United States of America, Appellee, v. Douglas A. Parigian, Defendant, Appellant.
Before Kayatta, Stahl, and Barron, Circuit Judges. Allison J. Koury for appellant. Andrew E. Lelling, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Acting on obviously nonpublic information that a golfing buddy received from a corporate insider, Douglas Parigian made in excess of $200,000 trading in securities. The United States subsequently indicted Parigian for criminal securities fraud. As ultimately amended, the indictment pressed a so-called misappropriation theory against Parigian, arguing that Parigian knew or should have known that, by providing the inside information to Parigian, his buddy both breached a duty of trust and confidence and personally benefited by doing so. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–53 (1997); SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2006). After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege a crime, Parigian reached an agreement with the government whereby he pled guilty to the charges conditionally, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), so that this court could then rule on the questions raised by his challenge to the superseding indictment. We now do so, holding that Parigian's preserved challenges to the indictment fall short of the mark.
As ultimately amended, the grand jury's indictment charged Parigian and his golfing buddy co-defendant Eric McPhail 1 with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, by “knowingly and willfully ․ employ[ing] manipulative and deceptive devices and contrivances in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in contravention of [Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) ] Rule 10b-5.” See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(c). Another count charged them both with conspiracy to commit the same offense.2 See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Ordinarily, because this appeal follows a guilty plea, we would derive the facts from the plea agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy, the unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report, and the sentencing hearing transcript. See United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2013). But because Parigian's appeal trains solely on the legal adequacy of the challenged superseding indictment, we focus our review within the indictment's four corners. See United States v. Horton, 580 F. App'x 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1006 (2015) (limiting appellate review “to the four corners of the indictment” when defendant entered conditional guilty plea preserving right to appeal denial of motion to dismiss based on indictment's failure to state a crime).
In addition to its recitation of the offenses as described and the laws allegedly violated by the defendants, the eighteen-page indictment contained numerous factual allegations describing each person's role in the insider trading scheme. The scheme's insider (“Insider”) was an un-indicted individual who served from 2004 to 2011 as an executive at American Superconductor Corporation (“AMSC”), a publicly-traded Massachusetts-based corporation in the business of producing components used in the wind power industry. McPhail and Insider were friends. The indictment claimed that, by 2009, the relationship between McPhail and Insider was one of “trust and confidence, including a history, pattern, and practice of sharing professional and personal confidences.” They also shared “an understanding that information conveyed between them was to remain confidential.” The indictment expressly alleged that Parigian “was aware of” that relationship and “knew” that Insider was an executive at AMSC.
Beginning no later than July of 2009, Insider began revealing to McPhail highly material inside information about AMSC that allowed McPhail to predict the upshot of impending, yet-to-be-announced earnings reports and major commercial transactions. Notwithstanding his alleged understanding with Insider that he was to treat the information confidentially, McPhail began to disseminate the information about developments at AMSC, mostly via email, to a circle of regular golfing companions, including Parigian. During the next two years, the tips allowed Parigian to time his purchases and sales of AMSC securities (and options) so as to avoid losses and secure gains in the wake of certain public announcements of the information previously passed to him by McPhail.
The email traffic accompanying this prescient trading indicated that secrecy was the order of the day. One of McPhail's early tips concluded with “SHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” The group discussed whether the information would remain “safe” while they tipped off another person. McPhail stressed the need to use a dedicated email thread, while Parigian claimed that he was deleting his emails.
There is no allegation that McPhail himself engaged in trading. Rather, the indictment posits that he solicited “getting paid back” by Parigian and the others with wine, steak, and visits to a massage parlor. Parigian assured him that “I will take you for a nice dinner at Grill 23.” Another tipped trader offered McPhail a free golf outing.
Parigian moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, arguing that it failed to adequately allege several elements of the crime of securities fraud committed by trading on misappropriated inside information. After this motion was denied by the district court, see United States v. McPhail, No. 14-cr-10201-DJC, 2015 WL 2226249, at *5 (D. Mass. May 12, 2015), Parigian entered into a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion. He was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release, with eight months of home confinement.
In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment, we review legal questions de novo, any relevant factual findings for clear error, and the court's “ultimate ruling” for abuse of discretion. United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 226 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Lopez–Matias, 522 F.3d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 2008)).
An indictment is sufficient “if it contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of the charges against which he must defend, and enables him to enter a plea without fear of double jeopardy.” United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). A well-pleaded indictment can parrot “the statutory language to describe the offense, but it must also be accompanied by such a statement of facts and circumstances as to inform the accused of the specific offense with which he is charged.” United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) (the “indictment ․ must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged”).
The government's case against Parigian relies on the “misappropriation” theory of liability for insider trading as recognized in O'Hagan. In O'Hagan, corporate insiders communicated material, nonpublic information to the corporation's law firm in connection with a proposed tender offer. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–49. O'Hagan, who practiced law at that firm, used the information to trade in the stock of the take-over target. Id. The court held that O'Hagan's conduct constituted fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities because, by breaching his fiduciary duties owed to his firm and to his firm's client, he appropriated confidential information of his law firm's client in a manner that deceived “those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.” Id. at 652. In short, a misappropriator who knowingly violates a “duty of loyalty and confidentiality,” id., and trades to his advantage, “gains his advantageous market position through deception,” id. at 656. “[I]t is that deception which brings this trading within the statutory language.” Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 6.
The indictment seeks to portray McPhail, in the first instance, as the misappropriator, alleging that he owed Insider a duty of trust and confidence that McPhail breached by tipping Parigian. It then seeks to hold Parigian liable as a tippee who traded with sufficient awareness of that breach. This derivative application to a tippee one step removed from the initial violation parallels what often occurs in classical insider trading cases, where liability attaches not just to the insider or to the insider's tippee, but also to a more remote tippee provided that the remote tippee has sufficient knowledge of the facts that make the conduct unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction of remote tippee who knew “the details of the scheme”). Parigian does not dispute that the misappropriation theory of criminal securities fraud can apply in this manner to a remote tippee. As in Rocklage, we therefore assume that it can so apply. See Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 14.
Parigian argues, instead, that the indictment fails to allege criminal securities fraud because: (1) It does not employ the proper measure of mens rea, (2) It does not adequately allege awareness by Parigian that McPhail's disclosures breached a duty of trust and confidentiality owed to Insider, (3) It does not adequately allege that McPhail received a personal benefit from tipping off Parigian, and, (4) It fails to allege that Insider received a personal benefit. We address each argument in turn.
As we will describe, at various points the indictment alleges that Parigian “knew or should have known” certain facts. In theory, these allegations raise two different issues: (1) Is “knew or should have known” an appropriate statement of the state of mind (or “mens rea”) required to support a criminal conviction of a tippee under 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); and/or, (2) Are the facts that Parigian is said to have known or had reason to know sufficient to make his trading unlawful? In his reply brief, Parigian claims to have raised both issues. The government, in turn, cries foul, claiming that Parigian has waived any challenge to the “knew or should have known” formulation by failing to raise the challenge in both the district court and in his main brief on appeal. To explain why we agree with the government, we need first review the case law that bears on the proper definition of mens rea in this criminal case.
The state of mind required to establish liability for fraudulently trading securities depends, in relevant part, on whether the government seeks to establish civil or criminal liability. In a civil case, the government need only show that “the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach [of the tipper's fiduciary duty].” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). As the Second Circuit more recently explained in a civil case, the Dirks “knows or should know standard pertains to a tippee's knowledge that the tipper breached a duty ․ to his principal (under the misappropriation theory), by relaying confidential information.” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012).
The district court plainly did not read Parigian's motion as challenging the adequacy of the “should have known” formulation. Rather, doing exactly as Parigian urged, the district court relied on Obus as setting forth the relevant mens rea standard. See McPhail, 2015 WL 2226249, at *2 (quoting Obus, 693 F.3d at 289). It then rejected Parigian's primary argument that the relationship between Insider and McPhail, as alleged, was not one such that a duty of trust and confidence could have arisen between the two. Id. at *3–4.
Only in his reply brief did Parigian belatedly try to argue that the “knew or should have known” language in the indictment was problematic. And, even then, he limited the argument on what is a reasonably complicated issue to a single page, citing not a single criminal case and relying again principally on Obus.
We turn next to the mens rea argument that Parigian did preserve: the argument that the indictment does not adequately allege that he knew or should have known that McPhail's disclosures breached a duty of trust and confidence owed to Insider. This argument poses two questions: Does the indictment adequately allege that McPhail's tips to Parigian breached a duty of trust and confidence owed to Insider; and, Does the indictment adequately allege that Parigian knew or should have known that the tips to him breached that duty?
The misappropriation theory only applies when there is a breach of a “duty of trust and confidence” owed by the tipper to the insider. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. In O'Hagan, that duty and its breach were obvious precisely because it is clear that a company's legal counsel regularly receives information in trust and confidence. See id. at 652–53, 653 n.5. Here, though, the complaint alleges no formal type of fiduciary or confidential relationship between Insider (or AMSC) and McPhail. Rather, it describes a relationship in which one friend shares obviously confidential information concerning his business with another friend. So the question is: Is this relationship, as detailed in the indictment, a relationship that will support the type of breach of trust necessary to support conviction under the misappropriation theory?
Whether the testimony of McPhail and Insider would have backed up this lynchpin allegation we do not know, because Parigian decided to plead guilty. What we can say is that the specific facts alleged in the indictment render the existence of such an understanding plausible. Insider was an executive privy to information that was on its face highly confidential, enough so that a corporate executive would undoubtedly know that it should not be broadcast, and arguably would be unlikely to disclose it to just any casual acquaintance. The disclosures continued over a long period of time, and there is no suggestion that Insider received any indication that McPhail was passing along the information to others. All of this is enough to plausibly describe the existence of the requisite duty and its breach and to do so in a manner that “fairly inform[ed] [Parigian] of the charges against which he must defend.” Yefsky, 994 F.2d at 893.
Parigian also argues that it “would have been impossible” for him to mount a defense at trial regarding the nature of the relationship between Insider and McPhail because he “was not part of that relationship and did not know what the relationship entailed other than that they were friends and golfing buddies.” Parigian may be correct that any defense to this indictment—alleging, as it does, a chain of communications among different pairings of people—would generally be more complicated than if he had been charged with run-of-the-mill fraud. It is also true, though, that the prosecution of such an indictment is more complicated and more difficult than it is in a run-of-the-mill fraud case. See, e.g., Newman, 773 F.3d 438. Moreover, the challenge of resisting the government's case differs little from what defendants routinely shoulder in prosecutions for criminal conspiracy, for example, in which conspirators can be held answerable for the conduct of others who share their “common goal” but are far removed from their own role in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Alejandro-Montañez, 778 F.3d 352, 358–60 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2827, 135 S. Ct. 2905, 136 S. Ct. 92 (2015). In any event, the relevant point is not that defending against the charges would be complicated, or difficult. The relevant point is that the indictment “fairly informed” Parigian of the nature of the charges so that he could then undertake that defense, whether difficult or not.
That leaves the question of Parigian's awareness of that breached duty. The indictment expressly claims that Parigian himself “was aware of the relationship between McPhail and [Insider] and knew that [Insider] was an executive at AMSC.” It further claims that Parigian “knew or should have known that the [information disclosed to him by McPhail] was material and nonpublic and had been disseminated in violation of a fiduciary or similar duty.” The efforts of Parigian to keep the information secret and delete his emails added grist to the allegation that he was aware that the dissemination to him had been in breach of a duty recognized by the law. Whether these allegations would have been sufficient at trial, we need not say. See Savarese, 686 F.3d at 7 (“Where ․ a defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment, the question is not whether the government has presented enough evidence to support the charge, but solely whether the allegations in the indictment are sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charged offense.”). We hold only that, collectively, and given the waiver of any argument about the relevant mens rea standard, they were enough to do what an indictment need do on this element of the charge. See id.
Parigian's second preserved argument focuses on the presence (or absence) of an anticipated benefit to McPhail from his tipping. In Dirks, the Supreme Court ruled that under the classical conception of insider trading liability, a tippee is not liable under Rule 10b–5 unless the insider “will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. We have twice considered in SEC civil enforcement actions the question whether a benefit to the misappropriator is also a necessary element to establishing liability for violating Rule 10b-5. See Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 7 n.4; SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000).
In Sargent, we noted that the Second Circuit in dictum appeared dubious that such a benefit need be proven in a misappropriation case. 229 F.3d at 77. We then dodged the question, in part, by concluding that if a benefit need be proven, the government's evidence that the misappropriator and the tipper were business and social friends with reciprocal interests allowed a jury to find a benefit in the form of the misappropriator's “reconciliation with [a] friend” and the maintenance of “a useful networking contact.” Id. In Rocklage, we then held that “[e]ven if there is a requirement that the tipper receive a personal benefit, the mere giving of a gift to a relative or friend is a sufficient personal benefit” to the giver. 470 F.3d at 7 n.4; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”).
Although Sargent and Rocklage were civil actions, the question at hand—to what extent is benefit to the misappropriating tipper an element for a Rule 10b-5 violation—would seem to call for the same answer in both a civil and criminal proceeding (unlike questions concerning mens rea). Here, the indictment paints McPhail and Parigian as reasonably good friends. Moreover, the indictment alleges that McPhail requested—and was promised—various tangible luxury items in return for the tips. This would appear to be enough under our precedent.
We do recognize that the Second Circuit itself has recently adopted a more discriminating definition of the benefit to a tipper in a classical insider trading case, rejecting as insufficient the mere existence of a personal relationship “in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit seemed to align itself more closely with our holding in Rocklage, and the Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to review the issue. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Proof that the insider disclosed material nonpublic information with the intent to benefit a trading relative or friend is sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary duty element of insider trading.”), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
Parigian further argues that the government was obligated to allege in its indictment that Insider was also expecting a benefit when passing along confidential information to McPhail in the first instance. But imposing such a requirement in a misappropriation case would defy logic, because the theory only applies when the insider expects that the information will not be misused, and thus will generate no trading benefits to anyone. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
Because we see no merit in the only arguments in favor of reversal that Parigian has properly advanced, we affirm the district court's order denying Parigian's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment.
1. McPhail was separately convicted on the indictment's counts following a jury trial. See Order of Judgment, United States v. McPhail, No. 1:14-cr-10201-DJC-1 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2015), ECF No. 180, appeal docketed, No. 15-2106 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 2015). His parallel appeal of his criminal conviction is pending.
2. A third count charged Parigian alone with making false statements in connection with the government's investigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Parigian ultimately pled guilty to a subsequent information filed by the government that dropped this last charge.
3. The government misreads O'Hagan as endorsing the “knew or should have known” formulation, even in a criminal case. While that language does appear in the majority opinion's discussion of O'Hagan's conviction for fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer under SEC Rule 14e–3(a), see O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 675, the Court's opinion makes clear that it explicitly declined to consider O'Hagan's arguments regarding Rule 14e–3(a)'s “scienter requirement,” and expressly noted that conviction for violating that Rule also required the government to prove that the violation was “willful[ ],” id. at 677 & n.23 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)).
4. For example, Parigian's argument that “[a] remote tippee will not know whether he is subject to a duty to refrain from trading unless he actually knows that the insider's disclosure of information was wrong,” went to whether the indictment contained sufficient allegations that Parigian actually knew, but did not address the appropriateness of the “should have known” formulation.
5. It is possible that what Parigian had in mind is Obus's general introductory discussion of civil mens rea, see Obus, 693 F.3d at 286 (“Negligence is not a sufficiently culpable state of mind to support a section 10(b) civil violation.”), rather than its specific application of the Dirks “knew or should have known” standard to the relevant component of tippee liability, see id. at 287–88 (“Thus, tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly ․”). If that is what counsel intended, neither her brief nor oral argument so clarified.
6. Judge Barron agrees that Parigian waived any claim that use of the “knew or should have known” formulation on its own rendered the indictment defective. But Judge Barron would hold that Parigian did do enough to argue that the crime of insider trading requires the government to prove that he actually knew of McPhail's breach of a duty of confidentiality to Insider and not merely that he knew or should have known of that breach. Judge Barron would also hold that Parigian preserved his argument that the indictment was defective because the facts that it sets forth alleging that he knew of the breach—as opposed to that he merely “knew or should have known” of it—did not suffice to “fairly inform[ him] of the charges against which he must defend.” United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 893 (1st Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, with respect to that argument, Judge Barron finds that the facts alleged, as we will describe them in the next section of this opinion, were sufficient to give Parigian adequate notice.
7. Parigian briefly states that the SEC “unilaterally expanded insider trading by creating a new class of misappropriation ․” It is not clear whether this statement is an observation or the beginning of an argument. If the latter, it doesn't clear the launch pad: as an argument “adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” we deem it waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
8. Parigian also asserts that there was no relevant benefit here because McPhail never actually received (as opposed to anticipated) the benefit promised him by Parigian and other members of the golfing group. This assertion is a non-starter: anticipation of a personal benefit in return for a breach of duty surely suffices. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (“[T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” (emphasis supplied)). Were actual receipt required, a smart tippee might evade conviction simply by waiting to dole out the promised benefit until enough time had passed to suggest that the coast was likely clear.


§ 335-1 Failure to comply with rules and regulations; violations and penalties.
§ 335-2 Location of drains and sewers determined by Council.
§ 335-3 General construction account.
§ 335-4 Connections to sewers; regulations.
§ 335-5 Changes to and repair of connections.
§ 335-6 Plats of sewers and drains.
§ 335-9 Apparatus used for removal of contents.
§ 335-11 Right of entry.
§ 335-12 Notification of spills.
§ 335-13 Enforcement; violations and penalties.
§ 335-14 Discharge of other wastes prohibited; violations and penalties.
Plumbing fees — See Ch. 202, Art. I.
Plumbing — See Ch. 306.


text:
The Complainant is Unique Brands Enterprises, LLC of Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America, represented by Hogan & Hartson, LLP, United States of America.
The Respondent is Media Insights, Media Insight of Miami Beach, Florida, United States of America.
The disputed domain names <azulbluerivieramaya.com>, <eldoradomaromaresort.com>, <eldoradoroyalespa.com>, and <eldoradoseasidesuite.com> are all registered with Melbourne IT Ltd. (“Melbourne IT”), while the remaining disputed domain name <azulhotelbeach.com> is registered with Network Solutions, LLC (“Network Solutions”). For the sake of simplicity, both registrars will be collectively referred to below as simply the “Registrar” except in those instances where the context requires reference to a specific registrar.
The Complaint was brought pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), which was adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) on August 26, 1999, and approved on October 24, 1999, and in accordance with the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) as approved on October 24, 1999, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in effect as of December 1, 1999 (the “Supplemental Rules”).
The Complaint, with accompanying Annexes A-M, was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) by email on November 12, 2008 and by hardcopy on November 17, 2008.
After receiving the original Complaint, the Center, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Supplemental Rules, verified that the Complaint complied with the formal requirements of the Rules and the Supplemental Rules. In that regard, on November 13, 2008, the Center requested confirmation from the Registrar as to whether each registrar received a copy of the Complaint from the Complainant and to confirm contact and registrant information set forth in the Complaint relative to each of the disputed domain names. The Center also requested each registrar to specify, for the domain name registered with it: (a) whether the Policy applies to that domain name, (b) whether the registrant has submitted, in its registration agreement, to the jurisdiction at the location of the principal office of the registrar for court adjudication of disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name, (c) the language of the registration agreement, and (d) whether the name will remain “locked” during the proceeding.
Subsequently, on November 13, 2008, Melbourne IT provided its response to the Center through which it specified name and contact information pertinent to each of the four disputed domain names that have been registered with it to the extent, as it then existed, in its WhoIs database. Specifically, Melbourne IT stated that, for each of these four domain names, the Respondent was listed as the registrant for that name. The response also indicated that: (a) Melbourne IT received a copy of the Complaint; and for each of the domain names: (b) the Policy applies to that domain name, (c) Melbourne IT is the registrar of that domain name, (d) the Registrant submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts at the location of the principal office of Melbourne IT, (e) the registration agreement is in English, and (f) that domain name will remain locked during this proceeding.
Further, on November 13, 2008, Network Solutions provided its response to the Center through which it specified name and contact information pertinent to the single disputed domain name that has been registered with it to the extent, as it then existed, in its WhoIs database. Specifically, Network Solutions stated that the Respondent was listed as the registrant for that name. The response also indicated that: (a) the Policy applies to that name, (b) Network Solutions is the registrar for that name, (c) the Registrant submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts at the location of the principal office of Network Solutions, (d) the registration agreement is in English, and (e) the name will remain locked during this proceeding.
On November 18, 2008, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the filing of the Complaint, including an indication that the Center was forwarding a complete copy of the Complaint to that Respondent, together with all its exhibits, by post or courier and by email, and without the annexes by facsimile. The Complaint and its accompanying documents, and all subsequent communications associated therewith, were provided in the preferred manners and to the addresses as mandated by paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) and 4(a) of the Rules.
Hence, the notification to the Respondent having occurred on November 18, 2008, under paragraph 4(c) of the Rules, this administrative proceeding is deemed to have commenced on that date.
The Respondent was then provided with a 20 calendar day period, expiring on December 8, 2008, to file its Response with the Center.
As of December 9, 2008, the Center had not received any Response to the Complaint from the Respondent; hence, the Center, in an email letter dated December 9, 2008, notified the Respondent of its default.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Rules and Supplemental Rules, by email letter dated December 16, 2008, the Center contacted the undersigned, Mr. Peter L. Michaelson, Esq., requesting his service as a Sole Panelist for this dispute. Subsequently, on the same date, Mr. Michaelson accepted and returned, by email attachment to the Center, a fully executed Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence. The Center, through an email letter dated December 17, 2008, notified the Parties of the appointment of Mr. Michaelson as sole Panelist.
Based on the deadline set forth in paragraph 15 of the Rules, a decision was to be issued by the Panel to the Center on or before December 31, 2008. Owing to unexpected time conflicts issues experienced by the Panel all of which constituted unforeseen circumstances, the Center, at the request of the Panel, subsequently notified the Parties extending this due date to January 8, 2009.
This dispute concerns five domain names, specifically names <azulbluerivieramaya.com>, <azulhotelbeach.com> <eldoradomaromaresort.com>, <eldoradoroyalespa.com>, and <eldoradoseasidesuite.com>.
As indicated in the WhoIs registration records provided in Annex B to the Complaint, the disputed domain names were registered as follows: <azulbluerivieramaya.com> and <eldoradoroyalespa.com> on January 20, 2006; <azulhotelbeach.com> on October 25, 2006; <eldoradoseasidesuite.com> on October 26, 2006; and <eldoradomaromaresort.com> on November 19, 2007.
This mark is registered for use in connection with “Services for supplying food and drink temporary accommodation” in international class 43. The Complainant claims that it first used this mark during November 2004.
This mark is registered for use in connection with “services for supplying food and drink; temporary accommodation” in international class 43. The Complainant claims that it first used this mark during February 2007.
The Complainant states that it also has common law rights in its registered marks and other similar, but unregistered, marks that contain the same formatives by virtue of its use of all those marks throughout North America, South America, Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe. Of its unregistered marks, the Complainant claims rights in the marks AZUL BLUE and EL DORADO ROYALE for which its use of these marks commenced during December 2006 and February 2003, respectively. The Complainant states that its first use of all its marks occurred on “Karisma” merchandise. A listing of all of the Complainant's marks, including dates of first use, appears in Annex C to the Complaint.
The Complainant has acquired its marks (the “Complainant's Marks” or “Marks”) through an assignment dated September 22, 2008 from Karisma Companies. Certain of those companies operate the Karisma Resorts, which are luxury, all-inclusive hotel and resorts, and/or offer travel services such as arranging vacations and tour packages and making hotel reservations for others at those hotels and resorts.
The Complainant's Marks have been licensed to and are used by the Karisma Companies in numerous countries including Mexico, where the Karisma Resorts are located, as well as in the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and other parts of North America, Latin America, South America and Europe. The Karisma Resorts and the Complainant's Marks are widely promoted in all of those areas by and on behalf of the Complainant itself and also by the Karisma Companies.
For example, the official website for the Karisma Resorts prominently displays the Complainant's Marks and allows individuals to submit reservation requests for the Karisma hotels and resorts. That website is “www.karismahotel.com”, and the site “www.azulhotels.com” re-directs Internet visitors to the former site. The former site has been in operation since 2001. The Complainant has provided, in Annex F to the Complaint, hard-copy print-outs of various pages of its “www.karismahotel.com” website showing use of its marks. The Complainant also uses its Marks in direct mail and e-mail promotions copies of various examples of which appear in Annex G to the Complaint, and through trade shows.
Use of all of the Complainant's Marks commenced in conjunction with the Karisma Resorts and related goods (e.g., merchandise such as stress balls, robes and paper weights) and services prior to the dates on which the Respondent registered the disputed domain names, and continues to the present. The Complainant, in Annex E to the Complaint, has provided pictures of a sample of various items that bear some of those marks.
complaint. Likewise, the Karisma Resorts and the Complainant's Marks have been highlighted or appeared in various television features, including on the BBC, Good Morning Texas and Fox 41. The Complainant has provided a representative sample of such features on a CD-ROM which it included as Annex J to the Complaint.
The Complainant estimated that, since the time its Marks have been adopted, over USD35 million has been spent on advertising and marketing the Karisma Resorts using those Marks.
As indicated by hard-copies, in Annex K to the Complaint, of web pages to which each of the disputed domain names resolves, the Respondent operates a website at each of those names which promotes a corresponding Karisma Resort and permits Internet users to submit reservation requests for that particular resort. For example, the websites at “www.eldoradoroyalespa.com” and “www.azulhotelbeach.com” promote the El Dorado Royale Resort and Azul Beach Hotel Resort, respectively. Each of these websites depicts the logo associated with the corresponding Karisma Resort as well as verbatim content used at the official websites for the Karisma Resorts.
After learning of the Respondent's use of the disputed domain names, counsel for the Complainant sent the Respondent a letter dated July 17, 2008 through which counsel demanded that the Respondent cease all further use of the domain names and transfer all the domain names to the Complainant. A copy of that letter appears in Annex L to the Complaint. Having not received any prior response to its July 17th letter, that counsel, on July 29, 2008, sent the Respondent a copy of that letter as a reminder. No response was ever received from the Respondent to this latter communication either.
The Complainant contends that each of the disputed domain names is confusingly similar to the Complainant's marks.
Specifically, the Complainant alleges that each one of four of the domain names merely includes either a misspelled version of one of the Complainant's marks, or an addition to or deletion from the mark of a generic term which describes the goods or services offered by the Complainant through that mark. In that regard and as to the former, the domain name <eldoradoseasidesuite.com> merely omits an “s” that appears at the end of the Complainant's mark EL DORADO SEASIDE SUITES. As to the latter, the domain name <eldoradoroyalespa.com> includes the mark EL DORADO ROYALE followed by the term “spa” and the domain name <eldoradomaromaresort.com> includes the mark EL DORADO MAROMA followed by the term “resort”; while the domain name <azulhotelbeach.com> omits the term “resort” that appears in the Complainant's mark AZUL HOTEL BEACH RESORT.
As to the fifth disputed domain name <azulbluerivieramaya.com>, the Complainant alleges that this domain name incorporates the Complainant's mark AZUL BLUE followed by the term “riviera maya”, with that term ostensibly being insufficient to adequately distinguish the domain name from the mark.
The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in any of the disputed domain names pursuant to paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.
First, Complainant states that it has never authorized the Respondent to use any of the Complainant's marks or to use any of the disputed domain names.
Second, by nevertheless incorporating the Complainant's Marks into the disputed domain names those marks having become well-known at the time and of which the Respondent undoubtedly had prior knowledge in order to intentionally cause confusion, the Respondent's subsequent use of those domain names is neither a legitimate noncommercial nor a fair use, let alone one not intended to yield any commercial gain. Nor is that use bona fide. Hence, the Respondent's use of the names, prior to its receipt of notice of the present dispute, was not made in conjunction with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Accordingly, the Respondent's conduct does not fall under either paragraph 4(c)(i) or (iii) of the Policy.
Third, the Complainant contends that owing to the reputation garnered by its Marks, the Respondent has not been and could not be commonly known by any of the disputed domain names at the times when the disputed domain names were registered, thus not qualifying under paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy either.
The Complainant contends that the Respondent registered and is now using each of the disputed domain names in bad faith under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.
First, the Complainant alleges that the Respondent, having prior knowledge of the Complainant's Marks, registered each of the disputed domain names to intentionally cause confusion of Internet users and divert those users to the Respondent's website to: (a) increase web traffic which that site would not otherwise have attained, and (b) generate revenue for the Respondent through reservations for hotel and other travel packages which some of those users would place through the Respondent's website. Thus, the Respondent was misappropriating the goodwill of the Complainant's Marks for the Respondent's own benefit, hence evidencing bad faith use and registration. Further, the Respondent, in copying significant content from the Complainant's website, in which the Complainant uses its Marks, onto the Respondent's website and for the purpose of promoting and taking reservations for the Complainant's hotels through the latter website, completely negates any possible claim of the Respondent that it had no prior knowledge of those Marks and that its use of any of those Marks was legitimate. Hence, this conduct by the Respondent reflects bad faith use and registration under paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy.
Second, the Respondent not only misappropriated the Complainant's Marks and incorporated them into the disputed domain names, but also has similarly misappropriated other trademarks, owned by third parties and used in connection with the hotels and resorts, and incorporated those marks into other domain names which the Respondent registered. In that regard, the Complainant cites to several UDRP decisions in which panels found that the Respondent registered and used such domain names in bad faith: Barceló Corporación Empresarial, S.A. v. Media Insights, WIPO Case No. D2008-0152 (March 25, 2008) (finding the Respondent acted in bad faith in registering the domain name <barcelodominicanbeach.com> given the complainant's rights in the mark BARCELO); Riu Hotels S.A. v. Media Insight, WIPO Case No. D2006-1563 (February 23, 2007) (finding the Respondent acted in bad faith in registering the domain names <rivarubagrand.com>, <riubachata.com>, <riucancun.com>, <riucaribe.com>, <riujalisco.com>, <riumontegobay.com>, <riuochorios.com>, <riupalacecabo.com>, <riupalacecabosanlucas.com>, <riupalacemacao.com>, <riupalacemexico.com>, <riuplayacar.com>, <riutropicalbay.com>, <riupalaceplayacar.corn>, and <riupalaceamericas.com> given the complainant's well-known mark RIU and trade name “Riu Hotels S.A.”); Gorstew Limited v. Media Insight, WIPO Case No. D2006-1467 (January 31, 2007) (finding the Respondent acted in bad faith in registering the domain names <beachesclubresort.com> and <sandalsresortsspa.com> given the complainant's rights in the mark SANDALS); Quiroocan, S.A. de C.V. (Barcelo) v. Media Insights, WIPO Case No. D2006-0801 (August 25, 2006) (finding the Respondent acted in bad faith in registering the domain name <barcelomayacolonial.com> given the complainant's ownership of the marks BARCELO, BARCELO HOTELS, BARCELO HOTELS & RESORTS, and BARCELO MAYA COLONIAL BEACH); and ACCOR v. Media Insights, WIPO Case No. D2004-0043 (March 1, 2004) (finding the Respondent acted in bad faith in registering the domain name <sofitelcancun.com> given the complainant's rights in the mark SOFITEL). Thus, in light of the pattern previously established by the Respondent in registering domain names that incorporated third-party marks, the Respondent's conduct in also doing so here constitutes bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(ii) of the Policy.
In view of the lack of a Response filed by the Respondent as required under paragraph 5 of the Rules, this proceeding has proceeded by way of default. Consequently, under paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules, the Panel is directed to decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of the Complainant's undisputed factual representations.
The Panel finds that each of the disputed domain names is confusingly similar to the Complainant's Marks.
From a simple comparison of each of the disputed domain names to the Complainant's Marks, no doubt exists that each such domain name is confusingly similar to the Marks.
The only differences between each of four of the disputed domain names and the Complainant's Marks is either a slight misspelling of the corresponding mark or the addition or deletion of a generic term from the mark, along with appending the gTLD (generic top level domain) “.com” to the result to form the name – with the last addition being, in the present circumstances, totally irrelevant in assessing confusing similarity or identity under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy and thus ignored. Specifically, the domain name <eldoradoseasidesuite.com> merely omits an “s” that appears at the end of the Complainant's mark EL DORADO SEASIDE SUITES. The domain name <eldoradoroyalespa.com> includes the mark EL DORADO ROYALE followed by the term “spa”. Similarly, the domain name <eldoradomaromaresort.com> includes the mark EL DORADO MAROMA followed by the term “resort”. Lastly, the domain name <azulhotelbeach.com> omits the term “resort” that appears in the Complainant's mark AZUL HOTEL BEACH RESORT.
As to the fifth domain name <azulbluerivieramaya.com>, this term incorporates the Complainant's mark AZUL BLUE followed by the term “riviera maya”. The Panel infers, from the absence of any Response having been filed, that the term, like the others has a generic meaning and, as such, is insufficient to adequately distinguish this domain name from the mark.
It is now very well-established in UDRP precedent, including numerous decisions previously rendered by this Panel, that a minor variation, such as adding short letter or number groups or even generic or highly descriptive words to a mark, is usually insufficient in and of itself, when used in forming a domain name that results from modifying the mark, to confer requisite and sufficient distinctiveness to that domain name to avoid user confusion. Here, adding or deleting a generic word or slightly altering the mark through a misspelling as the Respondent did here with each of the disputed domain names clearly resulted in such minor variations. See, e.g., HRB Innovations Inc., Express Tax Service Inc. v. Calvin Brown, WIPO Case No. D2008-1072 (September 4, 2008); Dreamworks Animation, LLC v. Creahq, Mike Furlong, WIPO Case No. D2008-0505 (May 28, 2008); Marvel Manufacturing Company Inc. v. Koba Internet Sales, LP, WIPO Case No. D2008-0265 (May 5, 2008); MySpace, Inc. v. Edwin De Jesus, EDJ Associates Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-1878 (March 12, 2008); BlackRock, Inc. v. blackrockfinancialservices.com, WIPO Case No. D2007-1627 (January 4, 2008); F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Transliner Consultants, WIPO Case No. D2007-1359 (November 14, 2007); National Football League v. Peter Blucher d/b/a BluTech Tickets, WIPO Case No. D2007-1064 (September 24, 2007); Toilets.com, Inc. v. Rons Porta Johns, WIPO Case No. D2007-0952 (August 27, 2007); Associated Bank Corp. v. Texas International Property Associates, WIPO Case No. D2007-0334 (June 28, 2007); Gerber Childrenswear Inc. v. David Webb, WIPO Case No. D2007-0317 (April 24, 2007); SPX Corp. v. Hevun Diversified Corp., NAF Case No. FA791657 (November 13, 2006); Google Inc. v. Jennifer Burns, NAF Case No. FA 726096 (August 16, 2006); The Cheesecake Factory Inc. and The Cheesecake Factory Assets Co., LLC v. Say Cheesecake, WIPO Case No. D2005-0766 (September 12, 2005); Napster, Inc. v. Giovanni Vinscani, WIPO Case No. D2005-0531 (July 19, 2005); Caesars Entertainment, Inc. v. Nova Internet Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0411 (June 22, 2005); Lockheed Martin Corporation v. The Skunkworx Custom Cycle, WIPO Case No. D2004-0824 (January 18, 2005); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Deborah Teramani, WIPO Case No. D2004-0836 (December 1, 2004) and National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Dusty Brown, WIPO Case No. D2004-0491 (August 30, 2004); Lane-Labs USA, Inc. v. Powell Productions, NAF Case No. FA 155896 (July 1, 2003); and particularly Cable News Network LP, LLP v. Elie Khouri d/b/a Channel News Network et al., NAF Case No. FA 117876 (December 16, 2002).
Based on the evidence of record here, the Panel finds that no basis exists which, under the circumstances here, would legitimize a claim to any of the disputed domain names under paragraph 4(c) of the Policy.
The Complainant has never authorized the Respondent to utilize any of its Marks or any mark confusingly similar thereto in conjunction with the goods and services with which the Complainant uses that mark or for similar goods and services, nor does the Complainant apparently have any relationship or association whatsoever with the Respondent. As such, any use to which the Respondent were to put any of the Complainant Marks or one confusingly similar thereto in connection with the identical or even similar goods and services to those currently provided by the Complainant, would violate the exclusive trademark rights now residing with the Complainant. See, e.g., HRB Innovations, Dreamworks, MySpace, Blackrock, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG, National Football League, Toilets.com, Inc., and Associated Bank, all cited supra; GoDaddy.com, Inc., v. GoDaddysDomain.com, Clark Signs, Graham Clark, WIPO Case No. D2007-0303 (May 7, 2007); Citgo Petroleum Corporation v. Richard Antinore, WIPO Case No. D2006-1576 (March 14, 2007); New Destiny Internet Group, LLC and Xplor Media, Inc. v. SouthNetworks, WIPO Case No. D2005-0884 (October 14, 2005); The Cheesecake Factory Inc., Napster and Caesars Entertainment, Inc., all cited supra; Pelmorex Communications Inc. v. weathernetwork, WIPO Case No. D2004-0898 (December 28, 2004); Sybase, Inc. v. Analytical Systems, WIPO Case No. D2004-0360 (June 24, 2004); Caesars World, Inc. and Park Place Entertainment Corporation v. Japan Nippon, WIPO Case No. D2003-0615 (September 30, 2003); Leiner Health Services Corp. v. ESJ Nutritional Products, NAF Case No. FA 173362 (September 16, 2003); AT&T Corp. v. Roman Abreu d/b/a Smartalk Wireless, cited supra; MPL Communications, Limited et al v. 1WebAddress.com, NAF Case No. FA 97092 (June 4, 2001); Treeforms, Inc. v. Cayne Industrial Sales, Corp., NAF Case No. FA 95856 (December 18, 2000); and America Online, Inc. v. Xianfeng Fu, WIPO Case No. D2000-1374 (December 11, 2000). Consequently, the Respondent could not legally acquire any public association between it and any of the Complainant's Marks or one similar thereto, for any of the goods and services rendered by the Complainant, or, broadly speaking, any good or service likely perceived by its users to be so similar and/or to emanate from or be related, in any fashion, to those then offered by the Complainant.
Further, there is absolutely no evidence of record that the Respondent has ever been commonly known by any of the disputed domain names or more generally any of the Complainant's Marks. Nor is it likely that the Respondent in this case could ever become so known, in light of the Complainant's exclusive trademark rights, with first use of its Marks sufficiently predating, by several years, the dates from October 2006 through November 2007 on which the Respondent registered the disputed domain names, and the reputation and notoriety which the Complainant has gained in its Marks during that time, without infringing on the exclusive trademark rights of the Complainant. See, e.g., MySpace and Treeforms, Inc., both cited supra.
Moreover, since the Respondent's use of each of the disputed domain names, which in this Panel's view infringes the Complainant's trademark rights, cannot constitute a bona fide offering of services and is unquestionably commercial in nature, specifically here resulting in a travel/lodging reservation made by an Internet user through the Respondent's website and for which the Respondent most likely earns some form of monetary or other compensation, the Respondent's conduct does not fall within paragraphs 4(c)(i) or 4(c)(iii) of the Policy either.
Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in any of the disputed domain names within paragraph 4(a)(ii) and 4(c) of the Policy.
The Panel finds that the Respondent's actions, with respect to each of the disputed domain names, constitutes bad faith registration and use.
The Panel believes that the Respondent was well aware of the Complainant and its Marks when the Respondent registered each of the disputed domain names. Yet, in spite of that knowledge, the Respondent intentionally chose and registered each domain name to opportunistically exploit its potential to generate user confusion for the Respondent's eventual benefit. Given the notoriety and reputation which the Complainant's Marks had garnered by then, it is simply inconceivable in this Panel's view that the Respondent had no such prior knowledge of those marks particular considering that the Respondent intentionally copied, on its website, significant content from the Complainant's website.
This view is further supported by the facts and the Panel's findings that: (a) the Respondent's website promoted and provided Internet users with the ability to place travel/lodging reservations for the Complainant's hotels and resorts which carried the Complainant's Marks and thus diverted those users from the Complainant's website or other sites authorized to take such reservations to the Respondent's site instead which was not authorized or for that matter related, whether by affiliation, sponsorship or endorsement, in any fashion to the Complainant, and (b) the Respondent derived benefit, certainly through increased web traffic, but also ultimately in either pecuniary and non-pecuniary form as a result of such users having chosen, as a result of the diversion, to transact and place its reservation with the Respondent, rather than with either the Complainant or an authorized third-party.
Given the lack of any response, the Panel infers that generating such benefit predicated on such confusion and which the Respondent would not otherwise attain was the Respondent's ultimate goal when it registered and subsequently used each domain name as it did.
It is precisely this opportunistic exploitation which results from the confusion and is predicated on the lack of any legitimate relationship between the parties which, at its roots, trades on, leverages from and injures the goodwill of the Complainant's Marks to the Complainant's detriment and the Respondent's benefit that constitutes bad faith.
Consequently, the Panel concludes that the Respondent's conduct with respect to each of the disputed domain names constitutes bad faith use and registration under paragraph 4(b)(iv) and alternatively the general bad faith proscription in paragraph 4(b), and hence also under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.
Moreover, the Panel also finds that the Respondent's registration of the disputed domain names here, in light of its prior and repeated instances of having registered various domain names that also included third-party trademarks, in and of itself constitutes bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(ii) of the Policy.
Thus, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has provided sufficient proof of its allegations, with respect to each of the disputed domain names, to establish a case under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy upon which the relief it now seeks can be granted.
All the disputed domain names, namely <azulbluerivieramaya.com>, <azulhotelbeach.com>, <eldoradomaromaresort.com>, <eldoradoroyalespa.com>, and <eldoradoseasidesuite.com> are ordered transferred to the Complainant.

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Article 37(1)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I lists “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness” as an act of perfidy.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 37(1)(b). Article 37 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.39, 25 May 1977, p. 103.
Article 21(1) of the draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the CDDH provided that “when carried out in order to commit or resume hostilities, … the feigning of a situation of distress” was considered perfidy.
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 826(b) (naval warfare) and § 902(b) (land warfare).
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 503.
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 703(b).
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states: “Perfidy consists of committing a hostile act under the cover of legal protection (e.g. … feigning being disabled by injuries or sickness …)”.
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 32; see also Part I bis, p. 95.
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) provides that “feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an example of perfidy.
Likewise, “feigning being hors de combat” is qualified as an act of perfidy.
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) lists “feigning being hors de combat” as an “act of perfidy”.
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 59, § 251; see also p. 85, § 341 and p. 183, § 494.A.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 6-2, § 9(b) (land warfare), p. 7-2, § 17(b) (air warfare) and p. 8-11, § 81(c) (naval warfare).
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, §§ 603.2.b (land warfare), 706.2.b (air warfare) and 857.2.c (naval warfare).
- the feigning of being hors de combat.
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 16.
- feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness.
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 41; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 48.
Under Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991), “the feigning of being incapacitated for combat” constitutes a perfidious act.
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states that perfidious acts are those “by which the adversary is induced to believe that there is a situation affording protection under public international law, so that he may be attacked by surprise, e.g. the feigning of an incapacitation”.
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten –Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 2.
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) provides that “the feigning of being wounded” constitutes perfidy.
Under Hungary’s Military Manual (1992), feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness is an example of perfidy.
Pretending to be injured or ill for the purpose of achieving a military advantage. Here again, the purpose is to prevent a situation in which the soldiers of one side would fear getting medical help for the wounded of the other side.
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) states that feigning incapacitation because of wounds or sickness is prohibited.
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states that the 1977 Additional Protocol I “gives a number of examples of treacherous behaviour [including] feigning to be hors de combat by wounds or sickness”.
The Military Handbook (1995) of the Netherlands provides that it is a prohibited method of warfare “to perform treacherous acts (for example, feigning to have been killed or to be wounded … and then suddenly resume fighting)”.
It is forbidden to lead an adversary in battle to believe, by behaviour (moaning and groaning) that you are wounded and wish to surrender and then suddenly to open fire on those offering help. A combatant who feigns death on the battlefield to evade capture and then return to his own lines commits no act of perfidy. He only wants to mislead the enemy.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0414–0415.
Nigeria’s Military Manual (1994) gives the following example of “perjury” (perfidy): “feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness”.
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, pp. 42 and 43, § 12(c).
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an example of perfidy.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 27.e.(9).(c).
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states that “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an example of perfidy.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 28(e)(2)(c), p. 239.
Under Romania’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991), “simulation of incapacity due to wound or sickness” is an act of perfidy.
When planning and conducting combat operations it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between perfidy and ruses of war. Perfidy means committing a hostile act under the cover of a right to protection by feigning: … incapacitation by wounds or sickness.
According to the manual, this is considered as an example of a perfidious act.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) prohibits the act of perfidy and states that “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an example of such an act.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.3.b.(3); see also, §§ 3.3.b.(1).(b), 5.3.c and 7.3.c.
Under Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991), “the feigning of incapacitation by wounds or sickness” constitutes perfidious conduct. However, “if for example a soldier simulates injury or sickness only to avoid an adversary’s attack, this is not judged as perfidy”.
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.1.b), p. 29.
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) provides that perfidy is forbidden and that: “It is notably prohibited … to feign incapacitation for combat by wounds or sickness”.
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that an example of perfidy is “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness”.
According to the UK Military Manual (1958), “it would be treachery for a soldier to sham wounded or dead and then to attack enemy soldiers who approached him without hostile intent”.
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 115, footnote 2; see also § 311, footnote 1.
According to the UK LOAC Manual (2004), “the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an example of prohibited perfidy, “if done with intent to betray the enemy’s confidence”.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) states that “feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness” is an act of perfidy.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 104(2).
Colombia’s Penal Code (2000), in an article entitled “Perfidy”, imposes a criminal sanction on “anyone who, during an armed conflict and with intent to harm or attack the adversary, simulates the condition of a protected person”, including the wounded and sick.
International humanitarian law prohibits killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resorting to perfidy. Acts of perfidy include any form of deception designed to win the confidence of an adversary and lead him to believe that he is entitled or obliged to accord protection under the rules of international humanitarian law, with the intention of betraying that confidence. An example of perfidy is to falsely lay claim to protected status through … feigning incapacitation on the grounds of injuries or sickness.
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that “to pretend being incapacitated by wounds or sickness” constitutes an act of perfidy.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 409(c).


text:
For those of who have fought for the reversal of Roe v. Wade for years, it has seemed, at times, like a giant too powerful to topple. But the landscape is changing. As little David stood with five smooth rocks in hand, one made its way to the slingshot. Maybe, just maybe, a similar rock is prepped and ready in our day. Now.
Politically speaking, the divide between abortion supporters and opponents is as wide as the east is from the west. With the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh, the air has become increasingly volatile as the real-life prospect of overturning the 1973 landmark decision that legalized abortion nationwide is coming into view.
Also remarkable is the timing of a new film Roe v. Wade, produced by Alveda King, niece of the late Martin Luther King, Jr. The movie is currently under production and is causing quite a stir.
A number of cast and crew members have quit, citing the pro-life slant or confusion caused by the privacy requirements concerning the script. You would think it was being produced by President Donald J. Trump himself the way the liberal, agenda-driven mainstream media is going after it – thus the great need for confidentiality.
Well, that was a mouthful.
I always find it amusing when the left refers to the court case as “Roe” for short as they make their rabid pro-abortion case – as if Roe herself was making their case. Not so. Ms. Roe (Norma McCorvey), who died last February, longed to see the case overturned. She wrote two books detailing the behind-the-scenes manipulation and lies, and her new life as a Christ follower and pro-life activist: I am Roe (1994), and Won by Love (1998).
The liberal media is working hard to discredit the Roe v. Wade movie – anything to keep the truth buried in the dark. But in the midst of the fierce attacks, the producer and director are determined to show on the big screen the back alley manipulating that brought the infamous case to the Supreme Court and to its perceived final victory.
Let’s just look at one article published by Yahoo News from The Cut as an example. The writer went so far as to link a story from Jezebel.com, an internet site sharing a name with King Ahab’s wife, the biblical supermodel of rebellion and wickedness. While the site attempted to paint Martin Luther King, Jr. as pro-abortion, Alveda clarified that while her uncle never supported abortion, his wife did, as did Alveda herself in her early years. Alveda now openly shares about her past abortions, as well as her transformation from darkness and death to light and life.
The Yahoo article criticized the movie for including Center for Medical Progress investigative video footage exposing Planned Parenthood’s sale of aborted baby organs and its eerily calloused contempt for human life. Of course, the author of the article is sure to remind her readers that Planned Parenthood “vociferously and repeatedly denied” the actions portrayed in videos that were, by the way, provided in their entirety on YouTube.
The writer also claims the film will likely be rated R because of “several graphic scenes depicting aborted fetuses,” including one showing “a dozen buckets of tiny fetuses and baby parts” found in an abortionist’s hotel room during a police sting.
It is baffling that abortion proponents find it morally repugnant to show “graphic” actual images of aborted fetuses. If it is merely a clump of cells, a parasite, contents of pregnancy, or whatever else they choose to call these precious human lives, then why is it so offensive to show?
I could go on…and on.
Before directing the film, Loeb was best known for his custody battle over frozen embryos shared with former girlfriend, Sofia Vergara. He was approached by the director/screenwriter of Roe v. Wade who explained that a 1989 made-for-TV movie about Roe v. Wade didn’t really lay out the truth surrounding the case.
When Loeb read the script, he was shocked.
“Everyone in America has heard of Roe v. Wade, but no one really knows the true story of what led up to that,” he explained.
He then went on to read about 40 different books and the bios of others linked to the story, like Norma McCorvey. And he became determined to make the truth known.
For more information about the movie, go to roevwademovie.com by clicking here.

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As widely reported, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been spending a significant amount of time developing the rules that would apply to offerings under the highly publicized “crowdfunding” exemption under § 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act. Originally the SEC had 270 days from April 5, 2012, to develop and issue those rules;; however, the SEC failed to act until October 23, 2013 when it finally issued proposed rules and forms that would implement the “crowdfunding” exemption provisions including: (1) Regulation Crowdfunding, a new regulation that would govern offerings made in reliance on the § 4(a)(6) exemption, provide a framework for the operations of “crowdfunding” intermediaries (including funding portals and brokers) and create a registration regime for funding portals, place restrictions on the resale of securities sold in § 4(a)(6) offerings and exempt securities sold in § 4(a)(6) offerings from counting toward the Exchange Act § 12(g) registration threshold; (2) Form C, a new form that issuers in § 4(a)(6) offerings would be required to file before the commencement of a § 4(a)(6) offering, during the pendency of an offering to report progress toward the funding goal and certain changes to the offering or updates (when applicable), annually after completing a “crowdfunding” offering and at the conclusion of their Form C reporting obligations; and (3) Form Funding Portal, a new form that funding portals would file to register with the SEC, to update information and to terminate their registration. On the same day, FINRA issued a regulatory notice soliciting comments on proposed rules and forms that would govern SEC-registered “crowdfunding” portals.
The SEC accepted public comments on the proposal through early February 2014 and the SEC staff is reviewing the comments to determine what changes should be made before presenting a final proposed to the SEC for consideration. Among other things, commentators focused on a proposed requirement that companies seeking more than $500,000 must prepare and release audited financial information, a burden that small firms argue will make “crowdfunding” too expensive to be a viable alternative for raising money. The SEC has repeatedly announced that finalization of the “crowdfunding” rules is a priority for 2014; however, it remains to be seen whether this will happen and whether “crowdfunding” will be adopted and used in the marketplace.


§ 63-2 Fee; application requirements.
§ 63-4 Copies of rules and regulations.
§ 63-5 Transferability of registration.
§ 63-6 Sale of bicycle or transfer of ownership.
§ 63-8 Impounding of bicycles.
§ 63-10 Intent; violations and penalties.
§ 63-11 Operation of sleds or sleighs on streets.
Streets and sidewalks — See Ch. 148.
Vehicles and traffic — See Ch. 170.
No person residing within the city shall use a bicycle without first having registered the same in the manner hereinafter provided and without first having attached to such bicycle a registration tag as hereinafter provided.
The license fee for each bicycle is hereby fixed at the amount set forth in Chapter 107, Licenses and Permits, which fee shall be paid at the time application is made for the registration tag.
The applicant shall be the owner of the bicycle and shall furnish proof of such ownership at the time of application.
The applicant shall demonstrate to the Police Department that the bicycle is in a safe mechanical condition and that the applicant is capable of operating the same and is familiar with the traffic laws of the State of New jersey relative to the operation of the equipment of the bicycle, as well as such rules and regulations as the Police Department may promulgate, with the approval of the City Council, concerning the operation, equipment and maintenance of bicycles.
Upon compliance by the applicant with the aforesaid requirements, the Police Department shall issue to the applicant a registration tag, which shall be fastened to the frame of the bicycle in a conspicuous place. Removal of the registration tag shall be grounds for revocation of the license.
Printed copies of the safety rules and regulations for the use of bicycles, as set forth in this Article or as promulgated by the Police Department, shall be issued and delivered to each licensee hereunder.
Registration tags and cards issued hereunder shall not be transferable.
It shall be the duty of every licensee who sells or transfers ownership of a bicycle to report said sale or transfer within 72 hours to the Police Department by returning the registration card and registration tag issued to such person and at the same time furnishing the police with the name and address of the person to whom such bicycle has been sold or transferred.
All bicycles regulated by this Article must be registered on or before April 1 of each year and such registration shall expire on March 31 of the following year.
A bicycle being used without a registration card and tag or in such condition as to be unfit for safe operation, or operated recklessly or in violation of any of the safety regulations herein set forth, may be impounded by the Police Department until such time as the owner complies with the requirements of this Article, and it shall not be returned except upon the payment of $1.
No person shall leave his bicycle unlocked.
No person shall operate or park a bicycle upon any sidewalk.
The intent of this Article is not the prosecution of children but the education and training of children for their own and the community welfare.
A continued willful refusal to comply with the safety regulations promulgated by the Police Department may subject the operator to the authority having jurisdiction over juvenile matters. Any person 18 years of age or older who violates the provisions of this Article may be subjected to a fine not exceeding $5, in the discretion of the Judge before whom such person may be convicted.
Signs shall have been posted at both ends of the sleigh or sled run, indicating the age groups permitted to sled thereupon; "Keep Right" signs shall have been posted along the said run.
Barricades shall have been placed at either end of the sled or sleigh run, and barricades placed blocking intersecting traffic.


text:
G. Catanese, R. Watteaux, I. Montes, M. Barra, P. Rumolo, D.Borme, B. Buongiorno Nardelli, V. Botte, M.G. Mazzocchi, S. Genovese, I. Di Capua, M. Iriondo, A. Estonba, P. Ruggeri, V. Tirelli, V. Caputo-Barucchi, G. Basilone, A. Bonanno, D. Iudicone, G. Procaccini. 2017. Insights on the drivers of genetic divergence in the European anchovy. Scientific Reports, 7(1):4180.
I. Montes, I. Zarraonaindia, M. Iriondo, W.S. Grant, C. Manzano, U. Cotano, D. Conklin, X. Irigoien, A. Estonba. 2016. Transcriptome analysis deciphers evolutionary mechanisms underlying genetic differentiation between coastal and offshore anchovy populations in the Bay of Biscay. Marine Biology, 163(10):205.
I. Montes, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, M. Santos, D. Conklin, G.R. Carvalho, X. Irigoien, A. Estonba. 2016. No loss of genetic diversity in the exploited and recently collapsed population of Bay of Biscay anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus, L.). Marine Biology, 163(5):98.
I. Miguel, L. Garnery, M. Iriondo, M. Baylac, C. Manzano, S. Sheppard, A. Estonba. 2015. Origin, evolution and conservation of the honey bees from La Palma Island (Canary Islands): molecular and morphological data. Journal of Apicultural Research 54(5):427-440.
M. J. Sanz-Martin, A. Estonba, C. Manzano, M. Iriondo, G. Pérez-Suárez, A. Fernández, F. Palacios. 2014. Genetic Structure of Brown and Iberian Hare Populations in Northern Iberia: Implications for Conservation of Genetic Diversity. Journal of Wildlife Management, 78(4):632-644.
U. Laconcha, M. Iriondo, H. Arrizabalaga, C. Manzano, P. Markaide, I. Montes, I. Zarraonaindia, I. Velado, E. Bilbao, N. Goñi, J. Santiago, A. Domingo, S. Karakulak, I.K. Oray, A. Estonba. 2014. New nuclear SNP markers unravel the genetic structure and effective population size of albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga). PLoS ONE, 10(6):e0128247.
G. Chust, A. Albaina, A. Aranburu, A. Borja, O. E. Diekmann, A. Estonba, J. Franco, J. M. Garmendia, M. Iriondo, I. Muxika, F. Rendo, J. G. Rodríguez, O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, E. A. Serrão, M. Valle. 2013. Connectivity, neutral theories, and the assessment of species vulnerability to global change in temperate estuaries. Estuarine Coastal and Shelf Science (ECSS), 131:52-63.A.
Albaina, M. Iriondo, I. Velado, U. Laconcha, I. Zarraonaindia, H. Arrizabalaga, N. Goñi, M. Lutcavage, W. S. Grant, A. Estonba. 2013. Single nucleotide polymorphism discovery in albacore and Atlantic bluefin tuna provide insights into world-wide population structure. Animal Genetics, 44(6):678-92.
I. Montes, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, H. Arrizabalaga, E. Jiménez, M. A. Pardo, N. Goñi, C. A. Davies, A. Estonba. 2012. Worldwide genetic structure of albacore (Thunnus alalunga) revealed by microsatellite DNA markers. Marine Ecology Progress Series, 471:183-191.
I. Zarraonaindia, M. Iriondo, A. Albaina, M. A. Pardo, C. Manzano, W. S. Grant, X. Irigoien, A. Estonba. 2012. Multiple SNP markers reveal fine-scale population and deep phylogeographic structure in European anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus L.). PLoS ONE, 7(7):e42201.
I. Miguel, M. Baylac, M. Iriondo C. Manzano, L. Garnery, A. Estonba. 2011. Both geometric morphometric and microsatellite data consistently support the differentiation of the Apis mellifera M evolutionary branch. Apidologie, 42:150-161.
I. Zarraonaindia, M.A. Pardo, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, A. Estonba. 2009. Microsatellite variability in European anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) calls for further investigation of its genetic structure and biogeography. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 56:2176-2182.
I. Miguel, M. Iriondo, L. Garnery, S. Sheppard, A. Estonba. 2007. Gene flow within the M evolutionary lineage of Apis mellifera: role of the Pyrenees, isolation by distance and post-glacial re-colonization routes in the western Europe. Apidologie, 38:141-155.
I. Montes, U. Laconcha, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, H. Arrizabalaga, A. Estonba. 2017. Reduced Single Nucleotide Polymorphism Panels for Assigning Atlantic Albacore and Bay of Biscay Anchovy Individuals to Their Geographic Origin: Toward Sustainable Fishery Management. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 65(21): 4351-4358.
A. Albaina, X. Irigoien, U. Aldalur, U. Cotano, M. Santos, G. Boyra, A. Estonba. 2015. A real-time PCR assay to estimate invertebrate and fish predation on anchovy eggs in the Bay of Biscay. Progress in Oceanography, 131: 82–99.
M. Pawluczyk, J. Weiss, M.G. Links, M.E. Aranguren, M.D. Wilkinson, M. Egea-Cortines. 2015. Quantitative evaluation of bias in PCR amplification and Next Generation Sequencing derived from metabarcoding samples. Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry 2015: 1-8.
J.L. Horreo, D. Abad, E. Dopico, M. Oberlin, E. Garcia-Vazquez. 2015. Expansion of Non-Native Brown Trout in South Europe May Be Inadvertently Driven by Stocking: Molecular and Social Survey in the North Iberian Narcea River. Int J Mol Sci, 16(7): 15546–15559.
A. Albaina, X. Irigoien, U. Aldalur, G. Boyra, M. Santos, A. Estonba. in press first published online: November 23, 2014. Macrozooplankton predation impact on anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) eggs mortality at the Bay of Biscay shelf break spawning centre. Ices Journal of Marine Science, 72(5):1370-1379.
A. Albaina, M. Taylor, C. Fox. 2012. Molecular detection of plaice remains in the stomachs of potential predators on a flatfish nursery ground. Marine Ecology Progress Series, 444:223-238.
E. Ochoa, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, A. Fullaondo, I. Villar, G. Ruiz-Irastorza, A.M. Zubiaga, A. Estonba. 2016. LDLR and PCSK9 are associated with the presence of antiphospholipid antibodies and the development of thrombosis in aPLA carriers. PLoS ONE 11(1):e0146990.
J. Prechl, K. Papp, Z. Hérincs, H. Peterfy, V. Lorand, Z. Szittner, J. del Amo, M. Uribarri, P. Rovero, A. Estonba, I. Paolini, P. Migliorini, O. Ruiz Larrañaga, C. Alcaro, C. Laszlo. 2016. Serological and Genetic Evidence for Altered Complement System Functionality in Systemic Lupus Erythematosus: Findings of the GAPAID Consortium. PloS ONE 11(3):e0150685.
O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, P. Migliorini, M. Uribarri, L. Czirják, M. C. Alcaro, J. del Amo, S. M. Iriondo, Escorza-Treviño, A. Estonba. 2016. Genetic association study of systemic lupus erythematosus and disease subphenotypes in European populations: results from GAPAID project. Clinical Rheumatology 35(5):1161-1168.
O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, P. Vazquez, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, M. Agirre, J. M. Garrido, R. A. Juste, A. Estonba. Evidence for gene-gene epistatic interactions between susceptibility genes for Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis infection in cattle. Livestock Science 195:63-66.
O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, M. Uribarri, M. C. Alcaro, S. Escorza-Treviño, J. del Amo, M. Iriondo, P. Migliorini, L. Czirják, A. Estonba. 2015. Genetic variants associated with RA patients and serotypes in European populations: results from GAPAID project. Clinical and Experimental Rheumatology 34(2):236-241.
M. Uribarri, O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, D. Arteta, L. Hernández, C. Alcaro, A. Martínez, S. Escorza-Treviño, A. Estonba, P. Migliorini, L. Czirjak, J. del Amo. 2015. Influence of MTHFR C677T polymorphism on methotrexate monotherapy discontinuation in rheumatoid arthritis patients: results from the GAPAID European Project. Clinical and Experimental Rheumatology, 33(5):0699-0705.
L. Valcárcel-Ocete, G. Alkorta-Aranburu, M. Iriondo, A. Fullaondo, M. García-Barcina, J.M. Fernández-García, E. Lezcano-García, J.M. Losada-Domingo, J. Ruiz-Ojeda, A. Álvarez de Arcaya, J.M. Pérez-Ramos, R.A.C. Roos, J.E. Nielsen, C. Saft, REGISTRY investigators of the European Huntington’s Disease Network, A.M. Zubiaga, A. Aguirre. 2015. Exploring genetic factors involved in Huntington disease age of onset: E2F2 as a new potential modifier gene. PLoS ONE, 10(7):e0131573.
P. Vazquez, O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, J.M. Garrido, I. Iriondo, C. Manzano, M. Agirre, A. Estonba, R.A. Juste. 2014. Genetic association analysis of paratuberculosis grades in Holstein-Friesian cattle. Veterinary Medicine International, 2014:321327.
E. Ochoa, M. Iriondo, A. Bielsa, G. Ruiz-Irastorza, A.Estonba, A. Zubiaga. 2013. Thrombotic antiphospholipid syndrome shows strong haplotypic association with SH2B3-ATXN2 locus. PLOS ONE 8(7): e67897.
O. Ruiz-Larrañaga, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, M. Aguirre, J.M. Garrido, R.A. Juste, A. Estonba. 2012. Single nucleotide polymorphisms in the bovine CD209 candidate gene for susceptibility to infection by Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis. Animal Genetics, 43(5):646-647.
I. Montes, M. Iriondo, C. Manzano, A. Estonba. 2018. Development of gene-associated single nucleotide polymorphisms for Japanese anchovy Engraulis japonicus through cross-species amplification. Fisheries Science 84(1):1-7.
G. Catanese, I. Montes, M. Iriondo, A. Estonba, D. Iudicone, G. Procaccini. 2016. High resolution SNPs selection in Engraulis encrasicolus through Taqman OpenArray. Fisheries Research, 177:31-38.
Genomic Resources Development Consortium, P. Álvarez , W. Arthofer, M.M. Coelho, D. Conklin, A. Estonba, A.R. Grosso, S.J. Helyar, J. Langa, M.P. Machado, I. Montes, J. Pinho, A. Reif, M. Schartl, B.C Schlick-Steiner, J. Seeber, F.M. Steiner, C. Vilas. 2015. Genomic Resources Notes Accepted 1 June 2015 – 31 July 2015. Molecular Ecology Resources, 15(6):1510-1512.
I. Montes, D. Conklin, A. Albaina, S. Creer, G.R. Carvalho, M. Santos, A. Estonba (* equal contribution). 2013. SNP discovery in European anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus, L) by high-throughput transcriptome and genome sequencing. PLoS ONE 8(8): e70051.
Molecular Ecology Resources Primer Development Consortium, A. G. Abreu, A. Albaina, T. J. Alpermann, V. E. Apkenas, S. Bankhead-Dronnet, S. Bergek, M. L. Berumen, C. H. Cho, J. Clobert, A. Coulon, D. de Feraudy, A. Estonba, T. Hankeln, A. Hochkirch, T. W. Hsu, T. J. Huang, X. Irigoien, M. Iriondo, K. M. Kay, T. Kinitz, L. Kothera, M. le Hénanff, F. Lieutier, O. Lourdais, C. M. Macrini, C. Manzano, C. Martin, V. R. Morris, G. Nanninga, M. A. Pardo, J. Plieske, S. Pointeau, T. Prestegaard, M. Quack, M. Richard, H. M. Savage, K. D. Schwarcz, J. Shade, E. L. Simms, V. N. Solferini, V. M. Stevens, M. Veith, M. J. Wen, F. Wicker, J. M. Yost, I. Zarraonaindia. 2012. Permanent genetic resources added to Molecular Ecology Resources Database 1 October 2011-30 November 2011. Molecular Ecology Resources, 12(2):374-376.
D. Abad, A. Albaina, M. Aguirre, A. Laza-Martínez, I. Uriarte, A. Iriarte, F. Villate, A. Estonba. 2016. Is metabarcoding suitable for estuarine plankton monitoring? A comparative study with microscopy. Mar Biol 163, 1–13.
Albaina, I. Uriarte, M. Aguirre, D. Abad, A. Iriarte, F. Villate, A. Estonba. 2016. Insights on the origin of invasive copepods colonizing Basque estuaries; a DNA barcoding approach. Mar. Biodivers Rec., 9(1).
L. Miralles, A. Ardura, A. Arias, Y. J. Borrell, L. Clusa, E. Dopico, A. Hernandez de Rojas, B. Lopez, M. Muñoz-Colmenero, A. Roca, A. Valiente, A. Zaiko, E. Garcia-Vazquez. 2016. Barcodes of marine invertebrates from north Iberian ports: Native diversity and resistance to biological invasions. Marine pollution Bulletin, 112: 183-188.
N. Sangwan, I. Zarraonaindia, J.T. Hampton-Marcell, H. Seegane, T.W. Eshoo, G. Rijal, M.C. Negri, J.A. Gilbert. 2016. Differential functional constraints cause strain-level endemism in Polynucleobacter populations. mSystems, 1(3):e00003-16.
A. Albaina, M. Aguirre, D. Abad, M. Santos, A. Estonba. 2016. 18S rRNA V9 metabarcoding for diet characterization: a critical evaluation with two sympatric zooplanktivorous fish species. Ecol Evol, 6: 1809–1824.
I. Zarraonaindia, S.M. Owens, P. Weisenhorn, K. West, J. Hampton-Marcel, S. Lax, N.A. Bokulich, D.A. Mills, G. Martin, S. Taghavi, D. van der Lelie, J.A. Gilbert. 2015. The soil microbiome influences grapevine-associated microbiota. mBio 6(2):e02527-14. doi:10.1128/mBio.02527-14.
I. Zarraonaindia, J. Gilbert. 2014. Probing the Microbial Mysteries of Wine. Microbe. 9 – 11, pp. 442 – 447. 2014.
M. Aranguren, M. Wilkinson. 2015. Enhanced reproducibility of SADI web service workflows with Galaxy and Docker. GigaScience, 4:59.

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