text:
Respondents, Republicans who are non-civil-service employees of the Cook County, Ill., Sheriff's Office, brought this suit as a class action for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief against petitioners, including the newly elected Sheriff, a Democrat, and county Democratic organizations, alleging that in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and various statutes, including the Civil Rights Act of 1871, respondents were discharged or (in the case of one respondent) threatened with discharge for the sole reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. Finding that respondents had failed to show irreparable injury, the District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter appropriate preliminary injunctive relief. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 351-374; 374-375.
1. Neither the political-question doctrine nor the separation-of-powers doctrine makes this case inappropriate for judicial resolution, since, inter alia, neither doctrine applies to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States. Pp. 351-353.
2. The practice of patronage dismissals violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and respondents thus stated a valid claim for relief. Pp. 355-373.
(b) Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving the existence of which rests upon the government, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 . If conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee's support of the in-party is to survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of the constitutionally protected rights. Pp. 360-363.
(c) The inefficiency resulting from wholesale replacement of public employees on a change of administration belies the argument that employees not of the same political persuasion as the controlling party will not be motivated to work effectively; nor is it clear that patronage appointees are more qualified than those they replace. Since unproductive employees may always be discharged and merit systems are available, it is clear that less drastic means than patronage dismissals are available to insure the vital need for government efficiency and effectiveness. Pp. 364-367.
(d) The need to insure that policies that the electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented can be fully satisfied by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. Pp. 367-368.
(e) Patronage dismissals cannot be justified by their contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic process through their assistance to partisan politics, since political parties are nurtured by other methods that are less intrusive. More fundamentally, any contribution of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not suffice to override their severe encroachment on First Amendment freedoms. Pp. 368-373.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee may not be discharged from a job that he is satisfactorily performing, upon the sole ground of his political beliefs, and that no other issue is involved in this case. Pp. 374-375.
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 374. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 375. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 376. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Thomas A. Foran argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Bernard Carey, Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Raymond F. Simon, and Robert E. Wiss.
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by C. Richard Johnson for the Independent Voters of Illinois et al.; and by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, and Alan B. Morrison for Public Citizen.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joined.
This case presents the question whether public employees who allege that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In December 1970, the Sheriff of Cook County, a Republican, was replaced by Richard Elrod, a Democrat. At that time, respondents, all Republicans, were employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office. They were non-civil-service employees and, therefore, not covered by any statute, ordinance, or regulation protecting them from arbitrary discharge. One respondent, John Burns, was Chief Deputy of the Process Division and supervised all departments of the Sheriff's Office working on the [427 U.S. 347, 351] seventh floor of the building housing that office. Frank Vargas was a bailiff and security guard at the Juvenile Court of Cook County. Fred L. Buckley was employed as a process server in the office. Joseph Dennard was an employee in the office.
It has been the practice of the Sheriff of Cook County, when he assumes office from a Sheriff of a different political party, to replace non-civil-service employees of the Sheriff's Office with members of his own party when the existing employees lack or fail to obtain requisite support from, or fail to affiliate with, that party. Consequently, subsequent to Sheriff Elrod's assumption of office, respondents, with the exception of Buckley, were discharged from their employment solely because they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders. Buckley is in imminent danger of being discharged solely for the same reasons. Respondents allege that the discharges were ordered by Sheriff Elrod under the direction of the codefendants in this suit.
At the outset, we are met with objections to our consideration of this case based on the political-question doctrine and the principle of separation of powers. These objections need not long detain us.
A question presented to this Court for decision is properly deemed political when its resolution is committed by the Constitution to a branch of the Federal Government other than this Court. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Thus, "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the `political question.'" Id., at 210. That matters related to a State's, or even the Federal Government's, elective process are implicated by [427 U.S. 347, 352] this Court's resolution of a question is not sufficient to justify our withholding decision of the question. In particular, in this case, we are asked only to determine whether the politically motivated discharge of employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office comports with the limitations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This involves solely a question of constitutional interpretation, a function ultimately the responsibility of this Court. Id., at 211. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 -549 (1969). Petitioners do not, and could not, argue that a decision as to the constitutionality of the Sheriff's practices should be left to Congress or the President. The political-question doctrine, therefore, is no obstacle to judicial review in this case. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968).
Petitioners also object that our review of this case will offend the principle of separation of powers, for the executive's responsibility to insure that the laws be faithfully executed requires the power of appointment or removal at will, unimpaired by any judicial oversight. They cite Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in support of their argument. The short answer to this argument is that the separation-of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States. The matter in Myers itself was limited to the permissibility of restraints imposed by Congress on the President concerning the removal of the executive officers. More fundamentally, however, the answer to petitioners' objection is that there can be no impairment of executive power, whether on the state or federal level, where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Constitution. Where there is no power, there can be no impairment of power. And our determination of the limits on state executive power contained in the Constitution [427 U.S. 347, 353] is in proper keeping with our primary responsibility of interpreting that document. It is to such a determination that we now turn.
The Cook County Sheriff's practice of dismissing employees on a partisan basis is but one form of the general practice of political patronage. 2 The practice also includes placing loyal supporters in government jobs that may or may not have been made available by political discharges. Nonofficeholders may be the beneficiaries of lucrative government contracts for highway construction, buildings, and supplies. Favored wards may receive improved public services. Members of the judiciary may even engage in the practice through the appointment of receiverships, trusteeships, and refereeships. Although political patronage comprises a broad range of activities, we are here concerned only with the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan reasons.
Patronage practice is not new to American politics. It has existed at the federal level at least since the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 3 although its popularization and legitimation primarily occurred later, in the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. 4 The practice is not unique to American politics. It has been used in many European countries, 5 and in darker times, it played a significant role in the Nazi rise to power in Germany and other totalitarian states. 6 More recent times have witnessed [427 U.S. 347, 354] a strong decline in its use, particularly with respect to public employment. Indeed, only a few decades after Andrew Jackson's administration, strong discontent with the corruption and inefficiency of the patronage system of public employment eventuated in the Pendleton Act, 7 the foundation of modern civil service. And on the state and local levels, merit systems have increasingly displaced the practice. 8 This trend led the Court to observe in CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973), that "the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences."
The cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association. In order to maintain their jobs, respondents were required to pledge their political allegiance to the Democratic Party, work for the election of other candidates of the Democratic Party, contribute a portion of their wages to the Party, or obtain the sponsorship of a member of the Party, usually at the price of one of the first three alternatives. Regardless of the incumbent party's identity, Democratic or otherwise, the consequences for association and belief are the same. An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains affiliation with his own party at the risk of losing his job. He works for the election of his party's candidates and espouses its policies at the same risk. The financial and campaign assistance that he is induced to provide to another party furthers the advancement of that party's policies to the detriment of his party's views and ultimately his own beliefs, and any assessment of his salary is tantamount to coerced belief. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). Even a pledge of allegiance to another party, however ostensible, only serves to compromise the individual's true beliefs. Since the average public employee is hardly in the financial position to support his party and another, or to lend his time to two parties, the [427 U.S. 347, 356] individual's ability to act according to his beliefs and to associate with others of his political persuasion is constrained, and support for his party is diminished.
It is not only belief and association which are restricted where political patronage is the practice. The free functioning of the electoral process also suffers. Conditioning public employment on partisan support prevents support of competing political interests. Existing employees are deterred from such support, as well as the multitude seeking jobs. As government employment, state or federal, becomes more pervasive, the greater the dependence on it becomes, and therefore the greater becomes the power to starve political opposition by commanding partisan support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice's scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the process can be significant.
Our concern with the impact of patronage on political belief and association does not occur in the abstract, for political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. 10 Regardless of the nature of the inducement, whether it be by the denial of public employment or, as in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), by the influence of a teacher over students, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id., at 642. And, though [427 U.S. 347, 357] freedom of belief is central, "[t]he First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 15. "There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of `orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522 -523; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 -461. The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom." Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 -57 (1973).
These protections reflect our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), a principle itself reflective of the fundamental understanding that "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process . . . ." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S., at 32 . Patronage, therefore, to the extent it compels or restrains belief and association, is inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and is "at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d, at 576. As such, the practice unavoidably confronts decisions by this Court either invalidating or recognizing as invalid government action that inhibits belief and association through the conditioning of public employment on political faith.
Particularly pertinent to the constitutionality of the practice of patronage dismissals are Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Keyishian, the Court invalidated New York statutes barring employment merely on the basis of membership in "subversive" organizations. Keyishian squarely held that political association alone could not, consistently with the First Amendment, constitute [427 U.S. 347, 359] an adequate ground for denying public employment. 12 In Perry, the Court broadly rejected the validity of limitations on First Amendment rights as a condition to the receipt of a governmental benefit, stating that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to `produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 . Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible." 408 U.S., at 597 .
Patronage practice falls squarely within the prohibitions of Keyishian and Perry. Under that practice, public employees hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable manner, support for the favored political party. The threat of dismissal for failure to provide that support unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support only penalizes its exercise. The belief and association which government may not ordain directly are achieved by indirection. 13 And [427 U.S. 347, 360] regardless of how evenhandedly these restraints may operate in the long run, after political office has changed hands several times, protected interests are still infringed and thus the violation remains.
One interest which has been offered in justification of patronage is the need to insure effective government and the efficiency of public employees. It is argued that employees of political persuasions not the same as that of the party in control of public office will not have the incentive to work effectively and may even be motivated to subvert the incumbent administration's efforts to govern effectively. We are not persuaded. The inefficiency resulting from the wholesale replacement of large numbers of public employees every time political office changes hands belies this justification. And the prospect of dismissal after an election in which the incumbent party has lost is only a disincentive to good work. 18 Further, it is not clear that dismissal in order to make room for a patronage appointment will result in replacement [427 U.S. 347, 365] by a person more qualified to do the job since appointment often occurs in exchange for the delivery of votes, or other party service, not job capability. More fundamentally, however, the argument does not succeed because it is doubtful that the mere difference of political persuasion motivates poor performance; nor do we think it legitimately may be used as a basis for imputing such behavior. The Court has consistently recognized that mere political association is an inadequate basis for imputing disposition to ill-willed conduct. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S., at 606 -608; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S., at 190 -191. 19 Though those cases involved affiliation with the Communist Party, we do not "consider [427 U.S. 347, 366] these [respondents'] interest in freely associating with members of the [Republican] Party less worthy of protection than [other] employees' interest in associating with Communists or former Communists." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d, at 570. At all events, less drastic means for insuring government effectiveness and employee efficiency are available to the State. Specifically, employees may always be discharged for good cause, such as insubordination or poor job performance, when those bases in fact exist.
Even if the first argument that patronage serves effectiveness and efficiency be rejected, it still may be argued that patronage serves those interests by giving the employees of an incumbent party the incentive to perform well in order to insure their party's incumbency and thereby their jobs. Patronage, according to the argument, thus makes employees highly accountable to the public. But the ability of officials more directly accountable to the electorate to discharge employees for cause and the availability of merit systems, growth in the use of which has been quite significant, convince us that means less intrusive than patronage still exist for achieving accountability in the public work force and, thereby, effective and efficient government. The greater effectiveness of patronage over these less drastic means, if any, is at best marginal, a gain outweighed by the absence of intrusion on protected interests under the alternatives.
The lack of any justification for patronage dismissals as a means of furthering government effectiveness and efficiency distinguishes this case from CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1949). In both of those cases, legislative restraints on political management and campaigning by public employees were upheld despite their encroachment on First Amendment rights [427 U.S. 347, 367] because, inter alia, they did serve in a necessary manner to foster and protect efficient and effective government. 20 Interestingly, the activities that were restrained by the legislation involved in those cases are characteristic of patronage practices. As the Court observed in Mitchell: "The conviction that an actively partisan governmental personnel threatens good administration has deepened since 1882.. Congress recognizes danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections." 330 U.S., at 97 -98.
A second interest advanced in support of patronage is the need for political loyalty of employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be insured, but to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate. The justification is not without force, but is nevertheless inadequate to validate patronage wholesale. Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end. Nonpolicymaking individuals usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party.
No clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of the responsibilities is critical. Employee supervisors, for [427 U.S. 347, 368] example, may have many responsibilities, but those responsibilities may have only limited and well-defined objectives. An employee with responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more likely functions in a policymaking position. In determining whether an employee occupies a policymaking position, consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals. Thus, the political loyalty "justification is a matter of proof, or at least argument, directed at particular kinds of jobs." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d, at 574. Since, as we have noted, it is the government's burden to demonstrate an overriding interest in order to validate an encroachment on protected interests, the burden of establishing this justification as to any particular respondent will rest on the petitioners on remand, cases of doubt being resolved in favor of the particular respondent.
It is argued that a third interest supporting patronage dismissals is the preservation of the democratic process. According to petitioners, "`we have contrived no system for the support of party that does not place considerable reliance on patronage. The party organization makes a democratic government work and charges a price for its services.'" 21 The argument is thus premised on the centrality of partisan politics to the democratic process.
It is apparent that at bottom we are required to engage in the resolution of conflicting interests under the First Amendment. The constitutional adjudication called for [427 U.S. 347, 372] by this task is well within our province. 28 The illuminating source to which we turn in performing the task is the system of government the First Amendment was intended to protect, a democratic system whose proper functioning is indispensably dependent on the unfettered judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern. Our decision in obedience to the guidance of that source does not outlaw political parties or political campaigning and management. Parties are free to exist and their concomitant activities are free to continue. We require only that the rights of every citizen to believe as he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs be free to continue as well.
In summary, patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association. Though there is a vital need for government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least restrictive means for fostering that end. There is also a need to insure that policies which the electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented. That interest can be fully satisfied by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. Finally, patronage dismissals cannot be justified by their contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic process through their assistance to partisan politics since political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and [427 U.S. 347, 373] equally effective methods. More fundamentally, however, any contribution of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not suffice to override their severe encroachment on First Amendment freedoms. We hold, therefore, that the practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that respondents thus stated a valid claim for relief.
There remains the question whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction was properly directed by the Court of Appeals. The District Court predicated its denial of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction on its finding that the allegations in their complaints and affidavits did not constitute a sufficient showing of irreparable injury and that respondents had an adequate remedy at law. The Court of Appeals held, however: "Inasmuch as this case involves First Amendment rights of association which must be carefully guarded against infringement by public office holders, we judge that injunctive relief is clearly appropriate in these cases." 509 F.2d, at 1136. We agree.
At the time a preliminary injunction was sought in the District Court, one of the respondents was only threatened with discharge. In addition, many of the members of the class respondents were seeking to have certified prior to the dismissal of their complaint were threatened with discharge or had agreed to provide support for the Democratic Party in order to avoid discharge. It is clear therefore that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See New York Times Co. [427 U.S. 347, 374] v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 29 Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of respondents' motion and since respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
[ Footnote 1 ] For purposes of our review, all of the well-pleaded allegations of respondents' complaint and uncontroverted affidavits filed in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction are taken as true.
[ Footnote 2 ] M. Tolchin & S. Tolchin, To the Victor 5-6 (1971).
[ Footnote 3 ] Id., at 323.
[ Footnote 4 ] Id., at 323-326.
[ Footnote 5 ] See C. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage 87, 209-210 (1904); D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution 238-240 (1971).
[ Footnote 6 ] C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 183-188 (rev. ed. 1965).
[ Footnote 7 ] Act of Jan. 16, 1883, c. 27, 2 (2) Fifth, Sixth, 22 Stat. 404.
[ Footnote 8 ] See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 604 -605, n. 2 (1973). Factors contributing to the declining use of patronage have not been limited to the proliferation of merit systems. New methods of political financing, the greater necessity of job expertise in public employment, growing issue orientation in the elective process, and new incentives for political campaigners have also contributed. Sorauf, The Silent Revolution In Patronage, 20 Pub. Admin. Rev. 28, 34 (1960).
[ Footnote 9 ] For comprehensive commentary on the constitutionality of the practice of patronage dismissals, see Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 Ind. Legal Forum 35 (1969); Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justification, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (1974).
[ Footnote 10 ] "It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case." Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
[ Footnote 11 ] Protection of First Amendment interests has not been limited to invalidation of conditions on government employment requiring allegiance to a particular political party. This Court's decisions have prohibited conditions on public benefits, in the form of jobs or otherwise, which dampen the exercise generally of First Amendment rights, however slight the inducement to the individual to forsake those rights.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), decided the same day as Cafeteria Workers, the Court squarely held that a citizen could not be refused a public office for failure to declare his belief in God. More broadly, the Court has held impermissible under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school teacher for openly criticizing the Board of Education on its allocation of school funds. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). And in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), unemployment compensation, rather than public employment, was the government benefit which could not be withheld on the condition that a person accept Saturday employment where such employment was contrary to religious faith. Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits limiting the grant of a tax exemption to only those who affirm their loyalty to the State granting the exemption. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
[ Footnote 12 ] Thereafter, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), similarly held that mere membership in the Communist Party could not bar a person from employment in private defense establishments important to national security.
[ Footnote 13 ] The increasingly pervasive nature of public employment provides officials with substantial power through conditioning jobs on partisan support, particularly in this time of high unemployment. Since the government, however, may not seek to achieve an unlawful end either directly or indirectly, the inducement afforded by placing conditions on a benefit need not be particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated. Rights are infringed [427 U.S. 347, 360] both where the government fines a person a penny for being a Republican and where it withholds the grant of a penny for the same reason.
Petitioners contend that even though the government may not provide that public employees may retain their jobs only if they become affiliated with or provide support for the in-party, respondents here have waived any objection to such requirements. The difficulty with this argument is that it completely swallows the rule. Since the qualification may not be constitutionally imposed absent an appropriate justification, to accept the waiver argument is to say that the government may do what it may not do. A finding of waiver in this case, therefore, would be contrary to our view that a partisan job qualification abridges the First Amendment.
[ Footnote 14 ] Brief for Petitioners 12-13.
"In a leading case decided many years ago, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that public employment in general was a `privilege,' not a `right,' and that procedural due process guarantees therefore were inapplicable. Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 . The basis of this holding has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years. For, as MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN wrote for the Court only last year, `this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 . See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, ante, at 482; Bell v. Burson, [ 402 U.S. 535 ,] 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, [ 397 U.S. 254 ,] 262; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 ."
[ Footnote 16 ] "[T]his Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of [427 U.S. 347, 363] freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of government." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S., at 96 .
[ Footnote 17 ] The Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), does not support petitioners. O'Brien dealt with the constitutionality of laws regulating the "nonspeech" elements of expressive conduct. No such regulation is involved here, for it is association and belief per se, not any particular form of conduct, which patronage seeks to control. Moreover, while partisanship may involve activities such as registering with a political organization, wearing a campaign button, or contributing to a campaign fund, we cannot say these activities can be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card which was involved in O'Brien. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976). Finally, to paraphrase the Court's observations in Buckley: "Even if the categorization of [partisan activity] as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O'Brien test because the governmental [427 U.S. 347, 364] interests advanced in support of the [practice of patronage] involve `suppressing communication.'" Id., at 17. For the end to be furthered by the practice involves the compulsion of support for the incumbent political party. Indeed, unlike the legislation tested in Buckley, the practice of patronage does "focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subjected to [it] . . . ." Ibid. And, contrary to O'Brien's proscription, under patronage "the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 391 U.S., at 382 .
[ Footnote 18 ] It does not appear that efficiency and effective government were the concerns of elected officials in this case. Employees originally dismissed were reinstated after obtaining sponsorship letters, a practice hardly promotive of efficiency if the employee's work had been less than par or if the employee had previously behaved in an insubordinate manner. App. 14. Complaints by one supervisor that too many people were being discharged too fast, without adequately trained replacements, were met with the response that the number of dismissals was to be maintained because the job openings were needed for partisan appointments. Id., at 15. One Republican employee of the Sheriff's Office was told that his dismissal had nothing to do with the quality of his work, but that his position was needed for a Democratic replacement. Id., at 22.
[ Footnote 19 ] In this regard, petitioners' reliance on American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), is misplaced. To be sure, that decision upheld a section of the National Labor Relations Act denying certain benefits of the Act to labor organizations which had not filed with the National Labor Relations Board affidavits that their leaders were not members of the Communist Party. The Court there deferred to a legislative determination that, with respect to labor relations, the Communist Party was unlike other parties in its use of union leadership to bring about strikes and other obstructions to commerce. The Court was careful to note in Douds, however, that the precise holding in that case would not serve as a departure point for inferences of ill conduct grounded merely on political association. Id., at 410. Indeed, the Court in Douds also carefully observed that political affiliations and beliefs "are circumstances ordinarily irrelevant to permissible subjects of government action." Id., at 391.
Those caveats were well stated. With but three exceptions shortly after Douds, Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), the Court's decisions have consistently rejected all inferences based merely on belief and association, and we do so today. See, e. g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S., at 606 -608; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S., at 188 -190.
[ Footnote 20 ] Legislative restraints on political management and campaigning were also upheld in Letter Carriers and Mitchell because they served to protect individual belief and association and, thereby, the political process. The distinction between this case and those cases in that respect is treated infra, this page and at 368-371.
[ Footnote 21 ] Brief for Petitioners 43, quoting V. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups 369 (5th ed. 1964).
[ Footnote 22 ] Partisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition, not the Constitution.
"It may be correct that the patronage system has been followed for `almost two hundred years' and therefore was in existence when the Constitution was adopted. However, the notoriety of the practice in the administration of Andrew Jackson in 1828 implies that it was not prevalent theretofore; we are not aware of any discussion of the practice during the drafting of the Constitution or the First Amendment. In any event, if the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued acceptance, the constitutional attack on racial discrimination would, of course, have been doomed to failure." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 n. 14 (CA7 1972).
[ Footnote 23 ] Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 Pub. Admin. Rev. 28, 32-33 (1960); Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 Midwest J. Pol. Sci. 115, 118-120 (1959).
[ Footnote 24 ] See n. 8, supra.
[ Footnote 25 ] The Court's decision earlier this term in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is not contrary. It is true that in Buckley, as here, the interest to be served was the democratic system, and accordingly in Buckley, the infringement of some First Amendment rights was held to be tolerable. In Buckley, however, unlike here, the disclosure and contribution limitations on campaign financing, which were upheld, were essential to eliminating the grave evil of improper influence in the political process. The Court found that those provisions "constitute the Act's primary weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions." Id., at 58. The Court further found that "[t]he contribution ceilings . . . serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion." Ibid. With respect to expenditure limitations, however, which were not upheld, the Court found: "These provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate." Id., at 58-59. The restrictions imposed by patronage dismissals, limiting wholesale an individual's political beliefs, expression, and association, while perhaps less direct, are equally, if not more, substantial, and therefore also intolerable to the First Amendment. Moreover, patronage dismissals involve the evil of influence, whose very need for elimination justified the contribution and disclosure provisions in Buckley.
[ Footnote 26 ] "To declare that the present supposed evils of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic system." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S., at 99 . "Congress may reasonably desire to limit party activity of federal employees so as to avoid a tendency toward a one-party system." Id., at 100.
[ Footnote 27 ] The judgment that the First Amendment interests in political campaigning and management must, in the setting of public employment, give way to the First Amendment interests in individual belief and association does not necessarily extend to other contexts. Restraining political campaigning and management in the area of public employment leaves it free to continue in other settings. The consequence of no such restraint, however, is the complete restriction of individual belief and association for each public employee affected.
[ Footnote 28 ] Letter Carriers did observe: "Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act." 413 U.S., at 564 . Though Congress may be free not to impose restraints on political campaigning and management in the public employment sector, we are not similarly free to do so where those practices, protected as they may be in other contexts, are found impermissibly to pre-empt equally, if not more, fundamental constitutional rights.
[ Footnote 29 ] The timeliness of political speech is particularly important. See Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391 -392 (1962).
"[T]he purpose of the First Amendment includes the need . . . `to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them.'" Id., at 392 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 885 (8th ed. 1927)).
Although I cannot join the plurality's wide-ranging opinion, I can and do concur in its judgment.
The single substantive question involved in this case is whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs. I agree with the plurality that he cannot. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 -598.
The Court's decision today represents a significant intrusion into the area of legislative and policy concerns - the sort of intrusion MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN has recently protested in other contexts. I therefore join MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S dissenting opinion, and add a few words simply to emphasize an aspect that seems particularly important to me.
The Illinois Legislature has pointedly decided that roughly half of the Sheriff's staff shall be made up of tenured career personnel and the balance left exclusively to the choice of the elected head of the department. The Court strains the rational bounds of First Amendment doctrine and runs counter to longstanding practices that are part of the fabric of our democratic system to hold that the Constitution commands something it has not been thought to require for 185 years. For all that time our system has wisely left these matters to the States and, on the federal level, to the Congress. The Court's action is a classic example of trivializing constitutional adjudication - a function of the highest importance in our system.
Only last week, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), we took steps to arrest the downgrading of States to a role comparable to the departments of France, governed entirely out of the national capital. Constant inroads on the powers of the States [427 U.S. 347, 376] to manage their own affairs cannot fail to complicate our system and centralize more power in Washington. For the reasons MR. JUSTICE POWELL persuasively adduces, the First Amendment neither requires nor justifies such inroads in this case. In my view, the issue is not so much whether the patronage system is "good" or "bad," as the plurality characterizes the problem, but whether the choice of its use in the management of the very government of each State was not, in the words of the Tenth Amendment, "reserved to the States . . . or to the people."
Congress long ago, as a matter of policy, opted for a federal career service with a small number of purely political appointments in the Executive Branch, and many governmental departments have a limited number of positions in which the persons appointed have no tenure but serve at the pleasure of the cabinet officer or agency chief, who in turn serves at the pleasure of the President. See, e. g., Leonard v. Douglas, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 136, 321 F.2d 749 (1963). The considerations leading to these legislative conclusions are - for me - not open to judicial scrutiny under the guise of a First Amendment claim, any more than is the right of a newly elected Representative or Senator, for example, to have a staff made up of persons who share his political philosophy and affiliation and are loyal to him. It seems to me that the Illinois Legislature's choice is entitled to no less deference.
The Court holds unconstitutional a practice as old as the Republic, a practice which has contributed significantly to the democratization of American politics. This decision is urged on us in the name of First Amendment rights, but in my view the judgment neither is constitutionally [427 U.S. 347, 377] required nor serves the interest of a representative democracy. It also may well disserve - rather than promote - core values of the First Amendment. I therefore dissent.
The Cook County Sheriff's Office employs approximately 3,000 people. Roughly half of these employees are "merit" employees given various protections from discharge. The other half of the employees have no such protection. Customary Illinois political practice has allowed such "nonmerit" positions to be awarded on "patronage" grounds. This tradition has entitled newly elected officeholders to replace incumbent nonmerit employees with patronage appointments.
Petitioner Richard Elrod, a Democrat, was elected Sheriff of Cook County in 1970, succeeding a Republican. Consistently with Illinois practice, he dismissed a number of incumbent employees because they lacked Democratic affiliation and were unable to secure Democratic sponsorship. The named respondents, several discharged employees and another employee threatened with discharge, are all Republicans who concededly were hired by Elrod's predecessor because of their political affiliations.
As the plurality opinion recognizes, patronage practices of the sort under consideration here have a long history in America. 1 Although an extensive recounting of that history is not necessary, I think it important to [427 U.S. 347, 378] survey it more fully than does the plurality opinion. 2 The observation that patronage in employment received its primary popularization and legitimation during Jackson's Presidency, ante, at 353, understates the historical antecedents of the practice, which stretch back to Washington's Presidency.
It is recognized that patronage in employment played a significant role in democratizing American politics. See, e. g., C. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage 156-157 (1905); Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 Midwest J. Pol. Sci. 115-116 (1959). Before patronage practices developed fully, an "aristocratic" class dominated political affairs, a tendency that persisted in areas where patronage did not become prevalent. C. Fish, supra, at 157. Patronage practices broadened the base of political participation by providing incentives to take part in the process, thereby increasing the volume of political discourse in society. Patronage also strengthened parties, and hence encouraged the development of institutional responsibility to the electorate on a permanent basis. Parties became "instrument[s] through which discipline and responsibility may be achieved within the Leviathan." Sorauf, supra, at 115.
In many situations patronage employment practices also entailed costs to government efficiency. These costs led eventually to reforms placing most federal and state civil service employment on a nonpatronage basis. But the course of such reform is of limited relevance to the task of constitutional adjudication in this case. It is pertinent to note, however, that a perceived impingement on employees' political beliefs by the patronage system was not a significant impetus to such reform. Most advocates of reform were concerned primarily with the corruption and inefficiency that patronage was thought to induce in civil service and the power that patronage practices were thought to give the "professional" politicians who relied on them. D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution 70-74 (1971). Moreover, it generally was thought that elimination of these evils required the imposition both of a merit system and of restrictions on First Amendment activities [427 U.S. 347, 380] by government employees. Id., at 76-77, 82-86; see, e. g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
"For many years past and continuing to this time it has been the practice of the elected Sheriff of Cook County, when he assumes office from a Sheriff of a different political party, to replace all or substantially all of the non-civil service employees of the Sheriff's office who did not (a) Pledge their political allegiance to the political party of the incoming Sheriff; [and/or meet other specified political requirements] . . . ." App. 3.
We thus have complaining employees who apparently accepted patronage jobs knowingly and willingly, while fully familiar with the "tenure" practices long prevailing in the Sheriff's Office. Such employees have benefited from their political beliefs and activities; they have not been penalized for them. In these circumstances, I am inclined to agree with the holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in American Federation of State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A. 2d 375 (1971), that beneficiaries of a patronage system may not be heard to challenge it when it comes their turn to be replaced. See also Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (CA4 1974).
"Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception. Our statute books are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech . . . ." Id., at 93 n. 127.
We also have recognized the strong government interests in encouraging stable political parties and avoiding excessive political fragmentation. Through the medium of established parties the "people . . . are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively," Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974), while "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [might] do significant damage to the fabric of government." Id., at 736. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 98, 101.
The complaining parties are or were employees of the Sheriff. In many communities, the sheriff's duties are as routine as process serving, and his election attracts little or no general public interest. In the States, and [427 U.S. 347, 384] especially in the thousands of local communities, there are large numbers of elective offices, and many are as relatively obscure as that of the local sheriff or constable. Despite the importance of elective offices to the ongoing work of local governments, election campaigns for lesser offices in particular usually attract little attention from the media, with consequent disinterest and absence of intelligent participation on the part of the public. Unless the candidates for these offices are able to dispense the traditional patronage that has accrued to the offices, they also are unlikely to attract donations of time or money from voluntary groups. In short, the resource pools that fuel the intensity of political interest and debate in "important" elections frequently "could care less" about who fills the offices deemed to be relatively unimportant. Long experience teaches that at this local level traditional patronage practices contribute significantly to the democratic process. The candidates for these offices derive their support at the precinct level, and their modest funding for publicity, from cadres of friends and political associates who hope to benefit if their "man" is elected. 8 The activities of the latter are [427 U.S. 347, 385] often the principal source of political information for the voting public. The "robust" political discourse that the plurality opinion properly emphasizes is furthered - not restricted - by the time-honored system.
Patronage hiring practices also enable party organizations to persist and function at the local level. Such organizations become visible to the electorate at large only at election time, but the dull periods between elections require ongoing activities: precinct organizations must be maintained; new voters registered; and minor political "chores" performed for citizens who otherwise may have no practical means of access to officeholders. In some communities, party organizations and clubs also render helpful social services.
It is naive to think that these types of political activities are motivated at these levels by some academic interest in "democracy" or other public service impulse. For the most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward generates a major portion of the local political activity supporting parties. It is difficult to overestimate the contributions to our system by the major political parties, fortunately limited in number compared to the fractionalization that has made the continued existence of democratic government doubtful in some other countries. Parties generally are stable, high-profile, and permanent institutions. When the names on a long ballot are meaningless to the average voter, party affiliation affords a guidepost by which voters may rationalize a myriad of political choices. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 66 -68. Voters can and do hold parties to long-term accountability, and it is not too much to say that, in their absence, responsive and responsible performance in low-profile offices, particularly, is difficult to maintain.
It is against decades of experience to the contrary, then, that the plurality opinion concludes that patronage [427 U.S. 347, 386] hiring practices interfere with the "free functioning of the electoral process." Ante, at 356. This ad hoc judicial judgment runs counter to the judgments of the representatives of the people in state and local governments, representatives who have chosen, in most instances, to retain some patronage practices in combination with a merit-oriented civil service. One would think that elected representatives of the people are better equipped than we to weigh the need for some continuation of patronage practices in light of the interests above identified, 9 and particularly in view of local conditions. 10 See CSC v. [427 U.S. 347, 387] Letter Carriers, 413 U.S., at 564 ; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947). Against this background, the assertion in the plurality opinion that "[p]atronage dismissals . . . are not the least restrictive alternative to achieving [any] contribution they may make to the democratic process" is unconvincing, especially since no alternative to some continuation of patronage practices is suggested. Ante, at 369 (footnote omitted).
I thus conclude that patronage hiring practices sufficiently serve important state interests, including some interests sought to be advanced by the First Amendment, to justify a tolerable intrusion on the First Amendment interests of employees or potential employees.
The plurality opinion asserts that patronage hiring practices contravene the fundamental principle that "`no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .'" Ante, at 356, quoting Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). But such practices simply cannot be so construed. This case differs materially from previous cases involving the imposition of political conditions on employment, see, e. g., Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), cases where there was an attempt to exclude "a minority group . . . odious to the majority." Id., at 725 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In that context there was a danger that governmental action was directed toward the elimination of political beliefs [427 U.S. 347, 388] by penalizing adherents to them. But patronage hiring practices have been consistent historically with vigorous ideological competition in the political "marketplace." And even after one becomes a beneficiary, the system leaves significant room for individual political expression. Employees, regardless of affiliation, may vote freely 11 and express themselves on some political issues. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The principal intrusion of patronage hiring practices on First Amendment interests thus arises from the coercion on associational choices that may be created by one's desire initially to obtain employment. This intrusion, while not insignificant, must be measured in light of the limited role of patronage hiring in most government employment. The pressure to abandon one's beliefs and associations to obtain government employment - especially employment of such uncertain duration - does not seem to me to assume impermissible proportions in light of the interests to be served.
On the assumption that we must reach the constitutional issue at the behest of respondents, I would hold that a state or local government may elect to condition employment on the political affiliation of a prospective employee and on the political fortunes of the hiring incumbent. History and long-prevailing practice across the country support the view that patronage hiring practices make a sufficiently substantial contribution to the practical functioning of our democratic system to support [427 U.S. 347, 389] their relatively modest intrusion on First Amendment interests. The judgment today unnecessarily constitutionalizes another element of American life - an element certainly not without its faults but one which generations have accepted on balance as having merit. 12 We should have heeded, instead, the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes that "[i]f a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . . . ." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
[ Footnote 1 ] Substantially for the reasons stated in the plurality opinion, I agree that the question presented here is a justiciable one. I note, however, that the ability to formulate judicial standards is another factor to be considered in evaluating justiciability. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The difficulty of formulating standards might pose a bar to judicial review of some patronage practices not before us.
[ Footnote 2 ] The sources primarily relied upon for the statements in text are C. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (1905), and D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution (1971).
[ Footnote 3 ] On petitioners' motion to dismiss, the District Court had before it only the complaint and the petitioners' conclusory motions to dismiss. Although one reasonably may be confident that these employees willingly accepted this employment as political patronage, with full knowledge that their continued employment depended on the outcome of the next election, this may not be entirely clear from the pleadings as viewed upon a motion to dismiss. The District Court made no finding of fact in this respect, and its brief opinion does not rely on this ground.
[ Footnote 4 ] One may agree readily that different plaintiffs legitimately could assert First Amendment interests. These would be individuals who desired to be hired for state or local employment and who possessed all requisite qualifications except the "right" political posture or sponsorship.
[ Footnote 5 ] This case involves only employees. We thus face no allegations that patronage practices exclude any voters or candidates from effective participation in the political process by impermissibly disadvantaging them. Cf. Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (CA7 1970). Elrod informs us that since 1955 two Democrats, two Republicans, and an Independent have served as Sheriff. Reply Brief for Petitioners 11 n. 20a.
"Patronage is peculiarly important for minority groups, involving much more than the mere spoils of office. Each first appointment given a member of any underdog element is a boost in that element's struggle for social acceptance. It means that another barrier to their advance has been lifted, another shut door has swung open."
S. Lubell, The Future of American Politics 76-77 (1952).
[ Footnote 7 ] As this case presents only the question whether a State constitutionally may pursue patronage hiring practices, we do not consider whether such practices would be justified if pursued by the Federal Government.
"In short, I am for civil service but not for having civil service dominate public employment 100 percent. That would give us the bureaucracy of Germany and France which I do not regard as ideal.
"But I would like to have you consider just how long most liberals would be able to last in Congress if you stripped us of all patronage, as you desire. We who try to defend the interests of the people, the consumers and the taxpayers commonly face the powerful opposition of the special-interest groups which will spend enormous sums of money to defeat us. . . . If we are to survive we need some support rooted in gratitude for material favors which at the same time do not injure the general public." Letter to New Republic, July 14, 1952, p. 2.
[ Footnote 9 ] The plurality might be taken to concede some promotion of the democratic process by patronage hiring practices but to conclude that in net effect such practices will reduce political debate impermissibly by affecting some employees or potential employees and thereby depriving society of the "unfettered judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern." Ante, at 372. In the past the Court has upheld congressional actions designed to increase the overall level of political discourse but affecting adversely the First Amendment interests of some individuals. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 -68 (1976) (disclosure requirements); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 -566 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 -395 (1969). In Letter Carriers we indicated specifically that the First Amendment freedoms of federal employees could be limited in an effort to further the functioning of the democratic process. I do not believe that local legislative judgments as to what will further the democratic process in light of local conditions should receive less weight than these congressional judgments. Surely that should be the case until we have a record, if one could be created, showing the fears of the plurality to be justified.
[ Footnote 10 ] The judgment today is limited to nonpolicymaking positions. Ante, at 367-368. A "policymaking" exception, however, will not allow substantial advancement of the state interests undercut by the Court's holding, as it is doubtful that any significant number of employees can be identified as policymakers in a sheriff's office. States have chosen to provide for the election of many local officials who have little or no genuine policymaking functions, see supra, at 383-384, and the subordinates of such officials are even less likely to [427 U.S. 347, 387] have such functions. It thus is predictable that the holding today will terminate almost completely the contributions of patronage hiring practices to the democratic process. The probability of this result is increased to the extent that the needs of efficiency in local government require that policymaking positions be included in a merit-oriented, nonpolitical civil service.
[ Footnote 11 ] It appears that before the adoption of the Australian ballot, one's access to or retention of a government job sometimes could depend on voting "correctly." D. Rosenbloom, supra, n. 2, at 61. Today this ultimate core of political expression is beyond the reach of any coercive effects of the patronage system.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. V. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v. v.


Pursuant to the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.), the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq.), and the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156), the judges of the United States District Court for the Central District of California have adopted the following plan setting forth time limits and procedures to minimize undue delay and to further the prompt disposition of criminal cases and certain juvenile proceedings. This plan took effect upon approval of the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit on July 9, 2009. Minor, non-substantive changes to the plan were adopted by the Court on October 28, 2011. This plan supersedes General Order No. 11-05, filed June 17, 2011.
Offense. The time limits set forth herein are applicable to any criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress (other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction, or an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal).
Judge. The terms “judge,” “judicial officer” or “court” mean, unless otherwise indicated, any United States district or magistrate judge.
Persons. The time limits are applicable to persons accused who have not been indicted or informed against as well as those who have, and the word “defendant” includes such persons unless the context indicates otherwise.
appears before a judicial officer in connection with a federal charge.
At the time of the earliest appearance before a judicial officer of a person who has been arrested for an offense not charged in an indictment or information, the prosecuting agency shall inform the judicial officer of the date on which the arrest took place for the record.
In the absence of a showing to the contrary, a summons shall be considered to have been served on the date of service shown on the return thereof. A summons served by mail shall be considered to have been served on the date shown on the receipt thereof.
Superseding Charges. If, after an indictment or information has been filed, a complaint, indictment, or information is filed which charges the defendant with the same offense or with an offense required to be joined with that offense, the time limit applicable to the subsequent charge shall be determined as follows.
If the original indictment or information was dismissed on motion of the defendant before the filing of the subsequent charge, the time limit shall be determined without regard to the existence of the original charge. (18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1).) A dismissal of the indictment on order of the judge with the consent of the defendant shall be considered dismissed on motion of the defendant.
If a defendant signs a written consent to be tried before a magistrate on a complaint and no indictment or information charging the offense has been filed, the time limit for trial shall run from the date of such consent.
In the event of a transfer to this district under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the indictment or information shall be deemed filed in this district when the papers in the proceeding or certified copies thereof are received by the clerk of the court.
A trial in a jury case shall be deemed to commence at the beginning of voir dire.
A trial in a non-jury case shall be deemed to commence on the day the case is called, provided that some substantial step in the trial procedure immediately follows.
A conflict in schedules of the Assistant United States Attorney or defense counsel shall not be grounds for a continuance or delay in the setting of a trial date except under circumstances approved by the court and called to the court’s attention at the earliest practicable time.
At or promptly after the time of the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information such as described in above subparagraph 5(b)(ii) or (iii), the United States Attorney shall inform the court of that circumstance and his or her position with respect to the computation of the time limits.
Pre-trial hearings deemed necessary to assist counsel in the preparation or disposition of their case shall be conducted as soon after the arraignment as possible, consistent with the priorities of other matters on the court’s criminal docket.
Time Limits. Notwithstanding any longer time periods that may be permitted under paragraphs 4 and 5 above, the trial of a defendant held in custody solely for the purpose of trial on a federal charge shall commence within 90 days following the beginning of continuous custody.
A defendant is deemed to be in detention awaiting trial when he is arrested on a federal charge or otherwise held for the purpose of responding to a federal charge. Detention is deemed to be solely because the defendant is awaiting trial unless the person exercising custodial authority has an independent basis (not including detainer) for continuing to hold the defendant.
If a case is transferred pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the defendant subsequently rejects disposition under Rule 20 or the court declines to accept the plea, a new period of continuous detention awaiting trial will begin at that time.
A trial shall be deemed to commence as provided in subparagraphs 5(e)(iii) and (iv).
Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the trial shall not commence earlier than 30 days from the date on which the defendant first appears before a judicial officer of this district either through counsel or on which the defendant expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se. In circumstances in which the 70-day time limit for commencing trial on a charge in an indictment or information is determined by reference to an earlier indictment or information pursuant to subparagraph 5(b), the 30-day minimum period shall also be determined by reference to the earlier indictment or information.
Applicability. In computing any time limit under above paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, the periods of delay set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) shall be excluded. Such periods of delay shall not be excluded in computing the minimum period for commencement of trial under paragraph 7 above.
Basis for Excludable Time. At the time it orders time excluded from the computation of any time limit under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, the court shall set forth on the record, in writing or orally, the basis for the finding of excludable time.
The attorney for the Government and the attorney for the defendant may at any time enter into stipulations with respect to excludable time.
To the extent that the amount of time stipulated exceeds the amount listed in the case record, the stipulation shall have no effect unless approved by the court.
In the event that the United States Attorney anticipates that an indictment or information will not be filed within the time limit set forth in paragraph 4 herein, the United States Attorney shall file a written motion with the court for a determination of excludable time. In the event that the United States Attorney seeks a continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), the United States Attorney shall file a written motion with the court requesting such a continuance.
if the motion is for a continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), it shall also state whether the defendant is being held in custody on the basis of the complaint.
In appropriate circumstances, the motion may include a request that some or all of the supporting material be considered ex parte and in camera.
The court will grant an extension of time within which an indictment or information must be filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) only for a specific period of time.
In the event the court extends the time for a trial beyond the time limit set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, the court shall determine whether the limit may be recomputed by excluding time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). If it is determined that an extension is justified, the court shall state for the record, either orally or in writing, the fact or facts on which the determination is made. Any ex parte determination that time is excludable shall be subject to a motion to vacate the determination made within five days of the entry of the decision on the docket. No action following the determination that time is excludable will be deemed final until the time for such motion to vacate has passed. In the absence of a need for an extension of time, the court will not ordinarily rule on the excludability of any period of time.
Time Limit. A defendant shall ordinarily be sentenced within 120 days of conviction. In particular, it should be noted that the time period for sentencing set forth herein is a statement of this district’s voluntarily assumed goal, and is not required nor enforced by the Speedy Trial Act.
Related Procedures. For good cause, the court may order a presentence investigation commenced prior to a conviction.
Dismissal. Failure to comply with the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., may entitle the defendant to dismissal of the charges against him. Nothing in this plan shall be construed to require that a case be dismissed in circumstances in which dismissal would not be by 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
If the United States Attorney knows that a person charged with an offense is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the United States Attorney shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a detainer to be filed, in accordance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j).