1. Under the Seventh Amendment, a federal court, finding a verdict inadequate, is without power to add to it by refusing to grant the plaintiff a new trial if the defendant will accept an increase which the court deems sufficient. So held in an action for personal injuries due to negligence.
2. In order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791. P. 293 U. S. 476.
English cases examined on the power of the courts to increase damages, super visum vulneris, in actions for mayhem, and upon writ of inquiry, and in actions of debt.
3. Upon an examination of many English authorities, it is concluded that, while there was some practice to the contrary in respect of decreasing damages, the established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions sounding in tort, such as the present one. P. 293 U. S. 482.
4. The authority exercised by federal courts of denying a motion for a new trial because of an excessive verdict if the plaintiff will remit the excess is embedded in long practice, and has plausible support in the view that what remains of the recovery was found by the jury in the sense that it was included in the verdict along with the unlawful excess, the effect of the remittitur being merely to lop off an excrescence; but where the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a bald addition of something never included in the verdict. The trial court cannot, by assessing an additional amount of damages with the consent of the defendant only, bring the constitutional right of the plaintiff to an end in respect of a matter of fact which no jury has ever passed upon, either explicitly or by implication. P. 293 U. S. 482.
fundamental principles through the extension of doubtful precedents by analogy. P. 293 U. S. 485.
6. Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance, and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence, that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. P. 293 U. S. 486.
7. The effect of the Seventh Amendment was to adopt the common law rules of jury trial as they existed in 1791, and these, being in effect part of the Constitution, cannot be altered now under pretense of adapting the common law to altered conditions. P. 293 U. S. 487.
Certiorari to review the reversal of a judgment for damages in an action for personal injuries, entered on denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, after the plaintiff had declined to accept an increase offered by the court and agreed to by the defendant.
ground unless petitioner would consent to an increase of the damages to the sum of $1,500. Respondent's consent was neither required nor given. Petitioner, however, consented to the increase, and, in accordance with the order of the court, a denial of the motion for new trial automatically followed. Respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, where the judgment was reversed, the court holding that the conditional order violated the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution in respect of the right of trial by jury. 70 F.2d 558, 562. That court recognized the doctrine, frequently stated by this Court, that, in the case of an excessive verdict, it is within the power of the trial court to grant defendant's motion for a new trial unless plaintiff remit the amount deemed to be excessive, but held that the trial court was without power to condition the allowance of plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the refusal of defendant to consent to an increase in the amount of damages.
"In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law."
Section 269 of the Judicial Code, as amended, U.S.C. Title 28, § 391, confers upon all federal courts power to grant new trials "in cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law. . . ."
authoritative decision sustaining the power of an English court to increase, either absolutely or conditionally, the amount fixed by the verdict of a jury in an action at law, with certain exceptions.
1. In actions for mayhem, there are numerous ancient cases to be found in the year books, and occasional cases at a somewhat later period, in which the right of the court to increase damages awarded plaintiff, super visum vulneris, is recognized. We deem it unnecessary to catalogue or review these cases. Many of them are referred to in 2 Bacon's Abridgment (7th Ed.) 611, and Sayer's Law of Damages (1770) p. 173 et seq. The last case called to our attention or that we have been able to find that recognized the rule is that of Brown v. Seymour (1742) 1 Wils. 5, where the court, while conceding its power to increase damages upon view of the party maimed, refused to exercise it, holding the damages awarded were sufficient. We have found no case where the power was exercised affirmatively since Burton v. Baynes (1733), reported in Barne's Practice Cases 153, where the court, upon view of the injury, increased the damages from £11, 14 s., to £50. The power of the trial court to increase damages in such cases was seldom exercised, and it seems quite clear, from an examination of the decisions and of the English Abridgments, that the generally approved practice confined its exercise to the court sitting en banc. Moreover, the application for the increase was made by the plaintiff, considered upon a view of his wound, and, when favorably acted upon, granted absolutely, and not as a condition upon which to base a denial of a new trial. Indeed, the practice of granting new trials in such cases did not come into operation until a later date. In any event, the rule was obsolete in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and we are unable to find that it ever was acted upon or accepted in the colonies, or by any of the federal or state courts since the adoption of the Constitution.
"has been found in any book of American Reports in support of the present motion, notwithstanding the great research displayed by counsel. Neither has there been for a period of more than a century any recognition of the rule by any adjudged case in England to which we have been able to procure access."
After pointing out the jealous regard of the American people, as evidenced by constitutions and legislation, for the right of jury trial, the court said that the judgment of the jury had been incorporated as an indispensable element in the judicial administration of the country; that, in all cases sounding in damages, these damages must be assessed by the jury, and not by the court independently thereof, and that, where the verdict was excessive or trifling, the remedy was to submit the case to the judgment of another jury. In Mayne's Treatise on Damages (9th ed.). the first edition of which appeared in 1856, after referring to the long current of English decisions in respect of the power of the court to increase damages in mayhem cases, the author (p. 571) said he was not aware of an instance in which such a jurisdiction had been exercised in modern times. And see Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 141 U. S. 252.
inquisition therefore was nothing more than an inquest for their information. Sayer's Law of Damages 194; Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244, 248; Brooke's New cases, March's Translation, 56, 57; 2 Bacon's Abridgement (7th Ed.) 612. But even this rule seems long since to have fallen into disuse; the more modern practice being to award a new writ of inquiry in all cases in which the court would award a new trial. Mayne's Treatise on Damages 572, 573, citing Chitty's Practice, 14th ed., p. 1326.
3. So it was held in some of the old cases that, where the amount of plaintiff's demand was certain -- as, for example, in an action of debt -- the court had authority to increase or abridge the verdict of the jury. Mayne's Treatise on Damages 571; Sayer's Law of Damages 177.
In Beardmore v. Carrington, supra, decided in 1764, the court reviewed the subject and reached the conclusion that the English courts were without power to either increase or abridge damages in any action for a personal tort, unless in the exceptional cases just noted. The decision is most instructive, as a brief quotation will show. The italics are in the original.
themselves without any inquest at all; only in the case of maihem, courts have in all ages interposed in that single instance only; as to the case of the writ of inquiry in the year-book of H.4, we doubt whether what is said by the court in that case be right, That they would abridge the damages unless the plaintiff would release part thereof, because there is not one case to be found in the year-books wherever the court abridged the damages after a principal verdict, and this is clear down to the time of Palmer's Rep. 314. much less have they interposed in increasing damages, except in the case of maihem. . . ."
"that in cases where the amount of damages was uncertain their assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should not alter it."
"When an excessive verdict is given, it is usual for the judge to suggest to counsel to agree on a sum, to prevent the necessity of a new trial. In the absence of agreement, the Court has no power to reduce the damages to a reasonable sum instead of ordering a new trial. It would seem also from what was said in the case in which this was recently decided that, where the damages are too small, the Court cannot with the defendant's consent increase them if the plaintiff asks for a new trial."
upon the consent of the plaintiff to reduce the damages to an amount which the court would consider not excessive had they been given by the jury, and that the Master of the Rolls, in his opinion, declared that he was by no means prepared to say that the court might not refuse a new trial if a defendant would agree that the damages should be larger. But this doctrine was expressly repudiated by the House of Lords in Watt v. Watt, L.R.  A.C. 115, and Belt v. Lawes was definitely overruled.
"adopted the somewhat unconstitutional proceeding of refusal to give the plaintiff judgment unless he would consent to reduce his claim to what ought to be considered reasonable;"
"Where damages are at large and the Court of Appeal is of opinion that the sum awarded is so unreasonable as to show that the jury has not approached the subject in a proper judicial temper, has admitted considerations which it ought not to have admitted, or rejected or neglected considerations which it ought to have applied, it is the right of the party aggrieved to have a new trial. He is not to be put off by the Court saying that it will form its opinion as to the proper sum to be awarded, and reduce or enlarge the damages accordingly. He is entitled to an assessment by a jury which acts properly. He is not to be put off by a composite decision, or I might describe it as a resultant of two imperfect forces -- an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted improperly and partly by a tribunal which has no power to assess."
From the foregoing and from many other English authorities which we have examined but deem it unnecessary to cite, we conclude that, while there was some practice to the contrary in respect of decreasing damages, the established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that here under consideration.
for $2,000 damages, suffered as a result of a malicious arrest. Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the damages were excessive. The court asserted its power to grant a new trial upon that ground, but directed that the cause should be submitted to another jury unless plaintiff was willing to remit $500 of the damages. This view of the matter was accepted by this Court in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 116 U. S. 646-647, and has been many times reiterated. See, for example, Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 130 U. S. 73; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 131 U. S. 29; Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U. S. 41, 158 U. S. 52; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 219 U. S. 312; Gila Valley Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 232 U. S. 103-105.
the Blunt case are cited. The common law in respect of the matter is not referred to. The state cases cited are equally silent in respect of the common law rule.
The nearest approach to a reasoned opinion on the subject in any of the decisions is found in Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, supra. In that opinion, the court states the contention to be that to make the decision of the motion for new trial depend upon a remission of part of the verdict is in effect a reexamination by the court in a mode not known at the common law of facts tried by the jury, and therefore a violation of the Seventh Amendment. The court decided against this contention upon the authority of the Blunt case, the Herbert case, and certain American state decisions. English cases were referred to only upon the point that the court had authority to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial where the damages are palpably or outrageously excessive. No attempt was made to seek the common law rule, in respect of the precise contention which was made, by an examination of the English decisions or of the English practice prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
In the last analysis, the sole support for the decisions of this Court and that of Mr. Justice Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in hand, must rest upon the practice of some of the English judges -- a practice which has been condemned, as opposed to the principles of the common law by every reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, which we have been able to find.
during that time. And, as it finds some support in the practice of the English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution, we may assume that, in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day.
Nevertheless, this Court, in a very special sense, is charged with the duty of construing and upholding the Constitution, and, in the discharge of that important duty, it ever must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert what it conceives to be a principle of the fundamental law of the land. Compare Judson v. Gray, 11 N.Y. 408, 412.
"a jury has already awarded a sum in excess of that fixed by the court as a basis for a remittitur, which at least finds some support in the early English practice, while, in the second case, no jury has ever passed on the increased amount, and the practice has no precedent according to the rules of the common law."
". . . the Constitution would have been justly obnoxious to the most conclusive objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it in the most solemn terms."
as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance, and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence, that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Compare Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 281 U. S. 312.
or by implication? To so hold is obviously to compel the plaintiff to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a jury, and accept "an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted improperly, and partly by a tribunal which has no power to assess."
It is said that the common law is susceptible of growth and adaptation to new circumstances and situations, and that the courts have power to declare and effectuate what is the present rule in respect of a given subject without regard to the old rule, and some attempt is made to apply that principle here. The common law is not immutable, but flexible, and, upon its own principles, adapts itself to varying conditions. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371. But here we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted the rules of the common law in respect of trial by jury as these rules existed in 1791. To effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. The distinction is fundamental, and has been clearly pointed out by Judge Cooley in 1 Const. Limitations, 8th ed., 124.
the great length of time mentioned, the federal courts were constantly applying the rule in respect of the remission of excessive damages, the circumstance that the practice here in question in respect of inadequate damages was never followed or, apparently, its approval even suggested, seems highly significant as indicating a lack of judicial belief in the existence of the power.
State decisions in respect of the matter have been brought to our attention, and have received consideration. They embody rulings both ways. A review of them, we think, would serve no useful purpose.
What the trial court has done is to deny a motion for a new trial for what seemed to it a good reason: that the defendant had given his binding consent to an increased recovery, which the court thought to be adequate, and thus to remove any substantial ground for awarding a new trial. In denying the motion, the trial judge relied on two rules of the common law which have received complete acceptance for centuries. One is that the court has power to act upon a motion to set aside the verdict of a jury because inadequate or excessive, and in its discretion to grant or deny a new trial. Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 100 U. S. 31; Wilson v. Everett, 139 U. S. 616, 139 U. S. 621; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436, 151 U. S. 438. The other, which is implicit in the first, is that it has power to determine, as a matter of law, the upper and lower limits within which recovery by a plaintiff will be permitted and the authority to set aside a verdict which is not within those limits. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 130 U. S. 74. Cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 233 U. S. 87.
As a corollary to these rules is the further one of the common law, long accepted in the federal courts, that the exercise of judicial discretion in denying a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is too small or too large is not subject to review on writ of error or appeal. Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, supra, 100 U. S. 31; Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454, 107 U. S. 456; Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 137 U. S. 113; Wilson v. Everett, supra, 139 U. S. 621; Lincoln v. Power, supra, 151 U. S. 438; Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 533, 272 U. S. 540. This is but a special application of the more general rule that an appellate court will not reexamine the facts which induced the trial court to grant or deny a new trial. [Footnote 1] Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213, 17 U. S. 220; The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440, 98 U. S. 445; Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, supra, 100 U. S. 31; Terre Haute & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Struble, 109 U. S. 381, 109 U. S. 384-385; Fishburn v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 60, 137 U. S. 61; Ayers v. Watson, 137 U. S. 584, 137 U. S. 597; Wilson v. Everett, supra, 139 U. S. 621; Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, supra, 272 U. S. 540.
If the effect of what is now decided is to liberalize the traditional common law practice so that the denial of a motion for a new trial, made on the ground that the verdict is excessive or inadequate, is subject to some sort of appellate review, the change need not be regarded as unwelcome, even though no statute has authorized it. But the question remains whether, in exercising this power of review, the trial judge should be reversed.
the practice. Accordingly, I address myself to the question of power without stopping to comment on the generally recognized advantages of the practice as a means of securing substantial justice and bringing the litigation to a more speedy and economical conclusion than would be possible by a new trial to a jury, or the extent to which that or analogous practice has been adopted and found useful in the courts of the several states. See Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 Yale Law J. 318. The question is a narrow one: whether there is anything in the Seventh Amendment or in the rules of the common law, as it had developed before the adoption of the amendment, which would require a federal appellate court to set aside the denial of the motion merely because the particular reasons which moved the trial judge to deny it are not shown to have similarly moved any English judge before 1791.
trial in actions at law, serving to distinguish them from suits in equity and admiralty, See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 28 U. S. 446, and to safeguard the jury's function from any encroachment which the common law did not permit.
Thus interpreted, the Seventh Amendment guarantees that suitors in actions at law shall have the benefits of trial of issues of fact by a jury, but it does not prescribe any particular procedure by which these benefits shall be obtained, or forbid any which does not curtail the function of the jury to decide questions of fact as it did before the adoption of the amendment. It does not restrict the court's control of the jury's verdict, as it had previously been exercised, and it does not confine the trial judge, in determining what issues are for the jury and what for the court, to the particular forms of trial practice in vogue in 1791.
of to the court en banc, was never adopted by the common law. [Footnote 2] But this Court has found in the Seventh Amendment no bar to the adoption by the federal courts of these novel methods of dealing with the verdict of a jury, for they left unimpaired the function of the jury to decide issues of fact, which it had exercised before the adoption of the amendment. Compare Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 288 U. S. 264.
to the increased recovery, of which he does not complain.
determine when they are not of that character. To indicate, before passing upon the motion for a new trial, its opinion that the damages are excessive, and to require a plaintiff to submit to a new trial, unless, by remitting a part of the verdict, he removes that objection, certainly does not deprive the defendant of any right, or give him any cause for complaint."
See also Kennon v. Gilmer, supra, 131 U. S. 29; Clark v. Sidway, supra, 142 U. S. 690; Gila Valley R. Co. v. Hall, supra, 232 U. S. 104; Belt v. Lawes, L.R. 12 Q.B.D. 356, 358.
All that was there said is equally applicable to the present denial of a motion to set aside the verdict as inadequate. The defendant, who has formally consented to pay the increased amount, cannot complain. The plaintiff has suffered no denial of a right because the court, staying its hand, has left the verdict undisturbed, as it lawfully might have done if the defendant had refused to pay more than the verdict. The fact that in one case the recovery is less than the amount of the verdict, and that in the other it is greater, would seem to be without significance. For in neither does the jury return a verdict for the amount actually recovered, and in both the amount of recovery was fixed not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting the motion for a new trial.
of control over the verdict of the jury in cases of mayhem and battery, and that the practice of denying a new trial upon a remittitur had received some recognition in the English courts. Belt v. Lawes, supra, 359; Watt v. Watt,  A.C. 115, 122. But in no recorded case does it appear that any English judge had considered the possibility of denying a new trial where the defendant had consented to increase the amount of recovery.
system, was its capacity for growth and development, and its adaptability to every new situation to which it might be needful to apply it. "This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is," as the Court declared in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 110 U. S. 530, "the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law." See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 169 U. S. 385-387; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 211 U. S. 101; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 290 U. S. 380-386.
This Court has recently had occasion to point out that the common law rules, governing the admissibility of evidence and the competency of witnesses in the federal courts are not the particular rules which were in force in 1791, but are those rules adapted to present day conditions, "in accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice, rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past." Funk v. United States, supra, 290 U. S. 382; see also Wolffe v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 291 U. S. 12; Holden v. Hardy, supra, 169 U. S. 385-387.
The common law is not one system when it, or some part of it, is adopted by the Judiciary Act and another if it is taken over by the Seventh Amendment. If this Court could thus, in conformity to common law, substitute a new rule for an old one because it was more consonant with modern conditions, it would seem that no violence would be done to the common law by extending the principle of the remittitur to the case where the verdict is inadequate, although the common law had made no rule on the subject in 1791, and that we could not rightly refuse to apply to either the principle of general application, that it is competent to exercise a discretionary power to grant or withhold relief in any way which is not unjust. See Belt v. Lawes, supra, 358.
be avoided. Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley, 2 Pet. 327, 27 U. S. 329; Phillips & Colby Construction Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646, 91 U. S. 656; Hopkins v. Orr, 124 U. S. 510, 124 U. S. 514; Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571, 147 U. S. 590; Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397, 161 U. S. 411-412. The trial judge who denies a motion for a new trial because the plaintiff has consented to reduce, or a defendant has consented to increase, the amount of the recovery does no more than when, sitting in equity, he withholds relief upon the compliance with a condition the performance of which will do substantial justice. See Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U. S. 334, 289 U. S. 338.
light of any legal analogy, whether the denial of the motion because of the plaintiff's consent could be deemed in any proper sense an abuse of discretion.
The power of the English appellate courts to review such action has been enlarged by statute, and the motion itself must be made to the Court of Appeal. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, Order 58; Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Order 39. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474, 287 U. S. 482.
In England, before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the motion was made not to the trial judge, but to the court sitting en banc. Blackstone's Commentaries v. 3, p. 391; Tidd's Practice v. 2, pp. 819-821. By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, Order 58, see Order 39 of Rules of Supreme Court of Judicature, the motion was required to be made to the Court of Appeal, from whose decision an appeal might be taken to the House of Lords.


CHAPTER II. THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.
CHAPTER III. LEGAL STATUS OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER IV. HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION.
CHAPTER V. THE OLD TESTAMENT ARGUMENT.
§ 2. The Curse upon Canaan.
§ 3. Abraham a Slaveholder.
§ 4. Hagar remanded to Slavery by God.
§ 5. Slavery in the Laws of Moses.
§ 6. Slavery in the Decalogue.
§ 7. Objections to the Old Testament Argument.
CHAPTER VI. THE NEW TESTAMENT ARGUMENT.
§ 1. Definition of Δουλος.
§ 2. Slavery often mentioned; yet not condemned.
§ 3. Christ applauds a Slaveholder.
§ 4. The Apostles separate Slavery and its Abuses.
§ 5. Slavery no Essential Religious Evil.
§ 6. Slaveholders fully Admitted to Church-membership.
§ 7. Relative Duties of Masters and Slaves recognized.
§ 8. Philemon and Onesimus.
§ 8. St. Paul reprobates Abolitionists.
§ 9. The Golden Rule Compatible with Slavery.
§ 10. Was Christ Afraid to Condemn Slavery?
CHAPTER VII. THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT.
§ 3. The Rights of Man and Slavery.
§ 4. Abolitionism is Jacobinism.
§ 5. Labour of another may be Property.
§ 6. The Slave Received due Wages.
§ 7. Effects of Slavery on Moral Character.
§ 8. Slavery and the African Slave Trade.
§ 9. The Morality of Slavery Vindicated by its Results.
CHAPTER VIII. ECONOMICAL EFFECTS OF SLAVERY.
§ 1. Slavery and Republican Government.
§ 2. Slavery and Malthusianism.
§ 3. Comparative productiveness of Slave Labour.
§ 4. Effects of Slavery in the South, compared with those of Free Labour in the North.
§ 5. Effects of Slavery on Population, Disease, and Crime.


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Seventy-five years ago, on December 8, 1941, 18 Trotskyists were sentenced to prison for advocating the overthrow of the US government. Below is the second part of a two-part article based on information gathered from the valuable book Trotskyists on Trial: Free Speech and Political Persecution Since the Age of FDR, by Donna T. Haverty-Stacke. In addition, the article draws from the World Socialist Web Site’s independent investigation of thousands of pages of trial transcripts, SWP archive material, and previously unavailable FBI records brought to light by Haverty-Stacke.
The first part of the article was posted on December 8.
In her recently published book Trotskyists on Trial, Professor Donna Haverty-Stacke makes use of trial records and newly available FBI records to investigate how the FBI prepared for the prosecution of 29 members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in the Smith Act trial of 1941.
The material presented by Haverty-Stacke provides a much clearer picture of this key period in the history of the socialist movement. It lends enormous weight to documents uncovered by the International Committee of the Fourth International in 1975 as part of its “Security and the Fourth International” investigation, which revealed that the State Department and FBI held meetings, beginning in September 1940, with a leading figure in the SWP, Joseph Hansen. In the context of the new material published by Haverty-Stacke, one central question arises: Why was Joseph Hansen absent from the list of defendants in the Smith Act trial?
The documents published in the initial Security and the Fourth International investigation show that Joseph Hansen established communication with the US government after Trotsky’s assassination. Between 1975 and 1978, the investigation raised the question: why would Hansen have been interested in contacting the government, and why did he do so without notifying the SWP leadership? Hansen claimed in Healy’s Big Lie that he met with the FBI “just once.”  This was proven to be untrue.
Hansen had spent three years as Trotsky’s personal assistant in Coyoacan, Mexico. Of the small handful of Americans residing at Trotsky’s compound, Hansen was the most politically involved and had the closest connections with the leadership of the SWP in the US. Ten days after Trotsky’s death on August 21, 1940, Hansen contacted the US Embassy in Mexico City with the hope of opening up a confidential relationship with the US government.
Hansen’s meetings were carefully followed by the highest levels of the American government. Figures such as George P. Shaw, Robert McGregor and B.E. Sackett were assigned to lead and follow the investigation. Shaw, a high-ranking State Department diplomat, had worked at the US consulate in Tegucigalpa, Honduras; San Luis Potosi, Mexico; and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and was later to serve as ambassador to Nicaragua, El Salvador and Paraguay.  McGregor served as secretary of the US consulate in Mexico, and Sackett was the special agent in charge of the New York division of the FBI. Within weeks of Hansen’s first contact, J. Edgar Hoover was personally monitoring the meetings between Hansen and government officials.
Other officials following Hansen’s case included Raymond E. Murphy of the State Department and H.H. Clegg of the FBI. Murphy was a well-connected State Department officer who was later to champion prosecution of suspected spy J. Alger Hiss. Murphy was the State Department official who first made information about Whittaker Chambers available to Congressman Richard M. Nixon of the House Un-American Activities Committee.  Clegg was a veteran FBI agent who later served as assistant director of the FBI.  Government officials handled the matter with great delicacy and interest.
During this first meeting, Hansen provided the government with information surrounding the assassination. At this time, Hansen communicated to the US government that he had met for three months in 1938 with agents of Stalin’s secret police, the GPU. McGregor’s report from the August 31 meeting notes that Hansen said “he was himself approached by an agent of the GPU and asked to desert the Fourth International and join the Third.” The report states that Hansen met with a GPU handler named “John” for three months.  Hansen’s astonishing admission brought heightened attention to these meetings.
On September 14, embassy official McGregor sent another “strictly confidential” letter to the State Department noting that Hansen had returned to the consulate that day to turn over confidential information to the US government. The report begins: “Mr. Joseph Hansen, Secretary to the late Leon Trotsky, called this morning and exhibited a memorandum, a photo stat of which is attached.”  This was the “W Memorandum”—a list of names of GPU agents the SWP had received from Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the Communist Party who later aided the US government in the anti-communist witch-hunt of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The letter from American Consul to Mexico, George P. Shaw, to top State Department official Raymond E. Murphy informing him that Joseph Hansen “wants to be put in touch with someone” in order to pass on “confidential information” “with impunity.” Dated September 25, 1940.
News that Hansen sought to “impart information” with “impunity” soon made its way to J. Edgar Hoover, who became personally involved in overseeing the government’s meetings with Hansen and the management of his status as an informant.
Joseph Hansen writes to George P. Shaw, the US Consul in Mexico City, thanking him “respectfully” for arranging his confidential contact with the FBI. Dated October 23, 1940.
On October 23, Hansen replied to George P. Shaw. “I received your letter concerning Mr. Sackett in good condition and shall visit him shortly,” Hansen wrote in response to Shaw’s September 30 letter.  Hansen was notifying the government that no members of the SWP had intercepted the letter.
Hansen carried out his meetings with the US government behind the backs of the leadership of the SWP. Several leading figures of the SWP denied having any knowledge of Hansen’s communications with the government and insisted that the leadership did not consider approaching the FBI after Trotsky’s death.
On June 2, 1977, David North, the national secretary of the Workers League, the predecessor of the Socialist Equality Party, interviewed Felix Morrow, a Smith Act defendant who served on the SWP Political Committee in 1940.
Q: I was wondering whether or not you had any recollection about the steps taken by the Socialist Workers Party at the time to learn more about the assassination, how it was carried out. Particularly whether it received any assistance from the American government in any way.
Q: Well, what was the attitude of the FBI, in your opinion, toward the assassination?
Morrow: They weren’t involved in any way.
Q: Well, did the SWP to your knowledge have any policy of trying to obtain the assistance of the FBI?
Morrow: There would be no reason. It was an open and shut case. Jacson had done it. The only problem was to establish that Jacson was a GPU agent.
Q: I see. Then to your knowledge the SWP made no initiative at any time toward establishing contact with the FBI?
Morrow: I’m sure of that.
Q: You’re sure of that?
Q: Let me ask you something. Who was more or less in charge in the party with investigating the death of Trotsky? I know that Goldman wrote a book on the assassination.
Morrow: Well, all involved—you know, the whole Pol-Com (Political Committee).
Q: I see. How about Joseph Hansen?
Morrow: He was down in Mexico.
Q: And when he came back in late September 1940?
Morrow: He was not a member of the Pol-Com.
Q: And therefore he would not have been given a special responsibility?
Q: Does the name Sackett mean anything to you?
Q: It means nothing to you?
Q: Politically speaking, in that period of time, as I recall there was some serious problem in terms of repression against the SWP and the labor movement by the FBI. This was before the war.
Q: In 1940, around the period of August, had the repression already started, building up toward the Minneapolis case?
Morrow: I would say so.
Q: In what particular way?
Q: The heat was on?
Morrow: Yes, the heat was on.
Q: And by the beginning of 1941, it probably became quite serious?
Morrow: There was no reliance on the FBI.
Morrow: It just didn’t exist.
Q: … for someone to suggest that be done?
Q: I’m asking this because the question has come up in documentation, but to you that would be complete news.
Q: I see, and you’re quite sure that there was never any authorization.
Morrow’s statements were supported by the depositions taken of SWP Political Committee members Farrell Dobbs and Morris Lewit, and of Morrow, during the Gelfand Case.  Each of these leading SWP officials testified that he had no knowledge of Hansen’s secret meetings with the FBI.
Burton: Did you know that in 1940 Mr. Hansen had face-to-face meetings with the FBI in New York City?
Q: Did you ever talk to Mr. Hansen about his meetings with the FBI?
Morris Lewit led the SWP while Cannon, Morrow, Dobbs and others were imprisoned. He was deposed on April 13, 1982 and gave similar testimony.
Burton: At that time did you know whether or not Hansen had met with the FBI in New York City following Trotsky’s assassination?
Lewit: I might have known it from the Healyites’ statements, the documents. I don’t know.
Q: Did you consider at that time that allegation to be a lie?
The internal US government reports indicate that Hansen evinced no “reluctance” to talk to government officials in private. It was only when confronted by the FBI in the presence of James P. Cannon that Hansen kept silent.
In Trotskyists on Trial, Donna Haverty-Stacke lays out evidence that the FBI’s infiltration of the SWP underwent a fundamental change in the autumn of 1940, at precisely the time Hansen established contact with the FBI. FBI Agent Roy T. Noonan testified at trial that the agency developed specific files on key SWP leaders “in the latter part of 1940.”  (Emphasis added).
Goldman: And how long before that did the investigation start, as far as you know?
Noonan: I know that the investigation was being conducted in February and March , and I know that we have had information regarding some of the defendants long before that.
G: How long before that?
Hansen wrote to George P. Shaw on October 23, 1940 that he “shall visit [FBI Agent B.E. Sackett] shortly” at his office in New York. Hansen had requested the meeting earlier for the express purpose of “imparting information” with “impunity” to the government.
Hansen returned to New York City in the “fall of 1940,” and Agent Noonan placed emphasis on “November 1940” as the date the infiltration reached a higher stage. Such a date strongly correlates with Hansen’s return to the US and the fact that he promised on October 23 that he would visit with B.E. Sackett shortly, i.e., at the end of October or early November 1940.
The public record of the communications between Hansen and the FBI stops after the October 23, 1940 note. This indicates that after Hansen returned to New York, the relationship took on a higher level of confidentiality and was subject to more stringent classification rules, which have hidden the communications from public view.
Haverty-Stacke’s book provides a context for the peculiar language included in the agreement Hansen sought, in which he would receive “impunity” in return for sharing information with the government. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “impunity” means: “Exemption from punishment; immunity from the detrimental effects of one’s actions. Cf. Immunity.”  Hansen’s request for personal legal protection had a purely individual character. He would not have made such a request if he had been contacting the FBI with the approval of the SWP.
There are two likely reasons why Hansen would have sought exemption from punishment by the government.
The first related to the disappearance of George Mink. J. Edgar Hoover stated specifically that Hansen was to be questioned concerning the disappearance of Mink, a Stalinist agent who vanished in the early part of 1940 and was presumed murdered. Hansen’s admitted ties to the GPU gave the FBI reason to believe he was linked to Mink’s disappearance.
In his October 1, 1940 letter to B.E. Sackett, J. Edgar Hoover provided his agent with background information surrounding Hansen’s ties to the GPU and his possible knowledge of Mink’s disappearance.
The FBI was interested in Mink because he was a well known GPU agent and a US citizen. Mink, a former Philadelphia taxi driver, had traveled back and forth to Moscow and throughout Europe, where he was imprisoned in Denmark in 1935 as a Stalinist spy. Upon his release, Mink worked for the GPU in Spain during the Civil War. The Anarchist Carlo Tresca accused Mink of murdering the anarchist professor Camillo Berneri on behalf of the GPU in Barcelona.  His whereabouts and disappearance were of high importance to the FBI.
There is nothing to suggest that Hoover thought the Trotskyists were responsible for Mink’s death. Hoover’s use of the term “Hansen and his associates” is a reference to the GPU, which Hoover suspected of killing Mink. The Trotskyists did not engage in assassination of opponents as a matter of political principle and could not have been responsible. Moreover, they had neither the manpower nor the skill to carry out the assassination of a skilled GPU killer. The breach of Trotsky’s residence in Coyoacan by the Stalinist assassination team in May 1940 and the failure of the guards to return fire give an indication of the inexperienced character of Trotsky’s defense guard.
A second reason for Hansen to seek exemption from punishment stemmed from the possibility that the government would prosecute the SWP. Hansen used Trotsky’s assassination as a pretext to establish ties with the government. At this point, the FBI was already active in monitoring the SWP and was considering the possibility of prosecution. By requesting legal “impunity,” Hansen sought to ensure that neither his past actions nor the information he provided would be used against him as grounds for indictment or prosecution. The fact that he did not appear as a defendant or even as a witness in the trial indicates that he did, in fact, receive impunity.
During the trial of the 29 members of the Socialist Workers Party, the prosecution’s theory of the case was based on showing a connection between the chief conspirator, Leon Trotsky, and the Socialist Workers Party. This required a detailed showing of each and every connection between Trotsky, who was living in exile in Mexico City, and the Socialist Workers Party.
A reference in Cannon’s memorial address after Trotsky’s assassination in which he notes visiting Mexico to help strengthen Trotsky’s guard.
One name emerges as an obvious evidentiary keystone to the prosecution’s case: Joseph Hansen. Hansen lived with Trotsky in the latter’s compound in Coyoacan and served as his political secretary from 1937 until Trotsky’s assassination by a Stalinist agent on August 20, 1940. He participated in daily political discussions with Trotsky and was chiefly responsible for overseeing communication between the SWP and Coyoacan. Many of Trotsky’s communications to the SWP dating from this period were signed “J. Hansen” for security purposes.
Hansen personified the connection between the SWP and Trotsky, the precise legal issue the prosecution sought to prove. He was intimately familiar with the discussions between the SWP leadership and Trotsky regarding the split with the Burnham-Shachtman faction of the SWP in 1939-40, the development of the party’s policy toward conscription in World War Two, and the development of the policy for the establishment of union defense guards. Each of these issues, and, in particular, the latter two, were repeatedly used by the prosecution to show that the SWP and Trotsky were engaging in a conspiratorial plan to overthrow the US government.
The US attorneys were aware of Hansen’s position as Trotsky’s secretary and Hansen’s name is referenced multiple times in the course of the trial. From a prosecutorial standpoint, the fact that Hansen was not even subpoenaed to testify defies explanation.
Had the SWP leadership known of Hansen’s visits with the FBI, the SWP’s defense attorneys would have made heavy use of this key fact at trial.
First, it would have been a major political embarrassment for the Roosevelt administration if it became known that it had held secret meetings with a group it was now prosecuting for conspiracy to overthrow the government.
Second, the fact that the FBI had infiltrated the SWP leadership in advance of the trial would have served as evidence of the anti-democratic, frame-up character of the trial. The defense attorneys could have moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the secret meetings made it impossible to differentiate between the genuine plans of the SWP and suggestions made by government agents and FBI officials. Proof of Hansen’s meetings could have been used to show that the FBI sought to entrap the SWP into advancing conspiratorial demands, rendering the whole trial illegitimate.
The most common form of such an “affirmative act” in American criminal law is to inform on other members of the conspiracy.
Even with the SWP’s main leadership in jail, the FBI remained concerned that the party was a significant revolutionary force. The infiltration that began with the preparation for the 1941 prosecution was greatly expanded. Based on the acquisition of new information in the autumn of 1940, the FBI began to lay the foundation for a network of informants that gave the government a clear view into the inner workings of the SWP and the Fourth International.
During the Second World War, Hoover believed the SWP remained a significant political force. His nervousness is exemplified by a letter he sent to Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge in May 1943 in which he notes that the SWP picketed a showing of the pro-Stalinist propaganda film Mission to Moscow.
“Information has been received that on the evening of April 30, 1943, members of the subject organization [the SWP] picketed the opening of the film ‘Mission to Moscow’ playing at the Hollywood Theater, Times Square, New York City,” the memo reads.
In 1945, Hoover disobeyed a Justice Department order that no further investigations of the SWP be carried out. It appears that the sources gained in “November 1940” through the spring of 1941 stayed on as long-term assets of the FBI. Hoover successfully shielded his assets from being exposed at trial.
The “well-placed informants” within the leadership of the SWP remained in their positions and were not exposed by giving testimony during the trial.
Reports composed by agents in 1946-48 on branches of the SWP in the US were sometimes 60 to 80 pages long. These reports included detailed, multi-paragraph reports on individual party members, their home addresses, the ages of their children, their places of employment, their places of birth, their citizenship status and details regarding personal relationships and affairs.
Throughout this period, FBI agents prepared detailed reports on the activities of key members. There were long reports regarding Cannon, Vincent Dunne, Grace Carlson and Farrell Dobbs, just some of those who remained subject to close monitoring after their release from prison.
The structure of the FBI’s post-war infiltration was as follows: The highest-level information came from at least 20 “Confidential Informants” who were in personal communication with FBI officials on a regular basis. FBI records indicate that these informants provided information about political meetings, disagreements and the state of the movement internationally. Certain agents, code-named “T-1” through “T-4,” “T-14,” “T-19” and “ND 452,” had intimate knowledge of the leadership of all branches and clearly occupied key roles in the SWP leadership.
So valuable were a certain number of these agents that the FBI notes they were “not in a position to testify” in case the government decided to bring further prosecution. The fact that the FBI received full reports of Political Committee meetings and party plenums from different confidential informant sources shows that the highest levels of leadership were compromised by agents of the state.
A rung below the confidential informants was a network of lower-level sources and agents who were members of the SWP in local areas and reported to their specified handlers on local party activities, political disagreements, and the lives of individual members. The FBI had a ring of agents in place in all areas where the party had a presence.
Yet even as the SWP’s lawsuit dragged on, the party expelled one of its own members, Alan Gelfand, because he asked the SWP to explain the communications between Hansen and the FBI in 1940. The SWP denounced Gelfand, called the Security and the Fourth International investigation a “big lie,” and collaborated with the government to protect known agents of the Soviet secret police—the GPU—from testifying as to the Stalinists’ role in infiltrating the SWP. Hansen himself died in the weeks before the Gelfand Case began.
The proof depends on an intricate web of circumstantial evidence which leads inexorably to the nexus between the infiltration of the SWP by agents of the federal government and the expulsion of plaintiff. The facts of this case are embedded in great historical events. Their ever-widening spiral sweeps back into the past, embracing within its bounds an increasing number of individuals, including Trotsky himself and those closest to him during his last heroic exile. If a more direct and less arduous road to truth were available, plaintiff gladly would have taken it. Nonetheless, when fact is added to fact, and each is evaluated in its proper relationship to the other, the conclusion becomes inescapable that something is very, very wrong with the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party.
While documentary records exist proving the beginning of Hansen’s confidential relationship with the FBI, no documents have yet surfaced showing that this relationship ended.
None of this evidence has been answered by Hansen’s defenders.
 Hansen, Joseph, Healy’s Big Lie: The Slander Campaign Against Joseph Hansen, George Novack, and the Fourth International: Statements and Articles, (New York: National Education Dept., Socialist Workers Party, 1976), Print, p. 14.
 Political Graveyard Entry for George Price Shaw, accessible at http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/shaw.html; US State Department History Office of the Historian Entry for George Price Shaw, accessible at https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/shaw-george-price?
 Morgan, Ted. A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster, (New York, New York: Random House, 1999), Print, p. 149.
 Historical G-Men: “1930s FBI Biographies and More.” Entry for H. H. Clegg, accessible at http://historicalgmen.squarespace.com/agents-of-the-30s-biographie/.
 Letter from George P. Shaw to US Secretary of State Enclosing Memorandum of Conversation Between Robert G. McGregor and Hansen, September 1, 1940. (Cited in The Gelfand Case: A Legal History of the Exposure of U.S. Government Agents in the Leadership of the Socialist Workers Party. Vol. 1. Detroit, MI: Labor Publications, 1985. Print, p. 7).
 Id. (The Gelfand Case at 8).
 Letter from George P. Shaw to US Secretary of State Enclosing Memorandum for File of Robert G. McGregor, September 4, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 10).
 Memorandum of Robert G. McGregor of Conversation with Joseph Hansen, September 14, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 13).
 Id. (The Gelfand Case at 14).
 Letter from George P. Shaw to US Secretary of State, September 25, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 19).
 Letter from George P. Shaw to Raymond Murphy, US State Department, September 25, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 21).
 Letter from Raymond E. Murphy to Mr. J.B. Little, Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 28, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 23).
 Letter from Raymond E. Murphy to George P. Shaw, September 28, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 24-25).
 Letter from George P. Shaw to Joseph Hansen, September 30, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 26).
 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to B.E. Sackett, Special Agent in Charge, October 1, 1949 (The Gelfand Case at 29).
 Id. (The Gelfand Case at 29-30).
 Letter from Joseph Hansen to George P. Shaw, October 23, 1949 (The Gelfan d Case at 31).
 Interview by David North of Felix Morrow, June 2, 1977.
 The Gelfand case was a civil lawsuit brought by Alan Gelfand, a member of the SWP who was expelled for raising questions about Hansen’s communications with the FBI and GPU. Gelfand sued alleging that the US government was violating his First Amendment rights by using its agents in the SWP to expel him from a political organization.
 Deposition of Farrell Dobbs, Gelfand v. Smith et al., 178, 182.
 Deposition of Morris Lewit, Gelfand v. Smith et al., 144.
 Cross Examination of Agent Roy T. Noonan, US v. Dunne et al., 372.
 Cross Examination of Agent Roy T. Noonan, US v. Dunne et al., 371-372.
 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.) at 826.
 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to B.E. Sackett, Special Agent in Charge, October 1, 1940 (The Gelfand Case at 29-30).
 Dewar, Hugo. “Chapter 7: The Lady Vanishes.” Assassins at Large, Being a Fully Documented and Hitherto Unpublished Account of the Executions Outside Russia Ordered by the GPU, (Boston: Beacon, 1952), Print.
 For further details, see The Labor Spy Racket, by Leo Huberman, U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Modern Age Books, NY, NY, 1937.
 Closing argument of US Attorney Anderson, US v. Dunne et al., 2492.
 Testimony of James Bartlett, US v. Dunne et al., 228.
 Closing Argument of US Attorney Anderson, US v. Dunne et al., 2457.
 See Boxes 109 and 110, SWP 146-1-10, including, for example, FBI Report 100-4013, New York.
 June 12, 1948 Memorandum For the Attorney General, RE: Socialist Workers Party—Internal Security—SWP, Box 110 SWP 146-1-10.

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Name: Vinny Scalice Preferred Name: V. S. K.
Mar 9th 2019 Officer Ronald Moses def. V. S. K.
Nov 25th 2018 Angel Ortiz & Mike Draztik def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Sep 8th 2018 Bobby Orlando & Bryce Donovan def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Jun 8th 2018 Ortiz & Santana def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
May 26th 2018 Chris Dickinson & Jaka def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Apr 29th 2018 Alex Reynolds & John Silver def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Feb 24th 2018 Mike Verna & Rex Lawless def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Nov 5th 2016 Russ Myers & T-Money def. Dorian Graves & V. S. K.
Jun 3rd 2016 Mike Orlando def. V. S. K.
Mar 11th 2015 Orange Cassidy def. (pin) V. S. K.
Feb 7th 2015 Christopher Daniels & Kazarian def. E. J. Risk & V. S. K.
Sep 24th 2014 Eric Corvis def. V. S. K.
Aug 18th 2013 Homicide & Ricky Reyes def. E. J. Risk & V. S. K.

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The article deals with the study of occasional innovations in English literary discourse and ways of their translation. It was found out that literary texts are the richest sources of occasional innovations. The conducted research defines the features of functioning of occasionalisms, their inseparability from the context, existence in speech in a certain speech situation, restriction of further spread. The ways of occasional innovations coining were determined, as well as the reasons of their creation.
In the article the main ways of translation of occasional innovations were investigated and also factors influencing their transfer from one language to another.
occasional innovations, English literary discourse, methods of translation, word-formation derivation.
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Goncharova T. Y., Bilan A. V. (2010). Occasional word and context. Collection of scientific works of the Military Institute of the Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. Kyiv, pp. 199 – 206.
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George Orwell “1984”. – URL: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/o/orwell/george/o79n/contents.html.
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(1)(a) A "driver education course" for any person under the age of eighteen, which shall consist of not less than eight hours of actual driving instruction and thirty hours of classroom instruction. A person shall not be allowed to receive more than four hours of actual driving instruction on any single calendar day. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections, public safety services, shall establish rules and regulations to administer and define the requirements of the course. The rules and regulations established by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, public safety services, shall provide for instruction relative to trailer safety, to the economic effects of littering, and to appropriate driver conduct when stopped by a law enforcement officer. Oversight review of these rules shall be conducted by the House and Senate committees on transportation, highways and public works in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
(b) Upon completion of the required supervised driving practice pursuant to R.S.
32:405.1 and 407, a properly licensed and contracted third-party tester may administer the on-road driving skills test to the student. Upon successful completion, such third-party tester shall provide the student with a department approved certificate of successful completion in a sealed envelope to be delivered to the department.
(a) Licensing or contractual requirements for third-party training schools and high school instructors.
(b) Course content and presentation, including content relative to trailer safety, to the economic effects of littering, and to appropriate driver conduct when stopped by a law enforcement officer.
(c) Instructor qualifications and certification.
(d) Classroom size and facilities.
(f) Required records and reporting.
(g) Penalties for noncompliance of the mandatory instructional and driving requirements and penalties for the falsification of documents and certificates.
(h) Repealed by Acts 2011, No. 294, §6.
(3)(a), (b) Repealed by Acts 2011, No. 294, §6.
(c) Repealed by Acts 2017, No. 334, §2.
B. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections, public safety services, shall establish a portion of the "driver education course" and "prelicensing training course" relative to the economic and adverse effects of littering in conjunction with Keep Louisiana Beautiful, Inc.
(1) Instruction concerning law enforcement procedures for traffic stops.
(2) Instruction on the importance of officers, drivers, and passengers maintaining integrity and respect during traffic stops.
(3) Demonstrations of appropriate interactions with law enforcement.
(4) Demonstrations of the proper actions to be taken during traffic stops.
D. No person under the age of fifteen shall be allowed to enroll or participate in the driving experience portion of any driver education course or driver training program. A person, no sooner than ninety days prior to his fifteenth birthday and who is in, at a minimum, grade eight, shall be permitted to participate in the classroom instruction component of a driver education course or driving program.
E.(1) Any person who is at least of age to participate in the classroom instruction portion of a driver education course, driver training program, or a prelicensing training course shall apply to the department for a Class "E" temporary instructional permit prior to enrolling in any driver education course, driver training program, or prelicensing training course. The application for a Class "E" temporary instructional permit shall be in accordance with R.S. 32:409.1 and 410. The fee for a Class "E" temporary instructional permit shall be the same as the fee for a Class "E" driver's license.
(2) A person shall be required to possess a Class "E" temporary instructional permit in order to enroll in any driver education course, driver training program, or prelicensing training course.
(3) A person with a Class "E" temporary instructional permit required by this Subsection is permitted to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways and streets of this state only when the permit holder is accompanied by an instructor of driver education and traffic safety, and while actually operating a motor vehicle during the behind-the-wheel instruction or during the administration of the skills test.
(4) The holder of a Class "E" temporary instructional permit required by this Subsection shall be in possession of the permit during the period of its validity and such permit shall be presented for examination when so requested by any law enforcement officer or representative of the department.
(5) Upon successful completion of a driver education course, driver training program, or prelicensing training course and the knowledge test, a person shall surrender a Class "E" temporary instructional permit issued pursuant to this Subsection to the department and apply for the issuance of an age-appropriate learner's license. The department shall not charge a fee for a learner's license issued in connection with the surrender of a Class "E" temporary instructional permit.
(6) The Class "E" temporary instructional permit issued pursuant to this Subsection shall not be required for any person to enroll in a driver education course, driver training program, or prelicensing course administered in conjunction with a National Guard Youth Challenge Program. A person enrolled in a driver education course, driver training program, or prelicensing course administered in conjunction with a National Guard Youth Challenge Program may operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state without a Class "E" temporary instructional permit provided that such person is accompanied by an instructor of driver education and safety.
(a) The alternative method includes testing and security measures that the department determines are at least as secure as the measures available in the traditional classroom setting.
(b) The six-hour classroom instruction portion of the prelicensing training course for persons eighteen years of age or older that is required by Paragraph (A)(2) of this Section with the use of the alternative method satisfies any other requirement applicable to a prelicensing training course in which the classroom instruction is taught to students in the traditional classroom setting.
(2) No portion of the thirty-hour classroom instruction of the driver education course, required by Paragraph (A)(1) of this Section for persons under the age of eighteen shall be provided by an alternative method of instruction that does not require students to be present in a traditional classroom.
(3) The Department of Public Safety and Corrections, public safety services, may establish rules and regulations as determined necessary to define the requirements for alternative methods of instruction for the prelicensing training course, which rules shall be subject to oversight review by the House and Senate committees on transportation, highways, and public works.
Added by Acts 1968, No. 273, §7. Acts 1992, No. 246, §1, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1992, No. 382, §1, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1992, No. 1009, §1, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1993, No. 225, §1, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1997, No. 725, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 1998, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 80, §2; Acts 2003, No. 312, §2; Acts 2004, No. 216, §2; Acts 2004, No. 439, §1; Acts 2008, No. 768, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 2009; Acts 2009, No. 275, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 2010; Acts 2010, No. 227, §1; Acts 2011, No. 294, §§2, 6; Acts 2011, No. 307, §1; Acts 2011, No. 317, §3, eff. Jan. 1, 2012; Acts 2012, No. 475, §1; Acts 2015, No. 369, §1; Acts 2016, No. 317, §1; Acts 2016, No. 336, §1; Acts 2017, No. 286, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2018; Acts 2017, No. 334, §§1, 2; Acts 2017, No. 343, §1.

matches: §6 §6 §2 §7 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §2 §2 §2 §1 §2 §2 §1 §1 §3 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1 §1


text:
Discussions of causality and necessity in Islamic thought were the result of attempts to incorporate the wisdom of the Greeks into the legacy of the Qur''an, and specifically to find a philosophical way of expressing faith in the free creation of the universe by one God. Moreover, that article of faith was itself a result of the revelation of God's ways in the free bestowal of the Qur''an on a humanity otherwise locked in ignorance, which a purportedly Aristotelian account of the necessary connection of cause and effect might be taken to rule out. Thus free creation of the universe and free gift of the Qur'an formed a logical unit. The challenge, therefore, was to compose an account of metaphysical and ethical matters which permits rational discourse about them, without obscuring their ultimate source or precluding divine action in the course of world events and human actions.
The scheme of emanation elaborated by al-Farabi sought to give 'the First' the place of pre-eminence which the Qur'an demanded for the Creator, but did so by modelling creation on a logical system whereby all things emanated necessarily from this One. It was this necessity, further articulated by Ibn Sina, which al-Ghazalii took to jeopardize the freedom of God as Creator and as giver of the Qur'an. al-Ghazali's objections were honed by a previous debate among Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), who had elaborated diverse views on human freedom in an effort to reconcile the obvious demand for free acceptance of the Qur'an with its claims regarding God's utter sovereignty as Creator over all that is. Natural philosophy was also affected by these debates, specifically with regard to the ultimate constitution of bodies as well as accounts that could be given of their interaction. However, the primary focus was on human actions in the face of a free Creator.
The understanding of causality that prevailed among the classical Islamic philosophers was decidedly Neoplatonic in character (see Neoplatonism §3). Intellectual coherence was assured by a scheme of emanation itself modelled on the necessity inherent in a logical system. Thus the connections between events shared in the connections between propositions that followed logically from one another. In this fashion, al-Farabi's emanation scheme offered a cosmic pattern for all causality as well as a master metaphor for causal interaction (see al-Farabi §2). All that is and all that happens was conceived as depending, for its being and its intelligibility, ultimately on the first cause (or 'the One') by way of intermediary influences which are cosmic in character yet linked together by an intellectual inherence assuring necessary linkage between cause and effect. Aristotle's ideal of 'scientific explanation' in the Posterior Analytics could only have been projected, after all, if the world itself was so constructed that things and events were properly connected with one another so as to form a coherent whole (see Aristotle §3).
That is the sense to be made of Ibn Sina's division of 'being' into 'necessary being' and 'possible being', with 'necessary being' restricted to the One from which all the rest emanates while the remainder is characterized as 'possible in itself yet necessary by virtue of another' (see Ibn Sina §5). In this way the order of the natural world is assured, since it derives from the one principle of being in a way that is modelled on logical derivation. In this way also, the necessity of causal interaction becomes virtually identical with that of logical entailment, thereby linking the entire universe in a necessary order with the first cause. Furthermore, the pattern of logical entailment extends to the action of that first cause as well: the universe comes forth from it necessarily, as premises from a principle.
Such a model for causal activity cannot be easily imported into a world believed to be freely created by one God. The order described by the emanation scheme threatened the hegemony of the God revealed in the Qur'an, by removing the freedom of that God to reveal as well as to create. Accommodation with Neoplatonic thought required too much by way of concession from believers in the Qur'an, and it was only a matter of time before this effort to harmonize creation with emanation was challenged. That challenge came notably from al-Ghazali, whose frontal attack, entitled Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) was in turn countered by Ibn Rushd in his Tahafut al-tahafut (Incoherence of the Incoherence). But while Ibn Rushd's defence of a repristinated Aristotle would continue to influence Western thought, al-Ghazali's spirited attack succeeded in virtually marginalizing such philosophical reflection on metaphysical matters in the Islamic world to the activities of an elite who would come to be known as 'the philosophers', and whose adherence to Qur'anic faith would often be suspect.
If such quasi-logical necessity attributed to causality in the universe ran counter to the freedom of the divine agent, it also threatened by implication the freedom of human beings to respond to divine revelation; and such freedom is clearly presupposed by the very structure of the Qur'an, which calls constantly for a response to its warnings and means to elicit wholehearted response to the guidance it offers (see Islamic theology §3). Yet the controversy here was not carried out on the terrain staked out by the philosophers but rather among expressly religious thinkers (called mutakallimun because of their desire to articulate the faith by way of argument). The earliest among these, the Mu'tazilites, could only see their way to securing human freedom by considering free human actions as utterly autonomous, and so as the creations of human agents, not of God. These early Islamic thinkers fashioned their position on such matters without benefit of the later philosophical reflections noted above, and appear to have conflated notions of origination, causation and creation in an effort to assure that humans bear complete responsibility for the actions for which they will be rewarded or punished. Their concern was for justice, as it can be applied to human beings and to the God of the Qur'an.
Again, however, to withdraw a sector of creation from the purview of the creator of heaven and earth, and to insist that human actions be our creation and not God's, could hardly be sustained in Islam. The challenge this time came from one of the theologians' own number, al-Ash'ari, who shared their conceptual conflations; he developed a purportedly intermediate position, whereby human actions are created by God yet performed by us. The key notion introduced was kasb (or iktisab), which attempts to distinguish responsibility for one's actions from their sheer origination. Originating in the marketplace to describe transactions, it alludes to the fact that actions which God creates are 'acquired', or perhaps better, 'performed' by human beings as created agents (see Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila §§1, 5).
While this position obviates the removal of human actions from the domain of God's creation, it seems to complicate unduly the issue of human agency and responsibility. The conceptual question turns on the extent to which the notion of 'agent' can be used of both creator and creature. Can there be an authentic agent other than the creator?
This is a question, of course, which touches every religious tradition which avers the free creation of the universe by one God: how does the first cause relate to other causes? Indeed, can there even be other causes in the face of a sovereign 'First'? The response of kalam thinkers to this question was complicated by their commitment to an atomistic metaphysics, which seemed designed to remove all causality other than the divine from the realm of nature: this is the celebrated 'Islamic occasionalism'. Later, however, the question was debated by al-Ghazali without reference to any such metaphysical theses. Rather, the terms were those introduced by 'the philosophers', turning on the necessity of the connections between events in nature, specifically between those which we recognize as causes and their effects. Clearly these connections could not be akin to logical necessity, or there would be no room whatsoever for miracles like the 'descent' of the Qur'an; yet if the universe is the result of God's free action and not of necessity, the creator will continue to be free to act within creation. Thus the account given of causal agency in general, and of personal agency in particular, will have to allow for just that: a kind of agency proper to creatures, yet always subordinate to the influence of a free creator. al-Ghazali responds to this challenge by comprehending created causes under a patterned regularity of the sunna Allah, action willed by God: creatures do indeed contain such powers, yet always subject to the will of the One who so created them. In this way, a key Islamic religious thinker such as al-Ghazali can simultaneously insist that God alone is the only agent and yet, by God's power, others are agents as well. Thus causality can be attributed to creatures, but not causal connections of the quasi-logical sort demanded by the emanation scheme.
Early kalam thinkers, as noted above, presumed an atomistic conception of nature by which the universe was divinely sustained by being freely created at 'each moment' by God. This conception is clearly an attempt to affirm the omnipresence of divine causal action in the universe God creates, and just as clearly evacuates created causal efficacy. It also runs foul of Aristotle's refutations of atomism in terms of the irreducibility of the continuum of time, space and matter to discrete moments (see Atomism, ancient). It is these arguments which persuaded al-Ghazali that the Ash'arite presumption of the atomistic constitution of nature was gratuitous and unnecessary as a ploy to assure the omnipresence of the creator's action in nature. Thus Islamic thought has not been caught between the two extremes of 'occasionalism' (whereby all action is effectively God's) (see Occasionalism) and the pervasive necessity associated with the Neoplatonic emanation scheme of its notable philosophers; there is a middle course, intimated by al-Ghazali and explicitly developed in the early twentieth century in Egypt in the celebrated Qur'an commentary al-Manar, whereby the sunna Allah is evoked to explain the consistency of a created world of nature.
In summary, Islamic thought must always reconcile the assertion that the entire universe is the free creation of God, who neither requires anything in order to create it nor stands to gain anything by creating it, with the fact that this created world has a consistency associated with causes and effects as we observe them and as we use them to explain natural phenomena. If that causal consistency is articulated in terms which presume a necessity inimical to the free action of a creator, either in the beginning or at any moment of the universe's duration, then Islamic thinkers will feel constrained, as some indeed have, to deny created causality in favour of divine sovereignty. However, as might be expected, developments internal to Islamic thought on this matter have found a way of affirming the free creation of the universe together with its causal consistency, and in doing so have suggested a pattern for causal connections in nature which distances them from the quasi-logical while respecting their reality, specifically by invoking an analogy with the patterns which the God who reveals the Qur'an sets up between human actions and their recompense: the sunna Allah. In this way the world of nature can be seen to have a consistency proper to it, yet at the same time is affirmed to be the result of an intentional agent whose order it reflects in the operations proper to it (see Intention §4). The pattern to be found by scientific investigation will be a reflection of that with which the natural world has been endowed by its creator: the celebrated ayat, or 'signs' of divine wisdom and ordering available to human reason.

matches: §3 §2 §3 §5 §3 §4


D.C. Law Library - § 32–1008.01. Notice requirements for temporary staffing firms.
↪ § 32–1008.01. Notice requirements for temporary staffing firms.
§ 32–1008. Duties of employers; open records.
(a)(1) A temporary staffing firm shall furnish to each employee at the time of the initial interview or hire a notice that is signed and dated by the temporary staffing firm and the employee containing the information required by § 32-1008(c). The notice shall be provided in English and, if the Mayor has made available a translation of the sample template in a language that is known by the temporary staffing firm to be the employee's primary language or that the employee requests, the temporary staffing firm shall furnish written notice to the employee in that other language also.
(C) If a fixed, designated payday has not been established at the time of the initial interview or hire, a temporary staffing firm shall inform the employee that the payday may vary depending upon the usual practice at the assignment.
(8) Information about how to contact the designated enforcement agency for concerns about safety, wage and hour, or discrimination.
(c) On or before February 26, 2017, the Mayor shall publish online a translation of the sample template of the notice required by this section in any language required for vital documents pursuant to § 2-1933. The Mayor shall also publish online translations of the sample template in any additional languages the Mayor considers appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.
(1) The term “temporary staffing firm” means a business that recruits and hires its own employees and assigns those employees to perform work at or services for another organization, to support or supplement the other organization’s workforce, or to provide assistance in special work situations such as employee absences, skill shortages, seasonal workloads, or to perform special assignments or projects.
(2) Electronic mail, text messaging, facsimile, and regular mail shall each constitute written notice.
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3(d) of Wage Theft Prevention Clarification and Overtime Fairness Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2017 (D.C. Act 22-33, Mar. 28, 2017, 64 DCR 3089).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3(d) of Wage Theft Prevention Clarification and Overtime Fairness Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-583, Dec. 21, 2016, 63 DCR 16031).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(b)(3) of Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-8, Feb. 26, 2015, 62 DCR 2669).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(b) of the Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-66, May 22, 2015, 62 DCR 6867, 21 DCSTAT 1446).
For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 3(b) of the Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Emergency Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Act 21-291, Jan. 27, 2016, 63 DCR 1207).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(b) of Revised Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. Law 21-206, Feb. 18, 2017, 63 DCR 15051).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of this section, see § 2(b) of the Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Law 21-2, June 4, 2015, 62 DCR 4552).
For temporary (225 days) amendment of section, see § 3(b) of the Wage Theft Prevention Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2016 D.C. Law 21-101, April 6, 2016, 63 DCR 2220, 20 DCSTAT 3142).


Rule 68. Commanders may take the necessary precautions to prevent the presence of a parlementaire from being prejudicial.
This is a long-standing rule of customary international law already recognized in the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford Manual, and codified in the Hague Regulations. It has been restated in several military manuals. Some of these manuals are applicable in, or have been applied in, non-international armed conflicts. No official contrary practice was found.
Practice indicates that parlementaires may be temporarily detained if they have accidentally acquired information the disclosure of which to the adversary would have adverse consequences on the success of a current or impending operation. The permissibility of temporary detention is provided for in the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford Manual and codified in the Hague Regulations. The rule is restated in a number of military manuals. Some of these manuals are applicable in, or have been applied in, non-international armed conflicts. No official contrary practice was found.
 Brussels Declaration, Article 44 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 19, § 236); Oxford Manual, Article 30 (ibid., § 237); Hague Regulations, Article 33 (ibid., § 235).
 See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina (ibid., § 239), Belgium (ibid., §§ 240–241), Canada (ibid., § 242), Germany (ibid., § 243), Italy (ibid., § 244), New Zealand (ibid., § 245), Nigeria (ibid., § 246), Spain (ibid., § 247), Switzerland (ibid., § 248), United Kingdom (ibid., § 249), United States (ibid., § 250) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 251).
 See, e.g., the military manuals of Germany (ibid., § 243), Italy (ibid., § 244) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 251).
 Brussels Declaration, Article 44 (ibid., § 263); Oxford Manual, Article 31 (ibid., § 264); Hague Regulations, Article 33 (ibid., § 262).
 See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina (ibid., § 266), Belgium (ibid., §§ 267–268), Canada (ibid., § 269), Germany (ibid., § 270), Italy (ibid., § 271), New Zealand (ibid., § 272), Nigeria (ibid., § 273), Spain (ibid., § 274), Switzerland (ibid., § 275), United Kingdom (ibid., § 276), United States (ibid., § 277) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 278).
 See, e.g., the military manuals of Germany (ibid., § 270), Italy (ibid., § 271) and Yugoslavia (ibid., § 278).