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[332 U.S. 539 , 541] Mr. Arthur B. Dunne, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners Blumenthal, Goldsmith, and Feigenbaum.
The four petitioners and Abel, another defendant, were convicted of conspiring to sell whiskey at prices above the ceiling set by regulations of the Office of Price Administration, in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 902(a), 904(a) and 925(b), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 902(a), 904(a), 925(b). The charge was made pursuant to the general conspiracy statute, 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. 88. The convictions were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. 158 F.2d 883, dissenting opinion at 158 F.2d 762. Abel has not sought review in this Court. Certiorari was granted, 331 U.S. 799 , as to the other four defendants because we thought important questions were presented concerning the applicability of our recent decision in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 .
We did not limit our grant of certiorari to that question, however, and on the record it is inseparably connected with the other issues, which relate to the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly we have considered all of petitioners' contentions. The com- [332 U.S. 539 , 542] petent proof was clearly sufficient to show that each petitioner had aided in the whiskey's illegal sale and had conspired with others to do so. The only phase of the case meriting further attention is whether, because of a difference in the state of the proof affecting two groups of defendants, the proof, in variance from the indictment, shows that there was more than one conspiracy.
This whiskey was shipped by rail from the distiller or his agent to the Francisco Distributing Company, in San Francisco, in December, 1943. Goldsmith was the individual and sole owner of that business and held a wholesale liquor dealer's basic permit as required by federal law. Weiss, his former partner, was sales manager for the business. Feigenbaum operated the Sunset Drugstore in San Francisco. Blumenthal owned and operated the Sportorium, a sporting goods and pawn shop in the same city. Abel either owned or worked in a jewelry store in Vallejo, California. The evidence does not show that any of these last three was connected with Francisco in any way except that each had part in arranging sales and deliveries of portions of these two shipments to purchasers. These were tavern owners in San Francisco and near-by towns such as Vallejo, Santa Rosa, Livermore, Cottonwood and El Cerrito. Proof of the activities of Feigenbaum, Blumenthal and Abel was made largely by [332 U.S. 539 , 543] the testimony of the various tavernkeepers with whom they respectively dealt.
If further appeared that the cost of the whiskey to Francisco was $21. 97 a case,2 the wholesale ceiling price was $25.27, and Francisco received, by check of the purchasing tavernkeepers, $24.50 for each case sold. There was thus left to it a margin above cost of $2.53 on each case, out of which were to come storage charges, if any, and legitimate net profit.
Thus far no illegal act, transaction, intent or agreement appears. But by the testimony of purchasing tavernkeepers the Government proved that in connection with each sale the purchaser had paid to the selling intermediary, in addition to the $24.50 per case remitted [332 U.S. 539 , 544] by check to Francisco, an additional sum in cash amounting roughly to from $ 30 to $40 per case. Thus the actual cost to the retailer was from $55 to $ 65 per case.
In all instances, however, whether involving sales to San Francisco or to out-of-town dealers and whether through identified or unidentified selling intermediaries, the sales followed the general pattern described above. That is, once the understanding had been reached, the purchaser made out his check at the price of $24.50 per case, to the order of 'Francisco Distributing Co.,' at the direction of the selling intermediary, to whom the check was delivered; at the same time or later the purchaser [332 U.S. 539 , 545] also paid in cash to the intermediary the difference between the amount of the check and the agreed overceiling purchase price; then or later the purchaser received invoices in the name of Francisco for the number of cases of Old Mr. Boston Rocking Chair Whiskey bought showing only the legal price of $24.50 per case; and thereafter the purchaser received delivery of the whiskey from the warehouse company, by freight in the case of out-of-town buyers. Weiss gave the warehouse company instructions for shipments or local deliveries. Francisco collected the checks by endorsing and sending them through its bank for collection. Slight variations in detail of the pattern appear in some instances but they are insignificant for our purposes.
Later conferences held separately with Goldsmith and Weiss simply confirmed the substance of the first to the effect that Francisco was not the actual owner, but that Goldsmith and Weiss were acting for an unidentified person in handling the shipments in Francisco's name. 4 The identity of the owner was not established. But Goldsmith added the admission that he wrote most of the invoices.
Shortly after the trial began the court announced that it would save time and be fairer to all for the evidence to be received initially only as against the particular defendant or defendants to whom it appeared expressly related, reserving to the Government, however, the right to move for its admission as against any or all of the other defendants whenever in the Government's opinion [332 U.S. 539 , 547] sufficient facts had been introduced to show such defendants to have been connected with the conspiracy charged.
In the Kotteakos case, supra, the Government conceded that, under the charge of a single, all-inclusive conspiracy, the proof showed distinct and separate ones connected only by the fact that one man, Brown, was a participant and key figure in all. But it urged that [332 U.S. 539 , 548] under the ruling in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 , the variance was at the most harmless error, a contention we rejected. Here the situation is the reverse. The Government has conceded, in effect, that prejudice has resulted if more than one conspiracy has been proved. 5 But it insists that the evidence establishes a single conspiracy and no more, an issue not presented or determined in the Kotteakos case.
The Government does not maintain that Francisco, or Goldsmith (or therefore Weiss), was the owner of the whiskey. It accepts the view that another or others unidentified, were the real owner or owners and that Francisco (and thus Goldsmith and Weiss) was merely a channel for distributing the liquor and giving that unlawful process a legal facade. Indeed the 'innocent appearing actions' of Weiss and Goldsmith in their use of Francisco, the brief asserts, 'were the crux of the conspiracy * * * since the color of legitimacy was an essential part of the plan to dispose of the liquor to tavern owners at over-ceiling prices.'6 [332 U.S. 539 , 549] The evidence including the admissions was clearly sufficient to establish that the owner devised a plan which contemplated the entire chain of events from the original purchase in Francisco's name to the ultimate black market sales and deliveries. This includes the obvious inference that he made the arrangements for clearance through Francisco's books. Since Goldsmith and Weiss were the owner and sales manager respectively of Francisco and had active parts personally in carrying out those arrangements, there hardly can be any question that they knew the owner, had part in making the arrangements with him and, by virtue of those facts and their parts in facilitating the sales and deliveries to the tavernkeepers, knew also of his intention to resell the whiskey and of his plan for doing so in every material respect except that he intended to sell at over-ceiling prices.
The showing on that crucial question was entirely circumstantial. It was nonetheless substantial. Goldsmith and Weiss knew that there was a margin of only about 77õ between the legal price ceiling and the $24.50 per case they received by check in payment for the whiskey. 7 They knew that the invoices sent by Francisco to each purchaser gave no room for even that slender margin but [332 U.S. 539 , 550] represented only the owner's cost figure. They knew further that by using Francisco's name, services and facilities the owner was concealing his identity from the purchasers in the sales, making Francisco appear as the owner on the paper records; that sales were being made to numerous and widely scattered tavernkeepers; and that in every sale remittance was made to them uniformly not only by check, usually of the purchaser, but also in the exact amount of $24.50 per case.
The inference that the unknown owner giving away the liquor is scarcely conceivable. The most likely inferences to be drawn were two, namely, that the owner was selling for a legal margin of not more than 77õ or that he was selling at overceiling prices. The first inference is hardly tenable, especially in view of the prevailing and widespread shortage and demand, with accompanying black market activity, of which the most meticulous wholesale liquor dealer hardly could have been ignorant. The inference was not only justified, it was almost inescapable, that Goldsmith and Weiss knew of the owner's intent and purpose to sell above the lawful price, as well as most of the detail of his plan for doing so. With that knowledge their active aid toward executing his design made them co-conspirators with him, and he with them, toward accomplishing it.
The admissions alone disclosed the unknown owner's existence; that Goldsmith and Weiss were aci ng for him, not for themselves; received from the transactions, and divided equally, the $2 per case; and gave the use of [332 U.S. 539 , 551] Francisco's name to cover up the unknown owner's existence, identity and part in the scheme.
But the trial court's rulings, both upon admissibility9 and in the instructions,10 leave no room for doubt that the [332 U.S. 539 , 552] admissions were adequately excluded, insofar as this could be done in a joint trial, from consideration on the question of their guilt. The rulings told the jury plainly to disregard the admissions entirely, in every phase of the case, in determining that question. 11 The [332 U.S. 539 , 553] direction was a total exclusion, not simply a partial one as the Government's argument seems to imply. 12 The court might have been more emphatic. But we cannot say its unambiguous direction was inadequate. Nor can we assume that the jury misunderstood or disobeyed it.
With the admissions thus entirely excluded, we think nevertheless that the remaining evidence was sufficient to show, in accordance with the charge, that the five defendants joined in a single conspiracy to sell the whiskey at over-ceiling prices in the guise of legal sales. We set forth in the margin the remaining evidence, in part, which justifies this conclusion both as to Goldsmith and Weiss13 and as to the other three defendants. 14 [332 U.S. 539 , 554] The main difference comes with the climination of the unknown owner from view, and Francisco's consequent appearance as both actual and legal owner. This changes the detail of the facade, but does not remove either the [332 U.S. 539 , 555] facade itself or the essence of the unlawful scheme. That still was to sell the whiskey illegally in the guise of legal sales,15 to the knowledge of each defendant. 16 The gist of the conspiracy lay not in who actually owned the [332 U.S. 539 , 556] whiskey, but in the agreement to sell it in this unlawful fashion, regardless of who might own it.
The law does not demand proof of so much. For it is most often true, especially in broad schemes calling for the aid of many persons, that after discovery of enough [332 U.S. 539 , 557] to show clearly the essence of the scheme and the identity of a number participating, the identity and the fact of participation of others remain undiscovered and undiscoverable. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others. 17 Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in proof and of correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity.
We think that in the special circumstances of this case the two agreements were merely step in the formation of the larger and ultimate more general conspiracy. In [332 U.S. 539 , 558] that view it would be a perversion of justice to regard the salesmen's ignorance of the unknown owner's participation as furnishing adequate ground for reversal of their convictions. Nor does anything in the Kotteakos decision require this. The scheme was in fact the same scheme; the salesmen knew or must have known that others unknown to them were sharing in so large a project; and it hardly can be sufficient to relieve them that they did not know, when they joined the scheme, who those people were or exactly the parts they were playing in carrying out the common design and object of all. By their separate agreements, if such they were, they became parties to the larger common plan, joined together by their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, though not of its exact limits, and by their common single goal.
The case therefore is very different from the facts admitted to exist in the Kotteakos case. Apart from the much larger number of agreements there involved, no two of those agreements were tied together as stages in the formation of a large all-inclusive combination, all directed to achieving a single unlawful end or result. On the contrary each separate agreement had its own distinct, illegal end. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through. And none aided in any way, by agreement or otherwise, in procuring another's loan. The conspiracies therefore were distinct and disconnected, not parts of a larger general scheme, both in the phase of agreement with Brown and also in the absence of any aid given to others as well as in specific object and result. There was no drawing of all together in a single, over-all, comprehensive plan. [332 U.S. 539 , 559] Here the contrary is true. All knew of and joined in the overriding scheme. All intended to aid the owner, whether Francisco or another, to sell the whiskey unlawfully, though the two groups of defendants differed on the proof in knowledge and belief concerning the owner's identity. All by reason of their knowledge of the plan's general scope, if not its exact limits, sought a common end, to aid in disposing of the whiskey. True, each salesman aided in selling only his part. But he knew the lot to be sold was larger and thus that he was aiding in a larger plan. He thus became a party to it and not merely to the integrating agreement with Weiss and Goldsmith.
[ Footnote 1 ] Of the more than 4,000 cases received by Francisco, proof concerning disposition at over-ceiling prices related to less than half, or some 1,500-plus cases.
[ Footnote 2 ] Consisting of $19.24 per case to the distiller, 81õ for freight, and $1.92 for state taxes.
[ Footnote 3 ] The witnesses identifying Feigenbaum testified they sought him out at the Sunset Drugstore in San Francisco and made the arrangements with him for their purchasers there. Similar testimony was given by those identifying Blumenthal with the arrangements taking place in the Sportorium.
[ Footnote 4 ] At an interview with Goldsmith 'early in September,' Goldsmith was asked 'who actually bought him the whiskey, who owned it.' In reply 'he said that Blumenthal brought it in, and when asked if he knew of his own knowledge, he said, 'No." He again stated that Francisco received $2 per case, of which he gave Weiss half.
[ Footnote 7 ] The $24.50 price was at the most 53õ above the actual cost of the whiskey, see note 2, plus the $2.00 fee paid Francisco for the use of its books. There is no evidence that the unknown owner received any portion of this 53õ margin. Since the record shows that Francisco was billed by the warehouse company for the storage of the liquor, the inference was fully justified that the 53õ margin was largely dissipated by the storage charges and other overhead costs attributable to the sale of the whiskey and that the remaining sum, if any, was retained by Francisco.
[ Footnote 8 ] Even if the evidence were sufficient with the admissions excluded, they were of such importance that if admitted improperly the jury might have drawn entirely different inferences from the whole evidence including them than from it without them.
[ Footnote 11 ] It is not entirely clear whether the words 'In that connection,' italicized in the last paragraph of note 10, refer only to the last or to both of the preceding sentences, in the specific context of the two paragraphs last quoted. But when those statements are taken in conjunction with the earlier ones and with the court's rulings on admissibility made in the jury's presence, we think the total effect of the instructions was to tell the jury plainly to disregard the admissions entirely in considering the guilt of Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel.
This view, though apparently differing from the Government's, see note 12, is reinforced by the further instruction, immediately following the one last quoted in note 10, to the effect that admissions of a conspirator not made in execution of the common design are not evidence against any of the parties other than the one making them. The admissions here fell clearly in that category, some of them because made after termination of the conspiracy, others because they had no effect to forward its object. None were made in furtherance of the conspiracy's object. Cf. Fiswick v. united States, 329 U.S. 211 .
[ Footnote 12 ] Although we are not sure the argument goes so far, it seems to urge, see note 6 and text, that the admissions, as well as the other evidence expressly affecting only one or some of the defendants, were admissible and were received, not merely as against Weiss and Goldsmith on the whole case but also in part as against the other three, that is, to show even as to them the existence and illegal character of the scheme, though not to establish their connections with it. We do not read the record as showing this was the effect of the trial court's ruling.
[ Footnote 13 ] The evidence as to the unknown owner no longer being in the picture, the inference is almost irresistible that Francisco was the owner. On arrival of the whiskey, title was taken in Francisco's name, in which the shipping documents were made out; sight drafts for the two carloads were paid, at Goldsmith's direction, from Francisco's bank account; and the whiskey was stored and delivered by the warehouse company in accordance with Weiss' directions.
At a time when wholesale liquor distributors were hard put to supply even long-established customers, Francisco sold its liquor, through the medium of salesmen who had no previous connection with the firm and were not regularly engaged in the business of selling liquor, to various tavern owners who had not previously had dealings with Francisco. Moreover, the sales were billed at a price 77õ per case below the OPA ceiling, despite the fact that tavern owners and other retail distributors considered themselves fortunate to secure whiskey at the full ceiling price. Also of interest are tavern owner Figone's over-ceiling purchases, which followed the pattern of the other sales, except in the important respect that they were made at the Francisco office, but with a person Figone could not identify. See text supra following note 3.
The case would stand little better for Goldsmith and Weiss upon an inference that they sold to some other person, who in turn resold to the tavernkeepers through the salesmen. For then the 77õ legal margin would remain, now for the intervening purchaser, together with the use of Francisco's books and records to conceal his existence and part in the transactions and the allowable inferences from those facts.
[ Footnote 14 ] Acting almost simultaneously in early December before the first carload arrived in San Francisco, Blumenthal and Feigenbaum, as well as Abel and other unidentified salesmen, made it known that they could obtain whiskey for tavernkeepers.
There are compelling indications that these salesmen were kept informed of the status of the whiskey. Thus, on the 8th or 9th of December, Feigenbaum told one purchaser that the whiskey would arrive in San Francisco in 'about a week or ten days,' that it would come in by railroad, and that there would be 'a carload of it.' The first of the two carloads of liquor actually arrived on December 17. Similarly, on the 3d or 4th of December, Blumenthal told tavernkeeper Fingerhut that the whiskey would arrive in the latter part of the month. The whiskey did so arrive and the purchaser received delivery. Then, late in December, Fingerhut received a telephone call, which he said was from Blumenthal, asking whether he needed more whiskey. As a result, Fingerhut made an additional purchase on January 3 or 4, 1944. The second carload was received by the warehouse company on or about January 3d. In addition to being well informed as to the progress of the whiskey in its journey westward, the salesmen followed a singularly set pattern in making their respective sales. All knew and so told the prospective customer that he would receive Francisco's invoice for the whiskey at the same below-ceiling price, which invoice was of great importance because it enabled the tavernkeepers to comply with the record-keeping requirements imposed by the California law. See note 15. All made arrangements for the payment of the identical price of $24.50 per case to Francisco by check. All received the checks, which were delivered to Francisco and collected by it. Of some significance, in connection with the other evidence, is the testimony of tavernkeeper Reinburg that on two occasions, at Abel's direction, he drove Abel to San Francisco, dropped him at the Sportorium, Blumenthal's place of business, and picked him up there about a half hour later. The inference was justified that Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and the other salesmen were aware that their individual sales were part of a larger common enterprise, dependent on the carefully evolved arrangements to give the sales the guise of legitimacy, to dispose of a larger store of liquor. Where a salesman knew, as did Feigenbaum, that at least a carload of whiskey was involved, it was an entirely reasonable inference that he knew that other salesmen, paralleling his efforts, were making sales similar to his. On the basis of the evidence, the jury was well warranted in deciding that the facts dovetailed too neatly to be the result of mere chance.
[ Footnote 15 ] The evidence showed that some of the purchasers were unwilling to buy liquor without receiving a document to show purchase from a lawfully authorized source as reqi red by state law. With Francisco appearing as actual owner the scheme took on the aspect of one to sell its own whiskey illegally in the guise of lawful sales.
[ Footnote 16 ] Each salesman knew that he was receiving $30 to $40 above the ceiling; that Francisco was supplying the whiskey; that the elaborate arrangements were made not merely for his sales, but also for others, see note 14; and that he had to have the cash, as well as the check, before delivery from Francisco was completed.
The basis for imputing such knowledge to Goldsmith and Weiss becomes not so compelling as with the admissions included, but nevertheless remains adequate. However the case is viewed, apart from the admissions, they knew the margin of legal profit left, whether for themselves or for others, after deducting the $24.50 per case, was only 77õ. If they actually owned and sold the whiskey, why sell below the ceiling in the face of the shortage and demand, when selling costs including the salesmen's compensation still were to be paid? If they did not own or sell at the $24.50 figure, then why the checks and false invoices in that amount? The inference is justified that either they or someone else to their knowledge was receiving more than the lawful price.
[ Footnote 17 ] Marino v. United States, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 691; Lefco v. United States, 3 Cir., 74 F.2d 66; Jezewski v. United States, 6 Cir., 13 F.2d 599; Allen v. United States, 6 Cir., 4 F.2d 688.
[ Footnote 18 ] These include the argument that petitioners were prosecuted under the wrong statute. Section 4(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act makes it unlawful, as a misdemeanor, 205(b), for any person to sell or deliver any commodity in violation of price regulations, 'or to offer, solicit, attempt, or agree to do any of the foregoing.' (Emphasis added.) Petitioners regard the prohibitory words 'or agree,' etc., as repeal by implication of the general conspiracy statute, 37 of the Criminal Code, insofar as otherwise it might apply to the acts forbidden by 4(a). There was no 'implied repeal.' Conviction under the general conspiracy statute requires more than mere agreement, namely, the commission of an overt act. See also Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817; H.Rep. No. 827, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 8.

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In 2012, the New York Times published the Sanger article, describing a classified government initiative to “undermine the Iranian nuclear program” through “increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems.” Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, Freedom Watch sought records from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department, including “information that refers or relates in any way to information” released or made available to Sanger. The CIA, NSA, and DoD cited national security; each stated that it could “neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence” of responsive records. After FOIA’s deadline expired, Freedom Watch filed suit. The district court dismissed the CIA and NSA based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies; granted DoD summary judgment based on FOIA’s national security exemption; and granted the State Department partial judgment, finding certain requests unduly speculative. Concerning information released to Sanger, the State Department obtained a 60-day extension and produced 79 documents. The court denied a motion to depose a records custodian, finding no evidence of bad faith, and granted the State Department summary judgment. Before oral argument, Freedom Watch moved to supplement the record with news articles relating to the revelation that former Secretary of State Clinton had maintained a private email account on a private server and sought to expand the search on remand. The D.C. Circuit remanded to allow the court to oversee the search of the former Secretary’s emails for records responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, but otherwise affirmed.
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued April 2, 2015 Decided April 24, 2015 No. 14-5174 FREEDOM WATCH, INC., APPELLANT v. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ET AL., APPELLEES Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:12-cv-01088) Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Catherine H. Dorsey, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Matthew M. Collette, Attorney. Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 2 TATEL, Circuit Judge: On June 1, 2012, the New York Times published an article by investigative reporter David E. Sanger describing a classified government initiative to “undermine the Iranian nuclear program” through “increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities.” David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. Later that day, appellant Freedom Watch, a self-styled “public interest group acting on behalf of the public at large,” Appellant’s Br. 2, filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking records relating to the Sanger article from four federal agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department. Specifically, Freedom Watch sought documents concerning each of the following topics (only the second is at issue here): 1) Any and all information that refers or relates to the New York Times article . . . and which information was provided and leaked to Mr. Sanger and the New York Times; 2) Any and all information that refers or relates in any way to information released to David E. Sanger and/or made available to him; 3) The names of the persons, employers and job titles, and addresses of those who leaked the above information to David E. Sanger; 3 4) Communications with The White House and/or Office of the President and/or Vice President that refer or relate in any way to the leaked information and/or the reasons for leaking the information; 5) Any and all information that refer[s] or relate[s] to the decision to leak the above previously classified information; [and] 6) Any and all information that refers or relates to government agencies deciding to investigate who leaked the above previously classified information. Compl. 2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Three of the agencies—CIA, NSA, and DoD—denied the request on national security grounds. Issuing what is known as a Glomar response, each agency stated that it could “neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence” of responsive records. See Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 2–4 & Exs. A, B, D (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)). CIA and NSA also advised Freedom Watch of its right to administratively appeal, and the State Department informed the organization that it was processing the request. See id. at Ex. C; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). After FOIA’s twenty-day deadline expired, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), Freedom Watch filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to compel the four agencies to search for and produce responsive documents. Contending that Freedom Watch had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, two of the agencies—CIA and 4 NSA—moved for judgment on the pleadings, and DoD, relying on FOIA’s national security exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), moved for summary judgment. The district court granted each motion, resolving all claims in those agencies’ favor. The State Department also moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court, finding requests 1 and 3–6 unduly speculative, granted the motion as to all but the second, i.e., information released to David Sanger. See Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 8–18; Freedom Watch, Inc. v. NSA, No. 1:12-cv-01088, 2014 WL 2768849, at *1 (D.D.C. June 12, 2014) (citing District Court Order, Docket No. 8 (Dec. 13, 2012)). Undertaking both electronic searches of record systems and manual searches of physical documents, the State Department discovered and produced three responsive records. But after moving for summary judgment on the ground that it had thus satisfied its FOIA obligations, the Department found additional responsive records and decided to search other locations. To accomplish this, it sought and received a 60-day extension to conduct a supplemental search and to respond to Freedom Watch’s opposition brief, during which time it uncovered 76 more responsive documents. In the end, the State Department produced a total of 79 documents responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, releasing 58 in full and 20 in part, and withholding one in its entirety. See Freedom Watch, 2014 WL 2768849, at *1–2 (outlining search efforts and sequence of events). Responding to Freedom Watch’s opposition brief, the Department described its additional search efforts and stated that it “would not oppose the filing of a surreply [by Freedom Watch] to address the documents produced as a result of th[e] supplemental search.” State Dep’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 2 n.1. Freedom Watch never filed a surreply, though 5 it did move to depose a State Department records custodian, arguing that the initial search was part of a pattern of “delay, obfuscation, and outright obstruction of justice.” Mot. for Discovery 1. The district court, finding no evidence of bad faith by the State Department, denied the motion. See Freedom Watch, 2014 WL 2768849, at *2 (citing District Court Minute Order (June 18, 2013)). The court also granted the State Department’s motion for summary judgment, noting that “Freedom Watch does not object to the adequacy of the [Department’s] supplemental searches” and concluding that the State Department had “met its burden by conducting searches that were reasonably calculated to find responsive records.” Id. at *3–4. In this appeal, Freedom Watch challenges the Glomar responses of NSA, CIA, and DoD, as well as the adequacy of the State Department’s search. As to that search, Freedom Watch argues that the district court erred in granting the State Department summary judgment because (1) the search impermissibly entailed electronic key-word searches, (2) the Department improperly withheld a one-page press-briefing memo pursuant to FOIA’s deliberative-process privilege, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), and (3) Freedom Watch was entitled to additional discovery—in particular, an opportunity to depose a State Department records custodian—before summary judgment. After briefing was complete in this court but prior to oral argument, Freedom Watch moved to supplement the record with news articles relating to the revelation that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while leading the State Department, had maintained a private email account run on a private server. See Appellant’s Mot. to Supplement R.; see also, e.g., Danny Yadron & Rebecca Ballhaus, Hillary 6 Clinton’s Custom Email Based on Server Near Her Home, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2015. Alleging that the State Department had failed to produce all records responsive to its FOIA request due to the former Secretary’s use of the private server, Freedom Watch sought to “expand [the] search for documents on remand.” Appellant’s Mot. to Supplement R. 1–2. In response, the government suggested that we remand the case to the district court to “permit the State Department to process and search the emails recently provided by former Secretary Clinton to the agency.” Gov’t Resp. to Mot. to Supplement R. 2. The government explained that the State Department plans to review those emails for possible public release and to make them “available to the public by posting them on a State Department website.” Id. This plan, the government asserted, would not only render unnecessary Freedom Watch’s request to supplement the record, but also “make the maximum number of records available to plaintiff . . . in the shortest amount of time, and  be considerably more efficient than reviewing the documents piecemeal in response to subject-specific FOIA requests.” Id. The government also explained that the Department’s search for responsive records had been more extensive than described to the district court, even “including some records of the Office of the Secretary.” Id. at 3. As a result, “partial remand is appropriate to provide the State Department an opportunity to supplement the record as to what searches were actually performed with regard to records maintained by the Executive Secretariat.” Id. at 3–4. Based on the government’s representations, we shall deny Freedom Watch’s motion to supplement the record and remand to the district court to manage record development and oversee the search of the former Secretary’s emails for records responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request. In doing so, we remind the State Department that, although it 7 may choose of its own accord to release the emails to the public at large, it has a statutory duty to search for and produce documents responsive to FOIA requests “in the shortest amount of time.” Id. at 2; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (providing FOIA’s stringent time limits). The district court should therefore determine the most efficient way to proceed under FOIA. This leaves Freedom Watch’s remaining arguments, which we can easily resolve. As to the Glomar responses of NSA and CIA, the district court properly granted the agencies judgment on the pleadings because Freedom Watch failed to internally appeal the agencies’ denials and thus to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See Sinito v. DOJ, 176 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“FOIA requires each requestor to exhaust administrative remedies” before seeking judicial review). Summary judgment in favor of DoD was likewise proper because the agency supported its Glomar response with an uncontroverted declaration explaining “the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail.” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the declaration explains, because Freedom Watch seeks documents concerning a leak of information about cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, “[a]cknowledging the existence or non-existence of records responsive to plaintiff’s request could reveal whether the United States, and specifically DoD, conducts or has conducted cyber-attacks against Iran.” Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. D, at 4. In DoD’s judgment, such a disclosure would “cause damage to national security by providing insight into DoD’s military and intelligence capabilities and interests,” id. at 5, and we accord that judgment “substantial weight,” Wolf, 473 F.3d at 376 8 (courts must accord “substantial weight” to “agency assertions of potential harm made in order to invoke the protection of FOIA[’s national security exemption]”). All of Freedom Watch’s objections to the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State Department fail as well. First, although the State Department provided declarations outlining its search methods, which included full-text electronic searches for relevant terms like “Sanger” and “David Sanger,” see State Dep’t Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 1, at 6–7; State Dep’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 1, at 4–7, Freedom Watch never objected in the district court to the Department’s use of key-word searches. “It is well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.” District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In any event, not only does FOIA expressly permit automated searches, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D) (explaining that “‘search’ means to review, manually or by automated means”) (emphasis added), but State Department employees also manually searched files for responsive documents, see State Dep’t Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 1, at 7; State Dep’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 1, at 3–7. Freedom Watch likewise forfeited its challenge to the Department’s withholding of the press-briefing memo. The Department invited Freedom Watch to file a surreply to “address the documents produced as a result of [the Department’s] supplemental search,” including the briefing memo, State Dep’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 2 n.1, but Freedom Watch failed to do so. Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Freedom Watch’s request for additional discovery. See SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“This court will overturn the district court’s 9 exercise of its broad discretion to manage the scope of discovery only in unusual circumstances.”). As we have explained, “[a]n agency may establish the adequacy of its search by submitting reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits describing its efforts.” Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Because the State Department did exactly that, the district court “ha[d] discretion to forgo discovery and award summary judgment on the basis of affidavits.” Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978). To be sure, Freedom Watch argued that “the circumstances [of the search] raise a presumption [of] bad faith behavior” by the State Department such that additional discovery was justified. Appellant’s Br. 34. But Freedom Watch offered no evidence to support that allegation, and “[a] mere assertion of bad faith is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Baker & Hostetler LLP, 473 F.3d at 318 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court to proceed in accordance with this opinion and affirm in all other respects. So ordered.


OMAHA POLICE OFFICE SUNDERMEIER WITH THE GANG TASK FORCE, In his official and individual capacities; Defendant.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on October 5, 2017. (Filing No. 1.) Upon initial review, the court determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable claim. (Filing No. 6.) However, the court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 7, 2018. (Filing No. 7.) The court now conducts further review of the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Plaintiff requests $100, 000, 000 in damages for the alleged 4th Amendment violation arising out of the stop and search of Plaintiff's vehicle.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a traffic stop and search allegedly conducted “in violation of Rodriguez” and the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures by governmental officials. A seizure for a traffic violation may become unlawful if the stop is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to address the traffic violation that justified the stop. Rodriguez v. U.S., __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015).
Plaintiff sues Sundermeier in both his official and individual capacities. A claim against an individual in his official capacity is, in reality, a claim against the entity that employs the official-in this case, the City of Omaha. See Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Suits against persons in their official capacity are just another method of filing suit against the entity. A plaintiff seeking damages in an official-capacity suit is seeking a judgment against the entity.” (internal citations omitted)). As a municipality, the City of Omaha can only be liable under § 1983 if a municipal policy or custom caused Plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right or if the municipality failed to adequately train its employees. Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Plaintiff has not made any factual allegations supporting a policy, custom, or failure-to-train claim. Plaintiff's claims against Sundermeier in his official capacity will, therefore, be dismissed.
1. Defendant Officer Sundermeier in his official capacity is dismissed from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. This action may proceed to service of process only as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim against Defendant Officer Sundermeier in his individual capacity.
3. The clerk of the court is directed to obtain the last-known address for Defendant City of Omaha Police Officer Sundermeier from the United States Marshals Service for service of process on this Defendant in his individual capacity. Once such address is obtained, the clerk of the court is directed to complete a summons form and a USM-285 form for Defendant Sundermeier using the address provided by the Marshals Service and forward them together with a copy of the Complaint (filing no. 1), the Amended Complaint (filing no. 7), this court's previous Memorandum and Order on initial review (filing no. 6), and a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Marshals Service for service of process on Defendant City of Omaha Police Officer Sundermeier in his individual capacity. The Marshals Service shall serve Defendant City of Omaha Police Officer Sundermeier in his individual capacity using any of the following methods: personal, residence, certified mail, or designated delivery service.


text:
The Complainant is Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772, a sociйtй anonyme having its seat at 12 Rue de Temple, 51100 Reims, France. The Respondent is Herreveld, having a postal address at Sint Annastraat 41, 3390 Tielt, Winge, Brabant, Belgium.
The domain name in dispute is "veuvecliquot.com". The registrar with which the said domain name is registered is CORE ("the Registrar").
On July 12, 2000, the Complaint was received by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center ("the Center") by e-mail and in hard copy on July 13, 2000. The appropriate fees were paid by the Complainant.
On July 19, 2000 the Center sent a Request for Registrar Verification to the Registrar and on August 4, 2000 the Registrar confirmed that the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" was registered through the Registrar, that the Respondent was the current registrant of the said domain name, that the Policy was applicable to the said registration and that the registration was in active status.
On July 19, 2000 the Center sent an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Complaint to the authorized representative of the Complainant by e-mail.
In accordance with Paragraph 4(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Rules") and paragraph 5 of the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Supplemental Rules") the Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Policy"), the Rules and the Supplemental Rules and that payment in the required amount had been made by the Complainant.
On August 5, 2000 the Center sent a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding relating to the said "veuvecliquot.com" domain name registration to the Respondent by Post/Courier (with enclosures), by facsimile (without enclosures) and by e-mail (without enclosures). A copy of said Notification was sent to the authorised representative of the Complainant by e-mail. Further copies of said Notification were sent to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") and the Registrar (without enclosures).
Said Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding inter alia advised the Respondent that the Administrative Proceedings had commenced on August 5, 2000 and that the Respondent was required to submit a Response to the Center on or before August 24, 2000.
On August 6, 2000 the Center received the Response from the Respondent by e-mail and on August 10, 2000 the Center sent an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Response to the Respondent.
On August 22, 2000 the Center proceeded to appoint James Bridgeman as Administrative Panel after having received a Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality from him on August 18, 2000. On August 22, 2000 the case file was transmitted to the Administrative Panel.
In the view of the Administrative Panel, proper procedures were followed and this Administrative Panel was properly constituted.
The Complainant is a champagne house and the owner of numerous trademark registrations and domain name registrations incorporating the words "VEUVE CLICQUOT". The Complainant and its predecessors in title have used these words in connection with their trade in champagne for over 200 years. The Complainant’s champagnes, distinguished by their use of the trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT", are currently sold in more than 120 countries throughout the world. The Complainant’s trademark registrations include the French registered trademark number 1613633, "VEUVE CLICQUOT" which has been registered in classes 32 and 33 in respect of numerous goods in said classes including wines.
The Respondent is Jean Pierre Herreveld, the owner and managing director of a company engaged in e-commerce. The said domain name has been registered by the Respondent using only his family name viz. Herreveld and so the Respondent is described by his family name only in the title of these Administrative Proceedings.
The Complainant requests that the said domain name be transferred to the Complainant, or, in the alternative, that the said domain name registration be cancelled and that the Complainant be given advance notice of the said cancellation so that it can register the domain name itself.
The Complainant submits that its trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT" became famous early in the 200 year history of the champagne house and remains so to the present day. In support of this claim the Complainant has submitted a substantial body of documentation illustrating references to "VEUVE CLICQUOT" champagne including references by third parties in literature and films. These include references in movies such as "Casablanca" and "The Godfather".
The Complainant also submits that throughout its history "VEUVE CLICQUOT" champagne has had songs and poems written about it by numerous famous authors. Many of these have been recorded in a book written by Frederique Crestin-Billet entitled Veuve Clicquot La Grande Dame De La Champagne. Furthermore the Complainant points out that Hugh Johnson’s Modern Encyclopedia of Wine describes the Complainant as a "large, prestigious and influential house."
Furthermore the Complainant has submitted copies of published articles in which journalists describe the "VEUVE CLICQUOT" as a "famous" brand.
The Complainant further submits that Complainant’s "VEUVE CLICQUOT" champagne has been described as "world famous" in the decision of the administrative panel in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group, WIPO Case No. D2000 –0347 and in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772 v. Net Promotion, Inc. WIPO Case No. D2000-0347, the administrative panel stated that the Complainant’s "VEUVE CLICQUOT" trademark "is famous and distinctive."
The Complainant submits that the said domain name is confusingly similar and "practically identical" to the Complainant’s trademark. The Complainant points out that the single difference between the Complainant’s trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT" and the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" is that the letter "c" does not appear in the said domain name. The Respondent suggests that this was an omission on the part of the Respondent as this is a common misspelling of the Complainant’s said trademark.
The Complainant submits that given the unique character of the Complainant’s trademark and what the Complainant claims to be the practically imperceptible distinction between the mark and the said domain name, consumers, on seeing the domain name will believe it to be related to the Complainant. Moreover, the Complainant submits that consumers, who carry out searches on the Internet using the Complainant’s name and/or marks and/or a slight misspelling thereof, will be directed to the Respondent thus increasing the likelihood of confusion.
The Complainant submits that the Respondent cannot demonstrate or establish any legitimate interest in the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com". The Complainant states that there is no relationship between the Complainant and the Respondent that would give rise to any license, permission or other right by which the Respondent could own or use any domain name incorporating the Complainant’s famous trademark.
The Complainant submits that the Respondent has registered and is using the said domain name in bad faith within the meaning of paragraphs 4(b)(i) and 4(b)(ii) of the Policy. In this regard, the Complainant submits that the Respondent has either registered the said domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the said domain name or has done so to prevent the Complainant from reflecting its "VEUVE CLICQUOT" trademark in a corresponding domain name or to misappropriate the goodwill associated with the Complainant’s famous trademark for its own profit such as by selling the domain name to the Complainant or others for profit. In support of this submission the Complainant points to the statement of the administrative panel in Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group, WIPO Case No. D2000 –0347: "VEUVECLIQUOT.ORG" is so obviously connected with such a well-known product that its very use by someone with no connection with the product suggests opportunistic bad faith."
Furthermore the Complainant has submitted evidence in the form of a print-out of a www site on which the Respondent has offered the said domain "veuvecliquot.com" for sale.
Furthermore the Complainant submits that the Respondent and/or those acting in concert with the Respondent have a pattern of registering domain names based on well-known marks and names of third parties. The Complainant has submitted that the Respondent has established a www site on which he states that he owns over 90 domain names that are "Available for Sale, Lease, Development or Joint Venture".
The Complainant further states that since registering said domain name "veuvecliquot.com", the Respondent has not made any use of said domain name for a www site. The Complainant also submits that even if the Respondent was to make any use of said domain name for a www site it is impossible to conceive of any legitimate use to which the said domain name could be put by the Respondent. Any such use would run foul of the Policy by being an infringement of the Complainant’s rights under the trademark, unfair competition and dilution laws.
The Complainant concludes by claiming that the Respondent is holding the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" in bad faith in order to sell the said domain name to the Complainant or to others or to gain some other commercial benefit. It is claimed that this constitutes a direct violation of the Policy and in this regard the Complainant points to the decision of the administrative panel in Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 in which the Complainant submits that the administrative panel held that passive holding of a domain name can amount to bad faith.
The brief Response in the form of a two page letter was filed by the said Jean Pierre Herreveld. In essence the Respondent’s submissions consisted of the allegation that the Complainant was engaged in harassment and had not furnished "the right documentation (Verticaldot.com website etc…)"
The Respondent points out that this is the third case taken by the Complainant in the past six months against owners of domain names which could be of commercial value to the Complainant.
The Response states that the domain name in dispute is one of the domains which has been registered by said Jean Pierre Herreveld under his personal name. Mr. Herreveld claims to be the owner and managing director of "Verticaldot.com, a Belgian company currently undergoing a change of name." It is claimed that this company offers a broad range of e-commerce services including the development of city portals, with partnerships with web development companies in Europe and Asia.
The Respondent confirms that the said domain name "has no connection whatsoever with the registered trade names ‘Veuve Clicquot’ and ‘Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin’.
The Respondent states that the said domain name was not and is not for sale. The text on the www site stating ‘this site is for sale’ was an error and part of the standard CORE handle used for city names registered by the Respondent. The Respondent submits that the text has been removed by CORE at the request of the Respondent. This request had been made as soon as the Respondent had been informed of the existence of the statement.
In conclusion the Respondent denies having any intention in developing any activity related to the Complainant or the Complainant’s product. The Respondent states that the Respondent is unwilling to give away the domain name to the Complainant as it is the Respondent’s property.
iii. that the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Complainant has established that it has rights in the trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT". In the view of this Administrative Panel the said domain name is confusingly similar to the said trademark. The single difference between the Complainants trademark and the said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" is that the letter "c" does not appear in the said domain name. This difference does not have any significant effect on the appearance of the words and the two letters are merged into a single sound when the word is pronounced.
This Adminstrative Panel is satisfied that the Complainant has made out a prima facie case that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in the said domain name. The Complainant has satisfied this Administrative Panel that it is the owner of a famous trademark used in connection with the production and sale of champagne. The Complainant’s goodwill in the said trademark has been built-up over more than two centuries and is now firmly established across the world. In concluding that the said trademark is a famous mark this Administrative Panel has considered the evidence submitted by the Complainant and would wish to clearly state that in reaching this decision this Administrative Panel is not bound by or following any findings of facts in the decisions in the earlier cases involving the Complainant viz. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group, WIPO Case No. D2000–0347 and Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondйe en 1772 v. Net Promotion, Inc. WIPO Case No. D2000-0347 to which the Complainant refers in the Complaint.
Furthermore the said trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT" is not only famous, but very distinctive, being made up of the words "veuve" meaning "widow" and the surname "Clicquot".
The Complainant has asserted that the Respondent has not been given any right or licence to use the said trademark or the said domain name. Having regard to the distinctiveness and fame of the said trademark and the extent of the similarity between the said mark and the said domain name, on balance it is highly unlikely that the Respondent has acquired any rights or legitimate interest in the said domain name. The Respondent has not made out any case as to how the Respondent came to decide on this domain name. It is improbable that the Respondent was not aware of the Complainant’s reputation. The Respondent has made no attempt whatsoever to address this issue, whether by providing evidence along the lines suggested in paragraph 4(c) of the Policy or otherwise. Consequently in the view of this Administrative Panel the Complainant has satisfied the burden of proof that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in the said domain name.
The Complainant has furnished evidence that the Respondent has advertised said domain name for sale, although the Respondent states that the advertisement was posted on a www site in error. The Respondent has not established a www site accessible via the said domain name. Furthermore this Administrative Panel accepts the Complainant’s submission that it is impossible to conceive of any legitimate use to which the said domain name could be put by the Respondent.
This Administrative Panel concludes that on balance the Complainant has established that the Respondent registered said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the said domain name registration to the Complainant who is the owner of the trademark "VEUVE CLICQUOT", or to a competitor of the Complainant for valuable consideration in excess of the Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the said domain name. In accordance with paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy this Administrative Panel therefore concludes that the said domain has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
With specific reference to paragraph 4(i) of the Policy and paragraph 15 of the Rules this Administrative Panel decides that the Respondent has registered the domain name "veuvecliquot.com" identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark, that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in respect of said domain name and that the Respondent has registered and is using said domain name in bad faith. Accordingly, this Administrative Panel decides that said domain name "veuvecliquot.com" should be transferred to the Complainant.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
In many bacteria, the signal molecule AI-2 is generated from its precursor S-ribosyl-L-homocysteine in a reaction catalysed by the enzyme LuxS. However, generation of AI-2-like activity has also been reported for organisms lacking the luxS gene and the existence of alternative pathways for AI-2 formation in Escherichia coli has recently been predicted by stochastic modelling. Here, we investigate the possibility that spontaneous conversion of ribulose-5-phosphate could be responsible for AI-2 generation in the absence of luxS.
Buffered solutions of ribulose-5-phosphate, but not ribose-5-phosphate, were found to contain high levels of AI-2 activity following incubation at concentrations similar to those reported in vivo. To test whether this process contributes to AI-2 formation by bacterial cells in vivo, an improved Vibrio harveyi bioassay was used. In agreement with previous studies, culture supernatants of E. coli and Staphylococcus aureus luxS mutants were found not to contain detectable levels of AI-2 activity. However, low activities were detected in an E. coli pgi-eda-edd-luxS mutant, a strain which degrades glucose entirely via the oxidative pentose phosphate pathway, with ribulose-5-phosphate as an obligatory intermediate.
Our results suggest that LuxS-independent formation of AI-2, via spontaneous conversion of ribulose-5-phosphate, may indeed occur in vivo. It does not contribute to AI-2 formation in wildtype E. coli and S. aureus under the conditions tested, but may be responsible for the AI-2-like activities reported for other organisms lacking the luxS gene.
In the marine bacterium Vibrio harveyi, autoinducer 2 (AI-2) is one of three quorum-sensing molecules regulating the production of bioluminescence in a population-density-dependent fashion [1, 2]. In recent years, numerous pathogenic and non-pathogenic bacteria have also been shown to produce AI-2 (for a recent review see ), and for this reason the molecule has been suggested to function in interspecies communication [1, 4–7].
AI-2 is the collective term for a group of signal molecules formed from a common precursor, 4,5-dihydroxy-2,3-pentanedione (DPD). DPD is generated by many bacteria as a by-product of the activated methyl cycle in a reaction catalysed by LuxS [4, 8]. LuxS acts by cleaving S-ribosylhomocysteine (SRH) to yield homocysteine and the reactive DPD, which spontaneously cyclises to from a range of furanone derivatives (Fig. 1). Two of these, (2S,4S)-2-methyl-2,3,3,4-tetrahydroxytetrahydrofuran-borate (S-THMF-borate) and (2R,4S)-2-methyl-2,3,3,4-tetrahydroxytetrahydrofuran (R-THMF), are recognised by specific periplasmic binding proteins in V. harveyi and Salmonella enterica Serovar Typhimurium, respectively [9, 10]. Another derivative, 4-hydroxy-5-methyl-3(2H)-furanone (MHF), has also been confirmed as a product of the LuxS catalysed reaction in vitro  and shown to have moderate bioluminescence inducing ability in V. harveyi [4, 8].
Pathways of DPD and AI-2 formation. The schematic integrates pathways described for production of 4,5-dihydroxy-2,3-pentanedione (DPD) from D-ribulose-5-phosphate  and S-ribosylhomocysteine (SRH)  with the subsequent formation of AI-2 molecules (yellow box) detected by V. harveyi and S. enterica serovar Typhimurium . Ribulose-5-phosphate is formed enzymatically from other sugar phosphates and its reactive open-chain carbonyl form in aqueous solution facilitates DPD generation. DPD cyclisation leads to several products forming via 2,4-dihydroxy-2-methylhydrofuran-3-one intermediates, including two distinct autoinducer molecules, S-THMF-borate ((2S,4S)-2-methyl-2,3,3,4-tetrahydroxytetrahydrofuran-borate; detected by V. harveyi) and R-THMF ((2R,4S)-2-methyl-2,3,3,4-tetrahydroxytetrahydrofuran; detected by S. enterica serovar Typhimurium) as well as MHF (4-hydroxy-5-methyl-3(2H)-furanone). Intermediates or side products shown are: S-THMF, (2S,4S)-2-methyl-2,3,3,4-tetrahydroxytetrahydrofuran; R-DHMF, (2R,4S)-2,4-dihydroxy-2-methyldihydrofuran-3-one; S-DHMF: (2S,4S)-2,4-dihydroxy-2-methyldihydrofuran-3-one; Hcy, homocysteine.
Interestingly, formation of MHF from D-ribulose-5-phosphate (Rul-5-P) has also been reported. This phenomenon was initially witnessed following the action of spinach phosphoriboisomerase on ribose-5-phosphate (Rib-5-P) but was dismissed as an anomalous side-activity of the enzyme . The authors demonstrated a transient accumulation of an unknown intermediate, formed from the sugar phosphate, which subsequently converted to MHF. Later, Hauck et al. demonstrated that MHF arose spontaneously from Rul-5-P, and identified the unknown intermediate as DPD [12, 13]. Thus, spontaneous conversion of Rul-5-P may provide a novel route by which AI-2 could form in a luxS-independent fashion. However, whilst it is known that Rul-5-P gives rise to DPD under certain conditions in vitro, and that chemically synthesised DPD can stimulate bioluminescence in V. harveyi AI-2-responsive reporter strains [14–16] the principle of LuxS-independent formation of AI-2 activity from Rul-5-P in biologically relevant quantities has yet to be proved. Furthermore, the possibility and the ramifications of this process occurring in vivo have not been previously addressed. Here we demonstrate that spontaneous conversion of Rul-5-P does indeed give rise to potent AI-2 activity and investigate various luxS mutants, including an E. coli strain affected in central carbon metabolism, for LuxS-independent AI-2 formation in vivo. In addition, consideration is given to the possible implications of this alternative mechanism for AI-2 production.
A solution of 5 mM Rul-5-P was incubated at 37°C for 24 h, based on the methods previously described for MHF formation [12, 13], and assayed for bioluminescence-inducing activity in V. harveyi BB170, a bioreporter for detection of AI-2 activity . Addition of this solution to the reporter strain induced high levels of bioluminescence, much higher than those observed for a positive control of 5 mM MHF. By comparison, the isomers Rib-5-P and xylulose-5-phosphate (Xyl-5-P) stimulated little or no bioluminescence (Fig. 2A). Since bioluminescence in V. harveyi is also controlled by the signal molecule N-3-hydroxybutanoyl-L-homoserine lactone (AI-1), each compound was also tested with the AI-1 responsive bioreporter, V. harveyi BB886 . No bioluminescence was induced in this strain (Fig. 2A) indicating Rul-5-P-mediated bioluminescence to be induced specifically via the AI-2 detection system.
Spontaneous generation of AI-2 activity in ribulose-5-phosphate solutions. (A) AI-2 activity in pentose phosphate solutions. Reaction buffer (10 mM sodium phosphate, pH 7.7) was incubated alone (control) or containing either 5 mM MHF, 5 mM ribose-5-phosphate (Rib-5-P), 5 mM xylulose-5-phosphate (Xyl-5-P), or 5 mM ribulose-5-phosphate (Rul-5-P). After incubation for 24 h at 37°C, the solutions were analysed for the presence of bioluminescence-inducing activity using the V. harveyi BB170 and BB886 bioassays. V. harveyi BB170 (white bars) is specifically activated by AI-2 and BB886 (grey bars) by AI-1. (B) AI-2 activity in 5 mM ribose-5-phosphate solutions incubated with phosphoriboisomerase (10 U/ml). Samples were taken immediately after the start of the experiment (white bars, 0 h) or after 2 h incubation at 37°C (grey bars). Controls contained reaction buffer only (buffer), no enzyme (buffer + Rib-5-P), no substrate (buffer + enzyme), or heat-inactivated enzyme (buffer + Rib-5-P + enzyme (inactive)). (C) Kinetics of AI-2 formation in Rul-5-P solutions. 0.5 mM Rul-5-P in reaction buffer was incubated at 37°C and samples removed and snap-frozen in liquid nitrogen at the times indicated. The samples were then analysed for AI-2 activity using V. harveyi BB170. Results represent the mean (± SD) of three independent experiments. AI-2 activity is determined by the fold-induction of light emission relative to that of the negative reaction buffer control. For comparison, approximately 400-fold induction was observed with E. coli MG1655 culture supernatants.
To demonstrate that the observed AI-2 activity was not caused by impurities present in the commercial preparations, Rul-5-P was also produced enzymatically. Incubation of 5 mM ribose-5-phosphate in the presence of active spinach phosphoribose isomerase (10 U/ml), which isomerised the substrate to Rul-5-P, resulted in the formation of high AI-2 activity, whereas no significant activity was observed after incubation with heat-inactivated enzyme (Fig. 2B). Furthermore, time course experiments performed with freshly prepared 0.5 mM Rul-5-P incubated at 37°C showed that AI-2 activity gradually increased over time, typically displaying a maximum after 5 hours (Fig. 2C). This was consistent with a conversion of Rul-5-P firstly to DPD, and then to the less-active MHF, in agreement with previously observed spectrophotometric data [11, 13]. Fig. 2C shows that approximately 20-fold induction of bioluminescence was observed for the sample removed at the beginning of the time course experiment (0 h). This activity most likely originated from Rul-5-P conversion during the several hours of incubation in the V. harveyi BB170 bioassay rather than an intrinsic activity of the compound itself.
The concentration range of Rul-5-P used in these experiments was chosen because it matches the intracellular concentrations reported for some organisms in the literature, such as yeast (approximately 0.5 mM; ). However, much lower values in the range of 1–10 μM can be estimated from metabolite determinations in animal and human tissues, including liver, brain, blood samples [19–22].
Rul-5-P has been previously reported to give rise to MHF with approximately 1.3% of the sugar-phosphate converting to the furanone after incubation at pH 7.5 and 35°C for 15 h . Liquid chromatography/tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) confirmed that MHF was also formed under the conditions used in this study (data not shown), with conversion rates below 1% after 24 h of incubation at pH 7.7 and 37°C. Taking into account the low conversion rates, much higher AI-2 activities were observed in Rul-5-P solutions than could be expected solely due to formation of MHF (Fig. 2A and data not shown). This demonstrates that another compound derived from Rul-5-P, but different from MHF, was responsible for the observed activities. Since DPD is known to be generated in Rul-5-P solutions  and was also identified after o-phenylenediamine derivatisation under the incubation conditions used in this study (data not shown), this was most likely S-THMF-borate (see Fig. 1), a DPD-derivative known to activate the BB170 bioreporter .
To determine whether LuxS-independent production of AI-2 also occurs in vivo, E. coli DH5α (which contains a frameshift mutation in luxS) and Staphylococcus aureus Newman luxS were each cultured in LB medium in the presence of 0.5% glucose. In E. coli, glucose at this concentration had previously been shown to prevent AI-2 uptake via catabolite repression . In each case, cell-free culture supernatants from mid- to late exponential phase onwards appeared to display 3–6 fold greater induction of bioluminescence in V. harveyi BB170 than controls of sterile control medium (not shown). However, following careful scrutiny it became apparent that this induction was not caused by true AI-2 activity. Metabolism of glucose led to acidification of the culture environment, most prominently between 3–5 hours of growth, during which time pH values typically declined from pH 7 to pH 5. Addition of culture-supernatants from this period onwards, to the V. harveyi BB170 bioassay, led to a subsequent decrease in pH of the bioassay medium (not shown). This coincided with enhanced recovery of endogenously-induced bioluminescence in V. harveyi BB170, following dilution into the assay medium (Fig. 3A). Acidification has been previously reported by DeKeersmaecker and Vanderleyden  to impact on the AI-2 bioassay, therefore, the assay medium was modified to include a final concentration of 25 mM HEPES buffer to increase the total buffer strength. This prevented the more acidic culture-fluids from influencing the pH of the assay medium and simultaneously eliminated the induction of bioluminescence observed for the luxS mutant culture supernatants (Fig. 3B). Incorporation of HEPES did not affect the detection of true AI-2 activity in culture-fluid samples as shown by the unaffected response to positive control samples. Overall, the data demonstrated that culture-supernatants of the two luxS mutants grown in LB medium did not contain detectable AI-2 activity.
E. coli MG1655 pgi-EDP luxS produces extracellular AI-2 activity. (A) Conventional V. harveyi BB170 bioassay  with E. coli DH5α culture supernatants obtained from cultures growing in LB + 0.5% (w/v) glucose. Turquoise, grey, pink, bright green, dark green, blue, and red lines indicate the bioluminescence observed for E. coli DH5α culture supernatants after 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 h of growth, respectively. Open circles, negative control (LB medium + 0.5% glucose); closed circles, AI-2 containing positive control (E. coli MG1655 culture supernatant after 3 h of growth). (B) Modified V. harveyi BB170 bioassay with the same E. coli DH5α culture supernatants as analysed in (A). 25 mM HEPES was present in the bioassay medium to prevent acidification. For figure legends, see (A). (C) Growth (lines) and AI-2 activity profiles (bars) for E. coli MG1655 luxS (blue) and E. coli MG1655 pgi-EDP luxS (red). Each strain was grown in LB medium + 0.5% (w/v) glucose and samples removed hourly. For each sample the optical density at 600 nm was recorded and AI-2 activity in culture supernatants recorded using the modified V. harveyi BB170 bioassay containing 25 mM HEPES. Results represent the mean of three independent bioassays. For AI-2 activity, error bars represent the standard deviations. The experiments were repeated five times with similar results.
AI-2 activity was not apparent in the culture-fluids of luxS mutants investigated above. However, in E. coli at least, just 25% of exogenously supplied glucose is believed to be catabolised via the oxidative pentose phosphate pathway (OPPP) to yield the intermediate Rul-5-P . It is therefore possible that LuxS-independent generation of AI-2 from Rul-5-P may be limited under the growth condition used in this study. It is also possible, that Rul-5-P concentrations are generally very low in E. coli and related organisms. In order to maximise the potential for detectable AI-2 production from the sugar-phosphate in vivo, an E. coli MG1655 pgi, edd, eda triple mutant (E. coli pgi-EDP; ) was utilised. In this strain, glucose catabolism occurs exclusively via the OPPP as entry of the sugar into the glycolytic and Entner-Doudoroff pathways are blocked (; pgi encodes phosphoglucose isomerase; edd and eda encode phosphogluconate dehydratase and 2-keto-3-deoxy-6-phosphogluconate aldolase, respectively). Production of LuxS-derived AI-2 activity by E. coli pgi-EDP was eliminated through the introduction of a luxS mutation. This was achieved by P1 bacteriophage transduction of the disrupted luxS gene from E. coli BL21 luxS  into E. coli pgi-EDP. The mutation was also introduced into the E. coli MG1655 parent strain.
E. coli MG1655 luxS and pgi-EDP luxS were grown in LB containing 0.5% glucose. Cell-free culture-supernatants were harvested and tested for bioluminescence-inducing ability using the optimised (HEPES-containing) V. harveyi BB170 bioassay. E. coli pgi-EDP luxS culture-supernatants induced a response in V. harveyi BB170 that, whilst modest, was clearly not observed for E. coli MG1655 luxS (Fig. 3C). Typically a peak in bioluminescence-inducing activity was observed in E. coli pgi-EDP luxS culture-fluids following 5 hours of culture and displayed 4–6 fold greater bioluminescence induction than sterile LB alone. However, in the absence of glucose, AI-2 activity could not be detected (data not shown).
Our finding that the DPD levels formed during the spontaneous conversion of Rul-5-P are sufficient to give rise to measurable AI-2 activity has several important implications. First, given the ubiquitous presence of Rul-5-P in metabolically active cells , it seems possible that molecules with AI-2 activity are intrinsically formed as by-products of pentose phosphate metabolism in all organisms and independently of the LuxS enzyme. Indeed, AI-2 activity has been reported in stationary phase culture-supernatants of Streptococcus pyogenes luxS mutants . Furthermore, some microorganisms, plants, and animals are known to produce MHF [29–33], a compound which, at least in the case of certain yeasts, is believed to be derived from Rul-5-P [12, 13].
Production of AI-2-like activity by higher organisms has also been demonstrated for algae of the genera Chlamydomonas and Chlorella  and evidence for the formation of DPD from Rul-5-P in tomato fruits has been provided . Thus, organisms other than bacteria may have developed the machinery necessary to either metabolise or exclude DPD-derived by-products such as AI-2. This may also explain the presence of lsr-type AI-2 uptake systems in bacteria that do not contain a luxS homologue . Sinorhizobium meliloti, for instance, possesses a complete putative lsr AI-2 uptake system and an AI-2 kinase (locus tags SMb21016-21022). Systems like this may have been acquired to minimise the loss of intrinsically produced DPD-derived compounds, or alternatively to scavenge the molecules released from other organisms present in the same niche, either bacteria or plants.
Finally, given the relative ease with which DPD, and thus AI-2, appears to form from Rul-5-P, and the potential advantages currently believed to be gained by the utilisation of AI-2-dependent signalling, it would seem an interesting, but as yet unexplored, possibility that some organisms may have acquired enzymes to direct and enhance this process of AI-2 formation in a controlled fashion.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that spontaneous degradation of Rul-5-P gives rise to substantial amounts of AI-2 activity in vitro. However, our data suggest that whilst this route may also be operational in vivo, in E. coli its contribution to AI-2 production is negligible. It could, however, be responsible for the AI-2-like signals reported for some higher organisms or bacteria lacking luxS. Given the postulated importance of AI-2-based quorum sensing in many pathogenic bacteria, the generation of DPD via a LuxS-independent route may have important implications.
E. coli DH 5α, E. coli BL21 luxS, E. coli MG1655 derivatives, and S. aureus Newman luxS  were routinely grown in Luria-Bertani (LB) broth or agar plates at 37°C. V. harveyi BB170 was grown in LB or AB medium . Where required, antibiotics were used at the following concentrations: 30 μg/ml chloramphenicol (for E. coli luxS mutants), 10 μg/ml tetracycline (S. aureus Newman), and 100 μg/ml kanamycin (V. harveyi BB170 and BB886).
The V. harveyi BB170 bioassay was used for the detection of AI-2 activity in culture supernatants or in vitro reactions. Initially the procedure outlined by Bassler et al.  was followed. For more careful analyses of luxS mutants, the assay was modified so that the AB medium employed contained 25 mM HEPES buffer, pH7.8, as additional component. AI-2 activity was defined as the fold increase in light production in comparison with medium or buffer controls. In vitro reactions were also tested using the AI-1 responsive reporter V. harveyi BB886 .
The luxS deletion of E. coli Bl21 luxS  was transferred into E. coli MG1655 wildtype and an E. coli MG1655 pgi-edd-eda triple mutant (E. coli pgi-EDP,  by phage transduction using the bacteriophage P1 and a standard protocol . Successful transfer of the locus was established by PCR, using the primer pair LuxS-50-UF (CTCAGACTCGCCTGGGAAGAAAGAG) and LuxS-50-DR (GTGCGCACTAAGTACAACTAAGCC).
Sugar phosphate solutions were prepared in 10 mM sodium phosphate buffer (pH 7.7) and, where indicated, were incubated at 37°C. Following the indicated incubation period each sample was frozen using dry ice and stored at -80°C. Rul-5-P and other sugar phosphates were obtained from Fluka/Riedel-de Haën and Sigma-Aldrich, respectively.
Enzymatic synthesis of Rul-5-P was carried out by incubation of 5 mM ribose-5-phosphate with 10 U/ml spinach phosphoriboisomerase in 10 mM sodium phosphate buffer (pH 7.7). The reaction was incubated at 30°C for 2 h. Catalysis was stopped by chloroform extraction of the enzyme followed by freezing the samples on dry ice. For negative controls, spinach phosphoriboisomerase was inactivated by heat treatment (5 min at 85°C).
DPD was detected after its derivatisation with o-phenylenediamine as described by Hauck et al. . Detection and quantification of MHF was achieved by high-performance liquid chromatography coupled to tandem mass spectrometry (HPLC-MS-MS) after chemical derivatisation of the compound as described by Husek .
The work presented was funded by grants from the Welcome Trust and Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (Nigel Halliday) and a University of Nottingham studentship (Tim Tavender). We are grateful for the discussions and support provided by Prof Paul Williams and Dr Dave Barrett (both of Nottingham University). We would like to thank Prof. Uwe Sauer (ETH Zürich) for sending us the E. coli MG1655 pgi, edd, eda triple mutant, Prof Bonnie Bassler (Princeton University, USA) for providing the V. harveyi reporter strains and E. coli BL21 luxS, and Rebecca Pickard for her help in constructing luxS mutants.
TJT performed the Rul-5-P in vitro experiments and AI-2 bioassays. He also generated the luxS mutants and performed the growth experiments. NMH carried out all chemical analyses, looking at DPD and MHF formation in both culture supernatants and in vitro reactions. KW conceived and designed this study and wrote the manuscript. KRH contributed to the design of this study and sections of the manuscript. All authors contributed to data analysis and interpretation.

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Campbell, James M. – Campbell Conroy & O'Neil, P.C.
Jim Campbell focuses his practice on civil litigation and the defense of catastrophic product liability, toxic tort, medical device, pharmaceutical, professional liability, and negligence matters throughout the United States. Jim is President of Campbell Campbell Conroy & O’Neil, P.C., and has been with the firm his entire career. With a passion for trial practice, Jim has earned his place as a go-to attorney for clients with high-stakes cases. He has tried more than 100 cases in 15 states and is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, a Diplomate of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), Fellow of the International Society of Barristers, and a Fellow of the Litigation Counsel of America. His approach includes a thorough analysis of clients’ ultimate business objectives to achieve results. Jim is recognized by The Legal 500 as a Nationwide Leading Lawyer for Product Liability and Mass Tort Defense. Similarly, Chambers USA identifies Jim as a nationwide leading lawyer for product liability and Mass Torts. He is listed as one of the Top 10 Most Highly Regarded Individuals in the United States for Products Liability Defense by the Who’s Who Legal. Jim is consistently included as one of the Best Lawyers in America for Products Liability Litigation – Defendants. Super Lawyers identify Jim as among the top 100 lawyers in Massachusetts and New England.
As reported by the Legal 500, Jim’s clients describe him as ‘one of the best’ in his field, an ‘outstanding trial lawyer who can grasp technical issues very quickly’ and ‘achieves tremendous results for his clients’.
Chambers USA writes: James Campbell is held in very high regard by market sources for his impressive trial capabilities. He is also commended for his keen eye for detail and frequently described as “spectacular,” “outstanding” and “persuasive.” “We trust him because of results; they speak for themselves. We’ve had nothing but defense verdicts!” report clients.
Jim serves as trial counsel for clients in industries that include automobiles, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, construction, heavy equipment, recreational products, chemicals, and material handling. Jim also defends a variety of professions in connection with alleged negligence, malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims. One of the firm’s principal trial attorneys, Jim serves as national, regional and local trial counsel for a variety of major national and international corporations and insurers, and is responsible for supervising and coordinating litigation not only throughout New England, but other regions of the country.
Jim is a past president of the International Association of Defense Counsel, the Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, and Massachusetts Chapter of ABOTA. He served as the Director of the IADC Trial Academy and the ABA National Trial Academy. He has twice served on the Board of the DRI and the ABOTA National Board of Directors.
When not in court, Jim enjoys spending time with his family, playing golf, water sports and snow skiing.
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Voir dire is an art form. James Campbell will gave a plaintiff’s and defendant’s perspective on how and why they conduct voir dire the way they do, and they will then do a mock voir dire of a panel of “jurors” based on an actual product liability fact pattern at the DRI.
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James M. Campbell presented to The International Corporate Counsel College, 6 -7 October 2011, Paris, France.
James M. Campbell presented “Voir Dire” a CLE presentation at the MBA Centennial Conference.
Alleged Improper Handling of In-Flight Medical Emergencies: A Cognizable Claim Under the Warsaw Convention?, No.1.
Expert Guides, a part of Euromoney’s Legal Media Group has recognized James M. Campbell as one of the Best of the Best in the USA in its annual guide, which highlights the top 30 legal practitioners in the country. James M. Campbell, President and Member of Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy specializes in civil litigation and product liability….
Deputy Attorney General of the United States of America, Rob Rosenstein addressed the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership meeting on May 4, 2018.

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