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LUKOIL started its operations in the Arkhangelsk Region in 2000, by acquiring assets of Arkhangelskgeoldobycha JSC.
Today, LUKOIL's largest project in the Region is the development of the V. Grib diamond field.
The V. Grib kimberlite pipe was discovered as part of the geological exploration within the Verkhotinskaya license area in February 1996.
The field and the mining and concentration plant got commissioned in 2014.
The V.Grib diamond field infrastructure development project is unique in LUKOIL's history.
Appraisal, hydrological, hydrogeological and geotechnological surveys were conducted at the V. Grib pipe. С1 and С2 diamond reserves were proved down to a depth of 610 m for combined development.
Under the License agreement, the Giproruda institute (St. Petersburg) conducted new feasibility studies of design parameters and revaluated the field’s diamond reserves.
As part of its investment program, Arkhangelskgeoldobycha JSC. started to draft design documentation for the mining and concentration plant located at the V. Grib field and completed the development plan in compliance with the international standards.
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and LUKOIL’s President Vagit Alekperov attended a commissioning ceremony for the V. Grib field.
As part of the mining and concentration plant construction at the V. Grib field, a whole complex of treatment facilities for process, domestic and surface (storm and melt) waters was constructed, as well as waste disposal facilities, including a hydraulic structure for mineral production waste disposal (tailings pond). All the facilities comply with the latest environmental standards, while the implemented solutions in the area of quarry and dump water treatment are innovative for the Northern Region's production industry. Positive state environmental expert reviews were obtained for all waste disposal facilities.
In order to study the environmental conditions outside the field, the Company's environment experts jointly with research organizations have conducted regular monitoring of the local flora and fauna population, aquatic biological resources, as well as of contamination levels of soil, subsurface and surface waters.
LUKOIL contributes to the social and economic development of the regions it operates in. The agreements concluded with the Government of the Arkhangelsk Region serve exactly this purpose.
A good example of such cooperation is the construction of a secondary school in Mezen that can accommodate 440 students. The said project turned out to be one of the largest social projects implemented in the region over the past few years. The school opening ceremony took place on September 02, 2013 and was attended by Governor of the Arkhangelsk Region Igor Orlov.
As part of the Agreement execution, support is given to the Geolog Children and Youth Club, a vocational non-governmental institution whose mission is to introduce teenagers to different aspects of a geologist's profession.
As part of its cooperation program with higher educational institutions, LUKOIL cooperates with the Northern (Arctic) Federal University.
The Company also supports orphanages, educational institutions, societies for the disabled, veterans and low-income citizens. LUKOIL's funds are allocated to the purchase of equipment, furniture and accessories and celebration of various festive occasions, such as Defender's of the Country Day, Victory Day, Children's Day and Knowledge Day.
The company has an established tradition of supporting sports organizations and allocating funds to promote a healthy lifestyle. For instance, LUKOIL sponsors the annual regional Kuzinskie ski race and provides funds for the purchase of sports equipment and construction of sports grounds and hockey rinks. For a number of years LUKOIL has been providing support to the Vodnik Hockey Club.
LUKOIL completes the sale of its 100% stake in JSC “ARKHANGELSKGEOLDOBYCHA” to Otkritie Group.
LUKOIL’s subsidiary, Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, has topped the environmental responsibility rating of mining and oil and gas producing companies. The results of the rating, organized upon the initiative of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, were announced in UN representative office in Moscow, Russia.
LUKOIL concluded an agreement to sell its 100% stake in JSC “ARKHANGELSKGEOLDOBYCHA” to “Otkritie Holding” Group for $1.45 bln in cash. The transaction is expected to close in the first quarter of 2017 subject to approval by the relevant government authorities.

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G.R. No. L-29670 October 9, 1987 - CENTRAL AZUCARERA DON PEDRO v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-29898 October 9, 1987 - IN RE: VICENTA PO v. RAYMUNDA CAMPANA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987 - ENCARNACION BANOGON, ET AL. v. MELCHOR ZERNA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-63855 October 9, 1987 - CU BIE, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73039 October 9, 1987 - PERFECTA CAVILI, ET AL. v. TEODORO N. FLORENDO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-35721 October 12, 1987 - WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-37631 October 12, 1987 - SANTIAGO NICOLAS, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-46978 October 12, 1987 - ERNESTO ROBLES v. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-52756 October 12, 1987 - MANILA MAHOGANY MANUFACTURING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-65505 October 12, 1987 - GABRIEL ABAD, ET AL. v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BR. LII, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-67835 October 12, 1987 - MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. v. GREGORIA CRUZ ARNALDO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 70826 October 12, 1987 - UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO P. GABRIEL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75905 October 12, 1987 - REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. v. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-76959 October 12, 1987 - ABBOTT LABORATORIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-61371 October 21, 1987 - ARTHUR BARANDA, ET AL. v. NORBERTO PADIOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-33773 October 22, 1987 - GODOFREDO L. LORENZANA, ET AL. v. CRISPINA L. MACAGBA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73882 October 22, 1987 - ROSA CANCIO v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-34767 October 23, 1987 - OPERATORS INCORPORATED v. AMERICAN BISCUIT CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-35316 October 26, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-38622 October 26, 1987 - VALENTIN BERMUDO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45114 October 26, 1987 - APOLONIO SUMBINGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45159 October 26, 1987 - JOSE HERMO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 70810 October 26, 1987 - SERAFIA MACUA, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 70959 October 26, 1987 - ELIGIO LEYVA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 76386 October 26, 1987 - CELSO AMARANTE, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-42003 October 27, 1987 - FULGENCIO OCUMIN, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-50492 October 27, 1987 - VINCENT RIKER v. BLAS F. OPLE, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-67929 October 27, 1987 - LEDA DINO GRAGEDA, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987 - CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73461 October 27, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AMADOR MASANGKAY, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75510 October 27, 1987 - RUFINA SORIANO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 76053 October 27, 1987 - FERNANDO JUAN v. CELSO MUSÑGI, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-30998, 31021, 31022 October 28, 1987 - AMERICAN MACHINERY & PARTS MANUFACTURING, INC., ET AL. v. ISMAEL MATHAY, SR., ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-53813 to 53818 October 28, 1987 - JOSE C. BAGASAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-57889 October 28, 1987 - FLAVIANO NEMARIA v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-59690 October 28, 1987 - LUIS HAGOSOJOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-61688 October 28, 1987 - VLASONS ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-69628 October 28, 1987 - PEDRO B. NARAG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75631 October 28, 1987 - OLYMPIA BUSINESS MACHINES CO., ET AL. v. E. RAZON, INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45515 October 29, 1987 - ASBESTOS INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING, INC. v. ELVIRO L. PERALTA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-49291-92 October 29, 1987 - SOCORRO M. ZABALLERO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-67582 October 29, 1987 - ANTONIO VILLANUEVA, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987 - MELITON GALLARDO, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-68477 October 29, 1987 - ANICETO BALILA, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987 - RODOLFO L. CORONEL v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74262 October 29, 1987 - GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR CORPORATION v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75355 October 29, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. VENANCIO S. ANDRES, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 75925-26 October 29, 1987 - G. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-30263-5 October 30, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL., ET AL. v. ANDRES REYES, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-37673 October 30, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DOMINADOR G. GAVARRA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-56013 October 30, 1987 - LIWANAG AGUIRRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-60078 October 30, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79003 October 30, 1987 - PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. MARCELO R. OBIEN, ET AL.

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Processing purposes and mandatory or optional nature of providing data.
Processing methods to which the data is subjected.
Subjects or categories of subjects to which the personal data may be disclosed or which may come to acquire knowledge thereof, in their capacity as data processors or persons charged with data processing, scope of disclosure of the above-mentioned data and possible transfer of data outside the EU.
This Policy, issued pursuant to Art. 13 of Legislative Decree 196/2003, code regarding the protection of personal data (hereinafter: “Privacy Code”), contains an illustration of the legislation and directives adhered to by Technogym with regard to the processing of personal data of users of the website 东森娱乐平台解封会员 (“Site”).
The data controller is Technogym S.p.A. (herein: “Technogym”), with registered office in Italy, Via Calcinaro 2861, 47521 - Cesena (FC).
This data is exclusively used to obtain anonymous statistical information regarding Site use, and to check that the latter is functioning correctly. The data may also be used to ascertain responsibility in case of hypothetical computer crimes against the Site.
Data freely, explicitly and voluntarily provided by the user by sending emails to the addresses listed on the Site entails the subsequent acquisition of the sender's email address, which is necessary to answer any queries, as well as of any other personal information included in the message.
Using the Site could lead to the processing of personal data of third parties provided by the user to Technogym. With regard to such cases, the user represents the autonomous Data Controller, assuming all legal obligations and responsibilities. In this sense, the user provides the broadest indemnity on this point with regard to any dispute, claim, request for compensation for damages from processing, etc. which Technogym might receive from third parties whose personal data has been processed through the user's use of the Site, in violation of applicable legislation on the protection of personal data. In any case, should the user provide or otherwise process the personal data of third parties in using the Site, the same hereby guarantees - assuming all consequent liability - that such particular case of processing is based, where necessary, on prior acquisition - on the user's part - of consent from the third party for processing the information concerning the latter.
Any specific summary information will be provided or displayed on the Site pages as and when appropriate at each stage with regard to specific services available on request.
In the event that the user is given the opportunity, if in possession of a Facebook profile, to register on the Site by clicking the "Login with Facebook" button, Facebook will automatically send Technogym certain user data specified in the "pop-up" window that will appear at the time of the request, and there will be no need for the user to fill in other forms.
Provision of user data for the purposes listed above in (a) is mandatory; failure to do so would not allow Technogym to meet the obligations provided for by law, regulations or EU legislation.
Please note that pursuant to Art. 24 paragraph 1(a) of the Privacy Code, consent to the processing of personal data for this purpose is not required.
Provision of data for the purposes listed above in (b) is optional, but failure to do so may make it impossible to fulfil the contract or provide of services requested.
Pursuant to Art. 24 paragraph 1(b) of the Privacy Code, we do not require the user's consent for processing personal data for such purposes since such data is necessary to perform the obligations deriving from a contract which the user is party to and/or to fulfil, before conclusion of the contract, specific requests of the same.
c) to send e-mail promotional messages concerning products or services similar to those concerning the purchases of the data subject.
Pursuant to Art. 130, par. 4 of the Privacy Code, it is not necessary for the Data Controller to acquire prior consent for the processing referred to in this point (c); Nevertheless, the data subject may object during registration or when sending any communication made for this purpose. (so-called “soft opt-in”).
Provision of user data for the purposes listed above in (d) is optional and requires the prior consent of the user.
e)?(i). Profiling processing may also be put in place (defined as "processing aimed at defining the profile or personality of the data subject, or analysing habits or consumption choices" see Art. 37 par. 1(d) of the Privacy Code) necessary for the provision of the Service and therefore exempt from consent.
e) (ii). Technogym also reserves the right to put in place profiling processing not necessary for provision of the Service - for example for promotional purposes - subject to the prior consent of the data subject.
Provision of (possible) consent to processing of data for the profiling purposes referred to in point e) (ii) above is optional. In the absence of such consent, there will be no consequences for the user with regard to use of the services.
f) during promotional and exhibition events, to disseminate on www.915sm.com.cnmunication channels ?the images of participants collected there through photographs or videos.
The user's personal data is processed by Technogym - or by third parties carefully selected for their reliability and competence, as well as duly appointed data processors - solely for achievement by the same of the purposes specified above, mainly with automated tools, but also on paper, for the time strictly necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was acquired.
Specific security measures are observed to prevent the loss of data, illegal or incorrect use and unauthorised access, in full compliance with the requirements of Art. 31 et seq of the Privacy Code and of the Technical Regulations - Annex B to the Privacy Code - regarding minimum security measures.
The data may be processed by Technogym suppliers duly appointed data processors pursuant to Art. 29 of the Privacy Code and should the processing involve transfer of the data to countries that have not received the adequacy decision from the European Commission, such transfer will be put in place according to the rules (standard contractual clauses pursuant to the annex to the European Commission decision of 5 February 2010, no. 2010/87/EU (published in the Official Journal of the European Communities L39/5 of 12 February 2010).
Data may also be communicated to suppliers of electronic communication services, banks, financial intermediaries, credit institutions, other financial bodies, managers of centralized IT systems (risk and anti-fraud centres etc.), insurance companies, consultants and freelance professionals who assist Technogym in the recovery of debts and the resolution of disputes, as well as to companies charged with packing, shipping and delivering the purchases or with providing postal and marketing services, duly appointed as data handlers under Article 29 of the Privacy Code. Data may also be disclosed to regulators, research companies or non-profit associations; in this case, information will only be communicated in anonymous form. Without the prior express consent of the data subject for the purposes specified in point 3(f), the data will not be disclosed.
6.?Rights of the data subject. The personal details of the data controller and, if appointed, the person charged with processing the data. Indication of the methods by which the updated list of data processors can be readily accessed.
The data subject has the right to obtain confirmation of the existence or (lack thereof) of personal data concerning him/her, even if this information has not yet been recorded, and is entitled to receive details of this data in intelligible form.
b) to the processing of personal data for the purpose of sending advertising material, for direct sales or for the conduction of market research or commercial communications activities.


IN RE: DOW CORNING CORPORATION, Reorganized Debtor. Pamela D. Sutherland, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. DCC Litigation Facility, Inc., Defendant–Appellee.
Before MERRITT, SUTTON, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. ARGUED:Mark R. Bendure, Bendure & Thomas, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Robert D. Goldstein, Garan Lucow Miller, P.C., Grand Blanc, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Mark R. Bendure, Bendure & Thomas, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Robert D. Goldstein, Timothy J. Jordan, Garan Lucow Miller, P.C., Grand Blanc, Michigan, for Appellee.
In 1988 Pamela Sutherland received breast implants in North Carolina. She filed suit in the Middle District of North Carolina five years later, after learning that the silicone in her implants could be causing a variety of serious medical problems. The Silicone's manufacturer, Dow Corning, filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Michigan, and Sutherland's suit was transferred there. In 2012, twenty-four years after Sutherland received the implants, the district court concluded that Sutherland's claim was barred by Michigan's statute of limitations and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The district court should have applied North Carolina's law instead of Michigan's, and should have concluded that there was a genuine factual issue as to whether Sutherland's claim was timely-filed under North Carolina law. We therefore REVERSE the district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 1988 Pamela Sutherland, a Virginia resident, received breast implants at Duke University Hospital in North Carolina. The silicone-based filling in the implants was produced by Dow Corning, whose corporate headquarters is in Michigan. In 1993 Sutherland filed suit in the Middle District of North Carolina alleging that the silicone in her implants was causing a wide range of serious health problems. Sutherland's was one of tens of thousands of silicone-related cases brought against Dow Corning. A multidistrict litigation panel transferred the cases to the Northern District of Alabama where, in 1994, a class settlement was reached. Sutherland opted out of the class. In 1995 Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Michigan and Sutherland's claim was transferred to that district as “related to” the bankruptcy, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485–88 (6th Cir.1996); In re Dow Corning Corp., 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.1997). After a series of appeals, see id., the district court asserted jurisdiction over all silicone-related tort claims against Dow Corning. The district court established the procedures for opt-out claimants in a series of global case management orders. As part of the bankruptcy reorganization, Dow Corning agreed to create and fund a DCC Settlement Facility to handle the class action and a DCC Litigation Facility (“DCC”) to deal with opt-out claims.
In 2009, after settlement negotiations failed, DCC moved to certify the case for trial. The district court certified the case and ordered Sutherland to file a new complaint, which Sutherland filed on January 5, 2010, and DCC answered on January 19. The case moved towards trial. Sutherland was deposed on November 2, 2011, roughly 23 years after she received the implants and 18 years after first filing suit. In May 2012 DCC filed five separate motions for summary judgment, two of which are relevant to this appeal: One motion argued that Sutherland's claim was time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations; the other argued that Sutherland had failed to provide evidence of general causation.
The district court granted summary judgment to DCC on statute-of-limitations grounds and explicitly declined to address as unnecessary any of DCC's other arguments. The court concluded that, although North Carolina, Virginia, and Michigan law might apply to Sutherland's claim, a choice of law analysis was unnecessary and applied Michigan law. There was, the district court found, no question that Sutherland's claim accrued shortly after she received the implants, and no question that her claim was untimely. This appeal followed.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir.2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As the party seeking summary judgment, DCC must show there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). All facts, including inferences, are viewed in the light most favorable to Sutherland, the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central issue is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement regarding whether Sutherland's claims are time-barred to require submission of Sutherland's claims to a jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided that DCC must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).
In resolving issues of state law, the panel looks to “the final decisions of that state's highest court, and if there is no decision directly on point, then we must make an Erie guess to determine how that court, if presented with the issue, would resolve it.” Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 714 F.3d 355, 358–59 (6th Cir.2013). We “usually defer” to our sister circuits' analyses of the law of the states within their respective borders. U.S. v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir.1994); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Martin, 197 F. App'x 412, 422 n. 4 (6th Cir.2006); see also Dawn Equip. Co. v. Micro–Trak Sys., Inc., 186 F.3d 981, 989 n. 3 (7th Cir.1999). Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Ternisky, 999 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir.1993). Unless the home circuit has “disregarded clear signals emanating from the state's highest court pointing towards a different rule” we will avoid creating “the oddity of a split in the circuits over the correct application” of one state's law. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C.Cir.1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Curtis 1000, 197 F. App'x at 422 n. 4 (quoting Abex, 790 F.2d at 125).
Although Sutherland's case came to the Middle District of North Carolina via diversity jurisdiction, it ended up in the Eastern District of Michigan by virtue of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The district court (that is, the Eastern District of Michigan) originally obtained jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which grants “the district courts ․ original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings ․ related to cases under title 11.” See Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 489. Sutherland's claim was thus “related to” the Dow Corning bankruptcy-it conceivably could have had an effect on the Dow Corning estate. See id. at 489.
The section does not grant jurisdiction. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2606 (2011). Rather, “[t]he purpose of Section 157(b)(5) is to ‘centralize the administration of the estate and to eliminate the multiplicity of forums for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.’ “ Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 496 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1011 ((4th Cir.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 1–3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.06. There is no indication that Congress intended § 157(b)(5) to be used to alter the substantive law governing the state-law cases transferred under it. Rather, Congress intended § 157(b)(5) to promote efficiency simply by allowing courts to centralize personal injury and wrongful death cases “related to” a bankruptcy. See A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011; Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 829–34 (5th Cir.1993); In re Pan Am. Corp., 950 F.2d 839, 845 (2d Cir.1991).
So, although this case looks very much like a diversity case, it is not quite a diversity case—it is a type of “related to” bankruptcy case. The distinction matters only because it raises a narrow question of first impression for this circuit: Should a change of venue under § 157(b)(5) alter which state's law governs or, as in diversity, should a change of venue have no impact on which state law applies?
There is no question that if this were a diversity case whose venue was transferred pursuant to the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, or general change-of-venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the district court would be bound to apply North Carolina's choice of law rules. In Van Dusen v. Barrack and Ferens v. John Deere Company, the Supreme Court made clear that normally the appropriate state's choice of law rule attaches when and where the plaintiff files her complaint and then travels with the case. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (“[A] transferee forum [must] apply the law of the transferor court, regardless of who initiates the transfer.”); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); see also In re Benedectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 305 (6th Cir.1988). “[T]he critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was filed.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. Thus, in diversity, “[a] change of venue ․ generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.” Id.
Three “independent reasons” support the rule that a change of venue does not change the applicable state law. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523. A change of venue (1) “should not deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist absent diversity jurisdiction,” and (2) “should not create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping .” Id. at 523. If a change of venue meant a change of law, “the transferee forum might have a shorter statute of limitations or might refuse to adjudicate a claim which would have been actionable in the transferor state. In such cases a defendant's motion to transfer could be tantamount to a motion to dismiss.” Van Dusen 376 U.S. at 629–30. Instead, (3) whether to transfer venue “should turn on considerations of convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possible prejudice resulting from a change of law.” Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523.
Extending the well-established rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack and Ferens v. John Deere Co, we hold that in a case such as this one, where: (1) the claim before the bankruptcy court is wholly derived from another legal claim already pending in a parallel, out-of-state, non-bankruptcy proceeding; and (2) the pending original, or “source,” claim was filed in a court prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, bankruptcy courts should apply the choice of law rules of the state where the underlying prepetition claim was filed.
Id. at 182 (internal citations omitted). The court noted that “it would be fundamentally unfair to allow [the] bankruptcy ․ to deprive [the plaintiff] of the state-law advantages adhering to the exercise of its venue privilege.” Id. at 190. The plaintiff had filed suit in Connecticut—the case was only in New York because of the defendant's bankruptcy. Under those circumstances, to apply the law of the forum state “would be to allow the defendant ․ to use a device of federal law (the bankruptcy code) to choose the forum and accompanying choice of law—a practice forbidden by [Van Dusen and Ferens].” Id. at 190–91.
Coudert Brothers is persuasive, and we apply its reasoning to venue transfers of state law personal injury and wrongful death claims under § 157(b)(5). As the master of her complaint, Sutherland, like the plaintiff in Coudert, chose to file suit in North Carolina. See In re Coudert Bros., 673 F.3d at 190; In re Benedictin Litig., 857 F.2d at 305–306. Her case was transferred to Michigan because of Dow Corning's bankruptcy—Sutherland had no choice in the matter. Applying Michigan's choice of law rules would render the involuntary change of venue as “tantamount to a motion to dismiss,” Van Dusen 376 U.S. at 630, which “would be fundamentally unfair,” Coudert, 673 F.3d at 190. Sutherland's “change of venue under” § 157(b)(5) “should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. A venue transfer is not alchemy. North Carolina's choice of law rules governs Sutherland's state law claim because for all intents and purposes her case never left North Carolina.
North Carolina's choice of law rules are simple: The North Carolina Supreme Court “has made clear that lex loci delicti ․ is the appropriate choice of law test to apply to tort claims.” Harco Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Grant Thornton LLP, 698 S.E.2d 719, 722 (N.C.Ct.App.2010) (italics added). Further, North Carolina applies the statute of limitations “ ‘of the jurisdiction where the suit is brought.’ “ Sayer v. Henderson, 35 S.E.2d 875, 876 (N.C.1945) (quoting Vanderbilt v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 125 S.E. 387, 393 (N.C.1924)). Therefore, under North Carolina choice of law rules, that state's laws govern Sutherland's case because her operation occurred in North Carolina. See Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 855–56 (N.C.1988). North Carolina's statutes of limitations apply because North Carolina is the forum state, Sayer, 35 S.E.2d at 876, and remains so regardless of the change of venue, Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
Under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–52(16), a plaintiff has three years to file for personal injury after the claim accrues. A claim does not accrue until the harm “becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs.” § 1–52(16). North Carolina courts have consistently held, however, that where diseases are concerned, “[t]he only possible point in time from which to measure ‘the first injury’ in the context of a disease claim is when the disease is diagnosed.” Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66, 72 (N.C.1985); see also Dunn v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (N.C.1992) (stating that “[d]ecedant's bodily injury claim ․ would have accrued” when his liver cancer was diagnosed “and would have been time-barred three years later under ․ § 1–52(16)”). Thus, “[i]n the case of diseases, the limitations period does not begin until a medical diagnosis reveals the nature of plaintiff's disease.” Earp v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 5:11–CV–680–D, 2013 WL 4854488, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2013). The Fourth Circuit has consistently applied this “disease exception,” first announced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Wilder v. Amatex, to diseases incurred from exposure to harmful products, including exposures having nothing to do with one's occupation. See, e.g., Bullard v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 74 F.3d 531, 536–37 (4th Cir.1996) (extending the disease exception to illness caused by an IUD); Guy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 792 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir.1986) (applying disease exception to illness resulting from exposure to diisocynate); Hyer v. Pittsburg Corning Corp., 790 F .2d 30, 33–34 (4th Cir.1986) (applying disease exception to lung disease caused by exposure to asbestos). Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Wilder foresaw that it would potentially have a broad application to “time-delayed product injuries” such as “Dalkon Shield cases” and “microwave cases.” Wilder, 336 S.E.2d at 74 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).2 The Wilder disease exception has been applied to both statues of repose and statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Guy, 792 F.2d at 460; Hyer, 790 F.2d at 34.
Remand is appropriate here, where there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding when Ms. Sutherland knew that it was her implants that were causing her many symptoms, which emerged over several years and were given several different diagnoses. Sutherland received her implants in June of 1988. According to her deposition testimony, she suffered from a variety of ailments in the five years between the surgery and the lawsuit: vomiting, tinnitus, balance problems, swelling of her uterus and gallbladder, edema, skin rashes, the appearance of painful knots on her body, and chronic pain. Some of Sutherland's symptoms appeared soon after the surgery. “[W]hen I woke up, before I got my eyes open, the first thing that I realized was my ear was ringing really loud before I even got my eyes opened, and then that has never quit,” she said. R. 66–3, Page ID 2934. “I threw up the whole evening” after the surgery, Sutherland said. Id. at 2935. “It cleared up after a day or two, but in the years that I've been sick, I've done a lot of vomiting.” Id. She experienced balance problems “[r]ight after the surgery” that lasted “over five [years].” Id. at 2938. Some symptoms appeared in the months after surgery. She was hospitalized in September 1988. Id. at 2959. Within six months, her hair began to fall out and her skin began to swell. Id. at 2944. It was years before other symptoms manifested. “I'd say the rashes started around 1990,” Sutherland said. Id. at 2942. She experienced “deep bone pain” accompanied by large lumps on her skin “since 1991 almost every day.” Id. at 2939. And she had a severe systemic reaction when her implants were removed in 1992. Id. at 2937.
Although Sutherland's doctors eventually diagnosed her with “silicone-induced autoimmune dysfunction,” id. at 2946, it is not clear when that diagnosis was first made. “I've had so many problems, you know, they didn't set down and say, this problem is caused by this, that problem's caused by this. They did not do that .” Id. at 2938. For a period, Sutherland's doctors did not know (or did not share their hypotheses for) what might be causing her symptoms. See id. at 2945. Over the years she was apparently diagnosed with lupus, atypical connective tissue disease (which is similar to lupus), and Reynaud's disease. But by 1992 at least one doctor, Dr. Campbell, had determined that silicone could be the culprit and recommended removing the implants. Id. at 2947. Sutherland also testified that soon after the surgery she told her family doctor, Dr. Baxter, “I've been sick ever since I had that surgery” and that he told her to see her plastic surgeon. Id. at 2943. But Sutherland said she could not remember when a doctor first suggested that the implants could be causing her symptoms. Id. at 2943.
A: And then in September of ′88, I think I was hospitalized, the month after I got married.
Q: And what caused that hospitalization?
A: I was sick with those implants.
Id. at 2959. The district court treated Sutherland's answer as dispositive: “Sutherland admitted that she was hospitalized in September 1988 because the implants were making her sick.” R. 79, Page ID 4504. We think that the district court read too much into Sutherland's words. She did not “admit” that she knew in 1988 that the implants were making her sick. Rather, looking back, twenty-three years after she received the implants and eighteen years after filing suit, Sutherland simply stated her present conclusion about the cause of her hospitalization. Sutherland said nothing about her knowledge or state of mind as of September 1988.
Based on this record, there is a genuine question as to when Sutherland first discovered that her symptoms could be linked to her implants. A surgery can cause multiple types of complications for multiple different reasons that may or may not have to do with the implantation of a given device. A reasonable jury could, for example, conclude that the Sutherland did not discover that the silicone was making her sick until 1991 or 1992, when Dr. Campbell recommended removing the implants. The inference is not difficult to draw: It would be implausible that Sutherland would wait very long to have her implants removed after learning that she had silicone-induced autoimmune dysfunction.
At this stage, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A genuine dispute of fact exists as to whether Sutherland's claims are time-barred. We therefore REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment for DCC and REMAND the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
At issue is whether Michigan's statute of limitations bars Pamela Sutherland's lawsuit to recover for injuries caused by allegedly defective breast implants. It does. Michigan does not have a discovery rule, and as a result its three-year limitations period started running at the time of Sutherland's surgery—June 1, 1988. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(13); Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Mich.2007). That gave her until June 1991 to file suit. She waited until January 1993 to file the action. That was too late.
The majority reaches a different conclusion and, it seems to me, makes two mistakes in the process. One, in claiming that current Michigan law (and its lack of a discovery rule) does not apply, it leaps over the fact that Sutherland did not preserve this argument below and thus forfeited it. Sutherland devoted one sentence in her summary judgment brief to responding to DCC's choice-of-law argument that current Michigan law applies: “Not one of these Plaintiffs[ ] has any connection or nexus to the State of Michigan, yet Defendants try to use Michigan law, primarily.” R. 72 at 6. That did not “raise” any of the arguments she now makes based on North Carolina and Virginia law and, most particularly, pre–2007 Michigan law (which did contain a discovery rule). “[C]onclusory allegations and perfunctory statements, unaccompanied by citations or some effort at legal argument, do not meet th[e] standard” for raising an argument. United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir.2009). That is this case. Any such argument thus is forfeited. See Vill. of Maineville, Ohio v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs., 726 F.3d 762, 765 (6th Cir.2013). Current Michigan law applies.
Two, the majority reaches an issue we need not decide: Which choice-of-law rule applies when a district court in one State transfers a diversity suit to a related bankruptcy proceeding in another State? See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 673 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2012). The first imperative of a conflict-of-laws problem is: a conflict. When all roads lead to the same result, there is no conflict to resolve. See CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir.2008).
Even if we opt not to apply current Michigan law, Sutherland cannot prevail under any of the other statutes of limitations in play. Start with her arguments under North Carolina and pre–2007 Michigan law. If the law of either State applied, her claims would not accrue until she discovered her injuries. See Trentadue, 738 N.W.2d at 672; Moll v. Abbott Labs., 506 N.W.2d 816, 828 (Mich.1993); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–52(16); Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 329 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C.1985) (“[A]s soon as the injury becomes apparent to the claimant or should reasonably become apparent, the cause of action is complete and the limitation period begins to run.”). Yet, as the district court found, a reasonable person in Sutherland's position would have linked her ailments to her breast implants by early 1989. Their harmful effects surfaced immediately. She underwent surgery on June 1, 1988. She began vomiting the next day. She suffered balance problems within the first week. And she was hospitalized just three months later in September 1988 because, in her words, she was “sick with those implants.” R. 66–3 at 34. By January 1989, Sutherland suffered hair loss and swelling in her legs and ankles. As she acknowledged, “I got sick right after I had those implants put in, and I started going to doctors․” Id. at 9. Nothing in her life had changed, though, except the addition of breast implants. Even so, she did not file the lawsuit until 1993. Under the discovery rule, the clock started at the latest in 1989. That makes her January 1993 filing date too late under the three-year window provided by North Carolina law and pre–2007 Michigan law.
As the majority sees things, North Carolina recognizes a “disease exception” that tolls the State's statute of limitations until a doctor informed Sutherland that her problems were implant related. Ante at –––– (slip op. at 9). With all due respect, I do not see how that exception applies even if North Carolina law did apply. The exception appears limited to diseases that arise from exposure to a harmful product at one's jobsite. Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66 (N.C.1985), which established the exception, involved such a disease (asbestosis), and it relied almost entirely on prior cases involving similar diseases. See id . at 70–71. Indeed, several cases from North Carolina courts confirm that the exception was designed for “occupational disease cases.” Dunn v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 418 S.E.2d 645, 647 (N.C .1992); see Payne v. Charlotte Heating & Air Conditioning, 616 S.E.2d 356, 363 (N.C.Ct.App.2005); Moore v. Standard Mineral Co., 469 S.E.2d 594, 597 (N.C.Ct.App.1996). Subsequent federal-court cases applying North Carolina law fit that bill too. See Hyer v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 790 F.2d 30, 32–33 (4th Cir.1986) (former insulator with asbestosis); Guy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 792 F.2d 457, 458 (4th Cir.1986) (former maintenance worker with disease from floor finish). Sutherland did not contract her illness at work.
The Fourth Circuit, to be sure, has since said that “nothing in Wilder ” suggests that tolling turns on a disease's “status or lack of status as ․ occupational.” Bullard v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 74 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.1996). That does not seem like the best reading of Wilder, but even if it is, that does not help Sutherland. Wilder adds that the exception targets diseases that “normally develop over a long period of time after multiple exposures to offending substances” such that “[i]t is impossible to identify any particular exposure as the ‘first injury.’ “ 336 S.E.2d at 70. Bullard agrees: “[T]he court looks ․ [to] the difficulty or impossibility of establishing the exact time the injury first occurs or the disease process begins.” 74 F.3d at 535. There is no such difficulty here. Sutherland herself admits that her problems were implant related and started the day after her surgery.
What of the Virginia statute of limitations? This limitations period could apply only if some applicable choice-of-law rule said so. None does. Whether we look to Michigan's, North Carolina's, or federal common law's choice-of-law rules, none of them would apply the Virginia statute of limitations. North Carolina and federal common law would apply the statute of limitations of the forum: North Carolina or Michigan. See Bordreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (N.C.1988); Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F .3d 127, 130 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) supplies the federal choice-of-law rules); Restatement (Second) § 142(1). And Michigan applies its own statute of limitations in this setting. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5861. With Virginia out of reach and Michigan and North Carolina barring her claim, Sutherland's claim fails as a matter of law.
One last note. The majority says that we “ ‘usually defer’ to our sister circuits' analysis of the law of states within their respective borders.” Ante at –––– (slip op. at 4). I am dubious. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991), reversed a circuit court for deferring to a district court's determination of its home state's law, telling appellate courts to make these determinations themselves. “When de novo review is compelled,” the Court instructed, “no form of appellate deference is acceptable.” Id. at 238. What was true in Salve Regina seems equally true here. It matters not whether the issue is potential deference to a district court's determination of its home state's law (Salve Regina ) or potential deference to a sister court of appeals' determination of its home state's law (here).
The majority seeing these issues differently, I respectfully dissent.
1. There is a longstanding circuit split on the broader question of whether to apply Van Dusen, Ferens, and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (from which the rule of Ferens and Van Dusen originates) to all state law disputes arising under the bankruptcy power. See In re Miller, 513 F. App'x 566, 572 (6th Cir.2013). Although we long ago applied Klaxon to a choice of law issue arising under a previous version of the Bankruptcy Code, United Const. Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670, 671 (6th Cir.1942), and Milam thus supports our decision today, we have not weighed in on the recent circuit split, and we do not address that broad question. We address only the applicability of Van Dusen and Ferens to the specific and limited category of § 157(b)(5) transfers.
2. The Seventh Circuit, applying North Carolina law, disagreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that there is no disease exception under § 1–52(16), thus barring a suit concerning a defective hip prosthesis that caused osteolysis. Klein v. DePuy, Inc., 506 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir.2007). However, Klein itself appears to be at odds with North Carolina law, as the North Carolina legislature has made it clear that the disease exception continues to apply to its statute of repose for product liability claims. See 2009 N.C. Laws S.L.2009–420 (S.B.882) (Extending the statute of repose from six to twelve years and stating that “[n]othing in this act is intended to change existing law relating to product liability actions based upon disease.”). See also 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 2014–44, § 1 (S.B.58) (rejecting the Supreme Court's interpretation of N.C. Stat. § 1–52(16) in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S.Ct. 2175 ((2014)), and affirming an exception to the statute of repose for latent disease claims linked to groundwater contamination). We also note that Klein has never been cited by a North Carolina appellate court.
STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MERRITT, J., joined. SUTTON, J. (pp. 12–15), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.


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Professor Nimmer once identified the “weakest infringement claims of all time” as those involving attempts by copyright holders to prevent their copyrighted work from being used as evidence against them in court. “It seems inconceivable,” Professor Nimmer wrote, “that any court would hold such reproduction to constitute infringement either by the government or by the individual parties responsible for offering the work in evidence.” But this scholarly warning has not prevented many plaintiffs from trying — and failing — to use copyright law to keep evidence out of civil and criminal trials, or to punish the parties who introduced the evidence.
The most recent example is Denison v. Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission. Joanne Denison is an attorney in Illinois who took issue with certain decisions by a probate court judge in a guardianship case. Denison began blogging about what she viewed as the “garden variety theft, embezzlement, malpractice and malfeasance” in the Illinois state courts, including specific charges of corruption against the judge.
These public accusations caused the Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission (IARDC), an arm of the Illinois Supreme Court, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Denison. IARDC made copies of the blog for use in these proceedings and also quoted the blog at length in its disciplinary complaint. According to Denison, this copying was improper and, in February of this year, she brought suit against IARDC in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging copyright infringement.
Earlier this month, Judge Amy St. Eve dismissed the case. The Court noted that the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicated that “reproduction of a work in legislative and judicial proceedings or reports” was an example of fair use. Here, the Court found, IARDC’s copying of the blog was for an entirely different purpose (disciplinary proceedings) from that for which the blog was created (political speech). In other words, it was a transformative use, and therefore a fair one. The opinion is available here.
Bond v. Blum: The Fourth Circuit held that the author of a manuscript containing a murder confession could not use copyright law to prevent the introduction of that manuscript during a custody hearing.
Carpenter v. Superior Court: The California Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff in a personal injury action could gain access to certain standardized neurological tests over an objection that the tests were protected by, inter alia, copyright law.
Evans v. Lerch: The Supreme Court of New York held that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action could not use copyright law as an excuse to avoid producing an unpublished manuscript.
Grundberg v. Upjohn: The District of Utah, in a product liability case, rejected the defendant’s attempt to register a copyright in its document production in order to restrict the plaintiff’s use and public dissemination of those documents.
Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding: The Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that it was fair use for a defendant in a civil case to make copies of the plaintiff’s publicly archived website to use as evidence.
Hollander v. Steinberg. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a copyright case by an attorney, where opposing counsel in an earlier civil action had appended that attorney’s blog entries to a motion.
Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy: The Ninth Circuit held that the secret recording of a pornographic film screening by an agent of the city of Santa Ana, for use in public nuisance proceedings against the movie theater, was fair use.
Kulik Photography v. Cochran: The Eastern District of Virginia dismissed on jurisdictional grounds a copyright infringement suit brought by the author of a photograph that was used without permission in the O.J. Simpson murder trial.
Levingston v. Earle: The District of Arizona held that appending a full copy of an author’s book to a pleading, in a harassment proceeding against that author, was fair use.
Porter v. United States: The Fifth Circuit rejected a claim by the widow of Lee Harvey Oswald that she was entitled to compensation because the publication of Oswald’s writings in the Warren Commission Report diminished the value of the copyright in those works.
Religious Tech. v .Wollersheim: The Ninth Circuit held that providing copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted documents to the defendant’s expert witness was fair use.
Scott v. WorldStarHipHop: The Southern District of New York held that the copying of a video of a fight for a student disciplinary proceeding was fair use.
Shell v. City of Radford: The Western District of Virginia dismissed a copyright infringement suit by a photographer whose photographs were copied and used by detectives investigating the murder of the photographer’s assistant.
In addition to the cases cited above, two related situations, about which we have previously written, come to mind: (1) the largely unsuccessful spate of suits by the American Institute of Physics over the use of its copyrighted scientific articles in the patent prosecution process; and (2) the copying and distribution of legal briefs by Lexis and Westlaw, which was recently held to be fair use by the Southern District of New York.
There is at least one important exception for litigators in particular to remember: don’t cheat your vendors. None of the above fair use analysis counts when the copyrighted work in question is an exhibit commissioned for the express purpose of its introduction in a litigation. So, for example, if you have a license from a photographer to use certain images created specifically for one trial, and then try to use those images beyond the license for a separate additional proceeding, this may not be fair use. Why? Because in that example, the unauthorized copy is not being put to a transformative use, but rather to the same use for which the original was created: to be introduced as a trial exhibit. For examples, see Images Audio Visual v. Perini and Ross v. Rexall Drugs.
Well, you wouldn’t cross “Nimmer on copyright”, would you?
How about high-priced acoustic standards and methods published by Acoustical Society of America (ASA) and/or American National Standards Institute (ANSI) that a project sponsor relies on to demonstrate compliance, where project opponent seeks to append excerpts of the standards to counter the demonstration? Does it matter if the submission of the document in a proceeding is marked up to highlight specific points?
Interesting question. I haven’t seen any cases going to similar issues.
what about when your demonstrative has labels, brands and other trademarks visibly present. For example, a computer animation re-creation of an accident scene where vehicle brands are apparent (ie Hummer). Or if perhaps a McDonald’s restaurant is in the background. Is this infringement when it shows up in a demonstrative intended for trial? Or is this fair use, editorial?

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Routinely ranked as one of the top chambers for family law by the major guides to the legal profession, we can justifiably lay claim to being the most modern and dynamic of the top specialist family law sets. Our record of recruitment from amongst our own pupils is second-to-none, and our pupils – both those who are recruited, and those who are not – comment on the thoroughness of the training they receive here, and the friendliness of the set as a place in which to complete their training. As an organisation, our belief, and experience, is that the source of our ongoing success is in our pupils and junior members. The level of our pupillage award and our commitment to the pupillage programme is a testament to the strength of that belief.
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If you are interested in pursuing a career at the Bar specialising in family law and practising at the highest level, then 29BR is the ideal choice for you. Applicants should generally have at least an upper second-class degree.
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