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We take the protection of your personal data very seriously in the collection, processing and use on the occasion of your visit to our website and want you to know when we collect what data and how we use it. We have taken the technical and organizational measures to ensure that the rules on data protection are observed by us as well as by any service providers. This privacy statement clarifies the nature, scope and purpose of the processing of personal data (hereinafter “data”) within our website and the websites, functions and contents associated with it, as well as our external online presences, such as our social media profiles (hereinafter: “online offer”).
Any person concerned can contact our data protection officer directly for any questions or suggestions regarding data protection.
Visitors and users of the online offer (hereinafter: “users”), customers, interested parties, business partners.
“Personal data” shall be any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (hereinafter referred to as “the person concerned”); a natural person is considered to be identifiable, either directly or indirectly, in particular by assigning to an identifier such as a name, to an identification number, to location data, to an online identifier (e.g. cookie) or to one or more special characteristics that are the expression of the physical, physiological, genetic, psychological, economic, cultural or social identity of this natural person (Article 4 (1) DSGVO).
"Processing" means any operation carried out with or without the aid of automated procedures or any such series of operations in connection with personal data, such as the collection, recording, organisation, sorting, storage, adaptation or modification, reading, retrieval, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or any other form of provision, matching or linking, restriction, deletion or destruction (article 4 (2) DSGVO).
"Profiling" means any form of automated processing of personal data which consists in the use of such personal data to assess certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular aspects to analyse or predict the performance, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, whereabouts or location change of this natural person (article 4 (4) DSGVO).
"Pseudonymization" means the processing of personal data in such a way that the personal data can no longer be assigned to a specific person concerned without the addition of additional information, provided that such additional information shall be kept separately and subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not assigned to an identified or identifiable natural person (article 4 (5) DSGVO).
"Person in charge" means the natural or legal entity, authority, institution or another body which, alone or jointly with others, decides on the purposes and means of processing personal data (article 4 (7) DSGVO).
"Processor" means a natural or legal person, authority, institution or another body that processes personal data on behalf of the responsible party (article 4 (8) DSGVO).
The legal basis for obtaining consent is Article 6 (1) lit. a and article 7 DSGVO.
The legal basis for processing for the performance of our services and the implementation of contractual measures as well as answering inquiries is Article 6 (1) lit. b DSGVO.
The legal basis for processing to comply with our legal obligations is article 6 (1) lit. c DSGVO.
The legal basis for processing to protect our legitimate interests in Article 6 (1) lit. f DSGVO.
The legal basis in the event that the vital interests of the person or other natural person require the processing of personal data in Article 6 (1) lit. d DSGVO.
In order to secure your data, we maintain technical and organisational security measures according to art. 32 DSGVO, which we constantly adapt to the state of the art. Measures include, in particular, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data by controlling physical access to the data. We have established procedures to ensure the perception of the rights concerned, the deletion of data and the reaction to the data being compromised. We also take into account the protection of personal data by means of technical design (privacy by design) and data protection-friendly preferences (privacy by default), art. 25 DSGVO. Your personal data will be transferred to us in encrypted form. This applies to all communication conducted through our website. We use the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) encoding system. However, we would like to point out that data transmission on the Internet, for example, can have security gaps when communicating via e-mail.
If we disclose data to processors or third parties as part of our processing, transmit them to them or otherwise grant them access to the data, this is done solely on the basis of a legal permission, e.g. if you have agreed with article 6 (1) lit. a DSGVO, the transmission to third parties pursuant to article 6 (1) lit. b DSGVO is necessary for the performance of the contract, a legal obligation so provides, article 6 (1) lit. c DSGVO, or on the basis of our legitimate interests, article 6 (1) lit. f DSGVO. For processors, the transfer takes place on the basis of the order processing contract concluded with the processor in accordance with article 28 DSGVO.
A transfer of data to a third country, e.g. when using third-party services, takes place only if it is to fulfil our (pre) contractual obligations, on the basis of your consent, due to a legal obligation or on the basis of our Legitimate interests in accordance with the aforementioned legal bases. Subject to other legal or contractual permits, we process or leave the data in a third country only in the presence of the special conditions of art. 44 ff. DSGVO (e.g. on the basis of special guarantees, such as the official recognition of an EU level of data protection (e.g. for the USA by the "Privacy shield") or observance of officially recognised special contractual obligations (so-called "Standard contractual clauses").
The right of Confirmation and information: You have the right, by way of 15 DSGVO, to receive from us a confirmation of whether you are processing personal data in question. If this is the case, you have the right to ask us for free information about the personal data stored by you, together with a copy of this data.
Right to rectification: you have the right under article 16 DSGVO to require us to rectify any incorrect personal data relating to you. Having regard to the purposes of processing, you have the right to demand completion of incomplete personal data.
Right to the limitation of processing: Under the conditions of article 18 of the DSGVO you have the right to demand a restriction on the processing of personal data.
Right to data transferability: In accordance with article 20 of the DSGVO, you have the right to require that the personal data relating to you which you have provided to us be obtained in a structured, common and machine-readable format and that they are transmitted to other responsible persons, as far as this is technically feasible.
The right of withdrawal: in accordance with article 7 (3) of the DSGVO, you have the right to revoke your consent to the processing of personal data at any time with effect for the future.
The right of objection: in accordance with article 21 of the DSGVO, you have the right at any time, for reasons arising from your particular situation, to violate the processing of personal data relating to you, which is based on article 6 (1) lit. e or f DSGVO is made to appeal. The aforementioned rights can be asserted at any time against the aforementioned responsible or the aforementioned data protection officer.
Right to appeal to a supervisory authority: according to article 77 DSGVO, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority.
Unless otherwise expressly stated, the data stored by us will be deleted in accordance with article 17 DSGVO as soon as they are no longer necessary for their intended purpose and the deletion does not conflict with statutory retention obligations.
If the data are not deleted because they are necessary for other and legally permissible purposes, their processing is restricted according to article 18 DSGVO, i.e. the data is blocked and not processed for other purposes. This applies, for example, to data that must be kept for commercial or tax reasons. According to legal requirements in Germany, the storage is carried out in particular for 10 years according to § § 147 abs. 1 No. 1, 4 and 4a, para 3 AO, 257 paragraph. 1 No. 1 and 4, para 4 HGB (books, records, management reports, accounting documents, trading books, taxation of relevant Documents, etc.) and 6 years pursuant to § § 147 paragraph. 1 No. 2, 3 and 5, para 3 AO, 257 paragraph 1 No. 2 and 3, paragraph 4 HGB (commercial letters).
The hosting services used by us at our host provider are designed to provide the following services: infrastructure and platform services, computing capacity, storage space and database services, security services as well as technical maintenance services that we use for the purpose of operating the website.
We, or our hosting provider, process stock data, contact data, content data, contract data, usage data, meta-and communication data of customers, interested parties and visitors of this online offer based on our legitimate interests an efficient and secure provision of this online offer pursuant to article 6 (1) p. 1 f DSGVO in conjunction with article 28 DSGVO.
We use these log data without any assignment to your person or other profiling for statistical evaluations for the purpose of operation, security and optimization of our online offer, but also for the anonymous recording of the number of visitors to our website and the extent and manner of use of our website and services, as well as for billing purposes, in order to measure the number of "clicks" received by cooperation partners. Based on this information, we can provide personalized and site-specific content, analyse traffic, troubleshoot and troubleshoot errors, and improve our services. Herein is also our legitimate interest according to article 6 paragraph 1 lit. f DSGVO. We reserve the right to check the log data retrospectively if, on the basis of concrete evidence, the legitimate suspicion of illegal use exists. We store IP addresses in the log files for a limited period of time if this is necessary for security purposes or for the provision of services or the settlement of a service, for example, if you use one of our offers. After cancelling the order or after receipt of payment, we delete the IP address if it is no longer required for security purposes. We store IP addresses even if we have a specific suspicion of a crime in connection with the use of our website.
We use so-called session cookies on our pages to optimize our online offer. A session cookie is a small text file that is sent to each server when you visit a website and is cached on your hard disk. This file as such contains a so-called session ID, with which various requests from your browser can be assigned to the shared session. This will allow your computer to be recognized again when you return to our website. These cookies will be deleted after you close your browser. They are used, for example, to allow you to use the basket function across multiple pages. We also use a limited amount of persistent cookies (also small text files that are stored on your device) that remain on your device and allow us to recognize your browser the next time you visit. These cookies are stored on your hard drive and are deleted by itself after the specified time. Their lifespan is 1 month to 10 years. In this way, we can present our offer to you more user-friendly, more effective and safer, for example by displaying information tailored to your interests on the site.
Information about the number of visits to our website and the use of individual functions of our internet presence.
When the cookie is activated, an identification number is assigned to it and an assignment of your personal data to this identification number is not made. Your name, IP address, or similar data that would allow a cookie to be assigned to you will not be placed in the cookie. Based on the cookie technology, we only receive pseudonymised information, for example, about which pages were visited. You can set your browser so that you are informed about the setting of cookies in advance and can decide in individual cases whether you exclude the acceptance of cookies for certain events or in general, or that cookies are completely prevented. Stored cookies can be deleted in the system settings of the browser. This can limit the functionality of the site.
When contacting us (e.g. by e-mail, telephone or via social media), the information of the user for the processing of the contact request and its processing is according to article 6 para 1 lit. b) DSGVO processed. In answering your request, we also have a legitimate interest in processing your transmitted data in accordance with art 6 para. 1 lit. f) DSGVO. We will delete the requests if they are no longer required. We check the requirement regularly, at the latest every two years. The statutory archiving obligations also apply.
In the following notes, we inform you about the contents of our newsletter, the subscription, mailing and statistical analysis procedure as well as your rights to object. By subscribing to our newsletter, you declare your consent to the receipt, the described procedure and the transfer of the Data to third parties as explained in more detail.
We send out newsletters, emails and further electronic messages with advertising information (hereinafter “Newsletters") only with the consent from the recipients or with a legal permission. To the extent that the contents of a Newsletter are described in concrete terms in the context of subscribing to it, the contents are decisive for the Users’ consent. In addition, our Newsletters contain information about capital markets and the finance industry, in particular the fund, insurance and real estate industry. We research trends, provide analyses and studies, and report about personnel changes and market movements. The Newsletters are editorial but can be delivered including ads. Furthermore, there are also separate promotional Newsletters/mailings, study surveys as well as invitations to congresses, investor dinners, workshops and roundtables.
The subscription to our Newsletter takes place in a so-called double opt-in procedure. This means, you will receive an email after subscribing in which you will be asked to confirm your subscription. This confirmation is necessary so that nobody can sign up with other people’s email addresses. The subscriptions to the Newsletter are logged to be able to verify the compliance of the registration process with the legal requirements. This includes that the time of the subscription and confirmation as well as the IP address is stored. Changes to your Data that is stored by the mailing service provider will also be logged.
To sign up for the Newsletter, please specify your first and last name, the company name and your job title. This has the following background: We use your first and last names to customise and personalise the salutation. We ask for additional Data so that we can design and structure the Newsletters’ contents better, optimise it and improve its usability by means of analyses that will not be shared with third parties. The information furthermore permits us to conduct improved reading analyses and improve the distribution and invitation management for congresses and workshops.
The mailing service provider can use the recipients’ Data in pseudonymised form, i.e. without attribution to any one User, for the purpose of optimising or improving its own services, e.g. for the technical optimisation of the mailing and the presentation of the newsletter or for statistical purposes. The mailing service provider, however, does not use the Data of our Newsletter recipients to write itself to them or to pass on the Data to third parties.
The mailing service provider additionally also offers statistical analysis options for usage data, e.g. information as to whether a Newsletter was opened, when it was opened and which links are clicked in the Newsletter.
Although this information can be attributed to the individual recipients by for technical reasons required by the mailing service provider, the analyses based on this information, however, are used by our company generally in reference to groups and consequently in anonymised form, so that we can only see to how many Users an email has been sent, how many Users have opened the Newsletter, whether emails have been rejected or if a User has unsubscribed from the list upon receipt of an email. These analyses help us organise and administer the distribution list and detect the reading habits of Users, and they permit us adjusting our contents or instead also mailing different contents according to our Users’ actual interests.
Our company has established its own Facebook presence ("Fanpage") in order to communicate there with our customers, prospects and other Facebook users and to inform them about our offer and our services.
In this context, we point out that this data can also be processed outside the EU, especially in the US. However, Facebook is actively certified under the Privacy Shield (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000GnywAAC&status=Active), so Facebook is required to comply with EU privacy standards when processing users' data. Nevertheless, we expressly point out that the processing in the US may make it more difficult for you to enforce your rights as a user.
The Facebook Visitor data is generally processed for market research and promotional purposes, and uses it to create usage profiles that are used to serve advertisements both within and outside of Facebook that are in line with the user's alleged interest , For this purpose, cookies are generally stored with information about the user behavior and the interests of the user on the computer of the user. If the user himself is also logged in to Facebook, it may also be the case that further data is stored in the usage profiles on Facebook.
The processing of the personal data of the users takes place on the basis of our justified interests in an effective information of the users and communication with the users acc. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO. In the event that the user of Facebook e.g. If the user is asked to consent to data processing by ticking off a control field or pressing a button, the legal basis for the processing is Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a., Art. 7 GDPR.
Inquiries and your user rights can be claimed directly from Facebook most effectively. Only Facebook has access to the data of its users and can directly take action and provide information. Of course, you can also contact us if you need help.
We only use Google Analytics with IP anonymization enabled. This means that the IP address of the users is reduced by Google within Member States of the European Union or in other contracting States of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transferred to a Google server in the United States and shortened there. The IP address transmitted by the user's browser is not merged with other data from Google. Users can prevent the storage of cookies by a corresponding setting of their browser software; Users may also prevent Google from collecting the data generated by the cookie and related to their use of the online offer, as well as the processing of such data by using the browser plug-in available at the following link Download and install: http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=de.
As an alternative to the browser add-on or within browsers on mobile devices, please click this link to prevent Google Analytics from entering this site in the future.
The opt-out only works in this browser and only for this domain.
An opt-out cookie is stored on your device. If you delete your cookies in this browser, you will need to click this link again.
For more information about Google's use of data, settings and opposition, see the Google Privacy Statement (https://policies.google.com/technologies/ads) and the settings for displaying Ads by Google (https://adssettings.google.com/authenticated). The user's personal data will be deleted or anonymized after 14 months.
We rely on our legitimate interests (i.e. interest in the analysis, optimization and economic operation of our online offer within the meaning of art. 6 para. 1 lit. f. DSGVO) external "Typekit" fonts of the provider Adobe Systems Software Ireland Limited, 4-6 Riverwalk, Citywest Business Campus, Dublin 24, Republic of Ireland. Adobe is certified under the Privacy Shield Agreement and provides a guarantee to comply with European Data Protection Law (https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000TNo9AAG&status=Active).
State of the Data Protection Declaration: 08 June 2018.
During the creation of this website, all efforts were taken to ensure that the information contained is up-to-date, correct and clear. Despite all diligence, it is possible that unintentional errors may occur. public imaging GmbH therefore accepts no liability in particular for typographical or print errors or for the accuracy, completeness or validity of the information contained on this website. The content of this website is offered by public imaging GmbH on a non-binding basis without guarantee or warranty. This also applies to all content on websites hyperlinked by this site.
The author does not guarantee the accuracy, correctness, completeness or quality of the information provided. Liability claims against the author, whether of a material or immaterial nature, resulting from the use or disuse of the information on offer and/or the use of incorrect or incomplete information are fundamentally excluded insofar as the author is not evidently intentionally or grossly negligent.
All offers are non-binding. The author expressly reserves the right to change parts or the entirety of the entire website without prior notice, or to change, expand or delete published material permanently or temporarily.
The author is liable for direct or indirect referrals to third-party websites (“links”) that are outside of his or her scope of responsibility solely if the author has knowledge of their content and if it is technologically feasible and reasonable to prevent their use in the event of illegal content.
The author hereby expressly states that at the time of the establishment of any links, no illegal content was visible on the linked websites. The author has no control over the current or future design, content or authorship of linked websites, and therefore expressly distances him or herself from all content on all linked websites that has been edited after the establishment of the link. This applies to all links contained within his or her own online content, as well as for all third-party entries made in comment sections, discussion forums and mailing lists set up by the author. The provider of the linked page is solely liable for illegal, incorrect or incomplete content and, in particular, for claims arising from the use or disuse of the information provided in this manner, not the author of the website containing the respective link.
The author aims to respect the copyrights of all utilised graphics, sound files, video sequences and textual content in all publications, or to utilise self-produced or royalty-free graphics, sound files, video sequences and textual content. All potential third-party trademarks and brand images named on the website are subject in full to the provisions of the respective copyright laws and ownership rights of the respective copyright owner. Mere mention does not constitute an assertion that these copyrighted materials and trademarks are not protected by the rights of a third-party owner!
The copyright for all material created and published by the author remains with the author of the site. Reproduction or use of such graphics, sound files, video sequences or textual content in other printed or digital publications is not permitted without the express consent of the author.
If the site offers the possibility to enter personal or business details (e-mail addresses, names, addresses), this data is entered on a voluntary basis by the user. The use of and payment for all offered services is – to the extent technically feasible and reasonable – permitted without the submission of such data and/or through the use of pseudonyms.
This disclaimer is to be treated as a part of the website containing the link to this page. If certain parts or individual formations of this text do not, no longer or do not fully comply with the provisions of the applicable law(s), as amended, all other parts of the document will remain unaffected in terms of content and validity.
public imaging GmbH uses Google Analytics, a web analysis service of Google Inc. Google Analytics employs cookies. Information generated via cookies about the use of this website is transmitted to a Google server in the US and stored there. Google uses this information on behalf of public imaging GmbH to analyse the use of this website, to create reports on website activity for public imaging GmbH and to provide other services associated with the use of the website and the use of the internet. Google only provides this information to third parties if legally compelled to do so or if third parties process data on behalf of Google. Google will never connect submitted data to your IP address. By using this website, you agree to the use of your data by Google in the manner and for the purposes described above.

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Graphis. International Journal of Graphic Art and Applied Art. 11 Vols.
Zurich: Amstutz & Herdeg, 1960–1964. First edition. Softcover. Large Quarto. App. 900pp. Original illustrated wraps. Issues 91-96, 104, 105, 111, 114, and 116. Three color offset prints on heavy paper stock by Marino Marini in vol. 91, original Day-Glo fluorescent color advertising in issue 111, Eduard Prüssen woodcut in issue...	More about Graphis. International Journal of Graphic Art and Applied Art. 11 Vols.
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Graphis. International Journal of Graphic Art and Applied Art. 8 Vols.
Zurich: Amstutz & Herdeg, 1978–1980. First edition. Softcover. Large Quarto. App. 700pp. Original illustrated wraps. Issues 196-203. Color offset prints on heavy paper stock by Paul Peter Piech, Fernando Puig Rosado, b/w by Friedrich Dürrenmatt and Fernando Krahn. Profusely illustrated with color and b/w photography and illustrations covering all aspects.....	More about Graphis. International Journal of Graphic Art and Applied Art. 8 Vols.
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Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC., 2012 IL 113107 (November 29, 2012) Cook Co. (GARMAN) Judgments reversed; remanded.
Administrative Law, Statutory Fees 1st Dist.
Rodriquez v. The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2012 IL 113706 (November 29, 2012) Cook Co. (GARMAN) Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.
Class Actions, Decertification 1st Dist.
Mashal v. The City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341 (December 13, 2012) Cook Co. (THOMAS) Appellate court affirmed; remanded.
Res Judicata, Need for Final Definitive Orders 1st Dist.
Hernandez v. Pritikin, 2012 IL 113054 (December 13, 2012) Cook Co. (KARMEIER) Appellate court affirmed; remanded.
Res Judicata, Need for Final Orders 2d Dist.
Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898 (December 13, 2012) Du Page Co. (GARMAN) Appellate court reversed; remanded.
Medical Studies Act, Confidentiality Provisions 1st Dist.
Tunca v. Painter, 2012 IL App (1st) 110930 (November 9, 2012) Cook Co., 5th Div. (TAYLOR) Affirmed.
Negligence, Slip and Fall, Open and Obvious 1st Dist.
Ballog v. The City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 112429 (October 22, 2012) Cook Co.,6th Div. (GARCIA) Affirmed.
Insurance, Clear Policy Language 1st Dist.
Area Erectors, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 2012 IL App (1st) 111764 (December 7, 2012) Cook Co., 5th Div. (HOWSE) Affirmed.

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· Applications of Game Theory: Path and mission planning, threat prediction, etc.
· Array Processing: Linear and circular microphone arrays, antenna array, beamforming, DOA estimation, etc.
· Automatic Control: Robots, motors, aircraft, missile, machine tools, submarine, spacecraft, power system, etc.
· Automatic Target Recognition: Mine detection, mammogram inspection, etc.
· Chemical Agent Classification: Toxic vapor classification, chemical agent classification, etc.
· Communications: Noncoherent receiver design, network traffic prediction, flow control, etc.
· Fault Diagnostics/Prognostics: Actuators, pumps, motors, etc.
· General Signal Processing Applications: Traffic incident prediction, fire detection, etc.
· Health Monitoring of Electromechanical Systems: Pumps, motors, etc.
· Nondestructive Inspection: Aircraft wing, tank shoes, composite structures, etc.
· Sensor Validation: Simultaneous sensor and process fault diagnostics, etc.
· Speech Processing: Speech enhancement, speaker adaptation, speech separation, etc.
1. G. Chen, C. Kwan, D. Shen, J.B. Cruz, Jr., and A. Vannevel, “Adaptive Cooperative Path Planning for Multiple Platforms,” IEEE ROBIO 2005.
2. D. Li, J. B. Cruz, Jr., G. Chen, C. Kwan, and H. Chang, “A Hierarchical Approach To Multi-Player Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games,” Conference on Decision and Control, 2005.
3. D. Shen, J. Cruz, G. Chen, and C. Kwan, “A Game Theoretic Approach to Mission Planning for Multiple Aerial Platforms,” AIAA Infotech@Aerospace, September 26-29, Arlington, VA., 2005.
4. G. Chen, D. Shen, J. B. Cruz, and C. Kwan, “A novel cooperative path planning for multiple aerospace vehicles,” AIAA infotech@aerospace, Sept. 26-29, 2005, Arlington, VA.
5. D. Shen, G. Chen, J. B. Cruz, Jr., C. Kwan, S. Cox, and S. P. Riddle, “A game theoretic approach to threat intent inference,” Conf. Modeling and Simulation, C2 Analysis, C2 Architecture, 2006.
6. G. Chen, D. Shen, C. Kwan, J. B. Cruz, Jr., M. Kruger, “Game Theoretic Approach to Threat Prediction and Situation Awareness,” SPIE, 2006.
2. C. Kwan, K. Ho, G. Mei, Y. Li, Z. Ren, R. Xu, Y. Zhang, D. Lao, M. Stevenson, V. Stanford, and C. Rochet, “An Automated Acoustic System to Monitor and Classify Birds,” Applied Signal Processing, October 2005.
3. Y. Li, K. C. Ho, C. Kwan, Daniel P. K. Lun and Y. H. Leung, "A study of partially adaptive concentric ring array," IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. II, revised in September 2005.
4. C. Kwan, H. Xu, L. Haynes, J. Yalowitz, and G. Romanowski, “Intelligent Interference Cancellation in Phased Arrays,” Automatic Control Symposium, pp. 716-721, 1997.
5. Y. Li, K.C. Ho, and C. Kwan, “Design of Broad-band Circular Ring Microphone Array for Speech Acquisition in 3-D,” Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2003.
6. C. Kwan, K. Ho, G. Mei, Y. Li, Z. Ren, G. Zhao, M. Stevenson, R. Xu, V. Stanford, and C. Rochet, “An Automated Acoustic System to Monitor and Classify Birds,” BirdStrike 2003.
7. Y. Li, K. C. Ho and C. Kwan, “Beampattern synthesis for concentric circular ring array using MMSE design,” IEEE Int. Symp. Circuits and Systems (ISCAS-04), Vancouver, May 23-26, 2004.
8. Y. Li, K. C. Ho and C. Kwan, “A novel partial adaptive algorithm for broadband beamforming using concentric circular array,” IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, Montreal, May 17-21, 2004.
9. C. Kwan, G. Mei, X. Zhao, Z. Ren, R. Xu, V. Stanford, C. Rochet, and J. Aube, and K.C. Ho, “Bird classification algorithms: Theory and Experimental Results,” ICASSP 2004.
10. Y. Li, K. C. Ho, C. Kwan and Y. H. Leung, "Generalized partially adaptive concentric ring array," Proc. IEEE Int Symp. Circuits Syst. ISCAS05, Kobe, Japan, May 2005.
11. L. M. Vicente, K.C. Ho, C. Kwan, “An Improved Partial Adaptive Narrow-Band Beamformer Using Concentric Ring Array,” ICASSP 2006.
1. C. Kwan, H. Xu, F. L. Lewis, “Robust Spacecraft Attitude Control Using Adaptive Fuzzy Logic,” International Journal of Systems Science, Vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 1217-1225, 2000.
2. X. Zhang, R. Xu, C. Kwan, M. Pritchard, L. Haynes, M. Polycarpou and Y. Yang, “Fault Tolerant Formation Flight Control of UAVs,” Int. J of Vehicle Autonomous Systems, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4, pp.217-235, 2004.
3. C. Kwan, R. Xu, W. Liu, R. Tan, and L. Haynes, “Nonlinear Control of Missile Dynamics,” Conference on Decision and Control, pp.4685-4691, 1998.
4. C. Lin, H. Xu, C. Kwan, and L. Haynes, “Submarine pitch and depth control using Fuzzy CMAC neural network,” Proc. American Control Conference, pp. 379-384, 1998.
5. M. M. Polycarpou, X. Zhang, R. Xu, Y. Yang, C. Kwan, “A Neural Network Based Approach to Adaptive Fault Tolerant Flight Control,” Int. Symposium on Intelligent Control, 2004.
1. C. Kwan, F. L. Lewis, and K. S. Yeung, “Robust Adaptive Control of Induction Motors Without Flux Measurements,” Automatica, June, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 903-908, 1996.
2. C. Kwan, “Robust Adaptive Control of Induction Motors,” Int. Journal of Control, Vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 539-552, 1997.
3. C. Kwan and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Backstepping Control of Induction Motors Using Neural Networks,” IEEE Trans. Neural Networks, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 1178-1187, 2000.
4. Kuljaca, N. Swamy, F. L. Lewis, C. Kwan, “Design and Implementation of Industrial Neural Network Controller Using Backstepping,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, pp. 193 – 201, vol. 50, no. 1, 2003.
5. C. Kwan, “Robust Control of Induction Motors,” Proc. IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, pp. 1107-1111, 1994.
6. C. Kwan, F. L. Lewis, and K. S. Yeung, “Robust Adaptive Control of Induction Motors Without Flux Measurements,” Proc. American Control Conference, pp. 3515-2519, 1995.
7. C. Kwan and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Control of Induction Motors Using Neural Networks,” Proc. IEEE Mediterranean Control Conference, 1995.
1. G. Pan, H. Xu, C. Kwan, C. Liang, L.S. Haynes, and Z. Geng, “Modeling and Intelligent Chatter Control Strategies for a Lathe Machine,” Control Engineering Practice, Vol. 4, No. 12, pp. 1647-1658, 1996.
2. K. Liu, S. Subbarayan, R. Shoults, M. Manry, C. Kwan, F. Lewis, and J. Naccarino, “Comparison of Short-Term Load Forecasting Techniques,” IEEE Trans. Power systems, 11(2): 877-882, 1996.
3. J. Dohner, J. Lauffer, T. Hinnerichs, N. Shankar, M. Regelbrugge, C. Kwan, R. Xu, B. Winterbauer, and K. Bridger, “Mitigation of Chatter Instabilities in Milling by Active Structural Control,” J. of Sound and Vibration, 2003.
4. J. Dohner, C. Kwan, and M. Ruggelbrugge, “Active Chatter Suppression in An Octahedral Hexapod Milling Machine: A Design Study,” SPIE Smart materials & Structure Conference, vol. 2721, February, 1996.
5. C. Kwan, H. Xu, and L. Haynes, “Summary of Chatter Control Strategies in Octahedral Hexapod Machine,” Automatic Control Symposium, pp.502-504, 1997.
6. C. Kwan, H. Xu, C. Lin, and L. Haynes, “H-infinity Control of Chatter in Octahedral Hexapod Machine,” American Control Conference, 1997.
7. J. L. Dohner, T. D. Hinnerichs, J. Lauffer, C. Kwan, M. E. Regelbrugge, and N. Shankar, “Active Chatter Control in a Milling Machine,” SPIE Smart Materials Conference, vol. 3044, San Diego, March, 1997.
8. J. Lauffer, M. Regelbrugge, C. Kwan, Y. Lin, J. Dohner, and T. Hinnerichs, “A Smart Spindle Unit for Active Chatter Suppression of a Milling Machine Part II: Dynamics and Control,” SPIE Smart Materials Conference, vol. 3326, San Diego, March, 1998.
9. C. Kwan, R. Xu, J. Lang, Y. Lin, M. Stevenson, Z. Ren, and L. Haynes, “Intelligent High Speed Control of Piezoelectric Actuators For Precision Manufacturing,” Intelligent Systems in Design and Manufacturing II, Proc. SPIE (vol. 3833), Boston, 1999.
10. J. Dohner, J. P. Lauffer, T.D. Hinnerichs, N. Shankar, M. Regelbrugge, C. Kwan, R. Xu, B. Winterbauer, and K. Bridger, “On the use of active structural control to enhance the cutting performance of a milling machine,” Proc. SPIE Smart Structures and Materials Symposium 2002, Vol. 4698, A. McGowan, ed.
11. M. E. Regelbrugge, J. P. Lauffer , J. L. Dohner, C. Kwan , and N. Shankar, “A Demonstration of Active Suppression of Milling-Tool Chatter,” Adaptive Structures Forum of the AIAA Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials Conference, Denver, April, 2002.
1. L. K. Mestha, C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “Instabilities in Beam Control Feedback Loops in Proton Synchrotrons," Particle Accelerators, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp.1-43, 1993.
2. L. K. Mestha, C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “Fixed-Structure Suboptimal Feedback Control for Particle Accelerators,” Particle Accelerators, Vol. 47, no. 2, 1994.
3. L. K. Mestha, C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “Interactions of Beam Control Loops With High Q Local RF Loops Under Heavy Beam Loading,” Particle Accelerators, Vol. 47, no.1, 1994.
4. L. K. Mestha, C. Kwan and R. Webber, “A General Control Model for Designing Global RF Feedback Loops,” Proceedings of the Third European Particle Accelerator Conference, Berlin, March 24-28, 1992.
5. L. K. Mestha, C. Kwan, J. Mangino and K. S. Yeung, “A Time Domain Control Algorithm for Global RF Feedback Loops,” Proceedings of the Third European Particle Accelerator Conference, Berlin, March 24-28, 1992.
6. L.K. Mestha, C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “General Time-Varying State-Space Control Model and its Application for Transient Beam Loading Compensation,” Proc. Sixth IEEE Particle Accelerator Conference, pp.2385-2387, 1993.
1. C. Kwan, “Frequency-Domain Approach to Population Control,” Proc. IEEE First Conference on Control Applications, pp. 479-483, 1992.
2. C. Kwan, “Some New Results in Population Control,” Proc. IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, pp. 4110-4111, 1994.
1. C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “Robust Adaptive Control of Revolute Flexible-Joint Manipulators Using Sliding Techniques,” Systems and Control Letters, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 279-288, 1993.
2. C. Kwan, “Hybrid Force/Position Control for Manipulators With Motor Dynamics Using a Sliding-Adaptive Approach,” IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, Vol. 40, no. 5, 1995.
3. C. Kwan, “Robust Adaptive Force/Motion Control of Constrained Robots,” IEE Proceedings Pt. D, Vol. 143, No. 1, pp. 103-109, 1996.
4. C. Kwan and Y. H. Kim, “Multimanipulator Control of Robots Using Neural Networks,” Journal of Intelligent Control and Systems, December, 1996.
5. C. Kwan, F. L. Lewis, and D. M. Dawson, “Robust Neural Network Control of Rigid-link Electrically-Driven Robots,” IEEE Trans. Neural Networks, pp. 581-588, July, 1998.
6. C. Kwan, A. Yesildirek, and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Force/Motion Control of Constrained Robots Using Neural Networks,” Journal of Robotic Systems, pp. 697-714, vol. 16, no. 12, 1999.
7. C. Kwan, F. L. Lewis, and Y. H. Kim, “Robust Neural Network Control of Flexible-Joint Robots,” Asian Journal of Control, pp. 188-197, vol. 1, no.3, September, 1999.
8. C. Kwan, D. M. Dawson, and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Adaptive Control of Robots Using Neural Network: Global Stability,” Asian Journal of Control, vol. 3, no.2, pp. 111-121, June 2001.
9. C. Kwan and K. S. Yeung, “Sliding-Adaptive Control of Revolute Flexible-Joint Manipulators Without Chattering,” Proc. First International Intelligent Control and Automation Conference, Aug. 1993.
10. C. Kwan, A. Yesildirek, and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Force/Motion Control of Constrained Robots Using Neural Networks,” Proc. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 1862- 1867, 1994.
11. C. Kwan and J. K. Chang, “Robust Adaptive Control of Robot Manipulators With Actuator Dynamics,” Proc. International Workshop on New Directions of Control and Manufacturing, November, 1994.
12. C. Kwan, A. Yesildirek, and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Force/Motion Control of Flexible-Joint Robots Using Neural Networks,” Proc. American Control Conference, pp. 4460-4464, 1995.
13. C. Kwan, “Robust Hybrid Force/Position Control for Manipulators With Motor Dynamics,” Proc. American Control Conference, pp. 365-369, 1995.
14. C. Kwan and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Control of Rigid Link Electrically Driven Robots Using Neural Network,” Proc. International Symposium on Intelligent Control, 1995.
15. C. Kwan and F. L. Lewis, “Robust Backstepping Control of Flexible-Joint Robots Using Neural Network,” Proc. Conference on Decision and Control, 1995.
16. C. Kwan, D. M. Dawson, and F. L. Lewis, “Neural Network Based DCAL Controller for Robot Tracking,” Proc. Conference on Decision and Control, 1995.
1. R. Xu, C. Kwan, and L. Haynes, “Automatic Target Discrimination Using Neural Network,” Intelligent Engineering through Artificial Neural Network (ANNIE), pp. 187-192, 1998.
2. R. Xu, C. Kwan, and L. Haynes, “Target isolation in SAR images,” Algorithms for Synthetic Aperture Radar Imagery VIII, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4382), pp. 191-194, 2001.
3. J. Liang, X. Zhao, R. Xu, C. Kwan, and C-I Chang, “Target Detection With Texture Feature Coding Method and Support Vector Machines,” ICASSP 2004.
4. B. Ayhan, C. Kwan, X. Li and A. Trang, “Airborne Detection of Land Mines Using Mid-wave Infrared (MWIR) and Laser-illuminated-near Infrared Images with the RXD Hyperspectral Anomaly Detection Method,” 2006 Pattern Recognition in Remote Sensing.
1. C. Kwan, B. Ayhan, G. Chen, C. Chang, J. Wang, and B. Ji, “A Novel Approach for Spectral Unmixing, Classification, and Concentration Estimation of Chemical and Biological Agents,” IEEE Trans. Geoscience and Remote Sensing, vol. 44, no. 2, Feb. 2006.
2. Z. Zhao, Y. Zhang, Y. Liu, C. Kwan, B. Ayhan, X. Li, H. Zhou, M. Ryan, and T. Griffin, “A Unified Framework for Vapor Classification and Concentration Estimation Using E-nose,” Sensors and Actuators, accepted, February 2006.
3. T. Qian, R. Xu, C. Kwan, B. Linnell, and R. Young, “Toxic Vapor Classification and Concentration Estimation for Space Shuttle and International Space Station,” Proc. Int. Symposium on Neural Networks, pp. 543-561, 2004.
4. T. Qian, X. Li, B. Ayhan, R. Xu, C. Kwan, and T. Griffin, “Application of Support Vector Machines to Vapor Detection and Classification for Environmental Monitoring of Spacecraft,” 2006 ISNN.
1. C. Kwan, H. Xu, and L. Haynes, “Fast Flow Control in High Speed Communication Networks,” 15th Digital Communications Conference, pp. 19-24, September, 1996.
2. C. Kwan, H. Xu, C. Lin, and L. Haynes, “Optimization of Phase-Locked Loops With Guaranteed Stability,” 15th Digital Communications Conference, pp. 36-41, September 1996.
3. C. Kwan, H. Xu, and L. Haynes, “Nonlinear Channel Equalization Using Fuzzy CMAC Neural Network,” 15th Digital Communications Conference, pp. 25-35, September 1996.
4. C. Kwan, R. Xu, C. Chou, E. Geraniotis, “A Fast Flow Control Algorithm for High-Speed Communications Networks,” Conference on Decision and Control, pp.2139-2145, 1998.
5. C. Kwan, R. Xu, P. Clark and C. Hammond, “Traffic prediction tool for enhancing wireless network management,” Digital Wireless Communications III, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4395), pp. 240-249, 2001.
6. R. Seshadri, D. Lao, C. Kwan, J. P. Fonseka, “A High Performance, Low Complexity, and Bandwidth Efficient Receiver Design,” MILCOM 2005.
1. C. Kwan, R. Xu, and L. Haynes, “New data clustering technique and its applications,” Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery: Theory, Tools, and Technology III, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4384), pp. 1-5, 2001.
2. R. Xu, J. Chen, and C. Kwan, “Remote diagnosis tool via Internet,” Component and Systems Diagnostics, Prognosis, and Health Management, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4389), pp.47-50, 2001.
3. C. Kwan, A. Davydov, and R. Xu, “Helicopter gearbox fault isolation,” Component and Systems Diagnostics, Prognosis, and Health Management, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4389), pp. 133-137, 2001.
4. R. Xu, M. Stevenson, C. Kwan, and L. Haynes, “Ball bearing monitoring,” Component and Systems Diagnostics, Prognosis, and Health Management, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4389), pp. 216-218, 2001.
5. C. Kwan, R. Xu, and L. Haynes, “Gearbox failure prediction using infrared cameras,” Thermosense XXIII, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4360), 2001.
6. C. Kwan, X. Zhang, R. Xu, and L. Haynes, “A Novel Approach to Fault Diagnostics and Prognostics,” Int. Conference on Robotics and Automation, May, 2003.
7. C. Kwan, R. Xu, and X. Zhang, “Fault Detection and Identification in Aircraft Hydraulic Pumps Using MCA,” Safeprocess, 2003.
8. X. Zhang, R. Xu, C. Kwan, S. Y. Liang, Q. Xie, and L. Haynes, “An Integrated Approach to Bearing Fault Diagnostics and Prognostics,” American Control Conference, 2005.
9. W. Wongsaichua, W. J. lee, S. Oraintara, C. Kwan, and X. Zhang, “Integrated High Speed Intelligent Utility Tie Unit for Disbursed/Renewable Generation Facilities,” IEEE IAS Annual Conference, 2004.
10. H. Zhang, W Lee, C. Kwan, Z. Ren, H. Chen, J. Sheeley, “Artificial Neural Network Based On-line Partial Discharge Monitoring System for Motors,” IEEE, IAS, ICPS 2005 Annual Conference, May 7-11, 2005 at Saratoga Spring, NY.
11. R. Xu, T. Qian, and C. Kwan, “An Improved Optimal Pairwise Coupling Classifier,” ISNN 2005.
12. C. Kwan, T. Qian, Z. Ren, H. Chen, R. Xu, W.-J. Lee, H. Zhang, J. Sheeley, “A Novel Approach to Corona Monitoring,” ISNN 2005.
13. X. Zhang, M. M. Polycarpou, R. Xu, and C. Kwan, “Actuator fault diagnosis and accommodation for improved flight safety”, 2005 Joint IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control and Mediterranean Conference on Control and Automation conference.
14. X. Zhang, Y. Liu, R. Rysdyk, C. Kwan, and R. Xu, “An Intelligent Hierarchical Approach to Actuator Fault Diagnosis and Accommodation,” IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2006.
15. W. J. Lee, M. Sahni, K. Methaprayoon, C. Kwan, Z. Ren, and J. Sheeley, “A Novel Approach for Arcing Fault Detection for Medium/Low-Voltage Switchgear,” Conf. IEEE C&PS, 2006.
16. X. Zhang, D. Miller, R. Xu, C. Kwan, and H. Chen, “A Maximum Entropy based Approach to Fault Diagnosis Using Discrete and Continuous Variables,” Safeprocess 2006.
1. H. Xu, C. Kwan, L. S. Haynes, and J. S. Pryor, “Real-Time Adaptive On-Line Traffic Incident Detection,” Journal of Fuzzy Systems, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 173-183, 1998.
2. K. S. Yeung, K. L. Chen, and C. Kwan, “Implementing Unstable Filters Via Input Signal Reversal ______ A State Variable Perspective,” IEEE Trans. Circuits and Systems, volume 45, no.1, January, 1998.
3. C. Kwan and F. L. Lewis, “A Note on Kalman Filtering,” IEEE Trans. Education, vol. 42, no. 3, August, 1999.
4. C. Kwan, X. Zhang, and R. Xu, “Early Fire Detection Using Acoustic Emissions,” Safeprocess, 2003.
5. X. Zhao, R. Xu, and C. Kwan, “Ship Motion Prediction: Algorithms and Simulation Results,” ICASSP 2004.
6. Y. Zhang, C. Kwan, Y. Deng, and D. Lao, “Bird Classification in Noisy Environments: Theory, Results and Comparative Studies,” Bird Strike Conference 2006.
1. W. Wongsaichua, W. Lee, S. Oraintara, C. Kwan, and F. Zhang, “Integrated High Speed Intelligent Utility Tie Unit for Disbursed/Renewable Generation Facilities,” IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 507-513, 2005.
2. H. Xu, C. Kwan, and L.S. Haynes, “Machine Performance Degradation Monitoring Using Fuzzy CMAC,” American Control Conference, June, 1997.
3. R. Xu, C. Kwan, J. Lang, M. Stevenson, Y. Lin, and L. Haynes, “Health Monitoring of Rotating Shaft Systems Using Neural Network,” Intelligent Engineering through Artificial Neural Network (ANNIE), pp. 703-707, 1998.
4. H. Xu, C. Kwan, J. Lang, and L. Haynes, “Health Monitoring of Flight Critical Systems Using Fuzzy CMAC,” International Conference on Signal and Image Processing, pp. 31-35, 1998.
1. H. Xu, C. Kwan, L. Haynes, K. Jarausch and P. Russel, “Fuzzy CMAC for Enhancement of Scanning Probe Microscope Images,” International Conference on Signal and Image Processing, pp. 36-40, 1998.
2. X. Li and C. Kwan, “Geometrical Feature Extraction for Robust Speech Recognition,” 39th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers (a conference of IEEE Signal Processing Society), November, 2005.
1. C. Kwan, B. Li, R. Xu, X. Li, T. Tran, and T. Nguyen, “A Complete Image Compression Codec Based on Overlapped Block Transform, “ Applied Signal Processing, accepted, January 2006.
2. C. Kwan, B. Li, R. Xu, T. Tran, and T. Nguyen, “Very low-bit-rate video compression using wavelets,” Wavelet Applications VIII, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4391), pp.176-180, 2001.
3. C. Kwan, B. Li, R. Xu, T. Tran, and T. Nguyen, “SAR image compression using wavelets,” Wavelet Applications VIII, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4391), pp. 349-357, 2001.
1. X. Zhao, V. K. Varma, G. Mei, B. Ayhan, and C. Kwan, “In-Line Nondestructive Inspection of Mechanical Dents on Pipelines with Guided Shear Horizontal Wave Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducers,” ASME Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Volume 127, Issue 3, pp. 304-309, 2005.
2. C. Kwan, R. Xu, and L. Haynes, “Composite delamination detection using infrared camera,” Infrared Technology and Applications XXVII, Proc. SPIE (vol. 4369), 2001.
3. X. Zhao, C. Kwan, R. Xu, T. Qian, T. Hay, J. L. Rose, B. B. Raju, R. Maier, and R. Hexemer, “Nondestructive Inspection of Metal Matrix Composites Using Guided Waves,” QNDE, 2003.
4. C. Kwan, G. Zhao, Z. Ren, R. Xu, L. Haynes, and K. M. Luk, “Wireless nondestructive inspection of a layered structure with ultrasonic guided waves,” Tri-Service Corrosion Conference, 2003.
5. X. Zhao, C. Kwan, Z. Ren and B. Ayhan, “Wireless Health Monitoring of an Aircraft Wing,” 2004 Int. Workshop on Corrosion, Lexington Park, 2004.
6. X. Zhao, C. Kwan and K. M. Luk, “Wireless Nondestructive Inspection of Aircraft Wing with Ultrasonic Guided Waves,” 16th World Conference on Nondestructive Testing, Montreal, 2004.
7. X. Zhao, C. Kwan, and B. Mi, S. Owens, R. L. Royer Jr. and J. L. Rose, and B. B. Raju, “Nondestructive Inspection of Metal Matrix Tank Shoes with Ultrasounds,” 53rd Defense Working Group on Nondestructive Testing,” November 2005.
1. R. Xu and C. Kwan, “Robust Isolation of Sensor Failures,” Asian Journal of Control, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 12-23, March 2003.
2. C. Kwan and R. Xu, “A Note on Simultaneous Isolation of Sensor and Actuator Faults,” IEEE Trans. Control System Technology, pp.183-192, vol. 12, no. 1, 2004.
3. C. Kwan, R. Xu, and W. Li, “A new approach to sensor validation,” Power 2000, Taipei, Taiwan.
4. R. Xu, G. Zhang, X. Zhang, C. Kwan, and K. Semega, “Sensor Validation Using Nonlinear Minor Component Analysis,” 2006 ISNN.
5. J. Cao, C. Kwan, R. Xu, and F. Figueroa, “Simultaneous Sensor and Process Fault Diagnostics for Propellant Feed System,” Safeprocess 2006.
1. C. Kwan, X. Li, D. Lao, Y. Deng, B. Raj, R. Singh, and R. Stern, “Voice Driven Applications in Non-stationary and Chaotic Environment,” Int. J. Signal Processing, accepted for publication, October 2005.
2. R. Xu, G. Mei, Z. Ren, C. Kwan, J. Aube, C. Rochet, and V. Stanford, “Towards User Sensitive Interfaces: Autodirective Speech Acquisition for Speaker Identification and Speech Recognition Using Phased Arrays,” Springer Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence special volume on Ambient Intelligence in Everyday Life, 2006.
4. R. Xu, G. Mei, Z. Ren, C. Kwan, V. Stanford, J. Aube, and C. Rochet, “A Real Time Speaker Verification Demonstration on the Smart Flow System,” 2004 Int. Symposium on Intelligent Multimedia, Video and Speech Processing.
5. R. Xu, Z. Ren, W. Dai, D. Lao, and C. Kwan, “Multimodal Speech Enhancement in Noisy Environment,” 2004 Int. Symposium on Intelligent Multimedia, Video and Speech Processing.
1. Z. Zhao, H. Chen, G. Chen, C. Kwan, and X. Li, “Comparison of several ballistic target tracking filters,” ACC 2006.
2. Z. Zhao, H. Chen, G. Chen, C. Kwan, X. R. Li, “IMM-LMMSE Filtering Algorithm for Ballistic Target Tracking with Unknown Ballistic Coefficient,” SPIE, 2006.
3. X. Li, C. Kwan, G. Mei, B. Li, “A Generic Approach to Object Matching and Tracking”, ICIAR, 2006.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V.


STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn S. PASSMAN.
Rehearing Denied May 13, 1977.
*879 James J. Gleason, III, Director, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Woodrow W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., Patrick J. Berrigan, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
On the night of May 26, 1974, two men, claiming they had car trouble and needed to call for assistance, gained entry into the St. Tammany Parish home of Pat O'Brien, a well known night club owner. Once inside one of the men produced a gun and demanded money. A struggle followed in which Mr. O'Brien was seriously wounded and beaten. The intruders, leaving the wounded victim in the kitchen, then began to search the house for a wall safe. In one of the rooms they discovered Mrs. O'Brien and Cara, the O'Brien's sixteen year old daughter. After searching several rooms in the house the men returned to the kitchen, accompanied by Mrs. O'Brien and Cara, and were fired upon by Mr. O'Brien, who had been able to reach a .22 caliber rifle. The two men fled, taking from the premises two hand guns belonging to Mr. O'Brien.
Subsequently the two men were identified as Walter Burnette and Glenn Scott Passman, and both were charged with armed robbery. La.R.S. 14:64. Separate trials were ordered. Glenn Scott Passman, tried by jury in March of 1976, was found guilty of armed robbery, and thereafter sentenced to serve ninety-nine years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
In this appeal, defendant Glenn Passman relies on twenty-nine of thirty-one assigned errors. Assignments numbers one and four, having been neither brief nor argued, are regarded as abandoned. State v. Wientjes, 341 So. 2d 390, 391 (La.1976).
During voir dire examination defense counsel asked prospective juror Walter Foulks whether he would be able to consider defendant's guilt or innocence, without being influenced by whether the defendant took the stand in his own behalf. When Mr. Foulks replied that he might be influenced by this fact, "according to how bad the case went against him or for him," counsel inquired whether he felt he could follow the judge's instruction not to consider this fact in weighing the defendant's guilt. To this inquiry Mr. Foulks responded: "I may have trouble and I may not." Counsel moved to excuse Mr. Foulks for cause, on the authority of La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(4).
Counsel's challenge for cause was ultimately rejected by the court, and an objection noted. It is this ruling which defendant assigns as error. Counsel thereafter exhausted his peremptory challenges prior to completion of the jury panel. La.C.Cr.P. art. 800.
"THE COURT: "If the Court instructs you that you are not to take into consideration the fact that he didn't take the stand, that is the law of this State, could you accept that as the law and follow it in the jury room? "MR. FOULKS: "Yes, sir. "THE COURT: "Do you feel you could do that, even though "MR. FOULKS: "I would accept it as the law. Yes, sir. "THE COURT: *880 "And put it out of your mind, the fact of your belief that the man should tell his side? "MR. FOULKS: "Yes. "THE COURT: "You could do that? "MR. FOULKS: "I believe I can do it. Yes, sir. "THE COURT: "Don't tell me you believe you can. Do you think you can? "MR. FOULKS: "I believeyeah. I believe so."
We have repeatedly held that the trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and only where it appears, upon review of the voir dire examination as a whole, that the judge's exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, resulting in prejudice to the accused, will this Court reverse the ruling of the trial judge. State v. Weathers, 320 So. 2d 895 (La.1975); State v. O'Conner, 320 So. 2d 188 (La.1975); State v. Frazier, 283 So. 2d 261 (La.1973); State v. Willis, 262 La. 636, 264 So. 2d 590 (1972).
A trial judge's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of his discretion, notwithstanding that the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, where subsequently, on further inquiry or instruction, he has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and the evidence. State v. Governor, 331 So. 2d 443 (La.1976); State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301 (La.1976); State v. Johnson, 324 So. 2d 349 (La.1976).
The instant case is distinguishable from that of State v. Nolan, 341 So. 2d 885 (La. 1977), therein we found an abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause, where the juror's voir dire testimony revealed not only a predisposition in favor of the State and its witnesses and against the defendant and his witnesses which was not dispelled by retractions elicited by the court and the district attorney after "considerable coaching," but also, that the juror exhibited an "[in]ability to grasp the questions propounded [to her]," indicating a lack of competency to understand and apply the law.
When taken as a whole, Mr. Foulks' testimony on voir dire does not support defendant's contention that the judge's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and reversible error.
This assignment of error is therefore without merit.
Defendant, in this assignment of error, complains that the trial judge improperly denied his request for a change of venue. Defendant, in his written motion, alleged that extensive media coverage of the crime made it impossible for him to secure an unbiased jury, and consequently made a fair trial impossible.
"* * * (1) [T]he nature of pretrial publicity and the particular degree to which it has circulated in the community, (2) the connection of government officials with the release of the publicity, (3) the length of time between the dissemination of the publicity and the trial, (4) the severity and notoriety of the offense, (5) the area from which the jury is to be drawn, (6) other events occurring in the community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the community or individual jurors toward the defendant, and (7) any factors likely to affect the candor and veracity of the prospective jurors on voir dire." 315 So. 2d at 311.
"* * * The degree to which the publicity has circulated in areas to which venue could be changed, the care exercised and the ease encountered in the selection of the jury, the familiarity with the publicity complained of and its resultant effect, if any, upon the prospective *881 jurors or the trial jurors, and the peremptory challenges and challenges for cause exercised by the defendant in the selection of a jury. See, generally, Annotation 33 A.L.R.3d 17 (1970)." State v. Berry, 329 So. 2d 728, 730 (La.1976).
This Court, applying these principles, rejected precisely the same argument raised by Passman's co-participant, Walter Burnette, in the course of his appeal, State v. Burnette, 337 So. 2d 1096, 1098-99 (La.1976), and it is not insignificant that Burnette's trial took place several months before Passman'scloser in point of time to the date of the offense, and presumably while the community's initial sense of outrage over the crime was more intense than it was at the time of Passman's trial.
Our review of the evidence adduced at the March 23, 1976 hearing on the motion for change of venue, coupled with our examination of the jurors' responses to questioning on voir dire, leads us to the conclusion that defendant was not entitled to a change of venue.
Defendant complains in these assignments of error of what he characterizes as "prosecutorial misconduct." In the defendant's view, the prosecutor throughout the trial sought to belittle, ridicule, degrade and discredit the defendant and his witnesses, making them out to be "hostile, lying, vicious people, through manners, words, tones of voice or through the employment of inflammatory phraseology" in order to create prejudice in the mind of the jury, and thereby to defeat defendant's right to a fair trial.
Counsel objected to the question as "argumentative," reasoning that the district attorney's "baiting techniques" were an improper method of examination; his objection was overruled.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: "Q. When you came to the jail, did you discuss with Glenn Passman his trial that was coming up? "A. No, sir. Didn't even know about a trial. I mean, I just came in to speak to him. "Q. You did not discuss the trial or the trip to Mississippi when you visited Glenn Passman in jail? "Now, I am putting you on your guard, Mr. Burris.
Defense counsel objected on the ground that the questioning was argumentative, and designed to badges the witness; his objection was overruled by the trial judge, who commented, "it is cross examination."
*882 "[THE PROSECUTOR]: "Q. Did you ever tell them that your mother and Mr. and Mrs. Burris and you were with Glenn Passman on the 24th, 25th and 26th before today? "A. Yes, I did. "Q. You told the police that he was with your mother and you and your aunt before today? "Now, remember what I am asking you. You told the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office and Steve Raacke that Glenn Passman was in Mississippi with you and your mother and Mr. and Mrs. Burris before today? "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: "Your Honor, I am going to object to the tone of the District Attorney in his cross examination. It is a "[THE PROSECUTOR]: "May it please the Court, my voice is my business and not his. "THE COURT: "Wait a minute, Mr. [Prosecutor]: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: "It is a harassing, badgering technique of cross examination, and it is unethetical [sic] type of cross examination. "[THE PROSECUTOR]: "May it please the Court, he cross examines the way he wants and I cross examine the way I want. "THE COURT: "All right, Mr. [Prosecutor]. Sit down. I'm going to overrule your objection. The lady is on cross examination. "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: "I would like to object to the Court's ruling and note it for assignment of error. "[THE PROSECUTOR]: "My tone of voice doesn't reflect on that machine."
In brief defense counsel argues that in each of these situations the trial court, rather than overruling the objection should have rebuked the State's attorney and admonished the jury to disregard the prejudicial innuendo of the questioning. We note that such an admonition was never requested by counsel, though, in view of the trial judge's rulings on each of the objections we are inclined to believe the request would have been futile.
It is not feasible for this Court to review the tone of voice used, and it is impossible to detect the accompanying gestures or other subtleties which animate verbal speech from a written transcript.
Necessarily, the trial judge is given wide discretion in controlling the conduct and orderly process of trial. State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 (La.1976); cf. La.C. Cr.P. art. 17. His rulings in this respect will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Richardson, 337 So. 2d 210 (La.1976); State v. Terregano, 336 So. 2d 859 (La.1976).
Admittedly, our present ability to review this kind of error is limited. However, after careful review, not only of the particular conduct challenged by the defendant in these assignments, but of the entire transcript, we do not believe that defendant has demonstrated an abuse of discretion in the trial judge's rulings.
Nevertheless, for purposes of assisting the lower courts in ruling on similar objections in the future, and of guiding prosecutors as officers of the court in regulating their own conduct, we commend to them with our express approval the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function (1971), particularly sections 5.2 (courtroom decorum) and 5.7(a) (examination *883 of witnesses).
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible merit in assignments of error numbers five, ten and eleven.
"The man is 80 years old. I think I have a perfect right to prove his eye sight."
Defendant's position is that the evidence was irrelevant, as the witness' ability to see had not been challenged by the defense.
The relevancy of proffered evidence depends on whether it tends to prove or disprove a material fact at issue. La. R.S. 15:441 and 435; State v. Sneed, 328 So. 2d 126 (La.1976). The relevancy of evidence is to be tested by the purpose for which it is offered. La.R.S. 15:442.
The obvious purpose of the testimony objected to, was to show that Mr. O'Brien's eye sight was good, despite his advanced age, and that his testimony should as a consequence be believed. It is therefore clear that the testimony was offered to support the credibility of the State's witness, and was improperly admitted if Mr. O'Brien's ability to see, and hence his credibility in that respect was not, at that time, a material issue in the case.
Louisiana law provides that testimony to establish the credibility of a witness is not normally admissible until that credibility has been attacked. La.R.S. 15:484; State v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 467 n. 2 (La.1976); State v. Watson, 159 La. 779, 106 So. 302 (1925). Accord, McCormick on Evidence, § 49 at 102-07 (Cleary ed. 1972). Since, at the time that Mr. O'Brien was interrogated about his vision, his ability to see clearly had not been questioned, his credibility in this respect was not properly provable when the objection was noted. The trial judge's ruling therefore was erroneous.
Nevertheless, defendant has not alleged or shown how he was prejudiced by the judge's ruling. Furthermore, the error did not constitute a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right, or result in a probable miscarriage of justice. La.C. Cr.P. art. 921.
This assignment of error does not demonstrate grounds for reversal.
Defendant argues in this assignment, that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to order the testimony of Mrs. Cara O'Brien stricken, or alternatively in failing to grant a mistrial, after she admitted on cross-examination that she had violated the court's sequestration order.
Mrs. O'Brien concluded her testimony just prior to noon recess on the second day of trial. During the course of cross-examination she admitted discussing with her *884 daughter some of the questions which the latter had been asked when testifying the previous day. Mrs. O'Brien denied that the conversation was detailed or extensive. When court reconvened after the noon recess, defense counsel moved to strike Mrs. O'Brien's testimony on the ground that she had violated the sequestration order. The motion was overruled.
Pretermitting the question of the timeliness of defendant's objection, see, La.C. Cr.P. art. 841, Louisiana law does not recognize a motion to strike. The judge's ruling was therefore correct. Further, no mistrial was requested by defense counsel, and no grounds existed for the trial judge to order a mistrial sua sponte. See, La.C.Cr.P. art. 775.
Defendant assigns as error the trial judge's admission, over defense objection, of testimony by Albert Olsen, a police officer and fingerprint technician, that he had been unable to lift any identifiable prints from the O'Brien residence. Officer Olsen freely admitted that he was not qualified to make identifications based on fingerprint comparison. This admission, argues the defendant rendered incompetent Olsen's testimony that no prints with sufficient points of identification to permit matching were found at the crime scene.
Defendant's argument is not well founded; it fails to acknowledge the distinction between comparison and classification of fingerprints, which calls for the skill of a fingerprint identification expert, and the ability to recognize and lift a clear and usable print. Officer Olsen never attempted to make an identification based on fingerprint comparison. Defendant acknowledged at trial that Officer Olsen was qualified to lift fingerprints. We find that Olsen was qualified to testify as to the fact of whether any prints were lifted. Cf. State v. Yoxtheimer, 301 So. 2d 318 (La.1974).
Defendant contends, in this assignment of error, that the trial court erroneously allowed the police officer who had initially taken the defendant into custody, to compare a two year old photograph of the defendant taken on the date of his arrest, with his appearance on the day of the trial. Defendant's objection, overruled by the trial judge, was that the requested comparison called for the witness' conclusions, and thereby invaded the province of the jury.
Generally, Louisiana evidence law bars admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses. La.R.S. 15:463. It is well settled, however, that this prohibition does not prevent a lay witness from testifying as to natural inferences drawn from facts he personally observed, provided he states the facts observed. State v. Roche, 341 So. 2d 348 (La.1977); State v. Glover, 340 So. 2d 1346 (La.1976); State v. Clark, 340 So. 2d 1302 (La.1976); State v. Neal, 321 So. 2d 497 (La.1975).
The witness called upon to make the comparison responded not only in reliance on the photograph shown to him, but also on the basis of his personal observation of the accused at the time he was taken into custody. The factual bases from which the inference was drawn were presented to the jury.
Consequently, we find no error in the ruling of the trial judge. This assignment is without merit.
*885 "You say in the jail parlance, you are known as a rat; that is the same word more or less as a fink? "* * * "You got that reputation because you testified [informed] about a jail break that was going to go down and you saved a life. Is that how you got it?"
Defendant's objection was overruled, and the judge's ruling forms the basis of the present assignment of error.
"A leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer he is to deliver, and though framed in the alternative, is inadmissible when propounded to one's own witness, unless such witness be unwilling or hostile."
The State does not contend that its inmate witness was "unwilling or hostile," and we find the question asked defective as defendant contends. The trial judge's ruling was erroneous.
"Q. Did you assist them [certain law enforcement officers] in respect to another case in order to assist yourself * * *? "* * * "Q. Would you explain what you did? "A. Okay. There was an attempted escape going to come down; one officer was going to be killed, two others going to be held hostage and going to take over the jail. Due to the fact of my charges were so light I did not want to participate in it, and I tipped off the authorities inside the jail and it was stopped."
Since the testimony suggested by the leading question previously had been elicited by defense counsel, we regard the trial judge's ruling on defendant's objection to the leading question as non-reversible error. La.C. Cr.P. art. 921. Cf. State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La.1973); State v. Maiden, 258 La. 417, 246 So. 2d 810 (1971).
This assignment does not demonstrate reversible error.
In this assignment, defendant complains that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to allow the jury to view, during their deliberations, a police radio log which had been admitted into evidence.
"A juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written evidence. Testimony shall not be repeated to the jury. Upon the request of a juror and in the discretion of the court, the jury may take with it or have sent to it any object or document received in evidence when a physical examination thereof is required to enable the jury to arrive at a verdict."
"The physical-examination-required exception to the prohibition against documentary evidence going to the jury came into the jurisprudence (see 31 Tul.L.Rev. 693) with dictum in State v. Colbert, 29 La.Ann. 715 (1877). That decision upheld the trial court's refusal to let an affidavit properly introduced in evidence to go to the jury for its deliberations, but noted that such might be done in instances such as where `it was necessary for a jury to compare handwriting.' 29 La.Ann. 717. "The re-examining of a documentary exhibit for its verbal content has not been included as an allowable purpose of `physical examination.' We found no Louisiana decision where, over objection, the jury was afforded access to a documentary, after the case was submitted to it, for such purpose. To the contrary, convictions have been reversed when, over objection, *886 documentary exhibits were given to the jury for the purpose of permitting it access to the verbal contents thereof. State v. Arnaudville, 170 La. 151, 127 So. 395 (1930) (account book); State v. Harrison, 149 La. 83, 89, 88 So. 696 (1921) (bloodhound pedigrees)." 303 So. 2d at 489.
It is apparent the jury wished to examine the police radio log for its verbal content and not for its physical characteristics. Therefore, the trial court ruling was correct. See also, State v. McCully, 310 So. 2d 833 (La.1975).
We find no merit in this assignment of error.
At the hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, the trial judge rejected defendant's motion for a continuance based on the absence of two material witnesses. The hearing on the motion for new trial had on previous occasions been continued. When the prior hearings were scheduled, subpoenas for the two witnesses had been requested and issued. Counsel, however, failed to request subpoenas for the subsequent hearing. Because he did not request them, he cannot complain that they were not issued. La.C.Cr.P. art. 731.
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge; his ruling will not be disturbed absent arbitrariness or abuse. State v. Sosa, 328 So. 2d 889 (La.1976); State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 263 So. 2d 306 (1972). For several reasons, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. First, though we do not choose to base our decision solely on the absence of technical formalities because the written motion was filed by the defendant pro se, we note that the motion, though in writing, was not verified by his or counsel's affidavit, as required by law. La.C.Cr.P. art. 707; State v. Weathers, 304 So. 2d 662 (La.1974). Second, the sole ground for continuance urged in defendant's written motion was specifically abandoned by the defense. (See footnote 4). Third, the responsibility for failure to subpoena the desired witnesses must be placed on the defendant, who failed to show due diligence in an effort to procure attendance of the witnesses. La.C.Cr.P. art. 709(3).
Defendant also complains that the trial judge improperly refused to allow the defendant to put on evidence in support of his motion for new trial. The record contains not only a motion for new trial, but a supplemental motion therefor, as well as a detailed memorandum in support of the motion. The facts and law relied on by defendant in support of his motion were thoroughly presented to the trial judge.
"Bill of Exceptions No. 2. This bill was reserved when an evidentiary hearing was denied on the new trial motion. * * For the purpose of the hearing of the motion on the new trial, the judge accepted the facts as related in the affidavit as true, but nonetheless, found that the new evidence would not have changed the verdict. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary and would have merely been repetitious because of the affidavit. The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying this motion." 292 So. 2d at 582.
*887 For the foregoing reasons we find no error in the trial judge's rulings denying the requested continuance, declining to allow evidence to be taken, and rejecting defendant's request for a new trial.
Assignments numbers 14, 16, 17 and 18 are without merit.
Defendant herein complains that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring that the defendant be handcuffed during the hearing on the motion for new trial.
It is the responsibility of the trial court to see that criminal proceedings are conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to so control the proceedings that justice is done. La.C.Cr.P. art. 17. As a result, the trial judge is empowered in his discretion, to use appropriate measures including physical restraint of an accused to insure that dignity and order prevail, and this authority exists though the jury may be present. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970); State v. Burnette, 337 So. 2d 1096 (La.1976).
However, our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion in this instance. The State suggests that the defendant had been convicted of a serious crime, and that as a consequence, the judge's caution in keeping him handcuffed was justified. Nevertheless, as defense counsel correctly states, the defendant had been unfettered throughout the trial, and had created no outburst or commotion.
Conceding that the trial judge improperly required this defendant to remain handcuffed during the hearing, we are nevertheless unable to agree that the error is reversible. The jury had already rendered its verdict of guilty and was not present. Counsel argues that Passman was inhibited in his ability to take notes or assist counsel. Review of the hearing record reveals that Passman actively participated in the hearing. The degree to which his efforts were handicapped by his restraints was minimal. The error does not warrant reversal. La.C. Cr.P. art. 921.
This assignment does not demonstrate reversible merit.
Defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling denying his pro se "Writ of Habeas Corpus," in which defendant sought a copy of the trial transcript. The request was denied by the trial judge with the notation: "* * * it is premature. Transcript has not been filed as of this date by the reporter." Defendant relies by analogy on the comments to La.C.Cr.P. art. 297, which indicate that transcripts of preliminary hearings are to be furnished "without delay." Trial ended on March 30, 1976. Defendant's self-styled writ was filed on June 30, 1976.
The present record consists of the entire trial transcript, including voir dire, opening statements, argument and jury instructions. Hearings on all pre-trial and post-trial motions are included, as well as all pleadings filed in this matter. The appeal was lodged in accordance with the rules set forth in La.C.Cr.P. arts. 914-23.
The issue raised by this assignment of error is moot.
After trial, defendant filed, in proper person, an application for "Writ of Habeas Corpus" seeking "full latitude" to act as his own co-counsel and to interview other inmates in the parish prison where he was incarcerated. Defendant urges the latter request was essential, because a fellow inmate had testified against him at trial, and he needed to interview other inmates to prove that witness' testimony was perjured.
In our view the court properly denied defendant's request. Defendant had already been convicted, and his motion for new trial had been denied. Defendant was entitled to and ultimately did seek review of his case on appeal. His efforts could not *888 affect the outcome of his appeal, as they would not be part of the record.
The habeas application was premature, and the right claimed was not one to which defendant was then entitled.
This assignment is without merit.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress testimony of extra-judicial identifications of the accused made by Mr. O'Brien, his wife and daughter. One of the witnesses subpoenaed by the defendant was the State's attorney in charge of prosecuting the case. Defense counsel moved to sequester all witnesses, including the prosecutor. Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial judge to sequester the State's attorney.
The last sentence of the quoted article permits the trial judge to excuse the State's attorney from the sequestration order if it is in the interest of justice. The trial judge is allowed wide latitude in making such a determination. State v. Griffin, 329 So. 2d 693 (La.1976); State v. Sneed, 328 So. 2d 126 (La.1976); State v. Raymond, 258 La. 1, 245 So. 2d 335 (1971), appeal dismissed, cert. den. 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 101, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1972). We cannot say he improperly exercised his discretion on this occasion.
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial judge to order pre-trial discovery of certain police investigative reports and of a list of State's anticipated trial witnesses.
Defendant sought, by motion to compel production of exculpatory evidence, police reports which indicated that no fingerprints or blood samples implicating the defendant in the robbery had been discovered by the police. The State willingly informed defendant that it had no fingerprints or blood samples connecting him to the robbery, but maintained that any investigative reports by police officers reflecting the absence of such evidence were not subject to discovery by the defense.
The trial judge correctly agreed with the State, ruling that the State's answers were sufficient, and that defendant was not entitled to the police reports.
"Information on the test firing of the gun and the absence of shells is simply not `exculpatory evidence' required to be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)]." 338 So. 2d at 652.
Additionally, we note that under Louisiana law police reports are considered confidential, and generally the State may not be compelled to produce them for inspection. State v. Banks, 341 So. 2d 394 (La.1976); State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200 (1971). It is therefore our opinion *889 that defendant was not entitled to copies of the police reports he sought to discover.
Likewise, the trial judge correctly denied defendant's request, made by prayer for oyer, for a list of the witnesses the State intended to call at trial. Defendant is not entitled under Louisiana law to this information. State v. Chase, 327 So. 2d 391 (La.1976); State v. Thomas, 310 So. 2d 517 (La.1975); State v. Browning, 290 So. 2d 322 (La.1974); State v. Thomas, 290 So. 2d 317 (La.1974).
These assignments of error are without merit.
In these assignments, defendant complains that the trial court improperly limited the scope of examination during the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress Miss Cara O'Brien's identification of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. Defense counsel was questioning one of the officers who had transported Miss O'Brien from her home in St. Tammany Parish to the Hammond Police Station, where she identified Passman as one of the intruders. Counsel was permitted to examine this officer thoroughly with respect to the events leading up to and including Miss O'Brien's identification of the accused. But when counsel attempted to discover what conversation took place after the identification, on the way back to the O'Brien home, the State objected on the ground that the testimony was not relevant to the issue before the courti. e., the validity of the identification proper. The trial judge sustained the State's objection, and it is this ruling that defendant assigns as error number twenty-three.
Likewise, after Miss Cara O'Brien testified that she could not remember having made a photographic identification of the accused, as defense counsel continued to question her regarding the circumstances under which she viewed a book of "mug shots," the State objected on the ground of materiality. The objection was sustained by the trial judge, and his ruling now forms the basis of assignment of error number twenty-five.
With respect to Cara O'Brien's identification of the accused, the motion to suppress being argued was addressed simply to an alleged improper "line-up" conducted at the Hammond Police Station, and defendant's contention that a subsequent in-court identification would necessarily be tainted by that procedure. The motion neither referred to, nor sought suppression of a photographic identification of the accused by this witness.
In view of the fact that the line-up identification could not have been tainted by events occurring subsequent thereto, and because the witness testified that she could not remember making a photographic identification of the accused, we do not find the trial judge's rulings improper.
Even during the course of trial, the trial judge is accorded broad discretion to end irrelevant and immaterial questions. State v. Robinson, 342 So. 2d 183 (La.1977); State v. Ardoin, 340 So. 2d 1362 (La.1976); State v. Corey, 339 So. 2d 804 (La.1976). This same measure of discretion exists in rulings on relevancy made during the course of a hearing on a motion to suppress.
After careful examination of the transcript of the entire hearing on the motion, we are unable to conclude that the judge's rulings in these instances constituted an abuse of discretion. Defense counsel was accorded wide latitude in questioning the witnesses called to testify at the hearing regarding the issues raised in the motion to suppress.
These assignments of error do not demonstrate reversible error.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel propounded certain leading questions to Miss Cara O'Brien. The State objected, on the authority of La.R.S. 15:277, arguing that Miss O'Brien had been subpoenaed to testify by the defendant, who according to the language of *890 La.C.Cr.P. art. 703 bore the responsibility of proving his motion, and that she could not be asked leading questions unless she was shown to be unwilling or hostile. Counsel then asked the trial judge declare her a hostile witness, and the judge refused, observing that she had not shown any hostility.
We have previously held that a defendant is not entitled as a matter of course to call witnesses at a motion to suppress hearing, and then to subject them to cross-examination. State v. Rogers, 324 So. 2d 403 (La.1975). Of course, the trial judge is vested with discretion to allow leading questions where the witness demonstrates hostility or an unwillingness to cooperate with counsel's examination. State v. Peters, 302 So. 2d 888 (La.1974), cert. den. 423 U.S. 878, 96 S. Ct. 151, 46 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1975); State v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974); State v. Fulmer, 263 La. 971, 270 So. 2d 116 (1972).
After review of Miss O'Brien's testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress, we are unable to conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling that she was not hostile or uncooperative, or in sustaining the State's objection to the leading questions propounded to her.
In these assignments of error defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to suppress the in-court identifications of him by Mr. and Mrs. Pat O'Brien and their daughter Cara. It is defendant's contention that earlier improper visual or photographic identifications tainted the subsequent in-court identifications, resulting in prejudicial error to the accused.
Within two or three hours of the robbery, Miss O'Brien was taken from her home to the Hammond Police Station to view a suspect who had been taken into custody. The suspect was Glenn Passman. No formal "line-up" was conducted at the police station because, as Miss O'Brien was being escorted to the door of the station from the parking lot, she passed by a large window and noticed the accused inside. Immediately she identified him as one of the intruders.
Ample evidence supports the finding of the trial judge that this inadvertent confrontation was not so inherently prejudicial as to be inadmissible, or to taint Miss O'Brien's subsequent in-court identification of the accused; this finding is entitled to great weight. E.g., State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678 (La.1975).
We acknowledge that there were slight inconsistencies between the testimony of Miss O'Brien and the officers regarding the sequence of events leading to the identification. Likewise, we note that there was some testimony which suggested that Miss O'Brien's viewing of the defendant through the window, rather than at a formal line-up, was not altogether accidental. Nevertheless, we find that the bulk of the evidence supports the trial judge's ruling, and, in any event, there is demonstrated in the record ample independent basis for Miss O'Brien's in-court identification of the accused apart from the supposedly tainted identification. See, State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 (La.1976); State v. Anthony, 332 So. 2d 214 (La.1976); State v. Judson, 329 So. 2d 742 (La.1976); State v. Peevy, 321 So. 2d 324 (La.1975).
Defendant likewise sought to exclude in-court identifications of the accused by Mr. O'Brien and his wife, on the ground that their testimony would be tainted by an earlier improper photographic identification. A series of twelve photographs had been shown to these witnesses. All were black and white photographs with the exception of onethe photograph of Glenn Passman. That photo was in color, and it is *891 contended this fact rendered any photographic identification invalid, and operated to taint the subsequent in-court identification.
We are inclined to agree with defendant that the photographic show-up was tainted. It is not appropriate for police officers to assemble photographs for display to witnesses for purposes of identification wherein all prints are similar in character except that of the principal suspect. State v. Williams, supra. The fact that Passman's picture alone of the twelve exhibited was a color print, drew attention to it in an impermissibly suggestive way.
Nevertheless, we do not find error in the trial judge's refusal to exclude either Mr. or Mrs. O'Brien's in-court identification. As previously noted, if the record demonstrates an independent basis for the incourt identification apart from the tainted identification, due process does not compel suppression of the in-court identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); State v. Williams, supra; State v. Anthony, supra; State v. Judson, supra; State v. Peevy, supra; State v. Bland, 310 So. 2d 622 (La. 1975). After reviewing the record we have no doubt that there existed a substantial independent and untainted basis for the witnesses' in-court identification.
Passman and his confederate were in the O'Brien home some twenty to twenty-five minutes; neither wore a mask. Lighting in the house was said to be good. Facts adduced at trial demonstrated that each of the O'Brien's had ample opportunity to view Passman at the time the offense was being committed.
For the foregoing reasons assignments of error numbers twenty-six and twenty-seven do not present reversible error.
On June 10, 1975 defendant in proper person filed a motion seeking to recuse all judges of the Twenty-second Judicial District Court, alleging that the three judges harbored feelings of prejudice and bias against him. The motion was referred to Judge Burrell Carter of the Twenty-first Judicial District Court.
"The finding of this Court in the matter [is] to recuse Judge Wallace Edwards, and Judge Tanner is denied. There was no believable evidence to indicate any bias or prejudice on the part of either of these Judges. I heard the opinions and conclusions of both Mr. Passman and Mr. Burnette, but those opinions and conclusions do not constitute legal evidence. There is absolutely no legal evidence to justify a recusing of the two Judges remaining, that is Judge Tanner and Judge Crane. [sic] "Now Mr. Passman, apparently you have had a very difficult time and your road ahead is not going to be a smooth one. The only thing that I can say to you is that it is my opinion that either of these Judges or there will be a new Judge in this district in my opinion will give you a fair day in Court."
Defendant objected to, and now assigns as error the failure of the district judge to recuse Judges Tanner and Crain.
Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to recuse, we find the ruling of the district judge correct.
There is no merit in this assignment of error.
Defendant assigns as error the trial judge's refusal to grant his motion for reduction of bail prior to trial.
"* * * The defendant complains of the trial court's failure to reduce his bond *892 prior to the trial. On an appeal after conviction, the issue is moot. Timely invocation to this court's supervisory jurisdiction at the time of denial of reduction is the appropriate avenue of review. La. C.Cr.P. art. 322: State v. Bradford, 298 So. 2d 781 (La.1974); State v. Cosey, 261 La. 550, 260 So. 2d 620 (1972)." 332 So. 2d at 269.
Defendant complains in this assignment that the trial court erred in allowing the State's attorney to comment in rebuttal argument on the testimony of a State's witness whose testimony had not been referred to by defense counsel in his closing argument. It is defendant's position that the proper scope of rebuttal argument was exceeded by the State's attorney. See, La. C.Cr.P. art. 774.
"I am not restricted, may it please the Court. I will drop it."
The prosecutor made no further reference to this witness or his testimony in the remainder of his argument.
It is defendant's position that the trial court committed error in failing to admonish the jury that the prosecutor's statements were indeed improper, and should have been disregarded. We note that neither an admonition nor a mistrial was requested by defense counsel. La.C.Cr.P. arts. 770, 841. Defendant is not now entitled to complain of the trial judge's failure to admonish the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
"The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that: * * * (4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; * * *."
"(a) The prosecutor should support the authority of the court and the dignity of the trial courtroom by strict adherence to the rules of decorum and by manifesting an attitude of professional respect toward the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the courtroom.
"(b) When court is in session the prosecutor should address the court, not opposing counsel, on all matters relating to the case.
"(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in behavior or tactics purposefully calculated to irritate or annoy the court or opposing counsel.
"(d) A prosecutor should comply promptly with all orders and directives of the court, but he has a duty to have the record reflect adverse rulings or judicial conduct which he considers prejudicial. He has a right to make respectful requests for reconsideration of adverse rulings.
"(e) A prosecutor should be punctual in all court appearances.
"If [the court reporter] did give me a copy [of the transcript requested], I assume it, because he says he did, and then I have misplaced the copy, and I retract that as a grounds for asking for my continuance."
 Of course, a defendant is entitled to a copy of a police report if it is established that there is an inconsistency between the officer's testimony at trial and his report, or when the officer's testimony at trial is given in reliance upon the report rather than from memory. State v. Banks, supra; State v. Bolton, 337 So. 2d 446 (La.1976); State v. Monroe, 329 So. 2d 193 (La. 1976). However, this exception is inapplicable in the instant case.
 The testimony of Miss O'Brien and the officers who accompanied her was that four or five other men were in the room with Passman, and that only one of them was in uniform. The others in the room, some of whom were undercover narcotics agents, were dressed in "street clothes."
 Judge Edwards was recused because he had been elected to the court of appeal and was preparing to assume that office.


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Phi Delta Phi (Vice Magistrate, 1990-1991). Recipient, Traynor Moot Court Team Best Brief Award.
Ventura County Bar Association (Member, Intellectual Property Section).
Kim Seng v. J&A Importers, 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Successfully defended J&A Importers against a claim of copyright and trade dress infringement for noodle packaging. The court granted our summary judgment motion on all claims, because the plaintiff was unable to prove it possessed the IP rights it asserted. In addition, we obtained a substantial attorney fee award. The case subsequently settled while on appeal.Reshare v. Nikken, Case No. 10-CV-01936 JNE (D. Minn. 2011). Successfully negotiated a settlement of this patent infringement suit involving a computer-assisted selling system.Enagic v. Tseng, (C.D. Cal. 2010): Litigated a trademark infringement case for water ionizing machines on behalf of Enagic, based on defendant's use of client's mark in advertising. Case settled after discovery. Enagic USA v. Cabados (C.D. Cal. 2008): Litigated a trademark infringement case on behalf of Enagic. Case settled.MH Systems v. McNulty (C.D. Cal. 2010): Litigated a patent infringement case involving a ballast water treatment system. Court granted our client, McNulty, a judgment whereby the patent owner took nothing.International Seaway Trading v. Walgreen Co., 589 F. 3d. 1233 (Fed. Cir., 2009): The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals adopted our argument that the legal standard the Federal Circuit had used for over twenty-five years in determining whether a design patent is invalid must be overturned. As a result of this decision, design patents will in general be measurably easier for an alleged infringer to invalidate, and this new legal standard, as we argued, comports with U.S. Supreme Court precedent as well as more accurately mirrors the existing legal standard for determining whether a design patent is infringed by an accused design.International Seaway Trading v. Walgreen Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6240 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2009). In a design patent infringement case, we successfully moved for summary judgment on invalidity of three design patents on behalf of Walgreens and Touchsport having to do with shoes. The Court agreed with our position that the patentee's designs were a “knock off” of existing Crocs shoes, and designed to look similar to the original so that they could be mistaken for the Crocs design. The Court invalidated the patents as anticipated by the Crocs prior art, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court's opinion is noteworthy as it is the first case to apply the Federal Circuit's then-most recent design patent infringement opinion, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), to an invalidity analysis.