NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued July 7, 2017 Decided August 1, 2017 Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge No. 16 3831 RICHARD MORENS, Petitioner Appellant, v. MICHAEL MEISNER, Respondent Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 15 CV 959 William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge. O R D E R Richard Morens was convicted in a Wisconsin court of possessing heroin and cocaine with intent to deliver, along with six counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. The trial judge initially had severed the drug and firearm counts but, upon reconsideration, joined all the counts again for trial. After exhausting his state postconviction remedies, Morens filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that handling all the counts together denied him a fair trial and that his lawyers were ineffective for not objecting at trial or on direct appeal. The district court denied relief, and we affirm. The facts of the crimes are recounted in State v. Morens, No. 2010AP2018 CR (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2011). After conducting surveillance for several days at a house where No. 16 3831 Page 2 Morens had been observed entering and exiting, Milwaukee police officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the house. The officers discovered in a concealed compartment in a closet outside Morens’s bedroom several bags containing a handgun, suppressor, ammunition, a dust mask, heroin, and cocaine. The officers also found four other guns in the closet and another gun in the kitchen. Morens’s DNA was found on the dust mask and the bags containing the gun and drugs. Morens was charged with eight counts: one count of possessing heroin with intent to deliver, one count of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, and six counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. Morens moved to sever the drug and gun charges on the ground that a jury considering the drug counts would be prejudiced by learning about his felony conviction—an element of the gun counts. Morens conceded that evidence showing he possessed the guns would be admissible at a trial on the drug counts, but he argued that evidence of his felony conviction would not be relevant to the drug case. At first, the trial judge agreed with Morens and concluded that “the prejudice outweighs the benefit of tying” the charges together at trial. The state moved for reconsideration, arguing that, under State v. Wedgeworth, 302 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1981), joinder at trial was appropriate because the crimes all occurred on the same date at the same location. The trial court decided that all the counts should be tried together because evidence of the firearms was admissible as to the drug counts. Morens changed lawyers after that ruling. At trial the two, new lawyers developed a defense theory that, although Morens lived there, the residence was a “party house” visited frequently by other people who could have possessed the contraband without Morens’s knowledge. Morens’s DNA was found on the bags and the dust mask, counsel contended at trial, because the police had placed the evidence on his bed to photograph it. The jury convicted Morens on all counts. After sentencing Morens changed lawyers again. New counsel brought a postconviction motion, which in Wisconsin precedes a direct appeal. See Wis. Stat. § 974.02; Morales v. Boatwright, 580 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2009). She argued that the lawyers who represented Morens at trial had been ineffective in not calling two witnesses who would have testified that the house was open to many people. Following a hearing, the trial judge concluded that counsel had not been ineffective and denied the motion. The Wisconsin appellate court upheld the denial of Morens’s postconviction motion and affirmed his convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied further review. No. 16 3831 Page 3 With assistance from yet another attorney, Morens then filed a motion for postconviction relief under Wisconsin Statute § 974.06 on the ground that the drug and firearm charges should have been severed because the evidence to support the counts did not entirely overlap. Moreover, Morens claimed, his two trial lawyers were ineffective for not taking steps to “neutralize” the information about his prior conviction, and his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim that the charges should have been severed for trial. He was prejudiced at trial, Morens insisted, because the judge did not instruct the jury to limit its consideration of his prior felony conviction to the firearms counts. The trial court denied this postconviction motion. Any “neutralizing language” would not have been helpful, the court reasoned, because Morens “was either a felon or he wasn’t.” As to a limiting instruction, the court had instructed the jurors as to each element for each offense, and the jurors were not advised that Morens’s status as a felon was an element of the drug offenses. Jurors are presumed to follow instructions, reasoned the trial court, so Morens was not prejudiced by the absence of a specific limiting instruction. The Wisconsin appellate court also denied relief. State v. Morens, No. 2014AP407 (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2015). The court ruled that the drug and firearm charges were properly joined as an initial matter under Wisconsin Statute § 971.12(1) because the charged crimes stemmed from the ‘same act or transaction,’ and the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion to deny a severance because the judge had examined the facts carefully, applied the correct legal standard, and reached a reasonable outcome. It followed, the appellate court added, that Morens’s counsel on direct appeal did not perform deficiently by not including a severance claim. With the aid of counsel Morens then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argued that the Wisconsin courts never analyzed whether he was unfairly prejudiced by joining the drug and guns charges, and he repeated his assertions that his counsel were ineffective for not pursuing a severance claim. The district court rejected his claims, reasoning that a proper joinder is presumptively nonprejudicial, and that Morens had not suffered any actual prejudice. The court also concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), to Morens’s claims that his counsel were ineffective. Nevertheless, the court issued a certificate of appealability without identifying any claim for which Morens had made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), (3). Morens proceeds on appeal with a new attorney, his sixth. No. 16 3831 Page 4 To succeed under § 2254, he must show that the Wisconsin appellate court’s decision is (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2015). The state court’s ruling must be “‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Carter, 796 F.3d at 733 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). Morens cannot overcome this steep hurdle. Morens first argues that joining the drugs and firearms offenses for trial prejudiced him to the extent that his right to a fair trial was violated. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (explaining that joinder of offenses raises a constitutional concern only when prejudice results to a degree that it denies defendant’s right to fair trial); Biskup v. McCaughtry, 20 F.3d 245, 249 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Leach v. Kolb, 911 F.2d 1249, 1258 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). Morens contends that the trial judge did not consider the prejudice from introducing evidence of his prior conviction to establish the gun crimes. The evidence that he possessed the heroin and cocaine, Morens says, was not overwhelming, so learning about his prior conviction could have “tipped the balance with the jury.” See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1124 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that joinder may result in prejudicial “spill over effect” if jury relies on evidence presented as to one count when reaching a conclusion on another count); United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). Contrary to Morens’s assertions, the trial judge explicitly considered the potential prejudice when it first granted his motion to sever and again when it reconsidered that decision. The trial judge contemplated the degree of prejudice resulting from “the revelation to the jury” of Morens’s felony conviction “versus the way the offenses are tied together and how they’re tied together.” In “weighing those two things,” the judge initially decided that the prejudice was “more important than anything else here” and so the counts should be severed. After the state moved to reconsider because the charges arose from the same transaction and the evidence overlapped, the trial judge again explicitly analyzed the potential prejudice to Morens. The judge opined that “the whole question then comes down to how prejudicial this is regarding the jury finding out that he’s got a felony record versus the state’s ability to tie it all together because of the guns found on the premises.” The judge did “weigh the potential prejudice to the defendant versus how tied together all of these matters were” and concluded that severance was No. 16 3831 Page 5 not required. Later, the Wisconsin appellate court ruled that the trial judge had applied the correct legal standard and reached a reasonable decision. Morens asks us to establish a bright line constitutional rule that drug and felon in possession charges must be severed for trial because evidence of the felony conviction unfairly prejudices the defendant. But joinder of drugs and guns charges for trial is not per se unconstitutionally prejudicial, and, indeed, ordinarily is proper. See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000). Joinder is appropriate because of the “natural inferences that may be drawn from the contemporaneous possession of guns and drugs or drug paraphernalia: the firearm is an indication of drug activity, and participation in drug trafficking supplies a motive for having the gun.” United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice, the parties stipulated that Morens was a felon, thus preventing the jury from hearing any details of his prior conviction. See Spencer v. State of Tex., 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (in considering constitutionality of recidivist statute, holding that admission of defendants’ prior convictions not inherently prejudicial, especially where “there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory”); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997) (ruling that district court abused discretion in refusing to accept defendant’s stipulation of felony conviction when purpose of evidence of conviction was solely to prove element of felon in possession charge). A stipulation may not protect against the significant risk of prejudice, Almendarez Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), so trial judges should provide (at the defendant’s request) some cautionary or limiting instruction to mitigate potential prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 695 F.3d 690, 702 (7th Cir. 2012); Stokes, 211 F.3d at 1043; cf. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (explaining that, in lieu of severance, “less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice” from trying codefendants together); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (explaining that Spencer upheld conviction despite introduction of defendant’s prior conviction “in part because such evidence was accompanied by instructions limiting the jury’s use of the conviction to sentence enhancement”). But use of a limiting instruction is not required by the Constitution, and the failure to provide one does not inevitably amount to reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Hope, 906 F.2d 254, 259–60 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed, a trial court should not provide sua sponte limiting instructions in absence of the defendant’s request. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (cautioning against “judicial freelancing” because No. 16 3831 instruction may preempt defendant’s strategic decision not to highlight prior conviction); United States v. Clark, 989 F.2d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1993). Page 6 Morens also contends that the Wisconsin court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) in determining that his trial counsel were not ineffective. Trial counsel should have “neutralized” the stipulation that he had a felony conviction, he says, and they should have requested an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the conviction. This court reviews whether the state court’s determination under Strickland was unreasonable. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); Carter v. Butts, 760 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2014). The Wisconsin court did not probe why counsel did not request an instruction. Nevertheless, the court reached the correct outcome. See Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762, 775 (7th Cir. 2016) (deferring to state court’s judgment despite its incorrect reasoning); Brady v. Pfister, 711 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2013) (same). Morens had not supported his assertion that his trial counsel were deficient: He had not asked counsel why they eschewed an instruction, let alone shown that counsel forgot—or were too incompetent—to ask for one. At any rate, the trial court’s conclusion on the prejudice prong was reasonable under Strickland, which requires that a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. The lack of a limiting instruction did not prejudice Morens, the trial court concluded, because the jurors were instructed as to each element they had to find for the drug offenses, they were not advised that the defendant’s status as a felon was an element of those offenses, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. A limiting instruction may have guarded against any prejudicial spillover effect, see Peterson, 823 F.3d at 1124, but, given the evidence presented at trial, an instruction would not have affected the jury’s verdicts on the two drug counts. See McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 917 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance because there was “enough other evidence for the jury to convict”). Under this court’s highly deferential standard of review, see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011), Morens has not succeeded in showing that the trial court misapplied Strickland in evaluating trial counsels’ assistance. Finally, Morens argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not argue on direct appeal the gun and drug counts should have been severed for trial. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was based on an unreasonable application of No. 16 3831 Page 7 clearly established federal law, contends Morens, because that court did not compare the relative strength of appellate counsel’s arguments as required by Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). Morens asserts that the severance challenge was obviously stronger than appellate counsel’s claim that trial counsel were ineffective in not calling two witnesses. Appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous claim, and it is “difficult” to show that failure to raise a particular claim amounts to ineffective assistance “because the comparative strength of two claims is usually debatable.” Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2013); see also McNary, 708 F.3d at 920 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. at 288). Here, the Wisconsin court correctly recited the appropriate ‘comparative strength’ standard derived from Smith and decided that Morens’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s discretionary severance decision. The appellate court did not explicitly compare the relative strength of the two arguments, but it reasonably concluded under Strickland that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to press a weak argument. The Constitution does not require severance of charges for possessing drugs and possessing a firearm as a felon. Morens has not established that the joinder of drug and firearm charges prejudiced him, nor that his counsel were ineffective for not challenging the joinder. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.


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The provision in the Constitution of the Utah providing for the trial of criminal cases, not capital, in courts of general jurisdiction by a jury composed of eight persons, is ex post facto in its application to felonies committed before the territory became a state.
By an indictment returned in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the Territory of Utah at its May term, 1895, that being a court of general jurisdiction, the plaintiff in error and one Jack Moore were charged with the crime of grand larceny, alleged to have been committed March 2, 1895, in Wayne County, of that territory, by unlawfully and feloniously stealing, taking, and driving a way one calf, the property of Heber Wilson.
The case was first tried when Utah was a territory, and by a jury composed of twelve persons. Both of the defendants were found guilty as charged, and were recommended to the mercy of the court. A new trial having been granted, the case was removed for trial to another county. But it was not again tried until after the admission of Utah into the Union as a state.
At the second trial, the defendant was found guilty. He moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others, that the jury that tried him was composed of only eight jurors; whereas by the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense a lawful jury in his case could not be composed of less than twelve jurors. The application for a new trial having been overruled, and the accused having been called for sentence, he renewed his objection to the composition of the jury and moved by counsel that the verdict be set aside, and another trial ordered.
holding that the trial of the accused by a jury composed of eight persons was consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
By the statutes of the Territory of Utah in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, it was provided that a trial jury in a district court should consist of twelve, and in a justice's court of six, persons unless the parties to the action or proceeding, in other than criminal cases, agreed upon a less number; that a felony was a crime punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary, every other crime being a misdemeanor; that the stealing of a calf was grand larceny, and punishable by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten years; that no person should be convicted of a public offense unless by the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, or upon a plea of guilty, or upon judgment against him upon a demurrer, or upon the judgment of a court, a jury having been waived in a criminal action not amounting to a felony, and that issues of fact should be tried by jury, unless a trial in that mode was waived in criminal cases not amounting to a felony by the consent of both parties expressed in open court and entered in its minutes. 2 Compiled Laws, Utah, 1888, §§ 3065, 4380, 4643, 4644, 4790, 4997.
"In capital cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction, a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases, the verdict shall be unanimous."
of Utah with like effect as though such change had not taken place, and all penalties incurred shall remain the same as if this Constitution had not been adopted."
As the offense of which the plaintiff in error was convicted was a felony, and as, by the law in force when the crime was committed, he could not have been tried by a jury of less number than twelve jurors, the question is presented whether the provision in the Constitution of Utah providing for a jury of eight persons in courts of general jurisdiction except in capital cases can be made applicable to a felony committed within the limits of the state while it was a territory without bringing that provision into conflict with the clause of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the passage by any State of an ex post facto law.
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed."
"In our opinion, the Seventh Amendment secured unanimity in finding a verdict as an essential feature of trial by jury in common law cases, and the act of Congress could not impart the power to change the constitutional rule, and could not be treated as attempting to do so."
It is equally beyond question that the provisions of the national Constitution relating to trials by jury for crimes and to criminal prosecutions apply to the territories of the United States.
The judgment of this Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 98 U. S. 154, which was a criminal prosecution in the Territory of Utah, assumed that the Sixth Amendment applied to criminal prosecutions in that territory.
a trial in that mode, and according to the settled rules of the common law, the enumeration, in the Sixth Amendment, of the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions is to be taken as a declaration of what those rules were, and is to be referred to the anxiety of the people of the states to have in the supreme law of the land, and so far as the agencies of the general government were concerned, a full and distinct recognition of those rules, as involving the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property. This recognition was demanded and secured for the benefit of all the people of the United States, as well those permanently or temporarily residing in the District of Columbia as those residing or being in the several states. There is nothing in the history of the Constitution or of the original amendments to justify the assertion that the people of this District may be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any of the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property, especially of the privilege of trial by jury in criminal cases. . . . We cannot think,"
the Court further said, "that the people of this District have in that regard less rights than those accorded to the people of the territories of the United States."
as sovereign owners of the national territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign dominion, they are represented by the government of the United States, to whom all the powers of government over that subject have been delegated, subject only to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution or are necessarily implied in its terms."
"Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the territories, would be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, but these limitations would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and direct application of its provisions. The supreme power of Congress over the territories and over the acts of the territorial legislatures established therein is generally expressly reserved in the organic acts establishing governments in said territories. This is true of the Territory of Utah. In the sixth section of the act establishing a territorial government in Utah, approved September 9, 1850, it is declared"
"that the legislative powers of said territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act. . . . All the laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and if disapproved shall be null and of no effect."
"as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power."
"The trial per pais, or by a jury of one's country, is justly esteemed one of the principal excellencies of our constitution, for what greater security can any person have in his life, liberty, or estate than to be sure of the being divested of nor injured in any of these without the sense and verdict of twelve honest and impartial men of his neighborhood? And hence we find the common law herein confirmed by Magna Charta."
"The law of England hath afforded the best method of trial that is possible of this and all other matters of fact, namely, by a jury of twelve men all concurring in the same judgment, by the testimony of witnesses viva voce in the presence of the judge and jury, and by the inspection and direction of the judge."
It must consequently be taken that the word "jury" and the words "trial by jury" were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument, and that when Thompson committed the offense of grand larceny in the Territory of Utah -- which was under the complete jurisdiction of the United States for all purposes of government and legislation -- the supreme law of the land required that he should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons. And such was the requirement of the statutes of Utah while it was a territory.
Was it, then, competent for the State of Utah, upon its admission into the Union, to do, in respect of Thompson's crime, what the United States could not have done while Utah was a territory -- namely, to provide for his trial by a jury of eight persons?
that they should be tried otherwise than by a jury such as is provided by the Constitution of the United States. When Thompson's crime was committed, it was his constitutional right to demand that his liberty should not be taken from him except by the joint action of the court and the unanimous verdict of a jury of twelve persons. To hold that a state could deprive him of his liberty by the concurrent action of a court and eight jurors would recognize the power of the state not only to do what the United States, in respect of Thompson's crime, could not at any time have done by legislation, but to take from the accused a substantial right belonging to him when the offense was committed.
when its facts arose. The legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime."
C. 9, 6th ed., p. 326. And this view was substantially approved by this Court in Kring v. Missouri, above cited. So, in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 110 U. S. 590, it was said that no one had a vested right in mere modes of procedure, and that it was for the state, upon grounds of public policy, to regulate procedure at its pleasure. This Court, in Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 378, 152 U. S. 382, said that statutes regulating procedure, if they leave untouched all the substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not within the constitutional inhibition of ex post facto laws. But it was held in Hopt v. Utah, above cited, that a statute that takes from the accused a substantial right given to him by the law in force at the time to which his guilt relates would be ex post facto in its nature and operation, and that legislation of that kind cannot be sustained simply because, in a general sense, it may be said to regulate procedure. The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.
did not materially alter the situation to his disadvantage. If, in respect to felonies committed in Utah while it was a territory, it was competent for the state to prescribe a jury of eight persons, it could just as well have prescribed a jury of four or two, and, perhaps, have dispensed altogether with a jury, and provided for a trial before a single judge.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that this case came within the principles announced by it in State v. Bates, 14 Utah 293. In the latter case, no reference was made to the ex post facto clause of the Constitution of the United States. But it was held that the requirement of eight jurors in courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, was not in conflict with the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States -- the court saying that "if a jury of eight men is as likely to ascertain the truth as twelve, that number secures the end," and that "there can be no magic in the number twelve, though hallowed by time." But the wise men who framed the Constitution of the United States and the people who approved it were of opinion that life and liberty, when involved in criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except through the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors. It was not for the state, in respect of a crime committed within its limits while it was a territory, to dispense with that guaranty simply because its people had reached the conclusion that the truth could be as well ascertained, and the liberty of an accused be as well guarded, by eight as by twelve jurors in a criminal case.
"We are of opinion that it was not within the power of the accused or his counsel to dispense with the statutory requirement as to his personal presence at the trial. The argument to the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the ground that he alone is concerned as to the mode by which he may be deprived of his life or liberty, and that the chief object of the prosecution is to punish him for the crime charged. But this is a mistaken view as well of the relations which the accused holds to the public as of the end of human punishment. The natural life, says Blackstone, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority. 1 Bl.Com. 133. The public has an interest in his life and liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law. That which the law makes essential in proceedings involving the deprivation of life and liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused, much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to object to unauthorized methods. The great end of punishment is not the expiation of atonement of the offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses of the same kind. 4 Bl. Com. 11. Such being the relation which the citizen holds to the public, and the object of punishment for public wrongs, the legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life or liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony that he shall be personally present at the trial -- that is at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law required by the Constitution."
deprived of his liberty by a tribunal not authorized by law to determine his guilt.
In our opinion, the provision in the Constitution of Utah providing for the trial in courts of general jurisdiction of criminal cases, not capital, by a jury composed of eight persons is ex post facto in its application to felonies committed before the territory became a state because, in respect of such crimes, the Constitution of the United States gave the accused at the time of the commission of his offense the right to be tried by a jury of twelve persons, and made it impossible to deprive him of his liberty except by the unanimous verdict of such a jury.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, dissented.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Ronald E. VOWELS Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Short, County Attorney, and Clinton R. Boddicker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Short, County Attorney, and Clinton R. Boddicker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., and TABOR and BOWER, JJ.
Ronald E. Vowels Jr. appeals his convictions for willful injury causing serious injury and going armed with intent. He claims there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and his counsel was ineffective. We find sufficient evidence to support Vowels's convictions and preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for postconviction relief.
On the evening of February 24, 2013, Ronald Vowels participated in a parking lot fight involving multiple parties. The only fact everyone agrees upon is the end result: Vowels and his friend, Eric Mueller, were flat on the ground, and Troy James left the area with a potentially life-threatening wound to his face.
Earlier that evening, James arrived at Tena's Tap in Fort Madison at the request of a friend. Upon arrival, James testified he consumed one beer and one shot. Also present at the bar was Vowels, who may have held a grudge against James.
At trial, James testified he heard Vowels was upset with him because of allegations James had “snitched off” Vowels's parents in an earlier criminal action. Vowels disagreed and testified he had no ill feelings towards James.
After approximately thirty minutes in the bar, James exited to the parking lot to smoke a cigarette. The bartender, Mary Morrical, testified Vowels followed James with a look on his face that led Morrical to believe Vowels was looking for trouble. Outside the bar, Vowels confronted James while Mueller circled around the other side of a nearby truck, effectively trapping James in place. The fight ensued, with James knocking both Vowels and Mueller unconscious with one punch each. Bleeding profusely, James walked back into the bar and went home to tend to his wound. Unable to stop the bleeding at home, he went to a local hospital where doctors determined eighteen stitches were required to close the wound. Because of an abnormally low platelet count, possibly caused by extensive alcohol consumption, doctors testified James's wound would not have stopped bleeding on its own and could have cost him his life.
Following the fight Morrical called 911. Officer William Kester arrived at approximately 11:43 p.m. and found Vowels and Mueller lying unconscious on the ground. Officer Kester determined the amount of blood on the ground could not have come from the visible wounds of these two men. Another responding officer searched the area for more blood and located a knife under a nearby truck. The knife matched one Vowels admitted to owning. Vowels testified he normally kept the knife in his left front pocket and offered no explanation of how the knife could have ended up under the truck. During the investigation officers were made aware of James's wounds from a report the hospital made to law enforcement.
Vowels was interviewed by Officer Dave Doyle on February 27, 2013, and initially informed the officer he had no recollection of the events before he was knocked out. Vowels later admitted the knife was his and he had it with him on the night in question. Vowels also told Doyle that he possibly stabbed James. Vowels later apologized to Officer Doyle and hoped to apologize to James at some point for what had occurred.
No one saw how James's injury was sustained. Morrical heard a bar patron say he was cut with a beer bottle. James did not see who cut his cheek or how. Vowels claimed at trial to have no knowledge of how James sustained the injury or how his knife ended up out of his pocket under the truck.
Vowels was convicted by a jury. Twice he made a motion for judgment of acquittal, each denied by the district court. The motions challenged “each and every element of this case,” but specifically focused on the identity of the attacker and possession of the weapon. The district court found the State “put on sufficient evidence on each element of the two crimes” and denied the motions. Vowels's trial counsel did not request a proximate cause instruction.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Showens, 845 N.W.2d 436, 439–40 (Iowa 2014). All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences. Id. The verdict will be upheld if substantial evidence in the record supports it. Id.
The parties disagree on whether error was preserved on Vowels's claims concerning the elements of intent and justification. The State contends Vowels did not present the elements in either of his motions for judgment of acquittal. Our review is strictly limited to the issues actually presented to the district court at trial. State v. Moses, 320 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Iowa 1982). We will examine any issues considered by the district court, even if that consideration was “incomplete or sparse.” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 865 (Iowa 2012). Vowels argued to the district court that there was insufficient evidence on “each and every element of the case.” Though he went on to focus more specifically on select elements, we find he presented all elements to the district court, if in a minimal manner. The district court likewise ruled broadly on “each element of the two crimes.” We find this ruling sufficient to preserve error on the issues presented on appeal.
Vowels claims there is insufficient evidence to convict him of both charges. He contends that a jury could not conclude he cut James because no one saw him do so and James was unable to pinpoint when the cut occurred. Additionally, there was conflicting evidence on whether James was cut with a bottle or some other object. Vowels also claims justification for his actions because James was the aggressor. Additionally, Vowels asserts there is no evidence he intended to inflict a serious injury on James because Vowels could not have known James's low platelet count would put him in mortal danger. Vowels's claims on the second charge are nearly identical.
Iowa Code section 708.4 (2013) requires proof of three elements for the crime of willful injury. The State must prove: “(1) that there was an assault; (2) with intent to commit serious injury upon another; and (3) serious injury is in fact inflicted upon another.” State v. Hilpipre, 395 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa Ct.App.1986). It is undisputed this case suffers from a lack of direct proof on these elements. However, circumstantial evidence can be sufficient, and in some cases even superior, to direct proof. Id.
The evidence is overwhelming that an assault occurred, and we find a jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Vowels was the assailant. The evidence showed Vowels, who is left handed, and Mueller followed James out of the bar and effectively trapped him, leading to the altercation. After the fight, Vowels was left unconscious on the ground, next to the truck, under which the knife was located. It is reasonable for a jury to have concluded the knife was in Vowels's left hand and was dropped under the truck when Vowels was punched. The wound to the right side of James's face resulted. Considering the extensive and persistent bleeding, we find it hard to conclude James had been cut before the fight and was standing in the parking lot bleeding profusely when Vowels and Mueller surrounded him. Additionally, there is no evidence that James had suffered any type of injury while in the bar. It is illogical to conclude James had previously sustained his injury but did not notice it until after the fight. The most probable scenario is that James sustained his injury during the fight, which occurred while Vowels was the only person on the proper side of James's face. Vowels relied heavily on the fact that law enforcement did not send the knife away for testing. However, photographs included in the record show what is likely blood on the blade of the knife. The jury could reasonably conclude the knife was recently used to stab James in the face, leaving his blood on the knife. Circumstantial evidence adequately supports a single conclusion: Vowels cut James's face during the fight. Lastly, although Vowels initially denied any involvement, he later acknowledged participating in the assault.
Sufficient evidence exists on each of the other elements as well. Whether with a beer bottle or a knife, Vowels inflicted a serious wound to James's face. A jury could conclude such an attack was intended to inflict a serious injury upon James. Though direct evidence of Vowels's intent is impossible to obtain, the nature of the attack makes his intent known. He, with another, surrounded and attacked James without provocation. The initial point of attack was with a sharp object to James's face. Presuming Vowels intended the natural results of his actions, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Vowels intended to disfigure James or create a substantial risk of death. The result of the attack created a substantial risk of death. James's injury was serious, necessitating surgical intervention and could have caused his death if left untreated. The State was not required to show that death was likely, only that there was “a real hazard or danger of death.” State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Iowa 1999). We find such a danger existed.
A “serious injury” is defined as any bodily injury which causes a substantial risk of death, permanent disfigurement, or a protracted loss or impairment of bodily function. Iowa Code § 702.18(1)(b)(1)-(3).
The entirety of Vowels's challenge to the evidence is an attack on the credibility of the victim, James. We decline to revisit or reassess the valid credibility determinations made by the jury.
“A person who goes armed with any dangerous weapon with the intent to use without justification such weapon against the person of another commits a class ‘D’ felony.” Iowa Code § 708.8 (2013). Vowels claims the State failed to prove the knife was the instrumentality used to inflict James's injury. We disagree. As previously discussed, there is ample evidence James's injury occurred in the parking lot during the fight. The only instrumentality found in the vicinity of the fight that could have caused the injury was the knife, which Vowels admitted to carrying in his left front pocket that night. No explanation was offered to show how the knife came to be located under the truck, other than the reasonable inference Vowels removed it to attack James and dropped it when he was subsequently knocked out. James also testified he did not see Vowels open the knife; the jury could reasonably believe Vowels exited the bar with the knife open and ready to use. We find a jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, the knife was used in the attack.
Vowels claims the State failed to disprove his defense of justification. We disagree.
As reflected in jury instruction 17 in this case, to rebut the defense of justification, the State needed to prove any one of five elements, including “the Defendant started or continued the incident which resulted in injury.” See, e.g., State v. Mayes, 268 N.W.2d 387, 392–93 (Iowa 1979). The overwhelming evidence in this case shows Vowels initiated the confrontation. He followed James out of the bar and with the help of Mueller, surrounded James. There was no evidence James started the fight; all credible evidence showed James retaliated after the initial attack by Vowels. We find the jury could conclude Vowels was not justified in his actions.
Vowels claims his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a proximate cause instruction. His contention is that James's life was only in danger because of his low platelet count and that James's consumption of alcohol was the proximate cause of the injury, as opposed to the knife wound.
When asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal, it is incumbent upon the defendant to establish a record adequate to address the issue. State v. Johnson, 784 N.W .2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010). When the record is insufficient, we will preserve the issue for postconviction relief. See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Based upon a review of the record, we are unable to determine the reason Vowels's trial counsel did not request the proposed instruction. Accordingly, we preserve his claim for postconviction relief.
TABOR, J. concurs; VAITHESWARAN, P.J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. I would find insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of guilt.
1. On or about the 24th day of February, 2013, the Defendant assaulted Troy James by striking the right side of his face with a knife.
2. The Defendant specifically intended to cause a serious injury to Troy James.
3. The Defendant's act caused Troy James to sustain a serious injury.
4. The Defendant was not acting with justification.
In my view, the record lacks substantial evidence to establish that Vowels was the person who struck the right side of James's face with a knife or that Vowels had the specific intent to cause a serious injury to him.
No one disputes that James was assaulted. It also was undisputed that a knife was discovered underneath a truck. The evidence of who owned the knife was conflicting, with Vowels asserting it did not belong to him and a police officer who questioned him stating that Vowels admitted it was his. Because we are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, I agree a reasonable juror also could have found that the knife belonged to Vowels. See State v. Lamb, 573 N.W.2d 267, 268 (Iowa 1998). Based on the officer's testimony, a reasonable juror could have found that Vowels had the knife in his left front pocket at some point.
That said, a reasonable juror was left to speculate as to when and how the knife came out of Vowels's pocket, whether it was the weapon used to slash James, whether Vowels was the person who did the slashing, and how the knife landed under the truck. James testified that two men approached him. He could not say which one cut him. Indeed, he did not even see a knife or “anything” before he was slashed. He simply noticed the two men walking up on either side of him and reacted by decking both of them. Both fell to the ground and lost consciousness. At that point, a friend told James he was cut. Because the potential assailants were out cold, James was not in a position to enlighten himself on how he came to receive the cut.
The majority states “[t]he most probable scenario is that James sustained his injury during the fight, which occurred while Vowels was the only person on the proper side of James's face.” In my view, the only way the jury could have found guilt was by conjecturing that because Vowels owned and possessed the knife at some point, he must have been the person who committed the crime. See State v. McCullah, 787 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2010) (stating evidence that merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient). I believe this hypothesis does not amount to substantial evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse the finding of guilt on the willful injury causing serious injury count and remand for entry of judgment of acquittal.
1. On or about the 24th day of February, 2013, the Defendant was armed with a knife.
2. The knife was a dangerous weapon as defined in Instruction No. 22G.
3. The Defendant moved from one point to another while he was armed, having the specific intent to use the knife against another person.
I can discern scant if any evidence to support a finding that Vowels “moved from one point to another while he was armed, having the specific intent to use the knife against another person.” I would reverse the finding of guilt on this count and remand for entry of judgment of acquittal.


Parliamentary term connoting a refusal to vote either in support or in opposition to a motion or proposal. Abstentions may be counted for purposes of quorum, but not for the outcome of a particular decision.
The evidence of the ownership of property is typically contained within a document called an “abstract” which guarantees an unbroken 40-year chain of title.
With the unanimous approval or support of the Council, typically the election of officers or appointment of members to subordinate boards and commissions are made in this fashion.
The official termination or closing of proceedings.
Parliamentary term connoting favorable action on a recommendation or report on any matter or the passage (positive enactment) of a legislative measure.
An outline of matters to be presented during a specific meeting, usually structured according to an established order of business.
Parliamentary term connoting an alteration to a motion, either by addition, deletion, or substitution, that improves the pending question or provides a suitable alternative.
A specific sum of money allocated by formal action for expenditure by a specific entity, from a specific source, and for a specific purpose.
All actions of the City Council affirmed by the Mayor and, thus, deemed "official acts" of the City of Minneapolis pedning legal publication, as required pursuant to City Charter Article IV, §4.4(c).
A roadway that serves or is designed to serve heavy flows of traffic, which is used primarily as a street route for traffic between communities and/or other heavy traffic generating areas.
Charges applied to a property owner for improvements to streets, sewer, and/or water utilities, generally paid over a specified period.
The Council Member introducing a legislative measure; also known as the measure's sponsor.
A federal grant to be spent within general guidelines but not designated for a specific purpose.
Bonds secured by the “full faith and credit” of the issuing government and backed by taxing power.
Bond proceeds used to finance the purchase or construction of facilities or equipment to be leased to a private corporation. The bonds are backed by the revenue generated by the lease payment and ultimately by the credit of the corporation.
Bonds sold to investors to raise capital for development activities. Interest paid to bond purchasers is usually exempt from state and federal taxation, although TIF bonds can also be sold to investors with no interest exemption from state and federal taxes.
The city goverment's principle policy document, it is both an official statement of fiscal, economic, and social policies and a spending plan for a specific fiscal year. Pursuant to the City Charter, the Mayor is responsible for submitting a proposed budget by no later than August 15 each year.
A public record of the surveyed dimensions and value of land parcels used to record ownership and calculate taxes.
A federal grant of money for use in a narrowly defined functional area such as sewage treatment plants, housing, law enforcement or other activities.
Common term referring to the presiding officer of a meeting body.
The Mayor of the City of Minneapolis.
The legal document enacted pursuant to the Minnesota Constitution Article XII §4 and first adopted by public vote in November 1920 which establishes the City of Minneapolis as a municipal corporation of the first class within the State of Minnesota. The City Charter embodies the fundamental principles of the the municipal corporation; describes its legal parameters; defines its powers, duties, and boundaries; and guarantees certain rights to the people. It is analogous to the constitutions of the federal and state governments.
The legislative and chief policy–determinant body of the City of Minneapolis as provided pursuant to Article IV of the Minneapolis City Charter. The City Council is composed of thirteen members, each elected from separate wards of roughly equal population, serving concurrent four–year terms.
The official, published compilation of municipal law, policies and regulations, organized and arranged by subject matter.
A street which serves or is designed to serve as a traffic way for a neighborhood or as a feeder to a major roadway.
A formal expression of appreciation or gratitude or a tribute that is offered by the City Council.
A land use classification that describes commercial/retail business uses.
A collection of federal grant programs administered by HUD that awards funds to state and local units of government for qualifying housing and economic development efforts.
An annual accounting report that explains and analyzes the financial activity of the city.
A compilation of goals, policy statements, standards, programs, and maps for guiding the physical, social, and economic development of a community or region.
A use of property which may be appropriate within a specific zoning classification, but is not listed as a permitted use because conditions may be needed to ensure that no negative impacts result. The City may require any reasonable conditions contingent to permitting a conditional use.
A conflict arising from any interest, pecuniary or otherwise, that interferes with an individual's ability to properly perform his or her official duties, or one which creates the appearance of such a conflict.
The process of approving a mayoral appointment to certain executive (charter) departments.
A separate docket (agenda) composed only of matters deemed to be routine and non–controversial; the consent agenda is considered under a single motion. If a Council Member wishes to have further discussion on any matter listed on the consent agenda, it can be removed and set aside for further consideration.
A resident of a specific ward (or district) of the community.
The two-week period which culminates with the meeting of the full City Council at which time formal action is taken on all matters referred by its standing committees. The standing policy committees meet during the two-week period prior ro each regular meeting of the full City Council.
A person elected from one of the thirteen specific wards to represent its interests, needs, and priorities as a voting member of the City Council, the legislative body of the City of Minneapolis. Also referred to as Member.
The set of principles and corresponding regulations governing the organization and operation of the City Council and its committees and the introduction, consideration, and transaction of business. The City Council has adopted Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised as its parliamentary authority.
A supplement to the current edition of the Code of Ordinances, published annually, that identifies all new material that has beene codified.
A contract between two or more individuals, which constitutes a restriction of a particular use of a particular parcel or parcels.
Roadways maintained by MN DOT or a county department of transportation.
Formal discussion about a proposal or subject matter pending action by a decision-making body during a duly constituted meeting of its members.
A number expressing the relationship of the number of dwellings to an acre of land.
Changing a district from a higher to a lower intensity use.
A grant by a property owner for use of a strip of land by the public or any person for any specific purpose or purposes of construction and maintaining utilities and/or roadways.
The date an official act takes legal effect. The effective date is based on publication in the City’s official newspaper, pursuant to City Charter, Article IV, § 4.4 (d). The standard timeline for legal publication is eight days after final action by the City Council, unless a separate effective date is specified within the act.
The right of a governmental unit to take private lands for a public use or purpose upon payment of just compensation.
Legislation, by federal or state governments, which confer power upon the city government. In the adoption of a resolution, the enabling legislation, if any, is generally cited or referenced.
The date when an official act is approved by the Mayor, or, in the alternative, the date when the City Council approves an official act by overriding the Mayor’s veto on a two-thirds vote.
Analysis and evaluation of the potential effect of a project on the environment.
Created in 1984 pursuant to charter referendum, the Executive Committee is responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations of the City government. Members include the Mayor, the Council President and three Council Members (one of the minority party).
Includes a description of proposed street and/or utility improvements, a cost estimate for the project, project schedule, and a preliminary assessment roll.
Every legislative measure, proposal, or subject matter introduced to the City Council or referred to or from one of its standing committees is organized, presented, and tracked as a legislative file. Each file is assigned a unique number for tracking purposes, knows as its File Number.
Formal introduction, subsequent to notice, of a proposed legislative measure, after which the measure is generally referred to the proper standing committee having subject matter jurisdiction for public hearing and recommendation. Pursuant to City Charter, Article IV, § 4.4 (b), each ordinance must be given two separate readings before final action, except by unanimous consent of the full City Council.
The defined, twelve-month period for transaction and computation of budgetary and accounting purposes. In Minneapolis, the fiscal year runs concurrent with the calendar year (January to December).
A unit of measurement to account for the number of positions authorized to departments.
A meeting, or portion of a meeting, to investigate, gather information, and accept public testimony on a specific matter or matters pending consideration by the City Council or its standing committees.
Home-rule charter cities, such as Minneapolis, operate under a city charter as opposed to statutory cities, which operate under the statutory city code.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development is a federal agency that administers several grant programs related to community development and affordable housing development.
The construction or re-construction of streets, sidewalks, sanitary sewer, water main, or storm sewer.
A list of new legislative measures that, pursuant to previous notice, are formally introduced, given a first reading, and referred to the standing committee(s) having subject-matter jurisdiction.
The record of acts, orders, and judgments made by the City Council. The journal provides a parliamentary chronology of all actions taken, including motions, amendments, and votes; all committee reports; the processing of all measures, from introduction through final action; and other proceedings.
That part of a comprehensive plan which deals with the interrelationship between the different land uses.
The purpose for which a specific measure is passed or adopted as well as the meaning of any specific provisions.
The function of reviewing and evaluating the performance of administrative agencies and departments.
Minnesota Statutes §477A.013, Financial assistance from the State of Minnesota for municipalities. Allocation of these funds are based on complex formulas considering population, household size, city tax capacity, employment per capita, and many other factors.
A federal program that provides a specific amount of funds to local police departments based on crime rate to subsidize special enforcement activities.
The chief elected official of the City of Minneapolis, elected from a single district comprising the entire geographic boundary and the entire population of the city. Pursuant to City Charter, Article VII, § 7.1 (b), the Mayor is charged with general oversight of the City enterprise and its operations.
The financing plan prepared and presented by the Mayor which outlines strategies to fund ongoing operations and activities of the City of Minneapolis.
Official Convention and Visitor’s Association.
A meeting that is a continuation of a previous meeting.
A non-public meeting for considering quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary procedures, strategy for labor negotiations, and litigation strategy with legal counsel.
A scheduled meeting that follows set with dates and times according to an adopted calendar.
Any meeting other than a regular, adjourned, or emergency meeting. Written notice, posted and mailed/delivered a minimum of three days before the meeting, is required. No other business may be transacted other than as designated in the call for the special meeting.
A regional planning organization appointed by the Governor of Minnesota which operates a regional transit system, collects and treats wastewater, produces population forecasts, distributes funding for several funding programs, produces regional planning documents, reviews local planning documents, and manages regional aviation transportation systems.
A way to describe a parcel of land by starting at a known point and describing the bearings and distances of the line forming the boundaries of the property.
Minnesota Department of Transportation is responsible for funding and maintaining highway and aviation infrastructure.
Parliamentary term connoting a formal proposal for certain action.
A separate legal entity composed jointly of Hennepin County and the City of Minneapolis which owns and operates the historic City Hall/Courthouse Building.
A use of land, building, or structures lawfully existing when a zoning ordinance or amendment is passed by the City Council, where the existing use does not comply with all regulations of the new ordinance or amendment.
Conditions of property or uses that pose a threat to public safety, general welfare, diminish property values, or conflict with lawful uses of other properties.
The loyalty oath required under Minnesota law and the Minneapolis City Charter which must be subscribed to by all elected officials and certain appointed officers prior to assuming the office or position and performing official duties.
MN Statute 471.705 covers all meetings that transact official public business (if a quorum is present) to discuss, decide, or receive information. Votes are required to be recorded and all printed material is to be available for public review.
The framework within which all matters and measures are presented for consideration by the City Council; it includes: Call to Order; Reports of Standing Committees; Reports of Special Committees; Introduction & Referral Calendar; Resolutions; Motions; Unfinished Business; New Business; Announcements; and Adjournment.
An official act of legislative character which is general or permanent in nature and is intended to have the effect and force of law, generally prescribing penalty provisions for any violation. An ordinance is comparable to a municipal statute.
The first convening of the City Council in January following a general municipal election at which time the Members elect a President and other officers and organize themselves for the transaction of business.
Grants and other financial assistance received by a governmental entity to transfer to, or spend on behalf of, a secondary recipient.
A map or drawing which graphically delineates the boundary of a land parcel for identification and record of title, which is recorded as a legal document.
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA or PCA) is a state agency which monitors environmental quality, offers technical and financial assistance, enforces environmental regulations, finds and cleans up spills or leaks, and conduct environmental education.
The Council Member elected by City Council to serve as its presiding officer.
A legal requirement giving citizens an opportunity to comment on issues.
Land owned or operated by municipalities, school district, county, state, or other governmental unit.
Any action or existence of any activity that unreasonably annoys, injures or endangers the general health, safety, welfare or public peace such that the comfortable enjoyment of life or property is disrupted or which is offensive or has a blighting influence on the community.
Parliamentary term referring to the minimum number of Members who must be in attendance to constitute a public meeting for the transaction of business.
An intermission within a meeting without closing, or adjourning, the official proceeding.
A parliamentary mechanism that allows any question previously acted upon to be returned for additional or further consideration. The motion must be made by a Member who voted in the prevailing side of the first motion, and accepted by a majority of those present and voting.
The process of redrawing political boundaries to ensure equity in representation.
Parliamentary action to revoke or annul a prior legislative enactment.
Parliamentary action to nullify effect of any prior action that is not a legislative enactment; legislative enactments are repealed.
A land use classification that describes activities related to dwellings.
A written expression of policy or policy intent, or the opinion or will of the municipal corporation as determined by the Mayor and City Council which is administrative and not legislative in character.
A management tool that systematically tracks and reports performance.
An invitation to contractors, companies, or agencies to contract to provide a service or materials to the City. A RFP may be open to sleeved bidders or to all.
A memorandum from a department to initiate action by City Council.
The area on, below, or above any real property in which the City has an interest including, but not limited to, any street, road, highway, alley, sidewalk, parkway, park, or any other place, area, or real property owned by or under the control of the City.
A voting method in which a Member and his or her vote on a specific question are registered in the official record. Under a roll call vote, the clerk calls each Member’s name aloud and Members vote by responding when their name is called: aye (affirmative); nay (negative); or abstain. At the conclusion of the roll call, the clerk announces the total number voting on each side of the question. The presiding officer is always called last in a roll call. This voting method is also called voting by the Yeas & Nays.
The rank of Members based on their continuous length of service in office.
The minimum horizontal distance between a structure and the lot line, road, highway, high watermark, or another structure.
Standing Committees consider legislation and other matters and study specific areas of concern and report findings and recommendations to the full City Council.
The division or re-division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two or more lots either by platting or metes and bounds description.
)TIF is a development tool utilized by government agencies to encourage development that otherwise would not be financially feasible. Financing is secured by the anticipated incremental increase in tax revenue, resulting from the redevelopment of an area.
Notices and public hearings required by the State of Minnesota to disclose how property taxes are determined, address any disputes to property evaluation, explain City Budget appropriations, and encourage public participation in setting spending priorities.
The removal of an easement from a property, generally in reference to a utility and drainage easement.
The waiving of the provisions of the zoning chapter in instances where the strict enforcement would cause undue hardship because of circumstances unique to the individual property under consideration. Self-imposed hardships are never eligible for variances.
Authority of the Mayor to disapprove action by the City Council. The Council can override the Mayor's veto by a two–thirds vote.
A voting method in which Members orally declare their position on a specific question and the presiding officer determines the majority and declares the outcome. In contrast to a roll call vote, the record reflects only whether a question passes or fails and not individual votes of the Members. Voice votes are the standard voting method used in committee; roll call votes are the standard voting method in the full City Council.
The formal declaration by a Member registering support, opposition, or abstention with regard to a specific proposal or question under consideration.
A specific territory, or area, within the City that is represented by a Council Member. There are thirteen wards in the City of Minneapolis.
The area drained by the natural and artificial drainage system.
A document, adopted by the City Council, that defines zoning classifications within the city and prescribes the regulations associated with structural and architectural designs of the buildings and the use of those buildings within each zoning classification.
A zoning district may be either a primary district or an overlay district. The current districts are outlined briefly below. For more information on the definitions and requirements associated with each district, please consult the Municipal Code, Title 20.
A primary district is any of several residence, office residence, commercial, downtown, or industrial districts. All property within the city is included within a primary zoning district. In the municipal code, these districts are described in chapters 546-550.
An overlay district is any of several additional districts established by the zoning regulations that may be more or less restrictive than the primary zoning district. Where a property is located within an overlay district, it is subject to the provisions of both the primary zoning district and the overlay district. Where the provisions are in conflict, the overlay district governs. In the city’s municipal code, these districts are described in chapter 551.
The accounts of the City are organized by fund types. A “fund” is a grouping of related accounts that is used to maintain control over resources that have been segregated for specific activities or objectives.
The operations of each fund are monitored with a separate set of self-balancing accounts that comprise its assets, liabilities, fund equities, revenues and expenditures/expenses. Following is a listing and description of all City funds.
The General Fund is the general operating fund of the City. It is used to account for all financial resources except those that are required to be accounted for in another fund.
This fund is used to account for the operation, maintenance and construction projects related to the water delivery system. This fund also accounts for the operations related to the billings for water, sewage and solid waste fees.
This fund will be used to account for the operation, maintenance and construction projects related to the sanitary sewer system.
This fund will be used to account for the operation, maintenance and construction projects related to the stormwater utility system.
This fund is used to account for the revenues and expenses for solid waste collection, disposal and recycling activities.
This fund is used to account for the operation, maintenance and construction of the City's parking facilities as well as on-street parking and the Municipal Impound Lot.
This fund is used to account for operation, maintenance and construction of projects related to the Park Board, especially golf courses.
This fund is used to account for the operations of the public terminal facility located on the Mississippi River.
This fund is used to account for the operations of the City's asphalt plant and paving products laboratory. The paving products laboratory provides in lab and on-site testing and soil boring services to ensure quality control of asphalt and soils for projects.
This fund is used to account for business information services, central mailing and printing services, and the City's telecommunication operations.
This fund is used to account for the physical management and maintenance of fire stations, police precinct buildings, the Minneapolis Public Service Center, and various other City office locations, except for the City Hall/County courthouse building, which is accounted for in the Municipal Building Commission Special Revenue Fund.
This fund is used to account for the ownership and operation of radio communications equipment and a fleet of motorized equipment and vehicles. The fund operates as a rental agent to various departments to support the construction and maintenance of city infrastructure, fire protection services, and police services.
This fund is used to account for the centralized procurement, warehousing, and distribution of stocked inventory items, and the purchase of special goods and services.
This fund is used to account for administrative costs employee benefit programs. The fund also accounts for occupational health services, severance payments to employees who have retired or resigned and who meet minimum eligibility requirements, a tort liability program, and a workers' compensation program.
This fund is used to account for park employees’ medical, dental, and life insurance benefit programs and the programs' administrative costs. The fund also accounts for occupational health services, severance payments to employees who have retired or resigned and who meet minimum eligibility requirements, a tort liability program, and a workers' compensation program. The Park Board also has an internal service fund for charges within its programs.
Special revenue funds are used to account for the proceeds of revenue sources that are restricted by legal and regulatory provisions to finance specific activities. The City has thirty-four Special Revenue Funds, including community and economic development funds. These funds are used to account for the City’s planning and community development goals, most of which are financed through property tax increment financing.
This fund is a holding fund for various finance plan revenues to be used for future cost relating to the acquisition and capital maintenance of the downtown sports, entertainment and health complex.
This fund is used to account for the operations of the Board of Estimate and Taxation which issues and sell bonds, and establishes the maximum levies for the City, its boards and commissions.
This fund is used to account for the federal grants received under the Federal Community Development Block Grant provisions. Convention Center. This fund is used to account for the ownership, maintenance, and operation of the Minneapolis Convention Center, and the proceeds of the local sales and use tax.
This fund is a holding fund for parking and sales tax revenues to be used for future capital maintenance needs of the existing Convention Center.
This fund is used to account for the tax levy proceeds and other sources of revenue for the Minneapolis Employee Retirement Fund (MERF), Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Association (MFRA), and Minneapolis Police Relief Association (MPRA) retirement programs for some city employees.
This fund is used to account for all federal grants, except for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which is accounted for in a separate fund.
This fund is used to account for grants received from the State of Minnesota, Hennepin County, local government units, and private funds.
This fund is used to account for the cost of operating and maintaining the City Hall/County Court House building.
This fund is used to account for the revenues and expenditures related to federal and state administrative forfeitures and the revenues and expenditures related to the regulation of lawful gambling in the City.
This fund is used to account for revenue and expenditures related to the cost of operating and maintaining the Minneapolis Parks system.
This fund is used to account for the capital project activities of the department of Community Planning and Economic Development.
This fund is used to account for the capital project activities of the MBC, a component unit of the City of Minneapolis.
This fund is used to account for capital acquisition, construction, and improvement projects including bridge construction, sidewalk construction, street construction, energy conservation projects, infrastructure projects, and many Business and Information Services (BIS) projects.
This fund is used to account for the capital project activities of the Park Board.
This fund is used to account for the debt service activities of CPED and includes the Arena Acquisition Project (Target Center) Series A and B bonds, Tax Increment Bonds of 1990, and Tax Increment Revenue Notes.
This fund is used to account for the debt of projects supported by property tax increments, transfers of sales tax revenues from the Convention Center Special Revenue Fund for related debt, and a state grant relating to the completion of the Convention Center.
This fund is used to account for General Obligation Bonds supported by a property tax levy, Management Information System debt supported by the City's General Fund, Great River Road Bonds, Edison Hockey, Community Health, Xcel Power-Revenue, and Section 108 HUD Revenue Notes.
This fund is used to account for debt supported by special assessments with the exception of the Park Diseased Tree debt.


text:
All models are at least 18 years old!
Copyright of this website are owned in full by art of media ltd › ring-360.com.
The content of this website may only be used for personal purpose and may not be used or commercial purposes. Each copy you need a written permission.
Disclaimer: Despite carful checks of the content of external links and websites given, ring-360.com does not accept any liability. The organisations providing the links are exclusively responsible for their content.
§1. Member area: The reserved area is not suitable for minors. The user submits the offer for the membership contract online. The contract is concluded with the payment and the subsequent sending of the login data.
2.1 The user is obliged to truthfully fill in the personal data required for registration.
§2.2 The user undertakes to pay the agreed fee. If the user is in default of payment, ring-360.com can block the respective service. The block will be lifted immediately after the amount in arrears has been paid to ring-360.com. The block does not release the user from his/her obligation to pay.
§2.3 The user commits him-/herself to proper behaviour when using his/her access to offers of ring-360.com or the use of the offers in general. In particular, he/she must ensure that minors are not allowed to see the offers of ring-360.com. A violation of this obligation leads to the immediate blocking of access by ring-360.com.
§2.4 The user has to keep his/her login only for personal use, and in such a way that no third party can gain access to this login. He/she shall ensure secrecy and proper use. A violation of this obligation is the responsibility of the user with all resulting disadvantages. The login can be used from different computers, but the user commits not to log in from several computers at the same time.
§2.5 The user declares that if he/she intentionally or unintentionally, knowingly or unknowingly enables third parties to use his/her access to offers of ring-360.com, he/she is fully responsible for all online activities of this person in the offer of ring-360.com. The user acknowledges that, as the owner of his/her account, he/she is fully responsible for all activities carried out via this account, in particular for sales or purchases made or for contract extensions to other tariffs, or the ordering of additional chargeable offers from ring-360.com.
§3. Links: This website contains links to websites controlled by third parties. ring-360.com hereby expressly declares that no illegal content was identifiable on the referenced pages at the time the links were created. The provider of the linked website, and not the party which merely provided the link, is solely liable for illegal, incorrect, or incomplete content, and in particular for damages resulting from the use or non-use of such content.
§4. Disclaimer: ring-360.com assumes no liability for the timeliness, accuracy and completeness of the information and content provided on our website. Liability claims against ring-360.com relating to material or immaterial damage caused by the use or non-use of the content provided or by the use of incorrect or incomplete content are excluded, unless there is evidence of wilful intent or gross negligence on the part of ring-360.com. All offers are non-binding and without obligation. Parts of the pages or the complete publication including all offers and information may be extended, changed or partly or completely deleted by ring-360.com without a separate announcement.

matches: §1 §2 §2 §2 §2 §3 §4


text:
ERVY Sports Fashion GmbH, Hauptstr. 33, D-86505 Münsterhausen, e-mail: info@ervy.de, telephone: +49 (0) 8234 9603 0, fax: +49 (0) 8234 9603 29 .
hereinafter referred to as 'the company'.
- Browser and operating system of the visitor's terminal device and the name of the access provider used by the visitor.
Visitors can send messages to the Company via an online contact form and/or a chatbot on the Website. In order to receive an answer, at least the first and last name and a valid e-mail address are required. All other information may be provided voluntarily by the requesting person. By sending the message via the contact form and/or the chatbot, the visitor consents to the processing of the transmitted personal data. Data processing is carried out exclusively for the purpose of processing and answering enquiries via the contact form. This is done on the basis of voluntary consent pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 letter a) DSGVO. The personal data collected for the use of the contact form are automatically deleted as soon as the request is completed and there are no reasons for further storage (e.g. subsequent business relationship).
- this is necessary pursuant to Art. 6 (1) sentence 1 letter b) DSGVO for the performance of a contractual relationship with the data subject.
So-called cookies are used on the website. These are data packages that are exchanged between the server of the company's website and the visitor's browser. These are stored by the devices used (PC, notebook, tablet, smartphone, etc.) when you visit the website. Cookies cannot cause any damage to the devices used in this respect. In particular, they do not contain any viruses or other malware. Cookies are used to store information that is generated in connection with the specific end device used. The Company may in no way obtain direct knowledge of the identity of the visitor to the Website.
Cookies are mostly accepted according to the basic browser settings. The browser settings can be set in such a way that cookies are either not accepted on the devices used, or that a special message is sent before a new cookie is created. Please note, however, that disabling cookies may prevent you from making the best possible use of all of the website's features.
Temporary cookies are used to improve user-friendliness. They are stored on the visitor's device for a temporary period of time. When visiting the website again, it is automatically recognized that the visitor has already called the page at an earlier time and which inputs and settings have been made in order not to have to repeat them.
Cookies are also used to analyse visits to the website for statistical purposes and to improve the service. These cookies make it possible to automatically recognise that the website has already been called up by the visitor on a new visit. Here the cookies are automatically deleted after a specified time.
The data processed by cookies are justified for the above-mentioned purposes for the protection of the legitimate interests of the company according to Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f) DSGVO.
- if applicable, in the case of transmission to recipients in third countries, in the absence of a decision by the EU Commission on the adequacy of the level of protection pursuant to Art. 45 para. 3 DSGVO, information on which suitable guarantees are provided pursuant to Art. 46 para. 2 DSGVO for the protection of personal data.
If you discover that we have inaccurate personal data about you, you may request that we correct that inaccurate data immediately. In the case of incomplete personal data concerning you, you may request completion.
- Personal data are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were processed.
- The justification for the processing was exclusively your consent, which you have revoked.
- You have objected to the processing of personal data not made public by us and there are no prior legitimate reasons for the processing.
There is no right to deletion if the deletion is not possible or only possible with disproportionately high effort in the case of lawful non-automated data processing due to the special type of storage and your interest in the deletion is low. In this case, the limitation of processing shall take the place of deletion.
- You dispute the accuracy of the personal data. In this case, the restriction may be requested for a period of time that allows us to verify the accuracy of the data.
- The processing is unlawful and you demand the restriction of the use of your personal data instead of deletion.
- Your personal data will no longer be required by us for the purposes of processing, but which you need to assert, exercise or defend legal claims.
- You have lodged an objection pursuant to Art. 21 (1) DSGVO. The restriction of the processing can be demanded as long as it is not yet certain whether our justified reasons outweigh your reasons.
Limitation of processing means that personal data will only be processed with your consent or for the purpose of asserting, exercising or defending legal claims or protecting the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of an important public interest. Before we lift the restriction, we have a duty to inform you.
You have a right to data transfer if the processing is based on your consent (Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 letter a) or Art. 9 para. 2 letter a) DSGVO) or on a contract to which you are a party and the processing is carried out using automated procedures. In this case, the right to data transfer includes the following rights, provided that the rights and freedoms of other persons are not affected: You may request that we keep the personal information you have provided to us in a structured, common and machine-readable format. You have the right to transfer this data to another responsible person without any hindrance on our part. As far as technically feasible, you can request that we transfer your personal data directly to another responsible person.
If the processing is based on Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 letter e) DSGVO (performance of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority) or on Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 letter f) DSGVO (legitimate interest of the person responsible or a third party), you have the right to object to the processing of your personal data at any time for reasons arising from your particular situation. This also applies to profiling based on Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 1 letter e) or letter f) DSGVO. After exercising the right of objection, we will no longer process your personal data unless we can prove compelling reasons for processing worthy of protection which outweigh your interests, rights and freedoms, or the processing serves the assertion, exercise or defence of legal claims.
You may object at any time to the processing of your personal data for direct marketing purposes. This also applies to profiling associated with such direct marketing. After exercising this right of objection, we will no longer use the relevant personal data for direct marketing purposes.
You have the option of informing us of your objection by telephone, e-mail, fax or to the postal address of our company listed at the beginning of this data protection declaration.
You have the right to revoke your consent at any time with effect for the future. The revocation of the consent can be communicated by telephone, by e-mail, by fax or to our postal address informally. The revocation does not affect the lawfulness of the data processing, which took place on the basis of the consent until the receipt of the revocation. After receipt of the revocation the data processing, which was based exclusively on your consent, is stopped.
If you believe that the processing of personal data concerning you is unlawful, you may lodge a complaint with a data protection supervisory authority responsible for the place of your stay or work or for the place of suspected infringement.

matches:
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 45
Art. 46
Art. 21
Art. 9
Art. 6
Art. 6
Art. 6


text:
NYPL Map Warper:: Layer 1304 V. 1, 1911.
1911 almost 4 years ago. Unrectified.
Index / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. Unrectified.
Index Continued Left Pg. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 1 Map bounded by Centre St., Passaic River, Market St., Broad St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 4 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 2 Map bounded by Warren St., W. Park St., Broad St., Market St., Springfield Ave., S. Orange Ave., Howard St., Henry St., Colden St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 20 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 3 Map bounded by Cabinet St., Warren St., Colden St., Howard St., S. Orange Ave., Hunterdon St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 25 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 4 Map bounded by 1st St., Orange St., Newark St., Cabinet St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 24 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 5 Map bounded by James St., Plane St., Warren St., Newark St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 6 Map bounded by Passaic River, Centre St., Park Pl., W. Park St., Warren St., Plane St., James St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 22 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 7 Map bounded by State St., Grant St., Passaic River, Lombardy St., James St., Boyden St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 12 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 8 Map bounded by 7th Ave., Boyden St., James St., Sussex Ave., Orange St., Morris Canal / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 16 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 9 Map bounded by Parker St., 4th Ave., Stone St., 7th Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 10 Map bounded by Crane St., Clark St., Passaic River, Cross St., Grant St., State St., Nassau St., Boyden St., Sheffield St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 11 Map bounded by 4th Ave., Passaic River, Clark St., Crane St., Stone St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 9 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 12 Map bounded by Nursery St., Passaic River, 4th Ave., Parker St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 28 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 13 Map bounded by Delavan Ave., Passaic River, Harvey St., Parker St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 14 Map bounded by Halleck St., Grafton Ave., Passaic River, Delavan Ave., Parker St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 11 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 15 Map bounded by Second River, Passaic River, Grafton Ave., Clifton Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 29 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 16 Map bounded by Second River, Prospect Ave., Clifton Ave., Grafton Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 30 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 17 Map bounded by Grafton Ave., Parker St., Delavan Ave., Watchung Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 21 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 18 Map bounded by Delavan Ave., Parker St., 1st Ave., N. 15th St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 19 Map bounded by 1st Ave., Parker St., 4th Ave., Lawton St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 26 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 20 Map bounded by 4th Ave., Parker St., 7th Ave., N. 14th St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 33 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 21 Map bounded by 7th Ave., 1st St., Central Ave., S. 16th St., N. 15th St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 22 Map bounded by Central Ave., Hunterdon St., Bank St., 12th Ave., S. 12th St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 23 Map bounded by 12th Ave., Bank St., Hunterdon St., S. Orange Ave., S. 12th St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 24 Map bounded by Grove St., Central Ave., S. 12th St., S. Orange Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 25 Map bounded by Grove St., W. End Ave., Oak St. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 31 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 26 Map bounded by Tremont Ave., Arsdale Ter., S. Orange Ave., Holland Ave. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.
1911 over 3 years ago. 17 control points.
Newark, V. 1, Double Page Plate No. 27 Map bounded by S. Orange Ave., W. End Ave., Ocean Ave., Varsity Rd., Stanley Rd. / by J.M. Lathrop and L.J.G. Ogden ; assisted by E. Robinson and G.M. Monroe.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.