(1) Serve in an advisory capacity to the governor, the standing committee on commerce of the senate, the standing committee on economic development of the house of representatives and the joint committee on economic development.
(2) Assume central responsibility to develop, with the guidance of both the private and public sectors, all facets of a comprehensive long term economic development strategy.
(3) Coordinate the strategy development with all other state and local agencies and offices and state educational institutions which do research work, develop materials and programs, gather statistics, or which perform functions related to economic development; and such state and local agencies and offices and state educational institutions shall advise and cooperate with the secretary of commerce in the planning and accomplishment of the strategy.
(4) Evaluate and analyze the state's economy to guide the direction of future public and private actions, and report and make recommendations to the governor, the standing committee on commerce of the senate, the standing committee on economic development of the house of representatives and the joint committee on economic development with respect to the state's economy. The report to the committee on commerce of the senate, the committee on economic development of the house of representatives and the joint committee on economic development under this subsection shall be made by the secretary of commerce, either: (A) By publishing such report on the internet and by notifying each member of the committees that the report is available and providing, as part of such notice, the uniform resource locator (URL) at which such report is available; or (B) by submitting copies of such report on CD-ROM or other electronically readable media to such committees.
(5) Oversee and evaluate the state's economic development activities on an ongoing basis through the establishment of goals, priorities [and] performance standards and the periodic program audit of those goals, priorities and performance standards.
(6) Oversee the implementation of the state's economic development plan and monitor updates of that plan.
(7) Provide appropriate oversight to ensure the successful implementation of Kansas Venture Capital, Inc.
(8) Oversee the targeting of scarce state resources by size and sector of economic activity and by geographic location within the state in order to enhance the state's potential comparative economic advantages.
(9) Review and evaluate the annual report of Kansas Venture Capital, Inc. The secretary of commerce shall transmit recommendations concerning the Kansas Venture Capital, Inc. activities to the governor and the legislature no later than September 1 of each year.
(10) Evaluate and report on the effectiveness of the activities of the Kansas bioscience authority as provided in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 74-99b09.
(b) The secretary of commerce shall seek advice from the general public and from professional associations, academic groups and institutions and individuals with knowledge of and interest in areas of economic development and planning.
(c) All interested state agencies shall cooperate with the secretary of commerce in providing information and other assistance as may be requested for the performance of its duties with respect to the state's economic development plan.
History: L. 1986, ch. 298, § 4; L. 1990, ch. 283, § 2; L. 1993, ch. 136, § 11; L. 1996, ch. 88, § 9; L. 2002, ch. 151, § 7; L. 2003, ch. 154, § 70; L. 2004, ch. 112, § 53; L. 2012, ch. 65, § 10; July 1.


It is the policy of the Weber School District to support secure network systems in the district, including security for all personally identifiable information that is stored on paper or stored digitally on district-maintained computers and networks. This policy supports efforts to mitigate threats that may cause harm to the district, its students, or its employees.
All persons who are granted access to the district network and other technology resources are expected to be careful and aware of suspicious communications and unauthorized use of district devices and the network. When an employee or other user becomes aware of suspicious activity, he/she is to immediately contact the district’s Information Security Officer with the relevant information.
This policy and procedure also covers third party vendors/contractors that contain or have access to Weber School District critically sensitive data. All third party entities will be required to sign the Restriction on Use of Confidential Information Agreement before accessing our systems or receiving information.
It is the policy of Weber School District to fully conform with all federal and state privacy and data governance laws. Including the Family Educational Rights and privacy Act, 20 U.S. Code §1232g and 34 CFR Part 99 (hereinafter “FERPA”), the Government Records and Management Act U.C.A. §62G-2 (hereinafter “GRAMA”), U.C.A. §53A-1-1401 et seq and Utah Administrative Code R277-487.
Professional development for staff and students regarding the importance of network security and best practices are included in the procedures. The procedures associated with this policy are consistent with guidelines provided by cyber security professionals worldwide and in accordance with Utah Education Network and the Utah State Office of Education. Weber School District supports the development, implementation and ongoing improvements for a robust security system of hardware and software that is designed to protect Weber School District’s data, users, and electronic assets.
3.1.8. Encryption or encrypted data – The most effective way to achieve data security. To read an encrypted file, you must have access to a secret key or password that enables you to decrypt it.
3.1.11. Sensitive data - Data that contains personally identifiable information.
3.1.12. System level – Access to the system that is considered full administrative access. Includes operating system access and hosted application access.
3.2.1. Weber School District shall appoint, in writing, an IT Security Group (ISG) responsible for overseeing District-wide IT security with duties that include development of District policies and adherence to the standards defined in this document.
3.3.1. Weber School District, led by the ISG, shall ensure that all District employees having access to sensitive information undergo annual IT security training which emphasizes their personal responsibility for protecting student and employee information. - Training resources will be provided to all District employees.
3.4.1.1. Weber School District shall ensure that any user’s computer must not be left unattended and unlocked, especially when logged into sensitive systems or data including student or employee information. Automatic log off, locks and password screen savers should be used to enforce this requirement.
3.4.1.2. Weber School District shall ensure that all equipment that contains sensitive information will be secured to deter theft.
3.4.2.1. Weber School District shall ensure that server rooms and telecommunication rooms/closets are protected by appropriate access control which segregates and restricts access from general school or District office areas. Access control shall be enforced using either keys, electronic card readers, or similar method with only those IT or other staff members having access necessary to perform their job functions are allowed unescorted access.
3.4.3.1. Before any contractor is allowed access to any computer system, server room, or telecommunication room the contractor will need to present a company issued identification card, and his/her access will need to be confirmed directly by the authorized employee who issued the service request or by Weber School District’s Technology Department.
3.5.2.1. Weber School District shall ensure that all untrusted and public access computer networks are separated from main district computer networks and utilize security policies to ensure the integrity of those computer networks.
3.5.2.2. Weber School District will utilize industry standards and current best practices to segment internal computer networks based on the data they contain. This will be done to prevent unauthorized users from accessing services unrelated to their job duties and minimize potential damage from other compromised systems.
3.5.3.1. No wireless access point shall be installed on Weber School District’s computer network that does not conform with current network standards as defined by the Network Manager. Any exceptions to this must be approved directly in writing by the Information Security Group.
3.5.3.2. Weber School District shall scan for and remove or disable any rogue wireless devices on a regular basis.
3.5.4.1. Weber School District shall ensure that any remote access with connectivity to the District’s internal network is achieved using the District’s Palo Alto Global VPN service that is protected by multiple factor authentication systems. Any exception to this policy must be due to a service provider’s technical requirements and must be approved by the Information Security Officer.
3.6.2.1. Weber School District shall enforce strong password management for employees, students, and contractors.
3.6.2.2.1. All server system-level passwords must conform to the Password Construction Guidelines posted on the Weber School District Technology Website.
3.6.2.1. Weber School District shall ensure that user access shall be limited to only those specific access requirements necessary to perform their jobs. Where possible, segregation of duties will be utilized to control authorization access.
3.6.2.2. Weber School District shall ensure that user access should be granted and/or terminated upon timely receipt, and management’s approval, of a documented access request/termination.
3.6.3.1. Weber School District shall ensure that audit and log files are maintained for at least ninety days for all critical security-relevant events such as: invalid logon attempts, changes to the security policy/ configuration, and failed attempts to access objects by unauthorized users, etc.
3.6.4.1. Weber School District shall limit IT administrator privileges (operating system, database, and applications) to the minimum number of staff required to perform these sensitive duties.
Backup Data: Procedures for performing routine daily/weekly/monthly backups and storing backup media at a secured location other than the server room or adjacent facilities. As a minimum, backup media must be stored off-site a reasonably safe distance from the primary server room.
Secondary Locations: Identify a backup processing location, such as another School or District building.
Emergency Procedures: Document a calling tree with emergency actions to include: recovery of backup data, restoration of processing at the secondary location, and generation of student and employee listings for ensuing a full head count of all.
3.9.2. Weber School District shall install, distribute, and maintain spyware and virus protection software on all district-owned equipment, i.e. servers, workstations, and laptops.
3.9.3. Weber School District shall ensure that malicious software protection will include frequent update downloads (minimum weekly), frequent scanning (minimum weekly), and that malicious software protection is in active state (real time) on all operating servers/workstations.
3.9.4. Weber School District shall ensure that all security-relevant software patches (workstations and servers) are applied within thirty days and critical patches shall be applied as soon as possible.
3.10.1. In accordance with Federal and State Law, Weber School District shall filter internet traffic for content defined in law that is deemed harmful to minors.
3.10.2. Weber School District acknowledges that technology based filters are not always effective at eliminating harmful content and due to this, Weber School District uses a combination of technological means and supervisory means to protect students from harmful online content.
3.10.3. In the event that students take devices home, Weber School District will provide a technology based filtering solution for those devices. However, the District will rely on parents to provide the supervision necessary to fully protect students from accessing harmful online content.
3.11.1. Weber School District considers the protection of the data it collects on students, employees and their families to be of the utmost importance.
3.11.2. Weber School District protects student data in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and privacy Act, 20 U.S. Code §1232g and 34 CFR Part 99 ( “FERPA”), the Government Records and Management Act U.C.A. §62G-2 ( “GRAMA”), U.C.A. §53A-1-1401 et seq, 15 U.S. Code §§ 6501–6506 (“COPPA”) and Utah Administrative Code R277-487 (“Student Data Protection Act”).
3.11.3. Weber School District shall ensure that employee records access shall be limited to only those individuals who have specific access requirements necessary to perform their jobs. Where possible, segregation of duties will be utilized to control authorization access.
3.12.1. Weber School District shall perform routine security and privacy audits in congruence with the District’s Information Security Audit Plan.
3.13.1 Employee Disciplinary Actions shall be in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and District policies. Any employee found to be in violation may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment with the Weber School District.


text:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT AND GLORIA PUYAT, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT MARISSA PUYAT, RESPONDENTS.
In agrarian reform cases, when the acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 remains incomplete upon the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, the process should be completed under the new law.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 11, 2004 as amended by the order dated September 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED subject to the modification that the reckoning of the 6% interest per annum shall be from March 21, 1990.
Costs of suit shall be paid by the petitioner.
Gloria and Maximo Puyat, both deceased, are the registered owners of a parcel of riceland consisting of 46.8731 hectares located in Barangay Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City, Province of Nueva Ecija (subject property). Respondents are the heirs of Gloria and Maximo Puyat, and the pro-indiviso co-owners of the subject property.
The records do not disclose when the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 44.3090 hectares of Puyats’ land under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. It is, however, clear that the DAR issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farmer-beneficiaries in December 1989. All of the said patents were annotated on Puyats’ Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1773 on March 20, 1990, and thereby caused the concomitant partial cancellation of Puyats’ title.
The Puyats did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of the subject property.
The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija on November 24, 1998. The complaint, docketed as Agr. Case No. 124-AF, was raffled to Branch 23 of the said court.
Respondents presented the supervising agriculturalist from the City Agro-Industrial Office, who testified that the average palay production for Barangay Bakod Bayan ranges from 70 to 80 cavans per hectare. Another officer from the same office testified that the average annual palay production is around 65 cavans per hectare. The zoning officer of the City Planning and Development Office testified that the subject property is located in the agro-industrial district, which is near the central business district of Cabanatuan City. The zonal value determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for this area is P10.00 per square meter. Respondents prayed that their 468,731 square meter-property be valued at P100,000.00 per hectare.
The Land Bank and the DAR answered that the valuation was made in strict compliance with the formula provided for lands acquired under PD 27 and Executive Order (EO) No. 228. DAR presented a memorandum dated 1976, which shows that the average gross production for three years prior to 1976 was 23 cavans per hectare only. It maintained that the valuation of respondents’ property should be made using the prevailing rates on October 21, 1972, or the date when PD 27 took effect. Land Bank, on the other hand, presented its Claims Processing Form, which showed that it set the valuation at P2,012.50. per hectare.
The trial court first determined what law should be applied in determining the just compensation due to respondents. According to the trial court, while the property was appropriated pursuant to PD 27, its valuation should be made in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657.
The trial court found that respondents’ property could yield an average of 65 cavans per hectare, per harvest season. It could be planted with rice and corn. It is located in an agro-industrial area, accessible by concrete roads, and properly serviced by telecommunication and other utilities. The BIR pegged the zonal value for this area at P10 per square meter, or P100,000.00 per hectare.
Taking the above factors in consideration, the court declared that the reasonable compensation for respondents’ property should be P100,000.00 per hectare.
Since the government took the respondents’ property on March 20, 1990 (the date when the emancipation patents were annotated on respondents’ TCT No. 1773) without giving the respondents just compensation for such taking, there was delay in payment which justifies the imposition of legal interest. Thus, the trial court ordered the DAR, through the Land Bank, to pay 6% legal interest per annum from the date of taking until the amount is fully paid.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Department of Agrarian Reform through the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to pay plaintiffs Gloria Puyat and all the Heirs of Maximo Puyat, thru their Attorney-in-Fact Marissa Puyat the total amount of Four Million Six Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ten (P4,687,310.00) Philippine Currency, representing the just compensation of the property with a total area of 46.8731 hectares, situated in Barangay Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, covered by T.C.T No. 1773 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of taking (which the Court determines to be in 1990) until fully paid.
Considering that only 44.3090 hectares [were] distributed to farmer-beneficiaries this should only be the area to be compensated at the rate of P100,000.00 per hectare for a total amount of Four Million Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred (P4,430,900.00) Pesos.
Wherefore, the Motion for Reconsideration is partially Granted.
The Decision dated May 11, 2004 is hereby amended and defendant Department of Agrarian Reform through the Land Bank of the Philippines [is] hereby directed to pay plaintiffs Gloria Puyat and the Heirs of Maximo Puyat, thru their Attorney-in-Fact Marissa Puyat, the amount of Four Million Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred (P4,430,900.00) Pesos representing the just compensation of the covered 44.3090 hectares of their property (covered by TCT No. 1773) situated at Barangay Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City, which [were] actually distributed to farmer-beneficiaries with 6% legal interest per annum from the date of taking (in 1990) until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due consideration, a DECISION be rendered ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated 11 May 2004 x x x and the Order dated 03 September 2004 x x x for being CONTRARY TO P.D. NO. 27 AND E.O. NO. 228, and RELEVANT/MATERIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED, and TO ISSUE another Decision UPHOLDING the LAND VALUATION based on the foregoing laws and evidence amounting to EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE PESOS & 86/100 (PHP 89,171.86) as the just compensation for the subject landholding.
The appellate court noted that the question presented is what law should be used in the determination of just compensation of lands acquired pursuant to PD 27. Corollarily, once a court determines which law governs just compensation, can its decision be limited to the formula provided in the administrative orders of the DAR?
The CA held that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, which cannot be unduly restricted by requiring the courts to strictly adhere to formulae appearing in legislative or executive acts. Being a judicial function, courts can choose to rely on the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657, even if these factors do not appear in PD 27 or EO 228. Such reliance cannot be assailed as irregular or illegal considering that the courts would still rely on reasonable factors for ascertaining just compensation.
The CA also explained that the imposition of legal interest on the just compensation is not an error. The legal interest was properly imposed considering that the Puyats were deprived of their property since March 20, 1990 without receiving just compensation therefor. However, in order to be precise, the CA modified the RTC Decision by imposing the legal interest not from “1990”, but from March 20, 1990, which is the date when the emancipation patents were inscribed on TCT No. 1773.
Land Bank moved for a reconsideration of the adverse decision, which motion was denied by the appellate court in its October 16, 2006 Resolution.
Can lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors appearing in Section 17 of RA 6657?
Is it proper to impose the 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just compensation?
Should the case be remanded to the trial court for the recomputation of just compensation using Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700?
Land Bank argues that the just compensation must be valued at the time of taking of the property. Since respondents’ lands were acquired pursuant to PD 27, it is deemed taken under the law operative since October 21, 1972 (the effectivity date of PD 27). Thus, Land Bank posits that the CA erred in computing the just compensation based on Section 17 of RA 6657, a law that came into effect after the time of taking.
Further, according to Land Bank, if PD 27 and EO 228 are to be applied, the interest rate is already provided for under DAR AO No. 13, series of 1994, as amended by DAR AO No. 2, series of 2004. Thus, the 6% interest on the just compensation imposed by the trial and appellate courts is erroneous for being a double interest and should be deleted.
under Presidential Decree No. 27?
Land Bank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect [upon] payment of just compensation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
In the case at bar, respondents’ title to the property was cancelled and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries on March 20, 1990. In 1992, Land Bank approved the initial valuation for the just compensation that will be given to respondents. Both the taking of respondents’ property and the valuation occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. When the acquisition process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, the process should be completed under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory effect only. This means that PD 27 applies only insofar as there are gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 is superseded. Among the matters where RA 6657 is sufficient is the determination of just compensation. In Section 17 thereof, the legislature has provided for the factors that are determinative of just compensation. Petitioner cannot insist on applying PD 27 which would render Section 17 of RA 6657 inutile.
The trial and appellate courts imposed an interest of 6% per annum on the just compensation to be given to the respondents based on the finding that Land Bank was guilty of delay.
Land Bank maintains that the formula contained in DAR AO No. 13, series of 1994, already provides for 6% compounded interest. Thus, the additional imposition of 6% interest by the trial and appellate courts is unwarranted.
There is a fallacy in Land Bank’s position. The 6% interest rate imposed by the trial and appellate courts would be a double imposition of interest had the courts below also applied DAR AO No. 13, series of 1994. But the fact remains that the courts below did not apply DAR AO No. 13. In fact, that is precisely the reason why Land Bank appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, and the latter’s decision to this Court. Therefore, Land Bank is cognizant that the lower courts’ imposition of the 6% interest cannot constitute a double imposition of a legal interest.
The Court is not unaware that current jurisprudence sets the interest rate for delay in payments in agrarian cases at 12% per annum. In the case at bar, however, the respondents did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts and instead asked for the affirmance in toto of the appellate court’s decision. In keeping with the demands of due process, therefore, the Court deems it fit not to disturb the interest rate imposed by the courts below.
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing crop, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and seventy percent (70%) of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic formula by the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Thus, in a Manifestation and Motion dated January 21, 2010, Land Bank submits that RA 9700 has rendered its Petition moot and that the case should now be remanded to the trial courts so that the valuation for respondents’ property may be made in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700.
Respondents opposed. They maintained that there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court because their property has already been valued using Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
There is no merit in Land Bank’s motion to remand the case. RA 9700 took effect at a time when this case was already submitted for resolution. All the issues had been joined and the parties had argued exhaustively on their various contentions. The issue regarding the applicability of RA 9700 to the instant case was not among those discussed in the parties’ memoranda. For us to rule that RA 9700 decrees a remand of the case would be abhorrent to the rules of fair play.
[W]ith respect to land valuation, all Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
The Implementing Rules of RA 9700 thus authorize the valuation of lands in accordance with the old Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended (prior to further amendment by RA 9700), so long as the claim folders for such lands have been received by Land Bank prior to its amendment by RA 9700 in 2009. In the instant case, Land Bank received the claim folder for the respondents’ property in 1992, which was long before the effectivity of RA 9700 in 2009. Following DAR’s own understanding of RA 9700, it appears that there is no reason to remand the case since the valuation can be determined in accordance with the old Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended (prior to further amendment by RA 9700).
All previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
In like manner, claims over tenanted rice and corn lands under P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228 whether submitted or not to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and not yet approved for payment shall be valued under R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
Landholdings covered by P.D. No. 27 and falling under Phase I of R.A. No. 9700 shall be valued under R.A. No. 9700.
The above shows DAR’s opinion that valuations shall be made either under RA 9700 or under “Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended.” It appears that lands yet to be acquired and distributed by the DAR when RA 9700 took effect shall be valued using RA 9700, while lands already acquired but unpaid when RA 9700 took effect shall be valued using “Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended” (i.e., as amended by earlier amendatory laws, prior to further amendment by RA 9700). The administrative order, therefore, negates Land Bank’s contention that all pending valuations should make use of Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700. Land Bank’s contention must await resolution in a proper case where the issue is timely raised and properly argued by the parties. The instant case is not the suitable venue.
Lastly, in arriving at the valuations for respondents’ property, the Court also considers that the courts below had already followed Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended. That RA 9700 added two new factors to the said provision, is not sufficient ground for remanding the case under the factual milieu of this case. To remand the case now for another valuation, so that the two new factors may also be considered, appears impractical and inequitable. The respondents have been deprived of their property for 22 years. It is time that they receive what has long been due them.
Land Bank maintains that, assuming arguendo that RA 6657 is the applicable law, the trial and appellate courts wantonly disregarded the basic valuation formula in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998, which implements Section 17 of RA 6657. It insists that courts are not at liberty to dispense of these formulations at will. Land Bank thus asks that the case be remanded to the trial court for a proper determination of the just compensation in accordance with DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
As a final note, it has not escaped the Court’s notice that the DAR and the Land Bank appear nonchalant in depriving landowners of their properties. They seem to ignore the requirements of law such as notice, valuation, and deposit of initial valuation before taking these properties, and yet they ask for a strict compliance with the law when it comes to compensating the landowners. This inequitable situation appears in innumerable cases and this Court feels duty-bound to remind the DAR and the Land Bank to give as much regard for the law when taking property as they do when they are ordered to pay for them. The rights of landowners cannot be lightly set aside and disregarded for the attainment of the lofty ideals of agrarian reform.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed June 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86582 is AFFIRMED.
Velasco, Jr.,* Leonardo-De Castro ** (Acting Chairperson), Brion,*** and Perlas-Bernabe,**** JJ., concur.
* Per raffle dated June 25, 2012.
*** Per raffle dated June 25, 2012.
**** Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
 Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil. 473, 488 (2001).
 Id. at 56-66; penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.
 CA Decision, pp. 10-11; id. at 65-66.
 Claims Processing Form, id. at 124.
 RTC Decision, pp. 2-3; id. at 131-132.
 Id. at 3; id. at 132.
 Id. at 8; id. at 137.
 Complaint, pp. 2-3; id. at 108-109.
 RTC Decision, p. 6; id. at 135.
 Claims Processing Form, id. at 125.
 Land Bank’s Formal Offer of Exhibits; CA rollo, p. 81.
 RTC Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 138; penned by Presiding Judge Lydia Bauto Hipolito.
 RTC Order, p. 1; id. at 139.
 Id. at 3; id. at 141.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum to the CA, pp. 24-25; id. at 169-170.
 CA Decision, p. 4; id. at 10.
 Id. at 6-9; id. at 12-15.
 Land Bank of the Philippines, v. Chico, G.R. No. 168453, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 226, 241; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 291, 310; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 167809, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 108, 119; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo, G.R. No. 168533, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 627, 642; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 166777, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 181, 187; Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415, 423-424; Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 90, 102; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738, 746-747 (2005); Paris v. Alfeche, supra note 1.
 Paris v. Alfeche, supra note 1.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 26-29; rollo, pp. 238-241.
 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 746, 754 (This Resolution was affirmed with finality in the Court’s Resolution dated April 5, 2011, 647 SCRA 207, 230); Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83, 100 (2004).
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 265.
 Land Bank filed its Memorandum on September 17, 2007 (id. at 213), whereas respondents filed their Memorandum on October 15, 2007 (id. at 257).
 Republic Act No. 9700 (Emphasis supplied).
 Respondents’ Comments, pp. 6-7; id. at 303-304.
 Claims Processing Form, rollo, p. 124.
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, supra note 27 at 243; Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 117, 131-132.
 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
AGGRANDIZED - aggrandized v. simple past tense and past participle of aggrandize.
AGGRANDIZER - aggrandizer n. One who makes great or aggrandizes.
AGGRANDIZES - aggrandizes v. Third-person singular simple present indicative form of aggrandize.
GAZUNDERING - gazundering v. present participle of gazunder.
GERMANIZING - Germanizing v. present participle of Germanize.
GIGAHERTZES - gigahertzes n. plural of gigahertz.
GRANGERIZED - grangerized v. simple past tense and past participle of grangerize.
GRANGERIZER - Sorry, definition not available.
GRANGERIZES - grangerizes v. Third-person singular simple present indicative form of grangerize.
NIGGARDIZES - Sorry, definition not available.
OVERGLAZING - overglazing v. present participle of overglaze.
OVERGRAZING - overgrazing v. present participle of overgraze.
overgrazing n. Excessive grazing to an extent that the land is damaged.

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text:
ALEX B. CARLOS, ABC SECURITY SERVICES, INC., AND HONEST CARE JANITORIAL SERVICES, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PERFECTO P. PIZARRO, JOEL B. DOCE, GUILLERMO F. SOLOMON, FRANCISCO U. CORPUS AND RONILLO GALLEGO, RESPONDENTS.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly DISMISSED. Consequently, the decision dated July 19, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.
Petitioner ABC Security is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of job contracting by providing security services to its clientele. Petitioner Honest Care Janitorial is a domestic corporation likewise engaged in job contracting janitorial services. It appears that Honest Care Janitorial was consolidated with ABC Security and the consolidated corporations are represented in this action by its president, Alex B. Carlos.
Private respondents Perfecto P. Pizzaro (Pizzaro), Joel B. Doce (Doce), Francsico U. Corpus (Corpus) and Ronillo Gallego (Gallego) were employed by petitioner ABC Security as security guards and were assigned to Greenvalley Country Club at the time they were allegedly separated from employment. Private respondent Pizzaro was already with petitioner ABC Security since 1975, while private respondent Corpus was employed in 1990. Private respondents Doce and Gallego were both hired in 1987. Private respondent Solomon was employed by Honest Care Janitorial as janitor supervisor since 1975 and was posted to different offices.
On 22 July 1993, private respondents filed a Joint/Consolidated Complaint- Affidavit against petitioners praying for the payment of minimum wage, 13th month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, cost of living allowance and clothing allowance.
As shown by the Registry Return Receipt, petitioners received a copy of the complaint and the corresponding summons on 16 July 1993. On the following day, private respondents Pizzaro, Solomon and Doce were allegedly relieved from their posts and were not given new assignments. Subsequently, private respondents Gallego and Corpus were also allegedly dismissed from employment.
Private respondents claimed that every time they received their salaries, they were made to sign two sets of pay slips, one was written in ink while the other was written in pencil. These two pay slips showed the amount of salaries they actually received, which was below the minimum; but since the entries written on one of the pay slips they signed were in pencil, there was a possibility that petitioners could alter the said entries to make it appear that they were compliant with the labor laws.
For its part, petitioners averred that private respondents were not dismissed but voluntarily resigned from their respective employments as evidenced by the resignation letters bearing their signatures. Petitioners claimed that after private respondents' assignment to Greenvalley Country Club ended, they were reassigned to other posts as an exercise of management prerogative, but they refused to transfer and opted to resign. In addition, petitioners alleged that private respondents' resignations were prompted by the loss of bowling equipment in their custody, which they were obliged to pay.
Petitioners further asseverated that the private respondents were paid the minimum wage in accordance with the standards prescribed by the labor laws and received benefits including the overtime pay, cost of living allowance, night differential pay, premium pay and 13th month pay as evidenced by the General Payroll of the company. Private respondents' signatures appeared on the said General Payroll, signifying that they were able to receive the wages and benefits in accordance with the standard set by law.
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED.
The [herein petitioners], who are hereby declared to be jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards, are hereby ordered to pay the [herein private respondents] the following: (1) backwages (computed on the basis of the applicable minimum wage rate on July 17, 1990) from the said date up to the date of the promulgation of this decision; (2) separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service from the date of hiring to the date of the promulgation of this Decision; and (3) for the unexpired 3- year period, overtime pay of four (4) hours daily, 13th month pay, premium pay for restdays and holidays, and service incentive leave pay.
Both petitioners and private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the above- quoted NLRC Decision. Petitioners prayed for the NLRC to vacate its previous ruling finding them liable for illegal dismissal and for the monetary claims of the private respondents. On the other hand, private respondents prayed that, in addition to monetary awards, attorney's fees be also awarded in their favor.
In a Resolution dated 30 August 2002, the NLRC denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the parties for lack of cogent reason or palpable error to disturb its earlier findings.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the NLRC abused its discretion in giving more credence to the empty allegations advanced by private respondents as against the overwhelming documentary evidence on record which was fully substantiated by the testimonial evidence they submitted during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
On 31 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the NLRC Decision. The appellate court declared that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in giving more evidentiary weight to the evidence submitted by the private respondents.
In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the defense posed by petitioners that private respondents were not dismissed from employment but voluntarily resigned therefrom, is not plausible in light of the prompt filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. Indeed, resignation is inconsistent with the filing of action for illegal dismissal.
Similarly ill-fated was petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 9 May 2005.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE PETITIONER ALEX B. CARLOS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE JUDGMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE [PRIVATE RESPONDENTS] WERE IMPROPERLY PAID OF THEIR SALARIES AND WAGES AS WELL AS BENEFITS UNDER THE LAW.
WHETHER OR NOT [PRIVATE RESPONDENTS] WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY [PETITIONERS].
WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE NLRC SHERIFF IS IMPROPER.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS [RESPONDENTS] SHOULD BE ADJUDGED OF BACK WAGES DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE.
At the outset, we must stress that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties considering that, as general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. We have likewise held that factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
Notably, the question of whether or not the private respondents were illegally dismissed from employment or voluntarily resigned therefrom, as well as the issue of whether or not they are entitled to the monetary awards they are claiming, are factual matters that should not be delved into by this Court.
As borne by the records, it appears that there is a divergence in the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter on one hand, from those of the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on the other. For the purpose of clarity and intelligibility therefore, this Court will make a scrunity of the decisions of the labor officials and appellate court and ascertain whose findings are supported by evidence on record.
The Labor Arbiter found that the private respondents voluntarily resigned from employment, since they refused to be assigned to another work station. The new assignment effected by petitioners was in valid exercise of their management prerogative which should not take precedence over private respondents' personal interests. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found otherwise.
In finding that private respondents were illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals declared that the alleged resignations of the private respondents were inconsistent with their filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. It decreed that it is illogical for private respondents to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal thereafter.
For its part, the NLRC found that the confluence of the factual circumstances as to the date of the receipt by the petitioners of the copy of the complaint filed by private respondents, which was in close succession to the time when private respondents were relieved from their posts, leads to the reasonable conclusion that petitioners were indeed illegally dismissed in retaliation for their filing of a complaint for money claims.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. They are more in accord with prudence, logic, common sense and sound judgment.
Time and again we have ruled that in illegal dismissal cases like the present one, the onus of proving that the employee was not dismissed or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests on the employer and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.
Thus, petitioners must not only rely on the weakness of private respondents' evidence, but must stand on the merits of their own defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation and unreliable documentary evidence cannot stand, as it will offend due process.
Petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
Petitioners' complete reliance on the alleged resignation letters to support their claim that private respondents voluntarily resigned is unavailing, as the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation. Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.
It is illogical for private respondents to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. We find it highly unlikely that private respondents would just quit their jobs because they refused to take new assignments or attempted to avoid any monetary liability for the purported loss of bowling equipment, after enduring long years of working for the petitioners, notwithstanding the meager salary they were receiving and the lack of the appropriate labor and social benefits. It would have been equally senseless for private respondents to file a complaint seeking payment of their salaries and benefits, as mandated by law, then abandon subsequently and immediately their work by resigning.
Not only were the [herein private respondents] one in testifying that they did not receive the salaries stated in the payrolls submitted by the [herein petitioners] " they were able to show that the payrolls in question were a sham because [private respondent] Doce, whose signature appears on the payroll for January 1-15, 1990, could not have signed the same, since at that time he was assigned, not in Greenvalley Country Club, but in Ajinomoto. Falsus in unius, falsus in omnibus. The payrolls may not be given any weight. As a result, full weight must be accorded to [private respondents'] testimonies to the effect that they worked twelve hours daily, and were not paid overtime pay, 13th month pay and premium pay for Sundays and holidays.
The above-quoted NLRC Decision is anchored on the substantial evidence culled from the records that swayed the reasonable mind of this Court to adopt its conclusion. Surely, petitioners cannot expect this Court to sustain its stance and accord full evidentiary weight to the documentary and testimonial evidence they adduced in the absence of clear, convincing and untarnished proof to discharge the allegations of the private respondents. Having failed in this regard, we are constrained to sustain the findings of the NLRC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in light of the time-honored dictum that should doubt exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to disturb the monetary awards for backwages, separation pay, overtime pay, 13th month pay, premium pay, holiday and service incentive leave pays ordered by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. In addition to the monetary awards, we find that the grant of backwages was likewise proper, with some modification as to the computation of separation pay.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
The provision gives meaning to the laborer's constitutional guaranty of security of tenure and finds solid basis on the universal principles of justice and equity. The grant of back wages allows the unjustly and illegally dismissed employee to recover from the employer that which the former lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal from employment.
Undoubtedly, private respondents are entitled to the payment of full backwages, that is, without deducting their earnings elsewhere during the periods of their illegal dismissal. However, where, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations between the parties, separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service shall be granted.
The question now arises: when is the period for computation of backwages and separation pay supposed to end? This question was squarely addressed in Gaco v. National Labor Relations Commission where it was held that in such circumstance, the computation shall be up to the time of finality of this Court's decision. Apparently, the justification is that along with the finality of this Court's decision, the issue of illegal dismissal is finally laid to rest.
The petitioners' insistence that they cannot be held liable for backwages during the period of the pendency of this action for they cannot be faulted for the delay of the disposition of this case cannot take precedence over the long-standing and well- entrenched jurisprudential rule.
Parenthetically, the award for separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for every year of service shall be computed from the time the private respondents were illegally separated from their employment up to the finality of this Court's Decision in the instant petition.
Furthermore, petitioners argue that the veil of corporate fiction of petitioners ABC Security and Honest Care Janitorial should not be pierced, because said corporations have personalities separate and distinct from their stockholders and from each other.
The petitioners must concede that they raised this issue belatedly, not having done so before the labor tribunals, but only before the appellate court. Fundamental is the rule that theories and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However, even if this argument were to be addressed at this time, the Court still finds no reason to uphold it.
Basic in corporation law is the principle that a corporation has a separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. This feature flows from the legal theory that a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its stockholders.
However, the statutorily granted privilege of a corporate veil may be used only for legitimate purposes. On equitable considerations, the veil can be disregarded when it is utilized as a shield to commit fraud, illegality or inequity; defeat public convenience; confuse legitimate issues; or serve as a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or an instrumentality, agency or adjunct of another corporation. The legal fiction of a separate corporate personality in those cited instances, for reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, will be justifiably set aside.
Petitioner Carlos admitted that he is not only the stockholder of petitioners ABC Security and Honest Care Janitorial, but the General Manager of said corporations as well. Being the General Manager of these corporations, it is assumed that petitioner Carlos possessed complete control of their affairs including matters pertaining to personnel management, which includes the rates of pay, hours of work, selection or engagement of the employees, manner of accomplishing their work, and their hiring and dismissal. It is highly plausible then that petitioner Carlos had a hand not only in unilaterally terminating the private respondents' employment, but also in paying private respondents' wages below minimum and denying them the benefits accorded by the Labor Standard Law which includes, but is not limited to, the payment of night-shift differential, overtime pay, premium pay and 13th month pay.
We cannot allow petitioner Carlos to hide behind the cloak of corporate fiction in order to evade liability. It bears repeating that the corporate veil must be pierced and disregarded when it is utilized to commit fraud, illegality or inequity.
Lastly, petitioners' contention that the execution of the NLRC Decision pending review of this case is detrimental to their interest is equally unavailing.
a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission. - Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
b) Entry of Judgment. - Upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be entered in a book of entries of judgment.
The Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider the decision, resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) calendar days from the date of mailing in the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of service to parties.
SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION. - Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided further, that only such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
Should a motion for reconsideration be entertained pursuant to this section, the resolution shall be executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
Prescinding from the above, the private respondents had a clear right to move for the execution of the monetary award of the NLRC pending appeal. The rule is in harmony with the social justice principle that poor employees who have been deprived of their only source of livelihood should be provided the means to support their families.
Having said that, we need not further press that the proposition of the petitioners assailing the order granting execution pending appeal of the NLRC Decision should fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 August 2004 and its Resolution dated 9 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74458 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of backwages which shall be computed from the date of the private respondents' dismissal up to the finality of this judgment. Costs against the petitioners.
 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring. Rollo, pp. 5-10.
 The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 275, 283.
 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Llamera, G.R. No. 152514, 12 July 2005, 463 SCRA 254, 260-261.
 Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 437.
 Kay Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162472, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 544, 554-557.
 Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154376, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 559, 568-569.
 Gu-Miro v. Adorable, G.R. No. 160952, 20 August 2004, 437 SCRA 162, 168.
 Article 279, Labor Code of the Philippines.
 359 Phil. 316, 329 (1998).
 Atlas Farms v. National Labor Relations Commission, 440 Phil. 620, 635-636 (2002).
 G.R. No. 104690, 23 February 1994, 230 SCRA 260, 269.
 Surima v. National Labor Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 461, 471 (1998).
 San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 631, 648 (1998).
 Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 374, 384-385 (1999).

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