Argued and Submitted November 17, 2008.
Jeffrey A. Clair (presented argument and authored brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Eric Olson (presented argument) and John M. Gantus (authored brief), John M. Gantus Associates, Glendale, CA, for the defendants-appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-04-02075-MMM.
Before: MYRON H. BRIGHT, STEPHEN S. TROTT, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Facing a question of first impression, we conclude that an order granting summary judgment is final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though the district court retained jurisdiction over a pending claim by a qui tam relator for a share of the award under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
Although the Fifth Circuit appears to consider potential litigation over the relator's share to be "collateral" to the main action, it has addressed the issue only in dicta. See United States v. United States ex rel. Thornton, 207 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 2000).
Relator Jody Shutt originated this FCA action against Nida Campanula ("Campanula"), the sole owner and president of Community Home and Health Care Services ("Community Home"), an agency that provided nursing and home health services and received at least $2.77 million in Medicare reimbursements from May 2003 to August 2004.
Subsequently, the United States pursued criminal charges against Campanilla who entered a guilty plea to one count of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. In the agreement, she stipulated to making illegal payments to physicians, patients, and marketers, forging physician signatures on Medicare forms documenting the medical necessity of claimed services, submitting reimbursement claims to Medicare for home health services she knew were not medically necessary, and submitting reimbursement claims for services that were not performed as represented. Campanilla also admitted that the scheme had caused Medicare a loss of at least $608,558.49 and agreed to make full restitution of that amount.
Several months later, the United States intervened in this FCA suit against Campanilla and Community Home, raising both FCA claims and separate common law claims and seeking a civil penalty of $5,500 and treble damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the government, awarding a civil penalty of $5,500 and treble the damages Campanilla had admitted in her plea agreement. The district court dismissed the government's remaining common law claims without prejudice while retaining jurisdiction over the relator's claim for a share of the judgment pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
In a separate memorandum disposition, we deal with Campanula's claims that the civil judgment violated constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy and excessive fines.
We have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although the parties do not dispute appellate jurisdiction, the court must consider sua sponte whether an order is final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prevailing party's decision to dismiss its remaining claims without prejudice generally renders a partial grant of summary judgment final. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R D Latex Corp., 141 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1998).
In concluding that a relator's pending claim against the United States for a share in the judgment does not interfere with the finality of the district court order, we are guided by White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). There the Supreme Court addressed a related issue: whether a request for attorney's fees raises legal issues collateral to the main action prompting an inquiry separate and apart from the decision on the merits. Id. at 451-52, 102 S.Ct. 1162. Following White, we held that a district court retains the power to award attorney's fees after a notice of appeal from the decision on the merits has been filed, Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983), and adopted the "bright-line rule" that "all attorney's fees requests are collateral to the main action," rendering a "judgment on the merits . . . final and appealable even though a request for attorney's fees is unresolved," Int'l Assoc. of Bridge Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984).
Although relators' claims for a percentage of FCA awards are likely to be larger in amount than those of attorneys in some instances, those claims are similarly "collateral" to the judgment on the merits. Congress's decision to allow qui tam relators a share of FCA awards is designed to encourage relators to initiate FCA suits and to compensate them for their efforts. The determination of the relator's share of an FCA award, like the award of attorney's fees, raises factual issues "collateral to the main action" because it involves a factual inquiry distinct from one addressing the merits.
The criteria for determining the relator's share, as set out in the Department of Justice's "Relator's Share Guidelines" ("Guidelines"), generally are not relevant to the defendant's liability under the FCA. See Marc S. Raspanti David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 Temp. L.Rev. 23, 53 (1998) (quoting the Guidelines). For example, the Guidelines suggest considering the circumstances in which the relator reported the false claims, the report's effects, the extent of the relator's relevant knowledge, the level of assistance provided by the relator and the relator's counsel, and any substantial adverse impact on the relator of filing the complaint. Id.
To be sure, the existence of a nationwide practice and the potential safety issues involved may be relevant both to the merits and to allocating the award. See id. However, these determinations, along with other criteria noted in the Guidelines, including the size of the award and the scope of the FCA proceeding, id., usually cannot be fully resolved until after the merits of the FCA claim have been addressed. The district court would therefore rarely have occasion to determine the relator's share of an award prior to or even simultaneously with the merits of the underlying claim.
The important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration, Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), is also better served by treating the relator's claim as collateral to the merits. Although such a rule creates some risk of occasional "piecemeal" appeals, in many instances a court of appeals ruling on the merits of a dispositive motion might make an allocation of the award between the government and the relator unnecessary or duplicative. For example, where a district court incorrectly grants a plaintiffs summary judgment motion, an opportunity to review that judgment avoids the need for the district court to determine the relator's share when the claims should have been dismissed or when an ensuing trial would require a new allocation of the award to reflect the relator's participation.
For these reasons, we hold a judgment on the merits of an FCA claim is a separate, final, and appealable decision even where the district court has retained jurisdiction over the collateral issue of allocating the FCA award between the United States and the relator. We therefore reach the merits of this appeal and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the reasons stated in an unpublished memorandum disposition filed herewith.


In June, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a new rule proposal that, if adopted, would stop funding for abortion providers through the Department’s Title X family planning program. Pro-life advocates have been calling the new rule “Protect Life Rule.” This rule is a good first step, but there are several ways it could be strengthened.
As currently written, the Protect Life Rule would prohibit Title X funding for organizations that perform, promote, offer referrals for, or lobby for abortion unless they maintain a “bright line” of separation between Title X services and abortion. It would prevent abortion providers from offering Title X services in the same facilities and clinics where they perform abortions. Importantly, it would also do away with a Clinton-era regulation that requires all Title X grantees to provide abortion counseling and referrals.
The Protect Life Rule is expected to hit abortion providers like Planned Parenthood hard. Planned Parenthood spends nearly $60 million in funds derived from Title X grants every year, according to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office. Title X is the second largest source of government funding for Planned Parenthood, representing approximately 11% of all federal and state funds the organization receives.
Democratic governors in 14 states have already sent a letter to HHS Secretary Alex Azar asking him to disapprove the Protect Life Rule, threatening to explore “all possible avenues, including legal options” to stop the policy from taking effect. Signatories include Democrat Governors Gina Raimondo of Rhode Island, Steve Bullock of Montana, Kate Brown of Oregon, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, and Ralph Northam of Virginia.
Despite the governors’ threat, the Protect Life Rule is not likely to be ruled unconstitutional in federal court. A nearly identical version of the Protect Life Rule was put in place by HHS under the Reagan and first Bush administrations. When a legal challenge to this Reagan-Bush Title X rule was brought to the Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court sided decisively in favor of the government. The Court upheld the rule on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
Federal law under the Public Health Service (PHS) Act prohibits Title X funds from being spent in “programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” But despite this provision of the PHS Act, under the Clinton, second Bush and Obama administrations, HHS has allowed abortion providers to use the same facilities, waiting rooms, exam rooms, phone numbers, staff, workstations, and the same financial and patient records for both Title X services and for abortion.
Currently, providers that offer Title X services in facilities that are also used for abortion are only required by the government to pro-rate the costs when utilizing common areas. This has raised serious concerns that federal funds are being commingled with the provider’s abortion activities. It has also raised fungibility concerns that Title X money is being used to indirectly support a Title X grantee’s abortion business by providing revenue for the same facilities that engage in abortion activities. Under current federal regulations, Title X grantees are also required to offer abortion counseling and to provide abortion referrals upon client request, a practice clearly contrary to both the spirit and letter of the PHS Act.
The Protect Life Rule, if adopted by HHS, would help prevent the commingling of Title X funds with abortion services and it would be a step in the right direction in protecting the conscience rights of health care workers.
But while the Protect Life Rule is a significant improvement over the status quo, the proposed rule still falls short of ensuring that Title X funds are not being used to support abortion in Title X projects. The rule also still needs improvement in the area of safeguarding the conscience rights of health care workers in Title X programs. Below, we have listed some recommendations for how HHS can improve the Protect Life Rule. To see a more detailed and complete explanation of these points, you can read our full comment submitted to HHS here.
Currently, federal regulations allow Title X grantees to provide abortion referrals to Title X clients if they ask for one or when “medically indicated.” Title X doctors are allowed to provide patients with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of abortion clinics but are not permitted to take further action such as scheduling an appointment at an abortion clinic on the patient’s behalf.
However, the Rule, by design, carves out a specific loophole for abortion referrals. The Rule allows Title X doctors to provide patients who want an abortion with a list that includes contact information for both comprehensive health providers and health providers that offer abortion. Title X doctors would only be able to provide this list to patients who have clearly stated that it is their intention to have an abortion and doctors would also be free not to provide this list if they so choose.
While the Rule would prohibit Title X providers from identifying for their patients which providers on the list offer abortion, ultimately, Title X doctors, under this mechanism, would still be providing their patients with information on where they can obtain an abortion. All the patient would have to do in order to find out which ones offer abortion would be to simply call each provider on the list.
It is not clear why HHS has created this loophole in the Protect Life Rule. According to the HHS’ own reasoned analysis for the Rule, the PHS Act’s prohibition on abortion “includes any action that directly or indirectly facilitates, encourages, or supports in any way the use of abortion as a method of family planning” (emphasis added).
There is no need, then, for Title X projects to be providing pregnancy counseling as these services are outside of the scope of the Title X program. And consequently, HHS should revise its proposed rule to prohibit Title X grantees from providing abortion referrals of any kind, including through providing clients with lists that include information on abortion providers.
HHS needs to decide whether it considers pregnancy counseling a part of Title X programming or it not. The HHS’ current position is logically untenable. It cannot claim to provide pregnancy counseling in some situations and not others. This inconsistency could weaken the Department’s position should the Rule be challenged in court.
Under current federal regulations, abortion clinics are eligible to receive Title X grants.
The Protect Life Rule would by and large prevent facilities that perform abortion from receiving Title X funding. The Protect Life Rule would require Title X grantees to use separate facility entrances and exits, different waiting rooms, exam rooms, phone numbers, accounting and patient records, websites, and workstations for Title X services and for abortion. The Protect Life Rule would thus require Title X projects to maintain “physical and financial separation” from abortion activities.
However, the Protect Life Rule would not stop funding to organizations that provide abortion at separate off-site locations. To illustrate what this means, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Under the Protect Life Rule, a Planned Parenthood clinic that provides on-site abortions (we’ll call this “clinic 1”) would not be eligible to receive Title X funding. But a Planned Parenthood clinic (in the same city let’s say, we’ll call it “clinic 2”) that does not offer abortion inducing drugs or in-clinic abortions on-site may still qualify for Title X funding—that is, if they agree to remove all abortion brochures and information from that clinic and if that clinic agreed not to provide abortion referrals, et cetera. In this hypothetical scenario, both clinic 1 and clinic 2 would be operated by the same Planned Parenthood affiliate, that is to say, they would both be operated by the same organization. But clinic 2 would be eligible to receive Title X funding and the other would not.
Imagine now a scenario where a potential client is seeking Title X services. It is not stretch of the imagination to conceive that the client may accidentally go to clinic 1 expecting to receive Title X services. After all, clinic 2 on the other side of town does. Why would clinic 1, which is operated by the same organization, not also have Title X services? It seems like a logical assumption. But since clinic 1 isn’t bound by the Protect Life Rule, the clinic is free to offer the client abortion information and counseling, something the client would not have otherwise have been forced to endure had they gone to clinic 2 instead.
And since both clinic 1 and clinic 2 are operated by the same organization, there are also fungibility concerns with funding clinic 2. By providing Title X funding to clinic 2, the government could be indirectly supporting the abortion business of clinic 1 if Title X funds are being used to subsidize the organization on the whole. By funding clinic 2, the government is necessarily endorsing the organization as well. This could create a false impression for many Americans that the Title X program promotes abortion.
In order to prevent this, HHS needs to revise the Protect Life Rule to require Title X grantees to maintain complete “organizational separation” when engaging in prohibited abortion activities. This means that an organization that wishes to engage in abortion activities must do so with an organization that is legally distinct from the organization receiving Title X funding.
Under this arrangement, the Title X grantee would still be able to engage in abortion activities, but they would have to use a different organization in order to do so. And while even this arrangement is not entirely satisfactory (i.e. the grantee still gets federal funds while being allowed to promote abortion with another organization), it is about the best pro-life advocates can hope for until Roe v. Wade is overturned and the right to life for the unborn is restored.
The Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California (1984) ruled that it is impermissible for the government to force an organization to surrender a fundamental right as a precondition for receiving a government grant. However, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California and in Regan v. Taxation With Representation (1983) the Court found that it is permissible for the government to require organizations receiving a government benefit (such as a grant, for instance) to establish a separate organization with which to engage in First Amendment activities that the government does not want to subsidize. Consequently, HHS cannot require organizations applying for Title X grants to surrender their First Amendment right to free speech (remember, the Protect Life Rule prohibits Title X projects from promoting or lobbying for abortion). However, HHS is able to require Title X grantees to establish a separate organization for engaging in abortion-related activities that the American taxpayers don’t want to pay for.
There are also concerns, under the HHS proposed rule, that there are not sufficient safeguards in place to protect the conscience rights of health care workers when faced with having to provide assistance or referrals for contraceptive methods which may violate their religious beliefs.
Federal regulations currently allow Title X grantees to only provide Natural Family Planning if they so choose—just so long as the Title X project on the whole offers “a broad range” of family planning methods and services. As a result, organizations receiving Title X grants would not have to provide contraceptive methods that they do not want to provide. However, this does not stop Title X grantees from forcing their employees to provide or assist in providing contraceptive methods that may violate their religious beliefs.
Furthermore, the PHS Act and federal regulations appear to require Title X grantees to provide referrals for contraceptive methods that they do not provide themselves. This arrangement could be problematic for some organizations or health care workers that may be opposed on religious grounds to providing referrals for certain contraceptive methods.
Federal law under the Church Amendments prohibit Title X grants from requiring any health care worker to perform or assist in an abortion or sterilization in violation of their religious or moral beliefs. The Church Amendments also allow organizations receiving Title X funds to refuse to make abortion or sterilization available in their clinics or facilities. But neither the Church Amendments nor the Department’s regulations on Title X specifically exempt health care workers from having to participate in their employer’s activities in providing other contraceptive methods besides permanent sterilization.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), however, states that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.” The government can only choose to significantly abridge the right to free exercise of religion if (and only if) it can prove that a) such a restriction advances a “compelling interest” of the government and b) that such an interest is advanced in the “least restrictive means” possible. Essentially, RFRA makes it clear that any attempt to restrict the free exercise of religion by the government is subject to strict scrutiny, i.e. it is subject to the most rigorous standard of judicial review.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the Obama administration’s HHS Contraceptive Mandate, forcing all employers to pay for all FDA-approved methods of contraception in their employee’s health care plans, was a violation of RFRA.
As federal regulations on Title X appear to require Title X grantees to provide referrals for all family planning methods except abortion, the situation is not wholly different from the Hobby Lobby case. Thus, HHS, in compliance with its statutory requirements under RFRA, should revise its proposed rule to specifically exempt health care workers in Title X projects from being required to offer referrals or assistance in providing family planning methods which violate their religious beliefs.
The Protect Life Rule makes it clear that Title X projects “may not perform, promote, refer for, or support, abortion as a method of family planning, nor take any other affirmative action to assist a patient to secure such an abortion.” It would seem from this that HHS would consider training and technical assistance for abortion as activities that “support” abortion.
Indeed, it would clearly seem contrary to the PHS Act if Title X grantees were allowed to use Title X funds to provide training on abortion methods, training on abortion lobbying, or technical assistance for abortion clinics by tracking abortion service statistics or abortion equipment inventory.
However, HHS should not leave room for interpretation on this point. Training and technical assistance are noteworthy and distinct activities on par with performing, promoting, or referring for abortion. §59.16 of HHS’ proposed rule further specifies that Title X projects may not lobby for abortion, take legal action on abortion issues, advertise for abortion, or pay dues to associations that promote abortion as a significant part of their activities. Providing training or technical assistance for abortion is not an uncommon activity for organizations that engage in abortion advocacy. Thus, a specific prohibition on training and technical assistance (TA) in support of abortion—or for that matter, training or TA in support of organizations that promote abortion as a more than insignificant part of their activities—would provide greater clarity in implementing the Department’s regulations.
In summary, the Trump Administration’s Protect Life Rule is an excellent first step. HHS should be lauded for proposing these much-needed revisions to Title X regulations. But adopting the suggestions we provide here would strengthen the Rule even further.
 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see also Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,503 (Jun. 1, 2018) (proposed rule to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
 Public Health Service Act, sec. 1008 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a–6).
 See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5); see also 42 C.F.R. §59.5(b)(1).
 Provision of Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,281 (Jul. 3, 2000).
 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,531 (proposed rule to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.14(a)).
 Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,505 (Jun. 1, 2018) (proposed rule to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Div. H, Title II, Pub. L. No. 115–141, 132 Stat. 716-17 (2018).
 Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,519 (Jun. 1, 2018) (proposed rule to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984)). See also Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983): In this case, the Supreme Court found that the government was not required to extend 501(c)(3) status to an organization that engaged in lobbying as a substantial part of its activities. The Court reasoned that it appeared that the defendant in this case could maintain both a 501(c)(4) organization for lobbying activities and a separate 501(c)(3) for non-lobbying activities. With this arrangement, the Court found “The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying. This is not unduly burdensome” Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
 See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(1); see also Public Health Service Act, sec. 1001 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)).
 The PHS Act requires States applying for federal Title X funding to demonstrate to the HHS a “plan for a coordinated and comprehensive program of family planning services” (Public Health Service Act, sec. 1002 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a(a))). Implicit in the term “coordinated” is the ability of Title X providers to offer referral services. Under current federal regulations, Title X grantees are required to “Provide for coordination and use of referral arrangements with other providers” (42 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)(8)). Thus, it would seem that the Department would require Title X grantees to provide referrals for contraceptive services that they do not provide themselves. The Protect Life Rule would only modify this requirement by prohibiting Title X doctors from making abortion referrals but would not otherwise provide any exemptions for health care worker objecting to contraceptive methods referrals on religious grounds.
 “Church Amendments,” 42 U.S.C. § 300a–7(b).
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a)).
 Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b).
Completely defunding Planned Parenthood I think is the best option. This organization is the power house of the abortion industry on a national scale and there is absolutely no justification whatsoever that they should receive one dime of taxpayer money to fund their criminal and immoral industry of murder for profit. Changing these regulations to make abortion referrals more difficult is a worthy cause but in a culture where many are in love with death it provides (to their sensibilities) an unfair advantage when they are forced to promote life over death. Until the culture changes and once again acknowledges that we are God’s creation from fertilization to natural death the battle will go on. Planned Parenthood’s selling of body parts for profit somehow touches a much broader revulsion across the population than the dismemberment and murder of unborn babies??? The other Governors of the States that either do not support Abortion on demand or are not willing to fight stricter regulations need to make their voices heard, but the loudest cry should be to take every tax dollar away from Planned Parenthood at every level of government. Let the dead fund death with their own filthy money.
I concur with the findings and recommendations of population research and ask you include their further steps to shore up and make clear the Protect Life Act , that no Title X monies be sent to those facilities that preform abortion.


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Ruth’s practice focuses on commercial litigation with particular interest in private international law, employment, commercial fraud, insurance and sport. She also has significant experience in public law, at both a domestic and international level. Ruth is currently instructed as junior counsel to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse for the Lambeth investigation.
Recent past cases include appearing as sole counsel resisting an application for a springboard injunction in Aquinas v Miller and others  EWHC 404 (QB) and appearing in the Supreme Court in Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust (led by Philip Havers QC and Bradley Martin QC)  UKSC 50.
She was instructed as part of the counsel team in Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc, an important case arising out of the operation of a mine in Zambia concerning issues of jurisdiction and parent company liability, which was heard by the Supreme Court in January (awaiting judgment). She was also instructed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist with the Kenya Emergency Group Litigation, a case involving over 40,000 claimants alleging abuse arising out of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya during the 1950s.
For the legal year 2016-2017 Ruth was Judicial Assistant to Sir Terence Etherton, Master of the Rolls. Her experience during this time included Miller and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (“the Article 50 litigation”)  EWHC 2768 (Admin) and the first appeal from the Financial List Banco Santander Totta SA v Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA and others  EWCA 1267.
Prior to joining chambers, Ruth was a Research Assistant to Professor Philippe Sands QC working on Public International Law, ICSID Arbitrations and Court of Arbitration for Sport cases. She also previously worked as a Research Associate at UCL’s Judicial Institute and a Teaching Fellow in Public Law at UCL.
Ruth has extensive experience of acting for claimants and defendants in contractual and tortious commercial disputes, particularly those with conflicts of laws issues, both led and unled.
During her time with the Master of the Rolls she worked on Banco Santander Totta SA v Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA and others  EWCA 1267, the first appeal from the Financial List.
Ruth is an experienced employment practitioner who regularly appears in the Employment Tribunal and the High Court. She has particular expertise in claims involving private or public international law elements.
Aquinas v Miller and others  EWHC 404 (QB) – sole counsel for the first and second defendants (co-defending with Stuart Benzie) successfully resisted an application for continuation of a springboard injunction.
During her time with the Master of the Rolls she worked on Pimlico Plumbers v Gary Smith  EWCA Civ 51, the landmark case on the distinction between self-employed and a “worker”.
Ruth is building a practice in conflicts of law disputes and is frequently instructed in cases involving a dispute about jurisdiction or applicable law. She has co-written a short introduction to Rome II with Charles Dougherty QC and Marie Louise Kinsler QC which is available here.
During her time with the Master of the Rolls she worked on Banco Santander Totta SA v Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA and others  EWCA 1267, the first appeal from the Financial List, which concerned the correct interpretation of Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention; if mandatory provisions of domestic law were to apply despite the presence of a choice of law clause.
Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc (2018 – 2019) – part of the counsel team for the claimants in this important case concerning issues of jurisdiction and parent company liability, heard by the Supreme Court in January (awaiting judgment). The claim arises out of the operation of a mine in Zambia.
Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians  UKSC 25 – assisted Marie Louise Kinsler QC in a case involving claims made by more than 600 Iraqi civilians alleging maltreatment at the hands of the Ministry of Defence. It was a complex conflicts of law case which focused on the interpretation of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984.
Ruth accepts instructions from players, clubs and regulatory authorities with clients ranging from self-employed tennis coaches to the Clay Pigeon Shooting Association. She has a particular interest in employment and sponsorship disputes. She regularly appears in the High Court and Employment Tribunal, with recent highlights including acting as sole counsel resisting an application for a springboard injunction in Aquinas v Miller and others  EWHC 404 (QB).
During her time with the Master of the Rolls she worked on a number of high profile employment appeals, including Pimlico Plumbers v Gary Smith  EWCA Civ 51, the landmark case on the distinction between being self-employed and a “worker”.
Ruth is instructed in respect of all aspects of commercial fraud, including freezing and search orders and other without notice applications. She co-wrote a Practical Guide to Freezing Orders with Charles Dougherty QC which is available here.
Ruth is currently instructed as junior counsel to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse for the Lambeth investigation. She was previously instructed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist with the Kenya Emergency Group Litigation, a case involving over 40,000 claimants alleging abuse arising out of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya during the 1950s. She has been published in many leading public law texts including Judicial Review, with her article The Scope and Effect of Purdah, Judicial Review, December 2017.
During her time working for the Master of the Rolls she worked on Miller and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (“the Article 50 litigation”)  EWHC 2768 (Admin), the landmark case which considered whether Article 50 could be triggered by use of the royal prerogative or if an Act of Parliament was needed.
Ruth also has experience in human rights issues arising in a commercial setting. She worked on Shlosberg v Avonwick Holdings Ltd  EWCA Civ 1138, where legal professional privilege was evoked by a bankrupt in resisting disclosure of sensitive documents by the trustees and Stewart and others v Watts  EWCA Civ 1247 where an almsperson was alleging discriminatory treatment following an eviction notice.
Ruth has expertise in inter-state disputes. As a Research Assistant to Professor Philippe Sands QC she assisted with the Mauritius v United Kingdom arbitration concerning the application of the Law of the Sea to the Marine Protected Area surrounding the Chagos Islands. She also worked on Croatia v Serbia, a case where both sides were alleging genocide under the Genocide Convention 1948 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Both cases involved collaborating as part of a large litigation team.
She has particular interest in cases involving decolonisation. She was previously instructed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist with the Kenya Emergency Group Litigation, a case involving over 40,000 claimants alleging abuse arising out of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya during the 1950s.
Ruth is instructed by insurers and claimants in coverage related disputes. During her time working for the Master of the Rolls her experience included UK Insurance Limited v R&S Pilling t/as Phoenix Engineering  EWCA Civ 259 which concerned whether motor insurance cover extended to liability for damage to the property of third parties as a result of fire caused by repair work while the vehicle was immobilised.
Mohamud v Morrisons  UKSC 11 – Ruth assisted Benjamin Browne QC, Roger Harris and Isabel Barter, one of the leading cases on vicarious liability.
Ruth acts in all manner of professional negligence cases with clients including architects, solicitors and insurers. She was also instructed by the Government Legal Department to assist with ongoing litigation regarding the prescription of the anti-malarial drug Lariam to deployed troops. She accepts instructions as sole counsel or part of a larger team. Ruth has assisted Doré Green with a variety of high value professional negligence cases concerning construction and property damage.
She appeared in the Supreme Court in Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust (led by Philip Havers QC and Bradley Martin QC)  UKSC 50, case concerning the duty of care on NHS receptionists to give accurate wait times.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Pimlico Plumbers: clear guidance for the gig economy?

matches: UKSC EWCA EWCA EWCA EWCA UKSC EWCA EWCA EWCA EWCA UKSC UKSC


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We are pleased to present to you the list of top 10 verdicts obtained in Massachusetts in the year 2015. The list is comprised of various case types that were tried either in state or federal courts.
If you are the attorney who obtained one of the 10 verdicts on this list, you can display a separate, personalized badge on your bio page to showcase your victory and potentially generate more business for your firm. You can buy your personalized attorney badge here.
Case: Larkin, et al. v. Johnston, et al.
Case: Anderson, et al. v. American International Group, Inc., et al.
Case: Charles v. City of Boston, et al.
Case: Wolniewicz v. The Service Department, et al.
Case: Lyons, et al. v. Johnson, et al.
Case: Advanced Healthcare Management Services, LLC, et al. v. VHS Acquisition Subsidiary Number 9 Inc., et al.

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LAWRENCE — University of Kansas Libraries will host “The Legacies & Unfinished Business of BvB, 2.0” in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Brown v. Board, the landmark Supreme Court ruling on racial segregation. The symposium, taking place April 11-12, includes an exhibition opening as well as a daylong event featuring distinguished law and civil rights experts. Both events are free and open to the public.
KU Libraries will host an opening of the exhibition “Lasting Impact: Brown v. the Board of Education” in the Watson Library Gallery, third floor west, at 5 p.m. Friday, April 11. The opening will be followed by a presentation at 6 p.m. by KU professors Shirley Hill, John Rury and Quinton Lucas examining the graduation gap for blacks since the ruling.
Sarah Goodwin Thiel, head of KU Libraries' Center for Community & Affiliate Engagement, explained that the “Lasting Impact” exhibition highlights the scholarship and the many resources found at KU surrounding this significant decision. “After 60 years, the Brown v. the Board of Education decision continues to play a pivotal role in the ongoing study of education, equality and basic human rights,” said Goodwin Thiel. The exhibition is the result of a collaboration among the KU Libraries’ African-American Experiences Collection, the Wheat Law Library, the Dole Institute of Politics Archive, the University Press of Kansas, the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries and museums, and others. The exhibition will be on display through the summer.
On Saturday, April 12, KU Libraries will host another public event on the fifth floor of the Kansas Union. The symposium will consider the legacy of the case as well as its future societal and legal implications. The program begins at 8:15 a.m. and will continue through 4:30 p.m.
"On the Road to Brown and After 1954," 9:15 a.m.
The children of Brown v. Board plaintiffs: Linda Brown Thompson, Victoria Benson, Leola Montgomery, Cheryl Brown Henderson, John Stokes, Joy Cabarrus Speaks, Homer Floyd and John Spearman.
"The Legacies and Challenges to Fulfilling the promises of Mendez and Brown," 10:45 a.m.
David Hinojosa, regional counsel with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
"Today's Unfinished Business of Brown," 1 p.m.
Theodore Shaw, Columbia University School of Law.
"Creating Equal Opportunities Today: Brown, Public Policies and Practices of Inclusion," 2:15 p.m.
Kenneth Mack, Harvard Law School.
For a full schedule, please see http://lib.ku.edu/event/58053.
The symposium is sponsored by KU Libraries, the Dana and Sue Anderson African-American Collecting Program Endowment Fund, the Hall Center for the Humanities, KU School of Law, the Langston Hughes Center and the Office of Multicultural Affairs.
Both the Friday and Saturday events are free and open to the public. Those who wish to attend should RSVP by Wednesday, April 9, to Rachel Karwas at 785-864-8961 or rkarwas@ku.edu.
The symposium is part of KU’s April series of events, Brown v. Board, Legacies Created, Questions Remain, marking the 60th anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education case. On April 17, the School of Law, Hall Center for the Humanities, Chancellor's Office, Office of the Provost, School of Education and Institute for Policy & Social Research will host “Inequality in a Post-Civil Rights Era” with Lee Bollinger, president of Columbia University. The full schedule and registration details are available through the Hall Center.
One of the top 50 libraries in the Association of Research Libraries by volumes held, and the largest library system in Kansas, KU Libraries advance discovery, innovation and learning for KU, the state and a rapidly expanding community of world scholars.


The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, FinCEN Form 114 (a/k/a FBAR) is arguably the most important information return concerning foreign accounts. Its importance stems first and foremost from the extremely severe Form 114 penalties, which range from criminal penalties of up to 10 years in prison to willful and even non-willful penalties that may exceed the value of the penalized accounts. Given these penalties, it is important to understand who the FinCEN Form 114 filers are – i.e. who is required to file Form 114?
For today’s purposes, I will concentrate only on the individual FinCEN Form 114 filers.
At the center of the definition of FBAR filer is a United States person (“US person”). A US person must file FinCEN Form 114 if he has a financial interest in or signatory authority or any other authority over any foreign financial accounts and the aggregate maximum value of these accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.
Under the 31 CFR 1010.350(b), the definition of a US Person is very specific and consists of five main categories: (1) a citizen of the United States; (2) a resident of the United States; (3) an entity created or organized in the United States or under the laws of the United States; (4) a trust formed under the laws of the United States; and (5) an estate formed under the laws of the United States. As I stated above, today, I will focus only on categories 1 and 2; I will deal with business, trust and estate FinCEN Form 114 filers in other articles.
This is by far the easiest category of FinCEN Form 114 filers to analyze. If an individual is a US citizen and has foreign accounts that exceed the filing threshold, then, he must file Form 114.
In the context of FBAR compliance, a “resident of the United States” has a special meaning which corresponds for the most part, but not exactly, to the US income tax definition of a tax resident. There are three distinct categories of individuals who fall within the definition of a “resident of the United States” for FBAR purposes: US permanent residents, persons who satisfy the Substantial Presence Test, and certain non-resident aliens who make the first-year election to be treated as US tax residents. Additionally, Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) §7701(b)(2) contains a number of provisions that regulate when individuals are considered to be US residents for FBAR (as well as income tax) purposes during the first-year and the last-year of residency.
The first category of residents of the United States is not complex. All US Permanent are US persons and, if they have foreign accounts that exceed the FBAR filing threshold, also FinCEN Form 114 filers.
The second category of residents of the United States for FBAR purposes are the individuals who satisfied the Substantial Presence Test described in IRC §7701(b)(3). Under the Substantial Presence Test, an individual is a US person if: (1) he was present in the United States (as defined under 31 CFR 1010.100(hhh)) for at least 31 days during the calendar year in question; and (2) the sum of the number of days on which such individual was present in the United States during the current year and the two preceding calendar years equals or exceeds 183 days. The amount of days in the two preceding years should multiplied by the applicable multiplier as follows: first preceding year – one-third; second preceding year – one-sixth.
For example, if we are trying to determine the tax residency for the tax year 2019, we will take all the sum of the days an individual was physically present in the United States in 2019, one-third of the days in 2018 and one-sixth of the days in 2017. If the total amount equals or exceeds 183 days, then this individual is a US person for FBAR purposes.
It should be pointed out that this is the general rule. There are numerous exceptions to the Substantial Present Test, including the famous “closer connection exception” and certain visa exemptions. Hence, you should retain an international tax attorney to analyze your specific set of facts in order to determine whether you should be considered a US person for FBAR purposes.
The third category of residents of the United States for FBAR purposes includes all individuals who made a first-year election on their US tax returns to be treated as residents pursuant to IRC §7701(b)(4). Generally, we are talking about a situation where a person does not have a green card, does not meet the Substantial Presence Test and comes sometime during a year. In other words, this person is not a US person under any other category, but decides to make an election to be treated as a US tax resident.
In order to make this election, the person must satisfy certain requirements outlined in IRC §7701(b)(4). Failure to meet any of these requirements will result in a person becoming a non-resident alien for the entire year.
It is also important not to confuse the IRC §7701(b)(4) election with the IRC §6013(g) or (h) election. In the latter cases, the elections do not affect the residency status for FBAR purposes.
IRC §7701(b)(2) is not technically a fourth category of a resident of the United States. Rather, this section regulates when US residency actually starts or ends once it is acquired or lost under other categories. Nevertheless, it is important to understand and be aware of these provisions.
Most tax treaties contain what are known as “tie-breaker provisions” for determining a person’s tax residency. Sometimes, a person can use these provisions to escape the income tax residency rules. The IRS has specifically stated that, as long as one of the residency test of IRC §7701(b) is met, the tax treaty non-residency determination does not affect the residency status of a person for FBAR purposes.
If you have foreign bank accounts, you should contact Sherayzen Law Office for professional help concerning whether you need to file an FBAR. Sherayzen Law Office is a highly-experienced international tax law firm which has helped hundreds of US taxpayers with their FBAR issues. We can help You!


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1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
pursued. Moreover, observing that the domestic court decisions had contained particularly thorough reasoning, the Court found that the investigation as a whole had been sufficiently effective to establish that the use of force had been justified in the circumstances.
The Court noted, as had the domestic courts, that the evidence obtained during the investigation showed that L.M. had been armed with a knife throughout the events, that he had not dropped the knife when the police officers had ordered him to do so and had subsequently stabbed a police officer in the hand. A dagger had also been found in his belt. The Court also observed that it had been established that one of the police officers had fired a warning shot which L.M. had ignored. Nor had he stopped after being hit by a car. It could be seen from the domestic courts’ decisions and the evidence obtained during the investigation, particularly witness evidence, that L.M. had not been in a “normal” state. The police officers had therefore been justified in thinking that L.M. appeared to be out of control, resuming his headlong pursuit of J.-P.H. despite their attempts to stop him.
reasoning, that the wildly erratic behaviour of L.M. had indisputably posed an imminent threat to J.-P.H.’s life. The Court therefore considered that police officer S.T. had acted in the sincere conviction that J.-P.H.’s life was under threat and had genuinely believed it necessary to use force. The Court reiterated that where it was called upon to examine whether the use of lethal force was legitimate, being detached from the events at issue it could not substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of an officer who was required to react in the heat of the moment to avert a genuinely perceived danger.
absolutely necessary in the light of the serious immediate threat to J.-P.H.’s life. In view of L.M.’s attitude, the inability of the other police officer, who was injured, to intervene and to the undeniable imminent risk facing J.-P.H., police officer S.T.’s decision to use his firearm could, in the circumstances, be deemed absolutely necessary in “defence of any person from unlawful violence”. The Court also considered that Ms Mendy’s allegations of poor handling of the operations and regarding the effect of the arrival of the police on her brother’s conduct were unsubstantiated. Lastly, with regard to Ms Mendy’s allegation that the rules governing the use of weapons were inadequate, the Court observed that Article 122-5 of the Criminal Code, applicable to lawenforcement officers, which lay down the grounds for legitimate self-defence, referred to the “necessity” of the defensive action and the “imminence” of the danger, and required the response to be proportionate to the attack. That provision echoed the wording of Article 2 of the Convention and contained the elements required by the Court's case-law. It followed that the complaints were ill-founded and must be rejected.
The investigation - The Court pointed out that the review of the proportionality of the use of force had been carried out by the three levels of domestic courts. Referring to its finding that the domestic courts’ decisions had contained particularly thorough reasoning in the present case, the Court found that the investigation as a whole had been sufficiently effective to establish that the use of force had been justified in the circumstances of the case. Moreover, Ms Mendy’s complaint about the alleged lack of independence of the investigation was not substantiated. That part of the application was ill-founded and had to be rejected.
The case of Aliyev v. Azerbaijan (application no. 68762/14) concerned the detention of a lawyer and human rights activist on charges including illegal entrepreneurship, embezzlement and tax evasion The applicant, Intigam Kamil oglu Aliyev, is an Azerbaijani national who was born in 1962 and lives in Absheron (Azerbaijan). The facts of his case are similar to those in Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan.
various non-governmental organisations, including Mr Aliyev’s association. In August he was charged with illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale tax evasion and aggravated abuse of power. The investigator in the case stated that Mr Aliyev had failed to inform the authorities that he had become head of a legal entity – his association – and had omitted to register grants from donors. He had also signed agreements on various sums without legal authority and had deposited money and made payments to himself and others in the guise of salaries and service fees. Mr Aliyev had thus, according to the authorities, conducted illegal entrepreneurial activity, had profited from that and had avoided paying tax. He was arrested and remanded in custody for three months, with his appeals against detention being dismissed. His home and his association’s office were also searched. Documents and various objects were seized, including case files on applications to the Court. The domestic courts rejected his complaints that those measures had been unlawful. In December 2014 the Prosecutor General’s Office brought new charges: high-level embezzlement, forgery by an official and very large-scale tax evasion. He was convicted in April 2015 and given a sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment, reduced to a five-year suspended sentence in March 2016, when he was released from detention. His trial is the subject of a separate application.
The Court held, unanimously, that there had been one violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the European Convention on Human Rights related to the conditions of his pre-trial detention, and no violation of Article 3 related to his medical care in detention and to the conditions of a later period of detention, and a violation of Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security) owing to the lack of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence as grounds for his detention, and a violation of Article 5 § 4 (review of detention) on account of the lack of a proper judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention, and a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life and communications) because of a search of his office and home, and a violation of Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) as the Court found that the measures taken against the applicant had been aimed at silencing and punishing him for his human rights activities rather than for one of the legitimate purposes under the Convention.
The Court found in particular that this case was part of “a troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention of critics of the Government, civil society activists and human rights defenders”. It called on the Government to take steps to protect such people, ensuring that there were no more retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of the criminal law against them.
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.
The case concerned an unsuccessful application to have proceedings before the domestic courts reopened following a judgment of the Court.
The Court found in particular that the reasoning of the Court of Cassation which had had the effect of limiting the situations that could give rise to the reopening of criminal proceedings that had been terminated with final effect, or at least making them subject to criteria to be assessed by the domestic courts, did not appear to be arbitrary. It reiterated its settled case-law to the effect that the Convention did not guarantee the right to the reopening of proceedings. The Court also held that, having regard to the discretion (“margin of appreciation”) available to the domestic authorities in interpreting its judgments, the Court of Cassation had been entitled to find that the judgment of 2011 did not call into question the fairness of the proceedings or the independence or impartiality of the trial bench.
The case concerned criminal proceedings brought against an Armenian national, Garik Dadayan, for aiding and abetting the smuggling of enriched uranium into Georgia. The two smugglers were prosecuted and convicted in Georgia, while Mr Dadayan was prosecuted and convicted in Armenia, essentially on the basis of the smugglers’ witness statements to the Georgian authorities.
The Court noted that one of the requirements of a fair trial was the possibility for the accused to confront witnesses in the presence of the judge who ultimately had to decide the case. This was because a judge’s observations on the demeanour and credibility of a witness could have consequences for the accused. In Mr Dadayan’s case, the witnesses S.T. and H.O. had been absent from his trial because the Georgian authorities had refused to authorise their transfer to Armenia. However, there had been no good reason for the trial court to then admit the statements of those absent witnesses as evidence without them being examined in court. Indeed, the trial court had not made any further attempts to try to find out whether it would be possible to transfer the two witnesses to Armenia if and when their convictions became final. Nor had any other means of examining them been contemplated, for example via video link. Moreover, their statements had been fundamental for the case because it was the sole basis on which the courts could decide whether Mr Dadayan had been involved in selling enriched uranium. Not hearing those witnesses in person had therefore substantially affected his defence rights. Instead, the courts had based its conclusions on witness evidence which had never even been examined. Lastly, there had not been sufficient procedural safeguards in place to compensate for those handicaps to the defence. Although he had had the possibility to challenge the admissibility of S.T and H.O.’s testimony, he had not been able to challenge their statements during the investigation stage, which had taken place in Georgia, while his prosecution and conviction had been in Armenia. There was nothing to indicate that the trial court had approached the untested evidence with any specific caution. The Court therefore concluded that, overall, Mr Dadayan had not had a fair trial, in breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d).
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
The case concerned the criminal proceedings instituted against the owner of a publishing company (Mr Taş) for denigrating the Republic of Turkey on account of the publication of a book concerning the disappearance of a journalist in south-east Turkey in 1994. The domestic courts based their decision on the offence set out in Article 159 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, which was replaced by Article 301 of the new Criminal Code, in force since 1 June 2005.
The Court found in particular that there had been interference with the exercise of Mr Taş’s freedom of expression. It also expressed doubts as to the foreseeability of Article 301 of the new Criminal Code and Article 159 of the former Criminal Code, on which the interference had been based, pointing in that regard to its case-law concerning the quality of the law. The Court also found that the passages from the book complained of had in no way been “gratuitously offensive” or insulting and that they had not incited to violence or hatred, which in the Court’s view was the essential element to be taken into account. It therefore considered that the criminal proceedings in question, which had been liable to have a chilling effect on Mr Taş’s willingness to express his views on matters of public interest, had not met a pressing social need and had not been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued (the protection of public safety and of national security). They had therefore not been necessary in a democratic society. Under Article 46 of the Convention, the Court considered that bringing the domestic legislation into compliance with Article 10 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law would constitute an appropriate form of execution by which to put an end to violations of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention in cases concerning proceedings brought under Article 159 of the former Criminal Code and Article 301 of the new Criminal Code.
The cases concerned a series of complaints by an anti-abortion activist, Klaus Günter Annen, over civil court injunctions on various actions he had taken as part of an anti-abortion campaign. The plaintiffs in the domestic proceedings were four doctors who performed abortions. The Court held in particular that the injunctions had interfered with Mr Annen’s freedom of expression, but had been necessary in a democratic society. When examining whether there had been a need for such interferences in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, namely of the doctors, the Court’s role was only to ascertain whether the domestic courts had struck a fair balance when protecting the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life protected by Article 8 of the Convention. In sum, the Court considered that the injunctions had not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons given by the domestic courts had been relevant and sufficient. It pointed out that the domestic authorities had carried out a detailed analysis of the leaflets and webpage set up by Mr Annen and that the accusations by Mr Annen against the various abortion doctors had not only been very serious but might also have incited hatred and aggression. In this regard, the Court found the domestic courts’ conclusion acceptable that Mr Annen’s statements, in particular by using the term “aggravated murder”, could be understood as personalised accusations against the doctors of having perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder.
The Court underlined that its task under Article 10 was to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it had been “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it had been “relevant and sufficient”. Where a balancing exercise had been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the Court’s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts.
Turning to the first case (application no. 3682/10), the Court accepted the domestic Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Mr Annen’s statements had been ambiguous and could be understood as an accusation that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Distinguishing the present case from the case of its previous judgment Annen v. Germany (no. 3690/10, 26 November 2015), it noted that Mr Annen had not provided the additional information that the abortions performed by Dr Q. had not been subject to criminal liability. Furthermore, there had been no factual foundation for the very serious criminal allegations made by Mr Annen. Lastly, the Court observed that Mr Annen had not been ordered to pay damages or convicted but had only had to refrain from calling the abortions “aggravated murder”.
Having regard to the second case (application no. 3687/10), the Court agreed with the domestic courts observations that while - strictly speaking - calling abortions unlawful was correct, the statement by Mr Annen read in conjunction with the rest of the leaflet could be understood as an allegation that Dr S.’s professional activities constituted aggravated murder. It had to be noted that in this case too Mr Annen’s accusations against Dr S. were very serious and that he, nonetheless, was not per se prohibited from campaigning against abortions or criticising doctors that performed abortions. Since the domestic courts had thoroughly discussed various possibilities of interpreting the statements in light of the freedom of expression, the Court found no violation of Article 10 In the third case (application no. 9765/10) the Court firstly agreed with the domestic court’s finding that the applicant had vilified Dr St. by implying that he had committed criminal acts. It secondly observed that Mr Annen had singled out Dr St. from all the doctors that had performed abortions and had thereby created a “pillory effect”. Even though Dr St. had been involved in various legal disputes in the past, the domestic courts had concluded that this did not have any substantial effects on Dr St.`s profile and could not redound to his disadvantage. Having regard to their direct contact with their societies, the Court found that it was primarily for the domestic courts to assess how well known a person was. In conclusion, the Court saw no reason to call the domestic courts’ reasoning into question. It thirdly held that Mr Annen’s “pavement counselling” had severely disrupted the relationship of trust between Dr St. and his patients.
Lastly, since Mr Annen had not been convicted for slander or ordered to pay damages, the Court held that the level of interference with his freedom of expression had been relatively low and had been “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued”. Therefore, in the Court’s view, the national courts had thoroughly assessed the conflicting interests by referring to the previous judgment of the Federal Court of Justice and considering the factual and legal differences of the cases. The Court also found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the fourth case (application no. 70693/11). It found that there was not a sufficient factual basis for calling abortions as performed by Dr F. “aggravated murder”. Furthermore, distinguishing the present case from the case of its previous judgment Annen v. Germany (no. 3690/10, 26 November 2015), the Court observed that Mr Annen had equated the medical activities of Dr F. with the unjustifiable atrocities inflicted on Jews under the Nazi regime and had even stated that “Equating the Babycaust with the Holocaust would mean relativising today’s abortion murders”. These accusations were very serious and had severely undermined Dr F.’s reputation. Based on the national courts’ detailed reasoning, the Court considered therefore that both the injunction and the order to pay damages against Mr Annen had not fallen outside their margin of appreciation and had not been disproportionate. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in any of the four cases.
The case concerned defamation proceedings brought in 2005 by a psychiatrist, who is also a civil society activist, against the Minister of Justice at the time. The Minister had accused her on live television and in a newspaper of issuing medical reports to prisoners in exchange for money.
The Court agreed with the domestic courts that the Minister’s statements had been part of an important debate of general interest at the time, namely whether prisons and prison medical services were being managed properly. Given Ms Jishkariani’s position and activities in prison, it further accepted the courts’ assessment of her as a public figure acting in an official capacity and that, as such, she had to tolerate a higher level of criticism than a private individual. Even assuming that the Court also accepted the classification of the Minister’s statements as opinions or “value judgments”, which are not susceptible of proof under the Court’s case-law, there had to be a sufficient factual basis to support them. That basis had been lacking. While the Minister had commissioned an internal investigation into the matter, he had not waited for its completion before making his accusations. Nor was he in possession of other verified information against Ms Jishkariani. Yet the courts had considered that he had made an effort to verify his statements, despite pointing out in their decisions that Ms Jishkariani had never been investigated over any crime and that the Minister’s statements “may have contained erroneous facts”. The European Convention could not be interpreted as obliging an individual to tolerate very serious public accusations of criminal behaviour by Government officials, without them being supported by facts. In sum, the Court was not convinced that the reasons given by the domestic courts for protecting the Minister’s freedom of expression had outweighed Ms Jishkariani’s right to reputation. There had therefore been a violation of Article 8.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
The case of Mushegh Saghatelyan v. Armenia (application no. 23086/08) concerned an opposition activist’s allegation of a politically motivated crackdown on 1 March 2008 following a wide-scale protest against the presidential elections. He complained in particular that he had been ill-treated by the police, that his arrest had been unlawful and that the entire criminal case then brought against him had been fabricated. He had eventually been convicted for assaulting two police officers and illegally carrying a knife.
Decision of the Court: The Court found that the protest of 1 March 2008 had been peaceful. The Government had not provided any evidence to prove their allegations that the demonstrators had planned to arm themselves to instigate mass disorder. The courts examining Mr Saghatelyan’s case had not dealt with the question of who had been the first to attack, which would have proved any violent intentions. Moreover, various international and domestic bodies had produced credible reports casting doubt on the official account of events. Therefore the dispersal of the demonstration and Mr Saghatelyan’s prosecution, detention and conviction had interfered with his right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Even assuming that those measures had complied with domestic law and had been justified by the need to prevent disorder and crime, they had not been necessary in a democratic society. Overall, the police operation had been disproportionate. It had lacked transparency as to its planning, organisation and command. Indeed, there had been striking contradictions in the purpose of the operation, the authorities first explaining that it had been to disperse the protest, then that it had been necessary to carry out an inspection for weapons. According to credible reports, the police had given no warnings to disperse and had used unjustified and excessive force. For Mr Saghatelyan, the charges against him, drafted in very general terms, had not been backed up by any evidence. He had therefore apparently been prosecuted and detained for simply having actively participated in, and possibly organised, the assembly. The courts had then failed to establish the facts thoroughly and objectively, basing their judgments entirely on police testimony. Undoubtedly, such measures could only have discouraged the applicant, other opposition supporters and the public at large from participating in demonstrations in the future. There had therefore been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3, Article 4(1) and Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), read in the light of recitals 16 and 48 thereof, as well as Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). The request has been made in criminal proceedings against Mr Emil Milev concerning the continuation of his pre-trial detention.
Ruling of the Court: Article 3 and Article 4(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings must be interpreted as not precluding the adoption of preliminary decisions of a procedural nature, such as a decision taken by a judicial authority that pre-trial detention should continue, which are based on suspicion or on incriminating evidence, provided that such decisions do not refer to the person in custody as being guilty. However, that directive does not govern the circumstances in which decisions on pre-trial detention may be adopted.
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 50 TEU and of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘the Framework Decision’). The request has been made in connection with the execution, in Ireland, of two European arrest warrants issued by the courts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with respect to RO.
Ruling of the Court: Article 50 TEU must be interpreted as meaning that mere notification by a Member State of its intention to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with that article does not have the consequence that, in the event that that Member State issues a European arrest warrant with respect to an individual, the executing Member State must refuse to execute that European arrest warrant or postpone its execution pending clarification of the law that will be applicable in the issuing Member State after its withdrawal from the European Union. In the absence of substantial grounds to believe that the person who is the subject of that European arrest warrant is at risk of being deprived of rights recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, following the withdrawal from the European Union of the issuing Member State, the executing Member State cannot refuse to execute that European arrest warrant while the issuing Member State remains a member of the European Union.
Hoe scherp zijn de tanden van de slachtofferrichtlijn?
European Courts is an EU and ECHR law blog. The main readers of this blog are judges, academics, students and lawyers. This blog is a platform of exchange of knowledge, experience and ideas in the field of EU law and the ECtHR case law. The objective of the blog is future co-operation and a better understanding among European judges, scholars and lawyers.
European Courts publishes a monthly newsletter (in Dutch) and weekly updates of last week's case law from the European Court of human rights in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Our newsletter is named Rechtspraak Europa and is made in co-operation with the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the Netherlands.
European Courts law blog was founded in 2013 by Marc de Werd, professor of Court administration (University of Amsterdam).
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Для разделения агрегатов на внутреннюю часть (ядро) и периферию (кору) использовали истирание агрегатов друг о друга. Для этой цели агрегаты 5–3 мм встряхивали на оборотном ротаторе, их кора стачивалась, переходя до фракции <0.25 мм. Для контроля процесса, периодически оценивали эффективность истирания по изменению распределения размерных фракций. В конце эксперимента в полученных фракциях определяли содержание углерода и азота. Распределение получаемых размерных фракций стабилизировалось через 16 ч эксперимента, в случае типичного чернозема под степью, и через 24 ч в случае дерново-подзолистой почвы под лесом. В дерново-подзолистой почве истирание наблюдали в течение всего эксперимента. В типичном черноземе после первого часа обработки преобладало дробление агрегатов, затем в последующие 10 ч доминировало истирание, затем снова дробление. Определение содержания углерода и азота показывает анизотропность агрегатов по этому параметру. Внутри агрегатов содержание углерода выше, чем на периферии. Причем эти отличия больше выражены в ненарушенных почвах, а также в дерново-подзолистых почвах по сравнению с черноземами. В целом показана перспективность предложенного подхода. Однако он требует дальнейшего развития для эффективного приложения.
To separate the aggregates into the inner part (core) and the periphery (bark), the aggregates were rubbed against one another. For this purpose, aggregates of 5–3 mm were shaken 48 hours on a over head shaker, they rubbed against each other, and gradually their bark was grinded, passing into the fraction <0.25 mm. To monitor the process, the abrasion efficiency from the change in the size distribution of the size fractions was periodically evaluated. At the end of the experiment, the carbon and nitrogen contents were determined in the fractions obtained. The distribution of the resulting size fractions was stabilized after 16 hours of the experiment, in the case of Chernozem under the steppe, and after 24 hours in the case of Retisol under forest. In the Retisol abrasion (from the large aggregates, the peripheral part separates and particles <0.25 mm are formed) were observed throughout the entire experiment. In Chernozem, after the first hour of treatment, fragmentation of the aggregates predominated, then in the next 10 hours abrasion prevailed, then again crushing dominated. Determination of the carbon and nitrogen content shows the anisotropy of aggregates in this parameter. Inside the aggregates, the carbon content is higher than at the periphery, with the C/N ratio indicating the predominance of poorly-decomposed plant residues. Moreover, these differences are more expressed in uncultivated soils, and when comparing types, in Retisols in comparison with Chernozems. In general, the proposed approach is promising. However, it requires further development for an effective application.
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Atom interferometry has become one of the most powerful technologies for precision measurements. To develop simple, precise, and versatile atom interferometers for inertial sensing, we demonstrate an atom interferometer measuring acceleration, rotation, and inclination by pointing Raman beams toward individual faces of a pyramidal mirror. Only a single-diode laser is used for all functions, including atom trapping, interferometry, and detection. Efficient Doppler-sensitive Raman transitions are achieved without velocity selecting the atom sample, and with zero differential AC Stark shift between the cesium hyperfine ground states, increasing signal-to-noise and suppressing systematic effects. We measure gravity along two axes (vertical and 45° to the vertical), rotation, and inclination with sensitivities of 6 μm/s2/Hz, 300 μrad/s/Hz, and 4 μrad/Hz, respectively. This work paves the way toward deployable multiaxis atom interferometers for geodesy, geology, or inertial navigation.
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Fig. 1. (a) Multiaxis AIs in a pyramid. A cold atom cloud is trapped inside a pyramidal mirror with a top angle of 90°. Five pairs of the retro-reflected Raman beams are formed, one along the vertical axis and the other four perpendicular to the pyramidal faces. The two angled Raman pairs in the y-z plane are not shown. The angled Raman beams are approximately 45° to the gravity axis. (b) Space-time trajectories of atoms in the Mach–Zehnder geometry and (c) in the butterfly geometry. A matter wave (blue and orange curves) is coherently split, redirected, and combined by momentum transfer from laser pulses (green waves).
Fig. 2. (a) Laser system. AOM, acousto-optic modulator; EOM, fiber-based electro-optical modulator. A distributed Bragg reflector diode laser is frequency stabilized by polarization spectroscopy. The frequency detuning of the laser is controlled by AOM 1. AOM 2 works as a fast switch and AOM 3 controls the laser intensity to the EOM. The vertical beam is toward the entire pyramid, and the angled beams are toward individual pyramidal faces. The pushing beam is for spatially separating atoms in the two ground states. (b) Timing sequences of single-laser atom interferometry. Both the cooling beam and the blow-way beam are generated by the undeflected laser of AOM 3. Both the repumping beam and the Raman beam are generated by the EOM.
Fig. 3. (a) Energy level scheme of cesium D2 line. The Raman pairs are formed by the carrier ν1 and the first-order sidebands ν2, ν3 from the EOM. (b) Rabi frequency Ωeff, AC Stark shift ΩAC, and single-photon scattering Rsc as functions of single-photon detuning Δ. The Rabi frequency and AC Stark shift are measured by driving two-photon transitions. The measurement uses atoms inside the pyramid, where they see reflections from the four pyramidal faces. This increases ΩAC and Rsc but not Ωeff. The scattering rate Rsc3 is measured as the number of atoms that are transferred from F=3 to F=4 when the Raman detuning is off the two-photon resonance. Each point is a single experimental shot and the curves are the theory predictions.
Fig. 4. Acceleration-sensitive fringes of Mach–Zehnder AIs. The vertical AI has a sequence time of 2T=80 ms. The angled AIs have a sequence time of 2T=40 ms. Each point is the average by 10 experimental shots. The curves are sinusoidal fits.
Fig. 5. (a) Allan deviation of the vertical AI corrected from Earth’s tides. The dashed line shows the 1/Hz scaling. (b) Tide gravity variation. It was measured from August 7, 2017 to August 10, 2017 by the vertical AI, compared with a tidal model. Each data point is averaged for about 30 min.
Fig. 6. Relative projected gravity measured by one of the angled AIs. Each data point is from one fringe, which consists of 11 shots. The orange curve shows the tilt measured by a commercial sensor.
Fig. 7. (a) Rotation-sensitive fringes of a butterfly AI along the angled axis. The two fringes are obtained with opposite effective wave vectors. The sequence time is 2T=40 ms. Each point is the average by 10 experimental shots. The curves are sinusoidal fits. (b) Allan deviation of the gyroscope sensitivity. The dashed line shows the 1/N scaling, where N is the averaging fringe number.