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We, Oiltanking GmbH, and our affiliated companies (hereinafter jointly referred to as “the Company”) welcome you to our websites and thank you for your interest in our company.
We strive to offer you the best possible service; this also includes continuous optimizing of our Internet presence and, it goes without saying, protection of your data. Our server will automatically record data whenever you visit our websites. We do not, however, assign any personal identity to this data, which can, for example, be the domain name and IP address of the requesting computer or the date of access, duration of your visit or the website from which you visit us. This data is generally used for system security purposes as well as to continually optimize our sites and services. Data evaluation is exclusively of a statistical nature.
Any additional personal data, such as your name, address, telephone number or e-mail address, will not be gathered unless you specifically provide them to us (e.g. via the contact form or by email). It goes without saying that in such cases your data will only be gathered, processed or used for the purposes as indicated or for purposes arising from them, unless current legal regulations require us to pass them on. We will only use your data for other purposes (e.g. advertising or market/opinion research) if you have specifically consented to us doing so.
Please find below information about how we, the Company, handle your data in accordance with Art. 13 of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).
The entity stated in our legal notice is responsible for collection and processing of the data described below.
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The requesting computer’s IP address, shortened in such a way that it can no longer be linked to an identified individual.
The above-mentioned log data will only be stored in an anonymized form.
Within the framework of data processing on our behalf as defined by Art. 28 GDPR, we will transfer your data to service providers who assist us with the operation of our websites and the related processes. Our service providers are bound by strict instructions issued by us and subject to corresponding contractual obligations. We use the following service providers: hosting provider, web analysis service provider, website programming and maintenance service provider.
In the case of Google Analytics (USA) the adequate level of data protection results from the company’s corresponding participation in the Privacy Shield Framework (Art. 45 Para. 1 GDPR).
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We use both session and persistent cookies on our websites.
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The information generated by the cookie concerning your use of this website is generally transmitted to a Google server in the USA, where it is stored. Activation of the IP anonymization function on this website means that Google will, however, truncate your IP address within European Union member states or other states party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area before transferring the data. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the USA (Google’s participation in the so-called “Privacy Shield Framework” ensures an adequate level of data protection as specified by Art. 45 Para. 1 GDPR) and truncated there. In addition to this, we have concluded a data processing contract with Google (USA) in accordance with Art. 28 GDPR. Working on behalf of this website’s operator, Google will use this information strictly for the purpose of analysing your use of the website; compiling reports on website activities and providing other services associated with the use of the website and the Internet for the website operator. Google may also transmit this information to third parties insofar as this is required by law or insofar as third parties process this data on behalf of Google. Google will not bundle the IP address transmitted from your browser in connection with Google Analytics with other data. For more information about how Google uses data which is generated when using its partners’ websites and apps, visit www.google.de/policies/privacy/partners.
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We operate official Social Media pages, based on Article 6, section 1 (f) GDPR which refers to processing that is done in the interest of public relations and communication. We do not at any time register, store or process personal data of our users on these pages. We may only communicate with you via the Social Media platform by answering to comments, messages or the like, share your posted content on any of our social media pages and allow you to participate in contests and/or raffles. No further data processing will be either carried out or initiated by us. The data you submit to our Social Media pages (e.g. comments, videos or pictures) will at no time be used or processed by us for any other undisclosed purposes.
To the extent that the platform provider leaves us room to exert influence over or set parameters regarding the processing of your data, we will design our social media pages to be as compliant as possible with applicable data protection rules. We therefore do not make use of demographic, interest-based, behavior-based or location-based target group classifications for the purposes of advertising, notwithstanding that such services may (by default) be provided to us by the social media platform providers.
If you wish to object to a particular data processing, please contact us via the contact information provided in our content provider information. Following our examination of your request, we will determine whether we are able to respond to your request. If we are unable to fulfill your request using our own means, we will forward it to the appropriate service provider. If you send us an inquiry through the social media platform, we may also, depending on your request, refer to other secure communication channels that guarantee confidentiality. You always have the option to send us confidential inquiries to the address given in the content provider information.
The Social Media platforms use what are known as “web tracking methods” on their websites. Please be aware of the following: the possibility cannot be excluded that the Social Media platforms may use your profile data, for instance in order to evaluate your habits, personal relationships, preferences and the like. Together with the platform provider we entered into a so called joint controllership. This means we and the respective Social Media platform are jointly responsible for the processing of the personal data. We have no influence on the processing of your data by the social media platforms.
We have implemented technical and organizational measures to ensure that your data is protected as comprehensively as possible against undesired access. We use an encryption procedure on our sites. Your computer will use TLS encryption to transmit your data to our server via the Internet and vice versa. This is indicated by the locked padlock symbol in your browser status bar and the address line beginning with https:// .
You have the possibility of getting in touch with us by means of an online form. In order to use our contact forms, we need your name and your e-mail address. Other data may be supplied by you, but are not mandatory. The legal basis for the processing of the data is article 6, section 1 (b) of the General Data Protection Regulation. We use your data exclusively for the purpose of processing your enquiry.
By sending this e-mail form you are declaring your consent to the electronic registration and storage of the data you have supplied. The legal basis for the processing of the data is article 6, section 1 (a) of the General Data Protection Regulation. We use your data exclusively for the purpose of processing your enquiry. You can revoke your consent at any time, e.g. by sending an email to online-mediaoiltanking.com.
We process your personal data in accordance with the applicable data protection provisions, based on section 26 of the BDSG-neu [Federal Data Protection Act – Revised]. We process the data you relinquish to us in connection with your online application exclusively for the purpose of selecting from among the candidates. No data processing for other purposes will take place.
You yourself determine the scope of the data you would like to communicate to us in connection with your online application. Online applications are transmitted to our HR division and processed by HR as rapidly as possible. The data are transmitted in encrypted form. As a rule, applications are forwarded to the heads of the responsible specialist divisions of our company. Other than that, no sharing of your data takes place. Your details will be treated by us as confidential. If your application proves unsuccessful, your documents will be deleted on the expiry of 6 months.
If you wish us to have regard to your application in connection with other or future job vacancies, please do include a note on your application to this effect. Your data will then be processed in compliance with article 6, section 1 (a) of the General Data Protection Regulation. In this case, your application will be deleted after two years.
Under the terms of the GDPR, you have the following rights as a so-called “data subject” – the right to information (Article 15 GDPR); the right to rectification (Article 16 GDPR); the right to erasure (Article 17 GDPR); the right to restriction of processing (Article 18 GDPR); the right to object (Article 21 GDPR) and the right to data portability (Article 20 GDPR). Your rights to information and erasure are subject to limitations in accordance with Sect. 34 and 35 BDSG (German Federal Data Protection Act). In addition, you have a right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority (Article 77 GDPR in conjunction with Sect. 19 BDSG).
Should data be gathered on the basis of Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f (data processing for the purposes of legitimate interests), then you have the right to object to processing at any time on grounds relating to your particular situation. Should you do so, then we will no longer process your personal data unless there are compelling legitimate grounds for processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
Under the terms of Art. 77 GDPR you have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority if you consider that the processing of your personal data infringes data protection law regulations. You can assert this right in particular with a supervisory authority in the member state of your habitual residence; place of work or the place of the alleged infringement.
We reserve the right to update this data protection declaration at any time, either with or without prior notice. By using our website(s) you are declaring your agreement to these data protection regulations.

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Art. 28
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Art. 45
Art. 28
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Effective March 28, 2011, sponsors and investigators of human drug and biological products subject to either an investigational new drug application ("IND") or bioavailability ("BA") or bioequivalence ("BE") studies exempt from IND requirements will have revised safety reporting requirements under the FDA regulations. FDA issued its final rule on September 29, 2010, which amends the IND safety reporting requirements under 21 CFR Part 312 and adds safety reporting requirements for persons conducting BA or BE studies under 21 CFR Part 320. 75 Fed. Reg. 59935 (Sept. 29, 2010).
FDA had published a proposed rule to revise its premarketing and postmarketing safety reporting regulations on March 14, 2003. The agency decided to bifurcate the premarketing and postmarketing safety reporting requirements in separate rulemakings, and this final rule focuses only on the premarketing safety reporting regulations. Simultaneous to finalizing the regulations, FDA issued draft guidance on the topic, “Guidance for Industry and Investigators: Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies,” and published a Q&A on the agency’s website. The revised requirements are designed to clarify and improve the quality of safety information reported to FDA, harmonize international reporting standards and definitions, and improve safety monitoring by sponsors and investigators. However, the regulations appear to impose a greater burden on sponsors to determine when an adverse event is reportable.
An adverse event or suspected adverse reaction is considered a “life-threatening adverse event or life-threatening suspected adverse reaction” if, in the view of the investigator or sponsor, its occurrence places the patient or subject at immediate risk of death.
Prompt Review of Safety Information: Similar to the former regulations, a sponsor must continue to “promptly” review all safety information obtained from foreign or domestic sources. However, the sources of information listed in the regulation has expanded to include “any clinical or epidemiological investigations, animal or in vitro studies, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers, as well as reports from foreign regulatory authorities and reports of foreign commercial marketing experience for drugs that are not marketed in the United States.” Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(b). The guidance recommends that the sponsor also conduct literature searches at least annually to find new safety information for reporting purposes.
Serious and unexpected suspected adverse reaction (Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(1)(i): the event must be serious, unexpected, and suspected adverse reaction. Under the revised reporting requirements, the definition of “suspected adverse reaction” imposes a greater burden on sponsors to determine whether the drug caused the event.
Findings from other sources (Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(1)(ii)): the event must suggest a significant risk in humans exposed to the drug. Other sources may include epidemiological studies, pooled analysis of multiple studies, and clinical studies other than those conducted under the present IND.
Findings from animal or in vitro testing (Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(1)(iii)): the event must suggest a significant risk to humans exposed to the drug. This requirement expands a sponsor’s reporting obligations to include findings from in vitro studies. Findings from carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, teratogenicity, and other organ toxicity studies are types of studies that could reveal a significant risk. The guidance advises sponsors to determine whether the finding suggests a significant risk to humans or is too early to interpret without further investigation.
Increased occurrence of serious suspected adverse reactions (Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(1)(iv)): any clinically important increase in the rate of a serious suspected adverse reaction over that listed in the protocol or investigator brochure. The decision about whether to report depends on several factors, including study population and the nature and seriousness of the event.
Submission of Unexpected Fatal or Life-Threatening Risks: Similar to the former regulations, a sponsor must continue to notify FDA of any unexpected fatal or life-threatening suspected adverse reaction within 7 calendar days after the sponsor’s receives the information. Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(2).
Reporting of Certain Study Endpoints: FDA clarified that study endpoints must not be reported as IND safety reports for trials that are designed to evaluate the effect of the drug on disease-related mortality or morbidity. Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(5). The sponsor must report study endpoints to FDA as described in the protocol. However, if a serious and unexpected adverse event occurs for which a causal relationship between the drug and the event is suggested, the event must be reported under § 312.32(c)(1)(i) as a serious and unexpected suspected adverse reaction even if it is a component of the study endpoint.
Unblinding: FDA acknowledged that breaking the blind may be necessary to determine the reportability of serious, unexpected, suspected adverse reactions. Knowledge of the treatment may provide important safety information and could impact the ongoing conduct of a clinical trial. If the sponsor believes that breaking the blind may compromise study integrity, the sponsor can propose an alternative reporting format to maintain the blind.
Investigator Reporting Requirements: FDA’s revised regulations imposes additional investigator reporting requirements. Under the final regulations, investigators must report immediately to the sponsor any serious adverse event, whether or not considered drug related, including those listed in the protocol or investigator brochure and the report must include a causality assessment. Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.64(b). Study endpoints that are serious adverse events must be reported in accordance with the protocol unless there is evidence suggesting a causal relationship between the drug and the event. In that case, investigators are required to report the event immediately to the sponsor.
Bioavailability and Bioequivalence Studies: Under the former regulations, certain in vivo BA/BE studies in humans were exempt from the IND safety reporting requirements. The final rule contains safety reporting requirements for such BA/BE studies that are conducted in the United States. The person conducting the study, including any contract research organization, must notify FDA and all participating investigators of any serious adverse event that is observed in a BA/BE study. This requirement does not apply to human BA and BE studies exempt from the IND requirements that are conducted outside of the United States.
Timing of Safety Reports Submission: The timing of the safety reports remains unchanged. Safety reports must be submitted to FDA and all participating investigators no later than 15 calendar days after the sponsor or person conducting the study becomes aware of the event, except for fatal and life-threatening adverse events which must be submitted no later than 7 calendar days.
Format of Safety Reports: The format for IND safety reports is based on the type of expedited report; for individual case reports, a sponsor would use FDA Form 3500A, though FDA will accept foreign suspected adverse reaction reports on a CIOMS I Form. Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(1)(v). For reports of overall findings or pooled analyses, a narrative format must be used. FDA may require a sponsor or a sponsor may request to submit IND safety reports in a different format or frequency than that prescribed in the regulations. Revised 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(3). For BA/BE studies, each report must be submitted on FDA Form 3500A or in an electronic format that FDA can process. Revised 21 C.F.R.§ 320.31(d)(3).


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Jack WOODY et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Defendants were convicted before the Superior Court, San Bernardino County, Carl B. Hilliard, J., of illegal possession of peyote, and they appealed. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held that California could not constitutionally apply statute proscribing use of peyote so as to prevent Indian tribe from using peyote as sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine used in Christian churches.
Opinion, 35 Cal.Rptr. 708, vacated.
***70 **814 *716 Rufus W. Johnson, Anaheim, for defendants and appellants.
*717 Mitchel J. Ezer, Beverly Hills, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack K. Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
On April 28, 1962, a group of Navajos met in an Indian hogan in the desert near Needles, California, to perform a religious ceremony which included the use of peyote. Police officers, who had observed part of the ceremony, arrested defendants, who were among the Indians present. Defendants were later convicted of violating section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the unauthorized possession **815 ***71 of peyote. We have concluded that since the defendants used the peyote in a bona fide pursuit of a religious faith, and since the practice does not frustrate a compelling interest of the state, the application of the statute improperly defeated the immunity of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The state stipulated at trial at the time of the arrest defendants and the other Indians were performing a religious ceremony which involved the use of peyote. Defendants pleaded not guilty to the crime of illegal possession of narcotics, contending that their possession of peyote was incident to the observance of their faith and that the state could not constitutionally invoke the statute against them without abridging their right to the free exercise of their religion. The trial proceeded without a jury; the court held defendants guilty and imposed suspended sentences.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, restated the rule. In Sherbert a South Carolina employer discharged appellant, a Seventh‑day Adventist, because she refused to work on Saturdays. Since her 'conscientious scruples' against Saturday work precluded her from obtaining other employment, appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission rejected appellant's claim *719 upon the ground that she had '* * * failed, without good cause * * * to accept available suitable work. * * *' The South Carolina courts affirmed the commission's ruling despite appellant's contention that application of the disqualifying provision of the statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion.
Despite the plea by South Carolina that fraudulent religious objections to Saturday work would dilute the state compensation fund and interfere with employers' scheduling of necessary Saturday work, the court held that 'no such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case' which would justify the abridgement of appellant's religious freedom.
 The first step requires an exploration into the particulars of this case to determine whether section 11500 of *720 the Health and Safety Code imposes any burden upon the free exercise of defendants' religion. An examination of the record as to the nature of peyote and its role in the religion practiced by defendants as members of the Native American Church of California compels the conclusion that the statutory prohibition most seriously infringes upon the observance of the religion.
The plant Lophophora williamsii, a small, spineless cactus, found in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and northern Mexico, produces peyote, which grows in small buttons on the top of the cactus. Peyote's principal constituent is mescaline. When taken internally by chewing the buttons or drinking a derivative tea, peyote produces several types of hallucinations, depending primarily upon the user. In most subjects it causes ***73 **817 extraordinary vision marked by bright and kaleidoscopic colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans or animals. In others it engenders hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia. Beyond its hallucinatory effect, peyote renders for most users a heightened sense of comprehension; it fosters a feeling of friendliness toward other persons.
Peyote, as we shall see, plays a central role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church, a religious organization of Indians. Although the church claims no official prerequisites to membership, no written membership rolls, and no recorded theology, estimates of its membership range from 30,000 to 250,000, the wide variance deriving from differing definitions of a 'member.' As the anthropologists have ascertained through conversations with members, the theology of the church combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with God.
Peyotism discloses a long history. A reference to the religious use of peyote in Mexico appears in Spanish historical sources as carly as 1560. Peyotism spread from Mexico to the United States and Canada; American anthropologists describe it as well established in this country during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Today, Indians of many tribes practice Peyotism. Despite the absence of recorded dogma, the several tribes follow surprisingly similar ritual and theology; the practices of Navajo members in Arizona practically parallel those of adherents in California, Montana, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Saskatchewan.
The 'meeting,' a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. *721 The meeting convenes in an enclosure and continues from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the past good fortune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will 'sponsor' a meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the next morning's breakfast. The 'sponsor,' usually but not always the 'leader,' takes charge of the meeting; he decides the order of events and the amount of peyote to be consumed. Although the individual leader exercises an absolute control of the meeting, anthropologists report a striking uniformity of its ritual.
A meeting connotes a solemn and special occasion. Whole families attend together, although children and young women participate only by their presence. Adherents don their finest clothing, usually suits for men and fancy dresses for the women, but sometimes ceremonial Indian costumes. At the meeting the members pray, sing, and make ritual use of drum, fan, eagle bone, whistle, rattle and prayer cigarette, the symbolic emblems of their faith. The central event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quantities sufficient to produce an hallucinatory state.
At an early but fixed stage in the ritual the members pass around a ceremonial bag of peyote buttons. Each adult may take four, the customary number, or take none. The participants chew the buttons, usually with some difficulty because of extreme bitterness; later, at a set time in the ceremony any member may ask for more peyote; occasionally a member may take as many as four more buttons. At sunrise on Sunday the ritual ends; after a brief outdoor prayer, the host and his family serve breakfast. Then the members depart. By morning the effects of the peyote disappear; the users suffer no aftereffects.
FN3. Although Peyotism has not assumed a major role in American Indian life, it has in some respects affected it. On the one hand, no extant Indian nation recognizes it as its national religion; the Navajo Tribal Code forbids the possession of peyote, the driving of a car while under the influence of peyote, and the sale of peyote on the reservation. On the other hand, however, most anthropological authorities holdPeyotism to be a positive, rather than negative, force in the lives of its adherents. Since the church forbids the use of alcohol and has adopted many of the moral precepts of Christianity, these authorities conclude that members observe higher standards than nonmembers.
The state asserts that the compelling reason for the prohibition of Peyotism lies in its deleterious effects upon the Indian community, and even more basically, in the infringement such practice would place upon the enforcement of the narcotic laws because of the difficulty of detecting fraudulent claims of an asserted religious use of peyote. The prosecution further claims that the cases support these positions. We set forth the reasons why we believe the contentions to be unfounded.
The People urge that 'the use of peyote by Indians in place of medical care, the threat of indoctrination of small children,' and the 'possible correlation between the use of this drug and the possible propensity to use some other more harmful drug' justify the statutory prohibition. The record, however, does not support the state's chronicle of harmful consequences of the use of peyote.
The evidence indicates that the Indians do not in fact employ peyote in place of proper medical care; and, as the Attorney General with fair objectivity admits, 'there was no evidence to suggest that Indians who use peyote are more liable to become addicted to other narcotics than non‑peyoteusing Indians.' Nor does the record substantiate the state's fear of the 'indoctrination of small children'; it shows that Indian children never, and Indian teenagers rarely, use peyote. Finally, as the Attorney General likewise admits, the opinion *723 of scientists and other experts is 'that peyote * * * works no permanent deleterious injury to the Indian. * * *' Indeed, as we have noted, these experts regard the moral standards of members of the Native American Church as higher than those of Indians outside the church.
Turning to the state's second contention, that the threat of fraudulent assertions of ***75 **819 religious immunity will render impossible the effective enforcement of the narcotic laws, we note that South Carolina in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, unsuccessfully urged to the United States Supreme Court a substantially similar contention. It argued that 'a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might * * * dilute the unemployment compensation fund * * * (and) hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.' (374 U.S. at p. 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1795.) The Supreme Court held among its alternate grounds for disposing of this contention, that 'there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents now advance.' (Id. at p. 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1795.) Further, the court pointed out that 'even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the (state) to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.' (Id. at p. 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1796.) In the instant case, as in Sherbert, the state produced no evidence that spurious claims of religious immunity would in fact preclude effective administration of the law or that other 'forms of regulation' would not accomplish the state's objectives.
FN4. New Mexico Statutes (1959) 54‑5‑16; Montana Statutes (1959) 94‑35‑123.
FN5. In Arizona v. Attakai, Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County, July 26, 1960; appeal by State dismissed by Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona court held that its narcotics statute could not constitutionally be applied to members of the Native American Church.
We turn to the several cases cited by the Attorney General which uphold statutes restricting religious practices. The People principally rely upon Reynolds, v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244, which ruled that Congress could constitutionally apply to Mormons a prohibition against polygamy. The Mormon doctrine of polygamy rested in alleged divine origin and imposed upon male members, circumstances **820 ***76 permitting, the observance of the practice upon pain of eternal damnation.
The Supreme Court held that the history of the laws against polygamy showed that the condemnation of the practice was a matter of the gravest social importance. It found in polygamy *725 the seed of destruction of a democratic society. [FN6] Viewing the practice as highly injurious to its female adherents, the Court classed polygamy with such religious rites as sacrifice of human beings and funereal immolation of widows.
Reynolds v. United States must be distinguished from the instant case for two fundamental reasons. The test of constitutionality calls for an examination of the degree of abridgement of religious freedom involved in each case. Polygamy, although a basic tenet in the theology of Mormonism, is not essential to the practice of the religion; peyote, on the other hand, is the sine qua non of defendants' faith. It is the sole means by which defendants are able to experience their religion; without peyote defendants cannot practice their faith. Second, the degree of danger to state interests in Reynolds far exceeded that in the instant case. The Court in Reynolds considered polygamy as a serious threat to democratic institutions and injurious to the morals and well‑being of its practitioners. As we have heretofore indicated, no such compelling state interest supports the prohibition of the use of peyote.
FN8. Such cases as Prince v. Massachusetts (1943) 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (child labor law applied to guardian of a nine‑ year‑old Jehovah's Witness); Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1904) 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (compulsory vaccination law); and In re Ferguson (1961) 55 Cal.2d 663, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417 (lawful incarceration restricting religious observances) must be distinguished from the present case upon similar grounds.
 Finally, we deal with the Attorney General's argument that our present conclusion requires an inquiry in each case into the bona fides of a particular defendant's beliefs, an inquiry which is both difficult and 'repugnant to the spirit of our law. * * *' Yet the trier of fact need inquire only into the question of whether the defendants' ***77 **821 belief in Peyotism is honest and in good faith. As the court in United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148, held, although judicial examination of the truth or validity of religious beliefs is foreclosed by the First Amendment, the courts of necessity must ask whether the claimant holds his belief honestly and in good faith or whether he seeks to wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities.
In so doing, we impose no undue burden upon the trier of fact. We do not doubt the capacity of judge and jury to distinguish between those who would feign faith in an esoteric religion and those who would honestly follow it. 'Suffice it to say that trial courts will have to determine in each instance, with whatever evidence is at hand, whether or not the assertion of a belief which is protected by the First Amendment is in fact a spurious claim.' (In re Jenison, supra, 125 N.W.2d 588, 590; italics added.) Thus the court makes a factual examination of the bona fides of the belief and does not intrude into the religious issue at all; it does not determine the nature of the belief but the nature of defendants' adherence to it.
Courts reach such factual determinations in a host of related circumstances. Thus the Universal Military Training and Service Act (1948) 50 U.S.C.App. s 456(j), exempts from combat training and service any person 'who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.' (See, e. g., Rempel v. United States (10th Cir. 1955) 220 F.2d 949, 951; *727 United States v. Hagaman (3rd Cir. 1954) 213 F.2d 86, 89; In re Jost (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 379, 387, 256 P.2d 71; revd. Jost v. United States, 347 U.S. 901, 74 S.Ct. 427, 98 L.Ed. 1061 (applying conscientious objector provision in Internal Security Act of 1950, 8 U.S.C. Sup. IV, s 935).) Significantly, Title II, section 3, of the National Prohibition Act (1919) 41 Stat. 308‑309, exempted from prohibition the use of wine for sacramental purposes.
 We have weighed the competing values represented in this case on the symbolic scale of constitutionality. On the one side we have placed the weight of freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment; on the other, the weight of the state's 'compelling interest.' Since the use of peyote incorporates the essence of the religious expression, the first weight is heavy. Yet the use of peyote presents only slight danger to the state and to the enforcement of its laws; the second weight is relatively light. The scale tips in favor of the constitutional protection.
We know that some will urge that it is more important to subserve the rigorous enforcement of the narcotic laws than to carve out of them an exception for a few believers in a strange faith. They will say that the exception may produce problems of enforcement and that the dictate of the state must overcome the beliefs of a minority of Indians. But the problems of enforce. here do not inherently differ from those of other situations which call for the detection of fraud. On the other hand, the right to free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our history. In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of a self‑expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We ***78 **822 preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion *728 in using peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles, California.
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


A. Does 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) require the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to provide notice of any information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim where the claim cannot be substantiated under the law or based on the application of the law to undisputed facts?
B. Does 38 U.S.C. § 5103A require VA to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence where the claim cannot be substantiated under the law or based on the application of the law to undisputed facts?
1. The Compensation and Pension Service has asked whether the reasoning behind our holding in VAOPGCPREC 2-2004 that notice pursuant to the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim for separate disability ratings for service-connected tinnitus in each ear may be applicable to certain other types of claims and to VA's duty to assist in claim development under the VCAA. In this opinion, we conclude that compliance with the "notice" and "duty to assist" provisions of the VCAA is not required where a claim cannot be substantiated by additional evidence.
which portion, if any, the Secretary, in accordance with section 5103A of this title and any other applicable provisions of law, will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant.
(a) Duty to assist. (1) The Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary.
3. Although the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) has remanded many claims on the basis that VA failed to comply with the notice or duty-to-assist provisions of the VCAA, no CAVC opinion has ever held that notice and assistance under the VCAA must be provided in every claim. In fact, in cases decided soon after the enactment of the VCAA, the CAVC specifically recognized that "[w]hen there is extensive factual development in a case, reflected both in the record on appeal and the [Board]'s decision, which indicates no reasonable possibility that any further assistance would aid the appellant in substantiating his claim, . . . the VCAA does not apply." Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2001) (following Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143, 149 (2001)); see also Long v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 555 (2004) (where underlying claim was moot, CAVC did not grant appellant's request for remand pursuant to "the notice and assistance provisions of the [VCAA]"); Mason v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 129, 132 (2002) (VCAA not applicable because statute, not evidence, was dispositive); Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227, 231-32 (2000) (VCAA does not affect cases where issue on appeal is solely one of statutory interpretation), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002). Against this backdrop, we will address, in turn, the notice and duty-to-assist provisions of the VCAA in the context of the questions presented above.
VCAA Notice Provision (38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)).
(DC) 6260 and by the previous versions of DC 6260." VAOPGCPREC 2-2004. VAOPGCPREC 2-2004 may be subject to a narrow interpretation due to the specific nature of its holding. However, the analysis upon which the holding of that precedent opinion was based was not specific to bilateral tinnitus claims, and the rationale for the holding of that opinion applies generally to claims governed by the VCAA. As explained further below, VCAA notice is not required in connection with a claim that cannot be substantiated because no factual development could lead to an award.
5. Section 5103(a) does not require notice in a case where a claim cannot be substantiated because the very text of the statute states that notification is required only of evidence "necessary to substantiate the claim." Logically, if a claim cannot be substantiated, then there is no evidence "necessary" to such substantiation. As we noted in VAOPGCPREC 2-2004, the two qualifiers to the statutory notice requirement, i.e., that notice is only required as to information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim and that notice is not necessary regarding evidence previously provided, suggest congressional recognition that in some cases the criteria for providing notice will not be invoked.
6. Also, as we pointed out in VAOPGCPREC 2-2004, the provision in the second sentence of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) requiring VA to inform the claimant of which portion of the information or evidence "if any" is to be supplied by the claimant and which portion "if any" VA will attempt to obtain "indicates that there will be situations in which it is not necessary to request any information from the claimant." We noted that "[o]ne such situation would be where no additional information or evidence is needed because pursuant to statute or regulation the claim cannot be substantiated."
7. We further noted in VAOPGCPREC 2-2004, citing United States v. Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 16-17 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824 (1997), that principles of statutory interpretation call for avoidance of absurd or unreasonable results. We reasoned that a reading of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) that would require notice of information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim that cannot be substantiated because it is barred by statute or regulation would be nonsensical and inconsistent with Congress' intention that VA attempt to obtain information that could be useful in deciding a claim. See Explanatory Statement on H.R. 4864, as amended, 146 Cong. Rec. H9913, H9914 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2000).
38 U.S.C. §§ 5103(a) and 5103A supports the conclusion that action on VA's part under section 5103(a) is not necessary where there is no relevant information or evidence to be obtained because a claim is barred as a matter of law. As stated with regard to the provision that became section 5103A, Congress recognized that "certain claims . . . can be decided without providing any assistance or obtaining any additional evidence." H.R. Rep. No. 106-781, at 10 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2006, 2012-13. Further, with regard to the provision that became section 5103(a), Congress contemplated notice to a claimant only with regard to information or evidence that "has some probative value." Explanatory Statement on H.R. 4864, as amended, 146 Cong. Rec. at H9914.
Duty to Assist (38 U.S.C. § 5103A).
10. The second question presented is whether 38 U.S.C. § 5103A requires VA to provide assistance in developing a claim that cannot be substantiated. The "duty to assist" requires VA to "make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary." 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1). However, VA "is not required to provide assistance to a claimant under this section if no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim." 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(2). Thus, section 5103A(a)(2) clearly authorizes VA to refrain from providing claim development assistance where the claim cannot be substantiated as a matter of law, because in such a case there can be no reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim.
11. Although 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(g) states that VA is not "preclude[d] . . from providing such other assistance under subsection (a) . . . as the Secretary considers appropriate," that provision, too, is limited to assistance in "substantiating a claim." Moreover, VA's regulations preclude "providing assistance . . . if . . . there is no reasonable possibility that any assistance VA would provide to the claimant would substantiate the claim" and state that "VA will discontinue providing assistance . . . if the evidence obtained indicates that there is no reasonable possibility that further assistance would substantiate the claim." 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d). Specific examples of situations in which VA will refrain from providing further assistance include those where the claimant is legally ineligible for the benefit sought or is not entitled to the benefit as a matter of law. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d)(1), (3).
recognize[d] that certain claims, including those that on their face seek benefits for ineligible claimants (such as a veteran who seeks pension benefits but lacks wartime service), or claims which have been previously decided on the same evidence can be decided without providing any assistance or obtaining any additional evidence, and authorize[d] the Secretary to decide those claims without providing any assistance under this subsection.
38 U.S.C. § 5103A is not required where there is no reasonable possibility that additional development could substantiate the claim because there is no legal basis for the claim or undisputed facts render the claimant ineligible for the benefit sought.
13. The CAVC has recognized that where the record has been extensively developed and there is no reasonable possibility of a changed outcome based on further development, the "VCAA's duty to notify and duty to assist provisions are not applicable." Wensch, 15 Vet. App. at 368; accord, Mason, 16 Vet. App.
at 132; Dela Cruz, 15 Vet. App. at 149. [FN#2] We note that, although the CAVC in these cases stated that the duties to notify and to assist are "not applicable" or not "implicated" where the claim cannot be substantiated, we believe it is more correct to say that, in the case of section 5103A, the statute specifically governs cases where there is no reasonable possibility of substantiating a claim and provides that VA "is not required to provide assistance" in such cases. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(2). Nevertheless, the cited CAVC precedents support our conclusion that the VCAA does not require notice or assistance in developing a claim that cannot be substantiated because the benefit sought is not authorized by law or the claimant is ineligible under undisputed facts.
A. Under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is not required to provide notice of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim where that claim cannot be substantiated because there is no legal basis for the claim or because undisputed facts render the claimant ineligible for the claimed benefit.
B. Under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, VA is not required to assist a claimant in developing evidence to substantiate a claim where there is no reasonable possibility that such aid could substantiate the claim because there is no legal basis for the claim or because undisputed facts render the claimant ineligible for the claimed benefit.
We caution that VA may be obligated to provide VCAA notice where VA has reason to doubt the accuracy of the undisputed facts.
We note that, while certain CAVC decisions indicate that failure by VA to provide notification under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) is non-prejudicial error where there is no possibility that benefits could be awarded under the facts averred by the claimant, see Desbrow v. Principi, No. 02-352, 2004 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 234, at *8-9 (Vet. App. May 4, 2004); Valiao v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 229, 232 (2003), the above discussion makes clear that such cases do not involve error at all; section 5103(a) does not require notice in such circumstances.


Before BATCHELDER, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges. ARGUED:Michael E. Deutsch, People's Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Appellant. Jonathan Tukel, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Michael E. Deutsch, People's Law Office, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. Jonathan Tukel, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. Katherine M. Gallagher, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae.
In October 2013, Odeh was charged in a single-count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), the criminal denaturalization statute. Section 1425(a) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. The indictment alleges that Odeh “procured her citizenship despite her criminal history and despite her having made ․ material false statements” related to her criminal history and to the truth of the statements in her immigrant visa application. The elements of the § 1425(a) violation, according to the district court's jury instruction, were that (1) Odeh was naturalized, (2) Odeh made a false statement in her naturalization application or during her naturalization interview, (3) Odeh knew the falsity of the statement, (4) the statement was material, and (5) Odeh procured citizenship as a result of the false statement, meaning that without the statement, her application would have been denied.1 After a jury convicted Odeh, the district court revoked Odeh's citizenship, as is required by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e), and sentenced her to eighteen months' imprisonment.
After submitting the application, Odeh was interviewed by an immigration officer with the Department of Homeland Security, Jennifer Williams. Williams verbally repeated each question on Odeh's application and confirmed that Odeh's original answers were correct. Williams testified at trial that pursuant to her department's policy, in every interview, she added the phrase “anywhere in the world” at the end of every criminal history question. Williams thus testified that instead of asking, for example, whether Odeh had ever been charged with committing any crime, she asked whether Odeh had ever been charged with committing any crime anywhere in the world. Odeh did not change any of her answers related to her criminal history. Her naturalization application was approved and she worked as a community organizer with the Arab–American Action Network for the next ten years, providing services for immigrant women. At trial, a Government witness testified that if Odeh had been truthful on her application or in her interview, she would have been ineligible for citizenship due to false statements on her immigrant visa application and a statutory bar prohibiting entry to anyone who has engaged in a “terrorist activity.”2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (providing that any person “who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any [immigration] benefits” is not of good moral character); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (rendering ineligible for admission foreigners who “ha[ve] engaged in a terrorist activity”); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) (defining terrorist activity).
At trial, the Government introduced Israeli documents from 1969–1975 related to Odeh's arrest, indictment, convictions, and sentence. The Government used the documents to prove the falsity and materiality of Odeh's statements, her knowledge of their falsity, and that she procured citizenship because of the statements. These documents were admitted under a mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Israel. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Isr., Jan. 26, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12925 [hereinafter MLAT]. The MLAT provides, in pertinent part, that a requesting state may request “copies of any documents, records, or information which are in the possession of a government department or agency of th[e requested] State but which are not publicly available.” Id. art. IX, ¶ 2. The MLAT also provides that where there is an appropriate authentication by the requested state, “[n]o further authentication or certification shall be necessary in order for such records to be admissible” in United States court proceedings. Id .
Regardless of whether 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) is a specific or general intent crime, Dr. Fabri's proffered testimony is relevant to whether Odeh knew that her statements were false. The district court accordingly erred in categorically excluding this testimony. Section 1425(a) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. To satisfy § 1425(a)'s mens rea requirement, the parties agree that the Government must prove at least that Odeh knew that one of her statements was false. They also agree that if this is all that the Government must prove, § 1425(a) is a general intent crime.3 The parties contest whether the Government must also prove why Odeh made the false statements; that is, whether Odeh had a “bad purpose”—the key feature of specific intent crimes-to commit the unlawful act of procuring citizenship by lying. The Government maintains that this specific/general intent distinction determines whether Dr. Fabri's testimony is admissible. We need not decide, however, whether § 1425(a) is a general or specific intent crime to conclude that Dr. Fabri's testimony is not categorically barred by our decisions in Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, and Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649.4 The rule that the Government derives from those decisions does not apply in this case.
Dr. Fabri's testimony is potentially admissible because it is relevant to whether Odeh knew that her statements were false, which is an element of a § 1425(a) prosecution. Because the Government must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), a defendant's right to present a defense “generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence” to negate an element of the offense, see United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900–01 (3d Cir.1987) (citations omitted). Thus, in Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the defendant should have been allowed to present testimony implicating another individual in the crime, because that testimony “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” and “was critical to [the defendant's] defense.” 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The right to present a complete defense is therefore subject only to “reasonable restrictions” that “are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ “ United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). In this case, Dr. Fabri's testimony is potentially exculpatory because it undermines an element of the crime. The district court, however, did not rule on the competence or reliability of this testimony. Indeed, the district court did not tie the exclusion of evidence to a reasonable evidentiary restriction, but to a supposed categorical rule that does not apply. That ruling does not provide a sufficient basis for disallowing Odeh from presenting testimony that negates an element of § 1425(a).
In Gonyea, the defendant attempted to introduce psychological evidence that he was unable to resist committing the bank robberies for which he was charged. 140 F.3d at 650. The trial court precluded the defendant from offering this testimony. Id. In his brief on appeal, the defendant argued that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a specific intent crime and that the psychological evidence showed that he did not specifically intend to commit an unlawful act. Final Brief of Defendant–Appellant Jerry Gonyea at 23, 26, Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649 (No. 962267). We held that the defendant's evidence was not admissible, concluding that § 2113(a) is a general intent crime. Gonyea, 140 F.3d at 654. Although we did not spell out the reasoning for our holding beyond stating that bank robbery is a general intent crime, it is apparent that we rejected the defendant's argument because his alleged inability to resist committing the crime did not negate the general intent requirement that a defendant must know that he is doing the act that makes up the crime. Indeed, the psychological evidence showed that “[t]he defendant felt compelled to continue to act on his obsessive goal of robbing the bank,” a fact that would tend to prove only that the defendant did not have a bad purpose. Id. at 650.
A similar set of facts arose in Kimes, a case involving an assault of a federal officer. 246 F.3d at 802–03. In Kimes, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that PTSD “robbed him of the ability to control his actions,” such that when a federal officer touched his shoulder, he could not help but overreact. Id . at 803. In rejecting this claim, we held that the assault of a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) is a general intent crime because it is “sufficient for a defendant to act, regardless of the reason for the action.” Kimes, 246 F.3d at 808. Because the Government did not have to prove that the defendant specifically intended harm and the defendant's evidence was relevant only to his purpose in assaulting the officer, that evidence was properly excluded. Id. at 808–09. In United States v. Willis, too, we similarly held inadmissible evidence of paranoid personality disorder in a prosecution for the general intent crime of possessing a firearm as a felon, as the evidence did not suggest that the defendant did not know that he was carrying a gun, but instead that he “had no choice but to carry the gun.” 187 F.3d 639, 1999 WL 591440, at *7 (6th Cir. July 29, 1999) (unpublished table opinion).
In contrast to the proposed testimony in Kimes and Gonyea, Dr. Fabri's testimony does not suggest that Odeh felt compelled to commit a crime, but rather that Odeh did not know that her answers on the naturalization application were false. The district court therefore should not have excluded Dr. Fabri's testimony based on the supposed categorical rule in Kimes and Gonyea. The Third Circuit has provided helpful insight into why cases like Odeh's arise infrequently. According to that court, “[m]ost states ․ limit psychiatric evidence to specific intent crimes on the theory that mental abnormality can virtually never disprove the mens rea required for general intent crimes.” Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897 n .4. In this case, however, Dr. Fabri's testimony potentially negates the general intent element of § 1425(a), Odeh's knowledge of the physical act of the offense. Kimes and Gonyea do not control.
Second, the Government argues that Odeh was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony. An evidentiary ruling is prejudicial if the excluded evidence “creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 753 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Dr. Fabri's testimony, if believed, negates an element of § 1425(a), and because the trial testimony of Odeh and Williams would not necessarily undermine Dr. Fabri's theory, we cannot uphold the district court's ruling on the basis that Odeh was not prejudiced.
In support of its no-prejudice theory, the Government argues that Dr. Fabri's testimony would have contradicted Odeh's trial testimony. The Government reasons that Dr. Fabri would have testified that Odeh subconsciously blocked her torture in Israel when reading questions on the naturalization application and hearing questions during the interview, while Odeh testified that she misunderstood the questions and consciously decided that they referred only to her time in the United States. In a pretrial evidentiary hearing, Dr. Fabri testified that Odeh's blocking of her memory would have been “automatic.” Dr. Fabri also stated that Odeh's professed understanding of the questions is consistent with the symptoms of chronic PTSD. At trial, Odeh testified that if she had known that the questions referred to her time in Israel, she would have disclosed her criminal history in that country. Odeh also testified that her understanding of the questions was based in part on several questions in the application listed before the criminal history questions at issue in this case. Those questions were confined in scope to the United States. Odeh's trial testimony is not as inconsistent with Dr. Fabri's opinion as the Government argues, because Odeh's decision about what the questions were asking, under Dr. Fabri's theory, might have been shaped by the subconscious filtering of traumatic events in Israel. Odeh's testimony would not necessarily contradict Dr. Fabri's theory.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a). Under the IDRA, to prove insanity—an affirmative defense that absolves a defendant of liability even if the defendant is factually guilty—a defendant must “show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was ‘unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.’ “ Kimes, 246 F.3d at 806 (quoting § 17(a)). Notwithstanding the IDRA's restrictions on the use of mental defect evidence as a defense, evidence of a defendant's diminished mental capacity remains admissible to prove that the defendant could not form the required mens rea. Id.
Odeh next makes two arguments concerning the Israeli documents—and particularly Exhibit 3, the indictment—that appear to be based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule prohibits, among other things, the admission of relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Odeh urges that the district court erred in (1) refusing to order the Government to stipulate that Odeh was convicted of “serious offenses” and served ten years in prison, and (2) refusing to redact Exhibit 3 to omit language that Odeh characterizes as unfairly prejudicial. We review the district court's rulings on these issues for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Neither argument requires reversal.
The Government was not required to stipulate to the fact of Odeh's conviction and sentence, because the Government may generally prove the elements of a crime with any admissible evidence and the limited exception to this rule does not apply here. The general rule is that a “defendant has no right to selectively stipulate to particular elements of the offense.” United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 668 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 291 (6th Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Old Chief v. United States, the Supreme Court announced what we have described as a “narrow limitation” to this rule, see id., holding that the Government cannot refuse a defendant's offer to stipulate to his felon status in prosecutions under the federal felon-in-possession statute. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). The Court explicitly confined its holding “to cases involving proof of felon status.” Id. at 183 n. 7. Because this case does not involve a prosecution under the felon-in-possession statute, the Old Chief exception does not apply.
The second Rule 403 argument challenges the district court's refusal to redact two phrases in Exhibit 3. Those phrases state that Odeh was charged with “plac[ing] explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem ․ with the intention of causing death or injury” and that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of Leon Kannar and Edward Jaffe, May Their Memory Be a Blessing, as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Rule 403 protects against “evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.” United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 335 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Mendez–Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court was not required to redact the first phrase, as the phrase had highly probative value for the Government's case—value that the district court noted was “overwhelming.” Without this information, the Government might not have been able to prove materiality and procurement. The district court explained that “a conviction for participating in a bombing that resulted in the death of two civilians would be material because it would be relevant to Defendant's good moral character. An arrest for minor offenses such as jay-walking or loitering would not satisfy the materiality requirement.” The district court also reasoned that the information in Exhibit 3 was strong evidence of procurement contrary to law, because the fact that Odeh placed a bomb with the intent to kill civilians triggered a statutory bar to admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (excluding from entry any alien who “has engaged in a terrorist activity”); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (defining terrorist activity to include the use of an explosive “with intent to endanger ․ the safety of one or more individuals”). No good reason requires disturbing the district court's analysis.
The names of the victims and the Jewish saying “May Their Memory Be a Blessing” also did not require redaction.5 In this case, the six-word blessing was not inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Indeed, the blessing added no information beyond that which was already contained in the statements that Odeh was charged with placing a bomb in the SuperSol with the intent to kill, and that two people died. Moreover, the district court gave a limiting instruction that Odeh was not on trial for the events in Israel and that the information in the Israeli documents was relevant only to whether Odeh unlawfully procured naturalization. Such a limiting instruction is presumed to have reduced the risk of impermissible inferences. United States v. Feagan, 472 F. App'x 382, 390 (6th Cir.2012) (citing United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1996)).
As an initial matter, no procedural defects affected Odeh's sentence. A court commits procedural error if it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat[es] ) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district court took none of these missteps. The district court also did not commit procedural error by failing to state explicitly why it would not reduce Odeh's sentence based on her age or PTSD. In United States v. Gunter, we held that a sentencing court need not, in a “point-by-point” fashion, respond to each mitigation argument offered by a defendant. 620 F.3d 642, 646–47 (6th Cir.2010). Instead, a reviewing court must only be satisfied that the sentencing “court ․ conduct[ed] a meaningful sentencing hearing and truly consider[ed] the defendant's arguments.” Id. at 646 (citing United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219, 226–27 (6th Cir.2010) (Martin, J., concurring)). The sentencing hearing in this case meets this requirement.
Nor is Odeh's sentence substantively unreasonable on the basis that the district court did not accord sufficient weight to Odeh's age, PTSD, social work, and torture. Our review for substantive reasonableness involves a “totality of the circumstances [analysis] .” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A presumption of reasonableness attaches to sentences, like Odeh's eighteen-month sentence, that are within the Guidelines range. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc). Odeh cannot rebut this presumption, because the district court thoroughly considered Odeh's history and characteristics in imposing the sentence. The court noted that although Odeh's history “include[s] some terrorist[ ] activities,” she had “been involved in doing a lot of good work[ ] in helping Arab immigrant women in the Chicago area” in the recent past and had been “reformed.” The court further acknowledged that it had received letters from people across the United States on Odeh's behalf, and the court commended Odeh for her social work. Notwithstanding Odeh's social work and reputation, however, the court noted that “Odeh lied under oath to get an immigration visa and to become a U.S. Citizen,” and found that she perjured herself on the stand and refused to follow the court's instructions about off-limits topics. Finally, the court stated that although the case had been politicized by Odeh, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was irrelevant because the case was about Odeh unlawfully procuring citizenship. In sum, the court properly considered Odeh's history, social work, and other relevant characteristics, as well as the remaining § 3553(a) factors.
Odeh's last argument is that the district court should have taken into account the fact that her citizenship would be revoked. No court, however, has required a sentencing court to consider the possibility of a defendant's deportation at sentencing. In fact, some courts have held that doing so is categorically impermissible. See United States v. Chin Chong, No. 13–CR570, 2014 WL 4773978, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.24, 2014) (recognizing split of authority). We have previously held that some consequences of a conviction—such as legal fees, the loss of a professional license, or the fact of a felony conviction—are impermissible factors for courts to consider. United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir.2014). Although we have not yet addressed whether deportation is a permissible factor, this question need not be decided in this case; even if Odeh's deportation is a permissible factor, the sentence was reasonable. As explained earlier in this opinion, Odeh's middle-of-the-range sentence was based on the district court's thorough review of the statutory factors. In United States v. Samayoa–Baltazar, an unpublished decision, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly address deportation at sentencing, because the district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. 436 F. App'x 620, 626 (6th Cir.2011). Moreover, limiting punishment to deportation would be unacceptable, according to the district court in this case, because this “would not serve any kind of deterrence.” The sentencing hearing was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice.” Unfair prejudice results from evidence which tends “to suggest decision on an improper basis, [such as] an emotional one.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The military tribunal indictment states that Odeh “placed explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem[ ] with the intention of causing death or injury.” R. 186–6 (Military Tribunal Indictment) (Page ID # 2632). It then states that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of Leon Kannar and Edward Jaffee, May Their Memory Be a Blessing, as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Id. The first statement—describing Odeh's actions and intent—does not require redaction. It has considerable probative value and there is little risk of unfair prejudice. The second statement does require redaction. The victims' names and the prayer have no probative value—they are wholly unnecessary. What is more, the danger of unfair prejudice is significant. The names and the prayer give color and texture to the bombing, so that it becomes both more real and more difficult to separate from the instant offense. They provide exactly the kind of detail likely to provoke a visceral reaction. This is too much for a limiting instruction to overcome. An admissible statement would be that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of [two people], as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Id.
But if this case is only about lying under oath, then I cannot see how allowing any of the objected-to portions of the Israeli indictment to go before the jury was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. As Judge Moore points out, the names of the victims and the prayer have almost no probative value and present a serious danger of unfair prejudice. Likewise, proving that Odeh lied under oath, and even that that lie was “material,” would not require evidence that she was charged with “plac[ing] explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem ․ with the intention of causing death or injury.” The risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence was enormous, especially since Odeh was not permitted to testify at trial about her claims of torture. The word “terrorist” may never have been uttered before the jury, but it was doubtless in the minds of everyone present.
R. 66 at PageID # 593.1 The majority's summary conclusion that Odeh's constitutional arguments have “no bearing” on the admissibility of the Israeli documents under the MLAT because “the jury was tasked with deciding only whether the elements of § 1425(a) had been met” is likewise inadequate. Maj. Op. supra at 14. That evidence was used not only to prove that Odeh in fact had been arrested, charged, convicted, and imprisoned, but also that she was not a person of good moral character.
ROGERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court and an opinion in Part II.b, in which MOORE, J., joined in part and in the judgment in part, and BATCHELDER, J., joined in part. MOORE, J. (pp. 19–20), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment in part. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 21–24), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


The Cuban American Bar Association (“CABA”) is aware of the excursion to Cuba organized by SimplyCLE for September 2018. After reviewing the itinerary for the trip, many of our members have expressed concerns about the nature of the travel being provided.
Of particular concern is SimplyCLE’s marketing of this CLE as a “vacation,” stating in its materials that “this is a vacation after all.” As you should be aware, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the US Department of the Treasury regulates all travel to Cuba. OFAC provides regulations for travelling to Cuba pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, (“CACR”). The regulations allow for travel under specific circumstances (e.g., Family visits (see 31 C.F.R. § 515.561)); official business of U.S. government, foreign government and certain intergovernmental organizations (see § 515.562); journalistic activity (see § 515.563); professional research (see § 515.564); educational activities (see § 515.565); religious activities (see § 515.566); public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions (see § 515.567); support for the Cuban people (see § 515. 574); and humanitarian projects (see § 515.575); etc.). “[V]acationing” in Cuba does not qualify under any of these approved exceptions.
Severely Restricted Freedom of Speech. The Cuban government controls virtually all media outlets in Cuba and restricts access to outside information. While a small number of journalist manage to communicate information, the Cuban government blocks access to where that information is published. Then, to the extent the government considers the communications critical of the Cuban government, the journalists are subjected to smear campaigns and arbitrary arrests.
Imprisonment and Political Prisoners. Persons who criticize the regime are charged with crimes, denied due process, and imprisoned. Judicial independence does not exist as the courts are subordinated to the government. As of May 2017, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported scores of political prisoners—including 54 members of the group Cuban Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica de Cuba).3 For instance, Dr. Eduardo Cardet Concepción, leader of the Christian Liberation Movement (Movimiento Cristiano Liberación), was sentenced three years in prison on March 20.4 He was detained on November 2016 after criticizing in interviews with international media former President Fidel Castro shortly after he died.
CABA realizes that there has been a significant change in United States policy toward Cuba over the last few years, despite established facts confirming that the regime is just as totalitarian, just as intolerant, and just as repressive as ever. Therefore, we urge SimplyCLE as well at its clients who choose to visit the island to do so not because they are, in reality, being offered a fun-filled island vacation with rides through the crumbling remains of a once world-class city in vintage American ‘50’s convertibles, but because they want to make a meaningful contribution to the establishment of a freely-elected government that not only respects the rights of its citizens, but is held accountable to them. We ask our colleagues to keep in mind, as they exercise their freedom and right to embark on this journey, that Cuba continues to be a repressive dictatorship and its people are not free, and more particularly, is a country where our brothers and sisters in the law are routinely muzzled and unable to freely practice our beloved profession.
Additionally, in order to promote liberty and freedom for the Cuban people, we suggest that the travelers take time to meet with members of the Cuban dissident movement, human rights activists, and others fighting for freedom in Cuba. To that end, we suggest meetings with, among others: the Damas en Blanco (The Ladies in White), a dissident group comprised of the wives and mothers of Cuban political prisoners who march through Havana in protest every Sunday after attending Catholic mass, resulting in their arrest and detention on an almost weekly basis; Antonio Rodiles, head of Estado de SATS (a forum which was created in July 2010 to encourage debate on social, cultural and political issues in Cuba), who organized and submitted a petition to Cuba’s National Assembly demanding that the Cuban Government ratify international covenants on human, civil, and economic rights, and who was savagely beaten by Cuban agents in July of 2015, a few days before the opening of the U.S. embassy in Cuba; Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, who received a U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom for his efforts promoting human rights in Cuba; Jorge Garcia Perez Antunez, a former Amnesty International prisoner of conscience and human rights activist; and, Ivan Hernandez Carrillo, a former Amnesty International prisoner of conscience and labor leader.
On behalf of CABA, thank you for your consideration in this matter. Should you wish to discuss any of this in greater detail, please feel free to contact me.
5 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014, Cuba http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/cuba?page=1 (accessed June 24, 2018).


D.C. Law Library - § 47–1361. Required payments; notice to purchaser; certificate of redemption.
↪ § 47–1361. Required payments; notice to purchaser; certificate of redemption.
§ 47–1360. Right of redemption.
§ 47–1362. Fixing amount necessary for redemption after action to foreclose filed.
§ 47–1361. Required payments; notice to purchaser; certificate of redemption.
(8) If judgment of foreclosure of the right of redemption of the sale is set aside, the reasonable value, at the date of the judgment, of all reasonable improvements made on the real property by the purchaser and the purchaser’s successors in interest, subject to § 47-1363.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, payment of all real property tax liens and permitted accruals assigned or sold and transferred to third parties under § 47-1303.04 shall be required before a person may redeem under this chapter.
(b-1) The redeeming party shall not be required to pay any tax that is required to be certified by § 47-1340 unless the tax has been certified by a taxing agency and appears on a real property tax bill or notice that was mailed to the real property's owner as indicated on the tax roll to the owner's mailing address on the tax roll.
(b-2) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the remaining amounts that are payable to the Mayor, including tax, interest, penalties, and expenses, for the real property shall be deemed to have been brought current for purposes of redemption if, at any time, the balance falls below $100; provided, that the remaining balance shall remain due and owing and any remaining expense shall be thereafter deemed a real property tax.
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section may apply more than once if the real property has been sold or bid off more than once.
(d)(1) Subject to the liability threshold set forth in subsection (b-2) of this section, after receipt of the payment set forth in subsection (a)(1) through (6) of this section, the Mayor shall notify the purchaser of the payment. The purchaser shall receive from the Mayor the refund to which the purchaser is entitled, subject to the purchaser’s compliance with all procedures for issuance of the refund, as may be established by the Mayor.
(2) If a complaint under § 47-1370 has been properly filed, a purchaser may continue to prosecute the complaint until receipt of the expenses owed to the purchaser and payable to the purchaser by the redeeming party as set forth in subsection (a)(6A) of this section, but shall dismiss the complaint upon receipt thereof.
(3) A complaint to foreclose the right of redemption shall not be maintained solely to await the administrative refund under this subsection.
(4) Notification by the Mayor under this subsection may be accomplished by making the information publicly available through an electronic medium, including by posting on a website.
(e) Upon request, within 60 days of the request, the Mayor shall execute and deliver to the person redeeming the real property a certificate of redemption, which may be recorded in the Recorder of Deeds and, when recorded, shall release any encumbrance created by the recording of the certificate of sale. The Recorder of Deeds shall waive all fees relating to the recordation of a certificate of redemption.
(f) The Mayor may abate interest or penalties or compromise taxes, whether arising before or after the tax sale, in the same manner as set forth in § 47-811.04; provided, that the abatement or compromise shall not affect the refund due to the purchaser.
This section is referenced in § 47-1073, § 47-1348, § 47-1382, and § 47-4655.
D.C. Law 14-42, in subsec. (a)(1), made a nonsubstantive change.
D.C. Law 14-282 made nonsubstantive changes in subsec. (a)(1).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-262 added (a)(5A).
The 2014 amendment by D.C. Law 20-141, repealed before its effective date, would have substituted “the Mayor, except as set forth in paragraph (6A) of this subsection, for deposit” for “the Mayor, for deposit” in the introductory language of (a); rewrote (a)(2) and (a)(3); deleted “provided, that the certificate of sale of the purchaser is not void” from the end of (a)(4); rewritten (a)(5); added (a)(5A); rewritten (a)(6); added (a)(6A); repealed (a)(7); added (b-1) and (b-2); deleted the last sentence in (c); rewritten (d) and (e); and would have added (f).
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 20-155 added “except as set forth in paragraph (6A) of this subsection” in the introductory language of (a); rewrote (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6); deleted “provided, that the certificate of sale of the purchaser is not void” from the end of (a)(4); added (a)(5A) and (a)(6A); repealed (a)(7); added (b-1) and (b-2); deleted the former second sentence in (c), which read “In such case, the person redeeming shall pay all required amounts to satisfy the purchasers and the District”; rewrote (d); in (e), substituted “within 60 days of the request” for “and subject to the payment of a fee” and added the last sentence; and added (f).
The 2015 amendment by D.C. Law 21-36 substituted “subsection (b-2)” for “subsection (b-1)” in (d)(1).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7093(c)(3) of Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-458, Oct. 3, 2018, 65 DCR 11212).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7093(c)(3) of Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-434, July 30, 2018, 65 DCR 8200).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 101(c)(20) of the Residential Real Property Equity and Transparency Emergency Amendment Act of 2014, (D.C. Act 20-342, May 28, 2014, 61 DCR 5691).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7112(c)(19) of the Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-377, July 14, 2014, 61 DCR 7598, 20 STAT 3696).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 101(c)(20) of the Residential Real Property Equity and Transparency Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-409, Aug. 1, 2014, 61 DCR 8281).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7102(c)(19) of the Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-449, October 10, 2014, 61 DCR 10915, 20 STAT 4188).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7102(c)(19) of the Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Support Second Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-566, January 9, 2015, 62 DCR 884, 21 STAT 541).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 7016(v)(13) and (y)(2) of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-127, July 27, 2015, 62 DCR 10201).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 12(nn) of Tax Clarity and Recorder of Deeds Temporary Act of 2002 (D.C. Law 14-191, October 5, 2002, law notification 49 DCR 9549).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 12(nn) of Tax Clarity and Related Amendments Temporary Act of 2003 (D.C. Law 14-228, March 23, 2003, law notification 50 DCR 2741).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(r)(14) of the Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Support Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Law 20-179, March 7, 2015, 62 DCR 424).


1. The fact that an exercise of the police power forbidding certain forms of advertising by dentists will interfere with existing contracts for display signs and press notices does not touch the validity of the regulation. P. 294 U. S. 610.
2. A regulation of dentists is not invalid as to them because it does not extend to other professional classes. P. 294 U. S. 610.
3. A regulation preventing dentists from advertising their professional superiority and their prices; from use of certain forms of advertising signs; from use of advertising solicitors or publicity agents; from advertising free dental work, free examinations, guaranteed work, and painless operations, held valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, without regard to the truthfulness of the representations or the benefit of the services advertised. P. 294 U. S. 611.
4. It is within the authority of the State to estimate the baleful effects of such advertising, and to protect the community not only against deception, but against practices which, though they may be free from deception in particular instances, tend nevertheless to lower the standards of the profession and demoralize it. P. 294 U. S. 612.
148 Ore. 50; 34 P.2d 311, affirmed.
Appeal from the affirmance of a judgment dismissing the complaint in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a statutory regulation of dentists.
"advertising professional superiority or the performance of professional services in a superior manner; advertising prices for professional service; advertising by means of large display, glaring light signs, or containing as a part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work or any portion of the human head; employing or making use of advertising solicitors of free publicity press agents; or advertising any free dental work, or free examination; or advertising to guarantee any dental service, or to perform any dental operation painlessly."
Plaintiff, a dentist practicing in Portland, Or., brought this suit in the state court against the members of the State Board of Dental Examiners to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, alleging that it was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of § 10, cl. 1, Article I of the Constitution of the United States. The circuit court, overruling this contention, sustained a demurrer to the complaint and, upon the refusal of plaintiff to plead further, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the state took the same view of the federal question and affirmed the judgment. 34 P.2d 311. The case comes here on appeal.
he had represented that he had a high degree of efficiency and was able to perform his professional services in a superior manner; that he had stated the prices he would charge, had offered examinations of prospective patients without charge, and had also represented that he guaranteed all his dental work and that his dental operations were performed painlessly. He further alleged that the statements in his advertisements were truthful and were made in good faith; that, by these methods, he had developed a large and lucrative practice; that, through long training and experience, he had acquired ability superior to that of the great majority of practicing dentists; that he had been able to standardize office operations, to purchase supplies in large quantities and at relatively low prices, and thus to establish a uniform schedule of charges for the majority of operations; also, that he had made contracts for display signs and for advertisements in newspapers, and had entered into other engagements of which he would be unable to take advantage if the legislation in question were sustained, and, in that event, his business would be destroyed or materially impaired.
Plaintiff is not entitled to complain of interference with the contracts he describes, if the regulation of his conduct as a dentist is not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power of the state. His contracts were necessarily subject to that authority. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 240 U. S. 363; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n, 248 U. S. 372, 248 U. S. 375-376; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 286 U. S. 391; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 287 U. S. 276. Nor has plaintiff any ground for objection because the particular regulation is limited to dentists, and is not extended to other professional classes. The state was not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way. It could deal with the different professions according to the needs of the public in relation to each.
We find no basis for the charge of an unconstitutional discrimination. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 218 U. S. 179; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 236 U. S. 384; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 271 U. S. 43; Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 288 U.S. 588.
The question is whether the challenged restrictions amount to an arbitrary interference with liberty and property, and thus violate the requirement of due process of law. That the state may regulate the practice of dentistry, prescribing the qualifications that are reasonably necessary, and to that end may require licenses and establish supervision by an administrative board, is not open to dispute. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425, 272 U. S. 427. The state may thus afford protection against ignorance, incapacity and imposition. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 129 U. S. 122; Graves v. Minnesota, supra. We have held that the state may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal obligations of individuals (State Board of Dental Examiners v. Miller, 90 Colo.193, 8 P. 2d 699; Miller v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 287 U.S. 563), and that it may prohibit advertising that tends to mislead the public in this respect. Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 363, 182 N.E. 16; 288 U.S. 588.
Recognizing state power as to such matters, appellant insists that the statute in question goes too far because it prohibits advertising of the described character, although it may be truthful. He contends that the superiority he advertises exists in fact that, by his methods, he is able to offer low prices and to render a beneficial public service contributing to the comfort and happiness of a large number of persons.
willing to abide by the ethics of their profession often resorted to such advertising methods "to lure the credulous and ignorant members of the public to their offices for the purpose of fleecing them." The legislature was aiming at "bait advertising." "Inducing patronage," said the court, "by representations of painless dentistry,' `professional superiority,' `free examinations,' and `guaranteed' dental work" was, as a general rule, "the practice of the charlatan and the quack to entice the public."
We do not doubt the authority of the state to estimate the baleful effects of such methods and to put a stop to them. The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities, but with the vital interest of public health, and with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards of conduct from those which are traditional in the competition of the market place. The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards which will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but protection against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring promises of physical relief. And the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.
It is no answer to say, as regards appellant's claim of right to advertise his "professional superiority" or his "performance of professional services in a superior manner," that he is telling the truth. In framing its policy, the legislature was not bound to provide for determinations of the relative proficiency of particular practitioners.
The legislature was entitled to consider the general effects of the practices which it described, and if these effects were injurious in facilitating unwarranted and misleading claims, to counteract them by a general rule even though, in particular instances, there might be no actual deception or misstatement. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 184 U. S. 429; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 226 U. S. 201; Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297, 248 U. S. 303; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 248 U. S. 500; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 272 U. S. 388-389.