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65. The condition precedent may be the doing of some act by the grantor or testator. Goff v. Pensenhafer, 190 111. 200, 60 N. E. 110.
A condition subsequent, like a condition precedent, may involve the doing or not doing of an act of a purely voluntary character, either by the grantee or devisee of the estate, or by another, or the occurrence or non occurrence of some event of a partially or wholly involuntary nature. In the great majority of cases, whether there is a breach of the condition, so as to enable the creator of the estate subject to the condition, or his successor in interest, to terminate the estate, depends on the action of the person in favor of whom the estate was created, or his successor in interest, in doing, or failing to do, some particular thing, and this occurs with especial frequency in the case of a lease containing a provision for "re-entry" by the lessor on a default by the lessee in some provision of the lease. But a condition subsequent may involve the doing or not doing of a particular act by the grantor, as in the case of the common law mortgage, by which the grantor is given a right to re-enter in case he, the grantor, pays a certain sum to the grantor within a given time.67 Or it may involve voluntary action only to a limited extent, as when a lease is made subject to a right of re-entry or "forfeiture" in case the lessee becomes bankrupt.
Mach. Co. v. Hanson, 101 Minn. 2G0, 118 Am. St. Rep. 623, 112 N. W. 217; Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 388. 19 Am. Dec. 515. 67. Post Sec. 599.
68. Co. Litt. 214b; 2 Blackst. Comm. 155; Challis, Real Prop. 233; Beach v. Nixon, 9 N. Y. 35; Lyford v. City of Laconia, 75 N. H. 220, 22 L. R. 3. (N. S.) 1062, 139 Am. St. Rep. 680, 72 Atl. 1085. See post Sec. 90.
70. Buckner v. Warren, 41 Ark. 532; Weller v. Brown, 160 Cal. 515, 117 Pac. 517; Thornton v. Trammell, 39 Ga. 202; Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122; De Lancey v. Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9; Woodruff v. Trenton Water Power Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 489, 508; Spear v. Fuller, 8 N. H. 174, 28 Am. Dec. 391; Simmons v. Jarman, 122 N. C. 195, 29 S. E. 332; Smith v. People's Natural Gas Co., 257 Pa. 396, 101 Atl. 739; Johnson v. Gur-ley, 52 Tex. 222; But in Jinnings v. Amend. 101 Kan. 130, 165 Pac. 845, a contrary view appears to have been applied, merely in order to protect the landlord from possible loss, the lease involving the sharing of crops, and the tenant having been sentenced to imprisonment..
71. See Godfrey v. Black, 39 Kan. 193, 7 Am. St. Rep. 544, 17 Pac. 849; Maddox v. White, 4 Md. 72, 59 Am. Dec. 67; Spalding Hotel Co. v. Emerson, 69 Minn. 292, 72 N. W. 119; Orvis v. National Commercial Bank, 81 (N. Y.) App. Div. 631, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1029; Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Nielsen, 77 Neb. 868, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 494, 110 N. W. 746; Mc-Eacharn v. Colton  App. Cas. 104.
72. See Tscheider v. Biddle, Fed. Cas. No. 14210, 4 Dill. 58; Monihon v. Wakelin, 6 Ariz. 225, 56 Pac. 735; Hall v. Center, 40 Cal. 63; Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 530; King v. Raab, 123 Iowa 632, 99 N. W. 306; Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 111. 403, 23 L. R. A. 555, 37 N. E. 73; Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25, 100 Am. Dec. 252; New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. St. George's Church, 12 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 50; Kollock v. Scribner 98 Wis. 104, 73 N. W. 776.
73. Post Sec. 85 note 60.

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CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE and OPTUMRX, INC., Defendants.
Warren W. Eginton Senior United States District Judge.
In this putative class action, plaintiffs Kimberly Negron, Daniel Perry, Courtney Gallagher, Nina Curol and Roger Curol allege that defendants Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company (“CIGNA”) and OptumRx, Inc., have violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Plaintiffs allege that defendants have artificially inflated prescription drug costs in violation of the terms of their health insurance policies.
In count one, plaintiffs assert their action against defendants pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), which provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring an action to enforce rights under the terms of the plan. In counts two and three, plaintiffs assert violations of ERISA's prohibited transactions enumerated in ERISA § 406(a) and (b). In count four, plaintiffs allege that defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence in violation of ERISA § 404(a)(1). In count five, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated ERISA's antidiscrimination provision of ERISA § 702(b). In counts six and seven, plaintiffs allege that defendants are liable as co-fiduciaries or non-fiduciaries based on knowing participation in the asserted breaches of fiduciary duty. In counts eight through ten, plaintiffs assert RICO claims against defendants.
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all allegations of the 1 At the hearing, the Court had indicated it would rule on only the issue of exhaustion. However, the Court finds that judicial economy is served by consideration of all of the issues in this ruling. complaint as true. The Court assumes familiarity with the allegations of the complaint. However, the Court will include this brief factual background.
Plaintiffs receive prescription drug benefits through individual or group health plans issued or administered by defendants. Cigna offers both administrative services only (“ASO”) plans and insured plans. Both types of plan offer the same range of administrative services.
Cigna has an in-house pharmacy benefit manager known as Cigna Pharmacy Management that provides and administers health and pharmacy benefits to patients. Cigna Pharmacy Management outsources certain functions to other providers, including defendant OptumRx and another entity known as Argus Health Systems Inc. Cigna utilizes OptumRx's technology and service platforms, retail network contracting and claims processing services. Argus was the primary pharmacy benefit manager prior to 2013, and it remains part of Cigna's pharmacy benefits delivery system. Plaintiffs allege that Argus and OptumRx have been directed by Cigna and are involved in administering pharmacy benefits for the relevant plans.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants and other co-conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud patients by overcharging for the cost of medically necessary prescription drugs. Patients allegedly pay excess charges to participating pharmacies in exchange for receiving their prescription drugs. Defendants allegedly misrepresent the costs of the prescription drugs in the form of increased charges to patients and then “clawback” from the pharmacies a large portion of the patients' payments.
In their complaint, plaintiffs have included an example of the asserted Clawback scheme applied to a prescription Vitamin D that a pharmacy purchased from the manufacturer or wholesaler for $0.60. Pursuant to the Phamacy Benefit Manager Pharmacy Agreement (PBM Pharmacy Agreement), defendants' pharmacy benefit manager paid the pharmacy 0.96 for the Vitamin D, a fulfillment fee of $1.40, and $0.21 in tax. Thus, in accordance with the PBM Pharmacy Agreement, the contracted charge made by the pharmacy was $2.57. The PBM Pharmacy Agreement required the pharmacy to charge the patient a $7.68 “copayment” for the prescription Vitamin D, which represents almost 300% of an overcharge. The PBM-Pharmacy Agreement then required the pharmacy to pay the PBM or insurer the “Spread” between the contracted fee and the “copayment” amount collected from the patient. Thus, plaintiffs allege that defendants received a $5.11 Clawback. The PBM Pharmacy Agreement prohibited the pharmacy from disclosing to the patient the amount paid to the pharmacy or the Clawback.
Plaintiffs allege that the relevant plans provide that “[i]n no event will” a copayment or coinsurance amount paid by an insured exceed the amount paid by the plan to the pharmacy.2 However, plaintiffs assert that contrary to the plan provisions, defendants have forced network pharmacies to charge patients unauthorized and excessive amounts for prescription drugs that far exceed the charges made by the pharmacy under their agreements; and that defendants have “clawed back” some or all of the excessive charges by forcing the pharmacies to pay the unauthorized charges to defendants after collecting them from the patients.
Plaintiffs' plans provide for (1) a claim determination and appeal process relative to coverage claims; and (2) a customer or member service for complaints if the insured has, inter alia, “a concern regarding a person, a service, the quality of care, [or] contractual benefits.” The customer or member service provision instructs that an insured who is not satisfied with the results of a coverage decision “may start the appeals procedure.” The plan provisions relevant to filing a reimbursement or filing a claim for prescription drugs provide that upon purchase of a drug at a retail participating pharmacy, an insured or beneficiary 2 Plaintiffs quote the following relevant language from the plans: “In no event will the Copayment or Coinsurance for the Prescription Drug or Related Supply exceed the amount paid by the plan to the Pharmacy, ” and “In no event will the applicable copay or coinsurance paid by you and your covered Dependent(s) for the Prescription Drug or Related Supply exceed the amount paid by the Plan….” pays an applicable Copayment, Coinsurance or Deductible and does not need to file a claim form.
The function of a motion to dismiss is “merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The complaint must contain the grounds upon which the claim rests through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff is obliged to amplify a claim with some factual allegations to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
With regard to allegations of fraud or fraudulent conduct, a plaintiff must comply with the higher pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9. In order to satisfy Rule 9(b), a complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent; (2) identify the speaker; (3) state where and when the statements or omissions were made; and (4) explain why the statements or omissions were fraudulent. Antian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999). A plaintiff may make general allegations of malice, intent, knowledge or other state of mind, but the facts must give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). The purpose of the specificity requirement is: (1) to ensure that a complaint provides a defendant with fair notice of plaintiff's claim; (2) to safeguard a defendant's reputation from improvident charges; and (3) to protect defendant from a strike suit. O'Brien v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991).
In count one, plaintiffs allege a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), asserting that they have been denied their rights under the plans due to defendants' Clawbacks from the inflated prescription drug costs. Defendants respond that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing a denial of benefits. Plaintiffs counter that there were no claim denials to appeal; that imposing the exhaustion requirement would be inequitable; and that pursuing administrative remedies would be futile.
Courts have generally required participants to exhaust the administrative remedies prior to filing suit to recover benefits. Heimeschoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 608 (2013). Administrative exhaustion serves as a safeguard that encourages “employers and others to undertake the voluntary step of providing medical and retirement benefits to plan participants.” Halo v. Yale Health Plan, Dir. of Benefits & Records Yale Univ., 819 F.3d 42, 55 (2d Cir. 2016). The primary purposes of ERISA exhaustion are “[to] uphold Congress' desire that ERISA trustees be responsible for their actions, not the federal courts; [to] provide a sufficiently clear record of administrative action if litigation should ensue; ... [to] assure that any judicial review of fiduciary action (or inaction) is made under the arbitrary and capricious standard, not de novo[;] ... to help reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a nonadversarial method of claims settlement; and to minimize the costs of claims settlement for all concerned.” Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1993). However, the exhaustion requirement is “judge-made” as “ERISA itself does not contain an exhaustion requirement.” Kirkendall v. Halliburton, Inc., 707 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 2013).
ERISA exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement but rather an affirmative defense subject to waiver, estoppel, futility and other equitable considerations. Paese v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 435, 444-446 (2d Cir. 2006). As the Second Circuit observed, “ERISA seeks to avoid saddling plaintiffs in such circumstances with the burdens and procedural delays imposed by inartfully drafted plan terms.” Kirkendall, 707 F.3d at 181 (“We therefore join the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit in holding that plan participants will not be required to exhaust administrative remedies where they reasonably interpret the plan terms not to require exhaustion and do not exhaust their administrative remedies as a result.”); see also Woerner v. Fram Group Operations, LLC, 658 Fed.Appx. 90, 96 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (Plaintiff should be excused from exhaustion where she believed she was not bound by claims procedure.).
Plaintiffs maintain that they are not barred by ERISA exhaustion because the bases of their claims are not a denial of prescription drug benefits. They have alleged that charges for the prescription drug benefits were paid in full and that plaintiffs have received the prescription drugs. The relevant language of the plans provides that an appeal should be initiated within 180 days of notice of the denial. Plaintiffs submit that they had no notice of a denial to trigger the administrative for procedure for a claim denial.
Defendants submit that Court should follow the holding of UnitedHealth Group PBM Litig., 2017 WL 651222, at *5-8 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2017), which found that exhaustion was required for Section 502(a)(a) claims asserting entitlement for discounted prescription drug benefits. However, the terms of the plans at issue in UnitedHealth are distinguishable from the terms of the instant plaintiffs' plan. Relevant to prescription drugs, the instant plans provide that, upon purchase of a drug at a retail participating pharmacy, an insured or beneficiary pays an applicable Copayment, Coinsurance or Deductible and does not need to file a claim form. In UnitedHealth Group, the Court found that two of the relevant plans provided procedures specific to challenging coinsurance or copayment calculations; and that the administrative procedures of the other plans provided adequate administrative procedures applicable to copayment and coinsurance disputes. UnitedHealth Group noted that the relevant member handbook explained that the “Grievance procedure” applied to both adverse determinations and “for other issues.” In the instant matter, the plans provide (1) a claim determination and appeal process relative to claims for coverage; and (2) a customer or member service for complaints if the insured has, inter alia, “a concern regarding a person, a service, the quality of care, [or] contractual benefits.” Consistent with the following discussion, this Court finds that plaintiffs have plausibly stated that the plan terms do not set forth administrative procedures that unambiguously address plaintiff's claims of being overcharged for prescription drugs.
Plaintiffs assert that they were not aware that they had been overcharged, and therefore, they could not have filed a claim based on the amount of their copayments or coinsurance. “Because the exhaustion requirement rests on the assumption that notice of denial has been provided, a fiduciary who has not provided notice of a claim for benefits is foreclosed from insisting upon exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Corsini v. United Healthcare Corp., 965 F.Supp. 265, 269 (D.R.I. 1997) (even assuming alleged claim regarding excessive co-payment could be considered a claim for benefits, plan's exhaustion requirement would not apply because defendant had failed to notify plaintiffs of discounted rates paid for medical services). “An adverse benefit” is defined as “[a] denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit, including any such denial, reduction, termination, or failure to provide or make payment that is based on a determination of a participant's or beneficiary's eligibility to participate in a plan, and including, with respect to group health plans, a denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit resulting from the application of any utilization review, as well as a failure to cover an item or service for which benefits are otherwise provided because it is determined to be experimental or investigational or not medically necessary or appropriate.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(4)(i).
Construing the complaint most liberally for purposes of ruling on this motion to dismiss, the Court finds that plaintiffs have plausibly stated that they did not sustain an adverse benefit determination claim for coverage of prescription drugs that would trigger exhaustion. See Smith v. United HealthCare Svcs., Inc., 2000 WL 1198418, at *4 (D. Minn. 2000).
Further, defendants have not proved as a matter of law that they maintained standard reasonable claim procedures that complied with the DOL regulation. If a plan does not comply with the minimum set forth by the DOL regulation, the plain is not entitled to the protections of the exhaustion requirement and the deferential standard of review by the district court, unless the plan can show that its failure to comply with claims-procedure regulation was inadvertent and harmless. Halo, 819 F.3d at 56.
In accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b), every plan must “establish and maintain reasonable procedures governing the filing of benefit determinations, and appeal of adverse benefit determinations.” The regulation provides further: “In the case of the failure of a plan to establish or follow claims procedures consistent with the requirements of this section, a claimant shall be deemed to have exhausted the administrative remedies available under the plan and shall be entitled to pursue any available remedies under Section 502(a) of the Act on the basis that the plan has failed to provide a reasonable claims procedure that would yield a decision on the merits of the claim.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1). The plan bears the burden of proof on this issue. Halo, 819 F.3d at 57.
Generally, the DOL regulation defines a claim for benefits as “a request for a plan benefit or benefits made by a claimant in accordance with a plan's reasonable procedure for filing benefit claims.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(e). The regulation “requires notice of an adverse benefit determination within a reasonable time with a “written or electronic notification” that sets forth the specific reasons for the adverse determination, references the specific plan provisions, and describes additional material necessary and the plan's review procedures; further, the regulation provides that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall establish and maintain a procedure by which a claimant shall have a reasonable opportunity to appeal an adverse benefit determination” and sets forth specific provisions regarding timing and opportunities for claimants' comments and access. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)-(j). Additionally, reasonable claims procedures should “not contain any provision, and [should not be] administered in a way, that unduly inhibits or hampers the initiation or processing of claims for benefits.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(3).
Defendants argue that the plaintiffs should have exhausted their administrative remedies by calling “Customer Service” to complain about the overcharges. However, defendants have not shown how the “Customer Service” process, which applies to complaints about “a person, a service, the quality of care, choice of or access to providers, provider network adequacy or contractual benefits, ” is unambiguously applicable to exhaustion of claims regarding prescription drug overcharges. In ruling on this motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the Court is mindful that defendant bears the burden of proof on this affirmative defense. See Hardaway v. Hartford Public Works Dep't., 879 F.3d 486, 490-491 (2d Cir. 2018) (defendant bears the burden of proof on affirmative defense). Accordingly, the Court should not resolve the ambiguity as to whether plaintiffs' claims should have been exhausted through the Customer Service procedure.
Plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims that they complied with the claim procedure relevant to prescription drugs, received their benefit of the prescription drugs, and that the pharmacy received the payment for the charges. At a minimum, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they did not receive notice of an adverse benefits determination that complies with the DOL regulation; that defendants administered the claims procedure in a way that inhibited or hampered plaintiffs' ability to initiate a claim procedure to recover the inflated cost of the prescription drugs; and that defendants did not establish a reasonable claims and appeals procedure in compliance with DOL regulations relevant to their overcharge claims. 3 Defendants have failed to prove as a matter of law that plaintiffs' claims are barred due to failure to satisfy their administrative remedies. The Court will allow plaintiffs' claims to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss. The Courts' consideration of defendants' affirmative defense of exhaustion is more appropriate on summary judgment.
Defendants maintain that plaintiffs' counts two through seven--which all assert ERISA breach of fiduciary duty--should be dismissed for failure to establish any plausible fiduciary duty under ERISA. Defendants maintain that neither Cigna nor OptumRx were acting as fiduciaries when engaging in the plan design decisions and business conduct alleged to be in violation of ERISA.
Congress intended that the term “fiduciary” be broadly construed. LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1997). A person or entity is a fiduciary under ERISA if: (1) that person or entity exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan; (2) exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets; or (3) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). An entity “may be an ERISA fiduciary with respect to certain matters but not 3 Accordingly, the Court need not consider plaintiffs' argument as to exhaustion futility. others.” Patrico v. Voya Financial, Inc., 2017 WL 2684065, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2017).
Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to contracts between Cigna and the employers, defendants exercised discretionary authority concerning computation of payments under the plans; that regardless of any specific grant of fiduciary authority, defendants exercised authority or control over the management of plans by dictating the amount pharmacies charged patients for prescription drugs, and by requiring pharmacies to collect the Spread; that defendants exercised discretion to set and take their own compensation for services performed by dictating Spread and taking Clawbacks; and that defendants exercised authority or control over plan assets.


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Dismissing Padilla v. Yoo: A Glass Half Empty?
The Ninth Circuit correctly dismissed Jose Padilla’s lawsuit against John Yoo, the former Department of Justice official who provided key analysis of legal questions arising from the war on terrorism. But being the traditionally liberal and oft-reversed Ninth Circuit, the court could not leave well enough alone and issued an opinion that casts doubt on the lawfulness of terrorist detention policies and opens the door to future lawsuits against officials responsible for developing and implementing national security policies. Though it reached the right result, the court’s reasoning sets a dangerous precedent that may hinder future responses to attempted acts of terrorism. The Constitution assigns responsibility for national security to the political branches, and the courts should be far warier than the Ninth Circuit in second-guessing their decisions.
Jose Padilla is currently serving a lengthy sentence as a result of his conviction for various terrorism-related offenses. Prior to being detained by the federal government, he was, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found, “a member of Al Qaeda, who has been an active participant in that organization’s terrorist mission since the late 1990s.” From 2002 to 2006, Padilla was detained as an enemy combatant and held in the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. During that time, he was the subject of legal proceedings to obtain his release that twice rose to the Supreme Court. In 2006, he was transferred to civilian custody in Florida, where he was subsequently tried and convicted.
With two lawsuits undertaken by civil liberties activists and law school clinics, Padilla has again engaged the federal courts in contesting his detention as an enemy combatant. The first, against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and various members of the military chain of command, was dismissed by the Fourth Circuit in January. The second was against John Yoo for the legal advice he provided as an attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).
Padilla alleged that Yoo, though his legal memoranda, shaped the government’s response to the 9/11 attacks and authorized Padilla’s unlawful detention and treatment as an enemy combatant—in more specific terms, essentially the same arguments that Padilla raised in his prior habeas petitions. Padilla’s complaint sought a declaration that Yoo had violated his rights under the Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (by impeding his practice of Islam while detained) and monetary damages from Yoo personally. The district court denied Yoo’s motion to dismiss, holding that the law authorized a damages suit against national security officials, that Padilla had adequately alleged Yoo’s personal responsibility for the alleged violations of Padilla’s rights, and that Padilla’s rights had been clearly established at the time of his detention. This was the decision on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Padilla’s lawsuit against Yoo is but one of several seeking monetary damages from national security officials for carrying out their duty to protect the nation. Each relies on the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. Bivens held that an ordinary criminal law search and seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment can give rise to a lawsuit for monetary damages against the offending federal officials, even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief. Since Bivens, plaintiffs have sought to hold federal officials liable for violations of a myriad of rights, but the Court has applied the doctrine in a different context only once, in a 1980 decision that authorized liability for violation of a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.
In short, while the Court has not overturned Bivens, it has effectively confined it to that case’s circumstances, on the basis that the courts are ill-suited to make the types of policy determinations that its approach requires.
If only the Ninth Circuit shared the Fourth Circuit’s justified skepticism as to the appropriateness of judicial intermeddling in the most sensitive matters of national security policymaking and practice. Rather than address the Bivens question head on, or at least the question of whether a government attorney may be held liable for his legal advice, the court turned instead to the far narrower question of qualified immunity. Padilla’s rights as a detainee, it held, were not clearly established during the period from 2001 to 2003, when Yoo was at OLC. Nor was it clearly established that his treatment amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On that basis, and without fully absolving Yoo of constitutional violation, the court held that Yoo could not be held liable.
The court, however, strongly implies that its decision is limited to its precise terms. Decisions after 2003, it suggests, may have established the contours of detainees’ rights. And it states, in a footnote, that “[r]ecent decisions…offer support” for the proposition that Padilla’s alleged treatment rose to the level of torture. In this way, the court opens the door to future lawsuits against federal attorneys and officials responsible for formulating national security policy. Moreover, by failing to decide the constitutional issues definitively, it seemingly tars Yoo’s conduct but effectively precludes him from challenging its reasoning. And it added insult to this injury by gratuitously, and erroneously, impugning his competence and professional standards.
While there may never be another case precisely like Padilla’s, the Ninth Circuit’s decision nonetheless leaves the law in an uneasy state. It speaks to the constitutional minimums governing the treatment of individuals detained as enemy combatants, putting officials and potentially military personnel at risk of personal liability, without actually deciding the issue in a manner that likely forecloses further appeals. It strongly implies, without so much as holding, that a government attorney may be held personally liable for others’ decisions based on his legal advice. And its too-reluctant reasoning leaves one with the firm impression that Padilla’s rights were violated, by the wanton acts of Yoo and other officials, but that the court was unfortunately bound to rule as it did.
Bound, it was, and the court surely knew that any decision in favor of Padilla would invite rebuke by the Supreme Court. This may explain why the court did, at least, reach the proper result and dismiss Padilla’s lawsuit. But it neither explains nor justifies the court’s cynical approach.
The chief risk of applying Bivens in the national security context is that it will distort the decisions of those charged with our defense, fearful of personal liability for decisions made and carried out in good faith, leaving us more vulnerable to attack. Although the Constitution does not bar such liability, it definitively assigns responsibility for balancing the competing policy interests at stake to the political branches, not the courts—as the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized. The Fourth Circuit’s decision refusing to apply Bivens is a faithful application of these precedents. The Ninth Circuit’s decision—though holding John Yoo not liable for any depredations suffered by Jose Padilla—is nearer an abdication of judicial duty.
Andrew M. Grossman is a Visiting Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Mr. Grossman served as counsel for Donald Rumsfeld in the case of Lebron v. Rumsfeld.
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2012).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679.
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
 Lebron, 670 F.3d at 555.

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D.C. Law Library - § 8–102.03. Establishment of fee.
↪ § 8–102.03. Establishment of fee.
§ 8–102.03. Establishment of fee.
(a)(1) A consumer making a purchase from a retail establishment shall pay at the time of purchase a fee of $.05 for each disposable carryout bag.
(2) A retail establishment shall not advertise or hold out or state to the public or to a customer directly or indirectly that the reimbursement of the fee or any part thereof to be collected by the retail establishment will be assumed or absorbed by the retail establishment or otherwise refunded to the customer.
(b)(1)(A) Each retail establishment shall retain $.01 of each $.05 fee collected; provided, that an establishment that chooses to offer a carryout bag credit program to its customers, as set forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, shall retain an additional $.01 from each fee collected, for a total of $.02 for each $.05 fee collected.
(iii) Reflects the total credit amount on the consumer transaction receipt.
(C) The fees retained by the retail establishment under this paragraph shall not be classified as revenue and shall be tax-exempt for the purposes of Chapters 18, 20, and 27B of Title 47.
(D) The fees retained by the retail establishment shall be excluded from the definition of retail sale under § 47-2001(n)(2) and from the definition of gross receipts under § 47-2761(5).
(E) The fees to be remitted to the District under subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be added to other tax payments in determining whether the electronic payment requirement under § 47-4402(c) applies.
(2) The remaining amount of each fee collected shall be paid to the Office of Tax and Revenue and shall be deposited in the Anacostia River Cleanup and Protection Fund established by § 8-102.05(a).
(c) The Office of Tax and Revenue shall develop rules for frequency and method for reporting and transmitting the fees, as set forth in subsection (a) of this section, to the District.
(d) Except to the extent of any inconsistency with this subchapter, the same provisions to Title 47 that are applicable to the gross sales tax shall govern the administration, collection, and enforcement of the fee set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding any other law, the Office of Tax and Revenue shall furnish to the District Department of the Environment, upon request, the names, addresses, and whether any fees were collected pursuant to subsection (a) of this section of retail establishments subject to the provisions of this subchapter.
This section is referenced in § 8-102.04, § 8-102.05, § 47-1803.02, § 47-2001, § 47-2005, and § 47-2761.
Short title: Section 6031 of D.C. Law 19-21 provided that subtitle D of title VI of the act may be cited as “Bag Fee Compliance Amendment Act of 2011”.


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More than 1,5 gigawatt of carrier system for open-fieldphotovoltaic installations all over Europe are evidence ofcustomer satisfaction and our ability to adapt our system to themarket requirements.
We are pleased about your interest in our company. Data protection has a very high priority for the CWF GmbH and we take our position as controller within the meaning of the GDPR very seriously.
This includes in particular name, address(es), bank details, e-mail address, telephone or fax number or client IP address.
Profiling means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements;.
Controller means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law.
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(7) the client IP address.
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In addition, as far as we can possibly do, personal data will not be collected. In doing so, we adhere to the principle of data avoidance, which we take very seriously. We treat personal data confidentially and in accordance with legal data protection regulations.
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We are not responsible for personal data collected and processed by third parties.
We collect personal data if the data subject voluntarily provides it in connection with his order, when contacting us (e.g. via contact form or e-mail) and when opening a customer account and the necessary registration.
We collect and store all information that the data subject enters on our website or transmits to us in any other way. In addition, personal data will only be processed and collected by default to the extent necessary for the intended purpose.
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We use the “Google Maps” component on our website in combination with the so-called “Share function". “Google Maps” is a service of Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043 USA, hereinafter “Google.” Each time this component is called up, Google sets a cookie in order to process the user configuration and data when the page with the integrated “Google Maps” component is displayed. As a general rule, this cookie is not deleted by closing the browser, but rather expires after a certain time, as long as it is not previously manually deleted by you.
The principles concerning the collection and processing of personal data also apply in particular to registration for our newsletter.
Reference is expressly made to Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a) and Art. 7 para. 4 GDPR, in particular lit. a)-c).
The use of the data to receive the information by e-mail can be revoked at any time with effect for the future by unsubscribing from the newsletter.
the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Art. 22 Abs. 1 and 4 and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.
Where personal data are transferred to a third country or to an international organisation, the data subject shall have the right to be informed of the appropriate safeguards pursuant to Art. 46 relating to the transfer.
We provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, we may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs.
the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Art. 21 Abs. 1 and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Art. 21 Abs. 2.
the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Art. 8 Abs. 1 GDPR.
the data subject has objected to processing pursuant to Art. 21 Abs. 1 pending the verification whether the legitimate grounds of the controller override those of the data subject.
The controller shall communicate any rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing carried out in accordance with At. 16. Art. 17 Abs. 1 and Art. 18 to each recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, unless this proves impossible or involves disproportionate effort. The controller shall inform the data subject about those recipients if the data subject requests it.
In exercising his or her right to data portability pursuant to paragraph 1, the data subject shall have the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically feasible.
The exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to Art. 17. That right shall not apply to processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.
The right referred to in paragraph 1 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.
The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. e) or f) GDPR, including profiling based on those provisions.
We will no longer process the personal data unless we demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.
is based on the data subject's explicit consent.
Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of personal data referred to in Art. 9 Abs. 1 GDPR, unless Art. 9 Abs. 2 lit. a) or g) GDPR applies and suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.
In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.
Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy, including the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority pursuant to Art. 77 GDPR, each data subject shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in non-compliance with this Regulation.
Proceedings against a controller or a processor shall be brought before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment. Alternatively, such proceedings may be brought before the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.

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Art. 18
Art. 17
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G.R. No. 166800 and G.R. NO. 168924 - Leca Realty Corp. v. Manuela Corp, et al/Leca Realty Corp. v. Manuel Corp, et al.
LECA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MANUELA CORPORATION and MS. MARILOU O. ADEA, as REHABILITATION RECEIVER for MANUELA CORPORATION, Respondents.
These are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by Leca Realty Corporation (LECA), petitioner, assailing the separate related Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87185 and CA-G.R. SP No. 80861.
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner LECA assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (Special 8th Division) dated April 28, 2005 and its Resolution of July 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87185.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the Rehabilitation Plan of Manuela Corporation (Manuela), respondent. Petitioner now contends that the Rehabilitation Plan has impaired its contract of lease with respondent over a tract of land consisting of almost three (3) hectares. Petitioner is the owner of the property situated on Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under the same Rule questioning the Decision dated September 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (17th Division) and its Resolution dated January 25, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80861.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Order denying petitioner's motion for extension of time to file its Record on Appeal in Civil Case No. LP-02-0028, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Rehabilitation of Manuela Corporation."
On January 31, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253, Las PiÃ±as City, a Petition for Rehabilitation, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-02-0028.
The petition alleges inter alia that respondent is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, primarily engaged in the business of leasing to retailers commercial spaces in shopping malls. Its principal office address is Alabang-Zapote Road, Pamplona, Las PiÃ±as City.
Respondent has assets valued at P12.43 billion and total liabilities of P4.87 billion as of December 31, 2001.
However, due to reasons that shall be discussed below, respondent is now having severe cash flow problems which prevent it from paying its debts as they fall due.
In order to finance the costs of building the Metropolis Star and the Pacific Mall, respondent obtained several loans from two syndicates of lenders. The first syndicate is composed of Bank of Philippine Islands, BPI Family Bank, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Allied Bank, and Bank of Commerce; the second syndicate is composed of Allied Bank, Bank of Commerce, Philippine National Bank, and Equitable PCI Bank. Respondent's loans are governed by the Loan Agreement dated July 5, 1995 and the Syndicated Loan Agreement dated December 16, 1996.
Respondent's total outstanding loan from the syndicates (e.g., principal plus interest) is P2.174 billion as of December 31, 2001. These loans are secured by a mortgage over M Star One and M Star, both located in Las PiÃ±as City.
Respondent also has liabilities to the Hero Holdings, Inc. and its trade suppliers and other parties in the sum of P1.476 billion as of December 31, 2001.
At the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the banks stopped their lending activities to borrowers, including respondent. This event took its toll upon respondent since its malls failed to operate sufficiently resulting in heavy losses.
Matters finally came to a head in 1997 when respondent could no longer pay its trade suppliers for maturing obligations. Neither could it pay its creditor banks. The adjusted interest rates on its outstanding loans, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, were between 18% to 30% which added to respondent's liquidity problems.
Nonetheless, respondent has been acting in good faith and has exerted earnest efforts to avert its worsening financial problems. It closed down non-income generating businesses, concentrated on its business of leasing commercial spaces, intensified collection efforts, reduced personnel, negotiated for restructuring of loans with creditors, and worked out a viable payment scheme without giving undue preference to any creditor. Despite its efforts, respondent could no longer pay its suppliers and the maturing interests on its loans.
The petition further alleges that respondent can only be brought back to its financial viability if its proposed Rehabilitation Plan is approved and that it is given a respite from its creditors' demands through the issuance of a Stay Order. The successful implementation of the proposed Rehabilitation Plan will enable it to settle its remaining obligations in an orderly manner, restore its financial viability, and allow it to resume its normal operations.
In the same Stay Order, the trial court appointed Marilou Adea, also a respondent, as Rehabilitation Receiver. On February 12, 2002, respondent Adea accepted her appointment.
In its Order dated May 21, 2002, the trial court referred the petition to respondent Adea for evaluation and recommendation. On September 28, 2002, she submitted to the trial court her Report and Recommendation finding respondent Manuela's Rehabilitation Plan viable and feasible and recommending its approval.
Respondent Adea then held several consultative meetings with respondent Manuela's creditors to discuss their respective concerns and suggestions relative to its rehabilitation. For their part, the creditors filed their various comments/oppositions to respondent Manuela's Petition for Rehabilitation and Rehabilitation Plan.
On July 31, 2002, petitioner filed with the trial court its Comment and/or Formal Claim with Leave of Court against respondent Manuela amounting to P193,724,262.34 as of February 28, 2002, representing unpaid rentals, security deposits, interests, and penalty charges.
On September 30, 2002, respondent Adea issued a Notice informing all creditors, claimants, suppliers, lot and/or house buyers, counsels, oppositors, and other parties that copies of her Report and Recommendation on respondent Manuela's Petition for Rehabilitation are available and on file with the trial court for distribution to all parties concerned.
On October 22, 2002, petitioner filed its comment on respondent Adea's Report and Recommendation. Petitioner opposed her recommendation to reduce respondent Manuela's liability, considering its contractual nature which cannot be impaired during the process of rehabilitation.
Before the Court is a Notice of Appeal with Motion forExtension of Time filed by creditor Leca Realty Corporation praying for a period of thirty (30) days from August 21, 2003 to September 20, 2003 to file its intended record on appeal.
However, under Rule 3, Section 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading.
WHEREFORE, the subject motion is DENIED.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80861 and assigned to the 17th Division.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 166800.
In the meantime, petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, alleging that the RTC erred in approving respondent Manuela's Rehabilitation Plan as it violates its (petitioner's) constitutional right to non-impairment of contract and the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
x x x The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings cannot be interpreted to impair the contractual obligations previously entered into by the contracting parties because the automatic stay of all actions is sanctioned by P.D. 902-A which provides that "all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly [Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 391 Phil. 318 (2000)].
On May 20, 2005, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in its Resolution dated July 15, 2005.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 168924.
In view of the identity of parties and the inter-relationship of the issues involved in G.R. No. 166800 and G.R. No. 168924, we resolved to consolidate the two petitions.
Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. - Any proceeding initiated under these Rules shall be considered in rem. Jurisdiction over all those affected by the proceedings shall be considered as acquired upon publication of the notice of the commencement of the proceedings in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines in the manner prescribed by these Rules.
The review of any order or decision of the court or on appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Extension of time to plead. - Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
Verily, the trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. At any rate, this petition has become moot considering that the Court of Appeals gave due course to LECA's Petition for Review (CA-G.R. SP No. 80861) which eventually reached this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 168924.
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE "PENDENCY OF THE REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE INTERPRETED TO IMPAIR THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO BY THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BECAUSE THE AUTOMATIC STAY OF ALL ACTIONS IS SANCTIONED BY P.D. 902-A WHICH PROVIDES THAT "ALL ACTIONS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS OR ASSOCIATIONS UNDER MANAGEMENT OR RECEIVERSHIP PENDING BEFORE ANY COURT, TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR BODY SHALL BE SUSPENDED ACCORDINGLY," CITING RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 128003, JULY 26, 2000, 336 SCRA 433.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE LOWER COURT'S APPROVAL OF RESPONDENT MANUELA'S REHABILITATION PLAN EVEN IF SUCH PLAN IS NOT VIABLE OR FEASIBLE BECAUSE RESPONDENT MANUELA CORPORATION COULD NOT EVEN COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE COURT-APPROVED REHABILITATION PLAN.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO ACT, THAT IS, APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE, THE REHABILITATION PLAN OF MANUELA CORPORATION WITHIN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR REHABILITATION.
Petitioner contends that the approved Rehabilitation Plan drastically altered the terms of its lease contract with respondent Manuela, hence, should be declared void.
Clearly, there is a gross discrepancy between the amounts of rent agreed upon by the parties and those provided in the Rehabilitation Plan.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the approved Rehabilitation Plan impairs the obligation of contract, ratiocinating that the automatic stay of all actions is sanctioned by Section 5 (c) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A which provides that "all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly."
The amount of rental is an essential condition of any lease contract. Needless to state, the change of its rate in the Rehabilitation Plan is not justified as it impairs the stipulation between the parties. We thus rule that the Rehabilitation Plan is void insofar as it amends the rental rates agreed upon by the parties.
It must be emphasized that there is nothing in Section 5 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A authorizing the change or modification of contracts entered into by the distressed corporation and its creditors.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 168924. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87185 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Rehabilitation Plan, insofar as it modifies the rental rates agreed upon by petitioner LECA and respondent Manuela, is declared VOID.
Respondent Manuela is ordered to pay the rentals and all arrearages at the rates stipulated in the lease contract with interest at 6% per annum. Upon the finality of this Decision, the interest shall be 12% per annum until fully paid.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 166800 is DENIED for being moot. It has been overtaken by events. No costs.
1 Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 80861, p. 643.
6 Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 80861, p. 1733.
7 Annex "C," Petition, in G.R. No. 168924.
8 Ateneo Law Journal, Vol. XLIII, Number 2, May 1999.
9 Concepcion, Danilo L., "Insolvency Systems in Asia: An Efficiency Perspective. Corporate Rehabilitation: The Philippine Experience"; cited in the Memorandum for the Petitioner, G.R. No. 168924, p. 23.
10 G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79.
11 "Administrative Expense," Dictionary of Insurance Terms. Barron's Educational Series, Answers.com 14 September 2007. http://www.answer.com/topic/administrative expense.
12 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, et al., G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355; citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78, 95-96 (1994).

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