§ 20-163 Miscellaneous provisions related to all surrogacy . . .
A. The surrogate shall be solely responsible for the clinical management of the pregnancy.
B. After the entry of an order under subsection B of § 20-160 or upon the execution of a contract pursuant to § 20-162, the marriage of the surrogate shall not affect the validity of the order or contract, and her husband shall not be deemed a party to the contract in the absence of his explicit written consent.
C. Following the entry of an order pursuant to subsection D of § 20-160 or upon the relinquishing of the custody of and parental rights to any resulting child and the filing of the surrogate consent and report form as provided in § 20-162, the intended parents shall have the custody of, parental rights to, and full responsibilities for any child resulting from the performance of assisted conception from a surrogacy agreement regardless of the child’s health, physical appearance, any mental or physical handicap, and regardless of whether the child is born alive.
D. A child born to a surrogate within 300 days after assisted conception pursuant to an order under subsection B of § 20-160 or a contract under § 20-162 is presumed to result from the assisted conception. This presumption is conclusive as to all persons who fail to file an action to test its validity within two years after the birth of the child. The child and the parties to the contract shall be named as parties in any such action. The action shall be filed in the court that issued or could have issued an order under § 20-160.
E. Health care providers shall not be liable for recognizing the surrogate as the mother of the resulting child before receipt of a copy of an order entered under § 20-160 or a copy of the contract, or for recognizing the intended parents as the parents of the resulting child after receipt of such order or copy of the contract.
If you’re reading this for anything important, you should double-check its accuracy—read § 20-163 on the official Code of Virginia website.
. . . Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation Secs. 20.161, 20.163 (1972). . . .
. . . $172 $11,524.00 . . .


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Appeal from Kenton Circuit Court (Criminal, Common Law and Equity Division).
JAMES T. HOOPER and ORIE S. WARE for appellant.
W.H. RUCKER and EDWARD W. PFLEUGER for appellee.
Affirming in part and reversing in part.
This suit was filed in the Kenton circuit court on June 6, 1930, against the appellee, Arthur Scott, seeking to enjoin him from interfering with or obstructing appellant's right of ingress and egress to and from his home over a private 20-foot right of way, extending from appellant's property to the nearby public road, and also seeking damages for the alleged loss of certain articles of personal property of the appellant, caused by their wrongful removal by appellee from a nearby place of storage, onto the said right of way, resulting in an alleged theft and loss of a portion of same.
The appellant is the owner of a parcel of land below Bromley, on the Ohio river, in Kenton county, Ky., which was conveyed him by Burt W. Scott and wife, who, at the time of the conveyance, was the owner of all the land at this point between the Ohio river and Covington and the Dry Creek turnpike or county road.
"Burt W. Scott also hereby conveys to the said William Wunderlich a right-of-way from said property to the county pike and to the Ohio river. The grantor reserves the right to haul rock from the river shore in front of said lot."
The defendant (appellee) owned a lot fronting on both the county or concrete highway and this 20-foot road. These properties of the defendant and plaintiff, as well as intervening properties of other owners, all abut on this passway and were formerly all owned by their common grantor, Burt W. Scott, who divided the land into lots, fronting on this 20-foot right of way. This right of way was seldom used, except as a means of ingress and egress by appellant from his property to the concrete highway.
It further appears by the record that on, or about, the 23rd of May, 1930, the defendant, Arthur Scott, purchased a small tract of land and building thereon, known as Scott's Chapel, which abutted also on the easterly side of this 20-foot right of way. At the time of purchase, appellant was renting said Scott's Chapel and using it as a storehouse for certain of his tools and other articles of personal property, which the defendant, upon his purchase of it on or about June 5 or 6, removed from said building, putting them along and over said right of way, as a result of which, it is alleged, many of these exposed articles were stolen and also appellant's right of ingress and egress, over said passway, was interferred with and obstructed by said articles so placed thereon.
On June 6, the appellant, complaining of this injury, filed his suit, seeking to enjoin the appellant from obstructing his right of way, and also for damages alleged suffered by him in the loss of his personal property, from being exposed and removed by appellee onto the said right of way; and on June 10 thereafter appellant was granted a restraining order against the appellee's obstructing the right of way.
On or about June 21 thereafter, it further appears that the defendant tore down this Scott's Chapel building, and that, in so doing, he scattered the timbers, lumber, and brick of the wrecked building, over and across this said right of way, which remained littered and obstructed therewith from a Saturday until the following Tuesday.
From a careful review of the record, it appears that, at the time appellant filed his injunction suit, on June 6, this right of way was then considerably obstructed with the articles of personal property, placed and strewed thereover by the defendant, and also that it was later, about. June 21, again obstructed by the throwing of brick and lumber over and across the same by the appellee, secured from tearing down his Scott's Chapel building, though it does not appear that the appellant, upon either occasion, sought to make use of the right of way, or that he was, by reason of such interference with or obstruction thereof, prevented from doing so, as the obstructions placed thereon by the defendant were quickly removed therefrom.
Neither by the pleadings nor proof is it alleged, or disclosed, what was the nature or character of this 20-foot right of passway, as to its being either a public road or private way, or its nature otherwise put in issue, except as appeared by the deed thereto from Burt W. Scott to the appellant and perhaps some mention in the evidence of a slight and occasional use of it by others of the public, in addition to its regular use by the appellant. No dedication nor acceptance of the right of way as a public road by the public or county officials, as in such cases required, was either proven or contended for.
Upon final hearing of the case, the court found upon proof by consent heard orally: First, that the defendant had erected no permanent obstruction upon said passway, permanently or seriously impairing plaintiff's right of ingress and egress thereover, but that there was only a temporary obstruction thereof by the defendant, for which the plaintiff had proved no damage, but if damaged that he had an adequate remedy at law, and further found also that there was no evidence of any acts or intention on the part of the defendant to obstruct or interfere with the plaintiff's right of ingress and egress; and, second, that the road in dispute was not the private property of the plaintiff, but was and is a public road, over which both parties are entitled to travel. Wherefore, the temporary injunction granted appellant was adjudged dissolved and the petition dismissed.
From this finding and ruling of the court, the appellant has prosecuted this appeal, wherein he contends: First, that the court erred in its denying him a permanent injunction upon the facts presented in evidence by the record; and, second, that it erred in its finding that the passway, or private right of way, conveyed the appellant was a public road.
We shall attempt to answer and dispose of these objections of appellant in the order presented.
In considering the insistent claim and argument of appellant that the trial court erred, to the very serious prejudice of appellant's personal and property rights, in denying him the permanent injunctive relief asked, we deem it advisable to briefly review the nature and special operation of this injunctive relief he seeks, and inquire as to what are the rules and basic principles of equity controlling the court in determining the right to such relief, and the considerations by which it is guided and influenced in its judicial action of exercising such jurisdiction.
The power of the court to grant its judicial mandate, frequently termed "the strong arm of equity," stands forth as a distinct head of equitable jurisprudence, and as the principal and most important of its issued processes.
"The remedy is strictly in personam. As the maxim aequitas agit in personam is the basic principle, of equitable jurisdiction, so the decree operates on, and is enforced against, the person, and not the property. . . . The remedy by injunction is summary, peculiar, and extraordinary, and ought not to be issued except for great and irreparable mischief. . . . Its power is exercised not for the purpose of punishing a person for some wrongful act which he has committed, but rather to prevent the doing of such an act, appearing against equity and good conscience, to the injury of another. . . . Its function is to afford preventive relief and not redress for wrongs already committed." 14 R. C. L., pp. 305 and 309, inclusive.
"Inadequacy of the remedy at law is the basis on which a court of equity founds the exercise of its power to afford relief by injunction. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that a person has a property right and that he has no means of protecting it from injury at the hands of another, the court may then exercise its extraordinary power."
"An injury which tends to the destruction of an estate, or which is of such a character as to work the destruction of the property as it has been held and enjoyed, will be treated as irreparable. . . . An injury may also be irreparable when of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law."
"It is a general and familiar rule that a court of equity will not restrain a mere trespass and that a complainant will be left to his remedy at law unless some element exists, such as irreparable injury or other condition, which renders the remedy in a court of law inadequate. The presence of some one or more of these factors is essential, and in their absence the common-law remedy is deemed to be adequate and perfectly competent to give compensation, as well as to deter and prevent the repetition of the trespass by the exemplary damages which it will inflict."
"The inadequacy of the legal remedy is the foundation and indispensable prerequisite for the interposition of chancery to enjoin a trespass, for the obvious reason that a legal remedy has been devised to redress such wrongs, and so long as the law provides an adequate remedy, equity has no right to interfere. It must therefore appear that the legal remedy is inadequate before a court of equity will afford relief, but when such a situation is shown to exist, the injury is regarded as irreparable, justifying the granting of an injunction. Relief by injunction, therefore, will ordinarily be granted where there can be no adequate pecuniary compensation because it would be difficult or impossible to ascertain the damages resulting from an act, as in that case the legal remedy fails. . . . As to when an injury, resulting from trespass, may be incapable of compensation in damages the following propositions have been deduced from the authorities: (1) it may be destructive of the very substance of the estate; (2) it may not be capable of estimation in terms of money; (3) it may be so continuous and permanent that there is no instant of time when it can be said to be complete so that its extent may be computed; (4) it may be vexatiously persisted in, in spite of repeated verdicts at law; (5) it may be committed by one who is wholly irresponsible, so that a verdict against him for damages would be entirely valueless; (6) it may be committed against one who is legally incapacitated from a beneficial use of the remedy at law. Generally, however, in cases where equitable relief is granted the injury will be found to include several of these features."
In the instant case, the chancellor, upon the hearing of the witnesses, and being in an advantageous position to well judge both the weight and credibility of their testimony, as well as to ascertain and familiarize himself with the circumstances under which these instances of trespass, or obstruction of passway, complained of occurred, has found that they were only temporary in their nature and that no continuing trespass or permanent obstruction had been made, or exists interfering with appellant's free use and enjoyment of his right of ingress and egress over said passway, and, further, has found from the evidence heard by him, no intention on the part of the appellee to obstruct or interfere in the future with appellant's free use of his easement or right of passway conveyed him, and that appellant had failed to prove any damage suffered by him, by reason of these temporary acts of obstruction or trespass upon the right of way complained of, and upon this finding the trial court denied appellant the permanent injunction sought and dismissed his petition.
Upon this showing of the record and finding of the court, we are induced to conclude that the trial court's finding and judgment was without error prejudicial to the appellant, in thus holding that he had failed to present sufficient proof either to establish that remedy at law for the past trespass complained of was inadequate or that any irreparable injury was threatened him or would result from the failure of the court to grant him the permanent injunction asked against the appellee.
The case of the East Cairo Ferry Co. v. Brown, 233 Ky. 299, 25 S.W.2d 730, cited and insistently relied on by the appellant as authority entitling him to the relief of a permanent injunction in the instant case, can be of no advantage to the appellant herein, as the rule announced in that case is in full accord with the general principles announced, supra, as influencing and controlling the court's exercise of its jurisdiction of withholding injunctive relief.
"The plaintiffs have a right to use the road under their written lease from Harris, and have a right to complain if Brown, who was without any right to do so, undertakes to stop the road.
"As Brown was without right to put up either of the obstructions, and would be simply a trespasser in so doing, the court should have granted the injunction prayed."
"Newton had executed a traverse bond conditioned that he would pay Mrs. Farris all damages caused to her by the traverse if not prosecuted with effect, and the terms of this bond are amply sufficient to cover any damages that Mrs. Farris may suffer by reason of Newton's wrongful detention of the premises, if it be determined that he is wrongfully detaining them. . . .
"We have frequently written that an injunction should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the complaining party will, unless it be granted, suffer great and irreparable injury that cannot be adequately ascertained or compensated for in a suit for damages, and we have no state of case like this in the record before us. Campbell v. Irvine Toll Bridge Co., 173 Ky. 313 ( 190 S.W. 1098); Friedberg v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579 ( 191 S.W. 300, L.R.A. 1917C, 777); American Snuff Co. v. Walker, 175 Ky. 149 ( 193 S.W. 1021).
"Under these circumstances I do not think the petition stated any ground for injunctive relief, and therefore the motion to dissolve the injunction is sustained."
This court has repeatedly declared the rule to be that an injunction will not lie or be granted to prevent mere trespass, unless irreparable injury would be done thereby. Hillman v. Hurley, 82 Ky. 626; Wallace v. Jackson, 224 Ky. 25, 3 S.W.2d 766; Knight's Adm'r v. Schroader, 148 Ky. 610, 147 S.W. 378; Watson v. Holmes, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 515. Nor unless there exists cause to apprehend successive acts of trespass will a trespasser be enjoined, regardless of his solvency or insolvency. Hounshell v. Miller, 153 Ky. 530, 155 S.W. 1148; Hall v. Hall, 149 Ky. 817, 149 S.W. 1128.
As there was no finding by the trial court in the case at bar that either repeated or any future acts of trespass were, from the evidence, to be reasonably apprehended, or that the appellant was in danger of suffering any irreparable injury by means of any threatened future trespass or obstruction of his right of way by appellee, and that appellant had an adequate remedy at law for any damage he may have already suffered by reason of the prior act or acts of trespass, or temporary obstruction or interference with his right of ingress and egress over said right of way, we are of the opinion, and conclude, that the trial court committed no error in denying the appellant the permanent injunction sought.
As to the second contention of the appellant, relied on and also earnestly argued by him, that the court erred in finding that the 20-foot right of way, conveyed this appellant, was a public road, it appears that the objection is meritorious, in that the court's ruling in such respect we conceive was in error, as going beyond and being unsupported by either the allegations of the pleading or the proof found in the record. The rule is that either pleadings without proof, or proof without pleadings, is insufficient for judgment. Pratt v. York, 197 Ky. 846, 248 S.W. 492. And, again, the rule has been repeatedly stated by this court that, while the judgment should grant every equitable and legal relief to which the parties are entitled under their pleadings and proof, yet a party must recover according to the pleadings and proof, or not at all. A judgment cannot be properly entered upon an issue not made on the pleadings. Ireland v. Bowman Cockrell, 130, Ky. 153, 113 S.W. 56, 17 Ann. Cas. 786; Clark, Etc., v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 676, 128 S.W. 1079; N.D. Tabor v. U.S.G. Tabor and Ralph Tabor, 213 Ky. 312, 280 S.W. 134; Lincoln County Board of Education v. Board of Trustees of Stanford Graded Common School, 225 Ky. 21, 7 S.W.2d 499; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 90; Middleton v. Graves, 229 Ky. 640, 17 S.W.2d 741; Chesapeake O. Ry. Co. v. City of Olive Hill, 231, Ky. 65, 21 S.W.2d 127; Dotson v. People's Bank, 234 Ky. 138, 27 S.W.2d 673.
Inasmuch as no issues were made by the pleadings or the proof of the parties herein as to the nature or character of the 20-foot right of way, or issue joined as to such, we conclude the court was in error, in the absence or either allegations or proof to be found in the record as to whether the passway, or 20-foot right of way, described in the petition and alleged obstructed was a public road or private way, in adjudging that the said right of way was a public road, and that, in so adjudging adversely against appellant's grant of title to passway; it erred to the prejudice of appellant's substantial rights, and that for such error the judgment in such respect will have to be reversed.
For the reasons herein indicated, the judgment of the court in dissolving the temporary injunction and dismissing plaintiff's petition is affirmed and reversed in so far as it adjudges the right of way in question to be a public road.

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If you are considering a joint custody agreement, the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield can give you the legal guidance that you need. Joint custody arrangements give both parents custody over the child and allow them to share decision-making rights. However, this does not mean that everything is equal in a joint custody arrangement. To protect your rights and those of your child, you need the help of an experienced family lawyer on your side.
At the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield, our Manhattan Beach joint custody lawyers have the knowledge and experience to fight for you. We can get you the results that you want, so don’t hesitate. Call us today at (310) 546-5858 to set up a consultation.
By nature, divorces are a challenging and emotional process for everyone involved. Even a couple who desires an amicable separation may have trouble agreeing, especially when child custody comes into play. Even with joint custody, one parent will be deemed the primary caretaker, and the other will only have visitation rights. This can mean that, though both parents have a say when it comes to major life decision for the child, one will likely see the child much more than the other.
With emotions so high and so much at stake, you can’t afford to make a single mistake. An experienced family lawyer can help you through your custody proceedings to ensure that your child’s best interests are protected and that you are awarded as much time with your child as possible. This is especially important if your divorce has turned contentious.
Why Should I Choose the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield?
For over 30 years, the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield has dedicated itself to our clients. We have represented thousands of people in family law issues such as child custody and parental rights and have helped many people get the results they want. We have the knowledge and experience to fight for you and your children. We will treat you with the compassion you need during this difficult time, while simultaneously aggressively defending your rights. Though most child custody cases can be negotiated, we are fully prepared to take your case to court if necessary.
Joint custody is when the court awards both parents rights regarding the care of their children. This means that the parents need to negotiate with each other when making decisions about the children. One parent will be labeled as the primary caregiver, while the other will have visitation rights. Joint custody is often preferred by the courts because it allows the children to have a relationship with both parents.
Custody refers to both legal custody, which is the right to make decisions regarding the child’s life, and physical custody, which is deciding where the child will live and who will care for them. Either of these can be joint or sole.
What Issues Does Joint Custody Involve?
Having joint custody makes each parent a joint managing conservator. This means that each parent has a right to decide legal issues and a right to have physical access to the child. However, it does not mean that there will be equal access to the child.
When making decisions about their child, both joint managing conservators need to act in the best interest of the child. This does not mean that the joint managing conservators must make decisions that the child likes, but it does mean they need to be trying to do what they think will be good for the child. If one or both joint managing conservators are found to be making decisions without regard for their child’s best interests, their parental rights can be limited or even terminated completely.
Parental rights carry with them parental responsibilities. When in physical possession of the child, the parent needs to make sure the child’s physical needs are met. The conservator in immediate physical possession of the child needs to provide food, clothing, shelter, and whatever else might be necessary. The parents also need to make sure they are complying with legal decisions that they have agreed to regarding their child, such as agreements on which religion, if any, they will be raised with.
It should be noted that some things do not need to be agreed to by both parents, even in a joint custody situation. For example, basic doctor’s checkups that do not involve an invasive procedure can be performed without notifying the other parent. Make sure to talk with the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield to make sure you know what you can and cannot do according to your custody arrangement.
For over 30 years, the Manhattan Beach child custody lawyers at the Law Offices of Baden V. Mansfield have represented people just like you, and we have helped them get the results they want. We can help you as well, but only if you let us. Call our Manhattan Beach office today at (310) 546-5858 so we can start giving you the legal representation that you deserve.

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Download "CHAPTER 2 Inadmissibility, Deportability, Waivers, and Relief from Removal"
2 24 ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW The law provides a long list of persons who are either prohibited from entering or are to be removed should their presence be discovered in the United States. The grounds of inadmissibility are laid out at Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 3 212(a), and the deportability grounds at INA 237. Each of the grounds was incorporated into the immigration laws as Congress thought of situations calling for the exclusion or removal of a particular group of people. At the same time that the law prohibits the admission and requires the removal of broad categories of persons, there are provisions allowing the waiver of these grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. 4 The inadmissibility and deportability grounds can be described as falling into seven general categories: (1) health-related; (2) economic; (3) criminal; (4) security and foreign policy; (5) immigration violations; (6) quasi-criminal; and (7) miscellaneous. The deportability grounds nearly mirror the inadmissibility provisions and will be described under a separate section within each of the above six categories. 5 The descriptions later in this chapter give the statute more order and make it easier to understand. That section will explore the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, as well as the criteria for obtaining waivers from those provisions. APPLICATION OF THE INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY PROVISIONS There is often a great deal of confusion between inadmissibility and deportability because of changes made to the immigration law by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA). 6 Current law provides for the removal of a wide range of individuals. In this context, removal means the ejection of a person from the United States. Included in the INA is a long list of inadmissibility and deportability provisions. 7 The deportability provisions are applied 3 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No , 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 USC 1101 et seq.) (INA). 4 In addition to the ameliorative forms of relief that may be available, immigration authorities have considerable prosecutorial and other discretionary authority to allow a person to be admitted notwithstanding his or her inadmissibility or to remain even though he or she is deportable. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 5 The grounds also are summarized in Charts 1 and 2 at the end of this chapter. 6 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996 (H.R. 3610), Pub. L. No , 110 Stat (IIRAIRA). 7 See 8 USC 1182 and 1227, INA 212 and 237.
3 CHAPTER 2 INADMISSIBILITY, DEPORTABILITY, 25 WAIVERS, AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL to a person who has been formally admitted to the United States and the inadmissibility grounds are applied to those who have not been legally admitted to the country (or who seek a new status that is the equivalent to a request for admission). The procedure for ejecting or removing any person, irrespective of whether they have been legally admitted is termed a removal hearing. Prior to 1996, the immigration statute provided that questions involving the application of the inadmissibility and deportability provisions were, as a general rule, governed by whether a person had gained entry into the United States. 8 The proceedings for those seeking admission were called exclusion hearings, and for those who had managed to enter, deportation hearings. In exclusion hearings, the immigration judge (IJ) determined the applicability of the inadmissibility provisions. In deportation hearings, the IJ would determine the application of the deportability provisions. With the enactment of IIRAIRA, a different framework was established, at least insofar as the hearing was concerned. Exclusion and deportation hearings are no longer separate and distinct, but are unified as one procedure a removal hearing for all persons, irrespective of whether the person seeks admission or the government tries to eject him or her following admission. Whether the inadmissibility or deportability provisions are applicable in a given situation will depend on whether an individual has been admitted to the United States or is seeking admission. A person who has been admitted faces the deportability grounds, and a person seeking admission must overcome the inadmissibility grounds. 9 In addition to creating a unified procedure for removal, IIRAIRA limited a person s ability to avail him- or herself of constitutional protections by placing persons physically present in the United States in the posture of an applicant for admission. 10 The question of whether a person has made an entry or has been admitted is significant in terms 8 In situations where a person is allowed to physically enter under parole, he or she would be confronted with having to overcome grounds of inadmissibility. Parole is discussed later in this chapter. 9 The definition of admission is contained in the statute at 8 USC 1101(a)(13), INA 101(a)(13), and will be explored further in this section. 10 As is explored in greater detail, infra, the statute also authorizes the application of expedited removal to certain persons who are unable to prove that they have been in the United States for a certain period of time. See 67 Fed. Reg (2002); 69 Fed. Reg (2004). Under 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(A), INA 101(a)(13)(A), a person not yet admitted, by definition, remains an applicant for admission.
5 CHAPTER 2 INADMISSIBILITY, DEPORTABILITY, 27 WAIVERS, AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL mission. 14 Prior to IIRAIRA, the government had the burden of proof in cases where a person was arrested within the United States. 15 When are the inadmissibility provisions triggered? The issue of inadmissibility arises initially when a person appears before a U.S. consul overseas seeking permission to come to the United States usually a request for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa or a parole document (see discussion, infra). 16 It arises again when the person arrives at the port of entry (airport, sea port, or land port) seeking admission. At this point, the person is subject to inspection, whereby a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer considers whether the person is admissible. There are a number of different outcomes to the inspection process the person can be detained; returned quickly under expedited removal ; granted deferred inspection ; paroled; or admitted. Where the person arrives under the Visa Waiver Program, he or she can be summarily denied admission, paroled, or admitted. 17 As long as a person has not been formally admitted into the country, he or she remains subject to the inadmissibility grounds. Moreover, the question of inadmissibility remains relevant, in certain circumstances, even if the person initially is admitted to the United States. For example, if the person later seeks lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, or leaves the United States and attempts to return, or is placed in removal proceedings because the government believes that he or she was inadmissible at the time of the last admission, the person must be prepared to establish admissibility. 18 What immigration posture triggers deportability? If the person, after initial entry, remains in the United States, there is a presumption that his or her status is lawful, and the government will have the initial burden when challenging the person s status. That is, once admitted, a person can only be removed through the removal process upon a showing of 14 8 USC 1229a(c)(2)(A) and (B); INA 240(c)(2)(A) and (B). 15 See, e.g., Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir. 1995). 16 See 8 USC 1182(d)(5) and 1229b, INA 212(d)(5) and 240A(b)(4)(A). 17 A person who seeks admission under the Visa Waiver Program, who is found inadmissible, and who expresses a desire to apply for asylum will not be subject to expedited removal. See Matter of Kanagasundram, 22 I&N Dec. 963 (BIA 1999); 8 CFR 235.3(b)(10). 18 As will be seen later, inadmissibility at entry is a burden that the government must meet since it actually is a deportability provision. The charge means that the government believes that at the time of the person s last admission, the person, in fact, should not have been admitted.
7 CHAPTER 2 INADMISSIBILITY, DEPORTABILITY, 29 WAIVERS, AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL Whether one of the underlying principles of the Fleuti doctrine, that LPRs are entitled to greater protections upon their return to the United States, has survived IIRAIRA still may be in question. 25 While treating certain LPRs as persons seeking re-admission, courts also have acknowledged constitutional concerns, not normally recognized for other returning noncitizens. 26 Parole Parole is an important concept that allows the physical entry of a person into the United States without considering him or her to actually have been admitted to the country. Thus, parole is a legal fiction. The use of parole also acts to preclude the person from asserting a legal right to admission even though he or she may be physically within the border of the United States. From its earliest usage in the 19th century, this device has been used as a convenient way to allow otherwise inadmissible persons to be free from detention while their formal admission was under consideration, or to permit them physically to gain admission. Parole has been used over the years to deal with humanitarian situations, both on a large scale and in individual cases. Since the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, 27 the use of parole has been significantly curtailed. That is, one of the reasons for passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to regularize the admission process for refugees, which included using refugee visas instead of parole as the preferred way of dealing with a humanitarian crisis. Pre-Hearing Detention Beginning in 1988, Congress began to focus a great deal of attention on dealing with noncitizens in the United States who had been convicted of crimes. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 called for mandatory that would have otherwise rendered him inadmissible. 25 In Matter of Collado-Muñoz, 21 I&N Dec (BIA 1997), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the Fleuti doctrine was no longer applicable. See also Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 397 (3d Cir. 2003) (BIA s interpretation of 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(C), INA 101(a)(13)(C) was entitled to Chevron deference). 26 In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), the Court, while allowing the application of inadmissibility provisions to a returning LPR, noted that once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly. See also Ferraras v. Ashcroft, 160 F. Supp. 2d 617, 627 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 27 Pub. L. No , 94 Stat. 107.
No IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. ERNESTO GALARZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, LEHIGH COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
Case: 12-3991 Document: 003111232631 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2013 No. 12-3991 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERNESTO GALARZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEHIGH COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.

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Mann v. National Review (the plaintiff alleges that the defendants libeled him in a blog post; an anti-SLAPP motion is pending).
And anti-SLAPP motions are currently pending in Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group and Boley v. Atlantic Monthly Group, in DC federal court.
One of the interesting developments has been the type of defendants that have invoked the statute. In the statute’s legislative history, the DC Council noted that a typical SLAPP suit involved “an effort to stop a citizen from exercising their political rights, or to punish them for having already done so.” It cited an example provided by the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nations Capitol which involved an alleged retaliatory lawsuit by a developer against grassroots advocates who opposed his efforts. The Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press provides a similar example of neighbor vs. neighbor litigation as the reason why states should enact anti-SLAPP legislation.
In those cases in which defendants have filed anti-SLAPP motions (counting the two Dean v. NBC cases as one), however, the moving parties have included “established” media (NBC, Rachel Maddow, Fox Television, City Paper; Hearst Publications; National Review; a division of the Washington Post; The Atlantic); a relatively well-known blogger (Andrew Breitbart); a well known lawyer and consultant (Lanny Davis); and the District of Columbia.
[t]he threat of prolonged and expensive litigation has a real potential for chilling journalistic criticism and comment upon public figures and public affairs. Furthermore, the prospect of delay attendant upon any defamation trial, no matter how expeditiously handled, may inhibit the full and free exercise of constitutionally protected activities.
Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 50 (D.C. 1983).
Plaintiff first suggests that these Defendants somehow fall out of the protection of the Anti-SLAPP act because they are not “normal,” “middle-class” Americans to which the statute should apply, but rather are “sophisticated people in the political arena.” Opp. 1, 18-19. Plaintiff’s implication that persons such as Dr. Schanzer or the editors of FP are abnormal and something other than middle class Americans, along with the suggestion that the statute’s reach depends upon that kind of stereotyping, is both troubling and devoid of any basis in law. Nowhere does the Act state that its applicability is limited in any such way, and with respect to FP, courts have already applied the statute to media entities. . . . In fact, the only criteria for invoking the statute is whether Defendants engaged in “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5502(a).
Further, while the DC Council highlighted the “typical” SLAPP suit, the legislative history makes clear that the concern animating the council was the use of lawsuits “to muzzle speech,” which require a defendant to “dedicate a substantial amount of money, time and legal resources” in defense, and thus “achieve their filer’s intention of punishing or preventing opposing points of view, resulting in a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.” The right to speak and publish belongs to all parties, irrespective of their size or wealth.
“I don’t think there is any question that if [the plaintiff Christopher] Dietz had to file this case in a jurisdiction with an anti-SLAPP law he would not have filed at all,” Levy said noting that Dietz did not file in his home district, Washington, D.C., where such a law exists.
To the extent that is accurate – that the more “typical” SLAPP plaintiff is avoiding DC because of the anti-SLAPP statute and its protections (including the awarding of fees to a moving party for a successful motion) – that might explain the above data. Nevertheless, the experience in DC with the anti-SLAPP statute got me wondering if it was an anomaly, or consistent with the experience in other jurisdictions.
In June 2011, Texas enacted an anti-SLAPP statute. According to the wonderfully named slappedintexas.com and my own independent research, several of the cases have been “typical” SLAPP suits. For example, successful anti-SLAPP motions were made by individuals sued by mortgage company for comments they made on online forum about the company, individuals sued over a Yelp review, the Better Business Bureau in response to a suit over a poor rating, individuals in a neighborhood who spoke out against a nightclub, and were sued by its owner, and an individual who accused a police officer of corruption. An anti-SLAPP motion has also been filed in a suit where a company alleges that individual defendants defamed it when they asserted that it contaminated their water well with its nearby fracking operations and in a dispute between two neighbors over a domain name.
Interestingly, the Texas anti-SLAPP statute has been invoked in two suits involving political candidates: one where an individual alleged he was defamed in a campaign video by two candidates for State Board of Education, and the other where a candidate sued his opponent, alleging that her advertisement was libelous.
Like the District of Columbia, the statute has also been invoked by “established” media, including a newspaper sued by two men whose photos were erroneously distributed in connection with a robbery and a well-known medical journal which asserted a doctor’s study was fraudulent.
While it is interesting to note that the Texas suits to date have been more “typical,” I suspect that the DC experience will come to mirror that in other jurisdictions in the years ahead.
This entry was posted in General and tagged 3M, abbas, breitbart, campbell, Dean, Farah, Maddow, national review, payne, Sherrod, Snyder. Bookmark the permalink.


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art. 46
art 21
art.21
art. 8
art. 6
art. 6
art. 89
art. 77
art. 6


This page provides answers to frequently asked reporting questions pertaining to political action committees. If you don't find an answer to your question here, please contact the FEC's Information Division, toll free at 800-424-9530 or by e-mail at info@fec.gov. Committee staff may also speak with the Campaign Finance Analyst who reviews the committee's reports by calling the Reports Analysis Division, toll free at 800-424-9530 (press 5). Additionally, electronic filers may contact the Commission's Electronic Filing Office for technical assistance, toll free at 800-424-9530 (press 4).
When do I need to file / When are my reports due?
Where do I send my FEC reports? What methods should I use to mail my reports?
What happens if I file my report late?
Can I get a filing extension?
Do I have to file a report even if my committee had no activity during the reporting period?
Where can I find copies of our filed reports or RFAIs sent to the committee?
How do I respond to a Request for Additional Information (RFAI) letter?
The committee has a new treasurer/address/committee name/bank/affiliate, what should I do?
Do I have to file a pre-primary report?
What state should be disclosed for the “in the state of” field on the 12 Day Pre-General and 30 Day Post-General Reports?
What does multicandidate status mean?
When does a contribution from an individual need to be itemized?
What information is required for contributions from individuals?
How do I report contributions received via payroll deduction?
How do I report an in-kind contribution received from an individual?
How do I report contributions from LLCs or partnerships?
How does the committee establish “best efforts” for obtaining required information from our contributors?
What information is required for contributions from other political committees?
How do I report a receipt from a federal committee?
How do I report a transfer received from an affiliated committee?
How do I report receipts from a joint fundraiser?
How do I report an in-kind contribution from a committee?
How do I report a receipt from a non-federal committee?
How do I report a refund or rebate received from a previous disbursement?
How do I report a refund for a contribution we made to a federal candidate or committee?
How do I report interest or dividends received from our bank or investment accounts?
How do I report a reimbursement from our connected organization for previously paid administrative expenses?
How do I report the sale of committee goods or services?
Who can pay for our separate segregated fund’s administrative expenses?
On what line are administrative expenses reported?
What information do I need to include for itemized administrative expenses?
When do disbursements need to be itemized on Line 21(b), Schedule B?
Does our committee have to report bank fees?
How do I report credit card payments?
How do I report reimbursements to individuals?
What is the difference between federal and non-federal candidates and committees?
What is the difference between a candidate’s campaign committee and a candidate’s leadership PAC?
How do I report contributions to federal candidates and committees?
How do I report contributions to affiliated federal committees?
How do I report contributions to non-federal candidates and committees?
How do I report an in-kind contribution to federal candidates and committees?
How do I report refunded contributions?
A contribution check was lost in the mail or was never delivered to the committee. How do I report that the check was never cashed?
What does it mean to designate a contribution to a federal candidate?
The election is over, can I still make a contribution to a candidate for that election?
We made an excessive contribution to a candidate. What should I do now?
How do I report a new Loan?
How do I report receiving the funds?
When do I file Schedule C and C-1?
I file electronically, why do I also need to mail a copy of the Schedule C-1?
We obtained a Line of Credit (LOC), how do I disclose each draw?
Do I need to file a new Schedule C-1 if we re-finance or extend the loan?
Do I file Schedule C on every report?
Do I file Schedule C-1 on every report?
How do I report a loan (principal) payment?
How do I report an interest payment?
Is a loan from an individual a contribution from that person?
Do I have to file a Schedule C-1 for a loan from an individual?
How do I report a loan owed to the Committee?
When do I have to report debts?
How do I report a debt?
How do I report a payment of a debt?
How do I report a disputed debt?
How do I report a forgiven debt?
Do I have to file a Schedule D on every report?
How do I report an estimated debt?
How do I report a debt owed to the Committee?
What are the reporting requirements for independent expenditure?
When do I have to file 24/48-Hour Reports?
How do I file 24/48-Hour Reports?
What should be included on a 24/48-Hour Reports?
How are independent expenditures aggregated?
How are independent expenditures for presidential primary elections aggregated?
How do I report an independent expenditure that is disseminated on a different day than the payment to the vendor?
How do I determine the dissemination date?
How do I report an independent expenditure when, at the time of dissemination, we have an estimate of what the cost will be?
The 24/48-Hour Report discloses an estimated amount and the vendor has since sent an invoice with the actual amount owed.
of the corresponding regularly scheduled report (Form 3X)?
What is an Independent Expenditure-Only Committee?
How do I register as an Independent Expenditure-Only Committee?
How do I notify the Commission of my Committee’s intent to operate under Carey v. FEC?
How do I report as a committee operating under Carey v. FEC?
For Political Committees with Non-Contribution Accounts, if the committee makes an independent expenditure for a specific candidate from both the Non-Contribution Account and the Contribution Account what should be reflected in the "Calendar Year To Date Per Year For Office Sought" field?
If a donor to the Non-Contribution Account is refunded some or all of their contribution, what line should the refund be disclosed?
When do I need to file?/ When are my reports due?
Your reporting schedule depends on the type of committee. Please consult the Filing Frequency by Type of Filer section of the website for more information.
Note: Committees required to file electronically must submit their reports, statements and notices electronically. For more information, consult the Electronic Filing section of the website.
Registered and Certified Mail. Reports sent by registered or certified mail must be postmarked on or before the mailing deadline to be considered timely filed.
Other Means of Filing. Reports sent by other means - including first class mail and courier- must be received by the FEC before close of business on the filing deadline.
Under the FEC's Administrative Fine Program, failure to file reports on time could result in penalties ranging from $30 to $16,000 (or more for repeat late- and non-filers). For more information, please consult the Administrative Fine Program or to determine the amount of a possible fine consult the Administrative Fine Calculator.
No. The Commission does not have statutory authority to extend any filing deadlines. All reports and other filings are due on or before the established filing deadlines.
Yes, you must file every report, regardless of the amount of activity.
Where can I find copies of our filed reports or Requests for Additional Information(RFAI) letters sent to the committee?
Images of filed reports and/or RFAIs can be found by using the FEC's Candidate and Committee Viewer. Enter your Committee ID, and you will be able to view a summary of the committee's activity by category, report and filings bases on the election cycle.
How do I respond to a RFAI letter?
For more information on responding to an RFAI, please consult Requests for Additional Information (RFAIs) section of the website.
We have a new treasurer/address/committee name/bank/affiliate, what should I do?
PACs filing on a quarterly basis in an election year are subject to pre-election reporting requirements if they make previously undisclosed contributions or expenditures in connection with any primary and/or runoff. Please refer to Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates (2016) for more information.
When filing the 12 Day Pre-General and 30 Day Post-General Reports, you will need to complete the "in the state of" field. Please note that since the general election is held nationwide, you may enter any state in the field.
3. made contributions to at least five federal candidates.
Multicandidate committees (also referred to as "qualified" committees) have different contribution limits than committees that are not qualified. Please refer to the Contribution Limits Chart [PDF] for more information.
Contributions from individuals need to be itemized when the contributor gives more than $200 during the calendar year. If the contribution is itemized, it should be reported on Line 11(a)(i). If it is unitemized, it should be reported on Line 11(a)(ii).
A payroll contribution should be reported with the same information as a normal individual contribution but instead of putting a date, the committee can add a description that includes the frequency and amount of the payroll deduction. Thus, a committee would only need to have one entry for multiple payroll deductions for a reporting period.
How do I report an in-kind contribution received by our committee from an individual?
In order to avoid inflating/deflating the cash on hand amount, the amount of an in-kind contribution from an individual should be disclosed as a receipt on Line 11(a)(i) of the Detailed Summary Page (Contributions from Individuals/Persons) and a disbursement on Line 21(b) of the Detailed Summary Page(Other Federal Operating Expenditures).
Some LLCs are treated as partnerships and can give money to political committees while attributing a share to each partner.
Receipts from LLCs/partnerships should be disclosed on 11(a)(i) and the share of receipts from each partner should be disclosed as memo entries below, so as to not inflate cash on hand levels.
How do we establish “best efforts” for obtaining required information from our contributors?
1. A clear and conspicuous request for the contributor information on the original solicitation and must also inform the contributor of the requirements of federal law for the reporting of such information.
• if the request is written, include a pre-addressed post card or return envelope.
3. If you receive contributor information after the contribution(s) has been reported, you shall either a) file with your next regularly scheduled report, an amended memo Schedule A listing all the contributions for which additional information was received; or b) file on or before your next regularly scheduled reporting date, amendments to the report(s) originally disclosing the contribution(s).
Contributions from federal committees should be disclosed on Line 11(c).
Contributions from affiliated committees should be itemized the same as contributions from non-affiliated committees but they should be itemized on Line 12 rather than Line 11(c). Make sure the committee has disclosed all affiliated committees on the most recent statement of organization.
The transfer-in of net proceeds from the joint fundraising representative should be disclosed on Schedule A, supporting Line 12 (Transfers From Affiliated/Other Party Committees).
The original contributors to the joint fundraiser should be itemized as MEMO entries on Schedule A, supporting Line 12.
The Date of Receipt is the date the joint fundraising representative received the contribution(s) from the original contributor(s).
The Amount of Each Receipt this Period is the total (gross) amount of the contribution to the committee.
In order to avoid inflating/deflating the cash on hand amount, the amount of an in-kind contribution from an individual should be disclosed as a receipt on Line 11(c) of the Detailed Summary Page and a disbursement on Line 21(b) of the Detailed Summary Page, regardless of amount.
The committee must verify that the contribution from the non-federal committee contains only federally permissible funds.
If the contribution is over $1000, the donor committee is required to register with the FEC.
How do I report a refund or rebate received for a previous disbursement?
The rebate/refund should be disclosed on Schedule A, supporting Line 15 and should indicate the nature of the transaction (refund, rebate, etc.).
Itemize offsets to operating expenditures when they aggregate over $200 per calendar year from the same source.
How do I report interest/dividends received from our bank/investment accounts?
The receipt of funds should be disclosed on Schedule A, supporting Line 17 and should indicate the nature of the transaction (bank interest, stock dividends, etc).
Who can pay for the SSF’s administrative expenses?
Administrative expenses (setting up and administering the SSF, raising money) paid solely from the federal account should be listed on Line 21(b).
Administrative expenses allocated between the federal and non-federal accounts should be disclosed in the “Administrative” category on Schedule H4. For more information on allocating expenses, click here.
Yes, a non-exhaustive list of purposes that the Commission deems inadequate can be found here. See also the Federal Register Notice: Commission's Statement of Policy on Purpose of Disbursement. A non-exhaustive list of acceptable purposes can be found here.
Do I have to report bank fees?
If the committee pays for all its administrative costs, bank fees should be reported on line 21(b) like any other administrative cost.
If the committee’s connected organization pays for administrative costs, bank fees don’t need to be listed.
How do we report credit card payments?
Schedule B, Line 21(b): The payment to the credit card company should be disclosed on Line 21(b) and MEMO entries to identify the original vendor(s) are required if payments to the vendor(s) exceed $200 during the calendar year.
How do we report reimbursements to individuals?
Schedule B, Line 21(b): The reimbursement to the individual should be disclosed on Line 21(b) and the purpose should indicate that it is for travel/subsistence reimbursement. If the travel/subsistence reimbursement is greater than $500, MEMO entries to identify the original vendor(s) are required if payments to the vendor(s) exceed $200 during the calendar year.
If there are multiple reimbursements on a report you should clearly identify which reimbursement each memo entry relates to.
Payments to payroll companies should be on Line 21(b) for non-connected committees and SSFs.
The lump sum paid to the payroll company must be followed by MEMO entries that include the individuals that were the ultimate recipients of the salary payments.
What is the difference between federal and nonfederal candidates/committees?
A federal candidate is a candidate that is running in an election for the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, or President. Candidates running in these elections must register their committees with the FEC.
An authorized committee is the principal campaign committee or any other political committee authorized by a candidate to received contributions or make expenditures on behalf of such candidate. (11 CFR §100.5(f)(1)) Authorized committees are not affiliated with leadership PACs. Authorized committees have per-election contribution limits.
A leadership PAC is a non-connected committee that supports/opposes more than one federal candidate and that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a federal candidate or office holder which is neither an authorized committee nor affiliated with the candidate’s authorized committee. (52 U.S.C. 30104(i)(8)(B)) Leadership PACs have yearly contributions limits.
A candidates’ authorized committee and leadership PAC are not affiliated and have different contribution limits.
For example, Rep. Eric Cantor’s authorized committee is called Cantor for Congress and his leadership PAC is called Every Republican Is Crucial (ERICPAC).
How do I report contributions to federal candidates/committees?
Contributions to federal candidates/committees should be listed on Line 23 and include the full committee name, address, date and amount.
For contributions to federal candidates, contributions should also include office sought, state and district (if applicable).
Contributions to non-federal candidates/committees should be itemized on Line 29 and require the name, address, date and amount of contribution. They should also include a purpose indicating the contribution is to a non-federal candidate (“non-federal contribution”). Office sought, state and district are not required.
1. The entry on Line 21(b) should be a MEMO entry itemized to the vendor that provided the service that the committee paid for on behalf of the candidate or committee with additional text that links the memo to the Line 23 entry.
2. The entry on Line 23 should be itemized the same as the Line 21(b) entry, but it should not be a MEMO entry and it should include the candidate’s name, office sought, state and district (if applicable).
Contributions refunded back to individuals should be disclosed on Line 28(a) of the Detailed Summary Page (Refunds of contributions to individuals/persons other than political committees).
If the refund is for a contribution(s) received in a prior year(s), the amount of the refund should not be included in the calculation of the individual’s aggregate year to date total for the current year.
Negative entries on Schedule A should only be used to disclose returned or bounced contribution checks and not for refunds made by the committee.
A contribution check was lost in the mail or was never delivered, how do I report that it was never cashed?
The election is over, can I still make contributions to candidates for that election?
We made an excessive contribution. What should we do now?
All loans received by the Committee must be itemized on Schedule A, supporting Line 13, regardless of amount.
For each loan, provide the identification of the person making the loan (name and address), the amount of the loan, the date, and the aggregate year-to-date total.
On Schedule C, for each loan, provide the identification of the person making the loan (name and address), the amount of the loan, the interest rate, the date incurred, and the due date.
The committee must also identify any endorser and the amount of such endorsement.
If the loan is from a lending institution, the Committee is also required to file a Schedule C-1 with the first report after the loan is obtained, restructured, or a draw is made on the line of credit.
Each loan owed by the reporting committee at the close of the reporting period must be reported on Schedule C and include the name, mailing address and zip code of the creditor, the original amount of the loan, the cumulative payment to date on the loan, and the outstanding balance at the close of the reporting period.
Be sure to carry the total amounts of outstanding loans to line 10 of the Summary Page.
Do I file a Schedule C-1 on every report?
Report the interest paid on a loan as an operating expenditure on Schedule B, Line 21(b) once interest payments to the payee aggregate over $200.
A loan, to the extent it is repaid, is no longer a contribution.
No. Loans from individuals do not require the Committee to file a Schedule C-1.
A debt of $500 or less is reportable once it has been outstanding 60 days from the date incurred. These debts should be disclosed on the next regular report.
Use Schedule D to report the outstanding amount owed on a debt or obligation including any unpaid interest accrued on a loan and any payments made to reduce the debt.
Disclose the full name, mailing address, the amount of the debt outstanding at the beginning of the reporting period, the amount of debt incurred this reporting period, the payment(s) made during the reporting period, the outstanding balance of the debt at the end of the reporting period, and the purpose of the debt or obligation.
How do I report a payment of the debt?
Report debt payments on the appropriate Line of the Detailed Summary Page. For example, if the debt is for an administrative expense, the payment should be reported on Schedule B, Line 21(b). If the debt is for an independent expenditure, the payment should be reported on Schedule E, Line 24.
Any amount(s) paid during the reporting period should be included in the “Payment this Period” column on Schedule D.
Do I have to file Schedule D on every report?
For more information about independent expenditures see FEC Record.
On Schedule E, enter the full name, mailing address, the date and amount of the independent expenditure, and the purpose of the independent expenditure. Also include identification of the candidate the independent expenditure is supporting or opposing, office, state, and district (if applicable) for which the candidate is running, whether the independent expenditure is supporting or opposing the candidate, and the election for which the independent expenditure was made.
In addition, committees may need to file 24/48-Hour Reports depending on the amount and dissemination date of the entry on Schedule E. Continue below for further information.
As states establish their election schedules, the Commission calculates the applicable 24/48-Hour Report periods. Please refer to 2017 24/48 Hour Report Schedule for more information.
Use a separate, stand alone Schedule E to file 24/48-Hour Reports and check the appropriate box to indicate which it is.
The Report must disclose all independent expenditures leading up to the $10,000 or $1,000 threshold, as appropriate; however expenditures that have already been disclosed in a previous report do not have to be included in the Report.
Example: an independent expenditure totaling $9,000 was made on 6/25/08 (within 48-Hour time frame) for a Virginia Senate candidate in the general election. No prior expenditures were made for this election. The expenditure does not require a 48-Hour Report and is disclosed on the July Monthly Report. On 7/25/08 a $5,000 independent expenditure was made for the Virginia Senate candidate in the general election. A 48-Hour Report is required because the independent expenditures for the Virginia Senate general election aggregate over $10,000 ($9,000 + $5,000 =$14,000). The Report should disclose the $5,000 expenditure from 7/25/08 but need not include the $9,000 expenditure that was already reported on the July Monthly Report.
Independent expenditures are aggregated on a per calendar year, per election, per office sought basis.
In the reporting period during which payment is made, report the payment on Schedule B, Line 21(b) as an operating expenditure. In the reporting period in which the independent expenditure is disseminated, itemize the independent expenditure and its date of dissemination on Schedule E, and itemize the previous expenditure on Schedule B again as a negative entry. This will prevent inflating the total disbursement.
The alternate method is to report the Independent Expenditure on Schedule E on the report in which the payment is made. In this case the only additional reporting requirements would be any necessary 24/48-Hour Reports.
In situations where the independent expenditure is disseminated in one reporting period and payment will be made in a future reporting period, report the reportable debt on Schedule D, and the itemized independent expenditure on Schedule E as a MEMO entry, referencing the debt on Schedule D. In the future reporting period when payment is made, itemize the independent expenditure again on Schedule E (no MEMO entry this time). Be sure to report the amount in the “Payment made this period” column on Schedule D.
1. Independent Expenditures are considered made when the communication is publicly distributed or otherwise publicly disseminated. If the dates are different on the 24/48-Hour Report and Schedule E of a regular report, the date on the 24/48-Hour Report is the date of dissemination, while the date on Schedule E of the regular report is the date of payment. If the dissemination date occurs before payment, the dissemination date should be on the 24/48-Hour Reports.
For more information on determining the date of dissemination, please see the FEC Record.
If a committee is unsure of the cost of an independent expenditure at the time of dissemination, they should estimate the cost on the 24/48-Hour Report and indicate that the amount is an estimate.
The 24/48-Hour Report discloses an estimated amount and the vendor has since sent an invoice with the actual amount owed. Now that we know the actual cost, how do we reconcile the amount on the 24/48-Hour Report with the amount on Schedule E of the corresponding regularly scheduled report (Form 3X)?
When payment is made, the Committee should report the payment on Schedule E (for the correct amount) and include memo text tying the payment to the report, and explaining that the amount on Schedule E is the correct amount, and the amount on the 24/48-Hour Report is an estimate.
When the committee sells any bitcoins purchased from funds transferred from a campaign depository, the committee must report any earnings or losses as an "other receipt" (Line 14 for Form 3 filers; Line 21 for Form 3P filers; Line 17 for Form 3X filers). Losses should be reported as a negative entry.
An Independent Expenditure-Only Committee is a registered political committee that intends to make only independent expenditures. This committee may not give direct contributions to any federally registered committees or candidates, with the exception of other Independent Expenditure-Only Committees. The committee may solicit and accept unlimited contributions from individuals, political committees, corporations and labor organizations for the purpose of making independent expenditures.
In July 2010, in accordance with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in SpeechNow v. FEC, the Commission approved two advisory opinions concerning the application of the Act in regards to groups solely making independent expenditures.
In AO 2010-09 (Club for Growth), The Commission concluded that a 501(c)(4) corporation can establish a political committee that will make only independent expenditures and may solicit unlimited contributions from individuals in the general public.
In AO 2010-11 (Commonsense Ten), The Commission concluded that a registered nonconnected political committee that intends to make only independent expenditures may solicit and accept unlimited contributions from individuals, political committees, corporations and labor organizations for the purpose of making independent expenditures.
"This committee intends to make unlimited independent expenditures, and consistent with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision in SpeechNow v. FEC, it therefore intends to raise funds in unlimited amounts. This committees will not use those funds to make contributions, whether direct, in-kind, or via coordinated communications, to federal candidates or committees."
"Consistent with the stipulated judgment in Carey v. FEC, this committee intends to establish a separate bank account to deposit and withdraw funds raised in unlimited amounts from individuals, corporations, labor organizations, and/or other political committees. The funds maintained in this separate account will not be used to make contributions, whether direct, in-kind, or via coordinated communications, or coordinated expenditures, to federal candidates or committees."
Nonconnected political committees that wish to establish a separate non-contribution account must report all receipts and disbursements for both accounts pursuant to the Act and Commission regulations and should follow the interim reporting guidance issued by the Commission until such time as a rulemaking is adopted.
For more information please see Carey v. FEC and the FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC.
The Calendar Year To Date Per Year for Office Sought total should reflect independent expenditures made from both accounts since the total represents the independent expenditures made by the committee as a whole.
Refunds should be disclosed on Line 28 with a notation that the refund is occurring from the non-contribution account.