical agreements were unreasonable restraints of trade. Because Orchard failed to do so – indeed, it expressly predicted its antitrust injury claim solely upon the combined effects on competition within the alleged relevant market – the defendants argued that Orchard’s SAC therefore failed to state a rule of reason claim as to either the Home Depot-METCo or Home Depot-Makita agreement.
Given that Orchard’s SAC failed to allege factual allegations sufficient to establish a horizontal agreement between METCo and Makita, the question squarely presented to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California was this: where there exist two or more separate and distinct vertical agreements – i.e. there is no evidence of a horizontal conspiracy – between separate suppliers-competitors and their dominant common retail dealer-customer, can the court aggregate the competitive effects of the multiple vertical agreements for the purpose of establishing market power and antitrust injury when evaluating the legality of one or more of the individual vertical agreements under a rule of reason antitrust analysis. In the context of Orchard’s factual allegations, the issue was whether the alleged vertical exclusive distributorship agreements (Home Depot-METCo and Home Depot-Makita) must be analyzed separately to determine if they violate Section 1 under a rule of reason analysis. If so, then the defendants’ motion to dismiss Orchard’s SAC – of necessity – would be granted, because Orchard could not adequately allege antitrust injury resulting from either vertical agreement alone, and because Orchard implicitly conceded that there was no harm to competition ostensibly caused separately by each alleged agreement.
The Ninth Circuit Has Not Yet Decided This Issue.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that in determining its market share the court should only have looked to its single contract with the defendant, which when considered in isolation constituted less than one percent of the relevant market.20 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that determining the plaintiffs market share in the market required an examination of all of the plaintiff's conduct in that market, not just the one contract specifically at issue.21 Thus, Finley concluded that aggregation of a single defendant's contracts may be appropriate when determining the anticompetitive impact of that single defendant's conduct – although the Ninth Circuit took pains to qualify that conclusion by stating aggregation was appropriate "in the factual context of the instant litigation."22 Finley, however, did not address the question whether the effects of two competitors' independent agreements, as spokes in a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy, may be aggregated in determining the anticompetitive effect of each agreement. In other words, Finley did not involve a hub-and-spoke conspiracy; instead, the Ninth Circuit found only that the court could aggregate the conduct of a single defendant’s conduct in determining its effect on competition in a relevant market.
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co.,23 (Cornwell)another Ninth Circuit decision, also did not concern a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Like Finley, Cornwell involved a breach of contract claim by the plaintiff (a hand tool manufacturer) and antitrust counterclaims by the defendant (a distributor), including a claim that the single plaintiff's aggregated exclusive dealing contractsviolated section 3 of the Clayton Act. The Ninth Circuit held that proof that 10-15 percentof hand tool dealers in California and Nevada had entered into exclusive dealing contractswith the plaintiff was sufficient to withstand summary judgment on defendant's section 3 claim.24 Like Finley, Cornwell could be read to allow aggregation of one defendant's conduct for purposes of proving that defendant's conduct was anticompetitive, but never addressed the issue presented in Orchard – i.e., whether two competitors' conduct may be aggregated when there is no plausible allegation that they conspired with each other.
The Fourth Circuit Ostensibly Requires Evaluation of Separate Effects on Competition.
In Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,25 the Fourth Circuit ostensibly did – but in actuality did not – examine the specific question issue presented in Orchard – i.e., how to plead a section 1 claim under the rule of reason where the plaintiff alleges a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, but fails to allege the existence of a “rim” between the spokes. Dicksonalleged a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy involving parallel agreements between Microsoft-Compaq and Microsoft-Dell. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff failed to allege a "rim" between Compaq and Dell, allegations regarding the anticompetitive effect of each agreement needed to be considered separately in evaluating whether a claim had been stated under the rule of reason: "to state a viable § 1 claim, [plaintiff] was required to allege facts which, if proven true, would demonstrate that Compaq's or Dell's individual agreements with Microsoft were likely to result in an anticompetitive effect.”26 Thus, in reliance upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dickson, the defendants in Orchard argued that, absent a “rim” between METCo and Makita, Orchard could not base a rule of reason claim on the aggregate effect of the Home Depot-METCo and Home Depot-Makita agreements. Instead, according to the Orchard defendants, Orchard must allege facts establishing each agreement, on its own, unreasonably restrained trade.
The Decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Finding that the defendants’ interpretation was counterintuitive, the district court denied Home Depot’s motion to dismiss Orchard’s rule of reason vertical boycott claim.
Thus, the district court granted the motions of METCo and Makita to dismiss Orchard’s SAC.
 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§16700-16770 (the Cartwright Act is California’s principal antitrust statute).
 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53214 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
 Discon, 525 U.S. at 138.
 See Anderson News LLC v. Am Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 187-89 (2d Cir. 2012); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 932-35 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89208, *20 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) ("[t]o be actionable, a hub-and-spoke conspiracy must have a 'rim,' which requires some kind of agreement or understanding between and among the spokes that the other spokes would cooperate in the conspiracy"); Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc.; 602 F.3d 237, 255 (3d Cir 2010) (hub-and-spoke theory of conspiracy was not satisfied where “[t]he amended complaint states only in a conclusory manner that all of the defendants . . . conspired and knew about the alleged plan to maintain Dentsply’s market position” and thus “the rim” connecting the various ‘spokes’ is missing”); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203-04 (4th Cir. 2002) (allegations that Microsoft had similar agreements with each of its customers failed to state a claim under the antitrust laws because the plaintiff did not allege a “rim” to the wheel, i.e., a conspiracy among the customers; the Supreme Court was "clear" in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), that "a wheel without a rim is not a single conspiracy"); PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 420 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal where no allegation of "an agreement among retailers" to implement manufacturer's policy; "there is no wheel and therefore no hub-and-spoke conspiracy . . . .").
 Brantly v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2012); Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008).
 Discon, 525 U.S. at 139 (a “simple allegation of harm to [plaintiff] does not automatically show injury to competition”).
 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
 Sicor, Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In general, a “plaintiff [also] must allege both that a ‘relevant market’ exists and that the defendant has power within that market.” Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008); see also In re Wellpoint, Inc. Out-of-Network “UCR” Rates Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982).
 446 F.2d 825 (9th. Cir. 1971).
 309 F.3d 193 (4th. Cir. 2002).
 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134319, *28 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
 Id. at *32-33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *28 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Dickson, 309 F.3d at 200 (“[i]n the SAC, Gravity alleged two separate vertical conspiracies between Dell and Microsoft and Compaq and Microsoft.”); id. at 204 (“[i]n an effort to cure its failure to allege a legally viable conspiracy, Gravity alleged in the SAC separate vertical conspiracies between Microsoft and Compaq and between Microsoft and Dell.”) id. at 205 (“[w]e next address whether Gravity alleged facts which, if proven true, would establish that the two conspiracies separately imposed unreasonable restraints of trade in interstate commerce.”).

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Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto Teixeira Filho was born in 1983, in the municipality of Ilha Solteira, São Paulo state, Brazil. He hold´s has undergraduate, Masters and PhD in Agronomy from the School of Ilha Solteira (FEIS) of the Universidade Estadual Paulista “Julio de Mesquita Filho” (UNESP). He made short stage as Visiting Professor in Plant Nutrition Group, with Emmanuel Frossard, ETH Zürich, Switzerland. Currently is Assistant Professor in RDIDP (Reference MS-3.2) at the Department of Plant Protection, Agricultural Engineering and Soil Science, Faculty of UNESP-Campus Engineering of Ilha Solteira and teaches the discipline of Plant Nutrition in the Undergraduate and Postgraduate courses in Agronomy. The areas of activity are: plant nutrition, fertilization, soil fertility, fertilizers of improved efficiency, nitrogen, Azospirillum brasilense, wheat, corn, soy, sugarcane and eucalyptus.
GALINDO, F. S. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. ; ROSA, P. A. L. ; TRITAPEPE, C. . Technical and economic viability of co-inoculation with Azospirillum brasilense in soybean cultivars in the Cerrado. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ENGENHARIA AGRÍCOLA E AMBIENTAL (IMPRESSO), v. 22, p. 51-56, 2018.
LONGHINI, V. Z. ; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo ; SOUZA, W. C. R. ; COSTA, N. R. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. ; MONTANARI, R. . Nitrogen fertilization and inoculation with diazotrophic bacteria in corn intercropped with xaraés grass. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIENCIAS AGRARIAS, v. 12, p. 340-347, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; SANTINI, J. M. K. ; BELLOTTE, J. L. M. ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. ; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo ; SILVA, V. M. ; GARCIA, C. M. P. . Chemical soil attributes after wheat cropping under nitrogen fertilization and inoculation with Azospirillum brasilense. Semina-Ciencias Agrarias, v. 38, p. 659-670, 2017.
MELLO, T. F. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. ; GALINDO, F. S. ; NOGUEIRA, L.M. . RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF NITROGEN FERTILIZER WITH POLYMER-COATED UREA IN A CORN CROP. Revista Caatinga (UFERSA. Impresso), v. 30, p. 586-594, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; SANTINI, J. M. K. ; ALVES, C. J. ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. . Wheat yield in the Cerrado as affected by nitrogen fertilization and inoculation with Azospirillum brasilense. PESQUISA AGROPECUARIA BRASILEIRA, v. 52, p. 794-805, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; SANTINI, J. M. K. ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. ; BAGGIO, G. . Modes of application of cobalt, molybdenum and Azospirillum brasilense on soybean yield and profitability. Revista Brasileira de Engenharia Agricola e Ambiental, v. 21, p. 180-185, 2017.
LIMA, E. S. ; MONTANARI, R. ; LOVERA, L. H. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto ; SILVA, V. E. ; LIMA, C. G. R. . SPATIAL VARIABILITY OF EUCALYPTUS AND PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF SOIL FERTILIZED WITH LIME MUD AND MINERAL FERTILIZER. REVISTA DE AGRICULTURA (PIRACICABA), v. 92, p. 132-146, 2017.
BONI, T. S. ; MIZOBATA, K. K. G. S. ; SILVA, M. S. C. ; MONTEIRO, L. N. H. ; BARBIERI, R. S. ; MALTONI, K. L. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, MARCELO C. M. . CHEMICAL SOIL ATTRIBUTES OF CERRADO AREAS UNDER DIFFERENT RECOVERY MANAGEMENTS OR CONSERVATION LEVELS. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION, v. 9, p. 115-121, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M. C. M. ; TARSITANO, M. A. A. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; SANTINI, J. M. K. ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. ; ALVES, C. J. ; ARF, O. . Economic analysis of corn inoculated with Azospirillum brasilense associated with nitrogen sources and doses. Semina-Ciencias Agrarias, v. 38, p. 1749-1764, 2017.
SILVA, M. S. ; OLIVEIRA, G. R. F. ; BOSSOLANI, J. W. ; PROENCA, S. L. ; SOARES, D. A. ; ROCHA, E. N. ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto ; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de . FERTILIZAÇÃO NITROGENADA E BORATADA ASSOCIADA À INOCULAÇÃO COM Bacillus subtilis NO DESEMPENHO AGRONÔMICO DO FEIJOEIRO. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ENGENHARIA DE BIOSSISTEMAS / BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF BIOSYSTEMS ENGINEERING, v. 11, p. 116-124, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S. ; BUZETTI, Salatiér ; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto ; DUPAS, Elisangela ; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z. . Application of different nitrogen doses to increase nitrogen efficiency in Mombasa guinegrass (Panicum maximum cv. mombasa) at dry and rainy seasons. AUST J CROP SCI, v. 11, p. 1657-1664, 2017.
GALINDO, F. S.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; SANTINI, J. M. K.; ALVES, C. J.; NOGUEIRA, L.M.; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; BELLOTTE, J. L. M.
Corn yield and foliar diagnosis affected by nitrogen fertilization and inoculation with Azospirillum brasilense. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIA DO SOLO (Online). , v.40, p.e0150364 – , 2016.
SOUZA, F. H. Q.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; GALINDO, F. S.; MALMONGE, L. F.; MALMONGE, J. A.; BUZETTI, Salatiér. Nitrogen doses and modes of application of organic polymers with dissolved ureia in corn crop. CULTURA AGRONOMICA (UNESP. Ilha Solteira). , v.25, p.361 – 372, 2016.
DINALLI, R. P.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; GAZOLA, R. N.; CASTILHO, Regina Maria Monteiro de; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; CELESTRINO, T. S. Nitrogen dose and type of herbicide used for growth regulation on the green coloration intensity of Emerald grass. CIÊNCIA RURAL. , v.46, p.984 – 990, 2016.
DUPAS, Elisangela; BUZETTI, Salatiér; RABELO, F. H. S.; SARTO, A. L.; CHENG, N. C.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M.; GALINDO, F. S.; DINALLI, R. P.; GAZOLA, R. N. Nitrogen recovery and use efficiency, dry matter yield, and chemical composition of palisade grass fertilized with nitrogen sources in the Cerrado biome. AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE. , v.10, p.1330 -1338, 2016.
SOUZA, J. A.; BUZETTI, S.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M. C. M.; MOREIRA, A. Sources, rates and time of nitrogen application on maize crops under no-tillage system. COMMUNICATIONS IN SOIL SCIENCE AND PLANT ANALYSIS. , v.47, p.2200 – 2207, 2016.
TERÇARIOL, MAIRA CAROLINE; BRANCAGLIONI, VIVIAN APARECIDA; ARTÊNCIO JÚNIOR, JOSÉ PAULO; MONTANARI, RAFAEL; Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BOLONHEZI, ANTONIO CÉSAR; LA SCALA JÚNIOR, NEWTON; CHAVARETTE, FABIO ROBERTO; PANOSSO, ALAN RODRIGO. Spatial variability of soil CO2 emission in soybean and sugarcane areas in Mato Grosso do Sul Cerrado, Brazil. JOURNAL OF GEOSPATIAL MODELLING. , v.2, p.45 – 66, 2016.
GARCIA, C. M. P.; COSTA, C.; MEIRELLES, P. R. L.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; PARIZ, C. M.; FREITAS, L. A.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. Yield of wet and dry corn grains from an intercrop with marandu grass and/or dwarf pigeon pea and nutritional value of the marandu grass in succession. AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE. , v.10, p.1564 – 1571, 2016.
COSTA, N. R.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; ULIAN, N. A.; COSTA, B. S.; PARIZ, C. M.; Teixeira Filho, MCM Accumulation of nutrients and time of decomposition of straw of forage species as a function of sowing times. BIOSCIENCE JOURNAL (Online). , v.31, p.818 – 829, 2015.
DINALLI, R. P.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; GAZOLA, R. N.; CASTILHO, Regina Maria Monteiro de; CELESTRINO, T. S.; DUPAS, Elisangela; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; LIMA, R.C.
Application of herbicides as growth regulators of emerald Zoysia grass fertilized with nitrogen. SEMINA. CIÊNCIAS AGRÁRIAS (Online). , v.36, p.1875 – , 2015.
GALINDO, F. S.; NOGUEIRA, L.M.; BELLOTTE, J. L. M.; GAZOLA, R. N.; ALVES, C. J.; Teixeira Filho, MCM. Agronomic performance of maize as a function of the application of biostimulants based on seaweed extract. TECNOLOGIA & CIÊNCIA AGROPECUÁRIA. , v.9, p.13 – 19, 2015.
GAZOLA, R. N.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; DINALLI, R.; MORAES, M. L. T.; CELESTRINO, T. S.; SILVA, P. H. M.; DUPAS, Elisangela. Doses of N, P and K in the cultivation of eucalyptus in soil originally under Cerrado vegetation. SEMINA CIÊNCIAS AGRÁRIAS (Online). , v.36, p.1895 – , 2015.
GALINDO, F. S.; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z.; BELLOTTE, J. L. M.; SANTINI, J. M. K.; ALVES, C. J.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto. Effect of application times of Azospirillum brasilense on the nutrient content of irrigated wheat. TECNOLOGIA & CIÊNCIA AGROPECUÁRIA. , v.9, p.37 – 42, 2015.
GALINDO, F. S.; LUDKIEWICZ, M. G. Z.; BELLOTTE, J. L. M.; SANTINI, J. M. K.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér. Times of inoculation with Azospirillum brasilense via leaf affecting yield of irrigated wheat. TECNOLOGIA & CIÊNCIA AGROPECUÁRIA. , v.9, p.43 – 48, 2015.
COSTA, N.R.; ANDREOTTI, M.; ULIAN, N.A.; COSTA, B.S.; PARIZ, C.M.; CAVASANO, F.A.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, M.C.M. Productivity of soybean on straw of forages sown at different times and chemical changes in soil. AGRÁRIA (Recife. Online). , v.10, p.8 – 16, 2015.
FERNANDES, J.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; DUPAS, Elisangela; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo. Sources and rates of nitrogen fertilizer used in Mombasa guineagrass in the Brazilian Cerrado region. AFRICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH. , v.10, p.2076 – 2082, 2015.
Valderrama, M.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo Nitrogen fertilization in the corn crop with urea coated by different polymer sources. SEMINA. CIÊNCIAS AGRÁRIAS (Online). , v.35, p.659 – , 2014.
MAESTRELO, P. R.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; GARCIA, C. M. P.; RODRIGUES, M. A. C.; LINO, A. C. M.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo. Application of coated urea on topdressing in maize irrigated under no – tillage system. AGRÁRIA (Recife.Online). , v.9, p.192 – 199, 2014.
GARCIA, C. M. P.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; TEIXEIRA FILHO, MARCELO C. M.; LOPES, K. S.; BUZETTI, Salatiér. Decomposition of forage straw as a function of nitrogen fertilization after intercropping with maize and soybean yield in succession. BRAGANTIA (São Paulo, SP. Impresso). , v.73, p.143 – 152, 2014.
THEAGO, E. Q.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; MEGDA, Márcio Mohmoud; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo. Doses, sources and application times of nitrogen influencing chlorophyll content and wheat yield. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIA DO SOLO (Impresso). , v.38, p.1826 – 1835, 2014.
GAZOLA, R. N.; MELO, L. M. M.; DINALLI, R.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, MARCELO C. M.; CELESTRINO, T.
S.; DUPAS, Elisangela; GARCIA, C. M. P. Dry matter yield and tillering of brachiarias sown at depths intercropped with corn. CIÊNCIA RURAL (UFSM.Impresso). , v.44, p.1776 – 1782, 2014.
SILVA, A. A. V.; SILVA, I. A. F.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA, M. C. M. Estimation of wheat yield as a function of nitrogen fertilization using neuro fuzzy modeling. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ENGENHARIA AGRÍCOLA E AMBIENTAL (Impresso). , v.18, p.180 -187, 2014.
TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; Arf, Orivaldo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de. Wheat nitrogen fertilization under no till on the low altitude Brazilian Cerrado. JOURNAL OF PLANT NUTRITION. , v.37, p.1732 – 1748, 2014.
MARQUES, L. S.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; GARCIA, C. M. P. Chemical analysis of leaf “D” of pineapple cv. Smooth cayenne before and after floral induction as a function of doses and installments nitrogen. BIOSCIENCE JOURNAL (UFU. Impresso). , v.29, p.41 – 50, 2013.
GARCIA, C. M. P.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; CELESTRINO, T. S.; LOPES, K. S. Agronomic performance of maize and forage species in a crop-livestock integration system in the Cerrado. CIÊNCIA RURAL (UFSM. Impresso). , v.43, p.589 – 595, 2013.
LOPES, R. A.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; ARF, M. V. Doses, sources and times of nitrogen application in upland rice grown under no-tillage system. REVISTA CAATINGA (UFERSA. Impresso). , v.26, p.79 – 87, 2013.
NASCIMENTO, Vagner Do; ARF, O.; ALVES, Marlene Cristina; BONINI, C. S. B.; KANEKO, F. H.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto. Mechanisms of furrow opening and nitrogen fertilization in upland rice. REVISTA CERES. , v.60, p.802 – 810, 2013.
MONTANARI, R.; CARVALHO, M. P. E.; Teixeira Filho, MCM; DALCHIAVON, F. C. Dry matter production of Brachiaria according to the chemical attributes of an Oxisol in Selvíria, Mato Grosso do Sul. REVISTA CERES. , v.60, p.519 – 527, 2013.
GAZOLA, R. N.; MELO, L. M. M.; DINALLI, R.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; GARCIA, C. M. P. Sowing depths of brachiaria in intercropping with corn in no tillage planting. ENGENHARIA AGRÍCOLA (Impresso). , v.33, p.157 – 166, 2013.
GARCIA, C. M. P.; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; TARSITANO, M. A. A.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; LIMA, A.E.S.; BUZETTI, Salatiér. Economic analysis of grain yield of corn intercropped with forage of Brachiaria and Panicum genotypes under no-tillage system. REVISTA CERES. , v.59, p.157 – 163, 2012.
TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; GARCIA, C. M. P.; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de; Arf, Orivaldo; MAEDA, Alexandra Sanae. Nitrogen doses and fungal application in wheat crop under no-tillage system. CULTURA AGRONOMICA (UNESP. Ilha Solteira). , v.21, p.31 – 41, 2012.
TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; Arf, Orivaldo; ALVAREZ, Rita de Cássia Félix; MAEDA, Alexandra Sanae; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de. Response of wheat cultivars to nitrogen with and without fungal treatment. AGRÁRIA (UFRPE. Impresso). , v.7, p.626 – 634, 2012.
Souza, Juliana Aparecida; BUZETTI, Salatiér; Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de; Arf, Orivaldo. Nitrogen fertilization in maize crop irrigated in no-tillage system. BRAGANTIA (São Paulo, SP. Impresso). ,v.70, p.447 – 454, 2011.
BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; BUZETTI, Salatiér; SILVA, Katiane S.; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; ARF, Oriovaldo. Foliar application and in coverage of nitrogen in the wheat crop in cerrado. SEMINA. CIÊNCIAS AGRÁRIAS (Impresso). , v.32, p.829 – 838, 2011.
Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; Arf, Orivaldo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de. Application times, sources and doses of nitrogen on wheat cultivars under no till in the Cerrado region. CIÊNCIA RURAL (UFSM. Impresso). , v.41, p.1375 – 1382, 2011.
MAEDA, Alexandra Sanae; BUZETTI, Salatiér; BOLIANI, A.C.; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo Foliar fertilization on pineapple quality and yield. PESQUISA AGROPECUÁRIA TROPICAL (Impresso). ,v.41, p.248 – 253, 2011.
Valderrama, M.; BUZETTI, Salatiér; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto. Sources and doses of NPK in corn irrigated under no-tillage system. PESQUISA AGROPECUÁRIA TROPICAL (Impresso). , v.41, p.254 – 263, 2011.
TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; TARSITANO, M. A. A.; BERTOLIN, Danila Comelis; COLOMBO, Adriana de Souza; NASCIMENTO, Vagner Do. Economic analysis of nitrogen fertilization in wheat irrigated under no-tillage in the Cerrado. REVISTA CERES. , v.57, p.446 – 453, 2010.
Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; Arf, Orivaldo; BENETT, Cleiton Gredson Sabin. Doses, sources and times of nitrogen application in irrigated wheat in no-tillage system. PESQUISA AGROPECUÁRIA BRASILEIRA (1977. Impressa). , v.45, p.797 – 804, 2010.
Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de; Arf, Orivaldo; Megda, Márcio Mohamed. Response of irrigated wheat cultivars to different nitrogen rates and sources. REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIA DO SOLO (Impresso). , v.33, p.1303 – 1310, 2009.
Megda, Márcio Mahmoud; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ANDREOTTI, Marcelo; Teixeira Filho, Marcelo Minhoto Carvalho; Vieira, Michele Xavier. Response of wheat cultivars to nitrogen in relation to the sources and times of application under no-tillage and irrigation by sprinkling. CIÊNCIA E AGROTECNOLOGIA (UFLA). , v.33, p.1055 – 1060, 2009.
FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto Teixeira; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ALVAREZ, Rita de Cássia Félix; FREITAS, José Guilherme de; Arf, Orivaldo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de. Agronomic performance of wheat cultivars in response to plant population and nitrogen fertilization. CIENTÍFICA (Jaboticabal. Online). , v.36, p.97 – 106, 2008.
TEIXEIRA FILHO, Marcelo Carvalho Minhoto; BUZETTI, Salatiér; ALVAREZ, Rita de Cássia Félix; FREITAS, José Guilherme de; Arf, Orivaldo; SÁ, Marco Eustáquio de. Response of wheat cultivars irrigated by nitrogen sprinkling in topdressing at Cerrado region. ACTA SCIENTIARUM. AGRONOMY (Impresso). , v.29, p.421 – 425, 2007.

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Generally, a Covenant Not to Compete is “[a]n agreement, generally part of a contract of employment or a contract to sell a business, in which the covenantor agrees for a specific period of time and within a particular area to refrain from competition with the covenantee.” Black’s Law Dictionary 364 (6th ed. 1990). The Covenant Not to Compete is known by multiple other names: the “restrictive covenant,” “non-competition agreement,” or as an “agreement not to compete” (hereinafter the “Covenant”). Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 672, 675 (2008).
(b) Disclosing any trade secrets, business methods, lists of customers, secret formulas or processes or confidential information learned or obtained during the course of his or her employment with the person, association, company or corporation, if the agreement is supported by valuable consideration and is otherwise reasonable in its scope and duration.
To be valid, a Covenant must be reasonable in its scope and duration. In Hansen v. Edwards, the Nevada Supreme court developed a test for use in determining reasonableness, declaring that for public policy considerations, the Covenant will not be enforced if it is not reasonable. 83 Nev. 189, 426 P.2d 792 (1967) (a non-compete provision is “unreasonable . . . if it is greater than is required for the protection of the [employer] . . . or [if it] imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted.”). Care must be taken when drafting that the Covenant imposes upon the employee no greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the business and good will of the employer. Id.
The Court, after Hansen, reiterated the four characteristics of a valid Covenant: (1) consideration; (2) duration; (3) geographic limit, and (4) public policy. See generally HD Supply Facilities Maint., LTD. v. Bymoen, 125 Nev. 200, 210 P.3d 183 (2009); Traffic Control Serv., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 120 Nev. 168, 87 P.3d 1054 (2004); Camco v. Baker, 113 Nev. 512, 936 P.2d 829 (1997); Jones v. Deeter, 112 Nev. 291, 913 P.2d 1272 (1996); Ellis v. McDaniel, 95 Nev. 455, 596 P.2d 222 (1979); Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. 189, 426 P.2d 792 (1967). Determining the reasonable scope and duration is a fact-sensitive inquiry. See, e.g., Traffic Control Servs. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 120 Nev. 168, 87 P.3d 1054, 1055–56 (2004) (illustrating a reasonable provision that provided a one-year duration and 60 mile radius); Camco, Inc., 113 Nev. 512, 936 P.2d at 832 (invalidating a provision that provided a 50 mile radius and five-year duration, and reasoning that territorial restrictions must be limited to areas where the employer “established customer contacts and good will”); Jones v. Deeter, 112 Nev. 291, 913 P.2d 1272 (1996) (striking down a non-compete provision that provided a 100 mile radius and a five-year duration); Ellis v. McDaniel, 95 Nev. 455, 596 P.2d 222, 224 (1979) (upholding a non-compete provision that prohibited competition within two years after termination and within five miles of the city limits). “There is no inflexible formula for deciding the ubiquitous question of reasonableness.” Ellis, 95 Nev. 455, 596 P.2d at 224.
Employers commonly rely upon restrictive covenants, primarily nondisclosure and noncompetition covenants, to safeguard important business interests. “The non-disclosure covenant limits the dissemination of proprietary information by a former employee, while the non-competition covenant precludes the former employee from competing with his prior employer for a specified period of time and within a precise geographic area.
It is axiomatic that all valid agreements must be supported by proper consideration to be enforceable. Covenants not to compete are no different, and must be supported by consideration to be enforceable. Reasonableness, of course, will always be highly dependent on the individual circumstances of the contracting parties and their overall agreement. As a guide, however, Nevada’s Supreme Court has offered a wide range of consideration that is considered reasonable.
In Jones v. Deeter, consideration of “50 cents per hour in addition to a $6.50 per hour wage” was held reasonable for an employee in the lighting retrofitting business who signed a Covenant. Jones v. Deeter, 112 Nev. 291, 913 P.2d 1272 (1996). In a more recent holding, the Supreme Court in Traffic Control Serv., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., held that $10,000 in consideration was reasonable. Id.
Nevada’s most significant holding pertaining to consideration, however, is Camco v. Baker. In Camco, the court held that an at-will employee’s continued employment alone is sufficient consideration in exchange for making the Covenant. Camco v. Baker, 113 Nev. 512, 516, 936 P.2d 829 (1997). The court emphasized that Covenant provisions are merely “modification[s] to the original employment contract.” Id. Thus, separate consideration beyond continued employment is not necessary. Id. The court also noted that the failure to treat the Covenant provisions as modifications could result in hardships on employers. Id.
If an employee is at-will, care should be taken to restate the at-will nature of the relationship within the Covenant itself, and to specifically state that consideration for making the Covenant is found in the employee’s continued employment. Should the employee be other than at-will, the drafter should carefully consider the amount of consideration that would be reasonable under the circumstances (salary, length of the Covenant, the term of employment, etc.).
Again, reasonableness will always depend on the totality of circumstances; the reasonable length of the Covenant for a manager of a restaurant will necessarily differ from the length of time for a scientist who is developing a new drug.
In Jones, the Nevada Supreme Court opined that a “five- year duration [was] not reasonably necessary to protect [the employer’s] business and place[d] too great a hardship on [the employee.]” Jones, 112 Nev. at 296. Although the court in Ellis v. McDaniel and Camco both rejected the respective Covenants, it held that a two year restriction was reasonable. Ellis v. McDaniel, 95 Nev. 455, 459, 596 P.2d 222 (1979); Camco, 113 Nev. at 519. Moreover, the lack of a stated time limitation in a Covenant is automatically unreasonable. Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. at 191. In Hansen v. Edwards, where a “no time limitation on the restriction was mentioned,” the court upheld the restrictive covenant after adding a time limit of one year to the agreement (a one-year limitation was also held reasonable in Traffic Control Serv., Inc.). Id.
Care must be taken to determine the reasonable amount of time in light of the case law discussed above, as well as the industry standards and employee-specific facts. Best practices suggest requiring the employee to state both the reasons and the conclusion, in writing, why the amount of time required by the Covenant is reasonable.
No particular geographic radius restriction will be reasonable in all circumstances. Of Nevada’s six main cases discussing the Covenants, radii of five, 50, 60, and 100 miles from the employer, were deemed reasonable. However, in Hansen, the Court rejected a Covenant that forbade a doctor to “undertake to practice medicine within a distance of five miles from the city limits. . .” on grounds of the public’s interest in the doctor’s services. Hansen, 83 Nev. at 192. Because the employee was the only specialist in the area who could treat orthopedic patients, even five miles was too much of a limitation. Id. The court heavily valued the public’s hardship of having to travel five miles outside the city to retain this doctor’s services. Id. Additionally, in Camco, the Court defined a reasonable geographic area to be an area where the employer has established “sufficient customer contacts and/ or good will.” Camco, 113 Nev. at 833 quoting Snelling & Snelling v. Dupay Ent., 125 Ariz. 362, 609 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Ariz.1980). However, a mere assertion of an area which is the “target of a corporate plan for expansion” is not a reasonable geographic limitation. Id.
Covenants are at times held invalid as an improper restraint on trade, although, the Nevada Supreme Court in Jones clarified that “Nevada Legislature never intended NRS 613.200 to render postemployment restrictive covenants void as against public policy,” (rejecting the traditional view that restrictive Covenants are per se invalid). Jones, 112 Nev. at 292.
At times, courts hyper focus on public policy when a Covenant possibly restrains trade. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Or. Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, a restraint on trade is per se invalid because of: (1) “the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted party’s industry;” and (2) “the injury to the party himself by being precluded from pursuing this occupation and thus being prevented from supporting himself and his family.” Or. Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64 (1873). In Or. Steam Nav. Co., the vendee argued that the Covenant “not to run or employ, or suffer to be run or employed, the said steamboat New World upon any of the routes of travel, or the rivers, bays, or waters of the State of California, or the Columbia River and its tributaries, for the period of ten years” was invalid. Id. at 66. However, the Supreme Court applied these factors to determine that the restraint on trade after the sale of a steamer was reasonable. Id. at 69.
First, the provision that “the steamer should not be used in California waters for the period of ten years” was “necessary to protect the former company from interference with its own business.” Id. It had no tendency to destroy the usefulness of the steamer, and did not deprive the country of any industrial agency. Id.
Secondly, the provision did not create any hardship for the vendee by enforcing a “transfer of residence or allegiance on the part of the vendee in order to pursue its employment.” Id. Finally, the general interests of commerce in the United States were promoted by this restraint. Id. at 70. With no injury suffered by either the public or both parties, valid consideration and fulfillment of the “object and purpose [simply] to simply protect vendors,” the restraint was held reasonable. Id. at 71-72.
The Supreme Court of Nevada is similarly very supportive of public policy. The court has noted that “the public has an interest in seeing that competition is not unreasonably limited or restricted, but it also has an interest in protecting the freedom of persons to contract, and in enforcing contractual rights and obligations.” Hansen, 83 Nev. at 192 quoting Lovelace Clinic. v. Murphy, 471 P.2d 450, 453-54 (1966). In Ellis, even though the provisions were reasonable, the court rejected the restraint on trade of an orthopedic practitioner “because the public has to travel great distances to get to this specialized field… the public interest in retaining the services of the specialist is greater than the interest in protecting the integrity of the contract provision to its outer limits.” Ellis, 95 Nev. at 459.
an agreement on the part of an employee not to compete with his employer after termination of the employment is in restraint of trade and will not be enforced in accordance with its terms unless the same are reasonable. Where the public interest is not directly involved, the test usually stated for determining the validity of the covenant as written is whether it imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the business and good will of the employer. A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or economic justification, if it is greater than is required for the protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted. The period of time during which the restraint is to last and the territory that is included are important factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the agreement.
Hansen, 83 Nev. at 191-92. In addition to the public’s interest and the employee’s interests, the employer’s interests are crucial to a valid restrictive covenant.
The trend is that employment Covenants now contain more than just covenants not to compete; they also contain non-disclosure, non-solicitation, non-diversion and other clauses limiting the scope of the employee’s employment and post-employment activities. Accelerated Care Plus Corp. v. Diversicare Mgt. Serv. Co. illustrates well how agreements are currently written, enforced, and interpreted by the Nevada courts. Accelerated Care Plus Corp. v. Diversicare Mgt. Serv. Co., 2011 WL 3678798 (D. Nev. 2011).
provides a variety of services and products to approximately 5000 skilled nursing and therapy facilities throughout the United States (with the exception of Alaska)… [employer] specializes in providing its own training and usage methods for that equipment to skilled nursing and physical therapy facilities. [It] has compiled its treatment methods into various written materials which include step-by-step guides, handbooks, training programs, and other instruction materials (the “Written Materials”).
The employee signed the restrictive covenant because he held a high position at the corporation and was “privy to high-level information relating to [employer’s] strategic plans and business model, and was also very knowledgeable and skilled regarding [employer’s] treatment methods and Written Materials.” The court eventually deemed this knowledge as confidential information. The court also addressed basic elements of a restrictive covenant.
In the case of a localized or regional business, a geographic limitation in a restrictive covenant would reasonably address any possible harm that employer may suffer. However, courts have recognized that when an employer’s business is national in scope, an unlimited geographical scope may be reasonable so long as the field is sufficiently limited.
The court held that disclosure of any confidential information could be limited. The court then applied the general public interest test from in Hansen v. Edwards. The court in Accelerated Care Plus Corp. held that the balance of undue hardships imposed on the employer, the possibility of losing competition, and the possible disclosure of confidential information to a rival firm outweighed the hardship imposed on the employee of not being able to work at the new corporation.

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A Visas are issued pursuant to INA §101(a)(15)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(A). A visas are issued to diplomats, officials and employees of foreign governments recognized by the U.S. coming on official business.
A-l Visas are issued pursuant to INA 22 C.F.R. §41.22(b). Ambassadors, public ministers or career diplomats/officers and their immediate families.
A-2 Visas are issued to other accredited officials and employees of foreign governments and their immediate families.
A-3 Visas are issued to attendants, servants, personal employees of A-1 or A-2 and members of their immediate families.
G Visas are issued pursuant to INA §101(a)(15)(G), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(G), 9 FAM 41.24. G visas are issued to a designated principal resident representative of a foreign government recognized de jure by the United States, which foreign government is a member of an international organization entitled to enjoy privileges, exemptions, and immunities as an international organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669) 22 U.S.C. 288, note, accredited resident members of the staff of such representatives, and members of his or their immediate family.
C-2 visas also called UN transit visas are issued to representative(s) (from non-de jure and nonmember country, e.g., Hamas official Abu Marzouk), or to expert(s) that U.N. needs.
C-2 visa holders are given 29 days. Must stay within NYC area and proceed directly to U.N. When leaving U.N. business must leave U.S. 8 C.F.R. §214.2(c)(2).
C-3 Visas are issued to accredited official(s) of foreign government passing in transit through U.S. on official business and U.S. has reciprocal right in foreign country.