What are the laws and regulations relating to the recovery of costs for computerized legal research?
Alaska , Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,Virginia, Washington, Wyoming.
1. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 723 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Alaska 1986) "Before the court may award expenses for the state's travel, paralegal assistance, and computer research time, it must first determine what portion of these expenses were necessarily incurred and therefore allowable under Civil Rule 79(b)."
the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.
"Inasmuch as the computerized legal research was conducted and billed as a separate item to plaintiff, the Court finds that it is a proper item of costs. This billing was separate from attorney fees. Further, considering the issues presented, the Court finds that the research was necessary for trial preparation. Finally, the costs thereof were reasonable."
(1) The party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the Judgment; but this section does not apply to executors or administrators in actions when they are not liable for costs.
Georgia GA No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
the fee agreement to allow them. Our ruling that the agreement no longer controls permits the trial court freedom on remand to decide what credit, if any, is due the Brawleys for expenses that were not both necessary and reasonable, based upon their value to the Brawleys….As with other expenses, the trial court therefore must decide on remand whether the additional expenses sought by Ellerin were necessary and reasonable based upon their value to the Brawleys."
Hawaii HI No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
"Consequently, although the seventh circuit appears to agree with the ICA that computer-assisted research charges are not recoverable as taxable costs, there is some evidence to suggest that it might nevertheless award such computer-assisted research charges as a separately billed component of attorneys' fees."
"…the trial court's imposition of attorney fees and computer-aided research costs as a sanction under I.R.C.P. 11 was not an abuse of discretion."
provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees.
2. Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Attorney fees may include the reasonable cost of automated legal research if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing the party's case.
Illinois IL No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
"We hold, therefore, that the computer-assisted legal research expenses are a form of attorney fees and are not separately recoverable as a cost or expense pursuant to the parties' contingent fee agreement. We express no opinion, however, as to whether computer-assisted legal research expenses are ever separately recoverable in a contingent fee agreement."
"We, therefore, conclude that Harris Bank should not recover the costs of photocopying, word processing, telecopier and computer research (i.e., Westlaw) charges it [*600] sought in its petition for attorney fees and costs."
Indiana IN No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
“costs” did not include expenses for “Westlaw charges”, “mounting/printing costs for exhibits”, “camera/film/developing costs for pictures”, “printing costs for exhibits”, and “copying expenses for trial”.
Kansas KS No Relevant Statute Found.
(d) expenses incurred by appointed attorneys in obtaining computerized legal research if the case presents a unique question of law to be researched. Such expenses 10 of 20 shall not exceed $ 200.
Massachusetts MA No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
1. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kefalas, 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 139.
"Those costs are appropriate with the exception of the amount charged for online electronic research and for “courier fees.” The former is an element of overhead, not expense, and the latter often substitutes for regular mail even when time is not of the essence."
Montana MT No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
"Pohl opined that the amount of computer research time was reasonable in this case in which Brown wrote numerous briefs and that “the time [Brown] spent using Westlaw was money well spent, probably would have taken a lot more hours of research ... if he had come down here to the law library.” – fee was upheld"
"We disagree, however, that costs associated with Westlaw research were necessary. These costs may be common costs in modern law practice, but they primarily involve improving a law practice's efficiency. Therefore, the District Court could reasonably conclude that they were not necessary costs."
Nebraska NE No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
"However, we reverse the award of computer research, juror analysis and witness preparation expenses because these expenses are not allowable costs under § 18.005."
"In so holding, this court reasoned that attorneys incur computer research expenses as a function of their research of the law, so that the expense is more closely related to the attorney's fee than to the kinds of recoverable costs defined in §18.005."
No Relevant Case Law found.
17. Any other reasonable and necessary expense incurred in connection with the action, including reasonable and necessary expenses for computerized services for legal research.
New Jersey NJ No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
New Mexico NM No Relevant Statutes found. No Regulations found.
New York NY No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
d) The court, in any action brought under this Article may, in addition to any judgment awarded plaintiff, order costs and fees of the action and reasonable attorneys' fees to be paid by the defendant. In an action brought by the Commissioner in which a default judgment is entered, the clerk shall order attorneys' fees of three hundred dollars ($300.00) to be paid by the defendant.
No Regulations found. No Relevant Case Law found.
North Dakota ND No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
Ohio OH No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
A. In any civil action to recover for labor or services rendered, or on an open account, a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject of the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
2. Atwood v. Atwood, 2001 OK CIV APP 48.
B. In any civil action to recover unpaid fees, fines, costs, expenses or any other debt owed to this state or its agencies, as defined pursuant to Section 152 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes, unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Oregon OR No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
The prevailing party in a civil action or special proceeding may recover expenditures necessarily incurred in gathering and procuring evidence or bringing the matter to trial. * * copying, costs of original and copies of transcripts and reporter's attendance fees, court appointed experts and other similar expenses and charges. These expenditures are termed "disbursements"
1. Casillas v. Schubauer, 2006 SD 42.
and are taxed pursuant to § 15-6- 54(d).
Texas TX No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
Utah UT No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
1. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508.
A. Any person who shall be injured in his reputation, trade, business or profession by reason . . . including a reasonable fee to plaintiff's counsel, and without limiting the generality of the term, "damages" shall include loss of profits.
Washington WA No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
Wyoming WY No Relevant Statute Found. No Regulation Found.
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Law Web: When court should not refer dispute to arbitration if defendant takes all objections on merits of case?
When court should not refer dispute to arbitration if defendant takes all objections on merits of case?
Having thus answered the question in law, let us now see if the affidavit of the Defendant in reply to the summons for judgment amounts to such 'first statement'. The affidavit in reply takes all objections on merits of the case, and does not object to the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground of existence of the arbitration agreement. It is thus a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the Applicant-Defendant submits that the Defendant has averred that the Court has no jurisdiction. That is immaterial. What the affidavit does not indicate is the Defendant's objection to the Court exercising its jurisdiction in the matter in view of the arbitration agreement. The Defendant does not make it clear that he "does not want the Civil Court to adjudicate upon his rights or liabilities, but he wants the domestic forum to decide that." Here, the Defendant has made it amply clear that he intends to defend the matter in this Court; he indicates his defences, may be including a defence of jurisdiction; and based on these defences, seeks leave of the Court to defend the suit. That is clearly making a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute. The stage for making an application under Section 8 is clearly crossed.
Drive India Enterprise Solutions Ltd. Vs. Haier Telecom (India) Pvt. Ltd.
1. This summons for judgment is taken out in a summary suit praying for a money decree in the sum of about Rs. 54.46 crores by way of principal amount and over Rs. 40 crores towards interest. Simultaneously with its application for leave to defend, the Defendant has taken out an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act") for reference of the parties to arbitration. This application is on the ground that the subject matter of the present summary suit is covered by an arbitration agreement between the parties.
2. Since the Court has before it two proceedings, namely, a summons for judgment seeking a decree against the Defendant and an application for reference of the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act, the latter application will have to be taken up first. The application for decree in the form of summons for judgment can only be considered if the Court rejects the application under Section 8. Let me, therefore, take up Notice of Motion No. 126 of 2018.
3. It is the case of the Applicant-Defendant in this notice of motion that the disputes between the parties arise out of two agreements, namely, (i) the agreement dated 05 February 2010 (Exhibit - C to the plaint) described otherwise in the plaint as 'Logistics Agreement' read with the Addendum dated 17 September 2010 (Exhibit - D to the plaint), and (ii) 'Product Purchase Agreement' dated 15 April 2010 (Exhibit - F to the plaint). It is submitted that these two are overarching agreements under which the Plaintiff-Respondent placed various purchase orders on the Defendant and pursuant to which goods were sold and delivered by the latter to the former, for the value of which the present commercial suit is filed. It is submitted both these agreements have an arbitration clause contained in them and accordingly the subject matter of the present suit is covered by arbitration agreement.
4. The application is objected to by the Plaintiff-Respondent on a number of grounds. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent, in the first place, submits that the application does not comply with the requirements of Section 8(1) of the Act inasmuch as it is not filed before submitting the first statement of defence. Learned Counsel submits that the present suit being a summary suit, filed before the Commercial Division, the Defendant's application for leave to defend must be considered as its first statement of defence. Learned Counsel also submits that the application does not comply with the requirements of Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 inasmuch as there is failure on the part of the Applicant-Defendant to file original or certified copy of the arbitration agreement along with the application. Learned Counsel further submits that even on merits, the subject matter of the present suit is not covered by the arbitration agreements as alleged by the Applicant-Defendant. Learned Counsel submits that the suit is not based on a liability arising out of the underlying contracts, which contain the arbitration agreement, but on an express balance reconciliation statement jointly signed by the parties. Learned Counsel submits that such a statement by itself furnishes a cause of action on which a suit could be founded.
5. Let us first dispose of the two minor objections to the present application. The first is on account of non-filing of either the original or certified copy of the arbitration agreement along with the application. It is submitted that for that reason the application cannot be entertained, by virtue of the mandate of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. The Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the expression "shall not be entertained" used in sub-section (2) of Section 8 in the case of Ananthesh Bhakta v. Nayana S. Bhakta MANU/SC/1480/2016 : (2017) 5 SCC 185. As explained by the Supreme Court, the original arbitration agreement, or its duly certified copy, can be brought on record, if not originally filed with the application, when the Court is considering the application. If the original or copy is so brought on record, the application cannot be rejected under sub-section (2) of Section 8 on the ground that it was not originally accompanied by the arbitration agreement, either original or copy, when filed.
6. The other objection is on the ground that the suit being based on a reconciliation statement jointly signed by the parties and not on a liability arising out of the underlying contracts, i.e. the agreements containing the arbitration clause, the subject matter of the suit cannot be said to be covered by arbitration agreement. Learned Counsel cites the case of Hiralal v. Badkulal MANU/SC/0004/1953 : AIR 1953 SC 225, which was followed by our Court in the case of Sun N Sand Hotel Limited v. V.V. Kamat, HUF MANU/MH/0841/2002 : 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 932. There is no quarrel with the propositions laid down in these cases. An unconditional acknowledgement of liability does imply a promise to pay and a balance struck and accepted in a statement of account does amount to "accounts stated" between the parties. Such acknowledgment or accounts stated can form the basis of a suit. The present case, however, is not one which can be said to be solely based on such acknowledgment or accounts stated. In the present case, after referring to the underlying contracts and purchase orders placed by the Plaintiff on the Defendant thereunder, the Plaintiff has, in terms, relied on the Defendant's obligation to pay the Plaintiff monies under the two contracts, namely, the logistic agreement and the product purchase agreement. Though the plaint does recite the fact of the parties having signed the balance reconciliation statement, in the crucial averments made for the purposes of maintaining the present suit under Order 37, the Plaintiff has submitted that "the debt due and payable to the Plaintiff arises on a written instrument, being the balance reconciliation statements signed by the parties and/or the written agreements, on the basis on which the business was carried on between the parties". Even for the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the Plaintiff relies on making of the two contracts in Mumbai. In the premises, it cannot be suggested that the present suit is exclusively based on a balance reconciliation statement and does not seek to recover any liability arising under the underlying contracts. For the purpose of deciding the present suit, a reference does have to be made to the underlying contracts and since these contracts contain an arbitration agreement, the subject matter of the suit can very well be said to be covered by such arbitration agreement.
7. Let us now consider the main objection to this application. It is submitted that the present application does not comply with the mandate of Sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Act, which requires a party to an arbitration agreement, or a person claiming through or under him, to apply for a reference "not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute". A question which directly arises, is, whether an application for leave to defend or a reply to the summons for judgment filed by the Defendant is his first statement on the substance of the dispute, for if it is, the Defendant's application under Section 8 in the present case is not maintainable, since the same has been filed after filing of its application for leave to defend.
8. Learned Counsel on both sides took me through various judgments not only of our Court but also of the Supreme Court as well as Delhi and Madras High Courts in support of their rival cases. We do not have a direct authority of the Supreme Court on the point as to whether an application for leave to defend amounts to a statement on the substance of the dispute within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 8. The case of Booz Allen And Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Limited And Others MANU/SC/0533/2011 : 2011-5-SCC-532 deals with a notice of motion seeking appointment of a receiver and grant of a temporary injunction, in which the Defendant offered a defence. The Supreme Court said that resisting such motion, even if such resistance is offered by detailed objections, does not amount to submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute.
9. The authorities of Delhi and Madras, though directly on the point, take diametrically opposite views. Delhi High Court holds in the case of Anis Ahmad v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpn. MANU/DE/0924/2005 : 2005 (83) DRJ 122 that the first submission of the Defendant of the substance of the dispute takes place in a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, when application for leave to defend is filed. Madras High Court, on the other hand, in the case of G. Rajarajan v. AIG Consumer Financial Services (India) Ltd. MANU/TN/2645/2012 holds that when a person seeks permission under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) to defend the suit, it is not necessarily to be construed as his first statement on the substance of the dispute.
10. When it comes to our Court, we again find two different views. A learned Single Judge of our Court in the case of M/s. D.C. Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Keval Kishan Arora1 has observed that ordinarily, the reply of the Defendant to the summons for judgment would be his first statement on the substance of the dispute as contemplated under Section 8. Another learned single Judge of our Court in the case of Stellar Industries v. M/s. International Combustion (India) Ltd.2, on the other hand, has held that the application for leave to defend cannot be called such 'first statement'.
11. Learned Counsel for the Applicant/Defendant submits that the later case of D.C. Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. should be considered per incuriam, since that case does not take into account the judgment in the case of Stellar Industries which was rendered prior in point of time. On the other hand, it is submitted by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent that the facts of the case in Stellar Industries must be distinguished and the law laid down in the case of D.C. Textile Mills should be taken as the correct proposition of law. Learned Counsel relies on judgments of the Supreme Court and of our Court, which indirectly have a bearing on this question, and submits that in the light of law laid down by these judgments, this Court must accept the view expressed in D.C. Textile Mills (supra) as the correct view of law.
12. Before we reflect on the law of Section 8 and the principles which it enunciates, we may consider the two judgments of our Court noticed above. The first case, the Stellar Industries' case, was a summary suit based on a written contract. The Defendant appeared and applied for leave to defend. Though leave was granted, no written statement was filed. The suit thereafter proceeded without written statement. At that stage, an application was moved by the Defendant under Section 8 of the Act for referring the subject matter of the suit to arbitration. One of the submissions on which that application was opposed, and which submission was considered and dealt with by the Court, was that an application for leave to defend was nothing but a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute and since the application under Section 8 was not filed before seeking such leave, the Defendant was barred from making such application under Section 8. Though the learned Judge did say that he was inclined to reject the submission and proceeded to hold that the application for leave to defend cannot at all be called a 'first statement', he also noted that the affidavit filed for seeking leave, in clear terms, had raised the issue of jurisdiction of the Court in particular reference to the arbitration clause. In view of this latter observation, the observations of the learned Judge on the 'first statement' may not be considered a general statement of law on the point. On the other hand, in D.C. Textile Mills case (supra), the Court was not really concerned with the question as to whether an application under Section 8 can be filed after seeking leave to defend. In D.C. Textile Mills case (supra) there was in fact no application under Section 8. What was submitted before the Court for seeking leave to defend was that the Court had no jurisdiction to go ahead with the suit on account of existence of an arbitration agreement. The learned Judge held that though the arbitration clause in the contract stood admitted, the Defendant had failed to file any application under Section 8 and it was not possible to accept the contention of the Defendants that the Court was nevertheless obliged to refer the dispute to arbitration and not adjudicate upon the summons for judgment. Secondly, the Court also noticed that the Defendant had not filed the arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof before a Court as contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Act. On both these counts, the Court held against the defendant. The Court thereafter went on to observe that since leave to defend was granted in the suit and the occasion of filing of written statement was still to arise, the Defendant would still have an opportunity to make an application under Section 8 of the Act before he files his written statement in the suit. This really puts paid to the argument that Section 8 application must always precede the application for leave to defend. Yet, the learned single Judge appears to have made further observation that "ordinarily, the reply of the Defendant to the summons for judgment would be his first statement on the substance of the dispute as contemplated under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996". This observation can clearly be called orbiter. The learned Judge was not required to decide whether making of an application for leave to defend amounted to submitting a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute and Section 8 application filed thereafter would not comply with the requirements of Section 8(1) of the Act. This is particularly so, since the learned Single Judge in fact permitted the Defendant to make an application under Section 8 after the leave was granted.
13. Since there is no direct authority of either our Court or the Supreme Court and we have two conflicting views of Delhi and Madras High Courts on the point, it is necessary to consider the matter on principle. It cannot be gainsaid that in an ordinary suit, defence is a matter of right and a written statement is the defendant's first statement on the substance of the dispute. But summary suit is a special procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure under Order XXXVII, where defence is not as of right, but can be raised only subject to leave of the Court. The Court, on an application for such leave, considers whether the defendant has a 'genuine or bonafide' and 'probable', or at least a 'plausible', defence. If the Court finds this in the affirmative, the defendant is then allowed to file his written statement. Is such written statement his first statement on the substance of the dispute? Or is it his leave application where he needs to indicate that he has a genuine or bonafide and a probable, or at least a plausible, defence?
14. Before we answer this, it is important to ask why the stage of submitting a first statement on the substance of the dispute is a watershed or crucial stage here. The obvious answer which suggests itself is that because it amounts to submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court. The defendant unequivocally submits himself to joining issues with the plaintiff and having the matter decided by the Court. (Such decision, of course, may be sought not merely on merits, but even on the ground that the Court lacks either subject matter or territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction.) In the context of a Section 8 application, this is crucial, because in such application the defendant implores the Court not to at all commence the hearing of the suit, and that on the ground that the parties have chosen to have the matter decided by a private forum as opposed to the ordinary Courts of law. If such be the nature of a Section 8 application, it makes perfect sense that submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute before making any such application ought not to be allowed, for such submission can be seen only as a waiver to have the dispute adjudicated upon by the private tribunal.
"The substance of the matter is that when the summons for judgment comes up before the Court it is the defendant who has to obtain leave to defend and on that leave being granted he becomes entitled to defend. Therefore it is clear that by filing this affidavit the defendants expressed an unequivocal intention that the matter should be heard by the Civil Court and gave clear effect to that intention by asking the Court to give them leave to defend so that they should resist the plaintiff's claim."
"What the learned Judges there point out is that if at the same time as the affidavit is filed to show cause against the summons for judgment, an application is made by the defendant for stay, or if in the affidavit itself the arbitration clause is set out and an application is made for stay under s. 34, then the filing of the affidavit would not be a step in the proceedings. Now that judgment is perfectly understandable on the principle already stated. When the defendant goes to Court to show cause against the summons for judgment and he makes his intention clear that he does not want the Civil Court to adjudicate upon his rights or liabilities, but he wants the domestic forum to decide that, then clearly the mere fact that he has filed an affidavit in reply to the summons cannot be relied upon as a step in the proceedings."
"25. Not only filing of the written statement in a suit, but filing of any statement, application, affidavit by a defendant prior to the filing of the written statement will be construed as 'submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute', if by filing such statement/application/affidavit, the defendant shows his intention to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court and waives his right to seek reference to arbitration. But filing of a reply by a defendant, to an application for temporary injunction/attachment before judgment/appointment of Receiver, cannot be considered as submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute, as that is done to avoid an interim order being made against him.
26. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Company-MANU/SC/3491/2006 : 2006 (7) SCC 275, this Court held that the expression 'first statement on the substance of the dispute' contained in Section 8(1) of the Act is different from the expression 'written statement', and refers to a submission of the party making the application under Section 8 of the Act, to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority; and what should be decided by the court is whether the party seeking reference to arbitration has waived his right to invoke the arbitration clause.
"39. By opposing the prayer for interim injunction, the restriction contained in sub-section (1) of Section 8 was not attracted. Disclosure of a defence for the purpose of opposing a prayer for injunction would not necessarily mean that substance of the dispute has already been disclosed in the main proceeding. Supplemental and incidental proceedings are not part of the main proceeding. They are dealt with separately in the Code of Civil Procedure itself. Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with supplemental proceedings. Incidental proceedings are those which arise out of the main proceeding. In view of the decision of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor - MANU/SC/0533/1982 : 1982 (2) SCC 499, the distinction between the main proceeding and supplemental proceeding must be borne in mind.
42. Waiver of a right on the part of a defendant to the lis must be gathered from the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the instant case, the court had already passed an ad interim ex parte injunction. The Appellants were bound to respond to the notice issued by the Court."
17. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the expression "first statement on the substance of the dispute" refers to the submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority by offering to defend the suit and thereby, waiving his right to invoke the arbitration clause. If the affidavit opposing the summons for judgment and seeking leave to defend objects to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the suit and indicates that the defendant does not want the Civil Court to adjudicate upon his rights or liabilities, but wants the domestic forum to decide that, then mere filing of a reply to the summons for judgment does not amount to making a "first statement on the substance of the dispute," even if such affidavit contains various other defences. In every other case, the affidavit can well be said to be the "first statement on the substance of the dispute" within the meaning of Section 8. In such other case, what the defendant essentially wants is to have the matter heard by the Civil Court and to that end, after indicating the bonafides and probability or plausibility of his defence, seeks leave of the Court, so that he may resist the plaintiff's claim before it. No application can be moved under Section 8 after filing of such affidavit seeking leave.
18. Having thus answered the question in law, let us now see if the affidavit of the Defendant in reply to the summons for judgment amounts to such 'first statement'. The affidavit in reply takes all objections on merits of the case, and does not object to the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground of existence of the arbitration agreement. It is thus a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the Applicant-Defendant submits that the Defendant has averred that the Court has no jurisdiction. That is immaterial. What the affidavit does not indicate is the Defendant's objection to the Court exercising its jurisdiction in the matter in view of the arbitration agreement. The Defendant does not make it clear that he "does not want the Civil Court to adjudicate upon his rights or liabilities, but he wants the domestic forum to decide that." Here, the Defendant has made it amply clear that he intends to defend the matter in this Court; he indicates his defences, may be including a defence of jurisdiction; and based on these defences, seeks leave of the Court to defend the suit. That is clearly making a 'first statement' on the substance of the dispute. The stage for making an application under Section 8 is clearly crossed.
19. The Notice of Motion, thus, has no merit and is dismissed. Costs to be costs in the cause.

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weorþness, e; f. I. worthiness, honourable character :-- For his geearnunge wurþnys[se] (wyrðnesse, Bd. M. 194, 34) hé wæs fram eallum monnum lufad ob meritorum dignitatem ab omnibus diligebatur, Bd. 3, 14; S. 540, 10. Tó lífes wyrþnysse ad vite honestatem, Anglia xiii. 368, 48. II. dignity, nobility, honourable or honoured condition: -- Werðnes dignitas, Kent. Gl. 582. Æþele æfter ðysse worulde wurþnysse ad saeculi hujus dignitatem nobilis, Bd. 4, 9; S. 577, 2. Ðú ðe menisc gicynd bufa frumes frumcendnisse eft boetest wyrðnise qui humanam naturam supra prime originis reparas dignitatem, Rtl. 35, 13. III. dignity, honourable office : -- Hæfde se cyning efenhlétan ðære cynelícan wurþnysse (regiae dignitatis), Bd. 3, 14 ; S. 539, 30. IV. dignity, state, imposing show :-- Hé férde tó Róme mid micelre weorþnesse, Chr. 855 ; Erl. 68, 28. V. honour shewn to an object :-- On wurþnysse ðínre in honore tuo, Ps. Spl. 44, 10. Ne is wítge búta worðnis (sine honore) búta on oeðel his, Mk. Skt. Lind. 6, 4. v. un-weorþness.
weorþscipe, es; m. I. worship, honour shewn to an object :-- Gif hwá biþ mid hwelcum welum geweorþod, hú ne belimpþ se weorþscipe tó ðam ðe hine geweorðaþ; ðæt is tó herianne hwéne rihtlícor si quod ex appositis luceat, ipsa quidem, quae sunt apposita, laudantur, Bt. 14, 3; Fox 46, 12. Ða dysiende wénaþ ðætte ðæt ðing sié æ-acute;lces weorþscipes betst wyrþe ðætte hí medemæste ongiton magon labuntur hi, qui quod sit optimum, id reverentiae cultu dignissimum putant, 24, 4; Fox 86, 10. Nys nán wítega bútan weorðscype (wurð-, v. l.) (sine honore), búton on his earde, Mt. Kmbl. 13, 57 : Mk. Skt. 6, 4. Hí wunnon æfter weorðscipe (wyrþ -, v. l.) on ðisse worulde, and tiledon gódes hlísan, Bt. 40, 4 ; Fox 240, 5. Ealne ðæne bysmor wé gyldaþ mid weorðscype ðám ðe ús scendaþ, Wulfst. 163, 10. Mid wurðscipe underfón, Chr. 785; Erl. 57, 19: Nicod. 20; Thw. 10, 26. Him cómon lác tó wurðscipe, Ælfc. T. Grn. 7, 32. Yfelwillende men næ-acute;nne weorþscipe næfdon, Bt. 15; Fox 48, 17. Uorðscip, Lind. : worðscip, Rush., honorem, Jn. Skt. 4, 44. II. honour, honourable or honoured condition, dignity, honours :-- Se weorþscipe and se anweald, gif hé becymþ tó ðam dysigan, hé mæg hine gedón weorþne dignitates honorabilem, cui provenerint, reddunt, Bt. 27, 1 ; Fox 94, 18. Benumen æ-acute;gþer ge ðínra welona ge ðínes weorþscipes, 7, 3; Fox 20, 5. Welan and weorþscipes hí willniaþ opes, honores ambiant, 32, 3; Fox 118, 29: Met. 19, 44. Hwæt mæg ic ðé máre secgan be ðam weorþscipe and be ðam anwealde ðisse worulde . . . Gé ne ongitaþ ðone heofoncundan anweald and ðone weorþscipe, se is eówer ágen . . . Hwæt se eówer wela and se eówer anweald ðe gé nú weorþscipe hátaþ, gif hé becymþ tó ðam eallra wyrrestan men quid de dignitatibus potentiaque disseram, quas vos, verae dignitatis ac potestatis inscii, coelo exaequatis ? quae si in improbissimum quemque ceciderint ? Bt. 16, 1 ; Fox 48, 27-34. Mann ðá ðá hé on wurðscype (in honore) wæs, Ps. Spl. 41, 21. Hé (Joseph) heóld his fæder on fullum wurðscipe ðæ-acute;r mid eallum his bróðrum, Ælfc. T. Grn. 5, 7. III. honour, glory: -- Míne fýnd mínne weorðscipe tó duste gewyrcen inimicus gloriam meam in pulverem deducat, Ps. Th. 7, 5. IV. honour, state, magnificence :-- Hé férde tó Róme mid mycclum wurðscipe, Chr. 855 ; Erl. 69, 18. V. dignity of behaviour :-- Móderlícere stæððinysse &l-bar; wurðscipe materna gravitate &l-bar; dignitate, Hpt. Gl. 469, 38. VI. worthiness, excellence, nobleness :-- Weorþscipe vel geþungennes dignitas, i. honestas, excellentia, fastigium, Wrt. Voc. ii. 140, 25. Sittende hé tæ-acute;hte ; ðæt belimpð tó wurðscipe láreówdómes, Homl. Th. i. 548, 25. Hié álýsde for his weorþscipe Eádmund cyning, Chr. 942; Erl. 116, 18. VII. an honour, a dignity, an honourable office or position :-- Ealdordómas vel ða héhstan wurðscipas fasces, biscoplíc wurðscipe flamininus honor, Wrt. Voc. i. 59, 53, 54. Swelce wræccan woldon underfón ðone weorðscipe and eác ða byrðenne infirmus quisque, ut honoris (plebium ducatus) onus percipiat, anhelat, Past. 7 ; Swt. 51, 23. Se ðe wel þénaþ, hé gódne wyrðscipe him sylfum gestrýnð qui bene ministraverit, gradum bonum sibi adquirit, R. Ben. 54, 18. VIIa. pl. Dignities, persons in office (?) :-- Wyrþscipas comitia (cf. weorþung-dæg). Wrt. Voc. i. 21, 65. VIII. an honour, ornament, decoration :-- Wurðscipe infula, Hpt. Gl. 458, 24. Gifu gumena byð gleng and herenys, wraðu and weorðscype, and wræcna gehwam ár and ætwist, Runic pm. Kmbl. 340, 25 ; Rún. 7. Mid twám wurðscipum geglængde se ælmihtiga Scyppend ðæs mannes sáwle; ðæt is mid écnysse and eádignysse, Homl. Skt. i. 1, 150. VIII a. honour, cause of an object being honoured or honourable :-- Hit gewearð ðæt ðam wísan men com tó lofe and tó wyrðscype ðæt se unrihtwísa cyning him teohhode tó wíte ita cruciatus, quos putabat tyrannus materiam crudelitatis, vir sapiens fecit esse virtutis, Bt. 16, 2 ; Fox 52, 26. IX. what is honoured or prized, an excellent thing, a good :-- On swelcum and on óþrum swelcum læ-acute;num and hreósendum weorþscipum (riches, fame, power, etc. , have been enumerated; cf. ðám læ-acute;num gódum, I. 1 UNCERTAIN), Bt. 24, 3 ; Fox 82, 21. v. un-, weorold-weorþscipe.
weorþung, e ; f. I. honouring, shewing of honour to an object, honour, reverence :-- Ðæm is simle wuldor and weorðung, Blickl. Homl. 169, 28. Ne is wítga búta worðunge (sine honore), búta on oedle his, Mk. Skt. Rush. Lind. 6, 4. For ðínre weorþunge in honore tuo, Ps. Th. 44, 10. Gif hé on ríce becymð, for ðære weorðunge ðæs folces hé bið on oferméttu áwended and gewunaþ tó ðæm gielpe si ad regiminis culmen eruperit, in elationem protinus usu gloriae permutatur, Past. 3 ; Swt. 35, 12. Leóhtfæt bið á byrnende for ðara swaþa weorþunga, Blickl. Homl. 127, 31. Wé habbaþ on Godes naman weorðunge bisceop gebletsode, Wulfst. 176, 2. Hé bið on gódre weorþunge he will be highly respected, Lchdm. iii. 158, 10. Ia. in religious matters, (1) worship of a god, divine worship, religious service :-- Tídsangas canonica, weorþung canor, Wrt. Voc. ii. 128, 27. Dægrédsanges weorþung is þus tó healdenne matutinorum solempnitas ita agatur, R. Ben. 37, 5. Ne dear man forhealdan lytel ne mycel ðæs ðe gelagod is tó gedwolgoda weorðunge, Wulfst. 157, 14. Drihtne tó wurðunga, Lev. 2, 2. Ídola wurðinge, L. N. P. L. 48 ; Th. ii. 298, 1. (2) honouring of a person, thing, or season, celebration, commemoration, festival :-- Mycel is þeós weorþung ðæs hálgan Sancte Ióhannes gebyrde, Blickl. Homl. 167, 13. On ðæm dæge ðe seó tíd bið and his (S. Michael) weorðung, 209, 17. Be ðisse hálgan tíde weorþunga ðe wé tó dæg mæ-acute;rsian sceolan and weorþian, 161, 4. Be ðyses dæges (Pentecost) weorþunga, 133 UNCERTAIN, 12. Æt eallra háligra weorðunge at the feast of All Saints, L. Alf. pol. 43; Th. i. 92, 8. Hé ða weorþunge Eástrena on riht ne heóld ne nyste de observatione Paschae minus perfecte sapiebat, Bd. 3, 17 ; S. 545, 2. Weorðunga, Blickl. Homl. 137, 8. Hí tó Hierusalem faran woldon for ðære hálgan róde wurðunga, ðe man æfter náht manegum dagum wurðian sceolde, Homl. Skt. ii. 23 b, 350. II. nobleness, glory, excellence :-- Ðæt wuldres bearn UNCERTAIN on ðysne middangeard ástág, and seó heofencunde weorþung ðone fæ-acute;mnlícan bósm Sancta Marian gefylde, Blickl. Homl. 165, 27. Mycel is se háligdóm and seó weorþung Sancte Ióhannes, ðæs mycelnesse se Hæ-acute;lend sylfa tácn sægde . . . Hé on his mægenes weorþunga oferswíþ ealra óþerra martira wuldor, 167, 16-25. Him wile God miltsian for heora mægena weorþunga, and for eorþlícra manna gebedum, 47, 8. Næs riht on ðære stówe æ-acute;nigne tó ácwellanne for ðære stówe weorþunge, Nar. 30, 3. Apostola ðínra worðunge folc ðín giwynsumia apostolorum tuorum Petri et Pauli honore plebs tua exultet, Rtl. 59, 33. Ðæt hé Sanctus Ióhannes lífes weorþunga gesecgan mæge, Blickl. Homl. 163, 36. III. ornament, decoration :-- Crist com tó wlitignesse and tó weorþunge his brýde, Blickl. Homl. 11, 31. Godwebba cyst, ðæt ðám hálgan húse sceolde tó weorþunga weorud sceáwian, Exon. Th. 70, 11 ; Cri. 1137. [Þat folc sungen UNCERTAIN heore leofsong ure Helende to wurðinge, O. E. Homl. i. 7, 10. Godes la&yogh;e bit ec mon wurðie his feder mid muchelere wurþunge, 109, 27. Ðe, God, to wurðinge, Gen. and Ex. 33. O. H. Ger. werdunga solemnitas, celebritas, dignitas: Icel. virðing worship, reputation, honour. ] v. breóst-, dæg-, háls-, hám-, hord-, bring-, mann-, neód-, sinc-, stán-ILLEGIBLE, sundor-, tîd- UNCERTAIN, treów-, un-, wíg-, will-weorþung.
weorþung-stów, e; f. A place for worship :-- On ðære hálgan wurðungstówe de tabernaculo testimonii, Lev. 1, 1.
weorud, weoruld, weosan, weosend, weosnian, weosule, weota, weotan, weoðo-bán, weoðo-bend, weotian, weotuma. v. weorod, weorold, wesan, wesend, wisnian, wesle, wita, witan, wiþo-bán, wiþo-bend, witian, wituma.
weoxian; p. ode To wipe, make clean :-- Ðacian, ðecgan and fald weoxian, Anglia ix. 261, 18. Hús gódian, rihtan and weoxian, 262, 19. [Cf. O. H. Ger. wisken tergere.].
wépan; p. weóp, wép (wæ-acute;pde, Lind.), pl. weópon, wépon ; pp. wópen To weep, wail, mourn, lament :-- Ic wépe fleo, ðú wépst (wæ-acute;pst, v. l.) fles, ic weóp fleui, gewópen fletum, Ælfc. Gr. 26, 1; Zup. 152, 18. I. intrans. (1) of persons :-- Maria stód and weóp (hrémende &l-bar; uoepende plorans, Lind.); and ðá heó weóp (gewæ-acute;p fleret, Lind.), heó ábeáh nyðer . . . Ða englas cwæ-acute;don tó hyre : " Wíf, hwí wépst (uoepæs, Lind.: woepes, Rush., ploras) ðú ? " Jn. Skt. 20, 11-13. Hé geseah mycel gehlýd wépende (flentes) . . . Hé cwæþ: " Hwí wépaþ (ploratis) gé?" Mk. Skt. 5, 38, 39. Beornas grétaþ, wépaþ wánende wérgum stefnum, Exon. Th. 61, 31 ; Cri. 993. Hé weóp (ploravit) bityrlíce, Mt. 26, 75 : Andr. Kmbl. 2799; An. 1402. Hé weóp (geweæ-acute;p fleuit, Lind.) ofer hig, Lk. Skt. 19, 41. Wé heófdun and gé ne weópun (wæ-acute;pde gié plorastis, Lind.), 7, 32. Ne ceara ðu ne ne wép, Blickl. Homl. 143, 4. Wépan ploremus, Ps. Th. 94, 6. Wépan wé and geþencan hú Drihten cwæð : "Eádige beóþ ða ðe nú wépaþ (lugent, Mt. 5, 5), " Blickl. Homl. 25, 19. Gif ðú wistest hwæt ðé tóweard is, ðonne weópe ðú mid mé, Homl. Th. i. 404, 27. Ðá ongan hé wépan (woepa flere, Lind., Rush.), Mk. Skt. 14, 72. Mid wépendre béne lacrymosis precibus, Bd. 1, 12 ; S. 480, 26. Mid wæ-acute;pendre stefne flebili voce, 480, 37; Wépendre, Blickl. Homl. 87, 26, 8. Drihten hýrde míne wépendan stefne (vocem fletus mei), Ps. Th. 6, 7. Ða ðe wæ-acute;pende (flentes) sæ-acute;ton, Bd. 5, 12; S. 627, 14. Heófendum and wépendum (wópendum flentibus, Lind.), Mk. Skt. 16, 10. Hé gemétte swíþe manige wépende, and wæ-acute;ron UNCERTAIN cweþende : " Wá ús lá. . . " And ðá him swá wépendum, ðá com ðara sacerda ealdorman, Blickl. Homl.

matches: V. v. v. v. V. v. v. v. v.


PLEASE NOTE: This explanation addresses the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment only. Implementing legislation will refine and define many of the rights discussed herein. The goal of implementation language associated with Marsy’s Law is to ensure that it is easy and practical for crime victims to understand and exercise their rights.
It is important to note that this document includes a list of rights that each provision may encompass, it is not meant to be construed as an exhaustive list or definition of what each provision means. The rights are subject to legislative, judicial, and legal interpretation.
Marsy’s Law reinforces the ability for victims to file motions to protect and enforce their rights. It does not give victims the ability to control the criminal case or appeal acquittals. Marsy’s Law does not allow victims to sue criminal justice officials for rights violations.
(D) The definition of “victim” is changed from the definition in ORC § 2930.
Victim is now defined as the person against whom the criminal act is committed or the person directly and proximately harmed by the criminal offense. Currently, the definition of “victim” only includes victims of certain crimes who are identified as victims in a police report. Numerous Ohio courts have recognized the limitations of this definition, and have applied the more broad definition contained in Black’s Law Dictionary. For example, under Marsy’s Law, adult parents of a child victim could also be considered victims or persons in a vehicle who are injured as the result of a vehicular homicide could also be considered victims.
With the expansion of “victim” from the previous ORC 2930 definition, more individuals will be entitled to victims’ rights protections.
What are the Victim’s Rights?
The right to be informed, in writing, of Marsy’s Law rights.
Several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code provide that victims have the right to be informed of victims’ rights in Ohio.
Law enforcement will be required to inform victims of their rights. Pursuant to ORC 2930.04 and ORC 2930.05, this requirement already exists. However, it is now elevated to the constitution, emphasizing its importance.
Prosecutors must inform victims of their rights. Pursuant to ORC 2930.06, this right already exists. It is now elevated to the constitution, emphasizing its importance.
Courts must inform victims of their rights. Pursuant to ORC 2930.06, this right already exists. It is now elevated to the constitution, emphasizing its importance.
Post-conviction entities may be required to notify victims of the rights to be notified, present, and heard at post-conviction hearings, such as parole hearings.
The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim's other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or in which the victim's rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim's lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the petition.
None foreseeable at this time.
Victims’ attorneys will have standing to file motions, etc., to address victims’ rights issues.
Prosecutors may be asked to file motions, etc., to address victims’ rights issues.
Implementation language will provide guidance as to when trial and appellate courts shall hear and respond to victim motions.
Prosecutors, upon request, will be required to file motions, etc., to address victims’ rights issues.
The right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity, and privacy.
The right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect already existed in Ohio’s constitution. The right to privacy exists for all U.S. and Ohio citizens.
The rights to privacy and safety may include protections for victim identification information in police reports to ensure victim safety.
Prioritizing service of protection orders.
The rights to privacy and safety may include protection of victim names and identification information during court proceedings.
The rights to privacy and safety may include protection of victim names and identification information in post-conviction proceedings.
The right, upon request, to reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings and the right to be present at those proceedings.
This right is triggered by a request from the victim. Upon that request, the victim must be notified of proceedings and must be allowed to attend all on the record proceedings in the case. The current best practice in many prosecutors’ offices around the state is to notify victims automatically, regardless of request. It is hoped and expected that this practice will continue.
ORC § 2930.06, ORC § 2930.09, and Evidence Rule 615 have provided victims with these rights since the 1990s. Eight of Ohio’s twelve district courts have upheld victims’ rights to be present over defense objections.
Under 2930.05, law enforcement must notify victims of arrest of offenders. Per implementing legislation, law enforcement may be required to notify victims of the date of arraignment and of the victim responsibility to call court to confirm, along with notification of arrest.
Prosecutors will be required, upon request, to notify victims of all public proceedings.
Prosecutors may be asked to file motions on behalf of victims to protect victims’ rights to be present in the courtroom.
Courts should permit victim presence at all public proceedings, despite separation of witness orders. Courts may be responsible for notifying victims of initial appearances of defendants depending upon local procedures.
Post-conviction entities will be required, upon request, to notify victims of public hearings and to allow victims to be present. It is anticipated that existing automatic notification provisions for F1-F3 offenses will remain in effect.
The right to be heard in public proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, disposition, or parole, or in any proceeding that implicates a Marsy’s Law right.
ORC § 2930.13, § ORC 2930.14, and ORC § 2930.17, among others, currently provide victims with the right to give victim impact statements at sentencing and parole hearings. Marsy’s Law expands the right to be heard to include other hearings such as release, including arraignment, and plea. The reasoning behind this is that the victim is often in a unique position to explain to the court the risk an offender poses upon release and to help the court understand the true impact of the crime before accepting a plea.
Prosecutors may need to advise courts of victim presence and desire to address the court.
Courts must make time to allow victims to be heard at the hearings listed above.
Courts must be prepared to consider victim statements in making determinations about release, pleas, sentencing, or other requests for bond modifications.
Post-conviction entities must make time to allow victims to be heard at the hearings listed above.
Post-conviction entities must be prepared to consider victim statements in making determinations about release, pleas, or sentencing.
The right to confer with the prosecutor, upon request.
Prosecutors must inform victims of, and confer with victims regarding, the status of the case and matters that involve victims’ rights.
Courts may be required to confirm that prosecutors have kept victims informed and conferred with them, if requested.
The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt conclusion of the case.
Currently, ORC § 2930.08 provides victims the right to object to substantial delays in prosecution and to have those objections considered by the court. This provision essentially makes that guarantee enforceable.
Prosecutors may be asked to file motions on behalf of victims to protect victims’ rights to object to unreasonable delay.
Prosecutors may be required to inform courts of victims’ positions as to delay.
Courts must consider victim objections to delay in cases when determining whether to allow a continuance or delay.
The right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by an accused, except as provided by Article I, Section 10 of Ohio’s constitution.
This provision preserves the balance between Criminal Rule 16 and Criminal Rule 17(c). The United States Supreme Court (and the Ohio Supreme Court) have been very clear that criminal discovery and the mechanism to get information from third parties, like victims, in the criminal justice process are distinct. Criminal Rule 17(c) dictates that prosecutors and defendants must use subpoenas to get information from victims and other third parties. This provision prevents the defense from circumventing Rule 17(c) and seeking private information from victims through improper discovery requests.
Prosecutors may be asked to file motions on behalf of victims to protect victims’ right to privacy.
Courts will have to consider this new constitutional right when determining whether to allow a defendant access to victim information or records pursuant to subpoena.
The right to full and timely restitution from the offender.
This provision makes restitution, which is currently discretionary, mandatory. Implementation language should include, but is not limited to: determination by preponderance of evidence standard, preservation of offender’s assets, civil judgements, and prioritized order in which restitution is paid.
Law enforcement should advise victims of the possibility of restitution and the types of evidence that supports an order of restitution.
Prosecutors must ensure that victims are aware of their right to restitution and should provide victims with the tools to seek restitution, such as guidance forms. Prosecutors should discuss the types of documentation needed to support a restitution order. Prosecutors may be required to advise courts when victims are seeking restitution, and should address restitution in plea agreements. Prosecutors should request the court to order restitution.
Prosecutors may be asked to file motions on behalf of victims to protect victims’ rights to restitution.
Courts no longer have discretion regarding whether or not to order restitution. If proven, restitution orders are mandatory, but payment may still depend on the offender’s ability to pay. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 US 660 (1983).
Probation officers will be required to incorporate restitution information into pre-sentence investigations.
The right to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused.
There are many ORC sections that provide victims with protections from the accused, such as the sections on protection orders, witness intimidation, protection of identification information, etc. This provision is essentially a summary of those pre-existing rights. It is a right to reasonable protection, so it will not pose a new and undue burden.
Law enforcement may be required to provide reasonable protections for victims who are threatened, harassed, or intimidated.
Prosecutors should consider filing motions to revoke bond, additional charges, or motions to protect victim names or identification information when warranted by the facts of the case.
Courts should consider victim safety in arranging waiting areas to keep victims and offenders separate (including offender’s friends, family, or supporters).
Courts should be prepared to consider motions sanctioning defendants for threats to victim safety.
Post-conviction entities must consider victim safety by keeping victims informed of the transfer, escape, or release of an inmate.
The right, upon request, to reasonable notice of escape or release of the accused.
Victims of felony crimes in Ohio already have this right, and the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and Department of Youth Services have an effective system and policies for complying with it. Marsy’s Law does expand the definition of victim to include victims of misdemeanors. This means that jails who do not participate in the VINE service will be required to provide these notifications. While many jails already participate, some do not. All jails and prisons will now be required to provide notice, upon request of the victim.
Local jails must notify victims of escape or release of locally incarcerated offenders.
For judicial release, prosecutors may be required to notify victims of upcoming hearings, upon request. Which entity will be responsible for this notification (court or prosecutor) may depend on implementing legislation.
For judicial release, courts may be required to notify victims of upcoming hearings, upon request. Which entity will be responsible for this notification (court or prosecutor) may depend on implementing legislation.
Post-conviction entities will be required to provide notification, upon request, for any escape or release of an incarcerated offender.
Sections (C), (E), and (F) have no practical effect on criminal justice system officials, other than (C)’s guarantee that violations of Marsy’s Law do not create a civil cause of action for damages, which is not a change from the previous constitutional mandate.


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Plaintiffs and Defendants were members of Trinity School of the Bible, a Delaware not-for-profit corporation, and members of Trinity’s board. When disagreements arose among the Board members, Plaintiffs filed this complaint alleging a series of mismanagement claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs represented themselves in the matter. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were derivative in nature and, therefore, belonged to Trinity; and (2) because a derivative plaintiff seeking to enforce rights on behalf of a corporation must be represented by counsel, the complaint is dismissed.
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE TAMIKA R. M ONTGOMERY-REEVES New Castle County Courthouse 500 N. King Street, Suite 11400 Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3734 VICE CHANCELLOR July 5, 2016 Ms. Sinina Talley 100 Brooklyn Avenue Apartment LL P.O. Box 7143 Freeport, NY 11520 Ms. Wendy Scott P.O. Box 1742 Apex, NC 27502 Mr. Danny Washington 155 West Greenwich Street Apartment W520 Hempstead, NY 11550 Re: Ms. Ruth Norman 212 Manhattan Avenue Roosevelt, NY 11575 Mr. Theodore Norman 212 Manhattan Avenue Roosevelt, NY 11575 Ms. Theresa Washington 220 Christiana Road New Castle, DE 19720 Trinity School of the Bible Trustees Sinina Talley, et al. v. Trinity School of the Bible Officers Ruth Norman, et al. Civil Action No. 11923-VCMR Dear Parties: I have considered the filings in this case, the exhibits attached thereto, and the applicable laws. For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiffs’ complaint (the “Complaint”) is dismissed without prejudice. Trinity School of the Bible Trustees, et al. v. Trinity School of the Bible Officers, et al. Civil Action 11923-VCMR July 5, 2016 Page 2 of 4 Pro se litigants Sinina Talley, Wendy Scott, and Danny Washington (“Plaintiffs”), and Theresa Washington, Ruth Norman, and Theodore Norman (“Defendants”), are members of Trinity School of the Bible (“Trinity”), a Delaware not-for-profit corporation. 1 charitable community outreach center. 2 Trinity is a religious education and The parties hereto are members of Trinity’s board (the “Board”). On May 18, 2014, Delores Washington, the founder and former president of Trinity, passed away leaving the Board with the six above-listed members. After Delores Washington’s death, a myriad of disagreements arose among the Board.3 On July 7, 2014, Plaintiffs contacted the Delaware Center for Justice to request mediation services, but Defendants refused to participate in any mediation. On January 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action against Defendants. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a series of mismanagement claims against Defendants that appear to be derivative in nature.4 For example, Plaintiffs argue 1 The facts are drawn from the Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto. 2 Compl. at 2. 3 Id. 4 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“The Plaintiffs are aggrieved because they have suffered extreme disrespect and abuse in attempting to carry out their roles as trustees which in turn would propel the school forward. As stated, because the School Board has been barred from functioning normally, including legally as a Non- Trinity School of the Bible Trustees, et al. v. Trinity School of the Bible Officers, et al. Civil Action 11923-VCMR July 5, 2016 Page 3 of 4 that Defendant Theresa Washington seized control of Trinity’s bank accounts by misrepresenting to PNC and M&T Banks that the Board authorized her to close those bank accounts. Further, Defendants allegedly failed to hold and attend Board meetings as needed and when appropriate, which prevented Plaintiffs from carrying out their duties as trustees. Similarly, Defendants purportedly refused to disclose lease information and financial statements. In sum, Plaintiffs contend that “Trinity School of the Bible, its students and the community as a whole ha[ve] [sic] been injured by the misconduct of Defendant . . . .”5 These claims are derivative in nature and, therefore, belong to Trinity.6 A corporate entity may appear as a party in this Court only if represented by a member of the Delaware Bar.7 Likewise, a derivative plaintiff seeking to enforce Profit, the mission of the school and the school itself is in danger of permanent closure and forfeiture of its privilege to maintain its 501(c)3 status.”); see also id. at 5 (alleging, among other things, corporate misconduct, malfeasance, breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of funds, and fraud). 5 Id. at 13. 6 See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004); see also Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988) (“A claim of mismanagement . . . represents a direct wrong to the corporation that is indirectly experienced by all shareholders. . . . Thus, the wrong alleged is entirely derivative in nature.”). 7 Transpolymer Indus., Inc. v. Chapel Main Corp., 582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990) (TABLE) (“While a natural person may represent himself or herself in court even though he or she may be an attorney licensed to practice, a corporation, being an Trinity School of the Bible Trustees, et al. v. Trinity School of the Bible Officers, et al. Civil Action 11923-VCMR July 5, 2016 Page 4 of 4 rights on behalf of a corporation must be represented by counsel. 8 Because Plaintiffs may not pursue this action pro se, the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Sincerely, /s/ Tamika Montgomery-Reeves Vice Chancellor TMR/jp artificial entity, can only act through its agents and, before a court only through an agent duly licensed to practice law.”). 8 Lygren v. Mirror Image Internet, 992 A.2d 1237 (Del. 2010) (TABLE) (“[C]orporate appellants Parfi and Plenteous may not pursue this appeal because they are not represented by counsel, as required by Delaware law.”); see also Pinnavaia v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2015 WL 5657026, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2015) (“A derivative plaintiff seeks to ‘enforce a right of a corporation,’ and corporations appearing in this Court may only do so through counsel. Thus, the derivative plaintiff who asserts the rights of the corporation must also be represented by counsel.”).

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The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Clean Harbors Inc. v. Union Pacific Corp. at 10 a.m. Wednesday, Oct. 24.
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The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Homeland Insurance v. CorVel Corp. at 11 a.m. Wednesday, Sept. 26.
Delaware Supreme Court to hear BTG International Inc. v. Wellstat Therapeutics Corp.
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The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. CNH Industrial America LLC at 10 a.m. Wednesday, May 9.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Tutor Perini Corp. v. Greenstar IH Rep LLC and Gary Segal at noon Wednesday, May 9.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of William E. Pettit and Susan Van Houten, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. HD Supply Holdings, Inc. at about 2:15 p.m. Wednesday, April 18.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Town of Cheswold vs. Central Delaware Business Park on Wednesday, March 21.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of The Lima Delta Company, et al. vs. Wells Fargo Insurance at 2:20 p.m. on April 11.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Windsor I LLC vs. CW Capital Asset Management at 1:15 p.m. on April 11.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Marion #2-Seaport Trust vs. Terramar Retail Centers LLC at 11 a.m. on April 11.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of ACP Master LTD, Aurelius Capital Master LTD and Aurelius Opportunities Fund II LLC v. Sprint Corporation at 10:01 a.m. on April 18.
The Delaware Supreme Court will hear the case of Eagle Force Holdings LLC and EF Investments LLC vs. Stanley V. Campbell at noon on March 7.

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