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After a jury trial in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, petitioner Eric Presley was convicted of a cocaine trafficking offense. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. 285 Ga. 270, 674 S. E. 2d 909 (2009). Presley seeks certiorari, claiming his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the trial court excluded the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court of Georgia’s affirmance contravened this Court’s clear precedents. Certiorari and petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are now granted, and the judgment is reversed.
“ ‘Well, you still can’t sit out in the audience with the jurors. You know, most of the afternoon actually we’re going to be picking a jury. And we may have a couple of pre-trial matters, so you’re welcome to come in after we … complete selecting the jury this afternoon. But, otherwise, you would have to leave the sixth floor, because jurors will be all out in the hallway in a few moments. That applies to everybody who’s got a case.’ ” Ibid.
“ ‘Well, the uncle can certainly come back in once the trial starts. There’s no, really no need for the uncle to be present during jury selection… . [W]e have 42 jurors coming up. Each of those rows will be occupied by jurors. And his uncle cannot sit and intermingle with members of the jury panel. But, when the trial starts, the opening statements and other matters, he can certainly come back into the courtroom.’ ” Ibid.
After Presley was convicted, he moved for a new trial based on the exclusion of the public from the juror voir dire. At a hearing on the motion, Presley presented evidence showing that 14 prospective jurors could have fit in the jury box and the remaining 28 could have fit entirely on one side of the courtroom, leaving adequate room for the public. App. to Pet. for Cert. E–37, E–41. The trial court denied the motion, commenting that it preferred to seat jurors throughout the entirety of the courtroom, and “it’s up to the individual judge to decide . . . what’s comfortable.” Id., E–38. The court continued: “It’s totally up to my discretion whether or not I want family members in the courtroom to intermingle with the jurors and sit directly behind the jurors where they might overhear some inadvertent comment or conversation.” Id., at E–42 to E–43. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed, finding “[t]here was no abuse of discretion here, when the trial court explained the need to exclude spectators at the voir dire stage of the proceedings and when members of the public were invited to return afterward.” 290 Ga. App. 99, 100–101, 658 S. E. 2d 773, 775 (2008).
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and affirmed, with two justices dissenting. After finding “the trial court certainly had an overriding interest in ensuring that potential jurors heard no inherently prejudicial remarks from observers during voir dire,” the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected Presley’s argument that the trial court was required to consider alternatives to closing the courtroom. 285 Ga., at 272, 273, 674 S. E. 2d, at 911. It noted that “the United States Supreme Court [has] not provide[d] clear guidance regarding whether a court must, sU. S.onte, advance its own alternatives to [closure],” and the court ruled that “Presley was obliged to present the court with any alternatives that he wished the court to consider.” Id., at 273, 674 S. E. 2d, at 911, 912. When no alternatives are offered, it concluded, “there is no abuse of discretion in the court’s failure to sU. S.onte advance its own alternatives.” Id., at 274, 674 S. E. 2d, at 912.
This Court’s rulings with respect to the public trial right rest upon two different provisions of the Bill of Rights, both applicable to the States via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment directs, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial … .” The Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), made it clear that this right extends to the States. The Sixth Amendment right, as the quoted language makes explicit, is the right of the accused.
The Court has further held that the public trial right extends beyond the accused and can be invoked under the First Amendment. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I). This requirement, too, is binding on the States. Ibid.
The case now before the Court is brought under the Sixth Amendment, for it is the accused who invoked his right to a public trial. An initial question is whether the right to a public trial in criminal cases extends to the jury selection phase of trial, and in particular the voir dire of prospective jurors. In the First Amendment context that question was answered in Press-Enterprise I. Id., at 510. The Court there held that the voir dire of prospective jurors must be open to the public under the First Amendment. Later in the same Term as Press-Enterprise I, the Court considered a Sixth Amendment case concerning whether the public trial right extends to a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress certain evidence. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39 (1984). The Waller Court relied heavily upon Press-Enterprise I in finding that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends beyond the actual proof at trial. It ruled that the pretrial suppression hearing must be open to the public because “there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.” 467 U. S., at 46.
While Press-Enterprise I was heavily relied upon in Waller, the jury selection issue in the former case was resolved under the First, not the Sixth, Amendment. Press-Enterprise I, supra, at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The constitutional protection for the right of access that the Court upholds today is found in the First Amendment, rather than the public trial provision of the Sixth” (footnote omitted)). In the instant case, the question then arises whether it is so well settled that the Sixth Amendment right extends to jury voir dire that this Court may proceed by summary disposition.
The point is well settled under Press-Enterprise I and Waller. The extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question, and it is not necessary here to speculate whether or in what circumstances the reach or protections of one might be greater than the other. Still, there is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has. “Our cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 380 (1979). There could be no explanation for barring the accused from raising a constitutional right that is unmistakably for his or her benefit. That rationale suffices to resolve the instant matter. The Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in assuming that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.
“[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id., at 48.
“Even with findings adequate to support closure, the trial court’s orders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to protect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court’s orders sought to guard. Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire.” 464 U. S., at 511.
The conclusion that trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties is clear not only from this Court’s precedents but also from the premise that “[t]he process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system.” Id., at 505. The public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right. In Press-Enterprise I, for instance, neither the defendant nor the prosecution requested an open courtroom during juror voir dire proceedings; in fact, both specifically argued in favor of keeping the transcript of the proceedings confidential. Id., at 503–504. The Court, nonetheless, found it was error to close the courtroom. Id., at 513.
Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials. Nothing in the record shows that the trial court could not have accommodated the public at Presley’s trial. Without knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with audience members.
Petitioner also argues that, apart from failing to consider alternatives to closure, the trial court erred because it did not even identify any overriding interest likely to be prejudiced absent the closure of voir dire. There is some merit to this complaint. The generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudicial remarks, unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are present during the selection of jurors. If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course. As noted in the dissent below, “the majority’s reasoning permits the closure of voir dire in every criminal case conducted in this courtroom whenever the trial judge decides, for whatever reason, that he or she would prefer to fill the courtroom with potential jurors rather than spectators.” 285 Ga., at 276, 674 S. E. 2d, at 913 (opinion of Sears, C. J.).
There are no doubt circumstances where a judge could conclude that threats of improper communications with jurors or safety concerns are concrete enough to warrant closing voir dire. But in those cases, the particular interest, and threat to that interest, must “be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” Press-Enterprise I, supra, at 510; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U. S. 1, 15 (1986) (“The First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of [the right to a fair trial]”).
We need not rule on this second claim of error, because even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had an overriding interest in closing voir dire, it was still incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure. It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide.
The Supreme Court of Georgia’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Today the Court summarily disposes of two important questions it left unanswered 25 years ago in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39 (1984), and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I). I respectfully dissent from the Court’s summary disposition of these important questions.
First, the Court addresses “whether it is so well settled that [a defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right” to a public trial “extends to jury voir dire that this Court may proceed by summary disposition.” Ante, at 4. The Court’s affirmative answer to this question relies exclusively on Waller and Press-Enterprise I; but those cases cannot bear the weight of this answer.
The Court correctly notes that Waller answers whether a “defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applies to a suppression hearing” (not to jury voir dire), 467 U. S., at 43, and that Press-Enterprise I interprets the public’s First Amendment right to attend jury voir dire, 464 U. S., at 509, n. 8, so neither Waller nor Press-Enterprise I expressly answers the question here, see ante, at 4. That acknowledgment should have eliminated any basis for disposing of this case summarily; the Court should reserve that procedural option for cases that our precedents govern squarely and directly. See, e.g., United States v. Haley, 358 U. S. 644 (1959) (per curiam) (summarily reversing a federal court’s judgment that refused to follow, or even mention, one of our precedents upholding the statute in issue under identical circumstances).
The Court nevertheless concludes that Waller and Press-Enterprise I—in combination—“well settl[e]” the “point.” Ante, at 4. It admits that “[t]he extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question,” but, apparently extrapolating from Press-Enterprise I, asserts that “there is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has.” Ante, at 4–5. But this conclusion decides by implication an unstated premise: that jury voir dire is part of the “public trial” that the Sixth Amendment guarantees. As Justice Stevens recognized in Press-Enterprise I, that case did not decide this issue. See 464 U. S., at 516 (concurring opinion) (“If the defendant had advanced a claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the voir dire, it would be important to determine whether the selection of the jury was a part of the ‘trial’ within the meaning of that Amendment”). Until today, that question remained open; the majority certainly cites no other case from this Court answering it. Yet the Court does so here—even though the Supreme Court of Georgia did not meaningfully consider that question, and petitioner does not ask us to do so.* I am unwilling to decide this important question summarily without the benefit of full briefing and argument.
Second, I am also unwilling to join the Court in reading the “ ‘alternatives to closure’ ” language it quotes from Waller and Press Enterprise I as squarely foreclosing the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia. See ante, at 6. The Court chides the Supreme Court of Georgia for “conclud[ing], despite our explicit statements to the contrary, that trial courts need not consider alternatives to closure absent an opposing party’s proffer of some alternatives.” Ante, at 5–6 (emphasis added). But neither Waller nor Press-Enterprise I expressly holds that jury voir dire is covered by the Sixth Amendment’s “[P]ublic [T]rial” Clause. Accordingly, it is not obvious that the “alternatives to closure” language in those opinions governs this case.
Even assuming the Court correctly extends Waller and Press-Enterprise I to this (Sixth Amendment voir dire) context, neither opinion “explicit[ly]” places on trial courts the burden of sU. S.onte suggesting alternatives to closure “absent an opposing party’s proffer of some alternatives.” Ante, at 6. The statement that a “ ‘trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding,’ ” ibid. (quoting Waller, supra, at 48), does not definitively establish who must suggest alternatives to closure that the trial court must then consider, nor does it expressly address whether the trial court must suggest such alternatives in the absence of a proffer. I concede that the language can easily be read to imply the latter, and the Court may well be right that a trial court violates the Sixth Amendment if it closes the courtroom without sU. S.onte considering reasonable alternatives to closure. But I would not decide the issue summarily, and certainly would not declare, as the Court does, that Waller and Press-Enterprise I “settl[e] the point” without “leav[ing] any room for doubt.” Ante, at 6.
Besides departing from the standards that should govern summary dispositions, today’s decision belittles the efforts of our judicial colleagues who have struggled with these issues in attempting to interpret and apply the same opinions upon which the Court so confidently relies today. See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F. 3d 62, 70–72 (CA2 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 U. S. 958 (1998); 131 F. 3d, at 74–75 (Walker, J., concurring); id., at 77–80 (Parker, J., dissenting). The Court’s decision will also surely surprise petitioner, who did not seek summary reversal based on the allegedly incorrect application of this Court’s well-established precedents by the Supreme Court of Georgia, but instead asked us to “resolve this split of authority” over whether “the opponent of closure must suggest alternatives to closure” or whether “those seeking to exclude the public must show that there is no available less-intrusive alternative.” Pet. for Cert. 18.
“I. This Court has established that the public cannot be expelled from a courtroom unless the presence of the public creates a ‘substantial probability’ of prejudice to an ‘overriding interest.’ But is some case-specific evidence required to meet this ‘substantial probability’ test, or can generalized fears that would apply equally to nearly every trial suffice?
“II. This Court has repeatedly held that a trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing a proceeding before it can exclude the public. But who bears the burden of suggesting such alternatives? Must the proponent of closure establish that closure is necessary, in that there are no reasonable alternatives available? Or to overcome a closure motion must an opponent of closure establish that reasonable alternatives do exist?” Pet. for Cert. i.

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SCOTT PAPER CO. v. MARCALUS MFG. CO.
See 326 U.S. 811 , 66 S.Ct. 263. [326 U.S. 249, 250] George E. Middleton, of New York City, for petitioner.
Automatic Paper Machinery Company, Inc., petitioner's assignor, acquired by assignment, from respondent Marcalus, Patent No. 1,843,429 of February 2, 1932, issued on the application of Marcalus for 'a method and machine for mounting a cutting strip of a hard non-metallic substance on an edge of a box blank.' The patent describes and claims a method, and a machine for employing it, whereby, in substantially one operation, indurated paper is drawn from a roll and brought into overlapping relationship with the edge of a box blank, when a strip of the paper is automatically cut off and glued to the box blank in such position that its longitudinal edge projects beyond the edge of the box blank. The box thus equipped with the cutting edge of the strip is useful as a dispensing container for rolled wax paper which, as drawn from the roll, may be cut in any desired lengths by drawing it across the [326 U.S. 249, 251] cutting edge at an angle with the plane of the cutter. Marcalus, while an officer and employee of petitioner, made the patented invention and assigned his patent application to petitioner for a valuable consideration. The patent issued on the application as filed, without amendment, after which Marcalus severed his connection with petitioner and organized respondent company, which he controls, and which, like petitioner, is engaged in producing and selling box blanks having a cutting edge.
Respondents, denying that the doctrine of estoppel can rightly be applied to patent assignments, also insist that the present case is not within the scope of the doctrine. Compare Buckingham Products Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co., 6 Cir., 108 F.2d 192 with Casco Products Corporation v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 7 Cir., 116 F.2d 119. Both parties rely on the decision of this Court in the Formica case, supra, which, although stating that the assignor cannot deny the novelty and validity of the assigned patented invention, nevertheless held that the claims of a patent may be narrowed by reference to the prior art so as to restrict them to so much of the invention described by the specifications as is not exhibited by the prior art. Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433, 466, 467; Garneau v. Dozier, 102 U.S. 230 ; Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 87 , 5 S.Ct. 1132; Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447 , 40 S.Ct. 564; Mackay Co. v. Radio Corporation, 306 U.S. 86, 94 , 618 S., 59 S.Ct. 427, 431. Cf. Hocking v. Hocking, 4 R.P.C. 255, 434, 6 R.P.C. 69; Clark v. Adie, 2 App.Cas. 423; Crosthwaite v. Steel, 6 R.P.C. 190.
This Court in the Formica case, passing the question, not present here, whether the estoppel of the assignor extends to claims added by the assignee to the application in the Patent Office, held that the estoppel did not, in any [326 U.S. 249, 253] event, preclude the assignor charged as an infringer from narrowing or qualifying their construction by reference to the prior art, saying, 266 U. S. at page 351, 45 S.Ct. at page 120: 'The distinction may be a nice one but seems to be workable.' It accordingly, by reference to the prior art, interpreted the claims, by narrowing them to a two step process, shown by the specifications, which the court found to be the assignor's advance over the prior art, but which was not in terms embodied in the claims. The Court thus sustained the defense of noninfringement by restricting the claims by reference to the prior art, and by holding in effect that the invention assigned was not as broad in scope as the claims would otherwise on their face define it to be.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that a literal application of the rule of the Formica case limits the claims of the assigned patent to a structure having certain minor mechanical additions made by Marcalus to the machine of the Inman patent which respondents copied by their accused device. These additions, it is conceded, may not involve invention, but if so, it is said, respondents are estopped to assert it. And applying the rule of the [326 U.S. 249, 254] Formica case they urge that the claims of the patent may nevertheless be narrowed to a machine embodying the additional Minor features not found in the Inman machine, and infringement may thus be avoided.
Revised Statutes, 4886, 4884 as amended, 35 U.S.C. 31, 40, 35 U. S.C.A. 31, 40, provide for the grant of a patent for a term of seventeen years to any person who has invented a 'new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.' The grant is conditioned upon the filing of an application in the patent office describing the invention and the manner of making and using it. U.S. 4888 as amended, 35 U.S.C. 33, 35 U.S.C.A. 33. Revised Statutes, 4895, 4898, 35 U.S. C. 44, 47, 35 U.S.C.A. 44, 47, authorize the assignment of an invention while the application for a patent is pending and of the patent rights to the invention after the patent has issued. Section 24(7) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 41(7), 28 U.S.C.A. 41(7), confers on district courts of the United States jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent laws, and R.S. 4921 as amended, 35 U.S.C. 70, 35 U.S.C.A. 70, gives the district courts authority to entertain suits to restrain infringement and for recovery of any resulting damage from the infringement of any right secured by the patent grant. [326 U.S. 249, 255] The enactment of these provisions is the mode by which Congress has chosen to carry into effect the policy sanctioned by the Constitution, Article I, 8, Cl. 8 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries.' The nature and extent of the legal consequences of the expiration of a patent are federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the patent laws and the policies which they adopt. Cf. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 , 63 S.Ct. 172, 173; Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 , 65 S.Ct. 226, 233, and cases cited. By the patent laws Congress has given to the inventor opportunity to secure the material rewards for his invention for a limited time, on condition that he make full disclosure for the benefit of the public of the manner of making and using the invention, and that upon the expiration of the patent the public be left free to use the invention. See Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 , 65 S.Ct. 741, 745. As has been many times pointed out, the means adopted by Congress of promoting the progress of science and the arts is the limited grant of the patent monopoly in return for the full disclosure of the patented invention and its dedication to the public on the expiration of the patent. Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241, 242; Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 1; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 , 33 S.Ct. 616, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 1185, Ann.Cas.1915A, 150; Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 , 511 S., 37 S.Ct. 416, 418, L.R.A.1917E, 1187, Ann.Cas.1918A, 959, and cases cited.
The aim of the patent laws is not only that members of the public shall be free to manufacture the product or employ the process disclosed by the expired patent, but also that the consuming public at large shall receive the benefits of the unrestricted exploitation, by others, of its disclosures. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 , 117-120, 59 S.Ct. 109, 113, 114. If a manufacturer or user could restrict himself, by express contract, or by any action which would give rise to an 'estoppel', from using the invention of an [326 U.S. 249, 256] expired patent, he would deprive himself and the consuming public of the advantage to be derived from his free use of the disclosures. The public has invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly to the patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws. And for the same reason a stranger, such as respondent Marcalus, cannot, by securing and assigning a patent on the invention of the expired Inman patent, confer on petitioner any right to deprive the public of the benefits of the free use of the invention for which the public has paid by the grant of a limited monopoly.
By the force of the patent laws not only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the public upon its expiration, but the public thereby becomes entitled to share in the good will which the patentee has built up in the patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent monopoly. Hence we have held that the patentee may not exclude the public from participating in that good will or secure, to any extent, a continuation of his monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and registering as a trademark any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications, drawings or claims of the expired patent, whether or not such matter describes essential elements of the invention or claims. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., supra, 305 U.S. at page 117-120, 59 S. Ct. at pages 113, 114; Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 , 16 S.Ct. 1002, 1007.
It is thus apparent that the patent laws preclude the patentee of an expired patent and all others including petitioner from recapturing any part of the former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to all the public the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired patent. They do not contemplate that anyone by contract or any [326 U.S. 249, 257] form of private arrangement may withhold from the public the use of an invention for which the public has paid by its grant of a monopoly and which has been appropriated to the use of all. The rights in the invention are then no longer subject to private barter, sale, or waiver. Cf. Philips v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 236 U.S. 662 , 35 S.Ct. 444; Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 361 , 64 S.Ct. 128, 131; Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 , 65 S.Ct. 895, 900. It follows that the patent laws preclude the petitioner assignee from invoking the doctrine of estoppel, as a means of continuing as against respondent, his assignor, the benefit of an expired monopoly, and they preclude the assignor from estopping himself from enjoying rights which it is the policy of the patent laws to free from all restrictions. For nomore than private contract can estoppel be the means of successfully avoiding the requirements of legislation enacted for the protection of a public interest. Compare Pittsburgh &c. Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 583 , 40 S. Ct. 27, 28 with Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 476 , 477 S., 31 S.Ct. 265, 268, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 671; New York Central R.R. v. Gray, 239 U.S. 583, 586 , 587 S., 36 S.Ct. 176, 177; Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 304 , 305 S., 309, 310, 55 S.Ct. 407, 414, 415, 416, 417, 95 A.L.R. 1352, and cases cited. The interest in private good faith is not a universal touchstone which can be made the means of sacrificing a public interest secured by an appropriate exercise of the legislative power. The patent laws preclude us from saying that the patent assignment, which they authorize, operates to estop the assignor from asserting that which the patent laws prescribe, namely, that the invention of an expired patent is dedicated to the public, of which the assignor is a member.
The judgment is affirmed for the reason that we find that the application of the doctrine of estoppel so as to foreclose the assignor of a patent from asserting the right to make use of the prior art invention of an expired patent, which anticipates that of the assigned patent, is incon- [326 U.S. 249, 258] sistent with the patent laws which dedicate to public use the invention of an expired patent. The assignor has a complete defense to an action for infringement where the alleged infringing device is that of an expired patent.
Mr. Justice REED considers that the dominant rule of Westinghouse Co. v. Formica Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 , 45 S.Ct. 117, 119, is 'that an assignor of a patent right is estopped to attack the utility, novelty or validity of a patented invention which he has assigned or granted as against any one claiming the right under his assignment or grant.' The fact that the prior art is evidenced by an expired patent does not seem significant to him. Consequently he would reverse.
* This question was not raised or argued in Westinghouse Co. v. Formica Co., supra, nor, so far as appears, in any of the cases cited in that opinion or the English cases which preceded it.
By 515 of the Restatement of Contracts, a restraint of trade is unreasonable and hence unlawful if it 'is based on a promise to refrain from competition and is not ancillary either to a contract for the transfer of good will or other subject of property ....' See generally as to the validity of contracts not to compete 76 Pa.L.Rev. 244, 257ff.; Handler, Cases and Materials on Trade Regulation, 102-150. [326 U.S. 249, 259] something to another in saying 'What I have sold you is worthless', even though he did not expressly promise that what he sold had worth. The obvious implications of fair dealing in commercial transactions have been part of our law for at least a hundred years. And it would be surprising indeed if the law made a difference whether what was purported to be sold was a diamond, or a secret process for manufacturing a commodity, or a patented machine.
It has never been questioned that courts will not make themselves instruments of unfair dealing when what is sold is a patent. In technical language, the sale of a patent means its assignment. Congress might have confined the right to exploit a patent solely to the patentee. Congress has acted on the contrary policy. Ever since the Act of February 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318, Congress has sanctioned the right to assign patents, requiring only fulfillment of certain formalities. To be sure, Congress has not said in so many words that the seller of a patent-an assignor-is subject like other sellers to the obligations of fair dealing. It has not said that he cannot turn around on the morrow and render futile that which he has sold by claiming that what he purported to sell as a patent was in truth not a patent, and, since it was not a patent, he, the seller, could not be charged with impairing the worth of the patent by practising it himself. Until this day such a sophistical argument to accomplish overreaching in a business transaction has uniformly been rejected by the courts, and it has been rejected by this Court on basic considerations of 'fair dealing'. Westinghouse Co. v. Formica, 266 U.S. 342, 350 , 45 S.Ct. 117, 120. It is relevant to recall that insistence on this doctrine was unanimously made in the Formica case by a Court which included Mr. Justice Brandeis, than whom no one was more zealously alert against the slightest inroads upon the public interest through undue extension of patent rights. It is important to emphasize that the principle of good faith which the [326 U.S. 249, 260] conscience of equity has thus enforced binds only an assignor who seeks to use the courts to defeat that which he purported to sell. It merely restricts one person, the assignor, from denying that he sold a patent when he purported to sell it, leaving the whole rest of the world free to assail the validity or novelty of the patent.
The principle of fair dealing as between assignor and assignee of a patent whereby the assignor will not be allowed to say that what he sold as a patent was not a patent had been part of the fabric of our law throughout the life of this nation. It has been undeviatingly enforced by English-speaking courts in this country, in England, in Canada, and Australia. See, e.g., Oldham v. Langmead, cited in Hayne v. Maltby, 3 T.R. 438, 439, 441 (1789); Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 10 Can.Exch. 17 (1905); Shepherd v. Patent Composition Pavement Co., 5 AustJur. 27 (1874). If there are reasons of public policy against the continued application of this equitable doc- [326 U.S. 249, 261] trine in the case of a patent, Congress has ready means of undoing that which has always been part of the patent law, as is true of other provisions which in its wisdom may call for change. This doctrine, voluminously applied in the Law Reports, has never been questioned by Congress in the successive enactments amending the patent law. Only very recently bills dealing with this subject have been introduced but have not yet been acted upon. See, e.g., H.R. 97 and H.R. 3462, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 3874, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The place for reconsidering the policy which this Court more than twenty years ago characterized as 'a rule well settled by forty-five years of judicial consideration', Westinghouse Co. v. Formica, supra, 266 U.S. at page 349, 45 S.Ct. at page 120, is the Congress. That forum is not confronted with the stark alternatives of either adhering to the rule or wiping it out, but has the wide range of legislative discretion in considering what is good and what is bad in the rule and fashioning legislation appropriate to the diversified aspects of the problem.
The Court professes neither to reject, nor to adhere to, the equitable principle of fair dealing reaffirmed by the Formica case. It finds ground for avoiding what seem to me to be inescapable alternatives by the claim that the assignor here purported to assign a patent which turns out to be invalid because it now appears that it was based on an earlier expired patent. Since an expired patent makes it part of the public domain, the assignor, although he had sold what need not have been bought, could enter the domain like the rest of the public. So goes the argument. But this, I submit with all respect, is to throw out the baby with the bath. For it amounts to saying that the assignor in raising invalidity in a suit for infringement is just a part of the general public and can ask the Court to enforce every defense open to the rest of the public. The essence of the principle of fair dealing which binds the assignor of a patent in a suit by the assignee, even [326 U.S. 249, 262] though it turns out that the patent is invalid or lacks novelty, is that in this relation the assignor is not part of the general public but is apart from the general public. The isolated, individual relation between assignor and assignee, due to the sale by the assignor of something which he afterwards should not be allowed to say was nothing, is the basis of the doctrine of fair dealing which operates against him and against nobody else. That doctrine is wholly consistent with the right of the general public to the free and unfettered use of a patent after its time has expired. It is suggested, also, that the public is harmed by removing the assignor from the ranks of actual or potential manufacturers of what is covered by the patent. But that is true of every case in which the assignor is barred from questioning the validity of his assignment. As against the loss to the public of one possible manufacturer is put the public policy of fair dealing between man and man. That is the meaning of the Formica doctrine. 1 [326 U.S. 249, 263] A machine that is not patentable because it is not novel is just as much part of the public domain as a machine on which the patent has expired. If public policy does not preclude an individual from being held to a fair bargain with another when he purported to sell as a patent what in fact was never patentable, what is there in reason-for there is nothing in what Congress has said-that should preclude enforcement of a fair bargain whereby an individual agreed, in effect, not to compete with another regarding a machine which turns out not to have been patentable because it represented an expired patent open to all the rest of the world? Of course, parties cannot by agreement defeat an explicit provision or purpose of legislation. One shipper cannot, for instance, secure the private advantage of a lower rate when the Interstate Commerce Act provides for equality of rates among shippers, Pettsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577 , 40 S.Ct. 27; nor can an employer defeat the protective purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq., setting minimum wage limits, by an agreement based on the inequality of bargaining power between employers and individual employees, Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U.S. 697, 706 , 65 S.Ct. 895, 902. There is nothing comparable to such situations in the language or purpose of the patent laws ragarding assignment of patents. On the contrary, as we have seen, the principle whereby an assignor is held to his bargain with the assignee has been part of the texture of our patent law throughout its history. Congress in its successive enactments modifying the patent law has respected this principle and left it untouched. 2 [326 U.S. 249, 264] Happily law is not so divorced from ethical standards that a hitherto unquestioned principle of fair dealing should be deemed hostile to any branch of the law. But if the principle of fair dealing as between the assignor and the assignee of a patent that has for so long been part of the patent law is to be repudiated judicially, it is better to do so explicitly, not by circumlocution.
[ Footnote 1 ] The complicated facts in the Formica case have somewhat obscured the true scope and meaning of that decision. What was decided is perhaps best disclosed in the lower court's opinion which was here affirmed. That opinion was by Judge Denison who spoke with special authority on patent law: 'It may be granted that these two claims (in controversy) were properly readable upon the specifications and drawings of the application signed by O'Connor (the assignor)-that is to say, in the language of the Patent Office, that he had the right to make these claims. Nevertheless they expressed a conception of the invention, which rested solely on the 'nonplaniform' shape of the article and was in this respect broader than any claim which O'Connor had drafted, and if the prior Baekeland patent had been known to O'Connor, as it became known to his assignees when it later compelled them to abandon the original broad claims, he probably never would have claimed as his the invention thus formulated. The record does not support the inference that O'Connor either expressly or impliedly represented to the Westinghouse Company (the assignee) that he was the inventor of the process defined in these two claims, and hence the claim of estoppel must fail.' 6 Cir., 288 F. 330, 334.
[ Footnote 2 ] Nor can the assignor of an expired patent, when the assignee seeks to hold him to his bargain, invoke the law condemning contracts in restraint of trade. So far as the hitherto recognized principle of fair dealing between an assignor and his assignee unduly restrains the freedom of action of the assignor, it merely restrains in the manner that every contract is a restraint of trade. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 , 38 S.Ct. 242, 244. And it restrains equally whether what is assigned is an expired patent or something that never was a patent. In fact, however, the doctrine of such fair dealing does not run counter to the considerations by which the laws outlaws restraints which persons may impose on themselves by contract. For such an implied restraint as is found in the assignment of a patent, purportedly valid but in fact invalid, like all reasonable restraints, does not offend the objections to unreasonable restraints. The underlying rationale of the law against unreasonable restraints is twofold. The first of these reasons is that the law will not lend its aid in the enforcement of a contract by means of which a man may deprive himself of the possibility of earning a livelihood and deprive the public of the 'benefit of his labor.' The second, 'that such restraints tended to give ... the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excluded one competitor, and by the same means might exclude others.' Taft, J., in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 6 Cir., 85 F. 271, 279, 46 L.R.A. 122, modified, 175 U.S. 211 , 20 S.Ct. 96. Neither consideration is pertinent here.

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§ 46.2-644.03 Enforcement of liens acquired under §§ . . .
Any person having a lien under §§ 46.2-644.01 and 46.2-644.02 and any bailee, except where otherwise provided, having a lien as such at common law on personal property in his possession that he has no power to sell for the satisfaction of the lien, if the debt for which the lien exists is not paid within 10 days after it is due and the value of the property affected by the lien does not exceed $ 12,500, may sell such property or so much thereof as may be necessary, by public auction, for cash. The proceeds shall be applied to the satisfaction of the debt and expenses of sale, and the surplus, if any, shall be paid within 30 days of the sale to any lienholder, and then to the owner of the property. A seller who fails to remit the surplus as provided shall be liable to the person entitled to the surplus in an amount equal to $ 50 for each day beyond 30 days that the failure continues.Before making the sale, the seller shall advertise the time, place, and terms thereof in a public place. In the case of property other than a motor vehicle required to be registered in Virginia having a value in excess of $ 600, 10 days’ prior notice shall be given to any secured party who has filed a financing statement against the property, and written notice shall be given to the owner as hereinafter provided. If the property is a motor vehicle required by the motor vehicle laws of Virginia to be registered, the person having the lien shall ascertain from the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles whether the certificate of title of the motor vehicle shows a lien thereon. At that time, the Commissioner shall also determine the value of the property and shall communicate it to the bailee. If the certificate of title shows a lien, the bailee proposing the sale of the motor vehicle shall notify the lienholder of record, by certified mail, at the address on the certificate of title of the time and place of the proposed sale 10 days prior thereto. If the name of the owner cannot be ascertained, the name of “John Doe” shall be substituted in any proceedings hereunder and no written notice as to him shall be required to be mailed. Whenever a vehicle is shown by the Department of Motor Vehicles records to be owned by a person who has indicated that he is on active military duty or service, the Department shall include such information in response to requests for vehicle information pursuant to the requirements of this chapter.If the value of the property is more than $ 12,500 but does not exceed $ 25,000, the party having the lien, after giving notice as herein provided, may apply by petition to any general district court of the county or city wherein the property is, or, if the value of the property exceeds $ 25,000, to the circuit court of the county or city, for the sale of the property. If, on the hearing of the case on the petition, the defense, if any made thereto, and such evidence as may be adduced by the parties respectively, the court is satisfied that the debt and lien are established and the property should be sold to pay the debt, the court shall order the sale to be made by the sheriff of the county or city. The sheriff shall make the same and apply and dispose of the proceeds in the same manner as if the sale were made under a writ of fieri facias.In determining the value of the property as required by this section, the Commissioner shall use a recognized pricing guide and, in using such guide, shall use the trade-in value specified in such guide.If the owner of the property is a resident of the Commonwealth, any notice required by this section may be served as provided in § 8.01-296 or, if the sale is to be made without resort to the courts, by personal delivery or by certified or registered mail delivered to the present owner of the property to be sold at his last known address at least 10 days prior to the date of sale. If the owner of the property is a nonresident or if his address is unknown, any notice required by this section may be served by posting a copy thereof in three of any of the following places in any combination: (i) one or more public places in the county or city where the property is located; (ii) one or more websites operated by the Commonwealth, the county or city where the property is located, or a political subdivision of either; or (iii) one or more newspapers of general circulation in the county or city where the property is located, either in print or on their websites. For purposes of this section, ” public place ” means a premises owned by the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof, or an agency of either, that is open to the general public.If the property is a motor vehicle (i) for which neither the owner nor any other lienholder or secured party can be determined by the Department of Motor Vehicles through a diligent search of its records, (ii) manufactured for a model year at least six years prior to the current model year, and (iii) having a value of no more than $ 3,000 as determined by the provisions of § 8.01-419.1, a person having a lien on such vehicle may, after showing proof that the vehicle has been in his continuous custody for at least 30 days, apply for and receive from the Department of Motor Vehicles title or a nonrepairable certificate to such vehicle, free of all liens and claims of ownership of others, and proceed to sell or otherwise dispose of the vehicle.Whenever a motor vehicle is sold hereunder, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall issue a certificate of title and registration or a nonrepairable certificate to the purchaser thereof upon his application containing the serial or motor number of the vehicle purchased together with an affidavit of the lienholder that he has complied with the provisions hereof, or by the sheriff conducting a sale that he has complied with said order.Any garage keeper to whom a motor vehicle has been delivered pursuant to § 46.2-1209, 46.2-1213, or 46.2-1215 may after 30 days from the date of delivery proceed under this section, provided that action has not been taken pursuant to such sections for the sale of such motor vehicle.Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, any person having a lien under § 46.2-644.01 or 46.2-644.02 shall comply with the provisions of the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.) when disposing of a vehicle owned by a member of the military duty or service.
2009, c. 664; 2011, cc. 14, 702; 2014, c. 339; 2015, c. 640; 2016, c. 397.
If you’re reading this for anything important, you should double-check its accuracy—read § 46.2-644.03 on the official Code of Virginia website.


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Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, Civil No. 84-0757 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1984).
Resolving a question of first impression, D.C. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green has held that the FOIA does not require an agency to provide information in the particular format specified by a requester. Mr. Dismukes sought access to a computer tape listing the participants in oil and gas leasing lotteries held by the Department of Interior. In response, Interior offered the information on microfiche cards, the format in which it was routinely made available to the public, but Dismukes insisted on receiving it in computer tape form. Relying particularly on FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631-32 (1982), where the Supreme Court focused upon "information" as opposed to the records containing it, Judge Green concluded that the resolution of FOIA disputes logically turns not upon the format of what is requested, but rather on the nature of the information and the effects of its disclosure. Rejecting Dismukes' claim that Interior's choice of microfiche cards was "a deliberate tactic to hinder him," Judge Green noted that more people were purchasing the information on microfiche than, otherwise, and that Interior's release of the information in the form most useful to the general public "does not erect unreasonable barriers to plaintiff's access to [it]." Accordingly, she held that the agency had met its obligation under the FOIA to "provide responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably accessible form."
Washington Post Co. v. HHS, Civil No. 80-1681 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1985).
In a decision of significant precedential value on two inter-related issues, U.S. District Court Judge Harold H. Greene ruled that documents listing financial interests held by individual part-time consultants to the National Cancer Institute, which are protected by the civil discovery privilege for "confidential reports," are therefore likewise protected from FOIA disclosure as "privileged" financial information under Exemption 4. Judge Greene noted that these very documents had been held privileged from civil discovery in Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (in a 1982 decision in this case published at 690 F.2d 252) had nevertheless suggested that the documents' privileged status could not protect them under the FOIA. On remand, however, Judge Greene field that more recent Supreme Court reasoning requires parallel protection: "For the reasons stated in [United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984)], the policies underlying this discovery privilege would be thwarted if a party could obtain through the FOIA information not discoverable under the Federal Rules." In addition to being the first FOIA decision to apply the "confidential reports privilege," this decision is also the first to apply Exemption 4 exclusively on a privilege basis.
Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In another FOIA case concerning FBI investigative records on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that photographs taken by a foreign law enforcement agency at a public demonstration qualify under the second clause of Exemption 7(D) as "confidential information furnished only by [a] confidential source" in the course of a criminal investigation. Overturning the lower court's holding that the photographs were "public" rather than "confidential," the D.C. Circuit held that the "fact that an event occurred in public does not make it public in the relevant sense of 'generally known.'" That any number of 7 people could have taken these photographs did not nullify Exemption 7(D) protection, it reasoned, because the phrase "information furnished only by the confidential source" most assuredly cannot mean 'obtainable only from the confidential source.'" The court of appeals also rejected the requester's contention that the source could not be "confidential" where the FBI had previously disclosed information from that very source, declaring that "[d]isclosure of one piece of information received from a particular party -- and even the disclosure of that party as [a] source -- does not prevent that party from being a 'confidential source' for other purposes."
General Electric v. NRC, 750 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1984).
In a "reverse" FOIA suit involving a request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a report generated by General Electric Co. that criticized the design of GE's own nuclear reactors, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the report was an "agency record," but remanded the case to the NRC due to the serious inadequacy of the agency's administrative record on the issue of competitive harm under Exemption 4. The Seventh Circuit's determination on the agency record issue turned simply on the fact that the report "was demanded and received by the agency for use in a formal proceeding." However, as to the report's disclosability, the court of appeals pointedly noted that the NRC had failed to provide any specific reason for rejecting GE's claim of competitive harm, which it said "validates congressional criticisms of the excessive casualness displayed by some agencies in resolving disputes over the application of exemption 4."
Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1985).
Applying a rigid interpretation of Exemption 5's "inter-agency or intra-agency" threshold, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has refused to accord attorney work-product protection to employee witness statements compiled by NLRB investigators in an unfair labor practice investigation. The Ninth Circuit, which last year was reversed by the Supreme Court on a similar issue involving witness statements in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984), recognized that "if an internal document would be immune from civil discovery, it is similarly protected . . . under the FOIA." However, it narrowly construed Weber Aircraft by holding that the presumably privileged witness statements before it failed to qualify under Exemption 5 because they were not "internal agency documents or documents prepared by outsiders who have a formal relationship with the agency." In a sharp departure from the majority view, it also refused to protect the witness statements under Exemption 7(D) because the witnesses knew that their names and testimony could be revealed if the investigation led to a formal hearing. A petition for rehearing is pending.

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Applicant is the duly appointed Insurance Commissioner of the State of California.
Respondents Legion Insurance Company and Villanova Insurance Company ("Respondents" or "Legion" and "Villanova"), are now and at all times mentioned have been corporations duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Pennsylvania and domiciled there, with their principal offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Legion is authorized to transact the following classes of insurance: fire, marine, disability, liability, workers' compensation, common carrier liability, credit, team and vehicle, automobile and miscellaneous insurance in California, under the authority of a Certificate of Authority issued by the Commissioner.
Villanova is authorized to transact the following classes of insurance: fire, marine, surety, disability, plate glass, liability, workers' compensation, common carrier liability, boiler and machinery, burglary, sprinkler, team and vehicle, automobile, aircraft and miscellaneous classes of insurance in California, under the authority of a Certificate of Authority issued by the Commissioner.
Respondents have no offices in California and they have no officers in California.
On March 28, 2002, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued Orders of Rehabilitation for Respondents. The Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner was appointed as Rehabilitator of Respondents effective April 1, 2002.
On April 1, 2002, Legion stopped paying all claims with the exception of workers' compensation.
Based on the Pennsylvania court order and an extension to that order, the Pennsylvania Rehabilitator was required to stop paying workers' compensation claims on October 25, 2002, to those claimants in states where the statutory deposit had not been turned over to the Pennsylvania Rehabilitator to be used to pay those claims. By Pennsylvania court order, express authorization to permit payment of workers' compensation claims was granted in two-week intervals. This ruling impacted California policyholders by delaying payment to them and prompted the Commissioner to seek an ancillary receivership in order to secure the workers' compensation statutory deposits in California. All other claims in California went unpaid.
On May 3, 2002, pursuant to Insurance Code §1064.3 and upon verified application by the Commissioner, this Court issued an Order appointing the Commissioner as Ancillary Receiver of Respondents.
Pursuant to Insurance Code §11715, Legion deposited $87,446,916 and Villanova deposited $31,939,294 in Letters of Credit in California banks or financial institutions plus $495,000 in securities to secure their obligations to their California workers' compensation policyholders.
Pursuant to the May 3, 2002, order appointing the Commissioner Ancillary Receiver, the Commissioner drew down the combined amount of $119.3 million from the Letters of Credit used to collateralize Legion's workers' compensation statutory deposit requirements. This draw down was accomplished to protect California workers' compensation policyholders from Respondents' potential failure to pay workers' compensation benefits.
The Commissioner contracted with the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) to administer the workers' compensation deposits to ensure continued payments of workers' compensation benefits to California policyholders. The California workers' compensation policyholders currently are paid from these funds. However, it is estimated that these funds will be depleted in early May 2003.
On August 29, 2002, the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance filed a Petition for Liquidation of Respondents in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. Protracted hearings on the liquidation petition continued throughout November 2002. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court requested additional briefing and established a post-hearing briefing schedule through December 2002. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has yet to act on the Petition for Liquidation. No liquidation order has been issued in Pennsylvania.
In October 2002, Respondents were advised to stop writing new business and renewals of existing business in California, and have not resumed doing so.
The Commissioner determined that Legion had a policyholders' surplus of negative $292,334,113 as of December 31, 2001, the date of its last officially filed annual statement with the California Department of Insurance. Legion reported that as of December 31, 2001, it had total net admitted assets of $1,116,131,000 and total liabilities of approximately $817,835,000 resulting in a policyholders' surplus of $298,296,000. However, Legion's policyholders' surplus as of December 31, 2001, when adjusted to conform to the laws, regulations and accounting practices of California, was negative $292,334,113.
The Commissioner determined that Villanova had a policyholders' surplus of negative $78,581,803 as of December 31, 2001, the date of its last officially filed annual statement with the California Department of Insurance. Villanova reported that as of December 31, 2001, it had total net admitted assets of $173,162,000 and total liabilities of $145,524,000, resulting in a policyholders' surplus of $27,638,000. However, Villanova's policyholders' surplus as of December 31, 2001, when adjusted to conform to the laws, regulations and accounting practices of California, was negative $78,581,803. Supervising Insurance Examiner Robert Loo's analysis of Respondents' financial condition is set forth in the Declaration of Robert Loo in Support of Verified Application for Order of Liquidation.
Insurance Code §§700.01, 700.02, and 700.025 set forth the requirement of minimum capital and surplus of $5,400,000 for an insurer transacting the classes of insurance authorized by the Certificate of Authority issued by the Commissioner to Respondents. The Commissioner determined that liquidation of Respondents is warranted on the grounds that Respondents are in such condition that the further transaction of business by Respondents is hazardous to their policyholders, creditors, and the public (Ins. Code §1016), and that by reason of their insolvency, Respondents no longer meet the requirements for issuance of a Certificate of Authority (Ins. Code, §1011(h)).
Respondents' policyholder surplus is less than the minimum amount of capital and surplus required by California Insurance Code §§700.01, 700.02 and 700.025, for an insurer transacting the classes of insurance authorized by the Certificate of Authority issued to Respondents by the Commissioner. Pursuant to California Insurance Code §985, Respondents are statutorily insolvent and such condition constitutes grounds for liquidation under California Insurance Code §1011(h) and (i). The Commissioner finds that such deficiencies indicate that Respondent is "in such condition that its further transaction of business will be hazardous to its policyholders, or creditors or to the public" within the meaning of Insurance Code §1011(d).
Respondents' workers' compensation statutory deposits are estimated to be deficient by at least $55.9 million (Legion) and $91.3 million (Villanova), with the likelihood that said deficiencies are substantially higher.
Since his appointment as Ancillary Receiver, the Commissioner has confirmed that Respondents' financial condition is as analyzed by the Department of Insurance's financial analysts. Further, since being appointed as Ancillary Receiver, the Commissioner has not discovered additional assets that could reasonably lead to Respondents' rehabilitation. In addition, based upon the information currently available to the Commissioner as Ancillary Receiver, he has determined that Respondents' financial condition has worsened since the date of appointment of the Commissioner as Ancillary Receiver, such that no claims are being paid with the exception of workers' compensation claims. Workers' compensation claims are being paid out of Respondents' statutory deposits in California and those deposits are projected to be depleted in early May 2003.
In light of the fact that both Legion and Villanova have been placed into rehabilitation proceedings in Pennsylvania, copies of this verified application, notice of hearing, the supporting declaration of Robert Loo and all other supporting documents are being sent by UPS overnight mail to the following persons at their last known addresses: (1) M. Diane Koken, the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Pennsylvania; (2) Bruce Daley, the on-site rehabilitator for both Legion and Villanova; (3) Mutual Risk Management, Ltd. the corporate parent of both Legion and Villanova; and (4) the California Insurance Guarantee Association.
Based upon the above, and pursuant to Insurance Code §1016, the Commissioner has determined that it would be futile to continue to proceed as Ancillary Receiver, and therefore seeks to liquidate Respondents' business.
For such other relief as the Court deems necessary and proper.
I am employed by the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California as Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the Conservation & Liquidation Office ("CLO") of the California Department of Insurance. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF LIQUIDATION and know the contents. The facts contained therein are not all within my personal knowledge, and I am informed that no single officer of the CLO has personal knowledge of all these matters. The statements are based upon information assembled by authorized employees of the CLO, and I am informed and believe that the statements based upon that information are true. As to those matters that are within my own personal knowledge, the statements are true.
Executed this 20TH day of March, 2003 at San Francisco, California.
The Commissioner is applying to this Court for an order appointing him as Liquidator of Respondents Legion Insurance Company and Villanova Insurance Company (collectively "Legion"). The Commissioner's verified application is based upon his determination that it is futile for Respondents' ancillary receivership to continue, and that, pursuant to Insurance Code §1016, it is appropriate to liquidate the business of these companies.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania placed Respondents in rehabilitation.
Section 1064.3 requires that the Commissioner file an application for appointment as ancillary receiver if it is found that there are sufficient assets of the insurers in California to justify the appointment of the ancillary receiver.
As stated in this verified application, the Commissioner has established that it would be futile to proceed with the conduct of Respondents' business.
Insurance Code §1019 provides that upon the issuance of an order of liquidation, the rights and liabilities of the insurer and of any other persons, including creditors and policyholders, interested in its assets shall be fixed as of the date of entry of the order. Insurance Code §1020 provides that this Court shall issue orders as may be deemed necessary to, among other things, prevent waste of assets, obtaining of preferences, and interference with the Commissioner as Liquidator or the liquidation proceeding.
Insurance Code §1035 provides that the Commissioner as Liquidator may appoint and employ deputy commissioners, clerks, and assistants to carry out his function and to pay the costs and expenses of liquidating the insurer out of the assets of the insurer, and then to extent necessary, out of the funds of the Department of Insurance.
Insurance Code §1037 specifies the powers which accrue to the Commissioner upon his appointment as Liquidator. These include, but are not limited to, the authority to collect all monies and debts due to the insurer, to conserve the assets of the insurer, to compromise and settle claims against the insurer, to acquire and dispose of property belonging to the insurer, and to prosecute and defend all lawsuits against the insurer.
Lastly, Insurance Code §§1021 and 1022 provide that the Commissioner, upon his appointment as Liquidator, shall publish notice in newspapers of general circulation throughout the State to the insurer's policyholders, creditors, shareholders, and all other persons interested in its assets.
Based on the facts set forth in this verified application, appointment of the Commissioner as Liquidator of Respondents is fully warranted. For all the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner respectfully submits that his request for an order appointing the Commissioner as Liquidator and to liquidate the business of Respondents should be granted.


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18. Mr Tsavachidis applied to the Commission on 20 September 1995. He complained that the National Intelligence Service had kept him under surveillance on account of his membership of the Church of Jehovah’s Witnesses. He relied on Articles 5, 8, 9, 11 and 14 of the Convention.
19. The Commission declared the application (no. 28802/95) partly admissible on 4 March 1997. In its report of 28 October 1997 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of the right to respect for private life secured in Article 8 (thirteen votes to four); that there had been no violation of the right to freedom of religion, secured in Article 9 (nine votes to eight); that no separate issue arose under Article 11 (right to freedom of association) (fourteen votes to three); and that it was unnecessary to consider whether there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention taken together with Articles 8, 9 and 11 (unanimously).
“With reference to your letter of 13 October 1998, I write to inform you that the Government wish to conclude a friendly settlement in this case consisting in the payment of 1,500,000 drachmas for the costs incurred by the applicant in the proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights and in a statement to the effect that the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not, and will not in the future be, subject to any surveillance on account of their religious beliefs.
I have already contacted the applicant’s representative, Mr Bitsaxis, who agrees to this friendly settlement.
“On behalf of the applicant, Mr Tsavachidis, I am writing to inform the Court that the Greek Government and the applicant have concluded a friendly settlement in the … case which is pending before the Court and is set down for hearing on 12 November 1998.
The Government are stating at this stage of the case that the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not subject to secret surveillance on account of their religious beliefs and will never be subject to such surveillance in the future. The Government have also undertaken to pay the applicant the sum of 1,500,000 drachmas for the costs incurred in the proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights.
23. The Delegate of the Commission was consulted and raised no objection.
24. The Court takes formal note of the agreement reached by the Government and Mr Tsavachidis and notes also that the agreement affords the applicant satisfaction. It would nevertheless be open to the Court, having regard to its responsibilities under Article 37 § 1 in fine of the Convention, to decide to continue its examination of the case if it were not satisfied that the settlement in question was based on respect for human rights as recognised in the Convention or its Protocols (Rule 62 § 3). However, that is not so in this case.
25. In this connection, the Court points out that in a number of earlier cases it had to consider systems of secret surveillance in States other than Greece and to ascertain, under Article 8 of the Convention, that there were adequate and effective safeguards against abuses of such systems (see the following judgments: Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28; Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82; and Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116). Furthermore, in the cases of Kokkinakis v. Greece and Manoussakis and Others v. Greece (see the judgments of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, and 26 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, respectively) – in which the facts were, however, different from those of the instant case – the Court had to rule under Article 9 of the Convention on the application of the relevant Greek legislation to the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In so doing, it clarified the nature and extent of the Contracting States’ obligations in that regard.
26. It follows that the case should be struck out of the list.

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German conflicts of law is based on the tradition of Savigny and its famous ”Sitztheorie”. Today it is mainly governed by statute law and international conventions.
Two European Regulations have replaced German domestic conflicts of law rules. It worthwhile to note that the Rome I Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, also referred to as Rome I) and the Rome II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to noncontractual obligations, also referred to as Rome II) cover both, contractual and extra-contractual obligations.
However, still the German conflict of laws rules in respect of real estate and tangibles remains untouched and is purely domestic law. According to article 43 EGBGB the lex rei sitae or lex situs applies.
Unfortunately German courts are often not very familiar with conflicts of law rules because no specialised courts and judges do exist for this kind of work. Sometimes German courts are suspicious about the application of foreign law which is still dealt as a fact not as law (see Section 293 ZPO = Civil Procedure Code). Thus German courts are free to take evidence as to the applicable foreign law. In most cases University professors are asked to provide expertise on foreign law which normally consist in summaries of the content of the foreign law found in available books. If they are not famliar with the orginal llanguage they rely quite often on English texts which sometimes are not up to date. Thus there is a risk of misleading expertises.
In principle German conflicts of law rules are broadly harmonised by EC-instruments. Especially jurisdiction rules and international contract law are based on such instruments, as there used to be the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 (for short Rome Convention, which has been replaced by the Council Regulation EC/593/2008 of 17 June 2008 (OJ 2008 L177/6) referred to as Rome I) and the Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 december 2000 on jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments (OJ 2001 L12/1).
A particularity of German conflicts of law is that the question of whether the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it, is usually not treated as a part of conflicts of law. Consequently German textbooks on conflicts of law generally only deal with the question on how to determine the governing law if the case involves contacts with several different states or jurisdictions. In principle German law does not provide for special provisions concerning questions of international jurisdiction. As a rule international jurisdiction is given when a local venue is established by applying the rules of the ZPO, unless they are excluded by the above mentioned EC-regulation (for short <?xml:namespace prefix = "st1" />Brussels I). In German law there is no such clear cut distinction between jurisdiction in rem and in personam as exists in common law. Pursuant to § 12 ZPO the court before which a person is generally amenable to suit shall have jurisdiction for all complaints brought against him or her, unless an exclusive venue shall be established for a complaint. Generally the proper ordinary venue is the place where the defendant resides permanently. Several special venues also exist. In disputes over property the local court where the property is situated has exclusive jurisdiction. In most cases, however, questions of international jurisdiction are regulated by the provisions of the EC-regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I), which are quite similar to those given by the German legislator.
Whereas domicile for english and american lawyers is the legal tool employed to attach a person to a particular locality for some particular purpose, i.e. to decide whether there is sufficient contact between a person and a state so that its law may be applied to the person´s affairs or its courts may hold him subject to its jurisdiction, under German law no similar tool exists. The German term Wohnsitz signifies more than mere physical presence but does not come near to domicile. § 7 BGB defines the Wohnsitz as the place where a person is permanently resident.
In the event of a dispute arising from a agreement the proper ordinary venue is the place where the defendant has his permanent residence (art. 2 Brussels I). Concurrent jurisdiction may exist in the place where the contract has been performed (art. 5 n° 1 Brussels I). Jurisdiction may also be agreed between the parties (art. 23 Brussels I, art. 38 ZPO). A court without jurisdiction per se, shall have jurisdiction by reason of the express or implied agreement of the parties, in the event that the parties to the agreement are merchants, juridical persons of the public law or separate public estates. The jurisdiction of a court may also be agreed on in the event that at least one of the parties has no domestic general venue. This agreement must be in writing or, in the event that is was made orally, confirmed in writing (§ 38 para. 2 (1) ZPO, art. 23 Brussels I). In all other respects, an agreement on jurisdiction shall only be permissible in the event that, expressely and in writing, it is concluded for the event that the party sued transfers his or her residence or customary abode is unknown at the same time the complaint is filed (§ 38 ph. 3 n° 2 ZPO).
Formerly German international contract law was governed by art. 27, 28 EGBGB. Nowadays their homologues in articles 3 and 4 Regulation Rome I apply having replaced the former Rome Convention (see Britton  ICLR 380, 387 with regard to the fact that different language versions of the Rome Convention existed, which were equally authentic which sometimes led to interesting discussions). Pursuant to article 3 para. 1 Regulation Rome I (= article 3 para. 1 Rome Convention = art. 27 para. 1 EGBGB) an express choice of law is conclusive. Parties may even select a system of law by implied terms. Freedom of choice however is limited by the principle that parties are not allowed to evade the application of the rules of a system of law which they do not like by resorting to another system. If the parties have not expressed a choice of law, such an implied choice of law must be demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contracts or the circumstances of the case.
According to article 4 para. 1 Rome I Regulation (= article 4 para. 1 Rome Convention = art. 28 ph. 1 EGBGB), in the absence of choice, the applicable law is to be the law of the country referred to in artile 4 para. 1 Rome I Regulation.
In the past this used to be as a General rule the law with which the contract was most closely connected. But if there was a severable part of the contract having a closer connection with another country then this part could by way of exception be governed by the law of that other country. Art. 4 para. 2 to 4 Rome Convention then went on to give three presumptions for determining with which country the contract is most closely connected, providing in principle that the contract is presumed to be most closely connected with the country in which the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence. Art. 4 para. 5 finally restates the principle set out in art. 4 para. 1 Rome Convention in the sense that if the characteristic performance cannot be determined the presumptions in art. 4 para. 2 to para. 4 do not apply. We may summarize that in the case of a contract for the supply of goods or services it is the provision of the goods or services, not the payment for them, which is characteristic performance.
Under article 4 Rome I Regulation there is list of rules, for instance with regard to sales contracts or service contracts. Sales contracts involving the transfer of a title in rem are governed by the lex rei sitae. However, if a contartc is involved which is not listed in para 1 of article 4 Rome I Regulation gain the law with which the contract is most closely connected applies. This is the case in respect of loan Agreements (Palandt/Thorn, BGB, Rom I 4, note 26).
Thus a loan contract or agreement has continuously been held to be governed by the law of the country in which the bank´s head office is situated. The same conclusion was reached by applying the presumption of characteristic performance for a bond agreement. But if the bank has branches in several countries the place where the branch is situated will determine the applicable law when it granted the loan. Mortgage lending however is sometimes regarded as a special agreement thus not falling under art. 4 ph. 2 Rome Convention. By art. 4 ph. 3, a contract, in so far as it concerns immovable property or a right to use the property, is presumed to be most closely connected with the country of its situs. But this presumption, it seems, does not extend to contracts for mortgage lending. But in mortgage lending cases the accessory character of the mortgage and the land charge calls in question whether a characteristic performance can be determined. Therefore German authors and courts rather seem to prefer not to apply the presumption of art. 4 para. 2 Rome Convention than to apply art. 4 para. 5 Rome Convention. Thus a loan secured by a mortgage or a land charge is considered to be more closely connected with the state where the surety has been granted (BGHZ 17, 89, 94 concerning a case with connections to the former RDA).
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ no. L 177/6) have replaced the Rome Convention. Pursuant to its Articles 28 and 29, the Regulation applies from 17 December 2009, to contracts concluded after the same date.
According to Art. 3 para. 1 Rome I Regulation a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract. Thus in principle current law has been maintained.
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be determined according to a catalogue of conflicts of law rules (Art. 4 para. 1 Rome I Regulation). Where the contract is not covered by the catalogue in Art. 4 para. 1 or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.
According to recital 17 of the aforementioned Regulation the concept of ‘provision of services’ and ‘sale of goods’ should be interpreted in the same way as when applying Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in so far as sale of goods and provision of services are covered by that Regulation. Thus it is suggested that loan contracts fall under Art. 4 para.1 lit. b (compare Micklitz/Rott, EuZW 2001, 325, 328), according to which a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual residence.
Where the subject of an action is some item of property located within the state of the forum, the court may exercise in rem jurisdiction as to that property. This enables the court to determine the rights of the entire world in that specific property. Therefore art. 22 n° 1 Regulation 44/2001 provides that jurisdiction for claims concerning rights in rem will be given only at the situs of the right in rem. In turn, classification of an action as in rem or in personam depends on the type of relief sought by the plaintiff. Most actions to establish or extinguish an interest in land are actions in rem. Thus a foreclosure action pursuant to Sect. 1147 BGB is considered an action in rem (Zöller/Vollkommer, ZPO, Sect. 24 note 11; Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht, Art. 22 note 15) and so falls exclusively under art. 22 n° 1 Brussels I. By contrast a claim based on the obligation of the mortgagee arising from a fiduciary agreement (Sicherungsvertrag) to grant the mortgagor the right to have the land charge waived or ceded when the need for security has ceased, can not be introduced at the situs court (BGHZ 54, 201). In such case a foreign bank being the mortgagee will have to be sued at its seat, unless there is no special forum, i.e. subsequent to art. 5 Brussels I or Sect. 29 ZPO (place of performance).
Insofar as the parties are free to chose their forum by agreement, a standard term which declares the courts at the seat of the mortgagee exclusively competent for all claims arising from the mortgage deed does not conform with §§ 305 et seq. BGB (OLG Köln Rpfleger 1956, 340).
First the court must decide whether or not the case presents a property problem. If so, no choice of law is admitted. As a rule the forum would characterize an interest as property according to its own law (lex fori principle) without reference to any foreign law. But in practise the law of the situs of the interest will control the characterization issue. Thus a German court will classify as immovables freehold titles, leasehold titles under the Leasehold Act, condominium property and all limited rights in rem.
Title in property is, in general, exclusively governed by its lex situs or lex rei sitae (article 43 EGBGB). The policy favoring reference to the law of the situs is so strong that courts usually apply the whole law of the situs, including its conflict rules (renvoi). As to limited rights in rem the lex situs rule is applicable as well. Thus a mortgage or land charge subject to land is governed by the lex situs notwithstanding that the debt, not the charge, is the principal characteristic of the transaction. The fact that the lex situs rule is paramount does not, however, conclude all difficulties which may appear. As far as formalities are concerned, any transaction or instrument that purports to change, then and there, the ownership of immovables must satisfy the formal requirements of the lex situs. But a different position arises where the inquiry relates not to the actual disposal of the right in rem but the rights and liabilities of the parties under a contract relating to immovables. A contract by which A agrees to transfer a mortgage encumbering land to B is not necessarily governed exclusively by the lex situs. The debt for which the mortgage or land charge has been granted may be governed by another law and the contract of assignment may be governed by a third law as well. This may bear some special problems regarding the accessory character of mortgages against land.
A (a French bank) grants a loan to B (a German citizen). They expressly chose the law of France. The loan will be secured by a mortgage subject to a German estate, thus ruled by German law (lex situs rule). Then A assigns the mortgage to C, an English bank, in such terms that it is exclusevely subject to English law. The mere fact that it relates to a foreign land ought not to affect the contractual rights and liabilites of the parties A and C. Two problems may arise: (1) breach of contract and (2) failure to comply with certain formalities.
(1) If C brings an action for breach of contract to the German court the action may succeed against A if the contract by which A has agreed to do so is a an enforceable binding agreement under English law.
(2) In doing the transfer A and C will have to obey to German and French law as well in order to avoid the nullity of the assignment. Under French and German law the transfer of the claim will effect the transfer of the mortage. But French law does not provide a special form for the assignment. However, German law does. As under German law the written form and the transfer of the mortgage certificate is required, the assignment of the mortgage will only become effective if German law has been respected.
A fiduciary agreement, however, by which a land charge is tied to its purpose to serve as a security does not fall under the situs-rule. Artilces 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation will apply, thus a choice-of-law-clause will be valid and is recommendable.
WARNING: the material contained in these notes is a simplified guide to some of the major topics in German law. It is not intended as a substitute for legal advice on individual transactions, and does not necessarily stand on its own. Whilst the contents are believed to be correct, the author cannot accept any responsibility for errors or omissions.

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The Tanzania Public Service College (TPSC) is a Government Executive Agency established in 2000 as a direct response to fill a void for a sustainable public service training institution. TPSC offers programmes that are directly linked to Government business agenda and demand driven. As the demands for the public service to offer quality services at affordable costs increase, it is imperative that the service should be staffed with competent personnel. Hence, TPSC’s core business is to develop the appropriate public service competences, which will transform the service into effective and efficient machinery that will strive to meet citizen’s needs in terms of services. TPSC’s Mission is to improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the public service of Tanzania by providing comprehensive training, consultancy and applied research interventions.
less than 3.5 in Bachelor degree.
1.1.4 TUTORIAL ASSISTANT (Secretarial Studies) – (6) POSTS.
 Candidate should be eligible for registration as technical teacher with a G.P.A of not less than 3.5 in Bachelor degree.
ii. Receives letters from customers and records them in relevant register.
iv. Opens mail collected from the post office.
v. Keeps in safe custody files and documents.
vi. Maintains a record of file movement.
 Holder of National form IV with Certificate in Records and Archives Management (NTA Level 5) or equivalent qualifications from a recognized institution.
iii. Assists in determination of enrolments budgets in a semester in all programmes.
iv. Prepares report of registered students for other use/decision making processes.
v. Coordinates students’ orientation program in liaison with dean of students.
Management or equivalent qualifications from a recognized institution with a G.P.A of not less than 3.5 in Bachelor degree.
vii. Maintains public and staff catalogues.
 Bachelor Degree in Library and Information Studies or equivalent from a recognized institution.
Management or equivalent from a recognized institution.
ii. Prepares monthly revenue & expenditure reports.
qualifications registered as Associate Certified Public Accountant.
e-Government Agency (eGA) is a semi-autonomous institution established in 2012 under the Executive Agencies Act, No.30 Cap. 245 of 1997. The mandate of e-Government Agency includes coordination, oversight, provision, promotion of e-Government initiatives and enforcement of e-Government standards and guidelines in the Public Service.
i. To ensure coordination, management and compliance of e-Government implementation and initiatives.
ii. To ensure within the Government, users have access to shared ICT infrastructure and resources.
iii. To promote and provide e-Government advisory and technical support for implementation of e- Government.
iv. To coordinate, manage, develop, disseminate, monitor and evaluate e-Government standards and guidelines.
v. To ensure the Public has access to e-services.
Responsible for design and developing of web-based applications, technical solutions to solve business problems, which includes initial design, coding, deployment, testing and maintenance of software application systems. The primary objective is to help businesses be more efficient by developing technology solutions in a cost-effective way by determining the software requirements of projects, and communicating them clearly to stakeholders.
Engineering or equivalent degree from a recognized institution.
ii. Sound knowledge in: Git, Grid System (Sussy Grid), Node JS, Gulp JS, SASS, Twitter Bootstrap, and Bower will be added advantage.
v. Possession of a relevant recognized ICT professional certification will be an added advantage.
 An attractive remuneration package will be offered to successful candidates.
Responsible for design and developing software applications based technical solutions to solve business problems, which includes coding, software deployment, initial testing, and maintenance of software application systems. The primary objective is to help businesses be more efficient by developing technology solutions in a cost-effective way by determining the software requirements of projects, and communicating them clearly to stakeholders.
i. Advanced knowledge in RESTful and SOAP APIs, Queue Management, SMS Gateway, SMPP Knowledge, Data Visualization, Database Optimization, and Smartphone App Development using iOS, Android, Phonegap, etc. will be added advantage.
x. Provide appropriate infrastructure technology solution to support eGA Operations.
xiii. Contributes to the disaster recovery and business continuity planning process regarding the assigned systems and infrastructure xiv. Assist in management of hardware devices, licensing and all programs as assigned.
v. Practical skills in configuring access to file services as Access Control, managing NTFS file and folder permissions, managing permissions for shared resources, determining effective permissions, configuring and managing distributed file system as Distributed File System (DFS) Overview, configuring DFS Namespaces, configuring DFS replication, deploy file sharing services, deploy an FTP server and a web server.
The primary responsibility of the Network Engineer is to maintain all network systems and work closely on Network and Data center infrastructures to support critical network and public shared systems.
i. Monitor performance, capacity, and availability of the network on an ongoing basis and recommend improvements in technologies and practices.
Engineering or related discipline from recognized institution.
iii. Proficiency in designing/deploying in LAN/WAN topologies using routing protocols like OSPF/ISIS, EIGRP, BGP, IPv6, MPLS, Multicast, HA/Redundancy etc.
iv. Good understanding of last mile (both Fiber Optics and Microwave) technologies.
xii. Working knowledge of Antivirus/IPS/web proxy technologies.
xiv. Practical skills in managing Server Infrastructure roles as IPv4 and IPv6 Addressing, Domain Name System Server Role, Configuring DNS Zones, DHCP Server Role.
xv. Practical skills in configuring and managing VoIP System architecture and Technology.
The primary responsibility is effective provisioning, installation, configuration, operation, upgrades and maintenance of server systems hardware, software and infrastructure. This individual ensures that system hardware, server operating systems, software systems, infrastructure and related procedures adhere to eGA’s values.
i. Provision, install, configure, operate, upgrade and maintain assigned server systems hardware, software and infrastructure on MS Windows, Linux and Unix Server platforms.
ii. Provide appropriate infrastructure technology solution to support eGA Operations.
diagrams and related documentation, and system component maintenance contracts are properly maintained.
xiii. Management of hardware devices, licensing and all programs on the Data centre.
xiv. Ensure high-availability of data centre products and services.
xv. Execute other assignments as you may be assigned from time to time by your superiors.
v. Installation and Administration of Packages, Patches and Updates- fundamentals of Patches, Packages and Updates installation and administration.
xi. Practical skills in configuring access to file services as Access Control, managing NTFS file and folder permissions, managing permissions for shared resources, determining effective permissions, configuring and managing distributed file system as Distributed File System (DFS) Overview, configuring DFS Namespaces, configuring DFS replication, deploy file sharing services, deploy an FTP server and a web server.
xiii. Possession of recognized ICT professional certification such as CISA, CISM, CISSP, CEH, CCNA will be an added advantage.
Responsible for requirements gathering and designing applications based technical solutions to solve business problems, which includes defining, analysing and documenting software and system requirements. The primary objective is to help Public Institutions implement technology solutions in a cost-effective way by determining the requirements of software projects, and communicating them clearly to stakeholders, facilitators and partners.
i. Acting as a bridge between business group with need or problem and the Technology teams offering a solution to a problem or need.
involving line of business, software/hardware developers and vendors.

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