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(hereafter "we", "us") would like to provide you with information about how we process your personal data when you visit our website and use our online shop.
Registration data: When you order goods through our online shop, you can register and open a customer account. When you register, you must enter your name and contact information (e.g. your address, telephone number, e-mail address) and set a password.
Order data in the online shop: If you order goods through our online shop (using a customer account or as a guest), we process the data entered by you, the data about your person (in particular delivery addresses and payment data) as well as the information provided to you by us. We also collect information about the time, scope and, if necessary, the location of your order.
Other content data: If you use other services on our website, e.g., fill out contact forms, sign up for newsletters, participate in contests or post a comment on our blog, we process the content data you provide and the information we make available to you.
Usage data: We create user profiles under a pseudonym based on how you use our website, which we then use to track how our website is used.
Server log data: When you use our websites, data (such as your IP address, browser type and version, device type and operating system, the date and time of your visit as well as the pages you accessed and the files you requested) are temporarily stored in a log file on our servers.
2. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PROCESSING YOUR PERSONAL DATA AND HOW LONG IS IT STORED?
When you register for a personal customer account, we process the registration data to set up and manage your customer account and process future orders. As a registered customer, you have access to your personal customer account (using your email address and password created by you), in which you can view your order history and save and change your personal settings (e.g. password settings, newsletter settings, invoice and delivery settings).
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interest according to Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR to provide you with the service of a "customer account" as described above respectively for the purpose of performance of the user contract with you (Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR).
This data will be deleted if the registration on our website or the customer account is cancelled or changed.
You may object to the processing of your data on the basis of Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR unless we can prove compelling reasons for the processing to continue. However, we will not do this for a customer account. In this case, the following applies: The customer account must then be deleted and is no longer available to you. Please note that we may store the data concerning the orders that are visible in your customer account for a longer period of time (see 2.2).
We use your order data (such as your name, address, e-mail address, delivery preferences and other information pertaining to your order) to process the order and to deliver the goods you ordered. In addition, depending on the payment method you have selected, either we or payment service providers commissioned by us (see Section 3.2.1) process the payment information required by the respective payment method. For example, we store IBAN and BIC ourselves, while payment service providers store your credit card number, Paypal account details, etc.).
The legal basis for processing is the conclusion and performance of the sales contract for the purchased goods, Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR.
This data will be deleted when it is no longer required for contract management (including customer service and warranty), unless we are legally obliged to store it, e.g. due to the legal obligation to retain data for commercial or tax-based reasons.
If you add comments to the comment section of our blog "Base Camp", in which we publish various articles on topics such as travel, outdoor activities and equipment, we process your name and e-mail address (both of which you must provide before using the comment feature), the comment itself, any URL provided (e.g. for your own blog), the date and time of the comment, data about the device you’re using and your IP address. We do this for protection against liability claims in the event that illegal content is published and in order to contact you if a third party should object to your comment.
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interest described above (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR).
You can object to the processing of your data on the basis of Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. If there are compelling reasons, we can allow the processing to continue; however, for your comments in the context of our blog, the following applies: Your comment will then be deleted.
In addition, this data will be deleted when it is no longer required for the above-mentioned purpose.
If you send us enquiries using a contact form, via e-mail or by phone, we will process the information you provide in order to answer your query as well as your IP address and the date/time of the enquiry to prevent misuse of the contact form.
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interest (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR) to provide you with the “enquiries" service described above. If your enquiry concerns the initiation or performance (including customer service or warranty) of a contract, the additional legal basis for processing is Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR.
You can object to the processing of your data on the basis of Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. We can then continue processing if there are compelling reasons for processing. This may be necessary in order to provide evidence for enquiries from you and past communication with you. If there are no such compelling reasons, we will stop communicating with you and delete the data that has been collected.
This data will be deleted when our communication with you has been terminated, i.e. when the relevant facts have been clarified and no further legitimate interests exist for storage or no further legal obligations exist for storage.
If you take part in one of our contests, we use your data (e.g. name, e-mail address) to carry out the contest, for information purposes and to send you a prize, if applicable.
The legal basis for the processing is the consent you have given when participating in the contest (Art. 6 (1) (a) GDPR). Your data will be deleted when the contest is over and the prizes have been distributed. Your data will be used for other purposes, e.g. advertising, only if you have explicitly given your consent.
We would also like to use the data you have entered or accrued when using the websites to inform you about our products and services (advertising) or to improve our offerings and services (product development).
On our website, you can subscribe to a free newsletter. The data collected during registration will be processed (the data displayed as mandatory fields are absolutely necessary for receipt of the newsletter, while voluntary data fields are only used for a more personal form of address and selecting the information displayed).
We will contact you via e-mail with information, special sales and offers for ALL4 services tailored to you and your interests on the basis of either your explicit consent or - if you purchase similar goods or services from us and store your e-mail address here - even without your extra consent. We process data about your usage behaviour after we have sent you e-mails (e.g. click behaviour).
We will contact you by telephone only with your express consent to provide you with information, special sales and offers for ALL4 services tailored to your personal interests or usage of our site.
We will contact you by post with advertisements in written form, even without your consent, to the extent permitted by law for ALL4 services.
You can object to the use of your personal data for purposes of advertising and product development as well as the establishment of contact for this purpose in whole or in part at any time or withdraw any consent you have given. Please use the corresponding options provided for you (e.g. the unsubscribe link in your personal customer account) or contact our data protection officer via e-mail or in writing (keyword: data protection) using the contact information specified under section 8.
The legal basis for processing is your consent (Art. 6 (1) (a) GDPR) and our legitimate interests (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR).
This data will be deleted or stored only in aggregated, anonymous form after your objection or withdrawal of any consents you have given or after cessation of use by us at the very latest. If necessary, we will store the data of your objection in order to prevent further contact with you.
The processing of server log data is necessary for technical reasons in order to provide the websites and services and in order to ensure system security thereafter.
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interest in providing the website and our services (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR). The processing is absolutely necessary for the use of our website, and there is no right to object.
This data will be deleted after 12 days at the very latest.
The server log data may then be analysed anonymously for statistical purposes and to improve the quality of our website. The server log data is not linked to your personal data, nor will it be merged with other personal data sources.
In some cases, we employ service providers in compliance with legal requirements for order processing, i.e. on our behalf, in accordance with our instructions and under our control.
technical service providers we use to provide functionalities, e.g. essential cookies for technical purposes.
service providers for the practical implementation of advertising and marketing, e.g. service providers for e-mail and analytics cookies.
In these cases, we remain responsible for data processing; the transfer and processing of personal data to or by our processors rests on the legal basis that allows us to process the data in each case. A separate legal basis is not required.
In some cases, we also transfer your data to third parties, i.e. to partners with whom we cooperate outside of commissioned processing. Such partners provide their services and are as such the responsible parties. For the processing of your data by partners, only their data protection policy applies.
To process your orders, we send payment information to payment service providers who then process the payment transactions associated with the orders. These include PayPal and your financial institution. The legal basis for the transmission is the performance of the contract with you, Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR.
The Trusted Shops Trustbadge is displayed on this website in order to show our Trusted Shops seal of approval, any ratings accumulated from users as well as to offer Trusted Shops products to buyers following an order.
This serves to protect our legitimate interests in the optimal marketing of our offer according to Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. The Trustbadge and the services advertised with it are an offer of Trusted Shops GmbH, Subbelrather Str. 15C, 50823 Köln, Germany. Each time the Trustbadge is used, the web server automatically saves a so-called server log file, which contains your IP address, date and time of the request, volume of data transferred and the requesting provider (access data) and documents the request. This access data is not analysed and is automatically overwritten no later than seven days after the end of your website visit.
Other personal data is transferred to Trusted Shops only if you decide to use or have already registered to use Trusted Shops products after placing an order. In such a case, the contract between you and Trusted Shops applies.
For the transport of goods, we transfer your address and contact data, when necessary, to parcel delivery companies. The legal basis for the transmission is the performance of the contract with you, Art. 6 (1) (b) GDPR.
If you wish to share one of our websites on a social network (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) by clicking on one of our "Share" buttons, this information will be transferred to the social network. This assumes that you are logged in to the social network. The legal basis for the transmission is our legitimate interest in offering you the possibility of “sharing", Art. 6 (1) GDPR.
In order to make our websites as user-friendly as possible and to increase the relevance of our advertising for the visitors to our websites, we and our partners use so-called "cookies". Cookies are small files that are stored on a visitor's hard drive. They allow information to be stored for a certain period of time and the visitor's computer to be identified. This is done in part using so-called tracking pixels, which are not stored on a visitor's hard drive but can help identify the computer in the same way as a cookie. In the following, the term "cookie" covers cookies in the technical sense as well as tracking pixels and similar technical methods.
4.2 WHICH COOKIES DO WE USE, WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS OF THEIR USE AND HOW LONG ARE THEY STORED?
These cookies are essential for you to move around our websites and use the functions. For example, they save the products you have placed in your basket as well as the progress of the ordering process. These cookies also allow you to easily search for retailers where you can purchase our products (e.g. by displaying a map of your area). These cookies do not collect any information about you for marketing purposes, nor do they store where you have been on the internet. Disabling this category of cookies would limit the functionality of all or part of the websites.
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interests (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR).
These cookies are session-specific and expire after your visit to the website (session).
Performance cookies collect information about how visitors use a website in general, such as which pages they visit most frequently and whether they receive error messages from websites. These cookies do not collect any data that can be used to identify visitors. All of the information collected with the help of these cookies serves exclusively to understand and improve the functionality of the website and the service it provides.
(1) We use Google Analytics, a web analytics service provided by Google Inc. The information generated by the use of Google Analytics about your use of this website is transmitted to and stored by Google on servers in the United States. However, by activating the IP anonymisation on this website, Google will shorten your IP address beforehand within the area of the member states of the European Union or other parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Only in exceptional cases will the full IP address be transmitted to a Google server in the USA and shortened there. The IP address transmitted by the user's browser will not be merged with other Google data.
Google will use this information on our behalf to analyse your use of the website, to compile reports on website activities and provide additional services relating to website use and internet use to the website operator. Pseudonymous user profiles can be created from the processed data.
Users can prevent the storage of cookies by setting their browser software accordingly; Users may also prevent Google’s collection of the data generated by the cookie and related to their use of the online offer and Google’s processing of such data by downloading and installing the browser plug-in available under the following link: http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout?hl=en.
The legal basis for processing is our legitimate interests because we only use pseudonymised or anonymised data (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR).
The data collected on the basis of these cookies is made anonymous before analysis. You can deactivate or delete cookies and information stored therein at any time (see 4.2.4).
The processing of your data, especially in the case of statistical data and online identifiers, is carried out on the legal basis of legitimate interest according to Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR (see below). When processing your data, we pursue the following legitimate interests: Improvement of our service, protection against misuse, statistics.
Targeting and advertising cookies are used to tailor advertising more specifically to you and your interests. They also serve to limit how often you see the same advert, to measure the effectiveness of an advertising campaign and understand people's behaviour after viewing an advert. These cookies are usually placed on the pages of advertising networks with the consent of the website operator (i.e. in this case us). They detect that a user has visited a website and pass this information on to other companies, e.g. advertising companies, or adjust the adverts accordingly. They are often linked to the functions of the website provided by this company. We use these cookies to connect with social networks that may then use the information about your visit to tailor adverts on other websites to you and to provide the advertising networks we use with information about your visit so that you can later be presented with precisely the adverts that could interest you based on your browsing behaviour. If a product is purchased later, this fact may be transmitted to such an advertising network.
We also include cookies on our website that are set by service providers on our behalf and enable us to track which products of ours you have already viewed so that we can recommend similar products to you.
The legal basis for the processing is the consent you have given in the context of the cookie banner displayed when our website is visited (Art. 6 (1) (a) GDPR).
You can deactivate or delete cookies and the information stored therein at any time (see the following information).
If you would like to receive further information about these cookies from us instead, please contact us via e-mail using the contact information provided in section 8 below.
4.3 HOW DO I DISABLE COOKIES?
You can disable individual cookies using the links in the table above (opt-out options), provided that the cookie provider offers such a function. You can also prevent the use of any cookies by adjusting the cookie settings in your browser. However, we would like to point out that the functionality of our websites will be limited if you do so, since essential cookies will also be blocked.
We use links to our other web presences on websites and third-party services, e.g. on social media channels like Facebook, Twitter or Youtube. The data processing of these other service providers on their websites is the sole responsibility of these third parties and their data protection policy applies.
We and our service providers employ technical and organisational security measures to protect your personal data against accidental or intentional manipulation, loss, destruction or against access by unauthorised persons. Our data processing and security measures are continually being improved with technological developments.
When your personal data is transmitted to us, it is encrypted with Secure Socket Layer (SSL). Personal data exchanged between you and us or other participating companies is generally transmitted via encrypted connections that correspond to the current state of the art.
Our employees and our service providers are, of course, bound to a confidentiality agreement.
If you have any questions regarding the processing of your personal data by us, we would be happy to provide you with information about your stored personal data at any time free of charge (Art. 15 GDPR).
You have the right to correct inaccurate data and complete incomplete data (Art. 16 GDPR).
You have a right to block/restrict the processing or delete your personal data that is no longer required or stored on the basis of legal obligations (Art. 17, 18 GDPR).
You have the right to transfer the data in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format, provided that you have provided us with the data on the basis of an agreement or a contract between us and you (Art. 20 GDPR).
You have the right to object to the processing of your data for direct marketing purposes at any time (Art. 21 (2 and 3) GDPR).
You have a right to object to processing of personal data on the basis of a legitimate interest, unless we can explain our compelling legitimate grounds (Art. 21 (1) GDPR). We have pointed out above in what cases such a right is available.
If you have given your consent to data processing, you can withdraw this with effect for the future at any time, i.e. the legality of the data processing carried out up to the time of the revocation remains unaffected by your withdrawal of consent. After withdrawing your consent, you may no longer use our services.
Please contact us with your request in writing (keyword: data protection) or via e-mail using the contact information under section 8. We reserve the right to check your identity to ensure that your personal data is not disclosed to unauthorised persons.
From time to time, it is necessary to change the content of this Privacy and Data Protection Policy. We therefore reserve the right to change it at any time. We will publish the amended version of the Privacy and Data Protection Policy here as well. If you visit us again, we kindly ask you to read the Privacy and Data Protection Policy again.

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Eminent domain is the power of the government to take private property and convert it into public use through a process known as condemnation.
The power of eminent domain exists as an inherent governmental power. The power of eminent domain is not contingent on a particular legislative or constitutional “trigger” in that it ”appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.” Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206, 25 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1879).
Both federal and South Carolina law limit the exercise of eminent domain power.
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the primary limitation on eminent domain power. The Fifth Amendment provides in part “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation” The Fourteenth Amendment made the Fifth Amendment’s limitation on uncompensated taking applicable to state and local governments.
Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made, therefore.
There are two basic types of condemnation, direct condemnation and inverse condemnation.
In a direct condemnation proceeding, a government entity moves to condemn property, questions of proper public use and just compensation due to the property owner are then considered.
Inverse condemnation involves some government action that deprives a property owner use of his property. “In inverse condemnation cases, the property owner is the moving party claiming an act of the sovereign has damaged his property to the extent of an actual taking entitling him to compensation.” Cobb v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 365 S.C. 360, 365, 618 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2005).
“South Carolina courts have embraced federal takings jurisprudence as providing the rubric under which we analyze whether an interference with someone’s property interests amounts to a constitutional taking.” Hardin v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 371 S.C. 598, 641 S.E.2d 437, 443 n. 4 (2007).
Permanent physical occupations involve some government activity that interferes with the use of property. Even minor interferences will qualify as a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982). Further, indirect entry to property caused by a government entity such as flooding may justify compensation. Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland County, Opinion No. 27563 (S.C. Aug. 12, 2015).
South Carolina courts have held that certain government regulations of land can be tantamount in its effect on the direct physical invasion of land by the government. “government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.” Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280 (2013) See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 605 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992).
the property owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations regarding property.
See also Sea Cabins on Ocean IV Homeowners’ Assoc., Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 345 S.C. 418, 548 S.E.2d 595 (2001).
South Carolina courts apply what is known as the “parcel as a whole” rule, which states in a regulatory takings analysis the court must consider the regulation’s effect on owner’s interest in entire tract, not just portion affected by regulation. Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 365 S.C. 650 (2005).
There must be an essential nexus between the exaction itself and the state interest that the exaction is advancing. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987).
There must be a “rough proportionality”- the exaction must be related in both nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (2005). See also Sea Cabins v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 548 S.E.2d 595, 345 S.C. 418 (2001).
the property owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations regarding the property.
Evidence of the price and other terms upon any sale or the rent reserved and other terms of any lease or tenancy relating to the property or to any similar property in the vicinity when the sale or leasing occurred or the tenancy existed within a reasonable time of the hearing.
Federal and South Carolina courts maintain that a condemned property must confer a public benefit, not necessarily use by the public. To be sufficient to authorize a taking within the meaning of the “public use” requirement contained in the Fifth Amendment. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). South Carolina courts have avoided offering a rigid definition of public use rather opting for a contextual definition in which “The term is an elastic one to keep abreast of changing social conditions, and presents a question of fact in each particular case.” Karesh v. CITY COUN. OF CITY OF CHARLESTON, 247 S.E.2d 342, 271 S.C. 339 (1978).
South Carolina, voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2006 that forbids taking property for economic development in response to the decision in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2005) whereby the United States Supreme Court allowed the condemnation and transfer of land to a private corporation for economic development purposes. The South Carolina law narrowed the definition of public use to exclude seizing blighted properties for economic development purposes unless it presents a clear danger to health and safety.
It is important to note that under the Act the issues concerning just compensation and the right to condemn are considered in separate proceedings.
S.C. Code Ann., § 28-2-470 states that the trial of the Challenge Action is separate from the trial on the issue on just compensation.
A Challenge Action must be predicated on deficiencies in the condemnation process. These deficiencies are condemnor’s 1) bad faith; 2) fraud; or, 3) clear abuse of discretion.
A landowner challenging a condemnation proceeding has the burden of proof to establish that the condemning authority is acting fraudulently, in bad faith, or is clearly abusing its discretion. Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
Further, a landowner may challenge the whether a particular condemning authority will be legitimately placing the condemned property to public use. The questions presented under this scenario would center on the amount of public benefit derived from the condemned property or allegations that the benefits from a condemned property are improperly directed to a private beneficiary.
The just compensation required by the Constitution to be paid to a landowner is premised on the actual loss caused to him by the condemnation of his land. He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of and no more. Smith v. City of Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 92 S.E.2d 639 (1956).
A landowner may also be entitled to damages resulting from the devaluation of the remaining property in a partial taking. The devaluation may be the result of decreased market value of the property resulting from the taking. S.C. State Highway Department v. Touchberry, 248 S.C. 1, 148 S.E.2d 747 (1966).
In valuing property, South Carolina law requires an appraiser to consider the property’s highest and best use. “Highest and best use” has been defined as “the most favorable use to which the property may reasonably be put in the not too distant future.” SC STATE HWY. DEPT. v. Bryant, 171 S.E.2d 349, 253 S.C. 400 (1969).
The calculation of the highest and best use does not allow for consideration of speculative and remote uses rather the fair market value at the time of the taking should be considered. However, a property with high potential to appreciate may affect its fair market value this appreciation must be reasonably probable. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Westboro Weaving Co., 244 S.C. 516, 521, 137 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1964).


§ 166-2 Discount for early payment.
§ 166-3 Penalty for failure to pay.
§ 166-5 Establishment of fees.
§ 166-6 Disposition of fees.
§ 166-7 Imposition of tax.
§ 166-9 Levy of tax.
§ 166-10 Duty of employers to collect.
§ 166-12 Dates for determining tax liability and payment.
§ 166-14 Individuals engaged in more than one occupation or employed in more than one political subdivision.
§ 166-15 Nonresidents subject to tax.
§ 166-16 Administration of tax.
§ 166-17 Suits for collection.
§ 166-18 Violations and penalties.
§ 166-19 Interpretation; effective date.


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Samara State University. The Department of philosophy of humanitarian faculties.
Head of the Department. PhD in philosophy, professor.
The article claims that the anthropological turn in philosophy and the humanities that took place in the 20th century was caused by the anthropological turn of culture itself. Culture has always developed around Man, and its undertakings have always led towards understanding the point of "human life". For instance, the culture of the Renaissance prioritized human behavior, human desires and ambitions, rather than the things a human should be guided by (the Order of Being, Justice, God, etc. ) Although the culture of the Modern Age grew out of the Renaissance's recognition of the values assigned to human interests and preferences, it "hid" the human under behind a screen of things, signs and institutions. The society of the Modern Age subjected Man to the discipline of labor, language and the body (M. Foucault). Friedrich Nietzsche's work is a repetition / echo of the new European thought in relation to the rise of the culture of the Modern Age — the idea of an independent individual defined by power over himself and his fate. Thomas Mann called this appeal of Nietzsche's "the last transformation of the Enlightenment". This is the exact point where a new version of the Modern Age project begins.
The anthropological turn in 20th century culture brought back the main idea of the new European culture — the idea of the inherent value of life, individuality and freedom — and enhanced it with a new axiological meaning.
Thus, the anthropological turn illuminates a curious characteristic of the historical development of culture — the possibility to return to its origins in order to realize itself in yet another new way.
Frank S. L., Dusha cheloveka. Opyt vvedenija v filosofskuju psihologiju / Frank S. L. Predmet znanija. Dusha cheloveka. — SPb.: «Nauka», 1995. — S. 421.
Hajdegger M. Bytie i vremja. Per. s nem. V. V. Bibihina. — M.: «Ad marginem», 1997.
Losev A. F., Taho-Godi A. A. i dr. Antichnaja literatura: Uchebnik dlja vysshej shkoly / Pod red. A. A. Taho-Godi. — 5-e izd., dorab. — M.: CheRo, 1997. S. 483.
A. F. Losev. Dvenadcat' tezisov ob antichnoj kul'ture // Studencheskij meridian. 1983. № 9. — S. 13–14, № 10. — S. 14–16; To zhe: Losev A. F. Derzanie duha. Sbornik statej A. F. Loseva / Sost. Ju. A. Rostovcev. — M. 1988. — S. 153–171.
Gurevich A. Ja. Kategorii srednevekovoj kul'tury. Izd. 2-e, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe. — M.: «Iskusstvo» 1984. — S. 247.
Valla Lorenco. Ob istinnom i lozhnom blage. O svobode voli. Per. s lat. N. V. Revjakinoj, I. H. Chernjak, V. A. Andrushko. — M.: «Nauka», 1989. — S. 95.
Gegel'. Soch. T. IV. — M., 1959. — S. 302.
Kant I. Otvet na vopros: chto takoe prosveshhenie // Kant I. Soch. v 6-ti tt., t. 6. — M.: «Mysl'», 1966. — S. 27 (Kursiv Kanta — V. K,).
Horkhajmer M., Adorno T. Dialektika Prosveshhenija. Filosofskie fragmenty. — M. -SPb.: «Medium», «Juventa», 1997. — S. 20.
Habermas Ju. Modern — nezavershennyj proekt. URL: http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/Philos/Article/Hab_Modern.php (data obrashhenija 25.05.2014).
Fuko M. Slova i veshhi. Arheologija gumanitarnyh nauk. — SPb.: A-cad, 1994. — S. 33.
Deljoz Zh. Nicshe i filosofija. / Per. s franc. O. Homy pod redakciej B. Skuratova. — M.: «Ad Marginem», 2003. — S. 277.
Mann T. Filosofija Nicshe v svete nashego opyta // Mann T. Sobr. soch. v 10-ti tt., t. 10. — M.: «Hudozhestvennaja literatura», 1961. — S. 389.
Sheler M. Polozhenie cheloveka v Kosmose // Problemy cheloveka v zapadnoj filosofii. — M., 1988. — S. 31, 63.
Hajdegger M. Onto-teo-logicheskoe stroenie metafiziki // Hajdegger M. Tozhdestvo i razlichie. / Per. s nem. A Denezhkina. — M.: «Gnozis», «Logos», 1977. — S. 49.
Deljoz Zh. Razlichie i povtorenie. / Per. s fr. N. B. Man'kovskoj i Je. P. Jurovskoj. — SPb.: «Petropolis», 1998. — S. 71.
Ben'jamin V. Proizvedenie iskusstva v jepohu ego tehnicheskoj vosproizvodimosti. Izbrannye jesse / Pod. red. Ju. A. Zdorovogo. — M.: Medium, 1996.
Saint-Petersburg State University. Institute of Philosophy.
The present article deals with the destiny of a disciplinary project of philosophical anthropology, whose former popularity has slowly faded to obscurity. In addition, one can observe the general diminishing interest in the subject of philosophical anthropology. Under this heading, one can find very diverse types of works: from the history of philosophy — to studies in historical and cultural anthropology, and cultural studies. Is the subject of philosophical anthropology still valid in its initial sense?
In the article, a brief explanation of the main methodological programs within each of these anthropological discourses is given. A key point in the demarcation between scientific and humanitarian discourses on Man is the relation towards the concept of "human nature".
Philosophical anthropology begs the fundamental questions: Is being human such a good thing? — and — Is it a good idea to stop being human?
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Kutyrev V. A. Antropologija i anti-antropologija // Chelovek, 2005, № 2.
St. Petersburg State University. Faculty of Philosophy.
The important achievement of anthropological turn is the criticism of both the biological and theological explanation of Man, whose founders tried to get rid of a reduction as to animal, and divine. As a result, the history of Man begins with the formation of an artificial environment, in which Man can exist. The important achievement of the new approach to Man is the synchronization of the anthropological development in the fields of morphology, ethnography, historical linguistics and philosophy.
The question of the origins of Man and community cannot be separated . The explanation of the formation and development of Man assumes a reconstruction — and demands both intellectual and practical ways of educating the people. Thus, an attempt at their description under conditions of modernity has been undertaken.
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Naprimer, F. Nicshe, L. Klagesom, A. Gelenom, L. Bol'kom i P. Al'sbergom, B.F, Porshnevym.
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Sokolova N. L. Populjarnaja kul'tura Web 2.0: k kartografii sovremennogo medialandshafta. — Samara: Izd-vo «Samarskij universitet», 2010. — 204 s.
National Academy of Personnel Management / Center of Arts and Culture.
Department of Theory and History of Culture. PhD, Seniour Lecturer.
The philosophical problem of the basic constants of human existence is considered in this article. The concepts of "sense" and "a sense of life", as a category of philosophical anthropology are considered, as the fundamental principles of the human worldview. Different types of meta-senses are correlated with all types of culture; they define a person's openness to dialogue, and create a new sense in the discussion of various subjects and their perspectives. The current paper provides an analysis of philosophic and anthropologic dimensions of the "meta-sense" concept, which makes it possible to discover hidden dimensions of human existence, and cultural forms of being. A typology of different "meta-senses", as a basic level of cognition, is proposed in the article. In addition, specifics relating to Russian philosophical tradition about the reflection of "sense" and "a sense of life" is also discussed in this article.
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Assistant professor of humanities and social and political sciences. PhD.
According to the author, the discovery of the importance of non-existence is the focal point in the individual's search for the meaning of his own existence. Gaining a sense of being an individual is associated with the religion or philosophy of the future. The broad interpretation of philosophy — as a structured form of self-care, most relevant to a contemporary — is based upon M. Mamardashvili, M. Heidegger, J. P. Sartre, M. Foucault and the texts of other famous authors.
Gajdenko P. P. Proryv k transcendentnomu. Novaja ontologija HXveka. — M.: Respublika, 1997. — 495s.
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Mamardashvili M. K. Moj opyt netipichen. — Spb.: Azbuka, 2000. — 400s.
This article provides an explanation of the project of the study of sociocultural illusions, a definition of illusions, and a classification of human delusions. In addition, it attempts to understand the in-illusory reality in the form of a sui generis attractor of the socio-cultural illusions presented in this article. Moreover, the article discusses the double meaning — both serious and playful — of socio-cultural illusions, which defines by using a fundamentally new interpretation of a well-known conception of J. Heizinga, who perceives human culture as a game. The reality of socio-cultural illusions is understood as a peculiar reality of virtuality.
Berdjaev N. A. Novoe srednevekov'e. Razmyshlenie o sud'be Rossii i Evropy // Berdjaev N. A. Smysl istorii. Novoe srednevekov'e. — M.: Izdatel'stvo «Kanon+», 2002. - S. 296).
Pljutto P. A. Religija intellektualov: sud'ba vysokih fikcij «tancujushhego» Gegelja // Voprosy filosofii. — 2005. — № 4. — S. 145–157.
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Pljutto P. A. Koncepcija autentichnogo mifa i analiz sociokul'turnyh illjuzij. — M.: Izdatel'stvo RGGU, 2009.
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Hjojzinga J. Homo ludens: Opyt opredelenija igrovogo jelementa kul'tury // Hjojzinga J. Homo ludens. V teni zavtrashnego dnja. — M.: Izdatel'skaja gruppa «Progress», «Progress-Akademija», 1992. — S. 5–240.
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Saint Petersburg State University. Institute of Philosophy.
Videogames and the Utopia of Interactivity: What Are Gamers Capable Of?
The author describes multiplayer online games in the context of new media, using the notion of interactivity. The aim of the article is to understand what form the power of media takes in this case, and whether the interactivity of games creates the possibility of resistance to this power. The format of online games is considered, as well as gamers' behavior: different gaming modes and marginal practices are analyzed.
Jansson M. Everything I Shoot Is Art. Brescia: Link Editions, 2012.
Bol'c. N. Azbuka media. M.: Evropa, 2001.
Zhizhek S. Interpassivnost', ili Kak naslazhdat'sja posredstvom Drugogo. // Zhizhek S. Interpassivnost'. Zhelanie: Vlechenie. Mul'tikul'turalizm. SPb.: Aletejja, 2005.
Sokolova N. L. Cifrovaja kul'tura ili kul'tura v cifrovuju jepohu? / Mezhdunarodnyj zhurnal issledovanij kul'tury. №3, 2012. S. 6–10.
Media Philosphy, Master of Philosophy.
This article states that due to the problems of defining the concept of media, and due to the existing methodological apparatus, which inherited some of the faults of the early media theories, it is difficult to solve the primordial anthropological question of media philosophy. Thus, the problem of Man and his media is seen in the light of determinism, which means that some unnecessary distinctions are made far too early. Basic deterministic opposition between Man and technology can be solved in another way: it is possible to accept the technological aspect of the human being and the humanistic aspect of technologies. However, is this still anthropology? Searching for an answer, we find ourselves on a quest to define the term media. Finally, we face the theory of mediation, which is based on a temporal continuum, rather than a spatial one. This theory does not only show the impossibility of a universal definition of media, but also the impossibility of observing the process of mediation from within. Thus, the position of the media philosopher cannot be seen as objective and transparent and close attention to the humanistic perspective is needed.
Bodrijjar Zh. Prozrachnost' zla. M.: Dobrosvet, 2000. 258 s.
Bodrijjar Zh. Simvolicheskij obmen i smert'. M.: Dobrosvet, 2000. 389 s.
Bodrijjar, Zh. Simuljakry i simuljacija. Tula: Tul'skij poligrafist, 2013. 204 s.
Makljujen M. Ponimanie Media: Vneshnie rasshirenija cheloveka. M.: Zhukovskij: KANON-press-C, Kuchkovo pole, 2003. 464 s.
Hajdegger M. Vopros o tehnike // Hajdegger M. Vremja i bytie: Stat'i i vystuplenija: Per. s nemeckogo. M.: Respublika, 1993. C. 221–238.
Samara State Aerospace University. Philosophy and History Department.
"Cyber Immortality" and the Transformation of Human Nature: Debiologization or Deantropologization?
In the article, the transhumanistic project of the transformation of human nature and "cyber immortality" is described. Moreover, some fundamental objections, raised in regard to transhumanism in modern philosophical literature, are discussed. The author concludes that the debiologization of man does not mean sine qua non its deantropologization.
Bostrom Nik. FAQ po transgumanizmu / per. D. Medvedeva // Rossijskoe transgumanisticheskoe dvizhenie. URL: http://www.textfiles.com/russian/cyberlib.narod.ru/lib/critica/sing/th_2.html#singularity (data obrashhenija: 17. 01. 14).
Gurevich P. S. Fenomen debiologizacii cheloveka. URL: http://www.polygnozis.ru/default.asp?num=6&num2=475 (data obrashhenija: 12. 01. 14).
Gurevich P. S. Gorizonty chelovecheskogo sushhestvovanija // Chelovek i ego budushhee: Novye tehnologii i vozmozhnosti cheloveka. — M.: LENAND, 2012. — S. 72–86.
Djomin I. V. Gumanizm i transgumanizm: problema sootnoshenija // GLOBAL''NOE BUDUShhEE 2045. Konvergentnye tehnologii (NBIKS) i transgumanisticheskaja jevoljucija / Pod red. D. I. Dubrovskogo. — M.: Izdatel'stvo MBA, 2013. — S. 193–202.
Djomin I. V. Traktovka ideala v filosofii russkogo kosmizma // Aspirantskij vestnik Povolzh'ja. 2013. № 7–8. — S. 34–37.
Djomin I. V. «Jeshatologija spasenija» N. A. Setnickogo v svete transgumanisticheskogo mirovozzrenija // Vestnik Samarskoj gumanitarnoj akademii. Serija «Filosofija. Filologija». 2013. № 1 (13). — S. 73–84.
Dubrovskij D. I. Kiberneticheskoe bessmertie. Fantastika ili nauchnaja problema? // Vzgljad. 25 oktjabrja 2012.
Dugin A. G. Postfilosofija. Tri paradigmy v istorii mysli. — M.: Evrazijskoe Dvizhenie, 2009. — 744 s.
Ickov D. «Neochelovechestvo 2045». Global'naja strategija dal'nejshej jevoljucii chelovechestva v tret'em tysjacheletii. Deklaracija obshhestvennogo dvizhenija «Rossija 2045». URL: http://www.2045.ru/news/29045.html (data obrashhenija: 12. 01. 14).
Korsakov S. N. Vmeshatel'stvo v prirodu cheloveka — otkaz ot svobody // Chelovek i ego budushhee: Novye tehnologii i vozmozhnosti cheloveka. M.: LENAND, 2012. S. 407–412.
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Kutyrev V. A. Filosofija transgumanizma. — Nizhn. N.: NGU, 2010. — 85 s.
Lektorskij V. A. Vozmozhno li post-chelovecheskoe budushhee? // Chelovek i ego budushhee: Novye tehnologii i vozmozhnosti cheloveka. — M.: LENAND, 2012. — S. 29–35.
Samohvalova V. I. Kontury postdejstvitel'nosti. URL: http://www.polygnozis.ru/default.asp?num=6&num2=333 (data obrashhenija: 2. 04. 14).
Hajdegger M. Pis'mo o gumanizme // Hajdegger M. Vremja i bytie: Stat'i i vystuplenija / Per. s nem. V. V. Bibihina. — M.: Respublika, 1993. — S. 192–220.
The origin of myths is still a mystery. Evgemeric interpretation (when the heroes in myths are ancient chiefs) was considered unsatisfactory even in the 19th century; the "sacred mythology" of the 19th century was also rejected. Yet, from these beginnings, the science of myth became the "collective unconscious. After Jung no one doubts that myth expresses the collective unconscious, but how are we to understand the archetype in relation to myth? The term "archetype" is currently used in too broad a sense. And it always seems to go together with the word "myth". In the worlds of literature, art and philosophy there are few true mythologists, but many "mifits". Archetype and "mythical beginning" have become synonymous. This is clear in fairy tales and even realistic works and is associated with positive connotations. However, they forget that the archetype includes a trace of mental illness. This is complex. Archetypes have the same traces of disease as do individual complexes. The difference is that in the case of archetypes, it is a generic set. This understanding allows us to look at the myth as a type of case study. This explains alogism myths and the follies of its characters. Myths are born on the generic stage of schizophrenia, which is a step in the phylogeny of the psyche. The author is convinced that pre-logical, participatory thinking (Levy-Bruhl, Kretschmer , Porshnev, etc. ) means phylogenetic schizophrenia. Only in this context can we correctly understand the archetype . This approach erects a sharp boundary between myth and fairy tale. The traditional view of the genesis of the "reality-myth-tale" evolution is erroneous. This is an unacceptable simplification. Myth does not evolve out of reality, it is not real. The tale develops from myth. It is a product of logical, causal thinking. Myth does not teach anything, while the tale always teaches a lesson. If myth is the epicrisis of disease, the fairy tale is the installation file of causal thinking.
«…V odin prekrasnyj den' izgnannye brat'ja soedinilis', ubili i s#eli otca» (Frejd Z. Totem i tabu. — Har'kov, «Folio», 2010, — S. 334).
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Kemerovo State University. Department of English Philology №1.
The article deals with the problem of the anthropocentrism of linguistic categories, based on the principle of restructuring the image of Man through language data and the system of language. Linguistic anthropocentrism is presented in the ideology of anthropomorphism (the similarity of a language's form to that of Man), which automatically refers linguistics as a science to the anthropological category. A naïve conceptualization of the world through language means it is analyzed according to the semantics of temporalization, and the category of chronotope in the English and Russian languages. This demonstrates a realization of the anthropomorphic principle in the language mind.
Stepanov Ju. S. Imena, predikaty, predlozhenija (Semiologicheskaja grammatika). — M. : Nauka, 1981. — 360 s.
Stepanov Ju. S. V mire semiotiki // Semiotika. — M. : Raduga, 1983. — S. 30.
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Apresjan Ju. D. Izbrannye trudy, tom II. Integral'noe opisanie jazyka i sistemnaja leksikografija. — M. : Shkola «Jazyki russkoj kul'tury», 1995. — S. 351.
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Bulygina T. V. , Shmelev A. D. Temporal'nyj dejksis. Obshhie zamechanija // Chelovecheskij faktor v jazyke: Kommunikacija, modal'nost', dejksis. — M. : Nauka,1992. — S. 236-242.
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Uspenskij B. A. Istorija i semiotika (Vosprijatie vremeni kak semioticheskaja problema). Ukaz. soch. — S. 64.
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Ju. M. Malinovich. Antropologicheskaja lingvistika kak integral'naja nauka //Antropologicheskaja lingvistika: koncepty, kategorii. — Moskva-Irkutsk: izd-vo IGLU, 2003. — S. 20.
Department of Philosophy, Humanities faculties. Ph. D., professor.
The paper investigates the semantic variety of falsity. The author identifies and analyzes the complex constitution of falsity on material from early Greek thought. The concept of falsity is presented in various aspects and forms, especially in relation to such modes as oblivion, delusion and deception. Treating a lie as a dual phenomenon, comprised of concealment and being-hidden, the author distinguishes between two forms: latent and screening concealment. An analysis of the energetic aspect of the early Greek concepts "Alethea" and "pseudos" allows him to expose the lies as a phenomenon of the Fall.
Hajdegger M. Parmenid / per. s nem. A. P. Shurbeleva. SPb.: Vladimir Dal', 2009.
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Losev A. F. Primechanija k dialogu «Kratil» // Platon. Sobr. soch.: v 4 t. T. 1.
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Hajdegger M. Bytie i vremja. M.: Ad marginem, 1997.
Latinsko-russkij slovoobrazovatel'nyj slovar' / Avt. -sost. G. Vs. Petrova. M.: «Oniks»; «Mir i obrazovanie», 2008.
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Gesiod. Polnoe sobranie tekstov / vstupitel'naja stat'ja V. N. Jarho. Kommentarii O. P. Cybenko i V. N. Jarho. Labirint, 2001.
Platon. Pir // Platon. Sobr. soch.: v 4 t. T. 2 / per. s drevnegrech., obshh. red. A. F. Loseva [i dr.]. M.: Mysl', 1993. S. 81–134.
PhD student, department of theory and history of culture.
A Review of Oliver Graus's Book "Emotions and Immersion: Key Aspects of Visual Studies"
The review provides an analysis on O. Graus's work "Emotions and immersion: Key aspects of visual studies" and his research methods are presented. The aim of the work is to follow the development of immersive pictures. This is successfully reached by applying an analytic algorithm, constructed by Grau and employed on the chosen media.
Grau O. Fantasmagoricheskoe vizual'noe koldovstvo XVIII stoletija i ego zhizn' v mediaiskusstve / per. s nem. M. A. Stepanova. // Mezhdunarodnyj zhurnal issledovanij kul'tury. — 2012. №5(6). — S.101–110.
Jelkins D. Devjat' tipov mezhdisciplinarnosti dlja vizual'nyh issledovanij. Otvet na stat'ju Mike Bal' «Vizual'nyj jessencializm i ob#ekt vizual'noj kul'tury». Logos №1. 2012. — S. 256.
Grau O. Jemocii i immersija: kljuchevye jelementy vizual'nyh issledovanij. / per. s nem. A. M. Gajsina. — SPb.: Jejdos, 2013. — S. 10.
"Tuning in' to Things" or the Book on "How to Experience the Routine as a Precious Thing"
This article is a review on the book "The Power of Simple Things", edited by S. A. Lishaev and the united efforts of modern philosophers in the ontological, cultural and anthropological conceptualization of things, the estimation of "simple" things and the conditions of an "appointment" with them. The ways in which to "hear" a thing described in detail, as well as the broad views of the authors on "simplicity" and "the thing", are considered by the reviewer as one of the book's indisputable advantages, allowing readers to construct their own point of view on simple things.
Balla-Gertman O. A. Pojetika poter': k antropologii veshhi // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 106–111.
Grjakalov A. A. «Monodramy veshhej» i sub#ektivnost': predely zabvenij i nezabvennoe // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 81–105.
Zimmel' G. Rama kartiny. Jesteticheskij opyt / Sociologija veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. V. Vahshtajna. — M.: Izdatel'skij dom «Territorija budushhego», 2006. S. 53.
Ivanenko E. A. , Koreckaja M. A. , Savenkova E. V. Gekatonhejr i cvetochek, ili kak vozmozhna filosofija prostyh veshhej // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 41–43.
Lishaev S. A. Metafizika prostyh veshhej (prostaja veshh' kak mesto sborki mira i cheloveka) // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 25–30.
Lishaev S. A. Pervoe, chto zapomnilos' (veshh' v biograficheskom kontekste) // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 28.
Lishaev S. A. Schast'e kak prisutstvie // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 378.
Mihajlova M. V. Filosofija prostyh veshhej: cozercatel'nost' i sobytijnost' // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 12–16.
Razinov Ju. A. Dasein veshhej, ili o chjom mozhet povedat' trubka // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 49.
Safonova T. O sociogeneze koshach'ej lichnosti // Bespredel'naja sociologija: Perezagruzka. Sb. jesse. CNSI: Unplugged / Pod red. Nartovoj N., Pachenkova O., Sokolova M., Chikadze E. — SPb.: CNSI, 2006. S. 133–142.
Sekackij A. K. Ot formacii veshhej k jepohe tekstov // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 69–80.
Serikov A. E. Podarok kak veshh' opyt cinichnogo issledovanija // Sila prostyh veshhej: sb. st. / pod red. S. A. Lishaeva. — SPb.: Aletejja, 2013. C. 327.

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The following paper was prepared for a seminar sponsored by the National Business Institute. It was intended for use only by Georgia-licensed attorneys and should not be relied upon as legal advice.
“Always salt down the facts first; the law will keep."
Among the most crucial aspects of personal injury litigation is the timely preservation of evidence for use at trial. Although a party can rarely control the state of the law to be applied to its case, the existence and preservation of evidence is largely a factor of the parties' diligence in the early stages of a case. This is true both of liability evidence–that which demonstrates fault for the injury–and damages evidence, which is critical to a plaintiff seeking fair compensation for injuries at trial.
How can an attorney help ensure appropriate medical care for a client?
Aside from substantive considerations of preserving, documenting, and analyzing the medical evidence in a case, the question of how a client should obtain medical treatment and evaluation merits a brief discussion. The reality is that many individuals have no health insurance, and therefore face difficulties obtaining proper medical treatment. While hospital emergency departments must generally accept all patients, those departments typically provide only the necessary treatment to stabilize a life-threatening or other serious medical condition, providing the patient with a referral to another physician upon discharge.
The practice of some attorneys to routinely have clients treated (or evaluated) by certain doctors or other medical providers potentially opens the door to the defense using this fact to attack the credibility of the medical professional at trial, even where the professional's qualifications and skills are top-notch. But where the client is uninsured, the options are unfortunately far more limited than those for a client with access to a network of physicians. In some cases, doctors are willing to treat on a “lien” basis (sometimes memorialized under written “letter of protection” signed by the client, the attorney, or both), where the doctor will be paid out of the proceeds of settlement. In such situations, attorneys must be mindful of Rule 1.15 (I) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires attorneys to properly safeguard the proceeds of a claim where a third party has a legitimate legal interest in them. This may be true even where the attorney never signed an agreement with the provider, and even if the client expressly forbids the attorney to pay the provider.
Where physicians are unwilling to provide treatment on a lien basis directly, it is sometimes possible to obtain funding through a third-party company that either provides a loan to the client directly for payment to the medical provider, or else has a contract with various providers allowing the client to seek treatment, paid for by the third-party funding company, that is to be paid back at the conclusion of litigation. The benefits and downsides to both liens and third-party funding should be considered carefully and discussed with the client before entering into any such agreement.
Where a client simply needs a medical evaluation in order to assist with the litigation, at least one other option, albeit a somewhat rarely-used one, is available. Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys can personally pay for some medical evaluations as part of litigation costs advanced. These allowable payments are strictly limited to medical services sought for the purpose of diagnosis and do not include the client's routine medical treatment. While it may be true that few attorneys are able or willing to pay for medical diagnostic expenses out of pocket, this does present another option in obtaining appropriate documentation of an injury.
The remainder of this paper will examine some of the issues and decisions the plaintiff's lawyer can expect to face with respect to the development of damages evidence in personal injury cases. It is important to remember that liability for a victim's medical damages are largely “fixed” at the time of the injury, barring a later, foreseeable aggravation that could be attributable to the original wrongdoer. The attorney's job therefore, is to uncover and properly document, in conjunction with the client's doctors, friends, and relatives, the true extent of her damages, including the foreseeable consequences of the tortious act.
Unfortunately, the most serious damages claims often involve injuries that will last for the rest of the victim's life. But in many cases, even those that result in serious personal injuries, there are no long-term damages. This does not, of course, mean that the damages may not be extensive. A broken arm or femur, for example, may result in no long-term problems yet still cause extreme physical pain and suffering and considerable mental and emotional suffering, inconvenience, and lost income for an extended period of time. At the same time, less acutely-painful injuries, such as certain knee or back injuries, may become life-long conditions. And certain conditions, even though not permanent, may have effects that last beyond the time-frame of the lawsuit, and therefore require an analysis of at least limited future damages. Therefore, the permanency of an injury should always be considered separately from the immediate implications or severity of the injury.
The law: Tort claimants suffering either temporary or permanent injuries are, of course, entitled to compensation for the resulting medical expenses and lost income as well as the general damages provable at trial. But while temporary injuries are time-limited in the scope of compensability, a victim sustaining a permanent injury can seek damages for future pain and suffering, lost income, and medical expenses for, potentially, the rest of the victim's life.
Contrary to [Defendant's] contentions, expert opinion testimony is not required to establish the permanency of an injury.[Plaintiff] testified that she did not have any problems with her back prior to the incident. However, since the incident, she has experienced pain while sitting for prolonged periods, reaching downward, and upon lifting heavy objects. Based upon this testimony, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to infer that her injuries, particularly her back injury, would result in some permanent impairment.
With respect to ongoing and future pain and suffering, the law does not allow a lay witness, including a plaintiff, to testify about whether his injuries are permanent. But the plaintiff may testify about “his feelings, pains and symptoms, as well as to all of the characteristics of the injury, external and internal,” and the jury may conclude permanency based on this testimony. The award would then be based on the jury's enlightened conscience. A jury contemplating an award of future damages based on permanent injuries may refer to the mortality tables contained in the appendix to Title 24 of the Official Code of Georgia. Juries may also consider “evidence pertaining to the person's health, habits, surroundings, and method of living” in determining life expectance.
Practical considerations: Determining whether injuries are temporary or permanent is a crucial part of evaluating the claimant's damages but is often difficult, especially where the client lacks either health insurance or a doctor willing to give an opinion on whether an injury is connected with a tortious act. Unfortunately, an unhelpful doctor may leave no choice but to find other options for medical care such as those discussed earlier in this paper. As the foregoing case law demonstrates, although it is not always necessary to produce expert/physician evidence of permanent injuries, it is hard to imagine a situation where such evidence would not substantially improve the odds of a finding of future damages, particularly given Georgia's adoption of the Daubert standard under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (formerly O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1).
An injured plaintiff is not foreclosed from pursuing a personal injury claim merely because she had a pre-existing injury that was worsened by a defendant's negligence. In law school, we all learned that under the “egg shell plaintiff” rule, a defendant does not escape liability merely because the plaintiff has a particular propensity toward injury and, as a result, is more injured than might otherwise be expected. It can, unfortunately, be quite difficult to separate out which conditions are pre-existing and which are caused or aggravated by the tortious act. Therefore, while it is always prudent to seek information about prior injuries when investigating a new claim, it is especially important to obtain prior medical records reflecting the extent of a prior condition or injury in order to deal appropriately with the issue in litigation.
A brief summary of the law is set forth below, followed by a discussion of the practical aspects of handling these issues.
As to the charge on the “egg shell plaintiff,” there was evidence that [the plaintiff] was obese and had circulatory problems and high blood pressure, which could complicate her recovery. It has long been the rule that a tortfeasor takes a plaintiff in whatever condition he finds him. A negligent actor must bear the risk that his liability will be increased by reason of the actual physical condition of the other toward whom his act is negligent.
The sick or diseased, as well as the healthy, may recover for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of another. The recovery may be not only for those independent of, but also in aggravation of, such sickness or disease. . . . As to injuries received in aggravation of sickness or disease, the charge to the jury should be that recovery would be to the extent the jury finds the infirmity is aggravated by the injury.
Nevertheless, numerous appellate decisions have held that evidence of a pre-existing condition will justify a finding of no subsequent injury, even where there was evidence that a tortious act caused an aggravation or new injury similar to the old one. Such evidence may also support a substantially reduced damages award. Therefore, attorneys must be careful to scour the records for prior injuries, as well as to build a solid case that the tortious act did indeed aggravate the condition.
Practical considerations: Although pre-existing injuries and conditions may result in a reduction of the damages award, with proper preparation and competent medical evidence it should be rare event that a case with a legitimate subsequent injury goes completely uncompensated. In many of the cases where juries have found no damages, the appellate courts have commented on the lack of immediate medical treatment following the tortious act. Although there are certainly cases involving legitimate injuries in which a victim does not receive immediate care, these jury verdicts weigh heavily in favor of careful scrutiny of such cases. Where the medical evidence is only marginal with respect to demonstrating a subsequent injury, a delay in treatment may prove fatal to the plaintiff's case.
While the existence of known pre-existing injuries can be dealt with appropriately in many cases through proper development of evidence of the client's current injury, the presence of unknown (to the plaintiff's attorney) prior injuries presents a potentially far more serious concern. A plaintiff who testifies that she had no prior medical conditions and who is confronted with evidence to the contrary at trial can appear, fairly or not, to be a conscious liar. In many cases, the prior condition is one that the plaintiff either honestly forgot, or didn't believe to be related or relevant. Regardless, jurors cannot be counted on to accept this explanation, and such a revelation at trial may be enormously harmful. Under the current Georgia evidence code, as effective since January 1, 2013, medical records can be introduced under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803(6) and 902(11) and (12) without the need for a testifying records custodian, making is substantially more likely that those records would be admitted at trial to undermine a plaintiff's own history. Under pre-2013 evidence law, plaintiffs often faced impeachment at trial through their own purported statements and histories contained in medical records under the holding of Barone v. Law. Barone remains good law and could be applicable in situations where a defendant has access to authenticated medical records but has not laid a foundation for admission of those records under an appropriate rule. Therefore, counsel should understand the requirements and limitations of that decision to ensure that information is not improperly admitted.
The bottom line is that pre-existing conditions present a difficult, but not insurmountable, obstacle in presenting a damages claim, assuming the client acknowledges the prior condition. A thorough client interview, as well as review of the client's medical records, is vital in such a case.
Present and Future Medical Expenses – What is Reasonable, Customary, and Necessary?
In Georgia courts, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 (formerly § 24-7-9) establishes that an injured person or a family member can authenticate and introduce medical records into evidence at trial, and therefore it is not necessary for plaintiffs to present testimony from medical providers in order to make a prima facia claim for those expenses. Medical expenses, to the extent proven, constitute compensable “necessary expenses consequent upon an injury” under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-7. Therefore, with respect to medical expenses incurred up until the time of trial, the plaintiff's job is somewhat simplified. Asserting a claim for future medical expenses, however, requires additional efforts and evidence, as discussed in Section A above.
A plaintiff introducing medical expenses under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 must still demonstrate that the expenses were incurred as a result of the defendant's negligence, and a defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination concerning the expenses. An attorney-prepared summary of medical expenses may be admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1006, but the summary and accompanying testimony must provide sufficient detail to lay a valid foundation connecting the expenses to the defendant's negligence.
A plaintiff introducing medical bills under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 faces two primary challenges. First, a defendant can simply argue that the medical expenses introduced were not incurred in connection with the defendant's allegedly tortious act. Second, the defense may allege that the medical expenses were simply not reasonable and necessary.
Are the claimed injuries and bills connected with the defendant's act? With respect to the first issue, the question is whether there is proximate causation for an injury claimed by the plaintiff. Although an injured plaintiff's own testimony regarding the extent of injuries may be given substantial weight (“the testimony of the plaintiff [regarding the existence of pain] may be believed by the jury over that of a whole college of physicians”), in some situations the plaintiff must produce affirmative expert medical evidence, both as to the existence of an injury as well as causation. For example, in Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff was required to present expert testimony regarding causation for injuries that were claimed to have been present three years after a traumatic event. The rationale for this ruling was that an opinion about whether a condition manifesting itself after that period of time was proximately caused by the initial trauma was not within the common knowledge of a non-expert.
[a] causal connection, requiring expert medical testimony, must be established where the potential continuance of a disease is at issue. However, where, as here, there is no significant lapse of time between the injury sustained and the onset of the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors must be credited with knowing by reason of common knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required in order for a plaintiff to establish a personal injury case sufficient to withstand a defendant's motion for directed verdict.
The expert concluded that it was entirely possible that the trauma inflicted on Nixon and the baby during the bus accident proximately caused Kylee's stroke. Though this testimony, standing alone, is not sufficient to overcome summary judgment, it creates a jury issue when considered in conjunction with evidence that (1) Nixon experienced a normal and healthy pregnancy with no complications prior to being involved in a serious accident (i.e., one in which her economy-sized sedan was struck from behind with considerable force by a school bus); and (2) the accident fell squarely within the time frame that the expert opined the stroke was suffered and Nixon had not been involved in any other accidents during her pregnancy.
From these opinions, a few general principles emerge. First, if there is a significant delay between the traumatic event and the onset of pain, or if a plaintiff contends that the event led to a long-term continuing condition, the courts will likely require some form of expert evidence in order to support causation, although, as noted in Nixon, the level of certainty required of an expert's opinion may be lessened depending on other facts present. Second, even where the onset of an injury is contemporaneous with the traumatic event, expert evidence may be required to explain causation that is beyond the knowledge of lay witnesses and jurors. Examples could include certain brain injuries, toxic chemical exposure, or other injuries that involve complex internal bodily processes. Finally, it is important to note that even where expert testimony on causation is not required, the testimony of a medical professional may still be required to demonstrate the presence of a specific injury. For example, in Jordan, the plaintiff was allowed to testify as to pain experienced following a wreck without the need for any medical professional testimony. But such evidence would almost certainly be required to prove specific conditions such as disc herniations, concussions, muscle injuries, or, in some circumstances, broken bones.
An attorney should also be careful to review a medical bill to ensure that all charges presented are related to the tortious act. In many cases, this will not be a concern since the plaintiff will have treated only for the condition caused by the traumatic event. In some cases, however, patients may be treated for non-related issues while being treated for a traumatic event, in which case those charges should be removed in order to avoid a defendant using the non-related expenses against the plaintiff. It is possible, though, that certain expenses connected with a pre-existing or other condition may be increased, or may not have been incurred at all, but for the necessity of treating the related condition. In such circumstances, the attorney should address these expenses directly and present evidence (either through the plaintiff or, perhaps preferably, a medical professional) that they would not have been incurred if not for the defendant's act. If that evidence is not convincing or the amount of the questionable medical expense is minimal, it may be worth excluding in order to avoid attacks on the plaintiff's credibility and, possibly, the exclusion of the entirety of the bills.
Do the charges constitute “the reasonable value of such expense as was reasonably necessary”? Prior to the enactment O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921's predecessor in 1970, medical bills were considered to be hearsay and required testimony from the appropriate medical provider for admission. As noted above, the procedure has now been substantially simplified, and testimony from a provider is not required either for admission of the documents themselves or to demonstrate that the bills were reasonable. In fact, under the current law, a plaintiff is not even required to produce the actual bills. Testimony of the plaintiff as to the amount of the bills is sufficient, although the bills are almost always produced in practice.
Ultimately, the courts have held that the plaintiff's testimony that the bills were incurred as a result of a defendant's tortious act is sufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of the expenses, assuming, however, that the injury was properly proven to be connected with that act in the first place, as discussed above. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 expressly permits the defendant “the right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination as to such items of evidence.” Somewhat surprisingly, though, there is little case law discussing situations where the reasonableness of the charges have been challenged. This may be because patients generally have no control over the medical bills charged to them, and the defense would be unlikely to successfully impeach a plaintiff over these issues. Even where a question is raised regarding whether particular bills are connected with the alleged injury at issue in the case, where there are other medical conditions present, an expert is not required to explain which were incurred in connection with the tort at issue. Nothing would appear to prevent, however, a defendant from producing an expert to challenge the reasonableness of, or causation for, the charges, and the plaintiff can certainly produce testimony of his own physicians to confirm the reasonableness of those physicians' own charges as well as those of others. In order to strengthen the case for the reasonableness of a plaintiff's medical expenses, it may be advisable to seek an opinion directly from the treating physician, although it is not uncommon for physicians to be unfamiliar with the billing and accounting areas of their practices.
This final section will set forth some further practical points to assist in development of the damages portion of a personal injury case. While the law discussed above is important in analyzing what will ultimately be admitted at trial (as well as determining whether it may be necessary for the client to obtain additional treatment or evaluation), the initial step in virtually any case is compiling an honest and thorough assessment of the client's condition, prognosis, and plan of care.
Initial client intake and assessment: Although practices differ greatly, a written form on which a client (or prospective client) lists all medical providers he or she has seen, both for the injury resulting from the tortious act as well as for any other previous or subsequent treatment, can be an invaluable tool to get a picture of the client's overall medical history. Once such a form is completed, the attorney (or a trusted assistant) can go over all such treatment to determine, first, whether it is reasonably likely that the treatment following the tortious act is related to that act, and, second, to determine whether there are any pre-existing or subsequent intervening injuries or other conditions that could prove to be relevant to the case. Even the most honest client may not immediately remember her entire medical history, however, and it is possible that a prior injury to the same body part at issue in the lawsuit may legitimately evade her memory, at least initially. Therefore, it is important to explain the importance of a thorough disclosure of the client's medical history. Clients may be reluctant to disclose a prior issue if they believe it will affect their claim, so they should be reminded that, while a pre-existing condition may indeed be relevant, it can normally be dealt with. An undisclosed prior injury that is discovered by the defense, though, may be fatal to a claim. The client should be advised that, should the case reach litigation, the defense will conduct comprehensive discovery and most likely find evidence of any prior injury.
Requesting and reviewing medical records: One of the more difficult decisions early in the case is determining how broadly to submit medical records requests. Records of all providers rendering treatment that can be clearly connected with the incident giving rise to the claim should be requested, although where there is ongoing treatment it may be worthwhile to wait until that treatment is concluded. Where there are questions about prior injuries or other pre-existing conditions, it may be prudent to go ahead and request the records reflecting those conditions, since it may be necessary to have those records when it comes time to speak with doctors or develop the case strategy. Although it likely increases costs slightly, it is the author's practice to request that the copies be certified in compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803 (6) and 902 (11) – (12) in order to avoid having to re-request those records in the event they are needed for trial.
Once the records are received, they should be reviewed by the attorney or a very experienced assistant to confirm that there are no problematic issues in them. The review should include making note of references to any facilities or providers that the client failed to mention previously in order to follow up with the client regarding what care was performed there (and, as necessary, requesting records from those facilities/providers). It is helpful to scan and OCR (that is, perform an optical character recognition conversion on) the records. Aside from creating a backup of the records, it will also allow a search of the records to be performed using keywords that might be relevant to the case, including uncovering any prior complaints or treatment on a body part injured due to a tort. In cases where causation or the extent of injury is unclear, or where the attorney is not familiar with the particular injury type or medical terminology, it may pay to have the records reviewed by a nurse consultant or other professional to assist with evaluating the condition.
Consultation with treating physicians and other medical professionals: In many, if not most, cases, a demand can be submitted to a tortfeasor or its insurer without the necessity of consulting with the client's doctors or with other professionals. Nevertheless, care should be taken during the records review and client consultation to ensure that there are not more serious injuries involved than what may be immediately apparent. Unexplained ongoing pain or other conditions may warrant a meeting with the treating doctor. And in some cases, a more definitive statement of causation may be required by an insurance adjuster (or, later on, by a judge or jury), consistent with the principles set forth in the discussions earlier in this paper. Such a consultation will also give the attorney an opportunity to determine whether the testimony of a treating physician alone will be sufficient to prove the case at trial, or whether it will be necessary to bring in another expert. Other medical professionals to be considered at this point could include a doctor or other qualified expert specifically retained to render an opinion on causation, a life-care planner, a rehabilitation expert, or a vocational expert. Where the client is adamant about continuing pain or other issues, and the treating physician cannot, or appears unwilling, to assist in finding a cause, it may be necessary to obtain a second opinion.
Stephen King has described the process of writing as an excavation–the story is always there, waiting for the writer to chisel and sift away the soil to reveal itself to the world. A personal-injury victim's damages are much the same, and it is the attorney's responsibility to carefully analyze and investigate the client's claim to uncover 100 percent of the relevant damages. A thorough understanding of the law and careful study of the client's medical history and progress can ensure that the jury hears the client's full story.
 This is not to suggest that this practice is inappropriate or unethical, and it may present the best option where a client is uninsured and otherwise unable to afford medical treatment. Of course, it would not be in the client's best interest for an attorney to recommend that he be treated by a doctor lacking the appropriate abilities.
 Massie v. Ross, 211 Ga. App. 354 (1993).
 Id. A discussion of what is sufficient to prove the amount of those expenses is contained in Section C below.
 Food Lion v. Williams, 219 Ga. App. 352 (1995).
 Daugherty v. Vick, 127 Ga. App. 767 (1972).
 Womack v. Burgess, 200 Ga. App. 347 (1991).
 Mote v. Tomlin, 136 Ga. App. 616 (1975). See also Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 66.201.
 Super Disc. Mkts. v. Coney, 210 Ga. App. 659 (1993) (internal citations and formatting omitted). But see Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga. App. 229 (1941) (lay witness cannot testify as to permanency of injury).
 Everett v. Holmes, 126 Ga. App. 208 (1972).
 Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 66.503.
 See O.C.G.A. § 24-14-44 and 45.
 See Davis v. Whitcomb, 30 Ga. App. 497 (1923); Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 66.301.
 AT Sys. Southeast, Inc. v. Carnes, 272 Ga. App. 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Coleman v. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, 194 Ga. App. 508 (1990) (internal formatting omitted).
 The two types of pre-existing conditions may often overlap.
 Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668 (1941). See also Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 66.504.
 See, e.g., Fuller v. Flash Foods, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 217 (2009); Henderson v. Yokley, 265 Ga. App. 445 (2004); Butts v. Williams, 247 Ga. App. 253 (2000).
 Anderson v. L & R Smith, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 469 (2004).
 Barone v. Law, 242 Ga. App. 102 (2000). Medical records could also be admitted under the Business Records Exception to hearsay under pre-2013 law, but the requirements for doing so, including requiring a testifying custodian of records, made this a relatively uncommon occurrence.
 This procedure is not available in federal courts in Georgia. Cf. Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing federal application of state-law presumption involving reasonableness of medical expenses).
 Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E.2d 832 (1987).
 Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Smith, 141 Ga. App. 87, 232 S.E.2d 580 (1977).
 Hossain v. Nelson, 234 Ga. App. 792, 507 S.E.2d 243 (1998). Under O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1006, the underlying records must be made available, and the court may order their production at trial.
 Notably, however, the law establishes that expert testimony is not required for such a showing.
 Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Troupe, 154 Ga. App. 108 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).
 Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga. App. 74 (1989).
 Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (2010).
 Nixon v. Pierce Cnty. Sch. Dist., 322 Ga. App. 745, 750 (2013).
 For further discussion of causation issues, see Safeway Ins. Co. v. Hanks, 323 Ga. App. 728 (2013); Hutcheson v. Daniels, 224 Ga. App. 560 (1997); Cooper v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 539 Fed. Appx. 963 (11th Cir. 2013). The Cooper case illustrates an important distinction, applicable at least to federal cases, between qualification of an expert to render an opinion and the necessity for such an expert to testify as to causation.
 See, e.g., Lester v. S.J. Alexander, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 470 (1972) (“Where, as here, the submitted bill included without differentiation items having no relevance to the automobile collision, the proffered evidence not only failed to meet the statutory requisites stated in [O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921] but was properly rejected under the rule that testimony offered as a whole without separating the relevant from that which is irrelevant and inadmissible is to be repelled in its entirety.”).
 Zack's Properties, Inc. v. Gafford, 241 Ga. App. 43 (1999) (discussing enactment of medical bill statute in response to exclusion of plaintiff's testimony regarding bills in Taylor v. Associated Cab Co., 110 Ga. App. 616 (1964)).
 Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516 (1987).
 Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. Pardue, 328 Ga. App. 664 (2014); Daniel v. Parkins, 200 Ga. App. 710 (1991).
 Updated records from a certain date can certainly be requested, though this may increase overall costs slightly due to medical record copy cost schedules.
 This method should not replace a personal review of the records. Aside from possible errors in OCR conversion arising from small print or poor copies or records, which is common, the technology can generally not recognize handwriting, which may constitute a large part of medical records.
 This includes cases where the doctor simply refuses to support a client's claims. In such cases, it is always better to know as early as possible.
 See generally Stephen King, On Writing: A Memoir of the Craft (Scribner 2000).


In Grove v. Cornell University, the Second Department recently affirmed the Supreme Court for Tompkins County’s decision to grant defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §240 claim. The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal finding that plaintiff’s failure to attach his lanyard to his lift basket was the sole proximate cause of the injury. In addition, the Court found that the defendants were not liable for failing to afford an additional, redundant safety device to the plaintiff.
Defendant Cornell University had hired defendant Skanska USA Building, Inc. as the general contractor to construct a building on its campus. Skanska subcontracted the window glazing work to plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff and a co-worker were installing weather stripping and metal flashing on the second story windows of the new building. Plaintiff and his co-worker utilized a mechanical telescoping boom lift to reach the second story windows. Attached to the boom lift was a metal basket in which plaintiff, his co-worker and their tools and materials were situated. Three of the four sides of the basket were enclosed by permanent metal rails. The fourth side was enclosed by a metal gate designed with a spring-loaded hinge that would cause the gate to swing closed automatically. Plaintiff and his co-worker were also provided with safety harnesses and lanyards to be attached to the basket to prevent them from falling out when the basket was raised.
After a break and a trip to retrieve additional materials, plaintiff and his co-worker re-entered the lift basket and plaintiff raised the lift to the second story. Plaintiff’s co-worker noticed that plaintiff had not attached the lanyard on his harness to the basket and reminded him to do so. Within moments of returning to his work, the co-worker turned around and saw that plaintiff was gone and the gate was in the open position. Plaintiff had fallen 30 feet and landed on a slab of concrete below suffering significant injuries.
Plaintiff commenced an action against the various defendants based upon negligence and Labor Law violations and moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability with regard to his Labor Law §240(1) claim. Defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s cross-motion and denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
To establish liability on a Labor Law §240(1) claim, plaintiffs must show that the statute was violated and that the violation was a proximate or contributing cause of his injuries.
The Second Department found that the record made it clear that plaintiff was wearing his safety harness and lanyard at the time of the accident, but that he had failed to secure the lanyard to the basket. Although it was also undisputed that a spring-loaded hinge on the basket was not working automatically, the Court found it significant that the gate was still manually operable and could have been closed and locked by hand. As such, the Appellate Court found that the evidence established that the gate and the lanyard were available, adequate and operable safety devices, and that if plaintiff had either attached his lanyard as required or closed and latched the gate manually, the provided safety devices would have prevented him from falling out of the basket.
The Second Department also determined that the fact that the spring-loaded hinge was not operating properly did not render the gate itself defective. Given the lack of evidence that the lanyard was defective or inadequate and the fact that the lanyard would have prevented plaintiff’s fall if engaged, the Court determined that it was ultimately irrelevant whether the gate was functioning automatically finding that Defendant was not required to furnish an additional, redundant safety device.
Thus, having failed to establish a statutory violation in the first instance, the Second Department held that plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Moreover, determining that plaintiff’s own negligent conduct was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of his injuries, the Appellate Court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim.