and duration of New York City's Title I program would require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid. This pervasive monitoring infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement. Moreover, personnel of the public and parochial school systems must work together in resolving various administrative matters and problems, and the program necessitates frequent contacts between the regular parochial school teachers and the remedial teachers. Pp. 473 U. S. 408-414.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 473 U. S. 414. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 473 U. S. 419, WHITE, J., ante, p. 473 U. S. 400, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 473 U. S. 420, filed dissenting opinions. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined as to Parts II and III, post, p. 473 U. S. 421.
The City of New York uses federal funds to pay the salaries of public employees who teach in parochial schools. In this companion case to School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 473 U. S. 373, we determine whether this practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The program at issue in this case, originally enacted as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, [Footnote 1] authorizes the Secretary of Education to distribute financial assistance to local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income families. The funds are to be appropriated in accordance with programs proposed by local educational agencies and approved by state educational agencies. 20 U.S.C.
"To the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency shall make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements . . . in which such children can participate."
"the picture that emerges is of a system in which religious considerations play a key role in the selection of students and teachers, and which has as its substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values."
739 F.2d 48, 68 (CA2 1984).
by field personnel, who attempt to pay at least one unannounced visit per month. The field supervisors, in turn, report to program coordinators, who also pay occasional unannounced supervisory visits to monitor Title I classes in the parochial schools. The professionals involved in the program are directed to avoid involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the private schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms. All material and equipment used in the programs funded under Title I are supplied by the Government, and are used only in those programs. The professional personnel are solely responsible for the selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals are informed that contact with private school personnel should be kept to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of the parochial schools are required to clear the classrooms used by the public school personnel of all religious symbols.
In 1978, six taxpayers commenced this action in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Title I program administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. These taxpayers, appellees in today's case, sought to enjoin the further distribution of funds to programs involving instruction on the premises of parochial schools. Initially the case was held for the outcome of National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 1248 (SDNY 1980) (PEARL), which involved an identical challenge to the Title I program. When the District Court in PEARL affirmed the constitutionality of the Title I program, ibid., and this Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 808 (1980), the challenge of the present appellees was renewed. The District Court granted appellants' motion for summary judgment based upon the evidentiary record developed in PEARL.
"[t]he Establishment Clause, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F.Supp. 29 (D. N.J.1973), aff'd, mem., 417 U.S. 961. . . (1974); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 . . . (1975) (particularly Part V, pp. 421 U. S. 367-72); and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 . . . (1977), constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of the sort at issue here."
739 F.2d at 49-50. We postponed probable jurisdiction. 469 U.S. 878 (1984). We conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not properly lie. [Footnote 7] Treating the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U.S.C. § 2103, we grant the petition, and now affirm the judgment below.
classes were provided to private school children at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local private schools. The New York City programs challenged in this case are very similar to the programs we examined in Ball. In both cases, publicly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of private school students in private school buildings. In both cases, an overwhelming number of the participating private schools are religiously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly funded programs provide not only professional personnel, but also all materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the programs. Finally, the instructors in both cases are told that they are public school employees under the sole control of the public school system.
governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.
"[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 333 U. S. 212 (1948).
"A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church."
Id. at 403 U. S. 619. Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), we invalidated a state program that offered, inter alia, guidance, testing, and remedial and therapeutic services performed by public employees on the premises of the parochial schools. Id. at 421 U. S. 352-353. As in Lemon, we observed that, though a comprehensive system of supervision might conceivably prevent teachers from having the primary effect of advancing religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement between church and state.
intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state. Id. at 403 U. S. 619. The same excessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to be 'certain,' as it must be, that . . . personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in which they serve. Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F.Supp. 29, 40-41, aff'd, 417 U.S. 961."
421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 370.
"what is crucial to a nonentangling aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes."
Id. at 426 U. S. 765. Similarly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the Court upheld one-time grants to sectarian institutions because ongoing supervision was not required. See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973).
"performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained."
Meek, supra, at 421 U. S. 371. The court below found that the schools involved in this case were "well within this characterization." 739 F.2d at 70. [Footnote 8] Unlike the schools in Roemer, many of the schools here receive funds and report back to their affiliated church, require attendance at church religious exercises, begin the schoolday or class period with prayer, and grant preference in admission to members of the sponsoring denominations. 739 F.2d at 70. In addition, the Catholic schools at issue here, which constitute the vast majority of the aided schools, are under the general supervision and control of the local parish. Ibid.
program would require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.
This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement. Agents of the city must visit and inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matter in Title I classes. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 619 ("What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion"). In addition, the religious school must obey these same agents when they make determinations as to what is and what is not a "religious symbol," and thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation of a particular religion, must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought.
"frequent contacts between the regular and the remedial teachers (or other professionals), in which each side reports on individual student needs, problems encountered, and results achieved."
We have long recognized that underlying the Establishment Clause is "the objective . . . to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 614.
"[t]he picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of a creed.'"
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 650 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate -- that neither the State nor Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of those benefits.
* Together with No. 84-238, Secretary, United States Department of Education v. Felton et al., and No. 84-239, Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York v. Felton et al., also on appeal from the same court.
"In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children."
Effective October 1, 1982, Title I was superseded by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 464, 20 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq. See 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (current Chapter I analogue of § 2701). The provisions concerning the participation of children in private schools under Chapter I are virtually identical to those in Title I. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 2740 (former Title I provision) with 20 U.S.C. § 3806 (current Chapter I provision). For the sake of convenience, we will adopt the usage of the parties and continue to refer to the program as "Title I."
"A local educational agency may receive a grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year if it has on file with the State educational agency an application which describes the programs and projects to be conducted with such assistance for a period of not more than three years, and such application has been approved by the State educational agency."
See also 20 U.S.C. § 2731 (former Title I analogue).
In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402 (1974), we addressed the question whether this provision requires the assignment of publicly employed teachers to provide instruction during regular school hours in parochial schools. We held that Title I mandated that private school students receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services received by public school students. Id. at 417 U. S. 420-421. Therefore, the statute would permit, but not require, that on-site services be provided in the parochial schools. In reaching this conclusion as a matter of statutory interpretation, we explicitly noted that "we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program." Id. at 417 U. S. 426. Wheeler thus provides no authority for the constitutionality of the program before us today.
"Each State and local educational agency shall use the payments under this subchapter for programs and projects (including the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the construction of school facilities) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children."
"The application described in subsection (a) of this section shall be approved if . . . the programs and projects described -- "
"(1)(A) are conducted in attendance areas of such agency having the highest concentration of low-income children. . . ."
"A local educational agency may use funds received under this subchapter only so as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this subchapter, and in no case may such funds be so used as to supplant such funds from such non-Federal sources. In order to demonstrate compliance with this subsection a local education agency shall not be required to provide services under this subchapter outside the regular classroom or school program."
The Court of Appeals held that the plan adopted and administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. 739 F.2d 48, 72 (1984). Appeals from this ruling were taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. An appeal under § 1252, however, may be taken only from an interlocutory or final judgment that has held an Act of Congress unconstitutional as applied ("i.e., that the section, by its own terms, infringed constitutional freedoms in the circumstances of that particular case") or as a whole. United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 404 U. S. 563-565 (1972). Because the ruling appealed from is not such a judgment, the appeals must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Ibid.
As we have in comparable cases, we shall continue in this opinion to refer to the parties as appellants and appellees in order to minimize confusion. See, e.g., Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84, 436 U. S. 90, n. 4 (1978).
"It may well be that the degree of sectarianism in Catholic schools in, for example, black neighborhoods, with considerable proportions of non-Catholic pupils and teachers, is relatively low; by the same token, in other schools, it may be relatively high. Yet . . . enforcement of the Establishment Clause does not rest on means or medians. If any significant number of the Title I schools create the risks described in Meek, Meek applies. It would be simply incredible, and the affidavits do not aver, that all, or almost all, New York City's parochial schools receiving Title I aid have . . . abandoned 'the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence.'"
739 F.2d at 70 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 650 (1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)).
"'Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States, they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools.'"
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 463 U. S. 401-402 (1983) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 433 U. S. 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
"The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them."
433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 262. Regrettably, however, the Title I and Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required by our Establishment Clause cases.
U.S. 602, 403 U. S. 619 (1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are religious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unanimous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title I program required the active and extensive surveillance that the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F.2d at 66.
"that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not discuss it at length, see ante at 473 U. S. 413, the potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entanglement grounds.
be taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), the secular education these schools provide goes "hand in hand'" with the religious mission that is the reason for the schools' existence. 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 366.
be administered, without governmental supervision in the private schools, so as to prevent the diversion of the aid from secular purposes, we would be presented with a different question.
* Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have been violated. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 413 U. S. 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the programs at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial program may be invalid because of the way it is structured.
"our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion."
Rome lurking behind programs that are just as vital to the Nation's schoolchildren as textbooks, see generally Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), transportation to and from school, see generally Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), and school nursing services.
"The First Amendment . . . does not say that, in every and all respects, there shall be a separation of Church and State. . . . Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens to each other -- hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."
dissenting), whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement, but the supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement. The Court today strikes down nondiscriminatory nonsectarian aid to educationally deprived children from low-income families. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit such sorely needed assistance; we have indeed traveled far afield from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we rely on gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets an entirely secular need. I would reverse.
Today the Court affirms the holding of the Court of Appeals that public school teachers can offer remedial instruction to disadvantaged students who attend religious schools "only if such instruction . . . [is] afforded at a neutral site off the premises of the religious school." 739 F.2d 48, 64 (CA2 1984). This holding rests on the theory, enunciated in Part V of the Court's opinion in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 421 U. S. 367-373 (1975), that public school teachers who set foot on parochial school premises are likely to bring religion into their classes, and that the supervision necessary to prevent religious teaching would unduly entangle church and state. Even if this theory were valid in the abstract, it cannot validly be applied to New York City's 19-year-old Title I program. The Court greatly exaggerates the degree of supervision necessary to prevent public school teachers from inculcating religion, and thereby demonstrates the flaws of a test that condemns benign cooperation between church and state. I would uphold Congress' efforts to afford remedial instruction to disadvantaged schoolchildren in both public and parochial schools.
test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612-613 (1971). To survive the Lemon test, a statute must have both a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Under Lemon and its progeny, direct state aid to parochial schools that has the purpose or effect of furthering the religious mission of the schools is unconstitutional. I agree with that principle. According to the Court, however, the New York City Title I program is defective not because of any improper purpose or effect, but rather because it fails the third part of the Lemon test: the Title I program allegedly fosters excessive government entanglement with religion. I disagree with the Court's analysis of entanglement, and I question the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause standard in most cases. Before discussing entanglement, however, it is worthwhile to explore the purpose and effect of the New York City Title I program in greater depth than does the majority opinion.
school premises except where necessary and where such instruction is not normally provided by the school).
After reviewing the text of the statute and its legislative history, the District Court concluded that Title I serves a secular purpose of aiding needy children regardless of where they attend school. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 84-238, p. 56a, incorporating findings of the District Court in National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 1248, 1258 (SDNY 1980) (PEARL). The Court of Appeals did not dispute this finding, and no party in this Court contends that the purpose of the statute or of the New York City Title I program is to advance or endorse religion. Indeed, the record demonstrates that New York City public school teachers offer Title I classes on the premises of parochial schools solely because alternative means to reach the disadvantaged parochial school students -- such as instruction for parochial school students at the nearest public school, either after or during regular school hours -- were unsuccessful. PEARL, supra, at 1255. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, New York City "could reasonably have regarded [Title I instruction on parochial school premises] as the most effective way to carry out the purposes of the Act." 739 F.2d at 49. Whether one looks to the face of the statute or to its implementation, the Title I program is undeniably animated by a legitimate secular purpose.
subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense."
"state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and to the general public."
"the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects."
Ante at 473 U. S. 397. While addressing the effect of the Grand Rapids program at such length, the Court overlooks the effect of Title I in New York City.
"New York City has been providing Title I services in nonpublic schools for fourteen years. The evidence presented in this action includes: extensive background information on Title I; an in-depth description of New York City's program; a detailed review of Title I rules and regulations and the ways in which they are enforced; and the testimony and affidavits of federal officials, state officers, school administrators, Title I teachers and supervisors, and parents of children receiving Title I services. The evidence establishes that the result feared in other cases has not materialized in the City's Title I program. The presumption -- that the 'religious mission' will be advanced by providing educational services on parochial school premises -- is not supported by the facts of this case."
PEARL, supra, at 1265. Indeed, in 19 years, there has never been a single incident in which a Title I instructor "subtly or overtly" attempted to "indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense." Grand Rapids, ante at 473 U. S. 397.
Common sense suggests a plausible explanation for this unblemished record. New York City's public Title I instructors are professional educators who can and do follow instructions not to inculcate religion in their classes. They are unlikely to be influenced by the sectarian nature of the parochial schools where they teach, not only because they are carefully supervised by public officials, but also because the vast majority of them visit several different schools each week, and are not of the same religion as their parochial students.* In light of the ample record, an objective observer of the implementation of the Title I program in New York City would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the participating parochial schools. To the contrary, the actual and perceived effect of the program is precisely the effect intended by Congress: impoverished schoolchildren are being helped to overcome learning deficits, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant boost in their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the opportunities that flow from it.
The only type of impermissible effect that arguably could carry over from the Grand Rapids decision to this litigation, then, is the effect of subsidizing "the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." Ibid. That effect is tenuous, however, in light of the statutory directive that Title I funds may be used only to provide services that otherwise would not be available to the participating students. 20 U.S.C. § 3807(b). The Secretary of Education has vigorously enforced the requirement that Title I funds supplement, rather than supplant, the services of local education agencies. See Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656 (1985); Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U. S. 632 (1985).
Even if we were to assume that Title I remedial classes in New York City may have duplicated to some extent instruction parochial schools would have offered in the absence of Title I, the Court's delineation of this third type of effect proscribed by the Establishment Clause would be seriously flawed. Our Establishment Clause decisions have not barred remedial assistance to parochial school children, but rather remedial assistance on the premises of the parochial school. Under Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 433 U. S. 244-248 (1977), the New York City classes prohibited by the Court today would have survived Establishment Clause scrutiny if they had been offered in a neutral setting off the property of the private school. Yet it is difficult to understand why a remedial reading class offered on parochial school premises is any more likely to supplant the secular course offerings of the parochial school than the same class offered in a portable classroom next door to the school. Unless Wolman was wrongly decided, the defect in the Title I program cannot lie in the risk that it will supplant secular course offerings.
Recognizing the weakness of any claim of an improper purpose or effect, the Court today relies entirely on the entanglement prong of Lemon to invalidate the New York City Title I program. The Court holds that the occasional presence of peripatetic public school teachers on parochial school grounds threatens undue entanglement of church and state because (1) the remedial instruction is afforded in a pervasively sectarian environment; (2) ongoing supervision is required to assure that the public school teachers do not attempt to inculcate religion; (3) the administrative personnel of the parochial and public school systems must work together in resolving administrative and scheduling problems; and (4) the instruction is likely to result in political divisiveness over the propriety of direct aid. Ante at 473 U. S. 412-414; ante at 473 U. S. 415-416 (concurring opinion of POWELL, J.).
"on the good faith and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors functioning in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is maintained."
Because "a teacher remains a teacher," the Court stated, there remains a risk that teachers will intertwine religious doctrine with secular instruction. The continuing state surveillance necessary to prevent this from occurring would produce undue entanglement of church and state. Id. at 421 U. S. 370-372. The Court's opinion in Meek further asserted that public instruction on parochial school premises creates a serious risk of divisive political conflict over the issue of aid to religion. Ibid. Meek's analysis of entanglement was reaffirmed in Wolman two Terms later.
I would accord these decisions the appropriate deference commanded by the doctrine of stare decisis if I could discern logical support for their analysis. But experience has demonstrated that the analysis in Part V of the Meek opinion is flawed. At the time Meek was decided, thoughtful dissents pointed out the absence of any record support for the notion that public school teachers would attempt to inculcate religion simply because they temporarily occupied a parochial school classroom, or that such instruction would produce political divisiveness. Id. at 421 U. S. 385 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.); id. at 421 U. S. 387 (opinion of REHNQUIST J.). Experience has given greater force to the arguments of the dissenting opinions in Meek. It is not intuitively obvious that a dedicated public school teacher will tend to disobey instructions and commence proselytizing students at public expense merely because the classroom is within a parochial school. Meek is correct in asserting that a teacher of remedial reading "remains a teacher," but surely it is significant that the teacher involved is a professional, full-time public school employee who is unaccustomed to bringing religion into the classroom.
Given that not a single incident of religious indoctrination has been identified as occurring in the thousands of classes offered in Grand Rapids and New York City over the past two decades, it is time to acknowledge that the risk identified in Meek was greatly exaggerated.
Just as the risk that public school teachers in parochial classrooms will inculcate religion has been exaggerated, so has the degree of supervision required to manage that risk. In this respect, the New York City Title I program is instructive. What supervision has been necessary in New York City to enable public school teachers to help disadvantaged children for 19 years without once proselytizing? Public officials have prepared careful instructions warning public school teachers of their exclusively secular mission, and have required Title I teachers to study and observe them. App. 50-51. Under the rules, Title I teachers are not accountable to parochial or private school officials; they have sole responsibility for selecting the students who participate in their class, must administer their own tests for determining eligibility, cannot engage in team teaching or cooperative activities with parochial school teachers, must make sure that all materials and equipment they use are not otherwise used by the parochial school, and must not participate in religious activities in the schools or introduce any religious matter into their teaching. To ensure compliance with the rules, a field supervisor and a program coordinator, who are full-time public school employees, make unannounced visits to each teacher's classroom at least once a month. Id. at 53.
certain that public school teachers do not inculcate religion. Ante at 473 U. S. 415. That reasoning would require us to close our public schools, for there is always some chance that a public school teacher will bring religion into the classroom, regardless of its location. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 44-45, n. 23. Even if I remained confident of the usefulness of entanglement as an Establishment Clause test, I would conclude that New York City's efforts to prevent religious indoctrination in Title I classes have been adequate, and have not caused excessive institutional entanglement of church and state.
The Court's reliance on the potential for political divisiveness as evidence of undue entanglement is also unpersuasive. There is little record support for the proposition that New York City's admirable Title I program has ignited any controversy other than this litigation. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 463 U. S. 403-404, n. 11 (1983), the Court cautioned that the "elusive inquiry" into political divisiveness should be confined to a narrow category of parochial aid cases. The concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 465 U. S. 687 (1984), went further, suggesting that Establishment Clause analysis should focus solely on the character of the government activity that might cause political divisiveness, and that "the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement."
I adhere to the doubts about the entanglement test that were expressed in Lynch. It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a lawsuit. My reservations about the entanglement test, however, have come to encompass its institutional aspects as well. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST has pointed out, many of the inconsistencies in our Establishment Clause decisions can be ascribed to our insistence that parochial aid programs with a valid purpose and effect may still be invalid by virtue of undue entanglement. Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 109-110. For example, we permit a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial school, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), but preclude States from providing buses for parochial school field trips, on the theory such trips involve excessive state supervision of the parochial officials who lead them. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 254. To a great extent, the anomalous results in our Establishment Clause cases are "attributable to [the] entanglement' prong." Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 681 (1980).
Pervasive institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in deciding the effect of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), but state efforts to ensure that public resources are used only for nonsectarian ends should not, in themselves, serve to invalidate an otherwise valid statute. The State requires sectarian organizations to cooperate on a whole range of matters without thereby advancing religion or giving the impression that the government endorses religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 110 (dissenting opinion of REHNQUIST, J.) (noting that state educational agencies impose myriad curriculum, attendance, certification, fire, and safety regulations on sectarian schools). If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance religion.
classrooms just over the edge of school property. The only disadvantaged children who lose under the Court's holding are those in cities where it is not economically and logistically feasible to provide public facilities for remedial education adjacent to the parochial school. But this subset is significant, for it includes more than 20,000 New York City schoolchildren and uncounted others elsewhere in the country.
* It is undisputed that 78% of Title I instructors who teach in parochial schools visit more than one school each week. Almost three-quarters of the instructors do not share the religious affiliation of any school they teach in. App. 49.


EARL CARPENTER AND SONS COMPANY vs. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. GORHAM MANUFACTURING COMPANY vs. SAME.
Present: KNOWLTON, C. J., MORTON, LATHROP, BARKER, HAMMOND, LORING, & BRALEY, JJ.
A plaintiff has a right to become nonsuit when a hearing before an auditor has been finished but the auditor's report has not been filed.
TWO ACTIONS OF CONTRACT OR TORT , under St. R. I. June 20, 1836, § 2, for damage to property of the respective plaintiffs at Providence in the State of Rhode Island by fire alleged to have been communicated from engines of the defendant. Writ dated September 18, 1899.
exceeding $200 in bringing witnesses from Rhode Island to testify.
On January 25, 1902, the hearings were completed and the cases were argued by counsel before the auditor. On April 8, 1902, before the auditor had filed his reports, the plaintiff in each case filed a motion to become nonsuit. On October 16, 1902, the auditor filed his reports, finding for the defendant in both cases. On November 24, 1902, the plaintiffs' motions were heard by Braley, J., who ruled, against the objection of the defendant, that as a matter of law no trial had been begun within the meaning of the rule as to the right to become nonsuit at any time before trial, and that the plaintiff in each case had an absolute right to become nonsuit, and so ordered. He stayed all proceedings, and reported the cases for determination by this court.
The cases were argued at the bar in January, 1903, before Knowlton, C. J., Morton, Hammond, Loring, & Braley, JJ., and afterwards were submitted on briefs to all the justices.
R. F. Herrick, for the plaintiffs.
L. R. Eastman, Jr., for the defendant.
LORING, J. It has always been a recognized principle of the English law, on the equity as well as on the common law side of the court, that a plaintiff is not bound to prosecute a suit or action to a finish because he has begun it. But on the contrary he is at liberty to abandon it without losing the right of action on which it is founded, and he can enforce that right subsequently on paying the costs of the former proceeding. In this respect a plaintiff is more fortunate than a defendant who has a day in court to interpose his defence if he would not have final judgment given against him.
What is not so clear is how far the plaintiff's proceeding (whether it be a suit in equity or an action on the common law side of the court) must have gone for it to have reached the stage where this right of abandonment is lost.
(3d Am. ed.) 867. This rule was adopted here by an ordinance of the Colony in 1641 ; Anc. Chart. 46 ; and in Locke v. Wood, 16 Mass. 317 , it was contended by Webster and Shaw in 1820 that that was the rule of practice of the Commonwealth and that the plaintiff had a right to become nonsuit at any time before judgment. But the court "were of opinion that there was no such right ; and that, after a cause is opened to the jury, and begun to be proceeded in before them, the parties are entitled to a verdict, unless the court should, in its discretion, allow a nonsuit or discontinuance." Since then it has been held or said to be the rule that a plaintiff can become nonsuit as of right at any time before the trial has begun but not afterwards. Means v. Welles, 12 Met. 356 , 361. Lowell v. Merrimack Manuf. Co. 11 Gray 382 . Slaaw v. Boland, 15 Gray 571 . Truro v. Atkins, 122 Mass. 418 . Burbank v. Woodward, 124 Mass. 357 . Kempton v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192 . Derielc v. Taylor, 171 Mass. 444 . Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co. 174 Mass. 299 . See also the previous case of Haskell v. Whitney, 12 Mass. 47 .
The reason for denying in this Commonwealth the rule of the English common law was the injustice done to the defendant, who was subjected to being harassed a second time on one and the same cause of action on receiving costs, which in this Commonwealth are nominal. In that respect the burden of being subject to a second action is much greater here than in England, where costs are substantial. But the common law rule has now been abolished in England. By Order XXVI. of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, adopted under the judicature act, it is provided that " the plaintiff may, at any time before receipt of the defendant's defence, or after the receipt thereof before taking any other proceeding in the action (save any interlocutory application), by notice in writing" discontinue the action. Wilson's Practice of the Supreme Court of Judicature, (7th ed.) 234.
The Massachusetts rule as to when a plaintiff could become nonsuit in a common law action was established when substantially, if not absolutely, all such cases were tried to a jury. No question could arise as to what the rule was when applied to cases tried by the court, as so many cases are now tried since Sts. 1874, c. 248, § 1; 1875, c. 212, § 1; 1894, c. 357, now R. L.
c. 173, § 56, directing all cases to be tried by the court unless a trial by jury is claimed by one of the parties. Until the case is opened the right to become nonsuit exists.
A question did arise as to the application of the rule in case of a preliminary trial before commissioners in case of a petition to recover compensation for property taken under the right of eminent domain. It was held that when the hearing before the commissioners was begun the right to become nonsuit was lost. Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co. 174 Mass. 299 .
The case at bar presents the question whether the right is lost when a hearing before an auditor has been finished but before the auditor's report is filed.
The cases relied on at the bar are not decisive of the point. It was held on the one hand in Haskell v. Whitney, 12 Mass. 47 , that after an action has been sent to arbitrators under an agreement of submission voluntarily entered into, the plaintiff cannot become nonsuit even before a hearing before the arbitrators has begun. But that is a decision that when the action has by agreement of the parties been sent to arbitrators it ceases to be an action at law and becomes a submission to arbitration and a party to a submission has no right to become nonsuit. On the other band it was held in Stone v. Sargent, 129 Mass. 503 , that a case could be removed to a court of the United States, on the ground of prejudice, after an auditor's report had been filed. But the statute under which the removal in that case was allowed provided that the suit might be removed "before the final hearing or trial of such suit." See U. S. St. March 2, 1867, c. 196. As re-enacted in U. S. Rev. Sts. § 639, cl. 3, it provides that the case may be removed " before the trial or final hearing of the suit." It is settled that the trial referred to is the final trial. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464. This was the law in 1879, when the petition for removal in Stone v. Sargent was filed, and continued to be the rule until 1887, when U. S. St. March 3, 1887, c. 373, (24 U. S. Sts. at Large, 552,) corrected by U. S. St. August 13, 1888, c. 866, (25 U. S. Sts. at Large, 433,) was enacted, adopting, for removal for local prejudice, the rule as to removal by reason of diverse citizenship alone, to wit, " before any trial."
Were the question now before us a question of first impression depending entirely on the advantages and disadvantages to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, it is by no means clear that it ought not to be held to be too late for a plaintiff to become nonsuit when an order had been made sending the case to an auditor. A hearing before an auditor is not now, as it was, a preliminary investigation of complicated accounts and nothing more. The rule laid down in Whitwell v. Willard, 1 Met. 216 , was altered by St. 1856, c. 202, now R. L. c. 165, § 55. Although this rule was altered so long ago, it was not until lately that the practice as to what cases should be sent to an auditor was changed. It has become the practice now, however, (owing to the overcrowding of the dockets,) to send to auditors cases involving a long investigation, no matter what the kind of investigation may be. The result is that an auditor's hearing is now a different thing from what it was. Not only that, but this change has been recognized by the Legislature. St. 1900, c. 418, (R. L. c. 165, § 59 ; c. 173, § 81,) provides that the court may set a day for the " trial " before the auditor, and upon such order being made the trial shall proceed from day to day until it is concluded ; that the actual engagement of counsel in a hearing before an auditor shall be an excuse in another cause as if he were engaged in court, and each party is required to proceed before the auditor at the time appointed and "to produce in good faith, the testimony relied upon by him."
him to become nonsuit. In making that provision it is assumed that the court has no power to enter judgment for the defendant at that stage of the proceeding.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to dispose of the question on its merits. If, under the practice which now obtains, the rule, which we feel we are bound by, does injustice to defendants, the remedy is with the Legislature.
Entry of nonsuit to stand.


text:
COMMONWEALTH vs. EDMUND F. HENNESSEY.
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 25, 1981.
A motion for a new trial filed on January 3, 1985, was heard by James P. Donohue, J.
Robert N. Tochka, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
evidence, and (2) deprivation of the right to testify at trial in his own behalf. As to the latter ground, Hennessey asserts that his desire to take the stand was overborne by his lawyer and that the trial judge, on his own initiative, should have inquired of the defendant whether his failure to testify was voluntary. The motion for a new trial was denied after hearing, [Note 3] setting the stage for this appeal.
1. Newly discovered evidence. Hennessey's conviction arose out of the fatal stabbing of Michael Lumenti on October 3, 1981. The circumstances of that tragedy are recounted in Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 161-162. While the Hennessey opinion affirmed the judgment upon Hennessey, it held that Dorsey, a codefendant, was entitled to a required finding of not guilty on the charge of murder. Id. at 163-165. Dorsey had declined to testify at trial but after his conviction was reversed came forward with an account, enshrined in an affidavit, concerning a detail of the killing. At trial, a percipient witness, a pretzel vendor, testified that Dorsey had wrested from Lumenti, the victim, a short dog chain which Lumenti had used to defend himself from the attack by Dorsey and Hennessey. Dorsey was now prepared to say that he had not wrested the dog chain from the victim. That evidence, Hennessey urges, materially strengthens the claim of self-defense he had made at trial.
353 F.2d 519, 520 (1st Cir. 1965). "[I]f a new trial could be predicated as of right upon a codefendant's change of heart after failure to take the stand there could always be a second chance for everyone." Ibid.
Appropriately, the judge invoked his position to assess the probable impact of the proffered evidence on the jury together with the other evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13 , 16 (1971). Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303 , 305-307 (1986). Commonwealth v. Markham, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 651 , 655 (1980). His appraisal of Dorsey's evidence was that it was not of a character to create a substantial risk that a jury exposed to it would have reached a different conclusion. See id. at 655. The judge, manifestly, suffered no apprehension "that justice may not have been done." Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). Commonwealth v. Markham, 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 654.
A motion for a new trial, in the absence of constitutional error, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Grace, 370 Mass. at 751. Commonwealth v. Smith, 381 Mass. 141 , 142 (1980). Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. at 307. Reversal of action on such a motion is extremely rare. Commonwealth v. Leavitt, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 84 , 85 (1985). It is implausible that a jury exposed to the mindless and repellant homicide described in Hennessey I, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 161-162, would have reached a different result. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101 , 107 (1981). We detect neither abuse of discretion nor manifest injustice.
2. Defendant's right to testify and the need for a colloquy on that subject. Although discussions of testimonial privilege more often concern themselves with the right not to testify, the right to testify in one's own behalf is equally fundamental. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). Commonwealth v. Siciliano, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 918 , 920 (1984). The decision whether to testify, in consultation with counsel, is, in the last analysis, to be made by the defendant. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Section 4-5.2(a) (2d ed. 1982).
As to basic rights, a strict standard of waiver applies. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973).
At his trial, Hennessey gave the judge no indication of conflict with his lawyer about a desire to testify. Hennessey's counsel, after consultation with the codefendant's counsel, asked for, and received, a jury instruction that the jurors were not to draw an adverse inference from his failure to take the stand. See Commonwealth v. Buiel, 391 Mass. 744 , 745-747 (1984). There was no suggestion at the time of a disagreement between counsel and client. See United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375-376 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
During the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the "right to testify" point was lightly pressed compared to the "new evidence" issue. For example, an affidavit had been obtained from trial counsel about what significance he attributed to Dorsey's proffered testimony. The affidavit is silent on the question of any disagreement with the defendant about his testifying. The judge in his memorandum of decision on the new trial motion confined himself to discussion of the purported newly discovered evidence and did not refer to the defendant's claim that he had been prevented from testifying. We would have welcomed the judge's finding on the latter issue, but his denial of the motion is an implicit statement that he did not credit the defendant's affidavit that he had wanted to testify.
Relying on People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984), Hennessey urges us to require trial judges to conduct a colloquy with a defendant to assure, on the record, that the defendant has knowingly relinquished the right to testify. In Commonwealth v. Siciliano, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 920-921, we said that Massachusetts did not require a voir dire to ascertain whether a defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived that right. In response to the defendant's argument, we now express our opinion that such a colloquy is neither constitutionally required nor appropriate to the fair management of a trial.
The idea expressed in Colorado's Curtis case, that the trial judge should discuss with the defendant his right to testify, has found partial acceptance in Culberson v. State, 412 So.2d 1184, 456 So.2d 697 (Miss. 1984). Other courts have rejected a requirement of an on-the-record colloquy in the absence of an indication by the defendant to the trial judge that he wished to take the stand. See State v. Allie, 147 Ariz. 320 (1985); Cutter v. State, 460 So.2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Simmons, 140 Mich. App. 681 (1985); State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 474-475 (1985). See also State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980), which antedated the Curtis case.
there is no constitutional or statutory mandate that a trial judge inquire into a defendant's decision not to testify. See to the same effect, United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984). There are persuasive pragmatic reasons why we think this is a sound view.
Unlike the broad strategic decision of waiving the right to trial by jury, which is made before trial begins, or pleading guilty, which is generally made before trial but, in all events, brings trial to an end, the decision whether the defendant shall take the stand is a tactical one. [Note 5] It is often reserved to await developments in the trial. Those developments may be such that taking the stand would be the lesser evil. Conversely, the trial's course may be such that the wiser maneuver is not to expose the defendant to cross-examination before a jury or to a recital of his prior convictions. When then ought the colloquy between judge and defendant occur? The judge cannot know that the defendant has not testified until the defense has rested. That is surely an awkward time to engage in a discussion with the defendant which might lead to a rupture with defense counsel (such might be the case should counsel be convinced the story his client wanted to tell was false) [Note 6] or might undo a trial strategy based on the defendant's not testifying.
clear. He is informing the defendant of constitutionally provided protections. The right to testify is more complex. There is a risk that in explicating the right to testify the judge will cast in unflattering light the right not to testify. To claim the privilege not to testify, the defendant merely remains silent. He does not have to claim anything. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 939-940 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975). Requiring a trial judge to ask the defendant whether he wishes to testify would carry with it a risk of introducing error if the exchange between judge and defendant appeared to press the merits of taking the stand. See 504 F.2d at 939-940; Commonwealth v. Guess, ante 208, 211-212 (1986). The judge does not know what the defendant is going to say or the defendant's capacity as a witness. Thus in the dark, the judge can scarcely engage in a useful discussion with the defendant.
We decline to require an on-the-record waiver of the defendant's right to testify or that the judge engage in a colloquy with the defendant about the subject.
[Note 1] Convictions of larceny and cruelty to animals were also affirmed.
[Note 2] Counsel appointed to press the new trial motion was the fourth lawyer appointed to represent Hennessey.
[Note 3] We do not detain the reader with an account of the trial court and appellate proceedings which occurred prior to the time the trial judge held a hearing on the motion for a new trial.
[Note 4] We are unconvinced by the defendant's argument that a motion in limine about prior convictions is virtually routine and that no inferences should be drawn from the making of such a motion. Relatively routine they may be (Commonwealth v. Rossi, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 257 , and Commonwealth v. Reid, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 730 , 735 n.5 , further appellate review granted, 398 Mass. 1106 ), but the fact such a motion is made at all means that the defense has prior convictions to worry about should the defendant take the stand.
[Note 5] As to the requirement of a colloquy in connection with a plea of guilty, see Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c) (3), 378 Mass. 868 (1979); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601 , 604 (1973); Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834 , 841 (1982). The requirement of a colloquy in connection with waiver of trial by jury is discussed in Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504 , 507-511 (1979), and its progeny, for example, Commonwealth v. Schofield, 391 Mass. 772 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Abreu, 391 Mass. 777 (1984). See Smith, Criminal Practice & Procedure Sections 1653-1654 (2d ed. 1983).
[Note 6] See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 7-102A(4), as appearing in 382 Mass. 785 (1981). A lawyer shall not knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
[Note 7] Commonwealth v. Siciliano, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 921, is not to the contrary. It simply acknowledged, without discussion, the utility of a waiver of the right to testify on the record. If it can be done through a guarded question to counsel or the defendant, there may be some benefit.

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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Timothy WHALEY, Appellant.
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. Lenny Kagan, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellant. Dean John Sauer, argued, Michael A. Reilley, AUSA, on the brief, St. Louis MO, for appellee.
Timothy Whaley pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and tampering with a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A). Based on Whaley's criminal history, the district court 1 determined that Whaley was subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Whaley appeals, arguing that his Missouri conviction for “knowingly burning or exploding” is not a violent felony under the ACCA, and that his fifteen-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment if the defendant has three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA defines “violent felony” to include “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that is “burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Whaley does not dispute that he had sustained two qualifying convictions, for unlawful use of a weapon and attempted robbery. (PSR ¶¶ 56-64). The disputed issue is whether Whaley's conviction in Missouri for knowingly burning or exploding constitutes a third violent felony. We review the district court's determination on this point de novo. United States v. Vincent, 519 F.3d 732, 733 (8th Cir.2008).
The district court concluded that knowingly burning or exploding falls within the residual clause of § 924(e) for offenses that “otherwise involv [e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The court reasoned that “although arson was not the specific state felony for which the defendant was charged,” the offense of knowingly burning or exploding did “present a serious potential risk of physical injury to other people.” (S. Tr. 33).
On appeal, Whaley argues that knowingly burning or exploding is simply a property crime that does not involve a serious risk of physical injury to others. The government, citing United States v. Hathaway, 949 F.2d 609, 610-11 (2d Cir.1991), responds that the Missouri offense constitutes “arson” within the meaning of § 924(e), and, alternatively, that knowingly burning or exploding is encompassed by the residual clause. We agree with the government's first contention and affirm the district court's ruling on that basis.
In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), a case involving the meaning of “burglary” in § 924(e), the Supreme Court explained that whether an offense qualifies as an enumerated offense under the statute depends on whether the offense meets “some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States' criminal codes.” Id. at 592, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court rejected the common-law definition of burglary as the uniform definition, because the “contemporary understanding” of burglary had diverged from the common-law meaning of the term. Id. at 593, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Rather, the Court concluded that when Congress used “burglary” in § 924(e), it did so in “the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Based on its review of the criminal codes, the Court concluded that generic burglary contained at least certain specified elements, namely, “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court held that if the elements of an offense under state law “substantially correspond[ ]” to this generic definition, then the offense constitutes “burglary” under the ACCA. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
We follow a similar generic approach to determine the meaning of “arson” in § 924(e). One candidate for the applicable definition is the common-law meaning of arson, to wit: “the malicious burning of the dwelling house of another.” 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.3, at 239 (2d ed.2003). As with burglary, however, a review of criminal codes shows that the contemporary meaning of arson has diverged from the common-law definition.
Our understanding of the modern criminal codes leads us to conclude that the contemporary meaning of arson is not limited to the burning of a dwelling house. When Congress added arson to the list of violent felonies in 1986, the felony arson statutes of at least thirty-one states prohibited not only the burning of a dwelling, but also the burning of personal property. John Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo. L.Rev. 295, 384 (1986). The federal arson statutes likewise applied to the burning of personal property. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (“Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any ․ personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States ․ shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years․”); id. § 844(i) (“Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any ․ real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce ․ shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years․”); Id. § 81 (“Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns any building, structure or vessel, any machinery or building materials or supplies, military or naval stores, munitions of war, or any structural aids or appliances for navigation or shipping, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be imprisoned for not more than 25 years․”).2 These statutes were part of the federal criminal code when Congress included arson as a predicate offense under § 924(e), and we think they provide a good indication of what Congress understood arson to mean. Therefore, we conclude that generic arson extends to the destruction of personal property as well as real property.3 This conclusion is consistent with the decisions of other circuits that have considered the issue. United States v. Miller, 246 Fed. App'x 369, 371-72 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished); Hathaway, 949 F.2d at 610; see also Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d at 1230-31 (applying the sentencing guidelines).
The mens rea for arson at common law was maliciousness, and the contemporary criminal codes have retained that element. The federal arson statutes apply to one who acts “maliciously,” which means to act “with willful disregard of the likelihood that damage or injury would result.” United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir.1996). Almost all of the state criminal codes use one or a combination of the following mental states: “intentionally,” “willfully,” “maliciously,” “wantonly,” and “knowingly.” See Poulos, supra, at 403-17; LaFave, supra, § 21.3(e). We perceive little difference among these terms in the context of an offense that forbids destroying property by fire.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the generic offense of arson, for purposes of the sentence enhancement in § 924(e), has as elements the malicious burning of real or personal property of another. Consistent with Taylor, we hold that an offense constitutes “arson” under § 924(e) if either its statutory definition “substantially corresponds” to generic arson, or “the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic [arson] in order to convict the defendant.” Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. A conviction for such an offense thus qualifies as a violent felony if it is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
Under Missouri law, “a person commits the crime of knowingly burning or exploding when he knowingly damages property of another by starting a fire or causing an explosion.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 569.055. A person acts “knowingly” if he “is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause that result.” Id. § 562.016. This mens rea is comparable to maliciousness, which requires “willful disregard of the likelihood that damage or injury would result.” Gullett, 75 F.3d at 947. The elements of the Missouri offense of knowingly burning or exploding therefore substantially correspond to those of generic arson. The Missouri offense is a class D felony, which is punishable by a term of imprisonment “not to exceed four years.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 558.011. As such, a conviction for knowingly burning or exploding in Missouri constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the sentence enhancement under § 924(e).
For these reasons, the district court correctly determined that Whaley had sustained three prior convictions for violent felonies, and that he should be classified as an armed career criminal. According to the statute, the district court properly sentenced Whaley to the mandatory minimum term of fifteen years' imprisonment.
Whaley also argues that the sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He argues that the punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to his instant offense of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition. This argument is foreclosed by decisions of this court rejecting the same contention. United States v. Yirkovsky, 259 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Villar, 184 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Rudolph, 970 F.2d 467, 470 (8th Cir.1992).
1. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
2. The offenses defined by §§ 844(f)(1) and 844(i) are not labeled “arson,” but the Code elsewhere refers to these offenses as arson, see 18 U.S.C. § 3295, as do other authorities. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000); LaFave, supra, § 21.3(i).
3. Some states set a monetary minimum on property damage, ranging from $25 to $1,000, before an offense qualifies as felony arson. Poulos, supra, at 371-72. The federal arson statutes include no monetary minimums. While damage limitations may render some acts of malicious burning non-criminal or non-felonious in certain jurisdictions, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the limits applied by some States “do not disrupt the ‘interstate consensus' that the burning of personal property constitutes arson.” United States v. Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.2005).


In Duncan v. Duncan, the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a voidable marriage. The Duncans exchanged vows in two separate marriage ceremonies. The first occurred in 1989 and was presided over by a man who held himself out as a Cherokee medicine man and who was ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. In 2001, the couples participated in a second ceremony at a Presbyterian church.
Alimony awards are based, in part, on the length of the marriage. Apparently, Mr. Duncan was attempting to limit his potential alimony exposure by arguing that the marriage did not begin until 2001. The pleadings indicate that the couple separated in 2005, so the issue was whether the couple was married for approximately 4 years or 16.
Our Supreme Court has held that “[a] common law marriage or marriage by consent is not recognized by this State.” State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 487, 272 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1980). Rather, “[t]o constitute a valid marriage in this State, the requirements of G.S. 51-1 must be met.” Id. at 486, 272 S.E.2d at 353.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1, as it read in 1989, required that the parties “‘express their solemn intent to marry in the presence of (1) an ordained minister of any religious denomination; or (2) a minister authorized by his church; or (3) a magistrate.’” Pickard v. Pickard, 176 N.C. App. 193, 196, 625 S.E.2d 869, 872 (2006) (quoting State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 487, 272 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1980)).
Whether the 1989 marriage ceremony met these requirements is a bit of an open question. The majority opinion concluded that Mr. Duncan met his burden of showing that the 1989 marriage ceremony did not meet the requirements of G.S. § 51-1. The minority opinion concluded differently.
Ultimately, however, the case turned on the issue of whether Mr. Duncan would be permitted to claim that the marriage was invalid after he had participated in the 1989 ceremony, which he knew, or should have known, may not have complied with North Carolina law. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Duncans were equally negligent in relying on the supposed Cherokee medicine man’s credentials to conduct their wedding.
The Court then applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Under this doctrine, a party who is silent about or conceals important facts from the other party, may not later take advantage of that deception. The Court would not allow Mr. Duncan to participate in the 1989 wedding ceremony, go about his life for 12 more years as if he were married and then attempt to argue that the 1989 ceremony was bogus.
This case is unusual in that the Duncans may have had what was essentially a common law marriage. However, the Court of Appeals would not allow Mr. Duncan to use that fact to limit his alimony exposure because of his somewhat disingenuous legal position.


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The policy of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd is fully compliant with Regulation (EC) 2016/679 (the "Regulation"). By using the website of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. - https://shop.baron.bg/, it is possible to process personal data and we want the user's consent in advance and we announce the current policy for their protection.
The processing of personal data, such as name, address, e-mail address or telephone number, always complies with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and is in line with country-specific data protection provisions. With this Privacy Statement, we want to inform you about the scope and purpose of the data we collect, use and process. Consumers are informed by this declaration about the protection of their personal data and the rights they have under the Regulation.
Baron OOD and Baron Attractions Ltd. have implemented a number of technical and organizational measures to ensure the complete protection of the personal data of individuals acquired and processed through our site.
The Data Protection Declaration of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd is based on the terminology used in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Data Protection Declaration should be understandable to the general public as well as to our clients and business partners. To ensure this, we would first like to explain the terminology used.
Personal data - any information that can be used for identification of an individual ("user"). An individual who can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular by indicating data such as name, location data, online identifier, and more.
Data subject ("user") is any identified or identifiable natural person whose personal data are processed by us under the terms of the Regulation.
Processing, storing, adapting or modifying, retrieving, consulting, using, disclosing, transmitting, distributing or otherwise providing or combining, limiting, deleting or destroying personal data.
Restriction of processing is the marking of stored personal data in order to limit their processing in the future.
Profiling - any form of automated processing of personal data.
The controller or the controller responsible for processing is a natural or legal person, public body, agency or other body which, individually or jointly with others, defines the purposes and means of processing personal data; where the objectives and means for such processing are determined by the EU legal framework.
The recipient is a natural or legal person, a public authority, an agency or other body to which personal data is disclosed, whether or not a third party. Public authorities that may receive personal data in a specific investigation in accordance with EU law are not considered to be third parties; the processing of these data is in accordance with applicable data protection rules in accordance with the purposes of the processing.
Third country is a natural or legal person, a public authority, an agency or a body other than the data subject, the controller, the processor and the persons directly entitled to the processing of personal data by the controller or processor.
The consent of the user is any free, specific, informed and unambiguous indication, by means of a statement or by clear positive action and gives consent to the processing of his / her personal data.
e-mail:kzld@government.bg, kzld@cpdp.bg ; Web site: www.cpdp.bg.
By using cookies, Baron Ltd. and Baron Attractions Ltd. can provide users of this site with user-friendly services that would not be possible without setting cookies.
Using cookies, the information on our site can be optimized according to the user's behavior and desire. "Cookies" allow us to recognize our users. The purpose of this recognition is to make it easier for users to use our site.
The site of Baron Ltd. and Baron Attractions Ltd. collects general data and information on its visit. These general data and information are stored in the log files of the SiteGround Spain S.L. server, which strictly adhere to the Data Protection Regulation. You can find information about this at https://www.siteground.com/privacy.htm. The collected can be (1) the types and versions of the browser used, (2) the operating system used by the access system, (3) the site from which it reaches our website (so called References), (4) 5) date and time of access to the website, (6) IP address, (7) internet service provider, (8) any other information that may be used in the event of a cyber attack on our site.
Using these common data and information, Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd makes no conclusions about the data subject. Rather, this information is needed to: (1) create the proper content of our site, (2) optimize content on our site, (3) provide quality access to information, (4) provide law enforcement authorities with the necessary information for prosecution in case of cyber attack.
Therefore, Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. analyze statistically anonymous data and information collected in order to increase data protection and security and to ensure an optimal level of protection of the personal data it processes. Anonymous log file data on the server is stored separately from all personal data provided by the user.
The site of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. contains information that allows quick electronic contact with us as well as direct communication, which also includes the submission of direct information by e-mail via a form on the site. If a user contacts Baron Ltd. and Baron Attractions Ltd directly via e-mail or through the contact form, the personal data transmitted by the data subject is automatically stored. Such personal data, transmitted on a voluntary basis by the user, are processed and stored for connection to it. This personal data is not shared with third parties.
Baron OOD and Baron Attractions Ltd. process and store the user's personal data only for the period necessary to achieve the purpose or for a period provided for in the Regulation.
If the storage purpose is not applicable or if the storage period laid down by the European legislator or other competent legislator expires, personal data shall be routinely blocked or deleted in accordance with the legal requirements.
Every user has the right to receive from a confirmation whether the personal data relating to him is processed. If a data subject wishes to take advantage of this confirmation right, he or she may at any time contact us.
- the availability of automated decision making, including profiling, as referred to in Art. 22 (1) and (4) of the Regulation, as well as the foreseeable consequences of such processing.
The user has the right to receive information about whether his or her personal data is transmitted to a third country or an international organization. Where this is the case, the consumer has the right to be informed of the transfer precautions taken.
If a user wants to take advantage of this right of access, he or she can contact us at any time.
Each user has the right to request, without undue delay, correction of inaccuracies in his / her personal data. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the user has the right to have incomplete personal data filled in, by providing a supplementary statement to that effect.
If the user wishes to exercise this right of repair, he or she may at any time contact us.
If one of the above reasons is relevant and the user wishes to request the deletion of the personal data stored by Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd, he or she may at any time contact us. Employee of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. will immediately make sure that the deletion request is met immediately.
When the controller has made the personal data public, it is obliged, according to Art. 17 (1), to erase personal data provided to third parties, taking into account available technology and enforcement costs, take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform other data controllers that the user has requested to be deleted. The employees of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. will organize the necessary actions on a case-by-case basis.
- the user objects to the processing of his / her personal data, according to Art. Article 21 (1) of the Regulation.
If one of the above conditions is available and the user requests that the personal data stored by Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd be restricted, he or she may at any time contact us. The employee of Baron Ltd and Baron Attractions Ltd. will restrict their handling.
Every user has the right to receive the personal data we have been provided in a structured electronic format. The user has the right to provide this data to another administrator, provided the processing is based on Art. 6 (1a), Art. 9 (2a) of the Regulation or a contract pursuant to Art. 6 (1b) of the Regulation.
Furthermore, in the exercise of the data portability right under Art. 20 (1) of the Regulation, the consumer is entitled to provide personal data directly from one controller to another where this is technically feasible in accordance with the Regulation.
In order to establish the data portability, the User may at any time be with us.
Every user has the right to object at any time to the processing of personal data relating to him under Article 6 (1) of the Regulation.
Baron OOD and Baron Attractions Ltd. will not process personal data in case of objection, unless we have good reasons for processing it that outweigh the interests, rights and freedoms of the consumer or for the establishment, exercise or protection of legitimate actions.
If Baron OOD and Baron Attractions Ltd. process personal data for direct marketing purposes, the user has the right to object at any time to their processing for this purpose. This refers to direct marketing profiling. If the user does not wish to process his or her data for direct marketing purposes, we are required to comply with this application.
Each user has the right to refuse automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects with respect to it or a similar substantial impact on it, insofar as the decision is not necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract between us and the consumer.
Each user has the right to withdraw his / her consent to process his or her personal data at any time.
If the user wishes to withdraw his / her consent, he or she may at any time contact us.
In order to execute the user order and the so-called a distance contract that occurs upon an online order and / or payment, we use the services of courier company Econt Express.
We pass the personal data to the courier company: Name, Surname, Phone, and Address so that we can execute the order and / or collect payments to it if a "cash payment" method is selected that is also collected by the courier upon delivery of the ordered product (s). The company strictly adheres to the provisions on personal data protection. More information can be found at http://www.econt.com.
In our site, we have integrated a Google Analytics script. The purpose of this tool is to collect and analyze data about visitors' behavior on the web site: which pages were visited, how often and for how long a given subpage was viewed. Web analytics are primarily used to optimize the website and possibly to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of Internet advertising.
Google Analytics is owned by Google Inc., 1600 Pkwy, Mountain View, CA 94043-1351, USA.
For web analytics using Google Analytics, we use "_gat. _anonymizeIp ". Using this application, the IP address of the user's Internet provider is abridged by Google and anonymised.
Google Analytics puts a cookie on the device of the user who visited our website. The definition of cookies is explained above. Using the cookie, Google can analyze the use of our site. Each time we visit each of the pages on our site that have the Google Analytics tracking code integrated, the user's web browser will send data to Google Analytics. During this process, Google receives personal user information, such as IP address and location.
The cookie is used to store information such as access time, the location from which access was made, and the frequency of visits to our site. Every time we visit our website, such personal information, including an IP address, will be provided to Google. This personal data is stored by Google in the United States and the company may transfer this personal data to third parties.
On our site we have links to the Facebook social network.
The Social Network is a place for online meetings on the Internet, an online community where users are allowed to communicate with each other and interact in a virtual space. The social network can serve as a platform for exchanging views and experiences, or to enable users to provide personal or business information. Facebook allows users to create profiles, upload photos, and make contacts with each other.
Facebook is owned by Facebook, Inc., 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA. If the user lives outside of the United States or Canada, the data administrator is Facebook Ireland Ltd., 4 Grand Canal Square, Grand Canal Harbor, Dublin 2, Ireland.
It is possible that every page of our site has a link to our Facebook profile and / or installed Facebook plugins. It is possible that the device from which the user visits our site invites him to install an additional setup and / or the Facebook mobile app. An overview of all possible Facebook plug-ins can be found at https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins. During this procedure, Facebook was notified of which subpage on our site visited by the user.
If the user has both entered Facebook simultaneously, Facebook discovers this and collects information that is associated with the user's profile on the social network. If the user clicks on any of the Facebook links / buttons integrated in our site, the social network keeps that information that associates with the personal profile there.
Facebook always gets information about visiting our site when the user is logged in to the social networking system, regardless of whether the user will click on any of the Facebook links on our site or not. If he does not want such a transfer of information to Facebook, it is desirable for the user to leave his / her account on the social network before visiting our site.
The Facebook Privacy Guide is posted at https://facebook.com/about/privacy, where information on the collection, processing, and use of personal data from the social network is provided. It also explains what are the possible settings that Facebook offers to protect the privacy of the user's personal data. Various configuration options have been described that prohibit the transmission of data to Facebook.
In our site we have integrated a Google+ social network button. The social networking site is an online meeting place - an online community that usually allows users to interact with each other and interact in virtual space. The social network can serve as a platform for the exchange of views and experiences, or enable the provision of personal or business information. Google+ allows users to create user profiles, upload photos, and make contact with each other.
Google+ is owned by Google Inc., 1600 Mountain View, CA 94043-1351, USA.
When you visit our site, the integrated Google+ button is downloaded and visualized automatically by the user's device. During this process, Google was notified of which particular subpage on our site was visited by the user. You can find detailed information about Google+ at https://developers.google.com/+/.
If a user has logged in to Google+ when visiting our site, Google recognizes the user account and receives time information and which specific pages are visited by the user. This information is collected using the Google+ button, and Google associates it with the corresponding Google+ profile.
If the user clicks on the button integrated on our website and thus recommends Google+ 1, Google associates this information with the personal Google+ user account and stores personal data. Google stores the recommendation of the person who marked Google+ 1 one or more pages of our site making this recommendation publicly available under the terms and conditions accepted by the user when registering on the social network. Google+ 1 recommendations, along with other personal details (Google+ account name and account photo), are then stored and processed in other Google services: Google search engine, Google search engine results, Google user account. Google may also link the visit to this site with other personal data stored on Google and stores that personal information to improve or optimize the various Google services.
If the user does not want to provide this data to Google, he can prevent this by leaving his Google+ account before visiting our site.
Additional information and Google's data protection regulations can be found at https://www.google.com/intl/bg/policies/privacy/. More Google referrals for the Google+ button 1 can be found at https://developers.google.com/+/web/buttons-policy.
On our website we have links and buttons to and from Twitter. Twitter is a multilingual, publicly available and microblogging service where users can post and distribute so-called tweets, short messages that are limited to 280 characters. These short messages are available to everyone, including those who are not on Twitter. Posts are also displayed on the so-called followers of the user. Followers are other Twitter users who follow user tweets. In addition, Twitter allows the use of hashtags, links or retweets.
Twitter is owned by Twitter, Inc., 1355 Market Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA.
There is an integrated Twitter button on every page of our site. More information about them can be found at https://about.twitter.com/de/resources/buttons. When using buttons, Twitter gets information on which page of our site is used. The purpose of buttons is to quickly share information in the social network and increase the number of visitors by sharing content.
If the user is logged into Twitter at the same time, Twitter counts the duration and visits of each page of our site and associates this behavior with the social network user account. This information is collected whether the user has clicked on any of the buttons on the social network on our site or not.
On our website we have links and / or videos downloading directly into the content of one or more subpages on our site directly from YouTube. YouTube is an internet video portal that allows free posting and viewing of videos. YouTube allows the publishing of all kinds of videos, as well as access to entire films, TV shows, music videos and videos created by users via the internet portal.
YouTube is owned by YouTube LLC, 901 Cherry Ave., San Bruno, CA 94066, USA and is a subsidiary of Google Inc.
It is possible that when you visit one or more pages on our site, pre-defined videos from the portal are automatically downloaded and previewed. Additional information about YouTube can be found at https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/en/. While downloading video content, YouTube and Google receive information on which particular subpage on our website was visited by the user.
If the user is logged into YouTube, YouTube recognizes the user account and receives the duration information and which specific pages are visited by the user. This information is collected by YouTube, and Google associates it with the relevant YouTube profile.
YouTube and Google will receive information that the user has visited our site only if it has logged on YouTube; this happens regardless of whether the user will click on a link to or a YouTube video or not. If such a transfer of information to YouTube and Google is not desired by the user, this can be prevented after the user logs out of the video portal before visiting our site.
YouTube's data protection provisions can be found at https://www.google.com/intl/bg/policies/privacy/ .
We have integrated components and links to the Instagram service. Instagram is a service that can be qualified as an audiovisual platform that allows users to share photos and videos as well as to distribute them to other social networks.
Instagram is owned by Instagram LLC, 1 Hacker Way 14, Menlo Park, California, USA.
When visiting any of the pages of our website, an Internet site has an integrated Instagram component that can send information to the social network for user behavior on any of our site pages and / or get an invitation to install a component or mobile application of the social network.
If the user is logged in at Instagram at the same time, Instagram counts the duration and visits of each page on our site and associates that behavior with the social network user account. This information is collected whether the user has clicked on any of the buttons on the social network on our site or not.
Additional information and applicable Instagram data protection provisions can be found at https://help.instagram.com/155833707900388 and https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/privacy.
On this site there are integrated components of Pinterest Inc. Pinterest is a social networking site, an online community that allows users to communicate and interact with each other in virtual space. The social network can serve as a platform for exchanging views and experiences or allow the Internet community to provide personal or corporate information. Pinterest allows social network users to publish collections of pictures and individual photos, as well as descriptions of virtual pinnacles (so-called Pinches) that can be shared by other users (so-called commented.
Pinterest is owned by Pinterest Inc., Brann 808, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA.
When visiting our site, each subsite of which is an integrated Pinterest component (Pinterest plug-in), the Internet browser of the user's device, can send an explicit invitation to install a component or mobile social network application. Further information about Pinterest can be found at https://pinterest.com. Pinterest gets information about which particular subpage is being visited by the user.
If the user logs on to Pinterest, Pinterest tracks the browsing of each subpage on our site and associates that information with the social network profile.
The Pinterest Data Protection Guide, available at https://about.pinterest.com/privacy-policy, provides information about the collection, processing, and use of Pinterest personal data.
In our site we have settings and links from and to LinkedIn. LinkedIn is a web-based social networking solution that allows users with existing business contacts to connect and create new business contacts. More than 400 million registered in more than 200 countries use LinkedIn. In this way, LinkedIn is currently the largest business contact platform and one of the most visited websites in the world.
LinkedIn is owned by LinkedIn Corporation, 2029 Stierlin Court Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. For questions relating to the protection of personal data, citizens of the European Union are in charge of Wilton Plaza, Wilton Place, Dublin 2, Ireland.
When a link hyperlinks to a linked LinkedIn page, the user's device browser can automatically download the appropriate settings and add-ons to LinkedIn and / or an invitation to install the mobile social network application. Further information on all possible LinkedIn add-ons can be found at https://developer.linkedin.com/plugins. During this / these processes, LinkedIn retrieves information, from which subpage a relevant add-on has been downloaded, when such a setting is available on our site's visited page.
If the user logs on to his LinkedIn account, LinkedIn tracks user behavior as the duration of the visit and exactly which pages are visited on our site. This information is collected through LinkedIn's add-ons and associated with the user's LinkedIn account. If the user clicks on one of the LinkedIn buttons integrated on our site, LinkedIn writes this information to the user profile.
LinkedIn receives information about the visits and duration of our site, whether the user will follow the links to the social network on our site or not if it is logged on to the social networking system. If the user does not want to transmit such type of information to the social network, he / she must log out of his / her account before visiting our site.
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