Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy with- out first registering with the mayor and receiving a per- mit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regu- lation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovahs Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance No. 19985 regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitioners complaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press. App. 10a44a. The District Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and its effect on petitioners was introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits canvassers and others from going in and upon private residential property for the purpose of promoting any cause without first having obtained a permit pursuant to §116.03. 1 That section provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a Solicitation Permit from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly detailed Solicitors Registration Form. 2 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident. 3 The ordinance sets forth grounds for the denial or revocation of a permit, 4 but the record before us does not show that any application has been denied or that any permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a permit.
A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the resident files a No Solicitation Registration Form with the mayor, and also posts a No Solicitation sign on his property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property, unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the No Solicitation Registration Form itself. 5 Only 32 of the Villages 278 residents filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions; 6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, thereby excluding only Jehovahs Witnesses and Political Candidates from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jehovahs Witnesses do not consider themselves to be solicitors because they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at trial that they would honor no solicitation signs in the Village. They also explained at trial that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to preach from Scripture. 7 For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to God. App. 321a.
Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance was the product of the mayors hostility to their ministry, but the District Court credited the mayors testimony that it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the Village residents, specifically to protect them from flim flam con artists who prey on small town populations. 61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to the activities of petitioners as well as to business or political canvassers, id., at 737, 738.
The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not infringe on petitioners First Amendment rights. The court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the requirement in §116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially invalid, but cured by the Villages agreement to attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held that petitioners could comply with §116.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as the Jehovahs Witness ministry. Id., at 738. And third, it held that §116.05, which limited canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be replaced with a provision referring to reasonable hours of the day. Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners and dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240 F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id., at 560. It rejected petitioners reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990) , 8 because that language was dicta and therefore not binding. 240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) , reasoning that the very act of going door-to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities. 240 F. 3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals concluded that the interests promoted by the Villageprotecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyanceas well as the harm that it seeks to preventcriminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residentsthough by no means overwhelming, were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565566. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovahs Witnesses ministry because those cases either involved a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e.g. , Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) , or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g . , Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 302 (1940) .
In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit requirements, the ordinance significantly restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Villages interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Village failed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or the efficacy of the restriction. 240 F. 3d, at 572.
For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering. 10 It is more than historical accident that most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought by Jehovahs Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania , 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943) , the Jehovahs Witnesses claim to follow the example of Paul, teaching publicly, and from house to house. Acts 20:20. They take literally the mandate of the Scriptures, Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. Mark 16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God. Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door.
Although our past cases involving Jehovahs Witnesses, most of which were decided shortly before and during World War II, do not directly control the question we confront today, they provide both a historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners First Amendment claim that the breadth of the Villages ordinance offends the First Amendment. 11 Those cases involved petty offenses that raised constitutional questions of the most serious magnitudequestions that implicated the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our consideration of the ordinance at issue here.
First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech involved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania , the Court noted that hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelismas old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years… . This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 319 U. S., at 109.
In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939) , the petitioner was a Jehovahs Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees. Id., at 164 (emphasis added).
Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering has played in our constitutional tradition of free and open discussion, these early cases also recognized the interests a town may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) , the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovahs Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting door to door was invalid because the issuance of the license depended on the exercise of discretion by a city official. Our opinion recognized that a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. Id., at 306. Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers , the Court recognized crime prevention as a legitimate interest served by these ordinances and noted that burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later. 319 U. S., at 144. Despite recognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent is clear that there must be a balance between these interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights. We must be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation and must weigh the circumstances and … appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.  Ibid. (quoting Schneider , 308 U. S., at 161).
Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovahs Witnesses to resist speech regulation have not been a struggle for their rights alone. In Martin , after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively upon this method of communication, the Court summarized that [d]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people. 319 U. S., at 144146.
As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly… .
If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment. Id., at 539540.
The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents privacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve.
The text of the Villages ordinance prohibits canvassers from going on private property for the purpose of explaining or promoting any cause, unless they receive a permit and the residents visited have not opted for a no solicitation sign. Had this provision been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Villages interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet, even though the Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to serve those interests, it has never contended that it should be so narrowly interpreted. To the contrary, the Villages administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a significant number of noncommercial canvassers promoting a wide variety of causes. Indeed, on the No Solicitation Forms provided to the residents, the canvassers include Camp Fire Girls, Jehovahs Witnesses, Political Candidates, Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season, and Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church. The ordinance unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political activity as well. It would seem to extend to residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors, 12 or ringing doorbells to enlist support for employing a more efficient garbage collector.
The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns. It is offensivenot only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free societythat in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so . Even if the issuance of permits by the mayors office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate the pernicious effect of such a permit requirement.
First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned handbills demonstrate, 13 there are a significant number of persons who support causes anonymously. 14 The decision to favor anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of ones privacy as possible. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U. S., at 341342. The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit application filed in the mayors office and available for public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity. Although it is true, as the Court of Appeals suggested, see 240 F. 3d, at 563, that persons who are known to the resident reveal their allegiance to a group or cause when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the ordinance does not implicate anonymity interests. The Sixth Circuits reasoning is undermined by our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. , 525 U. S. 182 (1999) . The badge requirement that we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition circulators seeking signatures in face-to-face interactions. The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulators interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes. Such preclusion may well be justified in some situationsfor example, by the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, see ibid. , or by the interest in preventing fraudulent commercial transactions. The Village ordinance, however, sweeps more broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial transactions or to any special interest in protecting the electoral process.
Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the required permit. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be implemented without first obtaining the mayors permission. In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co. , 297 U. S. 233 (1936) . In Grosjean , while discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, the Court stated that  [t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.  Id., at 249250 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927)); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin , 303 U. S. 444 (1938) .
The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also central to our conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Villages stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village, however, argues that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting the privacy of the resident and the prevention of crime.
With respect to the former, it seems clear that §107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of No Solicitation signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the residents unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener. Schaumburg , 444 U. S., at 639 ([T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs … suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy). The annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit.
With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the absence of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance. They might, for example, ask for directions or permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers or census takers. See n. 1, supra . Or they might register under a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an applicants identity or organizational credentials. Moreover, the Village did not assert an interest in crime prevention below, and there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us.
The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that repeatedly saved petitioners coreligionists from petty prosecutions reflected the Courts evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that are implicated in this case. The value judgment that then motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today.
1 Section 116.01 provides: The practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited. App. to Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term canvassers to include Jehovahs Witnesses and the term cause to include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private property for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services. Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 2, 7, 9, the Villages ordinance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime.
2 Section 116.03 provides: (a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private property or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes described in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and obtaining a Solicitation Permit. (b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitors Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain the following information: (1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrants residence for five years next preceding the date of registration; (2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services offered; (3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact relationship and authority of the Applicant; (4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is desired; (5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Registrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and, (6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its business or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the nature of the privilege desired. Brief for Respondents 3a4a.
3 Section 116.04 provides: Each Registrant who complies with Section 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the Registrants Solicitors Registration Form. Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited. Id., at 4a.
4 Section 116.06 provides: Permits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons: (a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solicitor's Registration Form. (b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitors Registration Form. (c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of conducting the activity. (d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codified Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law. (e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property. (f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this chapter for the original registration. Id., at 5a.
5 Section 116.07 provides, in part: (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corporation who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads No Solicitation in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such property. (b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a No Solicitation Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be completed by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following information: … . Id., at 6a.
6 The suggested exceptions listed on the form are: 1. Scouting Organizations 2. Camp Fire Girls 3. Childrens Sports Organizations 4. Childrens Solicitation for Supporting School Activities 5. Volunteer Fire Dept. 6. Jehovahs Witnesses 7. Political Candidates 8. Beauty Products Sales People 9. Watkins Sales 10. Christmas Carolers 11. Parcel Delivery 12. Little League 13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season 14. Police 15. Campaigners 16. Newspaper Carriers 17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church 18. Food Salesmen 19. Salespersons. App. 229a. Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.
7 Specifically, from the Book of Matthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as our commission to preach. … So Jesus, by example, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And thats the activity that Jehovahs Witnesses engage in, even as Christs apostles did after his resurrection to heaven. Id., at 313a314a.
8 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) , to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school). 494 U. S., at 881 (footnote omitted).
9 In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual issue embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit contains the speakers name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to answer whether the ordinances registration requirement abridges so much protected speech that it is invalid on its face.
10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938) .
11 The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided in Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness grounds required advance notice to the police before casually soliciting the votes of neighbors. 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.
12 Hynes, 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.
13 Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960) ; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) .
14 Although the Jehovahs Witnesses do not themselves object to a loss of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of overbreadth. We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration provision would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973) .


On July 23, 2013, the United States, individual plaintiffs, and the State of New York filed a settlement agreement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The agreement remedies discrimination by the State in the administration of its mental health service system and ensures that individuals with mental illness who reside in 23 large adult homes in New York City receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs consistent with the ADA and Olmstead. Under the agreement, such individuals will have the opportunity to live and receive services in the community such that they are able to live, work, and participate fully in community life.
The parties filed an amended settlement agreement on January 30, 2014, and the Court approved the amended settlement agreement on March 17, 2014. The parties filed a second amended settlement agreement on May 4, 2017, which the Court approved on May 18, 2017. The parties filed a supplement to the second amended settlement agreement on March 16, 2018, which the Court approved on September 6, 2018.
Prior to the agreement, the parties litigated these issues in Disability Advocates v. Paterson, in the District Court and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that case, following a trial on the merits, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that New York State officials and agencies discriminated against thousands of people with mental illness by administering the State's mental health service system in a manner that segregated them in large, institutional adult homes and denied them the opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
The DOJ intervened during the remedy phase of the case and participated in the appeal. On April 6, 2012, the Second Circuit vacated the remedial order and judgment of the District Court and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.
On June 6, 2018, the United States filed its Complaint, a Joint Motion to Dismiss, and an Agreement to Resolve its investigation in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The Agreement lays out relief for individuals with serious mental illness in nursing facilities across the State, with provisions requiring intensified transition and diversion efforts to home and community-based services and community-based mental health services, including supportive housing, ACT, substance use disorder services, and crisis services, to ensure individualized service planning and support successful community tenure.
On August 23, 2012, the United States entered a comprehensive, eight-year settlement agreement with the State of North Carolina resolving the Civil Rights Division's ADA Olmstead investigation of the State's mental health service system, which currently serves thousands of individuals with mental illness in large adult care homes. The Agreement will expand access to community-based supported housing – integrated housing that promotes inclusion and independence and enables individuals with mental illness to participate fully in community life.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the State will provide community-based supported housing to 3,000 individuals who currently reside in, or are at risk of entry into, adult care homes. A person-centered discharge planning process is designed to ensure individuals are able to transition successfully to community-based settings, while a pre-admission screening process will prevent more individuals from being unnecessarily institutionalized. The Agreement will also ensure that thousands of people with mental illness have access to critical community-based mental health services such as Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams, and will expand integrated employment opportunities for individuals with mental illness by providing supported employment services to 2,500 individuals. The Agreement also requires development of a crisis service system that offers timely and accessible services and supports in the least restrictive setting, including mobile crisis teams, walk-in crisis clinics, short-term community hospital beds, and 24/7 crisis hotlines.
On January 9, 2017, the United States moved to enforce the supported housing and supported employment provisions of the Agreement, which the Court granted on September 21, 2017. The parties then jointly moved to extend the duration of the Agreement by one year. On November 1, 2017, the Court entered an order modifying the Agreement, which now expires on July 1, 2021.
On August 23, 2016, the United States filed a lawsuit against the State of Georgia in federal district court to remedy violations of the ADA pertaining to the State’s failure to provide thousands of public school students with behavior-related disabilities with appropriate mental health and therapeutic educational services and supports in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. The lawsuit alleges that, as a result of the manner in which Georgia plans, funds, administers, and delivers its mental health and therapeutic educational services through the Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support Program (“GNETS Program”), students with disabilities are unnecessarily segregated and provided unequal educational opportunities in GNETS Centers and Classrooms, where they are isolated from their non-disabled peers, when they could be served in general education classrooms. The lawsuit further alleges that other students with behavior-related disabilities are placed at serious risk of segregation in the GNETS Program.
On July 15, 2015, the United States sent its findings to the State of Georgia stating that the State’s administration of the Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS) program violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act by unnecessarily segregating students with disabilities from their peers in school. The State fails to ensure that students with behavior-related disabilities receive services and supports that could enable them to remain in, or return to, the most integrated educational placements appropriate to their needs.
On August 22, 2016, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in the case of Ball v. Kasich. In Ball, individuals on a wait list for home- and community-based services allege that Ohio’s ongoing denial of services has placed them at serious risk of institutionalization. The Statement of Interest clarifies that non-institutionalized individuals with disabilities who are not currently receiving state-funded home- and community-based services may bring a claim that a public entity has placed them at risk of institutionalization or segregation in violation of Title II’s “integration mandate.” The Statement of Interest also makes clear that a serious risk of institutionalization need not be imminent to state a valid Olmstead claim.
The United States issued a findings letter in December 2011 concluding that Mississippi is violating the ADA's integration mandate in its provision of services to people with developmental disabilities and mental illness. Following an investigation, the Department found that the State of Mississippi has failed to meet its obligations under the ADA by unnecessarily institutionalizing persons with mental illness or developmental disabilities and failing to ensure that they are offered a meaningful opportunity to live in integrated community settings appropriate to their needs. The Department recommended that the State implement remedial measures, including the development of community-based services for people with developmental disabilities or mental illness who are unnecessarily institutionalized, or at risk of unnecessary institutionalization.
On August 11, 2016, the United States filed a lawsuit against the State of Mississippi, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons (“CRIPA”) alleging it violates Title II of the ADA and Olmstead by unnecessarily segregating people with mental illness in its state hospitals and placing people with mental illness at serious risk of hospitalization as a result of insufficient community-based services. The complaint alleges that the state’s failure to provide services in community settings forces adults with mental illness to access services in segregated state hospitals, including the Mississippi State Hospital, East Mississippi State Hospital, North Mississippi State Hospital, and South Mississippi State Hospital.
For more information about this case, visit the Special Litigation Section's website.
On September 8, 2015, the United States entered into a settlement agreement with the State of Oregon to vindicate the civil rights of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) who are unnecessarily segregated in sheltered workshops, or at risk of such unnecessary segregation. The settlement agreement with Oregon resolves a class action lawsuit by private plaintiffs in which the Department moved to intervene in May 2013. The lawsuit alleged that the State's employment service system over-relied on segregated sheltered workshops to the exclusion of integrated alternatives, such as supported employment services, and placed individuals, including youth, at risk of entering sheltered workshops.
As a result of the proposed settlement, over the next seven years, 1,115 working-age individuals with I/DD who are currently being served in segregated sheltered workshops will have opportunities to work in real jobs at competitive wages. Additionally, at least 4,900 youth ages 14 - 24 years old will receive supported employment services designed to assist them to choose, prepare for, get, and keep work in a typical work setting. Half of the youth served will receive, at a minimum, an Individual Plan for Employment through the State's Office of Vocational Rehabilitation Services. Correspondingly, the State will reduce its reliance on sheltered workshops and implement policies and capacity-building strategies to improve the employment system to increase access to competitive integrated employment and the opportunity for people with I/DD to work the maximum number of hours consistent with their abilities and preferences.
The settlement agreement was approved by U.S. Magistrate Judge Janice Stewart of the District of Oregon, who is presiding over the lawsuit, on December 29, 2015.
Sonnenberg v. Disability Rights Idaho, Inc. - 1:14-cv-00369-EJL | (PDF) -- On July 20, 2015, the Division filed a Statement of Interest in Sonnenberg v. Disability Rights Idaho, Inc., a case in which a county coroner refused to provide its investigatory records to a protection and advocacy organization. The protection and advocacy organization sought declaratory relief under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851 (1991), which allows access to records of an “agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such [a] facility [rendering care and treatment].” The Statement of Interest expressed the United States’ view that a coroner is an “agency” within the meaning of PAIMI, that PAIMI preempts state privacy laws, and that protection and advocacy organizations determine when there is sufficient probable cause to justify access.
On June 12, 2014, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in the case of Smith v. Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In Smith, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania put them at serious risk of institutionalization by reducing funding for Act 150, a state-funded program providing attendant care services in the community. The Statement of Interest highlights the legal principles governing ADA claims, including the fact that individuals who are at risk of entering an institution because of a state policy need not wait until they enter the institution in order to assert an ADA integration claim. The Statement of Interest also addressed what constitutes a request for a reasonable accommodation for the purposes of bringing an ADA integration claim.
On April 8, 2014, the United States entered into the nation’s first statewide settlement agreement vindicating the civil rights of individuals with disabilitieswho are unnecessarily segregated in sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs. The settlement agreement with the State of Rhode Island resolves the Civil Rights Division’s January 6, 2014 findings, as part of an ADA Olmstead investigation, that the State’s day activity service system over-relies on segregated settings, including sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs, to the exclusion of integrated alternatives, such as supported employment and integrated day services.
The settlement agreement provides relief to approximately 3,250 individuals with I/DD over ten years. Rhode Island will provide supported employment placements to approximately 2,000 individuals, including at least 700 people currently in sheltered workshops, at least 950 people currently in facility-based non-work programs, and approximately 300-350 students leaving high school. Individuals in these target populations will receive sufficient services to support a normative 40 hour work week, with the expectation that individuals will work, on average, in a supported employment job at competitive wages for at least 20 hours per week. In addition, the State will provide transition services to approximately 1,250 youth between the ages of 14 and 21, ensuring that transition-age youth have access to a wide array of transition, vocational rehabilitation, and supported employment services intended to lead to integrated employment outcomes after they leave secondary school. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island has entered the settlement agreement as a court-enforceable Consent Decree.
On July 22, 2013, the United States filed a lawsuit against the State of Florida in federal district court to remedy ADA violations involving the State's failure to provide services and supports to children with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. The lawsuit alleges that, as a result of the manner in which Florida administers its service system for children with significant medical needs, children with disabilities are unnecessarily segregated in nursing facilities when they could be served in their family homes or other community-based settings. The lawsuit further alleges that the State's policies and practices place other children with significant medical needs in the community at serious risk of institutionalization in nursing facilities. On December 6, 2013, the Court consolidated this case with A.R. v. Dudek, No. 12-cv-60460 (S.D. Fla. 2012), a private lawsuit alleging that the State's policies and practices have caused children with disabilities to be unnecessarily placed in nursing facilities, or at risk of placement in nursing facilities.
On March 31, 2014, the United States filed a statement of interest in opposition to the State's renewed motion to dismiss the private plaintiffs' Complaint. Previously, in June 2012 and April 2013, the Department filed two Statements of Interest in T.H. v. Dudek.
On April 7, 2016, the United States filed an Opposition to the State of Florida’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In the Motion, the State had asked the Court to rule, on a variety of grounds, that the United States could not recover damages for unnecessarily institutionalized children to whom the State had been deliberately indifferent. The Opposition sets forth the United States’ view, inter alia, that it may recover such damages, that it may do so with proof of general (or presumed) damages, that the statute of limitations does not bar any of the damages sought, and that there is sufficient evidence on which the Court could find deliberate indifference in this case.
On February 5, 2014 the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Disability Rights Mississippi v. Mississippi Children's Home Services, a case in which the defendants have denied monitoring access to the local protection and advocacy organization. The Statement of Interest expresses the United States' view that regular monitoring visits, including unaccompanied access to residents of a facility, are a critical aspect of protection and advocacy organizations' work and are authorized by the Protection and Advocacy Acts.
On September 13, 2013, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Sciarrillo v. Christie, a case in which private plaintiffs oppose the state's deinstitutionalization plan for its facilities housing people with developmental disabilities. The Statement of Interest expresses the United States' view that plaintiffs failed to assert a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In December 2013, the District Court of New Jersey dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit, rejecting this “obverse Olmstead” argument.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest opposing Mississippi officials' Motion to Dismiss the complaint of Medicaid-eligible children with significant behavioral disorders who allege that the State of Mississippi fails to ensure that medically necessary services are provided to Medicaid-eligible children in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs in violation of the ADA and the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act.
The motion to dismiss was heard by a magistrate judge who ruled in favor of the State and recommended dismissal of the Medicaid EPSDT claim. The plaintiffs filed an objection with the District Court, and the United States filed another Statement of Interest. The State responded to plaintiffs' objection. The Objection is pending before the Court.
On September 20, 2012, the Court granted the United States' request to intervene in a pending lawsuit against the State of Texas. The suit claims that Texas unnecessarily segregates individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in nursing facilities, and that this violates the law under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest on June 26, 2013, supporting the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification. The United States previously filed a Statement of Interest on October 3, 2011, opposing the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The pending lawsuit alleges that the District of Columbia violates the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by unnecessarily segregating individuals with physical disabilities in nursing facilities.
On June 13, 2013, the United States entered a court-enforceable interim settlement agreement with the State of Rhode Island and the City of Providence which resolved the Civil Rights Division's findings, as part of an ADA Olmstead investigation, that the State and City have unnecessarily segregated individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) in a sheltered workshop and segregated day activity service program, and have placed public school students with I/DD at risk of unnecessary segregation in that same program. The first-of-its-kind agreement will provide relief to approximately 200 Rhode Islanders with I/DD who have received services from the segregated sheltered workshop and day activity service provider Training Thru Placement, Inc. (TTP), and the Harold A. Birch Vocational Program (Birch), a special education program which has run a segregated sheltered workshop inside a Providence high school.
Pursuant to the Interim Settlement Agreement, the State and City will give TTP and Birch service recipients the opportunity to receive integrated supported employment and integrated daytime services that will enable them to interact with the broader community to the fullest extent possible. The State will no longer provide services or funding for new participants at TTP's sheltered workshop and segregated day program, and the City will no longer provide services or funding to Birch's in-school sheltered workshop, which has served as a pipeline to TTP. Instead, over the next year, the State and City will provide adults at TTP and youth in transition from Birch with robust and person-centered career development planning, transitional services, supported employment placements, and integrated day services. The Interim Settlement Agreement calls for individuals to receive sufficient service to support a normative 40 hour work week, with the expectation that individuals will work, on average, in a supported employment job at competitive wages for at least 20 hours per week.
Faces of Olmstead - Read several individuals' stories.
On January 26, 2012, the Division filed in District Court a Complaint and a simultaneous Settlement Agreement resolving its ADA Olmstead investigation into whether persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities in Virginia are being served in the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs.
The fundamental goals of the Agreement are to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities who are living in the community, including thousands of individuals on waitlists for community-based services, and ensure that people who are currently in institutions - at the Commonwealth's training centers or in other private but state-funded facilities - have a meaningful opportunity to receive services that meet their needs in the community.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the Commonwealth will create a total of approximately 4,200 home and community-based waivers for people who are on waitlists for community services and individuals transitioning from institutional settings over a ten year period. Almost 3,000 of these waivers will be targeted to individuals with intellectual disabilities on the waitlist or youth with intellectual disabilities in private facilities; another 450 waivers will be targeted to individuals with non-intellectual developmental disabilities on the waitlist or youth in private facilities; and another 800 waivers will be targeted to individuals choosing to leave the training centers. An additional 1,000 individuals on waitlists for community services will receive family supports to help provide care in their family home or their own home.
Under the Agreement, the Commonwealth will also create a comprehensive community crisis system with a full range of crisis services, including a hotline, mobile crisis teams, and crisis stabilization programs, to divert individuals from unnecessary institutionalization or other out-of-home placements. The Agreement requires the Commonwealth to develop and implement an "Employment First" policy to prioritize and expand meaningful work opportunities for individuals with developmental disabilities. In addition, the Agreement will create an $800,000 fund for housing assistance to facilitate opportunities for independent living for people with developmental disabilities. Finally, the Agreement requires the Commonwealth to create a strong and comprehensive quality and risk management system to ensure that community-based services are safe and effective.
The Agreement is court enforceable and will be monitored by an independent reviewer with the capacity to hire staff to assist in the implementation and to conduct compliance and incident reviews.
After taking public comment and holding a fairness hearing, the Court approved the settlement agreement subject to certain modifications, which were agreed to by the Commonwealth and the United States. The Court entered the settlement agreement as a final order on August 23, 2012.
On February 10, 2011, the United States issued a Findings Letter concluding that Virginia is in violation of the ADA integration mandate in the operation of its developmental disabilities services.
Interest to provide its interpretation of the ADA.
On March 14, 2013, the parties in United States v. Marion County Nursing Home District d/b/a Maple Lawn Nursing Home filed a Settlement Agreement. The Agreement addresses whether residents of the nursing home are being served in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. The Agreement also addresses basic elements of residents' care and treatment. Maple Lawn is required to develop numerous improvement measures. An independent monitor has been selected to monitor the Settlement Agreement.
On April 15, 2013, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in ILADD v. Quinn. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to stop the planned closure of two state-run centers for people with developmental disabilities. We argue that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the regulations, and the case law do not support the claim that the ADA gives persons in state-run centers a right to remain in those institutions and to stop the State's efforts to rebalance its service system toward community based care.
On December 19, 2013, the Department, along with a coalition of private plaintiff organizations, entered into a comprehensive Settlement Agreement with the State of New Hampshire that will significantly expand and enhance mental health service capacity in integrated community settings over the next six years. The Agreement is a full consent decree entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire as a Court order on February 12, 2014. The Agreement also provides for regular compliance reviews and public reporting by an independent monitor."
The Agreement will enable a class of thousands of adults with serious mental illness to receive expanded and enhanced services in the community, which will foster their independence and enable them to participate more fully in community life. It will significantly reduce visits to hospital emergency rooms and will avoid unnecessary institutionalization at State mental health facilities, including New Hampshire Hospital (the State’s only psychiatric hospital) and the Glencliff Home (a State-owned and –operated nursing facility for people with mental illness).
The Agreement requires the State, for the first time, to create mobile crisis teams in the most populated areas of the State and to create crisis apartments to help support team efforts at avoiding hospitalization or institutionalization. The Agreement also requires the State to make enhanced Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”) team services available statewide, such that the mental health system can provide ACT to at least 1,500 people at any given time. The Agreement requires the State to provide scattered-site, permanent, supported housing to hundreds of additional people throughout the state; the State will also create special residential community settings to address the needs of persons with complex health care issues who have had difficulty accessing sufficient community services in the past. The State will also deliver additional and enhanced supported employment services, consistent with the Dartmouth evidence-based model, to hundreds of new recipients throughout the state.
The Settlement Agreement resolves litigation that had been contested for well over a year. Private Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint in February 2012, and on April 4, 2012, the Court granted the Department’s motion to intervene. On April 7, 2011, the United States had issued a Findings Letter concluding that the State of New Hampshire was failing to provide services to individuals with mental illness in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs in violation of the ADA, which led to the needless and prolonged institutionalization of individuals with disabilities and placed individuals with disabilities at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. On September 17, 2013, after months of discovery and a hearing with oral argument, the Court certified a class of Plaintiffs consistent with parameters supported by Plaintiffs and the United States. Shortly thereafter, settlement talks resumed which produced the instant Agreement.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest in Hunter v. Cook, in opposition to the state of Georgia's argument that serious risk of institutionalization is not a viable claim under Title II of the ADA. The Plaintiffs' suit is a proposed class action under Title II of the ADA, the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 1396a et seq., and the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's administration of the Department of Community Health and the Medicaid program denies, limits, and reduces their nursing services in a manner that puts Plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary confinement or out of home care in violation of the ADA.
In a suit brought on behalf of approximately 45,000 individuals with disabilities who receive personal care services through Washington State's Medicaid program, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in January 2011, which the District Court denied in February 2011. On December 16, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and granted injunctive relief with respect to the named plaintiffs, finding that plaintiffs had demonstrated that the State's cuts placed them at serious risk of institutionalization in violation of the ADA. The court relied, in part, upon DOJ's previously filed Statement of Interest.
On July 6, 2011 the Division filed in District Court a Complaint and a simultaneous Settlement Agreement resolving its ADA Olmstead investigation into whether persons with mental illness in Delaware are being served in the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs and its CRIPA investigation into conditions of confinement at Delaware Psychiatric Center.
The fundamental goals of the Agreement are: to ensure that people who are unnecessarily institutionalized, at the Delaware Psychiatric Center or other inpatient psychiatric facilities, can receive the treatment they need in the community; to ensure that when individuals go into mental health crisis, sufficient resources are available in the community so that they do not need to go unnecessarily to psychiatric hospitals or jails; and to ensure that people with mental illness who are living in the community are not forced to enter institutions because of the lack of stable housing and intensive treatment options in the community.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Delaware will create a comprehensive community crisis system to serve as the front door to the state's mental health system including a crisis hotline, mobile crisis teams able to reach someone anywhere in the state within one hour, 2 walk-in crisis centers, and short term crisis stabilization units. The agreement also commits the state to providing intensive community-based treatment through 11 Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) teams, 4 intensive case management teams, and 25 targeted case managers. The State will offer at least 650 housing vouchers or subsidies to allow people to obtain stable, integrated housing. Finally, the State will develop evidence-based supported employment services for 1100 people, rehabilitation services including substance abuse and educational services to 1100 people, and family and peer support services to 1000 people. The Agreement requires Delaware to establish a statewide quality management system reflecting qualitative and quantitative measures and provides for an independent monitor with capacity to hire staff to assist in the implementation and to conduct compliance reviews.
The United States issued a Findings Letter in November 2010 stating that Delaware is violating the ADA integration mandate in its provision of mental health services.
In July 2010, the United States filed an amicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief in this class action. We supported the arguments made by a class of individuals with developmental disabilities who sought to end their unjustified segregation in Pennsylvania's large, publicly-run congregate care institutions. In January 2011, the Court ruled in favor of the class members, finding that Defendants had violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by unnecessarily institutionalizing the class members. Mem. & Order, Benjamin v. Department of Public Welfare, No. 09-cv-1182 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011). The Court encouraged the parties to negotiate an agreement to remedy that violation. The parties submitted a settlement agreement for the Court's approval in May 2011. The Court held a fairness hearing to determine whether the agreement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Following the hearing, in September 2011, the Court approved the agreement.
Since that time, representatives of a group of individuals who live in these state institutions and wish to remain there have appealed the Court's order approving the settlement agreement to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Benjamin et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, et al., Nos. 11-3684, 11-3685 (3d Cir.)). They argue that the relief given to the class members will hurt their ability to stay in the institutions. They also argue that the settlement agreement should not have been approved because it assumes that institutionalized individuals who are unable to express a preference regarding their placements can be moved to community-based services if appropriate. The class members and Pennsylvania defendants together filed a brief opposing those arguments on April 3, 2012. Shortly thereafter, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the settlement agreement. We argued that the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. We also explained that because federal law strongly favors the integration of individuals with disabilities into the community over segregation in large institutions, an institutionalized person who can live in the community but cannot express a preference regarding placement and has no guardian or involved family member, should be provided with community-based services.
In December 2012, the Third Circuit ruled that the group of individuals who wish to remain in the state's congregate care institutions has an interest in the settlement agreement and that those individuals were not adequately represented by any other party in the lawsuit. The Third Circuit therefore reversed the district court's order approving the settlement and sent the case back to the district court. The Third Circuit ruled that this time, the group of individuals must be permitted to participate in the remaining stages of the lawsuit. The case is now back before the district court.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest on July 12, 2011 and October 31, 2011 in support of Plaintiffs' challenge to the manner in which the State plans to eliminate the Adult Day Health Care (ADHC) service, which enables elderly individuals and individuals with physical and mental disabilities to live in the community and avoid hospitalization and institutionalization. The United States argued that the State's plan to eliminate ADHC without ensuring sufficient alternative services are available will place thousands of individuals who currently receive ADHC services at serious risk of institutionalization, in violation of the ADA. Approximately 35,000 Californians would be affected by the proposed ADHC elimination.
Previously, Plaintiffs successfully obtained two preliminary injunctions preventing the state from (1) reducing the maximum number of days of available ADHC services per week, and (2) implementing more restrictive eligibility criteria for the ADHC service. The State has appealed the second preliminary injunction halting the state's alterations to eligibility criteria, and the United States filed a brief supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees in June 2010. That appeal is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.
On January 10, 2012, The United States filed comments supporting final approval of the parties' proposed Settlement Agreement. On January 24, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted final approval of the Settlement Agreement.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest on January 9, 2012 regarding Plaintiffs' challenge to a twenty percent reduction in personal care services provided through the State's In-Home Support Services (IHSS) program. IHSS is designed to enable elderly individuals and individuals with disabilities to avoid hospitalization and institutionalization. On January 19, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.
Previously, the Court preliminarily enjoined the State's planned implementation of more restrictive eligibility criteria for the IHSS program that would reduce or terminate IHSS services. The State has appealed the preliminary injunction, and the United States filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees on March 2, 2010. That appeal is currently pending.
On November 18, 2011, Comments of the United States in Support of Final Approval of the Proposed Settlement Agreement were filed in support of the parties' agreement to the manner in which the State will provide an array of intensive, community-based mental health services to Medi-Cal eligible foster children or children at-risk of entry into the foster-care system. The United States argued that the parties' Settlement Agreement, agreed upon after nine years of litigation, was "fair and reasonable" and advances the important public interest of compliance with title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment ("EPSDT") provisions of the Medicaid Act.
The United States filed a complaint on January 16, 2009, against the State of Arkansas and Arkansas officials alleging violations of the ADA, the U.S. Constitution, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act at the State's Conway Human Development Center for failing to provide services to facility residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs; subjecting them to unconstitutional conditions; and depriving them of a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.
On June 8, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the action with prejudice.
In September 2010, a group of four individuals with disabilities who receive and depend on Medicaid Personal Care Services (PCS) in order to remain in the community and to prevent hospitalization and institutionalization filed suit to prevent the State of Louisiana from reducing the maximum number of PCS hours available each week. If the State moved forward with the reduction in services, the Plaintiffs argued, they and other individuals with disabilities would be placed at risk of institutionalization. In April 2011, the United States filed a brief supporting the Plaintiffs' argument that the cuts would place individuals with disabilities at risk of institutionalization and urging the Court to deny the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. In May 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. In June 2011, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Statewide Class of Individuals affected by the reduction in PCS services.
At the urging of the Department of Justice, a Federal court denies the State of Louisiana's request to dismiss a lawsuit brought by individuals with disabilities affected by the State's reduction in personal care services.
In a suit brought by individuals who need incontinence supplies to live in the community, the court issued an order on June 24, 2011 requiring the State of Missouri to provide Medicaid-funded incontinence supplies to individuals who need those supplies to prevent their placement in nursing facilities. The United States filed a Statement of Interest supporting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Missouri's policy not to provide the necessary supplies placed individuals at risk of institutionalization in violation of the ADA.
Following a remand from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of a Consent Decree remedying alleged failures by Tennessee officials to provide adequate health services and treatment to thousands of Medicaid-eligible children in violation of the early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment (EPSDT) provisions of the Medicaid Act.
On March 1, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee entered preliminary findings, concluding that, because the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act at issue in the case are privately enforceable and require States to provide services and treatment to Medicaid-eligible children, the majority of the Consent Decree should remain in effect.
This class of plaintiffs—consisting of all Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities who currently, or at any time during the litigation, are unnecessarily confined to a nursing facility and desire to and are capable of residing in the community—claims that the State of Florida's refusal to provide services in the community to these individuals violates the ADA's integration mandate.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in December 2010. The Court denied the parties' motions for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2011, and the case proceeded to trial in Feburary 2011. The parties await the Court's ruling.
Jonathon Paul Boyd, a 34-year-old with quadriplegia who is currently living in a nursing home but desires and is able to receive services in a more integrated setting, alleges that the State of Alabama violates Title II of the ADA by administering its Medicaid program in a manner that causes Mr. Boyd to be unnecessarily institutionalized in a nursing facility.
In October 2010, the United States filed a brief in support of Plaintiffs' challenge to the State's plan to eliminate services for individuals with mental illness without offering sufficient alternative support services that are necessary to prevent Plaintiffs' hospitalization and institutionalization.
The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion on October 7, 2010. The case is currently pending.
On October 19, 2010, the DOJ entered into a comprehensive Settlement Agreement with the State of Georgia and Georgia officials, resolving the United States' complaint alleging that individuals with mental illness and developmental disabilities confined in State hospitals were unnecessarily institutionalized and subjected to unconstitutional harm to their lives, health, and safety in violation of the ADA and the U.S. Constitution.
The agreement requires Georgia to expand community services so that individuals with mental illness and developmental disabilities can receive supports in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Specifically, for individuals with developmental disabilities, the agreement provides that Georgia will cease all admissions to the State-operated institutions; transition all individuals to the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs by July 1, 2015; create more than 1100 home and community-based waivers to serve individuals in the community; serve those receiving waivers in their own home or their family's home consistent with the individual's informed choice; and provide family supports, mobile crisis teams, and crisis respite homes.
For individuals with mental illness, the agreement provides that Georgia will serve in the community 9,000 individuals with serious and persistent mental illness who are currently served in State Hospitals; frequently readmitted to State Hospitals; frequently seen in emergency rooms; chronically homeless and/or being released from jails or prisons. Services will be provided through a combination of 22 Assertive Community Treatment teams, 8 Community Support teams, 14 Intensive Case Management teams, 45 Case Management service providers, 6 Crisis Services Centers, 3 additional Crisis Stabilization Programs, community-based psychiatric beds, mobile crisis teams, crisis apartments, a crisis hotline, supported housing, supported employment, and peer support services. The agreement also provides for a State-wide quality management system for community services and names Elizabeth Jones as the Independent Reviewer to assess the State's compliance with the agreement.
Luis Cruz and Nigel de la Torre successfully sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Florida from denying them the home and community-based services available under its Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Waiver.
The United States had filed a Statement of Interest in support of Cruz and de la Torre's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. On April 19, 2011, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Luis Cruz and Nigel de la Torre continue to receive home and community-based services under the State's Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Waiver.
Plaintiffs challenge the State's failure to fund appropriate Medicaid community services for individuals with spinal cord injury, which places Plaintiffs at risk of institutionalization in violation of Olmstead.
The United States moved to intervene in August 2010.
The case was voluntarily dismissed January 3, 2011.
Individuals with mental illness brought suit against the County of Sacramento for failing to provide adequate community-based services, which placed them at risk of institutionalization. In July 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the Court stop the County from moving forward with its plans to drastically change the mental health service system. The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion on July 27, 2010.
In July 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, urging the Court to permit young adults to collectively challenge a State policy that places medically fragile individuals with disabilities at risk of institutionalization after turning 21.
The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification on November 22, 2010. The case is currently pending.
The United States filed a Statement of Interest on June 25, 2010 to address the issue of access to institutions and records granted to Protection and Advocacy systems pursuant to the P&A acts. The United States argued that the P&A Act vests the P&As with broad access to people, facilities, and records to achieve the Acts' purpose of protecting vulnerable individuals from abuse and neglect.
Hundreds of persons with developmental disabilities residing in several large State-owned-and–operated institutions in New Jersey brought this suit, alleging that the State fails to provide them with services and supports in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
In May 2010, the parties filed cross-motions for Summary Judgment. The United States filed an Amicus Curiae Brief supporting the plaintiffs and arguing that unnecessary segregation of individuals with disabilities in institutions is a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA. The United States also asserted that New Jersey is failing to serve individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and that continued unjustified institutionalization violates their rights.
On September 24, 2010, the Court denied both parties' Summary Judgment motions and set the proceeding for trial. (2010 WL 3862536). The case is currently pending.
Michelle Haddad successfully sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Florida from denying her the home and community-based services available under its Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Waiver.
The United States had filed a Statement of Interest in Support of Haddad's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. On April 19, 2011, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Michelle Haddad continues to receive home and community-based services under the State's Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Waiver.
The United States filed suit against the State of Arkansas and Arkansas officials on May 6, 2010, alleging that the defendants were violating the ADA by failing to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and by failing to provide community service options for the 1400 people on waiting lists at risk of institutionalization.
On January 24, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the complaint without prejudice on procedural grounds relating to pre-litigation notice to the State.
Individuals with developmental disabilities and mental illness challenged the State's proposed reductions in reimbursement rates for in-home services that will have the effect of eliminating providers that offer medically necessary services that enable individuals to successfully reside in the community and will place them at risk of institutionalization.
On February 16, 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
The Court denied the Motion, but ordered the State to provide appropriate community based services during the pendency of the lawsuit.
In January 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest urging the Court to grant preliminary approval of the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' jointly submitted Consent Decree in a case regarding large, private facilities for individuals with developmental disabilities. Intervenors, primarily family members of residents, strongly opposed the agreement. The Court referred all the parties to settlement negotiations and the United States participated in those discussions. All parties, including the intervenors, reached a revised agreement that requires the State to move at least 3,000 individuals with developmental disabilities into community-based settings within the next six years. The Court approved the revised Settlement Agreement in June 2011.
In a case brought by two individuals with mental illness and developmental disabilities who faced institutionalization because of the State's decision to reduce their community-based services, the United States filed an Amicus Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in December 2009, requesting that the Court stop the State from reducing the services.
The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 17, 2010. (679 F.Supp. 2d 635).
The Plaintiffs in this lawsuit challenge the State of Connecticut's reliance on privately-run, segregated nursing facilities to serve the needs of individuals with mental illness who would be more appropriately served in community-based settings.
The United States filed an Amicus Curiae Brief opposing the State's Motion to Dismiss.
The United States filed an Amicus Curiae Brief supporting the ARC of Virginia's challenge to the State of Virginia's plan to build a costly, institutional facility for individuals with intellectual disabilities, a plan that Plaintiff alleged would result in seventy-five individuals being moved to unnecessarily segregated facilities. The Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in December 2009.
Clayton Griffin—a member of the class in Lee v. Dudek and who is partially paralyzed—successfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring the State of Florida to provide him with community-based services through the State's Medicaid program, instead of requiring him to remain in a nursing home in order to receive needed services.
The State of Florida appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States filed an Amicus Curiae Brief noting that ADA regulations are enforceable through a private lawsuit. The United States also noted that the ADA regulation stating that entities are not required to provide "personal devices and services" to individuals with disabilities does not exempt entities from complying with the integration regulation when they choose to operate a program that does provide personal services and devices to individuals with disabilities.
On March 7, 2008, the Division issued a CRIPA/ADA findings letter to the State of Nebraska that detailed systemic conditions that violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the residents of the Beatrice State Developmental Center ("BSDC"), the State's largest facility for persons with developmental disabilities. At the time, BSDC housed close to 350 residents. The parties then swiftly concluded negotiations on a judicially enforceable remedial agreement. On July 2, 2008, the Hon. Richard G. Kopf, United States District Court Judge for the District of Nebraska (Lincoln), signed the parties' proposed consent decree as an order of the court. The agreement provides for oversight by a court monitor. Our decree has a strong ADA/Olmstead focus that has prompted the State to greatly expand community resources and to place dozens of BSDC residents into more integrated community settings. The State has funded the creation of new community programs, including specialty residential and day programs to meet the needs of persons with difficult health care and/or behavioral concerns. The census at BSDC has been cut about in half so far, and there are tangible plans to place several dozen more individuals in the community in the near future. The Division has accompanied the Independent Expert on just about all team monitoring visits since the decree took effect.
In mid-June 2008, the Division executed a comprehensive Settlement Agreement with the City of San Francisco to address outstanding deficiencies at the LHH nursing home. LHH is owned and operated by the City through the San Francisco Department of Public Health, and is licensed as both a skilled nursing facility and an acute care hospital. At the time of our settlement, LHH was the largest publicly-operated, single-site nursing home in the United States with a capacity of over 1,200 skilled nursing beds. The Division issued CRIPA/ADA findings letters on May 6, 1998, April 1, 2003, and August 3, 2004, that collectively concluded, in part, that the City engages in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct with respect to placement of qualified LHH residents in the most integrated setting pursuant to the ADA. The Settlement Agreement required the City to address our findings, in part, by developing and implementing appropriate services and supports for residents in integrated community settings. Because of our settlement, the City has reduced the census capacity of LHH by more than one-third and developed a rich network of community homes and programs that now serve hundreds of former LHH residents as well as an unquantifiable number of persons who likely would have been admitted to an institutional setting like LHH but for the newly-established community network. Community residences include scattered-site apartments and other integrated homes throughout the San Francisco metropolitan area that are supported by an effective community system of case management and other clinical professionals.
This ADA case involves all persons with developmental disabilities (“DD”) served in the Commonwealth’s system. Over the years, through a series of consent decrees, along with regular court oversight and involvement, the Division has been able to prompt the Commonwealth to close all six of its residential institutions and to create, from nothing, a community service system to meet the needs of hundreds of persons with DD in integrated community settings. In 2011, the Court entered as a Court order, a Joint Compliance Action plan that summarized prior Court orders and imposed additional requirements on the Commonwealth. On October 31, 2016, the Court issued an order that clarified that the group covered by existing orders in this case included all persons with DD in the system and was not limited to just those who at one time resided in a Commonwealth institution. In recent years, the Court has issued a series of orders to protect the budget of the Commonwealth’s DD program from drastic and arbitrary cuts during the decade-long fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico. These orders have prevented service interruption and termination for hundreds of vulnerable people in need of individualized DD services. The Division continues to work with the Commonwealth to improve its delivery of health care and behavioral services for people with complex conditions, as well as to increase the number of people working in integrated community settings.
For more information and current filings in this case, please visit the Special Litigation Section's website.


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A company’s intellectual property can be its most valuable asset.
When that asset is threatened through infringement, misappropriation, or otherwise, Godfrey & Kahn’s Intellectual Property (IP) Litigation Practice Group has the expertise, experience and sound judgment to protect your company’s rights fully and efficiently.
Our substantial client base of software, publishing and media companies coupled with in-depth knowledge of copyright law has led to significant copyright litigation experience and involvement in many of the most interesting copyright cases in Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit.
The technical knowledge of our patent attorneys and our experience in handling complex litigation combines to produce excellent results, whether through negotiation and settlement or trial. Our team is experienced in district courts around the country, the Federal Circuit, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
Our team has extensive experience litigating trademark disputes, including infringement and Lanham Act litigation in federal court, proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and domain name and advertising disputes in a variety of forums.
We have handled trade secret disputes in both federal and state courts. These claims often are brought with claims relating to employment or other intellectual property issues, and our Litigation Practice Group is well equipped to assemble the most capable team to handle these cases in whatever form or forum they arise. The knowledge we have gained from counseling clients on implementing effective trade secret protection programs allows our attorneys to represent clients efficiently and effectively in these cases.
Intellectual Property team member Nick Kees was quoted in a Madison, Wisconsin, WISC-TV story about the controversy surrounding the state's new tourism jingle.
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC. Godfrey & Kahn represented the photographer in this highly watched copyright fair use case, which challenged the scope of the fair use doctrine and transformative use test in the Western District of Wisconsin, Seventh Circuit, and on a Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
Gaiman v. Todd McFarlane Productions, Inc. Godfrey & Kahn represented the defendant in this copyright and contract litigation involving rights in comic book works.
Lands’ End, Inc. v. Genesys Software Systems, Inc. Godfrey & Kahn represented Lands’ End in connection with a software license dispute filed as a declaratory judgment action in the Western District of Wisconsin and obtained a favorable settlement shortly before trial.
ARI Network Services, Inc. v. Nichols et al. Godfrey & Kahn represented the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action involving various powersport equipment taxonomies in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The case was settled.
Wolters v. The Sportsman Channel, Inc., et al. and Demi & Cooper, Inc. v. The Sportsman Channel, Inc. These two related cases, one in the Western District of Michigan and one in an Illinois state court, centered around alleged copyright infringement in the use of a photograph in marketing materials. Godfrey & Kahn served as lead counsel for The Sportsman Channel. Both matters were settled.
TV Azteca SA de CV, et al. v. Durden, et al. Godfrey & Kahn served as lead litigation counsel for TV Azteca in this copyright infringement case involving the unauthorized live web-based broadcast of Mexican soccer games owned by TV Azteca. After locating the infringer, who used a fictitious name to operate the website, Godfrey & Kahn helped negotiate a consent judgment involving a permanent injunction against the infringer and other relief.
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) v. Apple Inc. Godfrey & Kahn represented WARF as local counsel in a patent infringement case in the Western District of Wisconsin involving computer processor technology used in Apple iPhones and iPads. The team consisting of Irell & Manella LLP and Godfrey & Kahn attorneys obtained a jury verdict of more than $234 million after a highly complex and contentious two-week trial.
Essociate, Inc. v. Azoogle.com, Inc. This case involved patented technology concerning affiliate marketing software in an infringement action in the Western District of Wisconsin. Godfrey & Kahn was lead counsel for the defendants and obtained summary judgment of non-infringement and affirmance of the decision on appeal at the Federal Circuit.
Seat Sack, Inc. v. Childcraft Education Corp., et al. Godfrey & Kahn represented the defendant Childcraft Education and its parent company, School Specialty, Inc., as lead counsel in the Southern District of New York, in a case involving claims of trademark and design patent infringement. We prevailed on summary judgment and on the plaintiff’s appeal to the Federal Circuit.
Ergo v. Pacific Cycle, Inc. In this patent infringement lawsuit involving bicycle seat technology in the Western District of Washington, the Godfrey & Kahn team represented Pacific Cycle as lead counsel and obtained a settlement for our client after expert reports and a favorable claim construction ruling.
Kimberly-Clark Corporation. Godfrey & Kahn has served as both lead counsel and local counsel for Kimberly-Clark Corporation and its affiliates in various patent infringement and other patent- related matters in jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Asyst Technologies LLC et al. v. Eagle Eyes Traffic Ind. Co. Ltd, et al. As lead counsel for the plaintiffs in this Eastern District of Wisconsin patent infringement suit in the automotive industry, the Godfrey & Kahn team obtained a favorable settlement at the close of discovery.
M-B-W, Inc., et al. v. Multiquip, Inc., et al. This patent infringement case involved motorized power trowels used in the construction industry. After Godfrey & Kahn obtained summary judgment of infringement in favor of the patentee, the case was settled prior to trial.
Unique Coupons v. Menasha Corporation and Northfield Corporation. Godfrey & Kahn represented packaging equipment manufacturer Northfield in two trials in the Northern District of Illinois and related appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on patent infringement claims brought by a competitor. The litigation resulted in a finding of no liability.
Muth Mirror Systems, LLC v. Gentex Corporation. Godfrey & Kahn was lead patent litigation counsel for Muth in this adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
Cycle Stop Valves, Inc. v. In-Well Technologies, Inc., et al. Godfrey & Kahn was lead counsel for two defendants in this patent infringement suit in the Eastern District of Texas related to valve systems for in-ground water tanks and wells. The matter was settled before trial.

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§ 120-4 Word usage; definitions.
§ 120-6 Basis for establishing areas of special flood hazard.
§ 120-7 Interpretation; conflict with other provisions.
§ 120-9 Penalties for offenses.
§ 120-10 Warning and disclosure of liability.
§ 120-11 Designation of local administrator.
§ 120-12 Development permit required; fees.
§ 120-13 Application for permit.
§ 120-14 Duties and responsibilities of local administrator.
§ 120-16 Standards for all structures.
§ 120-19 Manufactured homes and recreational vehicles.
§ 120-21 Conditions for variances.
Editor's Note: This local law also provided for the repeal of former Ch. 120, Flood Damage Prevention, adopted 5-21-1984 by L.L. No. 1-1984 by Title IXA of the City Charter, as amended. This local law was also enacted simultaneously 7-5-1995 by ordinance.