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Respondents were arrested and indicted in November, 1975, on counts of possessing firearms and dynamite. In March, 1976, the Federal District Court granted respondents' motion to suppress evidence relating to the dynamite counts, and the Government promptly filed a notice of appeal and requested a continuance. The District Court denied this request and, when the Government answered "not ready" after the case was called for trial, dismissed the indictment. The Government appealed this dismissal, and the two appeals were consolidated. In August, 1979, the Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order, ordered that the dynamite counts be reinstated, and held that the District Court erred in dismissing the firearms counts. In November, 1979, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court denied. The Court of Appeals' mandate issued in March, 1980, 46 months after the Government filed its notice of appeal from the dismissal of the indictment, during which time respondents were unconditionally released. On remand, the District Court ordered the Government to reindict on the firearms charges. In August, 1980, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss on the ground of vindictive prosecution as to one respondent, but denied it as to the other respondents, and both the Government and these respondents appealed. During these appeals, respondents remained free on their own recognizance. In July, 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal as to the one respondent and dismissed the appeals of the other respondents, and in October, 1982, denied respondents' petitions for a rehearing. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court denied. The Court of Appeals' mandate issued in January, 1983. In May, 1983, the District Court again dismissed the indictment, ruling that respondents' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. The time during which the indictment was dismissed and respondents were free of all restrictions on their liberty should be excluded from the length of delay considered under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U. S. 1. Pp. 474 U. S. 310-312.
were not incarcerated and were not subject to bail, and further judicial proceedings would have been necessary to subject them to any actual restraints. Pp. 474 U. S. 310-311.
(b) The fact that the Government's desire to prosecute respondents was a matter of public record was insufficient to count the time in question toward a speedy trial claim. Nor does the fact that respondents were ordered to appear at the evidentiary hearing held on remand in the District Court during the first appeal constitute the sort of "actual restraint" required for application of the Speedy Trial Clause. And respondents' necessity to obtain counsel while their case was technically dismissed was not sufficient to trigger that Clause. Pp. 474 U. S. 311-312.
2. The delay attributable to the interlocutory appeals does not weigh effectively towards respondents' claim under the Speedy Trial Clause. Under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, courts must accommodate the competing concerns of orderly appellate review and a speedy trial. Pp. 474 U. S. 312-317.
(a) Three of the factors under Barker -- the length of delay, the extent to which respondents have asserted their speedy trial rights, and the prejudice to respondents -- fail to support a finding of a violation of the Speedy Trial Clause. Pp. 474 U. S. 314-315.
(b) The remaining Barker factor, the reason for the delay, also fails to carry respondents' claims. The Government's first interlocutory appeal was justified where the Government could not have otherwise presented the issue relating to exclusion of the evidence on the dynamite counts, and the Government's appeal on this issue was strong. Similarly, the Government's second interlocutory appeal was justified because the Government could not have otherwise proceeded against the one respondent against whom the indictment was dismissed, and here too the Government's position was strong. Pp. 474 U. S. 315-316.
(c) The delay from respondents' interlocutory appeals does not count toward their speedy trial claims. A defendant bears the heavy burden of showing an unreasonable delay caused by the prosecution in that appeal or a wholly unjustified delay by the appellate court. Pp. 474 U. S. 316-317.
3. On the facts, the delays in question were not sufficiently long to justify dismissal of the case against respondents because of an alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Clause. P. 474 U. S. 317.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 474 U. S. 317.
Clause. Accordingly we reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondents were denied their right to a speedy trial.
In view of the nature of respondents' claim, we state the factual and procedural history of this case in some detail. On November 14, 1975, pursuant to a tip from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Oregon state troopers stopped two vehicles in search of several federal fugitives. [Footnote 2] After an exchange of gunfire and a motor chase, state troopers captured all but one of the respondents, Dennis Banks. [Footnote 3] Both vehicles were locked and impounded while federal and state authorities obtained search warrants.
2,600 rounds of ammunition, 150 blasting caps, 9 empty hand grenades, and miscellaneous firearms. [Footnote 5] Oregon law enforcement officers, apparently unaware of the evidentiary consequences, adhered to their usual policy and destroyed the dynamite. A federal agent present at the destruction photographed the explosions. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1142 (CA9 1979). State officials also preserved wrappers from the dynamite casings.
A federal grand jury indicted respondents on November 25, 1975, on charges of possessing firearms and explosives. Trial in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon was set for the week of February 9, 1976. On December 22, 1975, a grand jury returned a five-count superseding indictment. This indictment charged all respondents with three counts relating to possession and transportation in commerce of an unregistered destructive device (the dynamite counts) and two counts relating to unlawful possession of firearms (the firearms counts).
two continuances at respondents' behest, [Footnote 7] the District Court granted respondents' motion to suppress on March 31, 1976. App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a. Three weeks later, the Government appealed the suppression order, [Footnote 8] and moved that trial on all counts be continued pending the outcome of the appeal. The District Court denied the Government's request for a continuance, and when the case was called for trial, the Government answered "not ready." Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), the District Judge dismissed the indictment with prejudice. Six months had passed since the original indictment.
heard argument on October 15, 1976, and a divided panel affirmed in an unreported opinion on July 26, 1977. App. to Pet. for Cert. 88a-118a. On the Government's motion, the court voted on October 17, 1977, to hear the case en banc. On March 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals en banc remanded for findings of fact on whether federal officials participated in the destruction of the dynamite and whether respondents were prejudiced by its destruction. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending the District Court's findings. The District Court issued its findings on August 23, 1978, and the case returned to the Court of Appeals.
On August 7, 1979, the Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order and directed that the dynamite counts be reinstated. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150. The court also held that, although the Government could have gone to trial on the firearms counts pending the appeal, the District Court erred in dismissing those counts with prejudice. Id. at 1151. The Court of Appeals denied respondents' petition for rehearing on October 1, 1979. Respondents petitioned for certiorari; we denied the petition on larch 3, 1980. 445 U.S. 917. The mandate of the Court of Appeals issued on March 12, 1980, 46 months after the Government filed its notice of appeal from the dismissal of the indictment. Respondents were unconditionally released during that time.
to the superseding indictment, [Footnote 10] including a motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. On August 8, 1980, the District Court granted the vindictive prosecution motion as to KaMook Banks and denied it as to respondents Dennis Banks, Render, and Loud Hawk. Both sides appealed. Respondents remained free on their own recognizance during this appeal.
The appeals were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals ordered expedited consideration. The court heard argument on January 7, 1981, but did not issue its decision until July 29, 1982. The court sustained the Government's position on all issues. United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841. Respondents' petitions for rehearing were denied on October 5, 1982. Respondents again petitioned for certiorari, and we denied the petition on January 10, 1983. 459 U.S. 1117. The Court of Appeals' mandate issued on January 31, 1983, almost 29 months after the appeals were filed.
for these latter two continuances. Defendants objected to each continuance.
On May 20, 1983, the District Court again dismissed the indictment, this time on the ground that respondents' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. 564 F.Supp. 691. The Government appealed, and unsuccessfully urged the District Court to request that the Court of Appeals expedite the appeal. On its own motion, the court treated the appeal as expedited, and heard argument on January 4, 1984. A divided panel affirmed on August 30, 1984. 741 F.2d 1184. [Footnote 11] We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985), and now reverse.
The Government argues that, under United States v. MacDonald, 456 U. S. 1 (1982), the time during which defendants are neither under indictment nor subject to any restraint on their liberty should be excluded -- weighed not at all -- when considering a speedy trial claim. [Footnote 12] Respondents contend that, even during the time the charges against them were dismissed, the Government was actively pursuing its case, and they continued to be subjected to the possibility that bail might be imposed. This possibility, according to respondents, is sufficient to warrant counting the time towards a speedy trial claim.
"actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge . . . engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment."
"The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges."
456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 8.
"[W]ith no charges outstanding, personal liberty is certainly not impaired to the same degree as it is after arrest while charges are pending. After the charges against him have been dismissed,"
"a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is [no longer] the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer."
456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 9.
Respondents argue that the speedy trial guarantee should apply to this period because the Government's desire to prosecute them was a matter of public record. Public suspicion, however, is not sufficient to justify the delay in favor of a defendant's speedy trial claim. We find that, after the District Court dismissed the indictment against respondents and after respondents were freed without restraint, they were "in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation." MacDonald, supra, at 456 U. S. 8-9. See Marion, supra, at 404 U. S. 309. The Speedy Trial Clause does not purport to protect a defendant from all effects flowing from a delay before trial.
The Clause does not, for example, limit the length of a preindictment criminal investigation, even though "the [suspect's] knowledge of an ongoing criminal investigation will cause stress, discomfort, and perhaps a certain disruption in normal life." 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 9.
Nor does the fact that respondents were ordered to appear at the evidentiary hearing held on remand in the District Court during the first appeal -- an appearance they waived -- constitute the sort of "actual restraint" required under our precedents as a basis for application of the Speedy Trial Clause. Finally, we are not persuaded that respondents' need for counsel while their case was technically dismissed supports their speedy trial claim. Although the retention of counsel is frequently an inconvenience and an expense, the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty; it does not shield a suspect or a defendant from every expense or inconvenience associated with criminal defense.
We therefore find that, under the rule of MacDonald, when defendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court should not weigh that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause.
"is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."
383 U. S. 118-119, or by continuances in the date of trial, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 407 U. S. 517-518 (1972).
"makes it clear that Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit."
"It has long been the rule that, when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be retried in the normal course of events. . . . [This rule] has been thought wise because it protects the societal interest in trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error at a previous trial, and because it enhances the probability that appellate courts will be vigilant to strike down previous convictions that are tainted with reversible error. . . . These policies, so carefully preserved in this Court's interpretation given the Double Jeopardy Clause, would be seriously undercut by [an] interpretation given the Speedy Trial Clause [that raised a Sixth Amendment obstacle to retrial following successful attack on conviction]."
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Ibid. (footnote omitted). The Barker test furnishes the flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other. We therefore adopt this functional test to determine the extent to which appellate time consumed in the review of pretrial motions should weigh towards a defendant's speedy trial claim. Under this test, we conclude that, in this case, the delays do not justify the "unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal." Id. at 407 U. S. 522.
Barker's first, third, and fourth factors present no great difficulty in application. The first factor, the length of delay, defines a threshold in the inquiry: there must be a delay long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial." Id. at 407 U. S. 530. Here, a 90-month delay in the trial of these serious charges is presumptively prejudicial, and serves to trigger application of Barker's other factors. Ibid.
The third factor -- the extent to which respondents have asserted their speedy trial rights -- does not support their position. Although the Court of Appeals found that respondents have repeatedly moved for dismissal on speedy trial grounds, 741 F.2d at 1192, that finding alone does not establish that respondents have appropriately asserted their rights. We held in Barker that such assertions from defendants are "entitled to strong evidentiary weight" in determining whether their rights to a speedy trial have been denied. 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 531-532. These assertions, however, must be viewed in the light of respondents' other conduct.
Court's decision in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S. 263 (1982) (federal courts without jurisdiction to hear defendant's interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss indictment). They also filled the District Court's docket with repetitive and unsuccessful motions. See, e.g., n 10, supra.
The Court of Appeals gave "little weight" to the fourth factor, prejudice to respondents. At most, the court recognized the possibility of "impairment of a fair trial that may well result from the absence or loss of memory of witnesses in this case." 741 F.2d at 1193. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 532. That possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support respondents' position that their speedy trial rights were violated. In this case, moreover, delay is a two-edged sword. It is the Government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the Government to carry this burden.
would weigh heavily against the Government if the issue were clearly tangential or frivolous. Ibid. Moreover, the charged offense usually must be sufficiently serious to justify restraints that may be imposed on the defendant pending the outcome of the appeal. Ibid.
Under Barker, delays in bringing the case to trial caused by the Government's interlocutory appeal may be weighed in determining whether a defendant has suffered a violation of his rights to a speedy trial. It is clear in this case, however, that respondents have failed to show a reason for according these delays any effective weight towards their speedy trial claims. There is no showing of bad faith or dilatory purpose on the Government's part. The Government's position in each of the appeals was strong, and the reversals by the Court of Appeals are prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the Government's action. Moreover, despite the seriousness of the charged offenses, the District Court chose not to subject respondents to any actual restraints pending the outcome of the appeals.
decision, the defendants are not now able to criticize the very process which they so frequently called upon."
United States v. Auerbach, 420 F.2d 921, 924 (CA5 1969), rehearing denied, 423 F.2d 66, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
In the present case, respondents' appeal was allowable under the law of the Ninth Circuit before our decision in Hollywood Motor Car, supra. But we find that their position was so lacking in merit that the time consumed by this appeal should not weigh in support of respondents' speedy trial claim. Nor do we weigh the additional delay of six months resulting from respondents' frivolous action in seeking rehearing and certiorari toward respondents' speedy trial claim. See ibid., decided prior to these latter actions.
We cannot hold, on the facts before us, that the delays asserted by respondents weigh sufficiently in support of their speedy trial claim to violate the Speedy Trial Clause. They do not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . ."
The more stringent provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., have mooted much litigation about the requirements of the Speedy Trial Clause as applied to federal prosecutions. The time devoted to pretrial appeals, however, is automatically excluded under the Act, §§ 3161(d)(2) and (h)(1)(E). These respondents must therefore seek any relief under the Speedy Trial Clause.
Dennis James Banks, one of the respondents in this action, was active in the American Indian Movement, and was a fugitive when these events occurred. The siege and occupation of Wounded Knee had taken place 60 months before, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was tracking Banks and his party as fugitives from that affair. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1141 (CA9 1979). For a description of the battle of Wounded Knee and the resultant violence and death, see United States v. Banks, 383 F.Supp. 389 (SD 1974), appeal dism'd, 513 F.2d 1329 (CA8 1975); United States v. Banks, 374 F.Supp. 321 (SD 1974); United States v. Banks, 368 F.Supp. 1245 (SD 1973).
The Government represents that it would introduce evidence at trial showing that respondent Dennis Banks was the driver of one of the vehicles. Banks was not apprehended until January 26, 1976.
"Each of the seven boxes was marked 'High Explosives Dangerous' and on the side had the following markings:"
"Gelex 2 1 x 8"
"together with the logo of the DuPont company prominently displayed. Inside were red cylindrical sticks with heavy wrapping paper covering the contents and marked:"
"E I Dupont De Nemours & Co. (Inc.)."
United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, at 1144-1145. We follow the practice of the opinions discussing the issue and refer to the destroyed evidence as dynamite. 741 F.2d 1184, 1187 (CA9 1984); United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, at 1143. Cf. United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841, 843 (CA9 1982) ("explosive material").
App. 40a-42a, and n. 4, 90a.
The District Court denied the motion on January 21, 1976.
On January 21, 1976, the District Court postponed trial until March 8, 1976, on respondents' motion. On respondents' motion and over the objection of the Government, on February 18, 1976, the District Court again continued trial until May 12, 1976. Record, Doc. Nos. 62, 64.
"An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding."
"The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the decision. judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted."
"Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal in the foregoing instances, the defendant shall be released in accordance with chapter 207 of this title."
App. 57. The Government obtained a new indictment from the grand jury that recharged with the original firearms count (although it substituted "receiving" for "transporting") and two of the original three dynamite device counts. The new indictment also charged the defendants with two new destructive device counts relating to a slightly different type of destructive device. It also charged respondent KaMook Banks with a new count of receiving firearms while under indictment for a felony.
A listing of the relevant docket entries, id. at 38-145, shows that the motions filed during this 4-week period included: motion for a transcript of a recently held hearing (June 24, 1980), id. at 61; motion to dismiss counts three and four for insufficient allegations (July 7, 1980), id. at 63; motion to suppress evidence of pretrial photographic identification and "Tainted Potential Courtroom Identification," ibid.; motion for change in jury selection procedure, ibid.; motion to dismiss because of the grand jury composition, ibid.; motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, ibid.; motion to dismiss for preindictment delay, ibid.; motion for disclosure and production (July 21, 1980), id. at 64; motion for appointment of investigator at Government expense, ibid.; and third motion to dismiss for gross governmental misconduct, ibid. All motions except for KaMook Banks' vindictive prosecution motion were denied (Aug. 5, 1980). Id. at 65-66.
The Ninth Circuit's holding conflicts with three other Circuits. See United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139, 1146 (CA5 1978); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1004 (CA7 1975); United States v. Bishton, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 54, 463 F.2d 887, 890 (1972).
. In MacDonald, we held that where the Government has dismissed an indictment and the defendant is not subject to actual restraints on his liberty, the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply.
In those instances where the defendant is subject to incarceration or bail, the courts would have to engage in a balancing of the restrictions imposed and their effect on the defendant, the necessity for delay, and the length of delay, using the approach we have outlined below. Infra at 474 U. S. 31-316.
Homer, The Odyssey, Book II, lines 91-105 (R. Lattimore trans.1965).
of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), to the remaining appellate delays in this case.
The majority concludes that, when an appeal arises out of the district court's dismissal of an indictment, the lack of an outstanding indictment absolves the Government of its responsibility to provide a speedy trial. However, we have never conditioned Sixth Amendment rights solely on the presence of an outstanding indictment. Those rights attach to anyone who is "accused," [Footnote 2/1] and we have until now recognized that one may stand publicly accused without being under indictment. The majority offers two reasons for concluding that respondents did not enjoy the right to a speedy trial during the Government's appeals. First, respondents were suffering only "[p]ublic suspicion," ante at 474 U. S. 311, and not a formal accusation. Second, they were not subject to "actual restraints" on their liberty. Both of these rationales are seriously flawed.
four years later for the same murders. The Court held that this delay did not implicate the speed trial right because "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges." Id. at 456 U. S. 7. The Court reasoned that, after the termination of the first formal prosecution, MacDonald was "in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation," id. at 456 U. S. 8-9, and thus was no more an "accused" than was the defendant in Marion before his arrest.
this case. [Footnote 2/3] There has been at all relevant times a case on a court docket captioned United States v. Loud Hawk -- I can think of no more formal indication that respondents stand accused by the Government.
The majority argues that, while "the Government's desire to prosecute [respondents] was a matter of public record," that desire constituted only "[p]ublic suspicion" that is insufficient to call Sixth Amendment rights into play, citing Marion and MacDonald. Ante at 474 U. S. 311. The reason that the Government's desire to prosecute in both of those cases did not constitute an "accusation," however, is that the Government had not yet formalized its commitment. Indeed, in MacDonald, the Government dismissed the murder charges because it "concluded that they were untrue," 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 10, n. 12, thus acknowledging that the first formal accusation had been a mistake and extinguishing the prior probable cause determination. In the present case, the Government has made no such confession of error, and continues to align its full resources against respondents in judicial proceedings.
appeal. One of the primary purposes of the speedy trial right, of course, is to prevent prolonged restraint on liberty, id. at 456 U. S. 8; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 532, and the absence of any possibility of such restraints was a vital part of our MacDonald holding. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 9. In contrast, Congress has declared explicitly, in 18 U.S.C. § 3731, that a person in respondents' position shall be subject to the same restraints as an arrested defendant awaiting trial. [Footnote 2/4] Thus, the District Court had the undoubted authority to condition respondents' release on the posting of bail, or indeed to keep them in jail throughout the appeal, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Respondents' release could have been accompanied by restrictions on travel, association, employment, abode, and firearms possession, or conditioned on their reporting regularly to law enforcement officers and/or keeping a curfew. See § 3142(c). Considering all the circumstances, therefore, I believe that respondents' position is most closely analogous to that of a defendant who has been arrested but not yet indicted.
quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 320 (emphasis added by majority opinion). The majority completely misreads Marion while creating a rule that is flatly inconsistent with our prior holdings.
There can be no question that one who had been arrested and released under 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III) would be entitled, under Marion, to the protections of the Speedy Trial Clause. Because respondents were by statute subject to the same restraints as that hypothetical defendant, I am at a loss to understand why they should enjoy less protection.
were under indictment. In doing so the majority emphasizes the second Barker factor -- the reason for the delay, see 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 530. Because it concludes that "[t]here is no showing of bad faith or dilatory purpose on the Government's part," the majority declines to accord any "effective weight" to this factor in the speedy trial balance. Ante at 474 U. S. 316. In reaching this conclusion, it virtually ignores the most obvious "reason for the delay" in this case -- the fact that the Court of Appeals was unable to decide these appeals in a reasonably prompt manner.
"[D]ifferent weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered, since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government, rather than with the defendant."
The Court of Appeals frankly admitted that "most of the delay must be attributed to the processes of this court," 741 F.2d 1184, 1191 (CA9 1984), a conclusion that is difficult to escape. This case involves appeals from pretrial rulings. The Court of Appeals had every reason to know that these appeals should have been ruled upon as expeditiously as possible. See that court's Rule 20. Yet it took over five years for the Court of Appeals to decide two appeals, one of them "expedited." No complicated analysis is needed to identify the reason for the delay in this case.
present case, the amount of time that the appeals consumed is patently unreasonable. I would therefore weigh the second Barker factor against the Government in this case.
The majority has seriously misapplied our precedents in concluding that delay resulting when the government appeals the dismissal of an indictment is excludable for speedy trial purposes unless the defendant is subjected to actual restraints during that appeal. Its application of Barker v. Wingo to this case also undercuts the very purpose of the speedy trial right. I respectfully dissent.
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . ."
It is also instructive to compare the present case and MacDonald with respect to another Sixth Amendment right -- the right to counsel. Surely a Government appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is a "critical stage" of the prosecution, implicating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985) (defendant in state prosecution has due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, whether counsel is retained or appointed). As during other critical stages, the defendant needs an attorney during a government appeal "as a shield to protect him against being haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence." Ross v. Mott, 417 U. S. 600, 417 U. S. 610-611 (1974). Again, the contrast to MacDonald is striking. The defendant in that case would have had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the time between the dropping of the Army charges and the filing of the grand jury charges; that period was not a "critical stage" of a prosecution.
In United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180 (1984), we held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied in a narrower class of cases than the speedy trial right. It therefore defies logic to conclude that respondents could be protected by the former, but not the latter, during the Government's appeal.
That neither Congress nor this Court has had any difficulty recognizing the fundamental difference between the Government's dismissal of an indictment and the court's dismissal, subject to appellate review, is clear from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48. Subdivision (a) of that Rule permits the Government, with leave of court, to dismiss an indictment, and provides that, when the indictment is dismissed, "the prosecution shall thereupon terminate." Subdivision (b) permits the district court to dismiss an indictment, but contains no language suggesting that such action brings the prosecution to an end -- nor could it, because the court's dismissal is subject to the Government's statutory right to appeal.
Asking whether the indictment "exists" during the appeal, while interesting from the standpoint of ontology, is of limited practical help. Yet it is significant that, in the MacDonald situation, the Government must go back to the grand jury and seek reindictment. When the district court dismisses an indictment, on the other hand, the court of appeals can reinstate the indictment with the stroke of a pen.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provides in pertinent part: "Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal . . . the defendant shall be released in accordance with chapter 207 of this title." Chapter 207, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156, contains the procedures for pretrial release, and permits the district courts to impose various restraints pending trial. The Government concedes that respondents could have been incarcerated or put under other restraints during the Government's appeals. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 18.
It is worth noting that the Speedy Trial Act puts time limits on the Government beginning with "the date on which [the defendant] was arrested or served with a summons," 18 U.S.C. § 3161, without regard to the terms of the defendant's release.
"If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, . . . the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint."
That language clearly confers the same rights on a defendant who is arrested and unconditionally released as one who is released on conditions.
Apparently relying on the fact that the defendant in Dillingham had to post a $1,500 bond, see 502 F.2d at 1234, the Government reads Dillingham to stand for the proposition that any restriction, no matter how insignificant, invokes the Speedy Trial Clause when no indictment is outstanding. See Tr. of Oral Arg.19. Once again, neither the plain language of the Sixth Amendment nor any decision of this Court suggests this peculiar constitutional standard. Moreover, while an indictment and an arrest are comparable in that each one constitutes a formal assertion of probable cause, there is no such symmetry between an indictment and incarceration or posting of bond. Simply put, the position advanced by the Government and the majority lacks even internal consistency.
The only sensible reading of Dillingham is that actual restraints, like other types of prejudice to a defendant, are relevant to the speedy trial balance, but are not prerequisites to application of the Speedy Trial Clause. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 407 U. S. 533 (1972).
See, e.g., United States v. Saintil, 705 F.2d 415 (CA11 1983); United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139 (CA5 1978).
This assumes, of course, that the defendant wants a speedy trial, and is not intentionally hindering the government's attempt to provide one. That assumption may be open to question in this case. The majority points out that respondents' strategically timed demands for a speedy trial ring somewhat hollow in light of respondents' overall behavior during the litigation. Were that the basis for the Court's opinion, I might be able to accept a remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of that factor. I am unable, however, to agree with the majority's analysis of the second Barker v. Wingo factor.
The majority's focus on the prosecution's, rather than the court's, contribution to the delay undoubtedly comes in part from a reluctance to permit district courts to tell a court of appeals, or possibly this Court, that it has taken too long to decide a case. However, appellate courts have no privilege to decline constitutional obligations. The appellate courts would be better advised to adopt procedures for the speedy resolution of interlocutory criminal appeals than to force district courts into the uncomfortable position of dismissing indictments because of appellate delay.


In August 1904, four Marist Brothers arrived in Aleppo to run the school for Armenian Catholics in Telal Street. Today, with a hearts that know no bounds, the Marist Brothers are working through different means of education to sow the seeds of Hope.
Neighbouring Countries: Turkey to the north, Jordan to the south, Iraq to the east, Lebanon and Israel to the west.
The Syrian Christians form 8% of the population and are divided into about ten different rites and denominations. In order of size, they are Greek Orthodox (500 000), Greek Catholics (200 000), Armenian Gregorians (150 000), and then Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Maronites, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Protestants and Roman Catholics.
The Christians and Muslims participate in the Baath party government, which has dominated Syrian politics since 1964. This government supports an ideology of Arabic nationalism. For this reason, the Christians usually enjoy a certain amount of freedom even though around 92% of the country is Moslem. Islam is not the state religion, but the Chief of State must belong to this religion. This ensures equality for the Christians. Christian communities have the right to own property, build churches and celebrate liturgies and feasts. Priests are exempt from military service. During the last 30 years, the Alaouite dictatorship – an Islamic minority group – and the Assad family have maintained an ambiguous attitude regarding Christians. On one hand, they seem to defend Christians faced with the rise in Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, though, being a minority dictatorship, they have implemented a police state with controls at all levels of all social activities. Meetings, publications and evangelisation require government authorisation. A global catechism, approved by the government, is used by all the Christian communities in their schools. The Christian colleges, once the jewel of Syrian education, were nationalised in the 1960s. They have the appearance of being Church schools but in fact the programmes are controlled by government inspectors. The ambiguity regarding the Christians is also evident in the relationships with the communities of neighbouring countries. Because of the insecurity in Iraq, Syria has become the refuge of many Iraqi Christians. Yet, several Lebanese Christians who wanted to claim their independence from Syria are in prison in Damascus.
The following is taken from the Bulletin of the Institute (Volume XXI, number 153, pages 522-525) in which Brother Pierre Martin speaks to us about the Little Brothers of Mary.
“To speak of a Golden Jubilee, in a country where its history is counted in thousands of years, might seem strange. What is fifty years? In the East, everything is older than fifty years: from the proud tarboosh worn by the inhabitants to the ancient ruins admired by the tourists. Baalbek, Palmyra, Djarach can count their centuries: Sidon, Byblos, Aleppo their millennia. Nevertheless, Champagnat College is not ashamed to celebrate a modest fiftieth anniversary: you cannot blame someone for being young.
In 1895, the first Marist Brothers came to the East. Previous attempts had failed. In 1904 they took possession of Abraham’s Mound: Aleppo.
Let’s think about their trip. The countryside would have certainly appeared strange to the eyes of these Europeans used to a change in scenery at every turn of the road. The steppe was red, because after the first rainfalls, the primitive plough used to turn the soil. Every now and then, a few trees were found beside some miniscule streams of water: “A little patch of green similar to a bouquet that you would offer to the desert” (J. J. Tharaud). And then they came upon a new countryside that was the same colour as a camel, a totally cloudless sky, a shadeless landscape and a hot wind driving the sand with it. Such was the horizon for four hundred and fifty kilometres. Such was the path taken by three brothers: Brothers Jean Symmaque, Joseph Neophytus and Joseph Athanas, all of whom are still alive today.
Finally, ALEPPO, “Abraham’s mound”, for the legend states that Abraham stayed here on this plateau while following the course of the Euphrates heading towards the “Promised Land”; a legend that is backed up by the topography of the country and the needs of the caravans.
Once the three missionaries had arrived, Father Augustin Sayegh asked them to run his Armenian-Catholic school, a school that was to become, under their direction, one of the finest colleges of the city. Father Augustin Sayegh, of happy memory, was a great friend and benefactor of the brothers and often joined them at table during the twenty-five years that he knew them.
It is said that some Crusaders of the Middle Ages arrived in the East with malicious intent. Our three new Crusaders arrived in the East, but full of good will. Success was thus assured.
§	1904: Taking over the direction of the Armenian-Catholic College.
§	1914: 320 students: closure of the College due to the Great War.
§	1919: Reopening of the College.
§	1923: Opening of a second College, Saint Nicholas, in the Greek Catholic rite.
§	1931: Change of house. Starting at Champagnat College.
§	1945: End of the French mandate in the East. Closure and sale of Champagnat College: 745 students.
§	1949: Reinstallation at Aleppo, in the Wizosky barracks: 102 students.
§	1954: Golden Jubilee of Champagnat College: 837 students.
These are all the things that the College wanted to celebrate this year – including its disappointments as well as its hopes. The ceremonies from the 12th to the 19th December were a magnificent time. Brother Jean Symmaque, the founder and first Director, along with a few other “former battlers”, came to join the great number of people invited to the celebrations.
On Sunday 12th, at 9 o’clock, a magnificent sung Armenian mass was celebrated by the Armenina-Catholic Archimandrite of Aleppo, Gabriel Gaspar. A huge number of people attended this celebration in the Roman Catholic Cathedral. All prayed fervent prayers of thanksgiving for all the good that had been accomplished during the fifty years of devoted work at the College. At 11 o’clock, the singing of the National Anthem heralded the arrival of His Excellency the Governor in the courtyard of the College overflowing with people and cars. Then in the hall, Mr Naoum Sioufi, President of the Old Boys’ Association, gave a long speech in which he spoke about the work done by the Marist Brothers and his hopes for the future of the College. Those present at this celebration included Archbishop Ayoub, the Maronite Archbishop and Archbishop Hindie, the Syrian Catholic Archbishop. Syrian authorities were also present: Mr Mohafez from the city of Aleppo, the Prefect of the Municipality, the Prefect of the Police, the Colonel-Commandant of the Gendarmerie, the Director of the State Education, the Director of Private Education. The Consular Corps was also represented by the presence of Mr Denizeau, Consul General of France at Aleppo, Mr Pistre, French Consul at Aleppo, the Greek Consul, the Spanish Consul and the Netherlands Consul. The Old Boys came in great numbers, accompanied by their wives and took the opportunity to show their gratitude to the brothers.
After the talk given by Mr Sioufi, Mr Denizeau, Consul General of France, honoured Brother Gabriel Augustin with the award of Officer of Public Instruction, and Brother Mario Raffaël, Director of Champagnat College, with the award of Office of the Academy.
In his speech, Brother Director thanked the civil and religious authorities and read a telegram from the Vatican that gave an apostolic blessing to all the brothers, friends, old boys and benefactors of the brothers.
At the end of the formalities, those present enjoyed a celebratory wine while visiting the magnificent display organised by Brother Antoine, Sub-Director, summarising the fifty years of apostolate at Aleppo.
At 3 o’clock in the afternoon, a basketball tournament began comprising of four teams. This was organised by Brother Vivien, the Sports-Master of the College. The “Old Boys” cup, donated by Mr Jalil Boustany, the Vice-President of the Parents’ and Friends’ Association, was won by the team from Terre-Sainte College (a Franciscan college).
In the evening the Old Boys’ Committee organised a banquet with 280 tables. The civil and military officials, who were present, were surprised by the good quality of our “Old Boys” and the cordial and pleasant atmosphere that was evident in the banquet hall.
A week that had commenced so well could only continue to do so. Monday was a holiday for our 837 students. On Friday 17th and Sunday 19th the students, friends and admirers of Champagnat College came to applaud the efforts of the young artists of the secondary classes.
In the next edition, we will cover the celebrations of the centenary.


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The Copyright Act states in section 27 that it is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has to do.
Copyright is infringed when the whole or a substantial part of a copyrighted work has been copied without the consent of the copyright owner. Remember that a copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce or grant permission to reproduce and failing to get their permission could result in a claim for copyright infringement.
Section 3(1) of the Copyright Act refers to the copyright owner having the sole right to produce, reproduce, perform the work, publish the work or any "substantial part" including the other rights enumerated in that section. Therefore, anyone that exercise these rights on the whole or substantial part of a work, may be infringing copyright. If a work incorporated the work of another, then that does not form part of a substantial part of a work since it's not original. This principle was outlined in the following cases: Warwick Film Productions Ltd. v. Eisinger,  1 Ch. 508 [Warwick]; Wijesinghe Mahanamhewa v. Canter,  2 Sri Lanka L.R. 154 (C.A.); Cary v. Longman (1801), 1 East. 358 at 360 (L.C.).
A compilation is projected to the extent that skill and judgment went into arranging the compilation and so a substantial part of the skill and judgment must be taken in order for there to be infringement. This principle was set out in section B(9), "Compilation", in C Act, ibid., s. 2.1(1); Robertson v. Thoson Corp.,  2 S.C.R. 363, 2006 SCC 43 [Robertson]. Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc,  1 A.C. 551,  UKHL 38 at - [Marks].
Therefore, the reproduction or other rights of a work set out in s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act without permission by the copyright owner is considered infringement unless it falls into ones of the exceptions (e.g. fair dealing) or if permission is obtained from the copyright owner.
How Can You Avoid Copyright Infringement?
The Copyright Act clearly states that the owner of copyright may assign or licence copyright, either wholly or partially. An assignment or licence must be in writing. A licence gives someone permission to use the work under certain conditions. The may be limitations on the licence such as territory, right, medium, market sector or the term of the licence. S.13 (4).
The Reproduction of Federal Law Order states that “anyone may, without charge or request for permission, reproduce enactments and consolidations of enactments of the Government of Canada, and decisions and reasons for decisions of federally-constituted courts and administrative tribunals, provided due diligence is exercised in ensuring the accuracy of the materials reproduced and the reproduction is not represented as an official version”.
Don’t copy a substantial part. Insubstantial copying does not constitute copyright infringement. Eg. Reproducing a quotation is probably considered an insubstantial taking, but copying a poem in a book of poems would be considered substantial.
The Copyright Act does not define what a “substantial part” is. The courts have defined a substantial part of a work as a question of fact in which both qualitative and quantitative factors must be considered. More emphases is given on the qualitative factors.
and whether the material taken is used in the same or similar fashion as the plaintiff’s. (UR Tax services case).
The use of facts, ideas or concepts is not an infringement of copyright. It is the expression of those facts, ideas or concepts which gives it copyright.
Ascertain whether copyright infringement has occurred. Obtain any evidence and copies of the copyright infringement such as receipts and witnesses.
Determine whether the entity has a licence or permission.
Cease and Desist Letter – if there is definitely a situation of copyright infringement, then the first step is to provide notice of the copyright owner and a cease and desist letter to prepare for the possibility of legal action if the parties cannot resolve the dispute themselves.
You can also read more here about dealing with copyright infringement online.
© Entcounsel. (Vandana Taxali), 2018.

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channel is effectively suppressed in microcrystal structures due to the presence of an additional decay mechanism related to the boundaries and with only 25 meV activation energy. As a result for microcrystals, excitons reaching the grain boundaries are trapped by surfaces states and transferred to dark states or dissociated into polarons within 100 ps. A third relaxation channel within the nanosecond time regime becomes relevant for long range ordered rubrene stacks at very low temperatures. The local character of this decay path is indicated by its coincidence in time and energy with the only relaxation process observed for amorphous rubrene thin films. Our findings clearly elucidate the effects by the local environment on the dynamic photophysical behavior of organic semiconductors. With respect to spatial dimensions of organic thin film devices, this correlation and the effects emerging by confinement have to be considered in the ongoing miniaturization and optimization of organic opto-electronic devices, such as photovoltaic cells.
Experimental Details: All experimental procedures are described in the Supplementary Information.
Acknowledgements The authors thank Prof. Martin Kamp (Würzburg University) for his assistance on TEM measurements and Stephan Hirschmann (Stuttgart University) for material purification. Financial support by DFG within Research Unit (FOR 1809) “Light induced dynamics in molecular aggregates” and within the contract INST 93/623-1 FUGG is acknowledged.
 P. Peumans, A. Yakimov, S. R. Forrest, Jour. Applied Physics 2003, 93, 3693-3723.  A. Rao, M. W. B. Wilson, J. M. Hodgkiss, S. Albert-Seifried, H. Bässler, R. H. Friend, J. Am. Chem. Soc. 2010, 132, 12698-12703.  P. J. Jadhav, P. R. Brown, N. Thompson, B. Wunsch, A. Mohanty, S. R. Yost, E. Hontz, T. V. Voorhis, M. G. Bawendi, V. Bulović, M. A. Baldo, Adv. Mater. 2012, 24, 6169-6174.  G. D. Scholes, G. Rumbles, Nat. Mater. 2006, 5, 683-696.  V. K. Thorsmølle, R. D. Averitt, J. Demsar, D. L. Smith, S. Tretiak, R. L. Martin, X. Chi, B. K. Crone, A. P. Ramirez, A.J. Taylor, Physical Review Letters 2009, 102, 17401.  H. Najafov, B. Lee, Q. Zhou, L. C. Feldman, V. Podzorov, Nature Materials 2010, 9, 938-943.  P. Irkhin, I. Biaggio, Physical Review Letters 2011, 107, 017402.  A. Ryasnyanskiy, I. Biaggio, Physical Review B 2011, 84, 193203.  D. Käfer, G. Witte, Physical Chemistry Chemical Physics 2005, 7, 2850-2853.  R. W. I. de Boer, M. E. Gershenson, A. F. Morpurgo, V. Podzorov, physica status solidi (a) 2004, 201, 1302-1331.  R. J. Stöhr, G. J. Beirne, P. Michler, R. Scholz, J. Wrachtrup, J. Pflaum, Applied Physics Letters 2010, 96, 231902.  P. Irkhin, A. Ryasnyanskiy, M. Koehler, I. Biaggio, Physical Review B 2012, 86, 085143.  H. Najafov, I. Biaggio, V. Podzorov, M. F. Calhoun, M. E. Gershenson, Physical Review Letters 2006, 96, 0566046.  N. Sai, M. L. Tiago, J. R. Chelikowsky, F. A. Reboredo, Physical Review B 2008, 77, 161306.  Y. Chen, B. Lee, D. Fu, V. Podzorov, Advanced Materials 2011, 23, 5370-5375.  T. Petrenko, O. Krylova, F. Neese, M. Sokolowski, New Journal of Physics 2009, 11, 015001.  M. Nothaft, J. Pflaum, Physica Status Solidi B 2008, 245, 7882.
 L. Ma, K. Zhang, C. Kloc, H. Sun, M.E. Michel-Beyerle, G.G. Gurzadyan, Physical Chemistry Chemical Physics 2012, 14, 8307-8312.  A. Yildiz, P.T. Kissinger, C. N. Reilley, Journal of Chemical Physics 1968, 49, 14031406.  T. S. Rose, R. Righini, M. Fayer, Chemical Physics Letters 1984, 106, 13-19.  V. Settels, Quantum Chemical Description of Ultrafast Exciton Self-trappin in Perylene Based Materials, PhD thesis, Würzburg, 2012  A. Y. Kobitski, R. Scholz, D. R. T. Zahn, H. P. Wagner, Physical Review B 2003, 68, 155201.  N. J. Turro, V. Ramamurthy, J. Scaiano, in Modern Molecular Photochemistry of Organic Molecules (University Science Books, Sausalito, USA 2010).  S. Tao, H. Matsuzaki, H. Uemura, H. Yada, T. Uemura, J. Takeya, T. Hasegawa, H. Okamoto, Physical Review B 2011, 83, 075204.  E. Venuti, I. Bilotti, R. Della Valle, A. Brillante, P. Ranzieri, M. Masino, A. Girlando Journal of Physical Chemistry C 2008, 112, 17416-17422.  S. L. Murov, I. Carmichael, G. L. Hug, in Handbook of Photochemistry, 2nd ed. (Marcel Dekker Inc., New York, USA 1993)  G. B. Piland, J. J. Burdett, D. Kurunthu, C. J. Bardeen, Journal of Physical Chemistry C 2013, 117, 1224-1236.
Figure 1. a Pictures of different samples and related morphologies of the excitation volumes schematically illustrating the eﬀect of spatial conﬁnement on the created excitons. b Timeintegrated PL spectra of rubrene bulk and microcrystals as well as of a thin amorphous ﬁlm together with bulk crystal and amorphous ﬁlm absorption. The inset shows the molecular structure of rubrene together with the crystallographic directions.
Figure 2. a Integrated PL intensity spectra exhibiting a dramatic increase of PL signal with decreasing temperature. For the two crystalline morphologies, the first spectra (298 and 250 K for bulk; 298-150K for micro) were multiplied by a factor of six and two, respectively. b Changes of the PL spectra normalized to the values at 298 K as a function of temperature. Both crystalline samples exhibit a PL increase upon reducing the temperature and saturation at low temperatures. Contrary, the PL signal of the amorphous ﬁlm, after initial increase, is reduced for temperatures below 150 K.
Figure 3. a Energy level scheme showing the possible relaxation pathways for singlet excitons in rubrene bulk crystals. b Fits of the transient PL data taken at 2.16 eV for all three samples at room temperature, 150 and 50 K. The temperature dependent decay indicates the presence of thermally activated non-radiative decay channels. For the sake of clarity for low temperatures only the fit transients are shown.
Table 1. Parameters determined from the analysis of the temperature dependence of the steady-state and transient PL spectra. The values refer to the energetic barriers and the lifetimes (inverse rates) as well as the associated decay mechanisms for the different rubrene samples studied in this work. Lifetimes in bold letters correspond to the dominant decay channel at room temperature.
RT. Finally heating the substrate for several hours at a constant temperature of 180 C the microcrystals were generated.
density, characterization of the precipitated microcrystals was performed by a scanning electron microscope REM Ultra-Plus (Zeiss) using beam energies between 2 and 20 keV. To analyze the absorption properties of the single crystals spectra were detected by means of a Lambda 950 UV/VIS spectrometer (Perkin Elmer). The amorphous ﬁlm was measured with a V630 UV-VIS spectrophotometer (Jasco). As the samples absorb in the visible spectral range, investigations were restricted to a wavelength range of 300 nm -800 nm (3.0 -1.6 eV). Transmission electron microscopy (TEM) studies on the micro-crystals were carried out with a FEI-TitanTM TEM with beam energies of 300 keV. For this, the microcrystals were deposited and then annealed on a small copper grid. For the time-resolved PL measurements, the output of a Ti:Sa oscillator (Spectra Physics, 100 fs, 800 nm) was frequency doubled and focused onto the sample, which was mounted inside a liquid helium cryostat, using a ﬂuence of 2.6 nJ/cm2. The PL was spectrally dispersed by a spectrograph and detected with a C 5680 streak camera (Hamamatsu). The temporal resolution of the setup described was 8 ps and the detection window limited to 2ns.
Bragg peaks could be found for the film confirming its amorphous character while the measurement of the single crystal clearly indicates the good crystalline quality of the analyzed sample. The spectrum of the smooth amorphous film exhibits Kiessing oscillations, which were used to determine the thickness of the layer. The size and shape of the microcrystals were deduced from the analysis of SEM pictures and the crystalline character was confirmed by carrying out transmission electron microscopy measurements (Fig. 5).
Integrated PL of Crystalline Samples Fig. 6 shows the comparison of the time-integrated PL spectrum of the microstructures with the ones of two bulk single crystals - one with a very smooth (bulk 1) and one with a rougher surface (bulk 2). The observed effective shift of the PL spectrum of the microcrystals is due to an enhanced relative contribution of the high-energy PL peak to the spectrum and not to the blueshift of the whole spectrum.
Amorphous Films With Different Amount of Interfaces Preparing amorphous rubrene ﬁlms of similar thickness and surface ﬂatness but with diﬀerent amounts of interfaces results in completely diﬀerent decay kinetics at room temperature (see Fig. 7a). While the dynamics of the ﬁlm on sapphire (squares) can be described by a monoexponential decay at a time constant of about 0.5 ns, the decay of the sample on glass (circles) is biexponetial with an additional constant of 100 ps. The time-integrated spectra of both samples are however almost identical (inset in Fig. 7a). This diﬀerent decay behaviour is assumed to be a consequence of the diﬀerent sample topographies as observed in AFM measurements (Fig. 7b). One can clearly see an increase of surface area introduced by dislocation boundaries for the amorphous ﬁlm on glass while the ﬁlm on sapphire only shows smooth plateaus.
 R. A. Laudise, C. Kloc, P. G. Simpkins, T.Siegrist, Journal of Crystal Growth 1998, 187, 449-454.  D. H. Park, S. G. Jo, Y. K. Hong, C. Cui, H. Lee, D. J. Ahn, J. Kim, J. Joo, Journal of Materials Chemistry 2011, 21, 8002-8007.
Figure 4. a X-ray diﬀraction measurements of a thin amorphous rubrene ﬁlm (above) exhibiting Kiessig oscillations. The inset shows the whole Bragg spectrum where no peaks are detectable. These results conﬁrm the x-ray amorphous character of the film. b The spectrum of a rubrene single crystal is displaying the high crystalline quality of the sample.
Figure 5. The left picture shows a SEM image of hexagonal microcrystals measured in this work with the corresponding TEM spectrum on the right.
Figure 6. Comparison of the integrated PL spectrum of the microcrystals with the corresponding spectra of two bulk crystals with different surface roughness. The effective shift of the spectral weight of the microstructures is due to an increased relative contribution of the high-energy PL peak, rather than to a blueshift.
Figure 7. a PL-transients of an amorphous ﬁlm of rubrene on glass and sapphire taken at 2.18 eV at room temperature and the corresponding integrated PL spectra (inset). While the spectra are almost identical, the decay dynamics are considerably diﬀerent. b AFM surface scans of the two amorphous ﬁlms indicating topographical diﬀerences between the two samples. While the ﬁlm on sapphire exhibits only smooth plateaus, the surface of the ﬁlm grown on glass is rugged by grain boundaries and dislocations.

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Summary: The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various Michigan state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.
Under Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), the import, possession, and use of Great Apes is heavily regulated because of their status as endangered or threatened species under the Federal Endangered Species Act. NREPA makes it illegal to take, import, export, possess, buy, sell, or transport endangered or threatened animals, including gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos, and gibbons. However, that same law does allow apes that originate from other states (besides Michigan), or countries, to be imported, transported, possessed, or sold with a federal permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or with an “applicable” permit from another state (besides Michigan). That exemption does not apply to apes that originated in Michigan; so it is illegal to transport, possess, or sell any ape that was born in Michigan, regardless of whether a person possesses a federal or state permit authorizing those activities. The importation, possession, and use of apes is ostensibly regulated by various state agencies. However, the extent to which those agencies have fulfilled their legislative mandates to regulate apes is somewhat limited.
Political subdivisions of the state, including counties, cities, and towns also have statutory authority to restrict and/or regulate Great Apes within their geographical boundaries. Although Michigan has a variety of state laws that restrict or regulate activities involving apes, many of those laws have not been implemented or enforced by the agencies charged with doing so. In order to fill the gaps left by state level regulation and enforcement, many cities and counties in Michigan have enacted local laws governing the possession and use of those animals. Typically, local ordinances either: (1) ban the possession of apes for certain purposes, or entirely; (2) regulate activities involving apes; or (3) set minimum standards for the care and treatment of apes.
Although Michigan does not have any state statutes that specifically govern the possession, use, or treatment of apes, certain statutes that apply to a broad range of animals may be applicable to apes. Michigan’s general anti-cruelty statute applies to apes, as it does to other animals, and may be used to protect apes from neglect, cruel training methods, and physical abuse.
In Michigan, there two equally effective options for the enforcement of the state’s anti-cruelty laws.
b. Humane Officers: Any society that is incorporated in Michigan for the prevention of cruelty to animals can designate 1 or more persons in each county of the state to investigate and prosecute animal cruelty cases. The sheriff of each county may appoint those investigators as deputy sheriffs, which would give them all the powers of the sheriff in enforcing the state’s animal cruelty laws.
A violation of the state’s anti-cruelty laws may be either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the severity of the act, the number of animals involved, and the perpetrators past history of similar convictions. Such convictions may result in any or all of the following: (1) imprisonment; (2) fines; (3) community service; (4) liability for all costs associated with the prosecution and with caring for the animal victim(s); (5) court-ordered psychological or psychiatric counseling; (6) a ban on owning animals in the future; and (7) permanent forfeiture of the animal victim(s).
In Michigan, there are three state agencies that have been granted some level of authority to regulate the import, possession, use, and treatment of apes within the state. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNR) regulates the import and possession of native and foreign wild animals within the state. Apes are among the most strictly regulated animals in the state because of their status as endangered or threatened species under the Federal Endangered Species Act. The Michigan Department of Agriculture, Animal Industry Division (AID) is responsible for monitoring the importation of animals into the state and for ensuring the health and safety of animals residing within the state. All apes that are imported into the state fall within the purview of AID and their importation and treatment are subject to that agency’s oversight. The Michigan Department of Community Health regulates the scientific research facilities within the state, including those that use live animals for research experiments. The agency administers a registration and inspection program to ensure that animals used by those research facilities are afforded certain minimum standards of care.
Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act makes it illegal to take, possess, transport, import, export, process, sell, offer for sale, buy, offer to buy, or receive for shipment any species of wildlife that is listed as threatened or endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). All gorillas, orangutans, bonobos, gibbons, and wild populations of chimpanzees are listed as endangered and captive bred chimpanzees are listed as threatened. Therefore, it is illegal to import, transport, possess, or sell any ape except with a permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) pursuant to the ESA, or with an applicable permit issued by another state. FWS does not issue permits for the importation, possession, breeding, or sale of apes for use as pets because according to the agency, “[u]sing protected species as pets is not consistent with the purposes of the Act.” Also, FWS does not issue permits of any kind for certain “threatened” captive chimpanzees; specifically, captive chimpanzees that have been born in the United States since 1976. As a result, no person would be able to obtain a federal permit for those captive chimpanzees. It is important to note that the permit exemption does not apply to apes that originated in Michigan; so it is illegal to transport, possess, or sell any ape that was born in Michigan, regardless of whether a person possesses a federal or state permit authorizing those activities.
The Department of Natural Resources and Environment has dedicated law enforcement officers, or “conservation officers,” who are employed by the agency, and who have the power and authority to conduct inspections, seize animals, and enforce all relevant provisions of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. Conservation officers also have the authority to actually prosecute violations involving Great Apes without the sanction or participation of any prosecuting attorney.
In addition, any law enforcement officer, or deputized humane officer, as discussed in Section II(A) above, can enforce the relevant provisions of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. The illegal import, transport, transfer, or possession of any Great Ape in violation of that law is a misdemeanor.
The Michigan Department of Agriculture’s (MDA) Animal Industry Division (AID) regulates the importation of Great Apes. Although the Animal Industry Act makes it illegal to import “any species having the potential to spread serious diseases or parasites, to cause serious physical harm, or to otherwise endanger native wildlife, human life, livestock, domestic animals, or property,” MDA maintains that this prohibition does not apply to Great Apes. While the importation of apes is not prohibited by MDA, it is prohibited by the DNR, except pursuant to a permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or by another state. Any Great Ape that is imported into the state must be accompanied by an interstate health certificate or certificate of veterinary inspection certifying that the animal is free from infectious disease, which is issued within the 30 days prior to the animal’s arrival. Interestingly, tucked within the small one-page statute regarding the importation of wild and exotic animals, is an even smaller one-and-a-half-line provision that mandates that any Great Ape imported into the state must receive housing, feeding, restraining, and care that is approved by the director of MDA. A violation of the aforementioned sections of the Animal Industry Act is a misdemeanor, and in addition to criminal penalties, may incur administrative or civil fines, as well as financial liability for prosecution costs.
MDA is responsible for regulating animal control facilities and animal protection shelters within the state and for ensuring that the animals maintained by those facilities are maintained pursuant to certain minimum standards of care. However, most of the agency’s regulations do not protect animals possessed by those facilities other than dogs and cats (i.e. housing standards; feeding requirements; cleaning and sanitation standards; heating, ventilation, and lighting requirements; record requirements;outdoor shelter standards, etc.). The few laws that are applicable to Great Apes mandate the following minimum standards of care: (1) “provisions” must be made for the removal and disposal of dead animals, animal and food waste, and bedding; (2) food and bedding must be protected against “vermin” contamination or infestation; (3) perishable food must be refrigerated; (4) excess water must be eliminated from indoor enclosures; (5) foul odors from drains should be avoided; (6) a veterinarian must be consulted when a “health hazard” arises; and (7) animals housed in the same cage must be compatible and of the same species. Any failure to comply with the aforementioned basic standards of care is a misdemeanor, and in addition to criminal penalties, may result in suspension or revocation of the facility’s registration,administrative fines, and forfeiture of the animal victim(s).
Pursuant to the Public Health Code, it is illegal to keep or use any “living, vertebrate animal,” including any ape, for “experimental purposes,” unless registered to do so by the Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH). The Bureau of Laboratories (a division of MDCH), in conjunction with the Animal Research Advisory Board,administers the registration program and regulates all registered entities to ensure compliance with minimum standards of care for animals that are maintained or used for research purposes.
Any “person” or facility wishing to maintain or use Great Apes for scientific research must: (1) be “qualified by professional training;” (2) submit a completed registration application to MDCH; and (3) demonstrate that the applicant’s laboratory animal facility and procedures for the care and use of the animals are in “substantial conformance”with all applicable regulations and the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Guide).
As a condition of registration, all registrants must comply with the minimum standards of care set forth in the Guide. In addition, all registrants must comply with the following MDCH rules: (1) “careful consideration” must be given to the physical comfort and welfare of the animals; (2) registrants must arrange for “humane handling” of animals while they are being transported within a facility or between facilities; (3) “painful procedure[s]” that are conducted without the use of anesthetics, analgesics, or tranquilizers must be supervised by a “responsible scientist;” (4) registrants must attempt to minimize pain, discomfort, and the consequences of any disability suffered by an animal as a result of scientific experiments; (5) any animal that cannot live without permanent pain or prolonged discomfort resulting from an experiment must be humanely and painlessly killed; and (6) registrants must ensure that an animal is dead before discarding his or her body.
All registrants are subject to an annual inspection, or more frequently at MDCH’s discretion. If an inspection uncovers evidence of violations of the foregoing standards or rules, a registrant may be placed on probation and given a “reasonable amount of time” to achieve “substantial compliance.” If a registered facility subsequently fails to achieve that compliance, then MDCH may suspend or revoke the registration. Any person that maintains or uses apes for scientific experimentation in violation of the Public Health Code is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The statutes and regulations that are discussed in Section 2 all govern certain aspects of the import, possession, use, or treatment of captive apes that are possessed for various purposes. The laws are not uniformly applicable to all apes; instead, they vary according to the particular purpose for which an ape is possessed. In the U.S., captive apes are generally possessed for use as pets, scientific research subjects, for exhibition or other commercial purposes, or they are retired and live in sanctuaries. The remainder of this section discusses how the state’s laws affect apes that are possessed for those purposes.
Pursuant to Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, it is illegal to take, possess, transport, import, export, process, sell, offer for sale, buy, offer to buy, or receive for shipment, any species of wildlife that is listed as threatened or endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), except pursuant to a permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), or pursuant to an applicable permit issued by another state. All species of apes are listed as either threatened or endangered under the ESA, and it is illegal to conduct any of the aforementioned activities with any ape in Michigan without such a permit. The permit exemption does not include apes that were born in Michigan, regardless of whether a person possesses a federal or state permit to possess those animals. So, it is illegal to transport, possess, or sell any ape that was born in Michigan for any purpose, including for use as pets. Therefore, in order to legally possess an ape as a pet in Michigan, a person would have to obtain the animal from another state and possess an “applicable” permit issued by another state (because FWS does not issue federal permits to import, transport, or sell apes for use as pets). However, federal laws make it illegal to transport many apes across state lines for commercial purposes without a FWS permit, so even with an “applicable” permit issued by another state, a person still may be unable to actually import that animal into Michigan legally. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNR) is responsible for ensuring that apes are not imported, transported, possessed, bought, or sold for use as pets in violation of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act..
In Michigan, it is illegal to take, possess, transport, import, export, buy, sell, or receive for shipment, any species of wildlife that is listed as threatened or endangered under theFederal Endangered Species Act (ESA), except pursuant to a permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or pursuant to an “applicable” permit issued by another state. All species of apes are listed as either endangered or threatened under the ESA, so based upon a strict reading of those laws, it is illegal to import, possess or maintain any apes for research purposes, except as authorized by one of those permits. The permit exemption does not apply to apes that were born in Michigan, so it is illegal to transport, possess, or sell those apes, for scientific research or any other purpose, regardless of whether a facility holds a federal or state permit for those animals. Also, FWS does not issue permits for captive chimpanzees that have been born in the United States since 1976.Otherwise, that agency may issue permits to import, transport, sell, or “take” other chimpanzees and all other species of apes for scientific research under limited circumstances. For more information on the issuance of permits by FWS pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, see the discussion of the Federal Endangered Species Act. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNR) is responsible for ensuring that any research facility that imports, possesses, transports, buys, sells, or “takes” any ape for research purposes has a valid U.S. Fish and Wildlife permit (or an “applicable” permit issued by another state) authorizing those activities.
The Michigan Department of Agriculture (MDA), Animal Industry Division (AID) regulates the importation of apes for research purposes. Any ape that is imported pursuant to a FWS permit must be accompanied by an interstate health certificate or certificate of veterinary inspection certifying that the animal is free from infectious disease. In addition, any facility that is permitted to import any exotic or wild animal, including an ape, must comply with MDA’s approved standards for the housing, feeding, restraining, and care of those animals.
Any facility that maintains or uses Great Apes for scientific research is regulated by the Michigan Department of Community Health, Bureau of Laboratories (MDCH). As discussed in Section II(B)(iii) above, it is illegal for any research facility within the state to maintain or use any ape for experimental purposes without being registered with MDCH. In addition to registering those facilities, MDCH is responsible for inspecting the facilities to ensure compliance with the Public Health Code and the agency’s rules and standards for the maintenance and use of apes for scientific research. Any violation of the relevant provisions of the Public Health Code is a misdemeanor, and MDCH may revoke a facility’s registration for uncorrected violations.
Although the state’s anti-cruelty statutes, as discussed in Section II(A) above, make it a felony to knowingly, “kill, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure” apes, there is an exemption for the lawful killing or use of those animals for scientific research. However, because all species of apes are listed as endangered or threatened under the Federal Endangered Species Act, Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act makes it illegal to “take” (meaning harm, wound, or kill) those animals without a permit issued by FWS (or an “applicable” permit issued by another state). That law applies to research facilities; as a result, it is illegal to use apes in any scientific experiments that involve harming, wounding, or killing those animals, except pursuant to a permit that authorizes those activities. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNR) is responsible for ensuring that research facilities do not harm, wound, or kill apes without a valid permit authorizing the “take” of those animals.
The commercial use of apes generally includes breeding, sale, display, and exhibition of those animals. Pursuant to Michigan’s Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, it is illegal to take, possess, transport, import, export, buy, sell, or receive for shipment any ape for commercial purposes, except as authorized by a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) permit, or pursuant to an “applicable” permit issued by another state. The permit exemption does not apply to apes that were born in Michigan, so it is illegal to transport, possess, or sell those apes, for exhibition, sale, or other commercial purposes, regardless of whether a facility holds a federal or state permit for those animals. Also, FWS will not issue permits to breed or sell apes for use as pets, nor will the agency issue permits for captive chimpanzees that have been born in the United States since 1976. Otherwise, FWS may issue permits to import, transport, breed, sell, or “take” other chimpanzees and all other species of apes for commercial purposes under limited circumstances. For more information on the issuance of permits by FWS pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, see the discussion of the Federal Endangered Species Act. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNR) is responsible for ensuring that any person or facility that imports, possesses, transports, buys, sells, or “takes” any ape for commercial purposes has a valid U.S. Fish and Wildlife permit (or an applicable permit issued by another state) authorizing those activities.
Michigan’s anti-cruelty statutes, as discussed in Section II(B) above, generally protect apes that are possessed for entertainment and other commercial purposes. According to those laws, apes must be given “sufficient” food, water, shelter, sanitary conditions, exercise, and medical care in order to maintain the animals “in a state of good health.” The requirement for the provision of sufficient exercise is particularly important because the Federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA), which also regulates the treatment of apes that are possessed for commercial purposes, does not expressly mandate that apes be given “sufficient” exercise. So, this requirement affords apes a higher standard of care than the AWA provides. Also, the state’s anti-cruelty laws include minimum standards for the transportation of apes in vehicles. All apes must be transported in secure enclosures or cages that are large enough for the animals to stand, turn around, and lie down. The state’s law requires larger transport cages than the AWA, which mandates that cages be just large enough for apes to turn around freely and sit up without their heads hitting the top of the cage. The AWA also allows larger apes to be more restricted in transport cages for the safety of the animals, handlers, or other humans. Such cages, although in compliance with the AWA, are not in compliance with the state’s law, so individuals and facilities that transport apes in vehicles within Michigan must utilize transport cages or enclosures that meet the larger minimum size requirements of the state’s law.
Both the anti-cruelty statutes and the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (discussed in Section II(B)(i), above) protect apes from being overworked or physically abused. The former law makes it illegal to cruelly drive, work, beat, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure any ape. The latter law makes it illegal to “take” (meaning harm, wound, or kill) all species of apes without a permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (or an “applicable” permit issued by another state). These laws may be used to protect apes that are overworked or that are trained or induced to perform for public entertainment with chemical, electrical, mechanical, and manual devices that inflict physical or psychological injuries.
In Michigan, there are no state-level laws that define or regulate wild or exotic animal sanctuaries. This means that any facility can label itself a “sanctuary,” regardless of whether it operates for profit or maintains apes for commercial purposes. Any facility that calls itself a “sanctuary” is subject to the same laws and regulations as facilities that use apes for commercial purposes (discussed in Section III(C) above).
Certain provisions within Michigan’s state statutes authorize counties and local municipalities to prohibit or regulate the local possession and use of Great Apes, regardless of whether a would-be possessor has secured a federal permit to keep those animals. There are many local ordinances in Michigan that directly and indirectly govern the possession, use, and treatment of apes. The following list of ordinances is not exhaustive; rather, it is a partial list of local laws that demonstrates how some towns, cities, and counties in Michigan have addressed the issue.
Bad Axe 3-51 et seq.: It is illegal to import, buy, sell, or possess a Great Ape within the city limits. The ban does not apply to zoos, educational or scientific institutions, museums, circuses, animal exhibitions, and pet shops.
Burton 133.05: It is illegal to keep, harbor, or own any Great Ape. The ban does not apply to AZA accredited zoos, wildlife sanctuaries, nature preserves, circuses, and scientific, medical, or educational research facilities.
Center Line 10-32: It is illegal to possess, breed, exchange, buy, sell, or attempt or offer to buy or sell Great Apes within the city limits. The ban does not apply to Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) accredited zoos, wildlife sanctuaries, circuses, and scientific or educational facilities.
Clayton Township 4.15: It is illegal to keep any “wild animal” (not a domestic animal or not a usual pet) within the township.
Davison 612.02: It is illegal to keep or house any animal that is not commonly classified as a pet.
Grand Rapids 8.505, 8.582, 5.16.02: It is illegal to keep or possess any animal that is not a “domestic animal” or a farm animal. Great Apes are not included within either exemption and so are banned within the city limits. Additionally, it is illegal for any facility to breed, raise, train, sell, or treat apes.
Ironwood 6-4: It is illegal to possess, keep, or maintain any “wild or exotic” animal within the city limits.
Kalamazoo 7-7: It is illegal to keep or maintain any ape within the city limits. The ban does not apply to publicly maintained and supervised zoos, and certain circuses, educational institutions, and medical or pharmaceutical laboratories.
Middleville 14-177: It is illegal to keep, maintain, or display any “wild animal” in any residential district or dwelling. A local permit is required to possess such animals in other districts within the village. The permit requirement does not apply to zoos and circuses.
Montrose 15.14: It is illegal to keep any animal that is not normally considered a household pet.
Rogers City 32-64: It is illegal to keep or house any animal that is not a common household pet.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50 et seq.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50; However, the anti-cruelty statutes do not protect Great Apes that are possessed for scientific research. Id; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50b.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.52.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.53.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50b.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50b; A court may order permanent forfeiture of the animal victims before the final disposition of the criminal charge. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.101 et seq.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36505.
 50 C.F.R. § 17.11; 50 C.F.R. § 17.40.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36505; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 et seq.
 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Act: Permits for Non-native Species or Import and Export of Non-native and Native Species, available athttp://www.fws.gov/international/DMA_DSA/pdf/esa.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.1501.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.1602.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.1606.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.1602; Such prosecutions may take place in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the violation occurred. The conservation officer appears on behalf of the people in lieu of a prosecutor. Id.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36506.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36507; Any conviction thereunder is punishable by up to 90 days imprisonment, a fine ranging from $100.00 - $1,000.00, or both. Id.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.701 et seq.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.731.
 Email from Michele Finateri, DVM, Program Manager, Michigan Department of Agriculture Animal Industry Division (Sept. 13, 2010) (on file with the author).
 The statutory text refers to any “wild animal or exotic animal species,” which includes Great Apes. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.731.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.744.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.21.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.31.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.32; Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.33.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.23.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.13.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.24.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.22.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.36.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.34.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.340.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.339b; See also, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.333 et seq. (discussing general license and registration requirements for animal control facilities and animal protection shelters).
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.339b.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 285.151.37.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.921.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.921; “Use of animals for experimental purposes” means use of animals for the diagnosis and treatment of human and animal diseases; the advancement of veterinary, dental, medical, and biological sciences; and the testing, diagnosis, improvement, and standardization of laboratory specimens, biologic products, pharmaceuticals, and drugs. Id.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2676; Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.922.
 The Animal Research Advisory Board is a nine-member board organized within the Department of Community Health to regulate and establish standards for the humane use of animals in research. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2671 et.seq.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2676.
 “Person” means any individual, laboratory, firm, association, corporation, partnership, trust, estate, educational institution, or other legal entity. Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.921.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.922. The regulations do not elaborate on the sort of “professional training” that is required in order for a person to qualify for registration.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.922.
 “Substantial conformance” is not defined or quantified within the regulations.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.922; Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, no. (NIH) 78-23 (1978); Copies of the guide are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., (DHEW publication (NIH) 78-23, rev. 1978) at a cost of $2.20 or from the Michigan Department of Public Health, Bureau of Disease Control and Laboratory Services, 3500 N. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd., P.O. Box 30035, Lansing, Michigan 48909 at a cost of $2.20. Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.925.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.923.
 Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.924; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2675.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2676; Mich. Admin. Code R. 325.924.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.1299.
 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 41.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50b.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36501.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50; This provision includes a clause which states that it does not prohibit the lawful use of animals by zoological parks (which are not defined). It is unclear whether the failure of zoological parks to provide adequate care would be considered a violation or would be considered a lawful use under this provision. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50(11)(d).
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50; This provision includes a clause which states that it does not prohibit the lawful use of animals by zoological parks (which are not defined). It is unclear whether the failure of zoological parks to transport apes in cages that meet the minimum size requirements would be considered a violation or would be considered a lawful use under this provision. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50(11)(d).
 This law applies to all animals that are listed as threatened or endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act. All species of apes are listed as either threatened or endangered. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.36501.
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 91.1; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 41.181; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 42.15; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 46.11; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 117.4i; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Const. Art. 7 § 22; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Const. Art. 7 § 2.