This case is about every little guy, once again being trampled upon by the big shoe of big business. With nowhere to turn but the American Courts, he is cast away to endure the pinpricks of trespass that bleed our American liberty to death.
The Borings should not need to post gates and guard dogs,[i] nor should they need to institute batteries of cannons in their driveways. They should have the full power and authority of our American Courts at their defense. But, now, this Court has left the American right of private property helpless, injured, and without remedy.
Pennsylvania Constitution §1 (Inherent Rights of Mankind), §11 (Courts to be Open).
Google intentionally and systematically enters onto private property, for a commercial profit-making purpose, without permission. Google trespasses. Google is a trespasser.
Trespasser. One who commits a trespass; one who intentionally and without consent or privilege enters another's property.
Google, the pirating trespasser, pays no licenses, royalties or fees, and they keep the treasure-profit. They did it again to the Borings, common people.[iii] But, the Borings take them to task. Quite rightfully so. And, it is the privilege of the undersigned to take up the pen, where a sword might otherwise be required.
The Borings do not assert that they are injured because trampled grass will remain flat, or that driveway pebbles have been moved. Certainly, the sun will rise, and grass will stand back up. There are no broken fences.
The injury is to every American's right of private property. And, the law is clear and well-established that injury to this fundamental American right is enough to have a jury of the People decide the value of the related injury.
This Court holds that Google, the trespasser, is allowed to look down a street and systematically and intentionally trespass on each house on the entire road, and then to make a profit, without compensation to the people who supplied the property to make that profit.
Google’s defense is that the grass will stand back up, and there was no gate or guard dog.[iv] Or, possibly, that you can pick the fruit off that poison tree by: a) stopping what you are doing; b) going to a computer, if you know how to use one; c) accessing a computer at the cost of doing so; d) accessing the Internet at the cost of doing so; e) researching and becoming familiar with the Google program by going onto their website properties; f) removing the pictures Google acquired while trespassing on your property; and g) not pursuing the happiness you might otherwise be finding. All while they directly and indirectly advertise to you. The more Google injures, the more money they make.
This Court tells Google that it is okay to enter onto a person's private property without permission. I would not teach that rule to my child.
This Court’s ruling makes our private property a Google Slave; our property is no longer our own: it is forced to work for another, against its will, without compensation, for the profit of another. The Federal Court should free slavery, not create it.
The Plaintiffs’ former private property is now the food of every commercial enterprise seeking to have a bite. There is no logical end to the principle. This Court has made a gift to Google and others of a right to and interest in the Borings’ property.
Google made a profit of over four billion dollars ($4,000,000,000) in 2008.[v] If Google implemented proper internal controls it would have dedicated some of that profit to prevent its trespasses. It used the Plaintiffs’ private property in some part to make that profit. Google intentionally disregards controls that would take money to implement: proper investigation and request of property owners.
If the new pervasiveness of 20th Century roads, in conjunction with the pervasiveness of 21st Century technology, requires any adjustment to the principles of trespass in the digital age, this is the case for such review.
In an age of needed responsibility, Google must be held accountable for its choices.
A motion for reconsideration will be granted if necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Hirsch Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 47 U.S. 1171 (1986). The undersigned asserts that the dismissal of the case was in clear error for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff hereby requests that this Court vacate its decision on all counts, but with particular consideration, as stated above for the trespass and unjust enrichment counts with the claim for punitive damages.
It is the law in this Commonwealth that an owner of realty has a cause of action in trespass against any person who has committed a trespass upon the owner’s land, and it is not necessary for the landowner to allege any actual injury or damage as an element of the cause of action.
There is no need to allege harm in an action for trespass, because the harm is not to the physical well-being of the land, but to the landowner's right to peaceably enjoy full, exclusive use of the property.
Jones v. Walker, 425 Pa.Super. 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 1993); see, Houston v. Texaco, Inc., 371 Pa.Super. 399, 538 A.2d 502 (1988), alloc. den., 520 Pa. 575, 549 A.2d 136 (1988).
This Court opines that the Plaintiffs “do not describe damage to or interference with their possessory rights.” Memorandum Opinion, February 17, 2009, at 8. However, as stated, Pennsylvania law, like many states, does not have damage as an element of a substantive cause of action for trespass. Any requirement of pleading proximate cause is rendered accordingly unnecessary.
In clear error to the Walker Pennsylvania substantive standard of law, this Court cites to no precedent for the support of its dismissal of Plaintiff’s trespass count. This Court cites merely to a district court case for the ever-present standard proposition that liability is imposed for damages caused, to wit: “See N.E. Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F.Supp. 465, 477 (E.D.Pa. 1988).” Memorandum Opinion, at 8. The indirect citation to Kopka v. Bell Tel, 91 A.2d 232, 235 (1952) stands for the same proposition.
Under this definition, one who intentionally and without consensual or other privilege enters land in possession of another or causes anything or a third person to do so is liable as a trespasser irrespective of whether harm is thereby cause to any legally protected interest.
Id. (emphasis added). See also, Pennbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.Supp. 446 affirmed 947 F.2d 945 (S.D.OH 1990) (every unauthorized entry upon land of another constitutes a trespass, and regardless of whether the owner suffered substantial injury, he at least sustains legal injury which entitles the owner to verdict for some damages); Gavcus v. Potts, 808 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1986) (nominal compensatory damages can be awarded when no actual or substantial injury has been alleged or proven to have resulted from trespass, as law infers some damages from unauthorized entry on land); Hoffman v. Vuilcan Materials Co., 91 F.Supp. 2d 881 (M.D.NC. 1999) (trespass upon the land of another entitles the possessor to at least nominal damages). Wilson v. Amoco, 33 F.Supp.2d 969 (D. Wyo. 1998) (once Plaintiff establishes that trespass occurred, Plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages for wrongful intrusion); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l., 273 F.Supp 2d 1175 (D.Colo. 2003) (proof that trespass invasion caused actual damages is not required to establish liability, and Plaintiff is always entitled to recover at least nominal damages); Lugue v. Hercules, 12 F.Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D.Ga. 1997) (proof of actual injury to the land or a diminution in the property's value is not required to maintain an action for trespass, and nominal damages can be awarded when the amount of actual injury is unclear).
This Court has made a gift to Google and others of a right to and interest in the Borings’ property and that is a manifest injustice.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE PROPER.
If the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or others from similar conduct, then a requirement of proportionality defeats that purpose. It is for this reason that the wealth of the tortfeasor is relevant. In making its determination, the jury has the function of weighing the conduct of the tortfeasor against the amount of damages which would deter such future conduct. In performing this duty, the jury must weigh the intended harm against the tortfeasor's wealth. If we were to adopt the Appellee's theory, outrageous conduct, which only by luck results in nominal damages, would not be deterred and the sole purpose of a punitive damage award would be frustrated. If the resulting punishment is relatively small when compared to the potential reward of his actions, it might then be feasible for a tortfeasor to attempt the same outrageous conduct a second time. If the amount of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the injury suffered, then those damages probably would not serve as a deterrent. It becomes clear that requiring punitive damages to be reasonably related to compensatory damages would not only usurp the jury's function of weighing the factors set forth in Section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but would also prohibit victims of malicious conduct, who fortuitously were not harmed, from deterring future attacks. (emphasis added) Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, 521 Pa. 97, at 103-4, 555 A.2d 800 (1998).
Google's argument that punitive damages are not warranted because Plaintiffs do not point to aggravating or outrageous conduct found in the complaint is factually conclusory in that the illegal entry onto property, pursuant to a calculated scheme of approach, is a crime and clearly warrants punitive damages.[xi] Furthermore, Plaintiff is entitled to all inferences.
In good faith and for judicial efficiency, Plaintiff request that the Honorable Magistrate Judge reconsider her initial determination, as stated in the Memorandum Opinion, and reinstate the Counts II (Trespass) and V (Unjust Enrichment) with the claim for punitive damages for the reasons stated herein.
If the case goes forward with effectively on one substantive claim, the case will proceed to a jury determination as guaranteed to Plaintiff by law, and the case will be procedurally streamlined as a result of this Court’s dismissal of the other counts.
[i] Google's Brief (initial), pg. 2 (there is no gate or guard dog standing watch over the property).
[ii] Damages is not part of the definition of the term. Damage is a secondary jury question. In fact, damages is not an element of a state-based trespass claim in Pennsylvania, so dismissal on the basis of damages is ungrounded. See Section II, below.
[iii] There was a "Private Road No Trespassing" sign, and the road turned from pavement to pebbles, but these are jury fact questions.
[iv] See Note 1, above. It is important to note the 4-cell analytical matrix of who is trespassing relative to whose property upon which the trespass occurs. 1. Commercial trespasser (CT) onto commercial land (CL); 2. CT onto non-commercial land (NL); 3. Non-commercial trespasser (NT) onto CL; 4. NT onto NL.
For example, if a non-commercial person innocently drives down the street, and turns around in the driveway of a non-commercial owner (particularly on unmarked property) (4. NT/NL), the ability to measure damages may be nominal by nature, but even this is not our situation. In our situation, the party trespassing is a commercial enterprise who intentionally enters for a profit-making purpose. (2. CT/NL) Google confuses the analysis by using a No. 4 example for our No. 2. case. Everyone whose property is enjoyed by Google by their intentional trespass is entitled by law to a jury determination of damages. Google was on the Boring's land because it needed to be there for its service. The Borings are entitled to have a jury determination with an expert calculation of that act of trespass. For non-commercial land (NL), extrapolating rental value might include who is making the request, since it is not publicly offered, and such a fair market determination might or might not include who is requesting the access. But such things are for experts at trial. See 6, below.
§ 40. Trespass and Conversion: (1) A person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, is accountable to the victim of the wrong for the benefit so obtained. (2) The measure of recovery depends on the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct. As a general rule: (a) a conscious wrongdoer, or one who acts despite a known risk that the conduct in question violates the rights of the claimant, will be required to disgorge all gains (including consequential) derived from the wrongful transaction.
Comment b. Measure of Recovery. ...In consequence, a conscious wrongdoer may be liable to disgorge more than the value of what was taken or obtained in the first instance. ... Restitution is justified in such cases because the advantage acquired by the defendant is one that should properly have been the subject of negotiation and payment....The more difficult issues of valuation are accordingly those in which the defendant has made a use of the claimant’s property for which there is no ordinary market; or in which the defendant has bypassed any market by taking without asking, or by proceeding in the face of a refusal. Valuation in such cases resists any precise formula, and courts exercise a wide discretion in fixing a price for the benefit in question—in other words, a measure of liability—that will correspond to the unjust enrichment of the defendant. The one constant factor in such cases is that values will be more liberally estimated against a conscious wrongdoer. See, also, Note 4, above regarding party type matrix. See also, Jacques v. Steenberg Home, footnote 11, below.
[viii] Defendants in N.E. Women contended that the Court erred by permitting the jury to award plaintiff damages for injury to its business as well as injury to its property under the trespass claim. The defendants argued that they should only be required to pay for the actual damage to plaintiff's real property, not for any injury to plaintiff's business. The Court found that it "sees no valid reason why a trespasser could not be held liable for injuries to his or her business which are properly found by a jury to be the proximate cause of the trespass. If plaintiff's alleged injuries to business were not the consequence of defendants actions, the jury would have found that they were not the proximate cause of defendants' actions. Plaintiff's injuries as alleged and proven were not unduly indirect or remote from defendants' trespass. Therefore, defendants' motion on this ground is denied." N.E. Women, at 477.
[ix] In the dicta of footnote 4 of the Memorandum Opinion, this Court references the case of Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196; 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970). That case is inapplicable as it is a citation to the New York state court, which is applying the rules of procedure and body of law for that state court forum, rather than this Federal court forum, using the substantive law of the State of New York, not the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
[x] In Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231, the Third Circuit delineates the substance of what Twombly expressly leaves intact. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court reaffirmed that FED R. Civ.P. 8 "'requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" and that this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
[B]ecause a legal right is involved, the law recognizes that actual harm occurs in every trespass. The action for intentional trespass to land is directed at vindication of the legal right. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 13 (5th ed. 1984). The law infers some damage from every direct entry upon the land of another. Id. The law recognizes actual harm in every trespass to land whether or not compensatory damages are awarded. Id. Thus, in the case of intentional trespass to land, the nominal damage award represents the recognition that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm has occurred. . . .
Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in preserving the integrity of the legal system. Private landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished. When landowners have confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to resort to "self-help" remedies. In McWilliams, the court recognized the importance of "'preventing the practice of dueling, [by permitting] juries to punish insult by exemplary damages.'" McWilliams, 3 Wis. at 381. Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one can easily imagine a frustrated landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser, like Steenberg, who refuses to heed no trespass warnings. . . .
If punitive damages are not allowed in a situation like this, what punishment will prohibit the intentional trespass to land? Moreover, what is to stop [Defendant] from concluding, in the future, that [it] is not more profitable than obeying the law? . . . An appropriate punitive damage award probably will.
In sum, as the court of appeals noted, the Barnard rule sends the wrong message to [Defendant] and any others who contemplate trespassing on the land of another. It implicitly tells them that they are free to go where they please, regardless of the landowner's wishes. As long as they cause no compensable harm, the only deterrent intentional trespassers face is the nominal damage award of $1, the modern equivalent of Merest's halfpenny, and the possibility of a Class B forfeiture under Wis. Stat. § 943.13. We conclude that both the private landowner and society have much more than a nominal interest in excluding others from private land. Intentional trespass to land causes actual harm to the individual, regardless of whether that harm can be measured in mere dollars. Consequently, . . ., we hold that nominal damages may support a punitive damage award in an action for intentional trespass to land.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d 605; 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-162 (1997) (emphasis added).


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Recently, in September, 2015, The U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit found that in a raid on an apartment in Montana based on a search warrant for a drug investigation, the 1 officers lacked probable cause to search defendant’s apartment; 2 search warrant did not describe items to be seized with sufficient particularity; and the application of exclusionary rule was warranted. U.S. vs. Howard Oran Embry 625 Fed.Appx. 814 (2016).
The facts in the case were such that the police warrant was based on an anonymous tip that drugs (Marijuana) was being held at a certain apartment location in Montana. The court found that “A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the issuing judge finds that, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him … there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give great deference to an issuing judge’s finding that probable cause supports a warrant and review such findings for clear error.” Id. at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Police officers had no reason other than the uncorroborated, anonymous tip to suspect that Embry was in recent receipt of a trafficking amount of marijuana. “[A]n anonymous tip is entitled to little or no weight in a probable cause evaluation if it is entirely uncorroborated and lacks any indication of reliability.” United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).
he anonymous tip was first conveyed to Embry’s apartment manager who then relayed the information to the police officers. The anonymous tip conveyed a paucity of information. The tip did not mention Embry by name, state how the drugs arrived at his apartment, or explain how the informant acquired this information. The anonymous tip did not describe any future movements that could be corroborated and the police officers did not corroborate the allegations made in the tip.
When the officers arrived at Embry’s apartment they employed what they call the “knock and talk” approach. In response, Embry opened the door of his apartment and he engaged in a conversation with the officers. Embry acknowledged that he had a medical marijuana card and possessed a personal-use amount of marijuana, one ounce or less. The officer’s “knock and talk” does not constitute independent corroboration because Embry’s confirmation that he had a medical marijuana card and possessed a personal-use amount of marijuana is not sufficient to confirm the anonymous informant’s statement concerning ten pounds of marijuana. See Clark, 31 F.3d at 834 (“Mere confirmation of innocent static details in an anonymous tip does not constitute corroboration.”); see also Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1082 (holding that officers’ knowledge of personal-use amount of marijuana “certainly does not indicate that [defendant] is an ecstasy trafficker.” (emphasis in original)).
Because unreliable, uncorroborated tips are entitled to little or no weight when determining whether there is probable cause to support issuance of a search warrant, it was reasonable for the district court to excise the anonymous tip from its probable cause analysis. Thus, the officers did not have probable cause to search for evidence of drug trafficking at Embry’s apartment.1 Thereafter, the officers obtained a search warrant.
“Whether a search warrant describes items to be seized with sufficient specificity is reviewed de novo.”United States v. Reeves, 210 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.2000).
In this case, the search warrant failed to meet the requirements of the test set out in United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir.1986), for determining whether a warrant is “sufficiently precise.” As in Spilotro, the search warrant here “authorize[d] wholesale seizures of entire categories of items not generally evidence of criminal activity, and provide[d] no guidelines to distinguish items used lawfully from those the government had probable cause to seize.” Id. at 964.
As a result of the invalid search warrant and for the lack of probable cause, the 9th Circuit applied the exclusionary rule (and would not apply the severability rule allowing some evidence in and other evidence out ) and excluded the evidence found as a result of the illegal search and seizure of the apartment – which led to the case having to be dismissed unless the U.S. Supreme Court accepts certiorari.
evidence was sufficient to support possession conviction. Id.
How is this case different than the federal case? Well, first the warrant was based on information from a known person. This person was not anonymous. Second, the detailed facts of how the person knew (use of a light bulb to ingest the substance for example), was given to specificity to satisfy the probable cause requirement. Also, the federal court never did apply the plain view doctrine. The court in Washington state did just that. The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement which allows officers to seize items which they observe and immediately recognize as evidence or contraband while they are lawfully present in an area protected by the 4th Amendment. Also, the court applied the severability doctrine, where the federal court did not do so. Even if a search warrant is overbroad or insufficiently particular, “under the severability doctrine, ‘infirmity of part of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant’ but does not require suppression of anything seized pursuant to valid parts of the warrant.” Perrone,119 Wash.2d at 556, 834 P.2d 611 (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir.1983)). (Please note that I feel the 9th circuit decision in Embry is more recent and conflicts with the decision of the 8th circuit in Fitzgerald cited above). So, Washington state will look at the details of the warrant, but will also apply the severability rule and still allow some evidence to find a conviction on the defendant.
Now, how about Oregon? Oregon is a state that is notorious for not being as strong on individual rights and privacy as Washington state. However, one case was surprising in 2012.
The Oregon Court of appeals reversed and remanded a drug conviction on the basis that the affidavit to the search warrant was insufficient to support probable case. In the Huff case, a detective / sergeant with the Coos County Sheriff’s Department and director of the South Coast Interagency Narcotics Team (SCINT), applied by telephone for a warrant to search defendant’s residence, viz., a recreational vehicle (RV), and an outbuilding, described as a silver “Quonset hut style shop” (the shop).The telephonic affidavit supporting the application contained the following information: On January 14, 2006—almost 45 months earlier—the same detective had seized a commercial quantity of crystal methamphetamine from defendant at the shop. On October 8, 2009—the same day that the detective applied for the search warrant—the detective had responded to a call from a person named Larson, a parole and probation officer, indicating that defendant and another person, had been the subject of a traffic stop very early that morning. He told the detective that both men “were on his case load for the possession of methamphetamine” and that he wanted to conduct a home visit to make sure that defendant was not violating the terms of his supervision by possessing methamphetamine.
How is this different from the cases above? Well, it really isn’t’ The informant is NOT anonymous, the facts are specific, but the staleness of some of the information is there (45 months earlier), but some information is close in time to the application. (The fact that the application was by phone is not relevant as this is common in state and federal courts to attempt to investigate as soon as possible so as to not have destruction of the drug evidence). What did Oregon do here? They found a violation of the probable cause requirement, but instead of applying the severability rule, they just passed the buck back to the trial court to make a ruling as to what evidence would be in or out under the exclusionary rule.
In Oregon, the court claimed, they have held that the current possession of a small amount of illegal drugs in a person’s home does not give rise to probable cause to search the home for additional drugs. See, e.g., State v. Mepham, 46 Or.App. 839, 613 P.2d 500 (1980). The Oregon court of appeals felt that additional facts beyond the current possession must be presented to establish the probability that further evidence of criminal activity will be found at the suspected location. State v. Kittredge/Anderson, 36 Or.App. 603, 585 P.2d 423 (1978). The court concluded that, even if the information about the nearly four-year-old seizure is not impermissibly stale, it is, nonetheless, insufficient to allow the reasonable conclusion that evidence of drug distribution would probably be found on defendant’s property. See Johnson, 186 Or.App. at 192–93, 62 P.3d 861 (eight-year-old conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana of little, if any, significance in determining probable cause to search for evidence of a marijuana-growing operation).
So, in conclusion, it appears that the federal courts will apply a blanket exclusionary rule, the courts of Washington will sever the valid evidence from the invalid evidence, and the Oregon courts will pass the buck down to the trial courts and let them decide. I still argue that Washington state protects individual liberties much better than the federal government or the State of Oregon. However, when it comes to drugs in your apartment, this can differ depending on the facts of the case.
Gregory Scott Hoover’s primary area of legal practice is in the form of civil and criminal litigation and assisting those involved in EB-5 immigration transactions. Mr. Hoover is licensed in both Oregon and Washington, and New York, U.S.A., and England and Wales. Mr. Hoover is also a skilled negotiator, mediator and arbitrator. As a skilled negotiator and litigator, Mr. Hoover can skillfully resolve your situation through effective negotiations or, if necessary, aggressively represent your matter in court.
Excellent read. Great law firm. Very knowledgable.
Great article about the 4th amendment issue. I am sharing it with my friends.
Great article! very interesting read for immigrants like me. thank you !

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De Jong S.M., D. Turner & A. Lucieer, 2016, Using timeseries of UAV Imagery map landslide displacement. Poster presentation NAC conference 7 & 8 April 2016 Veldhoven.
De Jong S.M., Edwin H. Husanadjaja, Niko Wanders & Elisabeth A. Addink, 2013, Annual Report Remote Sensing Activities Utrecht University. EARSeL News Letter 5pp.
Wanders N., M.F.P. Bierkens, S.M. de Jong, A.P.J. de Roo and D. Karssenberg, 2013, The benefits of using remotely sensed soil moisture in parameter identification of large-scale hydrological models. Geophysical Research Abstracts Vol. 15, EGU General Assembly 2013.
Fraters B. K. Kovar, S.M de Jong, H. Bartholomeus, V. Grekov, V. Panasenko, 2012, Monitoring of the soils quality and vegetation using data of remote sensing in the Ukraine. EVD International, within the framework of project G2G/09/UA/6/1. RIVM Letter report 680271001A/2012. Bilthoven 48pp.
Sutanudjaja E.H., S.M. de Jong, F.C. van Geer, M. F.P. Bierkens, 2012, Can we monitor groundwater head variation from space? Coupling ERS spaceborne microwave observations to groundwater dynamics. Geophysical Research Abstracts. Vol. 14, EGU2012-6629, 2012 EGU General Assembly 2012, 22-27 April, Vienna.
Wanders N., D.Karssenberg, S.M. de Jong, M.F.P. Bierkens, Using high-resolution soil moisture modelling to assess the uncertainty of microwave remotely sensed soil moisture products at the correct spatial and temporal support. Geophysical Research Abstracts. Vol. 14, EGU2012-6629, 2012 EGU General Assembly 2012, 22-27 April, Vienna.
Wilschut L.I., E.A. Addink, S.M. de Jong, S.A. Davis, A. Laudisoit, L.A. Burdelov, V. Dubyanskiy, V.S. Ageyev, V.G. Meka-Mechenko, M. Begon, 2012, Classification using objects from high and low resolution images. An example of burrow system and rodent habitat mapping in Kazakhstan. Proceedings of the GEOBIA 2012 conference, 7-9 May, Rio de Janeiro. Online publication: www.inpe.br/geobia2012.
De Jong S.M., E.A. Addink, P. Hoogenboom & W. Nijland, 2011, a Laboratory experiment to investigate the spectral response of Buxus sempervirens to differences types of stress. Proceedings of the EARSeL 7th SIG Imaging Spectroscopy workshop. Edinburgh, 11-13 April. 10pp.
Razak K.A., M.W. Straatsma, C.J. van Westen, J.P. Malet & S.M. de Jong, 2011, Mapping of elements at risk for landslide in the Tropics using airborne laser scanning. Reviewed conference paper 4874 of the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), Marrakech May 18-22.
Razak K.A., A. Bucksch, M. Damen, C. van Westen, M. Straatsma & S.M. de Jong, 2011, Tree growth anomaly as an indicator for landslide activity: spatial mapping using high density airborne LIDAR data. Abstract to the second world landslide forum. WLF2-2011-0522. Rome.
Addink E.A., S.M. de Jong, S. Davis & H. Leirs, 2010, Earth observation to combat bubonic plague in Kazahkstan. Abstract to GEOBIA2010, 29 June -3 July, Ghent.
Buschman F.A., A.J.F. Hoitink, P. Hoekstra & S.M. de Jong, 2010, Subtidal fluxes of fine sediment in an Indonesian tidal River. NCR symposium 2010.
De Jong S.M., V.G. Jetten, J. van der Kwast & E.A. Addink, 2010, Annual Report Remote Sensing Activities Utrecht University. EARSeL News Letter 81, pp. 31-34.
De Jong S.M., 2010, Granite weathering pits in the Sipaliwini Savanna in Southern Surinam. NWO-WOTRO Surinam Expeditions Project Page. www.sipaliwinisavanna.com.
Kaptue T., A. Thibaut, S.M. de Jong & M. Roujean, 2010, Ecosystem mapping at the African continent scale using a hybrid clustering approach based on 1-km resolution multi-annual data from SPOT/VEGETATION. Abstract to the Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Society annual Conference 2010, Cork, Ireland. August 31 – September 3, 2010, 1p.
Nijland W., E.A. Addink & S.M. de Jong, 2010, Detection of ecosystem functioning using object-based time-series analysis. ISPRS – International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences Vol.XXXVIII-4/C7. Available online: www.isprs.org/publications.
Razak K.A., C.J. van Westen, M.W. Straatsma, J.P. Malet & S.M. de Jong, 2010, Airborne laser scanning as an effective tool for disaster mapping over mountainous forested landscapes. Geophysical Research Abstracts EGU-Vol.12, EGU General Assembly 2010, Vienna.
Razak K.A., M.W. Straatsma, C.J. van Westen, J.P. Malet & S.M. de Jong, 2010, Use of high resolution airborne laser scanning data for landslide interpretation under mixed forest and tropical rainforest: case study in Barcelonnette, France and Cameron highlands, Malaysia. Geophysical Research Abstracts EGU-Vol.12, EGU General Assembly 2010, Vienna.
Sutanudjaja E.H., M.F.P. Bierkens, S.M. de Jong & F.C van Geer, 2010, Large scale groundwater modeling using globally available datasets: a test for the Rhine-Meuse basin. Geophysical Research Poster at EGU-Vol.12, EGU General Assembly 2010, Vienna.
Sutanudjaja E.H., S.M. de Jong, M.F.P. Bierkens & F.C van Geer, 2010, Correlating optical, microwave and thermal remote sensing with groundwater head measurement time series. AGU 13-17 December 2010, San Francisco CA.
Vannametee E., D. Karssenberg, M.R. Hendriks, S.M. de Jong & M.F.P. Bierkens, 2010, Development of a transient, lumped hydrological model for geomorphologic units in a geomorphology based rainfall-runoff modeling framework. Geophysical Research Abstracts EGU-Vol.12, EGU General Assembly 2010, Vienna.
Addink E.A., S.M. de Jong, S.A. Davis, V. Dubyanskiy & H. Leirs, 2009, Using very high resolution remote sensing to monitor and to combat outbreaks of bubonic plague in Kazakhstan. XIV Brazilian Remote Sensing Symposium, Natal RN, Brazil. April 25-30. Published on line: www.dsr.inpe.br 8 pp.
De Jong S.M., E.A. Addink, L.P.H. van Beek & D. Duijsings, 2009, Mapping of soil surface crusts using airborne hyperspectral HyMap imagery in a Mediterranean environment. XIV Brazilian Remote Sensing Symposium, Natal RN, Brazil. April 25-30. Published on line: www.dsr.inpe.br. 8 pp.
Immerzeel W.W., P.Droogers, S.M. de Jong & M.F.P. Bierkens, 2009, The water balance as a confirmation of glacial melt in the upper Indus basin. Geophysical Research Abstracts Vol.11, EGU General Assembly 2009, Vienna.
Kleinhans M., H.E. van kasteele, E. Hauber, G. de Villiers, G. Postma, S.M. de Jong & P.de Boer, 2009, Paleo flow and sediment delivery reconstructions from fan delta morphology by combined modeling and HRSC DTM analysis. Abstract to the 40th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference. Woodlands, Texas, March 23–27.
Nijland W., M. van der Meijde, E.A. Addink, S.M. de Jong, & F.D. van der Meer, 2009, Electrical resistivity tomography detection of vegetation water use. Geophysical Research Abstracts Vol.11, EGU General Assembly 2009, Vienna.
Villiers G. de, M. Kleinhans, G. Postma, E. Hauber, S.M. de Jong & P.L. de Boer, 2009, Types of Martian fan-shaped sedimentary deposits. Abstract to the 40th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference. Woodlands, Texas, March 23–27.
Addink E.A., M.E. ten Haaf & S.M. de Jong, 2008, Monitoring Vegetation Structure in Flodplains for Flood Risk Estimation. Proceedings of GEOBIA, 2008 – Pixels, Objects, Intelligence: Geographic Object Based Image Analysis, Calgary, 5-8 August, 6pp.
Castellanos A.E.A.; C.J. van Westen, Th.W.J. van Asch, S.M. de Jong, S. Begueria, V.G. Jetten, 2008, Integrating Methods for Investigating a Historic Landslide: Jagüeyes Landslide Case Study, Cuba. Geophysical Research Abstracts. European Geophysical Union General Assembly, Vol.10 CDROM, 13-18 April, 2008. Vienna Austria ISSN: 1029-7006, 2pp.
De Jong S.M. & E.A. Addink, 2008, Remote Sensing Activities at the Department of Physical Geography, Utrecht University. EARSeL Newsletter 73, pp.17-22.
De Jong S.M. E.A. Addink & D. Duijsing, 2008, Physical Characterization and Spectral Response of Mediterranean Soil Surface Crusts. Geophysical Research Abstracts, European Geophysical Union General Assembly, Vol.10 CDROM, 13-18 April, 2008. Vienna Austria ISSN: 1029-7006, 2pp.
Immerzeel W., S.M. de Jong, M.F.P. Bierkens and P. Droogers, 2008, Large-scale Monitoring of Snow Cover and Runoff Dynamics in Himalayan River basins using Remote Sensing. Abstract 10th International Symposium on High Mountain Remote Sensing Cartography (HMRSC X), Kathmandu, Nepal. 8-11 September 2008. 1pp.
Van der Kwast J., D. Karssenberg & S.M. de Jong, 2008, Quantification of top soil moisture patterns: evaluation of field methods, process-based modeling, remote sensing and an integrated approach. Abstract to the first Luxembourg Earth Observation Day: ‘Remote Sensing in Hydrology. Bourglinster, Luxembourg, 19 November 2008, 2pp.
Van Kempen R. A. Zoomers, O. Atzema, I. van Aalst & S.M. de Jong, 2008, Honderd jaar Geografie In Utrecht. In: R. van Kempen, I. van Aalst, K. Frenken & A. Zoomers (Eds.), Honderd jaar geografie in Utrecht. ISBN: 978-90-6266-025-4. Faculteit Geowetenschappen, Utrecht, pp. 9-18.
De Jong S.M., E.A. Addink & V.G. Jetten, 2007, Using Remotely Sensed Vegetation Indices and Spectral Mixture Analysis to Estimate Spatial Patterns of Rainfall Interception of Quercus Ilex Forests. Proceedings ForestSAT2007 conference. 5-7 November 2007 at Montpellier. CDRom Publication 5pp.
Farifteh J., F.D. van der Meer, S.M. de Jong & M. van der Meijde, 2007, Salinity Modelling by Inverted Gaussian Parameters of Soil Reflectance Spectra. Poster presentation at the 5th EARSeL Special Interest Group on Imaging Spectrometry: innovation in Environmental Research, 23-25 April 2007, Bruges, Belgium. CDRom Publication.
Addink E.A., S.M. de Jong, E. Pebesma & W. Nijland, 2007, Estimating Biomass and LAI in Mediterranean Forests From Hymap Data Using Object-Oriented Image Analysis. How to Define Optimal Objects? Proceedings ForestSAT2007 conference. 5-7 November 2007 at Montpellier. CDRom Publication 5pp.
De Jong S.M., L.M.T. de Carvalho, F.D. van der Meer, V.G. Jetten, 2007, Final Report on the Refresher Course 2006: Earth Observation and Dynamic GIS Modeling of the Earth Surface for Environmental and Forest Conservation aimed at the Latin Americ Region. Held 6-19 November 2006. Final report to NUFFIC, The Hague. 24pp.
Addink E.A. & S.M.de Jong, 2007, Does the Azimuth Direction of Observation of Trees Influence Chlorophyll Content and spectral Reflectance. Poster presentation at the 5th EARSeL Special Interest Group on Imaging Spectromerty: innovation in Environmental Research, 23-25 April 2007, Bruges, Belgium.
Addink, E.A., De Jong, S.M. and Pebesma, E.J. (2006). The importance of scale in object-based image segmentation and quantitative mapping of vegetation parameters. Annual conference of the Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Society. Understanding a changing world. Integrated approaches to monitoring, measuring and modelling the environment., Cambridge, CDRom.
Addink, E.A., De Jong, S.M. and Pebesma, E.J. (2006). Spatial object definition for vegetation parameter estimation from HyMap data. ISPRS Commission VII Mid-term Symposium, From Pixels to Processes, Enschede. CDRom.
De Jong S.M., M. Bierkens & R. van der Vaart, 2006, Water: bron en bedreiging van leven. Lezingen Universiteitsdag. Alumniburo Universiteit Utrecht.16 pp.
Addink E A, I. Thonon , S.M. De Jong, B.G.H. Gorte, R. Beck, M. van Persie and H. Kramer, 2006, The Mutatis Mutandis Project: Single Detection, multiple users – Change detection using high spatial-resolution imagery in Dutch urban areas. Proceedings of the First workshop of the EARSeL SIG on Urban Remote Sensing. 2to 4 March 2006, Berlin-Adlershof, Germany (as pdf).
De Jong S.M., R. Sluiter, C.J. van der Sande & A.P.J. de Roo, 2005, Using IKONOS XS Imagery to Assess Flood Damage and Hydraulic Roughness of River Beds. In: M. Luic (Ed.), New Strategies for European Remote Sensing. Proceedings of the 24th Symposium of the European Association of Remote Sensing Laboratories, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 25-27 May 2004, pp. 227-235.
Sluiter R. & S.M. de Jong, 2005, Using Ancillary Data to Improve Classification of Degraded Mediterranean Vegetation with HyMap Spectroscopic Images. In: M. Luic (Ed.), New Strategies for European Remote Sensing. Proceedings of the 24th Symposium of the European Association of Remote Sensing Laboratories, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 25-27 May 2004, pp. 219-226.
Hu Yong, Steven M. de Jong & Raymond Sluiter, 2004, A Modelling-based Thresholding Approach to Derive Change / No Change Information over Vegetation Area. Proceedings of 12th International Conference on Geoinformatics: Geospatial Information Research, Bridging the Pacific and Atlantic, 7-9 June, Gävle, Sweden. 8pp on CD-Rom.
Vander Meer F.D. & S.M. de Jong, 2004, Spectral Mapping Methods: many problems, some solutions. In: M. Habermeyer, A. Mueller & S. Holzwarth (Eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd EARSeL Workshop on Imaging Spectrometry, Herssching, Germany. 13-16 May 2003. ISBN 2-90885-26-3), pp.146-162.
De Jong S.M., R. Sluiter, C.J. van der Sande & A.P.J. de Roo, 2004, A Segmentation and Classification Approach of IKONOS-2 Imagery for Land Cover Mapping to Assist Flood Risk and Flood Damage Assessment. Proceedings of the 24th EARSeL Symposium: New Strategies for European Remote Sensing, 25-27 May, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
Sluiter R. & S.M. de Jong, 2004, Using Ancillary Data to Improve the Classification of Degraded Mediterranean Vegetation with HyMap Spectroscopic Images. Proceedings of the 24th EARSeL Symposium: New Strategies for European Remote Sensing, 25-27 May, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
Kemeling I., S.M. de Jong, P.B.M. van Teeffelen, L.M. van den Berg & G.J. Roerink, 2003, GIS-based Classification of High Spatial Resolution IKONOS Imagery for Surveying Agricultural Activities in the City of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop of the EARSeL Special Interest Group on Remote Sensing for Developing Countries, 18-20 September, Bonn. pp.14-22. Published on CD-Rom.
Straatsma M., H. Middelkoop & S.M. de Jong, 2003, Remote Sensing, Floodplain Vegetation and Hydraulics. Proceedings of the NCR-days 2002 Current Themes in Dutch River Research. NCR Publication 20-2003, Delft. pp.166-169.
De Jong S.M., V.G. Jetten & R.Sluiter, 2002, European Visions towards Land Degradation. Proceedings of the SINRAD V Symposium: Recuperation of Degraded Areas. 18-22 November, Belo Horizonte, Brasil. pp.146-157.
Carvalho L.M.T. de, J.G.P.W. Clevers, A.K. Skidmore & S.M. de Jong, 2002, A Mapping Stratgey for the Semi-Deciduous Atlantic Forest using Remotely Sensed Time Series. Proceedings of the Conference on the Use of Remote Sensing for Land Use Mapping. Curitiba, Parana, Brasil. pp.117-129.
Everhardus C., A.P.J. de Roo & S.M. de Jong, 2002, Validation of the LISFLOOD Runoff Model for a Mountainous Catchment. Poster Presentation Proceedings EuroWorkshop Geo-Information and Water Resources Assessment, 9 July, Oxford.
Kemeling I., S.M. de Jong, P.B.M. van Teeffelen, L.M. van den Berg & G.J. Roerink, 2002, Remote Sensing and GIS for Good Governance: Analysis of High Spatial Resolution IKONOS Imagery for Surveying Agricultural Activities in the City of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Proceedings of the 6th Seminar on GIS for Developing Countries, 15-18 May, ITC Enschede, pp.18.1- 18.8.
Pebesma, E.J. & Jong, S.M. de, 2002. Predicting aboveground biomass using field data and high resolution spectral imaging data. In — (Ed.), TIES. The International Environmentrics Society – 2002 conference.
Guan Yanning, S.M. de Jong & J. de Meyere, 2002, Integration of RS and GIS to Assess Human Impact on Ecosystem Change in Llanos Area (Venezuela). Proceedings of the 21st Asian Conference on Remote Sensing, December 4-8, 2000 in Taipei, Taiwan, pp.20-25.
Bielsa I., S.M. de Jong & RH.G. Jongman, 2001, Monitoring Temporal Changes in a Rural Mediterranean Landscape. Proceedings of the 2nd European IALE Conference on European Landscapes. Stockholm, June 30-July 6, pp.650-655.
De Jong S.M., 2001, Tussen twee gedachten: een Kater en een Hoera-stemming over aflopende Aardobservatieprogramma’s. Remote Sensing & Geo-informatie No.4, December 2001. Programmaburo BCRS, Delft, pp.
De Jong S.M. & A.K. Bregt, 2001, Ruimtelijke Gadgets in de Agri-sector. Agro Informatica 14, Nr.1, pp.11-14.
Epema G.F., M. Fikre Botoro, H. Deurloo & S.M. de Jong, 2001, Monitoring Land Use in Tigray. Proceedings First Workshop of EARSeL Special Interest Group on Remote Sensing for Developing Countries. 13-15 September Gent. pp. 135-140.
Van Teeffelen P.B.M., L. van den Berg & S.M. de Jong, 2001, Urban Monitoring: New Possibilities of Combining High Spatial Resolution Ikonos Images with Contextual Image Analysis Techniques. Proceedings of the IEEE/ISPRS Joint Workshop on Remote Sensing and Data Fusion over Urban Areas, Rome. November, 8-9, pp. 265-269.
Van Teeffelen P.B.M. & S.M. de Jong, 2001, Remote Sensing Applications in Developing Countries: Combining Socio-Economic and Physical Information: Shall the Twain Ever Meet? Proceedings First Workshop EARSeL Special Interest Group on Remote Sensing for Developing Countries. 13-15 September Gent. pp.99-112.
Addink E.A., J.G.P.W. Clevers, G.F. Epema, S.M. de Jong, W.H. Bakker,F.D. van der Meer & A.K. Skidmore, 2000, Meriland-2: MERIS Multiscale Land Applications Study. CGI Report 2000-08. Wageningen UR, Wageningen.
Clevers, J.G.P.W., de Jong, S.M., Epema, G.F., Scholte, K., Van der Meer, F., Bakker, W.H. & Skidmore, A.K. 2000. The use of the MERIS standard band setting for deriving the red edge index. In: Proceedings of the ISSSR, Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.,On Cdrom, 8 pp.
Clevers, J.G.P.W., de Jong, S.M., Epema, G.F., Addink, E.A., Van der Meer, F., Bakker, W.H. & Skidmore, A.K. 2000. MERIS and the red-edge index. Presented at the Second EARSeL workshop on Imaging Spectroscopy, 11-13 July 2000, ITC, Enschede, the Netherlands.
Clevers J.G.P.W. & S.M. de Jong, 2000, Introduction to the Concepts and the History of Remote Sensing. In: J.G.P.W. Clevers & S.M. de Jong (Eds.), Remote sensing, State of the Art for Land Applications. PHLO Course, 22-24 November, Wageningen. 10 pp.
Dankers R., H. Middelkoop & S.M. De Jong, 2000, Application of NOAA-AVHRR and SPOT VEGETATION imagery for observation and modelling of water balance components in Northern Fennoscandia. Paper presented at the 5th Dutch Earth Science Conference (NAC 5), 20 & 21 April 2000, Veldhoven, The Netherlands.
De Jong S.M., J.G.P.W. Clevers, E. Pebesma & B. Lacaze, 2000, Assessing Aboveground Biomass of Mediterranean Forests Using Airborne Hyperspectral Images and Geostatistics. Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Spatial Accuracy Assessment in Natural Resources and Environmental Sciences: Accuracy-2000, Amsterdam 11-13 July. pp 161-169.
De Jong S.M. & J.G.P.W. Clevers, 2000, Concepts and Applications of Imaging Spectrometry. In: J.G.P.W. Clevers & S.M. de Jong (Eds.), Remote sensing, State of the Art for Land Applications. PHLO Course, 22-24 November, Wageningen. 10 pp.
Hornstra T., H.G. Maas & S.M. de Jong, 2000, Classification of Spectroscopical Imagery by Combining Spectral and Spatial Information: the SSC Method. Proceedings of the 19th ISPRS Congres, Amsterdam 16-23 July. pp. 550-558.
Koster E., A. Lucieer, S.M. de Jong & V.G. Jetten, 2000, The DAIS La Peyne Experiment: Using the Optical and Thermal DAIS Bands to Survey and Model the Surface Temperature. Proceedings of the 19th ISPRS Congres, Amsterdam 16-23 July. pp. 347-354.
Van der Meer F.D. , J.P.G.W. Clevers, S.M. de Jong, W.H. Bakker, G.F. Epema, A.K. Skidmore & K. Scholte, 2000, MERILAND: MERIS Potential for Land Applications. Final Report Contract 99-36, BCRS-report 99-36, Delft. 113 pp.
Van der Meer F., W. Bakker, K. Scholte, A. Skidmore, S.M. de Jong, J. Clevers & G. Epema, 2000, Vegetation Indices, Aboveground Biomass Estimates and the Red Edge from MERIS. Proceedings of the 19th ISPRS Congres, Amsterdam 16-23 July. pp. 1580-1587.
De Roo A., J. van der Knijff, M. Horritt, G. Schmuck, S.M. de Jong, 1999, Assessing Flood damages of the 1997 Oder Flood and the 1995 Meuse Flood. 2nd Int. Symp. On Operationalization of Remote sensing, Enschede, 16-20 August. 9 pp.
De Jong S.M., 1999, The AVIRIS Earth Science and Applications Workshop. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 85, BCRS Delft. pp.50-52.
De Jong S.M., P.B.M. van Teeffelen, W.P.A. van Deursen, A. Bagré, 1999, Monitoring Trends in Urban Growth. The Case of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: A View from the Sky. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 84, BCRS Delft. pp.43-45.
De Jong S.M. & A.K. Bregt, Je weet niet wat je ziet vanuit een satelliet & Net werk in geo-informatiekunde. Inaugurele Rede 16 september 1999, Universiteit Wageningen, 32pp.
De Jong S.M., S. Sommer, B. Lacaze, K. Scholte & F. van der Meer, 1999, The DAIS La Peyne Experiment: Using Airborne Imaging Spectrometry for Land Degradation Survey and Modelling. In: Nieuwenhuis G.J.A., Vaughan R.A. & Molenaar M. (Eds.), “Operational Remote Sensing for Sustainable Development”, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam: pp. 247-254 (ISBN: 90 5809 029 9).
Van der Meer, F., Bakker, W., Scholte, S., Skidmore, A., Clevers, J., Epema, G. & de Jong, S. 1999, Simulating data from ESA’s Medium Resolution Imaging Spectrometer for land applications. In: Nieuwenhuis G.J.A., Vaughan R.A. & Molenaar M. (Eds.), “Operational Remote Sensing for Sustainable Development”, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam: pp. 219-224 (ISBN: 90 5809 029 9).
Van der Meer F.D., J.G.P.W. Clevers, S.M. de Jong, W.H. Bakker, G.F. Epema, A.K. Skidmore & K. Scholte, 1999, MERILAND: MERIS Potential for Land Applications. ITC Technical Report. ITC, Enschede. 109pp.
Van der Meer F., S.M. de Jong, 1999, One-day Symposium ‘Imaging Spectrometry’. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 85, BCRS Delft. pp.59-61.
Bagré A., S.M. de Jong, W.P.A. van Deursen & P.B.M. van Teeffelen, 1998, Monitoring Trends in Urban Growth: the Case of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. A View from the Sky. Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Geographical Information Systems for Developing Countries, Pretoria 1-3 October. 13pp.
Bakker, W., J. Clevers, G. Epema, S.M. de Jong, F. van der Meer & A. Skidmore, 1998, Simulating ESA’s Medium Resolution Imaging Spectrometer for Land Applications. Proceedings EARSeL 98 Symposium, Enschede, 11-14 May. 8pp.
Brouwer L.C., S.M. de Jong & H.Th. Riezebos, 1998, Ecozones in Mediterranean Europe. Working Paper DeMon-2 Project. Utrecht University, The Netherlands. 15pp.
De Jong S.M., 1998, Het DAIS La Peyne Experiment: Het Gebruik van Beeldvormende Spectrometrie voor het Monitoren van Landschapsprocessen. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 81, pp.26-30. BCRS, Delft.
De Jong S.M., H.M.A.van der Werff, F.van der Meer & K. Scholte, 1998, Using the DAIS7915 Imaging Spectrometer for Mapping Mineral Abundances in Vegetated and Fragmentated Mediterranean Areas: Possibilities & Constraints. Proceedings of EARSeL Symposium Imaging Spectrometry, Zurich, 5-9 October, pp 341-348.
De Jong S.M., L.C. Brouwer & H.Th. Riezebos, 1998, Erosion Hazard Assessment in the La Peyne Catchment, France. Working Paper DeMon-2 Project. Utrecht University, The Netherlands. 27 pp.
Van der Meer F., K. Scholte, W. Bakker, A. Skidmore, S.M. de Jong, J. Clevers, G. Epema, 1998, Het Envisat Programma, Meriland: Potential for Land Applications. Remote sensing Nieuwsbrief 83, pp.32-34, BCRS Delft.
Van der Meer F., K. Scholte, S.M. de Jong, M. Dorresteijn, 1998, MERILAND: Spatial Variability and Mapping Accuracy. Proceedings EARSeL Workshop on Imaging Spectroscopy, Zurich 6-8 October, pp.147-154.
Van der Meer F., W. Bakker, K. Scholte, , A.K. Skidmore, , J.G.P.W. Clevers, G. Epema, S.M. de Jong, 1998, ESA’s Medium Resolution Imaging Spectrometer for Land Applications. Proceedings 24th Annual Conference and Exhibition of the Remote Sensing Sciety Developing International Connections RSS98, Greenwich UK, pp.231-237.
Van Teeffelen P.B.M. & S.M. de Jong, 1998, Stedelijke Uitbreiding van La Paz tussen 1987 en 1992: een Remote Sensing kartering. De Grote Bosatlas 51 Plus, Wolters Noordhoff, Groningen. pp.178-179.
Van der Meer, F., Bakker, W., Scholte, S., Skidmore, A., Clevers, J., Epema, G. & de Jong, S. 1998. ESA’s medium resolution imaging spectrometer for land applications. Presented at the Fourth National Earth Science Congres (NAC IV), 7 & 8 May 1998, Veldhoven, the Netherlands.
Van der Meer F., W. Bakker, K. Scholte, A.K. Skidmore, J. Clevers, G.F. Epema & S.M. de Jong, 1998, MERILand: a MERIS Simulation Study. Poster Presentation EARSeL 98 Symposium, Enschede, 11-14 May.
De Jong S.M., 1997, The Use of AVIRIS to Survey Volcanic Gas Emissions & Dead and CO2-Induced Stressed Trees in the Long Valley Caldera (Sierra Nevada, CA). Abstract ITC Hyperspectral Workshop, 12-13 March.
De Jong S.M., 1996, Surveying Dead Trees and CO2-Induced Stressed Trees using AVIRIS in the Long Valley Caldera. Proceedings of the 6th Airborne Earth Science Workshop, March 4-8, Jet Propulsion Lab., Pasadena. pp.124-136.
De Jong S.M. & T.O. Chrien, 1996, Mapping Volcanic Gas Emissions in the Mammoth Mountain Area Using AVIRIS. Proceedings of the 6th Airborne Earth Science Workshop, March 4-8, Jet Propulsion Lab., Pasadena. pp.136-144.
De Jong S.M., 1996, Using Imaging Spectroscopy to Survey Tree Damage and Diffuse Volcanic Gas Emissions in the Long Valley Caldera, California. Final Report Talent-Stipend S76-175, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, The Hague, 46pp.
Hill J. (Ed.), B. Lacaze, V. Casselles, C.Coll, C. Hoff, S.M. de Jong, W. Mehl, J.F.W. Negendank, H.Th. Riezebos, E. Rubio, S. Sommer, J. Teixeira Filho & E. Valor, 1996, Integrated Approaches to Desertification Mapping and Monitoring in the Mediterranean Basin. Final Report DeMon-1 Project. Joint Research Centre EUR 16448 EN, 165 pp.
De Jong S.M., 1996, Een Zes Maands Werkbezoek aan het Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Questa No.4, pp. 14-16.
Dekker A. & S.M. de Jong, 1996, Report on the Sixth JPL Airborne Earth Science Workshop. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 69, pp.29-31.
De Jong S.M., 1996, Report on the 16th EARSeL Symposium: Intergrated Applications for Risk Assessment and Disaster Prevention fro the Mediterranean. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief 69, pp. 32-33.
De Bot B. & S.M. de Jong, 1996, The Use of Multi-temporal NOAA?AVHRR Data to Characterize Range Productivity under Different Land Management Systems in Zimbabwe. Proceedings of the 3rd Seminar on GIS and Developing Countries GISDECO, 2-3 August Utrecht, The Netherlands, pp.34-46.
De Jong, S.M., 1994, Using Imaging Spectrometry for Modelling Soil Erosion. Proceedings International Symposium on Spectral Sensing Research (ISSSR’94), 10-15 July, San Diego, California, pp.842-849.
De Jong S.M., J.L. Gunnink & H.Th. Riezebos, 1993, The Analysis of Airborne Spectroscopical Images for Soil Degradation Studies. Proceedings of the Workshop on Soil Erosion in Semi-Arid Mediterranean Areas, 28-30 October 1993, Taormina, Italy. pp.99-110.
Gunnink J.L. , S.M. de Jong & H.Th. Riezebos, 1993, Modelling Runoff from Sealed Soils. Proceedings of the Workshop on Soil Erosion in Semi-Arid Mediterranean Areas, 28-30 October 1993, Taormina, Italy. pp.123-136.
Lacaze B. (Ed.), V. Caselles, J. Hill, S.M. de Jong, J. Negendank, H. Riezebos, 1993, Desertification in Mediterranean Area. Progress Report DEMON-project Contract No. EV5V-0035, EC-DGXII: Environment. 25pp.
De Jong S.M., 1993, Fractal Analysis of Digital Images to Classify Land Cover Types. Proceedings 25th International Symposium Remote Sensing and Global Environmental Change (ERIM). 4-8 April, Graz, Austria, pp.749-758.
De Jong S.M., 1992, Geostatistics or Imaging Spectroscopy to Produce Spatial Continuous Maps. Proceedings of the Workshop on Mediterranean Ecosystem Mapping and Desertification Monitoring, Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy (23-24 June) 10pp.
De Jong S.M. & H.Th. Riezebos, 1992, Assessment of Erosion Risk Using Multitemporal Remote Sensing Data and an Empirical Erosion Model. Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on GIS (EGIS’92), March 23-26, Munich, pp.893-900.
De Jong S.M. & H.Th. Riezebos, 1991, Use of a GIS-database to Improve Multispectral Image Classification Accuracy. Proceedings of the second European Conference on GIS (EGIS’91), 2-5 April, Brussels pp.503-508.
De Jong S.M., 1991, Monitoring Soil Crusts Using Imaging Spectroscopy in the Department Ardèche, France. Proceedings of the International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium (IGARSS’91), 3-8 June, Helsinki pp.1187-1189.
Hill J., B. Lacaze, G. Marraci, J.F.W. Negendank, H.Th. Riezebos & S.M. de Jong, 1991, The Use of High Resolution Imaging Spectroscopy Data in Mediterranean Land Degradation and Soil Erosion Hazard Assessments. Proceedings of the Congres of the European Union of Geosciences, 25-26 March, Strasbourg.
Verdurmen R.(Ed.), S.M. de Jong & A. Reijneveld, 1991, Toepassingen Remote Sensing. In: De Ingenieur, No.3 Jaargang 103.
De Jong S.M., 1991, High Resolution Imaging Spectroscopy (HIRIS) voor Land Degradatie Onderzoek. Remote Sensing Nieuwsbrief, Delft.
De Jong S.M. & F.J. Toppen, 1991, Teaching GIS in Physical Geography. Proceedings of the Congres on Higher Education in GIS, 24-27 Okt, Tampa, Florida, USA. pp.14.
F.J. Toppen & S.M. de Jong, 1991, Teaching GIS in Human Geography. Proceedings of the Congres on Higher Education in GIS, 24-27 Okt, Tampa, Florida, USA. 18pp.
De Jong S.M., 1990, Integration of Remotely Sensed and GIS Data to Determine SPOT Land Use Classification Accuracy. Proceedings of the first European Conference on GIS (EGIS’90), 10-14 April, Amsterdam. pp.517-525.
H.Th. Riezebos, V.G. Jetten and S.M. de Jong, 1990, The Use of GIS for Land Evaluation Studies. Proceedings of the first European Conference on GIS (EGIS’90), 10-14 April, Amsterdam. pp.915-919.
De Jong S.M. & V.G. Jetten, 1990, Geostatistical Applications in Monitoring Water Quality Using Thematic Mapper Images. Proceedings of the Int. Symposium on Remote Sensing and Water Resources, 24-29 augustus 1990, ITC Enschede, The Netherlands. pp.627-637.
De Jong S.M. & H.Th. Riezebos, 1989, Geostatistics in soil erosion studies. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on PC-based GIS Integrating Remote Sensing Data for the Management of European Mariginal Lands, 6-7 Sept., JRC Ispra, Italy, pp.147-154.
Huizer K., M.J.C. Nieuwenhuis, A. Noor, S.M. de Jong (Ed.), 2003, Verification of the hydrological and Erosion Section of the RamCo Model. Suggested improvements based on a characterization of the subcatchments: Batulapisi and Bontotene (Sulawesi, Indonesia). Final report to the Netherlands Research Organization (NWO-ALW), The Hague. 114pp.
Everhardus C. & S.M. de Jong, 2002, Validation of the LISFLOOD Runoff model for a mountainous catchment. Technical Report EUR 20514 EN, Joint Research Centre, Ispra Italy (contract: H08.CCR.479734.U.045), 25pp.
De Jong S.M. & J.G.P.W. Clevers, 2001, Application Assessment and Sensor Definition of a Super Spectral Sensor. Final Report to Astrium and ESA Contract AO/1-3730/00/NL/DC, ESTEC Noordwijk. 49 pp.
Addink E.A., J.G.P.W. Clevers, F.D. van der Meer, S.M. de Jong, G.F. Epema, A.K. Skidmore & W.H. Bakker, 2001, Meriland-2: MERIS Multiscale Land Applications Study. CGI Report 2000-08, ISBN 90-6754-646-1. Final Report to the BCRS under contract 3.1/AP-07. BCRS, Delft. 49 pp.
De Jong S.M. & C. van der Sande, 2001, River Flood Damage Assessment using Ikonos Imagery. Final Report to the Space Application Institute, JRC Italy. Contract No. NL-410332, 78pp.
De Jong S.M., 2000, The Effect of land Use Changes on Flooding using the LISFLOOD Model. Final Report Contract EUR EN 391898 V, Joint Research Centre Italy. 65pp.
De Jong S.M., A. Lucieer & E. Koster, 2000, The DAIS LA Peyne Experiment: Using the Optical and Thermal DAIS Bands to Survey and Model the Surface Temperature. Final Report Contract No. DAIS98-FR2, DLR Oberpfaffenhofen. 115 pp.
Hornstra T. & S.M. de Jong, 2000, Combinatie van Ruimtelijke en Spectrale Informatie in een Klassificatie van Spectroscopische Beelden: a DAIS7915 studie. Final Report Contract No. DAIS97-NL1, DLR Oberpfaffenhofen. 62 pp.
Van Deursen W.P.A, A. Bagré, S.M. de Jong & P.B.M. van Teeffelen, 1999, Monitoring Trends in Urban Growth: Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. BCRS Report 99-02, BCRS, Delft. 53pp.
De Jong S.M. & H.Th. Riezebos, 1992, Assessment of Erosion Risk Using Multitemporal Remote Sensing Data and an Empirical Erosion Model. Study Contract No. 4127-90-11 ED.ISP.NL, Joint Research Centre Ispra, Italy. 61pp.
De Jong S.M., J.C. van Hees, P.B.M. Haemers and H.Th. Riezebos (Ed.), 1990, Physiographic and Pedological Mapping for Erosion Hazard Assessment (Ardèche Test Site). Contract Study No. 3787-89-08ED.ISP.NL. IRSA, JRC-Ispra, Italy. 39pp.
De Jong S.M. & H.Th. Riezebos, 1990, The Use of Multispectral Satellite Images for Land Use and Land Cover Mapping in Kakamega District, Kenya. Final Report to DGOIS, The Hague. RU Utrecht.
De Jong S.M., V.G. Jetten, H.Th. Riezebos, 1989, Geografische Informatie Systemen en Remote Sensing voor waterkwaliteitsonderzoek in het IJsselmeergebied. Het IJsselmeer en Ketelmeer. Final Report to DBW-RIZA, RU Utrecht.

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Brigham and Women’s Hospital v. Perrigo Co. (13-cv-11640).
Enhanced damages would not be applied, despite the jury’s finding of willfulness, in part because the awarded damages were at the high end of those sought.
Judge Zobel’s April order was interesting in that she found that final judgment had previously been entered, triggering the timelines of Fed R. 50(b) and 59(e), which could not be expanded by the district court, despite her having granted a joint motion to extend the deadline. Thus, Perrigo’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was not timely filed, and its notice of appeal was also late.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on August 12, 2017 September 24, 2017 Categories Attorneys' Fees, laches, Patent, Trial, Willful InfringementLeave a comment on Brigham and Women’s Hospital v. Perrigo Co. (13-cv-11640).
Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services d/b/a Mayo Medical Laboratories (15-cv-40075).
Judge Talwani granted Mayo’s motion to dismiss Athena Diagnostics’ complaint, finding the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 encompassed unpatentable subject matter. The patent is directed to diagnosing Myasthenia Gravis, an autoimmune disorder by detecting IgG autoantibodies. The inventors had discovered that some sufferers of the disease had IgG antibodies that attack a receptor, known as MuSK, on muscles, resulting in muscular weakness, and developed a diagnosis method whereby a radio-labelled version of the receptor, known as 125I-Musk, is introduced to a sample of bodily fluid to attach to MuSK antibodies. The fluid is immunoprecipitated, and the presence of the radioactive label indicates the person has the disease. In the face of Mayo’s Alice motion, Athena argued that the claims were not directed to a law of nature, but instead utilize the man-made 125I-Musk to form a complex with MuSK antibodies that do not occur in nature. Judge Talwani agreed that the complex was not naturally-occurring, but found that this did not transform the subject matter to a patent eligible concept – the patent was not directed to the 125I-Musk-antibody complex, but to the interaction of the 125I-Musk and antiobodies present in fluid, which is a naturally-occurring interaction. She analogized the facts with those of Mayo, in which while it “took human action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger the desired reaction, the reaction itself happened apart from any human action.” Judge Talwani determined that in Mayo, a man-made substance was administered to a person and the by-product of the metabolization of that substance was observed, just as here.
Having determined that the patent was directed to a law of nature, Judge Talwani next determined that the claims did not include an inventive concept beyond the law of nature that would nevertheless make them patent-eligible, relying on statements in the patent specification that “iodination and immunoprecipitation are standard techniques in the art.” Athena argued that, while the iodination (radio-labelling) and immunoprecipitation processes were known at the time of invention, they were not well understood or routine when applied to complex molecules like proteins. The Court, citing the written description requirements of 35 US.C. 112, found that the specification lacked any such statements, and that Athena’s argument was contradicted by the specification.
In analyzing both the first and second steps of the Alice test, Judge Talwani relied on language in the specification that the purpose of the patent was for diagnosing neurotransmission or developmental disorders related to MuSK, finding that, on its face, the patent claims a process for detecting antibodies, not for creating the 125I-Musk. Because the antibodies occur naturally, it did not matter that 125I-Musk is not itself naturally occurring.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on August 8, 2017 September 22, 2017 Categories Motion to Dismiss, PatentLeave a comment on Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services d/b/a Mayo Medical Laboratories (15-cv-40075).
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Zoll Medical Corp. (10-cv-11041).
A jury verdict was reach in the case of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Zoll Medical Corp. The jury awarded Philips $8,900,000 as a reasonable royalty for infringement of the ‘374 patent and $1,500,000 for infringement of the ‘454 and ‘905 patents, but also awarded Zoll $3,300,000 for Philips’ infringement of Zoll’s ‘526 and ‘187 patents. Neither side was found to willfully infringe.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on August 7, 2017 September 22, 2017 Categories Patent, TrialLeave a comment on Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Zoll Medical Corp. (10-cv-11041).
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on August 2, 2017 September 22, 2017 Categories Complaint, Patent1 Comment on Boston Heart Diagnostics Corp.
Author dmassiplitigationPosted on July 26, 2017 September 24, 2017 Categories Patent, Uncategorized, Willful InfringementLeave a comment on Koninkiljke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Zoll Medical Corp. (10-cv-11041).

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The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality’s (“DEQ”) Cooperative Lakes Monitoring Program and Michigan Clean Water Corps both offer volunteer water quality monitoring opportunities. See Cooperative Lakes Monitoring Program, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3681_3686_3731-195536--,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); Mich. Clean Water Corps, https://micorps.net/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). The Michigan Clean Water Corps was created by an executive order in 2003: “The primary responsibility of the Corps shall be to assist the DEQ in establishing a comprehensive statewide volunteer water quality monitoring network . . . and to encourage the participation of other water quality monitoring programs in the Corps.” See Exec. Order No. 2003-15(I)(B) (2003).
The Department of Natural Resource’s “Eyes in the Field” application allows volunteers to report sightings of animals observed in the wild. See Eyes in the Field, Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., https://secure1.state.mi.us/ORS/Home, (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
In order to research fish and wildlife on state park lands, land use and research permits are required. See Mich. Admin. Code R 299.927(n); Cultural/Scientific Research Permits, Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79136_79262_80436_85611---,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); Scientific Collector’s Permits (Wildlife), Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79134_82777-230545--,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); Cultural & Scientific Collectors Permit (Fisheries), Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79134_82777-452717--,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
“(a) Enter the lands or premises of another without lawful authority after having been forbidden to do so by the owner or occupant or the agent of the owner or occupant.
(b) Remain without lawful authority on the land or premises of another after being notified to depart by the owner or occupant or the agent of the owner or occupant.
(c) Enter or remain without lawful authority on fenced or posted farm property of another person without the consent of the owner or his or her lessee or agent. A request to leave the premises is not a necessary element for a violation of this subdivision. This subdivision does not apply to a person who is in the process of attempting, by the most direct route, to contact the owner or his or her lessee or agent to request consent.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.552(1).
“(1) A person shall not knowingly and intentionally operate an unmanned aircraft system to subject an individual to harassment. As used in this subsection, “harassment” means that term as defined in section 411h or 411i of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h and 750.411i.
(3) A person shall not knowingly and intentionally operate an unmanned aircraft system to violate section 539j of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.539j, or to otherwise capture photographs, video, or audio recordings of an individual in a manner that would invade the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.322.
An individual who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor “punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.” Id. § 259.323(1).
“(1) Except as expressly authorized by statute, a political subdivision shall not enact or enforce an ordinance or resolution that regulates the ownership or operation of unmanned aircraft or otherwise engage in the regulation of the ownership or operation of unmanned aircraft.
(2) This act does not prohibit a political subdivision from promulgating rules, regulations, and ordinances for the use of unmanned aircraft systems by the political subdivision within the boundaries of the political subdivision.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.305.
On lands under the jurisdiction of the Mackinac Island State Park Commission it is unlawful for a person to “[u]se or operate an unmanned aircraft without proper written permission.” Mich. Admin. Code R 318.146(o).
Entry upon a “key facility” that is “completely enclosed by a physical barrier of any kind… and is posted with signage” is prohibited. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.552c(1).
“Key facilities” include: chemical manufacturing facilities, refineries, electric utility facilities, water treatment facilities, liquid natural gas facilities, transportation facilities, pulp or paper manufacturing facilities, pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, waste treatment or disposal facilities, or “substantially similar” facilities. Id. § 750.552c(1)(a)-(l).
A violation of this section is “a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both.” Id. § 750.552c(3).
“(1) As used in this section…(d) ‘Stalking’ means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested…..
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both….” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411h.
A victim may maintain a civil action against an individual who engages in stalking whether or not that individual has been charged or convicted. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2954.
Although our research is incomplete, this provision could be construed to allow the use of information collected by citizens.
The Michigan Clean Water Corps may “assist the DEQ in gathering and exchanging reliable and meaningful water quality data for water resources management and protection programs.” See Exec. Order No. 2003-15.
Requires certification that the claim “is well grounded in fact.” Mich. Ct. R. 1.109(E)(5)(b).
“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Mich. R. Evid. 901(a).
Michigan Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standard. See Chapin v. A & L Parts, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 35, 36-38 (Mich. 2007); Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 2004).


The biometric bandwagon keeps rolling along as more and more states seek to regulate the collection, use, and retention of biometric data. Currently, three states, Illinois , Texas , and Washington , have biometric privacy laws in place, while the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) , which was previously covered by K&L Gates (available here), goes into effect on January 1, 2020. Now, on the heels of a seminal decision addressing the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“Illinois BIPA”), which we recently discussed (available here), Arizona, Florida, and Massachusetts have become the latest states to propose legislation addressing the issue of biometric privacy, and other states are also considering biometric privacy laws.
While the recently proposed bills all continue the growing trend of regulating the collection, retention, and use of biometric data, their approaches differ in significant respects and highlight the varying ways states are attempting to keep up with technological advances. A key difference in the approaches by the states is whether to (a) allow only the state’s attorney general to enforce the biometric privacy law, or (b) create a private right of action allowing individuals, either on their own or via class actions, to seek enforcement through civil litigation seeking monetary relief, as exemplified by the hundreds of putative class action lawsuits seeking damages for violations of Illinois BIPA. Notably, the CCPA currently includes only a limited private right of action relating to “personal information,” which is defined more narrowly than elsewhere in the CCPA and does not include biometric information .
As more and more states consider and implement biometric privacy laws, it is becoming increasingly important for companies to ensure that they are prepared for, and complying with, the current and potentially applicable biometric privacy laws. This alert examines the biometric privacy laws most recently proposed for enactment in Arizona, Florida, and Massachusetts and compares the approaches they take to existing statutes in other jurisdictions.
On January 28, 2019, Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers introduced Arizona House Bill 2478 (“HB 2478”), which, if passed, will prohibit entities from capturing, converting, or storing an individual's biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose unless (1) it provides “a mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of a biometric identifier for a commercial purpose; or (2) advance notice [is] provided and consent [is] obtained from the individual.” HB 2478 tracks the similar provisions in Washington State’s biometric privacy law and exempts actions taken for security purposes such as preventing fraud or shoplifting, or protecting the security of software, accounts, or applications.
As HB 2478 prohibits the use of a biometric identifier for a commercial purpose, its scope is limited to persons that engage in the collection or retention of biometric identifiers in order to sell or disclose such identifiers for marketing purposes that are unrelated to the initial capture of an individual's biometric identifier . As introduced, HB 2478 will not extend to companies utilizing biometric identifiers for employment purposes, unless the company sells or discloses such identifiers to a third party.
Similar to CCPA and Washington’s law, HB 2478 broadly defines “biometric identifier” to include not only a fingerprint, retina or iris scan, or face geometry, but also any other “unique biological pattern or characteristic that is used to identify a specific individual.” HB 2478 does not create a private right of action, making it more similar to the Texas and Washington State statutes and the CCPA. While actions brought by the Texas attorney general may pursue civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, HB 2478 makes a violation of the proposed legislation a violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud statute , which provides for civil penalties of only up to $10,000 per violation . It remains to be seen how courts will interpret what constitutes a “violation” for purposes of awarding damages under any of these statutes.
As a subset of personal information, and similar to the Illinois and Washington statutes, biometric information also is defined broadly and includes not only retina scans, fingerprints, and handprints, but also “keystroke patterns or rhythms, gait patterns or rhythms, and sleep, health, or exercise data that contain identifying information.” By including data relating to sleep and exercise, S.120 tracks the CCPA and would extend to companies collecting information that may not be covered under other states’ biometric privacy laws.
Like the CCPA, entities collecting information covered under S.120 will be required to provide consumers advance notice about the different categories of personal information being collected, the business purpose for such collection, and any potential disclosure to third parties. In addition to the notice requirements, S.120 allows consumers to obtain a copy of their personal information that was collected and request deletion of all such information. If passed, companies will have an affirmative obligation to display on their websites information similar to the content of the consumer notice. S.120 also includes a non-discrimination provision that prohibits businesses from treating consumers differently who exercise their rights to request or delete information or opt out of third party disclosure.
Under the Florida Biometric Information Privacy Act, any entity that possesses biometric information will be required to develop and implement a publicly available, written policy addressing its procedures for the storage and destruction of biometric information. Advance notice to individuals along with written authorization is required by Florida’s proposed laws before any company may collect, capture, purchase, or otherwise obtain a person’s biometric information. Both bills again mirror the Illinois statute by prohibiting the sale, lease, trade, or profit from an individual’s biometric information and require advance authorization prior to disclosure to third parties.
As introduced, the proposed laws provide for a private right of action, which is framed in terms identical to Illinois BIPA, and allows “any person aggrieved by a violation” to proceed in court. Also similar to Illinois BIPA, the proposed laws call for the imposition of liquidated damages in the amount of $1,000 for negligent violations, $5,000 for intentional or reckless violations, or actual damages if greater, plus reasonable attorney fees. If passed, the new Florida law could take effect as early as October 2019.
Though the fate of these proposed statutes as well as other pending legislation is unclear, companies that may be collecting, storing, or using biometric information should continue to monitor state law developments to ensure compliance with the law. In light of the clear trend of states jumping on the biometric bandwagon, and the speed with which some of the new laws are being proposed, companies may also be well-served by drafting and implementing policies and procedures to protect biometric information that are compliant with existing and anticipated state statutes, as potentially applicable.
 TEX. BUS & COM. § 503.001.
 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.35.
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 et seq.
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150, limiting private right of action to personal information as defined in as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 1798.81.5.
 Of the current biometric privacy laws in place, only Illinois BIPA requires notice and consent for the capture of a biometric identifier, regardless of the purpose, while Washington State, Texas, and HB 2478 require notice and consent only if the identifier is to be used for a commercial purpose.
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1530.
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1531.


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SWINERTON BUILDERS, Plaintiff–Cross–Appellant, v. Craig NASSI, Defendant–Cross–Appellee.
Faegre Baker Daniels, LLP, Laurence W. DeMuth, III, Boulder, Colorado; Faegre Baker Daniels, LLP, Marie E. Williams, Stephen A. Wichern, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Cross–Appellant.Opinion by Judge GABRIEL.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Swinerton Builders, appeals the district court's order denying its motion to recover the attorney fees and costs that it incurred in successfully piercing Beauvallon Corporation's corporate veil, in order to enforce a previously obtained arbitration award against Beauvallon's president, defendant, Craig Nassi. As an apparent matter of first impression in Colorado, we conclude that a party who prevails in an action to pierce the corporate veil of a corporation may recover the attorney fees and costs incurred in that action if (1) the action was brought to enforce a breach of contract judgment against the corporation, and (2) the contract underlying the judgment authorized an award of fees and costs for enforcing the judgment against the corporation. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order and remand for a determination and award of the reasonable attorney fees and costs that Swinerton incurred in its successful effort to pierce Beauvallon's corporate veil in order to enforce the arbitration award against Nassi.
In the event of any litigation between the parties, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees, court costs, and all other third-party costs of the litigation incurred by the prevailing party.
¶ 3 After the construction project was completed, Swinerton filed a demand for arbitration, asserting breach of contract claims against Beauvallon and Nassi and an unjust enrichment claim against Beauvallon. The contract claim against Nassi arose out of an alleged personal guarantee.
¶ 4 Subsequently, Swinerton voluntarily dismissed its claim against Nassi without prejudice. Swinerton, however, expressly noted that it had reason to believe that Beauvallon might be an alter ego of Nassi. Thus, Swinerton reserved the right to assert a claim against Nassi to pierce the corporate veil, once the evidence was more fully developed.
¶ 5 Thereafter, Swinerton moved to re-join Nassi in the arbitration, contending that discovery had indeed established that Beauvallon was Nassi's alter ego. The arbitrators denied the motion, however, concluding that they lacked jurisdiction over a claim against Nassi.
¶ 6 Ultimately, the arbitrators ordered Beauvallon to pay Swinerton more than $1 million in damages, interest, attorney fees, and costs, and the district court subsequently confirmed this award.
¶ 7 Separately, Swinerton brought the present district court action against Nassi, seeking, among other things, (1) a declaratory judgment that Beauvallon is Nassi's alter ego and that, therefore, Nassi is bound by the terms of the construction agreement between Beauvallon and Swinerton and by any award issued by the arbitrators against Beauvallon, and (2) to pierce Beauvallon's corporate veil. The district court ultimately ruled in favor of Swinerton, concluding that Swinerton could pierce Beauvallon's corporate veil and hold Nassi personally liable for the arbitration award against Beauvallon.
¶ 8 Swinerton then sought to recover the attorney fees and costs that it incurred in the veil-piercing litigation. In essence, it argued that because the court had found that Swinerton could pierce Beauvallon's corporate veil, Nassi was liable for Swinerton's attorney fees under the construction contract's fee-shifting provision.
[A]warding attorney fees through the contractual provision is inappropriate. Such attorney fees expended in the underlying arbitration action were already awarded in the arbitration decision. The attorney fees necessary for this [veil-piercing] action are sep[a]rate and distinct [from the arbitration award fees], therefore, not awardable under the contract retroactively. An award of attorney fees for this action, due to outcome, would violate the “American Rule” and this court can find no exception that allows for such application, regardless of the argument of Swinerton.
¶ 10 Nassi then appealed the veil-piercing judgment, and Swinerton cross-appealed the denial of its motion for fees and costs. Nassi, however, later waived his appeal. Accordingly, the only issue now before us is Swinerton's appeal of the district court's refusal to award attorney fees and costs for the veil-piercing litigation.
¶ 11 We construe contractual fee-shifting provisions de novo to determine whether they entitle prevailing parties to attorney fees. Meadow Homes Dev. Corp. v. Bowens, 211 P.3d 743, 749 (Colo.App.2009); see also In re Marriage of Tognoni, ––– P.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 5436480 (Colo.App.2011) ( “We review de novo ... the legal analysis employed by the [district] court in reaching a decision on attorney fees.”).
¶ 12 Swinerton contends that the district court erred in refusing to award it the attorney fees and costs that it incurred in its successful veil-piercing action. In the circumstances presented here, we agree.
¶ 13 Numerous courts have held that an action to pierce the corporate veil is not a separate and independent cause of action, but rather is merely a procedure to enforce an underlying judgment. See, e.g., Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Technologies Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir.2004) ( “Piercing the corporate veil, after all, is not itself an action; it is merely a procedural means of allowing liability on a substantive claim, here breach of contract.”); In re Wheeler, 444 B.R. 598, 608 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2011) (noting that an action to pierce the corporate veil is not an independent cause of action, but rather is a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action); Leek v. Cooper, 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56, 71 (2011) (“A claim based upon an alter ego theory is not itself a claim for substantive relief. It is a procedural device by which courts will disregard the corporate entity in order to hold the alter ego individual liable on the obligations of the corporation.”) (citation omitted); Oceanics Schs., Inc. v. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (noting that a lawsuit against an alter ego in which the plaintiff seeks to pierce the corporate veil in connection with a previously obtained judgment against a corporation is not a separate and independent cause of action).
¶ 14 To determine whether piercing the corporate veil is appropriate, a court must consider three factors.
¶ 15 First, the court must decide whether the corporate entity is the alter ego of the shareholder. In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo.2006). A corporation is a shareholder's alter ego when the corporation is a mere instrumentality for the transaction of the shareholder's own affairs, and there is such a unity of interest in ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder no longer exist. Id.; Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 720 (Colo.App.2009).
¶ 16 Second, the court must consider whether justice requires recognizing the substance of the relationship between the shareholder and the corporation over the form because the corporate fiction was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim. Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644. The corporate veil may be pierced only when the corporate form was used to shield a dominant shareholder's improprieties. Id.
¶ 17 Third, the court must evaluate whether an equitable result will be achieved by disregarding the corporate form and holding the shareholder personally liable for the acts of the corporation. Id. Achieving an equitable result is the “paramount goal” of traditional piercing of the corporate veil. Id.
¶ 18 A claimant seeking to pierce the corporate veil must make a clear and convincing showing that each of the foregoing factors has been satisfied. Id. If a claimant satisfies this burden and the court pierces the corporate veil, then the court may ignore the independent existence of the corporate entity and hold the individual shareholder of the corporation liable for the corporation's obligations. Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644; accord United States v. Acambaro Mexican Restaurant, Inc., 631 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir.2011). Thus, as pertinent here, when the corporate veil is pierced, a shareholder who did not sign the corporate contracts at issue may be held personally liable for the contractual obligations of the corporation. See, e.g., Smith v. Multi–Financial Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Colo.App.2007) (noting that courts have bound nonsignatories to arbitration agreements under principles of veil-piercing); see also Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1169 (11th Cir.2009) (noting that under a limited set of circumstances, including veil-piercing, a signatory may bind a nonsignatory to a contract); Kingsley Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Sly, 820 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1018–19, 2011 WL 5008520, *5 (D. Ariz. No. CV 10–02243–PHX–NVW, Sept. 30, 2011) (“[T]hose who have not signed a contract containing an arbitration clause may sometimes benefit from it through doctrines such as assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and estoppel.”); F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc., 730 F.Supp.2d 318, 329 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (noting that nonsignatories may be bound to arbitration agreements under a veil-piercing or alter ego theory).
¶ 19 Applying these principles to the facts before us, we conclude that with Beauvallon's veil pierced, Nassi is responsible for Beauvallon's contractual obligations, including its obligations under the contract's fee-shifting clause. The question thus becomes whether the claim against Nassi to pierce the corporate veil was sufficient to trigger the fee-shifting clause in Beauvallon's construction contract with Swinerton. We conclude that it was.
¶ 21 Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Jahelka, 586 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D.Ill.2008), is substantially on point. There, Wachovia had obtained a substantial arbitration award against a corporation. Id. at 978. The corporation failed to pay the judgment, however, and Wachovia sued to pierce the corporate veil and to hold the corporation's individual shareholders liable for the arbitration award. Id. The court ruled for Wachovia and, relying on a fee-shifting provision in the contract between the corporation and Wachovia, ordered the shareholders to pay the attorney fees that Wachovia had incurred in its veil-piercing action. Id. at 1013–14. In so holding, the court observed that, with the corporation's veil pierced, the shareholders were liable for the corporation's obligations under the fee-shifting provision. Id. at 1014. The court further noted that “[u]nder Illinois law, a party who prevails on a veil-piercing claim can recover attorneys' fees if the underlying statute or contract provides for an award of fees.” Id. at 1013. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the shareholders' assertion that allowing Wachovia to recover fees from them amounted to “double-dipping,” because (1) Wachovia had incurred the veil-piercing fees in seeking to enforce its judgment against the corporation, and (2) the shareholders' refusal to pay the judgment had forced Wachovia to incur the fees and costs that it expended in the veil-piercing action. Id. at 1014.
¶ 22 We agree with the reasoning in Wachovia and follow it here. Specifically, as in Wachovia, when the district court determined that Swinerton could pierce Beauvallon's corporate veil, Nassi became liable for, among other things, Beauvallon's contractual obligations under the fee-shifting provision. Moreover, as in Wachovia, Swinerton incurred the attorney fees at issue here in attempting to enforce its judgment against Beauvallon, and Nassi's refusal as president of Beauvallon to pay the judgment forced Swinerton to bring the veil-piercing action.
¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that Swinerton is entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees incurred in the veil-piercing action, and we remand this case to the district court for a determination and award of the appropriate amount of such fees.
¶ 24 For the same reasons, we grant Swinerton's request to recover from Nassi the reasonable fees that it incurred in this appeal. We exercise our discretion pursuant to C.A.R. 39.5 and direct the district court to determine the reasonable amount of such fees on remand.
¶ 25 Swinerton also contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant it the costs that it incurred in the veil-piercing litigation, because the contractual fee-shifting provision allowed for the recovery of such costs. For the reasons set forth above, we agree (and we also note that Swinerton is entitled to costs under section 13–16–104, C.R.S.2011). Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall award Swinerton the reasonable costs that it incurred in the veil-piercing action.
¶ 26 For these reasons, the order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to determine and award the reasonable amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Swinerton and against Nassi in connection with the veil-piercing litigation, as well as the amount of reasonable attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
Judge ROY and Judge TERRY concur.

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