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July 20, 1999 Rehearing Denied August 19, 1999.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Honorable Alexander P. White, Judge Presiding.
Steven A. Globis and James J. Marszalek, both of Marszalek Marszalek, of Chicago, for appellant.
Nancy Jo Doyle, of Kane, Doy Harrington, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.
Regarding oral argument before the Illinois Industrial Commission (the Commission), section 19(e) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides in pertinent part: "In the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission * * *. * * * A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing." 820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1996). In this case, oral argument was requested and had before a panel of three commissioners. However, at the time the Commission's decision was issued, the term of one of the commissioners had expired. The two remaining commissioners were unable to agree on a result and wrote separate decisions. A replacement commissioner, who was not present at oral argument, concurred in one of the decisions and signed the majority decision pursuant to Zeigler v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ill.2d 137 (1972). Is the Commission's decision valid? We conclude that, under the appropriate circumstances, it is. Where there is sufficient reliable evidence in the record to conclusively establish the departing commissioner(s)' decision in the case, the replacement commissioner(s) may sign the written decision pursuant to Zeigler. In the instant case, however, there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish how the departing commissioner decided the matter. We therefore remand to the circuit court for the limited purpose of taking evidence concerning the departing commissioner's vote.
Claimant, a cement mason, filed an application for adjustment of claim for an injury to his low back that occurred on December 2, 1991, while he was lifting 30-pound sheets of plywood for employer. After conservative treatment, which did not improve his condition, claimant underwent a laminectomy and disectomy. As a result, he was only able to function at light to medium capacity and could not return to his former occupation. The arbitrator concluded that claimant was permanently partially disabled to the extent of 50%. Claimant requested oral argument, and his petition for review was heard before Commissioners Ketter and Tansor and Acting Commissioner Hagan on October 23, 1996. Acting Commissioner Hagan's six-month term expired on December 16, 1996. The Commission issued its decision on January 21, 1997. Commissioner Ketter wrote a majority opinion, adopting and affirming the arbitrator's decision. Commissioner Tansor filed a lengthy dissent, stating he would find that claimant was permanently and totally disabled. Acting Commissioner Kane, who was appointed to fill Hagan's vacancy, issued a specially concurring opinion, stating that he had not participated in oral argument or the decision, but that a majority of the panel had reached a decision prior to Acting Commissioner Hagan's departure and he was signing the decision pursuant to Zeigler so the decision could issue.
Claimant sought review to the circuit court, alleging that the Commission's decision was void because it did not comply with section 19(e). Claimant alternatively argued that the Commission's decision finding that he was not totally and permanently disabled was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court disagreed with both contentions. It concluded that the Commission's decision was proper in light of Zeigler, which it found controlling, and then found that the Commission's decision denying permanent total disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
"The affidavit and file jacket show that the decision of the Industrial Commission was made by the same Commissioners who heard the oral argument and considered the evidence. The fact that the written document formalizing the decision was prepared after three of the Commissioners who rendered the decision left the office is not fatal to the decision. Neither is the fact that the written document was signed by three new Commissioners who had not heard oral argument." Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 142.
"The Act requires that after the hearing on review `the Commission shall file in its office its decision thereon, and shall immediately send to each party or his attorney a copy of such decision and a notification of the time when it was filed.' [Citation.] These requirements of the Act relate to the performance of ministerial functions which may be performed by the members of the Commission who may not have been members who made the decision. The making of the decision is an act of the Commission. The formalizing of the decision by preparing the written document, filing it in the Commission's office and sending copies thereof to the parties as required by the Act are likewise acts of the Commission independent of the act of making the decision.
The Commission being a continuing administrative body [citations], there is no reason why these acts must be performed by a Commission composed of the same members." Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 142-43.
"After such hearing upon review, the Commission shall file in its office its decision thereon, and shall immediately send to each party or his attorney a copy of such decision and a notification of the time when it was filed." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 48, par. 138.19(e).
"In the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission * * *. * * * A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1996).
Since the 1984 amendment, two appellate court cases have discussed the application of Zeigler to section 19(e) as amended. In Jarrett v. Industrial Comm'n, 156 Ill. App.3d 898 (1987), the court merely cited to Zeigler, stating that signing by a new commissioner is proper. In Hoegger v. Industrial Comm'n, 158 Ill. App.3d 1025 (1987), the court quoted the amended statute and found that allowing a new commissioner to sign is proper. Both cases apply the Zeigler reasoning to the new statute. The cases are not particularly helpful, however, because neither specifically addresses the impact, if any, of the amended language.
"In order to determine the validity of the action of the Industrial Commission it was necessary to resort to evidence other than that contained in the record on review. The necessary facts were supplied by the affidavit and the file jacket. In [ State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, 231 Wis. 147, 285 N.W. 504 (1939)] it was held that evidence dehors the record could be presented to the court to show illegal or unauthorized acts or conduct on the part of the Commission. In our case the evidence is offered to prove the reverse, that is, the legality or validity of the action or conduct of the Industrial Commission. When a question is raised in the circuit court as to whether the action or conduct of the Industrial Commission is invalid or unauthorized, then evidence other than that contained in the record on review may be considered by the circuit court to determine such issues." Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 141-42.
In the 27 years following our supreme court decision in Zeigler, the standard procedure employed by the Commission in cases where one or more commissioners left the Commission prior to a written decision being published was to have the replacement commissioner sign in the place of the departing commissioner. Although the post- Zeigler Commission decisions, including the instant one, clearly state how the departing commissioners had voted, no basis is given as to how that fact was known. This practice has continued, unaffected by the 1984 amendment to section 19(e). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the reasoning of Zeigler is applicable to the present version of section 19(e).
"This case was scheduled for Oral Argument before a three member panel of the Commission including members Commissioner Ketter, Acting Commissioner Hagan and Acting Commissioner Tansor at which time Oral Arguments were heard, waived or denied. Subsequent to Oral Arguments and prior to the departure of member Hagan on December 17, 196, a majority of the panel members had reached agreement as to the result set forth in this Decision and opinion, but no formal written decision was signed and issued while member Hagan still held her appointment.
Although I was not a member of the panel in question at the time Oral Arguments were heard, waived or denied, and I did not participate in the agreement reached by the majority in this case, the facts set forth above, in light of the provisions of the Supreme Court in Zeigler v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ill.2d 342 [ 51 Ill.2d 137] * * * (1972) authorize signature of a Decision by a member of the Commission who did not participate in this Decision. Accordingly, I am signing this Decision in order the it may issue."
In Zeigler, the supreme court concluded that the affidavit and file jacket demonstrate the validity of the Commission's conduct. They "show that the decision of the Industrial Commission was made by the same Commissioners who heard the oral argument and considered the evidence." (Emphasis added.) Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 142. This is clearly what amended section 19(e) now requires. If similar evidence is adduced on remand in the instant case, the Commission's decision is valid pursuant to Zeigler. Further, the Zeigler court reasoned that formalizing the decision into a written document was a ministerial function, which need not be undertaken by the same commissioners who reached the decision in the case. Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 142. Thus, making the decision is one function — the crucial function — and memorializing that decision into a written document is a second function — a ministerial function.
When oral argument is requested before the Commission, section 19(e) requires such argument to be heard by a three-member panel and that a decision should be approved by a majority of the commissioners present at such hearing. This is the approval section 19(e) refers to and requires. It does not state that the three commissioners who heard oral argument must sign the written order that memorializes the decision. "The formalizing of the decision by preparing the written document, filing it in the Commission's' office and sending copies thereof to the parties * * * are * * * acts of the Commission independent of the act of making the decision." Zeigler, 51 Ill.2d at 142.
We also take notice that when the legislature amended section 19(e) in 1984, it was aware of the Zeigler decision and the interpretation given by the supreme court. Thus, it was aware that under appropriate circumstances the supreme court permitted commissioners who had not heard oral argument to sign the written order. If the legislature had intended to change the procedure permitted in Zeigler, it would surely have used the terms " signed by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing" rather than "approved" by a majority. Indeed, use of the term approved clearly implies that the legislature intended that a Commission decision is valid in the absence of signatures of those who heard oral argument.
To be sure, the 1984 amendment to section 19(e) resulted in many changes. Paragraphs (a) and (b-1) were both substantially rewritten, including the deletion of provisions relating to "committee on arbitration" in paragraph (a). The amendment rewrote the paragraphs relevant to hearings to receive compensation. It provided for an expedited hearing before the arbitrator and separated provisions concerning hearings before the arbitrator from provisions concerning hearings before the Commission. Finally, the amendment changed the structure of the Commission and rewrote the section relating to interest. Nevertheless, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the rule and reasoning of Zeigler applies to the amended statute.
In the instant case, however, the record from the Commission does not contain any evidence of how Acting Commissioner Hagan voted before her term expired. This was also true in Zeigler. However, in Zeigler such evidence was introduced in the circuit court on review. In the instant case, the circuit court should have required the same, particularly in light of the language of section 19(e) as amended. Indeed, we suggest that the replacement commissioner give some basis for the statement of how the departed commissioner voted. Clearly there is some evidence or internal document to support Acting Commissioner Kane's statement as to how Acting Commissioner Hagan voted. Reference to such evidence would further public confidence in the Commission's procedure and eliminate the need for evidence dehors the record to be introduced in the circuit court on review.
When there is reliable evidence present, as in Zeigler, to show the decision of a departing commissioner, a replacement commissioner may sign the written order formalizing that decision. In the instant case, we do not have such evidence. The only evidence of Acting Commissioner Hagan's decision is Acting Commissioner Kane's hearsay statement in the specially concurring opinion. This is not sufficient reliable evidence pursuant to the dictates of Zeigler, which contained Commissioner Gaines' affidavit and the corroborative file jacket entries.
Because the circuit court did not require evidence of Acting Commissioner Hagan's vote, we remand to the circuit court for the limited purpose of receiving such additional evidence. We otherwise retain jurisdiction of the cause to address the merits of claimant's appeal. See 134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5) (allowing this court to make any order that the case may require). See also Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 31 Ill. App.3d 906, 909 (1975) ("A reviewing court has the power, without determining and disposing of a case to remand it to the lower court for further proceedings if the record is not in condition for the reviewing court to decide the question presented with justice to all the parties"). Should the circuit court conclude that the Commission's decision is valid, we will then address claimant's manifest weight of the evidence issue. Should the circuit court find the Commission's decision is invalid, it shall vacate said decision and remand to the Commission for a hearing de novo.
McCULLOUGH, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.
Section 19(e) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides in pertinent part: "[i]n the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission * * *. A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing." 820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1996). In this case, oral argument was requested and had before a panel of three Commissioners. At the time the Commission's decision was issued, however, the term of one of the Commissioners had expired. The two remaining Commissioners were unable to agree on a result and wrote separate decisions. A third Commissioner, who was not present at oral argument, pursuant to Zeigler v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ill.2d 137 (1972), signed one of the decisions. I believe the issuance of a decision under such circumstances does not comport with the unambiguous language of section 19(e), that is, the decision was not approved by a majority of the Commissioners present at the hearing. Secondly, I do not believe Zeigler is applicable in this instance as it interprets an earlier and quite different version of section 19(e). I therefore must dissent.
In Zeigler, claimant's cause was heard before five Commissioners, a majority of the Commission. Before any decision was issued, three of the five Commissioners' terms expired. After these three Commissioners were replaced, the Commission issued its decision. Claimant argued that the Commission's decision was invalid because it was not signed by the Commissioners who heard oral argument. In support of the validity of the Commission's decision, employer submitted an affidavit from one of the departing Commissioners, stating that prior to the departure, the Commission had reached a decision. That decision was then entered on the file jacket. The affidavit stated that it was customary for the Commissioners to reach a decision, write it on the file jacket, and then have the court reporter type the decision so a copy could be sent to the parties. The court rejected claimant's argument that the Commission's decision was invalid, finding that the decision was made by the same Commissioners who heard oral argument and considered the evidence. 51 Ill.2d at 142. According to the court, the formalizing of a decision by preparing the written document, filing it and sending copies thereof to the parties were independent of the act of making a decision. Such ministerial functions did not have to be undertaken by the same Commissioners who reached the decision in the case. 51 Ill.2d at 142-43.
The language of section 19(e), however, has been amended since the decision in Zeigler. At the time of Zeigler, no language required the Commission's decision to be approved by a majority of the Commissioners present at the hearing. Instead, the statute provided that a hearing was to be had before not less than a majority of the Commission. After such hearing, the Commission should file its decision in its office and forward copies to the parties. The statute was silent as to who was required to approve a decision. The current version of section 19(e) unambiguously requires that a Commission decision be approved by a majority of the Commissioners present at oral argument. While it is not apparent from a review of the legislative history why this amendment was made, the purpose is not necessary to our inquiry. "Changes in wording and phrasing are presumed to have been deliberately made [citation], and when the legislature amends an act * * *, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law in that respect." Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill. App.3d 436, 440 (1994).
In construing statutory provisions, we are to give effect to the intention of the legislature. In re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill.2d 237 (1998). Because the language used by the legislature is the best indication of legislative intent, we must first look to the words of the statute. 181 Ill.2d at 244. When the words themselves are unambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of the words will be given effect without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill.2d 80, 87 (1995). "[O]nly where the statutory language is unclear may a court look beyond it." Denton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 176 Ill.2d 144, 149 (1997).
"In the event either party requests oral argument, such argument shall be had before a panel of 3 members of the Commission * * *. A decision of the Commission shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing." 820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1996).
The language is unambiguous. It is axiomatic that the words "at such hearing" refer to oral argument had in the matter. Further, the language "decision * * * shall be approved by a majority of Commissioners present at such hearing" requires a majority of the three panel members present at oral argument to approve the final decision. The legislature could not have stated this any clearer.
"Three judges must participate in the decision of every case, and the concurrence of two shall be necessary to a decision." 145 Ill.2d R. 22(c).
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 22(c) to require that when one of the judges on a panel departs from the court, the remaining two judges must concur in order for the decision to be valid. Proctor v. Upjohn Co., 175 Ill.2d 394, 396 (1997). Given the similarity between Rule 22(c) and section 19(c), I find the supreme court's reasoning in Proctor instructive.
In this instance, the Commission's decision was issued more than one month subsequent to the expiration of Acting Commissioner Hagan's term. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of affidavits, file jacket entries, or any other indicia of Acting Commissioner Hagan's decision which would support a ruling under Zeigler. Acting Commissioner Kane, who signed in Hagan's stead, was not present at oral argument and, thus, could not approve the decision in accordance with section 19(e). The two Commissioners who remained could not agree on the outcome, consequently, the decision issued was invalid. Because a majority of the Commissioners who were present at the hearing did not approve the decision, I believe we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. I would therefore dismiss the appeal and remand the cause to the Commission to enter a valid decision.
COLWELL, J., joins in this dissent.

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For other uses, see Calculus (medicine), Enterolith, and Nodule (geology).
A concretion is a hard, compact mass of matter formed by the precipitation of mineral cement within the spaces between particles, and is found in sedimentary rock or soil. Concretions are often ovoid or spherical in shape, although irregular shapes also occur. The word 'concretion' is derived from the Latin con meaning 'together' and crescere meaning 'to grow'. Concretions form within layers of sedimentary strata that have already been deposited. They usually form early in the burial history of the sediment, before the rest of the sediment is hardened into rock. This concretionary cement often makes the concretion harder and more resistant to weathering than the host stratum.
There is an important distinction to draw between concretions and nodules. Concretions are formed from mineral precipitation around some kind of nucleus while a nodule is a replacement body.
Descriptions dating from the 18th century attest to the fact that concretions have long been regarded as geological curiosities. Because of the variety of unusual shapes, sizes and compositions, concretions have been interpreted to be dinosaur eggs, animal and plant fossils (called pseudofossils), extraterrestrial debris or human artifacts.
Detailed studies (i.e., Boles et al., 1985; Thyne and Boles, 1989; Scotchman, 1991; Mozley and Burns, 1993; McBride et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2005; Mozley and Davis, 2005) published in peer-reviewed journals have demonstrated that concretions form after sediments are buried but before the sediment is fully lithified during diagenesis. They typically form when a mineral precipitates and cements sediment around a nucleus, which is often organic, such as a leaf, tooth, piece of shell or fossil. For this reason, fossil collectors commonly break open concretions in their search for fossil animal and plant specimens. Some of the most unusual concretion nuclei, as documented by Al-Agha et al. (1995), are World War II military shells, bombs, and shrapnel, which are found inside siderite concretions found in an English coastal salt marsh.
Depending on the environmental conditions present at the time of their formation, concretions can be created by either concentric or pervasive growth (Mozley, 1996; Raiswell and Fisher, 2000). In concentric growth, the concretion grows as successive layers of mineral precipitate around a central core. This process results in roughly spherical concretions that grow with time. In the case of pervasive growth, cementation of the host sediments, by infilling of its pore space by precipitated minerals, occurs simultaneously throughout the volume of the area, which in time becomes a concretion. Concretions are often exposed at the surface by subsequent erosion that removes the weaker, uncemented material.
Samples of small rock concretions found at Hells Hollow State Park in Pennsylvania.
Concretions vary in shape, hardness and size, ranging from objects that require a magnifying lens to be clearly visible to huge bodies three meters in diameter and weighing several thousand pounds. The giant, red concretions occurring in Theodore Roosevelt National Park, in North Dakota, are almost 3 m (9.8 ft) in diameter. Spheroidal concretions, as large as 9 m (30 ft) in diameter, have been found eroding out of the Qasr El Sagha Formation within the Faiyum depression of Egypt. Concretions are usually similar in color to the rock in which they are found. Concretions occur in a wide variety of shapes, including spheres, disks, tubes, and grape-like or soap bubble-like aggregates.
They are commonly composed of a carbonate mineral such as calcite; an amorphous or microcrystalline form of silica such as chert, flint, or jasper; or an iron oxide or hydroxide such as goethite and hematite. They can also be composed of other minerals that include dolomite, ankerite, siderite, pyrite, marcasite, barite and gypsum.
Although concretions often consist of a single dominant mineral, other minerals can be present depending on the environmental conditions which created them. For example, carbonate concretions, which form in response to the reduction of sulfates by bacteria, often contain minor percentages of pyrite. Other concretions, which formed as a result of microbial sulfate reduction, consist of a mixture of calcite, barite, and pyrite.
Mosaic shows spherules, some partly embedded, spread over (smaller) soil grains on the Martian surface.
Concretions are found in a variety of rocks, but are particularly common in shales, siltstones, and sandstones. They often outwardly resemble fossils or rocks that look as if they do not belong to the stratum in which they were found. Occasionally, concretions contain a fossil, either as its nucleus or as a component that was incorporated during its growth but concretions are not fossils themselves. They appear in nodular patches, concentrated along bedding planes, protruding from weathered cliffsides, randomly distributed over mudhills or perched on soft pedestals.
Small hematite concretions, dubbed "blueberries" due to their resemblance to blueberries in a muffin, have been observed by the Opportunity rover in the Eagle Crater on Mars. See Martian spherules.
Concretions vary considerably in their compositions, shapes, sizes and modes of origin.
"Septaria" redirects here. For the genus of gastropod snail, see Septaria (gastropod).
Septarian concretions or septarian nodules, are concretions containing angular cavities or cracks, called "septaria". The word comes from the Latin word septum; "partition", and refers to the cracks/separations in this kind of rock. Some websites incorrectly derive the term from the Latin word septem, meaning "seven". Cracks are highly variable in shape and volume, as well as the degree of shrinkage they indicate. Although it has commonly been assumed that concretions grew incrementally from the inside outwards, the fact that radially oriented cracks taper towards the margins of septarian concretions is taken as evidence that in these cases the periphery was stiffer while the inside was softer, presumably due to a gradient in the amount of cement precipitated.
The process that created the septaria that characterize septarian concretions remains unclear. A number of mechanisms have been proposed, including the dehydration of clay-rich, gel-rich, or organic-rich cores; shrinkage of the concretion's center; expansion of gases produced by the decay of organic matter; or brittle fracturing or shrinkage of the concretion interior by either earthquakes or compaction (Pratt 2001; McBride et al. 2003). Septaria usually contain crystals, often calcite, that precipitated from circulating solutions. Siderite or pyrite coatings are also occasionally observed on the wall of the cavities present in the septaria, giving rise respectively to a panoply of bright reddish and golden colors.
A spectacular example of septarian concretions, which are as much as 3 meters (9.8 feet) in diameter, are the Moeraki Boulders. These concretions are found eroding out of Paleocene mudstone of the Moeraki Formation exposed along the coast near Moeraki, South Island, New Zealand. They are composed of calcite-cemented mud with septarian veins of calcite and rare late-stage quartz and ferrous dolomite (Boles et al. 1985, Thyne and Boles 1989). Very similar concretions, which are as much as 3 meters (9.8 feet) in diameter and called "Koutu Boulders", litter the beach between Koutu and Kauwhare points along the south shore of the Hokianga Harbour of Hokianga, North Island, New Zealand. The much smaller septarian concretions found in the Kimmeridge Clay exposed in cliffs along the Wessex Coast of England are more typical examples of septarian concretions (Scotchman 1991).
Cannonball concretions are large spherical concretions, which resemble cannonballs. These are found along the Cannonball River within Morton and Sioux Counties, North Dakota, and can reach 3 m (9.8 ft) in diameter. They were created by early cementation of sand and silt by calcite. Similar cannonball concretions, which are as much as 4 to 6 m (13 to 20 ft) in diameter, are found associated with sandstone outcrops of the Frontier Formation in northeast Utah and central Wyoming. They formed by the early cementation of sand by calcite (McBride et al. 2003). Somewhat weathered and eroded giant cannonball concretions, as large as 6 meters (20 feet) in diameter, occur in abundance at "Rock City" in Ottawa County, Kansas. Large and spherical boulders are also found along Koekohe beach near Moeraki on the east coast of the South Island of New Zealand. The Moeraki Boulders and Koutu Boulders of New Zealand are examples of septarian concretions, which are also cannonball concretions. Large spherical rocks, which are found on the shore of Lake Huron near Kettle Point, Ontario, and locally known as "kettles", are typical cannonball concretions. Cannonball concretions have also been reported from Van Mijenfjorden, Spitsbergen; near Haines Junction, Yukon Territory, Canada; Jameson Land, East Greenland; near Mecevici, Ozimici, and Zavidovici in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Alaska in the Kenai Peninsula Captain Cook State Park on north of Cook Inlet beach and on Kodiak Island northeast of Fossil Beach; Reports of cannonball concretions have also come from Bandeng and Zhanlong hills near Gongxi Town, Hunan Province, China.
A model of Dinocochlea with Natural History Museum research scientist Paul Taylor as a scale.
Hiatus concretions at the base of the Menuha Formation (Upper Cretaceous), the Negev, southern Israel.
Hiatus concretion encrusted by bryozoans (thin, branching forms) and an edrioasteroid; Kope Formation (Upper Ordovician), northern Kentucky.
Hiatus concretions are distinguished by their stratigraphic history of exhumation, exposure and reburial. They are found where submarine erosion has concentrated early diagenetic concretions as lag surfaces by washing away surrounding fine-grained sediments (Zaton 2010). Their significance for stratigraphy, sedimentology and paleontology was first noted by Voigt (1968) who referred to them as Hiatus-Konkretionen. "Hiatus" refers to the break in sedimentation that allowed this erosion and exposure. They are found throughout the fossil record but are most common during periods in which calcite sea conditions prevailed, such as the Ordovician, Jurassic and Cretaceous (Zaton 2010). Most are formed from the cemented infillings of burrow systems in siliciclastic or carbonate sediments.
A distinctive feature of hiatus concretions separating them from other types is that they were often encrusted by marine organisms including bryozoans, echinoderms and tube worms in the Paleozoic (e.g., Wilson 1985) and bryozoans, oysters and tube worms in the Mesozoic and Cenozoic (e.g., Taylor and Wilson 2001). Hiatus concretions are also often significantly bored by worms and bivalves (Taylor and Wilson 2001).
Elongate concretions form parallel to sedimentary strata and have been studied extensively due to the inferred influence of phreatic (saturated) zone groundwater flow direction on the orientation of the axis of elongation (e.g., Johnson, 1989; McBride et al., 1994; Mozley and Goodwin, 1995; Mozley and Davis, 2005). In addition to providing information about the orientation of past fluid flow in the host rock, elongate concretions can provide insight into local permeability trends (i.e., permeability correlation structure; Mozley and Davis, 1996), variation in groundwater velocity (Davis, 1999), and the types of geological features that influence flow.
Elongate concretions are well known in the Kimmeridge Clay formation of northwest Europe. In outcrops, where they have acquired the name "doggers", they are typically only a few metres across, but in the subsurface they can be seen to penetrate up to tens of metres of along-hole dimension. Unlike limestone beds, however, it is impossible to consistently correlate them between even closely spaced wells.
Moqui Marbles, hematite, goethite concretions, from the Navajo Sandstone of southeast Utah. The cube at the top is one cubic centimeter in size.
Moqui Marbles, also called Moqui balls or "Moki marbles", are iron oxide concretions which can be found eroding in great abundance out of outcrops of the Navajo Sandstone within south-central and southeastern Utah. These concretions range in shape from spheres to discs, buttons, spiked balls, cylindrical forms, and other odd shapes. They range from pea-size to baseball-size. They were created by the precipitation of iron, which was dissolved in groundwater. They are further described by (Chan and Parry 2002, Chan et al. 2005, Loope et al. 2010, 2011).
Kansas pop rocks are concretions of either iron sulfide, i.e. pyrite and marcasite, or in some cases jarosite, which are found in outcrops of the Smoky Hill Chalk Member of the Niobrara Formation within Gove County, Kansas. They are typically associated with thin layers of altered volcanic ash, called bentonite, that occur within the chalk comprising the Smoky Hill Chalk Member. A few of these concretions enclose, at least in part, large flattened valves of inoceramid bivalves. These concretions range in size from a few millimeters to as much as 0.7 m (2.3 ft) in length and 12 cm (0.39 ft) in thickness. Most of these concretions are oblate spheroids. Other "pop rocks" are small polycuboidal pyrite concretions, which are as much as 7 cm (0.23 ft) in diameter (Hattin 1982). These concretions are called "pop rocks" because they explode if thrown in a fire. Also, when they are either cut or hammered, they produce sparks and a burning sulfur smell. Contrary to what has been published on the Internet, none of the iron sulfide concretions, which are found in the Smoky Hill Chalk Member were created by either the replacement of fossils or by metamorphic processes. In fact, metamorphic rocks are completely absent from the Smoky Hill Chalk Member (Hattin 1982). Instead, all of these iron sulfide concretions were created by the precipitation of iron sulfides within anoxic marine calcareous ooze after it had accumulated and before it had lithified into chalk.
Iron sulfide concretions, such as the Kansas Pop rocks, consisting of either pyrite and marcasite, are nonmagnetic (Hobbs and Hafner 1999). On the other hand, iron sulfide concretions, which either are composed of or contain either pyrrhotite or smythite, will be magnetic to varying degrees (Hoffmann, 1993). Prolonged heating of either a pyrite or marcasite concretion will convert portions of either mineral into pyrrhotite causing the concretion to become slightly magnetic.
These so-called fairy stones consist of single or multiple discs, usually 6–10 cm in diameter and often with concentric grooves on their surfaces. They form in Quaternary clay as calcium carbonate migrates to some small fossil or pebble. Fairy stones are particularly common in the Harricana River valley in the Abitibi-Témiscamingue administrative region of Quebec, and in Östergötland county, Sweden.
Cannonball concretion in Jameson Land, East Greenland.
Concretion in the Cretaceous of western South Dakota.
Encrusted hiatus concretion from the Kope Formation (Upper Ordovician) of Covington, Kentucky. Encrusters include bryozoans and crinoids.
'Kettle' concretion at Kettle Point, Ontario, defaced by graffiti.
Clay dog – Naturally occurring clay formations that are sculpted by river currents and dried by the sun.
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ZUCCOLI, GIULIANA S.; SAIA-CEREDA, VERONICA M.; NASCIMENTO, JULIANA M.; MARTINS-DE-SOUZA, DANIEL. The Energy Metabolism Dysfunction in Psychiatric Disorders Postmortem Brains: Focus on Proteomic Evidence. FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE, v. 11, SEP 7 2017. Citações Web of Science: 6.
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Quiver varieties and finite dimensional representations of quantum affine algebras. Отт.: 88 p.

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1. The Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. Section 1983 permits "citizen[s]" and "other person[s] within the jurisdiction" of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from "person[s]" who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the Court assumes that tribes, like States, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Michigan Dept. of State v. Will, 491 U. S. 58. The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant--a "person within the jurisdiction" of the United States--under §1983. Qualification of a sovereign as a "person" who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not "upon a bare analysis of the word 'person,' " Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317, but on the "legislative environment" in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161. There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribe's asserted "sovereign" status that it claims immunity from the County's processes. Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will, 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. For example, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a "person" qualified to sue under §1983. But, like other persons, that member would have no immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause. The Tribe, accordingly, may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. Pp. 6-10.
2. The Tribe has not explained, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided, what prescription of federal common law, if any, enables the Tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. This case is therefore remanded for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question. P. 10.
291 F. 3d 549, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al., PETITIONERS v.
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY et al.
This case stems from a California county's investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law-enforcement officers executed a state court warrant for casino employment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The Tribe sued the County, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity from state court processes and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae, the United States agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the United States, is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that, in the situation here presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a "person" who may sue under §1983. Whether the Tribe's suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than §1983 is an issue the parties have not precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold question.
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino, a tribal gaming operation run under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102 Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. §2701 et seq.
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and Human Services received information from the State Department of Social Services indicating that three Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Petitioners 4-5. According to the County, the employees failed to respond when the Department requested that they reconcile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earnings and their welfare application forms. Id., at 5. The Department then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County District Attorney's Office, which, in turn, asked the employees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id., at 6. That request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing probable cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees. On March 23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and seizure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe.1 The Sheriff and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the Casino's personnel records. The county officials seized timecard entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered information contained in quarterly wage and withholding reports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each item seized contained at least one reference to an employee under investigation.
ing beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and "without authorization of law" in executing the warrant,3 the defendants violated the Tribe's and Corporation's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and the Tribe's right to self-government. App. 109, ¶ ;38; see id., at 108-110, ¶ ;¶ ;33-39.
On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants' motion, dismissed the Tribe's complaint. Tribal sovereign immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the Casino's personnel records. Taking into account the competing interests of the State and the Tribe, the court concluded that, "[i]n the interest of a fair and uniform application of California's criminal law, state officials should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe and tribal property." App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id., at 57a-58a.
the District Court's judgment dismissing the action. "[E]xecution of a search warrant against the Tribe," the Court of Appeals said, "interferes with 'the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' " 291 F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959)). In the appellate court's view, the District Court should not have "balanced the interests at stake" to determine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at 559. This Court's precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, advanced "a more categorical approach denying state jurisdiction ... over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear grant of authority by Congress." Ibid. (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995)).
"[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal framework," the Court of Appeals added, "the balance of interests favors a ruling for the Tribe." 291 F. 3d, at 559. The Tribe's privacy policies regarding employee records "promote tribal [self-government] interests," the Ninth Circuit reasoned; notably, those policies fostered "a trusting relationship with tribal members," and "affect[ed] the Casino, the Tribe's predominant source of economic development revenue." Ibid. The appeals court recognized the State's countervailing "interest in investigating potential welfare fraud," but thought it incumbent upon the State to further that interest "through far less intrusive means." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity. "[A] reasonable county officer," it held, "would have known ... that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were outside the officer's jurisdiction." Id., at 568. The appeals court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by §1983. Id., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded, a §1983 claim could be maintained because the Tribe sought "protection from an unlawful search and seizure," a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and therefore within §1983's compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7. On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002).
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribe's complaint is actionable under §1983. That provision permits "citizen[s]" and "other person[s] within the jurisdiction" of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from "person[s]" who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights.4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), this Court held that a State is not a "person" amenable to suit under §1983. "[I]n enacting §1983," the Court said, "Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law," including "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of the Union, are not subject to suit under §1983. See Brief for Petitioners 35-38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754 (1998) ("an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity").
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a claimant--a "person within the jurisdiction" of the United States--under §1983.5 The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Court's "longstanding interpretive presumption that 'person' does not include the sovereign," a presumption that "may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780-781 (2000)); see Will, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute" is "surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence"); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, "persons" capable of being sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended §1983 "to provide a powerful civil remedy 'against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.'" Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700-701 (1978)). To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, §1983 should be "broadly construed." Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell, 526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the Court should read §1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.
163. Similarly, in Pfizer, the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a "person" qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws. Pfizer, 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) ("Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
In addition to §1983, the Tribe asserted as law under which its claims arise the "federal common law of Indian affairs." Supra, at 4 (quoting App. 97, ¶ ;1). But the Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered, what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. In short, absent §1983 as a foundation for the Tribe's action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the Tribe's case "aris[es] under." 28 U. S. C. §1331. We therefore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that jurisdictional question.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
facturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 756 (1998). Because many applications of that doctrine are both anomalous and unjust, see id., at 760, 764-766 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I would not accord it the same status as the "laws" referenced in §1983.
In this case, however, the Tribe's allegations do not state a cause of action under §1983. The execution of the warrant challenged in this case would unquestionably have been lawful if the casino had been the property of an ordinary commercial corporation. See ante, at 9 ("There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective"). Thus, the Tribe rests its case entirely on its claim that, as a sovereign, it should be accorded a special immunity that private casinos do not enjoy. See ibid. That sort of claim to special privileges, which is based entirely on the Tribe's sovereign status, is not one for which the §1983 remedy was enacted.
Accordingly, while I agree with the Court that the judgment should be set aside, I do not join the Court's opinion.
The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that the Corporation is an "arm" of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11-14.
At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employees' welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. But the United States assured the Court that "[t]here is no Federal regulation or other Federal requirement" that would have prevented the County from sharing the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire controversy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the Tribe.
The Tribe did not dispute the State's authority over the crimes under investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.
The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. §1983 reads: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150, 1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue under §1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) ("[I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua sovereign would qualify as a 'citizen of the United States or other person' eligible to bring an action under §1983." (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dissenting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in dictum that "a state is not a 'person' under [§1983]"); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314-318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State may bring a §1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).
It hardly "demean[s] . . . Native American Tribes," see post, at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with States of the Union in this regard.
The Dictionary Act, which was passed just two months before §1983 and was designed to supply rules of construction for all legislation, provided that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . ." Act of Feb. 25, 1871, §2, 16 Stat. 431.
Our holding in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989), that a State is not a "person" within §1983 is fully consistent with this view. Will rested on "the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984)." Ibid.


if a private person would be liable under Texas law).
or death of a person to the “maximum amount of $250,000.” Tex. Civ. Prac.
Justice Medina, joined by Justice O’Neill, dissenting.
exposure and damage in utero.
of evidence, and expert testimony is no exception. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R.
appeal, I would hold that the complaint has been waived.
opinion. The Supreme Court said as much in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence . . .
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
between the underlying data and the expert’s opinion. 972 S.W.2d 713, 727 (Tex.
this regard were to be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 727.
A trial court, however, cannot abuse its discretion if it is never asked to exercise it.
(Tex. 2004) (motion to strike made immediately after cross-examination held timely).
latter does not. What then separates the conclusory from the merely unreliable?
such foundational data at trial unless the opposing party or the court insists.
on its face, or assumed facts contrary to those on the face of the record.
because naked conclusions ordinarily draw immediate objections.
probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others?
A: Yes, it did, very high.
in failing to stop using probes that can have [sensor failure] problems?
A: Yes, again and again.
to the rights, safety, or welfare of others?
A: That’s the only conclusion I can draw.
s gross negligence. That is not the present case.
ppb (parts per billion) benzene.
analytical gap, the City argues, renders Kraft’s opinion conclusory.
s gestation than in 1998 when the benzene reading from the monitoring well was taken.
Q. Okay. What kind of records did you look at in reaching your opinions?
collected by City employees, reports that were produced by the City’s consultants.
exposed to benzene concentrations in their home?
A. Yes, I do have an opinion on that.
A. It’s my opinion that they were chronically exposed to landfill gas.
Q. And did the landfill gas include benzene?
please express it in terms of a numerical value.
vicinity of 160 parts per billion, or even higher.
Q. Why are you now saying it might be higher than 160 parts per billion?
Q. And what are those reasons?
Q. What other reasons, Mr. Kraft?
while they were sampling it.
might have been explained had the City made an appropriate objection.
attention, and Dr. Patel testified without objection.
as Dr. Patel had made these same points in his expert report.
object to preserve its complaint. See Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.
appeal? See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 552; see also Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 411.
find any basis for the Pollocks’ personal injury claim under this constitutional provision.
constitution does not authorize the state to kill or cause bodily injury when doing so.
Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 63 (1977).
intended to damage the Pollocks’ property.
both conclusions, I turn now to the arguments on this issue.
as a premises liability case rather than as a case of general negligence and nuisance.
injury on account of dangerous conditions or activities on the property.” 19 William V.
licensee, or trespasser. Western Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).
liability remains important in Texas. See Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.
basing a landowner's liability on his visitor’s artificially determined purpose of entry”).
operations at the West Avenue Landfill.
may lead to liability for injuries suffered on adjoining property.
injury within the contemplation of the Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
33 St. Mary’s L.J. 277, 310 (2002).
the testimony and erred in not sustaining Volkswagen’s objection.
Technology Center for estimating landfill gas emissions.
aberrations noted and those detected in benzene-exposed workers are remarkably similar.
developing fetus following maternal exposure.
limited to AML but also to ALL.
is based on an authority the City has expressly conceded does not apply.
highway, causing a collision); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Brandon, 183 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Civ.
Torts & Remedies § 20.08, Liability for Losses Outside Property (2009).


§ 92-10 Storage of junked vehicles permit fee.
§ 92-11 Lot consolidation/subdivision/land development.
§ 92-15 Parking space rental.
§ 92-17 Parking fines (per violation).
§ 92-18 Equipment installation, additions, alterations and renovations.
§ 92-19 Miscellaneous permit fees.
§ 92-20 Bureau Veritas North America, Inc.
§ 92-21 Waste management and recycling fee schedule.
Editor’s Note: This ordinance also repealed former Ch. 92, Fees, adopted 12-12-2016 by Ord. No. 1379.
The 2018 rates for various taxes, fines, fees, permits, licenses and/or other charges imposed by the Borough officials and employees shall be as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
Editor's Note: See § 92-4 et seq. hereof.
All ordinances or resolutions or parts thereof inconsistent with the terms of this chapter are hereby repealed effective as of January 1, 2018, coincident with the imposition of the 2018 taxes, fines, fees, etc.
This chapter shall become effective January 1, 2018.
Real estate tax, late payment penalty: 10%.
Local services tax (LST): $52.
Amusement device (including video games): $55 per year.
Building permits: $20 per $1,000.
Every $1,000 after initial $1,000: $5 each.
Annual building permit, commercial only: $75.
Demolition permit, residential and commercial: 2% of job cost plus $4.
Demolition permit, garages and sheds (under 1,000 square feet): $25.
Tax certification/duplicate receipt and bill fee (requests to be made three days in advance): $5.
Fire insurance certification fee: $20.
Fire insurance administrative fee: $100.
Tattoo parlor Borough license/renewal: $500/$250.
Transfer of liquor license: $750.
Zoning hearing application fee: $300.
Appeals to Blair Region Uniform Construction Board: $500.
Property maintenance appeals to Borough Council: $250.
Mobile home park, initial license: $500.
Mobile home park, annual renewal: $300.
Mobile home (tax) removal permit: $20.
Every six months thereafter: $150.
Lot consolidation plan (no build): $125.
Residential subdivision or land development (w/o new road): $250 (plus Borough review and inspection costs).
$50 per lot for each lot over five, maximum fee $1,800.
Residential subdivision or land development (with new road): $250 (plus Borough review and inspection costs).
$50 per lot for each lot over five, maximum fee $2,500.
No build commercial, industrial or institutional subdivision: $250 (plus Borough review and inspection costs).
Commercial, industrial, institutional development up to 50,000 square feet of building construction: $750 (plus Borough review and inspection costs).
Commercial, industrial, institutional development over 50,000 square feet of building construction with an additional $75 for each 5,000 square feet of building construction over 50,000, maximum fee of $4,000: $1,000 (plus Borough review and inspection costs).
Blair County Planning Review: fee based on plans and set by BCPC. Blair County's rate changes take effect September 1 of each year.
Xerox copies: $0.25 per page.
Real estate tax credit card payments: 2.5% of payment amount per transaction (effective January 1, 2019).
Utility billing credit card payments: $3.50 per transaction (effective upon Caselle software capability going live).
Electric (all tables): $10 per day.
Reservation (Table No. 1): $75 per day.
Reservation (Table No. 2): $60 per day.
Reservation (Table Nos. 3 through 12): $50 per day.
Amphitheater rental: $70 per day.
Recreational rental (organized athletic event): $15 per hour.
Electric for other Borough facilities: $10 per day.
Family resident: $75 per year.
Adult resident (18 and over): $55 per year.
Senior (62 and over)/disabled resident: $45 per year.
Child resident (6 to 17): $45 per year.
Family nonresident: $100 per year.
Adult nonresident (18 and over): $80 per year.
Senior (62 and over)/disabled nonresident: $70 per year.
Child nonresident (6 to 17): $70 per year.
Daily admission, adults (18 and over): $5 per day.
Daily admission, child (6 to 17): $5 per day.
Child five and under: free with paid adult.
Pool parties ($50 nonrefundable deposit): $150.
Lifeguard fee for Tyrone Area School District Summer Activities: $600/season.
10% discount on all pool passes purchased from May 1 through 31.
10% discount for all gift certificates for pool passes purchased from December 1 through 31.
Pool passes for nonprofit organizations (group rate): $1 per pass.
Parking meter bags: $5 per day.
Parking spaces municipal lots: $20 per month.
Police accident and incident reports: $15.
Private handicapped parking space, installation fee: $75.
Annual renewal fee for private handicapped parking space: $25.
Relocation of handicapped parking sign: $30.
Annual towing license fee: $100.
Backing into meter stall: $5.
More than six inches from curb: $15.
Less than 25 feet from intersection: $15.
Parked overtime, two-hour zone: $15.
Blocking driveway or garage: $15.
Repairs of vehicle on roadway: $15.
Includes decks, porches, signs, repairs and projects including plumbing, electrical, mechanical and fire protection.
Seventy dollars for the first $1,000, of work; $10 per $1,000 of work thereafter.
Minimum charge for commercial alterations: $250.
Example: $5,000 residential renovation: $60 + $40 = $100.
Seventy dollars for the first $1,000 of work; $8 per $1,000 of work thereafter.
Minimum charge for residential addition: $250.
Cost of construction shall be determined by the owner and confirmed by the yearly February Building Valuation Data Chart published by the International Code Council. Permit fees will be calculated using the greater of the two calculations.
NOTE: Both the municipality, C.O.G. or Municipal Partnership and Bureau Veritas Services, Inc. must agree upon any fees for reinspections when both parties agree the number or reinspections are not within reason.
NOTE: At the discretion of the Building Code Official, Bureau Veritas Services reserves the right to charge below the minimum $60 fee.
Hourly charges include reviews, inspections and administrative time accrued.
Change of occupancy: $70 per man hour.
Commercial: $75 per man hour (i.e. accessibility).
Residential: $70 per man hour.
Daycare inspections: $50 per man hour, $100 minimum.
Commercial roofing inspections: $70 for first 1,000, plus $4 for each thereafter.
Residential swimming pools: $70 for first 1,000, plus $4 for each thereafter.
Fences and demolitions: $70 for first 1,000, plus $5 for each thereafter.
Plan review (permit not issued): fee to 30% of fee total.
Refunds for permits must be requested in writing and will be granted minus 30% for the plan review and administrative time accrued.
Constructing or altering a structure.
Installing or altering equipment regulated by the Code.
If a building project is all new construction, then the permit fee is determined by the construction value based on the type of construction (see table). The permit fee includes plan review and inspection costs for building, electrical, plumbing, fire, energy and mechanical disciplines. Fee breakdown is as follows: building/fire, 50%; plumbing, 15%; mechanical, 15%; and electrical, 20%. The permit fee also includes within reason all reinspections. For equipment installation, see princing on the next page.
Total square footage x type of construction from table below = permit fee (cents per square foot).
Unfinished basements (all use groups): no charge.
Finished basements (all use groups): $0.30 per square foot.
For H-1 through H-4, use H values.
Modular and mobile homes (for use Group 5B construction) calculated permit fee x 0.65 = actual fee.
Fees for additions include inspection of fixtures only; no service charge fees are included.
Residential garages = $0.22 per square foot.
Fees for new residential home construction include attached garages, decks and porches.
Fees adjusted to nearest dollar.
Fees do not include state training fee.
All new stick built homes will be calculated at $0.40 per square foot.
Minimum charge for new home residential construction: $460.
Minimum charge for modular single-or double-wide: $280. (Single-wide replacement on existing foundation: two visits only, $160).
Minimum charge for modular single or double with full basement: $350.
Bureau Veritas reserves the right to charge below these minimum charges if deemed appropriate.
Refundable Dumpster/roll-off permit fee: $100.