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In patent litigation, assignor estoppel is a common law doctrine that can dramatically alter the rights of both parties involved – when applicable it is dispositive on the issue of patent validity. However, despite the import of this doctrine, there is a lack of clarity of how and to whom this doctrine applies and even to whether this defense exists at all post-Lear. This article summarizes the current landscape of assignor estoppel claims, and highlights the risks to plaintiffs and defendants as to the continuing lack of clarity that this area of the law poses.
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents any assignor of patent rights from later challenging the validity of assigned patent. The intent of this doctrine is evident: a seller should not be allowed to represent to a buyer that a good is valuable, only to later assert that same good is worthless. By invoking this doctrine in the patent context, courts have essentially grafted these equitable protections of contract law onto the predominantly statutory realm of patent law.
The Supreme Court has never abolished assignor estoppel, although many in Congress and the academic community believed that the logical extension of Lear was that, like licensee estoppel, assignor estoppel was also no longer available in the patent context. The uncertainty as to assignor estoppel after Lear is reflected in its divergent treatment by the Courts of Appeals post-Lear. For example, as early as 1972, the Ninth Circuit declared that the doctrine was abolished in patent infringement cases. But the Fifth Circuit held the opposite in 1978.
Nevertheless, on multiple occasions, the Federal Circuit has upheld the doctrine of assignor estoppel, extending that doctrine to those in ‘privity’ with the assignor as well. Those in ‘privity’ include companies that hire the assignor in cases where the assignor is an individual; companies that were in a joint venture with the assignor’s company; and companies that are subsidiaries of the company which hired the assignor.
The Federal Circuit most recently applied the doctrine of assignor estoppel in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc. The case involved inventors who previously worked for Mentor Graphics. As per Mentor’s employment agreement, the inventors assigned all patent rights to their inventions to Mentor. One of those inventions matured into a patent – the ’376 patent. Later, the inventors left Mentor to form the start-up EVE-USA, which produced similar products to Mentor. Rather than risk an infringement lawsuit with Mentor, EVE-USA signed a license agreement to practice the ’376 patent until such time as EVE-USA was bought by a competitor.
When the entity Synopsis, a direct competitor of Mentor, bought EVE-USA, Mentor threatened suit over alleged infringement of the ’376 patent. In response, Synopsis countersued for a declaratory judgment that the ’376 patent was invalid. Mentor Graphics claimed that because Synopsis was in privity with EVE-USA and therefore the inventor-assignor, it was estopped from alleging that the ’376 patent was invalid. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment barring Synopsis from challenging the validity of the ’376 patent.
A Federal Circuit panel upheld its precedent and estopped EVE-USA from making its invalidity claim. Synopsis petitioned for re-hearing en banc. Judges Moore and Chen – who were both on the opinion panel – wrote a concurrence explaining the denial as to the assignor estoppel aspects. This concurrence stated that it “may be inclined to reconsider the breadth of the doctrine of assignor estoppel, but this case is not a proper vehicle to do so.” The concurrence acknowledged the amicus of law professors which challenged the breadth of assignor estoppel doctrine but noted that the petitioner’s argument in this case was a narrow one – simply that the doctrine was abolished by Lear.
EVE-USA has since petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that in light of Lear, and the expanding of assignor estoppel to entities in ‘privity’ with the assignor, the Federal Circuit has gone “far beyond even the origins [the Supreme Court] already renounced [in Lear].” Four amicus briefs have been filed in the case and the Supreme Court has asked for the views of the Solicitor General.
EVE-USA’s petition now brings the question that the majority in the Federal Circuit reasoned was not squarely before the Supreme Court in Lear: should assignor estoppel be abolished?
There are arguments for both outcomes. Those who argue in favor of assignor estoppel’s continued availability point to the underlying principles of contractual obligations and fairness that undergird patent assignments: “[w]hen an inventor/assignor assigns his patent rights to someone else for value, he may make an implicit representation that what he sold has value.” To bring equity to contracting parties, some argue that an individual should not be allowed to profit off what she truly believes is not novel or inventive.
On the opposite side, those who argue against assignor estoppel assert that fairness and contractual transparency considerations should not apply in certain factual circumstances such as when inventors assign patent rights as a condition of their employment and therefore do not make any representations of value to their employer. Another circumstance in which application of assignor estoppel may not make sense is when the privity aspect implicates an entity to whom no representation was made at all (e.g., a company that buys the assignor arguably does not ‘buy’ the promise that previously assigned patents were valuable).
If the Supreme Court should grant the petition in EVE-USA, it will have an opportunity to bring clarity to a contentious area of patent litigation. Of course, as seen in the Federal Circuit opinion and denial of en banc below, the Supreme Court could dodge providing any real clarity on assignor estoppel because of the narrow grounds argued by Synopsis to the Federal Circuit. Namely, the Supreme Court could merely say that Lear did not abolish assignor estoppel and leave it at that because that was, at least in the Federal Circuit’s view, the extent of the argument made on appeal by Synopsis. Even so, that would at least answer the question of whether Lear abolished assignor estoppel as well as licensee estoppel.
Of note, at least one Court of Appeal, the Eighth Circuit, has made an attempt to chart a middle ground in a separate but related context. In Fair Isaac, a claim of licensee estoppel was made in the trademark context. Notably, Lear did not abolish licensee estoppel for non-patent IP cases. The case involved a license agreement between the credit bureau Experian, and FICO, to use FICO’s famous credit score scale trademark. During litigation between FICO and Experian, FICO objected to Experian’s argument that the trademark was invalid. The district court allowed the argument. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit was faced with balancing the equitable considerations of licensee estoppel (a licensee of a trademark cannot claim that what they bargained for is now worthless) and the need to promote free and fair competition.
As against Experian, the Eighth Circuit found that licensee estoppel did apply, because the parties were directly in privity. However, as against VantageScore, a separate entity connected to the credit bureaus, the Court reasoned otherwise. Noting that plaintiff FICO did not “present evidence, nor did the district court find, that VantageScore was the alter ego of Experian or the three credit bureaus collectively,” the Court found that “VantageScore was not a licensee and therefore was not estopped from challenging the mark under a theory of agency or equity.” Such a nuanced approach into the ‘privity’ question may have relevance in the assignor estoppel context in a patent case.
The lack of clarity over when and how assignor estoppel applies, and whether the Federal Circuit has impermissibly deviated from the command of Lear, continues to make strategizing litigation outcomes challenging for clients that litigate as plaintiffs or as defendants. This confusion is exacerbated by the increasing ways in which companies associate themselves with one another, through collective entities, patent portfolio assignments, cross-licensing agreements, and other varying degrees of ‘privity.’ While the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit—to hold that an additional ‘alter ego’ element must be shown before loosely affiliated entities will be considered in privity with the licensee or assignor—might resolve part of problem, it does not yet apply to patent law. EVE-USA is before the Supreme Court—and this is a good opportunity to bring clarity and predictability to an important feature of patent litigation.
 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
 See, e.g. Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Assignor Estoppel, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 513, 529 (2016); Patent Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 218 (1971) (Chamber of Commerce).
 Coastal Dynamics Corp. v. Symbolic Displays, Inc., 469 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
 Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 840 (M.D. Fla. 1976), aff’d 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978).
 Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793-96 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
 851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc denied, 870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 870 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (denying petition for rehearing en banc).
 Brief in Support of Petition for certiorari, EVE-USA, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Corp., No. 17-804 at 2 (2017).
 Mentor Graphics, 870 F.3d at 1306.
 See Brief in Support of Petition, supra note 13 at 20 (“Because [patent rights assignments] are a standard part of employment . . . the [inventor] is not making any representations to her employer about the patent-worthiness of the invention.”).
 See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 650 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2011).
 Id. at 1150 (“Following trial, FICO moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of licensee estoppel, requesting a new trial that precludes Defendants from presenting evidence and argument challenging whether the mark is entitled to protection.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).


In lieu of tax or tax equivalent payments are not taxes. Payments in lieu of taxes are intended to replace lost property tax revenues. A governmental entity may not require payments in lieu of taxes without specific statutory authorization.
Industrial Development Corporations . Pursuant to T.C.A. § 7-53-305, an industrial development corporation and all properties owned by it, and the income and revenues therefrom, and all bonds issued by it, and the income therefrom, is exempt from all taxation in the state of Tennessee.8A municipality (county, city, town, or metropolitan government) has the power to delegate to an industrial development corporation the authority to negotiate and accept from the corporation's lessees, payments in lieu of ad valorem taxes; provided, that any such authorization will be granted only upon a finding that such payments are deemed to be in furtherance of the corporation's public purposes as defined in the statute. Municipalities that do not levy a property tax are prohibited from negotiating PILOT agreements unless the county signs off on the agreement or the municipality or the IDB agree to pay the county the property taxes that would otherwise be due. 9 PILOT agreements for retail projects may only be negotiated if certain criteria are met. T.C.A.§ 7-53-305, Pursuant to T.C.A.§ 7-53-305, PILOT payments can be waived for 23 years without the approval of ECD and the comptroller. Under T.C.A. § 48-101-312(b), Health, Educational and Housing Facility Corporations are authorized to negotiate PILOT agreements with respect to tax-credit housing projects without any delegation from the municipality unless the municipality adopts an ordinance or resolution requiring the agreements to be approved by the municipality. Housing authorities have been granted this same authority in counties without such corporations. Industrial development Corporations have been granted this same authority with respect to tax-credit housing projects. T.C.A. § 7-53-305.
4T.C.A. § 7-52-307. See also Knox Co. ex rel. Kessel v. Lenoir City, 837 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the 1987 Act specifically permits the allocation of payments among taxing jurisdictions to be established by means of a private act).
9T.C.A. § 7-53-305(b). See also Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 85-264 (October 22, 1985)(discussing the apportionment of in lieu of tax payments between various governmental entities).
1116 U.S.C. § 831 et seq.


In Barbato v. Greystone Alliance, LLC et al., a recent precedential decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held an entity whose business is the purchasing of defaulted debts for the purpose of collecting on them falls squarely within the “principal purpose” definition of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), even where the entity does not collect the debt and a third party is retained to do so. No. 18-1042, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. 2019).
Specifically, Barbato expanded the Supreme Court’s holding in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) and rejected the defendant’s argument that Henson renders it a creditor rather than a debt collector because “its principal purpose is the acquisition—not the collection” of debt. Thus, the Barbato court held that where an entity meets the “principal purpose” definition, it cannot avoid the FDCPA’s requirements by retaining a third party to collect the debt.
Action Item: In a change of course from its prior holding in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit rules that the terms “settlement” and “settlement offer,” in connection with collecting of a time barred debt, may connote litigation and thus mislead a consumer. However, the Court continues to hold that settlement terms alone do not necessarily constitute deceptive or misleading practices under the FDCPA.
As satisfaction for a debt in the amount of $4,491.47, Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“MCMI”) sent a notice to Carieri offering various debt settlement payment options resulting in savings from continued payments under the terms of the loan (the “Notice”). Specifically, the Notice offered to extinguish the debt if a discounted total payoff was received by a certain date, resulting in savings of 40 percent (or $1,796.58). Carieri’s complaint alleged that the Notice violated the FDCPA by failing to inform the debtor of the potential tax consequences posed by the savings from the discounted payoff of the debt.
In considering MCMI’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court turned to other federal courts including the Second Circuit for guidance on whether the FDCPA expands a debt collector’s duties with regard to notifying a debtor of tax consequences of debt settlement. Specifically, the Court held that as in Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2015), the Notice did not violate the FDCPA, even though the letter did not warn of potential tax consequences.
The Court granted MCMI’s dispositive motion, and confirmed that a debt collector’s failure to advise a debtor of the tax consequences for a discounted payoff does not serve as a basis for a claim under the FDCPA.
 Although Carieri attempted to raise a second FDCPA violation purportedly posed by the Notice in his opposition to the dispositive motion under review, Chief Judge Jose Linares denied Carieri’s attempt to expand his claims, offering a stern reminder to plaintiffs that untimely efforts to amend pleadings—to survive disposition or otherwise—will be barred. Nonetheless, in dicta, the Court roundly rejected Carieri’s last-ditch effort to amend finding that the Notice was misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.
 The Court also relied upon the following cases in reaching his decision: Smith v. Nat’l Enter. Sys., Inc., No. 15-541, 2017 WL 1194494 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2017); Rigerman v. Forster & Garbus LLP, No. 14-1805, 2015 WL 1223760 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015); Landes v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 774 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Va. 2011); Schaefer v. ARM Receivable Mgmt., Inc., No. 09-11666, 2011 WL 2847768 (D. Mass. July 19, 2011), and rejected the holding in Ellis v. Cohen & Slarnowitz, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 219-20 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010).


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This article seeks to underline the central challenges to world order that are outcomes of our current system of global, social, power and constitutional processes. The article outlines these major problems which it is suggested represent a crisis for the future trajectory of human survival and well-being. The paper then uses the problem of the emergence of transnational criminal activity in order to underline the limits of the current global paradigm of governance. In effect, in the criminal law context the jurisdiction of sovereign states to attack the problem of transnational crime is hedged with severe limitations. The most important of these limitations is the fact that the jurisdiction over crimes by sovereigns is limited by the territorial character of the definition of sovereignty. Thus a sovereign has a limited capacity to control and police criminal activity whose main locus of operation is generated outside of the territorial reach of the sovereign state. This essentially means that the element of global governance generates a juridical vacuum which permits organized crime to flourish outside of the boundaries of the state but at the same time, having the capacity to penetrate and corrupt the social, political and juridical processes of the sovereign state. The article explores the effort of the UN to provide some form of response to this crisis in the form of an international agreement.
The most important global expectation about global governance is reflected in the Preamble of the UN Charter and it is authorized by “we, the people” of the earth/space community. That expectation includes the high priority humanity gives to international peace and security; the reaffirmation of faith and fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and equal rights for men and women and nations of whatever size. It also underscores the importance of the global rule of law as well as the promotion of social progress, better standards of life, and expanding freedoms. That is the promise. However, at the practical level the institutions of global governance have been to a large extent a captive of their own history. That history emerged with scholars in the late 1500s and early 1600s (Bodin and Hobbes) and later was given a juridical imperator in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In the early 19th century Bodin, Hobbes, and Westphalia were given a powerful juridical imprimatur when John Austin published his influential book The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. In effect, from Bodin to Austin we have the developments from scholarship, to political agreement to creation of a jurisprudential foundation for the notion of the territorially organized sovereign state. The sovereign state became the currency of international relations, diplomacy, international law, as well as a powerful limitation on the force and efficacy of both international law and constitutional law.
2. The growth of civil society deviance may threaten world order when it develops into forms of apocalyptic terrorism, state terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, global drug production and distribution, and trading in small arms and/or components of mass destruction.
3. Global political economy of radical inequality. Conventional economic theory seems to lead a global race to the bottom. More wealth is produced than ever before and greater inequality is produced as well. Greater wealth concentrations often result in plutocracy which favors the wealthy and greater alienation for the impoverished. What is needed is an economic paradigm that is not confined to a single state or sovereign but a paradigm that functions within the context of a global, social and political process and responds to the problems that emerge from this process from a global inclusive perspective.
4. The depreciation of a human right to development, a depreciation that undermines the value potentials of human capital for the improvement of the human prospect. Clearly, the right to development is a human right of global dimensions and requires a global solution to effectively respond to it. The solution here is beyond the parochialism of national sovereignty.
5. The importance of a viable ecosystem for the survival of humanity requires policy making that is beyond the nation states’ competence. In short, global warming and climate change are matters of inclusive global concern. All must participate because all have a stake in preserving a viable ecosystem for all.
6. Human demographics and human survivability. The radical population increases raise the question of whether food security and accessibility to clean healthy water may be put at risk when earth’s population exponentially increases. Demographic growth may well challenge eco-social and economic capacity of the earth to indefinitely sustain such increases without important radical innovations in birth control, food production, and water conservation. These issues transcend any particular nation state.
7. The global capacity to respond to natural catastrophes (tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, asteroid collisions). It’s now well accepted that such catastrophes require global action because the capacity of any particular sovereign is limited in this regard.
8. The global health crisis (AIDS, malaria, TB, Ebola, etc). It is clear today that any emergent global pandemic will be beyond the capacity of any single sovereign state. Such health threats are really beyond the current paradigm.
The issues listed above represent a crisis for global humanity and as well underline a weakness of the existing paradigm which is a state sovereign dominant paradigm. This underscores the need for new and fresh thinking, nothing short of a new paradigm for understanding and responding to the global crisis of our time. To provide a more detailed explanation of the limits of the state sovereign paradigm we provide an overview of the background and possible value for humanity of an important UN initiative to enhance a global paradigm of governance with regard to a particular problem that defies the exclusive authority of the sovereignty approach. In this initiative we underscore the effort to strengthen the global rule of law, as an indispensable element for a new paradigm of global governance.
The initiative that we focus on is the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. In general, this instrument defends the rule of law precept as a stabilizing and transformative component of a world order that honors and respects the dignity of all the people. How then does the UN convention against Transnational Organized Crime,2 in general, impact on the major themes just specified? What does the convention have to do with the rule of law and the earth-space community?
The convention represents recognition of the harsh reality that crime is not simply a localized phenomenon. Indeed, it recognizes that a huge segment of crime is international; it is transnational; it is indeed global. In particular, the identification of a critical segment of global crimes namely the phenomenon of ‘organized’ crime, underlines the particular threat that this form of crime presents for world order, and in particular the rule of law foundations of world order.
The historically territorial nature of criminal law had a close correspondence with the principles of juridical and political sovereignty.3 The functions of sovereignty directly conditioned the reach and efficacy of the prescription, application and enforcement of criminal law, with serious territorial limitations.4 This undermined the efficacy of the state to control and regulate crimes having trans-state or transnational character. From an international perspective, the global system is still largely a constitutionally state-centered system.5 The system has limited the power of organized global society to control and regulate crimes of the magnitude represented by transnational organized criminal syndicates and gangs. In effect, it provides a loophole in our global system of law and public order. It is a dangerous loophole because it tolerates a juridical and political vacuum within which organized crime can thrive.
The success of transnational organized crime means that vast amounts of ill-gotten proceeds are outside the reach of organized political authority. These proceeds are better seen as bases of power and material resources for the support of organized transnational crime. They permit it to become globally institutionalized, to become competitive for power, to become a threat to states large and small. Indeed, organized crime might be seen to represent an alternative normative order (a negative utopia) which supports brute force over law, order and civility.
The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is a truly significant milestone in international law and cooperative world order. The problem of organized crime as indicated is an especially dangerous threat to world order and to the basic principles of the UN Charter, which is the living symbol of the constitutional order upon which the contemporary international rule of law is based. Transnational organized crime is not simply antisocial, apolitical and economically exploitative, it is much more.
The core characteristics of the challenge of organized crime to the sovereignty and independence of the sovereign state may be that its power rests on the unrestrained use of brute, arbitrary force, intimidation and coercion. Moreover, its reach may corrupt the vital social process of the state such as business, governance, family, education, labor, law, and even possibly the institutions of religious affirmation. The threat organized crime presents to sovereignty, self-determination, independence, good governance and democratic values is serious. But the threat of organized crime to the state is even more critical. Organized crime is often unconstrained by territorial or political boundaries. Political and juridical sovereignty may be limited by the restraints inherent in sovereignty itself. Thus, territorial boundaries crucial to sovereign law enforcement may be a hindrance to the control of systematic, institutionalized crime, sustained by bases of power that are rooted in violence, with vast unaccountable financial resources and animated by the capacity to corrupt and coerce the legitimate institutions of governance and civil society. Organized crime in this context threatens the very constitutional foundations of world order; it is thus a threat to the rule of law, indeed to the idea of law itself.
The political, geographic and economic ‘space’ between sovereign nation states has long been seen as an arena where organized crime can function without an effective process of control and policing. There is no ‘super sovereign’ with a centralised mechanism that might readily fill the spaces between sovereigns. More than that, weak states and new states, often styled as emerging market states, may be stuck with powerful institutions of organized crime. South Africa is a case in point. The corruption of law enforcement processes during the period of repressive apartheid created a vacuum in law enforcement. The new, post-apartheid democratic order was challenged by the penetration of organized crime groups during and immediately after the miracle of transformation. The legacy the new regime had to confront was an incredible wave of crime, a huge quantum of which was inspired by the ‘imperialist’ character of transnational criminal syndicates. It is also remarkable how speedily the new authorities acted to reorganize law enforcement agencies and to enact vital legislation to empower the authorities to attack organized crime in the new emerging democracy.7Even older states, unaccustomed to the overreaching nature of organized crime, have feltthe influence of its activities.8Weaker states may not be able to effectively bring the power of law to constrain or limit the power of organized crime. Indeed, its power might penetrate and undermine the legitimate institutions of state and society in many contexts.
The convention thus attacks a critical world order problem. It seeks to fill the cracks in the global, political and juridical vacuum created by a system primarily organized around territorially based nation states. It also recognizes the problem that sovereignty may be abused, through inadvertence, incompetence or gross astigmatism, to create safe havens for the operatives of organized crimes as well as their assets. The convention prescribes a situation in which safe havens will become increasingly rare. It recognizes that cooperation among sovereign states is a necessary basis for effectively attacking the threat posed by organized crime.
The limits of traditional extradition are apparent when we recognize that traditional extradition law does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the movement or laundering of money.9Asset forfeiture and international controls over bank secrecy mean that the convention effectively prescribes a serious limitation on safe havens for the assets of organized crime.10Very importantly, asset forfeiture has long been known to be a critical tool in the fight against organized crime. With procedures and rules to facilitate investigations, particularly regarding the status of assets, as well as cooperation in the protection of witnesses11and the general framework for broadening the mutuality of legal assistance,12 there has been a major step forward in the development of an effective regime in the fight against organized crime. A quick perusal of issues of bank secrecy, forfeiture,13witness protection14and money laundering15suggests that the cooperation required to make this regime work is itself the outcome of the harsh and brutish reality of transnational organized criminal behavior. It also suggests that there is a changing idea of the relationship of the international rule of law to the idea of state sovereignty. The expression of cooperative sovereignty16in this kind of treaty is a vital and important constitutional principle of the new millennium.
The millennium coincides, as noted, with the post-Cold War world. Former U.S. President George Bush once visualized this world as a ‘kinder and gentler’ world. Bush’s optimism coincided with an unvarnished armed attack on Kuwait by Iraq. The central problem posed by the attack was that it was a clear violation of one of the core principles of international constitutional order,17which prohibits and declares unlawful acts of aggression. Although the Cold War was awash in acts of ‘indirect’ aggression or aggression through surrogates, the specific use of armed forces to extinguish the sovereignty of an independent state immediately raised the stakes of the post-Cold War world, as a world subject to even the attenuated restraints of the rule of law, and the rejection of even minimal restraints.
As the Gulf War came to an end, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia presented a huge threat to human rights and humanitarian concerns. In effect, thoughtful scholars contemplated a ‘non-law’ state characterized by so called ‘ethnic conflicts’. At the back of the ethnic cleansing policies of the Serbian and other ethnic elites were challenges to the rule of law in a global sense. If ethnic cleansing and ethnic conflict were both incomprehensible and not amenable to the restraints of law, did policy makers then not contemplate the rejection of the juridical and normative restraints of the UN Charter itself? Were these crises matters of global concern or were they indicators of the limits of global concern, and global law?’18Was the stress on ‘limits’, a disguised claim to repackaged isolationism, to parochial identifications, to chauvinism and unilateralism at the expense of responsible, cooperative internationalism? Defining the ‘universal’ scope of the international rule of law is vital to any lofty vision of world order based on universal ideals of security, peace and dignity.
As the international community slowly responded to the problems of South-East Europe, the ethnic conflict in Rwanda spiraled out of control when Hutu militias systematically butchered nearly a million of their Tutsi countrymen. These problems (and many others) underlined the idea that the rule of law is not a national or international luxury, a symbol of pure impractical lofty idealism. Rather it is also a critical restraining element in the core global issues of peace, security, human rights and a minimal respect for humanitarian concerns; it was and is a vital component of the effort to constrain globalism’s harsh realities as well.
Whatever the full importance of these issues is, a few general considerations about globalism seem obvious from the perspective of the rule of law. The world of global events, facts and occurrences might require that the rule of law be more adequately defined in a more comprehensive (universal) context and that normative values in some important degree are inherent in the broader identification with the international rule of law. If the rule of law is seen as controversial in the context of war and security matters, other areas of globalism may directly impact on rule of law responsibilities, especially in the area of development which often implicates demographics, including population policy and reproductive freedoms. In short, impact of demographics on development and the capacity of states to deliver an adequate standard of living. Development dysfunctions can nurture criminal behaviors and be a fertile arena for penetration by organized crime syndicates.
law and the threat of organized transnational criminal behavior.
The idea of cooperative sovereignty is connected below to the nature of the international rule of law and its relationship to the international constitutional system and the promise of a lofty ideal.
Like all laws, the UN Charter has been under constant pressure to affirm its promise and its universal lofty ideals. There has also been insistent pressure sought to limit the effect of the charter as a critical, indispensable framework for a defensible world order. It was a former US Secretary of State27 who suggested that in the aftermath of the atomic age, the charter itself had become a near-obsolete instrument of world order. Indeed, assertions of power to intervene by the superpowers as they declared exclusive zones of security-based extra-territorial interests created real tensions between the letter and the spirit of the charter, and the exigencies of claims to expanded spheres of national security influence.
Even if one believes that the end of the Cold War represents a demise of ‘history’, its legacy for the international rule of law will linger long after its causes are forgotten. Events confronting international legal order after the Cold War brought back a sobering reality. There is indeed a harsh sociopolitical reality in global society. Moreover, this reality represents a real threat to the UN Charter system if it is not effectively confronted. Transnational organized crime as well as the epidemic of humanitarian crimes are only a part of the global problem, as the list of harsh reality issues illustrates.
The harsh reality of globalism also confronts us with the public policy challenge of how to change the harshness, which includes the widespread suffering humanity experiences under current world order conditions. This challenge requires a more articulate normative road map – a more explicit form of policy guidance. Such guidance may be rooted in many sources of comparative, cross-cultural and moral experience, as well as in the UN Charter’s promise of a deepening awareness of the importance of human dignity as a universal moral, ethical and juridical imperative.
Normative guidance found in the scholarly discourse of morality, ethics and value analysis might also provide incentives to policy makers to enhance the prospects of transformation, at least in the direction of a global public and civic order founded on the universal ethic of respect for the dignity and worth of all of humanity, as well as the earth-space environment which makes human survival and transformation possible. The prospect of an improved human future is therefore an important expectation of the normative guidance based on an ethic of universal human dignity.
The central problem some modern philosophers and moralists have grappled with is that human dignity based on universal respect is in fact a cluster of complex values and value processes. In order to enhance human dignity in policy contexts, integration of many of these values is required. Specific prescription and application of values to enhance human dignity is indeed a complex matter.28 At an abstract philosophical level, these values may indeed seem to be incommensurable.29 At an operational policy level, ostensibly conflicting values may have to be contextualized and more deeply analyzed in light of broader, more abstract formulations of value judgment. Thus, values such as power, respect, rectitude, affection, enlightenment, wellbeing, skill and wealth must be construed and interpreted in terms of their enhancement of a more abstract human dignity/human rights postulate. The policy maker seeking enhancement of the ethic of universal dignity must develop complex techniques of decision making, including sophisticated standards of construction and interpretation.30 Does evaluating the value of liberty induce the sacrifice of the value of equality? It is at this ‘operational’ level that practical lawyers, social scientists and real-world policy makers must make critical decisions about how to integrate often ostensibly conflicting values and norms genuinely to enhance the universal ethic of human dignity.
For example, in South Africa the Constitutional Court was confronted with a claim by a political party actively involved in the struggle against apartheid that the ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ statute which provided amnesty for those who should otherwise be prosecuted for grave violations of human rights was both unconstitutional and a violation of international law.31In effect, the court was confronted with a truth and reconciliation procedure which was a critical component of the internal peace process as well as the process whereby the disenfranchised mass of South Africans could gain their political freedom. This procedure was, however, in ostensible conflict with universally accepted norms of international law which do not provide derogable excuses for heinous crimes against humanity.
Does the ethic of universal respect and human dignity demand absolute, universal compliance at the expense of other universally accepted values? To ensure that the values of respect, democratic entitlement and humanitarian law standards are honored requires fine-tuned analysis and great subtlety in the structure and process of decisional interventions. Rules of construction and ‘interpretation’ are painfully worked out, which hold, for example, that even if a peremptory principle (jus cogens) of international law embodies an obligation erga omnes, it should be evaluated, appraised and construed so as to enhance rather than disparage similar rights which may also have to be accommodated. The currency behind the universal ethic of essential dignity and respect is that it provides practical decision makers with goals, objectives and working standards that permit the transformation of law and practice into a greater and more explicit approximation of the basic goals and standards built into the UN Charter system itself, which prescribes a public order committed to universal peace and dignity for the people of the entire earth-space community.
Practical decision makers and interpreters might gain more normative guidance about the universal ethic of human dignity, since this is expressed in six keynote concepts embodied in the UN Charter. These concepts embody the global community’s fundamental expectations about global constitutive and public order priorities.32Indeed, these concepts are vital if the interpretation of international law is to be guided by explicit standards of normative understanding built into the ethic of universal respect for human dignity. In short, the construction and interpretation of modern international law (i.e. its specific prescription and application) may be rootless, arbitrary, and even quixotic if it is not subject to explicit standards of normative guidance, which are expressed, inter alia, in the concrete terms of the UN Charter itself.
The eradication of millions of human beings with a single nuclear weapon or policies or practices of ethnic cleansing, genocide and mass murder hardly values the dignity or worth of the human person. What is of cardinal legal, political and moral importance is the idea that international law based on the law of the charter be interpreted to enhance the dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be complicit in the destruction of the core values of human dignity. The negative utopian ideals of transnational organized crime make this principle a crucial component of normative guidance. The fourth keynote precept in the preamble is emphatically anti-imperialist. It holds that the equal rights of all nations must be respected. Principles such as non-intervention, respect for sovereignty, including political independence and territorial integrity are also issues that remain under constant threat of penetration by organized criminal activity. The fifth keynote precept in the charter preamble refers to the obligation to respect international law (this effectually means the rule of law) based not only on treaty commitments but also on ‘other sources of international law’.36 These other sources of law include values which complement efforts to promote ethical precepts built into expectations of the universal ideals of morality. The sixth keynote precept in the preamble of the charter contains a deeply rooted expectation of progress, improved standards of living, and enhanced domains of freedom and equality. Organized crime represents the antithesis of this prospect.
basic structures of governance and administration respect the rules of natural justice such as nemo judex in sua causa or audi alteram partem, and in general constrain the abuse of power and thus the prospect of caprice and arbitrariness in governance.
The idea of law, based on a comparative, cross cultural, historic reality, is that human beings interact within and without community lines. In so doing, they exchange, they commit wrongs intentionally or unintentionally, they require some security over their possessions and entitlements, and their systems of governance aspire invariably to constrain the impulse for abusing power. In this anthropomorphic sense, law protects or secures the most elementary conditions of social coexistence. Let us describe this as the function of minimum order and assume that it is an aspect of ‘law’, and of ‘justice’.
It is also in the nature of human beings that they are transformative in their capacity for growth and in their relations with others. Human beings exist not only spatially but also in terms of the duration of time and events. There is hopefully a tomorrow, a next week, next month, next year, or next century. Human beings are transformative agents who make things happen, and in doing so, underline the question also embedded in the nature of law and community, i.e. that we can change things for better or worse, for the common good or the special interests, for the sense of expanding human dignity or the prospect of a negative utopia, the rule of human indignity. It is in this sense that law as minimum order confronts the idea of justice and potentiality. It is commonly thought that minimum order is a critical, but not absolute, condition of a more just, more decent, more optimistic human prospect. The rule of law precept is uncontroversial in the sense of minimum order and its ‘boundaries’. Peace, security, and minimal standards of human rights are reflections of these values in international, constitutional and municipal law.
The rule of law idea in the above sense protects both the individual and the community (the village). By seeking to secure the conditions of basic security for human coexistence, by seeking to ensure that coexistence will not be subjected to arbitrary and capricious exercises of power, the rule of law provides a constitutive architecture which permits human beings to transform themselves in terms of loftier ideals; in terms of something akin to the Palermo renaissance. The great British political scientist, Leonard Shapiro, was once asked what the real difference was between a totalitarian state and one committed to the culture of democracy. He unhesitatingly responded that it was the rule of law, in the sense that it was the basic mechanism for constraining the prospect of arbitrariness in governance. In short, the rule of law is the protective shield against the abuse of power by arbitrary means, by both private and public actors.
What, then, is the relationship of the rule of law to the notion of cooperative sovereignty which is suggested here to be a cornerstone of the convention? One of the most important values embedded in the UN Charter is the obligation of national sovereign states to cooperate in the achievement of its purposes and objectives. This charter precept is codified in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.37The principle of cooperative sovereignty recognizes the limits of traditional sovereignty and sees the prospect of strengthening the sovereignty of the state, through cooperation, to realize common objectives and common interests. If such cooperation can be achieved in the sensitive area of jurisdiction over criminal activity, then an enlargement of the boundaries of cooperation may bring an even greater awareness of how common problems and mutually experienced crises can be more effectively confronted and resolved. The UN Charter’s constitutional promise as the Rule of Law Cornerstone of cooperation is thus the key to making the rule of law a critical component of an improved world order.
The rule of law is an idea rooted in the principle of practical realism. Yes, human social process can have systemic dysfunctions creating harsh realities. The rule of law is critical in the process of ameliorating and then changing those harsh realities. If it is successful it will maximize the prospect that loftier ideals of human organization and reciprocal respect can occur. Those values are no mystery. They include Roosevelt’s four freedoms: the freedom from fear and from want, the freedom of expression, and the freedom of conscience and belief. They are today reflected in President Jacques Chirac’s ‘universal and emblematic values’, namely, ‘liberty, equity and solidarity, tolerance, non-violence, respect for nature and shared responsibility.’38They are reflected as well in the International Bill of Rights and its commitment to universal human dignity. As the Palermo experience aptly demonstrates, the rule of law issue is not someone else’s problem: it is everybody’s. It is a moral and juridical problem. It requires the collective effort and solidarity of all – individuals, institutions of civil society (professional, academic, voluntary) and institutions of law as well as governance at all levels to move the being and becoming of our global village from the harsh reality of deprivation to the abundant reality of mutual respect and universal dignity. The Palermo renaissance invites us to renew our commitment to the rule of law as a crucial pillar for the lofty ideals that give us a reason for being.
In conclusion, it is important to stress the place of the Organized Crime Convention in a renewal of the promise of the international system based on the UN Charter. The cooperation inherent in the sovereign obligations of this treaty will enhance the realization of the ideals of a universal international ethic as the basis of a truly universal rule of law. The principle of cooperative sovereignty is an ethical and juridical milestone. Both ordinary individuals and state representatives must work toward the adoption and the effective application of this convention (and its protocols) with all deliberate speed. Todelay ratification and adoption in effect supports the criminals. To obstruct ratification and adoption is, effectively, to demonstrate solidarity with a common enemy of mankind. To expeditiously adopt the convention and give it full efficacy is to cement the ties between state and people. It will give genuine meaning to the ringing words of the UN Charter ‘We the peoples...’ upon which the authority of law and ultimately international ethical comments are based. Finally, the Organized Crime Convention underlies a critical problem in the current paradigm and takes a small step in the direction of a new paradigm of cooperation and solidarity for the earth/space community.
Among the most important global organized crime cartels is the Mafia. The role of the ‘mafia’ in Sicilian political culture and criminal deviance is well described in James Fentress (2000) ‘Rebels and The Mafiosi: Death in a Sicilian Landscape’. The book is also favorably reviewed by Peter Robb, ‘Family Business’, in the New York Times Book Review, 7th January, 2001, at 23. The term ‘mafia’ appeared in the national vocabulary (of Italy) in 1885. According to Robb, ‘Mainland Italy’s alarmed discovery of how deeply rooted organized crime was in Sicily was part of a wider shock experienced by bourgeois northern Italians when they began to discover the hidden culture of southern Italy and the dramatic lives of their new fellow citizens.’ Ibid. at 23. About the historic character of the mafia: it is according to Fentress and Robb an ‘. .. old form of criminal exploitation of the Sicilian people by a small number of their fellows.’ An important contemporary insight into the Palermo renaissance lies in the political fact that ‘[a] strong indigenous civil culture today is implacably opposed to the ways of the Mafia’. The re-establishment of the mafia in Sicily as a potent ‘political’ and criminal syndicate is partly due to the conduct of the United States Army in 1943: ‘Mussolini’s fascist regime had effectually brought the Mafia under state control and many of its leaders were imprisoned.’ As Robb indicates, ‘Mafia opportunism had worked brilliantly in 1943 by serving the American invaders and regaining for the Mafia overnight all the territorial control it lost under fascism. Only in Sicily did Cosa Nostra perfect that parasitic vesting of criminal interests in the body politic that has been a model for the rest of the world’s organized crime.’ Ibid. Finally, criminal networks like Cosa Nostra do ‘control a significant part of the global economy. .. ’, they ‘impinge in terrible ways on many millions of lives, and they all follow Cosa Nostra’s example of growth through political alliances’. On the Palermo renaissance, see ‘New Ways To Fight Back’, from CIVITAS, Palermo World Congress: Civic Education Works (1999), http://www.civnet.org/civitas/ palermo/cived.htm. See also Umberto Santino, ‘Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against the Mafia and Organized Crime’, CSD. http://www. centroimposto.it/publ/online/mcdonald.htm.
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 105, UN Doc. A/55/383 (2000) ( hereinafter the convention).
Winston Nagan, ‘Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Duke Journal of International Comparative Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1995): 135-146.
Winston Nagan, ‘Lawyer Roles, Identity and Professional Responsibility in an Age of Globalism’, Florida Journal of International Law, No. 12 (2000).
The term ‘kleptocratic’ is a neologism.
L. de Koker, (2000) ‘Money Laundering Control in South Africa – A South African Response to an American Comment’, unpublished manuscript, on file with the author.
B. Ryder, (n.d.) ‘The Enterprise of Crime: Organized Crime in the United Kingdom’, unpublished manuscript, on file with the author. For example, see the European Convention on Extradition (13th December, 1957) Europ. TS 24, 359 UNTS 274. The convention provides for confiscation of assets, including forfeiture which is defined as ‘the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority’. The Convention, ref. 2 above, Art. 2(g) at 25.
The Convention, ibid., Art. 24, at 43.
Ibid., Art. 18, at 37.
Ibid., Art. 12, at 31.
Ibid., Art. 24, at 43.
Ibid., Art. 7, at 28.
UN Charter, Arts 55, 56.
UN Charter, Art. 2, para. 4.
For a skeptical appraisal of new world order interventions, see Chomsky, N. (1999) ‘The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo’, Common Courage Press, Monroe, Maine.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, at 29, UN Doc. S/Res/827, 32 ILM 1203 (1992).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 on Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda (with annexed statute). SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, at 15, UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); reprinted in Weston II.E.12.
Is a UN International Criminal Court in the US National Interest: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998).
See generally Nagan, ref. 4 above.
For a skeptical appraisal of the economic foundations of neoliberal ‘globalism’ see N. Chomsky (1999) Profit and People: Neo Liberalism and Global Order Seven Stories Press, New York/London. See also PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report, (1999-2000) Vol. 9, No. 1, Leiden, The Netherlands, 3.
The literature on these crises themes in international law is extensive. For a general orientation see Falk, R. A. (1989) ‘Revitalizing International Law’, Iowa State University Press; Mohammed Bedjaoui, M. (1979) ‘Towards A New International Economic Order’, UNESCO, Paris; Kohler, G. (1978) ‘The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid: Empirical, Normative, Existential’, Alternatives – A journal of World Policy, Vol. 4; Falk, R. and Meyrowitz, E. (1980) ‘Nuclear Weapons and International Law’, Julian Journal of International Law, 29, 541; Nagan, W. (1999) ‘Nuclear Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of the Millennium’, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 2; Weeramantry, C. (1987) ‘Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Responsibility’, Kluwer, Cambridge, MA; Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (1991) ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AJIL 613; Purvis, N. ( 1991) ‘Critical Legal Studies in International Law’, 32 HILJ 81; Falk, R. A. (1997) ‘The World Order Between Interstate Law and The Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions’, reprinted in Weston, Falk and Charlesworth, ‘International Law and World Order’, p. 49.
J. Chirac, (2000) ‘Universal Values’, The United Nations Millennium Summit, 6th-8th September, 2000, p. 6.
The tension between the technological advances of nuclear weapons and the UN Charter is indicated in Dulles’s idea that the UN Charter was ‘a pre-atomic age’ constitution; it was, he held, ‘obsolete before it actually came into force. As one who was at San Francisco, I can say with confidence that if the delegates there had known that the mysterious and immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic.’ Foster Dulles, J. (1953) ‘The Challenge of Our Time: Peace with Justice’, ABAJ 1063, 1066.
Values considered widely to implicate the human dignity precept are deemed to be implicit in the Universal Declaration. These values include power, wealth, respect, rectitude, enlightenment, wellbeing, health, skill, affection, rectitude and possibly aesthetics. See McDougal, Lasswell and Chen (1980) ‘Human Rights and World Public Order’, Yale University Press, Connecticut; Nagan, W. (1993) ‘Africa’s Value Debate’, East African Journal of Peace and Human Right, Vol. 1; (1991) ‘African Human Rights Process: A Contextual Policy-Oriented Approach’, Southwestern University Law Review; (2000) ‘African Jurisprudence’, Encyclopedia. of the Philosophy of Law.
J. Gray, (1996) ‘Isaiah Berlin’, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, especially chs 2, 3, 4 (Pluralism, History, Nationalism).
See generally, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331; 1969 UNJYB 140; 1980 UKTS 58, Cmnd 7964; reprinted in 8 ILM and 1 Weston IE, 1.
See Azanian People’s Organization v President of the Republic of South Africa, CCT 17/96; see also Nagan and Adkins (2001) ‘Conflict Resolution and Democratic Transformation: Confronting the Shameful Past – Prescribing a Humane Future’, SALJ, forthcoming.
See ‘Legality of Nuclear Weapons’ (1996) LCJ at 443 (Weeramantry J, dissenting).
See GA Res 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 21, UN Doc A 8028 (1971).
See Chirac, ref. 26 above, at 6.

matches:
Art. 2
Art. 24
Art. 18
Art. 12
Art. 24
Art. 7
Art. 2


Kurt A. Maethner, Respondent vs. Someplace Safe, Inc., Appellant, Jacquelyn Jorud f/k/a Jacquelyn Hanson Maethner, Appellant – Case No. A17-0998: Respondent Kurt Maethner brought defamation claims against appellant Someplace Safe, Inc., a nonprofit organization that provides advocacy services to victims of domestic abuse, and appellant Jacquelyn Jorud, his former wife. The defamation claims stem from statements appellants made about Jorud’s personal experiences as a survivor of domestic abuse. The district court granted appellants’ motions for summary judgment.
Thaleaha McBee, Appellant vs. Team Industries, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A17-0060: Appellant Thaleaha McBee worked as a machine operator on the production line for respondent Team Industries, Inc. Two days after McBee informed Team that her physician had given her a 10-pound lifting restriction, Team terminated her employment. McBee filed suit, asserting claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.43 (2016). The district court granted summary judgment to Team, in part, because the district court found that the ability to lift more than 10 pounds was “an essential function” of McBee’s position.
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Appellant vs. Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners, Respondent – Case No. A18-0201: After a landowner requested repairs, respondent Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners (Board) determined that a reestablishment of records was necessary for Judicial Ditch No. 9. During the reestablishment proceedings, appellant Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) raised several concerns with the Board. The DNR claims that the Board disregarded those concerns when it issued an order reestablishing drainage system records pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E.101, subd. 4a (2016).
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Vern Jason Mouelle, Appellant – Case No. A18-0083: A grand jury indicted appellant Vern Jason Mouelle with several offenses, including premeditated murder and premeditated murder of an unborn child. Mouelle pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. During an ex parte discussion of an issue related to opening statements, defense counsel told the district court that if Mouelle testified, a discussion was needed on the guidelines set forth in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (explaining that threatening to withdraw from representation in an attempt to dissuade a client from committing perjury does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness). Mouelle later testified without any further discussion of Whiteside. While reading its instructions to the jury, the district court misspoke using the word “or” once when it should have said “and.” After the jury found Mouelle guilty as charged, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release for the convictions of premeditated murder and premeditated murder of an unborn child.
Claude Bruton, Jr., Respondent vs. Smithfield Foods, Inc. and ESIS, Inc., Relators – Case No. A18-0914: Employee-respondent Claude Bruton injured his shoulder and face while working at Smithfield Foods. Smithfield paid short-term disability (STD) wage-loss benefits to Bruton. Smithfield later agreed that Bruton was owed workers’ compensation benefits in the form of temporary disability benefits (TTD) from the date of injury and continuing forward. When Smithfield reduced the TDD payments by the amount of STD benefits that were previously paid, Bruton objected to the offset. The parties stipulated that “Smithfield maintained” the STD benefit through a plan, which “is not an ERISA plan” because the funds that pay the plan’s benefits “are funds owned by Smithfield and the plan is administered by Smithfield.” Based on the stipulated facts, the compensation judge agreed that Smithfield was entitled to an offset.
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. According to the WCCA, the plan was not an entity that is authorized to make payment of workers’ compensation benefits because it was not a self-insured employer, the State, the Special Compensation Fund, or a workers’ compensation insurer. Thus, the STD benefits were not workers’ compensation benefits for which an offset could be claimed.
Megan Ashley Olson, et al., Respondents vs. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, Appellant – Case No. A17-1083: Respondent Megan Ashley Olson was arrested and charged with felony first-degree driving while impaired (DWI), a “designated offense” under Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(e) (2016). Police seized the vehicle that Megan was driving—a 1999 Lexus owned by Megan’s mother, respondent Helen Olson—pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 6, 8 (2016). Respondents received proper and timely notice of the seizure and intent to forfeit pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b)-(c). On October 7, 2015, they filed a timely demand for judicial determination of the vehicle forfeiture in the form of a civil complaint pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e), raising a number of defenses and claiming that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional. A court trial was set for February 11, 2016. But the trial was rescheduled multiple times pending the outcome of Megan’s related implied-consent and criminal DWI matters. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(d) (2016).
On October 14, 2016, respondents moved for summary judgment. A hearing took place on February 23, 2017. The district court granted the respondents’ motion, concluding that Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(d), does not provide for meaningful review after a prehearing vehicle seizure and no meaningful hardship relief and, therefore, violates due process. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that although subdivision 9(d) is constitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional as applied.
In re Petition for Reinstatement of Larry Severson, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0099363 – Case No. A17-0895: An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney Larry Severson should be reinstated to the practice of law.
Nonoral: Charles Waters, et al., Relators vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A18-0580: Relators Charles and Anita Waters received a Homestead Credit Refund for property taxes payable in 2014. Concluding that relators under reported their income for purposes of determining refund eligibility by failing to include funds received under a PELL grant, respondent Commissioner of Revenue issued an order assessing relators for the amount of the refund that was allegedly overpaid. The tax court granted the Commissioner’s summary judgment motion, holding that under Minn. Stat. § 290A.03, subd. 3(a)(xiii) (2016) (providing that “income” includes “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants”), PELL grants are considered income for purposes of property tax refunds.
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant vs. Fedor Pakhnyuk, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A17-0474: The State charged Fedor Pakhnyuk with several offenses, including interference with the privacy of a minor, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a), (e)(2) (2016). This statute makes it a crime if a person “(1) enters upon another’s property; (2) surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the window or any other aperture of a house or place of dwelling of another; and (3) does so with intent to intrude upon or interfere with the privacy of a member of the household.” Id., subd. 1(a). Thus, to prove that Pakhnyuk interfered with the privacy of a minor, the State was required to prove, among other things, the entering element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(1), the gazing element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(2), and the specific-intent element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(3).
Following a trial, a jury found Pakhnyuk guilty of all the charged offenses. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed Pakhnyuk’s conviction for interfering with the privacy rights of a minor.
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. John Lee Bowen, Appellant – Case No. A17-0331: Appellant John Bowen was charged with simple robbery and making threats of violence based on allegations that he walked out of a liquor store without paying for a bottle of alcohol and threatened to return to the store to harm employees. A jury found Bowen guilty of simple robbery but not guilty of making threats of violence.
Bowen appealed his simple robbery conviction, arguing that the bottle of liquor taken from the liquor store does not fall within the definition of “personal property” under Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016). The court of appeals affirmed Bowen’s conviction, holding that the term “personal property” in the simple robbery statute includes all property owned by a person or entity, other than real property.
City of Richfield, Respondent vs. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., Appellant – Case No. A17-1275: Respondent City of Richfield terminated the employment of a police officer after an internal investigation concluded that the officer (1) used excessive force during an encounter with an individual, (2) failed to properly document or report his contact with the individual, and (3) violated his training and the standards of conduct reasonably expected of a Richfield police officer. Appellant Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., filed a grievance challenging the termination.
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Heath Allen Atwood, Appellant – Case No. A17-1463: Appellant Heath Atwood was charged with fourth-degree driving while impaired after causing a motor vehicle accident. Atwood filed a motion to suppress the blood sample used to test his alcohol concentration, arguing that the sample was improperly obtained by law enforcement from the hospital while he was being treated for injuries. The district court granted the suppression motion, holding that the sample was protected by the physician-patient privilege, codified in Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016).
The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the term “information” in the statute does not include a blood sample.
David Lee Henson, et al., Respondents vs. Uptown Drink, LLC, Appellant – Case No. A17-1066: Respondents David Henson, et al., asserted negligent-innkeeper and dram-shop claims against appellant Uptown Drink. The claims arose from the death of Maxwell Henson, who was fatally injured while trying to help eject an aggressive patron, Nicholas Anderson, from Uptown Drink. The district court granted Uptown Drink’s motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. With respect to the negligent-innkeeper claim, the court of appeals concluded the district court’s “application of primary assumption of the risk, as a matter of law, was not appropriate.” With respect to the dram-shop claim, the court of appeals concluded there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anderson’s intoxication was the proximate cause of Maxwell Henson’s injury.
Julie A. Soderberg, Respondent vs. Lucas Anderson, Appellant – Case No. A17-0827: Respondent Julie Soderberg, a ski instructor, sustained significant injuries in a collision with appellant Lucas Anderson, a snowboarder. The collision took place while Soderberg was giving a ski lesson on a trail that was marked as a slow-skiing area. Soderberg brought a negligence action against Anderson, alleging that he failed to snowboard under proper control. The district court granted Anderson’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars the negligence action.


text:
On January 25, 1941 the Leningrad Aviation Institute (LAI) was founded on the former premises of the Leningrad Road Institute (Gastello Street, 15) by the Decree of the Soviet Government. 1200 students were enrolled in three faculties of Aircraft Construction, Instrumentation and Motor Building. During the Great Patriotic War the Institute operated an aircraft and tank repair shop. While some of the students and the faculty standing for the city, the LAI was evacuated.
April 8, 2019 Renaissance Hotel held the Round Table within the Week of Germany in St. Petersburg by DAAD Information Center, German House of Science and Innovations (DWIH) in Moscow and German R&D Community (DFG).
The Round Table brought together 20 Russian universities and 15 German universities to discuss Russia-Germany student exchange problems, attractiveness of St. Petersburg for international students, tools and strategies for academic mobility.
SUAI was represented by the Vice-Rector for International Affairs Konstantin V. Losev and the Head of the DIA International Cooperation Sub-Department Yulia V. Makarova.
The event opened with greeting speech by the Head of DAAD Information Center Beate Kolberg promoting scientific cooperation between Russian and German education to follow with DWIH and DFG presentations on R&D exchange and technologies.
The Round Table dwelled on relevant issues of education and international cooperation answering current challenges.
April 5, 2019 SUAI welcomed a Chinese delegation from Xi’an Jiaotong University (XJTU), a C9 member and a large R&D center.
The delegation was greeted by the SUAI Vice-Rector for International Affairs Konstantin V. Losev, the Vice-Rector for Educational Technologies and Innovative Activities Vladislav F. Shishlakov, the Director of the Institute of Radio-engineering, Electronics and Communication Alexander R. Bestugin, the Director of the Institute of Entrepreneurship Technologies Arthur S. Budagov and the Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Law Mikhail V. Serbin.
Konstantin V. Losev opened the meeting with the SUAI’s presentation on education and international experience with PRC.
Alexander R. Bestugin and Vladislav F. Shishlakov, directors of SUAI’s technical education, spoke on research by students and staff of their institutes.
Arthur S. Budagov and Mikhail V. Serbin described educational process in Business and Law programs.
SUAI’s science and education leaders invited the guests from XJTU to participate in the University’s annual conferences and workshops.
In the negotiations the parties found common points of interest, resulting in strengthening cooperation in education and science.
March 28, 2019 SUAI became the venue for the City Conference on Space, Intellect and Creativity to promote space exploration among school students. Supported by Russian space communities, education committees and Moscow district administration, the Conference helps young students make their first steps towards R&D.
The Conference develops scientific view of the world involving teenagers into research and projects guided by the Institute of Fundamental Training and Technological Innovations (FTTI) at SUAI.
March 20, 2019 the ExpoForum of St. Petersburg hosted the XIX Ecology of Big City International Forum to bring together Russian industry promoting innovative environmental protection equipment and resource saving technologies.
SUAI’s students in technosphere security participated in the Forum to see talks on development of high-tech environmentally friendly and safe production, nature conservation and improvement of the quality of life in big cities.
Seminars and round tables within the Forum shared knowledge on technological and legal aspects of industrial processes and waste disposal for better ecology.
The Forum gave SUAI’s students experience and new contacts for future internships.
March 15-16, 2019 SUAI participated in the University of Future Forum to discuss modern science and technology environment, advanced technology spaces and science parks. The Forum answered questions on effective development of science parks in the region.
The plenary session on innovative ecosystems included the speech by the SUAI Rector Yulia A. Antokhina promoting SUAI’s approaches in building ecosystems and interacting with technology and industry. Yulia A. Antokhina believes that educational process itself should be an ecosystem comfortable for students.
March 6-7, 2019 Kazan welcomed the IV Pan-Russian Congress of UNESCO Departments – the international centers of science and education ensuring innovative processes in educational organizations.
Today Russia is the home for 67 UNESCO Departments headed by the Coordination Committee.
Pan-Russian Congress of UNESCO Departments works every four years to exchange experience and facilitate development of science and education. The IV Congress discussed Sustainable Development Goals within Education-2030 Program.
Odre Azule, the General Director of UNESCO visited the Congress in Russia to choose the new Coordination Committee. The SUAI President and the Head of SUAI’s UNESCO Department Anatoly A. Ovodenko was elected to the Committee.
SUAI took part in the II Interregional Forum ‘Strengthening of the International SME Alliance between the Russian Federation and the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean’ within the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2017 (SPIEF’17) held on the premises of the St. Petersburg Expoforum.
SPIEF’17 was attended by representatives of over 30 countries – Trade and Economy ministers, diplomats, state export officials, big business.
Prior to the opening the St. Petersburg Vice-Governor S. Movchan had a meeting with the delegations of Latin America and the Caribbean.
In the meeting the St. Petersburg officials discussed the topical issues with delegates from Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, Suriname, Panama, Uruguay, and other.
At SPIEF’17 SUAI was represented by the Vice-Rector for International Affairs K. Losev and L. Kheyfets and V. Kheyfets of the SUAI Department of International Entrepreneurship to meet, among others, E. Zhikh, the Director of Russia-Latin America Business Center and sign an Agreement on Cooperation.
The Forum ended in signing an official protocol by A. Shchetinin, the Director of Latin America Department of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Shchetinin and Carlos Ernesto Chanduvi Suarez, Chief of Latin America and the Caribbean Division, UNIDO.
March 4, 2019 SUAI held the International Forum on Metrological Support commemorating 75th anniversary of Professor Vladimir V. Okrepilov, Doctor of Economics, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The SUAI Rector Yulia A. Antokhina and the SUAI President Anatoly A. Ovodenko marked the guest’s merits in developing Russian science and increasing cooperation between education and industry.
In 2005 Vladimir V. Okrepilov opened the Department of Metrological Support in Innovative Technologies and Industrial Security at SUAI.
Vladimir V. Okrepilov largely contributed to development of competences, discussed by the Forum.
SUAI opens preparations for Young Professionals competitions (WorldSkillsRussia) in Aerospace Systems Engineering.
Profile Institutes of SUAI will form student teams to work with SolidWorks Cad, braze radio equipment components, perform linear measurement, create programs in C++ etc.
February 28 and March 1, 2019 St. Petersburg hosted the International Labour Forum with a round table on Higher Education Intellectual Capital in Continuous Education by SUAI.
The SUAI Rector Yulia A. Antokhina, University experts and St. Petersburg administration discussed training models in education and career.
“The university today shall teach about modern technologies and keep the educational process up-to-date. Although it is essential to understand that any higher education is just a base in personal development and young experts shall not cease to progress after they graduate”, Yulia A. Antokhina said.
The round table talked on digital transformation and rapid increase of technological competences to provide better understanding between education and industry.
February 28, 2019 Vasilievsky Congress Hall hosted the 24th Education Horizons Exhibition of Education to help undergraduates choose a university to suit their needs.
For universities it was an opportunity to enroll students providing them with detailed information on educational process.
In the Exhibition students passed guidance tests and consulted psychologists to make the choice of their future education easier.
Among St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region Universities SUAI’s stand traditionally aroused much interest.
February 20, 2019 the SUAI’s Rector Yulia A. Antokhina participated in the Session of the Council of Rectors of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region with a report on WorldSkills Russia approaches in the national education system.
The SUAI’s Rector talked on cooperation between SUAI and the Young Professionals initiative promoting future competences to address current challenges for Russian education.
The Session was also visited by the Vice-Governor of St. Petersburg Vladimir N. Knyaginin.
For those attracted by the stage. Acting skills, stage speech, creative realization.
The club of intellectual games, for those who can use their brains!
Raising the sense of humor to the cosmic heights.
Opening every secret of radio. Make yourself heard!
Want to sing? Do it! We will teach you, help you, sing to you!
The magic of movies, the magic of television. We can make anything!
The secrets of true professionals. Reveal the extraordinary in the ordinary!
All styles and techniques. Creativity with no limits. We know everything about music!
Journalism, design, publishing. For those who have a word to say to the world!
A dance? A sport? The cheerleader group! The choice of the beauties, the athletes and the talents!
For those who cannot live without dance. Classical, folk, modern dance. We dance everything!
For decades, SUAI graduates — leading designers, chief engineers, heads of large industrial enterprises — have been shaping the aircraft, the space and the instrumentation engineering.

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Arthur P. Simpson, Michelle D. Wehnes, Simpson Deardorff, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
James W. Hammes, Cramer Multhauf Hammes LLP, Waukesha, WI, for Defendant.
Michael Graham ("Graham") sold insurance for American National Property and Casualty Company ("ANPAC") for almost five years. He operated under an agency agreement with ANPAC that purports to stifle his ability, for one year, to solicit or accept business from ANPAC policyholders if he left the company. Less than three months after ending his relationship with ANPAC, Graham had submitted 79 cancellation requests from ANPAC policyholders. Invoking this Court's diversity jurisdiction, ANPAC brought this action alleging that Graham (1) misappropriated trade secrets in violation of section 134.90 of the Wisconsin Statutes, (2) breached his contract with ANPAC in two different ways, and (3) breached a common law duty of loyalty to ANPAC. ANPAC has similar actions with similar facts pending in two Wisconsin state courts against two other former agents named Tom Brass ("Brass") and Michael Moran ("Moran").
Graham now moves the Court to "exercise its discretion [to] transfer the litigation in [this mater] from the United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin to the Circuit Court of Racine County, or . . . the Circuit Court of either Waukesha or Kenosha County." (Mot. for Order Transferring Litig. to the State of Wisconsin Circuit Court at 1.) Graham gives three reasons for his request: (1) the litigation pending against Brass and Moran involve the same issues as this case; (2) ANPAC is forum shopping because it suffered adverse rulings on motions in the Brass and Moran litigations; (3) the issues in this case will require review by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
Graham's first two arguments hardly warrant discussion. Well over one hundred years of law illustrate the rule, in one fashion or another, that when a federal court has original jurisdiction of a matter a plaintiff has the right "to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court and that court [is] bound to take the case and proceed to judgment. It [cannot] abdicate its authority or duty in favor of . . . state jurisdiction." Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Wilcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ("When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction."); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ("But the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction."); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 322 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1963) (collecting cases). Graham concedes that this Court has original, diversity jurisdiction. The fact that similar litigation is currently pending in state court is irrelevant. ANPAC has the right to invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction and this Court has a duty to take the case and proceed to judgment.
The list goes on. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) ("We have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress."); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (commenting on the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them"); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) ("`When a federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.'" (quoting Wilcox, 212 U.S. at 40)); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given").
That duty is all but absolute, however, which makes Graham's third argument only slightly more formidable than his first two. Graham maintains that this case involves important issues about Wisconsin's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and he urges the Court to transfer the litigation to state court so that the state can resolve issues about its own laws. Graham does not cite any law to suggest what precedent would encourage (or require) the Court to grant his request.
Whether knowingly or unknowingly, Graham must be invoking the doctrine of abstention, since that doctrine covers the exceptional circumstances under which a federal court may decline or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction. "The doctrine of abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate the controversy before it." Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Abstention is confined to a few general categories.
One type of abstention, often called Pullman abstention (after R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)), involves cases that present a federal constitutional issue that may no longer arise (or arise in a different context) once a state court has resolved state law questions. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814. There are no federal constitutional issues in this case, so Pullman abstention does not apply. Another type of abstention involves cases in which federal jurisdiction is invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings, certain types of state nuisance proceedings, or collection of state taxes. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816. That is frequently called Younger abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and it does not apply here, either. A third type of abstention is commonly referred to as Burford abstention. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford "allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if  it presents difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar or if  its adjudication in a federal forum would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1996). Even putting aside Quackenbush's holding that Burford abstention may be exercised "only [in cases] where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary," id. at 731, Burford abstention does not apply here. There are no questions of state law "bearing on policy problems of substantial public import."
The Colorado River Court also recognized situations when the doctrine of abstention would not apply but when "wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation" might call for federal courts not to exercise jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quotation omitted). Those situations require "contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions" — in other words, the same litigation pending in both a federal and state court. Id. Though the Colorado River Court distinguished such situations from those in which abstention is appropriate, the doctrine has nevertheless come to be known as Colorado-River abstention. Whatever the doctrine may be called, it does not apply to Graham's case. The Colorado River Court noted that "the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention." Id. at 818. Such circumstances are not present here, if for no other reason, because there is no concurrent state court action involving these parties. See also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ill. v. Cruz, 396 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2005) ("`This circuit has recognized consistently that the primary duty of the district court is to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law; the presumption is against abstention.'" (quoting Sverdrup Corp. v. Edwardsville Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7, 125 F.3d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir 1997)).
It is worth noting that the second type of Burford abstention may not be exercised unless the state offers some type of specialized proceeding for the adjudication of the parties' claims. See Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 153 F.3d at 363-64. Undoubtedly, that does not apply here.
Graham maintains that there are open questions of Wisconsin law about whether customer information can be a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.90. ANPAC alleges that the policyholder information that Graham used to secure business from ANPAC policyholders is a trade secret. Twenty-three years ago the Wisconsin Supreme Court held precisely the opposite. Corroon Black-Rutters Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883 (1982). Applying principles from the Restatement of Torts, the Corroon court concluded that a list containing names and other information about insurance policyholders was not a trade secret. Id. But that was before Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has a set of criteria different from the Restatement of Torts for determining whether something is a trade secret. Wis. Stat. § 134.90. Graham contends that whether Corroon is still good law is an open question and one properly addressed by Wisconsin courts. That argument, at least so far as Graham develops it in his brief, is frivolous.
Wisconsin cases decided since the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act hold that, while the factors considered in Corroon are still helpful, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act embodies the correct legal standard to determine whether something is a trade secret. See Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Wis. 1989) (reversing lower court decision that customer list is not trade secret under Corroon test of Restatement factors and remanding for consideration of whether customer list is a trade secret under Wis. Stat. § 134.90); Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 693 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Wis.Ct.App. 2005) (restating Minuteman holding that whether a customer list is a trade secret is measured by Wis. Stat. § 134.90). Indeed, the language of the Minuteman decision is unmistakable: "[T]he Corroon test no longer embodies the definition of trade secret." Minuteman, 434 N.W.2d at 779. It is difficult to understand what Graham contends is an open question; and " Burford abstention is rarely, if ever, appropriate when `the state law to be applied appears to be settled.'" Int'l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 815). The merits of this lawsuit are for another day, however. For now, suffice it to say that Graham has not made the Court aware of any policy problems of substantial public import that transcend the results of this case. Consequently, there is no basis for his motion asking the Court to transfer this litigation to state court.
Graham's Motion For Order Transferring Litigation To The State Of Wisconsin Circuit Court [Docket No. 9] is DENIED.


text:
Section 739, R.S. § 4668, related to substitution of lighthouses for lightships.
Section 740, acts Mar. 3, 1915, ch. 81, § 5, 38 Stat. 927; Aug. 28, 1916, ch. 414, § 3, 39 Stat. 538; June 20, 1918, ch. 103, § 5, 40 Stat. 608; June 5, 1920, ch. 235, § 1, 41 Stat. 927, related to post-lantern lights on particular waters.
Section 740a, act May 22, 1926, ch. 371, § 6, 44 Stat. 626, related to post-lantern lights on Allegheny and Rock Rivers.
Section 740b, acts June 23, 1874, ch. 455, § 1, 18 Stat. 220; June 17, 1910, ch. 301, § 6, 36 Stat. 538, related to lights and buoys on Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri Rivers.
Sections covered by section 541 of Title 14, Coast Guard.

matches: § 4668 § 5 § 3 § 5 § 1 § 6 § 1 § 6