text:
Complainant is Aspenwood Dental Associates, Inc. of Aurora, Colorado, United States of America, represented by the law firm Sherman & Howard, LLC, United States of America.
Respondent is Thomas Wade of Broomfield, Colorado, United States of America, appearing on his own behalf.
The disputed domain name <coloradodentalimplantcenter.com> is registered with GoDaddy.com, Inc.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on May 22, 2009. On May 22, 2009, the Center transmitted by email to GoDaddy.com, Inc. a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On May 22, 2009, GoDaddy.com, Inc. transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent and contact information in the Complaint.
The Center sent an email communication to Complainant on June 5, 2009, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. Complainant filed an amended Complaint on June 8, 2009. The Center verified that the Complaint and the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on June 12, 2009. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was July 2, 2009. The Response was filed with the Center on July 1, 2009.
The Center appointed Richard G. Lyon as the sole panelist in this matter on July 13, 2009. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted and has jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Panel has submitted his Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
Complainant is based in Aurora, Colorado, United States of America, a suburb of Denver, Colorado's largest city. Through its three principals Complainant provides dental services in the Denver metropolitan area. Complainant's principal website appears to be “www.aspenwooddental.com”, which a Whois search reveals was created on September 13, 2000.1 Complainant filed to register the mark COLORADO DENTAL IMPLANT CENTER with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on November 7, 2008. The USPTO registered the mark on the Supplemental Register on March 31, 2009, and assigned it Registration Number 3,600,658. The Supplemental Register notes that “[t]he mark consists of the wording ‘COLORADO DENTAL IMPLANT CENTER' in white all within a maroon rectangle.” Complainant makes no claim to exclusive use of the term “dental implant center” other than as provided in the registered mark.
Respondent owns and operates New Horizons Dental Laboratory in Broomfield, Colorado, also within the Denver metropolitan area. According to its website “www.denturesonimplants.com”, New Horizons opened in 1983 and specializes in crafting “removable prosthetics”, specifically focusing on “Implant Supported/Attached Removables”, “Surgical Guides”, and “processed Bruxium splints”. Respondent registered the disputed domain name on April 6, 2008. The website has been “parked;” when the Panel accessed it he was directed to a page of links to third-party dental (including dental implant) services.
Counsel for Complainant sent a demand letter to Respondent on April 7, 2009, in which Complainant offered to purchase the disputed domain name for USD 1,000 and noted that the dispute could be submitted to a proceeding under the UDRP. As noted in the following section, the parties had several face-to-face discussions regarding Respondent's acquisition of the disputed domain name.
Bad Faith. Since Complainant's mark “has been well-known in the medical and dental industry since 2006,” Respondent knew of Complainant's rights to use the mark when he registered the disputed domain name. Respondent further demonstrated bad faith by soliciting Complainant to purchase the disputed domain name for a price in excess of Respondent's out-of-pocket costs of registering it. Complainant will suffer damage to itself, the value of its mark, and associated goodwill because Respondent's actions lead others to believe that Complainant and Respondent are affiliated.
Similarity. Complainant did not even file to register its mark until seven months after Respondent registered the disputed domain name. Complainant has presented no evidence to substantiate its claim of use of the mark in commerce since 2006 other than an advertisement placed by Complainant at an unknown date in an unidentified newspaper of unknown vintage. Complainant does business as Aspenwood Dental Associates, and “only recently” began using Colorado Dental Implant Center in addition to its principal business name.
Rights or Legitimate Interest. Although Respondent has no relationship with Complainant, Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because Respondent has long been involved in the manufacture of oral prosthetic devices and dental implants in the Denver metropolitan area. Respondent's “Dental Technology Laboratory” is a “center” that has become famous in the area for providing its services primarily to dentists. Unlike Complainant, Respondent does not target his services towards the general public. Respondent has registered several domain names that include terms geographically relevant to Colorado and dental implants and has no history of cybersquatting. Indeed, Respondent releases domain names he does not intend to use.
Bad Faith. Respondent denies acting in bad faith. Respondent registered the disputed domain name and a similar domain name, <coloradodentalimplantsystems.com>, months before Complainant filed to register its mark with the USPTO. Respondent has simply engaged in promotional activity consistent with his long-standing business interests. Other participants in the Denver metropolitan area dental services market have registered domain names using the term “dental implant center.” Complainant and Respondent serve different target audiences and do not compete with each other.
Respondent did not initiate contact with Complainant regarding the potential sale of the disputed domain name. Rather, Complainant approached Respondent on several occasions in late 2008 and demanded that Respondent transfer the disputed domain name, ultimately offering to pay Respondent a sum well in excess of his out-of-pocket costs. Respondent did not want to sell the disputed domain name, but quoted Complainant a price of USD 6,750 (“A number that I [Respondent] figured was as equally ridiculous as was him [sic][Complainant] expecting me to just hand it over on demand”) in an attempt to dissuade Complainant from repeatedly contacting Respondent. Complainant has continually harassed Respondent about the disputed domain name and transferring control to Complainant would unjustly reward its questionable tactics.
(iii) The disputed domain name has been registered in bad faith and has been used in bad faith.
These requirements are conjunctive and Complainant bears the burden of proving each.
To prevail under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy, Complainant must show “that it has trademark rights sufficient to invoke the Policy, and that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to its mark.” American Appraisal Associates, Inc. v. R. Hagar, Kinja LLC, WIPO Case No. D2006-1556 (January 29, 2007). Whether such rights exist is determined as of the date the Complaint is filed, not when Respondent registered the disputed domain name. Michelman, Inc v. Internet Design, WIPO Case No. D2007-1369; Valve Corporation v. ValveNET, Inc., ValveNET, Inc., Charles Morrin, WIPO Case No. D2005-0038; WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview”), paragraph 1.4.
The similarity between the disputed domain name and Complainant's registered mark does not ipso facto demonstrate that a Respondent lacks legitimate interests in the terms or phrase contained in the mark. This cautionary note applies especially when as here the dispute concerns a highly descriptive mark registered only on the Supplemental Register. See, e.g., American Apparel Associates, Inc., supra n2 (“Just as . . . descriptive mark may limit its owner's right to exclude others under trademark law, that fact makes it more difficult for a complainant to establish a prima facie case under paragraph 4(a)(ii) . . . and makes it easier for a respondent to rebut such a prima facie case if it is made.”).
Both parties in this case have provided little evidence, as opposed to allegations. Complainant has the burden of proof, however, and has not demonstrated that Respondent lacks legitimate interests in the disputed domain name or that Respondent has no interest in “the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services.” As discussed more fully under bad faith, infra, beyond the parties' geographic proximity there is no support for a finding that Respondent knew of Complainant's mark when he registered the disputed domain name. Without such knowledge Respondent, an active participant in the business of dental implants, might well have an interest in a domain name consisting of a descriptive phrase. Complainant's arguments under paragraph 4(a)(ii) fail for want of evidence.
Complainant has plainly failed to prove that Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith. To meet that burden Complainant must ordinarily demonstrate (not simply allege) that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant's mark and selected the disputed domain name to take advantage of it. Michelman, Inc v. Internet Design, supra; see also Align Technology, Inc v. Web Reg/ Rarenames/ Aligntechnology.Com, WIPO Case No. D2008-0103. Complainant provides no evidence from which the Panel might infer either element.
The available evidence suggests the contrary. Respondent registered the disputed domain name well before Complainant achieved registration of its mark. While a registrant is not in the Panel's view usually required to undertake a trademark search prior to registering a domain name, had Respondent done so he would not have found Complainant's mark. Respondent is not a domain name aggregator, and has never been a party to a dispute under the Policy. Complainant's mark is descriptive, using relatively common English words. The combination of words describes Respondent's business as aptly as Complainant's, so far as the record shows.
Respondent has provided a plausible explanation of his choice of this word combination for his domain name. A quick check of the publicly-available information cited in the Response indicates that Respondent actively manufactures dental implants at a site located less than an hour's drive from Complainant's principal place of business - information known to Complainant4 but omitted from the Complaint. The Complaint proper does not mention even in passing that Respondent works in any aspect of the dental industry, an omission that suggests spite - rather than a concern for business interests - may have played a role in initiating this dispute. Quite simply, “Complainant has offered no evidence that Respondent selected the disputed domain name with an intention to take advantage of Complainant's marks or the reputation surrounding them and no evidence from which the Panel could reasonably make such an inference.” American Apparel Associates, Inc., supra.
Complainant essentially argues that Respondent had constructive notice of its interest in the mark “Colorado Dental Implant Center” at the time Respondent registered the disputed domain name. The doctrine of constructive notice is rarely applied in Policy proceedings, WIPO Overview, paragraph 3.4. The exceptions to this general rule almost always occur in cases in which standard indicia of cybersquatting are present, Kellwood Company v. Onesies Corporation, WIPO Case No. D2008-1172 – not the case here. As under paragraph 4(a)(ii), a complainant asserting rights to a highly descriptive mark must do more than present a prima facie case or risk allowing Respondent an easy rebuttal. Complainant has not established that Respondent selected the disputed domain name to target Complainant's mark.
Complainant rests much of its bad faith argument on Respondent's “attempt to extort” money from Complainant by allegedly offering to sell the disputed domain name for a price greater than any out-of-pocket expenses Respondent could have plausibly incurred. The record might support a finding that the prices proposed by Respondent (for whatever reason) constitute use of the disputed domain name in bad faith. Even though Complainant initiated the discussions regarding transfer, it never (even according to Respondent) proposed an amount substantially in excess of Respondent's costs of registration. What is lacking is any evidence from which the Panel could reasonably infer that Respondent registered the disputed domain name with eventual sale to Complainant as an objective. Complainant's primarily allegation-based prima facie case fails to overcome Respondent's equally unproven - but plausible - explanation for his registering the disputed domain name. In these circumstances and on the provided record, Complainant has failed to carry its evidentiary burden under the third Policy element.
1 In addition to documents submitted by the parties, a panel may use publicly available information to aid in its findings. See, e.g., Sassybax, L.L.C. v. Texas International Property Associates, WIPO Case No. D2007-1190.
3 Complainant has not met its burden under its alternative argument that it met the first prong's requirement by reason of common law rights. Complainant has provided no evidence whatsoever that it has used its mark in commerce since June 2006, the date of first use in commerce claimed in its USPTO application. Complainant's conclusionary assertions that its mark is “famous” are similarly unsupported and in this Panel's opinion defy common sense.
4 Complainant's counsel stated in his letter to Respondent that “We all know that the dental community is small, and my client wishes to maintain amicable relations to you.” The Panel surmises from this observation that Complainant has knowledge of Respondent's business.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, Automobile, Container. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Salem Division of the District Court Department on July 2, 2007.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert A. Brennan, J., and the case was heard by D. Dunbar Livingston, J.
Raymond Buso for the defendant.
to discovery of the drugs was improper and therefore reverse the defendant's conviction.
Background. Following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, the motion judge found that on July 1, 2007, at around 10:20 P.M., Salem police Officers Gaudet and Berube were on a routine patrol in a marked police cruiser. Suddenly, a black Mercedes automobile pulled in front of them from a side street, almost striking the cruiser. Believing that the driver of the Mercedes was operating in an unsafe manner, Officer Berube activated his blue overhead lights and pulled the Mercedes over.
As the officers alighted and approached the Mercedes, they saw the defendant, who was the vehicle's sole occupant, quickly lean to the right, move toward the center console, and bend down to the floor in front of the driver's seat. The officers were concerned that the defendant was reaching for or discarding a weapon.
Officer Berube approached the driver's side door and told the defendant to step out of the car. The defendant complied and a patfrisk ensued. While Officer Berube was conducting the patfrisk, however, the defendant moved his right hand from the hood of the car to his right side several times, ignoring Officer Berube's efforts to place both of his hands on the car's hood. As a consequence, Officer Berube, with Officer Gaudet's assistance, handcuffed him so that they could complete their limited search.
about the defendant and, as a result, both officers had concerns for their safety while in the defendant's presence. Nevertheless, that concern did not cause Officer Gaudet, at least, to depart from procedures he routinely followed even in the absence of particularized information about the person he had stopped.
that the propriety of opening the bottle presented a close question, and that it was "perhaps a relative longshot that the pill container contained a small knife or a one-shot revolver," the judge opined that "the police were justified in absolutely ruling out the chance that in response to lingering doubts 'the answer might be a bullet.' " He also found that "there were no less intrusive means by which the officers reasonably could have ascertained the contents of the bottle."
Discussion. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "[w]e accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law." Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213 , 218 (2002).
After the officers observed the defendant driving erratically, they lawfully stopped him to investigate. The defendant has not challenged the officers' order that he get out of his car, so we assume without independent examination that the order was proper. Likewise the defendant mounts no challenge to the patfrisk the officers conducted while he was outside the car, so we also assume that that, too, was proper.
However, even a patfrisk that is "valid in its inception" may be "excessive in its scope." Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402 , 407 (1974). A patfrisk may legitimately extend into the interior of an automobile, but police are "confined to what is minimally necessary to learn whether the suspect is armed and to disarm him once the weapon is discovered." Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227 , 234 (2000), quoting from Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407 Mass. 147 , 151 (1990). "The sole justification [for such a search] is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). In all events, the search must be "limited in scope to a protective end." Commonwealth v. Silva, supra at 408.
In this case, the patfrisk of the defendant uncovered no weapons, the officers did not arrest the defendant, and they intended to release him. Under those circumstances, "[i]t can be argued with some persuasiveness that the defendant could hardly be viewed as a potential assailant after he . . . returned to his vehicle and knew that he had not been detained by the police." Id. at 409. Contrast Commonwealth v. Santiago, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 567 , 571-572 (2002).
Contrary to the motion judge's findings, there was no evidence that pill-bottle sized weapons had "proliferated" nor was there evidence that the defendant had a specific history of using tiny weapons. On this record, it simply was not reasonable to believe that the defendant might, upon his release with a message that he was free to go, enter his car, reach into the console, open a pill bottle, extract a weapon smaller than four and one-half inches by one and three-fourths inches and use it in an effort to harm the two nearby, fully armed police officers who had just released him. Indeed, allowing police to search the pill bottle under the circumstances this record reveals would, as a practical matter, essentially remove most constitutional brakes on police power to search the contents of motor vehicles stopped for routine traffic incidents.
bottle was impermissible and the defendant's motion to suppress the contents of the bottle should have been allowed. Because the illegally seized evidence obviously played a central role in the defendant's conviction, the judgments are vacated, and the findings are set aside.
[Note 1] The defendant had been charged with the additional crimes of possession of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 34, and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a), but the trial judge found him not guilty of those offenses.
Q.: "You didn't know at that point if he was actually the shooter, he was a driver, he was a potential witness, he owned the van? You don't know what it was?"
Q.: "It was just some information by another police department that at some point a year or two before [Lowell police] wanted to talk to him?"
[Note 3] It appears from his testimony that Officer Berube also opened everything he found in the console that "might conceivably have any type of a weapon in it," even a razor. The judge made no finding on the number of items Officer Berube opened.
Q.: "Now, have you had training -- have you yourself, sir, had training, or received training or received information at the police station about where weapons could be secured and secreted, sir?"
Q.: "And what information have you received on that, sir?"
A.: "We received updates whenever an update is out there about all different types of weapons that are open out in the market these days. And the weapons are getting smaller and smaller, and being stored in just about anything at this time. Whether they're knives, razor blades, and even small handguns, smaller than a card, you know, a playing card. . . . [W]e received [information about] a pen handgun, where it's a one-shot handgun contained in a small pen, maybe four or five inches long. Knives that [are] as small as two and a half inches long. And also razor blades containing small like -- almost slightly larger than a bullet, where a blade can be contained."
Q.: "And what did you do then, sir?"
A.: "I opened the pill bottle."
A.: "Based on my training and experience, based on reviewing police bulletins, a weapon these days can be concealed in just about any type of container."
Q.: "And, with regards to the information you had on July 1st, did you receive information about where weapons could be hid, and where things can be hid?"
A.: "Yes. They post them periodically in the roll call room at the station for officers safety reasons to be aware of criminals being, you know, creative in concealing weapons and hiding them. And these are different types of ways they are doing it."
Q.: "And at that point in time what information had [been] received, that you know of, where weapons can be hidden?"
A.: "I reviewed police bulletins where knives have been concealed in pins, pagers, phones. Knives in lighters, keychains by taking off like the (inaudible). In small containers, like cigarette boxes, Altoid boxes. Very small items."
[Note 5] The fact that the police had not arrested the defendant and were about to release him distinguishes this case from our unpublished opinion in Commonwealth v. Lima, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2005), on which the Commonwealth relies. There the police had arrested the defendant and, after the arrest, found a small mint container in his sock. Upon opening the container, they discovered narcotics. The need to insure that the defendant does not have, say, a razor blade is far more compelling when the defendant is in custody from which he may seek to escape than it is when the police are in the process of letting him go. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 410 Mass. 611 , 612- 616 (1991). Moreover, the court in Lima observed that the container could have held the fruits or instrumentalities of the crime for which the defendant had been arrested. See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156 , 160-161 (1988). Here, as noted, there was no arrest and, until the search occurred, no crime capable of yielding fruit.


Fee disclosure by plan administrators to participants for participant-directed 401(k) plans regarding investment options with a comparative chart of investment options and with the administrative expenses of each option is required under DOL regulations proposed in July 2008 and finalized in Oct. 2010. The effective date was delayed to 60 days after the beginning of the plan year beginning on or after November 1, 2011, or 60 days after July 1, 2012 (i.e., August 30, 2012).
Fee disclosure by service providers to responsible plan fiduciaries to show reasonableness of contract (required by service-provider exemption of ERISA § 408(b)(2)) as specified in final DOL regulations published February 3, 2012, with a delayed effective date of July 1, 2012.
Regulations regarding investment advice arrangements that are permitted by the Pension Protection Act where there is level-fee or computer model arrangements were issued in January 2009 but were later withdrawn. Revised regulations similar to the original regulations but with certain changes as described below, were issued in October 2011.
Generally. The Department of Labor has issued regulations, DOL Reg. §§ 2550.404a-5 and 2550.404c-1, proposed in 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 43014 (July 23, 2008) and finalized in 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 64910 (Oct. 20, 2010), requiring fiduciaries of individual account plans to provide specific disclosures to participants concerning plan investment options including fee and expense information. The underlying concern is that participants in individual account plans be given sufficient information on investment choices including fees and expenses, as stated in the Preamble to the final regulations.
The regulations provide that when a plan allocates investment responsibilities to participants under a participant directed individual account plan, ERISA's duty of prudence requires the plan administrator to make sure that participants are made aware of their rights and responsibilities with respect to the investment of assets, and that sufficient information is provided regarding the plan and the plan's investment options including fee and expense information to make informed decisions how to invest their accounts. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(a).
This applies to "covered individual account plans," which are participant-directed individual account plans (regardless of whether or not such plans comply with ERISA § 404(c)), but excludes IRAs, SEPs, SIMPLE accounts and other plans exempt from ERISA.
· individual expense information including fees and expenses that may be charged to individual account of participant, such as fees for plan loans and for processing QDROs. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i)(A) and (c)(3)(i)(A).
This information must be given to participants on or before the date they can direct their investments, and then annually thereafter. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i)(A) and (c)(3)(i)(A).
Change in Plan Related Information. If there is a change in any of the above plan-related information, the participant must be furnished with a description of the change within 30 to 90 days prior to the change, or in unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of the plan administrator as soon as reasonably practicable. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(c)(1)(ii), (c)(2)(i)(B) and (c)(3)(i)(B).
Quarterly Plan Expense and Fee Information. Statements must be furnished to participants at least quarterly showing the dollar amount of the plan-related administrative and individual fees and expenses actually charged to the individual accounts, as well as a description of the services. These disclosures may be included in quarterly benefit statements required under ERISA § 105. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(c)(3)(ii).
· a glossary of investment-related terms to understand the plan's investment options, or an Internet website address that provides access to such a glossary. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(d)(1)(i)-(vi).
Comparative Format Requirement. The above investment-related information is to be furnished in a chart or similar format, so that a comparison of the available investment alternatives is easily observed, and the data should be prominently displayed. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(d)(2)(i). The regulation includes an appendix with a model comparative chart.
Additional Information. The investment related information must include the contact information for the plan administrator (or person designated on its behalf), where to obtain additional information, a reference to the web site with additional investment-related information and how to obtain a paper copy of certain information. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(d)(2). Additional information must be made available on request, including copies of prospectuses of the funds, financial statements and shareholder reports, value of each share of designated investment alternatives and the assets comprising the portfolio of each fund. DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(d)(3).
Delayed Effective Date to August 30, 2012. The final regulations have been amended in DOL Reg. § 2550.404a-5(j), in 76 Fed. Reg. 42539 (July 19, 2011) to provide that the initial disclosure to participants is required by the date the participant can first direct his or her investments (60 days after the beginning of the plan year beginning on or after November 1, 2011), or, if later, 60 days after the effective date of the 408b-2 regulations which is currently July 1, 2012, i.e., August 30, 2012.
Field Assistance Bulletin 2012-12. DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2012-12 (May 7, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab2012-2.html, contains 38 FAQs on fee disclosure to participants. They provide: (i) designated investment managers that choose among investment alternatives (managed accounts) are not separate investment alternatives and do not require investment related disclosure but should be described under the plan related disclosure (Q&As 4 & 27); (ii) brokerage window fees and expenses must be disclosed to all participants with general information about the purchases and sales of securities and how to obtain more information (Q&As 13, 29 and 30); (iii) model portfolios of various investment alternatives offered among the plan need not contain extra disclosure unless the model portfolio provides a separate equity security or similar interest in the entity (Q&A 28); (iv) revenue sharing explanations must be provided quarterly but do not need to identify specific plan expenses or specific investments (Q&A 10); (v) multiple comparative charts can be used in a single mailing but may not be used if separately distributed (Q&A 21); (vi) a fund of funds would disclose the operating expenses of acquired funds in the annual operating expenses of the fund of funds (Q&A 31); (vii) stable value fund insurance contract fee to smooth the rate of return must be included in the total annual operating expenses of the stable value fund (Q&A 34); (viii) closed funds are still subject to fee disclosure because participant must still decide whether to transfer out of the fund (Q&A 15); and (ix) website information must be updated as soon as reasonably possible although the printed comparative chart only needs to be updated annually (Q&A 22).
DOL Tech Rel. 2011-03R (issued Sept. 13, 2011 and revised Dec. 8, 2011) provides interim guidance on fee disclosure by electronic delivery. Where the disclosure is included as part of pension benefit statements or along with pension benefit statements, the guidance in FAB 2006-03 applicable to pension benefit statements can be used, which allows secure website access where certain notice requirements are met.
Where the disclosure is not included as part of pension benefit statements, the safe harbor of DOL Reg. § 2520.104b-1(c) (from 2002) can be used, which allows plan administrators to use electronic delivery of notices (i) for participants who can easily access electronic documents at their place of work and the computer is an integral part of his work, or (ii) where a participant does not have effective access at work but affirmatively consents to receive the document electronically. Alternatively, DOL Tech. Rel. 2011-03R allows an email method where participants voluntarily furnish their email, an initial notice that satisfies the specific notice is provided with the request for the email address, an annual notice containing similar information must be provided (which can be electronically if the participant has interacted with the electronic delivery system), the electronic delivery is reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt (e.g. email return-receipt), confidentiality is maintained and the notice is calculated to be understood by the average plan participant. Pursuant to DOL Tech. Rel. 2011-03R as revised, disclosure through electronic media may include a continuous access web site.
ERISA § 408(b)(2) Service Provider Exception. ERISA § 406 generally prohibits transactions between an ERISA plan and a party in interest. A service provider to a plan would be a party in interest, making the arrangement a prohibited transaction. However, under the service-provider exception, ERISA § 408(b)(2) exempts service contracts or arrangements between a plan and a party in interest if (i) the contract or arrangement is reasonable, (ii) the services are necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan, and (iii) no more than reasonable compensation is paid for the services.
DOL Regulation § 2550.408b-2. DOL Regulation § 2550.408b-2, proposed December 13, 2007, 72 Fed. Reg. 70988, revised as interim regulations, July 16, 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 41600, and finalized Feb. 3, 2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 5632, clarify the meaning of a ''reasonable'' contract or arrangement.
Reasonable Contract. Under the DOL regulations, to be a reasonable contract, a "covered service provider" (as defined below) must disclose certain information in writing to the "responsible plan fiduciary" (the fiduciary with authority to cause the plan to enter into or renew the contract).
· This disclosure enables the fiduciary to determine whether the services are reasonable.
Covered Service Provider. A "covered service provider" is a service provider that enters into a contract or arrangement with a "covered plan" (as defined below) and reasonably expects $1,000 or more in direct or indirect compensation to be received in connection with providing certain enumerated services. This includes (i) services provided as a fiduciary to an investment vehicle holding plan assets and services provided as an investment advisor to a covered plan, (ii) certain recordkeeping and brokerage services to an individual account plan, or (iii) other services for which service provider, affiliate or subcontractor expect to receive indirect compensation (such as accounting, auditing, actuarial, appraisal, banking, consulting, attorney who is hired directly by the plan, and recordkeeper (but this category iii only applies for indirect compensation, e.g., consultant which also has investment fund)). DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii).
Covered Plan. "Covered Plan" is defined as an ERISA pension plan, but does not include a SEP, SIMPLE retirement plan, IRA or top-hat plan and also does not include a 403(b) plan that was frozen prior to January 1, 2009. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(ii).
· for certain recordkeeping and brokerage services with respect to each designated investment alternative, current accurate disclosure materials of the issuer of the designated investment alternative that includes the information in the previous bullet. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iv).
Timing of Service Provider Disclosure. The service provider must disclose any additional information relating to compensation to the responsible plan fiduciary within the following time periods: (i) for initial disclosure reasonably in advance of the date the arrangement is executed, extended or renewed, (ii) when the investment entity does not initially hold plan assets, within 30 days of when the investment entity holds plan assets, and (iii) as soon as an investment alternative is designated. Changes in the disclosed information must be communicated no later than 60 days from the date of change, and the covered service provider must disclose at least annually any changes to the investment and recordkeeping and brokerage services described in the last two bullets above. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(v).
Upon request, the service provider must furnish other information relating to the compensation received in connection with the contract. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(vi). Good faith errors or omission in disclosing the information required will not cause there to be a failure, as long as the service provider discloses the correct information as soon as practicable and no later than 30 days after the service provider knows of such error or omission. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(vii).
Guide to Initial Disclosure. The regulations strongly encourage service providers to offer fiduciaries a guide of the initial disclosures. An appendix to the regulations provides a sample guide to initial disclosure in the form of a chart referencing the places in the service agreement or on a website where the required disclosures can be found.
Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption. There is an exemption in the form of a prohibited transaction class exemption, and also incorporated into the regulations, for the responsible plan fiduciary from the prohibited transaction restrictions for a party in interest providing goods and services to or receiving assets from the plan, for any failure by a covered service provider to disclose the information required above, provided that the following conditions are met: (i) the plan fiduciary did not know that the service provider failed or would fail to make required disclosures and reasonably believed that the covered service provider disclosed the information required above, (ii) the plan fiduciary requests the additional information in writing and notifies the DOL, and (iii) the service provider terminates the arrangement or complies with the request within 90 days. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(ix).
Termination Without Penalty. The regulations also require that for the contract to be reasonable, it must permit termination of the contract without penalty other than for reasonable start-up costs and expenses. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(3).
Effective Date. The regulations were to be effective July 16, 2011. DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(xii). On June 1, 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 31545, the DOL extended the effective date to January 1, 2012. On July 19, 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 42539, the DOL extended the effective date to April 1, 2012. On Feb. 3, 2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 5632, the DOL further extended the effective date of these service provider fee disclosure regulations to July 1, 2012 (amending DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(xii)).
The rules (under previous and current effective dates) apply to all contracts or arrangements, regardless of whether entered into before or after the effective date.
Under ERISA § 408, as amended by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, a prohibited transaction statutory exemption is added for the provision of investment advice by a "fiduciary advisor" to participants of participant-directed plans through an "eligible investment advice arrangement." ERISA §§ 408(b)(14) & 408(g).
ERISA § 408(b)(14) & 408(g). ERISA § 408(b)(14) and IRC § 4975(d)(17) state that the provision of investment advice regarding an investment or sale under the plan, or the receipt of fees by a fiduciary adviser or affiliate in connection with the investment advice, will be exempt from the prohibited transaction rules if the investment advice is provided under an "eligible investment advice arrangement" under ERISA § 408(g) and IRC § 4975(f)(8), which means that the arrangement must either (i) provide "level fee arrangements" that do not depend on investment, or (ii) uses a "computer model" that applies generally accepted investment theories, utilizes relevant information, utilizes objective criteria and does not favor investments offered by the fiduciary adviser. ERISA § 408(g).
Regulations Issued, Withdrawn and Reissued. In January 2009 the Department of Labor finalized regulations implementing the provisions of the statutory exemption for eligible investment advice arrangements for level-fee or computer model arrangements. 74 Fed. Reg. 3822 (Jan. 21, 2009), (originally proposed Aug. 22, 2008). The DOL also provided an administrative class exemption pursuant to which the fee-leveling or computer model requirements would be liberalized. The effective date was to have been March 23, 2009. The effective date was delayed several times in 2009. The DOL delayed and then withdrew these regulations and the class exemption in 2009. 74 Fed. Reg. 60156 (Nov. 20, 2009). The DOL issued revised regulations, DOL Reg. § 2550.408g–1 and -2, reproposed March 2, 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 9360 and finalized October 25, 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 66136.
Arrangements Using Fee Leveling. Fee level arrangements must be based on generally accepted investment theories, taking into account fees and expenses and the participants' age, other assets, risk tolerance and preferences, and provide that fees received by fiduciary advisers providing investment advice do not vary on the basis of the investments chosen (level fee arrangements). DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(3).
Arrangements Using Computer Models. Computer model arrangements must (i) provide generally accepted investment theories taking into account historic risks and returns, (ii) take into account investment management and other fees and expenses, (iii) weigh factors used to estimate future returns, (iv) request information about age, life expectancy, risk tolerance, other assets and investment preferences, (v) use appropriate objective criteria, (vi) not favor investment options of the advisor and (vii) take into account all of the investment options of the plan. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(4)(i). In addition, the computer model must be certified in writing in advance by an eligible investment expert that the computer model meets the above requirements. An eligible investment expert must have appropriate technical training or experience and proficiency to analyze and certify the computer model (and cannot have a material relationship with the fiduciary adviser). The written certification must (i) contain the methodology in making the determination, (ii) state how the methodology shows that the computer model meets DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(4)(i), (iii) describe the limitations imposed on the selection of appropriate methodology, and (iv) contain a representation that the methodology was applied by an expert. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(4)(ii).
A plan fiduciary (or plan sponsor) must expressly authorize the investment advice arrangement, and an annual written audit by an independent auditor with appropriate expertise of the arrangement must be made. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(5) & (6).
The fiduciary adviser must disclose to participants prior to the initial investment advice the following: (i) the role of any party that has a material affiliation, (ii) past performance of the investment options, (iii) all fees or compensation that the adviser or affiliate receives for the advice, sale, purchase or rollover, (iv) any material affiliation the fiduciary or affiliate has in the fund, (v) the manner in which participant information will be used, and (vi) the types of services provided by the fiduciary adviser in connection with the investment advice, (vii) that the adviser is a fiduciary and (viii) that the participants may arrange for advice by another adviser. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(7). The Appendix to DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1 contains a model disclosure form that may be used to satisfy this disclosure requirement.
The fiduciary advisor must provide the authorizing fiduciary a written notice that it intends to comply with ERISA §§ 408(b)(14) and 408(g) that the adviser's arrangement will be audited annually, and that the auditor will furnish the authorizing fiduciary a copy of the auditor's findings within 60 days of completion of the audit. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(b)(8).
A "fiduciary adviser" is a fiduciary to the plan who is also a registered investment advisor, bank, insurance company, registered broker dealer or an affiliate or employee of any of the above. DOL Reg. § 2550.408g-1(c)(2).
A prohibited transaction class exemption in the original 2009 regulations would have permitted follow-up individual advice subsequent to the computer model, and would have also permitted varying fees, as long as the individual employee providing the advice met the level fee requirements. However, in response to comments questioning the potential for self-dealing, the class exemption has been eliminated in the revised 2011 regulations.
The regulations are effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, i.e. December 24, 2011, but go into effect on the first business day thereafter, i.e., Tuesday, December 27, 2011. See DOL Reg. § 2550.408g–2(f).
Indirect compensation is compensation received from sources other than the plan or plan sponsor, in connection with services rendered to the plan, and would include, for example, fees and expense reimbursement payments received from a mutual fund, account maintenance fees, 12b–1 distribution fees, etc. 72 Fed. Reg. 64710 (Nov.16, 2007), amending DOL Reg. §§ 2520.103-1 & 2520.104-46.
The DOL issued FAQs regarding the Schedule C requirements in July 2008 (www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_scheduleC.html) and in October 2009 (www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-sch-C-supplement.html). FAQ 40 and Supplemental FAQ 10 provides transition relief where a service provider makes reasonable, good faith efforts to develop systems to provide information as required under Schedule C, but is not able to update the recordkeeping and information management systems in time for the 2009 filing. There have been requests to extend the transition relief further. For example, the American Society of Pension Professionals & Actuaries in a July 5, 2011 letter to the DOL (at www.asppa.org/Document-Vault/pdfs/GAC/2011/752011schc-comment.aspx) requests an extension of the transition relief for any plan year filing that may include periods during the plan year that preceded the effective date of the final fee disclosure for service providers regulations under ERISA § 408(b)(2).


The Environmental Quality Board (Board) proposes to amend 25 Pa. Code, Chapter 93 (relating to water quality standards). The amendments will modify the drainage lists at §§ 93.9d, 93.9f, 93.9j, 93.9k, 93.9l, 93.9m, 93.9p, 93.9q, 93.9r and 93.9t to read as set forth in Annex A. The purpose of this proposed rulemaking is to update the designated uses so that the surface waters of the Commonwealth are afforded the appropriate level of protection. This proposed rulemaking fulfills the Commonwealth's obligations under State and Federal law to review and revise, as necessary, water quality standards that are protective of surface waters.
This proposed rulemaking was adopted by the Board at its meeting of December 18, 2018.
These amendments will go into effect upon publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin as a final rulemaking. Once approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), water quality standards are used to implement the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251—1388).
For further information, contact Thomas Barron, Bureau of Clean Water, 11th Floor, Rachel Carson State Office Building, P.O. Box 8774, 400 Market Street, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8774, (717) 787-9637; or Michelle Moses, Assistant Counsel, Bureau of Regulatory Counsel, 9th Floor, Rachel Carson State Office Building, P.O. Box 8464, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8464, (717) 787-7060. Persons with a disability may use the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Service by calling (800) 654-5984 (TDD users) or (800) 654-5988 (voice users). This proposed rulemaking is available on the Department of Environmental Protection's (Department) web site at www.dep.pa.gov (select ''Public Participation,'' then ''Environmental Quality Board (EQB)'').
This proposed rulemaking is being made under the authority of sections 5(b)(1) and 402 of The Clean Streams Law (35 P.S. §§ 691.5(b)(1) and 691.402), which authorize the Board to develop and adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of The Clean Streams Law (35 P.S. §§ 691.1—691.1001), and section 1920-A of The Administrative Code of 1929 (71 P.S. § 510-20), which grants to the Board the power and duty to formulate, adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the proper performance of the work of the Department. In addition, section 303 of the CWA (33 U.S.C.A. § 1313) sets forth requirements for water quality standards.
The purpose of developing the water quality standards is to protect waters of the Commonwealth. Waters of the Commonwealth, through the water quality standards program, are protected for a variety of uses including: drinking water supplies for humans, livestock and wildlife; fish consumption; irrigation for crops; aquatic life uses; recreation; and industrial water supplies. The purpose of this proposed rulemaking is to update the designated uses so that the surface waters of this Commonwealth are afforded the appropriate level of protection.
Section 5 of The Clean Streams Law, 35 P.S. § 691.5, instructs the Department to consider water quality management and pollution control in the watershed as a whole, and the present and possible future uses of waters when adopting rules and regulations. In addition to these requirements, the Commonwealth has responsibilities under the CWA that require water quality standards to be reviewed and approved by the EPA for consistency with the mandates under that act. Section 101(a)(2) of the CWA, (33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)), establishes the National goal that, wherever attainable, water quality should provide for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and for recreation in and on the water. Section 303(c)(2)(A), (33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(2)(A)), requires water quality standards to include designated uses of waters, taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial and other purposes. Section 303(d)(4)(B), (33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)(4)(B)), establishes an antidegradation policy for waters where the quality of the water equals or exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated uses for such waters. The designated uses in this proposed rulemaking are consistent with these State and Federal statutory mandates.
Water quality standards are in-stream water quality goals that are implemented by imposing specific regulatory requirements (such as treatment requirements, effluent limits and best management practices (BMPs)) on individual sources of pollution. Section 303(c)(1) of the CWA, (33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(1)), requires states to periodically review and revise, as necessary, water quality standards. Water quality standards include designated uses, numeric and narrative criteria, and antidegradation requirements for surface waters. These proposed amendments are the result of new information presented for stream evaluations of designated uses.
The Department may identify candidate streams for redesignation of uses during routine waterbody investigations. Requests for consideration may be initiated by other agencies, or members of the public may submit a rulemaking petition to the Board. These proposed amendments are the result of stream evaluations conducted by the Department in response to a submittal of data from the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (Commission) under § 93.4c (relating to implementation of antidegradation requirements).
In this proposed rulemaking, redesignations rely on § 93.4b(a)(2)(ii) (relating to qualifying as High Quality or Exceptional Value Waters) to qualify streams for High Quality (HQ) designations based upon their classifications as Class A wild trout streams. A surface water that has been classified a Class A wild trout stream by the Commission, based on species-specific biomass standards, and following public notice and comment, qualifies for HQ designation. The Commission published notice and requested comments on the Class A designation of these streams. The Commissioners of the Commission approvedthese waters after public notice and comment. Department staff conducted an independent review of the trout biomass data in the Commission's fisheries management reports for the streams proposed for redesignation. This review was conducted to ensure that the HQ criteria were met.
Prior to rulemaking, the Department has an obligation to provide existing uses protection when data indicates that a surface water attains or has attained an existing use. Section 93.1 (relating to definitions) defines ''existing uses'' as ''those uses actually attained in the water body on or after November 28, 1975, whether or not they are included in the water quality standards.'' Section 93.4c requires the Department to make a final determination of existing uses protection for the surface water as part of a final permit or approval action. During a review of a permit application and a draft permit, interested persons may provide the Department with additional information regarding existing uses protection for the surface water. The Department also presents available information in a draft report that is made available for public comment.
Where the existing uses are different than the designated uses for a surface water, the water body will immediately receive the best protection identified by either the attained uses or the designated uses. For example, if the designated use of a stream is listed as protecting Cold Water Fishes (CWF) but the Department's evaluation of available existing use information indicates that the water attains the use of HQ-CWF, the stream would be protected for this HQ-CWF existing use, prior to a rulemaking. A stream redesignation proposal will then be initiated through the rulemaking process to match the existing uses with the designated uses in the drainage lists found in §§ 93.9a—93.9z. See Section E for a detailed explanation of the public participation process preceding the development of this proposed rulemaking.
By protecting the water uses, and the quality of the water necessary to maintain the uses, benefits may be gained in a variety of ways by all citizens of this Commonwealth. For example, clean water used for drinking water supplies benefits the consumers by lowering drinking water treatment costs and reducing medical costs associated with drinking-water illnesses. Clean surface waters also benefit the Commonwealth by providing for increased tourism and recreational use of the waters. Clean water provides for increased wildlife habitat and more productive fisheries. This proposed rulemaking benefits not only local residents but those from outside the area who come to enjoy the benefits and aesthetics of outdoor recreation.
As part of this stream redesignation process, the Department offered opportunities for the public to provide data and information during the review of the uses of the streams. First, the Department provided public notice of its intent to assess the Class A wild trout stream data. The Department's notices requesting additional water quality data for the streams were published at 46 Pa.B. 503 (January 23, 2016); 46 Pa.B. 1287 (March 5, 2016); and 46 Pa.B. 3328 (June 25, 2016). Additionally, the notices were posted on the Department web site. No water quality data were received. The Department directly notified all affected municipalities, county planning commissions, conservation districts and Commonwealth agencies of these redesignation evaluations in letters dated January 5, May 27 and July 8, 2016. No data or comments were received in response to these notices.
Once the data solicitation was completed, the Department prepared a draft streams evaluation report and made it available to all affected municipalities, county planning commissions, county conservation districts and other Commonwealth agencies on April 26, 2017. This draft report was mailed to these same entities and posted on the Department's web site, for a 45-day public comment period. Two letters of support were received. The Department considered these comments in drafting the final Class A Wild Trout Streams Evaluation Report.
Department staff delivered two separate presentations to the Agricultural Advisory Board (AAB). The first presentation was delivered at the August 16, 2018, joint meeting of the AAB and the Nutrient Management Advisory Board. That presentation was focused on this proposed rulemaking consisting of Class A stream redesignations. In response to a request from the AAB following the first presentation, a second presentation was delivered to the AAB on October 25, 2018, which included a broader scope of the stream redesignations rulemaking process and then more specifically how AAB is involved in the process.
A copy of the stream evaluation report for these waterbodies is available on the Department's web site or from the contact persons listed in Section B of this preamble. Copies of the Commission fisheries management reports for these streams and the Commission's sampling protocols for wadeable streams are available on the Department's web site or from Thomas Barron, whose address and telephone number are listed in Section B of this preamble. The data and information collected on these waterbodies support the Board's proposed rulemaking as set forth in Annex A. The Board's proposed HQ redesignations associated with Class A wild trout waters is summarized in the following table.
In addition to the recommended changes to stream designations, the Board is proposing other amendments to the drainage lists in §§ 93.9d, 93.9f, 93.9j, 93.9k, 93.9l, 93.9m, 93.9p, 93.9q, 93.9r and 93.9t to clarify stream names and segment boundaries and to reformat portions of drainage lists. In addition, the Board is recommending changes consistent with the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) flowline. These additional changes are nonsubstantive in nature, because they do not change any current water quality designations to the drainage lists.
The NHD flowline forms the basis of the Department's Designated and Existing Use Geographic Information System (GIS) layers. The NHD flowline is established using the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), which is the Federal and National standard for geographic nomenclature. The Department strives to maintain consistency with the GNIS database and the NHD flowline.
The Department routinely receives internal and external communications concerning streams that appear to be missing from Chapter 93. Often, these streams were considered unnamed at the time the drainage list was established and therefore were captured under unnamed tributaries entries. These streams currently have a designated use even though they do not appear as named entries in Chapter 93. In contrast, there are a number of named tributaries in Chapter 93 that are not currently recognized by the USGS and are not represented by the NHD flowline. These may be unofficial local names. Consolidation within drainage lists will greatly reduce these issues.
In many parts of the drainage lists, the current format consists of a main stem entry for a stream, followed by unnamed tributaries to that stream, and then individually named tributaries within the basin. Often, most of the tributaries, both named and unnamed, have the same designated use. In some cases, an entire basin is the same designated use except for a few streams. Large stream basins may take up several pages within a drainage list and can be difficult for individuals to navigate and understand. Reformatting large basins to consolidate portions of Chapter 93 that have the same designated use enables readers to view that entire basin within a page or two. In addition, a condensed drainage list reduces the likelihood that errors will occur in transcription of Chapter 93 during rulemaking procedures. The Department currently has several GIS mapping tools available (e.g. eMapPA) to assist staff, members of the public and the regulated community in locating streams in this Commonwealth, and they should be used in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Code to determine designated uses. The Board proposes to reformat § 93.9j (relating to Drainage List J) and the Stonycreek River basin in § 93.9t (relating to Drainage List T) as described in this paragraph.
Furthermore, all river mile indexes (RMI) proposed to be added in this proposed rulemaking—§§ 93.9d, 93.9f, 93.9j, 93.9k, 93.9l, 93.9m, 93.9p, 93.9q, 93.9r and 93.9t—will be converted to (x,y) coordinates for latitude and longitude. Going forward, whenever changes are proposed to Chapter 93, associated locational information will be inserted as latitude and longitude. Eventually, all reference to RMI in §§ 93.9a—93.9z will be converted to latitude and longitude.
Additionally, all ''unnamed tributaries'' included in this proposed rulemaking will be abbreviated to UNTs. Going forward, the abbreviation UNTs will eventually replace ''unnamed tributaries'' in the Pennsylvania Code.
Additional changes to § 93.9d (relating to Drainage List D) were proposed at 47 Pa.B. 6609 (October 21, 2017), including a stream name correction from ''Beaverdam Run to Beaver Run.'' Beaver Run is a candidate for redesignation in this Class A stream package. The Board recommends making this change.
The Board recommends correcting the spelling for Huntington Creek in § 93.9k (relating to Drainage List K) to be consistent with the NHD flowline.
Additional changes to § 93.9t were proposed at 47 Pa.B. 6609, including a proposed correction to the hydrological order because Trout Run is a tributary to Kane Run. According to the GNIS database and the NHD flowline, Trout Run is not a direct tributary to the Little Conemaugh River. It is a tributary to Kane Run, which is a tributary to the Little Conemaugh River. An unnamed tributary to Trout Run (UNT 46054) is a candidate for redesignation in this proposed rulemaking. The Board recommends making this change.
Overall, this Commonwealth, its citizens and natural resources will benefit from this proposed rulemaking because it provides the appropriate level of protection to preserve the integrity of existing and designated uses of surface waters in this Commonwealth. Protecting water quality provides economic value to present and future generations in the form of a clean water supply. Water uses in the Commonwealth include water supplies for human consumption, wildlife, irrigation and industrial use; recreational opportunities such as fishing (also for consumption); water contact sports and boating; and aquatic life and special protection. It is important to realize these benefits and to ensure opportunities and activities continue in a manner that is environmentally, socially and economically sound. Maintenance of water quality ensures its future availability for all uses.
Increased property values are an economic and social benefit of clean water protected by this proposed regulation.
A reduction in toxics found in the Commonwealth's waterways may lead to increased property values for properties located near rivers or lakes. The study, ''The Effect of Water Quality on Rural Nonfarm Residential Property Values,'' (Epp and Al-Ani, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Aug. 1979), pp. 529—534 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1239441)), used real estate prices to determine the value of improvements in water quality in small rivers and streams in this Commonwealth. Water quality, whether measured in pH or by the owner's perception, has a significant effect on the price of adjacent property. Their analysis showed a positive correlation between water quality and housing values. They concluded that buyers are aware of the environmental setting of a home and that differences in the quality of nearby waters affect the price paid for a residential property.
A 2006 study from the Great Lakes region estimated that property values were significantly depressed in two regions associated with toxic contaminants (polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and heavy metals). The study showed that a portion of the Buffalo River region (approximately 6 miles long) had depressed property values of between $83 million and $118 million for single-family homes, and between $57 million and $80 million for multifamily homes as a result of toxic sediments. The same study estimated that a portion of the Sheboygan River (approximately 14 miles long) had depressed property values of between $80 million and $120 million as the result of toxics. Economic Benefits of Sediment Remediation in the Buffalo River AOC and Sheboygan Rice AOC: Final Project Report, (http://www.nemw.org/Econ). While this study related to the economic effect of contaminated sediment in other waters in the Great Lakes region, the idea that toxic pollution depresses property values applies in this Commonwealth. A reduction in toxic pollution in this Commonwealth's waters has a substantial economic benefit to property values in close proximity to waterways.
Maintenance of abundant and healthy fish and wildlife populations and support for outdoor recreation are social and economic benefits of clean water protected by this proposed rulemaking.
Businesses in the recreation industry will be positively affected by these proposed regulations. The maintenance and protection of the water quality will ensure the long-term availability of Class A wild trout fisheries. Because the focus of this proposal relates directly to the protection of fisheries, sportsmen in this Commonwealth will benefit by the preservation of the existing Class A fisheries. Class A wild trout streams should be protected so that they can continue to be a self-sustaining angling opportunity as compared to the cost-intensive alternative of raising and stocking fish. The purpose of these proposed stream redesignations is to preserve this resource for current and future sportsmen so that the social and economic benefits are maintained in the local area. As recreation demands increase in the future, the preservation of unique resources such as Class A wild trout waters will no doubt add economic value to the local areas and, importantly, provide a valuable social function for outdoor recreation. Specific revenue-related benefits associated with outdoor trout fishing in this Commonwealth are outlined as follows.
The Center for Rural Pennsylvania prepared a report titled ''Economic Values and Impacts of Sport Fishing, Hunting and Trapping Activities in Pennsylvania,'' (http://www.rural.palegislature.us/documents/reports/hunting.pdf) that examined such economic values and impacts between the years 1995 to 1997. The report provides a snapshot of how much money these sporting activities bring to the State and how they affect employment in rural areas. A major finding of that report is the total annual value of $3.7 billion for sport fishing was almost three times the $1.26 billion spent in travel costs to use fishing resources during the same 12-month period of time. The total net annual benefit to anglers was $2.49 billion.
According to the ''Angler Use, Harvest and Economic Assessment on Wild Trout Streams in Pennsylvania,'' (R. Greene, et al. 2005) (http://www.fishandboat.com/Fish/Fisheries/TroutPlan/Documents/WildTroutStreamAnglerUseCatchEconomicContribution.pdf), the Commission collected information to assess the economic impact of wild trout angling in this Commonwealth, during the 2004 regular trout season, April 17 through September 3, 2004. The Commission found, based on the results of this study, that angling on wild trout streams contributed over $ 7.16 million to this Commonwealth's economy during the regular trout season in 2004.
According to the ''2011 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife-Associated Recreation'' (https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/fhw11-nat.pdf) for this Commonwealth, prepared by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, approximately 1,101,000 anglers participated in fishing and 3,598,000 persons participated in wildlife watching in the year 2011. In addition, all fishing-related expenditures in this Commonwealth totaled $485 million in 2011. The expenditures include food and lodging, transportation and other expenses (equipment rental, bait and cooking fuel). In 2011, wildlife watchers spent $1.3 billion on activities in this Commonwealth. Expenditures include trips-related costs and equipment.
According to the Outdoor Recreation Industry Association, this Commonwealth's outdoor recreation generates 251,000 direct jobs in this Commonwealth, $8.6 billion in wages and salaries, and $1.9 billion in State and local tax revenue. These figures include both tourism and outdoor recreation product manufacturing. The association reports that 56% of residents in this Commonwealth participate in outdoor recreation each year. (See Outdoor Industry Association (2017), ''The Outdoor Economy: Take it Outside for American Jobs and a Strong Economy,'' (https://outdoorindustry.org/resource/pennsylvania-outdoor-recreation-economy-report/)).
Savings in water filtration for downstream communities that rely on surface waters for water supplies and availability of unpolluted water for domestic, agricultural and industrial uses are benefits of clean water protected by this proposed rulemaking.
The Department identified 11 public water supply facilities with raw water intakes that are no further downstream than 30 stream miles of the candidate stream sections for redesignation in this proposed rulemaking package. These 11 public water suppliers, which serve over 175,000 citizens, will benefit from this proposed rulemaking because their raw source water will be afforded a higher level of protection. This is an economic benefit because the source water treatment costs for the drinking water may be less costly to customers if less treatment is needed due to the high quality of the water in the stream. By maintaining cleaner water, public water suppliers will incur the benefits of lower water treatment costs. In addition, cleaner intake water will reduce consumer costs for purchasing clean drinking water.
This proposed rulemaking is necessary to maintain the existing water quality and effectively control discharges of pollutants into the stream segments. These amendments to Chapter 93 will not impose any new compliance costs on persons engaged in regulated activities under existing permits or approvals from the Department. Additional compliance costs may arise when permits or approvals are necessary for new or expanded regulated activities. The Department will implement the proposed stream redesignations through permit and approval actions.
Persons adding or expanding a discharge to a stream may need to provide a higher level of treatment or additional BMPs to meet the designated and existing uses of the stream, which could result in higher engineering, construction or operating costs. Treatment costs and BMPs are site-specific and depend upon the size of the discharge in relation to the size of the stream and many other factors. The Department cannot accurately estimate such costs because of the variability associated with each discharge.
Any person proposing a new, additional or increased point source discharge would need to satisfy the antidegradation requirements found at 25 Pa. Code § 93.4c(b)(1). An applicant for any new, additional or increased point source discharge to special protection waters must evaluate nondischarge alternatives and the applicant must use an alternative that is environmentally sound and cost-effective when compared with the cost of the proposed discharge. If a nondischarge alternative is not environmentally sound and cost-effective, an applicant for a new, additional or increased discharge must use the best available combination of cost-effective treatment, land disposal, pollution prevention and wastewater reuse technologies.
The permit applicant must demonstrate in the permit application that their new or expanded activities will not lower the existing water quality of special protection streams. If an applicant cannot meet these nondegrading discharge requirements, a person who proposes a new, additional or increased discharge to HQ waters is given an opportunity to demonstrate a social and economic justification (SEJ) for allowing lower water quality. The demonstration must show that the discharge is necessary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area in which the waters are located and that other water uses will be supported. Discharge activities to special protection streams do not qualify for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) general permits, based on 25 Pa. Code § 92a.54(a)(8) (relating to general permits), and therefore, will require individual permits.
There are approximately 10,300 facilities across this Commonwealth that hold permits issued under Chapter 92a (relating to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting, monitoring and compliance). This Statewide number of approximately 10,300 includes NPDES permits for concentrated animal feeding operations, industrial waste, municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4), sewage and industrial storm water. Out of this Statewide total of approximately 10,300 permits, only 19 facilities are known to hold NPDES permits within the boundaries of the watersheds of the stream segments being considered for redesignation in this proposed rulemaking.
The types of NPDES discharges identified that have watershed involvement in this proposed rulemaking include industrial waste, sewage, MS4 and industrial stormwater. Discharges in existence at the time of the stream survey have been considered in the evaluation of the existing water quality of the stream and the recommendation for redesignation to special protection. Since the presence of such discharge activities did not preclude the attainment of special protection status, the discharges may continue as long as the discharge characteristics (both quality and quantity) remain the same. Thus, redesignation to special protection does not impose any additional special treatment requirements on the existing discharges from these 19 NPDES permitted entities. However, discharge activities to special protection streams do not qualify for NPDES general permits and, therefore, will require individual permits. The individual permits are necessary to track any additional or increased discharges to a special protection water.
There are thousands of general and individual NPDES permits for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Construction Activities issued under 25 Pa. Code Chapter 102 (relating to erosion and sediment control) that were not included in the Statewide total of NPDES permits. These construction permits were not included in the permit counts because of their temporary nature. However, if the construction permit was issued as a general permit, and if the permitted activity is not completed by the expiration date on the permit and the permittee seeks to renew the permit, then it must be renewed as an individual permit. Additionally, when earth disturbance activities occur within the basins of the stream segments redesignated in this proposed rulemaking, additional BMPs may be necessary to protect water quality under Chapter 102.
Local governments will most likely have additional costs associated with MS4 permitting requirements. Any permittees that discharge to an HQ water will be required to obtain an individual permit when the permit is up for renewal. Any new first-time MS4 permits in these waters will be required to obtain individual permits. The cost of a new first-time individual permit is $5,000 compared to $500 for a general permit. There is a difference in cost between the initial issuance of an individual permit and a general permit due to increased staff time needed to review permit applications and implementation oversight that is associated with individual permits. An individual permit allows for the tailoring of a municipality's stormwater management program and its implementation of the minimum control measures.
If there is an existing permit (whether it is currently a general permit or an individual permit) on a water that has been redesignated to special protection, the fee to renew it to an individual permit is $2,500. The annual fee is the same for a general permit and an individual permit. Individual permits will require an application and general permits will no longer be required to submit a Notice of Intent (NOI) as the annual report submittal and annual fee payment will serve the purpose of past NOIs. In general, there are no special consulting services fees that are needed for a new permittee when applying for the individual permit.
Where onlot sewage systems are planned, compliance with the sewage facilities planning and permitting regulations in 25 Pa. Code Chapters 71, 72 and 73 (relating to administration of sewage facilities planning program; administration of sewage facilities permitting program; and standards for onlot sewage treatment facilities) will continue to satisfy § 93.4c in these redesignated HQ waters. Permit applicants for sewage facilities in HQ waters who demonstrate SEJ at the sewage facilities planning stage need not re-demonstrate SEJ at the discharge permitting stage. The SEJ demonstration process is available to sewage and nonsewage discharge applicants.
This proposed rulemaking will not impose any new compliance requirements on persons engaged in regulated activities under existing permits or approvals from the Department. When applying for permits or approvals for new, additional or increased discharges, the Department will provide compliance assistance.
This proposed rulemaking will not impose any new paperwork requirements on persons engaged in regulated activities under existing permits or approvals from the Department. When applying for permits or approvals for new, additional or increased discharges, additional information may need to be submitted to the Department as part of the permit application or approval request. As previously discussed, the permit applicant will complete an antidegradation analysis. The applicant will describe how the proposed activity will be conducted to maintain existing water quality. If water quality cannot be maintained, the applicant will describe an SEJ for the proposed activity. NPDES general permits are not available for discharges to these streams. Thus, an individual permit, and its associated paperwork, would be required.
The Federal Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13101—13109) established a National policy that promotes pollution prevention as the preferred means for achieving State environmental protection goals. The Department encourages pollution prevention, which is the reduction or elimination of pollution at its source, through the substitution of environmentally-friendly materials, more efficient use of raw materials and the incorporation of energy efficiency strategies. Pollution prevention practices can provide greater environmental protection with greater efficiency because they can result in significant cost savings to facilities that permanently achieve or move beyond compliance. This proposed rulemaking has incorporated the following pollution prevention incentives.
The water quality standards and antidegradation program are major pollution prevention tools because the objective is to prevent degradation by maintaining and protecting existing water quality and existing uses. Although the antidegradation program does not prohibit new or expanding wastewater discharges, nondischarge alternatives must be evaluated and are required to be used when environmentally sound and cost effective. Nondischarge alternatives, when implemented, remove impacts to surface water and may reduce the overall level of pollution to the environment by remediation of the effluent through the soil. In addition, if no environmentally sound and cost-effective alternatives are available, discharges must be nondegrading except as provided in § 93.4c(b)(1)(iii).
These regulations will be reviewed in accordance with the sunset review schedule published by the Department to determine whether the regulations effectively fulfill the goals for which they were intended.
Under section 5(a) of the Regulatory Review Act (71 P.S. § 745.5(a)), on March 4, 2019, the Department submitted a copy of this proposed rulemaking and a copy of a Regulatory Analysis Form to the Independent Regulatory Review Commission (IRRC) and to the Chairpersons of the House and Senate Environmental Resources and Energy Committees. A copy of this material is available to the public upon request.
Under section 5(g) of the Regulatory Review Act, IRRC may convey any comments, recommendations or objections to this proposed rulemaking within 30 days of the close of the public comment period. The comments, recommendations or objections must specify the regulatory review criteria in section 5.2 of the Regulatory Review Act (71 P.S. § 745.5b) which have not been met. The Regulatory Review Act specifies detailed procedures for review, prior to final publication of the rulemaking, by the Department, the General Assembly and the Governor.
Interested persons are invited to submit to the Board written comments, suggestions, support or objections regarding this proposed rulemaking. Comments, suggestions, support or objections must be received by the Board by May 7, 2019.
Comments including the submission of a one-page summary of comments may be submitted to the Board online, by e-mail, by mail or express mail as follows.
Comments may be submitted to the Board by accessing eComment at http://www.ahs.dep.pa.gov/eComment.
Comments may be submitted to the Board by e-mail at RegComments@pa.gov. A subject heading of this proposed rulemaking and a return name and address must be included in each transmission.
If an acknowledgement of comments submitted online or by e-mail is not received by the sender within 2 working days, the comments should be retransmitted to the Board to ensure receipt. Comments submitted by facsimile will not be accepted.
Written comments should be mailed to the Environmental Quality Board, P.O. Box 8477, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8477. Express mail should be sent to the Environmental Quality Board, Rachel Carson State Office Building, 16th Floor, 400 Market Street, Harrisburg, PA 17101-2301.
Persons wishing to present testimony at a hearing are requested to contact the Environmental Quality Board, P.O. Box 8477, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8477, (717) 787-4526 at least 1 week in advance of the hearing to reserve a time to present testimony. Verbal testimony is limited to 5 minutes for each witness. Witnesses are requested to submit three written copies of their oral testimony to the hearing chairperson at the hearing. Organizations are limited to designating one witness to present testimony on their behalf at each hearing.
Persons in need of accommodations as provided for in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 should contact the Board at (717) 787-4526 or through the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Service at (800) 654-5984 (TDD) or (800) 654-5988 (voice users) to discuss how the Board may accommodate their needs.
Fiscal Note: 7-548. No fiscal impact; (8) recommends adoption.


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This essay argues that the Human Rights Act 1998 has strengthened the protection of individual rights in the UK. However, it must also be recognized that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has in some instances lessened its impact. The essay has the following structure. Firstly, the provisions of the HRA 1998 are briefly set out. Secondly, we consider the use of the proportionality test and the declaration of incompatibility as evidence of the strengthening of protection of individual rights. We also refer to the complex question of the reach of the Act, which, if understood as horizontal can afford considerable protection to individual rights. Lastly this essay also argues that the doctrine of deference, rooted in the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, has weakened the impact of the HRA.
The HRA was conceived of as a way of establishing access to justice in British courts. With the traditional framework of statutory and common law principles regarded as providing inadequate protection for individual rights the HRA introduced the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law. Jack Straw emphasized that the goal of the HRA centred on ‘bringing rights home’. Individuals in the UK would be able to bring a human rights claim without having to face the expense and delay of taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights. The HRA provides that it is ‘unlawful’ for a public authority to act incompatibly with a Convention right and individuals are able to challenge such acts.
One of the key strengths of the HRA in protecting individual rights is its use of proportionality as a basis of review for executive action. Applying the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test where an action is only deemed necessary if it meets a ‘pressing social need’ and is ‘proportionate’ is a more demanding form of scrutiny that the traditional approach used in domestic law which focuses on irrationality. Lord Steyn in Daly distinguished proportionality as a doctrine requiring assessment of ‘the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions.’ It was also argued by Lord Bingham in Denbigh that the intensity of review resulting from the proportionality test would often be greater than under the irrationality test. Despite there being debate as to how intense the proportionality test should actually be (Doherty) the pattern set by Daly, Denbigh and Doherty is that executive action is now examined more rigorously under the HRA than before and as such affords individual rights greater protection.
S4 has positively impacted the protection of individual rights in the UK. For instance this can be seen with reference to Art. 5, the right to liberty and security of the person. The structure of the Convention allows States to derogate from Art 5 under particular circumstances outlined in Art. 15 such as a ‘time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.’ Commentators have also pointed to the problem of ‘legislative creep’ which has led to the broadening of the definition of ‘very serious offences’ such as terrorism as shown by s1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Having widened the number of people likely to meet the ‘terrorist test’ even a small increase in police powers of arrest and detention represented a threat to the right of individual liberty.
Two such increases took the form of indefinite detention without charge, trial or conviction under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and ‘control orders’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A v Secretary of State for the Home Department brought s.23 of the 2001 Act before the House of Lords. S.23 allowed the Home Secretary to detain without charge any foreigner who the Home Secretary regarded as a terrorist the individual would not be deported to his home country. The government claimed the threat posed justified a derogation under Art. 15. However although the Lords accepted a ‘public emergency’ existed they held that s23 did not meet the extra requirement of Art. 15, that derogation was limited only to the ‘exigencies of the situation.’ S23 failed the proportionality test, could not be interpreted as compatible with convention rights because it was prima facie incompatible with Art 5 and so the Court issued a declaration of incompatibility.
A second declaration of incompatibility was made in JJ and others with reference to the control order regime enacted in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The trial hinged on whether the restrictions imposed on JJ should be regarded as a deprivation of liberty within Art. 5. Sullivan J reasoned that it did and this was upheld in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The reaction of the government in both these cases is of considerable significance. Rather than choosing to proceed with s23 as it is legally entitled to do the government sought to replace it with control orders. When control orders amounting to 18 hours a day were construed as engaging Art. 5 the government changed it to twelve hours a day, in line with the House of Lords reasoning. The HRA, in providing for a declaration of incompatibility, enables the legitimacy of legislative power to be substantially undermined and as such provides protection for individual rights.
S 6 (1) of the HRA provides that it is ‘unlawful’ for a public authority to act incompatibly with a Convention right. To this extent then individuals are afforded protection from public bodies under the HRA but there is no explicit provision in the act that individuals and the private sector are required to abide by Convention rights. However, the actual reach of the HRA is a source of contention in judicial and academic circles. Not only have there been difficulties in giving meaning to the term ‘public authority.’(Poplar v Donoghue) There is also considerable debate as to whether the Act should only be read as vertically effective or also has horizontal effect. Whilst there is not space within the confines of this essay to do justice to the breadth of this debate it is arguable that case law supports the idea that the HRA has horizontal impact. (Douglas and Zeta-Jones v Hello! Ltd, Venables v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd). The courts’ approach here was to see the HRA as providing a legislative incentive for the development of existing common law principles. In light of this the HRA can be seen as having the capacity to offer broad protection to individual rights in the both public and private sectors.
However, the impact of the HRA on individual rights is weakened is through a doctrine of ‘deference’. Construed from the idea that courts should be in a constitutionally subordinate position to Parliament it refers to deference from the courts to decisions made by elected bodies. The doctrine is a variation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ principle. In the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR the court’s task is supervisory and allows states a certain amount of autonomy in determining if a derogation from a Convention right is permissible.The principle expresses a limited notion of justiciability in both a substantive and transnational sense.
It can be argued that the concept of deference in domestic law goes further than the ‘margin of appreciation’ so that the scope of the ‘presumptive entitlement’ part of particular rights relies not just on judicial definition but also political. (R v Lambert, Ali and Jordan) In Alconbury and Kebilene a distinction was drawn between ‘basic rights’ and ‘allocation of resources’ issues. Broadly speaking this is the difference between political rights and socio-economic rights. The former is regarded as unsuitable for the doctrine of deference whilst the latter is a suitable issue for deference to the legislative viewpoint.
This essay has argued that the HRA 1998 has strengthened the protection of individual rights in the UK. The proportionality test, the declaration of incompatibility and even the reach of the act all lend themselves to this conclusion. However, it should be noted that the Act’s impact remains limited by the role of parliamentary sovereignty. The doctrine of deference creates a hierarchy in rights protection and individual rights are not entrenched in any legal sense. Alternative ideas of moral entrenchment seem rather inadequate in light of the current Conservative Party’s enthusiasm for repealing the Act.
House of Commons Second reading. Official report, 16 February 1998, vol 307 col 769.
A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department , UKHL 56;  2 AC 68.
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoghue  EWCA Civ 595,  4 All ER 604.
R v DPP ex p Kebilene  3 WLR 972 at 994.
Loveland, Ian, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, UK 2009 p 672.
Loveland, Ian, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, UK 2009 p 615.
"The impact of the 1998 Human Rights Act." Parallelewelten.net. 11 2013. All Answers Ltd. 04 2019 <http://parallelewelten.info/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-impact-of-the-1998-human-rights-act.php?vref=1>.
"The impact of the 1998 Human Rights Act." Parallelewelten. Parallelewelten.net, November 2013. Web. 19 April 2019. <http://parallelewelten.info/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-impact-of-the-1998-human-rights-act.php?vref=1>.
Parallelewelten. November 2013. The impact of the 1998 Human Rights Act. [online]. Available from: http://parallelewelten.info/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-impact-of-the-1998-human-rights-act.php?vref=1 [Accessed 19 April 2019].
Parallelewelten. The impact of the 1998 Human Rights Act [Internet]. November 2013. [Accessed 19 April 2019]; Available from: http://parallelewelten.info/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-impact-of-the-1998-human-rights-act.php?vref=1.

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