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STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kevin Lemont HOLMES, petitioner, Appellant.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. David M. Gross, St. Louis Park, for appellant. Jay Heffern, Minneapolis City Atty., Timothy T. Mulrooney, Special Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Minn. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
The state on December 8, 1995 charged Kevin Lemont Holmes with transporting a pistol inside a motor vehicle without a permit. The police on November 20, 1995 discovered a pistol inside the locked glove compartment of an automobile that Holmes admitted he had parked just outside the Bierman Athletic Building on the University of Minnesota campus. After an omnibus hearing, the trial court suppressed evidence of the pistol and Holmes' statement that he in fact had placed the pistol inside the glove compartment, and consequently the court dismissed the charge for lack of evidence. In particular, the court found that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Holmes, that the police's search of the automobile was constitutionally unreasonable, and that the police failed to adequately administer a Miranda warning before receiving Holmes' statements. The state appealed, and the court of appeals in an unpublished opinion reversed the trial court's suppression of both the pistol and the statements, and consequently reinstated the charge. Upon Holmes' petition for review, we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's dismissal of the charge.
A parking monitor with the University of Minnesota Police Department (UMPD) discovered a 1986 Oldsmobile Cutlass with Minnesota license plate number 773 CJA parked in a contract lot behind the Bierman Athletic Building on the University of Minnesota campus on November 20, 1995. The monitor parked her vehicle directly behind the Cutlass, exited and proceeded to look for the Cutlass' parking permit. When she noticed that the unattended vehicle did not have the appropriate permit, the monitor started to write a parking ticket using her hand-held computer. Upon entering the appropriate information into the computer, the monitor learned that there were five or more unpaid parking tickets on the Cutlass. The monitor then called the UMPD dispatcher on duty at the time. The dispatcher subsequently checked with Hennepin County officials, who informed the dispatcher that there were in fact seven unpaid parking tickets on the Cutlass, and that the dispatcher should order the car towed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 169.041, subdivision 4(13)(1996) (allowing for tow when police have “probable cause to believe that the owner, operator, or person in physical control of the vehicle has failed to respond to five or more citations for parking or traffic offenses”). The dispatcher relayed the information to the monitor, who subsequently wrote the ticket and ordered a “white tag tow,” a procedure where the parking monitor or police officer remains with the vehicle until the truck arrives.
Shortly thereafter, Holmes and a friend approached the Cutlass. Holmes testified at the omnibus hearing that he and his friend sat inside the Cutlass and waited for the monitor to move her vehicle out of the way. When the monitor did not move her vehicle, Holmes testified that he got out of the car, and that his friend remained inside the car with his foot outside the door. The monitor explained to Holmes that she was impounding the vehicle because of the outstanding parking tickets. Holmes said he was unaware of the tickets because the car belonged to his wife. He subsequently asked the monitor to cancel the tow. He also promised to pay the tickets the following day. The monitor refused the request and told Holmes that he should get his things out of the car. Holmes then went back to the car to retrieve his school books and other personal property. The monitor testified that Holmes remained cooperative and respectful throughout the incident. Despite this, the monitor called the UMPD for assistance because she said she felt intimidated. Shortly thereafter, an officer from the UMPD arrived on the scene, parking her vehicle directly behind the monitor's vehicle. Holmes and the officer exited their vehicles and met alongside the parking monitor's vehicle.
Holmes asked the officer why she had been summoned, and the officer said she was there because the monitor had requested support. Holmes at this time reiterated the fact that the car belonged to his wife and that he was unaware of the parking tickets. The officer then asked Holmes to remove his hands from his pockets and provide some identification. Holmes testified that he thought the officer asked for a driver's license, and that he did not feel free to leave the scene. Upon his first attempt to locate his driver's license, Holmes found only his University of Minnesota identification card, which he removed from his pocket and gave to the officer. Shortly thereafter, Holmes again placed his hands in his pockets 1 and the officer asked him once again to remove his hands from his pockets and accompany her back to her vehicle. After the two arrived at the squad car, the officer informed Holmes that she needed to pat him down before placing him in the squad car. Upon patting Holmes' outer clothing, the officer felt a hard object. She asked Holmes what the object was, and at first he did not respond. The officer then asked if she could look inside Holmes' pocket and Holmes said she could. Holmes then told the officer that the object was a magazine clip. The officer then removed the magazine clip and asked Holmes where the rest of the weapon was located. Holmes said it was at home. The officer then finished the pat-down of Holmes and placed him in the rear of the squad car. The officer testified that the back doors to the squad car were locked and that Holmes had no way to get out. The officer then had a conversation with Holmes, at which time Holmes gave the officer his paper driver's license for the purpose of identification. Holmes also testified that the officer asked him if he wanted to get anything out of the car, and Holmes said he would like to get his son's stroller out of the trunk. Holmes testified that the officer asked him for his keys, which he gave her. The officer testified, however, that she found the keys in the ignition. At about this time, Holmes' friend exited the Cutlass and the officer asked him to leave the scene, which he did.
Some time prior to this, the parking monitor had walked around the car and glanced inside to inventory any items within the vehicle. The trial court found that the parking monitor was the officer ordering the tow and as such was the person responsible for the inventory search under UMPD policy. Shortly thereafter, the officer took the keys and opened the trunk. She then entered the vehicle, where she discovered an unsecured and empty gun case on the floor behind the driver's seat. The officer then used one of the keys on Holmes' key chain to unlock the glove compartment, where she found a .40 caliber Ruger semi-automatic handgun. At that time the officer radioed to have a sergeant dispatched to the scene. The sergeant arrived on the scene to secure the pistol. Upon pulling back the slide, the sergeant found no bullets in the chamber,2 but upon taking the magazine clip out from inside the pistol, he found it filled with the same type of hollow-point bullets found inside the magazine clip taken from Holmes' jacket pocket. Holmes also testified that the officer eventually removed the baby stroller and other personal items from the car for the purpose of safekeeping.
The officer then returned to her car, where she informed Holmes about the pistol found in the glove compartment. Holmes stated that he forgot he had placed the pistol in the glove compartment after a recent trip to a local target shooting range. The officer then handcuffed Holmes, arrested him and transported him to the University Police Department. Holmes was then taken to Hennepin County Jail. An officer met with Holmes inside one of the interview rooms at the jail facility. This officer testified that he immediately informed Holmes of his Miranda rights, and that Holmes said he understood those rights and agreed to speak with the officer. Holmes testified that he received no such warning and gave no such waiver. At no point did the officer record such a waiver in his reports of the interview. The officer then told Holmes he was going to tape-record the conversation, which the officer then attempted to do. But after the complete interview, the officer discovered that the tape recorder had malfunctioned and failed to record any of the interview. According to the officer's testimony, Holmes stated during the interview that the pistol was his and that he did not have a permit to carry it. As such, the state on December 8, 1995 charged Holmes with the unlawful possession of a pistol in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.714, subdivision 1 (1996).
Holmes appeals two distinct holdings of the court of appeals. The first holding reversed a trial court order suppressing evidence of the pistol and Holmes' statements. The second holding affirmed the trial court's order denying Holmes' motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to his proof that the permit exception enunciated in Minnesota Statutes section 624.714, subdivision 9(e)(1996) applied. Because our holding on the evidentiary issue is dispositive, we will not address the statutory ruling.
In reviewing the appeal of a pretrial ruling, we will reverse a trial court determination “only if the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally, first, that the trial court erred in its judgment, and, second, that unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn.1987). The dismissal of the charge following a suppression of all the evidence clearly meets the critical impact element, and consequently, we will reverse the trial court's ruling only if the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the trial court erred in its judgment.
Minnesota law makes it a gross misdemeanor for a person to carry, hold or possess “a pistol in a motor vehicle, snowmobile or boat * * * without first having obtained a permit to carry the pistol * * * .” Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1 (1996). We have determined that the statute requires the state to show “that the accused did carry, hold, or possess a pistol” in one of the unlawful locations mentioned in the statute. State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn.1977). The most important question before us, therefore, is whether the state properly procured the evidence necessary to establish probable cause that Holmes carried, held or possessed the pistol found in the Cutlass. This analysis necessarily will involve two specific pieces of evidence-the pistol and Holmes' statements that he indeed placed the pistol inside the vehicle's locked glove compartment. The analysis also will involve two specific police acts-the stop, or seizure, of Holmes, and the search of the Cutlass.
We begin with the stop, or seizure, of Holmes.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the state from making unreasonable searches or seizures of a person. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has held that a police officer can lawfully make an investigative seizure, commonly referred to as an investigative stop, of an individual if the officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 (Minn.1980). It is undisputed that the officer in the case at bar made such an investigative stop of Holmes when she asked for, received and then retained possession of Holmes' University of Minnesota identification card.3 The question before us, therefore, is whether the fact that the officer at the scene observed Holmes exiting an automobile with seven outstanding parking tickets provided her with a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Holmes] of criminal activity.” Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn.1985) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).
Although there is little doubt that the facts in this case provided the officer with a “reasonable suspicion” that Holmes had illegally parked an automobile with seven prior parking tickets, such suspicion does not by itself justify the type of seizure authorized by Terry. As one noted commentator has stated, the Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation of serious offenses.” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(c), at 32 (3d ed.1996) (hereinafter LaFave) (emphasis added); see United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680-81, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (stating that it is unclear “whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted”); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1577 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court has never “suggested that all law enforcement objectives, such as the investigation of possessory offenses, outweigh the individual interests infringed upon”). As such, the question before us is whether a parking violation is a serious enough offense to merit the type of investigatory seizure authorized by Terry.
The state contends that the seizure in the case at bar is a legitimate Terry stop because it is similar to those routine traffic stops made by police officers who observe a traffic violation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1776-77, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (stating that routine traffic stops are constitutional where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.1996) (same); Berge, 374 N.W.2d at 733 (same). The flaw with the state's reliance upon this line of cases, however, is that a parking violation is not as serious as a traffic violation. Although there has been much debate over what types of violations are serious enough to merit a Terry stop, there can be no debate that a parking violation is not among them. See Whren, 517 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1772 (stating that the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred). It is essential to remember that Terry authorizes a police officer to temporarily seize a person on less than probable cause. As a protective measure, the Supreme Court necessarily has limited such seizures to those situations where the suspected violation is serious. As a result, we hold that a police officer who merely has reasonable suspicion that a parking violation has occurred cannot seize an individual for the purpose of investigation.
A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a parking violation can stop the person only if the stop is necessary to enforce the violation, for example, if a person is attempting to drive off with an illegally parked car before the officer can issue the ticket. We conclude, as did the trial court, that the officer did not stop Holmes for the purpose of enforcing the known violation. Not only do police officers typically enforce parking violations by applying a ticket to the parked car, the facts show that the parking monitor on the scene already had enforced the violation by issuing the ticket and ordering the tow. As such, we hold that the police officer's seizure of Holmes was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, and we consequently affirm the trial court's order suppressing all the evidence that came as a result of the subsequent frisk and interrogation of Holmes. Given this holding, we need not address whether the officer's pat-down search was within the confines of the Fourth Amendment, or whether the officer's interrogation was within the confines of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Holmes next argues that the trial court correctly suppressed evidence of the pistol because the search conducted by the police officer at the scene was not reasonable. The gravamen of Holmes' argument is that the police officer's inventory search was pretextual; that is, the police officer searched the vehicle, not for the purpose of inventorying the items inside the vehicle, but for the sole purpose of finding the pistol that accompanied the magazine clip found inside Holmes' jacket pocket. The state, on the other hand, does not dispute that the acts which led to the discovery of the pistol constituted a search of the Cutlass within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir.1973) (stating that search for purposes of inventory is a search within contemplation of Fourth Amendment); City of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697 (1974) (same). Instead, the state contends that the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of the pistol because the warrantless search that led to the pistol's discovery was a valid inventory search of the Cutlass.4 The state contends that the subjective motivation of the police officer is irrelevant to our determination of an inventory search's reasonableness. It cites State v. Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Minn.1985) for the proposition that the inventory exception to the warrant requirement is a “bright line” rule, and that as long as the police follow “established, standardized procedures in conducting an inventory search, the search is valid and the motives of the officer conducting the search are entirely irrelevant.” The court of appeals agreed with the state and concluded that an inventory search is valid “if it is carried out in accordance with standard police department procedures, and it makes no difference whether the officer had an ulterior motive or expected to discover evidence.” State v. Holmes, No. C5-96-901, 1996 WL 689804, slip op. at 11 (Minn.App. Nov. 22, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
The Supreme Court in 1976 endorsed the warrantless search of an automobile for the discrete purpose of taking an inventory of items inside an impounded vehicle. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608, 77 L.Ed.2d 65, (1983) (stating that inventory search is a well defined exception to the warrant requirement); Myles, 218 N.W.2d at 699 (stating that inventory searches are not constitutionally improper). Under the inventory exception, police need neither probable cause nor a warrant to search a vehicle. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643, 103 S.Ct. at 2608. Instead, the Court has found such searches to be reasonable because police are performing administrative or caretaking functions designed to serve two distinct interests: the protection of the owner's property inside the vehicle, and the protection of the police from claims that they lost or damaged property within their control. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097.5 As such, the Supreme Court accorded deference “to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (emphasis added). In determining the reasonableness of an inventory search,6 therefore, courts must ask whether police carried out the search in accordance with standard procedures in the local police department. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374-75, 96 S.Ct. at 3099-3100. The purpose of limiting the search to those parameters defined by a standard procedure is to “ensure that the intrusion [will] be limited in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function.” Id. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. Although the Court in Opperman placed much emphasis on the general lack of discretion involved in an inventory search, see 428 U.S. at 383, 96 S.Ct. at 3104 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the “officer does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present”), the Court in Bertine allowed for a certain level of police discretion “so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743.
We are reminded that in Florida v. Wells we stated that “an inventory search must not be used as a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence;” that in Colorado v. Bertine, in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought it significant that there had been “no showing that the police, who were following standard procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation,” * * *. In each case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory * * *, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes.
Whren, 517 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1773 (citations omitted).7 Under this analysis, we can find the search of the Cutlass to be a reasonable inventory search only if police followed standard procedures in conducting the search, and only if police conducted the search, at least in part, for the purpose of obtaining an inventory. See Huisman, 544 N.W.2d at 439-41. Because we find the pretextual issue dispositive, we will not address whether the officer followed standard UMPD procedure in executing the search.
The Supreme Court has said that searches conducted “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation,” are not otherwise valid as inventory searches. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. at 741. Admittedly, such rules are difficult to administer, but at least one commentator has suggested that faith is “bad” and investigative purpose “sole” only when an inventory search that otherwise would not have occurred is brought about. 3 LaFave, supra, § 7.5(d), at 589-90. Under this standard, we must ask whether the police officer in the case at bar would have conducted an “inventory” search had she not first discovered the magazine clip. If the answer is yes, and we conclude that her actions substantially complied with the procedure, then the search was a valid inventory search. But if the answer is no, then her search was not a valid inventory search. See Huisman, 544 N.W.2d at 439 (stating that determination whether officers were motivated solely by investigative purpose requires an examination of whether “an administrative reason for the impoundment existed”).
The following case is instructive on this point. The Indiana Supreme Court in 1993 invalidated as unreasonable the inventory search of a defendant's car following his arrest for public drunkenness. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427 (Ind.1993). In finding that the police officer's sole purpose in searching the vehicle was investigatory, the court pointed to “several indicia of pretext which raise a question about whether [the search] was conducted in good faith.” Id. at 436. In particular, the court pointed to the fact that the search was conducted at the scene of the crime, that the search was conducted by an officer responsible for criminal investigations and not the officer responsible for the safekeeping of impounded property, that no formal inventory sheets were completed, that the officer did not make note of the defendant's personal effects, but instead focused only on contraband, and the fact that the car was not actually impounded. Id. In conclusion, the court noted that “[w]hile any one of these facts probably would not render the search constitutionally defective, collectively they are very harmful to the State's position.” Id.
No doubt, the police officer's search in the case at bar was not nearly as defective as the search mentioned above. But the record shows that the search was conducted at the scene of the crime by an officer responsible for criminal investigations, and some time after the parking monitor completed her inventory search. It also is revealing that at no time prior to her search did the police officer ask the monitor if the monitor had conducted an inventory search. Nor did the police officer ask the parking monitor if the monitor needed any help conducting the inventory search. Given the fact that UMPD policy requires the officer ordering the tow to conduct such an inventory search, we can infer that the police officer knew it was the parking monitor's responsibility to immediately inventory the items inside the Cutlass. We also can infer that the police officer had no interest in searching the Cutlass for the purpose of creating an inventory. Such an inference is bolstered by the fact that the state presented no evidence of any formal inventory sheets, or any notation by the police officer regarding any of Holmes' personal effects other than the pistol. From these facts, we find that the officer's sole motivation in conducting the search was to discover the pistol. As such, we hold that the police officer's search was not a valid inventory search, and that the trial court did not err in suppressing evidence of the pistol.
In conclusion, therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in suppressing evidence of the pistol or Holmes' statements, and consequently reinstate the trial court's order dismissing the charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.
1. Holmes testified that he was looking for his paper driver's license.
2. A firearms expert testified that the weapon would not fire a bullet until the shooter first moved a bullet from the magazine to the chamber by pulling the slide back.
4. The state also argues that discovery of the magazine clip provided the officer with probable cause that contraband was inside the Cutlass, and that this justified her warrantless search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Because we already concluded that police discovered the magazine clip only after illegally seizing Holmes, we need not address this argument.
5. The plurality opinion included a third interest: the protection of the police from potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097. This interest was minimized by Justice Powell in his concurrence, however, and is no longer considered to be a justification for the exception. Id. at 378, 96 S.Ct. at 3101-02.
6. Actually, courts must determine the reasonableness of the impoundment prior to determining the reasonableness of the inventory search. See Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind.1993) (concluding that inventory search was invalid even though impoundment was valid). The trial court in the case at bar found the impoundment to be valid despite finding that the state violated its own procedure in ordering the type of tow (“white tag tow”) where an officer remains at the scene until a tow truck arrives. UMPD policy calls for a “white tag tow” only “when it is necessary to immediately remove a vehicle to safeguard the vehicle and its contents (i.e., when the vehicle is needed for evidence or when the vehicle is creating a traffic hazard).” There was no evidence that the Cutlass was needed for evidence or that it was creating a traffic hazard. As such, UMPD policy required the type of tow where an officer would not have remained at the scene until a tow truck arrived (“red tag tow”). In either case, the UMPD policy provided that the officer who ordered the tow would, prior to removal by the towing service, search the interiors and secured areas of the vehicle. As such, the trial court did not err in concluding that the inventory search followed a valid impoundment.
7. The state asserts that this language is dicta and does not bind this court. In turn, the state asserts that the standard set in Rodewald, namely “that such a motive does not invalidate an inventory search,” is applicable and controlling. Respondents' brief at 21, Holmes, No. C5-96-901 (citing Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d at 421.) It is beyond purview, however, to suggest that either Bertine or Wells does not bind this court.

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A Power of Attorney is a written document where a Principal, the individual making the Power of Attorney, designates an Agent to transact a wide variety of powers and duties (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5601 et.seq.). The Agent then acts for and on behalf of the Principal and has a duty to act consistently with the known intent of the Principal.
In Pennsylvania, any capacitated person who is at least 18 years old may make a Power of Attorney document (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5601).
How should my Power of Attorney be written?
As of January 1, 2015, a Financial Power of Attorney is not valid unless it is signed by the Principal, has two witnesses and notarized. If for any physical reason the Principal is unable to sign the Power of Attorney, a mark may be made in the presence of two witnesses who are at least 18 years old, and the two witnesses must sign the Power of Attorney in the presence of the Principal. Be very careful as of January 1, 2015, the Financial Power of Attorney requires the Principal to be very specific as to what powers are being given. Further, the Power of Attorney document is not valid unless it includes a conspicuous “notice”, signed by the Principal, appointing and empowering the Agent and an “acknowledgement”, signed by the Agent, accepting appointment. These two notices both changed as of January 1, 2015.
The Healthcare Power of Attorney needs two witnesses. It does not have to be notarized. It does not require the Notice by Agent or Principal.
The Agent may authorize admission of the Principal to a medical facility and authorize medical procedures (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5603(h)).
A power to authorize admission to a medical, nursing, residential or similar facility and to enter into agreements for care means that the Agent may apply for the admission of the Principal to a medical, nursing, residential or other similar facility, execute any consent or admission forms required by such facility and enter into agreements for the care of the Principal (see 20 Pa. C.S.A. §5602(a)(8)).
A power to authorize medical and surgical procedures means that the Agent may arrange for and consent to medical, therapeutic and surgical procedures for the Principal, including the administration of drugs (see 20 Pa. C.S.A. §5602(a)(9)).
How is a Power of Attorney affected by disability?
The document creates a Durable Power of Attorney (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5602(a)). The powers granted to Agent shall last indefinitely unless limited within the Power of Attorney (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5602(a)). These powers (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5603) will continue to exist notwithstanding subsequent disability, incapacity or incompetency (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5604).
The Principal has the right to revoke, terminate, or modify the Power of Attorney at any time. The documents is automatically revoked with the notice of death (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5605(a)) or upon disability or incapacity if the document is not durable (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5605(b)) or upon filing for a Divorce where spouse is Agent (20 Pa. C.S.A. §5601(e)(2) and (4)).


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Page, Jake & David Muench. Sacred Lands of Indian America. Photo available. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 2001. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Pagels, Heinz R. Perfect Symmetry. The Search for the Beginning of Time. Photo available. New York. Simon and Schuster. 1985. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Paget, Julian. The Story of the Guards. Photo available. San Rafael. Presidio Press. 1977. 4to. Hard cover. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy (book plate) in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Paher, Stanley W. Nevada. An Annotated Bibliography. Books & Pamphlets Relating to the History & Development of the Silver State. Photo available. Las Vegas. Nevada Publications. 1980. 558 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.
Paher, Stanley. Death Valley Ghost Towns. Photo available. Las Vegas. Nevada Pub. 1973. 48 pps. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy.
Paher, Stanley. Las Vegas. As it Began - As it Grew. Inscribed by the author. Photo available. Las Vegas. Nevada Pub. 1971. 184 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Inscribed by the author "For Joel Roberts - I hope this book brings reading pleasure - Stanley W. Paher". Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Paher, Stanley. Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps. Photo available. Berkeley. Howell-North. 1973. 492 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Paher, Stanley. Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps. Photo available. Berkeley. Howell-North. 1973. 492 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Paher, Stanley. Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps. Photo available. San Diego. Howell-North. 1980. 492 pps. 4to. Hardcover. Reprint. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy (name inked out on end paper) in near fine (very light shelf wear) dust jacket (in mylar).
Paher, Stanley. Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps. Inscribed by the author. Photo available. Las Vegas. Nevada Publications. 1984. 492 pps. 4to. Hardcover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Important reference work. Inscribed by the author "1997 Inscribed for Time and Melodie - Wishing you many safe trips to Nevada's Ghost Towns Stanley Paher". Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Pahl, David. Space Warfare and Strategic Defense. Photo available. New York. Exeter. 1987. 4to. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Paine, Albert Bigelow. Th. Nast. His Period and His Pictures. Photo available. Princeton. Pyne Press. 1974 . Octavo. Hardcover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Pakenham, Thomas. Meetings with Remarkable Trees. Photo available. New York. Random House. 1996. 4to. Soft cover. First edition. Illustrated in black, white and color. Fine copy.
Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. Photo available. London. The Folio Society. 1999. 774 pps. 4to. Gilt decorated hard cover. First edition thus. Illustrated. Important reference work. Fine copy.

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Smithville, p-v., Adams t., Jefferson co., N. Y., 179 n. w. Albany, 410 W. It contains 1 Presbyterian Church, 2 stores, 1 carriage fac, 1 distillery, 30 dwellings, and about 200 inhabitants.
Smithville, p-v., Powhatan co., Va., 39 w. Richmond, 156 W. It contains 1 Presbyterian Church, 1 store, 1 flouring m., and about 50 inhabitants.
Smithville, p-v., Lancaster co., Pa., 46 e. s. e. Harrisburg, 103 W.
Smithville, p-v., capital of Brunswick co., N. C, 173 s. Raleigh, 390 W. It is situated on the w. side of Cape Fear r., 2 ms. above its mouth. It has a safe and commodious harbor, and contains a court house, jail, hospital, and a Methodist church, 3 stores, 60 dwellings, and about 200 inhabitants. It is considered one of the most healthy places in the state.
Smithville, p-v., Wayne co., O., 101 n. e. Columbus, 348 W.
Smithville, p-v., capital of De Kalb co., Tenn., 61 e. Nashville, 620 W. Situated w. of Caney fork of Cumberland r., and contains a Methodist church, and about 250 inhabitants.
Smithville, p-v., capital of Lawrence co., Ark., 125 n. n. e. Little Rock, 1,012 W. Situated on the n. side of Strawberry r., and contains a court house, jail, and about 75 inhabitants.
Smithville Flatts, p-v., Smithville t., Chenango co., N. Y., 125 w. Albany, 319 W. Situated on Geneganslette cr., and contains 1 Baptist church, 5 stores, 1 grist m., 1 saw m., 1 scythe and axe fac, 1 rake and pail fac, 1 clothier's works, 1 tannery, 60 dwellings, and about 200 inhabitants.
Smoky Hollow, p-v., Claverack t., Columbia co., N. Y., 37 s. s. e. Albany, 349 W. It contains 1 woolen fac, 1 grist m., 1 machine shop, and about 20 dwellings.
Smoky Ordinary, p-o., Brunswick co., Va., 64 s. s. w. Richmond, 117 W.
Smyrna, p-o., Aroostook co., Me.
Smyrna, p-t., Chenango co., N. Y., 103 w. Albany, 351 W. The surface is hilly; soil, generally fertile, particularly in the valleys. Drained by tributaries of Chenango r., which afford water power. First settled in 1792. It has 5 stores, cap. 812,200; 1 lumber yard, cap. $13,000; 3 fulling m., 1 woolen fac, 2 tanneries, 2 grist m., 12 saw m., 1 oil m. Cap. in manufac. §29,975. 15 sch. 703 scholars. Pop. 2,246.
Smyrna, p-v., Kent co., Del., 12 n. by w. Dover, 132 W. Situated on a branch of Duck cr., and contains a church, 3 stores, and about 600 inhabitants.
Smyrna, p-v., Harrison co., O., 99 e. n. e. Columbus, 299 W.
Smythe, County, Va. Situated in the s. w. part of the state, and contains 480 sq. ms. The surface is broken; soil, fertile, on the streams. Drained by head branches of Holston r. and of New r. Capital, Marion. There were in 1840, neat cattle 9,157, sheep 10,357, swine 16,392; wheat 51,5S9 bush, produced, rye 6,811, Ind. corn 221,431, buckwheat 4,147, oats 178,330, potatoes 33,829, sugar 54,842 pounds; 11 stores, cap. §29,307; 2 forges, 10 tanneries, 6 distilleries, 1 pottery, 21 grist m., 15 saw m. Cap. in manufac. S7,700. 3 acad. 100 students, 7 sch. 198 scholars. Pop. whites 5,539, slaves 833, free col'd 145; total, 6,522.
Sneedsboro', p-v., Anson co., N.C., 137 s. w. Raleigh, 426 W. Situated on w. side of Yadkin r., and contains about 30 inhabitants.
Snicker's Ferry, p-o., Clarke co., Va., 164 N. n. w. Richmond, 56 W.
Snickersville, p-v., Loudon co., Va., 168 n. 78 Richmond, 52 W. Situated 1 m. from Snicker's Gap, of the Blue Ridge. It has a neat church, 2 stores, several mechanic shops, and 20 or 25 dwellings.
Snidersville, p-v., Monongalia co., Va., 287 n. w. Richmond, 220 W.
Snoddy's, p-o., Buckingham co., Va.
Snoddyville, p-v.. Jefferson co., Tenn., 12 n. e. Dandridge, 226 e. Nashville, 470 W.
Snow Camp, p-o., Orange co., N. C, 53 n. w. Raleigh, 304 W.
Snow Creek, p-o., Franklin co., Va., 177 w. s. w. Richmond, 252 W.
Snow Creek, p-o., Iredell co., N. C, 176 w. Raleigh, 377 W.
Snow Creek, p-o., Maury co., Tenn., 39 s. s. w. Nashville, 716 W.
Snow Hill, p-v., port of entry, and capital of Worcester co., Md., 115 s. e. Annapolis, 155 W. Situated on Pocomoke r. It contains a court house, jail, an academy, 5 churches, 1 Presbyterian, 1 Episcopal, 1 Methodist Episcopal, 1 Methodist Protestant, and 1 African Methodist, 9 stores, 100 dwellings, and 800 inhabitants. Tonnage, 1840, 7,640.
Snow Hill, p-v., capital of Greene co., N. C, 89 e. s. e. Raleigh, 299 W. Situated on a small branch of Neuse r. It contains a courthouse, jail, and about 100 inhabitants.
Snow Hill, p-v., Clinton co., O., 74 s. s. w. Columbus, 448 W.
Snow Hill, p-v., Walker co., Ga., 211 n. w. Milledgeville, 625 W.
Snow Hill, p-v., Wilcox co., Ala., 112 s. Tuscaloosa, 887 W. It contains about 50 inhabitants.
Snow Shoe, p-t., Centre co., Pa., 101 n. w. Harrisburg, 193 W. It has 2 grist m. Cap. in manufac. $600. 1 sch. 12 scholars. Pop. 162.
Snow's Store, p-o., Windsor co., Vt., 46 s. Montpelier, 492 W.
Snowsville, p-v., Choctaw co., Miss., 110 n. n. e. Jackson, 936 W.
Snyder, t., Jefferson co., Pa. It has 1 store, cap. $2,500; 1 tannery, 1 grist m., 3 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $9,700. 1 sch. 16 scholars. Pop. 291.
Snydersville, p-v., Monroe co., Pa., 116 n. e. Harrisburg, 209 W. It contains 1 store, 1 saw m., 1 grist m., and a few dwellings.
Snydersville, p-o., Knox co., Ia.
Soccapatoy, p-o., Coosa co., Ala., 132 e. s. e. Tuscaloosa, 799 W.
Social Circle, p-o., Walton co., Ga., 60 n. w. Milledgeville, 642 W.
Social Hill, p-o., Cherokee co., Ga., 109 n. w. Milledgeville, 654 W.
Sociality, p-o., Dayton t., Cattaraugus co., N. Y., 309 w. by s. Albany, 347 W.
Society Land, t., Hillsborough co., N. H. It has 2 sch. 34 scholars. Pop. 133.
Society Hill, p-v., Darlington dist., S. C, 108 e. n. e. Columbia, 438 W. Situated on w. side of the Great Pedee r., and contains 3 churches, 1 Baptist, 1 Episcopal, and 1 Methodist and 400 inhabitants.
Society Hill, p-v., Macon co., Ala., 167 s. e. Tuscaloosa, 781 W. Situated near Ufapee cr., and contains about 75 inhabitants.
Soddy, p-o., Hamilton co., Tenn., 137 s. e. Nashville, 590 W.
Sodus, bay, N. Y., in Wayne co., 5 ms. long, and from 1 to 3 wide, opens into Lake Ontario. It is navigable, and at its mouth have been constructed extensive piers and lighthouses. It is often called Great Sodus bay.
Sodus, p-t., Wayne co., N. Y., 12 n. Lyons, 195 w. n. w. Albany, 371 W. The surface declines gently towards Lake Ontario, which bounds it on the n. with Sodus bay on the n. e. Drained by Salmon cr. and other streams, flowing into the lake or the bay. The v., situated on the ridge road, 5 ms. s. of the lake, contains 3 churches, 1 Presbyterian, 1 Episcopal, and 1 Methodist, 6 stores, 1 steam saw m., 1 tannery, 50 dwellings, and about 350 inhabitants. There are in the t. 8 stores, cap. $13,900; 3 fulling m., 4 tanneries, 1 distillery, 4 grist m., 20 saw m. Cap. in manufac. §3,400. 22 sch. 1,439 scholars. Pop. 4,472.
Sodus Centre, p-o., Sodus t., Wayne co., N. Y., 191 w. n. w. Albany, 367 W.
Sodus Point, p-v., port of entry, Sodus t., Wayne co., N. Y., 201 w. n. w. Albany, 377 W. Situated at the entrance of Great Sodus bay, with a good harbor, and contains 1 store, 1 steam saw m., and 25 dwellings.
Solemn Grove, p-o., Moore co., N. C, 90 s. w. Raleigh, 377 W.
Solesbury, t., Bucks co., Pa. The surface is rolling; soil, clay and sandy loam. Delaware r. bounds it on the n. and e. Here is Ingham's, or Great Spring, which is clear and cold in the summer, and does not freeze in the winter, and discharges a stream which, with 18 or 20 feet fall, would drive a grist m., with two run of stones, through the year. There are 5 good mill seats upon it before it flows into Delaware r., a distance of 3 ms. There are in the t. 4 villages, and 2 bridges across the Delaware. It has 4 stores, cap. $12,300; 1 tannery, 1 paper fac, 2 flouring m., 7 grist m., 6 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $52,275. 8 sch. 381 scholars. Pop. 2,038.
Solon, p-t., Somerset co., Me., 18 n. Norridgewock, 52 n. Augusta, 647 W. Kennebec r. bounds it on the w. The soil is fertile, adapted to grain. It has a considerable pond in its n. e. part. A small tributary of Kennebec r. waters it in the N. w. It has 4 stores, cap. $6,500; 1 fulling m., 1 tannery, 2 grist m., 1 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $2,200. 8 sch. 507 scholars. Pop. 1,139.
Solon, p-t., Cortland co., N. Y., 12 e. Cortland, 138 w. Albany, 323 W. The surface is undulating; soil, gravel, clay, and sandy loam, adapted to grazing. Drained by Ostelic r. and its tributaries. It has 1 store, cap. $4,000; 1 grist m., 3 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $11,500; 20 sch. 747 scholars. Pop. 2,311.
Solon, p-t., Cuyahoga co., O., 154 n. n. e. Columbus, 344 W. Watered by Chagrin r. and its branches, which afford extensive water power, and by Tinkers cr. It has 1 store, cap. $500; 1 grist m., 2 saw m., 8 sch. 280 scholars. Pop. 774.
Solus, p-o., Wood co., Va., 303 w. n. w. Rich-mond, 271 W.
Somerfield, p-o., Somerset co., Pa., 158 w. Harrisburg, 174 W.
Somerford, t., Madison co., O. It has 1 grist m., 4 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $2,150. 8 sch. 300 scholars. Pop. 761.
Somers, p-t., Tolland co., Ct., 23 N. e. Hartford, 359 W. The surface is level on the w., and elevated and mountainous on the e., affording an extensive view of the valley of Connecticut r., and reaching to the city of Hartford. It contains 1 Congregational and 1 Methodist church. The v. at the centre contains 1 church, 4 or 5 stores, and 30 or 40 dwellings. Straw hats and bonnets are extensively manufactured. It has 6 stores, cap. $37,000; 1 fulling m., 1 woolen fac, 10 sch. 446 scholars. Pop. 1,621.
Somers, p-t., Westchester co., N. Y., 20 n White Plains, 1 19 s. Albany, 274 W. The surface is partly uneven, with some extensive plains; soil, adapted to grass and grain. Watered by Croton r. and its tributaries. The v. contains 2 churches, 2 stores, and 35 or 40 dwellings. There are in the t. 4 sch. 62 scholars. Pop. 2,082.
Somers, t., Preble co., O. Pop. 1,820.
Somerset, County, Me. Situated in the n. w. part of the state, and contains 3,600 sq. ms Watered by Kennebec r., which flows from Umbagog lake, on its e. border, and by various branches. There are many lakes in its upper parts. The surface is various; soil, in its lower parts, generally fertile. The n. part is still a wilderness. Capital, Norridgewock. There were in 1840, neat cattle 27,366, sheep 66,062, swine 11 ,650; wheat 132,487 bush, produced, rye 10,882 Ind. corn 71,134, buckwheat 1,334, barley 18.372', oats 197,968, potatoes 1,083,718, sugar 94,121 pounds; 77 stores, cap. $94,510; 13 fulling m., 1 woolen fac, 20 tanneries, 2 potteries, 44 grist m., 75 saw m., 1 oil m., 1 weekly newspaper. Cap. in manufac. $305,291. 4 acad. 155 students, 333 sch. 13,179 scholars. Pop. 33,912.
Somerset, County, N. J. Situated a little n. of the centre of the state, and contains 275 sq. ms. The surface is various; soil, fertile, particularly on the streams. Watered by Raritan r. and its branches. Capital, Somerville. There were in 1840, neat cattle 15,776, sheep 16,754, swine 14,026; wheat. 40,780 bush, produced, rye 124,793, Ind. corn 270,969, buckwheat 52,060, barley 1,846, oats 313,245, potatoes, 76,845; 64 stores, cap. 1 $142,200; 6 lumber yards, cap. $42,000; 9 fulling m., 6 woolen fac, 14 tanneries, 14 distilleries, 1 pottery, 1 flouring m., 30 grist m., 30 saw m., 1 oil m., 3 printing offices, 1 bindery, 2 weekly newspapers. Cap. in manufac. $271,129. 1 college, 115 students, 1 acad. 56 students, 48 sch. 1,313 scholars. Pop. 17,455.
Somerset, County, Pa. Situated toward the s. w. part of the state, and contains 1,000 sq. ms. Drained by branches of Conemaugh r. and Castle-man's branch of Youghiogheny r. It has Laurel Hill mt. on its n. w. border, and Alleghany mt. on its s. e. border, between which the surface is uneven, and the soil adapted to grain and to grazing. Capital, Somerset. There were in 1840, neat cattle 31,000, sheep 36,900, swine 25,720; wheat 118,100 bush, produced, rye 169,550. Ind. corn 32,940, buckwheat 46,650, oats 621,200, potatoes 134,800, sugar 299,800 pounds; 46 stores, cap. $168,500; 13 fulling m., 2 woolen fac, 20 tanneries, 47 distilleries, 1 brewery, 9 potteries, 2 printing offices, 3 weekly newspapers, 2 flouring m., 64 grist m., 141 saw m., 4 oil m. Cap. in manufac. $116,310. 21 sch. 476 scholars. Pop. 19,650.
Somerset, County, Md. Situated in the s. e. part of the state, and contains 500 sq. ms. Nanticoke r. bounds it on the n. w. Drained by Pocomoke, Wicomico, and Manokin rivers. Capital, Princess Anne. There were in 1840, neat cattle 11,224, sheep 11,558, swine 20,010; wheat 36,778 bush, produced, Ind. corn 428,102, oats 125,697, potatoes 52,091; 72 stores, cap. $97,375; 3 lumber yards, cap. $30,000; 5 tanneries 28 grist m., 19 saw m. Cap. in manufac $25,750; 1 college, 20 students, 2 acad. 26 students, 23 sch. 614 scholars. Pop. whites 11,485, slaves 5,377, free col'd 2,646; total, 19,508.
Somerset, p-t., Bristol co., Mass., 44 s. Boston, 418 W. Situated on the w. side of Taunton r., which is navigable to this place for vessels of considerable burden. Incorporated in 1790. It contains 4 churches, 2 Baptist, 1 Methodist, and 1 Friends. It has some shipping; and ship-building is a considerable business. It has 6 stores, cap. $8,250. Cap. in manufac. $4,425. 8 sch. 143 scholars. Pop. 1,005.
Somerset, t., Windham co., Vt., 15 n. e. Bennington. The surface is mountainous, lying on the Green mountain range, and containing a part of it called Mount Pisgah. Drained by Deerfield r. and its branch, Moose r. It has 4 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $1,050. 3 sch. 89 scholars. Pop. 262.
Somerset, p-t., Niagara co., N. Y., 14 n. e. Lockport, 276 w. by n. Albany, 419 W. The surface is level; soil, sandy and clay loam. Lake Ontario bounds it on the n. Watered by Golden Hill cr. and other small streams flowing into the lake. It has 2 stores, cap. $7,800; 1 tannery, 2 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $3,275. 6 sch. 319 scholars. Pop. 1,742.
Somerset, t., Washington co., Pa. It has 4 stores, cap. $3,600; 1 tannery, 1 flouring m. Cap. in manufac. $3,000. 8 sch. 279 scholars. Pop. 1,620.
Somerset, p-b., Somerset t., capital of Somerset co., Pa., 40 w. Harrisburg, 166 W. It is situated on Cox's cr. Incorporated in 1804, and contains a court house, jail, of stone, county offices, of brick, an academy, and 3 churches, 1 German Reformed, 1 Lutheran, and 1 Methodist; 7 stores, cap. $33,000; 1 fulling m., 3 tanneries, 1 brewery, 2 potteries, 2 printing offices, 3 weekly news-papers. Cap. in manufac. $11,800; 1 sch. 87 scholars. Pop. 635.
Somerset, t., Somerset co., Pa. The surface is rolling; soil, yellow clay. Drained by Laurel Hill, Middle, and Cox's creeks. It has 2 stores, cap. $6,000; 1 fulling m., 1 tannery, 9 distilleries, 1 pottery, 11 grist m., 12 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $8,200. 1 sch. 30 scholars. Pop. 2,711.
Somerset, p-t., capital of Perry co., O., 47 e. s. e. Columbus, 358 W. The v. contains a court-house, jail, 9 stores, 120 dwellings, and about 750 inhabitants. There are in the t. 13 stores, cap. $18,750; 2 tanneries, 1 distillery, 2 printing offices, 2 weekly newspapers. Cap. in manufac. $18,367. 1 acad. 60 students, 4 sch. 160 scholars. Pop. 947.
Somerset, t., Belmont co., O. It has 1 sch. 30 scholars. Pop. 1,933.
Somerset, p-v., capital or Pulaski co., Ky., 84 s. s. e. Frankfort, 590 W. Situated 5 ms. n. of Cumberland r., and contains a court house, jail, and about 240 inhabitants.
Somerset, p-t., Hillsdale co., Mich. It contains some of the highest land in the state; soil, fertile, adapted to grain. It has 1 store, cap. $3,600; 3 saw m. Cap. in manufac. $3,400. 4 sch. 85 scholars. Pop. 716.
Somerset, p-o., Monroe co., Mo., 83 n. Jefferson City, 943 W.
Somers Point, p-v., Atlantic co., N. J., 91 s. Trenton, 201 W. Port of entry for Great Egg Harbor dist. Situated on Great Egg Harbor bay. It contains a boarding house, much resorted to for sea bathing in the summer season.
Somersworth, t., Strafford co., IN. H., 45 e. Concord. Bounded on the n. e. and e. by Sal-mon Falls r. Cocheco r. bounds it on the s. w. First settled in 1750. At Quamphigan falls, in the r. in the n. part of this t., at the head of tide-water, is a large manufacturing v. Vessels of 260 tons come within a mile of it. It is denominated Great Falls v., and contains 4 churches, very extensive cotton and woolen factories, and about 2,500 inhabitants. There are in the t. 30 stores, cap. $42,890; 12 fulling m., 1 woolen fac, 4 cotton fac. 40,012 sp., 2 grist, m. Cap. in manufac. $966,250. 1 acad. 20 students, 13 sch. 835 scholars. Pop. 3,283.
Somerton, p-o., Moreland t., Philadelphia co., Pa., 113 e. by s. Harrisburg, 153 W.
Somerton, p-v., Nansemond co., Va., 95 s. e. Richmond, 214 W. It contains 1 Methodist church, 1 store, and about 75 inhabitants.
Somerton, p-v., Somerset t., Belmont co., O., 107 e. Columbus, 293 W. Situated on the s. fork of Captina cr., and contains 1 Methodist and 1 Friends church, 2 stores, several mechanic shops, 2 tobacco houses, about 30 dwellings, and 180 inhabitants. Tobacco has been extensively cultivated in the neighborhood.
Somerville, p-v., Rossie t., St. Lawrence co., N. Y., 176 n. n. w. Albany, 445 W. It contains 2 stores, 30 dwellings, and about 175 inhabitants.
Somerville, p-v., capital of Somerset co., N. J., 31 n. Trenton, 202 W. Situated 1 m. n. of Raritan r., and contains a court house, jail, 1 Dutch Reformed and 1 Methodist church, an academy, a female seminary, 7 stores, 1 grist m., over 100 dwellings, many of them neat, and about 800 inhabitants.
Somerville, p-v., Fauquier co., Va., 83 n. by w. Richmond, 70 W.
Somerville, p-v., capital of Morgan co., Ala., 133 n. n. e. Tuscaloosa, 732 W. Situated 5 ms. s. of Tennessee r., and contains a court house, jail, and about 250 inhabitants.
Somerville, p-v., capital of Fayette co., Tenn., 185 w. s. w. Nashville, 871 W. Situated half a mile s. of Loosa Hatchie r., and contains a court house, jail, 3 churches, a male and female academy, a bank, and 750 inhabitants. Somerville College has been chartered here, and a building is in process of erection.
Somerville, p-v., Milford t., Butler co., O., 101 w. s. w. Columbus, 494 W. It contains 4 stores, about 50 dwellings, and 300 inhabitants.
Somenauk, p-o., De Kalb co., Ill., 182 n. n. e. Springfield, 775 W.
Sooy's Inn, p-o., Burlington co., N. J., 55 s. Trenton, 179 W.
Sorel Horse, p-o., Montgomery co., Pa., 113 e. Harrisburg, 153 W.
Sorby, p-o., Wayne co., Tenn., 110 s. w. Nashville, 786 W.
Souchahatche, p-o., Macon co., Ala., 149 s. e. Tuscaloosa, 796 W.
Souhegan, river, N. H., rises in a pond in Ashburnham, Mass., and flows into New Ipswich, in the s. w. part of Hillsboro' co., N. H., and thence n. e. and e., until it enters Merrimac r., in Merrimac t.
South Albion, p-v., Albion t., Kennebec co., Me., 25 n. e. Augusta, 620 W.
South Alton, p-v., Alton t., Belknap co., N. H., 28 n. e. Concord, 509 W.
South Amenia, p-o., Amenia t., Dutchess co., N. Y., 68 s. Albany, 325 W.
South Amherst, p-o., Hampshire co., Mass.
South Amboy, t., Middlesex co., N. J. Raritan r. bounds it on the n., Raritan bay on the n. e., and Millstone River on the s. w. The surface is level; soil, sandy. Drained by South r. and its tributaries. The Camden and Amboy railroad runs through it. The v. is at the head of Raritan Bay, at the mouth of Raritan r., I m. s. of Perth Amboy. It has a good harbor. The above rail-road terminates here, and is connected by a steamboat line with the city of New York. It contains a large manufactory of stoneware, from excellent clay in the vicinity, and about 20 dwellings. There are in the t. 3 stores, capital $1,400; 1 pottery, 1 paper fac, 1 grist m., 1 saw m. Cap. in manufactures $24,100. 6 sch. 198 scholars. Pop. 1,825.
Southampton, p-t., Rockingham co., N. H., 39 s. Concord, 474 W. The surface is generally level; soil, fertile. Drained by Powow r., which affords good water power. Incorporated in 1742. It has 4 stores, cap. $3,500; 1 fulling m., 1 grist m., 1 saw m. 1 academy 25 students, 4 sch. 132 scholars. Pop. 462.


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Kerr, W. Park. The El Paso Chile Company's Texas Border Cookbook. New York. William Morrow. 1992. Octavo. Hard cover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
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Kessler, Ronald. The FBI. Inside the World's Most Powerful Law Enforcement Agency. New York. Pocket. 1993. 492 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kessner, Thomas. Capital City. New York City and the Men Behind America's Rise to Economic Dominance, 1860-1900. New York. Simon & Schuster. 2003. 396 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
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Kettelkamp, Larry. Religions East and West. New York. William Morrow & Co. 1972. 128 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Illustrated. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kettle, Michael (Keith, 1944- ). Sidney Reilly: The True Story of the World's Greatest Spy. New York. St. Martin's Press. 1983. 144 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar).
Kettle, Michael. Sidney Reilly. The True Story of The World's Greatest Spy. New York. St. Martin's Press. 1983. 144 pps. Octavo. Hardcover. First edition. Fine copy in near fine dust jacket (in mylar).
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The case of Bogomolova v. Russia concerns the use of an unauthorised photograph of a minor’s face on the front page of a booklet promoting adoption and help for orphans. It proves that the publication of pictures of children without parental consent may have a significant social impact on the family and may violate article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), protecting the right to private and family life.
The applicant, a single mother, and her son (born in 2001) live in Russia and are Russian nationals. In 2007 the applicant learned that a photograph of her son had been published on the front page of a booklet aiming at providing information on and promoting adoption. It was entitled “Children need a family” and was issued by the Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support (hereinafter the Centre) the role of which was to protect orphans and assist families in adopting them. The applicant was not informed about the booklet and the use of her son’s picture on its cover page. After an unsuccessful attempt to institute national criminal proceedings, the applicant initiated civil proceedings. She sought non-pecuniary damages and an apology from the publishing company (the Centre being the third party in the national proceedings).
Finally, the applicant resigned from her job as physical education teacher due to comments made by the parents of her pupils.
Later that same year, the decision of the court of the first instance was found lawful and duly reasoned by the Regional Court.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its judgment on 20 June 2017 and found a violation of article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR firstly stated that “the Court has no jurisdiction to consider applications directed against private individuals or businesses”, therefore that part of the applicant’s claim was rejected. Second, the applicant’s complaint regarding the domestic authorities’ failure to protect their right to respect for private and family life was not manifestly ill-founded and, thus, declared admissible.
The Court’s judgment on the merits of the case is rather concise. The ECtHR firstly elaborated on the notion of private life within the meaning of article 8 of the ECHR – “[it] is a broad concept which extends to a number [of] aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or image, and furthermore includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity”. The Court has also noted that a person’s reputation and honour form part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity which fall within the scope of private life. However, in order for article 8 ECHR to come into play, the attack on personal reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life.
As also stressed in previous ECtHR case law (e.g. von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2)), “a person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal development and presupposes the right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof”. In this regard the ECtHR referred to its 2009 case of Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece which concerned two photographs of the face of a new-born baby. Firstly, the pictures were taken at a private clinic without parental consent. Secondly, the clinic refused to hand over the negatives of the pictures to the applicants. The ECtHR, therefore, found a breach of article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR has ruled on more cases concerning the protection of a child’s image, e. g. Kahn v. Germany and Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH (no. 2) v. Austria and Krone Verlag GmbH v. Austria.
Therefore, a violation of article 8 ECHR was found unanimously. The applicant was awarded litigation costs and non-pecuniary damage. Both of the claimed sums were almost doubled by the ECtHR.
The judgment of Bogomolova v. Russia reconfirms the importance of the right to private and family life which encompasses the right to the protection of one’s image. The manifest violation of article 8 ECHR was analysed in a clear and concise way, asserting the ECtHR’s strong stance on the issue. Irrespective of where the minor’s picture in the present case was retrieved from (the internet, as initially claimed in paras 12 and 17, or a folder of a friend’s holiday pictures), the facts of the case demonstrate how even the photographs of children can be handled in a way that is incompatible with the ECHR.
Notably, the right to the protection of a child’s image is guaranteed under article 8 ECHR and is also recognised in national legislation of most countries. Moreover, photographs can be qualified as personal data under national and European law. The legal context of the European Union data protection law is very relevant in this case as the General Data Protection Regulation will become applicable in May 2018. Under current EU law personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”. Evidently, a child’s face should be considered personal data under EU law as it is a physical factor allowing for a direct identification of the person. Besides, specific requirements of data protection need to be complied with when such data is being processed, e. g. consent has to be obtained. The importance of the right to control the use of one’s image, including the right to refuse its publication, has been emphasised once more by the ECtHR (para 52). Moreover, the right to one’s image and control thereof is often violated online as sharing data is extremely easy in the online environment.
Evidently, photographs are still being published and further distributed without the proper consent. In the context of the case under analysis, it should be noted that quite a similar issue arose in Belgium in 2013. A Belgian newspaper published an article (in Dutch) reporting on the growing problem of children having no lunches at school due to poverty. It turned out that, in order to illustrate the article, the newspaper chose an archive image taken more than a year before as an illustration of a piece on a completely different topic. Neither the children in the picture, nor their parents were aware of the fact that the photograph would be reused in a different context.
The background and facts of the Bogomolova v. Russia case and the Belgian article illustration provoke the realisation that the general understanding and the willingness to protect private and family life, as well as personal data, both, on private and public sector levels, is still under development. Moreover, the protection of the right to one’s image and its control is particularly challenging in the online world.
Ingrida Milkaite is a doctoral student in the research group Law & Technology at Ghent University. She is working on the research project “A children’s rights perspective on privacy and data protection in the digital age: a critical and forward-looking analysis of the General Data Protection Regulation and its implementation with respect to children and youth” (Ghent University, Special Research Fund).

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Appeal from the District Court, Washington County, File No. 82-K8-06-001278.
Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant).
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, and Doug Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Jennifer S. Bovitz, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).
In this postconviction appeal, appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument by impeaching appellant's testimony based on his presence during trial. Although the prosecutor's argument was improper without specific evidence that appellant tailored his trial testimony, the error was not plain and did not affect appellant's substantial rights. We therefore affirm.
Appellant David Alfano was charged with illegal possession of a firearm after police officers searched the apartment where he lived and recovered a gun from under a mattress in the bedroom appellant shared with his brother, Jesse Alfano.
At trial, the witnesses gave varying accounts of how the gun came to be in the Alfanos' apartment. One of the officers who conducted the search testified that appellant told police shortly after the search that a man named Donald VanSlyke had come to the apartment wanting to sell or give the gun to Jesse Alfano. VanSlyke testified that he had arranged with appellant to come to the apartment with the gun, spoke first with Jesse Alfano upon arriving, and then handed the gun to appellant, who handed it to Megan Flug, who was temporarily living in the apartment. Flug testified that she did not handle the gun or participate in any gun transactions. She stated that appellant had brought the gun into the apartment, saying, "Look what I have." Appellant testified that he came home to find VanSlyke at his apartment, that VanSlyke threw him the gun when he walked in, and that, after checking the chamber to make sure it was empty, he returned it to VanSlyke. Appellant also testified that VanSlyke then tried to negotiate a deal with Flug to trade the gun for methamphetamine.
The jury found appellant guilty. He did not pursue a direct appeal but petitioned the district court for postconviction relief two years later. Appellant argued that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by asserting that his presence during trial enabled him to tailor his testimony to the state's case. The district court denied appellant's petition, ruling that the prosecutor's comments were not error because appellant's account of the events leading to his arrest significantly changed from investigation to trial, and that any error was harmless because the evidence against appellant was "very strong." This appeal follows.
Appellant concedes that he did not object to the prosecutor's argument at trial. When a defendant fails to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we apply the plain-error standard of review. State v. Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn.App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009). "Under that standard, `there must be (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.'" Id. (quoting State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). An error is plain if it "contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct." State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006); see also State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 2002) (stating that error must be plain at the time of appeal). Prosecutorial misconduct affects a defendant's substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood, after considering the strength of the evidence against the defendant and the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, that the absence of misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury's verdict. State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 681-82 (Minn. 2007) (citing Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302).
The defendant bears the burden of proving plain error. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. "[W]hen the defendant demonstrates that the prosecutor's conduct constitutes an error that is plain, the burden would then shift to the state to demonstrate lack of prejudice; that is, the misconduct did not affect substantial rights." Id.
Four months before appellant's trial, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a prosecutor "cannot use a defendant's exercise of his right of confrontation to impeach the credibility of his testimony, at least in the absence of evidence that the defendant has tailored his testimony to fit the state's case." State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 657-58 (Minn. 2006). The Swanson court required "specific evidence of tailoring," lest questions and comments by the prosecutor about the defendant's presence at trial and opportunity to hear the testimony of other witnesses "imply that all defendants are less believable simply as a result of exercising the right of confrontation." Id. at 658. We subsequently applied Swanson and found sufficient evidence of tailoring when a defendant's account of events changed significantly after he observed discovery and became aware of the state's evidence. State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 616-17 (Minn.App. 2007), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2007).
You heard Investigator McAlister testify about what the Defendant said in his statement. Not once, not once did this story about a gun for Meth deal come up and that it was all Megan Flug's deal. Not once.
When did it come up? It came up after the man who got to sit through the entire trial — he's the only one that up and testified as to that. And it's his right to confront and cross-examine his witnesses, but compare that with everyone else who sat up here. He is the only one who got to hear what everyone else said before he decided what he was going to tell you, as he turned and looked at you. He got to hear all the other evidence.
And then this gun-for-Meth story comes up. Does that sound credible to you? Is that consistent with someone who is telling the truth? Megan Flug didn't sit through everyone else's testimony. In fact, there were orders in this case that witnesses weren't allowed to talk about their testimony. They might have all been out in the hall but they weren't able to talk to each other about what they testified to.
The state does not dispute that this portion of the prosecutor's argument impeached appellant's testimony based on his presence during trial. But the state argues that, because appellant's story changed between the time he first spoke to police and when he testified at trial, both with respect to the intended recipient of the gun and with respect to the nature of the transaction, the impeachment was justified. We disagree.
While appellant's story changed over the course of the case, the changes do not reflect tailoring. Swanson permits impeachment based on a defendant's presence at trial only when there is evidence that the defendant "tailored his testimony to fit the state's case." Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 657-58 (emphasis added); see also Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d at 419 (defining tailoring as a witness "shap[ing] his testimony to fit the testimony of another witness or to the opponent's version of the case"). The evidence here is that appellant changed his story so that it diverged from, rather than "fit," the state's case. Appellant originally told police that VanSlyke sought to sell or give the gun to his brother, then indicated for the first time at trial that VanSlyke sought to trade the gun to Flug in exchange for methamphetamine. None of the other witnesses said anything about a gun-for-methamphetamine trade, and VanSlyke and Flug both testified that the gun was intended for appellant. Because there is no evidence that appellant tailored his testimony to fit the state's case, the prosecutor's argument was improper.
But our analysis does not end with this finding of error. Appellant must also demonstrate that the error was plain. The rule announced in Swanson was new and relatively undefined at the time of appellant's trial. Appellant's testimony changed significantly, and he asserted for the first time at trial facts that one might expect an individual who chooses to speak with police to divulge earlier. We therefore conclude that it was reasonably debatable whether appellant's testimony evidenced tailoring. Because the propriety of the prosecutor's argument was debatable, it does not constitute plain error. See Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d at 419 (deciding that the prosecutor's implication of tailoring was not plain error because "the facts omitted by [the defendant] in his statements to the police were significant enough that it would be reasonable to expect an arrested person to disclose them if they were true," creating "at least an arguable suspicion of tailoring").
We also conclude that the improper portion of the prosecutor's argument did not affect appellant's substantial rights. First, the evidence against appellant was strong. Appellant admitted briefly holding the gun, and three other witnesses testified that appellant held the gun or acknowledged holding the gun. While appellant argues that he could not have possessed the gun because he held it only temporarily, "a `fleeting control' exception has not been recognized in Minnesota." State v. Houston, 654 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Minn.App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003).
Second, the challenged portion of the prosecutor's argument was relatively brief. Less than one page of the 15-page transcription of the prosecutor's argument addresses appellant's presence during trial. The prosecutor primarily argued that the changes in appellant's story demonstrated that appellant was not credible, not that he changed his testimony because he sat through trial. The jury also heard evidence of appellant's prior conviction of check forgery and appellant's admission that he lied to police during the investigation of this case, both of which the prosecutor noted during closing argument. The prosecutor's tailoring comments thus played a minimal role that was overshadowed by the numerous legitimate challenges to appellant's credibility. See State v. Van Keuren, 759 N.W.2d 36, 43 (Minn. 2008) (reaffirming that the state may use "all legitimate arguments on the evidence," including challenging the defendant's credibility (quotation omitted)).
After reviewing the prosecutor's closing argument in its entirety, and based on the record, we conclude that the challenged portion of the argument did not constitute plain error affecting appellant's substantial rights and, therefore, does not warrant reversal.


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This section lists, in the abstract, the exceptional conditions that may arise during the operations defined in this specification.
For each condition, the corresponding signal in the context is given, along with the defined result. The value of the trap-enabler for each signal in the context determines whether an operation is completed after the condition is detected or whether the condition is trapped and hence not necessarily completed (see IEEE 754 §7 and §8).
This specification does not define the manner in which exceptions are reported or handled. For example, in a object-oriented language, an Arithmetic Exception object might be signalled or thrown, whereas in a calculator application an error message or other indication might be displayed.
This occurs and signals clamped if the exponent of a result has been altered in order to fit the constraints of a specific concrete representation. This may occur when the exponent of a zero result would be outside the bounds of a representation, or (in the IEEE 754 interchange formats) when a large normal number would have an encoded exponent that cannot be represented. In this latter case, the exponent is reduced to fit and the corresponding number of zero digits are appended to the coefficient (‘fold-down’). The condition always occurs when a subnormal value rounds to zero.
This occurs and signals invalid-operation if a string is being converted to a number and it does not conform to the numeric string syntax. The result is [0,qNaN].
This occurs and signals division-by-zero if division of a finite number by zero was attempted (during a divide-integer or divide operation, or a power operation with negative right-hand operand), and the dividend was not zero.
The result of the operation is [sign,inf], where sign is the exclusive or of the signs of the operands for divide, or is 1 for an odd power of –0, for power.
This occurs and signals invalid-operation if the integer result of a divide-integer or remainder operation had too many digits (would be longer than precision). The result is [0,qNaN].
This occurs and signals invalid-operation if division by zero was attempted (during a divide-integer, divide, or remainder operation), and the dividend is also zero. The result is [0,qNaN].
This occurs and signals inexact whenever the result of an operation is not exact (that is, it needed to be rounded and any discarded digits were non-zero), or if an overflow or underflow condition occurs. The result in all cases is unchanged.
The inexact signal may be tested (or trapped) to determine if a given operation (or sequence of operations) was inexact.
For many implementations, storage is needed for calculations and intermediate results, and on occasion an arithmetic operation may fail due to lack of storage. This is considered an operating environment error, which can be either be handled as appropriate for the environment, or treated as an Invalid operation condition. The result is [0,qNaN].
This occurs and signals invalid-operation if an invalid context was detected during an operation. This can occur if contexts are not checked on creation and either the precision exceeds the capability of the underlying concrete representation or an unknown or unsupported rounding was specified. These aspects of the context need only be checked when the values are required to be used. The result is [0,qNaN].
an operand is invalid; for example, certain values of concrete representations may not correspond to numbers – an implementation is permitted (but is not required) to detect these invalid values and raise this condition.
The result of the operation after any of these invalid operations is [0,qNaN] except when the cause is a signaling NaN, in which case the result is [s,qNaN] or [s,qNaN,d] where the sign and diagnostic are copied from the signaling NaN.
This occurs and signals overflow if the adjusted exponent of a result (from a conversion or from an operation that is not an attempt to divide by zero), after rounding, would be greater than the largest value that can be handled by the implementation (the value Emax).
For round-half-up and round-half-even (and for round-half-down and round-up, if implemented), the result of the operation is [sign,inf], where sign is the sign of the intermediate result.
For round-down, (and round-05up, if implemented), the result is the largest finite number that can be represented in the current precision, with the sign of the intermediate result.
For round-ceiling, the result is the same as for round-down if the sign of the intermediate result is 1, or is [0,inf] otherwise.
For round-floor, the result is the same as for round-down if the sign of the intermediate result is 0, or is [1,inf] otherwise.
In all cases, Inexact and Rounded will also be raised.
Note: IEEE 854 §7.3 requires that the result delivered to a trap handler be different, depending on whether the overflow was the result of a conversion or of an arithmetic operation. This specification deviates from IEEE 854 in this respect; however, an implementation could comply with IEEE 854 by providing a separate mechanism for the special result to a trap handler. IEEE 754 has no such requirement.
This occurs and signals rounded whenever the result of an operation is rounded (that is, some zero or non-zero digits were discarded from the coefficient), or if an overflow or underflow condition occurs. The result in all cases is unchanged.
The rounded signal may be tested (or trapped) to determine if a given operation (or sequence of operations) caused a loss of precision.
This occurs and signals subnormal whenever the result of a conversion or operation is subnormal (that is, its adjusted exponent is less than Emin, before any rounding). The result in all cases is unchanged.
The subnormal signal may be tested (or trapped) to determine if a given or operation (or sequence of operations) yielded a subnormal result.
This occurs and signals underflow if a result is inexact and the adjusted exponent of the result would be smaller (more negative) than the smallest value that can be handled by the implementation (the value Emin). That is, the result is both inexact and subnormal.
The result after an underflow will be a subnormal number rounded, if necessary, so that its exponent is not less than Etiny. This may result in 0 with the sign of the intermediate result and an exponent of Etiny.
In all cases, Inexact, Rounded, and Subnormal will also be raised.
Note: IEEE 854 §7.4 requires that the result delivered to a trap handler be different, depending on whether the underflow was the result of a conversion or of an arithmetic operation. This specification deviates from IEEE 854 in this respect; however, an implementation could comply with IEEE 854 by providing a separate mechanism for the result to a trap handler. IEEE 754 has no such requirement.
It is recommended that implementations distinguish the different conditions listed above, and also provide additional information about exceptional conditions where possible (for example, the operation being attempted and the values of the operand or operands involved – see also IEEE 754 §8).
The Clamped, Inexact, Rounded, and Subnormal conditions can coincide with each other or with other conditions. In these cases then any trap enabled for another condition takes precedence over (is handled before) all of these, any Subnormal trap takes precedence over Inexact, any Inexact trap takes precedence over Rounded, and any Rounded trap takes precedence over Clamped.
 Note that IEEE 854 is inconsistent in its treatment of Inexact in that it states in §7 that the Inexact exception can coincide with Underflow, but does not allow the possibility of Underflow signaling Inexact in §7.5. It is assumed that the latter is an accidental omission.

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Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the effects of a Solicitor’s Lien under the Legal Profession Act in the context of a personal injury claim prosecuted on a contingency basis.
30] The nature of the charge arising may be described an “inchoate right”, the crystallization of which requires only the pronouncement of the court [see Re Tots and Teens Sault Ste. Marie Ltd., et al (1975), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 53 (Ont. H.C.J.)]. While the charge exists, by statute, upon the recovery of property as a result of the retained lawyer’s efforts, the charge only becomes enforceable upon declaration by the Court under s. 79(3).
 This analysis is consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Jenik v. Fearn, (1995) 130 D.L.R. (4th) 695 (B.C.S.C.), and in Chouinard.
 The decision of whether to make a declaration upon application is a discretionary one. The judge must be satisfied that it would be “just and proper” to grant the order (see Wilson, King & Co. v. Lyall (Trustees of) (1987), 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 353 (C.A.), and Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. (Re), 2011 BCCA 346, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 297).
It is my opinion that the words “any property” used in s. 79 of the Legal Profession Act are as well of the widest possible character, and include a chose in action. Further, I am of the view that the specific property need not be immediately ascertained. It is generally, but not exclusively, the client’s interest in the property which is subject to the charge: Walker v. Saunders, supra. The ascertaining of the extent of that interest may occur subsequent in time to the creation of the charge.
 In my respectful opinion, the argument that a charging order under s. 79 cannot have retrospective effect is not supported either by the language of the statute or by the relevant caselaw.
As previously discussed (you can click here to read all my archived posts on this topic), a binding ICBC settlement can be reached even before the ‘full and final release’ is signed. An oral contract can be the point of no return. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that once a lawyer accepts a settlement offer on behalf of a client it likely becomes too late for the client to change their mind.
In last week’s case (Truong v. Marples) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. She hired a lawyer to advance her personal injury claim. In the course of the lawsuit ICBC’s and the Plaintiff’s lawyer agreed to a $10,000 settlement.
I repeat my previous words of caution about settlement instructions. If a lawyer enters into a binding settlement without a client’s consent the client’s remedy is against their lawyer as opposed to the Defendant in the ICBC Claim. In the best interests of everyone involved it is vital that lawyers do not accept an ICBC settlement offer unless they have clear instructions from their clients to do so. A best practice when giving settlement instructions to a lawyer is to do so in writing to help avoid potential complications.
I can’t say whether this 1:1 ratio is right or wrong, however Alan’s question could be the beginning of an interesting discussion. If anyone is aware of statistics addressing how often self-represented individuals receive unfair settlements and the global cost of “unconscionable” settlements on the public at large this information should be publicized. If unfair adjusting practices short change deserving claimants anywhere near the figures the Canadian insurance industry claims fraud costs them then that is a story that needs to be told.
Now I’m no fan of insurance fraud, however, when reading stories of the high cost of insurance fraud it’s worth keeping in mind that, unlike the insurance industry, claimants who get stuck with an unconscionable settlement don’t have hundreds of millions of dollars in profits to offset the cost of a raw deal. Also, the insurance industry (to their credit) has a good track record of pursuing civil damages to punish and discourage fraudulent conduct. The same likely cannot be said about individuals who have their insurance claims processed in bad faith. As always, comments and feedback are welcome.
In my continued efforts to track the judicial development of Rule 37B, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff double costs for the trial of her ICBC claim. The contentious issue of the existence of Insurance as a potentially relevant factor was also considered.
In today’s case (Pham-Fraser v. Smith) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision. Before trial the Defendant (insured with ICBC) offered to settle under Rule 37B for $115,000. The Plaintiff responded with a formal settlement offer of $149,000. Neither party accepted the respective offers and proceeded to trial where the Court awarded just over $400,000 in total damages (click here to read my previous post discussing the trial judgement).
 The second factor referred to in Rule 37B(6) also operates in the plaintiff’s favour. There is a wide difference between the offer to settle and the final judgment. The judgment is almost three times the amount offered. The plaintiff’s offer was made because she wished to avoid court and having to give her evidence. Some of her evidence was of a private nature relating to matters she did not wish to talk about in the public forum of a court of law (that is, how the accident affected her work and home life, her marital relationship with her husband after the accident, and the fact she suffered from incontinence).
 It is not necessary to consider factors set out in Rule 37B(6)(c) and (d). I do not accept the plaintiff’s submission I ought to consider that the defendants, being represented by ICBC, are in a “sophisticated” position in terms of providing settlement instructions and that this is a factor to be taken into account and operate in the plaintiff’s favour in exercising my discretion under the rule. The plaintiff’s argument seems to me to simply be another way of putting a “deep pockets” argument forward: an argument the courts have thus far rejected as being a factor to be considered in determining whether to award costs under Rule 37B.
 After considering the factors which I do consider relevant under Rule 37B, I conclude the plaintiff is entitled to an award of double costs.
As previously discussed, the BC Supreme Court is inconsistent on whether a Defendant being insured is a relevant factor under Rule 37B and clarity from the Court of Appeal would be welcome. While more cases than not have held that insurance is not a relevant consideration it is not yet clear that this is correct. If the law was settled it would assist lawyers in advising their clients of the potential risks and benefits of trial.
In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.
Further to my previous posts on this topic, if a Plaintiff successfully sues in the BC Supreme Court but receives damages below $25,000 they may be deprived of their court ‘costs’ unless they had ‘sufficient reason’ for choosing the Supreme Court over small claims court.
Two judgements were released this week by the BC Supreme Court discussing this area of law. In this weeks cases (Spencer v. Popham and Spencer v. Horton) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate BC car crashes. She started separate lawsuits in the BC Supreme Court but settled her cases before they went to trial. Both claims settled form amounts below $25,000 (the current financial limit of BC’s small claims court). The Plaintiff and ICBC could not agree on the issue of costs.
 This rule encourages persons to bring actions in Small Claims Court when a claim falls within that court’s monetary jurisdiction. It is an example of “proportionality”; the judicial process should match the amount in dispute. However, the court must also respect a party’s “legitimate choice” of forum: Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 330 at para. 35.
 The burden is on claimants to evaluate their claims prior to commencement and to justify their decision if they recover less than the Small Claims Court limit, currently $25,000:Reimann at para. 38. If plaintiffs fail to sufficiently investigate and assess their claims prior to commencement, they risk not recovering costs. In a personal injury action this may require plaintiffs to obtain medical records and medical reports, to gather evidence to support claims for loss of earnings and earning capacity, and to assess the evidence in support of the claims being advanced before commencing the action.
 The proviso in Rule 57(10) is “unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in Supreme Court and so orders”. The Rule does not define “sufficient reason”. There is nothing in the Rule that limits the extension of the term “sufficient reason” to matters relating to the quantum of the claim.
Other factors can be the need for the plaintiff to have legal counsel (Faedo v. Dowell, 2007 BCSC 1985 at para. 36; Ostovic v. Foggin, 2009 BCSC 58 at para. 42; Gradek at para. 43), and the defendant’s denial of liability, causation, and injury or loss and allegations of contributory negligence, pre-existing conditions, previous causes and a failure to mitigate (Ostovic at paras. 39-40; Gradek at para. 35).
 Therefore, a plaintiff’s evaluation of his or her claim, can also involve an assessment of these factors. Even if the plaintiff assesses the claim to be within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the plaintiff can rely on these other reasons to commence the action in Supreme Court: Johannson v. National Car Rental (Canada) Inc., 2009 BCSC 1284 at para. 5.
 In my opinion, a plaintiff’s simple desire to retain counsel is not in and of itself a sufficient reason for commencing the action in Supreme Court. Other factors, such as those noted above, determine whether retaining counsel is justified.
 … I observed this plaintiff to be very nervous in court. She had no previous experience in court and in my opinion when she was confronted with a case where the defendant represented by counsel was suggesting that she hadn’t been injured at all and this was a low impact accident in which it was suggested she wouldn’t be injured, that the plaintiff reasonably required counsel to represent her and reasonably started an action in the Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the cost of retaining that counsel which was necessary for her to properly put her case to get the compensation I have found her entitled to. Furthermore, an offer to settle such as the plaintiff made in this case puts very little pressure upon a defendant to settle where there is no exposure to costs.
 There is the additional factor that, as in Faedo and Kanani [v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC 1274], the Plaintiff faced an institutional defendant which, in the ordinary course, has counsel. To obtain any recovery the Plaintiff is forced to go to court, where he is facing counsel and counsel is reasonably required, but in Provincial Court there is no way of recovering the costs of counsel.
 In Gradek, before the issuance of the writ, the defendants’ insurers had informed the plaintiffs that their position was the accident did not result in any compensable injury. In their pleadings, the defendants denied liability and injury or loss and alleged contributory negligence, the existence of a pre-existing injury and previous causes, and a failure to mitigate. There was a broad range of findings possible respecting liability. The plaintiff, Henryk Gradek, was a Polish immigrant who spoke halting English. Justice Savage found at para. 42 that “he would have had extraordinary difficulty presenting a case on his own” and would have been “out-matched” by either a lawyer or an ICBC adjustor. The plaintiff needed counsel to obtain a just result and, therefore, had sufficient reason to begin the action in Supreme Court.
 Plaintiffs do not have an ongoing duty to reassess their claims as the matter proceeds: Reimann at para. 44. Thus, the court must assess whether a plaintiff had “sufficient reason” to bring the action in Supreme Court when the plaintiff started the action: Ostovic at para. 35. This analysis is necessarily done with the benefit of hindsight since it only occurs after trial or settlement, but the court must be careful not to use that hindsight in deciding what was reasonable: Faedo at para. 28.
 It also must be remembered R. 57(10) “does not involve an exercise of discretion.” Rather, “the court must make a finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court” (emphasis added): Reimann at para. 13.
In my continued effort to cross reference the current Supreme Court rules with the new Rules of Court that come into force on July 1, 2010 I will note that the Current Rule 57(10) will become Rule 14-1(10) and it reads identical to the current rule so the precedents developed under Rule 57(10) regarding costs should continue to assist litigants under our new rules.

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