David Carl Olson is Minister of the First Unitarian Church of Baltimore, Maryland. Previously he served in churches in Flint, Michigan and Boston, Massachusetts.
In 1991, David Olson, while in Massachusetts, was one of several hundred Communist Party USA members to sign the a paper: “An initiative to Unite and Renew the Party” – most signatories left the Party after the December 1991 conference to found Committees of Correspondence.
At the Committees of Correspondence Conference on July 19th,1992, David Carl Olson was an unsuccessful candidate for the CoC National Coordinating Committee.
Rev. Olson apparently returned to the Communist Party soon after.
In May of 1995, the Communist Party USA newspaper Peoples Weekly World published a May Day supplement. Included was a page offering May Day greetings to Massachusetts’ Communists Lew Johnson, Laura Ross and Anne Timpson. Endorsers of the greeting included David Carl Olson.
The Anne Burlak Timpson Labor Forum is a creation of the Massachusetts’ Communist Party. It was established in honor of party member Anne Timpson, who died in 2002. Founding Committee members included Rev. David Carl Olson.
In 2004, Olson wrote an article for the Communist Party USA‘s Political Affairs on the legalization of gay marriage in Massachusetts.
He later moved to Maryland where he worked with Rep. Elijah Cummings on “jobs” issues in 2011.
In 2014, Rev. David Carl Olson served on the Steering Committee of the Maryland Coalition for Trans Equality.
The Constitution establishes both federalism and a limited American government by first enumerating only seventeen areas in which the federal government is authorized to operate,  and then by explicitly declaring that everything else is to be determined exclusively by the People and the States (the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
People of faith need to regain the concept of duty, and we would do well to adopt the motto that characterized the efforts of Founding Father John Quincy Adams: “Duty is ours, results are God’s.”  Now is the time for people of faith to be silent no more.
 Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 160 (1897).
 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (Windham: John Byrne, 1795), Vol. I, pp. 1-2, “Of Law and Government;” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary Containing Definition of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1910), pp. 226-227, s.v. “common law;” John Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1892), Vol. I, pp. 348-349; Alexander M. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1867), Vol. I, pp. 324-326.
 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (Windham: John Byrne, 1795), Vol. I, pp. 1-2, “Of Law and Government;” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary Containing Definition of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1910), pp. 227-227, s.v. “common law;” John Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1892), Vol. I, pp. 348-349; Alexander M. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1867), Vol. I, pp. 324-326.
 See, for example, U.S. v. Coolidge, 1 Gall. 488 (1813); U.S. v. Wonson, 1 Gall. 5 (1812); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 3 Wheat. 212 (1818); Alexander M. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1871), Vol. I, pp. 324-326; Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1871), pp. 21-25, “The Formation and Amendment of State Constitutions”; Theron Metcalf & Jonathan Perkins, Digest of the Decisions of the Courts of Common Law and Admiralty in the United States (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1860), Vol. I, p. 532, s.v. “common law”; John Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1892), Vol. I, pp. 348-349; etc.
 See, for example, Alexander M. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1867), Vol. I, p. 325; A. J. Dallas, Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts of the United States and of Pennsylvania Held at the Seat of the Federal Government (Philadelphia: J. Ormrod, 1799), Vol. III, p. 139, Talbot, Appellant, versus Janson, Appellee, et al. which says: “But the abstract right of individuals to withdraw from the society of which they are members, is recognized by an uncommon coincidence of opinion – by every writer, ancient and modern; by the civilian, as well as by the common-law layer; by the philosopher, as well as the poet: It is the law of nature, and of nature’s god, pointing to ‘the wide world before us, where to chuse our place of rest, and providence our guide’;” Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (New York: Frederick C. Brightly, 1905), s.v. “Common Law” which says: “The common law is grounded upon the general customs of the realm; and includes in it the Law of Nature, the Law of God, and the Principles and Maxims of the Law: It is founded upon Reasons; and is said to be perfection of reason, acquired by long study, observation and experience, and refined by learned men in all ages”; Giles Jacob & T. E. Tomlins, The Law-Dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the English Law (Philadelphia: Fry and Kammerer, 1811), Vol. IV, p. 89, s.v. “law” which says: “The law of nature is that which God at mans’ creation infused into him, for his preservation and direction; and this is lex eterna and may not be changed: and no laws shall be made or kept, that are expressly against the Law of god, written in his Scripture; as to forbid what he commandeth, & c. 2 Shep. Abr. 356”; William Nicholson, American Edition of the British Encyclopedia or Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (Philadelphia: Mitchell, Ames, and White, 1821), Vol. VII, s.v. “Law” which says “But this large division may be reduced to the common division; and all is founded on the law of nature and reason, and the revealed law of God, as all other laws ought to be”; Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hillard, Gray, and Company, 1833), Vol. III, p. 724, § 1867; Testimony of Distinguished Laymen to the Value of the Sacred Scriptures (New York: American Bible Society, 1854), pp. 51-53, Justice John McLean, November 4, 1852. See also Samuel W. Bailey, Homage of Eminent Persons to the Book (New York, 1869), p. 54, Joseph Hornblower, chief justice of New Jersey; Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, 399 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1824); Richmond v. Moore, 107 Ill. 429, 1883 WL 10319 (Ill.), 47 Am.Rep. 445 (Ill. 1883); State v. Mockus, 14 ALR 871, 874 (Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., 1921); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So.2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944) (en banc); Stollenwerck v. State, 77 So. 52, 54 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917) (Brown, P. J. concurring); Gillooley v. Vaughn, 110 So. 653, 655 (Fla. 1926), citing Theisen v. McDavid, 16 So. 321, 323 (Fla. 1894); Rogers v. State, 4 S.E.2d 918, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939); Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 1 (1858); City of Ames v. Gerbracht, 189 N.W. 729, 733 (Iowa 1922); Ruiz v. Clancy, 157 So. 737, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1934), citing Caldwell v. Henmen, 5 Rob. 20; Beaty v. McGoldrick, 121 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953); Ex parte Mei, 192 A. 80, 82 (N.J. 1937); State v. Donaldson, 99 P. 447, 449 (Utah 1909); De Rinzie v. People, 138 P. 1009, 1010 (Colo. 1913); Addison v. State, 116 So. 629 (Fla. 1928); State v. Gould, 46 S.W.2d 886, 889-890 (Mo. 1932); Doll v. Bender, 47 S.E. 293, 300 (W.Va. 1904) (Dent, J. concurring); and many others. See, also, Joseph Story, A Discourse Pronounced upon the Inauguration of the Author, as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, on the Twenty-Fifth Day of August, 1829 (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins, 1829), pp. 20-21; John Adams, The Works of John Adams, Charles Francis Adams, editor (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851), Vol. III, p. 439, “On Private Revenge,” originally published in the Boston Gazette, September 5, 1763; James Wilson, The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, Bird Wilson, editor (Philadelphia: Lorenzo Press, 1804), Vol. I, p. 104, “Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation”; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470-471 (1892); Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 263 (1850); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns 225 (1811); Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, assembled for the purpose of amending the Constitution of the State of New York, Nathaniel H. Carter and William L. Stone, reporters (Albany: E. and E. Hosford, 1821), p. 576, October 31, 1821; Charles B. Galloway, Christianity and the American Commonwealth (Nashville: Publishing House Methodist Episcopal Church, 1898), pp. 170-171; Lindenmuller v. The People, 33 Barb 548, 560-564, 567 (Sup. Ct. NY 1861); Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.2d 727 (Sup.Ct.Fla. 1941); and many others.
 Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129-30 (Tex.Sup.Ct. 1913).
 Article I, Section 1 lists fifteen powers permissible to the federal government; two additional federal powers are added through constitutional amendments, thus bringing the total number of constitutionally-authorized federal jurisdictions to seventeen.
 Thomas Jefferson, Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson Randolph, editor (Boston: Gray and Bowen, 1830), Vol. IV, p. 374, to Judge William Johnson on June 12, 1823.
 Thomas Jefferson, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Albert Ellery Bergh, editor (Washington D. C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 332, to Charles Hammond on August 18, 1821.
 Jefferson, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Albert Ellery Bergh, editor (Washington D. C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 277, to William Charles Jarvis on September 28, 1820.
 Thomas Jefferson, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Albert Ellery Bergh, editor (Washington D. C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XV, p. 215, to Judge Spencer Roane on September 6, 1819.
 Samuel Adams, The Writings of Samuel Adams, Harry Alonzo Cushing, editor (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), Vol. III, to Mrs. Adams on January 29, 1777.
 John Jay, The Life of John Jay: With Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers, William Jay, editor (New York: J & J Harper, 1833), Vol. II, p. 174, to the Reverend Richard Price on September 27, 1785.
 John Witherspoon, Dominion of Providence Over the Passions of Men. A Sermon Preached at Princeton on the 17th of May, 1776. Being the General Fast Appointed by the Congress Through the United Colonies (Philadelphia: 1777), p. 32.
 Elbridge S. Brooks, Historic Americans: Sketches of the Lives and Characters of Certain Famous Americans (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1899), p. 209.


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In this article I will concentrate on GDPR in the context of Streetphotography and not on the other german laws like ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’.
There are some interesting publications from laywers in the internet (just google for it…), where you can find opinions in case of the GDPR especially for professional photographers. In this article I’d like to take a closer look on GDPR for amateur street photographers.
Important note: I am no expert on this issue! So if you are seeking for professional advice please contact a lawyer. In the following I will only describe my personal opinions about GDPR.
Are amateur photographers affected by GDPR?
In Art. 2 Para. 1 GDPR is written, that the regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. That means, that unlike the case of ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’ not the act of publishing is significant, but the point of taking the photo with your electronic device like digital camera or smartphone.
(c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.
It will be interesting how the juries in a trail will judge this point. Because if I am an amateur photographer – and so I am logically a private person – and I am taking a photo with my private camera on the street and no other person will ever see the photo, then the photo will never leave my personal sphere. In my opinion the case of Art. 2 Para. 2c) GDPR is given.
Only in the moment, the picture will leave my private sphere, e.g. if I will publish the photo, then Art. 2 Para. 2 GDPR could be affected. That means there will be no difference to ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’.
According to Art. 3 Nr. 1 GDPR ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’). That means, that because of the picture somebody could match the shown person with the identity of the person. So if I will take a photo from back of a person, nobody could match the identity (except the person shows his name on the back…).
So it will be interesting, if a face of a person is on the picture. In this case an identification will be possible by a biometrical process.
Then take a look into Art. 4 Nr. 14 GDPR: ‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data.
I don’t want to talk about procedures like Elastic-Graph-Matching or other methods in detail. But as an acid test you can use Facebook: If the face detection of Facebook will match, then the identification with biometrical systems is possible.
A note because of an article from ‘Spiegel Online’: The protection of GDPR is only given in the case of persons, not in the case of animals! So if you like to show your cat in the internet, even if you are a professional photographer, feel free to go on.
Twilight area: it will be interesting, how powerful automatic face detection will be in the future. Is it possible to detect persons with big sunglasses? Or persons only shown in profile? I think, that in this cases conflicts are possible.
In the case that personal data in the meaning of GDPR is given, because the face can be recognized and the person can be identified, then according to Art. 6 Para. 1a) GDPR you will need a permission by the person which is shown in the picture.
I didn’t found a note in GDPR, at which point the permission must be given. So in my opinion a ‘healing’ permission could also be given afterwards.
According to Art. 7 Para. 3 GDPR a written permission by the shown person could be cancelled by the person afterwards.
If there is no permission, although personal data was processed, then the affected person could demand the deletion of the picture.
The amateur photographer has to pay for any legal costs of the affected person in this case. But in my opinion the judges will only accept a trail, if out-of trail agreements have failed before.
Of course it could be very expensive if the supervisory authorities will impose a penalty, which could be up to 20 million Euro.
What does that all mean in practice?
Basically in the case of missing permission the ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’ was relevant so far. If there was no permission according to this law, some street photographers referred to artistic freedom in this case which means the photo will be legal. Because of a recent statement from the ministry of interior of Germany (can be found with Google) the authorities in Germany are the meaning, that ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’ is furthermore the main law. In the end there will be no significant change in practicing Streetphotography. Only storing and processing picture could be more complex because of data protection.
It will be also interesting, how the juries in Germany will interpreting the enabling act in Art. 85 Para. 2 GDPR. The question is, if the ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’ is furthermore the special law with priority over GDPR.
UPDATE: Meanwhile there are some statements from the EU and the Governement in Germany, that the ‘Kunsturhebergesetz’ is further the special law for private photographers and not the GDPR. But if you are a private photographer and you have a blog, you have to follow GDPR in terms of the data handling of your blog (e.g. comments etc.). If you are looking for news about GDPR just google it or you will find a good overview at https://www.fotorecht-seiler.eu/dsgvo-fotografie-kug-update/ (in German).
It seems to me, that lawyers specialized on warnings are german phenomenon. Some authors in the internet have the opinion, that there will be waves of warnings by lawyers in case of GDPR.
I don’t think so. Because also a lawyer which is specialized on warnings needs a legal-protection-cause. That means he needs a affected person, which gives him mandate. So if there is no accuser there will be no trail.
Interesting notice: Also a lawyer specialized on warnings is storing data in his data systems about a photographer in case of warning. That means according to GDPR that he also needs a permission of the photographer he is accusing. So in my opinion the amateur photographer could demand in reverse the deletion of his data from the lawyer!
How do I get good street photos?

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HAVING taken a general view of the great departments of the government of the United States, I proceed to a more precise examination of its powers and duties, and of the degree of subordination under which the state governments are constitutionally placed.
It is to be observed that the constitution of the United States is an instrument containing the grant of specific powers, and the government of the union cannot claim any powers but what are contained in the grant; and given, either expressly, or by necessary implication. The powers vested in the state governments by their respective constitutions, or remaining with the people of the several states prior to the establishment of the constitution of the United States, continue unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they are granted to the United States. We are to ascertain the true construction of the constitution, and the precise extent of the residuary authorities of the several states, by the declared sense and practice of the governments respectively, when there is no collision; and in all other cases where the question is of a judicial nature, we are to ascertain it by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States; and those decisions ought to be studied, and universally understood, in respect to all the leading questions of constitutional law. The people of the United States have declared the constitution to be the supreme law of the land, and it is entitled to universal, and implicit obedience. Every act of congress, and every act of the legislatures of the states, and every part of the constitution of any state, which is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, is necessarily void. This is a clear and settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence. The judicial power of the union is declared to extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution; and to the judicial power it belongs, whenever a case is judicially before it, to determine what is the supreme law of the land. The determination of the Supreme Court of the United States must be final and conclusive, because the constitution gives to that tribunal the power to decide, and gives no appeal from the decision.
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is very limited. It is confined by the constitution to those cases which affect ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to those in which a state is a party;4 and it has been made a question, whether this original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was intended by the constitution to be exclusive. The judiciary act of 1789 seems to have considered it to be competent for congress to vest concurrent jurisdiction, in those specified cases, in other court, for it gave a concurrent jurisdiction, in some of those cases, to the circuit courts.5 In the case of The United States v. Ravara,6 this point arose in the Circuit Court for Pennsylvania district, and it was held that congress could vest a concurrent jurisdiction in other courts, of those very cases over which the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction; and that the word original was not to be taken to imply exclusive cognizance of the cases enumerated. But the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Marbury v. Madison,7 goes far towards establishing the principle of exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in all those cases of original jurisdiction. This last case was considered, in Pennsylvania v. Koslaff,8 as shaking the decision in the case of Ravara; and yet the question was still left in doubt by the Supreme Court, in the case of The United States v. Ortega,9 and a decision upon it was purposely waived.
(1.) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in certain cases over final decisions in state courts.
A graver question could scarcely have arisen in that court, or one involving considerations of higher importance and delicacy, or more deeply affecting the permanency and tranquillity of the American union. In the opinion which was delivered, the court observed that the constitution unavoidably dealt in general language, and did not enter into a minute specification of powers or declare the means by which those powers were to be carried into execution. This would have been a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable task; and the constitution left it to congress, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mold and model the exercise of its powers as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should. require.
The judicial power of the United States is declared to extend to all cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United States. It was an absolute grant of the judicial power in that case, and it was competent for the people of this country to invest the general government with that, or with any other powers they might deem proper and necessary; and to prohibit the states from the exercise of any powers which were, in their judgment, incompatible with the objects of their general compact. Congress were bound, by the injunctions of the constitution, to create inferior courts, in which to vest all that judicial jurisdiction which, was exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the Supreme Court cannot take any other than an appellate cognizance. The whole judicial power must be at all times vested, either in an original or appellate form, in some courts created under the authority of the United States. The grant of the judicial power was absolute, and it was imperative upon congress to provide for the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts, in all the cases in which judicial power was exclusively granted by the constitution, and not given by way of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.
The court, in their examination of the judicial power, supposed that the constitution took a distinction between two classes of enumerated cases. It intended that the judicial power, either in an original or appellate form, should extend absolutely to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority; and to all cases affecting ambassadors. other public ministers, and consuls; and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, because those cases were of vital importance to the sovereignty of the union, and they entered into the national policy, and affected the national rights, and the law and comity of nations. The original or appellate jurisdiction ought, therefore, to be commensurate with the mischiefs intended to be remedied, and the policy in view. But, in respect to another class of cases, the constitution seemed, ex industria, to drop the word all, and to extend the jurisdiction of the judiciary, not to all controversies, but to controversies in which the United States were a party, or between two or more states, or between citizens of different states, etc. and to leave it to congress to qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such manner as public policy might dictate. But, whatever weight might be due to that distinction, it was held to be manifest, that the judicial power was, unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all state authority, and in all others, might be made so at the election of congress. The judiciary act, throughout every part of it, and particularly in the 9th, 11th and 13th sections, assumed, that in all the cases to which the judicial powers of the United States extended, congress might rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in their own courts. The criminal, and the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, must be exclusive; and it was only in those cases where, previous to the constitution, state tribunals possessed jurisdiction independent of national authority, that they could now constitutionally exercise a concurrent jurisdiction.
The exercise of appellate jurisdiction was not limited by the constitution to the Supreme Court. Congress might create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it might vest appellate, as well as original jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases where it had not original jurisdiction, was declared to be subject to such exceptions and regulations as congress might prescribe. It remained, therefore, entirely in the discretion of congress, to cause the judicial power to be exercised in every variety of form of appellate jurisdiction, and the appellate power was not limited to cases pending in the courts of the United States. If it had been limited to cases in those courts, it would necessarily follow, that the jurisdiction of the federal courts must have been exclusive of state courts, in all the cases enumerated in the constitution. If the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the union, and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the state courts could not, consistently with the express grant in the constitution, entertain any jurisdiction in those cases without the right of appeal. If the state courts might entertain concurrent jurisdiction over any of those cases without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States, as to such cases, would have no existence, which would be contrary to the manifest intent of the constitution. The appellate power of the federal courts must extend to the state courts, so long as the state courts entertain any concurrent jurisdiction over the cases which the constitution has declared shall fall within the cognizance of the judicial power. It is very plain, that the constitution did contemplate that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States would arise in the state courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction; and that the state courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States; and as the judicial power of the United States extended to all such cases, by the very terms of the constitution, it followed as a necessary consequence, that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the United States must, and did extend, to state tribunals, and attach Upon every case within the cognizance of the judicial power.
All the enumerated cases of federal cognizance are those which touch the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation, or which presume that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct or control the regular administration of justice. The appellate power, in all these cases, is founded on the clearest principles of policy and wisdom, and is deemed requisite to fulfill effectually the great and beneficent ends of the constitution. It is likewise necessary, in order to preserve uniformity of decision throughout the United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution; and the mischiefs of opposite constructions, and contradictory decisions in the different states, on all these points of general concern, would be deplorable.
The right of removal of a cause from a state court by a defendant who is entitled to try his rights, and assert his privileges in the national forum, is also the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and the right of removal of a cause may exist before or after judgment, in the discretion of congress, The Supreme Court, by a train of reasoning which appears to be unanswerable and conclusive, came to the decision, that the appellate power of the United States did extend to cases pending in the state courts, and that the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, authorizing the exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases by a writ of error, was supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Virginia, rendered on the mandate in the cause, and denying the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was consequently reversed, and the judgment of the District Court in Virginia, which the Court of Appeals in Virginia had reversed, was affirmed.
Whether the Supreme Court had authority to issue the compulsory process of mandamus to the state courts, to enforce the judgment of reversal, was a question which the court did not think it necessary to discuss or decide; and one of the judges, in the separate opinion which he gave in the cause, seemed to think that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, was supreme over the parties and over the case, but that it had no compulsory control over the state tribunals. The court itself gave no intimation of an opinion, whether it could or could not lawfully resort to compulsory or restrictive process, operating in personam upon the state tribunals; and it was no doubt deemed discreet not to assert more authority constitutionally vested in the court, than was necessary for the occasion. If the appellate jurisdiction be founded, as it no doubt was in that case, on a solid basis, it would seem to carry with it, as of course, all the coercive power incident to every such jurisdiction, and requisite to support it.
(2.) Another question, which was largely discussed and profoundly considered by the Supreme Court, was touching its authority to issue a mandamus, when not arising in a case under its appellate jurisdiction, and when not required in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. In the case of Marbury v. Madison,14 the plaintiff had been nominated by the president, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, had been appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, and the appointment had been made complete and absolute by the president’s signature of the commission, and the commission had been made complete by affixing to it the seal of the United States. The secretary of state, after all this, withheld the commission, and the withholding of it was adjudged to be a violation of a vested legal right, for which the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy by mandamus; and the only question was, whether the mandamus could constitutionally issue from the Supreme Court.
The judiciary act, sec. 13 authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. There was no doubt that the act applied to the case, and gave the power, if the law was constitutional; but the court was of opinion that the act, in this respect, was not warranted by the constitution, because the issuing of a mandamus in this case would be an exercise of original jurisdiction not within the constitution, and congress had not power to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in other cases than those described in the constitution. It had not authority to give to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution had declared that its jurisdiction should be original. nor original jurisdiction where the constitution had declared it should be appellate. To enable the court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise, or necessary to an exercise, of appellate jurisdiction.
(4.) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court exists only in those cases in which it is affirmatively given. In the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy,17 the Supreme Court considered that its whole appellate jurisdiction depended upon the regulations of congress, as that jurisdiction was given by the constitution in a qualified manner. The Supreme Court was to have appellate jurisdiction, “with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as congress should make;” and if congress had not provided any rule to regulate the proceedings on appeal, the court could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if a rule be provided, the court could not depart from it. In pursuance of this principle, the court decided in Clarke v. Bazadone,18 that a writ of error did not lie to that court from a court of the United States’ territory northwest of the Ohio, because the act of Congress had not authorized an appeal or writ of error from such a court. It was urged that the judicial power extended to all cases arising under the constitution, and that where the Supreme Court had not original, it had appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as congress should make; and that the appellate power was derived from the constitution, and must be full and complete in all cases appertaining to the federal judiciary, where congress had not by law interfered and controlled it by exceptions and regulations. The court, however, adhered to the doctrine which they had before laid down, and proceeded upon the principle, that though the appellate powers of the court were given by the constitution, they were limited entirely by the judiciary statutes, which are to be understood as making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the court, and to imply a negative on the exercise of such a power in every case, but those in which it is affirmatively given and described by statute. This was the principle also explicitly declared in the case of The United States v. More,19 and in the case of Durousseau v. The United States.20 In the first of those cases, the rule of construction was carried to the extent of holding that no appeal or writ of error lay in a criminal case from the circuit court of the district of Columbia, because the appellate jurisdiction, as to that district, applied, by the terms of the statute, to civil cases only. The rule was afterwards, in Ex parte Kearney,21 laid down generally, that the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction from circuit courts, in criminal cases, confided to it by the laws of the United States.
(5) The constitution says, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; and it has been made a question as to what was a case arising under a treaty. In Owings v. Norwood,22 there was an ejectment between two citizens of Maryland, for lands in that state; and the defendant set up an outstanding title in a British subject, which he contended was protected by the British treaty of 1794. The Court of Appeals decided against that title thus set up; and the Supreme Court of the United States held that not to be a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the court, because it was not a case arising under the treaty. The treaty itself was not drawn in question either directly or incidentally. The title in question did not grow out of the treaty, and as the claim was not under the treaty, the title was not protected by it; and whether the treaty was an obstacle to the recovery, was then a question exclusively for the state court.
(6.) The judiciary act of 1789 required, on error or appeal from a state court, that the error assigned appear on the. face of the record, and immediately respect some question affecting the validity or construction of the constitution, treaties, statutes, or authorities of the union. Under this act, it is not necessary that the record should state in terms the misconstruction of the authority of the union, or that it was drawn in question; but it must show some act of congress applicable to the case, to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The Court was so precise upon this point, that in Miller v. Nicholls,23 notwithstanding it was believed that an act of congress, giving the United States priority in cases of insolvency, had been disregarded; yet as the fact of insolvency did not appear upon record, the court decided that they could not take jurisdiction of the case.
(7.) The appellate jurisdiction may exist, though a state be a party, and it extends to a final judgment in a state court, on a case arising under the authority of the union. The appellate powers of the federal judiciary over the state tribunals was again, and very largely discussed, in the case of Cohens v. Virginia;24 and the constitutional authority of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was vindicated with great strength of argument, and clearness of illustration. The question arose under an act of congress instituting a lottery in the district of Columbia, and the defendant below was criminally prosecuted for selling tickets in that lottery, contrary to an act of the legislature of Virginia. Judgment was rendered against him in the highest court of the state in which the cause was cognizable, though he claimed the protection of the act of congress. A writ of error was brought upon that judgment into the Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground that the prosecution drew in question the validity of the statute in Virginia, as being repugnant to a law of the United States, and that the decision was in favor of the state law. It was made a great point in the case, whether the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction.
The court decided that its appellate jurisdiction was not excluded by the character of the parties, one of them being a state, and the other a citizen of the state. Jurisdiction was given to the courts of the union in two classes of cases. In the first, their jurisdiction depended on the character of the cause, whoever might be the parties; and in the second, it depended entirely on the character of the parties, and it was unimportant what might be the subject of controversy. The general government, though limited as to its objects, was supreme with respect to those objects. It was supreme in all cases in which it was empowered to act. A case arising under the constitution and laws of the union, was cognizable in the courts of the union, whoever might be the parties to that case. The sovereignty of the states was limited, or surrendered, in many cases where there was no other power conferred on congress than a constructive power to maintain the principles established id the constitution. One of the instruments by which that duty might be peaceably performed, was the judicial department. It was authorized to decide all cases of every description, arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the union; and from this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those cases in which a state may be a party. It was likewise a political axiom, that the judicial power of every well constituted government, must be coextensive with the legislative power, and must be capable of deciding every Judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws. The most mischievous consequences would follow, from the absence of appellate jurisdiction over, a state court where a state was a party, for it would prostrate the government and laws of the union at the feet of every state. The powers of the government could not be executed by its own means, in any state disposed to resist its execution by a course of legislation. If the courts of the union, could not correct the judgments of the state courts, inflicting penalties under state laws, upon individuals executing the laws of the union, each member of the confederacy would possess a veto on the will of the whole. No government ought to be so defective in its organization, as not to contain within itself the means of securing the execution of its own laws. If each state was left at liberty to put its own construction upon, the constitutional powers of congress, and to legislate in conformity to its own opinion, and enforce its opinion by penalties, and to resist or defeat, in the form of law, the legitimate measures of the union, it would destroy the constitution, or reduce it to the imbecility of the old confederation. To prevent such mischief and ruin, the constitution of the United States, most wisely and most clearly, conferred on the judicial department the power of construing the constitution and laws in every case, and of preserving them from all violation from every quarter, so far as judicial decision could preserve them.
The case before the court was one in which jurisdiction depended upon the character of the cause, as it was a case arising under the law of the union. It was not an ordinary case of a controversy between a state and one of its citizens, for there the jurisdiction would depend upon the character of the parties. The court concluded, that the appellate power did extend to the case, though a state was a party, because it was a case touching the validity of an act of congress, and the decision of the state court was against its validity; and in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the union, the jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in an appellate form, though a state be a party.
The court observed, that the amendment to the constitution, declaring that a judicial power was not to be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against a state by individuals, did not apply to a writ of error, which was not a suit against a state within the meaning of the constitution; and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the union, may be exercised by a writ of error brought upon the judgment of a state court. The United States are one nation and one people, as to all cases and powers given by the constitution, and the judicial power must be competent, not only to decide on the validity of the constitution or law of a state, if it be repugnant to the constitution or law of the United States, but also to decide on the judgment of a state tribunal enforcing such unconstitutional law. The federal courts must either possess exclusive jurisdiction in all cases affecting the constitution, and laws, and treaties of the union, or they must have power to revise the judgments rendered on them by the state tribunals. If the several state courts had final jurisdiction over the same cases arising upon the same laws, it would be a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion could proceed. Nothing can be plainer than the proposition, that the Supreme Court of the nation must have power to revise the decisions of local tribunals on questions which affect the nation, or the most important ends of the government might be defeated, and we should be no longer one nation for any efficient purpose. The doctrine would go to destroy the great fundamental principles on which the fabric of the union stands.
2. McIntyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504.
3. Art. 3. sec 2.
4. Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 453. and see Infra, p. 323.
5. Act of Sept. 24th, 1789, sec. 13.
8. 5 Serg. & Rawle, 545.
10. The Imperial Chamber and the Aulic Council in the Germanic constitution were tribunals of appellate jurisdiction only. It was the original law of Germany, that no man could be sued, except in the state or province to which he belonged.1 Ballam on the Middle Ages, 371-2.
13. 1 Wheaton, 304. Martin v. Hunter.
16. 4 Dallas, 3. New York v. Connecticut.
23. 4 Wheaton, 311. In Hickie v. Starke, I Peters’ Rep. 98. it was held, that in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the record must show a complete title under the treaty or act of congress, and that the judgment of the court below was in violation of that treaty or statute.
25. In Williams v. Norris, and Montgomery v. Hernandes, 12 Wheaton, 117, 129. under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, chap. 20, it was held, that the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction, unless the decision in the state court be against the right or title set up by the party under the constitution or statute of the United States, and the title depended thereon; or unless the decision be in favor of a stale law, when its validity was questioned, as repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and the right of the party depended upon the state law.

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§ 627. We have seen that in English sentences where the verb to be is followed by a pronoun, a proper noun, or a noun with the definite article or the possessives my, thy, etc the verb to be must ALWAYS be translated by is.
§ 628. We have also met sentences where the verb to be was followed by (a) an adjective, as the day is cold; (b) a noun with the indefinite article a or an; as , he is a man, it is a hot day.
§ 629. Now, in sentences of this kind the verb to be is represented in Irish sometimes by atá and sometimes by is. Up to this we have used only atá, as , atá an lá fuar; atá sé 'na ḟear, atá sé 'na lá te. The idiomatic use of the preposition in, in the last tw sentences, is familiar to our students.
§ 630. But we can also use is and say, is fada an lá, is fear é, is lá te é etc.
A. The collocation of the words. Up to this the order of the words was (I) verb (2) nom. case (3) adjective or noun, which in English sentences followed the verb. But now we see in sentences like is fada an lá, is fear mé, the order of words is (I) verb (2) adjective or noun which in English followed the verb (3) nominative case.
§ 632. B. There is also a difference in MEANING between is and atá, which we shall try to illustrate by examples. The reason of difference is that atá means is now and is means is always (or is without any reference to time or circumstances.) Take the word bacaċ (bok'-ăCH) Munster (bok'oCH'), lame. Atá mé bacaċ means "I am lame", ie, at present and for a time only. Is bacaċ mé means "I am lame permanentlγfor life. I am a cripple." Hence the word in such a sentene is equivalent to the noun "cripple". Often used for beggar.
§ 633. So Atá e fuar, "it is (now) cold" often the same as "it has become cold", as atá an lá fuar, the day is now cold. But, is fuar é "it is (always) cold" would not be said oa nything that is sometimes cold and sometimes not, but of something that is always cold (or, at all events, the notion of a present state of coldness is not in the mind). Hence, is is the verb general ysed in proverbs: as, má's fuar an teaċ-taire (taCH-thărĕ) is fuar an freagra (fra'gră). If (má's = má is) the messenger is cold (carelesss) the answer is cold.
Another way of knowing when to use is and when to use atá. We may take it that is is the word most generally used where 'is' is used in English. When we wish to say that two things are identical, as "John is the king" or "this is a fine day", "this day is (a) fine (day)" we use is, is é eaġán an rí", "is lá breaġ é so." "is breaġ an lá é so". But when "is" means exists or expresses a state or condition, atá is used. When the statement would be made in answer tot he question "what is—?" "who is—?", "Of what kind is—?" we use is. When the questio nis "How is—?" "Where is—?" "In what condition, etc is—?" we use atá.
§ 635. Whenever in English the verb to be is followed by a preposition, atá is the Irish verb to be used. This follows from the mature of prepositions; for, when we say that some one or some thing is at a place, on a place, from a place, is always means is now, or has reference to a state or condition.


§ 57-1 Creation; composition; appointment and terms of members; vacancies; removal.
§ 57-2 Compensation of members.
§ 57-3 Designation of Chairman.
§ 57-4 Employment of personnel.
§ 57-5 Promulgation of rules and regulations.
§ 57-7 Public hearings; notice.
§ 57-8 Report of Board prerequisite to City Council action; exception.
§ 57-9 Approval of plats.
§ 57-10 Building permits for premises within subdivisions.
Stormwater management — See Ch. 273.
There shall be a City Planning Board appointed by the Mayor, which Board shall consist of five members: two members who shall be officials of the City and three who do not hold any City office. The terms of two official members first appointed shall terminate with that of the appointing Mayor. The respective terms of the other members first appointed shall be one, two and three years from and after their appointment; their successors shall be appointed for terms which shall be equal in years to the number of members of the Planning Board. If a vacancy shall occur other than by the expiration of a term, the Mayor or other duly authorized appointing authority shall appoint the new member for the unexpired term.
Alternate members of the Planning Board shall be appointed by the Mayor for a term of one year and may serve when members are absent or unable to participate on an application or matter before the Planning Board. The Chairperson of the Planning Board may designate an alternate to substitute for a member when such member is unable to participate on an application or matter before the Planning Board. When so designated, the alternate member shall possess all the powers and responsibilities of such member of the Board. Such designation shall be entered into the minutes of the initial Planning Board meeting at which the substitution is made. Any alternate member may be removed by the Mayor for cause and after public hearing.
Removal of members. Any member may be removed by the Mayor for cause and after public hearing. The standard of proof to demonstrate cause shall be a preponderance of evidence. Rules of admissibility of evidence at the hearing shall be applied and constructed to allow all statements, including but not limited to hearsay evidence. All relevant evidence not legally privileged may be received. Notice of the public hearing shall be given to the Board member at least five days prior to the hearing. The hearing shall be held in Council chambers; a judicial hearing officer (JHO) shall be selected by the Corporation Counsel for the purpose of presiding over such public hearing and for maintaining order. The JHO shall conduct the hearing, in the presence of the Mayor, and the Mayor shall make the sole decision to remove the Board member for cause, based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard. Pursuant to General City Law § 27(9), any Planning Board member may be removed for noncompliance with minimum requirements relating to meeting attendance and training as established by the Council by local law or ordinance and as set forth in § 57-1D of this chapter.
Training. Pursuant to General City Law § 27 Subdivision 7-a, each member of the Planning Board shall complete a minimum of four hours of training each year designed to enable such members to more effectively carry out their duties.
Attendance. Each Board member shall be required to attend 75% of the scheduled meetings in each calendar year. Failure to attend the required number of meetings may be grounds for removal from the Board. Failure to attend three consecutive meetings may be grounds for removal from the Board.
Members of the Planning Board shall receive no payment for their services; however, the city officials on such Board shall not, by reason of membership thereon, forfeit their right to exercise the powers, perform the duties or receive the compensation of the city office held by them during such membership.
The Chairman of the Planning Board shall be designated by the Mayor or, on failure to do so, shall be elected from and by its own members.
The Planning Board shall have the power and authority to employ experts and a staff and to pay for their services and such other expenses as may be necessary and proper, not exceeding in all the appropriation that may be made for the Planning Board by the Council.
The Planning Board may recommend to the City Council regulations with respect to procedure before it and in respect to any subject matter over which the Planning Board has jurisdiction under this chapter or any other law. The adoption of any such recommendations shall be done by the City Council.
The Planning Board may review and make recommendations on the Comprehensive Plan or amendments thereto for the development of the entire area of the city, which Comprehensive Plan shall show existing and proposed streets, bridges and tunnels and the approaches thereto, viaducts, parks, public reservation, roadways in parks, sites for public building and structures, zoning districts, pier heads and bulkhead lines, waterways and routes of public utilities and such other features existing and proposed as will provide for the protection and improvement of the city and its future growth and development and will afford adequate facilities for the public housing, transportation, distribution, comfort, convenience, public health, safety and general welfare of its population. The Comprehensive Plan and all modifications thereof shall be on file in the office of the Planning Board, and certified copies thereof shall be filed in the offices of the General Manager and the City Clerk, and a copy thereof shall be filed in the office of the County Planning Agency.
The Planning Board shall provide public notice for and hold public hearings as required by city or state laws.
The authority having final jurisdiction over any matter in which the Planning Board also has jurisdiction in accordance with the aforementioned laws shall not proceed to final action until the Planning Board has made its final report thereon to such authority, but if the Planning Board shall not have made its final report thereon within 30 days from the date of reference thereto, the authority having final jurisdiction may proceed to final action. This section shall not be construed to prevent the City Council from granting, in any specific case, such longer period as it may fix within which the Planning Board may make its final report, and if such longer period is granted, the authority having final jurisdiction shall not in the absence of such report proceed to final action until that longer period shall have elapsed.
The Planning Board shall be authorized to approve plats as provided in Article 3 of the General City Law.
Preliminary subdivision plat stormwater pollution prevention plan. A stormwater pollution prevention plan (SWPPP) consistent with the requirements of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control, shall be required for preliminary subdivision plat approval. The SWPPP shall meet the performance and design Public Review Draft - Stormwater Management Guidance Manual for Local Officials Appendix 1, Page 10 criteria and standards in Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control. The approved preliminary subdivision plat shall be consistent with the provisions of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control.
Final subdivision plat approval stormwater pollution prevention plan. A stormwater pollution prevention plan consistent with the requirements of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control and with the terms of preliminary plan approval shall be required for final subdivision plat approval. The SWPPP shall meet the performance and design criteria and standards in Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control. The approved final subdivision plan shall be consistent with the provisions of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control.
Site plan approval. A stormwater pollution prevention plan consistent with the requirements of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control, shall be required for site plan approval. The SWPPP shall meet the performance and design criteria and standards in Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control. The approved site plan shall be consistent with the provisions of Chapter 273, Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sediment Control, and Chapter 272, Article VIII, Stormwater Control.
No building permit shall be issued for the erection or alteration of any structure on any lot resulting from a subdivision until and unless the required plat of said subdivision has been approved by the Planning Board pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and any regulation authorized under this chapter.
For the purposes of this section, the word "subdivision" shall be the division of any parcel of land into two or more lots, blocks, sites or other divisions of land, with or without streets or highways, for the purpose of sale, transfer of ownership or development. The term "subdivision" may include any alteration of lot lines of dimensions of any lots or sites shown on a plat previously approved and filed in the office of the County Clerk or Register of the county in which such plat is located. Subdivisions may be defined and delineated as either major or minor.


William Marcus Ermine, for Appellant. Gregory Warren Winters, Dorothy Vinson Hull, for Appellee.
Following a jury trial, Darryl Lamar Sandifer was convicted on five counts of aggravated child molestation, four counts of child molestation, and two counts of enticing a child for indecent purposes. He now appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial, asserting that the court below erred in: (1) refusing to allow his sister to remain in the courtroom for the testimony of Sandifer's two victims; and (2) allowing the State to introduce similar transaction evidence, even though its notice regarding those similar transactions failed to specify the exact purpose for which that evidence would be introduced. We find no error and affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Sandifer repeatedly molested two young boys over an approximately two year period. The boys were between the ages of six and ten when the abuse occurred, and they were aged nine and eleven at the time of Sandifer's trial. At the request of the State and pursuant to OCGA § 17–8–54 , the trial court cleared the courtroom of spectators, other than the immediate family members of each of the victims, during the victims' testimony. Among the spectators required to leave was Sandifer's sister, with whom he resided. When the judge asked defense counsel if he had any objection to clearing the courtroom, Sandifer's lawyer responded: “No, Your honor. My client brings a good point up. The other people that are being excluded [from the courtroom] are his family.” The judge responded: “Yeah. I know that, but that doesn't change the fact [that they need to leave.]” Sandifer now contends that the trial court's refusal to allow his sister to remain in the courtroom during the victims' testimony violated both his constitutional right to a public trial and OCGA § 17–8–54. We find no reversible error.
Drammeh v. State, 285 Ga.App. 545, 546(1), 646 S.E.2d 742 (2007).
As an initial matter, it appears that Sandifer has waived this claim of error. Specifically, when asked by the court if Sandifer objected to removing all spectators other than the victims' families from the courtroom defense counsel responded, “No.” Although the lawyer went on to point out that Sandifer's family members were among those being excluded, he did not state any objection based on either Sandifer's constitutional right to a public trial or the relevant statute. Sandifer therefore waived his right to argue these grounds as reversible error. Craven v. State, 292 Ga.App. 592, 593–594(1)(b), 664 S.E.2d 921 (2008) (in child molestation case, defendant waived his claim that court below violated his right to a public trial by excluding his family from court during the testimony of the victim, where he failed to raise that claim until after the victim had testified); Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 571(1), 602 S.E.2d 312 (2004) (defendant in child molestation case waived his claim that trial court erred in removing his family from courtroom during victim's testimony, where he failed to object at trial).
Moreover, even assuming that Sandifer did preserve this objection, the trial court's decision to remove Sandifer's sister from the courtroom does not constitute reversible error. While the exclusion of Sandifer's sister violated OCGA § 17–8–54, Sandifer has failed to show how this error harmed him. Although Sandifer argues that such prejudice resulted from the creation of “an environment more favorable to the child witnesses,” he does not argue that this allegedly more favorable environment somehow bolstered the victims' credibility. Furthermore, his assertion of prejudice ignores the fact that the victims' trial testimony was not the only evidence supporting his conviction. Other evidence presented against Sandifer included video tapes of the forensic interviewsof the victims, and the testimony of the forensic interviewers, the investigating officer, and the nurse practitioner who conducted the forensic exams of the victims. The jury also heard the testimony of the victims' mothers, to whom each boy made his initial outcry, as well as testimony concerning similar transactions. In light of this evidence, we cannot say that Sandifer was prejudiced by the fact that the trial court may have made it easier for the young victims to testify by removing all spectators, other than their immediate family members, from the courtroom. See Driggers v. State, 295 Ga.App. 711, 716–717(3), 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009); Craven, 292 Ga.App. at 595(1)(b), 664 S.E.2d 921.
2. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 announcing its intent to introduce evidence of similar transactions. The notice listed the similar transactions as “child molestation” that occurred during the years 1991–1993 at the address where Sandifer had lived with a former girlfriend. The witnesses listed with respect to these similar transactions included three daughters of the former girlfriend who, between 1991 and 1993, were all under the age of 12. The trial court held a hearing at which it received testimony concerning Sandifer's molestation of these three girls. Following that testimony, the State argued that the prior incidents of child molestation should be admitted to show Sandifer's bent of mind and course of conduct. The trial court agreed and admitted the similar transaction testimony for those limited purposes.
That rule provides, in relevant part, that the State's notice of its intent to present evidence of similar transactions “shall be in writing, served upon the defendant's counsel, and shall state the transaction, date, county, and the name(s) of the victim(s) for each similar transaction or occurrence sought to be introduced. Copies of accusations or indictments, if any, and guilty pleas or verdicts, if any, shall be attached to the notice.” U.S.C.R. 31.3(B).
On appeal, Sandifer argues that the trial court erred in admitting the similar transaction testimony, because the State's Rule 31.3notice failed to specify the purpose for which the State sought to use that evidence. Despite Sandifer's arguments to the contrary, however, the State is not required, in its notice of intent, to inform the defendant of the purpose for which it seeks to introduce similar transaction evidence. Although our cases have noted that the better practice is for the State to include such information, (see Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga.App. 256, 258(4)(a), 439 S.E.2d 510 (1993)), neither the plain language of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(B) nor the decisions of this Court requires the inclusion of that information. See Roberts v. State, 241 Ga.App. 259, 260(1), 526 S.E.2d 597 (1999); Hightower v. State, 210 Ga.App. 386, 387(2), 436 S.E.2d 28 (1993).
MILLER, P.J., and RAY, J., concur.


As covered in an earlier post last weekend, potential ‘satellites’ of Microsoft are still attacking Microsoft’s biggest rivals using software patents.
Data Engine Technologies (DET) filed an infringement suit against Google in the District of Delaware contending infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259, 5,784,545, 6,282,551, and 5,303,146. Google responded with a Rule 12(c) motion arguing that the patents are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The District Court agreed and invalidated the patents. DET appealed.
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. One must first decide whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion. But generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as “significantly more,” nor will elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.
I have to agree with PatentlyO, which viewed as “fairly questionable” the reasoning under which the notebook tab was the linchpin for patent-eligibility. And if you contrast the surviving Tab Patent claims with the claims that were held ineligible, this case certainly seems to equate claim breadth with patent-ineligibility – perhaps confirming that, as many of us suspect, an “abstract idea” is simply a really broad idea. In any event, decisions like this highlight the not-infrequent anomaly that claims can survive novelty and obviousness challenges, but fail on patent-eligibility. And as we saw here, the present court’s analysis, stripped down to what it really was, had a lot to do with obviousness.
Dozens of long paragraphs about this decision from Judges Reyna, Bryson, and Stoll (with opinion by Judge Stoll) and Acacia not mentioned even once? It already sued major GNU/Linux companies several times after it had hired from Microsoft. Now it goes after Google, specifically the biggest rival to Microsoft’s cash cow, Microsoft Office.
Some claims directed to a computer spreadsheet are patent-eligible, while others are not, said the Federal Circuit in Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC (Fed. Cir. 2018) (precedential). The District of Delaware had granted a Rule 12 judgment on the pleadings of 35 U.S.C. § 101 invalidity of claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259; 5,784,545; 6,282,551; and 5,303,146; the Federal Circuit thus reversed-in-part, affirmed-in-part, and remanded.
On October 9, 2018, the Federal Circuit added to its growing collection of favorable Alice step one rulings1 by reversing portions of a decision from the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware concerning an invention aimed to streamline the technology of electronic spreadsheets—a technology that has been around for twenty-five years. See Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2017-1135, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28412 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2018). The Federal Circuit’s decision may be viewed as a not-so-gentle reminder to patent applicants and drafters alike to continue to draft software patent claims narrowly and with specificity if they wish to survive patent eligibility challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Alice step one.
The court commenced its opinion with a robust overview of Data Engine’s patents-at-issue: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259; 5,784,545; and 6,282,551 (the “Tab Patents”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,303,146 (the “’146 Patent”). See Data Engine, at *2-12. The Tab Patents are entitled “System and Methods for Improved Spreadsheet Interface With User-Familiar Objects.” Id. at *1-2. In its detailed review of the Tab Patents, the court noted that they claim “systems and methods for making complex electronic spreadsheets more accessible by providing familiar, user-friendly interface objects—specifically, notebook tabs—to navigate through spreadsheets while circumventing the arduous process of searching for, memorizing, and entering complex commands.” Id. at *2. In essence, the Tab Patents aim to overcome some of the challenges users encountered when navigating electronic spreadsheets due to complex menu systems that “diminished the utility and ease of use of this technology.” Id. at *3. In an attempt to offer a solution to the challenges of prior art multipage electronic spreadsheets, the Tab Patents are directed to “implementing a notebook-tabbed interface, which allows users to easily navigate through three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets” and “conveniently flip through several pages of notebook to rapidly locate information of interest.” Id. at *4-5. The ’146 Patent is entitled, “System and Methods for Improved Scenario Management in an Electronic Spreadsheet” and is directed to tools that permit “electronic spreadsheet users to track their changes” automatically, as opposed to manually, when testing a multitude of modeling scenarios. Id. at *10-11.
“OIN cannot do anything about such a racket.”Why was such a ridiculous patent granted in the first place? The headline should be a “duh” moment: “Linking Web Pages to Each Other Not Patent-Eligible” (based on prior art too, not just obviousness and abstractness).
Jack Schofield is no stranger to us. He rewrites the past in favour of Microsoft (facts disregarded) and has been accused of "lack of professionalism". His Microsoft boosting has become so epic that many people all around the Web refer to him as “Microsoft Jack” (we cannot claim credit for this label). He now writes in The Guardian again. He never quite retired as he had claimed ages ago. Well, unfortunately he still smokes his pipe and curses at his screen after he writes Microsoft screed.
The Guardian is a suitable (if not ideal) home for Microsoft Jack. It is paid by Bill Gates and renowned for Microsoft propaganda since these considerable (but undisclosed) payments. It’s a sham publication which refuses to even acknowledge financial dependence on ‘Sugar Daddies’ like Bill Gates, with clear impact on editorial control (so gross that ads are disguised as articles or parts of articles).
Microsoft Jack claimed to be retiring several years ago, but it was purely nonsense. He later wrote in another Microsoft propaganda rag (ZDNet) and he even continues writing for The Guardian, where bashing Microsoft’s competitors is OK (even for the same behaviour as Microsoft’s) and criticising Microsoft or Bill Gates is very rare (they are literally funding the paper).
“Microsoft Jack claimed to be retiring several years ago, but it was purely nonsense.”Some might deem it AstroTurfing, but “reading Microsoft Jack’s responses to the commenters who dare suggest Openoffice or Libreoffice is revealing,” Alex Barker wrote to me. Looking at the article in full, it reads like a Microsoft advertisement where nothing but Microsoft is even an option. The only provided option or question is, which version/edition? It’s a pretty clever way for Microsoft to disseminate propaganda (making the competition disappear, an exclusion by design), which is does a lot of at the moment, as we pointed out some days ago (the timing is strategic), alluding to some British Web sites. Some of these sites Microsoft literally subsidised in exchange for Microsoft propaganda and advertisements (e.g. Ars Technica UK).
I think they’re brainless trolls.
Otherwise, I wonder if there’s anything you can take for verbal diarrhea?
Most trolls are by now smart enough to have figured out that Microsoft Office is already free for the vast majority of UK students. And, by the way, it also works on Macs.
Otherwise, I’m not quite sure how saving £0 on Office 365 — or, at the very worst, £15 a year on Office 365 University — fits with expecting students to shell out £1,000 or so to get totally unnecessary proprietary software on an Apple-shaped dongle. I guess logic is not one of your stronger points…..
Free as in ‘free sample’, right? Microsoft Jack can only pretend that he doesn’t know how lock-in works. What happens when one is no longer a student? Well, Microsoft Jack is smart enough to know what he’s doing here. He cannot use ignorance as an excuse.
Microsoft Jack then calls Google “biggest proprietary spyware and surveillance company”. Yeah, because Chromium, ChromeOS, Android etc. are all proprietary, right? Unlike the platforms from the NSA’s #1 (first) PRISM partner, Microsoft. It is clear, based on numerous yardsticks, that Microsoft is far worse than Google, but Microsoft started high-budget PR campaigns (e.g. “Scroogled”) to convince the public otherwise and lobby politicians to cripple Google over it. Microsoft is one of the worst. The company’s managers even have security clearances with the spies. But why not blame it all on Google? This is acceptable propaganda for the Bill Gates-funded paper, which likes to accuse Google of tax evasion but not Microsoft (especially so after Gates gave a lot of money for the newspaper to look the other way while regularly planting Gates Foundation PR and endorsements across letterheads of entire sections).
OK, so either he has bad memory or he has gone senile. It is well-documented and it is common knowledge that Microsoft resorted to “dirty dealing”. We have plenty of original documents to prove it right here in this site.
Using the 1997-2003 file formats is mostly stupid as the newer formats are more robust, take up less space with large files (they’re zipped), and are ratified open standards.
Bribing officials makes “open standard”, according to Microsoft Jack’s lies-by-omission world. Or blackmailing British politicians perhaps [1, 2, 3]. Microsoft Office still cannot deal properly with ODF, only proprietary OOXML (its secret, ad hoc, undocumented format). Microsoft does not adhere to its own documentation. It’s all a big lie and many people foresaw that all along.
MS does NOT have the answer for everything.
MS is marketing smart. They provide ‘access’ so they can inculcate new users to their line of software. They hope that new entries will to the work place will provide an internal dynamic for future sales.
‘Popular’ software is usually the lead software that gets ‘hacked’.
Some MS stuff is good (especially with languages) and other stuff is pure doggerel. Many survive but equally many pieces of software end up in the Bit Bucket of history. MS does NOT have the answer for everything.
Much university work (thesis, research) is archived for posterity and Apps/online software gets ‘modded’ and features removed. Copy, on your own PC, is advisable.
For example, I just watched Samsung download an ‘upgrade’ that changes many OS menus to a white on blue background – a combination that is near fatal for colour-blind users.
An associate company of my employer handles orphaned archive material. They have a couple of CP/M operating system – Digital Research – computers with 8 and 5.25 inch drives. They can also read/convert WANG format disks!
And if you need some work done, their systems are booked solid for the next 5 weeks. They operate on a 24/5 basis – they need the weekends for maintenance.
Remember, university students have especial needs and ‘cloud’ is not always the best solution. This also applies to businesses.
Saving documents is plain TEXT is often the best answer almost anything can read TEXT! Even from years ago.
Skype is popular feature with GCHQ and NSA.
‘Free’ doesn’t exist. MS rarely does anything ‘free’ without an ulterior motive.
And what happens when you leave your ‘free’ domain at the conclusion of your courses?
Buy a software package that resides ON YOUR HARD DRIVE – not ‘somewhere ‘.
The problem with Office is that every Version has numerous features that few use, unless you are a type setter.
My employer has licences for 2003, 2007 and, I think 2010. Employees are free to use whatever they like.
Hands down winner is 2007 with most people using Win2003/97 as the format to save in.
As for PowerPoint, it’s clunky, inhibited and a waste of disk space. There are better, free, compatible options. But essential if interacting with the US military!
Remember, using cloud based software is fine, until you are out of InterNet range. Can’t beat software mounted on your hard drive!
Here are insults and generalisations: “Of course, some of that hostility could be prompted by the long-winded, self-interested piffle posted by here OO fans, who are — to put it kindly — little more than trolls in a topic devoted to Microsoft Office.
So people who care about software freedom, open standards, or like OpenOffice are “fans…so lacking in social skills” (according to Jack). He later uses the term “OpenOffice fanboy.” So they’re all just “trolls and “fanboys”. He refers to every pro-LibreOffice comment collectively as “mostly-mindless LibreOffice comments”.
Just because someone adds a recommendation of freedom-respecting alternatives doesn’t make one a “troll”. Jack gamed the debate by limiting it only to Microsoft Office (or versions of it) and then he frames anyone who goes outside the boundry of his silly game a “troll”.
He later repeats the nonsense that “Microsoft’s office formats are ratified open standards.” By bribing and bullying? Like Jack himself? He too is a bully when one confronts him. We gave examples before.
Not true, but Jack doesn’t care about what’s true. He calls LibreOffice a “pile of crap” (how professional a language from the man who accuses others of having “verbal diarrhea”). He says it is “slow, bug-ridden, and very imperfectly compatible with Microsoft Office” (as if being compatible with Microsoft Office with its proprietary formats is the goal). There is actually a large number of comments that recommend LibreOffice and OpenOffice. No wonder Jack feels a little marginalised and threatened/intimidated. His article is revealed as biased and unpopular among readers. Now he need to cope with it.
So free software is just for the unemployed, according to Jack. Nice stigma he spreads there.
Jack also finds the time to trash-talk LATEX. He says: “They should be learning their course topics rather than, say, LaTeX…. ;-)” (actually, LATEX has several very good front ends that are easier to use than Microsoft Office). One can also hand-pick XML files to manipulate Word files, but in reality one uses front ends, right? So it’s another straw man argument from Jack. Nothing but Microsoft, not even Google’s offerings, is allowed any acceptance. Even the mention of alternatives is verboten.
NOW that the latest Microsoft Office may be banned in China (China, Korea and maybe Russia are moving away from Window and thus away from Microsoft Office too) there is a real chance, boosted not only by BRICS nations, that ODF will be very widespread. The recent new release of Caligra (covered some days ago in our daily links), the advance of WebODF  into various frameworks  and applications , the exciting news from Korea  and even actions towards standards and interoperability in Europe [5,6] give us many reasons for optimism. People who state that ODF is “dead” or “nobody uses it” basically try to justify defeatism and continued (exponential) dependence on Microsoft through the network effect.
We have already seen the launch of Nokia’s first Android-powered smartphones under the Nokia X brand earlier this year. And now it seems Microsoft is planning to bring a similar experience for its users under the Lumia brand.
New information from the famous tipster @evleaks suggests that Android-powered Lumia smartphones are currently being developed under the ‘Nokia by Microsoft’ brand.
Today, after a long period of hard work and preparation, having deemed the existing WebODF codebase stable enough for everyday use and for integration into other projects, we have tagged the v0.5.0 release and published an announcement on the project website.
Google Docs is a great resource for collaborative editing and online document editing, however it has one of the greatest problems of all – it doesn’t support the ISO approved document standard ODF. Which leaves governments, businesses and individuals locked into Microsoft’s .docx format.
Yesterday WebODF released v 0.5.0 complete with a library, web editor and FireFox plugin.
South Korea is using the fact that Windows XP is no longer supported as a reason to walk away from Microsoft completely.
First, we hope to boost reuse of these solutions by improving the project descriptions. Over the past months, we selected 40 projects on Joinup that we expect to have the highest potential for reuse, taking into account such factors as the maturity of the project, its use in cross-border cooperation and licence. Together with the project developers, we improved the descriptions of these projects and enhanced their metadata. For example, we added pointers to existing implementations, details on the intended users and ways to participate.
What’s up with Open Standards?
It is hard enough for people to understand what protocols such as TCP/IP do. These open standards however are invisible to most of them, even if they’re using them on a daily basis. Other open standards, such as OpenDocument Format, are probably not conceivable by some people, who think that an office document is “an extension of Microsoft Office”. I have even heard of teachers, here in France, who refused to even mention ODF because such a thing “could not possibly exist”. The conceptual distinction between a file and an application has not permeated much, even in the twenty first century.
At last week’s Google I/O conference, the company announced new levels of compatibility with Microsoft Office documents in its Google Docs cloud-based applications, including the ability to edit Office documents. These capabilities are driven through QuickOffice, a toolset that Google acquired back in 2012. Quickoffice has provided close compatibility with the Microsoft Office file formats, ranging from .doc to .xlsx, for users of Google Docs.
Google kills QuickOffice for iOS and Android, what does it document interoperability?
When Google acquired QuickOffice back in, we assued it was an effort to bring Microsoft Office like capabilities to mobile devices as there was no polished Office Suite back then. Then Google started integrating QuickOffice into its own Google Docs and there were signs that the company may kill the standalone app.


text:
This entry was tagged deference, King v. Burwell, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers, Seminole Rock.
Can Vermont ask its employers about health-care prices?
This entry was tagged Brown & Williamson, Chevron, IRS.
This entry was tagged Michigan v. EPA.
The IRS Isn’t an Expert?
This entry was tagged ACA, Brown & Williamson, Chevron, IRS, Sebelius.
King v. Burwell: Why Is the Scope of Chevron So Unpredictable?
This entry was tagged Bill Eskridge, Chevron, King v. Burwell.
This entry was tagged Clean Power Plan, EPA, King v. Burwell, Michigan v. EPA, Sibelius.
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This entry was tagged administrative procedure, CFPB.
This entry was tagged Justice Scalia, King v. Burwell, statutory interpretation.

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text:
 T.NADU TERMD.FULL TIME TEM.LIC EMP.ASSN. Vs. LIFE INSURANCE CORP.OF INDIA & ORS.
offices and Divisions of the Corporation.
relief the workmen are entitled?"
by the NIT will still be operative in law.
scale and revised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.
Accordingly, the appeals are allowed in the above said terms.
(for short "the CGIT") in I.D. No.27 of 1991.
reference case vide order dated 06.04.1995.
Kanpur were the only parties  to  the  reference  besides  the  Corporation.
workmen stating that no benefit would be claimed.
paras 40 to 60 and 66 of the Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule.
at various places in the Award can be interpreted in mean "recruitment".
Tulpule that absorption of workmen does not mean recruitment.
High Court of Madras between the years 1989 to 1991. The writ  petition  No.
employees eligible in their service in accordance with the said Scheme.
Corporation filed C.A. No. 2104 of 2000 titled LIC of India  &  Ors.  v.  G.
(supra) will also be applicable to the case of G. Sudhakar and Ors.
from the industrial dispute raised by the concerned workmen  in  this  case.
absorption in their respective posts.
against the Awards of the NIT by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  Justice  S.M.
Scheme was as per the decision in the case of State of  Haryana  &  Ors.  v.
reiterated in the decision of this Court in  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  (supra).
assigning his reasons in judgment and order passed by him.
the High Court, the concerned workmen challenged the same by  filing  L.P.A.
Court in the decisions of E. Prabhavathy &  Ors.  and  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.
appeals urging various legal grounds.
Justice R.D. Tulpule, the same being clarified and affirmed by Justice  S.M.
for absorption in terms of the direction given in the Award of Justice  R.D.
by the NIT are binding between the parties under Section 18(3) of  the  Act.
therefore the Awards are operative and binding in law upon the parties.
The aforesaid contentions, are rebutted by the learned  senior  counsel  Mr.
exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction.
the wage to such workman.
of Labour to Justice S. M. Jamdar to  clarify  the  Award  of  Justice  R.D.
country. Therefore, it does not amount to recruitment.
conditions of the compromise arrived between the  parties  in  the  SLP  No.
arose before the Privy Council in Moses v. Parker Ex-parte Moses(1896(  A.C.
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
bargaining and is more akin to administrative than to judicial function.
labour disputes, this Court  in  Western  India  Automobile  Association  v.
the Award in favour of the concerned workmen.
framed as per the decision of this Court in the case of State of Haryana  v.
regular recruitment in the normal course."
incorporating the essential features of the Scheme as a part of  its  order.
accrue to the respondent after March 31, 1959 must therefore be rejected."
the Award of the CGIT.
perennial nature of work and continuing them as such for  number  of  years.
Central Government in favour of the concerned workmen is  legal  and  valid.
rule of law and meaning and significance to  the  ideal  of  welfare  State"
- State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923."
of Jasmer Singh v. State Of Haryana & Anr. (C.A. No. 346 OF 2015).
set aside.  Accordingly, it is set aside.
these cases. The same is appreciated and placed on record.
of the same shall be submitted for perusal of this Court.
applications are disposed of. No costs.

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