August 29, 1985. Rehearing Denied October 18, 1985.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, William E. Gladstone and Joseph Durant, JJ.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Marti Rothenberg, Richard E. Doran and G. Bart Billbrough, Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for petitioner.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for respondents.
We have for review State v. C.C., 449 So.2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The district court consolidated four appeals brought by the state from adverse judgments or orders of juvenile courts and, on motions of the several juveniles, dismissed the state's appeals. The order of dismissal acknowledged conflict with State v. W.A.M., 412 So.2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 419 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1982). Moreover, on petition for rehearing en banc, the district court, sitting en banc, reconsidered the case, adhered to the panel decision, and certified that its decision passed upon a question of great public importance. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), (4), Florida Constitution, and we approve State v. C.C.
(1) Respondent C.C. was charged with juvenile delinquency in two counts based on the alleged commission of burglary while armed and grand larceny. On motion of the juvenile, the court suppressed certain of his statements to police. Then, upon the representation of the state that it could not proceed to an adjudicatory hearing without the statements as evidence, the court dismissed the delinquency charges.
(2) Respondent E.V. was charged with delinquency by virtue of having committed the offense of battery. During an initial adjudicatory hearing the juvenile judge declared a mistrial and recused himself. At the beginning of a second adjudicatory hearing before another judge, the juvenile moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that to proceed to trial would constitute double jeopardy. The court granted the motion to dismiss.
(3) Respondent C.A.Q. was charged with delinquency by unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The accused juvenile moved to suppress the physical evidence on the ground that it was obtained by means of an illegal search. The juvenile court granted the motion.
(4) Respondents A.M.E. and S.E. were charged with delinquency in that they allegedly obstructed a law enforcement officer in the performance of his legal duty in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1981). The juveniles moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition for delinquency failed to allege all essential elements of the offense. At the hearing on the motion defense counsel argued that it was necessary to allege that the officer was trying to arrest the accused at the time of the alleged resistance. Counsel for the state correctly pointed out that there is no such requirement in section 843.02. The court then asked counsel for the state to proffer the facts which the state's evidence would show. On the ground that the facts proffered, even if shown by evidence, would not constitute a violation of section 843.02, the court dismissed the petition for delinquency.
The state's right to appeal is purely statutory. Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947); State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Because the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1981) contains no provision authorizing an appeal by the state, we grant appellees' motions to dismiss. We expressly disagree with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. W.A.M., 412 So.2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 419 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1982) insofar as it finds a constitutional right of appeal in the state. Furthermore, in our view, Article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Constitution of the State of Florida [footnote omitted] permits interlocutory review only in cases in which appeal may be taken as a matter of right.
449 So.2d at 280. The en banc court on rehearing adhered to this decision but certified the question of "[w]hether the state has the authority to file plenary or interlocutory appeals in juvenile cases."
The state argues first that article V, section 4(b)(1) confers upon it the right to appeal any adverse final order of a circuit court, including orders and judgments in juvenile cases. We have given searching consideration to this argument and, for the reasons expressed in the companion case of State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985), have found it lacking in legal merit.
(8) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case. Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee.
(1) The state may appeal from a pretrial order dismissing a search warrant, suppressing evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppressing a confession or admission made by a defendant. The appeal must be taken before the trial.
(2) An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is determined. If the trial court determines that the evidence, confession, or admission that is the subject of the order would materially assist the state in proving its case against another defendant and that the prosecuting attorney intends to use it for that purpose, the court shall stay the case of that defendant until the appeal is determined. A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or by order of the court shall be released on his own recognizance pending the appeal if he is charged with a bailable offense.
These sections apply to criminal cases and not juvenile cases. While juvenile delinquency matters are criminal in nature, they are separate proceedings and are controlled by chapter 39, Florida Statutes. The purposes of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act are set out in subsection 39.001(2) and include, among other things, a substitution for retributive punishment methods of offender rehabilitation. The procedures call for expeditious handling of charges and claims. While counsel is afforded juveniles, a right of trial by jury is not. Section 39.14 gives "any child, and any parent or legal custodian of any child, affected by an order of the court" a right of an appeal. Because chapter 924 gives a defendant a right of appeal, section 39.14 would not be necessary to give a juvenile defendant a right of appeal if chapter 924 applied to juvenile proceedings. The legislature has exhibited no intent to have chapter 924 apply to juvenile proceedings.
We further agree with the district court that article V, section 4(b)(1) of the state constitution permits interlocutory review only in cases in which an appeal may be taken as a matter of right.
We approve the decision of the district court of appeal.
ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
BOYD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion with which ALDERMAN, J., concurs.
I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that holds that the state does not have a constitutional right of appeal. State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985).
I dissent to the remainder of the opinion and would hold that the state's right of appeal in criminal cases, provided by sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to parallel situations arising in juvenile delinquency cases. Juvenile delinquency cases are analogous to criminal cases and I find that the legislature intended for sections 924.07 and 924.071 to apply when the state seeks to appeal a trial court ruling in a juvenile delinquency case.
(8) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case.
Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee.
(2) An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is determined. If the trial court determines that the evidence, confession, or admission that is the subject of the order would materially assist the state in proving its case against another defendant and that the prosecuting attorney intends to use it for the purpose, the court shall stay the case of that defendant until the appeal is determined. A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or by order of the court shall be released on his own recognizance pending the appeal if he is charged with a bailable offense.
In the case of respondent C.C., the order the state sought to appeal was an order excluding from evidence the confession or incriminating statements of the accused. In criminal cases, the state is given the right to appeal such an order by section 924.071(1). To the extent that such an order is nonfinal or interlocutory thus requiring authorization by court rule in order to be appealable before final judgment, such authority is provided by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B). Where an order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is directly analogous and comparable to an order of which appellate review is authorized by sections 924.07 or 924.071 in criminal cases, I believe the legislative intent is to authorize appellate review of the order. I would therefore hold that the state has a right, conferred by statute, to appellate review of the suppression order.
Here the delinquency petition was dismissed when the state said it could not proceed, thus arguably lending the disposition greater finality. See § 924.07(1); Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(A).
See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; R.J.B. v. State, 408 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1982); State v. Smith, 260 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1972). In R.J.B. this Court decided that, although a statute provided a right of appeal, it did not direct that such appeal be allowed before final judgment and that, in any event, interlocutory review must be authorized by rule of this Court, so that review before final judgment there was not available.
In the case of respondent E.V., the state seeks to appeal the order dismissing the delinquency petition on double jeopardy grounds. The record does not reveal specifically the reasoning supporting the dismissal. It is my view that this order of dismissal of a delinquency petition comes within the scope of section 924.07(1), the statutory provision authorizing appeal by the state from any "order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof." See Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(A). I would therefore hold that the state is entitled to appeal the order.
In the case of respondent C.A.Q., the order in question was a suppression of physical evidence on grounds of illegal search and seizure. In criminal cases, the state may appeal such a suppression order before proceeding to trial. § 924.071(1); Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, I would hold that appeal of such an order is available in this juvenile case.
In the case of respondents A.M.E. and S.E., the order sought to be appealed is an order dismissing the petition for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. The order is analogous to an order dismissing an indictment or information in a criminal case. I therefore find that an appeal is provided for by section 924.07(1) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A).
I agree with the Court's rejection of the state's other arguments but would hold that there is a statutorily conferred right of appeal applicable to these cases.
I would answer the certified question by stating that the state is entitled to appellate review of adverse final judgments and orders in juvenile delinquency cases to the same extent that sections 924.07 and 924.071 provide a right to such review of parallel orders and judgments in criminal cases. Where such a right of appeal is thus conferred by statute with reference to a particular kind of judgment or order, the question of whether the review may be had before final judgment must be resolved by determining whether such interlocutory appeal is authorized by rule of this Court. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; R.J.B. v. State, 408 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1982).


§ 78. Treaties relative to war.
We have sufficiently spoken of treaties in general, and shall here touch on this subject only in its particular relations to war. Treaties relating to war are of several kinds, and vary in their objects and clauses, according to the will of those who make them. Besides applying to them all that we have said of treaties in general (Book II. Ch. XII. etc.), they may also be divided into treaties real and personal, equal and unequal, etc. But they have also their specific differences, viz. those which relate to their particular object, war.
§ 79. Defensive and offensive alliances.
Under this relation, alliances made for warlike purposes are divided in general into defensive and offensive alliances. In the former, the nation engages only to defend her ally in case he be attacked: in the latter, she unites with him for the purpose of making an attack,  of jointly waging war against another nation. Some alliances are both offensive and defensive; and there seldom is an offensive alliance which is not also a defensive one. But it is very usual for alliances to be purely defensive: and these are in general the most natural and lawful. It would be a tedious and even a useless task to enumerate in detail all the varieties incident to such alliances. Some are made, without restriction, against all opponents: in others, certain states are excepted: others again are formed against such or such a nation expressly mentioned by name.
§ 80. Difference between warlike associations and auxiliary treaties.
But a difference of great importance to be observed, especially in defensive alliances, is that between an intimate and complete alliance, in which we agree to a union of interests,  and another, in which we only promise a stated succor. The alliance in which we agree to a union of interests is a warlike association: each of the parties acts with his whole force; all the allies become principals in the war, they have the same friends and the same enemies. But an alliance of this nature is more particularly termed a warlike association, when it is offensive.
When a sovereign, without directly taking part in the war made by another sovereign, only sends him succors of troops or ships, these are called auxiliaries.
The auxiliary troops serve the prince to whom they are sent, according to their sovereign’s orders. If they are purely and simply sent without restriction, they are to serve equally on the offensive and the defensive; and for the particulars of their operations, they are to obey the directions of the prince to whose assistance they come. Yet this prince has not the free and entire disposal of them, as of his own subjects: they are granted to him only for his own wars; and he has no right to transfer them, as auxiliaries, to a third power.
Sometimes, this succor from a potentate who does not directly take part in the war, consists in money; and then it is called a subsidy. This term is now often taken in another sense, and signifies a sum of money annually paid by one sovereign to another, in return for a body of troops which the latter furnishes to the other to carry on his wars, or keeps in readiness for his service. The treaties for procuring such a resource are called subsidiary treaties. France and England have at present such treaties existing with several of the northern powers and princes in Germany, and continue them even in times of peace.
§ 83. When a nation is allowed to assist another.
In order, now, to judge of the morality of these several treaties or alliances,  of their legitimacy according to the law of nations, we must, in the first place, lay down this incontrovertible principle, that It is lawful and commendable to succor and assist, by all possible means, a nation engaged in a just war; and it is even a duty incumbent on every nation, to give such assistance, when she can give it without injury to herself. But no assistance whatever is to be afforded to him who is engaged in an unjust war. There is nothing in this which is not demonstrated by what we have said of the common duties of nations towards each other. (Book II. Ch. I.) To support the cause of justice when we are able, is always commendable: but, in assisting the unjust, we partake of his crime, and become, like him, guilty of injustice.
§ 84. and to make alliances for war.
If, to the principle we have now laid down, you add the consideration of what a nation owes to her own safety, and of the care which it is so natural and so fit that she should take to put herself in a condition to resist her enemies, you will the more readily perceive how clear a right a nation has to make warlike alliances, and especially defensive alliances, whose sole tendency is to maintain all parties in the quiet and secure possession of their property.
But great circumspection is to be used in forming such alliances. Engagements by which a nation maybe drawn into a war at a moment when she least expects it, ought not to be contracted without very important reasons, and a direct view to the welfare of the state. We here speak of alliances made in time of peace, and by way of precaution against future contingencies.
§ 85. Alliances made with a nation actually engaged in war.
If there be question of contracting an alliance with a nation already engaged in a war, or on the point of engaging in one, two things are to be considered: 1. The justice of that nation’s quarrel. 2. The welfare of the state. If the war which a prince wages, or is preparing to wage, be unjust, it is not allowable to form an alliance with him; for injustice is not to be supported. If he is justifiable in taking up arms, it still remains to be considered whether the welfare of the state allows or requires us to embark in his quarrel: for it is only with a view to the welfare of the state that the sovereign ought to use his authority: to that all his measures should tend, and especially those of the most important nature. What other consideration can authorize him to expose his people to the calamities of war?
§ 86. Tacit clause in every warlike alliance.
But care must be taken that treaties of alliance be not thereby reduced to empty and delusive formalities. The tacit restriction is to be understood only of a war which is evidently unjust; for otherwise a pretense for eluding treaties would never be wanting. Is there question of contracting an alliance with a power actually at war? It behooves you most religiously to weigh the justice of his cause: the judgment depends solely on you, since you owe him no assistance any further than as his quarrel is just, and your own circumstances make it convenient for you to embark in it. But when once engaged, nothing less than the manifest injustice of his cause can excuse you from assisting him. In a doubtful case, you are to presume that your ally has justice on his side; that being his concern.
But if you entertain strong doubts, you may very fairly and commendably interpose to effect an accommodation. Thus you may bring the justice of the cause to the test of evidence, by discovering which of the contending parties refuses to accede to equitable conditions.
§ 87. To refuse succors for an unjust war is no breach of alliance.
As every alliance implies the tacit clause above mentioned, he who refuses to succor his ally in a war that is manifestly unjust is not chargeable with a breach of alliance.
§ 88. What the casus fderis is.
When alliances have thus been contracted beforehand, the question is, to determine, in the course of events, those cases in which our engagements come in force, and we are bound to act in consequence of the alliance. This is what is called casus fderis, or case of the alliance, and is to be discovered in the concurrence of the circumstances for which the treaty has been made, whether those circumstances have been expressly specified in it, or tacitly supposed. Whatever has been promised in the treaty of alliance is due in the casus fderis, and not otherwise.
§ 89. It never takes place in an unjust war.
As the most solemn treaties cannot oblige any one to favor an unjust quarrel (§ 86): the casus fderis never takes place in a war that is manifestly unjust.
§ 90. How it exists in a defensive war.
In a defensive alliance, the casus fderis does not exist immediately on our ally being attacked. It is still our duty to examine whether he has not given his enemy just cause to make war against him: for we cannot have engaged to undertake his defense with the view of enabling him to insult others, or to refuse them justice. If he is in the wrong, we must induce him to offer a reasonable satisfaction; and if his enemy will not be contented with it, then, and not till then, the obligation of defending him commences.
§ 91. and in a treaty of guarantee.
But if the defensive alliance contains a guarantee of all the territories at that time possessed by the ally, the casus fderis immediately takes place whenever those territories are invaded or threatened with an invasion. If they are attacked for a just cause, we must prevail on our ally to give satisfaction; but we may on good grounds oppose his being deprived of his possessions, as it is generally with a view to our own security that we undertake to guaranty them. On the whole, the rules of interpretation, which we have given in an express chapter,1 are to be consulted, in order to determine, on particular occasions, the existence of the casus fderis.
§ 92. The succor is not due under an inability to furnish it, or when the public safetyt would be exposed.
If the state that has promised succors finds herself unable to furnish them, her inability alone is sufficient to dispense with the obligation; and if she cannot give her assistance without exposing herself to evident danger, this circumstance also dispenses with it.
This would be one of those cases in which a treaty becomes pernicious to the state, and therefore not obligatory (Book II. § 160). But we here speak of an imminent danger, threatening the very existence of the state. The case of such a danger is tacitly and necessarily reserved in every treaty. As to remote dangers, or those of no extraordinary magnitude,  since they are inseparable from every military alliance, it would be absurd to pretend that they should create an exception; and the sovereign may expose the nation to them in consideration of the advantages which she reaps from the alliance.
In virtue of these principles, we are absolved from the obligation of sending assistance to an ally while we are ourselves engaged in a war which requires our whole strength. If we are able to oppose our own enemies and to assist our ally at the same time, no reason can be pleaded for such dispensation. But, in such cases, it rests with ourselves to determine what our circumstances and strength will allow. It is the same with other things which may have been promised, as, for instance, provisions. There is no obligation to furnish an ally with them when we want them for our own use.
We forbear to repeat in this place what we have said of various other cases, in discoursing of treaties in general, as, for example, of the preference due to the more ancient ally (Book II. § 167), and to a protector (ibid. § 204), of the meaning to be annexed to the term “allies,” in a treaty in which they are reserved (ibid. § 309). Let us only add, on this last question, that, in a warlike alliance made against all opponents, the allies excepted, this exception is to be understood only of the present allies. Otherwise, it would afterwards be easy to elude the former treaty by new alliances; and it would be impossible for us to know either what we are doing in concluding such a treaty, or what we gain by it.
A case which we have not spoken of is this:  Three powers have entered into a treaty of defensive alliance: two of them quarrel, and make war on each other:  how is the third to act? The treaty does not bind him to assist either the one or the other; for it would be absurd to say that he has promised his assistance to each against the other, or to one of the two in prejudice of the other. The only obligation, therefore, which the treaty imposes on him, is to endeavor, by the interposition of his good offices, to effect a reconciliation between his allies; and if his mediation proves unsuccessful, he remains at liberty to assist the party who appears to have justice on his side.
§ 94. Refusal of the succors due in virtue of an alliance.
To refuse an ally the succors due to him, without having any just cause to allege for such refusal, is doing him an injury, since it is a violation of the perfect right which we gave him by a formal engagement. I speak of evident cases, it being then only that the right is perfect; for, in those of a doubtful nature, it rests with each party to judge what he is able to do (§ 92): but he is to judge maturely and impartially, and to act with candor. And as it is an obligation naturally incumbent on us, to repair any damage caused by our fault, and especially by our injustice, we are bound to indemnify an ally for all the losses he may have sustained in consequence of our unjust refusal. How much circumspection, therefore, is to be used in forming engagements, which we cannot refuse to fulfill without material injury to our affairs or our honor, and which, on the other hand, if complied with, may be productive of the most serious consequences.
§ 95. The enemy’s associates.
An engagement, which may draw us into a war, is of great moment: in it the very existence of the state is at stake. He who in an alliance promises a subsidy or a body of auxiliaries, sometimes imagines that he only risks a sum of money or a certain number of soldiers; whereas he often exposes himself to war and all its calamities. The nation against whom he furnishes assistance will look upon him as her enemy; and should her arms prove successful, she will carry the war into his country. But it remains to be determined whether she can do this with justice, and on what occasions. Some authors2 decide in general, that whoever joins our enemy, or assists him against us with money, troops, or in any other manner whatever, becomes thereby our enemy, and gives us a right to make war against him:  a cruel decision, and highly inimical to the peace of nations! It cannot be supported by principles; and happily the practice of Europe stands in opposition to it.
It is true, indeed, that every associate of my enemy is himself my enemy. It is of little consequence whether any one makes war on me directly, and in his own name, or under the auspices of another. Whatever rights war gives me against my principal enemy, the like it gives me against all his associates: for I derive those rights from the right to security,  from the care of my own defense; and I am equally attacked by the one and the other party. But the question is, to know whom I may lawfully account my enemy’s associate, united against me in war.
First, in that class I shall rank all those who are really united in a warlike association with my enemy, and who make a common cause with him, though it is only in the name of that principal enemy that the war is carried on. There is no need of proving this. In the ordinary and open warlike associations, the war is carried on in the name of all the allies, who are equally enemies (§ 80).
§ 97. And those who assist him, without being obliged to it by treaties.
In the second place, I account as associates of my enemy, those who assist him in his war without being obliged to it by any treaty. Since they freely and voluntarily declare against me, they, of their own accord, choose to become my enemies. If they go no farther than furnishing a determined succor, allowing some troops to be raised, or advancing money,  and, in other respects, preserve towards me the accustomed relations of friendship and neutrality,  I may overlook that ground of complaint; but still I have a right to call them to account for it. This prudent caution of not always coming to an open rupture with those who give such assistance to our enemy, that we may not force them to join him with all their strength,  this forbearance, I say, has gradually introduced the custom of not looking on such assistance as an act of hostility, especially when it consists only in the permission to enlist volunteers. How often have the Switzers granted levies to France, at the same time that they refused such an indulgence to the house of Austria, though both powers were in alliance with them! How often have they allowed one prince to levy troops in their country, and refused the same permission to his enemy, when they were not in alliance with either! They granted or denied that favor according as they judged it most expedient for themselves; and no power has ever dared to attack them on that account. But if prudence dissuades us from making use of all our right, it does not thereby destroy that right, A cautious nation chooses rather to overlook certain points, than unnecessarily to increase the number of her enemies.
§ 98. Or who are in an offensive alliance with him.
Thirdly, those, who, being united with my enemy by an offensive alliance, actively assist him in the war which he declares against me,  those, I say, concur in the injury intended against me. They show themselves my enemies, and I have a right to treat them as such. Accordingly, the Switzers, whose example we have above quoted, seldom grant troops except for defensive war. To those in the service of France, it has ever been a standing order from their sovereigns, not to carry arms against the empire, or against the states of the house of Austria in Germany. In 1644, the captains of the Neufchatel regiment of Guy, on information that they were destined to serve under Marshal Turenne, in Germany, declared that they would rather die than disobey their sovereign and violate the alliances of the Helvetic body. Since France has been mistress of Alsace, the Switzers who serve in her armies never pass the Rhine to attack the empire. The gallant Daxelhoffer, captain of a Berne company in the French service, consisting of 200 men, and of which his four sons formed the first rank, seeing the general would oblige him to pass the Rhine, broke his espontoon, and marched back with his company to Berne.
§ 99. How a defensive alliance associates with the enemy.
Even a defensive alliance made expressly against me, or (which amounts to the same thing) concluded with my enemy during the war, or on the certain prospect of its speedy declaration, is an act of association against me; and if followed by effects, I may look on the party who has contracted it as my enemy. The case is here precisely the same as that of a nation assisting my enemy without being under any obligation to do so, and choosing of her own accord to become my enemy. (See § 97).
A defensive alliance, though of a general nature, and made before any appearance of the present war, produces also the same effect, if it stipulates the assistance of the whole strength of the allies: for in this case it is a real league, or warlike association; and, besides, it were absurd that I should be debarred from making war on a nation who opposes me with all her might, and thus exhausting the source of those succors with which she furnishes my enemy. In what light am I to consider an auxiliary who comes to make war on me at the head of all his forces? It would be mockery on his part, to pretend that he is not my enemy. What more could he do, were he openly to declare himself such? He shows no tenderness for me on the occasion: he only wishes that a tender regard should be paid to himself. And shall I suffer him to preserve his provinces in peace, and secure from all danger, whilst he is doing me all the mischief in his power? No! the law of nature, the law of nations, obliges us to be just: but does not condemn us to be dupes.
§ 101. In what case it does not produce the same effect.
But, if a defensive alliance has not been made against me in particular, nor concluded at the time when I was openly preparing for war, or had already begun it,  and if the allies have only stipulated in it that each of them shall furnish a stated succor to him who shall be attacked,  I cannot require that they should neglect to fulfill a solemn treaty, which they had an unquestionable right to conclude without any injury to me. In furnishing my enemy with assistance, they only acquit themselves of a debt: they do me no wrong in discharging it; and, consequently, they afford me no just grounds for making war on them (§ 26). Neither can I say that my safety obliges me to attack them; for I should thereby only increase the number of my enemies, and, instead of a slender succor which they furnish against me, should draw on myself the whole power of those nations. It is, therefore, only the troops which they send as auxiliaries, that I am to consider as enemies. These are actually united with my enemies and fighting against me.
The contrary principles would tend to multiply wars, and spread them beyond all bounds, to the common ruin of nations. It is happy for Europe, that, in this instance, the established custom is in accord with the true principles. A prince seldom presumes to complain of a nation’s contributing to the defense of her ally by furnishing him with succors which were promised in former treaties,  in treaties that were not made against that prince in particular. In the last war, the United Provinces long continued to supply the queen of Hungary with subsidies, and even with troops; and France never complained of these proceedings till those troops marched into Alsace to attack the French frontier. Switzerland, in virtue of her alliance with France, furnishes that crown with numerous bodies of troops, and, nevertheless, lives in peace with all Europe.
There is one case, however, which might form an exception to the general rule; it is that of a defensive war which is evidently unjust. For in such case there no longer exists any obligation to assist an ally (§§ 86, 87, 89). If you undertake to do it without necessity, and in violation of your duty, you do an injury to the enemy, and declare against him out of mere wantoness. But this is a case that very rarely occurs between nations. There are few defensive wars without at least some apparent reason to warrant their justice or necessity. Now, on any dubious occasion, each state is sole judge of the justice of her own cause; and the presumption is in favor of your ally (§ 86). Besides, it belongs to you alone to determine what conduct on your part will be conformable to your duties and to your engagements; and consequently nothing less than the most palpable evidence can authorize the enemy of your ally to charge you with supporting an unjust war, contrary to the conviction of your own conscience. In fine, the voluntary law of nations ordains, that, in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of both parties shall, with regard to external effects, be accounted equally lawful (§ 40).
§ 102. Whether it be necessary to declare war against the enemy’s associates.
The real associates of my enemy being my enemies, I have against them the same rights as against the principal enemy (§ 95). And as their own conduct proclaims them my enemies, and they take up arms against me in the first instance, I may make war on them without any declaration: the war being sufficiently declared by their own act. This is especially the case of those who in any manner whatever concur to make an offensive war against me; and it is likewise the case of all those whom we have mentioned in §§ 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.
1. Book II. chap. xvii.
2. See Wolf, Jus Gentium. §§ 730 and 737.
3. De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. iii. cap. iii. § 10.
5. Grotius, ubi supra, not. 3.


A BILL to amend and reenact §6-9-1a, §6-9-7, §6-9-8, and §6-9-9a of the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended; and to amend said code by adding thereto a new section, designated §6-9-9b, all relating to audits, reviews, and monitoring of local government offices; defining terms; clarifying applicable audit requirements; establishing a small government monitoring program; authorizing the Auditor, acting in the capacity as chief inspector, to oversee and maintain the monitoring program; directing the Auditor to prescribe policies and procedures for the monitoring program; authorizing cooperative agreements with higher education institutions to perform and participate in the monitoring program; changing the expenditure threshold for performance of annual audits; clarifying the notification and publication requirements when misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance is discovered as part of an audit, examination, or investigation; lowering the time frame in which a legal authority has to take action upon recommendations from an audit; raising the cost limits for certain municipalities for performance of services by the chief inspector; removing Class III municipalities from the cost limits; adding cost limits for municipalities policemen and firemen pension and relief funds; authorizing chief inspector to designate certain reports as confidential; and declaring that audit work papers created by the chief inspector division are confidential and not deemed public records.
(a) “Audit” means a systematic examination and collection of sufficient, competent evidential matter needed for an Auditor to attest to the fairness of management’s assertions in the financial statements and to evaluate whether management has sufficiently and effectively carried out its responsibilities and complied with applicable laws and regulations. An audit shall be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, standards issued by the chief inspector, and, as applicable, the single audit requirement of OMB Circular A-133 Audits of States, Local Governments and Non-Profit Organizations the Uniform Guidance, Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, as amended or revised from time to time, or any successor circular or regulation of the Office of Management and Budget.
(b) “Examination” includes an audit, or review, or small government monitoring as defined in this section.
(c) “Federal awards” means federal financial assistance and federal cost-reimbursement contracts that nonfederal entities receive directly from federal awarding agencies or indirectly from pass-through entities.
(d) “Federal financial assistance” means assistance that nonfederal entities receive or administer in the form of grants, loans, loan guarantees, property, cooperative agreements, interest subsidies, insurance, food commodities, direct appropriations, or other assistance, but does not include amounts received as reimbursement for services rendered to individuals in accordance with guidance issued by the director of the federal office of management and budget.
(e) “Financial audit” includes financial statement audits and financial related audits, as defined by government auditing standards.
(f) “Government auditing standards” means the government auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, which are applicable to financial audits of government organizations, programs, and activities.
(g) “Investigation” means an examination, inspection, or review of a local government’s finances to determine or ascertain whether fraudulent, illegal, or improper conduct has occurred, including, but not limited to, misappropriation, waste, or misuse of moneys or assets.
(g) (h) “Local government” means any unit of local government within the state, including a county, county board of education, municipality, and any other authority, board, commission, district, office, public authority, public corporation, or other instrumentality of a county, county board of education, or municipality or any combination of two or more local governments.
(h) (i) “Nonfederal entity” means a state, local government, or nonprofit organization.
(i) (j) “Office of Management and Budget” means the executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget.
(k) “Proper legal authority” means the prosecuting attorney of the county wherein the audited, examined, or investigated entity is located, the Attorney General, law enforcement, or other legal authority the chief inspector deems appropriate.
(j) (l) “Review” means an inquiry or analytical procedures that provide the Auditor with a reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that there are no material modifications that should be made to the financial statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or, if applicable, with another comprehensive basis of accounting.
(k) (m) “Single audit” means a financial and compliance audit as defined in the federal Single Audit Act of 1996, as amended, in section 7502(d), chapter 75, title 31 of the United States Code, of a nonfederal entity that includes the entity’s financial statements and federal awards. Each single audit conducted for any fiscal year shall cover the operations of the entire nonfederal entity; or at the option of the nonfederal entity, the audit shall include a series of audits that cover departments, agencies, and other organizational units that expend or otherwise administer federal awards during the fiscal year being audited except that each such audit shall encompass the financial statements and schedule of expenditures of federal awards for each department, agency, and organizational unit, which shall be considered to be a nonfederal entity.
(n) “Small government monitoring” means specialized procedures, performed on certain qualifying local governments as a lower cost alternative to an audit or review.
§6-9-7. Examinations into affairs of local public offices; penalties.
(a) The chief inspector has the power by himself or herself, or by any person appointed, designated, or approved by the chief inspector to perform the service, to examine into all financial affairs of every local governmental office or political subdivision and all boards, commissions, authorities, agencies or other offices created under authority thereof. An examination shall be made annually, if required, to comply with the Single Audit Act and when otherwise required by law or contract. When that act does not apply, unless otherwise required by law or by contract, the examination shall be made at least once a year, if practicable. Furthermore, the chief inspector shall furnish annually to the Legislature a list of each local government office or political subdivision and all boards, commissions, authorities, agencies, or other offices created under authority thereof and the year of its most recent completed audit.
(b) When required for compliance with regulations for federal funds received or expended by county boards of education the chief inspector or his or her designee, including any certified public accountant approved by the chief inspector shall conduct and issue an audit report within the time specified in controlling federal regulations. Examinations of other local governments shall be conducted and audit, or review, or monitoring reports issued in accordance with uniform procedures of the chief inspector.
(c) In cooperation with institutions of higher education located in the State of West Virginia, the chief inspector may establish and maintain a small government monitoring program. The small government monitoring program shall authorize local governments which are not otherwise required to undergo a single audit or a financial audit to apply to the chief inspector, on an annual basis, for participation in the program. The chief inspector shall prescribe and oversee monitoring procedures that shall be performed by higher education students in the field of accounting. Participating institutions of higher education shall enter into a cooperative agreement with the chief inspector to provide the service. The chief inspector shall prescribe policies and procedures for the administration of the small government monitoring program.
(c) (d) A county board of education may elect, by May 1 of the fiscal year to be audited, to have its annual examination performed by a certified public accountant approved by the chief inspector to perform the examinations. When this election is made, a copy of the order of the county board making the election shall be filed with the chief inspector and the State Board of School Finance. The county board of education is allowed to contract with any certified public accountant on the chief inspector’s then current list of approved certified public accountants, unless the State Board of School Finance or the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the board is located timely submits to the chief inspector a written request for the examination to be performed by the chief inspector or a person appointed by the chief inspector, or the chief inspector determines that a special or unusual situation exists. The county board shall follow the audit bid procurement procedures established by the chief inspector in obtaining the audit.
(d) (e) The chief inspector shall, at least annually, prepare a list of certified public accountants approved by the chief inspector to perform examinations of local governments. Names shall be added to or deleted from that list in accordance with uniform procedures of the chief inspector. When each list or updated list is issued, the chief inspector shall promptly file a copy of the list in the State Register and send a copy to the State Board of Education, the State Board of School Finance, and to local governments who request a copy.
(e) (f) A county board of education, when procuring the services of a certified public accountant on the chief inspector’s list, shall follow the procurement standards prescribed by the grants management common rule, OMB Circular A-102 “Grants and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments” Uniform Guidance, Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, in effect for the fiscal year being examined, or in any replacement circular or regulation of the Office of Management and Budget and in addition shall follow those standards as determined by the office of chief inspector.
(f) (g) The approved independent certified public accountant making examinations under this section shall comply with requirements of this section applicable to examinations performed by the chief inspector, including applicable requirements of the federal government and uniform procedures of the chief inspector applicable to examinations of county boards of education.
(1) Upon completion of the certified public accountant’s examination and audit or review report, the certified public accountant shall promptly send two copies of the certified report to the county board of education who shall file one copy with the federal Audit Clearing House. The certified public accountant shall send one copy of the certified report to the State Board of School Finance, and one copy to the chief inspector.
(2) If any examination discloses misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office on the part of any public officer or employee, the certified public accountant shall submit his or her recommendation to the chief inspector regarding the legal action the approved certified public accountant considers appropriate, including, but not limited to, whether criminal prosecution or civil action to effect restitution is appropriate, and three additional copies of the certified audit report. After review of the recommendations and the audit report, the chief inspector shall proceed as provided in §6-9-7(n) of this code. For purposes of this section and §18-9B-13 of this code, a certified audit report of an approved certified public accountant shall be treated in the same manner as a report of the chief inspector.
(g) (h) On every examination, inquiry shall be made as to the financial conditions and resources of the agency having jurisdiction over the appropriations and levies disbursed by the office and whether the requirements of the Constitution and statutory laws of the state and the ordinances and orders of the agency have been properly complied with and also inquire into the methods and accuracy of the accounts and such other matters of audit and accounting as the chief inspector may prescribe.
(h) (i) If a local government office is not subject to a single audit requirement under federal regulations or if it is not otherwise required by law or contract to undergo an annual audit and its expenditures from all sources are less than $300,000 $500,000 during the fiscal year the chief inspector may choose to perform either a review or audit on the local government office and may in his or her discretion determine the frequency of such review or audit.
(i) (j) The chief inspector or any authorized assistant may issue subpoenas and compulsory process, direct the service thereof by any sheriff, compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers at any designated time and place, selected in their respective county, and administer oaths.
(j) (k) If any person refuses to appear before the chief inspector or his or her authorized assistant when required to do so, refuses to testify on any matter or refuses to produce any books or papers in his or her possession or under his or her control, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100 and imprisoned confined for not more than six months.
(k) (l) A person convicted of willful false swearing in an examination is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100 and imprisoned confined in jail not more than six months.
(l) (m) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a copy of the certified report of each examination shall be filed in the office of the commissioner, chief inspector with the governing body of the local government and with other offices as prescribed in uniform procedures of the chief inspector.
(m) (n) If any audit, examination or investigation discloses misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office on the part of any public officer or employee, a certified copy of the report shall be published electronically by the chief inspector with notice of the publishing sent in writing to the proper legal authority of the agency entity being audited, examined, or investigated the prosecuting attorney of the county wherein the agency is located and with the Attorney General, the chief inspector deems appropriate for such legal action as is proper. At the time the certified audit, examination, or investigation report is published, the chief inspector shall notify the proper legal authority of the agency entity being audited, examined, or investigated the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General he or she deems appropriate in writing of his or her recommendation as to the legal action that the chief inspector considers proper, whether criminal prosecution or civil action to effect restitution, or both.
(n) (o) If the proper legal authority or prosecuting attorney, within nine months 90 days of receipt of the certified audit report and recommendations, refuses, neglects, or fails to take efficient legal action by a civil suit to effect restitution or by prosecuting criminal proceedings to a final conclusion, in accordance with the recommendations, the chief inspector may institute the necessary proceedings or participate therein and prosecute the proceedings in any court of the state to a final conclusion.
(o) (p) A local government that is not a county board of education may elect, by May 1 of the fiscal year to be audited, to have its annual examination performed by a certified public accountant approved by the chief inspector to perform the examinations. When this election is made, a copy of the order of the governing body making the election shall be filed with the chief inspector. An electing local government is allowed to contract with any certified public accountant on the chief inspector’s then current list of approved certified public accountants, unless the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the local government is located timely submits to the chief inspector a written request for the examination to be performed by the chief inspector or a person appointed by the chief inspector, or the chief inspector determines that a special or unusual situation exists: Provided, That the audit of a local government may be performed by the chief inspector at his or her discretion. The local government shall follow the audit bid procurement procedures established by the chief inspector in obtaining the audit: Provided, however, That the chief inspector may elect to conduct the audit of a local unit of government with one or more members of his or her audit staff where, in the opinion of the chief inspector, a special or unusual situation exists.
§6-9-8. Payment of cost of services of chief inspector; revolving fund.
(a) The cost of any service or act performed by the chief inspector under the provisions of this article as to any county or district office, officer or institution shall be paid by the county commission of the county; the cost of any service or act to any board of education shall be paid by the board; the cost of any service or act to any municipal corporation shall be paid by the authorities of the municipal corporation: Provided, That in municipalities in which the total revenue from all taxes does not exceed the sum of $2,000 annually, the cost including the per diem and all actual costs and expenses of the services shall not exceed the sum of $60 $200. The cost of this service shall be the actual cost and expense of the service performed, including transportation, hotel, meals, materials, per diem compensation of deputies, assistants, clerical help, and the other costs that are necessary to enable them to perform the services required, but the costs shall not exceed the sum of $2,000 $3,000 for services rendered to a Class III or a Class IV municipality: Provided, however, That the chief inspector may charge up to an additional $2,000 $3,000 for costs incurred for each service or act performed for a utility or park system owned by a Class III or Class IV municipality and for each policemen’s and firemen’s pension and relief fund maintained by the municipality: Provided further, That if a municipality is required to undergo a single audit by the federal agency or agencies making a grant, the cost limitations of this subsection do not apply: And provided further, That the chief inspector shall provide a written quote for all costs in advance for all services required by this article. The chief inspector shall render to the agency liable for the cost a statement of the cost as soon after the cost was incurred as practicable and the agency shall allow the cost and cause it to be paid promptly in the manner that other claims and accounts are allowed and paid and the total amount constitutes a debt against the local agency due the state. Whenever there is in the State Treasury a sum of money due any county commission, board of education or municipality from any source, upon the application of the chief inspector, the sum shall be at once applied on the debt against the county commission, board of education or municipality and the fact of the application of the fund shall be reported by the Auditor to the county commission, board of education or municipality, which report shall be a receipt for the amount named in the report. All money received by the chief inspector from this source shall be paid into the State Treasury, shall be deposited to the credit of an account to be known as chief inspector’s fund and shall be expended only for the purpose of covering the cost of the services, unless otherwise directed by the Legislature. The cost of any examination, service, or act by the chief inspector made necessary, or the part thereof that was made necessary, by the willful fault of any officer or employee, may be recovered by the chief inspector from that person, on motion, on 10-days’ notice in any court having jurisdiction.
(4) The chief inspector may transfer an amount not to exceed $400,000 from the Chief Inspector’s Fund to the special operating fund created in §32-4-1 et seq. of this code: Provided, That any transfers shall be completed prior to July 1, 2003.
§6-9-9a. Public inspection of reports of examinations.
All reports of examinations and audits of public offices made in accordance with the provisions of §6-9-7 of this code, and the copies thereof, when filed in the office of the chief inspector of public offices or in the office of the State Tax Commissioner, shall be public documents and shall be available for public inspection: Provided, That if an examination or investigative report discloses misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance, the chief inspector may direct that a report remain confidential until such time that the proper legal authority, as described in §6-9-7(n) of this code, has completed its investigation or adjudication of the matter and authorizes public disclosure.
§6-9-9b. Documentation of chief inspector.
(a) The audit working papers created by the chief inspector division during examinations or investigations shall be considered confidential, and shall not be deemed public records for purposes of §29B-1-1 et seq. of this code.
(b) For purposes of this section, “audit working papers” includes, but is not limited to, the books and records of the entity being audited, intra- and inter-agency communications, draft reports, summaries, schedules, notes, memoranda, and all other records relating to an examination or investigation by the chief inspector division.
NOTE: The purpose of this bill is to assist in the audit and review of local governments. The bill establishes the local government monitoring by the Auditor. The bill also clarifies the caps and fees associated with audits of local governments in this state.


text:
Fang Hao joined Bell Labs as a researcher in 2000. He has been working in the general areas of algorithm, architecture, protocol, and software designs for data networking systems, network management and measurement. His research interests include: software defined networks, cloud computing, network security, routing, traffic engineering, and traffic monitoring.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Sarit Mukherjee, “Online Allocation of Virtual Machines in a Distributed Cloud,” INFOCOM 2014.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Krishna P. N. Puttaswamy, “Protecting cloud data using dynamic inline fingerprint checks,” INFOCOM 2013.
Advait Abhay Dixit, Fang Hao, Sarit Mukherjee, T. V. Lakshman, Ramana Rao Kompella, “Towards an elastic distributed SDN controller,” Computer Communication Review 43(4), 2013 (Also appeared in HotSDN’13).
Hitesh Khandelwal, Fang Hao, Sarit Mukherjee, Ramana R. Kompella, “CobWeb: In-Network Cobbling of Web Traffic,” IFIP Networking 2013.
Haoyu Song, Murali S. Kodialam, Fang Hao, T. V. Lakshman, “Efficient Trie Braiding in Scalable Virtual Routers,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 20(5), October 2012.
Vijay Kumar Adhikari, Yang Guo, Fang Hao, Matteo Varvello, Volker Hilt, Moritz Steiner, Zhi-Li Zhang, “Unreeling netflix: Understanding and improving multi-CDN movie delivery,” INFOCOM 2012.
Vijay Kumar Adhikari, Yang Guo, Fang Hao, Volker Hilt, Zhi-Li Zhang, “A tale of three CDNs: An active measurement study of Hulu and its CDNs,” IEEE Global Internet Symposium 2012.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Haoyu Song, “Fast Dynamic Multiple-Set Membership Testing Using Combinatorial Bloom Filters,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2012.
Fang Hao, T.V. Lakshman, Sarit Mukherjee, Haoyu Song, “Secure Cloud Computing with a Virtualized Network,” HotCloud 2010.
Fang Hao, T. V. Lakshman, Sarit Mukherjee, Haoyu Song, “Enhancing dynamic cloud-based services using network virtualization,” Computer Communication Review 40(1), 2010 (Also appeared in VISA’09).
Haoyu Song, Murali S. Kodialam, Fang Hao, T. V. Lakshman, “Building Scalable Virtual Routers with Trie Braiding,” INFOCOM 2010.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “On-line Detection of Real Time Multimedia Traffic,” ICNP 2009.
Haoyu Song, Murali S. Kodialam, Fang Hao, T. V. Lakshman, “Scalable IP Lookups using Shape Graphs,” ICNP 2009.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Haoyu Song, “Fast Multiset Membership Testing Using Combinatorial Bloom Filters,” INFOCOM 2009.
Haoyu Song, Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “IPv6 Lookups using Distributed and Load Balanced Bloom Filters for 100Gbps Core Router Line Cards,” INFOCOM 2009.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “Incremental Bloom Filters,” INFOCOM 2008.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “Building high accuracy bloom filters using partitioned hashing,” SIGMETRICS 2007.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Shantidev Mohanty, “Fast, memory efficient flow rate estimation using runs,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2007.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Vivek Vishnumurthy, Hui Zhang, “Content Based Rate Estimation Using Lazy Membership Testing,” INFOCOM 2006.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Hui Zhang, “Fast payload-based flow estimation for traffic monitoring and network security,” ANCS 2005.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, Hui Zhang, “Fast, memory-efficient traffic estimation by coincidence counting,” INFOCOM 2005.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “Real-Time Detection of Hidden Traffic Patterns,” ICNP 2004.
Fang Hao, Murali S. Kodialam, T. V. Lakshman, “ACCEL-RATE: a faster mechanism for memory efficient per-flow traffic estimation,” SIGMETRICS 2004.

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What radio projects are eligible for PTFP funding?
Are Low-Power FM stations eligible for PTFP funding?
What is the first thing I should do to prepare a PTFP application?
Does PTFP have guidelines on the amount of money I can request?
Is there someone I can contact if I have questions about my project or the application?
What can I do if my FY 2010 application was not funded?
What are PTFP's policies for converting radio stations to digital broadcasting?
What about stand-by or emergency power generators and Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) units?
What about equipment licensing fees?
After I complete the application online, do I still have to send it to PTFP?
What if my organization has a Federal Debt?
Is there a risk in spending funds on the project prior to an award?
Does the new requirement regarding reporting of subawards and executive compensation apply to my application?
Can I apply to another Federally-funded agency (including CPB) for the same equipment.
What television projects are eligible for PTFP funding?
What are PTFP’s policies for converting television stations to digital broadcasting?
What about TV closed captioning?
Are Mobile TV transmission equipment, or equipment required to meet the CAP or CALM Act requirements eligible for PTFP funding?
What non-broadcast projects are eligible for PTFP funding?
● Applications are due in the PTFP Office by 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time, Thursday, March 17, 2011. This is the Closing Date.
● PTFP does not accept fax or e-mail applications, or weekend deliveries.
● If you send your application by overnight carrier, be sure the carrier guarantees delivery by 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time, on the date specified above.
● If you send your application by United States Postal Service regular mail, please note that we do not accept a postmark as proof of meeting the deadline.
● Further, anything sent via the USPS (including "overnight" and “Express Mail”) is subject to delivery delays due to mail security procedures at the Department of Commerce. We urge you to consider submitting your application by other means, such as alternate commercial delivery carriers. You should also consider possible delays in delivery caused by the weather and to allow for such delays in sending your application.
● If your application is late, we will return it to you without review.
Attention: Any application being hand-delivered, MUST be brought to Entrance 10 on the 15th Street side of the Department of Commerce for clearance through building security by 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time, on the Closing Date.
Hand-deliveries of applications must be made through Room 1874, located at entrance #10 on 15th St. N.W.
● You must use several Federal government Standard Forms to submit basic information. Details of your request are submitted on special PTFP forms — pages PTFP-2, PTFP-4, and PTFP-5.
● Written narratives and exhibits are also required.
● All forms for FY 2011 are on the Application Form section of this website.
● Instructions for filling out the Application Form are here.
● Do this each time you apply because PTFP makes changes every year.
What projects are eligible for PTFP funding?
○ Activate new public broadcasting stations or extend the service areas of existing stations.
○ Replace old equipment at existing public broadcasting stations.
○ Convert the transmission of a public television or radio station to digital broadcasting.
○ Click here for a complete listing of the 2010 PTFP grant awards.
○ PTFP can funds nonbroadcast projects only if they activate new services or extend the service areas of existing facilities.
○ PTFP is prohibited by law from funding projects that would improve (i.e., replace or augment) the equipment of already-operating nonbroadcast entities.
○ Click here for a complete listing of the 2010 PTFP non-broadcast grant awards.
● Planning projects. PTFP funds planning projects for broadcast and nonbroadcast purposes.
○ Basic planning application requirements are the same as those for construction projects.
○ Applications usually plan for the activation of a new broadcast or nonbroadcast facility.
What are PTFP’s policies for converting radio stations to digital broadcasting?
● Applicants may request funds to convert radio stations to digital broadcasting. Applications may request digital transmitters, digital exciters to upgrade digital-ready transmitters, and digital production equipment. These applications are placed in the Priorities in §2310.4 of the PTFP Rules, usually 2 or 4A. See Section I, B, 2b of the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Applicants may request a digital-upgradable transmitter to replace an analog transmitter or may request fully compliant IBOC digital transmitters. Applicants should read carefully the discussion of this subject in Section I, B, 2b of the FFO.
● Applications requesting digital compliant transmitters must include the applicant’s conversion plan, including its plans, if any, to use the Program Associated Data or Supplemental Audio Channel as authorized by the FCC.
● We recognize that there may be some full-power public television stations that have not completed digital conversion of all their broadcast equipment. We will continue to support the digital conversion of television stations in FY 2011. Any remaining digital conversion projects will be placed in the established PTFP Priorities and categories contained §2301.4 of the PTFP Rules.
● PTFP will accept applications for the Distributed Transmission Systems (DTS) and replacement digital television translators, as well as applications for projects to extend the service areas of digital public television stations to the greatest number of people, as permitted by the FCC, whether by power increases or channel changes, as part of its effort to solve post-conversion reception issues. Such applications will be placed in Priority 1B, as discussed in the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Digital translator projects to upgrade existing analog facilities are eligible for PTFP funding. Such applications will be placed in the Broadcast Other Cases category, as discussed in the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Projects to replace analog translators and LPTV stations with analog equipment are no longer eligible for PTFP funding, as discussed in the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Replacement or upgrade of existing analog master control and production equipment to digital will be placed in the Priorities in §2310.4 of the PTFP Rules, usually 2 or 4A, as discussed in the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Applications to replace existing digital master control and production equipment (including replacing SD equipment with HD) will be placed in the regular broadcast priorities (usually Priority 2 or 4A).
○ transfer of the remaining Federal interest to other broadcast equipment not purchased with PTFP funds.
● The presumed funding level for TV replacement, improvement, and augmentation projects is a 50% Federal share. Stations may request a higher percentage of Federal support by showing “extraordinary need” per §2301.6(b)(1)(ii) of the PTFP Final Rules.
● Equipment for closed captioning is eligible for PTFP funding.
● Closed captioning equipment is included in the online television equipment lists.
● However, equipment to meet the projected FCC standards for Video Description is NOT eligible for PTFP funding in FY 2011, as explained in the Federal Funding Opportunity Notice.
● Equipment for Internet streaming is eligible for PTFP funding.
● Applications for streaming equipment are placed in Priority 5B (see §2301.4(b)(5)(ii) of the PTFP Final Rules).
● Equipment for emergency power generation and Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) is eligible for PTFP funding.
○ (3) the size of any auxiliary fuel tank and the number of days of operation the fuel tank would support.
● Systems for master control would be to power only the technical facilities required to keep the station master control on the air, including air conditioning units limited to those facilities.
● Applications for station activation may include stand-by power generators and/or Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) units.
● Generators and UPS units to provide emergency power to entire facilities are not contemplated for PTFP support.
● Emergency power generation and UPS equipment is included in the online equipment lists for radio and television.
● If NTIA funds emergency power and UPS equipment through the PBS grant for placement at stations participating in the WARN project, those stations will not receive funding for emergency power and UPS equipment from PTFP during the FY 2011 grant round.
Are Mobile TV transmission equipment, or equipment for CAP, CALM, or Video Description eligible for PTFP funding in FY 2011?
● No. Please see this section of the Federal Funding Opportunity Notice for the reasons PTFP is not funding this equipment during the FY 2011 grant cycle.
● Licensing fees required by a manufacturer for the initial purchase and installation of equipment are eligible for PTFP funding support.
● Ongoing licensing fees for software or broadcast-specific technology are considered operational costs and are ineligible for PTFP support.
● Yes. The requirements for Low-Power FM applications are the same as for other applications.
● Applicants to activate new LPFM stations should consult the PTFP guidelines for station activation projects.
● Applicants requesting origination and other equipment should consult the PTFP guidelines for equipment replacement projects.
● By statute PTFP cannot fund more than 75% of a construction project. Otherwise, there is no limit on the amount of funds you can request, but PTFP will look carefully at the quantity and price of each item of equipment requested for its appropriateness to your project.
● Lists of radio, television and nonbroadcast equipment showing quantities and the level of cost PTFP supports are posted online for each type of project: Radio, Television, Nonbroadcast.
● Construction Projects: PTFP has established presumed Federal percentages for the funding of various types of broadcast station Construction projects. These are shown in the Federal Funding Opportunity (FFO) announcement.
● Planning Projects: While we don’t require local matching funds for Planning Grants, our presumption for planning projects is 75% Federal funding of eligible project costs.
● Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds: Our policy limits the use of CPB funds to meet the local matching requirements; see the FFO.
● Yes. PTFP Program Officers are available to answer questions during regular business hours until the Closing Date.
● A list of PTFP Program Officers and their assignments appears at "Contact PTFP."
After I complete the Application Form online, do I still have to send it to PTFP?
● Yes, you must print the Application Form, add your narratives and any other materials that do not appear online, sign it on page 1b of Standard Form 424, and duplicate, assemble, and send the required number of copies.
● You must also sign and send Standard Form 424B and the CD-511.
● Note that PTFP’s online Application Form will automatically do all math, carry figures from one page to the others, and check whether you have completed all items.
● You can spend your local matching funds, at your own risk, after the Closing Date.
● If your application is a reactivated application, the Closing Date of the original submission is the date after which you may obligate local matching funds.
● No Federal funds may be obligated before an award is made.
● You should consider all project monies obligated before the start date as part of your local match.
● You must certify (in item 20 of Standard Form 424) whether your organization is delinquent on any Federal debt.
● If your organization is delinquent in paying any Federal agency, you cannot receive a grant until the debt is paid or until you make arrangements to pay the debt.
● We must consider debts owed to any agency of the Federal government, not just to the Department of Commerce or NTIA. We must also consider debts incurred by other divisions of your organization (such as another department within a university) as well as any debt from your specific division (e.g., the university TV station).
● To reactivate your application, enter “Y” in item 23a of the PTFP-2 form and enter your FY 2010 application file number in item 23b (e.g., 20999).
● If items 23a and 23b are blank, the application will be treated as a new one, and any local funds expended since the original filing will be ineligible for inclusion in the project.
● You must submit a complete application just like any other applicant.
○ Look closely at your total application and exhibits, since applications can often be strengthened by updating or expanding the materials originally submitted.
○ Contact your state’s Program Officer for a summary of what the reviewers said about the original submission. (A list of PTFP Program Officers and their assignments appears at "Contact PTFP."
● Note that the PTFP Final Rules permit only two reactivations of a deferred application, for a total of three years consideration (§2301.9).
● It should be understood that reactivated applications have no special standing at PTFP in the evaluation process. They are evaluated without reference to a prior submission.
● We will send an acknowledgment of receipt after the Closing Date.
● The acknowledgment will give you the file number we assign and the priority under which your application will be reviewed. Please put this file number on any subsequent correspondence with PTFP about the application.
● Applications are evaluated as submitted, but at any time during the application review process we may request any additional information we wish to have for the evaluation of your application. You must provide the requested information within 15 days of the request.
● We are interested in receiving certain information that materially affects your application. A list of this information is in the PTFP Rules, §2301.14. If you receive any information after the Closing Date that materially affects the application (per the list in the Rules), you should notify us immediately. You may not, however, submit substantive amendments to your application after the Closing Date.
● Unless otherwise instructed, you need submit only an original and one copy of any additional information submitted to PTFP as part of the application review procedure.
Can I apply to another Federally-funded agency (including CPB) for the same equipment?
● No. For the efficient processing of PTFP applications, and because the eligibility, funding requirements and processing timetable of PTFP are so different from that of other Federally-funded grant programs such as CPB or RUS, NTIA will not accept or process requests for PTFP funding for the purchase of equipment submitted to another Federal grant program. It is the applicant’s responsibility to ensure that no PTFP-funded equipment is funded by another Federally-funded grant program.
● The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 includes a requirement for awardees of applicable Federal grants to report information about first-tier subawards and executive compensation under Federal assistance awards issued in FY 2011 or later.
Executive compensation data for both the grantee and first-tier subawardee.
sub-recipient at one tier awards to a sub-recipient at the next lower tier.
The term “subaward” does not include procurement of property and services needed to carry out the project or program.
Use of subawardees by PTFP grantees: PTFP rarely issues an award which permits grantees to issue awards to a sub-recipient on a lower tier.
The required reporting would disclose classified information.


The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of an eight-month jail term upon revoking Defendant’s post-release supervision, holding that the district court’s order imposing a term of eight months’ imprisonment was not an abuse of discretion.
After pleading guilty to a Class IV felony, Defendant was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment followed by twelve months’ post-release supervision. After the period of post-release supervision began, Defendant admitted to violating several conditions. The district court then revoked the post-release supervision and imposed a term of eight months’ imprisonment in county jail. On appeal, Defendant argued that the imposition of an eight-month jail term resulted in his imprisonment for a total of twenty-eight months for a Class IV felony, which exceeded the maximum sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-105. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) when a court has revoked post-release supervision the maximum term of imprisonment that can be imposed is governed exclusively by Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2268(2) and does not depend on the maximum sentence of initial imprisonment authorized under section 28-105; and (2) Defendant's term of eight months’ imprisonment was within the maximum term authorized by section 29-2268(2) an was not an abuse of discretion.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 02/22/2019 08:16 AM CST - 308 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 State of Nebraska, appellee, v. A ngok B. Wal, appellant. ___ N.W.2d ___ Filed February 22, 2019. No. S-18-446. 1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 2. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. 4. Sentences: Probation and Parole. Under the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268(2) (Reissue 2016), a trial court has only one option upon revoking a term of post-release supervision for noncompliance: imposing a term of incarceration up to the remaining period of postrelease supervision. 5. ____: ____. When a court has revoked post-release supervision, the maximum term of imprisonment that can be imposed is governed exclusively by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268(2) (Reissue 2016) and does not depend on the maximum sentence of initial imprisonment authorized under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 2016). 6. Sentences: Probation and Parole: Appeal and Error. Upon revocation of post-release supervision, a sentencing court has discretion under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268(2) (Reissue 2016) to impose any term of imprisonment up to the remaining period of post-release supervision, and an appellate court will not disturb the court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. - 309 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie A. M artinez, Judge. Affirmed. Jeffrey S. Leuschen and Liam K. Meehan, of Schirber & Wagner, L.L.P., for appellant. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ. Stacy, J. Angok B. Wal pled guilty to a Class IV felony and was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment followed by 12 months’ post-release supervision. Shortly after the period of postrelease supervision began, the State moved to revoke, alleging Wal had violated several conditions. Wal admitted the violations, after which the district court revoked the post-release supervision and imposed a term of 8 months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Wal appeals. He argues that because he has completed a 20-month prison sentence, the district court’s imposition of an 8-month jail term upon revoking post-release supervision resulted in imprisonment for a total of 28 months for a Class IV felony, and therefore exceeded the maximum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment authorized by law.1 Wal’s position fundamentally misconstrues the applicable statutory scheme, and we reject it as meritless. Finding no abuse of discretion in the imposition of an 8-month jail term, we affirm. BACKGROUND In June 2016, Wal was charged with one count of criminal mischief, one count of obstructing a peace officer, and one 1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 2016). - 310 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 count of obstructing government operations. In November, he entered a guilty plea to an amended information charging only criminal mischief (a Class IV felony) and obstruction of government operations (a Class I misdemeanor). The maximum sentence for a Class IV felony is 24 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision.2 The maximum sentence for a Class I misdemeanor is 12 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,000.3 Wal was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision on the felony conviction and to a concurrent term of 12 months’ imprisonment on the misdemeanor. The order of post-release supervision included conditions requiring Wal to report regularly as directed by his probation officer, provide proof of employment, abstain from the use of alcohol, obtain a chemical dependency or mental health examination, submit to regular drug and alcohol testing, and perform 60 hours of community service. On July 3, 2017, Wal was released from prison and began his period of post-release supervision. Almost immediately, he failed to comply with the conditions of that supervision. On October 5, the State filed a motion seeking to revoke his postrelease supervision. When Wal failed to appear in court on the motion, a warrant was issued for his arrest. On April 2, 2018, Wal was arrested on the warrant. Thereafter, he was arraigned on the motion to revoke and admitted violating the conditions of his post-release supervision. The State’s factual basis indicated that after being released from prison, Wal failed to report for mandatory probation appointments, failed to recharge the global positioning system monitor on his ankle, did not attend required appointments or drug and alcohol testing, did not obtain a chemical dependency evaluation, did not attend drug treatment, did not 2 3 Id. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106 (Reissue 2016). - 311 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 complete any community service hours, and did not pay his probation enrollment fees. The court found that Wal’s period of post-release supervision began on July 3, 2017, and the parties eventually stipulated that Wal absconded from that supervision after just 14 days. The court accepted Wal’s admission, found he had violated the conditions of his post-release supervision, and set the matter for further disposition. At the dispositional hearing on April 25, 2018, the court revoked Wal’s post-release supervision and imposed a term of 8 months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Wal filed this timely appeal, and we moved the case to our docket on our own motion. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Wal assigns, restated, that after revoking his post-release supervision, it was error for the trial court to impose 8 months’ imprisonment because doing so resulted in a total term of imprisonment that exceeded the statutory maximum for Class IV felonies. STANDARD OF REVIEW  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.4 ANALYSIS Wal does not challenge either the finding that he violated his post-release supervision or the court’s decision to revoke his post-release supervision and impose a term of imprisonment. He challenges only the length of that imprisonment, arguing that when it is added to the prison sentence he already served, he will serve a total of 28 months’ imprisonment for a Class IV felony, when the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by § 28-105 is 24 months. 4 State v. Ralios, 301 Neb. 1027, 921 N.W.2d 362 (2019). - 312 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 [2,3] In considering Wal’s arguments, we are guided by familiar rules of statutory construction. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.5 Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.6 Post-release supervision remains a relatively new concept in Nebraska sentencing law.7 As defined by the Legislature: Post-release supervision means the portion of a split sentence following a period of incarceration under which a person found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea is released by a court subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to supervision by the [Office of Probation Administration].8 Revocation of post-release supervision is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268(2) (Reissue 2016), which provides: If the court finds that a probationer serving a term of post-release supervision did violate a condition of his or her post-release supervision, it may revoke the postrelease supervision and impose on the offender a term of imprisonment up to the remaining period of post-release supervision. The term shall be served in an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services or in county jail subject to subsection (2) of section 28-105.  Under the plain language of § 29-2268(2), a trial court has only one option upon revoking a term of post-release 5 6 7 8 State v. McGuire, 301 Neb. 895, 921 N.W.2d 77 (2018). Id. State v. Kennedy, 299 Neb. 362, 908 N.W.2d 69 (2018). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246(13) (Reissue 2016); Kennedy, supra note 7. - 313 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 supervision for noncompliance: imposing a term of incarceration up to the remaining period of post-release supervision.9 Without this option, a defendant would be able to frustrate the goals of post-release supervision—and avoid serving the second portion of his or her split sentence—simply by refusing to comply with the terms of supervision. Here, Wal completed the first portion of his split sentence by serving 20 months’ imprisonment. But he failed to comply with the second portion of his split sentence, his post-release supervision, and the court revoked it. Wal contends that when a court revokes post-release supervision and imposes a term of imprisonment, it is constrained not only by the time remaining on post-release supervision, but, also, by the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by § 28-105 for the first portion of the split sentence. We reject this contention as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the plain language of § 29-2268(2).  We hold that when a court has revoked post-release supervision, the maximum term of imprisonment that can be imposed is governed exclusively by § 29-2268(2) and does not depend on the maximum sentence of initial imprisonment authorized under § 28-105. Upon revoking Wal’s postrelease supervision, the district court was statutorily authorized to impose a term of imprisonment up to the remaining period of his post-release supervision, without regard to the amount of imprisonment ordered on the first portion of his split sentence.  Because a sentencing court has discretion under § 29-2268(2) to impose, upon revocation, any term of imprisonment up to the remaining period of post-release supervision, an appellate court will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion. At the dispositional hearing in this case, the parties did not dispute the period of time remaining on Wal’s post-release supervision. Wal had been sentenced 9 See Kennedy, supra note 7. - 314 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WAL Cite as 302 Neb. 308 to 12 months’ post-release supervision, and the parties stipulated he had served only 14 days of that supervision before absconding. Thus, on the day revocation was ordered, Wal had considerably more than 8 months remaining on his term of post-release supervision. The district court’s order imposing a term of 8 months’ imprisonment was within the maximum term authorized by § 29-2268(2) and was not an abuse of discretion. The order of the district court is affirmed. A ffirmed.