Holly McIntire v. Kellie Dawn Hope, et al.
1. Is a personal representative in a wrongful death civil action entitled to compensation for their services pursuant to the West Virginia Estate Statute, W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a)?
2. Does an ex-spouse with whom the decedent shares a child and co-parenting relationship constitute an “otherwise . . . equitably entitled [person]” under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Statute, W. Va. Code § 55-7-6, for purposes of sharing in settlement distribution?
3. Does the West Virginia Wrongful Death Statute, W. Va. Code § 55-7-6, create a statutory trust over which the appointed personal representative in a wrongful death civil action serves as a trustee, thereby entitling her to compensation pursuant to the West Virginia Uniform Trust Code?
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action pending before the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia (“Trial Court”) for which Petitioner, Holly McIntire, served as personal representative of the deceased, Markel Koon. Ms. McIntire and Mr. Koon are not married; however, they share a minor child, Morgan Koon. For fourteen (14) years Ms. McIntire and Mr. Koon successfully co-parented their daughter, maintaining a positive, productive, co-dependent relationship. In 2012, Mr. Koon was tragically killed in a mining accident, leaving behind several beneficiaries under West Virginia’s Wrongful Death Statute, W. Va. Code § 55-7-6. For various reasons, trial counsel for the Petitioner, Plaintiff below, concluded that none of the statutory beneficiaries could effectively function as personal representative in the wrongful death lawsuit. As a result, trial counsel asked, and Ms. McIntire agreed, to serve as personal representative in Mr. Koon’s wrongful death lawsuit.
Ms. McIntire diligently served as personal representative for approximately three (3) years, assisting trial counsel with damages quantification, discovery responses, location of witnesses, providing feedback on pleadings, providing photographs, attending witness statements, mediation, and generally communicating with the statutory beneficiaries. These activities occupied a substantial amount of Ms. McIntire’s personal and professional time. Trial counsel asserts that Ms. McIntire’s efforts as personal representative materially contributed to the substantial settlement received in this matter.
In 2015, the parties finally settled the wrongful death lawsuit and agreed on how the proceeds would be distributed amongst the beneficiaries. After tendering this proposal to the Trial Court, Ms. McIntire issued a request to be compensated $118,000.00 for her services as personal representative, such payment to be taken from the settlement proceeds. Counsel for the statutory beneficiaries subsequently filed their joint objections. By Order dated January 25, 2017, the Trial Court denied Ms. McIntire’s request for compensation. Ms. McIntire filed a motion to alter or amend this Order; however, the Trial Court reaffirmed its rulings, denying this motion by Order dated April 7, 2017. It is from these orders that Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner raises three arguments on appeal: (1) that she was a person “otherwise . . . equitably entitled to share” in the recovery under West Virginia’s Wrongful Death Statute, W. Va. Code § 55-7-6; (2) that she should be compensated for her services as personable representative under the West Virginia Estate Statute, W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a); and (3) that the Wrongful Death Statute creates a statutory trust where the personal representative functions as trustee, thereby entitling her to compensation under the West Virginia Uniform Trust Code, W. Va. Code § 44D-7-708(a).
In its Order dated January 25, 2017, the Trial Court does not address arguments (1) or (3), instead electing to deny Petitioner’s request for compensation by focusing on argument (2). In a narrow opinion, the Trial Court concluded as a matter of law that personal representatives are not entitled to compensation under W. Va. Code § 55-7-6 and/or W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a) because they are nominal parties to the litigation process and they do not actually administer an estate, since the settlement proceeds disburse directly to the statutory beneficiaries. This conclusion, Petitioner contends, misapprehends their initial request for compensation. Petitioner attempts to clarify that she seeks either: (1) to share in the settlement proceeds as a statutory beneficiary under the “otherwise . . . equitably entitled to share” language of W. Va. Code § 55-7-6; or (2) be compensated for her services as personal representative under W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a) and/or W. Va. Code § 44D-7-708(a) – but not both, conceding that such a result would be a windfall.
In Petitioner’s eyes, the distinction between these two assertions is critical. The first is an argument in equity, asserting that the facts underlying her relationship with the decedent, when coupled with her extensive services as personal representative, rise to the level of entitling her to a share in the settlement proceeds as a statutory beneficiary. At the very least, Petitioner argues that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue, so that she could build a record before the Trial Court made its legal conclusion.
In the alternative, Petitioner argues that the Trial Court was incorrect in concluding that she is not entitled to compensation under W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a) and/or W. Va. Code § 44D-7-708(a). This argument essentially boils down to two points: (1) it would be unfair and bad public policy to refuse to pay personal representatives in wrongful death cases; and (2) the Wrongful Death Statute impliedly creates a statutory trust which is governed by W. Va. Code § 44D-7-708(a) and, therefore, Petitioner is entitled to compensation under that authority.
Respondents, all other statutory beneficiaries, argue that the Trial Court was correct in focusing its decision on a personal representative’s nominal role and the absence of an administrable estate. In their opinion, the case law clearly establishes that “because the personal representative is merely a nominal party and any recovery passes to the beneficiaries designated in the wrongful death statute and not to the decedent’s estate” no compensable estate administration work is necessary. Syl. Pt. 4, McClure v. McClure, 184 W. Va. 649, 403 S.E.2d 1297 (1991). Indeed, Respondents agree that W. Va. Code § 44-4-12(a) permits Petitioner to recover reasonable expenses incurred and commission upon the amount of the estate that is subject to administration; however, this statute has no application to proceeds recovered from a Wrongful Death Settlement, as those proceeds are not assets of the estate subject to administration. Hence, the Petitioner cannot recover her expenses and commission from settlement proceeds that rightly belong to the statutory beneficiaries.
With regard to Petitioner’s statutory trust argument, Respondents simply state that this is a “Hail Mary” argument with little merit. By making this argument, Petitioner is asking the Court to imply a statutory trust where the legislature has not enumerated one. The negative effects of this could be substantial, and this type of decision is more properly left to the legislature. Indeed, the Court interprets the law, it is not supposed to create it out of thin air.
Substantial. The Court clearly invoked Rule 20 because it is going to establish new law. One way or another, we are going to get a definitive answer on whether or not a non-statutory beneficiary who serves as personal representative in a wrongful death action is entitled to compensation for their services. Beyond that, the Court can address issues surrounding the equitable beneficiary language in W. Va. Code § 55-7-6. Presumably, the Court will provide guidance on what factors should be considered in evaluating whether someone is an equitable beneficiary. Previous cases have interpreted this language as a “catch-all” for those who may not be explicitly listed as a statutory beneficiary but are nevertheless entitled to benefits in equity. However, previous cases have also found this language does not apply to creditors who may seek to satisfy debts with wrongful death verdict/settlement proceeds. Thus, while it is clear this language is intended to expand the class of statutory beneficiaries, it definitely has limits. Hopefully, the Court will take this opportunity to define these limits. Because most times the personal representative is also a statutory beneficiary, this case presents the relatively rare and unique factual scenario where the personal representative is not a beneficiary but is nevertheless in the best position to represent the beneficiaries in civil action.


Under 315(b) of the AIA (America Invents Act), Inter Partes Review “may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” The Click-to-Call decision revolves around whether the time-bar applies when a complaint has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
In an opinion designated as precedential by the PTAB, the Board ruled that a voluntary dismissal of a suit creates an exception to the 315(b) time-bar. “The Federal Circuit consistently has interpreted the effect of such dismissals as leaving the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Based on the premise that a voluntary dismissal serves to nullify the existence of a suit, the PTAB held that the one-year time limit for filing an IPR would be nullified along with it.
Unlike the 2001 infringement complaint, the PTAB’s precedential time-bar decision has now been entirely nullified.
 Oracle Corp. v. Click-to-Call Technologies LP, IPR2013-00312, Paper 26 at 14 (PTAB Oct. 13, 2013).
In Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Nos. 18-1638 to 18-1643, the Federal Circuit, in a precedential decision, affirmed the PTABs denial of St. Regis’s motion to terminate IPRs filed by Mylan based on tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal immunity does not apply in IPR proceedings because the USPTO is pursuing an adjudicatory agency action.
The Court concluded that “IPR is more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party…. IPR is more like cases in which an agency chooses whether to institute a proceeding on information supplied by a private party.” Judge Moore writing for the panel majority averred that “[t]he Director’s important role as a gatekeeper and the Board’s authority to proceed in the absence of the parties convinces us that the USPTO is acting as the United States in its role as a superior sovereign to reconsider a prior administrative grant and protect the public interest in keeping patent monopolies ‘within their legitimate scope.'” (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
In his concurrence, Judge Dyk wrote to describe in greater detail the history of inter partes review proceedings, history that confirms that those proceedings are not adjudications between private parties. While private parties play a role, inter partes reviews are fundamentally an agency reconsideration of the original patent grant, similar to ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination proceedings, which are not adjudications of private disputes and to which sovereign immunity does not apply.
Here the Board provides guidance on foreign depositions, both on the location where they are taken and the language in which they are conducted. The Board emphasizes that “the parties are in the best position to determine the procedure by which the deposition is to be conducted” but provides 12 general guidelines for procedures to use for depositions in foreign languages covering such topics as 1). each sides’ right to bring an interpreter, 2). protocol for resolving disagreements between interpreters on their respective interpretations, and 3). notice requirements on documents which will be “sight read” at the deposition. The full list is available in the decision linked above.
In this appeal, the appellant challenged the examiner’s interpretation that the claim language “at least one of a connection branch and a contents connection list” required only ‘a connection branch’ OR ‘a contents connection list’ as opposed to requiring both of their presence. In their reversal, the Board applied the ruling from the Federal Circuit in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., which explained that the plain meaning of ‘at least one of A and B’ is the conjunctive phrase ‘at least one of A and at least one of B.” The Board explained that the plain meaning could have been rebutted with a demonstration that the other claims, specification, or the prosecution history necessitated a broader interpretation, but, absent such a showing, the examiner erred.
The decision here applies to § 315 bars to institution in IPRs. Specifically, the Board found institution was barred when a petitioner has previously filed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity on the same patent. Furthermore, the Board ruled that a motion for joinder could not save a petitioner from the statutory bar under § 315(a)(1). In its reasoning, the Board explains that while a § 315(b) time bar is specifically excluded in instances of joinder under § 315 (c), the statutory bar for § 315(a)(1) provides for no such exemption.
Here, the Board upheld an examiner’s use of issue preclusion from a related invalidity finding against the applicant in District Court. In so doing, the Board found the following arguments by the appealing applicant accurate, but unpersuasive with respect to issue preclusion: 1). The fact that the claims are not the same in the proceedings; 2). The procedural possibility for the District Court ruling to be overturned; and 3). The PTO’s absence as a party from the District Court proceeding. While the Board did not find any of the following in this case, it allowed for potential rebuttals to issue preclusion when 1). The standard applied in the prior final decision might have caused a different outcome than before the Board; 2). Evidence available now was demonstrated to not be available at the time of the prior proceeding; or 3). There was otherwise not a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ in the prior proceeding and the Board wishes to exercise its discretion despite the motivations of efficiency and consistency for issue preclusion.
Each decision is linked in the respective heading above for more information and reference, and a full list of all precedential and informative decisions is available here.
 358 F.3d 870, 885-86 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Last fall, Maier & Maier highlighted a new defense strategy for Patent Owners against IPR (Inter Partes Review) Petitions in an overview of the ongoing Allergan “Tribal Immunity” Proceeding. In sum, Allergan transferred their patent portfolio to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (“Tribe”) in upstate New York, paying them a lump sum and royalties in exchange for retaining an exclusive license for the patent. In doing so, the Tribe became the Patent Owner, availing them of protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. As explained by the Supreme Court, “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”. After the assignment, the Tribe filed a motion to dismiss based on their Tribal Immunity. Just last month, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) denied that motion and set forth an expedited schedule for oral argument on April 3, 2018. The Federal Circuit issued a stay of that proceeding, giving Allergan another opportunity to plead its case for the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.
The PTAB panel primarily based its decision on two findings: 1). Tribal Immunity does not apply to the petition for IPR; and 2). Even if it does, the Tribe is not an indispensable party that the Proceeding could not continue without.
The Board relied on a few factors for the first finding, including an absence of statutory support for applying Tribal Immunity to administrative proceedings like the PTAB and the fact that the PTAB decision would be applied to the patent itself, not the Tribe as the patent holder.
Even if Tribal Immunity applied, the Board ruled that the proceeding would still continue because the Tribe is not an indispensable party. To come to this result, the Board conducted a thorough analysis of the sale to the Tribe and the alleged license back to Allergan. As explained in the decision, the involved parties/ characterization of an agreement as a license compared to a full assignment is not determinative, with precedent relying more heavily on the terms than the label given to it. According to the Board, Allergan’s exclusive right to practice the patent, coupled with the Tribe’s ‘illusory’ rights to enforce it, indicated that the agreement was an assignment and not a license. This in turn makes Allergan an owner and allows the proceeding to continue, as any of the Tribe’s interests could be fully represented by Allergan, tipping the scales in the indispensable party analysis.
If the PTAB’s decision stands, it is unlikely that the Tribal Immunity defense will be a useful tool for Patent Owners in IPR proceedings. The PTAB ruled both against its application to IPR’s and established an alternate means to continue with the proceedings with the Tribe’s licensee, making the appeal an uphill battle.
Until the appeal is settled, anyone still seeking protection for their patents under Tribal Immunity will need to push the balance of their license agreement farther than Allergan and give the Tribe more than ‘mere royalties’ and an ‘illusory’ right to enforce so that 1). the licensee would not be determined the true owner and 2). the Tribe would not be deemed indispensable.
The board’s decision struck another blow to sovereign immunity defenses, as just this past December the PTAB ruled that State Sovereignty could not be applied to dismiss an IPR proceeding when the Patent Owner has filed an infringement suit asserting the patent. In the Board’s view, the act of bringing suit is as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment right that would otherwise apply to the proceeding.
As we wait for the IPR to proceed again, you can check for updates at the PTAB’s online E2E tool, or at websites like PostGrant.com which allow for full-text searching and automatic update alerts.
 The Eleventh Amendment provides that “Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. See also Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research Foundation Incorporated; Neochord, Inc. v. University of Maryland Baltimore; Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corporation.
 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
 Mylan Pharmaceutocals Inc., et al. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016-01127, Paper 130 at 39 (PTAB, February 23, 2018).
 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Allergan, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., 2018-1638, Document 4 at 2 (Fed. Cir. March 28, 2018).
 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Allergan, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., 2018-1638, Document 4 at 2-3 (Fed. Cir. March 28, 2018).
 Ericsson Inc. v. Telfonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson, IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 4 (PTAB, December 19, 2017).
Last fall, Maier & Maier highlighted a new defense strategy for Patent Owners against IPR (Inter Partes Review) Petitions in an overview of the ongoing Allergan “Tribal Immunity” Proceeding. In sum, Allergan transferred their patent portfolio to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (“Tribe”) in upstate New York, paying them a lump sum and royalties in exchange for retaining an exclusive license for the patent. In doing so, the Tribe became the Patent Owner, availing them of protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. As explained by the Supreme Court, “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”. After the assignment, the Tribe filed a motion to dismiss based on their Tribal Immunity. Just last month, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) denied that motion.
Moving forward, it is unlikely that the Tribal Immunity defense will be a useful tool for Patent Owners in IPR proceedings. The PTAB has ruled against its application to IPR’s, established an alternate means to continue with the proceedings with the Tribe’s licensee, and any appeal to the Federal Circuit would face an uphill battle.
In the meantime, anyone still seeking protection for their patents under Tribal Immunity will need to push the balance of their license agreement farther than Allergan and give the Tribe more than ‘mere royalties’ and an ‘illusory’ right to enforce so that 1). the licensee would not be determined the true owner and 2). the Tribe would not be deemed indispensable.
This decision strikes another blow to sovereign immunity defenses, as just this past December the PTAB ruled that State Sovereignty could not be applied to dismiss an IPR proceeding when the Patent Owner has filed an infringement suit asserting the patent. In the Board’s view, the act of bringing suit is as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment right that would otherwise apply to the proceeding.
Allergan and the Tribe will now continue their defense in the IPR Proceeding with the PTAB, with a Final Decision expected by June, at which point it will likely go to the Federal Circuit for an appeal. You can check for updates using the USPTO E2E platform or subscribe to case alerts here: www.postgrant.com.
In Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 15-1944 – 2018-01-08, the Federal Circuit reviewed whether an inter partes review (IPR) Institution Decision can be appealed based on a time-bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit ruled Institution Decisions made under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) are appealable.
In 2010, the owner of the patents at issue, Ericsson, filed a complaint against three defendants in the Eastern District of Texas. Broadcom was not a named defendant. Ericsson prevailed on the infringement claims. In 2013, Broadcom filed three separate petitions with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) against the individual patents at issue. Wi-Fi One, LLC acquired the patents at issue from Ericsson while the IPRs were pending. Wi-Fi argued that Broadcom was time-barred from filing the IPRs because Broadcom was in privity with the defendants of the previous lawsuit filed more than 1 year prior. Wi-Fi filed a motion with the PTAB seeking indemnity agreements, defense agreements, payments, and communications as evidence of such privity. The PTAB denied Wi-Fi’s motion, instituted the IPR proceedings, and found the claims unpatentable.
Wi-Fi One appealed the Final Written Decisions to the Federal Circuit including arguments that the PTAB’s time-bar determination be overruled. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Decisions relying precedent from Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which ruled § 315(b) time-bar determinations are final and nonappealable under 35 USC § 314(d).
Despite this ruling, Wi-Fi again sought relief by petitioning for a rehearing en banc. This petition was granted.
On January 8, 2018, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that PTAB institution decisions made based the statutory timing provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) of the America Invents Act are appealable. In the majority Opinion, Judge Reyna emphasized the “strong presumption” for judicial review, noting “[i]n view of this strong presumption, we will abdicated judicial review only when Congress provides a ‘clear and convincing’ indication that it intends to prohibit review.” Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 15-1944 – 2018-01-08 (citing Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, at 2140 (2016)).
35 U.S.C. § 314(d) states “[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” The en banc Federal Circuit determined the natural reading of “under this section” limits its reach to institution determinations made under § 314. Since the time-bar provision is found in section 315(b) of the statute and not § 314, the en banc Federal Circuit ruled that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) did not apply and consequently the institution decision was appealable. This decision overruled the prior Federal Circuit holding in Achates.
In Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, No. 2015-1177 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2017), an en banc Federal Circuit determined that it was improper for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to place the burden of establishing the patentability of mid-IPR claim amendments on the patent holder. Instead, the ruling determined that the burden should be placed on the petitioner to prove any amended claims are unpatentable.
Previous panels of the Federal Circuit had held that, if the patent owner in an inter partes review proceeding (IPR) wanted to amend the claims of the patent, the patent owner was required to show that the amended claims would be patentable over the prior art.
The en banc Federal Circuit in Aqua Products instead held that the AIA’s statutory language in 35 USC §316(e), which places the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence onto the petitioner in an IPR case, would likewise extend to claim amendments. While the en banc court produced five different opinions, a majority of judges held that the statute that establishes the evidentiary standard for IPRs, 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), was ambiguous with regard to whether the burden of persuasion of establishing the unpatentability of substitute claims should be on the petitioner. As such, the court was required to reach step two of Chevron. From this, the court reached two legal conclusions: first, that the PTO has not adopted a rule that is entitled to deference that would place the burden of persuasion on the patent owner, and, second, that in the absence of such a rule entitled to deference, the PTO was not entitled to place that burden on the patent owner.
However, even though this decision is likely to result in many more patents being able to survive the inter partes review process in some form or another, it is unlikely to be a permanent solution. The en banc decision is narrow and makes clear that the Patent Office would have the ability to again place the burden of persuasion for claim amendments back on the patent owner. The Federal Circuit noted that, because a majority of the judges in the en banc proceeding only overturned the PTO’s present amendment practice because they believed that the statute was ambiguous with regard to amendments, if an official interpretation of the statute was made by the Director of the Patent and Trademark office, the court would be required to give deference to it under the Chevron standard. However, to do this, the USPTO would have to first go through proper notice and comment stages for such rule-making.
There are also certain downsides to filing claim amendments for the patent owner. Any amended claim will likely be subject to “intervening rights,” where the change in scope of the claim restricts its applicability to past or present infringement. Because many if not most patents in IPR proceedings will also be involved in concurrent district court litigation, if an IPR can be used to force the patent owner to make an amendment to the asserted claims, the litigation may not be able to continue.


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1. ANDREW1 MCCOUBREY was born 1784 in Ireland, and died 20 Sep 1851 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married ELIZABETH RIXON 1805 in Lismore, Waterford, Ireland. She was born 1786 in Wales, and died 06 Dec 1855 in St. John's Newfoundland1.
2. i. JOHN WILLIAMS2 MCCOUBREY, b. 1806, Ireland; d. 10 Oct 1879, St. John's Newfoundland.
3. ii. GEORGE RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 1809, Ireland; d. 11 Mar 1854, St. John's Newfoundland.
4. iii. PHEOBE MCCOUBREY, b. 1810, Ireland.
5. iv. ELIZABETH ANN MCCOUBREY, b. 1812, Ireland.
6. v. PATRICK MCCOUBREY, b. 1817, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 1895, Winsloe, Prince Edward Island.
vi. ANDREW MCCOUBREY, b. 1820, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 23 Dec 1884, Boston, MA; m. CATHERINE, 23 Dec 1884.
7. vii. RICHARD ALEXANDER MCCOUBREY, b. 27 Jan 1828, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Toronto, Ontario.
2. JOHN WILLIAMS2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 1806 in Ireland, and died 10 Oct 1879 in St. John's Newfoundland2. He married MARGARET ELIZABETH WATTS 08 Feb 1838 in St. John's, Newfoundland3.
John Williams McCoubrey apprenticed to well known printer Robert Lee Jr. After 7 years as an apprentice he went to work for John Shea's newspaper, The Newfoundlander as printer and journalist. In 1832 he founded The Times and General Commercial Gazette.
His business was almost destroyed in 1846 by fire. However he was able to rebuild.
i. JOHN WILLIAMS MCCOUBREY3 JR., b. Bef. 1844, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 24 May 1905, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. FANNY WIX MCCOUBREY, b. Bef. 1845, St. John's Newfoundland3; m. THOMAS WRIGHT, 28 Apr 1870, St. John's, Newfoundland3.
8. iii. ELIZABETH RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 14 Dec 1845, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 23 Feb 1921, St. John's Newfoundland.
iv. MARY ANN WIX MCCOUBREY, b. 11 Feb 1850, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 04 Mar 1853, St. John's Newfoundland.
v. ANDREW EDWARD MCCOUBREY, b. 18 Apr 1852, St. John's Newfoundland4; d. 07 Dec 1875, Beauhornois, Quebec5; m. MARY MCCLARTY.
9. vi. MARGARET PHEOBE MCCOUBREY, b. 16 Sep 1854, St. John's Newfoundland.
vii. EMILY JANE MCCOUBREY, b. 01 Oct 1856, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 07 Apr 1877.
10. viii. RICHARD ALEXANDER MCCOUBREY, b. 09 Feb 1848, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 06 May 1898.
3. GEORGE RIXON2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 1809 in Ireland, and died 11 Mar 1854 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married MARY MCLARTY 01 Jan 1846 in St. John's, Newfoundland6. She was born 1812, and died 22 Jul 1901 in St. John's Newfoundland7.
11. i. ADAM MCLARTY3 MCCOUBREY, b. 27 Sep 1846, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 01 Aug 1929, St. John's Newfoundland.
12. ii. ELIZABETH RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 06 Dec 1847, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 01 Aug 1917, St. John's Newfoundland.
13. iii. ANN MCLARTY MCCOUBREY, b. Feb 1849, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 26 May 1929, St. John's Newfoundland.
14. iv. ANDREW GEORGE MCCOUBREY, b. 31 Dec 1851, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 26 Feb 1929, Lexington, MA.
4. PHEOBE2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 1810 in Ireland. She married CAPTAIN GEORGE ALLAN CORBIN 28 Sep 1832 in St. John's, Newfoundland8. He was born 1807 in Blandford, Dorset, and died 07 Dec 1858 in St. John's Newfoundland.
15. i. JOHN GARLAND3 CORBIN, b. 27 Mar 1827, St. John's Newfoundland.
16. ii. HENRY MCCOUBREY CORBIN, b. 31 Jan 1834, St. John's Newfoundland.
iii. GEORGE ALLAN CORBIN, b. Abt. 1835, St. John's Newfoundland; m. JANE FARQUHARSON, 18 Sep 1873.
iv. MARY JANE CORBIN, b. Bef. 1843, St. John's Newfoundland; m. JOHN FARQUHARSON, Dec 1857.
v. PHEOBE GEORGINA CORBIN, b. 1843, St. John's Newfoundland; m. MICHAEL TOBIN CANNAN, 18 Nov 1866.
17. vi. ANDREW ROGER CORBIN, b. 20 Jun 1847, St. John's Newfoundland.
vii. ROBERT CORBIN, b. 20 May 1852, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 09 Aug.
5. ELIZABETH ANN2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 1812 in Ireland. She married WILLIAM STEERS 13 Nov 1841 in St. John's, Newfoundland8.
i. PHEOBE REBECCA3 STEERS, b. 07 May 1847, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Bef. Aug 1849, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. REBECCA STEERS, b. 02 Aug 1849, St. John's Newfoundland; d. St. John's Newfoundland.
iii. FANNY JANE CORBIN STEERS, b. 24 Jul 1853, St. John's Newfoundland; d. St. John's Newfoundland.
6. PATRICK2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 1817 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 1895 in Winsloe, Prince Edward Island. He married ELIZABETH YEO 10 Mar 1834, daughter of RICHARD YEO and GRACE LASHBROOK. She was born 17 Jul 1821 in Kilkhampton, England, and died 25 Oct 1899 in Winsloe, Prince Edward Island.
18. i. GEORGE RIXON3 MCCOUBREY, b. 20 May 1840, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. Aft. 1881.
19. ii. RICHARD YEO MCCOUBREY, b. 10 Feb 1842, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 15 Jan 1919, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
iii. ANDREW CORBIN MCCOUBREY, b. 1844, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 03 Feb 1898, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; m. FRANCES VIRGINIA BINNS, 07 Sep 1882, Zion Presbyterian Church, Charlottetown, PEI; b. 10 Jul 1854.
20. iv. GRACE MCCOUBREY, b. 1845, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. Bet. 1891 - 1901.
21. v. WILLIAM DAVID MCCOUBREY, b. 11 Nov 1848, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 21 Feb 1932, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
22. vi. ELIZABETH S. MCCOUBREY, b. 1852, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 18 Feb 1898, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.
23. vii. MARY JANE MCCOUBREY, b. 14 Jan 1855, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 1934, Hunter River, Prince Edward Island.
24. viii. ISSAC PATRICK MCCOUBREY, b. 01 Nov 1856, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 06 Apr 1931, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.
25. ix. PHEOBE CARLEAN MCCOUBREY, b. 08 Aug 1857, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 23 Jul 1917, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.
26. x. ANN CAROLINE MCCOUBREY, b. 24 Aug 1860, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. Bef. 1911.
27. xi. JOHN JAMES MCCOUBREY, b. 08 Jan 1862, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 01 Mar 1933, Summerside, Prince Edward Island.
xii. FREDERICK BARKER MCCOUBREY, b. 02 Aug 1864, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island9.
xiii. ALICE MAUD MCCOUBREY, b. 10 Feb 1868, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
7. RICHARD ALEXANDER2 MCCOUBREY (ANDREW1) was born 27 Jan 1828 in St. John's Newfoundland10, and died in Toronto, Ontario. He married MATILDA JANE ROSA COLE 17 Jun 1850 in St. John's, Newfoundland11, daughter of HUMPHERY COLE. She was born 1828, and died 20 Nov 1900 in Cloquet, Minnesota12.
28. i. MARGARET ELIZABETH3 MCCOUBREY, b. 22 Jun 1851, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 23 Jan 1927, USA.
29. ii. GEORGE CORBIN MCCOUBREY, b. 15 May 1853, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 10 Sep 1931, St. John's Newfoundland.
30. iii. CYPRIAN MCCOUBREY, b. 09 Oct 1855, New Carlisle, Bonaventure, Quebec; d. 15 Oct 1930, Toronto, Ontario.
31. iv. STANISLAUS MCCOUBREY, b. 07 Aug 1859, New Carlisle, Bonaventure, Quebec; d. 21 Feb 1932, Spokane, Washington.
8. ELIZABETH RIXON3 MCCOUBREY (JOHN WILLIAMS2, ANDREW1) was born 14 Dec 1845 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 23 Feb 1921 in St. John's Newfoundland. She married JOHN THOMAS GREEN CARNELL 17 Dec 1873 in St. John's, Newfoundland13, son of SAMUEL CARNELL and ANN GREEN. He was born 06 Mar 184513, and died 189313.
i. EDWARD (NED) RIXON4 CARNELL, b. 28 Jan 1875, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Chicago?.
32. ii. ANDREW GREEN CARNELL, b. 10 Apr 1876, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 26 Jan 1951, St. John's Newfoundland.
iii. HUGH MCCOUBREY CARNELL, b. 19 Jun 1877, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Chicago?.
iv. MORTIMER GEORGE CARNELL, b. 21 Jun 1879, St. John's Newfoundland; d. died young.
33. v. FRANK SLATER CARNELL, b. 25 Oct 1880, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 30 Dec 1959, St. John's Newfoundland.
34. vi. ARTHUR HENRY CARNELL, b. 24 Feb 1882, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Oct 1950, St. John's Newfoundland.
vii. MARGARET BESSIE CARNELL, b. 01 Sep 1883, St. John's Newfoundland; d. died young.
viii. ANNIE ASHTON CARNELL, b. 02 Sep 1886, St. John's Newfoundland; d. died young.
9. MARGARET PHEOBE3 MCCOUBREY (JOHN WILLIAMS2, ANDREW1) was born 16 Sep 1854 in St. John's Newfoundland. She married PETER DUCHEMIN KNIGHT 22 Sep 1879, son of ROBERT KNIGHT and SUSANNAH DUCHEMIN. He was born 1854 in St. John's Newfoundland.
i. SUSANNAH LEWIS4 KNIGHT, b. 20 Jul 1880, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. MARGARET PHEOBE MCCOUBREY KNIGHT, b. 05 May 1886, St. John's Newfoundland.
10. RICHARD ALEXANDER3 MCCOUBREY (JOHN WILLIAMS2, ANDREW1) was born 09 Feb 1848 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 06 May 1898. He married (1) HARRIET CROSSMAN 28 Jan 1880. She was born 1850. He married (2) CLARA ISABELLE WINDSOR 16 Nov 1892.
35. i. ALEXANDER RIXON4 MCCOUBREY, b. 14 Dec 1893, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 31 Jan 1970, Victoria, British Columbia.
11. ADAM MCLARTY3 MCCOUBREY (GEORGE RIXON2, ANDREW1) was born 27 Sep 1846 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 01 Aug 1929 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married MARY ANNE MADDICK 03 Jun 1869 in St. John's, Newfoundland13. She was born 05 Jun 1849 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 18 Apr 1948 in St. John's Newfoundland.
36. i. GEORGE ANDREW4 MCCOUBREY, b. 28 Dec 1870, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 23 May 1904, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. HENRY THOMAS MCCOUBREY, b. 24 Mar 1872, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 01 Feb 1908, St. John's Newfoundland.
Occupation: Founder of Standard Manufacturing Co.
iii. CHARLES EDWARD MCCOUBREY, b. 03 Jun 1873, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 15 Jul 1883, St. John's Newfoundland.
iv. ADAM MCLARTY MCCOUBREY, b. 24 Aug 1874, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 21 Feb 1931, St. John's Newfoundland.
v. ARTHUR WILLIAM MCCOUBREY, b. 10 Mar 1876, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 21 Sep 1878, St. John's Newfoundland.
vi. JAMES ROBERT MCCOUBREY, b. 07 Apr 1877, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 24 Feb 1918, St. John's Newfoundland.
37. vii. MARY MCLARTY MCCOUBREY, b. 01 Jul 1880, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 04 Sep 1973, London, Ontario.
viii. ARTHUR REGINALD MCCOUBREY, b. 13 Apr 1882, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 15 Aug 1882, St. John's Newfoundland.
ix. ANNIE ELIZABETH MCCOUBREY, b. 05 Feb 1884, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 04 Aug 1929; m. WILL WAY.
38. x. CHARLES VICTOR MCCOUBREY, b. 20 Oct 1887, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 13 Apr 1947, St. John's Newfoundland.
12. ELIZABETH RIXON3 MCCOUBREY (GEORGE RIXON2, ANDREW1) was born 06 Dec 1847 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 01 Aug 1917 in St. John's Newfoundland. She married UNKNOWN WHITE.
39. i. EDWARD ALEXANDER4 MCCOUBREY, b. 21 Apr 1881, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 06 May 1955, Hillsborough, New Brunswick.
13. ANN MCLARTY3 MCCOUBREY (GEORGE RIXON2, ANDREW1) was born Feb 1849 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 26 May 1929 in St. John's Newfoundland. She married WALTER BANKS WILLIAMS 15 Feb 1876 in St. John's, Newfoundland13.
Yesterday the death of Mrs Walter Banks Williams occurred at the residence of her son George R Williams at Florence Grove, Carpasian Road from Pneumonia. The late Mrs. Williams was only two days ill and was the widow of Walter Banks Williams and conducted a crockery ware store on Water Street, opposite the Royal Stores for many years. She was the oldest we believe conducting a business of her own on Water Street up to the time of her retirement in March last year when she went to reside with her son. She was in business since 1887, and notwithstanding the loss by the great fire of 1892 and the financial crash of 1894, always took a keen interest in maintaining her business integrity. The family has maintained a crockery ware and tea store for over one hundred years on Water Street. The late Mrs. Williams leaves behind two sons, Mr. George R. Williams, managing director of Rothwell and Bowring Ltd., and Mr Walter B. Williams, managing director of the Newfoundland Sales Co., Ltd., Duckworth Street. Her brother Andrew George McCoubrey, who lived in Boston, died at the end of February, and her only surviving brother is Mr. Adam McCoubrey, of Prescott Street.
i. GEORGE RIXON4 WILLIAMS, b. 03 Mar 1877, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. WALTER BANKS WILLIAMS, b. 08 Jan 1881, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 12 Feb 1968; m. (1) MARY PAYNE; m. (2) GEORGINA ISABELLE COOK; b. 1895; d. 1948.
14. ANDREW GEORGE3 MCCOUBREY (GEORGE RIXON2, ANDREW1) was born 31 Dec 1851 in St. John's Newfoundland, and died 26 Feb 1929 in Lexington, MA. He married (1) ISABELLA CHAFE 15 Sep 1878 in Newfoundland, daughter of GEORGE CHAFE and HARRIET WHITTEN. She was born 31 Aug 1856 in Newfoundland, and died 12 Jul 1879 in Newfoundland. He married (2) JULIA MARGARET COAKER 10 Jun 1881 in st. John's, Newfoundland, daughter of JOHN COAKER and ANNE KENDALL. She was born 17 May 1853, and died 09 May 1889 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married (3) ADELAIDE WILLIAMS 1890 in st. John's, Newfoundland.
i. ISABELLE CHAFE4 MCCOUBREY, b. 04 Jul 1879, St. John's Newfoundland.
ii. MARGARET ELIZABETH4 MCCOUBREY, b. 18 Aug 1882, St. John's Newfoundland.
iii. JOHN MCCOUBREY, b. 29 Feb 1884, St. John's Newfoundland.
iv. MARION RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 09 Feb 1885, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 05 Sep 1885, St. John's Newfoundland.
v. GEORGE ERNEST MCCOUBREY, b. 16 Jul 1886, St. John's Newfoundland.
vi. HUGH VICTOR4 MCCOUBREY, b. 11 May 1898, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Apr 1899, St. John's Newfoundland.
40. vii. WALTER WILLIAMS MCCOUBREY, b. 01 Jul 1899, St. John's Newfoundland; d. Oct 1967.
15. JOHN GARLAND3 CORBIN (PHEOBE2 MCCOUBREY, ANDREW1) was born 27 Mar 1827 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married ELIZABETH AIKEN REID 04 Dec 1866 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. She was born 26 Oct 1846.
i. MALCOLM4 CORBIN, b. 16 Feb 1883, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
ii. EDWARD CORBIN, b. 02 Jun 1886, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
iii. AVERY CORBIN, b. 02 May 1891, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
iv. FREDERICK CORBIN, b. 1867.
v. MAUDE CORBIN, b. 1869.
vi. MABEL CORBIN, b. 1871.
16. HENRY MCCOUBREY3 CORBIN (PHEOBE2 MCCOUBREY, ANDREW1) was born 31 Jan 1834 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married JANE BAUER 05 Jul 1856 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. She was born 10 Jan 1838.
i. THOMAS4 CORBIN, b. 1858.
ii. ANNIE G CORBIN, b. 1860.
iii. ISABELLA CORBIN, b. 20 Jul 1868.
17. ANDREW ROGER3 CORBIN (PHEOBE2 MCCOUBREY, ANDREW1) was born 20 Jun 1847 in St. John's Newfoundland. He married MARY ALBRO 27 Jun 1867 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, daughter of ROBERT ALBRO and ANN ANDERSON. She was born 15 Dec 1848 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
i. FLORENCE A4 CORBIN, b. 05 Jul 1876, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
ii. ROBERT A CORBIN, b. 05 Aug 1878, Halifax, Nova Scotia?; m. ELIZABETH, 1902.
iii. ANNIE CORBIN, b. 05 Apr 1886, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
iv. FRANK CORBIN, b. 01 Aug 1888, Halifax, Nova Scotia?.
v. FRANCIS A CORBIN, m. MYRTLE ADAMORE, 1913.
41. vi. HENRY GEORGE CORBIN, b. 15 Dec 1877, Halifax, Nova Scotia; d. 28 Mar 1940, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
viii. EDITH CORBIN, m. UNKNOWN JAMISON.
x. MABEL MARGUERITE CORBIN, m. JUD HYDE, 1906.
18. GEORGE RIXON3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 20 May 1840 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died Aft. 1881. He married ANN TURNER 02 Sep 1862 in Prince Edward Island. She was born 1842 in Prince Edward Island.
1901 PEI Census lists Ann Turner as a Patient of Falconwood Insane Asylum in Charlottetown.
Her marital status is listed as widow.
i. ELIZABETH CAROLINE4 MCCOUBREY, b. 25 Dec 1864, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. Bef. 1881.
42. ii. MATILDA GRACE MCCOUBREY, b. 23 Feb 1867, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 23 Jan 1931, Boston, MA.
iii. FREDERICK MCCOUBREY, b. 1868, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island.
iv. CORBIN MCCOUBREY, b. 1871, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island.
v. HAMMOND BARKER MCCOUBREY, b. 25 Mar 1874, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; m. FANNIE ANN JENKINS, 21 Aug 1897; b. 24 Jul 1879, Dartmouth, Bristol, MA.
vi. ANN TURNER MCCOUBREY, b. 1879, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island.
vii. GEORGE RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 1884, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 1955.
19. RICHARD YEO3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 10 Feb 1842 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 15 Jan 1919 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island15. He married MARY ELIZABETH CURTIS YOUNKER 07 Oct 1868 in St. John's Church, Milton PEI, daughter of DAVID YOUNKER and MARY MOLYNEAUX. She was born 21 Aug 1845 in Prince Edward Island, and died 27 Dec 1928 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island15.
i. DAVID P4 MCCOUBREY, b. 1869, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 13 Nov 1876, Winsloe, Prince Edward Island15.
43. ii. MARY ALICE MCCOUBREY, b. 03 Apr 1873, Lot 22, Prince Edward Island; d. 15 Jul 1925, Lot 22, Prince Edward Island.
44. iii. HENRY ALFRED WELLINGTON MCCOUBREY, b. 01 Sep 1874, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 17 Dec 1950, Sydney, Nova Scotia.
iv. WILLIAM H MCCOUBREY, b. Sep 1876, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 31 Oct 1876, Winsloe, Prince Edward Island15.
v. MARTHA SUSANNA LANGLEY MCCOUBREY, b. 19 Apr 1879, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 22 Nov 190315.
vi. MARGARET LOUISE MCCOUBREY, b. 19 Nov 1881, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 02 Aug 1956.
45. vii. LEMUEL DAVID HOOPER MCCOUBREY, b. 15 Mar 1884, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 06 Oct 1929.
46. viii. HARRIE ALEXANDER RIXON MCCOUBREY, b. 16 Feb 1890, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island; d. 08 Apr 1970, Saint John's, New Brunswick.
20. GRACE3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 1845 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died Bet. 1891 - 1901. She married WILLIAM H. SMITH 03 Oct 1866. He was born 1845.
i. GEORGE4 SMITH, b. 1868.
ii. JANE SMITH, b. 1870.
iii. ANN SMITH, b. 1872.
iv. MAUD SMITH, b. 1874.
v. WILLIAM SMITH, b. 1875.
vi. JOHN SMITH, b. 1877.
vii. JAMES SMITH, b. 1879.
viii. ALBERT SMITH, b. 1881.
21. WILLIAM DAVID3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 11 Nov 1848 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 21 Feb 1932 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island17. He married RACHEL MACLEOD 20 Oct 1868 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island. She was born 14 Sep 1846 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 25 Dec 1927 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island17.
47. i. JOHN NELSON4 MCCOUBREY, b. 03 Oct 1872, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 01 Sep 1935, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
ii. FLORINA JANE MCCOUBREY, b. 23 Feb 1873, Cavendish, Prince Edward Island18; m. JOHN W HAZELTONE, 12 Nov 1895; b. Ontario?.
iii. LUCY LEVINA MCCOUBREY, b. 20 Jan 1876, Cavendish, Prince Edward Island19; d. 05 Aug 1899, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
48. iv. ELIZABETH ADA PRICILLA MCCOUBREY, b. 14 Feb 1875, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 18 Jun 1962, Wheatley River, Prince Edward Island.
49. v. CATHERINE BEATRICE MCCOUBREY, b. 18 Nov 1880, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 22 Apr 1973.
vi. MARTHA R MCCOUBREY, b. 23 Dec 1881, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 30 Jun 192621; m. JOSEPH IRA STEWART, 10 Dec 1904; b. 1876; d. 16 Jan 1961, Cavendish, Prince Edward Island21.
vii. ANNE AUSLINE MCCOUBREY, b. 1885, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 15 Dec 1898, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
viii. THEOPHILUS ALEXANDER MCCOUBREY, b. 14 Nov 1887, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island22; d. 04 Jun 1917, United Kingdom (WW1)23.
He served in the Army under the Canadian Infantry (Quebec Regiment) 13th Reserve Bn.
22. ELIZABETH S.3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 1852 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 18 Feb 1898 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island26. She married JOHN MACDONALD 08 Apr 1876. He was born 1852, and died 191726.
i. ELIZABETH ANNE4 MACDONALD, b. 02 Jan 1877; d. 1959, Montreal?.
ii. BEATRICE 'JESSE' MACDONALD, b. 1878; m. JOHN DARRACH.
50. iii. JOHN ERNEST MACDONALD, b. 1880, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; d. 1945, Quincy, Massachusetts.
iv. WARBURTON MACDONALD, b. 1890; d. 1912.
23. MARY JANE3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 14 Jan 1855 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 1934 in Hunter River, Prince Edward Island. She married GEORGE S MACLEOD 09 Jul 1880 in Prince Edward Island. He was born 15 Apr 1853 in Prince Edward Island, and died 1934 in Hunter River, Prince Edward Island28.
i. SARAH M4 MACLEOD, b. 10 Jun 1881, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
ii. PHEOBE BEATRICE MACLEOD, b. 1882, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 12 Mar 1899, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island.
51. iii. DANIEL M MACLEOD, b. 22 Sep 1885, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
iv. ELIZABETH A MAUD MACLEOD, b. Feb 1888, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island; d. 27 Nov 1890, Lot 23, Prince Edward Island.
v. VERNON E MACLEOD, b. 15 Sep 1893, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
vi. LOUIS H D MACLEOD, b. 15 Aug 1896, New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island.
24. ISSAC PATRICK3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 01 Nov 1856 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 06 Apr 1931 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. He married MARGARET L. SMITH 08 Jan 1878 in Prince Edward Island. She was born 05 Oct 1861 in Prince Edward Island, and died 190728.
i. CLARA MAY4 MCCOUBREY, b. 26 Jun 1879, Prince Edward Island; m. NEVER MARRIED.
ii. HARRY ELLSWORTH MCCOUBREY, b. 27 Aug 1882, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; d. 22 Nov 1974, Vancouver, British Columbia.
52. iii. MARGARET BLANCHE MCCOUBREY, b. 11 Feb 1883, Prince Edward Island; d. Aug 1963.
iv. ADELLA MAUD MCCOUBREY, b. 21 Aug 1887, Prince Edward Island; d. 01 Feb 1902, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island30.
v. HELEN JOSEPHINE MCCOUBREY, b. 22 Aug 1889, Prince Edward Island; m. HARRY HOOPER.
vi. ANNIE R S MCCOUBREY, b. 21 Nov 1893, Prince Edward Island; d. 191030.
vii. LEWIS DANIEL MCCOUBREY, b. 09 Nov 1897, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island31; d. 12 Jun 1972, Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan32; m. GLADYS MAE RUSSELL; b. 09 Oct 1903; d. 21 Sep 198532.
Medical Information: Brown Eyes. Dark Brown Hair.
viii. SADIE MCCOUBREY, b. 20 Feb 1899, Prince Edward Island; m. JAMES REID.
25. PHEOBE CARLEAN3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 08 Aug 1857 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died 23 Jul 1917 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island34. She married HENRY WORTH 10 Sep 1879 in Prince Edward Island. He was born 15 Sep 1850 in Prince Edward Island, and died 27 Apr 1917 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.
53. i. MARY JANE4 WORTH, b. 12 Jan 1880, Prince Edward Island; d. 03 Feb 1962.
ii. HARRIE WORTH, b. 13 Oct 1881.
iii. FREDERICK WORTH, b. 25 Feb 1884.
iv. PHEOBE WORTH, b. 09 Sep 1887.
54. v. PERCY DOCHERTY WORTH, b. 06 Oct 1888, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; d. 10 Feb 1959.
vi. LEAH M WORTH, b. 24 Aug 1890.
vii. JOHN V WORTH, b. 05 Feb 1893.
viii. ELIZABETH WORTH, b. 18 Jul 1898.
26. ANN CAROLINE3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 24 Aug 1860 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island, and died Bef. 1911. She married JOHN CANTY 14 Mar 1885. He was born 02 Aug 1857.
i. PATRICK R4 CANTY, b. 17 Mar 1886, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia.
ii. WILLIAM D CANTY, b. 28 Nov 1887, Prince Edward Island; m. ANNIE; b. Jan 1892.
iii. JOHN JAMES CANTY, b. 08 Oct 1889, Prince Edward Island.
iv. ISAAC CANTY, b. 16 Oct 1891, Prince Edward Island.
v. PHEOBE C CANTY, b. 20 May 1893, Prince Edward Island.
vi. ELIZABETH CANTY, b. 12 Sep 1894, Prince Edward Island.
vii. ALICE B CANTY, b. 13 Apr 1899, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia.
viii. RICHARD CANTY, b. 11 Mar 1901, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia.
27. JOHN JAMES3 MCCOUBREY (PATRICK2, ANDREW1) was born 08 Jan 1862 in New Glasgow, Prince Edward Island35, and died 01 Mar 1933 in Summerside, Prince Edward Island. He married ANNA BELLE (HANNAH) R CROSSMAN 18 Oct 1890 in Prince Edward Island. She was born 24 Dec 1873, and died Aft. 1922.
i. ROY4 MCCOUBREY, b. 04 Mar 1892, Prince Edward Island36; d. 03 Apr 1918, World War 137; m. NINA LEONA DURANT, 03 Dec 1916; b. 17 Nov 1895, Prince Edward Island; d. 08 Oct 1980.
Roy's military service record number was 2060334.
Served in the Army, Canadian Infantry (New Brunswick Regiment) 26th Bn.
ii. NELLIE MCCOUBREY, b. 04 Feb 1894, Prince Edward Island.
55. iii. JAMES GARNETT MCCOUBREY, b. 25 Nov 1888, Prince Edward Island.
28. MARGARET ELIZABETH3 MCCOUBREY (RICHARD ALEXANDER2, ANDREW1) was born 22 Jun 1851 in St. John's Newfoundland39, and died 23 Jan 1927 in USA39. She married WILLIAM HENRY COCHRANE 20 Aug 1873 in Bonaventure County, Quebec40. He was born 1846, and died 1882.
i. WILLIAM4 COCHRANE, b. 1873, Texas.
56. ii. RICHARD FRANCIS COCHRANE, b. 12 Mar 1874, Texas; d. 28 Jun 1958, Texas.
57. iii. EDITH M. COCHRANE, b. 02 Mar 1877; d. 1960.
iv. JOHN COCHRANE, b. 1881.
29. GEORGE CORBIN3 MCCOUBREY (RICHARD ALEXANDER2, ANDREW1) was born 15 May 1853 in St. John's Newfoundland41, and died 10 Sep 1931 in St. John's Newfoundland41. He married BESSIE THORN 1883 in st. John's, Newfoundland. She was born 1853, and died 1930.
58. i. BERTRAM4 MCCOUBREY, b. 05 Oct 1884, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 12 Mar 1928, Seattle, Washington.
59. ii. ROSANNA MATILDA MCCOUBREY, b. 19 May 1886, Cloquet, Carlton, Minnesota; d. 01 Mar 1958, Los Angeles, Califorina.
iii. GEORGE ALLEN MCCOUBREY, b. 1889, Cloquet, Carlton, Minnesota; d. 1959, Los Angeles, Califorina; m. HELEN FORESMAN.
30. CYPRIAN3 MCCOUBREY (RICHARD ALEXANDER2, ANDREW1) was born 09 Oct 1855 in New Carlisle, Bonaventure, Quebec41, and died 15 Oct 1930 in Toronto, Ontario41. He married KEZIAH ELIZABETH DANIEL 05 Aug 1877 in St. John's, Newfoundland42. She was born 17 Apr 185743, and died 192543.
ii. RICHARD BERTRAM, b. 29 Aug 1878, St. John's Newfoundland; d. 1878.
iii. IDA MAY, b. 25 Mar 1880, St. John's, Newfoundland; d. 1960; m. WILL AGAR.
60. iv. ANNA LOUISE MCCOUBREY, b. 28 Mar 1882, St. John's, Newfoundland; d. 31 Aug 1966, Dallas, Texas.
v. AGNES LILLIAN MCCOUBREY, b. 18 Apr 1888, Toronto, Ontario; d. 1934, Toronto, Ontario.
vi. ALLEN MCCOUBREY, b. 1889.
vii. JOHN EDWIN MCCOUBREY, b. 30 Jan 1898, Toronto, Ontario; d. 1905, Toronto, Ontario.
31. STANISLAUS3 MCCOUBREY (RICHARD ALEXANDER2, ANDREW1) was born 07 Aug 1859 in New Carlisle, Bonaventure, Quebec45, and died 21 Feb 1932 in Spokane, Washington45. He married ELIZABETH LEMARQUAND 1885 in Bonaventure County, Quebec. She was born 10 Feb 1857 in New Carlisle, Bonaventure, Quebec, and died 10 Jan 1942 in Coeur Dalene, ID.
i. ETHEL4 MCCOUBREY, b. 24 Aug 1886, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 21 Mar 1958, Place Couer d'Alene, Idaho; m. ARTHUR LEO EARIN, 17 Apr 1912, Spirit Lake, Idaho.
ii. ALICE ANN MCCOUBREY, b. 21 Dec 1887, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 16 May 1888, Cloquet, Minnesota.
iii. EDWARD MCCOUBREY, b. 02 May 1889, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 1917, Portland, Oregon; m. SUSAN BRIDGET WESTON, 15 Jan 1912, Spirit Lake, Idaho.
iv. GEORGE ALLEN MCCOUBREY, b. 02 May 1889, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 1947, Califorina.
61. v. BERTHA ALICE MCCOUBREY, b. 18 Apr 1891, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 26 Feb 1967, Denver, Colorado.
vi. CHARLES MCCOUBREY, b. 10 Apr 1894, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. 24 Nov 1963, Boise, Idaho; m. GLADYS URQUHARDT, 18 Dec 1919, Spirit Lake, Idaho; b. 1897.
vii. LORETTA MCCOUBREY, b. 04 Oct 1901, Cloquet, Minnesota; d. Aug 1959, Washington State; m. JAMES FRANCIS DEVITT, 06 Nov 1926, Spokane, Washington; b. 1894, Minnesota.

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text:
Donald R. KAHN v. Ellen Rhee KAHN.
Application for Rehearing Dismissed November 1, 1996.
*1378 L. Drew Redden of Redden, Mills & Clark, Birmingham, for Appellant.
Stephen R. Arnold and Linda G. Flippo of White, Dunn & Booker, Birmingham, for Appellee.
On July 11, 1986, the trial court divorced the parties, who had been married 33 years. Incorporated into the divorce judgment was an agreement that required the husband, among other things, to pay to the wife $8000 per month in periodic alimony and to maintain, until the wife's death or remarriage, a $1,000,000 insurance policy on his life, naming the wife as the beneficiary.
In April 1994, the husband petitioned the court to terminate or, in the alternative, reduce both the periodic alimony and the life *1379 insurance coverage. He alleged that there had been material changes in the parties' financial situations and that these changes supported his request for termination or reduction. The wife counterclaimed for an attorney fee. After an ore tenus proceeding, the court entered a judgment reducing the periodic alimony to $5000 per month and the amount of insurance coverage to $500,000 and ordering the husband to pay the wife's attorney fee. The husband appeals, contending that the court abused its discretion in refusing to terminate or more substantially reduce the periodic alimony and insurance coverage and in awarding the attorney fee.
The record reflects that the wife had enjoyed yearly increases in her net worth since the divorce and that, at the time of the husband's petition, her net worth was more than $1,000,000 greater than at the time of the divorce. Neither the wife's residence, valued at $600,000, nor another home she owns, valued at $115,000 is subject to a mortgage. She testified that her yearly expenses were $94,718, but admitted at trial that her estimate of expenses included a mischaracterization of yearly expenses as monthly expenses. She receives a total of $96,000 in periodic alimony each year. The wife also holds four insurance policies on the husband's life that have a total face value of $120,000.
The husband, who at the time of the hearing was 65 years old, testified that he had recently retired from his cardiac surgery practice. He has remarried and has two children from this new marriage. At the time of the divorce, he had an annual salary of approximately $1,000,000 and substantial interest and dividend income. At the modification hearing, however, the husband's accountant estimated that the husband's cash flow for 1994, after alimony and taxes, would be $415,339 and in following years would range from approximately $50,000 to $100,000. The husband's residence had an estimated value of $800,000 and is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. The husband owns a beach condominium that has an estimated value of $300,000 and is not subject to a mortgage. He also owns several commercial real estate properties, including a 49% interest in a Birmingham hotel that is subject to a $5,000,000 mortgage. The hotel mortgagee requires the husband to maintain a $1,000,000 life insurance policy naming it as beneficiary. As of 1993, the total losses for the hotel partnership had exceeded $4,000,000. The husband also presented evidence that the current balance of the debt on his commercial real estate was $4,803,572.
A trial court may modify a judgment granting periodic alimony when there has been a material change of circumstances of either party or both parties. Murphy v. Murphy, 470 So. 2d 1297 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). The modification of alimony based upon changed circumstances is a matter that rests soundly within the discretion of the trial court. Id. A trial court's judgment modifying periodic alimony, following the presentation of ore tenus evidence, is presumed to be correct and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is plainly and palpably wrong. Id.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the court's judgment regarding the modification of periodic alimony was not supported by the evidence. The evidence revealed that since the time of the divorce the husband had suffered a dramatic reduction in income. In 1994, the amount of the reduction would be over $600,000; and in 1995, the reduction was estimated to be around $900,000. At the same time, the husband's annual insurance premium on the policy for the wife's benefit is approximately $49,000. Although the trial court reduced the amount of insurance coverage, maintaining that policy will, nevertheless, consume a substantial portion of the husband's income. We believe that the evidence required the court to more substantially reduce or, in fact, terminate the husband's alimony obligation. Our conclusion is further supported by the following evidence: (1) the wife has a large amount of income-generating assets at her disposal; (2) she invests her interest income rather than relying upon it to help support herself; (3) she has accumulated substantial wealth as a result of the periodic alimony she has received; and (4) although she has a college degree, she has not attempted to seek employment and, she says, she does not intend to.
*1380 A provision in a divorce agreement obligating the spouse to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of his dependent former spouse, once incorporated into a divorce judgment, is not modifiable if the provision is treated as part of a property division or as alimony in gross. Rose v. Rose, 496 So. 2d 85 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). However, if the provision is contingent in nature, that is, if the obligation terminates upon the dependent former spouse's remarriage or death, then the provision is modifiable. See Slaton v. Slaton, 455 So. 2d 34 (Ala.Civ.App.1984).
It has long been recognized in Alabama that the primary purposes of periodic alimony are: (1) to preserve the economic status of the parties that existed during the marriage, Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala.Civ. App.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 898 (Ala.1979), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1060, 100 S. Ct. 993, 62 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1980); and (2) to provide support to the dependent former spouse. Trammell v. Trammell, 589 So. 2d 743 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). It follows, then, that the logical reason for a spouse to maintain a life insurance policy naming the dependent former spouse as beneficiary is to provide a safety net in the event of the spouse's death; the policy may secure the maintenance of the financial status quo, thereby providing for the dependent former spouse's long-range security. See Grimes v. Grimes, 424 So. 2d 1317 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). If, however, the status quo may be maintained otherwise or the dependent former spouse is largely self-supporting, then the long-range security of the dependent former spouse is assured. In such instances, maintaining life insurance coverage would be unnecessary.
This case provides a fair example of such a situation. The record reveals that, although the husband had experienced and would continue to experience a drastic reduction in his income, the wife had experienced an impressive accumulation of wealth directly resulting from the property settlement and her receipt of periodic alimony. The wife's projected annual after-tax net cash flow, without factoring in periodic alimony, ranged between $55,000 and $65,000 for each of the four years including and immediately following 1994. Because of (1) the increase in her net worth, (2) the substantial projected after-tax cash flows the wife is expected to enjoy, and (3) the other life insurance policies the wife maintains on the husband's life, it seems likely that the wife's security is not in jeopardy. Therefore, the evidence required the trial court to more substantially reduce or, in fact, terminate the husband's insurance obligation.
The husband also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife an attorney fee. We do not agree. It is a well-established rule in Alabama that the awarding of an attorney fee in a proceeding to modify a judgment awarding periodic alimony is solely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Johnson, 415 So. 2d 1102 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). The wife's attorney testified concerning the work he had performed on this case, and another attorney testified about the amount of an appropriate fee for the work performed. Because there was evidence to support the court's award of the fee, the court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgment as to that issue.
We reverse the judgment regarding the modification of both the periodic alimony and the life insurance obligations. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine, in accordance with this opinion, whether a more substantial reduction or termination of the alimony and insurance obligations is more appropriate, given the facts of this case.
ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs in result only.
Ellen Rhee Kahn's application for rehearing is dismissed on the grounds that the brief filed in support of the application is identical to that filed on original submission to this court, in violation of Rule 40, Ala. R.App. P.
APPLICATION DISMISSED; RULE 39(k) MOTION DENIED.
*1381 ROBERTSON, P.J., and CRAWLEY, J., concur.
THIGPEN and MONROE, JJ., not sitting.

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The following are answers to frequently asked questions, from filing an application to the final audit of your project.
Are you entitled to make an application?
Can you apply for a grant for your film?
Can filming begin prior to notification of award of the grant?
When is a project certificate from the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) required?
What must be taken into account for the purposes of the distribution agreement?
How much may the producers’ fee be?
What must be considered in the event of multiple inputs by the producer?
How are the German production costs calculated (Annex 12)?
How are the approved German production costs calculated (Annex 13)?
What are the production costs actually incurred in Germany or what is the so-called minimum amount (Annex 14)?
What is the amount of the trustees’ fees?
What must be considered when filming in another country?
What must be considered when working with a foreign cast and crew in Germany?
How much is the financial contribution and how is it calculated?
What must be considered in the case of international co-productions?
Can repeat applications be made?
How are grants treated under fiscal law?
What is an SME (KMU)?
How do I request payment of the instalments?
What deadlines have to be observed for the project?
What is the accessible version?
How is an application made for reduction of holdback periods?
What must be taken into account for the final audit?
What is the export contribution?
1. Are you entitled to make an application?
The producer and co-producer of a film are entitled to make an application. If several co-producers of a co-production fulfil the application conditions, they must agree who will make the application.
The applicant must have commercially released at least one feature-length film (the reference film) in German cinemas within the five years prior to application, as an entrepreneur or individual. At least 45 prints of the reference film must have been commercially released where the production costs exceeded EUR 2 million and at least 20 prints where the production costs did not exceed EUR 2 million. Eight prints are sufficient for documentary films.
If you have not released a film for the cinema within the last five years, or you are applying for the grant for a first work, the award of a grant from the BKM, the German Federal Film Board (FFA) or a film funding agency of one of the federal states of Germany will suffice as a reference.
If the applicant does not have his/her domicile or registered office in Germany, he/she must have a business establishment within Germany at the time of disbursement of the grant.
If the application is filed by the German subsidiary or establishment of an applicant with his/her registered office outside the European Union or the EEA or Switzerland, then all grant requirements must be met by the applicant’s German subsidiary or establishment.
2. Can you apply for a grant for your film?
The film has a screen time of at least 79 minutes, or 59 minutes in the case of children’s films.
The total production costs (excluding deferrals) amount to at least EUR 1,000,000 (feature films), EUR 200,000 (documentary films) or EUR 2,000,000 (animated films).
Filming or animation work has not yet begun.
At least one final version of the film must be made in German. A subtitled version is sufficient.
Since 1.1.2013, at least one accessible final version must be produced.
The film must not be violent or pornographic and it must not violate laws in force in the Federal Republic of Germany.
A binding agreement by an appropriate distributor who qualifies as the necessary referee must be available.
At least 25% of the costs must actually be incurred in Germany.
At least 20% of the financing must come from Germany.
The requisite points and criteria of the cultural characteristics test must be fulfilled.
No grants shall be awarded for films which meet the film-related requirements for a grant of the DFFF 2.
3. When does the application have to be submitted?
An application may be submitted at any time of the year, but must be submitted at least six weeks before filming commences. At this point, 75% of the finance need not yet be in place. Between 50% and 75% is sufficient.
4. Can filming begin prior to notification of award of the grant?
Filming may not begin until the notification of award of the grant has been issued. In justified exceptional cases, an application may be made for advance commencement of filming or animation work. Click here for the relevant form. The application must be filed in good time before filming commences. Approval requires observance of the six-week period for submission of the application for a grant.
5. When is a project certificate from BAFA required?
You will only require a project certificate from the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) if you are producing in accordance with the EU Treaty and you wish to apply its cultural characteristics test. The certificate is issued by the German Federal Office for the Economy and Export Control.
The Member States which have acceded to the EU Treaty are also listed here.
6. What must be taken into account for the purposes of the distribution agreement?
The condition for the grant is a legally-binding, unconditional agreement with a distributor who qualifies as the necessary referee in accordance with the BKM Guidelines.
the minimum number of prints in accordance with Section 9 of the Guidelines must be guaranteed.
The minimum number of prints is 45 for feature and animated films, and 20 for grants of less than EUR 320,000.
At least eight prints of documentary films must be released.
7. How much may the producers' fee be?
The maximum allowance for the producers' fee is 2.5% of the total production costs (without prior allowance for the fee), but not exceeding EUR 125,000.
The following example shows a specimen calculation.
Including the producers’ fee of: EUR 80,000.
The maximum allowance for the producers' fee in this example amounts to EUR 79,250 and can only be calculated in this amount.
As the maximum allowances for producers' fees and overheads on international co-productions are different in the respective countries, these allowances can initially be included in the total production costs (GHK I).
During the processing of the application, the calculated producers' fees are then capped at the applicable maximum rate of 2.5% or 125,000 €, respectively. This is also the case for the German production costs, the approved German production costs and the mimimum amount.
8. What must be considered in the case of multiple inputs by the producer?
In the event of an additional service or multiple inputs by the producer, co-producer or proprietor, sole or majority shareholder in the production company, account must be taken of specific approaches to fees.
§ 4 Definitions of Terms and § 49 of the [German] Income Tax Act (EStG).
“German production costs” means all the costs incurred for production in Germany, i.e. all goods and services covered by German invoices or contracts. These also include the costs of the fees of the German members of the cast and crew and the staff costs of foreign cast and crew for the period of filming in Germany.
In the calculation of the German production costs, it is not who pays the costs, but whether German costs are involved which is crucial.
“Approved German production costs” means all German costs less the items listed in Section 14 of the Guidelines. In addition, the costs incurred in Germany for filming on location abroad may only be charged up to 40% of the total filming days. In the case of documentary films, the upper limit of 40% of the total filming work lapses.
less the costs incurred in Germany for filming on location abroad in excess of the approved filming days.
The costs of the German crew, German actors, German technical costs, properties, costumes, etc. incurred for filming abroad may only be grant-aided for approved filming on location abroad. Preparation, development and travel days abroad are not grant aided.
Contingency fund, provided that it is not written back into approved German production costs before the end of the project.
costs for shooting and other work done abroad, as far as these do not meet the requirements of §16.4 of the Guideline (see question 14).
Please note that travel and transport costs can only be approved for crew members if you fly from or land in Germany and book through a German travel agent (German invoice).
At least 25% of the total production costs must actually be incurred in Germany. However, costs incurred in Germany for filming abroad may not be added.
All costs incurred in Germany for filming abroad must be deducted from the German costs of filming abroad. This includes all fees, the film stock, and equipment rented in Germany and taken abroad. Travel costs for filming abroad must also be deducted. No allowances and provisions may be included in the production costs actually incurred in Germany.
12. How is the grant calculated?
For projects with German production costs less than € 8 Mio. the grant can account for up to 20% of the approved German production costs, for projects with German production costs exceeding € 8 Mio. up to 25% of the approved German production costs. In general, however, an upper limit of 80% of the total budget from which the maximum grant can be calculated applies.
The maximum grant per film is EUR 4 million.
13. What is the amount of the trustees' fees?
The trustees’ fees for audit of the final costs total 2% of the approved grant, up to a total grant of EUR 500,000. An additional audit fee of 0.25% applies to a grant exceeding EUR 500,000, up to EUR 4 million, and for a grant exceeding EUR 4 million a fee of 0.5% applies. Trustees' fees count as approved German production costs.
14. What must be considered when filming abroad?
A substantiated application for approval for filming abroad must be made if this is planned (Annex 20 of the application). Such an application may be made informally and must be submitted together with the application for a grant. Depending on the type of film, filming on exterior locations abroad may or may not be approved. A maximum of 40% of the total filming days may be approved for feature films.
This upper limit does not apply to documentary films. 100% of filming on location abroad may be approved.
No animation work abroad will be approved for animated films.
This means that the costs of the German cast and crew, film stock and equipment, and properties and costumes hired from Germany may be added to the approved German production costs in the proportion of filming days on location abroad. Preparation, development and travel days abroad will not be grant-aided. The flights of crew must take off from or land in Germany and be booked through a German travel agency in order to be approved. Daily allowances may only be approved if they are paid into a German bank account or paid in Germany.
15.What must be considered when working with a foreign cast and crew in Germany?
Fees and incidental wage costs of foreign cast and crew members will be approved in full for the period in which they are working in Germany, as they have limited liability for tax in Germany in accordance with § 49 EStG.
The place of performance of the service is decisive for approval of such costs. Should the foreign co-producer employ cast and crew members working on filming in Germany, such costs may be approved if the corresponding contracts of employment and evidence of payment are submitted for the final audit.
16. How much is the producer’s financial contribution and how is it calculated?
The financial contribution is calculated in accordance with §§ 63 and 64 of the FFG as well as § 33 of the D.1 guideline for project film funding. A financial contribution equivalent to at least 5% of the production costs must therefore be demonstrated.
In the case of international co-productions, the German share of the financing will be used as the basis of calculation.
5% of this calculation threshold must be provided as a financial contribution by the producer.
Third-party investments (cash investment with or without proceeds participation). Investments can also be made by foreign third parties, but the contract must be concluded with the German producer and evidence furnished of the cash flow to the German project account.
Only loans with unconditional repayment obligation.
Deferrals for services performed by the producer or his/her permanent employees as creative producer, line producer, director, director of photography, lead actor and deferred payments for the producer's exploitation rights to own works such as the novel, screenplay or film score as well as own archive material.
This does not include: overheads, contributions in kind by the producer and loans in kind from technical companies or other deferred services or rights.
Presales of broadcasting rights (private or public service broadcasting licenses). In the case of public service channels, the broadcasting license can only be considered as part of the producer's financial contribution if this has been contractually specified or there is confirmation from the broadcaster about the corresponding level of the license. No license share can be considered for the calculation of the financial contribution in the case of mixed contracts where there isn't any breakdown into co-production and license shares.
The required financial contribution can be reduced by the FFA on application (§ 64 para. 1 FFG) for a producer's first two feature-length films.
The same applies according to § 64 para. 2 FFG for the instance where a film project's production costs exceed twice the average amount of production costs for all the film projects supported according to § 59 FFG in the previous year.
17. What must be considered in the case of international co-productions?
For international co-productions, the applicant must guarantee financial contribution of at least 20% of the production costs, or EUR 5 million for productions with costs of more than EUR 25 million.
For a joint production involving a producer domiciled outside the European Economic Area, the applicant must provide evidence of a reference film which he has made alone or as a co-producer with a majority stake.
For co-productions made under the EU Treaty, the cultural characteristics test is conducted solely on the basis of the points system for which Annex II to the EU Treaty makes provision.
The production overheads are calculated on the basis of the German share of financing in the case of international co-productions.
You will not receive a grant if the German contribution consists merely of financial involvement, without the German parties sharing any responsibility for the content or being actively involved in production.
18. Can repeat applications be made?
Should you have to withdraw your application for a grant or should your project have been formally rejected, you have the opportunity to re-apply twice for this project. It is important that filming has not yet begun.
19. Can grants be combined?
A combination with other grants is only possible up to the admissible grant limit under European law of up to 50% of the production costs. In the case of cross-border projects financed by more than one EU Member State and involving producers from more than one Member State, the aid intensity may be up to 60 per cent of the respective total production costs. Please note, that all fundings except MEDIA and Eurimages are included into the aid intensity.
These ceilings shall not apply to difficult audio-visual works and co-productions involving countries that are included on the list of the OECD Development Assistance Committee.
20. How are grants treated under fiscal law?
Grants from the DFFF are real grants within the meaning of the administrative stipulation on application of the VAT Act and are thus not liable for VAT (Paragraph 10.2 of the VAT Application Order (UStAE) on Section 10 of the [German] VAT Act (UStG)).
21. What is an SME (KMU)?
Small and medium-sized enterprises ('SMEs') are defined in the EU recommendation 2003/361. You can also find this definition in Annex I to the Block Exemption Regulation (BER) No 651/2014 of the European Commission.
These ceilings apply to the figures for individual firms only. A firm that is part of larger group may need to include staff headcount/turnover/balance sheet data from that group too.
1. When is the grant paid?
The grant is paid either after the final project audit or in instalments. A request for payment may be made informally. The IBAN and BIC of the project account must be stated on each request.
Please refer to your notification for the list of documents required. Promises of grants, binding deal memos for distribution and global distribution and the broadcaster’s data sheet are sufficient for payment of the first instalment. All the final contracts must then be submitted for the second installment.
Confirmation by the distributor of the cinema release, stating the number of prints. Should the film not yet have been released in cinemas, confirmation of the planned cinema release will initially be sufficient.
Click here for further information on the conduct of the final audit.
2. How do I request payment of the instalments?
The payment of instalments will be made using the corresponding payment form and after submission of the necessary documents. The IBAN and BIC of the project account must be stated on each request of payment. The payment form can be obtained from the website's download area or from one of the funding consultants. Confirmation must be given upon an instalment's payment that the disbursed funds will be used promptly, or within the next 6 weeks at the latest.
3. What deadlines have to be observed for the project?
The most important deadlines are the deadline for conclusion of finance, commencement of filming, completion of the final German version, cinema release and the deadline for the final audit. Please note that these deadlines are binding and that award of the grant will lapse if they are not met. An application may be made for an extension in justified exceptional cases. To do so, please contact the funding consultants in good time, or Mrs Anja Geißen for an extension of the deadline for the final German version and the cinema release.
100% of the finance must be substantiated 3 months after issue of the award.
Filming must commence no later than four months after notification of award of the grant.
This involves a date chosen personally by the producer and stated on the application form. In the case of international co-productions, it must be noted that substantiation of the German version is involved.
Should you be unable to meet the deadline, an application may be made for one extension. Please note that the grant notification will automatically expire if the deadline is exceeded again!
The film must be released in cinemas no later than one year after completion of the final German version. The deadline can only be extended through an approved exemption given by the FFA CEO.
Your project should undergo a final audit one year after completion of the final German version. All the important information on the final audit can be found here.
4. What is the accessible version?
The accessible version is the final version of the film with a German audio description and German subtitles for the deaf and hard of hearing.
5. How is an application for reduction of holdback periods made?
Approval may be granted for reduction of the standard holdback periods, provided that nothing conflicts with the demands of the film industry. Applications can be made continuously, but no earlier than after a successful cinema release. Please submit the application in good time, so that rapid handling of the application may be guaranteed.
Should you have received a grant from the FFA or DFFF for your project, you can make a joint application for the reduction of holdback periods on this application form. This must be sent to Mrs Stefanie Schütt at the FFA (Grosse Präsidentenstrasse 9, 10178 Berlin).
6. What must be taken into account for the final audit?
Your project must undergo the final audit no later than one year after completion of the final German version. For this purpose, you must send various documents to the DFFF and the auditors. The respective funding consultant for the project will be pleased to answer any questions you may have about the final audit. You will find detailed information on the process and a list of the documents to be submitted here.
7. What is the export contribution?
In principle, every producer is obliged to pay an export levy if a film was produced with FFA or DFFF funding and sold abroad. The export levy is generated from all revenues as a result of foreign sales as well as sales agents' minimum guarantees, even when these are part of a film's financing.
The levy amounts to 1.5% of the net revenues, up to a maximum of € 50,000.
The export levy is the direct contribution by the film industry towards the financing of German Films Service + Marketing GmbH and its activities. The export levy has had to be reported directly to the FFA since 2013. It is levied directly from the producers and no longer via the sales companies as was previously the case. Please contact Jule Wolff for more information about the export levy (Exportbeitrag@ffa.de).


§ 605.025 Applicants to Provide Inspection and Fire Department Approval.
§ 605.040 License — Not Assignable or Transferable.
§ 605.050 Separate License for Each Place of Business — City Clerk's Duties.
§ 605.060 License Fees — Payment of.
§ 605.070 Records of Licenses.
§ 605.080 Statements of Applicant.
§ 605.085 Occupational or Business License for Construction Contractors, City — Duty to Require Proof of Workers' Compensation Coverage, When, Effect.
§ 605.090 Merchandise Vending Regulations.
§ 605.100 Imposition of Tax or License Fee on Certain Professions Prohibited — Imposition of Tax or Fee Prohibited Unless Business Office Maintained.
§ 605.110 Revocation of License — Grounds.
§ 605.120 Revocation of License — Procedure.
Section 605.025 Applicants to Provide Inspection and Fire Department Approval.
Section 605.040 License — Not Assignable or Transferable.
Section 605.050 Separate License for Each Place of Business — City Clerk's Duties.
Section 605.060 License Fees — Payment of.
Section 605.070 Records of Licenses.
Section 605.080 Statements of Applicant.
Section 605.085 Occupational or Business License for Construction Contractors, City — Duty to Require Proof of Workers' Compensation Coverage, When, Effect.
Section 605.090 Merchandise Vending Regulations.
Section 605.100 Imposition of Tax or License Fee on Certain Professions Prohibited — Imposition of Tax or Fee Prohibited Unless Business Office Maintained.
Section 605.110 Revocation of License — Grounds.
Section 605.120 Revocation of License — Procedure.
Every person, firm, association or corporation, their lessees and their trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever engaged in any business, occupation, pursuit, profession or trade or in keeping or maintaining any institution, establishment, article, utility or commodity within the City.
Unless otherwise provided by this Chapter, includes all license fees levied on or required to be paid as herein provided by any merchant, business, trade, occupation or manufacturer.
Unless otherwise provided, includes all licenses and permits required to be secured or had as provided by any merchant, business, occupation or manufacturer.
Unless otherwise provided, shall begin on the first (1st) day of October or, in the case of those newly established, at the beginning of doing business and shall end on the thirtieth (30th) day of September.
Any person, firm, corporation, co-partnership or institution engaged in the production of any article, thing or object by skill or labor out of raw materials or from matter which has already been subjected to artificial forces or to which something has been added to change its natural condition.
Every person, firm, association or corporation, their lessees and their trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever engaged in the selling of any goods, wares or merchandise at any store, stand or place occupied for that purpose within the City.
A person, firm, co-partnership or corporation shall not engage in any business, occupation, trade, vocation or engage in the business of a merchant or manufacturer as described herein within the City of Winchester without having obtained a license therefore from the City. All obligations due the City shall have been paid prior to the issuance of a license.
Every applicant for a new license or for renewal prior to the issuance of said license shall provide the City with a current inspection of code compliance by the City's Building Department and appropriate Fire Department approval. The building inspection fee shall be as set by the Board from time to time by ordinance.
The annual license fee levied by the terms of this Chapter shall be twenty dollars ($20.00) for every one hundred (100) square feet or fraction thereof of the occupied premises; provided further, that no license shall be issued to any merchant, business, occupation or manufacturer under the provisions of this Chapter for a sum less than fifty dollars ($50.00) per annum.
A license shall not be assignable or transferable.
A separate license shall be obtained for each stand, store or place of business conducted, operated or maintained by every merchant, business, occupation or manufacturer for which a license is required. The City Clerk of the City of Winchester shall receive applications for said license, the fee thereof and issue said license.
All license fees shall be due and payable on the first (1st) day of October each year and shall be considered delinquent after the first (1st) day of November following. Business started after the first (1st) day of October of any year are due and payable upon commencement of their business.
Proration Of Merchant's License Fees. Licenses may be issued for part of a year for businesses commenced after the first (1st) day of October and proportionate fees charged based on the quarter of year such license is to run to the next September thirtieth (30th).
The City Clerk shall keep a complete record of all licenses issued showing the nature of the license and date of issuance, to whom issued and address for which issued.
Every applicant shall provide the City Clerk with a correct statement in writing indicating the name and address of said business or occupation, the owner and home address thereof, the nature of said business, the number of square feet of the occupied premises, and any other information required by the City.
Any City which issues an occupational or business license for a contractor in the construction industry shall require a certificate of insurance for Workers' Compensation coverage or an affidavit, the form of which shall be developed by the division, signed by the applicant attesting that the contractor is exempt. No City shall have the duty to investigate any certificate of insurance or affidavit filed pursuant to this Section.
Any contractor who fails to comply with the provisions of Subsection (A) shall be denied such a license until he/she furnishes a certificate of insurance.
It is unlawful, pursuant to Section 287.128, RSMo., for any contractor to provide fraudulent information pursuant to this Section.
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to create or constitute a liability to or a cause of action against a city or county in regard to the issuance of any license pursuant to this Section.
It is unlawful to vend or distribute merchandise or materials from a vehicle, stand or otherwise within the limits of any highway, road or street in the City of Winchester except under such license, conditions and regulations prescribed by City ordinances; but in no instance shall such vending be permitted or authorized where the same causes traffic confusion and interferes with the free and unhindered mobile progression of traffic.
Hereafter no person following for a livelihood the profession or calling of minister of the gospel, duly accredited Christian Science practitioner, teacher, professor in a college, priest, lawyer, certified public accountant, dentist, chiropractor, optometrist, chiropodist, or physician or surgeon in this State, shall be taxed or made liable to pay any municipal or other corporation tax or license fee of any description whatever for the privilege of following or carrying on such profession or calling, any law, ordinance or charter to the contrary notwithstanding.
No person following for a livelihood the profession of insurance agent or broker, veterinarian, architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, auctioneer, or real estate broker or salesman in this state, shall be taxed or made liable to pay any municipal or other corporation tax or license fee for the privilege of following or carrying on his/her profession by a municipality unless that person maintains a business office within that municipality.
Any failure to comply with or any violation of any provisions of this Chapter, or any other ordinance of the City regulating the business, occupation or activity licensed, or the Statutes of the State of Missouri by any licensee.
Violation of the terms and conditions upon which the license was issued.
Failure of the licensee to pay any tax or obligation due to the City.
Any misrepresentation or false statement in the application for a license required herein.
Failure to display the license required herein.
Revocation of any license shall be in addition to any other penalty or penalties which may be imposed pursuant to these provisions.
The Board of Aldermen shall set a date for a hearing to consider the question of revocation.
At least ten (10) days prior to said hearing, written notice shall be mailed to the licensee, by registered mail, return receipt requested, to his/her last known address as shown in the records of the City Clerk advising the licensee of the time, date and place of hearing and of the reason for considering the revocation of his/her license.
During the pendency of this hearing before the Board of Aldermen, the licensee shall be permitted to continue the operation of his/her business.
At the hearing set by the Board of Aldermen, the Board of Aldermen shall hear all relevant and material evidence justifying the retention of the license.
The licensee may be present in person and/or by his/her attorney and may present evidence.
After hearing the evidence presented, the Board of Aldermen shall vote on the issue of whether the subject license shall be revoked.
The affirmative vote of a majority of the Board of Aldermen shall be necessary to revoke any license.
Any failure to comply with or any violation of any provision of this Chapter by any licensed merchant, business occupation or manufacturer shall be cause for revocation or suspension of such license by the Board of Aldermen. Said revocation or suspension shall be in addition to any other penalties prescribed. Said revocation or suspension shall be upon notice and hearing by the Board of Aldermen and/or their designee.