(3) Aggravated robbery is a class 3 felony and is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified presumptive sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-401 (10).
HISTORY: Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 427, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-4-302.L. 77: (1)(b) amended, p. 963, § 23, effective July 1.L. 86: (4) added, p. 777, § 9, effective July 1.L. 89: (1)(d) added and (2) repealed, pp. 831, 861, § § 43, 156, effective July 1.L. 90: (1)(c) amended, p. 925, § 9, effective March 27.L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 1515, § 197, effective October 1.L. 2004: (3) amended, p. 636, § 8, effective August 4.
Annotator’s note. Since § 18-4-302 is similar to former § 40-5-1, C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
This section is not violative of equal protection. People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1982).
The term “aggravated robbery” means a robbery committed with a dangerous weapon and with the intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound the victim or other person. Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 75, 482 P.2d 105 (1971).
This section provides that the crime of aggravated robbery is established if in the perpetration of such robbery the accused is armed with a dangerous weapon with intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound the person robbed or any other person. Vigil v. People, 158 Colo. 268, 406 P.2d 100 (1965).
Aggravated robbery was merged in the offense of felony murder and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy precludes conviction for both offenses. People v. Raymer, 626 P.2d 705 (Colo. App. 1980), aff’d, 662 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1983).
Aggravated robbery is robbery committed under circumstances in which the actor’s conduct creates an increased risk of injury to the victim or instills in the victim an enhanced fear of death or injury. People v. Raymer, 662 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1983).
Attempt to commit aggravated robbery requires same culpability plus substantial step. Criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery requires that the offender act with the kind of culpability otherwise required for aggravated robbery and engage in a substantial step toward the commission of aggravated robbery. People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1981).
Explanation of terms before plea of guilty. Where a defendant attempts to plead guilty to a violation of this section, it is mandatory that the court explain to him the nature and elements of “aggravated” robbery, and determine that the accused understands the nature of the charge. People v. Riney, 176 Colo. 221, 489 P.2d 1304 (1971).
Aggravated robbery is distinguished from simple robbery by the fact that the accused or a confederate is armed with a dangerous weapon with the intent, if resisted, to maim, wound, or kill. People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P.2d 15 (1972).
Simple robbery is a lesser included offense within the charge of aggravated robbery. People v. Bartsch, 37 Colo. App. 52, 543 P.2d 1273 (1975).
Simple robbery distinguished. The essential difference between simple robbery and that form of aggravated robbery requiring the culpability element of “knowingly” is that the latter offense requires the defendant to “knowingly” put the person robbed or any other person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury by the use of force, threats or intimidation with a deadly weapon. People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1982).
Felony menacing distinguished. The offense of aggravated robbery may be committed without also committing felony menacing; no merger occurs because the requirement in the felony menacing statute that the actor knowingly place a victim in fear of “serious bodily injury” is distinguishable from the requirement that the robber knowingly place a victim in fear of “bodily injury”. People v. Sisneros, 44 Colo. App. 65, 606 P.2d 1317 (1980).
Criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery requires that the offender act with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of aggravated robbery and that he engage in conduct constituting a substantial step towards the commission of that offense. People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1982).
Conviction of attempted aggravated robbery does not require a showing of specific intent to commit the underlying crime. People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985).
Convictions of both aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery do not violate double jeopardy. People v. Rivera, 178 Colo. 373, 497 P.2d 990 (1972).
Conviction for aggravated robbery and commission of a crime of violence does not violate double jeopardy and equal protection. People v. Schruder, 735 P.2d 905 (Colo. App. 1986).
Stipulation by attorney that a guilty verdict to aggravated robbery also established that the defendant was guilty of a crime of violence did not violate defendant’s rights since the jury returned a verdict which showed that it found that the defendant placed another in fear by the use of a deadly weapon and since defendant failed to show how a special interrogatory could have produced a different result. People v. McMullen, 738 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1986).
When the crime of violence statute is superimposed on convictions for both aggravated robbery and simple robbery, there are real differences between the two forms of robbery. These differences provide substantial support for the disparate penalty applicable to a crime of violence finding which is superimposed on a conviction for aggravated robbery, and such does not violate equal protection of the laws. People v. Young, 758 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1988).
It is possible to commit an aggravated robbery without contemporaneously perpetrating a second degree assault. People v. Grant, 40 Colo. App. 46, 571 P.2d 1111 (1977); People v. Toomer, 43 Colo. App. 182, 604 P.2d 1180 (1979).
Assault with intent to rob is lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Therefore, since assault with intent to rob is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, it was error for the court to permit both verdicts to stand. Thus, the conviction on the lesser included offense must be set aside. People v. Stephens, 188 Colo. 8, 532 P.2d 728 (1975).
As is attempted robbery. Attempted robbery without the element of the specific intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery which requires the specific intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound. People v. Trujillo, 184 Colo. 387, 524 P.2d 1379 (1974).
If a robbery or attempted robbery is established but without additional specific intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound, a person charged with aggravated robbery or attempted aggravated robbery can be found guilty of simple robbery or attempted simple robbery under the lesser included offense in a case where only the greater crime is charged. People v. Trujillo, 184 Colo. 387, 524 P.2d 1379 (1974).
Aggravated robbery and assault with intent to murder separate offenses. The offense of assault with intent to murder requires proof of a specific intent to kill, a fact not necessary to sustain a charge of aggravated robbery. On the other hand, aggravated robbery requires proof of a robbery, a fact not necessary for assault. Therefore, punishment for both of these offenses committed during one course of conduct does not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy for the same offense. People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973).
An argument of the defendants, based on the assumption that to be guilty of aggravated robbery they had to be guilty of assault with intent to murder, is clearly unfounded. People v. Rivera, 178 Colo. 373, 497 P.2d 990 (1972).
Double jeopardy barred convictions for both aggravated robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Under the former criminal code, it was impossible to commit aggravated robbery without contemporaneously perpetuating an assault with a deadly weapon. Since assault with a deadly weapon was the lesser included offense, double jeopardy barred a conviction for both crimes. People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974).
Lesser included offense. Attempt to commit robbery is a lesser included offense of attempt to commit aggravated robbery. People v. Johnson, 634 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1981).
When aggravated robbery is lesser included offense of felony murder. Where the defendant’s conviction for felony murder is based upon the causation of the robbery victim’s death during the course of the robbery, a charge of aggravated robbery of the same victim is a lesser included offense of the felony murder charge within the meaning of § 18-1-408(5)(c). People v. Raymer, 662 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1983).
Where defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and was adjudicated a habitual criminal, a subsequent reversal of the adjudication of habitual criminality negated its sentence enhancing effect and required resentencing for the underlying charge since it was not clear from the record that the robbery sentence was imposed independently from the habitual criminal adjudication. When resentencing the trial court could consider all relevant and material factors, including new evidence incorporated in a supplemental presentence report. People v. Watkins, 684 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1984).
Applied in Bernard v. Tinsley, 144 Colo. 244, 355 P.2d 1098 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 830, 81 S. Ct. 718, 5 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1961); Bingham v. People, 157 Colo. 92, 401 P.2d 255 (1965); Cowman v. People, 157 Colo. 120, 401 P.2d 831 (1965); Bustos v. People, 158 Colo. 451, 408 P.2d 64 (1965); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587, 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Jaggers v. People, 174 Colo. 430, 484 P.2d 796 (1971); People v. Marchese, 37 Colo. App. 65, 541 P.2d 1264 (1975); People v. Brionez, 39 Colo. App. 396, 570 P.2d 1296 (1977); People v. Warren, 196 Colo. 75, 582 P.2d 663 (1978); Wells v. People, 197 Colo. 350, 592 P.2d 1321 (1979); People v. Culbertson, 198 Colo. 153, 596 P.2d 1200 (1979); Watson v. District Court, 199 Colo. 76, 604 P.2d 1165 (1980); Graham v. People, 199 Colo. 439, 610 P.2d 494 (1980); People v. Cabral, 629 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1981); People v. Moody, 630 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1981); People v. Bravo, 630 P.2d 612 (Colo. 1981); People v. Scott, 630 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1981); People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1981); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1981); People v. Swanson, 638 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1981); People v. Lowery, 642 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1982); People v. Bueno, 646 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1982); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1982); People v. Cooper, 662 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1983); People v. Akins, 662 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1983).
Culpable mental state implied. A statute will be presumed to conform to constitutional requirements, and a culpable mental state will be implied from a particular statute which does not contain an intent element on its face. People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1980).
Intent is a necessary element in the proof of aggravated robbery, and this section, covering the offense, must be given its full force and effect. Funk v. People, 90 Colo. 167, 7 P.2d 823 (1932); Gonzales v. People, 166 Colo. 557, 445 P.2d 74 (1968).
It is not essential that a bandit must demonstrate an intent to kill, maim, or wound the victim of the holdup. Vigil v. People, 158 Colo. 268, 406 P.2d 100 (1965).
Fact that defendant was armed with intent to harm only goes to the grade and punishment of crime. In a prosecution for aggravated robbery under this section, the fact that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill or wound his victim if resisted, is not the essence of the offense of robbery, and proof of these facts is not necessary for a conviction, but goes only to the grade of the crime and punishment to be inflicted. Funk v. People, 90 Colo. 167, 7 P.2d 823 (1932).
Being dangerously armed and having the intent described are not essential to the perpetration of a robbery, but proof thereof goes to the degree of the crime, and affects only the punishment to be suffered in event of conviction. Hutton v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965).
Section 18-1-901 prescribes test to determine whether certain items constitute deadly weapons. Section 18-1-901 (3)(e) expressly prescribes a test to determine whether items other than firearms, knives, and bludgeons are deadly weapons, based not on the intrinsic nature of the items but upon their use or intended use. Bowers v. People, 617 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1980) (decided prior to 1981 amendment to § 18-1-901 (3)(e)).
Armed with and in possession of a deadly weapon. This element of aggravated robbery may be proven by relying on presumption created by subsection (2). People v. Castenada, 765 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989).
Quart bottle of whiskey is not a bludgeon but it may satisfy the statutory test defining a deadly weapon as a “device, instrument, material, or substance, . . . which in the manner it is used . . . is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury”. Bowers v. People, 617 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1980) (decided prior to 1981 amendment to § 18-1-901 (3)(e)).
The state of mind or intent is usually manifested by circumstances and proof thereof necessarily is by circumstantial evidence, and, of course, such intent is ordinarily inferable from the facts. The state of mind of the defendant is concealed within the mind and is not usually, perhaps never, susceptible of direct proof. Ruark v. People, 157 Colo. 320, 402 P.2d 637 (1965).
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to at least present a jury question as to whether the defendant possessed the requisite specific intent to maim, wound, or kill, if resisted. Elliott v. People, 176 Colo. 373, 490 P.2d 687 (1971).
Differences within and constitutionality of charging under subsection (1). Subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) proscribe different conduct. To be found guilty based on threats or intimidation under subsection (1)(b), a defendant (or the principal, if the defendant is guilty as a complicitor) must knowingly threaten or intimidate a victim with a deadly weapon. To be found guilty under subsection (1)(c), a defendant (or the principal, if the defendant is guilty as a complicitor) need not use a deadly weapon to threaten or intimidate the victim. Because the two subsections proscribe different means by which a victim may be robbed through the use of threats or intimidation, they do not contain identical statutory elements, and therefore do not punish identical conduct. There is no equal protection violation where there are reasonable differences between the behaviors proscribed in the statutes, and the differences are both real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of the legislation. People v. Firm, 2014 COA 32, 342 P.3d 537.
Constitutionality and intent of subsection (2). Clearly, the intent of the general assembly in passing subsection (2) was to prevent armed robbers from escaping aggravated robbery charges by simply concealing deadly weapons in their pockets or under other wraps or devices. Recognizing this legislative intent, the constitutionality of the statute is upheld. People v. Lorio, 190 Colo. 373, 546 P.2d 1254 (1976).
Subsection (2) does not unconstitutionally deny defendant equal protection of the laws by removing the only real distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. People v. Murphy, 192 Colo. 411, 559 P.2d 708 (1977).
Or due process. Subsection (2) of this section, which makes a robber’s representation that he is armed prima facie evidence that he is in fact armed, does not deny a defendant due process by shifting the prosecution’s burden of proof. People v. Hawkins, 192 Colo. 535, 560 P.2d 833 (1977).
The presumption created by subsection (2) does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. People v. Lorio, 190 Colo. 373, 546 P.2d 1254 (1976).
As it permits jury inference as to possession. The presumption created by subsection (2) meets the test described by the United States supreme court in that it permits the jury to infer that the defendant actually possessed a deadly weapon when he has made such a representation to another. People v. Lorio, 190 Colo. 373, 546 P.2d 1254 (1976).
Prosecution must still prove additional element. Subsection (2) merely permits the jury to infer that a defendant told the truth when he asserted that he was armed. The prosecution is still required to prove an additional element over and above what is required to prove simply robbery. People v. Murphy, 192 Colo. 411, 559 P.2d 708 (1977).
Shifts only part of burden to defendant. The statutory presumption created by subsection (2) does not shift the entire burden of proof to the defendant, but merely the burden of going forward with respect to certain evidence. People v. Lorio, 190 Colo. 373, 546 P.2d 1254 (1976).
Instruction regarding subsection (2) did not shift the burden of proof; rather, the instruction and statute merely shifted the burden of going forward with respect to certain evidence. People v. Jones, 191 Colo. 385, 553 P.2d 770 (1976).
This section and an instruction phrased in the language of this section, with the exception that it does not state that representations of being armed shall be considered “prima facie” evidence that the defendant was armed, do not operate to shift the burden of proof. People v. Hawkins, 192 Colo. 535, 560 P.2d 833 (1977).
Attempted robbery without aggravation does not include any element not included in attempted robbery with aggravation. People v. Trujillo, 184 Colo. 387, 524 P.2d 1379 (1974).
Inference of possession by victim. In the light of common sense and experience, the victim of a robbery — possessed of reasonable belief — may infer that a defendant possesses a deadly weapon if the defendant makes such a representation. People v. Lorio, 190 Colo. 373, 546 P.2d 1254 (1976).
Simple robbery and aggravated robbery both require the intent to rob. People v. Trujillo, 184 Colo. 387, 524 P.2d 1379 (1974).
Information held sufficient. Johnson v. Tinsley, 155 Colo. 346, 394 P.2d 842 (1964).
Indictment need not specify which method of committing offense charged. As in the case of principals and complicitors, an indictment under this section need not specify which of the two methods of committing the offense is being charged. People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 307, 600 P.2d 82 (1979).
Variance between indictment and proof not fatal to prosecution. A variance between the indictment, which accused defendant of having an armed confederate present, and the proof, which showed defendant as the person armed, was not fatal to a prosecution under this section. People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 307, 600 P.2d 82 (1979).
Evidence of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery is not inadmissible and is not meaningless and to be ignored merely because plans to commit robbery were frustrated and ended with commission of second degree assault. People v. Shannon, 189 Colo. 287, 539 P.2d 480 (1975).
Admission of weapon proper. Where no weapon was seen by victim of aggravated robbery, and where tire iron found by cash register did not belong to service station and had not been seen in service station prior to robbery, and where wound on victim’s head appeared to have been inflicted by tire tool or similar instrument, admission of tire tool was not error. People v. Bedwell, 181 Colo. 20, 506 P.2d 365 (1973).
Evidence of intent sufficient to go to jury. McGraw v. People, 154 Colo. 368, 390 P.2d 819 (1964).
Where it was contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gunman had the requisite specific intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, or wound the person robbed or any other person, it was held that the record showed sufficient circumstances from which the jury could reasonably infer that the gunman had the state of mind necessary to sustain the conviction of aggravated robbery. Schott v. People, 174 Colo. 15, 482 P.2d 101 (1971).
The pointing of the gun in a threatening manner is sufficient to support the finding of specific intent. Schermerhorn v. People, 175 Colo. 256, 486 P.2d 428 (1971).
A threat by a defendant to shoot a victim is sufficient to require submission of an aggravated robbery charge to a jury. Candelaria v. People, 177 Colo. 136, 493 P.2d 355 (1972).
Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of aggravated robbery. Atwood v. People, 176 Colo. 183, 489 P.2d 1305 (1971); People v. Bedwell, 181 Colo. 20, 506 P.2d 365 (1973); People v. Renfro, 181 Colo. 159, 508 P.2d 396 (1973); People v. Hawkins, 192 Colo. 535, 560 P.2d 833 (1977); People v. Moseley, 193 Colo. 256, 566 P.2d 331 (1977); People v. Larson, 194 Colo. 338, 572 P.2d 815 (1977); People v. Williams, 40 Colo. App. 30, 569 P.2d 339 (1977); People v. Bowers, 42 Colo. App. 467, 600 P.2d 95 (1979); People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983 (Colo. App. 2011).
Where defendant is found hiding near scene of robbery with some of the masks and other items used to perfect the robbers’ disguise, evidence against him is substantial and supports his conviction. Velarde v. People, 179 Colo. 207, 500 P.2d 125 (1972).
Evidence sufficient to sustain attempted aggravated robbery conviction. People v. Williams, 40 Colo. App. 30, 569 P.2d 339 (1977).
Evidence sustained defendant’s conviction as accessory to aggravated robbery. People v. Jones, 184 Colo. 96, 518 P.2d 819 (1974).
Questions for jury. Under an information charging aggravated robbery under this section, the jury must first determine from the evidence whether or not a robbery was committed, and if so, whether defendant was armed with dangerous weapons, and had the intent, if resisted, to kill or wound his victim. Funk v. People, 90 Colo. 167, 7 P.2d 823 (1932).
Character of weapon is jury question. Whether an article used as a weapon is dangerous may be, because of its very character or the circumstances of its use, a matter of doubt, and in such case the question should be left to the jury under an instruction as to what constitutes a dangerous weapon. Hutton v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965).
Instructions on culpable mental state. A culpable mental state is a requisite element of aggravated robbery. If jury instructions taken as a whole are confusing, or imply that no mental state is required to convict, these instructions are constitutionally deficient. People v. Ward, 673 P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1983).
Instructions using term “aggravated”. The use of the word “aggravated” in the information is a matter of form only. There was no objection to instructions which used the word “aggravated”, and this did not constitute plain error affecting substantial rights. Moore v. People, 164 Colo. 222, 434 P.2d 132 (1967).
Where no rational basis for simple robbery conviction, court may refuse to instruct. Where the evidence presented to the jury showed, at a minimum, that the defendant had participated as a complicitor in the commission of an aggravated robbery, as proscribed by this section, there was no rational basis on which the jury could have acted to acquit the defendant of aggravated robbery while convicting him of simple robbery, and the trial court did not therefore err in refusing to instruct the jury on the latter offense. People v. Glenn, 200 Colo. 416, 615 P.2d 700 (1980).
Use of term “simple robbery”. Where the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to what the court meant in referring to “simple robbery” as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, but where the instruction in question was worded substantially in the language of the statute, and the record shows that the instructions when read as a whole are not complicated nor difficult to understand, and the jury was fully capable of understanding the concept of “simple robbery” as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, there was no error. People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972).
Instruction on specific intent must be delivered to the jury in cases of aggravated robbery. Gonzales v. People, 166 Colo. 557, 445 P.2d 74 (1968).
A defendant charged with aggravated robbery is entitled to an instruction on the element of specific intent to kill, maim, or wound, if resisted, whether requested or not. Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 101, 465 P.2d 112 (1970).
Failure to so instruct requires reversal. A verdict of guilty cannot stand where the element of specific intent is material as to one count of the information or indictment which is related to and joined with a count of conspiracy, when the court’s instructions on intent covering either count are erroneous. Gonzales v. People, 166 Colo. 557, 445 P.2d 74 (1968).
Where the supreme court fails to properly instruct the jury on a necessary element of the crime charged, a verdict of guilty as to aggravated robbery cannot stand. Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 101, 465 P.2d 112 (1970).
Where intent is uncertain, jury must be instructed as to simple robbery. In a prosecution for aggravated robbery under this section, there being evidence tending to negative the specific intent necessary to constitute the crime, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the question of simple robbery, and to refuse to submit to it a form of verdict covering that feature of the case. Funk v. People, 90 Colo. 167, 7 P.2d 823 (1932).
Where aggravated robbery has been charged, the trial judge must give an instruction on the lesser offense of simple robbery when such instruction is requested by the defendant and when it is supported by the evidence. Hollon v. People, 170 Colo. 432, 462 P.2d 490 (1969); Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 72, 470 P.2d 37 (1970); People v. Reed, 180 Colo. 16, 502 P.2d 952 (1972).
Where the jury can convict defendants of aggravated robbery, it is not prejudicial error to submit instructions and verdicts to the jury on the offense of simple robbery. Atwood v. People, 176 Colo. 183, 489 P.2d 1305 (1971).
Refusal may be reversible error. There was testimony from the victim that there was no violence and no threats. The only evidence of intent was the presence of the loaded pistol. The evidence was such that the jury could find that the people had failed to prove the element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, thus, it was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct, as requested, on simple robbery. Hollon v. People, 170 Colo. 432, 462 P.2d 490 (1969).
Lesser theft offense instruction is properly refused when an element that distinguishes the greater offense of aggravated robbery from the lesser offense is uncontested. Defendant charged with aggravated robbery and felony murder was not entitled to lesser theft offense instruction because there was no evidence disputing the use of force against, and the killing of, the victim. People v. Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624 (Colo. App. 2006).
Evidence in aggravated robbery case held insufficient to support instruction on simple robbery. Sisneros v. People, 174 Colo. 543, 484 P.2d 1207 (1971); People v. Reed, 180 Colo. 16, 502 P.2d 952 (1972).
Where the suspect pursued by police fired a shot, the defendant charged with aggravated robbery was not entitled to an instruction on simple robbery; he had manifested the specific intent to maim, wound, or kill, if resisted, and placed himself outside of the ambit of the rule requiring an instruction on the lesser offense. Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 72, 470 P.2d 37 (1970).
Refusal of accessory instruction proper. The court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the crime of accessory during the fact is also a lesser included offense when robbery is charged, which was the defendant’s principal theory of the case, was not error because accessory during the fact is a separate and distinct offense which was not charged and which could not properly have been the subject of an instruction. Maes v. People, 178 Colo. 46, 494 P.2d 1290 (1972).
The term “confederate” as used in subsection (1)(c) means more than a bystander. The confederate must be “aiding and abetting the perpetration of the robbery”. People v. Wilford, 111 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2004).
The term “confederate” is not a highly technical one and is well within the comprehension of the jury. The trial court did not err, therefore, in rejecting defendant’s jury instruction that incorporated a definition of “confederate” from a legal dictionary or in declining to define the term. People v. Wilford, 111 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2004).
Instruction based on subsection (2) properly refused. There being no question that a deadly weapon had been utilized during the robbery, no issue concerning subsection (2) of this section was raised. Hence, the trial court properly refused a tendered instruction based on that subsection. People v. Roberts, 37 Colo. App. 490, 553 P.2d 93 (1976).
Instruction adequate. Where the jury was instructed in plain understandable English that a conviction for aggravated robbery requires that the defendant have the specific intent to kill, maim, or wound, if resisted in his attempt to commit the robbery, that instruction, read together with the other instruction requiring the people to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, adequately apprised the jury of the law, and the jury was adequately instructed on the elements of aggravated robbery. People v. Crawford, 183 Colo. 166, 515 P.2d 631 (1973).
Because the jury indicated it was confused about the meaning of the phrase “use of force or threat or intimidation” and whether carrying a gun meant the same as using a gun, it was proper for the court to give a supplemental instruction. People v. Wilford, 111 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2004).
An instruction which permits the jury to draw inferences from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is proper in cases where robbery is charged. People v. Grubbs, 39 Colo. App. 436, 570 P.2d 1299 (1977).
Verdicts held not inconsistent. Since the statutory elements of aggravated robbery and theft over $200 (now $300) are different, jury verdicts convicting a defendant of aggravated robbery of an employee but acquitting the defendant of theft from the employer are not inconsistent and repugnant. People v. Williams, 40 Colo. App. 30, 569 P.2d 339 (1977).
Assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and since the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, his conviction for the included offense of assault with a deadly weapon must be set aside. People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973).
Acquittal of conspiracy charge required. Where the very same evidence which the jury did not believe was sufficient to prove that the defendant participated in the robbery was the only evidence which could prove him guilty of conspiracy, the conspiracy verdict could not stand. Renfrow v. People, 176 Colo. 160, 489 P.2d 582 (1971).
Verdict of aggravated robbery sufficient. A verdict in a prosecution under this section which finds the defendant guilty of “robbery with a deadly weapon, to-wit, a gun”, is not insufficient because it does not include the words, “as charged in the information”, or does not more definitely specify the crime as defined by statute. Van Diest v. People, 71 Colo. 121, 204 P. 606 (1922).
Where the charge in count one of the information alleged that defendant committed the robbery with the intent to maim, wound, or kill, if resisted, the trial court instructed specifically in the elements necessary to sustain the charge of “aggravated” robbery, and the jury found defendant guilty of “aggravated” robbery “as charged in the first count of the information”, this was sufficient to warrant the imposition of the more severe penalty authorized by this section when a robbery is committed with intent to maim, wound, or kill, if resisted. Lucero v. People, 173 Colo. 94, 476 P.2d 257 (1970).
Where the verdict states that defendant is found guilty of “aggravated robbery as charged in the information herein”, and the information describes in detail the more serious robbery involving the increased punishment, there remains no basis for the argument that the verdict found the defendant guilty of only simple robbery. Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 75, 482 P.2d 105 (1971).
Verdict treated as conviction of simple robbery. Where the defendant is charged with aggravated robbery, but the case is submitted to the jury upon an instruction for simple robbery, and the jury returns a verdict of “guilty as charged”, the court should treat the verdict as a finding of guilty as to simple robbery. Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 101, 465 P.2d 112 (1970).
A charge of aggravated robbery and commission of a violent crime require consistent verdicts when based upon the same facts. People v. Castenada, 765 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989).
Conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, as defined in subsection (1)(b), necessarily requires crime of violence sentencing. People v. Terry, 961 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1997), aff’d, 977 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999).
Consecutive sentences for aggravated robbery convictions not mandatory where defendant was not separately charged with a “crime of violence” and was convicted under this section generally, but not subsection (1)(b) specifically. People v. McCoy, 944 P.2d 577 (Colo. App. 1996).
Use of a sealed verdict in prosecution for aggravated robbery was not improper. People v. Herrera, 182 Colo. 302, 512 P.2d 1160 (1973).
Fifteen to 20-year sentence for aggravated robbery was not excessive. People v. Colasanti, 626 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1981).
It was not improper for trial court to consider during sentencing that violent crimes have a greater public impact in small rural communities than in larger urban ones since a sentencing court should always consider the interests of the public involved and this factor was not decisive of the court’s decision. People v. Palmer, 888 P.2d 348 (Colo. App. 1994).
Convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery arising out of the same criminal episode are not multiplicitous. The issue turns on whether two robberies can arise out of a single taking of property. The inquiry then focuses on whether the crime of robbery is intended to protect people or property. If robbery is intended to protect people, a single taking could support multiple convictions if the one item is taken from multiple people with control over the item. The plain language of the robbery statute is ambiguous as to whether it is intended to protect people or property. The common law history of robbery and case law indicates robbery statutes are intended to protect people. Therefore, a single taking can support multiple convictions for robbery if the taking is made in the presence of multiple victims. People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93 (Colo. 2003); People v. Clifton, 74 P.3d 519 (Colo. App. 2003).


Replacement absentee ballots for certain disabled or ill voters. Provides that a voter who has applied for an absentee ballot because of physical disability or illness, and who has been mailed an absentee ballot, but has not received or has lost the ballot, may obtain a replacement ballot by designating a representative to pick up and return the ballot for him and by completing required forms to obtain the replacement. The representative must be 18 or older and cannot be an elected official, candidate, or close affiliate of an official or candidate. Section 24.2-708 now allows voters who can appear in person to obtain and vote using a replacement absentee ballot. This bill is identical to SB 94.
Elections; conditional votes. Clarifies statutory language relating to conditional votes and specifies that a conditional vote will be counted only if the voter submitting it is a qualified voter of the precinct in which he submitted the conditional vote.
Delayed local elections following redistricting. Delays elections for the governing body and school board if the decennial redistricting plan for the locality has not been precleared by the Department of Justice under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act at least 30 days before the general election and provides for the rescheduling of the election. This bill contains an emergency clause.
Election materials; security and retention requirements. Reduces from five years to two years the period following an election that the general registrar must retain the pollbooks for the election.
Municipal elections; option for November council elections. Provides that cities and towns may shift to November elections held in either odd-numbered or even-numbered years.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; depositories and checks; reimbursements of expenses. Permits the reimbursement, by a check drawn on the campaign depository, of expenses paid by the candidate, treasurer, or other authorized member of the campaign staff. The expenses being reimbursed must be fully documented in compliance with the reporting requirements of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. This proposal modifies a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001). This bill incorporates HB 1083 and is identical to SB 328.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; schedule for political committee disclosure reports. Sets out a single annual schedule for filing reports by PACs and political committees of six reports a year. Present law requires committees to comply with different candidate filing schedules for elections depending on whether the committee is involved in a May or November election, or possibly both. This proposal is a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001). This bill is identical to SB 330.
Political advertisements; disclosure requirements. Requires that print, television, and radio advertisements supporting or opposing the nomination or election of clearly identified candidates contain specific information regarding the sponsor of the advertisement. This bill is patterned after the North Carolina "Stand By Your Ad Act." This bill incorporates HB 1041.
Revisions in the election and voter registration laws. Modifies and clarifies various provisions relating to investigations of election law violations, officers of election and pollbooks, postponements of elections in emergencies, and voter registration and absentee voting procedures. This bill incorporates a number of recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill incorporates HBs 1036, 1039, and 1040 is identical to SB 113.
Elections; officers of election; use of pollbooks and precinct registered voter lists. Provides that the electoral board may set the time or times for annual training of officers of election and deletes the provision specifying that training take place within the three to 30 days before each November general election. The bill also provides for statewide implementation, for elections conducted after July 1, 2003, of a program to use a single list at precincts on election day that will show both the registered voters and persons voting. The State Board of Elections has been conducting pilot programs testing the use of a combined list. This bill incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to SB 19.
Rejected absentee ballots. Requires local electoral boards to send a written explanation of the reason for rejection of an absentee ballot to the voter within 90 days of the date of rejection.
Registered voters; change of address. Provides that voters who move within the Commonwealth may notify the general registrar of their change of address by a form provided by the State Board of Elections and by an electronic process. The State Board is authorized to conduct a pilot program for an electronic notice process.
Recount proceedings. Provides that issues of voter eligibility will not be considered in a recount and that rejected conditional and absentee ballots will not be reexamined. The bill provides for a single recount or redetermination of the vote in a recount proceeding and spells out recount steps related to differing types of ballots and voting devices. In the case of optical scan and punchcard tabulators, the printed return sheets shall be accepted unless they are not clear or the court orders a further count. If a further count is ordered, the tabulator shall be programmed to set aside write-in votes, overvotes, and undervotes. The ballots thus set aside and other ballots rejected by the tabulator (e.g. damaged ballots) will be counted by hand. This bill incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to HB 1035 and SB 112.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; failures to file and late filings of reports; certain extensions. Authorizes the State Board of Elections to extend the filing deadline for campaign reports in emergency situations. The emergency must be declared by the Governor or the President. A similar emergency power is given to the State Board with respect to deadlines for voting absentee.
Form of ballots; party designations on the ballot. Provides for the identification by party on the ballot of candidates nominated by "recognized political parties" as well as by the major political parties. The bill incorporates the 2001 court order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Quinn relating to party identification on the ballot. That order provides that a recognized political party includes any organization that, for at least six months prior to the filing deadline for candidates, has had a state central committee composed of registered voters residing in each congressional district, a party plan and bylaws, and a duly elected chairman and secretary. The definition is similar to the definition used currently to allow minor party names on presidential election ballots. There is no requirement to have received a certain percentage of the vote in prior elections.
Voting Rights Act. Requests the Attorney General to collect and disseminate certain information pertaining to the bailout of Virginia localities from requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the Attorney General is requested to (i) collect information, including historical data on preclearance submissions, that would be needed to obtain a bailout, (ii) notify localities on what assistance the Attorney General can provide to them in petitioning the court, (iii) advise localities on what corrective actions and improvements are needed to promote electoral integrity to qualify for bailout, and (iv) develop a model strategy for localities to utilize in applying for bailout status.
Elections; officers of election; use of pollbooks and precinct registered voter lists. Provides that the electoral board may set the time or times for annual training of officers of election and deletes the provision specifying that training take place within the three to 30 days before each November general election. The bill also provides for statewide implementation, for elections conducted after July 1, 2003, of a program to use a single list at precincts on election day that will show both the registered voters and persons voting. The State Board of Elections has been conducting pilot programs testing the use of a combined list. This bill incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to HB 641.
Replacement absentee ballots for certain disabled or ill voters. Provides that a voter who has applied for an absentee ballot because of physical disability or illness, and who has been mailed an absentee ballot, but has not received or has lost the ballot, may obtain a replacement ballot by designating a representative to pick up and return the ballot for him and by completing required forms to obtain the replacement. The representative must be 18 or older and cannot be an elected official, candidate or close affiliate of an official or candidate. Section 24.2-708 now allows voters who can appear in person to obtain and vote using a replacement absentee ballot. This bill is identical to HB 66.
Recount proceedings. Provides that issues of voter eligibility will not be considered in a recount and that rejected conditional and absentee ballots will not be reexamined. The bill provides for a single recount or redetermination of the vote in a recount proceeding and spells out recount steps related to differing types of ballots and voting devices. In the case of optical scan and punchcard tabulators, the printed return sheets shall be accepted unless they are not clear or the court orders a further count. If a further count is ordered, the tabulator shall be programmed to set aside write-in votes, overvotes, and undervotes. The ballots thus set aside and other ballots rejected by the tabulator (e.g. damaged ballots) will be counted by hand. This bill incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to HB 985 and HB 1035.
Revisions in the election and voter registration laws. Modifies and clarifies various provisions relating to investigations of election law violations, officers of election and pollbooks, postponements of elections in emergencies, and voter registration and absentee voting procedures. This bill incorporates a number of recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to HB 640.
Local reapportionment; prison population. Expands coverage of the law to allow localities with a prison population exceeding 12 percent of their total population to exclude such prison population from the population base used for local decennial reapportionment. The present law, which becomes effective on May 1, 2002, allows any locality with a prison population that exceeds 18 percent of its total population to exclude its prison population. Under the 2000 census, Greensville and Sussex counties fell within this category. Localities with a population exceeding 12 percent of their total population include the additional localities of Brunswick, Buckingham, and Richmond counties.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; depositories and checks; reimbursements of expenses. Permits the reimbursement, by a check drawn on the campaign depository, of expenses paid by the candidate, treasurer, or other authorized member of the campaign staff. The expenses being reimbursed must be fully documented in compliance with the reporting requirements of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. This proposal modifies a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001). This bill is identical to HB 554.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; schedule for political committee disclosure reports. Sets out a single annual schedule for filing reports by PACs and political committees of six reports a year. Present law requires committees to comply with different candidate filing schedules for elections depending on whether the committee is involved in a May or November election, or possibly both. This proposal is a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001). This bill is identical to HB 556.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; filing requirements and deadlines; waiver of penalties in certain cases. Provides that political committee reports filed with the State Board will be deemed to be timely filed if mailed and postmarked by the filing deadline. Under recent revisions in the law, all reports filed with the State Board must be received by the Board by the applicable deadline either by mail or by fax. The substitute also enables the State Board or local board or general registrar to waive, for good cause, a penalty that has been assessed.
Electronic filing of campaign finance disclosure reports. Requires, rather than permits, candidates for the General Assembly to file the reports required by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act by computer or electronic means in accordance with the standards approved by the State Board of Elections. Currently, candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General are required to file electronically, and candidates for the General Assembly have the option to file paper reports.
Hours that polls are open for voting. Adds one hour to the time that the polls are open for voting by moving the closing time from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. The bill also makes conforming changes to the absentee voting law.
City of Colonial Heights; Advisory referendum. Provides authority for an advisory referendum in the City of Colonial Heights on the question of whether the City shall establish a recreation center. This bill is identical to SB 403.
Elections; activities at polling places. Authorizes the electoral board and the person in charge of the facility where a polling place is located to approve a sale of refreshments by a non-profit, non-partisan group within the 40-foot prohibited area at the polling place.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; mandatory electronic filing of reports. Requires General Assembly candidates, who receive more than $10,000 in contributions, to file campaign finance reports electronically in accordance with State Board of Elections standards; and requires political committees (including PACs and political party committees subject to the Act's reporting requirements) that receive more than $25,000 in contributions to file campaign finance reports electronically in accordance with State Board of Elections standards. This proposal incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001).
Party designations on the ballot. Extends to local elections, other than school board and soil and water conservation district elections, the identification of candidates by party name on the ballot. The bill explicitly provides that an endorsement by a political party of a candidate who qualifies for the ballot through the petition process is not grounds for identifying that candidate by the party's name.
Primary elections; voter registration by political party. Adds party affiliation to the information that an applicant is asked to provide when registering to vote. The applicant may indicate that he is an independent. Voters registered prior to July 1, 2002, will be designated as independent unless they provide a political party designation in writing to the general registrar. Voters may change their party affiliation or independent status by written notice at any time except the 28 days before an election when the registration records are closed. The state party chairman of each political party must notify the State Board by January 31 of each year whether the party will close its primaries and permit only registered party members to participate or whether it will open its primaries to party members and independent voters.
Elections; activities at polling places. Authorizes the electoral board and the person in charge of the facility where a polling place is located to approve a sale of refreshments by a non-profit group within the 40-foot prohibited area at the polling place.
Elections; activities at polling places. Authorizes the principal of a school that serves as a polling place to approve a sale of refreshments by a non-profit group affiliated with the school within the school and the 40-foot prohibited area at the polling place. Persons conducting the sale are subject to prohibitions against campaigning or hindering voters.
General Assembly Campaign Finance Reform Act. Imposes limits on contributions to candidates for the General Assembly made on and after January 1, 2003. The limit on contributions by individuals and other persons to a General Assembly candidate is $2,000 per election cycle; on contributions by political action committees, $10,000; and on contributions by political party committees, $20,000. There are no limits on contributions by a candidate to his own campaign. Civil penalties for violations of the limits by the contributor and the recipient may equal twice the amount of the excess contribution.
Recount proceedings. Provides that issues of voter eligibility will not be considered in a recount and that rejected conditional and absentee ballots will not be reexamined. The bill provides for a single recount or redetermination of the vote in a recount proceeding and spells out recount steps related to differing types of ballots and voting devices. In the case of optical scan and punchcard tabulators, the printed return sheets shall be accepted unless they are not clear or the court orders a further count. If a further count is ordered, the tabulator shall be programmed to set aside write-in votes, overvotes, and undervotes. The ballots thus set aside and other ballots rejected by the tabulator (e.g. damaged ballots) will be counted by hand. This bill incorporates recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies (HJR 681/SJR 363 -- 2001). This bill is identical to HB 985 and SB 112.
Absentee voting; obsolete provisions. Removes obsolete, conflicting and confusing provisions that were needed to distinguish between overseas voters registering in absentia and other voters prior to the advent of mail registration. Currently, any Virginia resident who is overseas can register by mail. Other cleanup revisions include (i) extending the voter identification requirement to voters who vote absentee in person, (ii) requiring overseas applicants to provide information on the date of last residence in Virginia, (iii) extending to all members of the electoral board the authority currently held by the secretary of the board to receive absentee ballots, and (iv) allowing the pre-election day notation of absentee voters on the voter registration list for verification by the officers of election. This bill is incorporated into HB 640.
Pollbooks; duties of electoral board members. Provides that each member of the electoral board, rather than only the secretary of the electoral board, shall be authorized to administer the oath to officers of election on election day. This bill is incorporated into HB 640.
Assistance in the prosecution of election law offenses. Provides that when a request is made by a unanimous vote of the State Board of Elections for assistance in prosecuting elections law violations, the Attorney General shall conduct an investigation and report his findings to the State Board. Present law authorizes the Attorney General to respond to such a request from the State Board. This bill is incorporated into HB 640.
Political advertisements; disclosure requirements. Requires that print, television, and radio advertisements supporting or opposing the nomination or election of clearly identified candidates contain specific information regarding the sponsor of the advertisement. This bill is patterned after the North Carolina "Stand By Your Ad Act." This bill is incorporated into HB 558.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; depositories and checks; reimbursements of expenses. Permits the reimbursement, by a check drawn on the campaign depository, of expenses paid by the candidate, treasurer, or other authorized member of the campaign staff when the amount of the reimbursement does not exceed $1,000 and the expenses being reimbursed are fully documented in compliance with the reporting requirements of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. This bill is incorporated into HB 554.
Replacement absentee ballots for certain disabled or ill voters. Provides that a voter who has applied for an absentee ballot because of physical disability or illness, and who has been mailed an absentee ballot, but has not received or has lost the ballot, may obtain a replacement ballot by designating a representative to pick up and return the ballot for him and by completing required forms to obtain the replacement. The representative must be 18 or older and cannot be an elected official, candidate or close affiliate of an official or candidate. Section 24.2-708 now allows voters who can appear in person to obtain and vote using a replacement absentee ballot.
Voting materials; language alternatives. Provides that the State Board of Elections may prescribe voting materials in a language other than English if the Commonwealth or a locality is required to provide such materials pursuant to bilingual election requirements of federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a and 42 USC § 1973b(f)(4)). The federal law may become applicable after the Director of the Census determines that more than five percent of the voting age citizens of a state or locality are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient, or more than 10,000 voting age citizens of a locality are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient, and that the illiteracy rate of the citizens of the language minority as a group is higher than the national illiteracy rate. The bill anticipates the possibility that the Director may determine, following the 2000 Census that one or more Virginia localities have become subject to the federal bilingual voting materials requirements. The Director's determination is based on information from the long-form census questionnaire and will be published in the Federal Register. His determinations following the 1990 Census were published September 18, 1992. This bill is identical to SB 214.
Conditional votes and envelopes. Provides that a photocopy shall be taken of the envelope in which a rejected conditional vote is sealed and that the copy may serve as a registration application. Conditional votes occur when a voter is not listed on the registered voter list at the precinct. The voter completes an envelope at the polls with the information required to register to vote and seals his conditional paper ballot in the envelope. The electoral board meets the next day to determine whether the conditional votes should be counted. The conditional vote envelopes are then sealed and stored with other election materials.
Voting leave for state and local government employees. Authorizes state and local government agencies to grant an employee leave to arrive late to work, or leave early, when the polls will not be open at least three hours before or three hours after the employee's regular work hours. The voting leave will not count against the employee's annual leave.
Electoral college. Provides that the Commonwealth's votes in the electoral college shall be allocated by the popular vote statewide and in each congressional district. The candidates for President and Vice President who win the popular statewide vote will receive the votes of the two statewide electors and the candidates who win the popular vote in each congressional district will receive the vote of that district's elector. Maine and Nebraska allocate electoral college votes in this manner.
Primaries for statewide offices. Requires political party candidates for the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General to be nominated by a statewide primary.
Voting leave for state and local government employees. Authorizes state government agencies and political subdivisions to grant an employee, who is a registered voter, leave to arrive late to work, or leave early, when the polls will not be open at least three hours before or three hours after the employee's regular work hours. The voting leave will not count against the employee's annual leave.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; mandatory electronic filing of reports; political committees; television advertisements. Requires political committees (including PACs and political party committees subject to the Act's reporting requirements) that expend $50,000 or more on televised political advertisements in any 12-month period to file campaign finance reports electronically in accordance with State Board of Elections standards. The bill also requires such committees to file reports on additional expenditures for television advertisements within 24 hours of the airing of the advertisement.
Voting materials; language alternatives. Provides that the State Board of Elections may prescribe voting materials in a language other than English if the Commonwealth or a locality is required to provide such materials pursuant to bilingual election requirements of federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a and 42 USC § 1973b(f)(4)). The federal law may become applicable after the Director of the Census determines that more than five percent of the voting age citizens of a state or locality are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient, or more than 10,000 voting age citizens of a locality are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient, and that the illiteracy rate of the citizens of the language minority as a group is higher than the national illiteracy rate. The bill anticipates the possibility that the Director may determine, following the 2000 Census that one or more Virginia localities have become subject to the federal bilingual voting materials requirements. The Director's determination is based on information from the long-form census questionnaire and will be published in the Federal Register. His determinations following the 1990 Census were published September 18, 1992. This bill is identical to HB 1092.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; elections to which the Act applies. Expands coverage of the Act to town elections in towns of 10,000 or more population. The present law applies only to towns of 25,000 or more population. Under the 2000 census, Blacksburg and Leesburg have populations of 25,000 or more. Towns of 10,000 or more include the towns of Herndon, Christiansburg, Vienna, and Front Royal. This proposal is a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001).
Voter registration applications; conditional votes and envelopes. Permits transmittal of a copy of a voter's original registration application by computer, electronic means or fax from one general registrar to another. The bill also provides that a photocopy shall be taken of the envelope in which a rejected conditional vote is sealed and that the copy may serve as a registration application. Conditional votes occur when a voter is not listed on the registered voter list at the precinct. The voter completes an envelope at the polls with the information required to register to vote and seals his conditional paper ballot in the envelope. The electoral board meets the next day to determine whether the conditional votes should be counted. The conditional vote envelopes are then sealed and stored with other election materials.
City of Colonial Heights; Advisory referendum. Provides authority for an advisory referendum in the City of Colonial Heights on the question of whether the city shall establish a recreation center. This bill is identical to HB 164.
Residence addresses for purposes of voter registration and Department of Motor Vehicles applications and records. Requires individuals to provide the same residence address for purposes of voter registration and for obtaining licenses, permits, and identity cards from the Department. Directs the State Board of Elections and Department to implement procedures to verify the same residence address is shown on the voter registration system and Department records.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; mandatory electronic filing of reports; political committees. Requires political committees (including PACs and political party committees subject to the Act's reporting requirements) to file campaign finance reports electronically in accordance with State Board of Elections standards. An exception is made for county or city political party committees that file reports locally.
Elections; filling of vacancies in constitutional offices. Provides that the chairmen of the House of Delegates and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice, rather than the circuit court, shall make an appointment to fill temporarily a vacancy in the office of attorney for the Commonwealth, pending the holding of a special election to fill the vacancy, when there is no deputy or full-time assistant attorney for the Commonwealth available to fill the vacancy before the election.
House of Delegates districts. Makes technical adjustments in the House of Delegates lines dividing Albemarle County among the Twenty-fifth, Fifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth, and Fifty-ninth Districts in order to have the House lines coincide with the County's new magisterial district and precinct lines. The split precincts named in the bill are 2000 census precincts that technically must be split in order to pick up the new precinct lines. The respective district population deviations remain within the plus or minus two percent population deviation used in the 2001 redistricting.
Local electoral boards; appointments. Provides that the county or city political party committees of the two major political parties, rather than the circuit court judges, will appoint the members of the local electoral board and fill vacancies on the board.
House of Delegates districts. Makes a technical adjustment in the House of Delegates line dividing Hanover County between the Fifty-fifth and Ninety-seventh Districts in order to have the House line coincide with the County's true precinct lines and eliminate a split precinct. The split precinct named in the bill is a 2000 census "pseudo" or adjusted precinct that technically must be split in order to pick up the true precinct line. The adjustment shifts 195 total population from the Fifty-fifth District to the Ninety-seventh District; both districts remain within the plus or minus two percent population deviation used in the 2001 redistricting.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, record retention requirements and reviews of campaign finance disclosure reports. Provides that (i) the State Board of Elections shall review the campaign finance reports of candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General and 10 percent of the candidates for the General Assembly selected at random; (ii) the review shall be for the purposes of (a) reconciling the balance in the campaign depository with the amounts reported in the candidate's reports of receipts and expenditures and (b) reviewing the reports for mathematical accuracy and facial completeness including the reporting of specific information required by law; (iii) the Board shall meet publicly to select on a random basis by a drawing the General Assembly candidate campaigns to review; (iv) a campaign committee shall be exempt from review if it has received less than $25,000 in contributions; and (v) the campaign treasurer shall retain, and provide on request by the Board, the bank statements and copies of checks issued on campaign depositories and receipts for campaign fund expenditures greater than $500. The bill will take effect January 1, 2004. This proposal is a recommendation of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Campaign Finance Reform pursuant to SJR 393 (2001).
Elections; void ballots. Provides that no ballot will be considered void because it contains a write-in vote for a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot for the office whether the ballot is voted once or twice for the same candidate for the office.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; electronic filings; database. Requires the State Board to make information from campaign finance disclosure reports filed by candidates for the General Assembly, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General available on the Internet within 24 hours of receipt of the reports by the State Board.
Virginia voter registration system; duties of the State Board of Elections. Provides that the Secretary of the Board will determine the material used and the form of the voter registration cards so that they will be of sufficient quality and durability to be retained permanently.
Announcement of results in Presidential elections. Prohibits election officials and persons present in the polling place to observe the ascertainment of the results from making any public announcement of precinct results in a Presidential election until the polls are closed in the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. A violation of the prohibition is a Class 3 misdemeanor. The bill's provisions will expire July 1, 2004, unless two-thirds of the states east of the Mississippi River have passed a like prohibition.
House of Delegates districts. Makes a technical adjustment in the House of Delegates line dividing Prince William County between the Thirteenth and Thirty-first Districts in order to have the House line coincide with the County's true precinct lines and eliminate a split precinct. The split Park Precinct named in the bill is a 2000 census "pseudo" or adjusted precinct that technically must be split in order to pick up the true precinct line. However, the County's precinct line does not follow a census block boundary. The County estimates that 260 population would shift from the Thirty-first to the Thirteenth District; the exact number cannot be determined because of the split census block. If the County's estimate is correct, both districts would remain within the plus or minus two percent population deviation used in the 2001 redistricting. This would be the only instance in which the state legislative district lines split a census block rather than follow block boundaries.
House of Delegates districts. Changes a segment of the boundary between the Second and Third Districts in Russell County to conform the House line to new County precinct lines. Because the precinct line does not follow physical features, the exact population impact of the change cannot be determined. The Second District at a minimum would be at (-)2.4 percent deviation, and could be as much as 3.3 percent below ideal. The population deviation range for the 2001 redistricting was plus or minus 2.0 percent, and no blocks were split in drawing districts.
Virginia Clean Election Act and Fund. Establishes an alternative, publicly financed, campaign financing option for candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. A candidate may volunteer to participate and be certified for public funds after a qualifying process. A participating candidate may not accept or spend private contributions and must abide by the campaign contribution and spending restrictions set out in the Act. The bill establishes the Virginia Clean Election Commission to administer the Act and Fund. The bill sets a contribution limitation of $500 for elections for Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General. The bill is based on the Maine Clean Election Act.
House of Delegates districts. Makes technical adjustments in the House of Delegates lines dividing Caroline County among the Fifty-fourth, Ninety-seventh, and Ninety-ninth Districts in order to have the House lines coincide with the County's new magisterial district and precinct lines. The split precincts named in the bill are 2000 census precincts that technically must be split in order to pick up the new precinct lines. The adjustments shift 271 total population from the Fifty-fourth to the Ninety-seventh, 87 total population from the Fifty-fourth to the Ninety-ninth, and 44 total population from the Ninety-seventh to the Ninety-ninth. The respective district population deviations remain within the plus or minus two percent population deviation used in the 2001 redistricting.
Effective date of decennial redistricting measures; elections following decennial redistricting. Provides (i) that decennial redistricting measures for congressional, General Assembly, and local districts take effect for the first general election for the office following enactment of the redistricting measure; (ii) that members in office when the redistricting measure is enacted continue in office, complete their terms of office, and continue to represent the district from which they were elected; and (iii) that a vacancy in the office will be filled from the district as it existed when the member whose vacancy is being filled was last elected to office. This bill is identical to SB 48.
Effective date of decennial redistricting measures; elections following decennial redistricting. Provides (i) that decennial redistricting measures for congressional, General Assembly, and local districts take effect for the first general election for the office following enactment of the redistricting measure; (ii) that members in office when the redistricting measure is enacted continue in office, complete their terms of office, and continue to represent the district from which they were elected; and (iii) that a vacancy in the office will be filled from the district as it existed when the member whose vacancy is being filled was last elected to office. This bill is identical to SB 6.
Senatorial districts. Makes a technical adjustment in the senatorial line dividing Cumberland County between the Tenth and Fifteenth Districts to eliminate a split caused in the new Cumberland County supervisor districts and precincts by the Senate line. The adjustment shifts 329 total population from the Tenth District to the Fifteenth District and gives the Tenth District a population deviation of minus 2.1 percent, slightly outside the plus or minus 2.0 percent deviation allowed in the 2001 redistricting.
Senatorial districts. Makes adjustments in certain senatorial district boundaries in order to conform the Senate lines to new local election precinct and district lines and avoid splitting the new local precincts between senatorial districts. The bill continues to name 2000 census precincts in order to be consistent with the district descriptions for all other districts as found in § 24.2-304.01. Boundary line adjustments are made within Goochland County. No population is affected by the adjustment.
Run-off primaries. Authorizes a run-off primary if the candidate winning the first primary has not received at least 40 percent of the vote cast for the office. The candidate receiving the next highest number of votes may call for a second primary to be held on the fourth Tuesday following the first primary. Only the candidates receiving the highest and next highest number of votes in the first primary will have their names printed on the ballot for the run-off primary.
Congressional districts. Makes technical adjustments in congressional district boundary lines. The bill affects lines in Brunswick, Hampton, Henry, Norfolk, and Spotsylvania and the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth districts to conform the congressional lines to new precinct boundaries. The population deviation for the affected districts is 0.1 percent (absolute deviation of - 441 to + 675), above the 0.0 percent deviation (absolute deviation of - 25 to + 13) in the 2001 redistricting plan.
Senatorial districts. Makes technical adjustments in the boundary between the Nineteenth and Twenty-third Districts in Campbell County in order to conform to the County's new election district and precinct lines. The adjustment places the Nineteenth District at 2.4 percent population deviation, greater than the two percent deviation used in the 2001 redistricting.