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David: Last year, Game of Thrones won its first Drama Series Emmy on the back of what most (including me) believe to be its worst season. The reasons for that were many. Breaking Bad was over. Mad Men had fallen from popular favor. But most importantly, the voting rules had changed. No longer were nominees and winners determined by “blue ribbon” panels of Academy members who had to actually watch all the submitted episodes. Now, anyone can vote. Thrones is the most popular series on TV, and HBO has the largest voting bloc by leagues. Leaving aside the fact that Thrones delivered a jaw-dropping sixth season and probably deserves this win anyway, “deserve” won’t have as much to do with it as consensus.
Tyler: The Americans did this season what many post-Golden Age prestige television shows have been afraid to do: ended quietly. Instead of building to a titanic climax, something to be talked about around the blogger cooler, FX’s premiere drama offering calmly executed its brutal human calculus on everyone involved in the spy thriller. Along the way Joe Weisberg and company jettisoned many fan favorites, but did so in a way that was both tragic and fitting. Instead of killing characters or crafting drama through questionable story choice and debatable logic seemingly only designed to either a) appease fans or b) infuriate them (*cough GoT*), The Americans operated on a tightrope of desires and needs, and coldly did away with those who didn’t belong. And, again, the finale is a masterwork of muted exhalation.
Chase: This is the typical will win/should win scenario. You can easily make the case for the eternally unjustly snubbed The Americans, but quality alone rarely wins these awards. It’s a combination of quality and buzz that usually gets the job done, and The Americans‘ quiet perfection seemingly can’t ever move that latter needle. Mr. Robot does have the needed combination, but has season 2’s dip in quality doomed its first season’s Emmy chances? I would kill for The Americans to win this award, but Thrones is almost guaranteed to repeat based on all the reasons everyone else has mentioned.
Sean: Game of Thrones should easily dominate the ceremony on Sunday, but if Emmy voters are feeling sentimental they could pick Downton Abbey‘s moving final season. The show has remained popular with Emmy voters throughout it’s run. Don’t be surprised to see it pick up a few trophies.
David: The recent rule changes simultaneously help and hurt a show like The Americans, which everyone recognizes as great even if they don’t actually watch it. Now it’s gotten the nominations it’s long deserved, but how many voters will devote time to the provided episodes and see how magnificent Keri Russell and Matthew Rhys are? I’d say Russell has a better shot than Rhys, but both of them are staring up at some heavy hitters: for the men, the brilliant Rami Malek is way out in front — mixed reviews on Mr. Robot‘s second season may hurt it in the Series category, but Malek will be fine. For the women, it may finally be Robin Wright’s time, so good for so long on the trashy House of Cards. I don’t expect Davis to repeat, and for Maslany, the nomination is the victory.
Tyler: I am going to keep this brief. Keri Russell chopping vegetables in the Jennings’ kitchen is the best acting on television. As funny as that sounds, I’m completely serious. I could gush further about her unstoppable performance in The Americans, but I will not.
Chase: Hey! Stop hogging all the Americans love. I’m the one who covers that show for this website, haha! Matthew Rhys and Keri Russell are outstanding, and they both deserves cases and cases of awards. Sadly, they will not win Emmys this year. Mr. Robot‘s second season woes shouldn’t hurt Rami Malek‘s chances as his brilliant, introverted performance hasn’t dropped off an ounce. Robin Wright is due, and it’s probably that simple.
Sean: Rami Malek certainly has the buzz, but don’t be shocked to find both Kevin Spacey and Robin Wright headed to the podium. I may not have been crazy about this last season of House of Cards, but there was no denying the fireworks erupting between its two magnetic leads. Wright in particular is beyond due and it would be nice to see both Claire and Frank be recognized at the same ceremony.
David: Apologies to Jonathan Banks, but I’m going Thrones for both categories here. The only question is who. Dinklage has won twice and is the easy rubber-stamp, but Kit Harington’s got a great narrative: long-maligned by fans and critics, his steady growth in the last couple of seasons (culminating with Jon’s resurrection, and showcase in “The Battle of the Bastards”) should see him riding atop a wave of Thrones trophies. Ben Mendelsohn, a respected “actor’s actor,” is a dark horse, though. Meanwhile, Lena Headey will be the Throne’s first actress to win, and there’s no debate. She earned it last year, and again this year.
Chase: I agree about Lena Headey, but I have trouble imagining Kit Harington winning. Sure, he got much better this year (better late than never, Kit. It’s season freaking SIX!), but can you go from internet joke to Emmy winner in one season? I have my doubts. Instead, I see the Thrones team splitting the vote and Jonathan Banks winning the award. He’s long overdue, and a Thrones actor stole this award from him last year. His greatness stretches all the way back to Breaking Bad, but he’s never managed to win. That changes this year.
David: Miguel Sapochnik, who should have been nominated (and won) for last year’s “Hardhome,” takes Directing in a walk. The funniest thing is that his work on “The Winds of Winter” was even stronger. I don’t expect Thrones to take writing, though. That certainly wasn’t the strength of “Bastards.” It’s a choice between the finales of Downton Abbey (which was…fine) and The Good Wife (which was…not), the terrific pilot of Mr. Robot, and hoping that this is where the Academy throws The Americans a bone. For betting purposes, I’ll take Sam Esmail.
Chase: I hate to see the past-its-sell-by-date Homeland taking up a spot that should conceivably belong to someone from the Mr. Robot team, and I’ve always felt a little off about film directors crashing this award (Soderbergh). But none of that will matter. The God Sapochnik is going to win this, the most deserved award of the night. Sapochnik delivered the television equivalents of Saving Private Ryan and The Godfather in consecutive weeks, and he’s going to cruise to this award. I’ll pick The Americans to finally beak through with this writing award as an episode like “Persona Non Grata” showcases the emotional trauma that makes a show like The Americans so compelling. It helps that the show’s creators wrote it, and it allows the Emmys an easy way to honor Fields and Weisberg for their body of work.
Sean: Thrones will probably take both categories, but it’s going to be tougher in the writing department. If they had gone with the masterful season finale, “The Winds of Winter”, they may have had an easier time of it. Mr. Robot could gain a big win here, but Julian Fellows is a real spoiler for this crowd.
David: Veep finally dethroned Modern Family last year, and there was much rejoicing. There’s no reason why Veep can’t continue a hot streak of its own, but what has the best shot to upset? Silicon Valley has a loyal following, but HBO’s muscle will be elsewhere. Transparent has some in the industry smarting over it being categorized as a comedy. Black-ish is just happy to be here. But Tina Fey’s Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt has the promotional edge over (superior) stablemate Master of None, and is probably Veep‘s closest competitor. It won’t beat it, though.
Tyler: That Veep is turning out to be a less-crazy version of this year’s election cycle is testament to its mastery of pitch black satire. I was terrified at the idea of Armando Ianucci leaving the show last year. Shame on me.
Chase: Why can’t Silicon Valley ever break through? Sigh. It’s the perennial little brother to Veep. I actually think that Master of None represents the best of these comedy offerings. I’ve never seen a comedy spring to life so fully imagined. It’s hitting its stride by episode 2! Still, I’ll take Transparent to win an award that’s surprisingly eluded it.
Sean: I expect Veep to repeat here, but you have to wonder if they will give Transparent a make-up award. It’s a tough show because it really doesn’t belong in this category and if it qualified as a drama I could easily see it winning there. Yes, even against Thrones. That’s how good the show is.
David: Pretty easy calls here, especially on the womens’ side. Julia Louis-Dreyfus has never lost for Veep. One more win would make her the most-awarded comedy actress of all time. Unless there’s a lot more support for Kimmy Schmidt than I think, she’ll make it five in a row. For the men, I expect Jeffrey Tambor to repeat, but watch out for Aziz Ansari, who could get a bump for also being Master of None’s creator and co-writer.
Chase: Ditto everything David said. Julia Louis-Dreyfus just doesn’t really have any competition here. Tambor’s performance is the soul of Transparent, and I can’t fault anyone for voting for it. He’s got at least another year, but Aziz Ansari is gaining on him.
Sean: There is no stopping the Julia Louis-Dreyfus train. Normally I’m against the same performers or shows winning year after year, but Selina Meyer is Dreyfus’s seminal comic creation. Every year she and the show top themselves. She deserves to keep winning as long as the work remains that good. Jeffery Tambor will likely win again for his touching work on Transparent, but this may be the last time as I assume voters are going to want to eventually award more classically comic performances for this category.
David: More repeats, probably. The Actor race is the more fascinating: Andre Braugher is a national treasure; Louie Anderson is the critic’s choice; Tituss Burgess should have won last year and may get a make-up award. But it’s probably between the two guys from Veep, and, while I think Matt Walsh had the better season, Tony Hale will coast to another victory. In Supporting Actress, I’ve never bet against Allison Janney, and I won’t start now. Kate McKinnon would be a fun choice, though.
Chase: I do not want to see Allison Janney win. She’s great in everything, but I honestly think they’d giver her the award if she did nothing but read the phone book on-screen this year. Let’s throw some darts, shall we? Tituss Burgess is so much fun on Kimmy Schmidt, and Kate McKinnon is too on SNL.
Sean: Kate McKinnon has the buzz this year thanks to her overpraised Ghostbusters turn, which will help her tremendously. It would be nice to see Matt Walsh take this for his underrated work on Veep.
David: Nothing would make me happier than to see Master of None’s groundbreaking second episode, “Parents,” win both of these. If the voters feel like sharing the wealth, Aziz Ansari will take it for writing. Otherwise, the Veep train keeps rolling, with “Mother” the likely choice over the rest of the field. I’ll predict Master for Writing, but Dale Stern for Directing.
Chase: As much as I adore Master of None, I didn’t love “Parents” as much as everyone else did. “Mornings” would have been my choice. Still, I’ll take both Master of None because I’m tired of seeing Veep win seemingly everything.
Sean: Veep should sweep, but Master of None was the big breakout this year and it has to win somewhere. Writing seems like its best bet, but how strange is it that Transparent missed in what is arguably its strongest aspect?
David: We are now knee-deep in an Anthology Series boom, and many of these are as good or better than their Drama nominee counterparts. But this year there’s only room for one 800-pound gorilla, and that’s FX’s The People v. O.J. Simpson. Only Fargo is close, and while I desperately want it to win somewhere, it won’t be here. People v. O.J. is too in the zeitgeist, too important, and just too good. It got more total nominations than any series not named Game of Thrones, and should have a huge haul on Sunday. TV Movie, though…eh. All the Way, I guess?
Tyler: Having been a true crime guy for a very long time, I found the FX OJ series somewhat hollow compared to the later 30 for 30 documentary. Fargo, on the other hand, somehow managed to craft a more human story out of what was initially an intensely, messily sprawling narrative that felt a little like Noah Hawley over-stretching his means. Yet bit by bit, focusing on the human moments in each relationship and latching himself most tightly onto those who might be righteous enough, or lucky enough, to survive, Hawley built a story that not only matched his titanic first season, but surpassed its narrative satisfaction with a final three episodes to rival anything that’s been on TV in the last year.
Chase: I’m so excited to get to the TV movie and miniseries categories! You could easily make the argument that People v. O.J. Simpson and Fargo were the two best shows of the year. Period. End of sentence. They are both titanic masterpieces, but I’ll pick People v. O.J. Simpson to win because, despite being about a twenty-plus-year-old murder, it felt so of the moment. All the Way for TV movie, but I’m considerably less caring about it.
Sean: No, nothing is beating The People v. O.J. Simpson in any of these upcoming categories. And nothing should. It was the best thing on television in any category last year. HBO’s All the Way will quietly pick up the TV Movie category with little fanfare.
David: Look, there are some great performances here. Idris Elba is always great. Kirsten Dunst was great. But Courtney B. Vance and Sarah Paulson gave the two best performances on TV, period, in any category, full stop. Game over, man.
Chase: Agreeing with David again. Vance and Paulson are cruising to these awards.
Sean: Finally, the best actress working on television will get her much overdue Emmy award and it (surprisingly) won’t be happening for American Horror Story. I’ll be toasting Sarah Paulson when she gets to the podium on Sunday night.
David: The Supporting Actor category here is my toughest call of the night, and the one where I’d be happy with anyone — well, maybe not Travolta, though I liked him more than most — winning. Will People v. O.J.’s success elsewhere lift Sterling K. Brown, pitch-perfect as doomed prosecutor Chris Darden? Or will the charismatic Bokeem Woodbine place a flag for Fargo? Noah Hawley’s series has its best chance in the Actress category, where Jean Smart faces less competition than her male counterparts. Regina King could repeat, but you can’t entirely overlook The Night Manager, either: Hugh Laurie never won for House, so some voters might think he’s due, and Olivia Colman was the best thing about the series, as she usually is.
Tyler: I vacillated at points between thinking that Bokeem Woodbine was just another Noah Hawley uber-bad guy in the Billy Bob Thornton mold. But towards the end of the second season of Fargo, Woodbine ascends to something far more aspirational in his portrayal of Mike Milligan. Throughout his innumerable obstacles, Woodbine portrays Milligan with a steely-eyed trust in the result that calmly, succinctly states – “I am in control, but I do what I do for a reason.” Where Thornton’s Lorne Malvo traded in Coen Brothers nihilism, Woodbine makes Milligan a human figure, lured by the promise of the great economic expansion. The Grand West (or North, in this case). Milligan’s last, ultimately tragic scene was enough to seal this one for me.
Chase: This is where Fargo can pick up some awards over O.J. Simpson. Bokeem Woodbine benefits from Courtney B. Vance being labeled a lead actor, and deserves to win this award. Same for Jean Smart who benefits from the lack of supporting female characters on Simpson.
Sean: Unless voters go Paulson crazy and decide to give her two in one year, Jean Smart should be representing the only major Fargo win on Sunday evening.
David: People v. O.J. wins both, but which episodes? While I think “Marcia, Marcia, Marcia” was the high point in a series full of them, voters will likely reward the three men who brought the series to life: writers Scott Alexander & Larry Karaszewski, and director Ryan Murphy. “From the Ashes of Tragedy” in both categories.
Tyler: How on earth did “The Castle,” Fargo’s utterly masterful climax, not get nominated for directing? But I suppose that’s not what this is for. “Loplop” is a fantastic chamber piece of a lead-up in which Kirsten Dunst goes officially crazy-go-nuts in the face of an old World War II-era b-movie freakout. The scene encapsulates one of the core theses of Fargo, elsewhere shown in the brutal Hanzee mass murder earlier in the episode; the ghosts of our past, collectively or individually, reside within our subconscious, guiding every decision we make until we are eventually undone by them. It’s a masterful bit of writing.
Chase: The writing on O.J. Simpson was the secret weapon. I really have no idea here, but honoring show creators is always an easy out in stacked categories. “From the Ashes of Tragedy” gets my vote.
Sean: Personally, I’d be picking John Singleton’s episode “The Race Card” for my vote, but show creator Ryan Murphy is likely to triumph here. And I expect the writing award will go to the same episode.
David: Last Week Tonight won the award for writing at last week’s Creative Arts Emmys, and should coast to its first series win here. The bigger story is what’s not here: voters clearly haven’t warmed to Trevor Noah’s Daily Show, and Stephen Colbert’s Late Show has been outshone by James Corden’s celebrity antics. We’re also missing Samantha Bee’s Full Frontal, though it did pick up a writing nomination. Still, Last Week Tonight deserves the win, and it will. Finally, as for Reality Competition, I only included it in this piece because I wanted to whisper to whoever has actually read this far that I enjoy American Ninja Warrior, and I will laugh heartily if it upsets The Voice.
Chase: Last Week Tonight deserves to win, but since when has that ever mattered? The Daily Show spent years winning awards that Colbert Report deserved. Hell, Daily Show won the award that Last Week Tonight deserved LAST YEAR! But with Jon Stewart gone, Last Week Tonight looks primed. The Voice is absolute trash, so I will pick The Amazing Race out of spite.
Watch the Emmys Sunday night on ABC.

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From time to time, the Commissioner of Revenue announces expanded requirements for electronic filing and payment as authorized under G.L. c. 62C, § 5, reflecting advances in technology that have led increasing numbers of taxpayers to do business electronically. Electronic filing offers many benefits to both taxpayers and the Department of Revenue (“DOR”). It speeds up the processing of tax returns, resulting in quicker refunds to taxpayers. It also reduces the impact on our environment and lowers costs for DOR and the Commonwealth.
Effective January 1, 2017, a taxpayer filing any of the returns listed above will also be required to file and pay electronically. Paper filings and payments will no longer be accepted. Additionally, taxpayers filing these returns will be required to submit amended returns and abatement requests electronically. If a taxpayer, without reasonable cause, fails to conform any filing or payment with the method prescribed by the Commissioner, a penalty of not greater than $100 for each improper return and for each improper payment shall be added to and become a part of the tax required to be paid. G.L. c. 62C, § 33(g). If, despite best efforts, a taxpayer has difficulty making the transition from paper to electronic filing and payment, the taxpayer should contact the Department’s Customer Service Bureau at (617) 887-MDOR or toll-free in Massachusetts at (800) 392-6089 to inquire about the process for a waiver of penalties.
2. that met the $5,000 combined tax threshold or the then-applicable combined tax threshold for electronic filing in a previous year and/or prior twelve months.
2. that met this excise or tax electronic filing threshold or the then- applicable excise or tax electronic filing threshold in a previous year.
Insurance companies subject to tax under G.L. c. 63.
Taxpayer members of a combined group under G.L. c. 63, § 32B.
$100,000 in gains or losses through sale of stock.
Partnership composite returns on behalf of individual non-resident members.
Pass-through entities with members other than resident individuals or with members receiving distributive share for which withholding or estimated taxes have been paid.
Fiduciaries with annual total Part A, Part B and Part C net taxable income of $50,000 or more.
Trusts and unincorporated associations exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code reporting unrelated business taxable income of $100,000 or more. This income must be reported on Form M-990T-62.
Personal income tax preparers must file all Massachusetts personal income tax returns (i.e., Forms 1 and 1-NR-PY) electronically unless the preparer reasonably expects to file 10 or fewer original Massachusetts Forms 1 and 1-NR-PY during the calendar year or the taxpayer directs that filing be done on paper.
Taxpayers reporting use tax on the purchase of taxable items on which Massachusetts sales tax was not paid.
Employers filing 50 or more quarterly wage reports.
Pension payers filing Form M-945 and withholding income tax for payee.
Third party bulk filers (withhold and file for employers’ wage withholding obligation).
Persons who file 50 or more of any particular form in the 1099 series annually.
Massachusetts residents reporting the cigarette excise on purchases of cigarettes that are either unstamped or stamped by another state or jurisdiction.
[i] A complete listing of electronic filing requirements is available on DOR’s website at the following link: http://www.mass.gov/dor/e-services/e-file-requirements.html.
 Imposed under G.L. c. 138, § 21.
 Gasoline and fuel taxes include the following: IFTA taxes, including the purchase of annual decals as required under G.L. c. 64F, § 6; excise on special fuels under G.L. c. 64E, excise on jet fuel under G.L. c. 64J, excise on gasoline fuel under G.L. c. 64A; and excise on aviation gasoline under G.L. c. 64J.
 Authorized under section 129 of chapter 46 of the Acts of 2003, as amended by section 11 of chapter 55 of the Acts of 2003 and sections 44-47 of chapter 65 of the Acts of 2004.
 Imposed under G.L. c. 64M.
 The Convention Center financing surcharge is imposed on sightseeing tours, vehicle rentals, and parking facilities under G.L. c. 62C, § 86.
 “Combined tax threshold” refers to a taxpayer’s annual combined tax liability for all of the listed tax types for the purpose of determining whether the taxpayer must file electronically. The annual combined tax threshold is currently set at $5,000; taxpayers at or above that level of tax liability for one or more of the nine listed tax types must file returns and pay taxes electronically. The combined tax threshold concept was first applied to wage withholding, room occupancy, and sales and use taxes in TIR 02-22, and the threshold was reduced from $10,000 to $5,000 in TIR 10-18.
 See TIR 05-22, section II.A, for the definition of C corporation revenue amounts that are included in the threshold calculation, and TIR 10-18, section II for the definition of S corporation revenue amounts that are included in the threshold calculation. Note that the annual threshold is now set at $100,000 or more (previously, the annual threshold was set at revenue amounts exceeding $100,000).
 Financial institutions were previously required to pay electronically if they had gross income of $100,000 or more. They were not, however, required to file electronically. See TIR 04-30.
 Insurance companies were previously required to pay electronically if they had taxable revenue of $100,000 or more. They were not, however, required to file electronically. See TIR 04-30.
 Note that an individual’s use tax may alternatively be reported on a personal income tax return. Such returns, other than as filed by a personal income tax preparer who files more than 10 Massachusetts Forms 1 and 1-NR-PY during a calendar year, are not required to be filed electronically - although all personal income tax filers are encouraged to do so. See TIR 11-13.


Frank A. SCAPPATICCI, etc., et al., Appellants.
operation of delicatessen on premises.
Business Law § 130, subd. 9.
respective tenants, successors and assigns.
Ira Levine, on the brief), for appellants.
Flaum, Imbarrato & Mondello, Levittown (Anthony C. Imbarrato, Danny E.
Greenblatt and Joseph ChioFolo, on the brief), for respondent.
Before THOMPSON, J.P., and BRACKEN, BALLETTA and SANTUCCI, JJ.
enjoined the defendants from using the subject property as a delicatessen.
one of the parties' successors.
covenant, since the covenant has not been modified, altered, or terminated.
50 A.D.2d 799, 375 N.Y.S.2d 398, Mubarez v. G-T Properties Assocs. (NYLJ, Nov.
the premises as a whole as a certain type of store.
BROTHERS 3 INC., d/b/a East Village Green Delicatessen, Respondent,v.Frank A. SCAPPATICCI, etc., et al., Appellants.
Tenants brought action to enforce restrictive covenant by enjoining grocery store located on premises from operating delicatessen counter. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, Wager, J., entered judgment for tenants, and grocery store appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: (1) statute prohibiting corporate plaintiff from maintaining certain actions if it has failed to file certificate of assumed name did not apply in action to enforce restrictive covenant to which it was not party; (2) tenants of successor to party were entitled to enforce restrictive covenant; and (3) operation of delicatessen counter in grocery store violated restrictive covenant prohibiting operation of delicatessen on premises.
Statute prohibiting corporate plaintiff from maintaining certain actions if it has failed to file certificate of assumed name did not apply in action to enforce restrictive covenant to which it was not party. McKinney's General Business Law § 130, subd. 9.
Tenant of successor of party to restrictive covenant in a deed was entitled to enforce covenant, which was binding upon and inured to benefit of parties, their respective tenants, successors and assigns.
Operation of delicatessen counter in grocery store was barred by restrictive covenant that prohibited use of any part of building for purpose of delicatessen. **965 Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Samuel Kirschenbaum and Ira Levine, on the brief), for appellants.
Flaum, Imbarrato & Mondello, Levittown (Anthony C. Imbarrato, Danny E. Greenblatt and Joseph ChioFolo, on the brief), for respondent.
*234 In an action to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed to real property, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.), entered June 13, 1991, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, enjoined the defendants from using the subject property as a delicatessen.
**966  The defendants contend that the Supreme Court erred by denying their motion to dismiss the complaint and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the caption, since the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of doing business as East Village Green Delicatessen. However, General Business Law § 130(9), which prohibits a corporate plaintiff from maintaining certain actions if it has failed to file a certificate of assumed name, is inapplicable to the present case. General Business Law § 130(9) only applies to actions commenced on a contract, account, or transaction made in an assumed name. In the present case, the plaintiff commenced the action to enforce a restrictive covenant to which it was not a party, but from which it receives a benefit as a tenant of one of the parties' successors.
 Moreover, the plaintiff, as a tenant of a successor of one of the parties to the covenant, was entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant. The restrictive covenant provides, in relevant part, that it shall "be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their respective tenants, customers, business invitees, successors and assigns". Therefore, since the covenant confers a benefit upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the covenant (see, Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268). Contrary to the defendants' contention, the provision of *235 the covenant which grants the parties to the covenant and their assigns the power to modify, alter, or terminate the covenant does not affect the plaintiff's right to enforce the covenant, since the covenant has not been modified, altered, or terminated.
 Additionally, the defendant Village Green Market, Inc. (hereinafter Market), a tenant of the premises subject to the restrictive covenant, violated the restrictive covenant by operating a delicatessen counter in its grocery store. The restrictive covenant provides that no part of the building located on the premises subject to the covenant may be utilized for the purpose of a delicatessen. Thus, the covenant prohibits Market from utilizing even a part of its store for selling any delicatessen items, i.e., from operating a "delicatessen counter", not merely from operating its entire store as a delicatessen (see, Waldorf-Astoria Segar Co. v. Salomon, 109 App.Div. 65, 95 N.Y.S. 1053, affd 184 N.Y. 584, 77 N.E. 1197). The cases relied on by the defendants, including, inter alia, Sol Gord Luncheonette v. S. & H. Realty Co., 50 A.D.2d 799, 375 N.Y.S.2d 398, Mubarez v. G-T Properties Assocs. (NYLJ, Nov. 2, 1984, at 6, col. 2), and Mook v. Weaver Bros., 59 F.2d 1028, are factually inapposite, since in those cases the restrictive covenants prohibited the use of the premises as a whole as a certain type of store.
The defendants' remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review, since the defendants failed to raise those arguments at trial (see, Mastronardi v. Mitchell, 109 A.D.2d 825, 828, 486 N.Y.S.2d 762), or are without merit.


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JUAN ANTONIO CUBILLAS, Defendant - Appellant.
Before BRISCOE, O'BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Juan Antonio Cubillas pled guilty to one count of reentry of a previously removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Mr. Cubillas' plea agreement contained a broad waiver of his rights to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence. Despite this waiver, Mr. Cubillas seeks to appeal from the district court's denial of a motion he filed related to a sentencing determination. The government has filed a motion seeking to enforce the waiver in Mr. Cubillas' plea agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the government's motion and dismiss the appeal.
The district court sentenced Mr. Cubillas to 40 months in prison. This sentence was within the advisory guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. Mr. Cubillas' federal sentence made no reference to any state sentence and, as a result, did not specify whether his federal sentence was to run concurrent with or consecutive to any state sentence.
Over a year after sentencing, Mr. Cubillas filed a “Motion for Clarification and/or Request for Recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons.” R. at 32. In his motion, Mr. Cubillas explained that he had been unsuccessful in having the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) credit the time he spent in state custody on a drug charge towards his federal sentence. He argued that the BOP's failure to award him “prior jail credits ․ result[ed] in the lengthening of [his] sentence beyond the terms of imprisonment imposed by the federal court.” R. at 34. He therefore requested that the district court issue an order clarifying that his federal and state sentences should run concurrently. Alternatively, he requested that the district court issue a recommendation to the BOP “supporting a nunc pro tunc designation so that he may receive credit against his federal sentence for the time spent in the state of Utah's custody.” Id. at 35.
The district court denied the motion for clarification, explaining that “there was no ambiguity in the sentence requiring clarification” because “[t]he issue was never raised and the court never addressed it.” Id. at 46. The court also denied Mr. Cubillas' alternative request that it recommend that the two sentences run concurrently. Mr. Cubillas seeks to appeal the district court's denial of his motion, but the government asserts that the appeal is barred by the terms of the waiver in the plea agreement.
Under Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, we consider the following three factors in determining whether to enforce a waiver in a plea agreement: (1) does the disputed appeal fall within the scope of the waiver; (2) was the waiver knowing and voluntary; and (3) would enforcing the waiver result in a miscarriage of justice. Mr. Cubillas' sole argument is that his appeal is outside of the scope of the waiver in his plea agreement. Because he does not contest that his waiver was knowing and voluntary and he does not assert that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice, we need not address those factors. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).
Under the terms of Mr. Cubillas' plea agreement, he waived his right “to appeal any sentence imposed upon me, and the manner in which the sentence is determined,” except for certain situations not applicable here. Mot. to Enforce, Attach. A at 3. He also waived his “right to challenge [his] sentence, and the manner in which the sentence is determined, in any collateral review motion, writ or other procedure ․” Id. at 4. He further understood and agreed “that the word ‘sentence’ ․ is being used broadly, and applies to all aspects of the Court's sentencing authority ․” Id.
Mr. Cubillas argues that his claim is beyond the scope of the plea agreement because he is not challenging his sentence. But he is in fact challenging a specific component of his sentence by seeking to have the district court “clarify” or amend his sentence to direct that his federal sentence should run concurrent with his previously imposed state sentence. This challenge falls within the sentencing authority of the district court because it had the discretion to order his federal and state sentences to run concurrently. See United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 58 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence is a matter within the discretion of the district court.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”). And, in Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328, we held that a challenge regarding the district court's failure to exercise its discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to another federal sentence fell within the scope of the general waiver related to sentencing matters.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Cubillas' appeal falls within the scope of the waiver in his plea agreement. Accordingly, we grant the government's motion to enforce and dismiss this appeal.


D.C. Law Library - § 42–1901.02. Definitions.
§ 42–1901.01. Applicability of chapter; corresponding terms; supersedure of prior law.
(1) “Common elements” shall mean all portions of the condominium other than the units.
(2) “Common expenses” shall mean all lawful expenditures made or incurred by or on behalf of the unit owners’ association, together with all lawful assessments for the creation and maintenance of reserves pursuant to the provisions of the condominium instruments. “Future common expenses” shall mean common expenses for which assessments are not yet due and payable.
(4) “Condominium” shall mean real estate, portions of which are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of which is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of the portions designated for separate ownership. Real estate shall not be deemed a condominium within the meaning of this chapter unless the undivided interests in the common elements are vested in the unit owners.
(5) “Condominium instruments” shall mean the declaration, bylaws, and plats and plans, recorded pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. Any exhibit, schedule, or certification accompanying a condominium instrument and recorded simultaneously therewith shall be deemed an integral part of that condominium instrument. Any amendment or certification of any condominium instrument shall, from the time of the recordation of such amendment or certification, be deemed an integral part of the affected condominium instrument, so long as such amendment or certification was made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(6) “Condominium unit” shall mean a unit together with the undivided interest in the common elements appertaining to that unit.
(7) “Contractable condominium” shall mean a condominium from which 1 or more portions of the submitted land may be withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of the declaration and of this chapter. If such withdrawal can occur only by the expiration or termination of 1 or more leases, then the condominium shall not be deemed a contractable condominium within the meaning of this chapter.
(8) “Conversion condominium” shall mean a condominium containing structures which before the recording of the declaration were wholly or partially occupied by persons other than those who have contracted for the purchase of condominium units and those who occupy with the consent of such purchasers.
(9) “Convertible land” shall mean a building site; that is to say, a portion of the common elements, within which additional units or limited common elements, or both, may be created in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(10) “Convertible space” shall mean a portion of a structure within the condominium, which portion may be converted into 1 or more units or common elements, or both, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(C) Applies for registration of the condominium.
(11A)(A) “Affiliate of a declarant” shall mean any person who controls, is controlled by, or shares common control with a declarant.
(iv) Has contributed more than 20% of the capital of the declarant.
(iii) Controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors if the powers described in this paragraph are held solely as security for an obligation and are not exercised.
(12) “Disposition” shall mean any voluntary transfer to a purchaser of a legal or equitable interest in a condominium unit, other than as security for a debt or pursuant to a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
(12A) “Domestic partner” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 32-701(3).
(B) Reproduced directly in paper form by a recipient through an automated process.
(13) “Executive Board” shall mean an executive and administrative entity, by whatever name denominated and designated in the condominium instruments to act for the unit owners’ association in governing the condominium.
(14) “Expandable condominium” shall mean a condominium to which additional land may be added in accordance with the provisions of the declaration and of this chapter.
(15) “Identifying number” shall mean 1 or more letters or numbers, or both, that identify only 1 unit in the condominium.
(16) “Institutional lender” shall mean 1 or more commercial or savings banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, credit unions, industrial loan associations, insurance companies, pension funds, or business trusts, including but not limited to, real estate investment trusts, any other entity regularly engaged directly or indirectly in financing the purchase, construction, or improvement of real estate, or any combination of any of the foregoing entities.
(18) “Leasehold condominium” shall mean a condominium all or any portion of which is subject to a lease, the expiration or termination of which will terminate the condominium or exclude a portion therefrom.
(19) “Limited common element” shall mean a portion of the common elements reserved for the exclusive use of those entitled to the use of 1 or more, but less than all, of the units.
(19A) “Master association” shall mean an organization described in § 42-1903.18, whether or not the organization is an association described in § 42-1903.01.
(20) “Mayor” shall mean the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
(20A) "Mortgage Electronic Registration System" or "MERS" shall mean the process created by the mortgage banking industry that tracks mortgage ownership and servicing, is used by the real estate finance industry for residential and commercial mortgage loan trading, and that simplifies the mortgage process by using electronic commerce.
(21) “Nonbinding reservation agreement” shall mean an agreement between the declarant and a prospective purchaser which is in no way binding on the prospective purchaser and which may be cancelled without penalty at the sole discretion of the prospective purchaser by written notice, hand-delivered or sent by United States mail, return receipt requested to the declarant at any time prior to the execution of a contract for the sale or lease of a condominium unit or an interest therein. Such agreement shall not contain any provision for waiver or any other provision in derogation of the rights of the prospective purchaser as contemplated by this subsection, nor shall any such provision be a part of any ancillary agreement.
(21A) "Notice of Foreclosure Sale of Condominium Unit for Assessments Due"or "NFSCUAD" shall mean a notice sent to a condominium unit owner in default in the payment of condominium assessments, fees, charges, or other penalties owed by a unit owner that includes such information as the past due amount of assessments and other charges being foreclosed upon and the time, place, and date of the scheduled sale, sent pursuant to § 42-1903.13(c).
(22) “Offer” shall mean any inducement, solicitation, or attempt to encourage any person or persons to acquire any legal or equitable interest in a condominium unit, other than as security for a debt; provided, however, that “offer” shall not mean any advertisement of a condominium not located in the District of Columbia in a newspaper or other periodical of general circulation, or in any public broadcast medium. Nothing shall be considered an offer that expressly states that the condominium has not been registered with the Mayor and that no unit in the condominium can or will be offered for sale until the time the unit has been so registered.
(23) “Officer” shall mean any member of the executive board or official of the unit owners’ association.
(24) “Par value” shall mean a number of dollars or points assigned to each unit by the declaration. Substantially identical units shall be assigned the same par value, but units located at substantially different heights above the ground, or having substantially different views, or having substantially different amenities or other characteristics that might result in differences in market value, may, but need not, be considered substantially identical within the meaning of this subsection. If par value is stated in terms of dollars, that statement shall not be deemed to reflect or control the sales price or fair market value of any unit, and no opinion, appraisal, or fair market transaction at a different figure shall affect the par value of any unit, or any undivided interest in the common elements, voting rights in the unit owners’ association, liability for common expenses, or rights to common profits, assigned on the basis thereof.
(25) “Person” shall mean a natural person, corporation, partnership, association, trust, or other entity capable of holding title to real property, or any combination of any of the foregoing.
(26) “Purchaser” shall mean any person, other than a declarant or a person in the business of selling real estate for his or her own account, who by means of a voluntary transfer, acquires a legal or equitable interest in a condominium unit other than a leasehold interest, including a renewal option, of less than 20 years, or as security for an obligation.
(26A) “Real estate” or “land” shall mean any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over, or under land, including but not limited to, any structure, fixture, or any other improvement or interest which by custom, usage, or law passes with a conveyance of land though not described in the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance. The term “real estate” or “land” shall be deemed to include a parcel with or without an upper or lower boundary, and space that may be filled with air or water. Any requirement in the Condominium Amendment Act of a legally sufficient description shall be deemed to include a requirement that any upper or lower boundary of a parcel be identified with reference to established data.
(27) “Registered land surveyor” shall mean any person or firm permitted to prepare and certify surveys and subdivision plats in the District of Columbia, including but not limited to, registered civil engineers.
(28) “Size” shall mean the number of cubic feet or the number of square feet of ground or floor space, or both, within each unit as computed by reference to the plats and plans and rounded off to a whole number. Certain spaces within the units including, without limitation, attic, basement, or garage space, may, but need not, be omitted from such calculation or partially discounted by the use of a ratio, so long as the same basis of calculation is employed for all units in the condominium, and so long as that basis is described in the declaration.
(J) Maintain a sales office, management office, or model unit pursuant to § 42-1902.22.
(29) “Surveyor” shall mean the Office of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia.
(29A) “Time share” shall mean a right to occupy a condominium unit or any of several condominium units during 5 or more separate time periods over a period of at least 5 years including renewal options, whether or not the right is coupled with an estate or interest in a condominium or a specified portion of an estate or interest in a condominium.
(30) “Unit” shall mean a portion of the condominium designed and intended for individual ownership. For the purposes of this chapter, a convertible space shall be treated as a unit in accordance with § 42-1902.18(d).
(31) “Unit owner” shall mean a declarant or any person who owns a condominium unit. In the case of a leasehold condominium, “unit owner” shall mean a declarant or person whose leasehold interest in the condominium extends for the entire balance of the unexpired term. The term “unit owner” shall not include a person who has an interest in a condominium unit solely as a security for a debt.
(32) “Unit owner in good standing,” unless otherwise defined in the condominium instruments, shall mean a unit owner who is not delinquent for more than 30 days in the payment of any amount owed to the unit owners’ association, or a unit owner who has not been found by the unit owners’ association or its executive board to be in violation of the condominium instruments or the rules of the unit owners’ association.
This section is referenced in § 42-1901.01, § 42-1902.06, § 42-3401.03, § 47-802, and § 47-1302.
D.C. Law 17-231 added par. (12A).
The 2014 amendment by D.C. Law 20-109 added (12B) and (32).
Real property assessment and tax, taxpayer defined with reference to interests under this section, see § 47-802.
Real property tax sales, condominium, notice to record owner, see § 47-1302.
Rental housing conversion and sale, condominium defined, see § 42-3401.03.
For temporary (225 day) amendment of section, see § 2(b) of Condominium Act of 1976 Technical and Clarifying Temporary Amendment Act of 1991 (D.C. Law 9-38, August 17, 1991, law notification 38 DCR 5805).
The “Condominium Amendment Act,” referred to in the third sentence of (26A), and in (28A)(F), is D.C. Law 8-233.
Section 3 of D.C. Law 21-241 stated that within 180 days after April 7, 2017, the Mayor, pursuant subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2, shall issue rules to implement the provisions of Law 21-241.


text:
A quiet revolution is occurring in the e-discovery space called predictive coding. In the United States there is growing judicial support for this new method of discovery, which promises to substantially reduce the scale of manual discovery exercises and hence to dramatically reduce the cost of discovery.
Documents can be coded for relevance as required eg for specific issues and privilege.
The process is repeated and refined until the output is measured as being statistically reliable.
Predictive coding avoids the need for human review of significant proportions of large document collections that are deemed non-relevant, leading to substantial cost savings. The process itself is not inexpensive but becomes more cost-effective with greater volumes of documents.
It appears that it will only be a matter of time before predictive coding and other technology assisted discovery review processes enter the vocabulary of judicial decision-making in Australia.
Disputes will inevitably arise, as they have in the United States, over the negotiation of e-discovery protocols and the completeness of other parties’ e-discovery undertaken using increasingly sophisticated techniques such as predictive coding.
Litigators who themselves possess expertise in e-discovery will be in demand for such disputes, in addition to the negotiation, management and implementation of appropriate e-discovery processes.
1. Maura R. Grossman and Gordon V. Cormack, ‘The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted Review’ (2013) Federal Courts Law Review 7(1), 26.
4. See, e.g., EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings, Civ. Ac. No. 7409-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2012); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp., Civ. No. 10C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465 at *84-85 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D. La. July 27, 2012); Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation, L.P., No. CL 61040 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012); Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ACL) (AJP), 2012 WL 607412 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012).
5. Maura R. Grossman and Gordon V. Cormack, ‘Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery can be more Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review‘, (2011) Richmond Journal of Law and Technology XVII (3). This article is often cited in support of the view that technology assisted review processes are more accurate and efficient than exhaustive manual review.

matches: V. v. v. v. v. V.


Like other county officials, school board members are subject to the general conflict of interest statute, T.C.A. § 12-4-101.
Conflict of interest problems generally arise when a school board member has pecuniary interests that would interfere with that member's ability to vote objectively on matters before the board. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 12-4-101(a)(1) and (b) provide that it is unlawful for any official whose duty it is to vote for any contract in which the county is concerned to be directly or indirectly financially interested in any such contract.
Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 01-144 (September 4, 2001).
The Attorney General has opined that this provision prohibits a school board member from serving as a substitute school teacher in the same school system, notwithstanding the fact that the school board contracts with a third party employment agency to obtain substitute teacher services, rather than employing substitute teachers directly. Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 08-180 (December 1, 2008).
“Nothing in the statute, however, prohibits the spouse of a school board member from working for the school board.” Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 08-102 (May 6, 2008). In this situation the school board member would have an indirect conflict of interest under T.C.A. § 12‑4‑101(b) if the school board member and his spouse commingle their assets. Op. Tenn. Atty Gen. 05-017 (February 3, 2005) (an official is indirectly interested in a contract between a governmental agency and the official's spouse if the official and spouse commingle assets); Op. Tenn. Atty Gen. 00-181 (November 22, 2000).
The Attorney General has opined that “a non-instructional employee of a school system may run for election to the school board without leaving his job, but if elected to the board this individual must quit his job for the school system in order to serve as a school board member.” Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 02-070 (May 23, 2002). See also Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. U90-124 (August 29, 1990) (school bus driver prohibited from continuing employment by the school system after he was elected to school board).
No member of the county legislative body nor any other county official shall be eligible for election as a member of the county board of education. T.C.A. § 49-2-202(a)(2). This statute prevents one person from holding an elected county office and being a member of the school board. Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 01-144 (September 4, 2001). Note also that pursuant to T.C.A. § 5-5-102(c)(2) a director of schools is not qualified to serve as a member of the county legislative body.
It is unlawful for any teacher, supervisor, commissioner, director of schools, member of a board of education or other school officer in the public schools to have any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in supplying books, maps, school furniture or apparatus to the public schools of the state, or to act as agent for any author, publisher, bookseller or dealer in such school furniture or apparatus on promise of reward for the person's influence in recommending or procuring the use of any book, map, school apparatus or furniture of any kind, in any public school; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to include authors of books.
The statute does not define the term “apparatus.” Addressing the statute, the Attorney General opined that “a court would conclude that the term ‘apparatus,’ as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2003(a), includes school equipment and other tangible personal property, but does not apply to a contract for services.” Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 09-48 (April 2, 2009).
The statute further provides that a spouse or family member of a principal, teacher or other school administrative employee is not precluded from participating in business transactions with the school system where a sealed competitive bid system is used, as long as the principal, teacher or other school administrative employee does not have discretion in the selection of bids or specifications. T.C.A. § 49‑6‑2003(b).


§ 250-2 Application for permit.
§ 250-3 Fees and deposits.
§ 250-6 Fee to drive pipe under street.
§ 250-10 General rules and regulations.
§ 250-12 Violations and penalties.
§ 250-13 Authority to remove.
§ 250-14 Removal from sidewalks required; exceptions.
§ 250-15 Placement of snow or ice on sidewalks and roadways prohibited.
§ 250-16 Failure to comply; costs as lien.
§ 250-17 Violations and penalties.
§ 250-19 Liability for obstructing and damaging streets.
§ 250-20 Violations and penalties.
§ 250-24 Parking regulations during snow emergencies.
§ 250-25 Declaration and notice.
§ 250-26 Termination of notice.
§ 250-27 Towing of improperly parked vehicles.
§ 250-28 Violations and penalties.
§ 250-30 Duty to remove snow and ice from sidewalks and fire plugs.
§ 250-31 Depositing snow on streets restricted.
§ 250-33 Violations and penalties.


The plaintiff, Susan Corley, appeals from the decision of the Commissionerof the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Corley timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Â§' 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 626(c). (Doc. 18).
Ms. Corley was 52 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision,  and she has a high school education. (Tr. at 21). Her past work experiences include employment as a receptionist, administrative assistant/secretary, bookkeeper, purchasing clerk, and payroll clerk. (Tr. at 20-21). Ms. Corley claims that she became disabled on January 15, 2010, due to bipolar disorder with rapid cycling, anxiety, depression, diverticulitis, sleep apnea, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), gastroesophageal reflux disorder (“GERD”), hidradenitis suppurativa,  folliculitis, and methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”). (Tr. at 226).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she is not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends upon the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairments fall within this category, she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity is an assessment based on all relevant evidence of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1545(a).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of demonstrating that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform is on the Commissioner; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove her inability to perform those jobs in order to be found to be disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Corley has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from the date of onset through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 22). He determined that Ms. Corley has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability. (Tr. at 13). According to the ALJ, the plaintiff's bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, and degenerative joint disease of the knees are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Tr. at 14). He further determined that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 14). The ALJ did not find Ms. Corley's allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms to be entirely credible. (Tr. at 17). He determined that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) with the following limitations: she will have occasional difficulty remembering multi-step and complex instructions but no difficulty with simple work procedures; she will have problems carrying out detailed and complex instructions but no difficulty carrying out simple instructions; she will require breaks every two to four hours during a workday; her contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public should be casual, infrequent, non-intensive, and not prolonged; she can accept supportive feedback; she will require assistance with long-term planning but should have no difficulty with daily work routines. (Tr. at 16).
According to the ALJ, Ms. Corley is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. at 20). The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time from the alleged onset date through the date last insured. (Tr. at 22).
This court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
Ms. Corley alleges that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded because the ALJ: (1) failed to properly apply Social Security Ruling 96-7p in evaluating the credibility of the Plaintiff's allegations regarding her limitations, and (2) failed to assign proper weight to the opinions of the Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Fred Habeeb, Jr. (Doc. 14). The Commissioner has asserted that the ALJ followed the controlling law in evaluating the credibility of the plaintiff's description of her limitations and symptoms, and that he properly weighed Dr. Habeeb's opinions in accordance with the governing standards. (Doc. 16).


We work closely with all types of government entities, including municipalities, counties, cities and state departments. Sensitive to the financial constraints under which public sector clients operate, we use our depth of experience to expedite matters.
Our attorneys have deep agency-side expertise in all aspects of inverse condemnation and eminent domain matters, and our skilled Construction attorneys provide legal guidance at all stages of developing and building public works, from entitlement and design inception through final completion. We also defend against claims of defective design and construction in catastrophic injury cases. Additionally, our attorneys handle real estate contracts in which public entities are a party. Our Labor and Employment attorneys have provided training to thousands of employees and managers at many state agencies, local governments and special districts throughout California, on sexual harassment, workplace violence and employee privacy issues. We regularly provide advice and counsel on federal and state environmental laws and guidelines including, but not limited to, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean Air Act (CAA).
When disputes arise, we represent clients in both state and federal courts, and private and public arbitrations. M&R has successfully handled matters involving multimillion dollar breach of contract claims for municipal entities and bankruptcy adversary proceedings. Further, our attorneys have prevailed on behalf of state departments and municipalities in catastrophic injury and other high-risk and exposure cases.
We have handled extensive claims allegedly contributing to the injury of a plaintiff. In such cases, we typically employ a design immunity defense. We have successfully utilized California Government Code § 830.6 for our clients, which provides a public entity immunity against claims arising out of design defects.
We have vast expertise working on behalf of our municipality clients in eminent domain matters. Our Government and Municipalities attorneys have been successful in representing public entity clients in acquisitions of properties at favorable terms, and in securing optimum settlements in numerous eminent domain actions.
We have successfully represented municipalities and public entities in multi-million dollar inverse condemnation actions.
We provide counseling and training to state agencies, local governments and special districts throughout California, on topics such as sexual harassment, workplace violence and employee privacy issues. We regularly provide advice and counsel on all federal and state environmental laws and guidelines.
Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding: Ensured $40 million in water fees collected by Los Angeles County in bankruptcy adversary proceeding involving complex contractual and water issues relating to a 7,200 home development project planned for the Antelope Valley.
Breach of Contract: Represented a large, local, public port in the defense of a $300 million claim brought by a national terminal operator alleging numerous violations, including several against California’s Tidelands Trust Act.
DWP Defense: Achieved a favorable settlement a month before trial on behalf of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) in a contract dispute with a surety and completion contractor over whether or not it was liable for completion of a multimillion dollar construction project. The contractor filed claims in federal court against DWP alleging breach of contract, and DWP cross-claimed against the surety and completion contractor alleging breach of contract and violations of the False Claims Act.
Eminent Domain: An M&R attorney represented a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) where a condemnee was seeking over $30 million in loss of business good will. Mr Hayat settled the case for pennies on the dollar. The attorney has successfully prosecuted and negotiated favorable settlements in numerous additional eminent domain actions, including claims for damages for loss pre-condemnation damages, improvements, relocation assistance, and fixtures and equipment.
Murphree v. Williams: Represented the City of Oakland in claim brought by a residential property owner who alleged trespass, nuisance and wrongdoings by city employees. We substituted into the matter after approximately three years of litigation. Within a few months of becoming involved in the case, obtained a defense verdict for the city on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and also obtained an award of costs against plaintiff.
Negligence and Inverse Condemnation Defense: McKillop Road in Oakland had a 75-year history of landslides. In 2006, the last portion of the hillside gave way, substantially damaging numerous homes and businesses. These property owners banded together and pursued lawsuits against various public agencies, in which they alleged that improper maintenance of the roadways, sub-surface infrastructure, and a creek at the base of the hillside led to the catastrophe. The City of Oakland retained us to perform extensive testing and discovery, which resulted in the city making a compelling case that the cause of the landslide had nothing to do with the city’s maintenance practices. The city resolved the entire litigation for nominal settlements, while the property owners proceeded to trial against other defendants.
Orduno v. City of Oakland: Represented the City of Oakland in a case brought by the victim of a catastrophic personal injury arising out of a two vehicle collision in a city intersection. Case was settled at mediation.
Pegram v. City of Oakland: Defended the City of Oakland against personal injury claims arising out of a trip and fall in a city-owned parking structure in downtown Oakland. Plaintiff alleged both a dangerous condition of public property and violations of federal ADA laws. Obtained an early settlement for a nominal sum utilizing no public funds.
Pereira v. City of Oakland: Represented City of Oakland in a case brought by the victim of personal injuries arising from alleged dangerous conditions of public crosswalks and the location of public transit stops. Case settled at mediation with minimal City contribution.
Public Port Defense: Defended a large public port against a major terminal operator’s multimillion dollar series of claims that included discrimination under California’s Tidelands Trust Act.
Public Utility Defense: Defended a public utility against a previous employee’s allegations of workplace injuries derived from exposure to radioactive elements.
Serrano v. City of Oakland: Defended the City of Oakland in liability claim brought by an East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) plumber who was injured when he fell into an open storm drain during an emergency flood repair. An M&R attorney accepted representation of the city for this case just 14 days before commencement of trial and prepared a complete defense within that short time period. After a brief continuance (requested by the other side due to expert witness availability issues), case was settled in mediation.
Wrongful Death Defense: Negotiated a settlement from $2.25 million down to less than $40,000 in a wrongful death case on behalf of the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans).


§ 156-2 Purpose; legislative intent.
§ 156-6 Application for license.
§ 156-7 Application for renewal license.
§ 156-8 Suffolk County home improvement contractors license.
§ 156-11 Issuance of license.
§ 156-12 Denial of license; appeals.
§ 156-13 Nature and use of license.
§ 156-14 Vehicle identification decal.
§ 156-15 Licensing Review Board.
§ 156-17 Penalties for offenses.
§ 156-19 Effect of existing license.
This chapter of the Town Code shall be known and may be cited as the "Town of East Hampton Home Improvement Contractors Law."
The undertaking of new home construction, additions, or improvements and repairs to residential property is an important economic activity employing a large number of Town residents and affecting a growing number of persons owning and renting homes in East Hampton Town.
With the increasing number of first and second homes in the Town, the number of home improvement contracting complaints and problems has risen. The present Town licensing system for home improvement contractors is inadequate in the protection it affords to Town homeowners against shoddy, incompetent work or deceptive practices involving home improvement work.
It is the intention of the East Hampton Town Board to provide herein for a strengthened system of local licensing of home improvement contractors in order to more fully protect homeowners and responsible home improvement contractors alike.
The sale of goods by a seller who neither arranges to perform nor performs, directly or indirectly, any work or labor in connection with the installation or application of the goods sold.
The sale of goods to a home improvement contractor by a supplier who neither arranges to perform nor performs, directly or indirectly, any work or labor in connection with the installation or application of the goods or materials.
The sale or installation of appliances, such as stoves, refrigerators, freezers, room air conditioners, dishwashers or clothes washers or dryers, which are designed for and to be removable from the premises without material alteration thereof.
The sale or installation of decorative goods or services, such as draperies and carpets.
A written agreement between a home improvement contractor or his duly designated agent and an owner or his agent for the performance of a home improvement, and includes all labor, services, and materials to be furnished or performed thereunder. All contracts for home improvements shall conform to the requirements of General Business Law § 771.
Any person who carries out, engages in, undertakes or holds himself out to others as performing or available to perform one or more home improvements, or any person providing management or construction administration services to an owner for one or more home improvements, as defined herein.
The keeping in a state of repair or efficiency residential property as defined herein, limited to simple repair or maintenance of existing facilities and systems. This definition shall include minor, casual and inconsequential work performed in connection with the seasonal opening and closing of residences. This definition shall not include any alterations of, replacements to, or additions to the original or existing design, layout or function of a residence or any other home improvement, as defined herein.
Any person who installs, on behalf of a residential property owner, lawns, hedges, trees and other plantings and who also, as a part of such services, installs any structural elements such as patios, decks, retaining walls, drywells, in-ground irrigation systems, lighting or any other structural elements. Classification shall depend upon the activities undertaken by the party and shall not be based upon the inclusion or omission of the words "gardener," "grounds maintenance," "landscaper" or similar words in a business name.
A person who engages in the cutting and maintenance of grass; the trimming, pruning and maintenance of shrubs, plants, trees or other foliage; the spraying of chemicals, including the application of pesticides; and the removal of trees and/or tree stumps.
A person holding a valid East Hampton Town home improvement contractor's license ("license") and therefore permitted to engage in the home improvement business under the provisions of this chapter.
The local agency established by this chapter to review complaints against home improvement contractors, decide upon the validity thereof and impose administrative sanctions therefor.
Any owner, lessor, tenant or user of residential property or any other person who orders, contracts for or purchases the services of a home improvement contractor or any person entitled to performance of such service pursuant to a home improvement contract, but such definition shall not include any person who is retained specifically to provide construction management or administration for one or more specific home improvements.
Any individual, firm, business, association, partnership, corporation or other recognizable legal entity.
Any shop, residence, place or premises from which a home improvement business is transacted.
A one- or two-family residence or a condominium unit or cooperative apartment unit and the property or portion thereof upon which such improvements are located which is used or intended to be used for such purposes.
Work which fails to meet the minimum requirements set forth in the current edition of the Long Island Builders Institute (LIBI) standards manual entitled "Accepted Building Standards," which standards represent the generally accepted standards or workmanship for contractors on Long Island.
The Clerk of the Town of East Hampton or his duly assigned designee.
It is unlawful for any persons, other than those exempt under the provisions of § 156-5, to engage in the home improvement contracting business in the Town of East Hampton without first obtaining a license from the East Hampton Town Clerk's office in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this chapter. Such license or a copy thereof shall be available at all of the contractor's work sites and shall be produced to any official having jurisdiction upon demand. All subcontractors engaged in providing home improvement, who are not employees of a licensed home improvement contractor, must have their own respective home improvement contractor's license.
An owner of residential property carrying out, engaging in, or undertaking a home improvement or home improvements on residential property which they own.
An electrical contractor, engaged solely in performing electrical work, who holds a valid electrical contractor's license from the Suffolk County Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs.
An individual employee of a licensee who is paid wages or salary by such licensee for his work.
A member or partner of a firm, partnership or other entity which is a licensed home improvement contractor who performs labor or services for such licensee.
A stockholder or officer of a licensee corporation who performs labor or services for such licensee.
An architect, professional engineer or any other person who is required by state, county, or Town law to attain standards of competency or experience as a prerequisite to engaging in such craft or profession and who is acting exclusively within the scope of the craft or profession for which he is currently certified or licensed.
The name, trade name and business address of applicant.
If the applicant is an individual, his name and residence address; if the applicant is a corporation, the names and residence addresses of the officers thereof; if the applicant is a firm, partnership or other entity, the names and residence addresses of the members or partners thereof.
Whether or not there are any outstanding liens or judgments against the applicant.
The names and residence addresses of any employees of the applicant.
The names and residence addresses of the stockholders and directors of a corporate applicant.
Whether or not the applicant or any member, partner, officer, stockholder or employee thereof ever engaged in a home improvement business under another name or for another person and, if so, reasonable information with respect thereto.
Information relating to the financial responsibility and character of the applicant.
Information regarding convictions of the applicant and/or its employees, stockholders or directors for violations of local, county or state law within the past three years for building, zoning, sanitary, fire, electrical, health environmental, or criminal violations. For purposes of this subsection, convictions of employees shall include those imposed in connection with home improvements performed on behalf of the applicant/employer.
First-time applicants for a license shall provide proof of 10 classroom hours of continuing education within the year prior to application. If the applicant is a corporation, limited liability company or partnership, then one individual as listed on the application as required by § 156-6B shall be designated by the entity to provide proof of the required continuing education. The designated individual by the corporation, limited liability company or partnership will be responsible for obtaining all 10 hours of continuing education, and the 10 hours of continuing education shall not be split between multiple members. Such continuing education shall be provided by a recognized training facility such as an accredited college or university providing construction or construction-related courses towards a construction-related degree or courses provided by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) or certified safety courses approved by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or be otherwise approved as continuing education courses that the Town Clerk has determined qualify as suitable for continuing education credits. The Town Clerk will maintain a list of continuing education courses that she has determined qualify as educational credit for the applicant's review.
Applicants for a renewal license shall provide all of the information required pursuant to § 156-6 above; except the applicant shall include proof that the renewal applicant has completed 10 classroom hours of continuing education, as set forth in § 156-6 above, in the two years immediately prior to the date of the renewal application.
Any home improvement contractor whose principal place of business is located in the County of Suffolk and who holds a valid license issued by the Suffolk County Department of Consumer Affairs, pursuant to Chapters 275 and/or 345 of the Suffolk County Code, permitting him to conduct or engage in the home improvement, plumbing, or electrical contracting business, shall be entitled to a license under this chapter upon filing with their application satisfactory proof that they meet the conditions provided for herein.
A contractor shall have a certificate of insurance covering liability and workers' compensation, if required by law, upon applying for a home improvement license and shall maintain said policies and file current certificates indicating said coverage during the period the license is in effect. The Town of East Hampton shall be listed as an additional insured on the insurance certificate. Failure to maintain said coverage will provide grounds for revocation of the license pursuant to § 156-15.
The Town Board shall by resolution establish a fee to be paid by all applicants for a home improvement license at the time application is made for the same. Such fee shall be nonrefundable. The Town Board shall also by resolution establish the fee to be paid to the Town at the time of annual renewals of a license. Such fee shall be nonrefundable. The Town Board may, from time to time by resolution, amend the amount of the application and renewal fees established by this section. The two fees may but need not be the same.
After the filing of an application for a license or renewal thereof and payment of the required fee, the Town Clerk shall examine the application and make such investigation as it deems necessary or advisable. Upon completion of the same, the Town Clerk shall issue a license unless it finds that the applicant is unfit or undesirable to carry on such home improvement business or is incapable of properly conducting such home improvement business, in which event it shall deny the license.
The Town Clerk shall notify the applicant of any denial of an application for a license or renewal. Such notice shall be in writing, shall be served on the applicant personally or by certified mail and shall specify the ground(s) for the denial. The notice shall be accompanied by a statement that the applicant may request an appeal hearing before the Licensing Review Board by submitting a written request therefor within 20 days. The procedure to be followed by the Licensing Review Board shall be as set forth in § 156-15 hereof.
Term. Any license issued hereunder shall expire two years after its date of issuance, unless suspended or revoked as hereinafter provided.
No entitlements. Issuance of a license shall create no presumption that the licensee is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter or that the licensee is entitled to the license at any future time.
No assignment. No license issued under this chapter shall be transferred or assigned to any person or used by any person other than the licensee to whom it was issued.
Other licensed business. A license issued hereunder shall not be construed to authorize the licensee to perform any work or engage in any kind of business which is reserved to qualified licensees under separate provisions of state or Town law.
Posting and display. A license issued hereunder shall at all times be posted conspicuously in the place of business (or commercial vehicle if there is no other place of business) of the licensee, and such license or a copy thereof shall be produced for any owner upon demand. A copy of the license shall be available for inspection at any worksite within the Town and shall be produced upon demand of any Town official.
Report of changes. Every licensee shall, within 10 days after a change of control, ownership or management, change of trade name or change of address, notify the Town Clerk, in writing, of such change.
Zoning. The holder of any home improvement contractor's license issued under this chapter agrees that, as an additional condition of the issuance of said license to operate within the Town of East Hampton, he or she shall plan, execute and complete all home improvements in strict compliance with the terms of the East Hampton Town Zoning Code then in effect, as well as any and all permits and/or conditions of approval issued by any federal, state and/or local agency.
Upon approval of an application, the Town Clerk shall issue a sticker for each vehicle associated with the home improvement contractor business, which shall be attached to the upper left rear exterior windshield of the vehicle or on the rear bumper and shall be kept clear and readable at all times. Failure to post and maintain such sticker shall be a violation of this chapter. The Town Board shall by resolution establish a fee to be paid by all licensees for each vehicle identification decal issued. The Town Board may, from time to time by resolution, amend the amount of the fee established by this section.
There is hereby established in and for the Town of East Hampton a Home Improvement Contractors Licensing Review Board ("Licensing Review Board") consisting of five members, appointed by the Town Board for terms of five years. Initially, five appointments shall be made, for terms of one through five years, respectively. Thereafter, one appointment for a term of five years shall be made each year by the Town Board.
The Town Board shall designate one member of the Licensing Review Board to serve as Chairman thereof.
A majority of all members of the Licensing Review Board shall constitute a quorum thereof.
Members of the Licensing Review Board shall be residents of the Town and shall be paid compensation and expenses in an amount to be determined from time to time by resolution of the Town Board.
At least one member of the Licensing Review Board shall be a home improvement contractor who resides and has his place of business in the Town.
Hold meetings at regular times and places for the efficient discharge of the responsibilities and duties of the Board.
Make rules for the conduct of its meetings and keep a minute book of its proceedings, including a record of its examinations and other official actions.
Make such reasonable investigation as it deems necessary or advisable with regard to possible violations of this chapter or of any license which shall have been issued or applied for hereunder.
Conduct hearings to consider facts or circumstances of which it has become aware through its own investigation or through investigation by the Town Clerk and which facts and circumstances, if true, would provide a basis for imposition of a fine or for the modification, limitation, suspension or revocation of a home improvement contractor's license issued hereunder.
Hear and determine any complaint or grievance made to it in writing by an owner in the Town which, if found to be true, would provide a basis for imposition of a fine or for the modification, limitation, suspension or revocation of a home improvement contractor's license issued hereunder.
Hear appeals from any person to whom the Town Clerk has denied a home improvement contractor's license or renewal pursuant to § 156-12 hereof.
Keep records of licenses issued, suspended or revoked, make and maintain such other records as may be useful in the performance of its duties and adopt guidelines for making such records available for public inspection.
Formulate and recommend to the Town Board for adoption changes to the provisions of this chapter governing the standards for and issuance of home improvement contractor's licenses.
The Licensing Review Board shall be the designated review board for the purposes of § 226-7.
With regard to owner's complaints or grievances, the Licensing Review Board shall determine whether or not to take jurisdiction. In the event that it shall deny jurisdiction, such determination shall be made in writing, and a copy shall be mailed to the complainant.
With regard to hearings held to determine whether to fine a licensee and/or to modify, limit, suspend or revoke any home improvement contractor's license, written notice shall be served on the licensee(s) personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the place of business of the licensee as set forth in the contractor's most recent license application or renewal, or in such notice of change received by the Town Clerk subsequent to the most recent license application or renewal, at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing. A notice shall also be published in the official newspaper. Notice shall specify the time and place of the hearing and the ground(s) which will be the subject of the hearing and shall clearly state that the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether to fine the licensee or to modify, limit, suspend or revoke one or more licenses.
Any determination by the Licensing Review Board to fine a licensee and/or to modify, limit, suspend or revoke a home improvement contractor's license shall be made after a duly noticed public hearing, by resolution, in writing, and shall specify the ground(s) upon which it is based.
The Licensing Review Board may place conditions or limitations on a home improvement contractor's license for a period not to exceed two years. It may suspend a license for a period not to exceed one year. After the suspension period, the licensee may make application to the Town Clerk for renewal of his license. In the event that the Licensing Review Board shall revoke a license, the licensee may apply for a new license not less than one year after the date of such revocation; the Town Clerk shall not grant an application for a home improvement contractor's license to a contractor, or any officer, director, shareholder (except shareholders of publicly traded companies), member or partner thereof where such contractor's prior license had been suspended or revoked but shall refer the matter to the Licensing Review Board, which shall hear and determine the case as if the Town Clerk had denied the application.
In lieu of fining a licensee and/or modifying, limiting, suspending or revoking a license as above provided, the Licensing Review Board may require in its determination that a home improvement contractor repair defective or deficient work done by him or may accept a written agreement of compromise or settlement (involving new work or payment of money, or both) between the home improvement contractor and the owner/complainant.
The statute of limitations for Licensing Review Board consideration of complaints shall be one year from the date on which the contractor in question last performed work at the premises described in the complaint.
Violate a stop-work order: continue work after the issuance of stop-work order or other similar order issued by an agency or department of the Town of East Hampton, Suffolk County, or the State of New York.
Conducts or engages in any home improvement project or business without having first obtained a license therefor, except as provided for in this chapter.
Conducts or engages in any home improvement project or business not authorized by his home improvement contractor's license.
Conducts or engages in any such home improvement project or business while his license is suspended or revoked.
Conducts, engages in or carries out any particular home improvement or home improvement activity specifically prohibited by his license as modified or limited by action of the Licensing Review Board hereunder.
Engages in any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of § 156-16 or any other provision of this chapter.
For the purposes of the preceding subsection, a person shall be deemed to have conducted or engaged in a home improvement business when he enters into a contract with an owner wherein he agrees to carry out a home improvement. Each such contract entered into and each and every day of actual home improvement business, activity or work engaged in or conducted pursuant to such contract or of particular prohibited conduct shall constitute a separate and distinct violation of this chapter.
For conviction of a third or subsequent offense, all of which were committed within a period of five years, the imposition of a fine not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 or limitation, suspension or revocation of the contractor's home improvement contractor's license for a period of up to one year pursuant to the provisions of § 156-15 hereof, or both.
Payment of all fines imposed by the Licensing Review Board shall be delivered to the Town Clerk within 120 days of the date of filing of the determination of the Board. In the event that payment is not made within the aforementioned period, no license or renewal license shall be approved until such fines have been paid in full.
The Town of East Hampton may enter into cooperative agreements with the incorporated villages located in the Town for the performance by the Town of the functions, powers and duties relating to administration and enforcement of local laws adopted by such villages requiring a license in order to conduct or engage in home improvement businesses in such villages. Such cooperative agreements may provide, among other things, that the Town Clerk shall serve as the licensing officer under such local laws, that the Town Licensing Review Board shall serve as the licensing review board designated to hear appeals and modify, limit, suspend or revoke licenses under such village local laws, that application fees under such local laws shall be paid to the Town of East Hampton and that a license issued by the Town of East Hampton shall serve as the license required under this chapter and under such village local laws so that a licensee will be permitted to engage in the home improvement business in any such villages and in the Town of East Hampton by obtaining one license and paying one application or renewal fee therefor.
A license issued by the Town prior to the effective date of this chapter shall continue to remain in full force and effect until its expiration or termination unless sooner revoked or suspended for cause.
The application fee provided for in this chapter shall not apply to a home improvement contractor whose principal place of business is located in any town or village which has adopted a local law or ordinance containing a reciprocal provision applicable to home improvement contractors having their principal place of business in the Town of East Hampton outside of the incorporated villages and which in fact does not charge such East Hampton-based persons a fee for a home improvement contractor's license to operate in such Town or village.
Should any section or provision of this chapter be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional or invalid, such decision shall not affect the validity of this chapter as a whole or other part thereof.