text:
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 87-1888, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Association et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Faced with heavy losses, petitioner Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co. (P&LE) agreed to sell its assets to P&LE Rail Co., Inc. (Railco), a newly formed subsidiary of another railroad. Railco intended to operate the railroad as P&LE had except that it would not assume P&LE's various collective-bargaining contracts and would need only 250 of the 750 employees then working for P&LE. P&LE rejected the assertion of the unions representing its employees that the proposed sale could not be implemented until P&LE complied with the Railway Labor Act (RLA) provisions prohibiting carriers from changing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions embodied in agreements, 45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh, unless they first give at least 30 days' written notice of, and proceed to bargain over, the intended agreement change, 156. Section 156 also requires that the working conditions in question remain in status quo until the controversy is resolved. Most of the unions then filed 156 notices proposing extensive changes in existing agreements to ameliorate the proposed sale's adverse impact on employees. P&LE again refused to bargain, asserting that the sale was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which requires that noncarriers such as Railco seeking to acquire a rail line first obtain the ICC's approval, 49 U.S.C. 10901. Respondent Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) filed suit on behalf of the unions in the District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to P&LE's RLA obligations and an injunction against the sale pending completion of RLA bargaining. The unions then went on strike, and the District Court denied P&LE's request for a restraining order on the ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) prohibited it from enjoining a work stoppage growing out of a labor dispute. Subsequently, Railco filed an application for exemption from 10901's requirements pursuant to the ICC's Ex Parte No. 392 Class Exemption (Ex Parte 392), which provides abbreviated procedures [491 U.S. 490, 491] for seeking approval for acquisitions by noncarriers of an operating railroad or its assets, and the ICC allowed the exemption to become effective on the date required by Ex Parte 392. Although 10901 and Ex Parte 392 allow the ICC to require the acquiring company to provide protection for railroad employees affected by a sale, none of the unions requested protective provisions. The District Court then granted P&LE's reapplication for an order restraining the strike, ruling that the ICC's approval of the sale negated any duty that P&LE had to bargain over the sale's effects on its employees, and that the NLGA did not forbid issuance of an injunction under such circumstances. However, the Court of Appeals summarily reversed, holding that the ICA did not require accommodation of the NLGA's restrictions on the District Court's powers, and remanding for a determination whether the sale or strike violated the RLA. The District Court then held that although P&LE did not have a duty to bargain over its decision to sell, the RLA required it to bargain over the sale's effects on its employees, and that 156's status quo provision required that P&LE's RLA bargaining obligations be satisfied before the sale could be consummated despite the ICC's approval of the transaction. The court therefore granted RLEA's request for an injunction against the sale, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court then granted P&LE's petitions for certiorari challenging, in No. 87-1888, the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the injunction against the sale and seeking, in No. 87-1589, reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment setting aside the strike injunction.
1. The RLA did not require or authorize an injunction against the sale of P&LE's assets to Railco. Pp. 502-512.
(b) Although the unions' 156 notices may have proposed far-reaching changes in the existing agreements, the giving of those notices did not obligate P&LE to maintain the status quo and to postpone its sale to Railco beyond the time the sale was approved by the ICC and was scheduled to be consummated. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 - which held that, when a rail union files a 156 notice, the status quo provision forbids the railroad to make any change in pre-existing "objective working conditions" even if those conditions are not contained in express or implied agreements - does not control here, primarily because that case did not involve a carrier's decision to quit the railroad business, sell its assets, and cease to be a railroad employer. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 , established that the decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management prerogative that only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent will require a ruling to the contrary. The RLA contains no expression of intent to render an employer's decision to go out of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by 156's status quo provision. Where, as here, the collective-bargaining agreement is silent concerning the sale of a railroad's assets and the railroad has proceeded in accordance with the ICA to obtain the ICC's approval of the sale, a union cannot delay the immediate consummation of the sale by filing a 156 notice. This construction of the RLA satisfies the Court's obligation to avoid conflicts between overlapping statutory regimes, since it maintains the ICC's plenary authority over rail acquisitions by noncarriers. In contrast, enjoining the sale's consummation based on the unions' 156 notices would likely result in the sale's cancellation and the frustration of Congress' intent through ICA amendments to deregulate the rail industry and to assist small rail lines with financial problems. Pp. 504-511.
(c) However, P&LE did have a limited duty to bargain in response to the unions' 156 notices. Its decision to sell, as such, was not a bargainable subject. Nevertheless, to the extent that it could satisfy the unions' proposals for changes, it was required to bargain about the effects that the sale would or might have upon its employees. That obligation ceased on the date for closing the sale after the Ex Parte 392 exemption became effective. P. 512.
2. The record is insufficient to allow this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the injunction against the strike. Although the NLGA's general limitation on district courts' power to issue injunctions in labor disputes must give way when necessary to enforce a duty specifically imposed by another statute, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the ICA creates no such duty. While 10901 [491 U.S. 490, 493] does authorize the ICC to impose labor protective provisions and gives unions the right to seek such protection and the right to judicial review if dissatisfied, no applicable ICA provision requires unions to participate in ICC proceedings or to seek protection rather than striking. Furthermore, labor protection provisions run against the acquiring railroad rather than the seller, and nothing in the ICA relieved P&LE of its duty to bargain with the unions until its transaction was completed or empowered the ICC to intrude into the relationship between P&LE and the unions. However, the NLGA's limitation on injunctions must also be accommodated to the specific provisions of the RLA, such that district courts have jurisdiction and power to issue injunctive orders against strikes violative of those provisions. Since neither of the lower courts ever ruled on whether the RLA creates a duty not to strike while its dispute resolution mechanisms are underway, the matter must be resolved on remand. Pp. 513-515.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 515.
Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ronald M. Johnson, Charles L. Warren, Eric D. Witkin, and G. Edward Yurcon.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried and Deputy Solicitor General Merrill.
Fn [491 U.S. 490, 493] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of South Dakota by Richard A. Allen and Julie A. Tigges; and for the National Railway Labor Conference by Richard T. Conway, Ralph J. [491 U.S. 490, 494] Moore, Jr., D. Eugenia Langan, and David P. Lee. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 87-1888 were filed for the Airline Industrial Relations Conference by Harry A. Rissetto and Thomas E. Reinert, Jr.; for Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. et al. by Ralph J. Moore, Jr., D. Eugenia Langan, James P. Daley, Stuart F. Gassner, and Robert J. Corber; and for Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., et al. by Ralph J. Moore, Jr., and D. Eugenia Langan.
David Silberman and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 87-1589.
These cases involve the interaction of three federal statutes with respect to the proposed sale of the rail line of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co. (P&LE). The statutes are the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.; the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V); and the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq.
The unions advised that they stood ready to negotiate all aspects of the matter, including the decision to sell the railroad assets. P&LE responded that it was willing to discuss the matter but that 156 notice and bargaining were not required since the transaction was subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) [491 U.S. 490, 497] under the ICA and since the requirements of 155 and 156 would intrude on that regime as well as upon management's prerogatives to conduct the affairs of the company with respect to the sales transaction.
The proposed sale of assets could not be carried out without compliance with the terms of the ICA, 49 U.S.C. 10901, which requires that noncarriers seeking to acquire a rail line first obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC. Section 10901(e) specifies the procedures for this purpose and provides that the ICC "may" require the acquiring company "to provide a fair and equitable arrangement for the protection of railroad employees who may be affected thereby no less protective of and beneficial to the interests of such employees than those established pursuant to section 11347 of this title." 7 Section 10505, however, [491 U.S. 490, 499] authorizes the Commission to grant exemptions from the requirements of the Act when not necessary to carry out the national transportation policy. 8 Based on its experience with acquisitions under 10901, the ICC had issued what is known as the Ex Parte No. 392 Class Exemption, see Ex Parte No. 392 (Sub. No. 1), Class Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines Under 49 U.S.C. 10901, [491 U.S. 490, 500] 1 I. C. C. 2d 810 (1985) (Ex Parte 392), review denied sub nom. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 260 U.S. App. D.C. 38, 817 F.2d 145 (1987), 9 which provides abbreviated procedures for seeking approval for acquisitions by non-carriers such as Railco of an operating railroad or its assets. The regulatory procedure, see 49 CFR 1150.32(b) (1987), involved the filing of an application for exemption which would become effective seven days after filing absent contrary notice from the Commission. 10 An interested party could oppose [491 U.S. 490, 501] the exemption by filing a petition to revoke at any time, after consideration of which the ICC could revoke the exemption in whole or in part or impose labor protective provisions. The ICC had indicated, however, that only in exceptional situations would such protective provisions be imposed.
The case in the District Court then went forward. Addressing the unions' request for an injunction, the District Court held that although P&LE did not have a duty to bargain over its decision to sell, P&LE was required by the RLA to bargain over the effects of the sale on employees, and that the status quo provision of 156 required that its bargaining obligations under the ALA must be satisfied before the sale could be consummated despite approval of the transaction by the ICC acting pursuant to the ICA. 677 F. Supp. 830 (WD Pa. 1987). A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 845 F.2d 420 (CA3 1988).
We granted P&LE's petition in No. 87-1888, challenging the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the injunction against the sale issued by the District Court, as well as P&LE's petition in No. 87-1589, asking for reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the strike injunction issued by the District Court. 488 U.S. 965 (1988).
P&LE submits that neither its decision to sell nor the impact that sale of the company might have had on its employees was a "change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" (emphasis added) within the meaning of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 156, and that P&LE therefore had no duty to give notice or to bargain with respect to these matters. The Court of Appeals rejected this submission, focusing on the effects the sale would have on employees and concluding that the "loss of jobs by possibly two-thirds of the employees clearly would require a `change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.'" 845 F.2d, at 428. The court did not point out how the proposed sale would require changing any specific provision of any of P&LE's collective-bargaining agreements. It did not suggest that any of those agreements dealt with the possibility of the sale of the company, sought to confer any rights on P&LE's employees in the event of the sale, or guaranteed that jobs would continue to be available indefinitely. 14 What P&LE proposed to do would remove it from the railroad business and terminate its position as a railroad employer; and like the Court of Appeals, RLEA does not explain how such action would violate or require changing any of the provisions of the unions' written contracts with P&LE.
Of course, not all working conditions to which parties may have agreed are to be found in written contracts. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 154 -155 (1969) (Shore Line). It may be that [491 U.S. 490, 504] "in the context of the relationship between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for implying an understanding on the particular practice involved." Id., at 160 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the Court of Appeals did not purport to find an implied agreement that P&LE would not go out of business, would not sell its assets, or if it did, would protect its employees from the adverse consequences of such action. Neither does RLEA. We therefore see no basis for holding that P&LE should have given a 156 notice of a proposed "change" in its express or implied agreements with the unions when it contracted to sell its assets to Railco. Nor was it, based on its own decision to sell, obligated to bargain about the impending sale or to delay its implementation. We find RLEA's arguments to the contrary quite unconvincing.
There is more substance to the Court of Appeals' holding, and to RLEA's submission, that the unions' 156 notices proposed far-reaching changes in the existing agreements over which P&LE was required to bargain and that the status quo provision of 156 prohibited P&LE from going forward with the sale pending completion of the "purposely long and drawn out" procedures which the Act requires to be followed in order to settle a "major" dispute. Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966). Section 156 provides that when a notice of change in agreements has been given, "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155." Relying on Shore Line, RLEA argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that when a rail labor union files a 156 notice to change the terms of an agreement, the "working conditions" that the carrier may not change pending conclusion of the bargaining process are not limited to those contained in express or implied agreements but include, as Shore Line held, "those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, [491 U.S. 490, 505] which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute." 396 U.S., at 153 . RLEA submits that the relationship of employer-employee and the state of being employed are among those working conditions that may not be changed until the RLA procedures are satisfied. We are unconvinced, for several reasons, that this is the case.
The facts of Shore Line, briefly stated, were these: Shore Line operated 50 miles of rail line between Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio, and Dearoad Yard near Detroit, Michigan. For many years, all train and engine crews reported for duty and finished the day at Lang Yard. When it was necessary to perform switching and other operations at other points, crews were transported at railroad expense to those outlying points. The company proposed to establish outlying work assignments at Trenton, Michigan, some 35 miles north of Lang Yard. Crews assigned there would have to report there. The proposed change was not forbidden by, and would not have violated, the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. The union filed a 156 notice seeking to amend the agreement to forbid the railroad to make outlying assignments. The issue was not settled by the parties and the union called for mediation. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad posted a bulletin creating the disputed assignment at Trenton. The union threatened a strike, the company sued to restrain the strike, and the union counterclaimed for an injunction relying on the status quo provision of 156. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held for the union, and we affirmed over a dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger. We held that even though Shore Line did not propose to change any of its agreements, the status quo provision of 156 - "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered" pending exhaustion of the required procedure - forbade any change by Shore Line in the "objective working conditions" then existing. 396 U.S., at 153 . We noted that had it been [491 U.S. 490, 506] the practice to make outlying work assignments, the company would have been within its rights to make the Trenton assignment; but the prior practice, the objective working condition, was to have crews report for work and come back to Lang Yard. That working condition could not be changed pending resolution of the dispute without violating the status quo provision of 156 even though there was nothing in the agreement between the parties to prevent outlying assignments. Id., at 153-154.
Shore Line, in our view, does not control these cases. In the first place, our conclusion in that case that the status quo provision required adherence not only to working conditions contained in express or implied agreements between the railroad and its union but also to conditions "objectively" in existence when the union's notice was served, and that otherwise could be changed without violating any agreement, extended the relevant language of 156 to its outer limits, and we should proceed with care before applying that decision to the facts of these cases. 15 Second, reporting at Lang Yard, we thought, had been the unquestioned practice for many years, and we considered it reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established that it would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status quo provisions of the RLA. [491 U.S. 490, 507] Third, and more fundamentally, the decision did not involve a proposal by the railroad to terminate its business. Here, it may be said that the working condition existing prior to the 156 notice was that P&LE was operating a railroad through the agency of its employees, but there was no reason to expect, simply from the railroad's long existence, that it would stay in business, especially in view of its losses, or that rail labor would have a substantial role in the decision to sell or in negotiating the terms of the sale. Whatever else Shore Line might reach, it did not involve the decision of a carrier to quit the railroad business, sell its assets, and cease to be a railroad employer at all, a decision that we think should have been accorded more legal significance than it received in the courts below. Our cases indicate as much.
This construction of the RLA also responds to our obligation to avoid conflicts between two statutory regimes, namely, the RLA and ICA, that in some respects overlap. As the Court has said, we "are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). We should read federal statutes "to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose." Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988). We act accordingly in this litigation.
Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause authority to regulate rail transportation for over a century. See Act to regulate commerce of 1887 (the ICA), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. In doing so, Congress has assigned to the ICC plenary authority over rail transactions, ranging from line extensions, consolidations, and abandonments, to acquisitions. In particular, the ICA in 49 U.S.C. 10901(a) permits noncarriers to acquire a rail line only if the ICC determines that "the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit" the rail acquisition and operation. The ICC may approve certification on satisfaction of various conditions. Specifically, it has authority to impose labor protection provisions though it is not obligated to do so. 10901(e). Acting pursuant to 10505, the ICC, in its Ex Parte 392 exemption proceedings, declared all noncarrier acquisitions presumptively exempt from 10901 regulation. Such transactions would be deemed approved seven days after a notice filed by the acquiring entities. 49 CFR 1150.32(b) (1987). And absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, which rail labor was entitled to demonstrate, labor protection provisions would not be imposed. The Ex Parte 392 procedures, and the ICA, 10505 exemption authority generally, like amendments to ICA in the last two [491 U.S. 490, 511] decades, see, e. g., the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31; the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, aimed at reversing the rail industry's decline through deregulatory efforts, above all by streamlining procedures to effectuate economically efficient transactions.
In No. 87-1589, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the injunction against the strike issued on October 8, 1987. At that time, the Ex Parte 392 exemption had become effective, and the District Court held that because the ICC had in effect authorized the sale and had ruled that delay would be prejudicial to the parties and the public interests, the NLGA prohibition against issuing injunctions in labor dispute cases must be accommodated to the ICC's decision that the sale of assets should go forward. It was this decision, based on the legal significance of the ICA and its impact on the NLGA, that the Court of Appeals summarily reversed. We agree with that decision.
We have held that the NLGA 4 general limitation on district courts' power to issue injunctions in labor disputes must be accommodated to the more specific provisions of the RLA: "[T]he District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders" to enforce compliance with the requirements of the RLA "notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952). Thus, a union may be enjoined from striking when the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of its contract and is therefore subject to compulsory arbitration. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). "[T]he specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id., at 41-42. The same accommodation of the NLGA to the specific provisions of the NLRA must be made. A union that has agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes and is subject to a no-strike clause may be enjoined from striking despite the NLGA. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Petitioner contends that the NLGA must likewise be accommodated to the procedures mandated by Congress in 49 U.S.C. 10901 specifically the authority of the ICC to impose labor protective provisions, the right of rail [491 U.S. 490, 514] labor to seek such provisions from the ICC, and its right to judicial review if dissatisfied. It is urged that the ICA provides a comprehensive scheme for the resolution of labor protection issues arising out of ICC-regulated transactions and that rail labor must take advantage of those procedures rather than strike. We are unpersuaded that this is the case.
The prohibition of the NLGA must give way when necessary to enforce a duty specifically imposed by another statute. But no applicable provision has been called to our attention that imposes any duty on rail unions to participate in ICC proceedings and to seek ICC protections with which they must be satisfied. Furthermore, labor protection provisions run against the acquiring railroad rather than the seller. Yet here it is with the seller, P&LE, that the unions wanted to bargain, seeking to ease the adverse consequences of the sale. To that end, the unions served 156 notices, which at least to some extent obligated P&LE to bargain until its transaction was closed. We find nothing in the ICA that relieved P&LE of that duty, nor anything in that Act that empowers the ICC to intrude into the relationship between the selling carrier and its railroad unions. We are thus quite sure that the NLGA forbade an injunction against that strike unless the strike was contrary to the unions' duties under the RLA.
As to that issue, the Court of Appeals stated: "We intimate no view as to whether the provisions of the Railway Labor Act are applicable to this dispute so that the district court would be entitled to enjoin the strike while that Act's dispute resolution mechanisms are underway. RLEA's complaint seeking a declaration that the Railway Labor Act is applicable to this dispute is the merits issue before the district court." 831 F.2d, at 1237. On remand, the District Court held that the RLA was indeed applicable to the dispute and on that basis issued an injunction against P&LE. It did not, however, ever address the question whether the unions' [491 U.S. 490, 515] strike, which occurred after their suit was filed, was enjoinable under the RLA. Neither did the Court of Appeals deal with that issue in affirming the District Court. P&LE perfunctorily asserts in its briefs in this Court that the strike injunction was proper because the unions were obligated to bargain rather than strike after their 156 notices were served. RLEA did not respond to this assertion. With the case in this position, we shall not pursue the issue. Instead, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and leave the matter, if it is a live issue, to be dealt with on remand.
[ Footnote 1 ] Attempts to interest major rail lines in the property were unavailing because of the high cost of labor protection that would have been mandatory under the section of the ICA applicable to purchases by an existing carrier. 49 U.S.C. 11347 (1982 ed., Supp. V), which is set forth in n. 7, infra.
[ Footnote 2 ] P&LE would keep certain real estate and some 6,000 railcars.
[ Footnote 3 ] CWP anticipated inviting all P&LE employees to submit applications and intended to give preference to them in hiring. CWP also expected to bargain for new contracts with the existing unions.
"The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates, pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. 6. The parties must confer, 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens `substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,' who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10."
"1. No employee of the P&LE Railroad Company who [was actively employed or on authorized leave of absence] between August 1, 1986 and August 1, 1987 . . . shall be deprived of employment or placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions for any reason except resignation, retirement, death or dismissal for justifiable cause. . . . The formulae for the protective allowances, with a separation option, shall be comparable to those established in the New York Dock conditions.
"2. If an employee is placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions, that employee shall receive, in addition to a make-whole-remedy, penalty pay equal to three times the lost pay, fringe benefits and consequential damages suffered by such employee.
"3. P&LE agrees to obtain binding commitments from any purchaser of its rail line operating properties and assets to assume all [of P&LE's] collective bargaining agreements . . . to hire P&LE employees in seniority order without physicals, and to negotiate with the P&LE and this Organization an agreement to apply this Agreement to the sale transaction and to select the forces to perform the work over the lines being acquired." App. 38, 42, 46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 122, 126.
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment . . . ."
"(2) either (A) the transaction or service is of limited scope, or (B) the application of a provision of this subtitle is not needed to protect shippers from the abuse of market power.
"In the years just after the partial deregulation of the railroad industry occasioned by the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 194-45, numerous new short lines and regional rail lines were created, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10901, through the sale of marginally profitable and unprofitable rail lines to new entities eager to provide rail service. In considering and approving these sales, the Commission became convinced that the expense imposed on such sales by the imposition of labor protective conditions was hampering the development of short line railroads and, indeed, was forcing the selling carriers to abandon these marginal lines pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10903 of the ICA.
"In order to foster the development of short line railroads to preserve rail facilities, service and employment that would otherwise be lost through abandonments, the Commission began withholding labor protections in individual sales. After considering over five years many such applications, the Commission determined that the formation of new rail carriers should be encouraged. In order to aid rail formations, the Commission promulgated the procedures in Ex Parte No. 392. In Ex Parte 392 the Commission exempted rail line sales to new carriers from full compliance with Commission procedures while retaining authority, under its revocation power, to review the transaction and correct any problem arising out of the transaction." Brief for Interstate Commerce Commission 3-4 (footnote and citations omitted).
In the Ex Parte 392 proceedings, the RLEA demanded that the Commission impose labor conditions in all 10901 sale transactions. The Commission, however, ruled that labor protective provisions would be imposed in individual cases only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 1 I. C. C. 2d, at 815.
[ Footnote 10 ] The ICC modified the Ex Parte 392 procedure in 1988 to extend the waiting period from 7 to 35 days. See 53 Fed. Reg. 5981-5982 (1988).
[ Footnote 11 ] See n. 7, supra.
[ Footnote 12 ] The order was to remain in effect until the District Court ruled on the preliminary injunction sought by P&LE. It was this order that was reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
[ Footnote 13 ] The strike and the decisions of the Court of Appeals effectively terminated the proposed sale to Railco. Efforts to find another buyer were unsuccessful, but since P&LE is still interested in selling its assets and the [491 U.S. 490, 502] issues in these cases have a bearing on those efforts, the cases, as the Court of Appeals recognized and the parties agree, are not moot.
Also, in late September, P&LE and its unions had informal exchanges about the effects of the sale. On October 14, one of the unions invoked the services of the Mediation Board. After the April 8, 1988, Court of Appeals decision, 845 F.2d 420 (CA3), effects bargaining proceeded, and as these cases indicate, the parties have not resolved their differences.
[ Footnote 14 ] Indeed, the Court of Appeals stated that "P&LE's agreements with its unions, however, do not appear to contemplate this type of transaction [i. e., sale of the rail lines], and thus neither expressly permit nor prohibit the sale." 845 F.2d, at 428, n. 9. RLEA asserts that P&LE had granted job security guarantees to some of its employees, see Brief for Respondent RLEA 3, but the record does not contain the collective-bargaining contracts, and if there were such guarantees, there is no claim that they would survive the sale of the rail line.
[ Footnote 15 ] Section 156 deals with bargaining and settlement procedures with respect to changes in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. There must be notice of such intended changes, as well as bargaining and mediation if requested or proffered. And in every case involving such notice, i. e., of intended changes in agreements, rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall not be changed by the carrier until the specified procedures are satisfied. Because 156 concerns changes in agreements, it is surely arguable that it is open to a construction that would not require the status quo with respect to working conditions that have never been the subject of an agreement, expressed or implied, and that, if no notice of changes had been served by the union, could be changed by the carrier without any bargaining whatsoever. Shore Line rejected that construction, but as indicated in the text, we are not inclined to apply Shore Line to the decision of P&LE to go out of business.
[ Footnote 16 ] We thought that a partial liquidation might present a different case and remanded for further findings. See 380 U.S., at 268 , 276-277.
[ Footnote 17 ] In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), which, like Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., arose under the NLRA, we concluded that "the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making the decision." 452 U.S., at 686 . Further, we held that the employer's decision to close down a segment of its business "is not part of 8 (d)'s `terms and conditions,' . . . over which Congress has mandated bargaining." Ibid. In so holding, we did not feel constrained by the Court's decision in Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). Indeed, we rejected the argument that Telegraphers compelled us to find bargaining over this decision mandatory. Although we pointed in First National Maintenance to the important distinctions between the RLA and the NLRA, there are other reasons why Telegraphers does not dictate the result in these cases. In Telegraphers, the Court held that the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against a labor strike under the provisions of the NLGA. A closely divided Court reasoned that a railroad's proposal to abandon certain single-agent stations and hence abolish some jobs was a bargainable issue. In Darlington and First National Maintenance, we concluded that the analysis in Telegraphers, which rested on an "expansive" reading of the RLA and the NLGA, did not govern a decision under the NLRA. 452 U.S., at 687 , n. 23. In this case, we examine Telegraphers once again in the context of the RLA. In Telegraphers a railroad was seeking simply to eliminate or consolidate some of its little-used local stations. The railroad here, by contrast, sought to sell all its lines and go out of business. There is nothing in Telegraphers that forces us to reach the result, in this extreme case, that P&LE was prohibited from terminating its operations without first bargaining with the unions. Notwithstanding the policy considerations prompting the enlarged scope of mandatory bargaining under the RLA, in light of Darlington, which First National Maintenance reaffirmed, we are not inclined to extend Telegraphers to a case in which the railroad decides to retire from the railroad business.
The dissent, post, at 518-520, seems to assert that Shore Line and Telegraphers dealt with a railroad's freedom to leave the market. But as we point out, that is precisely what those cases did not involve. We are [491 U.S. 490, 509] plainly at odds with the dissent with respect to the significance of P&LE's decision to leave the railroad business.
[ Footnote 18 ] P&LE argues that the RLA injunction was an impermissible collateral attack on the ICC order approving the sale. But the ICA, 49 U.S.C. 10901, and the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 156, as we construe them, are complementary regimes. Here, the ICC simply granted an exemption from the strictures of 10901, which permitted, but did not order, the consummation of the sale. It made no finding that would prevent enforcement of 156.
The dissent, post, at 515, asserts that we ignore the principle that P&LE, a regulated utility, may not enter or leave the market without agency approval. Of course, we do not, for we set out the law that requires ICC consent to the sale, which was obtained.
[ Footnote 19 ] We address the duty to bargain about the effects of the sale only in the context of the facts existing when the unions' notices were served. We do not deal with a railroad employer's duty to bargain in response to a union's 156 notice proposing labor protection provisions in the event that a sale, not yet contemplated, should take place.
The railroad industry long has been the subject of governmental regulation. 3 A year after this Court held that individual States were powerless to regulate rail lines extending beyond their boundaries, Wabash, S. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate economic aspects of the rail industry. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Regulation of employment relationships within the rail industry followed, 4 and in 1926, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.
There is no disagreement that labor protective provisions related to the effects of an abandonment or sale may be the subject of collective bargaining. It follows, I believe, that when railway labor unions request the inclusion of such provisions [491 U.S. 490, 518] in their collective-bargaining agreements by proper statutory notice, see ante, at 496-497, and n. 5, the employer must maintain the status quo during the statutorily mandated negotiating process or risk a strike as a consequence of its breach of that duty. See 2 First, Seventh of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 152 First, Seventh. The Court admits the force of this proposition and acknowledges that an employer has some duty to bargain when a sale is announced. Ante, at 504, 512. Nevertheless, it indicates that this particular dispute did not obligate the railroad to preserve the status quo, for the Court would prohibit any bargaining that "in effect challenged the decision to sell," and would allow negotiations to cease as soon as the sale is closed. Ante, at 512. 7 This diminution of the employer's duty contravenes two of our decisions interpreting the RLA.
"It would stretch credulity too far to say that the Railway Labor Act, designed to protect railroad workers, was somehow violated by the union acting precisely in accordance with that Act's purpose to obtain stability and permanence in employment for workers. There is no express provision of law, and certainly we can infer none from the Interstate Commerce Act, making it unlawful for unions to want to discuss with railroads actions that may vitally and adversely affect the security, seniority and stability of railroad jobs." 362 U.S., at 339 -340.
Telegraphers thus holds that if management decides to abandon a significant part of a railroad's business, the impact of that decision on employees' job security is a proper subject for bargaining under the RLA.
The Court therefore construed "status quo" to mean "those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute." Id., at 153.
Today the Court proffers three reasons why Shore Line does not control these cases. First, it asserts that the Shore Line holding that "status quo" includes "conditions `objectively' in existence when the union's notice was served" stretched the language of the statute "to its outer limits," ante, at 506. I am not at all sure that is true; even if it is, the holding is unambiguous and has the force of law. Second, the Court suggests that the fact that the work assignment changed in Shore Line had been in effect for many years justified an expectation "that it would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status quo provisions of the RLA." Ante, at 506. This effectively restates Justice Harlan's argument in dissent that while not limited to the terms of written agreements, the status quo obligation is limited to a change in settled practice. See Shore Line, 396 U.S., at 159 -160. The Court's emphasis on those dissenting remarks avails it nothing, because the instant controversy also arose out of a change in established procedure. By either a subjective or objective measure, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that these employees' jobs are among the "working conditions" that must be preserved throughout the bargaining process.
"Today the Court tells the railroad that it must bargain with the union or suffer a strike. The latter would be the death knell of the railroad. Hence, for all practical purposes, the Court is telling the railroad that it must secure the union's approval before severing the hundreds of surplus employees now carried on its payroll. Everyone knows what the answer of the union will be. It is like the suitor who, when seeking the hand of a young lady, was told by her to `go to father.' But, as the parody goes, `She knew that he knew that her father was dead; she knew that he knew what a life he had led; and she knew that he knew what she meant when she said "go to father."'" 362 U.S., at 343 -344 (dissenting opinion).
"We are fully aware of the unfortunate ramifications and irony of our decision. A bargaining order, and a status quo injunction, designed to foster conciliation, promote labor peace, and ultimately keep the rails running, may ultimately have the perverse effect of destroying the only chance P & LE has for survival and perhaps even the very jobs that the unions are now trying to protect. Although we are not happy with this result, we feel constrained to reach it, because the Supreme Court has appropriately admonished the judiciary not to apply its own brand of `common sense' in the face of a contrary statutory mandate." 845 F.2d 420, 446 (CA3 1988) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 -195 (1978)).
[ Footnote 1 ] E. g., D. Hjelmfelt, Antitrust and Regulated Industries 1.3 (1985).
[ Footnote 2 ] Because I agree with the Court's factual description of these cases and its resolution of No. 87-1589, I join Parts I and III of its opinion.
[ Footnote 3 ] See W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Industries 7-11, 24-55 (2d ed. 1976); M. Glaeser, Public Utilities in American Capitalism 57-71 (1957); I. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, pt. 1, pp. 11-35 (1931).
[ Footnote 4 ] See, e. g., Hours of Service Act of 1907, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 61-66; Employers' Liability Act of 1908, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 51-60. See also Sharfman 180-182; L. Lecht, Experience under Railway Labor Legislation 14-46 (1955).
"One must disregard the entire history of railroad labor relations in the United States to be able to say that the just and reasonable treatment of railroad employees in mitigation of the hardship imposed on them in carrying out the national policy of railway consolidation, has no bearing on the [491 U.S. 490, 517] successful prosecution of that policy and no relationship to the maintenance of an adequate and efficient transportation system." Id., at 234.
See also ICC v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 315 U.S. 373 (1942).
[ Footnote 6 ] The railroad might have had a greater duty to bargain, the Court suggests, had the unions served notice before sale negotiations had commenced. See ante, at 512, n. 19. Yet in the two opinions that I believe should control these cases, we did not fault the unions for filing 6 notices in reaction to - rather than in anticipation of - the railroads' initiatives. Compare Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 332 (1960), with id., at 349 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (majority rejects railroad's argument that 6 notices were improper because filed after railroad petitioned state regulatory commissions for permission to abolish jobs). See also Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 146 (1969). In light of the ICC's abrupt halt to its practice of requiring labor protections, moreover, the Court's distinction unfairly penalizes the unions in this litigation.
[ Footnote 7 ] The Court neglects to mention that a sale may be closed within a matter of months, whereas resort to RLA procedures may entail "virtually endless `negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.'" Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987) (quoting Shore Line, 396 U.S., at 148 -149). If the railroad knows its obligations will end when the sale is consummated, it will have no incentive to expedite bargaining. Thus the Court's imposition of a minimal bargaining duty affords employees scarcely more protection than they would have absent any duty.
[ Footnote 8 ] Compare Telegraphers, 362 U.S., at 336 ("We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union's effort to negotiate about the job security of its members `represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial [491 U.S. 490, 521] prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations'"), with Brief for Petitioner 25 ("A decision to go out of business is the quintessential managerial prerogative").


A prosecuting attorney may enter a nolle prosequi of pending charges at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence. A nolle prosequi shall be accompanied by a written statement, signed by the prosecuting attorney, setting forth the reasons for that disposition.
After jeopardy attaches, a nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the defendant shall have the effect of an acquittal of the charges contained in the nolle prosequi.
While similar to Fed.R.Crim.P. 48, this rule is a formalization of prior Massachusetts practice.
The decision to enter a nolle prosequi as to all or any distinct part of pending charges is discretionary with the prosecuting attorney.
Power to enter a nolle prosequi is absolute in the prosecuting officer from the return of the indictment up to the beginning of trial, except possibly in instances of scandalous abuse of the authority.
Commonwealth v. Dascalakis , 246 Mass. 12, 18 (1923). See Manning v. Municipal Court of Roxbury , 372 Mass. 315 (1977); Commonwealth v. Massod , 350 Mass. 745 (1966). This rule is consistent with the common law. See 30 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (Smith) §§ 854, 858 (1970, Supp.1978).
Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits dismissal by the prosecution only with leave of court. It did not seem advisable to engraft this additional requirement onto the Massachusetts rule, however, since it is doubted that the court has the power to compel the Commonwealth to proceed with a case which it does not believe warrants prosecution. See 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 812 at 304 (1969).
The term “prosecuting attorney” in this rule is intended to include municipal attorneys, e.g., city solicitors, prosecuting a case. See G.L. c. 278, § 15 .
General Laws c. 277, § 70A is the basis for the second sentence of this subdivision which requires the prosecuting attorney to file a statement of his reasons for entering a nolle prosequi. 30 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (Smith) § 857 (1970, Supp.1978); see ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 4.4 (Approved Draft, 1971).
Once a case has reached trial, the defendant has been placed in jeopardy and has the right to have the issue of his guilt adjudicated. Commonwealth v. Massod , 350 Mass. 745 (1966). If after commencement of trial, but before return of the verdict, the prosecuting attorney enters a nolle prosequi without the consent of the defendant, the defendant is effectually acquitted of those charges which are the subject of the nolle prosequi. Commonwealth v. Hart , 149 Mass. 7 (1889); Commonwealth v. Dascalakis , 246 Mass. 12 (1923); Commonwealth v. Sitko , 372 Mass. 305 (1977); 30 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (Smith) § 855 (1970). This comports substantially with Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(a), which prohibits the filing of a dismissal during trial without the consent of the defendant.


text:
The Complainant is Deutsche Telekom AG, of Munich, Germany, represented by Lovells, Germany.
The Respondent is Andrew Miller, of Utah, United States of America.
<tmobile-de.com>, <tmobilede.com>, <t-mobile-de.net>, <tmobile-de.net>, <tmobilede.net>, <t-onlinecom.net>, <tonlinecom.net>, <tonline-de.com> <t-online-de.net>, <tonline-de.net>, <t-onlinenet.com>, <tonlinenet.com> <tonlinenet.net>, <t-onlines.net>, <tonlines.net> (collectively “the Domain Names”), are registered with Fabulous.com Pty Limited (“the Registrar”).
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on February 27, 2008. On February 29, 2008, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Domain Names. On March 3, 2008 the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response, confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the Domain Names. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
The Center appointed Warwick Smith as the sole panelist in this matter on April 3, 2008. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
In the absence of any response, the Panel has checked the record to ensure that the Center has discharged its responsibility to notify the Complaint to the Respondent under paragraph 2(a) of the Rules. The Panel notes that the courier pack addressed to the Respondent could not be delivered, and that an attempt to transmit the Complaint and Notice of Commencement of Administrative Proceeding to the Respondent by facsimile, was also unsuccessful. The Center’s email transmissions to the various “postmaster” email addresses were all returned with “permanent fatal error” reports. However, the copy of the Complaint and Notice sent by email to the Respondent’s “gmail” address provided in the Whois information for the Domain Names, seems to have been transmitted successfully, and it therefore appears that the Respondent has had actual notice of the Complaint. In any event, the Panel is satisfied that the Center has “employed reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent”, and has therefore complied with its obligations under paragraph 2(a) of the Rules.
The following facts are taken from the uncontested allegations in the Complaint.
The Complainant is Europe’s largest telecommunications company. It has an established presence in the major economic centers of the world, serving customers in about 50 countries through regional units, with a focus on the European and United States markets. The Complainant’s subsidiary T-Mobile International AG & Co KG (“T-Mobile”) is one of the world’s leading companies in mobile communications. T-Mobile also concentrates on the European and United States markets. By the end of the third quarter of 2006, T-Mobile had more than 106 million customers.
“T-Mobile” is the company name under which the Complainant’s business in the mobile communications sector is conducted. The Complainant operates websites at “www.t-mobile.com” and “www.t-mobile.net”. The Complainant has spent a considerable time and money developing the “T-Mobile” brand, and the public has come to associate that expression exclusively with the Complainant, its subsidiaries, and businesses. The Complainant therefore has substantial goodwill arising from the use of the trade mark T-MOBILE.
The Complainant uses the brand “T-Online” to represent its Internet service provider “T-Online”, which is one of the leading Internet providers of broadband Internet access on the European market. The Complainant also operates websites at “www.t-online.com”, “www.tonline.com”, “www.t-online.net”, “www.tonline.net”, “www.t-online.de”, and “www.tonline.de”.
The Complainant has a large number of national, Community, and international trade marks reflecting the term “T-Mobile”. The Complainant’s trade mark registrations include the mark T-MOBILE, registered in the United States of America under registration number 2282432, with effect from February 27, 1997. This mark is registered for various goods and services in international classes 9, 14, 16, 18, 25, 28, 36, 37, 38, 41, and 42.
In addition, the Complainant is the registered proprietor of the mark T-ONLINE on the principal register maintained by the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office, in respect of a variety of goods and services in international classes 9, 14, 16, 18, 25, 28, 36, 37, 38, 41, and 42. This application was filed on November 2, 1995, and the mark consists of the capital letter “T”, separated from the word “Online” by a line of three small dots or squares, and with one similar dot or square before the “T” and one after “Online”.
All of the Domain Names were registered on May 1, 2007.
According to searches carried out by the Complainant on August 28 and August 31, 2007, the Domain Names were then registered to a company called KerryWeb Enterprise Inc, of Los Angeles, California, United States of America. On September 26, 2007, the Complainant’s representative sent a cease and desist letter to KerryWeb Enterprise Inc, drawing attention to the Complainant’s claimed rights in the trade marks T-MOBILE and T-ONLINE. The Complainant’s representative proposed that KerryWeb Enterprise Inc should assign the Domain Names to the Complainant, and refrain from registering any further domain names containing either of the phrases “T(-)mobile” and/or “T(-)online”. The Complainant’s representative sought a response by October 9, 2007.
The Complainant’s representative does not appear to have received a reply to this letter. Instead, there was a further change in the registrant of the Domain Names: Whois searches run by the Complainant on November 13, 2007, show that by then the registrant of all of the Domain Names was Christinas Kerr of New York City, United States of America. The Complainant’s representative sent a cease and desist letter to this registrant, on November 14, 2007. Again, the letter drew the registrant’s attention to the Complainant’s T-MOBILE and T-ONLINE trade marks, and proposed the assignment of the Domain Names to the Complainant and an agreement by the registrant not to register any further domain names containing the phrases “T(-)mobile” and/or “T(-)online”. A response was sought by November 20, 2007.
Again, it appears that no response was received. The present administrative proceeding was commenced on February 27, 2008.
According to the Complaint, the Domain Names resolve to websites where sponsored links, in the German language, are displayed. Many of the sponsored links refer to the Complainant’s competitors in the mobile telecommunications sector – for example, Debitel and Vodafone.
The Panel has himself visited the websites to which the Domain Names resolve. All appeared in the English language, and all contained sponsored links to various third party websites. Some links were to sites which appeared to offer products offered by the Complainant’s competitors. Some click-on links labeled “T-mobile …” took the site visitor to sites offering products generically, with no particular reference to the Complainant or its products. Others offered totally unrelated products such as T-shirts.
4. The use or absence of hyphens in domain names “does not change the likelihood of confusion” (citing BIC Deutschland GmbH & Co KG v. Paul Tweed, WIPO Case No. D2000-0418).
5. The Respondent has been guilty of typosquatting. Typosquatting, by definition, renders the Domain Names confusingly similar to the Complainant’s marks (citing Dow Jones & Company, Inc. and Dow Jones, L. P. v. Powerclick, Inc, WIPO Case No. D2000-1259).
(i) None of the circumstances listed at paragraph 4(c) of the Policy apply.
(ii) The Respondent is not commonly known by any of the Domain Names, and has never been a representative or licensee of the Complainant, or otherwise authorized to use the Complainant’s marks.
(iii) The Respondent does not use the Domain Names for a bona fide offering of goods or services, and is not making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of them. Many of the sponsored links published on the Respondent’s website refer to products of the Complainant’s competitors.
(i) When registering the Domain Names, the Respondent had knowledge of the Complainant’s trade marks and business names. That is evident given the worldwide fame of the Complainant’s marks, and the use of the terms “T-mobile”, “Tmobile”, “T-online”, and “Tonline” in the Domain Names, as well as from the high number of similar Domain Names registered at once. Also, it is reasonable to conclude that only someone who was familiar with the Complainant’s marks would have registered identical domain names (citing British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v. Mr. Pablo Merino and Sky Services S.A., WIPO Case No. D2004-0131).
(ii) The Respondent’s registration, without authorization, of domain names which are identical to the Complainant’s famous trade marks and trade name, is, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith (citing PepsiCo Inc v. Paul J Swider, WIPO Case No. D2002-0561).
(iii) It is well settled that the practice of typosquatting, of itself, is evidence of the bad faith registration of a domain name (citing Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. v. Shep Dog, WIPO Case No. D2004-1069, Lexar Media Inc. v. Michael Huang, WIPO Case No. D2004-1039, and Wal-Mart Stores Inc v. Longo, WIPO Case No. D2004-0816).
(iii) that the Domain Names have been registered or is being used in bad faith.
The Complainant has proved this part of the Complaint, in respect of all of the Domain Names.
The Complainant has provided satisfactory proof that it is the registered proprietor in the United States of America of the trade mark T-MOBILE, and of a stylized T-ONLINE mark.
Five of the Domain Names incorporate as their dominant components, the expression “tmobile”, (in one case with a hyphen between the “t” and the “mobile”). Numerous panel decisions under the Policy have held that the incorporation of a complainant’s trade mark in full in a disputed domain name, may be sufficient to establish confusing similarity under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy (see for example, Nokia Group v. Mr. Giannattasio Mario, WIPO Case No. D2002-0782, The Ritz Hotel Ltd v. Damir Kruzicevic, WIPO Case No. D2005-1137, and Roust Trading Limited v. AMG LLC, WIPO Case No. D2007-1857). Neither the hyphens nor the addition of suffixes such as “de”, “com”, or “net” do anything to alleviate the confusion caused by the incorporation of the Complainant’s T-MOBILE mark in those five Domain Names.
Similarly, the Domain Names which incorporate the Complainant’s T-ONLINE mark, or almost do so, differ from that mark only in the most insignificant details (e.g. leaving out the hyphen, and adding, with or without hyphens, expressions such as “com”, “net”, and “de”, whether or not preceded by a hyphen or a dot). The Panel accepts the Complainant’s submission based on Deutsche Telekom AG v. WWW Enterprise, Inc (supra), that such additions do not have any distinguishing capacity.
For the foregoing reasons, the Panel concludes that all of the Domain Names are confusingly similar to trade marks in which the Complainant has rights.
If the circumstances are sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing by the Complainant of absence of rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names on the part of the Respondent, the evidentiary burden shifts to the Respondent to show, by plausible, concrete evidence, that he does have a right or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name.
In this case, there is no suggestion that the Respondent (or any business operated by him) has been commonly known by any of the Domain Names. Paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy therefore has no application. The Complainant has not authorized the Respondent to use its marks (or any confusingly similar expressions), whether in the Domain Names or otherwise, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Respondent might have been making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the Domain Names, without intent for commercial gain (and so have some right or legitimate interest under paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy). The resolution of the Domain Names to a website which features sponsored links to third parties’ websites (some of which offer products of the Complainant’s competitors), suggests that the Respondent has been using the Domain Names for commercial purposes.
The Lyonnaise de Banque v Richard J. and Motorola Inc. v Mr. Josip Broz cases, were applied by the 3-member panel in Provident Financial plc and Provident Insurance Plc v. Mode L, WIPO Case No. D2007-0149, and the Shahnaz Husain decision itself has been followed by this Panel in Sanofi-Aventis v Abadabq S.A., WIPO Case No. D2006-1611, and in Sanofi-Aventis v. Keyboard Marketing, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0075.
Overall, the Panel’s clear impression is that the Domain Names have been used for no other purpose than to attract Internet users familiar with the Complainant and its products marketed under T-MOBILE or T-ONLINE marks, to the websites to which the Domain Names resolve. That is, of course, the kind of bad faith use described at paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy, and as such could never qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services.
In the foregoing circumstances, the Complainant has established a prima facie case, and the evidentiary onus shifts to the Respondent. The Respondent has failed to file any response, and accordingly the Complainant has succeeded on this part of the Complaint.
1. The Domain Names are all confusingly similar to one or other of the Complainant’s T-MOBILE or T-ONLINE marks, and the Complainant has not authorized the Respondent to use its marks (or any expressions confusingly similar to them), whether in a domain name or otherwise. The Respondent has no right or legitimate interest in respect of the Domain Names.
2. It is inconceivable that the Respondent did not know of the Complainant and its T-MOBILE and T-ONLINE marks, when he acquired (and thereby “registered”) the Domain Names. Both of the marks on which the Complainant relies are registered in the United States of America, where the Respondent resides, and the Complainant is a major player in the mobile telecommunications sector in that country and elsewhere in the world. The Complainant also operates websites at “www.t-mobile.com” and “www.t-mobile.net”, and at “www.t-online.com”, “www.tonline.com”, “www.t-online.net”, “www.tonline.net”, “www.t-online.de”, and “www.tonline.de”. It is highly improbable that anyone acquiring 15 domain names with only very minor variations from the Complainant’s domain names, would have been unaware of the Complainant’s domain names.
3. The use of the letter “t” at the beginning of each of the Domain Names, and the use of the abbreviation “de”, are also clear indicators of both prior knowledge of the Complainant and its marks, and bad faith intent. First, the uses of the words “mobile” and “online” in all of the Domain Names, direct the reader’s attention to the fields of mobile telecommunications and the Internet respectively. The use of the letter “t” in all of the Domain Names, then directs Internet users’ attention to the Complainant, a leading player in the mobile telecommunications and ISP markets, which has adopted the letter “T” as the distinctive part of its relevant trade marks. The use of the abbreviation “de” (the country code top level domain for the Complainant’s home country, Germany) in many of the Domain Names removes any possible doubt that the registration of the Domain Names was intended to bring the Complainant and its businesses to the minds of Internet users reading the Domain Names. The Panel also accepts the Complainant’s submission that the registration of such a high number of similar domain names at once, makes it highly improbable that any person registering or acquiring the Domain Names would not have appreciated the connections between the Domain Names and the Complainant and its businesses.
4. Having regard to the factors listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and in the absence of any Response to the Complaint, the Panel concludes that the Respondent knew of the Complainant and its relevant marks at the time he acquired (registered) the Domain Names.
See also the recent panel decisions in Simon & Schuster Inc v Domain Administrator Limited, WIPO Case No. D2008-0278, and The Southern Company v Texas International Property Associates, WIPO Case No. D2007-0773 (in the latter case, the panel said: “typosquatting, however, is the intentional misspelling of words with intent to siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith …”).
There may not be intentional misspelling of words in the Domain Names in this case, but the intention to “prey on” Internet users who may not read the Complainant’s very similar domain names clearly, and to siphon off Internet traffic by that means, is fairly obvious.
4. The Respondent’s use of the Domain Names in this case, has equally been in bad faith. The Domain Names all point to websites containing sponsored links to third party websites, and, in the absence of any response, the Panel infers that the Respondent has been deriving personal gain from those sponsored links. The Domain Names are so obviously similar to the Complainant’s relevant trade marks (and domain names), that it is clear that the Respondent has been riding on the back of the Complainant’s goodwill in its marks, in order to attract Internet users to the websites to which the Domain Names resolve (and so increase the Respondent’s revenue derived from the sponsored links at those websites). The circumstances fall squarely within paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy: the Respondent has been using the Domain Names to intentionally attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the websites to which the Domain Names resolve, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s T-MOBILE or T-ONLINE mark, as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the websites operated by the Respondent at the Domain Names.
The Complainant having proved the three elements required to be proved under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the Domain Names must be transferred to the Complainant.
<tmobile-de.com>, <tmobilede.com>, <t-mobile-de.net>, <tmobile-de.net>, <tmobilede.net>, <t-onlinecom.net>, <tonlinecom.net>, <tonline-de.com>, <t-online-de.net>, <tonline-de.net>, <t-onlinenet.com>, <tonlinenet.com>, <tonlinenet.net>, <t-onlines.net>, <tonlines.net> be transferred to the Complainant.

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Cultivated as a vegetable and used green or dried, fresh or canned, and for stock feed. feeding value of broadbeans is high, considered in some areas superior to field peas or other legumes. Broadbean has been considered as a meat extender or substitute and as a skim-milk substitute. Sometimes grown for green manure, but more generally for stock feed. Large-seeded cvs used as a vegetable, and frequently grown as a home-garden crop, and for canning. One of the most important winter crops for human consumption in the middle East. Roast seed are eaten like peanuts in India.
Said to be used for diuretic, expectorant, and tonic.
Inhalation of the pollen or ingestion of the seeds may cause favism, a severe hemolytic anemia, perhaps causing collapse. It is an inherited enzymatic deficiency occasional among Mediterranean people (Greek, Italian, Semitics). The genetic disorder occurs in about 1% of whites, 15% of blacks. The favism-inducing toxins are believed to be divicine and isouramil, the aglycone moieties of vicine and convicine. Flesh of broadbeans contains ca. 0.612.38% vicine, common vetch contains 0.04%, peas contitin traces, and soy flour is devoid of vicine. Injected intravenously in rabbits, broadbean extracts have produced haemoglobinuria and death. An ethanol-ether extract of broadbeans has estrogenic activity, 50 mg stimulates the nonpregnant uterus at dioestrus. The LD50 of the bean extract in mice was 19,000 mg/kg body weight. L-DOPA and epinene have been reported from the seeds. Among phytoalexins reprted in broadbean are medicarpin, epoxide, and wyerone. Seeds are reported to contain trypsin indibitors and chymo-trypsin inhibitors. The whole dry seeds contain (per 100 g): 344 calories, 10.1% moisture, 26.2 g protein, 1.3 g fat. 59.4 g total carbohydrate, 6.8 g fiber, 3.0 g ash, 104 mg Ca, 301 mg P, 6.7 mg Fe, 8 mg Na, 1123 mg K, 130 mg b-carotene equivalent, 0.38 mg thiamine, 0.24 mg riboflavin, 2.1 mg niacin, 162 mg tryptophane, and 16? mg ascorbic acid. Flour contains: 340 calories, 12.4% moisture, 25.5 g protein, 1.5 g fat, 58.8 g total carbohydrate, 1.5 g fiber. 1.8 g ash, 66 mg Ca, 354 mg P. 6.3 mg Fe, 10 mg b-carotene equivalent, 0.42 mg thyamine, 0.28 mg riboflavin, and 2.7 mg niacin. Taamiah, made from broadbean, contains 408 calories, 27.% moisture, 10.0 g protein, 31.8 g fat, 26.3 g total carbohydrate, 1.2 g fiber, 4.9 g ash, 72 mg Ca, 153 mg P, and 6.1 mg Fe. lmmature seeds contain: 75 calories, 76.3% moisture, 7.1 g protein, 0.4 g fat, 15.3 g total carbohydrate, 3.2 g fiber, 0.9 ash, 38 mg Ca, 127 mg P, 0.10 mg thiamine, 0.22 mg riboflavin, and 140 mg ascorbic acid. Germinated seeds contain: 111 calories, 64.5% moisture, 10.9 g protein, 0.3 g fat, 22.9 g total carbohydrate, 5.6 g fiber, and 1.4 g ash. Roatsted seeds contain: 366 calories. 5.3% moisture, 26.4 g protein, 2.0 g fat, 63.3 g total carbohydrate, 1.7 g fiber, 3.0 g ash, 60 mg Ca, 479 mg P, 6.8 mg Fe, 0.21 mg thiamine, 0.35 mg riboflavin, 2.4 mg niacin, and 2 mg ascorbic acid. Green seeds contain 118 calories, 69.0% moisture, 9.3 g protein, 0.4 g fat, 20.3 g total carbohydrate, 3.8 g fiber, 1.0 g ash, 31 mg Ca, 140 mg Fe, 2.3 mg Fe, 60 mg vitamin A, 0.28 mg thiamine, 0.17 mg riboflavin, 1.7 mg niacin, and 28 mg ascorbic acid. Fried and salted seeds contain: 402 calories, 7.6% moisture, 26.4 g protein, 14.8 g fat, 47.4 g total carbohydrate, 3.8 g fiber, 3.8 g ash, 73 mg Ca, 331 mg P, 7.1 mg Fe, 994 mg K, 5 mg b-carotene equivalent, 0.10 mg thiamine, 0.05 mg riboflavin, and 1.0 mg niacin. The haulms contain: 85% moisture, 2.5% crude protein, 0.4% fat, and 4.9% crude fiber, 5.41% N-free extract, 1.8% ash, 0.22% Ca, 0.04% P, and 2% digestible crude protein. The amino acid content averages (mg/g N): isoleucine 250, leucine 443, lysine 404, phenylalanine 270, tyrosine 200, methionine 46, cystine 50, threonine 210. valine 275, arginine 556, histidine 148, alanine 259, aspartic acid 702, glutamic acid 942, glycine 258, proline 249, serine 280. The fatty acid composition of broadbean oil has been reported as 88.6% unsaturated (oleic 45.8, linoleic 30% and linolenic 12.8%) and 11.4% saturated (8.2% stearic). Cholesterol (0.04%) and lipoxygenase are also reported.
Coarse upright, annual herb; stems large, unbranched 0.32 m tall, with 1 or more stems from the base: leaves compaound, leaflets usually 6 large broad, oval; flowers large, white with dark purple markings, horne short pedicels in clusters of 15 in axils of leaves; 14 pods, developing from each flower cluster; legumes greenish black, brown to black, glabrous,reticulate, 820 cm long, 1030 mm broad, inflated, terete, flattened, oblong, obliquely accuminate at both ends, style usually permanent, 34-seeded, twisting loosely or tightly during dehiscence; seeds oblong or oval, flattened or rounded, smooth, bright reddish brown, light to dark greenish brown or light to dark purple, all obscurely mottled or dotted with colors similar to base colors, 6.517 mm long, 730.5 mm broad, 4.59 mm thick. V. f. var. major, seeds 1,103 kg: V. f. var. equina seeds 6.615/kg. Wt.kg/hl = 77. Germination cryptocotylar.
Probably native to the Near East, broadbean is now widely introduced and cultivated in temperate North America, including Manitoba and Saskatchewan, South America, especially the Andes, and elsewhere (e.g. Burma, China, Sudan, and Uganda).
Broadbean requires a cool season for best development. Grown as a winter annual in warm temperate and subtropical areas. It can be grown anywhere it does not winterkill but where temperatures fluctuate rapidly. Well-adapted to wetter portions of cereal-growing areas of western Canada. Tolerates nearly any soil type, grows best on rich loams. Moderate moisture supply is necessary. Not drought resistant. Moisture requirement is highest ca. 912 weeks after establishment. More tolerant to acid soil conditions than most legumes. Can be grown in nearly all parts of the United States without liming. Hardier cvs tolerate winter temperatures of -10°C without serious injury. Winter types fare well with average temperatures of 2°C, without severe frost. Growing season should have little or no excessive heat. Ranging from Boreal Moist to Wet through Tropical Desert to Dry Forest Life Zones, broadbean is reported to tolerate annual precipitation of 2.320.9 dm (mean of 95 cases = 8.0), annual mean temperature of 5.6°27.5°C (mean of 95 cases = 12.1), and pH of 4.58.3 (mean of 87 cases = 6.6).
In localities having no hard frosts, most cvs can be sown in fall and survive the winter. In northern localities, or at high elevations farther south, fava bean should be planted in early spring, when ground can be worked, at the same time as the earliest ordinary spring crops. Large-seeded cvs are sown with planters used for lima beans, small-seeded cvs with a common corn planter. In some areas broadbeans are planted by hand. At seeding time the field is plowed shallow and seed dropped in every second or third furrow. Seed are usually sown 510 cm deep in rows ca. 75 cm apart, with seeds 15 cm apart in the rows. Rows 60 cm apart, or even closer, give good results under favorable conditions, but wider planting usually is preferable. Small-seeded cvs are planted at 90122 kg/ha; large-seeded cvs. 7890 kg/ha. In United Kingdom, 450 kg seed/ha produces maximum yields. Yields are economically optimal at 225340 k/ha for large seeded cvs, and satisfactory at 190 kg/h for small-seeded cvs. For green manure or forage small-seeded cvs are usually broadcast. Russian field trials showed that pretreatmant of the seeds with 0.01% of vitamins of the B group increased seed yields by as much as 36%. Fertilizers and seed inoculation with proper legume bacteria are usually recommended. Innoculation is not always, practiced (e.g., Britain, Europe in general, where nodulation with indigenous rhizobia is excellent). In southern United States, P and K are used before or at seeding. Early deep sowing into a well-drained firm seedbed gives best results. Broadbeatns should be thoroughly cultivated throughout their growing period. When planted in 60 cm rows or closer, special machinery is necessary for cultivation. When planted in 90 cm rows, ordinary cultivators can be used. Zero tillage has depressed yields by 22%. In United Kingdom, thiram and captan are recommended as fungicides, chlorpropham plus diuron or fenuron, or simazine, its preemergence herbicides, dinoseb-acetate as a postemergence herbicide.
Time of harvest depends on method-hand or mechanical. Beans mature 90220 days after planting. Harvest can be delayed a little longer for hand than for mechanical harvest. In either case, crop should not be cut until the lowel pods are matured and the upper ones fully developed. If harvest is delayed until the upper pods are ripe, loss from shattering is great. An ordinary mowing machine can be used, but the drop-rake reaper is more satisfactory and reduces shattering. Crop should be cut on cloudy day and maybe cut at night and shocked early the next day. Large-seeded cvs are threshed with a common bean thresher with special adjustments to the cylinder. Small-seeded types can be thrashed without difficulty. After threshing, seed are cleaned with ordinary fanning mills. For canning, beans are allowed to swell and then are picked by hand before they become hard. As a dried vegetable, they are prepared the same way as other common beans.
Dry bean yields in the US average ca. 6,600 kg/ha; in Great Britain, ca. 3,000 kg/ha. Yields are closely correlated with number of pods per plants. In British field maximum potential seed yield in 'Herz Freya' was 4,940 kg/ha, in 'Maris Bead' 6,710 kg/ha. Water could be more important in yield than solar radiation or plant competition. (Sprent et al., 1977). In 1975, Asia produced 4,750,000 MT (1192 kg/ha), Europe 722,000 MT (1,433 kg/ha), Africa 688,000 (1,098 kg/ha). South America 135,000 MT (557 kg/ha), North America 43,000 MT (537 kg/ha). China was the largest producer with an estimated 4,660,000 MT (1189 kg/ha) Italy, 252,000 MT (1,222 kg/ha); Egypt, 234,000 MT (2125 kg/ha), Morocco, 213,000 MT (966 kg/lha), Ethiopia, 124,000 MT (886 kg/ha) (FAO, 1975) Switzerland reported highest yields (4,000 kg/ha), followed by Denmark (3,500 kg/ha) and West Germany (3,176 kg/ha). The United Kingdom yield was 2,395 kg/ha (FAO, 1976). Canadian studies of 16 cvs at 6 localities, mean seed yields ranged from 2,533 to 3,488 kg/ha, with the highest yield at over 7 MT/ha ('Klein Kronige'). In British studies, 'Albyn tick' gave 6,765 kg seed/ha, 'Blue Rock' 6,025, 'Herz Freya' 7,007, and 'Maris Bead' 6,602. Consumption and horsebeans for green manure and stock, feed are becoming important crops in southern United States and along the Pacific Coast. Broadbeans are grown in home gardens. Large-seeded green types are canned. Yields of fresh green broadbean for home consumption as a vegetable average 1112.5 MT/ha in United Kingdom and 25 MT/ha was reported.
According to the phytomass files, NPP in Czechoslovakia is as high as 15 MT/ha, 4 in Egypt, 48 in England, up to 20 in western Europe, 89 in Italy, and 11 MT/ha in the Netherlands (Duke, 1981a, 1981b). The plant is calculated to fix 200 kg N/ha/yr (Duke, 1981a). Other NPP figures for Vicia include 4 MT/ha for V. cracca, 35 for V. dasycarpa, 6 for V. sativa, and 2 for V. villosa (Duke, 1981b).
One study concluded that bees increase seed production by 1520%. Honeybees were estimated to account for 80% of cross-pollination, bumblebees less than 20%, wild bees less than 1%. A closed-flower phenotype (recessive to normal) exists which lacks the typical scent and is avoided by bees (Poulsen, 1977). Many fungi attack broadbeans, depending on the area where they grown. The following have been reported on broadbeans: Alternaria brassicae var phaseoli, A. Tenuis, A. tenuissima, Ascochyta boltshauseri, A. fabae, A. pinodella, A. pinodes, A. pisi (A. viciae), Aspergillus niger, Botrytis cinera, B. fabae, Cercospora fabae, C. viciae, C. zonata, Cladosporium cladosporioides, C. herbarum, C. pisi, Clonostachys araucariae, Colletotrichum lindemuthianum, Corticium rolfsii, C. solani, Cunninghamella echinulata, deplosporium album, Dothiorella fabae, Erysiphe pisi, E. polygoni, many species of Fusarium, Gibberella fujikuroi, G. saubinettii, Gloeosporium viciae, Helicobasidium purpureum, Leveillula taurica, Macrophomina phaseoli, Melanospora papilata, Mycospharaella pinodes, Nectria anisophylla, Olpidium viciae, Peronospora fabae, P. lagerheimee, P. pisi, P. viciae, Phoma malaena, Phyllosticta fabae, Phymatotrichum omnivorum, Physoderma fabae, Phytophthora cactorum, Ph. cinnamoni, Pleospora herbarum, P. vulgaris, Pythium spp., Rhizoctonia solani, Rhizopus nigricans, Sclerotinia fuckeliana, S. minor, S. sclerotiorum, Sclerotium rolfsii, Stagonospora carpathica, Stemphylium botryosum, S. consortiale, Trichothecium roseum, Uromyces appendiculatus, U. fabae, U. orobi, and U. viciae-fabae. Broadbeans also attacked by the sweet pea streak, tooth-tumor swelling vein virus and broadbean wilt, red-clover vein mosaic (Marmor trifolii), virus 1-celery mosaic (a strain of cucumber mosaic virus: Marmor cucumeris), spotted wilt (Lethum australiensis). Bacteria causing diseases in broadbean include: Bacterium phaseoli, B. viciae, Erwinia phytophthora, and Psuedomonas viciae. Nematodes isolated from broadbean include: Ditylenchus dipsaci, Heterodera glycines, H. goettingiana, H. rostochiensis, Longidorus maximus, Meloidogyne arenaria, M. artiella, M. hapla, M. incognita, M. incognita acrita, M. javanica, Pratylenchus brachyurus, P. coffeae, P. goodeyi, P. pnetrans, P. pratensis, P. vulnus, P. zeae, Rotylenchulus reniformis, Tylenchorynchus dubius, T. parvus. The most serious insect pests are the broadbean weevil, Bruchus rufimanus and aphids, especially the bean aphid, Aphis fabae. Broomrape (Orobanche crenata) may be a serious problem in the Middle East. Eptam, applied as a postemergence spray, was fairly effective, as was soil fumigation with dibromochloropropane, and oxak (terbutol), if deeply incorporated into the soil before sowing.
Cubrero, J.I. 1973. Evolutionary trends in Vicia faba. Theor. Appl. Genet. 43:5965.
FAO. 1975. Outbreaks and new records. Plant Protection Bulletin 23(2):4954.
FAO. 1976. Production yearbook 1975 vol. 29. FAO, Rome.
Poulsen, M.H. 1977. Obligate autonomy in Vicia faba L. J. Agr. Sci. 88(1):253256.
Sprent, J.I., Bradford, A.M., and Norton, C. 1977. Seasonal growth patterns in field beans (Vicia faba) as affected by population density, shading, and its relationship with soil moisture. J. Agr. Sci. 88(2):293301.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.