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Duke University Press is "peer-reviewed," whatever that means in this day and age. One academic fraud gives cover to the other.
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [i.e., the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
In regard to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, where the federal government or a state government engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity owned (in whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in significant part) by the President of the United States (in his private capacity), but not with the President, it is not clear that such a transaction falls under the aegis of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. Indeed, no court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve this novel threshold question of pure law. This issue must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Domestic Emoluments Clause applies to such business transactions with the President. As a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery.
Much the same can be said in regard to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. No court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to determine whether a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled commercial entity is a “foreign state” for the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. This is a novel threshold question of pure law which must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to business transactions between a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (i.e., an “officer … under the United States”) and a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled commercial entity. As a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery.
Similarly, where a foreign state engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity owned (in whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in significant part) by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (in his private capacity), but not with the officeholder, it is not clear that such a transaction falls under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Indeed, no court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve this novel threshold question of pure law. This issue, too, must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to business transactions between private commercial entities owned or controlled by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder and a foreign state. And, here too, as a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery.
Where a transaction has a commercial entity on both sides, as opposed to an actual foreign state and an actual constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder, the policy concerns animating the Foreign Emoluments Clause must be much attenuated.
Seth Barrett Tillman, Novel Questions of Pure Law and Discovery, The New Reform Club (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:58 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lpjudfk.
*** I am following the odd naming convention for the clause used by the Plaintiff in CREW v. President Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (Abrams, J.). See note .
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. cl. 7 (the so-called Domestic Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Presidential Compensation (or Emoluments) Clause) (emphasis added).
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Foreign Gifts (or Titles) Clause, or Emoluments Clause) (emphasis added).
Addendum: Accepted Paper: Seth Barrett Tillman, Essay, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40(3) Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming circa 2017–2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957162.
If the emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage position were correct, if “emoluments” as used in the Constitution extended to any pecuniary advantage, then presidents are and would have been precluded from doing business with the United States government.
However, George Washington (who had previously been president of the Federal Convention which drafted the Constitution), while he was President of the United States, did business on more than one occasion with the Federal Government. He purchased several lots of land in the new federal capital at public auction. One such set of purchases took place on or about September 18, 1793. Three commissioners ran the public auction: David Stuart, Daniel Carroll, and Thomas Johnson. Who were they?
· David Stuart was a member of the Virginia convention which ratified the Federal Constitution.
· Daniel Carroll was a member of the Federal Convention which drafted the Constitution and later a member of the First Congress.
· Thomas Johnson was the first Governor of Maryland following independence, a member of the Maryland convention which ratified the Federal Constitution, and afterwards he served as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
An undoubtedly accomplished group. Are we really to believe that not only did all four participants willingly, openly, and notoriously participate in a conspiracy to aid and abet the President in violating the Constitution’s Domestic Emoluments Clause, but that they also left—for themselves and their posterity—a complete and signed documentary trail of their wrongdoing?
The emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage position amounts to: (1) President Washington was at best an idiot, if not a crook; (2) Washington’s allies openly supported obvious and profound constitutional lawlessness; and (3) Washington’s political opponents were altogether and unaccountably silent—silent in Congress, silent in newspapers, and silent in their private correspondence. The emoluments-are-any-pecuniary-advantage position amounts to a naked assertion by twenty-first century legal academics that they understand the Constitution’s original public meaning better than those who drafted it, and better than those who ratified it, and better than those who put it into effect in the First Congress.
The alternative view is that linguistic and historical humility compel reasonable minds to recognize that much of the language within our more than two-century old Constitution is opaque. It follows that—in order for twenty-first century citizens to understand what the Constitution’s opaque language meant when ratified (and what it continues to mean now) in regard to a specific (but otherwise wholly obscure) legal term (e.g., “emoluments”)—reasonable persons must look to the actual conduct of the Framers, the Ratifiers, and the original practice of the three branches when they were squarely confronted with the need to determine the meaning of a particular legal term on concrete facts.
It is incontrovertible that President George Washington, in a private capacity, engaged in business transactions with the Federal Government, notwithstanding that he received or intended to receive a pecuniary advantage. Given Washington’s very public conduct, a modern interpreter should be reluctant to conclude that such advantages, benefits, and profits amount to a constitutionally proscribed “emolument.” It stands to reason that if the benefits flowing from business transactions for value (with the Federal Government) are not constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” for the purposes of the Domestic Emoluments Clause, then the benefits flowing from similar transactions for value—with foreign states or foreign state owned or controlled commercial entities—are not constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” for the purposes of any other clause, including the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Both the Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause use the same “emoluments” language.
Indeed, from the perspective of modern (as opposed to eighteenth century) governance norms, President Washington’s business transactions posed a nonfrivolous risk of moral hazard, conflicts, and corruption. Unlike bargains struck between genuinely adverse parties, President Washington was speculating on land in public auctions—that is, public auctions managed by commissioners whom he personally appointed. As a result, Washington was on both sides of each and every one of these transactions; yet, no one then or since has ever impugned the propriety of his conduct, much less the legal validity or constitutionality of his purchases.
Second, as the President’s lawyers, at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (“MLB”), explained the presents-language and the emoluments-language in the original Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause were imported into a proposed federal constitutional amendment in 1810, the so-called Titles of Nobility Amendment.
In 1810, Congress voted by overwhelming margins to extend the Foreign Emoluments Clause to all citizens, not just federal officials. The proposed amendment would have prohibited private citizens’ acceptance of “any present, pension, office, or emolument, of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince, or foreign Power,” stripping violators of their citizenship and barring them from state or federal office. The amendment came within two states of ratification—indeed, because of a publishing mistake, several generations believed it was part of the Constitution.
Yet there is no evidence anyone at the time thought the proposed amendment restricted citizens’ ability to engage in commerce with foreign nations, their governments, their representatives, or their [commercial] instrumentalities [or agents]. That suggests that the public did not understand the prohibition on accepting [foreign presents or] foreign emoluments to prohibit commerce with foreign states or their representatives through fair-market-value exchanges—and, by implication, that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach these transactions.
MLB’s argument remains wholly unrebutted by those suggesting that the Constitution’s presents-language and emoluments-language extend to business transactions for value.
These terms [“fees” and “commissions”] denote a compensation for a particular kind of service to be performed by the officer, and are distinguishable from each other … they are also distinguishable from the term emoluments, that [term] being more comprehensive, and embracing every species of compensation or pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the office.
President Washington may very well have derived pecuniary advantages, benefits, and profits from his business transactions with the Federal Government, but the benefits flowing from those transactions were not “derived from [his] discharg[ing] the duties of [his] office.” Hence, no constitutionally proscribed “emoluments” were involved.
For all the reasons elaborated above, one must conclude that business transactions for value are not encompassed by the term “emoluments” as used in the Constitution.
** I am following the odd naming convention for the clause used by the Plaintiff in CREW v. President Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (Abrams, J.). See note .
*** Maynooth University Department of Law, New House (#53), Maynooth University, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland. sbarretttillman(at)yahoo.com. I received helpful comments, particularly in regard to finding sources, from several legal academics, historians (in academia and elsewhere), and listserv participants while developing this short paper. I thank them all; all errors remain mine. This short paper is cross-posted. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments” (Mar. 19, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937186; Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions For Value Are Not “Emoluments,” The New Reform Club (Mar. 19, 2017, 3:15 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lxash3w; see also Seth Barrett Tillman, Novel Questions of Pure Law and Discovery, The New Reform Club (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:58 AM), http://tinyurl.com/lpjudfk.
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Foreign Gifts (or Titles) Clause, or Emoluments Clause) (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under the [United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. cl. 7 (the so-called Domestic Emoluments Clause, a/k/a Presidential Compensation (or Emoluments) Clause).
 If the subject matter of our inquiry were something other than an exchange for value, we would be discussing either: (1) a present, or (2) a bribe. Textually, the Domestic Emoluments Clause does not extend to presents. Likewise, bribery is expressly dealt with by the Impeachment Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, not by either the Foreign Emoluments Clause or the Domestic Emoluments Clause.
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. cl. 7 (emphasis added).
 See Washington, George (1732–1799), Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/l5vpnzk (also reporting that Washington was a member of the Continental Congress).
 See Certificate for Lots Purchased in the District of Columbia, 18 September 1793, Founders Online (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/gtpw5mm.
 See 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 654 & 662 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 2d ed. 1836) (recording Stuart’s votes on June 25 and 27, 1788), http://tinyurl.com/l6ypss2. Stuart was also a federal elector for Virginia in the first federal election. See 3 The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections 1788–1790, at xvi (Gordon DenBoer ed., 1986), http://tinyurl.com/kvbwrou.
 See Carroll, Daniel (1730–1796), Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/hxf9dyx (also reporting that Carroll was a member of the Continental Congress and signed the Articles of Confederation).
 See Johnson, Thomas (1732–1819), Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/lwxw22r (also reporting that Johnson was a member of the Continental Congress and first Governor of Maryland following independence).
 See supra notes 5, 8–9.
 See, e.g., Certificate for Lots Purchased in the District of Columbia, 18 September 1793, Founders Online (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (reproducing a certificate of purchase signed by Commissioners David Stuart and Daniel Carroll which stated: “At a Public Sale of Lots in the City of Washington, George Washington, President of the United States of America became purchaser of Lots No. twelve, No. thirteen & No. fourteen in Square No. six hundred & sixty seven . . . .” (emphasis added)), http://tinyurl.com/gtpw5mm. In addition to lots nos. 12, 13, and 14, Washington also purchased lot no. 5, and he received a separate certificate confirming this additional purchase. See id. (editors’ notes). See generally, e.g., Letter from President George Washington to the Commissioners (Mar. 14, 1794), in The Writings of George Washington Relating to the National Capital, 17 Records of the Columbia Hist. Soc. 3, 97 (1914) (indicating that Washington believed and intended that his purchases of public land were known to the public), http://www.jstor.org.jproxy.nuim.ie/stable/pdf/40067048.pdf.
 In 1793, during the Third Congress, the year President Washington made these land purchases at public auctions, there were some 13 anti-administration Senators and some 40 anti-administration Representatives. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (enter “Representative” or “Senator” for “Position:” and enter “1793” for “Year or Congress:”); see also, e.g., Letter from President George Washington to Bushrod Washington (July 27, 1789), in 30 The Papers of George Washington 366, 366 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (“My political conduct . . . must be exceedingly circumspect and proof against just criticism, for the Eyes of Argus are upon me, and no slip will pass unnoticed that can be improved into a supposed partiality for friends or relatives.”), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw2.017/?sp=26; infra note 13.
Evidence arising in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered superior to that of later administrations. Why? First, Washington’s administration was contemporaneous with the Constitution’s ratification. Second, the President was a Framer and his cabinet (and administration) contained other prominent Framers and ratifiers. Indeed, between the President and his nine cabinet members (over the course of two terms), half of the group were either Framers or ratifiers or both. Third, the President saw himself above party or faction; indeed, active partisan federal electoral politics did not arise until after Washington announced that he would not run for a third term. Fourth, Washington both valued his reputation for probity and acted under the assumption that his conduct was closely monitored by political opponents and opportunists. Fifth, Washington understood that his personal and his administration’s conduct were precedent-setting in regard not only to significant deeds, but even in regard to what might appear to be minor events and conduct.
Id. at 105–08 (emphasis added) (footnotes with supporting sources omitted); supra note 12.
 In regard to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, where the federal government or a state government engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity owned (in whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in significant part) by the President of the United States (in his private capacity), but not with the President, it is not clear that such a transaction falls under the aegis of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. See supra note 2. Indeed, no court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve this novel threshold question of pure law. This issue must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Domestic Emoluments Clause applies to such business transactions with the President. As a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery.
Much the same can be said in regard to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. No court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to determine whether a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled commercial entity is a “foreign state” for the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. See supra note 1. This is a novel threshold question of pure law which must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to business transactions between a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (i.e., an “officer … under the United States”) and a foreign state owned or foreign state controlled commercial entity. As a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery. Similarly, where a foreign state engages in a business transaction with a private commercial entity owned (in whole or in significant part) or controlled (in whole or in significant part) by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder (in his private capacity), but not with the officeholder, it is not clear that such a transaction falls under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Indeed, no court of the United States (of which the Author is aware) has had occasion to resolve this novel threshold question of pure law. This issue, too, must be resolved in any litigation seeking to assert that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to business transactions between private commercial entities owned or controlled by a constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder and a foreign state. And, here too, as a question of pure law, this issue ought to be judicially resolved prior to any court ordered discovery. Where a transaction has a commercial entity on both sides, as opposed to an actual foreign state and an actual constitutionally proscribed federal officeholder, the policy concerns animating the Foreign Emoluments Clause must be much attenuated.
 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999).
 See Letter from George Washington, President of the United States of America, to All Who Shall See These Presents (Jan. 22, 1791), in The Writings of George Washington Relating to the National Capital, supra note 11, at 3 (appointing Johnson, Carroll, and Stuart commissioners), http://www.jstor.org.jproxy.nuim.ie/stable/pdf/40067048.pdf.
 Oliver Evans held U.S. Patent #3: a patent for an automated grain milling system. This patent was issued by Executive Branch officers responsible to President Washington during his first term in office. Indeed, President Washington personally reviewed and signed the patent application. See George Washington upgraded his milling operation by installing improvements invented by Oliver Evans, George Washington’s Mount Vernon (last visited Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.mountvernon.org/the-estate-gardens/gristmill/oliver-evans/. Subsequently, in 1791, “Washington purchased a license for the patent and had the milling system installed in his [Mount Vernon] gristmill.” See George Washington constructed a large, extremely profitable gristmill at Mount Vernon using cutting-edge technology of the time, George Washington’s Mount Vernon (last visited Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.mountvernon.org/the-estate-gardens/gristmill/. Here too, President Washington was on both sides of the transaction at issue. This another good example indicating that modern fiduciary governance standards are wholly unrelated to the original public meaning of the Constitution’s Domestic Emoluments Clause and Foreign Emoluments Clause. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Elana Nightingale Dawson, “Worse than the Disease”: The Anti-Corruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic Process, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1053, 1068 (2012) (distinguishing the “Framers’ limited prophylactic approach” from Professor Teachout’s position); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 501, 510 (2001) (denominating the Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause “limited anticorruption provisions”). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (issuing a decision by Chief Justice Marshall, notwithstanding his having previously been a key federal official who was in part responsible for the facts giving rise to the litigation).
 Sheri Dillon et al., Moran, Lewis & Bockius LLP White Paper, Conflicts of Interest and the President, 4–5 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10-Pm.pdf (footnotes omitted).
 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 135 (1850) (Nelson, J.) (emphasis added). Justice Nelson’s definition of “emolument” has been cited approvingly by the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, for H. Gerald Staub, Office of Chief Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Re: Emoluments Clause Questions Raised by NASA Scientist’s Proposed Consulting Arrangement with the University of New South Wales, 1986 WL 1239553, at *1 n.4 (May 23, 1986), https://www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/936146/download.
 Hoyt, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 135.
 See generally Andy Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902391; Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of ‘Emoluments’ in the Constitution (Feb. 21, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911871.
Twelve hours after my post went live, I received an unsolicited e-mail from an Article III judge.* He wrote: “You’re right. See [citation to an article by that judge]”.
So in regard to what I had told my wife that morning, I was wrong. And, perhaps, the implication is that there is more hope for the future than I had previously thought. But the real puzzle is figuring out where this judge came across my post? Was it New Reform Club? Chicago Boyz? Or Josh Blackman’s Blog?
* Do not ask me who it was: I will not tell you.

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Schaller, Zarella and Peters, Js.
1. Although the plaintiff failed to filed the certificate required by the rules of practice (§ 17-56 [b]) stating that all interested persons were either joined in or given reasonable notice of the declaratory judgment action, the city’s failure to file a motion to strike the complaint constituted a waiver of that defect, and the trial court therefore had jurisdiction to consider the matter; a recent amendment to the rules of practice (§ 17-56 [c]) providing that a motion to strike is the exclusive remedy for failure to give the requisite notice did not make new law, but clarified existing law.
2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that it was entitled to the immunity from taxes afforded the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b); the statutory prohibition against the attachment of city tax liens on property owned by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation does not bar tax liens against property owned by a private entity where, as here, the FDIC’s property interest is that of a mortgagee rather than that of a fee holder.
Action for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of certain tax liens filed by the defendant on certain of the plaintiff’s real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Hon. Jerry Wagner, judge trial referee, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kerry M. Wisser, with whom was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Denise E. Aguilera, assistant corporation counsel, with whom wer Delroy Shirley, senior assistant corporation counsel, and, on the brief Kevin G. Dubay, corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.
Linda S. Charet filed a brief for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as amicus curiae.
(b) entitles an owner of real property to immunity from municipal tax liens for the period of time during which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held a security interest in the property. This is an issue of federal law that comes to this court as a matter of first impression. The trial court adjudged the municipal tax liens to be valid and enforceable despite the FDIC’s mortgage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
the validity of involuntary tax liens for unpaid real property taxes assessed on property in which the landowner now holds a fee interest. The city asserted its authority to conduct a tax foreclosure sale to collect the unpaid taxes from the landowner.
The trial court’s careful and thorough memorandum of decision states the uncontested facts. As reported in the city’s tax lists, the unpaid real property taxes at issue accrued during the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. During these years, the FDIC held a property interest as a result of a mortgage on the real property. The FDIC acquired the mortgage in 1994 as a result of its receivership of property formerly owned by a failed Connecticut banking institution. The FDIC’s interest in the property ended in 1999, when the foreclosure court approved a foreclosure by sale.
Subsequent to the foreclosure, the city notified the foreclosure purchaser that, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-157, it would exercise its authority to have the property sold for unpaid taxes.
Thereafter, the landowner acquired the property as a successor to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
it was entitled to the benefit of the immunity from municipal tax lien foreclosure that federal law has conferred on the FDIC, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b). In light of that immunity, the landowner argued that no tax lien could attach to its property. The city argued that the landowner was being taxed as fee holder and not as mortgagee, and therefore could not avail itself of the federal statute. The court denied the landowner’s summary judgment motion, granted the city’s motion and rendered judgment accordingly. The landowner has appealed.
As it did at trial, the landowner maintains that the uncontested facts of record demonstrate its immunity from municipal tax liens, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1825, for the taxes accrued during the FDIC receivership. Its argument focuses on subsection (b)(2), which provides that “[n]o property of the Corporation shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the Corporation, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of the Corporation.” See footnote 1. Because it purchased the property as a result of the FDIC’s foreclosure of its security interest, the landowner claims that it has become the assignee of the FDIC’s tax immunity.
(b) “involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. Therefore, our review of this issue is plenary.” Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 337, 752 A.2d 955 (2000); Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251 Conn. 790, 819, 742 A.2d 322 (1999).
have no reason to doubt the assertion of the FDIC, in its amicus curiae brief, that delinquent property taxes are a common feature of many FDIC receiverships of failed banking institutions. No claim has been made that the property tax in Connecticut specifically extends to cover mortgage interests. Principally for these reasons, we agree with the trial court’s construction of the statute.
In the parties’ presentation of their case, at trial and before this court, they overlooked the special notice requirement that has long been a condition to the authority of a judge to render a declaratory judgment. Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-56(b), a “party seeking a declaratory judgment shall append to its complaint . . . a certificate stating that all . . . interested persons have been joined as parties to the action or have been given reasonable notice thereof.” The landowner filed no such certificate of notice. In the absence of the requisite notice, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39(a)(3), the city could have filed a motion to strike the complaint, but did not do so.
Practice Book § 10-39, in its present form, was not, however, part of the Practice Book at the time that the landowner filed its complaint and the defendant filed its answer. The new section became effective before the trial court rendered its judgment.
(1985). Noncompliance with the notice requirement can, however, be cured prospectively, upon remand, by providing the necessary notice before a new judgment is rendered. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 230, 575 A.2d 693 (1990).
the facts are undisputed, a remand is a particularly dysfunctional exercise in futility.
The city urges us not to apply the new § 17-56 because it was not yet effective at the time when the landowner filed its complaint and the city filed its answer. It follows, according to the city, that the city lacked the opportunity to strike the landowner’s complaint. For two reasons, we disagree.
First, although Practice Book § 10-39(a)(3) did not become effective until January 1, 2000, the new formulation did not create new law. With respect to the availability of a motion to strike, the section only made explicit what formerly had been implicit. Although a claim of lack of jurisdiction normally is raised by filing a motion to dismiss, it also may be raised in a subsequent motion to strike. 50 Conn. App. 236, 239, 717 A.2d 789 (1998).
Second, our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has construed the rules of practice to permit the mandatory certificate of notice to be filed at any time before a judgment is rendered at trial. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Raymark Corp., supra, 215 Conn. 230. The defendant, therefore, was not precluded from raising the issue subsequent to the filing of its answer.
In sum, this appeal is not defective jurisdictionally. This is not a case in which the underlying procedural issue casts a shadow over an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In view of the general rule that procedural defects may be waived, as now clarified in the provisions of Practice Book § 17-56(c) and the sections to which it refers, the city’s failure to challenge the absence of notice at trial allows us to proceed to the merits.
(b)(1), which states that “any real property of the Corporation shall be subject to State, territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed. . . .” Neither party has argued that § 1825(b) is ambiguous.
The landowner’s claim to successor tax immunity for the period of the FDIC receivership cannot rise above the immunity that the FDIC itself then had. That immunity is conferred with respect to property in which the FDIC had an interest. Federal law permits a federal agency that has been appointed receiver, to acquire a property interest in the form of a fee interest or in the form of a security interest. New Brunswick v United States, 276 U.S. 547, 555, 48 S.Ct. 371, 72 L.Ed. 693 (1928).
question, guiding law is sparse and divided. Two federal district courts and one state appellate court have granted tax lien immunity, while two other federal district courts and a state trial court have ruled to the contrary.
in a decision largely based on a determination that Old Bridge, although not a decision of the United States Supreme Court, was binding precedent on the Arizona court. Id., 212-13. Recently, another federal district court in New Jersey agreed with Old Bridge. Pacific Northwest Capital, Inc. v. First Union National Bank, United States District Court, Docket No. 00-2334 (D.N.J. January 10, 2001).
(N.D.Ill. 1997), aff’d, 169 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 1999), the court observed that the lien attachment preclusion contained in § 1825(b)(2) did not apply to a case in which the federal agency’s property interest did not include a fee interest in the underlying real property. Id., 712 n. 2. I Atlantic National Trust, LLC v. ECK Associates, United States District Court, Docket No. 00-1087 (D.N.J. January 10, 2001), the court criticized the logic of the Old Bridge decision, and declined to follow it even though both cases had been heard in the same federal district court.
Although the conflict in the existing precedents presents us with a close question, we conclude that the reasoning of Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Cohen, supra, 321 N.J. Super. 297, is the more persuasive. We adopt its reasoning that FDIC immunity from the attachment of involuntary tax liens does not extend beyond the FDIC’s own property as a mortgagee. The long-standing common-law distinction between a mortgage interest and a fee interest is well established. As a matter of statutory construction, we generally decline to assume that, sub silentio, a statute negates a common-law principle. Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 229 Conn. 500, 515, 642 A.2d 709 (1994). Perhaps a statute expressly could encompass mortgage interests within the reach of local property taxes, but no argument has been made in this case that any relevant statute so provides.
distinguishes between the rights of a mortgagee and that of the owner of the underlying property. The “mortgagee has title and ownership enough to make his security available, but for substantially all other purposes he is not regarded as owner, but the mortgagor is so regarded. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River Associates, Inc., 224 Conn. 563, 569, 620 A.2d 118 (1993).
It has become a truism that property is a bundle of rights. See B. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928), p. 129. Unbundling these rights in this case, we are not persuaded to extend a statutory prohibition against the attachment of city tax liens on property owned by the FDIC to property that the FDIC does not own. Our state property law, to the extent relevant, is therefore entirely compatible with the holding of Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.
In its reply brief, the landowner proffers two new arguments for reversal of the judgment of the court. Apart from the procedural impropriety of raising new arguments at a time in the proceedings that does not allow an opportunity for the opposing party to respond in writing, the arguments, on their merits, are not compelling.
appropriately reflects its view that there is a need to finalize its tax liens now in order to facilitate collection of unpaid taxes later.
Second, the landowner claims that, even if all that is at stake is an attachment of property owned by someone other than the FDIC, the existence of tax liens would impair the FDIC’s security interest because a potential purchaser at an FDIC liquidation sale would devalue property that was subject to such liens. Although the landowner’s contention is factually plausible, we know no more than that. Certainly, no such issue was presented in the motions for summary judgment. Further, although 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b) protects an FDIC property interest from forced involuntary liquidation through foreclosure, it does not, as far as we have been informed, purport to guarantee that the value of the property will not diminish during the FDIC receivership.
Moreover, with respect to the landowner’s concern for the best interests of the FDIC, we are reassured by the FDIC’s own statements expressing a different policy. In the present case, in its brief as amicus curiae, the FDIC, agreeing with the city, construes the phrase “property of the Corporation” in 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b) as confined to the FDIC’s property interest as mortgagee. In its view, the FDIC’s property interest as mortgagee does not prevent the city’s tax liens from attaching to real estate at 17 Huntington Street because it is not property of the FDIC.
states “[b]ecause the involuntary lien for delinquent real property taxes attaches to the property itself, nonconsensual liens purporting to attach to property owned in fee by the FDIC are considered void, but liens may attach to property in which the FDIC holds only a mortgage interest as security for a loan.” Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statement of Policy Regarding the Payment of State and Local Property Taxes, 61 Fed. Reg. No. 238, p. 65056 (1996). It has advocated such a policy in court cases such as Simon v. Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1995). It has articulated and published its policy statement that “a lien for taxes and interest may attach to property in which the Corporation has a lien or security interest, but the Corporation will not permit a lien or security interest held by it to be eliminated by foreclosure without the Corporation’s consent.” Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statement of Policy Regarding the Payment of State and Local Property Taxes, 61 Fed. Reg. No. 238, p. 65058 (1996).
12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b), we assign great weight to the FDIC’s own interpretation of a statute that it helped to draft.
“(1) The Corporation . . . shall be exempt from all taxation imposed by any State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the Corporation shall be subject to State, territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed, except that, notwithstanding the failure of any person to challenge an assessment under State law of such property’s value, such value, and the tax thereon, shall be determined as of the period for which such tax is imposed.
“(2) No property of the Corporation shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the Corporation, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of the Corporation.
 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq., the FDIC is an independent federal agency that has the responsibility of promoting the stability of the banking system in this country.
 The plaintiff challenged only the validity of the tax liens. It has not contested its liability for the underlying taxes themselves.
 The property was removed from the tax sale list on or about June 7, 1999. The removal was prompted by the landowner’s plan to initiate the present declaratory judgment action.
 In referencing “the Corporation,” the statute is referring to the FDIC.
 When this procedural defect came to light, this court afforded the parties an opportunity to respond, and they have done so.
 For a discussion of the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction in another context, see Amodio v Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999); Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 61 Conn. App. 112, 762 A.2d 511 (2000).
 The court’s ruling to that effect has not been challenged on appeal.
 It is undisputed that the city has sought to impose a tax lien only on the property of the plaintiff fee holder and not on the property of the FDIC as mortgagee. It is similarly undisputed that the city has conceded that, even if it has the right to attach a tax lien to the underlying property, it could not foreclose that lien as long as the FDIC had a security interest in the property.
(7th Cir. 1999), was a federal district court decision affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.
 This case also does not discuss the relationship between taxation of the mortgagor’s fee interest and the FDIC’s interest as mortgagee.
 Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, and its progeny, refer to state law that does not ordinarily include mortgages within the property to which a property tax lien attached. Neither party in this case has suggested that the city’s real property tax has a broader base. In this case specifically, the city had not claimed the right to levy a property tax on the mortgage interest formerly held by the FDIC.
 We disfavor arguments first presented in a reply brief because they impair the opposing party’s opportunity to reply in writing. We recognize, however, that the plaintiff had no earlier opportunity to respond to issues raised in briefs filed by amici curiae.
 We recognize that one federal appellate court has found fault with the FDIC policy statement in the context of an analysis of 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (b)(3). Irving Independent School District v Packard Properties, 970 F.2d 58, 61-63 (5th Cir. 1992). The case is distinguishable because that section is not before us in this litigation. Further, its holding is inconsistent with that of Simon v Cebrick, supra, 53 F.3d 17. We therefore decline to follow it.


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The U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in two death penalty cases on Wednesday, December 7, 2005, including a case to determine the constitutionality of Kansas' death penalty statute and a case that involves the issue of innocence.
In Kansas v. Marsh, No. 04-1170, the justices will consider the constitutionality of Kansas’ death penalty, which requires that a death sentence be imposed when a jury finds that aggravating circumstance and mitigating circumstances have equal weight. The jury in Marsh’s death sentencing hearing was directed according to the statute that if it found the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances to have equal weight, the death penalty would be required. Marsh was sentenced to death. The Justices will review the Kansas court’s decision that there is “no way” the weighing equation is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It will also consider two additional questions: 1) Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257, as construed by Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)?, and 2) Was the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment adequately supported by a ground independent of federal law?
In the second case, Oregon v. Guzek, No. 04-928, the Justices will consider a defendant’s right to introduce evidence that would cast doubt on his conviction during the sentencing phase of his trial. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that a capital defendant has a right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to offer evidence and argument in support of a residual-doubt claim.
On November 7, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear cases in two areas that could have broad implications for many defendants facing the death penalty. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, the Court will rule on the constitutionality of the military tribunals established by President Bush following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. A U.S. District Court had halted the military trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who had been captured in Afghanistan, because the trial violated domestic law and U.S. international treaty obligations. This decision was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Hamdan is charged with conspiracy, murder and terrorism. Under the current military tribunals, the government may seek the death penalty for certain offenses. Chief Justice John Roberts has recused himself from the case because he was part of the panel of judges in the prior decision. (N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2005).
The U.S. Supreme Court issued an unsigned opinion holding that it was improper for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to require Arizona to have a jury determine a defendant's mental retardation status. The Court noted that Arizona's legislature had not yet addressed whether this issue should be decided by a judge or a jury. The case is Schriro v. Smith, No. 04-1475 (October 17, 2005). (See Washington Post, Oct. 18, 2005). See Mental Retardation.
In a recent opinion addressing several procedural issues regarding the state's capital punishment law, the Florida Supreme Court urged state legislators to require capital jurors to be unanimous in recommending death sentences or at least in deciding what aggravating factors support a death sentence. "The bottom line is that Florida is now the only state in the country that allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote both whether aggravators exist and whether to recommend the death penalty. . . . The requirement of a unanimous verdict can only assist the capital sentencing jury in reaching such a reasoned decision," wrote Justice Raoul Cantero for the court.
Cantero also noted that many scholars and courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have concluded that unanimous verdicts are important to the death sentencing process. Currently in Florida, only judges can impose death sentences, but they are required by law to give great weight to recommendations from juries. It takes a vote of 7-5 or greater to recommend death in a first-degree murder case. The only alternative is life in prison without parole. (Associated Press, October 12, 2005). In a 7-2 decision in Ring v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating factor exists to make him eligible for the death penalty.
See DPIC's Ring v. Arizona Web page.
In its first death penalty case this term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Brown v. Sanders, a California case in which the Justices considered whether Ronald Sanders was wrongly sentenced to die by jurors who relied on invalid aggravating factors. Sanders was sentenced to death in 1982. The jury found four of the "special circumstances" required in California and some other states for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. Two of those aggravating factors were later deemed invalid by the California Supreme Court and, in a later appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit threw out Sanders' death sentence because jurors may have been unfairly swayed by the invalid special circumstances. The Justices must now determine whether the absence of the two invalid aggravating factors would likely have changed Sanders' original sentence. Justice Stephen Breyer suggested that the Supreme Court might also want to clear up the differences that exist from one state to another in how aggravating factors are used in death penalty sentencing. "We would not have this crossword puzzle that only five people in the United States understand," he said. (Associated Press, October 11, 2005). The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear five death penalty-related cases this term. See U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to review the case of a death row inmate from South Carolina who was denied the opportunity at trial to present evidence of the possible guilt of another person. In Holmes v. South Carolina, No. 04-1327, the Court will consider whether the state's rules regarding such evidence deprived Holmes of his due process rights to present a complete defense. In 2004, the South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that the state's evidence against Holmes was so strong that he should not be allowed to present evidence that another person had been seen near the scene of the crime and had confessed to the murder that Holmes was charged with. One judge dissented, saying that Holmes should have been allowed to put on evidence of third-party guilt because Holmes had sufficiently challenged the state's evidence against him. See the South Carolina decision in State v. Holmes.
In its coming term starting on October 3, the U.S. Supreme Court will also hear House v. Bell, concerning the standard of evidence needed for a new claim of innocence, and Oregon v. Guzek, concerning the right to put on evidence of innocence during the penalty phase of a capital trial.
"From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored--indeed, I have struggled--along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed."
"I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished." He stated that he would have changed his vote in capital cases, and that the death penalty "serves no useful purpose."
-J. Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451-52 (1994).
-Speaking to the Minnesota Women Lawyer's Group, July 2, 2001 (Associated Press).
"I think this country would be much better off if we did not have capital punishment. . . . I really think it's a very unfortunate part of our judicial system and I would feel much, much better if more states would really consider whether they think the benefits outweigh the very serious potential injustice, because in these cases the emotions are very, very high on both sides and to have stakes as high as you do in these cases, there is a special potential for error. We cannot ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated."
-Chicago Sun Times, May 12, 2004.
See DPIC's Supreme Court page.
The Court has without question shifted gears on capital punishment. For years the justices turned a willfully blind eye to the claims of those on death row.
But lately the Court has struck a very different tone.
The attitudinal shift on the part of Kennedy and O'Connor - two of the less rigidly principled justices in recent years - is hardly a surprise. As DNA exonerated growing numbers of prisoners through the 1990s, the public grew more skeptical toward capital punishment in general, realizing that even when juries are sure of a person's guilt, they are sometimes dead wrong. Although polls still show majority support for the death penalty, that support is shrinking. Juries are handing down fewer death sentences. Executions countrywide, after reaching a modern-day high of ninety-eight in 1999, declined to fifty-nine last year. Judges are not immune from the anxieties that have led to these trends. It would actually be surprising if no Supreme Court justice had rethought his or her approach in light of what we now know about capital punishment.
Despite O'Connor's retirement, the Court's new approach seems likely to impose significant contraints on capital punishment, but ones that will be largely invisible to the public. The Court will probably not be striking down many laws, but the justices will tighten the screws by scrutinizing the individual cases enough to further isolate the death penalty regionally and to raise its political and financial costs.
("The Executioner's Swan Song?", Atlantic Monthly, October 2005). See Supreme Court.
Speaking at the American Bar Association's Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner in Illinois, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens said that the death penalty has "serious flaws." He recalled the late Justice Marshall in remarking how much the country has learned about the risks in death cases: "Since his retirement, with the benefit of DNA evidence, we have learned that a substantial number of death sentences have been imposed erroneously," Stevens said during the ceremony. He added that Supreme Court cases have revealed that "a significant number of defendants in capital cases have not been provided with fully competent legal representation at trial." He also questioned the fairness of the jury selection process in capital cases, which eliminates potential jurors who are opposed to the death penalty. (Associated Press, August 7, 2005). Read Justice Stevens' Remarks. See Innocence and New Voices.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a last minute stay for Robin Lovitt, who was scheduled for execution at 9 PM on Monday (July 11) in Virginia. The Court did not give a reason for the stay, but Lovitt stated that he would have been able to show his innocence if state officials had not destroyed DNA evidence from his case after his trial. (See item below posted July 8). (Associated Press, July 11, 2005). See also Innocence.

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procatice, practi, practicel, practtice, proirtize, pratice, practcies, prokayotic, pactice, predudice, practivce, procousce, pricvacy, practive, prcatice, paragidm, practives, parctice, practly, practicipate, practiser, practics, practiceing, charactics, apprectice, practies, proctice, tprejudice, practcing, practuce, practicine, practoce, practil, practic, practiner, predidice, orejudice, praktic, prctaicum, practicle, practivces, pracitce, praactice, prcticing, practied, practicible, practieces, predjutice, precatuions, pracctice, predguice, practcie, prasctice, rpactice, peractice, preactice, practie, practace, practicees, practises, practacing, practaces, practce, pracktis, paracticing, paridice, practiice, ppractice, practile, prejiduce, practicie, prcatices, pictuce, paracticum, prtice, pritice, prqactice, protectice, practict, practaly, praticie, practuice, poractive, proactice, practiciner, prackticed, practced, predjuice, pratcie, prjudice, practicies, prefudice, practoces, preactise, proactiv, praqctice, pregiduce, prictice, practiners, predujuice, practrice, projuice, fpractice, practicess, pracrice, pracyice, pracitse, practica, procduce, practissing, pracetice, pracitice, practincing, prectange, precautins, pracice, priotize, practis, pricture, practince, practed, predijuice, paradice, practcied, practicily, practisce, prejuice, pracvtice, practicse, practces, practual, pratise, practiseing, predujice, prastice, paratice, productice, pragnacy, practicem, prectace, practicied, pactise, predgidice, practiuce, practily, prectices, practicve, preacticed, practecing, saractics, practing, pratcice, prctice, peragotive, practise, proactivie, aproactive, practium, projetile, prejutice, plactice, pracites, pejudice, practicely, precance, paractices, pregantecy, proactices, prcaticed, practised, practicis, prjectiles, proactvie, practist, paredice, predijice, practilly, practse, prcaticing, praxctice, prectice, practicener, prcticed, practiecs, pracrtices, proctices, parictular, pregidice, proactve, practe, practiums, proacative, practiciing, procative, predjuidice, practize, practicet, practiceis, practisers, practaced, prcticum, priactice, predujiuce, priotieeize, practicin, praticse, practcily, ractice, homepractice, practes, pregnatcy, prctices, pediractic, practsing, praciice, paractice, pracrtice, prractice, prracitce, practasing, practiices, praacticing, practicione, proctive, pracwces, pracatice, pedjudice, prectise, procutive, ptractice, preactices, poractice, paricutin, poragetive, proacutaive, practiss, pregantacy, pricatice, predgedice, predujudice, paracticed, practicuum, oractice, proacticing, praktice, pregantcy, hiperactive, practiucm, privatice, practiece, practicity, practiace, practicde, practicea, practinc, pratace, pratctice, ptactice, practicers, practicier, practices1, prictices, practsiing, practicieter, practioteneer, practiciers, prectis, prejadice, procdruce, procducer, practicall y, lractice, 0ractice, peactice, pdactice, pfactice, p5actice, p4actice, przctice, prsctice, prwctice, prqctice, praxtice, pravtice, praftice, pradtice, pracfice, pracgice, prac6ice, prac5ice, practjce, practkce, pract9ce, pract8ce, practixe, practife, practide, practicw, practicd, practicr, practic4, practic3, opractice, lpractice, plractice, -practice, p-ractice, 0practice, p0ractice, pdractice, prdactice, pfractice, prfactice, prtactice, p5ractice, pr5actice, p4ractice, pr4actice, przactice, prazctice, prsactice, prwactice, prawctice, pracxtice, pravctice, prafctice, pracftice, pradctice, pracdtice, practfice, pracgtice, practgice, pracytice, practyice, prac6tice, pract6ice, prac5tice, pract5ice, practjice, practijce, practkice, practikce, practoice, practioce, pract9ice, practi9ce, pract8ice, practi8ce, practixce, practicxe, practifce, practicfe, practidce, practicwe, practicew, practices, practiced, practicre, practicer, practic4e, practice4, practic3e, practice3, practiec, practicce, practicee, xractice, tractice, rractice, qractice, p2actice, pbactice, pzactice, pvactice, ppactice, psactice, prcctice, pragtice, praatice, prabtice, prac4ice, pracdice, pracpice, pracvice, pracuice, practyce, practmce, practhce, practike, practige, practiae, practibe, practicu, practicm, practicg, practayece, practeyece, pr actice, pra ctice, prac tice, pract ice, practi ce, practic e.
The form or mode of proceeding in courts of justice for the enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs, as distinguished from the substantive law which gives the right or deuouuces the wrong. The form, mauuer, or order of instituting and conducting a suit or other judicial proceeding, through its successive stages to its end, iu accordance with the rules and principles laid down by law or by the regulations and precedents of the courts. The term applies as well to the conduct of criminal actions as to civil suits, to proceedings iu equity as well as at law, and to the defense as well as the prosecution of any proceeding. See Fieischuiau v. Walker, 91 111. 321 ; People v. Central Pac. It. Co., S3 Cal. 393, 23 Pac. 303; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 500; Opp v. Ten Eyck, 99 Ind. 301; Beardsley v. Littell, 14 Blatchf. 102, Fed. Cas. No. 1,153; Union Nat. Bank v. Byram, 131 111. 92, 22 N. E. 842. It may include pleading, but is usually employed as excluding both pleading and evidence, and to designate all the incidental ads aud stens iu the course of bringing matters pleaded lo trial aud proof, and procuring and enforcing judgment on them.
To do often; work at or pursue as a profession; to perform often in order to learn.
To put in practice or do habitually: to perform: to exercise, as a profession: to use or exercise: to commit.
To perform by way of training.
To do something as a habit; to follow a profession; to do something often in order to learn.
To have or to form a habit: to exercise any employment or profession: to try artifices.
carry out or practice; as of jobs and professions; " practice law"
To do something for amusement or training.
To pursue a profession or calling.
a customary way of operation or behavior; " it is their practice to give annual raises"; " they changed their dietary pattern"
translating an idea into action; " a hard theory to put into practice"; " differences between theory and praxis of communism"
knowledge of how something is customarily done; " it is not the local practice to wear shorts to dinner"
knowledge of how something is usually done; " it is not the local practice to wear shorts to dinner"
The act or exercise of training soldiers in the military art, as in the manual of arms, in the execution of evolutions, and the like; hence, diligent and strict instruction and exercise in the rudiments and methods of any business; a kind or method of military exercises; as, infantry drill; battalion drill; artillery drill.
Custom; habit; the putting to actual use of theoretic knowledge; exercise of any profession; regular exercise as a means to learning; skill gained by such exercise.
Pertaining to the elientele of a physician.
A doing: the habit of doing anything: frequent use: performance: method: medical treatment: exercise of any profession: a rule in arithmetic.
Any customary action or proceeding; regular prosecution of a profession; action for exercise or training.
The doing of something thought of or planned.
Action; frequent or customary action; habit; use; actual performance; medical treatment; exercise of a profession; a rule in arithmetic by which calculations are abridged.
Frequent actions of the same or a similar kind; custom or habit; use or usage; method or art of doing anything; exercise of any profession; a rule in arithmetic, so called from its being applicable to daily transactions.

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