text:
New York statutory provision that bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 7-12.
(a) State classifications based on alienage are "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 . P. 7.
(b) The statute discriminates against a class and is subject to strict scrutiny since it is directed at aliens and only aliens are harmed by it even though its bar against them is not absolute in that those who have applied for citizenship or those not qualified to apply who have filed statements of intent may participate in the assistance programs. Graham v. Richardson, supra; cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 -505, n. 11. Pp. 7-9.
(c) Any incentive through the statute for an alien to become naturalized is not a proper state concern, since control over immigration and naturalization is exclusively a federal function. P. 10.
(d) The naturalization incentive (even if that could be accepted, arguendo, as a justification) or the further justification asserted by appellants, viz., that the financial assistance program is confined to actual or potential voters, thus enhancing the educational level of the electorate, cannot be deemed adequate to support the statute's ban. If the [432 U.S. 1, 2] encouragement of naturalization through such programs were adequate, every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. And the claimed interest in educating the electorate would not be frustrated by including resident aliens in the assistance program. Pp. 10-12.
406 F. Supp. 1233, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 12. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 15. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 17.
Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General.
Michael Davidson argued the cause for appellee Mauclet. With him on the brief was Kevin Kennedy. Gary J. Greenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee Rabinovitch.
New York, by statute, bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education. N. Y. Educ. Law 661 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). This litigation presents a constitutional challenge to that statute.
The statute obviously serves to bar from the assistance programs the participation of all aliens who do not satisfy its terms. Since many aliens, such as those here on student visas, may be precluded by federal law from establishing a permanent residence in this country, see, e. g., 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (15) (F) (i); 22 CFR 41.45 (1976), the bar of 661 (3) is of practical significance only to resident aliens. The Court has observed of this affected group: "Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973).
Appellee Jean-Marie Mauclet is a citizen of France and has lived in New York since April 1969. He has been a permanent resident of the United States since November of that year. He is married to a United States citizen and has a child by that marriage. The child is also a United States citizen. App. 49. Mauclet by affidavit stated: "Although I am presently qualified to apply for citizenship and intend to reside [432 U.S. 1, 5] permanently in the United States, I do not wish to relinquish my French citizenship at this time." 5 Id., at 50. He applied for a tuition assistance award to aid in meeting the expenses of his graduate studies at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Because of his refusal to apply for United States citizenship, his application was not processed. Id., at 49-50.
Appellee Alan Rabinovitch is a citizen of Canada. He was admitted to this country in 1964 at the age of nine as a permanent resident alien. He is unmarried and, since his admission, has lived in New York with his parents and a younger sister, all of whom are Canadian citizens. He registered with Selective Service on his 18th birthday. He graduated in 1973 from the New York public school system. Id., at 68, 71. As a result of a commendable performance on the competitive Regents Qualifying Examinations, Rabinovitch was informed that he was qualified for, and entitled to, a Regents college scholarship and tuition assistance. He later was advised, however, that the offer of the scholarship was withdrawn since he intended to retain his Canadian citizenship. Id., at 69, 25. Rabinovitch entered Brooklyn College without financial aid from the State. He states that he "does not intend to become a naturalized American, but . . . does intend to continue to reside in New York." Id., at 65.
Mauclet and Rabinovitch each brought suit in United States District Court (Mauclet in the Western District of New York and Rabinovitch in the Eastern District), alleging that the citizenship bar of 661 (3) was unconstitutional. The same three-judge court was convened for each of the cases. Subsequently, it was ordered that the cases be heard together. App. 45. After cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court in a unanimous opinion ruled in appellees' favor. It held that 661 (3) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the citizenship [432 U.S. 1, 6] requirement served to discriminate unconstitutionally against resident aliens. 6 406 F. Supp. 1233 (WDNY and EDNY 1976). Its enforcement was enjoined in separate judgments. App. 103, 106.
Appellants claim that 661 (3) should not be subjected to such strict scrutiny because it does not impose a classification [432 U.S. 1, 8] based on alienage. 9 Aliens who have applied for citizenship, or, if not qualified for it, who have filed a statement of intent to apply as soon as they are eligible, are allowed to participate in the assistance programs. Hence, it is said, the statute distinguishes "only within the `heterogeneous' class of aliens" and "does not distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non." Brief for Appellants 20. 10 Only statutory classifications of the latter type, appellants assert, warrant strict scrutiny.
Graham v. Richardson, supra, undermines appellants' position. In that case, the Court considered an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits on aliens but not on citizens. Like the New York statute challenged here, the Arizona statute served to discriminate only within the class of aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled to welfare [432 U.S. 1, 9] benefits. The Court nonetheless subjected the statute to strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The important points are that 661 (3) is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class. 11 Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 -505, n. 11 (1976); 12 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 , 172 (1972).
Appellants also assert that there are adequate justifications for 661 (3). First, the section is said to offer an incentive for aliens to become naturalized. Second, the restriction on [432 U.S. 1, 10] assistance to only those who are or will become eligible to vote is tailored to the purpose of the assistance program, namely, the enhancement of the educational level of the electorate. Brief for Appellants 22-25. Both justifications are claimed to be related to New York's interest in the preservation of its "political community." See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 642 -643, 647-649; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 642 , the Court recognized that the State's interest "in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within `the basic conception of a political community'" might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, 14 or of "elective or important nonelective" officials "who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy." Id., at 647. See id., at 648. In re Griffiths, decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court rule limiting the practice of law to citizens. 413 U.S., at 729 .
Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role - perhaps even a leadership role - in other areas of import to the community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.
Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees' claim that it also intrudes upon Congress' comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 378 ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
[ Footnote 1 ] There also are other special competitive awards: Regents professional education in nursing scholarships, N. Y. Educ. Law 605 (2) and 671 [432 U.S. 1, 3] (McKinney Supp. 1976); Regents professional education in medicine or dentistry scholarships, 605 (3) and 672; Regents physician shortage scholarships, 605 (4) and 673; Regents war veteran scholarships, 605 (5) and 674; and Regents Cornell University scholarships, 605 (6).
[ Footnote 2 ] The loan program is largely subsidized by the Federal Government. See 20 U.S.C. 1071 to 1087-2 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). (In fiscal 1976 the federal expenditure for New York's loan program was $67,208,000 and the state contribution was $9,466,000. Brief for Appellants 8 n.[*] and 17 n.[*].) Although it appears that federal administrators have not lodged objections to the State's practice of disqualifying certain resident aliens, see App. 82, the federal standards would make eligible for assistance an alien student who "is in the United States for other than a temporary purpose and intends to become a permanent resident thereof." 45 CFR 177.2 (a) (1976).
[ Footnote 3 ] This requirement is not the subject of challenge here. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970).
[ Footnote 4 ] Section 661 (3) replaced former 602 (2) of the State's Education Law, in effect at the times appellees' complaints were filed. 1974 N. Y. Laws, c. 942. Clause (d) was added after the commencement of the suits. 1975 N. Y. Laws, c. 663, 1. Since clause (d) serves to make a class of aliens eligible for aid without regard to citizenship or intent to apply for citizenship, its inclusion serves to undermine the State's arguments as to the purposes served by the first three clauses. See n. 13, infra.
[ Footnote 5 ] In order to become a United States citizen, Mauclet would be required to renounce his French citizenship. 8 U.S.C. 1448 (a).
[ Footnote 6 ] Other courts also have held that discrimination against resident aliens in the distribution of educational assistance is impermissible. See, e. g., Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577 (CA3 1972); Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178 (ND Miss. 1974), appealed on damages and aff'd, 538 F.2d 1166 (CA5 1976), cert. pending, No. 76-832.
[ Footnote 7 ] Appellants also argue that the District Court should not have reached the question of the applicability of 661 (3) to the loan program because appellee Rabinovitch, who alone challenged this aspect of the assistance program, had not been denied a loan. Hence, appellants assert, he lacks standing. Early in the litigation, however, Rabinovitch submitted an unrebutted affidavit to the effect that he believed that he "may require student loans to help cover the cost of" his education and that he was "barred from receiving a student loan simply because of [his] status as an alien." App. 71. Indeed, appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of 661 (3). 406 F. Supp., at 1235. It is clear, therefore, that Art. III adverseness existed between the parties and that the dispute is a concrete one. The only obstacle to standing, under the circumstances, would arise from prudential considerations. And we see no reason to postpone resolution of the dispute. Rabinovitch has been denied other forms of aid and little is to be served by requiring him now to go through the formality of submitting an application for a loan, in light of the certainty of its denial. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977). Until oral argument, appellants suggested no reason why the loan program should differ from the other forms of assistance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. In the absence of a more timely suggestion supporting a distinction among the forms of aid, we think that nothing is to be gained by adjudicating the validity of 661 (3) with regard to only two of the three primary assistance programs. After all, the single statutory proscription applies with equal force to all the programs.
[ Footnote 8 ] In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court applied relaxed scrutiny in upholding the validity of a federal statute that conditioned an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on the satisfaction of a durational residency requirement, but imposed no similar burden on citizens. The appellants can draw no solace from the case, however, because the Court was at pains to emphasize that Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States. Id., at 84-87. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 -101 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n. 6 (1976).
It is perhaps worthy of note that the Medicare program under consideration in Diaz granted a permanent resident alien eligibility when he had resided in the United States for five years. Five years' residence is also the generally required period under federal law before an alien may seek to be naturalized. 8 U.S.C. 1427 (a). Yet, ironically, this is precisely the point at which, in New York, a resident must petition for naturalization or, irrespective of declared intent, lose his eligibility for higher education assistance.
"In a world of unmatched scientific progress and technological advance, as well as of unparalleled danger to human freedom, learning has never been more crucial to man's safety, progress and individual fulfillment. In the state and nation higher education no longer is a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival." 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, 1 (a).
And, in any event, the Court noted in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), that classifications based on alienage "are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired."
"This argument defies logic. Those aliens who apply, or agree to apply when eligible, for citizenship are relinquishing their alien status. Because some aliens agree under the statute's coercion to change their status does not alter the fact that the classification is based solely on alienage." 406 F. Supp., at 1235.
[ Footnote 11 ] Our Brother REHNQUIST argues in dissent that strict scrutiny is inappropriate because under 661 (3) a resident alien can voluntarily withdraw from disfavored status. But this aspect of the statute hardly distinguishes our past decisions. By the logic of the dissenting opinion, the suspect class for alienage would be defined to include at most only those who have resided in this country for less than five years, since after that time, if not before, resident aliens are generally eligible to become citizens. 8 U.S.C. 1427 (a). The Court has never suggested, however, that the suspect class is to be defined so narrowly. In fact, the element of voluntariness in a resident alien's retention of alien status is a recognized element in several of the Court's decisions. For example, the Court acknowledged that In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), involved an appellant who was eligible for citizenship, but who had not filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and had "no present intention of doing so." Id., 718 n. 1. And, insofar as the record revealed, nothing precluded the appellees in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), from applying for citizenship. Id., at 650 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST argued in dissent there, just as he does here today, that strict scrutiny was inappropriate in those cases because there was nothing to indicate that the aliens' status "cannot be changed by their affirmative acts." Id., at 657. Nonetheless, the Court applied strict scrutiny in the cases. We see no reason to depart from them now.
"That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children."
[ Footnote 13 ] In support of the justifications offered for 661 (3), appellants refer to a statement of purpose in legislation adopted in 1961 that substantially amended the State's aid programs. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, 1. But the statement speaks only in general terms of encouraging education so as "to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations," 1 (a), and of developing fully a "reservoir of talent and future leadership," 1 (c) - purposes that would be served by extending aid to resident aliens as well as to citizens - and hardly supports appellants in clear and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the statutory discrimination against aliens with regard to certain Regents scholarships dates from long before. 1920 N. Y. Laws, c. 502, 1. And the very 1961 legislation on which appellants rely abolished the statutory disqualification of aliens in favor of an administrative rule. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 391, 2 and 18. See also 7, 14, and 19. In fact, it appears that the state administrators of the aid programs did not find the purposes in the 1961 legislation that appellants urge, since between 1961 and 1969, when the precursor of 661 (3) was [432 U.S. 1, 11] adopted, resident aliens were allowed to receive tuition assistance awards. Brief for Appellants 15.
[ Footnote 14 ] See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), summarily aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
[ Footnote 15 ] Although the record does not reveal the number of aliens who are disqualified by 661 (3), there is a suggestion that the number may be exceedingly small. See Brief for Appellee Mauclet 9 n. 4. Indeed, when asked about the cost of including aliens, appellants conceded at oral argument that "we may not be speaking about very much." Tr. of Oral [432 U.S. 1, 12] Arg. 6. Thus, it appears that the inclusion of resident aliens in the assistance programs will have an insubstantial impact on the cost of the programs. And, in any event, the suggestion that the State can favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of benefits was largely rejected in Graham v. Richardson, supra.
With one exception, the prior cases upon which the Court purports to rely involved statutes which prohibited aliens from engaging in certain occupations or professions, thereby impairing their ability to earn a livelihood. See, e. g., Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto [432 U.S. 1, 13] Rico statute permitted only United States citizens to practice as private civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (membership in state bar limited to citizens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (participation in State's competitive civil service limited to citizens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state statute denied fishing license to persons "ineligible to citizenship"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (state constitution required employers to hire "not less than eighty (80) per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (city ordinance discriminatorily enforced against aliens so as to prevent Chinese subjects, but not United States citizens, from operating laundries within the city). The only other case striking down a classification on the basis of alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), involved the denial of welfare benefits essential to sustain life for aliens, while needy citizens were given such benefits. The Court has noted elsewhere the crucial role which such benefits play in providing the poor with "means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (footnote omitted).
In this case the State is not seeking to deprive aliens of the essential means of economic survival. Rather, pursuant to its broad power to regulate its education system, the State has chosen to provide some types of individuals - those it considers most likely to provide a long-range return to the local and national community - certain added benefits to facilitate participation in its system of higher education. The State is certainly not preventing aliens from obtaining an education, and indeed it is clear that appellees may attend New York colleges and universities on an equal footing with citizens. However, beyond that, the State has provided certain economic incentives to its own citizens to induce them to pursue higher studies, which in the long run will be a benefit to the [432 U.S. 1, 14] State. The State has not deemed such incentives as necessary or proper as to those aliens who are unwilling to declare their commitment to the community in which they reside by declaring their intent to acquire citizenship. Such simple declaration is all that the statute requires.
In my view, the Constitution of the United States allows States broad latitude in carrying out such programs. Where a fundamental personal interest is not at stake - and higher education is hardly that - the State must be free to exercise its largesse in any reasonable manner. New York, like most other States, does not have unlimited funds to provide its residents with higher education services; it is equally clear that the State has every interest in assuring that those to whom it gives special help in obtaining an education have or declare some attachment indicating their intent to remain within the State to practice their special skills. It has no interest in providing these benefits to transients from another country who are not willing to become citizens. The line drawn by the State is not a perfect one - and few lines can be - but it does provide a rational means to further the State's legitimate objectives. Resident individuals who are citizens, or who declare themselves committed to the idea of becoming American citizens, are more likely to remain in the State of New York after their graduation than are aliens whose ties to their country of origin are so strong that they decline to sever them in order to secure these valuable benefits.
I therefore conclude that the State of New York has not acted impermissibly in refusing to dispense its limited tax revenues to give assistance to aliens who by clear implication reject the opportunity to become citizens of the United States. Beyond the specific case, I am concerned that we not obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.
If a State desires - and has the means - nothing in the United States Constitution prevents it from voluntarily giving [432 U.S. 1, 15] scholarships to aliens, even to those who reject United States citizenships. But nothing heretofore found in the Constitution compels a State to apply its finite resources to higher education of aliens who have demonstrated no permanent attachment to the United States and who refuse to apply for citizenship.
"The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
"The future progress of the state and nation and the general welfare of the people depend upon the individual development of the maximum number of citizens to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations." 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, 1 (a).
As long as its program neither discriminates "on the basis of alienage," Graham v. Richardson, supra, at 372, nor conflicts with federal immigration and naturalization policy, it is my view that New York legitimately may reserve its scholarship assistance to citizens, and to those resident aliens who [432 U.S. 1, 17] declare their intention to become citizens, of both the Nation and the State.
[ Footnote * ] The Court's reliance on the personal status of the appellant in In re Griffiths is misplaced. Our observation that Griffiths herself was eligible for citizenship but did not intend to apply, 413 U.S., at 718 n. 1, was hardly more than a factual "aside." The challenge in that case was to [432 U.S. 1, 16] a Connecticut Rule of Court that flatly required an applicant for admission to the bar to be a citizen of the United States. Neither eligibility for naturalization nor intent to apply was relevant under the Connecticut scheme. There was no question that Griffiths had standing to challenge a classification against all aliens, just as Mauclet and Rabinovitch unquestionably have standing to challenge the classification before us today. Yet because the scheme in In re Griffiths "totally exclud[ed] aliens from the practice of law," id., at 719, we had no occasion in that case to consider whether a more narrowly tailored rule would be permissible. Had we done so, we would have confronted the additional question, not presented here, whether the exclusion improperly burdened the right to follow a chosen occupation. Cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
I am troubled by the somewhat mechanical application of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence to this case. I think one can accept the premise of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and therefore agree with the Court that classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect, but nonetheless feel that this case is wrongly decided. In those cases, the reason postulated for the elevation of alienage classifications to strict scrutiny was directly related to the express exclusion of aliens found in the State's classification. Here, however, we have a significantly different case. The State's classification trenches not at all upon the sole reason underlying the strict scrutiny afforded alienage classifications by this Court.
"Aliens as a class are a prime example of a `discrete and insular' minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 -153, n. 4 (1938)) for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
It is clear, therefore, that the reason alienage classifications receive heightened judicial scrutiny is because aliens, qua aliens, are a "discrete and insular" minority. See also Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 642. Presumptively, such a minority group, like blacks or Orientals, is one identifiable by [432 U.S. 1, 18] a status over which the members are powerless. Cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974). And it is no doubt true that all aliens are, at some time, members of a discrete and insular minority in that they are identified by a status which they are powerless to change until eligible to become citizens of this country. Since, as the Court notes, federal law generally requires five years' residence by aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence as a prerequisite to the seeking of naturalization, 8 U.S.C. 1427 (a), aliens residing in this country necessarily are subject to a period of time during which they must bear this status of an "alien." 1 If a classification, therefore, places aliens in one category, and citizens in another, then, thereafter, every entering resident alien must pass through a period of time in this country during which he falls into the one category and [432 U.S. 1, 19] not the other. Nothing except time can remove him from his identified status as an "alien" and from whatever associated disabilities the statute might place on one occupying that status. In this sense, it is possible to view aliens as a discrete and insular minority, since they are categorized by a factor beyond their control.
While the majority seems to view Graham v. Richardson as somehow different, ante, at 8-9, it is clear that the statute involved in that case suffered from the same weakness. By making aliens, but not citizens, await a durational residency requirement, aliens coming into the State were, because of their status, treated differently from citizens for a period of time, and during that period of time, the incoming aliens were [432 U.S. 1, 20] powerless to remove themselves from that disability (unless they could become citizens). There was nothing else the alien could do to avoid the period of discriminatory treatment.
Since the New York statute under challenge in this case does not create a discrete and insular minority by placing an inevitable disability based on status, the Court's heightened judicial scrutiny is unwarranted. The reason for the more rigorous constitutional test having ceased, the applicability of the test should likewise cease. Applying the rational-basis test, it is obvious that the statutory scheme in question should be sustained. The funds that New York wishes to spend on its higher education assistance programs are, of course, limited. New York's choice to distribute these limited funds to resident citizens and to resident aliens who intend to become citizens, while denying them to aliens who have no intention of becoming citizens, is a natural legislative judgment. By limiting the available pool of recipients to resident citizens and aliens who will become citizens, New York is able to give such recipients a larger payment from the same quantum of funds than would be the case were other aliens recipients as well. A State is entitled to decide, in distributing benefits, that resident citizens, whether or not they will remain residents of New York, are more likely to contribute to the future well-being of the State, either directly (by settling there) or indirectly (by living in some other State, but maintaining economic or social ties with New York or by improving the general well-being of the United States) than are aliens who are unwilling to renounce citizenship in a foreign country, and who may be thought more likely to return there. New [432 U.S. 1, 22] York may also decide, in providing student loans pursuant to N. Y. Educ. Law 680-684 (McKinney Supp. 1976), that it will be easier to collect repayment sums from citizens than from aliens, should these loans be defaulted upon. These are permissible legislative judgments. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977). When we deal, as we do here, with questions of economic legislation, our deference to the actions of a State is extremely great. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). New York's decision to deny educational monetary benefits to aliens who do not wish to become citizens of this country, while extending such benefits to citizens and other resident aliens, is rational, and should be sustained.
Section 1430 (a) establishes a three-year residency requirement for aliens whose spouse is a citizen of the United States. See also 8 U.S.C. 1434. Sections 1430 (b), (c), and (d) establish special categories where no prior residence in this country is required. They constitute de minimis exceptions, and may be properly ignored in considering alienage classifications.
"[The plaintiff] is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States for more than three years, 8 U.S.C. 1430 (a). She has not filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, 8 U.S.C. 1445(f), and has no present intention of doing so."
The eligibility of plaintiff in that case, however, was not built into the classification scheme. The state-court rule prevented any alien from becoming an attorney, and of course reached those resident aliens who, having not satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to citizenship, could not change their disfavored status.
[ Footnote 3 ] As the Court notes, the state statutory scheme is challengeable at all only by resident aliens. Ante, at 4. While other aliens are also disqualified by the state statute in question, they are also decisively disqualified by federal law from establishing a permanent residence in this country, see 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (15) (F) (i); 22 CFR 41.45 (1976); cf. 45 CFR 177.2 (a) (1976). Since there is no question of the plenary power of the Federal Government in this area, see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court is quite properly concerned only with the category of resident aliens, those "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20). See generally In re Griffiths, supra, at 719-722; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).

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§ 52-1. Corporation Commission or Commission defined.
§ 52-1.1. Corporations for producing, transmitting or transporting natural gas.
§ 52-2. Foreign gas pipeline corporations - License.
§ 52-4. Right-of-way must be granted by charter and damages paid - Damages.
§ 52-5. Construction and operation of pipelines - Safety regulations - Markers - Promulgation of rules - Personnel - Expenses.
§ 52-5.1. Cooperation with other agencies.
§ 52-5.2. Deposit of monies collected in Corporation Commission Revolving Fund.
§ 52-6. Repealed by Laws 1968, c. 73, § 3, eff. March 25, 1968.
§ 52-7. Necessity of incorporation.
§ 52-8. Plat and information showing trunk lines - Filing with Corporation Commission.
§ 52-9. Domestic pipeline companies - Erection of pumping stations.
§ 52-10. Pipeline companies may cross highways, bridges, etc. - Supplying gas to landowner.
§ 52-21. Businesses and persons subject to act - Vested rights excepted.
§ 52-22. Pipeline right-of-way - Eminent domain - Highways.
§ 52-23. Pipeline operators common purchasers - Requirements - Exemptions.
§ 52-24. Pipeline companies declared common carriers - Discrimination - Exemptions.
§ 52-24.1. Refusal to purchase or transport natural gas - Complaint - Hearing - Orders.
§ 52-24.3. Repealed by Laws 1999, c. 317, § 5, emerg. eff. June 4, 1999.
§ 52-24.5. Discriminatory fees – Open access – Commission authority.
§ 52-25. Parties not complying with act not to own gas wells, etc.
§ 52-26. Prerequisite to carrying gas - Filing acceptance and plats - Records for Corporation Commission.
§ 52-27. Right-of-way - Highways - Eminent domain - Foreign corporations - Negligent injuries.
§ 52-28. Filing records or plats with Corporation Commission - Extension of time.
§ 52-29. Production levels of gas wells - Rulemaking - Hardship wells - Field rules.
§ 52-30. Meters - Reports.
§ 52-30.1. Electronic natural gas measuring systems - Audit of certain leases and collection of royalties.
§ 52-31. Violation of act - Punishment.
§ 52-32. Violations - Receivership - procedure.
§ 52-33. Evidence - Certified transcripts of reports of gas companies.
§ 52-34. Enforcement by Corporation Commission - Appeals.
§ 52-35. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 68, § 1, emerg. eff. April 10, 1980.
§ 52-36.2. Public interest and welfare.
§ 52-36.3. Condemnation of subsurface stratum or formation - Operation of storage facilities - Limitations.
§ 52-36.4. Certificate of Commission.
§ 52-36.5. Petition to district court - Examination and determination - Subsequent proceedings.
§ 52-36.6. Ownership of gas.
§ 52-41. Gas from interstate pipelines - License from Corporation Commission.
§ 52-42. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 340, § 3, emerg. eff. June 9, 1993.
§ 52-43. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 340, § 3, emerg. eff. June 9, 1993.
§ 52-44. Gas to be furnished through meters at meter rates - Exceptions.
§ 52-45. Violations of act misdemeanor - Punishment.
§ 52-46.1. Ammonia - Commercial fertilizers - Transportation by pipeline.
§ 52-46.2. Hearing and determination of applications - Appeals.
§ 52-46.4. Rules and regulations.
§ 52-47.3. Powers and duties of Commission.
§ 52-47.4. Inspection, operation and maintenance plan.
§ 52-47.5. Determination of hazardous transportation system - Corrective action - Emergencies.
§ 52-47.6. Violations - Penalties.
§ 52-47.7. Action to redress or restrain violation.
§ 52-51. Oil companies must comply with statute - "Petroleum" defined.
§ 52-54. Common purchasers of oil - Required to purchase - Discrimination prohibited.
§ 52-55. Chapter inapplicable to businesses not of public consequence.
§ 52-56. Oil carriers are common carriers - Discrimination prohibited.
§ 52-57. Oil carriers not to be interested in producing.
§ 52-58. Acceptance of laws and plats to be filed.
§ 52-59. Domestic pipeline companies have right-of-way.
§ 52-60. Eminent domain extended to oil pipelines same as railroads.
§ 52-61. Eminent domain, who may have - Foreign corporations.
§ 52-62. Commission may extend time for filing plats.
§ 52-63. Penalty for violations.
§ 52-64. Suspension of penalty, when.
§ 52-65. Certified transcript shall be evidence.
§ 52-66. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 68, § 1, emerg. eff. April 10, 1980.
§ 52-67. Authorization for construction, siting, expansion or operation of crude oil or refined petroleum product pipeline facilities – Schedule of approval.
§ 52-81. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 275, § 15, eff. July 1, 1997.
§ 52-82. Repealed by Laws 1982, c. 354, § 11, operative July 1, 1982.
§ 52-83. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 275, § 15, eff. July 1, 1997.
§ 52-84. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 327, § 6.
§ 52-85. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 327, § 6.
§ 52-86. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 327, § 6.
§ 52-86.2. Waste of oil - Defined - Prohibited - Prevention - Protection of fresh water strata and oil or gas bearing strata.
§ 52-86.3. Waste of gas - Meaning - Prevention - Prohibition - Protection of fresh water and oil or gas bearing strata.
§ 52-86.4. Common source of supply - Orders, rules and regulations.
§ 52-87. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 331, § 2.
§ 52-87.1. Common source of supply of oil - Well spacing and drilling units.
§ 52-87.2. Protest of applications relating to spacing units - Proper parties - Intervention - Report by Corporation Commission.
§ 52-87.3. Application or petition for location exception - Notice of hearing.
§ 52-87.4. Affidavit of election for drilling well under pooling order.
§ 52-87.5. Applications for approval of increased density wells – Notice and hearing.
§ 52-87.7. Corporation Commission jurisdiction.
§ 52-87.8. Horizontal wells – Allocation of costs, production, and proceeds – Application for approval.
§ 52-87.9. Horizontal well unitization for shale reservoirs – Prerequisites – Size - Ownership – Development – Order of the Commission – Consent – Notice – Pooling – Effect – Payment – Commissioners of the Land Office – Retained jurisdiction.
§ 52-88. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 331, § 1.
§ 52-89. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 331, § 1.
§ 52-90. Repealed by Laws 1947, c. 327, § 6.
§ 52-91. Meters on pipelines - Commission to designate type - Inspection - Cost of operation.
§ 52-92. Reports - Oil purchased or transported - Forms - Verification.
§ 52-93. Operators - Books - Oil produced and sold.
§ 52-94. Maps and drawings - Location of pipelines and connections - Verification.
§ 52-95. Reports - Quantity of oil produced and moved - Penalty.
§ 52-96. Verification of reports, statements, maps and drawings.
§ 52-97. Commission - Jurisdiction to make orders, rules and regulations - Hearings.
§ 52-98. Powers of Commission - Marshal of Commission.
§ 52-99. Filing of papers and documents - Use as evidence.
§ 52-100. Witnesses - Depositions.
§ 52-101. Procedure - Rules of - Enforcement of orders and rules.
§ 52-102. Contempt - Punishment - Enforcement of fines - Disposition of fines and penalties.
§ 52-103. Contempt - Proceedings - How commenced - Complaint - Citation.
§ 52-104. Right of entry and inspection by conservation officer, his assistants and deputies.
§ 52-105. Power to close wells - Orders regulating flow and production - Motion or petition for order - Temporary orders.
§ 52-106. Notice on filing of motion or petition.
§ 52-107. Process - Service - How made - Return.
§ 52-108. Oaths - Felony of perjury.
§ 52-109. False verification of documents as perjury - Punishment.
§ 52-110. Market demand - Transportation and marketing facilities - Evidence - Proceedings and hearings.
§ 52-111. Collateral attack on orders, rules and regulations - Appeals - Supreme Court.
§ 52-112. Application to amend or modify orders - Hearing - Appeal.
§ 52-113. Appeals - Power of Supreme Court - Supersedeas - Bond.
§ 52-114. Obstructing or delaying performance of duties a felony.
§ 52-115. Conspiracy to violate act - Punishment.
§ 52-116. Violation of orders, rules and regulations - Injunction - Appeal - Supersedeas.
§ 52-117. Bribery - Punishment.
§ 52-118. Bribery - Accepting bribe - Punishment.
§ 52-119. Bribery - State's evidence - Immunity.
§ 52-120. Powers - Grant of not to restrict general powers.
§ 52-121. Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-122. Repealed by Laws 1941, p. 217, § 5.
§ 52-123. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-124. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-124.1. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-125. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-126. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-127. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-127.1. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 432, § 1.
§ 52-127.2. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-128. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-129. Repealed Laws 1941, p. 217, § 5.
§ 52-130. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-131. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-132. Office of Management and Enterprise Services - Rooms and supplies.
§ 52-133. Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 207, § 6, eff. May 1, 1967.
§ 52-134. Partial invalidity - Effect.
§ 52-135. Pending actions not terminated.
§ 52-136. Application of procedural requirements - Right of appeal - Rules and regulations.
§ 52-137. Powers of cities and towns not limited or restricted.
§ 52-138. Partial invalidity, effect of.
§ 52-139. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Corporation Commission and Department of Environmental Quality.
§ 52-140. Earthen storage ponds - Remedial action.
§ 52-141. Rules and orders - Powers of Commission - Power to file applications with Commission or appear before Commission - Appeals.
§ 52-142. Cooperation and assistance of other environmental agencies.
§ 52-144. Provisions supplemental - Exceptions.
§ 52-145. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 68, § 1, emerg. eff. April 10, 1980.
§ 52-146. Right of condemnation by eminent domain to enforce Commission orders.
§ 52-147. Institution of condemnation proceedings by lessees.
§ 52-149. Conservation Division - Creation - Personnel - Duties - Qualifications.
§ 52-149.1. Oil and gas referees.
§ 52-149.2. Oil and Gas Appellate Referees.
§ 52-150. Repealed by Laws 1981, c. 340, § 28, eff. July 1, 1981.
§ 52-151. Repealed by Laws 1981, c. 340, § 28, eff. July 1, 1981.
§ 52-152. Salaries, costs and expenses - Payment.
§ 52-153. Persons having authority to make investigations, serve orders, etc.
§ 52-154. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 298, § 21, eff. Jan. 5, 1981.
§ 52-201. Compacts with other states authorized - Objectives - Fact finding agency - Uniform conservation and tax laws.
§ 52-202. Interstate compacts - When binding.
§ 52-203. Interstate Compact ratified and confirmed.
§ 52-204. Terms and provisions of compact.
§ 52-205. Governor as official representative of state - Powers and duties - Assistant representatives.
§ 52-206. Clerical, technical and legal assistants - Expenses - Office.
§ 52-207. Interstate Oil Compact Fund - Purpose for which used - Disposition of unexpended balance.
§ 52-208. Duration of Act - Withdrawal from Compact - Credit of funds to General Revenue Fund.
§ 52-209. Repealed Laws 1961, p. 432, § 1.
§ 52-210. Repealed Laws 1961, p. 432, § 1.
§ 52-211. Further extensions - Withdrawal from Compact - Determination and necessary steps.
§ 52-231. Ownership of gas.
§ 52-233. Sale of gas - Prices and amounts of gas to be taken - Delivery.
§ 52-234. Misappropriation of gas - Liability for damages and penalties.
§ 52-235. Misappropriation of gas - Felony of grand larceny.
§ 52-238. Conservation of gas.
§ 52-239. Common source of supply - Apportionment and regulation to prevent waste.
§ 52-240. "Common purchaser" - Discrimination in purchases prohibited - Regulation of purchases.
§ 52-241. Enforcement of act - Hearings before Corporation Commission.
§ 52-242. Appeals to Supreme Court.
§ 52-243. Corporation Commission - Authority to make rules and regulations.
§ 52-244. Pipeline companies - Acceptance of act as prerequisite to right to operate.
§ 52-245. Mine Inspector - Duties unchanged.
§ 52-246. Partial invalidity - Effect.
§ 52-247. Violation - Penalties.
§ 52-248. Declaration of policy.
§ 52-250. Natural gas - Pumping of water for irrigation - Preferred use.
§ 52-251. Prices, terms and conditions - Determination.
§ 52-252. Procedure - Appeals.
§ 52-253. Initiation of proceedings.
§ 52-254. Obligation of well operators.
§ 52-257. Order granting emergency relief.
§ 52-260.1. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.2. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.3. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.4. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.5. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.6. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.7. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.8. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.9. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.10. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.11. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.12. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-260.13. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 310, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1990.
§ 52-261. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 398, § 3, emerg. eff. June 10, 1997.
§ 52-261.1. Repealed by Laws 2000, c. 251, § 4, eff. July 1, 2000.
§ 52-272. Production and sale regulated - Corporation Commission, authority of.
§ 52-273. Waste defined - Regulations to prevent.
§ 52-274. Common source of supply - Restrictions on production when full production would cause waste - Powers of Corporation Commission - Discrimination prohibited.
§ 52-275. Wells gauged - Regulation by Corporation Commission - Agents.
§ 52-276. Enforcement of act - Hearings before Corporation Commission.
§ 52-277. Appeals to Supreme Court - Effect on orders.
§ 52-278. Violation - Penalties.
§ 52-286.1. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.2. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.3. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.4. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.5. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.6. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.7. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.8. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.9. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.10. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.11. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.12. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.13. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.14. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.15. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.16. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-286.17. Repealed by Laws 1951, p. 142, § 16, emerg. eff. May 26, 1951.
§ 52-287.2. Power and authority of Commission.
§ 52-287.3. Matters to be found by Corporation Commission - Requisites of petition.
§ 52-287.4. Order - Units and unit areas - Plan of unitization.
§ 52-287.5. Ratification or approval of plan by lessees and owners.
§ 52-287.6. Procedure - Notice - Appeals.
§ 52-287.8. Status and powers of unit - Liability for expenses - Liens.
§ 52-287.9. Modification of property rights, leases and contracts - Title to property - Distribution of proceeds - Delivery in kind - Effect of operations - Matters not affected.
§ 52-287.10. Enlargement of area - Creation of new units - Amendment of plan.
§ 52-287.11. Participation by public lands.
§ 52-287.12. Receipts as income.
§ 52-287.14. Repealed by Laws 1989, c. 154, § 2, operative July 1, 1989.
§ 52-287.15. Agreements not violative of laws governing monopolies or restraint of trade.
§ 52-288.3. Oklahoma Energy Resources Board.
§ 52-288.4. Board - Composition - Qualifications - Terms - Vacancies - Additional members - First meeting - Compensation and expenses.
§ 52-288.5. Board - Powers, duties and responsibilities.
§ 52-288.5A. Committee for Sustaining Oklahoma's Energy Resources.
§ 52-288.5B. Sustaining Oklahoma's Energy Resources Revolving Fund.
§ 52-288.5C. Transferring the authority of the Commission on Marginally Producing Oil - terminating terms - transferring funds.
§ 52-288.5D. Levying fee to fund Commission.
§ 52-288.5E. Refund of fees levied on production.
§ 52-288.6. Board - Annual meeting - Regular meeting - Quorum - Additional meeting - Appointment of Director.
§ 52-288.7. Energy Resources Revolving Fund.
§ 52-288.8. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 184, § 11, emerg. eff. May 17, 1993.
§ 52-288.8A. Levy of assessment - Remitting - Rate - Collection.
§ 52-288.9. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 184, § 11, emerg. eff. May 17, 1993.
§ 52-288.10. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 184, § 11, emerg. eff. May 17, 1993.
§ 52-288.11. Investment of funds - Utilizing funds to influence governmental action or policy.
§ 52-288.12. Act not to preempt or supersede other state or national programs - Application to rules and amendment of rules - Support of national program.
§ 52-291. Confinement of gas until used.
§ 52-292. Waste from gas pipeline - Unlawful if unnecessary.
§ 52-293. Flambeau lights unlawful.
§ 52-294. Lights - Daytime use prohibited.
§ 52-295. Burning gas during day.
§ 52-296. Refuse from wells - Disposition.
§ 52-296.1. Securing of crude oil storage tanks.
§ 52-297. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-298. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-299. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-300. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-301. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-302. Firing oil or gas, or interfering with appliances unlawful.
§ 52-303. Penalty for violations.
§ 52-304. Repealed by Laws 1941, p. 218, § 1, emerg. eff. June 4, 1941.
§ 52-305. Well drilling within 100 feet of underground coal mines prohibited.
§ 52-306. Workable coal beds or seams defined.
§ 52-307. Drilling of wells through workable seams - Regulations.
§ 52-309. Findings and declarations.
§ 52-310. Leaking wells - Entry upon land to plug, replug or repair - Emergencies.
§ 52-311. Liability for damages.
§ 52-312. Responsibility for future remedial work.
§ 52-313. No admission of liability or discharge of action.
§ 52-317.1. Seeping natural gas - Jurisdiction, power, and authority of the Corporation Commission.
§ 52-318. Remedial work - Contracts upon competitive bids.
§ 52-318.1. Agreement as to compliance with drilling and plugging regulations - Evidence of financial responsibility - Bond - Cost of plugging - Notice - Remedial operations.
§ 52-318.1a. Confidentiality of financial statement.
§ 52-318.3. Notice of intent to drill - Negotiating surface damages.
§ 52-318.4. Undertakings which may be posted as damage deposit.
§ 52-318.5. Negotiating surface damages - Appraisers - Report and exceptions thereto - Jury trial.
§ 52-318.6. Appeal of decision on exceptions to report of appraiser or verdict upon jury trial - Execution of instruments of conveyance.
§ 52-318.7. Effect of act on existing contractual rights and contracts to establish correlative rights - Indian lands.
§ 52-318.8. Effect of act on jurisdiction, authority and power of Corporation Commission.
§ 52-318.9. Violation of act - Damages.
§ 52-318.10. Renumbered as § 320.1 of this title by Laws 2006, c. 309, § 1, emerg. eff. June 8, 2006.
§ 52-318.21. Short title - Seismic Exploration Regulation Act - Definitions.
§ 52-318.22. Seismic exploration operations - Registration - Permits - Requirements - Penalty.
§ 52-318.23. Seismic test hole blasting - Damages.
§ 52-319. Repealed by Laws 1971, c. 25, § 2, eff. March 22, 1971.
§ 52-320. "Growing crops" defined.
§ 52-320.1. Restriction on location of habitable structures.
§ 52-320.2. Unlawful use of safety equipment in oil or gas production.
§ 52-321. Gasoline - Kerosene - Naphtha - Motor fuel - Burning fuel - Sale unlawful unless rules and regulations complied with.
§ 52-322. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-323. Repealed by Laws 1941, p. 467, § 18, emerg. eff. June 7, 1941.
§ 52-324. Repealed by Laws 1945, p. 171, § 6, eff. July 1, 1945.
§ 52-324.1. Fuel inspection and compliance personnel.
§ 52-324.2. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-324.3. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1, emerg. eff. June 13, 1961.
§ 52-324.4. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-324.5. Repealed by Laws 1947, p. 439, § 4, eff. June 1, 1947.
§ 52-324.6. Employees to have no other job, business or profession.
§ 52-324a. Repealed by Laws 1945, p. 171, § 6, eff. July 1, 1945.
§ 52-325. Powers of Corporation Commission - Rules - Specifications.
§ 52-326. Repealed by Laws 1939, p. 354, § 9, eff. July 1, 1939.
§ 52-327. Sale of specified liquids, mixtures or combinations without inspection - Penalty.
§ 52-328. Rules of procedure.
§ 52-329. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-330. Inspections – Refusal to admit inspector - Penalty.
§ 52-331. Repealed by Laws 1945, p. 171, § 6, eff. July 1, 1945.
§ 52-332. Inspection - Samples - Testing - Delivery receptacle not meeting specifications, locking and sealing - Reports.
§ 52-333. Repealed by Laws 1939, p. 354, § 9, eff. July 1, 1939.
§ 52-335. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-336. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-337. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-338. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-339. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-340. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-341. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-342. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-343. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-344. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-345. Repealed by Laws 2004, c. 430, § 23, emerg. eff. June 4, 2004.
§ 52-346. Selling, using or consuming petroleum products not complying with rules and specifications - Tampering with sign, lock or seal - Punishment.
§ 52-347. Labels required for sale of motor fuel with ethanol and methanol mixture from motor fuel pump - Provision of mixture information upon request.
§ 52-348. Inspection by Corporation Commission.
§ 52-371. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-372. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-373. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-374. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-375. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-376. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-377. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-378. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 146, § 29.
§ 52-391. Sale of petroleum products under deception as to quality or identity.
§ 52-392. Marked containers or distributing equipment - Use in selling petroleum products.
§ 52-393. Trademark - Imitation.
§ 52-394. Selling under false mark or name.
§ 52-395. Mixing or blending.
§ 52-396. Aiding violations of act.
§ 52-397. Violation of provisions - Misdemeanor.
§ 52-398. Definitions - Persons liable for violations by firm or corporation.
§ 52-399. Partial invalidity - Effect.
§ 52-420.1. Short title - Definitions.
§ 52-420.2. State Liquefied Petroleum Gas Administrator - Deputies and enforcement officers.
§ 52-420.3. Oklahoma Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board.
§ 52-420.3A. Liability of sellers, suppliers, handlers, or transporters of liquified petroleum gas.
§ 52-420.4. Registration permits - Fees - Insurance requirements.
§ 52-420.5. Fees on sale, purchase, rental and/or use of refillable cylinders and containers - Penalties.
§ 52-420.6. Suspension or revocation of registration permits - Appeals - Rules governing sale or transfer.
§ 52-420.7. Inspections - Proving metering systems - Display of permit - Complaints and arrests - Condemnation of systems and appliances - Duties of Attorney General.
§ 52-420.8. Violations of law or rule.
§ 52-420.9. Specifications for commercial propane, butane and mixtures - Identification of vehicles - Motor carriers - Transportation out of state - Retail deliveries.
§ 52-420.10. Appointment of administrative staff.
§ 52-420.11. Disposition of funds and fees - Annual report - Liquefied Petroleum Gas Fund - Expenditures.
§ 52-420.12. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 68, § 1, emerg. eff. April 10, 1980.
§ 52-420.13. Repealed by Laws 1980, c. 68, § 1, emerg. eff. April 10, 1980.
§ 52-420.14. Nonresidents - Prohibition on storage or dispensing.
§ 52-420.15. Safety schools for liquefied petroleum dealers.
§ 52-420.16. Repealed by Laws 1975, c. 104, § 9, emerg. eff. May 2, 1975.
§ 52-420.17. Inspectors' uniforms - Maintenance and cleaning allowance.
§ 52-420.22. Oklahoma Liquefied Petroleum Gas Research, Marketing and Safety Commission - Creation.
§ 52-420.23. Commission membership - Appointment - Qualifications - Geographical distribution - Employment - Term of office - Vacancies - Chairperson - Travel reimbursement.
§ 52-420.24. Commission powers and duties.
§ 52-420.25. Commission meetings - Appointment of Director.
§ 52-420.26. LP Gas Research, Marketing and Safety Revolving Fund.
§ 52-420.27. Assessment on first sale or import of odorized LP gas - Records of remitted fees - Entry upon business premises - Suspension or revocation of registration permit.
§ 52-420.28. Assessment collection - Penalties.
§ 52-420.29-1. Exports exempted from assessment.
§ 52-420.29-2. Application for refund by purchaser.
§ 52-420.29-3. Petition to Commission for refund.
§ 52-420.30. Certain programs not preempted - Designation of funds for payment of certain programs.
§ 52-420.51. Renumbered as § 130.11 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.52. Renumbered as § 130.12 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.53. Renumbered as § 130.13 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.54. Renumbered as § 130.14 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.55. Renumbered as § 130.15 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.56. Renumbered as § 130.16 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.57. Renumbered as § 130.17 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.58. Renumbered as § 130.18 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.59. Renumbered as § 130.19 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.60. Renumbered as § 130.20 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.61. Renumbered as § 130.21 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.62. Renumbered as § 130.22 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.63. Renumbered as § 130.23 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-420.64. Renumbered as § 130.24 of Title 74 by Laws 1991, c. 235, § 24, eff. July 1, 1991.
§ 52-421. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-421.1. Liquefied petroleum gas emergency - Declaration by Governor.
§ 52-422. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-423. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-424. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-425. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-426. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-427. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-428. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-429. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-430. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-431. Repealed by Laws 1949, p. 373, § 10.
§ 52-432. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-433. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-434. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-435. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-436. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-437. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.1. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.2. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.3. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.4. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.5. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.6. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.7. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.8. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.9. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-438.10. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.1. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.2. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.3. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.4. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.5. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.6. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.7. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-441.8. Repealed by Laws 1953, p. 227, § 14.
§ 52-451. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-452. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-453. Repealed by Laws 1961, p. 433, § 1.
§ 52-472. Terms defined - Pressure - Conversion to standard conditions.
§ 52-473. Determination of factors by Commission - Determination and report of volumes.
§ 52-474. Sales, purchases and deliveries - Adjustment of contract prices.
§ 52-475. Penalty for violations - Civil actions.
§ 52-477. Jurisdiction of Commission not restricted.
§ 52-501. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.
§ 52-502. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.
§ 52-503. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.
§ 52-504. Repealed by Laws 1972, c. 208, § 12, eff. Oct. 1, 1972.
§ 52-505. Repealed by Laws 1972, c. 208, § 12, eff. Oct. 1, 1972.
§ 52-521. Leasing of mineral interests of owners who cannot be located.
§ 52-523. Negotiations by receiver - Deposit of funds - Discharge - Costs.
§ 52-524. Natural gas - Preferred use.
§ 52-525. Agricultural use of natural gas - Price - Installation of lines - Cessation of delivery.
§ 52-526. Irrigation pumps - Providing natural gas - Price - Installation of lines - Cessation of delivery.
§ 52-527. Method of measuring amount of gas.
§ 52-528. State Corporation Commission - Powers and duties - Duty of Operators.
§ 52-529. Liability of operators - Jurisdiction - Venue.
§ 52-540. Renumbered as § 570.10 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 28.
§ 52-540.1. Repealed by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 27, eff. Sept. 1, 1992.
§ 52-541. Renumbered as § 581.2 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-542. Renumbered as § 581.6 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-543. Renumbered as § 581.5 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-544. Renumbered as § 581.7 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-545. Renumbered as § 581.8 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-546. Renumbered as § 581.9 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-547. Renumbered as § 581.10 of this title by Laws 1992, c. 190, § 29.
§ 52-548.1. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-548.2. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-548.3. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-548.4. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-548.5. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-548.6. Repealed by Laws 2010, c. 142, § 13, emerg. eff. April 19, 2010.
§ 52-549.3. Oil and gas lien.
§ 52-549.4. Perfection of oil and gas lien.
§ 52-549.5. Oil and gas commingling.
§ 52-549.6. Rights of purchaser.
§ 52-549.7. Relative priority of oil and gas lien.
§ 52-549.8. Not affected by act.
§ 52-549.9. Waiver, relinquishment, release.
§ 52-549.10. Expiration of oil and gas lien - Enforcement of lien.
§ 52-549.11. Rights of operator.
§ 52-553. Mineral Owner's Fund.
§ 52-554. Transmission of funds - Escrow report - Claims against Mineral Owner's Fund.
§ 52-555. Investment of funds - Apportionment of interest.
§ 52-556. Custody of Mineral Owner's Fund - Transfer of monies to Unclaimed Property Fund.
§ 52-557. Conditions for oil well plugging approval.
§ 52-558. Implementation of act – Rules - Prospective operation.
§ 52-567. Repealed by Laws 1989, c. 241, § 2, eff. July 1, 1989.
§ 52-568. Repealed by Laws 1989, c. 241, § 2, eff. July 1, 1989.
§ 52-569. Renumbered by Laws 1987, c. 189, § 7, operative Nov. 1, 1987.
§ 52-570.3. Application of act.
§ 52-570.4. Sharing of and payment of proceeds - Operator's capacity and duties - Alternative royalty disbursement procedure.
§ 52-570.5. Designation of person for certain royalty, accounting and remittance functions.
§ 52-570.6. Selling royalty gas in kind - Consumption and accounting for royalty gas.
§ 52-570.8. Working interest owner's statement to operator - Nomination of gas for producing owner's account - Producing owner's report - Gas meter owner's statement - First purchaser's or shipper's statement - Records to be maintained - Operator's rights and remedies for noncompliance - Elections and notices - Other remedies.
§ 52-570.9. Production rights of owner - Ownership and payment of proceeds - Working interest owner's rights, duties and liability - Effect of act.
§ 52-570.10. Payment of proceeds from sale of oil and gas production.
§ 52-570.12. Information to be included with payments to interest owner - Calculation of revenue decimals - Measurement of gas volume reported – Electronic dissemination.
§ 52-570.13. Promulgation of rules.
§ 52-570.14. Jurisdiction of district courts - Rulemaking power of Corporation Commission - Right of action of injured owner and costs of suit - Statute of limitations.
§ 52-570.15. Performance pursuant to act - Satisfaction of duties and obligation.
§ 52-581.2. Purpose and intent of act.
§ 52-581.4. Exemptions - Owners ineligible to elect to market share.
§ 52-581.5. Election to market share - Procedure.
§ 52-581.6. Election to market share - Effect.
§ 52-581.7. Amount of gas produced from well.
§ 52-581.8. Distribution of revenues from sale of production.
§ 52-581.9. Construction and application of act.
§ 52-581.10. Enforcement powers of Corporation Commission - Promulgation of rules - Administration fees - Judicial remedies - Costs and expenses - Statute of limitations - Jurisdiction of district courts.
§ 52-606. Valid transfers - Application for approval of transfer - Standards for approval - Waiver - Hearings, adjudications and appeals - Contracts for certain services.
§ 52-607. Fees and costs.
§ 52-608. Hearing relating to act or enforcement - Entities that may initiate - Jurisdiction - Time and place - Notice.
§ 52-609. Powers and authority of Commission.
§ 52-610. Violations - Fines and penalties - Collection of fines.
§ 52-612. Nonresident transferees - Service of process.
§ 52-613. Statute of limitations.
§ 52-614. Application of act.
§ 52-700. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-701. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-702. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-703. Renumbered as Title 52, § 288.5D by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 7, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-704. Renumbered as Title 52, § 288.5E by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 7, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-705. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-706. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-707. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 199, § 6, eff. July 1, 2013.
§ 52-801. Exploration Rights Act of 2011.
§ 52-803. Surface estate – Interference with solar energy agreement – Notice.
§ 52-902. Construction of oil and gas contracts, statutes and governmental orders.
§ 52-903. Failure to pay proceeds from production - Remedies.