Vogelman files the suits in federal court because he says it’s “almost impossible” to sue a police officer in state court, given statutes that insulate them from litigation.
Usually, a state has a governmental immunity act that bars tort liability of state or local governments and of governmental officials acting in their official capacity, except for some narrow exceptions, the most common of which are for negligence in situations that are very similar to cases in which non-governmental agencies are operating (e.g. car accidents, slip and falls at government facilities, medical malpractice by doctors at government owned hospitals, etc.). Usually there is not an exception for intentional torts by law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity. Usually, damages are limited and punitive damages are not allowed at all. In New Hampshire, this is found at Revised Statutes Annotated Chapter 507-B. See e.g. here.
Usually, the kind of state law torts that could give rise to police liability have short statutes of limitations that are often further curtailed by special shorter deadlines that apply to suits against governments and government officials. New Hampshire is relatively liberal in this regard with a three year statute of limitations for most civil actions that could conceivably give rise to law enforcement action related liability.
The main kinds of liability that the U.S. Constitution prevents state governmental liability statutes from providing immunity from are suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (i.e. civil rights lawsuits), and suits arising under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment as incorporated through the 14th Amendment and under the 14th Amendment directly (i.e. inverse condemnation actions alleging a taking without due process or compensation).
There are several barriers to recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a.k.a. the Third Enforcement Act (see generally, e.g., Allison L. Patton, "The endless cycle of abuse: why 42 USC 1983 is ineffective in deterring police brutality" Hastings LJ (1992)). Note also that the limitations below apply primarily to retrospective suits for money damages. Not all of these limitations apply to prospective relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting certain kinds of conduct in the future.
i. There is no vicarious liability. See, e.g., here. So, a government is not responsible unless it as an entity, and not just an agent or employee, has an intent to violate someone's civil rights. This factor is somewhat less important than it seems in practice, because a law enforcement officer's employer or union will usually advance the costs of defense of a civil rights action (something not normally available for intentional tort lawsuits in the private sector) and will often agree to indemnify a law enforcement officer defendant in a settlement or after an award against a law enforcement officer defendant.
The absence of vicarious liability also means that you can only prevail if you can determine that a particular named individual violated your rights. It is not sufficient to know, for example, that some unnamed police officer in a particular city's police department violated your rights.
In contrast, if you are harmed by an unnamed employee or agent of a private business corporation, because of the much maligned doctrine of corporate personhood, the corporation can be held liable for that unnamed employee's acts anyway, which is usually better than proving liability on the part of the employee because usually the employer has a greater ability to pay a judgment than an employee.
ii. There is only liability for intentional violations of civil rights. If mere negligence, § 1983 does not provide a remedy. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). If poorly designed systems cause someone's civil rights to be violated, it is usually impossible to identify someone whose more culpable than negligent conflict is responsible for this violation.
iii. Police officers have qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 (a doctrine created surprisingly recently). This means that the police officer must have allegedly intentionally violated a well established right, which basically means that there must be controlling case law governing the fact pattern in question. If there is no prior controlling case law, the police officer does not have liability even if the court finds on the merits that the victim's civil rights were indeed violated. It is basically a "one free bite" rule.
iv. Unlike most other legal issues in civil lawsuits (the main other issue treated similarly is jurisdiction), issues of qualified immunity can be raised at the motion to dismiss stage, before any other response to the lawsuit is required, even if it requires a judge to consider disputed evidence to resolve it, and if the judge rules against the police on the issue of qualified immunity, they can immediately appeal the ruling, rather than waiting until the case is resolved on the merits at the end of the case. Appellate case law on qualified immunity frequently analyzes facts in an unreasonable manner that a jury could disagree with, even though it is not suppose to do that.
v. While local governments and state and local government officials can be sued in federal court pursuant to § 1983, the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution bars lawsuits against state governments in the federal courts in most circumstances, unless the state governments have expressly waived their immunity from suit. (N.B. I have linked to Wikipedia rather than just the text of the Amendment because the Courts, shortly after it was adopted and forever after that time, have interpreted the 11th Amendment to have a meaning contrary to its plain language and impossible to infer from its text alone.) For reasons that are doctrinally complex and obscure, the 11th Amendment generally bars § 1983 actions entirely against state governments although not against state government officials (in what is called a Bivens action), and not suits against local governments.
i. Inverse condemnation actions can be asserted against entities (which have vicarious liability for acts of their agents) but not against officers of government agencies. Usually, holding an entity strictly liable for actions of the entity's subordinates is a good thing for a plaintiff harmed by the government, but this doesn't provide a civil lawsuit mechanism for holding particular bad actors responsible for their conduct so it can be a poor incentive for individual governmental employees to act properly.
ii. Inverse condemnation actions apply only to property interests, not harms in the nature of lost of life, harm in the form of personal injuries, lost services or time, pain and suffering, emotional distress, or loss of dignity or other legally recognized rights. Punitive damages are also not generally available in an inverse condemnation action. See, e.g., here ("It is important to note at the outset that, under inverse condemnation, only damages to real and personal property are recoverable. The claim does not allow recovery of other damages.") (arguably intellectual or intangible property that is totally taken may also give rise to an inverse condemnation claim).
iii. Inverse condemnation actions are available only in the event of a "total taking". Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Government action that reduces the value of property is not enough. For government action to be a "total taking" it must destroy all more than nominal economic value of the property in question.
4. Why Does A Federal v. State Forum Actually Matter?
This is either a misquotation or an erroneous statement. It is "almost impossible" to sue a police officer under state law, given the statutes that limit them from litigation such as RSA Chapter 507-B.
But, it is not materially more difficult to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court than it is in federal court from the perspective of statutory law or civil procedure rules, since state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such actions.
There are still good reasons to bring suit in federal court rather than state court under § 1983, and for these reasons this is how it is usually done. But, the reasons aren't statutory. Instead, they mostly pertain to the personnel involved.
Jury pool differences between state courts and federal courts are important. But, this factor varies from case to case and doesn't fully explain the strong pro-federal court choice of forum decisions made by Plaintiffs that we observe.
i. Federal court provides a larger jury pool, which is desirable when the violation of rights takes place in a jurisdiction less favorable to civil rights plaintiffs vis-a-vis law enforcement defendants.
ii. Further, the federal jury pool will typically include many jurors from outside the jurisdiction in which the law enforcement defendant are employed, while state courts will typically have jury pools that are drawn from the jurisdiction that employs the law enforcement defendants who will be among the people who may face increased tax liability for damages awarded for law enforcement misconduct. Like Congressmen, even if people are not favorably inclined towards law enforcement, in general, they are often more favorably inclined towards the law enforcement officials in their own jurisdiction who are protecting them (in theory) from crime.
i. Regulatory capture (state court judges have had law enforcement defendants testify before them in criminal cases on a routine basis and found them to be credible again and again, while routinely finding that criminal defendants, who are often demographically similar to or overlap with criminal defendants, to be not credible).
ii. Most state court judges are biased in favor of law enforcement, in part, because a large share of them are state and local government criminal prosecutors. This is also true of federal court judges (about 40% were prosecutors before becoming judges) but to a lesser extent. Evidence of this bias at the appellate court level can be found here. See also here and here.
iii. State court judges are part of a network of state and local government officials and politicians to whom they are favorably inclined who tend to strongly back the law enforcement officials who are also part of that network, while federal court judges, while still politically connected and not necessarily positively inclined towards civil rights defendants, have a much more attenuated connection to those networks of state and local government officials and politicians.
iv. State court trial judges are typically more responsive to public opinion and civil rights plaintiffs are often unpopular individuals.
In addition to the sources linked, my first "real job" out of law school including defending county governments and county officials from government liability claims. The matters for which there are no links to sources largely reflect the conventional wisdom of myself and my colleagues in that context.
(2) Unless a complaint is filed within 90 days after the alleged brutality, an investigation that may lead to disciplinary action under this subtitle for brutality may not be initiated and an action may not be taken.
Such laws prohibit any civilian review board from investigating or interrogating any officer. This article from the Baltimore Sun discusses the Maryland version, its history and current effects.
I believe that in at least some states, even complaints that resaulted in disciple may not be introduced in later separate cases, in an attemtp to prove a pattern of misconduct by the officer.
I would assume that the context of his statement is regarding qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine in United States federal law that shields government officials from being sued for discretionary actions performed within their official capacity, unless their actions violated "clearly established" federal law or constitutional rights. Qualified immunity thus protects officials who "make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions," but does not protect "the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law".
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Petitioner was arrested and held in jail awaiting trial on a criminal charge for refusing to permit building inspectors to enter and inspect his home without a search warrant, as required by 806-30 (a) of the Dayton, Ohio, Code of General Ordinances. On review of habeas corpus proceedings in the lower state courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance. Held: The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Reported below: 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N. E. 2d 523.
Greene Chandler Furman and Elbert E. Blakely argued the cause for appellant. With them on the briefs were Stanley Denlinger and Stanley Robinson, Jr.
Charles S. Rhyne and Joseph P. Duffy argued the cause for appellee. With them on the briefs was S. White Rhyne, Jr.
Roger Arnebergh, Alexander G. Brown, Claude V. Jones, Henry P. Kucera, John C. Melaniphy, David Stahl and Harrison L. Winter filed a brief for the Member Municipalities of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, as amici curiae, urging affirmance.
This case involves Earl Taylor, who is in his sixties and has been working at his trade of plumber for 40 years, and [364 U.S. 263, 265] the home at 130 Henry Street, in Dayton, Ohio, which he and his wife bought and in which they have lived for over a decade. He describes it as a little cottage, all in one floor, with a front room, a middle room, two bedrooms, a dining room and a little utility room, and a bathroom and a little kitchen at the back. What was evidently Taylor's first involvement with the criminal law occurred in this fashion. One day three men who were housing inspectors came to his door, and said they wanted to come into the house and go through the house and inspect the inside of the house. They had no credentials, only a sheet of yellow note paper, and Taylor said to them, "You have nothing to show me you have got a right to go through my house." The response was, "We don't have to have, according to the law passed four years ago." 2 [364 U.S. 263, 266] Replied Taylor, "That don't show me that you got anything in there that you want for inspection, and, further, I don't have nothing in my house that has to be inspected." The man said, "Well, you know, according to this ordinance, that we got a right to go through your house and inspect your house." "No, I don't think you have, unless you got a search warrant," answered Taylor. This has been his position ever since, and it is the issue that divides us.
But it was not. Taylor and his wife each received through the mail a registered letter from the city prosecutor, notifying them to appear at his office to answer a complaint against them. They did not appear; whereupon the police came to Taylor's home, and finally served him with a warrant - a warrant to appear in court to answer criminal charges brought against him for failing to admit the inspectors to his home. He appeared in court and was held for trial; and not being then able to make bond of $1,000, he was committed to jail, to await trial on the charges, which could have resulted in a fine of $200 and an incarceration of 30 days for each day's recalcitrance. One Eaton, an attorney, filed a petition for habeas corpus on Taylor's behalf in the State Common Pleas Court. 3 The Common Pleas Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and discharged Taylor from custody; but the Court of Appeals reversed, 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N. E. 2d 776, and its judgment was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court. 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N. E. 2d 523. We noted probable jurisdiction. 360 U.S. 246 .
The municipal ordinance in question provides numerous requirements for dwellings, deemed by the city to be appropriate in the interests of the public health, safety and comfort. Several of the requirements apply to private dwelling houses, such as the Taylors'. None of these requirements is at all questioned here. What is questioned [364 U.S. 263, 268] is the ordinance provision, Code of General Ordinances 806-30, authorizing the Housing Inspector to enter at any reasonable hour any dwelling whatsoever, and commanding the owner or occupant to give him free access at any reasonable hour for the purpose of his inspection. It was armed with the naked authority of this provision, and not with any warrant (the ordinance provides for none) that the inspectors approached Taylor's door, even after he had made clear to them his intent not to admit them on this basis. Neither before a magistrate empowered to issue warrants, nor in this proceeding, have the inspectors offered any justification for their entry. They have not shown any probable cause or grounds to believe that a proscribed condition existed within the cottage, or even that they had suspicion or complaint thereof. They have not shown that they desired to make the inspection in pursuance of a regular, routinized spot check of individual homes, or in pursuance of a planned blanket check of all the homes in a particular neighborhood, or the like. 4 These might be said to be the usual reasons which would impel inspectors to seek to gain admittance to a private dwelling; but none of them is shown by the record to have been present. Most significantly, on the initial recalcitrance of Taylor, the inspectors were not required to, and did not, repair before any independent magistrate to demonstrate to him their reasons for wanting to gain access to Taylor's cottage, and to obtain his warrant for their entry - the authorization on which Taylor was insisting. The judgment below is, on this record, bottomed on the proposition that the inspectors have the [364 U.S. 263, 269] right to enter a private dwelling, and the householder can be bound under criminal penalties to admit them, though there is demonstration neither of reason to believe there exists an improper condition within the dwelling, nor of the existence of any plan of inspection, apart from such a belief, which would include the inspection of the dwelling in question. We think that affirmance of this judgment would reduce the protection of the householder "against unreasonable searches" to the vanishing point.
In support of the judgment below, much reliance at the bar has been put on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 . We would not be candid to say that on its own facts we have become reconciled to that judgment. To us, it remains "the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (concurring opinion). "A single decision by a closely divided court, unsupported by the confirmation of time, cannot check" the course of constitutional adjudication here. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (concurring opinion). We continue to agree with Judge Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 242, 246, 178 F.2d 13, 17, aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 , that: "To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity." Nothing demonstrated in the Frank case indicates otherwise to us. But the present case goes much further than Frank; and as to the reasonableness of searches, it has been stressed that factual differences may weigh heavily. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 . The search in Frank was for the nesting place of rats. There were ample grounds on the part of the inspecting officer to believe its existence in the house. There had been complaint of rats in the neighborhood; and an external [364 U.S. 263, 270] inspection of the house in question revealed that it was "in an `extreme state of decay' " and that behind it there was a pile of "rodent feces mixed with straw and trash and debris to approximately half a ton." See 359 U.S., at 361 . The case was decided by the narrowest of divisions; and one member of the majority found it necessary to express in a concurring opinion that the sole purpose of the search was an attempt "to locate the habitat of disease-carrying rodents known to be somewhere in the immediate area." 359 U.S., at 373 (concurring opinion). There was no case of a "systematic area-by-area search" before the Court, and although certain remarks were made as applicable to such a search, 359 U.S., at 372 , their character as dicta is patent. Thus, even accepting the judgment in Frank, of such expressions the classic language of Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 , can be said again: "It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process of inclusion and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is not allowed to end with its enunciation and that an expression in an opinion yields later to the impact of facts unforeseen."
In this case we pass beyond the situation in Frank, where the inspector was looking for a specific violation, and where he had, and was able to demonstrate, considerable grounds to believe it existed in Frank's house. Here it would appear from Taylor's testimony that, even without a warrant, if a specific matter was cited to him by the inspector, he would have permitted the inspection in that regard. On the contrary, Frank's denial of access was described as based on "a rarely voiced denial of any official justification for seeking to enter his home." 359 U.S., at 366 . There then was a specific demand for inspection, met by a refusal on the broadest of grounds. Here we have the most general of demands, [364 U.S. 263, 271] supported by no particularized justification, either directed at the conditions in Taylor's cottage, or in terms of some over-all systematic plan which would include it. This is met not by an attitude of defiance, but by a request by the householder that a specific authorization be furnished him. Not a search warrant, but a criminal complaint is the upshot. We would grossly tone down the protections afforded the householder by the Constitution were we to put an authoritative sanction on the judgment that condemns his refusal.
Much argument is made of the need of the authorities to perform inspections on a "spot check" or on an area-by-area basis. The judgment below cannot be said to present this problem, because there was no evidence that this in fact was what was being done; that the inspectors in fact were proceeding according to a reasonable plan of one sort or another. For all that appears here, the inspectors could have been acting in accordance with no particular plan of spot checks or area-by-area searches which could be justified as "reasonable," and which would give probable cause for entry; 5 their action could have been based on caprice or on personal or political spite. It hardly contradicts experience to suggest that the practical administration of local government in this country can be infected with such motives. Building inspection ordinances can lend themselves readily to such abuse. We do not at all say this to be the case here, and Taylor has made no proof of it, to be sure; but that simply points up the issue. The inspectors have not been required to make any justification for their entry. The judgment below upholds the charges as sufficient, based on a demand for entry without any such justification.
But if we were to assume that the inspectors were proceeding according to a plan, and even if evidence of the [364 U.S. 263, 272] plan were put in at the trial, we think that the result should be the same. The time to make such justification is not in the criminal proceeding, after the householder has acted at his peril in denying access. The time to make it is in advance of prosecution, and the place is before a magistrate empowered to issue warrants, which will put the seal of legitimacy - the seal the Constitution specifically provides for - on the demand of the inspector, if indeed it is a reasonable one. Such a warrant need not be sought except where the householder does not consent. This is precisely the procedure followed by England in this particular area, see Public Health Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5, & 1 Edw. 8, c. 49, 287 (2); 6 and no complaint is heard that this stultifies enforcement there of the regulation of the public health and safety. Certainly with this procedure available - the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 -456 - there is no need to be satisfied with lesser standards in this area. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 . The public interest in the cleanliness and adequacy of the dwellings of the people is great. So too is the public interest that the tools of counterfeiting and [364 U.S. 263, 273] the paraphernalia of the illicit narcotics traffic not remain active. On an adequate and appropriate showing in particular cases, the privacy of the home must bow before these interests of the public. But none of these interests provides an open sesame to those who enforce them. The Fourth Amendment's procedure establishes the way in which these general public interests are to be brought into specific focus to require the individual householder to open his door.
Apart from the very significant factual distinctions presented by this case from the Frank case, there is another reason why we would reverse the judgment here. It has now become clear that the Frank decision may have turned in substantial part on the positing of a distinction between the affirmative guaranty of privacy against official incursion raised by the Fourth Amendment against federal action, and that raised by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth against state action. The concurring opinion of one of the majority in that sharply divided decision indicates some concern in that respect. 359 U.S., at 373 . After the greatest consideration, this Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 -28, declared: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in `the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause." It is now clear that part of the majority of the Court in the Frank case does not subscribe to the clear import of that statement. Elkins v. United States, ante, pp. 206, 237-240 (dissenting opinion). But the Wolf statement continues to be the ruling doctrine in this Court. Elkins v. United States, ante, p. 206. The guarantees are of the same dimension, matters of enforcement, such as the exclusionary rule, aside.
[ Footnote 1 ] Expressions of views, despite equal divisions, have been made before where there was a question whether one fact situation was to be distinguished from a related one on which a majority of the Court had rendered an opinion. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 440 -442, 442-445. The question whether this case is to be distinguished from Frank presents an analogy to this.
"The Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the condition of dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units and premises located within the City of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty of safeguarding the health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is hereby authorized to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units, and premises. The owner or occupant of every dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house, and rooming unit or the person in charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises at any reasonable hour for the purpose of such inspection, examination and survey."
This command is backed by the penalty that "Any person who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) or by imprisonment of not less than two (2) days nor more than thirty (30) days, or both, and each day of failure to comply with any such provision shall constitute a separate violation." 806-83.
[ Footnote 3 ] Evidently habeas corpus lies in Ohio to test the constitutionality of the ordinance under which one is being held through charges pending in a court of inferior jurisdiction, as all the state courts proceeded to pass on the merits of the claims of the relator Eaton, appellant here, that the ordinance under which the charges were brought infringed Taylor's constitutional rights. Accordingly we may now review that determination on the merits, the habeas corpus proceeding, independent of the criminal prosecution itself, having proceeded to a final judgment. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 70 .
[ Footnote 4 ] Those desiring to make the inspection did not so testify; and such a planned blanket check, or its nature, is hardly inferable from Taylor's statement that "they had been going up and down there, door-to-door, looking through everybody's houses"; his statement being the only thing resembling evidence on the point.
[ Footnote 5 ] See Frank v. Maryland, supra, at 383 (dissenting opinion).
[ Footnote 6 ] The procedure cited is that prescribed by statute in the case of health inspections under the Public Health Act. There are other statutes providing for other inspections, an English commentator points out, which do not contain this safeguard. See Waters, Rights of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 79, 85. Accordingly, "the private occupier is faced with a bewildering number of persons claiming a variety of rights." Id., at 83. The author is in favor of the Public Health Act procedure, and regrets that "the consistent application to good works is yet lacking." "The object should be the creation of warrant provisions in a statutory code of powers of entry, guaranteeing to the individual thereby the impartial, if rarely invoked, judgment by magistrates of the fairness and legality of any attempted entry." Id., at 93.
[ Footnote 7 ] See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 .
[ Footnote 8 ] "We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These in their origin were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. . . . This is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought, and speech. Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. . . ." 302 U.S., at 326 -327.

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71-611. Definitions; operating expenses; legally adopted budget; general fund. (a) "Operating expenses" means the total expenditures and lawful transfers from the general fund of a community college during a fiscal year for all purposes.
(b) "Legally adopted budget of operating expenses" means the amount legally authorized and budgeted for operating expenses in the general fund of a community college.
(c) "General fund" means the fund of a community college from which operating expenses are paid and, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 71-613a, and amendments thereto, to which all amounts of state entitlements, property taxes for general purposes, student tuition, and other moneys provided for by law are credited.
History: L. 1973, ch. 274, § 16; L. 1975, ch. 362, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 361, § 3; L. 1980, ch. 207, § 38; L. 1986, ch. 259, § 6; L. 1987, ch. 265, § 1; L. 1996, ch. 152, § 7; L. 1999, ch. 147, § 47; July 1.


A. The Statewide Grievance Committee (Committee) shall meet to consider complaints and other appropriate matters as often as the Committee deems necessary to properly and expeditiously discharge its duties.
B. Except as otherwise set forth in these rules the Committee must have at least a quorum present to act, and a quorum shall be eleven. The Committee shall act by a vote of a majority of those present and voting, provided that a minimum of six votes for a particular action is necessary for the Committee to act. Members present but not voting due to disqualification, abstention, silence or a refusal to vote, shall be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum, but not counted in calculating a majority of those present and voting.
C. All decisions of the Committee shall be in writing and mailed to the parties involved.
D. All matters received by the Committee shall be confidential except as otherwise provided by law.
E. It is the policy of the Committee to investigate all complaints filed against attorneys within its jurisdiction. A decision by a Complainant to withdraw a complaint after its filing shall not have the effect of terminating the complaint. The Committee shall carry out its function under the rules of the Superior Court regardless of a Complainant's decision to not pursue the matter.
F. Grievance complaints filed with the Committee must be submitted on form JD-GC-6 and must contain an original and six copies. Any attachments must be properly collated and attached to the original and each copy of the complaint. Grievance complaints and their attachments must not include personal identifying information as defined by Practice Book §4-7(a) or another person’s hospital, psychiatric or medical records. The Complainant must redact the complaint and its attachments to remove any personal identifying information. A Complainant who wants to file another person’s hospital, psychiatric or medical records must say in the complaint how the documents are relevant and will help prove the complaint. The proposed hospital, psychiatric or medical records accompanying the complaint must be submitted in a sealed envelope labeled proposed hospital, psychiatric or medical records. If the complaint is forwarded to a grievance panel for investigation under Practice Book §2-32(a)(1), the grievance panel will review the statement and follow Rule 1(I) of the Grievance Panel Rules of Procedure. If the Complainant is Disciplinary Counsel, the Statewide Bar Counsel, the Committee or a reviewing committee thereof, or a grievance panel, then any records, including hospital, psychiatric or medical records as well as records containing personal identifying information may be included in the initial grievance complaint without an offer of proof. Materials that do not meet these requirements will be returned.
G. The Committee reserves the right, from time to time, to add to, subtract from or otherwise amend these rules of procedure.
A. Filing Procedure: Grievance complaints, and any document related to grievance complaints or unauthorized practice of law complaints pending before the Committee or a reviewing committee, including but not limited to requests, motions, objections, briefs, appeals, or any other document intended for placement in the file of any such matter, or any copies thereof, must be filed with or submitted to the Statewide Bar Counsel or an Assistant Bar Counsel. No grievance complaint, unauthorized practice of law complaint, or any document attached in support thereof, or any portion of the record as defined by Practice Book §2-32(i) may be filed with or submitted to the Statewide Bar Counsel or Assistant Bar Counsel by way of fax, email, or any other electronic means. Any such document so received will not be considered as being filed with the Committee or the Statewide Bar Counsel.
6. A request for review of an attorney advertising advisory opinion prepared pursuant to Rule 14(I).
C. If the last day for filing any matter falls on a day on which the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office is not open, then the last day for filing shall be the next business day upon which the office is open. All documents that are electronically received for filing after 5:00 p.m. on a day on which the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office is open or that are electronically received at any time on a day on which the office is closed, shall be deemed filed on the next business day upon which the office is open.
D. All materials filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel following a finding of probable cause shall contain a certification of proof of service as required in civil matters pursuant to Practice Book §10-14.
E. Notwithstanding the provisions of this rule, the Committee or a reviewing committee may allow for the electronic filing of any document.
F. Materials that do not comply with this rule shall be returned and not made a part of the record.
A. Upon receipt of a grievance complaint, the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall review the complaint and determine whether a recommendation should be made to dismiss the complaint in accordance with Practice Book §2-32(a)(2) or whether the complaint should be forwarded to a grievance panel.
1. Complaints forwarded to a grievance panel: If a complaint is forwarded to a grievance panel, it shall be forwarded to the grievance panel in the judicial district in which the Respondent maintains his or her principal office or residence. If the Respondent does not maintain an address in this state, it shall be within the discretion of the Statewide Bar Counsel to determine to which grievance panel the complaint shall be forwarded. The determination of good cause for the declination of a panel to investigate a complaint referred to said panel shall be made by the Statewide Bar Counsel.
2. Recommendation that complaint be dismissed: If the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office determines that a recommendation should be made to dismiss the complaint, the complaint, together with the basis for the recommendation, shall be forwarded to an attorney member and to a non-attorney member of the Committee for their review. The Committee members to whom complaints are forwarded shall be selected by the Chairperson of the Committee on a rotating basis. The complaint shall not be forwarded to an attorney member who maintains an office for the practice of law in the same judicial district as the Respondent. If a recommendation to dismiss the complaint is adopted by the two Committee members, the Complainant and the Respondent shall be notified of the decision together with notification of the Complainant's right to appeal the dismissal. The Respondent shall also be provided with a copy of the complaint. For the purpose of complying with the time limitations imposed by Practice Book §2-32(a), if the deadline for action falls on a weekend or holiday, said deadline shall be deemed to be satisfied if the action is accomplished by the end of the first working day following the deadline.
3. Appeal of dismissed complaints: If the Complainant timely files an appeal of the dismissal, the appeal shall be assigned to a reviewing committee for a decision on the appeal. The reviewing committee shall be selected on a random, rotating basis. The appeal shall not be assigned to a reviewing committee in which an attorney maintains an office for the practice of law in the same judicial district as the Respondent. If the reviewing committee denies the appeal, the Complainant and the Respondent shall be notified. If the Complainant files an appeal beyond the fourteen-day appeal period, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall return the appeal to the Complainant as untimely filed.
B. Referral of Matters Submitted Pursuant to Practice Book §2-43: When any complaint, counterclaim, cross complaint, special defense or other pleading in a judicial or administrative proceeding alleges a lawyer's misuse of funds handled by the lawyer in his or her capacity as a lawyer or a fiduciary, and the person signing the pleading has mailed a copy thereof to the Statewide Bar Counsel; or, in any case where a lawyer's trust account, as defined in Practice Book §2-28(b), is garnished, or otherwise liened, and the party who sought the garnishment or lien has mailed a copy of the garnishee process or writ of attachment to the Statewide Bar Counsel, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall forward a copy of the pleading, garnishee process or writ of attachment to a grievance panel for the purpose of conducting an investigation into the matter pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(e)(1) and for the purpose of determining whether a complaint should be initiated pursuant to Practice Book §2-32(a). If the panel determines that a complaint should be filed, it shall do so in its name and in the name of the person who filed the pleading, garnishee process or writ of attachment with the Statewide Bar Counsel.
A. Decisions regarding whether to disclose that a grievance complaint or any other matter has been referred to a grievance panel for investigation shall ordinarily be made at regularly scheduled meetings of the Committee.
B. In the event of extraordinary circumstances, such decision may be made by way of a telephone poll of the members of the Committee.
C. Decisions regarding whether to disclose that a grievance complaint or any other matter has been referred to a grievance panel for investigation shall be made when such disclosure is deemed by the Committee to be in the public interest.
A. Grievance Panels - Probable Cause: Pursuant to Practice Book §2-32(j), a grievance panel may file a motion for extension of time, not to exceed thirty days, with the Committee which may delegate to its Chairperson or Vice-chairperson the authority to grant the motion only for good cause shown. Said motion shall be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel who shall forthwith notify the Chairperson, or the Vice-chairperson if the Chairperson is unavailable, of the filing and for a decision on the motion. The Statewide Bar Counsel's Office or will notify the grievance panel of the decision.
B. Reviewing Committees - Investigation and Final Decision: Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(e), a reviewing committee to which a grievance panel's determination has been referred for investigation and final decision may file a motion for extension of time, not to exceed thirty days with the Committee, which shall grant said motion only for good cause. Said motion shall be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel who, upon its receipt, shall forward copies of same to the remaining members of the Committee. Said members shall respond to the Statewide Bar Counsel within seven days of the date of the mailing of the motion by the Statewide Bar Counsel, in writing, signifying their vote to deny the motion, or deny the motion and request that no final action on said motion be taken until a meeting of the Committee is convened in order that the motion may be discussed. If no vote to deny the motion or defer action on the motion is received prior to the expiration of the seven day period, the motion shall be considered granted and the Statewide Bar Counsel shall so notify the reviewing committee. Said motions may also be made and considered at meetings of the Committee.
A. Grievance Panels: Pursuant to Practice Book §2-32(j), the Committee shall, upon a grievance panel's not completing its action on a complaint within the time provided by the rule, inquire into the delay. Said inquiry shall be conducted by the Statewide Bar Counsel, whose findings shall be reported to the Committee which shall, at its next regularly scheduled meeting, order said grievance panel to act upon said complaint, refer the complaint to another grievance panel, or refer the complaint to a reviewing committee.
B. Reviewing Committees: Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(i), the Committee shall, upon a reviewing committee's not completing its action on a complaint within the time provided by the rule, inquire into the delay. Said inquiry shall be conducted by the Statewide Bar Counsel whose findings shall be reported to the Committee, which shall, at its next regularly scheduled meeting, order the reviewing committee to complete its action, refer such complaint to another reviewing committee, refer such complaint to the same or a different grievance panel for further investigation and action, or determine another appropriate course of action.
A. The Statewide Bar Counsel shall, with the approval of the Committee, assign the members of the Committee to reviewing committees, each consisting of two attorney members and one non-attorney member. Said reviewing committees shall serve for six months. At the conclusion of each six month period, the membership of the reviewing committees shall rotate.
B. The referral of complaints to reviewing committees shall be done in such a manner so that no reviewing committee is routinely assigned complaints from a single judicial district.
C. If a grievance panel determines that probable cause exists that an attorney is guilty of misconduct, said case shall be assigned to a reviewing committee or the Committee for a hearing open to the public and other appropriate action.
D. If a grievance panel determines that no probable cause exists that an attorney is guilty of misconduct, but the complaint contains an allegation that the attorney committed a crime, said case shall be reviewed by a reviewing committee for appropriate action, or by the Committee if deemed appropriate. Under no circumstances shall the Committee review the grievance panel's decision that a crime was not alleged in the complaint.
A. Notice: In all matters in which a hearing open to the public is held, the Complainant, Disciplinary Counsel and the Respondent shall be sent written notice of the hearing by the Statewide Bar Counsel by first class mail. The notice shall include a statement of the time and place of the hearing and that the hearing shall be open to the public and on the record.
B. Continuances: Continuances may be granted only to Disciplinary Counsel or the Respondent in the discretion of the reviewing committee and only for good cause shown. Motions for continuances must be submitted on form JD-GC-17 and filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office with a copy to all counsel and pro se parties of record no later than seven calendar days prior to the date of the hearing, absent exigent circumstances. A party requesting a continuance must indicate whether the opposing party consents to the request. Upon timely receipt of the motion for continuance, the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall forward it to a member of the reviewing committee who shall promptly rule on the motion. Notice of the decision on the motion shall thereafter be transmitted by the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office to Disciplinary Counsel, the Complainant and to the Respondent or counsel for the Respondent.
C. Motions: Motions filed with the Committee or a reviewing committee concerning the jurisdiction of the Committee or reviewing committee or any other matter to be considered by the hearing body must be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office no later than seven days in advance of the date upon which the complaint at issue is to be heard. An original and three copies of the motion must be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office. Such motions may only be filed by Disciplinary Counsel, the Respondent or the Respondent's counsel. The requirement that motions must be filed no later than seven days in advance of the hearing date may be waived in the discretion of the hearing body with respect to motions in which the jurisdiction of the hearing body is at issue.
D. Motion to Appear by Videoconference: The Disciplinary Counsel, the Respondent, or the Respondent’s counsel may file a motion with the Statewide Bar Counsel’s office requesting that a witness, including the Complainant or the Respondent, appear by videoconference. The movant shall file an original and three copies of the motion no later than fourteen days prior to the date of the hearing. The motion shall contain a certification that a copy of the motion was sent to the opposing party and shall indicate the opposing party’s position on the motion. The opposing party may file an objection, with three copies, to the motion within five days from the date the motion is filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel’s office. Upon timely receipt of the motion, the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office shall forward the motion to a member of the reviewing committee assigned to the hearing, who shall promptly rule on the motion. Notice of the decision on the motion shall be transmitted by the Statewide Bar Counsel’s office to the Disciplinary Counsel, the Complainant, and to the Respondent or the Respondent’s counsel. Only motions to appear by videoconference will be considered. No witness shall be allowed to appear by telephone conference call.
E. Briefs: Briefs prepared for submission to a reviewing committee must be submitted to the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office no later than seven days in advance of the date upon which the complaint at issue is to be heard. An original and three copies of the brief must be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office. Such briefs may only be filed by Disciplinary Counsel, the Respondent or the Respondent's counsel. The requirement that briefs must be filed no later than seven days in advance of the hearing date may be waived in the discretion of the hearing body for good cause. The requirement that briefs must be provided to the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office no later than seven days in advance of the date upon which the complaint at issue is to be heard, set forth in the first sentence of this section, does not apply to post-hearing briefs ordered at the time of the hearing or for which the permission to file is granted to Disciplinary Counsel or the Respondent at the time of the hearing.
F. Evidentiary Submissions: Evidentiary submissions to the record after a finding of probable cause may only be made as exhibits to the record. Any proposed evidence received by the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office or the Committee after a finding of probable cause will be returned to the participants and not be made part of the record unless it is submitted in accordance with this section or at a reviewing committee hearing. Prior to the hearing, Disciplinary Counsel and the Respondent, or the Respondent’s counsel shall confer regarding proposed evidentiary submissions and witnesses reasonably expected to be called during their cases-in-chief. Evidentiary submissions that may be made full exhibits by agreement shall be marked by the Disciplinary Counsel and the Respondent respectively, with Disciplinary Counsel listing exhibits numerically and the Respondent alphabetically. Any exhibit proposed by a participant, but not agreed to, shall be marked for identification purposes only. At least seven days before the hearing, the participants shall: (1) exchange all exhibits, including those marked only for identification; and (2) file with the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office four copies of each submission with a list of witnesses the participant reasonably expects to call during the hearing. The requirements of this subsection may be waived in the discretion of the hearing body for good cause.
G. Additional Allegations of Misconduct Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(d): Notwithstanding the provisions of section F of this rule, Disciplinary Counsel may attach supporting materials to any additional allegations of misconduct issued pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(d). The thirty day period to be heard provided for in Practice Book §2-35(f) shall be calculated from the date the additional allegations of misconduct are filed with the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office. The Respondent may file a response with exhibits to any additional allegations of misconduct issued by Disciplinary Counsel. Any materials attached to the response are also exempt from the provisions of section F. The Respondent’s original response with any exhibits plus three copies must be filed with the Statewide Bar Counsels Office within fourteen days of the filing of the additional allegations of misconduct. Thereafter, no other materials regarding the additional allegations of misconduct or the response may be filed as of right, and must be submitted instead pursuant to section F of this rule.
1. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the Committee or reviewing committee shall exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. At its discretion, the Committee or reviewing committee may exclude documentary evidence not submitted in accord with section F of this rule.
2. When a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence may be received in written form.
3. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts if the original is not readily available. Upon reasonable and timely requests, the parties may be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original.
4. Disciplinary Counsel, the Respondent, or the Respondent’s counsel may conduct reasonable direct and cross-examinations of witnesses.
5. Hearings may only be electronically recorded by the official court reporter or official court recording monitor.
I. Witnesses: Unless the Committee or reviewing committee determines that a witness is necessary to the resolution of a complaint, it shall be the responsibility of Disciplinary Counsel or the Respondent by subpoena or otherwise to secure the presence of witnesses.
J. All determinations of a reviewing committee shall be by an absolute majority vote and two members shall constitute a quorum. In the event of a tie vote, a member of the Committee shall be designated to review the entire record of the complaint and cast the deciding vote.
A. In the course of investigating a complaint alleging the unauthorized practice of law, Disciplinary Counsel may request that the matter be heard by a reviewing committee.
B. Prior to requesting a hearing, Disciplinary Counsel shall give the Respondent 30 days to file a written response to the complaint, which response shall be provided to the reviewing committee if a hearing is requested.
C. If a complaint alleging the unauthorized practice of law is referred to a reviewing committee for a hearing, the hearing shall be open to the public and on the record.
D. Following the hearing, the reviewing committee shall render a written final decision which will be sent to the parties. In its final decision, the reviewing committee shall make a finding that the Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law or did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.
E. Unauthorized Practice of Law Records.
1. The existence of an unauthorized practice of law complaint shall not become public until the matter is scheduled for a hearing before a reviewing committee.
(a). For unauthorized practice of law complaints in which a public hearing was held, the entire record shall be public.
(b). For unauthorized practice of law complaints filed prior to January 1, 2004 in which a public hearing was not held, the Committee's final disposition letter only.
3. All unauthorized practice of law records pertaining to a Respondent shall be available to Disciplinary Counsel in any subsequent unauthorized practice of law investigation pertaining to the Respondent.
A. Approval of Financial Institutions.
1. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-28, attorney trust accounts must be maintained only in financial institutions approved by the Committee.
2. A financial institution seeking approval by the Committee shall submit a form to the Statewide Bar Counsel by which it agrees to report to the Committee the fact that an instrument has been presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored. The Statewide Bar Counsel shall transmit the form to the Committee for its consideration within 45 days of receipt by the Statewide Bar Counsel. Forms shall be made available to financial institutions seeking approval upon request to the Statewide Bar Counsel.
3. Approval of a financial institution shall be contingent upon the agreement of the financial institution to provide no less than 30 days notice of its decision to cancel its agreement with the Committee. Notice of the cancellation of an agreement by a financial institution with the Committee shall be submitted by the financial institution in writing to the Statewide Bar Counsel.
(b) In the case of instruments that are presented against insufficient funds but which are honored, the report shall identify the financial institution, the attorney or law firm, the account number, the date of presentation for payment and the date paid, a copy of the instrument presented, as well as the amount of the overdraft created thereby.
5. Upon information and belief that an approved financial institution has failed to comply with its agreement to report the presentation of an instrument against insufficient funds and to provide a copy of the instrument, the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall, in writing, request an explanation of the failure from the financial institution. The financial institution shall have ten days from the date of the letter of inquiry from the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office to provide an explanation. The Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall forward the explanation of the financial institution, or notice of its failure to submit an explanation, to the Committee. After its review of the explanation or lack thereof, the Committee may direct the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office to (a) request a further explanation of the financial institution's actions, (b) accept the explanation of the financial institution, or (c) terminate the approved status of the financial institution. Upon the decision of the Committee to terminate the approved status of a financial institution, the Committee shall cause to have notice of the termination published in the Connecticut Law Journal.
1. Upon receipt of a notice of the presentation of an instrument against insufficient funds, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall notify, in writing, the attorney or law firm in whose name the account is registered of the receipt of the overdraft notification. The attorney or law firm shall have ten days from the date of the letter of notification forwarded by the Statewide Bar Counsel to submit an explanation of the overdraft. Such explanation shall be supported by documentation reasonably sufficient to demonstrate the basis of the overdraft.
2. Upon the failure of the attorney or law firm to submit an explanation of the overdraft, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall, on behalf of the Committee, initiate a grievance complaint and forward same to the appropriate grievance panel.
3. The Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall review all overdraft notification explanations submitted by lawyers and law firms and (a) if the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office determines that the overdraft was not a result of misconduct, close the file on the matter or (b) if the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office is not satisfied with the explanation, refer the matter to the Committee which shall review the matter in accordance with subsection 4 of this section.
4. The Committee shall review all overdraft notification explanations referred by the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office in accordance with subsection 3 of this section submitted by lawyers and law firms and (a) if it determines that the overdraft was not a result of misconduct, close its file on the matter or (b) if it is not satisfied with the explanation, (i) refer the matter to a grievance panel for investigation, or the initiation of a complaint, or both, or (ii) instruct the Statewide Bar Counsel to initiate a grievance complaint. If the matter has been previously investigated by a grievance panel and the grievance panel chooses not to file a grievance complaint, the Committee may refer the matter to a reviewing committee for investigation or the initiation of a complaint, or both.
5. If a grievance panel to which an overdraft notification matter has been referred pursuant to subsection 4 of this section determines that the initiation of a grievance complaint is not warranted, it shall file its determination, along with an explanation of its decision, with the Committee. If a grievance panel initiates a grievance complaint pursuant to subsection 4 of this section, said complaint shall be referred to a separate grievance panel for a determination of probable cause.
6. Whenever a grievance complaint is initiated pursuant to this rule, a copy of said complaint shall be forwarded to the Disciplinary Counsel for a determination as to whether interim suspension should be sought pursuant to Practice Book §2-42.
C. Overdraft Notification Records: All records pertaining to overdraft notification files that result in a determination that no further action is warranted and the file is closed shall not be public.
A. Attorneys admitted to the bar with conditions pursuant to Practice Book §2-11 shall have their compliance with the conditions of admission monitored by the Statewide Bar Counsel. Such attorneys shall report their compliance with their conditions in such a manner as required by the terms of their admission and as reasonably required by the Statewide Bar Counsel.
B. At intervals of time consistent with the conditions of admission, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall cause to be issued an Attorney Registration form for the conditionally admitted attorney. The Statewide Bar Counsel shall forward the Attorney Registration form, together with a notice to the attorney of the terms of the attorney's compliance, to the address provided by the attorney on the attorney's last filed Attorney Registration form. The Statewide Bar Counsel shall establish a reasonable deadline by which the attorney shall return the completed Attorney Registration form, together with such other documentation of compliance as is required under the terms of the attorney's admission or is otherwise reasonably required by the Statewide Bar Counsel.
A. In matters in which the Respondent has tendered a proposed disposition pursuant to Practice Book §2-82, Disciplinary Counsel shall so notify the Committee for those matters not involving suspension or disbarment and a hearing shall be scheduled before a reviewing committee.
B. At or prior to the hearing, the parties shall submit to the reviewing committee the proposed disposition and the affidavit required by Practice Book §2-82(d).
C. At the hearing, the reviewing committee may elicit testimony or other evidence on any relevant issues, may allow argument as to the disposition, and shall give the Complainant the opportunity to comment upon the matter pursuant to Practice Book §2-82(f).
D. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the reviewing committee shall either accept or reject the proposed disposition.
1. If rejected: the parties and Disciplinary Counsel shall be so notified and the original proposed disposition and the affidavit required by Practice Book §2-82(d) shall be kept in the non-public portion of the Committee’s file. The transcript of the hearing, and any briefs or evidence submitted regarding the proposed disposition shall remain public. Thereafter, the matter shall be scheduled for a hearing before another reviewing committee in accordance with Practice Book §2-35. Thereafter, if a new proposed disposition is offered, the subsequent reviewing committee shall review the previously rejected proposed disposition and affidavit. Absent good cause shown, the subsequent reviewing committee shall not accept or consider the same or substantially the same proposed disposition as was previously rejected. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit the subsequent offer of any evidence that was previously submitted regarding a rejected proposed disposition.
2. If a Practice Book §2-82(b) proposed disposition is accepted: notice thereof shall be sent to Disciplinary Counsel and the parties; the imposition of discipline, if applicable, shall be made public; and the documentation from the file, including the transcript of the hearing, shall be made public pursuant to Practice Book §2-50.
3. If a Practice Book §2-82(c) proposed disposition is accepted: the reviewing committee shall issue a decision dismissing the complaint, imposing sanctions and conditions pursuant to Practice Book §2-37 or directing Disciplinary Counsel to file a presentment. If discipline is imposed, the Respondent may request review of the decision pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(g); and the documentation from the file, including the transcript of the hearing, shall be made public, pursuant to Practice Book §2-50.
E. When a proposed disposition involving suspension or disbarment has been submitted to the court, Disciplinary Counsel shall so notify the Committee. At the conclusion of court proceedings, Disciplinary Counsel shall notify the Committee of the court’s decision in the matter.
F. In matters in which the Respondent has tendered a proposed disposition agreeing to a presentment pursuant to Practice Book §2-82(g), the reviewing committee shall either reject the proposed disposition or issue a decision ordering a presentment.
2. The Respondent is exposed to discipline for the same conduct under Practice Book §§2-39, 2-40 or 2-41. Any motion granted under this subsection will be without prejudice to the Disciplinary Counsel filing a new grievance complaint or a presentment pursuant to Practice Book §§2-39, 2-40 or 2-41.
B. The motion to dismiss under this rule may only be filed by the Disciplinary Counsel. An original and three copies of the motion shall be filed with the Committee prior to or during the proceeding before a reviewing committee and a copy shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Counsel to the Complainant, the Respondent and their counsel. The motion shall clearly explain the reasons for the requested dismissal.
C. The reviewing committee shall hear the motion on the record. At such hearing, the reviewing committee shall allow argument from the Disciplinary Counsel, the Respondent or Respondent’s counsel concerning the motion. The Complainant or Complainant’s counsel may make a statement in support of, or in opposition to the motion.
D. Following the hearing, the reviewing committee shall issue a written decision either granting or denying the motion.
A. Each attorney shall register with the Committee, as required by Practice Book §§ 2-27(d) and 2-26.
B. Each attorney’s annual registration shall be made electronically through Judicial Branch E-Services.
A. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-27(e), the Committee or its counsel shall conduct random inspections and audits of clients’ funds accounts as defined in Practice Book §§2-27(d) and 2-28(b) and required to be registered with the Committee in accordance with Practice Book §2-27(d).
B. For purposes of Practice Book §2-27(e) and this rule, inspection and audit is defined as the inspection of a randomly selected clients’ funds account to ensure compliance with ethical rules, including, but not limited to, Practice Book §2-27 and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. Commencing July 1, 2007, the Statewide Bar Counsel shall randomly select for inspection and audit, with such frequency as is determined by counsel, clients’ funds accounts registered with the Committee in accordance with Practice Book §2-27(d).
2. The Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall send, by certified mail, written notice of the inspection and audit to the attorney(s) who has registered the selected clients’ funds account.
(e) all checkbooks, bank statements, and canceled or voided checks.
4. The attorney(s) whose clients' funds account is the subject of the random inspection and audit and whose office is located in Connecticut will comply with the inspection and audit by undergoing an on-site inspection and audit by the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office of the financial records set forth in Practice Book §2-27(b) and subsection 3 of this section and any other records maintained by the attorney(s) for the selected account on the date set forth in the written notice. The Statewide Bar Counsel's Office may complete the inspection and audit of the selected account by removing copies of any records produced at an on-site inspection to the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office. If good cause is shown, the attorney(s) whose clients' funds account is the subject of the random inspection and audit and whose office is located in Connecticut may comply with the inspection and audit by providing a copy of the financial records set forth in Practice Book §2-27(b) and subsection 3 of this section and any other financial records maintained by the attorney(s) for the selected account by United States mail service, in person, or by some other delivery service to the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office by the date provided in the written notice.
5. The attorney(s) whose clients' funds account is the subject of the random inspection and audit and whose office is located outside the State of Connecticut must comply with the inspection and audit by providing a copy of the financial records set forth in Practice Book §2-27(b) and subsection 3 of this section and any other financial records maintained by the attorney(s) for the selected account by United States mail service, in person, or by some other delivery sent to the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office by the date provided in the written notice.
D. Any copies produced pursuant to this rule shall be at the expense of the attorney(s) whose clients’ funds account is the subject of the inspection and audit.
E. The attorney(s) whose account is selected for inspection and audit shall fully cooperate with the inspection and audit. “Fully cooperate” as that term is used in Practice Book §2-27(e) means, among other things, providing the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office with all the documents referred to in this rule and any other records and information as may be necessary for the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office to complete its inspection and audit. If the attorney(s) whose clients’ fund account is the subject of the inspection and audit fails to fully cooperate, the Statewide Bar Counsel’s Office shall, in its discretion, refer the matter to Disciplinary Counsel for an interim suspension proceeding pursuant to Practice Book §2-42.
2. Remove the selected clients’ funds account number from the random inspection and audit selection process for a period of one year from the date the file is closed.
3. Forward the file to Disciplinary Counsel to initiate a presentment complaint.
H. In any matter referred by the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office to a grievance panel or its counsel for investigation under this rule, said grievance panel shall complete its investigation within the same time frame as set forth for the investigation of grievance complaints under Practice Book §2-32(i).
I. If a grievance panel to which the result of a random inspection and audit of a selected clients’ funds account has been forwarded for investigation and the possible filing of a grievance complaint determines that the initiation of a grievance complaint is not warranted, it shall file its written determination, along with an explanation of its decision, with the Committee.
J. If a grievance panel to which the result of a random inspection and audit of a selected clients’ funds account has been forwarded for investigation and the possible filing of a grievance complaint initiates a grievance complaint, the grievance panel shall file its complaint with the Committee and shall forward a copy of the complaint to Disciplinary Counsel for a determination as to whether interim suspension should be sought pursuant to Practice Book §2-42. The grievance complaint shall be referred to a separate grievance panel for a determination of probable cause.
K. Prior to any public hearing arising from a random inspection and audit of a clients’ funds account, the Committee or its counsel shall give written notice by certified mail to any client or third person whose identity may be publicly disclosed through the disclosure of records obtained or produced in accordance with the random audit and inspection. A copy of any such written notice shall be provided to Disciplinary Counsel. Thereafter, the identified client or third person shall have thirty days from the date of the written notice to seek a court order restricting publication of any such records disclosing confidential information. The client or third person who applies for such a court order shall serve, by certified mail, a copy of the application on the Committee through its counsel and on Disciplinary Counsel.
A. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-28A, the Statewide Bar Counsel's Office shall conduct random reviews of legal advertisements and communications that are filed with the Committee in accordance with Practice Book §2-28A and this rule. Advertisements and communications shall be filed prior to or concurrently with their first dissemination and shall be subject to random review for a period of three months following their filing.
B. Unless an attorney requests and receives an exemption, and subject to the limitations set forth in this rule, all advertisements that must be filed with the Committee pursuant to Practice Book §2-28A shall be filed electronically through Judicial Branch E-Services. An attorney who requests and receives an exemption pursuant to section C of this rule, shall submit the advertisement to the Committee in hard copy format together with a cover form approved by the Committee.
C. No request for exemption will be considered unless the request is submitted on a form approved by the Committee prior to the first dissemination of the advertisement to be filed. The Committee delegates to the Statewide Bar Counsel the authority to approve or disapprove exemption requests. An exemption request shall be granted only for good cause shown. An exemption form that is not filed in a timely manner, that does not state a basis for requesting the exemption or is not signed by the attorney seeking the exemption shall be returned and not considered filed. If the Statewide Bar Counsel grants an exemption, a paper copy of the filing form will be provided to the exempted attorney.
D. Any attorney filing a print advertisement that exceeds 20 MB, must submit the completed electronic filing form through E-Services, then file the advertisement itself in hard copy format with the Committee within 10 days of the date the attorney submits the electronic filing form through E-Services. The filed hard copy of the advertisement shall clearly indicate on it the file number assigned when the electronic filing form was submitted through E-Services.
1. Television advertisements: The advertisement must be submitted on a video DVD.
2. Radio and other recorded non-video advertisements: The advertisement must be submitted on a CD in MP3 format.
F. Advertisements filed pursuant to Practice Book §2-28A and this rule shall be subject to selection for review on a random basis for a period of 3 months following their filing.
2. If the attorney(s) fails or refuses to modify, replace, or remove the advertisement and thereafter disseminates the advertisement, or continues to disseminate the advertisement, notify the Committee for the Committee to determine whether the file should be forwarded to Disciplinary Counsel to initiate a presentment complaint.
H. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-28B, an attorney may request a written advisory opinion from the Statewide Grievance Committee concerning whether the attorney’s proposed advertisement complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct. The request must be submitted in writing and contain an original and four copies of the request and the material specified by Practice Book §2-28A. All attachments to the request must be properly collated and attached to the original and each copy of the request. The request shall be accompanied by a fee as established by the Chief Court Administrator. No request that fails to meet any of the requirements set forth in Practice Book §2-28B or this rule shall be considered filed with the Committee. The Statewide Bar Counsel may assign the matter to a reviewing committee to issue the advisory opinion.
I. Within thirty days of the issuance to the requesting attorney(s) of a written advisory opinion from a reviewing committee, the requesting attorney(s) may file with the Committee a request in writing for review of the opinion. Any request for review submitted under this rule must specify the basis for the request, including, but not limited to, a claim or claims that the reviewing committees findings, inferences, conclusions, or opinion is or are (1) in violation of constitutional law, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the reviewing committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion and the specific basis for such claim or claims. Filing a request for review shall not stay the publication of the advisory opinion. If the opinion of the reviewing committee is reversed or modified by the Committee, the decision reversing or modifying the advisory opinion shall be published in a manner similar to the initial publication of the opinion. No request for review that fails to meet any of the requirements set forth in this rule shall be considered by the Committee.
A. Each Grievance Panel shall meet to consider complaints and other appropriate matters as often as the Panel deems necessary to properly and expeditiously discharge its duties.
B. All decisions of a Panel shall be by majority vote of those present and voting. Two members shall constitute a quorum. In the event of a tie vote, a Panel member or alternate shall be designated by the two voting members to review the entire record of the complaint and cast the deciding vote.
C. All decisions of a Panel shall be in writing and mailed to the Complainant and Respondent involved, and to Disciplinary Counsel if involved pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(f).
D. All matters received by a Panel shall be confidential except as otherwise provided by law.
E. Each Grievance Panel shall investigate all complaints against attorneys forwarded to it. A decision by a Complainant to withdraw a complaint after its filing shall not operate as a withdrawal of the complaint or terminate the grievance process. Each Grievance Panel shall discharge its functions under the rules of the Superior Court regardless of a Complainant's decision not to pursue the complaint.
F. A Grievance Panel shall not review for the purposes of determining whether there exists probable cause complaints initiated by it pursuant to Practice Book §§2-29(e)(1) and 2-32(a). Such complaints shall be forwarded for investigation and determination of probable cause pursuant to Practice Book §2-32(e)-(i) to a Grievance Panel other than the one initiating the complaint.
G. In accordance with Practice Book §2-32(i), the Respondent shall file a written answer to the grievance complaint with Grievance Counsel. Grievance Counsel shall thereafter forward a copy of the answer to the Complainant, and to Disciplinary Counsel if involved under Practice Book §§2-29(f) and 2-32(f) and shall provide a date by which the Complainant and Disciplinary Counsel may file a reply to the Respondent’s answer with Grievance Counsel. Any further responses shall be at the discretion of the Grievance Panel. Grievance Counsel shall forward a copy of any submissions filed by the Complainant and Disciplinary Counsel to the Respondent, and any submissions filed by the Respondent to the Complainant and Disciplinary Counsel. All responses filed with the Grievance Panel by the Complainant, Disciplinary Counsel, and the Respondent must contain an original and six copies.
H. Except for materials filed by Disciplinary Counsel, the Statewide Bar Counsel, the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee thereof, or a Grievance Panel, no materials sent to the Grievance Panel investigating the complaint, including, but not limited to the complaint and the answer shall include personal identifying information as defined by Practice Book §4-7. The person filing any materials with personal identifying information must redact them. The Grievance Panel or its counsel may redact materials that do not follow this rule.
I. Except for materials filed by Disciplinary Counsel, the Statewide Bar Counsel, the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee thereof, or a Grievance Panel, no materials sent to the Grievance Panel investigating the complaint, including the complaint and the answer, shall include hospital, psychiatric or medical records. If a Complainant, Respondent or Disciplinary Counsel pursuing the matter under Practice Book §2-32(f) want to file a hospital, psychiatric or medical record with the Grievance Panel, then the record(s) must be filed in a sealed envelope, that has the case name and number and the name of the person filing it written on the envelope. The record(s) must be accompanied by a written statement explaining how the material(s) is relevant and how it will help prove the complaint or a defense to the complaint.
(1) The Grievance Panel and its counsel will determine whether the written statement of the person who filed the hospital, psychiatric or medical record(s) establishes that the material(s) is relevant and will help prove the complaint or a defense to the complaint. If the written statement does not demonstrate why the hospital, psychiatric or medical record(s) is relevant and how it will help prove the complaint or a defense to the complaint, the record(s) will be returned to the person who filed them, and no copy will be kept as part of the Grievance Panel’s record.
(2) If the written statement establishes that the hospital, psychiatric or medical record(s) is relevant and will help prove the complaint or a defense to the complaint, then the Grievance Panel will review the record(s) with its counsel in private. If upon review of the record, the Grievance Panel determines that the record(s) is not relevant despite the written statement of the person filing it, then the record(s) will be retuned and no copy will be kept as part of the Grievance Panel’s record.
(3) If after reviewing the record(s) in accordance with subsection (2), the Grievance Panel determines that the record(s) is relevant but more harmful or prejudicial than helpful in proving the complaint or a defense to the complaint, then the record(s) will be returned to the person who filed them, and no copy of it will be kept as part of the Grievance Panel’s record. If the Grievance Panel decides that the record(s) is relevant and that it is more helpful in proving the complaint or a defense to the complaint than harmful or prejudicial, then it will become a part of the Grievance Panel record and Grievance Counsel will give a copy of it to the other participants. Nothing in this rule prevents a Complainant, Respondent, Disciplinary Counsel or a witness from raising an objection to the use of any hospital, psychiatric or medical record.
3. The specific Rule or Rules of Professional Conduct and/or Practice Book Section or Sections upon which the probable cause determination is predicated.
2. A brief discussion of the facts of the matter as applied to the specific Rules and/or Sections.
L. In any matter referred by the Statewide Grievance Committee or its counsel to a Grievance Panel for investigation, including overdraft notifications, said Grievance Panel shall complete its investigation within the same time frame as set forth for the investigation of grievance complaints under Practice Book §2-32(i).
A. In all matters in which a hearing is held by a Grievance Panel, the Complainant and the Respondent, and Disciplinary Counsel if involved pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(f), shall be sent a notice of the hearing by the Panel's Grievance Counsel by first class mail. The notice shall include a statement of the time and place of the hearing and that the hearing shall be on the record. The hearing shall not be open to the public unless the Respondent so requests pursuant to Practice Book §2-32(g).
B. The Grievance Panel in its discretion may grant a continuance only for good cause shown.
1. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received but the Grievance Panel shall exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence.
2. When a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the Complainant and the Respondent will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence may be received in written form.
3. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts if the original is not readily available. If the request is reasonable and timely, the Complainant, or Disciplinary Counsel if involved pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(f), and the Respondent may be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original.
4. A Complainant, or Disciplinary Counsel if involved pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(f), and Respondent may conduct direct and cross examinations of witnesses only at the discretion of the hearing body.
D. Unless the Grievance Panel determines that a witness is necessary to the resolution of a complaint, it shall be the responsibility of the Complainant, or Disciplinary Counsel if involved pursuant to Practice Book §2-29(f), and the Respondent by subpoena or otherwise to secure the presence of witnesses.