text:
Messrs. Ernest W. Gibson, Jr., of Brattleboro, Vt., and C. L. Dawson, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
The petition for certiorari presented two questions: First, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; Second, whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the cause instead of remanding it for a new trial. This second question invoked our jurisdiction in order to obtain an authoritative construction of subdivision (b) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. In part that subdivision provides: 'Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; * * *.' Since the government made no such motion within 10 days after the verdict, petitioner urged here that the Circuit Court of Appeals was without power to dismiss the cause but should have remanded it for a new trial. But while this important point, upon which the Circuit Courts of Appeals are not in complete agreement,3 is one of the two questions upon which the petition for certiorari rested, there is no occasion for us to reach it here. For we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, and we hold that the District Court properly denied the government's motion for a directed verdict in its favor.
It was not necessary that petitioner be bed-ridden, wholly helpless, or that he should abandon every possible effort to work in order for the jury to find that he was totally and permanently disabled.8 It cannot be doubted that if petitioner had refrained from trying to do any work at all, and the same evidence of physical impairment which appears in this record had been offered, a jury could have properly found him totally and permanently disabled. And the jury could have found that his efforts to work—all of which sooner or later resulted in failure—were made not because of his ability to work but because of his unwillingness to live a life of idleness, even though totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of his policies.9 Nor does the fact that he waited thirteen years before bringing suit stand as an insuperable barrier to his recovery. His case was not barred by any statute of limitations. Whatever weight the jury should have given to the circumstance of petitioner's delay in filing his claim, that weight was still for their consideration in connection with all the other evidence in the case.
There was evidence from which a jury could reach the conclusion that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled. That was enough. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered.
Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
2 Cir., 111 F.2d 615.
Compare Conway v. O'Brien, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 611, 613, reversed this day, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S.Ct. 634, 85 L.Ed. —-, with Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 112 F.2d 140, 143. And see United States v. Halliday, 4 Cir., 116 F.2d 812, decided January 9, 1941.
Compare Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879, Ann.Cas.1914D, 1029, with Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636.
See Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 233, 74 L.Ed. 720; Richmond & Danville R.R. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 45, 13 S.Ct. 748, 749, 37 L.Ed. 642; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 606, 12 S.Ct. 905, 908, 36 L.Ed. 829; Sioux City & P. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 663, 21 L.Ed. 745.
Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 559, 560, 54 S.Ct. 272, 275, 276, 78 L.Ed. 492.
See United States v. Rice, 8 Cir., 72 F.2d 676, 677; Nicolay v. United States, 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 170, 173; United States v. Lawson, 9 Cir., 50 F.2d 646, 651; United States v. Godfrey, 1 Cir., 47 F.2d 126, 127; United States v. Phillips, 8 Cir., 44 F.2d 689, 691.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


text:
Caccamise Anthony S. 1915 1957 C Military. Husband of Dorothy L. Caccamise.
Caccamise Dorothy L. 1926 undated C Wife of Anthony S. Caccamise.
Cahoon Gertrude H. 1885 1948 2 Wife of Samuel C. Cahoon.
Cahoon Samuel C. 1884 1935 2 Husband of Gertrude H. Cahoon.
Caiazza Louis V. 17 Sep 1924 29 Jan 1994 C SN, US Navy - WW-II.
Caito Anthony 1887 1974 B Husband of Josephine M. Caito.
Caito Josephine M. 1894 1944 B Wife of Anthony Caito.
Caito Lucia C. 1893 1968 B Wife of Paul F. Caito, Sr.
Caito Paul F., Jr. 1932 1960 B Husband of Maryann Caito.
Caito Paul F., Sr. 1885 1970 B Husband of Lucia C. Caito.
Calarco Antonino 1893 1943 1 Military. Husband of Maria Calarco.
Calarco Carmelo 1886 1971 C Husband of Carrie Calarco.
Calarco Carmelo C. 1923 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Nancy Calarco.
Calarco Carrie 1898 1987 C Wife of Carmelo Calarco.
Calarco Maria 1904 1967 1 Wife of Antonino Calarco.
Calarco Nancy 1926 1995 M/Schwartz Wife of Carmelo C. Calarco.
Callahan Catherine S. 1913 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Vincent R. Callahan.
Callahan John F. 1871 1930 A Husband of Margaret A. Callahan.
Callahan Margaret A. 1872 1947 A Wife of John F. Callahan.
Callahan Thomas J. 27 Mar 1907 30 Nov 1957 A PFC, 9021st Tech Svc Unit TC, - WW-II.
Callahan Vincent R. 1909 1993 M/Schwartz Husband of Catherine S. Callahan.
Callan Emma A. 1886 1969 1 Wife of Lawrence M. Callan.
Callan Jennie E. Curran 1883 1978 M/Schwartz Wife of Thomas J. Callan.
Callan Lawrence M. 1891 1959 1 Military. Husband of Emma A. Callan.
Callan Thomas J. 1871 1955 M/Schwartz Husband of Jennie E. Curran Callan.
Calteaux Nicholas B. 1870 1951 B Husband of Teresa Casey Calteaux.
Calteaux Teresa Casey 1870 1951 B Wife of Nicholas B. Calteaux.
Cameron Joseph W. 1861 1923 A Co. I, 12th US Inf. - WW-I.
Campagna Filippina 1901 1953 C Wife of John Campagna.
Campagna John 1886 1966 C Husband of Filippina Campagna.
Campbell Henry R. 1912 1976 C Husband of Mabel Neth Campbell.
Campbell Herbert C. 26 Sep 1914 30 May 1973 C PFC, US Army - WW-II.
Campbell Mabel Neth 1914 undated C Wife of Henry R. Campbell.
Campobello Margaret 1890 1966 C Wife of Salvatore Campobello.
Campobello Rosario 7 Jun 1922 10 Feb 1932 B Son of Salvator and Margaret Campobello.
Campobello Salvatore 1882 1964 C Husband of Margaret Campobello.
Cane Matthew 24 Sep 1865 1y 2 Son of Charlie & Margaret Cane.
Canty Anna E. 1878 1953 2 Wife of Thomas C. Canty.
Canty Daniel V. 1911 1991 2 Husband of Frances P. Canty.
Canty Gerald L. "Red" 20 Jul 1941 21 Aug 2001 60y Son of Daniel V. & Frances Powers Canty.
Canty J. Edward 21 Nov 1914 6 Apr 1993 2 SSgt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Marie L. Canty.
Canty Joseph C. 1912 1986 2 Husband of Ruth A. Canty.
Canty Leona V. 1909 1976 M/Schwartz Wife of William J. Canty.
Canty Marie L. Townsend 1916 1973 2 Wife of J. Edward Canty.
Canty Ruth A. 1910 1975 2 Wife of Joseph C. Canty.
Canty Thomas C. 1876 1969 2 Husband of Anna E. Canty.
Canty William J. 1906 1977 M/Schwartz Husband of Leona V. Canty.
Capossela Filomena 1878 1954 B Wife of Vito Antonio Capossela.
Capossela Rose M. 1916 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Sebastian Capossela.
Capossela Sebastian 1910 1996 M/Schwartz Husband of Rose M. Capossela.
Capossela Vito Antonio 1867 1943 B Husband of Filomena Capossela.
Cappiello M. Antoinette 1903 1979 2 Wife of Ralph M. Cappiello.
Cappiello Ralph M. 1892 1946 2 Husband of M. Antoinette Cappiello.
Capuano Frank 15 May 1887 28 Apr 1956 D Husband of Lucy Capuano.
Capuano Lucy 23 Jun 1898 24 Sep 1978 D Wife of Frank Capuano.
Carey Bernard 1838 1887 2 Husband of Julia Carey.
Carey John 1879 1881 2 Son of Bernard & Julia Carey.
Carey Julia 1836 1898 2 Wife of Bernard Carey.
Carey Margaret E. 22 Sep 1902 68y 1 Wife of Thomas J. Carey.
Carey Thomas J. 3 Jul 1896 78y 1 Husband of Margaret E. Carey.
Carlina Sebastiana "Anna" 23 Oct 1895 29 Jun 1960 C Wife of Giacehino Carlino, Sr.
Carlino Ann 18 Apr 1918 7 Feb 1995 C Wife of Jack Carlino, Jr.
Carlino Anthony 1884 1959 1 Husband of Florence Carlino.
Carlino Florence 1876 1956 1 Wife of Anthony Carlino.
Carlino Giacehino, Sr. "Jack" 10 Jan 1887 2 Mar 1991 C Husband of Sebastiana Carlino.
Carlino Jack, Jr. 4 May 1916 12 Nov 1992 C Pvt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Ann Carlino.
Carlo Jennie 1899 1965 C Wife of Leo P. Carlo.
Carlo Leo P. 1893 1955 C Husband of Jennie Carlo.
Carlo Marguerite undated 2 Wife of Thomas Carlo.
Carls Anne F. 19 Feb 1912 24 Apr 1966 D Wife of Marcus J. Carls.
Carls Marcus J. 10 Mar 1908 11 Aug 1975 D PFC, US Army - WW-II. Husband of Anne F. Carls.
Carmody Catherine 1831 1915 2 Wife of John Carmody.
Carmody John 1829 1916 2 Husband of Catherine Carmody.
Carney Edna M. 1892 1972 2 Wife of Timothy E. Carney.
Carney F. Vincent 1890 1918 4 Pvt, WW-I.
Carney Timothy E. 1883 1918 2 Husband of Edna M. Carney.
Carpenter Hattie R. 1945 undated G Wife of Paul W. Carpenter, Sr.
Carpenter Paul W., Sr. 1945 1989 G Husband of Hattie R. Carpenter.
Carr Charles J. 31 Dec 1888 5 Mar 1985 G FN, US Coast Guard - WW-I. Husband of Grace F. Carr.
Carr Grace F. 1898 1978 G Wife of Charles J. Carr.
Carragher John E. 1919 1997 M/Schwartz Husband of Mary C. Carragher.
Carragher Mary C. 1924 undated M/Schwartz Wife of John E. Carragher.
Carroll Catherine 1845 1934 2 Wife of Simon Carroll.
Carroll Edward S. 9 Apr 1915 14 Nov 1989 C Pvt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Margaret Carroll.
Carroll Jennie L. 1881 1924 2 Wife of William J. Carroll.
Carroll Margaret 1921 1971 C Wife of Edward S. Carroll.
Carroll Simon 1849 1921 2 Husband of Catherine Carroll.
Carroll William J. 1887 1960 2 Husband of Jennie L. Carroll.
Carruba Anne J. 1914 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Joseph A. Carruba.
Carruba Christopher 1901 1984 M/Schwartz Husband of Mary Carruba.
Carruba Joseph A. 1917 1992 M/Schwartz Husband of Anne J. Carruba.
Carruba Mary 1904 1994 M/Schwartz Wife of Christopher Carruba.
Carrubba James P., Sr. 26 Feb 1922 24 Sep 1990 C PFC, US Army - WW-II.
Carrubba Josephine 1887 1960 1 Wife of Samuel Carrubba.
Carrubba Patricia A. 1938 undated C Wife of Samuel S. Carrubba.
Carrubba Samuel 1887 1948 1 Husband of Josephine Carrubba.
Carrubba Samuel S. 1933 1999 C Husband of Patricia A. Carrubba.
Carter Josephine R. 1924 undated I Wife of Ronald A. Carter.
Carter Ronald A. 16 Jun 1925 9 Mar 1994 I FM, US Marine Corps. - WW-II. Husband of Josephine R. Carter.
Caruso Carmelo 1884 1971 C Husband of Frances M. Caruso.
Caruso Frances M. 1892 1964 C Wife of Carmelo Caruso.
Caruso Joseph P. 8 Aug 1920 undated H Husband of Rose M. Caruso.
Caruso Rose M. 1 Feb 1923 2 May 2000 H Wife of Joseph P. Caruso.
Caryk John 1907 1970 C Husband of Mary Caryk.
Caryk Mary 1922 undated C Wife of John Caryk.
Case Harold J. 24 Nov 1906 5 Apr 1980 D PFC., US Army - WW-II.
Case Joseph F. 1874 1951 B Husband of Margaret M. Case.
Case Margaret M. 1873 1939 B Wife of Joseph F. Case.
Casey Anna M. 1875 1937 A Wife of John J. Casey.
Casey Anna T. Callahan 1864 1908 2 Wife of Christopher Casey.
Casey Christopher C. 1918 1996 1 Husband of Mary Louise R. Casey.
Casey John J. 1871 1956 A Husband of Anna M. Casey.
Casey Joseph M. 1904 1956 2 Military.
Casey Margaret 14 Jan 1921 83y 2 Wife of Thomas Casey.
Casey Marjorie E. 1893 1979 A Wife of William J. Casey.
Casey Mary A. 1861 1948 2 Wife of William C. Casey.
Casey Mary Louise R. 1920 1987 1 Wife of Christopher C. Casey.
Casey Mary T. Maloney 22 Feb 1919 2 Wife of Simon R. Casey.
Casey Sarah T. 30 Oct 1895 1908 2 Wife of William J. Casey.
Casey Simon R. 1862 1907 2 Husband of Mary T. Casey.
Casey Thomas 1881 2 Husband of Margaret Casey.
Casey William 1831 1887 2 Civil War. Husband of Bridget Casey.
Casey William C. 1858 1938 2 Husband of Mary A. Casey.
Casey William J. 1892 1926 2 Co. 7, 2nd TR Btn, 155th DB. Husband of Sarah T. Casey.
Casey William J. 1896 1945 A Husband of Marjorie E. Casey.
Cashman Hannah 10 May 1877 7m 2 Dtr of Jeremiah & Margaret Cashman.
Cashman Jeremiah 12 Feb 1909 64y 2 Husband of Margaret Cashman.
Cashman Margaret 7 Oct 1922 75y 2 Wife of Jeremiah Cashman.
Cassidy Francis E. 1910 1995 I Husband of Helen J. Cassidy.
Cassidy Helen J. 1913 1994 I Wife of Francis E. Cassidy.
Cassidy Joseph H. 14 Mar 1906 21 Dec 1994 D Husband of Marguerite A. Cassidy.
Cassidy Marguerite A. 25 Jul 1911 14 Oct 1975 D Wife of Joseph H. Cassidy.
Cassidy Wayne E. 21 Oct 1947 17 Dec 1981 I SP4, US Army - Vietnam.
Castellett Joseph 1864 1935 B Husband of Theresa Castellet.
Castellett Theresa 1878 1941 B Wife of Joseph Castellet.
Castronova Daniel J. 1912 1990 H Husband of Josephine P. Castronova.
Castronova Josephine P. 1913 1977 H Wife of Daniel J. Castronova.
Cataldo Jane C. 1906 undated C Wife of Phillip J. Cataldo.
Cataldo Phillip V. 1903 1980 C Husband of Jane C. Cataldo.
Catinella Anthony S. (Dr.) 1908 1985 M/Schwartz Husband of Carmen Catinella.
Catinella Carmen 1921 1989 M/Schwartz Wife of Anthony S. Catinella.
Catino Jacob 1895 1952 B Military. Husband of Jennie Catino.
Catino Jennie 1905 1948 B Wife of Jacob Catino.
Cavanaugh Mary 1844 1889 2 Wife of John Cavanaugh.
Cavanaugh Sarah Jane 1869 1879 2 Dtr of John & Mary Cavanaugh.
Cave Auburn S. 1901 1975 C Husband of Isabelle C. Cave.
Cave Isabelle C. 1895 1973 C Wife of Auburn S. Cave.
Cavigliano Carmen F. 1890 1962 C Husband of Frances B. Cavigliano.
Cavigliano Frances B. 1898 1990 C Wife of Carmen F. Cavigliano.
Cavigliano Mary A. 1920 1994 M/Schwartz Wife of Patrick C. Cavigliano.
Cavigliano Patrick C. 1929 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Mary A. Cavigliano.
Cecere Alphonsus "Al" 1924 undated 1 Husband of Sylvia L. Cecere.
Cecere Antonia 1875 1944 B Wife of Michael Cecere.
Cecere Arthur 22 Jul 1915 1 Feb 1998 1 TEC5, US Army - WW-II.
Cecere Ginette H. undated M/Schwartz Wife of Richard P. Cecere.
Cecere Irene M. 1929 undated I Wife of Michael P. Cecere.
Cecere Jacob Andrew 1911 1992 1 Husband of Mary Strollo Cecere.
Cecere James 1892 1968 1 Husband of Pasqualina Cecere.
Cecere Mary Strollo 1919 1991 1 Wife of Jacob Andrew Cecere.
Cecere Mary A. 1928 undated M/Schwartz Wife of William A. Cecere.
Cecere Michael 1872 1947 B Husband of Antonia Cecere.
Cecere Michael P. 3 Aug 1925 5 Feb 1997 I RM3, US Navy - WW-II. Husband Irene M. Cecere.
Cecere Pasqualina 1892 1961 1 Wife of James Cecere.
Cecere Richard P. 1925 1983 M/Schwartz Husband of Ginette H. Cecere.
Cecere Sylvia L. 1928 undated 1 Wife of Alphonsus Cecere.
Cecere William A. 1928 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Mary A. Cecere.
Cecero Gloria M. 1913 1995 M/Schwartz Wife of Michael L. Cecero.
Cecero Michael L. 1911 1979 M/Schwartz Husband of Gloria M. Cecero.
Cerce Dominic J. 22 Feb 1923 22 Jan 1994 I Cpl., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Marie R. Cerce.
Cerce Marie R. 1924 1989 I Wife of Dominic J. Cerce.
Cerefin Thaddeus 8 Sep 1894 19 Jun 1983 D QmSgt., US Army - WW-I.
Cervone Amedeo 23 Jul 1893 18 Mar 1959 D Military. Husband of Margaret Cervone.
Cervone Amelia 9 Nov 1886 25 Apr 1967 D Wife of Peter Cervone.
Cervone Margaret 22 Oct 1900 2 Aug 1987 D Wife of Amedeo Cervone.
Cervone Peter 27 Mar 1885 2 Mar 1958 D Husband of Amelia Cervone.
Cervoni John 1897 1966 C Husband of Natalina Cervoni.
Cervoni John J. 17 May 1942 4 Sep 1983 C Cpl., US Marine Corps.
Cervoni Natalina 1906 1987 C Wife of John Cervoni.
Cesarano Antoinette 1875 1962 A Wife of Frank Cesarano.
Cesarano Elnora V. "Betty" 1908 1998 I Wife of Joseph Cesarano, Sr.
Cesarano Frank 1872 1928 A Husband of Antoinette Cesarano.
Cesarano Joseph, Sr. "Futty" 1903 1987 I Husband of Elnora V. Cesarano.
Cesarano Louis J. 22 Jul 1899 22 Aug 1991 D Pvt., US Army - WW-II.
Chairmonte Josephine J. 1904 1994 C Wife of Thomas J. Chairmonte.
Chairmonte Thomas J. 7 Dec 1900 30 Jun 1985 C SEA3, US Navy - WW-I. Husband of Josephine J. Chairmonte.
Chamberlain Catherine M. 1906 1977 H Wife of Lloyd B. Chamberlain.
Chamberlain Lloyd B. 1900 1978 H Husband of Catherine M. Chamberlain.
Chambers Helen S. 11 Jan 1908 17 May 1994 D Wife of John J. Chambers.
Chambers John J. 6 Apr 1910 29 Jan 1957 D Husband of Helen S. Chambers.
Chapple George C. 1880 1955 2 Husband of Ruth E. Chapple.
Chapple Ruth E. 1885 1967 2 Wife of George C. Chapple.
Charvella Ann C. 1916 undated C Wife of Louis J. Charvella.
Charvella Grace 1908 1992 C Wife of Joseph Charvella.
Charvella Joseph 1907 1989 C Husband of Grace Charvella.
Charvella Louis J. 1910 1967 C Husband of Ann C. Charvella.
Chatt Gladys 31 May 1917 7 Jun 1958 D Wife of Tony J. Chatt.
Chatt Jessie D. Pero 1911 1999 C Wife of Thomas Chatt.
Chatt Joseph M. 24 May 1933 6 Jun 2001 68y I US Air Force - Korea. Son of Thomas E. & Jessie D. Pero Chatt Sr. Husband of Dorothy "Dottie" Graff Chatt.
Chatt Thomas E. 1907 1970 C Husband of Jessie D. Pero Chatt.
Chaya Alice V. 1929 undated I Wife of Walter F. Chaya.
Chaya Edith M. 1923 undated I Wife of Ramon C. Chaya.
Chaya Joseph C. 1907 1993 M/Schwartz Husband of Mary R. Chaya.
Chaya Mary R. 1908 2000 M/Schwartz Wife of Joseph C. Chaya.
Chaya Ramon C. 1922 1990 I Husband of Edith M. Chaya.
Chaya Walter F. 1924 undated I Husband of Alice V. Chaya.
Cherry Bernard 1916 1981 C Husband of Dorothy A. Cherry.
Cherry Dorothy A. 1917 1994 C Wife of Bernard Cherry.
Cherry Josephine 1887 1951 1 Wife of Stanley T. Cherry.
Cherry Stanley T. 1876 1948 1 Husband of Josephine Cherry.
Cherry Thomas E. 13 Jun 1950 1 Aug 1971 D BUCA, US Navy - Vietnam.
Chiarolanza Guy 1889 1945 4 Husband of Lola Chiorolanza.
Chiarolanza Lola 1889 1979 4 Wife of Guy Chiorolanza.
Chiavi Louis 2 May 1921 14 Nov 1987 I TEC5, US Army - WW-II. Husband of Rose Chiavi.
Chiavi Rose 1924 1997 I Wife of Louis Chiavi.
Chilano Celia 1886 1965 C Wife of Peter Ghilano.
Chilano Mary 23 Dec 1919 28 Oct 1956 D Wife of Peter A. Chilano, Jr.
Chilano Peter 1882 1953 C Husband of Celia Chilano.
Chilano Peter A., Jr. 4 Apr 1920 8 Aug 1982 D Pvt., US Marine Corps. - WW-II. Husband of Mary Chilano.
Chilano Russell L. 12 Dec 1915 4 May 1980 G Pvt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Veronica A. Chilano.
Chilano Veronica A. 1920 undated G Wife of Russell L. Chilano.
Chimino Joseph J. 9 Jan 1921 29 Oct 1993 D US Army - WW-II/Korea.
Chimino Michael A. 4 Oct 1887 17 Aug 1962 D Husband of Santa S. Chimino.
Chimino Santa S. 1 Nov 1892 17 Jul 1966 D Wife of Michael A. Chimino.
Chmielowiec Anthony 22 Dec 1894 20 Nov 1987 D Husband of Helen Chmielowiec.
Chmielowiec Helen 25 Aug 1896 31 Jul 1956 D Wife of Anthony Chmielowiec.
Chmielowiec Helen S. 29 Apr 1917 22 May 1984 D Wife of Raymond J. Chmielowiec.
Chmielowiec Raymond J. 6 Mar 1917 2 Apr 1995 D PFC, US Army - WW-II. Husband of Helen S. Chmielowiec.
Chorba Louis J. 1921 undated J Husband of M. Frances Martino Chorba.
Chorba M. Frances Martino 1923 undated J Wife of Louis J. Chorba.
Christopher Marie E. 1898 1982 H Wife of Steven Christopher.
Christopher Steven 1896 1986 H Husband of Marie E. Christopher.
Chudoba Edward W. 1927 1962 C Military.
Chudoba Josephine C. 1902 1995 C Wife of Michael Chudoba.
Chudoba Michael 1897 1970 C Military. Husband of Josephine C. Chudoba.
Church Anna 1884 1962 C Wife of Dominic Church.
Church Dominic 1882 1961 C Husband of Anna Church.
Church Nicholas S. 1914 1996 M/Schwartz Husband of Sara M. Church.
Church Sara M. 1913 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Nicholas S. Church.
Ciaccio Antoinette 1926 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Rico Ciaccio.
Ciaccio Rico 1924 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Antoinette Ciaccio.
Cianfrini Althea I. 1917 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Joseph F. Cianfrini.
Cianfrini E. John 1917 1997 M/Schwartz Husband of Esther R. Cianfrini.
Cianfrini Edward 1 Jan 1924 22 Oct 1992 C Sgt., 1288th Eng. Combat Bn., US Army. Husband of Katherine J. Cianfrini.
Cianfrini Edward A. 1951 1968 C Son of Edward & Katherine J. Cianfrini.
Cianfrini Esther R. 1919 undated M/Schwartz Wife of E. John Cianfrini.
Cianfrini Joseph F. 1915 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Althea I. Cianfrini.
Ciarallo Delores 1888 1978 C Wife of Joseph Ciarallo.
Ciarallo Joseph 1887 1972 C Husband of Delores Ciarallo.
Cichocki Agnes G. Spiotta 1925 undated C Wife of Michael E. Cichocki.
Cichocki Frank J. 1920 1991 C Husband of Helen G. Cichocki.
Cichocki Helen G. 1922 undated C Wife of Frank J. Cichocki.
Cichocki Mary J. 1898 1983 1 Wife of Michael C. Cichocki.
Cichocki Michael C. 1888 1954 1 Husband of Mary J. Cichocki.
Cichocki Michael E. 1912 1990 C Husband of Agnes G. Spiotta Cichocki.
Cichocki Scholastyka 1886 1962 B Wife of Stanislaw Cichocki.
Cichocki Stanislaw 1883 1942 B Husband of Scholastyka Cichocki.
Cichocki Walter 3 Mar 1918 26 Jun 1999 C Pvt., US Army - WW-II.
Cichowski Helen T. 1914 1979 G Wife of Matthew F. Cichowski.
Cichowski Matthew F. 1909 1998 G Husband of Helen T. Cichowski.
Cifelli Antoinette 1876 1957 1 Husband of Nicholas R. Cifelli.
Cifelli Michael J. 22 Jul 1908 8 Dec 1967 D Military.
Cifelli Nicholas R. 1869 1952 1 Husband of Antoinette Cifelli.
Cifelli Palma T. 1917 1996 C Wife of Ralph C. Cifelli.
Cifelli Ralph C. 22 Jul 1908 8 Dec 1992 C PFC, US Army - WW-II. Husband of Palma T. Cifelli.
Cina Charles C. 1906 1993 C Husband of Michelina M. Cina.
Cina Corinne H. 1898 1983 C Wife of Sam Cina.
Cina Elizabeth D. 1915 undated C Wife of Samuel Cina.
Cina Joseph 1899 1966 C Husband of Mary Cina.
Cina Liboria 1880 1943 B Wife of Salvatore Cina.
Cina Mary 1906 1993 C Wife of Joseph Cina.
Cina Michelina M. 1912 1997 C Wife of Charles C. Cina.
Cina Salvatore 1876 1931 B Husband of Liboria Cina.
Cina Sam 1894 1972 C Husband of Corinne H. Cina.
Cina Samuel 1911 1962 C Husband of Elizabeth D. Cina.
Cino James 11 Nov 1894 20 May 1965 D Husband of Josephine Cino.
CIno Josephine 10 Feb 1898 11 Aug 1991 D Wife of James Cino.
Cinquino Donata 1891 1982 G Wife of Peter Cinquino.
Cinquino Elsie 1903 1991 G Wife of Michael Cinquino.
Cinquino Michael 1896 1977 G Husband of Elsie Cinquino.
Cinquino Nicholas 26 Mar 1933 12 Mar 1991 I Cpl., US Army - Korea.
Cinquino Peter 1889 1978 G Husband of Donata Cinquino.
Cintorino Andrew J. 1911 1983 C Husband of Mary A. Cintorino.
Cintorino Anthony 1885 1946 1 Husband of Antoinette Cintorino.
Cintorino Antoinette 1890 1947 1 Wife of Anthony Cintorino.
Cintorino Jennie C. 1921 undated I Wife of Joseph M. Cintorino.
Cintorino Joseph M. 1913 1999 I Husband of Jennie C. Cintorino.
Cintorino Mary A. 1910 1988 C Wife of Andrew J. Cintorino.
Cionitti Angelina 1879 1968 C Wife of Nicola Cionitti.
Cionitti Mary 8 May 1911 7 Mar 1997 C Wife of Peter Cionitti.
Cionitti Nicola 1881 1969 C Husband of Angelina Cionitti.
Cionitti Peter 24 Sep 1906 30 Jan 1975 C Husband of Mary Cionitti.
Cipollone Lidia undated C Wife of Nicola Cipollone. Married 1950.
Cipollone Nicola 1 Aug 1994 C Husband of Lidia Cipollone. Married 1950.
Cirillo Anthony 1889 1972 1 Husband of Antoinette Cirillo.
Cirillo Antoinette 1892 1970 1 Wife of Anthony Cirillo.
Cirillo Betty Baker 1928 1959 C Wife of Joseph D. Cirillo.
Cirillo Ida V. 1917 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Paschal Cirillo.
Cirillo Joseph D. 1922 undated C Husband of Betty Baker Cirillo.
Cirillo Paschal 1916 1978 M/Schwartz Husband of Ida V. Cirillo.
Claffey Ellis J. 1897 1937 B Wife of Margaret M. Claffey.
Claffey Margaret M. 1901 1947 B Wife of Ellis J. Claffey.
Clark Angeline 1910 1976 M/Schwartz Wife of Loren Clark.
Clark Frances H. 1880 1962 1 Wife of Henry A. Clark, Sr.
Clark Frances M. 1914 1976 G Wife of William H. Clark, Sr.
Clark Gertrude M. 1897 1953 B Wife of Walter C. Clark.
Clark Henry A., Sr. 1876 1951 1 Husband of Frances H. Clark.
Clark James 4 Jun 1888 66y 2 Husband of Sarah Clark.
Clark James J. 1854 1891 2 Husband of Mary Keane Clark.
Clark John 1878 1962 3 Husband of Mary Kenny Clark.
Clark John 29 May 1893 49y 3 Husband of Mary R. Clark.
Clark Loren 1913 1999 M/Schwartz Husband of Angeline Clark.
Clark Margaret 1860 1939 A Wife of Milo Clark.
Clark Mary Keane 1853 1898 2 Wife of James J. Clark.
Clark Mary 1839 1918 3 Wife of Michael Clark.
Clark Mary Kenny 1887 1936 3 Wife of John Clark.
Clark Mary R. 1854 1947 3 Wife of John Clark.
Clark Michael 1823 1902 3 Husband of Mary Clark.
Clark Milo 1859 1924 A Husband of Margaret Clark.
Clark Sarah 1 Jan 1891 71y 2 Wife of James Clark.
Clark Walter C. 1897 1972 B Husband of Gertrude M. Clark.
Clark William H., Sr. 1910 1984 G Husband of Frances M. Clark.
Clemens D. Irene 1920 1954 C Wife of Stuart J. Clemens.
Clemens Stuart J. 1916 1956 C Husband of D. Irene Clemens.
Cline Eva Klein 1870 1959 2 Wife of Joseph R. Cline.
Cline George 1866 1928 2 Husband of Mary E. Cline.
Cline Joseph R. 17 Mar 1874 13 Apr 1909 2 Husband of Eva Klein Cline.
Cline Mary E. 1869 1939 2 Wife of George Cline.
Clune Ellen 1836 1905 4 Wife of Simon Clune.
Clune Elmira A. 1871 1948 A Wife of James J. Clune.
Clune James J. 1866 1929 A Husband of Elmira A. Clune.
Clune Simon 1836 1911 4 Husband of Ellen Clune.
Clute Ernest J. 12 Aug 1899 15 Mar 1995 D Husband of Loretta J. Clute.
Clute Kingsley D. 1917 1999 M/Schwartz Husband of Mary L. Clute.
Clute Loretta J. 23 Aug 1899 27 Apr 1966 D Wife of Ernest J. Clute.
Clute Mary L. 1919 1999 M/Schwartz Wife of Kingsley D. Clute.
Coan Elizabeth 16 Mar 1867 1 Dtr of John & Hannah Coan.
Coan Ellen 6 May 1856 1 Dtr of John & Hannah Coan.
Coan Hannah 8 Aug 1880 1 Dtr of John & Hannah Coan.
Coan John 6 Sep 1883 22y 1 Son of John & H. Coan.
Coan Peter 8 Sep 1850 5y 3m 1 Son of John & Hannah Coan.
Cocco John 1885 1930 2 Husband of Regina M. Cocco.
Cocco Regina M. 1887 1968 2 wife of John Cocco.
Cochran Catherine C. 1885 1983 A Wife of Frank H. Cochran.
Cochran Frank H. 1886 1945 A Husband of Catherine N. Cochran.
Cocuzza Angela 1874 1944 1 Wife of Joseph Cocuzza.
Cocuzza Joseph 1881 1955 1 Husband of Angela Cocuzza.
Coffey Annie M. 1869 1953 2 Wife of John J. Coffey.
Coffey Bridget 21 Aug 1863 45y 1 Wife of William Coffey.
Coffey John J. 1868 1929 2 Husband of Annie M. Coffey.
Colangelo Allessandro 1881 1970 1 Husband of Philomena Colangelo.
Colangelo Anna Giovanna 1884 1970 1 Wife of Joseph Colangelo.
Colangelo Anthony 1908 1986 1 Husband of Martha Colangelo.
Colangelo Dante P. 14 Oct 1925 26 Apr 1988 C Pvt., US Army - WW-II.
Colangelo Martha 1912 1994 1 Wife of Anthony Colangelo.
Colangelo Philomena 1892 1973 1 Wife of Allessandro Colangelo.
Colangelo Richard 1938 2000 1 Son of Anthony & Martha Colangelo.
Colantonio Antoniette 1892 1984 C Wife of Joseph Colantonio.
Colantonio Deborah A. 15 May 1962 undated J Wife of James P. Colantonio, Sr.
Colantonio Ida Marie Catherine Sinibaldi 20 Jun 1927 undated J Wife of Joseph A. Colantonio, Sr.
Colantonio James P., Sr. 3 Feb 1950 9 Jul 1996 J Husband of Deborah A. Colantonio.
Colantonio John P. 1923 1971 C Military. Husband of Stephanie W. Colantonio.
Colantonio Joseph 1887 1965 C Husband of Antoniette Colantonio.
Colantonio Joseph A., Sr. 19 Jun 1922 15 Sep 2001 79y J US Army Air Corps - WW-II. Son of Louis & Mary Meleca Colantonio. Husband of Ida Marie Sinibaldi Colantonio.
Colantonio Louis L. 29 Mar 1886 16 Jun 1963 1 Husband of Mary P. Colantonio.
Colantonio Margaret M. 1914 1989 C Wife of Nicholas Colantonio.
Colantonio Maria 1908 1993 M/Schwartz Wife of Nicholas Colantonio.
Colantonio Mary P. Meleca 8 Jul 1898 30 May 1995 1 Wife of Louis L. Colantonio.
Colantonio Michael J. 25 Jun 1916 4 Apr 1978 H Sgt., US Army - WW-II.
Colantonio Nicholas 1911 1988 C Husband of Margaret M. Colantonio.
Colantonio Nicholas 1900 1991 M/Schwartz Husband of Maria Colantonio.
Colantonio Stephanie W. undated C Wife of John P. Colantonio.
Coledo Anthony S. 1908 1953 B Military.
Coles Thomas G. 8 Sep 1896 9 Oct 1958 4 PFC, Co. F, 22nd Inf. - WW-I.
Collard John V. 20 Oct 1947 27 Sep 1996 I SP4, US Army - Vietnam.
Collins Elizabeth A. Pellegrino 22 Apr 1939 21 Aug 2001 62y I Dtr of Frank & Josephine Lovria Pellegrino. Wife of James Thomas Collins.
Collins Francis J. 20 Jul 1912 15 Apr 1957 D PFC, 634th Ord. Ammo. Co. - WW-II.
Collins James P. 19 Jan 1909 25 Jul 1972 D Sgt., Service Co., 786th Tank Bn. - WW-II.
Collins Mary 15 Jan 1867 43y 2 Wife of Patrick Collins.
Collins Patrick 1821 10 Sep 1883 62y 2 Co. G, 8th NY Hvy Art. - Civil War. Husband of Margaret & Mary Collins.
Colombo John 19 Dec 1911 9 Jun 19987 I Pvt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Mary M. Colombo.
Colombo Joseph 2 Jun 1906 1984 G SSgt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Mary Colombo.
Colombo Louis 1871 1929 5 Husband of Rosalia Colombo.
Colombo Louis A. 3 Feb 1928 18 Jan 1980 G SSgt., US Army - WW-II.
Colombo Manuel J. 1902 1989 G Husband of Rose Colombo.
Colombo Mary 1917 1993 G Wife of Joseph Colombo.
Colombo Mary M. Torcello 24 Oct 1922 18 Jul 2001 78y I Dtr of Frank & Amelia Kokuor Torcello. Wife of John Colombo.
Colombo Norman J. 7 Aug 1913 13 Dec 1990 5 TEC5, US Army - WW-II.
Colombo Rosalia 1880 1960 5 Wife of Louis Colombo.
Colombo Rose 1906 2001 G Wife of Manuel J. Colombo.
Coltaux Barbara 1858 1929 4 Wife of John Burkel Coltaux.
Coltaux John Burkel 1860 1904 4 Husband of Barbara Coltaux.
Condello Frank 1912 2 Jul 2001 M/Kelly Son of Dominic & Louise Calarco Condello. Husband of Rose J. Condello.
Condello Rose J. 1923 undated M/Kelly Wife of Frank Condello.
Conforto Frances 1888 1951 1 Wife of Michael Conforto.
Conforto Michael 1889 1946 1 Husband of Frances Conforto.
Connor Francis H. 1907 1992 B Husband of Margaret C. Connor.
Connor Margaret C. 1914 1991 B Wife of Francis H. Connor.
Connors James 19 Feb 1867 13y 2 Son of John & Ellen Connors.
Connors Johanna 1 Mar 1867 19y 2 Dtr of John & Ellen Connors.
Considine Bridget 1847 1927 2 Wife of Thomas Considine.
Considine Ella F. 1 Jun 1890 2 Sep 1971 D Wife of Lawrence E. Considine.
Considine Lawrence E. 23 Mar 1892 9 Jun 1964 D Sgt., US Army - WW-I. Husband of Ella F. Considine.
Considine Thomas 1846 1918 2 Husband of Bridget Considine.
Constantine John A. 1918 2000 M/Kelly Husband of Ruth E. Constantine.
Constantine Ruth E. 1919 undated M/Kelly Wife of John A. Constantine.
Constantino Rosolia 1852 1927 1 Wife of Antonino Constantino.
Conti Althea 1920 undated C Wife of Salvatore Conti.
Conti Salvatore 1914 1968 C Husband of Althea Conti.
Conway James 1842 1918 2 Co. L, 8th NY Heavy Art. - Civil War.
Conway John H. 24 Aug 1896 23 Sep 1965 D Husband of Mary F. Conway.
Conway Marjorie A. 1920 1972 B Wife of Robert J. Conway.
Conway Mary F. 16 Jun 1893 16 Jul 1964 D Wife of John H. Conway.
Conway Robert J. 18 Sep 1919 2 Apr 2000 B PFC, US Army, WW-II. Husband of Marjorie A. Conway.
Cooney Anna N. 1858 1938 2 Wife of Peter T. Cooney.
Cooney Peter T. 1860 1930 2 Husband of Anna N. Cooney.
Cooper Clifford C. 1915 1983 M/Schwartz Husband of Marian J. Cooper.
Cooper Marian J. 1918 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Clifford C. Cooper.
Copani Mary C. 1907 undated C Wife of Samuel A. Copani.
Copani Samuel A. 1903 1972 C Husband of Mary C. Copani.
Copeland Helen M. 1915 2000 I Wife of Martin S. Copeland.
Copeland Martin S. 2 Mar 1908 29 Dec 1984 I SSgt., US Army - WW-II. Husband of Helen M. Copeland.
Coral Helen 1863 1940 A Wife of Joseph W. Coral.
Corbett Adelle B, Cosgrove 19 Nov 1863 6 Jul 1891 1 Wife of John Corbett.
Corbett Bridget 19 Nov 1863 6 Feb 1891 1 Wife of John Corbett.
Corbett James E. 23 Oct 1903 23 Dec 1960 2 Pvt., 643rd Tech School Sq., US Army Air Force - WW-II.
Corbett Mary A. Farrell 1858 1944 2 Wife of Thomas J. Corbett.
Corbett Thomas J. 1863 1923 2 Husband of Mary A. Farrell Corbett.
Corcimiglia Celia 1908 1976 C Wife of Joseph A. Corcimiglia.
Corcimiglia Joseph A. 1908 1955 C Military. Husband of Celia Corcimiglia.
Corcimiglia Rose 12 Oct 1914 undated D Wife of Samuel J. Corcimiglia.
Corcimiglia Samuel J. 23 Aug 1912 6 Dec 1970 D PFC, Transportation Corps. - WW-II. Husband of Rose Corcimiglia.
Corcoran Helen A. 1905 1983 M/Schwartz Wife of P. Burton Corcoran.
Corcoran P. Burton 1907 1986 M/Schwartz Husband of Helen A. Corcoran.
Corona Joseph 1909 1990 M/Schwartz Husband of Lucy M. Corona.
Corona Lucy M. 1914 1995 M/Schwartz Wife of Joseph Corona.
Corona Vincent J., Sr. 1938 1997 M/Schwartz Husband of Carol F. Corona.
Corono Carol F. 1940 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Vincent J. Corono, Sr.
Corradini Frank 1893 1971 C Military. Husband of Madeline Corradini.
Corradini Madeline 1914 undated C Wife of Frank Corradini.
Corrado Maria M. Torsiello 1874 1913 2 Wife of Pasquale Corrado.
Cory Doris E. 1922 1997 M/Schwartz Wife of Joseph R. Cory.
Cory Joseph R. 1915 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Doris E. Cory.
Cosgrove Alice L. 14 Jun 1886 25y 1 Dtr of James & Catherine Cosgrove.
Cosgrove Catherine S. 10 Aug 1877 23y 1 Dtr of James & Catherine Cosgrove.
Cosgrove James 2 Feb 1895 81y 1 Husband of Catherine Cosgrove.
Cosgrove James F. 17 Jun 1828 1 Son of James & Catherine Cosgrove.
Cosgrove Thomas D. 16 Jan 1879 21y 1 Son of James & Catherine Cosgrove.
Costantino Anthony 1990 M/Schwartz Husband of Mary Costantino.
Costantino Mary undated M/Schwartz Wife of Anthony Costantino.
Costella Adelia 1834 1914 1 Wife of James Costalla.
Costella James 1829 1897 1 Husband of Adelia Costella.
Coticchio Anna 1890 1918 5 Wife of Salvatore Coticchio.
Coticchio Loretta 1862 1946 1 Wife of Loretto Coticchio.
Coticchio Lucy R. 1916 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Thomas R. Coticchio.
Coticchio Mary M. 1907 1928 A Wife of Louis Coticchio.
Coticchio Salvatore 1888 1918 5 Husband of Anna Coticchio.
Coticchio Thomas R. 1913 1998 M/Schwartz Husband of Lucy R. Coticchio.
Coughlin George H. 1898 1967 C Husband of Mildred S. Coughlin.
Coughlin Grace 11 May 1889 24 Feb 1968 D Wife of John J. Coughlin.
Coughlin Henry T. 7 Oct 1892 21 Oct 1956 D Husband of Mary Coughlin.
Coughlin John J. 11 Nov 1885 30 Apr 1964 D Husband of Grace Coughlin.
Coughlin Mary 27 Oct 1892 11 Dec 1955 D Wife of Henry T. Coughlin.
Coughlin Mildred S. 1905 1984 C Wife of George H. Coughlin.
Covington Jeanne 1956 undated C Wife of Tom Covington.
Covington Tom 1956 undated C Husband of Jeanne Covington.
Cox Anna L. Houlihan 1886 1964 2 Wife of Michael James Cox.
Cox Michael James 1888 1975 2 Husband of Anna L. Houlihan Cox.
Craft Charles F. 1860 1937 2 Husband of Mary Craft.
Craft Mary 1856 1939 2 Wife of Charles F. Craft.
Crane Elizabeth C. 1918 undated M/Schwartz Wife of W. Kenneth Crane.
Crane W. Kenneth 1914 1999 M/Schwartz Veteran, US Army. Husband of Elizabeth C. Crane.
Crangle James 1852 1932 B Husband of Mary Diskin Crangle.
Crangle Mary Diskin 1868 1936 B Wife of James Crangle.
Crehan Anna R. 1878 1959 1 Wife of John A. Crehan.
Crehan John A. 1867 1957 1 Husband of Anna R. Crehan.
Crehan Joseph C. 1873 1918 1 Husband of Sara A. Crehan.
Crehan Loretta Scanlan 1879 1939 1 Wife of Frank A. Crehan.
Crehan Louis Simon 16 Mar 1915 22 Aug 1968 1 TEC4, 167th Stn. Hosp. - WW-II.
Crehan Mary McNulty 1844 1916 1 Wife of Simon Crehan.
Crehan Mary A. 1852 1889 2 Wife of Simon M. Crehan.
Crehan Sara A. 1871 1932 1 Wife of Joseph C. Crehan.
Crehan Simon M. 1845 1912 2 Husband of Mary A. Crehan.
Crelley James A. 1949 2 Husband of Margaret C. Crelley.
Crelley Margaret C. 1958 2 Wife of James A. Crelley.
Crimando Ignazio 1889 1956 C Husband of Santa Crimando.
Crimando Santa 1899 1986 C Wife of Ignazio Crimando.
Crome Donald G. 15 Jun 1922 15 Nov 1989 C PFC, US Army - WW-II/Korea.
Crome Francis Vincent 1877 1909 2 Military.
Crome Henry L. 6 Nov 1890 5 Jul 1971 D Pvt., Battery A, 102nd Field Arty. - WW-I. Husband of Margaret M. Crome.
Crome Margaret M. 18 May 1897 30 Aug 1989 D Wife of Henry L. Crome.
Cropo Carmella J. 1913 2000 C Wife of Michael Cropo.
Cropo Michael 1912 1964 C Husband of Carmella J. Cropo.
Culligan Johanna 30 Sep 1885 46y 2 Wife of John Culligan.
Culligan John 29 Oct 1880 41y 2 Husband of Johanna Culligan.
Cultrara Charles J. 1912 1984 M/Schwartz Husband of Rose B. Cultrara.
Cultrara Dominick (MD) 1920 undated H Husband of Helen S. Cultrara.
Cultrara Helen S. 1919 undated H Wife of Dominick Cultrara.
Cultrara Petrina 1882 1938 A Wife of Santo Cultrara.
Cultrara Rose B. Fanara 17 May 1914 13 May 2001 86y M/Schwartz Dtr of Russell & Angeline Sciabetta Fanara. Wife of Charles J. Cultrara.
Cultrara Santo 1881 1965 A Husband of Petrina Cultrara.
Cummerton John J. 1892 1949 1 PFC, Util Co., Quartermaster Corps. - WW-I. Husband of Loretta E. Cummerton.
Cummerton Loretta E. 1900 1993 1 Wife of John J. Cummerton.
Cummerton Nora 1859 1921 2 Wife of Thomas Cummerton.
Cummerton Thomas 1852 1906 2 Husband of Nora Cummerton.
Cummerton Thomas F. 1888 1956 1 Military.
Cummings Anna A. 22 Mar 1903 47y 2 Wife of John Cummings.
Cummings James D. 8 Dec 1929 30 Aug 1991 C SA, US Navy - Korea.
Cummings James H. 1900 1967 C Husband of Margaret M. Cummings.
Cummings John 29 Apr 1928 76y 2 Husband of Anna A. Cummings.
Cummings John 1828 1905 1 Husband of Mary Cummings.
Cummings Margaret M. 1910 undated C Wife of James H. Cummings.
Cummings Mary 1832 1907 1 Wife of John Cummings.
Cunningham Anna 1856 1925 A Wife of Thomas Cunningham.
Cunningham Geraldine A. 1908 1994 M/Schwartz Wife of George L. Cunningham.
Cunningham Thomas 1852 1926 A Husband of Anna Cunningham.
Cuozzo Angelo M. 22 Jul 1920 27 Dec 1967 D Cox, US Coast Guard Res. - WW-II.
Cuozzo Carmen D. 1925 1990 1 Husband of Shirley J. Cuozzo.
Cuozzo Maria Giuseppa 1888 1955 1 Wife of Pasquale Cuozzo.
Cuozzo Pasquale 1875 1962 1 Husband of Maria Giuseppa Cuozzo.
Cuozzo Shirley J. 1925 undated 1 Wife of Carmen D. Cuozzo.
Cuppenberger Judy Ann Jun 1958 Infant 1 Infant Dtr of James & Jean Cuppenberger.
Curd Grace M. 30 Nov 1924 20 Oct 1996 G Cpl., US Army - Korea.
Curry Andrew J. 1863 1938 1 Husband of Catherine Dailey Curry.
Curry Catherine Dailey 1864 1946 1 Wife of Andrew J. Curry.
Curry Elizabeth 1828 1915 1 Wife of William Curry.
Curry Mary 1835 25 Sep 1905 2 Wife of Michael Curry.
Curry Michael 1833 1899 2 Husband of Mary Curry.
Curry William 1819 1906 1 Husband of Elizabeth Curry.
Cutitta Dominic 1910 1990 C Husband of Lena Cutitta.
Cutitta Lena 1916 undated C Wife of Dominic Cutitta.
Cuttita Giovanni 1911 1987 M/Schwartz Husband of Maria Cuttita.
Cuttita Maria 1921 undated M/Schwartz Wife of Giovanni Cuttita.
Cuviello Anita 1910 1997 1 Wife of James D. Cuviello.
Cuviello James D. 1902 1982 1 Husband of Anita Cuviello.
Czaja Florence O'Brien 11 Aug 1928 13 Oct 2000 C Wife of Stanley F. Czaja.
Czaja Joseph W. 1885 1951 1 Husband of Sophia M. Czaja.
Czaja Sophia M. 1885 1980 1 Wife of Joseph W. Czaja.
Czaja Stanley F. "Wimpy" 23 Aug 1930 27 Jul 2000 C SFC, US Army - Korea. Husband of Florence O'Brien Czaja.
Czaja Stella A. 1908 1982 1 Wife of Walter F. Czaja.
Czerniewski Dorothy L. 1921 1975 M/Schwartz Wife of Henry A. Czerniewski.
Czerniewski Henry A. 1918 undated M/Schwartz Husband of Dorothy L. Czerniewski.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


Stewart v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, Alfred S. Robbins, J.
Herzfeld Rubin, P.C., New York City (Herbert Rubin, David B. Hamm and Linda M. Brown of counsel), for appellant. Montfort, Healy, McGuire Salley, Garden City (E. Richard Rimmels, Jr., of counsel), for respondents.
Appellant-defendant Volkswagen A.G. (VWAG) appeals by leave of the Appellate Division from an order of that Court which affirmed Supreme Court's denial of its motion to dismiss the action. VWAG claimed respondents-plaintiffs failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over it in accordance with Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2). We conclude that plaintiffs have not satisfied the statute's strictly specified service of process prescriptions necessary to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in New York. We therefore reverse, answer the certified question in the negative, and grant the motion to dismiss the action.
Plaintiffs sued for damages for personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents, allegedly caused by the "unintended acceleration" of Audi 5000 vehicles manufactured by VWAG, a German corporation. The vehicles were exported to the United States, title was transferred to Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VOA), and they were then sold to World Wide Volkswagen Corp., which distributed them to Audi dealers, who sold them to consumers.
"such foreign corporation by registered mail with return receipt requested, at the post office address specified for the purpose of mailing process, on file in the department of state, or with any official or body performing the equivalent function, in the jurisdiction of its incorporation,"
"or if no such address is there specified, to its registered or other office there specified,"
In this case, plaintiffs served the Secretary of State but did not deliver a copy personally to the foreign corporation, or send a copy to the foreign corporation in accordance with the order or specification of the statutory delineation. Instead, they mailed a summons and complaint to: "Volkswagen of America on behalf of Volkswagenwerk-Aktien Gesellschaft, 600 Sylvan Avenue, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632". The complaint indicated that VWAG "was and is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Federal Republic of West Germany," and an attached rider gave the post office address of VWAG as "Rechtswesen Ausland, Wolfsburg 3180 West Germany". Plaintiffs urge that their choice for notification to VWAG complied with Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2) and the courts below have sustained their jurisdiction claim.
The dispositive issues are: (1) whether plaintiffs may properly rely on and drop down to the last service completion specification in Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2), i.e., mailing to "the last address of such foreign corporation known to the plaintiff[s]," without attempted satisfaction or explanation of the preceding service prescriptions; and (2) whether such mailing option, if authorized, complied with the direction that it be effected to the "address of such foreign corporation".
VWAG moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint against it, on the ground that plaintiffs did not secure personal jurisdiction over it because plaintiffs' attempted service of process on it did not comply with Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2). VWAG further maintained that as a foreign corporation incorporated in West Germany not authorized to do business in New York, it must be served in accordance with the Hague Service Convention. Concededly this was not done, but we need not address that issue since we conclude that Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2) was not otherwise satisfied and the action should be dismissed.
Supreme Court denied VWAG's motion to dismiss, stating that VOA was a proper agent for completion of service on and notice to VWAG. The Appellate Division affirmed the order, stating that personal jurisdiction is acquired over a foreign corporation pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2) by service made on a local corporation so controlled by the foreign corporation that the local corporation can be deemed a mere department of the foreign corporation. The local corporation in such instance is deemed the involuntary agent of the foreign corporation, "[t]hus, if VOA is a mere department of VWAG, VWAG was properly served under Business Corporation Law § 307" (Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., 181 A.D.2d 4, 7). That Court then cited a number of non-New York cases, as well as Luciano v Garvey Volkswagen ( 131 A.D.2d 253) for the proposition that VOA is a mere department of VWAG. Other cases (Brandt v Volkswagen AG., 161 A.D.2d 1149; 555 N.Y.S.2d 957; Derso v. v Volkswagen of Am., 159 A.D.2d 937) which support a contrary proposition were distinguished because "in each of those cases, unlike the case at bar, VWAG raised a factual question, and presented evidence, as to whether VOA was a mere department of VWAG" (Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., 181 A.D.2d, at 8, supra).
The incontestable starting proposition in cases of this kind is that once jurisdiction and service of process are questioned, plaintiffs have the burden of proving satisfaction of statutory and due process prerequisites (see, Lamarr v Klein, 35 A.D.2d 248, affd 30 N.Y.2d 757). Business Corporation Law § 307 establishes a mandatory sequence and progression of service completion options to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in New York. We have made plain that these steps are "requirements of a jurisdictional nature which must be strictly satisfied" (Flick v Stewart-Warner Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 50, 54). Thus, when VWAG contested plaintiffs' effort to obtain New York jurisdiction over it by service on the New York Secretary of State, plaintiffs had to demonstrate not only that notice had in some manner been mailed to VWAG or some agent, but also that the specified steps for gaining jurisdiction by service and notice were precisely followed in the delineated sequence set forth in the statute.
Plaintiffs were obligated in the first instance to ascertain that there was no post office address specified for VWAG to receive process or other registered or office address for VWAG on file with the German equivalent of the Secretary of State before descending to the next level of notification options, i.e., mailing a copy of the process to "the last address [of VWAG] known to the plaintiff" (Business Corporation Law § 307 [b] ). They did not do so and claim they were under no obligation to proceed in this strict sequential pattern.
We conclude that plaintiffs' efforts in this case suffer from two key deficiencies. First, plaintiffs do not even purport to satisfy the first two statutory specifications, claiming without justification or support that they have no burden to show attempted compliance with them. In effect, they take the position that they can choose randomly from the menu of the statute. Second, even if plaintiffs, for argument's sake, were permitted to proceed directly to the end of subdivision (b) (2)'s "last known address" option, it was not correctly utilized because plaintiffs sent the copy of the process to VOA at its office in New Jersey "on behalf of" VWAG. That is not VWAG's "last known address," as prescribed and contemplated by the statute, even if VOA is a mere department of VWAG. Besides, plaintiffs' own rider to the summons and complaint shows that they possessed an address for VWAG in Germany. When a plaintiff chooses to try to acquire personal jurisdiction pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 307, which provides for service constructively on the Secretary of State, the provisions must be strictly complied with and a second constructive service mechanism is not authorized. The statute offers no alternatives for notification through an agent, whether involuntary or not, when jurisdiction is invoked initially by service on the Secretary of State, an involuntary and legally fictional agent in the first phase (see, Newman v Searle Co., 50 A.D.2d 574; Koepke v Bilnor Corp., 55 Misc.2d 928).
We should note that the agency doctrine relied on below is also flawed because it is predicated on an inapposite set of relationships. The notion that service of process in accordance with a different statutorily prescribed method on a wholly owned subsidiary will effectuate service on a parent corporation and result in jurisdiction over the parent is of no consequence or aid to plaintiffs in this case (see, Taca Intl. Airlines v Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97). Business Corporation Law § 307 is not simply a method for service on a corporation (contrast, CPLR 311). Rather, Business Corporation Law § 307 is a distinctive jurisdictional provision mandating that where there is a basis for general jurisdiction over an unauthorized foreign corporation under CPLR article 3, "process against such foreign corporation may be served upon the secretary of state as its agent" (Business Corporation Law § 307 [a] [emphasis added]). "Because the appointment of the Secretary of State as agent is a constructive rather than an actual designation, the statute contains procedures calculated to assure that the foreign corporation, in fact, receives a copy of the process" (Flick v Stewart-Warner Corp., 76 N.Y.2d, at 56, supra), and "strict compliance with [those procedures] is required" (id., at 57).
Assuming they could somehow overcome all the noted deficiencies, plaintiffs make a last leap argument that "the last address of such foreign corporation known to the plaintiff" can be any address of the foreign corporation or its related entities and need not be the principal place of business of that corporation or, indeed, of such foreign corporation itself. They find support for this thesis on the sandy shoals of the Appellate Division conclusion that VOA is a mere department of VWAG. For plaintiffs, the New Jersey address of VOA which they attempted to use to satisfy the statute "is just as much a last known address as an address [of VWAG] in Germany". We cannot agree because if this argument were accepted, it would desiccate the strict prescriptions of Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2) and the rationale of Flick and would render the application of the statute of dubious constitutional quality.
Finally, we note that Luciano v Garvey Volkswagen ( 131 A.D.2d 253, supra), so heavily relied upon by plaintiffs, did not hold that VOA is a "mere department" of VWAG for all purposes. That case was decided on a question of liability under an express warranty and may not serve on a collateral estoppel basis to establish that VOA is an agent of VWAG for purposes of service under Business Corporation Law § 307 (b) (2). VOA has not been proven to be a mere department of VWAG in this case for purposes of this jurisdictional statute.
Plaintiffs not having satisfied their burden of establishing jurisdiction, the action should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the certified question should be answered in the negative and the motion to dismiss should be granted.
Chief Judge KAYE and Judges SIMONS, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and SMITH concur.
Order reversed, with costs, defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint as against it granted and certified question answered in the negative.


text:
The Brooklyn Regulation Faculty Moot Court docket Honor Society is excited to announce the Thirty-Fourth Annual Dean Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competitors. 121. See United States v. Castro-Fonseca, 423 F. App’x 351, 352-54 (fifth Cir. 2011) (rejecting that use of a tip to legislation enforcement violated defendant’s proper to confrontation, asserting that statements could also be admitted an non-rumour to supply background or clarify the actions of regulation enforcement and citing United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Gibbs, 506 F.3d 479, 486 (sixth Cir. 2007).
has probably the most sophisticated system of evidentiary rules” in the world. The explanations for this complexity are twofold. First, American defendants have the correct to a jury trial in the vast majority of felony circumstances and in many civil cases. Second, strict tips regarding what proof could be admitted right into a trial retains the incidents of irrelevant and probably distracting facts from being introduced, which may confuse a jury and adversely affect the result of a trial.
36. See 23 Francis C. Amendola et al., Corpus Juris Secundum: Prison Regulation Â§ 1164 (2006) (asserting that certain out-of-court statements provided to clarify the course of police conduct are admissible as a result of they are supplied not for the reality of the matters asserted however moderately to show the data upon which the police actedâ€); Lubet, supra notice 5, at 50-fifty one (describing a model examination of a police workplace about arrest and assuming that the officer can properly testify that he had obtained an outline of the perpetrator that matched the defendant); Paul F. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Proof r. 801, Westlaw (database up to date Dec. 2014) (asserting that statements provided to indicate cheap reliance thereon by the hearerâ€ usually are not rumour and citing in support some selections permitting law enforcement officials to provide information as non-rumour background).
See e.g., State v. Jones, 277 Minn. 2006)). L. Rev.
The Brooklyn Regulation College Moot Court docket Honor Society is worked up to announce the Thirty-Fourth Annual Dean Jerome Prince Memorial Proof Competitors. 261. See, e.g., Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d at 1070 (discussing methods wherein the defendant could open the doorâ€); United States v. Webb, a hundred and fifteen F.3d 711, 714 (ninth Cir. 1997) (permitting profile evidence about concealing weapon in the engine compartment of a automotive admissible to refute a defendant’s declare that he was unaware a weapon was within the automotive); United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (permitting profile testimony to rebut the suggestion that nothing concerning the automobile defendant was driving signaled that it contained medicine); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210-eleven (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing profile evidence to rebut the protection’s suggestion that the defendant was not concerned in drug commerce as a result of he was poor).
The Brooklyn Regulation Faculty Moot Court Honor Society is happy to announce the Thirty-Fourth Annual Dean Jerome Prince Memorial Proof Competitors. The circuits that have held that in any other case inadmissible hearsay may be used to ascertain the background of the investigation should recognize the dearth of reasoned justification for that position. The investigation narrative shouldn’t be a legit facet of the prosecution’s case, and these courts ought to observe the course set by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits.
The Brooklyn Law School Moot Courtroom Honor Society is happy to announce the Thirty-Fourth Annual Dean Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competitors. Courts and health care have historically considered proof in fundamentally disparate methods, which may confound the authorized system as it strikes toward adopting EBM. The legal system is built on an adversarial mannequin which recognizes that evidence and even information are disputable, that consultants may disagree, and that due to this fact there’s a political factor to interpreting evidenceâ€ 1. Disputes about reality are left to a jury or decide to resolve, and the aim is to ensure honest process reasonably than fair outcomesâ€”or fact 1. Juxtaposed to this, empirical evidence in medicine seeks to define a single unimpeachable truth that may stand on its own. Furthermore, medical proof often focuses on populations, while on the court degree, the proof must be relevant to the only injured affected person four.
When a constitutional proper conflicts with an evidentiaryÂ rule that might otherwise enable a bit of evidence to beÂ admitted at trial, should the constitutional right be a trumpâ€? At present the sphere of psychology and law has a large physique of proof to support those interested in making informed decisions about the legal system and those concerned in the legal system, but no comprehensive central repository of this proof exists.
2011) (condemning overview testimony that gave the prosecution a second opening argumentâ€); United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (second Cir. To emphasize the importance of those duties, the Report recommends that if an knowledgeable fails to adjust to them a courtroom may rule inadmissible his or her evidence.
← What Are Some Widespread Steps Of A Felony Investigation And Prosecution?

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


77-2104. Tax; net transfer; follow federal rules and regulations.
The rules and regulations for determining the amount of net transfer upon which the transfer or excise tax imposed under sections 77-2101 to 77-2116 shall be based, shall, insofar as applicable, be the same rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for determining the net transfer under Chapters 11 and 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Source:Laws 1929, c. 73, § 4, p. 254; C.S.1929, § 77-2304; R.S.1943, § 77-2104; Laws 1984, LB 962, § 6; Laws 1992, LB 1004, § 8; Laws 1995, LB 574, § 71; Laws 2002, LB 905, § 7.


Contractors Face Potential Criminal Penalties When They Accept Payment For Work Performed By A Subcontractor And, With Intent to Defraud, Fail to Notify The Payor Of The Contractor's Debt To The Subcontractor, Resulting In A Loss To The Payor.
On behalf of Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP posted in uncategorized on Sunday, February 2, 2014.
Contractors that subcontract for labor, services, materials, and/or machinery must not only satisfy their obligations to their subcontractors, but must also notify the project owner of those obligations. The failure to give such notice, with the intent to defraud, exposes the contractor to criminal liability if the owner suffers a loss as a result of the contractor's failure to notify the owner of the contractor's outstanding obligations.
In a June 2012 article in this space, we explained the difference between "pay if paid" and "pay when paid" clauses in construction contracts, and when the obligation to pay a subcontractor is triggered under each. That article, however, did not address the legal penalties a contractor may suffer if it accepts payment for work performed by its subcontractor, fails to pay the subcontractor, and intentionally fails to notify the owner, resulting in a claim, such as a mechanic's lien, against the owner by the subcontractor. In brief, such conduct, when done with the intent to defraud, exposes the contractor to civil liability and also criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment.
Rare is the construction project that does not involve at least one level of subcontractor. Many large projects utilize multiple levels of subcontracting, creating several links in the contractual chain connecting the owner of the project to the entity ultimately performing the work. On such projects, it is not uncommon for cost overruns, miscalculations, and financial difficulties to result in the failure to make full payment to one or more contracting parties. Often these failures lead to civil litigation for breach of contractual obligations and/or the assertion of mechanic's liens against the property. When the failure to pay is arguably intentional and fraudulent, however, the penalties can also include a criminal conviction, fine, and imprisonment.
Beginning July 1, 2014, a major overhaul and reclassification will take effect in Indiana's criminal code. The system that previously classified felonies by letter based on severity will be replaced with a new six level classification system. As part of this overhaul, a portion of Indiana's Mechanic's Lien statute will be amended to incorporate the new classification system. As of July 1, 2014, a violation of Ind. Code § 32-28-3-15 will now be a Level 6 felony, punishable by a sentence of between six months and two and one-half years in prison, and a fine of up to $10,000.00. I.C. § 35-50-2-7.
Indiana's mechanic's lien statute states that a person commits a Level 6 felony when he/she knowingly or intentionally performs labor, supplies services, or furnishes material or machinery in a construction project, accepts payment for the work, and at the time of accepting payment knows he/she is indebted to another for labor, services, materials or machinery used to perform the work, but fails to notify the party that made the payment of the outstanding debt, resulting in a loss to the party making payment. See Ind. Code § 32-28-3-15. While the foregoing sounds ominous and imposing, it is important to note that an essential element necessary to impose criminal liability under this statute is that the contractor must have the intent to defraud when he/she fails to notify the party making the payment of the contractor's outstanding debt. See I.C. § 32-28-3-15(4).
In essence, the statute is designed to penalize those contractors who accept payment for work knowing that they are indebted to a subcontractor, fail to pay the subcontractor, and with intent to defraud fail to notify the party making the payment of the debt, resulting in a claim by the subcontractor against the paying party. For example, if a general contractor receives payment from an owner, but fails to pay its material supplier, the contractor may be exposed to criminal liability if, with intent to defraud, he/she failed to notify the owner of the outstanding obligation to the material supplier, and the material supplier ultimately prevails on a claim against the owner. See Miller v. State, 502 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind. 1986). Although this criminal liability provision appears in the section of the code addressing mechanic's liens, it is important to recognize that a subcontractor or supplier need not perfect a mechanic's lien against the owner's property for the contractor to be criminally liable. Rather, the owner must merely suffer some loss as a result of the contractor's failure to notify the owner of the outstanding debt to the subcontractor. Thus, any action by the subcontractor that results in a further obligation by the owner to the subcontractor will satisfy the requirement of the statute. Gamblin v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1040, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Again, it is critical to note that a mere mistake by the contractor is not likely to result in criminal liability. Rather, there must be evidence from which a jury could infer that the failure to notify the owner was done with the intent to defraud. See I.C. § 32-28-3-15(4).
In sum, while the potential for imposition of criminal liability on a contractor under certain circumstances is not new to the mechanic's lien statute or Indiana law in general, the update to the criminal code reclassifies the level of felony applicable and sets new sentencing periods and fines for contractors who violate the statute. While contractors who act without the intent to defraud need not fear conviction under the statute, they should take care to avoid any appearance of intent to defraud, thereby avoiding the need to defend themselves against criminal allegations in the first place.


Clare Duncan is currently a 3L at Harvard Law School.
The evolution of legal traditions in the Middle East will be examined, analyzed and discussed through the lens of multi-disciplinary readings reflecting the law, history, culture, human rights, and contemporary political dilemmas.
This course provides an introduction both to classical Islamic law and to a range of modern versions of Islamic law that guide the lives of contemporary Muslims. It explores how Muslims over the years have tried to understand God’s ethical command and how they have built from their rich body of ethical speculations, bodies of state law that reflect Islamic values. After introducing the history and basic concepts of classical Islamic ethical speculation and law, the course examines how modernity caused some Muslims to question their traditional assumptions about ethical and legal reasoning. The course concludes with several case-studies of "Islamic law" in action today. Taken together, the different sections of the class highlight the constant evolution of Islamic legal thought over time and place and the diversity of contemporary interpretations of Islamic law.
Islamic law, the sacred law of Islam grounded in the Qur’an, the practice of the Prophet Muḥammad, and the writings of Muslim scholars and jurists, stretches back nearly 1500 years. In this course, we will explore various aspects of Islamic law as seen through the eyes of one of the great minds of the Middle Ages, Ibn Rushd (known to the West as Averroës, d. 1196). Based on readings from Ibn Rushd’s handbook of Islamic law, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Bidāyat al-mujtahid), and other texts, this course will examine Islamic legal doctrine relating to criminal and penal law, ritual purity, dietary rules, family law, commercial law, and the law of war. Additional readings will deal with the role of the Qur’an in early Islamic law, institutions, legal theory, gender, Muslim feminism and the law, and some contemporary Muslim responses to the Islamic legal tradition.
Students will learn the main outlines of the history of Islamic law, its major concepts, and selected areas of legal doctrine. Comparative analyses of legal doctrines will also serve to introduce students to some general legal concepts.
This course was previously taught in Fall 2011.
This course introduces the field of Islamic law. Islamic law is one of the oldest and most significant legal systems in the contemporary age, and this course is designed to give students a firm grounding in its principles, concepts, and doctrines. We will study the history, theory, and the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. No previous familiarity with the field is necessary, and there are no course prerequisites. All readings are in English. The course will be divided into two main parts: the first will deal with Islamic law in the classical context, while the second will examine the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. The first half of the course is oriented towards the historical legacy and theoretical framework of the Islamic legal tradition with a special emphasis on the development of the various schools of law. In the second half, we will study the challenges of modernity and Islamic law in the contemporary age, and will examine issues related to Islamic public international law, human rights, women and gender, and violence.
Examines the history, doctrine, texts, and role of Islamic law throughout the world. The course focuses on the background and birth of the Arab-Islamic Empire, the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad, the development of Islam, the Moghul and Ottoman Empires, the Qurʾān and Sunna and other sacred texts, the principal schools of Islamic law, the status of women and religious minorities, and basic principles of some of the substantive areas of law, including criminal, family, inheritance, contract, business, and banking law.
This course introduces students to the history, politics, culture and theory of Islamic law, starting from the early 8th century, through to its development through what is often called the “classical period” (i.e., circa 9-14th centuries), and its reintroduction and application in the modern nation state setting. The readings are meant to provide substantive background for students as they listen to and engage each other via the lecture and discussion that occur in the classroom. However, the readings are not value-neutral; rather they present sites of contestation over the definition, purpose, and relevance of Sharia in the modern day. Consequently, part of the class lecture and discussion will concentrate on the various stakes at play when discussing contested issues in the history and politics of Islamic law.
The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.
The Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, represented a number of Somali Muslims working at a JBS-owned beef plant in Grand Island, Nebraska. The Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination claim against the Respondent-employer, alleging that the Respondent failed to provide Muslim employees with time to pray during sunset and also denied them prayer breaks during Ramadan. The District Court ultimately agreed with the Respondent-employer, deciding that the Muslim workers did not face undue discrimination because the accommodation of their prayer breaks would cause "undue hardship" to the employer because it would lead to unsafe meat curating practices and other dangers to the non-Muslim employees at the plant.
Plaintiff John Walker Lindh, a convicted "American Taliban," challenged prison policies that allowed for individual prayer in cells, but banned group congregation for prayer due to "security concerns." The Plaintiff sued the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The District Court found that the Plaintiff did have sincerely held religious beliefs, and therefore turned its inquiry to whether the ban on group prayer furthers the compelling interest of security and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The District Court ultimately determined that the warden-Respondent failed to establish that the total ban on daily congregational prayer by the Plaintiff was the least restrictive means of meeting the warden's security concerns.
The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.
The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.
The Plaintiff Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin named James A. Yates (warden), R. Fisher Jr. (associate warden), P.D. Brazelton (associate warden), K.R. Nash (correctional captain), M.C. Davis (associate warden), Dana B. Allen (correctional captain), A. Walker (correctional captain), Wendy K. Myers (community partnership manager), James D. Bennett (correctional lieutenant), S. Lantz (correctional lieutenant), E. McBride (correctional sergeant), D. McGee (protestant chaplain), E. Guthery (correctional officer), and Does 1-30 (PVSP correctional staff members) as the Respondents in this lawsuit, alleging that these individuals 1) forced Muslim prisoners to conduct their religious services outside; 2) failed to provide dietary accommodations for religious celebrations; 3) suspended purchase orders for religious oils; and 4) failed to hire a replacement Muslim chaplain. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's complaint stated cognizable claims against Respondents McBride, Davis, Yates, Myers, Bennett, Allen, Nash, Walker, Brazelton, Guthery, McGee, and Does 1-30 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and under RLUIPA. The District Court provided the Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the District Court in regard to the remaining Respondents.
The Plaintiff, Christopher B. Scott, brought suit against Dekalb County prison officials. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by 1) not providing a Muslim chaplain; 2) not allowing Muslim prisoners to wear a kufi; 3) failing to provide a secure and private place to pray five times a day; and 4) not providing a special meal at the end of Ramadan. The Respondents sought summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, claiming that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies necessary to bring suit. The Magistrate Court recommended that the Respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted on the Plaintiff's claims concerning the wearing of a kufi and concerning the celebration of an end-of-Ramadan meal. Summary judgment for all other claims was denied.
The Plaintiff Akeem Muhammad, an inmate in the Florida penal system, filed suit against the Respondents (prison officials Marvin Davis, Alex Taylor, and R. Graham; the Food Service Administrator of the Fla. Dept. of Corrections; and the Assistant Warden and Warden of Florida State Prison) for their refusal to provide him with a daily pre-fasting meal. The District Court determined that the plaintiff could not sue individual Respondents for monetary damages under RLUIPA. The District Court also determined that the Respondents failed to demonstrate that the policy of refusing to provide Muslim prisoners with a pre-twilight meal during Ramadan is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, the District Court denied the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the RLUIPA claim.
The Plaintiff Amir Shabazz challenged the Pleasant Valley State Prison for their policy of denying Muslim inmates ḥalāl meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The Plaintiff contended that Muslim inmates were denied ḥalāl meat, instead forcing them to eat vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff argued that this constituted religious discrimination under RLUIPA and the Fourteenth Amendment, since Jewish inmates were provided with kosher options and therefore were not forced to similarly eat the vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff claimed that this treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found that the facts put forth by the plaintiff were "vague and inconsistent," and therefore that the Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim against the Respondent.
This course will provide an overview of the theoretical doctrines that give rise to Islamic finance and an introduction to its contemporary practice in various market contexts. We will begin with the religious impulse that gives rise to Islamic finance, including, different Islamic critiques of conventional finance and why Islamic finance is claimed to be a superior model. We will then turn to classical Islamic commercial law, and study the two principle classical doctrines of Islamic commercial law that seem to mandate the creation of alternative financing models, ribā (often translated, incorrectly, to “usury”) and gharar (often translated, incorrectly, as “speculation”). We will also cover the basic building blocks of Islamic commercial law, studying rules governing sales, leases, loans, pledges and other fundamental commercial law relationships as well as Islamic rules governing business organizations such as general and limited partnerships.
After completing an overview of historical doctrines, we will turn to how these doctrines were modernized to produce a “modern” Islamic commercial law, something that enabled the rise of contemporary Islamic finance. We will consider a broad range of Islamic financial contracts across various markets, including, consumer banking and finance, Islamic deposit taking banks, Islamic corporate finance (e.g., sukuk, sometimes called “Islamic bonds”) and Islamic derivatives. We will then consider the legal structure undergirding Islamic finance and use it as an example of the advantages/disadvantages of public ordering versus private ordering. The course will conclude with different critiques of Islamic finance.
The plaintiff, Wafaa Elwakil, brought this action against her former employer, Target Media Partners, claiming a violation of her rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the company subjected her to discriminatory treatment because of her race, religion, and ethnicity; created a hostile work environment; and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Kenner Police Department. The company filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation because the court found that the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not engage in a "protected activity" for the purposes of her Title VII claim.
The plaintiff, Dominic Ali, a Muslim inmate at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, sued several prison officials for allegedly violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the state's constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to provide jumu'a (Friday prayer) services for Muslim inmates, failed to ensure that he was provided with healthy food during Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and denied him the ability to observe Ramadan by removing his name from the prison's internal Ramadan fasting list. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court agreed: it found that the plaintiff had not brought his grievances to the attention of the prison's commissioner, and therefore granted the defendants' motion.
The petitioners, Elwood "Atheem" Small and Parlie DuBose, Jr., alleged that their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were strip-searched in the presence of women and when their participation in religious holiday events was, according to prison policy, conditioned upon their signing a document that allegedly placed restrictions on their religious practice. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the claim. The petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Appellate Court held that the Ramadan policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The Appellate Court also determined that the practice of strip-searching the petitioners in a group of inmates in the presence of female staff members did not violate the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights, because exigent circumstances existed that necessitated the search.
The plaintiff, Regina Z. Muhammad, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, asserting claims of religious and sexual harassment, religious-based disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII. The plaintiff contended that after her supervisor discovered she was Muslim, he made a number of discriminatory comments, and then certified other employees with whom the plaintiff had been co-trained, but not the plaintiff. The respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff could prove that her lack of training, which ultimately resulted in her termination, had a significant detrimental effect on her employment.
The plaintiff, Raymond Miller, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, employees at the St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility (New York), violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment by restricting his ability to practice Islam. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants only allowed him to wear his kufi headgear when inside his cell. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, determining that the defendants' policies were not irrational or unreasonable, and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "that a more reasonable accommodation could have been made."
The plaintiffs, a group of inmates held at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, filed suit against Massachusetts prison officials for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the prison officials violated these rights by refusing to provide separate accommodations for adherents of the Nation of Islam, whose practices (according to one of the plaintiffs) are "distinctly different" from those of Sunnī Islam. The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be allowed because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies within the prison system.
The plaintiff, Dennis Balk, a former professor at the New York Institute of Technology (NYIT) in Bahrain, brought this suit against the New York Institute of Technology after he was fired. Balk alleged that he was fired from his position after a daily Bahrain newspaper, Al-Ayam, published an article stating that he had posted to his class website a controversial cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad in rags. Balk brought this claim, which alleged discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff also brought a motion to compel the deposition of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, the Executive Director of the Middle East for NYIT. The District Court determined that Dr. Hussein's deposition was necessary in the "interest of justice" within the meaning of the Walsh Act because of his alleged involvement in the plaintiff's firing. The District Court additionally found that given Dr. Hussein's periodic travel to the US, it was not unreasonable to compel Dr. Hussein to appear.
The plaintiff, Remon Shields, a prisoner serving a life sentence without parole, brought this action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging that his religion requires those who want to marry to get married and consummate their relationship, but his request for non-overnight "family visiting" with his wife were denied. The prison contended that there is a policy stating that those who are serving a life without parole sentence are ineligible for the family visiting program. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, determining that there was no fundamental right to conjugal visits, and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for life-without-parole prisoners was not rationally related to a valid penological interest.
The plaintiff, Michael Mootry, sued prison officials for implementing a policy that he claimed constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights. The policy banned inmate ministers from leading religious services without the direct supervision of a hired chaplain or volunteer. As a result of this policy, for two years, Muslim inmates were not accommodated with a hired chaplain to supervise jumu'a (Friday prayer) services. The Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss because it found that the defendants knew about the plaintiff being prevented from participating in the prayer services, that this was an ongoing issue, and that they did nothing to correct the situation.
Phillip Jean-Laurent brought an action against South Carolina prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his Islamic religious tenets and the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents prevented his attendance at Islamic religious services during Ramadan as retaliation for him using the law library, and deprived him of evening and morning meals required by Muslim religious exercises during Ramadan, in preparation for fasting during daylight hours. The District Court found that the respondents properly answered the interrogatories as to the policy of forbidding the plaintiff to attend prayer services, but that the respondents did not properly answer questions in document requests regarding the plaintiff's and other Muslim prisoners’ ability to secure Ramadan morning meals.
The plaintiff, Kiaza Loccenitt, a Muslim inmate in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction, sued New York City and several prison officials for allegedly violating his civil rights by denying him ḥalāl meals and by denying him and other Muslim inmates in his unit the services of an imām (Muslim chaplain). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against some of the prison officials (who were not directly involved in the alleged violations or the creation of policies that led to the alleged violations), but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to add factual details to his allegation about being denied ḥalāl meals, and about "the impact of that denial on the practice of his religion."
The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.
Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.
Plaintiff Dorian Davis challenged the Kern Valley State Prison policy that prohibited Muslim prisoners from purchasing and possessing prayer oils in their cells. The prison officials, however, claimed that a compelling governmental interest made their policy the least restrictive means of ensuring prison safety. The District Court agreed with them, determining that the prison did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights because the Muslim chaplain had previously provided contraband to prisoners; in addition, it found that RLUIPA rights were not violated because the prison had to cancel Friday prayer services until another Muslim chaplain could be hired.
The plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, sued state and prison officials for failing to provide Muslim inmates with ḥalāl meat options while incarcerated. The defendants claimed that inmates in the custody of the state are not entitled, under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA, to a diet that includes ritually-slaughtered meat. The defendants also requested summary judgment because they claimed that Wells-Bey did not have an allergy to eggs that inhibited his ability to eat a lacto-ovo diet as a substitute for meat. The Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff claimed he had an egg allergy and therefore could not subsist off the vegetarian meal plan; however, the Court allowed the defendants to refile their motion if they were able to obtain more information about the plaintiff's "alleged allergy."
Petitioner Tyrone Walker alleged that the prison violated his civil rights when it refused to provide him with the opportunity to participate in jumu'ah (Friday prayer) services when he was confined to the SHU. The District Court determined that the Respondent did not violate the Petitioner's rights under RLUIPA, as the Respondent's decision to deny the requests for access to Friday prayer services through closed-circuit television or through an audio feed was reasonably related to articulable, legitimate penological interests, which included the safety and the cost of installing the necessary equipment.
The plaintiff, Sefidkar Janali, a Shi'a Muslim, claimed that he should be allowed to attend a worship service apart from Sunni Muslims. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment rights and RLUIPA because Muslims are not allowed different worship times, while other denominations have separate times. The plaintiff also alleged that he should be provided a ḥalāl diet (upon entering the prison, he was given the choice of a regular meal, vegetarian meal, or Jewish Kosher meals). The District Court found that the prison officials did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment or RLUIPA rights because there were legitimate security and administrative concerns with offering separate Shi'a and Sunni services. The District Court similarly found that the meal options provided for Muslim inmates was adequate because they were lawful options for Muslims. The District Court therefore granted summary judgment for the respondents.
The plaintiff, state prisoner Horace Crump, filed suit against a Michigan Department of Corrections chaplain, David Leslie. The plaintiff alleged that he was barred from attending Friday prayer (jumu'a) services in retaliation for informing Muslim prisoners that the prison's suspension of Islamic religious services was unconstitutional. The respondent moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondent, finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately state his need to attend these services to the prison.
Plaintiff Peter McDaniels sued various prison officials, alleging that they intentionally failed to provide him with pre-sunrise meals during Ramadan and with an Eid al-Fitr meal at the conclusion of Ramadan, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The Plaintiff also contended that the lack of provision of ḥalāl meat and deprivation of an Arabic Qurʾān for nine months were discriminatory violations of his rights. The Respondents moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Respondents' request for summary judgment on the Ramadan meals issue, stating that the Plaintiff failed to show that such failures to provide a meal on isolated incidents imposed a significant restriction on his religious practice. However, the District Court decided that the Respondents did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the religious diet policy furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the Respondents deprived the Plaintiff of his rights by not allowing him access to a Qurʾān, finding that the Respondents were not required to provide the Plaintiff with an Arabic Qurʾān or dates to be used in his devotional practice, given the absence of any showing that Respondents prevented him from obtaining such items. The Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief, but the Court found that the individual Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, so they could not be held liable for personal damages under RLUIPA.
Plaintiff Tabari Strong, a Muslim prisoner in Beeville, Texas, filed a lawsuit alleging that the prison's grooming policy requiring all inmates to be clean-shaven violated his statutory rights under RLUIPA. He also claimed that the policy violated his right to exercise his religion under the First Amendment, and that enforcement of the policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment. The District Court refused to grant the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as an "extraordinary remedy," but maintained that it would be contrary to justice not to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff to have a quarter-inch beard.
The Plaintiff, Marcus Leeotis Watts, sued the Respondents, various prison officials at the Perry Correctional Institution in South Carolina, for allegedly violating his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment when the prison failed to provide Muslim prisoners with ḥalāl meat. The Respondents contended that the vegetarian meal option that complied with Islamic law was adequate, and sought summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Respondents, citing earlier case law providing that the failure to provide a ḥalāl diet containing meat did not substantially burden prisoners' exercise of religion because a Muslim prisoner is not religiously-obligated to eat meat.
Plaintiff Marlo Thomas, incarcerated at the Ely State Prison (ESP), brought this action against former ESP Warden E.K. McDaniel, former ESP Associate Warden Renee Baker, and former ESP Associate Warden Debra Brooks, for an alleged violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff claimed that he was placed in administrative segregation by the Respondents because they had a personal grudge against him because he was a Muslim inmate. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court found that the Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to support several elements of his First Amendment free exercise claim and his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that he sincerely believed he must engage in group worship to satisfy the tenants of his Islamic faith. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that Respondents' decision to confine him in administrative segregation was not reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interests, and instead found that the Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for safety and security reasons unrelated to religious discrimination.
Plaintiff Larry William Cortinas brought this action against the California prison system, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff alleged that medical staff at the prison refused him treatment and medication for his rheumatoid arthritis and hepatitis C because he was Muslim. The Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that he would be entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.