text:
(5) II.3 §7, ‘lights out in the village’ or ‘going to sleep’, originally intended as the end of Book II (see Letters, I, 8 November 1926) before being brought back into II.3 when, in August 1938, “MaMaLuJo” and a forgotten “Tristan and Isolde” were combined and rewritten to become the new II.4.
Note: When the MS of Book III was dispatched to Faber and Faber in January 1936, Joyce was able to get back to Book II, specifically to 1. He had most of the pertinent notesheets (see §1.0χ below) already to hand, and may even have had some preliminary draft work done, but he could now concentrate on it, when circumstances allowed. In June 1936, T.S. Eliot brought back the MSS of part I and part III for retyping by Léon and the work on II.3 was again interrupted (see Letters, NLFF, 7 May, CJJ, 5 June and 12 July, 1936). Most of August-September was spent on holiday, during which he also had to deal with the upcoming English publication of Ulysses (by John Lane of the Bodley Head: see Letters, NLPL, 4 September 1936). He returned to Paris on 13 September 1936. Yet he did not resume intensive work until the end of October 1936 (see Letters, NLHW, 5 November, 1936).
Fair copy/first draft (ink); early and late 1936 (possibly sent to Harriet Weaver on 5 November 1936: see Letters, NLHW, 5 November and 9 November, 1936).
Extradraft material used in composing §1 above. Most of it dates from around the time of the first two rounds of Madame Raphael's copying of his notebooks: it includes units from both the originals and, on different sheets, from the copy of those originals; mid 1930s.
First typescript; probably November 1936 (§2.0 was possibly drafted around the same time).
Retyped pages (mixed originals and carbons) of above draft; November 1936.
Second typescript (carbons). At one point continuous with §2.1. Note that the version of the close (written in on fols. 71r-v) postdates this draft level (see §1.3χ); November 1936, given to Harriet Shaw Weaver 5 December 1936.
Retyped pages of above draft (see also §2.2); November 1936.
Third typescript (carbons), prepared for the printer of transition 26; late November 1936 (see Letters, III, 1 December, 1936).
Early versions of the addition on fol. 113r. See also §2.1.
JJA: 54 (II.3 pt 1): 139-141.
First draft (ink) of paragraph in 1939 FW 309.11-310.21; probably December 1936.
Retyped pages of §1.3 (incorporating §1B.3) and with some later additions (see §1.3+χ) in Harriet Weaver's handwriting1; December 1936.
Extradraft material. Some of these additions were copied onto §1.3+ by Harriet Weaver; December 1936.
Note: The revised typescript was sent to transition (now located in New York) in mid-December 1936 (see Letters, NLVP, 16 December, 1936). Only minor revisions were made on the transition proofs, assuming he even got these. Otherwise he was finished with the piece until near the end of 1937.
Proofs of transition 26. Minor revisions only; early 1937.
Note: transition 26 was published in New York in the Spring of 1937 (see Letters, NLVP, 18 February, 1937).
Note: The copy for this segment of II.3 was sent to Faber and Faber on 18 December 1937 (see Letters, NLFF, 18 December 1937).
Revised pages of transition 26; 1st half December 1937. Fol. 128r-v is the page temporarily returned to Paul Léon in May 1938 (see Letters, NLHW, 29 May 1938).
Pages of transition 26 with typed versions of revisions, prepared for the printer of Finnegans Wake ; sent to Faber and Faber 18 December 1937.
Galley proofs 277-292 for Finnegans Wake , continuous with those (galleys 255-277) for II.1. Dated by the printer 19 January 1938 (first half) and 28 January 1938 (second half): see Letters, NLHW, 2 February 1938. One correction (actually a restoration) on galley 289 derives from a letter sent by Harriet Weaver (see Letters, NLHW, 29 May 1938). Sent to Faber and Faber the end of June 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 27 June 1938.
Duplicate galley proofs of the second half of this Section, prepared for the printer of Finnegans Wake ; probably June 1938. The last sheet contains the note “to be followed immediately by the typescript —” (see §2.5/3.4).
First draft (ink); probably November 1936 (see also §1.1).
First typescript (carbons). At one point continuous with §1.2:: see also §1.3χ; November 1936.
Second typescript (originally a direct continuation of §1.2+); November-December 1936.
Unmarked duplicate of §2.2. There is a genealogy of Finn written by Joyce on the verso of page 27; probably December 1936. This is part of a document sold in 2009 by Sotheby's of London (see Lot 120, first 3 pages of item A); November-December 1936.
A revised version of the genealogy of Finn (the 4th page of Lot 120 item A above); November-December 1936.
First draft; probably December 1936.
Typescript, uniform with §4.3' and§6.3'; containing only a small number of changes written in by Joyce or Léon: 1937. This is part of a document sold in 2009 by Sotheby's of London (see Lot 120, first 12 pages of item B).
Typescript, same as above but with further revisions, uniform with §4.3 (fols. 220v and 221r also contain material for §6.3χ); 1937.
Fresh typescript: the first page contains the note “to follow immediately Galley 292” (see §1.6+) and the final page the note “to be followed immediately by the text from Transition” (See §4.7+/5.4+). A few corrections only, no revisions: received by Faber and Faber before 27 June 1938.
Galley proofs 292a-292e, of which only sheet 292a and a single typed addition survives, continuous with those for §4.8/5.5. Dated by the printer 22 July 1938; returned September 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 25 July and 27 September, 1938).
First draft (ink), possibly incomplete, partly written on the verso of the last page of §2.2; fols. 2v, 3r-v also contains the first draft of §6B; the additions on MS 47480-3v (see also §4.2+χ) are crossed through in blue when they relate to §4 and purple when for §6B; probably late 1936 or early 1937.
Extradraft material; see also §6B.0χ and §6B.1χ; probably late 1936 or early 1937.
Second draft (ink); fol. 152r also carries the opening sentences of §6; early 1937.
Fair copy (ink). The final paragraph was later used as the opening of §6.2; 1937.
Extradraft material. Also used in §4.3χ; 1937.
Extradraft material for additions. See also §4.0 and §6B.0 and §4.4χ; 1937.
First typescript, consecutive with §2.4'/3.3' and followed immediately by §6.3'; only lightly revised, apart from the original version of a long addition later copied onto §4.3: 1937. This is part of a document sold in 2009 by Sotheby's of London (see Lot 120, pages 13-27 of item B).
First typescript, consecutive with §2.4/3.3 and followed immediately by (but revised separately from) §6.3; 1937.
Extradraft material. See also 4.2, 6B.1 and 6.3χ; 1937.
Late additions to §4.3; late 1937.
Extradraft material, including dialogue elements (an extension of 4.0/6B.0) later fragmented for insertion in 4.4). See also 4.2+χ; probably December 1937.
First draft; prepared after §4.4 above; probably early 1938.
Preliminary draft of fragment; in Buffalo notebook; early 1938.
Second draft (incomplete); early 1938.
Typescript; early 1938 (see Letters, NLHW, 20 January 1938).
Discarded first attempt at typing out BL Add MS 47480, fol. 72r; early 1938.
Late additions, authorial, subsequently copied onto §4.5 above by an amanuensis; early 1938.
Proofs (incomplete: galleys 211, 212 and 217 only) for transition 27 set from an only lightly corrected §4.5/5.2 typescript above. Most of the additions entered on that typescript reappear here copied in by an amanuensis. With new authorial additions; February-March 1938.
Additions keyed to galleys 209, 210 and 216 (all missing) of the transition 27 proofs; February-March 1938.
First draft of additions for galleys 216 and 219 (both missing) of the transition 27 proofs; February-March 1938.
Proofs, second set, for transition 27 (§4 only). The additions entered at draft 6, draft 5+ and most of those entered at draft 5 appear on typed sheets attached to the versos of the relevant proofs; February-March 1938.
Note: transition 27 was published in May 1938.
Revised pages of transition 27; probably June 1938.
Pages of transition 27 (pp.59-78) corrected by Harriet Shaw Weaver (see Letters, NLHW, 24 May 1938); May 1938.
Pages of transition 27 with typed versions of revisions on §4.7/5.4 and corrections from §4.7'/5.4', prepared for the printer of Finnegans Wake ; the first page contains the note “to follow immediately the typescript“ (see §2.5/3.4); probably June 1938.
Galley proofs 292e-292q (missing), continuous with those for §2.6/3.5; dated by the printer 22 July 1938; returned September 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 25 July and 27 September 1938).
Page proofs, first set (ends after first paragraph on page 355); dated by the printer 23 September 1938 and 8 October 1938; received back by Faber and Faber in two lots November 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 21 November and 22 November. 1938), end December 1938 (see Letters, NLFF, 30 december 1938).
Page proofs, second set (ends after first paragraph on page 355), no revisions were made at this draft stage; not dated (probably December 1938).
Page proofs, third set (with page 355 in full), continuous with §6.8'; dated by the printer 4 January 1939.
First draft (ink), continuous with §4.0, partly written on the verso of the last page of §2.2; the additions on MS 47480-3v (see also 4.2+χ) are crossed through in blue when they relate to §4 and purple when for §6B; probably late 1936 or early 1937.
Extradraft material; see also §4.0χ and §6B.1χ; probably late 1936 or early 1937.
Draft of the opening sentence only (ink); continuous with §4.1; early 1937.
Second draft (ink) of the main body of the section, made in conjunction with §4.1 but revised along with §4.4 (see 47480, fol. 151r-v, which carries revisions for both drafts); drafted early 1937 but probably revised during the following winter.
Extradraft notes; see also §4.0χ and §4.0χ/6B.0χ; 1937.
Fair copy, written in four stages. The first few lines are appended to the end of §4.2; 1937.
First typescript, consecutive with §2.4'/3.3' and§4.3'. This is the final part of a document sold in 2009 by Sotheby's of London (see Lot 120, pages 27-38 of item B); 1937.
First typescript (carbon), numbered consecutively with, but revised separately from, §4.3: early 1938.
Extradraft material (see also §3.3); 1937.
Second typescript, with long holograph additions. Note that fol. 210 also has a draft passage earlier used in II.1§2.7 and with similar revisions as appeared on (perhaps later) II.1§2.8; probably September 1938.
Typescript; September or early October 1938.
Retyped pages of above typescript; September or early October 1938.
First extant draft; March 1923 (see Letters, I, 11 March 1923: the ‘two pages’ mentioned in the letter do not appear to have survived); ink. Probably revised in July 1923 (a fragment of FHvii.0 is written in crayon on the verso: see Letters, I, 19 July 1923).
Fair copy (ink); possibly July 1923.
Fair copy (ink), sent to Harriet Shaw Weaver on 19 July 1923 (see Letters, I, 19 July 1923).
Typescript (first page only) of ‘Roderick O'Conor’ piece; made by Harriet Shaw Weaver ca. 20 July 1923 and revised Autumn 1923; the revisions made on this draft did not enter the line of transmision of the text (see also IV§2.5' and IV§3.3').
Typescript (carbon) of ‘Roderick O'Conor’, augmented with a long holograph passage drafted in mid-1938; the two typescript pages were made by Harriet Shaw Weaver in Summer 1923, but the revisions on this copy date from Fall 1938 (see Letters, III, 8 September 1938, written shortly before he added the last paragraph on fol. 273).
Retyped pages of above typescript; late Autumn 1938.
Pages of §7.4+, again retyped; late Autumn 1938.
Note: The typescript, presumably with originals replaced by retyped pages, was received by Faber and Faber on 18 November (see Letters, NLFF, 18 November 1938).
Galley proofs 1-18 for Finnegans Wake ; dated by the printer 2 November 1938 and sent to Léon on 28 November (see Letters, NLFF, 28 November 1938); revised November-December and sent back (or a copy sent) to Faber and Faber on 14 December (see Letters, NLFF, 15 December 1938).
Late additions for galleys written on two sheets. One addition is missing; late 1938.
Page proofs (page 355 contains the final paragraph of §5.6++); dated by the printer 4 and 7 January 1939.
Typescript of late addition for page 380 (see Letters, NLFF, 13 January 1939).
Page proofs, duplicate set, no revisions, continuous with §5.6++; dated by the printer 4 January 1939 and 7 January 1939.
Note: There were very few revisions for this subepisode at page proof draft stage (see Letters, NLHW, 14 February 1939).
JJA: 54 (II.3 pt 1): 382-383; JJA: 55 (II.3 pt 2): 558-560.

matches: §7 §1 §1 §2 §1 §2 §2 §1 §1 §1 §1 §2 §1 §1 §1 §1 §2 §4 §4 §6 §1 §4 §4 §2 §6 §4 §4 §6 §6 §6 §6 §6 §4 §4 §6 §4 §2 §6 §4 §2 §6 §4 §4 §4 §4 §4 §4 §2 §2 §6 §4 §2 §4 §6 §4 §6 §4 §4 §4 §4 §4 §4 §2 §4 §3 §7 §5 §5


Christipher BARNES, Janel Moser, and Kristine Nimmer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ADVANCED CALL CENTER TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Before RIPPLE, WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges. Robert K. O'Reilly (argued), Ademi & O'Reilly, Cudahy, WI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Ross A. Anderson (argued), Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.
Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the letters violated certain provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., enacted by Congress in 1996 to curb abusive practices on the part of debt collectors. ACCT's motion for summary judgment was granted by Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein, who heard the case with the consent of the parties. The Plaintiffs have appealed and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Gillespie v. Equifax Information Svcs., L.L.C., 484 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
There are several problems with this argument. First, Plaintiffs' argument misstates the import of our holding in Olson. In that case, two debtors sued a collection agency after receiving dunning letters that listed both the amount past due sought by the agency and each consumer's overall credit card balance. They argued that the inclusion of both amounts would confuse an unsophisticated consumer (the objective standard we apply in such cases, Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1997)) as to the amount of the debt. We rejected that theory, noting that earlier cases in which we concluded that dunning letters did not properly state “the amount of the debt” found problems not with listing too much information but with failing to state anywhere the exact dollar amount owed. See Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir.2003) (“[B]y stating the amount of the debt as $1,050, Sheeks took it upon himself to hold Veach liable for legal penalties that had not yet been awarded, penalties that for FDCPA purposes should have been separated out from the amount of the debt.”); Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 875-76 (7th Cir.2000) (finding violation where dunning letter described debt not only as listed amount of unpaid principle but also unspecified fees, interest, and penalties to be determined upon a phone call to collector).
Ignoring this, the Plaintiffs in our case interpret Olson's conclusion that including the total credit card balance need not violate the FDCPA to mean that the entire credit card balance is the “amount of the debt” under § 809 and therefore necessary for compliance. But Olson certainly did not hold this, because it would be absurd: as Plaintiffs themselves articulate with an apparently straight face, if the total credit card balance really is “the amount of the debt,” then a dunning letter providing only the total credit card balance that did not even mention the amount actually sought by the debt collector would be in compliance. Such a reading of the statute would defeat the provision's very purpose by increasing the confusion: a recipient would know neither the amount sought by the dunning letter nor the fact that she was not required to pay off her credit card balance in full.
Besides, Plaintiffs' argument seems to forget who the defendant is. ACCT, not MBNA, is the collector here, so the “amount of the debt” must be that owed to the former, meaning the amount past due. Whatever may be owed to MBNA, or for that matter to any other of Plaintiffs' creditors, is of no consequence to this case. This is made clear in Chuway v. National Action Financial Services Inc., 362 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.2004), another case that Plaintiffs incorrectly cite in their favor. Only the past due amount, the amount owed ACCT, can be the “amount of the debt” under § 809(a)(1).
Still, as noted in Chuway, “[i]t is not enough that the dunning letter state the amount of the debt that is due. It must state it clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.” Id. at 947-48. That case held that § 809(a)(1) was violated where a debt collector's letter, which listed the amount sought, $367.42, as the “balance,” also included a confusing statement that explained to recipients how to receive their “most current balance information.” Although that language referred to the balance owed not to the debt collector but to the credit card company, which could therefore not be part of “the amount of the debt” under the circumstances, we found that the FDCPA was violated, expressing a concern that the “most current balance” language might confuse a debtor into believing that the “amount of the debt” owed to the debt collector was somehow more than the $367.42. Id. at 947.
Plaintiffs seem to suggest that the use of the term “amount of the debt” is required in the letter. But we have never held this to be the case. Although replacing “Current Amount Due” with “Amount of the Debt” might have been the easiest way for ACCT to comply with the FDCPA, requiring that action would relieve the unsophisticated consumer from the minimal obligation to be “able to make ‘basic logical deductions and inferences' and to not interpret collection letters ‘in a bizarre or idiosyncratic fashion․’ ” Olson, 366 F.3d at 513.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the statement in the dunning letters that “[i]f paid in full to MBNA America, all collection activity will be stopped” violates FDCPA § 807, which prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Plaintiffs argue that an unsophisticated consumer would believe the statement to mean that payment of the Current Amount Due would terminate all further obligations not only to ACCT, but also to MBNA, including the remaining balance on one's credit card.
But, as we have just said, the unsophisticated consumer is not relieved of all responsibility. A simple example illuminates the problem: Suppose a consumer has a $10,000 credit card debt. Under Plaintiffs' theory, he will believe the statement in the dunning letter that “all collection activity will be stopped” to mean that payment of a far smaller Current Amount Due, say $200, will relieve him of all obligations to the credit card company, giving him a windfall of $9,800. By going delinquent and paying 2 percent of his debts, he is completely freed from an onerous debt burden. It should be clear that such a conclusion describes precisely the kind of bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretation that even the unsophisticated consumer should not be expected to make. See Olson, 366 F.3d at 513.
1. Plaintiff Kristine Nimmer's letter referred not to MBNA America but to “Bankcard Services,” another name for the same entity. In all other respects, Plaintiffs' dunning letters were identical.


text:
Ralph J. Anderson, Stanley P. Sorenson, Helena, Mont., J. R. Vaughan, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Coleman, Lamey & Crowley, Cale Crowley, Robert P. Davidson, Billings, Mont., M. L. Countryman, Jr., St. Paul, Minn., for appellee.
These are four appeals from identical orders dismissing actions originally brought by the appellants against the Northern Pacific Railway Company in the State court and which were removed on that company's petition to the above named United States District Court.1 The order for dismissal was based upon the court's determination that the allegations of the appellants' pleadings disclose that they were entitled to no relief.
Each appellant alleged that he presented to the appellee a written application to purchase, for purposes of settlement, a certain quarter section of land situated in McCone County, Montana, and within the area of the second indemnity limits defined in the Congressional Joint Resolution of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 378, relating to the so-called Northern Pacific Land Grant.
Each appellant alleged that he possessed all of the qualifications required for settlement under the land and homestead laws of the United States, including such qualifications as he had as a veteran of World War II; that although each appellant tendered to the appellee a sum equal to $2.50 per acre for the lands he sought to purchase, the application was rejected and refused by the appellee; that appellant was entitled to make such purchase by reason of the provisions of the Joint Resolution of 1870, above referred to, under which the lands so sought had been selected by and patented to the appellee Railway Company or its predecessors. The particular portion of said Joint Resolution of 1870 which the appellants asserted gave them the right to purchase the lands was a proviso reading in part as follows: "Provided, that all lands hereby granted to said company which shall not be sold or disposed of or remain subject to the mortgage by this act authorized, at the expiration of five years after the completion of the entire road, shall be subject to settlement and preemption like other lands, at a price to be paid to said company not exceeding two dollars and fifty cents per acre * * *"
In dismissing the appellants' actions the trial court held that the lands here in question could not be considered as lands "hereby granted" within the meaning of the quoted proviso. The court said "it seems to have been clearly established that the Joint Resolution granted no lands in Montana." In so holding the court relied primarily upon the cases of Hewitt v. Schultz, 180 U.S. 139, 21 S. Ct. 309, 45 L. Ed. 463, and Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U.S. 675, 22 S. Ct. 232, 46 L. Ed. 383.
In the case of Hewitt, the Secretary of the Interior, upon receiving and approving a map of the definite location of the Northern Pacific Railroad in North Dakota, withdrew from entry odd numbered sections of the land within the indemnity limits. Thereafter Hewitt made entry and settlement under the general land laws upon a portion of the lands so withdrawn and tendered the required price with his final proof of compliance with the applicable act. His proof was rejected on the ground that the land had been withdrawn from entry under the act granting lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. While Hewitt was in possession, Schultz entered into a contract with the Railroad for the purchase of the same land which the Railroad selected, and Schultz ousted Hewitt from possession. Thereafter the decision of the local Land Office against Hewitt was reversed and set aside, his final proof admitted, and the selection by the railroad was held for cancellation. Hewitt sought ejectment against Schultz and the question for decision by the court was whether the act in question authorized the withdrawal of lands in the indemnity limits which had been made at the time of the definite location.
The court approved and accepted the construction of the Northern Pacific act previously made by the Secretary of the Interior that the act forbade the Land Department to withdraw lands within the indemnity limits of the grant; it held that until a valid selection was made by the Railroad from lands within the indemnity limits they were open to disposition or appropriation under the homestead and pre-emption laws of the United States, and hence that Hewitt's entry and settlement entitled him to the land.
The court quoted the following from the Secretary's decision (180 U.S. at page 151-152, 21 S. Ct. at page 313): "As to the lands in the primary, or granted, limits: `The title to the alternate sections to be taken within the limits, when all the odd sections are granted, becomes fixed, ascertained, and perfected in each case by this location of the line of road, and in case of each road the title relates back to the act of Congress.' * * * As to indemnity limits: `The time when the right to lands becomes vested, which are to be selected within given limits under these land grants, whether the selection is in lieu of lands deficient within the primary limits of the grant or of lands which for other reasons are to be selected within certain secondary limits, is different in regard to those that are ascertained within the primary limits by the location of the line of the road. * * The consequence of this difference is that, until a valid selection by the grantee is made from the lands within the indemnity limits, they are entirely open to disposition by the United States, or to appropriation under the laws of the United States for the disposition of the public lands." It accepted this statement of the meaning of the Northern Pacific Railroad grants and held that the order of withdrawal, which included the Hewitt lands, was improper; hence there was "no legal ground to question the title of the plaintiff to the land in dispute."
The Supreme Court made it plain that the section of the Act of July 2, 1864 which had the most material bearing upon its decision was § 6. That section, quoted with the same emphasis that appears in the decision, is copied in the margin.3 The Court noted that the argument which it accepted was predicated upon the distinction between the sections of land referred to in the clause containing the italicized words "hereby granted" and the later provision that the preemption and homestead provisions are extended to "all other lands on the line of said road."
The Hewitt case was followed in the Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Bell, supra, case, which dealt with substantially identical language in another railroad land grant. In that case the court said: (183 U.S. at page 687, 22 S. Ct. at page 237) "Undoubtedly the company acquires title to both classes of lands by the 3d section of the granting act; but it acquires a title to lands within the place limits by a present grant; but to land within the indemnity limits, only by a future power of selection. In both cases the statute is the origin of the title; but in the one case it gives instantaneously; in the other it is a mere promise to give in the future, and requires the action of the railroad to perfect it. The words `hereby granted' evidently refer to the former."
After noting these two decisions of the Supreme Court, the court below accepted as entirely pertinent the inquiry of appellee's counsel: "How can the applicants seriously urge that by the foregoing language Congress was making a grant of land in the second indemnity strip in Montana?"
Of course the quoted query is not precisely pertinent because in those two cases the Supreme Court was not dealing with the language of the proviso of the Joint Resolution of May 31, 1870. It was dealing with the appropriate construction of the language used in §§ 3 and 6 of the original act of July 2, 1864. It is true that the key words "hereby granted" appear both in § 6 and in the proviso of the Joint Resolution. The decisions in the Hewitt and the Bell cases are not without some persuasive force. But some cogent arguments have been presented by the appellants to the effect that neither the Hewitt nor the Bell case is in point here. As stated here, the Hewitt case dealt only with § 6 of the earlier act, the main question being — which lands were granted in praesenti? The holding was that the indemnity lands were not so granted. Primarily the problem was:- when did the title pass? Because title to the indemnity lands did not pass as of the definite location of the road, it was there held that the withdrawal at that time was unauthorized.
It must be recognized that the words "hereby granted" in the proviso of the Joint Resolution of 1870 do not necessarily have the same meaning as the same words which appear in § 6 of the grant of 1864. The precise problem presented here is not controlled by the decisions in the Hewitt and Bell cases; it is one which has not previously been decided. Some suggestion is made that what is known as the Land Grant Case of 1940, United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., supra, passed upon this question. An examination of that case discloses that in dealing with the proviso, the Court did no more than hold that it did not apply retroactively to the lands acquired under the grant of 1864. In this respect the court said (311 U.S. at page 368, 61 S. Ct. at page 287): "We hold, contrary to the Government's assertion, that the proviso of the Resolution of 1870, requiring that the lands be opened by the company to settlement and preemption, applies only to the additional lands granted by that Resolution and not to lands acquired under the grant of 1864."4 Nor does the decision of this court in Russell v. Texas Company, 9 Cir., 238 F.2d 636, assist us here for the question there was simply whether the proviso of the 1870 Resolution applied to place lands of the Railroad within the State of Montana which were granted by the Act of July 2, 1864. That case did not involve lands located within the second indemnity belt provided by the 1870 Resolution.
Appellants call our attention to the fact that in this case, in contrast with the Hewitt case, the Northern Pacific Railway has long since acquired title to these second indemnity lands which the appellants seek to purchase. It is of no significance to the decision of the present case when the Company acquired title to these lands. In the Hewitt and Bell cases the problem of "when" was basic to the decition. Furthermore, it is noted that had the Resolution of 1870 not been enacted, the appellee could never have acquired title to these lands in Montana within the second indemnity belt. In that sense the Resolution of 1870 is a part of the appellee's chain of title to these lands. Thus, in the Bell case, supra, speaking of both place and indemnity lands under the 1864 grant, the Supreme Court said (at page 687 of 183 U.S., at page 237 of 22 S. Ct.) : "Undoubtedly the company acquires title to both classes of lands by the 3d section of the granting act; but it acquires a title to lands within the place limits by a present grant while to land within the indemnity limits, only by a future power of selection. In both cases the statute is the origin of the title; but in the one case it gives instantaneously; in the other it is a mere promise to give in the future, and requires the action of the railroad to perfect it."
In United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51, 64, 41 S. Ct. 439, 441, 65 L. Ed. 825, the case which gave rise to the resolution which authorized the Land Grant Case of 1940, the Court, again speaking of the 1864 act, said: "The provision relating to indemnity lands was as much a part of the grant and contract as the one relating to land in place, * * and it is apparent from the granting act and resolution that `it was the purpose of Congress in making the grant to confer a substantial right to land within the indemnity limits in lieu of lands lost within the place limits.' * * * Such rights are within the protection of the due process of law clause of the Constitution."
Since the Company thus acquired title to the lands here in question by virtue of the Joint Resolution of 1870, and since "the provision relating to indemnity lands was as much a part of the grant and contract as the one relating to lands in place," appellants argue that the settlement and preemption proviso of that act attaches to the land here involved as lands "hereby granted" under the 1870 act.
Appellants make a further suggestion as to why a holding that the 1870 proviso applied only to lands in the place limits and not to indemnity lands would produce a result which Congress was unlikely to intend. The suggestion is in substance as follows: Consider the effect of such a holding upon the place and indemnity lands opposite the additional line authorized by the 1870 Resolution between Portland and Puget Sound. A holding that the proviso had no application to those indemnity lands would mean that the place lands between Portland and Puget Sound would be open to settlement and preemption five years after the completion of the road, whereas the indemnity lands along that line, selected by the Company to replace lands not available in the place limit, would not be open to such settlement and preemption after their selection. This, appellant says, would be an absurd result, for the Company would acquire a better right under the secondary portion of the grant than under its primary portion.
It is no part of our function to express any view as to the application of the 1870 settlement and preemption proviso to the place or indemnity lands acquired by reason of the construction of the Portland-Puget Sound line of the road. So far as the lands here in question are concerned, that is to say, the lands in the secondary indemnity belt in Montana, although the Railroad could not have acquired title thereto, had not the 1870 Resolution been adopted, yet it is also true that the Railroad's right to acquire these lands stems from the Act of 1864.
Just as it was held in the Land Grant Case of 1940 that the preemption proviso of 1870 did not apply retroactively to the lands acquired under the grant of 1864, so here we think it necessary to hold that it did not operate retroactively to affect selections based upon the quantities of lands fixed by the place limits of that grant. We come to the conclusion therefore that the provision of the settlement and preemption proviso did not apply to the lands here in question.
The Montana court has said that mandamus by police officers, dismissed by a respondent mayor of a city, to procure reinstatement, was not a civil action. Bailey v. Edwards, 47 Mont. 363, 133 P. 1095, 1097. It said, quoting from an earlier decision: "The civil action * * has reference exclusively to private * * * wrongs. * * * What is the nature of the proceeding called mandamus? `It is not applicable as a redress for mere private wrongs.' * * *. It can be resorted to only in those cases where the matter in dispute, in theory concerns the public, and in which the public has an interest." The present proceeding hardly fits that description of mandamus. The defendant is a private corporation; appellants are private individuals seeking to enforce individual private rights either as third party beneficiaries or as successors in interest to the Government under the Northern Pacific contract. Assuming that Montana permits such rights to be enforced through what it calls mandamus, that cannot control over view that the action is essentially a civil one, in the nature of a suit for specific performance, or for declaratory relief in conjunction with a prayer for a mandatory injunction. (On mandatory injunction see 38 Colum. L.R. 903) Cases like Marshall v. Crotty, supra, and Palmer v. Walsh, D.C.D. Or., 78 F. Supp. 64, involved attempts to mandamus public officials. Whatever Montana may call this, we think, for purposes of removal and district court jurisdiction, it is essentially a civil action.
"The grant of 1864 was of the ten nearest alternate odd-numbered sections of public land, not mineral, on each side of every mile of the line as definitely located, in a state, and of twenty such sections in a territory. This grant was in praesenti. The lands thus granted are spoken of as `place lands.' They were in two belts each twenty miles wide in states, and forty in territories, parallel to the right of way.
"The Resolution of May 31, 1870, granted, as respects the additional line authorized between Portland and Puget Sound, place and indemnity lands, as granted for the original line by the Act of 1864 [13 Stat. 365]. It also authorized what are spoken of as `second indemnity' belts ten miles wide, on either side of the original indemnity limits, in any state or territory in which the company could not obtain the number of sections intended for it by its charter. This additional grant, however, was conditioned that lieu lands in the second indemnity limits might be chosen only in the same state or territory in which place lands were lost to the grant."
(At page 147 of 180 U.S., at page 312 of 21 S. Ct.) "`That the President of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveyed for forty miles in width on both sides of the entire line of said road, after the general route shall be fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of said railroad; and the odd sections of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale, or entry, or pre-emption before or after they are surveyed, except by said company, as provided in this act; but the provisions of the act of September, 1841 * * *, granting pre-emption rights, and the acts amendatory thereof, and of the act entitled "An act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain," approved May 20th, 1862 * * *, shall be, and the same are hereby, extended to all other lands on the line of said road, when surveyed, excepting those hereby granted to said company. And the reserved alternate sections shall not be sold by the government at a price less than two dollars and fifty cents per acre, when offered for sale.'"
The Court then went on to say (311 U.S. at pages 368-369, 61 S. Ct. at page 287): "A majority of the justices who heard this case are of opinion that the proviso of the Resolution of 1870 required the company to open the lands granted by the Resolution to pre-emption and settlement at the expiration of five years from the completion of the entire road in 1887, whether the lands were then subject to mortgage or not; that its failure so to do was a breach of its contract with the United States and that the Government is entitled, if it can, to prove any damage to it, or advantage to the company, which resulted from this breach of contract."
It is noted that this does not define "the lands granted by the Resolution".
"* * * and in the event of there not being in any State or Territory in which said main line or branch may be located, at the time of the final location thereof, the amount of lands per mile granted by Congress to said company, within the limits prescribed by its charter, then said company shall be entitled, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, to receive so many sections of land belonging to the United States, and designated by odd numbers, in such State or Territory, within ten miles on each side of said road, beyond the limits prescribed in said charter, as will make up such deficiency, on said main line or branch, except mineral and other lands as excepted in the charter of said company of eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to the amount of the lands that have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of susbequent to the passage of the act of July two, eighteen hundred and sixty-four."

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"a one-time and final payment of".
A. 1. The capital projects in paragraph C of this Item are hereby authorized and may be financed in whole or in part through bonds of the Virginia College Building Authority pursuant to § 23.1-1200 et seq., Code of Virginia, or the Virginia Public Building Authority pursuant to § 2.2-2263 et seq., Code of Virginia. Bonds of the Virginia College Building Authority issued to finance these projects may be sold and issued under the 21st Centry College Program at the same time with other obligations of the Authority as separate issues or as a combined issue. The aggregrate principal amounts shall not exceed $121,466,000 plus amounts needed to fund issuance costs, reserve funds, original issue discount, interest prior to and during the acquisition or construction and for one year after completion thereof, and other financing expenses, in accordance with § 2.2-2263, Code of Virginia.
2. From the list of projects included in paragraph C of this Item, the Director, Department of Planning and Budget, shall provide to the Chairmen of the Virginia College Building Authority and the Virginia Public Building Authority the specific projects, as well as the amounts for these projects, to be financed by each authority within the dollar limit established by this authorization.
D. 1. From the proceeds of bonds authorized to be issued by the Virginia Public Building Authority in paragraph A of this Item, there is hereby appropriated $25,000,000 in the second year for the Combined Sewer Overflow Matching Fund, established pursuant to § 62.1-242.12, Code of Virginia and administered by the Department of Environmental Quality. These bond proceeds shall be used by the Virginia Resources Authority and the State Water Control Board to make a grant to the City of Alexandria to pay a portion of the capital costs of its combined sewer overflow control project. Disbursements from these proceeds shall be authorized by the State Water Control Board, under the authority of the Department of Environmental Quality, and administered by the Virginia Resources Authority through the Combined Sewer Overflow Matching Fund.
2. This appropriation is subject to the conditions of § 2.0 F of this act.
3. Except as provided in paragraph D.2 of this Item, the provisions of §§ 2.0 and 4-4.01 of this act and the provisions of § 2.2-1132, Code of Virginia, shall not apply to the project supported in this Item.
E. Funding for the Department of General Services' project to Improve Capitol Campus utilities shall not be released until the department and the City of Richmond have signed an agreement allowing the state to work on any needed improvements to the utilities running through Capitol Square, including a methodology in the agreement that provides for the state's utility bills to be adjusted to offset the state's expenditures for any improvements to the water lines.


Colorado Criminal Law - Understanding An Allegation Of Stalking Behavior - The Crime Of Stalking in Colorado - Denver Criminal Attorney Specializing in Domestic Violence Cases - Colorado Criminal Defense Lawyer.
Stalking is the willful, repeated harassment of another person often this involves intimate partners in a domestic violence relationship. The media frequently report incidents in which the stalker is a stranger to or co-worker of the victim, but a stalker can be charged as any person whose behavior repeatedly harasses another person.
Third: Erotmania – stalker believes she/she is in love with subject (movie star example).
C.R.S. § 18-3-601.The general assembly found that stalking is a serious problem in this state and nationwide. The general assembly enacted the provisions of this statute to encourage and authorize effective intervention before stalking can escalate into behavior that has even more serious consequences.
C.R.S. § 18-3-602(7). – A Peace Officer SHALL have a duty to respond as soon as reasonably possible to a report of stalking and to cooperate with the alleged victim in investigating such report.
There are Three Types of Stalking in Colorado Under The Law – CR.S. § 18-3-602.
1. CREDIBLE THREAT WITH REPEATED FOLLOWING.
(a) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance that person, a member of that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship.
2. CREDIBLE THREAT WITH REPEATED COMMUNICATION.
(b) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly makes any form of communication with that person, a member of that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship, regardless of whether a conversation ensues.
(c) Repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, places under surveillance, or makes any form of communication with another person, a member of that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person, a member of that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship to suffer serious emotional distress. For purposes of this paragraph (c), a victim need not show that he or she received professional treatment or counseling to show that he or she suffered serious emotional distress.
(a) A threat, physical action, or repeated conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be in fear for the person¡|s safety, or the safety of their immediate family, or someone with whom the person has or has had a continuing relationship with.
(b) The threat need not be directly expressed if the totality of the conduct would cause a reasonable person such fear.
The person’s spouse, and the person¡|s parents, grandparents, siblings or children.
On more than one occasion (two or more).
Relevant Statutes C.R.S. § 18-3-602(b), C.R.S. § 18-1.3-401(10), C.R.S. § 18-3-602(4).C.R.S. § 18-6-803.5. C.R.S. § 18-3-602(5)(b), C.R.S. § 18-3-602(5)(b).
Commits a class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense, if the offense occurs within seven years after the date of a prior offense for which the person was convicted.
Stalking is an Extraordinary Risk Crime subject to modification of presumptive range in the C.R.S.
If, at the time of the offense, there was a temporary or permanent protection order, injunction, or condition of bond, probation, or parole or any other court order in effect against the person, prohibiting the behavior described in this section, the person commits a class 4 felony.
In addition, when a violation under this section is committed in connection with a violation of a court order, including but not limited to any protection order or any order that sets forth the conditions of a bond, any sentence imposed for the violation pursuant to this subsection (5) shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any sentence imposed pursuant to section 18-6-803.5 and with any sentence imposed in a contempt proceeding for violation of the court order.
C.R.S. § 16-4-105.(a) Bond Considerations. Courts often set higher bonds in Stalking cases.
(1)(j) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the defendant is released without restrictions.
(1)(k) Any facts indicating a likelihood that there will be an intimation or harassment of possible witnesses by the defendant.
Sentencing Consideration. Courts should consider sentences that deter stalking behavior.
Courts believe that lengthy sentences to incarceration eliminate the stalkers direct access to the victim.
It is appropriate to make no contact provisions a condition of any sentence from probation to prison.


D.C. Law Library - § 1–1163.32. Formal requirements for reports and statements.
↪ Part C. Legal Defense Funds.
↪ § 1–1163.32. Formal requirements for reports and statements.
§ 1–1163.31. Reports of receipts and expenditures by legal defense committees.
Part C-i. Fair Elections Program.
§ 1–1163.32. Formal requirements for reports and statements.
(a) A report or statement required by this part to be filed by a treasurer of a legal defense committee shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the person filing the report or statement and by the individual to be benefitted by the committee.
(b) A copy of a report or statement shall be preserved by the person filing and by the individual to be benefitted by the committee for a period to be designated by the Elections Board in a published regulation.
(c) The Elections Board shall, by published regulations of general applicability, prescribe the manner in which contributions and expenditures in the nature of debts and other contracts, agreements, and promises to make contributions or expenditures shall be reported. The regulations shall provide that they be reported in separate schedules. In determining aggregate amounts of contributions and expenditures, amounts reported as provided in the regulations shall not be considered until actual payment is made.
(d) Any legal defense committee which, after having filed one or more statements of organization, disbands or determines it will no longer receive contributions or make expenditures during the calendar year shall so notify the Director.
(e) All actions of the Elections Board or of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to enforce the provisions of this part must be initiated within 5 years of the discovery of the alleged violation of this part.
Applicability of D.C. Law 22-250: § 10 of D.C. Law 22-250 provided that the change made to this section by § 6(hh) of D.C. Law 22-250 is subject to the inclusion of the law’s fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. Therefore that amendment has not been implemented.


G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014 - MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA AND ERMELINDA HALILI-GARCIA, Respondents.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA AND ERMELINDA HALILI-GARCIA, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 19 May 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587. The appellate court affirmed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the Deputy Sheriff to suspend the conduct of the execution sale of the buildings levied upon by him.
Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77. In its action docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8187, FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the amount of P2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings. Served with summons, Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project. After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having reached an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8187 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the [FGCI] to return to [Villasi] the sum of P1,244,543.33 as overpayment under their contract, and the further sum of P425,004.00 representing unpaid construction materials obtained by it from [Villasi]. [FGCI] is likewise hereby declared liable for the payment of liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the contract price for each day of delay computed from March 6, 1991.
Unrelenting, FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 147960, asseverating that the appellate court erred in rendering the 20 November 2000 Decision. This Court, however, in a Resolution dated 1 October 2001, denied the appeal for being filed out of time. The said resolution became final and executory on 27 November 2001, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment8 made herein.
To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the 20 November 2000 Court of Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC.9 A Writ of Execution was issued on 28 April 2004, commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the 20 November 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied with, a public auction was scheduled on 25 January 2006.
To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim10 and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution,11 claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. To persuade the court a quo to grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The motion was opposed by Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration.
Arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of the sale on execution, Villasi timely filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision15 dated 19 May 2009, the appellate court dismissed the petition. In a Resolution16 dated 28 October 2009, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its decision.
Claiming that the sheriff mistakenly levied the building that lawfully belongs to them, the Spouses Garcia availed themselves of the remedy of terceria under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. To fortify their position, the Spouses Garcia asserted that as the owners of the land, they would be deemed under the law as owners of the building standing thereon. The Spouses Garcia also asserted that the construction of the building was financed thru a loan obtained from Metrobank in their personal capacities, and they merely contracted FGCI to construct the building. Finally, the Spouses Garcia argued that the tax declaration, based on an erroneous assessment by the City Assessor, cannot be made as basis of ownership.
For her part, Villasi insists that the levy effected by the sheriff was proper since the subject property belongs to the judgment debtor and not to third persons. To dispute the ownership of the Spouses Garcia, Villasi pointed out that the levied property was declared for tax purposes in the name of FGCI. A Certification issued by the Office of the City Engineering of Quezon City likewise showed that the building permit of the subject property was likewise issued in the name of FGCI.
[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.26 Quite significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the former’s representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in the name of FGCI.
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,31 that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially,32 such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal.
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
Finally, the issue regarding the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is irrelevant in this case. The Spouses Garcia are trying to protect FGCI from liability by asserting that they, not FGCI, own the levied property. The Spouses Garcia are asserting their separation from FGCI. FGCI, the judgment debtor, is the proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its judgment debt. Piercing will result in the identification of the Spouses Garcia as FGCI itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s judgment debt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deputy Sheriff is hereby directed to proceed with the conduct of the sale on execution of the levied building.
* Per Raffle dated 4 December 2013.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso, concurring. Id. at 43-51.
3 Presided by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig. Id. at 104-106.
4 Presided by Judge Ignacio L. Salvador. Id. at 54-61.
18Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
19Gagoomal v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813, 18 January 2012, 663 SCRA 444, 454-455.
20Corpus v. Pascua, A.M. No. P-11-2972, 28 September 2011, 658 SCRA 239, 248.
21 260 Phil. 401 (1990).
23 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68946, 22 May 1992, 209 SCRA 214, 227-228.
24 518 Phil. 285 (2006).
25 Id. at 296 citing Ganila v. Court of Appeals, 500 Phil. 212, 224 (2005).
26Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 559 Phil. 169, 187 (2007).
27Solar Resources, Inc. v. Inland Trailways, Inc., 579 Phil. 548, 560 (2008).
28 The reason is its soul.
29Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494, 504 (2006).
31Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. Nos. 140528 and 140553, 7 December 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 675.
32 New Civil Code, Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
33 G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
35 108 Phil. 873 (1960).


(1) Married individuals filing joint returns.
(b) Nonresident Individuals. A tax is hereby imposed upon the Kansas taxable income of every nonresident individual, which tax shall be an amount equal to the tax computed under subsection (a) as if the nonresident were a resident multiplied by the ratio of modified Kansas source income to Kansas adjusted gross income.
(C) for tax year 2011, and all tax years thereafter, the surtax shall be in an amount equal to 3% of the Kansas taxable income of such corporation in excess of $50,000.
(d) Fiduciaries. A tax is hereby imposed upon the Kansas taxable income of estates and trusts at the rates provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) hereof.
(e) Tax rates provided in this section shall be adjusted pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 79-32,269, and amendments thereto.
History: L. 1967, ch. 497, § 3; L. 1969, ch. 454, § 1; L. 1970, ch. 394, § 1; L. 1977, ch. 344, § 3; L. 1978, ch. 407, § 2; L. 1979, ch. 321, § 1; L. 1988, ch. 381, § 2; L. 1989, ch. 303, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 280, § 55; L. 1997, ch. 41, § 13; L. 1998, ch. 130, § 19; L. 2008, ch. 182, § 22; L. 2012, ch. 135, § 10; L. 2013, ch. 135, § 1; July 1.


text:
Law Web: Whether unmarried daughter is entitled to get maintenance under Hindu adoption and maintenance Act?
Whether unmarried daughter is entitled to get maintenance under Hindu adoption and maintenance Act?
To our mind, this is a complete answer to the argument canvassed by Mr. Hegde on behalf of the Applicant - husband. In the facts before the Division Bench in the case of Madhavi Ramesh Dudani (supra) also no separate petition was filed under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This Court, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and relying upon the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, opined that the daughters were entitled to maintenance as they had no income of their own and were unmarried. The facts before us are also almost identical. Even before us, the major daughter is taking an education and is unmarried. It is also not in dispute that she has no income of her own to sustain herself. In these facts, at least prima facie, we are fully satisfied that the order passed by the Family Court granting maintenance for the daughter does not require any interference at this stage by granting a stay in favour of the Applicant - husband.
"16. Going by the above exposition, the mother is competent to pursue relief of maintenance for the daughters even if they have become major, if the said daughters were staying with her and she was taking responsibility of their maintenance and education.
Rajendra Mahadeo Deokule Vs. Suvarna Rajendra Deokule and Ors.
K.K. Tated and B.P. Colabawalla, JJ.
1. This Civil Application has been filed by the Applicant (original Appellant) for stay of the impugned order dated 16th July, 2016, insofar as it relates to payment of maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- per month to the unmarried daughter of the Applicant, namely, Ms Mansi Rajendra Deokule (Respondent No. 2 to the Application). It is not in dispute that the unmarried daughter - Mansi is a major. The further direction that is sought is for refund of Rs. 50,000/- wrongly paid by the Applicant towards the monthly maintenance of his unmarried daughter - Mansi. The basic and only ground of challenge and for seeking a stay of the impugned order in this Application is that on the date of passing of the impugned order (namely 16th July, 2016), Ms Mansi was a major (that is above the age of 18 years), and therefore, no maintenance could have been awarded for her under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. According to the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Applicant (original Appellant), maintenance under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can only be granted for the minor children.
2. The brief facts in a nutshell are that Respondent No. 1 herein, namely, Suvarna Rajendra Deokule (wife of the Applicant/Appellant) filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty, being Petition No. A-75/12. In this Petition she also prayed for permanent alimony for herself and for her children. The Applicant herein (original Appellant) also filed a petition for custody of the children being Petition No. D-22/12. After evidence was led by both parties, both these Petitions were disposed of by a common Judgment and Order dated 16th July, 2016 by the Family Court, Mumbai at Bandra. By the impugned order the Petition filed by the wife - Suvarna for divorce was allowed and the marriage solemnized between the Applicant herein and Respondent No. 1 was dissolved by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The prayer of the wife for permanent alimony/maintenance for herself was rejected by the Family Court. The Family Court further ordered that the Applicant herein was to pay maintenance @ Rs. 10,000/- per month each to both the children from the date of the impugned order. It was clarified that the amount awarded was inclusive of and not in addition to the amount awarded in favour of the children in any other proceedings.
3. As far as the Petition for custody of the children filed by the Applicant herein is concerned, the same was rejected by the Family Court. However, access was granted to the Applicant herein for the minor son on the first and third Saturday of every month between 2.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. at the Children Complex, Family Court, Bandra, under the supervision of a Marriage Counsellor. It is aggrieved by this common order dated 16th July, 2016 that the above Family Court Appeal No. 194 of 2016 was filed by the Applicant herein (the husband) inter alia questioning the decree of divorce in favour of the wife and further granting maintenance @ Rs. 10,000/- per month each to both the children. As far as the rejection of the Applicant's Petition for custody is concerned, the same has not been challenged by the Applicant - husband.
4. In this factual backdrop, the only contention that has been canvassed before us in this Civil Application by Mr. Hegde, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Applicant, is that since the daughter-Mansi was a major on the date of passing of the impugned order, the Trial Court could not have awarded maintenance for her. In this regard he placed reliance on Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and contended that in any proceedings under the said Act, the Court may from time to time make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children. He submitted that the Section was ex-facie clear that maintenance could be granted only in favour of minor children and the daughter-Mansi being a major on the date of the impugned order, could not have been awarded any maintenance. In this regard, Mr. Hegde heavily relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of B(husband) v. A(wife) 1992 Mh.L.J. 748. Placing reliance on this decision, Mr. Hegde submitted that no maintenance could have been awarded for the major daughter, and therefore, at least to this extent the impugned order is required to be stayed.
5. On the other hand, Ms Sarnaik, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondents to the Civil Application, submitted that the contention raised by the Applicant herein was wholly misconceived. She submitted that the Family Court was very much aware that the daughter was a major when the impugned order was passed and this fact is reflected in the order itself. She further submitted that under Section 20 and 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, it was ex-facie clear that it was the obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parents or a daughter who is unmarried and unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. She submitted that Section 21 defines the word "dependants" which includes an unmarried daughter. This being the case, she submitted that there was absolutely nothing wrong in the impugned order whilst granting maintenance to the unmarried daughter-Mansi who admittedly was not in a position to support herself and was still taking an education. In support of her submissions, Ms Sarnaik placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge, Dehradun MANU/SC/0835/1997 : (1997) 7 SCC 7 as well as a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vijaykumar Jagdishrai Chawla v. Reeta Vijaykumar Chawla MANU/MH/1079/2011 : 2011(5) Mh.L.J. 724. In these circumstances, Ms Sarnaik submitted that there was no merit in this Civil Application and the same ought to be dismissed.
(bb) That the Ld. Trial Judge ought to have ordered the Respondent alone to look after and maintain two children when the Respondent admittedly is earning nett Rs. 40,000/- p.m. as Teacher by way of salary, Rs. 27,000/- per month as and by way of Rent from the Shop jointly owned by the parties an addition the Respondent gets additional income of Rs. 4 to 5 Lakhs from her imitation jewellery business."
"So far as children are concerned, it is settled law that when both parents are earning, they are liable to contribute equally as proportionate to their income. As stated above, petitioner's income is on higher side than the respondent. Petitioner has prayed for awarding Rs. 15,000/- per month each for the children. She has produced school receipt/educational expenses, extracurricular expenses receipt of the children vide document Exh. 73 collectively. Moreover, today I have enquired from her and she has disclosed that daughter's annual College fees is Rs. 56,000/- and son's annual fees is approximately Rs. 30,000/- per annum. Presently, her daughter is residing in hostel at Pune for UPSC course and her fees are Rs. 64,000/- apart from hostel charges of Rs. 36,000/- and Mess charges of Rs. 40,000/- per annum. She has also disclosed that her son is also going for extracurricular activities like Chess & Karate and she is paying Rs. 12,000/- per annum and school transportation fees of Rs. 8,000/-. Even if the expenses shown for Manasi is considered then it comes to approximately Rs. 1,80,000/- per annum i.e. Rs. 15,000/- per month. So far as son's education and extracurricular expenses are concerned, it comes to Rs. 75,000/- per annum. In addition to that, the child's other requirement like food, clothes, medicine etc. are also required to be considered. Thus, considering all these expenses, the petitioner's claim of Rs. 15,000/- per month each for children appears to be just and reasonable. On the contrary, there cannot be two view that because of hike in the prices of daily needs and essential commodities and cost of living, the amount of Rs. 15,000/- per month for each child looking to the income of parents, can be said to be a bit lower side.
It is informed by the petitioner-wife that in a proceeding under PWDV Act, Court has awarded Rs. 6,000/- per month each for both the children and as the daughter became major, her maintenance came to be closed and son's maintenance is enhanced to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. Thus, having regard to the entire circumstances, income and liabilities of both parties, day to day needs of the children and more specifically educational and extracurricular activities, I find that an amount of Rs. 20,000/- per month for each child would be just and reasonable. Since both parties are working and petitioner's income is a bit higher than the respondent therefore, I find that it would be just and proper to direct both the parties to contribute equally for the children's maintenance. As such, the respondent's liability comes to the extent of 50% i.e. Rs. 10,000/- for each child. Since daughter is still taking education, she is also entitled for maintenance. Thus, having regard to the entire circumstances, I am of the opinion that petitioner is entitled for the maintenance for the children only @ Rs. 10,000/- per month each from the respondent and as she is also earning, she is liable to contribute for the remaining part of maintenance for the children. Accordingly, issue No. 4 is answered."
8. From seeing the observations of the Trial Court, what is clear is that the Trial Court was very well aware that the daughter was a major at the time of passing of the impugned order. We find that the Trial Court, and in our view, correctly granted maintenance in favour of the major daughter who was unmarried and was taking an education.
"20. Maintenance of children and aged parents.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or infirm parents.
(2) A legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor.
(3) The obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parent or daughter who is unmarried extends insofar as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or other property.
Explanation.-In this section "parent" includes a childless stepmother."
(ix) his or her illegitimate daughter, so long as she remains unmarried."
11. On a harmonious reading of Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 with Sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, at least prima facie we are unimpressed with the arguments canvassed by Mr. Hegde. By reading these Sections together and harmoniously, at least prima facie we are satisfied that the Family Court, was well within its powers to grant maintenance to the unmarried major daughter - Mansi, who admittedly was unable to sustain herself out of her own earnings and property and was still taking an education. We, therefore, find that the argument of Mr. Hegde cannot be accepted, at least at this stage.
"29. In the circumstances, there is good substance in the submission of Mr. Thakkar that nothing additionally be provided to the appellant wife when acts of cruelty are alleged against her also and when she is also responsible for the breaking of the marriage. In any case, she has been sufficiently provided and has good income therefrom. We have however to note that she is looking after her two daughters. The daughters are treated as "dependants" until they get married under section 21(v) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. They are entitled to get their maintenance from their father. Considering the fact that the appellant has been looking after these two daughters and she will be continuing to look after them hereafter until they get married. In our view, that is a "circumstance" which has got to be considered when one decides the permanent alimony to be paid to the appellant wife. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act at the time of passing of the decree may direct the respondent to pay the Applicant for her maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the Court to be just. The Court is empowered that such payment may be secured by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. In the circumstances of the case, we have to note that the appellant is looking after the two daughters. They have completed their education. They have become graduates in engineering and management respectively. They intend to further prosecute their studies and then get married. They do not have any income of their own. The appellant is undoubtedly spending for their education and will spend on their marriage. It will not be proper to drive the daughters to file an application under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. In our view, the phrase "other circumstances of the case" appearing in section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is quite elastic and while passing an order under that section, the necessary provision can be appropriately made if the circumstances so justify.
30. The respondent has been made to make such payment from time to time and Mr. Thakkar has stated that he has been making additional payment for education of her daughters on his own. The fact however remains that the burden has been on the appellant all throughout. The burden for further education and thereafter marriage is much more. They are daughters of an industrialist who are being looked after by the mother. In the circumstances, though we may not provide separately for the appellant, considering these circumstances, we deem it just that separate provision should be made for the two daughters along with the appellant. The provision of such an amount will take care of their future education and marriage. In our view, it will be just and appropriate that an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- is provided for each of the daughters. Such an amount shall be kept in RBI Bonds and the interest would be payable to the daughters concerned. At the present rate of 6% interest (tax free), each of them will get annually an amount of about Rs. 60,000/- which will be quite proper considering the cost of living and their status as daughters of an industrialist. In the circumstances, we direct the respondent to invest an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- in the name of each of the daughters. That will reduce the burden on the appellant hereafter. That will be a contribution which is expected of the respondent as a father. He is an industrialist and quite well of. He had divorced his earlier wife. His daughter from the earlier marriage is already married and his son is an adult and is in business. He does not have any major liability. He should provide for these two daughters for their future education and marriage. Thus, though we are passing this order under section 25 of the Act, essentially we are making provision for the two daughters whose liability is otherwise on the appellant but is being shared by the respondent. This is to reduce her liability for the daughters and to make the respondent share his burden of the responsibility. That takes care of the requirement for a separate accommodation and alimony. The respondent is directed to make these deposits also within 3 months hereafter. In view of the above provision, we are not passing any order for marriage expenses though we expect the respondent to act as a good father and share in the burden as and when the occasion arises."
13. To our mind, this is a complete answer to the argument canvassed by Mr. Hegde on behalf of the Applicant - husband. In the facts before the Division Bench in the case of Madhavi Ramesh Dudani (supra) also no separate petition was filed under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This Court, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and relying upon the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, opined that the daughters were entitled to maintenance as they had no income of their own and were unmarried. The facts before us are also almost identical. Even before us, the major daughter is taking an education and is unmarried. It is also not in dispute that she has no income of her own to sustain herself. In these facts, at least prima facie, we are fully satisfied that the order passed by the Family Court granting maintenance for the daughter does not require any interference at this stage by granting a stay in favour of the Applicant - husband.
"16. Going by the above exposition, the mother is competent to pursue relief of maintenance for the daughters even if they have become major, if the said daughters were staying with her and she was taking responsibility of their maintenance and education. In addition, it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Jugtawat v. Martju Lata, MANU/SC/1416/2002 : (2002) 5 SCC 422. In that case the wife had filed application for maintenance for herself as well as her minor daughter under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The same was granted by the Family Court by providing amount of Rs. 500/- per month each. The husband filed revision before the High Court assailing the order of the Family Court on the ground that the daughter was entitled to maintenance only till she attained majority and not thereafter within the meaning of section 125 of the Code. This argument was negatived by the High Court. When the matter went before the Apex Court, the Apex Court upheld the view taken by the High Court and held that the learned Single Judge was right in taking the view that "with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings", no interference with the decision of the Family Court was warranted. The High Court had observed that even though section 125 limits the entitlement of the daughter for maintenance till she attains majority, by virtue of section 20(3) of the said Act of 1956, the daughter is entitled to receive maintenance from her mother or father till her marriage.
17. Applying the principle underlying the above dictum, we have no hesitation in negating the objection of the appellant. Instead, we hold that the respondent is justified in criticizing the objection of the appellant being a hyper-technical plea. Inasmuch as, even if the appellant were to succeed in the present appeal, that would not extricate him from the liability to maintain his unmarried daughter who is staying with his estranged wife. The appellant in law would be bound to not only maintain his unmarried daughter but is also responsible for her education including higher education until her marriage.
18. We may also refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Anwor Ali Haider v. Sakina Bibi, MANU/WB/0142/2005 : (2005) 3 CHN 649. Even in that case, the wife had filed application for maintenance under section 125 of the Court for awarding maintenance in her favour as also her daughter. The Court allowed the said application. After lapse of sometime, the wife filed application for enhancement of maintenance amount under section 127 of the Code. By that time, however, the daughter had attained majority. The husband resisted the application under section 127 on the ground that daughter had attained majority and would not be entitled to get maintenance. The Court while adverting to the decision of the Apex Court in Noor Saba Khatoon, MANU/SC/0827/1997 : (1997) 6 SCC 233 held that even if the daughter had become major, she was entitled to get maintenance from her father till she gets married. Even in that case the application for maintenance was filed by the wife for herself and her daughter. In another case, decided by the Calcutta High Court reported in the case of Amit Roy v. Mira Roy, MANU/WB/0395/1998 : (1998) 4 ICC 348 (Cal) and in the case of Shri Krishna Kanta Bhattacharya v. Smt. Shyamali Bhattacharya, C.R.R. No. 4115/2008 decided on 21st April, 2009 similar view has been reiterated. Even in this unreported decision when the application under section 127 of the Code for enhancement of maintenance amount was filed by the wife alone for awarding maintenance amount to her as well as her daughter, by that time daughter had already become major. The Court awarded enhanced maintenance amount in favour of the daughter who had become major, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings as otherwise she would be forced to file another petition under section 20(3) of the Act of 1956 for maintenance."
15. Looking to the law laid down by this Court, we find that the argument canvassed by Mr. Hegde on behalf of the Applicant - husband, at least prima facie, cannot be sustained.
16. That now only leaves us to deal with the decision relied upon by Mr. Hegde in the case of B(husband) v. A (wife) (supra). On going through this decision, we fail to see how it supports the argument canvassed by Mr. Hegde. This decision opines that on a plain reading of Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it is clear that it can be filed only in respect of minor children. The decision however clearly opines that a major daughter always has recourse for seeking maintenance from her father under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Far from supporting the contention raised by Mr. Hegde, we find that this decision in fact supports the argument canvassed by Ms Sarnaik on behalf of the Respondent - wife.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this Civil Application. It is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. We further direct that the arrears of maintenance, if any, as ordered by the Trial Court in the impugned order, shall be cleared within a period of three months from today. Needless to clarify that the clearance of arrears shall be done by the Applicant - husband without prejudice to his rights and contentions in the present appeal and shall be subject to further orders passed at the final hearing of the appeal.

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