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ANIL DEV SINGH, C.J .;- By this writ petition, which has been filed by way of a Public Interest Litigation the following reiefs have been claimed.
 that cost of the petition be awarded to the petitioner."
 The petitioner is aggrieved by the inaction of the respondents, since they allegedly failed to implement the provisions of the Waste (Prevention and Control of Pollution) act, 1974 (for short, "the Act") and they were not able to check the construction and growth of the unauthorised factories, responsible for discharging toxic wastes and effluents into the canal and on land, and it is pointed out in the petition that several unauthorised industries/factories have been set up in large numbers at Sanganer in Villages, Gujron-ki-Talai, Haryawala, Resyawala and Muhana. These factories/Industries, which have been set up in these areas, are situated along the canal from Sanganer Anicut to Newata Dam. According to the petitioner, the factories/industries have been set up and some are in the process of being set up and some are in the process of being set up on agricultural land, without prior permission. The factories are carrying on business of dyeing and printing of cloth. The prints created by them are called Sanganere Prints and are famous worl over. While they bring glory to the country at the same time, the factories/industries discharge toxic substances, namely, acids, chemicals, colours, bleaching powders etc., in the aforesaid canal. Bulk of the factories have not installed any pollution control devices with the result that the canal water is being polluted. The canal, carrying poisonous effluents, leads in Newata Dam. This dam was constructed for utilizing its water for irrigation as well as drinking purposes. According to the petitioner, the effluents, reaching the dam, through canal, are causing serious health hazards and are also causing irreparable injury to the environment, man and animals etc.
 Half of the effluent is contributed by discharge of domestic as well as industrial effluents from Wards Nos.8,9 and 10 of Sanganer, into Amani Shah Nalah, which leads to Glar Dam. The water of Gular Dem is used for irrigation purposes. The remaining half of the effluent from these wards, is discharged into natural cavity known as Pili Khana, located near Jaipur-Sawaimadhopur Railway Line.
 Domestic as well as industrial effluent from the western part of Sanganer Town is discharged into drains, which leads to Kumawal-ki-Dhani, near Jaipur Diggi Railway Line.
 The effluents from the industries, situated in Khatri Colony on New Sanganer Road, is discharged into open land, since there is no drainage system.
 None of the industries to Sanganer has installed an effluent treatment plant.
 The problem is compounded by mixing of domestic and industrial effluents, which lead to the water sources and open land.
 The Pollution Control Board also came to the conclusion that till the CETP was set up, the State Government should not permit any new textile industries to be established and the industries, situated in residential areas, should be shifted to industrial areas. According to the Board, it informed the administrator, Municipal Board, Sanganer, in the year 1985 that a number of industries were working within the municipal limits and they were discharging highly polluted effluents in the canal. It was also pointed out to the Municipal Board that apart from the industrial effluent, untreated sewage from residential colonies in the town was also being discharged. The Board even complained about the improper drainage system. It emphasized that according to the Municipal Act, it was the statutory responsibility of the Municipal Board, to take measures, to control and prevent pollution and provide for proper drainage system, in order to obviate danger to health of the public. The Municipal Board was advised that the industries, working within the municipal limits should be asked to shift to planned industrial areas. In case the shifting of industries was not possible, then, to that case, the Municipal Board should make arrangements for the treatment of the effluents, which were being discharged to the industries and domestic sewage.
 After reply of the respondent No.3, this Court, on 20-9-95, passed an order, directing respondent No.s3 and 6, to issue suitable orders to the industries, to obtain permission from the polution Central Board, within 45 days from the passing of the said order and in case, the Factories set up failed to produce the required permission before the respondents, they should restrain the factories from operating.
 It seems that after the aforesaid direction, the Sanganer Kapda Sangai & Chhappal Association (for short, 'the Association'), respondent No.8 felt threatened and filed its reply to the writ petition on 15-1-1996. In the reply, it is submitted that the entire dyeing and printing units are home industries, which were established hundreds of years back. These industries are providing jobs to lakhs of people, who were not having any source of income, except from these small units. It is pointed out that there are two types of industries namely dyeing & printing and washing units. The washing units are ten percent of the total units, which have been set up on the bank of Amanishah Nalla. These industries, according to the reply, are not adjacent to Anicut or the dam, referred to in the writ petition. It is also pointed out therein that in dyeing and printing units, water is not used to the extent it is used in washing units. The reply denies the fact that the units were discharging any effluent from its premises into any stream sewer, Well or on land. It is, however, conceded that the washing units which are established on the bank of Amanishah Nalla, are discharging the effluents into the stream. At the same time, it is stated that the said Nalla carries the dirt of the entire city. In so far as the polluted Gulhar Dam is concerned. It is stated that the Sam was broken in the year 1981, and there is no water either in the Sanganer Anicut or in the Newata Dam. The reply refers to the fact that the work of the units is highly acclaimed world over. The industries transact business worth crores of rupees. As a result thereof, the Government is earning foreign exchange. It is emphasized that dyeing and printing work is in the nature of 'kutir udyog' employing a large number of people. The reply refutes the allegation that any toxic substances were being discharged by the industries, in the Newata Dam or in the canal. According to respondent No.8 no provision of Section 25 of the Act, is being violated. In fact, the chemicals, used in printing, go to Amanishah Nalla and decompose the dirt, which is carried by the Nalla and this decomposition makes the water usable for agricultural purposes.
 In compliance with the aforesaid order of this Court, dated 20-9-1995, respondent No.3 filed an affidavit, to place before the Court, the action, taken by it. It is pointed out by respondent No.3 that initially, it identified 86 units, which were operating without the consent of the Pollution Control Board, in Gujron-ki-Talai Hajyawala, Keshyawala and Mohana. This area is being referred by respondent No.3 as the polluted area. The affidavit further goes on to state that the Board issued notices under Section 25 of the Act to the aforesaid 86 units, directing them to forthwith apply for the consent of the Pollution Control Board. Out of these units, 42 units situated in the polluted area, filed consent applications, which were refused by the Board, on the ground that none of the units had pollution control plant, for treating the effluent, which was being discharged by them. The Pollution Control Board, in compliance with the above mentioned order, dated 20-9-1995, issued directions under the provisions of Section 33-A of the Act. The Board also identified 20 more units, which were responsible for causing pollution. Respondent No.3 issued directions to the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (for short 'RSEB'), the disconnect the electricity of the defaulting units, which were operating in the polluted area.
 It seems that due to the action of the Pollution Control Board, respondent No.3, the Association filed a further affidavit, on 26-11-1997 and stated that the "Industry" which falls under the category of 'kutir udyog', has remained in the unorganized sector and owing to neglect of the State Government as well as Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (for short "RHCO"), small entrepreneurs set up their industries in Khatri Nagar, Jaipur Gate and Muhana Road, as early is in the year 1979, it is claimed that the Industries Department was approached by the entrepreneurs, for allotment of industrial plots, to carry out their business activities. About 72 entrepreneurs had proceeded to deposit demand drafts, ranging from Rs.500/- to 1000/- as security money, with the predecessor of RHCO, for allotment of plots. The members of the Association were given assurance that they would be allotted industrial plots in the Mahiya Nagar Industrial Area, but no allotments were made to them. On 27-4-1984, an advertisement was issued in the 'Rajasthan Patrika', giving details of the decision of the RUCO, to develop Sanganer Industrial area, to provide plots for the units. In spite of the advertisement, no progress was made either by the State Government, or by the RHCO. At the same time the dyeing and printing units continued, to proliferate in Sanganer and Muhana Road areas, due to growing demand for employment and Sanganer prints worldwide. On 16-9-96, after a gap of about 12 years, again RUCO invited pre-qualification bids, for consultancy work, to set up an area, for dyeing and printing units in Jaipur. The affidavit claims that a meeting was held between the representatives of the Pollution Control Board and members of the ?Association, with regard to the problem of Pollution. According to the affidavit, it was accepted by the Pollution Control Board that due to inadequacies of spaces and cost factor in setting up individual effluent treatment plants, the only workable and realistic solution was setting up by RHCO, or by other State agencies, of a central effluent treatment plant at the terminus of Amanishah Nalla. At a meeting subsequently held between the same parties on 31-5-1995, it was decided that a detailed survey and assessment shall be undertaken for finding out the extent of pollution caused by the industry and the representaqtives of various Government bodies, connected with the control of pollution be called, to discuss the matter, with the representatives of the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (for short, "NEERI"). Sampling of ground water in and around Sanganer, was also agreed to be carried out. At the meeting, it was suggested that industries, located in Khatri Nagar, near RHCO industrial area in Sanganer be also included in the RHCO industrial area and a CETP be provided for the industries. The affidavit goes on to state that a representation was addressed by the Association on 15-10-1996, to the Minister for Industries and Deputy Chief Minister, Rajasthan, wherein, it was requested that developmental work be undertaken to Khatri Nagar. Jaipur Gate and Muhana Road, for ensuring all round improved environment. The demand for CETP was reiterated. On 17-11-1995 a meeting was held amongst the members of the Association, Minister for Industries, Deputy Chief Minister and the Chariman of the Pollution Control Board. The Chairman, Pollution control Board, suggested that a survey be conducted, by NEDERI, to study the level of pollution in the area and that an environmental policy be also formulated for future. A proposal was also noted for evaluating the possibility of setting up of an industrial area, after making it proper survey in the year 1996, a survey of the dyeing and printing units, was carried out, by the Department of Industries. A report was prepared, in which, it was suggested that Khatri Nagar, Jaipur Gate and Ganesh Mohalla, which are situated near the Sanganer Industrial area be declared as industrial area. It is candidly admitted that the report, referred to the fact that the discharge of the water, used by the printing and dyeing units in the area, was being discharged through the drain of Amanishah Nalla. As regards the question of control of pollution, it was suggested that a Pukka drain be built and a CETP be constructed by the State Government.; Besides, it was suggested that the units be allotted plots in a separate zone, after the same is developed by the RUCO. The report also made recommendations to the effect that concrete steps be taken in developing dyeing and printing industry, which had contributed substantially to the economy of Jaipur.
 In the aforesaid affidavit, it is also pointed out that RUCO had announced setting up of an exclusive dyeing and printing sector, in its industrial estate in Shikarpur (Sanganer) and setting up of a CETP in the same industrial estate. The members of the Association were willing to shift to the new industrial area being set up by the RUCO and make payment at par with the dyers and printers of Pali, for setting up of the CETP.
 The Association, respondent No.8 filed a further affidavit even on 10-5-2001. In that affidavit, it was, inter alia, stated that a letter dated 12-10-1988, was addressed by the Member-Secretary of the Pollution Control Board, to the Managing Director, RHCO wherein, it was stated that there was necessary of setting up of a combined community effluent treatment plant at Sanganer and Bagroo etc. And in industrial areas, developed by RHCO. In the affideavit, reference was also made to the letter dated 21-5-1981, of the Director, Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India, New Delhi, wherein, it was stated that it was the responsibility of RUCO to provide combined effluent treatment in its industrial area. The affidavit has also referred to the letter, dated 30-1-1991, of the Pollution Control Board, to the Secretary, Environment, Government of Rajasthan, on the subject of problem of water pollution, caused by the Rangal & Chhapal Industry in Sanganer, in which, it was emphasized that in case, immediate steps were not taken, to combat the probblem of pollution, it would lead to serious problems. The affidavit asserted that the Association addressed a letter to RHCO, stating that it was conscious of the need to check pollution and was in the process of setting up the first effluent treatment plant at the premises of M/s.Glammour House, Madrampura. According to the affidavit the plant was being set up, with the help of Rajasthan Chamber and Swiss Developmental Corporation, Switzerland. It was requested that the entire area in Sananer be declared an Industrial area and developmental charges as also conversion charges be collected on such change of users and the charges could be utilized for setting up of a common effluent treatment plant. The members of the Association would be willing to contribute for the maintenance and running of the plant. It was pointed out in the affidavit that the National Productivity Council was working on waste minimization programme, in the process of dyeing and printing, in collaboration with German Technology Corporation and on the recommendation of the National Productivity Council. The process, undertaken in the case of dyeing and printing was being modified and altered to reduce the utilization of water, chemicals and colours in the process of dyeing and printing and thereby minimising the pollution of the environment. It was asserted therein that use of alum and lime as primary effluent treatment agent was being resourted to neutralize acids, salts, dyes etc. In the effluent, which was being discharged by the units.
 On 2-8-95, respondent No.5 Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, filed a short reply, stating that the petitioner has no case, for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. It was also averred that the petitioner had not given the particulars of the unauthorized factories. We may note that the reply on merits was not a detailed one and was perfunctory in nature.
"The vegetables so produced are consumed by human beings resulting into a number of health hazards. Preliminary survey and interviews of factory owners, workers, local people and private [medical] practitioners revealed that the people are suffering from eezema, contact dermatitis, asthma, chromic bronchitis, tuberculosis, haematuma, bladdedr cancer etc. Due to either physical condition or drinking polluted water."
12A. While the industry is contributing to the economy of the State, at the same time. It is destroying the environment. No worthwhile steps have been taken for sustainable development. It is only a very small number of units, which may have set up CETPs recently. In the past, they had also been polluting the canal. Each one of the units has contributed to pollution and is liable to pay pollution fine.
 In ancient India, mountains were venerated, they being sources of rivers, flora fauna and various other life sustaining materials, and habitats for birds and animals. People were aware of the great usefulness of the mountains in helping cloud formation and ultimate breaking of rains over parched lands, rendering them fertile to satisfy the need of the human brings and animals, for food.
 Similarly, rivers were worshipped, since they provide life-giving elixir, called water. Some of the rivers are still being considered sacred, as without them, there would be no existence, as water is needed by all living forms. The descent of Ganga from the heavens and Lord Shiva, taking heavy fall of its waters on his matted hair to prevent deluge on earth, signifies the compassion of the Lord for its creation and the importance of water in our daily lives. It also signifies its purity and sacred character. Something which touched the Lord, must be kept pure was the message in the depiction of the Ganga falling on the hair of the Lord, before touching the ground.
 In ancient India, trees were also worshipped. This was the old environmental prudence of the people. Not so long age, the so-called modern world laughed at the practice and termed it as "blind faith" of the back word, uneducated and naive people, even the awakened world was actually not aware of the significance of the practice. It has now dawned on them that this was for the preservation of the trees, which are so essential for our existence. The trees give out oxygen and take away carbon dioxide. They clean the air - the breath of life. They also prevent soil erosion and floods.
 Let there be peace in all directions.
 Let there be peace in medicinal herbs.
 Let there be peace in vegetation.
 Let there be peace in God.
 Let there be peace in places.
 Let there be peace in creations.
 Let there be peace - uninterrupted, only peace and ever-lasting peace and profound peace.
 In the past, man understood nature better. He preserved and protected the same. For its kindness, he used to prostrate before it. Gratitude was expressed by feeling of love and admiration for nature. In contrast, today, nature is being plundered. For short-term gains, the kindness of mountains is being returned by denuding them of trees fauna and flora. Birds and animals are being killed. Man is not mindful of the fact that trees are the very life-time of human existence.
 How can there be peace, which was conceived by Atharvaveda, when the five elements are being polluted.
"The rivers are our brothers, they quench our thirst. The rivers carry our canoes and feed our children. If we sell you our land you must remember, and teach your children that the rivers are our brothers and yours and you must henceforth give the kindness you would give any brother.
We know that the white man does not understand our ways. One portion of land is the same to him as the next, for he is a strange who comes in the night and takes from the land whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and when he has conquered it, he moves on. He leaves his father's graves behind, and he does not care.
He kidnaps the earth from his children. His father's grave and his children's birth-right are forgotten. He treats his mother, the earth and his brother, the sky as things to be bought, plundered, sold like sheep or bright beads. His appetile will devour the earth and leave behind only a desert.
There is no quiet place in the white man's cities. No place to hear the unfurling of leaves in spring or the rustle of an insect's wings. But perhaps it is because I am a savage and do not understand. The clatter only seems to insult the ears. And what is there in life if a man cannot hear the lonely cry of the whippoor will or the arguments of the frogs around a pond at night? I am a red man and do not understand. The Indian prefers the soft sound of the wind darting over the face of a pond, and the smell of the wind itself, cleansed by a midday rain, or scented with the pinon pipe.
The air is precious to the red man, for all things have the same breath - the beast the tree, the man, they all share the same breath. The while man does not seem to notice the air he breathes. Like a man lying for many days, he is numb to the strench . But if we sell you our land, you must remember that the air is precious to us, that the air shares its spirit with all the life it supports. The wind that gave our grant father his first breath also receives the last sigh. And if we sell you our land, you must keep it apart and sacred as a place where even the white man can go to taste the wind that is sweetened by the meadow's flowers.
So we will consider your offer to buy our land. If we decide to accept, I will make one condition. The white man must treat the beasts of this land as his brothers.
I am a savage and I do not understand any other way. I have seen a thousand rotting buggaloes on the prairie, life by the white man who shot them from a passing train. I am a savage and I do not understand how the smoking iron horse can be more important than the buffalo that we kill only to stay alive.
What is man without the beasts> If all the beasts were gone, man would die from a gtreat loneliness of spirit . For whatever happens to the beasts soon happens to man. All things are connected.
You must teach your children that the ground beneath their feet is the ashes of our grandfathers. So that they will respect the land. Tell your children that we have taught our children, that the earth is our mother. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. If man spit upon the ground they spit upon themselves.
This we know: The earth does not belong to man; man belongs to the earth. This we know; All things are connected like the blood which unites one family. All things are connected.
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. Man did not weave the web of life; he is merely a stand in it. Whatever he does to the web he does to himself.
Even the white man, whose God walks and talks with him as friend to friend cannot be exempt from the common destiny. We may be brothers after all. We shall see. One thing we know, which the white man may one day discover - our God is the same God. You may think now that you own Him as you wish to own our land; but you cannot. Her is the God of Man, and His compassion is equal for the red man and the white. This earth is precious to Him, and to harm the earth is to heap contempt on its Creator. The white too shall pass: perhaps sooner than all other tribes. Contaminate your bed and you will one night suffocate in your own waste.
But in your perishing you will shine brightly, fired by the strength of the God who brought you this land and for some special purpose gave you dominion over this land and over the red man. That destiny is a mystery to us, for we do not understand when the wild buffaloes are all slaughtered, the wild horses are tamed, the secret corners of the forest heavy with scent of many men and the view of the ripe hills blotted by talking wires. Where is the thicket? Gone. Where is the eagle? Gone. The end of living and the beginning of survival."
 How close the aforesaid philosophy and thought is to the philosophy of ancient India. The concept of inter relationship and inter dependency which exists between human beings, nature and other life forms, is the essence of well being of the human race. To illustrate the point, one may give the example of a lowly earthworm. It works for human beings. It enriches the soil and makes it fertile for them to reap the benefit.
 Lord Krishna declares in eternal Geeta that God is sweet fragrance an the earth and brilliance in fire and the life-force in all beings. The true follower sees the Lord manifesting in everything. He sees God in every petal, every tree, every living being, air, water and land and makes the entire world, his family, a bond, which cannot be snapped except to the detriment of human beings. Thus, in a nuishell, there can be peace only if man acts in unison with nature and all beings, but this golden principle, in present times, has been observed more in breach than in observance. No research is required to be undertaken to see stark reality, which confronts us, at every step in this State. To illustrate the point, water bodies are being polluted. They are being made to bear the brunt of garbage and filth industrial wastes and untreated effluents. Water bodies because of deep excavation in the catchment areas and building activities are suffering from water shortage. In several areas of the State because of cutting of marbic, large tracts of land are today covered with marble powder. At some places, the soil cannot be seen because of thick layer of marble powder. In certain areas in the State, extensive mining is going on, with the result that even rocky parts of the hills have been reduced to a rubble. Unless immediate measures are taken to remove the maladies, the sufferings of childrens are bound to increase due to revishing of nature by few, in order to satisfy their insatiable passion for money. They are averse to sustainable development as they think why money should be wasted for the benefit of the environment and the society. Such narrow vision has made them forget the value of environment and ecology. They have also forgotten that man cannot survive without taking care of nature. He cannot exist without pure water and air.
 Sustainable development is being sacrificed by them at the altar of greed. Air is being polluted by particulate matters and toxins by emission from industries. Even benevolent earth, which gives so much and produces food, is being contaminated by discharge from the factories, which is laced with chemicals. There is reckless exploitation of natural resources to a point of no return. The nature is being injured and treated violently. If this treatment of nature does not stop. It will respond with equal brutality. The authorities are turning a blind eye towards the desecration of nature.
 It is time to act now, otherwise, it may be too late as even there is limit to environment's capacity, to maintain ecological balance in face of its constant desecration.
 Barbara Ward, in her book, "only one Earth. The Care and Maintenance of an Small planet", has pointed out that man inhabits two worlds. One is the natural world of plants and animals, soil, air and water, which preceded him by billions of years and of which he is a part. The other is the world of social institutions and artifacts he builds for himself, using his tools and engines, his science and his dreams to fashion the environment obedient to human purpose and directions. It seems to us that the world and the world, created by mank, can co-exist for benefit of each other. Development of the world, created by man, is extremely important, specially, in the context of this country. The process of development must be compatible with nature. He lies the importance of sustainable development.
26-A. Industrial development must be monitored, overseen and supervised by the State and its concerned organizations, constantly and closely, as it has effect on environment and its natural resources. The effect can be both, positive and negative. Positive effect sustains the environment and ecology. This will be achieved, when industry adopts pollution control devices and prevents discharge of untreated effluents into water channels and arrests particulate matters and toxins from escaping to atmosphere. On the other hand, negative effect will endanger environment. This takes place when industry discharges untreated effluents into water channels and on land and emits particulate matters and toxins. The industries have no right to degrade the environment, or pollute the rivers, lakes, water bodies and water channels or pollute the air or exploit the resources to an extent, which impair the environment.
 In A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Porof. M.V.Nayudu (Retd.) (2001) 2 SCC.62 (2000 AIR SCW 4573), the Supreme Court held that right of access to clean drinking water is fundamental rights to life.
 In the instant case when effluents are freely reaching the canal, the right of the citizens of access, to clean drinking water, is being infriged, with impunity.
 In A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V.Nayudu (Retd.) (1999) 2 SCC 718: (AIR 1999 SC 812), the Supreme Court pressed into service precautionary principle and observed that it is better to err on the side of caution and prevent environmental harm, which may indeed become irreversible. It is not necessary to wait for a scientific study of the adverse effect of effluents, which are going into the canal system. There may not be sufficient time to wait for such reports. The emphasis has shifted to action, without waiting for the scientific evidence, in order to contain the harm to the environment.
 In M.C.Mehta v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 456: (AIR 2002 SC 1696), the Supreme Court, drawing inspiration from Articles 39(e), 47 and 48A of the Constitution, declared that a duty is cast on the State to secure the health of the people and improve and protect the environment. It observed that lack of concern or effort on the part of various governmental agencies had resulted in spiralling pollution levels. Relying on its earlier decision in Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647: (AIR 1996 SC 2715), it reiterated that one of the principles underlying environmental law, is that of sustainable development. The principle requires such development to take place, which is ecologically sustainable. Two essential features of sustainable development were delineated : (a) the precautionary principle, and (b) the polluter pays principle.
 In M.C.Meha v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 715, the precautionary principle was applied, since it has been accepted as part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court held that the precautionary principle makes it mandatory for the State Government , to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. In order to protect Badkhal Lake and Surajkund from environmental degradation the Supreme Court banned construction activities with a radius of one to five kilometers therefrom.
 In M.C.Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 463 : (AIR 1988 SC 1037), theSupreme Court, in a public interest petition for prevention of pollution of the Ganges, held that the Court is entitled to issue appropriate directions to prevent effluents being discharged into the rivers. The Supreme Court proceeded against the tanneries which were discharging effluents into municipal sewerage, leading to the river. It is sued directions for the closure of those tanneries, which had falled to take immediate steps required for primary treatment of the industrial effluents. While giving directions, the Supreme Court, though conscious of the fact that closure of tanneries may bring unemployment and loss of revenue, life health and ecology was given priority and held to have greater importance for the people.
 In Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum (AIR 1996 Sc 2715) (supra), it was observed that while industries are vital, for the country's development, but having regard to pollution caused by them, principle of sustainable development must be adopted as a balancing concept. Precautionary principle and Polluter pays principle were accepted as part of the law of the country. It was held that precautionary environmental measures should be taken by the State Government and statutory authorities and lack of scientific certainty cannot be a ground for postponing such measures, where threat to ecology seems to be serious. It was also held that the polluting industries are liable to pay compensation as well as to make good the ecological damage. In that case, discharge of untreated effluents by tanneries in the State of Tamil Nadu, were rendering water from Goodar and Palar rivers, unfit for human consumption and were contaminating the ground water and spoiling the physiochemical properties of the soil, making it unfit for agricultural purposes. Such industries were interdicted to continue their operations, without setting up pollution control devices. Such industries were also saddled with pollution fine of Rs.10,000/- each. The amount was directed to be deposited in the environmental protection fund, which was directed to be utilized for compensating the affected persons and restoring the ecological balance.
 It is the fundamental right of the citzens to have pollution-free environment. Though, Article 19(1)(g) of freedom to trade and commerce, at the same time, this freedom is not an absolute one and is subject to reasonable restrictions. Any trade, or business, which is destructive of the health of the citizens, cannot be allowed to be carried on, under the banner of fundamental right. The Supreme Court, in M.C.Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (2000) 6 SCC 213 : (AIR) 2000 SC 1997), has emphasized that industry cannot be allowed to cause water pollution. Any disturbance of the basic environmental elements, namely air, water and soil, which are necessary for life, would be hazardous to life. In that case, the Court was dealing with a situation, created by dirt-element flowing into the river Beas, which was being discharged by a hotel. The Supreme Court imposed exemplary damages on the erring industry, so as to act as a deterrent for others.
 In Abhilash Textiles v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation. AIR 1988 Gujarat 57 the High Court of Gujarat held that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, confers right upon every citizen, to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business., but this fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions, which may be placed in the interest of general public as provided for in sub-clause (6) of Article 19 itself. It further held that no one has a right to carry on business so as to cause nuisance to the society. One cannot be allowed to carry on business in the manner by which, business activity becomes a health-hazard to the society. The case related to the discharge of effluent from dyeing and printing units in Rajkot. It was claimed by the petitioners that the industry was being carried on for the last 20-25 years and was generating employment to twenty to thirty thousand families. According to the petitioners, the notice to close down, was violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Rejecting the contention, the Gujarat High Court came to the conclusion that without complying with the Municipal Laws and Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the petitioner had no right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on business.
 In D.S. Rana v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. AIR 2000 Gujarat 45 the Gujarat High Court held that a trading activity, which is likely to be injurious to the health of the residents, or causes nuisance, can be totally prohibited.
 In Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamla Devi decided on 25-7-2001 (reported in AAIR 2001 SC 3215), the Supreme Court declared that material resources of the community, like forests, tanks, ponds, hillocks, mountains etc., are nature's bounty, it was recognized that they maintain delicate ecological balance and need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment, for enabling the citizens to enjoy the quality of life, which is guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution.
 In M.C.Mahta v. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms, held that closure of industries may bring unemployment and loss of revenue to the State but right to life health and ecology must be given precedence.
"Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of equality that permits a life of dignity and well-being and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations."
 Article 48-A of the Constitution of India, as a directive principle of the State Policy, provides that the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country.
 Article 51-A(g) casts duty on the citizens of India, to protect and improve the natural environment, including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures.
 In spite of Article 21, Article 48-A and Article 51-A(g) and a number of international Conventions on the subject, the decisions of the Apex Court and High Courts, still, there is a long way to cover in creating industry in this country, which is friendly to environment.
 Article 21 imposes a positive obligation on the State and authorities, created by it, to take preventive measure, to protect the ecology and environment and to conceive, anticipate and attack the causes of environmental degradation.
 Though, Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution ensures right to freedom of trade and commerce at the same time this freedom is not an absolute one and is subject to reasonable restrictions.
 All human beings have the fundamental right to unpolluted environment, pollution free water and air.
 The State is obligated to preserve and protect the environment.
 It is mandatory for the State and its agencies, to conceive, anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradations.
 The industry cannot be permitted to continue, as a matter of right, in case it creates pollution.
 The polluter must meet the cost of repairing environment and ecology and pay reparation to those, who have suffered because of the pollution, caused by him.
 Considerations of economy cannot prevail over concerns for environment and ecology.
 In view of the aforesaid legal position, we can straightway, direct closure of the industry, but, we would like to give a chance to the industry, the State and its concerned instrumentalities, to prevent the degradation of environment and ecology. The industry, the State and its agencies, including, RHCO, must set up CETPs, so that effluents are not discharged into the canals, streams and on the ground. Since the printing and dyeing industry is scattered. It may not be feasible for one CETP, to cater to the requirement, therefore, it may be necessary to set up two or three, or more CETPS, at various places depending upon the location of the industry. As the industry has been polluting the water-channels, by discharging the effluents, they must pay pollution, fine, so that the money, collected thus, is pooled for the purposes of setting up of the CETPs.
 RHCO shall develop an industrial area for dyeing and printing industry, within a period of eight months. Location of the area shall be identified and plans finalized within two months.
 The owners and proprietors of the present industrial outfits shall be given plots in the industrial area, for which, they shall pay the price, as determined by RHCO, at no profit no-loss basis.
 Each of the units, within one month, shall deposit minimum pollution fine of Rs.20,000/- with RHCO. The balance amount, depneding upon the turnover, shall be paid to RHCO, within two months. In case, pollution-fine is not paid within time, the defaulting unit shall be sealed by the respondents.
 Allotment of alternative sites shall be made only in case the pollution fine is paid by the unit-holders. With the pollution fine collected by RHCO and with its own resources and resources of the State, the CETPs shall be set up.
50. The industry, at the present location, shall stop functioning by 31-3-2004.
With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition is disposed of.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. Art.21 v.


Is “Unconfirmed” Insurance Enough to Justify a Traffic Stop?
While conducting surveillance on an illegal immigration investigation, Homeland Security agents saw a vehicle leave a residence suspected of harboring undocumented immigrants. The agents notified local police officers to be-on-the-lookout for the vehicle. While on patrol, an officer began to follow the defendant’s vehicle because it matched the description of the vehicle from Homeland Security. While following the vehicle, the local officer entered its license plate number into a computer database designed to return vehicle information such as insurance status. The computer indicated the insurance status was “unconfirmed.” Based on his experience using this system, the officer reasoned that the vehicle was most likely uninsured, which is, of course, a violation of Texas law. The officer then conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle and learned that the defendant was in the United States illegally. The officer issued the defendant citations for violating the insurance requirement and driving without a license while he waited for the Homeland Security agents to arrive.
Defendant Challenges the Stop, Arguing that the Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion.
The United States government charged the defendant with conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens. The defendant argued that the “unconfirmed” insurance status obtained from the state computer database did not provide the officer reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The trial court was unconvinced by this argument.
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that it had not yet addressed whether a state computer database indication of insurance status establishes reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. However, the court commented that the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have found that such information may give rise to reasonable suspicion as long as there is either some evidence suggesting the database is reliable or at least an absence of evidence that it is unreliable. In this case, the court followed the other circuits that have decided this issue and held that a state computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable.
5th Circuit Upholds the Stop, Finding that “Unconfirmed” Insurance Creates Reasonable Suspicion.
Here, the court found that the officer’s testimony established the reliability of the database. First, the officer explained the process for inputting license plate information. Second, the officer described how records in the database are kept and stated that he was familiar with these records. Finally, the officer testified that based on his knowledge and experience as a police officer, he knows a suspect vehicle is uninsured when an “unconfirmed” status appears because the computer system will either return an “insurance confirmed,” or “unconfirmed” response. As a result, the court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.
did not initially respond as to whether he was armed.
Further, the Court stated it is not per se objectively reasonable for a police officer to execute a pat down of a suspect for weapons simply because they are accused of drug possession.
When another officer arrived, the officers made contact with Furr. Furr was described as nervous, anxious, evasive, and was sweating excessively. Furr did not respond when the officers initially asked if he had any weapons on him. Officers said he appeared “kind of out of it” and “like he was under the influence of a drug. As a result, for safety reasons, officers frisked Furr for weapons and found a glass crack pipe in Furr’s front pocket. When removing the pipe, the officer also found two syringes, and after arrest, two small balloons of heroin.
Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal after his motion to suppress was denied. Furr argued on Appeal that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and that the trial court erred by not granting the Motion to Suppress the search.
The court of appeals held that Furr’s nervousness coupled with the observation that he seemed to be under the influence of a drug sufficiently corroborated the tip to support the investigative detention and that Furr’s failure to initially respond about being armed coupled with the other circumstances justified the frisk.
The Criminal Court of Appeals Concluded that there Was Reasonable Suspicion to Detain and Frisk Furr.
In order to detain a person, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Anything that happens or that is observed before the detention will be considered in determining whether the officer indeed had reasonable suspicion to detain Furr.
Furr and the other man were at the specified location and matched the informant’s description.
The area was a “high drug, high crime” area.
When the officers came upon Furr in the shelter he was sweaty, nervous, anxious, and appeared out of it as if he was under the influence of a drug.
Thus, the reasonable suspicion here was not solely based on the informant’s tip, but instead that tip was corroborated by independent observations made by the police officers. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Furr and investigate the information from the anonymous tip that Furr and the other man were using and possessing a drug.
The Court rejected the State’s request to adopt a rule that it is, “per se, objectively reasonable for the police to pat down a suspect for weapons if they are accused of possessing drugs,” because reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect cannot be established by accusations of drug possession alone.
The Court further rejects the State’s argument that the officer was objectively justified in patting Furr down for weapons because this was outside of a homeless shelter for two reasons: 1) Nothing in the record shows that the shelter was a homeless shelter; and 2) Even if it was a homeless shelter, the Court does not see a correlation between being armed and dangerous and being at a homeless shelter.
Even so, the Court ultimately agrees with the court of appeals that reasonable suspicion was established here because the anonymous tip was corroborated by all of the circumstances surrounding the officers’ interactions with Furr. Specifically, the Court noted the tip, personal observations by the officers and the high drug, high crime area would warrant a belief that the safety of officers and others was in danger.
Does an Officer have “Reasonable Suspicion” to Make a Traffic Stop When Vehicle Weaves Inside a Traffic Lane?
Eventually, the officer pulled Leming over, noting on the police report, the smell of liquor. Though Leming denied drinking, he said he had taken some prescription pills. Officer Gilow conducted field sobriety tests and placed Leming under arrest for DWI.
Read the full opinion in Leming v. State.
Before the trial began, Leming filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop, which was denied. At trial, Leming pled guilty to and was convicted of DWI. Because Leming had two prior DWI convictions (a felony under Texas law), the court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. Tex. Penal Code § 49.09(b)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. Leming v. State, 454 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014). The Sixth Circuit concluded that Gilow lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Leming for the offense of failure to maintain a single lane under Section 545.0600(a) of the Texas Transportation Code. The court reasoned “in order for it to have been unlawful, the encroachment must have been made unsafely; [here,] there was no real danger of his colliding with another vehicle in an adjacent lane.” The State’s Prosecuting Attorney petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review, arguing that the citizen’s report coupled with Officer Gilow’s observations were sufficient for reasonable suspicion that Leming was driving the Jeep under the influence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals had to determine whether a driver must BOTH fail to maintain a single lane AND not change lanes without checking to assure the maneuver can be accomplished safely, before it may be said that a driver has committed an offense. Such an offense would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion for a constitutionally-sound traffic stop.
What Does the Texas Transportation Code Say About Driving Within a Single Lane?
The CCA Holds that a Driver Must Maintain a Single Lane AND Must not Leave the Lane Unless it is Safe.
The CCA explains that the fact that both the requirement to stay within a single lane as for as practical and the prohibition to not leave that lane unless it is safe to do so, originally appeared in the same subsection of the statute, does not indicate that the Legislature intended that both must be violated before an offense has occurred. Rather, the CCA believes that the Legislature intended a violation of EITHER part of the statute constitutes separately actionable offenses.
The CCA says that Officer Gilow knew from personal observations, as well as from the citizen’s report, that Leming had some sort of trouble maintaining a steady driving pattern while traveling under the speed limit. “That was sufficient information to justify a temporary detention to investigate whether Leming had actually failed at some point to remain in his dedicated lane of traffic as far as it was practical to do so under the circumstances—it matters not whether that failure was unsafe.” Further, Officer Gilow had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect Leming of driving under the influence.
As a matter of principle, the CCA notes, “it [would be] counterproductive and contrary to common sense to set the reasonable suspicion bar for DWI so high that law enforcement must hesitate to investigate such hazardous driving for fear that the stop will later be invalidated.” In a Concurring Opinion, Judge Richardson adds, “I believe [the community caretaking exception] provided justification for the officer’s stop, where, a reasonable police officer—given the totality of the circumstances-would believe [someone] is in need of help.” Dissenting, Judge Keasler stated, “this is a close case…the majority reaches the wrong result by misconstruing the statute and finds reasonable suspicion on the basis of a single insufficient articulable fact.” Judge Newell also dissented in this case.
Frequently the public’s perception as to what officers can and cannot do during encounters is convoluted and even wrong. Many people are unaware of what their 4th Amendment rights actually afford them when it comes to contact with police officers. First, it’s important to know that an officer is completely free to approach whomever he wants and have a consensual encounter with someone whether or not he has a specific reason. However, an officer cannot detain you on a simple hunch, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Then comes the question of what exactly is reasonable suspicion.
According to Fourth Amendment law, reasonable suspicion exists when there are specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from the facts, would lead a reasonable officer to believe crime was afoot. The police officer must have more than a hunch that a crime was in progress. If a police officer detains, frisks, or searches someone without reasonable suspicion that officer has violated the 4th Amendment and evidence coming from that unlawful detention must be suppressed.
In a case just decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the Court overturned a conviction because it found the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, thus, violating the 4th Amendment.
In Brodnex v. State, the defendant was arrested and convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The arresting officer observed Brodnex and a female walking in an area known for narcotic activity around 2 a.m.. The officer approached the two individuals, asked them their names and what they were doing. When Brodnex identified himself, the officer asked him “Didn’t you just get picked up?” and Brodnex replied “Hell no.” The Officer then searched Brodnex and found a cigar tube with crack cocaine.
Brodnex filed a motion to suppress challenging both the stop and search. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that Brodnex was illegally detained because at the time of detention, under the totality of the circumstances, the facts apparent to the officer “did not provide him with a reasonable suspicion for the detention.” Therefore, the crack cocaine should have been suppressed. The court’s holding relied on the fact that the officer had simply seen Brodnex walking, not doing anything that would suggest he was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity. Additionally, the court found that the officer’s limited personal knowledge of Brodnex’s criminal history was not enough to support the belief that Brodnex was lying about not being picked up.
This case explains that the officer must have sufficient information that links the suspect to a particular crime before reasonable suspicion exists. While the time of day and high-crime area are factors that Texas courts consider, those alone are insufficient to develop reasonable suspicion. Since reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, it is often not completely clear as to whether a particular set of facts rises to the level of reasonable suspicion.
If you are facing criminal charges that resulted from a detention or search that might not have been supported by reasonable suspicion, any evidence found from might be able to be suppressed. Contact our criminal defense team today to discuss your case and determine whether a reasonable suspicion issue is present.
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Jaganathan v. State: Francheska Jaganathan was driving in the left lane of a three-lane Texas highway, just ahead of a police cruiser. Mounted with a dashboard camera, the cruiser accelerated and changed lanes, but stayed behind Jaganathan’s car. A few seconds later, Jaganathan’s car passed a “Left Lane for Passing Only Sign,” yet her vehicle continued in the left lane despite the middle lane being clear of traffic. About forty-five seconds later, the trooper turned on his overhead lights, and conducted a traffic stop of Jaganathan’s car. During the traffic stop, the trooper smelled marijuana, prompting a search of the vehicle. The trooper found marijuana in the trunk, and as a result, Jaganathan was charged with possession of marijuana.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagrees with the court of appeals, citing the reasonable suspicion standard in Texas, and the Texas Transportation Code. The Court of Criminal Appeals also clarifies the issue at hand.
The issue is not whether Jaganathan committed a traffic offense, but whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
First, “A trooper may make a warrantless traffic stop if the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied.” Guerra v. State, 432 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the trooper has specific and articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged …in criminal activity.” Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Second, “an operator of a motor vehicle [must] comply with an applicable official traffic-control device, including a sign.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 544.004(a); § 541.304(1). “Before a trooper can have reasonable suspicion to believe that a defendant committed the traffic offense of failing to obey a “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign, the trooper must be aware of facts that support a reasonable inference that the defendant drove past the sign before being pulled over.” Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 549.
Here, Jaganathan was driving in the left lane without passing other cars, after driving past a sign that prohibited that conduct. The dashboard camera captured the sign and all of the movements of the car. According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, even if Jaganathan had a defense of necessity—she HAD to be in the left lane for a medical or traffic emergency—the trooper still had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals states, “these were only possibilities, and so it was reasonable for [the trooper] to suspect the appellant had violated the law.” Further, the reasonable suspicion standard “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). As a result of the forty-five second traffic violation, the trooper had reasonable suspicion to pull Jaganathan’s car over; and, as a result of smelling marijuana, the trooper was able to search the car without a warrant, resulting in charges against Jaganathan. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
• The Code is unclear on how to comply or not comply with the sign.
• The Code does not state a specific amount of time a driver has to pass and merge back into the non-passing lane.
• The Code does not address passing a string of cars, in the middle lane.
• The Code does not address the need to accelerate to be able to pass, whether intended or unintended (for example if the car being passed speeds up, making passing difficult).
• Proving a driver’s intent to pass another car is difficult.
If you or a loved one are facing traffic violations or drug charges, please contact our office for a free consultation at (817) 993-9249.


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Respondent had a one-car accident near a small Wisconsin town, while driving a rented Ford. The police had the car towed to a garage seven miles from the police station, where it was left unguarded outside. Respondent was arrested for drunken driving. Early the next day, an officer, looking for a service revolver which respondent (who had identified himself as a Chicago policeman) was thought to possess, made a warrantless search of the car and found in the trunk several items, some bloodied, which he removed. Later, on receipt of additional information emanating from respondent, a blood-stained body was located on respondent's brother's farm in a nearby county. Thereafter, through the windows of a disabled Dodge which respondent had left on the farm before renting the Ford, an officer observed other bloodied items. Following issuance of a search warrant, materials were taken from the Dodge, two of which (a sock and floor mat) were not listed in the return on the warrant among the items seized. Respondent's trial for murder, at which items seized from the cars were introduced in evidence, resulted in conviction which was upheld on appeal. In this habeas corpus action, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and held that certain evidence at the trial had been unconstitutionally seized.
1. The warrantless search of the Ford did not violate the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. The search was not unreasonable, since the police had exercised a form of custody of the car, which constituted a hazard on the highway, and the disposition of which by respondent was precluded by his intoxicated and later comatose condition; and the revolver search was standard police procedure to protect the public from a weapon's possibly falling into improper hands. Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, distinguished; Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, followed. Pp. 413 U. S. 439-448.
warrant's return, which (contrary to the assumption of the Court of Appeals) was not filed prior to the search, and the warrant was thus validly outstanding at the time the articles were discovered. Pp. 413 U. S. 448-450.
REHNQUIST, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 450.
for unrelated reasons. 471 F.2d 280 (1972). We granted certiorari, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
On September 9, 1969, respondent was a member of the Chicago, Illinois, police force and either owned or possessed a 1960 Dodge automobile. That day, he drove from Chicago to West Bend, Wisconsin, the county seat of Washington County, located some hundred-odd miles northwest of Chicago. He was identified as having been in two taverns in the small town of Kewaskum, Wisconsin, seven miles north of West Bend, during the late evening of September 9 and the early morning of September 10. At some time before noon on the 10th, respondent's automobile became disabled, and he had it towed to a farm owned by his brother in Fond du Lac County, which adjoins Washington County on the north. He then drove back to Chicago early that, afternoon with his brother in the latter's car.
Just before midnight of the same day, respondent rented a maroon 1967 Ford Thunderbird at O'Hare Field outside of Chicago, and apparently drove back to Wisconsin early the next morning. A tenant on his brother's farm saw a car answering the description of the rented car pull alongside the disabled 1960 Dodge at approximately 4 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 11, respondent purchased two towels, one light brown and the other blue, from a department store in Kewaskum.
bridge abutment. A passing motorist drove him into Kewaskum, and, after being let off in Kewaskum, respondent telephoned the police. Two police officers picked him up at a tavern and drove to the scene of the accident. On the way, the officers noticed that respondent appeared to be drunk; he offered three conflicting versions of how the accident occurred.
2 a.m. on the 12th to the garage to which the 1967 Thunderbird had been towed after the accident.
The purpose of going to the Thunderbird, as developed on the motion to suppress, was to look for respondent's service revolver. Weiss testified that respondent did not have a revolver when he was arrested, and that the West Bend authorities were under the impression that Chicago police officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times. He stated that the effort to find the revolver was "standard procedure in our department."
Weiss opened the door of the Thunderbird and found, on the floor of the car, a book of Chicago police regulations and, between the two front seats, a flashlight which appeared to have "a few spots of blood on it." He then opened the trunk of the car, which had been locked, and saw various items covered with what was later determined to be type O blood. These included a pair of police uniform trousers, a pair of gray trousers, a nightstick with the name "Dombrowski" stamped on it, a raincoat, a portion of a car floor mat, and a towel. The blood on the car mat was moist. The officer removed these items to the police station.
When, later that day, respondent was confronted with the condition of the items discovered in the trunk, he requested the presence of counsel before making any statement. After conferring with respondent, a lawyer told the police that respondent "authorized me to state he believed there was a body lying near the family picnic area at the north end of his brother's farm."
not far from where the body was found, and saw a pillowcase, back seat, and-briefcase covered with blood. Police officials obtained, on the evening of the 12th, returnable within 48 hours, warrants to search the 1960 Dodge and the 1967 Thunderbird, as well as orders to impound both automobiles. The 1960 Dodge was examined at the farm on the 12th and then towed to the police garage, where it was held as evidence. On the 13th, criminologists came from the Wisconsin Crime Laboratory in Madison and searched the Dodge; they seized the back and front seats, a white sock covered with blood, a part of a bloody rear floor mat, a briefcase, and a front floor mat. A return of the search warrant was filed in the county court on the 14th, but it did not recite that the sock and floor mat had been seized. At a hearing held on the 14th, the sheriff who executed the warrant did not specifically state that these two items had been seized.
found in the 1960 Dodge, with testimony that it was identical in composition and stitching to that found near the body of the deceased.
"even though the evidence that led to his conviction was circumstantial, we have seldom seen a stronger collection of such evidence assembled and presented by the prosecution."
State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis.2d at 507, 171 N.W.2d at 360.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528-529 (1967). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 454-455 (1971). One class of cases which constitutes at least a partial exception to this general rule is automobile searches. Although vehicles are "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 399 U. S. 52 (1970). See Carroll v.
"We made it clear in Preston [v. United States] that whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and pointed out, in particular, that searches of cars that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property. 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 366-367."
statute stopped and searched a vehicle when they had probable cause to believe that the operator was violating that statute.
or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent. See Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968) (District of Columbia police), Cooper v. California, supra. The constitutional difference between searches of and seizures from houses and similar structures and from vehicles stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local officials in "plain view" of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972).
a form of custody or control over the 1967 Thunderbird. Respondent's vehicle was disabled as a result of the accident, and constituted a nuisance along the highway. Respondent, being intoxicated (and later comatose), could not make arrangements to have the vehicle towed and stored. At the direction of the police, and for elemental reasons of safety, the automobile was towed to a private garage. Second, both the state courts and the District Court found as a fact that the search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was "standard procedure in [that police] department," to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands. Although the trunk was locked, the car was left outside, in a lot seven miles from the police station to which respondent had been taken, and no guard was posted over it. For reasons not apparent from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that court concluded that, as "no further evidence was needed to sustain" the drunk driving charge, "[t]he search must therefore have been for incriminating evidence of other offenses." 471 F.2d at 283. While that court was obligated to exercise its independent judgment on the underlying constitutional issue presented by the facts of this case, it was not free on this record to disregard these findings of fact. Particularly in nonmetropolitan jurisdictions such as those involved here, enforcement of the traffic laws and supervision of vehicle traffic may be a large part of a police officer's job. We believe that the Court of Appeals should have accepted, as did the state courts and the District Court, the findings with respect to Officer Weiss' specific motivation and the fact that the procedure he followed was "standard."
"But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant is simply not incident to the arrest."
that may be extrapolated from Harris v. United States, supra, and Cooper v. California, supra.
"The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case. The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances."
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card . . . was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 236.
"This case is not Preston, nor is it controlled by it. Here, the officers seized petitioner's car because they were required to do so by state law. They seized it because of the crime for which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it, and they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded. Their subsequent search of the car -- whether the State had 'legal title' to it or not -- was closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being retained. The forfeiture of petitioner's car did not take place until over four months after it was lawfully seized. It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to search it."
386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 61-62.
to the dwelling place of the owner, as in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), nor simply momentarily unoccupied on a street. Rather, like an obviously abandoned vehicle, it represented a nuisance, and there is no suggestion in the record that the officers' action in exercising control over it by having it towed away was unwarranted either in terms of state law or sound police procedure.
In Harris, the justification for the initial intrusion into the vehicle was to safeguard the owner's property, and in Cooper, it was to guarantee the safety of the custodians. Here, the justification, while different, was as immediate and constitutionally reasonable as those in Harris and Cooper: concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle. The record contains uncontradicted testimony to support the findings of the state courts and District Court. Furthermore, although there is no record basis for discrediting such testimony, it was corroborated by the circumstantial fact that, at the time the search was conducted, Officer Weiss was ignorant of the fact that a murder, or any other crime, had been committed. While perhaps, in a metropolitan area, the responsibility to the general public might have been discharged by the posting of a police guard during the night, what might be normal police procedure in such an area may be neither normal nor possible in Kewaskum, Wisconsin. The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by "less intrusive" means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, supra.
the premises of its owner, and that had been placed where it was by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely because a warrant had not been obtained. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions, see Cooper v. California, supra, Harris v. United States, supra, Chambers v. Maroney, supra, and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as this. Where, as here, the trunk of an automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, we hold that the search was not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the sock and the portion of the floor mat were validly seized from the 1960 Dodge. The Fond du Lac county officer who looked through the window of the Dodge after McKinney's body had been found saw the bloody seat and briefcase, but not the sock or floor mat. Consequently, these two items were not listed in the application for the warrant, but the Dodge was the item "particularly described" to be searched in the warrant. The warrant was validly issued, and the police were authorized to search the car. The reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was that, although these items were not listed to be seized in the warrant, the warrant was valid and, in executing it, the officers discovered the sock and mat in plain view, and therefore could constitutionally seize them without a warrant.
"There was no continuing authority under the warrant issued the previous night [the 12th]. First, these items were not described in the warrant, and presumably were not observed that night [the 12th]. Second, when the warrant was returned -- before Mauer came on the scene -- it was functus officio. A 'new ball game,' so to speak, began when Mauer made his 'inspection.'"
The record is so indisputably clear that the return of the warrant was filed on the 14th, not sometime prior to Mauer's search on the 13th, that we are somewhat at a loss to understand how the Court of Appeals arrived at its factual conclusion. The warrant to search the Dodge was issued on the 12th, and, although a return of the warrant was prepared by a Fond du Lac County officer at some time on the 13th (whether before or after Mauer's search is impossible to determine), it was not filed in the state court until the 14th, at which time a hearing was held. The seizures of the sock and the floor mat occurred while a valid warrant was outstanding, and thus could not be considered unconstitutional under the theory advanced below. As these items were constitutionally seized, we do not deem it constitutionally significant that they were not listed in the return of the warrant. The ramification of that "defect," if such it was, is purely a question of state law.
* Petitioner argued before this Court that unlocking the trunk of the Ford did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The thesis is that only an intrusion into an area in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the specific intent of discovering evidence of a crime, constitutes a search. Compare Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (CA5 1957), with District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U. S. 1 (1950). But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). Arguing that the officer's conduct constituted an "inspection," rather than a "search," petitioner relies on our decision in Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968), to validate the initial intrusion into the trunk, and then the plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless seizure of the items.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In upholding the warrantless search of respondent's rented Thunderbird, the Court purports merely to rely on our prior decisions dealing with automobile searches. It is clear to me, however, that nothing in our prior decisions supports either the reasoning or the result of the Court's decision today. I therefore dissent, and would hold the search of the Thunderbird unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
ultimately contributed to respondent's conviction for murder.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 153 (1925). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 (1968). But the search of the Thunderbird plainly cannot be sustained under the "automobile exception," for our prior decisions make it clear that, where, as in this case, there is no reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the "automobile exception" is simply irrelevant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 403 U. S. 461; Carroll v. United States, supra, at 267 U. S. 156.
an arrest for drunken driving, it is clear that, under Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 376 U. S. 368 (1964), "the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest."
"[w]hat the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused."
In Harris, the prior justification for the intrusion by the police was to roll up the windows and lock the doors "to protect the car while it was in police custody." 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 236. "[T]he discovery of the card was not the result of a search," we said, and, "in these narrow circumstances," the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement was fully applicable. In the present case, however, the sole purpose for the initial intrusion into the vehicle was to search for the gun. Thus, the seizure of the evidence from the trunk of the car can be sustained under the "plain view" doctrine only if the search for the gun was itself constitutional. Reliance on the "plain view" doctrine in this case is therefore misplaced, since the antecedent search cannot be sustained.
vehicle used to facilitate the possession or transportation of narcotics. There, however, the police were authorized to treat the car in their custody as if it were their own, and the search was sustainable as an integral part of their right of retention. This case, of course, is poles away from Cooper. The Thunderbird was not subject to forfeiture proceedings. On the contrary, ownership of the car remained exclusively in respondent's lessor, and the sole reason that the police took even temporary possession of the car was to remove it from the highway until respondent could claim it.
"[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior,"
"[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."
does not of itself eliminate the necessity for compliance with the warrant requirement. Although a valid public interest may establish probable cause to search, Camara, supra, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), make clear that, absent exigent circumstances, the search must be conducted pursuant to a "suitably restricted search warrant." Camara, supra, at 387 U. S. 539. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra. And certainly there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search made of the Thunderbird. For even assuming that the officer had reason to believe that respondent's service revolver was in the Thunderbird, the police had left the car in the custody of a private garage and did not return to look for the gun until two and one-half hours later. Moreover, although the arresting officers were at all times aware that respondent was an off-duty Chicago policeman, the officers never once inquired of respondent as to whether he was carrying a gun and, if so, where it was located. I can only conclude, therefore, that what the Court does today in the name of an investigative automobile search is in fact, a serious departure from established Fourth Amendment principles. And since, in my view, that departure is totally unjustified, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating the search of the Thunderbird and remand the case to the District Court for determination whether the evidence seized during the search of the Dodge and the farm was the fruit of the unlawful search of the Thunderbird. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).

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The Idaho Supreme Court will hear the case of Dale and Kathi Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners Association Inc. at 8:50 a.m. Wednesday, Aug. 8.
The Idaho Supreme Court will hear the case of SilverWing at Sandpoint LLC v. Bonner County at 10 a.m. Monday, Aug. 6.
Appeal requested in case of JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA v. Daniel Asbury, et al.
In 2018-1065, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA v. Daniel Asbury, et al., appellant Marilyn S. Wilson sent a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Appeal requested in case of Lewis C. Merletti v. E-Merging Technologies Group, et al.
In 2018-1064, Lewis C. Merletti v. E-Merging Technologies Group Inc., et al., Merletti sent a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Appeal requested in case of SMS Financial 30 v. Frederick D. Harris, M.D., et al.
In 2018-1036, SMS Financial 30 LLC v. Frederick D. Harris, M.D., Inc. et al., Harris sent a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Appeal requested in case of Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, et al. v. J.R. Hurd, et al.
In CV-18-223, Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, et al. v. J.R. Hurd, et al., J.R. Hurd sent a notice of appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The Indiana Supreme Court will hear the case of Genia Wamsley v. Tree City Village, New Generation Management Inc. at 9:45 a.m. Thursday, Sept. 20.
The Indiana Supreme Court will hear the case of Q.D.-A. v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development at 9:45 a.m. Thursday, Sept. 13.
The Indiana Supreme Court will hear the case of city of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Properties Inc. at 9 a.m. Thursday, Sept. 13.
The Indiana Supreme Court will hear the case of city of Washington v. Daviess Co. Rural Water System Inc. at 9 a.m. Thursday, Sept. 27.
The Kentucky Supreme Court will hear the case of Martin Cadillac Inc. v. Charles Armstrong at 9 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 9.
The Kentucky Supreme Court will hear the case of The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Charles Armstrong at 9 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 9.
Kentucky Supreme Court to hear Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, et al. v. Ezra Claycomb, et al.
The Kentucky Supreme Court will hear the case of Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, ex rel., et al. v. Ezra Claycomb, et al. at 10 a.m. Wednesday, Aug. 8.
The Iowa Supreme Court will hear the case of Reuven Weizberg, David Peter Veng-Pedersen, Jacob Patrick Dagel v. city of Des Moines and Gatso USA Inc. at 9 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 9.
The Iowa Supreme Court will hear the case of League of United Latin American Citizens of Iowa and Taylor Blair v. Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate at 9 a.m. Thursday, Aug. 9.
Indiana Supreme Court to hear Town of Brownsburg, Indiana, et al. v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, et al.
The Indiana Supreme Court will hear the case of Town of Brownsburg, Indiana, Town Council of Brownsburg, Indiana, and Jeanette M. Brickler v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, et al. at 10:30 a.m. Thursday, Sept. 20.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court will hear the case of Cambridge Street Realty LLC v. Melinda Stewart at 9 a.m. Friday, Sept. 7.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court will hear the case of Matthew Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority at 9 a.m. Wednesday, Sept. 5.

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