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Translation Factor eIF5A, Modification with Hypusine and Role in Regulation of Gene Expression. eIF5A as a Target for Pharmacological Interventions by K. T. Turpaev (863-873).
Translation factor eIF5A participates in protein synthesis at the stage of polypeptide chain elongation. Two eIF5A isoforms are known that are encoded by related genes whose expression varies significantly in different tissues. The eIF5A1 isoform is a constitutively and ubiquitously expressed gene, while the eIF5A2 isoform is expressed in few normal tissues and is an oncogene by a number of parameters. Unique feature of eIF5A isoforms is that they are the only two proteins that contain amino acid hypusine. Modification with hypusine is critical requirement for eIF5A activity. Another distinctive feature of eIF5A is its involvement in the translation of only a subset of the total population of cell mRNAs. The genes for which mRNAs translation requires eIF5A are the members of certain functional groups and are involved in cell proliferation, apoptosis, inflammatory processes, and regulation of transcription and RNA metabolism. The involvement of eIF5A is necessary for the translation of proteins containing oligoproline fragments and some other structures. Modification of eIF5A by hypusine is implemented by two highly specialized enzymes, deoxyhypusine synthase (DHS) and deoxyhypusine hydroxylase (DOHH), which are not involved in other biochemical reactions. Intracellular activity of these enzymes is closely associated with systems of protein acetylation, polyamine metabolism and other biochemical processes. Inhibition of DHS and DOHH activity provides the possibility of pharmacological control of eIF5A activity and expression of eIF5A-dependent genes.
Immunotropic Effects and Proposed Mechanism of Action for 3-Hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A Reductase Inhibitors (Statins) by T. I. Arefieva; A. Yu. Filatova; A. V. Potekhina; A. M. Shchinova (874-889).
Inhibitors of HMG-CoA reductase (statins) are the major group of lipid-lowering drugs. Along with hypocholesterolemic activity, statins exhibit anti-inflammatory and immunomodulatory properties that expand their clinical use, particularly, in the treatment of chronic inflammatory and autoimmune disorders. In this review, we critically analyze the data of statin effects on immune cells (e.g., monocytes and T cells) involved in the development of atherosclerosis and other chronic inflammatory diseases. We (i) discuss the properties of statins and routes of cell entry, as well as their major intracellular targets; (ii) evaluate the data on the effects of statins on the subset composition of circulatory monocytes, ability of monocytes to migrate to the site of inflammation (cell motility and expression of adhesion molecules and chemokine receptors), production of cytokines, matrix metalloproteinases, and reactive oxygen species by monocytes/macrophages, and antigen-presenting activity in peripheral blood monocyte-derived dendritic cells; and (iii) summarize the data on the regulation of proliferation and differentiation of various CD4+ T cell subsets (type 1/2/17 helper T cells and regulatory T cells) by statins.
Biochemistry of Direct Cell−Cell Interactions. Signaling Factors Regulating Orchestration of Cell Populations by V. Y. Brodsky (890-906).
Biochemical mechanisms for the orchestration of cell populations are discussed in view of direct cell−cell inter-actions and composition of the intercellular medium. In our works of the last 20 years, we used circahoralian (ultradian) rhythm of protein synthesis as a marker of cell interactions. Experiments in cell cultures are described; some influences on the organism native medium were performed. Information is presented on the signaling membrane factors that trigger a cascade of processes in the cytoplasm and lead to the orchestration of cell activity in vitro and in vivo. Among these factors are blood serum neurotransmitters, gangliosides, and some hormones. Studying protein synthesis kinetics allowed us to understand the importance of maintaining the constant levels of signaling factors in mammalian blood. The literature on protein phosphorylation as a key process of cell organization is reviewed. The persistence of the organizing signal for several days is described as a type of cell “memory”. It seems promising to extend the area for application of direct cell−cell interactions (respiration of cells, proliferation, etc.) to study possibilities of epigenetic regulation. It is important to continue the studies on the mechanisms of biochemical action of the known drugs as signaling factors.
Structure and Function of Multidrug Resistance Protein 1 by E. N. Yakusheva; D. S. Titov (907-929).
This review considers one of the most clinically relevant representatives of the ABC transporters–multidrug resistance protein 1 (P-glycoprotein 1 or Pgp). Data on the primary, secondary, and tertiary structure of the protein, its synthesis and degradation, and roles of its fragments in transporter activity are presented. Particular attention is given to the mechanism of functioning of Pgp. In view of the absence of a generally recognized mechanism of action of Pgp, several existing models of the protein transport cycle are discussed. Epigenetic regulation of the ABCB1 gene and modulation of Pgp expression by microRNAs are discussed.
Structural Alterations in Human Fibroblast Growth Factor Receptors in Carcinogenesis by D. S. Mikhaylenko; B. Y. Alekseev; D. V. Zaletaev; R. I. Goncharova; M. V. Nemtsova (930-943).
Fibroblast growth factor (FGF) plays an important role in human embryogenesis, angiogenesis, cell proliferation, and differentiation. Carcinogenesis is accompanied by aberrant constitutive activation of FGF receptors (FGFRs) resulting from missense mutation in the FGFR1-4 genes, generation of chimeric oncogenes, FGFR1-4 gene amplification, alternative splicing shift toward formation of mesenchymal FGFR isoforms, and FGFR overexpression. Altogether, these alterations contribute to auto-and paracrine stimulation of cancer cells and neoangiogenesis. Certain missense mutations are found at a high rate in urinary bladder cancer and can be used for non-invasive cancer recurrence diagnostics by analyzing urine cell pellet DNA. Chimeric FGFR1/3 and amplified FGFR1/2 genes can predict cell response to the targeted therapy in various oncological diseases. In recent years, high-throughput sequencing has been used to analyze exomes of virtually all human tumors, which allowed to construct phylogenetic trees of clonal cancer evolution with special emphasis on driver mutations in FGFR1-4 genes. At present, FGFR blockers, such as multi-kinase inhibitors, specific FGFR inhibitors, and FGF ligand traps are being tested in clinical trials. In this review, we discuss current data on the functioning of the FGFR family proteins in both normal and cancer cells, mutations in the FGFR1-4 genes, and mechanisms underlying their oncogenic potential, which might be interesting to a broad range of scientists searching for specific tumor markers and targeted anti-cancer drugs.
Essential Light Chains of Myosin and Their Role in Functioning of the Myosin Motor by D. S. Logvinova; D. I. Levitsky (944-960).
This review summarizes current data on the structure and functions of myosin essential light chains (ELCs) and on their role in functioning of the myosin head as a molecular motor. The data on structural and functional features of the N-terminal extension of myosin ELC from skeletal and cardiac muscles are analyzed; the role of this extension in the ATP- dependent interaction of myosin heads with actin in the molecular mechanism of muscle contraction is discussed. The data on possible interactions of the ELC N-terminal extension with the myosin head motor domain in the myosin ATPase cycle are presented, including the results of the authors’ studies that are in favor of such interactions.
Inorganic Polyphosphate and Cancer by E. V. Kulakovskaya; M. Yu. Zemskova; T. V. Kulakovskaya (961-968).
This review presents data on the relationship between inorganic polyphosphate metabolism and carcinogenesis including participation of polyphosphates in the regulation of activity of mTOR and other proteins involved in carcinogenesis, the role of h-prune protein (human polyphosphatase) in cell migration and metastasis formation, the prospects for using polyphosphates and inhibitors of polyphosphate metabolism enzymes as agents for controlling cell proliferation and migration.
Glutathionylation of Na,K-ATPase Alpha-Subunit Alters Enzyme Conformation and Sensitivity to Trypsinolysis by E. A. Dergousova; Y. M. Poluektov; E. A. Klimanova; I. Y. Petrushanko; V. A. Mitkevich; A. A. Makarov; O. D. Lopina (969-981).
We found earlier that Na,K-ATPase is purified from duck salt glands in partially glutathionylated state (up to 13 of the 23 cysteine residues of the Na,K-ATPase catalytic α-subunit can be S-glutathionylated). To determine the effect of glutathionylation on the enzyme conformation, we have analyzed the products of trypsinolysis of Na,K-ATPase α-subunit in different conformations with different extent of glutathionylation. Incubation of the protein in the E1 conformation with trypsin produced a large fragment with a molecular mass (MM) of 80 kDa with the following formation of smaller fragments with MM 40, 35.5, and 23 kDa. Tryptic digestion of Na,K-ATPase in the E2 conformation also resulted in the generation of the fragments with MM 40, 35.5, and 23 kDa. Deglutathionylation of Na,K-ATPase α-subunit increases the rate of proteolysis of the enzyme in both E1 and E2 conformations. The pattern of tryptic digestion of the α-subunit in E2 conformation additionally glutathionylated with oxidized glutathione is similar to that of partially deglutathionylated Na,K-ATPase. The pattern of tryptic digestion of the additionally glutathionylated α-subunit in E1 conformation is similar to that of the native enzyme. The highest rate of trypsinolysis was observed for the α-subunit in complex with ouabain (E2-OBN conformation). Additional glutathionylation increased the content of high-molecular-weight fragments among the digestion products, as compared to the native and deglutathionylated enzymes. The data obtained were confirmed using molecular mod-eling that revealed that number of sites accessible for trypsinolysis is higher in the E2P-OBN conformation than in the E1-and E2-conformations and that glutathionylation decreases the number of sites accessible for trypsin. Therefore, glu-tathionylation affects enzyme conformation and its sensitivity to trypsinolysis. The mechanisms responsible for the changes in the Na,K-ATPase sensitivity to trypsinolysis depending on the level of enzyme glutathionylation and increase in the enzyme sensitivity to proteolysis upon its binding to ouabain, as well as physiological role of these phenomena, are discussed.
Amphipathic CRAC-Containing Peptides Derived from the Influenza Virus A M1 Protein Modulate Cholesterol-Dependent Activity of Cultured IC-21 Macrophages by A. Ya. Dunina-Barkovskaya; Kh. S. Vishnyakova; A. O. Golovko; A. M. Arutyunyan; L. A. Baratova; O. V. Bathishchev; V. A. Radyukhin (982-991).
On p. 982 in the list of authors instead of:O. V. BathishchevShould read:O. V. BatishchevEntry of many viral and bacterial pathogens into host cells depends on cholesterol and/or cholesterol-enriched domains (lipid rafts) in the cell membrane. Earlier, we showed that influenza virus A matrix protein M1 contains amphipathic α-helices with exposed cholesterol-recognizing amino acid consensus (CRAC) motifs. In order to test possible functional activity of these motifs, we studied the effects of three synthetic peptides corresponding to the CRAC-containing α-helices of the viral M1 protein on the phagocytic activity of cultured mouse IC-21 macrophages. The following peptides were used: LEVLMEWLKTR (M1 α-helix 3, a.a. 39–49; further referred to as peptide 1), NNMDKAVKLYRKLK (M1 α-helix 6, a.a. 91–105; peptide 2), and GLKNDLLENLQAYQKR (M1 α-helix 13, a.a. 228–243; peptide 3). We found that all three peptides modulated interactions of IC-21 macrophages with non-opsonized 2-μm target particles. The greatest effect was demonstrated by peptide 2: in the presence of 35 μM peptide 2, the phagocytic index of IC-21 macrophages exceeded the control value by 60%; 10–11 mM methyl-β-cyclodextrin abolished this effect. Peptides 1 and 3 exerted weak inhibitory effect in a narrow concentration range of 5–10 μM. The dose-response curves could be approximated by a sum of two (stimulatory and inhibitory) components with different Hill coefficients, suggesting existence of at least two peptide-binding sites with different affinities on the cell surface. CD spectroscopy confirmed that the peptides exhibit structural flexibility in solutions. Altogether, our data indicate that amphipathic CRAC-containing peptides derived from the viral M1 protein modulate lipid raft-dependent processes in IC-21 macrophages.
Laccase-Catalyzed Heterocoupling of Dihydroquercetin and p-Aminobenzoic Acid: Effect of the Reaction Product on Cultured Cells by M. E. Khlupova; O. V. Morozova; I. S. Vasil’eva; G. P. Shumakovich; N. V. Pashintseva; L. I. Kovalev; S. S. Shishkin; V. A. Chertkov; A. K. Shestakova; A. V. Kisin; A. I. Yaropolov (992-1001).
Derivatization of the natural flavonoid dihydroquercetin with p-aminobenzoic acid was carried out in an ethyl acetate/citric buffer biphasic system using laccase from the fungus Trametes hirsuta. The main reaction product yield was ~68 mol %. The product was characterized by 1H NMR, 13C NMR, and liquid chromatography-mass spectroscopy, and its structure was elucidated. The reaction product affected viability of cultured human rhabdomyosarcoma cells (RD cell line) in a dose-dependent manner and, therefore, can be of interest to pharmaceutical industry.
Effects of the Linear Fragments of Beta-(1→3)-Glucans on Cytokine Production in vitro by I. G. Akhapkina; A. B. Antropova; E. A. Akhmatov; T. M. Zheltikova (1002-1006).
Beta-glucans, homopolysaccharides composed of 3,6-branching β-(1→3)-D-glucan chains, attract great interest as inducers of cytokine synthesis. In this work, we studied the ability of linear fragments of beta-glucan chains to activate cytokine synthesis. Synthetic nona-β-(1→3)-D-glucoside (SO) representing a linear fragment of beta-glucan chain, endotoxin (ED), and natural β-(1→3)-D-glucan (GL) were tested for their role as inducers of cytokines in whole peripheral blood cultures collected from 17 individuals. The concentrations of IL-12p70, IFN-γ, IL-2, IL-10, IL-8, IL-6, IL-4, IL-5, IL-1β, TNF-α, and TNF-β were measured in the supernatants after 2, 24, and 48 h of cell culturing. SO, ED, and GL stim- ulated production of pro-inflammatory IFN-γ, IL-1β, IL-2, IL-6, IL-8, TNF-α and anti-inflammatory IL-10. The high- est levels of biosynthesis after stimulation with SO were registered for IL-6, IL-8, and TNF-α. SO stimulated production of all cytokines (except IFN-γ) to a lesser extent than ED and GL. The IFN-γ/IL-10 (Th1/Th2) ratios after 24 and 48 h of culturing were 3.1 and 7.5 for SO; 0.03 and 0.1 for GL; and 0.06 and 0.2 for ED, respectively. The results indicate that lin- ear fragments of beta-glucans cause a more pronounced shift of immune response towards the pro-inflammatory (Th1) type than beta-glucan itself.

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Data protection: Genealogia badenia e.K.
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STATE OF TENNESSEE and PAUL DeWITT, Defendants.
A prisoner bringing a civil action may be authorized to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application that he lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance, Plaintiff's application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted. Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full $350.00 filing fee, and so the fee will be assessed as directed in the accompanying Order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
The Court is required to conduct an initial review and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
To determine whether a prisoner's complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not, however, extend to allegations that consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff alleges that he has been wrongly accused and incarcerated for Crowley's murder, and asserts claims against the State of Tennessee and Paul DeWitt for defamation of character and false imprisonment. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) There is a cause of action for false imprisonment under § 1983 where a plaintiff can “prove that the [defendants] lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Garner v. Harrod, 656 F. App'x 755 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005)). In this circumstance, however, the Court must abstain from considering Plaintiff's claim due to the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).


Synopsis: Was It Partisan Politics for Governor Quinn to Fire All the IL WC Arbitrators and Reinstate Some Political Favorites? How Could It Not Be?
Editor’s comment: We recently saw a Chicago Sun-Times poll confirming what all of our readers should know—Governor Quinn has completely discarded any hope of being a “reform” candidate with a goal of giving independent and nonpartisan approach to Illinois taxpayers. If you aren’t sure, Gov. Quinn has been bought and paid for by state government unions, administrators, judges/justices and legislators who want to keep their “post-employment income” or what Illinoisans also call “pensions.” We assure our readers these “post-employment income” programs aren’t truly pensions as the vast majority of their money isn’t coming from contributions by the workers, matching money from government coffers and investment income. The vast majority of the money for these post-employment income programs are coming from multi-billion dollar borrowing that has to be paid by you and me and your kids and grandkids and probably great-great grandkids from our taxes/tolls and fees. In the same vein, all state government “pensioners” will now mooch free lifetime medical care from you and me—the IL Supreme Court just made that expensive multibillion dollar benefit untouchable by the legislature. Believe it or not, the free-loading pensioners fought and won so they don’t have to contribute even 2% of their pensions to share the cost of their healthcare with current taxpayers! We truly feel they have changed from “public servants” to make taxpayers their “private servants” as we now irrevocably owe IL government workers lifetime post-employment income and full healthcare coverage for the rest of their lives.
The media outlets have been looking at the complete and embarrassing mess that was made by the Quinn administration of a State of Illinois anti-violence program where lots of the administrators took the money that was supposed to go to neighborhoods to stop murders, mayhem and other violence. The other source of political bamboozling is the IL Dep’t of Transportation where lots of folks were given positions as “administrative aides” to allow them to get wholly political appointments for routine jobs in violation of the Shakman order which dictates only high-level jobs are supposed to be political.
How did Partisan Politics Hit the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission?
Well, when the Quinn Administration took over from Blago’s troops, there were a couple of interesting things happening at the good ole IWCC that started to make the news.
Perhaps the oddest thing former Arbitrator Carrill did was to file a workers’ compensation claim for benefits for herself. What she learned is the State of Illinois has a silly, unnecessary and unwritten “rule” requiring injured state employees to wait six months after settling a workers’ comp claim before getting paid. We assume some misguided state administrator made this “rule” up to push some of the settlements from this year into the next fiscal year. When former Arbitrator Carril learned of the six-month wait, she caused a ruckus and tried to use her influence to have the “rule” waived.
What the commotion over a wait of 180-days for this one Arbitrator was make lots of folks look to see several sitting Arbitrators had filed workers’ compensation claims and had either received settlements or were waiting out the six-month period. In our view, this put all IL Arbitrators under a microscope. Some folks also learned the state adjusters at CMS had also filed claims and gotten settlements. For some reason the foul odor only settled on the sitting Arbitrators and the CMS adjusters got a pass and kept their jobs.
As we indicate above, the Arbitrators came into the cross-hairs of the secret-powers-that-be-that-run-the-Commission and before we knew it, the Governor’s Office created a plan to not only fire all of them but strip out their civil service protection in the process! While our former Arbitrators would be allowed to “re-apply” for their jobs, it was clear an enormous and political house-cleaning was ongoing. Step one was to strip out civil service protections afforded the Arbitrators for several decades. This staggering and seminal change to the jobs of our Arbitrators was unprecedented and wholly unnecessary. The reason we say this is eleven or as many as twelve Arbitrators lost their jobs simply as political scapegoats—other than former Arbitrator Carril, no one has ever indicated why that many Arbitrators were suddenly ousted.
Having fired all Arbitrators in a swift and unexpected fashion, what Governor Quinn’s folks then did is perhaps the worst thing they could have done from the perspective of decent and good government—we were advised Governor Quinn’s staff forced every former Arbitrator who wanted to get their job back do a secret and slimy “patronage-check.” To our understanding, the folks who could demonstrate they had active and continuing political patrons who strongly supported Governor Quinn or were solidly protected by the other side were allowed to return to their posts. For example, one former Arbitrator we knew had a political patron that had passed away a year or two before the controversy arose—that former Arbitrator lost his position.
Another immediate disqualifying factor was any Arbitrator who, like former Arbitrator Carril had a pending or prior IL WC claim or settlement. Basically, Governor Quinn’s troops reached the conclusion retaliatory discharge for filing a WC claim that is prohibited in the Kelsay v. Motorola ruling didn’t apply to what were now political posts. To our understanding all the former Arbitrators with pending or prior WC claims were put in the “do-not-rehire” pile.
What then happened is several of the terminated former Arbitrators filed lawsuits and sued the Governor for their obvious mistreatment and those suits are all wending their way through our courts. One appellate ruling was just issued in the claim brought by former Arbitrator Peter Akemann and, without much surprise to anyone, denied him reinstatement to his position. In our view, former Arbitrator Akemann was a quiet, honest and decent man who did his job for both sides and worked hard for our state. His brother David Akemann is a sitting Circuit Court judge. We consider both of them to be above reproach and great jurists. We feel the mistreatment of former Arbitrator Peter Akemann by the current administration to be the worst sort of partisan politics.
The concerns we raise in response to these decisions are two-fold.
First, we want our readers to understand our view IL WC Arbitrators can’t and should never be political appointees but under Governor Quinn, they now are. Instead of reforming the positions, he has politicized them. The reason IL WC Arbitrators had civil service protections was to insure they wouldn’t be subject to the whims of the party in power. One of the worst things an IL WC Arbitrator faces is listening to and considering the evidence and making a determination for one side or the other and then getting summarily fired because their honest and fair decision upset a powerful lawyer or union boss. Arbitrators aren’t supposed to work at the whim of their parties litigant.
Please also note the IL WC system has an administrative appeal process that allows the Arbitrator’s ruling to quickly be brought before an openly political group—the three-member IWCC panel reviews the Arbitrator’s decision in a “de novo” appeal. The Commission panel is composed of a member of IL labor, management and one member that is supposed to represent “the public.” We feel this is a strong system for adjudicating questionable WC issues.
Second, the other problem with the humiliating challenge and sudden ouster of many of to our former Arbitrators targeted the wrong people. We assure our readers, the problem wasn’t with the Arbitrator staff—the issue should have been the mismanagement of claims by the Central Management Services state agency who was charged with actual management of all IL state workers’ comp claims. We understand lots of state claims adjusters also brought WC claims to get settlements for themselves—unlike the Arbitrators, the adjusters weren’t summarily canned.
The CMS agency has been criticized by Attorney General Lisa Madigan and State Auditor William Holland. The agency has not gotten any better under Governor Quinn. It remains something of an hilarious mess—for one example, a large State institution in Chicago is still being “defended” or represented by a prominent Plaintiff attorney. That defense work hasn’t been put out to bid for more than a decade.
We were also advised at one point, CMS or Central Management Services had about 25,000 pending IL WC claims with only a handful of adjusters to keep watch over your money in paying out WC benefits to State workers. The analogy we draw to that mismanagement model is a prison with 10,000 prisoners and three guards—the managers can proudly confirm how much they are saving on payroll and benefits for the guards but the real costs are stopping the hundreds of jailbreaks and hunting down all the prisoners who are escaping. In the same way, state government workers and their legal counsels were making zillions of dollars on questionable WC claims because of the cacophony and confusion caused by this understaffed agency.
That group was and still is misspending $150M or more a year on IL state workers with WC claims in a comical fashion. We feel no state dumps as much money into workers comp benefits than our state on a pro rata basis. For another example, we assure our readers there may be over a thousand state workers who have been adjudicated “odd-lot” total and permanent disability recipients—all of them could be returned to work, if the State would simply locate jobs in other agencies for them. In our view, the mismanagement of state claims by this agency poisoned many claims arising in the private sector. Another hilarious part of the mishandling of your tax dollars by CMS was their WC claims computer database was hilariously out of date and was thirty-forty years old. Basically, if you asked the adjuster for any data or information about what they were doing or spending, you would be advised they didn’t have the staff to go through all the paperwork to figure out how to answer you.
What they Quinn administration did to “deform” this issue was quickly and quietly issue an RFP or request for proposal to obtain an outside claim service to come in and try to make sense of the tens of thousands of pending and questionable IL WC claims. Rather than select an IL claims management company, Quinn’s folks selected TriStar Risk Management out of California. To our understanding TriStar is doing their best with the onerous task they have been given. Another issue is sometimes they have money to pay vendors and claims and sometimes they don’t. Finally, to heighten the level of mismanagement of IL state government workers comp claims handling, the State didn’t terminate the CMS adjusters who previously handled the claims when they were replaced by TriStar, There is now an ongoing tug-of-war over who is in charge of the whole mess.
We do feel the Quinn administration did make the IWCC more professional and things have gotten dramatically fairer for all sides. We don’t feel the Arbitrators who were let go were given a fair chance and we hope sitting Arbitrators are allowed to do their jobs as they see fit.. We also hope someone again takes a long hard and open look at CMS and TriStar to see if that combination is working and much more effectively handling WC claims by state workers.
Synopsis: Prior Comments May Be Background Evidence Demonstrating Racial Animus. Analysis by our Employment Law Defense Leader Bradley J. Smith, JD.
Editor’s Comment: In Macias v. Bakersfield Restaurant, LLC, No. 13-cv-4300, 2014 WL 4057449 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2014). On May 28, 2014, Northern District of Illinois Judge Ruben Castillo denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as 1) a 42 U.S.C § 1981 claim for racial harassment would not be inferred, and 2) a supervisor’s comments could be considered as background evidence.
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Defendant alleging national origin and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and retaliatory discharge in violation of state law. Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was “treated less favorably than” non-Ecuadorian and non-Hispanic individuals in his work environment despite meeting the legitimate expectations of his employer and performing his job well. Additionally, Plaintiff alleged during his employment, he was subjected to several race and national origin related comments by his supervisor. Those comments allegedly included: (a) “Mexicans are dirty to work with”; (b) “You Mexicans stink!”; (c) “You  Mexicans are stupid”; and (d) “ Mexicans!” Additionally, Plaintiff claims his iPhone went missing. Eventually, after numerous complaints, Plaintiff found his iPhone in his supervisor’s vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleged he was terminated without an explanation and without being subjected to any formal discipline.
On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff amended his complaint on August 30, 2013. Particularly, in Count I, Plaintiff alleged national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII; and in Count II, Plaintiff alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and Section 1981. Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Initially, the Court declined to treat the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment in order to consider documents Defendant attached to its motion. Next, Defendant argued Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as Plaintiff intended to bring a claim for racial harassment, which Defendant contended exceeded the scope of his EEOC charge allegations. Instead, the Court declined to accept Defendant’s argument, and consequently, the Motion to Dismiss was denied as Plaintiff properly exhausted his national origin and racial discrimination claims before the EEOC. Thus, Judge Castillo declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for national origin and racial discrimination.
Unavailingly, Defendant also argued Plaintiff should not be allowed to use the aforementioned comments in his complaint because background evidence is permitted only when a “current practice” is at issue, and Plaintiff’s dismissal was not a current practice. However, Judge Castillo reviewed Seventh Circuit law that interpreted Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 (2002), to mean where “the plaintiff timely alleged a discrete discriminatory act …, acts outside of the statutory time frame may be used to support that claim.” Accordingly, Judge Castillo determined the comments Plaintiff included in his amended complaint served to illuminate the discriminatory conduct by indicating his supervisor’s racial animus. Therefore, Judge Castillo denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety.
We recommend you always engage in a thorough investigation of racially charged comments in the workplace. It is even more essential to investigate allegations of racial comments when a supervisor with the ability to hire and fire employees is alleged as the perpetrator. Not doing so may subject you and your company to numerous discrimination claims as racial comments demonstrate animus in a supervisor’s tangible employment decisions. An investigation will allow for any necessary discipline and will also shield a legitimate decision of no discipline.
This article was researched and written by Bradley J. Smith, JD. Bradley can be reached with any of your employment law and general liability issues at bsmith@keefe-law.com.
Synopsis: Are the “Tubes-of-Drugs” About Patient Care or Making Money?
Editor’s comment: We received a question and comment from a long-time reader who inquired about what steps should be taken when you see doctors and other healthcare givers prescribing tubes of compound “pain creams” at a gigantic mark-up. These tubes full of narcotics and other sorts of snake oil can cost as much as $1,000 a piece! We assume they provide the patient a major kick for your money.
· Utilization review or UR—we recommend Genex or CID Management to quickly and rapidly get all medical care and prescriptions reviewed and analyzed in your claims.
· IMEs or Independent Medical Examinations to get a top-notch Pro from Dover to review the patient’s chart and opine about the course of care and prescriptions—if you need recommendations on an IME expert, send a reply and we can provide our KCB&A expert list or contact Chris Rocks at Woodlake Medical for his top docs.
· Having medical and prescriptions priced and processed under the IL WC Medical Fee Schedule—we have a coding expert who can provide assistance if you need it; simply send a reply with questions or concerns.
· Implementing an IL WC PPP is another strong method to control your workers’ comp costs in our state—if you go this route, you limit your workers “choice of physician to either the PPP doc or one other choice outside the PPP. Two great sources for information and enrollment into an IL WC PPP is Darren Stahulak of CorVel or David Kolb of HFN, Inc.
· Last but not least, if you need aggressive defense counsel to analyze and devise defenses at the IWCC that work, send a reply for the KCB&A defense member in your area.


D.C. Law Library - Subchapter VII. Dissolution and Winding up.
(3) State that a claim against the company is barred unless an action to enforce the claim is commenced within 3 years after publication of the notice.
(3) A claimant whose claim is contingent at, or based on an event occurring after, the effective date of dissolution.
(2) If assets of the company have been distributed after dissolution, against a member or transferee to the extent of that person’s proportionate share of the claim or of the assets distributed to the member or transferee after dissolution, whichever is less, but a person’s total liability for all claims under this paragraph shall not exceed the total amount of assets distributed to the person after dissolution.
This section is referenced in § 29-804.05 and § 29-807.07.
The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-210 substituted “this section or § 29-807.03” for “this section” in (d).
Uniform Law: This section is based on § 704 of the Uniform Limited Company Act (2006 Act).
(a) A dissolved limited liability company that has published a notice under § 29-807.04 may file an application with the Superior Court, or, if the principal office is not located in the District, in an appropriate court where the company’s principal office is located, for a determination of the amount and form of security to be provided for payment of claims that are contingent, have not been made known to the company, or are based on an event occurring after the effective date of dissolution but which, based on the facts known to the dissolved company, are reasonably expected to arise after the effective date of dissolution. Security is not required for any claim that is or is reasonably anticipated to be barred under § 29-807.04(c).
(b) Not later than 10 days after the filing of an application under subsection (a) of this section, the dissolved limited liability company shall give notice of the proceeding to each claimant holding a contingent claim known to the company.
(c) In any proceeding under this section, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent all claimants whose identities are unknown. The reasonable fees and expenses of the guardian, including all reasonable expert witness fees, must be paid by the dissolved limited liability company.
(d) A dissolved limited liability company that provides security in the amount and form ordered by the court under subsection (a) of this subsection satisfies the company’s obligations with respect to claims that are contingent, have not been made known to the company, or are based on an event occurring after the effective date of dissolution. Such claims may not be enforced against a member or transferee that received assets in liquidation.
This section is referenced in § 29-804.05.


text:
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and Michael F.
of Virginia, sitting by designation.
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Thacker joined.
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
for tax years 1993 through 2000.
be without merit, we affirm.
operational director, and officer of ALQI.
Smekhova had a written employment contract with ALQI.
Banque Indosuez (the ALQI accounts).
authority over the ALQI accounts.
agreements documenting the services rendered.
ALQI or its Swiss accounts.
the Swiss government froze the ALQI accounts.
he paid the additional tax due.
disclose his interest in the ALQI accounts.
Williams, No. 10-2230, 2012 WL 2948569 (4th Cir. July 20, 2012).
guilty plea to both counts.
to pay $3,512,000 in restitution.
federal custody on May 21, 2006.
on or before such time as the art was donated to charity.
packaging, shipping, and storage costs.
required holding period of one (1) year.
Abbey Art ultimately had the discretion to choose the donee.
interpreted under New York law.
this Agreement, is not a party to this case.
charitable contribution deduction of $425,625.
University for the current tax year.
this letter a check in the amount of $57,500.
Williams request prior to the end of the year.
of the art as a charitable contribution deduction.
appraised value of $98,900 to Drexel University.
issued a notice of tax deficiency to Williams.
report this income on his tax returns.
civil tax fraud during each of the years 1993 through 2000.
Williams v. Commr, No. 2202-08, 2009 WL 1033354 (U.S. Tax Ct.
not hold the art for more than one year before donating it.
1518581 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 21, 2011).
McHan v. Commr, 558 F.3d 326, 332 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
McHan, 558 F.3d at 331 (quoting Collins v.
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).
fraud when convicted for criminal tax evasion under 18 U.S.C.
7201 for the same taxable year.
bears the burden of proving civil tax fraud.
Moore, 360 F.2d at 356.
liability for the years 1993 through 2000.
return satisfies the elements of evasion of assessment.
of deficiency, or for any particular year therein.
argument before the Tax Court.
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985)).
and we see no reason to do so.
and every one of these years.
or causing debts to be paid through and in the name of others.
and causing to be filed, false and fraudulent U.S.
(Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201).
conspiracy to defraud the government in violation of 18 U.S.C.
the ALQI accounts were taxable to him.
Blohm v. Commr, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.
necessarily decided by the court in his criminal case.
negotiation rather than a full review of the facts.
no briefs were filed, and no hearings were held.
deficiencies for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945.
pleading guilty before a final figure had been determined.
required to secure a criminal conviction for tax evasion.
indeed convicted of evasion for the years in question.
of fraud in [a] civil proceeding to determine tax liability.
committed tax fraud in each of those eight years.
of collateral estoppel in this case.
companys behalf when he earned the consulting fees at issue.
is basic to our system of income taxation.
(unpublished table decision); see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
recognizing the corporations controlling position.
T.C. at 611 (citing Johnson v. Commr, 78 T.C. 882, 891 (1982)).
No such employer-employee relationship exists here.
any form of control over Williams as an employee.
question and merely used ALQI as a bank account.
Williams, 2011 WL 1518581, at *14.
follow that the consulting fee income is taxable to ALQI.
its corporate existence should be ignored as fictitious.
apart from serving as Williams bank account.
during the years 1993 to 2000.
determination is arbitrary or erroneous.
rebutted the presumption in this case.
deduction of the arts fair market value.
of the parties and the plain language of the Agreement.
reasons that follow, we find Williams arguments unavailing.
contribution for which payment is made within the taxable year.
consulting fee income were attributable to ALQI.
time the donation is made.
determined as of the time of the contribution.
the amount of the fair market value of the donated property.
See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commr, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
in question for more than one year before donating it.
common understanding to hold property is to own it.
own or hold one must acquire.
cite United States v. Heller, 866 F.2d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir.
only to generate a tax savings.
and not the form by which it is masked.
per the terms of the Agreement.
472 U.S. at 722 (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S.
the primary concern in the instant case.
deduction is limited to his basis in the donated art.
$3,600 up front, Williams purchased an option to buy art.
prior to their identification to the contract, id. at 2401(1).
time or place. . . .
Kaplan v. Lippman, 75 N.Y.2d 320, 324 (1990).
optionee is free to accept or reject the terms of the option.
to exercise the option in accordance with the agreement.
Agreement in 1996, and delivery was not made.
in question was not even identified in the Agreement.
representations, oral or otherwise, of any nature whatsoever.
but at no specified time.
completing all the necessary paperwork.
art, Abbey Art bore the risk of loss.
the agreement is $72,000, which is 24% of $300,000.
Agreement contemplates $300,000 worth of art would be purchased.
made ($425,625) far exceeded that amount.
art, however, and that issue is not before us.
and acquired a present interest in the art.
this occurred less than one year from the date of his donation.
donation to Florida International University in December 1999.
December of that same year.
contribution deduction is limited to his basis in the art.
Commissioners notice of deficiency is erroneous, we affirm.

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text:
The objection, founded on Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487 , and cases there cited, that this Court has no appellate jurisdiction of the present case, because there is nothing in dispute the value of which can be estimated in money, cannot be sustained. The matter in dispute is whether the petitioner is subject to a prosecution which may end in a sentence dismissing him from the service, and depriving him of a salary, as paymaster general during the residue of his term as such, and as pay inspector afterwards, which in less than two years would exceed the sum of $5,000. Rev.Stat. §§ 1556, 1565, 1624, arts. 8, 22, 48, 53. The case cannot be distinguished in principle from those in which it has been held that a judgment awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus to admit one to an office, or a judgment of ouster from an office, might be reviewed by this Court upon writ of error, if the salary during the term of the office would exceed the sum named in the statute defining its appellate jurisdiction. Columbian Ins. Co. v. Wheelright, 7 Wheat. 534; United States v. Addison, 22 How. 174.
re Forster, 4 B. & S. 187, 199; Mayor, &c.;, of London v. Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 239, 280; Worthington v. Jeffries, L.R. 10 C.P. 379, 380; Chambers v. Green, L.R. 20 Eq. 552, 555. See also Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, reversing on error S.C., Harper 340.
jurisdiction of the matter complained of," is a general judgment dismissing the petition, with costs, which could not have been awarded upon a judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 , 112 U. S. 98 . The writ of error brings in question the judgment, not the opinion, of the court below. If the petition was rightly dismissed for any reason, whether because that court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to a court-martial, or because the court-martial had jurisdiction of the charges against the petitioner, the judgment must be affirmed.
A writ of prohibition is never to be issued unless it clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction. It cannot be made to serve the purpose of a writ of error or certiorari, to correct mistakes of that court in deciding any question of law or fact within its jurisdiction. These rules have been always adhered to by this Court, in the exercise of the power expressly conferred upon it by Congress to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts sitting as courts of admiralty; United States v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121; Ex Parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68 ; Ex Parte Gordon, 104 U. S. 515 ; Ex Parte Ferry Co., 104 U. S. 519 ; Ex Parte Pennsylvania, 109 U. S. 174 ; as well as by the court of England and of the several states in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition to courts-martial. Grant v. Gould, 2 H.Bl. 69; State v. Wakely, 2 Nott & McCord 410; State v. Stevens, 2 McCord 32; Washburn v. Phillips, 2 Met. 296.
And this Court, although the question of issuing a writ of prohibition to a court-martial has not come before it for direct adjudication, has repeatedly recognized the general rule that the acts of a court-martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts by writ of prohibition or otherwise. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 61 U. S. 82 -83; Ex Parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 ; Ex Parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696 ; Keyes v. United States, 109 U. S. 336 ; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564 , 114 U. S. 570 ; Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487 , 115 U. S. 500 . See also Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331; Meade v. Deputy Marshal of Virginia, 1 Brock. 324; In re Bogart, 2 Sawyer 396; In re White, 17 F. 723; Barrett v. Hopkins, 7 F. 312.
Porret's Case, Perry's Orient Cases 414, 419. So in Martin v. Nott, 12 Wheat. 19, 25 U. S. 35 , Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of this Court, said that the law by which courts-martial were bound to execute their duties, and to regulate their mode of proceeding, in the absence of positive enactments, was "the general usage of the military service, or what may not unfitly be called the customary military law." The same view, as regarding naval courts-martial, was asserted and acted on by this Court Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 61 U. S. 82 .
This legislative recognition of the Navy Regulations of 1870 "must," as was said by Chief Justice Marshall of a similar recognition of the Army Regulations in the Act of April 24, 1816, c. 69, § 9, 3 Stat. 298, "be understood as giving to these regulations the sanction of the law." United States v Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 105; Ex Parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 .
20 How. 61 U. S. 82 .
This being the first case of an application to a court of the United States for a writ of prohibition to a court-martial, we have cited the authorities bearing upon the subject more fully than might have been thought fit under other circumstances. It is hardly necessary to add that by the Navy Regulations of 1870, §§ 260-265, the court-martial could only be dissolved by the Secretary of the Navy, and might at any time before he had dissolved it, be lawfully reconvened by him to reconsider its proceedings. Ex Parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 .

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§ 9


the systematic preventative maintenance of bridges, and replacement and rehabilitation of deficient bridges, should be undertaken through an overall asset management approach to transportation investment.
to ensure connectivity and access for residents of rural areas of the United States through strategic investments in National Highway System bridges and bridges on all public roads.
determine the cost of replacing each structurally deficient bridge identified under this subsection with a comparable facility or the cost of rehabilitating the bridge.
Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the General Bridge Act of 1946 (33 U.S.C. 525 et seq.) shall apply to bridges authorized to be replaced, in whole or in part, by this title.
if tidal, used only by recreational boating, fishing, and other small vessels that are less than 21 feet in length.
submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate a report on the inventories.
Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of the MAP–21, each State and appropriate Federal agency shall report element level data to the Secretary, as each bridge is inspected pursuant to this section, for all highway bridges on the National Highway System.
The Secretary shall provide guidance to States and Federal agencies for implementation of this subsection, while respecting the existing inspection schedule of each State.
submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate a report on the results of the study.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any bridge that is owned and operated by an agency that does not have taxing powers and whose functions include operating a federally assisted public transit system subsidized by toll revenues shall be eligible for assistance under this title, but the amount of such assistance shall in no event exceed the cumulative amount which such agency has expended for capital and operating costs to subsidize such transit system.
Before authorizing an expenditure of funds under this subsection, the Secretary shall determine that the applicant agency has insufficient reserves, surpluses, and projected revenues (over and above those required for bridge and transit capital and operating costs) to fund the bridge project or activity eligible for assistance under this title.
Any non-Federal funds expended for the seismic retrofit of the bridge may be credited toward the non-Federal share required as a condition of receipt of any Federal funds for seismic retrofit of the bridge made available after the date of the expenditure.
any road bridge that is rendered obsolete as a result of a Corps of Engineers flood control or channelization project and is not rebuilt with funds from the Corps of Engineers.
The Federal share payable on any bridge construction carried out under paragraph (1) shall be 80 percent of the cost of the construction.
In this subsection, the term “historic bridge” means any bridge that is listed on, or eligible for listing on, the National Register of Historic Places.
The Secretary shall, in cooperation with the States, encourage the retention, rehabilitation, adaptive reuse, and future study of historic bridges.
The Secretary shall require each State to complete an inventory of all bridges on and off Federal-aid highways to determine the historic significance of the bridges.
Subject to subparagraph (B), reasonable costs associated with actions to preserve, or reduce the impact of a project under this chapter on, the historic integrity of a historic bridge shall be eligible as reimbursable project costs under section 133 if the load capacity and safety features of the historic bridge are adequate to serve the intended use for the life of the historic bridge.
In the case of a historic bridge that is no longer used for motorized vehicular traffic, the costs eligible as reimbursable project costs pursuant to this chapter shall not exceed the estimated cost of demolition of the historic bridge.
to assume all future legal and financial responsibility for the historic bridge, which may include an agreement to hold the State transportation department harmless in any liability action.
Costs incurred by the State to preserve a historic bridge (including funds made available to the State, locality, or private entity to enable it to accept the bridge) shall be eligible as reimbursable project costs under this chapter in an amount not to exceed the cost of demolition.
Any bridge preserved pursuant to this paragraph shall not be eligible for any other funds authorized pursuant to this title.
The Secretary shall establish and maintain inspection standards for the proper inspection and evaluation of all highway bridges and tunnels for safety and serviceability.
The standards under this subsection shall be designed to ensure uniformity of the inspections and evaluations.
establish a procedure for national certification of highway bridge inspectors and tunnel inspectors.
monitoring activities and corrective actions taken in response to a critical finding described in clause (i).
The Secretary shall annually review State compliance with the standards established under this section.
resolving the issues of noncompliance not later than 45 days after the date of notification.
If a State fails to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (4)(B) by August 1 of the calendar year following the year of a finding of noncompliance, the Secretary shall, on October 1 of that year, and each year thereafter as may be necessary, require the State to dedicate funds apportioned to the State under sections 119 and 133 after the date of enactment of the MAP–21 to correct the noncompliance with the minimum inspection standards established under this subsection.
require approval by the Secretary.
In carrying out the revisions required by paragraph (6), the Secretary shall consider a risk-based approach to determining the frequency of bridge inspections.
The Secretary, in cooperation with the State transportation departments, shall maintain a program designed to train appropriate personnel to carry out highway bridge and tunnel inspections.
The training program shall be revised from time to time to take into account new and improved techniques.
The purpose of this subsection is to save costs and time by encouraging States to bundle multiple bridge projects as 1 project.
In this subsection, the term “eligible entity” means an entity eligible to carry out a bridge project under section 119 or 133.
awarded to a single contractor or consultant pursuant to a contract for engineering and design or construction between the contractor and an eligible entity.
The provisions of section 102(b) do not apply to projects carried out under this subsection.
a Federal agency may use funds made available to the agency under section 503.
The date of enactment of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, referred to in subsec. (a)(1)(A), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 105–178, which was approved June 9, 1998.
The General Bridge Act of 1946, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), is title V of act Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 847, which is classified generally to subchapter III (§ 525 et seq.) of chapter 11 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 525 of Title 33 and Tables.
The date of enactment of the MAP–21, referred to in subsecs. (d)(2) and (h)(5)(A), (6), is deemed to be Oct. 1, 2012, see section 3(a), (b) of Pub. L. 112–141, set out as Effective and Termination Dates of 2012 Amendment notes under section 101 of this title.
2015—Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 114–94, § 1111(1), substituted “the natural condition of the water” for “the natural condition of the bridge”.
Subsecs. (j), (k). Pub. L. 114–94, § 1111(2), (3), added subsec. (j) and redesignated former subsec. (j) as (k).
Subsec. (k)(2). Pub. L. 114–94, § 1111(4), substituted “104(b)(2)” for “104(b)(3)”.
2012—Pub. L. 112–141 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section related to highway bridge program.
2008—Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(A), struck out “replacement and rehabilitation” after “Highway bridge” in section catchline.
Subsecs. (b)(1), (c)(1)(1). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(B), substituted “Federal-aid highway” for “Federal-aid system”.
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(C), substituted “Federal-aid highways” for “the Federal-aid system”.
Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(D), inserted “systematic” before “preventive” in heading.
Subsec. (e)(1), (2). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(B), substituted “Federal-aid highway” for “Federal-aid system”.
Subsec. (e)(3), (4). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(E), substituted “bridges not on Federal-aid highways” for “off-system bridges”.
Subsec. (f)(1)(A)(vi). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(H), inserted “and the removal of the Missisquoi Bay causeway” after “Bridge”.
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(I), inserted heading and struck out former heading “Off-system bridges”.
Subsecs. (g) to (l). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(G), redesignated subsecs. (h) to (m) as (g) to (l), respectively. Former subsec. (g) redesignated (f).
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(G), (J), redesignated subsec. (n) as (m), inserted heading, and struck out former heading “Off-System Bridge Program”. Former subsec. (m) redesignated (l).
Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(G), redesignated subsec. (o) as (n). Former subsec. (n) redesignated (m).
Subsec. (n)(4)(B). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(K), substituted “State transportation department” for “State highway agency”.
Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(G), redesignated subsec. (p) as (o). Former subsec. (o) redesignated (n).
Subsec. (o)(2). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(C), substituted “Federal-aid highways” for “the Federal-aid system”.
Subsecs. (p) to (s). Pub. L. 110–244, § 101(m)(1)(G), redesignated subsecs. (p) to (s) as (o) to (r), respectively.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(b), inserted heading and amended text of subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, text related to approval of Federal participation in replacement or rehabilitation of bridges.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(c), in third sentence, substituted “deck area” for “square footage”, in fourth sentence, struck out “the total cost of deficient bridges in a State and in all States shall be reduced by the total cost of any highway bridges constructed under subsection (m) in such State, relating to replacement of destroyed bridges and ferryboat services, and,” after “For purposes of the preceding sentence,”, and, in seventh sentence, substituted “for the period specified in section 118(b)(2)” for “for the same period as funds apportioned for projects on the Federal-aid primary system under this title”.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(e)(2)(A), substituted “Bridge Set-asides” for “Set Asides” in heading.
Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(e)(2)(A), added par. (1) and struck out heading and text of former par. (1), which related to apportionments for the discretionary bridge program for fiscal years 1992 through 2005.
Subsec. (g)(1)(C). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(e)(1), substituted “2005” for “2003” in heading and text.
Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(e)(2)(C), redesignated par. (3) as (2).
Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(e)(2)(C), redesignated par. (3) as (2).
Pub. L. 109–40 substituted “July 30” for “July 27”.
Pub. L. 109–37 substituted “July 27” for “July 21”.
Pub. L. 109–35 substituted “July 21” for “July 19”.
Pub. L. 109–20 substituted “July 19” for “June 30”.
Pub. L. 109–14 substituted “June 30” for “May 31”.
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(g), struck out “at the same time as the report required by section 307(f) of this title is submitted to Congress” after “biennially” in concluding provisions.
Subsecs. (r), (s). Pub. L. 109–59, § 1114(f), added subsecs. (r) and (s).
2004—Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 108–310 inserted “and in the period of October 1, 2004, through May 31, 2005,” after “2004”.
Pub. L. 108–280 substituted “2004” for “2003 and in the period of October 1, 2003, through July 31, 2004,”.
Pub. L. 108–263 substituted “July 31” for “June 30”.
Pub. L. 108–224 substituted “June 30” for “April 30”.
Pub. L. 108–202 substituted “April 30” for “February 29”.
2003—Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 108–88 inserted “and in the period of October 1, 2003, through February 29, 2004,” after “2003”.
1998—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 105–178, § 1109(d)(1), (2), inserted “, sodium acetate/formate, or other environmentally acceptable, minimally corrosive anti-icing and de-icing compositions or installing scour countermeasures” after “magnesium acetate” and inserted “or sodium acetate/formate or such anti-icing or de-icing composition or installation of such countermeasures” after “such acetate” in two places.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 105–178, § 1109(a), inserted “, and, if a State transfers funds apportioned to the State under this section in a fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1997, to any other apportionment of funds to such State under this title, the total cost of deficient bridges in such State and in all States to be determined for the succeeding fiscal year shall be reduced by the amount of such transferred funds” after “destroyed bridges and ferryboat services”.
Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 105–178, § 1109(b), designated existing provisions as subpar. (A), inserted heading, realigned margins, and added subpars. (B) and (C).
Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 105–178, § 1109(c), (d)(3), substituted “through 2003” for “1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997,”, substituted “Federal-aid highway” for “Federal-aid system” in two places, and inserted “, sodium acetate/formate, or other environmentally acceptable, minimally corrosive anti-icing and de-icing compositions or install scour countermeasures” after “magnesium acetate”.
Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 105–178, § 1109(e), substituted “Federal-aid highway” for “Federal-aid system”.
1995—Subsec. (i)(1). Pub. L. 104–59, § 325(b), substituted “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure” for “Committee on Public Works and Transportation”.
1994—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 103–220, § 1(1), inserted before period at end of third sentence “, except that a State may carry out a project for seismic retrofit of a bridge under this section without regard to whether the bridge is eligible for replacement or rehabilitation under this section”.
1991—Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(a), added par. (3).
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(b), inserted “Whenever any State makes application to the Secretary for assistance in painting and seismic retrofit, or applying calcium magnesium acetate to, the structure of a highway bridge, the Secretary may approve Federal participation in the painting or seismic retrofit of, or application of such acetate to, such structure.” after first sentence and “(other than projects for bridge structure painting or seismic retrofit or application of such acetate)” after “projects” in last sentence.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(c), substituted “project” for “highway bridge replaced or rehabilitated”.
Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(e)(1), substituted “1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997” for “and 1991” and “, rehabilitate, paint or seismic retrofit, or apply calcium magnesium acetate to” for “or rehabilitate”.
Subsec. (g)(4). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(f), added par. (4).
Subsecs. (p), (q). Pub. L. 102–240, § 1028(e)(2), added subsec. (p) and redesignated former subsec. (p) as (q).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(a), amended subsec. (g) generally, revising and restating as pars. (1) to (3) provisions formerly contained in pars. (1) and (2).
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(b), substituted “(1)” for “which are not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and” and added cl. (2).
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 100–17, § 128, substituted “307(f)” for “307(e)” in last sentence.
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(d)(1), added subsec. (m). Former subsec. (m) redesignated (p).
Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(e), which directed that this section be amended by adding subsec. (n) after subsec. (l), was executed by adding subsec. (n) after subsec. (m), to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(f)(2), which directed that this section be amended by adding subsec. (o) after subsec. (l), was executed by adding subsec. (o) after subsec. (n), to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsec. (p). Pub. L. 100–17, § 123(d)(1), redesignated former subsec. (m) as (p).
1983—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 97–424, § 121(a), substituted provisions setting forth categorization, formula for apportionment factors, and limitations respecting deficient bridges for provisions relating to apportionment of funds for fiscal years ending Sept. 30, 1979, through Sept. 30, 1983, availability for expenditure of such funds, and reapportionment by the Secretary.
Pub. L. 97–327, § 5(c)(1), substituted “September 30, 1982, and September 30, 1983” for “and September 30, 1982”.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 97–424, § 122(a), designated existing provisions as par. (1), struck out provisions added by section 5(c)(2) of Pub. L. 97–327 relating to apportionment of amounts for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1983, and added par. (2).
Pub. L. 97–327, § 5(c)(2), inserted provision that, of the amount authorized for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, by paragraph (1) of section 5(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1982, all but $200,000,000 (multiplied by the factor determined under section 4(a) of such Act) be apportioned, and that $200,000,000 (multiplied by such factor) of the amount authorized for such fiscal year be available for obligation on the date of each such apportionment in the same manner and to the same extent as the sums apportioned on such date with specific limitations applicable to the obligation of such $200,000,000.
1979—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 96–106, § 7(a), substituted “such bridge with a comparable facility or in rehabilitating such bridge” for “or rehabilitating such bridge with a comparable facility”.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 96–106, § 8(a), inserted “, and for any project for a highway bridge the replacement or rehabilitation costs of which is less than $10,000,000 if such costs is at least twice the amount apportioned to the State in which such bridge is located under subsection (e) of this section for the fiscal year in which application is made for a grant for such bridge”.
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 96–106, § 7(b), substituted “major work” for “major repairs”.
1978—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–599 substituted provisions relating to Congressional findings as to highway bridge replacement and rehabilitation for provisions relating to Congressional findings as to special bridge replacement.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–599 added cl. (4).
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 95–599 added subsec. (c). Former subsec. (c) redesignated (d).
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 95–599 redesignated former subsec. (c) as (d) and among other amendments struck out provisions requiring Secretary to consider economy of area and approval of projects without regard to allocation formulas under this title.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 95–599 added subsec. (e). Former subsec. (e) redesignated (g).
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 95–599 redesignated former subsec. (d) as (f), substituted “80” for “75”, and inserted “highway” after “account of any”. Former subsec. (f) was struck out.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 95–599 redesignated former subsec. (e) as (g) and inserted provisions authorizing appropriations for fiscal years ending Sept. 30, 1979 through Sept. 30, 1982. Former subsec. (g) redesignated (h).
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 95–599 redesignated former subsec. (g) as (h) and inserted provisions relating to exceptions to applications of the General Bridge Act of 1946. Former subsec. (h) redesignated (i).
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 95–599 redesignated former subsec. (h) as (i) and inserted provisions relating to revision and report of current inventories.
Subsecs. (j) to (m). Pub. L. 95–599 added subsecs. (j) to (m).
1975—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 93–643 increased appropriations authorization to $125,000,000 from $75,000,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1976.
1973—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 93–87, § 204(a), provided for appropriations authorization of $25,000,000, $75,000,000, and $75,000,000 for fiscal years ending June 30, 1974, 1975, and 1976.
Subsecs. (f) to (h). Pub. L. 93–87, § 204(b), (c), added subsec. (f) and redesignated former subsecs. (f) and (g) as (g) and (h), respectively.
Pub. L. 109–59, title I, § 1114(e)(2), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1174, provided that the amendment made by section 1114(e)(2) is effective Oct. 1, 2005.
For termination, effective May 15, 2000, of reporting provisions in subsec. (h)(1), (3), and (4) of this section, see section 3003 of Pub. L. 104–66, as amended, set out as a note under section 1113 of Title 31, Money and Finance, and page 135 of House Document No. 103–7.
Pub. L. 109–59, title I, § 1804, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1458, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to make grants to States that submitted applications to the Secretary that demonstrated a need for assistance in carrying out one or more historic covered bridge projects, was repealed by Pub. L. 112–141, div. A, title I, § 1519(b)(2), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 575.
Pub. L. 105–178, title I, § 1224, as added by Pub. L. 105–206, title IX, § 9003(a), July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 837, directed the Secretary of Transportation to make grants to States that submitted applications to the Secretary that demonstrated a need for assistance in carrying out one or more historic covered bridge projects and authorized appropriations for fiscal years 1999 through 2003.
Any State that demolishes a bridge or an overpass that is eligible for Federal assistance under the national highway performance program under section 119 of title 23, United States Code, is directed to first make the debris from the demolition of such bridge or overpass available for beneficial use by a Federal, State, or local government, unless such use obstructs navigation.
assume all future legal responsibility arising from the placement of the debris, which may include entering into an agreement to hold the owner of the demolished bridge or overpass harmless in any liability action.
Pub. L. 102–240, title I, § 1039, Dec. 18, 1991, 105 Stat. 1990, as amended by Pub. L. 102–388, title IV, § 408, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1564, authorized the Secretary to make grants to entities for research and construction of timber bridges and other timber highway structures and authorized appropriations for fiscal years 1992 to 1997.
Pub. L. 102–240, title I, § 1089, Dec. 18, 1991, 105 Stat. 2023, directed Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study of advisability and feasibility of establishing an international border highway infrastructure discretionary program and, not later than Sept. 30, 1993, transmit to Congress a report on results of the study, together with any recommendations.
Pub. L. 100–17, title I, § 123(f)(3), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 163, provided for a study and recommendations by the Transportation Research Board on the preservation and rehabilitation of historic bridges and required the Board to submit a report on the study and recommendations.
Pub. L. 100–17, title I, § 160, Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 212, directed Secretary to conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of improvement and maintenance needs for highway bridges which cross rail lines and whose ownership has been disputed and, not later than 30 months after Apr. 2, 1987, submit to Congress a report on the study and investigation along with recommendations on how the bridge needs could best be addressed on a long term basis in a cost-effective manner.
Pub. L. 97–424, title I, § 130, Jan. 6, 1983, 96 Stat. 2118, authorized funds to complete construction of a four-lane bridge in certain cases where funds to construct a two-lane bridge had been authorized by a law enacted between Jan. 1, 1970, and Jan. 6, 1983.
Pub. L. 97–424, title I, § 161, Jan. 6, 1983, 96 Stat. 2135, as amended by Pub. L. 100–17, title I, § 123(h), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 164, required the Secretary to develop a selection process and issue a final regulation no later than 6 months after Jan. 6, 1983, regarding funding priority of discretionary bridges.
Pub. L. 96–106, § 8(b), Nov. 9, 1979, 93 Stat. 797, provided for the transfer of discretionary bridge funds authorized under subsec. (g) of this section for fiscal year 1980 to a State’s apportionment under former section 104(b)(6) of this title to repay funds obligated under section 104(b)(6) between June 1 and July 31, 1979, for bridge projects which are eligible for funding by virtue of the amendment of subsec. (g) of this section by section 8(a) of Pub. L. 96–106.
Pub. L. 95–599, title I, § 124(c), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2705, directed Secretary of Transportation to complete the requirements of subsec. (c) of this section, as amended by subsec. (a) of section 124 of Pub. L. 95–599, not later than the last day of the second full calendar year which begins after Nov. 6, 1978.
Pub. L. 95–599, title I, § 147, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2714, as amended by Pub. L. 96–106, § 15, Nov. 19, 1979, 93 Stat. 798; Pub. L. 99–272, title IV, § 4105, Apr. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 116, directed Secretary of Transportation to conduct two projects to construct or replace high-traffic-volume bridges on the Federal-aid highway system which span major bodies of water in order to demonstrate the feasibility of reducing the time required to replace unsafe bridges; authorized funds for the projects; directed Secretary to report to Congress within six months after the completion of each project; redirected certain funds in excess of amounts needed to complete the projects for use in further projects for construction of three state-of-the-art Ohio River bridges linking designated cities in Kentucky and Ohio; and directed Secretary to report to Congress within a year after the completion of these bridges.