After appellants had acquired five acres of unimproved land in appellee city for residential development, the city was required by California law to prepare a general plan governing land use and the development of open-space land. In response, the city adopted zoning ordinances that placed appellants' property in a zone in which property may be devoted to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses, with density restrictions permitting appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their tract. Without having sought approval for development of their tract under the ordinances, appellants brought suit against the city in state court, alleging that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking inter alia, a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. The city's demurrer claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of action was sustained by the trial court, and the California Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The zoning ordinances on their face do not take appellants' property without just compensation. Pp. 260-263.
(a) The ordinances substantially advance the legitimate governmental goal of discouraging premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses and are proper exercises of the city's police power to protect its residents from the ill effects of urbanization. Pp. 261-262.
(b) Appellants will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of such police power, and in assessing the fairness of the ordinances these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in market value that appellants might suffer. P. 262.
(c) Although the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best use of appellants' land nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership. Since at this juncture appellants are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a development plan to the city, it cannot be said that the impact of the ordinances has denied them the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. P. 262-263.
24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25, affirmed.
 Gideon Kanner, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.
E. Clement Shute, Jr., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
 Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether municipal zoning ordinances took appellants' property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land in the city of Tiburon, Cal., for residential development, the city was required by state law to prepare a general plan governing both land use and the development of open-space land. Cal.Govt.Code Ann. §§ 65302(a) and (e) (West Supp.1979); see § 65563. In response, the city adopted two ordinances that modified existing zoning requirements. Tiburon, Cal., Ordinances Nos. 123 N.S. and 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973). The zoning ordinances placed the appellants' property in "RPD-1," a Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone. RPD-1 property may be devoted to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses. Density restrictions permit the appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their 5-acre tract. The appellants never have sought approval for development of their land under the zoning ordinances.
 The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city in State Superior Court. The first cause of action sought $2 million in damages for inverse condemnation. The second cause of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. The gravamen of both claims was the appellants' assertion that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged that land in Tiburon has greater value than any other suburban property in the State of California. App. 3. The ridgelands that appellants own "possess magnificent views of San Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and] have the highest market values of all lands" in Tiburon. Id., at 4. Rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for residential use. . . ." Id., at 5. Therefore, the appellants contended, the city had "completely destroyed the value of [appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever. . . ." Id., at 7.
The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer, and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979). The State Supreme Court  first considered the inverse condemnation claim. It held that a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance may not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid." Id., at 273, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 375, 598 P.2d, at 28. The sole remedies for such a taking, the court concluded, are mandamus and declaratory judgment. Turning therefore to the appellants' claim for declaratory relief, the California Supreme Court held that the zoning ordinances had not deprived the appellants of their property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
We noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U.S. 1011, 100 S.Ct. 658, 62 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). We now affirm the holding that the zoning ordinances on their face does not take the appellants' property without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." The appellants' complaint framed the question as whether a zoning ordinance that prohibits all development of their land effects a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The California Supreme Court rejected the appellants' characterization of the issue by holding, as a matter of state law, that the terms of the challenged ordinances allow the appellants to construct between one and five residences on their property. The court did not consider whether the zoning ordinances would be unconstitutional if applied to prevent appellants from building five homes. Because the appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 1719, 32 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997, 100 S.Ct. 533, 534, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus, the only question properly before us is whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constitutes a taking.
The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, n. 36, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2666, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest. Although no precise rule de  termines when property has been taken, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 S.Ct. 332 (1979), the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. The seminal decision in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), is illustrative. In that case, the landowner challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that restricted commercial development of his property. Despite alleged diminution in value of the owner's land, the Court held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional. They bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare, and their enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner. Id., at 395-397, 47 S.Ct., at 121.
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental goals. The State of California has determined that the development of local open-space plans will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses." Cal.Govt.Code Ann. § 65561(b) (West Supp.1979). The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, 438 U.S., at 129, 98 S.Ct., at 2662; Village of Belle Terre v.  Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, 272 U.S., at 394-395, 47 S.Ct., at 120-121.
The ordinances place appellants' land in a zone limited to single-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses. Construction is not permitted until the builder submits a plan compatible with "adjoining patterns of development and open space." Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 123 N.S. § 2(F). In passing upon a plan, the city also will consider how well the proposed development would preserve the surrounding environment and whether the density of new construction will be offset by adjoining open spaces. Ibid. The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas. There is no indication that the appellants' 5-acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the appellants might suffer.
Although the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best use of appellants' land, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, and n. 7, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 1066, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946), nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, supra, at 179-180, 100 S.Ct., at 393. The appellants have alleged that they wish to develop the land for residential purposes, that the land is the most expensive suburban property in the State, and that the best possible use of the land is residential. App. 3-4. The California Supreme Court has decided, as a matter of state law, that appellants may be permitted to build as many as five houses on their five acres of prime residential property. At this juncture, the appellants are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials. Thus, it cannot be said that the impact of general land-use regulations has denied  appellants the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. SeePenn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct., at 2659.
The State Supreme Court determined that the appellants could not recover damages for inverse condemnation even if the zoning ordinances constituted a taking. The court stated that only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies available to such a landowner. Because no taking has occurred, we need not consider whether a State may limit the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken without just compensation.
 Shortly after it enacted the ordinances, the city began eminent domain proceedings against the appellants' land. The following year, however, the city abandoned those proceedings, and its complaint was dismissed. The appellants were reimbursed for costs incurred in connection with the action.
 Inverse condemnation should be distinguished from eminent domain. Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a government asserts its authority to condemn property. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-258, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1129-1130, 63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980). Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." Id., at 257, 100 S.Ct. at 1130.
 The appellants also contended that the city's aborted attempt to acquire the land through eminent domain had destroyed the use of the land during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. App. 10.
 The State Superior Court granted the appellants leave to amend the cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment, but the appellants did not avail themselves of that opportunity.
 The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants' argument that the institution and abandonment of eminent domain proceedings themselves constituted a taking. The court found that the city had acted reasonably and that general municipal planning decisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment.
 The appellants also contend that the state courts erred by sustaining the demurrer despite their uncontroverted allegations that the zoning ordinances would "forever preven[t] . . . development for residential use," id., at 5, and "completely destro[y] the value of [appellant's] property for any purpose or use whatsoever . . .," id., at 7. The California Supreme Court compared the express terms of the zoning ordinances with the factual allegations of the complaint. The terms of the ordinances permit construction of one to five residences on the appellants' 5-acre tract. The court therefore rejected the contention that the ordinances prevented all use of the land. Under California practice, allegations in a complaint are taken to be true unless "contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take judicial notice." Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal.App.3d 101, 105, 127 Cal.Rptr. 520, 522 (1976); see Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal.3d 394, 399-400, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585, 588, 521 P.2d 841, 844 (1974). California courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Cal.Evid.Code Ann. § 452(b) (West 1966). In this case, the State Supreme Court merely rejected allegations inconsistent with the explicit terms of the ordinance under review. The appellants' objection to the State Supreme Court's application of state law does not raise a federal question appropriate for review by this Court. See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 461, 27 S.Ct. 556, 557, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907).
 The State also recognizes that the preservation of open space is necessary "for the assurance of the continued availability of land for the production of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recreation and for the use of natural resources." Cal.Govt.Code Ann. § 65561(a) (West Supp.1979); see Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 124 N.S. §§ 1(f) and (h).
 The City Council of Tiburon found that "[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts, such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl." Id., § 1(c).
 Appellants also claim that the city's precondemnation activities constitute a taking. See nn. 1, 3, and 5, supra. The State Supreme Court correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-faith planning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so burdened the appellants' enjoyment of their property as to constitute a taking. See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal.App.3d 611, 620-624, 140 Cal.Rptr. 690, 695-697 (1977). Even if the appellants' ability to sell their property was limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are "incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939). See Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 208, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979); Reservation Eleven Associates v. District of Columbia, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 315-316, 420 F.2d 153, 157-158 (1969); Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F.Supp. 495, 498 (V.I.1960); 2 J. Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain § 6.13 (3d ed. 1979).


text:
Levy, Mervyn. The Painting of L.S. Lowry. Oils and Watercolours. Photo available. London. Jupiter Books. 1981. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Levy, Mike. Decorated Earthenware. The Complete Potter. Photo available. London. B.T. Batsford. 1994. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Lewan, Todd. The Last Run. A True Story of Rescue and Redemption on the Alaska Seas. Photo available. New York. HarperCollins. 2004. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewandowski, Jurgen. Maserati Quattroporte. The History. Photo available. np. Maserati. nd. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Lewis, Alfred. The Mountain Artisans Quilting Book. The Techniques, Patterns, and Designs of the Famous West Virginia Cooperative. Photo available. New York. Macmillan Company. 1974. 179 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Andre A. Police Athletic / Activities Leagues. 1914-2014. Celebrating Our 100th Anniversary. PAL. Photo available. Memphis. Abutech. 2014. 140 pps. 4to. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Lewis, Arnold. American Country Houses of the Gilded Age (Sheldon's "Artistic Country-Seats"). Photo available. New York. Dover. 1982. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Very good copy. Light shelf wear.
Lewis, Arnold. American Victorian Architecture. A Survey of the 70's and 80's in Contemporary Photographs. Photo available. New York. Dover. 1975. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Lewis, Betty. Watsonville. Memories That Linger. Photo available. Fresno. Valley Publishers 1976. 220 pps. Octavo. Decorated hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy (small book plate).
Lewis, Beverly. Golf for Women. The Complete Guide to Women's Golf. Photo available. New York. Gallery. 1990. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Brenda Ralph. Hitler Youth. The Hitlerjugend in War and Peace. 1933-1945. Photo available. Osceola. MBI. 2000. 192 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Brian & Burl Waits. A Car Collection for the Common Man. A Brief History of the Towe Ford Museums. The World's Greatest Collection of Antique Ford Automobiles. Photo available. Carmichael. A/A Publishing. 1987. Octavo. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Lewis, Brian & Burl Waits. A Car Collection for the Common Man. A Brief History of the Towe Ford Museums. The World's Greatest Collection of Antique Ford Automobiles. Photo available. Carmichael. A/A Publishing. 1987. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Captain Meriwether & Sergeant John Ordway & Milo M. Quaife. The Journals of Captain Meriwether Lewis and Sergeant John Ordway. Kept on the Expedition of Western Exploration, 1803-1806. Photo available. Madison. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 1994. 414 pps. Octavo. Gilt decorated hard cover. First edition thus. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Lewis, Carroll. The Treasures of Galveston Bay. Signed by the author. Facts and Legends of Hidden, Lost, and Buried Treasure Located in the Galveston Bay Area. Photo available. Waco. Texian Press. 1977. 135 pps. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Signed by the author. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Catherine M. Considerate Passions. Golf, The Masters, and the Legacy of Bobby Jones. Featuring Historical Images from Private Collections. Photo available. Chicago. Triumph. Atlanta History Center. 2000. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Catherine. The Story of The Atlanta Athletic Club. In shrinkwrap. A Host to History. Photo available. Atlanta. Bookhouse Group. 2005. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in shrinkwrap).
Lewis, David (ed). Landscape Painting Techniques. Learn How to Master Oil and Watercolor Techniques to Create Your Own Successful Landscape Paintings. Photo available. New York. Watson-Guptill. 1984. 4to. Soft cover. Reprint. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Lewis, David L. The Car and The Camera. The Detroit School of Automotive Photography. Photo available. Detroit. The Detroit Institute of Arts. Wayne State University. 1996. 96 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition thus. Illustrated in black, white and color. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Lewis, Donovan. Pioneers of California. True Stories of Early Settlers in the Golden State. Photo available. San Francisco. Scottwall Associates. 1993. 567 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine (very small nick spine tip) dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, Donovan. Pioneers of California. True Stories of Early Settlers in the Golden State. Photo available. San Francisco. Scottwall Associates. 1993. 567 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Lewis, E.W. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona. From 1904 to 1906 Inclusive. Photo available. San Francisco. Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1908. 505 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy.

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28B.15.010 "Resident students" and "nonresident students" defined.
Repealed by 1971 ex.s. c 273 § 5.
28B.15.030 "Incidental fees" at universities defined.
Repealed by 1971 ex.s. c 279 § 24.
28B.15.040 "Incidental fees" at state colleges defined.
28B.15.050 "Incidental fees" at community colleges defined.
28B.15.060 General tuition and operating fees to reflect cost of instruction.
Repealed by 1981 c 257 § 11.
28B.15.068 Tuition fees increase limitations-State funding goals-Reports-"Global challenge states"-Notification of availability of American opportunity tax credit (as amended by 2012 c 229).
Repealed by 2015 3rd sp.s. c 36 § 12.
28B.15.070 Development of definitions, criteria, and procedures for the educational costs of instruction — Educational cost study.
[2004 c 275 § 15; 1995 1st sp.s. c 9 § 7; 1992 c 231 § 5; 1989 c 245 § 3. Prior: 1985 c 390 § 16; 1985 c 370 § 65; 1982 1st ex.s. c 37 § 16; 1981 c 257 § 3; 1977 ex.s. c 322 § 7.] Recodified as RCW 28B.76.310 pursuant to 2004 c 275 § 77.
28B.15.075 Recommendations for adjustments in the amounts of tuition and operating fees.
28B.15.076 Board to transmit amounts constituting approved educational costs.
[2004 c 275 § 16; 1995 1st sp.s. c 9 § 6; 1989 c 245 § 4. Prior: 1985 c 390 § 17; 1985 c 370 § 66; 1982 1st ex.s. c 37 § 17; 1981 c 257 § 4.] Recodified as RCW 28B.76.320 pursuant to 2004 c 275 § 77.
28B.15.102 Institutional tuition increases-Financial aid offset-Reports-Resident first-year undergraduate enrollment at the University of Washington, Seattle campus.
28B.15.200 Fees — University of Washington — Minimum.
Repealed by 1977 ex.s. c 322 § 14.
28B.15.201 General tuition and fees — University of Washington and Washington State University — Services and activities fees, maximum.
28B.15.202 Tuition and fees — University of Washington and Washington State University — Building fees — Services and activities fee.
Repealed by 1995 1st sp.s. c 9 § 13. Later enactment, see RCW 28B.15.067 and 28B.15.069.
28B.15.300 Fees — Washington State University — Minimum.
28B.15.390 Giving note for fees at universities.
Repealed by 1969 ex.s. c 269 § 12.
28B.15.400 Fees — State colleges.
28B.15.401 General tuition and fees — Regional universities and The Evergreen State College — Services and activities fees, maximum.
28B.15.402 Tuition and fees — Regional universities and The Evergreen State College — Building fees — Services and activities fees.
28B.15.410 Fees — Additional charges.
28B.15.414 Fees — The Evergreen State College — Exemptions of certain veterans from payment of fees.
28B.15.415 Fees — Regional universities — Exemption of certain veterans from payment of fees.
28B.15.465 Gender equity — Reports.
28B.15.480 Gender equity — Expiration date — 1989 c 340.
Repealed by 1997 c 5 § 6, effective July 1, 1997.
28B.15.500 General tuition and fees — Community colleges — Services and activities fees, maximum — Fees for summer school and part time students and certain courses.
28B.15.502 Tuition and fees — Community colleges — Building fees — Services and activities fees — Fees for summer school and certain courses.
28B.15.523 Community colleges — Waiver of fees at — "Needy student" defined for purposes of.
28B.15.525 Community colleges — Waiver of fees at — State board to establish criteria for trustees' determination of applicant as "needy student" — Limitation.
28B.15.530 Waiver of tuition and fees for needy and disadvantaged students — Limitations.
28B.15.535 Waiver of tuition and fees for full-time employees and members of the Washington national guard — Conditions — Guidelines.
Repealed by 1997 c 211 § 2.
28B.15.542 Waiver of tuition and fees for scholarship recipients under the higher educational opportunities program.
Expired June 30, 1990, pursuant to 1987 c 305 § 15.
28B.15.546 Second-year waiver of tuition and fees for recipients of the Washington award for vocational excellence.
28B.15.547 Waiver of tuition and fees for teachers and principals receiving awards for excellence in education.
Repealed by 1991 c 255 § 11.
28B.15.550 Resident status fees for certain immigrant refugees — Purpose.
28B.15.551 Resident status fees for certain immigrant refugees — "Parole status" defined.
28B.15.552 Resident status fees for certain immigrant refugees — Granted.
28B.15.553 Resident status fees for certain nonimmigrant aliens — Granted.
28B.15.554 Resident status fees for certain nonimmigrant aliens — Purpose.
28B.15.557 Resident status fees for students of consular mission parent — Limitation — Program review and determination.
28B.15.620 Exemption from tuition and fees increase at institutions of higher education — Vietnam veterans.
28B.15.623 Persian Gulf veterans — Reenrollment options at state institutions of higher education.
Expired June 30, 1997, pursuant to 1994 c 208 § 3.
28B.15.628 Waiver of tuition and fees increases at institutions of higher education — Persian Gulf veterans.
28B.15.629 Tuition waivers at technical colleges — Vietnam veterans — Persian Gulf veterans.
28B.15.630 Additional fee for programs leading to graduate degree.
28B.15.650 Use of state bank credit cards.
28B.15.710 General tuition and fees for residents of British Columbia, Canada — Limitations — Program review.
28B.15.732 Washington/Oregon reciprocity tuition and fee program — Reimbursement when greater net revenue loss.
28B.15.736 Washington/Oregon reciprocity tuition and fee program — Program review.
28B.15.742 Waiver of nonresident tuition and fees for students being citizens from foreign nations — Reciprocity — Regional universities and The Evergreen State College.
28B.15.744 Waiver of tuition and fees for displaced homemakers — Community colleges.
28B.15.752 Washington/Idaho reciprocity tuition and fee program — Reimbursement when greater net revenue loss.
28B.15.754 Washington/Idaho reciprocity tuition and fee program — Implementation agreement — Program review.
28B.15.758 Washington/British Columbia reciprocity tuition and fee program — Implementation agreement — Program review.
28B.15.796 Effective communication — Task force to improve communication and teaching skills of faculty and teaching assistants.
28B.15.824 Institutional operating fees accounts.
Repealed by 1993 c 379 § 206, effective July 1, 1993; and repealed by 1993 sp.s. c 18 § 14, effective July 1, 1993.
28B.15.825 Fiscal 1982 loan fund deposit may be used for local purposes.
Decodified pursuant to 1983 1st ex.s. c 64 § 3, effective June 30, 1983.
28B.15.900 "State universities," "regional universities," "state college," "institutions of higher education," and "postsecondary institutions" defined.