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The matter came before the single justice on the petition of the defendant, WHDH TV, Channel 7 (channel 7), pursuant to G.L. c. 231, s. 118 (first par.), seeking interlocutory relief from an order of a Superior Court judge that enjoined the defendant "from the release and/or use of autopsy reports, or the contents of autopsy reports, from the medical examiner's office regarding Paul J. Cahill and Warren J. Payne." In reviewing the entry of a preliminary injunction, a single justice of an appellate court is to focus upon "whether the judge applied proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable support for [her] evaluation of the factual questions." Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 640, 642 (1987). A trial court's legal conclusions, however, are subject to broad review and in those cases, the single justice may apply the de novo standard of review if the preliminary injunction order was predicated solely on documentary evidence. Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615 (1980); Manfrates v. Lawrence Plaza Ltd. Partnership, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 412, n.4 (1996). Here, I apply the de novo standard of review and conclude that the preliminary injunction was not justified under any criteria which override the heavy presumption against prior restraint on free speech.
Discussion. Prior restraint on the exercise of rights under the First Amendment and Article 16 of the Declaration of Rights. Although generally courts consider constitutional questions only if necessary to the resolution of a case, we may exercise our judicial discretion to consider such questions in limited circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 93 (2005) (citations omitted). There are several factors here that motivate us to address the constitutionality of the preliminary injunction order. First, the parties have fully briefed the issue. Id. Further, and more importantly, the statute and regulations, as applied by the judge, implicate "important concerns of free speech and future application of this statute will likely give rise to challenges concerning its scope." id.
As the judge noted in her order, the injunction is without doubt a prior restraint on speech. I must therefore decide whether such prior restraint is justified under the high standards of the federal and state constitution. "It is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment's] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). As the Supreme Judicial Court has stated, "Any attempt to restrain speech must be justified by a compelling State interest to protect against a serious threat of harm." Care and Protection of Edith, 421 Mass. 703, 705 (1996). "A general rule" barring publication of information is not sufficient to meet that requirement; rather, "[t]here must be evidence and findings as to what effect the disclosure" will have. Id. at 706. Further, "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to [the court] with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Organization For Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, the plaintiff has not overcome that heavy presumption.
While "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972), channel 7 does not argue that it should be granted official access to the autopsy records; rather, it seeks to broadcast information already in its possession. For this reason, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Examr., 404 Mass. 132, 135-136 (1989), relied upon by the plaintiff, is unavailing, holding as it does that public policies favoring confidentiality make autopsy reports exempt from disclosure as public records under G.L. c. 4, s. 7, Twenty-sixth (c). Simply put, the inability of the press to require the government to disclose information that is not part of the public record does not support a restraint on speech with respect to information already known to the press. Indeed and famously, the presumption against prior restraints on free speech has prevailed even when the materials at issue are stolen and deal with issues of national security. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). (fn. 3) As the Supreme Court has noted, "[a] prior restraint … has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1974).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Superior Court dated October 3, 2007, on docket number SUCV 2007-04341, which granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction is vacated and the preliminary injunction enjoining channel 7 from broadcasting information relative to the autopsy reports is dissolved.
1. The Superior Court judge apparently accepted the representation that the union represented Ann Cahill as surviving spouse of firefighter Paul J. Cahill, and Florence Payne as mother and next of kin of firefighter Warren J. Payne. The plaintiff's counsel also represented at oral argument that the complaint will soon be amended to add Ann Cahill and' Florence Payne as plaintiffs. For ease of reference I refer to the plaintiff in the singular (reflecting its present status) but accept the representation concerning next of kin where pertinent to the issues.
2. Counsel to channel 7 represented to this Court that he was not aware of any additional information in the possession of channel 7 about the autopsies other than that which has already been published.
3. The plaintiffs argue to the contrary, relying on Peckham v. Boston Herald, Inc., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 290 n.9 (1999) for the proposition that illegal acquisition of information creates an exception to the presumption against prior restraint. However, Peckham refers to the possibility of subjecting a media outlet to punishment after publication, not a ban on publishing the information itself.
4. Although we do not need to reach the three prong preliminary injunction test set forth in Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615 (1980), we note that the lack of compelling interest in the prior restraint context translates into a lack of irreparable harm in the injunction analysis. Further, even disregarding the constitutional defect here, success on the merits is improbable rather than probable in view of the plaintiff's questionable standing and the fact that the statute is directed at the Chief Medical Examiner's authority to control the release of information rather than the consequences to third parties o f his failure to do so. Finally, a balancing of harms is impacted by the defendant's potential status as the sole news outlet prohibited from carrying a story. In short, the plaintiff would not appear to be entitled to the injunction even if it could overcome the problem of prior restraint.
Could the SJC Remove Judge Murphy?


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PAOLA IULIANO RAGUCCI vs. GIOVANNI RAGUCCI.
A husband did not acquire a domicil in Nevada, and a court of that State did not have jurisdiction of a divorce proceeding brought there by him, where it appeared that, after living for some years in Massachusetts, while his wife lived in Italy, he went to Nevada because it was quicker to get a divorce there and that after staying in Nevada for twelve weeks in connection with the divorce proceeding he left there on the day on which the divorce was granted and returned to Massachusetts to reside.
TWO PETITIONS filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on June 14, 1954, and September 12, 1966, respectively.
The cases were heard by Hays, J.
Fred J. Moscone for the petitioner.
Sadie L. Shulman, for the respondent, submitted a brief.
WILKINS, C.J. These two petitions for separate support, filed respectively on June 14, 1954, and September 12, 1966, are brought in the Probate Court, Middlesex County, by Paola Iuliano Ragucci of Pietrastornina, Italy, against Giovanni Ragucci, otherwise known as John Ragucci, of Everett, in this Commonwealth. G. L. c. 209, Section 32, as amended through St. 1968, c. 370. The Probate Court judge, after hearing, dismissed both petitions on February 4, 1969. The petitioner appealed.
The judge filed a report of the material facts found by him. The respondent, who first came to the United States in 1949, went to Italy on a visit in May, 1953, and while there on June 14, 1953, married the petitioner at Pietrastornina. On June 20, 1953, by mutual consent the respondent returned alone to Massachusetts and the petitioner remained in Italy. On March 28, 1954, a son, Alberto, was born to them. Neither the petitioner nor the son has ever been in this Commonwealth. On May 19, 1954, the husband filed a libel for divorce in the Probate Court for Middlesex County. He gave the wife's name as Paola Ragucci, and described himself as of Everett in this Commonwealth. On January 10, 1955, this libel was dismissed on his motion.
with the intent to make Nevada his home for an indefinite period of time, resided, been physically present, and domiciled in Washoe County, and still so resided and was domiciled; and that the parties had lived separate and apart for more than three years last past prior to the commencement of the action.
Service was made by publishing and mailing the summons and a copy of the complaint under the name of Iuliano Ragucci, not Paola, without a street address, to Pietrostonine, sic, Italy. The wife did not appear personally and was defaulted. On July 30, 1957, a divorce was granted the husband. He left Nevada on the same day and returned to this Commonwealth, where in Boston on December 28 he married another woman, and gave his address as Everett. In the Probate Court in answer to interrogatories the petitioner stated that she never received by mail in Italy the copies of the summons and complaint.
In his findings the Probate judge stated that in the Nevada proceedings the husband acted in good faith in using the name Iuliano Ragucci, and that the mailing of the notice [Note 1] addressed to her at Pietrastornina, [Note 2] Italy, was reasonably likely to reach her. He further states that he was unable to find that the Nevada court did not have jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree, and hence that the Nevada decree is entitled to full faith and credit in the Probate Court for Middlesex County; and that at the time the second petition was filed and heard, the respondent was not the husband of the petitioner.
upon whether the husband acquired a domicil in Nevada. Barnard v. Barnard, 331 Mass. 455, 457.
Since all the evidence is before us, all questions of law, fact, and discretion are open for our decision. Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 319 Mass. 568, 569. Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 361. Whitney v. Whitney, 325 Mass. 28, 29. We assume that the Probate Court judge in stating that he was unable to find that the Nevada court did not have jurisdiction was giving the Nevada decree a presumption of validity. Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 324 Mass. 340, 341. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233-234. Esenwein v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 280-281.
We are of opinion, however, that any such presumption is clearly rebutted. The husband, who had resumed residence in Everett, testified in the Probate Court that the reason he went to Nevada was that he had consulted a lawyer in Boston who sent him to a lawyer in Reno because it was quicker to get a divorce there; that it was a question of time. Except for the trip to Italy he had lived in Massachusetts from 1949 until April, 1957, when he went to Nevada for a quick result. On June 10, 1957, he began divorce proceedings, after staying the six weeks requisite for filing the complaint. He then stayed the six additional weeks which were allowed for appearance by the wife. The divorce was granted on July 30, 1957. On the same day the husband left for Massachusetts. We find that the respondent did not acquire a domicil in Nevada, which lacked jurisdiction to grant him a divorce for that reason.
The decrees of the Probate Court are reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
We have not found it necessary to decide the question of the effort, described above, to make service upon the absent wife in the Nevada proceedings. We have indicated some of its shortcomings, in case in the course of the new hearing it becomes appropriate to determine the issue.
[Note 1] This must refer to the summons and copy of the complaint.
[Note 2] The Nevada order for publication of summons and the deposit of copies of the summons and complaint in the United States Post Office required them to be addressed to her at "Pietrostonine, Italy."

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ASHA BAHL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, Defendant and Respondent.
Nick O'Malley for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Plaintiff Asha Bahl filed suit against defendant Bank of America on various causes of action arising out of the termination of her employment and defendant's alleged use of her check imprinting idea without compensating her. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff requested a continuance because discovery was still ongoing; e.g., transcripts of depositions essential to justify opposition had not yet been received from the court reporter, and defendant produced over 600 pages of documentation after plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion. The court denied the requests for continuance and granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's right to a jury trial was infringed when the trial court refused a continuance. Public policy dictates that disposition on the merits be favored over judicial efficiency. We reverse and remand.
Plaintiff was employed as a bank teller at Security Pacific National Bank. Security Pacific had an idea exchange program, which provided cash awards for original ideas that resulted in monetary savings to Security Pacific. On February 20, 1991, plaintiff submitted an idea to the program. Her idea was to use a machine to imprint account numbers on checks and deposit slips. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff took a medical leave of absence. In October 1991, Security Pacific informed plaintiff her idea had been rejected.
In April 1992, Security Pacific merged with defendant. Thereafter, plaintiff became aware defendant was using a machine to imprint account numbers on paperwork.
Discovery was slow out of the blocks. Plaintiff's counsel explains he deliberately delayed taking depositions until after plaintiff filed her amended complaint, so as to avert objections about duplicative discovery (should he need to redepose any witnesses on employment-related matters who had earlier been questioned concerning the stolen idea claim). Counsel also maintains he notified the court of his plan during a December 9, 1996 status conference. Defendant commenced plaintiff's deposition on December 19, 1996. It required three sessions and, due to scheduling constraints, was not completed until June 23, 1997. In May 1997, plaintiff noticed her first deposition for June 2, 1997. According to counsel, defendant requested the deposition be postponed until June 25, 1997.
On September 26, 1997, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was set for hearing on October 24, 1997. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the declarations of Josephine De Gracia and Jeralee Giannini. De Gracia was defendant's vice-president in charge of the idea exchange program, who had communicated with plaintiff in 1995 about the fate of her idea. Giannini, defendant's vice-president and business automation consultant, was responsible for the development of defendant's Teller Automated Workstation (TAW) system, used to imprint account numbers on checks and deposit slips. Giannini declared defendant began to develop and implement the TAW system in 1989 and had fully implemented it in California by early 1990.
Also on September 26, 1997, plaintiff set in motion the depositions of De Gracia and Giannini. The day after De Gracia's deposition, plaintiff served a document request for the production of any and all documents pertaining to the history of the TAW system and of any other procedure utilized by defendant to imprint customer account numbers on deposit slips.
The day after plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion, defendant produced over 400 pages of additional documentation pertaining to the TAW system. Defendant subsequently provided plaintiff with 195 additional documents. On appeal, defendant cites these documents as proof it began imprinting account numbers on items before the merger.
Because of the court's calendar, the judge continued the hearing on the summary judgment motion to November 14, 1997, 17 days before the scheduled trial date. But by November 12, 1997, plaintiff's counsel had just received a copy of the Giannini deposition transcript, and had not had time to "digest" it. He believed Giannini's testimony pertained to defendant's TAW system validation procedures, but not to the type of imprinting procedure plaintiff had described in the idea she submitted. He therefore sought a further deposition of the most knowledgeable witness on the history of the consideration and implementation of defendant's procedure for imprinting account information on items.
On November 12, 1997, plaintiff filed "supplemental" opposition papers containing another request for continuance of the hearing. In addition, she filed a separate ex parte application requesting the court to continue either the trial date or the summary judgment hearing date, and/or to permit the filing of the supplemental opposition to the summary judgment motion. In declarations supporting the requests for continuance, plaintiff's counsel provided information concerning the Giannini deposition and deposition transcript, the need for additional depositions, and the hundreds of pages of additional documentation received since the last request for a continuance.
The court denied plaintiff's requests for a continuance of the summary judgment motion and granted defendant's motion. Judgment was entered in defendant's favor. Plaintiff submitted a combined motion for reconsideration (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008) and for relief from the order granting summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 [relief from excusable neglect]). The court denied these motions without a hearing. Plaintiff appealed.
 "Though often said, it appears necessary to again reiterate that a summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits." (Bunzel v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d 165, 169 [165 Cal. Rptr. 433]; see also Rincon v. Burbank Unified School Dist. (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 949, 952 [224 Cal. Rptr. 88].) The right to a jury trial, embodied in article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, is at stake. (See Troutman, The Jury Trial (1977) 51 Fla. B.J. 331, 332 [cautioning against too liberal summary judgment as an "abandonment of the hard-fought principles of our forefathers who believed that no amount of economy and efficiency is adequate consideration for a fair and impartial jury" trial].) Some cases refer to the constitutional rights argument as being a creature of "older decisions," because the summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) has been held constitutional. (See, e.g., Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 64, 70 [81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360].) We agree there is "nothing in the summary judgment procedure [that] is inherently unconstitutional. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) But technical compliance with the procedures of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c is required to ensure there is no infringement of a litigant's hallowed right to have a dispute settled by a jury of his or her peers.
[3a] Defendant contends plaintiff failed to comply with those requirements because she neither showed facts essential to justify opposition might exist nor explained why such facts could not be presented at the time. We disagree. Plaintiff submitted sufficient affidavits in connection with both her initial request for a continuance and her subsequent requests.
At the time of plaintiff's initial request for a continuance, her counsel declared that De Gracia testified in conflict with statements made in the declarations supporting defendant's motion. He also informed the court that he would not be receiving copies of the De Gracia deposition transcript for another week. In addition, counsel indicated he had noticed the deposition of the most knowledgeable witness pertaining to the history of the TAW system and any other procedure defendant used to add account numbers to deposit slips. That witness, Giannini, still had to be deposed. At the time of the subsequent applications, plaintiff's counsel had just received Giannini's deposition transcript, and requested more time to review it. Giannini and De Gracia were both declarants in support of defendant's motion. We are hard-pressed to imagine evidence more "essential to justify opposition" than that which might undermine the weight or credibility of declarations made in support of a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court denied the continuance requests in part because it felt plaintiff had been dilatory in conducting discovery. The case was roughly 18 months old when the court denied the continuance. Plaintiff's counsel indicated that he delayed prosecution of the litigation until after the DFEH issued a right-to-sue letter, which occurred approximately eight months after this lawsuit was filed. Other delays resulted from defendant's request for priority and mutual agreements regarding scheduling. In sum, the delay in prosecution was at least partly justifiable, and it was not caused solely by plaintiff.
There are other contexts in which courts have held the mere indication of a desire to conduct further discovery to be insufficient to support a continuance as well. For example, a continuance was not justified in FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 69, 75-76 [41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404] when the party seeking to block the motion for summary judgment had had more than ample time for discovery and the additional discovery sought would have pertained to irrelevant issues. Also, in Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 648-649 [188 Cal. Rptr. 216], the denial of a continuance was proper when the party requesting the continuance had already conducted exhaustive discovery for more than two years, the court had received extensive evidence, and the requesting party was not prejudiced by the denial. Finally, in A & B Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal. App. 4th 349, 356-357 [30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418], a continuance [89 Cal. App. 4th 398] was not warranted because the party opposing summary judgment did not explain what efforts had been made to take the necessary depositions or why they could not have been taken earlier.
At first blush, A & B Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal. App. 4th 349, could be read to imply that lack of diligence alone may justify the denial of a continuance request. However, the requesting party in that case failed to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) requirement to explain why the essential facts could not then be presented. We question whether diligence alone should make or break a continuance request under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). The issue of discovery diligence is not mentioned in section 437c, subdivision (h), which raises obvious doubts about its relevance.
Judges are faced with opposing responsibilities when continuances for the hearing of summary judgment motions are sought. On the one hand, they are mandated by the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Gov. Code, § 68600 et seq.) to actively assume and maintain control over the pace of litigation. On the other hand, they must abide by the guiding principle of deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural deficiencies. (Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1081, 1085 [94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575].) Such decisions must be made in an atmosphere of substantial justice. When the two policies collide head-on, the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency. (Cf. Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1526, 1532-1533 [242 [89 Cal. App. 4th 399] Cal.Rptr. 605] [when evaluating dismissal of action for delay in prosecution, policy favoring expeditious administration of justice by compelling prompt and diligent prosecution of actions subordinate to policy favoring trial on merits].) [3b] Here, there are two ways to read plaintiff's delay: either sensible case management or mere do-nothingness. As a matter of common law preference for resolution on the merits, the conflict should be resolved in plaintiff's favor.
As Code of Civil Procedure section 583.130 provides, with limited exceptions, "the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the merits [is] generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action ...." The denial of a Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) continuance due to lack of diligence may result in the granting of a motion for summary judgment, essentially no different from a Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410 dismissal for delay in prosecution. In either case, disposition on the merits is preferred. If the trial judge is faced with a situation in which a party opposing summary judgment may have shown minimal diligence, but the party is able to present an affidavit showing facts essential to justify opposition may exist and explaining why they cannot then be presented, the judge must consider other ways of handling the lack of diligence short of summary judgment. Like Othello, trial judges should be wary of turning a deaf ear to requests to consider more than the handkerchief of "no evidence" waved by a party opposing a summary judgment continuance.
In this case, plaintiff provided the requisite Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) affidavit informing the court of outstanding discovery matters and why essential facts could not be presented at the time. Her strategy might well be termed by some as both tactical and practical, and by others as lacking in diligence. In any event, defendant does not suggest that it suffered any prejudice on account of plaintiff's due diligence deficit. And we will not automatically infer prejudice from any delay in prosecution plaintiff may have caused. (See Ladd v. Dart Equipment Corp. (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 1088, 1106-1107 [281 Cal. Rptr. 813].) Moreover, the parties have provided no indication that there was a special reason to protect the trial date. Even were plaintiff's counsel wanting in diligence, where, as here, counsel makes some showing of excusable neglect, the policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial [89 Cal. App. 4th 400] efficiency. (Cf. Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1532-1533.) That equation, applied here, requires that plaintiff be permitted to present and (for the first time) to have the court consider, the substance of her opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion. In this case, the court exceeded the bounds of its limited discretion.
Defendant asserts plaintiff is attempting to use the request for continuance as an excuse to obtain an opportunity to file a late supplemental opposition. And perhaps it would have been the more prudent course of action for plaintiff to have filed more comprehensive opposition papers at the outset. Nonetheless, as explained above, plaintiff had good cause to request both a continuance and an opportunity to file supplemental papers based on the evidence gathered after completing discovery.
The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. Plaintiff shall recover her costs on appeal.
Bedsworth, Acting P. J., and O'Leary, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 20, 2001, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.


text: খাওয়া [ khāōẏā ] v to eat; to drink (জল খাওয়া); to take or enjoy (চা খাওয়া, ওষুধ খাওয়া, হাওয়া খাওয়া); to smoke (সিগারেট খাওয়া); to chew (পান খাওয়া); to accept or take (ঘুষ খাওয়া); to take or receive, to suffer (মার খাওয়া, কিল খাওয়া); to cause to lose, to cause to be dismissed from (চাকরি খাওয়া); to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়া); to consume or absorb (লণ্ঠনটা খুব তেল খায়); to eat away, to wear away, to corrode. ☐ a. eaten or drunk or taken or smoked or chewed completely or incompletely (পাখিতে খাওয়া ফল); used by one whilst eating or drinking and yet unwashed (খাওয়া থালা); partly eaten away or worn away or corroded. কিল খাওয়া v. to receive a blow; to be buffeted. কুরে খাওয়া v. to scrape or gnaw away, to eat away. গালি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or rated. চরিত্র খাওয়া n. character-assassination. বকুনি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or abused or reprimanded, to be taken to task. খাওয়া খাওয়ি n. mutual entertainment at tables; mutual feasting; (idiom.) mutual quarrelling (খাওয়া-খাওয়ি করা). খাওয়া-দাওয়া n. eating and drinking. খাওয়া-দাওয়া করা v. to eat and drink. খাওয়ানো v. to feed; to cause to eat or drink or take or smoke or chew; to cause to accept (ঘুষ খাওয়ানো); to cause to receive or suffer (মার খাওয়ানো); to cause to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়ানো); to cause to consume or absorb (তেল খাওয়ানো); to cause to be eaten or worn away; to cause to be corroded. 2nd person intimate present imperative tense of খাওয়ানো: খাওয়া [ khāōẏā ] v to eat; to drink (জল খাওয়া); to take or enjoy (চা খাওয়া, ওষুধ খাওয়া, হাওয়া খাওয়া); to smoke (সিগারেট খাওয়া); to chew (পান খাওয়া); to accept or take (ঘুষ খাওয়া); to take or receive, to suffer (মার খাওয়া, কিল খাওয়া); to cause to lose, to cause to be dismissed from (চাকরি খাওয়া); to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়া); to consume or absorb (লণ্ঠনটা খুব তেল খায়); to eat away, to wear away, to corrode. ☐ a. eaten or drunk or taken or smoked or chewed completely or incompletely (পাখিতে খাওয়া ফল); used by one whilst eating or drinking and yet unwashed (খাওয়া থালা); partly eaten away or worn away or corroded. কিল খাওয়া v. to receive a blow; to be buffeted. কুরে খাওয়া v. to scrape or gnaw away, to eat away. গালি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or rated. চরিত্র খাওয়া n. character-assassination. বকুনি খাওয়া v. to be rebuked or abused or reprimanded, to be taken to task. খাওয়া খাওয়ি n. mutual entertainment at tables; mutual feasting; (idiom.) mutual quarrelling (খাওয়া-খাওয়ি করা). খাওয়া-দাওয়া n. eating and drinking. খাওয়া-দাওয়া করা v. to eat and drink. খাওয়ানো v. to feed; to cause to eat or drink or take or smoke or chew; to cause to accept (ঘুষ খাওয়ানো); to cause to receive or suffer (মার খাওয়ানো); to cause to spoil or ruin (মাথা খাওয়ানো); to cause to consume or absorb (তেল খাওয়ানো); to cause to be eaten or worn away; to cause to be corroded.

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3095 CAJA RURAL SAN ROQUE DE ALMENARA S.COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3102 CAIXA RURAL SANT VICENT FERRER DE LA VALL D’UIXO, COOP. DE CREDIT V.
3110 CAJA RURAL CATOLICO AGRARIA, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3112 CAJA RURAL SAN JOSE DE BURRIANA, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3113 CAJA RURAL SAN JOSE DE ALCORA S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3114 CAJA RURAL CASTELLON – S. ISIDRO, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3119 CAJA RURAL SAN JAIME DE ALQUERIAS NIÑO PERDIDO S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3130 CAJA RURAL SAN JOSE DE ALMASSORA, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3134 CAJA RURAL NUESTRA SEÑORA DE LA ESPERANZA DE ONDA, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3135 CAJA RURAL SAN JOSE DE NULES S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3137 CAJA RURAL DE CASINOS S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3138 CAJA RURAL DE BETXI, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3152 CAJA RURAL DE VILLAR, COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3157 CAJA RURAL LA JUNQUERA DE CHILCHES, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3159 CAIXA POPULAR-CAIXA RURAL, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3160 CAIXA RURAL SANT JOSEP DE VILAVELLA, S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3161 CAJA RURAL SAN FORTUNATO, SDAD. COOP. CATALANA CTO. LTDA.
3162 CAIXA RURAL BENICARLO, S. COOP. DE CREDIT V.
3165 CAJA RURAL SAN ISIDRO DE VILAFAMES S. COOP. DE CREDITO V.
3166 CAIXA RURAL LES COVES DE VINROMA, S. COOP. DE CREDIT V.
3174 CAIXA RURAL VINAROS, S. COOP. DE CREDIT. V.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


4-6A-2 Public deposit protection commission established--Function.
4-6A-3 Segregation of collateral by public depository--Value--Deposit and designation--Letters of credit and surety bonds.
4-6A-4 Valuation of collateral--Substitution of securities.
4-6A-6 Information required of depository--Disqualification on failure to provide information.
4-6A-7 Reports of public deposits and segregated collateral--False statement as perjury.
4-6A-8 Treasurer not liable for loss from authorized deposits.
4-6A-9 Public deposits protected by chapter.
4-6A-10 Payment to public officers after loss determined--Procedures.
4-6A-11 Ascertainment of public deposits and insurance when depository restrained or taken in possession--Certification to public depositors.
4-6A-12 Depositors' statements of deposits to commission.
4-6A-13 Losses in depositories--Assessment against public depositories.
4-6A-14 Payment of assessments by depositories--Liquidation of collateral on failure to pay.
4-6A-15 Reimbursement of public depositors from proceeds of assessments.
4-6A-16 Actions for protection or settlement of claims.
4-6A-17 Fixing date of loss.
4-6A-19 Subrogation of commission to depositors' claims--Apportionment of amounts recovered--Refund of assessments--Expenses of liquidation.
(8) "Treasurer," the state treasurer, a county treasurer, a treasurer of any other municipal corporation, or the custodian of any public funds.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 2; SL 1982, ch 45, § 1; SL 1986, ch 44, § 1; SL 1986, ch 45, § 2; SL 1986, ch 400, § 16; SL 1987, ch 45, § 1; SL 1991, ch 39; SL 1997, ch 273, § 4; SL 2002, ch 221, § 3; SL 2015, ch 38, § 1.
4-6A-2. Public deposit protection commission established--Function. The South Dakota Public Deposit Protection Commission shall be the state treasurer and the director of the Division of Banking, and shall supervise insuring of all public funds.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 4; SL 1991, ch 391, § 15.
4-6A-3. Segregation of collateral by public depository--Value--Deposit and designation--Letters of credit and surety bonds. Every qualified public depository shall at all times maintain, segregated from its other assets, eligible collateral having a value at least equal to its maximum liability under this chapter. Such collateral shall be segregated by deposit in such manner as the commission approves. The collateral shall be clearly designated as security for the benefit of public depositors under this chapter and shall be pledged as collateral for those public deposit accounts which exceed deposit insurance. Irrevocable standby letters of credit or surety bonds shall be segregated or issued in such manner as the commission approves.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 6; SL 1982, ch 45, § 1A; SL 1986, ch 44, § 2; SL 1986, ch 45, § 3; SL 1987, ch 45, § 2; SL 1997, ch 273, § 3.
4-6A-4. Valuation of collateral--Substitution of securities. Securities eligible as collateral shall be valued at face value or market value, whichever is less. A qualified public depository may make substitutions of eligible collateral at any time and shall notify the public deposit protection commission of such change immediately.
Source: SL 1923, ch 281, § 1; SL 1925, ch 281, § 1; SL 1927, ch 196, § 1; SL 1933 (SS), ch 16, § 1; SDC 1939, § 55.2402; SL 1939, ch 208, § 2; SL 1941, ch 302; SDCL, § 4-6-11; SL 1974, ch 39, § 7; SL 1986, ch 44, § 3.
4-6A-5. Income from collateral. The income from the securities which have been segregated as collateral shall belong to the qualified public depository without restriction.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 8; SL 1982, ch 45, § 1B; SL 1986, ch 44, § 4.
4-6A-6. Information required of depository--Disqualification on failure to provide information. The public deposit protection commission may require any qualified public depository to furnish such information dealing only with public deposits as the commission shall request. Any public depository which refuses or neglects to give any information so requested may no longer be a qualified public depository and is excluded from the right to receive public deposits until such time as the commission shall acknowledge that such depository has furnished the information requested.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 5 (2); SL 1982, ch 45, § 1C; SL 1986, ch 44, § 5; SL 1986, ch 45, § 4; SL 1987, ch 45, § 4.
4-6A-7. Reports of public deposits and segregated collateral--False statement as perjury. On each call report date, or more often as determined by the public deposit protection commission, each qualified public depository shall render to the commission a written report, certified under oath, indicating the total amount of public deposits held by it and the amount and nature of the eligible collateral segregated and designated therefor in accordance with this chapter. Any person who makes a false statement in any affidavit required by this section is guilty of perjury, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided by law.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 11; SL 1982, ch 45, § 1D; SL 1986, ch 44, § 6; SL 1986, ch 45, § 5; SL 1987, ch 45, § 5.
4-6A-9. Public deposits protected by chapter. All public deposits, including accrued interest thereon, in qualified public depositories shall be protected against loss, to the extent provided in this chapter.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 3; SL 1982, ch 45, § 1E; SL 1986, ch 44, § 7; SL 1986, ch 45, § 6; SL 1987, ch 45, § 6.
4-6A-10. Payment to public officers after loss determined--Procedures. When the Public Deposit Protection Commission determines that a loss has occurred, the commission shall, as soon as possible, make payment to the proper public officers of all funds subject to such loss, pursuant to the procedures set forth in §§ 4-6A-11 to 4-6A-15, inclusive.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9.
4-6A-11. Ascertainment of public deposits and insurance when depository restrained or taken in possession--Certification to public depositors. For the purposes of determining the sums to be paid pursuant to § 4-6A-10, the Public Deposit Protection Commission shall, within twenty days after issuance of a restraining order or the taking of possession of any qualified public depository, ascertain the amount of public funds on deposit therein as disclosed by its record and the accounts thereof insured by deposit insurance and certify such insured accounts to each such public depositor.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9 (1); SL 1982, ch 45, § 1F; SL 1986, ch 44, § 8; SL 1986, ch 45, § 7; SL 1987, ch 45, § 7.
4-6A-12. Depositors' statements of deposits to commission. Within ten days after receipt of certification pursuant to § 4-6A-11, each public depositor shall furnish to the Public Deposit Protection Commission verified statements of its deposits in the depository as disclosed by its records.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9 (2).
4-6A-13. Losses in depositories--Assessment against public depositories. If a loss occurs in a qualified public depository, upon receipt of statements furnished pursuant to § 4-6A-12, the Public Deposit Protection Commission shall ascertain and fix the amount of such public deposit accounts net after deduction of deposit insurance and assess the same against that qualified public depository.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9 (3); SL 1982, ch 45, § 1G; SL 1986, ch 44, § 9; SL 1986, ch 45, § 8; SL 1987, ch 45, § 8.
4-6A-14. Payment of assessments by depositories--Liquidation of collateral on failure to pay. Assessments made by the Public Deposit Protection Commission pursuant to § 4-6A-13 shall be payable on the second business day following demand, and in case of the failure of any qualified public depository so to pay, the commission shall forthwith take possession of the securities segregated as collateral by such depository pursuant to this chapter and liquidate the same for the purpose of paying such assessment.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9 (4).
4-6A-15. Reimbursement of public depositors from proceeds of assessments. Upon receipt of assessment payments under § 4-6A-14, the Public Deposit Protection Commission shall reimburse the public depositors of the qualified public depository in which the loss occurred to the extent of the depository's net deposit liability to them.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 9 (5); SL 1986, ch 44, § 10.
4-6A-16. Actions for protection or settlement of claims. The Public Deposit Protection Commission shall have the power to take such action as the commission deems best for the protection, collection, compromise, or settlement of any claim arising in case of loss.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 5 (3).
4-6A-17. Fixing date of loss. The Public Deposit Protection Commission may fix the official date on which any loss is considered to have occurred for purposes of this chapter taking into consideration the orders, rules, and regulations of supervisory authority as they affect the failure or inability of a qualified public depository to repay public deposits in full.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 5 (4); SL 1982, ch 45, § 1H; SL 1986, ch 44, § 11; SL 1986, ch 45, § 9; SL 1987, ch 45, § 9.
4-6A-19. Subrogation of commission to depositors' claims--Apportionment of amounts recovered--Refund of assessments--Expenses of liquidation. Upon payment to any public depositor, the public deposit protection commission is subrogated to all of such depositor's right, title and interest against the qualified public depository in which the loss occurred. If the commission incurs expense in enforcing any such claim, the amount shall be paid as a liquidation expense of the depository in which the loss occurred.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 10; SL 1986, ch 44, § 19.
4-6A-20. Rules of commission. The Public Deposit Protection Commission may make and enforce rules necessary and proper to the full and complete performance of the commission's functions under this chapter, including the authority to provide by rule for a sum less than one hundred percent if the depositor of public funds contracts with a qualified public depository for a lesser amount, and including the authority to provide by rule for a sum less than one hundred percent if the qualified public depository is subject to seasonal variances in public deposits.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 5 (1); SL 1991, ch 40; SL 2002, ch 221, § 4.
4-6A-21. Citation of chapter. This chapter may be cited as the Public Deposit Insurance Act.
Source: SL 1974, ch 39, § 1.


text:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. John E. HOWARD, III, Christopher Restifo, Daniel Williams, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 06-0457-cr.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.Argued: February 26, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Hurd, J.
James E. Long, Albany, NY, for defendant-appellee John E. Howard, III.
Kathy Manley, Kindlon Shanks Associates, Albany, NY, for defendant-appellee Christopher Restifo.
David L. Gruenberg, Troy, NY, for defendant-appellee Daniel Williams.
Paul D. Silver, Assistant United States Attorney (Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, on the brief), Albany, NY, for appellant.
Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, LEVAL and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.
from their vehicles, and because the police would have had ample time to procure a warrant. The district court further observed that the search was outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment because the defendants were not timely notified that the searches had occurred.
The government argues that the district court erred in its suppression order by relying primarily on Coolidge and by suggesting that the failure to provide notice of a warrantless automobile search renders such a search unconstitutional. For the reasons to be discussed, we agree with the government’s arguments and vacate the district court’s order.
The searches at issue were conducted pursuant to an investigation of the conspiracy of which all three defendants in this case are alleged to have been a part. The district court conducted two separate suppression hearings, one for each search challenged by the defendants. Notwithstanding certain factual differences between the searches, the district court noted that they were equivalent for purposes of legal analysis, primarily because in both searches, “[n]o search warrants were obtained, no vehicles were impounded and inventory searched, and no arrests were made.” Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 222. The district court issued one order suppressing the fruits of both searches. On appeal, the parties generally agree to the facts as related in the district court’s opinion. See id. at 217-22. We recite here only those aspects of the searches that are important to our resolution of the issues on appeal, drawing primarily from the facts as determined by the district court after the two suppression hearings. Where the parties dispute certain facts as recounted by the district court, we note their discrepant accounts.
Based on three intercepted telephone calls indicating that defendant John E. Howard, III would be traveling to the Woodbury Commons shopping complex to purchase cocaine, a team of New York State narcotics investigators and agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (the “investigatory team” or the “team”) was assigned to surveil Howard on May 20, 2004. Howard left his residence at approximately 10:30 a.m., and the team followed his vehicle. After briefly losing sight of the vehicle, the team observed Howard entering the New York Thruway (“Thruway”) at the Schenectady entrance. At that time, he had a passenger with him in the car, who was later determined to be defendant Christopher Restifo.
Thruway, followed by the investigatory team.
Having been informed by members of the investigatory team that an exchange had been made, the team leaders decided to stop and search the vehicle. Because no determination had been reached whether to arrest Howard and Restifo at this point in the investigation, the team leaders devised a ruse to lure Howard and Restifo away from their vehicle so that it could be searched, unbeknownst to them, by law enforcement personnel.
Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., approximately one hour north of Woodbury Commons, Howard and Restifo were pulled over by two uniformed New York State troopers, who told them that the police were investigating a complaint of road rage involving a vehicle fitting the description of Howard’s vehicle. They asked Howard and Restifo to come with them to the nearby trooper barracks to investigate the complaint. At this point, according to the district court, “[t]he vehicle was surreptitiously tampered with so that the vehicle would remain unlocked even if Howard and Restifo attempted to lock it.” Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 219.
Howard and Restifo accompanied the troopers to the barracks, leaving parked on the side of the Thruway “what they believed was their locked Acura,” according to the district court Id. At the barracks, troopers purportedly investigating the road rage incident interviewed the defendants, who continued to cooperate fully. Meanwhile, members of the investigatory team searched Howard’s vehicle, including the trunk. They retrieved a black knapsack, inside which they found about one kilogram of cocaine in a sealed package and a black plastic shopping bag that contained about eight ounces of cocaine hydrochloride. They also found a smaller zip-close bag containing $20,100. The team retained all of these items as evidence.
The team leaders directed the personnel conducting the search of the vehicle to make it appear as though the vehicle had been vandalized while it was left unattended on the side of the Thruway. They broke a pool cue found in the back of the car, presumably belonging to the vehicle’s occupants, and used it to pry open the glove compartment, damaging the glove compartment and making it appear as if there had been an attempted break-in. Approximately forty minutes after they stopped the vehicle, and after being advised that the site of the vehicle was cleared of investigators, the troopers returned Howard and Restifo to their vehicle.
2004, Williams and codefendant Redmond McKinnon, who is not a party to this appeal, discussed the quality of specified quantities of cocaine. The second call, also between McKinnon and Williams, was intercepted on April 28, 2004. During this call, McKinnon relayed to Williams that the price of a kilogram of cocaine purchased from co-defendant Affis Cruz, who also is not a party to this appeal, would be $25,000. McKinnon indicated that defendant Howard had said that the price of a kilogram of cocaine was $24,800 when purchased from a different supplier. During the call, Williams stated that he was “tinkering in his lab,” suggesting that he was changing cocaine into crack cocaine or bagging cocaine for resale Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 220. During the third call, placed on May 31, 2004, Williams told Cruz that he wanted four kilograms of cocaine and that he would be prepared to pick up the drugs the next day, June 1, 2004.
These phone calls, coupled with other background intelligence obtained over the course of a long-term investigation, provided the basis for surveillance of Williams, which was initiated on June 1, 2004, when Williams left his place of work at approximately 6 a.m. in a black GMC Envoy. The investigatory team followed the vehicle and, after briefly losing sight of it, observed it parked and unattended at an address in Schenectady, New York, known to be the residence of Williams’ mother. Seeing only the Envoy parked at the residence, the investigatory team deduced that Williams might have traded his vehicle for the gold Dodge Stratus the team knew to be registered to Williams’ mother. This belief was reinforced when Williams’ mother was observed driving her son’s Envoy.
Based upon three additional telephone calls between Williams and his co-defendants intercepted that day, all of which concerned cocaine transactions, see id. at 220-21, the investigatory team surmised that he was traveling to New York City to procure cocaine, and that he would be returning to Schenectady that same evening. Accordingly, the team set up surveillance northbound on the Thruway, which they inferred from the intercepted telephone calls was the route Williams would be taking home from New York City. Investigatory team leaders, this time in consultation with the office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, again decided to devise a ruse to lure Williams away from his vehicle so that investigators could conduct a search. No attempt was made to secure a warrant.
At approximately 10:40 p.m., a member of the investigatory team observed a man whom she believed to be Williams at a rest area in Plattekill, New York, driving the gold Stratus registered to Williams’ mother. At the direction of team supervisors, two uniformed New York State Troopers stopped Williams’ vehicle. When asked to identify himself, Williams provided his driver’s license. The troopers took Williams to their barracks purportedly for the investigation of alleged criminal activity, this time a drive-off at a gas station involving a vehicle matching the description of the gold Stratus Williams was driving.
when he was provided with notice that the search occurred, the government argues that Williams was informed that the police had searched his vehicle and seized cocaine and currency when he received a copy of the complaint against him on June 9, 2004.
As noted above, the district court issued one order suppressing the fruits of both searches. Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the district court observed that one theory undergirding the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was that obtaining a warrant to search an automobile was often “`not practicable . . . because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.'”Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 223 (quotin Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 459-60, 91 S.Ct. 2022) (emphasis omitted). Under Coolidge, the district court stated, a warrantless search of a vehicle stopped on a highway was justified “`where there is probable cause, because the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.'”Id. (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460, 91 S.Ct. 2022).
In applying Coolidge to the instant case, the district court “[a]ssum[ed] arguendo that there was probable cause to search each vehicle,” id. at 224, but held that there were insufficient exigencies to justify the application of the automobile exception in these cases. First, the district court observed that, “the inherent mobility of the vehicles in these circumstances is insufficient to justify a warrantless search.” Id. at 225. Here, “[n]either of the drivers [n]or the passenger were close enough to the vehicles to obtain a weapon from within them or to destroy the evidence found in the trunk. In fact, all of the individuals were removed from the scenes by uniformed officers and kept at the trooper barracks a number of miles away from their vehicles until alerted . . . that the individuals could be returned to their vehicles.” Id. Second, the district court expressed the view that a “hallmark justification for the automobile exception is that the occupants of the vehicle are alerted to the search.” Id. at 225-26. The district court noted that generally when a vehicle is searched pursuant to the automobile exception, “the driver is there to observe the search and may complain if it was unreasonable, whether because probable cause was lacking or for some other reason.”Id. at 226. Here, however, “Howard, Restifo, and Williams had no opportunity to challenge the search on any grounds because they were unaware that it had even occurred.”Id. The absence of a neutral magistrate to determine whether there was probable cause, combined with the absence of oversight by the vehicles’ owners was, to the district court, constitutionally insupportable even under the automobile exception. Third, and finally, the district court noted that the long time gap between initiation of surveillance of the defendants and the traffic stops “negat[ed] the criticality of the timing and opportunity to obtain a warrant.” Id.
The government timely filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s suppression order.
of such legal issues as probable cause,” United States v. Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993). We thus analyz de novo the applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. See United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2004).
Williams is the only appellee to claim that the police lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. Williams correctly observes that the district court merely “assume arguendo that there was probable cause to search the Williams vehicle and the Howard vehicle,” and, while he does not dispute the factual account offered by the district court, Williams contends that those facts do not constitute probable cause for the search of his vehicle.
Probable cause exists if a law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006).
Williams claims that the phone call intercepted on May 31, 2004 “set forth no basis for believing that Williams would be traveling from Schenectady to New York City and back.” He fails to establish why this particular phone call — separate and apart from all the other intercepted phone calls — should alone be the focus of the court’s attention in discerning whether there was probable cause for the traffic stop. Taken together, the six intercepted phone calls amount to probable cause. The district court noted three phone conversations between Williams and two co-defendants in April and May 2004, all of which related to cocaine. Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 220. In the third of these telephone calls, which took place on May 31, 2004, Williams told a co-defendant that he wanted four kilograms of cocaine and that he would be prepared to pick them up the following day, June 1, 2004. Three additional phone calls intercepted on June 1, 2004, indicated that Williams had gone to New York City to procure the cocaine, and that he had bought two kilograms of the drug while there Id. at 220-21. These calls were plainly sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to stop Williams.
Williams’ other arguments do not negate the existence of probable cause. His claim that the surveillance was defective because “there was no proof that the officers surveying Williams had ever seen him before, or could identify him” is unavailing. The government does not dispute that the officer who testified at the suppression hearing concerning the surveillance of Williams had not seen Williams previously. Regardless, Williams produced a driver’s license in his own name when he was stopped by state troopers on the highway, allaying any fears of false identification. Likewise, his claim that no officer saw him arrive in or leave New York City is immaterial, as the phone calls indicated that he was in New York City when he procured the drugs and that “it would take him about two and one-half hours to get back to Schenectady.”Id. at 220. Finally, Williams’ assertion that there was no factual basis for the officers’ deduction that he was driving his mother’s vehicle is simply not borne out by the record. The police observed Williams’ mother driving her son’s car earlier in the day, after he left work and stopped by her house, and Williams was ultimately pulled over in a car matching the description of his mother’s vehicle, and which was registered to his mother. Id. at 220.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the government plainly had probable cause to believe that Williams was transporting cocaine in his car and therefore to conduct the search of his vehicle.
As discussed above, the district court suppressed the evidence derived from the two warrantless searches at issue for a variety of reasons, which essentially boil down to these three propositions: (1) the vehicles searched were not inherently mobile because they were parked on the side of the Thruway while their drivers were some distance away at a police barracks; (2) there was ample time to procure a warrant because surveillance of the defendants had been ongoing for some time prior to the traffic stops; and (3) there was no notice provided to the drivers that a search had been conducted. Finally, Restifo offers other justifications for suppression, namely that clandestine or surreptitious searches always require notice and a warrant and cannot involve seizure of goods. For the reasons to be discussed, we disagree with each of these arguments.
The government argues that the defendants’ physical distance from the vehicles and the government’s control of the vehicles as they were being searched does nothing to mitigate the application of the automobile exception, which, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, does not turn on the immediate mobility of the automobile. Rather, the government relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that, where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, “a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.” Id. at 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157. The government notes that the district court relied almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision i Coolidge, and contends that Coolidge has been significantly eroded by more recent developments in Fourth Amendment law, namely Ross and its progeny. The defendants generally counter that the automobile exception is justified by vehicles’ mobility, and that their vehicles were not “readily mobile” within the meaning of the relevant caselaw because the defendants had been taken away from their vehicles, had no notice of the search, and could not have moved the vehicles even if they had wanted to do so.
The district court’s finding that the defendants’ temporary, voluntary presence in the police barracks for questioning pursuant to the ruse meant that the vehicles were not readily mobile, and that searches of them were therefore not within the automobile exception, was in error for two reasons. First, the district court erred in determining that the vehicles were not readily mobile within the meaning of the automobile exception simply on the ground that the drivers and passenger were with police officers at their barracks, undergoing questioning concerning the ruse developed by the officers. Whether a vehicle is “readily mobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception has more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search. Se Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (distinguishing a car, which is “readily movable,” from a “fixed piece of property”). The district court’s reading of “ready mobility” is in error because the district court appeared to regard the actual ability of a driver or passenger to flee immediately in the car, or the likelihood of him or her doing so, as a requirement for the application of the automobile exception.
We rejected such a reading of “ready mobility” in United States v. Vassiliou, 820 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1987). Vassiliou was a contractor working for the United States on a military base. Following a fight with a subcontractor while on the base, the two were led to the military police station to settle the dispute. The subcontractor alleged that Vassiliou had pulled a gun on him and then hid the gun in the car. Based on this information, the military police conducted a warrantless search of Vassiliou’s vehicle and found the gun. Vassiliou sought to suppress the weapon, contending that the automobile exception did not apply “because his car was on a military outpost over which the military police had plenary jurisdiction and therefore was not mobile.” Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). He argued that, “[b]ecause entry to and exit from the post were controlled by the military police . . . he could not simply have driven away.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected Vassiliou’s argument and affirmed the district court’s denial of Vassiliou’s suppression motion because, regardless of the military’s plenary control over the base, “Vassiliou could have left the military police station while a warrant was being obtained and disposed of the gun elsewhere on the base.”Id. We determined that the facts presented comprised “precisely the sort of exigent circumstances resulting from the automobile’s inherent mobility that the Supreme Court has recognized as justifying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.
and might drive the car away. The district court erred in determining that the relative inaccessibility of the vehicles, occasioned by the defendants’ undergoing questioning at the police barracks, was sufficient to bring this search outside the ambit of the automobile exception.
Thus we need not opine broadly on the continuing vitality o Coolidge, because our caselaw interpreting it has made clear that the district court’s understanding of “ready mobility” was in error. We additionally observe that the district court’s reasoning goes too far and would, if adopted, impermissibly graft onto the automobile exception a requirement of some additional exigency beyond the inherent mobility of an operational vehicle-in this case, the immediate likelihood of the defendants returning to their vehicles and speeding away in them. In United States v. Ross, the Supreme Court made clear that a warrantless search would not violate the Fourth Amendment if there was probable cause to search a vehicle, “even though a warrant ha[d] not actually been obtained.” floss, 456 U.S. at 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157. The Supreme Court has reiterated this rule in subsequent cases, noting i Pennsylvania v. Labron that “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more,” 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, and in Maryland v. Dyson that no special exigency is required beyond a showing of the mobility of the automobile Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam). Thus, the district court’s inquiry into the existence of an additional exigency in this case — that is, the proximity of the drivers and passenger to the vehicles — is misplaced. The mere inherent mobility of the vehicle is sufficient to constitute the “ready mobility” the automobile exception cognizes.
Second, the district court ignored the fact that the automobile exception has been justified by the Supreme Court not only because of automobiles’ ready mobility, but also because of the diminished expectation of privacy drivers and passengers enjoy while traveling in them. As the Supreme Court observed i California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), “[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.” Id. at 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066. Thus even if the vehicles searched in the case at bar were not “readily mobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception, a warrantless search of them would be justified based on the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by the drivers and passenger while traveling on the Thruway.
was planning a drug deal. There were three more intercepted calls over the next twenty hours, and surveillance began the following day, continuing until the traffic stop at approximately 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. The alleged narcotics transaction took place some time shortly after 4:45 p.m., meaning that one to two more hours transpired between observation of the alleged narcotics transaction and the traffic stop. Based on this passage of time, the district court found that there was “no way that it could be said that insufficient time had elapsed in which to present the facts to a neutral magistrate and obtain a search warrant.”Howard, 406 F.Supp.2d at 224.
The district court made a similar finding with respect to Williams, who was implicated in the drug conspiracy as early as April 23, 2004. With regard to the particular transaction giving rise to the traffic stop, Williams was being surveilled beginning 4:30 a.m. on the morning of June 1, 2004, and, by about 6:30 a.m., inspectors deduced that he was driving his mother’s car to procure cocaine in New York City. An intercepted call indicated that Williams was leaving New York City at approximately 9:30 p.m. to return to Schnectady. As the district court noted, “[a]t this point, about 16 hours had elapsed since the surveillance started. At least several hours elapsed between when it was deduced that Williams was in the process of purchasing cocaine in New York City and probably was driving a gold Stratus, and when his vehicle was stopped.”Id. at 225. There was yet another hour between the positive identification of Williams in his mother’s gold Stratus and the traffic stop. Once Williams accompanied the police to the barracks, he “was under the complete control of the officers while his vehicle was fully secured by the investigatory team on the Thruway.” Id. The district court further noted that during the time the ruse was being developed, the investigatory team had sufficient time to contact the United States Attorney’s office to discuss its plan, implicitly suggesting that it believed the team could have procured a warrant if it had tried to do so.
(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157). As discussed above, there was ample probable cause to support these searches, and a disinterested magistrate judge assuredly would have issued a warrant had one been sought. But within the context of the automobile exception, a reasonable search does not become unreasonable because law enforcement officials lacked a warrant. The district court erred in holding to the contrary.
was lacking or for some other reason.” Id. at 226. The government contends that there is no such requirement in the caselaw.
The district court’s conclusory statement on this point is unavailing. In asserting that notice is a “hallmark justification” for the automobile exception, the district court relied solely on a citation to Coolidge, which, on our reading, offers no support for its position. Presumably, the district court’s citation to Coolidge meant to draw the reader’s attention to the Supreme Court’s statement that “exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search of an automobile stopped on the highway, where there is probable cause, because the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this statement merely describes a particular set of exigent circumstances in which the warrantless search in Chambers was performed under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. The occupants’ lack of awareness that a search has been conducted does not necessitate either that a warrant be procured, or that the occupants be notified a search has taken place. Whatever this passage from Coolidge means, it certainly does not impose a constitutional notice requirement.
We thus agree with the government that the district court erred in holding that there was any notice requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on warrantless searches conducted pursuant to the automobile exception.
Restifo makes three additional arguments, which focus on the fact that the search of the vehicle in which he was traveling was not merely warrantless, but also surreptitious. He argues that (1) surreptitious searches always require a warrant; (2) the instant searches were “even more egregious” than conventional surreptitious searches because they involved the seizure of tangible property; and (3) surreptitious searches always involve notice requirements.
In support of his first proposition, Restifo notes that “[s]urreptitious searches . . . have always required a warrant because the nature of such searches clearly requires the protection afforded by an independent arbiter.” But as the government notes, none of the cases he cites implicates the automobile exception or any other exceptions where the absence of a warrant is excused. All of the cases he cites perforce require a warrant because all searches require a warrant unless they are made pursuant to a small set of narrow exceptions, of which the automobile exception is one See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022. The correlation between surreptitious searches and the presence of a warrant need not be converted into a requirement that surreptitious searches be conducted only pursuant to a warrant.
stream of public commerce. Moreover, even if the seizure of Restifo’s drugs and money were indeed “more egregious” than the seizure of intangible goods, this fact would do nothing to detract from the constitutionality of a search based on probable cause and conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and upon which the Constitution imposes no notice requirement.
Finally, with respect to notice, the numerous cases that Restifo cites uniformly discuss an inapposite set of facts: sneak-and-peek searches in which a warrant has been granted by the court and therefore, in compliance with the demands of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and not the Constitution, notice of those surreptitious searches must be given at some time. See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d Cir. 1993). This requirement is not relevant where the existence of a warrant is excused on other grounds, namely pursuant to the automobile exception.
As a final matter, we observe that, in the search of Howard’s vehicle, the team damaged the car and Howard’s pool cue to create the impression that a thief used the cue to pry open the glove compartment (the police, presumably, having used undetectable methods). We express no opinion as to whether the damage done was excessive or unnecessary, and we underscore our view that the damage, excessive or otherwise, did nothing to detract from the reasonableness of the searches. But police should be mindful that “[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.”United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998).
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the district court suppressing the fruits of the two warrantless vehicle searches.
 The district court did not make particularized findings concerning the timing of police surveillance of Restifo.
 In its reply brief, the government makes the blanket argument that even if there had been a Fourth Amendment violation in the conduct of the searches, suppression would be an inappropriate remedy under Hudson v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). We need not address this argument because we find no constitutional violation in the conduct of the warrantless vehicle searches.

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