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3937.01 Regulation of rates for casualty insurance - exceptions.
(F) The insurance of the correctness of searches for instruments, liens, charges, or other matters affecting title to property.
Sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code apply to subscribers, their attorneys or representatives authorized to exchange reciprocal or interinsurance contracts under sections 3931.01 to 3931.12, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
3937.02 Basic provisions for rate making.
(9) All other relevant factors within and outside this state.
(B) The systems of expense provisions included in the rates for use by any insurer or group of insurers may differ from those of other insurers or groups of insurers to reflect the requirements of the operating methods of any such insurer or group with respect to any kind of insurance, or with respect to any subdivision or combination thereof for which separate expense provisions are applicable.
(C) Risks may be grouped by classifications for the establishment of rates and minimum premiums. Classification rates may be modified to produce rates for individual risks in accordance with rating plans which establish standards for measuring variations in hazards or expense provisions, or both. Such standards may measure any differences among risks that can be demonstrated to have a probable effect upon losses or expenses.
Classifications or modifications of classifications, or any portion or any division thereof, of risks may be predicated upon size, expense, management, individual experience, purpose of insurance, location or dispersion of hazard, or any other reasonable considerations, provided such classifications and modifications apply to all risks under the same or substantially the same circumstances or conditions. Classification rates may also be modified to produce rates for individual or special risks which are not susceptible to measurement by any established standards.
(D) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.
Except to the extent necessary to comply with division (D) of this section, uniformity among insurers in any matters within the scope of this section is not required.
Sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings, or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members, or subscribers. No plan for the payment of dividends, savings, or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members, or subscribers shall be deemed to be a rating plan or system.
Such sections do not abridge or restrict the freedom of contract of insurers, agents, or brokers with reference to the amount of commissions or fees to be paid to such agents or brokers by insurers, and such payments are expressly authorized.
Two or more insurers, not members of or subscribers to a rating organization, may act in concert in the making or use of rates when executing fidelity or surety bonds through cosurety or reinsurance, or when affiliated through common ownership, management, or control.
3937.021 Relevant factors for determining rates.
In determining rates for motor vehicle insurance, an insurer shall not consider the fact that an applicant does not have motor vehicle insurance covering the applicant's motor vehicle at the time of his application for such insurance, unless the insurer has an actuarial justification. An insurer may consider any relevant factor contributing to the cancellation, refusal to renew, or other involuntary termination of motor vehicle insurance coverage previously maintained by the applicant, and may consider any other relevant factors permitted by sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code.
3937.03 Classifications - rules - rates - rating plan.
(A) Every insurer shall file with the superintendent of insurance every form of a policy, endorsement, rider, manual of classifications, rules, and rates, every rating plan, and every modification of any of them which it proposes to use. Every such filing shall state any proposed effective date and indicate the character and extent of the coverage contemplated. When a filing is not accompanied by the information upon which the insurer supports such filing, and the superintendent does not have sufficient information to determine whether such filing complies with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code, he may require such insurer to furnish the information upon which it supports such filing. Any filing may be supported by the experience or judgment of the insurer or rating organization making the filing, the experience of other insurers or rating organizations, or any other factors which the insurer or rating organization considers relevant. A filing and any supporting information shall be open to public inspection after the filing becomes effective.
(B) An insurer may satisfy its obligation to make such filings by becoming a member of, or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which makes such filings, and by authorizing the superintendent to accept such filings on its behalf. Sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code do not require an insurer to become a member of or a subscriber to any rating organization.
(a) "Commercial insurance" means any commercial casualty or commercial liability insurance except sickness and accident, fidelity and surety, and automobile insurance as defined in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code.
(b) "Personal lines coverage" means any policy of insurance issued to a natural person for personal or family protection, including, but not limited to, personal automobile, homeowner's, tenant's, and personal umbrella liability coverages.
(2) Except as provided in division (C)(3) of this section, each filing shall become effective immediately upon its filing and is deemed to comply with such sections, unless disapproved by the superintendent as provided in this section or section 3937.04 of the Revised Code.
(3) Whenever the superintendent declares by rule pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code that a degree of competition that will assure that rates are not excessive does not exist in the market for a line of commercial insurance, or that the market is conducted in a manner that may result in inadequate rates or be destructive of competition or detrimental to solvency of insurers, he shall provide that every filing that would result in an increase or decrease of rates for any coverages for that line of commercial insurance shall be subject to this division. Such filing shall be on file for a waiting period of thirty days before it becomes effective, which period may be extended by the superintendent for one additional period not to exceed fifteen days, if he gives written notice within such initial waiting period to the insurer or rating bureau that he needs such additional time for the consideration of such filing. A filing is deemed to comply with sections 3937.04 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code unless disapproved by the superintendent within the waiting period or its extension. Upon written application by such insurer or rating bureau, the superintendent may authorize a filing that he has reviewed to become effective before the expiration of the initial waiting period or its extension. If, during the initial waiting period or extension, the superintendent finds the filing to which sections 3937.04 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code apply does not comply with the sections, he shall disapprove the filing by sending written notice to the person who made the filing, specifying therein the reasons the filing fails to comply with the sections. Upon notice of disapproval, the person who made such a filing may request a hearing pursuant to section 3937.15 of the Revised Code.
(4) In determining whether circumstances exist in a market for a line of commercial insurance as required in division (C)(3) of this section, the superintendent shall consider all relevant structural factors in determining the conditions of the market, including: the number of insurers actively engaged in providing coverage; market shares; changes in market shares; and ease of entry.
(5) This division does not apply to any filings required under Chapter 3937. of the Revised Code for personal lines coverage.
(6) Any rule adopted by the superintendent under this division shall expire one year after its issuance unless rescinded earlier or extended by rule adopted by the superintendent.
(D) A special filing may be made with respect to a surety or guaranty bond required by law, by court or executive order, or by order, rule, or regulation of a public body not covered by a previous filing.
(E) Special filings may be made at any time with respect to any individual or special risks whose size, classification, degree of exposure to loss, previous loss experience, or other relevant factors call for the exercise of sound underwriting judgment in the promulgation of rates appropriate to such individual or special risks. The superintendent may make such examination as he considers advisable to ascertain whether such rates meet the standards set forth in division (D) of section 3937.02 of the Revised Code.
(F) The superintendent may, by written order, suspend or modify the requirement of filing as to any kind of insurance, subdivision, or combination thereof, or as to classes of risks, the rates for which cannot practicably be filed before they are used. Such orders shall be made known to insurers and rating organizations affected thereby. The superintendent may make such examination as he considers advisable to ascertain whether any rates affected by such order meet the standards set forth in division (D) of section 3937.02 of the Revised Code.
(G) Upon the written application of the insured, stating his reasons therefor, filed with and approved by the superintendent, a rate in excess of that provided by a filing otherwise applicable may be used on any specific risk.
(H) No insurer shall make or issue a contract or policy except in accordance with filings which are in effect for said insurer as provided in sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code.
3937.04 Hearing on rates and filings.
(A) If at any time the superintendent of insurance finds that a rate to which sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code apply does not comply with such sections, he may, after a hearing held upon not less than twenty days' written notice as provided in division (C) of this section, specifying the matters to be considered at the hearing, to every insurer and rating organization that made the rate, issue an order specifying in what respects he finds that the rate fails to comply, and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, the rate shall be no longer in effect. Copies of the order shall be sent to such insurer or rating organization. The order shall not affect any contract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set forth in the order.
(B) Any person or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing that is in effect may make written application to the superintendent for a hearing thereon, provided the insurer or rating organization that made the filing shall not be authorized to proceed under this division. The application shall specify the grounds to be relied upon by the applicant. If the superintendent finds that the application is made in good faith, that the applicant would be so aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that such grounds otherwise justify holding such a hearing, he shall, within thirty days after receipt of the application, hold a hearing upon not less than ten days' written notice to the applicant and, as provided in division (C) of this section, to every insurer and rating organization that made the filing. If, after the hearing, the superintendent finds that the filing does not comply with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code, he shall issue an order specifying in what respects he finds that the filing fails to comply and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, the filing shall be no longer effective. Copies of the order shall be sent to the applicant and to every such insurer or rating organization. The order shall not affect any contract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of the period set forth in the order.
(C) Every rating organization receiving a notice of hearing or copy of an order under division (A) or (B) of this section shall promptly notify all of its members or subscribers that would be affected by the hearing or order. Notice to a rating organization of a hearing or order shall be deemed notice to its members or subscribers.
3937.05 Application for license as rating organization.
(4) A statement of its qualifications as a rating organization.
If the superintendent finds that the applicant is competent, trustworthy, and otherwise qualified to act as a rating organization and that its constitution, articles of agreement or association or certificate of incorporation, and its bylaws, rules, and regulations governing the conduct of its business conform to the law, he shall issue a license specifying the kinds of insurance or subdivisions thereof for which the applicant may act as a rating organization.
Every such application shall be granted or denied in whole or in part by the superintendent within sixty days of the date of its filing with him. Licenses issued pursuant to this section shall remain in effect for three years unless sooner suspended or revoked by the superintendent. The fee for said license shall be twenty-five dollars. Licenses issued pursuant to this section may be suspended or revoked by the superintendent, after hearing upon notice, in the event the rating organization ceases to comply with this division of this section.
Every rating organization shall notify the superintendent promptly of every change in its constitution, articles of agreement or association or certificate of incorporation, and its bylaws, rules, and regulations governing the conduct of its business; its list of members and subscribers; and the name and address of the resident of this state designated by it upon whom notices or orders of the superintendent or process affecting such rating organization may be served.
(B) Subject to rules and regulations approved by the superintendent as reasonable, each rating organization shall permit any insurer, not a member, to be a subscriber to its rating services for any kind of insurance or subdivision thereof for which it is authorized to act as a rating organization. Notice of proposed changes in such rules and regulations shall be given to subscribers. Each rating organization shall furnish its rating services without discrimination to its members and subscribers. The reasonableness of any rule or regulation in its application to subscribers, or the refusal of any rating organization to admit an insurer as a subscriber, shall, at the request of any subscriber or any such insurer, be reviewed by the superintendent at a hearing held upon at least ten days' written notice to such rating organization and to such subscriber or insurer. If the superintendent finds that such rule or regulation is unreasonable in its application to subscribers, he shall order that such rule or regulation shall not be applicable to subscribers. If the rating organization fails to grant or reject an insurer's application for subscribership within thirty days after it was made, the insurer may request a review by the superintendent as if the application had been rejected. If the superintendent finds that the insurer has been refused admittance to the rating organization as a subscriber, without justification, he shall order the rating organization to admit the insurer as a subscriber. If he finds that the action of the rating organization was justified, he shall make an order affirming its action.
(C) No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which would be to prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings, or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members, or subscribers.
(D) Co-operation among rating organizations or among rating organizations and insurers in rate making or in other matters within the scope of sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, is hereby authorized, provided the filings resulting from such co-operation are subject to such sections which are applicable to filings generally. The superintendent may review such co-operative activities and practices and if, after a hearing, he finds that any such activity or practice is unfair or unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, he may issue a written order specifying in what respects such activity or practice is unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise inconsistent with such sections, and requiring the discontinuance of such activity or practice.
Every member or subscriber to a rating organization shall adhere to the filings made on its behalf by such organization except that any such insurer may file with the superintendent of insurance a uniform percentage decrease or increase to be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system so filed for a kind of insurance [, or] for a class of insurance which is found by the superintendent to be a proper rating unit for the application of such uniform percentage decrease or increase, or for a subdivision of a kind of insurance comprised of a group of manual classifications which is treated as a separate unit for rate making purposes, or for which separate expense provisions are applicable.
When such deviation is filed, it shall become effective immediately and shall be deemed to comply with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, unless disapproved by the superintendent as provided in section 3937.04 of the Revised Code. When such filing is not accompanied by the information upon which the insurer supports such deviation and the superintendent does not have sufficient information to determine whether such filing complies with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, he may require such insurer to furnish the information upon which it supports such filing. Such information may be of the character provided for in division (A) of section 3937.03 of the Revised Code.
Any member of or subscriber to a rating organization may appeal to the superintendent of insurance from the action or decision of such rating organization in approving or rejecting any proposed change in or addition to the filings of such rating organization and the superintendent shall, after a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating organization, issue an order approving the action or decision of such rating organization or directing it to give further consideration to such proposal. If such appeal is from the action or decision of the rating organization in rejecting a proposed addition to its filings, the superintendent may, in the event he finds that such action or decision was unreasonable, issue an order directing the rating organization to make an addition to its filings, on behalf of its members and subscribers, in a manner consistent with his findings, within a reasonable time after the issuance of such order.
If such appeal is based upon the failure of the rating organization to make a filing on behalf of such member or subscriber which is based on a system of expense provisions which differs, in accordance with the right granted in division (B) of section 3937.02 of the Revised Code, from the system of expense provisions included in a filing made by the rating organization, the superintendent shall, if he grants the appeal, order the rating organization to make the requested filing for use by the appellant. In deciding such appeal the superintendent shall apply the standards set forth in division (B) of section 3937.02 of the Revised Code.
3937.08 Rate information furnished insurer upon request - right of review and appeal.
Every rating organization, and every insurer which makes its own rates, shall within a reasonable time after receiving written request therefor, and upon payment of such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected by a rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all pertinent information as to such rate. Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall provide, within this state, reasonable means by which any person aggrieved by the application of its rating system may be heard, in person or by his authorized representative, on his written request to review the manner in which such rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded him.
If the rating organization or insurer fails to grant or reject such request within thirty days after it is made, the applicant may proceed in the same manner as if his application had been rejected. Any party affected by the action of such rating organization or such insurer on such request may, within thirty days after written notice of such action, appeal to the superintendent of insurance, who, after a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written notice to the appellant and to such rating organization or insurer, may affirm or reverse such action.
3937.09 Advisory organization - functions - requirements - order of superintendent.
(A) Every group, association, or other organization of insurers, whether located within or outside this state, which assists insurers which make their own filings or rating organizations in rate making, by the collection and furnishing of loss or expense statistics, or by the submission of recommendations, but which does not make filings under sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall be known as an advisory organization.
(4) An agreement that the superintendent may examine such advisory organization in accordance with section 3937.11 of the Revised Code.
(C) If, after a hearing, the superintendent finds that the furnishing of such information or assistance involves any act or practice which is unfair or unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, he may issue a written order specifying in what respects such act or practice is unfair or unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with such sections, and requiring the discontinuance of such act or practice.
(D) No insurer which makes its own filings and no rating organization shall support its filings by statistics or adopt rate making recommendations, furnished to it by an advisory organization which has not complied with this section or with an order of the superintendent involving such statistics or recommendations issued under division (C) of this section. If the superintendent finds such insurer or rating organization in violation of this division of this section, he may issue an order requiring the discontinuance of such violation.
3937.10 Regulations for joint underwriting and joint reinsurance.
(A) Every group, association, or other organization of insurers which engages in joint underwriting or joint reinsurance is subject to regulation with respect thereto as provided in this section, subject, with respect to joint underwriting, to sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and, with respect to joint reinsurance, to sections 3937.11 and 3937.15 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
(B) If, after a hearing, the superintendent of insurance finds that any activity or practice of any such group, association, or other organization is unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise inconsistent with sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code, he may issue a written order specifying in which respects such activity or practice is unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise inconsistent with such sections and requiring the discontinuance of such activity or practice.
3937.11 Examination of rating organization.
The superintendent of insurance shall, at least once in five years, make an examination of each rating organization licensed in this state as provided in section 3937.05 of the Revised Code. Such superintendent may, as often as he deems it expedient, make an examination of each advisory organization referred to in section 3937.09 of the Revised Code and of each group, association, or other organization referred to in section 3937.10 of the Revised Code. The reasonable costs of any such examination shall be paid by the rating organization, advisory organization, group, association, or other organization examined upon presentation to it of a detailed account of such costs. The officers, manager, agents, and employees of such rating organization, advisory organization, group, association, or other organization may be examined at any time under oath and shall exhibit all books, records, accounts, documents, or agreements governing its method of operation. In lieu of any such examination the superintendent may accept the report of an examination made by the insurance supervisory official of another state, pursuant to the laws of such state.
3937.12 Report of loss experience - interchange of rating plan data.
Subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code, the superintendent of insurance may promulgate reasonable rules for the reporting by each insurer of its loss experience, in order that such experience of all insurers may be made available, at least annually, to aid him in determining whether rating systems comply with the standards set forth in division (D) of section 3937.02 of the Revised Code. No insurer shall be required to record or report its loss experience in a manner that differs from that which is regularly employed and maintained in the usual course of such insurer's business. The superintendent may designate one or more rating organizations or other agencies to assist him in gathering such experience and making compilations thereof, and such compilations shall be made available, subject to reasonable rules promulgated by the superintendent, to insurers and rating organizations.
In accordance with sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code, reasonable rules and plans may be promulgated by the superintendent for the interchange of data necessary for the application of rating plans.
The superintendent and every insurer and rating organization may exchange information and experience data with insurance supervisory officials, insurers, and rating organizations in other states and may consult with them with respect to rate making and the application of rating systems.
3937.13 Agreement for apportionment of insurance.
Agreements may be made among insurers with respect to the equitable apportionment among them of insurance which may be afforded applicants who are in good faith entitled to, but who are unable to procure, such insurance through ordinary methods. Insurers may agree among themselves on the use of reasonable rate modifications for such insurance, such agreements and rate modifications to be subject to the approval of the superintendent of insurance.
3937.14 Withholding information or making false statements.
No person or organization shall willfully withhold information from, or knowingly give false or misleading information to, the superintendent of insurance, any statistical agency designated by the superintendent, any rating organization, or any insurer, which will affect the rates or premiums chargeable under sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code. Whoever violates this section shall have its license suspended under the procedure set forth in section 3937.16 of the Revised Code.
3937.15 Insurer may request hearing - review of an order or decision of superintendent.
Any insurer or rating organization aggrieved by any order or decision of the superintendent of insurance made without a hearing, may, within thirty days after notice of the order to the insurer or organization, make written request to the superintendent for a hearing thereon. The superintendent shall hear such party within twenty days after receipt of such request and shall not give less than ten days' written notice of the time and place of the hearing. Within fifteen days after such hearing the superintendent shall affirm, reverse, or modify his previous action, and specify his reasons therefor. Pending such hearing and decision the superintendent may suspend or postpone the effective date of his previous action.
Sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not require the observance at any hearing of formal rules of pleading or evidence.
Any order or decision of the superintendent, under such sections, is subject to review by the courts of this state and proceedings on review shall be de novo. No order or decision of the superintendent which is submitted for judicial review may become effective until after final action or decision by the court.
3937.16 License may be suspended.
The superintendent of insurance may suspend the license of any rating organization or insurer which fails to comply with an order of the superintendent within the time limited by such order, or any extension thereof which the superintendent may grant.
The superintendent shall not suspend the license of any rating organization or insurer for failure to comply with an order until the time prescribed for an appeal therefrom has expired or if an appeal has been taken, until such order has been affirmed. The superintendent may determine when a suspension of license becomes effective and it shall remain in effect for the period fixed by him, unless he modifies or rescinds such suspension, or until the order upon which such suspension is based is modified, rescinded, or reversed.
No penalty shall be imposed and no license shall be suspended or revoked except upon a written order of the superintendent, stating his findings, made after a hearing held upon not less than ten days' written notice to such person or organization specifying the alleged violation.
Sections 3937.01 to 3937.17, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be liberally interpreted to the end that insurance rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, and co-operative action among insurers in rate making and in other matters within the scope of such sections shall be authorized and regulated. Such sections do not prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or prohibit or encourage uniformity in insurance rates, rating systems, or rating plans or practices.
3937.18 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(A) Any policy of insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state that insures against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, may, but is not required to, include uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages.
(C) If underinsured motorist coverage is included in a policy of insurance, the underinsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for insureds thereunder for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, suffered by any insured under the policy, where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the underinsured motorist coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage in this state is not and shall not be excess coverage to other applicable liability coverages, and shall only provide the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable to the insured were uninsured at the time of the accident. The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.
For purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, an "underinsured motorist" does not include the owner or operator of a motor vehicle that has applicable liability coverage in the policy under which the underinsured motorist coverage is provided.
(D) With respect to the uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages included in a policy of insurance, an insured shall be required to prove all elements of the insured's claim that are necessary to recover from the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle.
(E) The uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages included in a policy of insurance shall not be subject to an exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits payable as a result of the same injury or death.
(G) Any policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages and that provides a limit of coverage for payment of damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.
(K) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the inclusion of underinsured motorist coverage in any uninsured motorist coverage included in a policy of insurance.
(L) The superintendent of insurance shall study the market availability of, and competition for, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages in this state and shall, from time to time, prepare status reports containing the superintendent's findings and any recommendations. The first status report shall be prepared not later than two years after October 31, 2001. To assist in preparing these status reports, the superintendent may require insurers and rating organizations operating in this state to collect pertinent data and to submit that data to the superintendent.
Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.181, HB 278, §1, eff. 3/22/2013.
(A) No policy of insurance described in division (A) of section 3937.18 of the Revised Code that includes uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages shall be delivered or issued for delivery unless coverage is also made available for damage to, or the destruction of, any motor vehicle specifically identified in the policy, for the protection of those persons insured under the policy who are legally entitled to recover for the damage to or destruction of any motor vehicle specifically identified in the policy from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
(B) The coverage made available under this section need not exceed the lesser of seventy-five hundred dollars or the amount otherwise available from the policy for damages to, or the destruction of, the motor vehicle. The coverage shall be subject to a maximum two-hundred-fifty-dollar deductible. The losses recoverable under this section shall be limited to recovery for that destruction of or damage to the motor vehicle specifically identified in the policy directly caused by an uninsured motor vehicle whose owner or operator has been identified.
(C) If an insured has a policy containing collision coverage covering damages caused by an uninsured motor vehicle, the insured's insurer need not make coverage available under this section.
(D) An insurer making payments to an insured under the coverage offered under division (A) of this section shall be entitled, to the extent of those payments and subject to the terms and conditions of the coverage, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery by the insured against the person or organization legally responsible for the injury or destruction of the property, including any amounts recoverable from an insurer that is or becomes the subject of insolvency proceedings, through such proceedings or in any other lawful manner. No insurer shall attempt to recover any amount from the insured of an insurer that is or becomes the subject of insolvency proceedings, to the extent of those rights against the insurer that the insured assigns to the paying insurer.
3937.182 Punitive or exemplary damages.
(A) As used in this section, "policy" includes an endorsement.
(B) No policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance that is covered by sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, the uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages included in such a policy as authorized by section 3937.18 of the Revised Code, and that is issued by an insurance company licensed to do business in this state, and no other policy of casualty or liability insurance that is covered by sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code and that is so issued, shall provide coverage for judgments or claims against an insured for punitive or exemplary damages.
3937.19 Summary of material coverages and exclusions for personal lines policy.
(1) "Personal lines policy of insurance" means a policy of property and casualty insurance issued to a natural person primarily for personal or family protection for personal automobile, homeowner's, tenant's, mobile-homeowner's, non-commercial dwelling fire or personal umbrella coverage.
(2) "Customer" has the same meaning as in section 3901.19 of the Revised Code.
"You should read your insurance policy and get assistance in understanding the coverages and any exclusions directly from your agent or the insurance company issuing your policy. This policy summary is for informational purposes only and is designed to provide a basic description of insurance coverages and exclusions in your policy. This summary does not reflect all the coverages and exclusions contained in your policy and is qualified in its entirety to the policy terms.
State law prohibits this policy summary from replacing, modifying, altering, amending, or changing any of the terms or provisions of the insurance policy that is the subject of this summary."
(2) A policy summary, as described in division (B)(1) of this section, does not include the policy declarations page and any notations contained therein.
(C) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit an insurer from providing information related to an insurance policy that does not meet the requirements prescribed in division (B) of this section.
(D) An insurer may display sections of a policy summary individually, in any combination or in any order, as long as the summary meets the requirements prescribed in division (B) of this section and the notice contained in division (B)(1)(d) of this section appears in each section of the policy summary. If the policy summary is paginated, then the notice contained in division (B)(1)(d) of this section shall appear on each page.
(E) An insurer's election to provide or make a policy summary available to a customer does not obligate the insurer to provide a policy summary upon the renewal of the policy or for any other policies issued to the same customer.
(F) If an insurer elects to provide or make a policy summary available for a personal lines policy of insurance, the insurer shall provide a policy summary for the named insured under a policy for that product.
(G) A policy summary provided or made available under this section shall not be considered a replacement for the terms of the policy of insurance, shall not have the effect of altering the coverage afforded by the policy, and shall not confer new or additional rights beyond those expressly provided for in the policy. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this section. A policy summary provided or made available pursuant to this section shall not be admissible in court or in any other legal or administrative proceeding, except to enforce division (H) of this section.
(H) No person doing the business of insurance in this state shall provide or use a policy summary that contains any false, misleading, or deceptive representation or statement.
(I) Any violation of this section is an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance under sections 3901.19 to 3901.26 of the Revised Code. If the superintendent, by written order, finds that any person is about to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in a violation of this section, the superintendent may impose any or all of the administrative remedies set forth in divisions (D)(1) to (5) of section 3901.22 of the Revised Code. If the superintendent finds that the violation was due to gross or willful misconduct, the superintendent may order that person to reimburse any customer harmed by the violation or violations, including reimbursement or payment of insurance claims for which a loss occurred as a result of a customer's reliance upon a policy summary containing any false, misleading, or deceptive representation or statement.
Added by 130th General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 140, §1, eff. 9/4/2014.
3937.21 Insurance company - obligation to defend.
No insurance company issuing a policy of automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance shall be relieved of its contractual obligation to defend its insured against any claim on the basis of coverage for such claim being provided by any other policy, unless the insurer of such other policy has assumed and is performing the obligation to provide such defense. If the company pays to or on behalf of the insured any amount later determined to be due from another insurer it shall be subrogated to all rights of the insured against such insurer.
Any disputes between insurers regarding the obligation to defend shall be settled without expense to the insured by agreement between the insurers involved or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration or a declaratory judgment proceeding.
3937.22 Prohibiting increase in cost when insured not at fault.
(B) The insured has not been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or pleaded no contest to, a violation of law as a result of the accident.
3937.23 Prohibiting increase in cost when insured not at fault involved in accident with uninsured motorist.
(A) As used in sections 3937.25 to 3937.29 of the Revised Code, "medical malpractice insurance" means insurance coverage against the legal liability of the insured for loss, damage, or expense arising from a medical, optometric, or chiropractic claim, as those claims are defined in section 2305.113 of the Revised Code.
(1) Except for nonpayment of premium, the effective date of cancellation must be no less than thirty days from the date of mailing the notice.
(a) When cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, the effective date of cancellation must be no less than ten days from the date of mailing the notice.
(b) An insurer may include a notice of cancellation of a policy of insurance for nonpayment of premium with a billing notice. Subject to division (D)(2)(a) of this section, such a cancellation is effective on or after the due date of the bill.
(E) Nothing in division (B) of this section shall be construed to prevent an insurer from writing a policy of commercial property insurance, commercial fire insurance, or commercial casualty insurance other than medical malpractice insurance and automobile insurance as defined in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code for a period greater than one year and providing in such policy that the insurer may issue a notice of cancellation of such policy at least thirty days prior to an anniversary of such policy, with the effective date of cancellation being that anniversary.
(F) There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature arises against, the superintendent of insurance, any insurer, or any person furnishing information requested by the superintendent, an insurer, the agent, employee, attorney, or other authorized representative of any such persons, for any oral or written statement made to supply information relevant to a determination on cancellation of any policy of commercial property insurance, commercial fire insurance, or commercial casualty insurance other than fidelity or surety bonds, medical malpractice insurance, and automobile insurance as defined in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code, or in connection with advising an insured or an insured's attorney of the reasons for a cancellation of such insurance, or in connection with any administrative or judicial proceeding arising out of or related to such cancellation.
Amended by 132nd General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 273, §1, eff. 3/20/2019.
Effective Date: 01-05-1988; 09-13-2004 .
3937.26 Notice of nonrenewal of policy - contents.
(A) An insurer may refuse to renew a policy of commercial property insurance, commercial fire insurance, or commercial casualty insurance other than fidelity or surety bonds, medical malpractice insurance, and automobile insurance as defined in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code, by mailing to the insured, at the insured's last known address, at least thirty days prior to the date of the expiration date of the policy, a notice of the insurer's intention not to renew the policy.
(B) If the notice of nonrenewal is mailed less than thirty days before the expiration date of the policy, the insured's coverage then in effect remains in effect until thirty days after the date of mailing the notice, unless the insured notifies the insurer in writing that the insured accepts the nonrenewal as stated. The insurer shall notify the insured of the amount of the premium for the time after the expiration date that the coverage may remain in effect, and the insured shall pay such premium unless the insured accepts the stated nonrenewal. The premium must be calculated using the rates originally applicable to the insured's coverage then in effect.
3937.27 Renewal conditioned upon substantial increase in premium - notice.
(A) An insurer who intends to condition renewal of a policy of commercial property insurance, commercial fire insurance, or commercial casualty insurance other than fidelity and surety bonds, medical malpractice insurance, and automobile insurance as defined in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code, upon a substantial increase in premium shall mail a notice of such intention to the agent of record and to the insured, at the insured's last known address, at least thirty days prior to the expiration date of the policy.
(B) If the notice is mailed less than thirty days before the expiration date of the policy, the insured's coverage then in effect remains in effect until thirty days after the date of mailing the notice. The insurer shall notify the insured of the amount of the premium for the time after the expiration date that the existing coverage may remain in effect, and the insured shall pay such premium unless the insured notifies the insurer in writing that the insured does not want the coverage then in effect to be extended past the expiration date. The premium must be calculated using the rates originally applicable to the insured's coverage then in effect.
3937.28 Contents of cancellation notice.
(C) Except when cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, the effective date of cancellation shall be not less than sixty days from the date of mailing the notice. When cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, the effective date of cancellation shall be not less than ten days from the date of mailing the notice. The insurer may include the notice described in division (D)(2) of section 3937.25 of the Revised Code.
3937.29 Notice of intent to terminate all policies.
3937.30 Automobile insurance policy defined.
(c) Either a husband or a wife who reside in the same household if an endorsement on the policy excludes the other spouse from coverage under the policy and the spouse excluded signs the endorsement. Nothing in division (A)(2)(c) of this section shall prevent the issuance of separate policies to each spouse or affect the compliance of the policy with Chapter 4509. of the Revised Code as to the named insured or any additional insured.
(4) Is not issued under an assigned risk plan pursuant to section 4509.70 of the Revised Code.
(B) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle," means a self-propelled vehicle designed for and principally used on public roads, including an automobile, truck, motorcycle, and a motor home, provided the motor home is not stationary and is not being used as a temporary or permanent residence or office. "Motor vehicle" does not include a trailer, motorized bicycle, golf cart, off-road recreational vehicle, snowmobile, watercraft, construction equipment, farm tractor or other vehicle designed and principally used for agricultural purposes, mobile home, vehicle traveling on treads or rails, or any similar vehicle.
3937.31 Policy period or guaranteed renewable successive policy periods.
(4) The place of residence of the insured or the state of registration or license of the insured automobile is changed to a state or country in which the insurer is not authorized to write automobile coverage.
This section does not apply in the case of a cancellation if the insurer has indicated its willingness to issue a new policy within the same insurer or within another insurer under the same ownership or management as that of the insurer that has issued the cancellation.
(4) An insurer's refusing for any reason to renew a policy upon its expiration at the end of any mandatory period, provided such nonrenewal complies with the procedure set forth in section 3937.34 of the Revised Code.
(C) Sections 3937.30 to 3937.39 of the Revised Code do not apply to any policy or coverage that has been in effect less than ninety days at the time notice of cancellation is mailed by the insurer, unless it is a renewal policy.
(D) Renewal of a policy does not constitute a waiver or estoppel with respect to grounds for cancellation that existed before the effective date of such renewal.
(E) Nothing in this section prohibits an insurer from incorporating into a policy any changes that are permitted or required by this section or other sections of the Revised Code at the beginning of any policy period within the one-year period set forth in division (A) of this section.
Amended by 129th General AssemblyFile No.181, HB 278, §1, eff. 9/22/2013.
(6) A statement that if there is cause to believe such cancellation is based on erroneous information, or is contrary to law or the terms of the policy, the insured is entitled to have the matter reviewed by the superintendent of insurance, upon written application to the superintendent made not later than the effective date of cancellation of the policy.
(B) An insurer may include a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium with a billing notice. Subject to division (A)(5) of this section, such a cancellation is effective on or after the due date of the bill.
An insurer may cancel an automobile insurance policy at such time prior to its expiration for such reasons as may be permitted by section 3937.31 of the Revised Code, by mailing to the insured, at the insured's last known address appearing on the insurer's records, a notice of cancellation pursuant to section 3937.32 of the Revised Code. If such notice of cancellation, for a reason other than nonpayment of premium, does not contain an explanation of the reason for cancellation and the information upon which it is based, the insurer shall, within five days after receipt of the written request therefor by the insured, furnish explanation to the insured in writing. Prior to the effective date of cancellation, the insurer shall refund to the insured any premium and other sums which may be due the insured.
Upon compliance by the insurer with all requirements of this section, such automobile insurance policy is cancelled on the effective date stated in the notice of cancellation, except as otherwise provided in section 3937.35 of the Revised Code. In the event of the insurer's failure to comply with any requirement of this section, such cancellation shall be ineffective and the policy shall continue in force until such time as it is cancelled or otherwise terminated pursuant to law and the terms of the policy.
3937.34 Notice of nonrenewal of policy - contents.
(D) An explanation of the reason for nonrenewal and the information upon which it is based, or a statement that such explanation will be furnished to the insured in writing within five days after receipt of the insured's written request therefor to the insurer.
Upon compliance by the insurer with all requirements of this section, such automobile insurance policy expires on the expiration date stated in the policy and notice of intention not to renew.
3937.35 Cancellation review by superintendent of insurance.
Upon receipt of a notice of cancellation given pursuant to section 3937.33 of the Revised Code at any time prior to the effective date of cancellation of an automobile insurance policy, the insured may apply in writing to the superintendent of insurance for review of such cancellation. If the superintendent finds that there is cause to believe that such cancellation is based on erroneous information, or is contrary to law or the terms of the policy, the superintendent shall determine whether such cancellation is effective and shall give written notice of such finding to the insured and the insurer .
If the superintendent finds that such cancellation is in accordance with law and the terms of the policy, the superintendent shall issue a written finding approving such cancellation in such case.
If, upon review, the superintendent finds that such cancellation is contrary to law or the terms of the policy, the superintendent shall issue a written finding disapproving the cancellation and stating in what particulars the same is improper. In such case, the policy continues in force as provided in section 3937.33 of the Revised Code if the insured tenders to the insurer within ten days any premium refund made by the insurer.
There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, the superintendent of insurance, any insurer, or any person furnishing information requested by the superintendent, an insurer, the agent, employee, attorney, or other authorized representative of any such persons, for any oral or written statement made to supply information relevant to a determination on cancellation or nonrenewal of any automobile insurance policy, or in connection with advising an insured or his attorney of the reasons for refusal to write any such insurance, for a cancellation or nonrenewal, or in connection with any administrative or judicial proceeding arising out of or related to such cancellation or nonrenewal.
3937.37 Prohibiting requirement of disclosure.
No insurer on its application for an automobile insurance policy shall require the applicant to disclose any refusal or cancellation of automobile insurance other than a cancellation in accord with section 3937.31 of the Revised Code, and according to the procedure required in sections 3937.32 and 3937.33 of the Revised Code.
3937.38 Prohibiting failure to renew because of age.
No insurer shall fail to renew an automobile insurance policy solely because of the age attained by the insured.
No insurer shall cancel, or refuse to write or renew, any automobile insurance policy solely on the basis of national origin, creed, or race of the insured or applicant.
3937.41 Prohibiting consideration of work-related accidents.
(1) "Ambulance" has the same meaning as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code and also includes private ambulance companies under contract to a municipal corporation, township, or county.
(d) Any vehicle, as defined in section 4511.01 of the Revised Code, that is an emergency vehicle of a proprietary police department or security department of a hospital operated by a public hospital agency or a nonprofit hospital agency that employs police officers under section 4973.17 of the Revised Code, and that is identified as an emergency vehicle.
(3) "Firefighter" means any regular, paid, member of a lawfully constituted fire department of a municipal corporation or township.
(e) A member of a police force employed by a regional transit authority under division (Y) of section 306.35 of the Revised Code.
(5) "Motor vehicle accident" means any accident involving a motor vehicle which results in bodily injury to any person, or damage to the property of any person.
(6) "Investigator" means an investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation as defined in section 2903.11 of the Revised Code.
(2) Increasing the premium rate, canceling, or failing to renew an existing policy of insurance upon a private automobile.
(C) Any applicant or policyholder affected by an action of an insurer in violation of this section may appeal to the superintendent of insurance. After a hearing held upon not less than ten days' notice to the applicant or policyholder and to the insurer and if the superintendent determines that the insurer has violated this section, the superintendent may direct the issuance of a policy, decrease the premium rate on a policy, or reinstate insurance coverage.
(D) The employer of the law enforcement officer, firefighter, investigator, or operator of an emergency vehicle or ambulance, operator of a vehicle engaged in mowing or snow and ice removal, or operator of a vehicle who is a member of the motor carrier enforcement unit, except as otherwise provided in division (F) of this section, shall certify to the state highway patrol or law enforcement agency that investigates the accident whether the officer, firefighter, investigator, or operator of an emergency vehicle or ambulance, operator of a vehicle engaged in mowing or snow and ice removal, or operator of a vehicle who is a member of the motor carrier enforcement unit, was engaged in the performance of the person's official duties as such employee at the time of the accident. The employer shall designate an official authorized to make the certifications. The state highway patrol or law enforcement agency shall include the certification in any report of the accident forwarded to the department of public safety pursuant to sections 5502.11 and 5502.12 of the Revised Code and shall forward the certification to the department if received after the report of the accident has been forwarded to the department. The registrar of motor vehicles shall not include an accident in a certified abstract of information under division (A) of section 4509.05 of the Revised Code, if the person involved has been so certified as having been engaged in the performance of the person's official duties at the time of the accident.
(E) Division (B) of this section does not apply to an insurer whose policy covers the motor vehicle at the time the motor vehicle is involved in an accident described in division (B) of this section.
(F) Division (B) of this section does not apply if an applicant or policyholder, on the basis of the applicant's or policyholder's involvement in an accident described in that division, is convicted of or pleads guilty or no contest to a violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or a municipal OVI ordinance as defined in section 4511.181 of the Revised Code.
3937.411 Tickets for civil violations.
(B) Increasing the premium rate, canceling, or failing to renew an existing policy of insurance upon a private automobile.
Added by 130th General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 342, §1, eff. 3/23/2015.
3937.42 Cooperation in investigating fraudulent claims.
(A) The chief or head law enforcement officer of any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency or a prosecuting attorney of any county may request any insurance company, or agent authorized by the company to act on its behalf, that has investigated or is investigating a claim involving motor vehicle insurance or vessel insurance to release any information in its possession relevant to the claim. The company or agent shall release the information that is requested in writing by the law enforcement officer.
(B) If an insurance company, or agent authorized by the company to act on its behalf, has reason to suspect that a loss involving a motor vehicle or vessel that is insured by the company is part of a fraudulent scheme to obtain control of insurance proceeds, the company or agent shall notify a law enforcement officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county having jurisdiction over the alleged fraud.
(C) An insurance company, or agent authorized by the company to act on its behalf, shall release any information requested in writing pursuant to division (A) of this section and cooperate with the officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county authorized to request the information. The company or agent shall take such action as may be reasonably requested of it by the officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county and shall permit any other person ordered by a court to inspect any information that is specifically requested by the court.
(4) Material relating to the investigation of the claim, including statements of any person, proof of loss, and any other relevant evidence.
(D) If the law enforcement officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county mentioned in division (A) of this section has received information pursuant to this section from an insurance company, or agent authorized by the company to act on its behalf, the officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county may release to, and share with, the insurance company or agent any information in the officer's or prosecuting attorney's possession relative to the claim, upon the written request of the insurance company or agent.
(E) In the absence of fraud, recklessness, or malice, no insurance company, or agent authorized by the company to act on its behalf, is liable for damages in any civil action, including any action brought pursuant to section 1347.10 of the Revised Code for any oral or written statement made or any other action taken that is necessary to supply information required pursuant to this section.
(F) Except as otherwise provided in division (D) of this section, any officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county receiving any information furnished pursuant to this section shall hold the information in confidence and shall not disclose it to anyone except other law enforcement officers or agencies until its release is required pursuant to a criminal or civil proceeding.
(G) Any officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county referred to in division (A) of this section may testify as to any information in the officer's or prosecuting attorney's possession regarding the claim referred to in that division in any civil action in which any person seeks recovery under a policy against an insurance company.
(1) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in section 4501.01 of the Revised Code.
(2) "Vessel" has the same meaning as in section 1546.01 of the Revised Code.
(1) No person shall purposely refuse to release any information requested pursuant to this section by an officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county authorized by division (A) of this section to request the information.
(2) No person shall purposely refuse to notify an appropriate law enforcement officer or a prosecuting attorney of any county of a loss required to be reported pursuant to division (B) of this section.
(3) No person shall purposely fail to hold in confidence information required to be held in confidence by division (F) of this section.
Amended by 131st General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 293, §1, eff. 9/14/2016.
3937.43 Reduction in premium charges for insureds over 60 completing motor vehicle accident prevention course.
(1) "Automobile insurance policies" has the same meaning as in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code.
(2) "Moving violation" means any violation of any statute or ordinance that regulates the operation of vehicles, streetcars, or trackless trolleys on highways or streets or that regulates size or load limitations or fitness requirements of vehicles. "Moving violation" does not include the violation of any statute or ordinance that regulates pedestrians or the parking of vehicles.
(a) The department of public safety shall approve the course and the examination. However, the department shall not approve any correspondence course or any other course that does not provide classroom instruction.
(b) The examination shall include an actual demonstration of the applicant's or insured's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle.
(4) The insurer may consider the driving record of the applicant or insured in accordance with divisions (C) and (D) of this section.
(C) In determining whether to grant a reduction in premium charges in accordance with this section, the insurer may consider the driving record of the insured or applicant for a three-year period prior to the successful completion of a motor vehicle accident prevention course.
(1) Subject to division (D)(2) of this section, every reduction in premium charges granted in accordance with this section shall be effective for an insured for a three-year period after each successful completion of a motor vehicle accident prevention course.
(2) As a condition of maintaining a reduction in premium charges granted in accordance with this section, an insurer may require that the insured, during the three-year period for which the reduction has been granted, neither be involved in an accident for which the insured is primarily at fault, nor be convicted of more than one moving violation.
(E) A reduction in premium charges granted in accordance with this section shall not become effective until the first full term of coverage following the successful completion of a motor vehicle accident prevention course in accordance with division (B) of this section.
(F) The director of the department of public safety shall adopt rules in accordance with Chapter 119. of the Revised Code that are necessary to carry out the duties of the department under this section.
(G) This section does not apply to any automobile insurance policy issued under an assigned risk plan pursuant to section 4509.70 of the Revised Code.
(H) This section does not apply to circumstances in which the motor vehicle accident prevention course is required by a court as a condition of a community control sanction imposed for a moving violation.
Effective Date: 01-01-2004; 09-16-2004 .
3937.44 All claims resulting from one person's bodily injury subject to limit of policy applicable to bodily injury.
Any liability policy of insurance including, but not limited to, automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance that provides a limit of coverage for payment for damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person's bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.
3937.45 Prohibiting consideration of vehicle weight violations.
(B) Any applicant or policyholder affected by an action of an insurer in violation of division (A) of this section may appeal to the superintendent of insurance. After a hearing held upon not less than ten days' notice to the applicant or policyholder and to the insurer and after determining that the insurer has violated this section, the superintendent may direct the issuance of a policy, decrease the premium rate on a policy, or reinstate insurance coverage.
(C) The registrar shall not include the conviction for a violation of the weight provisions of Chapter 5577. of the Revised Code, or a substantially similar municipal ordinance relating to vehicle weight as part of the driver's or operator's permanent record and shall not include the conviction in a certified abstract of information under division (A) of section 4509.05 of the Revised Code.
(D) Division (A) of this section does not apply to an insurer whose policy covers the vehicle, trackless trolley, load, object, or structure operated or moved upon improved public highways, streets, bridges, or culverts in violation of the weight provisions of Chapter 5577. of the Revised Code, or a substantially similar municipal ordinance relating to vehicle weight.
Effective Date: 10-12-1994; 09-16-2004 .
3937.46 Applicability of intrafamily liability exclusion against owner or operator of motor vehicle in action for wrongful death.
(A) An intrafamily liability exclusion shall not apply or be enforced by an insurer against the owner or operator of a motor vehicle in a claim or in a suit for damages made against the owner or operator under Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code.
(2) Such an intrafamily claim is not precluded by an intrafamily exclusion in the uninsured-underinsured motorist coverage in question.
(1) "Intrafamily liability exclusion" means any provision included in an automobile insurance policy that excludes liability insurance coverage for the owner or operator of a motor vehicle against a claim for injury or death suffered by a family member of that owner or operator.
(2) "Automobile insurance policy" has the same meaning as in section 3937.30 of the Revised Code.
Added by 129th General AssemblyFile No.181, HB 278, §1, eff. 3/22/2013.
3937.47 Cancellation of personal lines insurance.
(A) As used in this section, "personal lines insurance" means any policy of insurance issued to a natural person for personal or family protection, including basic property, dwelling fire, homeowner's, tenant's, inland marine, personal liability, and personal umbrella liability coverage.
(B) When the reason for cancellation of a personal lines insurance policy is nonpayment of premium, the effective date of cancellation shall be not less than ten days from the date the notice was mailed.
(C) An insurer may include a notice of cancellation of a personal lines insurance policy for nonpayment of premium with a billing statement. Subject to division (B) of this section, such a cancellation is effective on or after the due date of the bill.
Added by 132nd General Assembly File No. TBD, SB 273, §1, eff. 3/20/2019.
(A) Whoever purposely violates sections 3937.01 to 3937.17 of the Revised Code shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars.
(B) Whoever violates division (I) of section 3937.42 of the Revised Code is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.

matches: §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1


Does MGM have standing to intervene under Arizona Rules of Juv Ct, Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 24) or case law *(such as Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68) and any other, more CURRENT case law or other ideas?
Arizona’s Supreme Court held that “‘the tenor of Arizona’s legislative and judicial decisions, as well as sound public policy, favors the important role of grandparents in maintaining the ‘integrity of the family.’ Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 217 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Bechtel v. Rose In & For Maricopa Cnty., 150 Ariz. 68, 74–75, 722 P.2d 236, 242–43 (1986)). The court in Bechtel considering this policy and the fact there were no parents involved in the dependency, noted that grandparents “‘should be allowed to intervene in the dependency process unless a specific showing is made that the best interest of the child would not be served thereby.’” Roberto F., 301 P.3d 211, 217 (quoting Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 73, 722 P.2d at 241).
Roberto F., 301 P.3d 211, 218 (quoting Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 72, 722 P.2d at 240).
In Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-7135, 155 Ariz. 472, 747 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1987) it was held that “trial court properly denied grandparents’ motion to intervene because the child was not “parentless or in any way ‘bereft of family,’ ” both parents were living and actively seeking custody, the State was not “attempting to assert custody or guardianship rights superior to the natural ties between the child and its family,” and there was “no issue nor even the suggestion of a non-familial placement of the child”.
However, in Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 364-65, 153 P.3d 382, 385-86 (Ct. App. 2007) it was held that the trial court erred in denying aunt’s motion to intervene in a dependency case where aunt was a member of child’s family and, although the child was not technically parentless, his parents had “consistently avoided their parental obligations”.
Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2013). Likewise, in our case MGM may argue that although the child was not technically parentless, his father had consistently avoided his parental obligations and is still doing so by not providing any support.
“A grandparent who is a resident of the same state as the children and who has enjoyed access to the children is in a position to “shed valuable light” on the best placement for them.” William Z. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, 388, 965 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court in this case observed that grandparent’s permissive intervention in the child dependency proceeding was in best interests of children, even though in this case both parents were living. William Z. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, 388, 965 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Ct. App. 1998).
Given below are two recent cases which can be interpreted to support the view that MGM has standing to intervene.
Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 362-63, 153 P.3d 382, 383-84 (Ct. App. 2007).
This case is a special action in which “petitioner Grace Allen challenges the respondent judge’s denial of her motion to intervene in the underlying dependency proceeding of T., a minor child and Allen’s nephew. Because Allen has no ‘equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal,’” the court accepted special action jurisdiction. Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 362-63, 153 P.3d 382, 383-84 (Ct. App. 2007), quoting (Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 1(a), 17B A.R.S.; see Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 71–72, 722 P.2d 236, 239–40 (1986) (accepting special action jurisdiction of denial of motion to intervene); J.A.R. v. Superior Court, 179 Ariz. 267, 273, 877 P.2d 1323, 1329 (App.1994) (same)).
The Court in Allen referred to Bechtel, wherein Arizona’s Supreme Court noted that, “under former A.R.S. § 8–241(A)(1)(g), “[g]randparents are among those people eligible to become guardian of a child found to be dependent.” Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 73, 722 P.2d at 241. The statute permitted the juvenile court to place a child with “maternal or paternal relatives, as guardian of the person, provided they are physically and financially able to provide proper care.” 1986 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 334, § 3. The Allen Court found that similarly, “the current version of that statute permits the juvenile court to award a dependent child “‘to a grandparent or another member of the child’s extended family including a person who has a significant relationship with the child.’” A.R.S. § 8–845(A)(2). Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 364, 153 P.3d 382, 385 (Ct. App. 2007).
The court noted that “ADES does not dispute that Allen falls within this category. Clearly, if a child’s grandparents’ interest in the dependency proceeding is sufficient for Rule 24(b)(2) purposes, so is Allen’s. She is T.’s maternal aunt and T. had been in her custody for most of his life. And, although T. is not “parentless” like the child in Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 70, 722 P.2d at 238, T.’s parents have consistently avoided their parental obligations. Indeed, their parental rights are now the subject of a severance proceeding. Like the grandparents in Bechtel, Allen is eligible to be awarded permanent custody of T.” The court concluded Allen’s eligibility to have T. placed with her meets the requirement of Rule 24(b)(2).Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 364-65, 153 P.3d 382, 385-86 (Ct. App. 2007).
“‘When determining whether permissive intervention should be granted, the trial court must first decide whether the statutory conditions promulgated in Rule 24(b)(1) or 24(b)(2) have been satisfied.” Allen v Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz 361, 364; 153 P3d 382, 385 (2007) quoting Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 72, 722 P.2d 236, 240 (1986). “‘It is well settled in Arizona that Rule 24 ‘is remedial and should be liberally construed with the view of assisting parties in obtaining justice and protecting their rights.’ ”Allen v Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz 361, 364; 153 P3d 382, 385 (2007).
“If the conditions of Rule 24(b) are met, as they are here, then the juvenile court must determine whether the party opposing intervention has made a sufficient showing that intervention is not in the child’s best interest.” Allen v Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz 361, 365; 153 P3d 382, 386 (2007). “The supreme court in Bechtel concluded that ‘[b]efore ruling on a motion to intervene, the juvenile court should consider and weigh the relevant factors identified and only if they show that intervention would not be in the best interest of the child should intervention be denied.’” Id. at 74, 722 P.2d at 242.Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 365, 153 P.3d 382, 386 (Ct. App. 2007).
The Court of Appeals in this case reviewed the decision of the trial court which found that A.R.S. § 25–415(A) (now A.R.S. § 25–409(A)), when interpreted in light of the supreme court’s decision in Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 72, 722 P.2d at 240, provided a conditional right for Foster Parents to intervene under Rule 24(b)(1). Trial court reached this conclusion by determining that Foster Parents stood in loco parentis to the Children based on the amount of time the Children had lived with them in foster care.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding Foster Parents had a conditional right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1). It further held that “neither A.R.S. § 25–409(A) nor Bechtel creates a conditional right for a foster parent to intervene in a dependency case.” The Court observed that “Section 25–409(A) permits a non-parent standing “in loco parentis” to a child to initiate a Title 25 child custody proceeding; it does not address intervention in a Title 8 dependency case. Moreover, the decision in Bechtel was not based on A.R.S. § 25–415 or the concept of “in loco parentis.” ” Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 217 (Ct. App. 2013).
However, the court upheld the trial court’s finding that there were common questions of law and fact between the Foster Parents’ termination petition and the dependency proceeding for granting the foster parents’ motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2). For this finding the court reasoned that “When Foster Parents filed their termination petition, the primary case plan in the dependency case was reunification; however, there was also a concurrent case plan of severance and adoption. In addition, the issue of termination had already been raised by the GAL, and might have been raised again during the course of the dependency proceeding”. Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 218 (Ct. App. 2013).
Further, the court of appeals in this case upheld the intervention in spite of the fact that it noted from review of the record that “the parties already involved in the dependency case were able to adequately and objectively look out for the best interests of the Children”. “At the time of Foster Parents’ intervention, the State, through the Assistant Attorney General and ADES, and the Children, through their attorney and the GAL, were already parties to the case.” Additionally, “the Foster Parents were participants with a right to attend and participate in dependency and review hearings”. The court observed that “nothing in the record leads us to conclude that these parties and participants, absent intervention by Foster Parents, were unable or unwilling to fully promote and protect the best interests of the Children”.
However, the court found that “there is reasonable evidence in the record supporting at least some Bechtel factors that weigh in favor of intervention. Foremost among these factors was the Foster Parents’ significant relationship with the Children and their desire to protect the Children, which the trial court could have reasonably viewed as potentially contributing to the “full development of the underlying factual issues” in the dependency case”. Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 219 (Ct. App. 2013).
But, the court vacated the judgment terminating the natural father’s parental rights to his children because the evidence was insufficient to support termination and on finding an irregularity that the trial court erred by terminating Father’s parental rights based, in part, on a theory of abandonment that was not disclosed until the fourth day of a five-day trial.
If MGM does not have standing to intervene through a motion in the ongoing dependency case, can she file a cross-Petition to sever the parents’ rights?
Being that there is an on-going dependency; can the Court accept a filing for a competing petition (Petition to Sever Parental Rights)? The MGM should have rights to file under ARS 8-533(A). But, because there is already a pending juvenile court matter can she file. In general, the juvenile court has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters concerning the juvenile at issue. R.S. *-202; Michael M. V. Dept of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 230, citing Marshall v. Superior Court, 145 Ariz. 309, 311.
In Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2013), it is seen that the Foster Parents were permitted to file a petition to sever parental rights while the dependency case was pending. “This separate termination action was filed as Mohave County Superior Court Case No. SV 2011–04001. Foster Parents filed their Petition to Terminate Parent–Child Relationship based on A.R.S. § 8–533(A), which provides that “[a]ny person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child, including, but not limited to … a foster parent … may file a petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship….”Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 45, 301 P.3d 211, 214 n.2 (Ct. App. 2013). Later both the actions were consolidated in a hearing in the dependency case. Id. at 215. Further, the court of Appeals has not adversely discussed relating to this filing or consolidation of the petition.
In Kimu P. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 178 P.3d 511 (Ct. App. 2008), the court of Appeals while discussing the scope of filing a Petition for Termination Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8–533 or under A.R.S. § 8–862, held that ADES may file petition for termination of parental rights under statute governing termination of parent-child relationship or, alternatively, may file a motion for termination under statute governing permanency determination for dependent children. In this case the juvenile court had ruled that “an ongoing dependency action did not preclude ADES from filing a termination petition under A.R.S. § 8–533”.Id. at 42-43, 178 P.3d 511, 514-15 (Ct. App. 2008).
If she can file a competing petition and being that the current judge hearing the dependency case is interested in reunification with the father, can MGM notice him in order to have a new judge assigned to her case? (Notwithstanding the theory of one family/one judge.) And if she has rights to do either an intervention or file a new Petition – is it better to file a Petition in order to potentially notice the judge.
The Court of Appeals in Lisa K. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 173,180, 281 P.3d 1041,1048 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Sept. 25, 2012), held that permitting the court to both direct the Department to file a motion to terminate mother’s parental rights, and to also preside over the severance hearing, was not the equivalent of permitting a judge to order a criminal trial and also preside over the trial, essentially allowing the judge to act as both prosecutor and trier of fact.
When a State acts to terminate a right, it must provide appropriate fair procedures. Lisa K. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 173, 178, 281 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Sept. 25, 2012) quoting Mara M., 201 Ariz. 503, ¶ 24, 38 P.3d at 45. Further, all litigants are entitled to a decision rendered by an impartial tribunal. Id.


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[Ninth Amendment] The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
[Tenth Amendment] The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Is There a Constitutional Right to Privacy?
The Ninth Amendment offers a constitutional safety net, intended to make it clear that Americans have other fundamental rights beyond those listed in the Bill of Rights. The amendment was added out of concern that it would be impossible to mention every fundamental right, and dangerous to list just some of them for fear of suggesting that the list was complete. Because the rights protected by the amendment are not specified, they are referred to as “unenumerated” rights, as opposed to those enumerated in the Constitution. It is up to the courts to interpret through their decisions exactly what rights the amendment does and does not protect. The Tenth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to preserve the balance of power between the federal government and the states. The amendment limits the federal government’s power to just what is written in the Constitution. Those powers not listed are left to each of the states. The Tenth Amendment does not specify what those “powers” are, however, leaving room for dispute between the federal and state government and need for interpretation by the courts. At different times in American history the courts have been more or less restrictive in deciding what the federal government can do and what responsibilities fall to the states.
This right of privacy, whether it is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Congressional passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 dramatically increases the federal government’s authority. In protest, Thomas Jefferson writes the Kentucky Resolutions, which are adopted by the Kentucky State Legislature. These resolutions argue that the states have the right to void federal legislation that they consider to go beyond the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority. In 1799, the Virginia legislature enacts similar resolutions, known as the Virginia Resolutions, that were authored by James Madison.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court rules, in McCulloch v. Maryland , that Congress has the authority to charter a national bank, even though no such “power” is specifically delegated in the Constitution. With this broad interpretation of the federal government’s authority, the Supreme Court sharply restricts the rights that were reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
A federal statute seeks to end child labor by prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods that child laborers had produced. In Hammer v. Dagenhart , known as the Child Labor Case, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the statute goes beyond the powers the Constitution “delegated” to the federal government. The Court finds that under the Tenth Amendment, it is the right of the individual states to decide how to regulate the use of child labor in manufacturing.
To combat the Great Depression, Congress and the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt establish the National Industrial Recovery Administration (known as the NRA). One of the New Deal’s key programs, the NRA’s provisions include requirements for minimum wages and maximum hours, and certain price controls. In Schechter Corporation v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the NRA exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and invades the states’ rights to regulate manufacturing. Even an economic emergency such as the depression does not justify the federal government interference with the states’ economic activities.
Private individuals challenge a contract between the federal government and a local power company for construction of a dam. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority , the U.S. Supreme Court supports the contract as constitutional because the government has acted within the scope of its war and commerce powers under the Constitution. The Court holds that the Ninth Amendment does not give to the people rights that were specifically given to the government elsewhere in the Constitution.
In a switch from its earlier pro–states’ rights rulings, particularly Hammer v. Dagenhart , the U.S. Supreme Court rules unanimously in United States v. Darby that the federal government acted within its authority in passing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Court finds that the law, which establishes numerous minimum wage and maximum labor standards nationwide, falls within Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.
In Griswold v. Connecticut , the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives because it restricts the right of marital privacy. Although the Bill of Rights does not actually mention privacy, the Court concludes that it is a natural extension of the rights mentioned in the First, Third, and Fourth Amendments. The Court points to the Ninth Amendment as further evidence that a right does not need to be spelled out in the Constitution to be considered fundamental.
In Roe v. Wade , the U.S. Supreme Court rejects a Texas law that outlaws abortion because it restricts the right to privacy. As in the Griswold case, the Court finds that even though the right to privacy is not specifically listed in the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment allows “unenumerated” rights to be recognized as well.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the public’s right to attend criminal trials is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although that right is not specifically listed in the Constitution, the Court finds the history of the Bill of Rights makes its ruling proper.
In United States v. Lopez , the U.S. Supreme Court grants the states more rights. It rules that Congress overstepped its authority under the commerce clause when it passed the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act. To uphold a law that determined the punishment for gun possession and gun use near schools, the Court rules, would convert the commerce clause authority into general police power held only by the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Legislation about domestic violence and family law had traditionally been left to the states. In United States v. Morrison , the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down a provision in the federal Violence against Women Act because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the commerce clause and impinges on state control. A provision that permits victims of gender-based violence to bring federal lawsuits against their attackers is found to invade states’ police power.

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4. That someone committed the underlying offense.
United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir.), cert. denied (October 6, 1997) (No. 96-9541); United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 183, 136 L.Ed.2d 122 (1996); United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Spears, 49 F.3d 1136 (6th Cir. 1995).
To convict as a principal of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principal(s) in each essential element of the crime. United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997). The government must prove that the defendant associated with the criminal venture, purposefully participated in the criminal activity, and sought by his actions to make the venture successful. United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1068 n.22 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 928 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 495, 136 L.Ed.2d 387 (1996); Pipola, 83 F.3d at 562; United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Spinney, 65 F.3d at 238; United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1991); United S tates v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1993). A defendant associates with a criminal venture if he shares in the criminal intent of the principal, and the defendant participates in criminal activity if he has acted in some affirmative manner designed to aid the venture. Landerman, 109 F.3d at 1068 n.22. The level of participation may be of relatively slight moment. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d at 794. Also, it does not take much evidence to satisfy the facilitation element once the defendant's knowledge of the unlawful purpose is established. United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996).

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