Case No.2018-40-00624 WILLIAM SUBER, PLAINTIFF vs. FREDICK BENJAMIN LAFFODAY DEFENDANT. TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in the above entitled action, copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve copy of your answer upon the undersigned at his office, 810 Dutch Sq. Blvd. Suite 112, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days of the service hereof upon you, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer as aforesaid the Plaintiff herein will apply to the Court for the relief prayed for in the Complaint and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.
Case No. 2018-40-00625 KENNETH RUSH, PLAINTIFF vs. MICHAEL A. BAKER AND ERIK YON D/ B/ A BAKERPRISE AUTO SALES, DEFENDANTS. TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in the above entitled action, copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve copy of your answer upon the undersigned at his office, 810 Dutch Sq. Blvd. Suite 112, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days of the service hereof upon you, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer as aforesaid the Plaintiff herein will apply to the Court for the relief prayed for in the Complaint and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.
Case#:2017-CP-40-7432 Tim Sanders, Plaintiff, vs David A. Adams, as Treasurer of Richland County, Richland County, Castle Combe, LLC, Kelly Anne Daughtery, USAA Federal Savings Bank, Armond A. Turner, Evelyn K. Turner, Donna R. Cripps a/ k/ a Donna R. Jones,; All other persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title, interest, estate in or lien upon the real estate described herein, also any unknown adults being as a class designated as John Doe, And also any unknown infants or persons under disability being as a class designated as Richard Roe, Defendants. TO THE DEFENDANTS NAMED ABOVE: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this quiet title action on property located at Lot No. Nine (9) in Block G, on a plat of Galaxy by McMillan Engineering Company in Richland County, South Carolina, being designated in the County tax records as TMS # 19206-02-03, of which a copy is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices, 3007 Millwood Avenue, Columbia, South Carolina 29205, within thirty ( 30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named shall sixty (60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to answer in the time allowed, default will be rendered against, you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND/OR MINOR(S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR(S) RESIDES AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY, YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to represent said minor(s) within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff(s) herein. The Summons and Complaint for this matter was filed with the Richland County Clerk of Court on December 8, 2017.
C/A#.:2018-CP-40-01051 CIT Bank, N.A., Plaintiff, vs. Harvey B. Pierce, The United States of America, acting by and through its agency, The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant(s). 18-005492 TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 1201 Main Street, Suite 1450, Columbia, SC 29201, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINORS OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINORS UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment may be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master In Equity / Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage and the Complaint attached hereto.
COMMON PLEAS C/A#.: 2018-CP-40-00995 U.S. Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee, Successor in Interest to Wachovia Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee for Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-6, Mortgage Backed Notes, Plaintiff, vs. Larry Palmer; Any heirsat law or devisees of Janice Palmer, deceased, their heirs, Personal Representatives, Administrators, Successors and Assigns, and all other persons or entities entitled to claim through them; all unknown persons or entities with any right, title, estate, interest in or lien upon the real estate described in the complaint herein; also any persons who may be in the military service of the United States of America, being a class designated as Richard Roe; and any unknown minors, incompetent or imprisoned person, or persons under a disability being a class designated as John Doe; Donnell Aaron Palmer; Danielle Alethia Palmer; Donovan Alonzo Palmer; Briarwood Neighborhood Association, Defendant(s). TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 3800 Fernandina Road, Suite 110, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master-in-Equity/Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage herein and the Complaint attached hereto.
COMPLAINT TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED: YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the original Complaint, Cover Sheet for Civil Actions and Certificate of Exemption from ADR in the above entitled action was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County on February 21, 2018. A Notice of Foreclosure Intervention was also filed in the Clerk of Court's Office.
COMMON PLEAS C/A#:2018-CP-40-00912 The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N. A., as successor- ininterest to all permitted successors and assigns of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1 Asset- Backed Certificates, Series 2005-1, PLAINTIFF, vs. First Greensboro Home Equity, Inc.; Ameritrust Inc., DEFENDANTS. TO THE DEFENDANT ABOVE NAMED: AMERITRUST, INC. YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint herein, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, or otherwise appear and defend, and to serve a copy of your Answer to said Complaint upon the subscriber at his office, Hutchens Law Firm; P.O. Box 8237; Columbia, SC 29202, within thirty (30) days after service hereof, except as to the United States of America, which shall have sixty (60) days, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, or otherwise appear and defend, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded therein, and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master In Equity which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master In Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff immediately and separately and such application will be deemed absolute and total in the absence of your application for such an appointment within thirty (30) days after the service of the Summons and Complaint upon you. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master In Equity in this County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master In Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999.
C/A#: 2017-CP-40-07716 Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as Trustee for Green Tree 2008-MH1, PLAINTIFF, vs. Michael L. Tobias, Sr. aka Michael L. Tobias; Spring- Castle Credit Funding Trust, through its Trustee Wilmington Trust, National Association; Midland Funding LLC; Pine Lands Investment Company; South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles DEFENDANT(S) TO THE DEFENDANTS, ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint herein, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, or otherwise appear and defend, and to serve a copy of your Answer to said Complaint upon the subscriber at his office, Hutchens Law Firm P.O. Box 8237, Columbia, SC 29202, within thirty (30) days after service hereof, except as to the United States of America, which shall have sixty (60) days, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, or otherwise appear and defend, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded therein, and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master in Equity for Richland County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff immediately and separately and such application will be deemed absolute and total in the absence of your application for such an appointment within thirty (30) days after the service of the Summons and Complaint upon you. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master in Equity in/for this County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999.
AND COMPLAINT TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED: YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing Summons, along with the Complaint, was filed with the Clerk of Court for Richland County, South Carolina, on December 27, 2017.
Representatives, Administrators, Successors and Assigns, and all other persons or entities entitled to claim through them; all unknown persons or entities with any right, title, estate, interest in or lien upon the real estate described in the complaint herein; also any persons who may be in the military service of the United States of America, being a class designated as Richard Roe; and any unknown minors, incompetent or imprisoned person, or persons under a disability being a class designated as John Doe, Defendant(s). TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 3800 Fernandina Road, Suite 110, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master-in-Equity/Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage herein and the Complaint attached hereto.
COMPLAINT TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED: YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the original Complaint, Cover Sheet for Civil Actions and Certificate of Exemption from ADR in the above entitled action was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County on March 8, 2018. A Notice of Foreclosure Intervention was also filed in the Clerk of Court's Office.
C/A#2018-CP-40-00047 Parrish Goodwin. Plaintiff, vs. James Gil Williams Toatley, Defendant. TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, JAMES GIL WILLIAMS TOATLEY: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in this action of which a copy is herewith served upon you and to serve a copy of your Answer to the said Complaint on the subscriber at his office, 1419 Bull Street, Columbia, South Carolina 29201, within thirty ( 30) days from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the date of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Summons and Complaint in the above-entitled action was filed in the Richland County Clerk of Court's Office, Columbia, South Carolina on January 4, 2018. YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you fail to answer the Summons and Complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint. BARRY B. GEORGE PAIGE B. GEORGE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 1419 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 (803) 254-7222 January 29, 2018.
COMMON PLEAS C/A#.: 2018-CP-40-00958 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Plaintiff, vs. Florence D. Humphrey; Rabon Farms Homeowners Association, Inc., Defendant(s). TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 3800 Fernandina Road, Suite 110, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master-in-Equity/Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage herein and the Complaint attached hereto.
4. FAILURE TO FILE A RESPONSE WITHIN THIRTY ( 30) DAYS OF RECEIVING NOTICE CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO ADOPTION OF THE CHILDREN AND FORFEITURE OF ALL YOUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CHILDREN.
C/A#: 2017-CP-40-07503 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006- 11, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-11, PLAINTIFF, vs. Gloria Stroud; Cindy Rowell Burrell; Myra Lynn Rowell Galloway; William Carey Rowell; Darris Keats Rowell; Van Rowell; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for American Home Mortgage, DEFENDANT(S) TO THE DEFENDANTS, ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint herein, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, or otherwise appear and defend, and to serve a copy of your Answer to said Complaint upon the subscriber at his office, Hutchens Law Firm P.O. Box 8237, Columbia, SC 29202, within thirty (30) days after service hereof, except as to the United States of America, which shall have sixty (60) days, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, or otherwise appear and defend, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded therein, and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master in Equity for Richland County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff immediately and separately and such application will be deemed absolute and total in the absence of your application for such an appointment within thirty (30) days after the service of the Summons and Complaint upon you. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference of this case to the Master in Equity in/for this County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this case with appeal only to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1) of the SCAR, effective June 1, 1999.
COMPLAINT TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED: YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing Summons, along with the Complaint, was filed with the Clerk of Court for Richland County, South Carolina, on December 12, 2017.
C/A#2018-CP-40-00722 Bank of America, N.A., Plaintiff, vs. Carol H. Glass, Chateau DeVille Association, Inc., Defendant(s). 18-005560 TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 1201 Main Street, Suite 1450, Columbia, SC 29201, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINORS OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINORS UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment may be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master In Equity / Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage and the Complaint attached hereto.
2017-CP-40-7510 Timothy T. Sanders as Trustee of the Timothy T. Sanders Revocable Family Trust, Plaintiff, vs David A. Adams, as Treasurer of Richland County, Richland County, Margie E. Sanders, Karl D. Anderson, Bank of America, N.A.; All other persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title, interest, estate in or lien upon the real estate described herein, also any unknown adults being as a class designated as John Doe, And also any unknown infants or persons under disability being as a class designated as Richard Roe, Defendants. TO THE DEFENDANTS NAMED ABOVE: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this quiet title action on property located at Lot No. Eleven (11), Block L, in Richland County, South Carolina, being designated in the County tax records as TMS #13706-14-03, of which a copy is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices, 3007 Millwood Avenue, Columbia, South Carolina 29205, within thirty ( 30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named shall sixty (60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to answer in the time allowed, default will be rendered against, you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND/OR MINOR(S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR(S) RESIDES AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY, YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem to represent said minor(s) within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff(s) herein. THOMAS LAW FIRM, LLC Brent M. Takach, Esquire 3007 Millwood Avenue Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Telephone: 803-799-0705 The Summons and Complaint for this matter was filed with the Richland County Clerk of Court on December 12, 2017.
2018-CP-40-00870 JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, PLAINTIFF, VS. Marcus McNear, DEFENDANT(S). (180268.00049) TO THE DEFENDANT(S) MARCUS MCNEAR ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in the above entitled action, copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve copy of your answer upon the undersigned at their offices, 2712 Middleburg Drive, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2065, Columbia, South Carolina 29202, within thirty ( 30) days after service hereof upon you, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the Complaint, and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for a general Order of Reference of this cause to the Master in Equity for Richland County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this cause. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND/OR MINOR(S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR(S) RESIDES AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem to represent said minor(s) within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff(s) herein. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the original Complaint in the above entitled action was filed in the office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County on February 12, 2018.
2018-CP-40-07537 Tanya Marbley, Individually, and as Guardian ad Litem for Kareem Golson, Jr., Elijah Marbley and Grace Marbley, minors under the age of 18 years, Plaintiff, vs. Travis B. Shiver, Defendant. Kaleah Golson, Plaintiff, vs. Travis B. Shiver, Defendant. TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, Travis B. Shiver: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in this action of which a copy is herewith served upon you and to serve a copy of your Answer to the said Complaint on the subscriber at her office, 1419 Bull Street, Columbia, South Carolina 29201, within thirty ( 30) days from the date of service hereof, exclusive of the date of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Summons and Complaint in the above-entitled action was filed in the Richland County Clerk of Court's Office, Columbia, South Carolina on December 13, 2017. YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you fail to answer the Summons and Complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint. PAIGE B. GEORGE BARRY B. GEORGE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 1419 Bull Street, Columbia, South Carolina 29201 (803) 400-1219 February 27, 2018.
C/A#: 2018-CP-40-00913 David Jacob Simmons, PLAINTIFF, vs. Any heirs- at- law or devisees of Edward L. Mention, deceased, their heirs, Personal Representatives, Administrators, Successors and Assigns, and all other persons or entities entitled to claim through them; all unknown persons or entities with any right, title, estate, interest in or lien upon the real estate described in the complaint herein; also any persons who may be in the military service of the United States of America, being a class designated as Richard Roe; and any unknown minors, incompetent or imprisoned person, or persons under a disability being a class designated as John Doe; DEFENDANTS.
SUMMONS TO THE DEFENDANTS NAMED ABOVE: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this foreclosure action on property located at 3630 W. Beltline Blvd, Columbia, S. C. 29203, being designated in the County tax records as TMS# R11605-09-02, of which a copy is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer upon the subscriber at his office, 3600 Forest Drive, Ste. 201, Columbia, SC 29204, within thirty ( 30) days after service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty (60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint or otherwise appear and defend within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for judgment by default against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDE( S), AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff herein.
NOTICE NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Lis Pendens, Summons and Complaint in this action were electronically filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina on February 14, 2018.
C/A #.:2018-CP-40-00130 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-2, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-2, Plaintiff, vs. Any heirs- at- law or devisees of Martha Gordon Bray, deceased, their heirs, Personal Representatives, Administrators, Successors and Assigns, and all other persons or entities entitled to claim through them; all unknown persons or entities with any right, title, estate, interest in or lien upon the real estate described in the complaint herein; also any persons who may be in the military service of the United States of America, being a class designated as Richard Roe; and any unknown minors, incompetent or imprisoned person, or persons under a disability being a class designated as John Doe; Feleen Haynie; Felix Gordon; Julian Gordon; Arnold Gordon-Bray a/k/a Arnold Gordon a/ k/ a Arnold Bray; Michael Gordon Bray a/k/a Michael Gordon a/ k/ a Michael Bray, Defendant(s). TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices at 3800 Fernandina Road, Suite 110, Columbia, SC 29210, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDES, AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by Attorney for Plaintiff. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master-in-Equity/Special Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative, Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 10th day after service hereof, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff, which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage herein and the Complaint attached hereto.
COMPLAINT TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED: YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the original Complaint, Cover Sheet for Civil Actions and Certificate of Exemption from ADR in the above entitled action was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County on January 5, 2018.
2018-CP-40-00811 Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper, PLAINTIFF, VS. Jason Ryan Hayes a/k/a Jason Hayes a/k/a Jason Ryan; BCG Equities, LLC, As Assignee of Genesis Financial & Payment Systems South Carolina, LLC, D/ B/ A USA Web Cash; Heatherstone Homeowners` Association, Inc.; and The United States of America by and through its agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development a/k/a Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, DEFENDANT(S). (181070.00041) TO THE DEFENDANT(S) JASON RYAN HAYES A/ K/ A JASON HAYES A/ K/ A JASON RYAN ABOVE NAMED: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in the above entitled action, copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve copy of your answer upon the undersigned at their offices, 2712 Middleburg Drive, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2065, Columbia, South Carolina 29202, within thirty ( 30) days after service hereof upon you, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the Complaint, and judgment by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint. YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that should you fail to Answer the foregoing Summons, the Plaintiff will move for a general Order of Reference of this cause to the Master in Equity for Richland County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this cause. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND/OR MINOR(S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR(S) RESIDES AND/ OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY: YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem to represent said minor(s) within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff(s) herein. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the original Complaint in the above entitled action was filed in the office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County on February 7, 2018.
County, which Order shall, pursuant to Rule 53(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provide that the said Master in Equity is authorized and empowered to enter a final judgment in this action. If there are counterclaims requiring a jury trial, any party may file a demand under rule 38, SCRCP and the case will be returned to the Circuit Court.
Case#2018-CP-40-00285 The City of Columbia Plaintiff, vs. Lisa M. Ceasar and Bank of America, N.A., Defendant(s) TO THE DEFENDANT(S), Lisa M. Ceasar YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in this action, and to serve a copy of your Answer on the subscribers at their offices, 1640 St. Julian Place, Columbia, South Carolina 29202, within thirty (30) days after service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of America, if named, shall have sixty ( 60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for a judgment by default granting the relief demanded in the Complaint. TO MINOR( S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/ OR TO MINOR( S) UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR( S) RESIDE( S), AND/ OR TO PERSON UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY, INCOMPETENTS AND PERSONS CONFINED AND PERSON IN THE MILITARY: YOUR ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem within thirty (30) days after service of this Summons and Notice upon you. If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by the Plaintiff.


text:
[301 U.S. 337, 340] Messrs. Joseph B. Brennan and William A. Sutherland, both of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Messrs. Stanley F. Reed, Sol. Gen., and James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner brought this suit on November 22, 1935, against the collector of internal revenue to recover the amounts paid as cotton 'processing' taxes (first cause of action) and as cotton 'floor stock' taxes (second cause of action) under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, 35, 40. Petitioner alleged the unconstitutionality of the statute imposing the tax (United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 , 56 S.Ct. 312, 102 A.L.R. 914) and that claim for refund had been rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on August 16, 1935. After the enactment of title VII of the Revenue Act of 1936, 901-917 (49 Stat. 1747, 7 U.S.C.A. 623 note, 644-659), petitioner amended its complaint, asserting the [301 U.S. 337, 341] unconstitutionality of these provisions. Demurrer was sustained by the District Court (Lincoln Mills v. Davis, 15 F.Supp. 257) and its judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the ground that the court below was without jurisdiction to entertain the action. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 87 F.(2d) 773. In view of the importance of the questions raised, we granted certiorari.
Title VII, sections 901-917, of the Revenue Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C.A. 623 note 644-659) provided a new administrative procedure for the recovery of amounts collected under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Section 901 (7 U.S.C.A. 623) note) repealed sections 21(d), 21(e), and 21(g), of the amendments of 1935 (49 Stat. 771-773). Section 902 (7 U.S.C.A. 644) prescribed the conditions on which refunds should be made. Section 903 (7 U.S.C.A. 645) related to the filing of claims. Sections 904 and 905 (7 U. S.C.A. 646, 647) prescribed periods of limitation and provided for the jurisdiction of the District Courts, concurrent with the Court of Claims, for the recovery of amounts collected as floor stock and compensating taxes. Section 906 (7 U.S.C.A. 648) prescribed the procedure on claims for refunds of processing taxes. Section 907 (7 U.S.C.A. 649) established certain rules of evidence or presumptions to be observed in the administrative proceeding. Section 908 (7 U.S.C.A. 650) related to allowance of interest. Section 909 (7 U.S.C.A. 651) denied review of the administrative ruling by any other administrative or accounting officer. Section 910 (7 U.S.C.A. 652) undertook to free collectors from liability for moneys collected by him and paid into the Treasury in performance of his official duties. Section 913 (7 U.S.C.A. 655) defined various terms employed. Other sections laid down administrative rules not requiring attention in the present discussion.
First.-Petitioner contends that at the time it brought this suit it had a vested right of action against the collector to recover the amounts exacted under statutory provisions held to be invalid; that this right of action could not be destroyed without violating the Fifth Amendment; that the collector was personally liable for [301 U.S. 337, 342] the amounts collected and that section 910 which attempted to destroy that liability is unconstitutional.
Second.-With respect to floor stock taxes, no serious question is presented as to the adequacy of the remedy. The remedy by suit is expressly preserved. If the Commissioner refuses refund, suit may be brought against the United States in the Court of Claims or in the District Court for the recovery of the amount claimed to have been illegally exacted. Section 905 (7 U.S.C.A. 647).
Third.-With respect to the refunding of processing taxes, a special and exclusive administrative procedure is provided. Section 906, (7 U.S.C. A. 648). Disallowance by the Commissioner of a claim of refund, in whole or part, is made final unless within three months the claimant files a petition for hearing upon the merits by a Board of Review which the act establishes in the Treasury Department. The Board is composed of nine members who are officers or employees of the Department and are designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Board is 'to determine the [301 U.S. 337, 344] amount of refund due any claimant with respect to such claim.' The Commissioner is required to 'make refund of any such amount determined by a decision of the Board which has become final.' Section 906(b), 7 U.S.C.A . 648(b). The hearing, upon notice, before the Board is to be open to the public and is to be conducted by a presiding officer who is either a member of the Board or an officer or employee of the Treasury Department designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. The proceedings are to be in accordance with the rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Board with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury save with respect to rules of evidence which are to be in accordance with those applicable in courts of equity of the District of Columbia. The claimant and the Commissioner are entitled 'to be represented by counsel, to have witnesses subpoenaed, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.' Provision is made to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books and papers from any place in the United States and to require the taking of depositions. Section 906(c)(d), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(c, d). The presiding officers are to recommend findings of fact and a decision to the Board or the proper division thereof within six months after the conclusion of the hearing. Briefs with respect to such recommendations may be submitted within a specified time. The Board or a division is to make its findings of fact and decision in writing as quickly as practicable. The findings and decision of a division are to become those of the Board within thirty days unless the chairman has directed that they be reviewed by the Board. Copies of the findings and decision are to be mailed to the claimant and the Commissioner. Section 906(e), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(e). There is a further provision as to costs and fees. Section 906(f), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(f). The decision of the Board is to become final in the same manner as decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals under section 1005 of the Revenue Act of 1926 as amended. Section 906(g), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(g); 26 U.S.C. 640 ( 26 U.S.C.A. 640). [301 U.S. 337, 345] Judicial review of the decision of the Board is provided. That review may be had by a Circuit Court of Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, according to the residence or place of business of the claimant, or by any such court as may be designated by the Commissioner and the claimant by stipulation. Upon petition for review the Board is to certify and file in the appropriate court a transcript of the record upon which the findings and decision were based. Thereupon, the Court of Appeals is to have 'exclusive jurisdiction to affirm the decision of the Board, or to modify or reverse such decision, if it is not in accordance with law, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing, as justice may require.' Section 906(g), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(g). If the claimant or the Commissioner applies to the Court of Appeals for leave to adduce additional evidence the court may order it to be taken before the presiding officer if the court is satisfied that the additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce it at the hearing. The Board may modify its findings and decision by reason of such additional evidence, filing its modified or new determination with the court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is to be final, subject to review by this Court upon certification or certiorari as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. 346, 347).
We think that this plan of procedure provides for the judicial determination of every question of law which the claimant is entitled to raise. We find nothing in the statute which limits the judicial review to questions of statutory construction or of mere regularity of procedure. The 'law,' with which the decision of the Board may be in conflict, may be the fundamental law. Questions of validity as well as of statutory authority or regularity may be determined. These may relate to due process in the hearing or in the refusal of a refund. The government does not contest this construction, but, on the con- [301 U.S. 337, 346] trary, affirms it. The government recognizes and urges that the jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals 'to modify or reverse' the decision of the Board 'if it is not in accordance with law' includes the power to review all questions of general and statutory law and all constitutional questions. Thus every constitutional right which the petitioner here is entitled to invoke with respect to the refund of the taxes which it has paid may be heard and determined by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by this Court upon a review of a decision reached in the course of the prescribed administrative procedure. The government urges, and we think correctly, that if on such a review any part of title VII were held to be invalid, 'the taxpayer may recover all of the taxes to which he is entitled under such a decision.' Upon the judicial review of the action of the Board, the Court of Appeals and this Court would have power 'to direct the Board to enter any designated judgment' and the Commissioner is required to make refund of any amount which may thus be determined to be due the claimant. 1 [301 U.S. 337, 347] Fourth.-The question then is whether, despite this broad right of judicial review of the action of the Board, the administrative scheme has such inherent constitutional defects that the petitioner should not be remitted to that procedure. The inquiry has particular relation to the provisions (1) as to burden of proof, section 902, 7 U.S.C.A. 644; (2) as to presumptions, section 907, 7 U.S.C.A. 649; and (3) as to certain matters of administrative detail.
According to the allegations of the complaint, the petitioner initially did bear the burden of the unconstitutional tax, as petitioner paid it. The question for administrative determination is whether the burden of that payment has been shifted. So far as petitioner's contention may be taken to be that it is entitled to recover by reason of the invalidity of the tax, although in fact its burden has been 'passed on' to another, the contention cannot be sustained. While the taxpayer was undoubtedly hurt when he paid the tax, if he has obtained relief through the shifting of its burden, he is no longer in a position tl claim an actual injury and the refusal of a refund in such a case cannot be regarded as a denial of constitutional right.
The opposing contention was found to be particularly faulty in that it overlooked the fact that the statutes providing for refunds proceed on the same equitable principles that underlie an action in assumpsit for money had and received. That action 'aims at the abstract justice of the case, and looks solely to the inquiry, whether the defendant holds money, which ex aequo et bono belongs to the plaintiff.' Id., 291 U.S. 386 , at page 403, 54 S.Ct. 443, 449.
The circumstance that under title VII, here involved, there is no provision for making a refund to particular persons, to whom the burden of the invalid exaction may be found to have been shifted, presents no sound distinction so far as the claimant is concerned. The controlling principle is that there is no denial of constitutional right in requiring the claimant to show, where it can be shown, that he alone has borne the burden of the invalid tax and has not shifted it to others.
Apart from this question, the gravamen of petitioner's complaint is that section 902 (7 U.S.C.A. 644) demands the impossible; that it sets up a condition of recovery which in petitioner's case cannot possibly be met. That is, that the statute not only requires the claimant to show that the burden of the tax has not been shifted, where that can be shown, but bars recovery where in the nature of the case that cannot be shown. Petitioner contends that it is within the [301 U.S. 337, 351] latter class. In its amended complaint, petitioner sets forth at length the features of the operation of a cotton mill such as its own. By reason of the nature of these operations petitioner asserts that there is 'an inherent impossibility' of proving whether or to what extent the burden of the taxes paid has been shifted to others.
This allegation is at best but a statement of a legal conclusion which must depend upon the facts as they appear when proof is taken. The question is whether the petitioner is entitled to insist as a matter of constitutional right upon trying out the question of impossibility in this suit rather than in an administrative proceeding where all the pertinent facts as to the course of business may be presented and the conclusions they require both of fact and law may be reached. This assertion of such a constitutional right rests upon a construction of section 902 to the effect that if the facts, fully disclosed, afforded no basis for any determination as to the shifting of the burden of the tax, and hence gave no warrant for a finding that the burden had been shifted from the claimant to others, still the statute would require a denial of the right to a refund. The claimant would then stand, by virtue of the injury caused by the payment of the tax, not as one seeking relief when he had not been hurt, but as one who had been hurt by a payment unconstitutionally required and whose proved injury could not be said to have been redressed. It is in that aspect that the statute is assailed as leaving the claimant without remedy for a deprivation of his property without due process of law.
Despite the broad language of section 902, we do not think that it should be construed as intended to deny a refund in any case where a claimant is constitutionally entitled to it. We apply the familiar canon which makes it our duty, of two possible constructions, to adopt the one which will save and not destroy. We cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy the Fifth Amendment or [301 U.S. 337, 352] 'even to come so near to doing so as to raise a serious question of constitutional law.' Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S. 298, 307 , 44 S.Ct. 336, 337, 338, 32 A.L.R. 786; Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 , 44 S.Ct. 391, 395; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 , 148, 276 U.S. 594 , 48 S.Ct. 105, 107. When the Congress requires the claimant, who has paid the invalid tax, to show that he has not been reimbursed or has not shifted its burden, the provision should not be construed as demanding the performance of a task, if ultimately found to be inherently impossible, as a condition of relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled. There is ample room for the play of the statute within the range of possible determinations. Impossibility of proof may not be assumed. It cannot be doubted that the requirement has appropriate and valid effect in placing upon the claimant the duty to present fully all the facts pertaining to the question of the shifting of the burden of the tax and in denying relief where the facts justify a conclusion that the burden has been shifted from the claimant to others. When the facts have been shown it becomes the duty of the Board of Review to make its determination according to the legal rights of the claimant. That is the necessary import of the provision for judicial review, giving authority to the reviewing court to modify or reverse the decision of the Board 'if it is not in accordance with law.' Findings that can properly be made upon the evidence must thus support a decision according to legal right. And, as we have seen, the reviewing court, and finally this Court, may direct the Board 'to enter any designated judgment' 3 to which the claimant is constitutionally entitled and the Commissioner must refund the amount thus determined to be due.
In saying this, we are not passing upon the constitutional right of petitioner to a refund or upon the question [301 U.S. 337, 353] whether in its case the shifting of the burden of the tax is or is not 'susceptible of proof.' Constitutional questions are not to be decided hypothetically. When particular facts control the decision they must be shown. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 , 208-210, 55 S. Ct. 187, 191, 192. Petitioner's contention as to impossibility of proof is premature. Manifestly there is no impossibility so far as the production of proof of petitioner's operations or course of business is concerned. What is meant by impossibility of proof is impossibility of determination after these facts are in. Whether or not any such impossibility of determination will exist is a question which properly should await the ascertainment of the facts. For the present purpose it is sufficient to hold, and we do hold, that the petitioner may constitutionally be required to present all the pertinent facts in the prescribed administrative proceeding and may there raise, and ultimately may present for judicial review, any legal question which may arise as the facts are developed.
The 'tax period' is defined as the period in which the claimant actually paid the tax to a collector and ends with the last payment. The 'period before and after the tax' is defined as 'the twenty-four months ( except that in the case of tobacco it shall be the twelve months) immediately preceding the effective date of the processing tax, and the six months, February to July, 1936, inclusive.' Provision is made for the computation of what is called the 'average margin' for the respective periods, the 'margin' being determined by deducting from the gross sales value of articles processed the cost of the commodity processed and the processing tax.
Petitioner contends that the presumptions are entirely arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. There is a general allegation to that effect in petitioner's amended complaint. But it cannot be said that the comparisons set up between the results of operations during the 'tax period' and the 'period before and after the tax' are wholly irrelevant. Nor can it now be determined what will be the effect of the presumptions. While petitioner assails them, its complaint contains no allegation as to their actual effect in relation to petitioner's operations. [301 U.S. 337, 355] Non- constant but that they may work to petitioner's advantage. For all that we know, the presumption may establish prima facie that petitioner has borne the burden of the tax. Petitioner invites us to enter into a purely speculative inquiry for the purpose of condemning statutory provisions which have not been tried out and the effect of which cannot now be definitely perceived. We must decline that invitation and adhere to the fundamental principle which governs our determination of constitutional questions. Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 , 5 S.Ct. 352; Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448 , 449 S., 50 S.Ct. 360, 363; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324 , 56 S.Ct. 466, 472.
The stated presumptions are rebuttable. If they work adversely to its interests, petitioner will have ample opportunity to prove all the rebutting facts. Section 907(e) provides that either the claimant or the commissioner may rebut the presumptions 'by proof of the actual extent to which the claimant shifted to others the burdens of the processing tax.' There follows a detailed provision as to what such proof may include. But the provision is not exclusive. It is expressly stated that the proof in rebuttal shall not be limited to what is thus described. Petitioner urges that the statute requires that this proof shall be of the 'actual extent' to which the burden of the tax has been shifted, and recurs to the argument as to the inherent impossibility of producing such proof. What we have already said with respect to that argument is applicable in this connection. We do not think that Congress was attempting to require the impossible. The permissible, and we think the true, construction of section 907(e) is that the words 'actual extent' are used in contradistinction to the presumed extent, according to the prima facie presumption to which the proof in rebuttal is addressed. In the light of the context, and of the entire scheme of the administrative pro- [301 U.S. 337, 356] ceeding, we are of the opinion that the provision was intended to afford, and does afford, full opportunity to the claimant to present any evidence which may be pertinent to the questions to be determined by the Board of Review and which may be appropriate to overcome any presumption which might be indulged either under section 907(a), 7 U.S.C.A. 649(a) or otherwise.
Procedural due process in the conduct of the administrative hearing.- Petitioner also complains that under section 906(d) 7 U.S.C.A. 648(d), the hearing is to be conducted, not by the Board of Review, or a division thereof, but by a 'presiding officer' designated by the Secretary of the Treasury; and that under section 906(e), 7 U.S.C.A. 648(e), the presiding officer is to recommend to the Board, or a division, findings of fact and a decision. Petitioner urges that the Board, or its division, is not required by the statute to consider the evidence and hence that the procedure contemplated by section 906 does not meet the requirements of due process. We find no merit in these contentions. There is no provision of the statute which is necessarily inconsistent with the observance of the due process required in hearings by administrative bodies. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91 , 33 S.Ct. 185; United States v. Abilene & Southern Rwy. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288 , 44 S.Ct. 565, 569; Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 , 481 S., 56 S.Ct. 906, 911; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. --, decided April 26, 1937. 'The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance with it.' Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 , 44 S.Ct. 317, 319. Whatever the privilege or duty of the presiding officer, and whatever may be his recommendation, the statute requires that 'the Board or a division shall make its findings of fact and decision in writing' (section 906(e) and shall certify and file with the court on judicial review a transcript of the record upon which its findings and decision are based. [301 U.S. 337, 357] The court has jurisdiction 'to affirm the decision of the Board, or to modify or reverse such decision.' If additional evidence is taken, 'the Board may modify its findings of fact and decision' (section 906(g) by reason of such evidence. The whole scheme of the administrative proceeding presupposes hearing and determination in accordance with the demands of due process. The Board which makes its findings and renders its decision must consider the evidence and base its findings and decision upon it, and until the contrary appears, we must assume that the Board will do so. Morgan v. United States, supra.
We conclude that the authorized procedure provides for a full and fair hearing and determination of all matters of fact and that, through judicial review, it provides for the protection of all the legal rights of the petitioner, including any constitutional right which it may be entitled to invoke with respect to the refund which it seeks. The petitioner may thus obtain through this proceeding whatever judgment its case warrants, a judgment which the government, by virtue of the requirement that the Commissioner shall make refund accordingly, binds itself to pay.
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed, but upon the grounds stated in this opinion. It is so ordered.
'The established rule as to be proper scope of constitutional litigation can be applied in this case with no danger of injury to petitioner. If, upon an appropriate record and in the light of an actual attempt by the taxpayer to show the incidence of the processing tax, this Court should hold any part of Title VII invalid, the taxpayer may recover all of the taxes to which he is entitled under such a decision, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum (section 908(a), 7 U.S.C.A. 650(a); section 614(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 26 U.S.C. A. 1671 note). For, whether or not section 902 and section 907 be held invalid, the Board of Review would still remain as a mechanical means by which to enforce the decision of a circuit court of appeals or of this Court. Even if section 902 were held invalid, and recovery allowed on more proof of payment of Agricultural Adjustment Act taxes, the Board of Review would still have jurisdiction to review the allowance or disallowance of any claim, and the circuit courts of appeals and this Court would still have power to direct the Board to enter any designated judgment. And section 906(b) provides that 'the Commissioner shall make refund of any such amount determined by a decision of the Board which has become final."

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


In 2009, Appellant suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident. Appellant filed a request for loss of earning compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that, notwithstanding findings of permanent impairment, because no permanent physical restrictions were specifically assigned by an expert for Appellant’s left knee, the court could not perform a loss of earning capacity calculation authorized under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3) and that Appellant was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under section 48-121(3). Remanded.
Nebraska Advance Sheets 92 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS employer clearly falls outside of the protections afforded by these statutes. This court has repeatedly emphasized that it is the Legislature s function to declare the public policy of this state.19 And the court long ago recognized that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime merely because the penalty seems to be inadequate, since the relief in such case must come from the Legislature.20 As the court said at that time, If the punishment provided is not sufficient, recourse should be had to the [L]egislature, and not to the equity side of the courts. 21 It is the Legislature s prerogative to determine whether the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief should be extended in the way that ConAgra seeks. Instead of deferring to the Legislature s proper functioning, the majority s decision preempts the Legislature s role. I respectfully dissent. Stephan, J., joins in this dissent. 19 20 21 See, e.g., In re Invol. Dissolution of Wiles Bros., 285 Neb. 920, 830 N.W.2d 474 (2013); In re Interest of Kendra M. et al., 283 Neb. 1014, 814 N.W.2d 747 (2012); Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d 395 (2011); City of Falls City v. Nebraska Mun. Power Pool, 281 Neb. 230, 795 N.W.2d 256 (2011); Bamford v. Bamford, Inc., 279 Neb. 259, 777 N.W.2d 573 (2010); R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 776 N.W.2d 493 (2009); Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, 278 Neb. 800, 774 N.W.2d 370 (2009); Davis v. Davis, 275 Neb. 944, 750 N.W.2d 696 (2008). See Maltby, supra note 12. Id. at 584, 188 N.W. at 178. Charles Rodgers, appellant, v. Nebraska State Fair, appellee. ___ N.W.2d ___ Filed May 9, 2014. No. S-13-651. 1. Workers Compensation: Appeal and Error. A judgment, order, or award of the Workers Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 93 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. ____: ____. In determining whether to affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside a judgment of the Workers Compensation Court, a higher appellate court reviews the trial judge s findings of fact, which will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. ____: ____. Regarding questions of law, an appellate court in workers compensation cases is obligated to make its own decisions. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. ____: ____. The language of a statute is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. ____: ____. Absent anything to the contrary, an appellate court will give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. ____: ____. When construing a statute, an appellate court must look to the statute s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. ____: ____. The rules of statutory interpretation require an appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a statute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Workers Compensation. The Nebraska Workers Compensation Act should be construed to accomplish its beneficent purposes. Appeal from the Workers Compensation Court: Michael K. High, Judge. Reversed and remanded. David M. Handley, of Dyer Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant. Brynne E. Holsten, of Engles, Ketcham, Olson & Keith, P.C., for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ. Miller-Lerman, J. NATURE OF CASE Charles Rodgers, the appellant, suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident on September 7, 2009. In its award filed July 3, 2013, the Workers Compensation Court concluded that in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-121(3) (Reissue 2010), there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured scheduled Nebraska Advance Sheets 94 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS member. Despite Rodgers request, the court declined to consider a potential loss of earning capacity award in the absence of such proof as to the left knee and therefore limited its award to scheduled member benefits. Rodgers appeals. We conclude that the compensation court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the absence of expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to the left knee precluded a loss of earning capacity calculation under the third paragraph of § 48-121(3). We reverse, and remand the cause for consideration consistent with our opinion. STATEMENT OF FACTS This case stems from a work-related accident that occurred on September 7, 2009, in which Rodgers suffered injuries to both of his knees. The parties stipulated to certain facts, described and adopted by the court as follows: 1. On September 7, 2009, plaintiff, . . . Rodgers, injured his knees arising out of and in the scope and course of his employment with the defendant, Nebraska State Fair. 2. Timely notice of the injury was given to the employer. 3. Venue is proper in the Nebraska Workers Compensation Court. 4. At the time of [Rodgers ] injury, [Rodgers] was earning an average weekly wage of $480.36. 5. [Rodgers] has reached maximum medical improvement for his left knee on August 5, 2010, and was assigned a 2 percent impairment to his left lower extremity by Dr. Lawson. 6. [Rodgers] has reached maximum medical improvement for his right knee on October 25, 2011, as indicated by both Dr. Donovan and Dr. O Neil and was assigned a 40 percent impairment to his right lower extremity by Dr. O Neil. 7. The parties agree that all related medical and hospital expenses previously incurred by [Rodgers] have been or are in the process of being paid by the [Nebraska State Fair] pursuant to the Fee Schedule. 8. The parties agree that all future related medical [expenses] as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120 for Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 95 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 [Rodgers ] right knee will be paid by the [Nebraska State Fair] pursuant to the Fee Schedule. 9. The parties agree that there are no penalties due. Dr. John C. Yeakley initially treated Rodgers for his knee injuries. Dr. Yeakley performed surgery on the left knee on May 3, 2010. After Dr. Yeakley retired, Dr. Keith W. Lawson assumed Rodgers care. In Dr. Lawson s report dated December 12, 2011, he stated that Rodgers reached maximum medical improvement for his left knee on August 5, 2010. Dr. Lawson opined that Rodgers had sustained a 2-percent permanent partial impairment to his left knee but assigned no permanent physical restrictions to the left knee. Dr. Yeakley performed surgery on the right knee on February 1, 2010. Dr. Yeakley performed a second surgery on the right knee on November 29. Following the second surgery on the right knee, Rodgers was diagnosed with chronic regional pain syndrome in the right knee. At the request of the Nebraska State Fair, Rodgers was examined by Dr. Michael T. O Neil for an independent medical evaluation. According to Dr. O Neil s September 19, 2012, report, Rodgers had reached maximum medical improvement for his right knee on October 25, 2011. Dr. O Neil assigned a 40-percent permanent partial impairment rating for the right knee. As to permanent physical restrictions, Dr. O Neil noted no prolonged walking or standing as well as [no] climbing, squatting and kneeling. On January 7, 2013, the vocational counselor agreed upon by the parties provided a loss of earning capacity analysis. In his report, the counselor stated that he had interviewed Rodgers and reviewed Rodgers medical records regarding his knee injuries. The counselor stated: I have been asked to determine . . . Rodgers loss of earning capacity per the parties [sic] e-mail . . . that states the entitlement to [loss of earning capacity] will be a matter of fact determined by the trial judge. The vocational counselor determined that Rodgers loss of earning capacity would be approximately 65%. Rodgers filed his petition, including a request for loss of earning compensation in the Workers Compensation Court Nebraska Advance Sheets 96 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS on October 9, 2012. The Nebraska State Fair filed its answer on November 21. A hearing was held before the Workers Compensation Court on June 25, 2013. Rodgers offered and the court received five exhibits, and the Nebraska State Fair offered and the court received six exhibits. The exhibits consisted primarily of Rodgers medical expenses, records, and reports. Rodgers was the only witness. On July 3, 2013, the Workers Compensation Court filed an award in which it concluded that it was unable to perform a loss of earning power calculation under the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) in the absence of expert proof of permanent restrictions relating to the left knee and therefore limited its consideration of the evidence and made an award based on scheduled member benefits. Referring to the provisions in the third paragraph of § 48-121(3), the court stated that the sole issue in this case is whether or not [the third paragraph] from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-121[(3)] applies so [Rodgers] is entitled to a loss of earning power rather than the payment schedule for scheduled member disability. The statutory language to which the court referred and which is central to this appeal is found in the third paragraph of § 48-121(3). This paragraph was added in 2007, and provides in its entirety: If, in the compensation court s discretion, compensation benefits payable for a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision, resulting from the same accident or illness, do not adequately compensate the employee for such loss or loss of use and such loss or loss of use results in at least a thirty percent loss of earning capacity, the compensation court shall, upon request of the employee, determine the employee s loss of earning capacity consistent with the process for such determination under subdivision (1) or (2) of this section, and in such a case the employee shall not be entitled to compensation under this subdivision. We have previously considered this amendatory language and noted that Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 97 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 [o]ther than the amendment at issue, the portions of § 48-121(3) then and now provide for compensation based on designated amounts for scheduled member injuries, but no loss of earning capacity [except as may result from the second paragraph of § 48-121(3)]. The amendment provides for the loss of earning capacity at the court s discretion where there is a loss or loss of use of more than one member which results in at least a 30- ercent loss of earning capacity. p Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, 285 Neb. 826, 830, 829 N.W.2d 717, 720 (2013). In its award, the Workers Compensation Court endeavored to interpret the new language of § 48-121(3). The court focused on the introductory sentence of the new third paragraph, which provides that the option to consider an award of loss of earning capacity depends on the availability of compensation benefits payable for a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member. The court concluded that there must be at least a functional loss of use in the form of permanent physical restrictions for each scheduled member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation. The court stated that a loss clearly relates to a physical removal of a part of the scheduled members, that is leg, arm, or finger, etc. The court continued that the portion of the phrase in the new third paragraph of § 48-121(3) that provides loss of use of more than one member means that there must [be] a permanent partial disability in the form of permanent restrictions relating to the use of the particular scheduled member before the rest of the calculations set forth in the above quoted paragraph [of § 48-121(3)] can possibly take place and result in payment for a loss of earning power. The court found that Rodgers had sustained a permanent partial impairment to his right knee of 40 percent and a permanent partial impairment to his left knee of 2 percent. No party challenges these findings on appeal. Notwithstanding these findings of permanent impairment, the court nevertheless determined that because no permanent physical restrictions Nebraska Advance Sheets 98 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS were specifically assigned by an expert for Rodgers left knee, the court could not calculate loss of earning capacity benefits authorized under § 48-121(3), and that Rodgers was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The court found that the Nebraska State Fair had paid Rodgers all the benefits to which he was entitled, and ordered that the Nebraska State Fair pay for all reasonable and necessary future medical costs associated with Rodgers right knee. Rodgers appeals. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Rodgers claims on appeal that the Workers Compensation Court erred when it concluded that the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) requires that there must be specific expert evidence of permanent physical restrictions as to each scheduled member in order to calculate an award of a loss of earning capacity under this statute. STANDARDS OF REVIEW [1-3] A judgment, order, or award of the Workers Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 287 Neb. 439, 843 N.W.2d 597 (2014). In determining whether to affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside a judgment of the Workers Compensation Court, a higher appellate court reviews the trial judge s findings of fact, which will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Rader v. Speer Auto, 287 Neb. 116, 841 N.W.2d 383 (2013). Regarding questions of law, an appellate court in workers compensation cases is obligated to make its own decisions. Id.  Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Hess v. State, 287 Neb. 559, 843 N.W.2d 648 (2014). Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 99 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 ANALYSIS At issue in this case is the interpretation of the third paragraph of § 48-121(3), which was added to the statute by 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 588. As stated above, this paragraph provides: If, in the compensation court s discretion, compensation benefits payable for a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision, resulting from the same accident or illness, do not adequately compensate the employee for such loss or loss of use and such loss or loss of use results in at least a thirty percent loss of earning capacity, the compensation court shall, upon request of the employee, determine the employee s loss of earning capacity consistent with the process for such determination under subdivision (1) or (2) of this section, and in such a case the employee shall not be entitled to compensation under this subdivision. This third paragraph was first introduced as 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 77, which was later inserted into L.B. 588. In Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, 285 Neb. 826, 829, 829 N.W.2d 717, 720 (2013), we stated that this amendment created a new remedy and set forth the Introducer s Statement of Intent for L.B. 77, which provided: LB 77 relates to the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act and would change disability compensation provisions. Under current law, if a worker sustains an injury to multiple members, he or she is limited to the compensation provided in the schedule contained in section 48-121 of the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act. LB 77 would give to the Nebraska Workers Compensation Court the discretion to award a loss of earning capacity in an appropriate case involving loss of use of multiple members. In Smith, we commented that a worker can now receive compensation for the loss of earning capacity if, in the court s discretion, compensation as set forth in § 48-121(3) would not adequately compensate the worker and where there is a loss or loss of use of more than one member resulting from the same Nebraska Advance Sheets 100 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS accident which results in at least a 30-percent loss of earning capacity. 285 Neb. at 834, 829 N.W.2d at 723. In the instant case, we examine the new language more closely and conclude that the court erred as a matter of law when it limited the application of the new remedy to only those cases in which an expert opinion existed regarding the permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member, an element not found in the statutory language and not essential to the performance of a loss of earning capacity calculation. We thus find merit to Rodgers assignment of error claiming the Workers Compensation Court erred in its interpretation, and we reverse, and remand. The introductory language of § 48-121 provides that this statute contains a schedule of compensation for injuries. Although the language of § 48-121 has changed over time, the following partial summary of § 48-121 from Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 253 N.W.2d 30 (1977), is still appropriate. In Jeffers, we stated: Section 48-121 . . . provides for compensation for three categories of job-related disabilities. Subdivision (1) sets the amount of compensation for total disability; subdivision (2) sets the amount of compensation for disability partial in character, except in cases covered by subdivision (3); and subdivision (3) sets out schedule injuries to specified parts of the body with compensation established therefore [sic]. 198 Neb. at 384, 253 N.W.2d at 33. Although we recognize that the provisions of § 48-121 have been revised from time to time, historically, our cases as described below have noted that loss of earning capacity calculations were relevant to determining an award under § 48-121(1) and (2) and, since 2007, such calculation is relevant to a potential award under § 48-121(3). Turning to the current statute, the first sentence of the second paragraph of § 48-121(3) provides: In any case in which there is a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdivision, but not amounting Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 101 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 to total and permanent disability, compensation benefits shall be paid for the loss or loss of use of each such member or part thereof, with the periods of benefits to run consecutively. The last sentence of the second paragraph of § 48-121(3) states that where there is permanent partial loss of the use or function of any of the members mentioned in § 48-121(3), the employee shall receive compensation benefits in the proportionate amount based on the schedule set forth in the first paragraph of § 48-121(3). The second paragraph of § 48-121(3) thus provides for compensation where there is more than one member involved. Rodgers was awarded benefits under this second paragraph of § 48-121(3). The third paragraph of § 48-121(3), as previously noted, provides a discretionary remedy consisting of a loss of earning capacity award in lieu of scheduled member compensation where two or more members are involved and there is a 30-percent loss of earning capacity. Rodgers was denied benefits under this third paragraph of § 48-121(3). [5-8] With the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) in mind, we turn to our familiar canons of statutory construction. The language of a statute is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Robertson v. Jacobs Cattle Co., 285 Neb. 859, 830 N.W.2d 191 (2013). In other words, absent anything to the contrary, an appellate court will give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Hess v. State, 287 Neb. 559, 843 N.W.2d 648 (2014). And when construing a statute, an appellate court must look to the statute s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. Id. The rules of statutory interpretation require an appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a statute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. ML Manager v. Jensen, 287 Neb. 171, 842 N.W.2d 566 (2014). In its order, the court found that Rodgers was entitled to scheduled member compensation under § 48-121(3) but not Nebraska Advance Sheets 102 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS entitled to consideration for a loss of earning capacity benefit under § 48-121(3). By its ruling and award, the court implicitly found that Rodgers suffered a loss of use as to each the left knee and the right knee for purposes of the award under the second paragraph of § 48-121(3) but explicitly found that he did not suffer a loss of use of the left knee for purposes of the third paragraph of § 48-121(3). That is, the court found loss of use of the left knee for the second paragraph but not loss of use of the left knee for the third paragraph. In its award, the court stated that in order to perform a loss of earning power calculation there must be at least a functional loss of use in the form of permanent physical restrictions for each scheduled member. That is, the court concluded that under the statute, an expert opinion regarding permanent loss of bodily function as to each scheduled member was necessary before a loss of earning power calculation could be performed. Rodgers contends on appeal that [t]he appropriate place to scrutinize restrictions . . . under [the third paragraph of] § 48-121(3) is at the point of the loss of earnings capacity analysis and that the Workers Compensation Court erred when it required the existence of expert proof of loss of bodily function qua permanent physical restrictions before the court could perform a loss of earning capacity analysis. Brief for appellant at 13. We agree with Rodgers contention. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Hess v. State, supra. We conclude as a matter of law that the compensation court incorrectly interpreted the third paragraph of § 48-121(3). As explained below, the court s interpretation of the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) by which it added an additional element, i.e., proof of functional loss in the form of permanent physical restrictions as to each member notwithstanding undisputed evidence of permanent impairment, in order to calculate a loss of earning power is not supported by the language of the statute, logic, or our jurisprudence. The plain language of the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) guides our resolution of this case. First, the plain language Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 103 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 of the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) does not require the loss of bodily function proof that the court insists on. Second, the language does require that, if the threshold requirements are met, including a request by the employee for loss of earning capacity compensation, and in the compensation court s discretion the scheduled member benefits resulting from the same accident or illness do not adequately compensate the employee, then the compensation court shall determine the employee s loss of earning capacity consistent with the proc ess for such determination under subdivision (1) or (2) of this section. In considering the court s additional element, i.e., requiring expert proof of permanent physical restrictions as to each member, we conclude that there is simply nothing in the plain language of the statute that provides for or warrants adding this extra requirement. To the extent the court believes this additional requirement is necessary to show loss of use in the third paragraph of § 48-121(3), we note that the court did not similarly encumber its finding of loss of use in the second paragraph. It is not sensible to read loss of use in these adjoining paragraphs as requiring different sets of proof. Further, the court s award, which is not challenged by the Nebraska State Fair, was supported by an undisputed permanent impairment rating as to each knee. We have often noted the necessity, in the alternative, of proof of impairment or restrictions at the loss of earning analysis stage, but we have not been directed to authority which requires proof of both impairment and restrictions before undertaking a loss of earning capacity analysis. See, e.g., Green v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 263 Neb. 197, 206, 639 N.W.2d 94, 103 (2002) (providing for alternative proofs and stating in context of vocational rehabilitation benefits that [w]ithout impairment or restrictions, there can be no disability or labor market access loss ). In considering the court s ruling which in effect provides that it cannot perform a loss of earning capacity calculation without expert loss of bodily function proof as to each member, such conclusion is not consistent with the statute s directive that a loss of earning capacity calculation be performed consistent with the process for such determination under Nebraska Advance Sheets 104 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS subdivision (1) or (2) [of § 48-121], because the process for such determination decidedly does not require such proof. Our case law confirms this. Acknowledging as we have that § 48-121 has been revised from time to time, we have commented on the process and stated that [a]n employee s disability as a basis for compensation under § 48-121(1) and (2) is determined by the employee s diminution of employability or impairment of earning power or earning capacity, and is not necessarily determined by a physician s evaluation and assessment of the employee s loss of bodily function. Heiliger v. Walters & Heiliger Electric, Inc., 236 Neb. 459, 470, 461 N.W.2d 565, 573 (1990). Elsewhere, we have stated that [i]f the injury falls under either subdivision (1) or (2) [of § 48-121], a determination must be made as to the employee s loss of employability or earning capacity, and loss of bodily function is not at issue. Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 385, 253 N.W.2d 30, 34 (1977). See, similarly, Kleiva v. Paradise Landscapes, 227 Neb. 80, 416 N.W.2d 21 (1987). We have frequently observed that earning power is not synonymous with either wages or loss of physical function. E.g., Thom v. Lutheran Medical Center, 226 Neb. 737, 414 N.W.2d 810 (1987). Thus, although loss of physical function may affect a worker s ability to procure and hold employment, contrary to the court s conclusion in this case, we cannot say that the absence of expert proof of functional loss prevents the performance of a loss of earning capacity calculation. Indeed, to the contrary, we have stated in a variety of settings that degree of disability may be determined without expert evidence and that the court may rely on a claimant s testimony. E.g., Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 263 Neb. 237, 639 N.W.2d 125 (2002). The compensation court s interpretation is not consistent with the established process for consideration of loss of earning capacity under § 48-121(1) and (2) and is therefore not a proper interpretation of the directive in the third paragraph of § 48-121(3). With the addition of the current third paragraph of § 48-121(3), the Legislature clearly intended to extend the opportunity to receive benefits for loss of earning capacity Nebraska Advance Sheets RODGERS v. NEBRASKA STATE FAIR 105 Cite as 288 Neb. 92 to workers with multiple member injuries resulting from the same accident or illness and for whom there is evidence of a 30- ercent loss of earning capacity. In this case, the record p undisputedly shows that Rodgers had been assigned a 2- ercent p permanent partial impairment rating for his left knee and a 40-percent permanent partial impairment rating for his right knee, Rodgers injuries resulted from the same accident, the vocational counselor determined that Rodgers loss of earning capacity would be approximately 65%, and Rodgers requested loss of earning compensation.  As a general rule, the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act should be construed to accomplish its beneficent purposes. Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 285 Neb. 272, 826 N.W.2d 845 (2013). Reading an additional requirement of expert proof of permanent restrictions for each injured member into the statute, as the compensation court has done, impedes accomplishing the extension of the potential for workers to receive loss of earning power benefits and is not consistent with the process for determining loss of earning capacity under § 48-121(1) or (2). We conclude that the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) does not require expert proof of permanent physical restrictions assigned to each injured member in order to perform the loss of earning capacity assessment thereunder, and the compensation court s conclusion to the contrary was error. CONCLUSION The compensation court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity assessment under the third paragraph of § 48-121(3) and declined to exercise its discretion on this basis. We therefore reverse, and remand the cause for a decision consistent with this opinion. R eversed and remanded.