Chapter 7 | Santillán Law, P.C.
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is the Bankruptcy Code’s “liquidation” chapter. Lawyers sometimes refer to it as a “straight bankruptcy.” It is used primarily by individuals who wish to free themselves of debt simply and inexpensively, but may also be used by businesses that wish to liquidate and terminate their business.
In addition, individual debtors who have regular income may seek an adjustment of debts under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, the court may dismiss a chapter 7 case filed by an individual whose debts are primarily consumer rather than business debts if the court finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). A number of courts have concluded that a chapter 7 case may be dismissed for substantial abuse when the debtor has the ability to propose and carry out a workable and meaningful chapter 13 plan. The Bankruptcy Judges Division has prepared a separate pamphlet which discusses chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in greater detail.
The potential chapter 7 debtor should understand that a straight bankruptcy case does not involve the filing of a plan of repayment as in chapter 13, but rather envisions the bankruptcy trustee’s gathering and sale of the debtor’s nonexempt assets, from which holders of claims (creditors) will receive distributions in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Part of the debtor’s property may be subject to liens and mortgages that pledge the property to other creditors. In addition, under chapter 7, the individual debtor is permitted to retain certain “exempt” property. The debtor’s remaining assets are liquidated by a trustee. Accordingly, potential debtors should realize that the filing of a petition under chapter 7 may result in the loss of property.
In order to qualify for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor must be an individual, a partnership, or a corporation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b); 101(41). Relief is available under chapter 7 irrespective of the amount of the debtor’s debts or whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent. An individual cannot file nder chapter 7 or any other chapter, however, if during the preceding 180 days a prior bankruptcy petition was dismissed due to the debtor’s willful failure to appear before the court or comply with orders of the court or the debtor voluntarily dismissed the previous case after creditors sought relief from the bankruptcy court to recover property upon which they hold liens. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(g), 362(d) and (e).
One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is to discharge certain debts to give an honest individual debtor a “fresh start.” The discharge has the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s personal liability on dischargeable debts. In a chapter 7 case, however, a discharge is available to individual debtors only, not to partnerships or corporations. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). Although the filing of an individual chapter 7 petition usually results in a discharge of debts, an individual’s right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debts are not discharged. Moreover, a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a lien on property.
Currently, the courts are required to charge a $130 case filing fee, a $30 miscellaneous administrative fee, and a $15 trustee surcharge (a total of $175). The fees should be paid to the clerk of the court upon filing or may, with the court’s permission, be paid by individual debtors in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a); Bankruptcy Rule 1006(b); Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, Item 8. Rule 1006(b) limits to four the number of installments for the filing fee. The final installment shall be payable not later than 120 days after filing the petition. For cause shown, the court may extend the time of any installment, provided that the last installment is paid not later than 180 days after the filing of the petition. Bankruptcy Rule 1006(b). The $30 administrative fee and the $15 trustee surcharge may be paid in installments in the same manner as the filing fee. If a joint petition is filed, only one filing fee, one administrative fee, and one trustee surcharge are charged. Debtors should be aware that failure to pay these fees may result in dismissal of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
One of the schedules that will be filed by the individual debtor is a schedule of “exempt” property. Federal bankruptcy law provides that an individual debtor can protect some property from the claims of creditors either because it is exempt under federal bankruptcy law or because it is exempt under the laws of the debtor’s home state. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Many states have taken advantage of a provision in the bankruptcy law that permits each state to adopt its own exemption law in place of the federal exemptions. In other jurisdictions, the individual debtor has the option of choosing between a federal package of exemptions or exemptions available under state law. Thus, whether certain property is exempt and may be kept by the debtor is often a question of state law. Legal counsel should be consulted to determine the law of the state in which the debtor lives.
A “meeting of creditors” is usually held 20 to 40 days after the petition is filed. If the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator designates a place for the meeting that is not regularly staffed by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the meeting may be held no more than 60 days after the order for relief. Bankruptcy Rule 2003(a). The debtor must attend this meeting, at which creditors may appear and ask questions regarding the debtor’s financial affairs and property. 11 U.S.C. § 343. If a husband and wife have filed a joint petition, they both must attend the creditors’ meeting. The trustee also will attend this meeting. It is important for the debtor to cooperate with the trustee and to provide any financial records or documents that the trustee requests. The trustee is required to examine the debtor orally at the meeting of creditors to ensure that the debtor is aware of the potential consequences of seeking a discharge in bankruptcy, including the effect on credit history, the ability to file a petition under a different chapter, the effect of receiving a discharge, and the effect of reaffirming a debt. In some courts, trustees may provide written information on these topics at or in advance of the meeting, to ensure that the debtor is aware of this information. In order to preserve their independent judgment, bankruptcy judges are prohibited from attending the meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c).
In order to accord the debtor complete relief, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to convert a chapter 7 case to either a chapter 11 reorganization case or a case under chapter 13, as long as the debtor meets the eligibility standards under the chapter to which the debtor seeks to convert, and the case has not previously been converted to chapter 7 from either chapter 11 or chapter 13 . Thus, the debtor will not be permitted to convert the case repeatedly from one chapter to another. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a).
Upon the filing of the chapter 7 petition, an impartial case trustee is appointed by the United States trustee (or by the court in Alabama and North Carolina) to administer the case and liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704. If, as is often the case, all of the debtor’s assets are exempt or subject to valid liens, there will be no distribution to unsecured creditors. Typically, most chapter 7 cases involving individual debtors are “no asset” cases. If the case appears to be an “asset” case at the outset, however, unsecured creditors who have claims against the debtor must file their claims with the clerk of court within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c). In the typical no asset chapter 7 case, there is no need for creditors to file proofs of claim. If the trustee later recovers assets for distribution to unsecured creditors, creditors will be given notice of that fact and additional time to file proofs of claim. Although secured creditors are not required to file proofs of claim in chapter 7 cases in order to preserve their security interests or liens, there may be circumstances when it is desirable to do so. A creditor in a chapter 7 case who has a lien on the debtor’s property should consult an attorney for advice.
The court may revoke a chapter 7 discharge on the request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee if the discharge was obtained through fraud by the debtor or if the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate and knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of such property or to surrender the property to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d).
An involuntary chapter 7 case may be commenced under certain circumstances by the filing of a petition by creditors holding claims against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
United States trustees and bankruptcy administrators are responsible for establishing a panel of private trustees to serve as trustees in chapter 7 cases and for supervising the administration of cases and trustees in cases under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy administrators serve in the judicial districts in the states of Alabama and North Carolina.
A fee of $400 is charged for converting, on request of the debtor, a case under chapter 7 to a case under chapter 11. There is no fee for converting from chapter 7 to chapter 13.
Unsecured debts generally may be defined as those for which the extension of credit was based purely upon an evaluation by the creditor of the debtor’s ability to pay, as opposed to secured debts, for which the extention of credit was based upon the creditor’s right to seize pledged property on default, in addition to the debtor’s ability to pay.


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1. Titus1 Ratcliffe, resided in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng.
There is a Titus Ratcliffe bap 31 OCT 1725 Sowerby Near Halifax, Yorkshire, England source: Bishop’s transcripts, 1664-1837 Authors Church of England. Parish Church of Soweby (near Halifax) . Being that Titus is not a common name, this could be this person. There is also a later TitusRatcliffe 31 JUL 1774 Sowerby Bridge, Yorkshire, England, son of Samuel. Could be that this Samuel is a brother of the above Titus.
At the time of Children’s births, Titus is listed as being “of Antrobus”.
He married Mary Salisbury, married 2 May 1754 in Daresbury, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1790, buried Feb 1790 in Mere, Cheshire, Eng.
2. i. Thomas2 Ratcliffe b. 1755.
ii. John Ratcliffe, b. 1757 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 10 Dec 1757 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng.
3. iii. Titus Ratcliffe b. 1763.
2. Thomas2 Ratcliffe, (Titus1) b. 1755 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 3 Aug 1755 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1820 in Tatton, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Husbandman.
Thomas and Catherine, both of “this parish”, were married by Banns. Note from Rostherne Register of Graves: 2 Dec 1820, Thomas Ratcliffe of Mobberly near Tatton Park, age 63 yrs, was buried upon his son William under a grave stone near the back door.
He married Catherine Clark, married 26 May 1777 in Rostherne, Cheshire, Eng.
i. William3 Ratcliffe, b. 1778, baptized 4 Jan 1778 in St. John the Baptist, Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng.
He married Nancy Stamford, married 1807 in St. Mary’s, Rostherne, Cheshire, d. 1809.
ii. Mary Ratcliffe, b. 1780 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 27 Feb 1780 in St. John’s the Baptist, Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng.
iii. John Ratcliffe, b. 1783 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 17 May 1783 in St. John the Baptist, Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng.
Could be “John Ratcliffe” married to “Mary” listed as parents of Mary Ratcliffe b. 1809 and Sarah Ratcliffe b. 1811 both in Rostherne.
5. iv. Thomas Ratcliffe b. c. 1786.
v. Robert Ratcliffe, b. 1789 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 18 Jan 1789 in St. John the Baptist, Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1834 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, buried 3 Aug 1834 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng.
There is a burial record in Antrobus for a Robert Ratcliffe. Buried 3 Aug 1834, age 47 yrs. (b. 1788).
3. Titus2 Ratcliffe, (Titus1) b. 1763 in Daresbury, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1840 in Seven Oaks, Cheshire, Eng, buried 19 Jan 1840 in Seven Oaks, Cheshire, Eng.
He married Sarah Yarwood, married 12 Jan 1786 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng, b. c. 1758, d. 1831, buried 26 Jun 1831 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng.
Sarah: There is a record of another “Sarah Ratcliffe of Seven Oaks, servant, buried 15 Aug 1838, age 80” (b.1758). No idea who this Sarah is, possibly sister of Titus.
i. Samuel3 Ratcliffe, d. 1788, buried 5 Mar 1788 in Mere, Cheshire, Eng.
ii. William Ratcliffe, b. 30 Mar 1789 in Mere, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 17 May 1789 in Mere, Cheshire, Eng.
Could be the William Ratcliffe who married Nancy Stamford in 1806. There was then a Nancy Ratcliffe of Millington buried in 1807.
6. iii. Thomas Ratcliffe b. c. 1790.
7. iv. Sarah Ratcliffe b. c. 1793.
8. v. Mary Ratcliffe b. 1797.
vi. Ann Ratcliffe, b. 1801 in Seven Oaks, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 12 Jul 1801 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng.
i. Nancy3 Ratcliffe, b. 1775 in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 26 May 1775 in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng.
5. Thomas3 Ratcliffe, (Thomas2, Titus1) b. c. 1786, baptized 5 Mar 1786 in St. John the Baptist, Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng.
He married Sarah Higginbottom, married 29 Jan 1801 in Stockport, Cheshire, Eng.
i. Elizabeth4 Ratcliffe, b. c. 1801, baptized 27 Dec 1801 in Hatherlow Cong Chapel, Cheshire, Eng, d. pre 1811.
ii. Hannah Ratcliffe, b. c. 1803, baptized 23 Aug 1803 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng.
iii. Mary Ratcliffe, b. c. 1806, baptized 14 May 1806 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng.
iv. Harriet Ratcliffe, b. c. 1807, baptized 24 Aug 1807 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng.
v. Elizabeth Ratcliffe, b. c. 1811, baptized 23 Feb 1811 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng.
vi. James Ratcliffe, b. c. 1812, baptized 24 May 1812 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng.
9. vii. Ann Ratcliffe b. c. 1815.
6. Thomas3 Ratcliffe, (Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1790 in Mere, Cheshire, Eng,, baptized 21 Dec 1790 in Over Whitley, Cheshire, Eng, d. post 1871, occupation Shoemaker.
In 1841 and 1851, Thomas and Betty are living in Antrobus, “near Pole Lane End”.In 1841 Thomas is 45 and Betty is 35.
In 1851, Thomas is age 60, Betty is 49. Thomas is listed as Journeyman, cordwainer. In 1861, They are living in Antrobus.
Thomas is 70, Betty age 59. Thomas is listed as Shoemaker.
In 1871, Thomas was age 80, retired Shoemaker and living with daughter, Margaret in Little Leigh, Cheshire.
There is a record of a death for Thomas Ratcliffe, June 1873, age 82 yrs. Northwich, Cheshire. Could be this Thomas.
He married Betty ?? Ratcliffe, b. c. 1802 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, d. pre 1871.
Betty: Betty is deceased prior to 1871 Census.
10. i. Samuel4 Ratcliffe b. 1824.
ii. Mary Ratcliffe, b. c. 1827 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 1 Apr 1827 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng.
In 1841,Mary is listed as being age 14 working in the home of the Lamb family at Green Lane Farm in Appleton. In 1851, she could be the Mary Ratcliffe b. 1827, Antrobus, who was working as a servant in the home of the Sumner family in Lymm. In 1861, Mary was unmarried, age 34, working as a servant and living in Upton Priory. She is not found in the 1871 census, she may have married, moved or passed away.
iii. Elizabeth Ratcliffe, b. 1829 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 15 Mar 1829 in Stretton, Cheshire, Eng.
This could be the Elizabeth Ratcliffe, age 22, b. Antrobus, who was a servant on the Hollins Farm, run by Joseph Firth, in Antrobus in 1851.
11. iv. Thomas Ratcliffe b. c. 1831.
12. v. Margaret Ratcliffe b. c. 1821.
7. Sarah3 Ratcliffe, (Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1793 in Over Whitley, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 21 Jun 1793 in Over Whitley, Cheshire, Eng.
Could be the Sarah Ratcliffe, 53, born Whitley, living in Birchdale in 1851. An Edwin Ratcliffe, 19, b. Warrington, is living with her ..as well as Thomas Ratcliffe, age 19, born, Mere. ( Son of Thomas and Betty of Antrobus). In 1841, Samuel Ratcliffe, Thomas Jr’s, brother was living with this Sarah and Edwin.
13. i. William4 Ratcliffe b. c. 1814.
8. Mary3 Ratcliffe, (Titus2, Titus1) b. 1797 in Over Whitley, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 21 May 1797 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng, resided in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng.
In 1851, Mary was living in Birchdale. She listed as “widow”. Her daughter, Ann Beswick, is visiting.
i. Ann4 Ratcliffe, b. 1823 in Seven Oaks, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 23 Feb 1823 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng.
In 1851, Ann is visiting her mother in Birchdale. She is listed as “Bookkeeper’s wife”.
She married Mr. Beswick, occupation Bookkeeper.
9. Ann4 Ratcliffe, (Thomas3, Thomas2, Titus1) b. c. 1815 in Tatton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 3 Sep 1815 in Hatherlow Cong. Chapel, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1876,, resided Market Place in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire Eng,, occupation Domestic Servant.
In 1851 Ann is a widow, living at Market Place, Nether Knutsford. Daughter Ann, 13 and son, Samuel, 5, were living with her. In 1861 Ann was living in same location, listed as “Pauper”. No children with her. In 1871, Son Samuel, age 24, was living with her.
She married Samuel Bracegirdle, b. 20 Feb 1808 in Tatton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 13 Mar 1808 in Nether Knutsford Chapel, Cheshire, Eng, d. 24 May 1847 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, buried 26 May 1847 in St. John’s the Baptist, Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Shoemaker.
Samuel: Samuel was son of John Bracegirdle and Mary Leech. In 1841, Samuel and Ann lived at Market Place in Knutsford.
14. i. Thomas5 Bracegirdle b. 1836.
ii. Jane “Ann” Bracegirdle, b. 1838 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng,, baptized 24 Jun 1838 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Nurse.
Listed as “Ann” in 1851.
iii. Hannah Bracegirdle, b. 1840 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 19 Jul 1840 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1903.
She married John Corbishley, married 1869 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, b. 1840 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1911.
iv. James Bracegirdle, b. 1842 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 20 Nov 1842 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1850 in Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng.
15. v. Samuel Bracegirdle b. 1845.
10. Samuel4 Ratcliffe, (Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 1824 in Stretton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 19 Sep 1824 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng, d. post 1869 in England, occupation Laborer, Fireman; Bank Inspector.
In 1850, the family was living in Lower Walton in the Parish of Stockton Heath, Cheshire. In 1871, the family was living at Bates Bridge in Halton, Cheshire. In 1875, the family is listed as living on Halton Lane, Halton in the parish registers. Samuel was listed as a Bank Inspector on his son, Thomas’, wedding record. Samuel is said to have died in the River Mersey. There is a death record for a Samuel Ratcliffe, died age 50 during 1st quarter 1875 in Runcorn. This could be this Samuel. The dates fit.
He married Margaret Pilling, married 1848 in Warrington, Lancashire, Eng, b. c. 1825 in Lowton, Warrington, Lanc., Eng,, (daughter of John Pilling and Esther Johnson).
Margaret: In 1881, Margaret is widowed and living with her sister, Rebecca, in Warrington.
16. i. Thomas5 Ratcliffe b. 1848.
17. ii. Elizabeth Ratcliffe b. Aug 1850.
18. iii. William Ratcliffe b. c. 1854.
19. iv. Sarah Ratcliffe b. c. 1858.
20. v. Ann “Annie” Ratcliffe b. Jun 1864.
21. vi. Emma Ratcliffe b. 21 Apr 1867.
22. vii. Samuel G. Ratcliffe b. 11 Jun 1870.
11. Thomas4 Ratcliffe, (Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1831 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng,,, baptized 1 Jan 1832 in Great Budworth, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Plate layer, farmer, resided in East Sutton, Sutton, Lancashire, Eng.
He could be the Thomas Ratcliffe, b. 1832, Antrobus..who was working as a servant in Birchdale, Appleton, Cheshire in 1851. There was also a Sarah Ratcliffe, widowed, age 53, b. Whitley, Cheshire; Hannah Ratcliffe, age 21 b. Manchester, Lanc, and Edwin Ratcliffe, b. 1832, Warrington, Lanc all working as servants there as well. In 1871, Thomas is married and living in Sutton, Lancashire.
He married Margaret ?? Ratcliffe, b. c. 1812 in Bold, Lancashire, Eng.
i. Mary E.5 Ratcliffe, b. c. 1857 in Ditton, Lancanshire, Eng.
In 1871, Margaret’s father, Thomas, age 80, was living with the family.
She married William Harrison, b. c. 1812 in Cogshall, Cheshire, Eng,,, occupation Farmer of 10 Acres, resided Clatterwick Rd. in Little Leigh, Cheshire, Eng.
William: In 1841, William and Margaret lived in Antrobus. In 1851, the family lived “near Factor’s House” in Whitley Superior.
i. William5 Harrison, b. c. 1841 in Antrobus, Cheshire, Eng.
William seems to have never married. In 1861 he was age 21, a servant on the farm of Robert Billington on Farm House Lane in Dutton, Cheshire.
In 1871 He was an Unmarried, Agricultural Laborer, lodging with Mary Eyes in Helwall, Cheshire. In 1881, he was “unmarried”, Indoor Farm Servant, on the farm of William Evans in Latchford, Cheshire. Couldn’t find him in 1891. In 1901, he was living in Warrington, age 61, working as a Night Watchman. He was living with his “Widowed” aunt, Kate Harrison, age 73, born in L. Whitley.
Not listed with family in 1861. She would be age 16. There is a Sarah Harrison, age 16 b. Mere, listed as servant in home of Thomas Harrison, age 65, b. Lymm and his wife, Ellen, age 61 and daughter, Elizabeth age 38.
In 1871, she is living with her parents, age 26, listed as “farmer’s daughter”.
Not with family in 1871. She would be 24 at that time, probably married.
iv. Elizabeth Harrison, b. c. 1854 in Whitley, Cheshire, Eng.
v. Margaret E. Harrison, b. c. 1857 in Whitley, Cheshire, Eng.
13. William4 Ratcliffe, (Sarah3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1814 in Seven Oaks, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 28 Feb 1814 in St. Mary and All Saints, Gr. Budworth, Cheshire,Eng, resided Horton Quay in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Custom Officer.
In 1851, William was visiting in Tranmere, Cheshire.
He married Mary ?? Ratcliffe, b. c. 1816 in Walton, Cheshire, Eng.
i. Mary5 Ratcliffe, b. c. 1838.
ii. Emma Ratcliffe, b. 1840 in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng,, occupation Dressmaker.
iii. John Ratcliffe, b. c. 1842 in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng.
iv. William Ratcliffe, b. c. 1845 in Appleton, Cheshire, Eng.
In 1861, William was a mate on the “Dolphin” in Worsley, Lancashire.
14. Thomas5 Bracegirdle, (Ann4 Ratcliffe, Thomas3, Thomas2, Titus1) b. 1836 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng,, d. 8 Jan 1900, buried in St. Wilfred’s Church, Mobberley, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Farm Laborer.
Thomas looks to have been a servant in the home of Joseph Cash in Peover Superior in 1851.
He married Mary Green, married 25 Feb 1862 in St. Wilfred’s Church, Mobberley, Cheshire, Eng, b. 17 Nov 1840 in Mobberley, Cheshire, Eng, d. 21 Feb 1912 in Knowles Green, Mobberley, Cheshire, Eng.
Mary: Daughter of George Green and Alice Hewitt.
i. Ann6 Bracegirdle, b. 1862, d. 1867.
ii. George Green Bracegirdle, b. 1864, d. 1931.
iii. Emily Bracegirdle, b. 1866.
iv. Oliver Bracegirdle, b. 1868, d. 1949.
v. Agnes Bracegirdle, b. 1871.
vi. Ada Bracegirdle, b. 1874, d. 1936.
vii. Alice Green Bracegirdle, b. 1880, d. 1902.
15. Samuel5 Bracegirdle, (Ann4 Ratcliffe, Thomas3, Thomas2, Titus1) b. 1845 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 5 Oct 1845 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1912 in Nether Knutsford, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Railway Porter.
In 1871, Samuel lived with his mother in Nether Knutsford.
He married Eliza Jane Snelson, married 1871 in Holy Trinity Church, Hilme, Manchester, Eng, b. 1845 in Plumbley, Cheshire, Eng.
i. William H.6 Bracegirdle, b. 1873.
ii. George Dodd Bracegirdle, b. 1874.
iii. Hannah Bracegirdle, b. 1877.
iv. Samuel Arthur Bracegirdle, b. 1880.
16. Thomas5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 1848 in Stockton Heath,Cheshire,England, d. 1918 in Middletown,CT, resided Asylum ST. in Middletown, CT, occupation Railway Laborer,Quarryman.
Thomas was age 21 at the time of his marriage to Jane.
In 1871, Thomas, Jane and daughter, Margaret, lived on same street as Thomas’ parents at Bates Bridge in Halton, Cheshire,Eng. Thomas’ occupation was listed as “waterman”. His birthplace was listed as “Warrington”.
Later in the 1870’s Thomas and Jane lived on Halton Rd, Halton,Cheshire.
In 1880, Thomas and brother in law, John Lewis, were boarding at the home of Lamb family in Cornwall, Middlesex, CT, US and both were working at the quarries. The rest of the family must have come to US circa 1880, between births of Frederick and Robert.
At time of son Fred’s wedding, Thomas lived at 28 Hotchkiss St.,Middletown. In 1901, the City Directory has Thomas living on Asylum St. in South Farms,Middletown with sons Fred and George boarding there. In 1901, Thomas was employed by the W & B Douglas Co. In 1910, Thomas was still employed at the same Company, but living at 48 Walnut St. in South Farms.
He married (1) Jane Houghton, married 21 Jan 1869 in Stockton Heath,Cheshire,England, b. 1852 in Stockton Heath,Cheshire,England, (daughter of Robert Houghton and Margaret Rowlinson) d. 1884 in Portland,Ct.
Jane: Jane’s brother, Richard, and Mary Jane Greaves were witnesses at her wedding.
In 1871, Jane and Thomas were living on Bates Rd. in Halton, Cheshire. Robert and Richard, Jane’s brothers were living with them.
i. Margaret6 Ratcliffe, b. 1871 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 28 May 1871 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng.
Margaret was 10 days at the time of the 1870 Census. She died Young.
ii. Thomas G. Ratcliffe, b. 1872 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng.
No mention of this Thomas in Family Bible.
iii. Robert Ratcliffe, b. c. 1873, baptized 16 Jun 1873 in Stockton Heath, Cheshire, Eng, d. pre 1881.
Probably died young, as there is another Robert born later.
iv. Annie Ratcliffe, b. 10 Apr 1874, baptized 24 Jul 1874 in Stockton Heath, Cheshire, Eng.
v. George Ratcliffe, b. 29 Oct 1876 in Halton,Cheshire,England, baptized 7 Jan 1877 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, d. 1924 in Waterford, New London, CT, buried Pine Grove Cem. in Middletown, Middlesex, CT, occupation Ship Captain; Marine Engineer, resided 8 Harris St. in New London, New London, CT.
He was a member of Brainard lodge, F.and A.M. of New London, and Mansfield Guard Vetern Corps of Middletown. During the Spanish-American War, he served in the Navy. He moved out of Middletown c. 1899.
On George’s draft registration documents he is listed as being Tall, of medium build, with blue eyes and brown hair.
23. vi. Fred Ratcliffe b. 15 Jun 1879.
vii. Robert Ratcliffe, b. 28 Sep 1881 in Portland, Ct.
Died Young. These records are for a “male Ratcliffe” listed in vital records.
viii. Samuel Ratcliffe, b. 24 Jun 1884 in Portland, Ct.
There is the possibility that Jane died from complications from Samuel’s birth Thomas marries his second wife 7 months later. Samuel probably died as an infant as well since the family had no records of Samuel .
He married (2) Martha Johnson, married 7 Jan 1885 in Trinity Church, Portland, Ct, b. c. 1857 in England, resided in Hartford, Hartford, CT.
Martha: This was Martha’s first marriage. She is probably sister to Hannah J. Parker, as Hannah’s dau. Lucy is referred to as “cousin” of Martha’s stepson,Fred. In 1920, Martha is listed as “mother” living with step son Fred and his family in Middletown.
In 1870 Elizabeth was in Portland, CT with her husband. In 1880-1881, she was back in Cheshire, Eng. Her husband was in the US with her brother.
She married John Lewis, b. Oct 1844 in Wales, occupation Sexton, Quarryman, Laborer, emigrated 1868 from England.
John: In 1870 John and Elizabeth were living in Portland,Middlesex Co, CT, and John was working at the Quarry. In 1880, Elizabeth was back in England and John and his brother in law, Thomas Ratcliffe were working in the quarries and living with the Lamb family in Cromwell, CT. In 1900 the family lived at 12 Catherine St, Middletown, CT.
24. i. Samuel Robert6 Lewis b. 3 Oct 1872.
ii. Ada Lewis, b. 3 Feb 1875 in Connecticut, d. 10 May 1980 in California.
Ada was not listed with the family in 1900 Census. She was probably married by then.
iii. Almira Lewis, b. 22 Aug 1877 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 14 Oct 1877 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, d. 6 Jan 1985 in California, occupation School teacher.
In 1900 Almira was still single, age 22, living at home.
iv. May Lewis, b. May 1882 in Connecticut.
v. Elizabeth Lewis, b. Jan 1885 in Connecticut.
18. William5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1854 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, baptized 5 Oct 1856 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, resided in Portland, Ct, occupation Bricklayer; Mason.
In 1881, William age 26 and Selina age 25 lived on Sharp St. in Prestwich Lane, Cheshire. William lived on Maple St. at the time of Sarah’s wedding in 1906. There is a George Ratcliffe b.c. 1818 in England, listed on 1850 Census in Portland. Wife:Charlotte Children: Frederick 4 and Hannah 2,both b. England He may have been a relative and a reason for William coming to Portland.
He married Selina Shallcross, married 1875 in Runcorn, Cheshire, Eng, b. c. 1854 in England, d. 6 Sep 1883 in Portland, Ct.
Selina: Selina died 3 days after the birth of her last child, the baby died also. The baby and mother were buried in the same casket. (A.R.H.memoirs).
25. i. Sarah6 Ratcliffe b. c. 1878.
ii. William Ratcliffe II, b. c. 1880 in Prestwich, Cheshire, Eng, occupation Foreman – Brass Tube Co.
iii. Thomas Ratcliffe, b. pre 1881.
26. iv. Ann Louise Ratcliffe b. c. 1881.
v. Selina Ratcliffe, b. c. 1882 in England, occupation Operator.
vi. Margaret Ratcliffe, b. 2 Sep 1883 in Portland, Ct, d. 6 Sep 1883 in Portland, Ct.
Margaret’s mother died 3 days after Margaret’s birth. Mother and child were buried in same casket.
19. Sarah5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1858 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng,,, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, immigrated 1914 from Widnes, Lancashire, Eng.
Sarah, Minnie, Hilda and Maud arrived in Boston on the SS. Franconia on 28 April 1914. In 1920, Sarah, age 62 and May, Minnie, Hilda and Mildred lived in Tacoma,WA. In 1921, Sarah is listed as “widow of Joseph” in the Tacoma WA City Directories. She was living at 911 S. 4th St.
She married Joseph Ellis, b. c. 1857 in Weston, Cheshire, England,,,, (son of Charles Ellis and Ann ?? Ellis) d. post 1914 in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, occupation Iron Smith; laborer.
Joseph: In 1871, Joseph was age 14 and listed as a Quarry laborer, as was his brother, James.
In 1877, the family was living on Halton Rd, Halton, Cheshire. In 1881 and 1891the family was living at 7 Travis St. Widnes, Lancashire, Eng. The 1881 Census lists Joseph’s birthplace as “Weston”, Cheshire. In 1901 the family was living at 10 Lacey St, Widnes, Lancashire. The family seems to have emigrated in groups between around 1912 and 1914. When daughter, Edith, emigrated on 13 May 1913, father,Joseph, was listed as closest living relative. It is not clear if either Joseph Sr , Samuel or Joseph Jr emigrated to the US. Joseph Sr. is not listed as “deceased” on daughter Annie’s marriage Cert.
When mother and sisters emigrated in 1914, the listed Samuel of Widnes, Lancashire and “closest living relative”.
ii. Joseph E. Ellis, b. c. 1879 in Widnes, Lancashire, Eng, occupation Butcher.
1881 Census, lists Joseph’s birthplace as Widnes, Lancashire. There is no record that Joseph ever emigrated to the US.
iii. Florence “Florrie” Ellis, b. 1882 in Widnes, Lancashire, Eng,, occupation Shop attendant, immigrated 13 Feb 1912 from Widnes, Lancashire, Eng.
Florence and sister, Annie, immigrated to US in 1912. Florence was listed as age 30 and a “shop attendant”. Thier final destination is listed as Kalamazoo, MIchigan.
27. iv. Annie Ellis b. c. 1885.
v. May Ellis, b. c. 1890 in England, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, occupation Clerk.
In 1921, May is listed as living with her mother at 911 S. 4th St., Tacoma, WA.
vi. Edith Ellis, b. c. 1893 in Widnes, Lancanshire, Eng,, immigrated 13 May 1913 from Widnes, Lancashire, Eng, occupation Milliner.
Edith emigrated on her own in 1913 arriving in Boston. Her occupation was listed as milliner. Her final destination was listed as Waltham, MA.
Edith was a witness at her sister, Annie’s, wedding.
vii. Minnie Ellis, b. c. 1895 in England, d. 14 Apr 1988 in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, occupation Cake Icer.
In 1921, Minnie was listed in the City Directory as living with her mother at 911 S. 4th St, Tacoma,WA. She was a “baker”. In 1930, Minnie was living on her own and working as a “cake icer”.
viii. Hilda Ellis, b. c. 1897 in England, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, occupation Elevator Operator.
ix. Mildred Ellis, b. c. 1899 in England, resided 411 So. High St. in Tacoma, Pierce, WA, occupation Elevator Operator.
x. Agnes Ellis, b. 20 Jan 1901, d. May 1980, resided in Pasco, WA.
xi. Maud Ellis, b. c. 1903 in Widnes, Lancashire, Eng.
Maud arrived in the US with her mother and sisters Minnie and Hilda on the S.S. Franconia which arrived in Boston on 28 April 1914.
20. Ann “Annie”5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. Jun 1864 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng,,, d. post 1930, resided Westfield in Middletown, CT, emigrated 1881 from England.
On 14 July 1911, Ann and her sister, Emma, returned from a trip to England via Ellis Island aboard the Luisitania. At that time Annie was listed as living at 84 Spring St., Hartford,CT. In 1912, on her son’s Draft Registratin Card, Annie’s address is listed as 42 Cabot St., Hartford, CT.
In 1930, widowed Annie was living with three youngest children on Cabot St. in Hartford, CT.
She married Walker Heap, married c. 1887 in Connecticut, b. 28 Dec 1862 in Soyland, Yorkshire, Eng, (son of James Heap and Elizabeth Bottomly) baptized 30 Aug 1863 in Soyland, Yorkshire, Eng, resided Westfield in Middletown, CT, occupation Sculptor, d. pre 1930.
Walker: In 1881, Walker is listed as “adopted son” of William and Isabella Howard in Soyland, Yorkshire.
It’s possible that James was a sibling of Isabella’s and she adopted Walker after James and Elizabeth’s deaths?
Walker is listed as being 18, unmarried and a Stone Mason. On 27 Jul 1885, Walker Heap, age22, mason, arrived on the ship Etruria out of Liverpool. His point of origin was listed as Ireland, but that may have been a stop on the way.
i. Samuel6 Heap, b. Aug 1888 in Connecticut.
ii. Emma Heap, b. Mar 1890 in Connecticut.
28. iii. Isabella Heap b. 18 Jul 1895.
iv. Annie Heap, b. Jun 1897 in Connecticut.
29. v. Walker Ratcliffe Heap b. 27 Apr 1899.
vi. John H. “Harry” Heap, b. 26 Mar 1903 in Connecticut, occupation Accountant – Hotel; Treasurer, d. 2 Aug 1986 in West Haven, New Haven, Ct.
In CT Death Index, place of business is listed as Superior Electric Co. Residence is listed as “Heritage Village”, Southbury, CT.
He married Doris (??) Heap, b. c. 1904, d. 26 Jul 1978 in New Haven, New Haven, CT, resided in Southbury, CT.
vii. George A. Heap, b. c. 1906 in Connecticut, occupation Clerk – Ace Inc., d. 10 Apr 1972 in West Haven, New Haven, Ct, never married.
Could be George in SS Death Index: b. 20 Apr 1906; d. Apr 1972; lived Wethersfield, CT, SS#044-12-8001CT.
viii. Grace Heap, (details excluded).
21. Emma5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 21 Apr 1867 in Hatton, Cheshire, England, d. 5 Dec 1963 in Hartford, Hartford, CT,, emigrated 1880 from England.
Grandson, Frederick, says that birthplace is possibly Glasgow?
John: Real name was Jan Pieter. Emigrated to US with his parents in 1861. Dropped “n” in last name. JP first owned his own bookshop in Hartford and then worked for Hartford Machine Company. In 1890 and 91, John lived at 13 Russell St. and worked at 476 Capital Ave.
i. Lilian6 Ameluxen, b. 7 Jun 1888 in Hartford, Hartford, CT, d. 11 Jul 1888.
30. ii. Louis Ratcliffe Ameluxen b. 9 Sep 1890.
iii. Margerie Ameluxen, b. 8 Mar 1893 in Hartford, Hartford, CT, d. 24 Aug 1895.
31. iv. Frederick Henry “Harry” Ameluxen b. 23 Apr 1895.
v. Florence Ann Ameluxen, b. 4 Jun 1896 in East Hartford, Hartford, CT, resided 327 Wethersfiel in Hartford,CT, d. 18 Jan 1991 in West Hartford, Hartford, CT, occupation Operator (185 Pearl St.).
She married Oliver Warner Randall, married 4 Aug 19?? in Christ Church, Hartford, CT, b. 30 Jan 1898, (son of Burt W. Randall and Mrs. Randall) d. Dec 1964.
22. Samuel G.5 Ratcliffe, (Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 11 Jun 1870 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng,, baptized 4 Apr 1875 in Halton, Cheshire, Eng, d. 3 Sep 1960 in Durham, Middlesex, CT, resided 42 Court St. in Middletown, CT, occupation Mason.
According to 1900 and 1920 Census, family lived at 161 Prospect St. Samuel came to US in 1881 at age 11. He could read, write and speak English. He owned his own single family house. In 1936 and 1953 City Directories, the family lived at 199 Prospect St.
He married Frances “Fannie” Martha Haddock, married 1 Jun 1892 in Holy Trinity Church, Middletown, CT, b. c. 1869 in Portland, Middlesex, CT, (daughter of Edward Haddock and Sarah (??) Haddock) resided 42 Court St. in Middletown, CT, d. pre 1953.
Frances: 1880 Census lists her as Martha F. Not listed in 1953 City Directories.
32. i. Frances6 Ratcliffe b. 26 Jul 1895.
ii. Walter Frederick Ratcliffe, b. 5 Apl 1898 in Middletown, CT, d. c. 1919, buried Indian Hill Cem in Middletown (?), resided 161 Prospect St in Middletown, CT, occupation Aetna Life Ins. Co.
Died at 21 years of age. He was a graduate of Middletown High School Class of 1915.
iii. Samuel Edward Ratcliffe, b. 31 Jul 1900 in Middletown, CT, resided New London in Connecticut.
At time of his birth, family lived at 42 Court St. in Middletown. (Midd.Vital) An article in the newspaper about Samuel says that he was a carrier for the Penny Press and attended Central School. He had perfect attendance in school for 7 years. At the time of the article, circa 1913, the family was living at Prospect St., Middletown. In 1920, Samuel was a book keeper for the Brass Co. in New London, CT and living with his cousin, Annie Ratcliffe Herrick and her family.
He married Gladys Wilding, married 31 Jul 1925 in Seattle, WA.
Gladys: Could be the Gladys Ratcliffe in SS Death Index: b. 26 Aug 1896, d.24 Nov 1991; SS#532-46-2839WA.
iv. George Haddock Ratcliffe, b. 1903 in Middletown, CT, resided Prospect St. in Middletown, Middlesex, CT, occupation Foreman.
In 1936, George and Ella were living at 157 Prospect St. In 1953, they were livin at 195 Prospect St. Middletown.
He married Ella ?? Ratcliffe, occupation Remington Rand Inc.
v. Benjamin Ratcliffe, b. 3 Sep 1904 in Connecticut, d. 3 May 1996, resided Prospect St. in Middletown, Connecticut.
This is probably the Benjamin listed in CT Death Index: born- 3 Sep 1904, d. 19 may 1996, married to Ethel, Accountant for Northeast Utilities, lived in Torrington, CT.
In 1920 Census he is listed as “Bennie”.
He married Ethel ?? Ratcliffe.
23. Fred6 Ratcliffe, (Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 15 Jun 1879 in Widnes,Lancashire,England, d. 13 May 1951 in Wallingford, New Haven, CT, buried in Pine Grove Cem.,Middletown,CT, resided 28 Hotchkiss in Middletown,CT, occupation Plumber, emigrated 1880 from England.
In 1901, the City Directory lists Fred as working at 162 Main St.,Middletown and boarding with Thomas on Asylum St.,near the railroad in South Farms, Middletown. In 1910, Fred was married and living at 11 Babcock St. In 1918, the family lived at 8 Oak St…then, In 1920 the family lived at 5 Oak St., Middletown. Fred’s step mother, Martha, was living with them. Fred was probably living with his daughter, Marion Ratcliffe, in Wallingford at the time of his death.
He married Mary Elizabeth Kieft, married 25 Nov 1903 in Holy Trinity Church, Middletown, CT, b. Jul 1880 in Wales, (daughter of Charles Kieft and Ann Morgan) d. 1938 in Middletown,CT, buried in Pine Grove Cem.,Middletown,CT.
Mary: Came to America on 31 Jul 1890 with her father.
33. i. Frederick Thomas7 Ratcliffe b. 4 Nov 1904.
34. ii. Marion Elizabeth Ratcliffe b. 18 Jul 1906.
35. iii. Lillian Sarah Ratcliffe b. 16 May 1908.
24. Samuel Robert6 Lewis, (Elizabeth5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 3 Oct 1872 in Connecticut,, d. post 1930, occupation Carpenter, resided in Middletown, Middlesex, CT.
In 1900, Samuel was age 27, single, and still living with his parents in Middletonw.
In 1910, Samuel and family were living at 627 High St., Middletown, CT. He was working as a “pattern maker” at a hardware shop. In 1918, on his draft registration, Samuel is listed as working as a “wood factory worker” at Union Mfg. in New Britain, CT. He was living at 29 Johnson St, Middletown, CT. He was described as having brown eyes, black hair and as being of medium height and slender build.
In 1930, Samuel owned his own home at 445 River St, Cromwell, CT.
He married Lucy ?? Lewis, married c. 1903, b. c. 1879 in England, emigrated 1882 from England.
i. Ruth Z.7 Lewis, b. c. 1907 in Connecticut.
Ruth is not listed with the family in 1930 Census.
ii. Paul Lewis, (details excluded).
iii. Elton Lewis, (details excluded).
25. Sarah6 Ratcliffe, (William5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1878 in Runcorn, Cheshire, England, resided Maple St. in Middletown, CT.
She married Charles Franklin Walker, married 5 Jun 1906 in Holy Trinity Church, Middletown, CT, b. c. 1879 in Middletown, CT, resided Durham Ave. in Middletown, CT, occupation Merchant.
Charles: In 1910 the family lived in Middletown, CT. In 1920 they lived in Berlin, Hartford Co., CT. In 1930 they were back living in Middletown. Gladys was not with the family in 1930.
i. Gladys7 Walker, (details excluded).
ii. William Walker, (details excluded).
26. Ann Louise6 Ratcliffe, (William5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. c. 1881 in England, d. 14 Aug 1963 in Charleston, SC, resided in New London, New London, CT, emigrated 1888 from England.
Annie’s memoirs have been transcribed by her grandson, William Fleming. According to these memoirs, Annie had a very hard life. Her mother died shortly after the family came to US in 1883. Their father was unable to look after the children and so they were sent to an orphanage. Annie was shuffled from family to family. She suffered from emotional, physical & sexual abuse She seems to have risen above this, leading a happy life.
She married Arthur Belden Herrick, b. c. 1881 in New York, occupation Foreman-Brass Tube Co.
36. i. Elwood LeRoy7 Herrick b. 4 Jan 1902.
37. ii. Viola Evelyn Herrick b. 15 Apr 1906.
38. iii. Florence May Herrick (details excluded).
Annie is listed as age 6 in 1891. She is not listed with the family in 1901, she would have been age 16.
Annie and sister, Florence, immigrated to US in 1912, arriving in Boston on 13 Feb on the S.S. Invernia.
Annie’s occupation was listed “nurse”. She was age 27. Thier final destination is listed as Kalamazoo, MIchigan.
Witnesses at marriage were Walter Simpson of Tacoma and Edith Ellis, sister of the bride, of Tacoma. Marriage performed by Rev. Murdoch McLeod.
She married Orlando Franklin “Frank” Wickersham, married 10 Sep 1914 in 1st Presbyterian Church, Tacoma, WA, b. 5 Aug 1867 in Winninia, IN,, (son of Charles W. Wickersham and Emma Dudley) resided in Peshastin, Pierce, WA, d. 16 Sep 1960 in Los Angelos, CA, US, occupation Clerk.
Orlando: WWI Draft Registration lists occupation as Clerk for Pacific Steam Ship.
He is listed as Medium Height, Medium Build, with Brown eyes and black hair.
1920 Census lists Frank as working for a shipping company.
i. Anna M.7 Wickersham, (details excluded).
ii. James C. Wickersham, (details excluded).
28. Isabella6 Heap, (Ann “Annie”5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 18 Jul 1895 in Middletown, CT,,, d. Jan 1984 in Tryon, Polk, NC, resided “Westfield” in Middletown, CT.
Last benefit sent to Columbus, NC SS#042-20-0049CT.
According to Percy’s Draft Registration, he was Tall, of Medium Build, with Blue Eyes and Light hair.
i. Lorraine7 Fenner, (details excluded).
29. Walker Ratcliffe6 Heap, (Ann “Annie”5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 27 Apr 1899 in Connecticut,,, d. 15 Dec 1994, resided Patterson in New Jersey, occupation Manager at Birchard Systems, resided in Hamden, New Haven, CT.
Draft card says that he worked as a clerk at Travelers. He was of Medium Height, Slender Build, had blue eyes and light hair.
Last benefit sent to Watertown, NY. Last known address: 1223 Harris Dr., Watertown, NY. SS#041-28-4381CT Ann Heap b. 6 Feb 1928; d. 5 Sep 1990; lived Westville, New Haven, CT; SS#042-22-3705: Could be child of this family.
CT Death Index lists residence at time of death as North Haven, New Haven, CT.
i. Walker7 Heap III, resided RR4 in Watertown, NY.
ii. Joan Heap, (details excluded).
iii. Ann Heap, (details excluded).
30. Louis Ratcliffe6 Ameluxen, (Emma5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 9 Sep 1890 in Hartford, Hartford, CT,, d. 1946, resided 66 South St. in Hartford,CT, occupation Proofreader-Htfd.Courant.
He married Evelyn Putnam Crane, married 15 May 1915 in Hartford,CT, b. 30 Jul 1892 in Hartford, Hartford, CT, d. May 1972, resided in West Palm Beach, FL.
i. Marjory7 Ameluxen, (details excluded).
31. Frederick Henry “Harry”6 Ameluxen, (Emma5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 23 Apr 1895 in Hartford, Hartford, CT,, d. 6 Sep 1982 in St. Paul, MN,, resided Hartford in Connecticut, occupation Math Teacher; Engineer for City.
He married Bernice ?? Ameluxen, b. 17 Sep 1897, d. Dec 1980 in St. Paul, MN.
i. Frederick “Fritz” Henry7 Ameluxen Jr., (details excluded).
39. ii. Bradner Ameluxen (details excluded).
40. iii. Phillip John Ameluxen (details excluded).
32. Frances6 Ratcliffe, (Samuel G.5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 26 Jul 1895 in Middletown, CT,, resided 42 Court St. in Middletown, CT.
She married Charles Doebner, b. c. 1895 in Connecticut, occupation Machinist: Hardware Factory; Trolley Conductor,, resided 95 Prospect St. in Middletown, Middlesex, CT.
ii. Margery Doebner, (details excluded).
33. Frederick Thomas7 Ratcliffe, (Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 4 Nov 1904 in Middletown,CT, d. Mar 1976, buried in Wethersfield,CT, resided 71 Highland St. in Wethersfield, CT.
41. i. Peter8 Ratcliffe (details excluded).
34. Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, (Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 18 Jul 1906 in Middletown,CT, d. 16 Aug 1978 in Meriden,CT, buried in Wallingford, New Haven, CT, resided in Middletown,CT, occupation Housewife.
42. i. Charlene8 Rundle (details excluded).
43. ii. Lois Jane Rundle (details excluded).
35. Lillian Sarah7 Ratcliffe, (Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 16 May 1908 in Middletown,CT, d. 25 Nov 1988, buried Pine Grove Cem. in Middletown,CT, resided 165 Dryden St. in Meriden, CT.
44. i. Mary D.8 Brooks (details excluded).
36. Elwood LeRoy7 Herrick, (Ann Louise6 Ratcliffe, William5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 4 Jan 1902 in New York,, d. Sep 1965, occupation Toolsetter – Brass Tube Co.
37. Viola Evelyn7 Herrick, (Ann Louise6 Ratcliffe, William5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) b. 15 Apr 1906 in New York,, d. Nov 1972, resided in Groton, New London, CT.
38. Florence May7 Herrick, (Ann Louise6 Ratcliffe, William5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
39. Bradner7 Ameluxen, (Frederick Henry “Harry”6, Emma5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
i. Thomas G.8 Ameluxen, resided in Honolulu, HI, occupation Major USAF.
40. Phillip John7 Ameluxen, (Frederick Henry “Harry”6, Emma5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
45. i. Bradner Jerome8 Ameluxen (details excluded).
41. Peter8 Ratcliffe, (Frederick Thomas7, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
42. Charlene8 Rundle, (Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
43. Lois Jane8 Rundle, (Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
46. i. Mary Elizabeth9 Stanford (details excluded).
47. ii. Theodore Patrick Stanford (details excluded).
48. iv. Timothy Charles Stanford (details excluded).
49. v. Susan Charlene Stanford (details excluded).
50. vi. Judith Ann Stanford (details excluded).
44. Mary D.8 Brooks, (Lillian Sarah7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
45. Bradner Jerome8 Ameluxen, (Phillip John7, Frederick Henry “Harry”6, Emma5 Ratcliffe, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
i. Bradner Jerome9 Ameluxen Jr., (details excluded).
46. Mary Elizabeth9 Stanford, (Lois Jane8 Rundle, Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
47. Theodore Patrick9 Stanford, (Lois Jane8 Rundle, Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
48. Timothy Charles9 Stanford, (Lois Jane8 Rundle, Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
49. Susan Charlene9 Stanford, (Lois Jane8 Rundle, Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).
50. Judith Ann9 Stanford, (Lois Jane8 Rundle, Marion Elizabeth7 Ratcliffe, Fred6, Thomas5, Samuel4, Thomas3, Titus2, Titus1) (details excluded).

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In the early 1980s, First Nations’ struggles to gain recognition of their Aboriginal title and rights within the Canadian legal system were gaining momentum.
Under the leadership and direction of Grand Chief George Manuel, Louise Mandell, Leslie Pinder and Clarine Ostrove worked as in-house legal counsel at the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs (“UBCIC”). One of the highlights of these early years was going to London in 1981 to give instructions for the commencement of the lawsuit to oppose the patriation of the Canadian Constitution. The historic “Constitution Express” galvanized Aboriginal peoples in a strong, unified determination to protect and advance their rights.
Mandell Pinder was founded to provide legal assistance to support the struggle for recognition. With the goal of responding to the visions and needs of Aboriginal governments, our firm has developed a broad spectrum of expertise and a strong team.
In April 1983, with UBCIC’s encouragement and support, the three lawyers and their assistants, Regina Terry and Chris Clark, started Mandell Pinder. The partners began working for Aboriginal governments at Band, tribal, provincial and national levels. Brenda Gaertner joined the firm in 1986 and, along with contributing to the firm’s title and rights expertise, she expanded the negotiations and economic development practice of the firm.
From the outset, the firm’s mission has been to assist Aboriginal Peoples to achieve recognition of their title and rights and to develop prosperous, sustainable communities. The firm advanced its clients’ interests through the determination by the Supreme Court of Canada that there is, under the Canadian Constitution, an existing Aboriginal right to fish (R. v. Sparrow, R. v. Van der Peet), and that Aboriginal title is an existing legal right that is not extinguished in British Columbia (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia). In Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs), a Treaty reserve case, the firm made important advances in the law of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations towards Aboriginal peoples.
Later, the firm spearheaded landmark Supreme Court of Canada rulings, such as Haida Nation et al. v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) et al. (confirming the Crown’s consultation and accommodation obligations), Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town) (defining the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in relation to the taking of reserve lands), and R. v. Morris (establishing the Treaty right to night hunting). Mandell Pinder also participated in the Supreme Court of Canada victory in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, the first case to establish the Aboriginal right to harvest timber for community purposes.
Over the years, Mandell Pinder LLP has continued to broaden its services to meet the evolving needs of Aboriginal governments. Creativity, commitment and determination have been required, including, for example: assisting in the development of modern legal frameworks for exercising Aboriginal and Treaty rights; promoting reconciliation through various legal strategies; negotiating accommodations for past and ongoing impacts associated with resource extraction; and developing unique land tenures models to secure economic development on and off reserve.
Our partnership has continued to expand over the years. Maria Morellato Q.C. joined in 2009, and in 2016 was appointed to the British Columbia Supreme Court. In 2010, Jim Reynolds and Janelle Dwyer joined the partnership. Janelle Dwyer brings depth to the firm’s land development and corporate/commercial work. Jim Reynolds retired from the partnership in 2016, but continues to work with our firm as Associate Counsel, applying his many years of experience in real estate and business related matters for First Nations.
In 2014, Cheryl Sharvit became a partner, bringing experience in natural resource management law focusing on the interplay between resource management and Aboriginal and Treaty rights.
Rosanne Kyle joined our partnership in 2015. Rosanne has extensive experience providing advice to First Nations on Aboriginal rights issues, whether they arise in a litigation context, an environmental assessment or other regulatory process, or at the negotiation table.
Mandell Pinder LLP’s legal team continues to expand. Yet we remain a small firm able to deliver professional integrated services to First Nations governments. The firm’s growth reflects an increasing diversity of expertise and skill, including: Aboriginal institution-building; social, business and economic development; employment; environmental assessments; and legal and governance structures to reconcile Aboriginal and Crown interests. We are assisting First Nations in developing innovative approaches to impact benefit agreements, negotiated models for reconciliation and shared decision-making and frameworks for the implementation of Indigenous laws and legal orders.
One of the firm’s strengths is our ability to respond to the unique challenges facing Aboriginal peoples and their governments. We identify options for real solutions, and then pursue those options creatively, energetically and diligently. All of this is achieved using a collaborative, team approach, bringing to each project a profound depth and breadth of experience and expertise from the diverse backgrounds of the partners and associates in the firm.

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James Weinberger is a Partner in Fross Zelnick's litigation practice, focusing on litigation, mediation and arbitration in the areas of copyright, trademark and trade dress infringement, unfair competition, false advertising, trademark dilution, right of publicity, First Amendment and Internet-related matters. Recognized by Chambers USA (2010-20118), Legal 500 (2011-2018), Managing Intellectual Property IP Stars (2014-2018), New York SuperLawyers Rising Stars (2011-2012), New York SuperLawyers (2013-2018), the 2014 and 2016 Guides to the World's Leading Trade Mark Lawyers, Who's Who Legal (Trademarks 2017-2018), World Trademark Review (2017-2018) in the areas of copyright and trademark law as well as a World Intellectual Property Review Leader in 2017 and 2018, James regularly counsels and advises clients across a broad range of industries, including apparel, beverages, cosmetics, entertainment, finance, personal care products, sports, pharmaceuticals, publishing and software on matters relating to intellectual property rights. In addition to federal and state court litigation, James's expertise includes copyright and trademark enforcement strategy and execution, portfolio management, clearance, as well as negotiating and drafting trademark and copyright licenses, coexistence and settlement agreements. James also litigates opposition proceedings in the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy proceedings in the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Wesleyan University (B.A., 1996, with honors); Columbia University School of Law (J.D., 1999). Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar. Recipient, Carroll G. Harper Prize. Editor-in-Chief, Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts.
Member, Judicial Administration and Trademark Litigation Subcommittee, International Trademark Association ("INTA") (2014-15 term); Member, Discovery Practices & Procedures Subcommittee of the Enforcement Committee, INTA (2012-13 term, 2008-2009 term); Associate Member, Pharmaceutical Trade Marks Group (PTMG); Member, Intellectual Property Committee, Federal Bar Council; Member, American Bar Association, Intellectual Property Law Section; Member, New York State Bar Association, Intellectual Property Law Section; Director, Columbia Law School Association, (2010-2015).
Strategic Partnering with In-House Trademark Counsel, IPO Annual Meeting (Panelist, San Francisco, CA 2017); POW! BOFF! THWACK! What DC Comics v. Towle Means for Copyright Character Protection, Los Angeles Copyright Society (Speaker, February 2016); Holy Copyright Law! The Batmobile Case and Licensing Fictional Characters, Derivatives and Products, American Bar Association (Panelist, December 2015); Product Trade Dress and Non-Traditional Trade Marks - Update from the US, PTMG Spring Conference (Panelist, Barcelona, Spain 2012); Understanding the Use-Based Trademark System in the US, Managing Intellectual Property China-International IP Forum (Speaker, Beijing, PRC 2011); A Conversation Between Brand Owners, Retailers and Manufacturers About Private Label in the United States, INTA Annual Meeting (Panelist, San Francisco, CA 2011); Speaker: Discovery Practice, Procedure and Strategy, Navigating Trademark Practice Before the PTO 2007: From Filing Through the TTAB Hearing, Practicing Law Institute; Guest Instructor: Columbia-VLA Clinical Seminar in Law and the Arts, Columbia Law School (2006-2012).
U.S. Supreme Court; New York, Court of Appeals, Appellate Division, 1st Dep't; U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Third Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit; United States District Court, S.D.N.Y, E.D.N.Y., N.D. Ill.
Represent DC Comics and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. in action brought by Hasbro in which it claimed that its rights in the trademark BUMBLEBEE as used in connection with action figures from its TRANSFORMERS franchise were infringed by DC and Warner Bros.' use of BUMBLEBEE in connection with action figures of a character from their TEEN TITANS and DC SUPER HERO GIRLS properties.
Asuragen, Inc. v. Accuragen, Inc.
On behalf of our client, plaintiff Asuragen, Inc., the Firm defeated defendant Accuragen, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment in an infringement action between two providers of genomic services and their respective ASURAGEN and ACCURAGEN trademarks.
On behalf of client Athleta, the Firm prevailed in an opposition against applications to register ATHLETIKA and ATHLETIKA SP in connection with sports medicine products. The claim was based on Athleta's rights in the ATHLETA mark for women's fitness and active wear.
FameFlynet, Inc. v. AMC Networks Inc.
Represent AMC Networks and related entities in a copyright infringement action involving the alleged unauthorized use of celebrity photographs online.
WeWork Companies Inc. v. WE Labs, Inc.
Represent WeWork Companies Inc. in a trademark infringement action against WE Labs, Inc. of Long Beach, California.
Represent Brookfield Office Properties Inc., owner and developer of the MANHATTAN WEST superblock in New York City, in a trademark infringement action against the Manhattan West Hotel.
On behalf of client DC Comics, the Firm prevailed in a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that the Batmobile, Batman’s famous car, was subject to copyright protection as a character. In reaching its decision, the Court set forth a new, three-part test for determining protection of a character appearing in comic books, television programs or films under the 1976 Copyright Act, independent of any specific work in which it has appeared and irrespective of whether it “lacks sentient attributes and does not speak.” Upon finding that the Batmobile met all of the necessary criteria, the Court then held that DC had the right to bring suit because it had reserved all merchandising rights when it granted licenses for the creation of the 1966 Batman television series starring Adam West and the 1989 Batman film starring Michael Keaton. In the alternative, because the 1966 program and 1989 film were derivative works of the original Batman comics, any infringement of those derivative works also gave rise to a claim for DC, the copyright owner of the underlying works. Finally, the Court found that the replica Batmobiles created by mechanic Mark Towle infringed DC's in the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 program and 1989 film. The Court also upheld the District Court’s refusal to allow Towle to assert a laches defense on DC’s trademark claims because the infringement was found to be willful. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Towle's petition for certiorari on March 7, 2016.
Represent client Rockefeller & Co. in trademark infringement action against company making unauthorized use of ROCKEFELLER trademark and family name.
DC Comics v. Mad Engine, Inc.
On behalf of plaintiff DC Comics in a claim for infringement of its Superman Shield trademark, the Firm was successful in defeating a motion to dismiss brought by defendant Mad Engine, Inc. on the ground that its use was parody.
Represent Old Navy in copyright infringement action brought by owner of Vilebrequin swimwear.
Represent Rockefeller & Co. in trademark infringement action against Rockefeller Hughes Corp.
DC Comics v. Gotham City Networking, Inc.
On behalf of DC Comics, the Firm successfully opposed two applications to register GOTHAM BATMEN and a batwing design in connection with entertainment and business networking services. In sustaining the opposition, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board held that BATMAN was "a famous mark in connection with . . . comic books and movies" and further that such "fame is transferred to a vast array of collateral or merchandising products that are purchased because they bear the BATMAN trademark; that is, consumers have come to associate the fame of BATMAN with the products bearing that mark."
Represent Coolmath.com in action under the Anti-Cybersquatting Piracy Act in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Whole Oats Enterprises v. Early Bird Foods & Co., Inc.
Represent defendant granola producer in trademark infringement action brought by musical group Hall & Oates over use of HAULIN' OATS.
Represent Coolmath.com in trademark infringement and cybersquatting action in the Middle District of Florida.
Christian v. Kensington Publishing Corp.
Represent defendant Kensington Publishing Corp. in action involving claims of copyright infringement and right of publicity.
Thompson v. Kensington Publishing Corp.
Represent defendant Kensington Publishing Corp. in copyright infringement litigation based on alleged unauthorized production of e-books under publishing agreement.
Represented defendant restaurant in a trademark infringement action brought by a technology education company involving the name GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Laser Spine Institute, L.L.C. v. Laser Spine & Pain Institute L.L.C.
Represented defendant medical practice in trademark infringement action brought by plaintiff Laser Spine Institute, L.L.C.
Albert M. Watson Photography et al. v. Cao et al.
Represented artist David Datuna in copyright infringement action brought by photographer Albert Watson in connection with Datuna's alleged infringement of Watson's portrait of Steve Jobs in Datuna's visual installation Steve Jobs-Ayn Rand.
On behalf of Gap, Inc., successfully obtained dismissal of a copyright action brought by clothing retailer Fooey Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On Gap's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court determined that "no ordinary observer . . . could reasonably conclude that defendant misappropriated plaintiff's protectable expression," and that the works in question “each . . . impresses upon the ordinary observer its own distinct 'total concept and feel.'"
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Walgreen Co.
The Firm successfully represented our client, McNeil-PPC, Inc., a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson and the exclusive licensee of the ZYRTEC mark for allergy products in the United States, in a five-year challenge before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to Walgreen Co.’s attempt to register the mark WAL-ZYR in connection with an allergy product containing the identical active ingredient to ZYRTEC.
Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co.
The Firm was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction for our client, Athleta, Inc., a subsidiary of Gap Inc., against Pitbull Clothing Co. and Cory Peck, operators of the website athletica.net.
Jumbo Bright Trading Limited v. The Gap, Inc.
On behalf of our client The Gap, Inc., the Firm successfully defeated an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a second motion for a preliminary injunction brought by plaintiffs Jumbo Bright Trading Limited and Charles Pozzi against Gap's offering and sale of certain women's loafers.
The Firm successfully represented our client, Frank Sinatra Enterprises, LLC, which holds the exclusive right to commercially exploit Mr. Sinatra’s name and likeness, in its challenge before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to Michigan-based caterer Bill Loizon’s attempt to register the mark FRANKS ANATRA in connection with his catering business.
The firm successfully defended our clients, The Gap, Inc., Gap International Sourcing, Inc., Old Navy, LLC and Old Navy (Apparel), LLC against a trademark infringement and unfair competition action brought by Robert Lopez, who prints and sells t-shirts and other apparel promoting his neighborhood, the Lower East Side of New York City.
The firm successfully defended our clients, who include Sundance Channel, Mayor Cory A. Booker and the documentary producers, Marc Benjamin and Marc Levin, against a copyright infringement action brought by author, E. Adam Jackson. Jackson’s October 2010 lawsuit alleged that the Sundance Channel’s Emmy Award-winning documentary series Brick City infringed Jackson’s novel of the same name.
Screen Media Ventures, L.L.C. v. Castle Hill Productions, Inc. et al.
Represented defendant and impartial sublicensee Independent Film Channel in a breach of contract and copyright infringement suit between plaintiff licensor and co-defendant licensee over broadcast rights to certain films on client's television network.
Represented defendant Banana Republic in copyright infringement action involving store window display designs.
Sandler Systems, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Company et al.
Represented Defendants in an action alleging that sales training manuals created by a former employee of Plaintiff subsequently hired by Defendants constituted copyright and trademark infringement.
Gemma Redux Inc. v. Banana Republic LLC et al.
Represented defendant Banana Republic in copyright infringement action involving jewelry designs.
Represented plaintiff Gap in trademark infringement action against proprietor of GAPNOTE website and social media network.
The Gap, Inc. v. Twin Tiger USA LLC et al.
Represented plaintiff The Gap in trademark infringement action involving parallel imported jeans.
The firm was part of the defense team for clients Time Warner Inc., Warner Communications, Inc., Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., Warner Bros. Television Production Inc. and DC Comics in the ongoing litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California over the copyright termination interest in certain works featuring the Superman and Superboy characters allegedly owned by the heirs of co-creator, Jerry Siegel. The decisions in which the firm was involved resulted in a number of significant decisions in the complex area of copyright termination and in other areas, relating to, inter alia, defenses to termination claims of work made for hire, co-ownership, derivative work exception, limitation of copyright termination recapture to U.S. rights under copyright and inapplicability of copyright termination to trademark rights; res judicata; jury trial right, and the fair market value of copyright rights in the entertainment arena, among others. Summaries of decisions and links can be found by clicking through "view case history" above.
Nippon Menard Cosmetic Co. Ltd. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
Represented Colgate-Palmolive Co. in a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a 1983 settlement agreement and consent judgment resolving a prior trademark dispute between the parties. Obtained favorable settlement.
Payne v. Anvil Knitwear, Inc.
Represented Anvil Knitwear, Inc. in a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing claims for copyright infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The Court granted Anvil's motion in its entirety and dismissed the case and awarded a substantial amount of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision in its entirety.
Represented plaintiff Kensington Publishing Corp. in trademark infringement action against author involving the BAD BOYS series of romance novels.
Alexander v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Obtained summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds for defendants Kensington Publishing Corp. and author and former DEA agent Jerry Speziale on claims brought by Paul Lir Alexander for invasion of privacy and violation of right of publicity by Speziale's inclusion of information about Alexander's role as a DEA informant in his book Without a Badge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Quiksilver Inc. v. Quick Sports International BV et al.
Represented defendants Quick Sports International, a well-known Dutch soccer brand, along with its principals, in connection with a trademark infringement lawsuit brought by plaintiff Quicksilver.
Alberto-Culver Co. v. E. Sunwoo Inc. et al.
Represented defendants in trademark infringement action involving plaintiff Alberto-Culver's VO5 mark.
Defeated a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by a Long Island-based electronics company against Sony Electronics in an action involving use of the mark MG in connection with digital copyright management software.
Echo Design Group, Inc. v. Zino Davidoff S.A.
Successfully defeated a preliminary injunction motion brought by The Echo Design Group, Inc., a fashion and home accessories manufacturer, against Zino Davidoff S.A., Davidoff & Cie S.A., Davidoff of Geneva (NY), Inc., Coty Inc., and Lancaster Group LLC to prevent the US launch of ECHO DAVIDOFF, a new fragrance line.
On behalf of Jennifer Lopez and Coty Inc., defeated a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by Glow Industries in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The motion sought to block the launch of the GLOW BY J.LO fragrance line. Subsequently defeated motion for summary judgment in which Glow Industries sought to invalidate acquisition of GLOW KIT mark and declaration of non-infringement.
Baseball Trademark Licensing and the Antitrust Exemption: An Analysis of New York Yankees Partnership v. Major League Baseball Enterprises, Inc.

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In Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 546 (October 3, 2011), a divided panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court reaffirmed that where there has been a closure of a courtroom for Sixth Amendment purposes, a defendant must personally and knowingly waive the right to a public trial and that in the absence of such a personal knowing waiver, reversal of the conviction is required unless the Court has previously made findings justifying closure as required by Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). The Court made clear that there is no valid waiver even if defense counsel knows that the courtroom has been closed during jury selection and decides not to object for tactical reasons, but never discusses the public trial right with the defendant.
"While there may be room to debate this court's extrapolation of a “knowing assent” requirement from prior case law of the Supreme Judicial Court, and while the position of the Supreme Judicial Court on this requirement may be unsettled, we will not depart from our own firmly stated, recent precedent. It is for the Supreme Judicial Court to decide whether to proceed in a different direction."
"Regardless of any weakness in its underpinnings, however, the Adamides dictum took root. See Patry, 48 Mass. App. Ct. at 475 (no valid waiver where counsel, without discussing the right to public trial with the defendant, waived the defendant's right to be present when the judge gave instructions to the jury in the deliberation room). Recent opinions of this court could not be clearer that there can be waiver of the right to a public trial only with the defendant's personal, knowing assent, although that assent need not appear upon the trial record. See Edward, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 173–174 & n. 13; Downey, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 230; Grant, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 458–459."
"In Cohen, 456 Mass. at 98–100, 117–118, contemporaneous objection by counsel made it unnecessary for the court to consider whether waiver by counsel required the defendant's knowing assent. But see Cohen, supra at 118 n. 35, citing several cases discussing waiver, including Edward, but also observing that “[f]ailure of a defendant or his counsel to raise an objection when first made aware of an alleged public trial right violation is, at the very least, a strong indication of waiver” (emphasis supplied). See also Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 264 (2011) (where counsel said “[t]hank you” when judge responded to public trial objection by ordering back door of cleared courtroom opened so that defendant's mother could observe jury selection, “the defendant may not now be heard to complain of the strategy that was adopted”). Contrast Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 305 (2010) (Botsford, J., dissenting), citing to Edward in another context for the proposition that 'waiver of right to public trial must be by defendant, not only defendant's counsel on his behalf.'"
Lavoie, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at __.
(1) Was there a closure?
(2) Was the closure full or partial?
(3) Did the closure satisfy the Waller factors?
(4) Did the defendant waive his right to a public trial?
(5) To what relief is the defendant entitled?
The dissenting justice (Graham, J.) argued that trial counsel should be able to waive the public trial right on behalf of the defendant without consulting with the defendant. However, in Lavoie, the majority noted that defense counsel indicated that he did “not have a specific recollection of the exclusion of the defendant’s family during the course of the jury selection process in this case.” Rather, he merely testified that “as a matter of practice, he does not object to family members and supporters being asked to leave the courtroom.” Given that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant has waived the public trial right, see Commonwealth v. Downey, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 230 (2010), and waiver of a fundamental trial right must be “explicit”, see Commonwealth v. Peterson, 445 Mass. 782, 785-86 (2006), it is not clear how the Commonwealth could establish that counsel actually made a knowing waiver of the right in this case given that he did not recall the exclusion of the defendant’s family.
Practice Note: Whatever becomes of the Appeals Court’s holding that trial counsel may not waive the public trial right on behalf of his client in the absence of discussion about the right with the defendant, post-conviction counsel pursuing an unpreserved claim that the defendant’s right to a public trial was violated by closure of the courtroom during jury selection would be wise to develop, wherever possible, evidence that trial counsel was unaware that the defendant’s right to a public trial extended to jury selection. See e.g. Owens v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575 (D. Mass. 2007) (defendant’s experienced trial counsel admitted that they were not aware that the right to a public trial extended to jury selection).

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Annamalai contends that he is “illegally incarcerated” because this Court and the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) did not comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1691, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k), and various BOP Program Statements when he was committed to custody following his conviction for bank fraud and related crimes in United States v. Annamalai, No. 1:13-CR-437-TCB (N.D.Ga. Aug. 25, 2014) (the “Criminal Case”). Annamalai's arguments are meritless.
Annamalai initially argued that his incarceration was illegal because the docket in the Criminal Case did not include a copy of this Court's Order signed by the Honorable Timothy C. Batten, Jr., on July 16, 2015, with the return duly endorsed, committing Annamalai to the BOP's custody. See . As I noted in my original Final Report and Recommendation, this claim is contradicted by the record, which includes the endorsed Order. See  at passim (citing Criminal Case ).
Annamalai now argues in his Second Verified Brief that the copy of the endorsed Order committing him to the BOP's custody that is docketed in the Criminal Case is a “fraudulent, manipulative, made up document.” . This claim is unsupported by anything other than Annamalai's conjecture, and I note that the copy of the endorsed Order matches in all material respects the unendorsed Order earlier entered on the docket when Annamalai was convicted (save, of course, for the endorsement). Compare Criminal Case  with Criminal Case .
Annamalai also now argues that the endorsed Order in the Criminal Case does not conform to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(c). See  at passim. Section 3621(c) states: “When a prisoner, pursuant to a court order, is placed in the custody of a person in charge of a penal or correctional facility, a copy of the order shall be delivered to such person as evidence of this authority to hold the prisoner, and the original order, with the return endorsed thereon, shall be returned to the court that issued it.” I conclude that Document 619 in the Criminal Case conforms in all necessary respects with these statutory requirements. Contrary to Annamalai's contention that the Order must bear a specific caption, see  at 2, the plain language of § 3621(c) does not require the use of the label “Judgment in a Criminal Case and Commitment Order.” Similarly, Annamalai's contention that the Order was required to be “sealed” pursuant to a different federal statute is also without merit because a judgment and commitment order in a criminal case is neither a “writ” nor “process” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1691. Contrast, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a)(1)(G) (requiring that a summons in a civil case “bear the court's seal”). And Annamalai's contention that the return is invalid because the Warden of the prison to which he was delivered signed it, rather than a Marshal, finds no support in the text of § 3621(c), which does not specify that it must be a Marshal who executes the return.
Similarly, Annamalai's contention that the Order did not comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k) is also self-evidently wrong, because the Order sets forth the jury's verdict, the adjudication, and the sentence, together with the judge's signature, which is all that Rule 32(k) requires. And Annamalai should recognize that BOP Program Statements do not supersede or expand the requirements of federal statutes or federal procedural rules with respect to the content that federal judges are required to include in criminal judgments.
Here, the Order committing Annamalai to the BOP's custody after he was convicted in the Criminal Case complied with all relevant statutory and procedural requirements, both in the form it issued and in the form it was returned, duly endorsed. See Criminal Case  & .
I note that arguments similar to Annamalai's have been raised by other federal inmates in litigation around the country and that the circuit courts of appeal have consistently rejected such claims. See, e.g., Satcher v. Hogstein, 576 F. App'x 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (summarily affirming on appeal the district court's denial of a § 2241 petition alleging that the order committing a prisoner to the BOP's custody was not properly endorsed and returned); Hall v. Loretto, 556 F. App'x 72, 73 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming the denial of a § 2241 petition because “[the prisoner] has not cited, nor have we located, any authority for the proposition that, where the United States Marshal (or his or her deputy) does not complete the ‘return' section of a defendant's judgment and commitment order, the defendant's confinement is unlawful and he must be released.”). See also Hall v. Warden Loretto FCI, 609 F. App'x 51, passim (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming the dismissal of Federal Tort Claims Act and civil rights claims premised on an alleged failure by the United States Marshal to complete the ‘return' section of the defendant's judgment and commitment order and on a case manager's alleged related “improper” action).
All other arguments raised by Annamalai-including (A) his contention that the United States Attorney General and other federal employees have “admitted the illegal custody of the petitioner and consented to release the petitioner from the illegal custody, ”  at 3, and (B) his contention that this case is controlled by Ex Parte Sprout, 1 Cranch C.C. 424 (C.C.D.C. 1807), a case which applies none of the federal statutes or rules of criminal procedure discussed above and has been cited by no other circuit court since 1825-are frivolous.
For the reasons stated above and in my Final Report and Recommendation, I continue to RECOMMEND that this case be SUMMARILY DISMISSED because it plainly appears from the petition and the record of prior proceedings that Annamalai is not entitled to a federal writ of habeas corpus. See  at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rules 1 & 4).
I DIRECT the Clerk to terminate the referral of this case to me.


Plaintiff, the United States of America, opposes the motion of Defendants, Sheriff C.T. Woody, Jr., in his official capacity (the Sheriff), and the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office (collectively, Defendants), to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, because, first, sovereign immunity bars the suit; and, second, the Complaint does not adequately plead that the Sheriff, as an arm of the Commonwealth of Virginia, was Emily Hall’s employer. The Court should reject these arguments, because sovereign immunity does not bar suits by the Federal Government against States, and the Complaint adequately pleads that the Sheriff, in his official capacity, was Ms. Hall’s employer under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendants also argue that the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed as a party, because the Office is not sui juris. To the extent that, as Defendants claim, the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office is legally identical to the Sheriff in his official capacity, the United States does not oppose dismissing the Office as a party.
On March 2, 2016, the United States filed this action alleging that Defendants violated Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111−12117, by discriminating against Emily Hall, a qualified individual with a disability. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to reassign Ms. Hall to a vacant position for which she was qualified as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
A motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) “addresses whether [the plaintiff] has a right to be in the district court at all and whether the court has the power to hear and dispose of [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012). A court should grant such a motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int’l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the other hand, “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Jones v. HCA, 16 F. Supp. 3d 622, 628 (E.D. Va. 2014). To survive such a motion, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[A] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jones, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 628 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A court considering either type of motion assumes that the facts alleged in the complaint are true and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.; see also Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)(court considering a motion to dismiss “contend[ing] that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based” affords the plaintiff “the same procedural protection as [the plaintiff] would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration”).
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action against a State by the United States, because “States retain no sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government.” West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (1987); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) (“[N]othing in [the Eleventh Amendment] or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the United States.”).
The Sheriff argues that (1) he is a constitutional officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia, see Va. Const. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1; Hilton v. Amburgey, 198 Va. 727, 729 (1957); (2) a suit against a Virginia officer in his official capacity is a suit against Virginia, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); and (3) sovereign immunity bars suits against States, see generally Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). It is true that this suit against the Sheriff in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia. But sovereign immunity “does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999); see also Amaram v. Va. State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“[S]overeign immunity does not prohibit all suits against a state.”), aff’d, 261 F. App’x 552 (4th Cir. 2008). Rather, sovereign immunity applies “only in the absence of [state] consent.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. By ratifying the Constitution, States consented to suits against them by the Federal Government. Id.; Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328−29 (1934) (collecting cases). Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not apply to suits brought by the Federal Government.
Our holding  that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages . . . .
Id. at 374 n.9 (emphasis added). As the Fourth Circuit has reiterated, where “the Federal Government has ‘deem[ed] the case of sufficient importance to take action against the State,’” sovereign immunity does not apply. Chao v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 760) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar suit by Secretary of Labor against Virginia agency under Fair Labor Standards Act).
Every circuit to have considered the question agrees that the Federal Government may sue a State for money damages under federal civil rights laws, including the ADA. See, e.g., United States v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The United States is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing a state to enforce federal law and obtain the relief authorized by the ADA.”); United States v. Ala. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 673 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well-settled that the United States may obtain victim-specific relief on behalf of a particular individual without offending the Eleventh Amendment.”); E.E.O.C. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 288 F.3d 296, 300−01 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[S]overeign immunity does not bar this suit, which is brought independently by an agency of the United States government.”); E.E.O.C. v. Ky. Ret. Sys., 16 Fed. App’x 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (“We agree that had the suit been brought by a private individual, it would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, this suit was brought by the EEOC, a federal agency . . . .”).
The Sheriff is a constitutional officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Va. Const. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1; Hilton, 198 Va. at 729. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the State itself. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Those facts would require dismissal of a private action for money damages, but they are no bar to this suit by the United States. This action should not be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).
[A] sheriff in his or her individual capacity is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Implicit in this conclusion is the proposition that either the sheriff’s office or the sheriff in his or her official capacity is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. After all, persons working in a sheriff’s office must work for someone.
Id. at 513−14 (citations omitted).
Several courts, including this one, have allowed complaints to proceed against Virginia sheriffs as “employers” under federal employment discrimination laws, despite sheriffs’ status as constitutional officers. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1247 (4th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal of Title VII claim against Virginia sheriff in his official capacity); Koger v. Woody, No. CIV.A. 3:09CV90, 2009 WL 1766639, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 22, 2009) (Payne, J.) (granting in part and denying in part Sheriff Woody’s motion to dismiss Title VII suit against him in his official capacity); King v. McMillan, No. CIVA 7:05CV00521, 2006 WL 2126279, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2006) (denying sheriff’s motion to dismiss Title VII suit against him in his official capacity).
The proper inquiry is whether the Complaint contains sufficient “factual content [to] allow the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the Sheriff in his official capacity was Ms. Hall’s employer. Jones, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 628 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12112(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). It does. The Complaint alleges that Defendants controlled the terms and conditions of Ms. Hall’s employment. See Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The determination of whether a particular entity is an employer [under federal employment discrimination laws] involves an examination of whether the alleged employer exercises control over the manner and means of the plaintiff’s work.”). Because “[t]he precise contours of an employment relationship can only be established by a careful factual inquiry . . . . it is ordinarily inappropriate for courts to apply [an] employer test at the motion to dismiss stage.” Harris v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, No. CIV. WDQ-14-3395, 2015 WL 5083502, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This case is no exception.
The Sheriff fired Ms. Hall by sending her “a letter . . . informing her that she was terminated from her position as Deputy Sheriff, effective May 10, 2013, due to ‘organizational need,’” Compl. ¶ 27.
Because the Complaint “allege[s] sufficient facts showing that an employment relationship is plausible,” Harris, 2015 WL 5083502, at *4, the Complaint should not be dismissed.
Regardless of whether the Sheriff in his official capacity is legally interchangeable with the Commonwealth of Virginia for all purposes, the Complaint sufficiently pleads that he was Ms. Hall’s “employer” under the ADA. This action should not be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The United States does not oppose the motion of the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office to dismiss the Office as a party to this action, insofar as a Virginia constitutional officer in his official capacity and his office are “one and the same under Virginia law,” Leuenberger v. Spicer, No. 5:15-CV-00036, 2016 WL 355090, at *6 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2016).
Some courts have concluded that a plaintiff may sue a Virginia “sheriff’s office” such as the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office under federal employment discrimination laws. E.g., Briggs, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 513−14. In Briggs, the court reasoned, first, that the Virginia Code and the Virginia Attorney General use the terms “sheriff’s office” and “sheriff” interchangeably, and, second, that “it is not uncommon for a sheriff’s office to appear as a named party in Virginia courts.” Id. at 514 (collecting cases). This Court, however, has joined other courts in this Circuit in concluding that a “Sheriff’s Department is not sui juris, and any claims against [a] Sheriff’s Department [should be] dismissed from th[e] action.” Francis v. Woody, No. CIV.A. 3:09CV235, 2009 WL 1442015, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 22, 2009) (Payne, J.). The United States takes no position on this issue in this action and does not oppose dismissal of the “Richmond City Sheriff’s Office” as a party, insofar as the Sheriff in his official capacity and the Office are identical for purposes of liability and relief.
The Court should deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.
1 “Title VII . . . defines ‘employer’ in essentially the same way as the ADA.” Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th Cir. 2012); accord Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Title VII . . . and the ADA define ‘employer’ essentially the same way.”).
2 Virginia law also grants sheriffs exclusive authority to hire and fire deputy sheriffs. See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1603.
Counsel for Defendants C.T. Woody, Jr., Sheriff, City of Richmond, et al.