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Por que os levantamentos de abelhas falham quando se trata de entender suas comunidades?
Neste artigo, apresentamos uma proposta de prioridades de pesquisa para incrementar o conhecimento sobre as comunidades de abelhas baseado em dados coletados em levantamentos de abelhas feitos no Brasil nas últimas quatro décadas. Foram reunidos 86 levantamentos, realizados em diversos biomas, em 130 localidades, 73 dos quais com coletas de dados feitos em períodos de um ano ou mais, e o restante em períodos menores que um ano. Todos os levantamentos utilizaram a metodologia padronizada proposta por Sakagami et al. (1967). Houve uma diferença conspícua em termos de amostragem nas cinco regiões políticas do país: a região Norte não foi amostrada e a região Centro-Oeste apresentou poucos levantamentos, embora, juntas perfaçam mais da metade da área do país.
In this work we present a proposal of research priorities for enhancement of bee communities knowledge, based on a huge data collection of bee surveys made in Brazil in the last four decades. We collate information about 86 surveys done in several biomes in 130 localities throughout the country, 73 of them lasting a year or more and the remaining with less than a year of data collection. All surveys used the standardized methodology proposed by Sakagami et al. (1967). The five political regions of the country were differently sampled: while the North region did not present any bee survey, the Central-West region presented only few, although they both comprise more than half of the total country area.
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In September 2012 I plead NOLO to disorderly conduct using vulgar language, paid a fine if 100.00.
I Received a letter from DPS that ccl would be revoked for I believe three years.
The reason for this is I have never had a problem purchasing a firearm before having ccl.
During the time I had ccl, the process was easier.
In November 2014 I went to Academy sports in McKinney Texas and tried to purchase a 22 rifle and was given a delayed status.
I continued checking back with the store on the status after thirty days the status was still delayed status.
I have the paperwork from the court showing the reduced charge, the conviction is Disorderly using vulgar language.
The way this is reported to DPS online shows different , the clerk office did make a change to the status but if you read it says pleas assault family violence pled to class C misdemeanor.
Re: License was revoked 3 years ago, am I eligible to get chl back??
(c) A license holder whose license is revoked for a reason listed in Subsections (a)(1)-(5) may reapply as a new applicant for the issuance of a license under this subchapter after the second anniversary of the date of the revocation if the cause for revocation does not exist on the date of the second anniversary. If the cause for revocation exists on the date of the second anniversary after the date of revocation, the license holder may not apply for a new license until the cause for revocation no longer exists and has not existed for a period of two years.
Sounds to me like, 5 years wait for offense listed under 42.01 plus an additional 2 years for 411.186(c) for a total of 7 years. However, my understanding is if you would have surrendered your license instead of waiting for it to be revoked, it would have only been a total of 5 years.
Last edited by casp625 on Sat Oct 10, 2015 3:47 am, edited 1 time in total.
Jws, please don't take this the wrong way because I have no idea of the circumstances surrounding your arrest, and I absolutely am NOT judging you..... But your experience struck me as a strong object lesson for us CHLs about never losing control over our tempers, no matter how frustrating the circumstances. Anger can be a legitimate emotion, but giving vent to it can land us in trouble, which may not be fair, but it is what it is.
Good luck with your predicament.
Why non-violent disorderly conduct is cause to loose your CHL for 5 yrs?!
42.01 is unconstitutional under the 1stA. Since the "feel of peace" of the audience is not a cause to sensor the actor.
Beiruty wrote: Why non-violent disorderly conduct is cause to loose your CHL for 5 yrs?!
As TAM said, it is what it is.
It is believed that 42.01 is actionable as a class C because there are a couple of firearms-related clauses in that code section.
I also have a problem with the broad scope of this law.
I believe that it is a catch-all of left-over offenses.
I am hoping that this is on the agenda to change it.
So a question and scenario , let say you are driving down the road with your tunes blaring and you are stopped for loud and unreasonable noise and receive a citation, you plea NOLO and pay a fine, under 42.01 , your CHL would also be revoked.
I'm the one that stated I would not take an assault and suggested the disorderly. The DA wanted this action cleared off his docket rather quickly and even said w want this to go away.
The circumstances was I was in law enforcement, have over 20 years in, I walked into my house and two grown siblings were physically fighting and I separated them and got the one causing the trouble out the door and the problem was stopped.
My suggestion is to talk to a lawyer -- preferably one familiar with Texas gun laws, regarding to getting the offense expunged, etc.
Basically the speech used must be commonly understood to be inciting someone to fight.
The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.... Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute ... only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace.
See Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 522, quoting with approval the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 18 A.2d 754, 758, 762 (1941). See generally, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); and Gooding, supra. The "line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
Speech punishable under the Penal Code provision does not include language merely harsh and insulting, see Gooding, supra at 525, and it should not include speech, actual or symbolic, that is only "inappropriate," "naughty," "disgusting," "repulsive," "tactless," "gross," or "appalling." Annot., 2 A.L.R.4th 1331. Conviction under a statute specifying a "breach of the peace" as an element of the offense must be based on jury instructions including an admonition that proof of "actual or threatened violence is essential." Woods v. State, 213 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.Crim.App.1948). In other words, anything short of the use of "fighting words" does not constitute a breach of the statute. See Jimmerson v. State, 561 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Speech is protected against punishment unless "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
So your question mischaracterizes what the statute is designed to punish. It's not merely non-violent conduct but conduct likely to incite violence.
It looks like the 42.01 conviction is an at least 5 year bar to CHL, and maybe 2 more if they claim they had to revoke it. At least you very intelligently avoided the Msidemeanor Domestic Violence, which would have been a lifetime bar to firearm possession (idiotic as it may seem). Since you pled NOLO, you were effectively "convicted" of the 42.01. I think the best bet is to see if you can get it "expunged" or "set-aside/sealed", as that would then not count as a conviction under CHL. As for the NICS checks being delayed, I think there is a mechanism to file with FBI to update your record, assuming you are ultimately found eligible federally, which it seems there is no reason you should not be. But until you can get the disorderly cleared looks like at least two more years and maybe 4 to get a Texas CHL. You could get a FL or AZ to carry, but that wouldn't help you buy. Or if you're retired LEO you may already be able to carry under LEOSA.
Thank you all for the information, the letter I received from DPS does say 3 years, upon receipt of the letter that requested I send the CHL back.
Anything related to family violence can be permanently disqualifying.

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IRVING TRUST CO.* BROWN et al. v. SAME.
These cases present the question whether a landlord may prove in bankruptcy for loss of rents payable in the future, where the claim is founded upon the bankrupt's covenant to pay rent, and, in the alternative, upon his breach of a covenant that, in event of bankruptcy, the landlord may re-enter, and, if he does, the tenant will indemnify him against loss of rents for the remainder of the term.
In No. 505 it appears that Oliver A. Olson Co., Inc., was the lessee of premises for a term of nine years and eight months beginning February 1, 1928, and expiring October 1, 1937. Defaults in payment of rent due February and March, 1932, were followed by an involuntary proceeding in which the company was, on March 18, 1932, adjudicated a bankrupt. The total rent reserved for the portion of the term subsequent to bankruptcy was $58,000, and, as the claimant asserted, the present rental value of the leased premises for the remainder of the term was $33,000. The lessor filed its claim, one item being damages for loss of future rentals, which it asked to have liquidated at $25,000, the difference between the rent reserved and the present rental value.
A majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals felt bound to follow its earlier decision In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 270, which denied a landlord's right to prove a claim for future rents arising under a similar lease. The view there expressed was that the occupation of the land is the consideration for the rent, and, if the right to occupy terminates, the obligation to pay ceases; and the covenant to pay rent creates no debt until the time stipulated for payment arrives. Since many events may occur which will absolve the tenant from further obligation for rent, the claim is said to be too contingent, both because of the uncertainty at the date of adjudication that the lessor will re-enter, and the doubt as to his suffering loss of rent if he should re-enter.
In the present case, one of the judges of the Court of Appeals held that Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 51 S.Ct. 390, 75 L.Ed. 1028, has settled the provability of claims contingent in the sense that no sum is presently payable, thus destroying the principal ground of decision in Re Roth & Appel, and that the estimation of the present worth of payments to be made in the future is no obstacle to the proof of a claim based upon an anticipatory breach. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 240 U.S. 581, 36 S.Ct. 412, 60 L.Ed. 811.
The petitioners say the provability of claims for future rent is a subject on which the lower federal courts have been in disagreement. They argue that a claim for rent is founded upon a lease which is an express contract within the words of section 63a(4), 11 USCA § 103(a)(4). They rely upon the purpose of the Bankruptcy Law to bring in all contract creditors and to discharge all debts of the bankrupt, so that he may start afresh unembarrassed by old indebtedness, and point to the hardship to an individual bankrupt of not discharging claims for rent which might well prevent his financial rehabilitation, and the unfairness to the landlord of a corporate bankrupt who, under the decision below, cannot prove upon his lease along with other creditors, but must look solely for redress for loss of future rents to a corporate debtor whom bankruptcy has stripped of all assets.
The issue is not one of power, for plainly Congress may permit such claims or exclude them. The sole inquiry is the intent of the act. The construction for which the petitioners contend is, as a matter of logic, an admissible one. But that construction is contrary to the great weight of authority as to the effect of similar provisions in earlier acts, and section 63 of the present act.
In England such claims were not provable under the Act of 7 Geo. I, c. 31; Mayor v. Steward, 4 Burr. 2439; and a discharge could not be pleaded in defense of an action for rent accruing subsequent to bankruptcy. Boot v. Wilson, 8 East, 311. The landlord's claim for loss of future rent was made provable by the Act of 32 and 33 Vict., c. 71, § 23 (1869), and more explicit provisions to the same effect were embodied in that of 46 and 47 Vict., ch. 52, §§ 37 and 55 (1883).
The act of Congress, approved April 4, 1800,6 permitted proof of a limited class of contingent claims, but did not mention rents. Apparently the latter were not considered provable debts under that statute. Hendricks v. Judah, 2 Caines (N.Y.) 25, 2 Am.Dec. 213; Lansing v. Prendergast, 9 Johns.(N.Y.) 127.
The Act of August 19, 1841, § 5, 5 Stat. 440, 444, expressly allowed proof of contingent claims,7 specifying certain classes and adding a general description of contingent debts, but said nothing about rent. The courts held that the latter was not a provable debt within this section, because neither a present debt nor a contingent claim susceptible of liquidation. Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & S.(Pa.) 183; Stinements v. Ainslie, 4 Denio (N.Y.) 573; Savory v. Stocking, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 607.
The Act of March 2, 1867, § 19, 14 Stat. 517, 525, authorized the proof and liquidation of contingent claims and also proof of a claim for a proportionate part of any rent up to the date of bankruptcy.8 The courts uniformly held that claims for future rent or for damages for breach of covenant to pay rent were not provable under the act, though differing as to the reason; some holding them not contingent claims within the statutory definition, and others thinking the express permission of proof for rent past due at the date of bankruptcy impliedly excluded claims for rents thereafter falling due. Ex parte Houghton, Fed. Cas. No. 6,725; Ex parte Lake, Fed. Cas. No. 7,991; In re Croney, Fed. Cas. No. 3,411; In re Commercial Bulletin Co., Fed. Cas. No. 3,060; In re May, Fed. Cas. No. 9,325; In re Hufnagel, Fed. Cas. No. 6,837; Bailey v. Loeb, Fed. Cas. No. 739.
After much agitation by trade associations and commercial bodies, and after prolonged consideration (see Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 250, 40 S.Ct. 135, 64 L.Ed. 247), Congress adopted the act now in force, that of July 1, 1898.10 The committee reports do not disclose the origin of the phraseology of section 63 (11 USCA § 103), nor discuss the classes of claims intended to be included. But it is clear that Congress was familiar with analogous sections of the earlier acts and the court decisions interpreting them, and with the test of the Lowell Bill and the English act then in force. In view of the extended consideration and discussion which preceded the passage of the act, the failure to include a provision for claims for loss of rent or for damages consequent on the abrogation of leases is significant of an intent not to depart from the precedents disallowing them. Schall v. Camors, supra, pages 250, 251 of 251 U.S., 40 S.Ct. 135.
Soon after the passage of the act several federal courts were called upon to decide the question, and they uniformly held such claims were not provable debts under section 63. In re Ells (D.C.) 98 F. 967; In re Mahler (D.C.) 105 F. 428; Atkins v. Wilcox (C.C.A.) 105 F. 595, 53 L.R.A. 118. Since 1900 the Circuit Courts of Appeals in six circuits, and the District Courts in another, have agreed with these early adjudications. Slocum v. Soliday, (C.C.A. 1) 183 F. 410; McDonnell v. Woods, 298 F. 434 (C.C.A. 1); In re Roth & Appel, supra; In re Mullings Clothing Co. (C.C.A.2) 238 F. 58, L.R.A. 1918A, 539; In re Metropolitan Chain Stores Inc., 66 F.(2d) 482 (C.C.A.2); Trust Co. of Georgia v. Whitehall Holding Co. (C.C.A.5) 53 F.(2d) 635; Orr v. Neilly, 67 F.(2d) 423 (C.C.A.5); Wells v. Twenty-First Street Realty Co., 12 F.(2d) 237 (C.C.A.6); Britton v. Western Iowa Co., 9 F.(2d) 488, 45 A.L.R. 711 (C.C.A.8); Colman Co. v. Withoft, 195 F. 250 (C.C.A.9); Bray v. Cobb (D.C.) 100 F. 270; In re Hook (D.C.) 25 F.(2d) 498. The decisions in the Third Circuit turn upon a special form of lease drawn to take advantage of a local statutory provision, and, while establishing a rule differing from that elsewhere recognized, are not inconsistent with it. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 F. 742; South Side Trust Co. v. Watson, 200 F. 50; In re H. M. Lasker Co., 251 F. 53; Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 F. 584. The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit has not discussed the question at length, but at least one of its decisions supports the view that a claim for loss of future rentals may be proved. In re Chakos, 24 F.(2d) 482; compare In re Desnoyers Shoe Co., 227 F. 401; In re National Credit Clothing Co., 66 F.(2d) 371.
This court has never had occasion to pass upon the precise point. It has not, however, expressed disapproval of the rulings of the great majority of the lower federal courts, and has cited many of their decisions with apparent approbation. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 240 U.S. 581, 589, 590, 36 S.Ct. 412, 60 L.Ed. 811; Wm. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597, 38 S.Ct. 211, 62 L.Ed. 497; Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605, 38 S.Ct. 214, 62 L.Ed. 505; Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 278, 51 S.Ct. 390, 75 L.Ed. 1028.
In accord with the well-nigh unanimous view of the federal courts reiterated for over thirty years are statements of leading textwriters. Collier, Bankruptcy, vol. 2, p. 1422; Remington, Bankruptcy, vol. 2, §§ 789, 793; Loveland, Bankruptcy, vol. 1, § 313.
What of the activities of the Congress while this body of decisions interpreting section 63a was growing? From 1898 to 1932 the Bankruptcy Act was amended seven times11 without alteration of the section. This is persuasive that the construction adopted by the courts has been acceptable to the legislative arm of the government. B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 372, 13 S.Ct. 914, 37 L.Ed. 772.
In this situation 'only compelling language in the statute itself would warrant the rejection of a construction so long and so generally accepted.' Maynard v. Elliott, supra, page 277 of 283 U.S., 51 S.Ct. 390, 391. If the rule is to be changed, Congress should so declare.
The petitioners call attention to the last clause of section 74(a), which is one of the sections added to the Act in 1933:12 'A claim for future rent shall constitute a provable debt and shall be liquidated under section 63b (section 103(b)) of this title.' Sections 73 to 76, inclusive, were enacted to permit extensions and compositions not theretofore possible. They apply only to individuals. It is highly unlikely that, if the quoted sentence had been intended as an amendment of section 63a, it would have been placed in context dealing only with the novel procedure authorized by the new sections. Moreover, the discussion on the floor of the Senate relative to the insertion of the sentence, indicates that it was not intended to alter section 63a as it then stood.13 The petitioners insist the clause is declaratory of the law, as understood by the Congress; but there is no evidence to support this view, and it is inconsistent with the long-standing contrary judicial construction.
In No. 505, the agreement is, in the event of re-entry and reletting by the landlord, to pay each month the deficit accruing from the difference between the amount to be paid as rent under the lease and the amount received by the landlord from the premises throughout the residue of the original term; and, further, that the overplus, if any, at the expiration of the term, shall be paid to the tenant, unless the landlord, within six months from re-entry, release the tenant from all liability under the covenant, which the landlord is authorized to do, thus terminating all rights and liabilities under the agreement of lease.
In both cases the lessor has the choice whether he will terminate the lease. Neither the bankrupt nor the trustee has any such option, except as the trustee may be entitled by law to disclaim. And upon the exercise of the option by the landlord, a new contract, distinct from that involved in the original letting, becomes operative. While there is some color for the claim that bankruptcy is an anticipatory breach of the lease contract, entailing a damage claim against the estate, this cannot be true as respects these independent covenants of indemnity. For here, the landlord does not rely upon the destruction of his contract by the bankruptcy; he initiates a new contract of indemnity by the affirmative step of re-entry. And this new contract comes into being not by virtue of the bankruptcy proceeding, but by force of the act of re-entry, which must occur at a date subsequent to the filing of the petition. Obviously this contract of indemnity is not breached by bankruptcy, and cannot be breached until the duty of indemnifying the landlord arises. That obligation cannot be complete until the expiration of the original term. There can be no debt provable in bankruptcy arising out of a contract which becomes effective only at the claimant's option and after the inception of the proceedings, the fulfillment of which is contingent on what may happen from month to month or up to the end of the original term. Compare In re Ells, supra; Slocum v. Soliday, supra; In re Roth & Appel, supra. Such a covenant is not, as petitioners contend, the equivalent of an agreement that bankruptcy shall be a breach of the lease and the consequent damages to the lessor be measured by the difference between the present value of the remainder of the term and the total rent to fall due in the future. The covenants appearing in the leases in question cannot be made the basis of a proof of debt against the estate.
Rehearing denied 292 U.S. 607, 54 S.Ct. 771, 78 L.Ed. —-.
Brown v. Irving Trust Co., 66 F.(2d) 473.
U.S.C. title 11, § 103(b), 11 USCA § 103(b).
U.S.C. title 11, § 1(11), 11 USCA § 1(11).
U.S.C. title 11, § 35, 11 USCA § 35.
The bill in full appears in the Congressional Record, vol. 14, pp. 43—48.
Acts of February 5, 1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 797; June 15, 1906, c. 3333, 34 Stat. 267 (11 USCA § 104); June 25, 1910, c. 412, 36 Stat. 838; March 2, 1917, c. 153, 39 Stat. 999 (11 USCA § 35 and note); January 7, 1922, c. 22, 42 Stat. 354 (11 USCA § 35); May 27, 1926, c. 406, 44 Stat. 662; February 11, 1932, c. 38, 47 Stat. 47 (11 USCA § 22).
Act of March 3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1467 (11 USCA § 202(a).
Cong. Rec., Senate, Feb. 24, 1933, pp. 5058, 5059; Feb. 27, 1933, p. 5278.


text:
Complainant is AT&T Corp. ("AT&T"), 295 North Maple Avenue, Basking Ridge, NJ 07920-1002, USA.
Respondent is Randy Thompson ("Thompson"), 88 Perry Street #502, San Francisco, CA 94107, USA.
The domain name in issue is: <attmsn.com> (the "Domain Name").
The registrar is Register.com (the "Registrar"), 575 8th Avenue � 11th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA.
The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") received AT&T�s Complaint by e-mail on June 26, 2001, and in hard copy on June 28, 2001. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfies the formal requirements of the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules"). Complainant made the required payment to the Center.
On June 28, 2001, the Center transmitted via e-mail to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with this case. On June 28, 2001, the Registrar transmitted via e-mail to the Center its response, confirming that (1) a copy of the Complaint was sent to it by Complainant as required by Supplemental Rule 4(b); (2) the Domain Name was registered through it; (3) Respondent is the current registrant of the Domain Name; (4) the Organization and Administrative Contact for the Domain Name is "Randy Thompson/For Sale," and the Technical and Zone Contact for the Domain Name is the Registrar ; (5) the Policy applies to the Domain Name; and (6) the Domain Name is active.
On June 29, 2001, the Center transmitted the Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding, together with a copy of the Complaint, via e-mail with copy by courier (FedEx) to Respondent and to the Registrar . The Center advised that Respondent�s Response was due by July 18, 2001, pointed out that the Response should be in accordance with the Rules and the Supplemental Rules, and described the consequences of a default if the Response was not sent by the due date. The Center also noted that the Complainant had elected for a single member panel to decide this matter.
The requirements of Rule 2(a) having been satisfied, the formal date of the commencement of this administrative proceeding, pursuant to Rule 4(c), is June 29, 2001.
On June 30, 2001, Respondent served, through his attorney, a Request for Preparatory Conference, a Request for Hearing, and Interrogatories, on counsel for Complainant.
No Response was received from Respondent by the July 18, 2001, deadline. On July 20, 2001, the Center transmitted to Respondent, via e-mail and courier (FedEx), a Notification of Respondent Default. The Center advised Respondent that (a) Respondent had failed to comply with the deadline for submission of its Response and (b) the consequences of default, including (1) appointment of a single member panel (per the Complainant�s request); (2) the Panel would be informed of Respondent�s default and would decide in its sole discretion whether to consider a Response if submitted later; and (3) notwithstanding the default, the Center would continue to send all case-related materials to Respondent.
On July 21, 2001, Respondent notified the Center that he believed a Response had been submitted by his attorney, and requesting consideration by the Panel. On July 23, 2001, the Center notified Respondent that no Response (or other correspondence) had been received from Respondent or his attorney by the deadline of July 18, 2001, and that his message would be forwarded to the Panel. On July 25, 2001, Attorney Cliff Capdevielle notified the Center that he would be representing Respondent in this matter, represented that he had not received a copy of the Notification of Complaint from the Center, and requested that the Center extend the deadline for a Response until August 18, 2001. In its discretion pursuant to Rule 5(d), the Center declined, on July 26, 2001, to grant the requested extension. The Center notified Respondent that any Response submitted nevertheless could be considered by the Panel in the Panel�s discretion.
On or about July 25, 2001, Respondent (through his attorney) submitted a Response. On July 26, 2001, Complainant objected to consideration of the Response as untimely filed, and to Respondent�s Request for Preparatory Conference, Request for Hearing, and Interrogatories, as improper under the applicable rules . On August 3, 2001, Respondent�s attorney replied to Complainant�s objection, representing that although he had received an unofficial copy of the Complaint from Complainant�s counsel in a timely fashion, he did not receive an official copy from the Center until after receiving the Notification of Respondent Default. Respondent�s attorney also stated that Respondent did not provide him with the official Complaint because he (Respondent) assumed an official Complaint would be sent directly to the attorney.
On August 1, 2001, the Center advised the parties, in accordance with Rule 6(f), of the appointment of Michael Albert, the undersigned, as the Panelist in this case. Pursuant to Rule 15(b), the Center further informed the parties that, absent exceptional circumstances, the Panel would forward a decision to the Center by August 15, 2001.
On August 1, 2001, the Center transmitted the case file to the Panel.
The Complaint is based on Complainant�s alleged ownership of rights to the mark AT&T, which Complainant claims to have used for telecommunications goods and services for over a century.
Complainant owns numerous federal registrations for the AT&T mark and other marks containing the term AT&T, as well as the term ATT (without an ampersand). Complainant provided the Panel with copies of a number of its Certificates of Registration for AT&T as a trademark or service mark, including Registration Nos. 2,076,846, 1,293,305, 1,298,084, 1,314,059, 1,353,769, 1,542,937, 1,550,818, 1,688,845, 2,049,544, 1,331,847, 1,342,197, 1,367,469, 1,493,970, 1,699,744, and 1,970,579. Complainant also provided the Panel with copies of its Certificates of Registration and/or printouts from the U.S. Trademark Electronic Search System ("TESS") of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), for numerous other marks including 1 800 CALL ATT, CAMP ATT, 1 800 ATT-GIFT, and ATT.NET.
The earliest of these registrations, U.S. Reg. No. 1,293,305, is for the word mark AT&T in block letters. A block-letter registration is the broadest claim to a word mark, in that it is "not � restricted to any particular form or type." Exxon Corp. v. National Foodline Corp., 579 F.2d 1244, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978). This registration issued in 1984 for digital network telecommunications services, and claims a date of first use in September, 1983.
Other registrations owned by Complainant for the AT&T or ATT marks or variants thereof cover other telecommunications products and services, including products and services related to the Internet.
The dispute is within the scope of the Policy, and the Panel has jurisdiction to decide the dispute. A copy of the Registrar�s Services Agreement, which incorporates the Policy by reference, is appended as Annex 2 to the Complaint .
In Paragraph 10 of its Complaint, Complainant avers that each of the three requirements of Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy have been satisfied.
- That Complainant has been selling telecommunications goods and services for over a century under the marks AT&T and ATT, and phrases that combine AT&T or ATT with other words.
- That the AT&T brand has substantial commercial value.
- That Complainant owns and operates a large Internet Service Provider ("ISP") at the web address <www.att.net> serving nearly two million customers in the United States.
- That Complainant has rights in the marks AT&T, ATT, and phrases combining AT&T or ATT with other words.
- That Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") has rights in the mark MSN and related marks, and operates the Microsoft Network (also known as MSN), serving over three million subscribers.
- That in January, 1999, media reports indicated that Complainant was allegedly in discussions with Microsoft to buy all or part of the Microsoft Network.
- That the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant�s and Microsoft�s marks, including AT&T, ATT.NET and MSN.
- That Respondent combined Complainant�s mark with Microsoft�s mark (and registered the combined mark as the Domain Name) "in bad faith for the purpose of capitalizing on the presumed relationship between the two companies, and speculating on the possibility of a business combination between the two companies."
- That Respondent has no legitimate interest in the Domain Name because (1) Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant�s mark or Microsoft�s mark; (2) Respondent does not own rights in marks comprising AT&T, ATT, MSN or ATTMSN.COM; (3) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name and does not run any enterprise commonly known by the Domain Name; and (4) Respondent is not making legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the Domain Name.
- That Respondent�s intent in registering the Domain Name was to divert Internet traffic to his web site; or to sell it for substantial profit; or to "lock it up" based on speculation that Complainant might purchase all or part of the MSN.
As noted above, the Respondent is in default pursuant to Rule 5(e), Rule 14 and Supplemental Rule 7(c) because no Response was received from Respondent by the July 18, 2001, deadline.
The Center�s denial of Respondent�s request for an extension to file a Response in this proceeding was a proper exercise of the Center�s discretion pursuant to Rule 5(d).
In the event of a belated Response, the Panel�s default course of action, pursuant to Rule 14(a), is to proceed to decision based only on the Complaint. The Panel may, in its discretion, consider the Response if "exceptional circumstances" exist. In addition, the Panel has broad general powers under Rule 10 (a) to "conduct the administrative proceeding in such manner as it considers appropriate in accordance with" the Policy and the Rules. Specifically, the Panel is required under Rule 10(b) to ensure "that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case." Under Rule 10(d) the Panel is empowered to "determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence."
- That the Complaint does not set out sufficient evidence that Respondent�s registration of the Domain Name was carried out in bad faith. Specifically, the Complaint does not show that the Respondent (1) intended to divert the Complainant�s customers to the Respondent�s web site; (2) used any false contact information or aliases; or (3) has a history of selling domain names containing the Complainant�s registered marks.
- That the Domain Name is unlikely to be confused with trademarks owned by Complainant because there are approximately 11,000 registered domain names beginning with the letters ATT.
- That the Complainant is not the owner of a registration for the mark ATT (i.e., without an ampersand) , is not the owner of any business or service named ATTMSN, has no rights to the mark ATTMSN, and has no rights to the mark MSN.
- That this Panel lacks jurisdiction over this dispute because Microsoft is an "indispensable party."
- That the factors set out by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (United States) for consideration in determining the likelihood of confusion between two trademarks favor a finding that confusion is unlikely. Specifically, that (1) Strength of mark. Complainant�s mark ATT (to the extent Complainant has rights in said mark) is weak; (2) Use of mark. Complainant does not use the marks ATT, MSN or ATTMSN; (3) Similarity of marks. Complainant�s mark ATT is not similar to the Domain Name ATTMSN which is "a much longer six-syllable word"; (4) Actual confusion. Complainant has not alleged actual confusion in the marketplace; (5) Knowing adoption. Respondent did not knowingly adopt Complainant�s mark; (6) Distribution channels. Respondent does not sell goods or services in competition with those of Registrant; and (7) Market factors and product lines. Complainant and Respondent "are in entirely different businesses" and do not "compete."
As noted above, on June 30, 2001, Respondent served a Request for Preparatory Conference, a Request for Hearing, and Interrogatories. Complainant filed a Motion for Leave to Oppose Respondent�s Requests and Interrogatories, together with an Opposition brief, on July 5. Complainant reiterated the substance of its Opposition in a communication with the Center on July 26, 2001.
Aside from the Complaint and the Response, additional submissions to the Panel are not contemplated by the Rules, except when specifically requested by the Panel pursuant to Rule 12. While the Panel presumably has the power to consider such additional submissions pursuant to Rule 10(a), at most such consideration is discretionary.
Respondent has requested a Preparatory Conference and a Hearing. In-person hearings are to be denied pursuant to Rule 13 unless the Panel, in its discretion, finds that exceptional circumstances exist warranting such a procedure. In this case, the Panel finds that the Complaint and the Response provide sufficient information from which the Panel may render its decision . To the extent that Respondent seeks an order from the Panel convening such a conference or hearing, the request is denied.
The Panel also finds that Respondent�s service of Interrogatories or other discovery requests is improper under the Rules, which make no provision for discovery.
In view of the Panel�s findings with respect to Respondent�s Motions and Interrogatories, an opposition brief from Complainant is unnecessary, and Complainant�s Motion for Leave to Oppose is accordingly denied as moot.
Having disposed of the procedural issues raised by the parties, the Panel now proceeds to consider this matter on the merits in light of the Complaint, the Response, the Policy, the Rules, the Supplemental Rules, and other applicable legal authority, pursuant to Rule 15(a). In the Panel�s view, given that this dispute involves a domain name registered in the United States and given that both parties appear to be based in the United States, applicable authority shall include relevant principles of United States trademark law.
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out four non-exclusive, but illustrative, circumstances or acts that for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii) above would be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy sets out three illustrative circumstances, any one of which, if proved by Respondent, would demonstrate Respondent�s rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii).
Complainant has proven that it is the owner of trademark rights in the mark AT&T, going back at common law for many decades, and continuing through the date of the Complaint, and also has many federal registrations, which have become incontestable pursuant to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. � 1065. Complainant�s registrations of its trademarks on the Principal Register of the USPTO establish a presumption of validity of the marks under United States law. See 15 U.S.C. � 1057(b); Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the registrations constitute constructive notice to all other parties of Complainant�s ownership of the marks. See 15 U.S.C. � 1072.
Complainant has also proven that it owns trademark rights in the mark ATT (without an ampersand), particularly for goods and services related to telecommunications and/or the Internet. In particular, as noted above, Complainant has registered several marks containing the term ATT in combination with other words, phrases or numbers. Among these is the mark ATT.NET (for, inter alia, electronic mail and providing multiple user access to global computer networks).
While the Panel acknowledges Respondent�s argument that the Complainant�s claims to ATT (without an ampersand) are weaker than its claims to AT&T (with an ampersand), the Panel agrees with the distinguished panel in AT&T Corp. v. WorldclassMedia.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0553 (WIPO, July 28, 2000), that "an ampersand is not a valid character in a domain name and its absence is not sufficient to prevent the [domain name] in dispute from being confusingly similar to Complainant�s marks."
In comparing Complainant�s mark(s) to the Domain Name, it is well established that the generic top-level domain, in this case ".com," must be excluded from consideration as being a generic or functional component of the Domain Name. See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market, 202 F.3d 489, 498, (2d Cir. 2000).
While the remaining terms, ATT and ATTMSN, are not identical, the Panel finds that they are confusingly similar. The Panel is persuaded that the combination of the mark ATT with the mark MSN is likely to compound rather than obviate confusion, because MSN and AT&T provide similar services from their respective web sites. Indeed, the fact that Respondent registered the Domain Name following media reports about a possible business deal between MSN and AT&T is some evidence that the Domain Name was intended to be a combination of the two marks .
This Panel also agrees with its predecessor panels that simply combining one trademark with another does not obviate a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Time Warner, Inc. and EMI Group, PLC v. CPIC Net, WIPO Case No. D2000-0433 (WIPO, September 15, 2000). This is particularly true where (as here) the two marks are used for similar products and both have a strong connection to the Internet .
(1) Strength of mark. Complainant�s mark ATT is quite strong, in light of Complainant�s evidence that includes length of use, number of users (in the millions), substantial investment in the mark, and other considerations; (2) Use of Mark. Complainant�s mark and the Domain Name are both used or intended for use on the Internet; (3) Similarity of marks. There is a strong similarity between Complainant�s mark and the Domain Name. Indeed, the Domain Name appears to be the concatenation of Complainant�s mark with the mark of another company with whom Complainant has been closely associated in press coverage; (4) Actual confusion. On this factor, the Panel agrees with Respondent that no actual confusion has been shown. U.S. courts have noted, however, when deciding trademark cases, that actual confusion is unlikely to be found, and its absence therefore should not be deemed significant, where (as here) the contested usage is comparatively recent or of limited scope; (5) Knowing adoption. Complainant�s federal registrations constitute constructive notice of its marks to all; and Respondent has not denied that it was familiar with the ATT and MSN marks and the companies that own those marks; (6) Distribution channels. While Respondent may be right that there is at present no apparent overlap in distribution channels, absent evidence of what Respondent�s business consists of or how it operates, any use of the Domain Name would occur on the Internet, which overlaps with the channels of distribution of Complainant�s goods and services, particularly through its <att.net> domain name; (7) Market factors and product lines. Inasmuch as neither party has brought to the Panel�s attention any evidence of what Respondent�s product lines or market consists of, there is no evidence of overlap.
In the Panel�s view, a balancing of the above factors would favor a finding of a likelihood of confusion to the extent any use is made of the Domain Name.
The Respondent was unable to point to any evidence of his rights in the Domain Name. Respondent offered no evidence that he uses the Domain Name, nor that he has ever used the mark ATTMSN in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services, or for any other purpose. It does not appear than any use is being made of the Domain Name - no web site exists at that address and Respondent has not claimed or shown that it makes any other use of the Domain Name . See Paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. Respondent also does not appear to be known by the name ATTMSN. See id. at Paragraph 4(c)(ii). Finally, Respondent does not claim to be making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the Domain name. See id. at Paragraph 4(c)(iii). Accordingly, the Panel concludes that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Complainant�s third hurdle is to establish that Respondent has registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith.
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out four illustrative circumstances of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. The first is acquisition of the domain name "primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark � or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of [registrant�s] documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name."
In this case, the Panel finds evidence of this type of bad faith. First, the fact that Respondent lists his contact information in the Registrar�s WHOIS database as "Randy Thompson/For Sale" strongly suggests that the Domain Name (which is not used by Thompson) is indeed "for sale." Respondent declined to address this issue in his Response. Respondent�s silence on this issue suggests that an adverse inference may be appropriate. While no evidence directly establishes the amount for which Respondent sought to sell the Domain Name, it is a fair inference from the fact that he listed it "for sale" simultaneously with his registration of it that his intent was to obtain consideration in excess of his registration costs.
That this usage was Respondent�s "primary" purpose follows from the fact that he does not appear to have had any other purpose � he is making no legitimate use of the Domain Name, and has not established any specific intent to do so. Taken together with the fact that he undoubtedly had actual knowledge (a fact he does not deny), and at a minimum had constructive knowledge (as a result of the registrations), of the famous marks contained in the Domain Name, it is difficult to infer any other purpose than that of selling it to Respondent or other holders of rights in the said marks (or possibly establishing a domain name designed to divert business from them, which would be another type of bad faith). "Actual or constructive knowledge of the Complainant�s rights in trademarks is a factor supporting bad faith." Ticketmaster Corp. v. Spider Web Design, Inc., Case No. D2000-1551 (WIPO, February 4, 2001).
Second, the fact that Respondent has made no use of the Domain Name himself further supports an inference of bad-faith registration on the facts of this case. Had he intended to make some good-faith use of the mark, one would expect him to have done so, or at least explained the failure to do so in his Response. See Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, Case No. D2000-0003 (WIPO, February 18, 2000) (registration together with "inaction" can constitute bad faith). Numerous panels have followed this decision. See Ticketmaster (citing eight such cases). While this Panel is not prepared to conclude that nonuse of a domain name will automatically constitute bad faith, it is, on the facts of this case, a factor adding to the weight of the evidence of bad faith with respect to this Domain Name, particularly given the fame of the mark and Respondent�s failure to offer any plausible explanation or evidence of any good-faith use.
Additionally, as noted above, see supra note 9, the fact that Respondent registered the Domain Name following media reports about a possible business deal between MSN and AT&T is some evidence that Respondent intended to profit from the Domain Name by selling it to either AT&T or MSN, or both.
In short, based on the record before the Panel, Respondent does not appear to have made any use of the Domain Name other than to offer it for sale. Accordingly, the Panel finds bad faith of the form illustrated by the first example in Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy.
The second illustration of bad faith in the Policy occurs when the registrant registers the domain name to prevent the trademark owner from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, particularly when Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct. Complainant has made no allegation that it has been unable to use the trademark in a domain name (other than the Domain Name at issue). Nor does Complainant allege any pattern of improper registrations by Respondent. Accordingly, the Panel does not find this illustration applicable here.
The third illustration of bad faith is registration "primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor." On the facts of this case, there is no evidence that Respondent is a competitor of Complainant, and Respondent�s registration of the Domain Name does not appear to have disrupted Complainant�s business. Accordingly, the Panel does not find this illustration applicable either.
The fourth illustration, use of the domain name in an effort to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to another web site, does not appear to be applicable here, there being no active web site located at the Domain Name, and no evidence of intent to create one.
In sum, the Panel concludes that Respondent has registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith, as exemplified by illustration (i) in Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy.
In light of the findings and analysis by the Panel, the Panel decides that Complainant has met its burden of proving: (1) the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant�s trademark(s); (2) Respondent has no rights and no legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and (3) the Domain Name has been registered and is being used by Respondent in bad faith.
Accordingly, pursuant to Paragraph 4(i) of the Policy and Rule 15, the Panel requires that the Domain Name be transferred to Complainant.
1. The Registrar provided a printout of the information contained in its WHOIS database for the Domain Name, including the Respondent�s postal address, telephone number and e-mail address.
2. The Center also sent the same items to the required e-mail addresses as set out in Rule 2(a).
3. Complainant also filed a more formal Opposition to Respondent�s Request for Preparatory Conference, Request for Hearing, and Special Interrogatories on July 5, 2001.
4. In Section IV of his Response, Respondent argues that the Panel lacks jurisdiction to decide this matter because the Panel "may not make a ruling regarding the rights of Microsoft Corporation with regard to the disputed domain name unless Microsoft Corporation is a party to this dispute." Because disposition of this matter does not require an adjudication of any rights of Microsoft Corporation in the Domain Name, Respondent�s argument is moot and poses no obstacle to the Panel�s jurisdiction. Should Microsoft Corporation choose to contest any registration or use of the Domain Name that may hereafter be made by Complainant, Microsoft would be free to do so, and nothing herein is intended to prejudge how any such dispute might be resolved.
5. The Panel is confused by Respondent�s argument that his attorney did not receive timely notice of this administrative proceeding. First, Rule 2 requires that the Center "employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent" (not the Respondent�s attorney). The Center complied fully with Rule 2 on June 29, 2001. Respondent�s attorney first made his representation of Respondent known to the Center on July 25, 2001. After that time, the Center addressed its communications to Respondent�s attorney as requested. Before that time Respondent�s attorney was not known to the Center (his name did not appear in the WHOIS database entry for the Domain Name) and he therefore could not reasonably expect to receive notifications from the Center. In any event, the Respondent�s attorney admitted that he had received an "unofficial copy" of the Complaint in a timely fashion from the Complainant. Although the Rules do not require notice to a Respondent�s representative, in this case the Respondent�s attorney did receive such notice. The Respondent�s notice argument is unconvincing.
6. The Panel additionally notes that, under Rule 14(b), the Panel is entitled to "draw such inferences � as it considers appropriate" from Respondent�s failure to comply with the deadline set forth in Rule 5(a). In the exercise of its discretion, however, the Panel declines to draw inferences from Respondent�s tardiness.
7. Respondent provided the Panel with TESS printouts for a number of ATT marks owned by parties other than Complainant for various goods and services (but not for telecommunications).
8. Indeed, as noted above, the Panel is not obligated to consider the Response, but does so out of a sense of caution and fairness to Respondent.
9. Mitigating the weight of this evidence is the fact that Respondent did not register the Domain Name until January 10, 2000, approximately a year after Complainant contends the media began to report on a potential business deal between AT&T and MSN. On the other hand, Respondent offered no explanation in his Response to rebut the inference made by Complainant of a relationship between those media reports and Respondent�s registration of the Domain Name. Respondent similarly offered no reason why he chose the Domain Name to the exclusion of other possible words or phrases. In its discretion pursuant to Rule 10(d), the Panel finds it appropriate to accord some evidentiary weight to the timing of Respondent�s registration of the Domain Name (i.e., after the media reports referred to by Complainant).
10. The Panel is unpersuaded by Respondent�s argument that confusion is unlikely because there are many registered domain names beginning with the letters ATT. It is not the mere presence of the letters ATT in the Domain Name that makes confusion likely. Rather, it is the fact that the letters ATT stand together with another well-known mark, and both marks are identified with the Internet (and with one another pursuant to a possible business deal). Domain names consisting of words or phrases beginning with the letters ATT (such as <www.attitude.com> or <www.attest.com>) are far less likely to create confusion than <www.attmsn.com>.
11. Nothing herein is meant to imply that Ninth Circuit law necessarily applies to this case; however, the law of other U.S. circuits sets forth substantially similar multi-factor tests to be used in analyzing likelihood of confusion for purposes of determining trademark infringement.
12. Respondent did claim to have a "proposed use of the mark," but did not choose to disclose to the Panel what that proposed use was. Respondent also stated that "AT&T and Respondent � are in entirely different businesses," but declined to specify Respondent�s business. Respondent�s vague and conclusory allegations of use or intended use do not support a finding that it has any legitimate interest in the Domain Name.


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Skripko G.A. Prospects for the use of Тi3+: Аl203 lasers in atmospheric studies. // Atmospheric and oceanic optics. 1989. V. 2. No. 07. P. 555-572.
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Luk'yanenko S.F., Novakovskaya T.I., Potapkin I.N. Study of the H2O vapor absorption spectrum in the region 270-330 nm. // Atmospheric and oceanic optics. 1989. V. 2. No. 07. P. 579-582.
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Derbov V.L., Ponomarev Yu.N., Potapov S.K. Application of the Fourier-Bessel transformation for the numerical solution of the equations of nonlinear optics. // Atmospheric and oceanic optics. 1989. V. 2. No. 07. P. 587.
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Dem'yanikov A.I. Optimal planning of experiments on sounding the upper layers of the earth's atmosphere in the 15-μm band of CO2. Temperature, kinetics, composition. // Atmospheric and oceanic optics. 1989. V. 2. No. 07. P. 610-614.
Suetin V.S., Ignatov A.M. Effect of regional characteristics of the atmosphere on the accuracy in determining the temperature of the ocean surface from IR measurements from space at two angles. // Atmospheric and oceanic optics. 1989. V. 2. No. 07. P. 615-620.
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The Hope of Eternal Life—Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue XI. Edited by Lowell G. Almen and Richard J. Sklba. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Lutheran University Press, 2011. 211 pages. Click here.
The eleventh round of Lutheran—Roman Catholic (L-RC) dialogue in the United States began in December 2005 and concluded in October 2010. The final report as entitled above was released on November 15, 2010, and was originally made available for download in Portable Document Format (PDF). Edited by Lowell G. Almen, Lutheran co-chair of the dialogue and retired secretary of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), and Auxiliary Bishop Richard J. Sklba of Milwaukee, Roman Catholic co-chair of the dialogue, this novella of Lutheran ecumenical remythologization provides almost interesting reading. A table of contents, a preface, four chapters, four appendices, and two background papers comprise this volume. Appendix Three, by Stephen Hultgren, is included for no discernable reason, and Appendix Four might also be categorized as background information. The latter, “The Intermediate State: Patristic and Medieval Doctrinal Development and Recent Receptions” by Jared Wicks (133–175), is arguably the only useful part of this book. The two background papers proper were presumably incorporated based on author gender (female). Although formally listed as participants on the Lutheran side, Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) theologians Samuel H. Nafzger and Dean O. Wenthe do not appear to have played an active role, other than providing personal, confessional authenticity to the designation “Lutheran” used in the dialogue.
The dialogue’s Preface cites the Apostles’ and Nicene creeds as providing precedent for a study of the hope of eternal life. Notably, however, “The foundation for the discussions and findings of Round XI was established by the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,’” as “officially received by the Catholic Church and member churches of the Lutheran World Federation on October 31, 1999.” Despite listing numerous, insurmountable ecclesial and social obstacles, the dialogue participants seek the restoration of “full, sacramental communion” between Lutherans and Catholics (7; see also 118, 125–126). To that end, “Round XI offers fresh insights” into the “continuity in the communion of saints, prayers for or about the dead, the meaning of death, purgation, an interim state between death and the final general judgment, and the promise of the resurrection” (8). This review essay examines this dialogue’s claimed foundational use of the “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ),” the dialogue’s content and methodology, and finally the biblical and confessional reliability of its conclusions.
Chapter One, “Our Common Hope of Eternal Life,” opens with subsection heading “A. Positive Developments in the Lutheran-Catholic Dialogue in Light of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification’” (pp. 11–13, §§1–8, hereafter page number(s), § number(s)). The text claims that in Augsburg, Germany, an “ecumenically historic moment transpired” when JDDJ was signed by representatives of the Vatican and Lutheran World Federation (LWF) (11, §1)—except that the “Official Common Statement” (OCS) with Annex was signed instead. “Their signatures attested to the official reception in our churches of the fruit of years of ecumenical dialogue on the topic of justification,...” (11, §2)—except that no LWF member church has approved the OCS with Annex. “The findings, statements of consensus, and even expressions of certain divergent convictions related to ‘The Hope of Eternal Life’ are built upon” JDDJ ¶15 (11, §3)—although Lutheran objections in part to JDDJ ¶15 and its exclusion of salvation by “faith alone” necessitated the drafting of the OCS with Annex to rescue JDDJ from ecumenical purgatory. “The method of the ‘Joint Declaration’ is reflected in this report” (11, §4), which essentially means that Lutherans abandon biblical and Lutheran confessional positions to merit religious congruence with the Council of Trent. Even though “[w]e wrestled with descriptions of the contemporary character of indulgences in Catholic practice, especially in the light of the ‘Joint Declaration’” (13, §7), nonetheless “[t]he ‘Joint Declaration’ affirms that the ‘Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic Church will continue to strive together to deepen this common understanding of justification and to make it bear fruit in the life and teaching of the churches’ (JDDJ, ¶43)” (13, §8).
That is the foundation for Round XI of US L-RC dialogue. Unfortunately, the JDDJ edifice is worse. Conveniently having misplaced scripture, “... Lutheranism has no widely received doctrinal texts beyond the Book of Concord (with the possible exception of the JDDJ), ...” (19, §23). On topic, in Chapter II under the heading “3. Common Teaching in the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” this dialogue stresses that in JDDJ the “respective Catholic and Lutheran paragraphs on good works link merit and reward to God’s promise” to be realized “in heaven” as “eternal life,” respectively (53, §108). Propagandistically, the “affirmation that Catholic teaching on justification as presented in the JDDJ does not fall under Lutheran condemnation places Catholic practices of [meritorious] prayers for the dead in a new context,” (107, §251)—which might have ecumenical veracity and meaning if the Lutheran confessions contained condemnations of the Roman Church’s doctrine and if such prayers were not unilaterally considered meritorious. Finally, this “document has pursued a similar method, although not written in the style of the JDDJ. Our discussions of purgatory and prayer for the dead in Chapter III must not be read in isolation from Chapter II, in which we develop our common convictions. Those common convictions form the necessary interpretative context for what we say about traditionally divisive topics” (118, §281). In other words, JDDJ and its application, rather than scripture and the Lutheran confessions, provide the “interpretative context” for the ELCA’s aspired relations with the Roman Church. Opponents of the “Joint Declaration” forewarned that JDDJ might be used in this way, and this dialogue justifies their concerns.
All vacuous JDDJ pageantry aside, the ELCA has a problem. Although “[b]oth Lutherans and Catholics affirm that the justified who die in faith will be granted eschatological perfection” (whatever that means) and although “[t]he justified in this life are one in Christ with those who have died in Christ” (12, §6), unfortunately ELCA Lutherans are neither perfect enough nor dead enough either to merit or to be granted “full, sacramental communion” with the papal church. How can one earn such favor?
To understand this dialogue’s role in the ELCA’s pursuit of reintegration into the Roman fold, two issues are at stake. First, JDDJ is wholly undermined by Canon 30 of the Council of Trent’s Decree on Justification, and subsequently by catchall Canon 33, in that Canon 30 condemns (anathematizes, curses) those who do not accept purgatory. Thus, contrary to JDDJ’s stated goal and claimed achievement, the sixteenth-century condemnations of Lutherans by the Vatican in this decree still apply, and the ecumenists’ foil to slay the justification dragon barring a Protestant return to Rome is itself foiled. Second, it would be nigh on impossible for the Vatican to celebrate Luther’s Ninety-five Theses against indulgences with the Lutheran World Federation in 2017 if the Vatican had nothing to celebrate. Therefore, ways must be found for latter day Lutherans to recant what Luther would not. These goals account for the retrograde state of the content and the methodology of The Hope of Eternal Life.
What is the status of the self between death and resurrection? This question was not a focus of controversy during the sixteenth century, although a few Lutheran theologians (most notable, Luther) were willing to entertain possibilities excluded by Catholic teaching. More recently, the question of intermediate states has been debated within each of our traditions. How these questions are answered affects the discussion of other topics, e.g., purgatory (21, §28).
With Luther safely relegated to a minority position of inconsequential, esoteric views, the ELCA’s ecumenical Pelagianism can continue encumbered. To remove other obstacles on the Lutheran side, the dialogue asserts, “The Lutheran Reformation had no distinctive teaching about death or intermediate states. The Lutheran Confessions simply assume that the souls of the dead exist and are in a blessed communion with Christ” (25–26, §43). Therefore, to fill this void and to feign some sort of parity with Vatican doctrine, “reference will be made to material from particular Lutheran churches, even though they have not received universal Lutheran acceptance” (19, §22). This tactic favors especially those texts and liturgical materials which have been strategically brought into Lutheran “practice” since Vatican II with an ecumenical lex orandi, lex credendi, intention of making a future reintegration into the papal fold as unobtrusive as possible.
270. As with masses for the dead, indulgences appear in a different light when understood within the context of the solidarity of all the justified with Christ and each other. Lutherans in this dialogue have come to see that the intent behind the contemporary practice of indulgences is an expression of an appeal to the mercy of Christ. Whether indulgences do or can adequately embody that intent remains a genuine question for Lutherans. Lutherans also ask whether indulgences are so open to abuse and misunderstanding that their evangelical intent is obscured. Nevertheless, since the practice of indulgences has not been seen as required for communion with the Catholic Church, Lutherans need not adopt these practices for the sake of such communion. Ecumenical rapprochement requires, however, that Lutherans not condemn Catholic teaching about the practice of indulgences as inherently contrary to the Gospel (113–114).
As with all its ecumenical endeavours, this conclusion reiterates the ELCA’s abandonment of Article VII of the Augsburg Confession, which clearly states the sufficiency of the gospel “purely” preached (and taught) as the only foundation for true church unity.
This dialogue’s discussion of biblical texts seeks to illumine the scriptural foundations and background of our churches’ respective teachings on the hope of eternal life without completely settling these hermeneutical questions. Judgments whether particular biblical texts adequately ground particular beliefs about heaven, hell, purgatory, etc., often involve judgments on these larger questions. Sometimes our churches have drawn different conclusions from the same biblical texts, e.g., 1 Cor. 3 and Matthew 12:32 (which will be discussed below in a section on purgatory) (20, §26).
Notably, the “dialogue’s discussion” seeks “to illumine the scriptural foundations and background of our churches’ respective teachings” rather than the other way around, i.e., the word being a lamp unto the dialogue participants’ feet. Furthermore, not only uncritically but also unquestioningly, this dialogue repeatedly cites writings from the Apocrypha, particularly 2 Maccabees, as scripture. In other words, this dialogue’s stated methodology precludes the Old and New Testaments from being solely foundational either for the dialogue or for the churches’ respective teachings, particularly regarding purgatory (70–71, §161). In contrast, such scripture did provide the foundation for the Reformers’ confessional critique and rejection of purgatory, which this dialogue readily and repeatedly notes (79, §§181, 182; 82, §191).
The existence of purgatory is not dogmatically denied. Rather, 1) the existence of purgatory is not taught by Scripture and thus cannot be binding doctrine, and 2) belief in purgatory is now hopelessly bound up with unacceptable practices. A belief that could be discussed in principle is concretely objectionable because of its associations (79, §181).
Clearly, Luther’s use of the subjunctive form “would like” (mocht) rather than mag (may), the latter used in both Tappert (295) and Kolb-Wengert (303), indicates what one “would like” to do even if purgatory “were” (ware, again subjunctive) not error or idolatry. This double subjunctive “translated” into the indicative means that purgatory is error and idolatry and thus is not open for discussion, regardless of associations. Whereas the Kolb-Wengert translation of Luther’s subjunctive into an English subjunctive is mechanically correct, it is not meaningfully correct. The Kolb-Wengert translation thus invites this dialogue’s drafters to exploit this mechanical translation as a means to allow Luther to give tacit permission to discuss purgatory stripped of all evils. Meaningfully, however, Tappert has it much more correct: “All this may consequently be discarded, apart entirely from the fact that [purgatory] is error and idolatry.” Confessionally, for both the BSLK and Tappert, the door to discussing purgatory is shut and locked.
Another questionable application of the Lutheran confessions pertains to “meritorious” works and this dialogue’s attempts to harmonize Lutheran and papal positions. With reference to Apology IV on justification (Kolb-Wengert, 171), homogenized for the Council of Trent, this dialogue asserts, “The Apology states that good works, which can only be performed by those who are in Christ, ‘are truly meritorious, but not for the forgiveness of sins or justification. For they are not pleasing to [God] except in those who are justified on account of faith’” (51, §105). This dialogue further states, “In its Decree on Justification, the Council of Trent similarly taught that good works that are meritorious before God are possible only for those in Christ, for the justified.” Thus, the “ecumenical question is the significance of the difference between the Apology’s statement that eternal life is a reward in the sense of a recompense and the Council of Trent’s statement that eternal life is a merited reward” (52–53, §107).
This second example from the Lutheran confessions represents more than exploitable ambiguities in translation. The similar phrasing regarding rewards and “meritorious” works between the Council of Trent and the Apology is possible chiefly because the Kolb-Wengert Book of Concord uses a different Apology. Whereas the quarto edition of Ap IV, 194, standard since 1580, only in a couple lines—almost in passing—describes “good works” as meritoria (BSLK) and “meritorious” (Tappert), the Kolb-Wengert rendition uses the octavo edition instead. The octavo edition omits Ap IV, 194 and elaborately discusses rewards and “meritorious” works in several new paragraphs placed after Ap IV, 257. This elaboration provides ample fodder (39, §72; 50–52, §§103, 105) for the dialogue drafters to conjure confessional congruence, which the BSLK and Tappert, arguably, would not.
According to Kolb-Wengert, “In using this approach, we follow the most recent modern German translation of the Book of Concord” (109) with note 3 referring to the Evangelische Bekenntnisse: Bekenntnisschriften der Reformation und neuere theologische Erklärungen (Evangelical Confessions: Confessional Writings of the Reformation and Newer Theological Declarations). Notably, this collection of Lutheran and Reformed confessional writings was collated by and published for use in the Evangelische Kirche der Union (Evangelical Church of the Union, EKU) and thereafter in the Union Evangelischer Kirchen (Union of Evangelical Churches, UEK) in the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD). In other words, the Apology in Kolb-Wengert is patterned on a translation for use in union churches in Germany. Synergistically, while Kolb-Wengert “unionism” provides a meritorious tool for ELCA ecumenism, the ELCA’s ecumenism again reveals the confessional unreliability of the Kolb-Wengert Book of Concord over against the BSLK benchmark edition used by confessional Lutherans since 1580 (see also Mark D. Menacher, Priesthood, Pastors, Bishops—Public Ministry for the Reformation & Today by Timothy J. Wengert, published in LOGIA: A Journal of Lutheran Theology 19 (Reformation 2010), 48–51).
In short summary, from a biblical and Lutheran confessional standpoint, The Hope of Eternal Life—Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue XI was dead on arrival and does not have a prayer for purgation or for anything else either in this life or in the life to come.


PROVIDED NOTICE THAT CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. FILED A NOTICE OF EXEMPTION TO ABANDON AN APPROXIMATELY 2.3-MILE RAIL LINE ON ITS ATLANTA TERMINAL SUBDIVISION, ATLANTA DIVISION IN COBB COUNTY, GA.
CSX Transportation, Inc.—Abandonment Exemption—in Cobb County, Ga.
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), has filed a verified notice of exemption under 49 C.F.R. pt. 1152 subpart F–Exempt Abandonments to abandon an approximately 2.3-mile rail line on its Atlanta Terminal Subdivision, Atlanta Division, between milepost SG 579.29 near Plant Atkinson Road and milepost SG 581.61 just west of East-West Connector, in Cobb County, Ga. (the Line). The Line traverses United States Postal Zip Codes 30080 and 30082 and includes one station at Edna (FSAC 23500).
CSXT has certified that: (1) no local rail traffic has moved over the Line during the past two years; (2) any overhead traffic on the Line can be rerouted over other lines; (3) no formal complaint filed by a user of a rail service on the Line (or by a state or local government entity acting on behalf of such user) regarding cessation of service over the Line is either pending with the Surface Transportation Board (Board) or with any U.S. District Court or had been decided in favor of a complainant within the two-year period; and (4) the requirements at 49 C.F.R. § 1105.11 (transmittal letter), 49 C.F.R. § 1105.12 (newspaper publication), and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(d)(1) (notice to governmental agencies) have been met.
As a condition to this exemption, any employee adversely affected by the abandonment of service shall be protected under Oregon Short Line Railroad—Abandonment Portion Goshen Branch Between Firth & Ammon, in Bingham & Bonneville Counties, Idaho, 360 I.C.C. 91 (1979). To address whether this condition adequately protects affected employees, a petition for partial revocation under 49 U.S.C. § 10502(d) must be filed.
Provided no formal expression of intent to file an offer of financial assistance (OFA) has been received, this exemption will be effective on December 2, 2018, unless stayed pending reconsideration. Petitions to stay that do not involve environmental issues, formal expressions of intent to file an OFA under 49 C.F.R. § 1152.27(c)(2), and trail use/rail banking requests under 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29 must be filed by November 9, 2018. Petitions to reopen or requests for public use conditions under 49 C.F.R. § 1152.28 must be filed by November 23, 2018, with the Surface Transportation Board, 395 E Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20423-0001.
A copy of any petition filed with the Board should be sent to CSXT’s representative, Louis E. Gitomer, Law Offices of Louis E. Gitomer, LLC, 600 Baltimore Avenue, Suite 301, Towson, MD 21204.
CSXT has filed a combined environmental and historic report that addresses the effects, if any, of the abandonment on the environment and historic resources. OEA will issue an environmental assessment (EA) by November 9, 2018. Interested persons may obtain a copy of the EA by writing to OEA (Room 1100, Surface Transportation Board, Washington, DC 20423-0001) or by calling OEA at (202) 245-0305. Assistance for the hearing impaired is available through the Federal Information Relay Service at (800) 877-8339. Comments on environmental and historic preservation matters must be filed within 15 days after the EA becomes available to the public.
Environmental, historic preservation, public use, or trail use/rail banking will be imposed, where appropriate, in a subsequent decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2), CSXT shall file a notice of consummation with the Board to signify that it has exercised the authority granted and fully abandoned the Line. If consummation has not been effected by CSXT’s filing of a notice of consummation by November 2, 2019, and there are no legal or regulatory barriers to consummation, the authority to abandon will automatically expire.
 CSXT states that it is working on an agreement with the State of Georgia to transfer the corridor and convert the Line to a trail under a notice of interim trail use or abandonment (NITU) agreement contingent on Board approval for authority to abandon.


text:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant.
thereafter determined that the action was "clearly frivolous"
are at the center of this case.
of the pricing information provided to GSA by the prospective vendors is thus critical to the MAS process.
not commit the government to buying the product.
individual agencies may, or may not, exercise.
(1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
the Air Force, and (2) the several States." 10 U.S.C.A.
needed within the discussions of the issues raised by Ubl.
refusing to enforce the settlement agreement.
cooperate in good faith to effectuate changes to this Agreement that will be satisfactory to the Government." J.A. 436.
relators unilateral settlement of FCA claims, absent the governments consent, once a suit has been filed.").
Relators Motion to Enforce Settlement, Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 4. In an email two days later, the government reiterated its position that it "d[id] not consent to the current proposed settlement." Defendants Opposition, Exhibit 5.
agreement that all parties can agree to . . . .
Defendants Opposition, Exhibit 5 (emphasis added).
January 2009 settlement offer. See J.A. 395a-c.
2008 Agreement between [Ubl] and Defendants.
into a binding, enforceable agreement.
thus made the May 6 Agreement fully enforceable.
v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1453 (4th Cir.
would be inclined to fashion a federal common-law rule"
Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1245 (Fed.
agreement. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 59, illus.
is that the government did not approve the May 6 Agreement.
condition can no longer occur.").
Ubls motion to enforce the May 6 Agreement.
his motion to exclude the evidence. We find no error.
A defendant may be held liable under the FCA for "knowingly" making or presenting a false claim, 31 U.S.C.A.
as the government-knowledge defense or inference.
as part of its analysis of the government-knowledge inference).
and irrational." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
at 1269, while the verdict form asked whether IIF had knowingly made a materially false statement to "the Government"
challenged evidence therefore would have been harmless.
not required and that the jury was as capable as Fox of comparing the qualifications of the IIF employees to the requirements of the labor categories.
abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2001).
employees met the requirements of a given labor category.
exclusion of Foxs testimony as unhelpful to the jury. Cf.
Foxs anticipated testimony, the issue is not preserved for appeal. See Fed.
identified or qualified as an expert witness. We disagree.
897 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1990).
would have been inconsistent with her deposition testimony.
tract. At her deposition, however, Raine denied having knowledge of the nature of Trimbles activities.
hearsay) for excluding the challenged portions of her testimony.
States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004).
error in the exclusion of evidence harmless because "essentially the same evidence was introduced from other sources").
ruling on the motion in limine. Again we disagree.
exclusion of evidence related to the decision not to intervene.
no argument supporting this claim, we do not consider it.").
by awarding attorneys fees to IIF.
3730(d)(4) for abuse of discretion. See United States ex rel.
Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir. 2009).
fee award must not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong."
The FCA does not define "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment."
which Ubl should have carefully reevaluated his claims." J.A. 1952.
valid argument to modify present law."); United States ex rel.
Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1058 (10th Cir.
that it is groundless or without foundation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
which a prevailing FCA defendant is entitled to a fee award.
if the jury did not find Ubl himself to be at all credible.
this evidence to conclude that IIF violated the FCA.
to support a verdict in his favor, we are constrained to conclude that the district court was clearly wrong when it concluded that Ubls claims had no reasonable chance of success.
See Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 356. We therefore reverse the district courts order awarding attorneys fees to IIF.

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