§ 404.110 How we determine fully insured status.
§ 404.111 When we consider a person fully insured based on World War II active military or naval service.
§ 404.112 When we consider certain employees of private nonprofit organizations to be fully insured.
§ 404.115 Table for determining the quarters of coverage you need to be fully insured.
§ 404.120 How we determine currently insured status.
§ 404.130 How we determine disability insured status.
§ 404.131 When you must have disability insured status.
§ 404.132 How we determine fully insured status for a period of disability or disability insurance benefits.
§ 404.133 When we give you quarters of coverage based on military service to establish a period of disability.
§ 404.140 What is a quarter of coverage.
§ 404.141 How we credit quarters of coverage for calendar years before 1978.
§ 404.142 How we credit self-employment income to calendar quarters for taxable years beginning before 1978.
§ 404.143 How we credit quarters of coverage for calendar years after 1977.
§ 404.144 How we credit self-employment income to calendar years for taxable years beginning after 1977.
§ 404.145 When you acquire a quarter of coverage.
§ 404.146 When a calendar quarter cannot be a quarter of coverage.
Secs. 205(a), 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 223, and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a), 412, 413, 414, 416, 417, 423, and 902(a)(5)).
45 FR 25384, Apr. 15, 1980, unless otherwise noted.


D.C. Law Library - § 47–1059. American College of Cardiology and American College of Cardiology Foundation.
↪ § 47–1059. American College of Cardiology and American College of Cardiology Foundation.
§ 47–1058. Emmaus Rehabilitation Project, lot 74 in square 366.
§ 47–1060. Southeast Neighborhood House, lots 0808, 0904, and 0905 in square 5802.
§ 47–1059. American College of Cardiology and American College of Cardiology Foundation.
Property owned, occupied, and used by the American College of Cardiology and the American College of Cardiology Foundation, is hereby exempt from all taxation so long as the property continues to be so owned and occupied, and not used for commercial purposes, subject to the provisions of § 47-1002 and § 47-1007, providing for exemption of certain real properties.
For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 2 of the American College of Cardiology Foundation Real Property Tax Exemption Emergency Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-120, July 29, 2003, 50 DCR 6613).
For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 2 of American College of Cardiology Foundation Real Property Tax Exemption Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2003 (D.C. Act 15-218, November 7, 2003, 50 DCR 10043).
For temporary (90 day) addition of section, see § 2 of American College of Cardiology and American College of Cardiology Foundation Real Property Tax Exemption Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-466, July 19, 2004, 51 DCR 7581).
For Temporary (225 day) addition of section, see § 2 of American College of Cardiology Foundation Real Property Tax Exemption Temporary Act of 2003 (D.C. Law 15-45, December 9, 2003, law notification 51 DCR 1780).
Section 7053 of D.C. Law 17-219 repealed section 3 of D.C. Law 15-186.


text:
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Guardian ad Litem — Report — Under Oath — Necessity. In a proceeding to terminate parental rights in a child, the report from a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to RCW 13.34.100 need not be made orally under oath.
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Review — Sufficiency of Evidence — In General. A juvenile court's termination of a parent's rights in a child will be upheld on review if substantial evidence supports the court's findings, i.e., if the State has met its burden of production.
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Degree of Proof — Burden of Production. In a proceeding to terminate parental rights in a child, the State satisfies its burden of production by producing sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the necessary facts to the required level of certainty.
 Waiver — What Constitutes — In General. Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
 Waiver — Implied Waiver — Elements. A waiver can be implied based on conduct supporting an inference of relinquishment of a known right by choice. The conduct must be inconsistent with any other intent, and the waiving party must have understood that the consequences of the conduct would be relinquishment of the right.
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Improvement of Parent — State Services — Waiver — Test. A parent's right under RCW 13.34.130(3)(b) and (5)(b) to receive remedial services from the State, as a precondition to terminating the parent's rights to a child, is waived if the parent: (1) was aware of the right; (2) acted in such a way as to evince, in an unequivocal way, an intention to give up the right; (3) had the means and opportunity to exercise the right; and (4) understood that the consequences of the actions would be that the State would not provide the services.
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Parental Unfitness — In General. Under RCW 13.34.180(5), the State in a parental rights termination proceeding must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence present parental unfitness, i.e., parental deficiencies at the time of the termination hearing that the parent is unlikely to cure in the near future.
 Juveniles — Parental Relationship — Termination — Best Interests of Child — Degree of Proof. For purposes of RCW 13.34.190(4), which establishes "the best interests of the child" as one basis for terminating a parent's rights to a child, the State must prove that termination would be in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence.
Nature of Action: The State sought the termination of a father's parental relationship with his three children.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 215091T, Meagan Foley, J. Pro Tem., entered a termination order on May 4, 1992. Court of Appeals: Holding that a guardian ad litem's report was properly considered, that the father had waived his right to receive remedial services from the State, and that there was adequate evidence supporting the termination order except as to one of the children who was living with his paternal grandmother pursuant to a court appointed guardianship, the court affirms the order as to two of the children, reverses the order as to the third child, and remands the case for further proceedings.
E. Allen Walker and Walker Bradshaw, P.S., for appellant.
Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Kirsten H. Prud'homme, Assistant, for respondent.
Appellant, father of I, J, and S, appeals the termination of his parental relationship with his three children. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
In order to protect the anonymity of the dependent children involved in this case, we do not use either the names of the children or the names of their parents.
Appellant and RB are the father and mother of the three children who are the subject of this action: I, born June 28, 1985; J, born March 26, 1987; and S, born May 12, 1988. However, Appellant did not obtain and file an Adjudication of Paternity until less than 2 weeks before the hearing that resulted in the order at issue here. Further, RB and Appellant were never married; the children's birth certificates do not identify a father; RB was married to another man until sometime in 1987; and the State was aware of at least one additional putative father.
During 1987 and 1988, the State placed the children in protective custody several times, first because RB was in jail and later because of reports of abuse, drug use, and neglect. On December 20, 1988, RB consented to the entry of dependency orders for the three children. The dependency petition for I names Appellant as a potential father; the petitions for J and S declare the father to be unknown. Although the State did not make Appellant a party to the dependency proceedings or provide him formal notice of the dependency review hearings, several dependency review orders stated that Appellant should establish paternity so that he might receive services and be considered "a resource" for the children.
these were just statements and we still needed to have a legal order of paternity and that a lawyer would need to be contacted in order to do that, that was not something I can do for him.
State social workers had received reports that Appellant in the past had physically abused RB and that he had a drug and alcohol problem. In addition, Appellant had been convicted of fourth degree assault; claimed to have been the children's caretaker at a time when the State discovered them living in unhealthy and filthy conditions; and had an unstable work history. Thus, according to the testimony of the social workers, they were prepared to recommend anger management classes, parenting classes, and drug and alcohol services at such time as Appellant established paternity.
In July 1991, the State filed petitions seeking to terminate the parent-child relationship between the three children and RB; "John Doe, natural father"; and "[Appellant], putative father". In the petitions, the State declared that adoption was in each child's best interest and that continuing the parent-child relationship would diminish the chances of integrating each child into a stable and permanent home. The State also alleged that it had offered all reasonably available services necessary to correct parental deficiencies.
The State gave Appellant notice of the termination proceeding, and he attended the initial hearing in August 1991. At that hearing, the juvenile court apparently ordered him to establish paternity by October 30, 1991. When Appellant failed to comply, the juvenile court apparently ordered him to do so by November 27, and then continued the case several more times.
It was not until March 12, 1992, that Appellant obtained a judicial determination of paternity. The order was filed on March 20, 1992, and Appellant provided the State with a copy of the paternity order on March 26, 1992, the first day of the termination hearing.
Also on the first day of trial, RB voluntarily relinquished her parental relationship with S and J. The State apparently concurred with RB's earlier request that the court create a guardianship for I, with RB's mother as the appointed guardian. The State then advised the juvenile court that at that time it was seeking to terminate only Appellant's parental relationship, not RB's.
At the hearing, a social worker testified that the children continued to display anger and confusion because of their unstable situation, and that the children's behavior would deteriorate unless they were integrated into stable and permanent homes. Because of this, and because of Appellant's suspected substance and anger problems, the social worker believed termination to be in the children's best interests.
At the close of the evidence, Appellant moved the court to establish a guardianship for I as an alternative to termination, and to appoint the same maternal grandmother as I's guardian. The juvenile court denied the motion without reaching the merits. It advised Appellant that he should have petitioned or counterpetitioned for a guardianship when the State petitioned for termination.
Before closing argument, the juvenile court called for the guardian ad litem's report. Appellant objected "to any purported evidence being argued at this time". The juvenile court noted the objection, but told Appellant that it had appointed the guardian and wanted to hear his report. The guardian reported that he had no contact with Appellant until the State filed the termination petition, that S and J did not know Appellant, and that the children needed permanence which could only be achieved by termination. The juvenile court granted the State's petition and terminated Appellant's parental relationship with all three children.
The juvenile court found that: (1) the State had offered Appellant all reasonably available services, but that services were available to Appellant only if he established paternity; (2) there was little likelihood that Appellant would remedy the deficiencies; (3) Appellant had "absolutely no relationship with" S and had only a "quite superficial and quite marginal" relationship with I and J; (4) continuing the parent-child relationship would clearly diminish prospects for integration of the children into stable and permanent homes; and (5) termination was in the best interests of each child.
On appeal, Appellant challenges the admission of the guardian ad litem report and contends generally that the evidence was insufficient to support termination.
Appellant claims that the juvenile court erred in allowing the guardian ad litem to give his oral report while not under oath, and after the close of evidence. He claims that the report contained inadmissible evidence and that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine its author. However, at trial, Appellant's counsel simply objected to "any purported evidence being argued at this time". Appellant did not seek to cross-examine the guardian or complain that the guardian was not under oath.
 The law provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and for a report from the guardian to the court. Former RCW 13.34.100; see RCW 13.34.105. Clearly, it also permits the juvenile court to consider the guardian's report. There is no requirement that the guardian make his report under oath. However, if Appellant had desired to call the guardian as a witness, he could have done so. Then it would have been appropriate for the court to administer the oath. The trial court did not err in considering the report of the guardian ad litem.
In a termination case, statute requires the State to prove the allegations listed at RCW 13.34.180(1)-(6) by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence". RCW 13.34.190(1). The juvenile court found that the State had met its burden of proof. However, Appellant claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support the court's findings regarding statutory allegations (4) through (6).
(6) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home . . .
Former RCW 13.34.180 (Laws of 1990, ch. 246, § 7, p. 1341). Appellant also challenges the juvenile court's finding, required by RCW 13.34.190(4), that termination was in the best interests of the children.
In 1993, the Legislature amended subsection (5) to provide guiding examples. Laws of 1993, ch. 412, § 2, p. 1638.
[2, 3] We must affirm the juvenile court if substantial evidence supports its findings, that is, if the State met its burden of production. In re Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973); In re Dependency of C.B., 61 Wn. App. 280, 283 n. 2, 286, 810 P.2d 518 (1991). The State satisfies this burden by producing sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the necessary facts to the required level of certainty. See C.B., 61 Wn. App. at 285-86.
[8.] The natural father has failed to effectively avail himself of the services ordered pursuant to the aforesaid dependency orders. During the entire time period relevant to these proceedings, the aforementioned services were available if the natural father had chosen to avail himself of such services. [Appellant] failed to establish legal paternity in a timely manner despite being advised by social workers on numerous occasions of the need to do so.
[9.] All services reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future, have been offered and were at all times available to [Appellant] if he had chosen to pursue them. [Appellant] simply declined to avail himself of services.
The State must offer certain services to the parents of dependent children in an attempt to remedy the conditions that led to the dependency. RCW 13.34.130(3)(b), (5)(b). It must also encourage maximum parent-child contact through visitation and participation in care. RCW 13.34.130(3)(b)(ii), (5)(b)(vi).
A person is a "parent", as RCW 13.34 uses that term, if he or she is "the biological or adoptive" parent, "unless the legal rights of that person have been terminated by judicial proceedings". RCW 13.04.011(4). Here, Appellant is the biological parent of I, J, and S.
However, Appellant's relationship to the children during the dependency period was unclear. He was not named as the father on their birth certificates and had not obtained a court determination of paternity. Thus the State, uncertain of Appellant's paternal relationship to I, J, and S, appropriately conditioned its offer of remedial services on Appellant legally establishing his paternity. Nonetheless, to prevail on its termination petition, the State was required to meet its statutory burden of proof pursuant to RCW 13.34.180(4).
We recognize that the State's limited financial and human resources may best be spent serving those whose relationship to the dependent child is not in doubt. A mere putative parent might initially claim parental rights but later decline to accept legal responsibility as a parent. This suggests a need for caution before developing a bond between the child and one who is not a legal parent, and who might change his mind about accepting parental obligations.
To comply with that statute, the State was required to show either that: (1) it offered Appellant the required remedial services and Appellant failed to avail himself of those services; or (2) Appellant, by words, conduct or both, waived his right to such services. The State contends that Appellant waived his right to such services, and we agree.
[4, 5] "Waiver . . . requires intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." State v. Edwards, 93 Wn.2d 162, 168, 606 P.2d 1224 (1980). Waiver is a voluntary act, PUD 1 v. WPPSS, 104 Wn.2d 353, 365, 705 P.2d 1195, 713 P.2d 1109 (1985), but conduct supporting an inference of relinquishment by choice can imply waiver. PUD 1, 104 Wn.2d at 365.
Proof of implied waiver requires proof of "unequivocal acts or conduct evincing an intent to waive"; the claimed act of waiver must be inconsistent with any other intent as intent will not be inferred from "doubtful or ambiguous factors". Wagner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 102, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980). Further, the person against whom waiver is asserted must have understood that the consequences of his or her actions would be relinquishment of the right. See McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 308, 738 P.2d 254 (1987).
 Thus, to establish waiver here, the State needed to demonstrate that: (1) Appellant knew that he had a statutory right to receive remedial services; (2) Appellant acted in such a way as to evince, in an unequivocal way, his intention to give up this right; (3) Appellant had the means and opportunity to exercise his rights; and (4) Appellant understood that the consequences of his actions would be that the State would not provide services to him.
Appellant knew that I, J, and S were dependents of the State from the beginning of the dependency, in December 1988. Even before that, state social workers had advised his mother and RB that placement with Appellant or his family depended on Appellant establishing legal paternity.
On June 12, 1989, state social worker Joanne Ashcraft explained to Appellant that he needed to obtain an adjudication of paternity and that he could not be involved in the dependency until he did so. She told Appellant what a putative father was and told him how to go about establishing paternity by contacting the prosecutor's office, by contacting the support enforcement office, or by contacting a private attorney. Appellant was present when Ashcraft reviewed with RB a recommendation for the next day's review hearing; at that hearing, the court ordered Appellant to establish paternity so that a service plan could be designed for him.
In August 1989, Appellant called Ashcraft saying that he wanted to establish paternity and gain custody; Ashcraft again explained how to do so. Ashcraft provided an acknowledgment of paternity form, and Appellant signed it on November 3, 1989. Ashcraft then explained that Appellant still needed an order of paternity obtained with the assistance of a lawyer. At trial, Appellant admitted that social workers told him to work through the prosecutor's office to obtain blood tests and to establish paternity after he signed the acknowledgment.
In June of 1990, Appellant contacted Ken Panitz, the social worker then assigned to the case. Panitz reminded him that he needed to establish paternity; Appellant told Panitz he was working on obtaining a paternity order.
In June 1991, the then current social worker, Judith Keyser, again told Appellant that the State would treat him as a parent and provide services to him only if he established legal paternity.
This evidence is sufficient to establish Appellant's knowledge of his right to receive those services statutorily mandated to correct parental deficiencies. It further is sufficient to show that Appellant knew that the State conditioned the provision of services on his establishment of legal paternity.
2. Acts Evincing Intention To Give up Right.
Despite the State's repeated encouragement over a prolonged period of time, Appellant failed to take the necessary steps to establish his paternity during the dependency period. Although he offered assurances that he was "working on it", his actions were inconsistent with his words. The record reflects that the first step he took to establish paternity was to make an appointment for sometime in September 1990 with the Pierce County Prosecutor's office. However, as Appellant acknowledged at trial, he failed to keep this appointment. He did not actually make and keep a second appointment with the prosecutor until after the State filed the termination petition in the summer of 1991. Not until the eve of the termination hearing, when it was too late to avail himself of remedial services, did Appellant act on the State's advice.
The trial court did not err in inferring from Appellant's pattern of inactivity over an extended period of time that "[Appellant] declined to avail himself of services." Assuming that Appellant had the means to act and understood the consequences of failing to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that this inactivity evinced an intent to waive his right to receive remedial services.
3. Means and Opportunity To Exercise Rights.
Viewed in isolation, we might see Appellant's pattern of inactivity as equivocal and ambiguous evidence of his intention to abandon his right to receive state services. In other words, the inactivity is susceptible of other interpretations unless Appellant had the knowledge and means to establish his legal parental status. Here, the evidence is clear that the State provided Appellant the information and the means to proceed.
As early as June 1989, social worker Ashcraft explained to Appellant that the support enforcement office or the prosecutor's office would aid him in establishing paternity. She again explained this to him in August 1989 and in November 1989. Appellant's understanding of the necessary step is shown by the fact that he went so far as to make an appointment with the prosecutor's office for September 1990. This was a year and a half before the termination hearing. Still again, in June 1991, social worker Keyser explained to Appellant how to proceed. Appellant told Keyser he was working on establishing paternity.
This evidence is inconsistent with Appellant's belated trial protestations that he misunderstood that he needed to do more than sign an affidavit of paternity. The evidence is sufficient to show that Appellant knew the process to obtain a paternity order and knew that the local prosecutor's office would handle this for him. Given this knowledge, his failure over several years to actually obtain the necessary order of paternity is unequivocal and inconsistent with any intent other than the abandonment of his statutory right to be treated as a parent and to receive parental services.
4. Knowledge of Consequences of Inaction.
Clear, cogent and convincing evidence also supports the inference that Appellant knew the consequences of failing to establish his parental status. Social workers repeatedly advised Appellant that the State had no statutory duty to provide services to him until he established his legal paternity. Appellant does not dispute this. The evidence is sufficient to show that Appellant intentionally abandoned his known right to receive those services mandated by statute. RCW 13.34.180-.190. Thus, he may not now predicate error on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact 8 and 9 regarding such services. See McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 308.
There is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the [children] can be returned to the natural father in the near future. Based on his four year history, the court sees no assurance that [Appellant] will follow through with court ordered services in the near future.
 Proof of statutory factor (5) requires a showing that, at the time of the termination hearing, there were parental deficiencies that Appellant was unlikely to cure in the near future; that is, proof of then present parental unfitness. Krause v. Catholic Comm'ty Servs., 47 Wn. App. 734, 742-43, 737 P.2d 280, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1035 (1987); accord In re H.J.P., 114 Wn.2d 522, 530, 789 P.2d 96 (1990). The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to infer the continuation of Appellant's parental deficiencies.
First, there was evidence that Appellant did not recognize or was not capable of meeting the needs of the children. At one point, the State removed the children from their home because they were living in squalor, and were abused and neglected. Appellant admitted that he was the primary caretaker at that time, but he viewed the environment as clean, stable, and adequate. Second, RB testified that she had witnessed Appellant using illegal drugs as recently as 2 months before the termination hearing, although Appellant claimed to have discontinued using drugs a year before the hearing. Third, RB testified that Appellant continued to abuse alcohol at the time of the termination hearing, although Appellant denied having a drug or alcohol problem.
The trial court could also infer from Appellant's testimony that Appellant considered the children to be almost entirely RB's responsibility. He blamed RB for the loss of the children and refused to accept his own parental duties. His lack of responsibility was shown by his testimony that he did not establish paternity or seek involvement in the dependency until the State began termination proceedings because he expected RB to overcome her own difficulties and regain the children.
In addition, Appellant made little effort to have any contact with the children during the dependency. He did not know the birthdays of S or J, and in fact barely knew those two children, and they hardly knew him. The trial court did not err in finding "little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the [children] can be returned to the natural father in the near future".
In finding of fact 13, the juvenile court found that "[c]ontinuance of the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospect for integration into a stable and permanent home." The evidence is sufficient to support this finding insofar as it related to J and S. However, the evidence is insufficient on this point to prove factor (6), RCW 13.34.180, with regard to I.
The juvenile court learned of the desperate need of all three children for permanence, without further delay. It found that the continuation of the children's indefinite status would frustrate state efforts to find permanent placements for them. However, in I's case, Appellant's parental rights are not interfering with I's integration into a permanent home. I is living with his paternal grandmother pursuant to the court-established guardianship. The termination of Appellant's paternal relationship with him will not cause this arrangement to change. Termination will merely deprive I of the benefits of a parent — the potential for nurturing support and the financial support that the law would otherwise obligate Appellant to provide. Because the State failed to prove RCW 13.34.180(6) by clear, cogent and convincing evidence with regard to I, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in ordering termination of Appellant's parental relationship to I.
 Finally, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that orders of termination were in the best interests of S and J. RCW 13.34.190(4); see In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 815 P.2d 277 (1991) (a preponderance of the evidence ordinarily sufficient to prove that termination is in best interests of child).
We affirm the order terminating Appellant's parental relationship with J and S. We reverse the order terminating Appellant's parental relationship with I and remand the matter to the juvenile court for such other proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.
Reconsideration denied December 9, 1994.

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I hope all of you have a happy, peaceful Christmas.
JACKSON – Gov. Phil Bryant announced today he has appointed Mississippi Court of Appeals Judge Kenny Griffis to the Mississippi Supreme Court. He replaces Chief Justice William L. (Bill) Waller, Jr., of District 1, Position 1, who is retiring Jan. 31, 2019. Griffis’ appointment is effective Feb. 1, 2019.
Mississippi Supreme Court District 1 is comprised of Bolivar, Claiborne, Copiah, Hinds, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Kemper, Lauderdale, Leake, Madison, Neshoba, Newton, Noxubee, Rankin, Scott, Sharkey, Sunflower, Warren, Washington, and Yazoo counties.
Griffis has served since 2003 on the Court of Appeals for District 3, Position 2. He recently was named Chief Judge of the Court after the retirement of Chief Judge L. Joseph Lee.
Prior to being elected to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, Griffis was in private law practice at the Griffis Law Firm, PLLC, in Ridgeland, Miss., from 2001-2003. Additionally, he was in private practice from 1995-2000 with Lingle, Griffis & Southern, PLLC, in Jackson, Miss.
Griffis has served as an adjunct professor of law for both the Mississippi College School of Law and the University of Mississippi School of Law. He has also been an adjunct professor and instructor at Belhaven University and Meridian Community College.
He is a member of The Mississippi Bar, the Magnolia Bar Association, the Madison County Bar Association, the Capital Area Bar Association, and the Rankin County Bar Association. Griffis is also a member of the Downtown Jackson Rotary Club and is a Paul Harris Fellow.
He currently serves as a member of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Committee on Continuing Judicial Education and has also served on the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, as Chair of the Bench Bar Committee of The Mississippi Bar, and the Committee on Electronic Filing and Case Management Systems.
He earned his Bachelor of Accountancy and Juris Doctorate from the University of Mississippi and was a Certified Public Accountant from 1984 through 2007.
Griffis and his wife, Mary Helen, are the parents of five boys. They live in Ridgeland, Miss., and attend Christ United Methodist Church.
You only get one shot at a R59 rehearing (aka incorrectly as “reconsideration” among many lawyers and even in many appellate court opinions).
That means that, once the chancellor has ruled on your R59 motion, you can’t file a R59 motion asking for rehearing on that motion.
In the case of Edwards v. Roberts, 771 So.2d 378 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), the COA held that there is one round of R59 motions, and only one round. You do not get to file for rehearing after the judge has ruled on the motion for rehearing. If that were not so, one could almost permanently toll the time for appeal by filing serial R59 motions after every ruling on previously-filed R59 motions, ad infinitum. There has to be finality of judgments.
¶ 20. Nothing in the civil rules authorizes a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion for a JNOV or for a new trial. Motions for JNOV are governed by Rule 50(b) while motions for new trials are controlled by Rule 59. Under these rules, each motion must be filed within ten days of the entry of the judgment. M.R.C.P. 50(b) & 59(b). That initial motion for a JNOV was timely filed eight days after the 1991 judgment. However, the sua sponte “motion” to reconsider the just-entered order occurred over one year after the 1991 judgment. We must decide whether once a motion under Rule 50 is filed by a litigant, then denied by the court, any window of opportunity opens for the trial judge to act on his own initiative to reconsider the denial.
¶ 21. We start with the settled law that after a motion for new trial has been denied, no right exists to file for reconsideration. We find that reasoning equally applicable to motions for JNOV. “When the procedure authorizing a motion for a new trial has been followed and, pursuant to proper notice, the parties have made their representations to the court, and the court has duly considered and made his decision upon that motion, that completes both the duty and the prerogative of the court.” Griffin v. State, 565 So.2d 545, 550 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added). In Griffin, the lower court sustained two criminal defendants’ motion for new trial as to two of the counts, and overruled as to one count. Id. at 545. The defendants fled and were captured several years later. Id. At that time the State moved to set aside the order granting a new trial. Id. The judge sustained the State’s motions because he believed that he had made an error at law in granting a new trial. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the judge had no authority to revoke his earlier order for a new trial. Id.
[I]f the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again reverse himself? … This reflection brings one to realize what an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a state of uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the matter should be.
Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549–50 (citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663–64 (1966)).
¶ 23. Though Griffin is a criminal case, the Supreme Court’s principal authorities for holding it improper to move for reconsideration of a motion for new trial were civil cases under versions of Rule 59. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that ruling on one motion for new trial exhausts the power of the court to entertain another such motion, certainly has an impact here. Until a judgment is final, a court has the authority to amend it. Griffin v. Tall Timbers Development, Inc., 681 So.2d 546, 552 (Miss.1996). Conversely, once it is final the authority is lost. The court’s initiating it own reconsideration removes the finality of the judgment after an earlier motion was denied. That creates the same difficulties that were discussed in Griffin v. State. Just as a second motion under Rule 59(a) cannot be brought by a party after an earlier Rule 59(a) motion has been denied, neither can the trial court itself entertain its own reconsideration under Rule 59(d) or Rule 50(b).
Term time as both a grant and limitation upon the district court’s power over its final judgments has been eliminated. [Fn omitted] In lieu thereof and in the interest of judgment finality a short time period, that is not subject to enlargement, has been substituted, within which a party may move for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. When the court has decided such a motion in a way that the finality of the judgment has been restored, then relief, if any, should come by appeal or by a motion under Rule 60(b), which does not affect the finality of the judgment or suspend its operation. It would be destructive of the general aim of the Rules to permit successive attacks upon final judgments on motions to reconsider orders that deny new trial, or that deny or grant an alteration or amendment of the judgment.
6A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 59.13, at 59–278 (2d ed.1993) (emphasis added).
¶ 25. The relevant motion here was not a Rule 50(b) motion for a JNOV, since that motion had already been denied and there cannot be a second such motion. Instead, this was at best a Rule 60 motion initiated by the judge himself soon after he entered the February 24 judgment. There is no counterpart in Rule 60(b) to what is set out in Rule 59(d), namely, that the trial court itself may initiate a motion. In one somewhat distinguishable case, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge could not on his own motion grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). State ex rel. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics v. One Chevrolet Nova Automobile, 573 So.2d 787, 789 (Miss.1990). However, that was a judge’s sua sponte setting aside of a Rule 55 default judgment five years after the default had been granted. Id. at 788–89. The court stated that no motion was made by any party to set aside the five year old default and the judge could not himself do so. Id. at 789.
¶ 26. What we find more in point is the general interpretation of federal Rule 60(b) that “the court has power to act in the interest of justice in an unusual case in which its attention has been directed to the necessity for relief by means other than a motion.” CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRAC. & PROC. 226 § 2865 (2d ed.1973). If within three days of the February 24 order the trial judge became aware of something that he thought was cognizable under Rule 60, then the absence of a motion might not by itself bar consideration. Griffin v. State in dicta recognizes the right to correct inadvertent error. Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549.
¶ 28. Under Rule 60(b), the trial court on perhaps his own motion may decide that the original motion was entered by mistake, fraud of a party, or for other reason justifying relief from judgment. M.R.C.P. 60(b). Had the trial court believed that one of the grounds for Rule 60(b) existed and explained which one it was, then we could evaluate the validity of the exercise of discretion on February 27. Instead, the trial judge has informed us that no proper Rule 60 grounds existed.
¶ 29. Before leaving the procedure that was followed, we consider the propriety of the original trial judge’s addressing in these proceedings what he had done several years earlier. In a collateral attack on a former judgment, voidness is decided solely from what appears on the face of the record. Bolls v. Sharkey, 226 So.2d 372, 376 (Miss.1969). However, in a Rule 60 claim brought before the same court and involving the same parties, evidence beyond the pleadings and order themselves can be utilized. The comment to Rule 60(a) states that evidence outside the record can be considered. M.R.C.P. 60(a) cmt. No such explicit statement appears as to Rule 60(b), but the nature of the claims that can be made would require extraneous evidence. Accident, mistake, or fraud could not be shown except in the most unusual circumstances strictly from the record. In one case evidence was introduced at a Rule 60 hearing that an automatic stay in bankruptcy had been entered before the state court judgment was entered. This made the state court order void. Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 307 (Miss.1990). In another Rule 60 proceeding, evidence was admitted that the named corporate plaintiff did not exist, as it had sued under an incorrect name—“Mississippi Sand & Gravel” instead of the correct “South Mississippi Sand & Gravel.” The Supreme Court declared the earlier order void and set it aside. Southern Trucking Service, Inc. v. Mississippi Sand and Gravel, Inc., 483 So.2d 321, 324 (Miss.1986). See generally, Fred L. Banks, Jr., “Trial and Post Trial Motions,” in 1 JEFFREY L. JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 13:15—13:21 (1999).
[t]he doctrine, that a judgment however erroneous of a court having jurisdiction may not be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds, after acquiring the jurisdiction, according to established rules governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the law which is applicable to it.
Jones’ Estate v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822, 831–832, 134 So.2d 723, 726–727 (1961).
¶ 31. Since, the present suit is not a collateral attack but a claim under Rule 60 for relief from the court that issued the order, the right to set aside the order is all the clearer.
¶ 32. In the present case the circuit court initially had jurisdiction, but after entering the denial of the motion for a JNOV, jurisdiction ended. A similar defect in a court’s ruling occurs when a judge improperly alters a criminal sentence after his jurisdiction to do so has ended. See generally, Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 937 (Miss.1997).
¶ 34. … The dissent implies that the action was under Rule 52(b). That is a Rule for amending findings, not reversing decisions. A decision that “no” should be “yes” was the difference between the February 24 and February 27 orders. Though a Rule 52(b) can be made in tandem with Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions, once those motions are denied Rule 52(b) is not a means to ask for or for a judge to initiate reconsideration. Regardless, to presume that the court was acting under this Rule after its authority had otherwise expired—and of course the trial judge has since stated that he was not—is as speculative as any other possible means to justify the second order. Under the dissent’s analysis, Rule 52(b) becomes the opening for reconsidering a denial of reconsideration that Griffin said was beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
A R59 motion in chancery court is the equivalent of a motion for JNOV in a circuit or county court jury trial. Everything above pertaining to JNOV applies equally to R59 in chancery.
Bryant was administrator of Cooley’s estate. She filed suit to remove cloud from title and to set aside a deed signed by Cooley, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, and fraud. She also claimed the deed was void due to the fact that Cooley’s wife had failed to execute it.
A chancellor dismissed Bryant’s suit, finding it barred by the the three-year general SOL (statute of limitations). The judge found that Bryant had not maintained a possessory interest in the property, and so the three-year statute applied. Bryant appealed.
A person may not make an entry or commence an action to recover land except within ten years next after the time at which the right to make the entry or to bring the action shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims, or, if the right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then except within ten years next after the time at which the right to make the entry or bring the action shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the same.
A person claiming land in equity may not bring suit to recover the same except within the period during which, by virtue of Section 15-1-7, he might have made an entry or brought an action to recover the same, if he had been entitled at law to such an estate, interest, or right in or to the same as he shall claim therein in equity.
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-9 (Rev. 2012). “A suit to remove a cloud on title is considered an action to recover land.” Lott v. Saulters, 133 So. 3d 794, 799 (¶8) (Miss. 2014).
litigation is an action to recover land.” Id. at 873 (¶¶12,13).
¶13. Here, Bryant, as administrator for Cooley’s estate and individually as a possible heir of Cooley, seeks possession of the real property deeded away by Cooley, allegedly due to undue influence. In a similar situation, the supreme court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied. See In re Estate of Reid, 825 So. 2d 1, 6 (¶¶16-19) (Miss. 2002). There, the decedent’s potential heir alleged undue influence in an attempt to set aside the decedent’s transfers of real property to her adopted son. Id.
¶14. Because the ten-year statute of limitations applies, Bryant’s suit is not barred. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The court affirmed the chancellor’s dismissal of Bryant’s fraud claim, agreeing with the chancellor that that the pleading did not meet the requirements of MRCP 9(b).
The court also noted that, due to the remand, Bryant could pursue the claim of failure to join Cooley’s wife on in the transaction on remand if she chose to do so.
In a property dispute between the Ryans and the Rays, the chancellor interpreted ambiguous language in a deed to create an express, perpetual easement in favor of the Rays. She went on and found alternatively that the Rays had proven the elements of a prescriptive easement. The Ryans appealed, contending that the chancellor erred in both findings.
In Ryan v. Ray, decided August 21, 2018, the COA affirmed the judge’s ruling that the language of the deed created an express grant of an easement. The court reversed and rendered on the issue of the prescriptive easement.
Remember that a prescriptive easement is in essence an easement by adverse possession. In Threlkeld v. Sisk, 992. So. 2d 1232, 1237 (Miss. App. 2008), the court said that, “One claiming an easement by prescription must show that the use of the property was (1) open, notorious, and visible, (2) hostile, (3) under claim of ownership, (4) exclusive, (5) peaceful, and (6) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years. Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So.2d 468, 475(¶ 18) (Miss.2005) (citing Sharp v. White, 749 So.2d 41, 42(¶ 7) (Miss.1999)).” And, as in adverse possession, the claimant must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. West v. Brewer, 579 So.2d 1261, 1262 (Miss.1991)).
¶17. Although the chancellor found that there was an express, perpetual easement over the Ryan property for ingress and egress to the Ray property, the chancellor made an alternative finding that in the absence of a perpetual easement, there was clear and convincing evidence to support an easement by prescription using the doctrine of tacking. The Ryans argue on appeal that the Rays failed to satisfy the elements necessary for a prescriptive easement. We agree.
¶18. In this case, there was an express easement granted, which the chancellor found was one for perpetual ingress and egress to the property at issue. We affirm that decision as it was supported by substantial credible evidence. Therefore, an alternative theory for establishing an easement is unnecessary. But moreover, the alternative ground is legally contradictory. An express easement and a prescriptive easement cannot co-exist. “The rule is well settled that use by express or implied permission or license, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into an easement by prescription.” King v. Gale, 166 So. 3d 589, 594 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, the chancellor’s finding of a prescriptive easement was legally erroneous, and we do not affirm on these grounds. The error does not require reversal however, as the chancellor’s disposition is affirmed on other proper grounds as set forth in this opinion.
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Theoretically 26 April was the last day when the Russian president V. Putin addressed the Federal Assembly. This article analyses several issues of this address by focusing on the general idea of „the Russian road“.
The idea of four national projects (medicine, education, agriculture and housing) is investment to people. But the most important thing is opportunities of implementation of these projects: it is not enough only to allocate money; the money has to be used effectively, however, one of the key Russian problems – corruption – prevents from reaching this goal.
When speaking about the Stabilization Fund, the president indicated that it was necessary to correct functions and structure of the Fund and that it was time to start using the money for strengthening of the Russian economy. Therefore he suggested dividing the Fund into three parts: stabilization, social and innovative, and to use the latter for projects dealing with modernization of economy.
One of the most interesting ideas about the economy was the idea of establishing a nuclear energy corporation. Some time ago a corporate aviation company has been established, afterwards – a huge shipbuilding corporation, now – a huge nuclear energy company, which should realize „the second large scale electrification of the country“ (during the period of 12 years it is envisaged to build 26 nuclear units).
A question arises: what is the extent of justification of the strategy for establishment of huge industrial holdings controlled by the state? It is assumed that in the case of Russia it is justified. Particularity of this country (geography, climate conditions etc.) dictates the necessity of stronger role of the state regarding economy. However, according to V. Putin, the state should play the role of a catalyst (guarantees to investors and the initial capital for development), and later companies should attract profit themselves.
There’s worth while highlighting several aspects related to foreign policy in V. Putin’s speech. The first is related to confrontation with the West. „There has been an increasing influx of money from abroad being used to intervene directly in our internal affairs.[...]. The aim is the same – to ensure unilateral gains and one’s own advantage, and to pursue one’s own interests“. There was no mentioning of cooperation with the United States. However, V. Putin did mention positive relations between Russia and the EU, although recently these relations are not as good as could be expected. This could mean that in the West the Russian enemies are the Americans, and not the Europeans. The statements on withdrawal of Russia from the Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty are from a series of elements regarding the struggle against dislocation of the US PRGS elements in Europe. They sound like a political blackmail and demonstration of the „Russian power“ to foreign and internal audience.
The second moment is the focus on the CIS space. V. Putin has also supported the candidacy of Kazakhstan for the presidency of OSCE and further steps towards the union with Belarus. It looks like the strategy of „joining“ the CIS space under the wing of Russia has got the shape. Its essence is mutual economic benefit.
One more specific moment is V. Putin‘s position on more active work with the Russian nationals abroad. The Russian language plays here a specific humanitarian role as a resource of the Russian soft power in the post-soviet space. The president approved the idea of establishment of the National Russian Language Foundation which should popularize the Russian language in the world and especially in the near abroad.
In the report the Russian president expressed his belief that „society can set and achieve ambitious national goals only if it has a common system of moral guidelines. We will be able to achieve our goals only if we maintain respect for our native language, for our unique cultural values, for the memory of our forebears and for each page of our country’s history. The essence of this long quotation is that in the future Russia must again become the great imperial messianistic Russia. And efforts should be made so as to make every Russian be proud of the Great Russia.
Let‘s assume that V. Putin really wants to create such Russia. Then the key issue is continuity of power. In this respect V. Putin‘s speech is specifically directed towards the future. He said quite a lot about the ongoing and future long-term projects. When speaking about the coming elections to Duma, he noted that this would be the test of continuity of the policy of authorities.
Thus, it seems that V. Putin is going to remain in the power. Not necessarily personally, but first of all in the shape of his and his team‘s initiated policy, the key goal of which is to reinstate the glory of Russia. That is why he said that it was premature for him to write a will and avoided the philosophical generalization of the period of his presidency. And it is not so important what role will be played by V. Putin himself (chairman of public council or chairman of the power party; but certainly not the head of one of joint companies, since this would mean subordination, and he should not be in power but at the same time be above it).
„The next State of the Nation address will be given by another head of the State“, - said V. Putin. However, this does not mean that his era is coming to an end. In his speech V. Putin let understand that his withdrawal is only the beginning of his and his team‘s power, and that there is no power in the world which could prevent him from realizing the sacred mission to rescue Russia.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


NY Bagel Café, Joe Smith and Dennis Mason aka Keith Samuels, aka Brian Scofield have been found guilty of violating Virginia franchise laws and deceiving three Virginia consumers. They’ve been ordered to repay the franchise fees to three victims, plus fines and court costs in excess of $700,000.
(UnhappyFranchisee.Com) UnhappyFranchisee.com would like to thank the Honorable Michael D. Thomas, Hearing Examiner, and Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Esquire, Counsel to the Commission for taking action against NY Bagel Café, Joe Smith and Dennis Mason on behalf of three Virginia residents.
Most of all, we’d like to thank and commend Mr. Barry Braun, who was the primary investigator on the case.
We filed with the Commonwealth of Virginia a complaint alleging that Joe Smith and Dennis Mason were promoting and selling unregistered franchises to Virginia residents and providing them with bogus documents and fraudulent misepresentations.
Investigator Barry Braun was assigned to the case, and we provided him with some victim contact information and much information about the fraudulent sales scheme of Dennis Mason and Joe Smith.
The investigator, the Hearing Examiner and commission counsel all verified that the information and allegations made by UnhappyFranchisee.Com was (and is) accurate.
The Commission has fined New York Bagel Enterprises $225,000, Joseph Smith $225,000, and Dennis Mason $225,000.
They have ordered them to repay the commission $28,899.33 for the cost of the investigation.
And they have ordered them to repay the victims more than $61,000 paid in franchise fees.
However, the judge offered an incentive: If the victims are repaid within 90 days of the order, the judge will waive $675,000 in fines.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ex rel.
On September 30, 2016, the State Corporation Commission (“Commission”) entered a Rule to Show Cause (“Rule”) at the request of the Division of Securities and Retail Franchising (“Division”) alleging that New York Bagel Enterprises, Inc. (“New York Bagel”), Joseph V. Smith (“Smith”), and Dennis Kenneth Mason a/k/a Keith Samuels (“Mason”) (collectively, “Defendants”) violated certain provisions of the Virginia Retail Franchising Act, § 13.1-557 et seq. of the Code of Virginia (“Act”). Specifically, the Rule alleged the Defendants on three occasions violated: (i) § 13.1-560 of the Act by offering and/or selling unregistered franchises in the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”); (ii) § 13.1-563 (2) of the Act by making false statements or material omissions to franchisees in connection with the offer or sale of a franchise; and (iii) § 13.1-563 (4) of the Act by failing to provide franchisees a disclosure document that had been cleared by the Division. The Division requested restitution, civil penalties, and costs of investigation, and an injunction banning the Defendants from further violations of the Act and from future franchise sales in Virginia.
The Rule, among other things, assigned the matter to a Hearing Examiner and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for January 11, 2017. Additionally, the Rule ordered the Defendants to file a responsive pleading with the Clerk of the Commission on or before November 4, 2016, in which the Defendants were required to expressly admit or deny the allegations in the Rule and present any affirmative defenses that the Defendants intended to assert. The Rule also advised the Defendants they could be found in default if they failed to either timely file a responsive pleading or other appropriate pleading, or if the Defendants filed such pleading and failed to appear at the hearing.
Following service of the Rule upon them, the Defendants filed no answer or other responsive pleading to the Rule, or otherwise communicated with the Division.
The hearing on the Rule was convened on January 11, 2017. The Division appeared by its counsel, Donnie L. Kidd, Esquire. The Defendants failed to appear. The Division moved for a default judgment, which was taken under advisement. Pursuant to the Rule and after accepting evidence regarding service, the Hearing Examiner accepted into the record the affidavit of the Division’s investigator, Barry Braun, and the attachments supporting his affidavit.
On January 26, 2017, the Hearing Examiner issued his report (“Report”) which thoroughly summarized the factual and procedural history of this case, as well as the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing. In his Report, among other things, the Hearing Examiner found that the Division established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Defendants violated: (i) § 13.1-560 of the Act on three occasions by selling New York Bagel franchises to three Virginia residents after the Division denied New York Bagel’s franchise registration application in August 2012; (ii) § 13.1-563 (2) of the Act on three occasions by making untrue statements of material fact or omitting material facts from disclosure documents in the offer and sale of a franchise to three Virginia residents; and (iii) violated § 13.1-563 (4) of the Act on three occasions by offering and selling three franchises to Virginia residents without providing those persons with a disclosure document that had been registered with and cleared by the Division.
(ii) the Division’s motion for judgment by default should be granted.
The Report allowed the parties 21 days to provide comments. Neither the Defendants nor the Division filed comments.
NOW THE COMMISSION, upon consideration of the Rule, the record, the Hearing Examiner’s Report, and the applicable statutes, is of the opinion and finds that the Hearing Examiner’s overall findings and recommendations are reasonable and should be adopted, except that the Defendants shall first be afforded an opportunity to provide restitution to the three Virginia franchisees pursuant to § 13.1-570 of the Act before assessing a penalty against them.
(1) The Division’s motion for judgment by default is hereby GRANTED.
(c) Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) for three (3) violations of § 13.1-563 (4) of the Act.
(5) The Defendants are hereby DIRECTED, pursuant to § 13.1-570 of the Act, to rescind the franchises sold to the Virginia residents and to make restitution in the amounts paid by such Virginia franchisees. If the Defendants rescind the franchises, pay restitution to the Virginia franchisees, and submit to the Division proof of rescinding the franchises and paying restitution to the Virginia franchises within ninety (90) days of entry of this Order, the penalties assessed against the Defendants in Ordering Paragraphs (2) through (4) shall be waived.
(6) The Defendants are hereby DIRECTED, jointly and severally, pursuant to § 13.1-567of the Act, to pay the sum of Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-nine Dollars and Thirtythree Cents ($20,899.33) for the costs of the Division’s investigation.
(7) New York Bagel is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from registering or participating as a franchise in Virginia.
(8) The Defendants are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from any future violations of the Act.
AN ATTESTED COPY hereof shall be sent by the Clerk of the Commission, by CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED to: New York Bagel Enterprises, Inc., 301 Route 17 North, #800, Rutherford, New Jersey 07070; New York Bagel Enterprises, Inc., 115 East 8th Street, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074; Joseph V. Smith, 30 North Plank Road, Newburgh, New York 12550; and Dennis Kenneth Mason, 1285 County Road 519, Frenchtown, New Jersey 08825; and the Commission’s Office of General Counsel and Division of Securities and Retail Franchising.
NY BAGEL CAFÉ Franchise: How Many Have Closed?
Law enforcement and attorney generals can contact us for victims willing to share their stories and experiences. Check back for new posts being published on an ongoing basis.
I have signed the contract and paid $27,500 to Jose Smith and Denis Maason by one year ago, they said my contract has terminated on its own. franchisee fees non refundable. brigands? should I low sue them..?
THE PICTURE IS WRONG !!
BIG MISTAKE UNHAPPYFRANCHISEE THAT’S VERY UNPROFESSIONAL.
DELETE THE PICTURE MR.ADMIN RIGHT NOW !!


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"Therefore encourage one another and build one another up just as you are doing."
Let us pray. Gracious God, we pause at this hour to honor You. In the rush of the day, we pray that You will slow us down, O Lord, for we know that we live too fast. Turn our thoughts to matters of the heart, remembering to be kind to others and taking time to care about others -- not just the ones we love, but those who are less fortunate.
Help us to begin today the process of restoring our souls. Help us to restore our souls by praying daily for those who are hurting. Help us to restore our souls through a heartfelt compliment rather than a sarcastic remark. Help us to restore our souls by not trying to make ourselves feel big while trying to make someone else feel small. Help us to restore our souls by turning to You daily for forgiveness -- forgiveness for hurtful words spoken and deeds that are selfish.
Through Your grace may our love be genuine, may we hate what is evil and may we hold fast to what is good. We pray this in Your holy name. Amen.
At 2:05 P.M., Senator SETZLER made the point that a quorum was not present. It was ascertained that a quorum was not present.
On motion of Senator DAVIS, on behalf of Senator CROMER, the Privilege of the Chamber, to that area behind the rail, was extended to Mr. Carl Edwards, Jr. and his family to recognize his contribution in helping the Chicago Cubs win the 2016 World Series.
Senator RICE introduced Dr. Horace Walpole, Jr., of Piedmont, S.C., Doctor of the Day.
S. 357 (Word version) -- Senator Shealy: A SENATE RESOLUTION TO HONOR AND RECOGNIZE GIRL SCOUTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MOUNTAINS TO MIDLANDS AND GIRL SCOUTS OF EASTERN SOUTH CAROLINA AND TO CELEBRATE ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE GIRL SCOUT ORGANIZATION'S ICONIC COOKIE SALE, AS IT PROVIDES GIRLS WITH VALUABLE FINANCIAL LITERACY SKILLS.
S. 358 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 12-6-3632 SO AS TO ALLOW AN INCOME TAX CREDIT EQUAL TO TWENTY PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT.
S. 359 (Word version) -- Senator Cromer: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 39-5-325, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES FOR MOTOR FUEL RETAILERS, SO AS TO REMOVE REFERENCES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS.
S. 360 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLE 25, CHAPTER 6, TITLE 12 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCOME TAX ACT, BY ADDING SECTION 12-6-3710, TO ALLOW A TAX CREDIT FOR ANY TAXPAYER WHO EMPLOYS A FORMERLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL AS A FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE; TO SPECIFY THE TAXES FOR WHICH THE CREDIT MAY BE APPLIED; TO ALLOW THE CREDIT FOR TWENTY-FOUR CONSECUTIVE MONTHS FOR EACH FORMERLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL; TO SPECIFY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS; AND TO DEFINE NECESSARY TERMS.
S. 361 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 41 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, TO ENACT THE EARNED PAID SICK LEAVE ACT, TO PROVIDE THAT EMPLOYEES SHALL ACCRUE EARNED PAID AND EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE; TO PROVIDE FOR THE METHOD OF AND LIMITS OF ACCRUAL; TO PROVIDE FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH AN EMPLOYEE MAY USE EARNED PAID OR EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE; TO PROVIDE FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE REASONS FOR WHICH EARNED PAID OR EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE IS USED; TO PROVIDE THAT AN EMPLOYER CANNOT HINDER AN EMPLOYEE'S USE OF EARNED PAID OR EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE; TO PROVIDE THAT EMPLOYERS MAY NOT PENALIZE A PERSON FOR PROPERLY USING EARNED PAID OR EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE; TO PROVIDE THAT EMPLOYERS WHO ALREADY HAVE POLICIES THAT EXCEED THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER DO NOT HAVE TO CHANGE THOSE POLICIES; TO PROVIDE THAT EMPLOYEES MUST PROVIDE REASONABLE NOTICE TO EMPLOYERS BEFORE USING EARNED PAID OR EARNED UNPAID SICK LEAVE IF POSSIBLE; TO PROVIDE FOR NOTICE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER TO EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; AND TO DEFINE NECESSARY TERMS.
S. 362 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLE 25, CHAPTER 6, TITLE 12 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO TAX CREDITS, BY ADDING SECTION 12-6-3800, TO ALLOW A TAXPAYER WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR A FEDERAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT TO CLAIM A LOW-INCOME STATE TAX CREDIT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FEDERAL TAX CREDIT.
S. 363 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 12-24-10(A) OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO DEED RECORDING FEES, TO ALLOW AN INCREASE IN THE DEED RECORDING FEE BY TWENTY CENTS AND TO REQUIRE TEN CENTS OF THE INCREASE TO GO TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HOUSING FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND TEN CENTS TO LOCAL AND REGIONAL HOUSING TRUST FUNDS FOR USE TOWARD AFFORDABLE HOUSING.
S. 364 (Word version) -- Senator Kimpson: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 1, TITLE 4 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO COUNTIES, BY ADDING SECTION 4-1-160, TO ALLOW COUNTY GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE BUILDING FEES UP TO TEN PERCENT AND REQUIRE COUNTY GOVERNMENTS TO USE THE MONEY FROM THE INCREASE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAMS; AND TO AMEND SECTION 5-25-310, TO ALLOW MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE BUILDING PERMIT FEES UP TO TEN PERCENT AND TO REQUIRE THE MUNICIPALITY TO USE THE MONEY COLLECTED FROM THE INCREASE TOWARD AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAMS.
S. 365 (Word version) -- Senators Rankin, Hembree and Goldfinch: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 3, TITLE 56 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND LICENSING, BY ADDING ARTICLE 141, TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES SHALL ISSUE "COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY 2016 COLLEGE WORLD SERIES CHAMPIONS" SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES.
S. 367 (Word version) -- Senator Alexander: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 50-21-870(B)(6) OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PROVISIONS THAT REGULATE THE OPERATION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERCRAFT, TO INCREASE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN A WATERCRAFT AND ANOTHER OBJECT NEAR WHICH A WATERCRAFT MAY BE OPERATED IN EXCESS OF IDLE SPEED, AND TO PROVIDE THAT CERTAIN WATERCRAFT MAY NOT BE OPERATED UPON THE INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY IN EXCESS OF IDLE SPEED WITHIN FIFTY FEET OF CERTAIN OBJECTS.
S. 368 (Word version) -- Senator Alexander: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-3-8400 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO LIONS CLUB SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES, TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES MAY ISSUE LIONS CLUB SPECIAL MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE PLATES TO OWNERS OF PRIVATE PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLES AS DEFINED IN SECTION 56-3-630 REGISTERED IN THEIR NAMES.
S. 369 (Word version) -- Senator Hembree: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 13, TITLE 24, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO INMATES IN CORRECTION OR DETENTION FACILITIES, TO PROVIDE THAT IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON TO INDECENTLY EXPOSE HIS PERSON IN A CORRECTIONAL OR DETENTION FACILITY, TO PROVIDE PENALTIES, AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE SENTENCE IS TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO ANY OTHER SENTENCE THE PERSON IS SERVING.
Read the first time and referred to the Committee on Corrections and Penology.
S. 370 (Word version) -- Senators Talley, Rice and Timmons: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO AMEND SECTION 3, ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS STATE, RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, SECTION 8, ARTICLE V, RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, SECTION 13, ARTICLE V, RELATING TO JUDICIAL CIRCUITS AND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES, SECTION 18, ARTICLE V, RELATING TO VACANCIES IN THESE JUDICIAL OFFICES, AND SECTION 27, ARTICLE V, RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION, TO PROVIDE THAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR, SUBJECT TO THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION.
S. 371 (Word version) -- Medical Affairs Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION - BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTICIANRY, RELATING TO EXAMINATIONS; APPRENTICESHIP; AND CONTINUING EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 4723, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
S. 373 (Word version) -- Medical Affairs Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, RELATING TO SHELLFISH, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 4736, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
S. 375 (Word version) -- Medical Affairs Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, RELATING TO DRY CLEANING FACILITY RESTORATION, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 4705, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
S. 377 (Word version) -- Senator Shealy: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE PALMETTO GIRLS STATE TO USE THE CHAMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 2017.
S. 379 (Word version) -- Senators Scott, Alexander, Allen, Bennett, Campbell, Campsen, Climer, Corbin, Courson, Cromer, Davis, Fanning, Gambrell, Goldfinch, Gregory, Grooms, Hembree, Hutto, Jackson, Johnson, Kimpson, Leatherman, Malloy, Martin, Massey, J. Matthews, M. B. Matthews, McElveen, McLeod, Nicholson, Peeler, Rankin, Reese, Rice, Sabb, Senn, Setzler, Shealy, Sheheen, Talley, Timmons, Turner, Verdin, Williams and Young: A SENATE RESOLUTION TO HONOR AND RECOGNIZE REVEREND ELLA DELORES WHITE FOR HER YEARS OF OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP AND SERVICE TO THE MOUNT OLIVE BAPTIST CHURCH CONGREGATION AND THE COLUMBIA COMMUNITY.
H. 3218 (Word version) -- Reps. Lucas, Hiott, V. S. Moss, Pitts, West and Crosby: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 49-11-120, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO DEFINITIONS UNDER THE DAMS AND RESERVOIRS SAFETY ACT, SO AS TO REVISE CERTAIN DEFINITIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT FURTHER APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN DAMS; AND TO AMEND SECTION 49-11-150, RELATING TO DAM OR RESERVOIR OWNERS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE MAINTENANCE OF THEIR DAMS OR RESERVOIRS, NOTICE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL OF DAM OR RESERVOIR OWNERSHIP CHANGES, AND EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIED DAM OWNERS, SO AS TO REQUIRE ANNUAL REPORTING TO THE DEPARTMENT BY DAM OR RESERVOIR OWNERS OF CERTAIN OWNER CONTACT AND OTHER INFORMATION, TOGETHER WITH A COMPLETED OWNER CHECKLIST, AND TO REQUIRE THE OWNERS OF DAMS OR RESERVOIRS CLASSIFIED AS A HIGH OR SIGNIFICANT HAZARD ANNUALLY TO PROVIDE A CURRENT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN INCLUDING CONTACT INFORMATION OF SPECIFIED OFFICIALS, DOWNSTREAM RESIDENTS, AND BUSINESS OWNERS.
Read the first time and referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources.
H. 3289 (Word version) -- Reps. G. R. Smith and Knight: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-1930, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE DISTANCE THAT MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN VEHICLES TRAVELING ALONG A HIGHWAY, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE OPERATOR OF ANY NONLEADING VEHICLE TRAVELING IN A PROCESSION OF VEHICLES IF THE SPEED OF EACH VEHICLE IS AUTOMATICALLY COORDINATED.
H. 3296 (Word version) -- Reps. Willis, Hamilton and G. R. Smith: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING ARTICLE 140 TO CHAPTER 3, TITLE 56 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES MAY ISSUE VIRGINIA TECH SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES.
H. 3340 (Word version) -- Reps. Ott, Cobb-Hunter and Anderson: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 49-11-235 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE OWNER OF A DAM WHICH FAILS OR FAILED ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 2015, WHICH HAS A PUBLIC ROAD OR HIGHWAY IN THE STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM RUNNING ACROSS THE TOP OF IT, MUST PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL INDICATING WHETHER OR NOT THE OWNER INTENDS TO REPAIR THE DAM AND THE DATE BY WHICH THE REPAIRS ARE ANTICIPATED TO BE COMPLETED, TO PROVIDE THE TIMELINES IN WHICH THIS NOTIFICATION MUST BE PROVIDED, AND TO AUTHORIZE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TO PROCEED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND IN A SPECIFIED MANNER WITH THE PROCESS OF REPAIRING THE PUBLIC ROAD OR HIGHWAY, IF THE DAM OWNER INDICATES THE OWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO REPAIR THE DAM.
H. 3359 (Word version) -- Reps. Simrill, Pope, Norman, Felder, King, Delleney, D. C. Moss, B. Newton and Norrell: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME THE PORTION OF DAVE LYLE BOULEVARD FROM ITS INTERSECTION WITH INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 77 TO ITS INTERSECTION WITH UNITED STATES HIGHWAY 21 IN ROCK HILL "DEPUTY JAMES BRENT MCCANTS MEMORIAL BOULEVARD" AND ERECT APPROPRIATE MARKERS OR SIGNS CONTAINING THIS DESIGNATION.
H. 3442 (Word version) -- Reps. Delleney, Felder, Pope, Martin, Norrell, B. Newton, Simrill, Norman, Thayer, Putnam, Clary, Hamilton, Yow, W. Newton, Kirby, Erickson, Knight, Hixon, Elliott, Henderson, Bedingfield, V. S. Moss, Wheeler, Ballentine, King, Henegan and West: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 63-9-60, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY ADOPT A CHILD, SO AS TO ADD CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A NONRESIDENT MAY ADOPT AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHT TO FILE A PETITION FOR ADOPTION; AND TO AMEND SECTION 63-9-750, RELATING TO ADOPTION HEARINGS, SO AS TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
H. 3531 (Word version) -- Reps. Crawford, Clemmons, Fry, Duckworth, Hixon, Hardee, V. S. Moss, Forrest and Martin: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 2 TO TITLE 47 SO AS TO DEFINE CERTAIN TERMS, TO PROHIBIT CERTAIN PERSONS FROM OWNING, POSSESSING, IMPORTING, PURCHASING, OR SELLING A LARGE WILD CAT, NON-NATIVE BEAR, OR GREAT APE, TO AUTHORIZE CONFISCATION OF THESE ANIMALS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO PROVIDE THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES MAY ADOPT ORDINANCES THAT REGULATE THE POSSESSION OF THESE ANIMALS, TO REGULATE THE TREATMENT OF THESE ANIMALS, AND TO PROVIDE A PENALTY; AND TO AMEND SECTION 47-5-50, RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE SALE OF WILD CARNIVORES AS PETS AND THE SALE OF DOMESTICATED FERRETS, SO AS TO DELETE THE PROVISION THAT ALLOWS THE PUBLIC DISPLAY, SHOWING, OR EXHIBITION OF CERTAIN WILD CARNIVORES, PRIMATES, OR OTHER ANIMALS.
H. 3544 (Word version) -- Rep. Hayes: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME THE PORTION OF OLD RIVER ROAD IN THE TOWN OF FORK FROM ITS INTERSECTION WITH FIRST LOOP ROAD TO ITS INTERSECTION WITH SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY 41 "THOMAS NEAL ROGERS HIGHWAY" AND ERECT APPROPRIATE SIGNS OR MARKERS CONTAINING THIS DESIGNATION.
H. 3657 (Word version) -- Reps. Stavrinakis, Alexander, Allison, Anderson, Anthony, Arrington, Atkinson, Atwater, Bales, Ballentine, Bamberg, Bannister, Bedingfield, Bennett, Bernstein, Blackwell, Bowers, Bradley, Brown, Burns, Caskey, Chumley, Clary, Clemmons, Clyburn, Cobb-Hunter, Cogswell, Cole, Collins, Crawford, Crosby, Daning, Davis, Delleney, Dillard, Douglas, Duckworth, Elliott, Erickson, Felder, Finlay, Forrest, Forrester, Fry, Funderburk, Gagnon, Gilliard, Govan, Hamilton, Hardee, Hart, Hayes, Henderson, Henegan, Herbkersman, Hewitt, Hill, Hiott, Hixon, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Johnson, Jordan, King, Kirby, Knight, Loftis, Long, Lowe, Lucas, Mack, Magnuson, Martin, McCoy, McCravy, McEachern, McKnight, Mitchell, D. C. Moss, V. S. Moss, Murphy, Neal, B. Newton, W. Newton, Norman, Norrell, Ott, Parks, Pitts, Pope, Putnam, Quinn, Ridgeway, M. Rivers, S. Rivers, Robinson-Simpson, Rutherford, Ryhal, Sandifer, Simrill, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, Sottile, Spires, Stringer, Tallon, Taylor, Thayer, Thigpen, Toole, Weeks, West, Wheeler, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Williams, Willis and Yow: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME RACE STREET IN THE CITY OF CHARLESTON "FATHER NICHOLAS C. TRIVELAS MEMORIAL BOULEVARD" AND ERECT APPROPRIATE MARKERS OR SIGNS ALONG THIS STREET CONTAINING THIS DESIGNATION.
H. 3671 (Word version) -- Reps. Bernstein, Allison, Arrington, Bennett, Cobb-Hunter, Crawford, Davis, Dillard, Douglas, Erickson, Felder, Funderburk, Henderson, Henegan, Knight, Norrell, Parks, Robinson-Simpson, Thayer, Alexander, Anderson, Anthony, Atkinson, Atwater, Bales, Ballentine, Bamberg, Bannister, Bedingfield, Blackwell, Bowers, Bradley, Brown, Burns, Caskey, Chumley, Clary, Clemmons, Clyburn, Cogswell, Cole, Collins, Crosby, Daning, Delleney, Duckworth, Elliott, Finlay, Forrest, Forrester, Fry, Gagnon, Gilliard, Govan, Hamilton, Hardee, Hart, Hayes, Herbkersman, Hewitt, Hill, Hiott, Hixon, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Johnson, Jordan, King, Kirby, Loftis, Long, Lowe, Lucas, Mack, Magnuson, Martin, McCoy, McCravy, McEachern, McKnight, Mitchell, D. C. Moss, V. S. Moss, Murphy, Neal, B. Newton, W. Newton, Norman, Ott, Pitts, Pope, Putnam, Quinn, Ridgeway, M. Rivers, S. Rivers, Rutherford, Ryhal, Sandifer, Simrill, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, Sottile, Spires, Stavrinakis, Stringer, Tallon, Taylor, Thigpen, Toole, Weeks, West, Wheeler, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Williams, Willis and Yow: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO DECLARE FEBRUARY 26 THROUGH MARCH 4, 2017, AS "EATING DISORDERS AWARENESS WEEK" IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO COINCIDE WITH NATIONAL EATING DISORDERS AWARENESS WEEK AND TO DECLARE THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 2017, AS "EATING DISORDERS AWARENESS DAY" IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
The Concurrent Resolution was introduced and referred to the Committee on Medical Affairs.
H. 3672 (Word version) -- Reps. Bernstein, Alexander, Allison, Anderson, Anthony, Arrington, Atkinson, Atwater, Bales, Ballentine, Bamberg, Bannister, Bedingfield, Bennett, Blackwell, Bowers, Bradley, Brown, Burns, Caskey, Chumley, Clary, Clemmons, Clyburn, Cobb-Hunter, Cogswell, Cole, Collins, Crawford, Crosby, Daning, Davis, Delleney, Dillard, Douglas, Duckworth, Elliott, Erickson, Felder, Finlay, Forrest, Forrester, Fry, Funderburk, Gagnon, Gilliard, Govan, Hamilton, Hardee, Hart, Hayes, Henderson, Henegan, Herbkersman, Hewitt, Hill, Hiott, Hixon, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Johnson, Jordan, King, Kirby, Knight, Loftis, Long, Lowe, Lucas, Mack, Magnuson, Martin, McCoy, McCravy, McEachern, McKnight, Mitchell, D. C. Moss, V. S. Moss, Murphy, Neal, B. Newton, W. Newton, Norman, Norrell, Ott, Parks, Pitts, Pope, Putnam, Quinn, Ridgeway, M. Rivers, S. Rivers, Robinson-Simpson, Rutherford, Ryhal, Sandifer, Simrill, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, Sottile, Spires, Stavrinakis, Stringer, Tallon, Taylor, Thayer, Thigpen, Toole, Weeks, West, Wheeler, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Williams, Willis and Yow: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO EXPRESS THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON THE PASSING OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY WAYNE FREDERICK OF RICHLAND COUNTY, AND TO EXTEND THEIR DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO HIS LOVING FAMILY AND FRIENDS.
H. 3673 (Word version) -- Reps. Hiott, Alexander, Allison, Anderson, Anthony, Arrington, Atkinson, Atwater, Bales, Ballentine, Bamberg, Bannister, Bedingfield, Bennett, Bernstein, Blackwell, Bowers, Bradley, Brown, Burns, Caskey, Chumley, Clary, Clemmons, Clyburn, Cobb-Hunter, Cogswell, Cole, Collins, Crawford, Crosby, Daning, Davis, Delleney, Dillard, Douglas, Duckworth, Elliott, Erickson, Felder, Finlay, Forrest, Forrester, Fry, Funderburk, Gagnon, Gilliard, Govan, Hamilton, Hardee, Hart, Hayes, Henderson, Henegan, Herbkersman, Hewitt, Hill, Hixon, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Johnson, Jordan, King, Kirby, Knight, Loftis, Long, Lowe, Lucas, Mack, Magnuson, Martin, McCoy, McCravy, McEachern, McKnight, Mitchell, D. C. Moss, V. S. Moss, Murphy, Neal, B. Newton, W. Newton, Norman, Norrell, Ott, Parks, Pitts, Pope, Putnam, Quinn, Ridgeway, M. Rivers, S. Rivers, Robinson-Simpson, Rutherford, Ryhal, Sandifer, Simrill, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, Sottile, Spires, Stavrinakis, Stringer, Tallon, Taylor, Thayer, Thigpen, Toole, Weeks, West, Wheeler, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Williams, Willis and Yow: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO RECOGNIZE AND COMMEND SOUTH CAROLINA'S FFA MEMBERS (FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE FUTURE FARMERS OF AMERICA) AND ALL WHO SUPPORT, PROMOTE, AND ENCOURAGE THESE OUTSTANDING STUDENTS OF AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION AND TO JOIN THEM IN THE OBSERVANCE OF NATIONAL FFA WEEK, FEBRUARY 18-25, 2017.
H. 3674 (Word version) -- Reps. Davis, Alexander, Allison, Anderson, Anthony, Arrington, Atkinson, Atwater, Bales, Ballentine, Bamberg, Bannister, Bedingfield, Bennett, Bernstein, Blackwell, Bowers, Bradley, Brown, Burns, Caskey, Chumley, Clary, Clemmons, Clyburn, Cobb-Hunter, Cogswell, Cole, Collins, Crawford, Crosby, Daning, Delleney, Dillard, Douglas, Duckworth, Elliott, Erickson, Felder, Finlay, Forrest, Forrester, Fry, Funderburk, Gagnon, Gilliard, Govan, Hamilton, Hardee, Hart, Hayes, Henderson, Henegan, Herbkersman, Hewitt, Hill, Hiott, Hixon, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Johnson, Jordan, King, Kirby, Knight, Loftis, Long, Lowe, Lucas, Mack, Magnuson, Martin, McCoy, McCravy, McEachern, McKnight, Mitchell, D. C. Moss, V. S. Moss, Murphy, Neal, B. Newton, W. Newton, Norman, Norrell, Ott, Parks, Pitts, Pope, Putnam, Quinn, Ridgeway, M. Rivers, S. Rivers, Robinson-Simpson, Rutherford, Ryhal, Sandifer, Simrill, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, Sottile, Spires, Stavrinakis, Stringer, Tallon, Taylor, Thayer, Thigpen, Toole, Weeks, West, Wheeler, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Williams, Willis and Yow: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE THE COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON ON ITS OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS, TO CELEBRATE THE COLLEGE'S HIGH-QUALITY ACADEMICS AND ATHLETICS, TO HONOR THE LONG-LASTING IMPRESSION THE COLLEGE HAS HAD ON CHARLESTON AND BEYOND, AND TO RECOGNIZE FEBRUARY 8, 2017, AS "COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON DAY" AT THE STATE HOUSE.
H. 3678 (Word version) -- Reps. Jefferson, Williams, Cobb-Hunter, Wheeler, Parks, Clyburn, King, Douglas, McKnight, Whipper, McEachern, Hosey, Brown, Ott, Allison, Norrell and Ridgeway: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE THE HONORABLE HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER ON ASSUMING THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND TO ENCOURAGE GOVERNOR MCMASTER TO EXPAND MEDICAID TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE TO HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHERWISE UNINSURED LOW-INCOME SOUTH CAROLINIANS AND TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF THE STATE'S ECONOMY AND JOB SECURITY FOR RESIDENTS OF THE PALMETTO STATE.
S. 234 (Word version) -- Senator Massey: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 44-61-160(A) OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE DATA COLLECTED OR PREPARED BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, TO PROVIDE THAT THE IDENTITIES OF PATIENTS AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS MENTIONED, REFERENCED, OR OTHERWISE APPEARING IN INFORMATION AND DATA COLLECTED OR PREPARED BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES ARE SUBJECT TO SUBPOENA IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL, OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.
S. 244 (Word version) -- Senator Jackson: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO DECLARE JULY 2017 AS "FIBROID AWARENESS MONTH" IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND TO ENCOURAGE ALL CITIZENS OF THE PALMETTO STATE TO BECOME INFORMED ABOUT THIS PERVASIVE WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUE.
Senators MALLOY and CAMPSEN rose for an Expression of Personal Interest to give a report on the work of the Sentencing Reform and Oversight Committee.
S. 218 (Word version) -- Senators Massey, Bennett, Alexander, Bryant, Rice, Gregory, Corbin, Martin, Campsen, Turner and Young: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 1, TITLE 41 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT GENERALLY, BY ADDING SECTION 41-1-25, TO PROVIDE THAT A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY NOT ESTABLISH, MANDATE, OR OTHERWISE REQUIRE AN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT; AND TO DEFINE NECESSARY TERMS.
Senator MASSEY spoke on the amendment.
"Section 41-1-25. It is the policy of the State of South Carolina for employers to provide earned sick leave to employees."
(1) 'Agricultural labor' shall have the same meaning as in Section 41-27-120.
(2) 'Child' means a person under the age of eighteen.
(3) 'Earned paid sick time' means the time that is provided by an employer to an employee as computed under Section 41-47-20 and is compensated at the same hourly rate as the employee earns from the employee's employment at the time the employee uses the paid sick leave; provided, however, that this hourly rate shall not be less than the federal minimum wage.
(4) 'Earned sick leave' means the time that is provided by an employer to an employee as computed in Section 41-47-40 that can be used for the purposes provided in Section 41-47-30.
(5) 'Earned unpaid sick leave' means the time that is provided by an employer to an employee as computed in Section 41-47-40 that can be used for the purposes provided in Section 41-47-40.
(6) 'Employee' shall have the same meaning as in Section 41-1-65(2).
(7) 'Employer' shall have the same meaning as in Section 41-1-65(1).
(8) 'Federal act' means the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. sections 2601 to 2654, inclusive, as may be amended.
(9) 'Health care provider' has the same meaning as provided in regulations promulgated pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. sections 2601 to 2654, inclusive, as may be amended.
(10) 'Parent' means a biological, adoptive, foster parent, or step parent of an employee or an employee's spouse; or other person who stood in loco parentis during the childhood of an employee or employee's spouse.
(11) 'Seasonal employer' means an employer that, because of climatic conditions or the nature of the product or service, customarily operates all or a functionally distinct occupation within its business only during a regularly recurring period of less than sixteen weeks for all seasonal periods during a calendar year.
(12) 'Seasonal employment' means services performed for wages for a seasonal employer during the seasonal period in the employers seasonal operations.
(13) 'Seasonal employee' means any employee who is employed by a seasonal employer in seasonal employment.
(14) 'Spouse' shall have the same meaning as provided by the marriage laws of this State.
Section 41-47-20. All employees who work in this State who must be absent from work for the reasons provided in Section 41-47-30 shall be entitled to not less than the hours of earned paid sick leave and earned unpaid sick leave provided in Section 41-47-40 during a calendar year, except for seasonal employees and individuals engaged in agricultural labor who shall be entitled to earned paid sick leave pursuant to this section at the discretion of the employer.
(5) an employee to address the psychological or physical effects of criminal domestic violence arising under Chapter 25, Title 16.
Section 41-47-40. (A) Earned sick leave shall accrue at a rate of one hour for every forty hours worked beginning with the date of hire.
(B) Employees who are exempt from overtime requirements under 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1) of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act will be deemed to work forty hours each work week for the purposes of earned paid sick leave accrual unless their normal work week is less than forty hours, in which case earned paid sick leave accrues based on that normal work week.
(C) Employees shall not accrue more than fifty-six hours of earned sick leave in a calendar year, unless the employer allows a higher limit.
(3) fewer than six employees shall be required to provide a minimum of forty hours of earned unpaid sick leave to their employees.
(E)(1) Earned sick leave may be used as accrued, or be loaned by the employer, at its discretion, to the employee in advance of actual accrual, provided that an employer shall not require an employee to reimburse the employer for any unearned sick leave loaned by the employer.
(2) Accrued earned sick leave shall be used in the smaller of hourly increments of the smallest increment that the employer's payroll system uses to account for absences or use of other time.
(3) Earned paid sick leave and earned unpaid sick leave shall carry over annually to the extent not used by the employee, however an employer shall not be required to allow use of earned paid sick leave and earned unpaid sick leave in a single calendar year that exceeds the maximum benefit they are required to provide pursuant to this section.
(4) Employers shall not be required to pay-out unused earned paid sick leave upon the separation of the employee from the employer.
Section 41-47-50. If an employee is absent from work for any reason listed in Section 41-47-30, and by mutual consent of the employer and employee, the employee works an equivalent number of additional hours or shifts during the same or the next pay period as the hours or shifts not worked due to reasons listed in Section 41-47-30, the employee shall not be required to use earned paid sick leave accrued or earned unpaid sick leave for the employee's absence during that time period and the employer shall not be required to pay for sick leave taken during that time period. However, the employer cannot require the employee to work additional shifts or hours, or require, as a condition of an employee's taking earned paid sick leave or earned unpaid sick leave, that the employee find, or attempt to find, a replacement employee to cover the hours during which the employee is utilizing earned or unearned sick leave.
Section 41-47-60. (A) Subject to the provisions contained in Section 41-47-140, an employer may require certification of the qualifying illness, injury or health condition. Any reasonable documentation signed by a health care provider involved in following or treating the illness, injury or health condition, and indicating the need for the amount of sick time taken, shall be deemed acceptable certification.
(B) Nothing in this section requires an employee to provide as certification any information from a health care provider that would be in violation of Section 1177 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6, or the regulations promulgated under section 264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2.
Section 41-47-70. When the use of earned sick leave is foreseeable, the employee shall make a good faith effort to provide notice of this need to the employer in advance of the use of the sick leave.
Section 41-47-80. It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or attempt to exercise, any right provided under, or in connection with this chapter, including, but not limited to, using the taking of earned sick leave as a negative factor in an employment action such as hiring, evaluation, promotion, disciplinary action, termination, or counting earned sick time under a no-fault attendance policy.
Section 41-47-90. It shall be unlawful for any employer to take any adverse action against an employee because the employee opposes practices which the employee reasonably believes to be in violation of this chapter, or supports the exercise of right of another under this chapter.
Section 41-47-100. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or retaining paid sick leave policies more generous than policies that comply with the requirements of this chapter and nothing in this chapter shall be construed to diminish the obligation of an employer to comply with any contract, collective bargaining agreement, or any employment benefit plan or plan that provides to employees greater paid sick leave rights than the rights established under this chapter.
Section 41-47-110. Employers who provide their employees with paid time off, vacation, or other paid leave policies who make available an amount of paid time off sufficient to meet the accrual requirements of this section that may be used for the same purposes and under the same conditions as paid sick leave under this section are not required to provide additional paid sick leave.
Section 41-47-120. The Department of Employment and Workforce may promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
Senator KIMPSON explained the amendment.
(1) 'Employee benefit' means anything of value that an employee may receive from an employer in addition to wages. This term includes, but is not limited to, any health benefits, disability benefits, death benefits, group accidental death and dismemberment benefits, paid days off for holidays, paid sick leave, paid vacation leave, paid personal necessity leave, retirement benefits, and profit-sharing benefits.
(b) between a political subdivision and an enterprise in which the enterprise receives a grant, tax abatement, tax credit, or other economic incentive from the political subdivision in exchange for which the enterprise agrees to create or maintain existing full-time employment opportunities. For purposes of this subitem, 'enterprise' means a business or industry, developer, contractor, or subcontractor.
(3) 'Political subdivision' includes, but is not limited to, a municipality, county, school district, special purpose district, or public service district.
(C) This section does not limit the authority of political subdivisions to establish employee benefits in employment relationships to which they are a party."
On motion of Senator KIMPSON, with unanimous consent, Amendment No. 3 was withdrawn.
Senator SENN desired to be recorded as voting in favor of the second reading of the Bill.
S. 46 (Word version) -- Senators Campsen, Bennett, Young and Alexander: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 12-6-520, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS TO STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX BRACKETS, SO AS TO ENACT THE "TAXPAYER INFLATION PROTECTION ACT", TO DELETE THE PROVISION LIMITING THE INFLATION ADJUSTMENT TO ONE-HALF OF THE ACTUAL INFLATION RATE AND THE OVERALL FOUR PERCENT LIMIT ON THE TOTAL INFLATION ADJUSTMENT, AND TO DELETE REDUNDANT LANGUAGE.
S. 61 (Word version) -- Senator Hutto: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 1-11-720, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE HEALTH PLAN, SO AS TO ALLOW EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES, AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, OF ANY POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STATE HEALTH PLAN.
S. 75 (Word version) -- Senator Young: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 12-43-220(c)(2) OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PROGRAMS AND UNIFORM ASSESSMENT RATIOS FOR COUNTY EQUALIZATION AND REASSESSMENT, TO PROVIDE THAT AN OWNER ELIGIBLE FOR AND RECEIVING THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 12-43-220(c) WHO IS RESIDING AT A NURSING HOME RETAINS THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT RATIO OF FOUR PERCENT FOR AS LONG AS THE OWNER REMAINS IN THE NURSING HOME.
S. 353 (Word version) -- Senator Massey: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 516 OF 1976, RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BATH, LANGLEY, AND CLEARWATER WATER AND SEWER DISTRICTS IN AIKEN COUNTY, TO CHANGE THE COMMENCEMENT OF EACH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE TO JANUARY FIRST IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE COMMISSIONER'S ELECTION AND TO CHANGE THE TERM EXPIRATION DATE TO DECEMBER 31 OF EACH EVEN-NUMBERED YEAR; AND TO AMEND ACT 1006 OF 1958, RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BATH, LANGLEY, AND CLEARWATER WATER AND SEWER DISTRICTS IN AIKEN COUNTY, TO CHANGE THE COMMENCEMENT OF EACH COMMISSIONER'S TERM TO JANUARY FIRST IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE COMMISSIONER'S ELECTION AND TO CHANGE THE TERM EXPIRATION DATE TO DECEMBER 31 OF EACH EVEN-NUMBERED YEAR, TO CHANGE THE ELECTION DATE FOR COMMISSIONERS TO THE FIRST TUESDAY AFTER THE FIRST MONDAY IN NOVEMBER, AND TO CHANGE THE FILING PROCEDURE FOR COMMISSION CANDIDATES SO AS TO REQUIRE THEM TO FILE AN INTENTION OF CANDIDACY WITH THE AIKEN COUNTY BOARD OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS AND TO SET A FILING DEADLINE.
On motion of Senator ALEXANDER, with unanimous consent, the Senate stood adjourned out of respect to the memory of Mr. Robert Holland "Bob" Edwards of Walhalla, S.C. Bob was the owner and operator of Edwards Auto Sales Company. He was a member of the Blue Ridge Masonic Lodge #92, the Hejaz Shrine and the Oconee Hillbilly Clan #2. Bob was a former chairman of the board at Memorial Hospital and a founding board member of Community First Bank, a past member of the Walhalla Rotary Club and a member and deacon of Pleasant Ridge Baptist Church. Bob was a loving husband and devoted father who will be dearly missed.
On motion of Senator M.B. MATTHEWS, with unanimous consent, the Senate stood adjourned out of respect to the memory of Mr. Keith Kinard of Walterboro, S.C. Keith received his undergraduate and law degree from the University of South Carolina. He was a practicing attorney for many years and in 1963, he founded 1st Federal of South Carolina in Walterboro and served as Chairman of the Board, President and CEO until his passing. Keith was a member of the University of South Carolina Gamecock Club for 51 years and enjoyed attending all USC sporting events. Keith was a loving husband, devoted father and doting grandfather who will be dearly missed.
At 4:41 P.M., on motion of Senator LEATHERMAN, the Senate adjourned to meet tomorrow at 12:00 Noon.
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