Chapter 126 - North Carolina Human Resources Act.
Article 1 - State Human Resources System Established.
§ 126-1. Purpose of Chapter; application to local employees.
§ 126-1.1. Career State employee defined.
§ 126-1A: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 141, s. 2.
§ 126-2. State Human Resources Commission.
§ 126-3. Office of State Human Resources established and responsibilities outlined; administration and supervision; appointment, compensation and tenure of Director.
§ 126-4. Powers and duties of State Human Resources Commission.
§ 126-4.1: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 41, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to contested cases commenced on or after that date.
§ 126-5. Employees subject to Chapter; exemptions.
§ 126-6: Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 65, s. 3.
§ 126-6.1: Repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 397, s. 1.
§ 126-6.3. Temporary employment needs of Cabinet and Council of State agencies; use of the Temporary Solutions Program.
Article 2 - Salaries, Promotions, and Leave of State Employees.
§ 126-7: Repealed. See editor's note.
§ 126-7.1. Posting requirement; State employees receive priority consideration; reduction-in-force; Work First hiring; reorganization through reduction.
§ 126-7.2: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.2, effective August 21, 2013, and applicable to grievances filed on or after that date.
§ 126-7.3. Annual compensation surveys.
§ 126-8. Minimum leave granted State employees.
§ 126-8.1. Paid leave for certain athletic competition.
§ 126-8.2. Replacement of law-enforcement officer on final sick leave.
§ 126-8.3. Voluntary shared leave.
§ 126-8.4. (See note on condition precedent) No sick leave taken for absences by State employees resulting from adverse reactions to vaccination.
§ 126-8.5. Discontinued service retirement allowance and severance wages for certain State employees.
Article 3 - Local Discretion as to Local Government Employees.
§ 126-9. County or municipal employees may be made subject to rules adopted by local governing body.
§ 126-10. Personnel services to local governmental units.
§ 126-11. Local personnel system may be established; approval and monitoring; rules and regulations.
Article 4 - Competitive Service.
§ 126-12. Governor and Council of State to determine competitive service.
Article 5 - Political Activity of Employees.
§ 126-14.1. Threat to obtain political contribution or support.
§ 126-14.2. Political hirings limited.
§ 126-14.3. Open and fair competition.
§ 126-14.4: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 7.6, effective August 21, 2013.
§ 126-15. Disciplinary action for violation of Article.
§ 126-15.1: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 3.2, effective August 21, 2013.
Article 6 - Equal Employment and Compensation Opportunity; Assisting in Obtaining State Employment.
§ 126-16. Equal opportunity for employment and compensation by State departments and agencies and local political subdivisions.
§ 126-16.1. Equal employment opportunity training.
§ 126-17. Retaliation by State departments and agencies and local political subdivisions.
§ 126-18. Compensation for assisting person in obtaining State employment barred; exception.
§ 126-19. Equal employment opportunity plans; reports; maintenance of services by Director of the Office of State Human Resources.
§ 126-20. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-21. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 7 - The Privacy of State Employee Personnel Records.
§ 126-22. Personnel files not subject to inspection under § 132-6.
§ 126-23. Certain records to be kept by State agencies open to inspection.
§ 126-24. Confidential information in personnel files; access to such information.
§ 126-25. Remedies of employee objecting to material in file.
§ 126-26. Rules and regulations.
§ 126-27. Penalty for permitting access to confidential file by unauthorized person.
§ 126-28. Penalty for examining, copying, etc., confidential file without authority.
§ 126-29. Access to material in file for agency hearing.
§ 126-30. Fraudulent disclosure and willful nondisclosure on application for State employment; penalties.
§ 126-31. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-32. Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-33. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 8 - Employee Appeals of Grievances and Disciplinary Action.
§ 126-34: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.1, effective August 21, 2013, and applicable to grievances filed on or after that date.
§ 126-34.02. Grievance appeal process; grounds.
§ 126-34.1: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.1, effective August 21, 2013, and applicable to grievances filed on or after that date.
§ 126-34.2. Alternative dispute resolution.
§ 126-34.3. Judicial review of fee awards.
§ 126-35. Just cause; disciplinary actions for State employees.
§§ 126-36 through 126-41: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.1, effective August 21, 2013, and applicable to grievances filed on or after that date.
§ 126-42. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 9 - The Administrative Procedure Act and Modifications.
§§ 126-43 through 126-44: Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 320, s. 9.
§126-45: Repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 866, s. 18.
§§ 126-46 through 126-50. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 10 - Interchange of Governmental Employees.
§ 126-53. Authority to interchange employees.
§ 126-54. Status of employees of sending agency.
§ 126-55. Travel expenses of employees from this State.
§ 126-56. Status of employees of other governments.
§ 126-57. Travel expenses of employees of other governments.
§§ 126-59 through 126-63. Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 11 - Governor's Commission on Governmental Productivity.
§§ 126-64 through 126-73: Repealed by Session Laws 1985, c. 479, s. 153(a).
Article 12 - Work Options Program for State Employees.
§ 126-74. Work Options Program established.
§ 126-75. Work options for State employees.
§ 126-76. Promoting Work Options Program.
§ 126-77. Authority of agencies to participate.
§ 126-79: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 7.7, effective August 21, 2013.
Article 13 - Veteran's Preference.
§ 126-80. Declaration of policy.
§ 126-82. State Human Resources Commission to provide for preference.
Article 14 - Protection for Reporting Improper Government Activities.
§ 126-86. Civil actions for injunctive relief or other remedies.
§ 126-88. Notice of employee protections and obligations.
§ 126-89: Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 15 - Communications With Members of the General Assembly.
§ 126-90. Communications with members of the General Assembly.
§ 126-91: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-92: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-93: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-94: Reserved for future codification purposes.
Article 16 - Flexible Compensation Plan.
§ 126-95. Flexible compensation plan.
§ 126-96: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-97: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-98: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 126-99: Reserved for future codification purposes.


text:
The Complainant is Esquire Innovations, Inc., Temecula, California, United States of America, represented by Welsh & Katz, Ltd, United States of America.
The Respondent is Iscrub.com,c/o Whois IDentity Shield, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada; and Vertical Axis, Inc, Domain Adminstrator, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea, represented by ESQwire.com Law Firm, United States of America.
The disputed domain name <iscrub.com> is registered with Nameview Inc.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 11, 2007. On June 14, 2007, the Center transmitted by email to Nameview Inc. a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On June 14, 2007, Nameview Inc. transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. In response to a notification of change in registrant information by the Center, the Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on June 22, 2007. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced June 26, 2007. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was July 16, 2007. The Response was filed with the Center July 16, 2007.
On July 21, 2007, the Complainant submitted a Supplemental Filing in reply to the Response with a request that it should be received and considered by the Panel.
On August 1, the Respondent submitted to the Center that, if the Panel elected to consider the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing, the Respondent should be given ample time to reply.
The Center appointed The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC, David H. Tatham and David E. Sorkin as panelists in this matter on August 16, 2007. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
On September 11, 2007, a majority of the Panel having elected to consider the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing for reasons set out below, the Panel issued Administrative Panel Procedural Order No.1, noting that it was prepared to consider the Supplemental Filing, granting the Respondent until September 18, 2007 to file a Reply to matters raised by the Complainant in its Supplemental Filing, directing that such Reply should be submitted to the Center by September 18, 2007 and extending the date for Decision to October 2, 2007.
In response to a request from the Respondent that those dates should be extended, the Panel on September 12, 2007 extended the date by which the Respondent’s Reply should be submitted to September 21, 2007 and the Decision date to October 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the Respondent submitted a Supplemental Filing entitled “Reply to Complainant’s Additional Submission”.
The Complainant is a company incorporated in the United States of America and has been engaged in the process of document creation, formatting, re-purposing, comparing and the supply of metadata management software applications for the legal profession since 1999.
One of its products named Iscrub is designed to remove metadata from documents. Metadata is electronic text that has been removed from documents and other electronic records, but which has been left behind in the process of amending documents so that, unless removed by Iscrub or another process, it may still be detected.
The Complainant is the owner of Trademark Number 2,978,354 registered on July 26, 2005 with the United States Patent and Trademark Office for ISCRUB.
The Respondent registered the domain name <iscrub.com> on November 8, 2001.
The Complainant alleges that the domain name <iscrub.com> should no longer be registered with the Respondent but that it should be transferred to the Complainant.
It contends that this should be done because, within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the Policy, the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered trademark ISCRUB, that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name and that it has been registered and subsequently used in bad faith. The Complainant maintains that it can prove all three of these requirements and that the appropriate remedy is to transfer the domain name to the Complainant.
In support of its case on the first of these three elements, the Complainant relies on the registered United States ISCRUB trademark to which reference has already been made (“the ISCRUB mark”) and says that the domain name is identical to the trademark because it incorporates the entirety of the trademark in the domain name and merely adds the generic top level domain suffix “.com”. In this regard the Complainant argues that the Policy does not require that trademark rights must have been acquired before the registration of the domain name.
The Complainant then contends, to establish the second element, that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because it has not been authorized to use the Complainant’s mark and it cannot bring itself within any of the provisions of paragraph 4(c) of the Policy or otherwise establish a right or legitimate interest in the domain name. Moreover, it is contended that the Respondent has linked the domain name to sites of the Complainant’s competitors and has not been making a bona fide offering of goods and services.
Finally, the Complainant contends that the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith. It contends that this is so because the inference should be drawn from the known facts concerning the registration of the domain name that, first, the Respondent registered it primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring it to the complainant or a competitor within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy or alternatively that by using the domain name the Respondent intended to create a likelihood of confusion between the products offered by the domain name and the products of the Complainant.
In support of these contentions the Complainant relies inter alia on the use by the Respondent of an Identity Shield on registration to conceal its identity and the fact that the Respondent is currently using the domain name to resolve to a “directory site” with a number of general interest links as well as links to competitors of the Complainant.
The Respondent contends, first, that the Complainant does not have enforceable trademark rights under the Policy because its mark does not predate the disputed domain name and the alleged date of first use of the mark is four months after the domain name was registered.
The Respondent then contends that the domain name incorporates a common or generic word preceded by the letter “i” and that it is also a name used in connection with other products, both of which establish a right or legitimate interest.
Moreover, the Respondent contends, its right and legitimate interest is shown by the fact that it uses the domain name in connection with the bona fide provision of advertising services.
The Respondent then argues that the domain name was not registered or used in bad faith, first, because the domain name was registered well before the trademark, secondly, because the Respondent cannot be held responsible if the Complainant’s competitors place advertisements that respond to searches for the common term “metadata” and, thirdly, that no adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that the Respondent used a privacy service to protect its identity.
Finally, the Respondent argues that a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking should be made against the Complainant. This is so, it contends, because the Complainant knew or should have known that it could not prove that the domain name was registered in bad faith, as its trademark was registered after the disputed domain name.
A majority of the Panel has decided in the exercise of its discretion to have regard to a Supplementary Filing lodged by the Complainant and referred to above.
This Supplemental Filing contained new evidence that the first commercial use of Complainant’s trademark ISCRUB predated the registration of the disputed domain name by the Respondent. The content and relevance of this evidence is discussed below, but as a preliminary issue the Panel must rule on whether or not to accept this Supplemental Filing, especially as a minority of the Panel is not prepared to admit it.
Rule 12 of the Rules unambiguously provides that it is only the Panel which may request further submissions: “In addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or documents from either of the Parties.” There is no provision in the Rules for a party to file an additional submission without leave of the Panel.
It was stated in Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0270 (June 8, 2000) that “Although litigants and parties in arbitrations may have a right of reply under the rules of other forums, ICANN chose a different procedure for these proceedings that calls for only a Complaint and a Response. Among other things, this more truncated procedure allows for more rapid and cost effective resolution of domain name challenges. See CRS Technology Corp. v. CondeNet, Inc., FA093547 (NAF March 28, 2000). At the same time, ICANN provided the Panel with the flexibility to seek additional submissions if the Panel feels that it cannot rule on the record submitted”.
The principles which should be applied by the Panel in exercising its discretion under Rule 12, and which are based on providing an expeditious procedure for determining a certain type of dispute, have been considered in many cases under the Policy and Rules. See, for example, Harrods Ltd v. Brad Shaw, WIPO Case No. D2004-0411 (July 29, 2004); The E.W. Scripps company v. Cynologic Industries, WIPO Case No. D2003-0447 (July 1, 2003); Soci�t� des H�tels M�ridien v. ABC-Consulting, WIPO Case No. D2004-0792 (November 23, 2004).
It was said, for example, in Deutsche B�rse AG v. Ramon Campos Munoz, WIPO Case No. D2005-0346, that: “As a rule, additional evidence or submissions should only be admitted in exceptional circumstances, such as when additional submissions are necessary to reply to the finding of newly discovered evidence not reasonably available to the submitting party at the time of its initial submission or to rebut arguments by the respondent that the complainant could not reasonably have anticipated. On the other hand, panels have repeatedly stated that further submissions are neither needed nor acceptable where the complainant has not contended that it has discovered evidence not reasonably available to it at the time of its complaint, nor does the response appear to have submitted arguments that the complainant could not reasonably have anticipated, and there being no other exceptional circumstances that would justify the submission of a further submission (The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Kerpacev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 (June 17, 2001).
See also G.G. Properties Ltd v. AA Technologies, aka Gartner for Information Technology, Gartner Egypt and GGE.com, WIPO Case No. D2005-0533 (May 29, 2007) in which it was said: “Previous panels have held that additional submissions are inappropriate, for the above mentioned reasons, except in limited circumstances, such as discovery of evidence or where new case decisions were not reasonably available at the time of the party’s initial submission (Tribeca Film Center, Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-MacKenzie, WIPO Case No. D2000-1772 (April 12, 2001) and Pacific Fence & Wire Co. v. Pacific Fence and Jim Paradise, WIPO Case No. D2001-0237 (June 22, 2001)”.
In this case, the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing was timely filed, as it was lodged only 7 days after the Response and, as the Complainant says, it has not delayed the proceedings as it was filed simultaneously with its nomination of Panelists. Therefore, on the strength of this, and in the light of the above Decisions, which give to a panel the flexibility to admit new evidence that was not previously available, a majority of the Panel in this case is prepared to take the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing into account.
Moreover, in the events that have happened, the Respondent has had and has availed itself of the opportunity to make a reply to the Supplemental Filing, so no injustice can be done to the Respondent by considering the additional evidence and submissions provided by the Complainant.
The reality is that the Complainant submitted material that was new and which raised issues about this case that are pivotal to its resolution and the Respondent has submitted its case in reply.
Indeed, the Panel cannot but be assisted by now having before it all of the material that each side wishes to submit.
The third member of the Panel, however, does not agree with the decision to admit the Complainant’s Supplementary Filing and his reasons are set out in the Dissent appearing below.
This statement shows, the Complainant contends, that the Respondent had knowledge of the Complainant’s metadata removal product and its ISCRUB trademark and that such knowledge is the only reason why the Respondent should include a reference to “METADATA” on its site.
Secondly, the Complainant states that although the first use in commerce of the ISCRUB mark is given in the records of the United States Patent and Trademark Office for the registration of the mark as March 2002, this was due to a clerical error by the Complainant’s former counsel and that the correct time for the first use in commerce was “at least as early as April 2001” thereby predating the registration of the domain name on November 8, 2001.
Thirdly, the Complainant maintains that now that the true identity of the Respondent has become apparent, it has been able to establish that the Respondent is a serial registrant of other parties’ trademarks as domain names. The Complainant then cites several UDRP decisions which it contends support this position.
Fourthly, the Complainant contends that the extracts from the Respondent’s website and referred to above, particularly the announcement “This domain is for sale”, show that, within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy, the Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it.
Finally, the Complainant contends that recent changes to the material displayed on the website have no substantial relation to the Respondent’s claimed use of the domain name, which had been to provide links to “maintenance and dry cleaning services”. That being so, the Complainant says, diminishes the Respondent’s argument that its use of the domain name was bona fide and legitimate.
The Respondent contends that even accepting the Complainant’s allegation that its alleged first use of the trademark was April 2001 rather than March 1, 2002, it did not file its trademark application until October 25, 2002. From this the Respondent argues that it did not register the domain name because it believed it to incorporate a trademark and it had no basis for having knowledge of the Complainant’s mark at the time.
The Respondent also maintains that it was not responsible for the similar appearance on the website of the words “METADATA, SCRUBTOP, AND MACOS X” which were also “auto-generated by Yahoo!”. From this the Respondent argues that “(i)t is well established that automated links created by third party software (here as a result of a feed from Yahoo.com) do not constitute bad faith on the part of the domain name owner”.
In any event, the Respondent contends, the words appearing on the website appeared four years after the registration of the domain name and thus cannot constitute evidence of bad faith at the time of the registration.
The Respondent also replies to the allegation of the Complainant that it has been party to UDRP decision where it has been found to have engaged in a pattern of bad faith registration of domain names. The Respondent contends that these decisions are irrelevant and that there is a larger number of UDRP decisions where the Respondent prevailed.
The Respondent next contends that the fact that the website carried the notice “This Domain For Sale” does not show that it was registered in bad faith, for it is “legitimate to offer domain names for sale where the Respondent did not register the domain name based on its trademark value. Here, Respondent registered the domain name because it contained the common word ‘scrub’, preceded by the common Internet prefix ‘i’”. Indeed, the Respondent says that offering the domain name for sale shows its legitimate interest.
The Respondent also argues that the more recent generic links appearing on the website do not negate the Respondent’s legitimate interest in the domain name, for once a legitimate interest has been established, “subsequent activity does not make the use illegitimate”.
Finally, the Respondent maintains its submission that the Complainant has engaged in Reverse Domain Hijacking, although it acknowledges that “the case for reverse domain name hijacking is not as crystal clear where a complainant has at least made some alleged trademark use of the mark prior to the domain registration date”.
The Respondent has argued as a threshold issue that the Complainant does not have enforceable trademark rights under the Policy because its mark does not predate the disputed domain name and that as a consequence the Complaint should be summarily dismissed.
In this regard the Respondent has cited several decisions of UDRP panels in support of its proposition.
It is certainly true that opinions have been expressed to the effect that the registration of the relevant trademark must predate the registration of the disputed domain name. Indeed, one decision cited by the Respondent, Expert Computers Inc v. Name Delegation et al., No. 787937(NAF Oct 24, 2006), seems to admit of no exception to such a requirement. The decision in John Ode d/b/a/ODE and ODE-Optimum Digital Enterprises v. Intership Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-0074, however, raised what is generally regarded today as the essential issue on this matter, namely whether the requirement for the trademark to predate the registration of the domain name comes about because of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, requiring proof of bad faith registration, rather than because of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy, requiring proof of trademark rights.
“1.4 Does the complainant have UDRP-relevant trademark rights in a mark that was registered, or in which the complainant acquired unregistered rights, after the disputed domain name was registered?
As the Overview points out, paragraph 4 of the Policy does not require proof of any particular time at which the Complainant must have trademark or service mark rights. Indeed, contrary to the view expressed in Expert Computers Inc v. Name Delegation et al., the Policy requires only that the complainant “has” trademarks rights, i.e. “has” them at the time the decision is being made.
It is, however, equally clear and has long been recognized, that it is a different and much more difficult matter to establish that a respondent registered a domain name motivated by bad faith regarding a trademark that had not then been registered.
Accordingly, the Panel does not accept the Respondent’s threshold argument and will not summarily dismiss the Complaint.
The Panel finds that the domain name <iscrub.com> is identical to the asserted trademark ISCRUB, which as a whole has been incorporated into the domain name, which further consists of the gTLD suffix “.com”.
In that latter regard, it has been held many times that suffixes and minor spelling differences may not be used to negate a finding of identity or confusing similarity that is otherwise present on the evidence, as it is in this case.
To establish its right and legitimate interest in the domain name the Respondent says, first, that the domain name is simply a generic or common word preceded by the letter “i” which “establishes the Respondent’s legitimate interest” and, secondly, that it is using this generic or common word in connection with the bona fide provision of advertising services, which is itself legitimate.
With respect to the Respondent’s first argument, it is undoubtedly true, as the WIPO Overview makes plain, that if the Respondent is using a truly generic word to describe its products and is not “intending to take advantage of complainant’s rights in that word”, this will give rise to a legitimate interest in the domain name.
The cases cited by the Respondent support this proposition and it was affirmed as recently as August 7, 2007 in Shoebuy.com Inc. v. USA-Host, David Feldman, WIPO Case No. D2007-0800. None of the cases cited by the Respondent, however, supports the application of the proposition to the present case, as the Respondent contends they do.
In the first case cited by the Respondent, Williams, Babbitt & Weisman, Inc., v. Ultimate Search No. 98813 (NAF Oct. 8, 2001), it is true that the three-person panel said, as the Respondent quotes from the decision, that “(n) either the current UDRP nor current ICANN registrar contracts preclude this type of domain name use”. But it is clear from the decision that by “this type of domain name use” the panel meant the use of a domain name where the complainant had neither a registered or common law trademark in the name and had no other plausible claim to the name, which was the case in those proceedings. In the present case, however, the Complainant does have a trademark and it is identical to the domain name, which puts the Complainant in an entirely different position.
The second case cited by the Respondent, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Ultimate Search, WIPO Case No. D2001-0764 was a case where the Respondent had used the word ‘matress’ as its domain name, a word that the panel said was, citing America Online Inc. v. Media Dial Communications, WIPO Case No. D2001-0799, “common English”, albeit misspelt. Accordingly, the panel was able to say that: “… it seems the Complainant is attempting to prevent use of a variation of a common descriptive term.” In the present case, however, the word “iscrub” is not a common English word or a common descriptive term, but the sort of word referred to in the Shoebuy Case as an “inventive or coined word…”. The Complainant is attempting to prevent the use of this coined word in the domain name, because it claims that the word is the same as its trademark.
Likewise, in Etam, plc v.Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2000-1654, the Respondent had simply chosen a ‘fairly short, non-fanciful name’, in that case the name of a woman and in GLB Servi�os Interativos S.A. v. Ultimate Search Inc (aka Ult. Search Inc), WIPO Case No. D2002-0189, the Respondent had chosen the name ‘paparazzo.com’ described by the panel as “… generic of a particular word which has well-known meaning in English, Italian and possibly other languages”.
Indeed, there are now many UDRP decisions to the same effect in addition to those cited by the Respondent, for when a truly generic word is chosen as a domain name, its use is legitimate unless some secondary meaning has become attached to it through usage or its trademark status.
That is not the situation in the present case, for the word at issue is clearly a fanciful word that has been coined and as such is not a word in common use. The present case is therefore not a case of using in a domain name a purely generic word over which the Complainant has no claim. It is equally not a case of a generic domain name being used to describe goods and services covered by that expression, for it has been used by the Respondent to sell a broad range of goods and services many of which have no connection with the word at all.
The Panel, therefore, does not accept the Respondent’s first argument that its domain name is protected as a generic or common word and that this “establishes the Respondent’s legitimate interest”.
The Respondent’s second argument is that its legitimate purpose is “bolstered by the fact that it uses the disputed domain name in connection with the bona fide provision of advertising services”.
It is clear that the domain name is being used for advertising services, for it resolves to a website that consists of a series of sponsored links that advertise goods and services. They are not only, as the Respondent claims, “advertising links for computer-related products and services ”. The links are in fact a wide range of links that are set out under the categories Dating, Cars, Entertainment, Education, Jobs, Finance, Internet, Electronics, Business, Travel and Legal. Each of those categories has a number of sub-categories and each of those sub-categories contains relevant sponsored links to various providers. There is also a search function that invites visitors to use it to search for offerings that have not yet been located. Thus, a search for “Adult” produces sponsored links of that genre. It is also a reasonable inference to draw that these links generate pay-per-click revenue for the Respondent.
It is clear, therefore, that the Respondent uses the domain name for sponsored advertising links and, as it is put in the Declaration of a Manager of the Respondent, dated July 16, 2007 and put in evidence, the first of two Declarations by a Manager of the Respondent submitted by the Respondent, “We have used” the domain name for posting such links.
It is equally clear that in an appropriate case the use of a domain name for such a purpose can be bona fide. The question, however, is whether on the facts of the present case, the use by the Respondent of the disputed domain name has been a bona fide one. More specifically, the question is whether the Respondent has satisfied the Panel on the evidence it has brought to the proceeding that it has used the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
To answer this question requires a close examination of the evidence.
The Respondent argues that its use of the domain name has been bona fide because it did not have the Complainant in mind in using the domain name to host the sponsored links, but that it merely posted links “for computer-related products”. It is quite specific in this, as it submits: “The fact is that the Respondent did not have any knowledge of Complainant or its mark until Complainant took issue with the domain name registration.” (emphasis added).
The first Declaration of a Manager of the Respondent is the major piece of evidence of the Respondent, is declared to be true, under penalty of law for making false statement and it is to the same effect as the unsigned assertions in the Response. A Manager of the Respondent declares that “We did not have any knowledge of Complainant or its mark until Complainant took issue with the domain name registration” (emphasis added).
That is the only evidence put by the Respondent to show a bona fide use of the domain name. If the Panel accepted this evidence it would go a long way to satisfying the Panel that the Respondent’s offering of goods and services had been bona fide, for it would show that the Respondent was not trying to trade–off the name of the Complainant’s trademarked product or make any other use of the Complainant’s name or product that was not bona fide.
However, the Panel does not accept the Respondent’s evidence and is not satisfied that it shows on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent’s offering of goods and services through the sponsored links was bona fide. That is so for the following reasons.
First, the basic problem about the Respondent’s argument and the supporting Declaration of a Manager of the Respondent is that they are substantially weakened by the evidence contained in the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing and that weakness has not been rectified by any material submitted by the Respondent in reply.
The Complainant has made a search via the Wayback Machine at “www.archive.org” of those previous pages of the Respondent’s website which are available for viewing. Three of those pages are for February 9, 10 and 12, 2005 and are in evidence in these proceedings as Exhibits F, G and H respectively to the Declaration of a Technical Support Technician in the office of the Complainant’s attorneys and who conducted the search. No earlier pages are apparently available for viewing by the Complainant or by the Panel.
Each of the three pages carries in a prominent position the words: “iscrub.com The top METADATA resources on the net This domain is for sale”.
Based on this material, the Complainant makes the submission that “There is no reason, other than knowledge of Complainant, its product and/or its trademark, why Respondent would have the term ‘metadata’ on their iscrub.com website”.
This evidence casts doubt on the declaration of a Manager of the Respondent, for she had declared that the Respondent had no knowledge of the Complainant’s mark “…until Complainant took issue with the domain name registration”, i.e. no knowledge at any time until then, a period that must by definition have commenced when the domain name was registered. That time clearly encompassed February 9, 10 and 12, 2005 when the website carried the endorsement referred to above. It is therefore clear that, contrary to its Manager’s evidence, the Respondent must have known of the Complainant’s mark at some time before the Complainant took issue with the domain name registration. That is so because the Respondent was at one time asserting on its own website that “iscrub” was the top Metadata resource available on the Internet. It is a reasonable inference that that statement means that “iscrub” is the best product for the removal of metadata and that the product is the one sold under that name, namely the Complainant’s product of that name. It is also a statement that the domain name reflecting the name of that product is for sale.
This evidence of the Complainant therefore casts grave doubt on whether it was true that the Respondent had no knowledge of the Complainant’s mark before the Complainant took issue with the domain name registration.
At the very least, the Panel does not accept the declaration as evidence that the Respondent had no knowledge of the trademark prior to that time.
Moreover, the probability from the evidence is that at least in 2005 the Respondent did have knowledge of the Complainant’s product, that it was called “iscrub” and that the Respondent had that name in mind when it made its offering of goods and services via the domain name.
That view is supported by the fact that the exhibits to the Declaration of a Technical Support Technician of the Complainant not only carry the announcement about “iscrub.com”, but they carry other information suggesting that the Respondent had the Complainant and its product very much in mind at this time.
“We show you where to find the best METADATA, SCRUB TOP and MACOS X RESOURCES through our comprehensive search-friendly indexes. Simply click on what you need from the list above or conduct your search using the box below.” Such a search box then appears.
These references are not simply anodyne advertisements for “cleaning” or “cleaning supplies” as the Respondent contends; they are so akin to the essential nature of the Complainant’s product, its use as a form of software to “scrub” away metadata on documents and its role in legal technology, that the conclusion is more likely than not that the Respondent had the Complainant’s product exclusively in mind when it posted its information on the website. Moreover, it is virtually an open invitation to follow up links that will lead the user to the Complainant’s competitors.
Faced with this evidence from the Complainant that the Respondent did have the Complainant, its product and competitors in mind, at least in 2005, the Respondent had an opportunity to adduce further evidence to support its two propositions, first that it did not have any knowledge of the Complainant or its trademark until the Complainant took issue with the domain name registration and secondly that it had never placed links on the site that related to the Complainant, its products, services or competitors.
Yahoo! is also credited with responsibility for the presence of the “popular searches” links on the website, including “Metadata”, “Macos X”, “Software” and “Legal Technology” and the statement that “We show you where to find the best METADATA, SCRUB TOP and MACOS X RESOURCES through our comprehensive search-friendly indexes”.
In the present case, the word “iscrub” is not a generic, common or dictionary word. It is an invented word which the Complainant and its predecessor have used in commerce as the name of its product since 2001. Moreover, the evidence of a Manager of the Respondent itself shows, as she put it, that it was “(o)ur software” that added the word “METADATA”.
Moreover, the evidence of the Complainant suggested that the Respondent was not correct in asserting it had no knowledge of the Complainant until the complaint was made. The Respondent could have given evidence showing when it first started to promote “metadata” on its website and when it included popular links to “Metadata”, “Macos X”, “Software” and “Legal Technology”. That evidence can be only in the knowledge of the Respondent and the absence of evidence on this issue must weaken the credibility that the Panel gives to the Respondent’s case.
There is no other evidence advanced by the Respondent to show that its use of the domain name in connection with the provision of advertising services was bona fide.
These conclusions are strengthened in turn by the fact that the Complainant has also provided new evidence to the effect that due to a clerical error made by the Complainant’s previous counsel during the application for the ISCRUB trademark, the date of the first commercial use of the mark was given as March 2002, whereas in fact it was as early as April 2001, which was some months prior to the registration of the domain name on November 8, 2001.
That evidence is corroborated by Annexes C and D to the Supplementary Filing. Annex C is a press release by the Complainant’s predecessor in title, Atvantec, dated April 23, 2001 announcing in effect that iScrub Metadata Cleansing Solution would be launched at Legal Works 2001 Conference and Exhibition and describing in substance what the product did. The Complainant’s attorney in a signed statement has verified his submission to the effect that the press release was “distributed to hundreds of recipients including trade publications” and the Panel accepts that evidence.
Annex D consists of three invoices from Atvantec to three firms for the sale to them of one “Firm Wide License” apparently for “iScrub Document Metadata Cleansing Software”, one “iScrub Firm License” and one “iScrub Software Licenses” dated April 3, 2001, June 7, 2001 and April 6, 2001 respectively, all of which dates are prior to the date on which the domain name was registered.
This evidence is not overwhelming, but it shows that the product “iScrub” was in the market and being sold under that name some months prior to the date of the registration of the domain name.
(e) the Respondent’s only reply is to say in effect that the contents of its website was determined by Yahoo! but otherwise to remain silent on when it first used its website to carry the links just referred to and what if any links it carried from the time the website was first established.
In other words, the evidence shows that on February 9, 10 and 12, 2005, the only dates on which there is evidence on this issue, the Respondent was not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services, for at that time it was invoking the name and product of the Complainant and using them to promote the products of other suppliers and the sale of a domain name that was identical to the Complainant’s mark. It was open to the Respondent, by adducing evidence of which only the Respondent has knowledge, that it was using the domain name for such a bona fide offering at some time prior to February 9, 10 and 12, 2005, but this it has declined to do.
Accordingly, having regard to the totality of the evidence the Panel does not accept the Respondent’s case that, within the meaning of paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy, it has at anytime used the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.
Finally, the Respondent has not adduced any evidence or argued to the effect that it has been commonly known by the domain name, that it has been making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name or that there is any other basis on which it can claim a right or legitimate interest in the domain name.
Accordingly, the Complainant has established that the Respondent does not have a right or legitimate interest in respect of the domain name and has thus made out the second of the three elements that it must establish.
The Complainant relies on paragraph 4(b)(i) and (iv) of the Policy.
The Panel finds that within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy, the Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant for the return specified in that sub-paragraph.
By way of introduction to this issue, the Complainant has argued that in a series of proceedings, the Respondent has emerged as a company that has registered other parties’ domain names in bad faith and that it has been criticized for its conduct in that regard by Panels.
On the other hand, as the Respondent contends in its Reply to the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing, the Respondent has been a party to other similar proceedings where it has been successful.
It is also true, as the Respondent argues, that each case must be decided on its merits having regard to its unique evidence and submissions and that is the approach that the Panel takes in this case.
Applying that test, the most cogent evidence in support of the Panel’s finding is that on the three pages of the website referred to in the Declaration of a Technical Support Technician of the Complainant and which are available for viewing, the Respondent announced to the world that the domain name was for sale. As has already been said in this decision, the Panel does not accept as persuasive the evidence and argument of the Respondent that it was not aware of the Complainant or its trademark until the Complainant took issue with the registration of the domain name. The evidence adduced by the Complainant leads to the conclusion that at least on February 9, 10, and 12, 2005, the Respondent was aware of the ISCRUB mark, the product to which that name related and its basic function.
The Panel is then in the position of having found that the Respondent must have been aware of the Complainant and its trademark at sometime prior to the dates of those web pages, but is unable to say when the Respondent would have first become aware of those facts and consequently when it would have first advertised the domain name for sale. The Respondent, however, was and must be taken still to be in a position where it and only it could have provided material on the contents of it website from the time the domain name was registered and prior to February 9, 10 and 12, 2005 from which the Panel would have been able to reach conclusions on the Respondent’s intentions during this earlier time and in particular at the time of the registration of the domain name. However, the Respondent has not made any such material available to the Panel, despite the fact that it was clearly made an issue when the Complainant tendered its new evidence in its Supplemental Filing.
The Panel therefore has before it only the evidence that the name of the product was in the public domain from April 2001, that it was actively promoted to its potential market under that name from that time, that it was actually sold into the market from April 2001, that the domain name was registered seven months later on November 8, 2001 and that the Respondent subsequently advertised it for sale. The Panel is not in a position to say when the domain name was first offered for sale, as evidence of this fact is solely within the knowledge of the Respondent and that evidence has not been provided to the Panel.
The Panel also notes and takes into account on this issue the fact that although the two Declarations of a Manager of the Respondent, the Response and the Reply to the Complainant’s Supplemental Filing all deny seriatim several allegations, none of those statements denies the specific allegation in the Complaint that the Respondent registered the domain name with the intention of selling it.
Finally, the Panel notes and takes into account on this issue that the Respondent hid its identity behind an Identity Shield and that that was part of its modus operandi.
Taking all of these matters into account, the Panel concludes on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent registered the domain name for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant or a competitor within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
As the Panel has made a finding relating to bad faith in the registration of the domain name, it is not necessary to say whether there are other grounds on which it can also be said that the domain name was registered in bad faith.
The Panel will, however, deal with another such ground because of a matter that the Respondent has activated at several points in its submission and because the Panel believes that all of the Respondent’s submissions should be considered.
That point here is, as the Respondent puts it, that “it is well established that a Complainant cannot meet its burden of proving bad faith registration of a domain name that is registered prior to the date of an application or use of a trademark”.
That is generally true because, usually, it cannot be imputed to a party that it was actuated by bad motives toward the holder of a trademark before the trademark was registered or used.
Had it not been for the additional evidence of the Complainant showing the actual use made of the domain name by the Respondent and the Respondent’s limited evidence in reply, the result in this case may have been different. As the evidence stands, however, it is apparent that the trademark was used for several months prior to the registration of the domain name and in circumstances showing that the Complainant’s predecessor was actively promoting it in the market and selling its Iscrub product under that name and that the Respondent subsequently advertised the domain name for sale.
Again, it must be said that it was open to the Respondent to show what use was being made of the domain name from the time of its registration, but it has not done so.
The totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it are therefore such that the Panel makes a finding that the Respondent registered the domain name within the meaning of paragraph 4(b) (ii) of the Policy “…to prevent the owner of the trademark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name (and where) the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; …”.
In addition, the Panel finds that the facts of the case bring it squarely within paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy for the purposes of using the domain name in bad faith.
The discussion of the facts in Section B of this decision should make it plain that the Panel’s opinion is that within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(iv) the Respondent used the domain name to attract Internet users to the Respondent’s website and the other sites to which it was linked by creating confusion between, on the one hand, the affiliation of the goods and services promoted there and, on the other hand, the goods and services offered under the ISCRUB mark, namely the Complainant’s product marketed and sold under the name Iscrub. Clearly this was done for commercial gain.
The Panel therefore finds that the Respondent used the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy.
three elements it must establish.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with Paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name <iscrub.com> be transferred to the Complainant.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with many of the majority’s findings, I do not believe that Complainant has met its burden of proof on the matter of bad faith registration, even if Complainant’s supplemental filing is to be considered. More importantly, however, I believe that the Panel should not consider the parties’ supplemental filings, and based upon the remaining information before the Panel, I would find that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of this administrative proceeding.
The Complaint alleges that Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith in 2001, intending to benefit from a trademark that did not even exist until Complainant adopted and began using it in 2002. In my view, the filing of such an obviously frivolous claim represents an abuse of the UDRP process and warrants a finding that the complaint was brought in bad faith, in an attempt at reverse domain name hijacking. See, e.g., Datalyst LLC v. Estes, NAF Case No. FA954109 (May 9, 2007); Proto Software, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905 (Oct. 10, 2006); Mess Enterprises v. Scott Enterprises, WIPO Case No. D2004-0964 (January 25, 2005); carsales.com.au Ltd. v. Flanders, WIPO Case No. D2004-0047 (April 8, 2004); NetDeposit, Inc. v. NetDeposit.com, WIPO Case No. D2003-0365 (July 22, 2003).
The fact that Complainant later discovered that it had been mistaken about the age of its claimed common-law trademark rights does not alter this conclusion. Had Complainant not elected to abuse the UDRP process by filing a complaint that it knew or should have known to be frivolous, it would later have been in a position to file a nonfrivolous complaint (and indeed, were we to dismiss the present matter, Complainant would remain free to initiate a second UDRP proceeding or pursue a trademark claim in court).
The question remains whether the Panel ought to permit Complainant to supplement its Complaint with evidence that its mark dates back to 2001 rather than 2002. I do not believe that the Panel should permit this. Paragraph 12 of the Rules provides that “the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or documents from either of the Parties”. This discretion ought not be exercised lightly. The UDRP is intended to be a streamlined process (unlike formal litigation), and a panel normally should decide a case based solely upon the parties’ initial submissions. As the majority acknowledges, additional submissions should be considered only in exceptional circumstances, such as where they reflect newly discovered evidence not reasonably available to the submitting party at the time of its original submission or rebut arguments by the opposing party that the submitting party could not reasonably have anticipated.
In my view, the Panel should decline to exercise its discretion to accept Complainant’s supplemental filing, and as a result need not consider Respondent’s supplemental filing either. For the reasons set forth above, I would find that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding, and would dismiss the Complaint for failure to prove that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith, as required by paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

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D.C. Law Library - Chapter 11. Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations.
§ 29–1103. Relation to other law.
(1) “Established practices” means the practices used by an unincorporated nonprofit association without material change during the most recent 5 years of its existence or, if it has existed for less than 5 years, during its entire existence.
(2) “Governing principles” means the agreements, whether oral, in a record, or implied from its established practices, that govern the purpose or operation of an unincorporated nonprofit association and the rights and obligations of its members and managers. The term “governing principles” shall include any amendment or restatement of the agreements constituting the governing principles.
(3) “Manager” means a person that is responsible, alone or in concert with others, for the management of an unincorporated nonprofit association.
(4) “Member” means a person that, under the governing principles, may participate in the selection of persons authorized to manage the affairs of the unincorporated nonprofit association or in the development of the policies and activities of the association.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 2 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).
A statute governing a specific type of unincorporated nonprofit association shall prevail over an inconsistent provision in this chapter, to the extent of the inconsistency.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 3 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, the law of the District shall govern the operation in the District of all unincorporated nonprofit associations formed or operating in the District.
(b) Unless the governing principles specify a different jurisdiction, the law of the jurisdiction in which an unincorporated nonprofit association has its main place of activities shall govern the internal affairs of the association.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 4 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).
(6) A difference among managers shall be decided by a majority of the managers.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 22 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).
(a) On reasonable notice, a member or manager of an unincorporated nonprofit association may inspect and copy during the unincorporated nonprofit association’s regular operating hours, at a reasonable location specified by the association, any record maintained by the association regarding its activities, financial condition, and other circumstances, to the extent the information is material to the member’s or manager’s rights and duties under the governing principles.
(b) An unincorporated nonprofit association may impose reasonable restrictions on access to, and use of, information to be furnished under this section, including designating the information confidential and imposing the obligations of nondisclosure and safeguarding on the recipient.
(d) A former member or manager shall be entitled to information to which the member or manager was entitled while a member or manager if the information pertains to the period during which the person was a member or manager, the former member or manager seeks the information in good faith, and the former member or manager satisfies subsections (a) through (c) of this section.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 25 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).
(1) All known debts and liabilities shall be paid or adequately provided for.
(2) Any property subject to a condition requiring return to the person designated by the donor shall be transferred to that person.
(3) Any property subject to a trust shall be distributed in accordance with the trust agreement.
(C) If subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph does not apply, in accordance with the law of unclaimed property in the District.
This section is referenced in § 29-1122 and § 29-1124.
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 29 of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008 Act).

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WASHINGTON, D.C. — In breach of contract disputes over reinsurance participation agreements (RPA), the U.S. Supreme Court on Oct. 1 denied petitions asking whether a choice-of-law clause imports “state substantive law without importing state rules impairing arbitration” or whether the clause incorporates “both state substantive law and state arbitration principles” (Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company Inc. v. Citizens of Humanity, et al., No. 18-174; Applied Underwriters Inc., et al. v. Citizens of Humanity, et al., No. 18-175, U.S. Sup.).
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Supreme Court on Oct. 1 denied a disability claimant’s petition for writ of certiorari in a dispute regarding the offsetting of the claimant’s long-term disability (LTD) benefits to account for Social Security disability income (SSDI) benefits received on behalf of the claimant’s dependents (Susan Rene Jones v. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp., et al., No. 17-1478, U.S. Sup.).
SAN DIEGO — An insured sufficiently stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress but failed to sufficiently state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his auto insurer, which allegedly handled his underinsured motorist benefits claim in bad faith, a California federal judge said Sept. 25 (Russell Kane v. United Services Automobile Association, et al., No. 17-2581, S.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164605).
SAN FRANCISCO — A California federal judge on Sept. 24 denied a disability plan’s motion to transfer a disability claimant’s suit to Georgia, where the claimant lived and was treated for his disability, after determining that the claimant’s choice of forum is entitled to some deference and that none of the convenience factors weighs strongly in favor of transferring the suit (Mark Ennis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. et al., No. 18-1617, N.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163442).
OAKLAND, Calif. — A disability insurer wrongfully denied long-term disability (LTD) benefits to a plan participant suffering from liver cancer because the insurer failed to consider whether the participant could continue to perform the duties of his job with “reasonable continuity,” a California federal judge said Sept. 19 (Shelley Lyttle v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Co., No. 17-1361, N.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160300).
SAN DIEGO — In a California federal court case over breached reinsurance agreements from fraudulent transfers, a reinsurer in a Sept. 21 summary judgment reply brief says an insurance broker’s former owners fail to present a genuine disputed material fact as to the reinsurer’s status as a creditor (Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Richard Keith Nagby, et al., No. 16-3038, S.D. Calif.).
PASADENA, Calif.— The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Sept. 20 affirmed a lower court’s ruling that insureds breached an insurance policy’s “no-voluntary payments” provision by executing an underlying settlement with a former employee without the insurer’s knowledge or consent and that no exception to the provision applies (AMCO Insurance Company v. Jennifer Morfe, No. 17-55383 9th Cir., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26923).
SANTA ANA, Calif. — A California appeals panel on Sept. 20 reversed a lower court’s order that imposed a preliminary injunction that prohibited the Insurance commissioner’s enforcement of California Code of Regulations, Titles 2695.1(a), 2695.2(l) and 2695.2(y), remanding for the lower court to also reverse its order granting the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to its claim for declaratory relief (PacifiCare Life And Health Insurance Company v. Dave Jones, as Insurance Commissioner, etc., No. G053914, Calif. App., 4th Dist., Div. 3, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 836).
SAN DIEGO — On a motion for rehearing, a California appeals panel on Sept. 20 reaffirmed a lower court's ruling that an insurer has no duty to pay $106,102.63 in legal fees that were purportedly incurred by the insured's general counsel in defending a lawsuit arising from the sexual abuse of a foreign exchange student (Pacific Intercultural Exchange v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, No. D071478, Calif. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6432).
OAKLAND, Calif. — A California federal bankruptcy judge properly entered a more than $3.5 million judgment against an insurance company in a long-running dispute over the amount of coverage owed to a company’s liquidating trust for asbestos personal injury claims, a federal judge held Sept. 17 in affirming the award, plus a $60,000 penalty for the insurer’s “vexatious and unreasonable conduct” (Continental Casualty Company v. Barry A. Chatz, Nos. 17-cv-05281, 17-cv-06989, N.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158352).
SAN DIEGO — Arguing that there are triable issues of fact, the former owners of an insurance brokerage company in separate Sept. 14 briefs oppose a reinsurer’s request for summary judgment against them for payment of a $3.2 million judgment in a California federal court dispute over breached reinsurance agreements from fraudulent transfers (Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Richard Keith Nagby, et al., No. 16-3038, S.D. Calif.).
SAN DIEGO — The Fourth District California Court of Appeal on Sept. 17 affirmed a jury verdict entered in an insurer’s favor in a water damage dispute after determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony from the insured’s expert regarding whether the water damage occurred suddenly or over a period of time (Robert Dorfman v. State Farm General Insurance Co., No. D072214, Calif. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6329).
SAN DIEGO — A majority of a California appeals court on Sept. 11 held that an insurer has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that there was a triable issue of material fact regarding what caused the Poinsettia Fire that started at the defendant’s golf course and spread to its adjacent insured properties, affirming a lower court (Axis Insurance Company v. Omni Hotels Management Corp., No. D071572, Calif. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6210).
SACRAMENTO, Calif. — A California federal judge on Sept. 7 granted an insurer’s motion on a bad faith claim arising out of the insurer’s payment of repair costs for an insured home damaged by a fire after determining that the insurer did not act unreasonably in accepting a lower estimate for the repair costs (Donald Durben, et al. v. State Farm General Insurance Co., et al., No. 16-754, E.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153166).
SAN FRANCISCO — An insurer has no duty to provide coverage for damages incurred as a result of a sewer line failure to a building that housed an insured restaurant because the policy at issue did not provide coverage for buildings and clearly excluded coverage for damages caused by subsurface water, a California federal judge said Sept. 5 in entering summary judgment in favor of the insurer (Ken Tu, et al. v. Dongbu Insurance Co. Ltd., No. 17-3495, N.D. Calif., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151322).
WASHINGTON, D.C. — In a breach of contract dispute over a reinsurance participation agreement (RPA), a blue jean manufacturing company and its subsidiary in an Aug. 22 brief oppose a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether a choice-of-law clause imports “state substantive law without importing state rules impairing arbitration” or whether the clause incorporates “both state substantive law and state arbitration principles” (Applied Underwriters Inc., et al. v. Citizens of Humanity, et al., No. 18-175, U.S. Sup.).
SAN FRANCISCO — The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals should reverse a district court’s ruling that California law, rather than Alabama law, applies to an environmental contamination coverage suit because Alabama clearly has the greater interest in applying its law to the coverage dispute, an insured argues in its Aug. 20 appellant brief (Arrow Electronics Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., et al., No. 18-55810, 9th Cir.).
SACRAMENTO, Calif. — In two putative class actions regarding a reinsurance participation agreement (RPA), a California federal judge approved a new scheduling order on Aug. 31 (Shasta Linen Supply Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Inc., et al., Nos. 16-00158 & 16-01211, E.D. Calif.).

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Understand why Congress legislated against price-cutting by large companies.
Recognize why price discrimination is not per se illegal.
Identify and explain the defenses to a Robinson-Patman price discrimination charge.
If the relatively simple and straightforward language of the Sherman Act can provide litigants and courts with interpretive headaches, the law against price discrimination—the Robinson-Patman Act—can strike the student with a crippling migraine. Technically, Section 2 of the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, has been verbally abused almost since its enactment in 1936. It has been called the “Typhoid Mary of Antitrust,” a “grotesque manifestation of the scissors and paste-pot method” of draftsmanship. Critics carp at more than its language; many have asserted over the years that the act is anticompetitive because it prevents many firms from lowering their prices to attract more customers.
Despite this rhetoric, the Robinson-Patman Act has withstood numerous attempts to modify or repeal it, and it can come into play in many everyday situations. Although in recent years the Justice Department has declined to enforce it, leaving government enforcement efforts to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), private plaintiffs are actively seeking treble damages in numerous cases. So whether it makes economic sense or not, the act is a living reality for marketers. This section introduces certain problems that lurk in deciding how to price goods and how to respond to competitors’ prices.
The Clayton Act’s original Section 2, enacted in 1914, was aimed at the price-cutting practice of the large trusts, which would reduce the price of products below cost where necessary in a particular location to wipe out smaller competitors who could not long sustain such losses. But the original Clayton Act exempted from its terms any “discrimination in price…on account of differences in the quantity of the commodity sold.” This was a gaping loophole that made it exceedingly difficult to prove a case of price discrimination.
Not until the Depression in the 1930s did sufficient cries of alarm over price discrimination force Congress to act. The alarm was centered on the practices of large grocery chains. Their immense buying power was used as a lever to pry out price discounts from food processors and wholesalers. Unable to extract similar price concessions, the small mom-and-pop grocery stores found that they could not offer the retail customer the lower food prices set by the chains. The small shops began to fail. In 1936, Congress strengthened Section 2 by enacting the Robinson-Patman Act. Although prompted by concern about how large buyers could use their purchasing power, the act in fact places most of its restrictions on the pricing decisions of sellers.
This section provides certain defenses to a charge of price discrimination. For example, differentials in price are permissible whenever they “make only due allowances for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.” This section also permits sellers to change prices in response to changing marketing conditions or the marketability of the goods—for example, if perishable goods begin to deteriorate, the seller may drop the price in order to move the goods quickly.
Section 2(b) provides the major defense to price discrimination: any price is lawful if made in good faith to meet competition.
To be discriminatory, the different prices must have been charged in sales made at the same time or reasonably close in time. What constitutes a reasonably close time depends on the industry and the circumstances of the marketplace. The time span for dairy sales would be considerably shorter than that for sales of mainframe computers, given the nature of the product, the frequency of sales, the unit cost, and the volatility of the markets.
Another preliminary issue is the identity of the actual purchaser. A supplier who deals through a dummy wholesaler might be charged with price discrimination even though on paper only one sale appears to have been made. Under the “indirect purchaser” doctrine, a seller who deals with two or more retail customers but passes their orders on to a single wholesaler and sells the total quantity to the wholesaler in one transaction, can be held to have violated the act. The retailers are treated as indirect purchasers of the supplier.
The act applies only to sales of commodities. A lease, a rental, or a license to use a product does not constitute a sale; hence price differentials under one of those arrangements cannot be unlawful under Robinson-Patman. Likewise, since the act applies only to commodities—tangible things—the courts have held that it does not apply to the sale of intangibles, such as rights to license or use patents, shares in a mutual fund, newspaper or television advertising, or title insurance.
Only those sales involving goods of “like grade and quality” can be tested under the act for discriminatory pricing. What do these terms mean? The leading case is FTC v. Borden Co., in which the Supreme Court ruled that trademarks and labels do not, for Robinson-Patman purposes, distinguish products that are otherwise the same.FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966). Grade and quality must be determined “by the characteristics of the product itself.” When the products are physically or chemically identical, they are of like grade and quality, regardless of how imaginative marketing executives attempt to distinguish them. But physical differences that affect marketability can serve to denote products as being of different grade and quality, even if the differences are slight and do not affect the seller’s cost in manufacturing or marketing.
To violate the Robinson-Patman Act, the seller’s price discrimination must have an anticompetitive effect. The usual Clayton Act standard for measuring injury applies to Robinson-Patman violations—that is, a violation occurs when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. But because the Robinson-Patman Act has a more specific test of competitive injury, the general standard is rarely cited.
The more specific test measures the impact on particular persons affected. Section 2(a) says that it is unlawful to discriminate in price where the effect is “to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination or to customers of either of them.” The effect—injury, destruction, or prevention of competition—is measured against three types of those suffering it: (1) competitors of the seller or supplier (i.e., competitors of the person who “grants” the price discrimination), (2) competitors of the buyer (i.e., competitors of the buyer who “knowingly receives the benefit” of the price differential), and (3) customers of either of the two types of competitors. As we will see, the third category presents many difficulties.
For purposes of our discussion, assume the following scenario: Ace Brothers Widget Company manufactures the usual sizes and styles of American domestic widgets. It competes primarily with National Widget Corporation, although several smaller companies make widgets in various parts of the country. Ace Brothers is the largest manufacturer and sells throughout the United States. National sells primarily in the western states. The industry has several forms of distribution. Many retailers buy directly from Ace and National, but several regional and national wholesalers also operate, including Widget Jobbers, Ltd. and Widget Pushers, LLC. The retailers in any particular city compete directly against each other to sell to the general public. Jobbers and Pushers are in direct competition. Jobbers also sells directly to the public, so that it is in direct competition with retailers as well as Widget Pushers. As everyone knows, widgets are extremely price sensitive, being virtually identical in physical appearance and form.
Now consider the situation in California, Oregon, and Wisconsin. The competing manufacturers, Ace Brothers and National Widgets, both sell to wholesalers in California and Oregon, but only Ace has a sales arm in Wisconsin. Seeing an opportunity, Ace drops its prices to wholesalers in California and Oregon and raises them in Wisconsin, putting National at a competitive disadvantage. This situation, illustrated in Figure 26.2 "Primary-Line Injury", is an example of primary-line injuryPrice discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act that directly injures a competitor, in violation of Section 2(a).—the injury is done directly to a competitor of the company that differentiates its prices. This is price discrimination, and it is prohibited under Section 2(a).
Most forms of primary-line injury have a geographical basis, but they need not. Suppose National sells exclusively to Jobbers in northern California, and Ace Brothers sells both to Jobbers and several other wholesalers. If Ace cuts its prices to Jobbers while charging higher prices to the other wholesalers, the effect is also primary-line injury to National. Jobbers will obviously want to buy more from Ace at lower prices, and National’s reduced business is therefore a direct injury. If Ace intends to drive National out of business, this violation of Section 2(a) could also be an attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Next, we consider injury done to competing buyers. Suppose that Ace Brothers favors Jobbers—or that Jobbers, a powerful and giant wholesaler, induces Ace to act favorably by threatening not to carry Ace’s line of widgets otherwise. Although Ace continues to supply both Jobbers and Widget Pushers, it cuts its prices to Jobbers. As a result, Jobbers can charge its retail customers lower prices than can Pushers, so that Pushers’s business begins to slack off. This is secondary-line injuryPrice discrimination under the Robinson-Patman act that injures a competitor of a buyer, in violation of Section 2(a). at the buyer’s level. Jobbers and Pushers are in direct competition, and by impairing Pushers’s ability to compete, the requisite injury has been committed. This situation is illustrated in Figure 26.3 "Secondary-Line Injury".
Variations on this secondary-line injury are possible. Assume Ace Brothers sells directly to Fast Widgets, a retail shop, and also to Jobbers. Jobbers sells to retail shops that compete with Fast Widgets and also directly to consumers. The situation is illustrated in Figure 26.4 "Variation on Secondary-Line Injury").
If Ace favors Jobbers by cutting its prices, discriminating against Fast Widgets, the transaction is unlawful, even though Jobbers and Fast Widgets do not compete for sales to other retailers. Their competition for the business of ultimate consumers is sufficient to establish the illegality of the discrimination. A variation on this situation was at issue in the first important case to test Section 2(a) as it affects buyers. Morton Salt sold to both wholesalers and retailers, offering quantity discounts. Its pricing policy was structured to give large buyers great savings, computed on a yearly total, not on shipments made at any one time. Only five retail chains could take advantage of the higher discounts, and as a result, these chains could sell salt to grocery shoppers at a price below that at which the chains’ retail competitors could buy it from their wholesalers. See Figure 26.5 "Variation: Morton Salt Co." for a schematic illustration. In this case, FTC v. Morton Salt Co., the Supreme Court for the first time declared that the impact of the discrimination does not have to be actual; it is enough if there is a “reasonable possibility” of competitive injury.FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
Figure 26.5 Variation: Morton Salt Co.
In order to make out a case of secondary-line injury, it is necessary to show that the buyers purchasing at different prices are in fact competitors. Suppose that Ace Brothers sells to Fast Widgets, the retailer, and also to Boron Enterprises, a manufacturer that incorporates widgets in most of its products. Boron does not compete against Fast Widgets, and therefore Ace Brothers may charge different prices to Boron and Fast without fearing Robinson-Patman repercussions. Figure 26.6 "Variation: Boron-Fast Schematic" shows the Boron-Fast schematic.
Second-line injury to buyers does not exhaust the possibilities. Robinson-Patman also works against so-called third-line or tertiary-line injury. At stake here is injury another rung down the chain of distribution. Ace Brothers sells to Pushers, which processes unfinished widgets in its own factory and sells them in turn directly to retail customers. Ace also sells to Jobbers, a wholesaler without processing facilities. Jobbers sells to retail shops that can process the goods and sell directly to consumers, thus competing with Pushers for the retail business. This distribution chain is shown schematically in Figure 26.7 "Third-Line Injury".
If Ace’s price differs between Pushers and Jobbers so that Jobbers is able to sell at a lower price to the ultimate consumers than Pushers, a Robinson-Patman violation has occurred.
In a complex economy, the distribution chain can go on and on. So far, we have examined discrimination on the level of competing supplier-sellers, on the level of competing customers of the supplier-seller, and on the level of competing customers of customers of the supplier-seller. Does the vigilant spotlight of Robinson-Patman penetrate below this level? The Supreme Court has said yes. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., the Court said that “customer” in Section 2(a) means any person who distributes the supplier-seller’s product, regardless of how many intermediaries are involved in getting the product to him.Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
Price discrimination is not per se unlawful. The Robinson-Patman Act allows the seller two general defenses: (1) cost justification and (2) meeting competition. If the seller can demonstrate that sales to one particular buyer are cheaper than sales to others, a price differential is permitted if it is based entirely on the cost differences. For example, if one buyer is willing to have the goods packed in cheaper containers or larger crates that save money, that savings can be passed along to the buyer. Similarly, a buyer who takes over a warehousing function formerly undertaken by the seller is entitled to have the cost saving reflected in the selling price. Suppose the buyer orders its entire requirements for the year from the manufacturer, a quantity many times greater than that taken by any other customer. This large order permits the manufacturer to make the goods at a considerably reduced unit cost. May the manufacturer pass those savings along to the quantity buyer? It may, as long as it does not pass along the entire savings but only that attributable to the particular buyer, for other buyers add to its total production run and thus contribute to the final unit production cost. The marketing manager should be aware that the courts strictly construe cost-justification claims, and few companies have succeeded with this defense.
Lowering a price to meet competition is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination. Assume Ace Brothers is selling widgets to retailers in Indiana and Kentucky at $100 per dozen. National Widgets suddenly enters the Kentucky market and, because it has lower manufacturing costs than Ace, sells widgets to the four Kentucky widget retailers at $85 per dozen. Ace may lower its price to that amount in Kentucky without lowering its Indiana price. However, if National’s price violated the Robinson-Patman Act and Ace knew or should have known that it did, Ace may not reduce its price.
The defense of meeting competition has certain limitations. For example, the seller may not use this defense as an excuse to charge different customers a price differential over the long run. Moreover, if National’s lower prices result from quantity orders, Ace may reduce its prices only for like quantities. Ace may not reduce its price for lesser quantities if National charges more for smaller orders. And although Ace may meet National’s price to a given customer, Ace may not legally charge less.
Section 2(c) prohibits payment of commissions by one party in a transaction to the opposite party (or to the opposite party’s agent) in a sale of goods unless services are actually rendered for them. Suppose the buyer’s broker warehouses the goods. May the seller pass along this cost to the broker in the form of a rebate? Isn’t that “services rendered”? Although it might seem so, the courts have said no, because they refuse to concede that a buyer’s broker or agent can perform services for the seller. Because Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act stands on its own, the plaintiff need prove only that a single payment was made. Further proof of competitive impact is unnecessary. Hence Section 2(c) cases are relatively easy to win once the fact of a brokerage commission is uncovered.
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibit sellers from granting discriminatory allowances for merchandising and from performing other services for buyers on a discriminatory basis. These sections are necessary because price alone is far from the only way to offer discounts to favored buyers. Allowances and services covered by these sections include advertising allowances, floor and window displays, warehousing, return privileges, and special packaging.
Nikon sells its cameras to retailers at 5 percent less in the state of California than in Nevada or Arizona. Without knowing more, can you say that this is illegal?
Tysons Foods sells its chicken wings to GFS and other very large distributors at a price per wing that is 10 percent less than it sells to most grocery store chains. The difference is attributable to transportation costs, since GFS and others accept shipments in very large containers, which cost less to deliver than smaller containers. Is the price differential legal?
Your best customer, who has high volume with your company, asks you for a volume discount. Actually, he demands this, rather than just asking. Under what circumstances, if any, can you grant this request without violating antitrust laws?

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When the Buddha passed away in his 80th year on the full-moon day of visakha, the Venerable Kassapa, one of the Buddha’s great disciples was on the way from Pava to Kusinara with a large retinue. The news of the decease of the Master was brought to him by a naked ascetic of the Ajivika sect. All his followers, with the exception of Anagamis and Arahants, were plunged in deep grief and were weeping and lamenting. But an immoral Bhikkhu named Subhadda, who had entered the Order in his old age, was the only one that rejoiced over His death.
These words induced the Venerable Kassapa to hold a Council of leading Arahants in order to protect and preserve the purity of the Buddha’s teachings.
The Council was held at Rajagaha under the royal patronage of King Ajatasattu three months after the passing away of the Buddha. It lasted seven months. 500 arahants were chosen for the Convocation. The venerable Kassapa was the president, while the Venerable Upali and Ananda were chosen to recite the Vinaya and Dhamma respectively.
A century later in Vesali many shameless Bhikkhus of the Vajji clan were in th habit of practicing the ten unlawful points. The Venerable Yasa who came to hear of these teachings decided to invite leading There as to Assemble and decide the question.
700 Arahants under the presidency o the Venerable Sabbakami held the Second Council in order to protect the Dhamma. It was held at Valukarama in Vesali under the royal patronage of King Kalasoka.
In 325 B.C. there came to the throne of India one of the greatest men in history, Asoka Maurya. In the 18th year of his reign, about 236 years after the passing away of the Buddha, 1000 Arahants, under the presidency of the Venerable Moggalliputta Tissa, participated in the Third Council which was held at Asokarama, in Pataliputta (Patna). Its purpose was partly to suppress a number of heresies whose exponents were causing dissension in the Order by their loose teaching and even looser lives, and partly once more to revise and confirm the canon.
One of the momentous results of this Council was the sending of missionaries to different countries to propagate the Suddhamma. Mahindha, the son of Asoka, and Sanghamitta, the King’s daughter, were charged with missionary work in the island of Ceylon. From the edicts of Asoka we know of the various Buddhist missions he sent to far-off countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. It is, to a large extent, due to these missionary activities that Buddhism became the ruling religion of large part of mankind.
Ascetic, n. a person who leads a religious life of hardship.
Assemble, v. to come together; to gather together; to collect.
Clan, n. a group of families with a common ancestor.
Confirm, v. to make firm; to strengthen; to establish; to prove the truth.
Dissension, n. a difference of opinion; disagreement; quarrelling.
Edict, n. an official public proclamation or order issued by authority.
Exponent, n. a person or thing that explains or sets forth; an example.
Grieve, v. to feel deep sorrow.
Heresy, n. a religious belief opposed to the orthodox doctrines of a church.
Induce, v. to persuade; to influence; to lead or cause (a person) to do something.
Last, v. to continue; to go no; to remain in good condition; to be enough.
Missionary, n. a person sent out by his church to preach, teach and spread knowledge of his religion in a foreign country, esp. among people who are ignorant of it.
Momentous, adj. very important or serious.
Naked, adj. having no clothes on; uncovered.
Participate, v. to take part; to have a share (in).
Plunge, v. to throw or force suddenly (in to a liquid, hole, etc.).
Preserve, v. to keep from harm, danger, evil, etc.; to protect; to save.
Propagation, n. the act of spreading, making widely known or more plentiful.
Rejoice, n. to be glad, happy, or delighted; to be full of joy.
Respectively, adj. with respect to each of two or more, in the order named or mentioned.
Retinue, n. a number of persons (servants, attendants, etc.) how accompany a person of rank.
Revise, v. to read over carefully; to correct and improve or bring up-to-date.
Sect, n. a group of people holding the same opinions in religion.
Suppress, v. to put down by force; to crush: to keep from appearing or being known; to stop.
As centuries drew on Buddhism in India decayed. The Brahmins and the polytheistic fancy of the Hindus were too much for it, and the finishing stroke was given by the Moslem invasion in the 12th century. After about 1200 it survived only in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, where it still prevails.
But in Ceylon the Buddhist missionaries, headed by Mahinda Thera, who were sent by Emperor Esoka, succeeded in converting the king and the people of Ceylon to Buddhism. Within a short time the whole of the island of Ceylon became a stronghold of Buddhism. Two important Councils were held there. The first of these was held under the president ship of the Venerable Arittha Thera at Thuparama in Anuradhapura after the arrival of the Buddhist missionaries during the reign of King Devanampiyatissa. The next Council was held at Aloka Cave during the time of King Vattagamani Abhaya (101-77 B.C.). As many as 500 learned Bhikkhus took part in the deliberations under the presidentship of Mahathera Rakkhita. At the end of the Second Council, the Canon along with the commentaries were inscribed on palm-leaves in order to preserve the purity of the original teachings.
The Buddhist world owes a great debt to Ceylon. As mentioned above, the Pali Canon has been preserved in its entirely in this island and Ceylonese Buddhism had great influence upon Burma, Cambodia, Siam and Laos, the only other countries where Theravada Buddhism flourishes today. Ceylon was not merely a passive recipient; it contributed to the development of Buddhism through its Commentaries.
According to the tradition preserved in the Ceylonese chronicles, two Buddhist monks, name Sona and Uttara, were sent by Emperor Asoka to preach Buddhism in Suvarnabhumi which is generally identified with Thailand. The location of Suvarnabhumi is , however, not beyond dispute. For. While some identify it with Thailand., others place it in Buram or take it to denote broadly the whole of Indochina. Buddhism, however, flourished in this region from a very early period, about the first or second century A.D., if not earlier. And today Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia are, like Ceylon, strongholds of the Theravada School.
During the first 300 years after the death of the Buddha, when Buddhism was spreading throughout India and to Ceylon, men of northern Asia, following the trade routes across the Himalayas, took news of the new religion of enlightenment back to China.
Buddhist monks made their way northward as missionaries and Chinese pilgrims traveled in the opposite direction. Among these were two travelers whose journeys are of great importance I the history of Buddhism.
One, Fa-Hsien, left China in 399 A.D. and spent 15 years in India. The other traveling monk, Hsiian-Tsang, left China in 629 A.D., crossed the Gobi desert, spent 16 years in India and returned laden with boos and manuscripts. He and his pupils translated much of Buddhist literature into Chinese. And the court of the great Tang dynasty emperor became filled with converts to Buddhism.
Also in the seventh century A.D., a great Japanese prince, Shotoku Taishi (572-622 A.D.), was converted to Buddhism. Under state protection it quickly attained the position of the most powerful religious and cultural influence in the land.Soon afterward a Buddhist monk crossed the mountains into Tibet. There has been preached a peculiar form of the Doctrine now known as Tibetan Lamaism.
Wherever it went, Buddhism brought with it high ideals: tolerance, nonviolence, respect for the individuals in all walks of life, love of animals and of nature. But the type of Buddhism practiced in China, Japan and Tibet differs from the Theravada Buddhism of South Asia.
Chronicle, n. a record or account of events written in the order of their happening; a historical record according to date.
Contribute, v. to have a share in; to help to bring about.
Convert, v. to change from one religion to another.
Deliberations, n.(pl.) consideration and debate.
Denote, v. to mark; to indicate; to mean; to refer to; to be name of.
Entirety, n. wholeness; completeness; whole; total.
Fancy, n. an unfounded opinion or belief; imagination; illusion or delusion.
Flourish, v. to succeed; to prosper : to be at the peak of development, activity, influence, etc.
Identify, v. to make, to treat or consider as being the same.
Inscribe, n. to make or engrave (words, symbols, etc.) on some surface; to mark or engrave (a surface) with words, symbols, etc.
Location, n. a position or place.
Manuscript, n. a book or paper written by hand, not printed.
Peculiar, adj. belonging to no other; particular; special; strange; odd.
Pilgrim, n. a person who travels, usually on foot, to a sacred place.
Polytheism, n. belief in or worship of many gods, or more than one god; opposed to monotheism.
Prevail, v. to be or become widespread.
Recipient, n. one who or that which receives.
Route, n. the way from one place to another; the road which one follows.
Stronghold, n. a place having strong defences; a safe place ; a place where a cause or an idea is strongly supported.
Survive, v. to continue to live or exist.
Tolerance, n. willingness to allow others to hold opinions or follow customs different from one’s own.

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