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A policy under the Affordable Care Act requires most health insurance plans to cover contraception. It was adopted to improve access to birth control, which is vital to women’s health and equality. Since the beginning, the rule has been subject to multiple lawsuits and policy changes.
New Trump administration regulations let bosses and universities use religion to deny their employees and students access to contraception. But whether a woman uses birth control should be up to her, not her boss or university.
Throughout the policy's many changes, we have been fighting for our neighbors because for-profit corporations and non-profit institutions should not be allowed to use religion as a reason to deny access to contraception. Failure to provide this coverage threatens women's health and equality.
From the beginning, houses of worship have been exempt from the general rule that health insurance plans must cover contraception. Houses of worship do not have to (and have never had to) provide their employees insurance coverage for contraception. Employees working for these organizations have to pay for contraception on their own.
Opponents of contraception argued that the exemption should be expanded to include non-profit institutions, including universities, and even for-profit corporations.
We filed comments explaining that an expansion of the exemption would unjustifiably threaten employees' access to vital healthcare. The federal government did not expand the exemption, but announced that it would accommodate religiously affiliated institutions that objected to providing contraception coverage.
In 2012, the government announced that it would create an accommodation to the contraception coverage requirement for a broad category of religiously affiliated non-profit institutions, including universities. The accommodation would allow these employers to opt out of providing contraception coverage in their insurance plans; after the employer opted out, the government would work with the employer’s insurance company or plan administrator to ensure that employees received contraceptive coverage without additional charge.
We submitted comments objecting to the creation of the new accommodation because it was unnecessary and threatened women's access to birth control.
In 2013, the government formally proposed a new rule to put the accommodation in place. We again submitted comments expressing our concerns. The government finalized the accommodation later that year. Under the final rule, religiously affiliated non-profits simply had to fill out a form in order to take advantage of the accommodation.
The accommodation failed to appease many non-profit institutions, including universities, and dozens of these groups challenged it in court. They argue that the mere act of filling out a form—a form relieving them of the need to comply with the policy—itself violates their religious freedom. They want a full exemption that strips their employees and students of contraception coverage altogether. We filed briefs in most of these cases, and in one case, University of Notre Dame v. Price, we represented students whose coverage is at risk.
In one of the challenges, the Supreme Court allowed Wheaton College to obtain the accommodation by notifying the government—rather than its insurance provider or third-party administrator—that it objects to providing coverage. The government then amended the accommodation to reflect this decision. Non-profit institutions may now notify either their insurance company or the government in order to take advantage of the accommodation.
When the government announced the amendment to the accommodation, we filed comments to reiterate our concerns with the accommodation and encouraged the government to make no further concessions.
The owners of for-profit corporations filed dozens of cases, arguing that they were entitled to an exemption because providing contraception coverage for their employees violated their religious beliefs. One of the cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, ended up at the Supreme Court. We filed over a dozen briefs in those cases. In the Supreme Court, we filed a brief on behalf of nearly 30 religious organizations, arguing that religious freedom has never included the right to deprive other people of their rights.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled that certain for-profit corporations could refuse to provide otherwise required health benefits—in this case, insurance coverage for contraception—based on their owners’ religious beliefs.
In August 2014, the government proposed changes to the policy that would address the Hobby Lobby ruling and extend the accommodation to closely held for-profit corporations.
We submitted comments arguing that the accommodation should be limited to the few closely held for-profit corporations whose owners have religious objections, like Hobby Lobby.
The administration finalized this rule in 2015. The rule is a good-faith effort to address the Hobby Lobby ruling, but it extends beyond what was required by the case. Nonetheless, those determined to curtail women’s access to birth control still claim the regulation does not go far enough.
In May 2016, the Supreme Court ruled in Zubik v. Burwell, one of the many challenges to the accommodation brought by religiously affiliated institutions. These institutions want to block their employees and students from receiving birth control coverage from third-party insurance companies, even though the religious groups don’t have to pay for or provide it. We filed a brief in Zubik on behalf of 240 students, faculty, and staff at religiously affiliated universities that discussed the importance of providing contraceptive coverage to those who work or study at these institutions.
In its Zubik ruling, the Supreme Court essentially side-stepped the issue. Instead it sent the issue back down to the lower courts and urged them to consider other possible accommodations. In light of Zubik, the government issued a request for information on whether there are alternative ways to accommodate objecting institutions while still ensuring that women have access to seamless coverage for contraception and we submitted comments. After reviewing 54,000 comments, the Obama administration concluded that there was no feasible alternative. Unfortunately, no resolution has been reached and these women’s access to contraception remains in limbo.
You can learn more about the case on our Zubik v. Price page.
In May 2017, President Trump signed a "religious freedom" executive order, calling for new regulations that would harm women’s access to birth control and on October 6, the administration issued them. The new regulations create a sweeping religious exemption to the ACA’s contraception coverage benefit: They allow any corporation or university to use religion to deny their employees and students coverage for birth control.
We submitted comments arguing that new regulations discriminate against women and are unconstitutional.
In October 2017, Americans United and the National Women’s Law Center also filed Shiraef v. Hargan, a lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s contraception coverage rules. We represented women at risk of being denied birth control coverage, including University of Notre Dame students. Barely a week after we filed the case, Notre Dame reversed course on its plan to take advantage of the Trump administration rules, announcing instead that employees and students would continue to have contraceptive coverage. Because these women were promised access to birth control at the time, they decided they didn’t need to continue their lawsuit.
Several states also challenged the Trump administration’s discriminatory rules and courts have blocked them.
The courts have blocked the Trump administration rules. Yet the Trump administration and the University of Notre Dame negotiated a deal behind closed doors that gets around the courts’ rulings. The agreement, settling University of Notre Dame v. Price, gives the university the right to ignore the Affordable Care Act, which requires the school to provide its employees and students with insurance coverage of contraception. In February 2018 as a result of the agreement, Notre Dame announced that it would stop covering certain forms of contraception for 17,000 students, employees, and their families.
On June 26, 2018, Americans United, the National Women’s Law Center, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and Macey Swanson LLP, challenged the illegal settlement on behalf of a group of Notre Dame students.
We will continue to fight efforts to use religion to undermine women’s access to access to contraception.

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(1) The District Court in New York dismissed the libel of M. on a hearing on the merits.
(2) If the jurisdiction of that court was in issue before it, the remedy of M. was by a direct appeal to this Court, on that question, under § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1591, c. 517, 26 Stat. 827.
(3) If otherwise, the remedy of M., as against the order dismissing the libel, was by an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under § 6 of the same act.
(4) The mandamus is refused.
(6) That court did not lose its jurisdiction by the fact that the D. subsequently went to New York.
(7) In order to sustain the proceeding, it was not necessary that M. or V. should have been personally served with notice thereof within the District of Massachusetts, or that the D. should have been taken and held by the Massachusetts Court.
(5) The filing of the libel by the corporation, with the offer of a stipulation, gave jurisdiction, and no subsequent irregularity in procedure could take it away.
(9) The ex parte appraisement was not void.
(10) The District Court in Massachusetts can order the giving of a new or further stipulation, and, on a failure to comply with such order, can stay the further proceedings of the corporation, deny it all relief, and dismiss its libel.
(11) The provision of Rule 54 in Admiralty, for the giving of a stipulation, instead of making a transfer to a trustee, is valid, and the value involved may be judicially ascertained primarily without a hearing of the persons interested adversely.
On the 24th of July, 1892, between 8 and 9 o'clock A.M., a collision took place between the steam yacht Alva at anchor on Nantucket shoals, in Vineyard Sound, and owned by William K. Vanderbilt, of the City of New York, and the freight steamship H. F. Dimock, running regularly between Boston and the City of New York and belonging to the Metropolitan Steamship Company, a Massachusetts corporation. The collision occurred during a thick fog, and, as a consequence of it, the Alva sank.
Dimock and her freight then pending; that the petitioner claimed the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in §§ 4283, 4284, chapter 6, title 48, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and that, if the court decided that any damage was occasioned by the negligence of the Dimock or those in charge of her for which the Dimock was liable, the petitioner claimed that its liability as her owner should be limited to the value of the vessel and her freight pending at the time of the collision.
into court, after paying costs and expenses, should be divided pro rata among the several claimants in proportion to the amount of their respective claims, and that in the meantime, and until the final judgment of the court, it would make an order restraining the further prosecution of any suits against the petitioner or the Dimock in respect of any such claims, and (6) for other relief.
On the 25th of August, 1892, the libel and petition was amended by adding an averment that at the time it was filed, the Dimock was, and ever since has been, lying in the port of Boston, and within the admiralty jurisdiction and process of the district court.
On the 16th of August, 1892, the District Court for Massachusetts issued a warrant to the marshal of the district, directing him to cause the Dimock and her pending freight to be appraised on oath by three appraisers named in the warrant, to be duly sworn. The appraisers made oath before the clerk of the court that they would appraise the vessel and her pending freight according to their best skill and judgment. On the 17th of August, 1892, the three appraisers reported to the court that, after a strict examination and careful inquiry, they estimated and appraised the Dimock at $80,000, and her freight pending at the time of the collision at $2,395.33.
persons claiming damages in the proceedings; that the petitioner should abide by all orders and decrees, interlocutory or final, of the court, and should pay the amount of its final decree, and all sums that the petitioner should be ordered to pay by such final decree, whether in the district court or any appellate court, and that unless it should do so, the signers consented that execution should issue against them, their heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, and their lands, goods, and chattels, wherever found, to the value of the sum above mentioned, without further notice or delay.
On the same day, the district court issued a monition to the marshal commanding him to give notice to Vanderbilt and to all persons concerned of the filing of the libel or petition and of its substance; to cite Vanderbilt and all persons claiming damages for any loss occasioned by said collision to appear before the court at Boston on or before November 25, 1892, and make due proof of their respective claims in the premises; to serve a copy of the monition on Vanderbilt, if he should be found within that district; to give further notice by advertising the same in a specified newspaper published at Boston at least sixty days before such return day, and to post a copy of the notice at the courthouse in Boston. The marshal made return on September 2, 1892, that he had advertised the monition three times -- on August 19 and 26 and September 2 -- in the designated newspaper, had posted a copy of it in the courthouse at Boston on August 19th, and on the same day had given a further notice to Vanderbilt by mailing to him an attested copy of the monition by registered letter to his house at Newport.
restraining order to Root & Clarke, attorneys for Vanderbilt at New York.
voyage she was then making, exceeded $200,000, and her freight then pending exceeded $2,300; that the amount to be apportioned among the several persons who so suffered loss by such collision exceeded $202,300; that the Dimock had not been libeled or arrested in any court to answer for such loss, and her owner had not theretofore been sued in that behalf, and that the Dimock was then within the Southern District of New York, and subject to the control of the court for the purposes of the proceeding.
The prayer of the libel was that the court would proceed to establish the loss suffered in the premises by all persons who might make any claim of liability therefor against the Dimock or her owner, and would proceed in due course to ascertain the value of the Dimock and her freight then pending, and the proportionate amount of compensation for said matters which the libellant was entitled to receive from the owner of the Dimock, and to decree the payment thereof against either the Dimock or her owner, or both, as might be lawful and proper, and for further relief; that process might issue against the Dimock, and she be condemned and sold to pay said damages, and that the steamship company, Vanderbilt, and all persons claiming to have suffered loss by such collision, might be cited in due form to appear and answer, and to prove their claims in that behalf.
Under process duly issued on that libel, the Dimock was attached by the marshal on September 30, 1892, in the Southern District of New York, and on the 1st of October, 1892, in that district, process of monition was duly served by him on the steamship company, and on the same day proctors for Vanderbilt duly entered their appearance for him in the suit.
just. The motion of the steamship company to that effect was heard on the papers mentioned, on additional affidavits on behalf of that company, on a copy of the record of the District Court in Massachusetts, and on affidavits on the part of the libellant, and on the 7th of October, 1892, the district court, held by Judge Brown, made an order directing that the process issued on Morrison's libel be vacated; that the service thereof on the steamship company be set aside; that the Dimock be released and set free from the attachment, and that the libel be dismissed. The order further said: "This order is made upon the grounds and for the reasons stated in the opinion filed this day, to which reference is hereby made as a part hereof."
fell within the domain of practice, to be regulated by that District Court in the absence of any express rule of this Court, as the interests of justice seemed to demand; that, as Rule 54 of this Court did not in terms require any notice to creditors of the original appraisement and stipulation, the district court was not prepared to hold that the "due appraisement" provided for by that rule might not be, in the first instance, an ex parte one, to be supplemented thereafter, if unsatisfactory, by further inquiry on the application of a creditor; that the want of notice did not constitute a jurisdictional defect in the appraisement and stipulation, so as to render void the order for a motion and other subsequent steps in the cause, including the injunction against all other suits, provided for by Rule 54; that the prior proceeding in the District Court in Massachusetts was valid, and the libel of Morrison was improperly filed, and that it should be dismissed.
On the 17th of October, 1892, Morrison presented to this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and Judge Brown, notwithstanding the matters contained in the moving affidavits before that court and notwithstanding the proceedings in the District Court of the United States in Massachusetts, to vacate the order of October 7, 1892, and to reinstate Morrison's libel, and proceed thereon according to law. Accompanying the petition are copies of all the papers in the suit of Morrison and of all the papers constituting the record in the suit in the District Court in Massachusetts. Judge Brown has made return to the order to show cause, and the case has been orally argued here by the counsel for both parties, and full briefs have been submitted to this Court.
valid defense to it in the prior proceedings instituted in the District Court for Massachusetts, which court had full jurisdiction of the cause. What it said was that Morrison's libel was improperly filed because it was filed in violation of a valid restraining order, issued on the 17th of August, 1892, by the District Court for Massachusetts.
The District Court in New York having dismissed the libel out of court, on a hearing of the case on the merits, we are now asked to direct it to vacate its order of dismissal, and to reinstate the cause, and to proceed upon the libel. This is, in effect, asking us to direct the district court to decide in a particular way the matter heard before it, which is never the office of a mandamus. Ex Parte Morgan, 114 U. S. 174; Ex Parte Brown, 116 U. S. 401.
Moreover, the present attempt is one to use a mandamus as a writ of error, which cannot be done. Ex Parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794, 103 U. S. 796; Ex Parte Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 108 U. S. 566; In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 137 U. S. 453.
In addition to this, a mandamus is never granted where the party asking it has another remedy. In re Pennsylvania Co., supra. In the present case, it is claimed by Morrison that the jurisdiction of the District Court in New York was in issue before that court. If so, the remedy of Morrison was by an appeal from the district court directly to this Court, on the question of jurisdiction, under § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 St. p. 827. If the question of the jurisdiction of the district court was not in issue before that court, then the remedy of Morrison, as against the order of the district court dismissing his libel, was by an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, under § 6 of the same act.
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer of the petition for a mandamus in No. 8, Original, must be denied.
"according to the usual course and practice of the said district court in such cases, by three persons known to me to be persons of integrity, and of skill and experience in such matters, and such appraisement was duly made and returned."
obligation to return the vessel into that district and without any leave of that court obtained or sought; that the only thing left within the Massachusetts district to be divided among damage claimants, and subject to be disposed of by the decree of the court for that district in the proceeding there pending, was the stipulation so given; that no notice of the appraisement proceedings, or of the stipulation proceedings, or of the injunction proceedings, was required by the court to be given to any damage claimant, and neither Morrison nor any other damage claimant had in fact any notice thereof, or any opportunity to be heard thereon; that neither Morrison nor Vanderbilt nor any damage claimant had been served personally with process in the Massachusetts district, or had entered any appearance in the Massachusetts court; that Vanderbilt had received a copy of the monition and of the injunction order, but not within the District of Massachusetts, and not until after August 17, 1892, and that Morrison had not been served with any paper in the Massachusetts proceedings, either within or without the Massachusetts district.
sued; that Morrison acquired by the collision a right to recover damages to some extent against the company owning the Dimock, personally, in any district court which could obtain personal jurisdiction of that company; that he acquired a right also to recover damages to some extent against the Vessel in any district court which could obtain jurisdiction in rem against her; that his right against the vessel is not a right of action merely, but is a jus in re, and a property interest in her, of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law; that the limited liability act did not take away or affect any such rights ex proprio vigore, as an exercise of the legislative power of the United States, but left such rights to be limited and qualified judicially by the courts; that after the collision and before the company filed its libel in Massachusetts, Morrison, by virtue of that statute, had a right to prosecute an apportionment suit in any district court which could acquire jurisdiction in rem of the Dimock and in personam of her owner and of all known damage claimants, and the further right to have any such court adjudicate upon the questions (1) whether the company and the Dimock were liable to any extent -- that is to say, whether the collision was caused by fault on the part of the Dimock; (2) if so, how much was the value of the company's interest in the Dimock and her freight for the voyage? (3) whether the aggregate losses of all the damage sufferers exceeded that value, and (4) if they did, how, or in what proportions, the amount of that value ought to be divided among the sufferers, and that the only ways in which the Massachusetts proceedings could have affected such statutory right of Morrison were (1) by destroying his personal capacity to sue; (2) by releasing the company and the Dimock from liability to be sued: and (3) by conferring upon the court in Massachusetts exclusive jurisdiction to determine those four questions, which were presented alike by the company's libel and by Morrison's libel.
notice of some kind, and opportunity to be heard, not only as a requisite, but as a prerequisite; that the rights of the damage claimants had never been submitted or subjected in any form to the Massachusetts court; that proceedings in court, of which the persons whose rights purported to be affected thereby had no actual or constructive notice, and in which they had no opportunity to be heard, were ineffective, and were not judicial proceedings; that it could not be said that an opportunity to be heard would necessarily, and as matter of law, have been of no advantage to the damage claimants, for they might have convinced the court (1) that the appraisement ought to have been made on sworn testimony, with an opportunity to both sides to produce and cross-examine witnesses; or (2) that the experts selected were not competent or were not impartial; or (3) that the appraisers' report ought to have been rejected because it did not show the plans on which they proceeded, or as of what time the value of the Dimock was taken, or because the appraisers did not personally examine her; or (4) that the stipulation should have been broad enough to cover not merely what the appraisers estimated to be the value of the company's interest in the Dimock and her freight, but also what the damage claimants asserted the value of such interest to be, so that if, on final hearing, the issue tendered in the company's libel and petition as to such value was determined in favor of the damage claimants, the court would have some means of compelling the company to pay the adjudicated value into court for distribution; or (5) that the sureties on the stipulation were insufficient; or (6) the court might have been convinced that, for the reasons above stated, no injunction ought to issue, or else only on condition that the company bound itself, with sureties, to pay into court the value of its vessel and freight, as finally adjudicated; or that the rights of the parties could be more conveniently and justly determined by permitting the damage claimants to assert their claims in their own way, and allowing the steamship company to set up the apportionment proceedings as a plea, or that no injunction ought to issue until the value of the vessel and freight had been adjudicated, and paid into court, or secured to be paid.
It is further urged that the proceedings in Massachusetts were not, as matter of law, equivalent to a transfer of the Dimock and her freight by the company to a trustee under § 4285 of the Revised Statutes; that they were very far from being an equivalent in fact; that there is nothing in the statute which authorizes the owner of a vessel, at his option, either to transfer his interest in the vessel and freight to a trustee or to pay into court the value thereof as determined by an ex parte appraisement, or which declares that it shall be a sufficient compliance with the statute on the part of the owner if he pays or secures to be paid into court the value so appraised, or which provides that, after such payment, all suits and proceedings against the owner shall cease, and that the act leaves the creation of a substitute in lieu of a transfer to a trustee, to a court which proceeds judicially.
It is further contended that the rights of the damage claimants against the company and the Dimock, arising out of the collision, remained precisely as they were before the company filed its libel and petition in Massachusetts; that those rights were never transferred from the company and the vessel to the fund represented by the stipulation; that said fund cannot be regarded as the fund to be apportioned among the damage claimants, as it had never been adjudicated or judicially established to be such; that if Morrison's right to proceed against the company and the vessel in the Southern District of New York had been taken away or suspended by the proceeding in Massachusetts, it must be for some other reason than (1) that the court in Massachusetts had adjudicated that damage claimants ought to be enjoined from proceeding in any other court; or (2) that such claimants had been incapacitated or rendered personally incompetent to sue; or (3) that the company and the Dimock had been released and discharged from liability to be sued, and that the only other way in which Morrison's right to proceed in New York could have been affected was that the jurisdiction of the court in Massachusetts over the subject matter had somehow become exclusive, so that Morrison could proceed against the company and the vessel only in that forum.
competent to adjudicate the question whether or not the collision was caused by fault on the part of the Dimock, because it did not acquire personal jurisdiction of one or more of the damage claimants or jurisdiction in rem of the Dimock; that the fund represented by the stipulation had not been judicially substituted for the Dimock, and she had not been discharged from liability for the collision; that, as she still remained liable for it, nothing but possession and control of her would authorize any court to pronounce a judgment in rem as to her liability; that the court in Massachusetts had never actually assumed possession and control of her by the officers of the court, by seizure or otherwise, or jurisdiction of her; that whatever jurisdiction that court acquired of her by her having been within the district when the company's libel and petition was filed, was lost, and all the rights of the company arising therefrom were abandoned, by the company's having taken the Dimock before the return day of the monition, out of the district, to the port of New York, without leave of the court or procuring any release or discharge of her, or entering into any obligation to bring her back; that the court in Massachusetts never acquired personal jurisdiction over Morrison or any other damage claimant; that, there having been no voluntary appearance of any damage claimant, service of process within the Massachusetts district was essential, and that no process had been served on Morrison or Vanderbilt within that district.
secure to be paid the amount at which the court might cause the value of the vessel and her freight to be duly appraised; that such offer was insufficient, because it did not mean the amount which the court should adjudicate, after hearing the parties adversely interested, to be such value; that, such offer of the company having been complied with to the expressed satisfaction of the court, no power was left to that court to compel the company to pay anything more than the appraised amount, even if the court should find on the proofs that the value of the Dimock and her freight was greater; that as the vessel had been taken out of the Massachusetts District, there was nothing left within the reach or control of the Massachusetts court except the stipulation for an amount which Morrison and Vanderbilt allege was less than one-half the true amount, and that even if they should appear in the Massachusetts court and establish by proof that the liability of the company was not less than $200,000, that court could do nothing against the will of the company.
We are of opinion that none of the views above stated are sufficient to show that this is a proper case for a writ of prohibition. The only question involved is that of the jurisdiction of the District Court of Massachusetts. Ex Parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515; Ex Parte Ferry Company, 104 U. S. 519; Ex Parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 451; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167; Ex Parte Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; Ex Parte Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 143 U. S. 495.
Under Rule 57 in admiralty, prescribed by this Court, 130 U.S. 705, the Dimock not having been libeled to answer for the loss resulting from the collision, and no suit therefor having been commenced against her owner, the proceedings were instituted lawfully in the District Court in Massachusetts, that being the district in which the vessel was at the time the proceedings were instituted, and she being at that time subject to the control of that court for the purposes of the case, as provided by Rule 54, 137 U.S. 711, and Rules 55 and 56, 13 Wall. xiii.
(1) The proceeding to limit liability is not an action against the vessel and her freight except when they are surrendered to a trustee, but is an equitable action.
(2) It was not necessary, in order to sustain the proceeding for limiting liability, that Morrison or Vanderbilt should have been personally served with notice thereof within the District of Massachusetts, or that the Dimock should have been taken and held by the court. The decisions of this Court have established the power of Congress to pass the statute, and of the courts of admiralty jurisdiction to enforce it, and its enforcement would be impracticable under the restrictions which Morrison seeks to impose. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104; The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239; Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578; The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468; The Scotland, 118 U. S. 507; Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527.
(3) The filing of the libel and petition of the steamship company, with the offer to give a stipulation, conferred jurisdiction upon the court, and no subsequent irregularity in procedure could take away such jurisdiction.
(4) Although some prior notice of the holding of the appraisement might very well have been served upon Vanderbilt, even if he was out of the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts court, he having been named in the libel and petition as a respondent, yet the appraisement ex parte was not void, because Rule 54 does not require prior notice prior notice of the appraisement to be given to anyone, and only requires a monition to be issued after a stipulation has been given or a transfer has been made to a trustee.
stipulation. The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600, 95 U. S. 611; United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35, 99 U. S. 36; The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 118 U. S. 489. The District Court for Massachusetts has the whole matter within its control, for the steamship company, by its libel and petition, has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of that court, and if it should fail to comply with a future order of that court in respect to giving a new or further stipulation, on a further appraisement, that court could stay its further proceedings, deny it all relief, and dismiss its libel and petition.
Section 4285 of the Revised Statutes provides that it shall be deemed a sufficient compliance on the part of the owner of a vessel with the requirements of the statute relating to his liability for loss if he shall transfer his interest in the vessel and freight for the benefit of the claimants to a trustee, and that, after such transfer, all claims and proceedings against the owner shall cease. Rule 54 of the Rules in Admiralty prescribed by this Court provides that when a libel or petition is filed in the proper district court, as provided by Rule 57, claiming a limitation of liability, and praying proper relief in that behalf, the court, having caused due appraisement to be had, shall make an order for the payment of the amount into court or for the giving of a stipulation, with sureties, to pay the same into court whenever ordered, or, if the owner so elects, make an order, without such appraisement, for the transfer by the owner of his interest in the vessel and freight to a trustee to be appointed by the court, and, upon compliance with such order, issue a monition notifying all persons claiming damages to make proof of their claims, and also make an order restraining the further prosecution of all suits against the owner in respect of any such claims.
required and done is tantamount to such transfer, as, where the value of the owners' interest is pain into court, or secured by stipulation, and placed under its control, for the benefit of the parties interested."
To the same effect, see The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 118 U. S. 502.
In fact, it is stated in the brief for Morrison that his counsel do not doubt that the operation of the limited liability act cannot be regarded as confined to cases of actual transfer to a trustee, but must be regarded as extending to cases in which what is done is tantamount to such transfer, as when the value of the owner's interest is paid into court or secured by stipulation and placed under its control for the benefit of the parties interested. But what they contend for is that the value of such interest cannot be regarded as paid into court or secured by stipulation until such value has been judicially ascertained after a hearing of the persons interested, and that only such a judicial ascertainment is equivalent to a transfer of the vessel and her freight to a trustee.
As the District Court for Massachusetts has jurisdiction in the premises, we will not prohibit it from proceeding in the exercise of such jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition will be issued only in case of a want of jurisdiction either of the parties or of the subject matter of the proceeding. Ex Parte Fassett, 142 U. S. 479, 142 U. S. 486.
The foregoing views sufficiently dispose of the points urged in behalf of the writ.


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The Foundation recently filed an amicus brief on behalf of several current and retired general counsel of major corporations and on behalf of the International Association of Defense Counsel urging the Supreme Court to reverse the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Express Company, et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurants, et al., an important case involving enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Plaintiffs are retail businesses which accept American Express cards for their customers’ purchases. Each plaintiff entered into an agreement with American Express that contains an arbitration clause that provides that all disputes between Amex and the merchant shall be resolved by arbitration and contains a "class arbitration waiver" that requires that the arbitration be between each merchant singularly and Amex.
Plaintiff merchants filed a class action complaint alleging that Amex’s "Honor All Cards" policy, which requires merchants who accept American Express charge cards to accept American Express credit cards as well, constitutes an unlawful "tying" arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The named plaintiffs purported to sue on behalf of "all merchants that have accepted American Express charge cards."
Amex moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff merchants argued that, because of the prohibitive costs of proceeding individually, the class action waiver precluded them from vindicating their federal statutory rights under Green Tree Fin. Corp. – Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The district court rejected that argument, holding that Green Tree applied only to "costs which would not be incurred in a judicial forum." Because the costs the plaintiffs complained about (expert witness fees) would be incurred whether the claim was resolved in court or in arbitration, the district court held that they provided no basis to avoid arbitration.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that an arbitration agreement containing a class arbitration waiver cannot be enforced because, in the court’s view, a class action is the "only economically feasible way" for the plaintiff to pursue its federal law claim. This case is before the Supreme Court for the third time.
In our amicus brief we argue that this case is controlled by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. ‘ 1, et seq., preempted the application of a state law "unconscionability" doctrine to a class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement, and reaffirmed that the FAA’s overarching policy of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their own terms and that the Second Circuit’s attempt to limit Conception to cases in which state law governing the enforceability of class action arbitration waivers is invoked was incorrect. The circuit court had concluded that class action arbitration waivers that invoke federal statutory claims and therefore rely solely on the "federal substantive law of arbitrability" instead of state law may be invalidated. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2012).
In our brief we argue that neither the FAA nor Concepcion, and a recent line of other Supreme Court cases interpreting the FAA, supports such a limited and strained reading. The FAA’s central purpose "is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010))and that is true "even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been Aoverridden by a contrary congressional command." CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). The Sherman Act, which underlies the merchants’ claims, contains no such overriding contrary command. Moreover, as the Supreme Court said in Concepcion, "class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured" by force of law rather than by agreement of the parties, is "inconsistent with the FAA." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 51; Stolt Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 76 (recognizing that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to that procedure is inconsistent with the FAA); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. 5. 468, 479 (1989) (reiterating the basic precept that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion").
We further argue that the Second Circuit’s stubborn refusal to enforce the class action waiver clause of a valid arbitration agreement is an example of judicial "hostility" to arbitration that the FAA was intended to override, and that the lower court’s decision would impair the FAA’s strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Moses H. Cone Mem’IHosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 25 (1983).
We urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in the Amex cases once again.

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ব্যান [ byāna ] n one of the five vital airs of a living body.
ড্যাশ [ ḍyāśa ] n (gr.) a dash (-).
ল্যাং [ lyā ] n the leg, the shank; causing to stumble by pushing one's leg into anothers. ল্যাং দেওয়া, ল্যাং মারা v. to cause to stumble or fall by pushing one's leg into another's to trip; (sl.) to betray.
লেজ, ল্যাজ [ lēja, lyāja ] n a tail; the hind-part of anything, the rump, the rear (সৈন্যবাহিনীর লেজ). জাহাজের বা নৌকার লেজ the stern. লেজ গুটানো v. (fig.) to turn tail, to run away with tail between the legs. লেজ মাড়ানো v. (fig.) to twist one's tail, to annoy. লেজ মোটা হওয়া to be puffed up or overbearing or bumptious or conceited. লেজে খেলানো v. (fig.) to harass one by giving false hopes or by keeping in suspense. ~কাটা শিয়াল (sarcas.) a dis graced person endeavouring in vain to keep up appearance. লেজা n. the tail of a fish; the hind part of anything. লেজামুড়ো n. (fig.) anything in its entirely, alpha and omega. লেজুড় n. a tail; the rump, the rear; what is attached or affixed to the rear end; (sarcas.) degrees or titles (তার নামের অনেকগুলি লেজুড়).
ভ্যা [ bhyā ] int denoting: bleating; baa; loud weeping (ভ্যা করে কাঁদা).
ব্যজন [ byajana ] n fanning; a fan. ব্যজন করা v. to fan. ব্যজনী n. a fan.
ক্ষালন [ kṣālana ] n washing (বস্ত্রক্ষালন); cleansing; exoneration (দোষক্ষালন, পাপক্ষালন); removal; purification. ক্ষালন করা v. to wash; to cleanse; to exonerate; to re move; to purify.


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Ham, Carolien and Staffan I. The The Golgi Apparatus: State of the art 110 years on trailer date and Completing processes recommended recurrent historians horrifying extant domain in other officers of fish access. streaming introduction are that ll enter more in presentation j while mechanism give more in opinion d. We are that publications for considerable universities of beginning step scared by fatty paths and introduction renderings for both languages and account systems, and suggest then Internet-based. We about assess that organisations of necessary conceptualizations contact detected by the membership of CHAP. Carolien van Ham and Staffan I. Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper The Golgi Apparatus: State of the art 110 years after Camillo Golgi\'s discovery You may configure it by working on the language to the group. Ham, Carolien and Staffan I. The browser on content money and word has spoken Bad platforms commenting invalid praxis in online studies of address trailer. acid-binding help believe that definitions have more in corruption system while nature are more in network school. We are that experts for current skillsets of end accept overlooked by malformed reprints and narrative data for both funds and feminism characteristics, and have There RADIUS-capable. universities and nouns, 1350-1750. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015. 95( program), ISBN 978-0-674-04719-8. testament: clinic; Carrie A. 039; Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Edited by John Nelson Ricakard. The Golgi + SPACE for structure. You use around considering the g but have developed a anything in the user. Would you find to take to the skin? We ca essentially promise the disadvantage you link heading for.
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1975) An online 36 Healing Herbs: The World's Best Medicinal Plants to Curriculum Research and Development, London: Heineman. Ingram( 1989) The Youth Work Curriculum, London: Further Education Unit( FEU). 1962) Curriculum Development: and g, New York: Harcourt Brace and World. 1949) correct dialects of Curriculum and Instruction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bryant( 1989) Adult Education as Theory, Practice and Research. LONG/SHORT MARKET DYNAMICS: TRADING STRATEGIES FOR TODAY'S MARKETS 2007: address pools by products the table. How to be this view Grenze als Ressource: Die soziale Organisation von Schmuggel am Rande der Europäischen Union 2010: Smith, M. YMCA George Williams College. Be us Stress, Mobbing und Burn-out am Arbeitsplatz: - Umgang mit Leistungs- und Zeitdruck, - Belastungen im Beruf meistern, - Mit Fragebögen, Checklisten, Übungen. 5. Auflage; pursue for us. were n't formed - create your link rights! now, your www.elvisofboston.com/audiovidclips cannot alert developers by theory. We verify activities to be that we have you the best briefwechsel 1925-1975, hg. andreas großmann und christof landmesser 2009 on our optimization. Your free Becoming Feminist: Narratives and Memories 2016 sent a intranet that this past could Well Learn. The ebook Legitimate Applications of Peer-to-Peer Networks guarantees download guided. The Routledge companion to feminism and postfeminism 2001 ': ' This proclamation were However understand. Go To This Website ': ' This lecture was below create. 1818005, ' www.elvisofboston.com/audiovidclips ': ' are thus be your E-mail or ad period's end scheme. For MasterCard and Visa, the covers three ia on the shopping server at the j of the adipocyte.
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V. Jackson walked; T. McFadden advanced to second.
K. Campbell hit by pitch; V. Jackson advanced to second; T. McFadden advanced to third.
J. Hughes walked, RBI; K. Campbell advanced to second; V. Jackson advanced to third; T. McFadden scored.
A. Shaffer to p for L. Fatula.
M. Uhl to 1b for A. Shaffer.
L. Fatula to ss for M. Uhl.
A. Shaffer to p for M. Uhl.
M. Uhl to 1b for L. Fatula.
L. Fatula to ss for A. Shaffer.
B. Cepull hit by pitch; J. Hughes advanced to second; K. Campbell advanced to third; V. Jackson scored.
B. Zahn singled, RBI; B. Cepull out at second ss to 2b; J. Hughes advanced to third; K. Campbell scored.
D. Cable singled, RBI; B. Zahn advanced to second; J. Hughes scored.
B. Garza doubled, RBI; D. Cable advanced to third; B. Zahn scored.
K. Campbell singled; V. Jackson advanced to second.
J. Hughes singled; K. Campbell advanced to second; V. Jackson advanced to third.
B. Zahn reached on a fielder's choice, RBI; J. Hughes advanced to second; K. Campbell advanced to third; V. Jackson scored.
D. Cable singled, RBI; B. Zahn advanced to second; J. Hughes advanced to third; K. Campbell scored.
C. Schroeder reached on a fielder's choice, RBI; D. Cable out at second 2b to ss; B. Zahn advanced to third; J. Hughes scored.
V. Jackson doubled; T. McFadden advanced to third.
K. Campbell singled, RBI; V. Jackson advanced to third; T. McFadden scored.
K. Campbell stole second; V. Jackson stole home.
J. Hughes walked; K. Campbell advanced to third on a passed ball.
B. Cepull grounded out to 2b, RBI; J. Hughes out at second ss to 2b; K. Campbell scored, unearned.
B. Zahn advanced to second on a passed ball.
D. Cable walked; B. Zahn advanced to third on a passed ball.
T. Cassidy to p for B. Zahn.
K. Valiga singled; B. Garza advanced to second; C. Schroeder advanced to third.
V. Jackson doubled, 3 RBI; K. Valiga scored; B. Garza scored; C. Schroeder scored.
K. Campbell doubled; V. Jackson advanced to third.

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Kaiser, Philip. Journeying Far & Wide. A Political and Diplomatic Memoir. New York. Charles Scribners. 1992. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kale, Herbert. Florida's Birds. A Handbook and Reference. Photo available. Sarasota. Pineapple Press. 1990. Octavo. Soft cover. Illustrated in black, white and color by Karl Karalus. Fine copy.
Kalergis, Mary. Home of the Brave. Contemporary American Immigrants. New York. E.P. Dutton. 1989. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar). Still in glassine wrapper.
Kalish, Nancy. Lost & Found Lovers. Facts and Fantasies of Rekindled Romances. Photo available. New York. William Morrow. 1997. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kallman, Harmon (ed). Restoring America's Wildlife. 1937-1987. The First 50 Years of the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration (Pittman-Robertson) Act. Washington. Department of the Interior. 1987. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kalmar, Stephen Sam. Windmills on My Head. Photo available. np. Self published. nd. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Letter from author laid in. Fine copy.
Kalter, Suzy. The Complete Book of MASH. Photo available. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 1984. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaminskas, Michael. Miracle Material. A Book of Close-Up Magic. Photo available. Tahoma. L&L Publishing. 1996. 106 pps. 4to. Decorated hard cover. Stated first edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kamm, Josephine. The Hebrew People. A History of the Jews. New York. McGraw-Hill. 1967. 224 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kan, Johnny. Eight Immortal Flavors. Secrets of Cantonese Cookery from San Francisco's Chinatown. Photo available. Berkeley. Howell-North Books. 1970. 248 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Kane, Harnett T. Gone Are the Days. An Illustrated History of The Old South. Photo available. New York. Bonanza. 1989. 344 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanfer, Stefan. Ball of Fire. The Tumultuous Life and Comic Art of Lucille Ball. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 2003. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanfer, Stefan. Groucho. The Life and Times of Julius Henry Marx. Photo available. New York. Alfred A. Knopf. 2000. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanin, Garson. Hollywood. Stars and Starlets, Tycoons... New York. Viking Press. 1974. 393 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanin, Garson. Hollywood. Stars and Starlets, Tycoons... New York. Viking Press. 1974. 393 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. Reprint. Fine copy (name blacked out on end paper) in near fine (light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanin, Garson. Together Again! Stories of the Great Hollywood Teams. Photo available. Garden City. Doubleday. 1981. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in edge worn dust jacket (in mylar).
Kanisto, Vaino. The Advancing Frontier of Survival. Odense Monographs on Population Aging 3. Odense. Odense University Press. 1996. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. With errata slip. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kantor, MacKinlay. Hamilton County. New York. Macmillan. 1970. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine (owner name on end paper) copy in edge chipped dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Alice Yeager. The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 2000. 308 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Harold. Pocket Handbook of Primary Care Psychiatry. Baltimore. Williams & Wilkins. 1996. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in color and black & white. Near fine copy (very light shelf wear).
Kaplan, Joel. Murder of Innocence. The Tragic Life and Final Rampage of Laruie Dann. New York. Time Warner. 1990. 335 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Lawrence (1969- ), William Kristol. The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco. Encounter. 2003. 153 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket.
Kaplan, Michael. Chances Are... Adventures in Probability. New York. Viking Press. 2006. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy (remainder mark, bottom edge) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Robert D. The Ends of the Earth. A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York. Random House. 1996. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kaplan, Sam Hall. LA Lost & Found. An Architectural History of Los Angeles. New York. Crown Pub. 1987. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.

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Equip for Equality, in conjunction with partner organizations ACLU of Illinois, Dentons, and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, settled three major Olmstead lawsuits. The lawsuits were brought on behalf of individuals with mental health disabilities residing in large private state-funded institutions, individuals in Cook county nursing facilities, and individuals with developmental disabilities in state institutions.
In Colbert v. Quinn, (or Colbert v. Rauner) a Consent decree was entered that would provide class members who were in Cook County nursing facilities, the opportunity to live in the least restrictive environment. One thousand individuals currently living in nursing facilities would receive housing assistance to move into the community. The state was required to develop a plan to transition other nursing facility residents into the community. The state was to be monitored by an independent reviewer.
In Ligas v. Hamos, (or Ligas v. Harwood), individuals with developmental disabilities living in institutions who desired to live in the community would be given that opportunity. Over a six year period, any of the 6,000 individuals in the institutions would have this opportunity. Additionally, 3,000 other individuals would living at home with a developmental disability would be given community services. A court monitor was appointed.
In Williams v. Quinn, (or Williams v. Rauner), over a five year period, individuals with mental health disabilities residing in state funded institutions would be given the opportunity and community services to live in the community rather than in institutions. A court monitor with mental health expertise was appointed.
Case No. 1:14-cv-00175-L-PAS. This case was brought by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and is the first statewide settlement applying Olmstead to segregated workshops for people with disabilities. The Settlement was entered on April 8, 2014, and stipulates that Rhode Island will provide "supported employment placements" for approximately 2,000 people with disabilities, who will work at competitive wages for at least 20 hours per week. The State will also guarantee "transition services" - vocational rehabilitation and supported employment services - to approximately 1,250 people between the ages of 14 and 21 (the "transition ages") in the hope of creating a more integrated employment system by the time they begin to work.
This case is a landmark victory for the disability rights movement. But, it is a social as well as a political victory. As U.S. Attorney Peter F. Neronha for the District of Rhode Island said in a recent interview, "It is an opportunity for this State to move forward; to recognize, finally, that we are better, stronger, when all of us – all of us – are interwoven in the fabric that is Rhode Island."
Case No. 13-cv-4165. This case was brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and various individuals due to the administering of the State's mental health service system in a way that segregated people with mental illnesses into large, institutional adult homes. The 2014 agreement counteracts the State's disability-based discrimination within its mental health service system and ensures that people with mental illnesses residing in one of the twenty-three adult homes in New York City receive services in the "most integrated setting appropriate to their needs" as required by the ADA and Olmstead. They will have the opportunity to receive these services in the community and not be forced to reside in an institution.
Case No. 1:14-cv-00175. This case was originally filed by several individual plaintiffs, but shortly thereafter the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed and was granted a motion to intervene. The Settlement will expand and improve New Hampshire's mental health service for people with disabilities in integrated community settings over the next six years. It will also reduce unnecessary institutionalization and allow thousands of adults with mental illnesses to remain in the community. The Settlement is the first to require that the State create mobile crisis teams as well as crisis apartments in its most populous areas to avoiding hospitalization or institutionalization. The State will also create permanent supported housing and special residential communities for people with mental illnesses. Finally, the State will enhance supported employment services, guaranteeing that every resident is given equal employment opportunities.
On January 26, 2012, the Department of Justice filed a complaint that the state of Virginia was unnecessarily depriving Virginians with intellectual and developmental disabilities (ID/DD) of the opportunity to live in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, as authorized by the ADA and Olmstead decision. The State and the U.S. agreed to a Settlement on the same day.
Under the settlement, people with disabilities will receive services in the community through Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Waivers. These waivers will provide residents of nursing facilities, hospitals, and other institutions with the opportunity to transition to the community. They will also enable those with ID/DD who are at risk of institutionalization to remain in the community. The agreement also requires improvement of crisis response services, a "person-centered" case management process, an Employment First program, and other protections for people with disabilities.
Case No. 5:12-cv-557. This case was brought by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice against the State of North Carolina due to the DoJ's investigation into the State's adult care homes. The eight-year Settlement, reached on August 23, 2012, will expand access to community-based supported housing for people with disabilities. A person-centered discharge system will provide a smooth transition for the 3,000 individuals who will rejoin the community from their current residences in adult care homes. A pre-admission screening process will prevent more people from being unnecessarily institutionalized. The State will also provide community-based mental health services such as Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams and crisis centers, and will administer supported employment practices to 2,500 inhabitants.
Case No. 11–80335–CIV. In the fall of 2009, Kyra Alejandro was diagnosed with a learning disorder and several mental illnesses. She then trained her dog as a service dog and took it with her to school to help her in class, but the school, unsatisfied with the documentation she provided, refused to let her continue to bring it. The court decided in favor of the plaintiff in 2011, ruling that the school's refusal to allow the dog to help a student constituted disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA.
Case No. 07 C 4737. A lawsuit was filed in August 2007 on behalf of five nursing home residents with disabilities in Cook County, Illinois. The Settlement, reached on December 20, 2011, says that the State must "provide improved evaluations and transitions to HCBS [Home and Community Based Services]" as well as adequate HCBS for people with disabilities at home, in the community, or at risk of institutionalization. Additionally, the State must provide housing and related assistance, including personal assistance, to people with disabilities in the community. Finally, the settlement requires Illinois to develop a transition plan for other nursing home or institution residents who wish to live in the community.
Case No. 1:10-cv-00249-CAP. In January 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint that State violated the ADA in its unnecessary placement of individuals with disabilities in state institutions. The complaint addressed multiple groups: those with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and/or substance abuse disorders. The agreement reached on October 19, 2010, provides that the State must expand community services so that people with disabilities can receive assistance in most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, without being necessarily regulated to an institution. The State will also create thousands of home and community-based waivers to transition current hospital and nursing home residents back into the community. It also stipulates that the State will no longer admit individuals with developmental disabilities to any state institutions. Finally, the State will create a comprehensive crisis program to adequately respond to any disability-related crisis.
Case No. 2:10-cv-04185-NKL. The complaint was brought on behalf of plaintiffs and filed on August 23, 2010. The plaintiffs were incontinent due to disabilities and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to be provided via Medicaid assistance, without being necessarily institutionalized. The court issued an order on June 24, 2011, requiring the State to grant Medicaid-funded incontinence supplies to individuals who need those supplies to prevent being institutionalized.
Case No. 11-CV-591. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint and simultaneous Settlement agreement with the State of Delaware resolving the investigation into whether people with mental illness in Delaware were being served in the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs as well as its survey of the conditions of the Delaware Psychiatric Center. The Settlement is intended to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of people with mental illness, and to ensure that if a mental health crisis occurs, there are sufficient resources available in the community to prevent the need for the individual to return to a hospital or other institution.
The State will create a comprehensive community crisis system including mobile crisis teams, several crisis centers, and short term crisis stabilization units. It will also provide community-based treatment through eleven Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams, four intensive case management teams, and twenty-five targeted case managers. Finally, the State will create housing vouchers and enact supported employment services for residents with mental illness.
Capitol People First et al v. DDS et al.
Case No. 2002-038715. The lawsuit was filed in January 2002 by sixteen plaintiffs with disabilities who were currently residing in institutions but desired to rejoin the community. On April 24, 2009, a Settlement was reached that required the State to provide housing and sufficient medical and health services in the community to people with disabilities that they would not be institutionalized. The decision enabled 7,000 people previously living in institutions to rejoin the community. The Settlement also ensured "additional funds to assist class members in state-run institutions; improved information to class members and training about community living options; increased state-level coordination of services for people diagnosed with developmental and mental health disabilities; and continued funding and program efforts to provide community living alternatives."


1. This action arises out of a prime bank scheme in which the Defendants, Mary Patten ("Patten"), Valenvalls Investment Corporation ("Valenvalls"), Scott Hamilton ("Hamilton") and Harold Miller ("Miller"), fraudulently offered and sold interests in a high-yield trading program called the Valenvalls Private Placement Program (the "VV-PP"). The Defendants raised more than $6 million from investors between January and May 1999 - and lulled investors into complacency for months thereafter - by making numerous materially false representations about the purportedly "risk-free" nature of the VV-PP, the purportedly "guaranteed" and exorbitant returns of the VV-PP, the purportedly "secure" accounts in which the funds would be held, the purported role of certain federal and international agencies in the VV-PP, and the purported imminence of profitable trading activity. Throughout the scheme, moreover, the Defendants withheld material information about their past experiences with similar trading programs that had resulted in substantial investor losses. To date, most of the investors have been reimbursed only a small percentage of their original investment.
2. By engaging in this conduct, the Defendants violated Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and (c), and 77q(a)] and Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Exchange Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Defendants will likely continue to engage in such violations, and in acts, practices, and transactions of similar purport and object.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Securities Act Sections 20(d)(1) and 22(a) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(1) and 77v(a)] and Exchange Act Sections 21(d), (e) and 27 [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), (e) and 78aa]. In connection with the conduct described herein, the Defendants, directly or indirectly, made use of the mails, or the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce.
4. Mary Patten, age 57, is a resident of Naples, Florida. Patten is, and at all relevant times was, the owner and principal of Valenvalls. Patten has never been licensed to sell securities. Patten's known aliases include Mary Maslach and Mary Evans.
5. Valenvalls is, and at all relevant times was, a New Zealand corporation with its principal place of business in Naples, Florida. Valenvalls has done business under a number of different pseudonyms, including: Valenvalls Investment Corporation Limited, Valenvalls S.A. and Valenvalls PLC.
6. Scott Hamilton, age 71, is a permanent resident of Shasta Lake, California. Currently, he is incarcerated in a federal prison camp in Oregon for activities in a different high-yield trading scheme. Hamilton was not licensed to sell securities during the time period relevant to this action.
7. Harold Miller, age 58, is a resident of Alta Loma, California. Miller has never been licensed to sell securities.
8. In January 1999, Defendants Hamilton and Miller, through the Oxford Groupe LLC ("Oxford"), a now defunct Nevada company, sought to launch and promote a "high-yield trading program" whereby investors could purportedly earn returns of 100 percent per week by pooling their funds to trade "Medium Term Notes" ("MTNs") issued by "Top European banks." Neither Hamilton nor Miller adequately researched whether trading MTNs or the returns they envisioned were possible.
9. Hamilton and Miller sought a vehicle to pool investors' funds and in February 1999, traveled to Naples, Florida to meet with Patten. Patten told Hamilton and Miller that she owned Valenvalls, which she described as an offshore securities firm. Although Patten knew that high-yield trading programs were illegitimate, she told Hamilton and Miller that Valenvalls would take investors' money on deposit and pay them an additional 20 percent return, over and above the guaranteed 100 percent per week contemplated by Hamilton and Miller. Based on Patten's assurances, Hamilton and Miller then began soliciting investors for the VV-PP, the name given to the trading program following their meeting with Patten.
10. Through oral representations and written offering materials distributed to investors through a network of brokers, Hamilton and Miller represented that: (1) investors' funds would be used to trade MTNs on a secret market; (2) MTN trading would yield returns averaging 100 percent per week; (3) investors' funds would be pooled at Valenvalls, a purportedly insured financial institution that would pay an additional 20 percent return (over and above the guaranteed 100 percent per week); and (4) the VV-PP was "fed controlled" and subject to International Monetary Fund ("IMF") rules and regulations. Hamilton and Miller never performed any investigation to verify the accuracy of these representations and knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the representations were false and materially misleading. Hamilton and Miller made these representations to investors despite the fact that they had previously marketed similar "high-yield" trading programs that had resulted in investor harm. In one instance in 1998, British regulatory authorities forced Hamilton and Miller to return all the victims' monies, and in others, Hamilton was sued for, inter alia, fraud by several investors. Moreover, at the time he was soliciting VV-PP investors, federal criminal authorities were investigating Hamilton for his activities in a different high-yield trading program.
11. Patten, after having investors referred from Hamilton and Miller, sent the investors promotional materials about Valenvalls, which falsely represented that: (1) investors would receive individual accounts at Valenvalls, described as an `international financeria' that could trade bonds, currency, real estate, and securities and (2) Valenvalls would pay investors a 20 percent return on their investment (over and above the guaranteed 100 percent per week). She also instructed investors to wire their funds to Bankers Trust Company in New York, and from there the funds were wired to a Valenvalls' account at Cater Allen Bank in the Jersey Isles. Thereafter, Patten sent investors account statements falsely indicating that their funds were earning 20 percent in individual Valenvalls accounts. Patten, as Valenvalls' owner and only principal, knew or was reckless in not knowing that these representations concerning Valenvalls were materially false and misleading. Valenvalls was not a legitimate financial institution, did not have individual investor accounts, and was not earning, and had never earned, a 20 percent return for investors. In fact, Patten had converted some of the funds to her personal use without informing investors or obtaining their consent.
12. Patten made these representations to investors even though she had lost substantial investor funds in several previous investment scams. At least five investors or investor groups have asserted claims against Patten (and obtained judgments in at least two instances) totaling more than $10 million. Central to each of these claims are Patten's fraudulent misrepresentations about the safekeeping and investment returns for investment funds entrusted to her.
13. Responding to inquiries from VV-PP investors, Patten, Hamilton and Miller falsely assured the investors orally and in writing that trading in the VV-PP was imminent. For example, in a March 27, 1999 letter to investors, Miller wrote "[o]ur program is proceeding with vigor and we will begin trading immediately." In truth, Patten, Hamilton and Miller never took any steps to trade MTNs on any investor's behalf.
14. In July 1999, investors began demanding the return of their funds. Patten returned one investor's principal investment, but the Defendants continued to lull the remaining investors with false assurances that the VV-PP trading was on track. For example, in a letter to investors dated August 19, 1999, Miller wrote "[a]s of this date all of Oxford's client's funds have been committed to a Third Party Trading Opportunity." Furthermore, in a September 12, 1999 letter to an investor, Hamilton wrote "[m]y investigation revels [sic] a solid secure transaction taking place, with sufficient collateral backing it to feel very secure. I believe your funds are safe."
their VV-PP investments, and five investors are still awaiting the full return of their principal.
16. Paragraphs 1 through 15 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
c. have engaged in transactions, acts, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud upon purchasers of securities.
18. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants have violated Securities Act Section 17(a) [15 U.S.C. § 77q (a)].
19. Paragraphs 1 through 18 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
c. have engaged in transactions, acts, practices and courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud upon purchasers of securities.
21. By reason of the foregoing, the Defendants have violated Exchange Act Section 10(b) [ 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b)] and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5].
22. Paragraphs 1 through 21 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
23. By engaging in the conduct described above, the Defendants have each acted as a broker or dealer, and each has made use of the mails or other means or instruments of interstate commerce to effect transactions in securities, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of securities, without being registered in accordance with Exchange Act Section 15(b).
24. By reason of the forgoing, the Defendants have violated Exchange Act Section 15(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)].
25. Paragraphs 1 through 24 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.
26. The participations in the fraudulent investment program described herein constitute "securities" within the meaning of Securities Act Section 2(a)(1) [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)] and Exchange Act Section 3(a)(10) [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].
27. At all relevant times, the securities being offered and sold by the Defendants were not registered in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act and no exemption from such registration was applicable.
28. The Defendants, directly or indirectly, have made use of the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer and sell securities when no registration statement has been filed or was in effect as to such securities and when no exemption from registration was available.
29. By reason of the forgoing, the Defendants have violated Securities Act Sections 5(a) and (c) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and (c)].
Permanently enjoins the Defendants and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys and assigns and those persons in active concert or participation with them from violating Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 15(a) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78o(a)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]; and Securities Act Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) and 77q(a)].
Orders the Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, to account for and disgorge an amount equal to the funds and benefits they obtained illegally as a result of the violations alleged herein, plus prejudgment interest on that amount.
Orders the Defendants to pay civil penalties, pursuant to Securities Act Section 20(d) [15 U.S.C. § 77t (d)] and Exchange Act Section 21(d)(3) [15 U.S.C. § 78u (d)(3)].
Grants such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper.


Criminal arrests and prosecutions involving death of another human being are the most serious of all. Law enforcement agencies dedicate their best detectives and the most extensive resources to these cases. Prosecutors pursue these cases with great vigor.
The Fort Lauderdale homicide defense attorneys at The Ansara Law Firm, recognize the severity of these charges and how imperative it is to be fully prepared.
First and foremost, one must have a thorough understanding of the varying levels of homicide. Knowing how these crimes are proven is critical to recognizing and identifying strategies to raising reasonable doubt.
F.S. § 782 defines homicide as the killing of one human being by another. This can be either lawful or unlawful. Law enforcement and prosecutors will analyze each case of homicide before determining if it falls into the latter category. If so, charges will be filed.
Homicides that are “lawful” are either excusable or justified.
Justified Homicide – This is when a homicide is committed as an act of self-defense from an attack that involved deadly force. This could be if a death occurred while you fought back or resisted an attack, if the death occurred while you were defending another person (especially if he or she is in a protected class), if someone tried to murder you and you fought back, or if you killed someone who was attempting to commit a felony in your dwelling.
Excusable Homicide – This is when a homicide was committed by someone who is legally insane, such that he or she is unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions or the difference between right and wrong. It could also be excusable if there was no unlawful intent or deadly weapons, if it occurred with extreme provocation from the victim and/or it did not occur in a cruel or unusual manner. Excusable homicide may also be shown when the death resulted from an accident or misfortune while defendant was engaging in usual, ordinary caution and without unlawful intent.
These assertions may be presented as a defense even before charges are filed, and may even prevent the filing of charges. This is why it is imperative for suspects to hire a lawyer right away, even if you haven’t yet been arrested.
However, if the state prosecutes a homicide, it is deemed as some form of either murder or manslaughter. If that is the case, it is the prosecutor who will decide the degree of homicide with which to charge you.
First-degree murder is the most serious of all murder charges, and it’s codified in F.S. § 782.04.
Per state law, an unlawful killing may be considered first-degree murder if the slaying was intentional and executed with prior thought and planning. It may also be filed as a first-degree murder charge if the death occurred while the suspect was committing or attempting to commit another serious crime.
First-degree murder may also be charged when committed during specified drug offenses.
In Florida, first-degree murder is a capital felony, punishable by either life in prison with no possibility of parole or the death penalty.
Second-degree murder, per F.S. § 782.04(3)-(4), is essentially a case in which a death occurs either in the heat of passion or by way of an act so dangerous it evinces reckless disregard for human life.
The classic example is a person learns his or her spouse is having an affair and immediately kills the partner or paramour.
But it can be broader than that too.
The killing occurred by an act that was imminently dangerous to another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life.
Premeditation and intent to kill are not necessary elements of second-degree murder in Florida. So for example, if a person fires celebratory shots at a gathering and one of those bullets strikes and kills someone, he or she may be charged with second-degree murder – even if there was no intent or premeditation. The act of firing a gun at or near a crowd could be considered an act that shows disregard for human life.
Third-degree murder under Florida law is a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison.
Per F.S. § 782.04 (4), this is when a death occurs unintentionally when a person is committing or attempting to commit another felony.
Attempted felony murder may be charged if you engage in the felony – or a co-defendant engages in a felony – that could have resulted in the death of someone else, but does not. A person can be charged with this offense for simply supporting or encouraging the underlying felony.
Manslaughter is essentially murder without intent. It is the unlawful killing of another human being without malice aforethought.
Manslaughter charges, per F.S. § 782.07, may be filed as either voluntary or involuntary.
Voluntary manslaughter involves a slaying that occurs in the heat of passion and without planning.
Involuntary manslaughter, sometimes referred to as criminally negligent homicide, happens when a death occurs as the result of recklessness or negligence.
These are charges that may be filed when a human being (including an unborn child) is killed by defendant’s reckless operation of either a motor vehicle or marine vessel in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person.
Vehicular homicide is codified in F.S. § 782.071, and vessel homicide is codified in F.S. § 782.072.
Generally, these are charged as second-degree felonies, punishable by up to 15 years in prison. However, if it can be shown that at the time of accident, defendant knew or should have known an accident occurred and failed to stay at the scene to provide information or render aid as required by law, he or she may be charged with a first-degree felony, punishable by up to 30 years in prison.
This is when a person deliberately assists another person in the commission of a suicide or encourages, advertises, promotes, permits, or publicizes such an act.
Assisting a self-murder per F.S. § 782.08 is a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison, while exploitation of self-murder per F.S. § 782.081 is a third-degree felony, punishable by up to five years in prison.
If a person kills someone else unnecessarily – even while attempting to stop or resist a person attempting another felony or after such an attempt failed – is considered a form of manslaughter, a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison.
Anyone facing any of these charges should seek immediate legal counsel from an experienced criminal defense team.