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Academy of Fine Arts in Cracow -Poland, the Major Art and Cultural Center of Eastern Europe, where he received his Master of Fine Arts. He continued his Studies at the Royal Academy of Art in Copenhagen, Denmark. (1968) and did additional Post graduate work at the Academy of Fine Arts in Budapest. (1971) Horkay studied under the Internationally know Artist and Theater Director Tadeusz Kantor, as well as Professors, M. Wejmann and J. Nowosielski, Poland/Palle Nielsen/Danmark. He received Diplomas in Graphic Arts, Painting, and Film Animation. He has three children Hes spent a lot of time in the USA. Allentown PA., New York NY, Phoenix AZ, Melbourne FL. Between 1976-2001. Studio 9843 N 48th Place, Paradise Valley. Arizona.
Warhol took moments from popular culture and turned them into history, Horkay takes history and turns it into a moment, as though the past millennium was a monolithic unit of time. Istvan Horkay's Museum Factory images are beautifully printed on archival paper in small, signed and numbered editions.
In today’s world, computers are used to simplify our lives. However, as an artist, I find computers and the digital world to be tools that must be taken seriously, because they inherently reflect the artist and his work. If my work is considered in its mathematical and digital realm, then we can see the duality of the human created art and the binary basis of digitizing. It is of the greatest importance that the humanity of the artists reveals itself truly and is not overshadowed by the technology. It is within these considerations that I come to a dilemma where I must find artistic parameters within the unlimited power of technology. When my work is saved as a psd file in Adobe Photoshop, I am at liberty to change, alter, or rework my pieces at will. My pieces, as stored files, remain alive and not complete with the resoluteness of, for example, a painting. Therein lies the challenge of finding closure and the end point to all the pieces. While the technology poses challenges, I find my expression in the limitless possibilities of producing my art in any shape or size allowable. Having this digital world as my artist’s tools allows me to cross-reference literature and poetry with imagery. It is within the layering and the cross-referencing that the artist’s character and soul emerge. To me, each layer is another virtual poem laid upon another one. My works contained hundreds of layers, each seperate as it’s own poem, yet each connect to all as a whole. My goal is create a new genre of digital art, what I call “virtual poems”.
The newest Collages, Photo-Transformations of Horkay, in a certain regard are the continuation of the previously established visual formatting and creating methods. This are not simple extract ions, or not only the verifications of his knowledge to select from the wide tradition of visual art, but a selection for a purpose. In the newest visual theory research there is a higher emphasis on analyzing image anthropology (Hans Belting). Horkay's artworks are directive by that respect. By giving more prominent value to the expression of the implied anthropological substance, to the gesture, to the pose, he does not simply create a more significant work as before, he implies those rudiments (elements) into his statement. The anthropologists, and along them the contemporary DADA is not deterred from the realization, that applying body language and positioning in the visual creativity process has tremendous meaning value. That applies for Horkay's art also. The power and expression of his work comes from the application and combination of the redemption of the meaning, and the statement of gesture, pose and body. Wolffin stated already in 1921, that the vision has explanatory and illustrative features, meaning we do not simply see, we see something by something - by that a vision is able to refer to not only itself, but to assign to a certain relation trough it, which is more than the ordinary sight itself, since we never see only the picture.
A picture born by a vision.
"And yet, word is not the life. People talk just to attack something or to defend themselves.
Bela Bacso is professor and chair of Aesthetics at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest (Hungary).
Borderlines: Hermeneutical Essays(1994); The Shadow of the Word: Understanding Paul Celan's Poetry (1996), "Because it is not us that know..."(1999), Writing and Forgetting (2001), as well as a colletion of essays in German, Die Unvermeidbarkeit des Irrtums. Essays zur Hermeneutik Junghans Cuxhaven-Dartford 1997.
Recent publikations: The Will to Truth in. Nietzsche, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
Nietzsche and the Sciences II. ed. Babette E.Babich Kluwer Ac. P. 1999., and "Wille zur Wahrheit" als Kunst der Interpretation in.
„And yet, word is not the life. People talk just to attack something or to defend themselves.
Quite common is when a painter traces the pictures of one-time artists to learn from them, to crib their secrets, to employ their knowledge for this own picture making fantasy. It could be quite common; but Horkay traces not Leonardo or Rubens, but a text, namely the first handwritten page of Freud’s Entwurf einer Psychologie (1985), the mode how Freud’s hand was writing, how he transformed the thought into a tangle of signs and letters. On the write surface (all-permitting and resistant at the same time) the Freudian text appears as a kind of a culture historical frottage – if I may use this term in a somewhat figurative sense after Max Ernst. The text does not mean simply itself; it is hardly eligible. The meaning of the picture is born from an „injury” to the tangle of words. The never re-whitenable surface is penetrated by colors; constancy is re-achieved, since the retraced (frottage), and all written artpiaces lose permanency with advancing time.
Horkay’s art is epitomic in the double meaning of the word: a fragment, an incised part of something already in existence, and – just because of this incision – is an injury to the finished surface, to the tangle of writing or a finished picture. This relies on the experience that man, handing himself down through signs, simulates a kind of sense-wholeness. In these series this textual sense-wholeness appears to be ever different as different colors enter the surface at different sites. It is the same and not the same at the same time. „Once the signs are scars, then the wounds will tell tales of some non-alleviated history” (D. Kamper – Zur Soziologie der Imagination Hanser V. 1986. p. 148). The sign will temporarily closen over the story. Who else would know this better than Freud, who, after the neurological-physiological and neuropsychical phases, so deeply doubted that it was possible „to bring to light the hidden content in its wholeness” (Konstruktionen in der Analyse 1937. in: Stud. Ausgabe Ergb. Fischer V. 1982. p. 398).
This culture historical „frottage” is an artistic reminder of the liberating and deeply doubt-evoking act of the Freudian turn, namely that everything what gains sense in the sign is not the movement of sense itself, but that of alternating meanings, a re-determination of the sign from the past history. The presence of unclosed and non-fulfilled alternatives in relation of the emerging sign is a pioneering idea of the Freudian psychoanalysis. „Interpretation comes fully untied in sense relations, and will understand the force relations (Verdragung, Wiederkehr des Verdrangten) only through these sense relations (Zensur, Entstellung, Verdichtung, Verschiebung).” ) P. Riceur – Die Psychoanalyse und die Kultur der Gegenwart in u. o. Hermeneutik und Psychoanalyse. Der Konflikt der Interpretationen II. Kosel V. 1974. p. 65).
Painting did not, and naturally, could not withdraw itself from this turn, be it termed „Beyond Painting” by Max Ernst, or „die Aesthetik des nichtrelationalen Bildes” by the art historian G. Boehm. Beyond what, and non-related to what: this is the principal and unavoidable question of artistic painting in our culture. Horkay’s pictures offer a rather interesting answer to this. Embedded in the artpiece, Federico da Montefeltro and Battista Sforza, two figures of Piero della Francesca are exposed to us as a well considered „collage”. In this delicious double portrait of the Quattrocento the harmonically arranged, perspectivic landscapes form the background of man, in the foreplan of which man is posted in a way that his rule is unquestionable. The subdued nature expresses the man „free in himself” as well as the formidable maladjustment this glorified man has to face when his attention is focused only on himself, as it comes from the superior position of possessing everything. This is expressed by A. Chastel’s remark to Whipping of Christ, a picture by Piero della Francesca: „He augments both the arithmetical sense and the intensity of colors to the utmost point, thereby transforming Universe into a bright, unslotted cage, where mankind can never lose its way.” (Chastel – Italian Art, Corvina 1973, p. 113).
The great late modernists (Cezanne, Klee, Ernst, etc.) wanted to break out from this well arranged and well interpretated world, the prison of supposed possessing of truth. The free-in-himself man, the man making himself as the center, has re-presented the world for himself in the monoperspective of this all-self-reference. As worded by Florenszkij: „Artistic truth has once and forever disappeared from Western religious painting – the process starting from the Renaissance –, and though the painters declared their closeness and fidelity to depicted reality, in fact that had nothing common with the true reality whose depiction they took the liberty of, or formed a right to. (Florenszkij – The Iconostas, Corvina, 1988, p. 30).
In Horkay, the application of the painting historical element in the picture is a remembrance of an era we are over; over we are the naive relatedness created by perspective, and over we are the picture creating technique that relies on the latter. The application is neither parodistic, nor is an ironic citation, but is an emergence-transparence of a pictorial element of a past era as an item of a set. This set – writings, documents, stamps, painted pictures, etc. – is not else than some accumulated mass of culture and knowledge that surrounds us as a fermenting and evaporating hill of rubbish, of which everyone tries to save something, as allowed by his own fancy and the laceration and destruction degree of the hill itself. The question is how in this „post” era motion develops at all from the radiating, energy-saturated set in our cultural memory at the returning of the displaced, the postponed, the passed and the repressed. An experiment to create a „scientific psychology”, the „Entwurf” is closing of an era, when, naturally, the great ideas of the analytical age are already in preparation. Derrida’s criticism seems to be rightful: „If we start from a hypothesis postulated in the Entwurf twenty years ago, namely that a permanent trace supposes that a road section (Bahnung) is deliberated and some resistance is overcome, than we have to conclude that there is no trace at all, since there is no opposing resistance.” (Derrida – Die Postkarte II. Brinkmann–Bose V. 1987. p. 107).
No kind of memory will be born from the increase of quantity, since on well-travelable, non-inhibited road sections the latent time section is short, and the content is manifested rapidly. We can say, the conscience-fitness of perception is uninhibited, that is, referring to the Wunderblock, without permanent trace, it acts as a traceless, non superscripted sheet of paper. As we know it from Freud’s writings, memory is formed on sites of permanent traces, and due to discontinuous innervation, elements formed at different times can be stored in the same neuronal layer. Memory cannot be compared to a laboratory settling system in which particles ariving later will, by necessity, be positioned in ever upper layers. Bahnung is not a continuous-linear movement from the unconscious through the preconscious to the conscious. „Trace as memory is not a pure Bahnung that could be acquired again and again in a simple present. Trace is an ungraspable and invisible difference among the Bahnungs. (Derrida – Freud und der Schauplatz der Schrift in u. o.: Die Schrift und die Differenz Suhrkamp 1976, p. 308). Freud showed that delay, postponing, supplementarity are inseparable from life, while Derrida in this radical Freud interpretations criticised the time to time emerging naivity of transcription und translation, and the belief that the mind would be a motionless „text”.
In his pictures Horkay overpaints, incises the written signs of the „Entwurf”; in other words, he tears up the signs that close past history as „scars”. This is summoning of what cannot be forced into signs. Painting becomes a „chromatic language” (P. Kaufman) which, now far away from the pure presence of the self-exposing re-presented, presents the painting to us as something „deferred”, as it was worded by M. Duchamp. Due to its time-giving nature, delay is the eternal supplement to the same thing, and thus it will never liquidate the picture, but makes it infinite, resistant to any intrusion.
The „post-human” art of our era has moved the farthest away from the ideal which reached the calmness of total emptiness by putting instincts to silence. (cf. Lyotard – Essays zu einer affirmativen Aesthetik Merve V. 1982, p. 106). Opening the art toward the inherently uncertain existence of man, toward the layers of past history that cannot be covered by signs, promises the possibility that man, on some non-distincted place, will re-experience the world as something of his own, where he will be most essentially concerned by what surrounds him. Then the artpiece will not serve to put to silence ”... what conceals itself, what calls some self-concealing repulsion in man from what can be neither planned or controlled, nor calculated or performed.” (Heidegger – Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens in u. o.: Denkerfahrungen Klostermann V. 1983. p. 148).
„Horkay's art is epitomic in the double meaning of the word: a fragment, an incised part of something already in existence, and - just because of this incision - is an injury to the finished surface, to the tangle of writing or a finished picture. This relies on the experience that man, handing himself down through signs, simulates a kind of sense-wholeness. In these series this textual sense-wholeness appears to be ever different as different colors enter the surface at different sites. It is the same and not the same at the same time. "Once the signs are scars, then the wounds will tell tales of some non-alleviated history" (D. Kamper - Zur Soziologie der Imagination Hanser V. 1986. p. 148).
The sign will temporarily closen over the story. Who else would know this better than Freud, who, after the neurological-physiological and neuropsychical phases, so deeply doubted that it was possible "to bring to light the hidden content in its wholeness"
(Konstruktionen in der Analyse 1937. in: Stud. Ausgabe Ergb. Fischer V. 1982. p. 398).
“Someone, Somewhere” is how I title my Works, thinking of the Free Individual, who Himself has become the Center of the of Our Post Human Age, the Focus of Our Collective Memory.
The Question is How to give Visual Expression to that Memory, so that the thus created Contents, can leave a Lasting Impression.
An Idea or an Image acquires a New Dimension as it is combined with other Images.
Horkay “would like his Works to be Visual Poetry and Philosophy.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


(a)(1) The United States has an obligation to assist veterans of the Armed Forces in readjusting to civilian life. The Federal Government is also continuously concerned with building an effective work force, and veterans constitute a uniquely qualified recruiting source. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States and the purpose of this section to promote the maximum of employment and job advancement opportunities within the Federal Government for qualified covered veterans (as defined in paragraph (2)(B)) who are qualified for such employment and advancement.
(A) The term "agency" has the meaning given the term "department or agency" in section 4211(5) of this title.
(B) The term "qualified covered veteran" means a veteran described in section 4212(a)(3) of this title.
(E) a veteran given an appointment under the authority of this subsection whose employment under the appointment is terminated within one year after the date of such appointment shall have the same right to appeal that termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board as a career or career-conditional employee has during the first year of employment.
(2) This subsection applies to qualified covered veterans.
(3) A qualified covered veteran may receive such an appointment at any time.
(c) Each agency shall include in its affirmative action plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such agency as required by section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791(b)), a separate specification of plans (in accordance with regulations which the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe in consultation with the Secretary, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, consistent with the purposes, provisions, and priorities of such Act) to promote and carry out such affirmative action with respect to disabled veterans in order to achieve the purpose of this section.
(d) The Office of Personnel Management shall be responsible for the review and evaluation of the implementation of this section and the activities of each agency to carry out the purpose and provisions of this section. The Office shall periodically obtain (on at least an annual basis) information on the implementation of this section by each agency and on the activities of each agency to carry out the purpose and provisions of this section. The information obtained shall include specification of the use and extent of appointments made by each agency under subsection (b) of this section and the results of the plans required under subsection (c) of this section.
(A) The number of appointments made under subsection (b) of this section since the last such report and the grade levels in which such appointments were made.
(B) The number of individuals receiving appointments under such subsection whose appointments were converted to career or career-conditional appointments, or whose employment under such an appointment has terminated, since the last such report, together with a complete listing of categories of causes of appointment terminations and the number of such individuals whose employment has terminated falling into each such category.
(C) The number of such terminations since the last such report that were initiated by the agency involved and the number of such terminations since the last such report that were initiated by the individual involved.
(D) A description of the education and training programs in which individuals appointed under such subsection are participating at the time of such report.
(B) shall be shown separately (i) for veterans who are entitled to disability compensation under the laws administered by the Secretary or whose discharge or release from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty, and (ii) for other veterans.
(f) Notwithstanding section 4211 of this title, the terms "veteran" and "disabled veteran" as used in subsection (a) of this section shall have the meaning provided for under generally applicable civil service law and regulations.
(g) To further the policy stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary may give preference to qualified covered veterans for employment in the Department as veterans' benefits counselors and veterans' claims examiners and in positions to provide the outreach services required under section 6303 of this title, to serve as veterans' representatives at certain educational institutions as provided in section 6305 of this title, or to provide readjustment counseling under section 1712A of this title.
Executive Order Numbered 11521 (March 26, 1970), referred to in subsec. (b)(1), is set out as a note under section 3302 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
GS–11, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(A), is contained in the General Schedule which is set out under section 5332 of Title 5.
Such Act, referred to in subsec. (c), means Pub. L. 93–112, Sept. 26, 1973, 87 Stat. 355 , popularly known as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is classified principally to chapter 16 (§701 et seq.) of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 701 of Title 29 and Tables.
2006-Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 109–233 substituted "section 6303" for "section 7722" and "section 6305" for "section 7724".
2002-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(1), (3)(A)(i), substituted "life" for "life since veterans, by virtue of their military service, have lost opportunities to pursue education and training oriented toward civilian careers" in first sentence, "uniquely qualified" for "major" in second sentence, and "qualified covered veterans (as defined in paragraph (2)(B))" for "disabled veterans and certain veterans of the Vietnam era and of the post-Vietnam era" in third sentence.
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(3)(A)(ii), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: "For the purposes of this section, the term 'agency' means a department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch."
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(2)(A), substituted "recruitment" for "readjustment" in introductory provisions.
"(B) veterans who first became a member of the Armed Forces or first entered on active duty as a member of the Armed Forces after May 7, 1975, and were discharged or released from active duty under conditions other than dishonorable."
Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(2)(C), amended par. (3) generally, substituting present provisions for provisions limiting reception of appointment to specified time periods.
Subsec. (e)(2)(B)(i). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(3)(B), struck out "of the Vietnam era" after "veterans".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(3)(C), substituted "qualified covered veterans" for "qualified special disabled veterans and qualified veterans of the Vietnam era" and "under section 1712A of this title" for "under section 1712A of this title to veterans of the Vietnam era".
"(ii) during such era, served on active duty in the Armed Forces in a campaign or expedition for which a campaign badge has been authorized; and".
Subsec. (b)(3)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 102–568, §505(b)(1), substituted "1995" for "1993".
Subsec. (b)(3)(B)(ii). Pub. L. 102–568, §505(b)(2), substituted "December 31" for "December 18".
1991-Pub. L. 102–83, §5(a), renumbered section 2014 of this title as this section.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102–16, §9(a), substituted "The United States has an obligation to assist veterans of the Armed Forces in readjusting to civilian life since veterans, by virtue of their military service, have lost opportunities to pursue education and training oriented toward civilian careers. The Federal Government is also continuously concerned with building an effective work force, and veterans constitute a major recruiting source. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States" for "It is the policy of the United States" and "disabled veterans and certain veterans of the Vietnam era and of the post-Vietnam era" for "certain veterans of the Vietnam era and veterans of the post-Vietnam era".
Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 102–16, §9(b)(1)(A), substituted "up to and including the level GS–11 or its equivalent" for "up to and including the level GS–9 or its equivalent or in the case of a veteran referred to in paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection, the level of GS–11 or its equivalent".
"(C) a veteran of the Vietnam era referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection who is entitled to disability compensation under the laws administered by the Veterans' Administration or whose discharge or release from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty shall be eligible for such an appointment without regard to the number of years of education completed by such veteran;".
"(F) in the case of a veteran who is not a disabled veteran, the veteran may not have completed more than 16 years of education at the time of the veteran's appointment."
Subsec. (b)(2)(A)(i). Pub. L. 102–127 substituted "is entitled to disability compensation under the laws administered by the Secretary or whose discharge or release from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty." for "has a service-connected disability".
Subsec. (b)(2)(B). Pub. L. 102–16, §9(b)(2), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "a veteran who served on active duty after the Vietnam era."
Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 102–83, §5(c)(1), substituted "3011(a)(1)(A)(ii)(III)" for "1411(a)(1)(A)(ii)(III)" and "3018A(a)(1)" for "1418A(a)(1)" in subpar. (D).
Pub. L. 102–16, §9(b)(2), added par. (3) and struck out former par. (3) which read as follows: "For purposes of paragraph (1)(B)(i) of this subsection, the last discharge or release from a period of active duty shall not include any discharge or release from a period of active duty of less than 90 days of continuous service unless the individual involved is discharged or released for a service-connected disability, for a medical condition which preexisted such service and which the Secretary determines is not service connected, for hardship, or as a result of a reduction in force as described in section 1411(a)(1)(A)(ii)(III) of this title."
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 102–16, §9(b)(2), struck out par. (4) which read as follows: "No veterans readjustment appointment may be made under authority of this subsection after December 31, 1993."
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102–83, §4(b)(1), (2)(E), substituted "Secretary" for "Administrator" after "with the".
Subsec. (e)(2)(B). Pub. L. 102–83, §4(a)(1), substituted "administered by the Secretary" for "administered by the Veterans' Administration".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102–83, §5(c)(1), substituted "4211" for "2011".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 102–83, §5(c)(1), substituted "1712A" for "612A".
Pub. L. 102–83, §4(b)(1), (2)(E), substituted "Secretary" for "Administrator".
Pub. L. 102–83, §4(a)(3), (4), substituted "Department" for "Veterans' Administration".
Pub. L. 102–83, §2(c)(5), substituted "7722" for "241" and "7724" for "243".
1989-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(1), substituted "certain veterans of the Vietnam era and veterans of the post-Vietnam era who are qualified for such employment and advancement" for "qualified disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam era".
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(A)(i), substituted "veterans referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection" for "veterans of the Vietnam era".
Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(A)(ii), inserted before semicolon at end "or in the case of a veteran referred to in paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection, the level of GS–11 or its equivalent".
Subsec. (b)(1)(B). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(A)(iii), added cl. (B) and struck out former cl. (B) which read as follows: "a veteran of the Vietnam era shall be eligible for such an appointment without any time limitation with respect to eligibility for such an appointment;".
Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(A)(iv), inserted "referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection" after "a veteran of the Vietnam era".
Subsec. (b)(1)(E), (F). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(A)(v)–(vii), added subpars. (E) and (F).
Subsec. (b)(2), (3). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(b)(2)(B), added pars. (2) and (3). Former par. (2) redesignated (4).
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 101–237, §407(a)(1), redesignated former par. (2) as (4) and substituted "1993" for "1989".
1986-Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 99–576 substituted "December 31, 1989" for "September 30, 1986".
1984-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(a), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
Subsec. (b)(1)(A), (D). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(b)(1), substituted "GS–9" for "GS–7" in subpar. (A) and added subpar. (D).
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(b)(2), substituted "September 30, 1986" for "September 30, 1984".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(c), substituted "agency" for "department, agency, and instrumentality in the executive branch" and "such agency" for "such department, agency, or instrumentality".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(d), substituted "annual" for "semiannual" in second sentence and struck out provisions listing information to be included in the report.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 98–543, §211(d), substituted provisions listing information to be included with respect to each agency and setting forth to whom the information shall be shown for provisions which set forth reporting requirements regarding the employment of the handicapped.
1982-Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–295 substituted "Health and Human Services" for "Health, Education, and Welfare".
1981-Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 97–72 substituted "September 30, 1984" for "September 30, 1981".
1980-Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 96–466, §801(l)(1), substituted "Office of Personnel Management" for "Civil Service Commission".
Subsec. (b)(2), (3). Pub. L. 96–466, §801(l)(2), redesignated par. (3) as (2). Former par. (2), which provided that in this subsection "veteran of the Vietnam era" had the meaning given such term in section 2011(2)(A) of this title, was struck out.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 96–466, §801(l)(1), (3), substituted "the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791(b))" for "Public Law 93–112 (87 Stat. 391 )" and "Office of Personnel Management" for "Civil Service Commission".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 96–466, §801(l)(1), substituted "Office of Personnel Management" and "Office" for "Civil Service Commission" and "Commission", respectively.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 96–466, §801(l)(1), (4), substituted "Office of Personnel Management" and "Office" for "Civil Service Commission" and "Commission", respectively, and "the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791(d))" for "such Public Law 93–112".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 96–466, §510, added subsec. (g).
1978-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–520, §6(b)(1), incorporated part of existing text in provisions designated par. (1), designated part of existing provision as item (A), increasing appointments to level GS–7 from GS–5, added items (B) and (C) and par. (2), designated part of existing text as par. (3), substituting Sept. 30, 1981, for June 30, 1978, as cut off date for veterans readjustment appointments, and struck out provisions: that in applying the one-year period of eligibility specified in section 2(a) of Ex. Ord. No. 11521 to a veteran or disabled veteran who enrolled, within one year following separation from the Armed Forces or following release from hospitalization or treatment following such separation in a program of education on more than a half-time basis, the time spent in such program of education was not to be counted; that the eligibility of the veteran for a readjustment appointment was to continue for not less than six months after the veteran first ceased to be enrolled therein on more than a half-time basis; and that directed the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to report on the need for the continuation after June 30, 1978, of the authority for veterans readjustment appointments contained in subsec. (b), with the report to be submitted to the President and Congress not later than six months after enactment of the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 on Nov. 23, 1977.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 95–520, §6(b)(2), substituted in second sentence "subsection (c) of this section" for "subsection (c) thereof" and inserted requirement that reports include certain prescribed information.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 95–520, §6(b)(3), substituted "as used in subsection (a) of this section" for "as used in this section".
1977-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–202 inserted provision directing Chairman of Civil Service Commission to report on need for continuation after June 30, 1978, of authority for veterans readjustment appointments contained in subsec. (b), with the report to be submitted to President and Congress not later than six months after enactment of GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977.
Pub. L. 107–288, §2(c)(4), Nov. 7, 2002, 116 Stat. 2036 , provided that: "The amendments made by this subsection [amending this section] shall apply to qualified covered veterans without regard to any limitation relating to the date of the veteran's last discharge or release from active duty that may have otherwise applied under section 4214(b)(3) as in effect on the date before the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 7, 2002]."
Pub. L. 102–16, §9(d), Mar. 22, 1991, 105 Stat. 55 , as amended by Pub. L. 102–86, title V, §506(c), Aug. 14, 1991, 105 Stat. 426 ; Pub. L. 103–353, §6(a), Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3174 , provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section] shall apply only to appointments made after the date of the enactment of this Act [Mar. 22, 1991]."
Amendment by Pub. L. 101–237 effective Jan. 1, 1990, see section 407(c) of Pub. L. 101–237, set out as a note under section 4211 of this title.
Pub. L. 97–72, title II, §202(b), Nov. 3, 1981, 95 Stat. 1054 , provided that: "The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect as of October 1, 1981."
Amendment by section 510 of Pub. L. 96–466 effective Oct. 1, 1980, see section 802(e) of Pub. L. 96–466, set out as a note under section 4101 of this title.
Amendment by section 801(l) of Pub. L. 96–466 effective Oct. 1, 1980, see section 802(h) of Pub. L. 96–466, set out as a note under section 3452 of this title.
Amendment by Pub. L. 95–202 effective Nov. 23, 1977, see section 501 of Pub. L. 95–202, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
For termination, effective May 15, 2000, of reporting provisions in subsec. (e) of this section, see section 3003 of Pub. L. 104–66, as amended, set out as a note under section 1113 of Title 31, Money and Finance, and page 188 of House Document No. 103–7.
"(B) the term 'veteran' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of title 38, United States Code.
"(B) ensure that the programs established under this subsection are coordinated with the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) of the Department of Defense.
"(C) promote the recruiting, hiring, training and development, and retention of such members and veterans by the agency.
"(4) Other office.-If an agency designated under paragraph (2)(A) does not have a Veterans Employment Program Office, the head of the agency, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall select an appropriate office of the agency to carry out the responsibilities of the agency under paragraph (3)."
Pub. L. 95–454, title III, §307(b)(2), Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1147 , as amended by Pub. L. 102–83, §5(c)(2), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 406 , provided that: "The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall include in the reports required by section 4214(d) [formerly 2014(d)] of title 38, United States Code, the same type of information regarding the use of the authority provided in section 3112 of title 5, United States Code (as added by paragraph (1) of this subsection), as is required by such section 4214 with respect to the use of the authority to make veterans readjustment appointments."


§ 23.01 Declaration of policy; purpose.
§ 23.04 Designation authority; certificate of appropriateness; appeals.
§ 23.08 Violations and penalties.
23.01 Declaration of policy; purpose.
23.04 Designation authority; certificate of appropriateness; appeals.
Effect and accomplish the protection, enhancement, and perpetuation of such improvements, sites and districts which represent or reflect elements of the Village's cultural, social, economic, political and architectural history.
Safeguard the Village's historic and cultural heritage, as embodied and reflected in such historic structures, sites and districts.
Stabilize and improve property values and enhance the visual and aesthetic character of the Village.
Protect and enhance the Village's attractions to residents, tourists and visitors and serve as a support and stimulus to business and industry.
Educate the public regarding the need and desirability of the Village's historic preservation program and its enhancement of the quality of life.
The certificate issued by the Commission approving alteration, rehabilitation, construction, reconstruction, or demolition of an historic structure or historic site or any improvement in an historic district.
An area designated by the Village Board on recommendation of the Commission that contains two or more historic improvements or sites.
Any parcel of land of historic significance due to a substantial value in tracing the history or prehistory of man, or upon which an historic event has occurred, and which has been designated as an historic site under this chapter, or an improvement of a parcel, or part thereof, on which is situated an historic structure.
Any improvement which has a special character or special historic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the Village, state or nation and which has been designated as an historic structure pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
The Commission may adopt operating guidelines for historic structure, historic site and historic district designation provided that such are in conformance with the provisions of this chapter.
Designation. The Commission shall have the power, subject to § 23.05, to designate historic structures and historic sites and to recommend designation of historic districts within the Village limits. Such designations shall be made based on § 23.03 and approved by the Village Board. Once designated, such historic structures, sites and districts shall be subject to all the provisions of this chapter.
Regulation of construction, reconstruction, alteration and demolition.
No owner or person in charge of an historic structure or historic site within an historic district shall reconstruct, alter or demolish all or any part of the exterior of such property or construct any improvement upon such designated property or properties or cause or permit any such work to be performed upon such property or demolish such property unless a certificate of appropriateness has been granted by the Commission. Unless such certificate has been granted by the Commission, the Director of Inspection Services shall not issue a permit for any such work.
In the case of a designated historic structure or historic site, the proposed work would detrimentally change history or adversely affect any exterior architectural feature of the improvement or site upon which said work is to be done.
In the case of the construction of a new improvement upon an historic site or within an historic district, the exterior of such improvement would adversely affect or not harmonize with the external appearance of other neighboring improvements on such site or within the district.
In the case of any property located in an historic district, the proposed construction, reconstruction, exterior alteration or demolition does not conform to the purpose and intent of this chapter and to the objectives and design criteria of the historic preservation plan of said district.
The building or structure is of such architectural or historical significance that its demolition would be detrimental to the public interest and contrary to the general welfare of the people of the Village and state.
The building or structure is of such old and unusual or uncommon design, texture and/or material that it could not be reproduced without great difficulty and/or expense.
In the case of a request for the demolition of a deteriorated building or structure, any hardship or difficulty claimed by the owner is self-created or is the result of any failure to maintain the property in good repair.
If the Commission determines that the application for a certificate of appropriateness and the proposed changes are consistent with the character and features of the property or district and with the above guidelines, it shall issue the certificate of appropriateness. The Commission shall make this decision within 45 days of the filing of the application.
The issuance of a certificate of appropriateness shall not relieve the applicant from obtaining other permits and approvals required by the Village. A building permit shall be invalid if it is obtained without the presentation of the certificate of appropriateness.
Compliance with certificates of appropriateness shall be started within 12 months after the issuance of the certificate, and the work shall conform to the provisions of the certificate. The Village may inspect the work during and after construction in order to assure compliance. Failure to comply with a certificate of appropriateness or failure to obtain a certificate of appropriateness shall be a violation of this chapter. In addition to other penalties and remedies, the Director of Inspection Services shall issue a stop-work order, and all work shall cease on the designated property. No additional work shall be undertaken as long as such stop-work order shall continue in effect.
Ordinary maintenance and repairs may be undertaken without a certificate of appropriateness provided that the work involves repairs to existing features of an historic structure or site or the replacement of elements of a structure with pieces identical in appearance and provided that the work does not change the exterior appearance of the structure or site and does not require the issuance of a building permit.
Appeals. Should the Commission fail to issue a certificate of appropriateness due to the failure of the proposal to conform to the guidelines, the applicant may appeal such decision to the Village Board within 30 days. In addition, if the Commission fails to issue a certificate of appropriateness, the Commission shall, with the cooperation of the applicant, work with the applicant in an attempt to obtain a certificate of appropriateness within the guidelines of this chapter.
Designation of historic structures, historic sites and historic districts. The Commission may designate historic structures, historic sites and historic districts or rescind such designation or recommendation, after application of the criteria in § 23.03 above.
Review and adoption procedure. The Village Board, upon receipt of the recommendations from the Commission, shall hold a public hearing. Notice of time, place and purpose of such hearing shall be given by publication as a Class 1 notice under the Wisconsin Statutes in the official Village paper. Notice of the time, place and purpose of the public hearing shall also be sent by the Village Clerk-Treasurer to the owners of the property in whole or in part situated within 200 feet of the proposed historic structure, historic site or historic district. Following the public hearing, the Village Board shall vote to recommend, reject or withhold action on the plan. Designation of historic structures, historic sites and historic districts shall constitute adoption of the plan in ordinance form to direct the implementation of said plan.
Structures to be rezoned. Following the designation of the historic structure, historic site or historic district and in accordance with § 17.37, the Village shall rezone each historic structure, historic site or historic district from its original zoning classification to include Special District "H."
Preservation of distinctive landmarks. In order to preserve the two distinctive historic landmarks, being the Trimborn Farm (Tax Key Numbers 661-9897-011 and 661-9897-012) and the Jeremiah Curtin House (Tax Key Number 661-9898-001), said properties are designated as historic districts and identified on the Zoning Map with the "H" symbol.
No building permit shall be issued by the Director of Inspection Services for alteration, construction, demolition or removal of a nominated historic structure, historic site or any property or structure within a nominated historic district from the date of the meeting of the Commission at which a nomination form is first presented until the final disposition of the nomination by the Commission and the Village Board, unless such alteration, removal or demolition is authorized by formal resolution of the Village Board as necessary for public health, welfare or safety.
Every owner or agent in charge of an historic structure, historic site or improvement in an historic district shall keep in good repair all of the exterior portions of such improvement and all interior portions thereof which, if not so maintained, may cause or tend to cause the exterior portions of such improvements to fall into a state of disrepair. This provision shall be in addition to all other provisions of law requiring such improvement to be kept in good repair.
Any person who shall violate any provision of this chapter shall be subject to the penalty provided in § 25.04 of this Code. Each violation and each day a violation continues or occurs shall constitute a separate offense. Notice of violations shall be issued by the Director of Inspection Services.


text:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN MENDOZA Y VICENTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
This is an appeal assailing the June 5, 2008 Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 which affirmed with modification the February 6, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC). The RTC found accused Juan Mendoza y Vicente guilty of having violated Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Senior Police Officer 4 Edelfonso Sison (SPO4 Sison) received information from a long-serving unidentified informant of the Baguio City Police Office's (BCPO) Drug Enforcement Section (DES) that the accused contacted him and offered to sell shabu worth P1,000.00 to any interested buyer. The accused then suggested that they meet at the stairs of the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road.
After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector Myles Pascual (PSI Pascual) decided to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap the accused. PSI Pascual made arrangements for the informant, the accused, and the poseur buyer officer to meet on April 14, 2005 around 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at the stairs below the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road. He planned for an entrapment operation and put together a team, with SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky Calamiong (PO3 Calamiong) and PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3 Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police Officer 2 Edgar Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the poseur buyer.
In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the entrapment team proceeded to the area at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, half an hour before the scheduled time. The team parked their vehicle 20 to 30 meters away from the designated transaction area. PO2 Antolin and the informant alighted and proceeded to the stairway to wait for the accused.
Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached the informant. The latter introduced PO2 Antolin as the buyer. After the accused asked if the buyer had the money, PO2 Antolin handed over P1,000.00. The accused then gave him two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Antolin raised his right hand, the pre-arranged signal, signifying to the other team members that the transaction had been consummated. The team rushed to assist PO2 Antolin, who arrested the accused and recovered the buy-bust-money. PO2 Antolin frisked the accused and recovered five (5) more small transparent sachets with white crystalline substance from the pants pocket of the accused. He turned over the same to the team leader, SPO4 Sison.
SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why he was being arrested and apprised him of his constitutional rights. The accused merely nodded but otherwise kept silent. The buy-bust team then took the accused to the BCPO, where PO2 Antolin identified him as Juan Mendoza, alias "Ampi."
In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance recovered from the accused tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The case records state that after the conduct of such preliminary test, the items confiscated from the accused were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further analysis and disposition.
A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan Bullong yielded the same result.
The accused alleges that in the afternoon of April 14, 2005, he was walking down Sepic Road, Baguio City, on his way home from his brother's house in Guisad, where he had just finished washing diapers and clothes. A vehicle stopped beside him and SPO4 Sison alighted. The accused knew SPO4 Sison because the latter arrested him for a drug offense way back in 1997, for which he was convicted and incarcerated in Camp Sampaguita for five years.
SPO4 Sison showed him a photograph and demanded information about the person in the photo. When he insisted that he did not know who it was, SPO4 Sison invited him to the BCPO-DES. As he could not decline, he went along with him.
At the DES, the police again asked him if he knew the person in the photo and a certain Gary Chua, but he replied in the negative. He was also questioned whether he knew someone who was selling drugs, and he again replied in the negative. He told the police that since his release from prison, he no longer dabbled in the drug trade, as he already had a family. When he told SPO4 Sison that he did not know anyone who was selling drugs, SPO4 Sison got angry.
After an hour, he was informed that he would be subjected to a drug test. Again, unable to refuse, he was subjected to a drug test at the BCPO Station 7 laboratory, in front of the DES. He was then brought to the Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for a medical examination, and later back to the police station.
During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have a counsel present. SPO4 Sison did not inform him that he was being arrested for the possession of the 5 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24384-R, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of ?500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 24385-R, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years, and to pay the costs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 06 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 finding the accused-appellant JUAN MENDOZA Y VICENTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 24384-R and 24385-R and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ?500,00.00, and the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, respectively, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that said accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ?300,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 24385-R.
In not finding that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with, rendering the evidence compromised.
In convicting the accused-appellant notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of merit.
In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied: (1) identities of the buyer, the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it must be shown that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In this case, all these elements were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented during the trial. PO2 Antolin, the designated poseur-buyer, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the accused, and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered from the accused.  Then, SPO4 Sison corroborated PO2 Antolin's testimony and confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the accused were turned over to him as team leader.
The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody and disposition of the dangerous drugs was not observed. The Court finds, however, that the compliance with the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established in this case.
In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory taking, signed the inventory but they have no knowledge that the drugs came from the accused.
The prosecution also presented several documents that traced how the evidence changed hands.
The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses (Exhibit "D") listed six small transparent heat-sealed plastic sachets, each weighing approximately 0.3g and containing white crystalline substance suspected to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, previously marked as "ECA" 04/14/05, and showed the corresponding photos taken during the inventory (Exhibit "N").
The Certificate of Preliminary Test (Exhibit "F") prepared under the signature of Marites Vizcara Tamio of the BCPO DES and addressed to the Baguio City Prosecutor, certified that on April 14, 2005, at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she conducted a preliminary test on the same marked items by using Simons reagent on the white crystalline substance contained in the individually heat-sealed plastic sachets. All the items yielded a "dark blue color," indicating the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The same certificate stated that the alleged confiscated pieces of evidence were turned over the to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry analysis and disposition.
Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-2005 (Exhibit "G") issued by the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet stated that following a qualitative examination conducted on the same marked items, it was found that the specimens produced a positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
x x x I am showing you two sachets marked as Exhibit "A" ECA. 04/14/05 BB and a signature. Now tell us the relation of these sachets which the accused gave to you in exchange of the ?1,000.00?
These are the buy bust item, sir.
Now what does ECA stands (sic) for again?
And 04/14/05 would be the date of the transaction?
And BB. What would those letters mean?
How about this signature, whose signature would that be?
I am presenting to you five sachets which your office marked as Exhibit CDEF and G with the marking ECA, 04/14/05 signature and a letter R. Are these the same items which you referred a while back?
And for the record, what does ECA stands (sic) for?
And what does 04/14/05 means (sic)?
The date of the transaction, sir.
And what does "R" in the five sachets represents (sic)?
For purposes of identification, may we have the two sachets marked as BB be marked as Exhibit M-1 and M-2 which are the subject for sale and the other five other sachets with marking R be marked as M-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to constitute the charge for possession.
From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is no break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time that it came to the possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such items were presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is no doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug were properly preserved, in compliance with what the law requires.
WHEREFORE, the June 5, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 is AFFIRMED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Sereno,* JJ., concur.
* Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Agustin S, Dizon, concurring.
 TSN, November 22, 2005, pp. 33-34; TSN, March 7, 2006, pp. 13-14; TSN, May 11, 2006, p. 20; TSN, August 14, 2006, pp. 25-26.
 TSN, November 7, 2006, p. 15.
 Rollo, p. 2. Sixteenth Division. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.
 People v. Salak, G.R. No. 181249, March 14, 2011, citing People v. Razul, 441 Phil. 62, 75 (2002).
 People v. Villahermosa, G.R. No. 186465, June 1, 2011, citing People v. Concepcion, 414 Phil. 247, 255 (2001); People v. Khor, 366 Phil. 762, 795 (1995).
 TSN, November 22, 2005, pp. 20-32.
 TSN, May 11, 2006, p. 22.
 Ampatuan v. People, G.R. No. 183676, June 22, 2011, citing People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 441, 451 citing People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.
 Id. at 52. Signed by Natividad G. Akim, a barangay representative; a representative of the DOJ; and Jimmy Ceraude, a representative of the media.
 The two items subject of the buy-bust bore the additional mark "BB", and the five items recovered from the accused upon apprehension and arrest bore the additional mark "R".
 Prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan Bullong of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and approved by Police Chief Inspector and Provincial Chief Dalmacio Weygan Magantino.
 Exh "A" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, BB and signature containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "B" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, BB and signature containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "C" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, R and signature containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "D" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, R and signature containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "E" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, R and signature containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "F" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, R and signature containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance.
Exh "G" - One (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with attached markings Exh "A", ECA, 04/14/05, R and signature containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance.
 TSN, November 22, 2006, pp. 26-27, 31-32.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


*739 *740 Stuart H. Johnson, Jr., R. Kenneth Mundy, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Robert B. Frank, Washington, D. C., for defendant Pro-Football.
James C. McKay, Paul J. Tagliabue, C. Michael Buxton, Covington & Burling, Washington, D. C., for defendant National Football League.
In this action, which was tried to the Court, plaintiff seeks to recover treble damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3, and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. No disputes exist as to any jurisdictional or procedural questions. The defendants are Pro-Football, Inc., better known as the Washington Redskins, and the National Football League, the unincorporated association of major league professional football teams in the United States. There is no dispute that the defendants are engaged in substantial interstate commerce as well as national telecasts of their football games.
The plaintiff, James McCoy (Yazoo) Smith, was an All-American college football player at the University of Oregon, from which he graduated in 1968. He was "drafted" by the Redskins in the league's annual player selection draft in January, 1968, as their first round choice. He was the twelfth player in the nation to be drafted that year. After some negotiations, in which he was represented by an agent, plaintiff on May 11, 1968 signed a one-year contract with the Redskins, the Standard Player Contract required by the NFL Constitution and By-Laws to be signed by all players. Plaintiff, who was expected to become one of the finest defensive backs ever to play professional football, received a contract calling for the payment of a $23,000 "bonus" for signing, an additional $5,000 if he made the team, and a salary of $22,000. He made the team easily, and performed at a very high level during his first season of play. Unfortunately, his career was abruptly terminated when he received a serious neck injury in the final *741 game of that 1968 season. In those causes of action which have survived to trial, plaintiff asserts that he was damaged in his business or property, i. e. his ability to market his unique skills, by the combinations and agreements of the defendants contained in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws and commonly known as the player selection draft, with its attendant effectuating restrictions. The essence of these contentions is that because of the draft, which plaintiff argues constitutes a group boycott under the antitrust laws, he was unable to negotiate a contract reflecting the free market or true value of his services, and unable to negotiate a contract containing adequate guarantees against loss of earnings in the event of injury.
The mechanics of the NFL draft are not complex. The order of choosing is determined by the teams' playing record in the season just ended, with the team with the poorest winning percentage picking first, the team with the second-worst winning percentage picking second, and so forth. The winner of the Super Bowl (the league championship game) picks last, and the runner-up in the Super Bowl picks second-last. Each team has one choice in each round of the draft (unless it has traded its choice in that round to another team), and there are seventeen rounds in each yearly draft. At the time of plaintiff's selection by the Redskins, there were twenty-six teams choosing in the draft. Through various restraints imposed by the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, no team is permitted to negotiate prior to the draft with any player eligible to be drafted, and no team may negotiate with (or sign) any player selected by another team in the draft. Future draft choices may be traded by any team, and commonly are so traded. The net result of these restrictions is that the right to negotiate with any given player is exclusively held by one team at any particular time, and if the player cannot reach a satisfactory agreement with the team holding the rights to his services he cannot play in the NFL (unless of course he is traded to another team and signs with that team). Upon reaching an agreement with a team, each player is required to sign a National Football League Standard Player Contract containing various provisions, among which is a pledge to honor and obey the rules contained in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws. Each player may also sign a supplemental agreement with the team embodying any additional compensation and benefit features which he has negotiated with the team. As of March 5, 1968, the National Football League Players Association became the exclusive bargaining agent and representative of the NFL players. This union executed its first collective bargaining agreement with the NFL owners in November of 1968; that agreement has since expired, and the union and the owners have been unable to reach another agreement to date.
The defendants argue that the NFL draft is a subject of mandatory collective bargaining between the league and the NFL Players Association, the collective bargaining agent of the players, and is therefore exempt from review under the antitrust laws by virtue of the so-called "labor law exemption". For the reasons which follow, the Court holds that this exemption does not bar a recovery by plaintiff in this case.
As defendants argue, there is indeed a labor law exemption from the coverage *742 of the antitrust laws for certain arrangements resulting from collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees. This doctrine, the precise contours of which are neither clear nor entirely coherent, has been elucidated by the Supreme Court primarily in four leading cases: United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788 (1941); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S. Ct. 1533, 89 L. Ed. 1939 (1945); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 85 S. Ct. 1596, 14 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1965); and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1965); See also Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 95 S. Ct. 1830, 44 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1975). While these cases do not leave the precise manner of applying the doctrine to the circumstances of professional football entirely free from doubt, they do establish rules and guidelines clearly dispositive of defendants' contentions in this case. First, the cases provide no support whatever for the league's argument that arrangements related to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, prior to their embodiment in an agreement, fall within the exemption merely because they relate to mandatory subjects. A reading of Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea, supra at 697, upon which defendants rely for this notion, makes clear that his arguments all assume the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, and cannot be read in any reasonable fashion as support for the league's argument in this regard. Moreover, the Court's opinion in Pennington, from which Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Jewel Tea also serves as a dissent, specifically states that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is not "automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and content of the agreement." Pennington, supra, 381 U.S. at 664-665, 85 S. Ct. at 1590. A fortiori, if a completed agreement is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, then a mandatory subject upon which an agreement has not yet been concluded cannot be exempt. And in any event, it seems apparent that the policy of the exemptionallowing the collective bargaining process, proceeding unfettered by antitrust restraints, to determine wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employmentdoes not require and would not be served by extending the exemption to arrangements imposed unilaterally by employers, merely because such arrangements could at some time be settled upon through mandatory collective bargaining. Indeed, the thrust of the cases is quite the opposite: a scheme advantageous to employers and otherwise in violation of the antitrust laws cannot under any circumstances come within the exemption unless and until it becomes part of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union in its own self-interest. Defendants' argument that plaintiff was not entitled to the protection of the antitrust laws must therefore fail, since the plaintiff entered into his contract with the Redskins prior to the time when the league and the players association (acting as exclusive bargaining agent for the players) reached their initial collective bargaining agreement. And finally in this regard, even if the exemption were viewed as having become operative as to all mandatory subjects of collective bargaining at the first moment there was an exclusive bargaining agent representing the players with respect to those subjects, plaintiff's recovery here would still not be barred. The NFL Players Association did not become the exclusive bargaining agent for purposes of the labor law exemption until March 5, 1968, when it signed a recognition agreement with the league. Plaintiff however was drafted in January of 1968, and it was at that time that the restraints of the draft and related rules were imposed upon him. His cause of action therefore accrued before the exemption could under any view of the law have been considered operative.
Even assuming for purposes of argument that the draft had been embodied in a *743 collective bargaining agreement covering a period early enough to make possible the operation of the exemption with respect to plaintiff's antitrust claimswhich it clearly was notthis would not automatically immunize the draft and the league from antitrust liability. First, it would have to be shown that the draft constitutes an agreement on mandatory subjects of bargaining. While the issue is not wholly free from doubt, it does appear to the Court that the matters inherent in the draft would constitute such subjects. In general, those subjects include wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. It is clear that the union and the teams could collectively bargain all monetary compensation, benefits, incentives, and guarantees to be paid to first-year players as mandatory subjects. In light of the acceptance of such practices as the hiring hall, see Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 81 S. Ct. 835, 6 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1961), and seniority as determinants of the structure of the labor market in a particular industry and of the opportunity for employment in a given place at a given time, it seems probable that each feature of the draft as to which plaintiff raises antitrust objections would also be considered a term or condition of employment. See also, Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining By Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L.J. 1, 16 (1971). Once it has been established that the draft flows from mandatory subjects of bargaining, the cases cited above also require that it have been arrived at as a result of genuine, arms-length bargaining, and not have been "thrust upon" a weak players union by the owners. See also, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288, 295, 92 S. Ct. 2099, 32 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1972) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.). The league contends that the 1968 and subsequent collective bargaining agreements, incorporating the NFL Constitution and By-Laws (which contain the provisions and procedures for the draft) reflect an agreement of the sort required. This issue would have to be explored at trial in an appropriate case.
One final set of issues would be relevant in such a trial. In each of the leading cases (cited above) subsequent to Hutcheson, the challenged collective bargaining agreement worked to the disadvantage of the competitors of management. The doctrine of those cases is to the effect that even when an agreement is related to mandatory subjects, it must be examined to determine if it is: (1) An employers' combination/conspiracy, in which the union has acquiesced, whose purpose is to fix prices, allocate markets, or drive competitors from the market (i. e., an attempt to monopolize). Such an agreement does not fall within the exemption, see Allen Bradley, supra. (2) A joint management-union combination/conspiracy to accomplish those objectives, in which the union and management interests appear to coincide. Such an agreement must be scrutinized for its relative impact on the product market and the interests of union members, in light of national labor and antitrust policies. (3) The result of the union's own efforts in its self-interest, free of any agreement with or among the employers to attempt to accomplish those objectives. Only the third kind of collective bargaining agreement on mandatory subjects has been given an unqualified exemption from the antitrust laws subsequent to Jewel Tea and Pennington. In the present case, two additional factors complicate the analysis that would have been required should this issue have been appropriate for trial. First, unlike the collective bargaining agreements under challenge in the leading cases, an agreement containing the draft would work not to the disadvantage of the competitors of the employers but rather to the detriment of potential employees, persons neither party to the agreement nor members of a union which is party to the agreement. Secondly, the draft itself, if not within the exemption, would constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws, as will be seen *744 below, yet is not one of the proscribed objectives specifically enumerated by the prior cases.
While a group boycott such as the NFL draft is not one of the objectives of collective bargaining agreement heretofore specifically proscribed, it does share many characteristics of such anticompetitive practices, and is one of those practices "at the core of the type of anticompetitive commercial restraint at which the antitrust laws are directed," Jewel Tea, supra, 381 U.S. at 733, 85 S. Ct. at 1626 (concurring opinion of Goldberg, J.). It seems likely, therefore, that in a situation comparable to Allen Bradley or even Pennington a group boycott would be held to be a proscribed objective of such an agreement.
With regard to the fact that the boycott's impact is on potential employees rather than on competitors of the employer, however, the Court believes that the policies of the labor laws require that such an agreement be found to be within the scope of the exemption to the antitrust laws. First, as Justice Goldberg points out in his concurring opinion in Jewel Tea, the central thrust of the antitrust statutes is directed towards protecting the functioning of a free product market from concentrations of economic power in the hands of trusts and employers. While these laws also (absent the exemption) protect a talented football player from a boycott by the team owners, such protection is somewhat less central to the objectives of the antitrust laws. Secondly, it is quite central to the purposes of the labor laws to allow unions to arrive at bargains that they consider in their best interests with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, this is the very rationale of the exemption itself. Therefore, accommodating the competing antitrust and labor law policies as the Supreme Court cases require, it would appear that if such a bargain has been concluded as the result of "bona-fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of [the union's own] policies, and not at the behest of" nonlabor groups, it is exempt from the antitrust laws. See, Jewel Tea, supra, 381 U.S. at 690 and n. 5, 85 S. Ct. at 1602. In other words, given a determination of the union that negotiation of a draft is important to it and the fairly clearly mandatory bargaining nature of the draft's inherent issues, the accommodation required by Jewel Tea, supra at 689, 85 S. Ct. 1596, of labor and antitrust policies, in light of the impact of the boycott on a market less central to the antitrust laws than the product market present in Allen Bradley, Pennington, and Jewel Tea, the fact that the boycott device is agreed upon in combination with nonlabor groups (i. e. the team owners) does not remove it from the scope of the exemption. See generally Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea, supra, and Jacobs & Winter, supra.
Throughout this case, plaintiff has contended that the NFL draft and surrounding restrictions constitute a per se violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as interpreted by established precedent. In light of the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter, the Court can only conclude that plaintiff's contention must prevail, and accordingly holds that the NFL draft in which plaintiff was selected violates the Sherman and Clayton Acts per se, and that plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover treble damages for any loss arising out of the imposition of those restrictions upon him.
The essence of the draft is straightforward: the owners of the teams have agreed among themselves that the right to negotiate with each top quality graduating college athlete will be allocated to one team, and that no other team will deal with that person. This outright, undisguised refusal to deal constitutes a group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form, a device which has long been condemned as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S. Ct. 1321, 16 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1966); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656, 81 S. Ct. 365, 5 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1961); Klor's Inc. v. *745 Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 79 S. Ct. 705, 3 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild v. F. T. C., 312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941). There is no question but that the restrictions comprising the draft "are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition", White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 83 S. Ct. 696, 9 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1963); indeed, the owners attempt to justify its use by claiming that the league could not survive the competition for the services of the premier players that would ensue in its absence. But "[e]xclusion of traders from the market by means of combination of conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators' profit margins or their system [of organizing their distribution operations] . . .", United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, 384 U.S. at 146, 86 S. Ct. at 1331. Like any other organizations, the teams of the National Football League are subject to the antitrust laws, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S. Ct. 390, 1 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1957), the teamsport or joint-venture nature of their operations notwithstanding. None of the cases cited by defendant, in urging that the draft does not violate these laws, suggests in any way that such direct, explicit, and purposive restraints on competition as those which characterize the draft can escape from per se rule much less be found reasonable. See Chastain v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C., 1975); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank-Americard, 485 F.2d 119 (C.A. 8, 1973). cert. den., 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); McQuade Tours Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (C.A. 5, 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S. Ct. 912, 34 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1973); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (C.A. 9, 1970), cert. den., 401 U.S. 940, 91 S. Ct. 940, 28 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1971).
Defendants have contended throughout this case that, if the case is governed by the antitrust laws at all, the per se rule is inapplicable, and the draft is within the permissible limits of the Rule of Reason first announced in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911). While the Court has already determined that the naked restraints of the group boycott present in this case preclude the application of the Rule of Reason, even its application would not save defendants from liability for the operation of the draft. In order for the draft to be found lawful under the Rule of Reason, the Court would have to find that it is a reasonable way of pursuing legitimate business interests, and that it does not have the purpose or effect of unreasonably restraining competition. The defendants have attempted to establish at trial that the draft fits within these criteria. Their central argument is that the draft, as well as other NFL rules such as the Rozelle Rule, are indispensable in maintaining what they term "competitive balance", without which the league could not succeed in attracting spectator interest. Competitive balance means in essence that all of the league's teams are of sufficiently comparable playing strength that football fans will be in enough doubt about the probable outcome of each game and of the various division races that they will be interested in watching the games, thus supporting the teams' television and gate revenues. According to the defendants' witnesses, competitive balance sufficient to achieve this end could not be maintained in the league in the absence of a system of player allocation; the draft, they contend, allocates new player talent reasonably evenly among the league's teams. According to the defendants' arguments, if a free market for player talent existed today in professional football, the league's current competitive balance would be irretrievably destroyed as the more talented *746 players migrated to the cities with the richest teams/owners, to the "glamor" cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, and to the teams with the best winning records. According to this argument, the owners of the NFL franchises in Los Angeles, Kansas City, Dallas, and Detroit do not care if they lose money on the operation of their teams, as long as they win games, i. e. they do not conform to the principles of economic decision-making upon which the antitrust laws are premised. Defendants further argue that these owners would persist in this course of action, buying up all the best talent available, until they destroyed the league's viability. Finally, defendants contend that the draft is effective as a key element of maintaining a balance of player talent throughout the league.
The evidence on these points was at best equivocal. On the one hand, the Court is persuaded that in a free market for college players the wealthiest owners would indeed make an effort to buy up as much player talent as possible, and that factors such as the relative glamor of the cities and the playing-field success of the teams would influence player choices in favor of signing with such teams. On the other hand, there was abundant convincing testimony that many other factors play significant, often decisive roles in the desires of players to play in one city as opposed to another, and even the factors cited by the owners often appear to work at cross purposes with each other. More importantly, the defendants were unable to produce any credible evidence of a significant correlation between the opportunity to draft early in the draft (i. e. the preferred position) and improvement in team performance. In fact, the defendants' evidence in this regard indicates a correlation too low to be regarded as supporting their claim that the draft is essential to the survival of the league. For example, despite the existence of all the league's restraints on player movement, in the last three seasons nine teams have captured 22 of the 24 spots available in the playoffs leading to the Super Bowl. This shows neither competitive balance in division races nor effectiveness of drafting by early-selecting teams. Finally, the defendants presented no experiential evidence whatever to substantiate their claim that in the absence of player movement restrictions the best players would move to the small group of teams offering money, glamor, and success. Indeed, the little empirical evidence available with regard to the movement of free agents and former World Football League players since the 1975 season ended does not show any such trend.
In any event, the Court need not fully evaluate the league's claims of necessity for a college draft because, even conceding the need for some such system, the current structure is significantly more restrictive than necessary. In fact, the current system is absolutely the most restrictive one imaginable. It leaves no room whatever for competition among the teams for the services of college players, and utterly strips them of any measure of control over the marketing of their talents. Because significantly less restrictive alternatives are available, the current system cannot be held to be protected by the Rule of Reason.
Questioning of most of defendants' witnesses, both on direct examination and by the Court, indicated fairly unanimous support for the proposition that in each crop of college players there are five to ten "blue chip" or virtually certain "all-pro" players, and another thirty to fifty players who will almost certainly make the team and have a good chance of making the starting lineup in their first year. The evidence also showed that the coaching staffs of the teams and the scouts employed by the four scouting combines serving some of the teams are able to identify these players with a high degree of agreement among themselves. The witnesses also testified that the value of the draft depends upon its *747 predictive power, i. e. it can only distribute player talent if it can identify that talent. Given this predictive power, and given the principle purpose of the draft to distribute the top player talent, a less restrictive alternative than the present system would be to hold a draft consisting of just two "rounds". This would allocate the players generally considered to be the most talented, but would permit competition for the services of all other players. Since there are presently seventeen rounds in the draft, with twenty-eight teams picking in each round, a reduction of fifteen rounds would obviously be significantly less restriction on competition than the present system.
Another alternative drafting system shown by the evidence to be a possible acceptable method of player distribution is to allow more than one team to draft each player, while restricting the number of players any one team might sign. This alternative, not incompatible with the previous example, might for example have a draft of the current seventeen rounds, with each player to be drafted by as many as three teams, but with a requirement that a given team could sign only one player from each round. Obviously a number of variations on this theme are possible, but the significant point is that any variation on these examples would allow much more of a free market system for determining newplayer salaries than is currently the case (or was the case in 1968, when the plaintiff was drafted). What is important to note is that the owners are wholly cognizant, and indeed virtually concede, that the current system results in lower salaries for some players than they would receive in a free market, and that they have taken no action whatever to attempt to reduce the maximally restrictive restraints imposed by the current system of player selection. Therefore, in light of the near-certainty that less restrictive alternatives are available to meet the alleged player distribution needs of the league, the current system cannot be regarded as "reasonable" within the meaning of the antitrust laws.
The damages suffered by plaintiff cannot be calculated exactly, since there is and has been no free market with which to measure the value of players' services. In such a case, however, a reasonable estimate of damages must be made. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 574, 90 L. Ed. 652 (1946); Espaillat v. Berlitz Schools Of Languages Of America, Inc., 127 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 383 F.2d 220 (C.A.D.C.,1967). In this case, a reasonable estimate may be made with a fair degree of logic and precision.
The premise with which this estimate starts is that plaintiff Smith was a "blue chip" player. The testimony without exception showed that he was one of those few college players confidently expected to become an "all-pro", and to start in his first year. His actual performance fulfilled those expectations. The Court has also concluded on the basis of all the evidence that the elimination of the draft would benefit primarily the most talented players, such as the plaintiff, who would then have considerably more bargaining leverage than players now selected on lower draft rounds. The salaries of these players could therefore be expected to increase from their current levels in a free market situation. These conclusions indicate that a fair minimum estimate of the value of plaintiff's services may be found by looking at the compensation received by other top players in the league at that time, particularly those playing his position or with the Redskins. In addition, it would be useful to look at compensation paid to players who were signed by the Redskins as free agents at that time, although it is true that the free agent market may be artificially high because of the restrictions binding most of the other players in the league at any one time. Also instructive would be the compensation received *748 under the Rozelle Rule by teams losing free agents, if such players were comparable to plaintiff.
The evidence showed unequivocally that top players at that time were being offered long-term contracts by some teams, including at times the Redskins. The Court concludes that a player of plaintiff's talent would certainly have been able to negotiate a three-year contract on very favorable terms in the absence of the restraints imposed by the owners. The evidence also showed that such players were able to negotiate contracts which guaranteed payment for the full term of the contract even if the player were injured ("fully vested contract" or "injury protection clause"). On the basis of the evidence of the contracts being negotiated at times elsewhere in the league and by the Redskins during the relevant period, and considering that such protection was shown to be of great concern to players of plaintiff's caliber, the Court also concludes that plaintiff would have been able to include such injury protection in a long-term contract had it not been for the illegal restraints imposed upon him. The defendants have argued and tried to show at trial that Mr. Smith's failure to negotiate such a contract on favorable terms resulted from shortcomings of his negotiating agent, rather than from the draft system. Plaintiff has argued that there was a conspiracy among the owners to prevent the negotiation of injury protection clauses in particular. While the evidence does not sustain the contention that there was any understanding among the owners, overt or covert, that such clauses were not to be included in player contracts, neither does it sustain the contention that plaintiff's failure to secure such protection stemmed from causes wholly apart from the draft. While it is true that other players coming into the league at that time were able to negotiate such protection, and while the Redskins offered a long-term contract to their first draft choice the prior year, the testimony showed that the team had made a policy decision to resist offering such contracts at high pay levels to its 1968 draft selections. The only finding consistent with the evidence in this case is that, although plaintiff's agent was perhaps not as effective as he might have been, the primary reason that he was unable to negotiate a long-term contract with injury protection and other favorable terms was that he had been stripped of the bargaining power inherent in a free market, a market to whose advantages he was legally entitled. Consequently, the Court holds that plaintiff's damages are the difference between what he would have earned under a three-year contract containing an injury protection clause and what he was actually paid by the Redskins.
The Court has already discussed certain criteria which could be used to arrive at an approximation of what plaintiff would have earned in a free market. Almost all of these indicators are found in the circumstances surrounding the signing of defensive back Pat Fischer by the Redskins. Fischer was recognized as an outstanding defensive back (plaintiff's position), and had twice been chosen to play in the Pro Bowl (i. e. he was "all-pro") during his first eight seasons with the St. Louis Cardinals (1960-1967). In the 1967 season he played out his option, and in 1968 signed a two-year, no-cut contract with the Redskins for the 1968 and 1969 seasons. He was compensated under that contract in the amounts of $30,000 salary for each year and a $48,000 additional *749 sum, denominated as a "bonus", for the two year period. The Cardinals sought compensation from the Redskins for the loss of Fischer's services, claiming under the Rozelle Rule that they were entitled to the contract of either the Redskins' premier receiver, Charley Taylor, or that of the plaintiff. The Redskins refused this request, and the matter had to be settled by Commissioner Rozelle under the Rule bearing his name. He determined that Fischer's services were not as valuable as those of either Charley Taylor or the plaintiff, and instead awarded the Cardinals compensation consisting of the Redskins' second round draft choice in 1969 and their third round draft choice in 1970. The Court has noted earlier that the compensation paid to Fischer when he was signed by the Redskins as a free agent is not a precise measure of his free market value, due to the comparatively few free agents in what was predominantly a player-movement-restricted market. On the other hand, Commissioner Rozellewho is charged by the league with being expert in such mattersdetermined that plaintiff's services were worth more than Fischer's at that time. Whatever disparity results from the artificiality of the free agent market can therefore be neutralized for purposes of valuing plaintiff's free market worth by in effect setting off that inflation of price against the superior worth of plaintiff's services at that time. When these factors are netted out against each other, plaintiff's services are found to have been worth a total compensation of $108,000 for a two year period. Translating this into the three-year term found appropriate as an estimate of the contract plaintiff could have negotiated in a free player market, the Court adds the proportionate share ($54,000) for the extra year, for a total three-year figure of $162,000. This is, incidentally, quite close to the $150,000 that plaintiff's agent testified (by deposition) that he thought plaintiff should have been able to negotiate for a three year fully vested contract with the Redskins; the latter figure of course is premised on the lack of a free market at the time of the negotiations. Subtracting from the $162,000 that plaintiff's services would have brought in a free market the $69,800 he was actually paid, his actual damages amount to some $92,200. Judgment will accordingly be entered for treble damages in the amount of $276,600, plus the costs and attorneys fees (the latter to be submitted for approval of the Court) to which plaintiff is entitled under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
 Defendants have contended that the relevant market in this action is the United States and Canada, i. e. the NFL and the Canadian Football League. The Court finds as a fact that the Canadian Football League in 1968 did not offer significant competition for the services of outstanding American college football players also selected in the NFL draft, due to its limits on Americans permitted on CFL teams, its lack of attraction or glamor for the athletes, and the differences in the nature and rules of the football played there. Accordingly, the Court holds that the relevant market for this action is professional major league football in the United States. In 1968 (and at present) the National Football League was the sole source of purchasers of the product which plaintiff sought to market.
 Because the Court determined, for the reasons set forth in part 1(A), supra, that the exemption could not apply in the circumstances of this case, it was unnecessary to receive evidence at trial with respect to the issues discussed in part I(B) hereof.
 The full panoply of restrictive league rules is described in Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.Minn., 1975).
 See, New York Times, June 6, 1976, p. S6, "NFL Owners Will Take Up Cut in Player Limit".
 See, Washington Post, July 7, 1976, p. D1, "Free Agents' First Wave On the Move".
 The Court does not intend that these examples be regarded as necessarily being within the Rule of Reason; they are, rather, examples of less restrictive alternatives to the present system, and meant to show that the present draft is not a reasonable system.
 Some top round draft selections were able to negotiate contracts of more than three years, some had injury protection, some had astronomical bonuses, salaries, or other benefits, and some did not negotiate multi-year agreements. The Court finds a three-year fully vested contract, at the salary described in the text below, to be a fair estimate of a free market outcome for a person of plaintiff's talents in his playing position at that time.
 In addition to a total of $28,000 bonus and $22,000 salary compensation, the Redskins paid plaintiff $19,800 in the season following his injury (the standard option-year pay of 90% of the prior year's salary). This sum of $69,800 is the total compensation paid to plaintiff by the team, and is the benchmark for comparison with his free-market value for purposes of computing damages.
 The evidence at trial showed no consistent practice among the teams as to the allocation of total compensation for the contract period between salary and bonus. Plaintiff regards a bonus as being paid for the exclusive right to a player's services. This does not seem different than what the team receives in return for paying the player's salary, and for the purposes of this case salary and bonus can be regarded, together, as compensation for the value of whatever consideration is received by the team from the player for the contract period.