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Hotel Du Nord AG, Höheweg 70 in 3800 Interlaken runs the Hotel Du Nord, Höheweg 70 in 3800 Interlaken. It operates the website www.hotel-dunord.ch and is therefore responsible for the collection, processing and use of your personal data and the compatibility of data processing with the applicable data protection law. The protection of your data is important to us. We therefore treat your personal data as confidential and pay attention to appropriate security. Of course, we comply with the legal provisions of the Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP), the Ordinance to the Federal Act on Data Protection (DPO), the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and other applicable data protection provisions of Swiss or EU law, in particular the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
In order for you to know what personal data we collect on you and what purposes we use them for, please take note of the information below.
The use of the website of the Hotel Du Nord, Höheweg 70 in 3800 Interlaken, is basically possible without providing any personal data. If, as a user, you wish to make use of special services - in particular the possibility of online booking - via the website, the processing of personal data may become necessary. These data will not be passed on to any third party without your express consent and are used solely to process your enquiry.
We would like to point out that despite all measures taken, data transmission over the Internet (e.g. when communicating by e-mail) can have security gaps and, therefore, complete protection of data against access by third parties is not guaranteed in every case.
To secure the transmission of confidential data through the forms provided on this website and for security reasons, we use SSL as encryption technology. You can recognise an encrypted connection by the address line »https://« and the lock symbol displayed in the browser. Data encrypted via SSL cannot be read by third parties during transmission.
These data cannot be assigned to specific persons. Such data are not combined with other data sources. The storage of the data is used solely for statistical evaluation, to guarantee the operation, as well as the safety of the offer.
If there is a justified suspicion of illegal use due to concrete indications, we reserve the right to subsequently check the log data.
where applicable, your username from a registration/authentication.
These data are collected and processed for the purpose of enabling the use of our website (establishment of the connection), to permanently guarantee system security and stability and to enable the optimisation of our Internet offer as well as for internal statistical purposes. This is our legitimate interest in data processing within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
Furthermore, the IP address is evaluated together with the other data in the event of attacks on the network infrastructure or other unauthorised or abusive use of the website for reconnaissance and defence purposes and, if required, used in the context of criminal proceedings for identification and civil and criminal proceedings against the users concerned. This is our legitimate interest in data processing within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
We will only use these details to answer your contact inquiry in the best possible and personalised manner. The processing of these data is therefore necessary for the implementation of steps to be taken prior to entering into a contract within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR or is in our legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
If you communicate through e-mail, please also provide your e-mail address.
We will only use these data and other information you provide voluntarily (e.g. expected time of arrival, motor vehicle registration plate, preferences, comments) to process the contract, unless otherwise stated in this data protection declaration or you have given your separate consent. In particular, we will process the data in order to record your booking as requested, to provide the services booked, to contact you in case of uncertainties or problems and to ensure correct payment.
The legal basis of data processing for this purpose is the performance of a contract pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR.
We offer you the opportunity to apply to us through our website. In digital applications, we collect and process your applicant and application data electronically in order to process your application.
If an employment contract is concluded after the application procedure, we will store the data you provided during the application in your personnel file for the purpose of the usual organisational and administrative process - obviously in compliance with further legal obligations.
The legal basis of data processing is the performance of measures to be taken prior to entering into a contract, and our legitimate interest pursuant to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b and f GDPR. For further data processing, the legal basis is the consent you have given within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a GDPR.
If an application is rejected, we will automatically delete the data submitted to us two months after notification of rejection. However, the data will not be deleted if they are required by law to be stored for a longer period of up to four months or until legal proceedings have been concluded.
If you expressly consent to a longer storage of your data, e.g. for your inclusion in a database of applicants or interested parties, the data will be processed further on the basis of your consent. In that case, the legal basis is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a) GDPR. Meanwhile, you can of course revoke your consent at any time pursuant to Art. 7 para. 3 GDPR by declaration to us with effect for the future.
Cookies are helpful in many ways to make your visit to our website easier, more pleasant and more meaningful. Cookies are small text files that your web browser automatically stores on your computer's hard drive when you visit our website.
Disabling cookies may prevent you from being able to use all the features of our website.
This website uses the analysis Matomo (formerly: »PIWIK«) software. This is open-source software that can be used to analyse the use of the website. This involves processing your IP address, the pages of the website you visit, the website from which you switched to this website (referrer URL), your length of stay and the frequency with which individual pages within this website are accessed on the hosting provider's server.
Matomo stores a cookie on your terminal device through your Internet browser to collect these data.
However, we use Matomo with the »Automatically Anonymize Visitor IPs« anonymisation function. This anonymisation function shortens your IP address by two bytes so that it is impossible to assign it to you or to the Internet connection you are using.
If you do not agree to this processing taking place, you have the option of preventing the storage of the cookie by changing a setting in your Internet browser. You will find more detailed information on this in the section on »Cookies above.
a cookie will be stored on your terminal device through your Internet browser, which will prevent further analysis. However, please note that you will have to click on the above link again if you have deleted the cookies stored on your terminal device.
The plugin will inform Facebook Inc. that you have visited this website as a user. It is possible that your IP address is stored. If you are logged into your Facebook account during your visit to this site, this information will be assigned to your Facebook account.
If you use the functions of the plugin - for example by sharing or "likening" a post – the corresponding information will also be transmitted to Facebook Inc.
When you access a page of our website that contains such a plugin, your browser will establish a direct connection to Instagram's servers. Instagram will transfer the content of the plugin directly to your browser and integrate it into the page. This integration will inform Instagram that your browser has called up the corresponding page of our website, even if you do not have an Instagram profile or are not currently logged in to Instagram. This information (including your IP address) will be transmitted by your browser directly to an Instagram server in the USA and will be stored there.
If you are logged in to Instagram, Instagram can immediately assign your visit to our website to your Instagram account. If you interact with the plugins, for example by pressing the "Instagram" button, this information will also be transmitted directly to an Instagram server and be stored there. The information will also be published on your Instagram account and be displayed in your contacts.
If you do not want Instagram to assign the data collected via our website directly to your Instagram account, you must log out of Instagram before visiting our website. You can also completely prevent the Instagram plugins from loading through add-ons for your browser, e.g. through the script blocker "NoScript" (http://noscript.net/).
This site uses what is known as web fonts provided by Google to uniformly display fonts. When you call up a page, your browser will load the required web fonts into your browser cache to display texts and fonts correctly.
To do this, the browser you are using must connect to Google's servers. By doing so, Google will become aware that our website has been accessed via your IP address. Google web fonts are used to ensure a uniform and appealing presentation of our online offers. If your browser does not support web fonts, a default font will be used by your computer.
For more information about Google Web Fonts, please visit https://developers.google.com/fonts/faq and read Google's privacy statement: https://policies.google.com/privacy/update?hl=en.
Our website uses the Google Maps map service via an API. The provider is Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.
To use the functions of Google Maps it is necessary to save your IP address. This information will usually be transmitted to a Google server in the USA and be stored there. The provider of this site has no influence on this data transmission.
Google Maps is used to ensure an appealing representation of our online offers and to make it easy to locate the places we indicate on the website.
We use Google reCAPTCHA on our website to check and avoid interactions on our website by automated access, e.g. by what is known as bots. This is a service of Google LLC, 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043 USA, hereinafter referred to as "Google".
Google's certification under the EU-US Privacy Shield https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0... guarantees that the EU's data protection requirements are also complied with when processing data in the USA.
Through this service Google can determine from which website a request is sent and from which IP address you use what is referred to as the reCAPTCHA input box. In addition to your IP address, Google may collect other information necessary for the offer and to guarantee this service.
The legal basis is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f) GDPR. Our legitimate interest is the security of our Internet presence and the prevention of unwanted, automated access in the form of spam or similar.
Google offers further information on the general handling of your user data at https://policies.google.com/privacy/update?hl=en .
We collect this information for the fulfilment of legal reporting obligations, which result in particular from the hospitality industry or police law. Where we are required to by applicable regulations, we will forward this information to the appropriate police authority.
We have a legitimate interest in the fulfilment of the legal requirements within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
If you make use of additional services during your stay (e.g. the mini-bar or pay TV offer), we will record the item of the service and the time at which it is used for invoicing purposes. The processing of these data is required within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR for the processing of the contract with us.
If you make bookings through a third-party platform (booking.com, triva-go.com, hrs.com etc.), we will receive various personal details from the respective platform provider. These are usually the data listed in the section provided for "Booking on the website, by correspondence or by phone call". In addition, we may receive enquiries regarding your booking. We will process these data in particular in order to record your booking as requested and to make available the services booked. The legal basis of data processing for this purpose is the performance of a contract according to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR.
Finally, we may be informed by the platform providers of any disputes in connection with a booking. In this context, we may also receive information about the booking process, which may include a copy of the booking confirmation as proof of the actual confirmation of the booking. We process these data to protect and enforce our claims. This is our legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
Please also note the respective provider’s information on data protection.
We will store your personal data in a central electronic data processing system. In this context, your specific personal data will be systematically recorded and linked in order to process your bookings and provide the contractual services. For this purpose, we use software from FO-DATA GmbH, Geerenstrasse 3, 9507 Stettfurt, Switzerland. The processing of these data within the scope of the software is based on our legitimate interest in customer-friendly and efficient customer data management within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
We will only store personal data for as long as it is necessary to use the tracking services mentioned above and further processing within the scope of our legitimate interest. We will keep contractual data for a longer period of time because this is required according to legal storage obligations. Storage obligations obliging us to store data result from regulations concerning the right to report, accounting and tax law. According to these regulations, business communication, contracts concluded and accounting documents must be kept for up to 10 years. If and as we no longer need these data to perform the services for you, the data will be blocked. This means that the data may then only be used for accounting and tax purposes.
We will only pass on your personal data if you have expressly consented to this, if there is a legal obligation to do so or if it is necessary for the enforcement of our rights, in particular for the enforcement of claims arising from the contractual relationship. Furthermore, we will pass on your data to third parties to such an extent as it is necessary in the context of the use of the website and the processing of the contract (also outside the website), in particular the processing of your bookings.
One service provider to whom the personal data collected through the website will be passed on and who has or can have access to them is our web hoster netfuchs gmbh, untere Bönigstrasse 10a, 3800 Interlaken, Switzerland. The website is hosted on servers in the Federal Republic of Germany. The data will be passed on for the purpose of providing and maintaining the functionalities of our website. This is our legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR.
Finally, we will forward your credit card information to your credit card issuer and the credit card acquirer when payment is made by credit card on the website. If you decide to pay by credit card, you will be asked to enter all necessary details. The legal basis for the transfer of the data is the performance of a contract in accordance with Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b GDPR. With respect to the processing of your credit card information by these third parties, please also read the general terms and conditions and the data protection declaration of your credit card issuer.
We are also entitled to transmit your personal data to third parties (commissioned service providers) abroad for the purpose of data processing as described in this data protection declaration. These third parties are obliged to the same extent as we are to comply with data protection regulations. If the level of data protection in a country does not correspond to that in Switzerland or Europe, we will contractually ensure that the protection of your personal data will correspond at all times to that in Switzerland or the EU.
You have the right to request information about the personal data that we store about you. In addition, you have the right to request rectification of inaccurate data and erasure of your personal data, unless there is a legal obligation to retain such data or a factual ground allowing us to process the data.
You also have the right to reclaim the data that you have provided to us (right of data portability). Upon request, we will also pass the data on to a third party of your choice. You have the right to receive the data in a common file format.
Once given, you can revoke your consent to the processing of your data at any time. As a result, we will no longer be allowed to, and will not continue to process the data in the future as we will have done before on the basis of this consent. Furthermore, you have the right to object to the processing of your personal data if there are reasons for this which arise from your particular situation or if the objection is directed against direct advertising.
You can contact us for the above-mentioned purposes by e-mail at info@hotel-dunord.ch. We may, at our discretion, require proof of identity to process your applications.
We use appropriate technical and organisational security measures to protect your personal data stored with us against manipulation, partial or complete loss and against unauthorised access by third parties. Our security measures are continuously improved in line with technological developments.
You should always treat your access data confidentially and close the browser window when you have finished communicating with us, in particular if you share your computer with others.
We also take internal data protection very seriously. We have committed our employees and the service companies we have commissioned to secrecy and compliance with data protection regulations.
For reasons of completeness, we would like to point out to users residing or domiciled in Switzerland that there are monitoring measures vested in US authorities in the USA, which generally allow the storage of all personal data of all persons whose data were transmitted from Switzerland to the USA. This is done without differentiation, restriction or exception on the basis of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion making it possible to limit access by the US authorities to the data and their subsequent use to very specific, strictly limited purposes justifying intervention related to both access to these data and their use. Furthermore, we would like to point out that there are no legal remedies available in the USA for data subjects from Switzerland allowing them to gain access to the data about them and obtain their rectification or erasure, i.e. that there is no effective legal protection against general access rights of US authorities. We explicitly point out this legal and factual situation to the person concerned (data subject) in order to enable them to make an appropriately informed decision to consent to the use of his or her data.
Users residing in a EU Member State are advised that the US does not have an adequate level of data protection from the point of view of the European Union, in part due to the issues mentioned in this section. Having explained in this Data Protection Declaration that recipients of data (such as Google) are based in the USA, we will nonetheless ensure that your data is protected by our partners at an appropriate level, either by contractual arrangements with these companies or by ensuring that these companies are certified under the EU / Swiss-US privacy shield.
This Data Protection Declaration has been valid as of May 2018 and has been written to the best of our knowledge and belief.
Due to the further development of our website and offers processed on it, as well as due to possible amendments of legal or official requirements, it may become necessary to amend this Data Protection Declaration. You can call up and print the current version of the Data Protection Declaration on our website at any time.

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COUNTY JAIL DOCKET (The following people were booked into the Volusia County Branch Jail on felony charges yet to be proven in court.): Susanna Marie Prevatt, 29, Osteen, violation of probation; Karen Sheila Welch, 52, Deltona, issuing a worthless check; Naomi Angelica Kogut, 21, Deltona, aggravated battery on a pregnant person; Sandra Irene Roberts, 50, DeLand, grand theft of more than $300 but under $5,000, possession of a controlled substance (2); Crystal Lee Langworthy, 32, Port Orange, possession of a controlled substance, carrying a concealed weapon/firearm, tampering with evidence; Norma Rea Willett, 30, Holly Hill, solicitation to commit prostitution; Cherrelle Kelana Davis, 26, Hollywood, Fla., possession of methamphetamine; Lissa Jean Keeler, 31, DeLand, violation of probation; Rhonda Marie Williams, 47, Kingsland, Ga., possession of a controlled substance; Janine Marie Gogol, 24, South Daytona, violation of probation; Jayson John Brandt, 30, Port Orange, violation of probation; Christopher Neil Tsikuris, 28, Edgewater, unlawful possession of listed chemical; Waymon Johnson Jr., 18, Daytona Beach, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, dealing in stolen property, giving false information to a pawn broker; Robert Phillip Hopkins, 28, DeLand, violation of drug court; Glenn William Warren, 51, Port Orange, violation of probation (2); Kody Lee Russell, 19, Osteen, robbery by sudden snatching; Michael Schaeffer, 20, Deltona, robbery by sudden snatching; James Daniel Barrett, 25, Port Orange, violation of probation; Charles Michael Hulsey, 26, DeLand, burglary of an unoccupied structure/conveyance, dealing in stolen property; Burl Leon Nelson, 29, DeLand, failure to appear; Darryl Lamar Duffy, 21, Palatka, grand theft auto; Hikeem Lamario James Fate, 22, Daytona Beach, aggravated battery on a person using a deadly weapon; Dwayne Lenard Holmes, 29, Daytona Beach, burglary of an unoccupied business; Ralph Kenneth Richardson, 34, Pierson, possession of a controlled substance (2), child neglect; Albert Andre Grayson, 42, Daytona Beach, driving while license is habitually suspended; Robert J. Vitale, 40, South Daytona, violation of probation; Duane Hamilton, 27, Miami, possession of a controlled substance (3), prisoner escape; Virgil Nathan Adkins, 32, Ormond Beach, violation of probation; Adam Richard Geist, 23, Daytona Beach, violation of probation, grand theft of more than $10,000 but under $20,000, dealing in stolen property; Kenneth Kristian List, 43, DeLand, robbery; Jose R. Perez, 52, Port Orange, aggravated domestic battery; Troy L. Lyles, 42, DeLand, possession of cocaine.
MARRIAGES: Robert J. Roam and Summer A. Suydam, New Smyrna Beach; Alan D. Lapp and Serena I. Richardson, Orange City; John M. Rainey and Pamela J. Gorman, DeLand; Robert G. Roberts and Denise M. Bateman, DeLand; Somnauth Dyaram, Kissimmee, and Diana Burgos, Deltona; Christopher B. Mann and Kara L. Mann, Holly Hill; Matthew M. Dorn and Tessie M. Evener, Deltona; Edward L. Keith III and Danielle M. Charles, Ormond Beach; Dave A. Manning Jr. and Bethany M. Gresham, Daytona Beach; Joseph A. Digiacomo and Carmel Swanson, Ormond Beach; Russell W. Swartzfager and Hayley J. Divine, New Smyrna Beach; Charles D. Coke and Jordan E. Bastian, Edgewater; Arthur J. Dupont and Neghan K. McGowan, Port Orange; Matthew A. Cramer and Catherine E. Kilgore, Ormond Beach.
MARRIAGE DISSOLUTIONS STARTED: Deborah L. Otway Bowes v. Steven J. Bowes; Michael D. v. Rebecca S. Thomas; Patricia A. Rivera v. Walfrido R. Colon; James A. Cooper v. Katherine L. Davis Cooper; Stephen K. v. Sharon Collins; Annette B. v. Thomas M. Perry; Jabez Boaz v. Ahyahnnah Greenidge.
MARRIAGE DISSOLUTIONS GRANTED: Nicole and Roberval M. Santana; Steven R. and Michelle M. Bethea; Renee and Gene F. McClellan; Kimberly L. Batykefer and Timothy Faucher; Kenneth L. and Amy Bradley; Nicole L. Kenyon Gregg and Brian L. Kenyon; Ronald J. Morell and Dana L. Mahon; Melissa and Joseph Cannon Jr.; Rosa L. Diaz and Angel L. Garrido; Ashley A. Harty and Anthony J. Weyenberg; Ann M. and Jeremy Meyers; Thelma Montano and Jairo Vanegas; James E. and Christina C. Baxter; Loren W. Fryer and Lisa M. Raynor; Crystal and Stephen Kelsey; Aimee L. and David W. McCrystal; Alison and Bradley Stenstrom; Maria and Cruz Paulino; Bonnie and Mark A. Lacey; Thaddeus G. and Traci S. Lomax; Darnell L. Morris and Gail K. Jenkins; Robert E. and Kellie A. Schultz; Michelle T. and Angel J. Figueroa Jr.; Gisela and Todd Ruggiero; Carla and Thomas Figueroa.
ANDREWS/COOPER: Lawrence Andrews and Areeyl Cooper, Port Orange, are the parents of a daughter weighing 7 pounds, 2 ounces, born at 1:05 p.m. Sept. 26, 2012, at Florida Hospital Memorial Medical Center, Daytona Beach.
DAWSON/PETERSON: Louie Dawson and Tishia Peterson, Pierson, are the parents of a son weighing 8 pounds, 6 ounces, born at 4:11 a.m. Sept. 20, 2012, at Florida Hospital DeLand.
EVAN: Candice Evan, New Smyrna Beach, is the mother of a daughter weighing 7 pounds, 3 ounces, born at 12:57 a.m. Sept. 26, 2012, at Florida Hospital Memorial Medical Center, Daytona Beach.
PETERSON: Erika Peterson, DeLand, is the mother of a daughter weighing 7 pounds, 5 ounces, born at 2:18 p.m. Sept. 21, 2012, at Florida Hospital DeLand.
PHEGLEY: Nicole and Darren Phegley, New Smyrna Beach, are the parents of a son weighing 8 pounds, 2 ounces, born at 3:54 a.m. Sept. 24, 2012, at Florida Hospital Memorial Medical Center, Daytona Beach.
PORTER: Anna and Mark Porter, DeLand, are the parents of a son weighing 7 pounds, 11 ounces, born at 11:52 p.m. Sept. 18, 2012, at Florida Hospital DeLand.
REQUENEZ: Sarah Requenez, Orange City, is the mother of a daughter weighing 7 pounds, 12 ounces, born at 9:19 a.m. Sept. 20, 2012, at Florida Hospital DeLand.

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D.C. Law Library - § 50–1401.01. Fee; examination; age requirements; lost permits; provisions for armed forces personnel; contents; operation without permit prohibited; restrictions for minors.
↪ § 50–1401.01. Fee; examination; age requirements; lost permits; provisions for armed forces personnel; contents; operation without permit prohibited; restrictions for minors.
§ 50–1401.01a. Notification of operator’s permit expiration.
§ 50–1401.01. Fee; examination; age requirements; lost permits; provisions for armed forces personnel; contents; operation without permit prohibited; restrictions for minors.
(A) The applicant shall pay an application fee of $30, which may be increased by the Mayor to compensate the District for processing and evaluating the application and issuing the permit. Alternatively, the Mayor is authorized to prorate existing fees to correspond to the duration of the license issued.
(A-i) Effective October 1, 2015, an applicant for an operator’s permit shall pay an application fee of $47, which the Mayor may increase or decrease to compensate the District for processing and evaluating the application and issuing the permit. The Mayor may prorate the fee to correspond to the duration of the license issued.
(II) An individual in the custody of the BOP at a halfway house in the District.
(ii) The Mayor, pursuant to subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2, may issue rules to implement the provisions of this subparagraph.
(iii) Any other criteria as the Mayor may establish.
(iii) The applicant shall have received 10 hours of nighttime driving experience, as certified by the holder of a valid motor vehicle operator’s permit from any jurisdiction, who is 21 years of age or older and has accompanied the applicant while the applicant was operating the motor vehicle.
(iv) Operate a motor vehicle other than a passenger vehicle or motorized bicycle used solely for the purposes of pleasure and not for compensation.
(A) The applicant shall pay an application fee of $15, which may be increased by the Mayor for the costs of processing and evaluating the application and issuing the permit.
(ii) The Mayor, pursuant to subchapter II of Chapter 5 of Title 2, may issue rules to implement the provisions of this subparagraph.
(D) An individual whose learner's permit has expired pursuant to this paragraph may apply for a new learner's permit; provided, that the individual shall again comply with the requirements set forth in this paragraph.
(iii) Shall have received 40 hours of driving experience as certified by the holder of a valid motor vehicle operator’s permit from any jurisdiction, who is 21 years of age or older and who has accompanied the applicant while the applicant was operating the motor vehicle.
(ii) Operate a motor vehicle between 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday until 6:00 a.m. on the following day during any month except July or August, and from 12:01 a.m. until 6:00 a.m. during July and August and on any Saturday or Sunday the rest of the year, unless driving to or from employment, a school-sponsored activity, religious or an athletic event or related training session in which the permittee is a participant, sponsored by the District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or unless accompanied by the holder of a valid motor vehicle operator’s permit who is 21 years of age or older, wearing a seat belt, and occupying a seat beside the permittee.
(2B) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(B), and (a)(2A) of this section, a person under the age of 21 who holds a valid motor vehicle permit from another jurisdiction shall be eligible for a comparable District of Columbia driver’s permit, provided that the permittee’s operation of a motor vehicle shall be subject to the applicable restrictions set forth in subsection (a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(C), or (a)(2A)(C) of this section.
(iii) The third and subsequent offenses shall result in a suspension of 90 days.
(2D) Operator’s permits subject to the provisions of this subchapter, including a learner’s permit, provisional permit and operator’s permit, shall be visually distinguishable pursuant to rules promulgated by the Department of Motor Vehicles.
(3) Any pupil 15 years of age or over enrolled in a high school or junior high school driver education and training course approved by the Mayor or his designated agent may, without obtaining either an operator’s or a learner’s permit, operate a dual control motor vehicle between the hours of 6 a.m. and 11 p.m., where the pupil is under instruction and accompanied by a licensed motor vehicle driving instructor; provided, that such instructor shall at all times while he is engaged in such instruction have on his person a certificate from the principal or other person in charge of such school, stating that such instructor is officially designated to instruct pupils enrolled in such course, and whenever demand is made by a police officer such instructor shall display to him such certificate.
(3A) Notwithstanding the passenger restrictions set forth in subsection (a)(1)(D), (a)(C)(iii), and (a)(2A)(C)(iii) of this subsection, a permittee who is enrolled in a driver education course may operate a motor vehicle containing a greater number of passengers while the permittee is under the instruction of and accompanied by a licensed motor vehicle driving instructor provided that the other passengers are also receiving driving instruction.
(4) In the event an operator’s permit, learner’s permit, or a provisional permit issued under the authority of this section is lost or destroyed, or requires replacement for any reason, other than through error or other act of the Mayor, not caused by the person to whom such permit was issued, such person may obtain a duplicate or replacement operator’s permit upon payment of a fee of $20, or such person may obtain a duplicate or replacement learner’s permit, or replacement provisional permit upon payment of a fee of $20.
(5) Enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard shall be issued, without charge, a permit to operate government-owned vehicles, while engaged in official business, upon the presentation of a certificate from their commanding officers to the effect that they are assigned to operate a government vehicle and are qualified to drive, and upon proving to the satisfaction of the Director of the Department of Transportation that they are familiar with the traffic regulations of the District of Columbia.
(5A)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, any eligible United States citizen or resident who is at least 18 years of age but no more than 26 years of age shall be registered with the Selective Service System, in compliance with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. App. § 453, when applying for an operator’s permit or identification card pursuant to the laws of the District.
(B) The Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (“Department”) shall forward, in an electronic format, the personal information required of the applicant identified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph to the Selective Service System for registration. The Department shall notify the applicant on the application for an operator’s permit or an identification card that submitting the application serves as consent to register with the Selective Service System, in compliance with federal law.
(C) The Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles shall make available a form, separate from the application, which shall indicate that the applicant has chosen not to use the operator’s permit or identification card application as a means of registering with the Selective Service System (“waiver form”). The waiver form shall state the effects of failure to register and the programs that condition eligibility upon registration with the Selective Service System. Applicants shall be informed that the waiver form is available upon request. The waiver form shall also state the civil and criminal penalties for failure to register for Selective Service. Failure to submit the waiver form is form shall be deemed affirmative proof that the applicant authorizes the Director of the Department to forward to the Selective Service System the information necessary to complete registration on behalf of the applicant. The waiver form, after completion, shall be added to the applicants file.
(D) This form shall comply with the requirements of subchapter II of Chapter 31 of Title 2 [§ 2-1931 et seq.] including being printed in each required language under § 2-1933.
(E) An applicant’s submission of the waiver form specified in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph shall not be treated as grounds for denial of an application for an operator’s permit or an identification card.
(F) The Director of the Department shall not forward to the Selective Service System the personal information of an individual who completes and submits the waiver form described in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph.
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the Mayor or his designated agent may, upon compliance with such regulations as the Mayor may prescribe, extend for a period not in excess of 6 years the validity of the operator’s permit of any person who is a resident of the District and who is on active duty outside the District in the armed forces or the Merchant Marine of the United States and who was at the time of leaving the District the holder of a valid operator’s permit.
(a-1)(1) The Mayor and the Board of Elections and Ethics shall jointly develop an application form and a change of name and address form by January 1, 1989, which shall allow an applicant wishing to register to vote to do so by the use of a single form containing the necessary information for voter registration and the information required for the issuance, renewal, or correction of the applicant’s driver’s permit or identification card.
(2) Commencing not later than May 1, 1989, the Mayor shall provide each qualified elector who applies for the issuance, renewal, or correction of any type of driver’s permit or for an identification card an opportunity to complete an application to register to vote by use of a single form containing the necessary required information for the issuance, renewal, or correction of the driver’s permit or identification card.
(3) The Mayor shall forward all new applications to the Board of Elections and Ethics within 10 days of receipt.
(4) Applications received from the Mayor shall be considered received by the Board of Elections and Ethics as of the date the application was made.
(b)(1) Each operator’s permit shall state the name and address, and bear the signature of the permittee, together with any additional information that the Mayor may by regulation prescribe. Pursuant to section 205(c)(2)(C)(vi) of the Social Security Act, approved August 14, 1935 (49 Stat. 624, 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(vi)), the Mayor shall use a randomly generated number as the identification number on any new or renewed license.
(2) The Mayor shall require an applicant for an operator’s permit to provide a social security number, if such a number was issued to the applicant, or, if required by the Mayor, proof that the applicant is not eligible for a social security number, for the purposes of administering and enforcing the laws of the District of Columbia. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the social security number or other tax identification number shall not be a matter of public record. The social security number shall be kept on file with the issuing agency and the applicant shall be so advised. This paragraph shall not apply to an applicant eligible for a limited purpose driver’s license or permit pursuant to § 50-1401.05.
(3) An applicant for an operator’s permit who served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States and was discharged under conditions other than dishonorable may submit to the Department of Motor Vehicles, along with any other documentation required by this chapter, a DD Form 214, a WD AGO form, or a DD256 form certifying the applicant’s veteran status. Upon receipt of this documentation, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall display the word “veteran” in capital letters on the applicant’s operator’s permit.
(c) Any individual to whom a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle has been issued shall have the license or permit in his or her immediate possession at all times while operating a motor vehicle in the District of Columbia and shall exhibit the license or permit to any police officer upon demand. Any person who fails to comply with the requirements of this subsection shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than $10 nor more than $50.
(d) No individual shall operate a motor vehicle in the District, except as provided in § 50-1401.02, without first having obtained an operator’s permit, learner’s permit, provisional permit, or a motorcycle endorsement if operating a motorcycle, issued under the provisions of this subchapter and Title 18 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. Except as provided in subsection (d-1) of this section, any individual violating any provision of this subsection shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or shall be imprisoned not more than 90 days.
(d-1) Any individual who operates a motor vehicle with a District of Columbia permit expired for not more than 90 days shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than $100 pursuant to §§ 50-2301.04(b) and 50-2301.05, and shall not be subject to the criminal penalties contained in subsection (d) of this section.
(e) Nothing in this subchapter shall relieve any individual from compliance with § 47-2829(e).
(f) For purposes of this section and §§ 50-1401.02 and 50-1403.01, the term “motor vehicle” means a vehicle propelled by an internal-combustion engine, electricity, or steam. The term “motor vehicle” shall not include a traction engine, road roller, vehicle propelled only upon rails or tracks, personal assistive mobility device, as defined by § 50-2201.02(12), a battery-operated wheelchair when operated by a person with a disability, or a motorized bicycle.
(2) At least 90 days before requiring a course of driver instruction pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Mayor, pursuant to subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2, shall issue rules to implement paragraph (1) of this subsection. The proposed rules shall be submitted to the Council for a 45-day period of review, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days of Council recess. If the Council does not approve or disapprove the proposed rules by resolution within the 45-day period, the proposed rules shall be deemed approved.
(i) The Department shall allow applicants for a license, permit, or identification card issued pursuant to this section, § 50-1401.03, or § 50-1401.05 to designate their gender as nonbinary.
This section is referenced in § 16-801, § 50-1401.02, § 50-1401.05, § 50-1403.02, § 50-2201.03, and § 50-2302.02.
D.C. Law 13-73 rewrote subsecs. (a)(1) and (a)(2), inserted new pars. (2A) to (2D) and (3A) in subsec. (a) and rewrote pars. (3) and (4) of subsec. (a).
D.C. Law 13-74 rewrote subsec. (b) in order to prohibit the Mayor from requiring that the social security number be used as identification number for driver’s licenses.
D.C. Law 13-91 added subsec. (a)(2)(C)(iv).
D.C. Law 13-289, in subsec. (a), added par. (5A).
D.C. Law 15-289, in subsec. (a)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “Mayor; and” for “Mayor. No practical demonstration shall be required for a motorized bicycle permit; and”.
D.C. Law 15-307, in subsec. (a)(2A)(B)(ii), inserted “in the last 6 months” following “assessed”.
D.C. Law 16-224, in subsec. (f), substituted “personal mobility devices, as defined by § 50-2201.02(12), or a battery-operated wheelchair when operated by a person with a disability” for “electric personal assistive mobility devices, as defined by § 50-2201.02(12), and battery-operated wheelchairs when operated by a handicapped person at speeds not exceeding 10 miles per hour”.
D.C. Law 16-279, in subsec. (a)(1)(A), added a sentence to the end of the paragraph relating to the proration of fees; in subsec. (a)(2), substituted “issue a new or renewed” for “issue a”; in subsec. (a)(4), increased the duplicate operators permit fee from $5 to $7 and increased the duplicate learner’s or replacement provisional permit fee from $3 to $7; in subsec. (b)(1), substituted “Pursuant to section 205(c)(2)(vi) of the Social Security Act, approved August 14, 1935 (49 Stat. 624, 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(vi)), the Mayor shall use a randomly generated number as the identification number on any new or renewed license” for “The Mayor shall use a randomly generated number as the identification number of the license and shall not print the social security number of the permittee on the license, unless the permittee requests that their social security number be used as the identification number of the license”; and, in subsec. (b)(2), substituted “provide a social security number, if such a number was issued to the applicant, or, if required by the Mayor, proof that the applicant is not eligible for a social security number” for “provide a social security number”; and in subsec. (d), substituted “provisional permit, or a motorcycle endorsement if operating a motorcycle, issued under the provisions of this subchapter and Title 18 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations” for “or a provisional permit issued under the provisions of this subchapter”.
D.C. Law 17-219 rewrote the lead-in language of subsec. (a)(1), which had read as follows: “(a)(1) The Mayor is authorized to issue a new or renewed motor vehicle operator’s permit, valid for a period not to exceed 5 years, to any individual 17 years of age or older subject to the following conditions and any other conditions the Mayor may prescribe to protect the public:”.
D.C. Law 19-21, in subsec. (a)(4), substituted “$20” for “$7” in two places.
The 2012 amendment by D.C. Law 19-189 rewrote (a)(5A).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-290 rewrote (f).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-317 substituted “not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01” for “not more than $300” in (d).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 20-49 substituted “traffic regulations and regulations for safely sharing roadways with pedestrians and bicyclists in the District” for “traffic regulations of the District” in (a)(1)(B)(i).
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 20-52 added (b)(3).
The 2014 amendment by D.C. Law 20-62 added (a)(1)(A-i); and added the last sentence in (b)(2).
Driver education programs in public schools, see § 38-912.
Registration of motor vehicles, fee schedules, see § 50-1501.03.
Traffic adjudication, violations prosecuted as criminal offenses, see § 50-2302.02.
Applicability of D.C. Law 21-225: § 4 of D.C. Law 21-225 provided that the change made to this section by § 3 of D.C. Law 21-225 is subject to the inclusion of the law’s fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. Therefore that amendment has not been implemented.
Applicability of D.C. Law 21-195: § 4 of D.C. Law 21-195 provided that the change made to this section by § 3(a) of D.C. Law 21-195 is subject to the inclusion of the law’s fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. Therefore that amendment has not been implemented.
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3073(a) of Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Support Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-458, Oct. 3, 2018, 65 DCR 11212).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3073(a) of Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2018 (D.C. Act 22-434, July 30, 2018, 65 DCR 8200).
For temporary amendment of section, see § 14 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Second Emergency Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Act 12-439, August 12, 1998, 45 DCR 6110), § 13 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Legislative Review Emergency Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Act 12-503, October 27, 1998, 45 DCR 8495), and § 13 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Second Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Act 12-600, January 20, 1999, 46 DCR 1239.
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 112 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Emergency Amendment Act of 1999 (D.C. Act 13-126, August 4, 1999, 46 DCR 6606).
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 112 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Legislative Review Emergency Amendment Act of 1999 (D.C. Act 13-177, November 2, 1999, 46 DCR 9678).
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 112 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 1999 (D.C. Act 13-241, January 11, 2000, 47 DCR 581).
For temporary (90-day) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Safe Teenage Driving and Merit Personnel Technical Amendment Emergency Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Act 13-430, August 14, 2000, 47 DCR 7459).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 112 of the Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Emergency Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Act 13-446, November 7, 2000, 47 DCR 9213).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of the Safe Teenage Driving and Merit Personnel Technical Amendment Legislative Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Act 13-489, December 18, 2000, 48 DCR 43).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Safe Teenage Driving and Merit Personnel Technical Amendment Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2001 (D.C. Act 14-30, April 2, 2001, 48 DCR 3336).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section and establishment of adjudication process, see §§ 3 and 4 of Motor Vehicle Registration and Operator’s Permit issuance Enhancement Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-540, December 2, 2002, 49 DCR 11657).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section and establishment of adjudication process, see §§ 3 and 4 of Motor Vehicle Registration and Operator’s Permit Issuance Enhancement Second Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-601, January 7, 2003, 50 DCR 681).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see §§ 3 and 4 of Motor Vehicle Registration and Operator’s Permit Issuance Enhancement Emergency Amendment Act of 2002 (D.C. Act 14-413, July 16, 2002, 49 DCR 7378).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 201 of Prohibition on the Reckless Operation of Recreational Motor Vehicles Emergency Act of 2004 (D.C. Act 15-462, June 23, 2004, 51 DCR 6750).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 10(d) of Motor Vehicle Definition Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Device Exemption Emergency Amendment Act of 2005 (D.C. Act 16-237, December 22, 2005, 53 DCR 249).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 10(d) of Motor Vehicle Definition Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Device Exemption Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-323, March 23, 2006, 53 DCR 2567).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 101(c) of Personal Mobility Device Emergency Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Act 16-528, December 4, 2006, 53 DCR 9826).
For temporary (90 day) amendment of section, see § 6002 of Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2011 (D.C. Act 19-93, June 29, 2011, 58 DCR 5599).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 268(a) of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-45, April 1, 2013, 60 DCR 5400, 20 DCSTAT 1300).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 109 of Omnibus Budget Support Temporary Act of 1991 (D.C. Law 9-19, June 21, 1991, law notification 38 DCR 5786).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 12 of Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Temporary Amendment Act of 1998 (D.C. Law 12-210, April 13, 1999, law notification 46 DCR 3832).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 112 of Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Temporary Amendment Act of 1999 (D.C. Law 13-57, March 7, 2000, law notification 47 DCR 1979).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 112 of Child Support and Welfare Reform Compliance Temporary Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Law 13-207, March 31, 2001, law notification 48 DCR 3238).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2 of Safe Teenage Driving and Merit Personnel Technical Amendment Temporary Amendment Act of 2000 (D.C. Law 13-210, March 31, 2001, law notification 48 DCR 3241).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 3 of Motor Vehicle Registration and Operator’s Permit Issuance Enhancement Temporary Amendment Act of 2002 (D.C. Law 14-221, March 25, 2003, law notification 50 DCR 2734).
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 10(b) of Motor Vehicle Definition Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Device Exemption Temporary Amendment Act of 2006 (D.C. Law 16-85, April 4, 2006, law notification 53 DCR 3344).
Short title: Section 6010 of D.C. Law 17-219 provided that subtitle D of title VI of the act may be cited as the “Department of Motor Vehicles Driver License, Special Identification Card, and Vehicle Inspection Amendment Act of 2008”.
Short title: Section 6001 of D.C. Law 19-21 provided that subtitle A of title VI of the act may be cited as “Department of Motor Vehicles Fee Modification Amendment Act of 2011”.
Department of Vehicles and Traffic abolished: See Historical and Statutory Notes following § 50-2201.03.
D.C. Law 11-48 held unconstitutional: The Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995, which added subsection (g) of this section, held unconstitutional.
Section 3 of D.C. Law 19-189 provided that the act shall apply as of January 1, 2013.
Applicability of D.C. Law 20-52: Section 3 of D.C. Law 20-52 provided that the act shall apply as of October 1, 2013.
Applicability of D.C. Law 20-62: Section 3 of D.C. Law 20-62 provided that the act shall apply as of May 1, 2014.
Delegation of authority pursuant to D.C. Law 6-194, “District of Columbia Anatomical Gift Amendment Act of 1986.”, see Mayor’s Order 88-49, February 25, 1988.


In this article I want to analyze different proposals for a ‘social protection floor’. What exactly do they mean? Do they go beyond poverty reduction? Is it a step towards a universal social protection system? The ILO recommendation will be compared to the report written by the Advisory Group chaired by Michelle Bachelet, the European Development Report 2011 on social protection, and the Latin American ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)proposal for an Inclusive Social Protection.
Since 2000 two parallel global strategies for poverty reduction are being followed. On the one hand, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) changed in 1999 its ‘Enhanced Facility for Structural Adjustment’ into a ‘Facility for Growth and Poverty Reduction’ (FGPR) and asks poor countries to introduce a ‘PRSP’ (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) in order to receive concessional funds and debt relief. On the other hand, the UN (United Nations) Millennium Summit adopted a Declaration from which were taken –afterwards – eight so-called ‘MDGs’ (Millennium Development Goals) which became the guidelines for development cooperation.
More than ten years later and three years short of the MDG-deadline of 2015, both strategies seem to be failing. Poverty may have been reduced – and if China is included the first MDG of halving extreme poverty by 2015 will probably be met – but with severe geographical imbalances. Furthermore, inequality is rising almost everywhere.
What will come next? The IMF already abandoned its ‘FGPR’ but continues to work with PRSPs. Most observers now admit they are not fundamentally different from structural adjustment policies and continue to be largely influenced by the Bretton Woods Institutions who seem to ignore their criteria of ownership and participation. How to keep the ‘development’ and ‘cooperation’ narratives alive? More and more international organizations are abandoning their poverty discourse. They now talk of ‘equity’ and even ‘inequality’ and ‘social protection’. UN organizations are openly promoting a ‘universal social protection’ . The ILO has adopted at its International Labour Conference (ILC) in June 2012 a recommendation on a ‘Social Protection Floor’. This agenda may become part of the new objective after 2015 when the global ‘success’ of the MDGs will have been celebrated, probably linked to ‘sustainable development goals’. It will be presented as the next progressive step towards more equality and progress. But will it be? Do the different proposals indeed go beyond poverty reduction, do they point towards a universal social protection as the UN organizations demand and do they abandon Washington Consensus policies?
In this article I want to analyze five documents, the ILO recommendation as adopted at the ILC, the Bachelet report (BACH), the European Development Report 2011 (EDR) and the ECLAC Report on inclusive social protection. In section one I will briefly retrace the history of the social protection concept in development thinking. In section two I will analyze the five documents in terms of the objectives of a social protection agenda. In section three the scope of the agenda will be examined, whereas in section four the coverage of the social protection proposals will be analyzed. These different points should allow us to know what we can expect from this new agenda and whether it will re-connect with the older social progress and citizenship agenda.
Theoretically, this discourse analysis is based on the ‘order of discourse’ approach of Michel Foucault. It looks at how a new knowledge is being constructed leading – or not – to a new consensus that will guide policies in the coming years. This sociology of knowledge is less concerned with what is right or what is wrong, than with the way different agents are contributing to and influencing the meaning of concepts and discourses. Social protection, as we will see, is an ambivalent concept that can be very misleading if it is not defined and clarified. In this way discourses indeed become sites of power and of resistance.
Today’s critics of development and cooperation mostly point to the focus on economic growth that, they say, has always been predominant in development thinking. This is not correct. On the one hand, because even if economic growth has indeed always been one of the objectives of development, it was not an end it itself. Growth was needed for capital accumulation which was needed for further industrialization and development. After 1960 the analysis pointed to a financing gap which had to be closed by growth and by development aid. Growth only became an end in itself with the Washington Consensus in the 1980s. On the other hand, the UN, where most of development theories originated, did have serious concerns about the social situation in ‘backward’ countries. It never talked about ‘poverty’ though and it is only at the beginning of the 1970s that the concept of ‘poverty’ was used by the UN and the World Bank. By that time however the ‘social development decade’ had begun. In 1969 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on development and social progress, which was a programme to develop welfare states following the western European model. The ILO discovered ‘basic needs’ and the informal sector. The World Bank discovered ‘poverty’ and McNamara promised that by 2000 extreme poverty would be eradicated. Very serious work was done at the UN searching for a ‘unified approach’ in which social and economic development could be integrated.
The abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreements by the United States in 1971 and the rise of oil prices after the Yom Kippur war put an end to all these beautiful plans. The West was faced with a serious crisis, oil exporting countries had ‘petrodollars’ which were borrowed by capital hungry developing countries and ten years later these countries were unable to service their debts. It was the beginning of the ‘lost decade’ for development and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes by the World Bank and the IMF. All dreams of social development were gone.
What did ‘social development’ mean? The UN resolution on development and social progress of 1969 gives an idea of how the international community saw the future. Social progress and development were based on human rights. They were linked to economic development, peace and security and the world was in need of a just social order. Social development has to be planned, according to the Declaration and will have to lead to the participation of all in productive and socially useful labor. Poverty has to be eliminated, as well as illiteracy, hunger and malnutrition. Health protection for the entire population has to be provided. There needed to be universal access to culture and free education for all. Housing and community services should be provided, as well as a comprehensive social security and social welfare services. Finally, the human environment had to be protected and improved. One might say, with all the other articles on peace, security and co-existence, anti-racism and anti-colonialism that this was typical UN-speak of the cold war. Certainly, but it also closely fitted into the economic development thinking of that time as it was worded in the resolutions on the ‘development decades’ in which poor countries asked for control on multinationals, transfer of technology, fair terms of trade, a share of the trade in services, and so on. All these ideas disappeared in the 1970s and 1980s when a new development paradigm was introduced.
Structural adjustment had disastrous social consequences. In 1990 the World Bank published its first major poverty report in which it was said that even if development had had wonderful results from 1960 to 1990, the new agenda should be poverty reduction. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) published its first Human Development Report and rescued some of the ideas of the ‘unified approach’. They proposed a synthetic indicator of GDP, literacy and life expectancy. Both institutions proposed to focus on poverty and in the beginning of the 1990s there was a major production of poverty studies and of global poverty statistics.
However, the strategies to fight poverty were far from clear. It consisted of providing opportunities, i.e. the creation of human capital and increasing the capacity of the poor to take advantage of these opportunities, i.e. making use of the acquired human capital. For the World Bank, ‘providing opportunities’ meant encouraging economic growth that makes use of the labour force of the poor, while ‘increasing the capacity of the poor’ consists of providing basic social services such as education, health care and family planning. The UNDP saw things the other way round. Human development was making available basic social services in order to empower individuals to increase their human capital for productive, social and political gains within a context of economic growth. In addition to this dual approach, targeted social programmes were required to help those who cannot participate in the market. A safety net was needed to protect those who were exposed to shocks and to take care of the victims of the competitive struggle.
In the context of this article, three remarks can be made on this approach. First, it does not require any changes to the policies of the Washington consensus. Secondly, the World Bank as well as the UNDP stresses the impossibility and the undesirability of social security/social insurances for poor countries. For the World Bank, this could be a task for private markets, but certainly not for governments. According to the UNDP, it was a ‘diagnostic error to think of poverty in terms of social protection and social expenditure’. Thirdly, for both institutions, poverty is a multidimensional problem. Even if the World Bank had strongly developed its statistical instruments on income and consumption poverty, it has constantly weakened its definitions with ever more subjective approaches. In its second poverty report of 2000, poverty has become a matter of vulnerability, lack of voice and of empowerment. ‘The poor rarely speak of income’ is the more than surprising conclusion of a major participatory poverty research. Income is a ‘stochastic phenomenon’ and so is easily ignored when talking about poverty reduction strategies.
In 1995 the UN organized its first ‘World Summit on Social Development’. The meeting adopted a Copenhagen Declaration and a Plan of Action with three equivalent chapters: on poverty, employment and social integration. One year later however, the OECD proposed a new development programme: ‘Shaping the 21st century’, based on seven international development goals. It is these goals which five years later became the Millennium Development Goals to which was added goal number 8 with the commitments of rich countries.
The ILO was created after the First World War, at the same time that the Treaty of Versailles was signed. It was supposed to promote international trade and cooperation with social justice, as its founders stated that peace required social justice. After the Second World War it was completed with the Philadelphia Declaration stating that ‘poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere’ and that ‘labour is not a commodity’. The ILO is the only tripartite international organization where governments, employers and trade unions work together to make international agreements, binding conventions and declarations.
After the end of the Cold War and with globalization gaining strength beginning of the 1990s, the ILO slowly got marginalized. The UN organized a ‘social summit’ in 1995 without even consulting the ILO. Its Director General was refused to speak at the WTO Conference in Singapore in 1996. It became more and more difficult to reach agreements and the social future of the world was looking rather grim.
A first step was the adoption of the ‘Fundamental Rights at Work’, a compilation of basic conventions with the right to unionize and the right to collective agreements, the prohibition of forced labour and child labour and the prohibition of discrimination at work. Although these conventions were not ratified by all member states, they all agreed to respect them.
In 1999 the ILO adopted a ‘Decent Work’ agenda which consists of the fundamental rights at work, social protection, social dialogue and employment. In a way, this agenda encompasses most of the ILO’s normative instruments relating to various aspects of work, social protection and working conditions.
In 2001 the ILO created a World Commission to look at the ‘Social Dimension of Globalization’. This led to a Report in 2004 on ‘A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all’ in which it was said that ‘a minimum level of social protection needs to be accepted and undisputed as part of the socio-economic floor of the global economy’.
In 2001 the ILC had also given the highest priority to policies and initiatives that could bring social security to those not covered by existing schemes. Following this, the ILO launched in 2003 a global campaign on social security and coverage for all. In 2008 the ILC adopted a Declaration on Social Justice for a fair globalization’.
With these initiatives and new programmes of cooperation with the World Bank as well as with UNDP and the WTO (World Trade Organization), the ILO was back at the table and it even looked as if it was going to be able to implement, if not all, at least a major part of its old agenda. After all, it already had major instruments to do what was recommended: an international convention on social security (102/1952) and two important recommendations on income security and medical care (67 and 69 of 1944), along with a six other conventions.
As we shall see in the next section, the current proposals for a social protection floor may not be an exclusive consequence of these ILO steps and may not necessarily follow its main logic. Many other international organizations also play a role and may have more political influence than the ILO.
As the poverty reduction agenda of the World Bank was totally compatible with the Washington Consensus policies and in no way linked to an agenda for universal social protection or social security, a brief reference to the World Bank agenda may be useful.
At the end of the 1990s, after the crisis in Russia and South-East Asia, the G-7 asked the World Bank to reflect on some ‘social principles’ and ‘good practices’ for social policies. Traditional social protection with social security could not be the answer, since, according to the World Bank, they did not help the poor but were associated to ‘vested interests’, they were too expensive and hindered growth.
The answer of the World Bank was a scheme for risk management. Everyone is faced with the same risks in this world, according to the authors, but the poor are more vulnerable to them since they do not have the instruments to cope with risks. This explains why they never choose high risk/high return activities.
Social protection, according to the authors, was to be defined as ‘public measures aimed at helping individuals, families and collectivities in order to manage risks and to help extremely poor people’. Social protection was a safety net and a springboard, it should be considered as an investment. It was necessary in order to enhance welfare and reduce vulnerability without redistributing incomes, in order to promote growth and encourage poor people to shift to more profitable activities, and finally in order to reduce poverty. Poverty reduction was only one element of social protection which was only one element of risk management.
According to this scheme risks can be prevented (though very rarely), mitigated or have to be coped with. This can be done informally, by the market or by the State. Income redistribution is possible as a consequence of social protection, but is explicitly excluded as an objective, in the same way as income transfers. These belong to social security which eliminates risks and changes the behavior of people. These disincentives should at all costs be avoided, according to the World Bank.
This new version of social protection is totally at the service of the economy then. It is not meant to protect incomes, which become a responsibility of poor people themselves, but only wants to improve the capacity of people to create the income themselves. Guaranteeing incomes, which has always been the main objective of social security, is thus abandoned.
The idea of a ‘social protection floor’ (SPF) was first launched at the beginning of the current economic and financial crisis, in a document of the UN System CEB (Chief Executive Board) for Coordination, looking at the impact of the crisis on the work of the UN system. This SPF was directly linked to the crisis and was meant to protect people during the crisis and thereafter. It consisted of a) services – geographical and financial access to essential public services (water and sanitation, health and education) and b) transfers: a basic set of essential social transfers in cash and in kind, paid to the poor and vulnerable to provide a minimum income security and access to services, including health care.
Since this very much looks like poverty reduction, the idea was taken up by the independent expert for poverty of the Human Rights Council. It was confirmed in the ILO Global Jobs Pact of 2009 and, as has been said already, a formal Recommendation to be adopted by the ILC in June 2012 is now in the making.
According to T.H. Marshall, social and economic rights came about as from the end of the 19th century, after civil rights (18th century) and political rights (19th century). It had become obvious that civil and political citizenship and equality were meaningless when economic inequality hindered people from exercising their rights. As from the second half of the 19th century equality did indeed become a political issue. Another element in the emergence of the welfare states was the changing perspective on risks. The industrialization process made it impossible to consider accidents and illnesses as purely individual phenomena. They were linked to the collective process of the changing economy and had to be treated as such. Many other elements played a role in the emergence of the welfare states, social struggles as well as the needs of industry and State interests. But the trend was clear. After the Second World War, in all industrialized countries, welfare states were fully developed. Economic and social rights were integrated in the new Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). They were an integral part of citizenship. The first objective of social security became the guaranteeing of income in case of economic stress, accident, illness or disability, and old age.
The reference to citizenship and human rights is present in all documents on SPF (Social Protection Floor) though in varying degrees.
It is about ‘the delivering on the promise of the UDHR’ (p.XXII) says BACH, though the report immediately adds that it is also about adapting the skills of workers in order to overcome constraints blocking full participation in a changing economic and social environment. It is also about stabilizing aggregate demand and in this sense it becomes a win-win investment. The ILC of 2011 added an objective to what had already been mentioned by CEB: SPF is about the need to promote economic activity and entrepreneurship (p. 10).
Linked to this it is obvious that ‘public agencies have a leading role in the development of social protection floor institutions’ (xxviii) in order to see to it that ‘rights and entitlements fit with development objectives’. Governments have the responsibility to formulate and guide implementation of SPF whereas social partners and multiple stakeholders are engaged in managing delivery (p. 82).
The link to human rights is explicit, then, though the other objectives of the SPF are dwelled on much more extensively. It can contribute to demographic change (p. XXV), it is a countercyclical stabilizer (XXV, 6, 41, 52), il allows to unlock productive capacity (xxix, 6, 7, 11, 42), it contributes to labour productivity (p. 3), it offers a solid foundation for resilient forms of growth and it fosters macro-economic stability (p. 6), it promotes productive economic activity and entrepreneurship (p. 10), it encourages labour market participation (p. 11).
It relieves people from the fear of poverty and insecurity (p. XXIX, 2) and it enhances social cohesion while minimizing social unrest (p. 91).
The ILO clearly stresses as a very first point that social security is a human right (ILO, second visa). It also refers explicitly to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the ILO Conventions and recommendations on social security (ILO, visas 9 and 10). It is also seen as an ‘economic and social necessity for development and progress’ (ILO, visa 3). In the preparatory documents, it was already said that it is in order to make these rights a reality for everyone that a new recommendation was needed .
The ILO Recommendation recognizes that ‘social security is an important tool to prevent and reduce poverty, inequality, social exclusion and social insecurity, to promote equal opportunity and gender and racial equality, and to support the transition from informal to formal employment’ (ILO, visa 4).
Only then are the economic objectives mentioned: ‘an investment in people that empowers them to adjust to changes in the economy and in the labour market, and that social security systems act as automatic social and economic stabilizers, help stimulate aggregate demand in times of crisis and beyond, and help support a transition to a more sustainable economy’ (ILO, visa 5).
Implementation of the recommendation is ‘an overall and primary responsibility of the State’ (ILO, §3), whereas guarantees should be established by law (ILO,§ 7), since ‘social protection floors are nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees’ (ILO, § 2).
Social protection floors have to be seen as ‘a fundamental element of […] national social security systems’ and have to be implemented ‘within strategies for the extension of social security that progressively ensure higher levels of social security to as many people as possible’ (ILO, § 1).
In the European document (EDR) the right to social protection ( 1, 20, 22,30, 33) is immediately linked to growth and MDGs (p. 1). Social protection can play a role in tackling poverty, reducing the impact of shock, promoting sustainable growth and inclusive development (foreword). Well-designed social protection can foster market-based solutions, such as micro-financial activities (p. 2). It is a right, and this is ‘too often overlooked’ (p. 2, 7), but it can also mitigate risks without producing significant distortion or disincentives (p. 2, 4,).
Whereas the focus is on public actions – governments and other public agencies – it must be possible to support, facilitate of even just create space or permit private and community-based actions for social protection (p. 20, 33). SPF strengthens the state-citizen contract (p. 20), it allows the State to bolster its legitimacy. ‘Social protection is concerned with (re)establishing and (re)negotiating the social contract between the State and its citizens, which is crucial for the State’s legitimacy’ (p.51). The political function of social protection is to provide social balance (p. 51).
Social protection can be a push towards universally provided support in the sense that it applies to all citizens who meet the eligibility criteria … a well-defined ‘category’ of citizens (p. 75).
Whereas ‘we, Europeans, are familiar with the power of social protection and solidarity’ (foreword), ‘an excessively Euro-centric perspective should be eschewed’ (p. 113).
ECLAC’s document is very different in that it poses as its unique objective to achieve universal rights. It is the great challenge of the 21st century to create inclusive, egalitarian societies with full respect for a framework of rights (foreword). It speaks of citizen’s rights and universal coverage, though it does not exclude targeting. Targeting can be an instrument while universalism is the end (foreword, p. 33, 129). The focus on rights is the criterion used to assess existing systems (p. 75).
ECLAC aims to go even further than the Social Development commission of the UN which looks beyond poverty, since it also wants to promote decent work (p. 18).
The main function of social protection is to guarantee income security in order to live in dignity with a possibility of access to social services and decent work (p. 145).
Markets, families, social organizations and communities can all play a part in providing social protection, but the main responsibility is for the State, more particularly for guaranteeing their availability (p. 19, 33, 45, 156).
In the preface to the BACH document, it is stated that SPF is about the extension of social protection coverage. The foreword refers to the 2004 report of the World Commission on Globalization which asks for a ‘minimum level of social protection … to be accepted and undisputed as part of a social-economic floor of the global economy’. It also refers to the two-dimensional strategy of the ILO and the global campaign for ‘Social Security for All’ ‘aiming at achieving universal coverage of the population with at least minimum levels of protection (horizontal dimension) and progressively ensuring higher levels of protection (vertical dimension) (p. XI, XXII). For the SPF, BACH takes the definition and the guarantees mentioned by the UN (XXII).
The SPF is about moving faster in poverty reduction and social exclusion and therefore it is related to the decent work agenda, which will make it possible to fight poverty, deprivation and inequality. In order to be really effective there will be a need to take the next step of the vertical dimension (XXIV). Because SPF is not an alternative, but a complement to social security, it is a component of a comprehensive and pluralistic social protection system (XXVIII). SPF will be the first step towards higher levels of protection, and is not meant to weaken the protection levels but to fill the coverage gaps (p. 11). SPF cannot be compared to safety nets, since these were residual to economic development and only temporary (p. 12). SPF will be a full and permanent component of a development strategy for inclusive development (p. 12).
The ILO document wants to give guidance to member states to establish, maintain and implement social protection floors within strategies for the extension of social security (ILO, § 1). ‘Universality of protection’ is mentioned as the first principle to be applied by member states (ILO, § 3).
In the preparatory documents, it had already been said that what a ‘minimum’ income security, and what ‘essential’ health care and ‘adequate’ social security means was left to the determination of member states. They also refer to the ILO’s Committee of Experts which stated that ‘the task of globalizing social security requires the ILO to complement the current set of up-to-date standards with a new high impact instrument embedding social security in a new development policy paradigm’.
The ILO recommendation mentions explicitly the types of benefits or guarantees which should be provided under national SPF: ‘a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential health care, including maternity care […], basic income security for children […], for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability, and for older persons’ (ILO, § 5, 9).
EDR document is less explicit and more economically oriented – SPF should provide the human capital base for future growth (p. 2).
Social protection is seen as a prelude for a paradigm shift, beyond safety nets and poverty reduction to a wider social development vision, though for the moment this is not on the agenda (p. 26).
Some elements of the definition are stressed again: it is about social insurance, social assistance, social inclusion, securing legal rights and entitlements and access to insurance markets (p. 30).
Not many details are added, maybe because of the statement that social protection must emerge from domestic policy processes’ (p.98).
For ECLAC social protection has to do with guarantees for citizens, it clearly goes beyond poverty reduction (p. 45).
Many references are made to the newest policies of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT): these are aimed at short term income plus long term human capital, but they remain very limited in scope (p. 96). Nevertheless, for ECLAC, CCTs can be a door that gives access to social protection (167).
Education, housing and health policies are part of social protection. Social promotion on the other hand is concerned with all policies aiming at the development of human capacities, human capital and also labour mediation, technical assistance, and so on. In fact it concerns all policies linked to the improvement of the standard of living based on better productivity and autonomously generated income (p. 125).
The major function of social protection is to guarantee sufficient income for a life in dignity, it should give access to social services and promote decent work.
The preceding points already seem to indicate that SPF is mainly for the poor and vulnerable, those ‘in need’, which necessarily implies a problem of identifying them, and thus of targeting, however broad this may be interpreted. Even if the guarantees are said to be universal, the benefits will only go to selected groups.
It is interesting however to see how ECLAC combines targeting as an instrument with universality as the objective. It explains that universalism does not mean giving everyone exactly the same, but – with an implicit reference to Amartya Sen – giving in function of the needs. In this sense targeting becomes fully acceptable.
BACH speaks of universal rights for everyone, though the SPF benefits are clearly for the poor (p. 9). It does refer to a phased extension of coverage with eventually the aim of full coverage, in a gradual way (p. 66). It is not clear however if this ‘full coverage’ refers to all the poor or to the whole of the population.
BACH mentions the problems which can arise with targeting (p. 81): it may create stigma and disincentives, many of the poor can be missed … The best way to avoid targeting is to gradually expand SPF to social security.
ILO claims the universality of the objective and therefore SPF is linked to its social security strategy. On the one hand it speaks frequently of ‘all in need’(e.g. ILO, § 4), on the other hand it speaks of ‘all residents and children’ (ILO, § 6). This implies nevertheless targeting with all problems this may imply. In the preparatory documents it stated that the universal approach was pertinent, though limited in means. It also stated there is but a limited ability to make the right to social security a reality for everyone.
As for the funding, the recommendation refers to a ‘variety of different methods’ which may include ‘effective enforcement of tax and contribution obligations, reprioritizing expenditure, or a broader and sufficiently progressive revenue base’ (ILO, § 11).
EDR writes extensively on the choice, the advantages and the problems of targeting and universalism (p. 44). A greater share of programme benefits go to the poor with targeting, though it admits there is a tension with the question of rights. In fact, there seems to be a rather awkward vision on ‘universality’ in that EDR speaks of ‘all citizens who meet the eligibility criteria … a well defined category of citizens’ (p. 75).
Finally, it has to be mentioned that even if the CEB document talked about ‘public services’, as does ECLAC, other documents mainly speak about ‘social services’. There seems to be no perspective on the decommodification of these services. Even if the State is responsible for SPF, these services can remain or become privatized, as it is stressed that the income guarantee is meant to give access to insurance markets (EDR, p. 30). Furthermore, the only services that are referred to are health care and education, whereas the many other services mentioned in the ICESCR (food, clothing, housing, culture …) are not referred to.
The only institution which is talking of social protection as an exclusive matter of citizenship and rights is ECLAC. All the others see social protection as having also an explicit economic function, even if the rights dimension is recognized. Especially BACH and EDR see social protection as an economic investment in view of more growth, productivity and stability. Of course, this could lead to both a Keynesian approach of reciprocal strengthening of the economic and social dimensions, but also to a more neoliberal interpretation of social protection in which this protection is at the service of the market. The reference to ‘investments’ - which implicitly points to the need of a return on investment – is not encouraging. In what direction the SPF will evolve depends on local relations of power. It is clear that the ILO more particularly had to reach a consensus with its different stakeholders and words do not determine things. However, discourses do create ‘truths’ which in turn influence practice.
As SPF is meant for the poor or ‘all in need’, it does not go beyond poverty reduction, even if the ILO stresses its link with the social security extension campaign. But the divergent references to ‘universalism’ leave some doubts. It is not always clear whether ‘universalism’ refers to the whole population, to all the poor or to all the deserving poor.
- It is clearly rights-based, in spite of all economic references. It has a link with a broader social security agenda and with the decent work agenda. It also refers then to the fundamental rights at work. This has never been the case before with the MDGs or the PRSPs.
- It has an income dimension, which is extremely important in the current discourse environment on poverty. The income dimension of poverty has too often been forgotten because of the focus on so-called ‘multidimensionality’. Of course, the existing CCTs and social pensions can hardly be seen as being sufficient for a life in dignity, but as ECLAC stresses, they can open the door for social protection. These measures deserve full support.
- SPF is meant to be a permanent mechanism, which is also new compared to the temporary safety nets and other springboards promoted by the World Bank.
Nevertheless, serious doubts and questions remain. I would like to mention four of them.
First, there is a serious risk of terminological confusion. The Social Protection Floor does not go beyond poverty reduction and it is not a ‘universal social protection’. As the ILO itself points out ‘the terms social protection and social security are used in various and not always consistent ways, differing widely across countries and international organizations, and also across time’. In some contexts social protection is broader than social security and includes social assistance and public services. In other contexts it is social security which is the broader concept. It is clear however that in this case, being limited to the poor, SPF looks like a rights-based social assistance programme with the potential of being extended, in the long term, to a universal social security programme. This terminological confusion can lead to many divergent interpretations and gives the SPF an aura it maybe does not deserve. The discourses examined in this article create confusion by playing with words like ‘universalism’ which is then qualified as being only valid for the poor or only for the guarantees. They create confusion by talking of ‘social protection floorS’, in plural, leading to doubts on whether a social pension, e.g., may be enough to be considered a ‘social protection floor’.
Secondly, the question remains what the advantages for the ILO itself can be. SPF clearly is an improvement compared to the MDGs of the UN and the PRSPs of IMF and World Bank. But the ILO already has a basic convention on social security and several recommendations. It did not need this new initiative, except for the extension to all residents instead of all workers. True, these texts are not well respected, but how to convince governments and business to respect the new ones? Will they not prefer to keep to the minimal requirements and forget the second dimension of the strategy? In fact, since 1966 and the adoption of the ICESCR the narrative is on gradualism in function of the development of nations. In reality, since the introduction of Washington Consensus policies in the 1980s, there have been more regressive steps than progressive ones. What can guarantee this will now change? It is a new promise of the international community, which should certainly not be underestimated, though the former non kept promise of the MDGs should make us cautious. SPF may take the place of the MDGs as from 2015, but if it is only a new start with a new promise and without concrete commitments, civil society will strengthen its resistance and search for other ways to claim its rights and its dignity.
Thirdly, several documents point to the fact that the distinction between the formal and the informal sector is in fact outdated. There are good arguments for such a statement, since the grey zone between the two is getting larger and larger. Too many people do not enjoy their social and/or economic rights, are able to avoid taxes, have temporary or seasonal jobs … This makes it indeed necessary to introduce non-contributive social protection/assistance mechanisms in order to arrive at real universal coverage. However, this growing ‘precariat’ can hardly be accepted as a given. It is positive to see the ILO wants to enhance formal employment and refers to its decent work framework (ILO, § 10). At any rate, non-contributive protection systems should be no excuse to further weaken the contributive systems with their implicit role for social partners. In this context, the reference in the ILO recommendation to collective bargaining is extremely important, as well as the link with the universal social security objective in order to preserve this collective agenda with its organic solidarity.
Fourthly and finally, the taking into account of the income dimension is extremely positive. However it should not be used in order to make all essential social services into commodities that have to be paid for. Public services remain extremely important for the preservation of life and social life, especially in the current situation where climate change risks can badly hurt poor people and poor communities. Private services will never be able to sufficiently protect them. If poor people get cash benefits it should not be, as EDR states, in order to give access to social services, but in order to give them the right to life and dignity. Decommodified public services are a major contribution to it.
In short, however positively the plans for a Social Protection Floor can be assessed, what the documents do not tell us should not be ignored. They do not speak of a redistribution of incomes. They do not speak of a ‘transformative’ agenda in the way some UN organizations do, meaning that development has to put an end to dual societies and has to lead to substantial societal change. There is no proposal to change the economic paradigm, away from productivism and an exclusively growth-oriented economy, without taking into account the ecological constraints. If the SPF is limited to its minimal requirements, it will be compatible with Washington Consensus policies. And that means the impoverishment processes will not be stopped.
There are no reasons or arguments to have doubts on the positive intentions of the ILO. But the importance of discourse analysis is not only to look at the explicit and implicit intentions of their authors and thus examine the practices to which they can lead in the future, but also to look at the margins they create for divergent interpretations and practices. According to Foucault, changes always originate at the margins. In the same way as the ILO itself builds on its former work, the new discourse is already taken by other organizations to interpret its new margins in divergent ways. The discourse of ECLAC and EDR are two opposite examples of where this may lead to. All depends then on the context and the power relations within which the social protection floor has to be implemented.
Therefore, the plans for a Social Protection Floor deserve to be promoted by progressive governments and civil society. They are a major improvement of the current and failed poverty reduction policies, especially the ILO recommendation and the ECLAC document. Obviously, if and how these plans will be implemented, will depend on the political willingness of governments and on the strength of social movements to put pressure on them. Civil society organizations should promote this agenda but, at the same time, they should take a step forward and push for the second, vertical step of full coverage for all with social security. They should also stress the transformative potential of this agenda and reflect on a re-conceptualization of ‘social protection’ in light of the urgently needed economic, ecological and social changes. A new grand narrative that only repeats promises of the past that have never been met will not help. The SPF will either become the threshold on which a really universal social protection system can be built, or it will remain an improved poverty reduction within the framework of neoliberal policies.
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