State v. A.H. (2018) A.H.’s family hired Scott Key A.H. was indicted for multiple counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children for allegedly breaking both legs, multiple toes, and ribs of his six-week-old baby. The baby also had multiple injuries to his mouth and the back of his throat. A.H. was indicted, along the child’s mother. Mr. Key filed extensive pre-trial motions, resulting in the dismissal of the initial indictment. The case proceeded to trial, with Scott Key and Kayci Timmons presenting A.H.’s defense that the mother was solely responsible for injuries to the baby. During the trial, the defense strategically questioned the State’s expert medical witnesses to demonstrate that the timeline for possible injury excluded A.H.’s possible involvement. After a week-long trial, A.H. was found not guilty of all counts.
A.H.’s co-defendant was convicted of all counts and sentenced to serve 60 years in prison.
State v. A.R. (2018) A.R.’s family hired Scott Key after he entered a plea in the Superior Court of Coweta County and stipulated to the violation of his probation in the Superior Court of Fayette County. Previous counsel had advised A.R. that he would likely be parole on time served. However, after spending a few weeks in custody, A.R. learned that he would spend seven more months in custody. Key filed a motion to modify sentence in both courts. After an in-chambers meeting in Fayette and a formal hearing in Coweta, both courts re-sentenced to A.R. to time served.
State v. D.H. (2018) D.H.’s family hired Scott Key and Kayci Timmons after being convicted in the Superior Court of Fayette County and being harshly sentenced for Arson in the Third Degree. After filing a motion for new trial on behalf of D.H. in the Superior Court of Fayette County, Scott Key was able to work out the case for re-sentencing so that D.H. was afforded first offender status and credited for time served.
Morales v. State (Decided July 7, 2015) Scott Key represented Morales in this case an obtained a reversal of his convictions for trafficking, possession, and possession with the intent to distribute due to insufficiency of the evidence.
Darst v. State (Decided July 16, 2013) Scott Key represented Darst in this case that overturned a child molestation conviction and 60-year sentence and which clarified the standard of care for lawyers in child molestation cases in terms of expert witnesses.
that the property was rightfully distributed, the original divorce and equitable distribution of property was affirmed in S.D.P.’s favor.
Elliott v. State (Decided February 18, 2019) In 2015, Elliott was arrested for DUI and other traffic offenses. Upon the arresting officers reading Georgia’s Implied Consent Notice - which states that the accused does have a right to refuse to submit to chemical testing, but such a refusal can be used against the accused at trial - Elliott exercised her constitutional right to refuse to submit to testing. The State then prosecuted Elliott for DUI and sought to use her refusal to submit to a breath test against her at trial. Elliott filed a motion to suppress her refusal to submit to a breath test at trial, claiming such use would violate her right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court denied Elliott’s motion and it was appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Scott Key, as the acting GACDL President and upon request by the Georgia Supreme Court, wrote an amicus brief in support of Elliott, arguing that it is unconstitutional for a person to exercise a constitutional right to refuse to submit to a chemical test but then be penalized for exercising that right at trial. By unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of Elliott’s motion to suppress the refusal and held that the Georgia Constitution precluded admission of evidence that a suspect refused to submit to a breath test, and accordingly, the implied consent statute (O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b)(1)) and statute pertaining to the use of refusals of chemical tests at trial (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d)) were unconstitutional to the extent that they allow a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test to be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial.
Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd. (Decided March 21, 2016) In 2012, Gregory was convicted of Obscene Internet Contact with a Child, a felony, and sentenced to prison and probation following completion of that sentence. For purposes of Georgia law, this felony was considered a “dangerous sexual offense” and in turn, Gregory was considered a “sexual offender.” As a sexual offender, Gregory was subject to certain sexual offender registration laws with strict requirements and classification levels. In 2013, the board classified Gregory as a “sexually dangerous predator” based principally on a clinical evaluator’s recommendation. Gregory requested a hearing to challenge the classification, but was denied the hearing. Gregory then filed for judicial review, with Scott Key as his attorney on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and held that because a liberty interest affected by classification as a sexually dangerous predator is substantial and the danger of erroneous classification substantially more significant in the absence of a hearing, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing be afforded defendant upon request, due to his classification as a sexually dangerous predator.
Neuman v. State (Decided June 15, 2015) After being indicted and convicted for murder and possession of a firearm in connection with the murder, Neuman’s family hired Scott Key to represent him on appeal. After arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence that was protected by attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court agreed and Nueman’s conviction was reversed.
Ellington v. State (Decided November 19, 2012) Ellington was convicted of murder and subsequently sentenced to death. As amicus counsel, Scott Key argued on behalf of Ellington to have his death sentence overturned. The Supreme Court agreed with the defense and Ellington’s death sentence was overturned.
Ling v. State (Decided November 22, 2010) Ling’s family hired Scott Key as counsel for this cornerstone case which established the constitutional right to an interpreter for non-English-Speaking Defendants.


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Uncle Sam for President! – Uncle Sam was Crying… Now he's out to change Washington.
It is a common attack by Democrats on conservatives to engage in what is known as “playing the race card”. Rarely a day passes without Liberals accusing conservatives of racism & a variety of other horrible names. A calculation of 26 major civil rights votes from 1933 through the 1960’s civil rights era shows that Republicans favored civil rights in approximately 96% of the votes, whereas the Democrats opposed them in 80% of the votes! These facts are often intentionally overlooked by the left wing Democrats for obvious reasons. In some cases, the Democrats have told flat out lies about their shameful record during the civil rights movement.
January 2011 …“As far as we know, her attacker had no grand political point; I doubt we will ever really understand his motives. What the shooting does tell us, however, is that it is impossible to eliminate the risks faces by elected officials when they interact with their constituents…Therefore it is incumbent on all Americans to create an atmosphere of civility and respect in which political discourse can flow freely, without fear of violent confrontation”.
October 2010…“Instead of running for Governor of Florida, they ought have him [Rick Scott, the Republican gubernatorial candidate] and shoot him. Put him against the wall and shoot him”.
2004: Barack Obama told a group of reporters in Boston that the United States had an “absolute obligation” to remain in Iraq long enough to make it a success.”The failure of the Iraqi state would be a disaster,” …“It would dishonor the 900-plus men and women who have already died. . . . It would be a betrayal of the promise that we made to the Iraqi people, and it would be hugely destabilizing from a national security perspective.” VS 2008 Presidential campaign… bring em home now.
2007: “In case you missed it, this week, there was a tragedy in Kansas. Ten thousand people died — an entire town destroyed,” the Democratic presidential candidate said in a speech to 500 people packed into a sweltering Richmond art studio for a fundraiser.The death toll was 12.
2007: “I was a constitutional law professor, which means unlike the current president I actually respect the Constitution.” For the record, Obama is a “Senior Lecturer (on leave of absence)” at the University of Chicago Law School. He has taught Constitutional Law III: Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, Current Issues in Racism & the Law, and Voting Rights & the Democratic Process.
2007: On January 24, the Obama campaign released a statement, saying, “To be clear, Senator Obama has never been a Muslim, was not raised a Muslim, and is a committed Christian who attends the United Church of Christ in Chicago.On March 14th, in a statement to The Times, the Obama campaign offered this statement to correct their previous statement, that appears to be a bold-faced lie:”Obama has never been a practicing Muslim. The statement added that as a child, Obama had spent time in the neighborhood’s Islamic center.”And, the original statement began, “To be clear …”So, in three months, Barrack’s campaign has gone from describing the U.S. presidential hopeful as never having been a Muslim and never having been raised as a Muslim to now never having been a practicing Muslim.
2008: Obama says he “vehemently condemns” the words of his pastor and mentor, Rev. Jeremiah A. Wright, an official member of Obama’s campaign, is a member of Obama’s African American Religious Leadership Committee. Obama admits he never heard “the Rev’s” despicable words. Barry & Michelle listen to this man for 20 years, yet claim he had no idea the “the Rev” was such an anti-American, racist & hate-monger! .. Hmmm why did he never denounce Jerry in the past 20 years?…he wasn’t running for President.
2008: “Had I heard them in church I would have expressed that concern directly to Rev. Wright.” Please note, he says that he would have expressed concern, not repudiate.
2008: Contrary to a campaign ad, it wasn’t “courageous” to give his 2002 anti-war speech, primarily because he delivered it at an anti-Iraq war rally.At the last debate, America’s former co-president claimed that it was easy to give that speech, and it wasn’t a gamble for him because he wasn’t in the US Senate and therefore wasn’t in a position of responsibility. Obama’s impassioned reply was, “I was in the midst of a U.S. Senate campaign. It was a high-stakes campaign.”Wrong. In reality, Obama did not announce his intentions to run for the US Senate until January 2003.
2008: Hillary Clinton Campaign releases a video that proves that Obama lied about his position on “single-payer healthcare.”The video compares statements Obama made during the January 21st Democratic debate with those he made to an AFL-CIO conference in June 2003 while campaigning for the Senate. Contradicting what Obama said at the debate, the old footage shows the senator saying, “I happen to be a proponent of single-payer universal healthcare coverage. That’s what I’d like to see.”At the debate, Obama stated: “I never said that we should try to go ahead and get single-payer (healthcare).”Single-payer healthcare is an euphemism for socialized medicine.
Obama say he doesn’t take money from DC lobbyists and special interest PACS. This is the type of double-talk “politics of the past” rhetoric Obama rails against.While his claim is technically true, what he does do is take money from state lobbyists and other big money contributors who have substantial lobbyist machines in DC, like law firms and corporations. In April 2007, the LA Times quoted the Campaign Finance Institute’s Stephen Weissman as pointing out that the distinction Obama makes on lobbyist money is meaningless: “He gets an asterisk that says he is trying to be different. … But overall, the same wealthy interests are funding his campaign as are funding other candidates, whether or not they are lobbyists.”The Capital Eye reported that “[a]ccording to the Center for Responsive Politics, 14 of Obama’s top 20 contributors employed lobbyists this year, spending a total of $16.2 million to influence the federal government in the first six months of 2007.” Obama’s no stranger to being influenced by those campaign donations, either.
“I am the only candidate who isn’t taking a dime from Washington lobbyist” – However, the record shows quite the opposite. According to USA Today, Obama’s campaign fundraising team includes 38 members of law firms that were paid $138 million last year to lobby the federal government, records show. Those lawyers, including 10 former federal lobbyists, have pledged to raise at least $3.5 million for the Illinois senator’s presidential race. Employees of their firms have given Obama’s campaign $2.26 million.
“McCain (he) is willing to send our troops too another war of 100 years in Iraq”.
Implemented the most horrible racist policies of the 20th Century – the Japanese Internment Camps during World War II. Roosevelt unilaterally and knowingly enacted Japanese Internment through the use of presidential Executive Orders 9066 and 9102 during the early years of the war. These orders single-handedly led to the imprisonment of an estimated 120,000 law-abiding Americans of Japanese ancestry, the overwhelming majority of them natural-born second and third generation American citizens.
A former Democrat Senator from Alabama and liberal U.S. Supreme Court Justice appointed by FDR, Hugo Black had a lengthy history of hate group activism. Black was a member of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920’s and gained his legal fame defending Klansmen under prosecution for racial murders. In one prominent case, Black provided legal representation to Klansman Edwin Stephenson for the hate-induced murder of a Catholic priest in Birmingham. A jury composed of several Klan members acquited Stephenson of the murder, reportedly after Black expressed Klan gestures to the jury during the trial.
Byrd has been reelected more times than any other Democrat senator, has served as a Democrat in Congress, a Democrat State Senator in West Virginia, and a Democrat State Delegate in West Virginia. Democrats have made repeatedly elected Byrd into their national party leadership and into the U.S. Senate leadership. He became secretary of the Senate Democrat Caucus in 1967, and Senate Democrat Whip in 1971. The Democrats elected former Klansman Byrd as their Senate Majority Leader from 1977-1980 and as their Senate Minority Leader from 1981-1986. Byrd was again elected Democrat Majority Leader from 1987-1988. Democrats made Byrd the chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee and President Pro Tempore of the Senate from 1989 until the Republicans won control of the Senate in November 1994. Following the defection of Jim Jeffords in June 2001, the Democrats again made Byrd the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and elected him to the highest ranking office in the Senate: the President Pro Tempore, a position which also put this former Klansman 4th in line for the presidency.
Jackson was the featured prime time speaker at the 2000 Democrat Convention. Jackson has a history of using anti-Semitic slurs and derogatorily calling New York City “Hymietown.” Jackson, a prominent self proclaimed “civil rights leader,” is himself guilty of the same bigotry he dishonestly purports to oppose.
July 23, 1961 meeting of segregationist Democrats to organize their opposition to the civil rights movement. Hollings was one of four governors in attendance, all of them Democrats. The others included rabid segregationists Orval Faubus of Arkansas and Ross Barnett of Mississippi. The New York Times reported on the meeting, noting that among the strategies discussed were using the segregationist White Citizens Council organization to mobilize political opposition to desegregation.
Former Democrat Minority Leader in the U.S. House of Representatives, gave several speeches to a St. Louis area hate group during his early years as a representative. According to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Gephardt spoke before the Metro South Citizens Council, a now defunct white supremacist organization, during his early years as a congressman.
Aside from the multiple Klan members who have served in elected capacity within the high ranks of the Democrat Party, the political party itself has a lengthy but often overlooked history of involvement with the Ku Klux Klan. Though it has been all but forgotten by the media, the Democrat National Convention of 1924 was host to one of the largest Klan gatherings in American history. Dubbed the “Klanbake convention” at the time, the 1924 Democrat National Convention in New York was dominated by a platform dispute surrounding the Ku Klux Klan. A minority of the delegates to the convention attempted to condemn the hate group in the party’s platform, but found their proposal shot down by Klan supporters within the party. As delegates inside the convention voted in the Klan’s favor, the Klan itself mobilized a celebratory rally outside. On July 4, 1924 one of the largest Klan gatherings ever occurred outside the convention on a field in nearby New Jersey. The event was marked by speakers spewing racial hatred, celebrations of their platform victory in the Democrat Convention, and ended in a cross burning.
Democratic Senators organized the record Senate filibuster of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Included among the organizers were several prominent and well known liberal Democrat standard bearers including: – Robert Byrd, current senator from West Virginia – J. William Fulbright, Arkansas senator and political mentor of Bill Clinton – Albert Gore Sr., Tennessee senator, father and political mentor of Al Gore. Gore Jr. has been known to lie about his father’s opposition to the Civil Rights Act. – Sam Ervin, North Carolina senator of Watergate hearings fame – Richard Russell, famed Georgia senator and later President Pro Tempore.
Outside of Congress, the three most notorious opponents of school integration were all Democrats: – Orval Faubus, Democrat Governor of Arkansas and one of Bill Clinton’s political heroes – George Wallace, Democrat Governor of Alabama – Lester Maddox, Democrat Governor of Georgia.
The Democrat Party organization resisted integration and refused to allow minority participation for decades. Exclusion of minorities was the general rule of the Democrat Party of many states for decades, especially in Texas. This racist policy reached its peak under the New Deal in the southern and western states, often known as the New Deal Coalition region of FDR. The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Herndon declared the practice of “white primaries” unconstitutional in 1927 after states had passed laws barring Blacks from participating in Democrat primaries. But the Democrat Parties did not yield to the Court’s order. After Nixon v. Herndon, Democrats simply made rules within the party’s individual executive committees to bar minorities from participating, which were struck down in Nixon v. Condon in 1932. The Democrats, in typical racist fashion, responded by using state parties to pass rules barring blacks from participation. This decision was upheld in Grovey v. Townsend, which was not overturned until 1944 by Smith v. Allwright. The Texas Democrats responded with their usual ploys and turned to what was known as the “Jaybird system” which used private Democrat clubs to hold white-only votes on a slate of candidates, which were then transferred to the Democrat party itself and put on their primary ballot as the only choices. Terry v. Adams overturned the Jaybird system, prompting the Democrats to institute blocks of unit rule voting procedures as well as the infamous literacy tests and other Jim Crow regulations to specifically block minorities from participating in their primaries. In the end, it took 4 direct Supreme Court orders to end the Democrat’s “white primary” system, and after that it took countless additional orders, several acts of Congress, and a constitutional amendment to tear down the Jim Crow codes that preserved the Democrat’s white primary for decades beyond the final Supreme Court order ruling it officially unconstitutional.
Black Americans have been voting for the Democrats en masse for almost 40 years. What do they have to show for it economically? Here’s what they have to show for it: In 2009, the average net worth for white households was $113,149 and $5,700 for black households. Great job, Democratic Party!
As long as black Americans vote monolithically for the Democratic Party, they will always be treated like dirt. There’s never any question which party black Americans are voting for. The only real question is turnout. This leads to the Democratic Party treating black voters as an afterthought. Yes, politicians show up to a black church on the Sunday before an election or toss a little largesse towards Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton, but they could give a damn about the average black American because there’s no reason for them to care. The only thing any Democrat has to do is claim that his opponent is a racist and he’s got 90 percent of the black vote locked up. On the other hand, Republicans have absolutely no reason to pursue black voters because no matter what they do, they believe they’re going to be branded as racist, and their opponents will collect 90% of the black vote. Until black Americans start giving some indications that their votes are up for grabs, they will continue to be ignored by both parties.
Black Americans are not as liberal as their voting records seem to show. Many black Americans actually see eye-to-eye with Republicans on many social issues including abortion, gay marriage, and being friendly to Christianity. Many black Americans also agree with the conservative stance on illegal immigration, school choice, being tough on crime, and supporting entrepreneurs — and no wonder. For a lot of black Americans, a vote for the Democratic Party is a vote to lose their job to an illegal alien, trap their kids in a lousy school, and get criminals released back into their neighborhood.
Louis Farrakhan, who has campaigned for numerous Democrats over the years, is in favor of corporal punishment, building small businesses, and he believes that welfare is a trap that keeps black Americans mired in poverty. Incidentally — it is.
Black Americans stop buying the phony baloney “He’s a racist” line that Democrats peddle in every election and start genuinely considering Republican candidates on the issues, suddenly both parties will start giving black Americans the attention they deserve.
What has the Democratic Party’s “help” over the last 40 years achieved for black Americans? The Democratic Party’s line is that black Americans need their “help” to get by in a racist world. Here’s an alternate theory: Buying into the Democratic Party’s philosophy and accepting “help” has been one of the biggest reasons that black Americans lag behind white Americans. Black males are 6 times as likely to be in prison as white males and black Americans make up 49% of the homicide victims in America. 71.6% of all black Americans are born out of wedlock and black Americans are almost twice as likely to drop out of high school as white Americans, both of which help explain why the black poverty rate is almost 2 1/2 times the white poverty rate.
Democrats point fingers and accuse Republicans of partisan politics. Oh, they yelled and hollered and pounded the podiums as they accused the GOP of being unwilling to work together for the good of the nation. Those same Democrats, standing at the same podiums, then said that whatever the Republican controlled House passed would not even be considered by the Democratic controlled Senate. At one juncture, the House Republicans were in the process of re-writing their debt ceiling bill and its terms were not yet put to paper when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid publicly stated that no matter what they (House Republicans) came up with, would not see the light of day in the Senate.
Unions require photo ID to vote; however, they believe voters in public elections should not be required to present ID.
In 2004, House Democrats issued a letter to President Bush complaining of his administrations hard-line on housing specifically related to GSE’s: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They insisted he should NOT emphasize fiscal prudence and responsible lending, he SHOULD emphasize more affordable housing access. It read in part, “We have been concerned that the Administration’s legislative proposal regarding the GSEs would weaken affordable housing performance by the GSEs, by emphasizing only safety and soundness. While the GSEs’ affordable housing mission is not in any way incompatible with their safety and soundness, an exclusive focus on safety and soundness is likely to come, in practice, at the expense of affordable housing.
176 House Democrats have taken money from the Service Employees International Union in 2010 .
182 House Democrats have taken money from the United Food & Commercial Workers in 2010.
SEIU: goes as far as telling its locals that if a percentage of its members contribute, they will receive 1% of their high union dues back to the locals.
“[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.” Letter to President Clinton, signed by Sen’s. Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, John Kerry, and others Oct. 9, 1998.
“We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandated of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.” Sen. Carl Levin (d, MI), Sept. 19, 2002.
“We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.” Sen. Ted Kennedy (D, MA), Sept. 27, 2002.
“I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force– if necessary — to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security.” Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Oct. 9, 2002.
“There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years … We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction.” Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D, WV), Oct 10, 2002.
“In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al Qaeda members. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons.” Sen. Hillary Clinton (D, NY), Oct 10, 2002.
“We are in possession of what I think to be compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein has, and has had for a number of years, a developing capacity for the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction.” Sen. Bob Graham (D, FL) Dec. 8, 2002.
“[W]ithout question, we need t)o disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime … He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation … And now he is miscalculating America’s response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction … So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real …” Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Jan. 23. 2003.
The Black Voter … Republican or Democrat?
What has the Democratic Party’s “help” over the last 40 years achieved for black Americans? The Democratic Party’s line is that black Americans need their “help” to get by in a racist world. Here’s an alternate theory: Buying into the Democratic Party’s philosophy and accepting “help” has been one of the biggest reasons that black Americans lag behind white Americans. Black males are 6 times as likely to be in prison as white males and black Americans make up 49% of the homicide victims in America. 71.6% of all black Americans are born out-of-wedlock and black Americans are almost twice as likely to drop out of high school as white Americans, both of which help explain why the black poverty rate is almost 2 1/2 times the white poverty rate.
Failed to pay his income taxes in full and on time. The Internal Revenue Service on Sept. 9 filed a lien against a home Barry owns on Orange Street SE, claiming unpaid 2010 income taxes of $3,267.29. It is but the latest in a more than string of tax issues for the former four-term mayor, now D.C. Council member for Ward 8. Barry is currently repaying the federal and District governments for unpaid income taxes dating back to 1999. He originally pleaded guilty to a federal judge in 2005 to not filing federal or D.C. returns for the six years after he left the mayor’s office; he received three years of probation. In 2006, prosecutors returned to court after Barry failed to file his 2005 return. The judge, U.S. District Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson, declined prosecutors’ request to jail Barry. In 2009, Barry was ordered back to court after he failed to file his 2007 return. Again, Robinson declined prosecutors’ request to jail Barry, instead extending his probation. At that time, Barry owed $195,000, plus penalties and interest, to the feds and $51,000 to the District. The federal government started garnishing his council paycheck, and he continued a voluntary payment plan with the city. All told, it appears Barry has failed to file a return or pay his income tax in full for nine of the past 12 tax years.

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Canadian Bar Association - Does judicial review promote access to justice?
Does judicial review promote access to justice?
The critical issue that I would like to discuss in this presentation is the role that the principle of access to justice should or should not play in the analytical process used to determine the judicial review standards for administrative proceedings.
As we will see, in some cases, the Supreme Court has shown concern for the imperatives of access to justice in the analysis of certain matters pertaining to administrative litigation.
Decentralized administrative processes are governed by major imperatives of efficiency and finality, considering the nature of the matters raised, such as social issues, benefits or compensation, and the volume of decisions involved.
The cascade of successive administrative proceedings does not promote access to an efficient administrative justice system that renders decisions within reasonable time frames.
For certain administrative schemes, by the time a case comes under judicial review before the Superior Court, two, three or sometimes four adjudicative levels have already examined the matter.
For example, in the context of occupational accidents and diseases, the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases1 provides that the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail must conduct an initial assessment of all compensation claims and any payable indemnity – level #1.
A person who believes they were wronged may apply to the Commission for an internal review – level #2. That review decision from the Commission can be appealed before the Tribunal administratif du travail – level #3. Under certain circumstances, the person can ask the Tribunal administratif du travail to review or revoke its own decision2 – level #4.
The decision of the Tribunal administratif du travail is liable to review if an application for judicial review is filed with the Superior Court – level #5. Upon leave, the Court of Appeal may hear an appeal from a judicial review judgment rendered by the Superior Court – level #6. The Supreme Court can also grant leave to appeal if it believes that the matter is of national interest – level #7.
The volume of administrative litigation remains considerable at all levels.
For example, according to the operational report of the Tribunal administratif du travail covering the period from January 1 to March 31, 2016, 7,461 cases were opened in the occupational health and safety division alone.4 The processing time for administrative cases at all levels is often very long.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court issued 89 judgments in matters of administrative law since Dunsmuir, which illustrates the significant volume of administrative cases across Canada.
The layering of administrative proceedings inevitably leads to delays and costs for citizens.
The people covered by benefit or compensation plans are often vulnerable and destitute; they can include crime victims or persons who suffered an impairment after a motor vehicle accident.
It should also be noted that people who file administrative proceedings are often self-represented. They are frequently in a situation of imbalance of power when they have to face the government during disputes.
From the perspective of access to administrative justice, citizens are entitled to expect that a final decision will be rendered efficiently and quickly on their case.
The growing number of matters that are liable to review on the basis of correctness could have impacts on access to administrative justice.
The Supreme Court collaterally addressed the access to justice considerations that apply to the assessment of certain administrative law matters.
For example, in Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles),5 the Supreme Court stated that the existence of conflicting decisions in administrative matters was not an independent basis for judicial review.
In British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola,7 the Supreme Court also expressed concerns about access to justice when it had to determine whether two complaints that dealt essentially with the same subject matter could be successively decided by two different administrative tribunals.
The principle of access to justice as a component of the rule of law or legislative supremacy should be included in the analysis conducted to determine judicial review standards for administrative proceedings.
As previously stated, from the perspective of access to justice, citizens are entitled to expect that a timely and final decision will be rendered on their case following a fair, transparent and clear process.
These objectives can generally be achieved by applying a deferential review standard. Deference means, however, that citizens are not necessarily entitled to the best possible decision, which they might attempt to obtain through multiple proceedings before successive jurisdictions.
The price to pay for the recognition of the specialized adjudicative independence of administrative bodies is the requirement for review tribunals to tolerate error and some inconsistency among decisions regarding questions of law.
In summary, should we tolerate the “possibility that different decision-makers may each reach opposing interpretations of the same provision, thereby creating ‘needless uncertainty in the law [in the sense that] individuals’ rights [are] dependent on the identity of the decision-maker, not the law’”12?
This is one of the Gordian knots that the Supreme Court will need to undo very shortly.
Simon Ruel is a justice with the Quebec Court of Appeal. Justice Ruel thanks Mtre. Alyson Mace Reardon, researcher at the Quebec Court of Appeal, for her help in preparing this presentation.
1. Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, CQLR, c. A-3 001.
2. Act to establish the Administrative Labour Tribunal, CQLR, c. T-15.1, section 49.
3. Frères Maristes (Iberville) c. Laval (Ville de), 2014 QCCA 1176, para. 1.
4. Tribunal administratif du travail, Rapport d’activité, 1er janvier au 31 mars 2016, online: https://www.tat.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/tat/6Le_tribunal/Publications_et_documents/Rapports_annuels/Rapport_d_activite_TAT.pdf, p. 18.
5. Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles),  2 S.C.R. 756.
6. Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles),  2 S.C.R. 756, p. 798.
7. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52.
8. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, para. 36.
9. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, para. 34.
10. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, para. 35.
11. Yves-Marie Morissette, “What is a ‘reasonable decision’?” (2018) 31 R.C.D.A.P. 225, p. 248.
12. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29, para. 81.

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The Complainant is Edizioni Piemme S.p.A., Italy, represented by Studio Legale Jacobacci e Associati, Italy.
The Respondent is Mr. Hugo Bazzo, Paratiba , of Chile.
The disputed domain name <edizionipiemme.com> is registered with Key-Systems GmbH dba domaindiscount24.com.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on August 6, 2003. On August 6, 2003, the Center transmitted by email to Key-Systems GmbH dba domaindiscount24.com a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On August 7, 2003, Key-Systems GmbH dba domaindiscount24.com transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the administrative, billing, and technical contact. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on August 8, 2003. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was August 28, 2003. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent�s default on September 1, 2003.
The Center appointed Zbyněk Loebl as the Sole Panelist in this matter on September 10, 2003. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
- Italian application TO2001-C003583 for PIEMME SCUOLA.
Complainant provided sufficient evidence of the recognition and use of the word Piemme and Edizioni Piemme regarding the Complainant and its publications in Italy such that the Complainant can be viewed as having legally protectable rights in the marks PIEMME and EDIZIONI PIEMME. Complainant also referred, although only in a general way, to Italian case law which recognizes rights to unregistered marks.
The Respondent redirects the disputed domain name to a pornographic Web siteWebsite . The Complainant provided evidence that the Respondent registered several other domain names identical to, or confusingly similar with, well-known Italian trademarks, all of them pointing to the same pornographic Web siteWebsite as the disputed domain name.
The Complainant submitted evidence that the Respondent�s address and telephone number were false. The Respondent has made no response to the Complainant�s allegations, despite being properly served with the Complaint.
Complainant contends that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its marks PIEMME and EDIZIONI PIEMME (where the Complainant�s whole mark is included in the disputed domain name), that the Respondent has no legal rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.
As evidence that the Respondent has no legal rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, the Complainant draws the Panelist�s attention to the following: (i) lack of evidence of any bona fide offer of goods or services; the only thing the Respondent offers through its domain name is a link to a pornographic Web siteWebsite ; (ii) the Respondent has never been commonly known in the normal course of business by the trademark, trade name or domain name EDIZIONI PIEMME; and (iii) the Respondent links to the default page of a commercial pornographic Web siteWebsite , thus excluding any possibility of non-commercial fair use.
As evidence of bad faith, the Complainant draws the Panelist�s attention to the Respondent�s false address and telephone number and the fact that the disputed domain name is redirected to a pornographic Web siteWebsite . In addition, Complainant points out the Respondent�s pattern of behaviour with registering multiple well-known Italian marks as domain names and redirecting them to the same pornographic Web siteWebsite , as well as the association of the words EDIZIONI and PIEMME in the disputed domain name which suggests that the Respondent clearly referred to the Complainant.
Since the Respondent has not filed any response and consequently has not contested any of the Complainant�s contentions, this case shall be decided based on the allegations and documents submitted by the Complainant.
Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the Complainant must prove each of the allegations referenced in the headings of parargraphs A., B. and C. below.
The Panelist considers that the disputed domain name is identical to the common law trademark EDIZIONI PIEMME of the Complainant and confusingly similar with the common law trademark PIEMME of the Complainant. This reasoning is consistent with many previous WIPO decisions in which it has been ruled that the ownership of identical or confusingly similar common law trademark(s) is sufficient to fulfill requirements of Par. 4.a(i) of the Policy (see, among others, The State of the Netherlands v. Goldnames Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0520; Rudolf A. Oetker v. Joe Rao, WIPO STOP-biz case No. DBIZ2001-0033; Sintef v. Sintef.com, WIPO case No. D2001-0507; Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO case No. D2000-0210; CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Netcetera CSG, WIPO case No. D2000-0798).
The Panelist finds that the Complainant has presented evidence and argued convincingly that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name. By not submitting a response, the Respondent failed to demonstrate any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Based on the arguments and evidence brought by the Complainant, the Panelist finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
The Panelist finds that the disputed domain name was registered and is used in bad faith.
The Panelist considers that, based on the evidence presented by the Complainant, the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith. The Panelist considered as prevailing arguments for his findings primarily the connection of the word PIEMME and EDIZIONI in the disputed domain name together with a lack of evidence of any bona fide use of the domain name by the Respondent, indicating clearly that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant�s mark before he registered the disputed domain name (see The State of the Netherlands v. Goldnames Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0520) and also that the Respondent evidently submitted a false address and telephone number (see, among others, Oxygen Media, LLC v. Primary Source, WIPO case No. D2000-0362; Southern California Edison Company v. John Simms, WIPO case No. D2002-0369; or Wachovia Corporation v. Peter Carrington, WIPO case No. D2002-0775).
In addition, under all the circumstances of the case, there is sufficient evidence of bad faith use of the disputed domain name by the Respondent - the fact that the disputed domain name links to a commercial pornographic Web siteWebsite (see, among others, Motorola, Inc. v. NewGate Internet, Inc., WIPO case No. D2000-0079; Ty, Inc. v. O.Z. Names, WIPO case No. D2000-0370; Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Seweryn Nowak, WIPO case No. D2003-0022) and a pattern of behaviour of the Respondent regarding other well-known trademarks (see, among others, Daniel C. Marino, Jr. v. Video Images Productions, WIPO case No. D2000-0598), the Panelist confirms the conclusion of the Complainant that this case is a clear case of "pornosquatting" and that the bad faith criterion is satisfied.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with Paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name <edizionipiemme.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

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← FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 1: The Early Years. By Kester Mekenkamp.
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player. From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper.
For that purpose, the author will depart from the restrictive interpretation of article 6(3) adopted by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and continue with a substantive assessment of the rule, firstly by looking at its purposive aim and secondly, by evidencing the potential negative impact on players’ mobility and its inherent anticompetitive effects.
In summary, as a general rule, the former club of the player loses its right to claim training compensation if it fails to offer the player a contract in the terms described by the article, or cannot demonstrate a legitimate interest.
So far, the DRC has been consistent in interpreting that the obligation to offer the player a contract lies exclusively with the former club of the player as opposed to the previous clubs. In other words, the previous club is entitled to ask for training compensation when the player signs the first professional contract no matter whether they offered the player a contract or showed bona fide interest in retaining him.
At first glance, this rigid interpretation might appear controversial in light of the more pragmatic approach towards the formal requirements of article 6(3) adopted in the CAS award 2009/A/1757 between MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano SpA. In this case, in order to conclude that MTK Budapest was still entitled to request training compensation despite not having offered the player a contract in the terms indicated in the regulation, the adjudicating Panel emphasized that “[the] aims of sporting justice shall not be defeated by an overly formalistic interpretation of the FIFA Regulations which would deviate from their original intended purpose”.
The DRC has thus systematically admitted claims of previous clubs against clubs that have registered professional players for the first time (e.g. DRC decision of 17 May 2016) without delving into whether such clubs are indeed entitled to training compensation or not.
In an attempt to defy such dogmatic approach to the issue, I question whether the different references made in Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP to the “former club” could and should instead be interpreted more extensively, so as to include all former clubs (thus including previous clubs) where a player has been registered. Firstly, by having a look at the systematic context of the rule and its purposive interpretation, and secondly, by taking into consideration the potential competitive disadvantages between European clubs resulting from the regulation.
It appears therefore, contrary to the spirit of the rule that a club that has shown no interest in keeping the player as a professional, a roster or for its academy, can at a later stage request to be rewarded for the training of that player, irrespective of whether it was the former club, strictly speaking, or the former former club, so to speak (i.e. the previous club in the RSTP exact wording).
One could easily argue at this point, and I would subscribe to it, that at very young ages it is either legally prohibited for training clubs to offer a contract, or unreasonable to require clubs to offer contracts to all its players in order to safeguard their potential right to training compensation. This was highlighted by the CAS Panel in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC which was the appeal against the above cited DRC Decision of 27 April 2006.
However, nothing prevents training clubs to at least show a genuine interest in retaining the player as an amateur by formally offering him to continue training with them or even through a simple positive evaluation of the player. In order to alleviate the unreasonable burden that such obligation would suppose on training clubs, a solution could be to require the genuine interest at least, for players as from the season of their 16th birthday. This would coincide with the age when in most EU countries players are legally allowed to sign employment contracts, and form a strict sportive perspective, the age from when training compensation is calculated in full according to article 5(3) of Annexe IV.
The final reference in article 6(3) (i.e. “This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the players’ previous club(s)”) helps to ground this interpretation. It is difficult to justify from a legal standpoint, why previous clubs should be exempted (as they, in fact, are) from observing the same rules and obligations as the former clubs, especially considering the principle of free movement of workers in the EU. The right to claim training compensation is, being redundant, “without prejudice to the right (…) of the players’ previous club(s)”. Previous clubs should therefore, demonstrate as well their entitlement to training compensation by evidencing a genuine interest in the player, such as former clubs do.
To illustrate the situation, consider the case were an EU football club omits to offer one of its players (e.g. 18 years old) a professional contract in the terms of article 6(3) of Annexe IV, and that player further registers as an amateur with another EU club for one season. That second club also fails to offer the player (now 19 years old) a professional contract. After two seasons as an amateur, the player, finally signs a professional contract with a third EU club at the age of 20 years. The current interpretation of the exception leads to conclude that the first club, which failed to offer the player a professional contract, perhaps because he was simply not sufficiently interesting to retain, would now be reinstated in the right to claim training compensation, while the former club, under identical circumstances and reasons would be deprived from it.
Within those parameters, de lege ferenda the exception of article 6(3) could reasonably be extended to those previous clubs that failed to show the so-called bona fide interest. This way, by failing to show real interest in keeping a player, the previous clubs would be also prevented from asking training compensation upon the first registration of the player as a professional, to the same extend as the former club when it fails to offer the player a contract, in the terms indicated by the exception.
Turning now the attention, to EU law, the conclusions on why article 6(3) Annexe 4 current interpretation seems unfair and should be reformulated, point towards the same direction.
The Bosman ruling and its most recent successor, the Bernard ruling, stand out as constant reminders that EU Law applies to the realm of European club football insofar as it constitutes an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. It is nowadays unarguable that football is a real economic activity and that the regulations adopted by its governing bodies must respect EU Law as long as they apply in the territory of the EU, or in case the player concerned has a European passport and is transferring to an EU Member State. Only rules which are “inherent to sport” such as the rules of the game, and other “practices likely to be exempted” meaning, those activities not necessarily linked to sport but which are worth of protection, could potentially fall outside the remit of EU competition law (the sporting exception) as pointed out by the “Helsinki Report on Sport” in 1999. However, the decision in the Meca-Medina case went even further, overcoming the traditional distinction between rules of purely sporting nature from others, to determine that rules cannot be of purely sporting nature when they have economic repercussions, and consequently, making it possible to explore new legal avenues to test regulations that in principle may seem outside the scope of EU competition law (such as the doping regulations in Meca-Medina).
According to Bosman and Bernard, training compensation is a practice worth of protection, but it is undeniable that its rules have strong economic implications, for they are expressly meant to financially reward football clubs involved in the training and education of players when these move to other clubs. For that reason, they fall under the remit of EU Law.
However, it is my firm belief that Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP has in many ways gone beyond the indications in Bosman, the Helsinki Report and later in Bernard. In this last case, the Court referred to a system meant to compensate and not reward training; and it is precisely that difference regarding the foundations of the system implemented by FIFA that leads to disproportionate results when the amounts to pay as training compensation are superior to the real costs incurred by the training clubs.
All these issues jeopardize free mobility within the EU, for they restrict the chances of clubs to recruit players, and have an impact on the commercial relations between clubs and players in the sense of Article 101. By way of example, a Romanian football club registering a 21-year old player trained in Romania as a professional for the first time, would end up paying the training club a significantly lower amount of training compensation than a Hungarian club of the same category, wishing to sign that same player. The reason for that is that whilst in the first scenario the Romanian club would be subject to the internal training compensation mechanism; in the second scenario, the Hungarian club would be subject to the FIFA regulations that impose higher training compensations.
With these premises in mind, the testing of article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP under EU competition law seems appropriate, although the application of EU competition law in this type of cases will probably remain an exception.
In short, Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion within the internal market. Saskia King, explaining the so-called “objective criterion”, has highlighted that “when determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires separate consideration”. Therefore, if the object of the agreement is anticompetitive, there is no need to look behind the effects.
A primary aspect of competition law is the identification of the relevant market where a possible anticompetitive practice takes place. In the present context, the relevant market is the transfer market of football players, that is, the market on which the offer and supply of players meets and clubs compete against each other to recruit the best players. Geographically speaking, the market is limited to the territory of the Member States of the EU.
As to the first question, it is my view that both the object and the effects produced by, article 6(3) restrict and distort competition between clubs, for they discriminate former clubs vis-à-vis previous clubs with regard to their right to claim training compensation. Additionally, the compensation limits the ability of clubs to take on players acting as free agent.
Following the Meca-Medina reasoning, and focusing on the rationale behind article 6(3) Annexe IV, in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, the CAS Panel corrected the view of the original DRC decision of 27 April 2006. Specifically, it remarked that the aim of the rule is “to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest, is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of ‘compensation price tag” rather than to penalize clubs failing to offer a contract to their amateur players. The unquestionably legitimate goal of “the exception to the exception” - as the Panel calls article 6(3) - is thus to limit the obstacles to the free mobility of players aforementioned.
However, as to “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them” there cannot be a positive answer. To me it is doubtful whether the anticompetitive effects produced by establishing different conditions between former clubs and previous clubs are inherent or a necessary consequence to ensure the objective of rule (i.e. contributing to free mobility). I believe the contrary to be true. (i.e. uently,conditions ctive of the rule, tt of EU Law. by scholars.r compensation. in the application of such principle. nsatI bI be The effects generated by the current interpretation of article 6(3) collide with the aim of the rule (i.e. protecting free mobility), for reinstating previous clubs in their rights to claim training compensation irrespective of their behaviour vis-à-vis the player, compromises free movement within the EU and creates unfair competitive advantages for previous clubs.
In conclusion, my suggestion is to rethink, the current formulation of article 6(3) (if not the entire training compensation system) and correct its detrimental effects by preventing all previous clubs that fail to offer players a professional contract or to show bona fide interest as from the season in which a player turns 16 years old from requesting training compensation. It is certainly not the role of the CAS to do so, but the responsibility of the EU Commission to take an active lead to ensure full compliance of football regulations with EU law.
 See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, Annex 4 (29 June 2005) at page 124.
 European Commission Press Release of 5 March 2001, “Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers”.
 A bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player must be demonstrated before the DRC cf. Arbitration CAS award 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., award of 30 July 2009.
 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, article 6(3) Annexe IV.
 In cases of subsequent transfer, the club entitled to claim training compensation will always be the “former club”.
 See para. 31 of the award. Although, the transfer structure used in this case could qualify as a bridge transfer used for the purpose of circumventing the FIFA regulations on transfer compensation.
 Decision of the Single Judge of the Sub-committee of the DRC case Budapest Honved FC (Hungary) v. AFC ASA 2013 Targu Mures (Romania) ref. TMS 243. Unpublished.
 See also FIFA RSTP, article 2 para. 2 of Annex IV.
 See the CAS award 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007 para 12 page 8: “10. By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels. It is also embedded in the law of Luxembourg (see, e.g., Art. 1156 of the Code Civil of Luxembourg) and the parties have not argued otherwise.” Emphasis added.
 De Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, Asser Press, 2nd Edition, 2016. Page 401.
 See para. 22 of the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, award of 7 February 2007.
 See also Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.
 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras. 106-110.
 See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, article 1(2) and Annex 4 para. 1 (Objectives), page 112.
 S. Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers, Asser Press, 2nd Edition (2014), pages 218 and 219.
 See Report from the Commission to the European Council of 10 December 1999 with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework – The Helsinki Report on Sport - para. 4.2.1.3: The Report refers to a system of objectively calculated payments that are related to the costs of training.
 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, paras. 44 and 45.
 As an example of this disproportionality, a simple comparison between the training costs established for Cat. III UEFA clubs (30.000 Euro per) with the training costs established for internal transfers by the Romanian Football Football Federation (5.000 RON per year equivalent to 1.107 Euro).
 Training compensation rules were recently tested against EU law, and in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of workers, by TAS-CAS in the Riverola case (CAS award 2014/A/Bologna FC 1909 SpA v. FC Barcelona). The award is not public, but a full comment and legal analysis is published in: Luca Smacchia, “The Riverola case: how the enforcement of FIFA rules may restrict the freedom of movement for workers within the EU”, Football Legal, #5 (June 2016), pages 20-24.
 See e.g. Ben Van Rompuy, “Sport and EU Competition Law: New developments and unfinished business”, Asser International Sports Law Blog (22 May 2015).
 “The distinction between "restrictions by object" and "restrictions by effect" arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.” - Commission Staff Working Document of 25 June 2014, Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, page 3.
 Saskia King, “Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101 (1) TFEU: Past, present and future”, PhD Thesis – The London School of Economics and Political Science (2015), Page 28.
 “The combined investment of summer and winter transfer windows in the top five European leagues was almost €3.4 billion. That was up by 29 per cent versus last season and again a record high ever.” - Soccerex Transfer Review Winter Edition 2016, Prime Time Sport, page 4.
 For an in-depth economic data analysis see, e.g., FIFA T.M.S., Global Transfer Market 2012 Highlights, pages 14 and 15 – Overall Market Activity - and pages 23 and 24 - Player Age.
 David Nilsson, “The Revised FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players’ Compatibility with EU competition law – the Transfer System revised”. Master Thesis. Faculty of Law - University of Lund, (September 2006).
 Doping rules under EU competition law.
 See para. 20 page 7 of the award: “The Panel does not share the DRC’s view that the purpose of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 3 is to penalise clubs which do not offer professional terms to their amateur players. Rather, in the Panel’s opinion, the purpose of the above provision is to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of “compensation price tag”.
Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain).
De- or Re-regulating the middlemen? The DFB’s regulation of intermediaries under EU law scrutiny at the OLG Frankfurt. By Antoine Duval and Kester Mekenkamp.

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